EUROPEAN REVI EW OF PHI LOSOPHY
Edi t or i al Boar d Manuel Gar ci a Car pi nt er o Rober t o Casat i Er os Cor azza j ér ôme Doki c Pet r Kot át ko Mar t i n Rechenauer Gi anf r anco Sol dat i TomSt oneham
Cogni t i ve Dynami cs 2
Chr i st i ne Tappol et
U
edi t ed by JEROM E
D0KI C
Csu Publ i cat i ons Cent er f or t he St udy of Language and I nf or mat i on St anf or d, Cal i f or ni a
Copyr i ght ©1997 CSI , I Publ i cat i ons
Cont ent s
Cent er f or t he St udy of Language and I nf or mat i on 1 el and St anl o RI Juni or Uni ver si t y 01 00999897
Par t I : Cogni t i ve Dynamks I nt r oduct i on / 3
321
I SBN: 1- 57590- 073- 2 I SBN: 1- 57586- 072- 4 ( phk. )
JEROME DOKI C
Ri p van Wi nkl e and Ot her Char act er s I 13
:si . 1
Publ i cat i ons r epor t s new devel opment s i n t he st udy of I an gnage, i nf or mat i on, and comput at i on. I n addi t i on t o l ect ur e not es, our publ i cat i ons i ncl ude monogr aphs, wor ki ng paper s, r evi sed di sser t at i ons, and conf er ence pr oceedi ngs. Our ai m i s t o make newr esul t s, i deas, and appr oaches avai l abl e as qui ckl y as possi bl e. Pl ease vi si t
01. 11-
websi t c at ht t p: / / csI i - wvst ant or d. edu/ publ i cat i ons/
l o r comment s on t hi s and ot her aut hor and Pt i hl i 5hei
t i des, as wel l as f or changes and cor r ect i ons by t he
f t c t ext i n t hi s book was set by CSLI Publ i cat i ons i n Mi ni on, a t ypehi ee desi gned by Rober t Sl i mhaeh, The di spl ay t ype i s set i n St one Sans, desi gned by Si mmer St one. The hook was pr i nt ed and hound i n t he Uni t ed St at es of Amer i ca.
JOHN PERRY
The Dynami cs of Si t uat i ons I 41 FRANçOI S RECANATI Dynami c Thought s and Empt y Mi nds / 77 MI CHAEL LUNTLEY
Dynami c and Coher ent Thought s / 105 MAt TE EZCURDI A
Cogni t i ve Dynami cs: An At t empt at Changi ng Your Mi nd / 141 CHRI STOPH HOERL
Bel i ef , Cont ent , and Cause / 159 Tost Es GRI MALTOS ANDCARLOS J. M OYA
Par t I I : Ot her Topi cs Cr i t i cal Not i ce of Fr ançoi s Recanat i ' s Di r ect Ref er ence I 175 ALBERTOVOLTOLI NI
10 t ( Æ 2- S1
Par t I Cogni t i ve Dynami cs
r
cogni t i ve
JEROME DOKI C I nt r oduct i on
It m ay be usef ul t o comment br i ef l y on t he t heme of t hi s vol ume, dynami cs, i n or der t o hi ghl i ght some of t he phi l osophi cal i ssues
r el at ed t o i t , as t hey wi l l be di scussed by our cont r i but or s. 1. 11w phr ase " cogni t i ve dynami cs" was once coi ned by Davi d Kapl an i n hi s cl assi cal wor k " Demonst r at i ves. " Accor di ng t o Kapl an, t her e i s a pr obl emposed by i ndexi cal r ef er ence over t i me: t he pr obl emof cogni t i ve dynami cs can he pot l i ke t hi s: what doe, s i t mean t o say of an i ndi vi dual who at one t i me si ncer el y asser t ed a sent ence cont ai ni ng i l l dexi cai s t hat at some l at er t i me he has ( or has not ) changed hi s mi nd wi t h r espect t o hi s asser t i on? ( 1992: 537, 11. 64) ' 11105
Mor e pr eci sel y, Kapl an says t hat a t heor y of cogni t i ve dynami cs i s concer ned wi t h t he quest i on of what ( t d, Jos/ mcoi s one has t o make i n t he expr essi on of
one' s
st andard
i ndexi cal t hought i f one i s t o expr ess t he same
( i ndexi cal ) opi ni on as t i me passes. A f r t mous exampl e of such an adj ust ment comes f r om Fr ege. I l owcan I expr ess on Tuesday t he t hought I expr essed on Monday when I sai d " ' l oday i s a beaut i f ul cl ay, " Fr ege asks? Hi s answer , i n " The Thought , " whi ch you wi l l meet sever al t i mes i n t hi s vol ume, sounds pr et t y obvi ous: I F someone want s t o say t he same t oday as l i e expr essed yest er day usi ng t he wor d ' ' t oday, l i e t n ust r epl ace t hi s wor d wi t h " yest er day. " Al t hough t he t hought i s t he sa I I I C, i t s ver bal CXI ) messi oi i i n ust he di f l er en t i n or der t hat t he change of sense whi ch woul d ot her wi se be af f ect ed by t he t i mes of ut t er ance may be cancel l ed out ( 195( 1: 296) .
di f f eri ng
4 Eur opean Revi ew of Phi l osophy However , t he seemi ng obvi ousness i n Fr ege' s answer i s mi sl eadi ng. I n t hi s passage, 1r ege has somet hi ng qui t e speci f i c and cont r over si al i n mi nd, as one can gat her f r omt he f amous debat e bet ween John Per r y ( 1993: Essay 1 and i t s Post scr i pt ) and Gar et h Evans ( 1985: Essay 10) : i f I amt o expr ess on Tuesday t he t hought expr essed t he day bef or e wi t h " Today i s f i ne, " I must use t he wor d " yest er day, " and not any ot her expr essi on co- r ef er ent i al wi t h " t oday" ( such as " my bi r t hday' or " Apr i l 26, 1996" ) . I n Evans' s i mage, wor ds l i ke " t oday, " " yest er day" and per haps " t omor r ow" f or m a f ami l y of i ndexi cal adver bs whi ch can be used t o expr ess t he same sense i n di f f er ent cont ext s. W e l i see one di f f i cul t y when we t r y t o gi ve f ur t her , subst ant i al i dent i t y condi t i ons f or i ndexi cal t hought s gr asped at di f f er ent t i mes: t hat t he cr i t er i on of di f f er ence of t hought s of f er ed by Fr ege ( f oes not seem t o he ver y hel pf ul i n t hi s connect i on. I n i t s st andar d f or mul at i on, t he cr i t er i on says t hat i f a r at i onal Subj ect gr aspi ng t he t hought s expr essed by t wo sent ences he accept s one senadopt s di f f er ent epi st emi c at t i t udes t owar d t hem t ence as t r ue, but suspends hi s j udgement about t he ot her ) , t hen t he t hought s cannot be t he same. I l owever , a pr econdi t i on f or appl yi ng t he cr i t er i on seems t o be t hat t he subj ect gr asp t he t hought s a! t he same t i me. The poi nt of i nt r oduci ng a " r at i onal " subj ect i s t hat hi s epi st emi c at t i t udes ar e coher ent ; t he subj ect ' s at t i t udes t ake car e of each ot her . Rat i onal coher ence, t hough, i s f i r st and I br emost a synchr oni c not i on. I f we want t o def i ne a di achr oni c not i on of r at i onal coher ence, we must have an i ndependent account of what i t i s t o gr asp t he same t hought over t i me. An exampl e shoul d hel p t o make t hi s poi nt cl ear . Suppose t hat on Monday mor ni ng, I t hi nk " Today i s l i ne?' i hen t he sky gr adual l y becomes cl oudi er ; i n f act , Monday t ur ns Out t o he a r ai ny day. On Tuesday, I t hi nk " Yest er day was not l i ne. " I hol d di f f er ent epi st emi c at t i t udes t owar d t he sent ences " l oday i s f i ne" ( as used on Monday mor ni ng) and " Yest er day was f i ne" ( as used on Tuesday) . I accept t he f or mer , but I r ej ect t he l at t er . Can t he Pr egean cr i t er i on of di f f er ence be used t o show t hat t he sent ences expr ess di f f er ent t hought s? i nt ui t i vel y, t he answer i s negat i ve. I f t he cr i t er i on coul d be used t o show t hi s, i t woul d al so i mpl y, i ncor r ect l y, t hat t wo t okens of t he " et er nal " sent ence " Apr i l 26, 1996 i s a f i ne day" ( wher e t he " i s" i s at empor al ) expr ess di f f er ent t hought s on Monday and on Tuesday: I accept t he sent ence as t r ue on t he f i r st day; I r ej ect i t on t he next .
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2. I n t he exampl e above, i t i s obvi ous t hat t he pr obl em ar i ses because I have changed my mi nd about Monday' s weat her . So we ar e back t o Kapl an' s quest i on: what does i t mean t o say of an i ndi vi dual who at one t i me si ncer el y asser t ed a sent ence cont ai ni ng i ndexi cal s t hat at some l at er t i me he has ( or has not ) changed hi s mi nd wi t h r espect t o hi s asser t i on? chr i suph l - l oer l deal s wi t h Kapl an' s quest i on expl i ci t l y. I nst ead of wor ki ng wi t h an i ndependent not i on of sense t o account f or t he phenomenon of changi ng one' s mi nd, l i e t r i es t o di scover what i s pr esupposed by t hat phenomenon. I n t he cour se of doi ng t hi s, he gi ves some necessar y condi t i ons f or a change of mi nd. The f i r st one i s qui t e i nt ui t i ve: when I change my mi nd, I go f r oma gi ven bel i ef t o a cont r adi ct or y one. For exampl e, I go f r om t he bel i ef t hat Apr i l 26, 1996 i s a l i ne ( l ay t o t he bel i ef t hat Apr i l 26, 1996 i s
not a f i ne day. l - l owever , t her e i s an i mpor t ant const r ai nt her e; as l I ner ! says, i f we want t o descr i be t he st r uct ur e of a change of mi nd i n or der t o under st and what i t means t o r et ai n a bel i ef ( or , i n Fr egean t er ms, t o gr asp t he same t hought over t i me) , we must be car ef ul not t o i nt r oduce an i ndependent not i on of what i t i s f or t wo bel i ef s hel d at di f f er ent t i mes t o cont r adi ct each ot her or not . Hoed t hen dr aws some i nt er est i ng cor ol l ar i es. Fi r st , t he phenomenon of changi ng one' s mi nd depends 01) a capaci t y t o have hi gher - or der t hought s: t hought s about my bel i ef s bef or e and af t er t he change of mi nd, and about t he r el at i ons bet ween t hem. A smal l chi l d wi t h i nsuf f i ci ent under st andi ng of hi s own ment al st at es cannot be sai d t o change hi s mi nd. Second, i f I cannot change my mi nd wi t hout knowi ng t hat I change my mi nd, t hi s knowl edge i s based on memor y. Memor y i s what l i nks my bel i ef s bef br c and af t er my change of mi nd. The t hi r d cor ol l ar y i s par t i cul ar l y cent r al t o 1- l oer l ' s pr oj ect . I f changi ng one' s mi nd i mpl i es knowi ng t hat and howwe have changed our mi nd, t her e must be a way t o he di r ect l y awar e t hat t he same cont ent i s hen I change my mi nd bet ween Monday and Tuesent er t ai ned over t i me. W 1 knowt hat I day, change my mi nd about t he same cont ent , once expr essed i s f i ne, " once expr essed wi t h " Yest er day was l i ne?' ( A r el at i vel y wi t h " Today neut r al not i on of cont ent i s at st ake her e. ) I n ot her wor ds, Hoer l cl ai ms t hat t her e Must be a di achr oni c i dent i t y cr i t er i on f or t hought s hel d at di f f er ent l i mes. ( See al so Mi chael l , unt l ey' s ar t i cl e f or an expr essi on of t hi s cl ai m. ) Somet i mes, t he f act t hat sent ences used at di f f er ent t i mes expr ess t he same
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Eur opean Revi ewof Phi l osophy
t hought can be an epi st eni i c gi ven. Thi s mi l i t at es agai nst t oo st r ongl y ext er nal i st not i ons of r at i onal i t y and of di achr oni c coher ence. At some poi nt i n hi s ar t i cl e, 1- ben al so t ouches on what I bel i eve i s an i mpor t ant r equi r ement on any t heor y of cogni t i ve dynami cs: t o account f or a change of mi nd, i t i s not enough t o say t hat cont r adi ct or y bel i ef s ar e hel d successi vel y; we have t o expl ai n howt he l at er bel i ef can r epl ace t he ear l i er one i n t he subj ect ' s cogni t i ve economy. Mor e gener al l y, t o expl ai n what i t i s t o ent er t ai n t he same cont ent over t i me, i t i s not enough t o poi nt out t hat t he same cont ent i s ent er t ai ned at di f f er ent t i mes; we have t o say somet hi ng about t he di achr oni c r el ( ui ous bet ween t he r el evant ment al st at es. Change of mi nd i s mor e wi despr ead t hat we may t hi nk, and i t i s easy t o over l ook t he pr esence of a change of mi nd when we come t o i nt er pr et i ng a par t i cul ar exampl e. Thi s mi ght have i mpor t ant consequences f or one' s t heor y of t he i dent i t y condi t i ons of t hought and bel i ef . Thi s i s ' I bbi es Gr i mal t os and Car l os Moya' s cl ai m, who suggest t hat t he st andar d di scussi on of t wo f ami l i ar cases of change i n bel i ef i s f l awed. Let us consi der f or exampl e t he f i r st case t hey di scuss, i . e. , John Per r y' s f amous exampl e of t he shopper . Her e i s Per r y' s own descr i pt i on of t he exampl e: I Once f ol l owed a t r ai l of . sugar on t i t per i n ar kct f l oor , pushi ng owcar t down t he ai sl e on one si de of a t al l cot i t i t er and back t he ai sl e on t he ot her , secki ng t he shopper wi t h t he t or n sack t o t el l hi nt he was ma ki ng a mess. . . But I seemed unabl e t o cat ch up. Fi nal l y i t dawned on me. I was f i l e shopper I was t r yi ng t o cat ch ( 1993: 33) . Ther e ar e at l east t wo r el evant bel i ef s i n t hi s exampl e, The f i r st i s expr essed by " The shopper wi t h a t or n sack i s maki ng a mess; " t he second i s expr essed by " I ammaki ng t mess?' Per r y' s mai n t hesi s about t hi s exampl e i s t hat t he wor d " t , " i n t he expr essi on of t he second bel i ef , i s essent i al : i f we r epl ace i t wi t h ot her desi gnat i ons of t he same per son, we l oose t he f or ce of t he expl anat i on; we cannot expl ai n why I f i nal l y st opped t he car t . Gr i mal t os and Moya have no quar r el wi t h t hi s t hesi s; t hei r cr i t i cal t ar get i s r at her t he way Per r y i s pr one t o descr i be t he change i n bel i ef i n t he exampl c. Per r y f avour s a t wo- t i er ed appr oach i n whi ch t her e i s a di st i nct i on bet ween bel i ef st at e and pr oposi t i on bel i eved. Thi s di st i nct i on i s al so expl ai ned ( and r ef i ned) i n Per r y' s ar t i cl e i n t hi s vol ume, but i n a nut shel l i t coni es t o t hi s: t he pr oposi t i on bel i eved cont ai ns t he obj ect s and t he pr oper t i es t hought about t hemsel ves and not , as i n Fr ge' s t heor y, modes of pr e-
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sent at i on of t hem. Now we coul d say t hat t he t wo bel i ef s i n t he exampl e e can expr ess t he same pr oposi t i on: t hat John Per r y i s maki ng a mess. ( W suppose f or t he sake of ar gument t hat t he phr ase " t he shopper wi t h a t or n sack" r ef er s di r ect l y t o John Per r y. ) So t he change i n bel i ef whi ch expl ai ns t he st oppi ng of t he car t i s not a pr oposi t i onal change; f or Per r y, i t i s a change i n t he bel i ef st at e. Gr i mal t os and Moya di sput e t hi s, and t r y t o show t hat what expl ai ns t he change i n behavi our i s a change i n t he pr oposi t i on whi ch i s bel i eved. Roughl y, when I f ol l owed t he t r ai l , I bel i eved t hat one of t he shopper s, hut not r ue, was maki ng a mess. A bi t l at er , 1 r eal i sed t hat i t was me, and not one of t he ot her shopper s, who was maki ng a mess. So I changed my mi nd; I hel d cont r ar y at t i t udes t owar d t he sent ence " 1 am maki ng a mess?' My st oppi ng t he car t i s expl ai ned by my comi ng t o bel i eve a new pr oposi t i on, whi ch I di d not bel i eve bef or e. So one i nf l uent ar gument f or t he di st i nct i on bet ween bel i ef st at e ( mor e gener al l y, causal r ol e) and pr oposi t i on bel i eved ( mor e gener al l y, semant i c r ol e) i s r ebut t ed. 3. I n Gar et h Evans' s ( 1985: Essay 10) i nt er pr et at i on of Fr ege, t he pr obl em of cogni t i ve dynami cs i s t he nar r ow pr obl em of what i t means t o e keep t r ack of t i l e same keep t r ack of an i ndexi cal t hought over t i me. W t hought by keepi ng t r ack of t he r ef er ent of t hat t hought i n t i l e same way. For exampl e, I can keel ) t r ack of t he dei ct i c t hought expr essed by" Thi s i s a bi r d" by keepi ng my eyes on t he bi r d movi ng i n f r ont of me. I n ot her cases, we cannot cont i nue t o keep t r ack of t he same obj ect i n t he same way, because we have l ef t t he cont ext i n whi ch i t was possi bl e t o r ef er t o t he obj ect wi t h t he same sor t of i ndexi cal . Hence i t appear s t o be possi bl e t o keep t r ack of t he same obj ect wi t hout keepi ng t r ack of t he same t hought i n Fr cge' s sense. Thi s shows one way i n whi ch t he nar r ow pr obl em of cogni t i ve dynami cs cal l be
general i sed.
general i sed
i n many ot her John Per r y shows t hat t he pr obl em can be " i nf or m at i on I -I c i . e. , gam es: ' gani es whi ch ways. car ef ul l y anal yses ei ght t he ul t er i or t he of a of i nf or m at i on and pi ece appl i cat i on i mpl y acqui si t i on of t hat pi ece of i nf or mat i on, t ypi cal l y when t he subj ect act s upon t he r el evant obj ect . ' 11w f i r st t wo games i nvol ve onl y i ndexi cal bel i ef s, si nce i n Per r y' s t er mi nol ogy t he subj ect mai nt ai ns hi s cpi st cmi c and pr agmat i c " at t achment " t o t he obj ect . ( Ther e ar e si mpl e t echni ques avai l abl e t o t he
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Eur opean Revi ewof Phi l osophy
subj ect f or gai ni ng i nf or mat i on f r omt he obj ect , and f or act i ng upon i t . ) I n t he t hi r d ki nd of game, " det ach and r ecogni se, " t her e i s a gap bet ween acqui si t i on and appl i cat i on i n whi ch t he subj ect i s not at t ached any mor e t o t he obj ect ; i t has become " i ndexi cal l y i naccessi bl e. " I n one sense, he can t hi nk of t he obj ect usi ng an i ndexi cal sent ence such as " That was a bi r d, " wher e hi s t hought i s based on t he memor y of t he bi r d, but t hi s i s not enough t o keep t r ack of t he obj ect i n Per r y' s sense. " Remember i ng" i s one of t he f i ve ot her games di st i ngui shed by Per r y, whi ch ar e t ypi cal l y pl ayed when t he subj ect i s det ached f r omt he obj ect . Usi ng t hese concept ual t ool s, Per r y i s abl e t o gi ve a f r esh anal ysi s of Fr ege' s exampl e wi t h " t oday" and " yest er day?' Consi der t he case wher e I Cont i nue t o hol d t he same bel i ef about Monday' s weat her , a bel i ef I expr ess on Tuesday wi t h " Yest er day was a f i ne day?' I n t he oor ni al case, I j ust pl ay t he game cal l ed " updat i ng" - l have a concept i on of t he cont ext ual change whi ch has t aken pl ace bet ween Monday and Tuesday, and t hi s concept i on al l ows me t o make t he adj nst ment f r om" t oday" t o " yest er day: ' and f r omt he e ar e cl ose t o Kapl an' s not i on of a " st andar d pr esent t ense t o t he past t ense. W adj ust ment . " I l owever , t her e i s anot her game t hat can be pl ayed her e. I can r t ' mcnt hcr Monday' s weat her , so t hat I can t hi nk of Monday by expl oi t i ng t he pi eces of i nf or mat i on I acqui r ed t hen. Thi s game i s si mi l ar t o t he game " det ach and r ecogni se. " ( I t i s onl y si mi l ar , si nce we cannot l i ve t he same day t wi ce. ) t he avai l abi l i t y of t hi s game i s i mpor t ant t o account f or ot her cases wher e t he subj ect does not updat e cor r ect l y- l i ke Ri p van Wi nkl e, f or exampl e, he t hi nks he has sl ept one ni ght but i n f act he wakes up sever al year s l at er . I n Per r y' s f r amewor k, such a subj ect , al t hough gr ossl y mi st aken, can cont i nue never t hel ess t o t hi nk of Monday by pl ayi ng t he backi ng game j ust ment i oned. Ther e i s an i mpor t ant di st i nct i on bet ween t wo ki nds of moves i nvol ved i n an i nf or mat i on game. On t he one hand, t her e ar e compensat or y moves, whi ch ar e j ust i f i ed i nsof ar as t her e has been an obj ect i ve change i n t he con-
compensa- t or y t ext of t hought and bel i ef . For exampl e, " updat i ng" moves ar e i f t he passage of t i me i s consi der ed as an obj ect i ve change. On t he ot her
hand, t her e ar e non- compensat or y moves, i . e. , moves whi ch ar e not j ust i f i ed by obj ect i ve changes. For exampl e, " i nf er r i ng" and " r emember i ng" ar e games whi ch t ypi cal l y i nvol ve l i on- compensat or y moves. Fr ancoi s Reeanat i cl ai ms i n hi s ar t i cl e t hat t her e ar e non- compensat or y moves t hat never t hel ess i nvol ve a cont ext ual change, even t hough, as non-
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compensat or y, t hey ar e not caused by an ant ecedent obj ect i ve change. Consi der an ut t er ance of " i t i s r ai ni ng" made i n Par i s at some par t i cul ar t i me. Fol l owi ng Per r y ( 1993: eb. 10) , Recanat i says t hat t he pr oposi t i on expr essed by t hi s ut t er ance has an " unar t i cul at ed const i t uent " whi ch cor r esponds t o a pl ace. I t i s i n vi r t ue of t hi s const i t uent t hat t he ut t er ance concer ns Par i s; t he ut t er ance i s t r ue i f and onl y i f i t i s r ai ni ng i n Par i s. I n Recanat i ' s Aust i ni an t er mi nol ogy, Par i s i s t he si ! oaüon whi ch suppor t s t he f act t hat i t i s r ai ni ng. Nowwhen t he subj ect moves f r om" I t i s r ai ni ng" t o " I t i s r ai ni ng i n Par i s, " t her eby r ender i ng expl i ci t t he pl ace whi ch i s i n quest i on, t he si t uat i onal component has shi f t ed. The name " Par i s" i s ext r act ed f r omit cont r ast i ve set cont ai ni ng ot her names f or ci t i es, e. g. , i n Eur ope. So t he si t uat i on whi ch suppor t s t he f act t hat i t ' s r ai ni ng i n Par i s i s Eur ope, not Par i s. The move f r om" i t i s r ai ni ng" t o " i t i s r ai ni ng i n Par i s" i nvol ves a cont ext ual change. Reeanat i gener al i ses i n ef f ect t he not i on of an unar t i cul at ed const i t uent : t her e i s al ways a pur el y cont ext ual component of cont ent , whi ch i s t he si t uat i onal el ement . Recanat i shows how power f ul a t ool i s t he not i on of an Aust i ni an pr oposi t i on, wi t h i t s di st i nct i on bet ween si t uat i on and f act . For i nst ance, t he not i on i s used t o deal wi t h r easoni ng and r easoni ng about
count er f act ual
someone el se' s ment al st at es. I n Recanat i ' s t heor y, new pr obl ems of cogni t i ve dynami cs ar i se. For t he t r ansi t i on f r om" I t i s r ai ni ng" t o " i t i s r ai ni ng i n Par i s" not onl y i nvol ves a cont ext ual change; i t al so i nvol ves a change i n coni c??! ( i f cont ent i s def i ned i n t er ms of Aust i ni an Pr oposi t i ons) . So we have t o expl ai n howi t i s possi bl e t o keep t r ack of t he same phenomenon ( t he r ai n) t hr ough changes i n cont ext and i n cont ent . 4. The pr obl emof cogni t i ve dynami cs i s al so r el evant t o a per enni al t heme i n phi l osophy, i . e. , t he quest i on of t he r el at i ve pr i or i t y of t he t heor i es of t hought and l anguage. Mi chael Dummet t i s f amous f or hol di ng t hat i n t he or der of expl anat i on, t he t heor y of l anguage i s pr i or t o t he t heor y of t hought ; i t i s onl y t hr ough a st udy of l anguage t hat we can have a sat i sf act or y account of t hought . ( Accor di ng t o t ) ummet t , t hi s pr i or i t y t hesi s i s even def i ni t i ve of anal yt i c phi l osophy. ) Now Mi chael Lunt l ey ar gues t hat t he exi st ence of dynami c t hought s poses a pr obl emf or a phi l osopher l i ke t ) ummet t who want s t o def i ne t hought over l i ngui st i c i t ems. W hen I go f r om " I bday i s f i ne" t o " Yest er day was f i ne: ' I gr asp one and t he same t hought ,
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I nt r oduct i on
Eur opean Revi ewof Phi l osophy
but t he l i ngui st i c expr essi on changes. I n f act , accor di ng t o Lunt l ey, my keepi ng t r ack of a dynami c t hought i s not gr ounded on r ul es of l i ngui st i c meani ng. As an expl anat i on of dynami c t hought s, Lunt l ey woul d pr obabl y r ej ect Kapl an' s suggest i on t hat t her e ar e st andar d adj ust ment s i n t he expr essi on of one' s t hought . To Lunt l ey' s mi nd, a pr oper , Fr ege- i nspi r ed i nt er pr et at i on of dynami c t hought s shoul d showt hat t he " Empt y Mi nds" t hesi s hol ds: we do not need r epr esent at i ons i n or der t o t hi nk, f or t hi nki ng i s not an oper at i on def i ned over r epr esent at i ons. I n Lunt l ey' s sl i ght l y pr ovocat i ve t er ms, " t hi nki ng does not r equi r e t hought s. " The not i on of r epr esent at i on cover s her e not onl y publ i c l anguage sent ences, but al so symbol i c i t ems i n t he l anguage of t hought . I n al l t hese cases, t he not i on of cogni t i ve si gni f i cance i s not def i nabl e i n t er ms of t he " ar r angement " of r epr esent at i ons. Lunt l ey dr aws i n a r adi cal way what he sees as t he nat ur al consequences of Evans' s ext er nal i st not i on of a dynami c t hought . I t i s t r ue t hat i n or der t o expl ai n t hat not i on, we have t o i nvoke t he subj ect ' s egocent r i c poi nt of vi ew. ( By cont r ast , a t heor y of l i ngui st i c meani ng i s " i nsensi t i ve" t o t hat poi nt of vi ew. ) However , t he not i on of an egocent r i c poi nt of vi ew i s concei ved i n t hor oughl y ext er nal i st t er ms: i t i s def i ned by r ef er ence t o t he ongoi ng or gani sat i on of t he subj ect ' s r at i onal behavi our i n hi s envi r onment . Cont r ast Mai t e Ezcur di a' s t hesi s. She cl ai ms, about Fr ege' s exampl e, t hat t he sameness ( or di f f er ence) i n t hought s expr essed by sent ences cont ai ni ng i ndexi cal wor ds l i ke " t oday, " " yest er day" or " t omor r ow" i s f ul l y det er mi ned by t he semant i c r ul es whi ch gover n t hei r uses. Her e i t seems t hat l anguage i s pr i or t o t hought i n t he or der of expl anat i on, f or i t i s t hr ough an i nvest i gat i on of t he l i ngui st i c meani ng of t hese i ndexi cal wor ds t hat we can det er mi ne t he t hought s t hey cont r i but e t o expr ess i n par t i cul ar cases. Ezcur di a opposes Evans' s i nt er pr et at i on of t he Fr egean exampl e. Accor di ng t o Evans, t he ut t er ance on Monday of " Today i s f i ne" and t he ut t er ance on Tuesday of " Yest er day was f i ne" expr ess t he same dynami c t hought onl y i f t hey ar e connect ed by an exer ci sed abi l i t y t o keep t r ack of Monday over t i me. Thi s i s pr eci sel y t he abi l i t y whi ch someone l i ke Ri p van Wi nkl e has l ost . Ri p l ost t r ack of Monday, and wi t h i t t he t hought he expr essed on t hat day wi t h " Today was f i ne. " ( Mor e pr osai c cases i nvol ve a f ai l ur e t o r eal i se t hat mi dni ght has passed. ) Ezcur di a, l i ke Per r y but f or di f f er ent r easons, cl ai ms t hat t hi s aspect of Evans' s t heor y of t hought i s not pl ausi bl e. She suggest s t hat we di st i ngui sh t he psychol ogi cal l evel of t hi nki ng and t he semant i c
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her eas t hi nki ng may i nvol ve t he ki nd of t r acki ng abi l i t i es l evel of t hought . W descr i bed by Evans, t hought i s i dent i f i ed essent i al l y i n t er ms of l i ngui st i c meani ng. 5. Of cour se, t hi s vol ume has no pr et ence of cover i ng al l t he aspect s of t he pr obl emof cogni t i ve dynami cs. To gi ve but one exampl e, not hi ng has been sai d about t he t heor i es of r at i onal changes of bel i ef - whi ch expl or e t he dynami cs of whol e bel i ef syst ems ( cf . f or exampl e For r est 1986, and Gär denf or s 1988) . I n one sense, t he cont r i but or s t o t hi s vol ume have been concer ned, not wi t h t he quest i on of when i t i s r at i onal t o change one' s bel i ef s, but wi t h t he mor e f undament al quest i on of what i t means t o mai nt ai n t he same bel i ef ( or a bel i ef wi t h t he same cont ent ) over t i me i n one' s cogni t i ve economy. I ncl uded i n t hi s vol ume i s al so a cr i t i cal not i ce, by Al ber t o Vol t ol i ni , of Recanat i ' s book Di r ect Ref er ence: Fr omLanguage t o Thought ( 1997) . CREA, Par i s Uni ver si t y of Geneva
Ref er ences
Evans, G. 1985. Col l ect ed Paper s. Oxf or d: Cl ar endon Pr ess. For r est , P. 1986. The Dynami cs of Bel i ef Oxf or d: Bl ackwel l . Fr cge, G. 1956. The Thought : A Logi cal Enqui r y. Tr ansl at ed by A. and M. Qui nt on, Mi nd 65, pp. 289- 311. Kapl an, D. 1989. Demonst r at i ves. Avai l abl e as a ms. si nce 1977, and t hen publ i shed i n J. Al mog, J. Per r y, and H. Wet t st ei n, eds. , Themes f r om Kapl an, New Yor k: Bl ackwel l , pp. 481- 563. Per r y, J. 1993. The Pr obl em of t he Essent i al I ndexi cal and Ot her Essays Oxf or d: Bl ackwel l . Recanat i , F. 1997. Di r ect Ref er ence: Fr omLanguage t o Thought . Oxf or d: Bl ackwel i .
(
JOHN PERRY
Ri p van Wi nkl e and Ot her Char act er s
I f someone want s t o say t he same t oday as he expr essed yest er day usi ng t he wor d ' t oday; he must r epl ace t hi s wor d wi t h ' yest er day
- Fr ege, " The Thought " 1. I nt r oduct i on I n " Demonst r at i ves' Davi d Kapl an devel ops an account of t he meani ng of i ndexi cal s and sent ences t hat cont ai n t hem based on t he concept s of cont ent , char act er and cont ext . The cont ent of a st at ement i s a pr oposi t i on; whi ch pr oposi t i on a st at ement expr esses depends not onl y on t he
char act er of t he sent ence used, but al so on t he cont ext : who i s speaki ng, t o whom, when, wher e and i n what ci r cumst ances. l i ngui st i c meani ng or
I n hi s essay, Kapl an br i ef l y sket ches an anal ogous concept of bel i ef : we ar e i n a bel i ef st at e wi t h a cer t ai n char act er i n a cer t ai n cont ext and t her eby bel i eve a cer t ai n pr oposi t i on. As Kapl an says, we bel i eve pr oposi t i ons under
char act er s. Kapl an t hen r ai ses t he f ol l owi ng quest i on. Suppose you have f or med a bel i ef of t he sor t t hat you woul d expr ess wi t h a sent ence cont ai ni ng an i ndexi cal , say, " You ar e a comput er sci ent i st " or " Today i s a ni ce day. " W hat do you need t o do t o r et ai n such a bel i ef , af t er you l eave t he cont ext i n whi ch t he sent ence i n quest i on expr esses i t ? W hat do you have t o do t o r et ai n a bel i ef t hat you once expr essed wi t h " You ar e a comput er sci ent i st , " af t er t he hat do you have t o do t o r et ai n t he bel i ef per son you ar e t al ki ng t o has l ef t ? W you once expr essed wi t h " Today i s a ni ce day' af t er t hat day i s gone? Fr ege' s r emar k quot ed above suggest ed a vi ew t o Kapl an: t o r et ai n a bel i ef as one moves i nt o a newcont ext , one must adj ust t he char act er under
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Eur opean Revi ewof Phi l osophy
whi ch one hol ds t he bel i ef , t o a new one t hat conf or ms t o a sent ence t hat woul d expr ess t he same pr oposi t i on i n t he newcont ext . Ther e ar e pat t er ns of char act er change t hat cor r espond t o pat t er ns of change i n cont ext of bel i ef . To cont i nue t o t hi nk t he same t hi ng as t he cont ext of bel i ef changes, i s t o t hi nk under a successi on of char act er s t hat det er mi ne t he same cont ent i n t he successi on of cont ext s, and conf or m t o such a pat t er n. To t hi nk t he t hought I t hought yest er day under t he char act er of " Today i s a ni ce day, " I must nowt hi nk a t hought under t he char act er of " Yest er day i s a ni ce day. " Kapl an r ej ect s t hi s suggest i on because of t he case of Ri p Van Wi nkl e, who f el l asl eep f or t went y year s and woke up t hi nki ng he had sl ept f or onl y a day. Kapl an t hi nks t he Fr ege- i nspi r ed st r at egy woul d l ead us t o deny t hat when Van W i nkl e awoke, he had r et ai ned t he bel i ef he expr essed, t he day he f el l asl eep, wi t h " Today i s a ni ce day. " Howwoul d he expr ess t hi s hel i ef i He mi ght t r y t o expr ess i t wi t h " Yest er day was a ni ce day, " but t hi s woul d f ai l . He woul d not have asser t ed anyt hi ng about t he day he f el l asl eep, but r at her sai d somet hi ng about t he day bef or e he spoke, a day t hat he sl ept t hr ough and of whi ch he has no memor y. I n hi s ar t i cl e " Under st andi ng Demonst r at i ves, " Gar et h Evans f ound t hi s an i nadequat e r eason t o abandon t he Fr ege- i nspi r ed st r at egy. He seems t o t hi nk t hat we shoul d si mpl y say t hat Ri p has f ai l ed t o r et ai n hi s bel i ef : I see no mor e st r angeness i n t he i dea t hat a man who l oses t r ack of t i me cannot r et ai n bel i ef s t han i n t he i dea t hat a man who l oses t r ack of an obj ect cannot r et ai n t he bel i ef s about i t wi t h whi ch he began ( Evans 1981, pp. 87n- 88n. )
speaker i n a l i t er al sense. The cont ext i s a set of f act or s t hat det er mi ne what i ndexi cal s st and f or : t he speaker of t he ut t er ance, t he t i me of ut t er ance, t he pl ace of ut t er ance, t he ci r cumst ance or possi bl e wor l d i n whi ch i t occur s. Char act er s ar e f unct i ons f r omcont ext s t o cont ent s. That i s, a char act er t akes a cont ext as i nput ( as i t s ar gument ) and pr ovi des a cont ent as out put ( as i t s val ue) . These char act er s ar e mat hemat i cal r epr esent at i ons of t he r ul es t hat l anguage assi gns t o expr essi ons. Char act er i s an i nt er pr et at i on of l i ngui st i c meani ng. Suppose t hat at a speci f i c t i me i n 1995- cal l i t t - Kapl an says t o Qui ne, " I l i ve west of you now. " On Kapl an' s t heor y, her e i s what happens: -
-
-
Qui ne. The char act er of ' now" i s a f unct i on f r oma cont ext t o t he t i me of t he cont ext . I n t hi s case, t he cont ent of " now" i s t . The char act er of " l i ve t o t he west of " i s a f unct i on f r om a cont ext t o t he 3- ar y r el at i on x l i ves t o t he west of y at t . Thi s char act er i s not sensi t i ve t o di f f er ences i n cont ext ; i t s cont ent i s t he same at al l cont ext s. 2 The char act er of " I l i ve t o t he west of you now" i s bui l t up out of t he char act er s of t he par t s. I t i s a f unct i on t hat f r oma cont ext t o t he pr oposi t i on t hat a l i ves t o t he west of b at t , wher e a i s t he cont ent of " I " i n t he cont ext , b i s t he cont ent of " you" i n t he cont ext , and t t he cont ent of " now" i n t he cont ext . I n t hi s case, t he cont ent i s t he pr oposi t i on t hat Kapl an l i ves t o t he west of Qui ne at t .
I.
t er mi nol ogy.
2. Li ngui st i c Char act er s and Rol es The cont ent of a st at ement i s a pr oposi t i on, " what i s sai d" by t he
The char act er of " I " i s a f unct i on f r oma cont ext t o t he speaker of t he cont ext . I n t hi s case, Kapl an i s t he speaker , and so he i s t he cont ent of " I " i n t hi s cont ext . ' The char act er of " you" i s a f unct i on f r oma cont ext t o t he per son t hat i s addr essed by t he speaker of t he cont ext , at t he t i me of t he cont ext , i n t he ci r cumst ances of t he cont ext . So t he cont ent of " you" i n t hi s case i s
I n t hi s essay I f i r st r evi ew Kapl an' s t heor y of l i ngui st i c char act er , and t hen expl ai n and mot i vat e a concept of doxast i c char act er . I t hen devel op some concept s f or deal i ng wi t h t he t opi c of bel i ef r et ent i on and t hen, f i nal l y, di scuss Ri p Van Wi nkl e. I come down on Kapl an' s si de wi t h r espect t o t he Fr cgc- i nspi r cd st r at egy, nar r owl y const r ued. But I advocat e somet hi ng l i ke t he Fr ege- i nspi r ed st r at egy, i f i t i s const r ued mor e br oadl y. On my vi ewi t i s r emar kabl y easy t o r et ai n a bel i ef , and I t hi nk Evans i s qui t e wr ong about Ri p and Kapl an. The cent r al concept I devel op, however , t hat of an i nf or mat i on game, i s i n t he spi r i t of much of Evans' wor k. I al so bor r ow some of hi s
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2.
Kapl an devel ops hi s account wi t hi n possi bl e wor l ds semant i cs, and i n t hat set t i ng t akes t he val ue of an expr essi on l i ke " I " at a cont ext t o be a r i gi d i nt ensi on r at her t han an i ndi vi dual . I n t hi s case, i t woul d be an i ndi vi dual concept t hat pi cked out Kapl an i n each wor l d. Thi s compl i cat i on i s basi cal l y an ar t i f act of t he semant i cal f r amewor k, not par t of t he i nt ui t i ve set of i deas Kapl an t r i es t o convey. I i gnor e t hi s and ot her i mpl i cat i ons. 1 ami gnor i ng t ense.
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Eur opean Revi ewof Phi l osophy
Kapl an doesn' t assi gn char act er s excl usi vel y t o i ndexi cal s ar i d sent ences t hat cont ai n t hem. Ever y expr essi on get s a char act er . The char act er s of expr essi ons t hat ar e not sensi t i ve t o changes of cont ext ar e const ant f unct i ons. The name " Davi d Kapl an, " f or exampl e, i s a f unct i on t hat r et ur ns Davi d Kapl an at ever y cont ext . I ' l l cal l char act er s l i ke t hi s " l oyal , " and char act er s, l i ke t hat of " I " and " you" t hat ar e sensi t i ve t o changes i n cont ext " f l i ght y. " I l i ke t o i nt er pr et Kapl an' s char act er s i n t er ms of what I cal l ut t er ance- r el at i ve or l i ngui st i c r ol es. Thi s i nt er pr et at i on l i nks Kapl an' s i deas wi t h an ol der t r adi t i on t hat emphasi zes t hat i ndexi cal s ar e " t oken- r ef l exi ve. " 3 Li ngui st i c convent i ons assi gn a name l i ke " Davi d Kapl an, " t o a par t i cul ar i ndi vi dual . But t hey assi gn an i ndexi cal l i ke " I " or " you" t o an ut t er ance- r el at i ve ( or l i ngui st i c) r ol e: bei ng t he speaker of u, ei ng- t h bei ng t he addr essee of u, et c. An ut t er ance of an i ndexi cal does not st and f or or r ef er t o t he r ol e assi gned t o i t ; i t st ands f or or r ef er s t o t he obj ect t hat pl ays t hat r ol e, r el at i ve t o t he ut t er ance i t sel f .
W hy ar e i ndexi cal s i mpor t ant ? The answer has t wo par t s. Fi r st , l i ngui st i c r ol es ar e cl osel y associ at ed wi t h ot her r ol es t hat obj ect s pl ay i n our l i ves. The speaker of t he ut t er ance I hear i s of t en t he per son I aml ooki ng at ; t he pl ace an ut t er ance i s made i s usual l y t he pl ace t he speaker occupi es, and usual l y near t he pl ace t he l i st ener occupi es. So, when I l ear n t hat an obj ect pl ays a l i ngui st i c r ol e r el at i ve t o an ut t er ance I hear , I l ear n about ot her r ol es t hat i t pl ays. Gi ven t hi s, i ndexi cal s ar e usef ul i n t wo si t uat i ons. Somet i mes one want s t o know mor e about an obj ect t hat pl ays some l i ngui st i c r ol e or associ at ed r ol e. I want t o knowmor e about t he per son I see bef or e me. I ask: " W ho ar e C om m on sense and at assur e m e t hat t he you?" my f aci l i t y l anguage per son I see bef or e me wi l l be t he addr essee of my ut t er ance. So i f I f i nd out whot he addr essee i s, I f i nd out who t he per son bef or e me i s. I want t o know t he name of t he ci t y I f i nd i t sel f i n. I ask: " W hat i s t he name of t hi s ci t y?" Common sense t el l s me t hat t he ci t y I ami n i s t he ci t y my ut t er ance wi l l t ake pl ace i n. So i f I f i nd out t he name of t he ci t y i n whi ch my ut t er ance occur s, I wi l l f i nd out t he name of t he ci t y i n whi ch I f i nd i t sel f . Somet i mes I need t o know what r ol e some obj ect i s pl ayi ng i n my l i f e, what i t s cur r ent r el at i on t o me i s. I ask, " W ho i s Davi d Kapl an?" You answer , 3.
See, i n par t i cul ar , Rei chenbach ( 1947) , Bur ks ( 1949) , and Per r y ( 1979) .
Ri p van Wi nkl e and Ot her Char act er s
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poi nt i ng: " That man i s Davi d Kapl an. " I want ed t o know whi ch of t he peopl e I coul d see was Davi d Kapl an. Common sense t ol d you t hat I woul d be abl e t o i dent i f y t he per son you demonst r at ed as one of t he ones I saw. I ask, "W hen i s Jul y 4t h?" You answer , " Tomor r ow. " Common sense t el l s you t hat I wi l l r eal i ze t hat your ut t er ance occur s at t he pr esent t i me, and so t hat t he day I ami nt er est ed i n i s j ust 24 hour s away. W hen we hear an i ndexi cal , t he f i r st way of t hi nki ng of t he r ef er ent t hat i s af f or ded t o us, i s t hi nki ng of i t as t he t hi ng t hat pl ays t he ut t er ance- r el at i ve r ol e. So when Qui ne hear s Kapl an' s ut t er ance uof "I l i ve t o t he west of you now' t he f i r st way of t hi nki ng of Kapl an pr ovi ded by t hi s ut t er ance i s as t he speaker of t he ut t er ance of "I . " Qui ne' s f i r st gr asp of t he t r ut h condi t i ons of u i s somet hi ng l i ke, " The speaker of u l i ves t o t he west of t he addr essee of u at t he t i me of u. " Thi s phase of under st andi ng usual l y sl i ps t hr ough one' s mi nd wi t hout st oppi ng, per haps wi t hout r i si ng t o consci ousness, as t he ut t er ance- r el at i ve r ol es gi ve way t o mor e i nt er est i ng associ at ed r ol es. I n nor mal ci r cumst ances Qui ne wi l l r eal i ze t hat t he per son he sees i s t he speaker of t he ut t er ance he hear s, t hat t hat per son i s Davi d Kapl an, t hat Kapl an i s addr essi ng hi m, and t hat t he t i me of ut t er ance i s, f or al l pr act i cal pur poses, t he t i me t he ut t er ance i s hear d. So Qui ne wi l l t hi nk somet hi ng l i ke, " Kapl an l i ves west of me now. " I n ot her cases, however , t he ut t er ance- r el at i ve r ol e may be our onl y way of t hi nki ng of t he obj ect s an ut t er ance i s about , at l east unt i l we have done some det ect i ve wor k. I f i nd a f aded not e i n my ol d copy of Wi t t genst ei n' s I nvest i gat i ons: " You ar e bei ng an ass. " I knowt hat t he not e i s t r ue i f and onl y i f t he per son t o whomi t was addr essed was bei ng an ass at t he t i me i t was wr i t t en. That may be t he onl y gr asp of t he t r ut h- condi t i ons I can get , unt i l I l ook t hr ough some paper s and r ecor ds and wr ack my br ai ns. Then I r emember : someone passed t he not e t o me, appar ent l y t hi nki ng my r emar ks i n a semi nar on t he pr i vat e l anguage ar gument wer e l ess pr of ound t haj l di d. NowI knowt hat t he not e- or mor e accur at el y, t he ut t er ance f or whi ch t he not e was t he t oken, was t r ue i f and onl y i f I was bei ng an ass. Kapl an' s syst em al l ows t he possi bi l i t y t hat we can say t he same t hi ng ( ut t er st at ement s wi t h t he same cont ent ) i n qui t e di f f er ent ways ( usi ng sent ences wi t h qui t e di f f er ent char act er s) . Thi s happens i f we use t he sent ences i n cont ext s wher e, due t o par t i cul ar and per haps pecul i ar ci r cumst ances, t hey t ur n out t o have t he same cont ent . Thi s happens when t he same obj ect
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pl ays t wo qui t e di f f er ent ut t er ance- r el at i ve r ol es. And i t can happen wi t hout our knowi ng i t . Kapl an asks us t o consi der t he sent ences " My pant s ar e on f i r e" and " Hi s pant s ar e on f i r e. " The char act er of t he f i r st i s a f unct i on t hat f or a cont ext wi t h a as t he speaker , r et ur ns t he pr oposi t i on t hat a' s pant s ar e on f i r e. The char act er of t he second i s a f unct i on t hat f or a cont ext wi t h a as speaker , i n a wor l d i n whi ch a i s poi nt i ng at b or ot her wi se cal l i ng at t ent i on t o hi m, ( " demonst r at i ng b" ) r et ur ns t he pr oposi t i on t hat Us pant s ar e on f i r e. Suppose, t o cont i nue wi t h Kapl an' s exampl e, t hat he says, " My pant s ar e on f i r e. " The cont ent of hi s r emar k i s t he pr oposi t i on t hat Davi d Kapl an' s pant s ar e on f i r e. Suppose nowt hat he sees hi msel f i n a mi r r or , doesn' t r eal i ze t hat he i s seei ng hi msel f , and, poi nt i ng at t he man i n t he mi r r or , says " Hi s pant s ar e on f i r e. " The sent ence i s qui t e di f f er ent , wi t h a qui t e di f f er ent char act er , but i n t hi s par t i cul ar cont ext t he cont ent i s t he same, t hat Davi d Kapl an' s pant s ar e on f i r e. Kapl an has sai d t he same t hi ng i n t wo di f f er ent ways wi t hout knowi ng i t , al t hough pr esumabl y he wi l l r ecogni ze what i s goi ng on bef or e l ong. Nowconsi der t he di f f er ence bet ween ( 1) ( 2) ( 3)
My pant s ar e on f i r e. Hi s pant s ar e on f i r e. Davi d Kapl an' s pant s ar e on f i r e on Jul y 4, 1984 at 5 p. m.
One can t hi nk of ( 1) and ( 2) as t ool s. ( 1) i s a t ool f or sayi ng t hat onesel f has bur ni ng pant s. ( 2) i s a t ool f or sayi ng of someone t hat one can see and demonst r at e, t hat t hey have bur ni ng pant s. Si nce l ot s of peopl e coul d, i n pr i nci pl e at l east , f i nd t hemsel ves wi t h bur ni ng pant s, or f i nd t hemsel ves i n a posi t i on t o demonst r at e someone t hat has bur ni ng pant s, t hese t ool s mi ght be used, agai n and agai n, i n di f f er ent si t uat i ons, t o say di f f er ent t hi ngs about di f f er ent peopl e. ( 3) doesn' t cont ai n any i ndexi cal s, j ust names. Even t he ver b can be t aken as t ensel ess, gi ven t he way t he dat e i s f i l l ed i n. As we sai d, Kapl an assi gns al l expr essi ons a char act er , not j ust i ndexi cal s, but f or non- i ndexi cal s t he char act er doesn' t do much. I t ' s j ust a way of maki ng t he t heor y wor k smoot hl y. So " Kapl an, " f or exampl e, i s assi gned a char act er t hat has Davi d Kapl an as cont ent i n al l cont ext s. And ( 3) as a whol e has a char act er t hat has t he same pr oposi t i on as cont ent i n al l cont ext s, t he pr oposi t i on t hat Kapl an has bur ni ng pant s on Jul y 4, 1984. Thus t he char act er of ( 3) i s ver y l oyal . I t
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st i cks wi t h t he same cont ent i n cont ext af t er cont ext . To put t he poi nt anot her way, wi t h ( 3) we have a t ool t hat al l ows us t o expr ess t he same pr oposi t i on, no mat t er when i t i s or wher e we ar e or t o whomwe ar e t al ki ng. As a t ool , ( 3) can seema bi t odd. W hy woul d we need or want a t ool f or of one sayi ng, j ust per son, t hat he has bur ni ng pant s? I t seems l i ke a ver y speci al pur pose t ool . We' l l r et ur n t o t hi s quest i on l at er .
3. Doxast i c Char act er s Howcan we concei ve of bel i ef s, so t hat char act er s may be i nt el l i gi bl y assi gned t o t hem? One concept i on i s t hat of bel i ef as an at t i t ude t owar ds a sent ence; t he bel i ef i nher i t s t he char act er of t he sent ence at whi ch i t i s di r ect ed. I t hi nk t hi s i s a r at her unsat i sf act or y concept i on. For one t hi ng, i t seems t hat f ai r l y compl ex t hought s about t hi ngs of al l sor t s woul d 4 pr ecede t hought s about sent ences, bot h l ogi cal l y and psychol ogi cal l y. A mor e sat i sf act or y way of concei vi ng of bel i ef s st ar t s wi t h t he i dea t hat t hey ar e concr et e cogni t i ve st r uct ur es t hat ar i se i n one' s mi nd i n cer t ai n si t uat i ons; t r aces, as i t wer e, of exper i ences of per cept i on, l ear ni ng, and i nf er ence. These st r uct ur es have cont ent ; when one has a bel i ef , t her e i s ( at l east when t hi ngs go r i ght ) , somet hi ng t hat one bel i eves, a pr oposi t i on P such t hat one bel i eves P. Bel i ef s so concei ved wi l l have t wo aspect s t hat must mesh, causal r ol e and The bel i ef s ar e caused by cer t ai n ki nds of per cept i ons, and cause cer t ai n ki nds of act i ons. But t hey al so have a cer t ai n cont ent ; t hey ar e bel i ef s
cont ent .
t hat such and such i s t he case, bel i ef s t hat P f or some pr oposi t i on P. These t wo aspect s shoul d mesh. Abel i ef t hat P shoul d cause act i on appr opr i at e t o i t s bei ng t he case t hat P. gi ven one' s desi r es and ot her bel i ef s. 4.
I ment i on t hi s concept i on mai nl y because many r easonabl y at t ent i ve r eader s seemt o f i nd i t i n " The Pr obl emof t he Essent i al I ndexi cal " ( Per r y 1979). But i t was not what I had i n mi nd. See " Bel i ef and Accept ance" ( Per r y 1980). 1 t hi nk t hi s mi si nt er pr et at i on has t hr ee r oot s. 1 di dn' t pr oper l y di st i ngui sh bet ween l i ngui st i c and cogni t i ve r ol es. I under est i mat ed t he ease wi t h whi ch peopl e woul d suppose t hat my vi ew, t hat sent ences wi t h i ndexi cal s ( or t hei r char act er s) , wer e mor e adequat e ways of cl assi f yi ng bel i ef st at es t han wer e pr oposi t i ons, woul d have t o r est on t he vi ew t hat sent ences ( or t hei r char act er s) wer e what bel i ef s wer e di r ect ed at . Fi nal l y t he pr obl em r ef er r ed t o i n t he t i t l e had t o do wi t h t he f act t hat i ndexi cal s scent ed essent i al t o expr essi ng cer t ai n t hought s; f r om t hi s some r eader s seemt o have assumed t hat I t hought t hat i ndexi cal s wer e necessar y f or havi ng t hose t hought s.
20 Eur opean Revi ew of Phi l osophy By t he causal r ol e of a st at e I mean t he var i ous combi nat i ons of f act or s t hat br i ng t he st at e about , and t he var i ous combi nat i ons of f act or s i t br i ngs about i n t ur n. Consi der t he st at e of bei ng nauseat ed. Thi s st at e i s uni ver sal and par t i al . To say i t i s uni ver sal i s t o say t hat di f f er ent peopl e at di f f er ent t i mes can be i n t he same st at e. You wer e nauseat ed l ast week, af t er a r i de on t he Fer r i s Wheel . I was nauseat ed yest er day, af t er bi ngi ng on sushi andhambur ger s. To say i t i s par t i al i s t o say t hat bei ng nauseat ed const i t ut es onl y par t of one' s t ot al st at e at a gi ven t i me. I was nauseat ed and embar r assed and gui l t - r i dden and i n a number of ot her st at es at t he same t i me. Each case of nausea has i t s own speci f i c causes. But t her e ar e pat t er ns. Cer t ai n combi nat i ons of f act or s br i ng about nausea, and nausea, t oget her wi t h ot her f act or s, has cer t ai n r esul t s. Thi s pat t er n i s t he causal r ol e of nausea. On a gi ven occasi on, t he causes of a speci f i c case of nausea may be pr et t y si mi l ar t o t he causes of some ot her st at e. Per haps t he mai n cause of my nausea was pr et t y much t he same t hi ng as my f eel i ngs of gui l t : massi ve over eat i ng. But t he ef f ect s of t he t wo st at es ar e di f f er ent . My nausea l eads t o me t o t ake Al ka- Sel t zer ; my gui l t l eads me t o t ur n on t he t el evi si on. And i n gener al , t he pat t er ns ar e not t he same. Lot s of t hi ngs cause nausea t hat don' t cause gui l t and vi ce ver sa, and nausea, i n combi nat i on wi t h var i ous f act or s, causes l ot s of t hi ngs t hat gui l t , i n combi nat i on wi t h t hose same f act or s, woul dn' t cause. One can t hi nk of causal r ol es i n var i ous st r i ct and phi l osophi cal ways or i n a sor t of l oose and casual way. The second wi l l suf f i ce f or my pur poses. Thi nk of t he causal r ol e of a st at e as i t s t ypi cal causes, t he t hi ngs you woul d expect mi ght cause an i nst ance of t hat st at e, i n mor e or l ess or di nar y ci r cumst ances, and si mi l ar l y wi t h i t s t ypi cal ef f ect s. W e sai d t hat t he causal r ol e of a bel i ef shoul d mesh wi t h i t s cont ent . But Kapl an' s case shows t hat t hi s meshi ng i s not si mpl e and di r ect . Fi r st , not e t hat t he causal r ol es of t he st at es we i magi ne t o occur ar e qui t e di f f er ent . I f we hear d t hat someone bel i eved t hat t hei r ver y own pant s wer e on f i r e, we woul d expect t hat somet hi ng l i ke t hi s happened. Fi r st , t hey dr opped an ash f r om a pi pe i nt o t hei r own l ap, or st ood t oo cl ose t o a f i r epl ace, or somet hi ng l i ke t hat . Then t hey f el t some unaccust omed war mt h i n t hei r net her r egi ons. Then per haps t hey smel l ed somet hi ng l i ke wool or cot t on or r ayon bur ni ng. Then t hey l ooked down' wher e t hi ngs wer e heat i ng up, and sawt he smoke. Those ar e t ypi cal causes of t he st at e one i s i n when
Ri p van Wi nkl e and Ot her Char act er s 21 one says, " My pant s ar e on f i r e. " The t ypi cal ef f ect s woul d i ncl ude st r ong emot i ons l i ke f ear , and at t empt s t o douse onesel f wi t h wat er or put out t he f i r e i n some ot her way, and sayi ng, " My pant s ar e on f i r e. " Nowconsi der t he st at e Kapl an was i n when he sawt he man i n t he mi r r or , who j ust happened t o be hi m, wi t h hi s pant s on f i r e. Thi s st at e i s t ypi cal l y caused by seei ng smoke and f l ames er upt f r omt he t r ouser s of someone st andi ng i n f r ont of one. I t t ypi cal l y l eads t o concer n and t he at t empt t o hel p and shout i ng, " Hi s pant s ar e on f i r e. " So t he t ypi cal causes of t hi s st at e ar e qui t e di f f er ent f r omt hat of t he f i r st st at e. Next , not e t hat t hese di f f er ent bel i ef st at es do not l i ne up di r ect l y wi t h pr oposi t i ons bel i eved, so t her e i s not a si mpl e and di r ect meshi ng bet ween causal r ol e and cont ent . W e can i magi ne a l ot of peopl e bei ng i n t he " My pant s ar e on f i r e" bel i ef st at e; t hey woul dn' t t her eby bel i eve t he same pr oposi t i ons. Kapl an woul d bel i eve t hat Kapl an' s pant s wer e on f i r e, Sear l e woul d bel i eve t hat Sear l e' s pant s wer e on f i r e, and so f or t h. And we can i magi ne a l ot of peopl e bei ng i n t he " Hi s pant s ar e on f i r e" st at e. They al l have somet hi ng i n common, but i t ) not what t hey bel i eve- i t ' s not t he cont ent . They woul d bel i eve qui t e di f f er ent pr oposi t i ons, dependi ng on whomt hey wer e l ooki ng at . At t hi s poi nt , i t i s ver y hel pf ul t o post ul at e a l evel of meani ng f or bel i ef s t hat i s anal ogous t o but not der i ved f r om t hat of char act er f or sent enceschar act er s t hat i n f act ar e qui t e i ndependent of l anguage. Abel i ef wi l l have a cer t ai n cont ent because ( i ) i t has a cer t ai n char act er , and ( i i ) i t occur s i n a cer t ai n bel i ef cont ext - i t i s a bel i ef hel d by a cer t ai n per son, at a cer t ai n t i me, i n a cer t ai n pl ace, at t endi ng t o cer t ai n obj ect s, et c. The vi r t ue of t hi nki ng of a bel i ef i n t hi s way, i s t hat i t makes i nt el l i gi bl e howt hi s meshi ng bet ween causal r ol e andcont ent coul d t ake pl ace, i n a syst emat i c psychol ogy of cont ent , f or t hese char act er s wi l l cor r espond mor e cl osel y t o bel i ef st at es t han pr oposi t i ons do. Awi der cl ass of r ol es i s needed t o char act er i ze bel i ef s t han i s needed t o char act er i ze ut t er ances. W e not ed t hat t he char act er s t hat ar e associ at ed wi t h i ndexi cal s ar e based on ut t er ance- r el at i ve r ol es. These r ol es ar e based on r el at i ons obj ect s mi ght have t o a gi ven ut t er ance. To char act er i ze bel i ef s we need what we mi ght cal l t hought - r el at i ve or cogni t i ve r ol es. These r ol es ar e based on r el at i ons t hat an obj ect can have t o a gi ven epi sode of t hought or a par t i cul ar bel i ef , such as bei ng t he owner of t he t hought , ( t he sel f r ol e) ,
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bei ng at t ended t o by t he owner of i t , bei ng r emember ed by t he owner of i t , bei ng hel d i n t he r i ght hand of t he owner of i t , bei ng above t he owner of i t , bei ng sat on by t he owner of i t , and so f or t h. I ' l l i ndi cat e doxast i c char act er s by quot i ng t he sent ence a speaker mi ght use t o communi cat e t he bel i ef s one has under t he char act er . Of cour se t he char act er s of t hese sent ences ar e l i ngui st i c r at her t han doxast i c; I suppl ement t he i ndexi cal expr essi ons wi t h br acket ed mat er i al t o i dent i f y t he under l yi ng cogni t i ve r ol e i nvol ved. For exampl e, " t hat man { t he one I see] " and " t hat man [ t he one I r emember ] , " " I [ sel f ] " and " now [ t he moment of t hought ] . Ther e i s a di f f er ence bet ween r ef er r i ng t o someone as " you" and desi gnat i ng t hemwi t h t he phr ase " t he per son I am addr essi ng, " even t hough t he r ol e of bei ng t he addr essee i s i nvol ved i n bot h cases. W hen one r ef er s t o a per son as " you, " one does not say t hat one i s addr essi ng t hem; one expl oi t s t hat f act t o r ef er t o t hem. One can l ear n how t o use " you, " wi t hout bei ng abl e t o expl i ci t l y f or mul at e t he condi t i ons under whi ch a use of t hat wor d r ef er s t o a per son ( per haps because one has not t hought about i t , or has not yet at t ai ned t he concept s, such as t he concept of a wor d and t he concept of r ef er ence, t hat woul d be necessar y t o t hi nk about i t ) . Even so, one has some gr asp of t hese condi t i ons; one has some sor t of posi t i ve doxast i c at t i t ude t owar ds t he f act t hat a use of " you" r ef er s t o t he addr essee. But one may not be pr oper l y sai d t o bel i eve t hat t he r ef er ence of " you" i s t he addr essee. One knows howt o use " you" t o r ef er t o t he addr essee, even t hough one may not know t hat a use of " you" r ef er s t o t he addr essee. I n t hese cases, I say t hat one i s at t uned t o t he way " you" wor ks, Si mi l ar l y t her e i s a di f f er ence bet ween bei ng abl e t o t hi nk of a t hi ng or per son i n vi r t ue of some r ol e i t pl ays i n one' s l i f e, and bei ng abl e t o ar t i cul at e t hat r ol e i n t hought or speech and t hi nk of i t as t he t hi ng or per son pl ayi ng t hat r ol e i n one' s l i f e. Consi der a chi l d, who i s t hi nki ng about a dog t hat she sawan hour or so bef or e. She has a cer t ai n memor y of t he dog, and i t i s i n vi r t ue of t hi s memor y t hat she i s abl e t o t hi nk of t he dog. I woul d r epr esent t he char act er of her t hought wi t h " That one I r emember ] [ t he dog was ver y cut e. " Thi s i s not t he same as " The I r em ember was t hi nki ng dog ver y cut e. " The chi l d mi ght l ack t he concept s needed t o t hi nk t hi s t hought ; even i f she has t hem, i t may t ake a bi t of t i me and wi t t o f i gur e out t hat t he dog can be char act er i zed as t he one she r emember s. St i l l , t he chi l d woul d be at t uned t o t he f act t hat t he dog she i s t hi nki ng of i s one t hat she r emember s, i n t hat she woul d know howt o consul t her memor y f or mor e i nf or mat i on
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about t he dog: t o f i nd t he dog she woul d go back t o wher e she had l ast seen i t , f or exampl e. e i magNowl et ' s r et ur n once agai n t o Kapl an and hi s bur ni ng pant s. W med Kapl an maki ng t wo set s of obser vat i ons of hi s own bur ni ng t r ouser s. W e i magi ned hi musi ng t he sent ences, " My pant s ar e on f i r e" and " Hi s pant s ar e on f i r e, " t o expr ess what he bel i eved. But he mi ght make t he obser vat i ons, and acqui r e t he bel i ef s, wi t hout sayi ng anyt hi ng. Even i f t hey don' t l ead t o di st i nct ut t er ances, t he bel i ef st at es ar e qui t e di f f er ent . I f Kapl an not i ces t hat hi s pant s ar e on f i r e i n t he usual way, he wi l l be i n qui t e a di f f er ent st at e t han i f he not i ces a man wi t h bur ni ng pant s i n a mi r r or . The di f f er ence i n t he act i ons he woul d t ake i n t hese ci r cumst ances, i ncl udi ng t he di f f er ence i n sent ences he woul d ut t er i f he wer e t o put what he not i ced i nt o wor ds, r ef l ect s a di f f er ence i n bel i ef s. The concept of bel i evi ng under a char act er i s i nt ended t o capt ur e t hi s di f f er ence. The di f f er ence i n bel i ef woul d be t her e, even i f Kapl an di dn' t say anyt hi ng. And t he di f f er ence bet ween t he t wo cases i s not t he pr oposi t i on t hat i s bel i eved, but t he char act er under whi ch i t i s bel i eved. Ther e ar e t wo char act er s her e, one cor r espondi ng t o t hat of " My[ sel f ] pant s ar e on f i r e" and one cor r espondi ng t o t hat of " Hi s [ t he man I aml ooki ng at ] pant s ar e on f i r e. " These char act er s come much cl oser t o l i ni ng up wi t h causal r ol es t han do t he pr oposi t i ons bel i eved. Thus t wo t hi ngs st and out at t he l evel of char act er t hat get obl i t er at ed at t he l evel of cont ent . Fi r st , t he di f f er ence i n causal r ol e of t he t wo bel i ef s. Sec- / ( ond, t he common nat ur e t hat di f f er ent bel i ef s wi t h di f f er ent cont ent s j) bel ongi ng t o di f f er ent peopl e at di f f er ent t i mes mi ght have, and i n vi r t ue of whi ch t hese di f f er ent si t uat i ons mi ght i nst ant i at e t he same psychol ogy of cont ent . Recal l t he di st i nct i on bet ween f l i ght y and l oyal char act er s f r omour di scussi on of l i ngui st i c char act er s. Loyal char act er s yi el d t he same cont ent f r omany cont ext ; t hese char act er s ar e t he sor t t hat bel ong t o sent ences t hat don' t cont ai n i ndexi cal s. Fl i ght y char act er s yi el d di f f er ent cont ent s i n di f f er ent cont ext s; t hese char act er s ar e t he sor t t hat bel ong t o sent ences t hat cont am i ndexi cal s. The same di st i nct i on appl i es t o doxast i c char act er s. " Davi d Kapl an has bur ni ng pant s at 4 p. m. on Jul y 4, 1996" i s a ver y l oyal char act er ; " I [ sel f ] have bur ni ng pant s now [ t he pr esent moment ] " i s a ver y f l i ght y char act er , expr essi ng a di f f er ent pr oposi t i on wi t h each var i at i on i n t i me or t hi nker . I f we know t hat an ut t er ance ent ence wi t h a f l i ght y char act er
I
a/
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expr esses a cer t ai n pr oposi t i on, we may knowqui t e a bi t about t he cont ext i n whi ch t he ut t er ance occur r ed. I f an ut t er ance of " I ama l ogi ci an" has t he cont ent t hat Davi d Kapl an i s a l ogi ci an, t hen t he speaker must be Davi d Kapl an. I f an ut t er ance of " That man wor ks f or Mi cr osof t now" has t he cont ent t hat El wood Fr i t chey wor ks f or Mi cr osof t on Oct ober 27, 1995, t hen t he ut t er ance occur r ed on Oct ober 27 and t he speaker was someone i n a posi t i on t o demonst r at e El wood Fr i t chey. The obj ect s t hat get r ef er r ed t o by t he i ndexi cal s must be pl ayi ng cer t ai n l i ngui st i c r ol es, and hence cer t ai n r ol es i n t he l i f e of t he speaker . The same i s t r ue wi t h bel i ef s. 1f f bel i eve t hat Davi d Kapl an has bur ni ng pant s under t he char act er " t hat man [ t he one I see] has bur ni ng pant s, " t hen I must be l ooki ng at Davi d Kapl an. I f anyone bel i eves t hat pr oposi t i on under t he char act er " I ( sel f ] have bur ni ng pant s, " t hat per son must be Davi d Kapl an. I f my bel i ef s ar e under char act er s, i t seems t hat many of t he char act er s t hey ar e under ar e ver y l oyal and not ver y f l i ght y. Ri ght nowI bel i eve t hat Davi d Kapl an i s a l ogi ci an. I amnot speaki ng t o hi m, seei ng hi m, or hear i ng hi mr i ght now. He i s pl ayi ng no r ol e i n m y l i f e t hat woul d enabl e me t o r ef er hi m by ut t er i ng " you" or by demonst r at i ng hi mand ut t er i ng " he. " W hat char act er do I bel i eve t hese t hi ngs under , and what i s t he poi nt of such bel i ef s? W hat causal r ol e, i f any, do t hey have? W hy do peopl e have such bel i ef s, and why do ot her s car e whet her or not t hey do? 4. I nf or mat i on Games W e ended each of t he l ast t wo sect i ons by wonder i ng about l oyal char act er s. W hy do we want sent ences t hat have l oyal char act er s- what use do we have f or such speci al pur pose t ool s? And what sor t s of bel i ef s have l oyal char act er s, and why ar e t hey i mpor t ant ? To consi der t hese quest i ons, I want t o i nt r oduce t he concept of an i nf or mat i on game. An i nf or mat i on game i nvol ves t he acqui si t i on and l at er appl i cat i on of a bel i ef about an i ndi vi dual . That i s, at some t i me one comes t o bel i eve somet hi ng about some per son or obj ect . Then, l at er , t hat bel i ef gui des one' s behavi or t owar ds t hat obj ect or at l east an obj ect t hat one t akes t o be t he same as i t . I cal l t he obj ect about whi ch one acqui r es t he bel i ef t he sour ce. 5 I cal l t he obj ect t o whi ch one appl i es t he bel i ef - t he obj ect one t akes t o be t he 5.
See Evans ( 1973) f or t he t er m" sour ce" used i n mor e or l ess t hi s way.
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sour ce- t he appl i candum. I n any i nf or mat i on game, one f aces t he pr obl em of maki ng r easonabl y sur e t hat t he sour ce i s t he appl i candum. Suppose I meet El wood Fr i t chey at a par t y; he t el l s me he i s a pr ogr ammer f or Mi cr osof t and I bel i eve hi m. So I acqui r e a bel i ef . Lat er I ask hi mi f he knows why t he Maci nt osh ver si on of W or d 6. 0 wor ks so sl owl y. I di r ect t hi s quest i on t o hi mbecause I bel i eve hi mt o be a Mi cr osof t pr ogr ammer . I f I di dn' t bel i eve t hat , I woul dn' t ask hi m. I t doesn' t make much sense t o ask some r andom per son t hi s quest i on. M y bel i ef t hat he i s a Mi cr osof t pr ogr ammer i s par t of t he r eason I ask hi m; my aski ng hi mi s an appl i cat i on of t he bel i ef . I n an i nf or mat i on game I acqui r e a bel i ef , and t hen l at er I appl y t he bel i ef I acqui r ed t o a cer t ai n obj ect : because I have t he bel i ef , and t ake t he obj ect t o be t he one t he bel i ef i s about , I deal wi t h i t i n a cer t ai n way. I n t hi s case, I ask a per son a cer t ai n quest i on, because I t hi nk he i s i n a posi t i on t o knowt he answer . I wi l l descr i be ei ght i nf or mat i on games, whi ch I cal l " st r ai ght - t hr ough, " " t r acki ng, " " det ach- and- r ecogni ze, " " updat i ng, " " r ecol l ect i on, " " i nf er ence, " " pl anni ng, " and " communi cat i on. " I i nt r oduce t he f i r st t hr ee by consi der i ng t hr ee scenar i os f or what hap_pens i n bet ween my acqui r i ng t he bel i ef and my appl yi ng i t . Fi r st , vi r t ual l y not hi ng comes bet ween. I am t al ki ng t o Fr i t chey, f ace t o f ace. He says t o me, " 1 ama pr ogr ammer at Mi cr osof t . " I acqui r e a bel i ef I woul d expr ess wi t h " You ar e a pr ogr ammer at Mi cr osof t . " I say, on t he basi s of t hat bel i ef , " W or d 6. 0 r un so sl owl y?" hy does t he Maci nt osh ver si on of W Thi s i s t he st r ai ght - t hr ough i nf or mat i on game. I st and i n a cer t ai n r el at i onshi p or f ami l y of r el at i onshi ps t o Fr i t chey. He i s i n f r ont of me; I am l ooki ng at hi m; I amt al ki ng t o hi m; he i s t al ki ng t o hen someone has t hese r el at i ons t o me, or as I shal l put i t , occupi es me. W t hese agent - r el at i ve r ol es i n my l i f e, I have ways of f i ndi ng out i nf or mat i on about hi m. ( I ' l l say t hat t her e ar c cpi st cmi c t echni ques associ at ed wi t h t he r ol e, or f or shor t , t hat i t i s an epi st emi c r ol e. ) I can l ook, and I can ask and l i st en t o t he answer , t o ment i on t he most obvi ous ways of gat her i ng i nf or mat i on about t he per son one i s t al ki ng t o f ace- t o- f ace. Ther e ar e al so ways of act i ng, t he success of whi ch wi l l t ur n on t he char act er i st i cs of t he per son t hat pl ays t hi s r ol e. ( I ' l l say t hat t her e ar e pr agmat i c t echni ques associ at ed wi t h t he r ol e, or f or shor t t hat i t i s a pr agmat i c r ol e. ) The act i on of aski ng, or d 6. 0 wor k so sl owl y, " wi t h t he goal of f i ndi ng out t he "W hy does W
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answer , has a chance of bei ng successf ul i f t he per son I amt al ki ng t o i s a pr ogr ammer at Mi cr osof t . I n t he st r ai ght - t hr ough i nf or mat i on game, maki ng sur e t hat t he sour ce i s t he appl i candumi s not a bi g pr obl em. The epi st emi c r ol e and t he pr agmat i c r ol e ar e cl osel y associ at ed and t he t i me di f f er ence bet ween acqui si t i on and appl i cat i on i s ver y shor t . Ther e i s not t i me f or one obj ect t o cease t o pl ay i t and anot her obj ect t o t ake i t s pl ace. I n par t i cul ar , I don' t need t o know a l ot about Fr i t chey t o successf ul l y pl ay t he st r ai ght - t hr ough i nf or mat i on game. I don' t need t o knowhi s name, or have any way of r ecogni zi ng hi m. I j ust need t o be abl e t o t el l t hat onl y one obj ect pl ays t he r ol e i n quest i on i n my l i f e f or t he f ewmoment s i t t akes f or t he game t o be pl ayed. Second case. I br eak of f my conver sat i on wi t h Fr i t chey, af t er l ear ni ng t hat he i s a Mi cr osof t pr ogr ammer but bef or e aski ng hi mabout t he Maci nt osh ver si on of W or d 6. 0. But I keep my eye on hi mas he and I move our var i ous ways ar ound t he par t y. Ot her peopl e assume t he r ol e i n my l i f e t hat Fr i t chey had: t hat i s, I conver se wi t h t hem. Fr i t chey pl ays a successi on of r ol es: obj ect t o my l ef t , obj ect t o my r i ght , obj ect I am gl anci ng at . Lat er we end up f ace t o f ace and I ask hi m, " W or d 6, 0 r un so sl owl y. " hy does W Her e t he t ask of maki ng sur e t hat t he appl i candumi s t he sour ce i s mor e compl i cat ed. I have t o t r ack Fr i t chy, t o use anot her apt t er m of Evans' s ( Evans 1981) . Thi s r equi r es t hat I be abl e t o ascer t ai n t hat a si ngl e obj ect has pl ayed a successi on f r ol es i n my l i f e. Thi s r equi r es mor e t han i s r equi r ed f or t he st r ai ght - t hr ough l anguage game, but i t doesn' t r equi r e t hat I have t he abi l i t y t o r ecogni ze or r e- i dent i f y Fr i t chy i f I l ose t r ack of hi m. I n t he st r ai ght - t hr ough and t r acki ng games, t he pl ayer st ays at t ached t o t he sour ce, i n t he sense t hat he r emai ns i n an epi st emi c r el at i on t o t he sour ce f r omacqui si t i on t o appl i cat i on. I n t he st r ai ght - t hr ough game i t i s t he same r el at i on and vi r t ual l y t he same t i me. I n t he t r acki ng game i t i s a successi on of r el at i ons t hr ough an i nt er val of t i me. The t hi r d game I cal l t he " det ach- and- r ecogni ze" game. I l ear n t hat Fr i t chy i s a pr ogr ammer f or Mi cr osof t . Then I go home. I don' t seemhi m f or days or even year s. At some l at er poi nt I see hi magai n. I r ecogni ze hi m, r emember hi s j ob, and ask hi m, " W or d hy does t he Maci nt osh ver si on of W 6. 0 r un so sl owl y?" Af t er I l eave t he par t y, Fr i t chey i s not pl ayi ng an epi st emi c or pr agmat i c r ol e i n my l i f e. He i s of cour se st i l l r el at ed t o me. He i s a cer t ai n di st ance and
Ri p van Wi nkl e and Ot her Char act er s 27 di r ect i on f r omme, but I amnot awar e of i t ; i t i s not par t of my concept i on of hi m. Ther e ar e var i ous act i ons I coul d t ake t o f i nd out t hi ngs about hi m, or t o have an ef f ect on hi m. But t her e i s no si mpl e t echni que, l i ke l ooki ng or aski ng a quest i on t hat I can use t o f i nd out mor e about hi m, and no si mpl e t echni que l i ke t al ki ng t o hi mor shovi ng hi mor gest ur i ng t o hi mt hat I can use t o have an ef f ect on hi m. Never t hel ess, Fr i t chey st i l l does pl ay a r ol e i n my l i f e. He i s t he man of whoma cer t ai n t hought of mi ne i s a memor y. Thi s r ol e, t hi s r el at i on t o my t hought and t o me, gi ves me a way of t hi nki ng of hi m. I t i s a ver y l oyal char act er. I can car r y t he memor y wi t h me as I t r avel away f r om Fr i t chy and he f r om me; i t s bei ng a t hought of Fr i t chey depends on t he way I acqui r ed i t , but not on my pr esent ci r cumst ances. As an anal ogy, consi der t he not e I l ef t i n my copy of t he I nvest i gat i ons. I don' t r emember who wr ot e i t . The si gnat ur e i s har d t o make out . The wr i t i ng, never ver y l egi bl e, i s f aded. I n spi t e of al l t hi s, t he per son who pl ayed t he r ol e, " wr i t er of t hi s l et t er ' i s t he same as i t was t hi r t y year s ago. I t i s a ver y l oyal r ol e. Andt he sour ce of memor i es i s si mi l ar l y l oyal . I n such a case, what i s t he poi nt of cont i nui ng t o bel i eve anyt hi ng about Fr i t chey? I t doesn' t have much of a poi nt , unl ess t her e i s a good chance I wi l l encount er hi magai n and be abl e t o appl y t he bel i ef usef ul l y t hen. But of cour se t hi s i s somet hi ng we do a l ot . W e acqui r e a bel i ef about an obj ect at one t i me, when t he condi t i ons ar e f avor abl e f or doi ng so. W e appl y t he bel i ef at anot her t i me, under qui t e di f f er ent condi t i ons. These l at er condi t i ons mi ght make i t i mpossi bl e t o acqui r e t he i nf or mat i on i f we di d not al r eady have i t . Doi ng t hi s r equi r es t hat we be abl e t o r ecogni ze t he obj ect i n quest i on. Unl ess I r emember a l i t t l e bi t about Fr i t chey, so I can r ecogni ze hi mt he next t i me I see hi m, I won' t be i n a posi t i on t o use t he i nf or mat i on I have r et ai ned. The i nf or mat i on t hat we need, t o make det ach- and- r ecogni ze a vi abl e i nf or mat i on game, f al l s i nt o t wo cat egor i es. Ther e i s t he i nf or mat i on we wi l l use when we encount er t he obj ect agai n, t o deci de what t o do. The i nf or mat i on t hat Fr i t chey i s a pr ogr ammer f or Mi cr osof t i s what l eads me t o or d 6. 0. Cal l t hi s sor t of i nf or mat i on, " i nf or ask about t he sor r y st at e of W mat i on f or act i on. " But t her e i s al so " i nf or mat i on f or r ecogni t i on. " My t i dbi t of i nf or mat i on about Fr i t chey wi l l si t usel ess i n my br ai n, unl ess I r emember al so t hat he i s a bi g man wi t h a r ed bear d, et c. , i nf or mat i on t hat wi l l al l ow me t o r ecogni ze hi mnext t i me I meet hi m. Of cour se, t hese ar e di f f er ent
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f unct i ons or uses f or i nf or mat i on, not di f f er ent cat egor i es of i nf or mat i on i t sel f . I n many cases, a bi t of i nf or mat i on wi l l ser ve bot h pur poses. To be usef ul , t hen, a det ached bel i ef , l i ke t he bel i ef t hat Fr i t chey i s a pr ogr ammer f or Mi cr osof t , wi l l have t o be par t of a l ar ger f i l e on Fr i t chey. The addi t i onal el ement s i n t he f i l e pr ovi de t he f act s about hi mt hat mi ght enabl e me t o r ecogni ze hi m. Never t hel ess, t her e i s no guar ant ee t hat bel i ef s wi l l be usef ul . Consi der my bel i ef t hat Fr i t chey was a Mi cr osof t pr ogr ammer . Under what char act er do I cont i nue t o bel i eve t hi s, once I det ach f r om Fr i t chey and l eave t he par t y? Si mpl y t he char act er : That man [ t he sour ce of t he bel i ef ] was a pr ogr ammer f or Mi cr osof t t hen [ t he t i me t he bel i ef was r equi r ed] . The bel i ef i s si mi l ar t o t he not e I di scover ed i n my ol d copy of Wi t t genst ei n' s I nvest i gat i ons. By i t sel f , wi t hout connect i on t o and augment at i on f r om ot her sour ces, i t i s usel ess. Thi s bel i ef , by i t sel f , i ncl udes no i nf or mat i on about Fr i t chey' s name, f or exampl e, so I coul dn' t even use i t t o cont act hi mi f I had a di r ect or y of Mi cr osof t empl oyees. A bel i ef t hat i s det ached and vi r t ual l y usel ess can never t hel ess be qui t e consci ous, even vi vi d. The f r ust r at i on t hat such bel i ef s can engender i s wel l known, and we have l i ngui st i c devi ces f or expr essi ng t hem. The f ol l owi ng conver sat i on not onl y makes per f ect l y good sense, i t i s al l t oo f ami l i ar f or some of us: " Do you know any pr ogr ammer s f or Mi cr osof t ?" " Yes . . . uh, uh, what ' s- hi s- name was a pr ogr ammer f or Mi cr osof t . I don' t r emember hi s name. " "W hen di d you meet hi m?" " I ' mnot sur e. " "W her e di d you meet hi m. " " I don' t r emember t hat ei t her . I can' t r emember much of anyt hi ng about hi m, except t hat he was a pr ogr ammer f or Mi cr osof t . " " Thanks. " A bel i ef l i ke t hi s one, t ot al l y usel ess at one t i me, may become usef ul l at er . Recover ed memor i es, or out si de sour ces, may di scl ose mor e i nf or mat i on about t he per son I r emember . Then t he appar ent l y usel ess bi t of i nf or mat i on may pr ove qui t e usef ul .
29
The det ach- and- r ecogni ze game pr ovi des par t of t he answer t o our quest i on about t he poi nt of bel i ef s wi t h l oyal char act er s. Such bel i ef s ser ve as component s of l ar ger , usef ul , bel i ef s, when t he obj ect s t he bel i ef s ar e about ar e r ecogni zed. They ar e compl et i ons f or pr agmat i cal l y at t ached bel i ef s, br oken of f f r omear l i er epi st emi cal l y at t ached bel i ef s. 6 Det ached bel i ef s do not si mpl y si t i n our mi nds and gat her dust whi l e we wai t t o encount er t he obj ect s t hey ar e about . They ar e par t s of var i ous act i vi t i es t hat do not di r ect l y af f ect t he obj ect s t hey ar e about , but may have pr of ound i ndi r ect ef f ect s on t hem. W e use such bel i ef s i n f i ve addi t i onal i nf or mat i on games. I n t he r ecol l ect i on game, I t r y t o squeeze mor e i nf or mat i on out of my memor i es. I may have f or mul at ed t he expl i ci t bel i ef t hat Fr i t chey was a pr ogr ammer f or Mi cr osof t as I t al ked t o hi m; he l eaves and I det ach t he bel i ef , t hi nki ng of hi mas " t hat man [ t hat I r emember ] . " But associ at ed wi t h t he bel i ef , at l east f or a whi l e, ar e memor y i mages f r omwhi ch I can cul l some mor e bel i ef s, t hat may ai d i n r ecogni zi ng hi m- e. g. , t hat he had a r ed bear d and wor e gr een suspender s over a pl ai d shi r t and had an unusual f asci nat i on wi t h Tupper war e. I do not need t o be at t ached t o Fr i t chey t o r ecol l ect mor e about hi m, and I al so do not need t o be at t ached t o hi mt o pl ay t he i nf er ence game- t o dr aw i nf er ences on t he basi s of my bel i ef s about hi m. I combi ne t hese bel i ef s wi t h ot her bel i ef s I have, t o f l esh out my concept i on of Fr i t chey. Gi ven hi s j ob, I i nf er t hat he i s br i ght and l i kes comput er s. Gi ven hi s dr ess, I assume t hat he i s happy i n Seat t l e and enj oys bei ng out door s. Gi ven t hat he wor ked f or Mi cr osof t when I t al ked t o hi m, I i nf er t hat he wi l l pr obabl y cont i nue t o do so f or some l engt h of t i me. I cal l a r at her speci al ki nd of i nf er ence updat i ng. Thi s i s an i nf er ence made not on t he basi s of obser ved or i nf er r ed movement s or changes i n t he t hi ng my bel i ef i s about , but on t he basi s of changes i n my own si t uat i on, or hen I meet Fr i t chey, I t hi nk gener al changes, l i ke t he passage of t i me. W 6.
What we have descr i bed so f ar i s per haps t he mai n var i at i on on t he det ach- andr ecogni ze i nf or mat i on game. Ther e i s a sour ce of my bel i ef , or of my f i l e of bel i ef s, about a cer t ai n per son. But we can al so have sour cel ess f i l es. Somet i mes we can f i gur e out qui t e a bi t about an obj ect t hat meet s a cer t ai n descr i pt i on, and wor k up a " f i l e" about i t , even t hough we have never encount er ed i t or communi cat ed wi t h anyone t hat has. I n t hi s case, once we have done t he r easoni ng, we ar e l ef t i n a si t uat i on anal ogous t o havi ng exami ned a sour ce.
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" Thi s man [ t he man I see] i s a pr ogr ammer at Mi cr osof t now [ t he t i me of t he t hought ] . " Lat er I t hi nk " That man [ t he man I r emember ] was a pr ogr ammer at Mi cr osof t t hen [ t he t i me I r emember [ . " The change f r om" now t i me of t he t hought ] " t o " t hen [ t he t i me of t he t hought [ " does not r ep[ [ t he r esent an i nf er ence about howFr i t chey has changed si nce I l ast saw hi m. I amj ust updat i ng; changi ng t he char act er i n a way t hat pr eser ves t he cont ent , gi ven t he new ci r cumst ance of bel i ef . Thi s updat e i s qui t e di f f er ent f r om anot her addi t i onal t hought I may have. Gi ven t he r el at i ve per manence of j obs at Mi cr osof t , I may f i gur e at the l at er t i me " That man [ t he man I r emember ] i s a pr ogr ammer at Mi cr osof t now [ t he moment of t hought ] . " Thi s i s not an updat e t hat pr eser ves t he previ ousl y bel i eved cont ent , but an i nf er ence- al t hough per haps one t hat i s not ver y r i sky, i f t he t i me i nt er val i s short. I t i s possi bl e t hat I have met Fr i t chey bef or e. Or per haps I have r ead an ar t i cl e about hi m- l et ' s suppose he has been i nvol ved i n t he Seat t l e Commons pr oj ect and was pi ct ur ed and br i ef l y descr i bed i n an ar t i cl e about i t . I al r eady have some concept of hi m. Upon r ef l ect i on, I may f i nd t hat t hi s concept f i t s t he man I t hought I had j ust met f or t he f i r st t i me t oo ni cel y t o be coi nci dent al , and concl ude t hat Fr i t chey i s t he man I r ead about. W hen I r ead about Fr i t chey i n t he paper , I was pl ayi ng t he communi cat i on i nf or mat i on game. Someone el se had met hi mand t al ked t o hi mand t aken hi s pi ct ur e. They had been i n an epi st emi c r el at i on t o hi m, and acqui r ed i nf or mat i on about hi m. The i nf or mat i on I get i s det ached. W hen I r ead about Fr i t chey, he pl ays a speci al sor t of epi st emi c r ol e in l i my f e, one medi at ed by symbol s. He was t he man I was r eadi ng about ; the man r ef er r ed t o by t he wor ds I sawi n t he paper . W hen I qui t r eadi ng the paper , I cont i nued t o have bel i ef s about hi m- det ached bel i ef s. For a whi l e, my bel i ef s about Fr i t chey may have been t i ed t o memor i es of t he ar t i cl e or t he paper . But of t en we r et ai n bel i ef s about a per son or t hi ngs we have encount er ed or r ead about , l ong af t er t he memor i es of t he per cept i ons, conver sat i ons or t ext f r omwhi ch we l ear ned about t hemhave f aded t o i nsi gni f i cance. The r ol e t hese obj ect s pl ay i n our l i ves i s j ust t hat of bei ng t he source of t he bel i ef s we have about them. Thebel i ef s I gai ned about Fr i t chey f r om r eadi ng t he ar t i cl e may be qui te det ached and f r agment ar y. Per haps I don' t r emember hi s name; I j ust have a concept of a manwhowas a pr ogr ammer at Mi cr osof t , wor ked on t he Commons, wor e gr een suspender s, and had a bi t of an odd name t hat r emi nded
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me of a Br i t i sh Rock St ar of an ear l i er er a. Such bel i ef s woul d seemqui t e usel ess. But t her e coul d he enough t her e t o make a pr et t y pl ausi bl e conj ect ur e, goi ng over t hi ngs af t er meet i ng Fr i t chey at t he par t y, t hat i t was t he same man. And t hen I woul d have a bel i ef t hat , next t i me I met Fr i t chey, coul d l ead t o a quest i on about hi s wor k on t he Commons, as wel l as t he one about W or d 6. 0. The f r agment ar y bel i ef s t ur n out t o be usef ul af t er al l . So now I am si t t i ng at home. I acqui r ed and det ached a bel i ef about Fr i t chey. I have r ecol l ect ed and i nf er r ed. And nowI i nt end t o ask hi m, next t i me I see hi m, about W or d 6. 0 and Seat t l e Commons. I amnot nowi n a t o do t posi t i on anyt hi ng o hi mdi r ect l y; he pl ays no pr agmat i c r ol e i n my l i f e at t he moment . But he wi l l , and I amf or mi ng pl ans about what t o do t hen- pl ayi ng t he pl anni ng i nf or mat i on game. Al l of t hese l ast f i ve games, r ecol l ect i on, i nf er ence, updat i ng, communi cat i on and pl anni ng, coul d he pl ayed whi l e I was st i l l at t ached, epi st emi cal l y or pr agmat i cal l y, t o Fr i t chey. But our mai n i nt er est i n t hemi s t hat t hey can be pl ayed wi t h det ached bel i ef s, bel i ef s wi t h l oyal char act er s, and hel p us see t he poi nt of havi ng such bel i ef s. Bel i ef s wi t h l oyal char act er s t hen have a causal r ol e t hat has t o do wi t h t he ki nds of i nf er ences and pl ans t hey l ead t o, and t hei r ef f ect s on act i on when combi ned wi t h ot her at t ached bel i ef s. 7 5. Mi si dent i f i cat i on
Suppose t hat a f ew days l at er I mi st akenl y t ake someone el se t o he El wood Fr i t chey- El wood' s br ot her Al phonse, say. I see Al phonse, as t al l and r ed- bear ded as El wood i s, one day at t he f eed l ot . " El wood, " I say, t al kor d 6. 0 r un i ng di r ect l y t o Al phonse, " W hy does t he Maci nt osh ver si on of W so sl owl y?" her e I have not onl y l ost t r ack of El wood, I have appl i ed my El wood bel i ef t o someone el se. Thi s i s no r eason t o say t hat I have l ost t he bel i ef . My bel i ef , t he one I acqui r ed at t he par t y, t hat El wood i s a Mi cr osof t pr ogr ammer , i s par t of t he expl anat i on f or my quest i on t o Al phonse- i t i s a mi sappl i cat i on of t hat ver y bel i ef . Si nce t he bel i ef expl ai ns t he mi st ake, t he mi st ake can har dl y he r eason f or supposi ng t he bel i ef t o have been l ost . I asked Al phonse t he quest i on, 7.
1 amher e concer ned wi t h what seems t o be a r at her basi c par t of our concept ual scheme, bel i ef s about i ndi vi dual t hi ngs and peopl e. Per haps as an expl i ci t di scl ai mer I shoul d not e t hat t her e ar e ot her i mpor t ant cl asses of bel i ef s t o whi ch such det ached bel i ef s ar e r el evant . For exampl e, a det ached bel i ef can ser ve as a conf i r mi ng i nst ance or a count er exampl e t o a gener al i zat i on.
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because I bel i eved t hat El wood was a pr ogr ammer at Mi cr osof t , and I t ook Al phonse t o be El wood. Suppose I say, by way of expl ai ni ng my quest i on t o t he puzzl ed l ooki ng Al phonse: " You ar e El wood Fr i t chey, t he Mi cr osof t Pr ogr ammer . " Thi s woul d be an i ndi r ect speech act , aski ng hi mi f i ndeed he was El wood. But consi der t he l i t er al st at ement I make. Cl ear l y i t i s f al se. The f act t hat I i nt end t o be speaki ng t o El wood and expr essi ng a bel i ef about El wood does not change t he f act t hat t he per son who i s pl ayi ng t he r el evant l i ngui st i c r ol e i n my l i f e i s Al phonse. Do I have, at t hi s poi nt , a bel i ef i n t he si ngul ar pr oposi t i on, t hat Al phonse Fr i t chey i s a Mi cr osof t Pr ogr ammer or t he pr oposi t i on t hat El wood i s Al phonse? I have sai d t hese t hi ngs, but do I bel i eve t hem? I t i s not necessar y t o say t hat I do. These bel i ef s ar e not r equi r ed t o expl ai n my quest i on; i t ' (
i s adequat el y expl ai ned by my t r ue bel i ef about El wood Fr i t chey and my f al se bel i ef t hat I amt al ki ng t o El wood Fr i t ch/ . Those bel i ef s expl ai n why I t hi nk I can say somet hi ng t o and about El wood Fr i t chj by usi ng a sent ence / t hat cont ai ns " you. " Ther e ar e r easons f or sayi ng t hat I don' t bel i eve t hese pr oposi t i ons. W hen t he mi st ake i s di scover ed, I woul d qui t e nat ur al l y say, " I t hought you wer e El wood" or " I t ook you t o be Hl wood. " I t seems t hat not ever y posi t i ve doxast i c at t i t ude i s comf or t abl y descr i bed as a bel i ef . My mi st ake, i n t aki ng Al phonse t o be El wood, may l ead t o f al se bel i ef s, i f i t r emai ns undi scover ed. But i f i t i s si mpl y a f r ansi t or y t hought , my t r ue bel i ef about El wood and my f al se bel i ef t hat t hi s man was El wood suf f i ce t o expl ai n my f al se st at ement . 6. Thi nki ng about Days Det ach- and- r ecogni ze i s a r easonabl e st r at egy f or deal i ng wi t h t he f act t hat i ndi vi dual s come and go. They become i ndexi cal l y i naccessi bl e, cease t o pl ay any epi st emi c or pr agmat i c r ol e i n our l i f e f or a whi l e, and t hen r e- ent er i t agai n. I n t he meant i me, by det achment , we can r et ai n our bel i ef s, updat e t hem, use t hem as t he basi s of i nf er ences, make pl ans about f ut ur e i nt er act i ons and communi cat e wi t h ot her s. Keepi ng t r ack of t he r el at i ve l ocat i ons t hat t i mes and i mmobi l e t hi ngs have t o us i s easi er t han keepi ng t r ack of peopl e and ot her mobi l e t hi ngs, at l east i n pr i nci pl e. I f I keep t r ack of my own movement s i n space, t hen I can cor r ect f or t hose movement s and st i l l t hi nk of al l t he pl aces I have been and bui l di ngs and l andmar ks I have seen i n t er ms of t hei r r el at i ve di st ance and
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di r ect i on f r omme. But I don' t usual l y do t hi s. Ri ght now, f or exampl e, I am wor ki ng at my home. I r emember wal ki ng at Pal o Al t o' s Bayl ands a f ew hour s ago. I don' t t hi nk of t he Bayl ands i n t er ms of t hei r r el at i ve di st ance and di r ect i on f r om me. I coul dn' t say r i ght of f t he t op of my head whet her t hey wer e t o my l ef t or r i ght , i n f r ont or behi nd me. I f I want t o t hi nk of t hem as " over t her e" I woul d st op and consi der wher e I l i ve i n r el at i on t o t hem, and what my or i ent at i on i n my house i s, and f i gur e i t out f r omt her e. I mi ght do t hi s f or exampl e i f I saw some f i r ewor ks, and wonder ed i f t hey coul d be comi ng f r omt he Bayl ands- i f t he Bayl ands wer e over t her e [ wher e I aml ooki ng] . W e do a much bet t er j ob keepi ng t r ack of whet her each of our exper i ences l i es i n t he past , pr esent or f ut ur e. Thi s i s f ai r l y easy because t her e i s an exact cor r espondence bet ween t he mode of t hi nki ng about t he exper i ence ( r emember i ng i t or pl anni ng t o have i t or havi ng i t ) and i t s posi t i on i n t i me r el at i ve t o t he pr esent moment . But we don' t usual l y keep ver y pr eci se t r ack of event s i n t er ms of t hese cogni t i ve r ol es. I f I have an i mpor t ant appoi nt ment comi ng up, I wi l l def i ni t el y be awar e t hat i t i s i n t he f ut ur e and not t he past ; I wi l l pr obabl y r emember t he t i me. As t he day goes on I may occasi onal l y f i gur e out how l ong i t i s bef or e t he event . But I don' t r et ai n my bel i ef by const ant l y updat i ng i n t er ms of " mi nut es f r omnow?' I r emember t hat t he appoi nt ment i s at 5; [ l ook at t he cl ock and see t hat i t i s 3: 30, and t hen I t hi nk, " An hour ai / a hal f f r omnowI see t he dean" or somet hi ng l i ke t hat . " W e can t hi nk of " now [ t he pr esent t i me] and " t oday [ t he pr esent day] " as ways of t hi nki ng about days t hat ar e bot h pr agmat i cal l y and epi st emi cal l y at t ached. On Sept ember 1st I can f i nd out what Sept ember 1st i s l i ke i n Pal o Al t o by l ooki ng. On Sept ember 1st I can make Sept ember 1st a day on whi ch I t ake a wal k by t aki ng a wal k. 8 On Sept ember 2nd, I can no l onger make any changes i n what happens on Sept ember 1st . 9 I amnot pr agmat i cal l y at t ached. I amno l onger i n a posi t i on t o act i vel y expl or e Sept ember 1st . I am not epi st emi cal l y at t ached. I can, however , st i l l expl or e my own memor i es, and may f or mnewbel i ef s as a r esul t of t hat expl or at i on.
8. 9.
See Evans ( 1981) . Set t i ng asi de " Cambr i dge changes. " I can t al k about Sept ember 1st on Sept ember 2nd, t hus maki ng i t , what i t hadn' t been bef or e, a day t al ked about by me on Sept ember 2nd. But t hi s doesn' t change what Sept ember 1st was l i ke; i t doesn' t change what happened on t hat day.
Ri p van Wi nkl e and Ot her Char act er s
34 Eur opean Revi ewof Phi l osophy Howabout t omor r ow? I amnot pr agmat i cal l y at t ached t o t omor r ow. I can' t do anyt hi ng t oday t hat wi l l di r ect l y change what happens t omor r ow. I can i ndi r ect l y af f ect t omor r ow by maki ng changes t oday i n mysel f and ot her s t hat wi l l have an ef f ect t omor r ow. I can pl an a t r i p t o a concer t , or cal l a meet i ng. And I am not now per cei vi ng t omor r ow' s event s; I am not epi st emi cal l y at t ached. I f I amnot now, and never have been, epi st emi cal l y or pr agmat i cal l y at t ached t o t omor r ow, howcan I t hi nk about t omor r ow, r eason about i t , make pl ans f or i t , and t he l i ke? Our syst em of dat es pr ovi des det ached ways of t hi nki ng about days t hat we have not yet encount er ed. Thi s syst em expl oi t s i mpor t ant met aphysi cal di f f er ences bet ween days on t he one hand and t hi ngs and peopl e on t he ot her . W e can syst emat i cal l y t al k about days we have not encount er ed and keep t r ack of t hemi n our t hought s and pl ans, si mpl y i n vi r t ue of t hei r posi t i on i n t he sequence of days, as r ef l ect ed by t he cal endar . Thi s i s i n par t because days ar e connect ed t o one anot her i n a l i near , pr edi ct abl e, f ashi on, dependent onl y on t he most gener al f act s t hat ci r cumscr i be exi st ence on ear t h. I t i s i n par t because of t he somewhat puzzl i ng f act t hat t he dat e of a day, i t s posi t i on i n t he cal endar , al t hough seemi ngl y a r el at i onal f act about i t , seems al so t o be i t s most essent i al f eat ur e. W e can hol d a day i n our modal e can i magi nat i on and change ever yt hi ng about what happens on t hat day. W suppose t hat al l sor t s of t hi ngs wi l l happen on Jul y 4, 1997; we can coher e can even ent l y i magi ne Jul y 4, 1767 havi ng been qui t e di f f er ent t han i t i s. W suppose t hat ever yt hi ng t hat wi l l happen on Jul y 4, 1997 coul d have happened i nst ead on Jul y 4, 1767, due t o t he absence of some sequence of event s a coupl e of mi l l i on year s ago t hat del ayed ever yt hi ng 230 year s. ( I n t hi s case, of cour se, Jul y 4, 1767 woul d be cal l ed " Jul y 4, 1997. " ) But we cannot consi der a gi ven day as bei ng i n a di f f er ent pl ace i n t he or der of days t han i t act ual l y i s. At l east i t i s not easy. Can next Jul y 4t h he a sour ce of my t hought s? No, f or i t l i es i n t he f ut ur e, and cannot be par t of t he cause of my bel i ef s. But I can have a sour ccl ess det ached bel i ef about next Jul y 4t h. The combi nat i on of our syst em of dat i ng, our hol i days and our t r adi t i ons al l ows me t o f i gur e out qui t e a hi t about next Jul y 4t h, even t hough I have not causal l y i nt er act ed wi t h i t . 10
10. 1 do not deny t hat we can and do have sour cel ess bel i ef s about per sons and
t hi ngs as wel l as t i mes and pl aces.
35
e Consi der what i s i nvol ved i n a si mpl e mat t er of ar r angi ng a meet i ng. W deci de t o meet on a cer t ai n day- say t wo weeks hence. The deci si on i s r ecor ded on a cal endar . At t hi s poi nt I amnot i n a pr agmat i c r el at i on t o t he day. I have made a pl an f or what wi l l happen on t he day, but I cannot make i t happen. I can' t at t end or not at t end t he meet i ng unt i l t he day i t sel f ar r i ves. The t ask of r ecogni zi ng a day i s di sanal ogous i n many ways t o r ecogni zhen we can i dent i f y t oday, yest er day, or t omor r owby i t s i ng an i ndi vi dual . W dat e, i t i s because we have been keepi ng t r ack, or ar e expl oi t i ng someone el se ( l i ke t he newspaper publ i sher ) , who does. Not i ce her e t hat " keepi ng t r ack" does not mean f ol l owi ng a par t i cul ar day. To keep t r ack of t i me i s usual l y not t o pi ck out a day and t r ack i t , but t o be awar e of whi ch day i t i s. That i s, t o be awar e of t he i mpor t ant pr oper t i es of t he day t hat pl ays t he " t oday" r ol e- what t he dat e i s, what event s ar e pl anned, et c. To l ose t r ack of what day i t i s, means not knowi ng t hat t he day t hat pl ays t hat r ol e has some ot her i mpor t ant at t r i but es, l i ke bei ng one' s anni ver sar y or t he day a phi l osophy paper was pr omi sed t o an edi t or . For t he most par t , apar t f r omhuman act i vi t i es and human i nst i t ut i ons, l i ke cal endar s and t he dat es on newspaper s, days don' t have par t i cul ar f eat ur es, easi l y ascer t ai nabl e by t he or di nar y ci t i zen, t hat set t hem of f f r om hen Ri p awakes i n t he hi l l s, t her e ot her days, i n r oughl y t he same season. W i s not hi ng about t he l ook of t hi ngs t hat suggest s t hat i t i s a 1786 day r at her t han a 1766 day. I t ' s onl y when he get s t o t own, and obser ves humans and human ar t i f act s, t hat t hi ngs begi n t o not f i t . So nowl et us r evi ew t he anal ogi es and di sanal ogi es we have f ound i n t er ms of our i nf or mat i on games. Ther e ar e cl ear anal ogues, wi t h days, t o t he st r ai ght - t hr ough and t r acki ng games. Ther e i s not a di r ect anal ogue t o t he det ach- and- r ecogni ze game, si nce we cannot r e- encount er a day once t i me has l ef t i t behi nd. However , t he pecul i ar met aphysi cal st at us of days, t hat i s r ef l ect ed i n our syst em of dat es, and per mi t s us t o ar r i ve at sour cel ess bel i ef s about t hem, pr ovi des an al t er nat i ve r out e t o / def at h¬d- Xhi nki ng. det ached t hi nki ng, pl anni ng, i nf or mat i on exchange, and t he l i ke. Wi t h t hi s al l i n mi nd, l et us, f i nal l y, r et ur n t o Ri p Van Wi nkl e. 7. Ri p van W i nkl e
What shoul d we say about Ri p VanWi nkl e? Van Wi nkl e acqui r ed a bel i ef t he day he f el l asl eep- Jul y 3, 1766, Ri p bel i ef t hat t hat day was a f i ne day. He hel d t hi s bel i ef under t he char say- a
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act er " Today [ t he day of t hi s t hought ] i s ni ce. " Then he sl ept f or t went y year s and t wo days, unt i l Jul y 5, 1786, and wal ked back t o t own. 1' W hat happened next ? The possi bi l i t y t hat st r uck Kapl an and Evans i s t hat Ri p mer el y updat ed hi s bel i ef . On Jul y 3r d he never f or ms any expl i ci t bel i ef ot her t han " Today hen he awakes on Jul y 5t h, t he [ t he day of t hi s t hought ] i s a ni ce day. " W bel i ef i s updat ed, due t o hi s awar eness of havi ng sl ept t hr ough a ni ght , and hi s l ack of awar eness of havi ng sl ept t went y addi t i onal year s, t o " Yest er day [ t he day bef or e t he day of t hi s t hought ] was a ni ce day. " He f al l s out of epi st emi c cont act wi t h t he cur r ent day when he f al l s asl eep, but has a r eady- _ , , made char act er i n mi nd f or when he wakes up. But t hen what i s t her e l ef t of t he or i gi nal bel i ef except t he f al se one about Jul y 4t h? But t he f al se bel i ef can not be t he t r ue bel i ef , so hasn' t Ri p l ost t he bel i ef i n quest i on? Thi s seems t o be t he ar gument t hat t hr eat ened Kapl an and appeal ed t o Evans. But even i n t he case of such t hi n updat i ng, t her e ar e backup char act er s f or Ri p t o hol d hi s bel i ef under . W hen Ri p bel i eves, t owar ds eveni ng, as i t dar k, of t hi s [ t he gr ows " Today day t hought ] was a ni ce day, " he has memor i es of seei ng t he f l ower s and f eel i ng t he sun, and so f or t h. So t he char act er , " That day [ t he day I r emember ] i s or was a ni ce day" i s avai l abl e t o sust ai n hi s bel i ef , when t he at t empt at updat i ng goes awr y. Even i f t hese memor i es f ade, t her e i s t he char act er , " That day [ t he day t hi s bel i ef was acqui r ed] i s or was a ni ce day. " So my vi ew i s t hi s. W hen he awakes on Jul y 5t h, Ri p updat es hi s bel i ef accor di ng t o hi s vi ew of howt he cont ext has changed. I l i s vi ew about t he change of cont ext i s mi st aken, and t he new char act er , " Yest er day [ t he day bef or e t he day of t hi s t hought ] was ni ce" i s not a way of bel i evi ng t he or i gi nal cont ent . But t hat i s no r eason t o say t hat Ri p has l ost hi s or i gi nal bel i ef . He r et ai ns i t under var i ous ot her backup char act er s. That ' s what I have t o say about Ri p; what about t he ot her concr et e char act er s t hat f i gur e i n our st or y, Fr ege, Kapl an and Evans?
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W e can' t pi n anyt hi ng much on Fr ege, f or we can' t hol d hi mr esponsi bl e f or t he st r at egy about bel i ef t hat hi s r emar k on sayi ng i nspi r ed. W e coul d consi der whet her he was r i ght about sayi ng, but we won' t do t hat i n t hi s essay. The st r at egy t hat Fr ege' s r emar k suggest ed t o Kapl an and Evans i s t hat r et ai ni ng bel i ef consi st s i n movi ng f r omf l i ght y char act er t o f l i ght y char act er i n ways t hat r ef l ect change i n cont ext . I t hi nk I have r ef ut ed t hat st r at egy. But my own st r at egy i s t he br oad i nt er pr et at i on of t he Fr ege- i nspi r ed one, gener al i zed and f r eed f r omi t s associ at i on wi t h hi s par t i cul ar exampl e. The det ach- and- r ecogni ze st r at egy f or handl i ng i nf or mat i on i t sel f embodi es a r egul ar t r ansi t i on, f r om st r ong char act er s t o l oyal char act er s and, when r ecogni t i on occur s, back t o st r ong char act er s. Thi s Fr ege- i nspi r ed doct r i ne, l i ke most , per haps, i s i nadequat e when const r ued nar r owl y, pl ausi bl e when gi ven a br oader i nt er pr et at i on. W e can' t f aul t Kapl an f or t hi nki ng t hat t her e was mor e t o be sai d about Van W i nkl e f or i n t hi s he was cor r ect . Evans was wr ong, I t hi nk, about Ri p and about Ri p Kapl an. But much of what I have sai d i s si mi l ar i n spi r i t t o i deas one f i nds i n t he body of hi s wor k. I wi l l end wi t h a coupl e of r emar ks on i nt er pr et i ng Evans. I n appr oachi ng Evans, i t seems t o me one must t r y t o separ at e hi s own i nf or mat i on- or i ent ed appr oach t o t hi ngs f r omt he devot i on t o a ver si on of Fr ege f i l t er ed t hr ough Davi dson t hat cr ops up nowand t hen, most especi al l y i n " Under st andi ng Demonst r at i ves' t he essay f r omwhi ch t he quot e above was t aken. Davi dson' s r el i ance on Tar ski and T- sent ences i n expl ai ni ng hi s vi ews on meani ng has i nspi r ed a t r adi t i on i n semant i cs t hat one mi ght cal l " homogeneous meani ng expl anat i on. " W e expl ai n t he meani ng of a sent ence by usi ng t he same sent ence, or one wi t h t he same meani ng. The wor k of Kapl an bel ongs squar el y i n t he t r adi t i on of " het er ogeneous meani ng expl anat i on. " One expl ai ns t he meani ng of a sent ence by showi ng, usi ng what ever l an-
11. Act ual l y, Kni cker bocker does not t el l us t he exact dat es, j ust t hat t he Decl ar at i on
guage one mi ght want , what sor t of t ool i t i s, howi t conveys var i ous t hi ngs i n var i ous ci r cumst ances. I magi ne t hat you ar e expl ai ni ng a Mer cat or pr oj ect i on map t o a chi l d.
asi de f r om t he possi bi l i t y of connect i ng humbl e anal yt i cal phi l osophy wi t h i mpor t ant l i t er at ur e, t he ext r a t went y year s doesn' t mat t er much.
One way of expl ai ni ng, per haps, i s t o use anot her Mer cat or pr oj ect i on map. A bet t er way i s t o use a gl obe. I t hi nk t he benef i t s of het er ogeneous over homogeneous expl anat i on ar e si mi l ar . As Davi dson hi msel f not es, t he homogeneous st r at egy wor ks wi t h i ndex-
of I ndependence and t he Amer i can Revol ut i on occur r ed whi l e Ri p sl ept . I ' ve added a day t o hi s t went y year sl eep f or exposi t or y conveni ence; t he i mpor t ant t hi ng i s t hat Ri p f el l asl eep on Jul y 3 and awoke on Jul y 5 t hi nki ng i t was Jul y 4;
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i nkl e and Ot her Char act er s Ri p van W
39
i cal s onl y when one supposes t hat t he semant i ci st ' s expl anat i on and t he st at ement expl ai ned ar e made by t he same per son at t he same t i me. , , One
1979. On t he l ogi c of demonst r at i ves. The Jour nal of Phi l osophi cal Logi c, 8: 81- 98. Repr i nt ed i n Mi dwest 1: 401- 412.
i nt er pr et at i on of " Under st andi ng Demonst r at i ves' i s t hat Evans t r i es, usi ng a var i et y of i deas t hat ar e i nt er est i ng i n t hei r own r i ght but ar e not necessar -
1989a. Demonst r at i ves. I n J. Al mog, et al . , eds. Themes Fr om Kapl an. New Yor k: Oxf or d Uni ver si t y Pr ess, pp. 481- 563.
of i ndexi cal s beyond t he speci al case i n whi ch i t wor ks. I t hi nk t hi s exper i ment f ai l s. And I al so t hi nk t hat t he i nf or mat i on- or i ent ed appr oach t hat one f i nds i n much of Evans wor k, and i n par t s of " Under st andi ng Demonst r at i ves' i s i l y wel l - sui t ed t o t he pur pose, t o ext end t he homogeneous t r eat ment
basi cal l y het er ogeneous i n i t s i mpl i cat i ons f or semant i cs.
Phi l osophy Depar t ment and CSLI St anf or d Uni ver si t y
Ref er ences Al mog, J. , J. Per r y, and f -I . Wet t st ei n, eds. 1989. Themes Fr om Kapl an. New Yor k: Oxf or d Uni ver si t y Pr ess. Bar wi se, J. and J. Per r y. 1983. Si t uat i ons and At t i t udes. Cambr i dge, MA: MI T- Br adf or d. Bur ks, A.
1949. I con, I ndex and Symbol . Phi l osophi cal and Phenomenol ogi cal Resear ch, vol . I X, no. 4, June 1949: 673- 689.
Cr i mmi ns, M . W 92. Tal k About Bel i ef s. Cambr i dge, MA: MI T- Br adf or d Books. Evans, G. 1973. The Causal Theor y of Names. Ar i st ot el i an Soci et y, Suppl ement ar y Vol ume 47, pp. 187- 208. 1981. Under st andi ng Demonst r at i ves. I n I -I . Par r et and J. Bouver esse, eds. Meani ng and Under st andi ng Ber l i n and NewYor k: Wal t er de Gr uyt er , pp. 280303. Repr i nt ed i n P. Your gr au, ed. Demonst r at i ves ( 1990) , pp. 71- 96. Fr ench, P. A. , T. E. Uehl i ng, Jr . , and H. K. Wet t st ci n, eds. 1979. Cont empor ar y I ' er specl i ves i n t he Phi l osophy of Language. . Mi nneapol i s: Uni ver si t y of Mi nnesot a Pr ess. I sr ael , D. , J. Per r y, and S. Tut i ya. 1993. Execut i ons, Mot i vat i ons and Accompl i shment s. The Phi l osophi cal Revi ew, Oct ober , 1993: 515- 540. Kapl an, U. 1978. t ) t hat . I n Mi dwest 1: 383- 400. Repr i nt ed i n P. Your gr au, ed. Demonst r at i ves ( 1990) , pp. 11- 33.
12.
See Per r y 1994, l ast sect i on.
19891) . Af t er t hought s. I n J. Al mog, et al , eds. Themes Fr om Kapl an. New Yor k: Oxf or d Uni ver si t y Pr ess, pp. 365- 614. Fer r y, J. I 979. The Pr obl emof t he Essent i al I ndexi cal , Nods 13, no. 1: 3- 21. Repr i nt ed i n J. Fer r y, The Pr obl emof t he Essent i al I ndexi cal and Ot her Essays ( 1993) , pp. 349. 1980. A Pr obl emabout Cont i nued Bel i ef . Paci f i c Phi l osophi cal Quar t er l y 61, no. 4: 317- 322. Repr i nt ed i n J. Per r y, The Pr obl emof t he Essent i al I ndexi cal and Ot her Essays ( 1993) , pp. 69- 90. 1993. The Pr obl em of t he Essent i al I ndexi cal and Ot her Essays NewYor k: Oxf or d Uni ver si t y Pr ess. 1994. Davi dson' s Sent ences and Wi t t genst ei n' s Bui l der s. APA Pr oceedi ngs. f or t hcomi ng. I ndexi cal s and Demonst r at i ves. I n B. Hal e and C. Wr i ght , eds. Compani on t o t he Phi l osophy of Language Oxf or d: Bl ackwel l . Rei chenhach, H. 1947.
50. Token- r ef l exi ve wor ds. I n El ement s of Symbol i c Logi c
NewYor k: The Fr ee Pr ess, pp. 284f f . Your gr au, P. , ed. 1990. Demonst r at i ves. Oxf or d: Oxf or d Uni ver si t y Pr ess.
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FRANc0I S RECANATI
The Dynami cs of Si t uat i ons
1. Ret ai ni ng cont ent t hr ough cont ext change 1. 1 Cogni t i ve dynami cs i f someone want s t o say t he same t oday as he expr essed yest er day usi ng t he wor d ' t oday: he must r epl ace t hi s wor d wi t h ' yest er day Al t hough t he t hought i s t he same i t s ver bal expr essi on must be di f f er ent so t hat t he sense, whi ch woul d ot her wi se be af f ect ed by t he di f f er i ng t i mes of ut t er ance, i s r eadj ust ed.
- Fr ege, " The Thought " I n t hi s wel l - known passage Fr ege dr aws a consequence f r om t he cont ext - sensi t i vi t y of nat ur al l anguage sent ences. Si nce t he same sent ence, wi t h t he same l i ngui st i c meani ng, can expr ess di f f er ent pr oposi t i ons i n di f f er ent cont ext s, we may have t o use a di f f er ent sent ence wi t h a di f f er ent l i ngui st i c meani ng i f we want t o expr ess t he same pr oposi t i on i n a changed cont ext . As Per r y and Kapl an emphasi zed, t he l anguage of t hought behaves si mi l ar l y: i n or der t o t hi nk t he same t hi ng t oday whi ch I t hought yest er day usi ng t he ment al wor d ' t oday, ' I must r epl ace t hi s wor d wi t h ' yest er day. ' Thi s r ai ses t he pr obl em of cogni t i ve dynami cs. I n or der t o r et ai n an at t i t ude ( e. g. , bel i ef ) t owar d a cer t ai n cont ent one may have t o change t he sent ence t hr ough whi ch t hat cont ent i s appr ehended. I t f ol l ows t hat r et ai ni ng a bel i ef cannot be equat ed wi t h keepi ng t he same sent ence i n one' s bel i ef box. Yet r et ai ni ng t he bel i ef i s not mer el y a mat t er of accept i ng, at t ' , a sent ence s' expr essi ng t he same cont ent whi ch was expr essed by t he sent ence s accept ed at t ; f or one may f ai l t o r eal i ze t hat s and s' expr ess t he same cont ent . Kapl an gi ves t he f ol l owi ng exampl e:
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has a t ense and a pr oper name. But i t i s l ess sensi t i ve t han t he sent ence I r ead on t he car d; i t has a const ant or near - const ant i nt er pr et at i on over a wi der r ange of change i n t he cont ext . I nt er pr et i ng down. Thi s i s t o f i nd a mor e sensi t i ve sent ence wi t h t he same i nt er pr et at i on. On a t r i p t o San Fr anci sco I r ead i n my Mobi l - Gui de, " San Fr anci sco has di l api dat ed cabl e car s. " I wr i t e on my not e- pad, " Thi s ci t y has di l api dat ed cabl e car s. " Or I t hi nk i t . But I do not get on t he cabl e car s I see. Lat er al i nt er pr et i ng. Thi s i s t o f i nd a sensi t i ve sent ence t o i nt er pr et a sensi t i ve sent ence. My f r i end shout s, " You ar e about t o be hi t by a r ock. " I t hi nk, " I am about t o be hi t by a r ock. " ( Per r y 1986a: 352)
I f i r st t hi nk " Hi s pant s ar e on f i r e. " I l at er r eal i ze " 1 amhe" and t hus come t o t hi nk " My pant s ar e on f i r e. " St i l l l at er , I deci de t hat I was wr ong i n t hi nki ng " I amhe" and concl ude " Hi s pant s wer e on f i r e. " I f , i n f act , I amhe, have I r et ai ned my bel i ef t hat m y pant s ar e on f i r e si mpl y because I bel i eve t he same cont ent , t hough under a di f f er ent char act er ? ( Kapl an 1989: 537n. )
The obvi ous answer t o t hi s r het or i cal quest i on i s ' No. ' To r et ai n a bel i ef i t i s not suf f i ci ent t o accept a sent ence s' expr essi ng t he same cont ent as t he pr evi ousl y accept ed sent ence. Ther e must be some speci al r el at i on bet ween t he newsent ence and t he ol d one- a speci al r el at i on whi ch i t i s t he busi ness of t he t heor y of cogni t i ve dynami cs t o i nvest i gat e. W hat I want t o do i n t hi s paper i s l ess t o f ur t her t he st udy of cogni t i ve dynami cs t han t o br oaden i t s scope. I want t o consi der a newdi mensi on of cont ext ual change, and t he speci f i c f or mof r et ent i on of cont ent t hat goes al ong wi t h i t .
1. 2 Hor i zont al and ver t i cal i nt er pr et i ng To ' r et ai n' t he cont ent of a speech or t hought epi sode even t hough t he cont ext changes, we must f i nd a sent ence expr essi ng t he same cont ent i n t he new cont ext . Thi s can he done i n t wo ways. I n Fr ege' s exampl e, ' t oday' i s r epl aced by ' yest er day; ' but i t coul d al so be r epl aced by an expl i ci t dat e ( e. g. , ' Wednesday' or ' t he t ent h of Mar ch' ) . Usi ng t he second met hod we make t he sent ence l ess cont ext - dependent i n or der t o f r ee i t f r om t he cont i ngenci es of t he or i gi nal cont ext . Usi ng t he f i r st met hod we keep t he degr ee of cont ext - sensi t i vi t y const ant but we compensat e f or t he change i n cont ext by a compl ement ar y l i ngui st i c change: we ' adj ust ' mdcxi cal s. The second met hod ( subst i t ut i ng names or dat es f or i ndexi cal s) cor r esponds t o Per r y' s not i on of ' i nt er pr et i ng up' whi l e t he f i r st met hod ( shi f t i ng i ndexi cal s) cor r esponds t o hi s ' l at er al i nt er pr et i ng: ' To i nt er pr et a sent ence hear d or r ead or ot her wi se appr ehended i s t o f i nd a sent ence wi t h t he same i nt er pr et at i on i n one' s own si t uat i on, as t he appr ehended sent ence had i n t he ut t er ance of or i gi n. Ne can di st i ngui sh sever al ki nds of i nt er pr et i ng. I nt er pr et i ng up. Thi s i s t o f i nd an i nt er pr et i ng sent ence wi t h a l ess sensi t i ve meani ng. My f r i end i n San Fr anci sco sends me a car d on whi ch he has wr i t t en, " Thi s ci t y has di l api dat ed cabl e car s. " I wr i t e i n t he dr af t of my t r avel - gui de: " San Fr anci sco has di l api dat ed cabl e car s. " Not e t hat t he sent ence I f i nd i s not i nsensi t i ve, I t
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Let us si mpl i f y t he t er mi nol ogy and t al k of ' ver t i cal i nt er pr et i ng' when what i s af f ect ed i s t he degr ee of cont ext - sensi t i vi t y of t he accept ed sent ence. I nt er pr et i ng up and down ar e t wo i nst ances of ver t i cal i nt er pr et i ng. I n cont r ast , l at er al ( or hor i zont al ) i nt er pr et i ng i s t he sor t of t hi ng Fr ege t al ks about : we go f r om" You ar e about t o be hi t " t o " I amabout t o be hi t " or f r om" I t ' s a l ovel y day t oday" t o " I t was a l ovel y day yest er day. "
1. 3 Ver t i cal i nt er pr et i ng and cont ext ual change Hor i zont al i nt er pr et i ng essent i al l y i nvol ves a change of cont ext . I t i s because t he cont ext changes t hat we have t o adj ust t he expr essi on i n or der t o mai nt ai n t he cont ent f i xed. The l i ngui st i c change compensat es f or t hat cont ext ual change, and i s j ust i f i ed onl y i nsof ar as t he l at t er occur s. I wi l l say t hat a l i ngui st i c change i s of t he ' compensat or y' var i et y whenever t he f ol l owi ng condi t i ons ar e sat i sf i ed: i)
Had t he accept ed sent ence been l ef t unchanged, t he change of cont ext woul d have caused a change i n t he expr essed cont ent .
ii)
Had t he cont ext been l ef t unchanged, t he change i n t he accept ed sent ence woul d have caused a change i n t he expr essed cont ent .
I t i s easy t o check t hat t he t wo condi t i ons ar e sat i sf i ed i n Fr ege' s exampl e. The or i gi nal sent ence " Today i s F" was appr opr i at e t o t he cont ext i n whi ch i t was t okened ( vi z. Wednesday) ; but i n a di f f er ent cont ext ( vi z. t he next day) t he same sent ence woul d expr ess a di f f er ent cont ent . To mai nt ai n t he cont ent f i xed, t he sent ence has t o be changed. Condi t i on ( i ) , t her ef or e, i s sat i sf i ed. The second condi t i on al so i s sat i sf i ed: t he changed sent ence " Yest er day was F" i s appr opr i at e t o t he newcont ext ( one day l at er ) ; but i f i t had been t okened i n t he or i gi nal cont ext ( Wednesday) t he expr essed cont ent woul d have been di f f er ent .
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W i t h ver t i cal i nt er pr et i ng, t he si t uat i on i s r at her di f f er ent , or so i t seems. Tr adi t i onal l y, ver t i cal i nt er pr et i ng i s not consi der ed as i nvol vi ng a change of cont ext at al l , but mer el y a change of wor di ng. W hat f ol l ows i s a pr i ma f aci e ar gument i n behal f of t he t r adi t i onal pi ct ur e. I n a gi ven cont ext , a gi ven cont ent can be expr essed i n t wo manner s: ei t her i n a cont ext - sensi t i ve manner or i n a cont ext - i nsensi t i ve manner . Ver t i cal i nt er pr et i ng i s mer el y t he t r ansi t i on f r omone manner of expr essi on t o t he ot her . Thus I can t hi nk " Today i s F, " r eal i ze t hat t oday i s Wednesday, and i nf er " Wednesday i s F. " The cont ext r emai ns what i t was: t he day of ut t er ance i s unchanged, i n cont r ast t o what happens i n Fr ege' s exampl e ( t he shi f t f r om ' t oday' t o ' yest er day' ) . Thi s shows t hat ver t i cal i nt er pr et i ng can t ake pl ace i n t he absence of cont ext ual change- i n such a way t hat t he f i r st condi t i on above does not appl y. Ver t i cal i nt er pr et i ng can al so t ake pl ace as a r esul t of cont ext change, as I poi nt ed out ear l i er : t o expr ess on Thur sday t he same cont ent t hat was expr essed by " Today i s F" on Wednesday, I may opt f or t he ver t i cal met hod and r ef er t o t he pr evi ous day as ' Wednesday Even i n t hat case, however , t he l i ngui st i c change i s not compensat or y; f or t he second condi t i on st at ed above i s not sat i sf i ed. Had t he cont ext been l ef t unchanged, t he change i n t he accept ed sent ence woul d not have caused a change i n t he expr essed cont ent . For ' i nt er pr et i ng up' i s a l i ngui st i c change whi ch mai nt ai ns cont ent f i xed whet her or not a change of cont ext occur s. Thi s ar gument suppor t s t he cl ai m t hat , i n cont r ast t o hor i zont al i nt er pr et i ng, ver t i cal i nt er pr et i ng i s de- coupl ed f r om cont ext ual change. Yet I bel i eve t hat i t i s not : ver t i cal i nt er pr et i ng, i n t he f r amewor k I wi l l set up, does i nvol ve a change of cont ext . ' Thi s concl usi on i s wel come, f or i t f aci l i t at es t heor et i cal uni f i cat i on. Ver t i cal i nt er pr et i ng has many char act er i st i cs i n common wi t h hor i zont al i nt er pr et i ng, and i t poses much t he same pr obl ems. I n par t i cul ar i t r ai ses t he pr obl em of cogni t i ve dynami cs. Thus we have no t r oubl e const r uct i ng a count er par t t o Kapl an' s exampl e i nvol vi ng ver t i cal r at her t han hor i zont al i nt er pr et i ng: I f i r st t hi nk " Today i s F. " I l at er r eal i ze " Today i s Wednesday" and t hus coni c t o t hi nk " Wednesday i s F. " St i l l l at er , I deci de t hat I was wr ong i n t hi nki ng " Today i s Wednesday" and concl ude " Today i s F. " I f , i n f act , t oday i s Wednesday, have I r et ai ned my bel i ef t hat Wednesday i s F si mpl y because I bel i eve t he same cont ent , t hough under a di f f er ent char act er ? 1. 4 Basi c ver t i cal i nt er pr et i ng
Ther e ar e t wo f or ms of ver t i cal i nt er pr et i ng, i l l ust r at ed by t he f ol l owi ng pi eces of r easoni ng: 1.
Evi dence f or t hat cl ai m wi l l be of f er ed onl y wi t h r espect t o basi c ver t i cal i nt er pr et i ng- t he speci f i c t opi c of t hi s paper .
The Dynami cs of Si t uat i ons
1)
Thi s ci t y has di l api dat ed cabl e car s Thi s ci t y = San Fr anci sco Er go: San Fr anci sco has di l api dat ed cabl e car s
2)
I t ' s r ai ni ng Thi s i s Par i s
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Er go: i t ' s r ai ni ng i n Par i s ( 1) i s Per r y' s exampl e of ' i nt er pr et i ng up. ' ( 2) i s a di f f er ent t ype of exampl e, whi ch I wi l l f ocus on i n t hi s paper . I t i l l ust r at es what I cal l ' basi c ver t i cal i nt er pr et i ng. ' I n bot h cases, we st ar t wi t h a cont ext - sensi t i ve sent ence: " I t ' s r ai ni ng, " or " Thi s ci t y has di l api dat ed cabl e car s. " The sent ence i s cont ext - sensi t i ve because a const i t uent of t he pr oposi t i on whi ch i t expr esses i s det er mi ned by t he cont ext . " Thi s ci t y has di l api dat ed cabl e car s: ' ut t er ed i n San Fr anci sco ( i n t he ci r cumst ances i magi ned by Per r y) , i s t r ue i f and onl y i f San Fr anci sco has di l api dat ed cabl e car s. San Fr anci sco i s a const i t uent of cont ent det er mi ned by t he cont ext . I n t he same way, when, at pl ace p, I l ook out t he wi ndowand say " I t ' s r ai ni ng, " what I say i s t r ue i f and onl y i f i t ' s r ai ni ng at p. I n bot h ( 1) and ( 2) , t he cont ext ual component of cont ent comes t o be obj ect i vel y desi gnat ed i n t he concl usi on. The di f f er ence bet ween ( 1) and ( 2) l i es i n t he manner i n whi ch t he cont ent of t he or i gi nal sent ence depends on t he cont ext . I n ( 1) , bef or e get t i ng t o be obj ect i vel y desi gnat ed ( i n t he concl usi on) , t he cont ext ual component of cont ent i s al r eady ' ar t i cul at ed: by means of t he i ndexi cal phr ase ' t hi s ci t y. ' That phr ase st ands f or San Fr anci sco. I t does so by vi r t ue of t wo f act or s: ( i ) a l i ngui st i c f act or - t he meani ng of t he phr ase ' t hi s ci t y; ' and ( i i ) a cont ext ual f act or - t he ci t y whi ch t he speaker mani f est s t he i nt ent i on t o demonst r at e. But i n ( 2) , t he cont ext - dependent const i t uent of cont ent i s not ar t i cul at ed at al l . I t i s det er mi ned by t he cont ext ual f act or al one. The not i on of an unar t i cul at ed const i t uent i s pr esent ed i n t hi s passage f r omPer r y: I t i s a r ai ny Sat ur day mor ni ng i n Pal o Al t o. I have pl ans f or t enni s. But my younger son l ooks out t he wi ndowand says, " I t i s r ai ni ng. " I go back t o sl eep. W hat my son sai d was t r ue, because i t was r ai ni ng i n Pal o Al t o. Ther e wer e al l sor t s of pl aces wher e i t wasn' t r ai ni ng: i t doesn' t j ust r ai n or not , i t r ai ns i n some pl aces whi l e not r ai ni ng i n ot her s. I n or der t o assi gn a t r ut h- val ue t o my son' s st at ement , as I j ust di d, I needed a pl ace. But no component of hi s st at ement st ood f or a pl ace. The ver b ' r ai ni ng' suppl i ed t he r el at i on r ai ns (t , p) - a dyadi c r el at i on bet ween t i mes and pl aces, as we have j ust not ed. The t ensed auxi l i ar y' i s'
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suppl i es a t i me, t he t i me at whi ch t he st at ement was made. ' I t ' doesn' t suppl y anyt hi ng, but i s j ust synt act i c f i l l er . So Pal o Al t o i s a const i t uent of t he cont ent of m y son' s r emar k, whi ch no component of hi s st at ement desi gnat es; i t i s an unar t i cul at ed const i t uent . ( Per r y 1986b: 2116)
Per r y cl ai ms, cor r ect l y, t hat t her e i s a di f f er ence bet ween " I t ' s r ai ni ng" and " I t ' s r ai ni ng her e?' The cont ent i s t he same: bot h ut t er ances ar e t r ue i f and onl y i f i t ' s r ai ni ng i n Pal o Al t o. I n bot h cases, Pal o Al t o i s a cont ext ual const i t uent of cont ent . But t hat const i t uent i s det er mi ned pur el y cont ext ual l y i n
one case, par t l y cont ext ual l y i n t he ot her case. 2 I n t he same paper ( p. 2 18) , Per r y makes a f ur t her cl ai m: t hat " I t ' s r ai ni ng her e" i s i nt er medi at e bet ween " I t ' s r ai ni ng" and " I t ' s r ai ni ng i n Par i s?' To go f r om" I t ' s r ai ni ng" t o " I t ' s r ai ni ng i n Par i s: ' we must f i r st conver t " I t ' s r ai ni ng" i nt o t he i ndexi cal t hought " I t ' s r ai ni ng her e?' Ent er t ai ni ng t he i ndexi eal t hought " I t ' s r ai ni ng her e" ( i n cont r ast t o t he pur e cont ext ual t hought " I t ' s r ai ni ng" ) al r eady i nvol ves r ef l ect i ng on t he r el evant aspect of t he cont ext ( t he pl ace wher e we ar e) and maki ng i t expl i ci t i n t he r epr esent at i on i t sel f . I f Per r y i s r i ght t he t r ansi t i on r epr esent ed i n ( 2) compr i ses f our st eps r at her t han t hr ee: a) b) c)
I t ' s r ai ni ng I t ' s r ai ni ng her e her e = Par i s
d)
Er go: I t ' s r ai ni ng i n Par i s
I n ( a) t he pl ace i s a pur el y cont ext ual const i t uent of cont ent . I n ( b) t hat const i t uent i s r ef l ect ed on and t hought about i n an egocent r i c manner . Then t he ' br i dgi ng t hought ' ( c) occur s, and t he egocent r i c f i l e i s l i nked t o an encycl opedi c one. The concl usi on ( d) i s an encycl opedi c t hought . 3 The st ep f r om ( h) t o ( d) i s an i nst ance of t he t r ansi t i on r epr esent ed i n ( 1) . The t r ansi t i on r epr esent ed i n ( 2) t her ef or e i s mor e compl ex t han and
2.
3.
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Eur opean Revi ew of Phi l osophy
Ar guabl y, t her e i s a cont i nuum bet ween pur e i ndexi eal i t y and unar t i cul at ed const i t uency. Demonst r at i ves f al l i n bet ween. The meani ng of a demonst r at i ve can be ver y poor ( as i n ' he' or ' t hat man' ) ; at l east i t does not det er mi ne t he r ef er ent , whi ch depends upon t he i nt ent i ons mani f est ed by t he speaker . That i s qui t e di f f er ent f r om' I' , wher e t her e i s a r ul e whose appl i cat i on does not have t o be l i censed by t he speaker ' s i nt ent i ons. That i s al so di f f er ent f r om unar t i cul at ed const i t uency cases, wher e communi cat i ve i nt ent i ons do al l t he j ob. 1 amusi ng t he t er mi nol ogy of Recanat i ( 1993) .
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cont ai ns t he t r ansi t i on i l l ust r at ed by ( 1) . But i t cont ai ns somet hi ng el se as wel l : a mor e basi c t r ansi t i on f r omunar t i cul at edness t o ar t i cul at edness ( i . e. , t he t r ansi t i on f r om( a) t o ( h) ) . The cl ai mt hat i ndexi cal i t y medi at es bet ween unar t i cul at ed const i t uency and obj ect i ve desi gnat i on i s not speci f i cal l y Per r y' s; i t has been made by var het her or not i ous aut hor s such as e. g. , Sechehaye ( 1926) or Lyons ( 1975) . W t hey ar e r i ght , I t hi nk we cannot but acknowl edge t hat t he t r ansi t i on i n ( 2) i nvol ves a basi c st ep whi ch ( 1) does not i nvol ve: t he st ep f r om unar t i cul at edness t o ar t i cul at edness. Tr ansi t i ons i nvol vi ng t hat basi c st ep ( or i t s conver se: t he st ep f r om ar t i cul at edness t o unar t i eul at edness) ar e i nst ances of what I cal l ' basi c ver t i cal i nt er pr et i ng' - t he pr ocess whi ch I amgoi ng t o st udy i n t hi s paper . 2. Aust i ni an semant i cs 2. 1 Aust i ni an pr oposi t i ons
The t heor et i cal f r amewor k I wi l l assume i s t hat of ' Aust i ni an semant i cs' ( Bar wi se and Et chemendy 1987; Recanat i 1996) . I n Aust i ni an semant i cs, a sent ent i al r epr esent at i on r epr esent s a st at e of af f ai r s, but i t s cont ent cannot be r educed t o t he st at e of af f ai r s i t r epr esent s. To use a r epr esent at i on, i n speech or i n t hought , i s t o ' appl y' i t t o some si t uat i on. The compl et e cont ent of a speech epi sode or a t hought epi sode i n whi ch a r epr esent at i on r i s used t her ef or e i nvol ves not onl y t he st at e of af f ai r s a whi ch r r epr esent s, but al so t he si t uat i on s whi ch t he r epr esent at i on i s supposed t o f i t . The compl et e cont ent of t he r epr esent at i onal act i s an ' Aust i ni an pr oposi t i on' , consi st i ng of a si t uat i on and a f act pr esent ed as hol di ng i n t hat si t uat i on. An Aust i ni an pr oposi t i on i s a pr oposi t i on of t he f or m: 5 Ht a
That t he compl et e cont ent of an ut t er ance or t hought i s an Aust i ni an pr oposi t i on i s i l l ust r at ed by t he f ol l owi ng exampl e, due t o Bar wi se and Et chemendy ( Bar wi se and Et chemendy 1987: 121- 2) . Looki ng at a poker game, I say " Cl ai r e has a good hand?' I descr i be t he si t uat i on I amwi t nessi ng as a si t uat i on i n whi ch Cl ai r e has a good hand. I f I ammi st aken and Cl ai r e i s not a const i t uent of t he si t uat i on ( i f she i s not among t he pl ayer s of t he game I amwat chi ng, cont r ar y t o what I bel i eve) , my ut t er ance i s not t r ueeven i f Cl ai r e i s pl ayi ng poker i n some ot her par t of t he ci t y and has a good
48
Eur opean Revi ewof Phi l osophy
The Dynami cs of Si t uat i ons
hand t her e; t he ut t er ance i s not t r ue because t he r el evant si t uat i on i s not as descr i bed. I n ot her wor ds, r at her t han bei ng t r ue i f f Cl ai r e has a good hand, t he ut t er ance i s t r ue i f f t he si t uat i on concer ned by t he ut t er ance suppor t s <
>. The compl et e cont ent of t he ut t er ance t her ef or e i s: t hat poker game F=<> 2. 2 Si t uat i ons and f act s I n si t uat i on t heor y ( e. g. , Bar wi se 1989) , si t uat i ons ar e model l ed as set s of at omi c f act s. An at omi c f act ( or st at e of af f ai r s- I wi l l use t he t wo phr ases i ndi f f er ent l y) i s a t r i pl e <, i >> consi st i ng of an i i r el at i on, a of n pl ace sequence appr opr i at e ar gument s, and a pol ar i t y i whi ch can he 0 or 1. Thus t he f act t hat Cl ai r e has a good hand can be r epr esent ed as: <, 1>> At omi c f act s ( whet her posi t i ve or negat i ve) ar e t he onl y f act s whi ch si t uat i ons cont ai n. W hat about non- at omi c f act s, e. g. , di sj unct i ve f act s ( John l oves Mar y or Pet er hat es Paul ) , gener al f act s ( Ther e i s a man who l oves Mar y) , and so f or t h? A si t uat i on s cannot cont ai n such f act s, but i t can suppor t t hem, by vi r t ue of t he at omi c f act s i t cont ai ns. The ' suppor t ' r el at i on can be def i ned al ong t he f ol l owi ng l i nes: A si t uat i ons suppor t s anat omi c f act o ( i n symbol s: s
o) j ust i n case a
49
2. 3 The cont ext ual nat ur e of si t uat i ons Acr uci al f eat ur e of t he t heor y I wi l l devel op wi t hi n t he Aust i ni an f r amewor k i s t he cont ext ual nat ur e of t he si t uat i onal component . The si t uat i on whi ch a r epr esent at i on concer ns i s a hi ghl y cont ext - dependent aspect of i t s cont ent ; l i ke t he r ef er ence of a demonst r at i ve, i t depends upon t he i nt ent i ons mani f est ed by t he speaker . The si t uat i onal component i s even mor e heavi l y dependent on cont ext t han t he r ef er ence of a demonst r at i ve. I n t he t heor y I wi l l devel op, t he si t uat i onal component i s unar t i cul at ed: i t i s a pur el y cont ext ual component of cont ent . Not e how st r ong t he cl ai mI ammaki ng i s. I f t he cont ent of ever y ut t er ance cont ai ns a si t uat i onal component whi ch i s pur el y cont ext ual , t hen cont ext - dependence i s gener al i zed i n a ver y r adi cal manner . The t heor y t o be devel oped i s i ndeed r adi cal l y ' cont ext ual i st . ' 4 But I wi l l not el abor at e t hat poi nt i n t hi s paper . The cl ai mt hat t he si t uat i on t al ked about i s ( al ways) a pur el y cont ext ual aspect of cont ent can he obj ect ed t o, on t he gr ounds t hat t he si t uat i on can he made expl i ci t i n t he sent ence i t sel f . Consi der t he f ol l owi ng pai r : I t i s r ai ni ng I n Par i s, i t i s r ai ni ng Assume t hat t he f i r st sent ence i s ut t er ed i n Par i s and concer ns Par i s. The obj ect i on goes as f ol l ows: Bot h r epr esent at i ons ar e about Par i s. I n t he second case, however , t he si t uat i on t he r epr esent at i on i s about ( Par i s) i s l i n-
A si t uat i on s suppor t s a di sj unct i ve f act a v a' j ust i n case s o or s o' . A si t uat i on s suppor t s an exi st ent i al f act l x a ( x) i f f , f or some obj ect a, s suppor t s o( a) .
gui st i cal l y encoded; i t i s not a pur el y pr agmat i c, cont ext ual component . Hence t he si t uat i onal component i s not al ways cont ext ual . But I wi l l deny t hat t he t wo r epr esent at i ons concer n one and t he same si t uat i on. As we wi l l see, as soon as t he si t uat i on ( Par i s) i s made expl i ci t i n t he r epr esent at i on i t sel f , anot her si t uat i on r epl aces i t i n t he cont ent of t he
The set of al l si t uat i ons whi ch suppor t a f act a ( whet her a i s at omi c or not ) def i nes t he si t uat i on t ype T( . To say t hat a si t uat i on i s of t he t ype T0 i s t o say t hat i t bel ongs t o { s s a} . I nsof ar as i t st at es a f act o, a sent ent i al r epr esent at i on ( be i t l i ngui st i c or ment al ) denot es a cer t ai n si t uat i on t ype, namel y
new t hought t hus gener at ed. I t f ol l ows t hat basi c ver t i cal i nt er pr et i ng ent ai l s a change of cont ext . Thi s i s r emi ni scent of Gar di ner ' s t r eat ment of i l l ocut i onar y f or ce ( whi ch he cal l s ' sent ence- qual i t y' ) . Sent ence- qual i t y i s el usi ve, Gar di ner says. As soon as i t i s made expl i ci t by means of such phr ases as ' I assur e you " wi t h t hemcomes a new i mpor t at i on of sent ence- qual i t y, t he nat ur e of whi ch i s not decl ar ed. Thus t he at t empt t o asser t t he qual i t y of a
Es.
T0. Accor di ng t o Aust i ni an semant i cs, t he r epr esent at i on i s t r ue i f and onl y i f t he si t uat i on whi ch i t concer ns bel ongs t o t he si t uat i on t ype whi ch i t denot es ( Aust i n 1950) .
4.
' Cont ext ual i sm' i s my name f or t he sor t of posi t i on ar gued f or by Tr avi s ( passi m) and Sear l e ( 1978, 1980) .
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sent ence wi t hi n t hat sent ence i t sel f does but i nvol ve us i n an i nf i ni t e r egr ess" ( Gar di ner 1932: 199l ) . Aust i n r ej ect ed t hat l i ne of ar gument and cl ai med t hat i l l ocut i onar y f or ce can be made expl i ci t r ef l exi vel y i n t he ut t er ance i t sel f ( Aust i n 1962) . Be t hat as i t may, t he si t uat i onal component of cont ent ar guabl y has t he same el usi ve pr oper t y whi ch Gar di ner ascr i bes t o i l l ocut i onar y f or ce: i t i s not possi bl e t o encode t he si t uat i onal component wi t hout shi f t i ng it. 3. 5- st r uct ur es 3. 1 I nt r oduci ng t he not i on 6- st r uct ur es ar e sent ence- l i ke r epr esent at i ons whi ch cont ai n ot her sent ence- l i ke r epr esent at i ons. To si mpl i f y mat t er s, I wi l l t al k of ' sent ences' i nst ead of ' sent ence- l i ke r epr esent at i ons. ' 8- st r uct ur es t her ef or e ar e compl ex sent ences consi st i ng of a sent ence ( t he ' r adi cal ' ) and an expr essi on ( t he ' 5- par t ' ) whi ch makes a sent ence out of a sent ence. Exampl es of such compl ex sent ences i ncl ude:
I n John' s mi nd / ci gar et t es ar e cheap W hen 1 was young, i t was t he case t hat / ci gar et t es ar e cheap wi l l consi der i n t hi s r adi cal hol ds. 6 A senanot her . W i t h r espect
cheap; but t hat i s not t r ue i n ot her si t uat i ons ( e. g. , i n Fr ance) . I n t he f i r st exampl e above, i t i s t he j ob of t he expr essi on ' I n Spai n' t o i ndi cat e t he speci f i c si t uat i on i n whi ch t he r adi cal ' ci gar et t es ar e cheap' i s sai d t o hol d. The 6- par t s ' i n John' s mi nd' and ' when I was young' pl ay t he same r ol e i n t he ot her exampl es, except t hat t he si t uat i ons r ef er r ed t o ar e r at her di f f er ent .
5. 6.
3. 2 Fact ual and count er f act ual 6- st r uct ur es I n f act ual 6- st r uct ur es, t he 6- par t i ndi cat es t hat t he r adi cal hol ds i n a ( possi bl y maxi mal ) por t i on of t he act ual wor l d, or i n a set of such por t i ons ( si t uat i on t ype) . The por t i ons of @r ef er r ed t o i n f act ual 8- st r uct ur es can be var i ousl y ci r cumscr i bed. I n some cases- as i n t he t hi r d exampl e above- t he si t uat i on i s t empor al l y ci r cumscr i bed. Tempor al 5- st r uct ur es i ncl ude: ( At t / when John get s back) i t wi l l he t he case t hat p ( At t / when John got back) i t was t he case t hat p I t somet i mes happens t hat p The si t uat i on t al ked about can al so be spat i al l y ci r cumscr i bed: Two mi l es f r omher e, i t i s t he case t hat p W her e John l i ves, i t i s t he case t hat p I n Chi cago, p Ot her por t i ons of @ ar e ci r cumscr i bed ar ound i ndi vi dual s. ( An i ndi vi dual l i ke John, or an event l i ke W or l d W ar I I , can bot h be consi der ed as ' si t uat i ons' i n t he t echni cal sense, i . e. , as a set s of at omi c f act s. ) Ther e ar e, I
I n Spai n / ci gar et t es ar e cheap
I n t ypi cal 6- st r uct ur es ( t he onl y 5- st r uct ur es I paper ) t he 6- par t i ndi cat es t he si t uat i on i n whi ch t he t ence may be t r ue of ( or at ) a si t uat i on, but nor of / at t o t he si t uat i on i n Spai n, i t i s t r ue t hat ci gar et t es ar e
51
On Gar di ner , Aust i n and t he expl i ci t mar ki ng of i l l ocut i onar y f or ce, see Recanat i ( 1987: 31f f ) . The negat i on oper at or ' i t i s not t he case t hat ' i s an except i on ( hence negat i ve sent ences ar e ' at ypi cal ' h- st r uct ur es) : i t makes a sent ence out of a sent ence, but i t does not i ndi cat e t he si t uat i on i n whi ch t he r adi cal hol ds. For mor e about t ypi cal and at ypi cal 6- st r uct ur es, see Recanat i f or t hcomi ng, par t 3, wher e an expanded ver si on of t hi s mat er i al i s pr esent ed.
bel i eve, st i l l ot her met hods of i ndi vi duat i ng por t i ons of @ , but I cannot go i nt o t hi s mat t er and I wi l l be cont ent wi t h t he exampl es I have gi ven. I t ur n t o count er f act ual 5- st r uct ur es. The def i ni ng char act er i st i c of
6- st r uct ur es i s t hat t hey t al k about count er f act ual si t uat i ons or si t uat i on t ypes. Her e I am not usi ng ' count er f act ual si t uat i on' i n t he sense of a si t uat i on whi ch does not obt ai n i n t he act ual wor l d. By count er f act ual si t uat i on I mean a ( possi bl y maxi mal )
counl cr f act ual
. Fact ual si t uat i ons ar e por por t i on of an al t er nat i ve t o t he act ual wor l d @ t i ons of @ ; count er f act ual si t uat i ons ar e por t i ons of al t er nat i ves t o 0i magi nar y wor l ds, et c. A count er f act ual si t uat i on t ype i s a set of si t uat i ons whi ch cont ai ns some count er f act ual si t uat i on. Two t ypes of count er f act ual 6- st r uct ur es ar e wor t h di st i ngui shi ng:
Met a- r epr esent at i onal b- st r uct ur es pr esent t he r adi cal as hol di ng i n t he si t uat i on descr i bed by some r epr esent at i on whi ch t he 6- par t r ef er s t o. Ment al st at es, pi ct ur es, st or i es, ut t er ances, et c. al l count as ' r epr esent at i ons' i n t he r el evant sense. Exampl es of met a- r epr esent at i onal 5st r uct ur es i ncl ude:
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The Dynami cs of Si t uat i ons
Eur opean Revi ewof Phi l osophy I n John' s mi nd, p I n t he pi ct ur e, p John bel i eves t hat p John sai d t hat p Accor di ng t o t he Anci ent s, p At t he end of Gone wi t h t he wi nd, p I n hypot het i cal 6- st r uct ur es, t he si t uat i on ( or t ype of si t uat i on) r ef er r ed t o i s count er f act ual , but i t i s not pr esent ed as t he si t uat i on
r esul t i ng 6- st r uct ur e, t hus gener at i ng an i t er at ed 6- st r uct ur e ' t he l andl or d t hi nks t hat ! i n 1996 i t wi l l be t he case t hat ! Pet er i s penni l ess. ' A t hi r d 6- par t , vi z. t he ' past ' oper at or , appl i es t o t hat i t er at ed 6- st r uct ur e. Four r epr esent at i ons can t her ef or e be di scer ned wi t hi n ( 1) : an at omi c r epr esent at i on, a si mpl e 6- st r uct ur e, and t wo i t er at ed 6- st r uct ur es of i ncr easi ng compl exi t y. The most compl ex i t er at ed 6- st r uct ur e, vi z. ( i ) , cor r esponds t o t he pr oposi t i on expr essed by ( 1) : (i )
depi ct ed by some r epr esent at i on. Exampl es of hypot het i cal 5- st r uct ur es i ncl ude:
(i i ) (i i i )
I t mi ght have been t he case t hat p I t may be t he case t hat p I f John had come, i t woul d have been t he case t hat p I f John has come, t hen i t i s t he case t hat p
( i v)
Necessar i l y, p I t i s l i kel y t hat p7
3. 3 I t er at ed and si t uat ed 6- st r uct ur es 6- st r uct ur es ar e compl ex r epr esent at i ons wi t h t wo const i t uent s: a r adi cal and a 6- par t . The r adi cal can be ' si mpl e or i t can i t sel f he a 6- st r uct ur e. I f t he r adi cal i t sel f i s a 6- st r uct ur e, t he r esul t i ng r epr esent at i on i s an i t er at ed 6- st r uct ur e such as t he f ol l owi ng: The l andl or d t hought t hat i n 1996, Pet er woul d be penni l ess The st r uct ur e of t hi s r epr esent at i on i s 6( 6( 6p) ) . A si mpl e sent ence, ' Pet er i s penni l ess, ' i s t ur ned i nt o a 6- st r uct ur e by appl yi ng t o i t t he 6- par t ' I n 1996 i t wi l l be t he case t hat . ' A second 6- par t , vi z. ' t he l andl or d t hi nks appl i es t o t he
53
I t was t he case t hat 6( SSp) ) t he l andl or d t hi nks t hat 6( Sp) i n 1996 i t wi l l be t he case t hat 6p Pet er i s penni l ess p
Semant i cal l y, each 6- st r uct ur e r epr esent s some si t uat i on ( i ndi cat ed by t he 6- par t ) as suppor t i ng a cer t ai n f act ( expr essed by t he r adi cal i n t hat 6st r uct ur e) . Let f he a f unct i on f r om 6- par t s t o t he si t uat i ons t hey i ndi cat e; and l et s1, s2 and s3 be t he val ues of t hat f unct i on f or t he ar gument s ' i n 1996 i t wi l l be t he case t hat ' t he l andl or d t hi nks t hat ' and ' i t was t he case t hat ' r espect i vel y. Fi nal l y, l et a be t he f act expr essed by ( i v) . The si mpl e 6- st r uct ur e ( i i i ) expr esses t he f act t hat s1 o; ( i i ) expr esses t he f act t hat 2 <<S1 a>>; and ( i ) - t he gl obal 6- st r uct ur e- expr esses t he f act t hat s3 <<s2 H<<
i ba>>>>. W hat f ur t her compl i cat es t he pi ct ur e i s t he f act t hat 6- st r uct ur es, however compl ex, ar e r epr esent at i ons, and as such t hey must t hemsel ves be i nt er pr et ed wi t h r espect t o some si t uat i on. As we have seen, a r epr esent at i on r epr esent s a st at e of af f ai r s, but i t s cont ent cannot be r educed t o t he st at e of af f ai r s i t r epr esent s. The compl et e ( or ' br oad' ) cont ent of a r epr esent at i on r i nvol ves not onl y t he st at e of af f ai r s a whi ch r r epr esent s, but al so t he si t uat i on s i n whi ch t he r epr esent ed f act hol ds. The compl et e cont ent of t he r epr esent at i onal act i s an ' Aust i ni an pr oposi t i on, ' of t he f or m:
Some r eader s may be sur pr i sed by my cl ai m t hat an i ndi cat i ve condi t i onal i s a count er f act ual i - st r uct ur e. I s t her e not a di st i nct i on bet ween i ndi cat i ve condi t i onal s and count er f act ual condi t i onal s? But I have def i ned a count er f act ual si t uat i on t ype as one t hat cont ai ns some count er f act ual si t uat i on; and I mai nt ai n t hat an i ndi cat i ve condi t i onal t al ks about such a si t uat i on t ype. Bot h i ndi cat i ve and count er f act ual condi t i onal s t hus t al k about count er f act ual si t uat i on t ypes. The di f f er ence i s t hat i n a count er f act ual condi t i onal , t he si t uat i on t ype cont ai ns onl y count er f act ual si t uat i ons, whi l e t her e i s no such r est r i ct i on i n t he case of an i ndi cat i ve condi t i onal .
S
A 6- st r uct ur e expr esses a f act whi ch has pr eci sel y t hat f or m; hence 6st r uct ur es expr ess Aust i ni an pr oposi t i ons. But , qua r epr esent at i ons, 6- st r uct ur es t hemsel ves must be i nt er pr et ed wi t h r espect t o si t uat i ons. The comi nvol ves not pl et e cont ent of t he r epr esent at i onal act of usi ng a 6- st r uct ur e
op
onl y t he Aust i ni an f act whi ch i t expr esses, but al so a si t uat i on whi ch i s pr esent ed as suppor t i ng t hat f act . The st r uct ur e of t he compl et e cont ent i s:
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Eur opean
s'
Revi ew of
The Dynam i cs of Si t uat i ons
Phi l osophy
Hzzsky>>
Her e s i s t he si t uat i on r epr esent ed by t he 6- st r uct ur e as t hat i n whi ch t he f act expr essed by t he r adi cal hol ds; whi l e s' i s t he si t uat i on wi t h r espect t o whi ch t he 6- st r uct ur e i t sel f i s i nt er pr et ed. s and s' pl ay qui t e di f f er ent r ol es: I wi l l say t hat s' i s ' exer ci sed' i n i nt er pr et i ng t he 8- st r uct ur e, whi l e s i s ' ment i oned' by a const i t uent of t he h- st r uct ur e. To di st i ngui sh t he t wo r ol es, I wi l l put t he exer ci sed si t uat i on i nt o br acket s: [ s' ]
<S =u>>
Thi s f or mul a cor r esponds t o what I cal l a si t uat ed 6- st r uct ur e. Let us r et ur n t o our compl ex exampl e of i t er at ed 6- st r uct ur e: " The l andl or d t hought t hat i n 1996, Pet er woul d be penni l ess. " That compl ex 6- st r uct ur e ment i ons t hr ee si t uat i ons 5 and 53 cor r espondi ng t o t he t hr ee 6-
35
don or t he count r y. Thi s i s a poi nt whi ch Eur opean ' st r uct ur al i sm' has much i nsi st ed on: what ever i s si ngl ed out i n speech i s ext r act ed f r oma ' par adi gm' or cont r ast i ve set . I f no ot her l ocat i on was i mpl i ci t l y consi der ed, t he speci f i cat i on of t he l ocat i on woul d pl ay no r ol e and coul d be omi t t ed. The f act t hat t he l ocat i on i s si ngl ed out shows t hat t he si t uat i on wi t h r espect t o whi ch t he l ocat i onal l y speci f i c r epr esent at i on i s i nt er pr et ed i ncl udes t he ment i oned l ocat i on and ot her s f r om t he same par adi gm. The si t uat i on mi ght be, f or exampl e, t he Cont i nent of Eur ope ( whi ch cont ai ns Par i s, Rome, Vi enna, et c. ) . But t he l ocat i onal l y non- speci f i c " I t i s r ai ni ng" can be i nt er pr et ed wi t h r espect t o a smal l er si t uat i on, vi z. Par i s i t sel f ( t o t he excl usi on of any ot her l ocat i on) . Thus we have t he f ol l owi ng cont r ast : ( 1) ( 2)
<> [ Eur ope] <<Par i s <>>> I Par i s]
par t s, but i t i s cont ext ual l y i nt er pr et ed wi t h r espect t o yet anot her si t uat i on- some si t uat i on i n whi ch t her e i s one and onl y one l andl or d, f or exampl e t he r ent si t uat i on. 8 The r esul t i s a si t uat ed 8- st r uct ur e, wi t h a r at her
A l ocat i onal l y speci f i c ut t er ance such as " I n Par i s, i t i s r ai ni ng" cont ext ual l y expr esses a si t uat ed 6- st r uct ur e l i ke ( 2) . But i f someone, i n Par i s, ut t er s t he l ocat i onal l y non- speci f i c " I t i s r ai ni ng, " t he compl et e cont ent she t her eby
compl ex r epr esent at i onal component :
expr esses may wel l be si mpl er and cor r espond t o ( 1) . Fr omwhat I have sai d i t f ol l ows t hat basi c ver t i cal i nt er pr et i ng i nvol ves a change of cont ext . I n t he t r ansi t i on f r om " I t ' s r ai ni ng" t o " I t ' s r ai ni ng i n
I The r ent si t uat i on]
=<<s3
<5,
H<si
' u>>>>>>
3. 4 Exer ci sed si t uat i on vs. ment i oned si t uat i on I t i s easy t o conf use t he exer ci sed si t uat i on and t he ment i oned si t uat i on. Bot h ar e used t o i nt er pr et a r epr esent at i on expr essed by ( a par t of ) t he 6- st r uct ur e: t he r epr esent at i on expr essed by t he r adi cal i s i nt er pr et ed wi t h r espect t o t he ment i oned si t uat i on, and t he r epr esent at i on gl obal l y expr essed by t he 6- st r uct ur e i s i nt er pr et ed wi t h r espect t o t he exer ci sed si t uat i on. Despi t e t hei r f unct i onal si mi l ar i t y, t he si t uat i on exer ci sed and t hat ment i oned by t he 6- par t must he di st i ngui shed; f or , i n gener al at l east , t hey hat f ol l ows i s an ar gument i n suppor t of t he bol d ar e di st i nct si t uat i ons. W conj ect ur e, t hat t he exer ci sed si t uat i on and t he ment i oned si t uat i on ar e al ways di st i nct . W hen I say " I n Par i s, i t i s r ai ni ng, " t hi s makes sense onl y i nsof ar as t he l ocat i on Par i s i s vi r t ual l y cont r ast ed wi t h some ot her l ocat i on, such as Lon8.
I t i s a const r ai nt on def i ni t e descr i pt i ons t hat t hey must be i nt er pr et ed wi t h r espect t o si t uat i ons i n whi ch t her e i s one and onl y one obj ect sat i sf yi ng t hei r descr i pt i ve cont ent .
Par i s, " t he exer ci sed si t uat i on shi f t s and becomes ' l ar ger . ' 9 I t al so f ol l ows t hat ( cont r ar y t o what was suggest ed ear l i er ) t he cont ent changes f r om" I t ' s r ai ni ng" t o " I t ' s r ai ni ng i n Par i s: " as ( 2) shows, t he cont ent of " I t ' s r ai ni ng i n Par i s" i s mor e compl ex t han t he cont ent of " I t ' s r ai ni ng. " Despi t e t hi s change i n cont ent , some cr uci al aspect of t he cont ent of t he or i gi nal r epr esent at i on hat i s r et ai ned i s t he Aust i ni an st r uct ur e ' Par i s <
9.
I nt ui t i vel y, we go f r oma por t i on of r eal i t y ( e. g. , t he ci t y of Par i s) t o a l ar ger por t i on cont ai ni ng t he ci t y of Par i s pl us ot her pl aces. But I sai d t hat si t uat i ons' ar e model l ed as set s of f act s, hence t he r el evant r el at i on ' l ar ger t han' must be def i ned i n t er ms of set i ncl usi on. Thi s const r ai nt has one i nt er est i ng consequence; t he f act s whi ch si t uat i ons cont ai n must be ' per si st ent ' ( ot her wi se t he i nt ui t i ve r el at i on ' l ar ger t han' can no l onger be capt ur ed) . However cent r al t hey ar e, t hose i ssues i nvol vi ng per si st ence and si t uat i onal i ncl usi on cannot be deal t wi t h i n t hi s paper , and I wi l l keep usi ng i nt ui t i ve not i ons such as t hat of a si t uat i on' s bei ng ' l ar ger ' t han anot her one and ' cont ai ni ng' i t as a const i t uent wi t hout anal ysi ng t hem.
56
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Revi ew of
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i ng>> whi ch i s common t o ( 1) and t o ( 2). I n ( 2) t hat st r uct ur e i s t hat of t he r adi cal , whi l e i n ( 1) t hat st r uct ur e cor r esponds t o t he compl et e cont ent . 10 I n t he next t wo sect i ons I wi l l st udy a t r ansi t i on opposi t e t o t hat f r om( 1) t o ( 2). The l at t er i s an i nst ance of ' r ef l ect i on' : Ref l ect i on [ s] p- [ s]
<sp>>.
The t r ansi t i on I amgoi ng t o t al k about , ' pr oj ect i on' , has t he opposi t e f or m: Pr oj ect i on [ s' ] z<sp>> -
{s]
p.
4. Pr oj ect i on
4. 1 Pr oj ect i on as si t uat i onal assumpt i on Gi ven a si t uat ed 8- st r uct ur e I s' ] a>>, consi st i ng of an exer ci sed si t uat i on and an i nner 6- st r uct ur e, pr oj ect i on consi st s i n ' assumi ng' t he ment i oned si t uat i on s whi ch f i gur es i n t he i nner 6- st r uct ur e: t he exer ci sed si t uat i on wi t h r espect t o whi ch t he 6- st r uct ur e i s i nt er pr et ed dr ops out of t he pi ct ur e, and t he ment i oned si t uat i on becomes t he exer ci sed si t uat i on. Pr oj ect i on t her ef or e t akes us f r om ( a) t o ( b): (a) ( b)
[ s' ] <<sH: a>> [ sj . . .
I n t hi s sect i on 1 wi l l gi ve a f ew exampl es of pr oj ect i on. W e shal l see t hat pr ocan f r om 6st r uct ur e, and t hat i t can al so oper at e f r om j ect i on oper at e any ' si mpl e' r epr esent at i ons.
4. 2 Pr oj ect i on f r om hypot het i cal ( 5- st r uct ur es I magi ne t he f ol l owi ng di scour se, consi st i ng of f our sent ences Dl t o 134:
The Dynami cs of Si t uat i ons
( D)
John may be ear l y. I f he i s ear l y, he wi l l wai t . He wi l l r ead t he newspaper , or wi l l t hi nk about hi s next book. Ther e won' t be any pr obl em.
Thef i r st sent ence, " John may be ear l y, " posi t s a si t uat i on t ype: i t says t hat , i n some possi bl e si t uat i on, John i s ear l y t o hi s appoi nt ment : Dl
3
5: 5
Not e t hat "I t ' s r ai ni ng her e" i s cl oser t o " I t ' s r ai ni ng i n Par i s" t han t o "I t ' s r ai ni ng" i n bot h r espect s. (i ) The pl ace wher e i t i s r ai ni ng i s expl i ci t l y r epr esent ed bot h i n "I t ' s r ai ni ng i n Par i s" and i n "I t ' s r ai ni ng her e' The cont ent of "I t ' s r ai ni ng her e" i s an i t er at ed 6- st r uct ur e, l i ke t he cont ent of "I t ' s r ai ni ng i n Par i s" ( and unl i ke t he si mpl er cont ent of "I t ' s r ai ni ng" ). (i i ) I n bot h cases t hat pl ace i s vi r t ual l y cont r ast ed wi t h ot her s, hence t he exer ci sed si t uat i on i s l ar ger t han t hat i n ( I ).
<<John i s ear l y>>
That 6- st r uct ur e i t sel f i s i nt er pr et ed wi t h r espect t o a si t uat i on s1, a si t uat i on whi ch suppor t s t he f act t hat John maybe ear l y. That ( exer ci sed) si t uat i on i s di f f er ent f r omt he possi bl e si t uat i on i n whi ch John i s ear l y ( ment i oned si t uat i on) . The compl et e cont ent of Dl t her ef or e i s: C( D1) [ s1]
H>>>
The second sent ence, D2, says somet hi ng of t he si t uat i on t ype posi t ed by t he f i r st sent ence: t hat i t suppor t s <<John wi l l wai t >>: D2
TJOhn i s ear l y
<<John wi l l wai t >>
That 8- st r uct ur e al so must be i nt er pr et ed wi t h r espect t o a si t uat i on. Si mpl i f yi ng somewhat , I wi l l t ake t hat si t uat i on t o be t he same as pr evi ousl y, vi z. .s The compl et e cont ent of t he second sent ence t her ef or e i s:
C( D2) [ s1]
<
i s ear l y
H<<John wi l l wai t >> >>
At t hi s poi nt pr oj ect i on oper at es, and t he si t uat i on t ype Tj ohn i s S ear l y assumed. The t hi r d sent ence, whi ch descr i bes what John wi l l do, i s i nt er pr et ed wi t h r espect t o t hat si t uat i on t ype. C( W ) [ Tj 0i
i s ear l y]
<<John wi l l r ead t he newspaper or t hi nk about hi s next book>>
Sent ence ( 4) al so i s i nt er pr et ed wi t h r espect t o t hat si t uat i on: C( D4) [ Tj 0i
10.
57
i s ear l y]
<>
Most phi l osopher s, conf r ont ed wi t h t he l i t t l e t ext above, woul d consi der sent ences D3 and D4 as el l i pt i c f or some condi t i onal sent ence: " I f John i s ear l y he wi l l r ead t he newspaper or wi l l t hi nk about hi s next book, " and " I f John i s ear l y t her e won' t be any pr obl em" r espect i vel y. That i s because t hey have t he f eel i ng t hat what i s asser t ed i s ' about ' t he possi bl e si t uat i on i n whi ch John i s ear l y. But t her e ar e di f f er ent ways of bei ng about a si t uat i on.
58 Eur opean Revi ew of
I n a condi t i onal sent ence such as " I f John i s ear l y, he wi l l wai t , " t he si t uat i on i n whi ch John i s ear l y i s expl i ci t l y ment i oned; but i n ( 3) and ( 4) t he si t uat i on i n whi ch John i s ear l y i s assumed. The r epr esent at i on ' concer ns' t hat si t uat i on, but i t i s not ' about ' i t ( Per r y 1986b) . I shal l r et ur n t o t hat cont r ast i n 6. 4. 3 Pr oj ect i on f r om f act ual 6- st r uct ur es Fact ual 6- st r uct ur es t oo al l owpr oj ect i on. ( E) bel owi s ver y si mi I n Chi cago t he t emper at ur e i s cur r ent l y mi nus 40. ( El ) School chi l dr en st ay at home. ( E2)
Her e t oo I woul d say t hat t he second sent ence i s not el l i pt i cal f or " I n Chi wi t h cago school chi l dr en st ay at home' even t hough i t i s cl ear l y i nt er pr et ed sent ence The cont ent of t he f i r st si t uat i on. t o t he compl et e r espect Chi cago i s: C( EI ) [ s2] =<>>> si t uat i on i s Pr oj ect i on oper at es f r omt hat si t uat ed 6- st r uct ur e: t he Chi cago assumed, and t he second sent ence i s i nt er pr et ed wi t h r espect t o t hat si t uat i on: C( E2) [ Chi cago]
<<school chi I dr en st ay at home>>
The cont r ast bet ween C( EI ) and C( E2) , t hat i s, bet ween ment i oni ng t he i s si mi l ar t o t he cont r ast , Chi cago si t uat i on and assumi ng t hat si t uat i on, ment i oned ear l i er , bet ween [ Par i s]
<>
and [ Fr ance]
<< Par i s <> >>
But t her e i s a si gni f i cant di f f er ence bet ween t he Chi cago exampl e and t he Par i s exampl e. I n t he l at t er exampl e t he exer ci sed si t uat i on- Par i s- - i s pr ovi ded by t he ext r al i ngui st i c cont ext ; i n E2 t he exer ci sed si t uat i on- Chi cago- i s a si t uat i on whi ch has been ment i oned and becomes t he exer ci sed si t uat i on t hr ough pr oj ect i on. That di st i nct i on t oo wi l l he di scussed i n 6.
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4. 4 Pr oj ect i on f r omsi mpl e r epr esent at i ons Pr oj ect i on f r om a 6- st r uct ur e i s a par t i cul ar case of si t uat i onal assumpt i on: i t i s t he case i n whi ch we assume a si t uat i on ment i oned i n some 6- st r uct ur e. But any ment i oned si t uat i on can be assumed, even i f i t ' s not ment i oned i n a b- st r uct ur e. I n t he f ol l owi ng exampl es t he ' base' of t he pr oj ect i on ( t he r epr esent at i on f r omwhi ch pr oj ect i on oper at es) i s not a 6- st r uct ur e: (I )
l ar t o ( D) : ( E)
The Dynami cs of Si t uat i ons
Phi l osophy
(2)
(3)
John i s t ot al l y par anoi d. Ever ybody spi es hi mor want s t o ki l l hi m, i ncl udi ng hi s own mot her . I di d not know you wer e so much i nt er est ed i n kni ght s. You shoul d r ead AConnect i cut Yankee i n Ki ng Ar t hur ' s Cour t , by Mar k Twai n. Ther e ar e a l ot of kni ght s. Ber kel ey i s ani ce pl ace. Ther e ar e bookst or es and cof f ee shops ever ywher e.
I n t hose exampl es t he base of t he pr oj ect i on (i . e. , t he sent ence i n bol d t ype) i s not a 6- st r uct ur e; i t i s a ' si mpl e' r epr esent at i on wi t h t he f or mR ( a1, a1) , e. g. , " Ber kel ey i s a ni ce pl ace, " or " John i s par anoi d, " or " You shoul d r ead Connect i cut Yankee. " Yet pr oj ect i on oper at es: t he exer ci sed si t uat i on shi f t s f r om a br oader si t uat i on s' i ncl udi ng t he si t uat i on s consi der ed as obj ect , t o t he si t uat i on s i t sel f . I n ( 1) t he ( exer ci sed) si t uat i on we st ar t wi t h i s a r eal si t uat i on s' whi ch cont ai ns John and hi s ment al st at es. That si t uat i on s' i s sai d i n t he f i r st sent ence t o suppor t <<John i s par anoi d>>. Nowa par anoi d i s someone who bel i eves hi msel f t o be i n a cer t ai n t ype of si t uat i on. Let us cal l t he si t uat i on John bel i eves hi msel f t o he i n hi s ' bel i ef - wor l d, ' Bel ; 0h1. The second sent ence of ( I ) i s i nt er pr et ed di r ect l y wi t h r espect t o t hat bel i ef wor l d, whi ch i s assumed. The speaker does not ser i ousl y asser t t hat ever ybody spi es John or want s t o ki l l hi m: she expect s t he hear er t o under st and t hat f act as hol di ng i n John' s bel i ef wor l d. Such a shi f t i n poi nt of vi ew i s const i t ut i ve of ' f r ee i ndi r ect speech, ' of whi ch ( 1) i s a t ypi cal i nst ance. I n ( 2) Twai n' s f i ct i on ( a por t i on of t he act ual wor l d) i s ment i oned i n t he f i r st sent ence. NowTwai n' s f i ct i on has a cer t ai n cont ent , t hat i s, i t descr i bes a cer t ai n si t uat i on. The second sent ence of ( 2) i s di r ect l y i nt er pr et ed wi t h r espect t o t hat count er f act ual si t uat i on. I t i s i n t hat si t uat i on t hat t her e ar e a l ot of kni ght s. Si mi l ar l y, i n ( 3) , t he si t uat i on ment i oned i n t he f i r st sent ence
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Eur opean Revi ewof Phi l osophy
i s Ber kel ey, and t he second sent ence i s i nt er pr et ed wi t h r espect t o t hat si t uat i on: ' ever ywher e' r anges over l ocat i ons i n Ber kel ey. The di f f er ence bet ween ( 1) - ( 2) and ( 3) wi l l be deal t wi t h i n §5. W hat i s common t o t hose exampl es i s t hat t hey al l i nvol ve pr oj ect i on: t he si t uat i on ment i oned i n t he f i r st sent ence i s ' exer ci sed' and used as cont ext f or t he i nt er pr et at i on of t he second sent ence. Exampl es ( 1) t o ( 3) can be anal ysed as f ol l ows:
t he wor l d of a pi ct ur e, of a novel , of an ut t er ance, or t he bel i ef wor l d of some par t i cul ar per son. Met a- r epr esent at i ons ar e known t o i nvol ve a doubl e l ayer of cont ent . They ar e about some obj ect - r epr esent at i on, but t he obj ect - r epr esent at i on i t sel f i s about somet hi ng, hence t wo l evel s ar e i nvol ved and pr oj ect i on becomes possi bl e. Exampl es l i ke ( 3) , however , showt hat t hat dual st r uct ur e i s an i nst ance of a mor e gener al phenomenon. Ber kel ey i s a ni ce pl ace. Ther e ar e bookst or es and cof f ee shops ever ywher e.
C( 1)
[ a' ] <<John i s par anoi d>> [ Bel . i ] <<John' s mot her want s t o ki l l hi m>>
( 3)
C( 2)
[ s' ] H> [ w( Connect i cut Yankee) ] =<>11
C( 3)
F USA]
Ber kel ey i s not a r epr esent at i on, and t he f i r st sent ence of ( 3) i s not a met ar epr esent at i on. Yet we f i nd t he dual st r uct ur e whi ch makes pr oj ect i on possi bl e. The f i r st sent ence of ( 3) t al ks di r ect l y about Ber kel ey consi der ed as an obj ect : i t st at es a f act of whi ch Ber kel ey i s a const i t uent . But t he second sent ence of ( 3) does not t al k about Ber kel ey i n t hi s manner . The second sent ence of ( 3) expr esses a f act i nt er nal t o Ber kel ey r at her t han a f act ' about ' Ber kel ey i n t he sense of i ncl udi ng Ber kel ey as a const i t uent . The second sent ence of ( 3) i s i nt er pr et ed wi t h r espect t o t he Ber kel ey si t uat i on wi t hout ment i oni ng t hat si t uat i on. That i s possi bl e because t he Ber kel ey si t uat i on has al r eady been ment i oned- i n t he f i r st sent ence. Thi s i s a st andar d i nst ance of pr oj ect i on. ' Si t uat i ons' ar e ent i t i es wi t h a dual char act er . They ar e obj ect s whi ch ent er i nt o r el at i ons and can be t hought and t al ked about ; but at t he same t i me t hey have a ' cont ent , ' whi ch i s a sor t of mi cr o- wor l d, cont ai ni ng t he f act s i nt er nal t o t he si t uat i on. W hen we ment i on a si t uat i on, we evoke i t s cont ent and t hi s i s suf f i ci ent t o make pr oj ect i on possi bl e: ment i oni ng a si t uat i on makes i t s cont ent avai l abl e as a ' cont ext ' f or t he i nt er pr et at i on of ot her r epr esent at i ons whi ch do not ment i on t hat si t uat i on. ( See Sper ber and Wi l son 1986 f or t he r el evant not i ons of ' cont ext ' and ' i nt er pr et at i on. ' ) I t f ol l ows t hat pr oj ect i on i s possi bl e whenever a si t uat i on wi t h a cer t ai n cont ent i s ment i oned; what i s ment i oned need not be a r epr esent at i on.
<> [ Ber kel ey] <> 5. Pr oj ect i on f r om met a- r epr esent at i ons 5. 1 Pr oj ect i on, met a- r epr esent at i ons, and t he dual st r uct ur e of si t uat i ons
I n exampl es ( 1) and ( 2) f r om t he pr evi ous subsect i on ( r epeat ed bel ow) , t he base of t he pr oj ect i on i s a met a- r epr esent at i on. (1) (2)
John i s t ot al l y par anoi d. Ever ybody spi es hi mor want s t o ki l l hi m, i ncl udi ng hi s ownmot her . I di d not know you wer e so much i nt er est ed i n kni ght s. You shoul d r ead A Connect i cut Yankee i n Ki ng Ar t hur ' s cour t , by Mar k Twai n. Ther e ar e a l ot of kni ght s.
I n ( 2) t he base r ef er s t o a cer t ai n book, and i n ( 1) i t ( i ndi r ect l y) r ef er s t o John' s ment al st at es. Bot h t he book and t he ment al st at es ar e ' r epr esent at i ons' whi ch have a cer t ai n cont ent , i . e. , whi ch descr i be a cer t ai n si t uat i on. I n met a- r epr esent at i onal pr oj ect i on t he base r ef er s t o a r epr esent at i on, and t he si t uat i on whi ch i s pr oj ect i vel y assumed i s t he si t uat i on whi ch t he ment i oned r epr esent at i on descr i bes. I r ef er t o t hat si t uat i on as w( r ) : t he wor l d of t he r epr esent at i on. Dependi ng on t he sor t of r epr esent at i on r i s, w( r ) wi l l be
11. On t he meani ng of ' w' see bel ow, §5. 1.
5. 2 Si t uat i onal cont ent vs. r epr esent at i onal cont ent
That i s not t o deny t hat t her e ar e cl ear di f f er ences bet ween met ar epr esent at i onal cases l i ke ( l ) - ( 2) , on t he one hand, and non- met a- r epr esent at i onal cases l i ke ( 3) on t he ot her hand. The met a- r epr esent at i onal exampl es, especi al l y ( 1) , cl ear l y i nvol ve somet hi ng l i ke ment al pr oj ect i on.
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Fewst udent s of ' f r ee i ndi r ect speech' woul d deny t hi s. The same i nt ui t i on i s commonl y appeal ed t o by t heor i st s of f i ct i on, who mai nt ai n t hat ment al pr oj ect i on i s i nvol ved i n exampl es l i ke ( 2) . Not e t hat t he i nt ui t i on i s weaker i n t he second case t han i t i s i n t he f i r st case; t hat may be because t he pr oj ect i on i s ver y r out i nel y accompl i shed i n our convent i onal way of t al ki ng about f i ct i on. Be t hat as i t may, when we t ur n t o exampl e l i ke ( 3) , i t becomes
The Dynami cs of Si t uat i ons
somet hi ng si mi l ar but mor e compl ex happens. A si t uat i on s i s al so ment i oned dur i ng t he f i r st st age, but t hat si t uat i on s i s a r epr esent at i on and, qua r epr esent at i on, i t descr i bes a si t uat i on w( s) . Nowi t i s t he descr i bed si t uat i on w( s) whi ch i s assumed dur i ng t he second st age, i n i nt ensi onal pr oj ect i on. So we have t he f ol l owi ng cont r ast : Ext ensi onal pr oj ect i on <<. . . s. . . >> [ s' I [ sj b. . .
hi ghl y cont r over si al t hat ment al pr oj ect i on i s i nvol ved ( as I cl ai m) : we do not have st r ong i nt ui t i ons t o t hat ef f ect , as we do i n t he case of ( 1) . I t hi nk t he i nt ui t i ve di f f er ence bet ween ( l ) - ( 2) and ( 3) poi nt s t o an i mpor t ant di f f er ence bet ween r epr esent at i ons and ot her ent i t i es. Let us compar e Ber kel ey and Twai n' s book. Bei ng a r epr esent at i on, Twai n' s book has somet hi ng whi ch Ber kel ey hasn' t , namel y, a r epr esent at i onal cont ent . I sai d t hat Ber kel ey, qua si t uat i on, has a cont ent , namel y t he set of f act s i nt er nal t o t he si t uat i on; but t hat si t uat i onal cont ent i s not t he same sor t of t hi ng as t he cont ent of Twai n' s book. The si t uat i onal cont ent of s i s t he set of f act s i nt er nal t o s. The di st i nct i on bet ween si t uat i onal cont ent and r epr esent at i onal cont ent i s i mpor t ant because r epr esent at i ons t hemsel ves ar e ' si t uat i ons. ' Qua si t uat i ons, t hey have a dual char act er : t hey ar e obj ect s whi ch ent er i nt o r el at i ons, and t hey have a si t uat i onal cont ent . I n t he same way i n whi ch Ber kel ey has a si t uat i onal cont ent , namel y t he set of f act s whi ch hol d i n Ber kel ey, Twai n' s book has a si t uat i onal cont ent , consi st i ng of ' i nt er nal ' f act s such as t he f act t hat t her e ar e f or t y f i ve chapt er s ( t he f i r st one of whi ch i s not count ed as a chapt er ) , or t he f act t hat a par t i cul ar passage i s bor r owed, l anguage and al l , f r om t he Mor t e d' Ar t hur . W hat i s di st i nct i ve of Twai n' s book, qua r epr esent at i on, i s t hat i t has a r epr esent at i onal cont ent over and beyond i t s si t uat i onal cont ent . The r epr esent at i onal cont ent of Twai n' s book cont ai ns e. g. , t he f act t hat a per son cal l ed Hank Mor gan, cr acked on t he head by a cr owbar i n ni net eent h- cent ur y Connect i cut , wakes t o f i nd hi msel f i n Ki ng Ar t hur ' s Engl and.
Because r epr esent at i ons have a r epr esent at i onal cont ent over and above t he si t uat i onal cont ent whi ch ever y si t uat i on has, t hey al l ow f or a speci al t ype of pr oj ect i on whi ch I cal l ' i nt ensi onal pr oj ect i on. ' Let us f i r st char act er i ze t he ot her t ype of pr oj ect i on: ext ensi onal pr oj ect i on. I n ext ensi onal pr oj ect i on, a si t uat i on s i s ment i oned, and t her eaf t er assumed: dur i ng t he f i r st st age, t he si t uat i on s i s consi der ed as an obj ect and t al ked about f r om t he per spect i ve of a br oader , exer ci sed si t uat i on s' , whi l e t he second st age sees s i t sel f pl ayi ng t he r ol e of t he exer ci sed si t uat i on. I n i nt ensi onal pr oj ect i on,
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I nt ensi onal pr oj ect i on: [ s' j f f <<. s. . . >> [ w( s) ] H. . The di f f er ence i s i l l ust r at ed by: ( 4)
I ' ve j ust r ead Twai n' s hook. Ther e ar e a l ot of chapt er s.
vs. ( 5)
I ' ve j ust r ead Twai n' s book. Ther e ar e a l ot of kni ght s.
I n bot h cases pr oj ect i on oper at es: t he second sent ence i s i nt er pr et ed wi t h r espect t o an exer ci sed si t uat i on di st i nct f r omt he exer ci sed si t uat i on whi ch gover ns t he i nt er pr et at i on of t he f i r st sent ence. I n ( 4) t he exer ci sed si t uat i on f or t he second sent ence i s t he si t uat i on ment i oned i n t he f i r st sent ence ( Twai n' s book) . I n ( 5) t he exer ci sed si t uat i on f or t he second sent ence i s w( Twai n' s book) : t he st or y t ol d i n t he book. W henever i t i s a r epr esent at i on whi ch i s ment i oned i n t he base, t he t wo t ypes of pr oj ect i on can t ake pl ace; whi l e onl y ext ensi onal pr oj ect i on i s possi bl e when t he ment i oned si t uat i on i s not a r epr esent at i on. For an i l l ust r at i on of t he cont ext ual ambi gui t y t hus gener at ed, consi der t hi s pi ece of di scour se: I ' ve j ust r ead Twai n' s book. Ther e ar e a l ot of pages. ' Page' can mean ei t her one si de of t he l eaf of a book, or a young mal e at t endant on ki ngs, nobl es et c. I n t he cont ext of " I ' ve j ust r ead Twai n' s hook, " bot h r eadi ngs make sense. I n t he ' l eaf ' r eadi ng t he second sent ence st at es a f act concer ni ng Twai n' s book ( ext ensi onal pr oj ect i on) ; i n t he ' young mal e' r eadi ng i t st at es a f act concer ni ng t he st or y t ol d by Twai n' s book ( i nt ensi onal pr oj ect i on) .
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The di f f er ence bet ween ext ensi onal and i nt ensi onal pr oj ect i on account s f or t he di f f er ence i n our i nt ui t i ons concer ni ng ( 1) , ( 2) and ( 3) above; i t account s f or t he f act t hat , i n t he Ber kel ey exampl e, t he pr oj ect i on i s bar el y not i ced, whi l e i n t he ' par anoi d' exampl e t he shi f t of poi nt of vi ew i s ver y mani f est . Ext ensi onal pr oj ect i on i s l i ke zoomi ng a det ai l s f r omsome or i gi nal scene ( exer ci sed si t uat i on) s' i s f ocused on i n such a way t hat i t becomes t he scene ( t he exer ci sed si t uat i on) . The di f f er ence bet ween t he f i r st st age ( when s i s seen agai nst t he backgr ound of ot her t hi ngs i n s' ) and t he second st age ( when s i t sel f i s t he backgr ound agai nst whi ch t hi ngs i n s ar e seen) i s a di f f er ence of gr ai n. I n i nt ensi onal pr oj ect i on, however , s i s not a por t i on of s' whi ch has been f ocused on, but an al t er nat i ve uni ver se. The shi f t i s much mor e dr amat i c and not i ceabl e. The i nt ui t i ve di f f er ence bet ween t he t wo t ypes of case shoul d not be over est i mat ed, however . As I al r eady ment i oned, exampl e ( 2) i s i nt er medi at e bet ween ( 1) and ( 3) as f ar as t he st r engt h of our i nt ui t i ons i s concer ned. And exampl es of i nt ensi or i al pr oj ect i on i n whi ch t he pr oj ect i ve st ep i s hat f ol l ows i s an exampl e t aken har dl y not i ced ar e not di f f i cul t t o f i nd. W al most at r andom. 5. 3 An exampl e of i nt ensi onal pr oj ect i on Open t he f i r st encycl opedi a of phi l osophy t hat comes t o hand. I n a t ypi cal ent r y f r om such an encycl opedi a, you wi l l f i nd sent ences expl i ci t l y about t he phi l osopher ' s l i f e and vi ews ( e. g. , sent ences begi nni ng wi t h " Accor di ng t o Lei bni z. ), f ol l owed by sent ences di r ect l y pr esent i ng t hose vi ews. The f ol l owi ng passage f r om Ur mson' s ' Conci se Encycl opedi a' pr ovi des an exampl e: Lei bni z' s [ met aphysi cs) i s compl et ed by hi s pr oof s of t he exi st ence of God. The syst emof cr eat ed monads i s, i n a sense, compl et e i n i t sel f , t hat i s, i t i s necessar i l y as i t i s gr ant ed t hat any par t of i t exi st s. But no one par t of i t cont ai ns t he r eason f or i t s own exi st ence, so t hat t he r eason f or i t s exi st ence must l i e i n a bei ng whi ch does cont ai n i t s own r eason f or exi st ence, t hat i s, i n a necessar y bei ng, whi ch we cal l God. Thi s ar gument , t he ' cosmol ogi cal ar gument ' , appear s i n t he Monadol ogy and t her e i s not hi ng i n i t whi ch i s pecul i ar t o Lei bni z ( Ur mson, ed. , 1975; 156) .
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who speaks, as i t wer e. The f i r st and l ast sent ence r ef er t o Lei bni z and hi s vi ew, and expr ess t he bel i ef s of t he aut hor of t he ar t i cl e, r at her t han Lei bni z' s bel i ef s. I n t he si t uat i onal f r amewor k, t he passage can be descr i bed as f ol l ows. The aut hor of t he ar t i cl e t al ks about one par t i cul ar aspect of t he hi st or y of West er n phi l osophy and phi l osopher s, vi z. Lei bni z and hi s met aphysi cal syst em. That i s t he exer ci sed si t uat i on f or t he f i r st and l ast sent ences of our passage: t he aut hor of t he ar t i cl e st at es t wo f act s concer ni ng t hat por t i on of West er n phi l osophy, namel y t he f act t hat Lei bni z' s doct r i ne of monads i s compl et ed by hi s pr oof s of t he exi st ence of God ( f i r st sent ence) , and t he f act t hat t he Cosmol ogi cal ar gument can be f ound i n t he Monadol ogy and i s not pecul i ar t o Lei bni z ( l ast sent ence) . I n cont r ast , t he exer ci sed si t uat i on f or t he i nt er medi at e sent ences i s not t he por t i on of t he wor l d whi ch i ncl udes Lei bni z and hi s wor ks, but a count er f act ual si t uat i on, vi z. t he si t uat i on whi ch Lei bni z' s met aphysi cal wr i t i ngs descr i be: t he ' Lei bni zi an uni ver se, ' as we may cal l i t . That i s a ver y di f f er ent si t uat i on f r omt he por t i on of t he act ual wor l d whi ch t he aut hor of t he encycl opedi a ar t i cl e t al ks about . The Lei bni zi an uni ver se i ncl udes God, monads, et c. ; t he por t i on of @ whi ch t he aut hor of t he ar t i cl e t al ks about i ncl udes Lei bni z, Ar naul d, and t he Royal Li br ar y at 1- l anover . The i nt er medi at e sent ences ar e meant as ( di r ect ) descr i pt i ons of t he Lei bni zi an uni ver se; t hey ar e not an el l i pt i cal descr i pt i on of Lei hni z descr i bi ng t he Lei bni zi an uni ver se. I n ot her wor ds, pr oj ect i on oper at es. But pr oj ect i on i s such a per vasi ve mechani smt hat i t i s bar el y not i ced even t hough, i n t hi s par t i cul ar case, i t bel ongs t o t he mor e dr amat i c, i nt ensi onal var i et y. 6. Si t uat i ons and cogni t i ve cont ent
6. 1 Pr oj ect i on vs. el l i psi s Let us go back t o t he Ber kel ey exampl e: Ber kel ey i s a ni ce pl ace. Ther e ar c bookst or es and cof f ee shops ever ywher e.
Ther e i s a cl ear cont r ast bet ween t he f i r st and l ast sent ence of t hat passage on t he one hand, and t he i nt er medi at e sent ences on t he ot her . The i nt er me-
Most l anguage t heor i st s woul d say t hat " Ther e ar e bookst or es and cof f ee shops ever ywher e" i s el l i pt i cal f or " I n Ber kel ey, t her e ar e bookst or es and cof f ee shops ever ywher e. " I n what sense i s my cl ai mabout pr oj ect i on di f f er ent
di at e sent ences st at e Lei bni z' s own vi ew of t he mat t er : i t i s Lei bni z hi msel f
f r om t he t r adi t i onal el l i psi s cl ai m? W hat i s t he di f f er ence bet ween sayi ng
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t hat t he sent ence i s el l i pt i cal f or " I n Ber kel ey t her e ar e bookst or es and cof f ee shops ever ywher e" and sayi ng t hat t he Ber kel ey si t uat i on i s cont ext ual l y assumed? I agr ee t hat Ber kel ey i s an aspect of t he cont ent of " Ther e ar e bookst or es
I n t hi s t heor y t her e i s a semant i c di f f er ence bet ween " Ther e ar e bookst or es and cof f ee shops ever ywher e, " whi ch st at es a f act concer ni ng Ber kel ey, and " I n Ber kel ey t her e ar e bookst or es and cof f ee shops ever ywher e, " whi ch st at es a di f f er ent f act ( a f act about Ber kel ey) , concer ni ng a wi der por t i on of
and cof f ee shops ever ywher e' i n t he f ol l owi ng sense. The speaker ( or t he t hi nker ) has Ber kel ey i n mi nd when she says " Ther e ar e bookst or es and cof f ee shops ever ywher e. " She i s t al ki ng of Ber kel ey, not of Par i s or any ot her ci t y. I n Per r y' s t er mi nol ogy, Ber kel ey i s an ' unar t i cul at ed const i t uent ' of t he
t he uni ver se. That semant i c di f f er ence i s t he r eason why I r ej ect t he not i on t hat one ut t er ance i s mer el y ' el l i pt i cal ' f or t he ot her ( hence synonymous wi t h i t ) .
cont ent expr essed by t he second sent ence. St i l l , t her e ar e di f f er ent ways of const r ui ng t hi s not i on of an unar t i cul at ed const i t uent . To say t hat " Ther e ar e bookst or es and cof f ee shops ever ywher e" i s el l i pt i cal f or " I n Ber kel ey t her e ar e bookst or es and cof f ee shops ever ywher e" i s t o opt f or a par t i cul ar const r ual , one whi ch I t hi nk must be r ej ect ed. I n t he Aust i ni an f r amewor k t he compl et e cont ent of a r epr esent at i on i s t wo- f ol d: i t consi st s of t he f act whi ch t he r epr esent at i on expr esses, pl us t he si t uat i on whi ch t hat f act concer ns. The st r uct ur e of t he compl et e cont ent i s: [ 51
H
Si nce t he compl et e cont ent of an ut t er ance or t hought i s an Aust i ni an pr oposi t i on wi t h t wo component s, t her e ar e t wo opt i ons f or unar t i cul at ed const i t uent s: t hey can bel ong ei t her t o t he si t uat i onal component , or t o t he ' r adi cal ' ( i . e. , t he r i ght - hand si de of t he Aust i ni an pr oposi t i on) . Accor di ng t o my t heor y of pr oj ect i on, t he si t uat i on ment i oned by t he base det er mi nes t he ' exer ci sed si t uat i on' wi t h r espect t o whi ch t he r epr esent at i on t hat f ol l ows i s pr oj ect i vel y i nt er pr et ed. The compl et e cont ent of " Ther e ar e bookst or es and cof f ee shops ever ywher e" t her ef or e i s: [ Ber kel ey] H<<' I ' her e ar e bookst or es and cof f ee shops ever ywher e>> I n ot her wor ds, t he f act whi ch i s st at ed ( on t he r i ght - hand si de) does not i ncl ude Ber kel ey as a const i t uent ; i n t hat r espect i t i s ver y di f f er ent f r om t he f act st at ed by t he base, namel y, t he f act t hat Ber kel ey i s a ni ce pl ace. For t hat f act i s about Ber kel ey i n t he st r ong sense: i t i ncl udes i t as a const i t uent . The compl et e cont ent of t he base i s: [ The US si t uat i on]
<>
Her e we f i nd Ber kel ey on t he si de of t he r adi cal , r at her t han on t he si t uat i onal si de.
6. 2 ' Concer ni ng' and ' bei ng about ' The di f f er ence bet ween ' concer ni ng' and ' bei ng about ' has been el abor at ed by Per r y i n hi s paper " Thought wi t hout r epr esent at i on" ( Per r y 1986b) . That di f f er ence comes out most cl ear l y i n t he case of t he Z- l ander s, a gr oup of peopl e who " do not t r avel t o, or communi cat e wi t h r esi dent s of , ot her pl aces" and have no name f or t he pl ace t hey l i ve i n. W hen a Z- l ander sees r ai n, he wi l l say t o ot her s not i n a posi t i on t o l ook out door s, I t i s r ai ni ng. Hi s l i st ener s t hen act appr opr i at el y t o t her e bei ng r ai n i n Zl and: t hey cl ose t he wi ndows i n Z- l and, cancel pl ans f or 7- l and pi cni cs, and gr ab umbr el l as bef or e goi ng i nt o t he Z- l and out - of - door s. They have no ot her use f or " i t i s r ai ni ng. " They do not cal l t hei r sons i n f ar - of f pl aces, or l i st en t o t he weat her news, or r ead newspaper s wi t h nat i onal weat her r epor t s. ( Per r y 19866: 212) . As Per r y poi nt s out , Z- l and i s an unar t i cul at ed const i t uent of t he cont ent expr essed by t he Z- l ander ' s ut t er ance " I t ' s r ai ni ng. " The ut t er ance i s t r ue i f and onl y i f i t i s r ai ni ng i n Z- l and. But t he Z- l ander s do not have a concept or i dea of Z- l and as opposed t o ot her pl aces. Thei r weat her t hought s ' concer n' 7- l and, not by vi r t ue of cont ai ni ng a r epr esent at i on of Z- l and ( i n whi ch case t hey woul d be ' about ' Z- l and) , but by vi r t ue of t hei r bei ng i n Z- l and. I n ot her wor ds, t he unar t i cul at ed const i t uent i s unar t i cul at ed not onl y l i ngui st i cal l y but al so ment al l y: i t ' s a const i t uent of cont ent di r ect l y pr ovi ded by t he envi r onment . I n such cases t he ment al r epr esent at i on, consi der ed i n abst r act i on f r om t he envi r onment whi ch i t concer ns, expr esses l ess t han a compl et e pr oposi t i on. The Z- l ander s t hi nk " I t i s r ai ni ng: " t he cont ent t hus ar t i cul at ed i s not f ul l y pr oposi t i onal - i t i s a pr oposi t i onal f unct i on, whi ch i s t r ut h- eval uabl e onl y wi t h r espect t o a par t i cul ar pl ace. Let us cal l t hat ar t i cul at ed cont ent t he ' cogni t i ve' or ' nar r ow' cont ent of t he r epr esent at i on. I t i s onl y when t he envi r onment i s t aken i nt o account t hat a compl et e, ' br oad' cont ent i s expr essed, whi ch i ncl udes Z- l and as an unar t i cul at ed const i t uent . I n t he
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Aust i ni an f r amewor k, t he di st i nct i on bet ween t he ( ' nar r ow' ) ment al component and t he envi r onment al component cor r esponds t o t he di st i nct i on bet ween t he exer ci sed si t uat i on and t he r adi cal . The compl et e cont ent of t he Z- l ander ' s t hought or ut t er ance i s: [ Z- l and]
<>
Now, as Per r y pl easant l y says, " t her e i s a l i t t l e of t he Z- l ander i n t he most wel l - t r avel l ed of us" ( Per r y l 986b: 216) . The di f f er ence bet ween t he Zl ander s and us i s t hat we do have a not i on of t he pl ace wher e we l i ve, as opposed t o ot her pl aces; so we ar e capabl e of ent er t ai ni ng a t hought about t he pl ace wher e we ar e, such as " I t ' s r ai ni ng i n Par i s, but not i n Sai nt Tr opez. " Per r y' s poi nt , however , i s t hat when we' r e i n Par i s ( or Pal o Al t o) and we say or t hi nk " i t ' s r ai ni ng" , we need not t hi nk r ef l ect i vel y about t he pl ace we' r e i n. W e can t hi nk " I t ' s r ai ni ng" and l et t he pl ace we ar e i n compl et e t he cont ent of our t hought . I n such a case t he compl et e cont ent of our t hought i s: [ Par i s]
<>
r at her t han [ sI =' z: <Par i s H>>>
Bar wi se ( 1989) al so appeal s t o t he cogni t i ve ar gument , i n connect i on wi t h t he f ol l owi ng exampl e. Suppose Hol mes and W at son f ace each ot her . I n bet ween st and t he sal t and t he pepper . Hol mes says " The sal t i s l ef t of t he pepper : ' because t he sal t i s l ef t of t he pepper f r om Hol mes' s per spect i ve. Fr omWat son' s per spect i ve, t he pepper i s l ef t of t he sal t ; however , W at son i s mi st aken as t o whi ch shaker i s whi ch, and he wr ongl y says " The sal t i s l ef t of t he pepper . " Hol mes and W at son appar ent l y " say t he same t hi ng, " but Hol mes i s r i ght and W at son wr ong. Thi s f ami l i ar si t uat i on shows t hat t he compl et e cont ent of what t hey say or t hi nk cannot be mer el y: " The sal t i s l ef t of t he pepper . " Some unar t i cul at ed const i t uent must he i nvol ved, whi ch account s f or t he di f f er ence i n t r ut h- val ue. Thi s unar t i cul at ed const i t uent i s t he per spect i ve: t he sal t i s on t he l ef t f r omHol mes' s per spect i ve, but i t i s not on t he l ef t f r omWat son' s per spect i ve. That i s why Hol mes i s r i ght and W at son wr ong. Thi s sai d, t her e ar e t wo ways t o go, accor di ng t o Bar wi se: t he unar t i cul at ed const i t uent may be f ed i nt o t he r adi cal , or i nt o t he si t uat i on t al ked about . On t he f i r st opt i on, bot h W at son and Hol mes ar e t al ki ng about t he same si t uat i on si t uat i on t hey shar e) , but t hey st at e di f f er ent f act s ( t he ' obj ect i ve' about t hat si t uat i on. The f act s t hey st at e ar e, r espect i vel y: Hol mes: Lef t - of ( sal t , pepper , per spect i ve H) Wat son: Lef t - of ( sal t , pepper , per spect i ve W )
Our t hought ' concer ns' Par i s, but i t i s not about Par i s i n t he sense of i ncl udi ng a speci f i c r epr esent at i on of Par i s. 6. 3 The cogni t i ve ar gument The maj or r eason f or put t i ng t he unar t i cul at ed const i t uent on t he si t uat i onal si de r at her t han t he si de of t he r adi cal i s t hat t hi s enabl es us t o capt ur e cogni t i ve gener al i zat i ons such as: when someone t hi nks <> she t akes her umbr el l a i f she want s t o go out door s, she cancel s pl ans f or pi cni cs, and so f or t h. Ther e i s a sense i n whi ch t he per son who t hi nks " I t ' s r ai ni ng" i n Pal o Al t o, and t he per son who t hi nks t hat i n Par i s, t hi nk si mi l ar t hought s, r esul t i ng f r omsi mi l ar per cept i ons, and behave si mi l ar l y. To account f or t hat si mi l ar i t y we must posi t some el ement of cont ent common t o t he t wo t hought s- somet hi ng whi ch does not var y when t he concer ned si t uat i on var i es ( Per r y 1986b) . I n t he Aust i ni an f r amewor k, t he r adi cal <> i s t hat common el ement of cont ent . I n a speech or t hought epi sode, t hat r adi cal i s ' appl i ed' t o t he si t uat i on whi ch t he ut t er ance ( or t hought ) concer ns.
69
Wat son' s and Hol mes' s per spect i ves t ur n out t o be ( unar t i cul at ed) const i t uent s of t he f act s whi ch t hey st at e. On t he second opt i on, t he r adi cal i s i nvar i ant : Hol mes and W at son st at e t he same f act : Lef t of ( sal t , pepper ) I l owever , I - I ol mes and W at son t al k about di f f er ent si t uat i ons. The si t uat i ons ar e i ndi vi duat ed i n t er ms of Hol mes' s and Wat son' s subj ect i ve per spect i ves on t hem. 12 The compl et e cont ent of Wat son' s and Hol mes' s r espect i ve ut t er ances ar e:
12.
The second opt i on coul d be obj ect ed t o on t he f ol l owi ng gr ounds. What ever i s t al ked about has t o be ' obj ect i ve' t o some degr ee, and ' per spect i val si t uat i ons' do
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e>
Wat son: [ Wat son' s per spect i ve] =<> The second opt i on enabl es us t o say t hat t he r adi cal i s t he same f or W at son and Hol mes, t her eby capt ur i ng t hei r si mi l ar i t y of at t i t udes. I f we t ake t he f i r st opt i on, t hen, accor di ng t o Bar wi se ( 1989: 240) , " we have not hi ng i n t he t heor y t hat cl assi f i es t he si mi l ar i t y i n at t i t udes of Hol mes and W at son i n cases l i ke t hese. And i t i s t hi s si mi l ar i t y t hat l eads t hemt o make t he same bodi l y movement s, r eachi ng i n t he same di r ect i on, t hough t owar d di f f er ent obj ect s, when t hey want t he sal t . " 6. 4 ' Dei ct i c' and ' anaphor i c' cases The si mi l ar i t y bet ween Per r y' s and Bar wi se' s exampl es and my exampl es of pr oj ect i on i s st r i ki ng when we consi der how t hey ar e anal ysed i n t he Aust i ni an f r amewor k: [ Pal o Al t o] H<> [ Hol mes' s per spect i ve] [ Ber kel ey]
=<>
<>
However , t her e i s al so a st r i ki ng di f f er ence bet ween t he f i r st t wo exampl es and t he t hi r d one- a di f f er ence whi ch i t i s t i me t o consi der and account f or . Succi nct l y put , t he di f f er ence i s t hi s. I n t he Bar wi se- Per r y exampl es t he exer ci sed si t uat i on i s det er mi ned by t he ext er nal cont ext : t he pl ace wher e t he Z- l ander s l i ve, t he pl ace wher e Per r y' s son i s, Hol mes' s per spect i ve, et c. not have t he r i ght degr ee of obj ect i vi t y: t he per spect i ve seems t o be much mor e an aspect of t he ' mode of pr esent at i on' under whi ch t he si t uat i on i s t hought about , t han an aspect of t he si t uat i on i t sel f . That obj ect i on i s ser i ous but I t hi nk i t can be met . Not hi ng pr event s us f r om vi ewi ng per spect i val si t uat i ons as ' r ef l exi ve si t uat i ons' whi ch i ncl ude a vi ewer wi t h a per spect i ve on t he si t uat i on. Hol mes' s si t uat i on i s a r ef l exi ve si t uat i on i ncl udi ng hi mas vi ewer , whi l e Wat son' s si t uat i on i s i dent i cal except t hat he i s t he vi ewer . Those r ef l exi ve si t uat i ons ar e ' obj ect i ve' because Hol mes and Wat son ar e bot h obj ect i vel y vi ewer s; t hei r havi ng a per spect i ve on t he si t uat i on t hey par t i ci pat e i n i s as much an obj ect i ve f act as anyt hi ng el se. Hol mes and Wat son mer el y f ocus on t hei r own per spect i ves, i . e. , on a por t i on of t he si t uat i on t hey ar e bot h i n.
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I n t he pr oj ect i on exampl es t he exer ci sed si t uat i on i s det er mi ned pr oj ect i vel y f r om t he pr ecedi ng di scour se. The di st i nct i on I have j ust made i s si mi l ar t o, and no mor e myst er i ous t han, t he di f f er ence bet ween anaphor i c and demonst r at i ve r eadi ngs of t he pr onoun ' he' . The cont ext ual val ues of t he pr onoun can be det er mi ned di r ect l y by t he si t uat i on of di scour se, or i ndi r ect l y f r omt he di scour se i t sel f . I n t he same way ( t hough on t he ' unar t i cul at ed' mode) , t he exer ci sed si t uat i on, det er mi ned by t he cont ext , can be det er mi ned di r ect l y by t he si t uat i on of di scour se ( ' dei ct i c' cases) or i ndi r ect l y f r om t he di scour se i t sel f ( ' anaphone' cases) . I n ' dei ct i c' cases, t he agent i s i n t he r el evant si t uat i on, hence she can ent er t ai n t he cont ent s appr opr i at e t o t hat si t uat i on ( e. g. , " I t ' s r ai ni ng" ) wi t hout havi ng t o ent er t ai n t he r ef l ect i ve cont ent ' about ' t he si t uat i on ( e. g. , " I t ' s r ai ni ng i n Par i s" ) . I n ' anaphor i c' cases t he r el evant si t uat i on ( e. g. , Ber kel ey) i s avai l abl e i ndi r ect l y, t hr ough pr oj ect i on f r om some r epr esent at i on about t hat si t uat i on ( " Ber kel ey i s a ni ce pl ace" ) . The cogni t i ve ar gument whi ch Per r y and Bar wi se bot h appeal t o i n suppor t of t he Aust i ni an anal ysi s i s sui t ed t o ' dei ct i c' cases: when a cogni t i ve agent f i nds her sel f i n a si t uat i on s and t hi nks " I t ' s r ai ni ng, " she t ends t o behave i n a cer t ai n way: she t akes her umbr el l a, et c. The agent ' s behavi or al di sposi t i ons r ef l ect t he r adi cal whi ch she ent er t ai ns, i ndependent l y of t he par t i cul ar si t uat i on whi ch t he t hought concer ns. Can we ext end t hi s ar gument t o ' anaphor i c' cases? I t seems t hat we cannot . For t he cogni t i ve agent who t hi nks: " I n Chi cago t he weat her i s bad. I t ' s r ai ni ng. Bobby t hi nks of goi ng t o Fl or i da f or a change" i s not t her eby di sposed t o t ake her umbr el l a when goi ng out door s. The si t uat i on whi ch she assumes ( t he Chi cago si t uat i on) i s di st i nct f r omt he si t uat i on she i s i n, and her di sposi t i ons t o act concer n t he l at t er , not t he f or mer . I n pr oj ect i on, however , t he subj ect ' s ment al behavi or r ef l ect s t he r adi cal she ent er t ai ns. The agent who pr oj ect i vel y ent er t ai ns t he r epr esent at i on " I t i s r ai ni ng" i s t her eby di sposed t o i nf er ent i al l y expl oi t t hat r epr esent at i on i n spont aneous r easoni ng. For exampl e she wi l l i nf er t hat t he pavement s ar e wet , et c. The subj ect does not bel i eve t hat i t i s r ai ni ng, but , as l ong as she assumes t he Chi cago si t uat i on, she ' accept s' t he r epr esent at i on t hat i t i s r ai ni ng and f eeds i t t o t he i nf er ent i al devi ce, as i f i t was a genui ne bel i ef . ( Nor mal l y, onl y r epr esent at i ons i n t he bel i ef box ar e f r eel y expl oi t ed i n spont aneous i nf er ence. ) I n ot her wor ds, she engages i n ' ment al si mul a-
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t i on' . 13 I n ment al si mul at i on t he pat h t o act i on i s bl ocked but ot her wi se t he subj ect i s i n qual i t at i vel y t he same cogni t i ve st at e she woul d be i n i f t he r epr esent at i on she accept s concer ned her act ual si t uat i on ( Cur r i e 1995) . I f , as I
suppor t s a cer t ai n f act ( t he f act t hat i t i s r ai ni ng) . The di f f er ence bet ween t he pr emi ss and t he concl usi on i s t hat t he si t uat i on i n quest i on i s exer ci sed i n t he pr emi ss, ment i oned i n t he concl usi on. The Aust i ni an f r amewor k per -
cl ai m, pr oj ect i on i n gener al ( and not mer el y i nt ensi onal pr oj ect i on) i s an i nst ance of ment al si mul at i on, t he cogni t i ve ar gument can be appeal ed t o wi t h r espect t o ' anaphor i c' cases as wel l as t o ' dei ct i c' cases.
mi t s us t o capt ur e t hat common component of cont ent . A l ar ge por t i on of t hi s paper has been devot ed t o an i nst ance of basi c ver t i cal i nt er pr et i ng di st i nct f r om r ef l ect i on: pr oj ect i on. Pr oj ect i on i s ver y si mi l ar t o r ef l ect i on, but i nver sel y or i ent ed. Pr oj ect i on and r ef l ect i on bot h
7. Concl usi on
My st ar t i ng poi nt i n t hi s paper was t he t r ansi t i on f r om" I t ' s r ai ni ng" t o " I t ' s r ai ni ng i n Par i s. " I t ' s r ai ni ng Thi s i s Par i s Er go: I t ' s r ai ni ng i n Par i s That t r ansi t i on ( an i nst ance of ' basi c ver t i cal i nt er pr et i ng' ) I cal l ' r ef l ect i on' ; i t i nvol ves goi ng f r oma r epr esent at i on concer ni ng a si t uat i on s, t o a r epr esent at i on expl i ci t l y about s. I have shown t hat r ef l ect i on ent ai l s a shi f t i n t he exer ci sed si t uat i on, hence a change of cont ext ( si nce t he exer ci sed si t uat i on i s an aspect of t he cont ext wi t h r espect t o whi ch t he r epr esent at i on i s i nt er pr et ed) . Thi s i s i n cont r ast t o t he st andar d vi ew, accor di ng t o whi ch ver t i cal i nt er pr et i ng i n gener al i s de- coupl ed f r omcont ext ual change. The cont ext i s not t he onl y t hi ng t hat changes i n t he r ef l ect i ve pr ocess; t he cont ent of t he r epr esent at i on al so changes, cont r ar y t o what t he st andar d vi ew l eads us t o expect . For exampl e we go f r om( 1) t o ( 2) : ( 1) ( 2)
e> [ Eur ope] H<Par i s =<>>> [ Par i s]
Bot h t he compl et e cont ent ( t he gl obal Aust i ni an pr oposi t i on) and t he r adi cal ( t he r i ght - hand si de of t he Aust i ni an pr oposi t i on) di f f er i n ( 1) and ( 2) . But t he t r ansi t i on st i l l count s as cont ent pr eser vi ng i n some cr uci al r espect . W hat i s r et ai ned i s t he cl ai m t hat a cer t ai n si t uat i on ( t he Par i s si t uat i on)
i nvol ve t wo r epr esent at i ons: one whi ch concer ns a si t uat i on s, and anot her one whi ch i s about t hat si t uat i on. Thr ough r ef l ect i on we go f r omt he r epr esent at i on concer ni ng s t o t he r epr esent at i on about s. Thr ough pr oj ect i on we go f r om t he r epr esent at i on about s t o t he r epr esent at i on concer ni ng s. I bel i eve t hat pr oj ect i on, i n bot h speech and t hought , i s an i mpor t ant phenomenon, and I hope t hat my ef f or t s ( f ol l owi ng t hose of Fauconni er 14 wi l l 1985) encour age ot her s t o i nvest i gat e i t f ur t her . I al so bel i eve t hat Aust i ni an semant i cs pr ovi des an adequat e f r amewor k f or st udyi ng t hat phenomenon. CREA, CNRS/ Ecol e Pol yt echni que 1 r ue Descar t es, 75005 Par i s, Fr ance r ecanat i @pol y. pol yt echni que. f r
Ref er ences
Aust i n, J. L. 1950. Tr ut h. I n hi s Phi l osophi cal Paper s, 2nd ed. , Oxf or d: Cl ar endon Pr ess, l 97l , p. 117- 33. 1962. Howt o Do Thi ngs wi t h Wor ds. Oxf or d: Cl ar cndon Pr ess. Bar wi se, J. 1989. Si t uat i ons, Fact s, and Tr ue Pr oposi t i ons. I n J. Bar wi se, The Si t uat i on i n Logi c, St anf or d: CSLI Publ i cat i ons, pp. 221- 54. Bar wi se, J. and J. Et chemendy. 1987. The Li ar . NewYor k: Oxf or d Uni ver si t y Pr ess. Cur r i e, G. 1995. Vi sual I mager y and t he Si mul at i on of Vi si on. Mi nd and Language 10: 25- 44. Davi es, M. and 11 St one, eds. 1995. Ment al Si mul at i on. Oxf or d: Bl ackwel l .
13.
On ment al si mul at i on, see Kahneman and Tver sky ( 1982) and t he huge l i t er at ur e on si mul at i on i n psychol ogi cal expl anat i on ( see e. g. Davi es and St one, eds, 1995) . For mor e on bel i ef , accept ance and si mul at i on, sec Recanat i , f or t hcomi ng, par t 2.
14.
Fauconni er ' s pi oneer i ng t heor y of ' ment al spaces' uses a not i on l i ke t hat of aöst r uct ur e, and i t uni f i es ext ensi onal and i nt ensi onal pr oj ect i on. I am much i ndebt ed t o t hat wor k.
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l - ' auconni er , C. 1985. Ment al Spaces: Aspect s of Meani ng Const r uct i on i n Nat ur al LanI TPr ess. guage. Cambr i dge, MA: M . Qui nt on) . Mi nd Fr ege, G. 1956. The Thought : A Logi cal Enqui r y ( t r ans. A. and M 65: 289- 311. Gar di ner , A. 1932. The Theor y of Speech and Language. Oxf or d: Cl ar endon Pr ess. Kahneman, D. and A. Tver sky. 1982. The Si mul at i on Heur i st i c. I n D. Kahneman, P. Sl ovi c and A. Tver sky, eds. , Judgment under uncer t ai nt y: Heur i st i cs ar i d bi ases, Cambr i dge: Cambr i dge Uni ver si t y Pr ess, pp. 201- 7. Kapl an, 1) . 1989. Demonst r at i ves. I n J. Al mog, H. Wet t st ei n and J. Per r y, eds. , Themes f r om Kapl an, NewYor k: Oxf or d Uni ver si t y Pr ess, pp. 481- 563. Lyons, J. 1975. Dei xi s as t he Sour ce of Ref er ence. I n P. Kcenan, ed. , For mal Semant i cs of Nat ur al Language, Cambr i dge: Cambr i dge Uni ver si t y Pr ess, pp. 61- 83. Per r y, J. 1986a. Per cept i on, Act i on, and t he St r uct ur e of Bel i evi ng. I n R. Gr andy and R. War ner , eds. , Phi l osophi cal Gr ounds of Rat i onal i t y: I nt ent i ons, Cat egor i es, Ends, Oxf or d: Cl ar er i don Pr ess, pp. 333- 61. 1986b. Thought wi t hout Repr esent at i on. Repr i nt ed i n Per r y ( 1992) , pp. 205- 19. 1992. The Pr obl em of t he Essent i al I ndexi cal ar i d Ot her Essays New Yor k Oxf or d Uni ver si t y Pr ess. Recanat i , F. 1987. Meani ng and For ce: t he Pr agmat i cs of Per f or mat i ve Ut t er ances Cambr i dge: Cambr i dge Uni ver si t y Pr ess. " 1993. Di r ect Ref er ence: Fr om Language t o Thought Oxf or d: Basi l Bl ackwel l . 1996. Domai ns of Di scour se. Li ngui st i cs ar i d Phi l osophy, 19: 445- 475. " f or t hcomi ng. The Si mul at i on of Bel i ef . I n F. Engel ( ed. ) , NewEssays on Bel i ef and Accept ance. Sear l e, J. 1978. Li t er al Meani ng. Er kennt ni s, 13: 207- 24. 1980. The Backgr ound of Meani ng. I n J. Sear l e, F. Ki ef er and M . Bi er wi sch, eds. , Speech Act Theor y and Pr agmat i cs, Dor dr echt : Rei del , pp. 221- 32. Sechebaye, A. 1926. Essai sur l a st r uct ur e l ogi que de l a phr ase. Par i s: Champi on. Sper ber D. and U. Wi l son. 1986. Rel evance: Communi cat i on and Cogni t i on. Oxf or d: Bl ackwel l . Tr avi s, C. 1975. Sayi ng and Under st andi ng. Oxf or d: Bl ackwel l . 1981. The Tr ue and t he Fal se: t he Domai n of t he Pr agmat i c Amst er dam: Benj ami ns.
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1989. The Uses of Sense: Wi t t genst ei n' s Phi l osophy of Language. Oxf or d: Cl ar endon Pr ess. Ur mson, J. , ed. 1975. The Conci se Encycl opedi a of West er n Phi l osophy and Phi l osopher s. Second ed. , London: l - l ut chi nson.
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MI CHAEL LUNTLEY
Dynami c Thought s and Empt y Mi nds
1. Accor di ng t o Evans' s t heor y of t hought s t her e can be such t hi ngs as dynami c t hought s by whi ch we keep t r ack of t hi ngs l i ke days, or of obj ect s movi ng i n our per cept ual f i el d. ' I ndeed, not onl y does Evans show t hat t her e can be such t hi ngs, he says we shoul d at t r i but e t o Fr ege t he " i nsi ght t hat a capaci t y t o keep t r ack of t he passage of t i me i s not an opt i onal addi t i on t o, but a pr econdi t i on of , t empor al t hought " ( Evans 1982: 194) . The capaci t y f or ent er t ai ni ng bel i ef s t hat per si st t hr ough our t r ack of t i me i s pr i or t o our capaci t y f or t hi nki ng of speci f i c t i mes. I n a si mi l ar vei n we mi ght add t hat a capaci t y f or keepi ng t r ack of an obj ect t hat changes posi t i on r el at i ve t o t he t hi nker i s a pr econdi t i on of obj ect di r ect ed t hought . 2 The l abel ' dynami c t hought s' i s mi sl eadi ng, f or i t suggest s a t hought compr i sed of a cent r al st at i c el ement whose dynami c pr oper t i es modul at e t hr ough t he passage of t i me and/ or spat i al movement . That , of cour se, st at ed abst r act l y, i s t he gener al f or mul a f or a dual component t heor y of t hought . But a dynami c t hought i s not l i ke t hat . I t i s a per si st i ng ent i t y t hat Evans 1982. See p. 192f f f or t he exampl e about keepi ng t r ack of a day and Ch. 6 f or t he t r eat ment of per cept ual demonst r at i ves, Thi s poi nt i s i mpl i ci t i n t he way Peacocke ( 1986) devel ops hi s not i on of i ndi vi duat i ng t hought s vi a t he not i on of a t hought ' s canoni cal commi t ment s. See t he account of t he canoni cal commi t ment s of t he t hought " That i s a cube" at p. 15f f . I bor r ow t hi s exampl e i n char act er i si ng t he degr ee of r eal i sm i mpl i cat ed i n any wor t hwhi l e account of cont ent i n Lunl l ey ( 1988) esp. Ch. 1, see al so Lunt l ey ( 1995a) f or a mor e det ai l ed di scussi on of t he same i ssues.
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Dynami c Thought s and Empt y Mi nds
Eur opean Revi ewof Phi l osophy
endur es t hr ough speci f i abl e per i ods of t i me and over speci f i abl e movement s t hr ough space. The t hought does not change, onl y i t s l i ngui st i c expr essi on changes. As such, t he ver y not i on of a dynami c t hought poses a r adi cal chal l enge t o t he or t hodox vi ew t hat t r eat s t hought s as def i nabl e over l i ngui st i c i t ems, f or t he per si st ence of a dynami c t hought i s nei t her gr ounded i n a per si st i ng l i ngui st i c i t em, nor i n any expl i ci t r ul es f or t he t r ansf or mat i on of l i ngui st i c i t ems. I t i s gr ounded i n t he cont ext ual not i on of t he t hi nker ' s egocent r i c gr asp of wher e and when t hey ar e. The dynami c t hought per si st s i n so f ar as t he t hi nker ' s egocent r i c poi nt of vi ew per si st s and t hat i s somet hi ng t hat i s char act er i sabl e i ndependent l y of r ul es of l i ngui st i c meani ng. The l abel i s doubl y mi sl eadi ng, f or i f dynami c t hought s ar e not def i nabl e over l i ngui st i c i t ems, i n a sense dynami c t hought s ar e not r eal l y t hought s at al l . W hat I mean by t hi s i s t hat dynami c t hought s cannot be t heor i sed as r epr esent at i ons, ent i t i es bef or e t he mi nd i n t hought . Once we t hi nk t hr ough t he not i on of a dynami c t hought we f i nd t hat t he neo- Fr egean i s commi t t ed t o what I cal l t he Empt y Mi nds t hesi s: 3 e do not need r epr esent at i ons i n or der t o Empt y Mi nds Thesi s: W t hi nk, f or t hi nki ng i s not an oper at i on def i ned over r epr esent at i ons; i t i s an oper at i on def i ned over our encount er s wi t h t he wor l d. I f t hi s i s r i ght , t he not i on of a dynami c t hought pr ovi des t he most basi c case f or t he r adi cal ext er nal i smof t he nco- Fr cgean account of cont ent . I n t hi s paper I want t o r evi ew t he pr i nci pl es of i ndi vi duat i on f or dynami c t hought s. I shal l t r ace t he way t hat t he r adi cal ext er nal i sm of t hese t hought s f l ows f r om t he f undament al pr i nci pl es of Fr egean t heor y. To under st and t he si gni f i cance of t he account of dynami c t hought s i s t o under st and why, despi t e what so many wr i t er s have sai d t o t he cont r ar y, Fr egean 4 t heor y can have no t r uck wi t h l i ngui st i c based account s of meani ng. Thi s can make t he whol e appar at us of neo- Fr egean si ngul ar t hought s, and espe-
j ect ' s egocent r i c poi nt of vi ew, r at her t han r ul es of l i ngui st i c meani ng. However , I shal l showt hat i f t he Empt y Mi nds t hesi s i s t r ue, t he cont r ol l i ng not i on of t he subj ect ' s egocent r i c poi nt of vi ewi s r ender ed beni gn. 2. Ther e i s a l ot at st ake i n al l t hi s and a f ew br oad i nt r oduct or y r emar ks about t he gener al backgr ound i ssues mi ght pr ovi de a pr el i mi nar y f ocus. Most peopl e ar e pr one t o t hi nk t hat t he gr oundf l oor concept i on of cont ent i s a st or y about t he way we handl e sent ences. Bei ng i n possessi on of cont ent i s bei ng i n possessi on of sent ences. The mani pul at i on of bel i ef s t hat occur s i n our cogni t i ve machi ner y i s a pr ocess def i ned over sent ent i al i t ems. On t hi s appr oach we st udy t he st r uct ur e of t hought by st udyi ng t he st r uct ur e of l anguage. 5 Suppose t hat an account of cont ent can be bui l t f r oma sent ent i al model of cont ent s. Mor e pr eci sel y, t hi s i s t o suppose t hat we can i ndi vi duat e cont ent s sent ent i al l y or , i f we adopt a dual component appr oach, we can i ndi vi duat e t he cor e component of any gi ven cont ent sent ent i al l y. 6 Thi s means t hat t he pr i nci pl es of i ndi vi duat i on of cont ent s ar e gover ned by our account of l i ngui st i c meani ng. Thi s means t hat we can t r eat cont ent s, t he i t ems possessi on of whi ch mar ks us out as pot ent i al l y i nt el l i gent bei ngs, as a r ange of symbol i c ent i t i es. On such an appr oach, our cogni t i ve f acul t i es wi l l , at hear t , be pr ocessi ng capaci t i es f or handl i ng nar r ow cont ent s, i t ems t hat can he i ndi vi duat ed i n whol e or i n cor e component par t i ndependent l y of how t hi ngs st and i n t he wor l d. 7 5. 6.
ci al l y dynami c t hought s, appear myst er i ous, f or i t i s al l gr ounded i n t he sub3.
4.
Of cour se, t he Empt y Mi nds t hesi s i s compat i bl e wi t h i nsi st i ng t hat t hought s have some symbol i c/ l i ngui st i c st r uct ur e. The sal i ent poi nt i s onl y t hat i t deni es t hat t he st r uct ur e of t hought i s capabl e of exhaust i ve i ndi vi duat i on i n t er ms of l i ngui st i c st r uct ur es. The char ge t hat sense i s t o be under st ood as a cont ext ual l y i nvar i ant not i on of l i ngui st i c meani ng i s becomi ng l ess common, al t hough even Per r y ( 1988) st i l l i dent i f i ed sense wi t h descr i pt i ve cont ent .
79
I ) ur nmet t ( 1992) even t akes t he pr i or i t y of l anguage t o t hought as def i ni t i ve of anal yt i c phi l osophy. Not e t hat t her e ar e t wo br oad t ypes of dual component t heor y avai l abl e i n t he l i t er at ur e. The cl assi c dual component t heor y McGi nn ( 1982) , al so i n Fodor ( 1987) i n whi ch i t i s nar r ow cont ent pl us causal cont ext t hat equal s t r ut h condi t i onal cont ent . The Per r y st or y i s subt l y di f f er ent , f or t hat has a cont ent cor e def i ned by l i ngui st i c meani ng wi t h r ul es of appl i ed l i ngui st i c meani ng bei ng empl oyed t o f i ne t une t he cor r ect t r ut h condi t i ons f or i ndexi cal cont ent s. On Per r y' s st or y, ment al cont ent i s st i l l ul t i mat el y a f unct i on of l i ngui st i c meani ng, but i t i ncor por at es appl i ed l i ngui st i c meani ng i n addi t i on t o l i ngui st i c meani ng pr oper . See Per r y ( 1988 and 1990). For di scussi on of Per r y' s appr oach see
7.
Cor azza and Doki c ( 1994) . Recanat i ( 1994) t hi nks t hat t he neo- Fr egean account can be made compat i bl e wi t h a st or y about nar r owcont ent . I t hi nk Recanat i i s mi st aken on t hi s al t hough
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Eur opean Revi ewof Phi l osophy I t ake t he f ol l owi ng as a har ml ess pl at i t ude about cont ent :
( 1)
W e ar e cr eat ur es whose engagement wi t h t he wor l d i s or gani zed by i nf or mat i on t hat we possess
The or t hodox vi ew of cont ent t akes t hi s as equi val ent t o, ( 2)
W e ar e cr eat ur es whose engagement wi t h t he wor l d i s medi at ed by i nf or mat i on t hat we possess.
On t he or t hodox vi ewt he not i on of cogni t i ve si gni f i cance- t he way t he wor l d i s pr esent ed t o us i n t hought - i s def i nabl e i n t er ms of t he ar r angement of r epr esent at i ons. I f you and I t hi nk about t he same obj ect but i n di f f er ent ways- same r ef er ence, di f f er ent sense, t hen t hi s wi l l be because we appr oach t he obj ect wi t h, as i t wer e, a di f f er ent set of sent ences bef or e t he mi nd' s eye. On t he or t hodox vi ew t he mi nd i s f ul l of i nf or mat i on and t hi s means t hat t he mi nd i s f ul l of sent ences or , of somet hi ng def i nabl e i n t er ms of t he l i ngui st i c meani ngs of sent ences. Thi s gi ves t he cl assi cal model of our cogni t i ve pr ocesses, t he sense- t hi nk- act par adi gmi n whi ch cogni t i ve pr ocesses ar e, i n pr i nci pl e, det achabl e f r omt he i nput s of sensat i on and t he out 8 put s of act i on. What ever i t mi ght mean t o say t hat t he mi nd i s f ul l of i nf or mat i on on t he neo- Fr egean appr oach t hi s cannot mean t hat i t i s f ul l of sent ences, or even somet hi ng t he cor e i ndi vi duat i on of whi ch i s sent ent i al . The or t hodox vi ewgi ves us a model f or cont ent as def i nabl e over a r ange of ent i t i es- r epr esent at i ons- and t hese ar e i t ems t hat ar e bef or e t he mi nd i n t hought and over whi ch t he pr ocesses of t hi nki ng ar c def i ned. The neo- Fr egean account
8.
I accept t he i mpor t ance of a key di st i nct i on t hat he dr aws bet ween t he i dea of obj ect dependent si ngul ar t hought s and t he i dea of t he obj ect dependence of si ngul ar t hought s. The l at t er does not r equi r e obj ect s f or al l si ngul ar t hought s, wher eas t he f or mer does. Thi s i s a di st i nct i on I endor sed i n Lunt l ey ( 1988) al so Lunt l ey ( 1995a) . Bi l gr ami ( 1992: Ch. 5) makes a si mi l ar di st i nct i on. My quar r el wi t h Recanat i concer ns onl y t he causal - t heor et i c appar at us i n t er ms of whi ch he f or mul at es t he above di st i nct i on. I do not bel i eve t hat causal - t heor et i c ext er nal i smi s compat i bl e wi t h neo- Fr egean ext er nal i sm. My r easons f or sayi ng t hi s wi l l become pl ai n bel ow, al t hough I do not have space t o di scuss Recanat i ' s posi t i on i n det ai l i n t hi s paper . For t he cl assi c sense- t hi nk- act par adi gm cf . Mal col m et al . ( 1989) al so Cl ar k ( 1993) .
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gi ves us a model i n whi ch t hi nki ng i s not and cannot be def i ned over such a r ange of ent i t i es- ( 1) does not ent ai l ( 2) . The deep met aphysi cal l esson t hat I t hi nk we can der i ve f r omt he neo- Fr egean account of dynami c t hought s i s t hat bei ng i n possessi on of cont ent does not consi st i n whol e or par t i n bei ng of possessi on of sent ences, r at her i t consi st s i n bei ng i n possessi on of t he wor l d. Cogni t i on does not i nvol ve a mani pul at i on of r epr esent at i ons except i n so f ar as t hat means t hat cogni t i on i nvol ves a mani pul at i on of t he wor l d. Thi s i s t he Empt y Mi nds t hesi s. 3. I st ar t wi t h some gener al r emar ks about t he poi nt and pur pose of a Fr egean appr oach t o cont ent , f or I want t o l ocat e t he di vi de bet ween i nt er nal i st and ext er nal i st account s of cont ent at t he most basi c poi nt i n Fr egean t heor y. Al t hough Evans' ext er nal i smi s mor e r adi cal t han any ot her ver si on i n t he l i t er at ur e, t he scope f or t hi s r adi cal ext er nal i smcan be l ocat ed i n t he deep st r uct ur e of Fr egean t heor y. The ext er nal i smof t he Empt y Mi nds Thesi s i s not a mi nor and super f i ci al adj ust ment t o Fr egean t heor y. Rat her , t he Empt y Mi nds Thesi s coni es f r omt he pr essur e t hat t he concept of a dynami c t hought put s upon a deep f eat ur e of any Fr egean t heor y. The f undament al cr i t er i on of di f f er ence f or t hought s on a Fr egean t heor y of cont ent di st i ngui shes t hought s by appeal t o pat t er ns of r at i onal assent / di ssent t o sent ences. W hat Evans cal l s t he I nt ui t i ve Cr i t er i on of Di f f er ence can be f or mul at ed as f ol l ows ( Evans 1982: 18f . ) : (3)
Sent ences S and S2 expr ess di st i nct t hought s i f f i t i s r at i onal l y possi bl e f or a subj ect who under st ands bot h sent ences t o assent t o one and di ssent t o t he ot her .
Evans f or mul at es t he cr i t er i on wi t h an i ndexi ng t o t i me, t her e needs al so t o be an i ndexi ng t o space, f or i t i s possi bl e t o assent t o " Thi s i s my coat " and di ssent t o " Thi s i s my coat " i f bet ween t he t wo ut t er ances of t he sent ence I have moved away f r ommy coat even t hough I have kept my eye on i t . However , t he expr essi on of t he t empor al and spat i al i ndexi ng and t he way t hat t hey const r ai n t he cor e not i on of r at i onal possi bi l i t y i s a cont ent i ous mat t er . I shal l r et ur n t o i t bel ow. Bef or e t ur ni ng t o t he speci f i c const r ai nt s on r at i onal possi bi l i t y t hat appl y t o si ngul ar t hought s and dynami c t hought s i n par t i cul at , I want t o not e t he under l yi ng connect i on bet ween t he not i on of r at i onal possi bi l i t y at pl ay her e and t he expl anat i on of behavi or .
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Eur opean Revi ew of Phi l osophy
The concept of r at i onal possi bi l i t y empl oyed i n t he i nt ui t i ve cr i t er i on of di f f er ence i s r equi r ed t o pi ck out pat t er ns of behavi or t hat make expl anat or y sense of an i ndi vi dual ' s act i on. The concept of r at i onal possi bi l i t y pr ovi des a st r uct ur e t o our behavi or ; i t pr ovi des t he pr i nci pl ed way of col l ect i ng behavi or t oget her t hat al l ows us t o make sense of what peopl e ar e doi ng. The poi nt of acknowl edgi ng t hat i t i s r at i onal l y possi bl e t o assent t o an ut t er ance of t he sent ence, ( 4)
John Maj or i s vi si t i ng t own
and di ssent t o an ut t er ance of ( 5)
The l eader of t he UK Conser vat i ve Par t y i s vi si t i ng t own
i s t o i mpose upon t hi nker s a st r uct ur e t o t hei r behavi or t hat makes over al l expl anat or y sense. On bei ng pr esent ed wi t h an ut t er ance of ( 4) as i nput a subj ect mi ght i ndul ge i n a sequence of behavi or t hat i s unpr ompt ed by bei ng pr esent ed wi t h an ut t er ance of ( 5) as i nput . Thi s i s a si mpl e ease of a gener al phenomenon: a subj ect wi t h i nput s t hat have di f f er ent i al ef f ect s upon out put s. The expl anat i on of t he di f f er ent i al ef f ect i s t hat despi t e t he co- r ef er ence of t he t er ms i n t he i nput s, t her e i s some not i on of i nf or mat i on t hat expl ai ns t he di f f er ence i n behavi or al out put . Thi s i s t o not e no mor e t han t he pl at i t ude i n ( 1) . The concept of i nf or mat i on t hat f i gur es i n our semant i c enqui r i es i s a concept t i ed t o t he expl anat i on of behavi or . To say t hat t he concept of i nf or mat i on i s t i ed t o t he expl anat i on of behavi or i s not t o say much, but i t i s t o make a mi ni mal char act er i sat i on of what i t i s t o he i n an i nf or mat i onal st at e. 9 I nf or mat i onal st at es- st at es wi t h cont ent - ar e st at es t hat syst emat i cal l y connect i nput s and out put s wher e we t hi nk of t he l at t er as act i ons ( i ncl udi ng l i ngui st i c pr oduct i ons) and t he f or mer as per cept ual i nput s ( i ncl udi ng per cept i on of l i ngui st i c st r i ngs) . I f a st at e di d not mani f est a capaci t y t o al t er 1b t i e t he concept of cogni t i ve si gni f i cance i n t hi s way t o t he expl anat i on of behavi or i s t o acknowl edge t hat t hebasi c const r ai nt on t he act i vi t y of phi l osophi cal semant i cs i s t o pr oduce a t heor y of cont ent t hat f i gur es i n t he expl anat i on of behavi or . I t her ef or e agr ee wi t h Per r y ( 1988) cont r a Wet t st ei n ( 1986) t hat we shoul d not di vor ce t he not i on of cogni t i ve si gni f i cance f r omsemant i cs i n or der mer el y t o pr ovi de a gener al t r ut h condi t i onal t heor y of meani ng f or l anguage, i f t he pr i ce of doi ng so i s t o di sengage t he busi ness of semant i cs f r omt he busi ness of expl ai ni ng our act i ons t o our sel ves and ot her s.
Dynami c Thought s and Empt y Mi nds
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out put s gi ven changes i n i nput , i t coul d not be t he sor t of st at e t hat pur por t ed t o he about ci r cumst ances i n t he wor l d. Consi der a ver y si mpl e case. Suppose a subj ect has a per cept ual st at e as of a chai r i n f r ont of her . Thi s i nput or di nar i l y r esul t s i n out put s such as ut t er ances of t he sent ence, " That ' s a chai r ?' W i t h a change i n i nput t o, e. g. , a per cept i on as of a chai r f acade, t he out put shoul d change i n a syst emat i c way. Out subj ect wi l l nowhe pr one t o ut t er sent ences l i ke, " That ' s no chai r " wi t h a st r ong l i kel i hood, ot her t hi ngs bei ng equal , t o engage i n var i ous f or ms of behavi or i ncl udi ng ut t er i ng sent ences l i ke, " Don' t si t t her e, " et c. A subj ect wi t h such sensi t i vi t y t o howt hi ngs ar e i s a subj ect wi t h bel i ef s about t hi ngs, l i ke chai r s. That i s why t hey i ndul ge i n changi ng pat t er ns of behavi or as t hei r i nput s r egar di ng wor l dl y goi ngs on al t er . I t i s t hei r bel i ef s t hat expl ai n t hi s, f or t he i nf or mat i onal st at es t hat make up t hei r bel i ef s ar e st at es t hat connect out put s and i nput s i n such a way t hat t he f or mer t r acks changes i n t he l at t er . I n t he l i mi t i ng case wher e t he out put s ar e l i ngui st i c, i nf or mat i onal st at es ar e st at es t hat pr oduce ut t er ances wher e t he ut t er ance pr oduct i on t r acks changes i n i nput . Mor e si mpl y, i nf or mat i onal st at es ar e st at e t hat medi at e t he way t hat ut t er ances t r ack t he t r ut h. W e can r epr esent t hi s di agr ammat i cal l y. i nput 1 i nf or mat i onal st at e i nput 2
7
out put 1 out put 2
I t i s i mpor t ant not t o mi sconst r ue t he not i on of t r acki ng i nvoked her e. The not i on of t r acki ng t hat I am i nvoki ng i s not a causal t r acki ng, t he i nf or mat i onal st at e i s not mer el y a swi t ch. 10 The r equi r ement t hat i nf or mat i onal st at es pr oduces changes of out put gi ven changes i n i nput i s a nor mat i ve r equi r ement . I t i s a r equi r ement of r at i onal i t y and t he t r acki ng i nvol ved i s a r at i onal t r acki ng. I nf or mat i onal st at es t hat pr oduce ut t er ances ar e st at es t hat syst emat i cal l y medi at e bet ween i nput and out put wher e t he syst emat i ci t y of t he r el at i onshi p bet ween i nput and out put i s t he syst emat i ci t y of r at i onal i t y. The mi ni mal const r ai nt t hat I amcur r ent l y pl aci ng upon t he not i on of an i nf or mat i onal st at es i s a const r ai nt whose r ol e l i es wi t hi n t he descr i pt i ve ent er pr i se of mappi ng t he l ayout of i nt ent i onal i t y. I t i s not I t ) . The concept of t r acki ng her e i s not Nozi ck' s, cf . Nozi ek ( 1981: 170f f ) .
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Eur opean Revi ewof Phi l osophy
Dynami c Thought s and Empt y Mi nds
of f er ed as par t of a sci ent i f i c model of t he mechani smt hat under l i es t hat i nt ent i onal i t y. Cal l t he above pi ct ur e t he Si mpl e Model of i nf or mat i on. The i ssue about i nt er nal i smand ext er nal i sm i s al r eady vi si bl e i n t he Si mpl e Model . The i ssue i s t hi s. The Si mpl e Model capt ur es t he sense i n whi ch i nf or mat i onal st at es st and i n some mat r i x of r el at i onshi ps bet ween t he i nput s and out put s of cr eat ur es whose engagement wi t h t he wor l d i s cogni t i vel y or gani sed. The
t h v' i a '
(5'
i ssue bet ween i nt er r i al i sm and ext er nal i sm ar i ses i f we ask how we ar e t o " i eor i se t hi s mat r i x of r el at i onshi ps. The or t hodox appr oach, whi ch suppor t s var i ous f or ms of i nt er nal i sm, i s t o t heor i se t hi s mat r i x of r el at i onshi ps
i ndi vi duat ed by pr i nci pl es der i vi ng f r om t he i ndi vi duat i on of ai
l i ngui st i c
i t ems. Suppose t hat aj r i ncpd way of i ncl i vi duat i ng cont ent s showed
that
no such aB o
i s a mat t er of bei ng i n possessi on of behavi or al / i nput connect i ons wi t h t he appr opr i at e composi t e st r uct ur e. I n shor t , t he f ami l i ar composi t i onal i t y of our i nt el l i gence i s not a pr oper t y of a quasi - l i ngui st i c set of ent i t i es, t he 12 composi t i onal i t y of i nt el l i gence i s a pr oper t y of our act i ons. I shal l have mor e t o say on t hi s ext er nal i st r eadi ng of t he Si mpl e Model i n my cl osi ng sect i on. W hat I nowwant t o do i s t o showhowt he neo- Fr eof gean t heor y dynami c t hought s f or ces t hi s ext er nal i st r eadi ng of t he Si mM odel pl e upon us. I shal l al so show how t he ext er nal i st r eadi ng of t he M odel r ender s beni gn t he appeal t o t he t hi nker ' s egocent r i c poi nt of Si mpl e vi ew t hat i s f undament al t o t he whol e Fr egean pr ogr amme.
bet ween i nput s and out put s as a f unct i on of t he conf i gur at i on of a r ange of
ent i t i es cal l ed r epr esent at i ons. The obvi ous way of handl i ng t hi s i dea i s to t r eat t hese r epr esent at i ons as l i ngui st i c i t ems, or at l east as i t ems t hat can be
ci wol . That , I suggest , i s what Evans t heor y of dynami c appear ber ef t of t houghj . I n t he supped t o t he m at r i x of bet w een i nput s and r el at i onshi ps any appr oach t heor i si ng f or t her e i s anot her way of That , how ever , i s t oo swi f t a out put s. r esponse, M odel of i nf or m at i on. r eadi ng t he Si mpl e The i nt er nal i st r eadi ng of t he Si mpl e Model t r eat s t he mat r i x of rel at i onshi ps bet ween i nput and out put as a map of our i nt ent i onal i t y. I t i s, f ur t her mor e, a map def i ned over a composi t i onal web of l i ngui st i c i t ems. The composi t i onal st r uct ur e of t he i nf or mat i on t hat or gani ses our engagement wi t h t he wor l d i s a st r uct ur e of r epr esent at i onal ent i t i es. The al t er nat i ve and r adi cal l y ext er nal i st r eadi ng of t he Si mpl e Model comes about when we t hi nk of t he mat r i x of r el at i onshi ps bet ween i nput and out put as a composi t i onal st r uct ur e of behavi or . On t hi s r eadi ng, we t r eat i nf or mat i on not as t hat st r uct ur al ar r angement of composi t e ent i t i es t hat medi at e bet ween sense and act i on, but as t he way i n whi ch behavi or i s syst emat i cal l y r el at ed to wor l dl y i nput . On t hi s ext er nal i st r eadi ng of t he Si mpl e Model , we pr ovi de a 1 quasi - behavi or i st r eadi ng of i nf or mat i on. ' Bei ng i n possessi on of i nf or mat i on i s not a mat t er of bei ng i n possessi on of r epr esent at i ons wi t h t he appr opr i at e composi t i onal st r uct ur e. On the ext er nal i st r eadi ng of t he Si mpl e Model , bei ng i n possessi on of i nf or mat i on 11.
I ' l l expl ai n t he ' quasi ' i n my f i nal sect i on.
85
4. A dynami c t hought i s a t hought t he i ndi vi duat i on of whi ch i nt r i nsi cal l y i nvol ves t he t hi nker ' s embeddi ng i n and gr asp of t empor al change. Dynami c t hought s, l i ke t he ongoi ng t hought about a day, ar e i t ems t hat necessar i l y per si st t hr ough t i me and gr asp of such t hought s expl oi t s t he 13 Such subj ect ' s gr asp of t empor al per si st ence. t hought s ar e al so i t ems i ndi vi duat ed by t he st andar d Fr egean appeal t o pat t er ns of r at i onal assent / di ssent t o sent ences. That t her e coul d be i t ems t hat ar e subj ect bot h t o a r at i onal i ndi vi duat i on and an i ndi vi duat i on t hat i mpl i cat es a not i on of t empor al change i s, pr i ma f aci e, met aphysi cal l y puzzl i ng. I t i s a speci al case of a mor e gener al f eat ur e of t he neo- Fr egean account of t hought s t hat we shoul d pause t o consi der . The ext er nal i smof a neo- Fr egeai i account of cont ent i s di st i nct f r omt he mor e f ami l i ar not i ons of ext er nal i sm f ound i n causal - t heor et i c t heor i es of 4 t hought . '
12.
\ f f _l 3. 14.
Cf . Br ooks ( 1987) , see al so di scussi on i n Var el a et al . ( 1992: 208f . ) on how composi t i onal anal ysi s i s anal ysi s of act i ons not of r epr esent at i ons, al t hough Br ook' s concept of act i on i s a r educt i oni st concept l ocat ed i n a causal st i mul us/ r esponse behavi or i sm. Si mi l ar ant i - r epr esent at i onal t hought s ar e at wor k i n Cl ar k ( 1993) . Cf . Campbel l ( 1994: Chapt er 2) f or an ar gument t hat t hi s gr asp of t he t empor al f r amewor k has t o be under st ood as endor si ng r eal i smabout t he past . l ocus cl assi cus Put nam( 1975) , Bur ge ( 1979) . Not suf f i ci ent not e i s nor mal l y gi ven i n t he l i t er at ur e t o t he di f f er ences bet ween causal - t heor et i c and neo- Fr egean ver si ons of ext er nal i sm. E. g. , Jacob ( 1993) di scusses bot h var i et i es as i f of a common f or m; Cr ane ( 1991) at l east acknowl edges t hat t hey ar e di st i nct but t akes t he causal - t heor et i c var i et y t o be t he mai n t ype t o consi der . Sur pr i si ngl y, Pea-
86
The st r uct ur e of t hought i s a r at i onal st r uct ur e, f or i t i s a st r uct ur e i ndi vi duat ed by t he I nt ui t i ve Cr i t er i on of Di f f er ence. Never t hel ess, i t i s al so a st r uct ur e t hat i s a wor l dl y st r uct ur e. Causal - t heor et i c ext er nal i sm has 5 t hought s model l ed as nar r ow cont ent s wi t h a causal anchor i n t he wor l d. ' The neo- Fr egean ext er nal i sm has t hought s as i t ems wi t h a r at i onal anchor age i n t he wor l d. The i dea t hat t he st r uct ur e of our t hought mi ght be bot h a r at i onal st r uct ur e and a wor l dl y st r uct ur e poses a deep chal l enge t o our 16 met aphysi cs. W e ar e pr one t o t hi nk of t he or gani sat i on and l ocat i on of obj ect s as a f unct i on of t he causal pr oper t i es of obj ect s. A causal l ocat i on of obj ect s woul d be one i n whi ch l ocat i on i s def i ned i n t er ms of t hei r causal pr oper t i es. For exampl e, a t r i angul at i on of an obj ect ' s posi t i on achi eved by r ef l ect i ng sound or l i ght of f an obj ect i s a causal l ocat i on. Fol l owi ng Fr ege, we ar e pr one t o t hi nk of t he f undament al pr oper t i es of t hought s- t hei r i nf er ent i al r el at i onshi p t o one anot her , as a f unct i on of what we mi ght cal l t hei r r at i onal l ocat i on- i t i s a mat t er of how t hey st and f or t he subj ect . How one t hought st ands t o ot her t hought s i s a mat t er t o be deci ded i n t er ms of t hei r r at i onal i nf er ent i al bear i ng upon one anot her f r om t he subj ect ' s poi nt of vi ew r egar dl ess of how t hey ar e causal l y r el at ed. I f we accept t he i dea of Fr egean t hought s t he i ndi vi duat i on of whi ch i s obj ect i nvol vi ng we have t o gi ve an account of howt her e can be t hought s t he i ndi vi duat i on of whi ch i s a f unct i on of obj ect s i n t he wor l d and yet not of t hose obj ect s' s causal pr oper t i es and l ocat i on, but of t hei r l ocat i on wi t hi n t he r at i onal l y or der ed space of a subj ect . I ndeed, we mi ght wonder what sense t her e i s t o t he i dea t hat obj ect s mi ght be l ocat ed wi t hi n a r at i onal l y or der ed space at al l .
15.
16.
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Eur opean Revi ewof Phi l osophy
cocke ( 1993) al so t akes t he same appr oach, al t hough hi s concer n t her e i s mor e wi t h expl anat i on t han t he met aphysi cs of ext er nal i sm. Thi s i s t he basi s of Fodor ' s cr i t i que of Put nam' s cxt er nal i sm i n Fodor ( 1987) , Chapt er 2: t her e i s al ways a nar r owcont ent t hat can be f act or ed out of t he Put nami an br oad cont ent and t hen t r eat ed as an i t em wi t h a causal anchor i n t he wor l d, an anchor t hat i s i r r el evant t o t he pr oj ect of psychol ogi cal expl anat i on. McDowel l ( 1994) has ar gued t hat t he space of r easons and t he space of causes i s one and t he same, and t hat t he way t o make sense of t hi s i s t o r et ur n t o a pr emoder n i mage of t he wor l d. I amnot convi nced McDowel l ' s ar gument i s suf f i ci ent l y wor ked out t o be compel l i ng al t hough I f i nd t he book suggest i ve i f somewhat specul at i ve.
87
The st andar d answer t o t he l at t er quest i on goes l i ke t hi s. Take t he case of hat i s di st i nct i ve of such t hought s on per cept ual demonst r at i ve t hought s. W a nco- Fr cgean account i s t hat t he obj ect i s pi cked out wi t hi n an egocent r i c f r ame of r ef er ence. I t i s t he f act t hat t he obj ect has a l ocat i on pi cked out egocent r i cal l y t hat shows t hat t hi s i s an account of t hought s pi cked out f r om t he t hi nker ' s poi nt of vi ew and not j ust causal r el at i ons bet ween t hi nker s and obj ect s. The egocent r i c l ocat i on of an obj ect i s a l ocat i on wi t hi n t he r at i onal l y or der ed space of t he subj ect . I n or der f or t hi s l ocat i on t o be a l ocat i on of an obj ect , however , what get s pi cked out egocent r i cal l y must be suscept i bl e t o an obj ect i ve l ocat i on t oo. I t i s onl y i f t he l at t er condi t i on i s sat i sf i ed t hat t he egocent r i c way of pi cki ng out t he obj ect i s a way whose cor r ect ness or i ncor r ect ness i s measur ed by obj ect i ve t r ut h- condi t i ons. 17 The st andar d neo- Fr egean account i s t hen what we mi ght cal l a f l si ded account : ' I t i s bot h phenomenol ogi cal and wor l d- i nvol vi ng. Demonst r at i ve t hought s ear n t hei r r i ght t o be count ed t hought s by t he nor mal Fr egean l i ght s i n so f ar as t hey ar e i ndi vi duat ed f r oman egocent r i c poi nt of vi ew- t hey capt ur e t he poi nt of vi ewof t he t hi nker . They ear n t hei r r i ght t o be t hought s wi t h obj ect i ve t r ut h- condi t i ons i n so f ar as t he phenomenol ogi cal l y sensi t i ve l ocat i on of obj ect s suppl i ed by t he egocent r i c f r ame of r ef er ence pi cks out an i t emwi t h an obj ect i ve l ocat i on. 18 I t i s i mpor t ant t o not e t hat I cal l t hi s a t wo- si ded account of t hought i n cont r ast t o t he f ami l i ar
17.
18.
Cf . Evans ( 1982: Chapt er 6) f or det ai l s. See Campbel l ( 1994) esp. Ch. I f or det ai l s on egocent r i c f r ames of r ef er ence and t he i mpor t ance t hat l ocat i on by such means shoul d i nt egr at e wi t h an al l ocent r i c l ocat i on whi ch i s gr ounded i n a concept i on of t he causal r ol e an obj ect pl ays i n t he ongoi ng expl anat i on of exper i ence and of encount er s wi t hi n t he wor l d. Thi s l at t er f or mof l ocat i on Campbel l cal l s a l ocat i on i n ' absol ut e space. ' Thi s i s mi sl eadi ng, f or al l t hat he r equi r es i s a not i on of obj ect i ve space. Ther e i s, of cour se, a debat e about whet her t he t wo si des of t he neo- Fr egean account ar e pr oper l y t wo- si des of a si ngl e st or y. The sensi t i vi t y t o t he t hi nker ' s poi nt of vi ew i s t he not i on of cogni t i ve si gni f i cance and Wet t st ei n ( 1986) ar gues t hat pr obl ems of cogni t i ve si gni f i cance ar e not pr oper l y pr obl ems of semant i cs- t he busi ness of wr i t i ng a t r ut h- condi t i onal t heor y of meani ng f or l anguage. Thi s put s t hi ngs t he wr ong way ar ound, f or i t assumes t hat semant i cs i s t he t heor y of l anguage. Per haps our t hi nki ng i s not pr i mar i l y a handl i ng of sent ences ( t hat ' s what neo- Fr egeans t hi nk) i n whi ch case t he busi ness of semant i cs i s not necessar i l y t he busi ness of wr i t i ng t r ut h- condi t i onal t heor y of meani ng f or l anguage. For mor e on t he backgr ound i ssues her e cf . Lunt l ey ( f or t hcomi ng) .
88
7
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Revi ew of
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dual - component model . 19 On t he neo- Fr egean t heor y t he i t em i ndi vi duat ed f r omt he egocent r i c poi nt of vi ew i s t he ver y same i t em as t hat const r ai ned by i t s capaci t y t o l ocat e an i t emwi t hi n t he obj ect i ve wor l d. For t he neo- Fr egean, t he egocent r i c l ocat i on cannot be f act or ed out as an i sol at abl e component t hat , i n t andemwi t h t he obj ect i ve cont ext , r esul t s i n a det er mi nat i on of t r ut h- condi t i ons. The neo- Fr egean t hought i s a t wo- si ded i t em, i t i s not a composi t e wi t h dual component s. Thi s st andar d account i s, I bel i eve, al ong t he r i ght t r acks, but i t onl y ser ves t o hi ghl i ght my ear l i er quest i on. For i f t hi s account has our cogni t i ve machi ner y deal i ng i n t hought s whose i ndi vi duat i on i s obj ect i nvol vi ng and yet r at i onal l y st r uct ur ed we st i l l need t o knowhowt her e can be such t hi ngs, f or , on t he f ace of i t , t hey ar e t ot al l y unl i ke al l ot her cat egor i es of t hi ngs we have ever come acr oss. These ar e, af t er al l , t hought s. They ar e i t ems wi t h a pl ace wi t hi n our psychol ogi cal r eper t oi r es. But t hey ar e Janus ent i t i es, f or t hey wear bot h t he f ace of t he r at i onal and of t he causal . A t wo- si ded account i s met aphysi cal l y odd. The oddi t y t ur ns on t wo r el at ed poi nt s. Fi r st , how coul d t her e be such t hi ngs? Mor e speci f i cal l y, what does t he not i on of t he subj ect ' s egocent r i c poi nt of vi ew r eal l y amount t o, f or i t i s t hi s t hat pr ovi des t he t wo- si dedness t o t he Fr egean account ? Wi t hout t he subj ect ' s poi nt of vi ew, t her e woul d be not hi ng t o di st i ngui sh t he Fr egean account f r om most ot her s. The answer t hat I pr opose t o t hi s pr obl em i s t hat t her e i s a sense i n whi ch t her e ar e no ent i t i es t hat enj oy bot h a wor l dl y and r at i onal i ndi vi duat i on, f or t hi nki ng does not r equi r e t hought s- t he Empt y Mi nds t hesi s. And, once we under st and t he si gni f i cance of t he Empt y Mi nds t hesi s, we wi l l have a cl ear er pi ct ur e of t he not i on of t he subj ect ' s poi nt of vi ew. I n or der t o cl ar i f y t he odd st at us of dynami c t hought s on t he neoFr egean account consi der a si mpl e exampl e. Consi der t he case of ademonst r at i ve t hought t hat per si st s whi l e I keep per cept ual t r ack of an obj ect . Keepi ng t r ack of a physi cal obj ect i s a mat t er of pr eser vi ng an i nf or mat i on l i nk wi t h t he obj ect i n per cept i on i n such a way t hat i t i s not r at i onal l y possi bl e t o adopt di f f er ent at t i t udes t o one' s demonst r at i vel y expr essed sent ences about t he obj ect . For exampl e, suppose I pi ck out an obj ect per cept ual l y and demonst r at e i t wi t h a ' Thi s. ' I f I keep per cept ual cont act wi t h t he
Dynami c Thought s and Empt y Mi nds
obj ect as we move apar t , t hen al t hough my demonst r at i ve t hought changes expr essi on f r oma ' Thi s' t hought t o a ' That ' t hought , i t r emai ns one and t he same t hought . Suppose I hang my coat on a peg and wal k away f r omi t but keepi ng my eyes on i t . Al t hough t he sent ences change f r om, e. g. , ( 3)
Cont r ast I t ecanat i ( 1994) who t hi nks t hat t he neo- Fr egean account can accommodat e nar r ow cont ent s and be made compat i bl e wi t h a dual component account .
Thi s i s my coat
to ( 4)
That i s my coat
t he t hought r emai ns const ant , f or under t he supposed condi t i ons i t i s not r at i onal l y possi bl e t o assent t o one of t hese sent ences and di ssent t o t he ot her . I f t he ci r cumst ances wer e changed so t hat I t ook my eye of f t he coat as I moved, t hen i t woul d be r at i onal l y possi bl e t o have di f f er ent at t i t udes t o t he sent ences and hence, by t he st andar d Fr egean t est , t her e woul d t hen be t wo t hought s not one. The pr i nci pl es at oper at i on i n t he neo- Fr egean t r eat ment of dynami c t hought s r ef l ect t he t wo- si ded char act er of neo- Fr egean t heor y. The I nt ui t i ve Cr i t er i on of Di f f er ence i s met wi t h t wo compl ement ar y const r ai nt s. Fi r st , t he not i on of what i s r at i onal l y possi bl e i s a not i on of r at i onal possi bi l i t y f r omt he t hi nker ' s poi nt of vi ew. Thi s i s a not i on of howt hi ngs ar e f or t he t hi nker , i t i s not mer el y an account of howt hi ngs ar e?) The r el at i vi t y t o t he t hi nker ' s poi nt of vi ew i s essent i al t o t he neo- Fr egean pi ct ur e. That i s t he egocent r i c const r ai nt . Second, t he not i on of r at i onal possi bi l i t y i s const r ai ned by our under l yi ng met aphysi cs, t he r ol e t hat our gr oundul oor concept i on of obj ect s and t hei r causal power s pl ays i n t he expl anat i on of exper i ence. The cont i nui t y of exper i ence as I wal k away f r ommy coat wi t h my eyes f i xed on i t i s expl ai ned by t he cont i nui ng causal power of t he coat . Shor t of t he post ul at i on of magi cal coat s et c. , t her e i s no r at i onal space f or assent i ng t o one sent ence and di ssent i ng t o t he ot her . The i ndi vi duat i on of t he t hought i s bot h phenoni enol ogi cal l y sensi t i ve and r esponsi ve t o our gr oundf l oor concept i on of howt he wor l d i s. 2'
The l at t er woul d suppor t t he neo- Russel l i an not i on of si ngul ar pr oposi t i ons f ami l i ar f r omt he wor k of Kapl an, Per r y, et c. 21. The f undament al i ndi vi duat i on of t hought s i s not r eal l y an epi st emol ogi cal i ndi vi duat i on. The modal i t i es i nvol ved woul d be bet t er cl assi f i ed as t r anscendent al modal i t i es. Cf . Lunt l ey ( 1995a) f or mor e on t hi s. 20.
19.
89
90
Dynami c Thought s and Empt y Mi nds 91
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The r esponsi veness t o our concept i on of howt he wor l d i s i s a r esponsi veness t o our ' best account so f ar ' of howt he wor l d i s. That i s, i t i s st i l l our account of t he wor l d t hat suppl i es t he const r ai nt her e, i t i s not t he wor l d i n i t sel f . And because t he account of t he wor l d i s t he ' best account so f ar ' t hi s al l ows f or a dynami c t hought t o per si st over smal l br eaks i n t he i nf or mat i on l i nk. For exampl e, my demonst r at i ve t hought about my coat wi l l per si st even i f my l i ne of si ght of t he coat i s br oken by someone wal ki ng acr oss my 22 per cept ual f i el d. Not e t hat on t he neo- Fr cgean account t he mappi ng of t he st r uct ur e of t hought i s apt l y t hought of as a mappi ng of a phenomenol ogy. I t i s, however , a phenomenol ogy t hat i s mapped nei t her by i nt r ospect i on nor by t he st r uct ur e of l anguage. The const r ai nt i mposed on t he mappi ng of t he t hi nker ' s poi nt of vi ew i s t he gr oundf l oor met aphysi cal concept i on of t he wor l d. The st r uct ur e of t he t hi nker ' s poi nt of vi ewi s a map of t he cogni t i ve i mpor t of t hei r i nf or mat i onal engagement wi t h t he wor l d. The map of t he i nf or mat i onal engagement wi t h t he wor l d i s a map st r uct ur ed by a not i on of a r at i onal per spect i ve upon t he wor l d const r ai ned by t he under l yi ng met aphysi cs of t he wor l d t her eby engaged. A i gi p. t hought i s somet hi ng t hat char act er i ses our per spect i ve upon t he wor l d, i t has i t s r oot s i n our eg cent r i c poi nt of _vi ew Thi s per spect i ve i s st r uct ur ed by a not i on of what i r at kt hâT wi t hi n t hi s poi nt of vi ew wher e t he not i on of r at i onal amount s t o: r at i onal wi t h r espect t o t he best ongoi ng. accoun, t , pf how. t h. yp1d i s, The r at i onal st r uct ur e of t he t hi nker ' s per spect i ve i s not measur ed as ' r at i onal wi t h r espect t o l i ngui st i c meani ng f or t he col l ect i on of sent ences wi t h di f f er ent l i ngui st i c meani ngs as expr essi ons of a per si st i ng dynami c t hought i s measur ed wi t h r espect t o t he ongoi ng egocent r i c poi nt of vi ew of t he subj ect . I t i s because of t hi s t hat a dynami c t hought , l i ke t he t hought about t he per cept ual l y demonst r at ed coat , has a pr i nci pl ed i ndi vi duat i on. The mdi vi duat i on i s measur ed by t he r at i onal possi bi l i t y of assent / di ssent t o var i oussent ences, i t i s not i ndi vi duat ed by t he sent ences t hemsel ves. W hat we have i s a dynami c st r uct ur e of i nf or mat i on wi t h a hi st or y and a e can r epr esent t hi s wi t h t he f ol l owi ng di agr am. Let S1 .. . S10 r epr epl ace. W sent sent ences ut t er ed by me dur i ng a passage of t i me i ndi cat ed by t he ar r ow.
22. See Evans ( 1982: 176) f or admi ssi on of t hi s ki nd of possi bi l i t y.
sl o S7
S 8 S5
S2
S6
sq
t
S3
Some of t hese sent ences wi l l expr ess t he same t hought and shoul d be col l ect ed t oget her i n a pr i nci pl ed way t o def i ne t he l i mi t s of a dynami c t hought . The sent ences t hat ar e col l ect ed t oget her as expr essi ons of an ongoi ng dynami c t hought wi l l not have t o be t okens of t he same symbol i c ar r angement , f or r ecal l t he sent ence may change f r om a ' t hi s' sent ence t o a ' t hat ' sent ence. I t mi ght seem r easonabl e t o expect t hat t hi s var i at i on i n sent ence t ype wi l l , however , he r est r i ct ed t o var i at i ons wi t h ki nds of l i ngui st i c st r i ng. For exampl e, i f sent ence s1 i s an expr essi on of a dynami c per cept ual demonst r at i ve, t hen al l ot her sent ences t hat ar e expr essi ons of t he same t hought wi l l i nvol ve per cept ual demonst r at i ves. I t hi nk, however , t hat even t hi s need not be t he case as I shal l i ndi cat e shor t l y. What col l ect s ut t er ances of sent ences t oget her as expr essi on of t he same dynami c t hought i s t he not i on of anendu. i ng- i nf or mat i onal st at e. The i ndi vi duat i on of t hi s st at e i s a f unct i on of a cont i nui ng phenomenol ogi cal per spect i ve ( t he egocent r i c poi nt of vi ew) const r ai ned by our gr oundf l oor concept i on of t he causal st r uct ur e and l ayout of t he physi cal wor l d. The r ol e of sent ent i al i t ems i n t he i ndi vi duat i on of neo- Fr egean dynami c t hought s i s i ndi r ect and pl aces no pr i nci pl ed const r ai nt on t he i ndi vi duat i on of a t hought . Consi der agai n t he dynami c t hought about t he coat as I pi ck i t out by t he per cept ual demonst r at i ve ' Thi s' and, i n movi ng about , change t he expr essi on of t he t hought t o a " That ' sent ence. Cl ear l y, t he cont i nui t y of t hi s dynami c t hought wi l l onl y l ast so l ong as I r et ai n per cept ual cont act wi t h t he obj ect , but t hat does not mean t hat t he same dynami c t hought has t o he expr essed wi t h a sent ence empl oyi ng a demonst r at i ve. I mi ght move ar ound t r acki ng t he coat , changi ng expr essi on f r om' Thi s' t o ' That . ' But i f I r et ur n t o t he pl ace wher e t he coat i s and say, ( 5)
The coat her e i s my coat
t hen I wi l l st i l l be expr essi ng t he same dynami c t hought as I ear l i er expr essed wi t h ( 3) and ( 4) even t hough t he t er mt hat pi cks out t he coat has
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changed f r om a per cept ual demonst r at i ve t o a descr i pt i on wi t h an embedded t oken- r ef l exi ve. The case of r et ai ni ng a dynami c t hought over a smal l br eak i n t he i nf or mat i on l i nk, as not ed above, al so i l l ust r at es t he same gener al poi nt t hat we cannot f i x t hought s by f i xi ng on l i ngui st i c meani ngs. 23 I n cases wher e t he per cept ual l i nk i s sust ai ned t her e woul d even be a case f or sayi ng t hat a use of a descr i pt i ve sent ence coul d ser ve t o expr ess t he same ongoi ng dynami c t hought despi t e t he f act t hat i t s l i ngui st i c meani ng i s 24 cl ear l y not - dynami c, e. g. , ( 6)
The coat t hat I t ouched one mi nut e ago i s my coat
The f undament al poi nt of i nvest i gat i ng t he st r uct ur e of t hi s phenomenol ogi cal engagement i s t o r eveal t he psychol ogi cal space of t he t hi nker , t he l ayout of t hei r i nt ent i onal i t y, f or i t i s onl y by capt ur i ng how t hi ngs ar e f or t he t hi nker t hat we gai n expl anat or y pur chase on t hei r behavi or . The dynami c i nt egr at i on of a t hought over t hese changes i n l i ngui st i c expr essi on i s al l down t o t he t hought ' s cont i nui ng r ol e i n an expl anat or y st or y about 25 my behavi or wi t h r espect t o t he coat . I n mappi ng t he st r uct ur e of t hought we ar e mappi ng t he t hi nker ' s i nt ent i onal pr of i l e. W e map t hei r i nt ent i onal pr of i l e i n or der t o expl ai n t hei r behavi or . I f t hat i nt ent i onal pr of i l e i s not pr i mar i l y mapped by a mappi ng of l i ngui st i c st r uct ur e, t hen t he f undament al t ask f or semant i cs i s not t o pr ovi de a gener al t heor y of l anguage or l i ngui st i c meani ng. The f undament al t ask of semant i cs i s t o map t hose cont ent s t hat f i gur e i n t he expl anat i on of behavi or . 26
Dynami c Thought s and Empt y Mi nds 93 what t he subj ect i s doi ng. Behavi or i s expl ai ned by knowi ng howt hi ngs ar e f or t he subj ect . I f 1 have l ost a pr opensi t y t o move t owar ds t he coat hook hei i i r y! ng t o meet my desi r e t o r et r i eve my coat , t hi s must , ot her t hi ngs bei ng equal , be because I have l ost my capaci t y t o l ocat e t he coat egocent r i cal l y. The expl anat or i l y sal i ent pat t er ns di scer ned i n my behavi or ar e syst emat i cal l y mapped by t he not i on of segment s of a per si st i ng egocent r i c poi nt of vi ew. Over t i me t hese segment s over l ap t o pr ovi de an over al l nar r at i ve uni t y t o a l i f e. 27 I f t he neo- Fr egean account of dynami c t hought s i s an i nst ance of t hi s gener al met aphysi cal oddi t y about t he possi bi l i t y of t hese t wo- si ded ent i t i es, why shoul d we accept t he neo- Fr egean account ? I bel i eve t hat accept ance of t he neo- Fr egean account i s made accept abl e once we acknowl edge t hat t he onl y way t o make sense of t hese ot her wi se queer ent i t i es i s t o embr ace t he Empt y Mi nds t hesi s. I shal l r et ur n t o t hi s poi nt shor t l y. I n t he next t hr ee sect i ons I want t o r evi ew t hr ee ar gument s i n f avour of t he neo- Fr egean t heor y of dynami c t hought s. The t hi r d ar gument wi l l concer n t he Empt y Mi nd t hesi s. 5. The f i r st ar gument t hat I want t o r evi ew i n suppor t of dynami c t hought s concer ns t he t empor al i ndexi ng t hat occur s i n t he hear t of t he Fr egean t heor y. Evans f or mul at es t he I nt ui t i ve Cr i t er i on of Di f f er ence as, t he t hought associ at ed wi t h one sent ence S as i t s sense must be di f f er ent f r om t he t hought associ at ed wi t h anot her sent ence 5' as i t s sense, i f i t i s possi bl e f or someone t o under st and bot h sent ences at a gi ven
Thi s i s why t he not i on of t he egocent r i c poi nt of vi ew i s f undament al t o t he neo- Fr egean pr oj ect , f or i t pr ovi des t he pur chase f or our expl anat i ons of 23.
24.
25.
26.
The case wher e a dynami c t hought i s pr eser ved over a smal l br eak i n t he i nf or mat i on l i nk i s per haps r eal l y a case wher e a demonst r at i ve based t hought shades i nt o a r ecogni t i on based t hought . Thi s i s a possi bi l i t y t hat Evans ( 1982) al l owed f or , seep. 176. Thi s i s not t o deny t hat Russel l got t he semant i cs of t he l i ngui st i c meani ng of def i ni t e descr i pt i ons r i ght , onl y t hat i t i s not necessar i l y r el evant t o a semant i cs concer ned wi t h t hought . Ther e i s t hen a pr of ound agr eement bet ween t he neo- Fr egean and Fodor ( 1987) on t he cent r al const r ai nt t hat t he concept of expl anat i on pl aces on our account of cont ent . Of cour se, t hi s i s not t o endor se Fodor ' s Language of Thought hypot hesi s or hi s gener al i nt er nal i sm. 1 agr ee her e t hen wi t h Per r y ( 1988) .
t i me whi l e coher ent l y t aki ng di f f er ent at t i t udes t owar ds t hem ( Evans 1982: 18- 9, i t al i cs mi ne) . The i ndexi ng embedded i n t hi s f or mul at i on i s, I bel i eve, a mi st ake. I f we onl y consi der gener al t hought s i t can seemt hat such t hought s can be sat i sf act or i l y i ndi vi duat ed vi a an i ndi vi duat i on of sent ences pr ovi di ng we keep 27.
See Campbel l ( op ci t . ) f or t he emphasi s upon howour t hought s kni t t oget her t o pr ovi de such a uni t y and t he cent r al r ol e t he egocent r i c per spect i ve pr ovi des i n f r ami ng t hi s nar r at i ve. Ther e ar e l essons t o be dr awn f or our account of mor al r easoni ng f r omdevel opi ng t he nar r at i ve st r uct ur e of t he neo- Fr egean t heor y of cont ent . For a f i r st st ab i n t hi s di r ect i on see Lunt l ey ( 1995b) , al so Lunt l ey ( I 995c) esp. chapt er 10.
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t he t i me f i xed. For such t hought s, t i me i s ext r i nsi c t o t he t hought . I t i s possi bl e t o bot h assent and di ssent t o t he sent ence, The Ki ng of Fr ance i s bal d t he or t hopr ovi ded t hat t hese at t i t udes ar e t aken at di f f er ent t i mes. Thi s i s ar e m odel l ed as at t i dox way of handl i ng t hought i ndi vi duat i on, t hought s one can have t udes t o cont ext ual l y i nsensi t i ve i t ems- sent ences. Of cour se, di f f er ent at t i t udes t o t he same sent ence as l ong as t he at t i t udes ar c t aken at di f f er ent t i mes. W hat one cannot do i s have di f f er ent at t i t udes t o t he same
Dynami c Thought s and Empt y Mi nds 95 component ' t he day bef or e' i t er at ed n- 1 t i mes. But none of us has a memor y t o enabl e us t o const r uct t hought s by such r ul es al one. W e need a r out e bet ween t hese ext r emes and t he f ol l owi ng t hought seems r i ght . W hat const i t ut es our gr asp of t he appr opr i at e segment of t i me i n such cases i s pr eci sel y what ever yone i nt ui t i vel y appeal s t o: our not i on of t he t hi nker ' s cont i nui ng egocent r i c poi nt of vi ew, a poi nt of vi ewt hat i s const r ai ned by our ongoi ng best account of t he way t he wor l d i s. But i f t hi s neoFr egean appr oach i s r i ght ( and i t appear s t o be t he onl y one t hat r epeat edl y count s t hought s cor r ect l y) , t he t heor y of t hought cl ear l y i s not t he t heor y of 30
sent ence at t he same t i me. Hence t he t empor al i ndexi ng i n Evans' s f or mul at i on. But t he i ndexed f or mul at i on of t he I nt ui t i ve Cr i t er i on of Di f f er ence t hat Evans suppl i es cannot he cor r ect . I f i t wer e cor r ect , t her e coul d be no such t hi ng as a cont ext ual l y sensi t i ve sense, pr eci sel y t he sor t of t hi ng t hat Evans i nvest i gat es t hr oughout most of The Var i et i es of Ref er ence. Even Russel l admi t t ed t hat si ngul ar t hought s r equi r ed i ndi vi duat i on i n a cont ext ual l y
l anguage.
sensi t i ve way, a ' t hi s' t hought mi ght he t he ver y same t hought as one expr essed wi t h a ' t hat : But i f t hat i s possi bl e t her e must he some pr i nci pl ed was accomway of col l ect i ng di f f er ent sent ences t oget her . For Russel l t hi s so l ong as a dem onst r at i ve j ust t hought per si st ed pl i shed epi st emol ogi cal l y, one r et ai ned acquai nt ance wi t h t he sense- dat um t hat was t he i mmedi at e
( i nf or mat i on) t hat i s subj ect t o var i ous ki nds of mani pul at i on ( cogni t i on) t he r esul t of whi ch i s a cont r i but i on on our par t t o t he wor l d ( an act i on) . 31 Ther e i s a cent r al concept ual poi nt i n f avour of t he or t hodox vi ew, but i t
28 For t he neo- Fr egean t hi s i s accompl i shed i n vi r t ue of obj ect of t hought . t he way t hat our met aphysi cs const r ai ns our concept i on of t he ongoi ng egocent r i c poi nt of vi ew. Gi ven t hat t hought s do per si st over t i me t her e must t hen be a way of consi der i ng t he r at i onal possi bi l i t y of assent / di ssent t o sent ences over t i me. I f t he pr i nci pl es f or col l ect i ng sent ences over t i me ar e mer el y t he pr i nci pl es
of l i ngui st i c meani ng we r un t he danger of cut t i ng t he di f f er ences bet ween t hought s t oo f i nel y. Ever y use of t he t oken- r ef l exi ve ' now' wi l l expr ess a di st i nct t hought . 29 On t he ot her hand, i f we empl oy pr i nci pl es of appl i ed l i ngui st i c meani ng as Per r y woul d have us do, we r un t he r i sk of cut t i ng t he t hought s t oo cr udel y. I t i s a r ul e of appl i ed l i ngui st i c meani ng t hat havi ng i dent i f i ed a day as ' t oday' one wi l l cor r ect l y r e- i dent i f y i t n days l at er by empl oyi ng t he phr ase " t he day bef or e t he day bef or e. . . yest er day" wi t h t he See t he f amous passage i n t he di scussi on af t er l ect ur e I I of Russel l ' s " The Phi l osophy of Logi cal At omi sm" i n Russel l ( 1956: 203) . 29. See Cor azza and Doki c ( 1992) f or t hi s wor r y wi t h r espect t o ' her e:
6. W hat t he or t hodox vi ew mi sses i s t he not i on of t he t hi nker ' s egocent r i c poi nt of vi ew. On t he or t hodox vi ew, our i nf or mat i onal engagement wi t h t he wor l d i s an engagement i n whi ch we ar e pr esent ed wi t h somet hi ng
depends on a dubi ous epi st emol ogy. Possessi on of i nf or mat i on gr ant s us t he abi l i t y t o hypot hesi se, t o make er r or s, t o wonder how t hi ngs woul d be i f . . . and so on. These ar e al l f acet s of an i nt el l ect ual det achment t hat i s i nt egr al t o t he concept of agency. I t i s because we ar e possessor s of i nf or mat i on t hat we can st ep out of t he bat t er y of causal i mpact s f r omt he wor l d and consi der how t hi ngs coul d be, wi t h t he r esul t t hat , somet i mes, we ar e abl e t o adj ust t he causal f l owand make t hi ngs ot her t han t he wor l d woul d have had t hem. The or t hodox vi ew has us i n r ecei pt of i nf or mat i on f r omt he wor l d and, once i n possessi on of t hi s i nf or mat i on, we can t hen st ep back and subj ect t hi s i nf or mat i on t o var i ous
30.
28.
31.
Thi s makes a mess of t he common i dea t hat Fr cgc' s wor k her al ded t he ' l i ngui st i c t or n i n phi l osophy) but so much t he wor se f or doi ng t he hi st or y of our subj ect i n sl ogans. The st r uct ur e of t hought i s not l i ngui st i c, hot i t i s a st r uct ur e t hat i s or i ent at ed t owar ds t r ut h. That i s t he key t o t he Fr egean t heor y of t hought and i t st i l l pr ovi des a shar p cont r ast t o t he phenomenol ogi cal t r adi t i on t hat Fr ege shunned. A good ear l y di scussi on of t he cont r ast bet ween a t hought - t heor et i c appr oach t o cont ent ver sus a l anguage- t heor et i c appr oach i s i n Campbel l ( 1986) . Thi s i s t he cl assi c sense- t hi nk- act par adi gm, cf . Mal col met al . ( 1989) .
96 Eur opean Revi ewof Phi l osophy
a
hen compl et e, we mani pul at i ons. These mani pul at i ons ar e cogni t i on. W t hen as i t wer e r et ur n t o t he wor l d and an act i on ensues t hat i s a r esul t in par t of t he cogni t i ve pr ocess. Thi s i nt el l ect ual det achment i s, i n some f orm, a pr er equi si t e f or agency. I t i s, however , a cont ent i ous epi st emol ogi cal move t o assume t hat t hi s det achment shoul d be t heor i sed by post ul at i ng a conf i gur at i on of r epr esent at i ons t o t ake t he pl ace of t he wor l d when we engage i n f al se and hypot het i cal t hought s. The abi l i t y t o t hi nk f al se t hought s i s cent ral , t o our cogni t i ve l i ves, but i t i s bad epi st emol ogy t o t hi nk t hat t he capaci t y f or f al se t hought s r equi r es r epr esent at i ons as i nt er medi ar i es bet ween t hi nker and wor l d as i t i s t o t hi nk t hat t he possi bi l i t y of mi sper cept i ons r equi r es a r epr esent at i ve i nt er medi ar y i n t he t heor y of per cept i on. The capaci t y f or a t heor y of t hought t o accommodat e t he phenomenol ogy of i ndexi cal t hought s i s an equal l y i mpor t ant const r ai nt on a t heor y of t hought . I t i s t hi s const r ai nt t hat , si nce Per r y' s ear l y semi nal ar t i cl es, t he or t hodox vi ew has been st r uggl i ng t o meet ( Per r y 1979) . I want t o exami ne t he gener al r eason why I t hi nk t he or t hodox appr oach must fail. The basi c pr obl emseems t o be t hi s. I t i s r el at i vel y easy t o wr i t e l i ngui st i c r ul es f or det er mi ni ng t he semant i c val ue of var i ous sent ence const r uct i ons f or i ndexi cal expr essi ons, demonst r at i ves and t oken r ef l exi ves. However , i t i s ' t ot al l y uncl ear t hat we can wr i t e gener al l i ngui st i c r ul es f or t he per si st ence of a t hought over t i me wi t hout i mpl i ci t l y appeal i ng t o t he not i on of t he egocent r i c poi nt of vi ew. That , however , i s not i t sel f l i ngui st i cal l y def i nabl e, i t i s e pl ot t he somet hi ng t hat gr ows, f ades, changes wi t h t he passage of t i me. W changi ng cont our s of t he egocent r i c poi nt of vi ewby pl ot t i ng t he changi ng behavi or al pat t er ns of t hi nker s gi ven t he assumpt i on t hat t hey ar e oper at i ng r at i onal l y. At heor y of t hought based on l i ngui st i c r ul es i s t i ed t o t he busi ness of f or mal semant i cs, t he pr oduct i on of a gener al t heor y of l i ngui st i c meani ng f or a l anguage. I t i s not t i ed t o a t heor y of cont ent t hat has i t s basi c f unct i on t o i ndi vi duat e t hat whi ch expl ai ns behavi or . And t hat , r ecal l , i s t he f undament al poi nt of a Fr egean t heor y of cont ent ( sect i on 3) . Consi der a coupl e of exampl es t o i l l ust r at e t he di f f i cul t i es t he or t hodox appr oach f aces. I f cont ent s ar e t hought of as st at i c i t ems def i nabl e i n t er ms of l i ngui st i c r ul es, t hen t hei r dynami c pr oper t i es ar e pr oper t i es of t he mode of expr essi on of cont ent s, t hey ar e not pr oper t i es of t he cont ent s t hemsel ves. " Consi der t he f ol l owi ng si t uat i on. 32. Compar e Kapl an' s t r eat ment of cogni t i ve dynami cs i n Kapl an ( 1979: 389) wher e
Dynami c Thought s and Empt y Mi nds 97
Yest er day I had t he t hought t hat I t hen expr essed as ( 7)
I l ost t o Gar y at chess t oday
and t oday I am consi der i ng t he r at i onal i t y of ent er i ng anot her chess encount er wi t h Gar y. I f my past per f or mance i s t o have any bear i ng on t he r at i onal i t y of my t hi nki ng I must be abl e t o r ecal l yest er day' s def eat . Cl ear l y, i t i s not enough i f I mer el y bel i eve t hat t her e was a day on whi ch I l ost t o Gar y at chess, f or unl ess I have some i dea of how cl ose or di st ant t hat day was I shal l be unabl e t o accor d t he bel i ef about t he def eat a r at i onal r ol e i n my del i ber at i ons. The si gni f i cance of my ear l i er def eat f or cur r ent pl anni ng must be a f unct i on of when I bel i eve t hat def eat occur r ed. I f t he def eat t ook pl ace t wo year s ago i t s bear i ng on my cur r ent pl anni ng woul d, pr esumabl y, be l ess i mpor t ant t han i f i t t ook pl ace yest er day. Of cour se, what I need t o be abl e t o r ecal l i s my pr evi ous day' s l oss as pr eci sel y t he l oss encount er ed on t he pr evi ous day, t he bel i ef t hat I expr ess as ( 8)
I l ost t o Gar y yest er day.
On t he or t hodox vi ew, ( 7) and ( 8) ar e di f f er ent expr essi ons of t he same bel i ef . Ther e i s t he st at i c i t emt hat r epr esent s my l oss at chess on a par t i cul ar day t o Gar y and t hi s i t emget s expr essed i n a way t hat syst emat i cal l y var i es wi t h t he passage of t i me. Thi s al l l ooks i nnocuous, but i t cannot be t he r i ght account . The poi nt t hat sent ences ( 7) and ( 8) do not necessar i l y expr ess t he di f f er ent t hought s i s r i ght . But i f al l we have t o go on i s l i ngui st i c meani ng and r ul es f or t he modul at i on of expr essi on of l i ngui st i c meani ng, t he i ndi vi duat i on of t hought s wi l l be t oo cr ude. I mi ght have a t empor al count er t i cki ng away i n my br ai n t hat mar ks of f each t went y f our hour per i od and t hus t r acks t he passage of days. Thi s count er coul d t r i gger appl i cat i on of a r ul e of appl i ed l i ngui st i c meani ng so t hat i f when t he count er was zer o I was pr one t o say, I l ost t o Gar y at chess t oday when t he count er was at 2 I was pr one t o say,
he cl ai ms t hat wor ds l i ke i ndexi cal s shoul d not be " consi der ed par t of t he cont ent of what i s sai d but shoul d r at her be t hought of as cont ext ual f act or s whi ch hel p us i nt er pr et t he act ual physi cal ut t er ance as havi ng a cer t ai n cont ent . "
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Dynami c Thought s and Empt y Mi nds 99
I l ost t o Gar y t he day bef or e yest er day
A t heor y of t hought based on l i ngui st i c meani ng i s i nsensi t i ve t o t he egocent r i c poi nt of vi ew. I n or der t o col l ect t he r i ght set of sent ences t oget her as expr essi ng a si ngl e dynami c t hought ( and t he i dea t hat t her e i s a si ngl e dynami c t hought i s t he i dea t hat t her e i s a si ngl e pat t er n of behavi or i n need of a common expl anans) we woul d need t o add t o t he account of t he syst emat i c modul at i on of sent ence expr essi on a r i der t o t he ef f ect t hat t he
and when t he count er was at 7 I was pr one t o say, I l ost t o Gar y a week ago yest er day. But such a not i on of t r acki ng a day i s not a r equi r ement of r at i onal i t y. I t t hr eat ens t o gr ant me f ar t oo much power t o my memor y. However , wi t hout some such account of howt he wor ds f or expr essi ng t empor al f l ow syst emat i cal l y modul at e wi t h t he passi ng of t i me, an account of t hought based on l i ngui st i c meani ng woul d cut t hought s t oo f i nel y. For t hen I woul d l ose t he
subj ect i n quest i on was wi l l i ng t o af f i r m t he new sent ences pr oduced by appl i cat i on of t he r ul es of appl i ed l i ngui st i c meani ng. But t o say t hat i s t o gi ve i n t o t he Fr egean pr i nci pl es of t hought i ndi vi duat i on, t he wor k i s t hen bei ng done by t he not i on of t he egocent r i c poi nt of vi ew. Her e' s anot her exampl e. Consi der t he f ol l owi ng si mpl e behavi or and t he
abi l i t y t o engage a dynami c t hought at al l . " The pr obl em her e i s t hat t he or t hodox appr oach i s t r yi ng t o squeeze out of t he r ul es gover ni ng l i ngui st i c meani ng somet hi ng t hat i s, by t he neohat t he Fr egean l i ght s, not a di r ect f unct i on of l i ngui st i c meani ng at al l . W or t hodox appr oach i s t r yi ng t o get pr i nci pl es of i ndi vi duat i on f or i s what
bel i ef s and desi r es t hat f i gur e i n our or di nar y f ol k psychol ogi cal expl anat i on of t he behavi or . Consi der a subj ect si t uat ed on one si de of a r oomwho desi r es t o get t o t he ar mchai r on t he ot her si de. A t abl e st ands i n t he di r ect pat h bet ween our subj ect and her goal . Ther e i s an el ement ar y pi ece of spa-
t he neo- Fr egean t akes f or gr ant ed- t he egocent r i c f r amewor k- t he or gani sat i on of t hought s t hat comes f r om t hem bei ng mi ne. Tr acki ng a day, or t r acki ng a movi ng obj ect , i s al ways my t r acki ng, a t r acki ng of a subj ect wi t h an egocent r i c poi nt of vi ew. Ever yone accept s t hat Russel l i an si ngul ar t hought s al one cannot expl ai n t he r at i onal i t y of act i on. Such t hought s mi ght r epr esent t he i t ems t hat need t o be consi der ed i n det er mi ni ng t he t r ut h or f al si t y of my t hought about t he chess def eat , but t hey cannot det er mi ne my ment al cont ent , my bel i ef about t hat chess def eat . As an i t em f or mani pul at i on i n cogni t i on we need some f ur t her pr i nci pl es. I nt ui t i vel y, what i s needed t o suppl ement t he appear ance of a sent ence expr essi ng t he Russel l i an pr oposi t i on about t he chess def eat i n my bel i ef box i s my di sposi t i on t o expr ess t hi s pr oposi t i on i n var i ous syst emat i c ways. But any at t empt t o f or mul at e pr i nci pl es of appl i ed l i ngui st i c meani ng must depend upon our pr i or sense of engagement wi t h space and t i me. I t i s my poi nt of vi ewt hat mat t er s i n pr ovi di ng t hi s engagement wi t h space and t i me, not r ul es of l i ngui st i c meani ng. These ar e my t hought s and my act i ons, my over al l nar r at i ve st r uct ur e of bel i ef s t hat expl ai n my act i on. '
33. Thi s i s t he pr obl em not ed above, see agai n, Cor azza and Doki c ( 1994) on t hi s. 34. Cf . Campbel l ( 1994) f or t he i nel i mi nabi l i t y of t he f i r st per son per spect i ve i n a f oundat i onal r ol e i n a gener al account of meani ng and met aphysi cs.
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t i al r easoni ng t hat our subj ect has t o under t ake i n or der t o wor k out howt o sat i sf y her desi r e t o r each t he ar mchai r . She has t o be abl e t o ent er t ai n t hought s about howt hi ngs woul d be wer e she t o t ake var i ous i ndi r ect pat hs t owar ds t he ar mchai r . She needs t o be abl e t o f i gur e out how t hi ngs woul d l ook wer e she t o move t wo met r es t o one si de, how doi ng t hi s woul d pr ovi de her wi t h a cl ear pat h t o t he ar mchai r , et c. These t hought s may be expr essed i ndexi cal l y as she t hi nks, " I f I moved over t her e t hen f r om t hat posi t i on I coul d get t o t her e wi t hout havi ng t o go t hr ough t hi s' or she mi ght pi ck out t he posi t i ons t hr ough whi ch she needs t o pl ot her movement i n t er ms of a met r i c: she t hi nks t hi ngs l i ke, " I f I go over t o t he pi ano I wi l l t hen have a cl ear pat h t o t he ar mchai r . " What ever ot her t hought s may be at pl ay i n t hi s r easoni ng one t hi ng i s cent r al , t hr oughout t he r easoni ng and t he ensui ng act i on, our subj ect must r et ai n an ongoi ng pr oposi t i onal at t i t ude r egar di ng t he ar mchai r . I n t hi s case t he at t i t ude i n quest i on i s a desi r e, a desi r e t hat our subj ect he i n t he ar mchai r . Thi s i s a desi r e she woul d expr ess as I want t o be i n t hat chai r and must be const r ued as a dynami c i t em. I t i s t he same desi r e t hat , shor t l y bef or e bei ng met she expr esses as I want t o be i n t hi s chai r and, per haps, al ong t he way she expr esses as
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Eur opean Revi ew of Phi l osophy I want t o be i n my chai r t her e.
I n so f ar as we ar e t o make expl anat or y sense of t hi s si mpl e movement acr oss t he r oom, we must see t hi s as a dynami c desi r e, f or onl y t hen do we see as t he behavi or as an ongoi ng si ngl e pat t er n wi t h a del i ber at e pur pose. Ther e i s a nar r at i ve t r aj ect or y t o our subj ect ' s pr ogr ess acr oss t he r oom. The whol e epi sode hangs t oget her . W e make sense of i t by ascr i bi ng t o her t he dynami c desi r e t o be i n a par t i cul ar chai r . The pr i nci pl ed col l ect i on of sent ence pr oduct i ons t hat expr ess t he same dynami c t hought i s pr i nci pl ed by our not i on of t he subj ect ' s egocent r i c or i ent at i on i n a r egul ar causal wor l d and of how t hat or i ent at i on f i gur es i n t he or di nar y expl anat i on of t hei r behavi or . Tr y t o do away wi t h t he subj ect ' s egocent r i c or i ent at i on and you l ose al l pr i nci pl es f or col l ect i ng t hought s and behavi or t oget her i nt o st abl e pat t er ns t hat per si st t hr ough t i me and space. 7. I f t he exi st ence of dynami c t hought s i s r equi r ed i n or der t o make sense of t he ongoi ng r at i onal i t y of our cogni t i ve l i ves, what of t he ont ol ogy of t hese st r ange ent i t i es? I have emphasi sed t he key r ol e t hat t he t hi nker ' s egocent r i c poi nt of vi ew pl ays i n neo- Fr egean t heor y. I t mi ght be t hought t hat t hi s i s an unwar r ant ed i nt r usi on of a quasi - Car t esi an myst er i ousness about t hought s t hat we woul d do wel l t o abandon. Not hi ng coul d he f ur t her f r omt he t r ut h. Recal l t he mor al f r om sect i on 3. The Si mpl e Model of i nf or mat i on pr ompt s t wo r eadi ngs. On t he i nt er nal i st r eadi ng, t he mat r i x of r el at i onshi ps bet ween i nput and out put t hat i s const i t ut i ve of bei ng i n possessi on of i nf or mat i on i s t heor i sed as a conf i gur at i on of r epr esent at i ons. These ar e ent i t i es def i ned over l i ngui st i c i t ems. I f we t hi nk of t hought s on such a model , t he appeal t o t he t hi nker ' s egocent r i c poi nt of vi ew comes out as an appeal t o a sor t of i nner Car t esi an t heat r e i n whi ch we wat ch t he di spl ay of t he conf i gur at i on of t hese ent i t i es. But t hi s means t hat i t i s t he or t hodox i nt er nal i st who st ands gui l t y of t he char ge of Car t esi ani sm. The neo- Fr egean account of dynami c t hought s pr ovi des an account of t hought s t hat ar e not suscept i bl e t o l i ngui st i c i ndi vi duat i on. The neoFr egean cannot t hen endor se t he i nt er nal i st r eadi ng of t he Si mpl e Model . The neo- Fr egean does not t heor i se t he mat r i x of r el at i onshi ps bet ween i nput and out put as a conf i gur at i on of r epr esent at i ons. Thi s mat r i x must be
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under st ood behavi or al l y. Bei ng i n possessi on of i nf or mat i on i s a mat t er of bei ng i n possessi on of i nput / out put behavi or of t he appr opr i at e composi t e st r uct ur e. As Cl ar k has r ecent l y sai d, 35" I shoul d pr ef er t o expl ai n t he sense i n whi ch t hought s ar e st r uct ur ed, not i n t er ms of t hei r bei ng composed of sever al di st i nct el ement s, but i n t er ms of t hei r bei ng a compl ex of t he exer ci se of sever al di st i nct concept ual abi l i t i es. " The behavi or i sm of t hi s ki nd of exr nal i smi s a quasi - behavi or i sm; i t i s what we mi ght cal l a r at i onal b vi or i r n. I t i s not a causal behavi or i sm, f or i t has no r educt i on i st aspi r at i ons. At one l evel t hi s ext er nal i sm seems qui t e banal , f or i t makes t he si mpl est sense j ossi bl e of t he i dea t hat when I t hi nk about a per cept ual l y demonst r at ed chai r what i s goi ng on i s t hi s: I enj oy a dynami c set of behavi or al i nput / out put connect i ons t hat f ocus my act i vi t i es on t he chai r and not some i nt er medi ar y r epr esent at i on. I n my t hought I am consci ous of t he chai r , not of a chai r r epr esent at i on. W hat i s bani shed by such an ext er nal i smi s t he i dea of t he mi nd bei ng f ul l of r epr esent at i ons. W e
bani sh bel i ef s, not bel i ever s. 36 W her e does t hi s l eave t he not i on of t he t hi nker ' s egocent r i c poi nt of vi ew? W hat t hat not i on amount s t o i s si mpl y t hi s: The t hi nker ' s egocent r i c of vi ew i s no mor e and no l ess t han t he ongoi ng r at i onal l y or gani sed poi nt behavi or al r eper t oi r e of t he agent . To f i nd an ongoi ng sense i n what a subj ect i s doi ng i s t o f i nd t her e an egocent r i c poi nt of vi ew. [ her e ar e st i l l such
t hi ngs as mi nds, f or t her e ar e such t hi ngs as r at i onal l y or gani sed pat t er ns of behavi or . But mi nds ar e empt y. They ar e not t heat r es ( Car t esi an or ot her -
wi se) f or t he pl ay of r epr esent at i on 37
Dept of Phi l osophy Uni ver si t y of War wi ck Covent r y CV4 7AL e- mai l : m. o. l unt l ey@csv. war wi ck. ac. uk
35. Cl ar k ( 1993: 202) wher e Cl ar k acknowl edges t he debt t o Evans. 36. Cl ar k ( 1993: 216) on Dennet t ' s ascr i pt i vi sm: ' I nst ead of bei ng an ascr i pt i vi st about bel i ever s. . , he shoul d be somet hi ng mor e l i ke an ascr i pt i vi st about bel i ef s. ' 37. The ar gument of t hi s paper has benef i t ed si gni f i cant l y f r om di scussi ons wi t h John Col l i ns. An ear l i er ver si on was t he sour ce f or a t al k I gave t o Davi d Mi l l er ' s ar wi ck, May 1995. Thanks t o t he scept i cs phi l osophy of sci ence semi nar at W D avi d M i l l er , pr esent , especi al l y Gr eg Hunt and Sue Chet wynd.
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Eur opean Revi ewof Phi l osophy Ref er ences
Bi l gr ar ni , A. 1992. Bel i ef and Meani ng. Bl ackwel l , Oxf or d, I T Ar t i f i ci al I nt el l i gence Br ooks, P. . 1987. I nt el l i gence wi t hout Repr esent at i on. M Repor t . et t st ei n Bur ge, T. 1979. I ndi vi dual i sr h ahd t he Ment al . I n Fr ench PA. , Uehl i ngT. , &W H. ( eds) Mi dwest St j i di es i n Phi l of phy Vol . 4. Uni ver si t y of Mi nnesot a Pr ess, Mi nneapol i s. Campbel l , J. 1986. Concept ual St r uct ur e. I n Zeani ng and I nt er pr et at i on. C. Tr avi s ( ed. ) , Bl ackwel l , Oxf or d pp. 159- 74. 1994. Past , Space, Sel f M I TPr ess. Cl ar k, A. 1993. Associ at i ve Engi nes. Br adf or d Book, MI T Pr ess, Cambr i dge Mass. Cor azza, E. , and J. Doki c. 1994. On t he Cogni t i ve Si gni f i cance of I ndexi cal s. Phi l osophi cal St udi es 66: 183- 96. or l d. Phi l osophi cal Quar t er l y Vol . 41, No. Cr ane, T. 1991. Al l t he Di f f er ence i n t he W I 6, pp. 1- 25. Dummet t , M . 1992. The Or i gi ns of Anal yt i c Phi l osophy. Duckwor t h, London. Evans, G. 1982. The Var i et i es of Ref er ence. Oxf or d Uni ver si t y Pr ess. Fodor , J. 1987. Psychosemant i cs. MI T Pr ess. Jacob, P. 1993. Ext er nal i sm and t he Expl anat or y Rel evance of Br oad Cont ent . I n Mi nd and Language Vol . 8, No. 1, pp. 131- 56. Kapl an, D. 1979. Dt hat . I n Cont empor ar y Per spect i ves i n t he Phi l osophy of Language Fr ench P. A. , Uehl i ng T. & Wet t st ei n H. ( eds) , Uni ver si t y of Mi nnesot a Pr ess, Mi nneapol i s. . 1988. Language, Logi c and Exper i ence: t he case f or ant i - r eal i sm. DuckLur i t l ey, M wor t h &Open Cour t , London &La Sal l e. 1995a. Thi nki ng of I ndi vi dual s: a pr ol egomenon t o any f ut ur e t heor y of t hought . I n The Phi l osophy of P F. Si r awson. P. J. Sen &R. P. Ver ma ( eds) , I ndi an Counci l of Phi l osophi cal Resear ch, NewDehl i . 19951) . Mor al sent i ment s and t he di f f er ence t hey make. Pr oceedi ngs of t he Ar i st ot el i an Soci et y, suppl ement ar y vol ume Vol . LXI X pp. 31- 45. 1995c. Reason, Tr ut h and Sel f t he post r noder n r econdi t i oned Rout l edge, London &Bost on. f or t hcomi ng. Cont empor ar y Phi l osophy of Thought and Language Bl ackwel l , Oxf or d, f or t hcomi ng 1998.
i nds Dynam i c Thought s and Em pt y M
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McDowel l , J. 1994. Mi nd and Wor l d. Har var d Uni ver si t y Pr ess. McGi nn, C. 1982. The st r uct ur e of cont ent . I n Thought and Obj ect . A. Woodf i el d ( ed. ) , Oxf or d Uni ver si t y Pr ess. Mal col m, C. , T. Smi t her s, and J. Hal l an. 1989. An Emer gi ng Par adi gm i n Robot Ar chi t ect ur e. Resear ch Paper 447, Dept . A. I . Edi nbur gh Uni ver si t y. Nozi ck, I t . 1981. Phi l osophi cal Expl anat i ons. Oxf or d Uni ver si t y Pr ess. Peacocke, C. 1986. Thought s: an essay on cont ent . Bl ackwel l , Oxf or d. 1993. Ext er nal i st Expl anat i on. Pr oceedi ngs of t he Ar i st ot el i an Soci et y, pp. 203- 30. Per r y, J. 1979. The Pr obl emof he Essent i al I ndexi cal . Nous Vol . XI I I , No. 1, pp. 3- 21. 1988. Cogni t i ve Si gni f i cance and New Theor i es of Ref er ence. Nous, Vol XXI 1, No. l , pp. l - l 8. 1990. I ndi vi dual s i n I nf or mat i onal and I nt ent i onal Cont ent . I n I nf or mat i on, Semant i cs and Epi st emol ogy. E. Vi l l anueva ( ed. ) , Bl ackwel l , Oxf or d pp. 172- 89. Put nam, I I . 1975. The Meani ng of " Meani ng. " I n H. Put nam. Mi nd, Language and Real i t y. Cambr i dge Uni ver si t y Pr ess, pp. 215- 71. Recanat i , F. 1994. HowNar r ow i s Nar r ow Cont ent ? Di al ect i ca. Vol . 48, No. 3- 4, pp. 209- 29. Russel l , B. 1956. Logi c and Knowl edge. P. . C. Mar sh ( ed. ) , Geor ge Al l en &Unwi n, London. Var el a, F. , E. Thompson, and E. Rosch. 1991. The Embodi ed Mi nd. M I T Pr ess. Wet t st ei n, H. 1986. Has Semant i cs Rest ed on a Mi st ake? The Jour nal of Phi l osophy, Vol . LXXXI I I , No. 4 pp. 185- 209.
MAI TE EZCURDI A
Dynami c and Coher ent Thought s
One of t he basi c ai ms of a t heor y of l anguage f or nat ur al l anguages i s t o expl ai n l anguage on t he basi s of evi dence whi ch can be obt ai ned f r om di f f er ent expr essi ons. I f such a t heor y does not expl ai n nor can be modi f i ed t o expl ai n, say, how names behave and t hei r meani ngs or how pr edi cat es cont r i but e t o t he meani ngs of sent ences of nat ur al l anguage, t hen i t i s i ncor r ect . The t heor y, or r at her t heor i es, I consi der her e ar e Fr egean ones, vi z. t heor i es whi ch acknowl edge t he exi st ence of t he semant i c l evel of sense. And t he dat a I amconcer ned wi t h ar e t hose t hat ar i se f r omwhat I cal l " t r acki ng i ndexi cal s" , i . e. , i ndexi cal s associ at ed wi t h abi l i t i es t o t r ack obj ect s, pl aces and/ or t i mes, t hr ough movement i n space and/ or t i me. , My pur pose i s t o assess di f f er ent pr oposal s as t o how a Fr egean t heor y can accommodat e a cl ai m about t he behavi our of t r acki ng i ndexi cal s. The cl ai m i n quest i on i s one i ni t i al l y and expl i ci t l y made by Fr ege whi ch I shal l cal l " t he Dynami c Thought Cl ai m" ( " DTC" f r omnowon) . I n " The Thought " Fr ege wr ot e: Some of t he i deas i n t hi s paper ar e al r eady pr esent i n Eecur di a ( 1994) , and ot her s wer e pr esent ed at t he conf er ence Pr obl ems on Ref er ence and Tr ut h ( Oct ober 1994) hel d at t he Phi l osophy Facul t y of t he Nat i onal Aut onomous Uni ver si t y of Mexi co. I t was f i ni shed whi l st a Vi si t i ng Resear ch Associ at e at Ki ng' s Col l ege London wi t h suppor t f r om t he pr oj ect DGAPA- 1N401794. Thanks t o Mar t i n Davi es, Mar k Pl at t s, Lour des Val di vi a, Davi d Wi ggi ns, and especi al l y Mar k Sai nsbur y f or di scussi ons on some of t he i ssues r ai sed her e. Fr egean t heor i es have been accused of bei ng unabl e t o account f or i ndexi cal s i n gener al ( e. g. Per r y 1977, Kapl an 1977, Bur ge 1977) . However , such obj ect i ons have been successf ul l y count er ed i n Evans ( 1982) and McDowel l ( 1984) . My concer n her e i s sol el ywi t h obj ect i ons agai nst such t heor i es based on t r acki ng i ndexi cal s.
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I f someone want s t o say t he same t oday as he expr essed yest er day usi ng t he wor d ' t oday' , he must r epl ace t hi s wor d wi t h ' yest er day' . Al t hough t he t hought i s t he same i t s ver bal expr essi on must be di f f er ent i n or der t hat t he change of sense whi ch woul d ot her wi se be af f ect ed by t he di f f er i ng t i mes of ut t er ance may be cancel l ed out . The same wi t h wor ds l i ke ' her e' and ' t her e' . ( p. 40) Accor di ng t o Fr ege, one can expr ess t he same t hought whi ch one expr essed on day 1 usi ng " t omor r ow" by usi ng i nst ead " t oday" on day 2 and " yest er day" on day 3. The synt act i c di f f er ence bet ween t hese i ndexi cal s i s not supposed t o ent ai l a di f f er ence i n t he t hought expr essed. DTC st at es t hen t hat one can expr ess t he same t hought i n l anguage as one moves t hr ough space and/ or t i me by maki ng use of t r acki ng i ndexi cal s. Exampl es of such t r acki ng i ndexi cal s ar c " t omor r ow" , " t oday" and " yest er day" ; " her e" and " t her e" 2; " t hi s" and " t hat " 3; " bef or e" , " now" and " l at er " . I n t he l i t er at ur e, t her e ar e t wo at t empt s t o i ncor por at e DTC wi t hi n Fr egean semant i cs. The f i r st was pr oposed by Evans ( 1981, 1982) , and i s t he mor e f ai t hf ul t o Fr ege' s i nt ent i ons. The second comes f r om Hi ggi nbot ham ( 1994) . I f i nd bot h pr oposal s pr obl emat i c, and so ar gue t hat a Fr egean' s best opt i on i s t o gi ve up DTCas i t st ands. I n sect i on 1 I pr esent f our cl ai ms whi ch any Fr egean must make, and f our pr i ma f aci e opt i onal t heses she can hol d. I ar gue agai nst Hi ggi nbot ham' s Fr egean pr oposal i n 2, and agai nst Evans' s account i n 3. My ar gument s agai nst t hem at t empt t o show t hat t hey cannot deal wi t h t he dat a ext r act ed f r om i ndexi cal s. However , i n def ence of Fr egean t heor i es i n sect i on 4 I pr esent an al t er nat i ve Fr egean account whi ch can deal wi t h t he dat a f r om t r acki ng i ndexi cal s, and whi ch capt ur es t he i nt ui t i ons behi nd DTCby accept i ng a modi f i ed ver si on of i t . 1. A Fr egean semant i c t heor y i nvol ves ( at l east ) t he f ol l owi ng f our cl ai ms whi ch ar e essent i al f or i t t o be Fr egean.
2. 3.
Dynami c and Coher ent Thought s
Eur opean Revi ewof Phi l osophy
" Her e" and " t her e" may al so be used i n a demonst r at i ve way whi ch i s non- t r acki ng, e. g. , j ust poi nt i ng t o a posi t i on i n a map. These demonst r at i ves may be used i n a t r acki ng and a non- t r acki ng way. W hen 1 move away f r oman obj ect I i ni t i al l y r ef er r ed t o usi ng " t hi s' i n keepi ng t r ack of i t I may st i l l r ef er t o i t by usi ng " t hat " . But i n ot her cases I may j ust use " t hat " and " t hi s" t o r ef er t o obj ect s I per cei ve at one moment but do not keep t r ack of as I move away.
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( CI )
Ther e ar e t wo semant i c l evel s, t hat of sense and t hat of r ef er ence, wher e senses ar e what per mi t expl anat i on of t he di f f er ence i n cogni t i ve val ue bet ween t r ue sent ences of t he f or ms a=a and a=b.
( C2)
The sense of an expr essi on ei sa way of at l east par t i al l y det er mi ni ng c' s r ef er ence 0. A mode of pr esent at i on of 0, t hat i s, a way i n whi ch 0 i s pr esent ed t o a subj ect or a way i n whi ch t hat subj ect t hi nks of 0, i s cont ai ned i n t he
( C3)
sense of e. ( C4)
W i t hout knowl edge of t he sense of e t her e woul d be no under st andi ng of e nor vi ce ver sa.
( Cl ) i s t he st andar d cl ai m whi ch a Fr egean must accept t o di st i ngui sh her sel f f r omRussel l i ans who onl y accept one semant i c l evel , vi z. t hat of r ef er ence. ( C2) i s a mor e per mi ssi ve cl ai m t han t he one t he t r adi t i onal vi ew hol ds about t he r el at i on bet ween sense and r ef er ence. The t r adi t i onal vi ewi s t hat sense compl et el y det er mi nes r ef er ence, i n par t i cul ar , t hat i t i s a way of det er mi ni ng r ef er ence. ( C' 2) i nst ead al l ows f or t he vi ew t hat t he sense of e and somet hi ng el se, say e' s cont ext of ut t er ance, j oi nt l y det er mi ne c' s r ef er ent 0. ( C3) amount s t o t he cl ai mt hat t her e i s somet hi ng psychol ogi cal i n t he 4
sense of an expr essi on, so t hat sense i s not a pur el y semant i c cat egor y. And i ndeed, i f senses ar e what hel p expl ai n t he di f f er ence i n cogni t i ve val ue bet ween say " Hesper us i s Hesper us" and " Hesper us i s Phosphor us" , and a di f f er ence i n cogni t i ve val ue ent ai l s t hat i t i s possi bl e f or t her e t o be a r at i onal subj ect who t akes opposi ng at t i t udes t owar ds t he cont ent s of t hese sent ences, sense shoul d be somet hi ng t hat can af f ect t he mi nds of subj ect s, t hat has some psychol ogi cal i mpact . l l ence, senses must ' cont ai n' ( Fr ege' s expr essi on) or i nvol ve somet hi ng psychol ogi cal . Thi s psychol ogi cal el ement 5 may j ust he modes of pr esent at i on. Fi nal l y, ( C4) t akes on t he vi ew t hat 4.
5.
The i mpl i ci t di st i nct i on her e bet ween senses and modes of pr esent at i on i s t hat senses ar e pr i mar i l y semant i c and secondar i l y psychol ogi cal , wher eas modes of pr esent at i on ar e essent i al l y psychol ogi cal . The usef ul ness of t hi s di st i nct i on wi l l become evi dent i n 3 and 4. For a di scussi on of t he r el at i on bet ween t hese cat egor i es see Ezcur di a ( 1994: Chapt er s 1 and 2) and Ezcur di a ( 1995) ; and f or ar gument s agai nst a vi ew of senses t hat i dent i f i es t hem wi t h modes of pr esent at i on see Mi l l i kan ( 1991) .
To suggest t hat t her e i s somet hi ng psychol ogi cal i nvol ved i n senses may st r i ke one as hi ghl y un- Fr egean. But i t i s not cl ear t hat t hi s i s so. Fi r st l y, a Fr egean needs senses t o have psychol ogi cal r el evance f or a pr oper account of why a sub-
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t her e i s an i nt i mat e connect i on bet ween under st andi ng e and knowi ng t he sense e expr esses, vi z. t hat one f ul l y under st ands e when and onl y when one comes t o knowt he sense of e. Ther e ar e ot her t heses a Fr egean can hol d whi ch ar e f ai t hf ul t o Fr ege' s own vi ews, but whi ch I wi l l not t ake t o be pr i maf aci e necessar y f or a t heor y t o be Fr egean. These concer n t he nat ur e of t he senses of sent ences and of accur at e speech r epor t s. ( TO) ( Ti ) ( T2)
( T3)
A t hought i s a compl ex sense t hat i s composed onl y of senses. Expr essi ons get t hei r r ef er ence ( at l east par t l y) vi a t he senses whi ch compl et e t he t hought of t he sent ences i n whi ch t hey occur . Sent ences non- ext ensi onal l y embedded i n l ar ger sent ences do not have t hei r usual r ef er ence, but r at her r ef er t o t he t hought whi ch t hey woul d nor mal l y expr ess i f unembedded. The t hought r ef er r ed t o i n a t r ue and f ul l y accur at e speech r epor t i s t he t hought expr essed i n t he speech of whi ch i t was a r epor t .
( TO) j ust capt ur es Fr ege' s vi ew t hat t he sense of a sent ence S i s t he t hought whi ch S expr esses, and t hat a t hought i s composed of senses onl y, i n par t i cul ar of t he senses whi ch t he meani ngf ul par t s of S expr ess. Gi ven ( C2) , t he Fr egean who hol ds ( TO) must al so hol d ( Ti ) , vi z. t hat an expr essi on get s i t s r ef er ence vi a i t s sense. ( T2) i s mot i vat ed by f ai l ur es of subst i t ut i vi t y. I n or der t o expl ai n f ai l ur es of sal va ver i t at e subst i t ut i on of co- r ef er ent i al expr essi ons i n non- ext ensi onj ect may t ake opposi ng at t i t udes t owar ds sent ences t hat expr ess di f f er ent t hought s. Secondl y, gr ant i ng t hat senses i nvol ve modes of pr esent at i on whi ch ar e pr i mar i l y psychol ogi cal f eat ur es does not ent ai l t hat al l modes of pr esent at i on ar e pr i vat e, t hat t hey ar c what Pr ege cal l ed " i deas' What makes modes of pr esent at i on pr i mar i l y psychol ogi cal i s t hat t hey ar e what t he mi nd i s causal l y sensi t i ve t o when t aki ng t he same or opposi ng at t i t udes. Thi r dl y, al t hough Fr ege i s cl ear t hat a pr oj ect i n psychol ogy i s di f f er ent f r omone i n l ogi c or semant i cs, he does not shy away f r omt he connect i ons bet ween t hem. I n par t i cul ar , he does not shy away f r omt he r ol e whi ch some psychol ogi cal aspect s may have i n l ogi c or semant i cs when i t i s unavoi dabl e. Al l he cl ai ms i s t hat l ogi cal i ssues must he kept apar t f r om psychol ogi cal ones onl y as f ar as possi bl e and as f ar as necessar y: The t ask i n hand i s pr eci sel y t hat of i sol at i ng what i s l ogi cal . Thi s does not mean t hat we want t o bani sh any t r ace of what i s psychol ogi cal f r om t hi nki ng as i t nat ur al l y t akes pl ace, whi ch woul d be i mpossi bl e; we onl y want t o become awar e of t he l ogi cal j ust i f i cat i on f or what we t hi nk. ( 1879, p. 5)
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al l y embedded sent ences, Fr ege bel i eved t hat when a sent ence was t hus embedded i t no l onger expr essed i t s usual sense nor r ef er r ed t o i t s usual r ef er ence. Rat her , i t r ef er r ed t o i t s usual sense. Thus, any Fr egean who hol ds ( T2) , shoul d hol d t hat when someone r epor t s an ut t er ance of mi ne i n a t r ut hf ul f ashi on by embeddi ng a sent ence i n a l ar ger sent ence cont ai ni ng " Mai t e sai d t hat . . . " , t he embedded sent ence must r ef er t o t he same t hought expr essed by t he sent ence whi ch I ut t er ed. Such a Fr egean woul d t hen al so have t o hol d ( T3) about accur at e speech r epor t s and t he nat ur e of t he embedded sent ences i n t hose r epor t s. Al l of t he Fr egean t heor i es I consi der bel ow accept ( Cl ) t o ( C4) . But not al l accept ( TO) t o ( T3) . Hi ggi nbot ham' s, i n par t i cul ar , r ej ect s ( TO) . 2. I ndexi cal s ar e cont ext - dependent expr essi ons, t hat i s, expr essi ons whi ch onl y r ef er r el at i ve t o cont ext s of ut t er ance and whose ut t er ances di f f er i n t hei r r ef er ence i f and onl y i f t he cont ext s i n whi ch t hey ar e ut t er ed ar e r el hat det er mi nes whet her any t wo cont ext s evant l y di f f er ent . W di f f er ent i s t he semant i c r ul e of t he i ndcxi cal i n quest i on. assumi ng t hat t he semant i c r ul e f or " I " i s t hat an ut t er ance of ut t er er , t he r el evant di f f er ence bet ween t wo cont ext s i s of
ar e r el evant l y For exampl e, i t r ef er t o t he t he ut t er er s.
Hence, t wo ut t er ances of " I " di f f er i n t hei r r ef er ence i f and onl y i f t hey ar e ut t er ed by di f f er ent subj ect s. Gi ven t hat i ndexi cal s get t hei r r ef er ent s onl y r el at i ve t o a cont ext of ut t er ance, we need t o speak not of t he r ef er ent s of i ndexi cal s si i npl i ci t er but r at her of t he r ef er ent s of i ndexi cal s r el at i ve t o a cont ext of ut t er ance or of t he of ut t er ances of i ndexi cal s or of i ndexi cal - t okens. And so we need / " r ef er ent s t o speak, not of t he pr oposi t i ons whi ch t he sent ences cont ai ni ng i ndexi cal s expr ess, but r at her of t he pr oposi t i ons expr essed by i ndexi cal - sent ences r el at i ve t o a cont ext ( or by ut t er ances of i ndexi cal - sent ences or i ndexi cal sent ence- t okens) . For si mpl i ci t y' s sake, however , I shal l use f r om now on " i ndexi cal " t o r ef er t o an i ndexi cal r el at i ve t o a cont ext ( or an ut t er ance of an i ndexi cal or an i ndexi cal - t oken) , r eser vi ng " i ndexi cal - t ype" f or t he cont ext - i ndependent t ype cat egor y; and I shal l assume t hat when speaki ng of sent ences cont ai ni ng i ndexi cal s I amr ef er r i ng t o t hose sent ences r el at i ve t o a cont ext ( or t o ut t er ances or t okens of t hose sent ences) . Suppose t hat on t he 5t h of Sept ember Samut t er s ( 1) and t hat on t he 6t h of Sept ember John want s t o r epor t what Samsai d by ut t er i ng ( 2) .
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( 1) ( 2)
I t i s r ai ni ng t oday. Samsai d t hat i t was r ai ni ng yest er day.
Dynami c and Coher ent Thought s
hi m, t he t hought expr essed by an i ndexi cal - sent ence i s composed of t he r ef er ent of i t s i ndexi cal and t he sense of i t s pr edi cat e: 8
Pr i ma f aci e, ( 2) i s a t r ue and f ul l y accur at e speech r epor t of ( 1) , i n spi t e of John' s use of " yest er day" . Let us cal l t hi s dat umabout i ndexi cal s " Per r y' s dat um' The quest i on i s whet her , and i f so how, a Pr egean t heor y may account f or ( 2) bei ng a t r ue and f ul l y accur at e r epor t of ( 1) - whet her , and i f so how, i t may accommodat e Per r y' s dat um. Hi ggi nbot ham bel i eves t hat i f a Fr egean hol ds ( TO) t o ( T3) , t hen she cannot account f or Per r y' s dat um. 6 Gi ven ( T2) and ( T3) , f or an ut t er ance u of a sent ence t o be a f ul l y accur at e r epor t of ( 1) , t he embedded sent ence i n u must r ef er t o t he same t hought as t hat expr essed by ( 1) . Yet i t i s not cl ear t hat t he embedded sent ence i n ( 2) r ef er s t o t he same t hought as t hat expr essed by ( 1) . The r eason i s t hat i t i s not cl ear t hat t he t hought expr essed by ( 1) i s t he same as t hat expr essed by ( 3) ( t he embedded sent ence now occur r i ng unembedded) when ut t er ed by John on t he 6t h of Sept ember . ( 3)
I t was r ai ni ng yest er day.
W er e ( 3) and ( 1) t o expr ess t he same t hought , t hen ( 2) woul d be a t r ue and accur at e r epor t of ( 1) . However , f or ( 3) and ( 1) t o expr ess t he same t hought , DTCmust be t r ue, t he same t hought must be expr essed by t wo di f f er ent but
I . 0. 1 t aki ng demonst r at i ves as cont r i but i ng a r ef er ence, but no sense, t o t he expr essi on cont ai ni ng t hemdoes i ndeed pr eser ve t he i dea t hat t he speech of t he r epor t has t he same cont ent as t he speech r epor t ed on: f or i n each case t hat cont ent i s ( t o use Evans' s not at i on) si mpl y t he or der ed pai r consi st i ng of t he day d and t he sense of [ "i t i s r ai ni ng on x" ] . 9 Gi vn t hat " yest er day" i n ( 3) and " t oday" i n ( 1) r ef er t o t he same day, on Hi , gi nbot ham' s t heor y ( I ) and ( 3) expr ess t he same t hought , and so vi ndi edt e DTC. Gi ven ( T2) and ( T3) , ( 2) i s her e a t r ue and f ul l y accur at e speech r epor t of ( 1) . Hence, on t hi s t heor y Per r y' s dat umi s vi ndi cat ed. Leavi ng senses out of t he t hought expr essed by ( 1) does not ent ai l t hat t he senses of i ndexi cal s ar e not r el evant t o t hat t hought nor t hat t hey l ay out si de al l t hought - pr ocesses. Hi ggi nbot ham does al l ow f or t he senses of i ndexi cal s t o compl et e or det er mi ne ( i n some sense) t he t hought expr essed by ( 1) , as ( Ti ) suggest s, and al so al l ows f or senses bei ng essent i al f or under st andi ng, as ( C4) demands. Hi ggi nbot ham t akes i t t hat t he sense of an i ndexi cal i compl et es t he t hought of a sent ence t hat cont ai ns i i n vi r t ue of det er mi ni ng i ' s r ef er ent ,
r el at ed t r acki ng i ndexi cal s at di f f er ent t i mes. Thus, t he vi ndi cat i on of Per r y' s dat um depends on t he vi ndi cat i on of DTC. I t i s i n an at t empt t o accommodat e Per r y' s dat umwi t hi n a Fr egean t heor y t hat Hi ggi nbot ham ( 1994) deni es ( TO) , vi z. t he cl ai mt hat t hought s have onl y senses as const i t uent s. I n par t i cul ar , because Hi ggi nbot ham bel i eves t hat Evans' s Fr egean t heor y whi ch accept s ( TO) t o ( T3) cannot account f or e shal l soon see Per r y' s dat umhe t r i es t o account f or i t by r ej ect i ng ( TO) . W how Hi ggi nbot ham i s wr ong i n t hi nki ng t hat Evans' s t heor y cannot account f or Per r y' s dat um ( even i f t hat account i s as yet i ncompl et e) . But at pr esent I shal l concent r at e on Hi ggi nbot ham' s Fr egean pr oposal . Hi ggi nhot hamaccept s DTC, ( TI ) , ( T2) and ( T3) , and r ej ect s ( TO) . 6. 7.
Ill
7
bot ham1986) . However , i f f or somet hi ng t o be an adequat e r epor t of ( 1) i t must expr ess a r el at i on bet ween Sam( t he ut t er er ) and an i nt er pr et ed l ogi cal f or m, i t i s di f f i cul t t o see what t hat i nt er pr et ed l ogi cal f or m shoul d be. I t shoul d not be necessar y t hat Ahe i nt er pr et ed l ogi cal f or m i n quest i on cont ai n t he i ndexi cal " t oday" , f or t ' 1' en John' s r epor t ( 2) woul d he f al se. But Hi ggi nbot hamaccept s Per r y' s suggt i on t hat i t i s a f ul l y adequat e and accur at e r epor t . So r epor t s of ut t er ances t at cont ai n i ndexi cal s shoul d not be t aken t o expr ess r el at i ons bet ween speer s and i nt er pr et ed l ogi cal f or ms, but r at her bet ween speaker s and t hought s. I l i gi nbot hamsays not hi ng on howt o r econci l e hi s gener al account of pr oposi t i onal at t i t ude r epor t s wi t h hi s account of Per r y' s dat um. 8.
For
I n Hi ggi nbot ham ( 1994, pp. 91- 4) . Per r y ( 1993b, p. 29) i s t he f i r st t o hol d t hi s agai nst Evans' s t heor y. Pr i ma f aci e, i t mi ght seemat l east st r ange t hat Hi ggi nbot ham ( 1994, pp. 91- 4) assumes ( T2) especi al l y gi ven hi s account of pr oposi t i onal at t i t ude r epor t s i n t er ms of r el at i ons bet ween subj ect s and i nt er pr et ed l ogi cal f or ms ( cf . Hi ggi n-
9.
I f i t wer e not f or t he f act t hat Hi ggi nbot ham uses t he wor ds " sense" and " t hought " , hi s account coul d be t aken t o be t he same as Kapl an' s of char act er and cont ent , wher e t he cont r i but i on of an i ndexi cal ( i f any) t o t he cont ent of a sent ence j ust i s i t s r ef er ent . However , si nce Hi ggi nbot ham i s t r yi ng t o pr ovi de an al t er nat i ve t o Evans' s account i n t he l i ght of Per r y' s dat umand i s not mer el y t r yi ng t o r epeat Kapl an' s vi ew, hi s use of " sense" and " t hought " shoul d be t aken i n a f ul l y Fr egean spi r i t . I t i s t hi s, as we shal l see, what makes hi s account obj ect i onabl e, f or i t does not r espond f ul l y t o t he Fr egean spi r i t , i n par t i cul ar , t o ( CI ) . Fl i ggi nhot ham ( 1994, p. 92) . 1 have adj ust ed t he t ext t o f i t ( 1) .
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and so par t of t he t hought expr essed by t he sent ence i n whi ch i occur s. Al t hough i ' s sense i s not par t of t he t hought expr essed, t he exi st ence of t hat t hought depends on i ' s sense det er mi ni ng a r ef er ent . Wer e i ' s sense not t o det er mi ne a r ef er ent t her e woul d be no t hought expr essed. Hi ggi nbot ham' s pr oposal i s t hat t hought s expr essed by i ndexi cal - sent ences ar e condi t i onal ont he cont ai ned i ndexi cal s act ual l y r ef er r i ng, and t hat senses j ust ar e what det er mi ne whet her , and i f so t o what t hose i ndexi cal s r ef er. Thi s may be capt ur ed i n gi vi ng t he t r ut h- condi t i ns f or i ndexi cal - sent ences. The t r ut hcondi t i ons of an i ndexi cal - sent ence r e condi t i onal on t he cont ai ned i ndexi cal ( s) act ual l y r ef er r i ng, and hence 4n t he sense( s) of t he i ndexi cal ( s) act ua r ef er ent . ' ° Thus, or exampl e, t he schema f or t he condi al l y det er mi ni ng t i onal t r ut h- condi t i ons of an ut t er ance l i ke ( 1) i s t he f ol l owi ng: (1' )
( Vx) ( I f t he speaker of " I t i s r ai ni ng t oday" r ef er s wi t h " t oday" t her ei n t o x and t o not hi ng el se, and x i s t he pr esent day, t hen t hat sent ence i s t r ue i f f i t i s r ai ni ng on x) .
I he act ual condi t i onal t r ut h- condi t i ons of ( 1) ar e: (I -) '
I f u i s an ut t er ance of " I t i s r ai ni ng t oday" by SamandSamr ef er s wi t h " t oday" t her ei n t o d, t hen u i s t r ue i f f i t i s r ai ni ng on
wher e " d" i s j ust a , const ant f or t he day i n quest i on, t he 5t h of Sept ember . And t he condi t i onal t r ut h- condi t i ons of ( 3) as ut t er ed by John ar e t he f ol l owi ng:
4
( 3' )
I f u i s an ut t er ance of " I t was r ai ni ng yest er day" by John, and John r ef er s wi t h " yest er day" t her ei n t o d, t hen u i s t r ue i f f i t r ai ned on d.
On Hi ggi nbot ham' s account ( 1) and ( 3) expr ess t he same t hought , have t he same t r ut h- condi t i ons: bot h ar e t r ue i f f i t r ai ned on d. Yet t hi s i s onl y so i f t he i ndexi cal s cont ai ned i n ( 1) and ( 3) do r ef er. I f Samdoes r ef er wi t h " t oday" t o t he day of ut t er ance, t hen ( 1) i s t r ue i f f i t i s r ai ni ng on t hat day. I f Samdoesn' t r ef er wi t h " t oday" t o t he day of ut t er ance, t hen t he st at ement of t r ut h- condi t i ons ( 1" ) i s vacuousl y t r ue. Thus, f or ( I ) t o expr ess a t hought , t he i ndexi cal i n ( 1) must r ef er , and f or t hi s t o be so t he i ndexi cal ' s sense must det er mi ne a r ef er ent . I n t he case of ( 3) , somet hi ng anal ogous t o ( 1) occur s: 10. Thi s way of obt ai ni ng t he t r ut h- condi t i ons of sent ences cont ai ni ng i ndexi cal s i s not novel . It i s f ound i n Bur ge ( 1974) , Davi es ( 1982) , and Wei nst ei n ( 1974) .
((
,,,
-
-
,k
Dynami c and Coher ent Thought s
u
ll
r-
( 3) onl y has t r ut h- condi t i ons i f John succeeds i n r ef er r i ng wi t h hi s se of , , " yest er day' and t hat depends on whet her t he sense of " yest er day" does det er mi ne a r ef er ent i n t he cont ext i n whi ch i t i s ut t er ed. Consequent l y, i n Hi ggi nbot ham' s account ( 1) and ( 3) onl y expr ess t he same t hought i f bot h Samand John succeed i n r ef er r i ng, and t o do so t he senses of t he i ndexi cal s i n ( 1) and ( 3) must det er mi ne t he same r ef er ent . Senses of i ndexi cal s ar e al so essent i al f or under st andi ng and meani ngf ul l y pr oduci ng i ndexi cal - sent ences. I ndexi cal - sent ences r equi r e t he speaker ( or hear er ) t o have si ngl ed out an i ndi vi dual ( or var i ant ) 0 t o whi ch r ef er ence i s bei ng made, andt o do t hi s t he speaker ( or hear er ) needs a capaci t y or abi l i t y t o t hi nk of 0 i n acer t ai n way. She needs t he capaci t y t o knowt he i ndexi cal ' s sense. I t i s i n vi r t ue of knowi ng t hi s ( t hough not onl y i n vi r t ue of t hi s) , t hat a subj ect may r ef er t o what she want s by pr oduci ng an i ndexi cal . I n or der t o under st and Sam' s ut t er ance ( 1) ( and f or Samt o pr oduce i t ) one needs t o t hi nk of t he 5t h as t he pr esent day, because a subj ect r ef er s t o a day wi t h " t oday" onl y i f she knows t hat t he day t o whi ch she i s r ef er r i ng i s t he pr esent day. And t o under st and ( 3) , one needs t o t hi nk of t he 5t h as t he pr evi ous day because a subj ect may r ef er t o t hat day wi t h " yest er day" onl y i f she knows t hat t he day t o whi ch she i s r ef er r i ng i s t he day pr i or t o t hat of her ut t er ance ( what ever t hat day may be) . Thus, i n or der t o have t he capaci t y t o r ef er t o a cer t ai n day wi t h " t oday" or " yest er day" one needs t o have knowl hat enabl e bot h edge of t he senses of t hose i ndexi cal s ( or i ndexi cal - t ypes) . W Samand John t o r ef er t o t he 5t h wi t h t he use of " t oday" and " yest er day" r es/ ect i vel y, i s t hei r knowl edge of t he senses of t hose i ndexi cal s. Knowl edge of { hose senses di ct at es t o a subj ect t hat i n or der t o expr ess on day 2 t he sai ne t hought expr essed on day 1 about day 1 she must use " yest er day" i nsead of " t oday" ( DTC) . Consequent l y, on Hi ggi nbot ham' s account Per r y' s dat umi s t r ue because t he senses of t he i ndexi cal s i n ( 1) and ( 3) ( t hough t hey ar e not par t of t he t hought expr essed) do det er mi ne t he compl et i on of t he t hought expr essed by ( 1) and ( 3) , and because t hey ar e necessar y f or under st andi ng and adequat el y r epor t i ng i ndexi cal - sent ences. I t i s onl y because John knows t hat t he sense of " yest er day" i s r el at ed i n a speci al way t o t he sense of " t oday" t hat he may pr oduce ( 2) and hence successf ul l y r epor t Sam' s sayi ng. But can we be sat i sf i ed wi t h Hi ggi nbot ham' s account ? I t hi nk not . By abandoni ng a t hesi s about t he nat ur e of t hought s, hi s account comes t o have t he hi ghl y un- Fr egean consequence of bei ng unabl e t o accommodat e what I
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shal l cal l " t he coher ent t hought dat um' Suppose t hat Paol a i s st andi ng cl oser t o one wi ndow t han t o anot her , and t hat upon l ooki ng t hr ough bot h wi ndows she sees what , unbeknownst t o her , i s a ver y l ong shi p: ( 4)
That shi p i s not t hi s shi p.
/
Al t hough t he demonst r at i ves i n ( 4) ar e co- r ef er ent i al , ( 4) says somet hi ng non- cont r adi ct or y of t he f or mab. I t expr esses a coher ent t hought . Fr ege i nt r oduces senses t o di sf i gui sh t he cogni t i ve val ue of " Hesper us i s Hesper us" f r om t hat of " Hesper us\ i s Phosphor us" by cl ai mi ng t hat t hese sent ences expr ess di f f er ent t hought s i n vi r t ue of t he f act t hat " Hesper us" and " Phosphor us" expr ess di f f er ent senses. For hi ma sent ence l i ke " Hesper us i s not Phosphor us" , unl i ke " Hesper us i s not Hesper us" , does not st at e a
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cont r adi ct i on. I t st at es a coher ent ( t hough f al se) t hought . I n a si mi l ar vei n, wi t hi n a Fr egean t heor y t hi s ought t o be t r ue of ( 4) unl ess we ar e gi ven a st r ong r eason agai nst t hi s. Yet , Hi ggi nbot ham cannot accommodat e t hi s dat umi n vi r t ue of t he r ol e he assi gns t o t he senses of i ndexi cal s. Pr i ma f aci e Hi ggi nbot har n coul d cl ai m t hat ( 4) does not st at e a cont r adi ct i on si nce di f f er ent const ant s ar e assi gned t o each of t he demonst r at i ves when t hei r t r ut h- condi t i ons ar e speci f i ed, such t hat on condi t i on t hat t he demonst r at i ves i n ( 4) r ef er , ( 4) i s t r ue i f f d' i s not d" . Thus, t he t hought expr essed by ( 4) woul d have t he f or m a. - b. But i f Hi ggi nhot ham' s vi ew i s
Fr egean, a sent ence t hat st at es t he non- i dent i t y of an obj ect wi t h i t sel f i s i ncoher ent and di f f er ent f r omwhat ( 4) st at es) 1 Unt i l Hi ggi nbot ham' s account can gi ve us a r eason f or bl ocki ng t he speci f i cat i on of ( 4) ' s t r ut h- condi t i ons as havi ng t he f or maa, we have no way of account i ng f or t he coher ent t hought dat um. I n or der t o vi ndi cat e t he coher ent t hought dat um Hi ggi nbot ham needs an account of t he t hought expr essed by an i ndexi cal - sent ence whi ch pr ecl udes usi ng t he same const ant when gi vi ng ( 4) ' s t r ut h- condi t i ons, 12 but whi ch at t he same t i me al l ows f or an assi gnment of t he same const ant when gi vi ng t he t r ut h- condi t i ons of ( 1) and ( 3) i n or der t o vi ndi cat e Per r y' s dat um. Hi ggi nbot h am' s account f aces, t hen, a conf l i ct i n accommodat i ng t hese t wo dat a f r om i ndexi cal s. Gi ven t hat t he r ef er ent i s what f i gur es i n t he t hought expr essed and t hat t he t hought expr essed may be capt ur ed t r ut h- condi t i onal l y, i t i s di f f i cul t t o see 13 how Hi ggi nbot hamcan sol ve t he conf l i ct . Pr i maf aci e, I can see onl y t hr ee opt i ons f or Hi ggi nhot ham' s account :
(i )
I f Hi ggi nbot har n wer e t o gi ve up Fr egean senses and t hought s, and speak i nst ead of Kapl an' s char act er and cont ent , t hen i t i s l ess l i kel y t hat he woul d be under pr essur e t o account f or t he coher ent t hought dat um. For t he di f f er ence bet ween char act er and cont ent i s not i nt r oduced t o expl ai n di f f er ences i n cogni t i ve val ue, but r at her j ust t o di st i ngui sh semant i c r ul es or l i ngui st i c meani ngs f r om pr opoor t r ut h- condi t i ons ( or what i s sai d) . As a mat t er of f act , Kapl an can ( and Ai t i ons does i n act ual l y Kapl an 1989) gi ve up t he i dea t hat " Hesper us i s Phosphor us" and " Hesper us i s Hesper us" expr ess di f f er ent char act er s wi t hout t her eby gi vi ng up t he di st i nct i on bet ween char act er and cont ent . I n cont r ast , a Fr egean cannot \ gi ve t hi s up on pai n of l osi ng t he mot i vat i on f or t he i nt r oduct i on of sense. However , Hi ggi nbot ham' s account i s pr esent ed as a Fr egean al t er nat i ve t o t hat of Evans' s, so i t ( unl i ke Kapl an' s) i s under pr essur e t o account f or t he coher ent t hought dat um. ( See f oot not e 8 above. )
12.
W hat we ar e r equi r i ng her e of Hi ggi nbot ham i s ul t i mat el y t hat t he di f f er ence i n t he senses of t he demonst r at i ves i n ( 4) be shown at t he t r ut h- condi t i onal l evel even i f t hey ar e not par t of t he t hought expr essed. So af t er al l ( TO) does seemt o be an essent i al ( and not an opt i onal ) cl ai mf or a
we knowt hat " t hat shi p" i s co- r ef er ent i al wi t h " t hi s shi p' t hen i t does not mat t er whet her t he same const ant i s used t wi ce i n speci f yi ng t he t r ut h- condi t i ons of ( 4). ( 4) ' s t r ut h- condi t i ons can be speci f i ed t hus: on condi t i on t hat t he demonst r at i ves i n ( 4) r ef er ( 4) i s t r ue i f f d' i s not d' ( or i f f d" i s not d" ) . Hence, t he t hought expr essed by ( 4) coul d have t he f or m aÆ a. On Hi ggi n-
shi p was not i t sel f . On t hi s account , I successf ul l y r epor t ( 4) by sayi ng t hat Paol a sai d t hat t hat shi p was not i t sel f . Not hi ng r el evant t o t he t hought i s l ef t out . But t hi s i s cer t ai nl y not somet hi ng t hat a Fr egean can accept . For a
t o accept t hat whi l e Paol a i s a r at i onal agent i n ut t er i ng ( 4) her sayi ng st at es somet hi ng i ncoher ent ; 14
11.
j ust t hat i ndexi cal s onl y cont r i but e t hei r r ef er ent s t o t he t hought expr essed by an i ndexi cal - sent ence, and t hat t hei r senses ar e not r el evant f or t he t hought expr essed, t hen i t does not mat t er howsuch r ef er ent s ar e speci f i ed i n t he t r ut h- condi t i ons of t he sent ence i n quest i on. Gi ven t hat ex hypot hesi
bot ham' s account , t her e i s no di f f er ence bet ween t he t hought expr essed by ( 4) and t hat of a sent ence whi ch asser t ed i n an i ncoher ent f ashi on t hat t hat
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13. 14.
Fr egean t heor y i n t he l i ght of ( Cl ) . Thi s i s t he l i ne whi ch Kapl an woul d adopt : Paol a i s a r at i onal agent i n ut t er i ng ( 4) si nce she i s gui ded by t he char act er s of t he demonst r at i ves i n ( 4) , yet what she st at es i s i ncoher ent .
( A44
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t o cl ai mt hat senses i n some way det er mi ne t hat ( 4) does not st at e an i ncoher ence even t hough t hey do not ent er i nt o t he t hought expr essed by ( 4) ; or / t o cl ai m t l 1at what mat t er s f or assessi ng coher ence ar e t he t hought s
(i i i )
expr essed by i ndexi cal - sent ences and t he senses of i ndexi cal s. ( i ) i s t he most nat u\ al l i ne f or Hi ggi nbot hamt o t ake, t hough i t deni es t he coher ent t hought dat um as a dat umabout t hought s. Si nce senses ar e what hel p t he speaker det er mi ne t he r ef er ent i n a par t i cul ar cont ext , and si nce t he senses of " t hat shi p" and of " t hi s shi p" di f f er ( one r equi r i ng t hat t he obj ect l ooks f ur t her away t han t he ot her ) , t he speaker i s r at i onal i n sayi ng what she i s sayi ng, i n per f or mi ng t he l i ngui st i c act i on of ut t er i ng ( 4) . But gi ven t hat i n Hi ggi nbot ham' s account t he sol e cont r i but i on of i ndcxi cal s t o t hought s ar e t hei r r ef er ent s, t hen what ( 4) st at es may be speci f i ed as somet hi ng of t he f or m a. - a. So al t hough t he t hought expr essed by ( 4) may st at e somet hi ng i ncoher ent , Paol a i s behavi ng as a r at i onal agent i n ut t er i ng ( 4) . Thi s move, t hough nat ur al t o Hi ggi nbot ham' s appr oach, i s ad hoc i f t her e i s no i ndependent ar gument f or r ej ect i ng t he coher ent t hought dat umand f or sayi ng t hat ( 4) ought t o be t r eat ed di f f er ent l y f r om" Hesper us i s not Phosphor us' One such ar gument coul d be t o show t hat Per r y' s dat um i s enxenched' 5 wher eas t he coher ent t hought dat umi s not , t hat t her e i s no dat umanal ogous t o Per r y' s f or " Hesper us i s not Phosphor us" , and t hat no ot her account of Per r y' s dat um i s avai l abl e. Thus we woul d be f or ced t o r evi se t he coher ent t hought dat um. However , i n 4 I shal l show t hat as i t has been pr esent ed Per r y' s dat umi s not t hus ent r enched so t hat we have no r eason t o r ej ect t he coher ent t hought dat um. Opt i on ( i i ) i s obscur e. How coul d senses det er mi ne t hat Paol a' s sayi ng does not st at e a cont r adi ct i on wi t hout t hem ent er i ng i nt o t he t hought expr essed by Paol a' s sayi ng? I f what mat t er s f or assessi ng whet her a sayi ng i s 15. I n f act , t hi s seems t o be 1- l i ggi nbot ham' s vi ew. He wr i t es: [ . . . [ 110 one, however st r i ct her st andar ds f or r epor t ed speech, coul d compl ai n t hat I had wr ongl y i nt er pr et ed her by r epor t i ng her as havi ng sai d t hat t oday i s Jul y 4 i f i ndeed she had sai d yest er day, ' Tomor r owi s Jul y 4' . l . . . l But t o abandon t he 1. . . 1 t hesi s [ t hat t he t hought r ef er r ed t o i n a t r ue r epor t of speech i s t he t hought expr essed i n t he speech of whi ch i t was a r epor t ] i s bi zar r e, si nce i t woul d open up i l l pr i nci pl e a possi bi l i t y t hat does not exi st , t hat t he speech r epor t i s l ess t han f ai t hf ul t o t he r epor t ed speech. ( 1994, p. 92)
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coher ent i s t he t hought i t expr esses, t hen how can senses be r el evant t o / whet her a sayi ng st at es somet hi ng coher ent wi t hout bei ng par t of t he/ t hought ? One coul d j ust say t hat i n assessi ng coher ence and r at i onal i t y one needs t o go beyond t he t hought expr essed by a sayi ng t o t he senses of i ndexi cal s. Thi s woul d j ust amount t o opt i on ( i i i ) and t he r ej ect i on of t he vi ew t hat t hought i s al l t hat mat t er s f or assessi ng t he coher ence of sayi ngs. But once mor e: i f sense i s semant i cal l y r el evant f or under st andi ng and i t mat t er s f or t he assessment of r at i onal i t y, why i sn' t i t par t of t he t hought expr essed? The onl y r eason whi ch one can obt ai n f r om Hi ggi nbot ham' s pr oposal i s, agai n, t he i nabi l i t y of ot her account s t o vi ndi cat e Per r y' s dat um, wher e such a dat um i s t aken t o be deepl y ent r enched. Yet , Evans hi msel f ( t hough i ncompl et el y) does of f er such an account . 3. The Fr egean account of i ndexi cal s of f er ed by Evans t akes ser i ousl y t he cl ai mt hat sense det er mi nes r ef er ence, such t hat t he sense of any expr essi on det er mi nes on i t s own t hat expr essi on' s r ef er ence. Thi s ent ai l s t hat i f t wo ut t er ances have t he same sense t hen t hey have t he same r ef er ence 1J" i ndependent l y of whet her t hey ar e ut t er ed i n t he same or i n di f f er ent con. t ext s. I n t he case of cont ext - dependent expr essi ons l i ke i ndexi cal s, cont ext i s?, , r el evant sol el y f or det er mi ni ng t he senses of i ndexi cal s, and not f or di r ect l y, det er mi ni ng t hei r r ef er ences. The cont ext of ut t er ance t oget her wi t h t he * - t J se n1se- t ype of an i ndexi cal - t ype det er mi nes t he par t i cul ar sense of t he i ndexi cl whi ch i s an i nst ance of t hat t ype. And t hat par t i cul ar sense al one det er - t ni i nes t he r ef er ence of t he i ndexi cal i n quest i on. Thus, when I ut t er " I " and our ut t er ances not onl y have di f f er ent r ef er ences, but t hey al so yu ut t er expr ess di f f er ent senses because t hey ar e ut t er ed i n r el evant l y di f f er ent cont ext s. Nonet hel ess, bot h ut t er ances shar e somet hi ng i n common: t he same sense- t ype i s associ at ed wi t h t hemf or t hey ar e bot h i nst ances of t he mdcxi cal - t ype "I " . For Evans t hen what i s const ant acr oss al l ut t er ances of an i ndexi cal - t ype i s t he sense- t ype associ at ed wi t h i t , and t hi s sense- t ype, j sj t t he i ndexi cal - t ype' s semant i c r ul e. Taki ng senses t o be ways of det er mi ni ng r ef er ence we may say t hat al l ut t er ances of t he same i ndexi cal - t ype get t hei r r ef er ence i n t he same sor t of way, vi z. by det er mi ni ng t hei r di f f er ent r ef er ent s i n t he same sor t of way. I t i s t hi s sor t of way or sense- t ype associ at ed wi t h an i ndexi cal - t ype t hat enabl es under st andi ng and pr oduct i on of newut t er ances of t hat i ndexi cal - t ype. But ,,t.,
0
zI 1' .
11 '
5
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knowi ng t he sense- t ype t hat cor r esponds t o an i ndexi cal does not const i t ut e a f ul l under st andi ng of t hat i ndexi cal . Rat her f or a subj ect t o f ul l y under st and what a speaker says when usi ng " I " he must come t o knowmor e t han j ust t he sense- t ype associ at ed wi t h t he i ndexi cal - t ype. He must come t o knowt he par t i cul ar sense, t he par t i cul ar way of det er mi ni ng t hat par t i cul ar r ef er ent , of det er mi ni ng t hat speaker . 16 Evans i s sympat het i c t o DTC. Li ke Hi ggi nbot ham, he bel i eves t hat upon usi ng " t oday" a subj ect must t hi nk about a day as t he pr esent day, and t hat t hi s i nvol ves a capaci t y or abi l i t y i n her. But al t hough Hi ggi nbot ham and Evans may agr ee t hat under l yi ng someone' s under st andi ng of i ndexi cal s ar e abi l i t i es t hat ar e r el evant t o her knowl edge of t he senses of t hose i ndexi cal s, t he way i n whi ch such abi l i t i es ar e r el evant t o t he t hought expr essed by an i ndexi cal sent ence i s di f f er ent i n Evans' s account f r om t hat i n Hi ggi nbot ham' s. On t he l at t er ' s vi ew, t hey ar e mer el y psychol ogi cal l y or pr eser nant i cal l y r el evant : t hey ar e j ust what enabl e a subj ect t o know t he sense expr essed by an i ndexi cal . But f or Evans t hey ar e al so semant i cal l y r el evant i nsof ar as t hey const i t ut e t he senses expr essed by cer t ai n i ndexi cal s. Evans bel i eves t hat t o knowa sense i s j ust t o t hi nk of a par t i cul ar obj ect i n a cer t ai n way, whi ch i s j ust t o have an i dent i f i cat or y abi l i t y i n r el at i on t o t hat obj ect ; and t hat i n t he case of t r acki ng i ndexi cal s t he r el evant ways of t hi nki ng or i dent i f i cat or y abi l i t i es j ust ar e ways of keepi ng t r ack of an obj ect . Gi ven t hat Evans accept s ( TO) , t he ways of t hi nki ng or abi l i t i es whi ch ar e t he senses t hat cer t ai n i ndexi cal s expr ess, ar e const i t uent s of t hought s, const i t uent s of what sent ences expr ess. Evans' s cl ai mi s t hat upon keepi ng t r ack of a par t i cul ar obj ect t hr ough t i me, one t hi nks of t he obj ect i n t he same way ( one i s exer ci si ng t he same i dent i f i cat or y abi l i t y) , and so one i s capabl e of gr aspi ng t he same t hought t hr ough t i me. I f a subj ect keeps t r ack of an obj ect 0f r om t1 t o t 2 t hen she i s t hi nki ng of 0t hr oughout i n t he same way and so i s abl e t o gr asp t he same t hought . Hence, when sh uses di f f er ent t r acki ng i ndexi cal s t o expr ess what she t hi nks about Oat t 1 and at t 2 she i s expr essi ng one andt he same t hought . I l owever , Evans t hi nks t hat i f t he subj ect does not keep t r ack of an obj ect 0 f r omt 1 t o t 2 t hen she cannot he sai d t o be t hi nki ng of 0 i n t he same way and so cannot be sai d t o gr asp t he same t hought as anot her per son who has kept t r ack of 0 gr asps. I f what enabl es a subj ect t o expr ess t he same t hought con16.
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Thi s i s Evans' s way of accommodat i ng cl ai m( C4) .
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cer ni ng 0 t hr ough t i me by usi ng t r acki ng i ndexi cal s i s t he same way of t hi nki ng of 0, t hen when a subj ect has l ost t r ack of 0 she wi l l be unabl e t o expr ess t hat t hought . Consequent l y, a cont i nuous t r acki ng abi l i t y on Evans' s account det er mi nes t hat t he t hought expr essed by sent ences cont ai ni ng di f f er ent ( yet r el at ed) t r acki ng i ndexi cal s i s t he same. And f ur t her , a di sl ocat ed t r acki ng abi l i t y i n a subj ect det er mi nes t hat t he t hought s expr essed by t he sent ences she pr oduces whi ch cont ai n di f f er ent ( yet pr i ma f aci e r el at ed) t r acki ng i ndexi cal s ar e not t he same. Suppose t hat Samhas kept t r ack of t he 5t h of Sept ember when on t he 6t h he ut t er s: ( 3' )
I t was r ai ni ng yest er day.
For Evans ( 1) and ( 3' ) expr ess t he same t hought because t hey ar e synt act i cal mani f est at i ons of t he same i dent i f i cat or y abi l i t y, namel y, t he abi l i t y of Sam t o keep t r ack of t he 5t h of Sept ember t hr ough t i me. As Evans hi msel f not es, t her e i s a l evel at whi ch we may gr ant t hat Sami s t hi nki ng of t he 5t h of Sept ember i n di f f er ent ways when ut t er i ng ( 1) and ( 3). I n Ut t er i ng ( I ) he i s t hi nki ng of i t as t he cur r ent or pr esent day, wher eas i n ut t er i ng ( 3' ) he i s t hi nki ng of i t as t he pr evi ous day. However , accor di ng t o Evans t hi s l evel of 17 ways of t hi nki ng does not cor r espond t o t he l evel of sense. On hi s account t he sense expr essed by " t oday" i n ( 1) and t hat expr essed by " yest er day" i n ( 3' ) ar e on, and t he same because t hey ar e mani f est at i ons of t he same way of t hi nki ng t hat const i t ut es sense, of t he same t r acki ng abi l i t y. Thi s ent ai l s t hat t he( t hought expr essed by ( I ) and ( 3' ) i s t he same. I t i s i n t hi s way t hat Evans' s ccount succeeds i n vi ndi cat i ng DTC. Never t hel ess, t hi s does not yet gi ve us an account of Per r y' s dat um. For t hat , Evans r equi r es t hat John, who r epor t s Sam' s ut t er ance by pr oduci ng ( 2) , expr esses t he same sense when he uses " yest er day" on t he 6t h ( i n ( 3) ) as t hat whi ch Samexpr esses when he pr oduces " t oday" i n ( 1). Evans r equi r es t hat John has kept t r ack of t he 5t h t hr ough t o t he 6t h f or t her e t o be sameness i n t he sense expr essed by " yest er day" i n ( 3) and " t oday" i n ( 1). For onl y i f John has kept t r ack of t he 5t h can " yest er day" i n ( 3) r ef er t o t he same day
17.
W e have her e an i mpl i ci t di st i nct i on i n Evans bet ween modes of pr esent at i on or ways of t hi nki ng whi ch ar e pur el y psychol ogi cal l y r el evant but whi ch ar e not senses, and hence not const i t uent s of t hought s, f r omt hose whi ch ar e al so senses and const i t uent s of t hought s.
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as Sam' s " t oday" i n ( 1) , and so onl y t hen can t hose t wo i ndexi cal s expr ess t he same sense. Assumi ng t hi s condi t i on t o be sat i sf i ed, Per r y' s dat um woul d be vi ndi cat ed. But coul d we t hen set t l e f or Evans' s account ? I t hi nk not .
br eaks down, when and onl y when she f ai l s t o be i n cont i nuous epi st emi c cont act wi t h 0. Hence, ( 3' ) coul d onl y have f ai l ed t o expr ess t he same t hought as ( 1) on t he pr esent account , i f Samhad had a di sl ocat i on i n hi s abi l i t y t o keep t r ack of t he 5t h of Sept ember . Thi s mi ght have ar i sen ei t her
Gi ven t hat Evans t akes senses t o be par t of t he t hought s expr essed by i ndexi cal - sent ences, he does not f ace t he pr obl em of accommodat i ng t he coher ent t hought dat umnor does he t her eby f ace a conf l i ct i n accommodat i ng bot h Per r y' s and t he coher ent t hought dat a. I n t hi s r espect he i s bet t er of f t han Hi ggi nbot ham. Never t hel ess, t her e ar e t hr ee pr obl ems wi t h Evans' s
t hr ough l oss of memor y or t hr ough f ai l ur e t o r eal i ze t hat mi dni ght had passed. Accor di ng t o t hi s account , " t oday" i n ( 1) and " yest er day" i n ( 3' ) woul d t hen have expr essed ( i f at al l ) di f f er ent senses f or t hey woul d have
account , i n par t i cul ar wi t h i t s vi ndi cat i on of DTC, and hence wi t h i t s vi ndi cat i on of Per r y' s dat um. ( A) I t has consequences t hat ar e count er i nt ui t i ve;
been mani f est at i ons of t wo di f f er ent abi l i t i es. Suppose t hat Al f r ed ut t er s ( 5) on t he 5t h of Sept ember : ( 5)
I t i s r ai ni ng t oday.
( B) i t f aces a pr obl emi n account i ng f or t he const ancy r equi r ed i n expl ai ni ng under st andi ng; and ( C) i t f aces a di f f i cul t y i n showi ng t he sameness of sense bet ween " t oday" i n ( 1) and " yest er day" i n ( 3) ( or ( 3' ) ) wi t hi n a t heor y of
Suppose f ur t her t hat Al f r ed f ai l s t o r eal i ze t hat mi dni ght has passed and so f ai l s t o keep t r ack of t he 5t h of Sept ember t hr ough t o t he 6t h when he ut t er s:
sense f or Engl i sh.
Recal l t hat i ndexi cal s ar e expr essi ons whi ch di f f er i n r ef er ence when t her e i s a r el evant di f f er ence i n t he cont ext s i n whi ch t hey ar e ut t er ed, and t hat t he
( A) Take t wo t r acki ng i ndexi cal s i ' and i " , and assume t hemt o be t wo di f f er ent synt act i cal mani f est at i ons of t he same t r acki ng abi l i t y. W hat makes t he sense expr essed by i ' t he same as t hat expr essed by i " ? I n par t i cul ar , what makes i ' and i " mani f est at i ons of t he same i dent i f i cat or y t r acki ng abi l i t y i n a gi ven subj ect ? The f ol l owi ng ar e i ndi vi dual l y necessar y and j oi nt l y suf f i ci ent condi t i ons i mpl i ci t i n Evans f or sameness of sense bet ween i ' and i " when pr oduced by t he same subj ect S: (i ) (i i ) (i i i )
Vat t 1 and i " at t 2 r ef er t o t he same obj ect or var i ant 0, S i s t he pr oducer of i and i ", and
S i s i n cont i nuous epi st emi c cont act wi t h 0 f r om t 1 t o t 2. 18
So f or Evans' s i ' and i " pr oduced by a si ngl e subj ect f ai l t o expr ess t he same sense when and onl y when t hat subj ect ' s abi l i t y t o i dent i f y 0 t hr ough t i me
(
Dynami c and Coher ent Thought s
18.
One mi ght obj ect t o t hi s t hi r d condi t i on as bei ng t oo st r ong. I f one' s at t ent i on dr i f t s or i f one goes t o sl eep i t i s not cl ear t hat one has l ost t r ack of t he day i n quest i on. One succeeds i n t hi nki ng about yest er day even i f one has gone t o sl eep. The way one does so i s t hr ough memor y. So per haps t hi s i s al l t hat i s r equi r ed of cont i nuous epi st emi c cont act : t hat at l east one be abl e t o keep t r ack of t he obj ect t hr ough memor y. To change t he r equi r ement of cont i nuous epi st emi c cont act f or one of cont i nuous causal cont act woul d l eave us wi t h t oo weak a const r ai nt . Mor e det ai l ed cogni t i ve psychol ogi cal t heor i es can, of cour se, f l esh out what t hi s cont i nuous epi st emi c cont act amount s t o.
( 6)
I t was r ai ni ng yest er day.
r el evant di f f er ence i n cont ext s i s det er mi ned by t he semant i c r ul e ( or sensehat ever t he det ai l s of t he semant i c t ype) of t he i ndexi cal - t ype i n quest i on. W r ul es f or " t oday" and " yest er day" ar e, t hese must det er mi ne t hat t he ref erence of an ut t er ance of " t oday" i s t he day of ut t er ance and t hat t he r ef er ence of an yest er day i s t he day pr i or t o t hat of t he ut t er ance ( 5) ut t er an1' of and ( 6) ar e ent ences whi ch ar e t ype- i dent i cal ( r espect i vel y) t o ( 1) and ( 3' ) ,
, , , '
and ( 5) i s r t t er ed on t he same day as ( 1) , and ( 6) on t he same day as ( 3' ) . Thus, i t i s pr i ma f ade pl ausi bl e t hat ( 1) and ( 5) expr ess t he same t hought and t hat ( 3' ) and ( 6) expr ess t he same t hought . Pr i ma f aci e, ( 1) and ( 5) expr ess t he same t hought because t hey ar e t ype- i dent i cal i ndexi cal - sent ences ut t er ed i n r el evant l y si mi l ar cont ext s, vi z. ut t er ed on t he same day. An anal ogous si t uat i on appear s al so t o be t r ue of ( 3' ) and ( 6) . But Evans' s account does not vi ndi cat e our i nt ui t i on t hat ( 3' ) and ( 6) expr ess t he same' t hought , nor even our i nt ui t i on t hat i n t he l i ght of t he i nf or mat i on we have so f ar ( 1) and ( 5) expr ess t he same t hought . On Evans' s account , t he t hought s expr essed by ( 1) and ( 3' ) ar e t he sameY Gi ven our i nt ui t i ons r egar di ng t he t hought s expr essed by ( 1) and ( 5) and gi ven t he addi t i onal pr emi se suppl i ed by Evans' s account t hat ( 1) and ( 3' ) expr ess t he same t hought , i t woul d seemt o f ol l ow t hat ( 3' ) and ( 6) expr ess t he same t hought . However , Evans' s own t heor y does not j ust i f y t hi s i nf er ence, i n spi t e of t he f act t hat ( 3' ) and ( 6) ( j ust as ( 1) and ( 5) ) ar e t ype- i den-
'
'
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t i cal i ndexi cal - sent ences ut t er ed i n r el evant l y si mi l ar cont ext s. Hi s t heor y suggest s t hat ( 1) and ( 3' ) expr ess t he same t hought because t hey ar e mani f est at i ons of t he same t r acki ng abi l i t y i n a subj ect . Si nce Samhas succeeded i n keepi ng t r ack of t he 5t h t hr ough t o t he 6t h, Evans woul d say t hat he can expr ess t he same t hought on t he 6t h by ut t er i ng ( 3' ) as he di d t he pr evi ous day when ut t er i ng ( 1). But hi s t heor y has as a consequence t hat ( 6) does not expr ess t he same t hought as ( 5) , because i t i s not gover ned i n Al f r ed by a si ngl e i dent i f i cat or y t r acki ng abi l i t y f r omt he 5t h t o t he 6t h, and so " t oday" i n ( 5) and " yest er day" i n ( 6) cannot expr ess t he same sense. On Evans' s t heor y, f or an i ndexi cal - sent ence t o expr ess t he same t hought as anot her i t i s not enough t hat t hey be ut t er ed i n r el evant l y si mi l ar cont ext s, t hat i s, i n cont ext s whi ch ar e si mi l ar accor di ng t o t he semant i c r ul e of t he i ndexi cal i n quest i on. However , i f Evans i s r i ght on t hi s, t hen not onl y do we l ack j ust i f i cat i on f or cl ai mi ng t hat ( 6) expr esses t he same t hought as ( 3' ) , but we ar e not even j ust i f i ed i n bel i evi ng t hat ( 1) and ( 5) expr ess t he same t hought cont r ar y t o our i ni t i al i nt ui t i ons. What we have sai d so f ar r egar di ng t he ut l er er s of ( 1) and ( 5) does not suf f i ce f or bel i evi ng t hat t hey expr ess t he same t hought . W e need f ur t her assur ance t hat t hey had t ype- i dent i cal t r acki ng abi l i t i es of t he same day. I n par t i cul ar , we need assur ance t hat i f Sam' s t r acki ng abi l i t y of t he 5t h i ni t i at ed on t he 4t h ( expr essi ng hi s t hought s about t he 5t h t hen usi ng " t omor r ow" ) , Al f r ed al so had such a t r acki ng abi l i t y on t he 4t h concer ni ng t he 5t h. But not hi ng i n our exampl e est abl i shes t hi s. Hence, cont r ar y t o our st r ong i nt ui t i ons at t he out set we have no j ust i f i cat i on f or asser t i ng t hat ( 1) and ( 5) expr ess t he same t hought . Evans' s account i s r i ght t o det ect a di f f er ence bet ween Al f r ed' s ut t er i ng ( 6) and Sam' s ut t er i ng ( 3' ) . I ndeed, one has succeeded i n keepi ng t r ack of t he day i n quest i on wher eas t he ot her has not . And i n f act , wher eas Sami s i nt endi ng t o r ef er t o t he 5t h of Sept ember wi t h " yest er day" , Al f r ed i s i nt endi ng ( havi ng f ai l ed t o keep t r ack of t i me) t o r ef er t o t he 4t h wi t h " yest er day" . But wher eas we mi ght be wi l l i ng t o wel come Evans' s account of t he di f f er ence bet ween ( 3' ) and ( 6) , i t i s l ess l i kel y t hat we woul d wel come t he i dea of an anal ogous di f f er ence bet ween ( 1) and ( 5). 19 Suppose t hat Al f r ed had suf f er ed memor y l oss and was not ' abl e t o keep t r ack of t he 5t h f r omt he 4t h. Thi s does not pr ecl ude t hat by usi ng " t oday" i n ( 5) he i s act ual l y r ef er r i ng t o 19. I n f act , I shal l ar gue l at er t hat Evans' s account of t he di f f er ence bet ween ( 3' ) and ( 6) i s mi sgui ded.
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t he 5t h nor t hat by doi ng so he i nt ends t o r ef er t o i t as t he cur r ent day. Fur t her mor e, t hi s seems t o be j ust t he sor t of way i n whi ch Al f r ed r ef er s t o t he 5t h, and j ust t he sor t of way i n whi ch i n ut t er i ng " t oday" on t he 5t h Samal so r ef er s t o t hat day. Hence, i n cont r ast t o t he di f f er ence bet ween Al f r ed' s ut t er i ng ( 6) and Sam' s ut t er i ng ( 3' ) , no par al l el di f f er ence ar i ses f or Al f r ed' s ( 5) and Sam' s ( I ). Ther e i s no br eakdown bet ween t he day t o whi ch Al f r ed want s t o r ef er and t he day t o whi ch any ut t er ance of " t oday" on t hat day woul d r ef er ( i ndependent l y of whet her t hi s be pr oduced by a subj ect who has successf ul l y t r acked t he 5t h) . So wher eas wi t h t he case of " yest er day" Al f r ed i s i nt endi ng t o r ef er t o a di f f er ent day f r omt he day t hat a ' non- di sl ocat ed' ut t er ance of " yest er day" on t he 6t h woul d r ef er t o, t hi s does not happen wi t h hi s ut t er ance of " t oday". Even i f Al f r ed has suf f er ed memor y l oss he i nt ends t o r ef er wi t h " t oday" i n ( 5) t o t he cur r ent day j ust as Sam, who has not suf f er ed memor y l oss, does wi t h hi s ut t er ance of " t oday" i n ( 1). Havi ng or l acki ng a di sl ocat ed abi l i t y f or keepi ng t r ack of days seems t o he semant i cal l y i r r el evant f or ut t er ances of " t oday" even i f not f or t hose of " yest er day" . Yet t her e i s not hi ng i n Evans' s account t hat al l ows f or t hi s. For Evans, Al f r ed' s " t oday" as a mani f est at i on of a di sl ocat ed abi l i t y expr esses a di f f er ent sense f r om Sam' s " t oday" whi ch i s a mani f est at i on of a successf ul t r acki ng abi l i t y. But (hi s seems i mpl ausi bl e. Ther e i s a i r t her wor r y concer ni ng Evans' s account of ( 6): what i s i t t hat ( 6) ét pr esses Does ( 6) expr ess anyt hi ng? ( 6) cannot expr ess Al f r ed' s i nt ended t hought si nce t hat t hought i s no l onger avai l abl e f or hi mt o gr asp once mi dni ght has passed, t hat i s, once mi dni ght has passed he cannot be t hi nki ng of t he 4t h of Sept ember as yest er day. He coul d onl y have had t hat t hought bef or e mi dni ght , vi z. on t he 5t h. I t r emai ns a myst er y i n Evans' s account what ( 6) act ual l y expr esses ( i f anyt hi ng at al l ) f or ( as we sawabove) i t coul d not expr ess t he same t hought as ( 3' ) nor coul d i t expr ess Al f r ed' s i nt ended t hought . The onl y opt i on f or Evans i s t o say t hat ( 6) di d not expr ess any t hought , and t hat what we came t o gr asp or knowwhen we t hought we under st ood ( 6) was j ust t he t hought - t ype, t he sense- t ype whi ch cor r esponds t o t he sent ence- t ype. But i t i s cl ear t hat we under st ood mor e t han t hi s, f or we knewt he r el evant f eat ur e of t he cont ext i n whi ch t he sent ence was ut t er ed. And i f we knewt he t hought - t ype and t he cont ext , i t i s i mpl ausi bl e t o t hi nk t hat we di dn' t knowt he sense i n quest i on. 1- l owever , Evans' s t heor y di ct at es t hat we di dn' t under st and ( 6) f or i t di d not expr ess any t hought . Once mor e t hi s r uns agai nst our seemi ngl y j ust i f i ed i nt ui t i ons. But enough
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of t he count er - i nt ui t i ve consequences of t hi s account . Let us see t he pr obl ems i t f aces wi t h t he const ancy r equi r ed f or under st andi ng. ( B) I n speaki ng about t he senses expr essed by ut t er ances of "I ", Evans says t hat , wher eas t her e i s no pr obl emi n assumi ng t hat t her e ar e a mul t i pl i ci t y of senses expr essed by t he same i ndexi cal - t ype, t her e i s a pr obl emi n t aki ng i t t o have mor e t han one sense- t ype associ at ed wi t h i t . The sour ce of t he pr obl eml i es i n t he f act t hat i n under st andi ng and meani ngf ul pr oduct i on of new ut t er ances of " I " i t i s t he sense- t ype t hat gui des us. W e appeal t o knowl edge of t he sense- t ype and i dent i f i cat i on of t he cont ext of ut t er ance ( ei t her t hr ough bei ng i n t hat cont ext or t hr ough knowl edge of what const i t ut es i t ) i n comi ng t o gr asp ( or r ef er t o) t he sense whi ch a par t i cul ar ut t er ance expr esses. Thus, i f t her e wer e a mul t i pl i ci t y of sense- t ypes associ at ed wi t h an i ndexi cal - t ype, Evans woul d have a pr obl em i n expl ai ni ng what i t i s t hat r emai ns const ant acr oss al l ut t er ances of t he same i ndexi cal - t ype and t hat enabl es under st andi ng of ut t er ances of t hat t ype i n di f f er ent cont ext s. I t hi nk t hat t hi s i s pr eci sel y t he pr obl em whi ch ar i ses f or Evans' s account of t r acki ng i ndexi cal s: hi s account l eads hi mt o hol d t hat t her e i s a mul t i pl i ci t y of sense- t ypes associ at ed wi t h an i ndexi caLt ype. The same sense- t ype cor r esponds t o t wo i ndexi cal s i f and onl y i f t hey r ef er t o t he same or t o di f f er ent obj ect s i n t he same sor t of way, i f and onl y i f t he ut t er er s t hi nk of t he same or of di f f er ent obj ect s i n t he same sor t of way. Al l speaker s who keep t r ack of t he 5t h of Sept ember f r omt he 4t h t o t he 6t h expr ess, accor di ng t o Evans, t he same sense when ut t er i ng " t omor r ow" , " t oday" and " yest er day" on consecut i ve days. Sam expr esses t he same sense when ut t er i ng t hose t r acki ng i ndexi cal s on consecut i ve days, and so does anyone el se who ut t er s t hemand has t he same ki nd of t r acki ng abi l i t y. However , t hose who f ai l t o keep t r ack of t he day i n quest i on cannot expr ess t he same sense wi t h ut t er ances of " t omor r ow" , " t oday" and " yest er day" on consecut i ve days. I suggest ed above t hat even i f Al f r ed has not kept t r ack of t he 5t h f r om t he 4t h, he does succeed i n r ef er r i ng t o t he day he i nt ends t o r ef er t o by ut t er i ng ( 5) and by t hi nki ng of t he 5t h as t he cur r ent day. He i nt ends t o r ef er t o t he cur r ent day, and he succeeds i n doi ng so. 2( ) But gi ven t hat he does not 20.
Evans says t hat i n or der t o under st and an ut t er ance of " t oday" one must t hi nk of t he day i n quest i on as t he cur r ent day ( 1981, p. 81) , and t hat t hi nki ng of i t i n t hi s way i nvol ves a di sposi t i on " t o j udge t hought s as t r ue or f al se accor di ng t o how
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have a si ngl e i dent i f i cat or y abi l i t y of t he 5t h f r om t he 4t h, t he sense whi ch hi s ut t er ance of " t oday" expr esses i s di f f er ent f r om t he sense whi ch Sam' s ut t er ance of " t oday" on t he 5t h expr esses. For Samhas kept t r ack of t he 5t h f r omt he 4t h and so i s not t hi nki ng of t he 5t h i n t he same way as Al f r ed i s, t hat i s, i n t he same way whi ch i s r el evant f or sameness of sense. W e have al r eady sai d t hat Evans di st i ngui shes ways of t hi nki ng t hat ar e senses f r omt hose t hat ar e not . He woul d hol d t hat when pr oduci ng ( 1) and ( 3' ) " t her e i s some l evel of descr i pt i on at whi ch [ Sam] i s t hi nki ng of t he same day i n di f f er ent ways" ( 1981, p. 84) , but t hat t hi s l evel of descr i pt i on of ways of t hi nki ng does not descr i be t he l evel of sense. The l evel of ways of t hi nki ng i r r el evant f or a di f f er ence of sense i s t hat whi ch t akes i t t hat upon ut t er i ng ( 1) Sami s t hi nki ng of t he 5t h as t he cur r ent day, and upon ut t er i ng ( 3' ) he i s t hi nki ng of i t as t he pr evi ous day. For Evans, t he l evel of descr i pt i on at whi ch a subj ect has t hought of t he day i n quest i on i n t he same way i s t hat whi ch descr i bes her i dent i f i cat or y abi l i t y t hr ough t i me. I t i s t hi s l evel t hat cor r esponds t o sense. Thus, t he f act t hat bot h Samand Al f r ed t hi nk of t he 5t h as t he cur r ent day makes no di f f er ence t o whet her t hey ar e expr essi ng t he same sense wi t h t hei r ut t er ances of " t oday" Sam' s t hi nki ng of t he 5t h as t he cur r ent day i s not t o be i dent i f i ed wi t h t he sense whi ch hi s ut t er ance of " t oday" expr esses f i d whi ch i s t he same as t hat whi ch hi s ut t er ance of " t omor r ow" a day eal i er expr esses. However , i n Al f r ed' s case hi s t hi nki ng of t he 5t h as t he cur r nt day does cor r espond t o t he way of t hi nki ng whi ch i s t he sense expr essedi by hi s ut t er ance of " t oday' Consequent l y, t he senses expr essed by Al f r ed' s and Sam' s ut t er ances of " t oday" di f f er even t hough t hey det er mi ne t he same r ef er ent . They di f f er i nsof ar as t hey cor r espond t o di f f er ent ways of t hi nki ng of t he same obj ect . Hence, at l east t wo sense- t ypes ar e associ at ed wi t h " t oday" : one cor r esponds t o t he same i dent i f i cat or y abi l i t y f r omt he day pr i or t o t hat of t he ut t er ance and anot her cor r esponds t o t hi nki ng of a day as t he cur r ent day. An anal ogous si t uat i on ar i ses f or " yest er day" I n ( A) I gr ant ed ( f or t he sake of ar gument ) t hat i n our exampl e upon ut t er i ng " yest er day" Al f r ed had f ai l ed t o expr ess t he t hought whi ch he t hi ngs obser vabl y ar e upon t hat day whi ch i n no way r est s upon hi s capaci t y t o i dent i f y t hat day as meet i ng some ant ecedent l y gi ven condi t i on, but depends onl y upon hi s bei ng al i ve on t hat day" ( i bi d. ) . Thus, he seems t o be f or ced t o admi t t hat her e Al f r ed i s sayi ng somet hi ng meani ngf ul and i s expr essi ng a sense wi t h " t oday" whi ch cor r esponds t o t hi nki ng of i t as t he cur r ent day.
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i nt ended t o expr ess. The suggest i on was t hat ut t er ances of " yest er day" coul d onl y expr ess senses when t her e was a cont i nuous t r acki ng abi l i t y of t he day t o whi ch i t s ut t er er s wer e i nt endi ng t o r ef er , such t hat when t her e was no such abi l i t y t hose ut t er ances woul d not expr ess a sense. They woul d be meani ngl ess. But t hi s seems unl i kel y. Suppose t hat Al f r ed has been unconsci ous f or a whi l e and upon waki ng on t he 6t h of Sept ember , knowi ng t hat hat day was i t yest er day?" or says " I he has been unconsci ous, he enqui r es " W was unconsci ous yest er day" . Sur el y he has sai d somet hi ng meani ngf ul . He i s r ef er r i ng t o t he day he i nt ends t o r ef er t o even t hough he has not kept t r ack of t hat day. And he i s r ef er r i ng t o t hat day as t he pr evi ous or pr ecedi ng day. Hence, we can say t hat t her e ar e at l east t wo sense- t ypes associ at ed wi t h f r om t he " yest er day" , vi z. one t hat cor r esponds t o an i dent i f i cat or y abi l i t y not , t hat ut t er ance and one t hat does r equi r es onl y t hat one pr ecedi ng day of t hi nk of t he pr ecedi ng day as t he pr ecedi ng day. However , not onl y do we have t wo sense- t ypes associ at ed wi t h " yest er e can say t hat a subj ect can keep t r ack of a day" and " t oday" , we have mor e. W I day not onl y f r omt he pr evi ous day, but r at her f r ommany days bef or e. SC) can keep t r ack of t he 5t h of Sept ember f r omt he 2nd of Sept ember mani f est af t er t he day af t er t omor r ow" on i ng m y t r acki ng abi l i t y by ut t er i ng " t he day t he 2nd, " t he day af t er t omor r ow" on t he 3r d, " t omor r ow" on t he 4t h and t r ack of t he 5t h i n t hi s " t oday" on t he 5t h. Anyone who successf ul l y keeps ki nd of i dent i f i cat or y abi l i t y f r om one who way, say Paol a, has a di f f er ent 4t h, say Sam, and f r om one who keeps keeps t r ack of t he 5t h f r omonl y t he t r ack of t he 5t h f r omt he 3r d, say Mar k. Thus, on t he 4t h Paol a i s t hi nki ng of t he 5t h i n a di f f er ent sor t of way f r omSam' s way of t hi nki ng of i t , and t hese t wo ways ar e di f f er ent i n ki nd f r omMar k' s way of t hi nki ng of i t . The same i s t r ue when t hey al l ut t er " t oday" on t he 5t h. Thei r ut t er ances expr ess di f f er ent ways of t hi nki ng because t hey cor r espond t o di f f er ent t r acki ng abi l i t i es,
t o t r acki ng abi l i t i es whi ch ar e di f f er ent i n ki nd. Hence, t her e ar e not onl y t wo sense- t ypes associ at ed wi t h " t oday" but mor e. How many depends on howf ar i n t i me we can keep t r ack of t he day i n quest i on, and on t he cor r espondi ng di sl ocat ed abi l i t i es f or each day t hat we can keep t r ack of t hat day. Ther e i s cer t ai nl y a l i mi t t o t hi s f or our capaci t i es ar e f i ni t e. Never t hel ess, our capaci t i es ar e suf f i ci ent l y l ar ge t o al l ow f or many sense- t ypes associ at ed wi t h " t oday" whi ch ar i se f r omt he many abi l i t i es t o keep t r ack of a par t i cul ar day f r omdi f f er ent days pr i or t o t hat of t he ut t er ance, and f r omt he many cor r espondi ng di sl ocat ed abi l i t i es t o keep t r ack of t hat day. I shal l not spel l
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out t he f ul l r easoni ng f or " yest er day" and " t omor r ow" , but i t i s easy t o see how somet hi ng anal ogous i s t r ue of t hem. Consequent l y, i n Evans' s t heor y t her e i s a mul t i pl i ci t y of sense- t ypes t hat ar e associ at ed wi t h " yest er day" , " t oday" and " t omor r ow" , and so an expl anat i on i s l acki ng of t he const ancy r equi r ed f or under st andi ng newut t er ances of each of t hese i ndexi cal - t ypes. ( C) Evans suggest s t hat di f f er ence and sameness of sense shoul d be shown i n a t heor y of sense f or a l anguage. Thus, i n t he case of t r acki ng i ndexi cal s t he di f f er ence and sameness of sense whi ch depends on successf ul and di sl ocat ed abi l i t i es shoul d be ( at l east ) shown i n a t heor y of sense f or t he l anguage cont ai ni ng t hose i ndexi cal - t ypes. Evans f avour s an i nt er pr et i ve semant i cs, i n par t i cul ar an i nt er pr et i ve t r ut h- t heor y t hat gi ves us i nt er pr et i ve t r ut h- condi t i ons f or each sent ence of t he l anguage i n quest i on. Fur t her mor e, he ( 1981) t akes i t ( i n agr eement wi t h McDowel l ) t hat such a semant i c t heor y can ser ve as a t heor y of sense. Thus, an i nt er pr et i ve t r ut h- t heor y must he one t hat gi ves us t heor ems f or sent ences cont ai ni ng i ndexi cal s whi ch showsameness and, di f f er ence of sense dependi ng on successf ul and di sl ocat ed abi l i t i es. But y' ( s di f f i cul t t o see howsuch sameness of sense coul d be capt ur ed f or ( I ) anc/ ( 3' ) . W hat woul d t hei r i nt er pr et i ve t r ut h- condi t i ons be such t hat t hey wot l d r ef l ect t he sameness of sense? I n par t i cul ar , what woul d t he t r ut h- a) i ons f or " t omor r ow" , " t oday" and " yest er day" he i n such a t heor y? Thi s i s t he t hi r d pr obl emwhi ch Evans' s account f aces. And i t i s a chal l enge f or anyone who want s t o hol d ( TO) , DTC and an i nt er pr et i ve t r ut h- t heor y as gi vi ng a t heor y of sense, a chal l enge whi ch has not yet met wi t h a sat i sf act or y sol ut i on. 21 Unt i l we have t heor ems whi ch show such sameness of sense, and whi ch ar e shown t o be der i ved f r om t r ut h- axi oms of an i nt er pr et i ve t r ut h- t heor y t hat ser ves as a t heor y of sense, Evans' s account f al l s shor t of f ul l y showi ng how i t i s t hat t he same t hought can be expr essed by ( 1) and ( 3' ) , and hence f al l s shor t of a f ul l account of Per r y' s dat um, of why ( 2) i s a t r ue r epor t of ( I ) . But even i f Evans' s t heor y coul d sol ve t hi s pr obl em, and even i f t he sol ut i on coul d al o yi el d an expl anat i on of t he const ancy r equi r ed f or under 21.
I n 4, 1 pr esent i nt er pr et i ve t r ut h- axi oms f or such i ndexi cal t er ms, but t hey ar e not ones t hat r ef l ect a sameness of sense bet ween ( 1) and ( 3' ) . However , si nce t he account I pr esent r ej ect s DTCas i t st ands, i t i s under no pr essur e t o del i ver sameness of sense bet ween ( 1) and ( 3' ) .
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st andi ng by posi t i ng t r ut h- axi oms f or t r acki ng i ndexi cal s t hat showed t hi s, i t woul d st i l l del i ver consequences cont r ar y t o our i nt ui t i ons r egar di ng t he pai r s ( 3' ) and ( 6) and ( 1) and ( 5) , and mor e gener al l y cont r ar y t o t he gener al i nt ui t i on t hat knowl edge of t he sense- t ype of an i ndexi cal - t ype and of t he cont ext of ut t er ance does suf f i ce f or knowi ng whi ch sense i s expr essed by an i ndexi cal . 22 4. Themai n depar t ur e of t he account whi ch I advocat e f r omEvans' s i s t hat on i t t r acki ng abi l i t i es ar e onl y pr esemant i cal l y or psychol ogi cal l y r el evant and ar e not senses. They ar e not t he ways of t hi nki ng t hat cor r espond t o t he senses of i ndexi cal s. Ther e i s an ambi gui t y i n t he wor d " t hought " whi ch Evans' s account expl oi t s. One ought t o di st i ngui sh bet ween t hought s as psychol ogi cal pr ocesses or st at es whi ch i ncl ude i dent i f i cat or y abi l i t i es, f r om t hought s as what sent ences expr ess. So f ar I have been usi ng " t hought ( s) " i n t he l at t er sense and wi l l cont i nue t o use i t i n t hi s way, r eser vi ng " t hi nki ng( s) " f or t he f or mer sense. The di f f er ence I want t o dr aw i s t hat wher eas t hi nki ngs ar e pr i mar i l y psychol ogi cal , t hought s ar e pr i mar i l y and essent i al l y semant i c. I t i s cl ear t hat when Fr ege spoke of t hought s he spoke of t hem as essent i al l y semant i c, as what sent ences expr ess. Evans expl oi t s t hi s ambi gui t y i n t he use of " t hought s" t o t ake some t hi nki ngs as el ement s or par t s of t hought s. But i t i s not cl ear t hat he i s j ust i f i ed i n maki ng t hi s move. Thi nki ngs ar e pr i mar i l y psychol ogi cal pr ocesses or st at es ( j ust l i ke wi shes, i nt ent i ons, and bel i ef s) and may have as t hei r obj ect s t hought s ( t hough t hey may al so have i ndi vi dual s as t hei r obj ect s) . Put di f f er ent l y: t hi nki ngs ar e t he vehi cl es of t hought s, and t hought s ar e t he cont ent s of t hi nki ngs. Thus, we need a j ust i f i cat i on f or assumi ng t hat t he di f f er ence i n t r acki ng abi l i t i es bet ween Samand Al f r ed makes a semant i c di f f er ence, makes a di f f er ence t o what i s expr essed by t hei r sent ences; and i s not j ust a di f f er ence i n t hei r psychol ogi es. Mi l l i kan ( 1991) has r i ght l y war ned us t hat we shoul d not make any of t he f ol l owi ng i nval i d moves: t hat we shoul d not ext er nal i ze sames or ext er -
22.
I f I ami n t he cont ext of ut t er ance and I knowt he sense- t ype of an i ndexi cal - t ype i, I may gr asp t he sense expr essed by t he ut t er ance of i . I f I amnot i n t hat cont ext , t hen I may knowwhi ch sense i s or woul d be expr essed i n t hat cont ext even t hough I amunabl e t o gr asp i t .
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nal i ze di f f er ent s. Her war ni ng i s t hat we shoul d not pr oj ect cer t ai n pr oper t i es of t he vehi cl es of cont ent ont o t he cont ent i t sel f : we shoul d not assume t hat i f t wo vehi cl es ar e t he same t hen t hei r cont ent i s t he same, nor t hat i f t wo vehi cl es ar e di f f er ent t hen t hei r cont ent i s di f f er ent . Appl i ed t o Evans, t he war ni ng woul d be not t o pr oj ect t he sameness i n t hi nki ngs ont o t he t hought i t sel f , not t o assume t hat i f t her e i s j ust one t hi nki ng ( one way of t hi nki ng or i dent i f i cat or y abi l i t y) t hen t hi s ent ai l s t hat t her e i s j ust one t hought t o be gr asped. The f act t hat t he same t hi nki ng, t he same abi l i t y or way of t hi nki ng, under l i es Sam' s ut t er i ng ( 1) and ( 3' ) i s no r eason t o guar ant ee t hat he i s gr aspi ng t he same t hought , and hence t hat ( I ) and ( 3' ) expr ess t he same t hought . Si mi l ar l y, t he f act t hat t her e ar e di f f er ent t hi nki ngs under l yi ng Al f r ed' s ut t er i ng ( 5) and ( 6) i s no guar ant ee t hat he i s gr aspi ng di f f er ent t hought s or t hat he i s not gr aspi ng t he same t hought , and so t hat ( 5) and ( 6) expr ess di f f er ent t hought s. Evans' s assumpt i on t hat a sameness i n t r acki ng abi l i t y guar ant ees a sameness i n t he t hought gr asped i s what enabl es hi mt o vi ndi cat e DTC. However , i f we wer e i nt ent on savi ng DTCwe woul d need a f ur t her nonquest i on- beggi ng ar gume) r ( f or i dent i f yi ng t r acki ng abi l i t i es wi t h par t s of t hought s. I do not bel i eÆ e t hat such an ar gument i s avai l abl e. Rat her t he I i n 3 ( B) concer ni ng t he const ancy r equi r ed f or under ar gument pr esent ed seem s t o show t hat i t i s hi ghl y pr obl emat i c t o assume t hat samest andi ng ness i n t r acki ng abi l i t y guar ant ees sameness of t hought gr asped, and hence t hat we ar e bet t er of f r ej ect i ng t hi s. Nonet hel ess, Evans i s r i ght i n t hi nki ng t hat t r acki ng abi l i t i es ar e i mpor t ant f or t he use of t r acki ng i ndexi cal s and f or t he psychol ogi cal pr ocesses whi ch enabl e us t o use t hem. I t hus accept t hat t r acki ng abi l i t i es ar e what enabl e us t o come t o knowt he senses of i ndexi cal s, but deny t hat sameness and di f f er ence of such abi l i t i es ent ai l anyt hi ng about t he sameness or di f f er ence of t he t hought s gr asped or expr essed. I n so doi ng, I gr ant t r acki ng abi l i t i es pur el y psychol ogi cal or pr esemant i c r el evance, but no semant i c r el evance. Thi s i s my mai n depar t ur e f r om Evans' s account . I n depar t i ng f r omi t t hus and i n accept i ng al l f our t heses ( TO) t o ( T3) , t he pr esent vi ew does not t r y t o account f or DTCor f or Per r y' s dat umat l east as t hey st and. Never t hel ess, i t does vi ndi cat e some of t he i nt ui t i ons behi nd t hem. One of t hese i nt ui t i ons i s t hat DTCi s t r ue of somet hi ng, i n par t i cul ar of t hi nki ngs t hough not of t hought s. Anot her i s t hat i t t akes Per r y' s dat umt o be t r ue of one l evel of cont ent . An i mpor t ant f act about
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Fr egean t heor i es whi ch nei t her Hi ggi nbot ham nor Evans make f ul l use of i s t hat Fr egean semant i cs have t wo semant i c l evel s, t hat of sense and t hat of r ef er ence. As we shal l see, Per r y' s dat umi s t r ue at t he r ef er ence- cont ent l evel but f al se at t he sense- cont ent l evel . Fr ege t hought of t r ut h- val ues as t he r ef er ence of sent ences, However , I t ake t he r ef er ence of a sent ence t o be not i t s t r ut h- val ue but somet hi ng mor e compl ex: t hat whi ch i s made up of t he r ef er ence of t he par t s of t he sent ence or der ed i n a cer t ai n way. Whi l st an i nt er pr et i ve t r ut h- t heor y can ser ve as a t heor y of sense, a non- i nt er pr et i ve t r ut h- t heor y may ser ve as a t heor y of r ef er ence whi ch shows t he compl ex r ef er ences of sent ences. 23 These t heor i es del i ver di f f er ent t r ut h- condi t i ons f or t he same sent ence. I nt er pr et i ve t r ut hcondi t i ons show t he t hought expr essed by t hat sent ence, wher eas pur el y r ef er ent i al t r ut h- condi t i ons show i t s r ef er ence. The pur el y r ef er ent i al t r ut h- condi t i ons of an at omi c decl ar at i ve sent ence ar e speci f i ed by descr i bi ng t hose f eat ur es i n t he wor l d ( obj ect s, t i mes, pl aces, pr oper t i es, et c. ) t o whi ch t he meani ngf ul par t s of t hat sent ence r ef er and by r epr esent i ng t hem as r el at ed i n a cer t ai n way. Gi ven t hat such t r ut h- condi t i ons cor r espond t o t he Fr egean l evel of r ef er ence, t hey ar e not sensi t i ve t o t he di f f er ences of sense bet ween sent ences l i ke ( 1) and t hose l i ke ( 3). Taki ng " d" t o be a const ant f or t he 5t h of Sept ember , ( 1) has r oughl y t he f ol l owi ng pur el y r ef er ent i al t r ut h- condi t i ons ( 1" ) " I t i s r ai ni ng t oday" ut t er ed on t he 5t h of Sept ember i s t r ue i f f i t was r ai ni ng on and t he pur el y r ef er ent i al t r ut h- condi t i ons of ( 3) ( and ( 3' ) ) ar e: ( 3 " ) " l t was r ai ni ng yest er day" ut t er ed on t he 6t h of Sept ember i s t r ue i f f i t was r ai ni ng on d. Gi ven t hat i nt er pr et i ve t r ut h- condi t i ons f or a sent ence cor r espond t o t he t hought whi ch t hat sent ence expr esses, t o t he l evel of sense, ( 1" ) and ( 3" ) do not gi ve us t he i nt er pr et i ve t r ut h- condi t i ons f or ( 1) and ( 3' ) . Such t r ut hcondi t i ons must not onl y gi ve us t he r i ght r ef er ence, but must al so show t he senses of " t oday" and of " yest er day" . And t hese t r ut h- condi t i ons must he der i ved f r omt r ut h- axi oms f or " yest er day" and " t oday". 23. I envi sage t he devel opment of a t r ut h- t heor y t hat ser ves as a t heor y of r ef er ence as dependent on a t r ut h- t heor y t hat ser ves as a t heor y of sense.
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Let x, l be a var i abl e over days, and i t s i ndexi ng wi t h " n" i ndi cat e t he val ue t he var i abl e t akes i n a gi ven sequence s. Let t he i ndexes i n t he Rx, day1 i ndi cat e an anaphor i c dependence of t he descr i pt i on on a pr evi ous X0' such t hat t he r ef er ence of t he descr i pt i on i s det er mi ned i n par t by t he r ef er ence of t he pr ecedi ng i n a way anal ogous t o t hat i n whi ch " hi s mot her " i n " John spoke t o hi s mot her " i s anaphor i c on " John" . Ther e " hi s mot her " get s i t s r ef er ence t n i n vi r t ue of mbei ng John' s mot her . Si mi l ar l y, t he Rx, 1 day' get s i t s r ef er ence r i n vi r t ue of r sat i sf yi ng t he pr oper t y AR( , x0) . So, " t he next x1 day" r el at i ve t o s r ef er s t o r i n vi r t ue of r bei ng t he day af t er t he day i n t he f i r st pl ace of s. Bear i ng t hi s i n mi nd, we can st at e t he semant i c r ul es, senset ypes or i nt er pr et i ve t r ut h- axi oms f or " t omor r ow" , " yest er day" and " t oday" i n t he f ol l owi ng way: ( TM) For any x1, " t omor r ow" ut t er ed on x1 r ef er s t o t he next x1 day. ( TT) For any x2, " t oday" ut t er ed on x2 r ef er s t o t he pr esent x2 day. 24 ( TY) For any . x3, " yest er day" ut t er ed on x3 r ef er s t o t he pr evi ousx3 day. Taki ng t he sequence i n14uest i on t o be t he or der ed t r i pl e of t he 4t h, t he 5t h and t he 6t h of Sept enber , upon appl yi ng ( TM) , ( TT) and ( TY) t o ut t er ances of " t omor r ow" , " est er day" and " t oday" whi ch ar e made consecut i vel y on t he 4t h, t he 5t h and t he 6t h, we can see howt hose ut t er ances al l r ef er t o t he 5t h. But t hey do so i n a di f f er ent way. Each t akes t he st andpoi nt of i t s day of ut t er ance, vi z. t hat i ndi cat ed by t he i ndexed var i abl e, and so each r ef er s t o t he 5t h i n a di f f er ent way f r omt he ot her s. W e can nowspeci f y t he i nt er pr et i ve t r ut h- condi t i ons f or ( 1) and ( 3' ) i n t he f ol l owi ng way: " I t i s r ai ni ng t oday" ut t er ed on t he 5t h of Sept ember i s t r ue i f f i t i s r ai ni ng on t he pr esent 5i i x day. " ) " I t was r ai ni ng yest er day" ut t er ed on t he 6t h of Sept ember i s t r ue i f f i t (3 was r ai ni ng t he pr evi ous6/ I x day. Si nce al l t hat mat t er s f or t he i nt er pr et i ve t r ut h- condi t i ons of a sent ence cont ai ni ng " yest er day" i s t hat a par t i cul ar day be r ef er r ed t o as t he pr evi ous day on t he day of ut t er ance andt hat t he same be pr edi cat ed of t he day r ef er r ed
24. 1 have used di f f er ent i ndexes f or t he var i abl es i n t he t r ut h- axi oms f or pur el y heur i st i c pur poses.
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t o, ( 3" ) gi ves t he i nt er pr et i ve t r ut h- condi t i ons not onl y f or ( 3' ) , but al so f or ( 3) and ( 6) . ( 3) , ( 3' ) and ( 6) r ef er t o t he same day i n t he same way and pr edi cat e t he same of i t . Thus, on t hi s account , we can r escue t he i nt ui t i ons
of a sent ence cor r esponds t o a l evel of cont ent and i t s sense t o anot her l evel of cont ent . The f i r st i s capt ur ed by speci f yi ng t he pur el y r ef er ent i al t r ut hcondi t i ons of t he i ndexi cal - sent ence and may be speci f i ed i n cont ext - i nde-
we had when exami ni ng Al f r ed' s ut t er ances ( 3' ) and ( 6) , vi z. t hat t hey expr ess t he same t hought i n vi r t ue of bei ng t ype- i dent i cal sent ences i n r el ehet her an i ndi vi dual has kept t r ack of a day vant l y si mi l ar cont ext s. W t i m e or not i s t hen t hr ough semant i cal l y i r r el evant f or t he t hought expr essed
pendent ways, and t he second by speci f yi ng t he i nt er pr et i ve t r ut h- condi t i ons of t he i ndexi cal - sent ence i n a cont ext dependent way. ( TM) , ( TT) and ( TY) onl y show t he sense- t ypes of " t omor r ow" , " t oday" and " yest er day" . But
by ( and t he r ef er ence of ) an i ndexi cal - sent ence. The di f f er ence i n Sam' s success and Al f r ed' s f ai l ur e i n keepi ng t r ack of t he 5t h of Sept ember i s not shown i n t he i nt er pr et i ve t r ut h- condi t i ons of t hei r i ndexi cal - sent ences. The
when such axi oms ar e appl i ed t o i nst ances of t hose i ndexi cal - t ypes t o obt ai n e can r ef er t o i nt er pr et i ve t r ut h- condi t i ons t hey ar e appl i ed i n a cont ext . W i nt er pr et i ve t r ut h- condi t i ons l i ke ( 1" ) and ( 3" ) wi t hout havi ng t o be on t he 5t h or 6t h of Sept ember . But we cannot gr asp t he senses shown by t hose
sameness or di f f er ence of t hought s expr essed by sent ences cont ai ni ng t r acki ng i ndexi cal s ar e f ul l y det er mi ned by t he semant i c r ul es of t he meani ngf ul expr essi ons cont ai ned i n t hem and by t he r el evant l y si mi l ar or di ssi mi l ar cont ext s.
t r ut h- condi t i ons i f we ar e not on t hose days, t hat i s, we cannot t hi nk of t he 5t h as t he pr esent day when i t i s not t he 5t h, nor can we t hi nk of i t as t he pr evi ous day i f i t i s not t he 6t h. On di f f er ent days we ar e not abl e t o r ef er t o t he 5t h wi t h ut t er ances of / t he pr esent x1 day" and " t he pr evi ousx2 day" on
A psychol ogi cal t heor y whi ch st udi es t he psychol ogi cal f act s t hat enabl e subj ect s t o use cer t ai n l i ngui st i c expr essi ons coul d expl ai n t he di f f er ence
t he r i ght - hand si de of bi cc/ ndi t i onal s si mi l ar t o ( 1" ) and ( 3" ) r espect i vel y, because t he 5t h does not sat i sf y t he pr oper t y of bei ng t he pr esent nor t he pr evi ous day on days t hat \ ar e not t he 5t h or t he 6t h r espect i vel y. Hence, i nt er pr et i ve t r ut h- condi t i ons ar e cont ext - dependent i n a way t hat pur el y
bet ween Sam' s and Al f r ed' s behavi our . Such a t heor y woul d dr aw on t he semant i c r ul es or sense- t ypes of t he i ndexi cal - t ypes t o expl ai n why gi ven cer t ai n psychol ogi cal f eat ur es of each subj ect one succeeds i n expr essi ng t he i nt ended t hought wher eas t he ot her does not . I t woul d say t hat wher eas Sam ( f or some r eason) was abl e t o keep t r ack of t he passage of t i me successf ul l y, Al f r ed was not . But t o gi ve such an expl anat i on i s, on t he pr esent account , t o gi ve an expl anat i on of pr esemant i c f act s, i n par t i cul ar of psychol ogi cal pr esemant i c f act s. 25 Gi ven t hat t he r ef er ence and t he sense of an i ndexi cal - sent ence ar e gi ven i n t er ms of di f f er ent sor t s of t r ut h- condi t i ons, we can say t hat t he r ef er ence 25.
1 have i mpl i ed her e t hat what Al f r ed i nt ends t o expr ess wi t h ( 6) does not coi nci de wi t h what ( 6) act ual l y expr esses. Yet i f t hought s ar e t he obj ect s of bel i ef s, t hen we cannot even say t hat at t he t i me of pr oduci ng ( 6) Al f r ed had a bel i ef about t he 4t h of Sept ember t o t he ef f ect t hat i t was r ai ni ng t he pr evi ous day whi ch he f ai l ed ( but i nt ended) t o expr ess wi t h ( 6) . I f t hought s ar e t he obj ect s of bel i ef s, t hen Al f r ed cannot have t hat bel i ef because mi dni ght has passed and so he cannot t hi nk of t he 4t h of Sept ember as t he pr evi ous day. Hence, Al f r ed' s mi st ake may be f ound not i n hi s f ai l ur e t o convey what he bel i eved, but r at her at t he l evel of hi s bel i ef s, i n hi s f ai l ur e t o have a bel i ef of a cer t ai n sor t . I n t hat si t uat i on, Al f r ed woul d have had a second or der bel i ef t hat i s f al se, vi z. t he bel i ef t hat he has a bel i ef about t he 4t h of Sept ember t hi nki ng of i t as t he pr evi ous day and t hi nki ng t hat i t was r ai ni ng t hen.
r ef er ent i al t r ut h- condi t i ons ar e not . Thi s ent ai l s t hat upon movi ng f r omt he 5t h t o t he 6t h we ar e unabl e t o gr asp t he t hought expr essed by ( 1) ( t hough we may r ef er t o i t ) . ( 1) and ( 3) ( or ( 3' ) ) have di f f er ent i nt er pr et i ve t r ut h- condi t i ons, and hence expr ess di f f er ent t hought s even t hough t he subj ect who ut t er ed ( 1) and ( 3) i s t he same and has kept t r ack of t he 5t h t hr ough t i me. Thus on t hi s account DTC i s f al se of t hought s. Yet , as we have seen, t hi s doesn' t ent ai l t hat t r acki ng abi l i t i es ar en' t psychol ogi cal l y and pr esemant i cal l y i mpor t ant , t hat t hey ar en' t what under l i e and enabl e us t o gr asp t he senses of i ndexi cal s. Hence, we may st i l l hol d t hat I ) ' l C i s t r ue of t hi nki ngs even i f not of t hought s. Havi ng deni ed DTC, t her e i s no hope of vi ndi cat i ng Per r y' s dat umas i t st ands. Such a dat umt ook i t t hat ( 2) was a t r ue and f ul l y accur at e speech r epor t of ( 1) . But i s t hi s t r ue? Does ( 2) r eal l y gi ve us a f ul l y accur at e r epor t of ( 1) ? Let us see what t he pr esent Fr egean account says about ( 2) and ( 1) , and consi der f ur t her whet her anyt hi ng i mpor t ant has been l ef t out . I f not , t hen per haps we ought t o r econsi der t he st at us of t he dat umr ef er r i ng t o ( 1) and ( 2) . Gi ven ( T3) and t he i nt er pr et i ve t r ut h- condi t i ons f or ( 1) and ( 3) , ( 2) cannot be a f ul l y accur at e r epor t of ( 1) . But t hi s does not ent ai l t hat t he
134 Eur opean Revi ew of Phi l osophy pr esent vi ewl eaves us wi t h no way of account i ng f or why ( 2) i s an appr opr i at e speech r epor t of ( 1). I t i s t r ue t hat t he embedded sent ence i n ( 2) , vi z. ( 3), does not have t he same i nt er pr et i ve t r ut h- condi t i ons as ( 1). So ( 2) , whi ch i s meant t o be John' s r epor t of Sam' s ut t er ance ( 1) a day l at er , does not r epor t t he t hought whi ch Samexpr essed wi t h ( 1) t he pr evi ous day. But i t i s al so t r ue t hat ( 1) and ( 3) have t he same pur el y r ef er ent i al t r ut h- condi t i ons, t he same r ef er ent i al cont ent . Thus, we can say t hat ( 1) and ( 3) agr ee at one l evel of cont ent even t hough t hey di sagr ee at anot her l evel . Si nce Per r y' s dat umas st at ed r equi r es agr eement at t he sense- cont ent l evel , i t i s not vi ndi cat ed f or t her e i s no r epor t of Sam' s sayi ng a day l at er t hat whol l y capt ur es t he t hought whi ch ( 1) expr esses. However , i t i s not cl ear t hat t he i nt ui t i on behi nd Per r y' s dat umi s not vi ndi cat ed. The i nt ui t i on i s t hat at some l evel of cont ent John' s r epor t i s t r ue and f ul l y accur at e. Thi s i nt ui t i on i s f ul l y vi ndi cat ed at t he r ef er ence- cont ent l evel . John' s r epor t of what Samsai d i s t r ue and accur at e as f ar as t he r ef er ent i al cont ent of what Samsai d goes. John succeeds i n r epor t i ng t he same cont ent at t he l evel of r ef er ence t hough not t he same cont ent at t he l evel of sense, t he same pur el y r ef er ent i al t r i t h- condi t i ons t hough not t he same i nt er pr et i ve t r ut h- condi t i ons. However , i t i s al so t r ue t hat John succeeds i n doi ng mor e. Ct r ast t he r epor t whi ch John makes wi t h a di f f er ent r epor t of Sam' s sayi ng, wi t h ( 7). ( 7)
Samsai d t hat i t was r ai ni ng on t he 5t h of Sept ember .
Because ( 7) r epor t s Samas t hi nki ng of a day as t he 5t h of Sept ember when he mi ght not be t hi nki ng of i t i n t hat way, ( 7) i s bot h i naccur at e and i nappr opr i at e. To br i ng t he poi nt home suppose t hat John seeks t o r epor t wi t h ( 9) Sam' s ut t er ance ( 8) on t he 5t h. ( 8) ( 9)
Today i s t he 5t h of Sept ember . Samsai d t hat t he 5t h of Sept ember i s t he 5t h of Sept ember .
( 9) i s i nappr opr i at e because i t r epor t s Samas havi ng af f i r med a t aut ol ogy whi ch he di d not . Al t hough t he pur el y r ef er ent i al t r ut h- condi t i ons of t he embedded sent ence i n ( 9) ar e t he same as t hose of ( 8) , t her e i s a di f f er ence bet ween John' s r epor t i ng i t usi ng " t he 5t h of Sept ember " and hi s r epor t i ng i t usi ng " t oday' Ther e i s somet hi ng i nvol ved i n our under st andi ng of " t oday" and " yest er day' and hence i n t hei r senses whi ch makes t hemmor e appr opr i at e subst i t ut i ons one f or t he ot her . So when John r epor t s Sam' s ut t er ance ( 1) , ( 2) i s a mor e sui t abl e r epor t t han ( 7).
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I n t al ki ng of appr opr i at eness and degr ees of appr opr i at eness i n speech r epor t s, I am assumi ng t hat pr agmat i c consi der at i ons i nf l uence what and when someone i s pr epar ed t o count as havi ng successf ul l y r epor t ed someone el se' s speech. And i n f act , I t hi nk t hat t hi s i s r i ght about pr oposi t i onal at t i t ude r epor t s i n gener al . What count s as a successf ul pr oposi t i onal at t i t ude r epor t i s heavi l y i nf l uenced by pr agmat i c consi der at i ons. Suppose t hat Laur a i s i nt er est ed i n knowi ng what Samsai d concer ni ng t he 5t h of Sept ember , t hen John' s r epor t i ng t o Laur a Sam' s ut t er ance of ( 1) wi t h ( 10) may be r egar ded as a successf ul speech r epor t because i t was appr opr i at e f or t he pur poses. ( 10) Samsai d of t he 5t h of Sept ember t hat i t was r ai ni ng. However , i f we ar e i nt er est ed i n expl ai ni ng Sam' s behavi our , say, hi s t aki ng an umbr el l a when he l eaves t he r oom, t hen ( 10) may not be suf f i ci ent l y appr opr i at e; r at her somet hi ng l i ke ( 2) mi ght be mor e appr opr i at e. On t hi s Fr egean pi ct ur e, al t hough John' s r epor t ( 2) i s not compl et el y accur at e, i t i s not f al se si nce i t r epor t s t he pur el y r ef er ent i al t r ut h- condi t i ons of what Samsai d. But mor e t han t hi s: i t gest ur es t owar ds t he sor t of wor d Samwoul d use t he f ol l owi ng day wer e he t o keep t r ack of t he day i n quest i on and wer e he t o pr edi cat e t he same of t hat day t he f ol l owi ng day, and so gest ur es t o t he sor t of t hought Samwoul d t hen have gr asped. Thus, we may say t hat al t hough John' s r epor t i s not f ul l y accur at e, i t i s nonet hel ess a suf f i ci ent l y appr opr i at e speech r epor t . The pr esent account does not r ender t he t hought Samgr asped when he ut t er ed ( 1) compl et el y i ncommuni cabl e or unr epor t abl e. Anyone can r epor t Sam' s speech f ul l y accur at el y ( i ndependent l y of any pr agmat i c consi der at i ons) on t he 5t h of Sept ember i n t he f ol l owi ng manner : ( 11)
Samsays t hat i t i s r ai ni ng t oday.
Not onl y does ( 11) r epor t accur at el y t he pur el y r ef er ent i al t r ut h- condi t i ons of ( 1) but al so i t s i nt er pr et i ve ones, i t s sense. The r eason why one can' t do t hi s t he f ol l owi ng day i s t hat one wi l l have moved on i n t i me and so t he appr opr i at e cont ext wi l l no l onger he avai l abl e t o enabl e gr asp of t he same t hought Samhad t he pr evi ous day. But not onl y i s t hi s i mpossi bl e f or t he speech r epor t er , Samhi msel f wi l l al so have moved on i n t i me and so he t oo wi l l be unabl e t o gr asp t hat t hought .
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Not hi ng appear s t o be l ef t out of t he expl anat i on of why ( 2) i s an appr opr i at e speech r epor t of ( 1). But mor e i mpor t ant l y, t her e i s no r eason t o bel i eve t hat we need mor e t han t he r el at i on of appr opr i at eness bet ween ( 2) and ( 1) t o vi ndi cat e t he i nt ui t i ons behi nd Per r y' s dat um. Rat her t han a t r ue and f ul l y accur at e r epor t , ( 2) i s an appr opr i at e r epor t of ( 1) i n vi r t ue not onl y of t he embedded sent ence i n ( 2) havi ng t he same pur el y r ef er ent i al t r ut h- condi t i ons as ( 1) , but al so i n vi r t ue of poi nt i ng t owar ds t he sor t of t hought whi ch t he speaker expr essed upon pr oduci ng hi s ut t er ance. I suggest t hen t hat Per r y' s dat umbe modi f i ed, wher e t he newver si on est abl i shes t he r el at i on of appr opr i at eness bet ween ( 2) and ( 1): ( 2) i s a successf ul speech r epor t of ( 1) i f and onl y i f i t i s suf f i ci ent l y appr opr i at e. And t hi s r el at i on bet ween ( 2) and ( 1) i s adequat el y expl ai ned i n t he Fr egear i account I ' m advocat i ng wi t hout gi vi ng up any of t he i ni t i al essent i al Fr egean cl ai ms ( CI ) t o ( C4) or any of t he Fr egean t heses ( TO) t o ( T3) . I How t hen does t he pr esent vi ew account f or t he coher nt t hought dat um? A f ul l account of such dat umwoul d r equi r e an accoun of demonst r at i ves, i n par t i cul ar of what compl et es t hem ( vi z. di r ect i ng i n\ ent i ons or demonst r at i ons) and of t he r ol e of t he mat r i x i n compl ex demonst r at i ves l i ke " shi p" i n " t hat shi p" and i n " t hi s shi p' I shal l not at t empt such a t ask her e. For t he pr esent pur poses i t suf f i ces t o gi ve a r ough i dea of what t he i nt er pr et i ve t r ut h- condi t i ons f or ( 4) ar e such t hat t hey vi ndi cat e t he coher ent t hought dat um. Leavi ng out what compl et e demonst r at i ves, and t aki ng c t o be a cont ext , " d" t o be a const ant f or an obj ect i n c, and " d' " t o be a di f f er ent const ant f or an obj ect i n c, such t hat each const ant cor r esponds t o a demonst r at i ve i n ( 4) , t he i nt er pr et i ve t r ut h- condi t i ons f or ( 4) ar e ( ver y r oughl y) t he f ol l owi ng: ( 4' )
" That shi p i s not t hi s shi p" as pr oduced by Paol a i n c i s t r ue i f and onl y i f d' whi ch i s t he shi p t hat l ooks t o be at some di st ance f r om Paol a i s not d" whi ch i s t he shi p t hat l ooks t o be near t o Paol a.
Cont r ast ( 4' ) wi t h t he f ol l owi ng whi ch gi ves us t he pur el y r ef er ent i al t r ut hcondi t i ons of ( 4): ( 4")
Dynami c and Coher ent Thought s
Eur opean Revi ewof Phi l osophy
" That shi p i s not t hi s shi p" as ut t er ed by Paol a i s t r ue i f and onl y i f d' i s not d' .
Gi ven t hat i n speci f yi ng t he pur el y r ef er ent i al t r ut h- condi t i ons of a sei i t ence, al l one i s i nt er est ed i n capt ur i ng i s t he r ef er ence of each meani ngf ul
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par t of t he sent ence i n quest i on, i t does not mat t er whet her we use t he same or di f f er ent const ant s f or r epr esent i ng such t r ut h- condi t i ons f or ( 4) si nce ex hypot hesi al l t he demonst r at i ves i n ( 4) ar e co- r ef er ent i al . However , t hi s i s not so f or t he case of gi vi ng i nt er pr et i ve t r ut h- condi t i ons. I n t hi s case, whi ch const ant s ar e used and when mat t er , and no const ant can be i mmedi at el y subst i t ut ed f or anot her even t hough co- r ef er ent i al wi t h i t . Thus, we can say t hat ( 4" ) does di spl ay an i ncoher ence wher eas ( 4' ) does not . The t r ut h- condi t i ons i n ( 4' ) have r oughl y t he f or m Fa&aÆ b&Gb, wher eas t hose of ( 4" ) have t he f or m aÆ a. Suf f i ce t hi s as t he begi nni ngs of a sket ch of howi n t he pr esent Fr egean pi ct ur e one coul d gi ve an account of t he coher ent t hought dat um, such t hat t he di f f er ence i n t he senses of t he t wo co- r ef er ent i al demonst r at i ves i n ( 4) i s shown i n i t s i nt er pr et i ve t r ut h- condi t i ons. 5. I have pr esent ed an al t er nat i ve Fr egean account of t he semant i cs of t r acki ng i ndexi cal s whi ch does not r un i nt o t he sor t of t r oubl e whi ch bot h Hi ggi nbot ham' s and Evans' s account s encount er ed. So I hope t hat t her e i s no r eason based on t r acki ng i ndexi cal s f or gi vi ng up on Fr egean t heor i es. I n t he cour se of doi ng so, I r ej ect ed DTCas a cl ai m about t hought s yet accept ed a modi f i ed ver si on of i t as an i mpor t ant cl ai mabout our psychol ogi cal pr ocesses of t hi nki ng. Such pr ocesses, such t hi nki ngs, ar e not t he same as what Fr ege cal l ed " t hought s" . The l at t er i s a semant i c not i on, wher eas t he f or mer i s pr i mar i l y a psychol ogi cal one. DTCt hen may hol d f or t hi nki ngs but not f or t hought s i n t he f ol l owi ng manner : t her e i s t he same psychol ogi cal t hi nki ng i n a subj ect when she uses t r acki ng i ndexi cal s t o r ef er t o an obj ect or var i ant as she moves t hr ough space and/ or t i me. I n abandoni ng t he or i gi nal f or mul at i on of DTC, I have al so abandoned a vi ndi cat i on of Per r y' s dat umas i t was st at ed; hut ! have suggest ed as wel l t hat t he pr esent account does not omi t anyt hi ng f r omour or i gi nal i nt ui t i ons concer ni ng ( 2) and ( 1) i n t er ms of appr opr i at e speech r epor t i ng. I nst i t ut o de I nvest i gaci ones Fi l osof i cas, Uni ver si dad Naci onal Aut ónoma de Mexi co
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Ref er ences
Sal mon, N. , and S. Soames, eds. 1988. Pr oposi t i ons ar i d At t i t udes. Oxf or d Uni ver si t y Pr ess, Oxf or d.
Al mog, J. , J. Per r y, and H. Wet t st ei n, eds. 1989. Themes f r omKapl an. Oxf or d Uni ver si t y Pr ess, Oxf or d. Bur ge, T. 1974. Demonst r at i ve Const r uct i ons, Ref er ence and Tr ut h. our nal of Phi l osophy, LXXI . 1977. Bel i ef Dc Re. Jour nal of Phi l osophy, LXXI V. Davi es, M . 1982. I ndi vi duat i on and t he Semant i cs of Demonst r at i ves. Jour nal of Phi l osophi cal Logi c, XI . Evans, C. 1981. Under st andi ng Demonst r at i ves i n Your gr au ( 1990) . " 1982.
Var i et i es of Ref er ence. J. McDowel l , ed. Oxf or d Uni ver si t y Pr ess,
Oxf or d. Ezcur di a, M . 1994. Sense, i ndexi cal s and Act i on. Ph. D. Thesi s. Un\ cr si t y of London. 1995. Modes de Pr esent aci ón y Modos de Det er r ni naci oCr i t i ca, Revi st a Hi spanoamer i cana de Fi l osof i a, XXVI I . Fr ege, C. 1879. Logi c. I n Her mes, Kamber t el and Kaul bach ( 1979) . " 1918. The Thought . I n Sal mon and Soames ( 1988) . Her mes, H. , P. Kambar t el , and F. Kaul bach, eds. 1979. Got t l ob Fr ege: Post humous Wr i t i ngs. Bl ackwel l , Oxf or d. Hi ggi nbot ham, J. 1986. Li ngui st i c Theor y and Davi dson' s Pr ogr ami n Semant i cs. I n LePor e ( 1986) . 1994. Pr i or i t i es i n t he Phi l osophy of Thought . Ar i st ot el i an Soci et y Suppl esnent ar y Vol ume, LXVI I I . Kapl an, 1). 1977. Demonst r at i ves. I n Al mog ( 1989) . " 1989. Af t er t hought s. I n Al mog ( 1989) . LePor e, E. , ed. 1986. Tr ut h and I nt er pr et at i on: Per spect i ves on t he Phi l osophy of Donal d Davi dson. Bl ackwel l , Oxf or d. McDowel l , J. 1984. Dc ReSenses. I n W r i ght ( 1984) . Mi l l i kan, R. 1991. Per cept ual Cont ent and t he Fr egean Myt h. Mi nd, C. Per r y, J. 1977. Fr ege on Demonst r at i ves. I n Your gr au ( 1990) . 1993a. The Pr obl emof t he Essent i al I ndexi cal and Ot her Essays Oxf or d Uni ver si t y Pr ess, Oxf or d. 1993b. Post cr i pt t o ' Fr ege on Demonst r at i ves I n Per r y ( 1993a) .
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Wei nst ei n, S. 1974. Tr ut h and Demonst r at i ves. Nohs, VI I I . Bl ackwel l , Oxf or d. Wr i ght , C. , ed. 1984. Fr ege: Tr adi t i on and I nf l uence. Oxf or d. Your gr au, P. , ed. 1990. Demonst r at i ves. Oxf or d Uni ver si t y Pr ess,
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CHRI STOPH HOERL
Cogni t i ve Dynami cs: An At t empt at Changi ng Your Mi nd \\\\\ I n " Demonst r at i ves" Davi d Kapl an i nt r oduces t he pr obl em of cogni t i ve dynami cs, t he quest i on of what i t means t o have r et ai ned a bel i ef over t i me whi ch one woul d have expr essed on a pr evi ous occasi on by usi ng an i ndexi cal expr essi on. I n a f oot not e, Kapl an poi nt s out t hat an i nvest i gat i on of t he phenomenon of cogni t i ve dynami cs mi ght st ar t wi t h t he f ol l owi ng quest i on: [ WI hat does i t mean t o say of an i ndi vi dual who at one t i me si ncer el y asser t ed a sent ence cont ai ni ng i ndexi cal s t hat at some l at er t i me he has ( or has not ) changed hi s mi nd wi t h r espect t o t hat asser t i on? ( Kapl an 1989: 538n) . I n t hi s i nvest i gat i on, I wi sh t o t ake up Kapl an' s suggest i on. I shal l choose t he phenomenon of changi ng one' s mi nd as my st ar t i ng poi nt and wor k my way f r oman anal ysi s of t hi s phenomenon t o an under st andi ng of cogni t i ve dynami cs. Of par t i cul ar i mpor t ance f or t hi s i nvest i gat i on wi l l be t he pr eci se st r uct ur e of t he t empor al r easoni ng a subj ect has t o engage i n i f she want s t o change her mi nd about somet hi ng. I shal l def end a t heor y accor di ng t o whi ch t he f ol l owi ng t hr ee condi t i ons must be sat i sf i ed i n or der f or i t t o be t he case t hat you have changed your mi nd about x: ( 1) ( 2) ( 3)
Fi r st you bel i eved of x t hat i t was cp, now you bel i eve of x t hat i t i s not q. You st opped bel i evi ng of x t hat i t was p bef or e you st ar t ed bel i evi ng of x t hat i t was not - cf . You knowt hat ( 1) and ( 2) .
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M y t ask wi l l be t o showwhy I t hi nk ( 1 ) - ( 3) ar e necessar y wi t hi n an anal ysi s of t he phenomenon of changi ng one' s mi nd. ( 3) ent ai l s ( 1) and ( 2) , but not vi ce ver sa, and t he mai n par t of t hi s i nvest i gat i on wi l l be t aken up by a di scussi on of what ( 3) adds t o ( 1) and ( 2) . M y basi c ar gument mi ght be descr i bed as f ol l ows: As t hey f i gur e i n bot h ( 1) and ( 2) , your bel i ef s concer ni ng x ar e r ef er ent i al l y t r anspar ent , i . e. you need not be awar e of t he f act t hat t hey concer n t he same obj ect . The r ol e of ( 3) l i es i n maki ng sur e t hat i t i s i n f act epi st emi cal l y t r anspar ent t o you t hat bot h bel i ef s ar e concer ned wi t h t he same obj ect . 2 I shal l ar gue t hat i t i s i n t hi s condi t i on t hat t he anal ysi s of a change of mi nd connect s wi t h a t heor y of cogni t i ve dynami cs, a t heor y accor di ng t o whi ch t he sameness of one' s bel i ef s ver t i me can he an epi st emi c gi ven.
Ther e ar e many al t er at i ons i n ' cogni t i ve st at e' whi ch don' t qual i f y as changes of mi nd. 3 ( 1) ser ves t o r ul e out t hr ee t ypes of such al t er at i ons. Under t he f i r st of t hese t ypes f al l al t er at i ons whi ch ar e due t o t he appear i ng or di sappear i ng of bel i ef s. No change of mi nd occur s when somebody acqui r es a bel i ef about a t hi ng she di dn' t even knowabout bef or e. Si mi l ar l y, f or get t i ng i s not a change of mi nd. ( One sol ut i on ( 1) l eaves open, however , i s t hat a change of mi nd mi ght he a co- occur r ence of f or get t i ng one bel i ef and acqui r i ng a di f f er ent one. ) A change of mi nd i s a t r ansi t i on f r om one bel i ef st at e t o anot her , not mer el y a t r ansi t i on f r oma bel i ef st at e t o some ot her st at e or vi ce ver sa. A second gr oup of al t er at i ons r ul ed out by ( 1) concer ns t hose cases i n whi ch t he subj ect ' s bel i ef s hel d at di f f er ent t i mes concer n di f f er ent r ef er ent s. Of cour se, a subj ect can come t o possess di f f er ent bel i ef s about t he weat her , f or i nst ance, j ust i n vi r t ue of l ooki ng out of t he wi ndowat di f f er ent t i mes. But t hi s has not hi ng t o do wi t h a change of mi nd. As Bai er put s i t : " Var yi ng one' s i nt ent i onal act i vi t y t o f i t var yi ng ci r cumst ances, l i ke updat i ng one' s 1.
2. 3.
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1 hesi t at e t o cal l t hemsuf f i ci ent condi t i ons, si nce 1 t hi nk t hat a sat i sf act or y anal ysi s of t he phenomenon of a change of mi nd shoul d be pi t ched at t he l evel of t he j ust i f i cat i on r at her t han t hat of t he dynami cs of t he change. Never t hel ess, I assume t hat such an anal ysi s woul d ent ai l condi t i ons ( 1 ) - ( 3) . 1 adopt t he di st i nct i on bet ween r ef er ent i al and epi st emi c t r anspar ency f r om Boghossi an ( 1994) who dr aws upon Qui ne ( 1960) i n choosi ng t hi s t er mi nol ogy. See Bal er ( 1978) and Dcnnct t ( 1978) f or some exampl es.
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ver si on of t he cur r ent ci r cumst ances, r equi r es no change of mi nd" ( Bai er 1978: 161) . As t hese consi der at i ons make cl ear , however , we shal l have t o r est r i ct t he domai n of obj ect s ' x' can st and f or i n a way t hat i sn' t yet expl i ci t i n ( l ) . Basi cal l y, we have t o make sur e t hat t he obj ect t he bel i ef s ar e about wi l l onl y be consi der ed i n so f ar as i t doesn' t under go change wi t h r espect t o t he pr oper t y sal i ent f or t he t r ut h of t he subj ect ' s bel i ef s. Of some t hi ngs t hi s wi l l be t r ue by def i ni t i on, such as par t i cul ar t i mes, or t i me- sl i ces of mat er i al obj ect s. However , we can al so al l ow t hi ngs i nt o t he domai n under consi der at i on whi ch don' t change as a mat t er of cont i ngent f act , such as mat er i al obj ect s i n a par t i cul ar per i od of t hei r l i f et i me. For t he sake of t hi s di scussi on, al l we need t o do as f ar as bel i ef s about endur i ng t hi ngs ar e concer ned i s t o count changes i n t he r ef er ent as changes of t he r ef er ent . Ther e i s a t hi r d gr oup of cases r ul ed out by ( 1) , al bei t one whi ch i s not as cl ear l y def i ned as t he ot her t wo. I t concer ns t hose al t er at i ons i n one' s cogni t i ve st at e i n whi ch t he subj ect does not move f r oma bel i ef cont ai ni ng one pr edi cat e t o a bel i ef cont ai ni ng a cont r adi ct i ng pr edi cat e. Accor di ng t o r ecent ext er nal i st or ant i - i ndi vi dual i st t heor i es, 5 an al t er at i on i n one' s cogni t i ve st at e can be due t o t he f act t hat one has moved f r omone l i ngui st i c communi t y t o anot her . I f t he t wo communi t i es have di f f er ent l i ngui st i c nor ms, t he t hought whi ch one used t o expr ess by ut t er i ng a sent ence i n t he f i r st communi t y ( and as a member of t hat communi t y) can di f f er i n meani ng f r om t he t hought one expr esses i n t he second communi t y ( and as a member of t hat communi t y) by ut t er i ng t he same sent ence. Thi s var i at i on i n meani ng can happen wi t hout one bei ng awar e t hat t hi s i s t he case. A si mi l ar phenomenon can be f ound i n mor e common cases. Thi nk of someone who used t o t hi nk of one of hi s f r i ends ' He i s l azy' but has si nce become mor e t ol er ant and nowt hi nks of t he same f r i end ' He i s l acki ng ener gy Has he changed hi s mi nd? I woul d say t hat t he answer , i n bot h cases, t ur ns on t he quest i on of whet her t he subj ect concei ves of t he pr edi cat es as cont r adi ct i ng each ot her or not . I n t he case of t he subj ect swi t chi ng f r omone l i ngui st i c communi t y t o t he ot her , i t i s pr eci sel y par t of t he ext er nal i st ' s st or y
4. 5.
Not e t hat t hi s does not mean gi vi ng up t he de r c speci f i cat i on of t he bel i ef s i n quest i on, because i t i s pr eci sel y a r est r i ct i on on t he r es t hey can be about . Cf . esp. Bur ge ( 1988) . For a di scussi on of t hi s phenomenon cf . Boghossi an ( 1994) . I t wi l l become cl ear t hat I di sagr ee wi t h Boghossi an on t he i mpl i cat i ons t hi s has f or sel f - knowl edge.
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t hat i n or der t o be i n a ment al st at e wi t h a cer t ai n ( ext er nal l y i ndi vi duat ed) cont ent t he subj ect does not need t o be abl e t o di st i ngui sh t he cont ent of t hi s ment al st at e f r omt hat of st at es she coul d be i n wer e t he ci r cumst ances di f f er ent . Si mi l ar l y, t he per son adopt i ng a mor e t ol er ant i ewof hi s f r i end mi ght do so agai nst t he backgr ound of a newout l ook on peopl e' s behavi our i n gener al ( mel l owi ng wi t h age) , a r evi si on of her pr evi ous 1i ews whi ch does not necessar i l y i nvol ve expl i ci t r ej ect i on of t hem. Whet her t her e i s a change of mi nd i n t hese cases t ur ns on t he quest i on of what t he t hi nker ' s hol di ng t he new bel i ef i mpl i es. As an anal ogue, we may consi der a si mi l ar quest i on ar i si ng wi t h r espect t o t he i mpl i cat i ons of what peopl e say i n a conver sat i on. I t wi l l r ar el y he t he case t hat a speaker wi l l st r ai ght f or war dl y cont r adi ct a st at ement anot her speaker has made. Rat her , we wi l l of t en f i nd si t uat i ons i n whi ch upon one speaker ' s ut t er i ng a sent ence l i ke, f or i nst ance, ' Bi l l i s l azy' anot her speaker wi l l r epl y wi t h a st at ement such as ' Bi l l i s l acki ng ener gy' . W hat t he second speaker says does not by i t sel f det er mi ne whet her she di sagr ees wi t h t he f i r st speaker ' s assessment of Bi l l or not . She can i ndi cat e di sagr eement by pr ef i xi ng her st at ement wi t h t he wor d ' No' , or by ut t er i ng i t i n a par t i cul ar t one of voi ce, t her eby maki ng cl ear t hat she i nt ends her ut t er ance t o car r y t he i mpl i cat i on of r ej ect i ng t he f i r st speaker ' s j udgement . But i t i s by no means cl ear t hat t he ut t er ance necessar i l y car r i es such an i mpl i cat i on, and i t can somet i mes be par t of t he goal of a conver sat i on f or t he speaker s t o r each agr eement on what t hey agr ee or di sagr ee on. Ret ur ni ng t o t he case i n whi ch someone ent er t ai ns di f f er ent bel i ef s at di f f er ent t i mes, we can t her ef or e say t hat her hol di ng t hose bel i ef s onl y const i t ut es a change of mi nd i f she concei ves of t he pr edi cat es whi ch f i gur e i n t hemas mut ual l y i ncompat i bl e. The t hi nker ' s hol di ng t hose bel i ef s however , wi l l not al ways commi t her t o maki ng such a j udgement , mor eover , she mi ght not even be abl e t o do so. 2. I have sai d t hat ( 1) dr aws a di st i nct i on bet ween changes of mi nd and cer t ai n ot her al t er at i ons i n a t hi nker ' s cogni t i ve st at e. However , st r i ct l y speaki ng, ( 1) does not ensur e t hat any al t er at i on i n t he t hi nker ' s cogni t i ve st at e has occur r ed at al l . Thi s i s wher e ( 2) has t o come i n. Consi der t he f ol l owi ng ar gument i nt r oduced by Saul Kr i pke. I n " A Puzzl e About Bel i ef " , Kr i pke consi der s t he ease of Pi er r e whomwe can cr edi t wi t h bot h t he bel i ef s expr essed by t he sent ences ' Londr es est j ol i e' and ' London i s ugl y' r espee-
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t i vel y. Obvi ousl y, t he t wo sent ences ascr i be i ncompat i bl e pr oper t i es t o what i s i n f act one and t he same ci t y. But , as Kr i pke shows, we can const r uct a coher ent st or y as t he consequence of whi ch Pi er r e can be sai d t o be di sposed e may r ead t hi s as a ease t o assent t o bot h t hose sent ences at t he same t i me. W i n whi ch ( 1) i s f ul f i l l ed wi t hout t her e bei ng any al t er at i on i n t he subj ect ' s cogni t i ve st at e at al l . I t woul d at f i r st be t r ue t hat Pi er r e bel i eved of London t hat i t was pr et t y and t hen i t woul d be t r ue t hat he bel i eved of London t hat i t was ugl y, si mpl y because i t was al l al ong t he case t hat he hel d bot h bel i ef s. The t ask of ( 2) i s t hus t o ensur e t hat a r eal change occur s, t hat t he subj ect hol ds t he t wo bel i ef s successi vel y. 1- l ayi ng sai d al l t hat , why do I t hi nk t hat ( 3) i s necessar y? I n f or mul at i ng char teisaon of t he bel i ef s i n quest i on. 6 ( 1) and ( 2) I have chosen de re On t he one hand, t hi s means t hat ( 1) and ( 2) hol d i ndependent l y of howt he obj ect of t he t hi nker ' s bel i ef i s descr i bed ( t hey ar e r ef er ent i al l y t r anspar ent ) . On t he ot her hand, ( 1) and ( 2) do not ent ai l t hat t he subj ect knows t hat t he bel i ef s concer n t he same obj ect ( t hey ar e not epi st emi cal l y t r anspar ent ) . As
t hey st and, ( 1) and ( 2) l eave out one f act whi ch seems t o be vi t al f or t her e to have been a change of mi nd: namel y t hat your bel i evi ng of x t hat i t i s not - cp, r epl aces your bel i evi ng of x t hat i t i s p. That means, t he l at t er t hought - epi sode occupi es t hat posi t i on i n your cogni t i ve economy whi ch used t o he occupi ed by t he f or mer t hought - epi sode, and i t has a di f f er ent t r ut h- val ue. Kr i pke' s st or y shows exact l y what i s mi ssi ng f r omt he account as l ong as al l we have ar e ( t ) and ( 2). I f i t i s possi bl e t o hol d cont r adi ct i ng bel i ef s concer ni ng one and t he same obj ect at t he same t i me ( as par t of one st at e of mi nd, as i t wer e) , hol di ng t hem successi vel y cannot be what const i t ut es a change of mi nd. Thus, t her e ar e eases i n whi ch ( 1) and ( 2) ar e t r ue but no change of mi nd has occur r ed. These ar e eases i n whi ch you don' t knowt hat 7 ( t ) and ( 2) hol d. Thi s i s why ( 3) i s necessar y wi t hi n an account of what i t means t o change one' s mi nd. The par t i cul ar pr obl emI wi sh t o di scuss i n t he
6. 7.
Not e t hat I speak of a de r e char act er i sat i on of t he bel i ef s, and not of t i e r e bel i ef s. As i t st ands, t hi s i s pr obabl y t oo st r ong, because i t seems l i kel y t hat al l t hat i s act ual l y needed i s your bei ng abl e t o know t hat ( 1) and ( 2) hol d. However , t hat i mpl i es t hat at l east on some occasi ons ( 3) wi l l have t o hol d i f a subj ect i s t o be abl e t o change her mi nd. Al so, t he condi t i on concer ns onl y t he i mmedi at e ( t empor al ) vi ci ni t y of t he change. I do not mean t o say t hat you onl y change your hat we ar e i nt ermi nd pr oper l y i f you cont i nue t o r emember t hat you di d so. W est ed i n i s t he dynami cs of t he change i t sel f ( whi ch does t o some degr ee i nvol ve
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r est of t hi s paper concer ns t he nat ur e of t he knowl edge post ul at ed i n ( 3) . I n a ser i es of paper s, Rut h Mi l l i kan has r ecent l y put f or war d a vi ewt o t he ef f ect t hat , pr eci sel y si nce ( 1) and ( 2) can hol d wi t hout ( 3) hol di ng, ( 3) can never be t he case as an ci pr i or i mat t er . The f act t hat t he cont ent s of t wo t hought epi sodes cont r adi ct each ot her ( or not ) cannot be t r anspar ent t o t he subj ect j ust i n vi r t ue of her ent er t ai ni ng t hose t hought - epi sodes, i t i s somet hi ng t hat has t o be est abl i shed. 8 The subj ect has t o r e- i dent i f y t he r ef er ent of one t hought - epi sode as t he r ef er ent of t he ot her bef or e she can ar r i ve at a j udgement about t hei r r el at i ve t r ut h- val ues. I n what f ol l ows, I shal l di scuss t hr ee cor ol l ar i es whi ch I t ake t o f ol l ow di r ect l y f r om t he cl ai mt hat i n or der f or you t o change your mi nd you have t o knowt hat you do so. M y ai mi s t o poi nt out t hat , ul t i mat el y, t he not i on of r e- i dent i f i cat i on cannot be made t o do t he wor k Mi l l i kan woul d l i ke i t t o do, especi al l y as f ar as t he t empor al cont ent of t he bel i ef s i n quest i on i s concer ned, and t hat we ei t her have t o gi ve up t he not i on of a change of mi nd as i nvol vi ng mor e t han ( 1) and ( 2) , or we have t o suppose t hat a subj ect can somet i mes know a pr i or i whet her she does i n f act ent er t ai n t he same t hought at di f f er ent t i mes or not . I n t he concl udi ng sect i on, I wi sh t o show t hat t hi s r esul t i s compat i bl e wi t h some of t he ext er nal i st i nsi ght s whi ch mot i vat e Mi l l i kan' s own vi ew. 3. The f i r st cor ol l ar y I wi sh t o di scuss concer ns t he ki nds of at t i t udes you have t o be abl e t o ent er t ai n i n or der t o change your mi nd: Cl :
8.
At t 1 you knewof x t hat you bel i eved i t t o be p, and now, at t 2, you knowof x t hat you bel i eve i t t o he not - cp. what happens bef or e and af t er ) , but one can cont i nue t o hol d a bel i ef whi l e f or get t i ng howone acqui r ed i t . Thi s al so seems t o be Kapl an' s vi ew: " Fun nat ur al l anguage ever y new synt act i c occur r ence of a t r ue demonst r at i ve r equi r es not j ust a r ef er ent - det er mi ni ng i nt ent i on, but a new r ef er ent - det er mi ni ng i nt ent i on" ( Kapl an 1989: 588) . I t woul d t her ef or e seemt hat , f or hi m, cogni t i ve dynami cs must come about as a mer e epi phenomenon, t he r esul t of a successi on of i nt ent i ons whi ch ar e i n ef f ect i ndependent of one anot her . The quest i on as t o why t hese i nt ent i ons occur , i . e. why t her e shoul d be an obl i gat i on on t he subj ect t o adj ust t he expr essi on of her t hought s t o t he passi ng of t i me, i s st r i ct l y speaki ng not par t of t he pr oj ect of di r ect r ef er ence semant i cs.
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I n shor t , a capaci t y t o ent er t ai n hi gher - or der at t i t udes i s pr esupposed i n t he abi l i t y t o change one' s mi nd. Changi ng one' s mi nd i s a mat t er of possessi ng and exer ci si ng knowl edge of one' s own ment al st at es. That t hi s i s i ndeed a r equi r ement on our ever yday not i on of a change of mi nd mi ght come out mor e cl ear l y when we consi der why we shoul d f i nd i t at al l wor t hwhi l e t o di st i ngui sh bet ween a change of mi nd and t he mer e acqui si t i on of a new bel i ef . Thi s di st i nct i on came out i n our di scussi on of condi t i on ( 1) above, and I t hi nk wher e we dr awsuch a di st i nct i on, i t i s because of consi der at i ons such as t he f ol l owi ng. I n her st udy of t he phenomenon, Annet t e Bai er l ocat es t he or i gi n of t he pr act i ce of changi ng one' s mi nd i n t he subj ect ' s bel ongi ng t o a communi t y of " mut ual r egul at or s" ( Bai er 1978: 167) . I t i s i n ot her s t hat we f i r st become awar e of a possi bl e mi smat ch bet ween what t hey bel i eve and what i s t he case, and i t i s ot her s who f i r st become awar e of a possi bl e mi smat ch bet ween our own bel i ef s and what i s act ual l y t he case. 9 And onl y i n r esponse t o mut ual cr i t i ci sm can a capaci t y f or sel f - cr i t i ci sm devel op whi ch l eaves r oom f or a change of mi nd. However , i f t he adopt i on of a sel f - cr i t i cal st ance i s t he r esul t of such an i nt er nal i zat i on of cr i t i ci sm made by ot her s, t hi s wi l l be because t he subj ect her sel f becomes awar e of a possi bl e di ssoci at i on bet ween what she bel i eves and what i s t he case. The shi f t f r om t he i nt er per sonal t o t he i nt r aper sonal i nt r oduces a per spect i ve ont o one' s own cogni t i ve st at es. The si gni f i cance of such a shi f t does not l i e i n det achi ng changes of mi nd f r omext er nal f act or s. W e of t en change our mi nd because we have f ound out newabout t he wor l d. But f i ndi ng out somet hi ng newabout t he somet hi ng wor l d does not suf f i ce f or maki ng us change our mi nd. W hen we do change our mi nd as a r esul t of a new di scover y, t hi s i s because t hi s di scover y has not j ust gi ven us a newvi ew of t he wor l d but because i t has al so gi ven us a new vi ew of our sel ves, because i t has f ed i nt o a sel f - cr i t i cal f acul t y: i nt o an awar eness t hat i s di r ect ed pr i mar i l y ont o what we bel i eve r at her t han what i s t he case. W e don' t have t o agr ee wi t h al l aspect s of Bai er ' s specul at i ve account of t he or i gi n of t hi nki ng t hat al l ows f or changes of mi nd i n or der t o acknowl edge t he f undament al poi nt t hat l i es at t he hear t of her consi der at i ons. No
9.
Bai er does not put i t i n t hose t er ms, but I t hi nk t hi s i s a f ai r t r ansl at i on of what she says i nt o t al k about bel i ef s. See al so Ast i ngt on &Gopni k ( 1988) , esp. pp. 201f . , f or si mi l ar consi der at i ons f r omt he poi nt of vi ewof devel opment al psychol ogy.
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mat t er what par t i cul ar r eason we have f or changi ng our mi nd about somet hi ng, t he r eason why r ef l ect i on, exper i ence, or t he i nf l uence of ot her s make us change our mi nds ul t i mat el y has somet hi ng t o do wi t h r at i onal i t y. Tal k of a change of mi nd has i t s pl ace i n an expl anat i on of t he cogni t i ve economy of a t hi nker . ' 0 I t ascr i bes t o t he t hi nker an abi l i t y t o make sense of a di st i nct i on bet ween a change i n t he wor l d and a change i n her own bel i ef s about t he wor l d, a di st i nct i on whi ch woul d not make sense wer e i t not f or her abi l i t y t o knowabout her own bel i ef s. I t i s i mpor t ant t o poi nt out t hat Cl can be f ul f i l l ed wi t hout t he subj ect knowi ng t hat i t i s i n f act t he same x bot h of her bel i ef s ar e concer ned wi t h. As Bur ge poi nt s out , 1 I i n or der f or t he subj ect t o have t he t ype of sel f knowl edge r equi r ed by Cl , i t i s not necessar y t hat she have any i ndependent way of i dent i f yi ng x as t he obj ect of her f i r st - or der bel i ef . The sour ce of our st r ong epi st enl i c r i ght , our j ust i f i cat i on, i n our basi c sel f knowl edge i s not t hat we knowa l ot about each t hought we have. I t i s not t hat we can expl i cat e i t s nat ur e and i t s enabl i ng condi t i ons. I t i s t hat we ar e i n t he posi t i on of t hi nki ng t hose t hought s i n t he second- or der sel f - ver i f yi ng way. Just i f i cat i on l i es not i n t he havi ng of suppl ement al backgr ound knowl edge, but i n t he char act er of t he sel f - eval uat i ng j udgement s ( Bur ge 1988: 660) . I n t hi s sense, knowi ng what one bel i eves at a t i me does not i mpl y knowi ng t he obj ect of one' s bel i ef i n a way t hat woul d enabl e one t o r ecogni ze i t as t he obj ect of ot her bel i ef s. The subj ect can be aut hor i t at i ve about her own
10.
11.
I n f act , i t i s an expl anat i on of a ski l l whi ch chi l dr en have t o acqui r e: " Thr eeyear - ol ds have bel i ef s, t hat i s, r epr esent at i ons of t he wor l d, and t hey change t hose r epr esent at i ons, but t hey have no under st andi ng of r epr esent at i onal change. That i s t o say, t hey do not knowt hat t hei r bel i ef s have changed" ( Ast i ngt on & Gopni k 1988: 193) . See al so Mi l l i kan ( 1993: 228n) , who emphasi ses t hat her cl ai ms ar e compat i bl e wi t h Bur ge' s ( 1988) and Davi dson' s ( 1987) account s of sel f - knowl edge. I t i s not i mmedi at el y obvi ous, however , how Davi dson' s vi ews t r ansl at e t o knowl edge of one' s own i ndexi cal at t i t udes. W hat he says i s t hat " [ t ] he agent her sel f 1. . . 1 i s not i n a posi t i on t o wonder whet her she i s r egul ar l y usi ng her own wor ds t o appl y t o t he r i ght obj ect s and event s, si nce what ever she r egul ar l y appl i es t hemt o gi ves her wor ds t he meani ng t hey have and her t hought s t he cont ent s t hey have" ( Davi dson 1987: 456) . I t wi l l be my ai mt o expl or e a vi ewof i ndexi cal s expl oi t i ng si mi l ar pr i nci pl es, but i t i s cl ear t hat a sl i ght l y di f f er ent st or y has t o be t ol d about what gi ves t hese t hei r meani ngs.
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bel i ef s i n t he way descr i bed by Cl even t hough she does not r eal i ze t hat t hey ar e concer ned wi t h t he same obj ect . 4. Somet i mes we can t el l t hat a change occur s j ust by per cei vi ng i t occur r i ng. I n t hi s r espect , one' s knowl edge t hat one has changed one' s mi nd must be di f f er ent f r omone' s knowl edge of ot her ki nds of changes, because i t necessar i l y i nvol ves memor y: C2:
At t 2, you knowof x t hat , at some t i me i n t he past , you bel i eved i t t o be p.
Thi s second r equi r ement br i ngs i n a newel ement : The scope of t he subj ect ' s knowl edge r anges no l onger j ust over t he cur r ent bel i ef s, but al so over a bel i ef t he subj ect no l onger hol ds. Agai n, i t i s i mpor t ant t o poi nt out t hat C2 can be f ul f i l l ed t oget her wi t h t he second hal f of Cl wi t hout t he subj ect knowi ng t hat t he r espect i ve bel i ef s ar e concer ned wi t h t he same x. W e wi l l event ual l y have t o ask howt he subj ect coul d come t o possess such knowl edge, but we bet t er not pr esuppose i t her e i f we don' t want t o beg t he quest i on at i ssue. I nst ead, t he quest i on I wi sh t o addr ess i s whet her we can make sense of C2 wi t hout assumi ng t hat t he subj ect al r eady knows t hat t he bel i ef ment i oned t her e concer ns t he same x as t he bel i ef ment i oned i n t he f i r st par t of Cl . The pr obl em, i n shor t , i s t hat t hi s case di f f er s i n an i mpor t ant r espect f r om t he cases of sel f - knowl edge di scussed above. The ext er nal i st account of sel f - knowl edge out l i ned i n t he pr evi ous sect i on r el i ed on t he f act t hat t he subj ect ent er t ai ned t he f i r st or der t hought whi l e ascr i bi ng i t t o her sel f , si mul t aneousl y. Onl y because of t hi s f act can t he r ef l exi ve j udgement " si mpl y i nher i t [ ] t he cont ent of t he f i r st - or der t hought " ( Bur ge 1988: 656) . 12 Ther e seems t o be no si mi l ar l y el egant sol ut i on avai l abl e wi t h r espect t o pr esent second- or der t hought s about one' s past f i r st - or der t hought s. I t seems t hat ei t her t he subj ect has t o know about t he co- r ef er ence of her past and pr esent bel i ef s, or t he cont ent of her past bel i ef i s not somet hi ng she can be aut hor i t at i ve about . The f or mul at i on I have chosen f or C2 al r eady ent ai l s t hat t he subj ect wi l l knowof t he co- r ef er ence of her past and pr esent t hought s. I n so f ar as C2 12. Bur ge' s choi ce of wor ds i n t hi s case seems sl i ght l y at odds wi t h hi s i nsi st ence on t he st r i ct si mul t anei t y of t he t wo t hought s.
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i nvol ves a pr esent bel i ef about an x, i t wi l l be t r anspar ent t o t he subj ect of t hat bel i ef t hat t hi s pr esent bel i ef concer ns t he same x her past bel i ef was about . I t wi l l he obj ect ed t hat al l t hi s shows i s t hat t he f or mul at i on of C2 I have gi ven begs t he quest i on. Al l we can demand of t he subj ect i s: ' At t 2, you know t hat , at some t i me i n t he past , you bel i eved of some x t hat i t was cp. ' Thi s seems t o def use t he pr obl em, si nce, at t 2, x i s r ef er r ed t o under a descr i pt i on ( r oughl y: ' What ever x i t was t hat my ear l i er bel i ef was about ' ) , whi ch l eaves open whet her I can st i l l i dent i f y i t or not . 13 I f we t ake t hi s r ef or mul at i on as our basi s, t he quest i on as t o whet her a change of mi nd has occur r ed or not becomes a mat t er of t he subj ect ' s abi l i t y t o r e- i dent i f y x as t he j oi nt obj ect bot h of her pr esent ment al st at e and her past ment al st at e, an abi l i t y whi ch i s i n pr i nci pl e f al l i bl e. Thi s not i on of ' r e- i dent i f i cat i on' pl ays a cr uci al r ol e i n t he account Rut h Mi l l i kan gi ves of i ndexi cal s. At t he hear t of Mi l l i kan' s t heor y i s t he f ol l owi ng consi der at i on: To know what an i ndexi cal i ndexes, t o i dent i f y t he i ndexed, r equi r es t hat one have a second r out e t o t hi nki ng of i t , a r out e ot her t han vi a t he i ndexi cal t oken, and t hat one gr asp t hi s second r out e as one ar r i vi ng at t he same r ef er ent . mdcxi cal s do not i n t hi s sense t el l what t hey poi nt at , what i t i s t hat t hey bear t hei r adapt i ng r el at i ons t o ( Mi l l i kan 1993: 271) . As f ar as t he r el at i on bet ween t wo di f f er ent occur r ences of i ndexi cal s i s
wi t hout not i ci ng i t . Ther e i s no r el at i on bet ween t he i ndexi cal s t hemsel ves whi ch coul d make t hei r havi ng t he same obj ect mani f est t o t he subj ect . The onl y way t he subj ect can i dent i f y t he cont ent s of t wo i ndexi cal s wi t h each ot her i s i n t er ms of an i dent i f i cat i on of a di f f er ent ki nd: by i dent i f yi ng each of t hemwi t h t he cont ent of t he same non- i ndexi cal t hought whi ch can ser ve t o medi at e bet ween t hem( cf . 1993: 275 and 360) 15 I n my opi ni on, t he i dea of r e- i dent i f i cat i on t ur ns out t o be hopel ess when i t comes t o expl ai ni ng howwe coul d come t o knowwhat we used t o bel i eve. I t i s const i t ut i ve of t he pr ocess of r e- i dent i f i cat i on as Mi l l i kan descr i bes i t t hat one and t he same obj ect can be r e- encount er ed on var i ous occasi ons and t hat t he di f f er ent epi sodes of encount er i ng i t ar e i ndependent of one anot her . However , pr eci sel y because t her e i s a di f f er ence bet ween change i n t he wor l d and r epr esent at i onal change, knowi ng what i t was I bel i eved cannot be a mat t er of bei ng abl e t o r e- i dent i f y i t wi t h somet hi ng I coul d f i nd mysel f bel i evi ng, now, i ndependent l y of what I used t o bel i eve. 16 W hat I used t o bel i eve concer ned how t hi ngs wer e at a par t i cul ar t i me, and, i n vi r t ue of t hei r ver y nat ur e, t i mes ar e not t hi ngs we can r e- encount er , 17 t hus, i nvoki ng t he not i on of r e- i dent i f i cat i on her e i s spur i ous. 15.
concer ned, Mi l l i kan t akes t hi s t o i mpl y t hat t he quest i on as t o whet her t hey i ndex t he same t hi ng or not can onl y be sol ved by i nvest i gat i on i nt o what i t i s t hey i n f act poi nt at . I n some cases, we ar e abl e t o keep t r ack of an i ndi vi dual , f or mi ng di f f er ent i ndexi cal s i n t he pr ocess of gat her i ng i nf or mat i on
16.
about one t hi ng. However , as Mi l l i kan poi nt s out , " t he act i vi t y of t r acki ng i s done i n t he wor l d, not i n t he mi nd" ( Mi l l i kan 1993: 358) . I t may pr ovi de us wi t h an abi l i t y mor e or l ess r el i abl y t o hi t upon t he same t hi ng ( t he same kont ent , ' 4 as Mi l l i kan woul d say) at di f f er ent t i mes. But t hi s doesn' t make t he f act t hat i t i s one and t he same obj ect t he subj ect keeps t r ack of an epi st emi c gi ven, si nce t her e i s no a pr i or i guar ant ee agai nst l osi ng t r ack 13.
14.
As Peacocke poi nt s out , t hi s move means t hat we have t o f i nd a not i on of ' under st andi ng' whi ch does not r el y on sameness of t hought , a not i on whi ch " mar ches wi t h r ef er ence t o t hought s, r at her t han empl oyment of t hem" ( Peacocke 1981: 192f . ) . Kont ent s, f or Mi l l i kan, ar e what Davi d Kapl an cal l s ' cont ent s " I n gener al , t he r esul t of eval uat i ng t he cont ent of a wel l - f or med expr essi on x at a ci r cumst ance wi l l be an appr opr i at e ext ensi on f or a" ( Kapl an 1989: 501) .
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17.
Ther e ar e many aspect s of Mi l l i kan' s anal ysi s wi t h whi ch I ami n compl et e agr eement , such as t he poi nt t hat keepi ng t r ack does not by i t sel f yi el d i nf or mat i ve t hought s of t he t ype' Thi s1 i s i dent i cal wi t h t hi s2' ( cf . Mi l l i kan 1993: 3. 58) . Wher e exact l y I t hi nk my account di ver ges f r omher s i s t he subj ect of t he concl udi ng sect i on of t hi s paper . Cor r espondi ng di f f i cul t i es emer ge wi t h an account of ' l ' - t hought s, because we don' t r e- i dent i f y our sel ves i n di f f er ent ways acr oss di f f er ent cont ext s. I t i s t her ef or e consi st ent wi t h her vi ews t hat Mi l l i kan t r eat s ' I ' as an " act i ve sel f name" ( cf . Mi l l i kan 1993: 274) r at her t han an i ndexi cal . However , I cannot see how a si mi l ar sol ut i on shoul d be avai l abl e i n t he case of t empor al expr essi ons. El sewher e Mi l l i kan acknowl edges t hi s di f f i cul t y and suggest s a sol ut i on: "I t i s har d t o see how one coul d gai n mor e t han one per spect i ve upon an af f ai r concer ni ng when t hi s or t hat happened, or devel op t he not i on of a l i near t i me sequence f or event s at al l , wi t hout t ur ni ng t o t heai d of ot her s who conf i r mone' s j udgement s. Onl y because my j udgement s of t i me sequence near l y al ways mat ch t hose of ot her s do I have r eason t o bel i eve t hat I have an obj ect i ve abi l i t y, not mer el y a seemi ng abi l i t y, t o f i t t hi ngs r emember ed i nt o a t i me sequence and t hat obj ect i ve t i me sequences exi st at al l . The medi um t hat i s anot her per son who speaks t o me pr ovi des at l east t he most accessi bl e way of havi ng mor e t han one per spect i ve upon t i me" ( Mi l l i kan 1984: 309) . I n my vi ew, however , her use of t he not i on ' per spect i ve' her e begs t he quest i on.
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The poi nt i s t hi s: i f we don' t al l ow C2 t o hol d i n t he way I f or mul at ed i t , we can never know whet her we have changed our mi nds or not , nei t her as an a pr i or i mat t er nor as an a post er i or i mat t er . Above, we saw t hat we have t o r est r i ct t he domai n of obj ect s ' x' can st and f or i n or der t o make sur e t hat we t al k about a change mer el y i n t he subj ect ' s bel i ef s about t he wor l d r at her t han a change i n t he wor l d i t sel f . The bel i ef s i n quest i on can concer n an obj ect onl y i n so f ar as t hi s obj ect does not under go change wi t h r espect t o t he pr oper t y sal i ent f or t he t r ut h of t he subj ect ' s bel i ef s. However , t he domai n of obj ect s t hus descr i bed j ust di sappear s out of si ght when we don' t al l ow C2 t o hol d. Not onl y does i t become i mpossi bl e t o r et ai n a par t i cul ar bel i ef about what was t he case at a par t i cul ar t i me or over a per i od of t i me, once t hat t i me has passed, i t becomes i mpossi bl e t o say what i t woul d mean t o ent er t ai n any bel i ef about what was t he case t hen. Al l owi ng C2 t o hol d r emoves t hi s di f f i cul t y, but i t al so means t hat t her e have t o be cases i n whi ch we know t hat a pr esent st at e we ar e i n concer ns t he same obj ect as a past st at e we wer e i n. 5. The mai n poi nt of t he above di scussi on can be br ought out i n a t hi r d cor ol l ar y whi ch al so makes expl i ci t t he di r ect connect i on bet ween changi ng one' s mi nd and cogni t i ve dynami cs: C3:
At t 2, you knowof x what i t woul d t ake f or you t o st i l l bel i eve t hat i t was cp.
Thi s cor ol l ar y cl ai ms t hat your knowl edge t hat you' ve changed your mi nd ul t i mat el y r est s upon t he f act t hat , had you not changed your mi nd, t her e woul d be modes of t hi nki ng avai l abl e t o you whi ch woul d make t hi s i mmedi at el y t r anspar ent t o you. I n shor t , you can somet i mes be di r ect l y awar e of t he f act t hat you ent er t ai n t he same cont ent on t wo di f f er ent occasi ons ( even t hough you mi ght have t o expr ess t hi s cont ent i n di f f er ent 18 And your bei ng aut hor i t at i ve about your changes of mi nd r est s ways) .
18.
I n f act , I am put t i ng f or war d an opt i on whi ch Mi l l i kan does not consi der , because she seems t o assume t hat on any ki nd of t heor y co- r ef er r i ng i ndexi cal s used at di f f er ent t i mes cannot expr ess t he same mode of pr esent at i on si nce one of t hemwoul d have t o be a ' mode di r ect ed t hr ough memor y' ( Mi l l i kan 1993: 338) .
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upon your bei ng aut hor i t at i ve about hol di ng on t o t he same cont ent i n t hi s way. Thi s i s pr eci sel y t he vi ewRut h Mi l l i kan t r i es t o avoi d at al l cost s, at l east i f i t i s t o expr ess a r equi r ement on what has t o be epi st emi cal l y gi ven t o t he subj ect . i Ti he abi l i t y t o r epr esent , t o t hi nk of , a kont ent does not ent ai l t he abi l i t y t o r ei dent i f y t hat kont ent when one t hi nks of i t agai n. Thi nki ng of a t hi ng does not i nvol ve ' knowi ng what ' one i s t hi nki ng of i f t hat means al ways r ecogni zi ng i t when encount er ed agai n i n t hought . Thi s i s because t he i dent i t y ver sus di f f er ence 1. 1 of t hought kont ent s al ways depend on howmat t er s st and i n t he wor l d, not j ust i n t he head. I t i s never di ct at ed by t he i nsi des of t hought al one ( Mi l l i kan 1993: 357f . )
Two di f f er ent cl ai ms make t hei r appear ance i n t hi s shor t passage: t her e i s, f i r st , t he cl ai mt hat whet her t wo t hought - epi sodes do i n f act concer n t he same t hi ng or not ( have t he same kont ent or not ) depends on ext er nal i st const r ai nt s, on howt he wor l d i s. Second, t her e i s t he cl ai m, assumed t o f ol l ow f r omt hi s, t hat i t cannot be par t of t he def i ni t i on of t hought t hat t he subj ect shoul d be abl e, upon ent er t ai ni ng a t hought - epi sode, t o knowwhat i t woul d mean t o ent er t ai n a t hought - epi sode concer ni ng t he same obj ect at a l at er t i me. On cl oser i nspect i on, t he gener al shape of t he ar gument shoul d l ook f ami l i ar . 19 Compar e t he ' ar gument f r om i l l usi on' : W e knowt hat our senses somet i mes decei ve us, i n t he sense t hat t her e i s no i nt er nal guar ant ee t hat how t hi ngs l ook t o us i s howt hi ngs act ual l y ar e i n t he wor l d. Some cases of t hi ngs l ooki ng t hus and so happen t o he due t o t hi ngs bei ng t hus and so whi l e ot her s ar en' t . Fr omt hi s i t i s ar gued t hat , si nce t he subj ect wi l l never he abl e t o t el l f or sur e whi ch of t hese t wo cases i s act ual l y f ul f i l l ed, how t hi ngs act ual l y ar e can, st r i ct l y speaki ng, never ent er i nt o our def i ni t i on of what i t means f or t hi ngs t o l ook a cer t ai n way. I nst ead, we need t o appeal t o pr i vat e ' sense- dat a' i n or der t o expl i cat e t he meani ng of t he t er m. As Paul Snowdon has poi nt ed out , i f we see our sel ves f or ced t o dr aw such a concl usi on, i t i s because of a backgr ound assumpt i on whi ch we haven' t i n f act pr ovi ded an ar gument f or , namel y t hat " t her e i s i n al l cases a
19.
Davi dson ( 1987) al so not es a cor r espondence bet ween t he pr obl ems of scept i ci smabout t he out er wor l d and aut hor i t y ( or l ack of i t ) about one' s own ment al st at es.
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si ngl e sor t of st at e of af f ai r s whose obt ai ni ng makes ' I ooks' - ascr i pt i ons t r ue" ( Snowdon 1981: 203) . I nst ead of t hi s assumpt i on, Snowdon suggest s a di sj unct i ve pi ct ur e whi ch di vi des what makes ' l ooks' - ascr i pt i ons t r ue i nt o t wo cl asses. I n cases wher e t her e i s no si ght i ng t hey ar e made t r ue by a st at e of af f ai r s i nt r i nsi cal l y i ndependent of sur r oundi ng obj ect s; but i n cases of si ght i ngs t he t r ut h- conf er r i ng st at e of af f ai r s i nvol ves t he sur r oundi ng obj ect s ( i bi d. ) . Thi s di sj unct i ve pi ct ur e al l ows us t o see howan i nst ance of i t appear i ng t o t he subj ect t hat such- and- such i s t he case can act ual l y be count ed as t he subj ect ' s seei ng t hat such- and- such i s t he case, wi t hout t hat i mpl yi ng t hat t hi s i s somehow i ndi r ect l y gi ven t o t he subj ect and t hat her knowl edge r est s upon her dr awi ng an i nf er ence f r oma mor e ' i mmedi at e' obj ect of acquai nt ance t o t he obt ai ni ng of t he obj ect i ve f act . Thi s al so means t hat whi l e our ent er t ai ni ng cer t ai n t hought s r equi r es ci r cumst ances out si de our sel ves t o be a cer t ai n way, t hei r bei ng a cer t ai n way makes ways of t hi nki ng avai l abl e t o us whi ch woul dn' t be avai l abl e ot her wi se. Thi s i s a poi nt r epeat edl y emphasi sed by John McDowel l , who poi nt s out t hat t he di sj unct i ve account r emoves t he appar ent epi st emi c bar r i er whi ch seems t o make our per cept ual bel i ef s st op shor t of t he f act s. " W hen someone has a f act made mani f est t o hi m, t he obt ai ni ng of t he f act cont r i but es t o hi s epi st emi c st andi ng on t he quest i on" ( McDowel l 1982: 215) . Nowl et us go back t o Mi l l i kan' s ar gument . As we have seen, t he cr uci al st ep i n her ar gument l i es i n sayi ng t hat because ext er nal condi t i ons det er mi ne whet her we do i n f act ent er t ai n t he same cont ent on t wo di f f er ent occasi ons, consi der at i ons about sameness and di f f er ence of cont ent s cannot ent er i nt o a def i ni t i on of what i t means t o ent er t ai n a par t i cul ar t hought . W e
i n r ef er ence of t wo t hought - epi sodes ent er t ai ned at di f f er ent t i mes t o be an e coul d put t hi s by sayi ng t hat t her e i s a t r anst er npor al epi st emi c gi ven. W i dent i t y cr i t er i on f or such t hought s. I t must be possi bl e f or t he subj ect t o r el y on t he f act t hat she i s ent er t ai ni ng t he same t hought agai n. I n di scussi ng ( 13, a st r onger cl ai mhas emer ged: The ki nds of t hought s one can change one' s mi nd about ar e t hought s of whi ch one can know what i t woul d t ake t o ent er t ai n t hem on a di f f er ent occasi on. I t i s const i t ut i ve of t he t hought s i n e mi ght quest i on her e t hat t hey can be ent er t ai ned on di f f er ent occasi ons. W cal l t hi s a t r anst empor al di st r i but i on cr i t er i on. I n f act , t he t r anst empor al di st r i but i on cr i t er i on i s mor e f undament al t han t he t r anst empor al i dent i t y cr i t er i on. W e cannot st ar t of f wi t h a compl et e account of what i t i s t o ent er t ai n an i ndexi cal bel i ef at one t i me whi ch l eaves open t he quest i on of what i t woul d be t o ent er t ai n t hat bel i ef at some ot her t i me. Rat her , i t i s const i t ut i ve of t he bel i ef bei ng t he bel i ef i t i s t hat i t can be ent er t ai ned at di f f er ent t i mes. The cogni t i ve r ol e of t empor al l y i ndexi cal t hought s can onl y he capt ur ed i n 20 cases wher e t hey ar e ent er t ai ned on di f f er ent occasi ons. 6. Above, I have sai d t hat changi ng one' s mi nd, i f i t i s t o be di f f er ent f r oma mer e change i n de r e bel i ef , must be seen as an exer ci se of one' s r at i onal i t y. I wi sh t o concl ude by cont r ast i ng t he vi ew of r at i onal i t y t hat emer ges f r om my di scussi on of what i t means t o change one' s mi nd wi t h some of Rut h Mi l l i kan' s r emar ks about r at i onal i t y. I n Whi t e Queen Psychol ogy she wr i t es: Rat i onal i t y obvi ousl y pi vot s on kont ent . I t i s kont ent s, f or exampl e, t hat must not be bot h af f i r med and deni ed by t he r at i onal per son. l o be abl e t o dr awl ogi cal i nf er ences f r om kont ent t o kont ent but onl y when t hese kont ent s ar e pr esent ed i n a cer t ai n way, under cer t ai n modes, i s a l i mi t at i on of r at i onal i t y. I t i s not , as t he r at i onal i st t r adi t i on t eaches, a r el ocat i on of r at i onal i t y i nt o some i nner , pur er , saf er r eal m. To r ecogni ze t he same kont ent as t he same so as t o r eason about i t appr opr i at el y but t o do t hi s onl y when t hi s kont ent i s pr esent ed agai n under t he same semant i c mode i s t o be capabl e of moment s of r at i onal i t y. The f ewer t hese moment s ar e, t he l ess one wi l l he r at i onal . Mul t i pl yi ng modes, t hen, cannot possi bl y i ncr ease one' s r at i onal i t y. To be r at i onal , one needs t o r een-
can nowsee t hat t he f act t hat we can somet i mes be mi st aken about t he cor ef er ence of t wo of our t hought - epi sodes does not have t o st and i n t he way of maki ng t he f act t hat a t hought can be ent er t ai ned at di f f er ent t i mes cr i t er i al f or i t bei ng t he t hought i t i s. I f we can gi ve a di sj unct i ve account of such cases, t he f act t hat appar ent t r anspar ency can somet i mes mi sl ead us does not have t o mean t hat we can never t r ade upon i dent i t y. W hi l e cer t ai n condi t i ons out si de our pr esent ment al st at es have t o be f ul f i l l ed i n or der f or us t o be abl e t o ent er t ai n cer t ai n t hought s, t hei r bei ng f ul f i l l ed can make modes of t hi nki ng avai l abl e t o us whi ch woul dn' t be avai l abl e ot her wi se ( as we have seen above) . The di scussi on of C2 was meant t o showt hat i n or der t o make sense of t he phenomenon of changi ng one' s mi nd, we have t o al l ow f or t he i dent i t y
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2t ).
I t i s her e wer e t he di f f er ence bet ween my account and t he t heor i es of f er ed i n Per r y ( 1979) and Lewi s ( 1979) i s pr obabl y most obvi ous. Thei r account of i ndexi cal t ho9ght s as ' sel f l ocat i ng' does not acknowl edge t hat sel f - l ocat i on mi ght be possi bl e onl y as par t of an ongoi ng pr act i ce.
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count er kont ent i n such a way t hat one r ecogni zes i t . Di ver si f yi ng modes of pr esent at i on does not hel p t hat ( Mi l l i kan 1993: 348) .
t ake f or me t o change my mi nd i n t he f ut ur e wi t h r espect t o an asser t i on made now, i t i s not cl ear how such an asser t i on coul d car r y any meani ng.
The ai m of t hi s paper was t o expl or e an opt i on whi ch t hi s quot at i on f r omMi l l i kan does not consi der . I n f act , t her e i s an ambi gui t y i n sayi ng t hat kont ent s " must not be bot h af f i r med and deni ed by t he r at i onal per son. " Mi l l i kan obvi ousl y i nt er pr et s t hi s as sayi ng t hat bei ng r at i onal consi st s i n not
The ai m of t hi s paper was t o poi nt out t hat , i n a case wher e an asser t i on cont ai ns an i ndexi cal expr essi on, conf i r mat i on or r evi si on of i t at a l at er t i me cannot dr aw upon a r e- i dent i f i cat i on a post er i or i of what i t was about , si mpl y because what i t was about may no l onger be t he case. I f r evi si on of a
af f i r mi ng and denyi ng t he same kont ent . However , t hi s st r ongl y ext er nal i st not i on of r at i onal i t y makes i t myst er i ous howany cr eat ur e coul d come t o be such t hat i t s psychol ogy f ol l ows r at i onal pat t er ns. Aweaker i nt er pr et at i on of t he same sent ence suggest s t hat r at i onal i t y i s t hat whi ch nor mal l y pr event s us f r omaf f i r mi ng and denyi ng t he same kont ent . Thi s does not mean l aps-
past asser t i on cont ai ni ng an i ndexi cal i s t o be possi bl e at al l , i t must be gr ounded i n a pr i or i connect i ons bet ween past and pr esent . Ther e must be cases i n whi ch t he f act t hat a subj ect i s ent er t ai ni ng t he same i ndexi cal bel i ef on t wo occasi ons i s epi st emi cal l y t r anspar ent t o t he subj ect , and i t i s t hi s t r anspar ency whi ch a t heor y of cogni t i ve dynami cs has t o expl ai n. 22
i ng i nt o t he opposi t e ext r eme of not acknowl edgi ng any ext er nal i st const r ai nt s upon t hought . I ndeed, t he passage f r om Mi l l i kan i s hi ghl y i nst r uct i ve i n pi npoi nt i ng wher e ext er nal i st const r ai nt s may come i n. She i s r i ght i n sayi ng t hat any mul t i pl i cat i on of modes of pr esent at i on r esul t s i n a decr ease i n r at i onal i t y. But t hi s can al so be i nt er pr et ed as sayi ng t hat an at omi st i c pi ct ur e of modes of pr esent at i on- a pi ct ur e accor di ng t o whi ch i t i s at best an acci dent al pr oper t y of a mode of pr esent at i on t hat i t can be ent er t ai ned at di f f er ent t i mes- i s hopel ess, because t he ver y poi nt of modes of pr esent at i on i s t o enabl e a subj ect t o ent er t ai n t he same kont ent on di f f er ent occasi ons. I n shor t , what i s dependent on ext er nal i st condi t i ons i s t he i ndi vi duat i on of modes of pr esent at i on. 2' W ays of t hi nki ng about a t hi ng ar e i t acr oss cont ext s. W hat t he wor l d i s of i nf or m at i on about ways r et ai ni ng l i ke wi l l have an i nf l uence on whet her we succeed i n doi ng so, but wher e we do, our doi ng so wi l l cont r i but e t o our r at i onal i t y. I t i s i n t he abi l i t y t o t r ade upon t he i dent i t y of t he obj ect s of t hought , t o r et ai n one and t he same bel i ef over t i me, wher e an abi l i t y t o be r at i onal i s conf er r ed on t he subj ect even t hough t hi s " abi l i t y t o be r at i onal l oops t hr ough t he out si de wor l d" ( Mi l l i kan 1993: 358) . The phenomenon f or whi ch Kapl an has coi ned t he t er m ' cogni t i ve dynami cs' t hus emer ges as havi ng a pi vot al r ol e i n our l i ves as r at i onal agent s. I t seems pl ausi bl e t hat i t i s qui t e gener al l y t he case t hat i n or der t o count as maki ng a si gni f i cant cont r i but i on t o a t hi nker ' s r easoni ng at al l , a bel i ef f or med at one t i me must i n pr i nci pl e be avai l abl e at a l at er t i me f or conf i r mat i on or r evi si on. I f I cannot f or m any concept i on of what i t woul d
Depar t ment of Phi l osophy ar wi ck Uni ver si t y of W Ref er ences Ast i ngt on, J. W., and A. Gopni k. 1988. Knowi ng you' ve changed your mi nd: Chi l dr en' s under st andi ng of r epr esent at i onal change. I n J. W. Ast i ngt on, P. L. Har r i s, D. R. Ol son, eds. Devel opi ng Theor i es of Mi nd. Cambr i dge: Cambr i dge Uni ver si t y Pr ess. Bal er , A. 1978. Mi nd and Change of Mi nd. I n P. A. Fr ench, T. Uehl i ng, H. K. Wet t st ei n, eds. Mi dwest St udi es i n Phi l osophy I V St udi es i n Met aphysi cs. Mi nneapol i s: Uni ver si t y of Mi nnesot a Pr ess. Boghossi an, p. 1994. The Tr anspar ency of Ment al Cont ent . I n J. E. Tomber l i n, ed. Phi l osophi cal Per spect i ves 8, Logi c and Langnage 33- 50. Bur ge, T. 1988. I ndi vi dual i sm and Sel f - Knowl edge. Jour nal of Phi l osophy 85, 649- 63. Davi dson, D. 1987. Knowi ng One' s Own Mi nd. Pr oceedi ngs and Addr esses of t he Amer i can Phi l osophi cal Associ at i on 60, 441- 58. Dcnnct t , D. C. 1978. Howt o Change Your Mi nd. I n Br ai nst or ms. Phi l osophi cal Essays on Mi ndand Psychol ogy. Br i ght on: Har vest er Pr ess. Evans, G. 1981. Under st andi ng Demonst r at i ves. I n I-I . Par r et and J. Bouver esse, eds. Meani ng and Under st andi ng. Ber l i n: De Gr uyt er .
22. 21. For si mi l ar pr oposal s, see McDowel l ( 1984) and Evans ( 1981) .
I amgr at ef ul t o t he edi t or of t hi s vol ume and t o an anonymous r ef er ee f or comment s.
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Kapl an, 1) . 1989. ' Demonst r at i ves; and ' Af t er t hought s. ' I n J. Al mog, J. Per r y, and H. Wet t st ei n, eds. Themes f r omKapl an. Oxf or d: Oxf or d Uni ver si t y Pr ess. Kr i pke, S. A. 1979. A Puzzl e about Bel i ef . I n A. Mar gal i t . Meani ng and Use. Dor dr echt : Rei del . Lewi s, 1) . 1979. At t i t udes Dc Di ct o and Dc Sc. The Phi l osophi cal Revi ew88, 513- 43. McDowel l , J. 1982. Cr i t er i a, Def easi bi l t y, and Knowl edge. Pr oceedi ngs of t he Br i t i sh Academy 68, 455- 79. Repr i nt ed i n J. Dancy, ed. Per cept ual Knowl edge. Oxf or d: Oxf or d Uni ver si t y Pr ess.
TOMES GRI MALTOS ANDCARLOS J. M OYA
Bel i ef , Cont ent , and Cause
1984. Dc r e Senses. Phi l osophi cal Quar t er l y 34, 283- 94. Mi l l i kan, R. G. 1984. Language, Thought and Ot her Bi ol ogi cal Cat egor i es: NewFoundat i onsf or Real i si n. Cambr i dge, Mass: MI T Pr ess. 1993. Whi t e Queen Psychol ogy and Ot her Essays f or Al i ce. Cambr i dge, Mass. : MI T Pr ess. Peacocke, C. 1981. Demonst r at i ve Thought and Psychol ogi cal Expl anat i on. Synt hese 49, 187- 217. l ' er r y, J. 1979. The Pr obl emof t he Essent i al I ndexi cal . Nai l s 13, 3- 21. . V. Qui ne, W
o.
1960. W or d and Obj ect . Cambr i dge, Mass. : MI T Pr ess.
Snowdon, V 1981. Per cept i on, Vi si on, and Causat i on. Pr oceedi ngs of t he Ar i st ot el i an Soci et y 81, 175- 92. Repr i nt ed i n J. Dancy, ed. Per cept ual Knowl edge. Oxf or d: Oxf or d Uni ver si t y Pr ess.
I n t hi s paper we i nt end t o anal yse t wo cases of change i n bel i ef . These cases have been desi gned by John Per r y and Wi l l i amG. Lycan i n or der t o showt hat t he semant i c pr oper t i es of a subj ect ' s bel i ef s, such as t hei r pr oposi t i onal cont ent , cannot expl ai n t he change i n t hat subj ect ' s behavi or . Bot h Per r y and Lycan t hi nk t hat t he concl usi on t hey ext r act f r omt hese cases can be r ai sed t o a gener al t hesi s, namel y t hat a f ai r l y shar p boundar y must be dr awn, i nsi de t he concept of bel i ef , bet ween semant i c pr oper t i es and causal power s. Per r y t hi nks we need a di st i nct i on bet ween bel i ef obj ect , or pr oposi t i on bel i eved, and bel i ef st at e. I t i s t he l at t er t hat account s f or t he bel i ef ' s causal r ol e. Lycan, i n t ur n, el abor at es on Per r y' s di st i nct i on by aski ng us t o di st i ngui sh bet ween t wo i ndi vi duat i ve schemes f or bel i ef s, namel y t he t r ut hcondi t i onal scheme and t he comput at i onal scheme: " The t r ut h- condi t i onal i ndi vi duat i ve scheme i s t ypi cal l y i mposed when what concer ns us ar e t he t r ut h- val ues or ot her semant i c aspect s of bel i ef s; t he comput at i onal scheme i s i mposed when what we car e about i s causal ef f ect s" ( Lycan 1988: 86) . W e shal l cont end, i nst ead, t hat bot h cases can be account ed f or wi t h no need t o cr eat e a gap bet ween pr oposi t i onal cont ent ( i ndi vi duat ed i n t er ms of t r ut h condi t i ons) and causal or comput at i onal r ol e. W e shal l t r y t o showt hat , i n bot h cases, t he r el evant change i n t he subj ect ' s behavi or i s expl ai ned by a Resear ch f or t hi s paper has been f unded by t he Spani sh Gover nment ' s DGI CYT as par t of t he pr oj ect PB93- 1049- C03- 02. Our t hanks t o t hi s i nst i t ut i on f or i t s gener ous hel p and encour agement . An ear l i er ver si on of t hi s paper was pr esent ed at t he VI I SI UCC, Bar cel ona, May 1995, W e benef i t ed f r omsever al comment s by t he at t endant s. W e ar e gr at ef ul t o Chr i st opher Hookway and Josep Cor bi , as wl l as t o an anonymous r ef er ee, f or t hei r usef ul comment s on ear l i er dr af t s of t hi s paper .
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change i n t he pr oposi t i onal cont ent of hi s bel i ef s. Our cr i t i cal anal ysi s of Per r y' s and Lycan' s cases i s meant t o enhance t he pr ospect s f or t he vi ew t hat or di nar y, wi de cont ent or meani ng i s causal l y ef f i caci ous and expl anat or i l y r el evant , agai nst t he nowadays wi del y spr ead scept i ci sm about such a causal ef f i cacy and expl anat or y r el evance. 1. Per r y' s exampl e. Let us st ar t wi t h t he by nowf amous Per r y' s exampl e: "I once f ol l owed a t r ai l of sugar on a super mar ket f l oor , pushi ng my car t down t he ai sl e on one si de of a t al l count er and back t he ai sl e on t he ot her , seeki ng t he shopper wi t h t he t or n sack t o t el l hi mhe was maki ng a mess. Wi t h each t r i p ar ound t he count er , t he t r ai l became t hi cker . But I seemed unabl e t o cat ch up. Fi nal l y i t dawned on me. I was t he shopper I was t r yi ng t o cat ch" ( Per r y 1993: 33). Per r y comment s on hi s own exampl e: " I bel i eved at t he out set t hat t he shopper wi t h a t or n sack was maki ng a mess. And I was r i ght . But I di d not bel i eve t hat I was maki ng a mess. That seems t o be somet hi ng I came t o bel i eve. . . My change i n bel i ef s seems t o expl ai n my change i n behavi or " ( Per r y 1993: i bi d). Let us cal l t he t i me when Per r y i s l ooki ng f or t he shopper wi t h t he t or n sack ' t l and t he t i me wher e he di scover s t hat he hi msel f i s t he shopper wi t h t he t or n sack ' t 2' . Obvi ousl y, a change i n bel i ef occur s at t 2. But i t i s not an easy t ask t o say exact l y what t hi s change consi st s i n. Per r y says t hat t hi s change i s not a change i n t he pr oposi t i on bel i eved, ei t her t i e r e or de di ct o. Accor di ng t o Per r y, i t i s a change i n bel i ef st at e, a st at e t hat woul d be shar ed by " al l t he good- hear t ed peopl e who have ever been i n a super mar ket , not i ced sugar on t he f l oor , and been r eady t o say ' I ammaki ng a mess" ( Per r y 1993: 47) . W hat al l t hese shopper s have i n common" i s not what t hey bel i eve. Ther e i s no de di ct o pr oposi t i on t hat al l t he. . . shopper s. . . bel i eve. Andt her e i s no per son whomal l t he shopper s bel i eve t o be maki ng a mess. . . " ( Per r y 1993: i bi d). What al l t hese shopper s have i n common i s a bel i ef st at e andwe cl assi f y t hemi n t he same gr oup f or t he pur poses of " expl anat i on and pr edi ct i on" ( Per r y 1993: 48). Pcr r y seems t o suppose t hat , i n hi s own exampl e, t he cr uci al st ep t owar ds t hi s st at e woul d occur when he st ar t s t hi nki ng of t he shopper wi t h a t or n sack ( namel y hi msel f ) not as t he shopper wi t h a t or n sack, but as he hi msel f W e do not want t o deny t hat i ndexi cal s ar e essent i al i n many cases f or act i on causat i on and expl anat i on. Thi s i s somet hi ng t hat Per r y beaut i f ul l y shows. I t i s al so t r ue t hat , i f we t r i ed t o say what al l t he af or ement i oned
Bel i ef , Cont ent , and Cause 161 e shoul d shopper s have i n common, we shoul d have t o use i ndexi cal s. W have t o say somet hi ng l i ke " each bel i eves of hi msel f t hat he hi msel f i s maki ng a mess. " However , we t hi nk t hat Per r y i s over st at i ng hi s case. I n our opi ni on, what expl ai ns hi s change i n behavi or i s ( or i s al so) a change i n what he bel i eves, a change i n t he pr oposi t i on he bel i eves. Ther e i s al so a change i n hi s psychol ogi cal st at e, a compl ex change i ndeed, but t hi s change i s e shal l t r y t o showt hat , at t l , pr ompt ed by a change i n what he bel i eves. W bel i eves a cer t ai n and t hat , at t 2, he ceases t o bel i eve t hi s Per r y pr oposi t i on and goes on t o bel i eve a di f f er ent pr oposi t i on, one whose t r ut h condi t i ons ar e, not j ust di f f er ent , but even opposi t e t o t hose of t he pr oposi t i on he bel i eves at t i . Never t hel ess, we shal l al so t r y t o see why Per r y' s pr oposal l ooks cor r ect , t hough i t i s not so. I n deal i ng wi t h Per r y' s and Lycan' s exampl es, we wi l l make r at her f r ee use of some of t he t heor et i cal t ool s we can f i nd i n St al naker ' s book I nqui r y e ar e not sur e t hat St al naker hi msel f wi l l appr ove of t hi s ( St al naker t 984) . W use. I n f act , we can f i nd i n hi s book some r emar ks t hat coul d al i gn hi mwi t h e t hi nk, however , t hat t he mai n st r eamof hi s wor k goes Per r y and Lycan. 1 W t hese aut hor s' e wi l l t ake si de wi t h St al naker i n f avour agai nst pr oposal s. W a of i ng pr agmat i c pi ct ur e i nt ent i onal i t y and i n hol di ng t hat pr oposi t i ons, t he cont ent s of i nt ent i onal st at es, ar e possi bi l i t i es, set s of possi bl e wor l ds. Mor eover , we shal l make use of some i deas t hat have been devel oped at l engt h i n a pr evi ous paper by T. Gr i mal t os and C. Hookway ( Gr i mal t os and Hookway 1995) . 2. W hat Per r y bel i eves. Let us st ar t anal ysi ng Per r y' s exampl e. He says t hat , at t i , he bel i eved t hat t he shopper wi t h a t or n sack was maki ng a mess and t hat he was r i ght i n bel i evi ng t hi s. I n sayi ng t hat he was r i ght i n bel i evi ng t hi s, Per r y seems t o i mpl y t hat hi s bei ng maki ng a mess was a t r ut h condi t i on of hi s bel i ef at f l , a t r ut h condi t i on t hat , as he di scover s l at er , was i n f act sat i sf i ed at t i . That Per r y was t he shopper wi t h a t or n sack and was maki ng a mess woul d be what makes t r ue bot h what he bel i eves at t i , namel y t hat t he shopper wi t h a t or n sack was maki ng a mess, and what he comes t o bel i eve at t 2, namel y t he bel i ef he woul d expr ess by sayi ng or t hi nki ng " 1 ammaki ng a mess: ' But onl y t hi s l at t er way of t hi nki ng t hi s f act , t hi s essent i al l y i ndexi cal , I.
See, e. g. , St al naker ( 1984: 82).
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e seek f i r st - per sonal way, woul d be what expl ai ns hi s change i n behavi or . W t o show, i nst ead, t hat t hi s change i s due t o a change i n t he pr oposi t i on bel i eved t oo. I t seems cl ear t hat t he def i ni t e descr i pt i on " t he shopper wi t h a t or n sack" cannot have a r ef er ent i al use i n t hi s cont ext , f or Per r y does not knowwho t he shopper i n quest i on i s. The use of t hi s def i ni t e descr i pt i on seems t o be at t r i but i ve ( t hough maybe not pur el y so, as wi l l he seen) . Let us el i mi nat e, f or si mpl i ci t y, t he speci f i cat i on " wi t h a t or n sack. " So, one way of char act er i zi ng what he says he bel i eves at t i i s t o say t hat he bel i eves t hat t her e i s someone ( and onl y one) who i s a shopper and i s maki ng a mess. Let us cal l t hi s pr oposi t i on ' P' . I n f or mal t er ms ( wher e ' S' st ands f or ' bei ng a shopper ' and ' M' f or ' bei ng maki ng a mess' ) , ( P)
x [ ( Sx A MX) A( y) ( My- x=y) j
Accor di ng t o t hi s i nt er pr et at i on, any shopper pr esent i n t he super mar ket at t i , i ncl udi ng Per r y hi msel f can be t he one who i s maki ng a mess. To make t hi ngs easi er t o r epr esent , l et us suppose t hat , bot h at t i and at t 2, t her e ar e onl y f our shopper s i n t he super mar ket , t hat i s, t hat t he pr edi cat e " bei ng a shopper " ( Sx) coul d be sat i sf i ed by onl y f our peopl e at t i : a ( Per r y hi msel f ) , b, c, and d. Now, under t hi s assumpt i on, what Per r y bel i eves at t i , on t hi s i nt er pr et at i on, i s as f ol l ows, i n f or mal t er ms, ( PP)
Ma vM bvM cvMd
wher e ' v' i s t o he r ead as an excl usi ve ' or ' . I s t hi s i nt er pr et at i on of what Per r y bel i eves at t i cor r ect ? W e do not t hi nk i t i s. Her e i s why. I n or der t o f i nd who t he messy shopper i s, Per r y under t akes due act i on. Thi s act i on consi st s i n f ol l owi ng t he t r ai l of sugar i n or der t o f i nd t he cul pr i t . But Per r y i s a r at i onal agent , who seeks t o r each hi s ends i n as much economi cal a way as i s possi bl e f or hi m. And i t i s obvi ous t hat t he most economi cal way t o f i ndi ng t he cul pr i t i s t o l ook i nt o hi s own car t f i r st , bef or e embar ki ng i n l ooki ng f or ot her shopper s, i f onl y he had consi der ed t he possi bi l i t y t hat l i e hi msel f wer e t he cul pr i t , t hat i s, i f he had bel i eved t he pr oposi t i on P. So, he had not consi der ed t hat possi bi l i t y and he di d not bel i eve P' . What Per r y bel i eves at t i i s not P ei t her , namel y t hat t her e i s someone ( and onl y one) who i s a shopper and i s maki ng a mess, but r at her somet hi ng l i ke t hi s: t hat t her e i s someone ( and onl y one) , di f f er ent f r om hi msel f , who i s a shopper and i s maki ng a mess. Let us cal l t hi s pr oposi t i on ' Q' . I n f or mal t er ms,
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( Q) Jx [ ( Sx A MX) A( y) ( My- * x=y) I AM a Now, adopt i ng t he same assumpt i on about t he shopper s t hat wer e pr esent i n t he super mar ket , what Per r y bel i eved, at t i , i s t he f ol l owi ng, i n f or mal t er ms, d) AM a ( Q' ) ( Mb v Mc v M agai n wi t h an excl usi ve ' or ' . And he was wr ong i n bel i evi ng t hi s, and not hat Per r y says he bel i eves at t i i s ambi guous bet ween t hese t wo r i ght . W r eadi ngs, namel y P ( P' ) and Q( Q' ) . However , a pr agmat i c per spect i ve on bel i ef makes i t cl ear t hat t he second r eadi ng i s t he cor r ect one. Under t he f i r st r eadi ng, Per r y woul d have i nspect ed hi s own car t f i r st . Let us go nowt o t 2. W hen Per r y acknowl edges t hat he hi msel f i s maki ng amess, he comes t o bel i eve a pr oposi t i on t hat i s not onl y di f f er ent f r om, but al so opposi t e t o, t he one he bel i eves at t i , a pr oposi t i on t hat excl udes j ust t he possi bi l i t i es i ncl uded by t he pr oposi t i on he bel i eves at t i and i ncl udes t he onl y possi bi l i t y excl uded by t hi s pr oposi t i on. At t l he bel i eved t hat ( Q' ) ( Mb v Mc v Md) A1Ma Now, at t 2 he comes t o bel i eve t he pr oposi t i on R: ( R) MaAi ( MbvMcvMd) The t r ut h condi t i ons of t hese t wo pr oposi t i ons, Q' and R, ar c not onl y di f f er ent but opposi t e. I t i s t hi s dr amat i c, r adi cal change i n t he pr oposi t i on bel i eved t hat expl ai ns hi s change i n behavi or . 3. A di agnosi s.
Let us t r y a di agnosi s of what i s happeni ng her e. Per r y seems t o suppose t hat t her e i s a pr oposi t i on he bel i eves al l t he t i me, namel y t hat t he shopper wi t h a t or n sack i s maki ng a mess. Si nce he says t hat he i s r i ght i n bel i evi ng t hi s, he must suppose t hat t hi s pr oposi t i on cor r esponds t o our hat changes at t 2 woul d be hi s bel i ef st at e, r oughl y pr oposi t i on P ( or P' ). W t he way he bel i eves t hi s pr oposi t i on. He st ar t s bel i evi ng i t i n a gener al , descr i pt i ve way, t hi nki ng of t he cul pr i t as t he shopper wi t h a t or n sack, and t hen he goes on t o bel i eve i t i n a f i r st - per son, essent i al l y i ndexi cal way, t hi nki ng of t he messy shopper as hi msel f . Our anal ysi s has been di f f er ent . W e have deni ed t hat Per r y bel i eved pr oposi t i on P ( or P' ) at any t i me. At t i ,
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Per r y bel i eved pr oposi t i on Q( or Q) . At t 2, he came t o bel i eve pr oposi t i on Rand st opped bel i evi ng Q( or Q' ) . But i s t her e not a sense i n whi ch Per r y bel i eved al so pr oposi t i on P ( or P' ) al l t he t i me? Wel l , her e i s how we see t hi ngs. P can be deduct i vel y der i ved f r omQ, t hat i s, f r oma pr oposi t i on we have cont ended Per r y bel i eved at t i . P can be der i ved f r omQ by det achi ng i t s f i r st conj unct . And P' , i n t ur n, can be der i ved f r omQ' by f i r st det achi ng t he f i r st conj unct , namel y M b v Mc v Md, and t hen i nt r oduci ng a newdi sM a. So, at t i , j unct , pr oposi t i ons P and P' can he der i ved f r omt he pr oposi t i ons Per r y bel i eves, namel y Qand Q' . Besi des, P and P' ar e t r ue, t hough Q and Q' ar e f al se. Now, P' can al so be der i ved f r om R, t he t r ue pr oposi t i on Per r y comes t o bel i eve at t 2, by f i r st det achi ng t he f i r st conj unct , Ma, and t hen i nt r oduci ng t he appr opr i at e di sj unct i ons. And P, wi t h appr opr i at e assumpt i ons, namel y t hat t he r ange of x ar e t he f our shopper s a, b, c, and d, can al so be der i ved f r omR by means of exi st ent i al gener al i zat i on. P and V ar e t r ue al l t he t i me. Does Per r y bel i eve t hemal l t he t i me? Per r y i s r at i onal and knows l ogi c. So, he woul d have come t o accept Pand P' , i n t he sense of bel i evi ng t hat t hese pr oposi t i ons wer e t r ue, because t hey f ol l owed f r omt he pr oposi t i ons he bel i eved at t i and f r omt he pr oposi t i on he came t o bel i eve at t 2. But he woul d not bel i eve P ( or P' ) i n t he sense i n whi ch he bel i eved Q ( or Q' ) and R. Hi s bel i ef about P ( or P) woul d onl y he a bel i ef about t he t r ut h val ue of t hat pr oposi t i on. The onl y behavi or al consequences of t hi s bel i ef woul d be t o assent i f asked whet her t hi s pr oposi t i on was t r ue. Taki ng t hi s met a- bel i ef ( as we coul d cal l i t ) as a basi s f or hi s di sposi t i ons t o act woul d be i r r at i onal , gi ven t hat i t cont ai ns l ess i nf or mat i on t han t he pr oposi t i ons he bel i eves and on whi ch he i s di sposed t o act . The t r ut h of P ( or P) l eaves open mor e possi bi l i t i es t han t he t r ut h of ei t her Q( or Q) or R. Thi s i s most cl ear l y seen at t 2, when Per r y comes t o bel i eve t hat he hi msel f i s maki ng a mess ( t hough i t al so hol ds at t i ) . Once he bel i eves t hi s, namel y R, and r educes t he possi bi l i t i es t o one, t her e i s no poi nt i n wi deni ng t he r ange of possi bi l i t i es agai n, bel i evi ng t hat he hi msel f i s maki ng a mess or any of t he ot her shopper s i s. Thi s i s a l oss, and not a gai n of i nf or mat i on. Ther e i s no poi nt i n t aki ng agai n as obj ect s of bel i ef possi bi l i t i es t hat have been excl uded by what he now bel i eves. Deduct i on does not al ways l ead t o bel i ef , as one of us has shown i n a di f f er ent paper . 2
2.
Gr i mal t os and Hookway ( 1995) . Gr i mal t os' and I - I ookway' s posi t i on i s cont ai ned i n t he f ol l owi ng: " Deduct i on gi ves r i se t o bel i ef when t her e i s a quest i on t o
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Our di agnosi s, t hen, has t wo par t s. Fi r st , i t mi ght be t hi s gap bet ween psychol ogy of bel i ef and l ogi c, and not a supposed spl i t bet ween pr oposi t i on bel i eved and st at e of bel i ef , or bet ween semant i cs and causal r ol e, what i s at st ake i n Per r y' s exampl e. And i t mi ght be t he pr esence of pr oposi t i on P ( or P' ) , t hat Per r y woul d bel i eve t r ue bot h at t i and at t 2, i n t hat i t i s l ogi cal l y i mpl i ed by t he pr oposi t i ons he bel i eves at ei t her t i me, t hat cr eat es t he appear ance t hat t he change i n behavi or i s not due t o a change i n t he pr oposi t i on bel i eved.
4. W hat i f . . . ? Suppose, however , t hat i t had been a shopper , ot her t han Per r y, say shopper c, who was maki ng t he mess. I f t hi s wer e t he case, i t mi ght be obj ect ed t hat what Per r y bel i eved at t i ' , namel y Qor Q' , woul d al so be t r ue at t 2' . Thi s i s r i ght , but i t does not show t hat t her e i s no change i n pr oposi t i on bel i eved. I n t hi s al t er nat i ve st or y, t he pr oposi t i ons Per r y woul d bel i eve at t l ' and at t 2' woul d al so have had di f f er ent ( t hough not opposi t e) t r ut h condi t i ons. At t i ' Per r y woul d have had t he same bel i ef as at t l , t hat i s, he woul d have bel i eved Q( or Q' ) . And at t 2' , af t er f i ndi ng t he shopper who was maki ng t he mess, namel y shopper c, hi s bel i ef woul d have been t hat c, and onl y c, was maki ng a mess. Let us cal l t hi s pr oposi t i on ' S' . I n f or mal t er ms, cA( M av M b v Md) ( S) M Once Per r y comes t o bel i eve t hi s l at t er pr oposi t i on, he cannot go on bel i evi ng Q( l et al one P) , t hough he woul d bel i eve t hat Q( and P) wer e st i l l t r ue, i n t hat t hey f ol l ow f r omwhat he now bel i eves. I n t hi s case, t her e woul d be a pr oposi t i on, P. t hat Per r y woul d bel i eve t r ue at t l ' and at t 2' , and anot her pr oposi t i on, Q, t hat he woul d bel i eve at t i ' and woul d mer el y bel i eve t r ue at t 2' . But t he pr esence of P and Qas obj ect s of Per r y' s ' bel i evi ng- t r ue' woul d not showt hat P or Q wer e what Per r y bel i eved al l t he t i me and, t her ef or e, t hat t her e was no change i n pr oposi t i on bel i eved, i n t er ms of t r ut h condi t i ons. S i s t r ue i f , and onl y i f , c, and no one el se, i s maki ng a mess. P and Q ar e obvi ousl y mor e per mi ssi ve. They coul d be t r ue even i f c was not maki ng a mess. Agai n, once Per r y comes t o bel i eve S, he ceases t o bel i eve Q, f or S whi ch t he concl usi on of t he i nf er ence i s t he st r ongest answer possessed by t he bel i ever " ( p. 41) . I t i s cl ear t hat t hi s condi t i on i s not sat i sf i ed by t he i nf er ence t o P or p' , i n t he cont ext of Per r y' s exampl e.
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cont ai ns mor e i nf or mat i on and r ul es out mor e possi bi l i t i es t han Q. Per r y, as any of us, i s psychol ogi cal l y unabl e t o go on ser i ousl y bel i evi ng Qaf t er comi ng t o bel i eve S. Qwoul d be mer el y t he obj ect of an at t i t ude of bel i evi ngt r ue, wi t h negl i gi bl e behavi or al consequences. Someone mi ght obj ect , however , ( i n f act , someone has obj ect ed) t hat we ar e not r eachi ng t he cor e of Per r y' s posi t i on, namel y t hat i ndexi cal s such as ' I' , even i f t hey r ef er t o t he same per son as ot her expr essi ons, i ncl udi ng pr oper names, and ar e semant i cal l y equi val ent t o t hem, di f f er i n causal r ol e, so t hat , i n t he end, semant i cs and causal r ol e must be kept apar t . Thi s i s r el at ed t o t he uneasi ness someone mi ght f eel about our use of t he const ant ' a' i n t he f or mal r epr esent at i on of our anal ysi s of t he or i gi nal Per r y' s exampl e. Shoul d i t be r ead as ' I ' or ' Per r y' or what ? Let us go t o t hi s poi nt . Suppose t hat , whi l e Per r y i s pour i ng sugar and l ooki ng f or t he messy shopper , t he l oudspeaker s of t he super mar ket announce: " John Per r y i s maki ng a mess. " Per r y, i n hear i ng t hi s, comes t o bel i eve t hat John Per r y i s maki ng a mess. Thi s, Per r y woul d cont end, i s not suf f i ci ent t o br i ng about t he r el evant change i n behavi or unl ess he al so bel i eves t hat he i s John Per r y, whi ch br i ngs i n t he i ndexi cal and i t s di st i nct i ve causal r ol e. Suppose t hat , i n f act , i n hear i ng t he l oudspeaker s' announcement , Per r y does not r eal i ze t hat John Per r y i s hi msel f . He bel i eves t hat John Per r y i s maki ng a mess but he does not bel i eve t hat he i s maki ng a mess ( i n f act , he bel i eves he i s not maki ng a mess) . Af t er a whi l e, he r eal i zes t hat he i s John Per r y and comes t o bel i eve t hat he i s maki ng a mess. Per r y' s bel i ef t hat John Per r y i s maki ng a mess and hi s bel i ef t hat he i s maki ng a mess seem t o be semant i cal l y equi val ent , t hough causal l y di f f er ent . Our answer woul d r un t hus. W hen Per r y bel i eves t hat John Per r y i s maki ng a mess wi t hout r eal i zi ng t hat he i s John Per r y and so wi t hout bel i evi ng t hat he i s maki ng a mess, " John Per r y" i s f unct i oni ng, i n t he cont ext of Per r y' s bel i ef , as a def i ni t e descr i pt i on, such as " t he shopper cal l ed ' John Per r y' , " or maybe as an i ndef i ni t e descr i pt i on, such as " a shopper cal l ed ' John Per r y" I n t hi s case, agai n, t hese descr i pt i ons cannot have a r ef er ent i al use, si nce Per r y does not knowwho t he shopper i n quest i on i s. Thei r use seems t o be at t r i but i ve, t hough, agai n, maybe not pur el y so, si nce he has excl uded hi msel f as a pot ent i al f ul f i l l er of t he descr i pt i ons. So, under t hi s pl ausi bl e i nt er pr et at i on, t he t wo bel i ef s ar e semant i cal l y di f f er ent and have di f f er ent pr oposi t i ons as obj ect s. Per r y' s f i r st bel i ef i s t hat t he ( or a) shopper cal l ed " John Per r y, " who i s not hi msel f , i s maki ng a mess. Thi s bel i ef i s f al se and
Bel i ef , Cont ent , and Cause 167 woul d be t r ue i n a wor l d i n whi ch Per r y' s name i s not " John Per r y' and i n whi ch someone di f f er ent f r om Per r y, cal l ed " John Per r y' was maki ng a mess i n t he super mar ket . Hi s second bel i ef , t hat he i s maki ng a mess, woul d not be t r ue i n t hat wor l d, and i s t r ue i n t he act ual wor l d. Ther e ar e wor l ds wher e Per r y' s name i s not " John Per r y' t hough t her e ar e not wor l ds wher e Per r y i s not Per r y or wher e he i s not hi msel f . The t wo bel i ef s have di f f er ent causal r ol es, but , unf or t unat el y f or t he def ender s of t he spl i t , t hey al so have di f f er ent t r ut h condi t i ons. So f ar , we have been assumi ng t hat Per r y has excl uded hi msel f f r omt he ext ensi on of t he r el evant descr i pt i ons. I t mi ght be t hought t hat our t hesi s r est s cr uci al l y on t hi s assumpt i on. Let us gi ve i t up and see what happens. Suppose, t hen, t hat Per r y suf f er s a sudden amnesi a at t ack. He has moment ar i l y f or got t en hi s name and, when he hear s t he l oudspeaker s' announcement , he i s agnost i c about whet her hi s name i s " John Per r y. " I n t hi s case, he has not excl uded hi msel f as a pot ent i al f ul f i l l er of t he descr i pt i on " t he shopper cal l ed ' John Per r y" As f ar as he knows, he mi ght be t he r el evant shopper , t hough he i s not sur e about t hat mat t er . So, l et us suppose, he l ooks at hi s dr i vi ng l i cence t o di scover t hat hi s name i s, i n f act , " John Per r y, " as a consequence of whi ch he modi f i es hi s behavi or i n t he r el evant way and r ear r anges hi s car t . W hat about t hi s case? W e cannot say, as i n our pr evi ous exampl e, t hat what he st ar t s bel i evi ng, namel y t hat t he shopper cal l ed " John Per r y" i s maki ng a mess, i s f al se. However , t hi s bel i ef and hi s l at er bel i ef t hat he i s maki ng a mess ar e not semant i cal l y equi val ent ei t her . Though bot h bel i ef s ar e t r ue i n t he act ual wor l d, t hei r t r ut h condi t i ons ar e di f f er ent . " The shopper cal l ed ' John Per r y' , " unl i ke ' I' , as t hought by Per r y, can desi gnat e di f f er ent i ndi vi dual s i n di f f er ent possi bl e wor l ds. Ther e ar e wor l ds, namel y t hose i n whi ch " John Per r y" i s not Per r y' s name, but t he name of a di f f er ent shopper i n t he super mar ket , wher e hi s f i r st bel i ef woul d st i l l be t r ue but wher e hi s second bel i ef woul d be f al se. Even i n t hi s case, t hen, Per r y bel i eves di f f er ent pr oposi t i ons, i ndi vi duat ed i n t er ms of t r ut h condi t i ons, bef or e and af t er hi s di scover y. Agai n, hi s change i n psychol ogi cal st at e and behavi or i s pr ompt ed by a change i n t he pr oposi t i on he bel i eves. Hi s second bel i ef excl udes possi bl e wor l ds i ncl uded i n what he st ar t s bel i evi ng. The case we have j ust consi der ed i s one i n whi ch what Per r y bel i eves at t i " woul d be cl ose t o P ( or P' ) whi l e what he bel i eves at t 2" woul d be cl ose t o R, wi t h t he appr opr i at e changes i n t he pr edi cat es. Thi s case, i n f act , seems t o be cl oser t o Per r y' s i nt er pr et at i on of hi s own or i gi nal exampl e, accor di ng
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saw, he di d not seem t o excl ude hi msel f f r om t he set of pot ent i al cul pr i t s. Thi s i nt er pr et at i on of t he or i gi nal Per r y' s exampl e can be deal t wi t h al ong t he l i nes of our l ast exampl e and i s not i n t he way of our cont ent i on. we
5. Lycan' s exampl e.
Let us go nowt o Lycan' s exampl e. As i n Per r y' s exampl e, we shal l al so di st i ngui sh t i and t 2. Lycan' s exampl e i s, at a f i r st si ght , i mpor t ant l y di f f er ent f r om Per r y' s, f or i n i t t he subj ect , Smi t h, st ar t s wi t h a bel i ef whose obj ect can be expr essed wi t h a sent ence cont ai ni ng a demonst r at i ve expr essi on, namel y ' t hat man and not a def i ni t e descr i pt i on, such as " t he shopper wi t h a t or n sack. " Her e i s Lycan' s exampl e: " Suppose Smi t h bel i eves t hat t hat man he i s Ost endi ng i s about t o be pounced on by a cr azed, homi ci dal puma, but unbeknownst t o Smi t h t he man he i s ost endi ng i s agai n hi msel f r ef l ect ed i n a mi r r or . He wi l l pr oceed on hi s way, unconcer ned about hi s own saf et y, unt i l he t ur ns and sees t he puma i n t he f l esh and t her eby suddenl y acqui r es t he bel i ef t hat he hi msel f i s about t o be pounced on, whi ch change of bel i ef wi l l pr ompt an i mmedi at e and st r i ki ng change i n behavi or " ( Lycan 1988: 85). Lycan ar gues t hat , i n t er ms of t r ut h condi t i ons, Smi t h bel i eves t he same pr oposi t i on al l t he t i me: " Smi t h al r eady bel i eved t hat t hat man he was ost endi ng was about t o be pounced on; he al r eady bel i eved what Kapl an ( 1975) cal l s t he ' si ngul ar pr oposi t i on' <Smi t h, k ( x i s about t o be pounced on) >. So what he comes t o bel i eve upon seei ng t he puma i n t he f l esh i s not t hat pr oposi t i on. Yet what he does come t o bel i eve, t hat he hi msel f i s about t o be pounced on, has exact l y t he same t r ut h- condi t i ons as t hat si ngul ar pr oposi t i on and i s t r ue i n j ust t he same possi bl e wor l ds" ( Lycan 1988: i bi d). So, hi s change i n bel i ef i s t o be char act er i zed i n comput at i onal t er ms, not i n t r ut h- condi t i onal t er ms: t he r epr esent at i ons ' I ' and ' t hat man' pl ay di f f er ent r ol es i n Smi t h' s psychol ogi cal economy, t hough bot h i n f act r ef er t o t he same per son i n t he same possi bl e wor ds, so t hat t hey gi ve r i se t o sent ences t hat , t hough synt act i cal l y di f f er ent , expr ess t he same pr oposi t i on. I t i s t he nar r ow, comput at i onal i ndi vi duat i on scheme t hat expl ai ns t he di f f er ence i n bel i ef s and t he cor r espondi ng di f f er ence i n behavi or . So Lycan cont ends. Lycan' s exampl e, t hen, seems t o be har der t o deal wi t h t han Per r y' s. A def i ni t e descr i pt i on, such as " t he shopper wi t h a t or n sack, " unl i ke ' I' , as t hought by Per r y, can desi gnat e di f f er ent i ndi vi dual s i n di f f er ent possi bl e
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wor l ds, so t hat " t he shopper wi t h a t or n sack i s maki ng a mess" and " I am maki ng a mess' as t hought by Per r y, expr ess pr oposi t i ons t hat have di f f er ent t r ut h condi t i ons and can be t r ue i n di f f er ent possi bl e wor l ds. However , demonst r at i ve expr essi ons such a ' t hat man' and t he per sonal pr onoun ' I ' seem t o desi gnat e r i gi dl y, so t hat i f t hey succeed i n desi gnat i ng t he same i ndi vi dual on an occasi on, namel y Smi t h i n Lycan' s exampl e, t hey desi gnat e t hi s same i ndi vi dual i n al l possi bl e wor l ds wher e t hi s i ndi vi dual exi st s. Ther ef or e, " t hat man i s about t o be pounced on" and " I amabout t o be pounced on" expr ess pr oposi t i ons t hat ar e t r ue i n t he same possi bl e wor l ds i f , i n f act , ' I ' and ' t hat man' desi gnat e t he same per son i n t he act ual wor l d. I t seems, t hen, t hat t he change i n Smi t h' s behavi or cannot be caused by a change i n t he pr oposi t i on he bel i eves, i ndi vi duat ed i n t er ms of t r ut h condi t i ons, whi ch r emai n t he same f r omt 1 t o t 2. However , we shal l t r y t o show, agai nst Lycan' s anal ysi s of hi s own exampl e, t hat what expl ai ns Smi t h' s change of behavi or i s a change i n t he pr oposi t i on he bel i eves, t hough t hi s l at t er change cer t ai nl y t r i gger s a change i n hi s psychol ogi cal st at e. I f so, t her e i s no need t o r esor t t o a spl i t bet ween t he t r ut h- condi t i onal and t he comput at i onal i ndi vi duat i ve schemes f or t he subj ect ' s bel i ef s. 6. W hat Sm i t h bel i eves.
W e can di st i ngui sh t wo possi bl e i nt er pr et at i ons of Lycan' s exampl e. Accor di ng t o t he f i r st , Smi t h i s not awar e t hat he i s l ooki ng at a mi r r or . I n t hi s case, t he r ef er ence of ' t hat man' somehowf ai l s, f or t her e i s no man wher e he i s ost endi ng. Then, t he bel i ef he has at t i , t hat he woul d expr ess by sayi ng " t hat man i s about t o be pounced on, " i s not t r ue. I t i s not , as Lycan says, t hat what he bel i eves at t i has t he same t r ut h condi t i ons as what he comes t o bel i eve at t 2, upon seei ng t he puma i n t he f l esh, namel y t hat he hi msel f i s about t o be pounced on. ' That man' does not r ef er t o hi msel f . I t does not r ef er at al l . Or , i f i t does, i t r ef er s t o an i mage i n t he mi r r or or t o a pl ace t hat i s at a di st ance of 2d f r om t he pl ace Smi t h st ands, wher e d i s t he di st ance bet ween Smi t h and t he mi r r or . Let us say t hat hi s bel i ef at ( 1 i s t r ue i n a possi bl e wor l d i n whi ch t her e i s a man, di f f er ent f r omhi msel f , i n t he pl ace he i s poi nt i ng at , who i s goi ng t o be pounced on. Thi s possi bl e wor l d i s di f f er ent f r omt he wor l d Smi t h i nhabi t s at U, wher e he hi msel f i s about t o be pounced on wher e he st ands, t hough, as we sai d, i t i s t he f i r st wor l d wher e Smi t h' s bel i ef woul d be t r ue. So, on t he f i r st i nt er pr et at i on, Smi t h bel i eves, at t i , a
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pr oposi t i on t hat i s di f f er ent f r omt he pr oposi t i on he st ar t s bel i evi ng at t 2. The t wo pr oposi t i ons have di f f er ent t r ut h condi t i ons and ar e t r ue i n di f f er ent possi bl e wor l ds. No need t o spl i t i ndi vi duat i on of bel i ef s i nt o t wo di f f er ent schemes: causal , comput at i onal r ol e and t r ut h condi t i ons go t oget her . Nowt o t he second i nt er pr et at i on. Accor di ng t o t hi s, Smi t h i s awar e t hat he i s l ooki ng at a mi r r or . On t hi s i nt er pr et at i on, Lycan' s exampl e comes ver y cl ose t o Per r y' s, f or now ' t hat man' does not f unct i on as a demonst r at i ve expr essi on any mor e. Thi s appar ent l y demonst r at i ve expr essi on i s r at her a di sgui sed f or m of a def i ni t e descr i pt i on, namel y " t he man r ef l ect ed i n t hat mi r r or " , and can desi gnat e di f f er ent i ndi vi dual s i n di f f er ent possi bl e wor l ds. Agai n, as i n our i nt er pr et at i on of Per r y' s or i gi nal case, Smi t h i s excl udi ng hi msel f f r om t he r ange of possi bl e per sons t hat f i l l t he descr i pt i on. The pr oposi t i on Smi t h bel i eves at t i can be expr essed by t hi s sent ence: " Ther e i s a man r ef l ect ed i n t hat mi r r or , who i s not mysel f and who i s goi ng t o be pounced on. " I n t hi s case, i t i s even cl ear er t han i n Per r y' s case t hat , had Smi t h i ncl uded hi msel f i n t he r ange of t he var i abl e, t he r at i onal t hi ng f or hi mt o do, assumi ng a nor mal amount of sel f i shness, woul d be t o t est t hi s hypot hesi s f i r st . So, Smi t h' s bel i ef at t i i s f al se, not t r ue, and i s t r ue i n t he possi bl e wor l ds i n whi ch t he man r ef l ect ed i n t he mi r r or i s not hi msel f . At t 2, Smi t h comes t o have a di f f er ent bel i ef , a bel i ef whose obj ect i s a di f f er ent pr oposi t i on, a t r ue one, namel y t hat he hi msel f i s about t o be pounced on. As i n Per r y' s case, t he newpr oposi t i on i ncl udes t he onl y possi bi l i t y excl uded by t he f i r st and excl udes t he possi bi l i t i es t hat t he f i r st i ncl udes. The " st r i ki ng change i n behavi or " at t 2 i s caused by t he f act t hat Smi t h comes t o bel i eve a pr oposi t i on t hat i s di f f er ent f r om t he one he bel i eved at t i , a pr oposi t i on wi t h opposi t e t r ut h condi t i ons and t r ue i n a set of possi bl e wor l ds not cor npossi bl e wi t h t he set i n whi ch t he ot her pr oposi t i on i s t r ue. Agai n, no need t o spl i t i ndi vi duat i on of bel i ef i nt o t wo separ at e schemes: causal r ol e goes hand i n hand wi t h t r ut h condi t i ons. Possi bl e var i at i ons on Lycan' s exampl e coul d be deal t wi t h al ong t he l i nes suggest ed by t he above t r eat ment of var i at i ons on Per r y' s exampl e. I t has of t en been emphasi zed t hat i r i dexi cal i t y i s i mpl i ci t i n many appar ent l y non i ndexi cal expr essi ons. Put nam suggest s t hat nat ur al ki nd t er ms ar e i mpl i ci t l y i ndexi cal . Per r y, i n t ur n, speaks about " t he i mpl i ci t nat ur e of much i ndcxi cal i t y" ( Per r y 1993: 49) . Our anal ysi s of Lycan' s exampl e shows t hat t her e i s al so much descr i pt i on i mpl i ci t i n many ut t er ances of demonst r at i ve expr essi ons and ot her r ef er ence t er ms. Besi des, as we have al so t r i ed
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t o showi n sect i on 4, bel i ef s appar ent l y i nvol vi ng r i gi d desi gnat or s can cont ai n i n f act def i ni t e descr i pt i ons whi ch do not need i nvol ve a r ef er ent i al use. They can even cont ai n i ndef i ni t e descr i pt i ons. Thi s mi ght pr ovi de a way of deal i ng wi t h some puzzl es, such as Kr i pke' s puzzl e about ' London' and ' Londr es I n one of t he cases, ' London' ( or ' Londr es' ) mi ght be a cover t def i ni t e descr i pt i on, as i s ' t hat man' i n t he second i nt er pr et at i on of Lycan' s exampl e. Thi s can al so show t hat , t o use a Wi t t genst ei ni an expr essi on, t he cr avi ng f or gener al i t y, t he seek f or uni ver sal r educt i ons of concept s, i s mi sgui ded. Thi s compl et es t he t ask we have meant t o car r y out i n t hi s paper . Our e have not t r i ed t o show t hat semant i cs and ai mhas been a modest one. W causal r ol e shoul d not be kept apar t f or what concer ns i nt ent i onal st at es. W hat we have t r i ed t o show i s t hat Per r y' s and Lycan' s exampl es do not e hope we have succeeded. pr ove t hat t hey shoul d. W Depar t ament de Met af I si ca i Teor i a del Conei xement Uni ver si t at de Val ènci a Apar t at Of i ci al 22109 46010 Val ènci a Tobi es. Gr i ni al t os@uv. es Cur i os. Moya@ uv. es Ref er ences
Gr i mal t os, T. and C. Hookway. I 995. When Deduct i on Leads t o Bel i ef . Rat i o ( New Ser i es) , VI I I , No. 1, pp. 24- 41. Kapl an, 1). 1975. How t o Russel l a Fr ege- Chur ch. Jour nal of Phi l osophy LXXI I , No. 19, pp. 716- 29. . G. 1988. Judgment ar i d Just i f i cat i on. Cambr i dge: Cambr i dge Uni ver si t y Lycan, W Pr ess. Per r y, J. 1993. The Pr obl em of t he Essent i al I ndexi cal . Now i n The Essent i al I r i dexi cal . Oxf or d: Oxf or d Uni ver si t y Pr ess, pp. 33- 52. St al naker , R. C. 1984. I nqui r y. Cambr i dge, Mass. : MI T Pr ess.
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Recanat i ' s Di r ect Ref er ence
Ever yt hi ng you want ed t o knowabout di r ect r ef er ence and al ways dar ed t o ask i s cont ai ned i n Recanat i ' s newbook, whi ch i s not onl y a compr ehensi ve sur vey on t he r ecei ved doct r i ne but al so an or i gi nal at t empt t o f i nd a newway out of t he many puzzl es whi ch sur r ound t he " newt heor y of r ef er ence" ( i n H. Wet t st ei n' s wor ds) si nce i t s or i gi ns. Pr i nci pl es and concept i ons ar e i ndeed acut el y speci f i ed and Recanat i ' s own t heses ar e ar gued f or i n a ver y subt l e and r i gor ous way. One cannot l eave t he vol ume wi t hout t he i mpr essi on t hat hi s under st andi ng of t he subj ect has been r adi cal l y deepened and enl i ght ened. A t hor ough anal ysi s of such a det ai l ed wor k woul d pr obabl y need a paper as l ong as t he vol ume i t sel f . Thus, I wi l l l i mi t mysel f t o r econst r uct t hr ee gener al ai ms of t he book and t o di scuss some of t he i ssues t hey r ai se. These ai ms ar e: i) ii)
iii)
t o f i nd a new cr i t er i on f or t he r ef er ent i al i t y of di r ect l y r ef er ent i al t er ms ( f r omnowon, DRt er ms) ; t o devel op a mul t i - l ayer ed pr agmat i cs whi ch al l ows one t o deal pr agmat i cal l y wi t h what has been hi t her t o consi der ed as bel ongi ng t o a semant i c l ayer onl y; t o put f or war d a t r ut h- condi t i onal pr agmat i c anal ysi s of bel i ef r epor t s whi ch account s f or t he semant i c i mpor t of t he non t r ut h- condi t i onal t hought under l yi ng a l i ngui st i c ut t er ance. Recanat i , F. 1997. Di r ect Ref er ence: Bl ackwel l ( paper back edi t i on) .
Fr om Language t o Thought .
Oxf or d: Basi l
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Let me deal wi t h i ) f i r st . Recanat i put s f or war d a cr i t er i on of r ef er ent i al i t y whi ch i n hi s mi nd al l ows one t o t el l de j ur e r i gi d desi gnat or s ( names, i ndexi cal s: what we have above l abel l ed DRt er ms) f r omde f act o ones ( def i ni t e descr i pt i ons such as " t he cube r oot of 27" ) . The f or mer , not t he l at t er , di r ect l y desi gnat e t hei r r ef er ent si nce t hey ar e t ype- r ef er ent i al . He def i nes t ype- r ef cr cnt i al i t y as f ol l ows: At er mi s ( t ype) - r ef er ent i al i f and onl y i f i t s l i ngui st i c meani ng i ncl udes a f eat ur e, cal l i t ' REP' , by vi r t ue of whi ch i t i ndi cat es t hat t he t r ut h- condi t i on . . . of t he ut t er ance wher e i t occur s i s si ngul ar . ( p. 17) Suppose we t ake t he f ol l owi ng t wo ut t er ances, " 3 i s odd" and " The cube r oot of 27 i s odd" , wher e t he f or mer cont ai ns a de j ur e, t he l at t er a de f act o, r i gi d desi gnat or . Al t hough bot h ut t er ances have si ngul ar t r ut h- condi t i ons, l et us say ar e associ at ed wi t h a si ngul ar pr oposi t i on t o t he ef f ect t hat t he number 3 i s odd, t he f or mer , but not t he l at t er , pr esent s i t sel f as t r ue i f f 3 i s odd, i . e. ( i n Recanat i ' s own t er ms) expr esses a si ngul ar pr oposi t i on t o t he ef f ect t hat 3 i s odd ( pp. 26- 7) . I t mi ght be pr el i mi nar i l y quest i oned, however , whet her t he pr oposi t i on an ut t er ance of " t he cube r oot of 27 i s odd" i s associ at ed wi t h i s not t he ver y same gener al pr oposi t i on i t expr esses. The exampl e Recanat i pr ovi des of a de f act o r i gi d desi gnat or i s t hat of ( i n D. Kapl an' s t er mi nol ogy) an obst i nat el y r i gi d descr i pt i on. i . e. a descr i pt i on whi ch denot es one and t he same denot at um i n al l possi bl e wor l ds r egar dl ess of whet her t hi s denot at um exi st s. But anot her exampl e of t he same ki nd of descr i pt i on may be pr ovi ded by any wor l d- i ndexed descr i pt i on of t he f or m" t he Fi n w" . Suppose an exampl e of such a descr i pt i on i s " t he act ual pr esent Ki ng of Fr ance' Now, an ut t er ance of " t he act ual pr esent Ki ng of Fr ance i s G" i s obvi ousl y f al se wi t h r espect t o t he act ual wor l d ( as wel l as any ot her possi bl e wor l d of cour se) , si nce t her e i s no act ual pr esent Fr ench ki ng. But t hi s shows t hat t he wor l dr el at i vi zed t r ut h- condi t i ons i t has ar e gener al , not si ngul ar as Recanat i cl ai ms: t he ut t er ance i s t r ue i f f t her e i s a uni que F, and t hi s i s G. Thus, i n or der t o t el l DRt er ms f r omr i gi d descr i pt i ons one does not need t o dr awa di st i nct i on bet ween t he t r ut h- condi t i ons an ut t er ance has and t hose i t pr esent s i t sel f as havi ng. The ai med di st i nct i on bet ween si ngul ar and gener al t r ut h- condi t i ons i s i ndeed al r eady obt ai ned at t he l evel of t he t r ut h- condi t i ons act ual l y possessed by an ut t er ance cont ai ni ng a DR t er m or a r i gi d descr i pt i on r espect i vel y.
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Be t hat as i t may, however , does an ut t er ance cont ai ni ng a DRt er mr eal l y pr esent i t sel f as havi ng si ngul ar t r ut h- condi t i ons, i n Recanat i ' s sense? I n hi s opi ni on, t he ut t er ance f ul f i l s t hi s t ask by means of REF, a component of t he l i ngui st i c meani ng of i t s DRt er m. REF makes i t t he case t hat t he mode of
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pr esent at i on of t he r ef er ent wi t h whi ch such a t er mi s associ at ed ei t her by convent i on or f or t he mer e pur pose of t hat ut t er ance i s t r ut h- condi t i onal l y i r r el evant . I n ot her wor ds, REF det er mi nes t hat no concept ual i ngr edi ent , i nher i ng t o t he mode of pr esent at i on a DRt er m i s ( st abl y or occasi onal l y) l i nked wi t h, f i gur es i n t he t r ut h- condi t i ons of t he ut t er ance i n whi ch such a t er m occur s ( pp. 33, 292) . Recanat i mor eover i nsi st s on t hat REF i s not an oper at or of an ar t i f i ci al l anguage l i ke t he Kapl ani an DTHAT, so t hat i t mi ght be pr ef i xed ad hoc t o any si ngul ar t er mwhat soever i n or der t o t ur n i t i nt o a r ef er ent i al l y used devi ce. Rat her , REF i s " a semant i c f eat ur e of nat ur al l anguage" ( p. 31) . But i f REF i s not pr ef i xed ad hoc, we have t o f i nd si gns of i t s pr esence i n nat ur al l anguage. W e mi ght f i r st hypot hesi ze t hat REF has a synt act i c couni n t he sur f ace f or m of t he ut t er ance i nvol ved, as i s t he case f or t he t er par t l i ngui st i c meani ng of a non- DRt er msuch as a def i ni t e descr i pt i on. That t he t r ut h- condi t i ons of an ut t er ance i n whi ch a def i ni t e descr i pt i ons occur s are not si ngul ar i s i ndeed al r eady i ndi cat ed by t he synt act i cal l y r el evant f act t hat t he descr i pt i on i s a compl ex expr essi on made out of a t er m f or a concept ual expr essi on. But t hat a DR t er m i s not a compl ex expr essi on i n t hi s sense does not eo i pso showt hat t he t r ut h- condi t i ons of an ut t er ance i n whi ch i t occur s ar e si ngul ar . ( A name, f or i nst ance, mi ght be st i pul at ed as equi val ent t o a def i ni t e descr i pt i on; t o say not hi ng of t he f act t hat i t coul d be t ypi cal l y cl ai med i n a Russel l i an st yl e t hat i t s sur f ace f or mdoes not mat ch i t s under l yi ng l ogi cal f or m. ) Thus, t o be a synt act i cal l y si mpl e si ngul ar t er mi s not suf f i ci ent f or bei ng di r ect l y r ef er ent i al . Nor i s i t a necessar y condi t i on, however . A name mi ght have a synt act i cal l y compl ex shape, f or i nst ance, and st i l l wor k as a DRt er m. ( Take " t he Si ci l i an def ence" as a name f or a chess t act i c; or even " t he i r on l ady" as a byname, i . e. , a descr i pt i on st abl y used as a name, not abl y as st andi ng f or Mr s. That cher . ) Recanat i mi ght i mmedi at el y r epl y t hat , si nce REF i s a semant i cal f eat ur e, t he synt act i c f or m of t he ut t er ance i n whi ch a DRt er moccur s i s i r r el evant f or i t . But r unni ng semant i cal l y does not f ar e any bet t er . To be sur e, i f we t ake an i ndexi cal such as "I ", f or i nst ance, we mi ght assess t hat i t s Kapl ani an char act er wor ks as i t s l i ngui st i c meani ng, hence i t has a semant i c i mpor t ,
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al t hough t hi s i s not r eveal ed by t he sur f ace f or m of t he ut t er ances i n whi ch " I " occur s. Char act er i ndeed l egi t i mat es " t he speaker i n cont ext c i s F" t o he i nf er r ed f r om" I amF' REF, however , does not seemt o have such an i nf er ent i al r ol e. Thus, t o say t hat REF has a semant i c r ol e i n nat ur al l anguage si nce i t i s what al l ows a DRt er mt o cont r i but e i t s r ef er ent onl y t o t he t r ut hcondi t i onal meani ng of t he ut t er ances i n whi ch t he t er m occur s r i sks ul t i hat mat el y t o be an ad hoc expl anat i on. ADRt er mi s DRbecause of REF. W i s REF? W hat makes i t DR. Recanat i says t hat qua component of t he l i ngui st i c meani ng of a DR t er mREF i ndi cat es t hat t he ut t er ance i n whi ch i t occur s expr esses a si ngul ar pr oposi t i on ( p. 292) ; " REF f or ces t he hear er t o i nt er pr et t he ut t er ance as r epr esent i ng a si ngul ar st at e of af f ai r s wi t h t he r ef er ence of t he r ef er ent i al t er mas a const i t uent " ( p. 296) . But he ul t i mat el y acknowl edges t hat such a t er m may be used non- r ef er ent i al l y i n a gi ven ut t er ance, so t hat t hi s expr esses a gener al pr oposi t i on ( p. 312) . ( Al so t he conver se i s possi bl e: a non- DR t er m may be used r ef er ent i al l y i n a gi ven ut t er ance, so t hat t hi s expr esses a si ngul ar pr oposi t i on ( t hi s i s what happens wi t h def i ni t e descr i pt i ons r ef er ent i al l y used: cf . chap. 15) . ) Thi s seems t o gener at e a t ensi on as f ar as t he pr oposi t i on expr essed by an ut t er ance wi t h a non- r ef er ent i al l y used DRt er mi s concer ned: i s t hi s pr oposi t i on gener al or si ngul ar ? Thi s appar ent t ensi on mi ght be r econci l ed i f Recanat i meant t hat due t o i t s l i ngui st i c meani ng an ut t er ance i n whi ch a DRt er m i s non- r ef er ent i al l y used pr esent s i t sel f as havi ng si ngul ar t r ut h- condi t i ons al t hough i t act ual l y has gener al t r ut h- condi t i ons. Thi s i nt er pr et at i on i s cor r obor at ed by t he f ol l owi ng passage: t he meani ng of a sent ence par t l y consi st s i n i ndi cat i ons concer ni ng t he condi t i ons under whi ch an ut t er ance expr esses a t r ue pr oposi t i on. These condi t i ons ar e not t o be conf used wi t h t he t r ut h- condi t i ons of t he ut t er ance, i . e. t he condi t i ons under whi ch t he pr oposi t i on act ual l y expr essed by t he ut t er ance i s t r ue. W hat t he sent ence i ndi cat es ar e t he condi t i ons under whi ch any ut t er ance of t hi s sent ence woul d expr ess a t r ue pr oposi t i on . . . These condi t i ons ar e i nvar i ant under cont ext ual change, whi l e t he pr opot i t i on expr essed by t he ut t er ance, and t her ef or e i t s t r ut h- condi t i ons, gener al l y depend on t he cont ext . ( pp. 288- 9) i n whi ch " t he pr oposi t i on expr essed" mani f est l y does not mean " t he pr oposi t i on t hat t he ut t er ance pr esent s i t sel f as havi ng' Rat her , accor di ng t o t hi s quot at i on i f t he ut t er ance cont ai ns a DR t er m non- r ef er ent i al l y used t he
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pr oposi t i on i t expr esses i s t he gener al pr oposi t i on i t i s act ual l y associ at ed wi t h. Thi s i nt er pr et at i on of " t he pr oposi t i on expr essed" by an ut t er ance of t hi s ki nd squar es t he gener al ar chi t ect ur e Recanat i i mposes on hi s mul t i - l ayer ed pr agmat i cs, whose def ence i s hi s second gener al ai m accor di ng t o t he pr esent r econst r uct i on. To hi s l i ght s, one must over t ake t he Gr i ce- i nspi r ed di st i nct i on bet ween what i s l i t er al l y sai d- a semant i c l evel - and what i s conver sat i onal l y i mpl i cat ed by an ut t er ance- a pr agmat i c l evel . On t he cont r ar y, i n pr ocessi ng an ut t er ance one i mmedi at el y get s a pr oposi t i on as what i s cont ext ual l y, hence pr agmat i cal l y, sai d by t he ut t er ance. Onl y medi at el y and opt i onal l y one get s a f ur t her pr oposi t i on as what i s conver sat i onal l y i mpl i cat ed by t hat ut t er ance ( chap. 13) . Thus, when an ut t er ance wi t h a non- r ef er ent i al l y used DRt er mi s at st ake, we have t hat what i t act ual l y and cont ext ual l y says i s a gener al pr oposi t i on ( t he opposi t e hol ds t r ue of an ut t er ance wi t h a r ef er ent i al l y used non- DRt er m, of cour se) . Pr i or t o t he l evel of what i s sai d, t her e i s onl y t he l i ngui st i c meani ng of t he ut t er ance ( pp. 246- 7) . Recanat i does not consi der i t , however , as a pr oposi t i onal l evel whi ch pr ecedes t hat of what i s cont ext ual l y sai d by t he ut t er ance. The l at t er i s so t o say t he most basi c pr oposi t i onal l evel ( p. 263) . But i f t hi s i s t he case, howcan one st i l l mai nt ai n t hat due t o i t s l i ngui st i c meani ng an ut t er ance such as t hat al l uded t o i n t he pr evi ous par agr aph pr esent s i t sel f as havi ng a t r ut h- condi t i on, i . e. a si ngul ar pr oposi t i on, whi ch i s di f f er ent f r omt he gener al pr oposi t i on i t act ual l y has qua what i t cont ext ual l y says? Qua pr oposi t i on expr essed by t he ut t er ance not i n t he sense of what i t cont ext ual l y says but i n t he or i gi nal sense gi ven by Recanat i t o t hi s phr ase of t he pr oposi t i on t he ut t er ance pr esent s i t sel f as havi ng, t hi s pur por t edl y pr esent ed si ngul ar pr oposi t i on shoul d on t he cont r ar y const i t ut e a pr oposi t i onal l evel whi ch ant ecedes t hat of t he gener al pr oposi t i on act ual l y sai d by t he ut t er ance. Does t hi s i mpl y t hat when an ut t er ance has not , so t o say, i t s expect ed t r ut h- condi t i ons ( f or i nst ance si ngul ar ones, i f i t i s an ut t er ance whi ch cont ai ns non- r ef er ent i al l y used DR t er ms) , one must deny t hat t hat ut t er ance pr esent s i t sel f as havi ng such expect ed t r ut h- condi t i ons? Per haps t he l ast suggest i on i s compat i bl e wi t h Recanat i ' s i dea t hat t he comput at i ons t hat det er mi ne t he most basi c pr oposi t i onal l evel of what i s act ual l y sai d by an ut t er ance ar e l ocal , t hat i s, ar e sub- pr oposi t i onal pr agmat i c pr ocesses of r ef er ence det er mi nat i on f or t he DR t er ms cont ai ned i n t he ut t er ance ( p. 263) . I n ot her wor ds, i n or der t o comput e what i s act ual l y
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sai d by t he ut t er ance one must f i r st det er mi ne, by means of pr i mar y pr agmat i c sub- pr oposi t i onal pr ocesses, what t he DRt er m cont ai ned i n i t act ual l y st ands f or. Thus, i n t he case of an ut t er ance cont ai ni ng a nonr ef er ent i al l y used DRt er m, t hi s ut t er ance woul d no l onger pr esent i t sel f as havi ng a si ngul ar pr oposi t i on qua i t s t r ut h- condi t i ons, si nce t he si ngul ar cl ement of t hi s pr oposi t i on ( t he expect ed r ef er ent of t he DRt er m) woul d have al r eady been r ul ed out by t he l ocal pr agmat i c pr ocess of at t r i but i ve det er mi nat i on of a denot at i on f or t hat use of t he DR t er m. Recanat i pr ovi des ( chap. 14) a l i st of t hese l ocal pr ocesses, st ar t i ng f r omsat ur at i on ( t he nor mal cont ext ual r ef er ent i al f i l l i ng of t he sl ot set up by an i ndexi cal ) and endi ng up wi t h t r ansf er ( t he cont ext ual pr ocess by means of whi ch a si ngul ar t er mst ands not f or i t s or di nar y r ef er ence but f or an ext ended r ef er ence somewhat l i nked t o t he pr evi ous one, f or i nst ance when " Pl at o" i s used t o desi gnat e not t he phi l osopher but a vol ume aut hor ed by hi m) . Bot h r ef er ent i al / at t r i but i ve and t r anspar ent / opaque di st i nct i on ar e deal t wi t h by Recanat i as pr agmat i c ambi gui t i es l ocat ed at t he most basi c pr oposi t i onal l evel of what i s cont ext ual l y sai d by an ut t er ance ( chaps. 15, 18- 20) . The l at t er di st i nct i on al l ows me t o i nt r oduce t he t hi r d gener al ai m of Recanat i ' s book, namel y t he at t empt of account i ng f or t he semant i c i mpor t of t he t hought under l yi ng an ut t er ance. Recanat i agr ees wi t h most di r ect r ef er ence t heor i st s on t hat an ut t er ance cont ai ni ng a DRt er m, as wel l as t he t hought under l yi ng i t , pr ovi des qua i t s t r ut h- condi t i onal meani ng a si ngul ar pr oposi t i on ( he t akes t hi s t r ut h- condi t i onal conver gence of ut t er ance and under l yi ng t hought as pr edi ct ed by t he so- cal l ed Congr uence Pr i nci pl e ( p. 65) ) . However , he al so says t hat t he semant i c cont ent of bot h t he ut t er ance and t he t hought i s not exhaust ed by t hei r shar ed t r ut h- condi t i onal meani ng ( pp. 53, 57) . That semant i c cont ent i ndeed i ncl udes a mode of pr esent at i on of t he r ef er ent whi ch i s expr essed by t he DRt er mof t he ut t er ance. Thi s mode of pr esent at i on must be concei ved as f ol l ows. The DRt er mof t he ut t er ance i s cont ext ual l y associ at ed wi t h a psychol ogi cal mode of pr esent at i on of t he r ef er ent , a ment al f i l e i n whi ch i nf or mat i on on t he r ef er ent i s st or ed. Thi s mode i ncl udes, as one of i t s par t s, t he l i ngui st i c mode of pr esent at i on of t hat r ef er ent whi ch cor r esponds t o t he Kapl ani an l i ngui st i c meani ng of t he t er m or char act er ( chaps. 4- 5) . The al r eady known f eat ur e REF of t he l i ngui st i c meani ng of t hat t er m, however , pr edi ct s t hat t hi s mode of pr esent at i on i s t r ut h- condi t i onal l y i r r el evant , so t hat i t does not occur wi t hi n t he t r ut h- condi t i ons of bot h t he ut t er ance and t he t hought ( p. 57) .
Cr i t i cal Not i ce of Fr ançoi s Recanat i ' s Di r ect Ref er ence 181 I n a nut shel l , REF neut r al i zes as i t wer e t he descr i pt i ve or concept ual f eat ur e, i f any, of t he mode of pr esent at i on: " REF can be seen as t r i gger i ng t he pr ocess of synecdochi c t r ansf er f r omdescr i pt i ve concept t o de r e concept " ( pp. 296- 7) . One mi ght wonder why t he t heor et i cal ' ent i t y' det er mi ned by t hi s mode of pr esent at i on must be l abel l ed as t he semant i c, and not mer el y t he cogni t i ve, cont ent of bot h t he ut t er ance and t he t hought . The r eason, I guess, i s easy t o under st and. What i s expr essed by t he ut t er ance as such a cont ent i s what i s r ef er r ed t o by t he cor r espondi ng ' t hat ' - cl ause of a bel i ef r epor t i n i t s opaque r eadi ng. Thus, t hat bel i ef r epor t has such a cont ent as a component of i t s t r ut h- condi t i onal meani ng ( p. 375 and f n. 6) . One mi ght t hus r emar k t hat t he t r ut h- condi t i onal i r r el evance of t he de r e mode of pr esent at i on i s suspended i n opaque r eadi ngs of bel i ef r epor t s i nvol vi ng a DRt er m. Thi s cer t ai nl y obt ai ns f or t he t r ut h- condi t i ons of t he whol e bel i ef r epor t ( when r ead opaquel y) . Si nce Recanat i ul t i mat el y pr opends t o sayi ng t hat t hese t r ut h- condi t i ons depend on t hat t he sent ence embedded i n t he bel i ef r epor t cont ext ual l y ( i . e. , when t he r epor t i s r ead opaquel y) expr esses a quasi - si ngul ar pr oposi t i on (i . e. , a pr oposi t i on cont ai ni ng not onl y t he or di nar y r ef er ent of t he DRt er mbut al so a mode of pr esent at i on of i t ) ( pp. 369- 70, 376- 7) , one mi ght concl ude t hat t he above suspensi on of t he t r ut h- condi t i onal i r r el evance f or t he mode of pr esent at i on i s det er mi ned by a cont ext ual shi f t i n pr oposi t i on- expr essi ng f or such a sent ence. I n ot her t er ms, Recanat i hen a sent ence cont ai ni ng a DR appear s t o endor se t he f ol l owi ng posi t i on. W t er moccur s out si de bel i ef cont ext s, i t ( nor mal l y) expr esses a si ngul ar pr oposi t i on, al t hough i t i s associ at ed wi t h a wi der semant i c cont ent ( namel y, a hen t hat sent ence occur s wi t hi n a bel i ef quasi - si ngul ar pr oposi t i on) . W r epor t opaquel y under st ood, however , t hat sent ence passes t o expr ess pr eci sel y t hat quasi - si ngul ar pr oposi t i on whi ch pr evi ousl y was i t s semant i c cont ent onl y. By so doi ng Recanat i seems t o opt f or a t r i adi c, not a dyadi c, r eadi ng of t he r el at i onal i t y of a bel i ef r epor t opaquel y r ead. Appar ent l y, t he t er mof t hat bel i ef r el at i on ar c onl y t wo, namel y t he bel i ever and a quasi - si ngul ar pr oposi t i on. Si nce a quasi - si ngul ar pr oposi t i on, however , i s not hi ng but a si ngul ar pr oposi t i on pl us a cer t ai n mode of pr esent at i on, t hen t he r eal t er ms of t he r el at i on ar e t hr ee. Now, I wonder whet her t her e i s r eal l y somet hi ng l i ke t he af or ement i oned cont ext ual shi f t i n pr oposi t i on- expr essi ng f or t he sent ence embedded i n a bel i ef r epor t . Recanat i i s si l ent on t he so- cal l ed mi xed cont ext s, whi ch
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pr eci sel y seem t o under mi ne t he i dea of such a shi f t . Suppose we have an ut t er ance of t he f or m" P and S bel i eves i t ", wher e " P" i s a sent ence cont ai ni ng a DRt er mand t he second conj unct i s r ead opaquel y. Regar dl ess of i t s Recanat i an semant i c cont ent , " P" , as i t occur s i n t he f i r st conj unct of t he above ut t er ance, cannot but expr ess a si ngul ar pr oposi t i on as i t s t r ut h- condi t i onal meani ng. The pr onoun "i t ", i n t he second conj unct of t hat ut t er ance, r ef er s back t o " P" so t hat i t expr esses what " P" i n t he f i r st conj unct expr esses. Hence, t he ut t er ance of t he r epor t " S bel i eves i t " as i t occur s i n t hat cont ext cannot but have a si ngul ar pr oposi t i on qua component of i t s t r ut h- condi t i onal meani ng. Some f i nal r emar ks on Recanat i ' s i nt er pr et at i on of opaque r eadi ngs of bel i ef r epor t s may be i n or der her e. Recanat i says t hat when DRt er ms ar e i nvol ved as bel ongi ng t o t he embedded sent ences i n bel i ef r epor t s so r ead, t hey cannot but have what he cal l s a mi xed use. That opaque r eadi ng i s i ndeed bet t er concei ved of as a r ef er ent i al + obl i que- r ef er ent i al r eadi ng, i n whi ch t he de r e mode of pr esent at i on l i nked t o t hat t er mi s bot h ascr i bed t o t he bel i ever and exer ci sed by t he r epor t er ( pp. 390, 394- 5) . Even i n t hi s r eadi ng, however , t he DR t er m must r ef er t o i t s or di nar y r ef er ent , " and not hi ng mor e" ( p. 396) . Recanat i i ndeed adds t hat t he t ask of r ef er r i ng i n such cont ext t o t he r el evant mode of pr esent at i on i s r at her f ul f i l l ed by t he whol e ' t hat ' - cl ause i n whi ch t he DRt er m occur s ( p. 397) . Once agai n, i t i s REF whi ch i s r esponsi bl e f or t hat a bel i ef r epor t wi t h a DR t er m does not el i ci t any ot her opaque r eadi ng: Mi xed uses cor r espondi ng t o [ r ef er ent i al +obl i que/ r ef er ci l t i aI r eadi ng] ar e t he onl y opaque uses t hat ar e not r ul ed out by t he semant i c f eat ur e REF whi ch pr oper names convey as par t of t hei r meani ng. ( Bei ng semant i cal l y r ef er ent i al , a pr oper name can onl y be used r ef er ent i al l y; i n par t i cul ar , t he name ' Ci cer o' can onl y be used t o r ef er t o Ci cer o. But a pur e opaque use .. . Woul d be a use of ' Ci cer o' whi ch di d not r ef er t o Ci cer o A pur el y opaque use of ' Ci cer o' woul d be such t hat t he speaker woul d not r ef er t o Ci cer o, but woul d r at her ascr i be t o John a bel i ef about some man t hought of by John as ' Ci cer o) ( p. 395) . Ther e ar e some pr obl ems i n t he above cl ai ms. Fi r st , t he t hesi s t hat a pr oper name ( " Ci cer o" i n t hi s case) can onl y be used t o r ef er t o a gi ven r ef er ent ( t he Roman or at or ) seems t o cont r ast wi t h what Recanat i hi msel f mai nt ai ns i n chap. 8 on t he i ndexi cal nat ur e of pr oper names. Accor di ng t o what he says t her e, pr oper names wor k as genui ne i ndexi cal s i nsof ar as one and t he same name- t ype can have di f f er ent r ef er ent s accor di ng t o i t s di f f er ent cont ext ual
Cr i t i cal Not i ce of Fr ancoi s Recanat i ' s Di r ect Ref er ence 183 uses. Thus, " Ci cer o" as a name- t ype i s not such, t hat any use of i t must have t he Roman or at or as i t s r ef er ent . Mor eover , Recanat i i mpl i ci t l y acknowl edges t hat REF does not make a DRt er m, a pr oper name above al l , t o be successf ul l y r ef er ent i al : " Ral ph Bani l l a' i s l i ngui st i cal l y a pr oper name even i f , f or some r eason, has no bear er " ( p. 15). But f r om t hi s pl us t he above cl ai m on t he i ndexi cal i t y of pr oper names i t f ol l ows t hat pace Recanat i REF ( what ever i t may be) cannot r ul e out each of t he f ol l owi ng, non- i ncompat i bl e, t heor et i cal possi bi l i t i es f or a DRt er mi n an embedded sent ence: a) t her e i s an opaque r eadi ng of a bel i ef r epor t i n whi ch t hat t er mdoes not r ef er t o a r eal obj ect , i t s st andar d r ef er ent ; b) t her e i s an opaque r eadi ng of a bel i ef r epor t i n whi ch t hat t er m r ef er s t o somet hi ng ot her t han i t s st andar d r ef er ent ; c) t her e i s an opaque r eadi ng i n whi ch t hat t er mbot h does not r ef er t o a r eal and st andar d r ef er ent and r ef er s t o somet hi ng el se, not abl y a non- exi st ent i t em. To be sur e, i t mi ght al so be t he case t hat such an opaque r eadi ng i s a r ef er ent i al -i - obl i que- r ef er ent i al r eadi ng i n Recanat i ' s own t er ms. Suppose ( t o make an exampl e i n whi ch an i ndexi cal i s i nvol ved) t hat whi l e hal l uci nat i ng I sai d: " I bel i eve you ar e a t er r i f i c ghost ' The de r e mode of pr esent at i on associ at ed t o " you" i s her e bot h ascr i bed t o t he bel i ever and exer ci sed by t he r epor t er ( t hi s t r i vi al l y f ol l ows f r omt he f act t hat i n t hi s case t he r epor t er and t he bel i ever ar e one and t he same per son) . Si nce t her e i s no r eal ghost i n t he vi ci ni t y of t he ut t er er , " you" does not r ef er t o a r eal i t em. But not e, f i r st , t hat i t i s not necessar y t hat t he onl y i nst ances of such an opaque r eadi ng ar e r ef er ent i al + obl i que- r ef er ent i al ( i f t he bel i ever i nst ead of t he pr onoun " you" ut t er s t he name " Ci cer o" whi l e i nt endi ng t o r ef er t o t he hal l uci nat ed ghost , I may r epor t hi s sayi ngs by ut t er i ng " he bel i eves t hat Ci cer o i s a t er r i f i c ghost " whi l e mer el y ascr i bi ng t o hi ma cer t ai n de r e ( unsuccessf ul , per haps?) mode of pr esent at i on) . Second, even when t he r ef er ent i al + obl i que- r ef er ent i al i nt er pr et at i on hol ds t r ue of i t , t hat r eadi ng r emai ns such, t hat t he above possi bi l i t i es a) - c) appl y t o i t . Thi s i ndeed i s what t he exampl es of a r epor t i n t he f i r st per son, bot h wi t h an i ndexi cal and wi t h a name- " l bel i eve t hat you ar e a t er r i f i c ghost " "I bel i eve t hat Ci cer o i s a t er r i f i c ghost " - show. Thus, i t i s not t r ue t hat t he DR t er m i nvol ved i n t he r epor t so r ead must r ef er t o i t s r eal and st andar d r ef er ent . Thel ast r emar ks i ndi r ect l y showt hat , hi s ' encycl opedi c' nat ur e not wi t hst andi ng, t her e i s st i l l a t opi c whi ch t hi s book does not enough conf r ont wi t h, i . e. t hat of so- cal l ed " empt y DR t er ms" . Si nce t hi s i s one of t he poi nt s
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whi ch has been advocat ed by det r act or s of di r ect r ef er ence t o r un agai nst t he t heor y, i t woul d be par t i cul ar l y hel pf ul i f Recanat i devot ed hi s at t ent i on t o i t i n t he next f ut ur e, so as t o t est hi s own t heor y on mor e addi t i onal dat a. Thi s does not absol ut el y weaken t he val ue of t he book; r at her , i t mer el y st r esses t hat a so det ai l ed and deep vol ume has not yet ut t er ed t he l ast wor d i n t he const r uct i on of a semant i c t heor y whi ch, what ever one may t hi nk of i t , has been r epr esent i ng t he cor ner st one of t he di scussi on i n cont empor ar y phi l osophy of l anguage.
Pr evi ous and f or t hcomi ng vol um es of t he Eur opean
Revi ewof Phi l osophy Vol ume
1, Phi l osophy of Mi nd, 1994.
Edi t ed by Gi anf r anco Sol dat i ( Uni ver si t y of ' I ubi ngcn) I SBN: 1- 881526- 38- 0 Paper
Vol ume
3, Response- Dependence,
f or t hcomi ng.
Edi t ed by Rober t o Casat i ( CNRS Fr ance) , and Chr i st i ne I ' appol et ( Uni ver si t y of Mont r eal )
Uni ver si t y of Pal er mo, I t al y
Cal l
f or paper s f or Vol ume 4,
The Nat ur e of Logi c.
Edi t ed by Achi l l e C. Var zi ( Col umbi a Uni ver si t y) Thi s i ssue ai ms t o of f er a vi vi d, up- t o- dat e i ndi cat i on of t he cont empor ar y debat e on t he nat ur e of l ogi c. The i nt ended f ocus i s on quest i ons per t ai ni ng t o t he exi st ence and i ndi vi duat i on of cl ear boundar i es del i neat i ng t he concer ns of l ogi c: Vi l hat i s t hei r di st i nct i ve char act er ? W hat makes l ogi c a subj ect of i t s own, separ at e f r om ( and gener al l y i n t he backgr ound of ) t he concer ns of ot her di sci pl i nes? W hat i s i t t hat makes a l ogi cal t heor y a l ogi cal t heor y, as opposed t o, f or i nst ance, a mat hemat i cal t heor y, or si mpl y a t heor y about ent i t i es or r el at i ons of some speci f i ed sor t ? W hat i s i t f or an expr essi on t o be a l ogi cal const ant ? Or , per haps equi val ent l y, what i s i t f or an oper at i on or a r el at i on t o be l ogi cal ? Can t hese quest i ons he addr essed i n a gener al set t i ng, or ar e t hey i nt r i nsi cal l y unanswer abl e except wi t hi n speci f i c f r amewor ks of r ef er ence ( e. g. , a l anguage, or a concept ual scheme) ? Howar e t hey t o he addr essed? Ar e t hey semant i c, synt act i c, pr agmat i c? And how do semant i cs, synt ax, or t he t heor y of pr agmat i cs cont r i but e t o our under st andi ng of t hese quest i ons? Ar e t he answer s f ul l y capt ur ed by exi st ent syst ems of l ogi c? Submi ssi ons, t wo copi es, doubl e spaced, shoul d r each t he edi t or no l at er t han 21st Sept ember 1997. Request s f or bl i nd r ef er eei ng wi l l he r espect ed. No manuscr i pt s wi l l he r et ur ned unl ess speci al pr ovi si ons ar e made by t he aut hor . Pl ease send submi ssi ons t o t he f ol l owi ng addr ess; Achi l l c C. Var ci , I I RC Depar t ment of Phi l osophy, Col umbi a Uni ver si t y, Phi l osophy Hal l 708, 1150 Amst er damAvenue, Mai l Code 4971, NewYor k NY 1( 1( 127, USA. Emai l : av72@ col umbi a. cdu
Cal l f or paper s f or Vol ume 5, Nor mot i vi t y and A Pr i or i Knowl edge. Edi t ed by ThmSt onchani ( Mer t on Col l ege, Oxf or d) The i ssue wi l l concent r at e on quest i ons r ai sed by 1 ny aspect of t he f ol l owi ng f ami l i ar ar gument . I . Meani ng i s nor mat i ve. I f a wor d has a meani ng, t hen t her e ar e cor r ect and i ncor r ect uses of t hat wor d. W or ds ar e used t o make j udgment s, ask quest i ons, gi ve or der s, expr ess wi shes. ( Par al l el poi nt s can he made f or concept ual cont ent . ) 2. Under st andi ng a wor d ( or possessi ng a concept ) ent ai l s conf or mi ng usage t o t hese st andar ds of cor r ect ness ( t o some degr ee) . 3. So, under st andi ng i nvol ves knowi ng nor ms of use. 4. Noi t r i s of usc al one det er mi ne t he t r ut h- val ues of some j udgment s. 5. So, t he t r ut h- val ues of some j udgment s ar e knowabl e i ner t l y on t he basi s of under st andi ng, t hat i s a pr i or i . I t i s hoped t hat cont r i but or s wi l l addr ess t hemsel ves t o such quest i ons as: W hat det er mi nes t he nor ms? I ) o t he nor ms i ncl ude mor e t han j ust t r ut h- condi t i ons, such as whet her a j udgment i s war r ant ed i n a gi ver si t uat i on? To what
ext ent , i f any, mi ght one mi suse a wor d, as opposed t o usi ng i t wi t h a di f f er ent meani ng? I s t he knowl edge i nvol ved i n under st andi ng pr oposi t i onal knowl edge or know- how? Must a pr i or i knowl edge be i ndubi t abl e? Cr i t i cal di scussi on of wor k on t hese t opi cs by phi l osopher s such as Qui ne, Davi dson, 1) ui n r net t , Bur ge and Mi l l i kan wi l l al so he wel come. Submi ssi ons, t wo copi es, doubl e spaced, shoul d r each t he edi t or no l at er t han 21st Sept ember 1998. Request s f or bl i nd r ef er eei ng wi l l be r espect ed. No manuscr i pt s wi l l he r et ur ned unl ess speci al pr ovi si ons ar e made by t he aut hor . Pl ease send submi ssi ons t o t he f ol l owi ng addr ess: .1 \ NCSt oneham, ERP, Mer t on Col l ege, Oxf or d OXI 411) , UK. Emai l : t oni . st onehani @ pl i i l osophy. oxf or d. ac. uk
Wit t genst ei n,
For f ur t her i nf or mat i on about t hi s r evi ew, cf . ht t p: / / kanpai . st anf or d. edu/ publ i cat i ons/ eur opean ht ml
Er r at a f or Eur opean Revi ew of Phi l osophy, Vol um e
1, Phi l osophy of Mi nd,
1994.
I n I r anccsco Or i l i a' s " A Not e on Godel ' s Ont ol ogi cal Ar gunsent , " pp. 125- 131, t he f ol l owi ng cor r ect i ons shoul d be not ed: 1. I n al l f or mul as t he symbol " q" shoul d he r epl aced by t he necessi t y oper at or " D". 2. p. 126, l i ne t o f r omt he bot t om: i nser t " monadi c" bet ween " onl y" and " pr edi cat e" 3. 1) . 127, bet ween l i nes 2 and 3 f r ombot t om: i nser t " i f \ i s of t he f or m I ' ( f ) , wher e f i s anypr edi cat e var i abl e, t hen A' =f ( t ) ; I f A i s of t he f or mP( A FBI ) , t hen Av=s I 13' 1( t ) ; " " '' "" af t er 4. 1) . 128, f or mul a ( Ax t ): i nser t 5. p. 28, penul t i mat e l i ne bef or e sect i on 4: " P( f ) &I ' ( f ) " shoul d he " P( f ) & - P( f ) ' ) 6. p. 129, f or mul a ( LM) : t he" I " occur r i ng i mmedi at el y af t er " ( t M) " shoul d be del et ed; t he f i r st occur r ence of " f " shoul d he ' f 1)
