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ANCIENT NEAR EASTERN STUDIES SUPPLEMENT
26
EXCHANGE RELATIONSHIPS ATUGARIT
Kevin M. MCGEOU...
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A~~ ~6g.3 ~ 1~tg l1 (p ~>
ANCIENT NEAR EASTERN STUDIES SUPPLEMENT
26
EXCHANGE RELATIONSHIPS ATUGARIT
Kevin M. MCGEOUGH
PEETERS LEUVEN - PARIS - DUDLEY; MA. 2007
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A CIP record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.
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DEDICATED TO
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my Grandparents: Francis Patrick & Helen McGeough and Andrew & Hilda Parley
Series Editors: Antonio Sagona and Claudia Sagona
ISBN 978-90-429-1935-8 D. 200710602/78
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Copyright by KevinMcGeough All rights reserved. No part ofthis book may be reproduced or translated in anyfOrm, byprint, pbotoprint, microfilm, microfiche or any othermeans without writtenpermission from thepublisher PRINTED IN BELGIUM
Peeters N.Y., Warotstraat 50, B-3020 Herem
CONTENTS
Dedication . . . . Acknowledgements Introduction . . .
v XV11
1 CHAPTER ONE
THE FORMALIST-SUBSTANTIVIST DEBATE AND A NETWORK-BASED APPROACH TO ANCIENT ECONOMY The Formalist-Substantivist Debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1. The Nineteenth Century Primitivist/Modernist Debate 11. Neo-classical Economics as the Basis for a Formal Model of the Economy 111. Application of Neo-classical Economics to the Ancient Economy IV. Early Alternatives to Neo-classical Economics v. Karl Polanyi and the Substantivist School of Thought vt. The Critique of Polanyi and the Defense of His Principles in the Near East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . V11. Moving Beyond the Formalist-substantivist Debate Behavioralist Models Network Theory Complexity Theory . Towards a Network-Based Model for the Study of the Economy
8 10 11 12 13 20 22 27 28 31 33 34
CHAPTER 1WO
PREVIOUS STUDIES OF THE UGARITIC ECONOMY History of Excavations and the Mission Archaeologique Francaise The Examination of Ras Shamra's Immediate Environs Minet el-Beida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ras Ibn Hani .. . . . . . . . Previous Approaches to Understanding the Ugaritic Economy 1. Feudal Models John Gray and Indo-Aryan Feudalists . . . . . . . . . George Boyer and the French Team's Conception of Ugarit's Social Structure
39 40 41 41 42 42 42
44
CONTENTS
Vlll
Anson Rainey and Social Stratification Gerald Miller and Juridical Texts . . . 2. Marxist Models . . . . . . . . . . . . Michael Heltzer and the Royal Service System Mario Liverani and the Italian School Jose-Angel Zamora and the Expanding Palace Sector Clayton Libolt and the Royal Land Grants . Ignazio Marquez Rowe and Ugaritic Tribute 3. Entrepreneurial Models . . . . . . . . . . . Hellenosemitica and the Brandeis Entrepreneurial Approach 1. Michael Astour ii. Robert Stieglitz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii. Brian Widbin . Christopher Monroe and the Merchants of the Late Bronze Age Marion Feldman and Late Bronze Age International Koine 4. Managerial and Administrative Approaches to the Economy William Whitt and Archival Studies Jose-Angel Zamora and Ugaritic Vineyards . 5. Patrimonial Models . The French Team's Recognition of Large Non-Royal Houses Juan Pablo Vita and Alternative Administrative Centers Stager, Schloen and the University of Chicago Neo-Weberians Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
CONTENTS
45 48 49 52 56 58 58 59 60 60 61 62 62 63 64 65 68 70 71 75 77 78 85
IX
108 109 111 113 114 115 116 117 117 118 119 119 120 121 122 123 127 128 130 130 132 132
mdkisu
md , mr ev sr albn Yfb ngr . s/fgr brd. bsnm bbtnm
trmn mbf Cultic Officials Land-holding and Obligations
ilkulpilku unt . . . . . . .
ubdy, updt, ubdit gt
argmn ntbtt) Conclusions CHAPTER FOUR
CHAPTER THREE
THE FORM AND FUNCTION OF UGARITIC ECONOMIC TEXTS
THE LANGUAGE OF THE UGARITIC ECONOMY Terminology of Social Designations
bns . . . bns mlk 'bd b? . n'r
.
adrt bbt, bPI
gzr ... Terminology of Occupational Designations
skn . mryn bdl mkr
89 89 90 94 95 97 98 99 100 100 101 102 105 107
Records from Private Archives Records of People . Personal Names . With Personal Names Alone With Reference to Other Individuals With Reference to Geographic Locations With Numbers . With Chattel, Commodities, and Precious Metals Occupational Categories . . . With Personal Names . . With Geographic Names Lists With Numbers Occupational Groups as Collectives Census Lists . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
137 137 138 138 140 142 144 145 149 150 153 154 157 159
x
CONTENTS
Records of Places . . . . . . . . . Simple Lists . Lists With Unexplained Numbers Information About Fields . . . . Information About the Circulation of Goods Information About Agricultural Equipment Records of Commodities Cereals Wine Olives Oil .. Precious Metals Salt Textiles Wood Records of Equipment Agricultural Equipment Transportation Equipment Military Equipment Records of Land . Field Transfers ubdy Fields . unt Records Conclusions
CONTENTS
160 160 160 161 161 162 163 164 165 166 166 166 168 168 169 169 170 172
173 174 174 176 177 177
\
Economic Activities Involving Trade or Sales . Economic Actions Involving Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . What kinds of goods and labor were controlled or disposed of, and by whom? . Silver . Other Precious Metals Comestibles Textiles Vehicles Military Equipment Agricultural Equipment Private Property . Merchant Activity General Labor . . Types of Labor . . Where does the power for control of goods and labor reside? On what grounds is this power based? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Palace . Individuals Within the Palace Administration Other Archives . What institutions, structures, and organizations existed to facilitate the circulation of goods? . Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Organizations for Which There is No Evidence . . . . Is there evidence at both a production and consumption level? Conclusions .
Xl
203 207 207 208 208 209 210 211 212
212 213
214 214 214 215 215 216 216 217 218 218 219 220
CHAPTER FIVE
ECONOMIC MODALITIES AT UGARIT: THE EVIDENCE FROM THE TABLETS Who engaged in economic action (i. e., was capable or compelled to)? The Individual . . . . . The Geographic Region . . Foreigners at Ugarit . . . . The Occupational Category CuItic Officials and the Temples What kinds of economic actions were engaged in? Economic Actions Involving Real Estate Economic Actions Involving Obligations Owed to Royal Authority Economic Actions Involving Cultic Obligations Economic Activities Involving Debt and Credit Economic Activities Involving Redistribution .
CHAPTER SIX
182 183 184 185 186 190 191 191 194 198 199 201
THE ARCHIVAL CONTEXT OF THE TABLETS: THE ELITE ARCHITECTURAL COMPLEXES AT UGARIT 1. Royal Palace Archives: Archaeological Context Royal Palace Archives: Western Archives The Nature of the Western Archive Royal Palace Archives: Central Archives . The Nature of the Central Archive . Royal Palace Archives: Southwestern Archive The Nature of the Southwestern Archive Royal Palace Archives: Southern Archive The so-called 'Oven' . The Composition of the Southern Archive
223 226 227 229 231 233 234 235 236 238
CONTENTS
XlI
Royal PalaceArchives: Eastern Archives . . The Nature of the Eastern Archive .. Royal Palace Archives: Room 73 (Bureau annexe) The Nature of the Archive Royal PalaceArchives: Room 90 Conclusions About the Palace . . 2. Non-Palatial Archives: Archaeological Contexts The Residential Quarter . . The House of Rap'anu The House of the Armourer House of the Scholar (Maison du lettrej House of Rashapabu . . . Maison au portique Blitiment au vase de pierre Maison aux albdtres
House of Yabninu (Southern Palace) Northern Palace and Palace-Associated Structures to the North . Northern Palace House of the Military Governor Other Structures House of Urtenu House of Agapsarri Tablet House (MT) Conclusions . . . . 3. Temples and the Houses of Cultic Personnel Urban Temples at Ugarit Library of the High Priest . . . . . House of the Hurrian Priest (PH) . Conclusions Regarding Cultic Areas 4. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . .
CONTENTS
239 241 243 243 244 244 246 246 247 249 249 250 251 252 253 254 256 256 256 257 257 259 259 260 261 261 262 263 263 264
Ports . Zoning . The Domestic Sections of Ugarit Centre de la ville Trancbee sud . . . . . . . . . Ville basse . . . . . . . . . .
\ 3.
4.
5.
6.
Conclusions About Zoning at Ugarit Domestic Structures and Household Assemblages The Layout of Domestic Structures . . . The Household Tomb . . . . . . . . . . Household Material Culture Assemblages Water and Waste Management Stone Tools in the House . Other Household Artifacts Function of Domestic Space Issues of Private Ownership The Relationship to "Elite Households" Industrial Evidence The Urban Farmer Urban Olive Oil Production Household Construction Stone Industry . . . . . . . Seasonal Limitations on Production and the Organization of Production Conclusions About Industrial Production Prestige Goods . . . Cylinder Seals . . . Military Equipment Stone Vessels . . . . Mycenaean Pottery Tablets . . . Conclusions . . . .
X111
272 273 273 274 275 277 277
277 278 281 283 284 285 286 287 289 290 290 291 291 292 293 294
296 297 299 299 301 302 305 305
CHAPTER SEVEN CHAPTER EIGHT
THE MATERIAL REMAINS OF THE UGARITIC ECONOMY 1. Environment . The Geography of the Syrian Coast Water . Natural Resources . . . Conclusions . . . . . . 2. Economic Infrastructure Roads .
266 266 267 269 270 271 271
ECONOMICS BEYOND THE CITY 1. Within the Kingdom of Ugarit . . . The Administration of the Periphery Correspondence . . . . . . . . . . . Transactions Involving the Palace Transactions Between Private Citizens Conclusions . .
311 311
319 319 320 322
XIV
2.
3.
CONTENTS
Beyond the Kingdom of Ugarit a) Modes of Transport Nautical . Overland . b) Major International Relationships Hatti Egypt . Cyprus Ura .. Other Major City-States c) Elite Economic Actors Within Ugarit The Queen Yabninu Urtenu Conclusions
CONTENTS
322 322 323 324 324 325 327 329 331 332 333 333 333 335 336
7.
8. 9.
CHAPTER NINE
CONCLUSIONS: A NETWORK-BASED MODEL OF ECONOMIC MODALITIES 1. Integrating Texts and Material Culture . 2. A Re-evaluation of Models of Near Eastern Economy Temple Economy . . Crypto-Feudal Models of Society Two-sector Models . The Patrimonial Household Model (PHM) Semi-Institutional House Models . . . . . 3. A Network-Based Model of Economic Modalities 4. A Network-Based Model of Economic Modalities Applied to Ugarit A. Interactions Involving the Royal Palace Administration . . . . . a) Non-Royal Elite Residents of Ugarit and Royal Administration. b) Non-Elite Residents of Ugarit and Royal Palace Administration. c) The Peripheral Kingdom of Ugarit and the Royal Palace Adrninistration B. The King of Ugarit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . a) Non-Royal Elites and the King . b) Non-Elite Residents of Ugarit and the King C. Non-Royal Elites at Ugarit . 1. Non-Royal Elites and Other Non-Royal Elites 2. Non-Royal Elites and Non-Elites at Ugarit ..
5. 6.
339 339 340 341 343 345 349 350 352 352 352 355 356 357 357 358 358 358 360
D. Non-Elite Residents of Ugarit . . . E. Ugarit's International Relationships F. Conclusions and Summary . . . . The Formalist-Substantivist Debate .. Substantive Economic Authority at Ugarit Power Through Debt Power Through Practice . . . . . . . Power Through Hegemony . . . . . Power Through a Monopoly of Force Loci of Palatial Economic Authority at Ugarit Production at Ugarit . . . The Institution of the gt . Class and Status at Ugarit The Question of Guilds . Conclusions and Implications for the Study of Non-Industrial Economic Activity . Avenues for Further Research
Bibliography . . . . . . . Subject Index . Index of Modern Authors Index of Ancient Terms Index of Ancient Texts . .
xv
361 362 363 364 369 370 372 372
373 374 374 376 378 378 380 381 382 420 427 430 432
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This is a revised version of my 2005 doctoral dissertation at the University of Pennsylvania. I have been very fortunate to have had the support of many individuals and organizations while working on this project, in its origins as a dissertation and its completion as a monograph. First and foremost, I wish to thank the members of my dissertation committee: Bruce Routledge, my thesis supervisor; Richard Zettler; and Mark Smith of New York University. Dr. Routledge has provided me with unwavering support throughout my studies at Penn, and any success of mine is largely due to his mentorship. Dr. Smith has gone far beyond the call of duty, both as my instructor in Ugaritic language and as the outside reader for my dissertation, working through three drafts (each larger than the former) and providing invaluable comments, feedback, and support. His help has been tremendous. Dr. Zettler has also been extremely supportive, especially in last minute matters of various types. Many thanks are also due to the faculty at the University of Pennsylvania who have assisted me. Jeffrey Tigay, both in and out of the classroom, has given endlessly of his time and expertise. I have taken more classes with Barry Eichler than with any other individual; his excellent teaching has been an inspiration. I would also like to thank Erle Leichty for all of his support, from establishing my program at Penn to giving advice for life after Penn. Numerous other faculty members have been patient and giving of their time. Holly Pittman, David Silverman, Steve Tinney, and Josef Wegner are all deserving of my thanks. Numerous fellow graduate students have also assisted me in any number of ways. Spencer Allen, Shawn Aster, Paul Delnero, Jennifer Jacobs, Jeremiah Peterson, Nick Picardo, Benjamin Porter, Matthew Rutz, Vanessa Smith, and William Zimmerle have all been of assistance in a variety of ways. And of course, none of this would have been possible without the help of Linda Greene, Peggy Guinan, and Diane Moderski. Thanks are also due to Anthony and Claudia Sagona, the editors of the Ancient Near Eastern Studies Supplement Series, for their support of my manuscript. I especially owe thanks to Anthony Sagona for his hard work in preparing this manuscript for publication. Likewise, the people at Peeters have helped tremendously. Thanks are due to Patrick Peeters and many others who worked to produce this publication. Thanks are also due to various people at the University of Lethbridge, where I currently teach in the Liberal Education Program. The Departments of Geography, History, and Religious Studies have also provided me with support in a variety of ways. I would like to thank all of my colleagues for their assistance at this stage of my academic career, especially: Walter Aufrecht, Shawn Bubel, Malcolm Greenshields, and D. Bruce MacKay. Bev Garnett, Margaret Cook, Charlene Sawatsky,
XVlll
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
and Erika jahn have also been helpful in various matters, and are all due thanks. The interlibrary loans staff members at the University of Lethbridge have made my continued research possible. Courtney Atkinson has advised me on technical matters big and small and Wim Chalmet came to my rescue in a computer crisis involving this work. Elizabeth Galway has been of help in ways too numerous to list. Without generous financial support, this project could not have been finished. I would like to thank the department of Asian and Middle Eastern Studies (as it was known then) for the generous assistance in the form of a University of Pennsylvania Dissertation Fellowship, which went beyond the already generous funding that saw me through my coursework. I would also like to acknowledge the support in the form of a dissertation grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. Finally, I would like to thank my family for their long-term financial and emotional support. There could not be more supportive people than my parents Murray and Linda McGeough, my sister Kristina, and her husband Sean Durnin. To everyone listed here, thanks.
INTRODUCTION
EXCHANGE RELATIONSHIPS AT UGARIT
Assuming that there are entities, economic zones with relatively definite boundaries, would not a method of observation based on geographic location be useful? Rather than describing the social stages of capitalism, for instance, to paraphrase the fine title of a luminous piece by Henri Pirenne, would it not be more interesting to describe the geographical stages of capitalism, or on an even larger scale to set in motion, within our historical studies, systematic research into economic geography - to see, in a word, how the waves and wanderings of history are recorded in a given economic area? Fernand Braudel
Ugarit has been identified as a key source of information on economic life in the pre-Classical Levantine coast and is often used as a model of such. 1 The wealth of textual data and material culture that has been recovered from the site has allowed the Ugaritic economy to be investigated from a variety of perspectives using a variety of types of evidence. Given the substantial economic data available about Ugarit, it Is somewhat surprising that the evidence from Ugarit has been underutilized in the more general academic sphere of the study of pre-modern economics. The following examination seeks to redress this. The study of economy at Ugarit can add substantially to the analysis of non-industrial economic relationships, since this is a situation where an unusually large amount of data on the subject of economy is available. Like~wise, by situating the study of the Ugaritic economy more fully in the context of the \rider discussion of non-industrial economy, a more informed analysis of Ugarit and Late Bronze Age Levantine economy is possible. Although it is possible to study any number of specific aspects of the Ugaritic economy, this examination shall focus on a broader subsection of economic life exchange relationships. These are situations where two or more parties interact, and are situations that are particularly well documented in the textual and archaeological evidence. These situations are the primary focus of this work. More generally, this study seeks to examine economic modalities at U garit, A modality is a way of doing something, a method of activity. Implied in the use of this term is the idea that these methods or ways of doing can be meaningfully understood as patterns and that these
1
See, for example, Saggs 1989, pp. 148-152.
2
3
KEVIN M. MCGEOUGH
INTRODUCTION
activities can be understood as a meaningful group or category. In this particular case, that meaningful category is based in economics and economic activity. By calling these economic activities (or methods of doing) modalities, the inherent ideological bias that is connected to most economic terminology is avoided, yet at the same time, an argument is made that there is a category of human activity that can be understood as economic. It is this category' of human activity that is the subject of this study of Late Bronze Age Ugarit. Economic life at Ugarit shall be viewed as part of a socially embedded process. What is often said about religion in the ancient world is also true for economics: ancient people did not view the economy as a discrete and separate component of everyday life. Social interaction and integration both affected and was affected by economic activities and situations. An understanding of economic patterns cannot be understood separate from social systems. Indeed, ancient economy cannot be viewed as a monolithic, singular entity with discrete boundaries and spheres of operation. Economic modalities, then, are understood here as the emergent structures of the social economy at Ugarit. Economics is often understood as the subsection of human life relating to the resources required for the satisfaction of human wants or needs. The action-oriented conceptual framework of philosophical hermeneutics suggests, then, the utility of defining economic action, before explicating a more holistic conceptualization of economics. Economic action, according to Weber: "is any peaceful exercise of an actor's control over resources which is in its main impulse oriented towards economic ends."2 There are two major points to be taken from Weber's suggestion. First, economic action is action with primary interest in activities involving the resources or the satisfaction of wants or needs. Second, this action must be considered peaceful, in other words, warfare and crime should not be considered economic action per se. These kinds of activities (war and crime) can be considered economically oriented action, in Weber's social scientific paradigm.' Actions that use force as their primary means but are geared towards economic ends, or actions that are only secondarily interested in economic ends are better considered as economic oriented action." Economic ends are those ends, "concerned with the satisfaction of a desire for "utilities"." If this kind of activity is organized and continuous, Weber considers it, an economic establishment."
To Weber, a very important underpinning of economic activity is the ability to control and dispose of goods and labor." Based on these boundaries of economy, it is possible to formulate specific questions that will be posed of the Ugaritic data. Who engaged in economic action (i.e., was capable or compelled to)? What kinds of economic actions were engaged in? And related to this, what kinds of goods and labor were controlled or disposed of, and by whom? Where does the power for control of goods and labor reside? With whom and on what grounds does this control reside? What institutions, structures, and organizations existed to facilitate the circulation of goods? Is there evidence of both production and consumption? All of these questions are geared towards elaborating the parameters (what are called modalities here) of economic activity at Ugarit. Beyond a description of Ugaritic economy, and the creation of a comparative model for the study of other Near Eastern economic situations, this study shall also contribute to the larger socio-historical discussion of the nature of non-industrial economy. Most explicitly manifest in the formalist-substantivist debate, this study shall produce a detailed case study of a non-industrial economy and by extension a testing ground for the basic premises of substantivist scholars. Indeed, while investigating Ugarit in the specific, this research shall test the validity of the hypotheses of Polanyi and his later followers and come to some conclusions about the general utility of this approach. The questions formulated above are not what make this study unique, however. What distinguishes this study from the studies of Ugarit that have come before is the approach. ~ious attempts to study the Ugaritic economy have had only limited success since most have involved the application of rigid top-down models that smooth over the complex systems inherent in economic activity. Other approaches have not adequately accounted for the variability of data or have sacrificed the variability of that data for the sake of the model. These models are discussed at length in Chapter Two but can be categorized as: crypto-Feudal models; Asiatic Mode of Production (AMP) models; entrepreneurial models; administrative models, and patrimonial models. The utility of each of these models is limited by an inability to adequately account for or incorporate the variability of data at Ugarit. What makes this project distinct from other attempts is that it embraces the variability of data. Through a Network-based model, the Ugaritic economy shall be viewed as an adaptive nonlinear system, with numerous and ever-changing possibilities. This perspective should allow economic life to be explored, at the same time avoiding monolithic conclusions or static structuralist or functionalist characterizations. A Networkbased model allows for the complexity of ancient economic life, yet at the same time allows the economy to be broken down into understandable units. This is possible because the focus of the analysis is shifted from the overarching picture of the economy,
Weber 1978, p. 63. Weber 1978, p. 64. 4 Weber 1978, p. 64. 5 Weber 1978, p. 63. Utilities (Nutzleistungen) in Weber's conception, Weber 1978, p. 68; are: "the specific and concrete, real or imagined, advantages (Chaneen) of opportunities for present or future use as they are estimated and made an object of provision by one or more economically acting individuals. " 6 Weber 1978, p. 63. 2
3
7
Weber 1978, p. 67.
4
5
KEVIN M. MCGEOUGH
INTRODUCTION
to the nodes of connection between individual economic actors. In this model, it is not the absence of a sovereign authority that is seen as central to a network. 8 Rather, it is based more on Wolfram's notion of a network; what will be studied are the connections within the network, and the transformations that occur at these connective nodes." It is assumed that a network involves certain norms (if not actual rules) that govern the interactions at each node of contact. It is also assumed that there is some degree of power relationship manifest at each node of contact, but that power is not necessarily manifest in the same way at each node.!'' Following Wolfram, quite simple rules may facilitate a large number of complex situations. II Simplifying economic modalities into series of individual interactions allows a large number of economic actions to be mapped out. Inherently, this approach is anti-structuralist, anti-Hegelian, and anti-functionalist, in that it allows any number of possibilities. Indeed, a Network-based model assumes that the evidence for particular economic interactions reflect only a small number of economic interactions that occurred or could possibly have occurred. It allows for an heterarchical organization of power. While power at each node is best understood in terms of hierarchy, power from a network perspective is heterarchical in nature, and manifests differently dependent on the relationship that is reflected at each separate node. From a practical standpoint, there are two levels of analysis that should be engaged in through this Network-based model of economic modalities: the nodes of contact between discrete economic agents and the overarching connections between various nodes of contact. Throughout this study, the Network-based model will be the approach taken. Each economic situation and type of evidence shall be viewed separately and analyzed with the conceptual tools appropriate for the form of the evidence. A consistent problem in the other models is that the findspot of the various texts are not taken into account. Yet it is very difficult to make general conclusions about the meaning of these economic texts without considering the context in which they were written. Perhaps the clearest manifestation of the embrace of variability in the study that follows is the use of both archaeological and textual data. Both types of data at Ugarit can be used to address questions about economic modalities. While the archaeological evidence at Ugarit is not ideal because of the methodologically primitive excavation techniques and the poor publication record of the project until the 1970s, analysis of
this evidence can still be productive. A particular problem that is apparent in the scholarly integration of both kinds of data is that scholars tend to prioritize one set of data over another. This prioritization tends to manifest as a number of types of problems. There is the more obvious type of prioritization where a scholar familiar with one type of data completely ignores another type of data. For example, while Heltzer has studied the economy of Ugarit for many years, and is arguably the most prolific scholar on this subject, he has rarely made mention of archaeological evidence. A less obvious error that is manifest as a prioritization occurs when scholars take evidence derived from a type of analysis that they are not familiar with as a "fact." Archaeologists often view the evidence derived from textual sources uncritically, since interpretation of textual data, from an archaeologist's perspective, seems straightforward. Likewise, textual scholars are often confused by the materiality of archaeological evidence, mistaking the materiality of objects for objective fact. In fact, archaeological evidence, even the most \basic levels of archaeological evidence (like typology and stratigraphy), constitutes a\ argument. 12 What shall differentiate this study is that both types of evidence will be u,derstood as scholarly arguments. One data set will not be used to naively check or prove the other data set, nor will simple "convergences" be identified.P Both categories of evidence will be compared as arguments and interpretations, from the perspective of their particular methods of analysis. Chapter One of this study will better outline economic modalities. This chapter shall provide an overview of the formalist-substantivist debate and situate the Networkbased model utilized in this examination within the context of that debate. Chapter Two shall continue the methodological discussion, but from a more specific perspective. The variant approaches that have already been used in the study of the Ugaritic economy shall be described and evaluated, both on their own terms and in the context of the theoretical backgrounds from which they were derived. Chapters Three and Four provide the background analysis and reasoning that has been incorporated into the analysis of the textual data at Ugarit. Chapter Three focuses primarily on the language used by Ugaritians while engaging in economic activity. Chapter Four moves the discussion of the textual evidence from the level of the word to the level of the tablet. The analysis is oriented around the gentes of tablets. Here genre is not taken as a primarily formal category, but rather as exemplified in the approach used in "New Rhetoric."14 Genre here is not equivalent to form, although form is a subject of investigation of this chapter. Genre is approached as a combination of both form and situation. Certain forms of writing are used in certain social situations and social contexts. It is the combination of the social context of the act of
See Fukuyama 1999, p. 199; for an explication of this view of a nerwork. Wolfram 2002, p. 193. 10 Stager's port-power model is a good example of how nerwork theory can be successfullyemployed for the study of the Near East. In Stager's model, Stager 2001, p. 629; the nerwork is structured as a hierarchy, where at each node of contact, one group is more powerful than the other. His model is created explicitly to understand trade at the regional level and to understand the relative power of various settlements in relation to one another. As such, it is limited to this scale of economic activity and is not entirely suited for the purposes of this study. II Wolfram 2002, p. 351. 8
9
12
13 14
I
See Brandfon 1987. See Dever 2001, p. 107, for an explication of this type of methodology. See Giltrow 2002, p. 24.
6
7
KEVIN M. MCGEOUGH
INTRODUCTION
writing and the form that that writing takes that constitutes genre here. While the textual evidence that survives is the tablet (i.e., the form), it is possible to reconstruct the social situation and to make observations on the different genres of economic texts. Both chapters place extra emphasis on the alphabetic texts, as these words and texts have been relatively neglected in comparison with the syllabic texts. Chapter Five provides a broader discussion of what can be learned about economic modalities at Ugarit from the textual data. It specifically answers the questions about Ugaritic economic activity asked above and summarizes the basic textual evidence about Ugarit. Discussion in Chapter Five is limited to discussion of economic action within the city of Ugarit and acts as a basic summary of those kinds of activities before moving on to the non-textual evidence. Chapter Six shall be the first attempt at integrating textual and archaeological data. Here the elite economic institutions shall be discussed. Most important in this discussion is the analysis of the findspots of the various tablets. Much criticism of the top-down models that have been used in the investigation of the Ugaritic economy is derived from the way these models smooth over differences between economic actors. This chapter is particularly important in identifying the variety of economic activities participated in at Ugarit. While the archaeological context of the tablets is not secure, general clusters of tablets can be identified, and their association with particular buildings is demonstrable. The non-textual archaeological evidence from each of these loci of economic record keeping will be presented and analyzed, comparing and contrasting the archaeological evidence and the nature of the textual discoveries. In this particular chapter, texts shall be treated as artifacts within an archaeological context, as has been proposed by Zettler.l" Chapter Seven analyzes the explicitly non-textual evidence at the site of Ugarit. While the archaeology of areas of tablet deposition is discussed in Chapter Six, Chapter Seven revolves around the analysis of those areas of the site that lacked substantial tablet finds. The site as a whole is regarded from an archaeological perspective. The specific questions outlined above are answered again, but this time through the evidence of archaeology. The argument from archaeology is explicitly construed as an argument separate from the textual evidence. This provides a basis for integrating the complimentary sets of data in a later chapter. Economic activity within the kingdom of Ugarit and economic action between Ugarit and other Near Eastern polities is dealt with in Chapter Eight. Here a core and periphery model derived from the Network-based approach is used to explore the relations between various economic entities. The application of this model helps to highlight certain aspects of economic relationships, especially the nature of power within those relationships. It also highlights some areas where a core-periphery model
is insufficient and where a Network-based approach with more nuance can better facilitate our understanding of ancient economic relationships. Chapter Nine provides an explicit description of exchange relationships at Ugarit. Conclusions are provided in this chapter. A methodology for incorporating archaeological and textual data shall be discussed, in tandem with observations about the Ugaritic economy derived from such comparison. An evaluation of each of the topdown models is presented, demonstrating the strengths and weaknesses of each model. An evaluation of the Polan ian approach to ancient economy is offered, and Ugarit's general contribution to the rmalist-substantivist debate is presented. Fourth, the conclusions derived from the Ne ork-based model shall be provided, before offering some general suggestions for further research. This is the first of two volumes. The second volume, titled Ugaritic Economic Texts, will present translations and commentaries of the alphabetic Ugaritic economic texts. To avoid repetition, long quotations from the alphabetic texts will be avoided here. The second volume will also discuss in more detail some of the syntactical! grammatical, lexicographical, and interpretative problems with reading alphabetic economic texts.
15
See Zettler 1996.
A NOTE ON ABBREVIATIONS
Throughout this study, ancient textual sources will be referred to according to the designations that are typical of Ugaritic and cuneiform studies. Most of the texts written in the alphabetic Ugaritic script shall be referred to by the abbreviation KTU, which refers to Dietrich, Loretz, and Sanmartin's 1995 edition of The Cuneiform Alphabetic Texts From Ugarit, Ras Ibn Rani and Other Places, along with the number given the text in this work. There are a few alphabetic Ugaritic texts that are not included in this volume. Some of these are referred to with the abbreviation MO (referring to Pardee's 2004 publication Manueld'Ougaritique) and the number given the text in that edition. Others have only been published in volume 3 of Hallo and Younger's The Context ofScripture those are referred to with the abbreviation COS and the number given in that volume. There are less standardized conventions for referring to texts from Ugarit written in syllabicscript. Here, the convention shall be to list them according to their editio princeps as well as their excavation number. The excavation number consists of the designation RS (Ras Shamra) followed by a number indicating the season of excavation (before the decimal) and the registration number of the artifact (after the decimal place). References to the editio princeps will use one of the following abbreviations: PRU 3 (Ie Palais Royal d'Ugarit 3, Nougayrol 1955); PRU 4 (Ie Palais Royal d'Ugarit 4, Nougayrol 1956); PRU 6 (Ie Palais Royal d'Ugarit 6, Nougayrol 1970); Ug. V (Ugaritica 5, Nougayrol 1968); RSO 7 (Ras Shamra-Ougarit 7, Bordreuil 1991); and RSO 14 (Ras Shamra-Ougarit 14, Bordreuil and Pardee 2001).
THE FORMAL1ST-SUBSTANT1VIST DEBATE
CHAPTER ONE
THE FORMALIST-SUBSTANTIVIST DEBATE AND A NETWORK-BASED APPROACH TO ANCIENT ECONOMY
If economics is not to remain the victim of history, constantly attempting to apply its tool-kit, generally with a time-lag, to yesterday's developments which have become sufficiently visible to dominate the scene today, it must develop or rediscover the historical perspective. Eric Hobsbawm Cuneiform scholars have astonishing achievements to their credit, but nevertheless the sources - including the Code of Hammurabi - have not yet been made available for interpretation by non-specialists. The scholar who has not mastered the field and must depend on translated texts cannot therefore reach definite conclusions regarding the Mesopotamian economy. Furthermore it is precisely the texts most important for legal and social history which often elude interpretation. Max Weber (trans. R. Frank)
The primary goal of this study is to outline economic modalities at Late Bronze Age Ugarit. This involves analyzing and identifying what kinds of economic activities took place, who engaged in those activities, and what motivated those activities. Prior attempts to outline economic modalities at Ugarit have done so through the interaction with the works of political economists, Classicists, and scholars of the Mesopotamian floodplain. Surprisingly, there has been little interaction between Ugaritic scholars and economic anthropologists, especially with regards to the forrnalist-substanrivist debate. This study seeks to remedy that situation. While previous works on Ugarit shall be discussed in Chapter Two, the following chapter shall outline the formalist-subsrantivist debate and provide a basis for situating the study of Ugarit within this intellectual tradition. After the history of the debate is outlined, a particular approach to the economy stemming from the forrnalist-substantivist debate, here called a Network-based model, shall be suggested.
THE FORMAL1ST-SUBSTANT1VIST DEBATE
Although modern economic theory can provide useful data for the study of the ancient economy, the analysis of ancient economic modalities should not be situated
9
within this discipline. Rather, it should be situated within the historical or anthropological study of economy. While social theorists (such as Weber and Durkheim) have postulated questions about the nature of the ancient economy since the late Nineteenth century, the study of this question has been taken up by Classicists and anthropologists, as opposed to economists or SOCI ogists. Near Eastern studies has somewhat interacted with this argument, but for the mos part, those studying Ugarit have not. This is unfortunate since the data from Ugarit has great potential for scholars attempting to understand the pre-modern economy. It is one of the goals of this work to help situate the study of the Ugaritic economy within this larger, cross-cultural debate. Since the 1950s,1 the formalist-substantivist debate has been one of the primary arenas for discussion of the pre-industrial economy. The debates stemmed from the appointment, in 1947, of Karl Polanyi as Visiting Professor of Economics at Columbia University. Polanyi and his students at Columbia challenged the notion that pre-industrial economies could be considered through the same conceptual apparatus as industrial economies. Polanyi and his students were considered substantivists. This title is derived from an understanding of economy as substantive; a perspective that sees the economy as embedded within society and is therefore culturally specific. This means that economies must be understood and defined by the "substance" of individual economies rather than through culturally universal criteria. This is a definition of economy which stands in contrast to the formal definition of economy, embodied by Neo-classical economics, where economy is understood to be: "derived from the logic of economically rational action."? A formal definition of the economy sees economic activity as the result of universal human nature and thus can be deduced from formal principles. In essence, the controversy boils down to the degree in which pre-industrial economy mirrors post-industrial economy, and how useful the methodology for the study of the latter is for the former. In recent years the controversy has died down. Certainly there is still considerable venom between the extreme proponents in the carnps.f Yet no consensus was ever reached and it is frequently obvious, when reading about ancient economics, which conceptual framework has been employed. Since Polanyi wrote explicitly about the economies of cuneiform civilizations, there was not the usual lag time in the incorporation of this methodological discussion into cuneiform studies. Polanyi's actual analysis of Mesopotamian economies has not proven to be very useful, primarily because of his relatively poor analysis of Mesopotamian institutions." Renger and van de Mieroop I More properly, the origins of this debate can be seen in the writings of Karl Rodberrus in the 1860s. 2 Polanyi 1977, p. xviii 3 Note for example Silver's extremely hostile comments towards the substantivists, Silver 1983, p. 141. 4 The problems with his interpretations of specific Mesopotamian economic institutions are discussed by many scholars. For a detailed criticism of Polanyi's interpretations, based on misreadings of Mesopotamian languages and misunderstandings of Mesopotamian society, see Veenhof 1972.
r 10
have suggested that this is not the appropriate lesson to be learned from Polanyi since the errors he made are understandable given his lack of formal training in Assyriology. Considered anew, these scholars suggest that Polanyi's methodology can still provide a useful framework for the study of ancient economy." Polanyi's methodology will be outlined in more detail below. At this stage it is important to note that Polanyi's most important contribution is not his description of Mesopotamian economy, but his method for approaching the data. The formalist perspective, in contrast, sees much continuity between past and present. It assumes a fundamental similarity in decisionmaking and value creation between past and present. The following discussion seeks to describe the development of both of these economic perspectives.
1.
THE FORMALIST-SUBSTANTMST DEBATE
KEVIN M. MCGEOUGH
11
ii. Neo-classical Economics as the Basis for a Formal Model of the Economy The economic theoretical framework designated as "Neo-classical economics" has its origins in the 1870s.12 From the 1870s to the First World War, models of equilibrium dominated economic theory. Backhouse defines the major difference between the Neo-classical schools of thought and the Classical schools of thought in these terms: The new systems proposed by jevons, Menger, Walras, and Marshall were all systems of static equilibrium, in which prices were determined by the interaction, in competitive markets, of the maximizing behaviour of economic agents. The emphasis was thus very different from that of the classical economists for whom a static system of price determination, though present, was in the background vis a vis the theory of growth and capital accumulation. 13
The Nineteenth Century Primitivist/Modernist Debate
Study of the economy started on a new path with the proposition by Rodbertus (in the 1860s), that the ancient economy was dominated by the oikos. 6 The oikos (household) was the primary unit of production in antiquity, according to Rodbertus - with commerce playing only a minor role in the general economy'! Rodbertus was primarily concerned with Roman estates and Roman taxation, but his suggestion has made an impact on the study of civilizations other than Rome. In 1893 Karl Bucher adapted the oikos model of Rodbertus to his own social evolutionary theory of the development of economy. Bucher argued that before the era of the nation-state, economy did not exist on scale larger than that of the city." The scale of economy in the classical world operated at the level of the household, and ideally households were self-sufficient. The self-sufficiency of the oikos meant that trade and currency were not important components of classical economy." According to Pearson, the notion that trade and currency did not figure in classical economy was easily contested by Eduard Meyer in 1895. 10 Meyer's arguments against BUcher were essentially the same as the criticisms that the formalists directed against Polanyi sixty years later. It was easy enough for Meyer to demonstrate that trade and currency had been components of economy long before classical antiquity, for example in the civilizations of Mesopotamia. For Meyer, there was no substantial difference between modern and ancient economy. II
Renger 1994, pp. 184-185; van de Mieroop 1999, p. 116. Pearson 1957, p. 5; Weber 1976, p. 42. 7 Weber 1976, p. 42. 8 Pearson 1957, p. 6. 9 Pearson 1957, p. 7. 10 Meyer 1957, p. 7. 11 Pearson 1957, p. 7.
5
6
The difference should be seen as the relative importance of price-setting mechanisms within the study of economics. For the Classical school, these price-setting mechanisms were relatively unimportant, and in Adam Smith's case, were considered a hindrance to comparative study. The Neo-classicists, while holding basically similar views about the nature of price-setting mechanisms, depart from Classical schools of thought in the importance they place on these mechanisms relative to other economic concepts. The driving force behind price-setting and valuation in Neo-classical thought is the concept of marginal utility. Utility, in its simplest form, is the ability or possibility of a good or service to satisfy human wants. Marginal utility is the added utility that the consumption of one more good or service has within the context of the supply of other goods or services. The law of diminishing marginal utility holds that as consumption of a good or service increases, the marginal utility of that same good or service decreases. Related are the concepts of supply and demand: supply is availability of a scarce good or service, and demand is the desire for that scarce good and resource. These concepts are all considered part of an equilibrium model because behind these concepts is a notion of an equilibrium price, when supply and demand are equivalent. In Neoclassical thought, supply and demand are such powerful principles, that they constitute the sole regulating force in an economy. Friedland and Robertson state: "The mainstream of neoclassical economics proceeds from the assumption that the market is an autonomous, self regulating arena."14 With marginal utility, or equilibrium as the basis of the Neo-classical school, some fundamental characteristics of this school of thought developed beyond and in contrast to Jevons, Menger, and Walras. Of importance to this discussion is the notion of rationality in decision-making. These economists developed the concept of the homo
12
13
14
Polanyi 1977, p. 21. Backhouse 1985, p. 131. Friedland and Robertson 1990, P: 6.
12
KEVIN M. MCGEOUGH
economicus who made economic decisions based solely on definable criteria of profit and loss. This would become a fundamental point of contention in the formalist-substantivist debate. Neo-classicists saw economic decision-making as entirely divorced from cultural baggage, and centered completely upon models of rational gain-loss decision-making. Even institutions that organize economic activity are seen, by Neoclassicists, as oriented around rational choice.I? iii. Application of Neo-classical Economics to the Ancient Economy Within the confines of the formalist-substantivist debate, the most important reaction was that of Michael Rostovtzeff. Responding to the rise of Soviet power and moving to the United States, Rostovtzeff argued against the validity of Marxist-Hegelian models for understanding ancient economy. Instead, Rostovtzeff argued in 1932 that the only difference between ancient and modern economy was a question of scale.16 Rostovtzeff's argument that scale is the only difference between modern and ancient economy is laid out in his monumental The Social and Economic History ofthe Roman Empire (1%3 [1957]). There, Rostovtzeff outlines a history of Roman economic development.'? He argued for a series of evolutionary stages within the Roman economy. The first major stage was the collapse of what he calls 'feudal capitalism,' in which wealthy landlords dominated the economic life of Rome.l'' This feudal capitalism was replaced by "city capitalism," where, since wealth was concentrated in the hands of the Emperor and his support structure, urban businessmen who were physically close to the Imperial residence and Temple of Saturn gained power.l'' These powerful individuals (called 'urban bourgeoisie,' by Rostovtzeff) began to accumulate capital within the urban environment.i'' Since the primary goal of the urban bourgeoisie was to gain a safe income, the economy of Rome stagnated and eventually this kind of capitalism collapsed." Also preventing the growth of Roman industry in this pseudo-capitalist environment was the limited purchasing power of the rnasses.F The poor could not afford to purchase goods, hence limiting both demand for goods and the reward for providing goods through the free market. While many differences are apparent between the Roman economy and the modern economy, the differences, according to Rostovtzeff, were better explained by scale as opposed to differences in orientation or motivation.
15 16
17 18 19
20 21
22
Friedland and Robertson 1990, p. 18. Pearson 1957, pp. 9-10. Rostovtzeff 1963, p. xiii. Rostovrzeff 1963, p. xiv. Rostovtzeff 1963, p. xiv. Rostovtzeff 1963, p. xiv. Rostovrzeff 1963, p. xiv. Rostovtzeff 1963, p. xv,
THE FORMALIST-SUBSTANTMST DEBATE
13
iv. Early Alternatives to Neo-classical Economics The writings of Max Weber seemed to straddle this controversy. Weber accepts the
oikos model, but with the same caveat that he credits to Bucher, that the oikos was only an ideal type 23 and not, in practice, the only form of economic unit in the ancient world.j" Weber's unique spin on the oikos model is his suggestion that the household, as a domestic production unit, was influenced by the intervention of big men with a monopoly on commerce ii.e., princes, chiefs) directly into local economy.P Yet he makes certain to be clear that the origins of large latifundia-style organizations did not lie in specific, goal-oriented economic policy, but rather the personal accumulation of labor at the household level.26 Weber also suggests that Eduard Meyer's arguments against Bucher were based on misunderstandings of Bucher's arguments." Whether this was true or not, Meyer (and his students) argued against the use of specialized economic terminology for the study of the ancient world, and instead chose terms like factory to describe institutions in the ancient world. Weber, however, explicitly states his dislike for such methodology: "Nothing could be more misleading, therefore, than to describe the economic institutions of antiquity in modern terms."28 Weber did not always follow this advice, and often used anachronistic historical terminology (such as 'feudalism' and (oikos') in his investigations. Indeed, Weber breaks from his own advice when discussing 'capitalism'. Weber suggests that capitalism is a useful term in the description of the ancient economy. He defines capital as: "wealth used to gain profit in commerce."29 This did exist in antiquity, according to Weber, but was limited by a number of variables.P Monarchies, as political institutions, had a limiting effect on capitalism in general'! Inherent to
23 Ideal types can be considered set constellations of sociological laws. Weber comments on ideal types, Weber 1978, p. 20: ".. .it is necessary for the sociologist to formulate pure ideal types of the corresponding forms of action which in each case involve the highest possible degree of logical integration by virtue of their complete adequacy on the level of meaning. But precisely because this is true, it is probably seldom if ever that a real phenomenon can be found which corresponds exactly to one of these ideally constructed pure types." Within this framework, Weber suggested that no distinction needs to be made between conscious and unconscious actions. Ideal types are better analyzed as though they involve conscious decision making processes, Weber 1978, p. 22. Ideal types are heuristic devices for scholars useful for understanding certain, set phenomenon. It must be remembered that ideal types are just that - models; they fulfill pragmatic functions, and in the practice of everyday life rarely appear exactly as formulated. 24 Weber 1976, p. 43. 25 Weber 1976, p. 46. 26 Weber 1976, p. 66. 27 Weber 1976, p. 43. 28 Weber 1976, p. 45. 29 Weber 1976, p. 48. 30 Weber 1976, pp. 52-60. 31 Weber 1976, p. 64.
15
KEVIN M. MCGEOUGH
THE FORMALIST-SUBSTANTMST DEBATE
this antique capitalism, in Weber's model, were public finance organizations.F Private capital was directly affected by these organizations and in essence was almost always originally a form of state wealth. 33 The most blatant example of these ancient financing strategies was tax farming. 34 Tax farming was the process in which states would sell the rights to collect taxes to private individuals. So in essence private citizens were accumulating capital but it was capital integrally dependent on state funds, in Weber's perspective. Furthermore, Weber suggested that the state or other authorities drastically limited the amount of profits.P Weber argues that institutions that look like guilds to modern historians are actually the remnants of the organization of state imposition and in reality were not related to the accumulation of private capical/" Related to capitalism but not dependent on it is Weber's notion of profit-making. Profit-making according to Weber: "is activity which is oriented to opportunities for seeking new powers of control over goods on a single occasion, repeatedly or continuously."37 This is different from capitalism, which Weber associates with capital accounting, in that it is not restricted to cornmerce.t" Similarly, capital accounting from the Weberian perspective can be oriented towards market relationships or power based relationships (such as taxation). This is the process in which opportunities for profitmaking are calculated based on the comparison of amounts of capital before and after the enrerprise/" Capital accounting is, according to Weber, a type of profit-making
These bases for domination are integral to Weber's understanding of the ancient world. In Weber's oikos model the dominant basis of authority was traditional. The tradition that allows domination is patriarchalism, an organizational structure founded on both economic and kinship terms, with its leadership stemming from rights of inheritance.i" To Weber, this kind of traditional power is the most important form of pre-rational dominarion.F It is based on piety towards tradition and towards the master, and is best referred to as patrimonialism.t" This kind of domination is geared towards fulfilling the master's wants, though this is limited by the fact that the master lives in the same location as other members of the group, and hence his happiness is directly related to other members of the household.t? Patrimonialism extends beyond the household level to the state level, in Weber's model.P" The difference is only in scale, not in structure.P! Typical of a patrimonial state is a lack of differentiation between public and private spheres of life.52 Office holders, in a patrimonial state, are granted offices based on their personal relationship with the ruler. The same can be said of organizations, in which the members as a collective have a relationship with the ruler, as constituted by the group identity.53 These officials (or organizations) can be maintained in three basic ways: through direct allowance from the master's storehouses, through the assignment of fees granted for particular acts, and through the grant of Iand.l" While this may in theory create quite a decentralized state, in practice there are numerous methods for keeping the powers of the officeholders in check. Special offices can be created, which travel through the master's sphere of influence ensuring the continued support of the master. 55 Requirements to appear at court and the creation of jurisdictional powers can help reduce the disintegration of the master's patrimonial authority. 56 These sociological concepts are not mere abstractions in Weber's work. Nor are they based on abstract notions divorced from empirical evidence. His work is rooted in close examination of a variety of civilizations. Weber's analyses of the details of ancient society are often neglected, since he was writing before much of the material sources of the ancient world were known or available to non-specialist audiences.57 Even given
14
that is unique to rational economic situarions.t" Domination, especially its legitimization, is an important concept in Weberian thought. For him, there is no legitimate domination without some element of voluntary compliance on the part of the dominated." This voluntary compliance is founded on one of three bases: rational, traditional, and charismatic.Y Rational grounds consist of a basic belief in the legality of the domination and the rights of the dominant to dominare.P This is the foundation of bureaucratic domination. Tradition based domination is based on the belief in the legitimacy of ancient or traditional power structures.t" Charismatic domination is based on the personal characteristics of a particular individual, which imbues others with the belief in the dominant's right to dominate.P Weber 1976, p. 61. Weber 1976, p. 61. 34 Weber 1976, p. 61. 35 Weber 1976, p. 64. 36 Weber 1976, p. 47. 37 Weber 1978, p. 90. 38 Weber 1978, p. 164. 39 Weber 1978, p. 91. 40 Weber 1978, p. 91. 4! Weber 1978, p. 212. 42 Weber 1978, p. 215. 43 Weber 1978, p. 215. 44 Weber 1978, p. 215. 45 Weber 1978, p. 215.
32 33
Weber 1978, p. 231. Weber 1978, p. 1006. 48 Weber 1978, p. 1008. 49 Weber 1978, pp. 1010-1011. 50 Weber 1978, p. 1013. 5! Weber 1978, p. 1013. 52 Weber 1978, p. 1028. 53 Weber 1978, p. 1023. 54 Weber 1978, p. 1032. 55 Weber 1978, p. 1042. 56 Weber 1978, pp. 1042-1043. 57 See his comments on the Code of Hammurabi in TheAgrarian Sociology ofAncient Civilizations, Weber 1976, p. 83. 46 47
16
17
KEVIN M. MCGEOUGH
THE FORMAL1ST-SUBSTANT1VIST DEBATE
this, his work has been of tremendous importance for other scholars in the study of the Classical and ancient Near Eastern world. These Neo-Weberians shall be discussed more fully in Chapter Two. While scholars such as Weber were looking at the larger social structures that lay beneath economic practices, others were looking to the objects of economic activity. At the end of the Nineteenth century there was a growing understanding that social relationships could be mediated through objects. The works of two scholars stand out as particularly important for the study of the ancient economy: Thorstein Veblen and Marcel Mauss. Thorstein Veblen's The Theory ofthe Leisure Class (1899) provides one early model that has figured prominently in ancient historians' understandings of the ancient economy. Particularly in the economic study of the Late Bronze Age where it is so tempting to classify certain artifacts as luxury goods and others as utilitarian, Veblen's model of conspicuous consumption has been productive. Veblen's model has been seen as useful for archaeologists because his model explicitly develops a means of understanding the social role of objects that otherwise appear to lack utilitarian value. The actual argument made by Veblen is worth discussing in detail, since the term 'conspicuous consumption' has come to be used in a way different from its original sense. First of all, it is important to note that 'conspicuous consumption' is not the main issue of Veblen's book. As the title The Theory of the Leisure Class suggests, it is the leisure class and the role played by the leisure class that is the focus of Veblen's work. The leisure class, according to Veblen, is the class of society that is divorced from material production. He states: "the rule holds with but slight exceptions that, whether warriors or priests, the upper classes are exempt from industrial employments, and this exemption is the economic expression of their superior rank."58 This is the central theme of Veblen's argument. He goes on to show the many ways in which the leisure class signifies their rank by engaging in various activities that indicate a non-participation in productive labor. Demonstrative expression of idleness is a primary means of signifying rank. Leisure is the non-productive consumption of time, which signifies a sense of the unworthiness of labor and the ability to afford to not have to work. 59 The demonstration of access to idleness is even greater when one is powerful enough to make other individuals idle. Servants exemplify this removal of other people from the realm of productive manufacture and trained servants are a marker of even greater
This marshalling of leisure power is inherently related to consumption. Knowledge of the proper methods of consumption and materials to be consumed are necessary components of the process.v' Intrinsically, the proper consumer must be separate enough from labor in order to be able to devote enough time to learn the proper habits of consumption. Wine tasting is an excellent example of this, and it easily extends to other aspects oflife (i.e., golf, theatre attendance). The consumption of particular goods becomes another means of demonstrating rank. By the conversion of productive energy into unproductive goods ti.«, ones that do not satisfy basic needs and are frequently called luxury goods), such possessions become: "evidence of the prepotence of the possessor of these goods over other individuals within the communiry.v- The possession of this property becomes a signifier of ranking within society.63 This is less explicit, but akin to the Roman practice of wearing rank-specific clothing as a means of signification. Veblen sees this kind of possession as unproductive: "Unproductive consumption of goods is honourable, primarily as a mark of prowess and a prerequisite of human dignity; secondarily it becomes substantially honourable in itself, especially the consumption of the more desirable things."64 Conspicuous consumption, then, is that consumption of non-productive goods. This becomes "a means of reputability to the gentleman of leisure."? The development of conspicuous consumption within the leisure class leads to a further stratification of non-productive ranks within society. Towards the upper ranks consumption is surrounded by more and more rules and obligations and it illustrates the increasing distance of the consumer from productive labor. Each level of consumption, however, has at its roots the desire to emulate the rank above.66 Elite emulation as understood by Veblen is the purposeful emulation of the upper classes, or other ruling classes. Veblen sees all acts of conspicuous consumption as attempts to illustrate an individual's divorce from productive labor. It is important to keep the concepts of conspicuous consumption and elite emulation separate. It is tempting to see them as virtually the same concept since in their end result both involve the acquisition of symbols of status. However, the base meaning of the acquisition of symbols is very different. Conspicuous consumption is a process of transforming productive energy into non-productive energy in order to demonstrate one's ability to do so. Emulation is the mechanism for determining what kinds of nonproductive energy are used. Not to say that the two concepts are unrelated but it must be remembered why and how they are separate concepts.
status.P'' 61 62
63 58 59
60
Veblen 1994 [1899], p. 1. Veblen 1994 [1899], p. 43. Veblen 1994 [1899], pp. 56,61.
64 65 66
Veblen Veblen Veblen Veblen Veblen Veblen
1994 1994 1994 1994 1994 1994
[1899], [1899], [1899], [1899], [1899], [I899],
p. 74. p. 28. p. 29. p. 69. p. 75. p. 25.
18
19
KEVIN M. MCGEOUGH
THE FORMALIST-SUBSTANTIVIST DEBATE
Veblen understood that part of the process of conspicuous consumption was the giving of lavish gifts, parties, and entertainments, as symbols of the transformation of productive energy into non-productive energy.67 Marcel Mauss, in his Essai sur Ie Don (The Gift), provides a methodology for analyzing this phenomena in more depth. He attempted to uncover the principles that compel the receiver of a gift to reciprocate the gift giving. 68 The giving of a gift is seen as part of a mutually obligatory social encounter. Gifts are not given freely (with some exceptions) and without obligation to the receiver. Giving is part of a process that creates and reinforces social relationships and positions. Gifts may appear to be voluntary but are in fact compulsory. Gift giving is a system of obligation. Mauss notes that unreciprocated gifts make the receiver uncomfortable and so the gift giver is obligated to return another gift, preferably a more valuable one. 69
This was fundamental to the academic components of the Soviet Union's New Economic Policy (NEP) in the 1920s, of which Chayanov was an active participant. One of the primary goals of the NEP was the Westernization and concurrent socialization of Soviet family farms. Chayanov's contribution was his development of a theory of peasant economy that could be considered a distinct phase in the Hegelian-Marxist conception of history dominant at the time,?3 This theoretical framework was intended for specific use in policy formation, based on accurate descriptions of rural farm life and the ability to predict the economic actions and outputs of individual households,?4
There are four features of gifts that compel them to be returned. The spirit of the gift, an intangible aspect of the gift that cannot be alienated from the giver, compels the receiver to return the same. Self-interest also compels return of the gift; social forces compel appropriate and predictable behavior. Related, reciprocity acts as a leveling device preventing the creation of social hierarchy. Gifting is part of what Mauss calls a system oftotal seruice/? There are three major components of this system of total service - the obligation to reciprocate gifts given as well as the obligation to give in the first place and the obligation to receive in the first place."! The reciprocity of gift giving is not just a reaction to an isolated event. It is the acceptable response to a socially integrated institution. One is culturally obligated to give gifts. Of particular interest in Mauss's work to the economic historian is what this concept of total service system suggests about pre-industrial economy. For Mauss this system was the primary mechanism for the circulation of goods in pre-monetary economies.V The moral compulsion to give, receive, and reciprocate is the driving cultural force for the circulation of goods and services rather than the desire to accumulate wealth or status (which would be consistent with Veblen's model). This has been a particularly productive viewpoint for scholars of ancient economy as will be discussed later. Also manifest as an early alternative to Neo-classical economic models were the works of Alexander Chayanov. Chayanov's primary contribution to economic anthropology was his explanation for the underproduction of domestic producers. Viewing the household as a primary unit of production in the tradition of Rodbertus and Weber, Chayanov was interested in studying economy from the smallest sections upwards.
Of primary importance, Chayanov discovered that the domestic mode of production tends to under-produce. Chayanov sees peasant farmers as having different production goals from capitalists. The aim of capitalist production is the creation of surplus, whereas the aim of the domestic producer is to satisfy the needs of the family, and/or household dependents." The domestic producers are not inclined to create surplus, because of the inherent distaste for the work itself.76 This distaste for labor, called 'drudgery' limits the production possibilities of the domestic unit,77 Drudgery affects production after minimal production goals are met (i.e., enough is produced to sustain the household). Producers may attempt to create a surplus if it may reasonably lead to some better quality of life but the drudgery of life acts as a check against possible extra work." While the results of Chayanov's theory may seem consistent with the frameworks of Neo-classical economics, Chayanov himself did not find Neo-classical economics useful in the setting of the pre-industrial Soviet Union. The pre-industrial nature of the Soviet Union in Chayanov's view did not have all of the features of a Neo-classical economy and to him if any components were missing then the models were not useful.79 This is an early argument that pre-industrial economies cannot be accurately understood through the lens of an economic model created for a post-industrial society. On the other hand, the argument has been made that Chayanov's theoretical underpinnings are rooted in Neo-classical economics.t" The political circumstances in which Chayanov operated certainly made it impossible for him to support such conceptual frameworks, at least publicly, but arguments have been made that acceptance of this framework are implicit in his writings. The connection between Chayanov's model and Neo-classical models is that both are essentially marginalist arguments. For Chayanov, 73 74
67 68 69 70 71
71
Veblen 1994 [1889], p. 76. Mauss 1990 [1950], p. 3. Mauss 1990 [1950], p. 65. Mauss 1990 [1950], pp. 5-6. Mauss 1990 [1950], p. 13. Mauss 1990 [1950], p. 46.
75 76 77
78 79 80
Kerblay 1987, p. 176. Durrenberger 1984, p. 7. Durrenberger 1984, p. 8; Kerblay 1987, p. 177. Durrenberger 1984, p. 9; Kerblay 1987, p. 178; Tannenbaum 1984, p. 28. Tannenbaum 1984, p. 28. Kerblay 1987, p. 178. Durrenberger 1984, p. 7. Donham 1980, p. 517.
20
KEVIN M. MCGEOUGH
THE FORMALIST-SUBSTANTIVIST DEBATE
the economy can be mapped out using the x and y axes of security and drudgery, whereas Neo-classical models' x and y axes are wants and resources. So while the conceptual frameworks used to understand the economy are similarly structured, the social and cultural embeddedness of the conceptual frameworks becomes quite clear in the comparison of the two. Whatever Chayonov's actual political views, studies such as his hinted that Neo-classical models were not always appropriate analytical tools, especially equilibrium and rational decision-making models. A new approach that allowed for greater variation was needed.
part, the Polanyian school is interested in the second aspect of substantive economy. Treating the economy as an instituted process is the fundamental means of analysis. Economies in the Polanyian viewpoint are integrated into the economy as patterns, referred to as 'forms of integration'r" In order to compare one economy with another it is important to compare like with like. By identifying which pattern of integration is dominant, this goal is made possible.I" This involves simplification of the actual details of the economy.87 To Polanyi, "by differentiating between sectors and levels of the economy those forms offer a means of describing the economic process in comparatively simple terms, thereby introducing a measure of order into its endless variations. "88 There are three primary forms of integration to Polanyians: reciprocity, redistribution, and market-exchange.s? Polanyi describes the use of these three terms:
v. Karl Polanyi and the Substantivist School of Thought Karl Polanyi reacted very strongly to scholars like Rostovtzeff The methodology Polanyi outlined in response to these kinds of works has been both influential and controversial within the field of economic anthropology. Most problematic has been the cursory application of the Polanyian models to historical situations, which has tended to discredit this school (see the discussion of the Old Assyrian trade caravans below). This is unfortunate, since the conceptualization of the relationship between economy and society has much utility.81 It is this conception, rather than previous attempts at application, which shall be concentrated on. At the foundation of Polanyi's conceptual framework is his notion of the relationship between economy and society. Pearson describes Polanyi's conception: Polanyi's basic solution [to the problem that markets are not always visible in the study of antique economy] was to return to the notion of the economy as the material meansproviding sphere and to examine the different institutional frameworks in which that sphere operated in different societies. Here, certainly there is no enigma. Every society must somehow find the material means for its survival, and that activity is everywhere clear and evident, providing "substantive" evidence. The whole process will be organized differentlyin different societies, run on different motives, and use varying materials and technologies, but it will always be there, observable and capable of analysis as a set of identifiable activities with some shape, some unity, some stability, if not necessarily as a differentiated economic system [Pearson's italics]. 82 The economy, from Polanyi's perspective, is embedded within society.83 Economy is the means through which humans gain materials necessary for survival. There are two major aspects of Polanyi's substantive economy: "one is the interaction between man and his surroundings; the other is the institutionalization of that process. In actuality, the two are inseparable; we will however, treat of them separately."84 For the most
One might think of the forms of integration as diagrams representingthe patterns made by the movements of goods and persons in the economy, whether these movements consist of changes in their locations, in their appropriation, or in both. As a form of integration, reciprocity describes the movement of goods and services (or the disposal over them) between corresponding points of a symmetrical arrangement: redistribution stands for a movement towards a center and out of it again, whether the objects are physically moved or only the disposition over them is shifted; and exchange represents a movement in a similar sense, but this time between any two dispersed or random points in the syscem." These three patterns shall be discussed in more detail below. It is important to remember the scale of the various interactions. All are manifest on an institutional level, that is to say a level that is reflected by the dominant economic organizations within a particular society. For example, barter between individuals does not indicate the existence of a market system." Nor do gifts between individuals indicate the presence of a predominantly reciprocal system. It should also be noted that trade does not indicate one or another of these patterns of integration for trade appears in various guises in all three of these forms. Indeed a pattern of integration should be understood as the dominant type of economic interaction at the largest levels of society. Reciprocity is a pattern of integration dominant between groups of equal status. There must be a differentiation of groups within the society in order for reciprocity to be present (on a societal scale). Of particular utility in the study of reciprocity is the work of Marcel Mauss (discussed above). In essence, however, economic self-interest is discouraged according to Polanyi in this pattern of inregrarion.F 85 86 87
Johannes Renger is a defender of Polanyi, suggesting that scholars have been mistaken to dwell on Polanyi's factual errors and to ignore his methodological concerns, Renger 1994, pp. 184-185. 82 Polanyi 1977, p. xxix. 83 Polanyi 1957, p. 250. 84 Polanyi 1977, p. 31. 81
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88 89 90 91 92
Polanyi 1957, Polanyi 1977, Polanyi 1957, Polanyi 1957, Polanyi 1957, Polanyi 1977, Polanyi 1977, Polanyi 1977,
p. p. p. p. p. p. p. p.
250; 1977, p. 35. 35. 250. 250. 250, 1977; pp. 35-36. 36. 42. 39.
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Redistribution, on the other hand, requires some kind of central organizing principle. In Polanyi's words: "Redistribution obtains within a group to the extent that in the allocation of goods (including land and natural resources) they are collected in one hand and distributed by virtue of custom, law, or ad hoc central decision. In this way, the reuniting of divided labor is achieved."93 There does not need to be an actual physical collection of goods, 'in redistribution. It can be manifest in apportional rights (the rights over the status of the goods or labor).94 Market trade is the third major form of integration. Polanyi explains market trade as: "a two-way movement of goods between persons oriented toward the gain ensuing for each from the resulting terms."95 At the heart of the market trade pattern of integration is the presence of price-setting mechanisms.I"
of each may vary."101 This is an important point. However, the argument should be made that the scale of transformation that accompanied the industrial revolution was so extreme and touched so many other elements of life, that while from a philosophical standpoint it is not discontinuous, for the practical purposes of historical inquiry it may be considered as such. Despite these criticisms the Polanyian model remains valuable since it allows for the easy comparison of different economies. Economies are basically too complex to understand as a whole and to understand many different economies at once is a near impossible cognitive feat. Polanyi's method creates a common frame of reference in which economies can be compared and understood. It strips economies of the terminology specific to that situation in order to clarify the general principles of the circulation of goods and labor as well as the institutions that facilitate these actions. 102 Polanyis method can be employed to answer specific questions about the circulation of goods, but it must be understood that these patterns of integration do not explain or describe all aspects of economic modalities. A number of cuneiform scholars have demonstrated difficulties in applying Polanyian models to Mesopotamian civilization. In a very influential 1976 paper, Rollig identifies specific Akkadian terminology that reflects markets and market trade. Rollig makes a very simple argument against the substantivists; since words for market, market-value, merchant, etc., are attested in Akkadian, then these institutions must have existed. It is worth mentioning a few of the examples given by Rollig. He notes that the word mabiru can refer to market-places and markec-rates.l'" The word kdru has a similar semantic range. 104 Likewise, markets existed in identifiable locations in the Mesopotamian city, the bdbi (gate) and the siiqu (srreetl.l'" Rollig also uses the attestation of the term sdbiru as evidence that merchants existed given that this is an accurate translation for this term. 106
vi. The Critique of Polanyi and the Defense of His Principles in the Near East A number of criticisms have been leveled at the Polanyian model of forms of integration. Gledhill and Larsen suggest that the forms of integration and movement of goods cannot be explained: "without specifying definite structures in society that may be seen as 'symmetrical' with such flows."97 If this is the case, then Polanyi's model requires a static view of ancient economy that does not allow for the dynamism critical to any study of economics since the forms of integration are therefore fixed by such structures." Furthermore, these models do not engage production at all; they concentrate on circulation of goods after production.i" Another important criticism of Polanyi is that there is an inherently social evolutionary conception underlying his model. In one of his other works, The Great Transformation, Polanyi describes how the industrial revolution inaugurated a complete transformation of human society. Amounting to a paradigm shift of Newtonian (or ]asperian) proportion, the industrial revolution marks a radical turning point in human life. Because of this conception Holton argues that Polanyi: "underestimates the extent of social differentiation of economy and society before the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.t"?" Holton does not see the industrial revolution as discontinuous in human history. He states: "The alternative proposed here is that embeddedness and differentiation are omni-present features of most if not all societies - even though the scale Polanyi 1977, p. 40. Polanyi 1957, p. 254. 95 Polanyi 1977, p. 42. 96 Polanyi 1957, p. 254. 97 Gledhill and Larsen 1982, p. 199. 98 However, ir should be nored that the "dynamic" models employed by Gledhill and Larsen for the study of Mesoamerican and Mesopotamian economics are not so dynamic. Their model is based on cyclic episodes, which is just a more complex static model, Gledhill and Larsen 1982, p. 226. 99 Gledhill and Larsen 1982, pp. 199-200. 100 Holton 1992, p. 39. 93
94
Rollig's discussion is the most obvious argument against Polanyi and the substantivists. If the words for some concept or modality exist then it should go without saying that the concept or modality itself also existed. Unfortunately, what looks like a
Holton 1992, p. 45. A slightly different understanding of the use of Polanyian models is argued for by Oppenheim, a usage that more typifies cuneiform studies in general. In "A Birds-EyeView of Mesopotamian Economic History," Oppenheim argues, following Polanyian lines, that scholars obscure ancient data when they try to understand that data through Nineteenth century normative models, Oppenheim 1957, p. 28. Oppenheim instead suggests, Oppenheim 1957, p. 28, that at least with literate civilizations the best way to gain an understanding of them is to identify and analyze their emic conceptions and that the best way to approach this task "is to study the semantics of selected key terms rather than to use modern categories of organization as the avenues of approach." 103 Rollig 1976, p. 288. 104 Rollig 1976, p. 293. 105 Rollig 1976, pp. 289, 291. 106 Rollig 1976, p. 295. 101
102
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Redistribution, on the other hand, requires some kind of central organizing principle. In Polanyi's words: "Redistribution obtains within a group to the extent that in the allocation of goods (including land and natural resources) they are collected in one hand and distributed by virtue of custom, law, or ad hoc central decision. In this way, the reuniting of divided labor is achieved."93 There does not need to be an actual physical collection of goods, 'in redistribution. It can be manifest in apportional rights (the rights over the status of the goods or labor).94 Market trade is the third major form of integration. Polanyi explains market trade as: "a two-way movement of goods between persons oriented toward the gain ensuing for each from the resulting terms."95 At the heart of the market trade pattern of integration is the presence of price-setting mechanisms."
of each may vary."IOI This is an important point. However, the argument should be made that the scale of transformation that accompanied the industrial revolution was so extreme and touched so many other elements of life, that while from a philosophical standpoint it is not discontinuous, for the practical purposes of historical inquiry it may be considered as such.
vi. The Critique of Polanyi and the Defense of His Principles in the Near East A number of criticisms have been leveled at the Polanyian model of forms of integration. Gledhill and Larsen suggest that the forms of integration and movement of goods cannot be explained: "without specifying definite structures in society that may be seen as 'symmetrical' with such flows."97 If this is the case, then Polanyi's model requires a static view of ancient economy that does not allow for the dynamism critical to any study of economics since the forms of integration are therefore fixed by such structures." Furthermore, these models do not engage production at all; they concentrate on circulation of goods after production.?' Another important criticism of Polanyi is that there is an inherently social evolutionary conception underlying his model. In one of his other works, The Great Transformation, Polanyi describes how the industrial revolution inaugurated a complete transformation of human society. Amounting to a paradigm shift of Newtonian (or jasperian) proportion, the industrial revolution marks a radical turning point in human life. Because of this conception Holton argues that Polanyi: "underestimates the extent of social differentiation of economy and society before the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.Y'P" Holton does not see the industrial revolution as discontinuous in human history. He states: "The alternative proposed here is that embeddedness and differentiation are omni-present features of most if not all societies - even though the scale
Despite these criticisms the Polanyian model remains valuable since it allows for the easy comparison of different economies. Economies are basically too complex to understand as a whole and to understand many different economies at once is a near impossible cognitive feat. Polanyi's method creates a common frame of reference in which economies can be compared and understood. It strips economies of the terminology specific to that situation in order to clarify the general principles of the circulation of goods and labor as well as the institutions that facilitate these actions. 102 Polanyi's method can be employed to answer specific questions about the circulation of goods, but it must be understood that these patterns of integration do not explain or describe all aspects of economic modalities. A number of cuneiform scholars have demonstrated difficulties in applying Polanyian models to Mesopotamian civilization. In a very influential 1976 paper, Rol1ig identifies specific Akkadian terminology that reflects markets and market trade. Rollig makes a very simple argument against the substantivists; since words for market, market-value, merchant, etc., are attested in Akkadian, then these institutions must have existed. It is worth mentioning a few of the examples given by Rollig. He notes that the word mahiru can refer to market-places and market-rates.P" The word karu has a similar semantic range. I04 Likewise, markets existed in identifiable locations in the Mesopotamian city, the babi (gate) and the suqu (streetl.l'" Rollig also uses the attestation of the term sabiru as evidence that merchants existed given that this is an accurate translation for this term. lOG Rollig's discussion is the most obvious argument against Polanyi and the substantivists. If the words for some concept or modality exist then it should go without saying that the concept or modality itself also existed. Unfortunately, what looks like a
Holton 1992, p. 45. A slightly different understanding of the use of Polanyian models is argued for by Oppenheim, a usage that more typifies cuneiform studies in general. In ''A Birds-Eye View of Mesopotamian Economic History," Oppenheim argues, following Polanyian lines, that scholars obscure ancient data when they try to understand that data through Nineteenth century normative models, Oppenheim 1957, p. 28. Oppenheim instead suggests, Oppenheim 1957, p. 28, that at least with literate civilizations the best way to gain an understanding of them is to identify and analyze their emic conceptions and that the best way to approach this task "is to study the semantics of selected key terms rather than to use modern categories of organization as the avenues of approach." 103 Rollig 1976, p. 288. 104 Rollig 1976, p. 293. 105 Rollig 1976, pp. 289, 291. 106 Rollig 1976, p. 295. 101 102
Polanyi 1977, p. 40. Polanyi 1957, p. 254. 95 Polanyi 1977, p. 42. 96 Polanyi 1957, p. 254. 97 Gledhill and Larsen 1982, p. 199. 98 However, ir should be noted that the "dynamic" models employed by Gledhill and Larsen for the study of Mesoamerican and Mesopotamian economics are not so dynamic. Their model is based on cyclic episodes, which is just a more complex static model, Gledhill and Larsen 1982, p. 226. 99 Gledhill and Larsen 1982, pp. 199-200. 100 Holton 1992, p. 39. 93 94
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simple solution to this general problem is not so simple. Whether or not one agrees with Rollig's translations of the particular words he cites one cannot disagree that there were market-places in Mesopotamia where people traded items and that some people had a more formal role in the process (i.e., merchants). This does not prove, however, that it was the dominant means of economic organization nor does it demonstrate the presence of free-market price-setting mechanisms. It simply proves that trade existed as a recognized mode of circulating goods in Mesopotamia. This is an important observation but it does not have as far-reaching ramifications as it may at first seem. Perhaps the strongest evidence against the substantivist school of thought applied to Mesopotamia is the case study of the Old Assyrian trade caravans.l'" Larsen summarizes the economic situation as: "a commercial system which consisted of a series of interlocking circuits, feeding each other and overlapping at certain nodal points."108 What is interesting here is the nature of economic advantage available for these traders. Veenhof attributes the profitability of this venture to the difference in "economic landscape". 109 He cites as an example the relative value of tin, which was twice as expensive in Anatolia than in Ashur.l!'' While this does represent market trade it does not represent supply and demand price mechanisms. According to Polanyi it demonstrates exactly the opposite for the basis of profit is the stability of prices and not the fluctuation of prices within a supply and demand model. This is akin to the kind of market economy Polanyi argues existed in pre-Industrial Europe and which was not changed until foreign trade became a very prominent feature of local markets. 111 Veenhof specifically addresses Polanyi's conclusions with a mixed evaluation. 112 Veenhof cites Polanyi's numerous factual errors as his first response.P" Polanyi's arguments
that silver did not act as money in Old Assyrian trade are thoroughly disproved. Instead, Veenhof describes a situation in which the merchants act as middlemen between two regions in this exchange system, where silver and gold are used to facilitate this.l!" Separate words were used for silver as money (Jimum), and as merchandise (luqutum).115 Veenhof argues then, that silver acted as money through its use as a standard of value, as a means of payment, as an indirect means of exchange between two groups through middlemen, and through its ease of transport.J'? Veenhof's evaluation of Polanyi's arguments about the lack of a free-market system underlying the trade network is less conclusive. He certainly proves, contra Polanyi, that there were physical locations of exchange that can be understood as markets and hence it should not be assumed a priori that market forces were not used to set prices. 117 Veenhof is, however, forced to concede that in Old Assyrian trade, markets were a less important trade mechanism than the relationships between the large trading houses.U" While prices fluctuated up to 20%, there were set reasons for the fluctuation of these goods.P? Veenhof argues that these fluctuations do not seem to be established through treaty arrangement, contra Polanyi.F'' However, it must also be pointed out that the existence of established criteria justifying the fluctuations of price is not necessarily indicative of a free-market and the prominence of the personal relationships created by the Old Assyrian traders is better construed as evidence against supply-demand mechanisms driving pricing strategies. Even given these instances where the Polanyian paradigm has not been successfully employed the model should not be rejected outright. Mario Liverani has offered a potentially useful adaptation of Polanyi's model for the study of the Near East. Rather than seeing Polanyi's forms of integration as the actual organizing principles of economic activity he suggests that they reflect the semiotic tools that ancients used to understand and categorize economic activity. Liverani summarizes his conception of LB society that leads to his adaptation of Polanyi's model:
107 The base of the Old Assyrian trade network is typically understood to be the city of Ashur. Donkey caravans from Ashur, equipped with tin and textiles would travel to Anatolia and sell these goods for gold and silver then return to Ashur and begin the cycle again, Larsen 1967, p. 4; Veenhof 2000, p. 862. These products carried by the caravans to Anatolia were not produced in Ashur, but rather were brought to Ashur from other production locations, Veenhof 2000, p. 863. These Assyrian merchants had a noticeable presence in Anatolia. At Kultepc, for example, the Assyrian merchants settled outside of the city in what was called a kdrum, which could refer to the area where they lived or the administrative body of the traders, Larsen 1977, p. 120. The society of these traders was usually organized along family lines, Larsen 1987, p. 50, with the heads of the families settled in Ashur and the younger men stationed in Anatolia, Larsen 1977, p. 121. Yet with this presence in Anatolia, there is no evidence that Ashur exercised any authority over the regions. 108 Larsen 1987, p. 53. 109 Veenhof 2000, p. 864. 110 Veenhof 2000, p. 864. III Polanyi 1977, p. 7. 112 Larsen on the other hand argues that the distinction between Neo-classical and substantivist models is not useful for Mesopotamia and what is more important is the varying degree of centralized control in different situations, Larsen 1987, p. 49. 113 Veenhof 1972, p. 350.
The political system of the Late Bronze Age in the Near East and the Eastern Mediterranean was characterized by large regional units (the result of a development of many centuries, impossible to sketch here), each endowed with a higher authority of regional extent, and a system of lower-level, local authorities with cantonal or city-specific jurisdiction. 121
Veenhof 1972, pp. 350-351. Veenhof 1972, p. 351. 116 Veenhof 1972, p. 350. m Veenhof 1972, pp. 352-356. 118 Veenhof 1972, p. 400. 119 Veenhof 1972, p. 400. 120 Veenhof 1972, p. 400. 121 Liverani 1987, p. 66.
114
115
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Within this interregional system, Liverani argues that two "ideological features" are distinctive: a fictive conception of parity of rank and the understanding that within each king's own territory, that king had specific legal responsibilities and jurisdiction.122 Eventually the system collapsed when the individual palaces collapsed and were unable to provide the security necessary for international trade. 123 While accepting Polanyi's threefold conception of patterns of integration Liverani argues that reciprocity and redistribution should be viewed through a different conceptuallens. He does not see these patterns as existing in reality. To Liverani these two patterns of integration are, "here considered not as descriptive models of really different networks of exchange, but as interpretations, mental models, of a reality that in itself does not belong to any pattern."124 These patterns of integration are interpretive models that are adopted by the partners engaging in the transaction although the partners do not have to agree on which pattern exemplifies the relationship.V'' These patterns represent choices on behalf of the agents of how they will understand the relationship. Liverani states about these patterns: "They do not point out two separate sets of facts, but can be used alternatively with reference to the same facts - of course with different, even opposed, communicative aims and results."126 An example of how different communicative aims can understand the same event quite differently is in the sphere of tribute. Tribute may be seen formally as a gift and certainly on the giver's part this is the preferable spin on the event. On the other hand, the receiver of tribute may see the tribute as granted not out of a desire on the giver's part for a mutual relationship but as a result of social pressure exerted on the giver.127 Liverani modifies Polanyi's vision of these two patterns of integration in three ways. First, he suggests that while ideally reciprocity should occur between peer-ranking partners, rarely will the partners actually have an equivalent ranking. 128 Second, and related, reciprocal relationships create an equivalence in goods exchanged, although this equivalence does not actually exist.129 And third, in relation to redistribution, this pattern is always viewed from the perspective of the dominant partner - peripheral agents may engage in other centralized activities of their own. 130 Liverani emphasizes that these patterns of integration serve as important tools for understanding how the actors understood the nature of the transactions in which they participated. A prime example of this involves international trade in terms of reciprocity and redistribution.
Since local populations were familiar with both of these kinds of exchange, they understood international trade in these terms.P! Reciprocity and redistribution were the conceptual frameworks that Late Bronze Age people used to understand their interactions with one another. Within the interpretive framework created by notions of reciprocity and redistribution, the two patterns exemplify different behavior and different values. In redistribution, only imports are celebrated; exports are not of interest within the framework of the pattern. Conversely, in reciprocity it is the export of goods that are emphasized and a concerted effort is made to downplay the importance of the reception of goods.132 According to Zaccagnini, the value of an object is determined by both its use-vale and its ceremonial value. 133 The value of the object is downplayed by the party requesting it. 134 Whether or not these viewpoints towards exchange are actually practiced or valued, these are the values that are communicated between the involved parties. However, as Liverani points out, at a most basic level there is great continuity between these two modes of integration. Both respond to the problem of scarcity of resources.135 Redistribution implies an accumulation of goods by the center that will allow the goods to be shared in situations of crisis. On a smaller scale, reciprocity values the generosity of people because in this type of transaction they are sharing scarce resources.136 While this model is generally quite convincing, one caveat needs to be noted. The evidence for this model of ceremonial exchange is derived almost entirely from epistolary texts. These letters provide excellent self-conscious discussions of exchange but they may reflect only one type of trade relationship. Letters inherently reflect the personal relationship between sender and receiver and would be an inappropriate form of communication (if not an impossible one) between parties that lack some sort of connection. These letters should be seen as the by-product of one particular type of economic relationship and Liverani's ceremonial model of exchange should be viewed as one distinct type of trade. This does not indicate that all trade relationships were constituted along these lines.
122 123 124 125 126
127 128
129 130
Liverani 1987, Liverani 1987, Liverani 2001, Liverani 2001, Liverani 2001, Liverani 2001, Liverani 2001, Liverani 2001, Liverani 2001,
p. 66. p. 70. p. 7. p. 8; Zaccagnini 1987, p. 61. p. 141. pp. 185-186. p. 7. p. 8. p. 8.
vii. Moving Beyond the Formalist-substantivist Debate When one studies the formalist-substantivist debate, one is struck by the relative rarity of economic theory post-dating the 1970s that is used by the Neo-classicists. 131 Liverani 2001, p. 141. For example, the term Iulmdnu describes a reciprocal relationship, but the terms mandattu, ndmartu, and tdmartu represent tributary or redistributive relationships, Liverani 2001, pp. 183-188. 132 Liverani 2001, pp. 151-152. 133 Zaccagnini 1987, p. 58. 134 Zaccagnini 1987, p. 58. 135 Liverani 2001, p. 153. 136 Liverani 2001, p. 153.
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This is significant since economic theory has changed drastically since the 1970s. The rampant inflation, energy crises, and disillusionment of the 1970s (especially in the economic sphere) led to a general abandonment of equilibrium models as dominant tools for economic analysis. In essence, Neo-classical economics stopped being the dominant framework for understanding the economy. Homo economicus became extinct. Economists and corporations stopped assuming that people engaged in rational decision-making. While many of these concepts had been suggested before the 1970s, it was not until the 1970s that non-marginal utility models became the norm and not the exception. Furthermore, economists stopped arguing for economics to be viewed as separate from culture. In essence, a substantivist approach came to dominate modern economic theory! What follows is a discussion of some trends in modern economic theory that have potential value in the investigation of ancient economy: behavioralist, network, and complexity based models.
is exactly the same.lt" These decision-making processes are composed of two steps: editing the information (which involves simplifying alternatives) followed by evaluation. Called 'Prospect Theory,' this is the heart of Kahneman's new understanding of decision-making. 141 Choice is often made according to the manner in which the options are framed. 142
Behavioralist Models
Originating in the 1960s but achieving widespread acceptance in the 1970s behavioralist models of economy were a natural outgrowth of Neo-classical economics. Since marginal utility theory presupposes that individuals engaging in economic activity make decisions based on rational premises, it was seen as important to test this aspect of the hypothesis. Moreover, it has become clear to a wide number of economists (both theoretical and practical) that early models of rational decision-making are not sufficient. While some suggest that the framework needs to be disregarded completely, others suggest that the notion of what constitutes rationality requires modification. Kahneman and Tversky have been trailblazers in this field. They have shown that the processes behind economic decision-making are much more complex than utility theory allows.P" This is most evident in the manner in which decisions are in made in reference to 'risky' situations (i.e., any situation with an unknown outcome). Situations with an unknown outcome in which an agent must make decisions, that is to say, make decisions without "advance knowledge of their consequences" can be studied as "gambles".138 What makes this conceptual framework distinct from utility theory is the possibility for variable outcomes. Utility theory demands a linear response to the possibilities.P" In practice, however, linear responses are unlikely even given virtually identical possibilities. The example Kahneman cites relates to odds making. The agent's decision-making is less likely to be effected by a change of odds from 39% to 40% than a change in odds from 99% to 100% even though the rate of difference in both 137 138 139
Kahneman and Tversky 2000b, p. 18. Kahneman and Tversky 2000a, p. 2. Kahneman 2000a, p. xi.
Framing is the way the options are described both internally by the decision-maker and by outside influences on the decision-maker. The framing of options are affected by what Kahneman and Tversky call formulation effects. 143 The example they give of formulation theory is instructive as a definition: "The public health problem illustrates a formulation effect in which a change of wording from "lives saved" to "lives lost" induced a marked preference from risk aversion to risk seeking."144 In other words, people are less likely to take a risk if they are told a set amount of lives are lost on account of taking the risk than if told a set of amount of lives will be saved if the risk is not taken. Kahneman and Tversky state: "The evaluation of outcomes is susceptible to formulation effects because of the nonlinearity of the value function and the tendency of people to evaluate options in relation to the reference point that is suggested or implied by the statement of the problem."145 Formulation effects are just one kind of framing effect that can influence decision-making.l'" It is not important to enumerate them all here: what is important is how the concept of 'framing effects' relates to Neo-classical theory. Framing as a concept still implies rational decisionmaking on the part of the agent but it does suggest that "rational choice" is greatly contingent on the circumstances. Another important variable in the decision-making process is the conception of value. In models of marginal utility, rational decision-making involves an explicit calculation of what will result in the greatest increase of value. From a behavioralist perspective, value in the decision making process is not based on the final state of value but rather the magnitude of the change of value from one reference point to another. 147 This theoretical framework helps to understand many seeming irrational choices made in practical economics. For example, stocks have traditionally outperformed bonds by a
Kahneman 2000a, p. xi. Kahneman and Tversky 2000b, p. 28. 142 Kahneman and Tversky 2000a, p. 4. 143 Kahneman and Tversky 2000a, p. 10. 144 Kahneman and Tversky 2000a, p. 9. 145 Kahneman and Tversky 2000a, p. 10. 146 Some other types of framing effects are as follows. Reflection effect is the transformation of the framing of options from positive to negative terms (or vice versa) and the concomitant shift in attitude, Kahneman and Tversky 2000b, p. 22. Isolation effect is when perceived similarities in alternatives are ignored and only the perceived differences between alternatives are accounted for, Kahneman and Tversky 2000b, p. 25. Since the differences and similarities are inherently subjective, this leads to inconsistencies in the decision-making process. 147 Kahneman and Tversky 2000b, p. 32. 140 141
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tremendous margin, yet investors continue to invest in bonds. Benartzi and Thaler suggest that two issues affect the situation, which are not normally accounted for by marginal utility. First, investors have a much greater sensitivity to loss, than to gain. 148 A loss is seen as much more troubling for an investor than a relatively similar gain is seen as fulfilling. Second, investors tend to make very frequent evaluations of their portfolios.U? Long-term gains are missed by short-term evaluations. This kind of behavior explains much about the recent irrational behavior of amateur investors (i.e., buying stocks at high prices and selling them at low prices). Kahneman's arguments are attempts to see economic decision-making as embedded within a larger cultural setting. He does not see economic action as divorced from social action. In fact, he argues that logical decision-making models need to be supplemented by 'substantive criterion.'150 By this he means external systems of preferences. One such substantive criterion is the application of Jeremy Bentham's notions of hedonic utility (i.e., the pleasurableness of certain decisions) into decision-making models.P! To Kahneman, adding substantive criteria to the analysis of economic behavior actually restricts the study of rationality by creating stricter conceptualizations.P'' Besides Kahneman, the other recipient of the 2002 Noble Memorial Prize in economics is Vernon Smith. Smith, one of the major forces in the field of experimental economics (a sub-discipline of game theory), also seeks to integrate psychology and economics in order to understand decision-making. In Smith's view, economic decisionmaking is rational.P'' The problem, demonstrated in experimental economics, is the consistent discrepancy between economic behavior when modeled in the laboratory and observed behavior from real-life situations.P" Smith phrases the observations in terms of 'right' or 'wrong' decision making as determined by equilibrium standards. Smith suggests that rational market behavior is facilitated by institutional rnediators.l'? That is to say that rational decision-making is observable in human economic behavior when that behavior is mediated through organizations and systems geared towards the reproduction of that behavior. In essence, this seems to be an argument (though it
is doubtful that Smith would describe it in this manner) that economic behavior is embedded within a societal context.
Benartzi and Thaler 2000, p. 301; Smith 2000, p. 4. Benartzi and Thaler 2000, p. 301. 150 Kahneman 2000b, p. 760. 151 Kahneman 2000b: 760. Another substantive criterion would be the constraint of "fairness." Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, 2000, p. 331, argue: "The findings of this study suggest that many actions that are both profitable in the short run and not obviously dishonest are likely to be perceived as unfair exploitations of market power... Further, even in the absence of government intervention, the actions of firms that wish to avoid a reputation for unfairness will depart in significant ways from the standard model of economic behavior." For a different evaluation of the same phenomenon see Smith 2000, p. 6. 152 Kahneman 2000b, p. 774. 153 Smith 2000, p. 5. 154 Smith 2000, p. 23. 155 Smith 2000, p. 23. 148 149
31
While it is impossible to distill the arguments of behavioralist economists into one or two key concepts two key issues stand out as important for the study of the ancient economy. First, framing has been identified as an important component of human economic action. How one understands the possibilities of economic action is just as important as the possible types of economic action. An important factor in the development of how individuals understand economic possibilities is how institutional mediators affect the framing process. Second, it has been demonstrated that the constitution of 'value' is not entirely based on Neo-classical conceptions of rational decision-making. Value is not an absolute and simple mathematical models of price versus availability do not adequately account for economic actions.
Network Theory The study of networks has also moved modern economic theory away from Neo-classical models and explicitly involves the study of the social value of economic interaction. Networks are formal systems of organization that lack a formal source of sovereign authority. Rather, the organization stems from informal relationships that are related through vertical relationships. 156 The defining aspects of a network are the rules that govern the connections between different nodes and the transformations that these connections go through in the various movements of the nerwork.P? Fukuyama elaborates, defining a network as: "a group of individual agents who share informed norms or values beyond those necessary for ordinary market transactions."158 Market relationships in their ideal form are relationships that do not extend beyond the exchange transaction. Network theory in contrast provides a socially embedded framework for economic transactions and information sharing. Yet it does not necessitate a formal, bureaucratic organization, in the Weberian sense. Modern economic analysis using network theory assumes that social norms inform the relationship between different nodes in the network. As such, it illustrates yet another kind of modern economic analysis that departs from Neoclassical presuppositions. Network theory is one aspect of a sub-discipline in economics that Fukuyama calls "the new institutionalism." 159 The presuppositions of this sub-discipline are that norms and rules are integral to business transactions. 160 These rules and norms are
156 157 158 159 160
Fukuyama 1999, p. 199. Wolfram 2002, p. 193. Fukuyama 1999, p. 199. Fukuyama 1999, p. 149. Fukuyama 1999, p. 149.
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THE FORMALIST-SUBSTANTIVIST DEBATE
ways of simplifying human behavior, according to Ronald Heiner.l''! Heiner argues that in the absence of norms and social rules, people would be unable to go about their day-to-day lives. It is impossible, in Heiner's view, for an individual to make rational decisions at every point in their lives. 162 People need to have many of these decisions already made for them, and this comes in the form of these social rules. 163 Systems develop in a manner that promotes the creation of restrictive rules rather than optimizing behavior.P" Whether or not one follows Heiner's argument, it is certainly evidence of the difficulties of optimizing theories in the field of practical economics. 165 These informal hierarchies and non-centralized systems of authority are particularly well suited for information management. They are typically applied in modern business theory to organize the flow of information in managerial systems. Centralized authorities are not particularly well geared towards information processing, since, as Fukuyama states the "overwhelming proportion of information generated in an economy is local in nature."166 As will be discussed later, network theory provides a model for information gathering and collecting in societies lacking a formal, rational (Weberian) bureaucratic organization. Network theory provides a useful model for the study of ancient economy. It suggests that contacts between individuals in an economic relationship are worthwh~le focal points of study. Moments of contact between agents are governed by many SOCIal norms and rules. While the norms may be informal, it does not mean that they are not powerful organizing forces. Economists now work under the assumption that market interaction does more than provide a mechanism of exchange, it creates value and those values become embedded in culture. 167 T h ese patterns 0 f associ aSSOCIatIOnS (.t.e., networks) provide consistent social frameworks for economic interaction. Friedland and Robertson describe these social frameworks in these terms: "The reality of economic life is that most actors interact repeatedly over time and thus form expectations about each other's behaviour, constructing patterns of behaviour that are not only valued in themselves but become mechanisms for the dissemination of information and for the control of each others' behaviour."168 It is important to look at how the relationships between individuals crystallize, and to build a model of economic modalities based on the norms identifiable from these relationships.
161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168
Heiner 1983, p. 561. Heiner 1983, pp. 566-567; 1985, p. 391. Heiner 1983, p. 561; see also Fukuyama 1999, p. 149. Heiner 1983, p. 569. Heiner 1983, pp. 560, 562-569. Fukuyama 1999, p. 195. Friedland and Robertson 1990, p. 27. Friedland and Robertson 1990, p. 28.
33
Complexity Theory
i _8
I
Another new approach that has entered modern economics in recent years is derived from the hard sciences. Complexity theory, especially as it has been developed by the Santa Fe Institute, has produced important research for the field of economics. 169 Complexity theory is a branch of mathematical systems theory that uses a pluralistic conceptual framework, which allows for different levels of pluralism to exist side by side, and interact with other complex systerns.l?? Complex systems are systems that self-organize.l?" In terms of economics, Waldrop describes self-organization as "people trying to satisfy their material needs unconsciously organize themselves into an economy through myriad individual acts of buying and selling; it happens without anyone being in charge or consciously planning it."172 Along with self-organization, these complex systems are adaptive. The system actively responds to stimuli, which in turn allows for new activities to be created within the system.l" All in all, the system is inherently dynamic.F" Complexity theory can also describe systems operating on the edge of chaos. 175 In Waldrop's words: "the components of a system never quite lock into place, and yet never quite dissolve into turbulence."176 Based on these premises, new understandings of economy have been created: ... the economy is viewed as an emergent, self-organizing evolutionary process. Agents classify knowledge and arrange it hierarchically and make decisions based on a cognitive hierarchical representation of what they "know" and expect about their highly localized world. The economy is most likely in sustained "disequilibrium."177
This understanding allows for the interaction of individual agents to be understood holistically. As such, it provides a means to understand a number of localized relationships in terms of a larger system without resorting to monolithizing the system as a whole. Here, economy and society are viewed not only as an integrated whole but are 169 The utility of complexity theory for the study of economics was suggested by John Reed, who was appointed CEO of Citicorp in 1984. Throughout the 1970s, rampant inflation had led to substantial loans from North American financing institutions to developing nations. But with the Carter administration's appointment of Paul Volker as head of the Federal Reserve Board, reducing inflation became a primary goal of the US government, Waldrop 1994, p. 94. This led to incredible profit losses for organizations like Citicorp, which had loaned tremendous amounts of money. John Reed felt that utility theory (and Keynesian economics) were not capable of predicting economic behavior in the face of seemingly random acts such as the appointment of Volker and sought a new theoretical perspective that could, Waldrop 1994, p. 95. Through an unparalleled grant, Reed orchestrated Citicorp's funding of the Santa Fe Institute's complexity studies, with the condition that Santa Fe look for economic applications of complexity theory, Waldrop 1994, pp. 95-96. 170 Wible 2000, pp. 15-17. 171 Waldrop 1994, p. 11; Wible 2000, p. 17. 172 Waldrop 1994, p. 11. 173 Waldrop 1994, p. 11. 174 Wible 2000, pp. 17-18. 175 Waldrop 1994, p. 12. 176 Waldrop 1994, p. 12. 177 Wible 2000, p. 23.
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almost analogous to a living organism. Viewing economy in this matter is useful as it accommodates the significant complexity of a multitude of economic interactions manifest in varying relations to one another. Inherent in complexity is the idea that complex patterns and situations can be created out of very simple patterns and situations. Wolfram attacks a fundamentally held, although not usually explicitly stated, viewpoint that there is "a direct correspondence between the complexity of observed behavior and the complexity of underlying rules."178 This is a very useful observation. Simple underlying rules can create quite complex behavior, and this complex behavior is frequently not predictable. Unlike proponents of complexity-related models like chaos theory, Wolfram argues that the initial conditions, or rules, are not complex.V" Wolfram's argument is relevant for the study of the ancient econorny.l'" It suggests that economic behavior, on analogy with computational theory, can produce quite complex results based on very simple rules. Simple rules of behavior can create quite complex results. This helps explain why a model such as Mauss's gifting model, which is in essence quite simple, has been such a productive model for social enquiry. Indeed the underlying rationale for behavior does not have to be very complex in order to allow for great variation. Against the postmodern critique of over-simplistic modeling, complexity-based modeling suggests that what are at heart simple models are valid and useful. Positing simple modalities of behavior does not imply simple behavior or monolithic patterns. It is useful, in studying the ancient economy, to attempt to discern what these underlying modalities were. Identifying general practices and constraints of behavior does not totalize human action. In fact, it does exactly the opposite. It allows for an almost infinite combination of possibilities for an individual's life but at the same time provides a way of making meaningful comparison of human activity.
Modern economic theory is not intended to be dispassionate, objective analysis. Economics has a different agenda than history, since it attempts to create models for maximizing scarce resources.l'" This makes un-adapted use of economic models in the study of the past dangerous and to Polanyi, made the use of these models futile. 182 The problem with using modern economic models without altering them is a problem of asking the wrong questions of inappropriate data. The fundamental orientation of modern economists is radically different from that of historians. This study seeks to adapt models from modern economics into a form that can answer historical questions.
TOWARDS A NETWORK-BASED MODEL FOR THE STUDY OF THE ECONOMY
Three recent developments in the study of economics that have potential value for the study of the ancient economy have been described here: behavioralist, network, and complexity models. A fundamental problem, however, afflicts direct application of modern economic theory to the ancient world. Both history and economic theory are intended as tools to be used in order to reach specific goals. History attempts to gain an understanding of the past and understand aspects of life in past times.
Wolfram 2002, p. 351. Chaos theory predicates that system behavior is not predictable if any initial condition is unknown or uncertain. After the book and movie Jurassic Park, this became a quite popular, though misunderstood, model of behavior. 180 Wolfram 2002, p. 351. 178 179
The approach taken can be called a Network-based approach. Economic actions shall be seen as occurring in a network organization. The network itself shall be seen as a complex, multi-variant system. While simple rules may lie at the heart of its organization, the end result is a complicated and ever-changing system. The study of individual nodes of economic contact shall be the basis of investigation. Each node should be understood as a situation of economic interaction between discrete groups or individuals. After identifying discrete groups or individuals engaging in an economic interaction, the next step should be to determine the nature of this economic interaction. Two separate 'natures' should be looked for: the nature of the actual interaction and the nature of how that interaction is represented by the separate parties. Any number of interpretations are possible, using many of the perspectives that have been suggested throughout this study. Is there competition involved, or reciprocity, or both? Hence there is a need for both a descriptive level of analysis (describing the transfer of goods or labor) and an interpretive level of analysis (focusing on how each party understood/ represented the interaction). The other level of interest is the determination of how each party understood the interaction. At the outset, framing becomes an issue, since, as has been discussed, the way that an interaction is initially framed determines how the agents proceed.l'" Framing is identifiable in antiquity in a number of ways. Language is of course a limitation, as are the material possibilities available for each agent. As Liverani has suggested, Polanyi's modes of integration well reflect ancient 181 Take for example, the definition of economics found in a popular freshman economics textbook, McConnell and Brue 1993, p. 1: "Economics is concerned with the efficient use or management of limited productive resources to achieve maximum satisfaction of human material wants." Or take the definition of economics found in a Dictionary ofEconomics first published in 1949, Sloan and Zurcher 1957, p. 102: ''A term applicable to any action or process which has to do with the creation of goods or services designed to satisfy human wants. More specifically the term is used to characterize the production of goods and services by the most effective means and in accordance with existing technical knowledge." This is a specific goal predicated on Neo-classical understandings of 'economic man' (homo economicus). The goal of this kind of study is the bettering of the abiliry to achieve the aims of maximum satisfaction within the constraints of scarciry. 182 Polanyi 1957, p. 244. 183 Kahneman and Tversky 2000a, p. 9.
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views of economic situations and while imperfect, this is a useful heuristic device for the modern interpreter.P'' It is also important to attempt to understand the motivations for the interaction. Intrinsically related to this are the power relationships that are manifest at each node of contact. The understanding of power in this Network-based model is greatly influenced by Foucault's analysisof power. He emphasized the role of power as a means of constituting social orientations. Foucault discusses the nature of power that is enacted upon the body. He considers the exercise of this power to be a "strategy," not an inherent quality possessed by the body that has been taken away by those in power.185 This power is not given over at a finite moment, but is part of a continual process of domination. He says "this power is exercised rather than possessed," and is, "the overall effect of its strategic positions."186 Indeed, the power held by some bodies over others is not an articulated, discrete power but rather a power that underlies many aspects of life. While Foucault's main theme is punishment, he also makes note that the same kinds of power are exercised upon the body in order to harness it as a productive labor force. 18? Control of another individual is a constant process. When one party marshals another party as a labor force, one cannot assume that the dominant power owns the subordinate. Instead the ability to marshal others as a productive force is part of a process, a strategy, a continual maneuvering between the dominant and the subordinate. Despite building decision making models that are culturally or socially dependent, economists continue to work almost exclusively on the agent/individual end of the spectrum in their modeling without considering fundamental questions, such as how 'framing', institutions, or cultural preferences are constituted. This study seeks to redress this issue by utilizing the observations of these economists who describe economies as socially embedded in tandem with the observations of social theorists like Bourdieu, Giddens, and Gramsci (whose works shall be discussed when germane in the following study). Perhaps most central to the understanding of the constitution of society that is assumed in this study are the principles of orientation outlined by Foucault. Foucault views these kind of principles of orientation as order. To Foucault:
For Foucault, there is a system of orientation that underlies daily life, but at the same time it has no real, coherent form unless it is examined. Like Schroedinger's Cat, the act of observation creates the results of the enquiry. Yet at the same time the creation of the result does not negate its existence. For people do live and act according to an order that, although ephemeral, plays an active part in life. It is this kind of order to which economic modalities belong. And it is the nature of this kind of order that makes economic modalities elusive to study. Foucault's understanding of order fits well with the idea of a network that is used here. A network is not a tangible 'thing' that can identified and described. It is a method of mapping out the constantly shifting complex relations of diverse individuals, groups, and institutions. The Network-based model for the analysis of ancient economy allows the incorporation of wide varieties of evidence and wide varieties of social theory. It prevents the monolithizing of human experience that can develop out of the application of Neo-classical or Polanyian models. This study of Ugaritic economy shall not adapt theoretical frameworks wholesale and systematically apply it to the data set. Theory in this work shall be oriented towards creating questions and observations by using a variety of theoretical frameworks and many different kinds of data. The Networkbased model allows a series of different models and approaches to intersect with one another. Before applying the Network-based model, it is necessary to discuss the substantial volume of work that has already been done on the Ugaritic economy. It is not sufficient to simply situate the Network-based study in the formalist-substantivist debate; the Network-based study must also be seen as part of the longer-term study of Ugarit as a whole. A discussion of the history of excavations at Ugarit as well as a discussion of the major conceptual frameworks used to study Ugarit shall be the subject of the next chapter.
Order is, at one and the same time, that which is given in things as their inner law, the hidden network that determines the way they confront one another, and also that which has no existence except in the grid created by a glance, an examination, a language; and it is only in the blank spaces of this grid that order manifests itself in depth as though already there, waiting in silence for the moment of its expression.l'"
184 185 186 187 188
Liverani 2001, p. 7. Foucault 1977, p. 26. Foucault 1977, p. 26. Foucault 1977, pp. 25-26. Foucault 1970, p. xx.
PREVIOUS STUDIES OF THE UGARITIC ECONOMY
39
HISTORY OF EXCAVATIONS AND THE MISSION ARCHAEOLOGIQUE FRANc;AISE
CHAPTER TWO
PREVIOUS STUDIES OF THE UGARITIC ECONOMY
Norms did not die; they were simply transformed into a new linguistic garb and in their new form continued their functions as of old. Yochanan Muffs One of the hardest things for a seasoned specialist to do is to make the adjustment required by the first discovery of texts in his field. Cyrus Gordon
While Chapter One has outlined the basic model that shall be used to investigate the Ugaritic economy, this chapter shall discuss the history of excavations at Ugarit as well as the major approaches that have already been used by scholars to understand this problem. It is possible to identify five major approaches that scholars have used to understand the Ugaritic economy: feudal models; Marxist models (particularly those based on the theory of the Asiatic Mode of Production); entrepreneurial models; administrative models; and patrimonial models. Each of these five approaches shall be discussed in connection with the particular intellectual trends that influenced their articulation, especially in the scholarship of the cuneiform world. 1 All of these models have helped illuminate the Ugaritic economy; at the same time, each of these models has particular weaknesses that limit its utility in outlining economic modalities. Some of those limitations will be discussed here; others shall be discussed in the conclusions in Chapter Nine.
I In the introduction to his study of the Aramaic legal papyri from Elephantine, Muffs elegantly argues for the conservatism of cuneiform legal traditions, Muffs 1969, pp. 12-16. Muffs further argues that legal traditions in areas of peripheral Akkadian (Susa, Nuzi, Cappadocia, and U?arit) all seem very different from Old Babylonian traditions, but when viewed from a wider perspective show remarkable cultural continuity, Muffs 1969, pp. 15-16. While it can be unwise to assume "sameness" across such large temporal and geographic expanses, it is even more unwise to ignore the possible benefits of the comparative approach. Certainly differences between the economic practices of these regions and times will be apparent at the surface level. On the other hand, Muffs is right in asserting the long lasting nature of many institutional practices. Even if not exactly analogous, the study of other similar institutions and situations can only be helpful.
The oft-told story of Ugarit's initial discovery need not take up too much space here.e Suffice it to say that an accidental discovery in 1929 of a vaulted tomb roof near Ras Shamra brought the site to the attention of Charles Virolleaud, at the time the director of the Service des Antiquites en Syria et au Liban/' Claude Schaeffer was assigned the task of excavating the necropolis and the nearby tell, and in 1929 he arrived at the site with his first team." Excavations began at the necropolis but eventually, in that first campaign moved to the area of the tell where a wealth of artifacts, buildings, and tablets in a never before seen cuneiform language were discovered.? The site was identified in 1931 when Schaeffer announced the discovery of a tablet with the inscription, "Niqmaddu King of Ugarit.:" Albright had already suggested the identification ofRas Shamra with Ugarit.? Until World War II excavations continued on the tell, and also in the harbor," Five major phases of occupation" were identified during this period. 10 Also discovered at this time were the Temples of Baal and Dagan, and the House of the High Priest. 11 The language itself was deciphered quite early. By 1930, Bauer, Dhorme, and Virolleaud had deciphered this language, now known as Ugaritic, using the textual finds from the House of the High Priest. 12 Work began again after World War II, with a campaign in 1948 and subsequent campaigns from 1950 on. 13 During these initial campaigns after World War II, from 1948 to 1955, the majority of the Royal Palace was excavated.l" During these excavations of the palace, the French team identified particular archives within the palace.l?
For accounts of this, see Courtois 1979b; Curtis 1999; Schaeffer 1966; and Smith 200la. Courtois 1979b, p. 1130; Curtis 1999, p. 6. 4 Curtis 1999, pp. 6--7; Schaeffer 1929, pp. 285-286; Yon 1997, p. 256. 5 Schaeffer 1929, pp. 285-286; Virolleaud 1929, pp. 304-310; Curtis 1999, pp. 8-9. 6 Schaeffer 1932, pp. 24-29; Schaeffer 1934, pp. 120-122; Curtis 1999, p. 9. 7 Albright 1931, p. 165. 8 Yon 1992a, p. 695; Curtis 1999, p. 9. The relevant site reports are: Schaeffer 1929; 1931; 1932; 1933; 1934; 1935; 1936; 1937; 1938; 1939. 9 The 5 phases first suggested by Schaeffer's team were as follows Level I (c. 1200-1600), Level II (c. 1600-2100), Level III (c. 2100-3500), Level IV (c. 3500-4000), and Level V (Neolithic). (Curtis 1999, P: 10). For more on phasing and for a discussion on the site grid(s), see North 1973 and Courtois 1974. 10 Schaeffer 1936, pp. 132-137; Curtis 1999, p. 9. II Schaeffer 1933, pp. 119-124; 1935, pp. 155-159; Curtis 1999, p. 9. 12 Yon 1997, p. 257. 13 Curtis 1999, p. 10. See Schaeffer 1951, pp. 1-2 for the excavator's comments on the effects of World War II. 14 Yon 1992a, p. 695; Curtis 1999, p. 10. The relevant site reports are: Schaeffer 1951a; 1951b; 1952; 1953; 1954; 1954/1955; 1957a; and 1962. 15 It is likely that Schaeffer's designation of various sections of the archives with names implying function can be traced to his having read an influential article by Godefry Goosens, which appeared in Revued'Assyriologie et d'archeologie orientale 46 (1952): 98-107, entitled "Introduction a l'archioeconomie de l'Asie anterieure", This article, which Whitt suggests laid the groundwork for the modern archival 2
3
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KEVIN M. MCGEOUGH
During and after the excavation of the Royal Palace, the team led by Schaeffer unearthed numerous other structures. The buildings within the immediate vicinity of the palace were excavated (i.e., the Southern Palace and the Northern Palace).16 Before Schaeffer stepped down as director in 1970 numerous other soundings and examinations of residential areas of the tell were also conducted. The campaigns continued under Henri de Contenson from 1971-1974,17 Perhaps the most important contribution of the excavations under de Conteson was the continued excavation of Sondage H. This sounding was located on the western side of the acropolis. Begun in 1962, this sounding has provided the basis for the current stratigraphic understanding of Ras Shamra.l" Jean Margueron led the excavations at Ugarit from 1975-1977. 19 From 1978 until 1998 excavations were led by Marguerite Yon.20 Under Yon excavations initially concentrated on the residential quarter of the city in the center of the telF1 City planning was one of the dominant interests of Yon's team, and architectural analysis of previously excavated material provided important additional inforrnation.P Under Yon a new series of publications were begun, Ras Shamra-Ougarit (RSO), a publication project that makes some attempt to rectify Schaeffer's poor publication record. It should be noted that many of these attempts are hampered by the poor methods and recording techniques of the earlier teams.P Yves Calvet leads the current team.r" THE EXAMINATION OF
RAs SHAMRAS IMMEDIATE ENVIRONS
Archaeologists have neglected Ugarit's periphery even though the potential information that could be gleaned from minimal survey work is obvious. This lack of knowledge about the periphery seriously hampers any examination of the Ugaritic economy. From the textual records it is clear that the Ugaritic economy was thoroughly integrated with other parts of the kingdom but unfortunately the specific evidence about each of these regions is sparse. There are two important exceptions to this. The harbor of Minet el-Beida has been somewhat excavated as has the nearby site of Ras ibn-Hani.
PREVIOUS STUDIES OF THE UGARITIC ECONOMY
Minet el-Beida The initial excavations of the French mission de Ras Shamra occurred at the site of Minet el-Beida." Important data was gathered during those early excavations but when the archaeological wealth of nearby Ras Shamra became apparent to the team excavation resources were concentrated on Ugarit proper." The most important finds at Minet el-Beida, initially, were the tombs filled with grave goods.F Schaeffer initially thought that this was a necropolis but further excavations showed that this was in fact an urban area and that like at Ugarit proper graves were built directly beneath domestic architecture." For the purposes of this study, the most important information derived from these excavations relates to Minet el-Beidas role as the main harbor for Ugarit. Astour has persuasively argued that this site should be identified with the port known from Ugaritic texts as Ma'hadu.i? Ras ibn Hani Though there have been over twenty years of excavations at this site, led by a joint French-Syrian team (under the direction of Adnan Bounni and Jacques Lagarce), only preliminary and popular reports have been produced.l" The site itself is about 4.5 km southwest of Ugarit and is located directly on the Mediterranean.I! The importance of this site in antiquity was likely related to the two bays that acted as harbors.V Of the excavated Late Bronze Age remains the most important for this study are the two palaces. The Southern Palace is over 5000 square meters in area and was supposedly constructed by a king of Ugarit.P The Northern Palace is smaller (2000 square meters) but its unusual layout and finds have meant it has undergone more serious investigation. 34 Discreet production areas have been identified including metallurgical production centers, a stone polishing area, and a bread-making area." In one of the metallurgical areas a most remarkable find was made - a copper mold in the shape of an ox-hide.l"
The relevant site reports are: Schaeffer 1929; 1931; 1932; 1933; 1935. Schaeffer 1932, p. 108. 27 See for example Schaeffer 1931, pp. 1--4. 28 Saade 1995, p. 213. 29 His full argument can be found in Astour 1970. The relevant r~ports are: Bos~uet 1978; Bounni, Lagarce, and Saliby 1976; Bounni, Lagarce, and Saliby 1978; Bounni, Lagarce, Saliby, and Badre 1979; Bounni, Lagarce, Saliby, Badre, Leriche, and Touma 1981. 31 Bounni et al. 1976, p. 233. 32 Bounni et al 1976, p. 233; Bounni and Lagarce 1997, p. 411. 33 B 34 ounn~. et a.L 1979, p. 222-236; Bounni and Lagarce 1997, p. 411. Bounni et al. 1979, p. 237-244; Bounni and Lagarce 1997, p. 411--412. 35 Bounni and Lagarce 1997, p. 412. 36 Bounni and Lagarce 1997, p. 412. 25
26
approach to cuneiform sources, describes general functional organizational elements of archival systems, Whitt 1993, p. 5. 16 Yon 1992a, p. 695. For the relevant site report, see Schaeffer 1970. 17 Yon 1997, p. 256-257. 18 Courtois 1979, p. 695; Yon 1992. 19 Yon 1992a, p. 695; 1997, p. 257. 20 Smith 2001a, p. 204. 21 Yon 1997, p. 257; Curtis 1999, p. 11. 22 Yon 1992a, p. 695. 23 See for example Callot and Calvet 2001. 24 Smith 2001a, p. 204.
41
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KEVIN M. MCGEOUGH
PREVIOUS STUDIES OF THE UGARITIC ECONOMY
This find certainly complicates the current understanding of the LB international copper trade. It indicates that Cyprus was not the only location where copper was put into this form even though the copper at Ras ibn Hani is usually assumed to have come from Cyprus. Two clusters of tablets were also discovered (in Akkadian and Ugaritic) attesting all of the same genres as found at Ugarit except for contracts.V From the correspondence it is apparent that at one point this palace was the property of a queen of Ugarit. 38 Another important find is a structure located to the west of the Northern Palace that contained two large kilns. 39
Economy was not the primary focus of Gray's work; Gray was actually more interested in literature and religion;" He was unusual compared to other Ugaritic scholars working in the 1940s and 1950s since he took some interest in economic issues. Not unusual for scholars of his era are two major presuppositions that are central to Gray's understanding of the Ugaritic economic system. The first is that Ugaritic society reflected an Aryan population influx. The second is that with these Aryan population elements came a form of feudalism and a system of guilds. That North Syria, in the Late Bronze Age, received a large influx of Aryan (or Indo-Aryan) population elements was not novel to Gray's work. This notion was well entrenched in the scholarly mind-set based on evidence from Alalakh, Nuzi, Kassite Babylonia, as well as Ugarit. Most of the evidence for this movement of people came from the onomastica of these Syrian and Mesopotamian sites. Many of the personal names seemed to reflect non-Semitic elements. Gray describes the evidence from Ugarit based on the personal names:
PREVIOUS APPROACHES TO UNDERSTANDING THE UGARITIC ECONOMY
Since the excavations at Ugarit began numerous scholars both affiliated and unaffiliated with the French team have participated in reconstructing the Ugaritic economy. For the most part, these works fit into five identifiable categories of intellectual thought, already mentioned above. Before applying the Network-based model of the Ugaritic economy, it is necessary to describe the work that has come before establishing the foundations for this study. Each of these approaches shall be discussed as actually applied to Ugarit and from within the intellectual milieu from which they originated. 1. Feudal Models Feudalism is best understood as a type of socio-political organization that functioned as the central organizing principle in medieval Europe and Japan. This is a decentralized system of organization where people are connected through vertical ties but rarely ever through horizontal ties. In other words, it is always apparent who ranks above an individual and who ranks below an individual but beyond this it is difficult to map out social relationships. In medieval Europe, feudalism revolved around land ownership. Landowners would swear obeisance to a lord who in turn for nominal control over the land provided security. In other situations, a lord could offer land grants as rewards or in return for service, especially military service, to individuals of lower status. The earliest characterizations of the Ugaritic economy describe the economy in terms analogous to feudalism.
John Gray and Indo-Aryan Feudalists John Gray was arguably the first scholar (independent of the Mission de Ras Shamra) to attempt a broad synthesis of Ugaritic social structures in the English language.t?
They illustrate the fact that, though the substratum of the population of this North Canaanite realm was Semitic, the administration found its mainstay among the nonSemitic elements, Aryans and Hurrians, who had come ultimately from the North-East and perhaps others from beyond the Taurus.F Non-Semitic names provided evidence for scholars working in the 1950s that Late Bronze Age societies in Syria, Mesopotamia and Anatolia, had large non-Semitic populations. It is worth discussing the evidence of Indo-Aryan populations beyond Ugarit in order to understand the effect of this theory on Ugaritic studies as a whole. In its most general form the theory held that an Indo-Aryan population moved from the Caucasus into Syria and Mesopotamia. This population bought with it new social institutions (maryannu) and new technology (horse and chariot technology). The presence of Indo-Aryan deities (Indras) and Indo-Aryan personal names provided the most important evidence for the origins of this migrant group.P To Gray, the evidence at Ugarit indicated that the arrival of Indo-Aryan people created disruptions in the Semitic social structures at Ugarit. Remnants of a tribal organization of society were detectable in the epic poetry and religious literature, especially the myth of Kirta that predated this Indo-Aryan incursion.t" However, the administrative records portrayed another situation at Ugarit. These records saw fiscal and military assessment based on guild or class and by city rather than tribe. 45 Gray believed that the earlier tribal orientation of Ugaritic society had been replaced by 41
37 38 39
40
Bordreuil and Caquor 1980; Bounni et al. 1979, p. 242; Bounni and Lagarce 1997, p. 412. Bounni and Lagarce 1997, p. 412. Bounni and Lagarce 1997, p. 412. Gray 1952.
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Smith 2001a, p. 88. Gray 1952, pp. 49-50. Houwink Ten Care 1995, p. 267. Gray 1955. Gray 1952, p. 50.
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feudalism and an hereditary orientation.w Gray does not spell out exactly what constitutes feudalism but he certainly views it as a type of social organization that is inconsistent with tribal organization. Within this feudal context Gray saw military authority centered in the maryannu. The maryannu, Gray noticed, appear in the first position in administrative occupation lists and received the largest amounts of payments.V Another form of authority was centered on the guild, which he claimed, "was probably a development of feudalism introduced to the Near East by the Aryans ... "48 Gray's investigation of the administrative lists at Ugarit led him to believe that occupational groups were organized into guilds. This is not a surprising assumption given that there are many texts where individuals are listed according to occupation and occupational groups seem to give and receive goods and labor (see Chapter Four). Gray's arguments have received criticism. Libolt comments on the difficulties of understanding exactly what Gray means by this feudal terminology but attempts to reconstruct his conceptual framework.t? Schloen assesses Gray's views as well: "his [Gray's] description of Ugaritian social structure borrows uncritically from medieval European feudalism."50 Indeed, Gray seems to use medieval feudalism as a generic model for pre-industrial economic systems. This is part of a larger trend in scholarship at the time that saw Indo-Aryan populations as transmitters of a new system of social organization. Gray's perspective stems from this theoretical framework. As such, it is important to understand Gray's work from that context, rather than just a simple reading of administrative texts in feudal terms.
The first type of feudal grant involves the giving of property in return for services rendered although the recipient of the property does not have to be the individual who performs the service - an alternate laborer or payment type may be sent in his place.t" The second type of feudal grant posited by Boyer involves land given in return for the performance of specific, specialized labor. 55 In this case only the recipient of the land may perform the service since the royal grant is intended to ensure the performance of that specialized activity. As such, the land then cannot be heritable since there is no guarantee that that service could be performed by the recipient's heirs. Boyer saw these two distinct types of feudalism existing in mutual tension. In general, royal authorities preferred the second kind of feudal grant, which gave power over specialized industry to the monarch. 56 According to Boyer this kind of feudal grant was prominent under Hammurabi of Babylon.V Recipients sought the first kind of feudal grant since it allowed the formation of hereditary property rights. 58 Boyer argues that the ftodalite fonciere grants represent a kind of break down in the feudal structure at Ugarit where personal fealty and personal ties between king and subject are replaced by, what is in essence, a taxation system. 59 The shift between the two types of documents, represented to Boyer, a weakening of the feudal system at Ugarit and was indicative of the loss of authority of the Ugaritic kings. 60 Libolt has criticized Boyer's understanding of these texts, although Libolt praised him for his attempt at a dynamic interpretation of the texts.P! Libolt argues that the description of ftodalite de[onction oupersonelle is more akin to an AMP model than a feudal model.62 Rather than demonstrating a collapse in the feudal system, the shift from ftodalite de[onction oupersonelle to ftodalitefonciere indicates the growth of a feudal society, based in a strong, non-royal class of landholders who are effectively able to challenge or check the power of the king of the Ugarit. 63 So while Boyer's readings of the texts are adequate his dynamic model may not hold up under closer scrutiny.
George Boyer and the French Team's Conception of Ugarit's Social Structure The first major attempt (made by the French team) at a discussion of Ugaritic social structure based on the textual evidence came with George Boyer's extensive introduction to the publication of Akkadian texts from Ugarit'! In his introduction Boyer adapts a feudal model as an implicit organizing principle of Ugaritic society. Boyer postulates two basic types of feudal grants between the royal palace and individuals within Ugarit based on the land grant texts found at the palace and comparative evidence from Old and Middle Babylonian sources. 52 Boyer's two distinguishable types of feudal grants are what he calls ftodalitefonciere and ftodalite de[onction oupersonelle. 53
Anson Rainey and Social Stratification Another pioneer in the study of Ugaritic society is Anson Rainey who was a student of Cyrus Cordon.P' His work on Ugaritic administrative documents was essentially
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Gray 1952, pp. 50-52. Gray 1952, p. 51. Gray 1952, p. 50. Libolt 1985, p. 2. Schloen 2001, p. 215. Boyer 1955. Boyer 1955, pp. 298-300. Boyer 1955, p. 294.
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1955, p. 294. 1955, p. 294. 1955, p. 298. 1955, p. 298. 1955, p. 299. 1955, p. 294. 1955, pp. 5-6. 1985, p. 6. 1985, p. 6. 1985, p. 6. 2001a, p. 77.
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lexical involving comparison between Ugaritic and Akkadian words. 65 This work stems from his Brandeis doctoral dissertation, which is primarily a lexical discussion.v" Further elaboration was made through numerous articles. Rainey does not provide an overarching synthesis of the nature of Ugaritic social structure and economic institutions, but his conceptual framework is clear from his studies.i" About social stratification at Ugarit Rainey comments:'
Unfortunately, the relationship between Inuya and her new "brother" before the adoption is unclear and this evidence must be considered preliminary. Rainey comments on the organization of the Ugaritic economy and administration based on his reading of the Akkadian and Ugaritic texts. According to his understanding of service exemptions found in royal land grant texts Rainey argues that the palace gained its subsistence needs directly from what he calls: "exactions laid upon the citizenry,'?" The palace itself was hierarchically organized, the most important non-royal official being the dkil ekalli, the chief of the palace.77 The king's labor force was organized into teams, each team led by a supervisor.Z" In general, the picture Rainey paints of the palace is not of a self-sufficient organization but rather as a larger administrative center that gained income from exactions on citizens and through international commercial ventures.i? Craft specialization is prominent in Rainey's description of the Ugaritic economy. Of craft specialization, Rainey states: "The populace was made up of people from all of the essential vocations and crafts. These artisans were organized, at least to some degree, according to their respective skills."80 According to Rainey the palace administration considered these craft specialists by grouping them according to their skills and that the individual craft specialists were organized in a manner akin to guilds." Group payments and the assignment of apprentices to individual trades further attest to the presence of guilds. 82
Life at Ugarit was organized under the leadership and control of an hereditary monarchy supported by a class of landed nobles. The powers exercised by her kingswere those of any typical oriental despot. Loyal members of the yeoman and noble classes were rewarded by grants of real estate from the crown to whom all the land and townships in the territory belonged.s'' For the most part Rainey understood the social organization of Ugarit as a combination of feudal elements and oriental despotism.v' Rainey describes ownership of land at Ugarit in explicitly feudal terms. He states, for example: "the kingdom of Ugarit was held by its ruler as a grant, or fief, from the Hittite kings ... the king ofUgarit was 'lord' or 'owner.'" 70 According to Rainey, landholders beneath the king held land only by virtue of their relationship to the king." Inheritance is one of the mechanisms through which the feudal nature of Ugaritic society was evident to Rainey, who cites instances in which the king makes land grants to individuals (and their heirs) in perpetuity, and calls these endowments "feudal grants."72 An important component of these grants was the restriction on the grantee's ability to alienate the real estate, a notion suggestive of feudalism." As at Nuzi, fictional adoption may have been one means of circumventing the inalienability of property given by feudal grant. 74 It is unclear whether or not fictive adoption is attested at Ugarit. Miller has argued against the presence of this practice at Ugarit; however, Monroe has more recently argued that Ug. 5 N 81 (RS 21.230) records that a woman named Inuya adopted a man as a brother, as a means of gaining access to his wealth;" 65 In fact, much of Rainey's arguments will be outlined in further chapters, in reference to specific lexical discussions. 66 Rainey 1962b. Libolt accurately criticizes the title of Rainey's dissertation, as Rainey does not for the most part discuss social stratification so much as occupational categories at Ugarit, Libolt 1985, p.7. 67 Schloens comments on Rainey are accurate, Schloen 2001, p. 218: "... his overall assessment of the social structure of Ugarit is confined to a few brief passages. This brevity is not a defect in itself, because Rainey expresses his views concisely and his basic picture of the organization of the kingdom is quite clear." 68 Rainey 1962b, p. 245. 69 Schloen 2001, p. 218; Smith 2001a, p. 88. 70 Rainey 1962b, p. 26. 71 Rainey 1962b, p. 26. 72 Rainey 1965a, p. 13. 73 Rainey 1965a, p. 14. 74 Rainey 1965a, p. 15. 75 Miller 1981, p. 350; Monroe 2000,p. 133.
Rainey makes some important comments on the nature of mercantile enterprise at Ugarit. He recognizes the existence of merchants (mkrm and bdlm in Ugaritic - see comments in Chapter Three), who had an official position within the Ugaritic palace, since they received rations directly from that institurion and land benefices from specific kings.83 These merchants had military connections as well. Rainey notes: "Mercantile enterprise (tamkdru) was a dangerous adventure."84 Foreign merchants residing in Ugarit "represented private or semi-private enterprises."85 This mercantile system at Ugarit was part of the greater Hittite mercantile system. As a Hittite vassal, Ugarit had a particular, formal place within this network.r'' Rainey notes that under Hattusilis III certain restrictions were placed on foreign merchants at Ugarit: the merchants had to leave Ugarit before winter, they could not own real estate 76 77
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1962b, p. 78. 1962b, p. 79. 1962b, p. 81. 1962b, p. 110. 1962b, p. 166. 1962b, p. 166. 1962b, p. 166-167. 1963, p. 314, 316-317. 1963, p. 314. 1963, p. 319. 1963, p. 320.
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and settle in Ugarit, and debts owed to merchants by Ugaritians could not be satisfied through real estate.V The overall picture of Ugaritic social structure presented in Rainey's studies is a rigidly hierarchical society. The king of Ugarit was subordinate to the Hittite king. Within Ugarit, non-royal rank manifest in three tiers: servants of the king of Ugarit (arad lar ugarit), citizens of'Ugarit (mar ugarit), and slaves of servants of the king of Ugarit (arad arad Iar ugarit).88 Mobility between these levels of society was possible through the decrees of the king of Ugarit. 89
fictive adoption sale tablets (like those attested at Nuzi) demonstrated to him that there was no need to circumvent royal authority over real estate.f" Miller's examination of the Akkadian legal evidence indicates that the role of the palace in economic life was not all encompassing.
Gerald Miller and juridical Texts The 1980 Johns Hopkins dissertation by Gerald Miller, Studies in the juridical Documents from Ugarit, represents an attempt at the kind of textual study used more often in studies of Mesopotamian" economic literature than of comparable Ugaritic materials. Most of the juridical texts studied by Miller reflect transactions involving real estate, although some other transactions and legal relationships are examined. More of Miller's work will be discussed in later chapters but some comments should be made here about his perspective in relation to development of Ugaritic studies in general. Miller consciously uses feudal terminology, as in his translation of ilku as "feudal obligation"?" but argues that he does not mean to reference medieval Europe." Instead, he describes feudalism as: a valid designation for a general method of political organization in which certain landed properties of a territory were held as heredity "grants" from the ruler in exchange for certain specified obligations for which the title-holders were responsible to the crown. 92
Within this roughly feudal framework Miller attempts to correct previous notions that the King of Ugarit owned all real estate within Ugarit. 93 Instead, Miller argues that there are three types of real estate within Ugarit: land owned by the royal family; land under indirect control of the palace through the hands of various administrators and families; and patrimonial estates which were owned privately and independent of the royal family.94 Miller also shows how property exchanges validated by the king or by witnesses do not represent ownership by the king. 95 Miller's belief that there were no
87 88 89 90 91
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Rainey 1963, p. 320. Rainey 1962b, 6. Rainey 1962b, 28. Miller 1980, p. 15. Miller 1980, p. 126, note 2. Miller 1980, p. 126 note 2. Miller 1981, p. 348. Miller 1981, p. 349. Miller 1981, p. 350.
2. Marxist Models Marxist models have been used in varying degrees of success to understand the Mesopotamian economy. Perhaps the most famous was Karl Wittfogel's resurrection of Marx and Engel's Asiatic Mode of Production Model, which elaborated the basic thesis that a monopoly on hydraulic technology in arid areas (particularly in Asia) led to strong centralized governments thus allowing Mesopotamian civilization to be categorized as "hydraulic".97 While initially popular, the work of various scholars from the University of Chicago's Oriental Institute demonstrated that this model of early Mesopotamian economy is not borne out by the evidence.l" More important for the study of Ugarit have been the Marxist Two-sector models that have been elaborated by Near Eastern scholars. Arguably the most influential Two-sector model is that proposed by Igor Diakonof£ Diakonoff's model understands Mesopotamian society in terms of the relationships between people and the land and the two distinct sectors of society that developed in relation to land ownership. One sector of society was patriarchal, holding alienable plots of land and self-governing on the community level,99 In addition, there developed a sector of society, encompassing Miller 1981, p. 350. By describing a society as hydraulic, Wittfogel, 1957, p. 3, attempted to emphasize what he called, "the agromanagerial and agrobureaucratic character of these civilizations." This kind of agrobureaucratic society developed absolutist leadership in which a small core area determined conditions in the larger peripheral areas, Wittfogel 1957, p. 3. The agromanagerial elites according to Wittfogel, should be considered despots who marshal resources for their own benefit rather than the benefit of the society as a whole, Wittfogel 1957, p. 136. Wittfogel uses the term despot purposefully in order to emphasize the harsh form of absolutism that typified hydraulic societies, Wittfogel 1957, p. 101. 98 Settlement surveys conducted by the University of Chicago in Mesopotamia have shown that the development of advanced irrigation techniques was not necessarily concomitant with the development of state level government, McC. Adams 198 I. Similarly for Egypt, another Chicago scholar, Karl Butzer, argued that irrigation was primarily organized on a local level and did not lead to a stratified society with an oriental despot at its apex, Butzer 1976. Furthering Chicago's attack on the Oriental Despotism model, Robert and Elizabeth Fernea (also at the University of Chicago) have marshaled ethnographic data from Iraq that illustrates how irrigation develops on a local scale. Robert Fernea, 1970, p. vii, set out to answer the question, "Had tribal leadership become centralized because of its association with the localized administration of irrigation systems?" Fernea demonstrated that at least in Daghara irrigation systems were developed gradually, and began on a small scale and gradually grew larger, Fernea 1970, p. 120. The pre-existing tribal structures determined the nature of the development of the irrigation schemes and the subsequent authority over them yet this tribal authority was in no way based upon the domination of this resource, Fernea 1970, p. 120-130. Indeed what was initially viewed as a productive model of social and economic organization has been proven to have been based on faulty premises. 99 Diakonoff 1974, p. 8. 96 97
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royal authority (or temple authority as the case may have been). In this sector land was controlled by elite administrative bodies and allotted ro personnel through arbitrary administrative criteria. 100 The personnel under the royal sphere of interest were dependent on the palace (or temple) for access to productive resources and for subsistence and were not able to engage in governance.l'" This Two-sector model of society argues for two distinct spheres of economic life. In one, the "Free" population owns land and controls means of production regardless of palace authority. The other sector involves the royal authority including those elites who control access to land and means of production and those individuals dependent on royal authority and gain access to land and resources through their relationship to the palace authorities.l'" This is a very different model from Asiatic Mode of Production models, although the two are frequently confused because of their common roots in Marxist thought. The Asiatic Mode of Production model presupposes the existence of only one sector of society in which land and the means of production (especially irrigation schemes) are completely controlled by an elite body. In an Asiatic Mode of Production model, all non-elites are dependent on the absolutist authority. Self sufficient villages may be self sufficient, but in fact participate in a larger scheme typically through a tributary relationship. Structurally speaking, the Two-sector model is completely opposed to the AMP model. In a Two-sector society there are two distinct relationships between people and the means of production (including real estate) that exist side-by-side but frequently in tension with one another. These two Marxist models should not be confused with one another for in essence their only real similarity is their use of the control of means of production as a diagnostic feature of ancient society. The end results, though, are completely different. Carlo Zaccagnini has attempted to revive the Marxian notion of the Asiatic Mode of Production in the context of post-Stalinist Marxism. Stalin-era Marxism did not allow for any stages in historical development beyond those described in the dominant unilinear evolutionary models.P" As a response to numerous scholarly comments on the general uselessness of AMP as a model for understanding pre-capitalist economies (and the lack of clarity by these same scholars on the meaning of AMP), Zaccagnini offers a revised version of the model. For Zaccagnini, some phases of Near Eastern history may be understood through this model, although a dogmatic application of the model to all of the Near East is not helpful.P" Zaccagnini proposes that the utility
of an AMP approach to the ancient Near East is heuristic. The application of the AMP and Marxist scholarly strategies in general highlight certain issues that may not be apparent through other conceptual frameworks.l'" According to Zaccagnini, areas that can be highlighted include but are not limited to, "the structural characteristics inherent in the ownership of the means of production, in the tributary mechanisms between the palace and the rural population, in the production, transformation, and circulation of goods ... ". 106 The application of an AMP model can illuminate these aspects of the ancient economy, in Zaccagnini's view. In the Asiatic Mode of Production as modified by Zaccagnini the palatial mode of production dominates the subaltern domestic or village mode of production. 107 In other words, Zaccagnini sees the substantial aspects of the Two-sector model as constituent elements of a larger system. Indeed it is the "functional nexus" linking the two sectors that is the Asiatic Mode of Production. 108 Zaccagnini defines five aspects of economic organization that are essential to an AMP model. 109 This mode of production is based on communal ownership of land where individual possession is legitimated through the individual's membership in the community.110 The second element of AMP is the despot, or the superior owner, the "comprehensive unit which is superimposed to all these small communities."lll It is important to recognize, however, that Zaccagnini notes that there is no evidence to suggest that any Near Eastern sovereign was considered the titular owner of allland. 112 Superior ownership status does not imply complete ownership. The third element of AMP involves the rights of the despot over the production surplus of the community units creating a tributary relationship.I'" For this tributary relationship to create a significant source of income for the despot the village communities must remain strong and prosperous in order to produce a base level of surplus. I 14 The fourth component is the "integration between agroculture [sic] and manufacture."1l5 These small communities are essentially self-sufficient and engage in both primary and secondary production activities.U'' The
50
Diakonoff 1974, p. 8. Diakonoff 1974, pp. 8-9. 102 Diakonoff 1974, p. 9. 103 Zaccagnini 1987, pp. 11-12. 104 Zaccagnini 1987, p. 13. Zaccagnini explicitly argues against the utility of AMP models for the study of Egypt, Southern Mesopotamia, and certain areas of the Tigris - anywhere where extensive irrigation technology was employed, Zaccagnini 1987, p. 55. The AMP approach is not as useful in these areas because the role of the small village (as opposed to the large city) is not as apparent in irrigation 100 101
agriculture based economies, Zaccagnini 1987, pp. 31, 53, 55. Identifying the tensions between selfsufficient villages and central administration is one of the primary uses of the AMP model, and therefore its application to areas that lack self-sufficient villages (as in areas heavily dependent on irrigation) is not productive, Zaccagnini 1987, pp. 53-55. 105 Zaccagnini 1987, p. 14. 106 Zaccagnini 1987, p. 16. 107 Zaccagnini 1987, p. 22. 108 Zaccagnini 1987, p. 22. 109 Zaccagnini 1987, pp. 26-27. 110 Zaccagnini 1987, pp. 23-24. III Zaccagnini 1987, p. 25. 112 Zaccagnini 1987, p. 54. 113 Zaccagnini 1987, p. 25. 114 Zaccagnini 1987, p. 54. 115 Zaccagnini 1987, p. 26. 116 Zaccagnini 1987, p. 26.
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fifth element is the lack of urban-rural differentiation within the village sector. I I? The appearance of these five characteristics is indicative of an Asiatic Mode of Production. For Zaccagnini a number of factors influence the development of an Asiatic Mode of Production. Most important of these are topography and environment. The village community must be able to be self-sufficient and strongly constituted. AMP does not appear in locations that require intense irrigation. However, regions such as North Syria provide a perfect natural environment for the development of AMp'118 It is noteworthy that while Zaccagnini and Wittfogel both use adapted AMP models the geographic settings of their respective Asiatic Modes of Production are almost exactly the opposite.
in the restructuring of society by invaders, though Heltzer sees these invaders as Semitic (Amorites) rather than Indo-Aryans.P> Unlike Gray, Heltzer theorizes that the social system created by the interaction between the invading population and the indigenous population was a spontaneous reaction to the new relationships rather than a formalized one. 126 This contrasting relationship found its most direct manifestation in regards to real estate. Heltzer describes the situation in these terms: The existing land-fund can be divided into two categories: 1) communal land, where the dominant role was played by the village community, which was itself a dependency of the royal administration in fiscal matters, i.e., natural and silver taxes, corvee, conscription, etc.; this land was alienated (sold and purchased) within the community on the condition of observing collective obligations (ilku in Ugarit) and the individual obligations of the family ('unt/ unuliu in Ugarit). 2) royal land, with its two main subdivisions: (a) dispersed royal economy, well known not only from Ugarit, but also from other countries of the area, especially from Mycenaean Greece; and (b) lands distributed as conditional holdings to royal servicemen of various professional groups, in return for their professional services (Pilku/'ubdy in Ugarit), It is interesting to note that the word pilku in the Akkadian of Ugarit originally also meant divided land-plot, as did temenos in Greek, which also appears in Linear B texts. 127
MichaelHeltzerand the Royal Service System Arguably the most prolific writer on Ugaritic economy, Michael Heltzer has been influential in terms of the model he postulates and the manner in which he has organized the data. Through numerous articles and monographs, Heltzer has concentrated on a number of aspects of the Ugaritic economy including its organization and administration. All of his work is predicated on one model of economic relationships. Heltzer's model has been described as a Two-sector model and as an Asiatic Mode of Production (AMP) Model. 119 The term used by Heltzer to describe his model is the Royal Service System and it will be referred to as such here. 120 While Schloen is right to point to the fact that Heltzer was a student of Diakonoff's, and that their models are very similar, it is difficult to describe Heltzer's model as either a Two-sector model or an AMP model.V' In fact it is a blend of both types of model. Heltzer's model is similar to a Two-sector model with the assertion that at Ugarit there were two distinct sets of land: a communal sector and royal sector. 122 However, since Heltzer a~es that both types of landowners were dependents of the king, the single center of authority, his model incorporates elements of an AMP model. 123 This combination of the two types of Marxist models is unique and hence the use of the separate term 'Royal Service System' is appropriate. The Royal Service System was not unique to Ugarit according to Heltzer. He sees all of the eastern Mediterranean in the latter half of the second millennium as characterized by this royal service system. 124 Like Gray, he sees this new social system originating
Both spheres of society - the village and the royal sphere had rights over some land. The king did not possess all of the land. Some real estate was held by the communal sector. However, this communal sector in effect was subservient to the royal sphere. The king of Ugarit while not sovereign over all land was in fact dominant over the entire population.F" Both economies existed side by side, however.V? Under the communal sphere were those elements of life that had existed prior to the invasion of the population that installed the royal sector of authority. Like Gray, Heltzer points to the Kirta epic for evidence of an earlier political system.P? Heltzer implies from this text and others that there was a degree of communal 'self-government' within the village secror.l'" However, property divisions within the village sector were not predicated on equal allocation. 132 Under the royal sphere were two subdivisions of land. The first subdivision, the dispersed royal economy, consisted of local production and distribution units, called gt.133 These estates according to Heltzer were the primary unit of palatial economic activity Heltzer Heltzer 127 Heltzer 128 Heltzer 129 Heltzer 130 Heltzer 131 Heltzer 132 Heltzer 133 Heltzer 125
Zaccagnini 1987, p. 26. 118 Zaccagnini 1987, p. 53. 119 Schloen 2001, p. 221; Smith 2001a, p. 134. 120 Heltzer 1988, p. 7. 121 Schloen 2001, p. 221. 122 Heltzer 1988, pp. 10-11. 123 Heltzer 1978, p. 5. 124 Heltzer 1988, p. 7. 117
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1988, p. 8. 1988, p. 8. 1988, pp. 10-11. 1978, p. 5. 1982, p. 186. 1976b, p. 75. 1976b, p. 77. 1976b, p. 84. 1982, p. 186.
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although not necessarily agricultural estates. 134 The function of these estates according to Heltzer was as a means of storing agricultural tools and palace owned livestock and animals.P? The second subdivision of Heltzer's royal economy, conditional holdings, includes feudal style grants to individuals with specialized skills. The land was granted them in exchange for specialized services rendered. These royal dependents were often organized into groups according to Heltzer and were supervised by royal managers. 136 These royal dependents were the bnJ mlk, to whom Heltzer compares the Akkadian arde Iarri, which translates as 'servants of the king.' 137 The problem with this connection is that it is not supported by the evidence in the polyglots found at Ugarit. As shall be discussed in Chapter Three, the evidence from the polyglots indicates that the term bnJwas equivalent to the Akkadian word aioilum, best translated as "man." There are many other problems with Heltzer's work. 138 Schloen sees a fundamental problem in Heltzer's understanding of real estate ownership at Ugarit, specifically in his simplified notions of real estate ownership. Especially problematic to Schloen is Heltzer's assertion that the king did not have rights over land in the communal sector.P? Schloen argues that in fact there is a hierarchy of rights over real estate.l'" Schloen states: "the fact that, in practice, the king would not usually violate traditional mores by evicting landholders and expropriating their land at will did not nullify the belief that he was the supreme landlord within his domain."141 Other problems with Heltzer's model are even more fundamental. His basic reading of the words must be criticized. Heltzer's main evidence for postulating two different sectors of land-ownership is based on his interpretation of pilku and ilku as words with separate semantic ranges. 142 As we shall see in Chapter Three this distinction cannot be upheld undermining Heltzer's entire argument postulating two separate sectors of land equally dependent on royal authority. This taken with Heltzer's incorrect understanding of the expression bnJmlk and a questionable interpretation of the institution of the gt that will be outlined in Chapter Three demonstrates that the Royal Service System model is purely hypothetical. There is in fact no evidence for its existence and this fundamental flaw undermines most of Heltzer's work on Ugarit. Heltzer's totalizing of social concepts is a general problem in his approach to the economic texts at Ugarit. From a philological standpoint, Heltzer seems to argue that
words have only one meaning and likewise social categories are stable and consistent. This kind of view overly simplifies the ancient situation in which identity was constituted in any number of ways and was frequently constituted in conflicting or separate manners depending on the circumstances. This leads Heltzer to consistently oversimplify situations even at the level of translation. The mistakes are compounded when his philological work, especially his comparative approach, is flawed. More of his specific philological comments are discussed in Chapter Three. Heltzer's attempts at understanding the Ugaritic economy are not entirely based in his conception of a Royal Service System. Heltzer also attempts to understand Ugarit's role in international trade and commerce. That Ugarit's strategic location led to its development as a mercantile power in the Late Bronze age, as argued by Heltzer, is not atypical of other analyses of the site. 143 Heltzer attempts to add to this discussion through his analysis and comparison of prices throughout the Near East. He demonstrates that Ugarit, in a manner similar to the Old Assyrian trade colonies, benefited through the exploitation of the disparity of prices in precious metals throughout the ancient Near East. 144 For example, gold was relatively inexpensive in Egypt compared with the value of gold in Mesopotamia proper and Ugarit gained an advantage by buying low from Egypt and selling high to Mesopotamia.l'v While this assertion sounds plausible, it has very minimal textual support. The argument is made through the comparison of two sets of texts. The first set of texts are those found at Ugarit that sometimes (although surprisingly rarely in the texts he cites) give amounts of metal paid in exchange for other items. 146 The second group of texts includes tablets from Alalakh; Kassite Babylonia; Nuzi-Arrapha; the Hittite Empire; Mari; Old Assyrian times; and Egypt. 147 Most of these texts are roughly contemporary sites but not always.148 More problematic is that these texts reflect a variety of genres and types. For example, the Hittite texts Heltzer uses are all legal documents, yet the majority of other texts used are private sales contracts or lists of items with associated values. 149 The actual similarity of these texts is that all include mention of amounts of silver alongside amounts of various goods. Comparison of these two sets of texts yields, to Heltzer, sufficient evidence that the people of Ugarit participated in speculation in precious metals.P'' In fact, there is no evidence for this. Heltzer assumes that the varying amounts of silver given for objects in all of these texts reflect an abstract conception
134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142
Heltzer 1982, p. 56; 1999b, p. 192. Heltzer 1982, p. 78; 1999b, p. 193. Heltzer 1996, p. 177. Heltzer 1982, p. 15; 1996 p. 177. For a particularly critical reading of Heltzer, see the relevant sections in Schloen 2001. Schloen 2001, p. 231. Schloen 2001, p. 231. Schloen 2001, p. 231. See Heltzer 1982, pp. 34-36 for his extended argument.
')
143 Heltzer 1977, pp. 210-211. For other, similar understandings, see the section of this chapter titled Hellenosemitica and the Brandeis Entrepreneurial Approach. 144 Heltzer 1977, p. 206. 145 Heltzer 1977, p. 206; 1978, p. 101. 146 Heltzer 1978, pp. 3-16. 147 Heltzer 1978, pp. 85-104. 148 Heltzer 1978, pp. 85-104. 149 Heltzer 1978, p. 95 n. 34. 150 Heltzer 1977, pp. 210-211.
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of price that was meaningful beyond that mere encounter. This may be true and likely the relative value of the objects were within a similar range at the same time and place. That these abstract 'prices' can be quantified and compared with other 'prices' is slightly more problematic but one could still argue that if not taken too far, this kind of analysis provides a rough, relative guide to issues of value. Even given this, there is still the problem that there is no evidence that merchants at Ugarit intentionally profited through the differential values of metals throughout the Mediterranean. It is possible, very possible, but the evidence that Heltzer uses to make this argument does not suggest this. Other suspect interpretations of the data are identifiable in Heltzer's work. For example, after listing the known cities within the kingdom of Ugarit, Heltzer makes the following controversial point, " ... about 130 villages had to perform collective obligations and pay collective taxes. It is most interesting that all obligations were performed and paid collectively by the entire village."151 In this statement, Heltzer is conflating different kinds of data. Reading texts that list the tax obligations of certain villages, Heltzer jumps to the conclusion that the city as a whole was responsible for all taxes as a communal entity. There is nothing in the evidence to support this conclusion. While some entity within the village was likely responsible for some kind of collective obligation, it is difficult to argue for the existence of self-sufficient, communal villages taxed as a whole based on this one class of text. Likewise, the use of totalizing adjectives such as "all" obscures the possibility that the people and villages within the Ugaritic sphere of influence were not monolithic entities.
here. For Liverani, the Late Bronze Syrian region as a whole divides basically into two sectors: palatine and free. 154 Laid upon a uniform distribution system of villages (what he calls the heritage neolithique) was a superimposed palatial system.l'? The palatine lands were either worked directly by the palace or were assigned as rewards to palace dependents.l " Members of the free sector, on the other hand, worked their own land, but were obligated to pay taxes to the palace receiving nothing for their efforts. 15? The palace lands were organized as farmsteads called gt according to Liverani. This institution had a distinct economic advantage over the free sector because of two factors. First, the gt workers were deprived of families.P" Second, many of the gt workers were devoted to specialized production.P? These two palatine advantages are evident based on where production surplus was directed. For the free sectors working primarily through a domestic mode of production the surplus had to be expended on supporting the family or esrare.l'" On the other hand, since the gt workers had no family (according to Liverani), the surplus could be directed towards specialized prcduction.l?' The economic advantages held by the royal production sector eventually led to the collapse of the system, in Liverani's model. The gt personnel did not replace themselves (since t r a d no families) and therefore had to be supplied by the villages. 162 Concomitant with this was the precarious condition of the domestic mode of production within the free sector. Since surplus was minimal, and risk aversion was difficult, the village (or free) sector consistently supplied new gt workers. 163 Eventually this negative feedback cycle led to a Late Bronze Age demographic collapse throughout Syria.164
Mario Liverani and the Italian School Italy has produced a number of important scholars in the field of Ugaritic studies. Many of these scholars have worked extensively on administration and economy at Ugarit. Perhaps the most important scholar in this field is Mario Liverani. In a number of studies, Liverani estimated production and consumption amounts of the gt institutions in Ugarit. While his raw data will be discussed later (see Chapter Four), his general conceptions of economic organization are worth discussion here. For the most part, Liverani approaches Ugarit with a Two-sector model similar to Helrzer's.P'' Liverani's approach differs in that it adds a diachronic element that explains the eventual collapse of the Two-sector sysrem.P" The use of the models shows enough differences to make a separate discussion of Liverani's work worthwhile
Schloen provides ample criticism for this model. Suggesting that the gt workers whom Liverani discusses actually did not work at the royal estates year round, Schloen is also able to point to evidence that at least some of these gt workers in fact had families. 165 Similarly Schloen makes arguments that some of the means of production were not owned by the palace sector but rather were brought with the temporary gt workers.l'f While ownership of the means of production and control over the means of production are not the same, Schloen is right to criticize the lack of evidence
154 155 156 157 158
Heltzer 1976b, p. 18. 152 Smith 200la, p. 134. 153 Schloen 2001, pp. 231-232. It should be noted, however, that in an article entitled "The Late Bronze Age Service System and Its Decline," Heltzer argues that the growth of non-productive elements in society, and the inability to support them, concomitant with successive droughts, overtaxed the royal service system leading to its eventual collapse, Heltzer 1988, p. 15. Even in Holtzer's earliest works there are dynamic elements to his model. For example, Heltzer argues for a gradual disintegration of large families throughout Ugaritic history, Heltzer 1976b, p. 102. 151
159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166
Liverani 1989, p. 127. Liverani 1982, p. 251. Liverani 2001, p. 127. Liverani 1989, pp. 127-128. Liverani 1982, p. 253. Liverani 1982, p. 253. Liverani 1982, p. 253. Liverani 1982, p. 253. Liverani 1982, p. 257. Liverani 1989, p. 152. Liverani 1982, p. 252. Schloen 2001, pp. 237, 239. Schloen 2001, p. 238.
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Liverani uses to assert the interconnectedness of the two sectors. Indeed it would seem unwieldy for the palace to support gt workers year round. This does not mean that the gt workers may not have participated in other specialized activities in the off-season.
greater possible understanding of the complex situation. So the king, for example, seemed to have some rights over all land, but these rights were dependent on a number of variables. 172
jose-Angel Zamora and the Expanding Palace Sector Jose-Angel Zamora also approaches the Ugaritic economy from a Two-sector perspective. Like Heltzer, Zamora takes the expression bni mlk as an administrative designation of palace dependents and by extension individuals within the palace's sphere of authority. 167 Ugaritic society was in Zamora's view divided into two large social groups: one (the palatial sphere), which was centralized with specialized skills and dependent on the other; and a rural, communal, and primitive sector. 168 Zamora suggests that the palace sector expanded at the expense of the village sector and that this expansion could be explained by the historical evolution of the whole system. 169 Zamora's Two-sector approach does not differ much from Heltzer's or Liverani's and much of the conclusions presented by Zamora can more strongly be argued for Alalakh.
Clayton Libolt and the Royal Land Grants Clayton Libolt's 1985 dissertation at the University of Michigan, entitled Royal Land Grants from Ugarit, like Gerald Miller's dissertation, incorporates textual methodologies first developed for the study of the Mesopotamian world. 170 This work represents an attempt to understand land tenure at Ugarit, and it marks a significant departure from previous works because of its more sophisticated understanding of the nature of land "ownership." Libolt describes ownership in this way: The word "own," when used in relationship to property, is culturally defined and analytically of marginal usefulness. It is much more useful to describe property in terms of certain rights and obligations. Any number of people may have, in a given culture, rights to a piece of property. The constellation of rights can be quite complex... and, it is the constellation as a whole that describes the land tenure system for a society.l" Libolt shifts the question of land tenure from who owned the land to who has what rights and obligations in regards to the land. This more nuanced understanding allows
Libolt assumes a Two-sector model of society in his analysis. Heritability of granted land is dependent on which sector of society is granted the land. For those outside the palace service system, land grants are heritable, and for those within the Royal Service System, granted land is not~ritable.173 This Two-sector system changed through the last years of Ugarit's existence. Generally, Libolt describes a loss of power on the part of the village and a concomitant rise in the use of administrative districts.V" These changes (among others) were based on the influence of Hittite law and represented the attempts of the Ugaritic king to gain control over the patrimonial elements of society,17s
Ignazio Mdrquez Rowe and Ugaritic Tribute Working under Gregorio del Olmo Lete and joaquin Sanmartin at the University of Barcelona, Ignazio Marquez Rowe engaged in the kind of study that Libolt had undertaken ten years earlier. Rowe's analysis, however, calls into question certain aspects of the Marxist perspective as applied to Ugarit. In a dissertation entitled El ilku en Ugarit. Estudio textualy contextual acerca del sistema tributario territorial, Marquez Rowe examined the system ofland grants used at Ugarit. In a 1999 article, the results of this enquiry were published in English. A dynamic model of land grant legal mechanisms is described, in which the various wordings of the contracts are inconsequential from a legal perspective (contra Libolt) but represent different scribal practices.l" Before the time of Arnmistamru II's reign, royal land grants implied exemption from ilku service.V? After this reign, a royal land grant implied performance of an ilku service, unless specifically exernpted.l?" This evolution corresponded with the changing nature of Hittite laws and thus illustrated the dependent nature of Ugaritic law upon Hittite.l/? Grants and obligations are the basis of Rowe's reconstruction of the social structure of LB Ugarit. Rowe disagrees with the Marxist scholars that LB society could be seen in a bipartite manner: those that had access to the means of production and those that did not. 180 Terms such as bn'f mlk refer not to distinct social classes per se but rather to 172
Zamora 1997, p. 93. 168 Zamora 1997, p. 94. 169 Zamora 1997, p. 112. 170 These methodologies include Libolt's systematic study of one particular type of document. At this point it should be noted that Libolt follows Kienast's methodology that every element in a legal document has meaning, and cannot be relegated as "stylistic," Libolt 1985, p. 21. Both Schloen 2001, p. 242, and Rowe 1999, p. 172, take exception to this approach. 171 Libolt 1985, p. 9. 16?
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173 174 175 176
177 178 179 180
Libolt 1985, p. 9. Libolt 1985, p. 133. Libolt 1985, p. 435. Libolt 1985, pp. 438, 440. Rowe 1999b, p. 172. Rowe 1999b, p. 175. Rowe 1999b, p. 175. Rowe 1999b, pp. 177-178. Rowe 2002, p. 17.
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juridical relationships.l'" Rowe states that Ugaritians did not have an emic understanding of an economic hierarchy but rather: "thought and surely acted in the concrete terms of rights and obligations, their real scale of hierarchy."182 More will be said of Rowe's arguments in Chapter Three but suffice it to say Rowe's conception of hierarchy (flexible and based on social relationships rather than upon a fixed class system) well fits the evidence from Ugarit. .
marine trade, which Linder divides into four categories, royal, private, joint royalprivate, and foreign. 186 All of these kinds of commercial trade operated under the sphere of influence of, and were regulated by royal authority.l'" Linder notes that of the over 350 different commodities that are ~entioned in the economic records: "Only a small proportion of the commodities meritioned could have been absorbed by the local market in Ugarit - the bulk being used in extensive commercial enterprises which characterized the Ugaritic economy."188 With the importance of trade as a central component of Ugaritic economy, the protection of the seas was a necessary component. Linder suggests that there is strong evidence for a native shipbuilding industry as well as evidence for a specific division of labor amongst ship crews.189 Linder suggests the probability that there was a naval analogue to the maryannu, a suggestion made by Astour as well.l'"
3. Entrepreneurial Models The conceptual frameworks employed for the study of the Ugaritic economy that bear closest resemblance to formalist models are the entrepreneurial models. These models understand the Ugaritic economy to have been driven by the same principles as modern capitalist societies, through the risk and ventures of private entrepreneurs. Most of the entrepreneurial models interpret the evidence from Ugarit to indicate the substantial presence of private individuals who engaged in trade and commerce for profit. Profit was the fundamental motivation of these people and they operated in an economic environment essentially similar to that of the modern west.
Hellenosemitica and the Brandeis Entrepreneurial Approach While Cyrus Gordon was at Brandeis University, numerous students were involved in the study of the Ugaritic economy. Brandeis students emphasized those elements of the Ugaritic economy that were integrated within a wider framework of GreekLevantine relations. One of those students engaged in this project, Michael Astour, dubbed this conceptual framework "Hellenosemitica."183 Viewing Ugarit within a wider framework of Aegean and West Semitic relations became an important avenue of study for Ugaritic and Late Bronze Age economy as a whole. For the students of Gordon engaged in the Hellenosemitica project, naval trade as manifest at Ugarit was of the utmost importance. It is this aspect of Late Bronze Age life, which is most often considered the primary mechanism for the transmission of Greek culture to the Levant and vice versa. Elisha Linder, one of Gordon's students, has gone as far as saying that Ugarit was a Canaanite thalassocracy, a term derived from the study of the classical world.V" By thalassocracy, Linder meant to emphasize two important components of Ugaritic economy - its orientation towards sea trade and its naval power from a military perspective.l'" One of these components of this orientation to the sea, manifest in the economic documents at Ugarit, was commercial
I.
Michael Astour
Ugarit as one component of a larger Eastern Mediterranean trade network is emphasized in the work of another Gordon student - Michael Astour. As with Linder, Astour sees Ugarit as part of a Mediterranean trade system in which commercial activity is the dominant activiry.l'" Particularly, Ugarit was, in Astour's words, "the principle transshipment point of Cypriote copper to the inner parts of Western Asia."I92 In his important works on historical geography, Astour identifies two port towns within the Ugaritic kingdom, namely Ma'hadu and Reshu.l'" Ugarit was a medium-sized state surrounded by the larger states of Hatti and Egypt. 194 Astour characterizes Ugarir's situation: "the political history of Ugarit is that of a wealthy but second-rank state which had to adapt itself to the interplay of firstrank powers in the Syrian arena."195 For Astour, Ugarit's geographic location, along numerous important axes of trade, as well as its natural marine resources, defined its position as a trade center for the other major Late Bronze Age players. 196 As such, the merchants at Ugarit enjoyed a position of great influence and power. The relationship between merchants and the palace at Ugarit is unclear in Astour's model. He poses the question of whether merchant activity represented free enterprise or whether the merchants were agents in the employ of the state but is unable to answer
186 187 188 189 190 191
181 182 183 184 185
Rowe 2002, p. 17. Rowe 2002, p. 17. Smith 2001a, p. 77. Linder 1981. Linder 1981, p. 31.
192 193 194 195 196
Linder Linder Linder Linder Linder Astour Astour Astour Astour Astour Astour
1981, 1981, 1981, 1981, 1981, 1973, 1973, 1970, 1981, 1981, 1981,
p. 33. pp. 33,41. p. 36.
p. 38. p. 40. p. 19. p. 19. p. 116. p. 3. p. 4. p. 3.
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this question.l?? He does postulate the existence of voluntary bands of commercial agents (sr) who formed to engage in trade activities. 198 The wealthiest merchants were the maryannu who required other status symbols as markers of their rank. 199 Foreigners at Ugarit were mostly individuals involved in merchant activity.20o ii. Robert Stieglitz Also a Gordon student, Robert Stieglitz devoted energy to the study of the Ugaritic economy.i''! His approach, exemplified in his article "Ugaritic Commodity Prices," involves formalist assumptions of ancient economic behavior. This formalist assumption comes through in his description of the nature of prices in Ugarit: Both barter and currency exchange were utilized in the kingdom ofUgarit, but the overwhelming majority of the documents that list the prices of trades quote them in terms of currency exchange. The currency exchange at Ugarit, not unlike other ancient Near Eastern kingdoms, consisted of exchanging fixed weights of metal, according to the agreed upon standards, for almost all commodities.Pi Stieglitz compares the relative weight standards of Ugarit and other locations and determines the prices (in shekels) of various comrnodities.P'' It is an interesting attempt at applying modern economic techniques to ancient documents but the utility of the project is not quite clear. Since he is unable to sufficiently prove the comparability of his data, or its degree of standardization, it is not clear how this data can be used. iii. Brian Widbin Brandeis produced students engaged in important work at Ugarit even after Gordon's departure from Brandeis in 1973 for a position at NYU.204 R.B. Widbin's 1985 dissertation followed Brandeis's tradition of working with Ugaritic administrative material, in his investigation of the palace's Eastern Archives. Widbin also followed Brandeis's tradition of implicit functionalism. For him though, the functionalism was not in specifying Ugarit's role in a world system but rather investigating the specific function of one archive in the palace, in distinction from the other archives. Widbin considers his approach to be the "archival method" and describes it as follows:
197 198
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~
Its operating assumption is that records are stored together for specific reasons, and the determination of these reasons provides context and control for the interpretation of documents in a given facility.205 Indeed Widbin studies the individual rooms that make up the Eastern archive (according to Schaeffer's designations) and attempts to determine the administrative function of the room from the nature of the documents archived there. More will be said of his specific results in later chapters but for now it is important to emphasize his methods and models. A number of general features of the Brandeis approach to Ugaritic economics can be identified. First, Ugarit is seen as part of a larger system, including the Aegean and the Egyptian and Hittite empires and that part is a large commercial and naval center. Second, social relations are described in primarily functionalist terminology. Third, the Brandeis students take an essentially formalist stance in economics or at least do not consider theoretical aspects of economics to any great extent - preferring to assume a relative "sameness" with the modern world.
Christopher Monroe and the Merchants ofthe Late Bronze Age In his 2000 dissertation from the University of Michigan, Scales of Fate: Trade, Tradition, and Transformation in theEastern Mediterranean ca. 1350-1175 BCE, Christopher Monroe attempts to reconstruct the culture of international commerce during the Late Bronze Age. Monroe uses a wide variety of textual sources, and attempts to describe the nature of mercantile activity at an international scale. Much of his argument derives from evidence at Ugarit, and his interpretations are important in the context of this study of economic modalities. Monroe generally takes a formalist approach to the ancient economy. The goal of ancient trade was profit,206 and this was gained through private enterprise.P? as well as what he calls 'entrepreneurial inheritance.F'" Monroe's analysis of the quest for profit uses the language of marginal utility and equilibrium models. For example, Monroe describes 'the calculus of profit': The three most significant variables in a rational pursuit of profit are value, distance, and transport cost. Differences in value in various locations provide a potential, or calculable, opportunity for exploiting a price difference. The distance between the locations of these values contributes to transport cost, which can increase value. Greater distances imply greater transport costs but also generally greater differences in value. How the trader controls these variables determines in large measure the success he or she has in predicting and making profits.209
Astour 1972, p. 26. Astour 1972, p. 24.
199 These otherstatus markers, according to Astour, were sufficient census, a horse, and state confirmation, Astour 1972, p. 15. 200 Astour 1970, p. 126. 201 Smith 200la, p. 77. 202 Stieglitz 1979, p. 15. 203 Stieglitz 1979, p. 23. 204 Smith 200la, p. 76.
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Widbin 1985, p. 2. Monroe 2000, p. 332. 207 Monroe 2000, pp. 240-241. 208 Monroe 2000, pp. 252-255. 209 Monroe 2000, p. 78. 205 206
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This is a valuable, but not particularly novel approach as it very much reflects the conceptual frameworks of economic analysis initially developed by Adam Smith (see Chapter One). Monroe is able to demonstrate the constraints and possibilities for profit available in the Eastern Mediterranean during the Late
with a value derived from human identity.-t? Through a stylistic analysis, Feldman is able to demonstrate that the same kinds of processes of international exchange discernible in the textual evidence of Late Bronze Age correspondence are manifest in the international material culture at Ugarit. As such, Feldman's work is an important supplement to the modeling of Late Bronze Age international relations as suggested by other, textually oriented scholars. Of particular note in Feldman's discussion is her observation of a particular artistic style she describes as an international koine. 220 Feldman acknowledges, but moves beyond previous scholarship in this direction, by more carefully defining this style. While the specifics of her analysis cannot be dealt with here, it is useful to mention that in general, this international style "encompasses a common, but restricted, repertoire of themes combined in a consistent fashion that defies attribution to anyone region."221 Feldman convincingly demonstrates that the artistic themes in this international style portray ideas and images of rulership.F? That rulership is the most important theme of this work is important in addressing the context of luxury goods as a means of negotiating identity and status within the setting of international relations.F'' Particularly valuable for this discussion of the Ugaritic economy are the implications regarding the goals and purposes of international trade as evidenced in the eastern Mediterranean. The acquisition of these objects goes beyond the mere desire to consume; rather it is focused upon identity and self-perception. There is a justification for trade that goes well beyond notions of marginal utility. The expenses of transportation and production, which were likely very high at an international scale, did not prevent the circulation of these goods. Cost-benefit analysis is somewhat irrelevant since material gain was not the primary purpose for acquiring these items. Great expense and effort could be devoted to the acquisition of these elite items because the reason for acquiring them was not, from a utility perspective, financial gain. When understood from this perspective, it is very clear why prestige items and scarce resources were the dominant goods in LB international trade, instead of foodstuffs or other subsistence items. This observation is consistent with the Finley-Jones model of the Classical econorny.P'
Bronze Age. Monroe treats the ancient economy much the way modern economies are treated. He does not question whether profit was an important motive and he seeks to explore where capital and financing originated.I!'' Occasionally his presuppositions lead to very strange readings of Ugaritic texts. For example, he understands royal land grants as royal investment in private entrepreneurial ventures.P! Similarly problematic, Monroe understands the office of md (see Chapter Three) as a relationship that provided tax breaks for elites. 212 While never reaching the levels of absurdity of formalist scholars like Morris Silver, Monroe's work is beset with uncritical application of modern equilibrium theories upon ancient data. Monroe concludes that traders constituted a distinct, professional group in the LB eastern Mediterranean.U" but the actual nature of individual merchant activity varied considerably.i'" He demonstrates the reliance of this group on royal authorities but also demonstrates how they operate at a supra-state level,215 While "concentrated in the cities," entrepreneurs "thrived in the margins, both within and between societies."216 Monroe sees merchants as contradictory cultural figures. While their status originated in their elite status in certain communities, their ability to profit derived from their liminal presence in other areas. Monroe's work describes and defines the cultural norms of this wealthy marginal group.
Marion Feldman and Late Bronze Age International Koine In her 1998 Harvard Dissertation, Marion Feldman situates ten luxury goods found at Ugarit within the social context of international relations at the same time challenging entrepreneurial models constituted through formalist perspectives. The luxury goods found at Ras Shamra are remnants of a reciprocal exchange system and are evidence of the attempts of Ugaritic kings to demonstrate their status within an international communicy.-'? Understanding the role of these goods through a variety of social scientific lenses.i" Feldman demonstrates that these luxury items were imbued
See, for example, Monroe 2000, p. 123. zn Monroe 2000, p. 124. 212 Monroe 2000, p. 125. 213 Monroe 2000, p. 1. 214 Monroe 2000, p. 346. 215 Monroe 2000, pp. 241, 348. 216 Monroe 2000, pp. 347-348. 217 Feldman 1998, p. 332. 218 EspeciallyAppadurai 1986. 210
4. Managerial and Administrative Approaches to the Economy Perhaps the least clearly identifiable conceptual frameworks used to study the Ugaritic economy are the managerial and administrative models. These models do not necessarily 219 220 221
222 223 224
Feldman Feldman Feldman Feldman Feldman Hopkins
1998, p. 15. 1998, p. 111. 1998, p. 176. 1998, p. 176. 1998, p. 335. 1983, pp. xi-xii.
)
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share similar presuppositions about the organization of power or the motivations of economic activity. What they do share is an orientation towards studying the management and administration of Ugaritic economy. This tends to create descriptions of the economy that emphasize centralized control and redistributive networks. In fact, even though a comprehensive managerial model has not been applied to the data at Ugarit, numerous smaller scale analyses have presupposed this kind of economic organization. Administrative models of economy are frequently employed in the study of cuneiform civilizations. One of the earliest models of economic organization used to understand the cuneiform record is the notion of the temple econorny.P" This model was especially important in German scholarship of Mesopotamia, and many prominent early Sumerologists and Assyriologists are closely linked with it. 226 While the nuances of the temple economy model differed quite a bit, the basic assumptions of the model were broadly consistent. This model has been typically used as a means of explaining the preponderance of economic documents found in temple archives and the expenditure of resources on public-religious architecture and sustenance, especially alongside the earliest periods of state formation in alluvial Mesopotamia. The temple economy model has met with increasing criticism in recent years. Foster has criticized this model, stating that the evidence, especially that used by Deimel, was inadequate at best but more likely incorrectly understood.P? More problematically, this model was based only on texts discovered in temples. 228 Of course the texts found in a temple are going to relate primarily to the affairs of that temple. This does not
mean that there were not aspects of economic life that were not affiliated with the temple. Rather, it suggests that the temple did not keep records of affairs unrelated to the economic activities of the temple. One should expect to find tablets mostly reflecting temple interests if one is only reading tablets found in a temple. Susan Pollock has described an updated form of this model of economy, calling the early Mesopotamian economy a "tributary economy. "229 In this kind of economic system, primary producers have access to most of the resources and most of the means of production.P" Local elites skim off of the top of these producers, extracting some amount of surplus.P! The evidence that Pollock sees for this kind of economic production is based on the. archaeological evidence. There is a marked similarity in economic activities between Ubaid Period sites, and the similar material culture inventories in various domestic structures.P'' The major difference between sites is the inventory of raw materials used. 233 The fact that each settlement did the same kinds of activities but used resources that were available locally indicates a general orientation towards local production.P" Alongside of this household-based economic system is evidence of elite activity, most notably in the forms of temples and temple material culture inventories. 235 The easiest explanation for these two distinct classes of material culture at Ubaid sites is to postulate a system in which temple elites skim off the surplus of household based producers and use it to fulfill, not their own subsistence needs, but rather their cultic or elite activity needs.P" Craft specialization models have also been important managerial models for the study of the ancient Near East. Of great importance in terms of the history of archaeological thought on ancient economy are the writings of V Gordon Childe. A highly prolific writer and a scholar who controlled a vast range of data, Childe made many contributions to this topic. The general recognition of Ugarit's role in the Late Bronze international economy, especially as a principle meeting area between Cyprus and the Levantine coast and a principle region for the transmission of raw materials like copper to Syro-Palestine, suggests a high degree of craft specialization within the eastern Mediterranean.P? Childe's arguments on this topic seem to underlie many conceptions of this particular aspect of economic history, although they are not often acknowledged explicitly as such.
225 A detailed examination of the different forms of the temple economy model that have been argued for is not necessary for the purposes of this examination. Frankfort's suggestions about the nature of temple economy in the Early Dynastic Period (which he dates to circa 3000-2340 BeE) are useful because of his clarity. Frankfort, 1970, p. 44, describes: The effective political unit was the city-state, and each of the gods owned one or more of the cities ...The god who owned the city was its advocate in the assembly of the gods. The doctrine of the divine overlordships had far-reaching consequences in the political and economic spheres. It resulted in a planned society best described as theocratic socialism. All the citizens, high and low, laboured in the service of the god and fulfilled allotted tasks. All tilled his fields and maintained the dykes and canals required for irrigation. Resources and labour were effectively pooled - seed, corn, draught animals, ploughs, and other implements were supplied by the temple. Craftsmen kept this equipment in order and regularly presented a quota of their produce to the temple. So did fishermen and gardeners, and indeed all other artisans. They were organized in guilds under foremen. The harvest of the gods' fields and orchards, gardens and cane-brakes, was likewise stored in the temple and regularly distributed to the community in the form of periodical and special (festival) rations. In Polanyian terms, Frankfort's model of economic organization involves redistribution as the primary pattern of integration. The power that underlies the redistributive system was based on the belief that the city god owns all within certain spheres of influence. The temple acts as the locus of communal effort and the economic authority of the Early Dynastic community. 226 Diakonoff 1974, p. 6. For examples of scholarship on the supposed temple economies, see Deimel 1931 (for a summary of his seventeen articles on the topic), Falkenstein 1954, Frankfort 1970, and Schneider 1920. 227 Foster 1981, p. 241. 228 Gelb 1971 and Zettler 1996.
229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237
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Pollock 1999, p. 79. Pollock 1999, p. 80. Pollock 1999, p. 80. Pollock 1999, p. 83-84. Pollock 1999, p. 84. Pollock 1999, p. 81. Pollock 1999, pp. 86-87. Pollock 1999, p. 92. Astour 1973 and Rainey 1962, for example.
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For Childe, technology lay at the heart of social evolution.P" At the heart of the 'urban revolution' 239 was the ability of a society to produce enough surplus that individuals could engage in non-subsistence labor, and use the surplus of that labor to gain their subsistence needs. 240 These craft specialists could be engaged in this work either full or part time, and could be independent or attached to elite organizations.r'! At Ugarit, scholars have concentrated on the roles of attached specialists more than independent specialists. As such, discussion of craft specialization at Ugarit has usually been from the palace's administration of craft specialist activities, and hence discussion of craft specialization here should be included in the discussion of managerial models. Functionalist models of society, where economic roles make up the constituent parts of the whole, have been used by scholars of the Ugaritic economy. Sometimes the society is seen as managed from a central, redistributive agent. While the temple has not been described as this agent at Ugarit, the palace has and models of palatial control similar to temple economy models have been put forward. What follows is an examination of some of the more important managerial models.
it was "haphazard and disorganized, meaning that strict central control would have been impossible."242 The reader is not told what constituted control, nor how Whitt's inability to discern an organizational system indicates that record keeping was haphazard. Was it truly haphazard, or did depositional processes and archaeological retrieval techniques skew the findspots of the tablets? Or was perhaps the organization of the palace administration not based upon modern notions of efficiency in information retrieval? These kinds of questions, which radically alter the conclusions of such a study, are not really addressed. Methodological considerations instead revolve around defining the uses of record keeping in non-cuneiform societies (i.e., medieval Europe and classical Athens) and evaluating how well Whitt's reconstruction of the Ugaritic archive fulfills the goals of record-keeping as defined by those other societies.243 While much could be gained from comparing the palace archive of Ugarit with archives in other situations, "sameness" must not be assumed between these civilizations a priori. This kind of naive approach to the study of cuneiform civilization is found throughout Whitt's work. Whitt's understanding of the nature of palace administration is telling. In his words: "Palace administration is best understood in terms of scribal offices and the activities each oversaw."244 For Whitt, the palace administration at Ugarit is a manifestation of what Weber would call (although Whitt does not discuss Weberian approaches) a rationalized bureaucracy. Whitt's study presupposes that the administrative sector of the palace was organized into discreet entities (offices), with discreet functions within the greater bureaucracy. Each section of the administration was defined by its administrative role, rather than the personal relationship of the worker to the king or higher official. As will be discussed below, other scholars take pains to show that Ugaritic society is better characterized as patrimonial (see for example Schloen 2001). Whitt acknowledges that it can be difficult to differentiate between public and private institutions, and uses the Murasu family archive (from Neo-Babylonian Nippur) as an example. 245 This presupposition carries further into Whitt's definition of an archive. Based on Posner's discussion at the 30 th Rencontre, Whitt defines an archive as all of the records accumulated while a particular function was performed by a particular institution or individual.f'? This stands in distinction to what Posner calls the "German tradition," in which an archive is an accumulation of records that have long-term value.247 Whitt's
William Whitt and ArchivalStudies William Whitt's 1993 dissertation at Duke University, Archives and Administration in the Royal Palace of Ugarit, is an attempt at an archival approach on a larger scale than Widbin's. Widbin's dissertation focused on the Eastern archive of the Royal Palace and used a heavy philological component. Widbin provided text editions of each of the tablets found in the Eastern archive. Whitt's approach is different because he attempts to compare the various, discreet archives of the Royal Palace, without attempting substantial philological discussion. He does not provide texts or translations, but he does catalogue the texts in each room, with notations about what type of text each is. He also attempts to reconstruct the findspots of the various texts. Unfortunately, Whitt's work does not provide much original research to the field of Ugaritic studies. His dissertation usefully gathers information previously published by the Mission Archaeologique Francais in a wide number of journals. It is worth discussing Whitt's dissertation in detail since it demonstrates many of the theoretical problems in utilizing an archival approach at Ugarit, theoretical problems that are in fact not solved by Whitt's work. Whitt's desire to integrate archaeological and textual material is commendable, but unfortunately his lack of critical engagement with either source of evidence cripples his study. His general lack of theoretical perspective makes his discussions of the role of archives and the palace in society confused and misleading. For example, his evaluation of the role of record-keeping and administration at Ugarit concludes that 238 239 240 241
Wailes 1996, p. 4. See Wailes 1996, pp. 3-4, for discussion of Childe's revolution based social evolutionary theories. Childe 1953, pp. 124, 129. Wailes 1996, p. 5.
Whitt 1993, p. 278. Whitt 1993, p. 284. 244 Whitt 1993, p. 1. 245 Whitt 1993, p. 3.Later it will be shown that instances like the Murasu family actually provide a better analogue for many of the other houses at Ugarit (i.e., Urtenu, Rap'anu, etc.) than other models. For more on rhis archive, see Bregstein 1993. 246 Whitt 1993, p. 2. 247 Whitt 1993, p. 2. 242 243
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preference for the non-German definition of archive keeping reflects his general conclusion that Ugaritic record keeping was inefficient, with minimal organization or retrieval ability.248 For Whitt, the goals of the record keeping were twofold: to assist the scribe's memory, and to provide a feeling of "assurance" for the parties involved in the document.v'? The overall impression ofUgaritic society, which Whitt derives from his study of the palace archives, is one of decentralized palace control.P? He draws a direct parallel with medieval European Feudalism, calling it a provincial sysrem.f" He recognizes that the king gave power to individuals with whom the king had a personal relationship.P? It is hard to reconcile this notion with Whitt's general understanding of the archives as rational bureaucratic offices. Each archive in the palace represented a particular office in Whitt's reconstruction. In general, Whitt's conclusions about the specific functions of the different archives do not differ much from Claude Schaeffer's initial suggestions. In his abstract, Whitt summarizes his findings: "the west office was mainly concerned with the military, the east office with in-coming and out-going goods and commodities, and the central office with legal and diplomatic affairs; the southwest office was responsible for baking tablets produced by other offices."253 Whitt's suggestion about the Southwest office can be discounted out of hand, as it has been proven that Schaeffer was mistaken in his identification of an oven in this area (see Chapter Six). The practice of baking tablets is more common to modern museums than to archives in the Ancient Near East.
Zamora analyzes the Ugaritic economic material from a number of perspectives. The role of vineyards and vine products in the administrative records are a subject of analysis. Zamora's observations in these areas shall be discussed in appropriate later sections. Arguments are made about the specific meaning of Ugaritic terminology; especially helpful are the identifications of specific words with parts of the vine and its fruits. These lexical arguments are especially convincing on account of Zamora's thorough understanding of botanical information, and the thorough use of all types of available textual evidence. Following a commodity chain style methodology, Zamora describes the life cycle of vines and their products, using textual and ethno-archaeological data as well as economic geography. The study of the lifecycle of these products continues through a discussion of their circulation, through administrative apparatus and commerce. Finally, the ideological and social role of these products within Ugaritic and Late Bronze Age society are discussed. Zamora's contributions to the study of Ugaritic economics fall in two categories. The first category is Zamora's specific contributions to understanding the specifics of the viticulture at Ugarit. The specific contributions to lexical issues and the new readings of texts will be discussed later. It is important to mention here Zamora's categorization of the overall organization of the industry. Production and consumption of vine products occurred primarily at a local level.255 There is some indirect evidence suggestive of larger palatial complexes dedicated to viticulture, but most production operated on a small scale.256 The circulation of these vine products was diverted to the central administration through a variety of taxation mechanisms.P? In Zamora's analysis, these taxation systems are the palace's primary means of accessing the viticulture components. The second contribution made by Zamora is more germane to this specific discussion - methodology. Zamora demonstrates the value of approaching a specific question from a multi-disciplinary perspective. Rather than just studying the textual evidence attempting to identify the semantic range of isolated terminology, Zamora comes at the subject of viticulture from a number of different angles including biological and social issues. Likewise, Zamora describes the economic aspects of viticulture as inseparable from the social role of viticulture, incorporating the embedded nature of economy into the discussion.
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jose-Angel Zamora and Ugaritic Vineyards One of the more in depth studies of one particular aspect of the Ugaritic economy was produced by Jose-Angel Zamora (2000), working in Madrid, under JesusLuis Cunchillos.P? Zamora has undertaken a thorough analysis of vineyards and the products of vineyard exploitation (especially wine) within the kingdom ofUgarit in La Vid y el Vino en Ugarit. The analysis is primarily based on textual evidence. However, Zamora goes far beyond most text-centered studies of economic topics by exploring the material manifestations of this activity. Discussion of the material culture behind the textual evidence is an important component of Zamora's overall interpretations. While the archaeological evidence of vineyard activity and grape processing at Ugarit is meager, Zamora uses evidence from other parts of the Late Bronze Age Mediterranean to understand the textual evidence. 248 249 250 251 252 253 254
Whitt Whitt Whitt Whitt Whitt Whitt Smith
1993, p. 289. 1993, p. 290. 1993, p. 292. 1993, p. 292. 1993, p. 292. 1993, p. iv. 2001a, p. 207.
5. Patrimonial Models Recent studies of the ancient Near Eastern economy have emphasized the primacy of the household as an organizing principle for economic activity. This had long been 255 256 257
Zamora 2000, p. 144. Zamora 2000, p. 144. Zamora 2000, p. 144.
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recognized in the Classical world. 258 For example, Finley's conception of the Greek institution of leitourgia (liturgy) sees the household as an important economic force. Finley discusses this concept at length:
order for them to engage in a specific economic activity and return the surplus from that activity to the larger household.F'" These "entrepreneurs" were completely embedded within the larger institution.F? Gelb similarly sees the household as an analogy used by Mesopotamians to understand and describe their economic situations. Recognizing the use of e (Sumerian) or bitum (Akkadian), both meaning "household," Gelb argues that it is important to investigate the usage of this terminology.266 He suggests, following D.R. Bender, that family, defined by kinship, needs to be distinguished from household, defined by co-residence.F" According to Gelb, whereas familial terminology reflects biological relationships, terminology for households (like e or Mtum): "extends in meaning to cover social groupings ranging from a small family household living under one roof to a large socio-economic unit, which may consist of owners and/or managers, labor force, domestic animals, residential buildings, shelters for the labor force, storage bins, animal pens, as well as fields, orchards, pastures, and forests."268 The Mesopotamian household is not just the physical structure of the house, but like the Greek use of oikos, includes all the social and economic means for the support of the complex.P? Yet even though the terminology for household in early Mesopotamia is used in state, temple, and private contexts, it is still necessary to differentiate between private households and public households.F'' The difference lies in the basis of ownership. Kin groups own or hold land in private households. Officials hold, own, or manage land in an official capacity in public households.F! From a practical standpoint, these two types of land ownership may overlap, but conceptually the justification for the ownership and usage of the land lies in different types of authority.272 It is important, for those reasons, to distinguish the two types of households in studying Mesopotamia. Gelb suggests that this difference is reflected in language. Private households are referred to with the construction e+ Personal Name. 273 Public households are referred to with the construction e+ Occupation Name. 274 While not stated by Gelb, if applied
The Greek liturgy was rooted in the age when the community was still inchoate, when the aristocratic households performed essential public services, such as the construction of a temple, by expending labour and materials at their private disposal. In the classical city-state the liturgy had become both compulsory and honorific at the same time, a device whereby the non-bureaucratic state got certain things done, not by paying them from the treasury but by assigning to richer individuals direct responsibility for both the cost and the operation itself.259
Greek Liturgy involved the hegemonizing of local elite values and directing their resources to public production. The utility of this model for the study of the ancient Near East will become clearer as this discussion develops. Certainly, the Greek Liturgy seems to be at least partially analogous to the large business families of the Neo-Babylonian period (i.e., Murasu and Egibi). The analysis of economics as driven by large households works well with Near Eastern evidence. Johannes Renger has outlined how the household economy operated on different scales. On this he states: "key elements in such an ideal-type of household economy are the unity of labor, living together within a household, and consumption of where there are no prices, no wages, no rent, no profit or capital."260 This notion of household economy as an ideal type does not depart much from Weber's perspective. However, for Renger, scale is a distinguishing variable among household production centers. Renger comments: "Only the institutional economy of the large households has a tendency to maximize production in order to support administrative and political superstructures and to be used for conspicuous consumption and prestige."261 These large institutional households often attempt to free themselves from certain kinds of activities. 262 Especially problematic for the larger households was the provision of subsistence needs for large labor forces year round. 263 This was accomplished by providing economic materials (i.e., tools, land) to certain members of the household, in
Renger 1994, p. 173. Renger 1984, p. 38. 266 Gelb 1979, pp. 2-3. 267 Gelb 1979, p. 1. 268 Gelb 1979, p. 3. 269 Gelb 1979, p. 3-4. 270 Gelb 1979, pp. 4-5. 271 Gelb 1979, pp. 4-5. 272 Gelb 1979, p. 5. Like Gelb, van Driel sees the temple and palace as the primary institutions in ancient Mesopotamia, and follows Gelb's suggestions that they can be viewed as households, van Driel 1999, p. 25. Van Driel raises a compelling point regarding the supposed patrimonialism of these institutions in another work. Van Driel argues that even though much of the structures of these institutes are analogous to households, in fact the redistributive mechanisms do not act as a household, van Driel 2002, p. 326. The palace, according to van Driel pays wages at the lowest rates possible, rather than along equitable lines as might be expected from a household, van Driel 2002, p. 326. 273 Gelb 1979, p. 11. 274 Gelb 1979, p. 11. 264
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258 Indeed, the Greek word from which the English term economy derives, oikonomia, is best understood as referring to the management of the oikos, Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1977, p. 8. This notion of managing the oikos is integral to understanding one of the major motivations behind the Greek and Roman paterfamilias. The proper management of the patrimonial estate was the major goal of economic activity, Veyne 1987, p. 139. This is distinguishable from the modern goal of investment - the production or acquisition of more capital. The Roman goal was not to make money, but to successfully provide for and manage the estate, Crook 1967, p. 207. This does not necessarily imply that capital accumulation was not a means of proper management of the estate, but it is to say that this was not the goal of such activities. 259 Finley 1985 [1973], p. 151. 260 Renger 1994, p. 170. 261 Renger 1994, p. 172. 262 Renger 1994, p. 172. 263 Renger 1984, p. 64.
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bt mlk (house of the king) should be considered a public
household, distinct from a private household. The organization of economic activity in Mesopotamia as oriented along household models has been well demonstrated. A good case study of this is the Ur III Temple of Inanna at Nippur, investigated in detail by Richard Zettler. The management of the economy of the temple was centralized under one official who acted in many capacities. 275 He represented the temple publicly (including legal settings); he received goods and could distribute them as well.276 In return for these services, this administrator held a substantial temple land allotment.F? The basis of his authority is unclear, but since the office was held by the same family for at least four generations, it was likely hereditary-?" Zettler suggests that perhaps this kind of landholding is analogous to the Islamic institution of the waqf, in which property is set aside as an endowment forever, as a means of pleasing God. 279 The hereditary nature of this office is remarkable. Zettler argues that this constitutes proof that the typical tripartite understanding of Mesopotamian society (royal, religious, and private)280 does not sufficiently represent the complexity of the situation.P" While there is only meager evidence for the temple's ties to the rest of Nippur, Zettler makes a number of important observations on this topic. 282 The temple was connected to the state economy in that it received goods as well as gave them to the central, government administration.P" Zettler describes links to other temples in Nippur as informal.2 84 Particularly noteworthy in this regard are examples of the sharing oflabor resources between temples. 285 Zettler also identifies evidence for a significant private sector in Nippur and its environs, contra Steinkeller.P" There are a number of manifestations of the temple's activities in relation to the private sector. Land was leased to private citizens who would produce surplus to sell on the market, in exchange for a share of the yield. 287 Commodities and goods that could not be Zettler 1992, p. 177. Zettler 1991, p. 108; 1992, p. 208. 277 Zettler 1992, p. 208. 278 Zettler 1991, p. 109; 1992, p. 177. 279 Zettler 1992, pp. 211-213. 280 See Steinkeller 1991, p. 22 for a typical use of this kind of tripartite model. 281 Zettler 1992, p. 235. 282 Zettler 1992, p. 215. Van Driel also expresses reservations regarding the oft-assumed self-sufficiency of patrimonial institutions, van Driel1999, p. 27. Indeed, these institutions do not work with the primary goal of self-perpetuation or support, but rather as organizations serving external purposes and integrated into a wider economy, van Driel1999, p. 27. In his own words, van Driel1999, p. 28, states that these institutions, "were in general not free agents, but increasingly became the executive organs of a centralizing monarchy which operated on a regional or country-wide basis." 283 Zettler 1992, p. 217. 284 Zettler 1992, p. 218. 285 Zettler 1992, p. 176. 286 Zettler 1992, p. 236. 287 Zettler 1992, pp. 219-220. 275
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produced through agriculture were gained through middlemen.P" The merchants who worked for the temple that Zettler has identified were not explicitly members of the temple; rather they were private citizens who bought and sold on behalf of the temple.P? Similarly, smiths seemed to be affiliated with the temple, but outside of its direct authority. In general, Zettler has demonstrated that this temple at Nippur was not self-sufficient, nor was it an independent political entity. Rather, it was completely integrated into the regional economy of Nippur and the Ur III state. 290 For this study of the economy at Ugarit, Zettler's analysis of the economic power of a single, non-royal family at Nippur is valuable. He paints a picture of wealthy, local elites dominating an official institution over time. Even though dynasties change and the political organization of the state is not stable, the power of this family is.291 Other members of the family demonstrated more authority within the temple than their official status may have led one to expect. 292 Indeed, Zettler chooses to label this kind of administration as "patrimonial."293 Similar situations have been identified at Ugarit, and at this stage it is important to return to Ugarit.
The French Team's Recognition ofLarge Non-Royal Houses
An important conceptual shift in the study of Ugarit by the French team has involved the gradual recognition of the importance of understanding the prominence of non-royal houses and families at the site. An excellent example of this changing understanding is apparent in the team's treatment of the erroneously labeled "Palais Sud." The close proximity of the Southern Palace to the Royal Palace, and the high volume of textual discoveries had obscured the non-royal aspects of this structure. It was recognized, however, that these texts reflected the importance of an individual named Yabninu in the commercial affairs of the site. In 1990, Courtois published the results of his re-examination of the texts and archaeology of this particular structure. Courtois argues that the chief resident of this building was Yabninu, mentioned in both the archives of the "Southern Palace" and the Royal Palace.F" The distinction between royal and non-royal, or private and public structure is problematic, given the archaeological and textual evidence regarding Yabninu's activities and role within Ugaritic society. Not only was Yabninu a wealthy merchant, but he also functioned as an administrator and diplomat of the kingdom of Ugarit. 295 Through comparison with other texts found in the palace archive, Courtois 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295
Zettler 1992, p. 220. Zettler 1992, pp. 225-226. Zettler 1992, p. 231. Zettler 1991, p. 114. Zettler 1991, p. 113. Zettler 1991, p. 114. Courtois 1990, pp. 105-106. Courtois 1990, p. 107.
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successfully demonstrates that Yabninu was an active member of Ugaritic society in the time just before the destruction of the city.296 Study of the texts found within the Southern Palace, and comparison with texts found in the other archives, led Courtois to conclude that the Southern Palace had a monopoly on the importation of grain crops from the villages near the Orontes, on the importation of tin and 'iron, and on some aspects of forest resource exploitation, such as lumber, resin, oils, and medicinal products.F" Other textual and archaeological evidence demonstrates the close mercantile connections of the Southern Palace to Egypt and the Aegean. 298 Courtois' arguments that the Southern Palace was involved in shipbuilding are not as definitive, but at very least indicate that there was a naval orientation within the archive.P" Related to the control of grain imports from Transorontian villages, Courtois postulates, based on the preponderance of syllabic correspondence in the Southern Palace, as well as the frequent repetition of the same toponyms in the texts of the Southern Palace, that the residents of this structure were involved in the administration of the eastern part of the kingdom of Ugarit. 30o Other evidence further indicates that Yabninu had a greater role at Ugarit than mere mercantile. Epistolary texts indicate that Yabninu was charged with a diplomatic mission to Amurru.l'" This is, however, not as unexpected as Courtois leads one to believe. From the Amarna letters, it is evident that diplomacy and international trade went hand in hand. It is not surprising then, to have evidence that a merchant at Ugarit would also be charged with royal diplomatic responsibilities. More surprising though is the presence of census texts in the Southern Palace. There are clear records (kept in the Southern Palace Archive) of the movement of people, both foreigners at Ugarit and Ugaritians in foreign locales. 302 Courtois argues that the personnel of the Southern Palace played a dual administrative role, taking censuses and acting as a police force. 303 The picture of Yabninu that emerges from this reconsideration of the evidence is clear. Yabninu had close connections to the Ugaritic royalty, but at the same time operated independently, and for his own gain. While he represented the king of Ugarit in various instances, this was not a 'job' per se, but rather represented specific situations where he was asked to act in that capacity. Yabninu, and the Southern Palace, had a specific role in the administration of the kingdom that included keeping track of merchants, and a less specified role relating to the eastern part of the kingdom. Yabninu's
house had particular trade, and/or industrial interests; especially noteworthy is the exploitation of forest resources and importation of precious metals. This suggests some degree of division of mercantile interests within the kingdom. However, the level of formality of the specification of these interests is not apparent from the present evidence. The 1973 discovery of what would later be identified as the House of Urtenu altered the general conception of the social structure of Ugarit. Initial publications refer to this structure as the bibliotbeque au sud de fa ville (see Bordreuil 1991 for example). At a colloquium in 1993, published in Ras Shamra-Ougarit (RSO) 11, Bordreuil and Pardee argued that this bibliotheque was the home of an important individual, Urtenu.F" The texts so far published (in Ras Shamra-Ougarit (RSO) 7, Ras Shamra-Ougarit (RSO) 14, and The Context ofScripture Volume 3) have demonstrated the importance of maritime trade and the numerous connections between Urtenu and the royal family.305 The discovery of substantial archives outside of the palace, containing tablets relating to international affairs, internal administration and economic affairs in general, has altered the prior models of Ugaritic society where the palace was seen as the dominant economic force at the site. The existence of a wealthy merchant class, both dependent on the palace and, at the same time independent of it has been postulated.F" The palace provided the merchants with certain economic materials that they had full control over.307 The members of this "merchant class" could also have been the heads of "international commercial firms," or at least involved in the activities of these firms. 308
Juan Pablo Vita and Alternative Administrative Centers Another scholar from Madrid is Juan Pablo Vita. 309 In an article in The Handbook of Ugaritic Studies, Vita describes many of the elements of Ugaritic society in broad terms. It is worth mentioning those aspects of Ugaritic society where Vita's views differ considerably from previous scholarship. Departing from the long held notion of Dietrich and Loretz, Vita sees Ugaritic social structure as distinct from the social structure postulated for Alalakh. 310 Social rankings were economic based, but also permeable.P!' In other words, it was possible for an individual's social ranking to change, and it was possible for an individual to hold more than one rank at a time. 312 For example, in PRU 3, 79, md of the king
Bordeuil and Pardee 1995. Yon 1995a, pp. 443, 449. 306 Malbran-Labat 2000, p. 195. 307 Malbran-Labat 2000, p. 195. 308 Bordreuil and Malbran-Labat 1995, p. 444; Malbran-Labat 2000, p. 195. 309 Smith 2001a, p. 137. 310 Vita 1999, p. 464. For Dietrich and Loretz's arguments, see Dietrich and Loretz 1966b; 1969a; 1969b; and 1970. 3ll Vita 1999, p. 464. 312 Vita 1999, pp. 465-467. 304 305
296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303
Courtois Courtois Courtois Courtois Courtois Courtois Courtois Courtois
1990, pp. 132-133. 1990, p. 141. 1990, pp. 131, 134-137, 140. 1990, p. 141. 1990, p. 132. 1990, p. 134. 1990, p. 114. 1990, p. 114.
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and maryannic do not seem to be mutually exclusive categories.P" Vita argues that social mobility was possible in Ugarit for a number of reasons. In, PRU 3, 162, by decree of the king, individuals were transferred from mru of a governmental official to mru of the queen.I'" Marriage also suggests to Vita the possibilities of social mobility, especially when the woman loses the status of servant before marriage, for example in
through which other social relationships could be viewed. On the other hand, the use of the symbol of the house of the father reinforced this social unit as the primary constituent of ancient society.322 These two social forces reinforced each other's validity. This patrimonial household model (PHM) that Schloen posits as the basis of his model is an adaptation of Max Weber's concept of the patrimonial house ideal type. 323 There has already been a discussion of Weber's patrimonial ideal type in Chapter One. It is important to note here that Schloen emphasizes that the PHM model, following Weber: "is the antithesis of rationalized bureaucracy."324 For Schloen then, the lack of rational bureaucracy (in the Weberian sense) is a feature of societies based on PHM. Indeed, Schloen argues that while it is possible to talk about officials, the offices held by these individuals were intrinsically related to their social status. 325 He states unequivocally about Ugarit: "There is no evidence of a complex system of ranked bureaucratic offices."326
PRU 3, 85.315 It is also important to note Vita's view of the major households with administrative records found outside of the palace proper (i.e. Rap'anu, Yabninu, Urtenu, and Rasapabu), These houses, in Vita's view, were administrative centers in the later years of the kingdom's existence.l'" However, Vita does not describe the role of these houses in the royal administration or in their relationship to one another. Possibly related to these houses is the practice of the palace giving certain amounts of goods to traders to exchange in trading missions, from which the palace would obtain profits. 3!7
Stager, Schloen and the University ofChicago Neo-Weberians In a groundbreaking paper, "The Archaeology of the Family in Ancient Israel", Lawrence Stager argues for the utility and accuracy of Weber's ideal type oikos model in ancient Israel, especially as it relates to the Levant in the Iron Age.318 This has been a very influential paper, both in its application of Weberian theory and in its integration of archaeological and textual data. Stager is able to add the specific data to Weber's model that were unavailable to scholars working when Weber was. The household, for Stager (and King in a later work), was the dominant arena of economic activity.3!9 King and Stager incorporate Polanyian theory into the Weberian model established .by Stager. In King and Stager's opinion, all three Polanyian patterns of integration, reciprocity, redistribution, and market, were present in ancient Israel. The question remains as to which was the predominant pattern of inregration.V" For King and Stager, market exchange was not very prominent at the level of the individual household, which was basically self-sufficient.F! David Schloen, in his book The House ofthe Father asFact and Symbol, based on his 1995 Harvard Dissertation, argues that the "fact" of the patronymic house and the symbol of the household were inextricably intertwined in Ugaritic society. The demographic "fact" of the house of father as the primary economic unit provided a symbol
313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321
Vita 1999, p. 465. Vita 1999, p. 466. Vita 1999, p. 467. Vita 1999, p. 471. Vita 1999, p. 472. Stager 1985. King and Stager 2001, p. 192. King and Stager 2001, p. 192. King and Stager 2001, p. 192.
Schloen applies his argument to Ugarit specifically, as well as to Near Eastern society as a whole. This discussion shall concentrate on those aspects of Schloen's arguments that are helpful in reconstructing Ugaritic social structure in relation to the economy. On the general nature of Ugaritic social structure, Schloen states: "The kingdom of Ugarit, like its neighbors, was essentially a hierarchy of households-nested-withinhouseholds, with the royal household at its apex."327 Each level in this hierarchy was conceived of as a betu 'abi, with relative authority understood through familial terminology. Weber's patrimonial ideal type is attractive to Near Eastern scholars because it is consistent with emic categories of expression.P'' Household language was, in Schloen's view, the dominant means of expression in the pre-Axial Near East. 329 Schloen describes the nature of this household terminology: These terms were used metaphorically, to be sure, but this does not mean that they were merely casual figures of speech or euphemisms for "real" economic and political relationships. They were widely used because alternative conceptions of social hierarchy were not readily available.P"
Schloen 20001, p. 1. Schloen 2001, p. 51. Note that Monroe argues that Schloen's interpretation and use of Weber in his 1995 dissertation is extremely simplistic and possibly should not be described as Weberian, Monroe 2000, pp. 327-331. This is not a particularly legitimate criticism as Schloen certainly uses aspects of Weber's thought as foundations for his own. Due to the volume of writing produced by Weber and the dynamic nature of his thinking, it is very easy to find internal inconsistencies within Weber's corpus. 324 Schloen 2001, p. 51. 325 Schloen 2001, p. 252. 326 Schloen 2001, p. 253. 327 Schloen 2001, p. 209. 328 Schloen 2001, p. 255. 329 Schloen 2001, P: 255. 330 Schloen 2001, p. 255. 322 323
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For Schloen, the people of Ugarit did not use other means to describe hierarchical relationships. A nested series of patrimonial relationships extended throughout the entire kingdom. Schloen states:
conceptual circuit as opposed to the two conceptual circuits explicitly posited by Liverani. Both scholars model power as a nested hierarchy culminating in an apical power source. Both argue that there was minimal distinction between urban and rural in antiquity, and both see the bottom of the hierarchy (village or household) as strong and self-sufficient. The main difference is the justification of the hierarchy; in Schloens model this justification is based on a reifying metaphor of family, and for Liverani this justification is based on land ownership. The criticism most consistently leveled at Schloen's argument is not that the model itself is wrong, but that Schloen uses his model for too much. 340 The PHM model cannot explain all aspects of social life in the ancient Near East. In fact, Monroe argues that this model is based on uncritical readings of "propagandizing texts"341 and that the model serves little to understand anything beyond political ideology.342 More balanced criticism comes from Daniel Fleming. In a review article, Fleming explores some of the problems with the overuse of Schloen's explanatory framework, which problematically for Fleming does not incorporate evidence for pastoralism.Y" As a demonstration of how the PHM model does not accurately reflect all Near Eastern social situations, Fleming uses evidence from Mari and Emar. 344 At Mari, Fleming emphasizes the importance of the 'tribal' social organization that King Zimri-Lim participated in. This 'tribal' organization superseded the urban and state levels of organization, and constituted a separate system of social orientation, suggesting a much more complex situation than a simple series of nested patrimonial relationships.Pv Turning to the Emar material, Fleming argues for a number of situations where the social organization does not seem to have originated in patrimonial, royal authority. Derived from his previous studies on ritual at Emar,346 Fleming outlines a situation where the king does not play an active or prominent role in citywide ritual activity.347 Related to this, Fleming sees evidence that, "the tradition of town-owned land, still collective in its terminology by the 13th century, emerged under an ideology different from that of the king-as-father-who-owns-all."348 Fleming argues that his reading of the Emar material is distinct from Marxist Two-sector models and draws out important evidence that Schloen's model does not reflect Near Eastern reality as neatly as Schloen argues for.349
It is sufficient to note here that individual ownership of entire villages, including their land and inhabitants, is' a clear indication of a hierarchy of households. Individual households within the village rendered taxes and service to the owner of the village, who in turn was a servant of the king. 33l
This model was replicated for all relationships within the kingdom. It was the manner, in Schloen's view, of all forms of organization. As such, due to the PHM as fact and symbol, Schloen suggests, "familiar household relationships provided the pattern not only for governmental authority and obedience but also for the organization of production and consumption and for the integration of the gods within human society."332 So, in Schloen's understanding, this PHM directly affected economic life at Ugarit. In practice, this patrimonial social structure meant a greater decentralization than what might initially be thought, given that all of society was part of the king's household. He states: "political authority and economic exchange were realized through dyadic personal relationships between social superiors and their dependents at each level rather than being focused in the single node of the palace."333 Schloen suggests that while the royal household was the apex of authority, it was more likely to engage in administration through upper level householders.V" So economic relationships and experiences would be manifest as particular household interactions rather than as a grandly unified scheme. Schloen's point is missed by Monroe, who argues that the society posited by Schloen is too repressive and rigid to have actually existed in the ancient world. 335 Schloen actually argues for an extremely decentralized society. There are two greater implications of PHM that Schloen posits. The first is what he calls, "a structural homology between center and periphery."336 The most important manifestation of this is in the lack of distinction between urban and rural spheres of life."337 The second is that center 338 and periphery are integrated through unequal, household relationships.P? In many ways, the PHM model is very similar to the Asiatic Mode of Production described by Liverani, although Schloen sees only one nested
Schloen 2001, p. 254. Schloen 2001, p. 254. 333 Schloen 2001, p. 317. 334 Schloen 2001, p. 317. 335 Monroe 2000, p. 326. 336 Schloen 2001, p. 317. 337 Schloen 200 I, p. 317. 338 Note that by center, Schloen is using Shils' definition, which is not spatial as such but rather relates to a society's governing values and symbols, Schloen 200 I, p. 3 I 7. 339 Schloen 200 I, p. 317. 331
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341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349
Fleming 2002; Monroe 2000; Routledge 2004, pp. 127-132; and Stone 2003. Monroe 2000, p. 185. Monroe 2000, p. 331. Fleming 2002, p. 76. Fleming 2002, p. 76. Fleming 2002, p. 77. Fleming 1992; 2000. Fleming 2002, p. 77. Fleming 2002, p. 79. Fleming 2002, p. 79.
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Stone's criticisms are similar, but less specific in scope.F" She is more critical of theoretical problems with Schloen's work, rather than demonstrating the inappropriateness of PHM in certain situations. Stone suggests that although Schloen acknowledges that Weber's ideal types are only intended as an heuristic device, in actual practice, Schloen applies his PHM too literally.351 Stone argues that Schloen is too rigorous in forcing descriptions of all Bronze Age Near Eastern societies to correspond with his PHM352, and suggests that a better use of PHM would be to examine the inherent flexibility of this system. 353 Stone also describes what she calls "two suspect theoretical leaps" made by Schloen. 354 Using the analogy of titles such as father and son in the Catholic Church, Stone argues that there is no demonstrable connection between the use of domestic metaphors as referents and patrimonial social organization.P? Her second "suspect leap", is that Schloen does not demonstrate that there is a connection "between the presence of extended family residence, agricultural activities by urban residents, and the patrimonial mode of production."356 This criticism is important for the study of Ugaritic economy, for if Stone is correct, than one cannot infer economic organization based on certain observed PHM characteristics. Routledge discusses the use of Weber by Schloen (as well as Master and Stager).357 Routledge is critical of Weber's understanding of patrimonial authority, suggesting that it is rooted in nineteenth century European understandings of the world. 358 Weber's conception of patrimonialism as a belief that was held by all members of a given society is too essentializing.P" Routledge suggests that the Weberian conception of patrimonial authority can be successfully adapted through Foucauldian interpretation.t'''' Rather than taking the household as an essential building block, Routledge argues "that the domestic domain is a place where subjects are formed," and that the house is itself not an "irreducible unit" but an area of activity for "historically constituted subjects."361 In other words, patrimonial authority should be understood as constructed rather than foundational or natural and therefore was subject to resistance and alternative types of authority.
Similar comments can be made about the essentializing use of Schloen's model at Ugarit. A difficult situation that is not fully explained by Schloen's model is the problem of landholding. In his criticism of Heltzer's model, Schloen argues that the king did have supreme rights over all the land in his kingdom, theoretically, but would not typically put himself in a position of breaking customary laws ofland-ownership.362 Yet Schloen himself is forced to posit the existence of "traditional mores" that fall outside of patrimonial authority.363 This is a hint that every aspect of Ugaritic social structure cannot be neatly explained through reference to the PHM model, and patrimonial authority. Similar hints that there existed legal customs beyond the authority of the king (or at least not based upon the authority of the king) come from legal documents found in the homes of non-royal individuals. Rowe describes these legal documents as taking the form of royal legal documents, but instead of the king's seal or name, the documents are concluded by a list of witnesses.364 This suggests that the legal weight of these documents rested in the observance that the agreement was made between the individuals, rather than by its facilitation or observation by royal authority. Other problems of the exaggerated utility of the PHM model are apparent. Schloen claims that the metaphor of the household was used to express power relationships, because other means of expressing hierarchy were lacking in ancient Ugarit. 365 This is a difficult observation to justify lexically. A multiplicity of words and their use in particular contexts demonstrates that Schloen's comments are an overstatement. In KTU 2.39, for example, the Hittite king's domination over the king of Ugarit is implicit in the use of the term ps (sun) as the primary referent of the Hittite king. The sun imagery connotes leadership, hierarchy, and dominance, without reference to the household. Other words demonstrate the same phenomenon. The term rb also expresses hierarchy, but not through household terminology. For example, KTU 2.4 is a letter to the rb khnm, perhaps best understood as "chief priest" or "head cultic official." The hierarchical relationship that is implied by the use of the word rb reflects some kind of occupational hierarchy. The presumed authority is derived, not from the rb khnm's status as paterfamilias, but from his position vis a vis other members of the same occupational category. Other occupational titles can indicate hierarchy without the use of familial terminology, most notably the word for king itself, mlk. Other titles that could be marshaled as evidence include bazannu and sakinu. One could argue that these titles simply reflect the occupation of the individual, and not hierarchical authority, but t~at would necessitate postulating the existence of rational-bureaucratic authority, which is even more problematic from a Weberian standpoint. Similar non-familial referents
Stone 2003. Stone 2003, p. 121. 352 She is also critical of the case studies of Islamic cities that he uses to describe the PHM. For Stone, 2003, p. 122, Islamic cities were not solely organized according to patrimonialism, but by "occupation, religion, ethnicity; or common village origin." 353 Stone 2003, p. 123. 354 Stone 2003, p. 123. 355 Stone 2003, p. 123. 356 Stone 2003, p. 123. 357 Rourledge 2004, pp. 127-132. 358 Rourledge 2004, p. 130. 359 Rourledge 2004, p. 130. 360 Rourledge 2004, p. 131. 361 Rourledge 2004, p. 131. 350 351
362 363 364 365
Schloen 2001, p. 231. Schloen 2001, p. 231. Rowe 2003, p. 720. Schloen 2001, p. 255.
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that demonstrate hierarchy are apparent in Ugaritic name lists. The addition of the third masculine singular possessive suffix -h to words such as lmd (see KTU 4.194 for example), indicate relationships of hierarchy and possession that are not necessarily predicated upon familial terminology. Designations reflecting the geographic origin or ethnic/city affiliation of individuals are further evidence that patrimonial models of authority and social organization were not the only means of mapping social relationships at Ugarit. KTU 4.417, for example, lists families residing in Ugarit, using gentilics as primary personal referents, not patronyms. An easily testable aspect of Schloen's model is his conception that market exchange was not a primary means of circulating goods in patrimonial settings. 366 Schloen states:
Likewise the smaller household probably did not display the same degree of division of labor as is expressed in the palatial texts. The numerous lists of individuals grouped according to occupational activity (see KTU 4.69 for example), are not replicated at the household level. These individuals are described according to their occupational category or specialist skills/roles, a semiotic system that likely did not exist at the household level. Indeed, the very existence of this degree of standardized, specialist activity, demonstrates that the PHM model is insufficient to account for the complexity of economic action at Ugarit. All of this is not to say that Schloens argument is incorrect, but rather to argue that the PHM model alone cannot adequately explain economic activity at Ugarit. Conclusions
In a patrimonial state characterized by substantive and practical rationality - regardless of its size and degree of centralization - there is typically no real market in basic commodities, most of which circulate instead on the basis of reciprocity and redistribution. 367
From this overview it is clear that there are certain areas of explicit disagreement amongst scholars of the Ugaritic economy. At a surface level, there are those arguments that are typical of cuneiform scholarship in general, disagreements about nuances of meanings of words or reconstructions of historical processes. More fundamentally problematic are those issues that stem from different conceptions of what are called economic modalities in this study. Before moving on to the argument at hand, it is useful to identify the major areas of controversy. The scholars mentioned above conceive of the mechanisms of trade very differently. The Brandeis Hellenosemitica approach presupposes what could almost be considered a functionalist approach to eastern Mediterranean trade at this time, where each region provides specific resources or adds value to goods, and these goods circulate through trade mechanisms. In contrast, Feldman emphasizes not the economic benefits of this trade, but rather the way that elite goods function as markers of identity in the Late Bronze Age. Feldman's identification of an international style that reifies and articulates themes of ruler-ship suggests that Late Bronze Age trade was more than just the movement of copper. At the same time, as Liverani has shown, the rationale behind Late Bronze Age trade is masked in the textual sources through language of reciprocity and redistribution. Related to this problem are the different conceptions of the people engaged in trade. Were these private capitalists, royal ambassadors or elite families who acted both in self-interest and in the interest of their sovereign? Indeed, this lies at the heart of the problem for understanding the relationship between the palace at Ugarit and the other prominent houses, especially those belonging to individuals who have been recognized as playing a role in international affairs. Were all of these houses directly under the authority of the king's household, as in Schloen's model? Or should power be seen as less directly stemming from the authority of the king as paterfamilias and more from the wealth of these local elites that could outlast dynastic politics? Schloen's arguments
Schloen later clarifies this statement by acknowledging that there is minimal evidence for large redistributive schemes, and that the acquisition of goods was more based on reciprocity, embedded in social relationships.Y" Stone's criticism of Schloen, that he argues that professionally manufactured goods circulated solely through redistributive schemes, is an unfair misreading of his work. 369 However, Schloen does seem to suggest that market exchange was not a significant force in the circulation of goods. This thesis shall be tested in the chapters that follow. It is difficult to reconcile textual attestations of economic activity found in the palace at Ugarit with economic activities that could be presumed for a patrimonial household. Palace texts record the distribution and receipt of goods. Individuals and towns, both of which would be considered subordinate household members through the PHM model, are provided with set amounts of goods, or are recorded as providing the palace with set amounts of goods. A similarly regimented system of distribution at the household level is not attested textually. While this is an argument from silence, it seems evident that the possibility must be made that distribution and receipt of subsistence products between father and dependents (children and wife) was not as systematic as that between king and dependents. Fathers likely did not require a set payment of commodities from their sons, as the king would expect from the village. These comments may seem self-evident, but they demonstrate how quickly problems arise when the PHM model is stretched to apply to every economic situation. 366 367 368 369
Schloen 2001, p. 79. Schloen 2001, p. 79. Schloen 2001, p. 199. Stone 2003, p. 123.
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bring up a new issue in the study of the power that lies beneath the Ugaritic economy. For Schloen, power rested not in bureaucracy, but in the relationship between officials and king. Whitt takes a different stance and attempts to identify the bureaucratic offices present in the palace at Ugarit. The relationship of the palace to non-royals at Ugarit is directly related to issues of land tenure. Boyer sees two different types of land tenure, both based on the power of the king to grant land, although both reflecting different degrees of royal authority. Gray uses similar, though less dynamic models of feudal authority over land. Libolt, Miller, and Heltzer both assume that there were two types of land tenure at Ugarit, one based on royal prerogative and another based on sub-altern traditions. The issue of craft specialization is another locus of disagreement in the scholarship on the Ugaritic economy. Gray and Rainey both see Ugarit's economy as highly specialized, with Gray arguing for the presence of guilds. Schloen has argued that even though occupational specialists engaged in specialized activities, even urban villagers engaged in some level of agricultural/subsistence production. Vita thinks it best to understand occupations as overlapping categories and not fixed categories of identity and work specialization. These and other themes will be addressed in the following chapters. The purpose of this research is not so much the study of the specific details of the Ugaritic economy, although that is of course of paramount importance in constructing the argument. Instead, the goal is to identify evidence for these different conceptions of Ugaritic economic modalities. These questions that lie beneath most studies of ancient economy need to be addressed as questions in their own right, not simply as presuppositions towards the investigation of other questions. Common to most of the perspectives addressed above is a substantivist approach to the ancient economy. Only a few of the scholars working with the Ugaritic material have taken a formalist stance towards the economy. Yet even given the general agreement of the appropriateness of a substantivist approach amongst these scholars, each seems to posit radically different models of social life and hence a radically different model of economic life. This problem reflects the limits of top-down, "totalizing" models of society. Top-down models smooth out difference and cover evidence that does not fit well with the model. Once imposed, a top-down model is difficult to escape and the variability of data is lost, as is the actual lived complexity of ancient economic life. Here then, the importance of a Network-based model is clear. A Network-based model, as applied in this study, allows for the variability of data and complexity is assumed, not smoothed over. In this study, the Network-based model shall attempt to understand economic interactions as larger components of a complex multi-variant system. Most of the following investigation shall examine the economic interactions at specific nodes of contact. Each interaction that has been identified for study shall be examined on its own and then
compared with the larger context of economic interactions in general. Presuppositions about the organization of these economic activities shall be avoided in the initial stages of the analysis; a Network-based model does not require one to posit either a Twosector or a patrimonial organization to society from the outset of the investigation. After the various economic interactions that have been attested at Ugarit are investigated, some conclusions will be offered. These conclusions are best understood as possibilities and limitations that Ugaritians may have had in regard to economic activity. As such, these limitations and possibilities were manifest in complex manners. The picture that results is that of a complex economic life (although not a chaotic one) embedded in the social world of ancient Ugarit. The attempt to answer these questions begins in the next chapter (Chapter Three) in the investigation of the specific language used in ancient Ugarit to describe economic actors and activities, especially important since language is so central to the constitution of understanding within a society.
THE LANGUAGE OF THE UGARITIC ECONOMY
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CHAPTER THREE
THE LANGUAGE OF THE UGARITIC ECONOMY
The criteria of a past performance of leisure therefore commonly take the form of "immaterial" goods. Such immaterial evidences of past leisure are quasi-scholarly or quasi-artistic accomplishments and a knowledge of processes and incidents that do not conduce directly to the furtherance of human life. So, for instance, in our time there is the knowledge of the dead languages.. , Thorstein Veblen To young people of the current generation the very idea of philology suggests something impossibly antiquarian and musty, but philology is in fact the most basic and creative of the interpretative arts. Edward Said
Before considering the evidence of the economic modalities at Ugarit from a textual perspective, it is important to comment on some of the problems inherent in the study of these materials. This chapter contains three separate sections dealing with certain categories of words and concepts at Ugarit: terminology of social designations, terminology of occupational designations, and terminology of land holding. Each of these categories of terminology present particular problems for translation, and at the same time are central to understanding economic modalities. These three sections are not intended as glossaries for the alphabetic vocabulary, but are intended to serve as extended investigations of key terminology. 1 The terminology to be discussed here has been particularly problematic in the reconstruction of Ugaritic economic life and subsequently social life. Vocabulary with definitions that have not been controversial shall only be discussed in passing here. For example, the word brt is well understood to refer to the occupation of ploughman.i and therefore need not be discussed in depth here. Discussion of prepositions and measurement terminology will be presented in volume 2.
This lexical category has already been widely studied by scholars of Ugarit. Words referring to social structure or social categories are important in the reconstruction of economic modalities as the translations of social designations tend to carry with them conceptions about the nature and structure of economic relationships.
bns This word has been at the root of many disagreements about Ugaritic social structure. In itself bns means simply "man," as shown in the polyglot (Ug 5. 130) where it is equivalent to Akkadian amilum (an Akkadian biform of awllum).3 This simple definition of the word can be misleading. Roth defines the use of the Akkadian equivalents of this word in the legal literature, "The term used for (1) the general, nonspecific, "person" as subject of a law provision, and for (2) a member of the highest privileged class, in contrast to a member of the muJkenu-class or to a slave.l" In essence, bns is equated with a term that has two uses in Akkadian, a specific use and a general use.? It is often difficult to determine what is meant in the Ugaritic texts. The use of bns as a general, non-specific term is certainly apparent in the Ugaritic administrative texts. This is best exemplified in texts such as KTU 4.380, which lists quantities of donkeys and bni at specific geographic regions. Likewise, KTU 4.358 lists amounts of bnim at a specific location. In these types of contexts, it seems most appropriate to understand bni as a generic designation for person. There are other situations where it is not as clear whether bns should be understood as a generic word, or a word with specific class connotations. For example, texts like KTU 4.752, list the bni who are at the disposal of a