EXTREME
RISK MANAGEMENT
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EXTREME
RISK MANAGEMENT
REVOLUTIONARY APPROACHES TO EVALUATING AND MEASURING RISK
CHRISTINA RAY
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Copyright © 2010 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Except as permitted under the United States Copyright Act of 1976, no part of this publication may be reproduced or distributed in any form or by any means, or stored in a database or retrieval system, without the prior written permission of the publisher. ISBN: 978-0-07-175956-4 MHID: 0-07-175956-5 The material in this eBook also appears in the print version of this title: ISBN: 978-0-07-170059-7, MHID: 0-07-170059-5. All trademarks are trademarks of their respective owners. Rather than put a trademark symbol after every occurrence of a trademarked name, we use names in an editorial fashion only, and to the benefit of the trademark owner, with no intention of infringement of the trademark. Where such designations appear in this book, they have been printed with initial caps. McGraw-Hill eBooks are available at special quantity discounts to use as premiums and sales promotions, or for use in corporate training programs. To contact a representative please e-mail us at
[email protected]. This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in regard to the subject matter covered. It is sold with the understanding that neither the author nor the publisher is engaged in rendering legal, accounting, securities trading, or other professional services. If legal advice or other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent professional person should be sought. —From a Declaration of Principles Jointly Adopted by a Committee of the American Bar Association and a Committee of Publishers and Associations TERMS OF USE This is a copyrighted work and The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. (“McGrawHill”) and its licensors reserve all rights in and to the work. Use of this work is subject to these terms. Except as permitted under the Copyright Act of 1976 and the right to store and retrieve one copy of the work, you may not decompile, disassemble, reverse engineer, reproduce, modify, create derivative works based upon, transmit, distribute, disseminate, sell, publish or sublicense the work or any part of it without McGraw-Hill’s prior consent. You may use the work for your own noncommercial and personal use; any other use of the work is strictly prohibited. Your right to use the work may be terminated if you fail to comply with these terms. THE WORK IS PROVIDED “AS IS.” McGRAW-HILL AND ITS LICENSORS MAKE NO GUARANTEES OR WARRANTIES AS TO THE ACCURACY, ADEQUACY OR COMPLETENESS OF OR RESULTS TO BE OBTAINED FROM USING THE WORK, INCLUDING ANY INFORMATION THAT CAN BE ACCESSED THROUGH THE WORK VIA HYPERLINK OR OTHERWISE, AND EXPRESSLY DISCLAIM ANY WARRANTY, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. McGraw-Hill and its licensors do not warrant or guarantee that the functions contained in the work will meet your requirements or that its operation will be uninterrupted or error free. Neither McGraw-Hill nor its licensors shall be liable to you or anyone else for any inaccuracy, error or omission, regardless of cause, in the work or for any damages resulting therefrom. McGraw-Hill has no responsibility for the content of any information accessed through the work. Under no circumstances shall McGraw-Hill and/or its licensors be liable for any indirect, incidental, special, punitive, consequential or similar damages that result from the use of or inability to use the work, even if any of them has been advised of the possibility of such damages. This limitation of liability shall apply to any claim or cause whatsoever whether such claim or cause arises in contract, tort or otherwise.
CONTENTS
Preface
vii
Chapter 1
Plausibility versus Probability: Two Worldviews
1
Chapter 2
The Evolution of Modern Analytics
8
Chapter 3
Natural Selection on Wall Street
23
Chapter 4
A Review: Risk Management Metrics, Models, and Best Practice
32
Chapter 5
Systemic Risk and Systems Thinking
61
Chapter 6
Belief Systems and the Inadvertent Conspiracy: The Global Capital Markets as System 81 Chapter 7
Analytic Tradecraft and Model Risk
94
Chapter 8
The Future as Forecast: Probability, Likelihood, and Uncertainty 117 v
vi
Contents
Chapter 9
An Alternative Path to Actionable Intelligence
144
Chapter 10
Solutions: Moving toward a Connectivist Approach
153
Chapter 11
An Introduction to Causality: Theory, Models, and Inference 165 Chapter 12
Bayesian Inference Networks: Estimating Vulnerability, Consequences, and Likelihood 175 Chapter 13
Securities Valuation, Risk Measurement, and Risk Inference Networks 189 Chapter 14
Risk Fusion and Supermodels: A Framework for Enterprise Risk Management 206 Chapter 15
Inferring Causality from Historical Market Behavior Chapter 16
Sensemaking for Warnings: Reverse-Engineering Market Intelligence 230 Chapter 17
The United States as Enterprise: Implications for National Policy and Security 245 Notes
263
Index
279
216
PREFACE
Shortly after September 11, 2001, I was struck by the stories in the press alleging insider trading in the stocks of the airlines involved in the attack. Dr. William Hery, research professor at the Polytechnic Institute of NYU, and I posited the ability to reverse-engineer actionable market intelligence, or MARKINT, that might be useful in counterterrorism from publicly available market information and prices. One of the earliest supporters of MARKINT was Randolph Tauss, director of corporate strategy at Omnis, Inc., who, while a senior government program manager, enthusiastically adopted the concept. Since then, my scope and interests have widened. Over the last eight years, I have come to see the intelligence community and the financial community as having essentially similar issues with respect to the measurement and mitigation of extreme risk. However, I’ve also seen that the members of each community are largely unaware of the applicability of the other’s work to their own problems. The financial community is generally unaware of the mathematical sophistication that has been operational in the defense community for a number of years in the form of network-centric operations within the Department of Defense. Similarly, in spite of new emphasis on open-source intelligence, or OSINT (as opposed to intelligence gathered by sensors or clandestine operations), the national security community is largely unaware of the wealth of information and analytical models available in the financial community that might be retasked to its purposes. Fortunately, this is changing. The financial crisis of 2007–2008 has been a driver of analytical change, and the missions of the financial and intelligence communities have never before been so aligned. Recently, vii
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Dennis Blair, the new director of national intelligence (DNI), said that the “primary near-term security concern of the United States is the global economic crisis and its geopolitical implications.” The President’s Daily Brief (the PDB) has been joined by the daily Economic Intelligence Brief (the “Butterfly Brief”), both of which are classified intelligence community products. The CIA is now publicly advertising employment opportunities for ex-Wall Streeters. At the same time, failures in risk management protocols and models by top-tier institutions such as Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns have spurred a search for alternatives. And recognition of the causal chains that led to the crisis has led some theorists to move from backward-looking statistical models to forward-looking causal inference models. Fortunately, the financial community is just now starting to take a systems view of the elements and interconnections of the causal network that is the global markets in an effort to explain and anticipate “black swan” events (i.e., undirected, unpredicted, and rare events) and “tipping points” (i.e., points at which a previously rare phenomenon becomes dramatically more common), popularized by Nassim Taleb and Malcolm Gladwell, respectively. This book contains much of what I’ve learned by having a foot in each world. It is meant to be a modern Art of War for those who are involved in the pseudo-warfare of trading in the global capital markets. Appropriately, I’ve been immeasurably assisted by experts from each world. From the financial community, I would like to thank Dr. Robert Mark, the founder of Black Diamond Risk Enterprises and one of the premier experts in the world on risk management and corporate governance. Bob generously suggested some additions on the subject of systemic risk and current best practice in risk management and contributed examples of typical risk reports. And from the government community, I would also like to thank Dr. Paul Edward Lehner, consulting scientist at the Center for Integrated Intelligence Systems of The MITRE Corporation. Paul provided me with extraordinarily insightful comments (and an education in cuttingedge developments in mathematical psychology) as well as a unique perspective of the complementary analytical techniques used by the private and public sectors. I’m also very appreciative to Bryan Ware (CEO), Dr. David Daniels (chief scientist), and Linwood Hudson (VP product development) of Digital Sandbox, Inc., of McLean, Virginia, who provided me with examples of risk inference networks used for purposes of national security.
Preface
ix
My thanks also to Professor James Moffat, who allowed me to reproduce his fascinating summary of complexity concepts as they apply to information-age military forces, and to Dr. Julien Diard of the Laboratoire de Psychologie et NeuroCognition, Université Pierre Mendès France, who allowed me to do the same with his comprehensive hierarchy of probabilistic modeling formalisms. And last but not least, my appreciation to Quantum 4D, Inc., and Palisades Corporation, who generously provided me with network analysis and visualization tools with which to create working examples of concepts from this book.
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CHAPTER 1
Plausibility versus Probability: Two Worldviews
Over the last three decades or so, sophisticated financial modeling has been almost exclusively statistical in nature. The ready availability of massive amounts of historical market data has fueled the creation of valuation and risk measurement models built on concepts such as association, correlation, and likelihood. All these models create implicit forecasts, that is, estimates of expected and possible future scenarios for a security or a portfolio of securities. Most often, these forecasts are based on the assumption that the future market behavior is well represented by the past. However, this stochastic approach implies a worldview that ignores causality in favor of correlation. In this world, it doesn’t matter whether gold prices increased because interest rates decreased or vice versa. It also doesn’t matter whether the prices of a utility stock and an airline stock are directly related in some fashion or whether, instead, they are both driven by a common dependence on fuel prices. This world is a supremely efficient world as well: all prices reflect new information immediately, and that information is transmitted instantaneously around the globe. However, intuition belies these notions. Traders and portfolio managers know that events drive prices. Catalysts such as the release of an economic indicator or an earnings report drive prices, and chain reactions precipitated by an important event can take a finite amount of time to propagate. Such statistical models were often sufficient in the past, when the volume and complexity of derivative instruments were far lower than they are today. But now, the value and risk of popular instruments such as options on credit derivatives and complex asset-backed securities increasingly depend on the modeling of low-probability, high-consequence events. If the models used are not adequate for the task of anticipating such high-consequence events, massive losses and market disruptions can 1
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occur. Certainly the financial disruptions that began in 2007–2008 are abundant evidence of such failures. But as the old saying goes, “Correlation is not causation.” The alternative to a statistical model is a causal model that explicitly creates an alternative worldview, one in which cause and effect are modeled in logical or temporal order. This alternative world is one in which plausibility rather than probability is modeled. The consequences and likelihood of events that have never before occurred but that can be reasonably anticipated (as a consequence of other events) are included in the quantitative models. Such modeling is the forte of the intelligence community and those responsible for national security, who must create metrics and construct solutions for threats that have never before occurred. Plausibility can be determined from a mixture of expert opinion, hard facts, and historical experience. Although the structure of any causal model may be guided by the insights of human experts, it need not be strictly an expert system. Instead, through a process of causal inference, past history can be used to validate and inform the model. A causal model is not necessarily deterministic; it can allow for uncertainty. Ideally, causal inference facilitates the integration of substantive knowledge with statistical data to refine the former and interpret the latter. Such causal models are used in other disciplines, most notably epidemiology and decision science. They are little used in finance, with the notable exception of the measurement of operational risk (i.e., the risk of loss due to human error). Causal models are nearly absent from1 quantitative modeling for purposes of instrument valuation or market and credit risk measurement. The preference that quantitative analysts have for “frequentist” or probabilistic models over causal models over the last three decades is understandable for a number of reasons. First, such models are relatively easy to create and implement, using financial theories (such as modern portfolio theory) that are already well accepted and in the public domain. Also, until recently, neither the mathematical language nor the technical tools that might facilitate the creation of causal models existed. Although the financial community commenced serious quantitative modeling in the 1970s, it wasn’t until the mid-1980s that much substantive work was done on causal models, even within the academic community. Thus, the creation of rigorous theory, methodologies, and a language of causality that might have facilitated such model building did not exist at the time the financial community was choosing its path. Perhaps more
Plausibility versus Probability: Two Worldviews
3
important, even if such models had been created, the data required to inform them were usually insufficiently granular, synchronized, and properly organized for use in a causal inference process. However, now, in the words of Judea Pearl, a leader in this field, “Put simply, causality has been mathematized.” At the same time, certain technological innovations have made causal inference practical in the financial arena. Consider one of the key questions in causal inference: How can one distinguish between mere correlation and cause and effect? When the sun rises and the cock crows, was one of these two events the catalyst for the other, or were they both the consequence of a third event? One of the best methods of validating causal relationships is via experimentation. We can wake up the cock at 3 a.m. and see if this causes the sun to rise. Or an experiment can be designed to eliminate all variables but one: for example, in medical trials, the effect of the drug on a patient. To produce valid results, such an experiment would probably contain key features used in causal modeling, such as randomization (e.g., patients are randomly selected to receive an experimental drug or a placebo) and elimination of exogenous factors (e.g., variations in age or sex). Fortunately, in finance, the capital markets are a laboratory that continuously provides us with natural experiments. Thus, rather than using historical market prices in statistical analyses, we can use them in causal inference models. Every day, traders receive information about catalytic events that move markets and are able to observe the synchronous or subsequent effects of those catalysts. Technological advances now make the observation of these natural experiments both possible and practical. Formerly, end-of-day data were relatively useless for determining causation because so many important events occur during the course of a trading day. Just as in a medical trial, when there are multiple variables, reliable causal inferences are exceedingly difficult to make. Only in the last few years has commercial software become available that is capable of capturing event data and synchronizing those data with real-time market data of the highest granularity. This synchronized information gives us the means to learn from one controlled experiment at a time, even if the experiments last just seconds. Although many events occur in the course of a trading day, few of them occur simultaneously, where simultaneous is defined as occurring within the same very small window of time. For example, we might capture the earliest moment at which an earnings report became public or a report on crude oil inventory was released. If we then examine the real-time
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behavior of stock or oil prices in the seconds to minutes after the release, we can form opinions about how such an event drives prices. Besides potentially providing better estimates of value and risk, causal models may be more intuitive and understandable by risk managers and portfolio managers than statistical models are. For example, the language of causality is a natural language for risk management. Examples of causal concepts are influence, ignorability, disturbance, effect, confounding, intervention, and explanation. The graphic representations that substitute for mathematical equations lend themselves well to financial applications. As Pearl points out, there is no analog in algebra or statistics to the causal operator “given that I do,” that is, the effect of a deliberate action on the outcome of the analysis. However, these representations lend themselves well to programming. Computer code does allow such operators; the statement A ⫽ B is a substitution rather than a statement about an inviolate relationship between A and B. Similarly, hedge positions can be considered “interventions” that can block certain paths: those that lead to undesirable outcomes, such as very large losses. Such a hedge might be a security that is already in a portfolio or, alternatively, an exogenous variable that drives changes in one or more securities in the portfolio. Further, the identification of hierarchically organized causes lends itself very naturally to the identification of systematic and specific risks as required by the Basel II accord. Such methods may provide results that are far superior to those provided by statistical methodologies such as principal component analysis,2 the results of which can be degraded by spurious correlations without expert intervention. Causal models also provide a natural framework for the estimation of two key risk measures for which no industry-standard methods yet exist: economic capital (the amount of capital required to ensure the continued existence of the enterprise to a very high degree of confidence) and enterprise risk (the risk to an enterprise from all sources of risk). In such models, expert opinion can be integrated with historical behavior to systematically generate all plausible future scenarios, estimate their likelihood, and measure their consequences. All else being equal, a causal approach is preferable to a statistical approach for several reasons. First, a causal approach allows a more general solution. A statistical solution can be simulated, albeit inefficiently, using a causal network that includes an error component. However, the reverse is not true. Second, causal networks do not require extensive historical data for all the securities and instruments in a portfolio. Causal models can be used
Plausibility versus Probability: Two Worldviews
5
even when history is not a reliable indicator of the future—for example, when a shift in risk regime has occurred or when new risk factors such as changing regulatory policy are expected to have a significant impact. Causal networks can also be allowed to have a specific order in which events occur or a temporal component suitable for high-frequency trading and real-time risk management. Forecasts of consequential behavior produced in sufficient time to execute a trade can be used in automated, algorithmic trading. Further, observed market behavior that is time dependent (e.g., volatility clusters and jump diffusion processes) might be more easily explained in terms of causal models than it is by statistical models. Also, instead of relying on solutions such as GARCH3 methods or stochastic volatility models4 to calibrate observations to history, such observations might be explained in terms of the observable, noninstantaneous effects of traders’ and portfolio managers’ behavior.5 A causal approach can use all available information to inform the model, not just historical pricing data. In the terminology of the intelligence community, this is the use of “all source intelligence.” For example, additional fundamental information might be used to inform (or override) certain causal relationships. The sensitivity of an airline to the price of fuel might be independently modeled by a fundamental equity analyst and then compared to the relationship inferred by the causal model. Or if a publicly traded home builder has never before hedged its interest-rate exposure but has just started such a program, the past dependence of the company’s stock price on interest rates might be overridden. A causal approach is far more dynamic than a statistical approach because it allows the introduction of prior knowledge. A forecast of one-day risk is substantially different one second after the release of the monthly unemployment statistics from what it was one second before that release, based on knowledge of both market expectations and the actual news. In the language of causal modeling, these are the prior and posterior distributions. Most important of all, a causal structure provides far more transparency than do statistical parameters. The graphical language of causal modeling reveals the fundamental relationships assumed by experts and inferred from data and lends itself to the use of visualization tools that enhance clarity and aid human cognition. The process of building such a model also removes some of the intellectual barriers between the front office and the middle office and between technical analysis and fundamental analysis. Causal relationships that can be understood and vetted by human experts with multiple areas of expertise are far more likely to be repeated in the future. Clearly, causal models are somewhat more difficult to implement and to inform than are statistical models. However, when they are used for
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certain purposes, such as valuing complex derivative instruments, estimating extreme or real-time portfolio risk, or designing an optimal hedging strategy, they are well worth the effort. For example, one of their major advantages is the ability to perform discrete-time and discrete-outcome modeling. Although common statistical methodologies such as copula approaches are mathematically elegant, they often implicitly eliminate the granularity, asymmetry, and noncontinuous behavior that are interesting features (and opportunities for profit) of real markets. By doing so, they may substantially over- or underestimate value or risk, particularly for instruments with a narrow payoff window, such as nth-to-default tranches in collateralized debt obligations,6 or in strategies such as calendar or price spreads in options. What a causal approach lacks in computational elegance it may make up for in accuracy. Consider a situation in which Treasury bond traders are split 50/50 on whether the Treasury will announce an auction of 30-year bonds. This is a binary event: it will occur, or it will not; the yield curve will flatten or steepen. A realistic forecast of changes in 30-year bond yields just after the announcement is likely to be bimodal because there is no neutral event. The benefit of a causal model is its ability to generate many plausible scenarios in a systematic fashion. The likelihood of some of these scenarios may be higher than in a random-walk world; that of others may be lower. Markets may have “hot spots” and “cold spots”: scenarios in which a convergence of certain chain reactions is likely to have major market repercussions or, conversely, scenarios that are virtually impossible. This alternative forecast of the future, in which the distributions of possible outcomes can be granular, be asymmetrical, and have extreme outcomes, has profound implications for financial engineering, portfolio management, risk management, and even decision science. Clearly, a set of possible future scenarios substantially different from those created using continuous, normally distributed variables, suggests radically different results for all kinds of estimates. Specifically, valuation models, particularly those for securities or complex derivative instruments, will produce results that are substantially different from the results of standard models that assume normality, symmetry, and outcomes that are in line with historical experience. Portfolio optimization and performance attribution models are similarly affected. The interactions between the securities in the portfolio may be poorly described by statistical measures such as correlation, and an ideal portfolio (i.e., one with an optimum risk-return profile) constructed using such
Plausibility versus Probability: Two Worldviews
7
scenarios might look quite different from one constructed using more traditional methods. Most important, risk measurement models based on causal methods may estimate risk to have a magnitude that is either far greater or far less— as well as less continuous—than that estimated using traditional stochastic models. Certain outcomes that were formerly assumed to be virtually impossible must now be considered, whereas others are now less likely than before. At the heart of all risk measurement (and in fact all financial engineering) is the ability to generate all plausible alternative scenarios and estimate their likelihood. The sensitivity of a portfolio, an enterprise, or even the global capital markets themselves to the most extreme of these scenarios provides a systematic method for generating stress tests (i.e., measures of the consequences of a particular scenario) and ensuring the continued existence of the system as we know it. The use of causal methods also provides solutions; they can be used to mitigate as well as measure risk. They provide a method for inserting circuit breakers into a portfolio or a banking system to subvert the most catastrophic outcomes. For example, a portfolio manager might purchase far out-of-the-money calls on crude oil to hedge the risk of large declines in the price of airline and hospitality stocks, or a regulator might modify capital requirements or position-limit rules. The ultimate goal of enterprise risk management is as a quantitative decision-making tool. Ultimately, the use of causal methods facilitates the highest-level goal of risk management: decision making by senior management. An understanding of the possible future paths that might trigger tipping points and lead to catastrophic outcomes can assist C-suite executives in optimizing their business strategies on a risk-adjusted basis. SUMMARY In this chapter, we contrasted frequentist and causal approaches to risk management and their utility in measuring and mitigating extreme risk and optimizing decision making. WHAT’S NEXT In the next chapter, we will relate key milestones in the evolution of risk management philosophy and describe the most recent and revolutionary innovations in quantitative decision making.
CHAPTER 2
The Evolution of Modern Analytics
The recent journey toward the current state of quantitative finance owes as much to philosophy as it does to mathematics. It has been said that a human can’t visualize a number of objects greater than five without breaking them into smaller groups, such as two sets of three or three sets of two. For more complicated problems, humans have always had to create an abstraction or model of how things work. As eloquently described by Peter Bernstein in Against the Gods: The Remarkable Story of Risk1 scientists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries considered the problem of decision making under uncertainty. Some of the greatest mathematicians in history (including Isaac Newton) were tasked by their patrons with solving gaming problems, with profit as the motive. Such problems provided the perfect thought experiment, involving as they did both chance and preferences. In a sense, they forced the evolution of the financial markets, since those who used these insights to inform their decisions prospered, whereas those who did not became extinct. This process of financial natural selection continues today. It’s a short leap from the gaming table to the trading room. Broker-dealers and hedge funds that were able to adequately manage risk survived and prospered during the financial crisis of 2008, whereas those that were not (including Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and AIG) did not. Along the evolutionary path are two historical milestones that were separated by more than 200 years but are suddenly receiving more attention from the mainstream of economic thought nearly simultaneously. DANIEL BERNOULLI AND A NEW THEORY ON THE MEASUREMENT OF RISK In 1954, spurred by a spate of recent references to this work, the journal Econometrica2 published the first English translation from the original 8
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Latin of Daniel Bernoulli’s 1738 Specimen theoriae novae de mensura sortis, or Exposition of a New Theory on the Measurement of Risk.3 Bernoulli is far more famous as a physicist for his contributions to fluid mechanics, including the basic principles that allow aircraft to fly. Exposition was considered an exceedingly minor scientific contribution until its rediscovery by economists, evolutionary biologists, computer scientists, and others in the second half of the twentieth century. Although Dr. Louise Sommer, the translator, explicitly attempted to retain the article’s eighteenth-century flavor, the concepts and language of the article are astoundingly up to date. This amazingly concise and complete piece of work not only discussed basic probability theory but also put forth the concepts of individual preferences and utility functions, which together form the foundation of a framework for cutting-edge topics such as quantitative decision support4 and enterprise risk management (ERM). For example, in discussing optimum wagering decisions, Bernoulli rejected the notion that the expected outcome (based on probabilities) should always be maximized and introduced sophisticated concepts such as risk premia5 and utility functions:6 Somehow a very poor fellow obtains a lottery ticket that will yield with equal probability either nothing or twenty thousand ducats. Will this man evaluate his chance of winning at ten thousand ducats? Would he not be ill-advised to sell this lottery ticket for nine thousand ducats? To me it seems that the answer is in the negative. On the other hand, I am inclined to believe that a rich man would be ill-advised to refuse to buy the lottery ticket for nine thousand ducats. If I am not wrong then it seems clear that all men cannot use the same rule to evaluate the gamble.
Bernoulli went on to more formally introduce key concepts such as quantitative measurement of risk, diversification, hedging, and, perhaps most important, the concept of maximizing utility rather than expected return: Thus it becomes evident that no valid measurement of the value of a risk can be obtained without consideration being given to its utility, that is to say, the utility of whatever gain accrues to the individual or, conversely, how much profit is required to yield a given utility . . . the determination of the value of an item must not be based upon its price, but rather the utility it yields.
Long before the advent of behavioral economics, Bernoulli proposed the famous St. Petersburg Paradox, first suggested to him by his distinguished cousin Nicholas Bernoulli. In this simple but elegant thought
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experiment, he presages preference theory by introducing the topic of human preferences in valuation decisions. In this experiment, a casino offers a gambler the opportunity to enter a game in which a coin is tossed repeatedly. The pot starts at one ducat but doubles each time heads appears on the toss. The game ends when tails appears, and the gambler realizes whatever is in the pot at that time, that is, 2k⫺1 ducats if tails appears on the kth toss. The question is, what should the gambler be willing to pay to enter this game? The series has an expected value of infinity, since there is always some finite—albeit minuscule—probability of an infinite number of coin tosses. Bernoulli recognized that there was a disconnect between what one might expect the gambler to pay and the expected value of infinity for the payout. Theoretically, the gambler should be willing to enter the game at any finite buy-in amount, but this is clearly a counterintuitive result (some have suggested that the mean amount that gamblers are willing to pay is as little as 25 ducats). A number of solutions to resolve this paradox have been suggested, but they tend toward the practical: no casino would offer a game that could lead to an infinite expected loss or has the resources to pay off on the most lucrative payouts (an implicit acknowledgement of credit risk), or gamblers tend to underestimate the probability of the most extreme outcomes. Bernoulli’s more insightful solution was to introduce the concept of a marginal utility function, in which he suggested that the utility to the gambler of each possible ducat earned is not equal. For example, the value to the gambler of the first ducat he earns is greater than that of one additional ducat added to a payoff of, say, 1,024 ducats (after 11 tosses). Depending on the nature of the function (Bernoulli suggested a logarithmic form7), the series can be made to converge to an intuitively acceptable value by weighting each successive outcome by its diminishing utility. Bernoulli presaged behavioral economics by recognizing that the price at which a particular bet might trade might be quite different from its theoretical value, excluding preferences; in the case of the St. Petersburg Paradox, it would trade at around 25 ducats instead of infinity. Instead of calculating the expected value, he calculated the expected utility. Bernoulli explicitly recognized that the price at which a bet might trade is a function of both objective measures of its worth and investors’ net preferences. In Exposition, Bernoulli addressed nearly every important issue having to do with portfolio diversification, optimum portfolio construction,
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risk measurement, capital adequacy, and decision making under uncertainty. He presages risk metrics such as value at risk (VaR),8 which are designed to constrain the worst outcomes possible, and capital requirements, and he even dealt with issues such as optimal hedging and the efficient frontier described by Markowitz 200 years later. However, probably his greatest philosophical insight was that Decision theory ⫽ probability theory ⫹ utility theory In Exposition, Bernoulli also considers the case of Caius, a Petersburg merchant who is deciding whether to insure commodities purchased in Amsterdam and transported by sea. The risk is high—he assumes that 5 of 100 ships sailing from Amsterdam will be lost—and the price of insurance is correspondingly high. “The question is, therefore, how much wealth must Caius possess apart from the goods under consideration in order that it be sensible for him to abstain from insuring them?” Bernoulli also asks the opposite question (i.e., from the viewpoint of the seller of insurance rather than that of the buyer): “What minimum fortune should be possessed by the man who offers to provide this insurance in order for him to be rational in doing so?” His answer is this: “This is the rule: that it is advisable to divide goods which are exposed to some danger into several portions rather than to risk them all together.” Bernoulli demonstrates that another merchant, Sempronius, would be best advised to diversify his investments among multiple ships. “In this way the value of Sempronius’ prospects of success will grow more favorable the smaller the proportion committed to one ship. However, his expectation will never rise in value above 7200 ducats. This counsel will be equally serviceable for those who invest their fortunes in foreign bills of exchange and other hazardous enterprises.”9 The power of Bernoulli’s logic is demonstrated by the fact that it has been adapted by other disciplines. For example, in evolutionary biology, the geographical dispersion of a species via migration increases the probability that the species will continue to exist in spite of the fact that some price was paid during migration. If a species remained in place at a location with uncertain environmental conditions, it would eventually die off. This is equivalent to a species hedging its evolutionary bets via diversification. As brilliant as his insights were, Bernoulli’s computational problems were trivial. His case studies dealt with discrete events: a coin toss results in either heads or tails; a ship does or does not survive a winter storm. There was little uncertainty regarding the odds of each event, as well: the probability of heads is 50 percent; the nature of winter storms at sea and
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the failure rate of eighteenth-century ships were relatively stable. Further, there was zero or weak correlation between the discrete events: the coin has no memory, and each ship’s fate was assumed to be independent of the others’. LOUIS BACHELIER AND BROWNIAN MOTION Almost two centuries later, the French mathematician Louis Bachelier expanded on Bernoulli’s work on the role of chance. Although little known in finance, Bachelier contributed both the philosophical and the mathematical foundations for modern quantitative finance. In July 2000 and on the occasion of the hundredth anniversary of the publication of Bachelier’s Ph.D. dissertation, the authors of a tribute to Bachelier in the journal Mathematical Finance10 declared, “The date March 29, 1900, should be considered as the birthdate of mathematical finance. On that day, a French postgraduate student, Louis Bachelier, successfully defended at the Sorbonne his thesis Theorie de la Speculation (The Theory of Speculation).” Anecdotally, the instructor who reviewed Bachelier’s dissertation was the famous mathematician, physicist, and philosopher Jules Henri Poincaré, the first to describe a chaotic deterministic system in physics that laid the groundwork for modern chaos theory. This dissertation contains a number of advanced financial concepts. Because Bachelier had responsibility for his family’s business (wine merchants), he had practical experience with French financial instruments, including forward contracts and options. Bachelier considered the evolution of stock prices over time to follow a Markov process, that is, a memoryless process in which the future depends on the current state of the system, not on its past. Bachelier stated, “The expectation of the speculator is zero.” This simple statement, along with his description of the Brownian motion that is an element of nearly every stochastic model in finance, presages an explicit representation of the efficient market hypothesis posited by Eugene Fama in his doctoral dissertation more than 60 years later. Bachelier demonstrated that a Gaussian (normal) distribution with variance that increases linearly with time correctly represents the results of a Markov process.11 Stunningly, Bachelier also presages the BlackScholes option-pricing model of the 1970s (inspired by a heat flow equation in physics) when he also observes that this family of distribution functions satisfies the heat equation: like heat, the probability diffuses or “radiates.”
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The Black-Scholes partial differential equation (PDE), from which the famous option-pricing formula for European-style12 options is derived, is dSt = mStdt + sStd Wt where St is the price of the underlying stock, m is the mean return, s is the standard deviation of returns of the stock, and Wt represents Brownian (random) motion (also called a Weiner process). This formula contains two components: one deterministic, in that the price is expected to trend over time along the mean expected return, and one stochastic, in which Wt represents all sources of uncertainty in price movement over time. Bachelier’s contribution to this concept has recently received new attention. As Courtault and his associates state in their centenary tribute, “It is worth noting that in spite of the fact that in modern English textbooks Brownian motion is traditionally referred to as the Wiener process, the original terminology suggested by W. Feller in his famous treatise An Introduction to Probability Theory and Its Applications (1957) was the Wiener–Bachelier process.” Bachelier’s work on Brownian motion also predates Einstein’s work on the subject. In his dissertation, Bachelier even applied his theories to the problem of option pricing, including that of American-style13 path-dependent options. This exceedingly practical contribution was unusual for a rigorously mathematical work. In it, he calculated the probability that a stock price controlled by Brownian motion does not exceed some threshold (the strike price) and identifies the least upper bound of the Brownian motion. The tribute continues: “Bachelier considered that his principal achievement was the systematic use of the concept of continuity in probabilistic modeling: the continuous distributions are the fundamental objects correctly describing the very nature of many random phenomena and not just mathematical inventions simplifying a work with discrete distributions.” Bachelier’s Theorie seemed destined for oblivion until it received fresh attention during the golden age of finance of the 1950s and 1960s. Economist (and later Nobel Prize winner) Paul Samuelson started to circulate the piece among his colleagues. Its appeal was instantaneous, and Samuelson and others took great interest in its implications. But Wall Street didn’t catch up with him until decades later, when stochastic calculus and some of its specific applications (for example, the copula function, which allowed the computation of joint marginal probability distributions) were required for increasingly complex valuation and risk management problems.
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FAMA AND THE EFFICIENT MARKET HYPOTHESIS One of the most powerful concepts in twentieth-century economic thought was the efficient market hypothesis (EMH). EMH posits that all markets for traded assets are informationally efficient; that is, the price of each security reflects all public information known about that security at any point in time, and prices correct instantly as news becomes known or other events occur. Like Einstein’s mythical dice, market prices are therefore memoryless, and changes to them can be represented by a random process. EMH implies that markets in the aggregate are rational; that is, although individual investors may over- or underreact to new information, on average they will correctly assess the effect of that information on price, and their diverse opinions are randomly distributed. EMH therefore anticipates the “wisdom of crowds” popularized many years later, which serves as the philosophical foundation for prediction markets. EMH was formalized and expanded by Eugene Fama (also within his Ph.D. dissertation, originally published in 1965) at the University of Chicago. In an article titled “Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work,”14 Fama identified three forms of efficient markets: weak-form, semistrong-form, and strong-form efficiency. Each of these had implications for mathematical finance and the suitability of stochastic methods for forecasting and risk measurement. In weak-form efficiency, Fama proposed that there is no serial correlation between successive prices in a time series. This implies that patterns in prices (for example, those identified in technical analysis15) that can be exploited for predictive value cannot exist. In weak-form efficiency, only fundamental analysis (e.g., projections of a company’s earnings and market share) can provide an opportunity to profit systematically over the long run. Extraordinary events such as market crashes are permitted in the weak form, being considered rare but statistically possible. In semistrongform efficiency, even fundamental analysis will not allow an opportunity for profit. In strong-form efficiency, market prices are assumed to reflect all information known to any market participant, either public or private, so that even insiders or those with expert knowledge have no edge. When legal and regulatory impediments to insider trading are strictly enforced, strong-form efficiency is deemed to be impossible. EMH provided the philosophical foundation for the use of stochastic methods in mathematical finance. Clearly, this is philosophically consistent with Bachelier’s earlier assumption of both a memoryless Markov
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process (in that all information from the past is included in the current market price) and a speculator’s expectation of profit being zero. Besides being philosophically attractive, EMH was exceedingly convenient. An assumption of instantaneous efficiency hugely simplified the task of modeling price movements in a mathematical fashion. Analysts could assume that all price observations were automatically synchronized. If one calculated, say, a correlation coefficient between the time series of two stocks, that statistic could be assumed to measure at least in part whether the two securities were related in a causal fashion, that is, were mutually dependent, as in a supplier-customer relationship, or were both dependent on the same exogenous drivers. In contrast to macroeconomic models, in which it might take time for the effects of a driver to be felt, no inconvenient leads or lags need be assumed. Some assumption of rational processes by investors is subtly implied as well, along with justified choices such as the assumption that daily returns (rather than just changes in price) are normally distributed. These choices were also operationally convenient; in the days of batch processing, any models that minimized computer run time (especially ones expressed as closed-form solutions that did not require iteration) were favored by financial institutions.
SAMUELSON AND THE MATHEMATIZATION OF ECONOMICS In addition to spurring innovation in market theories such as EMH, Paul Samuelson is best known for his pioneering work in creating meta-theories of economics—that is, in his own words, “a general theory of economic theories.” Samuelson’s classic Foundations of Economic Analysis16 was first published in 1947, also as a product of his doctoral dissertation at Harvard in 1941. In it, he applied mathematical rigor to economics. The front page of Foundations quotes the American physicist Willard Gibbs’s motto, “Mathematics is a language.” Perhaps Samuelson’s knowledge of thermodynamics assisted him in visualizing complex systems. Samuelson formalized the study of systems such as those of economies, describing the change in an equilibrium state as a function of the variables on which it depends, just as the gas in a container reacts to a change in temperature. Samuelson’s work helped make economics operational; that is, he formalized qualitative theories so that the variables that defined them could be measured via real-world observation. For example, Samuelson’s
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work described in mathematical terms the effect on a system in equilibrium of a change in one of its variables. Such “operationalization,” in turn, allowed econometricians to build quantitative models to explain or forecast economic conditions. HARRY MARKOWITZ AND MODERN PORTFOLIO THEORY In 1952, just two years before the new translation of Bernoulli, Dr. Harry Markowitz introduced portfolio theory in his paper “Portfolio Selection” in the Journal of Finance.”17 The topic, today called modern portfolio theory (MPT), was both highly novel and extraordinarily mathematical for the times. While defending his Ph.D. dissertation at the University of Chicago three years later, Markowitz has said that Milton Friedman jokingly argued that portfolio theory was not economics.18 Markowitz’s work moved Bernoulli’s work from the casino and the high seas to Wall Street. MPT dealt with formal and rigorously mathematical expansions of Bernoulli’s basic concepts. Like Bernoulli, Markowitz explicitly addressed the gap between intuitively correct behavior, such as the diversification practiced by the Medicis, and contemporaneous portfolio construction methods. Previously, portfolio managers had often constructed portfolios in a bottom-up fashion: when they identified new securities with favorable risk-reward characteristics, they added them to their portfolios irrespective of those portfolios’ prior composition. Although they might attempt to manage risk by limiting concentration in one or more individual stocks or industry sectors, they used no mathematical means to optimize the composition of a portfolio. Markowitz mathematized diversification; he proposed a formal framework for a top-down approach in which the optimal portfolio was constructed by first abstracting each security into quantitative measures of individual and combined risk (that is, its expected return, standard deviation, and correlation with every other security that might be included in the portfolio) and then identifying the portfolio that maximized return for each possible value of risk. For example, an ideal portfolio might consist of two securities, each with a favorable return, but negatively correlated so that their risks canceled. Such a portfolio is considered the theoretical ideal in “pairs trading” in equities, in which long and short positions in stocks of related industries are paired so that returns are additive but risk cancels out. Markowitz’s key insight was that all optimally constructed portfolios sit on the “efficient frontier” of risk versus reward, as shown in Figure 2-1 for a two-stock portfolio.19
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Return
Stock B
Stock A
Risk (Standard Deviation of Returns)
Figure 2-1 The Efficient Frontier for Two Stocks
This graph illustrates the efficient frontier for a universe of two stocks: A and B. The x axis reflects risk, expressed as the standard deviation of daily returns, and the y axis reflects reward, expressed as return. Security B is assumed to have both more risk and more reward than the more stable Security A. The curve reflects the efficient frontier for each possible portfolio composition, starting with 100 percent A (the lowest point) and going to 100 percent B (the highest point). Any portfolio with a return below the line for a given level of risk is suboptimal, and any portfolio with a return above the line is impossible. The investor is forced to accept a higher level of risk in order to increase return or accept a lower return to decrease risk. There is no right answer for the optimal portfolio construction; as Bernoulli pointed out, it depends on the investor’s appetite for risk. MPT produces a range of values rather than one perfect portfolio, and the investor’s utility function with respect to risk determines the portfolio that is right for her. That is, the maximum amount of risk that an investor is willing to take determines where on the curve her optimal portfolio falls. Essentially, MPT maximizes investor utility. Markowitz gave credit for MPT to A. D. Roy, who in July 1952 independently formalized the same equation as Markowitz. Years later, Markowitz graciously wrote, “On the basis of Markowitz (1952), I am often called the father of modern portfolio theory (MPT), but Roy (1952) can claim an equal share of this honor.” Roy went one step further than Markowitz: whereas Markowitz left the decision as to the amount of risk to the investor, Roy, like Bernoulli, also attempted to suggest an appropriate utility function. He advised choosing the single point on the efficient frontier that maximized (mP - d)/sP, where d is a “disaster level” in terms of return.
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Hi. 283.69
280
INDU Index - Hist Vol(100D) (R) 7.3241 INDU Index - Price (L) 283.69
Hi. 17.6274
18.00 16.00
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200
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Low. 161.60
1948
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Figure 2-2 INDU Prices and Historical 100-Day Volatility: January 1, 1948, to
December 31, 1952 Source: Bloomberg, L.P.
It’s interesting to note that to Roy, a disastrous scenario was one in which the return was insufficiently high rather than one in which the portfolio lost value. This is in spite of the fact that the stock market of the few years previous to the publication of his work had been reasonably volatile, as shown in weekly returns and historical volatility20 for the Dow Jones Industrial Average in Figure 2-2.21 There are some additional interesting implications of MPT. For one, the addition of risk-free assets that are funded by borrowing (i.e., adding leverage) can create a return that is above the original efficient frontier. However, there are also a number of issues with the theory. For example, risk is expressed in terms of the standard deviation of returns, which is not a natural unit for risk preference. (Most people would prefer some loss limit, whereas a high standard deviation where profit is concerned is a good thing.) Markowitz later suggested some alternative expressions of risk, such as expected value of loss and probability of loss, foreshadowing future risk metrics such as value at risk and extreme value theory (EVT),22 and suggested, like Bernoulli and Roy, an alternative form for utility. For a number of reasons, MPT was of mainly theoretical interest until the 1970s. First, portfolio optimization using such methods is a computationally intensive process. The size of the correlation matrix can be very large for all but the simplest portfolios: if N is the number of possible stock choices, the matrix is of size N ⫻ N. There were practical considerations as well. For example, return often trumped risk in the optimization process: a stock with outstanding
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performance would tend to dominate the recommended portfolio. In those early days, return considerations appeared to outshine risk considerations. Given the state of computer technology in 1952 and the computational demands of MPT, it’s no surprise that it wasn’t until decades later that Markowitz’s work was appreciated by the mainstream financial community. Markowitz recognized this impediment and attempted to address it. Although he is far better known for MPT than he is for his work in the field of operations research in the 1950s and 1960s, he also developed numerical methods and computer languages (i.e., SIMSCRIPT, a computer language specifically designed to facilitate simulations) that could speed certain calculations. His theoretical work, together with an expression of a utility function and the means to perform the necessary calculations, would operationalize automated decision support in the field of portfolio selection.
WILLIAM SHARPE AND SPECIFIC AND SYSTEMATIC RISK In 1964, economist William Sharpe expanded on Markowitz’s work by introducing the concepts of systematic risk and specific risk. Awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics for his work on the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), his work dealt in part with how much of a risk premia investors require to take on market risk and to what extent an enterprise should seek to hedge its own risks.23 Systematic risk is risk that is caused by movement of the markets as a whole (e.g., as a result of recessions or high interest rates), whereas specific risk is risk that is related to the individual characteristics of the securities (e.g., industry sector factors or management quality for a particular company). Specific risk can be reduced by diversification (i.e., by ensuring that highly correlated securities don’t constitute an inordinate share of the portfolio), but systematic risk cannot. According to Sharpe, an enterprise should seek only to eliminate systematic risk (often referred to as beta), since investors can reduce their exposure to specific risk via diversification. In 1966, Sharpe proposed the metric that is now famous as the Sharpe ratio and is routinely reported by every asset manager. This ratio characterizes the risk-reward profile of a portfolio manager by penalizing the manager for volatility of returns24: Portfolio return - risk-free rate Portfolio volatility
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Dissent about EMH, Kahneman, and the Growth of Behavioral Finance The efficient market hypothesis remained mainstream opinion until the 1990s in spite of the fact that actual price behavior was not consistent with its most basic premises, at least for strong-form efficiency. For several decades, economists and analysts have been well aware that distributions of historical returns exhibit fat tails.25 Depending on the asset class, these distributions might skew to the left or to the right.26 There are a variety of reasons for such skewness. Recently, economist Burton Malkiel (author of the classic finance book A Random Walk Down Wall Street27) pointed out that in emerging markets such as China’s, evidence of price manipulation as well as its statistical artifacts, such as serial correlation and nonrandom movement, can be observed. Practitioners have also long been aware of this nonrandom behavior. For example, as early as 1987 (after the Black Monday crash), risk managers at the Options Clearing Corporation (OCC)28 considered which type of distribution might best estimate future market movements and therefore determine how much margin they should collect to protect the exchange. They chose to use a Lévy distribution rather than a Gaussian distribution. In part, they selected a Lévy distribution (Figure 2-3) because it can be expressed analytically (like a Gaussian) and therefore calculated
1
c = 0.5 c=1 c=2
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0 0
0.5
1
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x
Figure 2-3 Lévy Probability Density Function Note: c is a scale parameter in the Lévy distribution.
2
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quickly. Also, it’s not so overly sensitive to new data (e.g., market shocks) that it creates its own market turmoil by precipitating sudden, large calls for additional margin. Such calls might exacerbate a crisis (and the exchanges’ own risk) if the OCC’s calculations were too responsive to recent history. There is some theoretical as well as empirical justification for such a choice. Mathematician Benoît Mandelbrot, the father of fractal theory, suggested that daily returns are well represented by a distribution with infinite variance and converge to a log-Lévy distribution. But if the markets are not efficient, what other nonrandom drivers might explain observed market behavior? Behavioral economists, who had previously been dismissed as having more to do with psychology than with finance, were suddenly taken seriously. Like Bernoulli, they posited that humans are subject to various preferences and biases in their decision making. Because markets are, after all, composed of humans, their behavior and biases will extend to their investment choices. Theoretically, such factors would not contradict EMH if they were randomly distributed and averaged out, along with all the other drivers of individual actions. However, these economists found evidence of nonrandom biases. Behavioral economists have identified a number of cognitive biases in humans, that is, a tendency to make errors in judgment or to prefer certain outcomes in a manner that is inconsistent with rational choice theory. Psychologists Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman29 and others related a number of types of biases, starting in the early 1970s. Some of those that are most relevant to market choices included innumeracy, in which individuals were unable to reason intuitively when faced with large-scale problems; confirmation bias, in which humans interpret new information in such a manner as to confirm a preexisting opinion; and illusory correlations, in which humans see causality where none exists. Some behavioral economists have provided empirical evidence of such biases outside the market environment. For example, psychologist Peter Wason demonstrated hyperbolic discounting, in which humans prefer smaller, immediate payouts to larger, distant ones, but prefer the larger payout if the two payouts are both in the future—albeit at the same distance in time from one another. Some economists feel that behavioral finance is not inconsistent with EMH. In fact, some hedge funds consider any systematic biases resulting from human behavior to be trading opportunities because both rational and irrational biases can be arbitraged away for a profit. One of the major purposes of the capital markets is risk transference, and those who prefer the left side of the efficient frontier (i.e., the risk
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adverse who will accept a lower return in exchange for lower risk) can exchange positions with those who prefer the right. If the size of the funds that engage in such arbitrage is sufficiently large compared to the biases, even behavioral effects can be traded away. SUMMARY In this chapter, we related the scientific innovations that gave birth to the fields of financial engineering and mathematical finance and the early consideration of modern topics such as securities valuation, risk management, and portfolio optimization. We further described the continuing bias toward a frequentist approach in problems having to do with wagering or its modern equivalents, tempered by recent emphasis on the role of investor preferences and utility functions. We also described how, by the middle of the twentieth century, economic theory had been mathematized. A frequentist approach, in which estimates of probability inform decision making under uncertainty, has dominated recent advances and provided a road map to quantitative risk management and portfolio optimization. WHAT’S NEXT In the next chapter, we will describe how Wall Street took economic theory and made it operational, thereby facilitating the extraordinary growth of the financial sector in the last three decades.
CHAPTER 3
Natural Selection on Wall Street
THE ASCENT OF THE QUANT Over the last three decades, growth in the financial sector has been driven in large part by rapid advances in mathematical finance and financial engineering. Such innovation is the bedrock on which new products, businesses, and strategies rest. Without the existence of mathematical models and the means to implement them, the growth of trading in entirely new types of securities—such as the multi trillion dollar credit derivatives market that is just a few years old—would not be have been possible. These advances have allowed participants to model increasingly complex and derivative instruments, better measure risk and performance, and optimize the use of an enterprise’s risk capital. This is the case because, in spite of the usefulness of these instruments as hedging vehicles, speculative trading in them for profit is still the dominant motive for most enterprises. Complex trading strategies employing such instruments (whose intrinsic risks are often multiplied many times by employing large amounts of leverage) cannot be initiated, monitored, or managed without state-of-the-art analytic tools on the trading desk and off. Such trading has been so lucrative that it has helped spawn the massive hedge fund industry, whose members forgo all the more mundane activities of a securities dealer or a bank. Instead, a hedge fund can concentrate on whatever proprietary strategy its principals deem most likely to produce exceptional returns. Also, the so-called quantitative trading strategies, in which the role of the human as decision maker is diminished (other than as the developer of the algorithms), have been popular with investors and successful in attracting new money. Parallel improvements in technology have facilitated this evolutionary path. The complex mathematical routines are computer-intensive, and supercomputers or their technical equivalent are sometimes required to meet the demands of analysts, traders, and risk managers. Furthermore, the computers themselves now trade; nearly 75 percent of all trading activity 23
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on the New York Stock Exchange today is computer-generated. So-called algo traders use mathematical algorithms to identify opportunities that last milliseconds, all without human intervention. The communications technology used by their executing brokers is so advanced that it is constrained only by the speed of light. Even lower-frequency traders and trading management are able to monitor global markets in real time on portals that provide them with a wealth of information, including trading opportunities, performance statistics, and risk metrics. They’re supported by a wealth of commercial offthe-shelf services that inform and supplement proprietary models. Historical data are readily available (Bloomberg L.P. alone has 1.2 million economic and financial time series available to its subscribers), and live exchange feeds available at very high (millisecond) frequencies have facilitated increasingly sophisticated models and strategies. In light of this intersection of attractive theory and the means to implement it, it was natural for the financial community to gravitate toward stochastic methods to create forecasting models. Thus, starting with the original “rocket scientists” in the late 1970s, quantitative analysts with doctorates in physics or computer science modeled future price behavior based only on past price behavior in increasingly sophisticated ways. Academics and practitioners both contributed to a burst of new theory, and the gap between innovation and implementation became exceedingly short. This is still the case, except that these quants have taken their place on front-office trading desks as well. Anecdotally, at the University of California at Berkeley, fully 25 percent of the applicants for a master’s degree in financial engineering already have a Ph.D. in physics. However, to rely on stochastic models, one must assume that the processes by which securities prices are established have both a deterministic (predicable) component and a random component. The deterministic component, which is subject to both known and unknown drivers, may be so complex that it’s virtually impossible to model. As in other areas in which stochastic models are used (e.g., meteorology), there are often so many interacting drivers in play at one time that attempting to separating them is exceedingly difficult even if they are deterministic at a microscopic scale. Therefore, trailblazing “quants” ignored the economic fundamentals that drove changes in market price. Instead, they concerned themselves only with the best means of expressing typical market behavior in rigorous mathematical equations, using only historical pricing data. These equations could be used to estimate both the value of a specific security or
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instrument and the uncertainly in that estimate over a particular future time horizon. Theoretically, such analysis could be done without even knowing the identity of each of the historical time series; they might as well be series A and B rather than IBM and Bank of America. In fact, practically the only concession to the fact that the historical data were market data was the assumption that returns1 (rather than some other metric) are normally distributed. Thirty or more years ago, this was an eminently reasonable choice because of the difficulty of collecting diverse fundamental data and modeling the market’s reactions to them. Perhaps more important, it was also an eminently practical choice. While best practice was in its embryonic state, only end-of-day prices were readily available for most securities and instruments. Furthermore, only end-of-day data could be synchronized with data from other sources2—a requirement when parameters such as correlation coefficients that measured relative behavior were being calculated. In addition, at such a low frequency, prices and events could not be synchronized. Many events might affect the price of a security over a 24-hour period—the day might include an economic news release, an earnings report, and a corporate action as well as noise and more mundane market flows. The linkage between events and the market reaction to those events might be separated by hours—certainly a long enough period to lose the association between cause and effect. Therefore, for good and practical reasons, quantitative analysts deliberately avoided the explicit modeling of causal relationships between a driver and a security or between changes in the price of one security and that of another. Instead, they modeled the behavior of one security relative to another in the form of a correlation coefficient. However, something was lost in the process. Quants do not need to understand economics or financial analysis; they don’t need to know that higher oil prices will hurt an airline. Instead, they can observe the correlation between airline and oil prices. A simple causal relationship (e.g., one cause, one effect) might create apparent correlation. Conversely, a more complex causal relationship (e.g., two causes, different effects) might obscure real correlation. A correlation coefficient calculated at a low daily frequency cannot distinguish among situations in which (1) news relevant to only one security triggered changes in another related security (e.g., one in the same industry), (2) the same news triggered changes in both securities simultaneously (e.g., an economic news release), or (3) multiple events drove
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prices in a complex manner. If such estimates of correlation are flawed because they fail to reflect causality, they will provide poor estimates of future portfolio risk. Nevertheless, analysts had some theoretical justification for ignoring causality in favor of correlation. Recall that the efficient market hypothesis postulates that, at any point in time, the market price of any security reflects all the information known about that security. Barring artificial constraints such as laws against insider trading, the fact that any nonpublic knowledge provides an opportunity for profit dictates that transactions designed to benefit from that information will move each security’s price to its proper level. However, in a stochastic modeling process, even the most expert analysts acknowledge the uncertainty with respect to results. Explicit modeling of the nature and magnitude of such uncertainty gave rise to quantitative risk measurement, in which risk managers reported metrics such as value at risk (a measure of short-term risk) or economic capital (a measure of the amount of capital required by the enterprise). Early on, analysts gradually recognized that simple statistical assumptions such as stable volatilities, normal distributions of returns, and independence of daily returns did not adequately represent actual market behavior to the degree of precision required when money was on the line. Many academic studies dating back to the 1960s observed that distributions in nearly all markets generally had fat tails, or higher-than-normal probabilities of very large and very small outcomes. Although most initial models used the Gaussian (normal) distribution as the starting point, theorists soon created alternative representations of the random component of the stochastic process. For example, a jumpdiffusion process was postulated for how prices moved over time (occasionally “jumping” and then diffusing that jump). These alternative representations were required to better price derivative securities (particularly those with some optionality) and measure risk. Over time, analysts developed new theoretical models that allowed for such observed behavior, such as extreme value theory (EVT), which explicitly attempts to model fat-tailed distributions, and generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH), which models stochastic volatility. Such models were used to value increasingly complex instruments as well as to measure market risk. For a long time, the party continued. Technical innovation kept pace with financial innovation, and the most quantitative and technologically proficient shops, such as Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, made money year after year.
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There was a kind of inadvertent conspiracy with respect to best practice. Although the top-tier firms all closely guarded their own proprietary models and the manner in which they calculated the parameters (e.g., variance and covariance) that informed those models, nearly all firms used models with the same underlying assumptions regarding price behavior. Without such relative unanimity, liquidity would have been much reduced: if firm A values a security at 80 and firm B values it at 90, no trade will occur, whereas if there is a quarter-point spread, it might. However, sometimes these methods were pushed beyond their original utility. As old innovations became commoditized and new and more complex variations were created, financial engineers were called upon to produce increasingly specific forecasts. For example, in the 1980s, they were called upon to project mortgage prepayment rates3 by geographical region for use in pricing mortgage-backed securities,4 and in the 2000s, they were called upon to project the recovery rates5 in the case of a bankruptcy for pricing credit default swaps.6 Analysts needed to express their uncertainty about their estimates in statistical terms, for example, to price securities with embedded optionality or to measure risk. Often, a single, complex derivative security might include a number of such sensitivities or might be ultrasensitive to one or more risk factors (for example, in the case of “first-to-default” tranches of a collateralized mortgage obligation [CMO]). It might even be pathdependent, for example, in the case of “down-and-out” options, in which a price movement below a specific threshold terminates the option before expiration. The terms for complex securities increased as well, requiring that forecasts of possible future scenarios be extended far into the future. Generally, most firms’ protocols called for using the last two or three years of data in calculating model parameters. (Data older than that are often considered unrepresentative of the future). However, using data from an immature market (e.g., using historical default probabilities and recovery experiences for purposes of pricing loans or credit default swaps) to price swaps with 10 years or more to expiration strained the “past represents future” assumption. Sometimes, specific exposures could be hedged in the open market. For example, sensitivity to short-term rates could be laid off in the Chicago Mercantile Exchange’s Eurodollar futures contract. However, such hedging only increased the gross size of the portfolio and added additional credit risk (if the counterparty to the hedge transactions failed to meet its contractual obligations) in place of the original market risk.
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Because many of the new structured securities “traded by appointment,” some of the largest dealers were required to keep these positions on their firms’ books for extended periods until they could be sold to institutional investors. Others held them willingly because they assumed that the positions would profit over time. For example, at the time of the AIG bailout, it was reported that AIG Financial Products held about $500 billion of credit default swaps on its books, which would have reaped large profits if there had been fewer credit defaults than expected. Firms that were heavily involved in securitization were highly vulnerable to model risk, that is, the risk that the quantitative models produced flawed forecasts. In general, a firm realizes most of the profit on a new securitization when the new issue is distributed to institutional investors. However, if the securities were held in the firm’s portfolio, their value could only be estimated (using the same quantitative models, albeit calibrated to trading activity) rather than directly observed. Thus, until the position was laid off, the firm continued to own the risk that reality would deviate from the original forecasts. THE WORLD BEFORE The stochastic methods that are widely used in the financial community require an assumption of system stability; that is, although there will always be random motion and even occasional shocks, there will be no event that is so far away from historical experience that the system won’t survive and most enterprises live to trade another day. Extreme events such as the crash of 1987 and the demise of LongTerm Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998 came close to triggering systemic failure; without timely bank intervention, one or more of the commodities exchanges might have closed their doors. However, in large part because of intervention by the Treasury and regulators, the casualties after each event were relatively limited, and so the lessons learned may have been more theoretical than tangible. Outside such special cases and within the normal ebb and flow of daily trading, ordinary risk had not proved to be much of a problem. Most firms prospered, even during interim spikes in volatility, because their day-to-day activities generated substantial profits. However, these firms were at risk from their own down-and-out scenario: an extreme event from which they might not recover. For example, a Russian financial crisis may have been the nominal trigger for LTCM’s sudden demise (Figure 3-1), but the amount of leverage that LTCM
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5,000 LTCM DJIA U.S. Treasury 4,000
3,000
2,000
1,000
3/
1/ 1 7/ 994 1/ 1 11 994 /1 /1 3/ 994 1/ 1 7/ 995 1/ 1 11 995 /1 /1 3/ 995 1/ 1 7/ 996 1/ 1 11 996 /1 /1 3/ 996 1/ 1 7/ 997 1/ 1 11 997 /1 /1 3/ 997 1/ 1 7/ 998 1/ 19 98
0
Figure 3-1 Assets under Management of Long-Term Capital Management
(billions of dollars) Source: Wikipedia Commons
employed, along with flawed risk management protocols, created its vulnerability to such an event. WHEN THE WORLD CHANGED During the peak of the U.S. credit crisis in November 2008, the negotiations between the Federal Reserve, the Treasury, and the large brokerdealers shone a spotlight on the fragility of valuation and risk management protocols. As former Lehman Chairman Dick Fuld said after the Lehman board voted unanimously to file for bankruptcy, “I guess this is good-bye.” It was reported that AIG CEO Hank Paulson had, on impulse, designated a $700 billion price tag for the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) because it was about half the size of the $1.7 trillion mortgage-backed securities market worldwide.
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Figure 3-2 Daily Five-Year CDS Spreads for Select G-10 Sovereign Debt: Two
Years Ending November 26, 2009 Source: Bloomberg, L.P.
Model error hit home, especially for firms with leverage as high as 30:1, as was the case for Lehman before its demise. Formerly high-quality assets became toxic assets, and virtually no asset was considered safe. As shown in Figure 3-2, even the sovereign debt of the United States (i.e., U.S. Treasury securities), which is normally considered the safest asset in the world, traded as high as 100 basis points in the credit default swap (CDS) market—worse than Germany and equivalent to medium-grade corporate debt not long before.
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These events demonstrated that the greatest risk to which a financial enterprise is exposed is systemic risk; when the entire system becomes unstable, it may be too late to change one’s exposure or mitigate damage. Weeks or even months are insufficient to turn the battleship, and the fact that most institutions are in the same boat can precipitate a liquidity crisis that exacerbates the downward spiral. SUMMARY In this chapter, we discussed the fundamental assumptions about the process by which prices are established, and the reasons—fundamental, technical, and practical—for their almost universal adoption by the financial community. We also discussed their extension to increasingly risky or inappropriate uses and the financial system’s resultant sensitivity to an assumption of stability that was violated during the credit crisis of 2008. WHAT’S NEXT In the next chapter, we will describe risk management models and protocols in use by financial institutions.
CHAPTER 4
A Review: Risk Management Metrics, Models, and Best Practice
IN THE TIME BEFORE VAR In the 1970s and early 1980s, risk management was often a haphazard affair. Even in the heyday of the bond-trading masters of the universe such as Salomon Brothers and Drexel Burnham, risk measurement generally consisted of simple aggregate statistics, such as “bond-equivalent position,” in which all Treasury bill, bond, and note positions held at the end of the day were converted to their economic equivalent in terms of the most recently issued 30-year bond.1 This metric served as both a position limit and a rough indicator of market risk. Such bond-equivalent positions were not converted to dollars, nor were any probabilities attached to various sized losses (although trading managers could make such a mental mapping based on their own experience). Credit risk was virtually ignored; counterparties were assigned notional trading limits by the credit department, and as long as these limits were not exceeded, credit risk was considered to be the firm’s problem and not the trading desk’s. C-suite executives were informed by daily profit and loss statements (P&L), and if the worst days were not too bad and the general trend was higher, then risk was assumed to be under control. When most of the risk on a desk consisted of simple long and short positions in stocks, bonds, commodities, and foreign exchange, such metrics were adequate. However, as trading in derivative securities increased and more and more structured products were created, they would no longer do. For example, an option might be more sensitive to implied volatility than to the price of the underlying security, and a mortgagebacked security might be more sensitive to prepayment assumptions than to interest rates. Securities such as these had explicit or implicit optionality, 32
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33
and financial engineers began building sophisticated models that accounted for uncertainty. COMMUNICATING RISK This stochastic approach was different from that used by the firm’s financial analysts (who might forecast a company’s earnings) and economists (who might forecast GDP). Instead, risk analysts forecast a distribution of outcomes rather than the single most likely scenario. But a distribution is hard to communicate to consumers. In the early 1990s, J.P. Morgan CEO Dennis Weatherstone called for a “4:15 report” that summarized all of the firm’s risk in a single page and was available just after the close of the major U.S. equity exchanges. To meet this demand, analysts at Bankers Trust, J.P. Morgan, and others popularized value at risk, a metric that communicated the magnitude of risk in a single, meaningful number. VALUE AT RISK Value at risk (VaR) is a statistical measure of the possible loss on a portfolio. Any estimate of VaR must include a reference currency (e.g., U.S. dollars), a time horizon (usually one day), and a confidence level (usually 1 percent2). As shown in Figure 4-1, VaR measures only the left tail (that is, losses) of a distribution of potential outcomes. For example, if one-day, 1 percent VaR is $1 million, then the likelihood of a loss greater than $1 million over a one-day horizon is estimated to be only 1 percent, or 2.33 standard deviations away from the mean for the normal distribution shown.3 Although Figure 4-1 shows a normal distribution, the definition of VaR includes no assumption about how P&L is actually distributed. Figure 4-2 shows two very different distributions that might produce the same value for VaR: a lognormal distribution and a uniform discrete distribution. Note that the maximum loss is very different for each: zero for the lognormal distribution and ⫺5 for the discrete distribution. In practice, P&L distributions for all but the simplest portfolios are likely to be asymmetrical and uniquely shaped because of the presence of securities with optionality. VAR AND RISK GOVERNANCE Having a single metric such as VaR enhanced decision making by providing an objective, quantitative measure of the risk of adverse market movement. As such, it improved communication between the trading
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–23.3
+∞ 99.0%
1.0%
Normal(0,10)
1% VaR = –23.3
Minimum –∞ Maximum +∞ Mean 0.0000 Std Dev 10.0000
–40
–30
–20
–10
0
10
20
30
40
Figure 4-1 VaR for a Normal Distribution of P&L
desk and the C-suite and facilitated more informed corporate governance and better disclosure to investors. Applications using VaR soon included • Ensuring the continued existence of the enterprise by limiting risk to an amount appropriate to the firm’s capital and appetite for risk • Allocating “risk capital” (either actual cash or the ability to take risk) to various activities throughout the enterprise • Assigning VaR-based position limits to specific activities, trading desks, and/or traders • Comparing alternative trading and hedging strategies, that is, trying to approach the “efficient frontier” of risk versus return • Measuring the risk-adjusted performance of an individual trader, a profit center, or an asset manager • Allocating assets (e.g., by a fund of funds) to portfolio managers in order to optimize the fund’s risk-reward profile • Determining performance margin (used by exchanges and by dealers for OTC instruments or futures and options contracts) • Facilitating greater transparency to investors (e.g., disclosing average daily VaR in annual reports)
A Review: Risk Management Metrics, Models, and Best Practice
35 +∞
1.0 1.0%
99.0% Lognorm(10,10) 0.0000 +∞ 10.0000 10.0000
1% VaR = 1
Minimum Maximum Mean Std Dev
A –1.00
+∞
1.0%
99.0%
Discrete({},{})
1% VaR = –1
Minimum Maximum Mean Std Dev
B
–6
–4
–2
0
2
4
–5.0000 5.0000 2.9406 1.5339
6
Figure 4-2 Two Distributions of P&L with Identical Values for VaR
CLASSICAL METHODS FOR COMPUTATION OF VAR There are a number of standard methods used to estimate VaR, each with its own advantages and appropriate uses. The most common are variancecovariance estimation, historical simulation, and Monte Carlo analysis. Somewhat less common is the use of extreme value estimation, which focuses on only the most unlikely events. Note that the term VaR is sometimes incorrectly assumed to be synonymous with variance-covariance VaR.4 However, VaR is just a metric (like temperature or pressure), and use of the term implies nothing about the method used to estimate it.
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It should be noted that VaR is a measure of portfolio risk and, as such, depends on the portfolio’s particular composition. With very few exceptions (i.e., when all the securities in a portfolio are perfectly correlated), VaR is not additive; that is, the VaR of a portfolio is not the sum of the VaRs of its individual components. Variance-Covariance Estimation Variance-covariance VaR is the earliest and most computationally efficient method by which VaR might be estimated. Based on modern portfolio theory (MPT), VaR is calculated to be some multiple of the standard deviation of the portfolio’s return, based on the variance of each security in the portfolio and the intercorrelations of the securities in the portfolio.5 VaR calculated in this manner is also known as parametric VaR, analytical VaR, or closed-form VaR.6 All these terms refer to the great advantage of variance-covariance VaR: that it can be estimated speedily (e.g., by 4:15), since it can be directly calculated from a closed-form solution.7 However, variance-covariance VaR is based on the assumption that returns are normally distributed and that the relationships between securities in the portfolio are linear. It also implicitly assumes that volatility is predicable. Historical Simulation Historical simulation is a method for estimating the distribution of outcomes using only historical experience. To calculate historical VaR, a static portfolio is repriced and its P&L calculated on each of a series of historical dates, for example, each day of the last three years. The power of historical simulation is that the set of market prices used can occur because these prices have occurred before; the various prices are necessarily all internally consistent, and their relative pricing may reflect some complex dynamic (e.g., nonlinearity or causality). Like variance-covariance VaR, historical VaR is also speedy to compute and requires an assumption that the future is well represented by the past. However, unlike variance-covariance VaR, it includes no implicit assumptions about the shape of historical distributions or about the form of the relationship between assets. Monte Carlo Simulation Monte Carlo simulation is the most flexible method for the estimation of VaR. To calculate Monte Carlo VaR, a random-number generator is used to create virtually every plausible future state (typically, 10,000 or more).
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Just as in historical simulation, a static portfolio is repriced and the P&L for each state is calculated. VaR is estimated by identifying, say, the 100th worst loss (1 percent of 10,000). Unlike in historical simulation, in Monte Carlo simulation, market prices are not available for portfolio reevaluation. Instead, the modeler must rely on theoretical valuation models to estimate what the price of each security in the portfolio would be at each future state. This extra step introduces another level of uncertainty. A Monte Carlo simulation can be as simple or complex as the modeler desires; it can simulate simple Brownian motion, or it can include complex dynamics over time. For example, a sophisticated model would need to estimate volatility surfaces, yield curves, and other inputs required to price complex derivative instruments and structured products. The quality of VaR calculated using Monte Carlo estimation depends on the quality of the valuation models as well as on the parameters that control the random scenario generation. Nevertheless, in spite of the computer power required to perform so many calculations, Monte Carlo simulation is the only commonly used method that is capable of dealing with complex securities and system dynamics properly. Extreme Value Theory (EVT) Extreme value VaR (EV VaR) is a method for better estimating the most extreme outcomes for a portfolio. Extreme value theory is a branch of statistics dealing with the most extreme deviations in probability distributions. It is used in a number of disciplines to estimate the very rare and the unobserved, such as natural 100-year events (e.g., hurricanes or forest fires) and even the limits of human performance in a footrace. EVT is concerned with determining the asymptotic limits that describe the distribution of extremes. For example, EVT might be used to estimate the distribution of the maximum wave height (not the entire distribution of wave heights) based on only the maximum observed wave heights from the previous 100 years. Use of EVT to estimate VaR is appropriate when, as in finance, the distributions of returns have been observed to have fat tails. If the market dynamic that generated the fat tails is unknown, then EV VaR might be best estimated by fitting a curve to the observations beyond some quantile.8 In Figure 4-3, a curve was fitted to all observations of P&L beyond the 80 percent tail quantile, and 5 percent VaR was estimated using that fitted curve. Use of EV VaR is most appropriate when there is substantial “tail risk.” For example, Figure 4-4 shows a distribution of hourly electricity prices for a historical period and for one route on the U.S. western power grid.
1
Conditional Probability
0.8 80% Quantile Threshold = ($40MM) 0.6
0.4
0.2
0 –300
–250
–200
–150
–100
–50
P&L ($MM)
Figure 4-3 Extreme Value VaR Modeling
Probability
Horizon: 1 Day Date Range: 4/1/98–9/28/00 Volatility = 7.48 STD = 0.47 Min = 18% Max = 414%
14% 12% 10% 8% 6% 4% 2% 0% 0%
100%
200%
300%
P(t)/P(t–lag)
Figure 4-4 Distribution of Hourly Electricity Prices, 1998–2000
38
400%
0
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(Electricity, denominated in megawatts, can be purchased in as small an increment as 15 minutes of power). The price of electricity can vary widely from hour to hour and can skyrocket as a result of restricted flow on the grid, increased demand (for example, during peak seasons for electricity use), or decreased supply (resulting from an outage by a power generator). Because electricity is very difficult to store, its price responds quickly to such drivers, and the right tail of its distribution is more pronounced than that for other commodities. Note that the best-fit lognormal distribution of returns is an exceedingly poor one; it underestimates the probabilities of both moderate returns (i.e., little change) and extreme returns (over 400 percent in one day). The advantage of EV VaR is that it is more likely to estimate extreme outcomes, while its disadvantage is that it fits a curve to relatively few events that may or may not be indicative of the future. ADDITIONAL RISK METRICS VaR identifies a threshold, but not the magnitude of loss beyond the threshold. Expected shortfall (ES), also known as conditional VaR (CVaR) or expected tail loss (ETL), is an additional risk metric that estimates the magnitude of expected loss. ES estimated at the 1 percent confidence limit is the expected P&L (or return) 1 percent of the time. ES depends on the shape of the distribution beyond the confidence limit. For example, the 1 percent likely expected shortfall in the lognormal distribution of Figure 4-2 is far less than that of the uniform distribution, with its low probability but highly adverse outcomes. Another useful metric is marginal VaR, which is the sensitivity of the VaR of a portfolio to the addition of a new position. It is the difference between the VaR of the existing portfolio and that of the new portfolio, and it provides a means of determining whether the potential addition moves the portfolio closer to the efficient frontier. For example, two candidates for addition to the portfolio might have identical expected returns, but if the first is positively correlated with the old portfolio (increases VaR) while the second is negatively correlated (decreases VaR), the second choice is the better one. COMPARISON OF VAR METHODOLOGIES Clearly, depending on how P&L is actually distributed, each of these methods can create very different estimates of VaR (and of loss beyond VaR). As shown in Figure 4-5, for a fat-tailed distribution typical of
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1.60% 1.40% 1.20%
VaR Confidence Interval
VaR Based on Normal Distribution
1.00% 0.80% Historical Simulation Results
0.60% 0.40%
VaR Based on Extreme Value Distribution
0.20% 0.00%
–35%
–30%
–25%
–20%
–15%
–10%
–5%
–0%
Return
Figure 4-5 Extreme Value VaR versus Historical VaR
financial data, variance-covariance VaR (which assumes a normal distribution) may produce the lowest estimate of risk, followed in increasing order by historical simulation and EVT. PARAMETER GENERATION FOR VAR In practice, even variance-covariance VaR methodologies are not literal implementations of modern portfolio theory. For example, while MPT might have used historical variances and covariances as is to inform a variance-covariance model (tacitly assuming that volatility is constant), current implementations recognize the critical dependence of VaR on a volatility forecast. So, for example, in 1996,9 RiskMetrics used an exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA), which weighted recent data far more heavily than older data in constructing a best estimate of future volatility, and assumed that volatility grew as the square root of time (i.e., four-day volatility is twice one-day volatility). By 2006,10 with the benefit of an additional 10 years of historical data, RiskMetrics had revised its methodology to better predict volatility over longer time horizons11 and to better account for fat-tailed distributions of returns.
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Similarly, recall that parametric VaR is computationally efficient; that is, it can be directly calculated using an equation rather than via simulation. However, it becomes far less efficient when the number of securities N in a portfolio is large (it can number in the thousands or more for a financial institution), since it requires an N ⫻ N correlation matrix. Even if this computation could be done quickly, including every individual security makes the result vulnerable to spurious correlation, in which two securities are highly correlated but have no causal relationship. (Similarly, two securities that are uncorrelated can have a causal relationship, perhaps disguised by company-specific events in the past that masked their true relationship.) So, in practice, representative time series are used as proxies for specific instruments. In the 1996 version of its seminal RiskMetrics protocol, J.P. Morgan used only 480 time series, derived from the term structures of global equity indexes, currency exchange rates, commodity futures, and interest rates. Even so, this reduced set required 480 variance forecasts and 114,960 covariance forecasts.12 As risk models further evolve, some firms are using macroeconomic or other risk factors instead of market proxies in order to better explain market movements as a function of fundamental drivers. APPROPRIATE USES Table 4-1 summarizes the key assumptions of each of the classic models, as well as the key inputs. While the variance-covariance model is a parametric solution, historical VaR, Monte Carlo VaR, and extreme value VaR are all scenario-based and depend on the accuracy of the scenarios when applied to the future. This comparison provides some insight into whether a model is appropriate for a given portfolio. For example, classic variance-covariance VaR implies that the relationship between assets is linear, so that if the portfolio includes securities for which this is not true (for example, an option, with its asymmetric dependence on underlying price), this method will provide a poor estimate of VaR. MODEL DESIGN AND PARAMETER ESTIMATION In practice, VaR is recalculated at least nightly. Each firm has its own protocols for revising the parameters that inform its VaR models. However, most firms ensure that VaR is dynamic and responds relatively quickly to changing market conditions. Because traders are often assigned
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T A B L E 4-1
Summary of Classic VaR Models
VaR
Type
Assumptions
Inputs
Variancecovariance
Parametric
Historical distribution is stable, and returns are normally distributed; linear relationships between assets
Variance of each asset; covariance matrix for all assets
Historical
Scenario-based Future is well represented by the historical period used Monte Carlo Scenario-based None
Extreme value
Empirical
Historical distribution is stable, and extreme scenarios can be projected from past experience
Historical prices Modeler’s view of market dynamics; accuracy of valuation models Tail quantiles
VaR-based limits, these dynamic parameters might force traders to reduce the size of their positions in response to higher risk. The forecast parameters for VaR are usually estimated from historical data. In selecting the historical period to use, there is a trade-off between using more data (which, in a stable system, increases confidence in the results) and using less data (which makes VaR more responsive to current market conditions). Alternatively, the parameters for VaR might be calibrated to current market prices. For example, rather than using a volatility forecast derived from historical data, one might instead use the variance implied by forward-looking options contracts by out-of-the-moneyness and term.13 If the market knows best (for example, that there are some high-risk events looming on the horizon), then using the market’s implied forecast might be superior to using an empirically derived forecast. At the world-class firms, there are myriad internal protocols and variations on the classic models, all jealously guarded as valuable intellectual property. Because most large financial institutions hold thousands to hundreds of thousands of individual securities (the larger number comes from the “one-of” nature of some structured products or customized derivatives), they generally use a Monte Carlo simulation together with their proprietary valuation models to measure risk.
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CATEGORIES OF RISK Originally, VaR was used primarily to describe market risk, that is, the risk of loss in a portfolio caused by adverse market movement. But there are additional sources of risk, as well. For example, credit risk is the risk of loss as a result of the failure of a counterparty to fulfill its contractual obligations. Some of the classic VaR methods are not appropriate for simple counterparty exposure, where no profit is generated if a counterparty performs, but huge losses are possible if it doesn’t. As shown in Figure 4-6, the distribution of outcomes is far from Gaussian, and its mean is not close to zero. The standard categories of risk to which an enterprise is exposed include the following. Market Risk. The risk of loss due to adverse market movement. The four primary sources of market risk are equity risk (the risk that stock prices will change), interest-rate risk (the risk that interest rates will change), commodity risk (the risk that commodity prices will change), and currency risk (the risk that exchange rates will change). These adverse changes include both changes in the security or instrument itself and second-order changes such as a change in implied volatility, a change in the spread between related securities, or a change in the shape of the yield curve. Credit Risk. The risk of loss due to the inability of counterparties to fulfill their contractual obligations. This includes the risk that a counterparty to a transaction will fail to meet a contractual obligation (e.g., make interest 10.00% 9.00% 8.00%
Probability
7.00% 6.00% 6.00% 4.00% 3.00% 2.00% 1.00% 0.00%
0
10,000,000
20,000,000 30,000,000 40,000,000 50,000,000 60,000,000 70,000,000
Loss ($)
Figure 4-6 Distribution of Credit Loss
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and principal payments, or pay off on an option exercise or credit default swap [CDS] default event). With the advent of CDS trading, credit risk was sometimes bifurcated into credit spread risk, or the risk of a mark-tomarket loss resulting from an increase in a CDS spread caused by a perceived decline in credit quality, and credit default risk, or the realized loss resulting from the failure of an obligor to meet its financial obligations. The magnitude of the loss from a credit event, or loss given default (LGD), depends on the recovery rate, or the amount that the enterprise expected to recover in a bankruptcy. Typically, a recovery rate of 40 percent is assumed. Operational Risk. The risk of loss due to human failure. Operational risk can stem from inadequate technology and operational protocols, management failures, fraud, and more mundane errors such as data input errors. For example, it might range from simple accounting errors to more catastrophic failures such as the inability to control a rogue trader (as in the case of Nick Leeson and Barings Bank14) or failure to protect the enterprise from a cyber attack. Model risk, or the risk of poorly specifying a valuation or risk model such as VaR, is sometimes considered an operational risk. Liquidity Risk. There are two types of liquidity risk: funding liquidity risk and asset liquidity risk.15 Funding liquidity risk is the risk that an enterprise cannot fund its cash requirements for such purposes as posting margin or meeting collateral obligations. Asset liquidity risk is the risk that a decline in market activity causes bid/offer spreads to widen and the size of those bids and offers to decrease, increasing the cost of forced position liquidation. Other less quantifiable risks include legal risk (the risk of loss due to legal actions), political risk (the risk of loss due to political actions), and reputational risk (the risk of loss due to damage to the firm’s reputation). In addition, a more general type of business risk is strategic risk, in which the firm is at risk from less than optimal business decisions. SYSTEMATIC AND SPECIFIC RISK Today, most risk managers divide their market exposure into systematic risk and specific risk. In the financial community, systematic risk 16 refers to the sensitivity of an instrument or portfolio to a change in the general market level (usually relative to a broad stock market index such as the S&P 500). Conversely, specific risk or idiosyncratic risk refers to that portion of an asset’s volatility caused by factors specific to that asset (for example, for a stock, its line of business or the quality of its management).
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If the price of a given stock tracks a market index perfectly, then its correlation with that index is 100 percent, and it is exposed only to systematic risk. Conversely, if the price of the stock is totally independent of the market index, its correlation is zero, and it is exposed only to specific risk. As previously discussed, a well-known result of portfolio theory is that systematic risk cannot be eliminated through portfolio diversification, whereas specific risk can. Naturally, most assets are exposed to both types of risk. Asset managers routinely report statistics such as alpha (the premium above a benchmark index that a portfolio earns) and beta (a measure of the portfolio’s volatility relative to that benchmark) that assist investors in understanding their relative exposure to systematic and specific risks. ECONOMIC CAPITAL While VaR is used to manage routine trading, economic capital (EC) is used to manage capital adequacy and ensure the continued existence of the enterprise itself. Economic capital is the enterprise’s own internal estimate of its capital requirements and is different from regulatory capital, or capital requirements enforced by financial regulators. Economic capital is generally calculated at very high confidence levels (e.g., 0.01 percent), which reflect the probability that the enterprise will cease to exist. It is meant to estimate the damage to the enterprise under the worst set of events that is reasonably plausible. Since such events may be like or unlike any that the enterprise has previously experienced, economic capital is often estimated using scenario analysis and stress tests. Both economic capital and VaR can be used to create a metric of risk-adjusted return on capital (RAROC), first popularized by Bankers Trust in the 1970s. RAROC can be expressed as either Expected Return/EC or Expected Return/VaR. SCENARIO ANALYSIS AND STRESS TESTS In scenario analysis, a set of possible future outcomes (scenarios) is selected, and their impact on a portfolio is estimated. Scenario analysis can be used to identify simple sensitivity to a risk factor or to quantify the most extreme outcomes. For example, Figure 4-7 shows the effect (on return, in this case) of a number of shifts in interest rates [plus or minus 100, 200, and 300 basis points (bp)] on a generic bond portfolio. In a scenario analysis, these need not be catastrophic outcomes; such analysis is a standard tool that is useful in “what-if” analysis on the trading desk. Unlike VaR, scenario
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0
Return (%)
10
–10 –300 bp
–200 bp
–100 bp
Flat
+100 bp
+200 bp
+300 bp
Scenario
Figure 4-7 Scenario Analysis on a Generic Bond Portfolio Source: Bloomberg, L.P.
Scenarios
P&L
%Ret(P)
11) Black Monday
–3.719
–35.25
12) Russian Ruble Devalues
–1.635
–15.50
13) Flight to Quality
–1.499
–14.20
14) Small Cap Worries
–1.042
–9.88
15) Sep 11
–1.011
–9.58
16) Corporate Scandal
–954
–9.04
17) G7 Summit
–751
–7.12
18) Economic Recovery Falters
–742
–7.03
19) Market Bounce
–515
–4.88
Figure 4-8 Stress Tests for Sample Portfolio Source: Bloomberg, L.P.
analysis need not have a specific time horizon—it may assume an instantaneous change, or it may instead allow a historical scenario to play out to its conclusion over time. A stress test is a special form of scenario analysis, in that its purpose is to stress the system to its breaking point. The scenarios used may be either historical or theoretical. For example, in Figure 4-8, the effects on a test portfolio of actual scenarios such as Black Monday and theoretical scenarios such as flight to quality are shown. Figure 4-9 shows a more detailed description of these two scenarios. Figure 4-10 shows the distribution of returns for the same bond portfolio and its benchmark, along with the best-fit normal distribution. The stress test estimates that it is 1 percent likely that the loss will exceed an 8.4 percent return (far less than the loss of 35.25 percent under the Black Monday scenario). Of course, the results of any stress test depend on the scenarios used: they should be appropriate for the type of portfolio. For example, a shortonly portfolio would profit under a Black Monday scenario, so bullish scenarios would need to be included. Similarly, a portfolio that included short positions in long-dated, far-out-of-the-money options might be more
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Black Monday 340
SPX Index
320 300 280 260 240
Flight to Quality— 1 Week
220
Representative of fear of global systemic failure resulting in equities down 10%, all credit spreads rising 100 bp, all AAA Sovereign rates 100 bp lower, all nonsovereign rates 100 bp higher, and exchange rates unchanged across all geographic regions.
200 Sep 87 Oct 87 Nov 87 Dec 87 Many have noted that no major news or events occurred prior to the Monday of the crash B
A
Figure 4-9 Black Monday and Flight to Quality Scenario Descriptions Source: Bloomberg, L.P.
25%
10%
90%
Portfolio 1%
5%
10%
95%
15%
99%
Probability
20%
Normal
5%
0%
.6 .2 .8 .4 .0 .6 .2 .8 .4 .0 .4 .8 .2 .6 .0 .4 .8 .2 .6 .0 12 –11 - –9 - –8 - –7 - –5 - –4 - –2 - –1 - 0 - 1 - 2 - 4 - 5 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 11 - 12 - 14 – - - 2 8 4 0 6 2 8 .4 .0 .4 .8 .2 .6 .0 .4 8 2 6 .0 2.6 11. –9. –8. –7. –5. –4. –2. –1 0 1 2 4 5 7 8 9. 11. 12. 4 –1 –1 – Return (%) Buckets
Figure 4-10 Return Distribution for Sample Portfolio Source: Bloomberg, L.P.
exposed to an increase in implied volatility than it is to a change in the underlying price. The set of scenarios must therefore be comprehensive, specific, and realistic. If it is not comprehensive, the enterprise is at risk from an
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unanticipated shock from which it cannot recover. If it is not specific, then important risk factors might be ignored. If it is not realistic, the enterprise may take on too little risk, thus reducing its earnings and its competitive status. A systematic approach to generating such scenarios is ideal. Together, stress tests and economic capital calculations assist an enterprise in identifying its optimal location on the efficient frontier. Note that, of the four standard VaR models, two are actually scenariobased. Historical VaR implicitly assumes that each past date is one scenario, and Monte Carlo simulation creates thousands of theoretical scenarios. While the calculation of economic capital from stress tests is not concerned with the relative probabilities of each plausible extreme scenario, these two VaR calculations convert these de facto stress tests to probability distributions by assuming that each scenario is equally likely. EVERYDAY RISK VERSUS EXTREME RISK VaR and economic capital are calculated differently and reflect different time horizons and probability levels. More important, they’re used for different purposes. There’s an implicit assumption in each metric that the enterprise can do nothing to mitigate the loss—raise new capital during a crisis in the case of economic capital, or liquidate all positions in less than one day in the case of VaR. To summarize, everyday trading risk is generally estimated using stochastic models, quantified as VaR, and controlled by position limits expressed in terms of VaR. Extreme event risk is generally estimated using stress tests, quantified as economic capital and expected shortfall, and controlled by capital adequacy and strategic business decisions such as imposing concentration limits by business activity. SELECTING A MODEL Financial institutions such as Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, and JPMorgan Chase use highly sophisticated (and expensive) risk models. These models may be entirely proprietary and built in-house, or they may use commercial off-the-shelf software that is customized for the firm’s use or is informed using internal protocols. Such models are capable of dealing with every asset class, every type of derivative security, and every exposure. The technology that supports the effort often provides real-time risk reporting, from the individual-trader level to senior management.
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However, not every enterprise needs or can afford such an allencompassing solution. For a hedge fund that, say, engages only in longshort trading in equities, such an implementation would be overkill. Nevertheless, there are certain best-practice standards for risk management irrespective of the size or style of the enterprise. What is always required is a deep understanding of the benefits and flaws of each type of risk model and their dependence on fundamental assumptions regarding market behavior. VaR should never be a “black box” statistic, even when it is communicated to the highest levels of management. ENTERPRISE RISK One of the hotly debated topics in risk management today concerns the estimation of enterprise risk, that is, quantitative measures of integrated risk with respect to all types of risk (market risk, credit risk, operational risk, and all the rest). All these different sources of risk combine to form enterprise risk. Because these risks are not independent, they cannot be added, and in fact may have very complex interdependencies. An integrated view of, say, market and operational risk requires information about the causal relationships between the two; for example, larger market moves may increase the consequences of a certain operational failure, if not its probability. If a back-office operational failure produces an erroneous position report, the magnitude of the loss depends on market prices at the time the position is corrected. Similarly, a failure to collect margin on an OTC transaction exposes the enterprise to both market and credit risk. Even legal and reputational risk may affect funding ability, with broad ramifications across the enterprise. For example, before Drexel Burnham’s bankruptcy, rumors about its legal and financial status abounded, causing lenders to pull credit lines virtually overnight and forcing the firm to cease trading activities in highly leveraged securities. Likewise, market risk and liquidity risk are highly related. A sharp change in market prices often leads to a loss of liquidity, as shell-shocked investors shy away from new transactions or require the payment of a substantial risk premium to take on new risk. Because of such interdependences, a comprehensive framework for enterprise risk management (ERM) is the holy grail of risk managers. This is so not only because the C-suite needs to know the magnitude of combined risk from all sources, but also because such a framework facilitates quantitative decision making, in which choices critical to the health and well-being of the enterprise are done as scientifically and objectively as possible.
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INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS: THE BASEL II ACCORD The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has been a key driver of risk management best practice. In 1988, the committee first17 recommended quantitative methods for determining minimum capital requirements for banks. Basel I dealt only with traditional bank sources of credit risk, and it specified a simple protocol for the calculation of risk-weighted assets (RWA). In this protocol, each type of credit risk was put into one of five buckets. (The least risky bucket included home-country sovereign debt, and the most risky bucket included corporate lending.) Then, each bucket was weighted (with weights ranging from 0 to 100 percent) in proportion to the perceived risk in order to generate RWA. International banks were required to have capital of at least 8 percent of RWA. Basel I did not speak to market risk, operational risk, or any other types of risk to which banks were exposed. By 1994, the Basel Committee had extended the scope of its recommendations to include all major sources of risk to which both individual institutions and the banking system as a whole were exposed. The Basel II accord, published in 2004, attempted to ensure that regulatory capital requirements better corresponded to actual risk. It also provided incentives for banks to create better internal estimates of risk and to integrate risk management into their corporate culture. This far more sophisticated set of recommendations was expressed in terms of the three pillars: • Pillar I. Recommended minimum capital requirements as a function of market risk, credit risk, and operational risk. (Some other types of risk were either included as operational risk or considered too intangible or difficult to quantify.) • Pillar II. Provided regulators with better tools for oversight, including the ability to review each bank’s risk management models used for estimation of risk. • Pillar III. Recommended disclosure requirements and promoted best practice with respect to market discipline. Basel II explicitly bifurcates interest rate and equity risk into systematic risk and specific risk. All three pillars are necessary; for example, merely measuring risk—even with the most sophisticated models—is not sufficient to meet Basel standards. An enterprise must demonstrate that it is using its knowledge of risk to better manage its business. Within Pillar I, Basel II now permitted an institution to select one of several approaches for calculating regulatory capital. For credit risk, and depending on its size and sophistication, a bank could choose to use (1) the
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Standardized Approach, in which capital was computed in a manner similar to that of Basel I, although with redefined buckets and weights, (2) the Foundation Internal Ratings-Based (IRB) Approach, in which a bank that creates internal credit ratings might use these to provide a more refined estimate of credit risk, or (3) the Advanced IRB Approach, in which a bank with sophisticated risk measurement models might provide its own estimates for RWA using such credit risk metrics as probability of default (PD), exposure at default (EAD), and loss given default (LGD). As in Basel I, the bank’s minimum capital requirement was calculated as a fixed percentage of RWA. Basel II recommended that market risk be measured in terms of VaR.18 It also provided three different ways to calculate reserves for operational risk, including the simplest (1) Basic Indicator Approach (BIA) based on net revenue, (2) the Standardized Approach (TSA), based on net revenue in each of eight lines of business (e.g., corporate finance, trading and sales, and retail brokerage), and (c) the Advanced Measurement Approach (AMA), in which, as in the Advanced IRB Approach for credit risk, a bank is allowed to base its capital requirements on its own operational risk models. As intended, Basel II rewarded banks (in the form of lower capital requirements) for implementing sophisticated risk management systems and integrating them into the corporate culture. By providing for a “risk audit,” the second pillar was intended to ensure that any risk management system used to generate capital requirements is conceptually and mathematically sound and is operated objectively and without bias. The Basel Committee periodically updates its quantitative and technical standards.19 It most recently added additional requirements for the calculation of market risk: that VaR be calculated daily at a 1 percentile, one-tailed confidence interval, and that the instantaneous shock reflect movement over a holding period of 10 days. Similarly, the committee requires that the data set used include at least one year of empirical data, and that it be updated at least monthly. (There are a number of more specific criteria that further set standards, for example, how the risk of options is calculated.) It’s a moving target; future standards for Pillar I will newly include requirements for credit migration risk (i.e., the risk that the credit rating of a counterparty or obligor degrades) and estimation of a new metric of risk called stressed VaR (discussed later in this chapter). Although Basel II was intended for banks, some of its best-practice recommendations became the standard for other financial institutions as well; good risk management practice became an integral part of an increasing number of financial and nonfinancial enterprises, and the role of chief risk officer gained in importance. And, as this book is being
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written, there is even legislation pending in the United States that would require every publicly traded company to have a chief risk officer (CRO). Basel II has precipitated the use of RARORAC as a metric of riskadjusted return on risk-adjusted capital, where risk-adjusted capital is based upon Basel II standards of capital adequacy. BEST PRACTICE IN RISK MANAGEMENT Best practice in risk management is more than a set of quantitative models; risk measurement is not risk management. Although risk metrics such as value at risk or economic capital inform decision-making processes, a corporate culture that integrates risk-based thinking and expertise at every level of the enterprise is the best protection against catastrophic risk. Although the mathematical models and protocols used to measure risk may vary from firm to firm, best practice in risk management is a constant. It is intended to optimize both strategic and tactical decisions at every level of the enterprise. Toward this end, each enterprise ideally has a designated chief risk officer and a senior risk committee that has the final say on the firm’s risk management protocols and procedures. Just as they would for any other business activity, the members of this management team must continuously review the enterprise’s practices—especially as market conditions change or the firm enters new lines of business. Tactically, position limits based on VaR control known risks via militarylike command-and-control (C2) protocols: that is, the exercise of authority by a properly designated commanding officer (or CRO) for purposes of a specific mission. But senior management must also focus on unknown risks, including the risk that the internal risk management models or protocols are flawed or that they require revision in light of new market conditions. Strategically, business decisions based on enterprise risk and economic capital control unknown risks and optimize the enterprise’s riskreward profile. Such decisions—for example, the allocation of specific VaR-based limits to certain lines of business—are informed not only by aggregate metrics, but also by drilling down into the specific sources and magnitude of risk. Minimum management reporting standards are detailed here. Risk Limit/Usage Reports Figure 4-11 shows a typical Basel-compliant risk limit report. (A similar report might be used to show actual risk and compare it to the limits.) Note that risk limits and ancillary information are broken down by line of business
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Effective Date
1-Dec-09
Illustrative Black Diamond
Expiry Date
1-Dec-09
Limit Report
Risk Type
Risk Measure Foreign Exchange Risk Total FX Risk FX Outright Risk FX Vega Risk Interest Rate Risk Total Interest Rate Risk Interest Rate Outright Risk Interest Rate Vega Risk Swap Spread Risk Floating Rate Basis Risk Cross Currency Basis Risk Equity Risk Total Equity Risk Equity Price Risk Equity Market/Outright Specific Risk Equity Vega Risk
Profit Center A
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Profit Center E
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2,000 2,000 1,750
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Commodity Risk Total Commodity Risk Precious Metals Crude Oil & Petroleum Natural Gas Base Metals
Figure 4-11 Risk Limits Report Source: Black Diamond Risk Enterprises
or profit center (e.g., Debt Capital Markets or U.S. Equities) and by source of risk (e.g., Interest-Rate Risk or Commodity Risk). Note, too, that additional detail on those sources of risk can be either mathematically expressed (e.g., FX Vega Risk, where vega is the sensitivity of a portfolio to implied volatility), separated by drivers (e.g., Systematic and Specific Risk, as required by Basel II) or broken down by asset (e.g., Precious Metals versus Natural Gas). Performance Attribution Reports Performance attribution reports (often called P&L Explain reports) attempt to decompose the sources of profit and loss at the trader, profit center, or enterprise level. Using position information together with observed market activity, the algorithms used attempt to explain P&L in terms of certain risk factors appropriate to the portfolio. For example, for a fixed-income portfolio, those risk factors might be changes in the general level of risk-free interest rates (e.g., U.S. Treasuries), in the shape of the yield curve, in credit risk premiums, in basis relationships, and in implied volatility.
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Each portfolio manager and risk manager spends a good part of his day analyzing these reports for anomalous behavior. Such a report provides information about the types of exposure to which the enterprise is at risk, but it may also provide early warning of a control or measurement problem. For example, if VaR is calculated only once a day, traders may be gaming the system by taking large positions intraday and liquidating them by the end of the day. But such gaming might be revealed in patterns of daily P&L. Forensic Risk Review Reports Changing patterns of risk over time are also a powerful source of warnings, and such patterns can be identified via forensic risk reports, such as a report that compares theoretical VaR to actual performance over time. Any estimate of risk is nothing but a forecast, and implicit in the use of stochastic methods is the assumption that future market behavior will be similar to that of the past. So, just as in any other forecasting activity, the quality of the forecasts must be evaluated forensically. In risk management, this is done via a backtest report that compares estimates of VaR to actual performance. If an enterprise calculates daily VaR at the standard 1 percent probability level, this means that it can expect actual losses to exceed VaR about three times per year (1 percent of 260 trading days).20 Consider the typical backtest report of Figure 4-12, which compares daily income for trading units to VaR in 2008. There are a large number of outliers, far more than the three expected—especially in the last few months of the year, during the height of the financial crisis. Furthermore, the magnitude of some of these outliers (both losses and profits) substantially exceeds the theoretical on several days. Although VaR is estimated from the left side of the distribution (losses), even anomalously large profits are a warning signal. As with the P&L Explain report, such large deviations (by count or by magnitude) from VaR need to be explained. ADDITIONAL RISK CONTROL MECHANISMS AND BEST PRACTICE Although risk metrics are exceedingly useful in limiting enterprise risk and enhancing decision-making ability, even the best models will fail at times, and so management should make provisions for unknown unknowns. When this is done, an enterprise is not unknowingly dependent on the forecasting ability of its risk models, no matter how sophisticated they may be.
Income of Trading Units and Value at Risk in 2008 in € m. 600 500 400 300
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Figure 4-12 Daily Backtest Report, 2008 Source: Black Diamond Risk Enterprises
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Risk measurement failures may sometimes be specific to certain activities, asset classes, industry groups, or counterparties. Therefore, best practice includes imposing concentration limits on such bins. Such limits essentially acknowledge that increased diversification will tend to mitigate the most extreme losses when risk measures fail. Best practice also includes explicitly estimating model risk where possible. Although it is difficult to quantify the risk that a basic model poorly represents the future, it is possible to construct some estimates of parameter error, that is, the likelihood the protocols used to generate the parameters that inform the model are flawed. There are specific statistical techniques for doing so. (These are addressed in Chapter 8.) THE EVOLUTION OF MODELS AND BEST PRACTICE The field of financial engineering and risk modeling is highly robust. New models and methods are created and implemented at blinding speed, because any small advantage can result in substantial profits. These are impossible to detail or even to fully track, given that many models are protected as though they were state secrets. Nevertheless, there have been two important developments in next-generation best practice in recent years. Both of these developments recognize the dynamic nature of market evolution over time and the effect of human actions and changing risk preferences as a driver of change. Static versus Dynamic VaR Since about 2006, risk managers who compared theoretical risk to actual performance have found increasing discrepancies. Some came to the conclusion that static VaR, in which portfolio composition remains constant over the horizon, was an increasingly poor estimate of reality. And this was especially true when a horizon longer than one day was used. In real life, when a position starts to go bad, a trader might take mitigating actions, such as liquidating all or part of the position or adding a hedge. One can expect such actions to be successful more times than not. Humans are still the best pattern recognition engines, and if a trader weren’t good at this, she wouldn’t have a job for very long. Similarly, traders might take less voluntary actions when conditions changed. Even if a trader believed in his strategy, an increase in his portfolio’s VaR might force him to liquidate some of it. Consider the case of a trader with a $10 million VaR limit who is using $7 million, or 70 percent
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of it. Generally, such a percentage gives the trader some margin for error as VaR varies from day to day. However, if there’s a market shock and volatility doubles, even though the trader has not changed his portfolio, his VaR is now $14 million, and he must bring down the position size to remain under the limit. In practice, he would anticipate such a forced liquidation, mitigating his loss by starting to liquidate when, say, VaR hits 95 percent of the limit. Although a mathematical model cannot anticipate new positions that a trader might take, it can model some of the dynamics of market prices. For example, a large shock is almost certain to have the following predicable consequences, each of which greatly influences performance: • • • • • •
Implied and historical volatility increase. The bid/offer spread widens. Liquidity is reduced. Credit risk increases. Operational risk has higher consequences. The ability to fund positions is diminished.
These changes may not all occur simultaneously; instead, they may evolve over time via a causal cascade. One method of simulating a dynamic outcome is the use of agent-based approaches, in which rules are defined that simulate the dynamics of market prices and the actions of agents with cognitive and decision-making abilities. Use of dynamic VaR is consistent with the Basel Committee’s updated requirement that a bank must justify its time scaling of risk parameters. Previously, many stochastic models assumed that, consistent with statistical theory for Gaussian distributions, the standard deviation of a 10day period is equal to the square root of 10 times the standard deviation of a 1-day period (implicitly and unrealistically assuming that volatility remains constant over the entire period). The committee explicitly states, “A bank using this approach must periodically justify the reasonableness of its approach to the satisfaction of its supervisor.” Stressed VaR The Basel Committee will also add to Pillar I the requirement that banks using the Advanced Measurement Approach calculate stressed VaR weekly. Stressed VaR combines the features of a VaR calculation and a stress test, in that the VaR of the current portfolio is calculated using parameters taken from a historical period of extreme financial stress. The committee specifies,
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“As an example, for many portfolios, a 12-month period relating to significant losses in 2007/2008 would adequately reflect a period of such stress; although other periods relevant to the current portfolio must be considered by the bank.” Each bank must meet a daily capital requirement that is now a function of both daily VaR and the latest available stressed VaR. EXTREME SCENARIO GENERATION Best practice in stress testing is not yet well defined. The existence of an enterprise depends on the quality of the extreme scenarios used to ensure capital adequacy. However, analysis of recent events has demonstrated that the scenarios used by many enterprises were often inadequate. As described in a recent Basel Committee publication on stress testing, Most bank stress tests were not designed to capture the extreme market events that were experienced. Most firms discovered that one or several aspects of their stress tests did not even broadly match actual developments. In particular, scenarios tended to reflect mild shocks, assume shorter durations and underestimate the correlations between different positions, risk types and markets due to system-wide interactions and feedback effects. Prior to the crisis, “severe” stress scenarios typically resulted in estimates of losses that were no more than a quarter’s worth of earnings (and typically much less).21
The publication went on to describe a number of common failures, such as dependence on historical scenarios, use of theoretical scenarios that were insufficiently extreme, and use of scenarios that did not integrate all important market changes (e.g., that included directional risk but not basis risk or liquidity risk), did not properly account for the dependence between market risk and credit risk, and did not properly account for new instruments (e.g., CDS) that did not exist at the time of some historical scenarios. In part, this was due to the inability to justify certain extreme scenarios. As the publication continued, “At many banks, it was difficult for risk managers to obtain senior management buy-in for more severe scenarios. Scenarios that were considered extreme or innovative were often regarded as implausible by the board and senior management.” Since the crisis, best practice emphasizes constantly reviewing previous scenarios and looking for new ones. However, this is often done on an ad hoc basis. Advanced methods for generating and justifying plausible extreme scenarios via a “scenario engine” are next-generation state of the art in risk management.
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IN DEFENSE OF VAR In the aftermath of the credit crisis, there was a great deal of criticism of risk management practice in general and VaR in particular. Some critics objected to the use of VaR on empirical grounds: its predictive ability was poor because it failed to provide warnings of the impending financial crisis. Others objected to the use of VaR on theoretical grounds: its fundamental assumptions included Gaussian distributions that were not consistent with the fat-tailed distributions seen in real life. However, much of this criticism was based on confusion between VaR the metric and the original variance-covariance model used to estimate VaR, which was based on modern portfolio theory of the 1950s. But these criticisms (and their proposed solutions) are inconsistent with current best practice and modeling. First, VaR is a predictor of risk: the term measurement is a misnomer. Therefore, actual P&L is expected to exceed VaR some percentage of the time. Second, neither proprietary nor commercial off-the-shelf VaR models generally assume Gaussian distributions; for many years, even variance-covariance models have been adapted to correct for heteroskedasticity and for dynamic volatility. And even institutions that don’t use VaR-based measures (e.g., futures and options exchanges) have explicitly used fat-tailed distributions to ensure capital adequacy with respect to performance margin. Third, capital adequacy is defined not so much by estimates of VaR as by the results of stress tests based on extreme scenarios and calculated to a much higher level of confidence (e.g., 0.01 percent rather than 1 percent). Some critics also recommended that risk-based capital adequacy requirements (such as those in the Basel II Advanced Measurement Approach) be replaced by fixed rules, such as those in Basel I or the Standardized Approach in Basel II. However, even a set of rules more complicated than the tax code would not make capital requirements correspond to actual risk better than internally generated risk forecasts. Such a rules-based system would be a de facto predictive model, but one that would be far less sophisticated than current best practice, and one that would be unresponsive to current market conditions. Furthermore, such fixed external rules can always be gamed; there are often many ways to make the same bet, some of which require less capital than others. A more valid criticism is that the scenarios used for stress tests were insufficiently extreme or were based only on historical events rather than on plausible future events.
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As the Basel Committee pointed out, stress tests are far less quantitatively determined than VaR is, and they often failed to model secondary market effects that affected performance (such as loss of liquidity) or to adequately simulate a cascade of interconnected events that played out over time. Finally, it’s important to understand that VaR is nothing but a metric, like length: if a broken ruler is used to measure the length of an object, that doesn’t mean that the concept of length is flawed. And as a metric, VaR has the same usefulness in managing risk that it always did—that is, providing an objective, quantitative measure of risk that can be easily communicated and on which position controls can be based. SUMMARY In this chapter, we discussed the basic types of financial risk, the classic models used to estimate risk, and the assumptions about market behavior on which these models depend. We discussed risk as a forecast, the difference between risk measurement and risk management, and current best practice and reporting requirements. We also discussed two key developments on the horizon of risk management: dynamic VaR, stressed VaR, and improved specification of extreme yet plausible scenarios. WHAT’S NEXT The next chapter will discuss systems behavior and describe how, consistent with dynamic and stressed VaR, the evolution of a system over time can be revealed and modeled.
CHAPTER 5
Systemic Risk and Systems Thinking
ROGUE WAVES, DETERMINISM, AND CHANCE Oceanographers have accepted the existence of “rogue waves” (also called “extreme waves”): anomalously large and spontaneous waves that occur in the deep ocean and on the Great Lakes. Rogue waves are not the largest waves ever observed, but they present a risk to even the largest vessels1 because they can occur in perfectly clear weather conditions and at odds to the prevailing wind directions and currents. Oceanographers have a number of theories about how such waves are generated. Some consider them to be merely an instance, albeit rare (e.g., a 100-year event), of the normal spectrum of waves, created by the same forces that create lesser waves. Others consider the initial conditions and the physics that may produce them. The geometry of the coastline or the seabed may focus smaller waves that are in phase, causing massive constructive interference. Alternatively, they may be generated by nonlinear effects in which a wave sucks energy from surrounding waves and becomes freakishly large. All these theories depend on physics, not chance. Even the rare-butnormal theory is deterministic: mechanical processes drive wave formation. Nevertheless, sometimes a statistical representation of wave heights is useful, particularly when the interaction among wave, shore, and wind is too complex to model physically. Of course, there might be tremendous value in knowing which of these theories is correct. If rogue waves are just a rare event that can’t be directly linked to the starting conditions, statistical representations of ocean systems are relatively unhelpful. However, if scientists are able to identify the congruence of initial conditions that causes rogue waves in the proximity of a vessel, risk modeling and warning systems based on such models might aid in risk mitigation.
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SURVIVING WITHIN A SYSTEM In much the same way, it is helpful to understand the systems in which we operate, and the systemic risk to which we’re exposed. In Chapter 1, we discussed two alternative worldviews: the world of the plausible and the world of the probable. One of our objectives in examining any system is to understand how well we understand both known unknowns and unknown unknowns. In finance, this will help us determine when a statistical representation is sufficient for identifying extreme scenarios and when only a causal model will do. The answer affects optimal decision making, whether the decision involves putting ships to sea, dealing with a new virus, or trading stocks. If catastrophic events are unpredictable, an enterprise that is concerned about its continuing survival must reduce its level of exposure at the expense of its profit. If, instead, such events can be anticipated, the enterprise can use more creative and specific solutions that constrain extreme risk while allowing business as usual. Whether the extreme event we wish to evaluate is a rogue wave, a collapse in the collateralized debt obligation (CDO) markets, or even military action by North Korea, it’s instructive to characterize systems that generate such outcomes in a more abstract manner. All threats, no matter what their source, can be considered in light of the vulnerability of the system that might generate them, the chain of events that might produce highly adverse consequences, and the likelihood and magnitude of resultant outlier events. It’s important to account for interdependence between systems as well. Systems can interact with other systems; the global markets can interact with, say, geopolitical systems. Either can drive or be driven by the other, and a clash or interaction between the systems might result in price controls on oil, an embargo on Cuba, or a deliberate attempt by a state actor to embed itself in the U.S. critical infrastructure. SYSTEMIC RISK, CONNECTIVITY, AND CONTAGION Economists sometimes explain the source of systemic risk in terms of two types of shocks to the system: macro or “common” shocks and micro or “chain reaction” shocks. The terms macro and micro do not refer to the magnitude of the shock, but rather to the influence of its drivers. A macro shock is a shock that affects all economies and markets directly, whereas a micro shock is one that permeates though the entire system via a process of contagion.
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Depending on the contagion process, the speed of a micro shock may be slower than that of a macro shock. The chain reaction may take time, whereas a macro shock—say, in the financial system—affects all asset classes everywhere at the same time. An example of a macro shock might be the events of 9/11, which caused a nearly instantaneous drop of over $2 trillion in global market capitalization. An example of a micro shock might be the credit crisis of 2007–2008, in which the effect of trading losses in mortgage-backed securities on banks and other financial institutions rippled though the global capital markets, leaving virtually no country or asset class untouched. What both of these definitions have in common is an explicit recognition of the connectivity of the global economies and capital markets and acknowledgment that it may be impossible to isolate financial, economic, and geopolitical risk. Change is risk, and determining the sensitivity of a system to micro or macro shocks requires systems thinking. SYSTEMS AND SYSTEMS THINKING A system is defined as a set of elements that have one or more relationships between them, and systems thinking is the process by which one seeks to understand those elements and relationships so as to be able to understand the behavior of the system as a whole. Systems are usually visualized graphically as a set of nodes with links or connections between them. A system is more than the sum of its parts, particularly if it’s large or complex. It may exhibit unique behavior that cannot necessarily be inferred from the behavior of its individual elements or any subset of them. In systems theory, it’s important to have perspective, as a very small observer of a single element may be oblivious to larger interactions that might be clear to a giant observer of the entire system. The relationships between system elements can be strictly deterministic (i.e., controlled by physical or other laws), completely stochastic (subject to chance), or more complex. Where human decision making is involved, some of the interactions can include behavioral effects as well. Modeling a system can involve both art and science when the modeler seeks to decide what is to be included in a system abstraction and what is to be excluded. The boundaries of an individual system depend on the nature of the relationships that link the nodes and drive change. The relationships between elements inside the system are different from the relationships those elements have with elements outside the system. For example, our solar system interacts with every celestial body in our
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galactic system via gravity, but it is the strongly linked nature of our own solar system relative to its other relationships that defines it as a system. If understanding a particular system requires that its interactions with other systems be understood as well, a modeler might create a kind of meta-system in which the elements of the system may be systems themselves. One of the most fundamental attributes we wish to understand about a system is its predictability (also called its banality): the degree to which we are able to forecast the system’s next state or states. This change in state might be an inevitable response to endogenous vulnerabilities that are already present in the system (e.g., too many high-risk mortgages), or it might be an unanticipated response to an exogenous shock (e.g., military action in the Mideast that raises the price of oil to $300 per barrel). A model without predictive ability has little value in managing extreme risk and can provide few insights that add value to the decisionmaking process. Conversely, a model with predictive ability may provide forecasts of possible future scenarios that are substantially different from those generated using other analytic methods and greatly aid in risk measurement and mitigation. DRIVERS OF SYSTEM BEHAVIOR: REGIME CHANGE AND BLACK SWAN EVENTS Micro and macro drivers may have different effects on a system. As they cascade though the pathways that connect the nodes, all those multiple relationships may interact in a way that forces equilibrium. Alternatively, they may create chaotic, oscillating, or extreme behavior. Events that occur within the system may be separated by distance or time, but, depending on the complexity of the system and the nature of its relationships, they may drive change in the system as a whole in unexpected ways. The reaction of the system to an exogenous or endogenous driver may even cause it to jump to a new and different version of itself that is unlikely to react to micro and macro drivers the same way it did before. Like political change in a sovereign state, economists call such a shift regime change. Sometimes such regime change is patently obvious, particularly if it occurred in response to a macro driver. However, sometimes the transition is less obvious. Although the new regime will no longer respond to old or new drivers in the same manner as the previous regime, traditional metrics such as historical volatility may not provide clear indicators that something very important has changed.
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The mechanism for change over time varies with the nature of the system. A system may evolve via a process of self-organization aided by positive (destabilizing) or negative (stabilizing) feedback. Systems can evolve in relatively smooth steps (e.g., in linear systems in which small changes create small effects) or can suddenly jump from one state to a radically different one (e.g., in nonlinear systems in which the same small changes create large effects). In the extreme, a system might be expected to exist for the indefinite future or might already include the seeds of its own inevitable destruction. Even a small and temporary perturbation may affect a system in various ways. If its influence dies out as the system assimilates the perturbation (i.e., returns to the same state of equilibrium), the system is called asymptotically stable. Alternatively, depending on the nature of the interconnections, the same perturbation may instead take the system over a tipping point and lead to black swan events such as the precipitous decline in housing prices in the late 2000s. Systems may or may not exhibit hysteresis (from the Greek for “lagging behind”), that is, retain memory even when the external input is removed. A system that does so is said to exhibit path dependence. Even natural systems can exhibit hysteresis. For example, the invention of the computer hard drive depends on it in that a piece of metal retains a small magnetic charge even when the external magnetic field is removed. Systems may also include a temporal component (e.g., effects take time to be fully realized) or may be represented independently of time (e.g., drug trials and results). Financial and economic systems often exhibit hysteresis. Because a market is nothing more than an aggregate of human participants, memory is, of course, explicitly present—both in the human mind, but also in the historical data used to inform investment strategies. COMPLEX SYSTEMS AND EMERGENT BEHAVIOR A system is considered complex if it has many elements and many relationships between those elements. A complex system’s collective behavior cannot be inferred from the behavior of the individual elements because of the high degree of interconnectivity. Conceptually, such collective behavior is similar to portfolio risk, in which the behavior of a portfolio cannot be inferred from the behavior of the individual securities that constitute it (unless there is no correlation between any of those securities, a special case that is analogous to blocked communication between the elements of the system).
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The mathematician Warren Weaver drew a distinction between “organized complexity” and “disorganized complexity” in a system. In disorganized complexity, the behavior of a very large number (say, millions) of moving parts can’t be distinguished from random behavior, even though the physics of the process is deterministic at a sufficiently microscopic level. In Weaver’s view, a system that exhibits disorganized complexity becomes something else: a new entity that’s different from the sum of its parts emerges from the chaos. In disorganized complexity, statistical models and methods might be used to characterize this emergent system rather than dealing with the computationally intractable problem of modeling the behavior of its component elements. Physical or statistical measures can then substitute for a deeper understanding of the causal relationships between the elements of the system. The classic example of disorganized complexity is that of gas in a container. Although Newton’s equations of motion control the interactions of each molecule of gas, metrics such as temperature and pressure can be used to characterize the system fully. Barring an exogenous change to the container of gas, it contains a stable system within its walls; we don’t expect pressure or temperature to change spontaneously except in response to an outside influence. Conversely, a system of organized complexity might be a city such as Paris, including both its physical infrastructure and its citizens. Paris’s layout was shaped by Napoleon III in a manner that was meant to stymie revolutionaries.2 The behavior of a complex system must be understood in terms of both its drivers and its current environment at any point in time. One critical feature of a complex system is its sensitivity to initial or changing conditions. These conditions determine whether the air movement caused by a minor weather condition will be lost in atmospheric noise or trigger a major hurricane. Decision makers must be especially cognizant of the fact that the same action taken a second time may not have the same effect if the environment has changed. For example, a speculator may attempt to squeeze cotton futures by buying 10,000 contracts of the nearby delivery month. However, that transaction will have wildly different outcomes, profitwise, if the open interest in that contract is 100 contracts or 100,000 contracts. Drivers of change need not be large themselves; a series of microscopic changes (many of them simultaneous) can lead to macroscopic change that is discernible by manual or automated means. For example, a number of small trades, unrelated but executed simultaneously, may
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trigger larger price movements because their net effect is consistent with that of news or insider trading by sophisticated traders, and thus triggers automated alerts. In the following sections, we will discuss various types of systems to better determine which of these best characterize economic and financial systems. Appropriate identification leads to alternative approaches for identifying system behavior and for identifying the elements and interactions that are most likely to lead to extreme outcomes. Dynamic Systems A system can be characterized as dynamic; that is, it changes with time. Such a characterization implicitly assumes that the system is at least partially deterministic; change in one of its elements inevitably breeds change in other elements. A dynamic system is not to be confused with a dynamical system, which is characterized by a set of differential equations that describe its behavior with respect to time, albeit for only a short period. We have no reason to believe that a financial or economic system can be expressed in so convenient a form. In the physical world, a dynamical system stops moving when an outside force is removed; it has no memory. Conversely, financial and economic systems can reasonably be expected to exhibit hysteresis and continue to react after the force is removed because human decision makers are capable of retained memory, both accurate and biased. Furthermore, we have no evidence, either intuitive or empirical, that the driving mechanisms or the equations that might be used to describe them are continuous with respect to time. The presence of so-called tipping points and black swan events provides evidence of noncontinuous behavior, as do the logical and continuing consequences of various discrete drivers (e.g., regulatory or policy changes). We do know, however, that the global financial system is dynamic; it interacts with other systems that are time-dependent (e.g., economic or geopolitical systems) and therefore changes with time. Even without specific outside stimuli, the passage of time alone may be sufficient to change the financial system as a result of behavioral effects. Stable foreign exchange or interest rates may change decisionmaking protocols or create the perception of a lower-risk environment that spurs investment or risk taking. For example, if market prices have been stable for some time, an investor may be enticed to swap out of lower-risk assets such as Treasuries and into higher-risk assets such as equities or commodities.
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There may be behavioral effects as well. For example, traders who maintain short positions in options receive positive reinforcement by reaping steady rewards in quiet markets.3 They may suffer from perception bias, which induces them to become overconfident and repeat the strategy even when it is inappropriate. Chaotic Systems A system can also exhibit chaos (more properly, deterministic chaos). A dynamical system may exhibit behavior that appears to be random, but only because of its complexity. A Tilt-a-Whirl carnival ride, which unexpectedly rotates or jerks from side to side, is an example of a chaotic system. Contrary to the colloquial use of the term, a chaotic system is fully deterministic at a sufficiently granular level. Even the result of a toss of a die is deterministic based on the physics of the throw, the characteristics of the table on which it’s tossed, and other relevant conditions. At the most granular level, we might consider the global capital markets as a deterministic system no different from a container of gas. Changing as it does with time, a chaotic system is highly sensitive to initial conditions and may exhibit the famous “butterfly effect,” in which a small perturbation early in the process multiplies exponentially and generates extreme outcomes such as hurricanes. As such, its changing state is entirely determined by the initial conditions; there is no random element involved. Complex Adaptive Systems We now consider the mechanisms by which a system changes. A complex adaptive system is a complex system that is able to adapt to its environment by changing in response to either exogenous shocks or changes in current conditions. For example, in a biological system, bacteria evolve in response to the use of antibiotics. The system has some or all of the following characteristics: • It is highly dependent on its initial state. • It has memory. • The number of elements that it contains and/or the number of relationships between elements is nontrivial, either in scope (e.g., there are many different drivers) or in form (e.g., they are nonlinear or discontinuous). • It is capable of feedback4 into the system. • It can interact with its environment (i.e., other systems).
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Such adaptation may result in a self-correcting process that attempts to maintain the current state. Alternatively, the adaptation might require the system to jump to an entirely new state—one that is considered catastrophic by some observers. This ability of an adaptive system can present a real danger to those who interact with it or use metrics to analyze it. Action and reaction may change, but this new dynamic may be invisible to the observer. Having taken one evolutionary path, the system is irrevocably changed, if only by new patterns of behavior influenced by memory. EVOLUTIONARY FORCES AND THE SELF-ORGANIZING SYSTEM An evolutionary system is one that changes over time in response to external drivers in a manner dictated by the nature of the internal interactions. Self-organization is the spontaneous generation of order in a complex adaptive system. A self-organizing system achieves such order via multiple interactions between its elements until some optimal system state is realized. In a self-organizing system, complex behavior can arise as the net result of myriad simple interactions between interconnected parts of the system and wholly within its boundaries. The system may evolve to a new form when positive and negative reactions occur at a highly granular level, which in turn can cause the system to increase in complexity without direction by an outside force. A market economy is one example of a self-organizing system, whereas its opposite, a command economy, is considered far less efficient in distributing assets. In practice, most economies are mixed economies, in which government provides some level of direction intended to orient the system toward a goal. In a system that is controlled by human interactions, a self-organizing system can be thought of as attempting to reach Nash equilibrium (named after the great mathematician and game theorist John Nash), in which equilibrium might be reached via a set of strategic interactions in which the participants attempt to maximize their own self-interests. However, such equilibrium often tends to gravitate toward minimum expected outcomes. For example, if the participants formed a cartel that fixed prices, they might increase their expected payoffs—both individually and as a group. However, it’s not always the case that equilibrium can be reached in such a system. Some systems are inherently unstable because stability is achieved only when each game player has no incentive to change her
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strategy. Furthermore, some economists believe that the conditions required to reach equilibrium are dauntingly unrealistic. Equilibrium may be temporary and transient, like the process by which humans walk on two legs. Self-organized systems often—but not necessarily—display emergent properties. Emergent properties are properties that cannot be inferred from an understanding of the granular interactions, but instead are something entirely new, created from the sum of many such interactions. In the physical and biological sciences, researchers characterize many phenomena as manifestations of self-organizing systems. If one searches the literature, one can find academic papers on applications as diverse as “Dynamical Model of the Baseball-Bat Collision” (physics), “The Emergence of Scale-Invariant Architecture in Rimmed-Pool Mineral Deposits in Yellowstone Hot Springs and Illinois Caves” (geology), “Multi-Resolution Modeling of Protein-DNA Systems” (biophysics), and “Division of Labor and the Behavioral Design of Social Insect Colonies” (entomology). However, there are relatively few studies on the application of complexity theory to the global capital markets. The reason for this dearth is unclear. Perhaps the degree of difficulty is the primary issue in light of the scale and complexity of the global financial system or the behavioral aspects of the interactions that rule most market evolution. Perhaps it’s the fact that a more computationally tractable alternative—that is, the use of stochastic methods—came to be viewed as best practice. Or perhaps it’s because when financial best practice was being defined, systems theory was less developed than it is now. This is no less true of the human ecosystem and its evolution, and considering market evolution as a complex, evolutionary system might well be productive in better understanding both systemic and specific risk. Such a view of the global economy is buttressed by the economist Leo Tilman, who discusses the forces of dynamic finance and characterizes the current state as one in which evolutionary processes and “financial Darwinism” involve an “ongoing tectonic financial shift.”5 EVOLUTIONARY MECHANISMS Generally, the only way to understand the emergent behavior of a complex system is by the use of experimental mathematics. In this field, the properties of an object are explored using numerical methods. For example, the integral of a complex function might be calculated numerically (when it has no closed form) by using a software tool such as Mathematica.
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Experimental mathematics is often used in pattern recognition problems and can be used to gain insight when a theory about the source of the pattern is lacking. The Bak-Sneppen Evolution Model In practice, a modeler will create some abstraction of the system of interest in the form of a network representation. Only after such a network is defined and populated can analysis proceed. Although it deals with a problem in biology, the classic Bak-Sneppen model of evolution provides many insights about how systems of any type evolve and how experimental mathematics can be used to identify emergent behavior. In the early 1990s, Per Bak and Kim Sneppen proposed a model that was intended to explain the very uneven history of evolution as evidenced by fossil records. These records provide evidence that biological evolution occurs in rare, random bursts (a phenomenon known as punctuated equilibrium) and is accompanied by a sudden and rapid decrease in the variety of species (known as extinction events). Bak and Sneppen hypothesized that these spikes in the rates of origination and extinction might be a feature of a self-organizing ecosystem whose model dynamics reproduces a process of natural selection. When this biological system is simulated by using only a simple assumption of codependence between nearby species, behavior consistent with observed historical patterns emerges. As time is stepped forward, the dynamics of the model repeatedly eliminates the least fit species, forces its neighbors to adapt to their missing presence, and causes the system to converge to a new state that allows an optimal response to new drivers. In a sense, preservation of the species is replaced by preservation of the system, albeit in a mutated form. As shown in Figure 5-1, in the Bak-Sneppen model, the system is represented by nodes in a d-dimensional lattice structure6 that serves as a representation of species interaction. Each node represents a different species, and random “fitness” (for survival) values are initially assigned to each node in the lattice. Then the simulation can proceed. As time moves forward in discrete steps, the least fit species (the nodes with the smallest fitness value) are identified, and only the 2d nodes surrounding them are assigned random new fitness values. Such a rule is intended to force the most rapid evolution on the least fit species, which in turn will most affect their immediate neighbors.
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Figure 5-1 Lattice Structure for Ecosystem Evolutionary Model
As the process continues, “coevolution” can be observed, in which proximate species exhibit synchronous change for better or worse. Such behavior helps account for the emergent properties of the system, in which patterns emerge in the system as a whole that are not apparent from the individual elements of the system. As the simulation progresses, the system exhibits the phenomenon of clustering, in which a set of nearby neighbors have extreme fitness values (either high or low), each of which was preceded by a neighbor with a similar extreme value. As this evolutionary cascade (referred to as an “avalanche”) proceeds over time, the system tends toward a limit in which no species has a fitness level below a certain threshold (i.e., the weak have been eliminated), and the fitness levels of the surviving species are uniformly distributed. The Distribution of Outcomes The Bak-Sneppen model allows estimation of the probability of cluster size S (where the size of a cluster is the time it took to reach the critical state), which can be shown to converge to a power law. A power law f(x) = xa has the property that the relative change f(kx) a f(x) = k is independent of x. That is, the probability of a given cluster size is of the form St, where t is a function of the particular system. Power laws lack scale and are often characteristic of fractals (geometric shapes or
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functions that exhibit self-similarity at any scale) in that each subset of a fractal shape has essentially the same shape as the whole. It must be noted that for systems that are specified differently from that of the simple Bak-Sneppen model, the clusters may be better represented by a function different from a power law. Although a power law may best fit the simulation results (in the case of the Bak-Sneppen model, cluster size as a function of time), it is only an empirical result and not a theoretical result. Other distributions might fit nearly as well, and slight tweaks to the artificial rules that control system evolution might result in a different coefficient for the power law, an entirely different function, or even a reduction of clustering with time if the model includes some mechanism (e.g., negative feedback) that prevents clustering. For example, other studies have used an approach similar to that of Bak and Sneppen to simulate a forest and its vulnerability to sparks and fire. If trees are initially clustered rather than being spaced equilaterally on a grid, a forest fire can self-propagate, and cluster size is better represented by a Poisson (exponential) distribution than by a power law. The results of an experimental simulation might then provide evidence that the network is not size-invariant, and it cannot be assumed to be represented by fractals. SELF-ORGANIZED CRITICALITY AND NETWORK-CENTRIC OPERATIONS In a self-organizing system that represents a conflict between parties, the clustering of strength on one side leads to casualties on the other side. Whether those parties are competing organisms or state actors, when a self-organized critical point7 is achieved, the system has the maximum flexibility to respond to a new driver. These nodes might similarly represent a network-centric view of military operations, where the nodes are assets of various types.8 As Professor James Moffat (an expert in complexity and warfare theory) points out, “One of the requirements of military command is to arrange things so that the forces collaborate locally and thus self-organize into this optimal state.” This characterization is key to the concept of net-centric operations (NCO, previously known as net-centric warfare), in which the military takes advantage of self-organizing features via increased information awareness and communication at the local level. In large part, the computers, headsets, and other technology available to the modern military facilitate this approach, and the NCO approach is given credit by some for success on the ground in Iraq.
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Such an evolutionary model also has implications for those who would control systemic risk, whether on the battlefield or in the global economy. A bottom-up approach, in which self-organization is recognized as an evolutionary inevitability, might be optimal. The focus might be placed on facilitating beneficial interactions between proximate elements that lead to the desired state rather than on top-down intervention. CREATING SYSTEM MODELS The Bak-Sneppen evolutionary model is only one example of a structural representation of a systems network. In their ecosystem model, Bak and Sneppen forced communication within the system, both temporally (by selecting the least fit at each time step) and spatially (by changing the fitness values only for near neighbors). Of course, the spatial dimension need not be strictly geographic; it is a metaphor for any nontemporal links between elements.9 Thus, with relatively homogeneous elements (differing only in the random fitness values initially assigned to them) and with influence determined by their geospatial proximity, Bak and Sneppen’s choice of a lattice structure in two dimensions was appropriate and efficient. However, other configurations of a network might be more appropriate for a different system; an alternative configuration of nodes and links might better describe the elements and relationships of the network. The network modeler is free to determine the most reasonable configuration in terms of fairly representing elements and relationships and in terms of creating computational efficiency. For example, a hub-and-spoke or tree structure might be more appropriate than a lattice structure, depending on how information flows between nodes. We might think of the evolutionary process as one that is facilitated by communication between elements: any network abstraction of the system is really an information grid rather than a physical grid. The network structure can also be as complex as required. For example, the elements of the system may be connected in any dimension and in more than one dimension. Both correlation and coincidence might be assumed to occur across any dimension of the system. We can imagine a d-dimensional space that accounts for different correlation and coincident events. The network representation might even explicitly include a time dimension: the interactions across this dimension might serve as proxies for correlated events, and the interactions within the dimension might do the same thing for coincident events. As the system adapts and evolves, as long as any element of the system still survives, information is transmitted throughout the system.
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Creating an abstraction of a real-life system is useful in another way. As an external stimulus triggers various responses within the system, we may be able to infer information about that stimulus even if we can’t directly observe it. We do so by measuring the response function in the observable parts of the system. For example, intercepting terrorist communications and observing the responses to them (say, physical movement by members of a terrorist cell) might lead an intelligence analyst to other information about the system. Similarly, observing the change in the price of a home builder’s stock synchronous with a large increase in interest rates might lead to inferences about the firm’s exposure to interest rates and its hedging strategy or lack thereof. SIMULATION AND TOY MODELS Clearly, the rules applied in the Bak-Sneppen model are simplistic and have a more random relationship between proximate nodes than might, say, a financial or military system. Such a simplistic system is sometimes called a toy system because it necessarily lacks certain features of the real world. Although instructive, its results will be only as good as the modelers’ choices with respect to network design and rules of interaction. Nevertheless, such toy systems allow study of the emergent behavior of any system as well as its sensitivities to variations in those rules. Simulations using toy models demonstrate how certain characteristics of systems of interest emerge and suggest strategies for influencing a highly complex self-organizing system and prodding it toward a desirable goal. This is especially true in the case of the financial markets, since only self-organization is feasible in the global capital markets. Although outside forces such as those present in a command economy can influence the system, there is no outside entity that is capable of imposing order on the entire system; in fact, this is one of the reasons why grand gestures such as trade embargos often fail to achieve the desired economic results. As mathematical psychologist Dr. Paul Lehner of MITRE Corp. said, “Simulations always generate surprising results. We code a few rules into the simulation, have certain expectations about what will evolve (based on our internal mental simulation), and then are surprised when things don’t evolve as expected. We learn a lot about what we don’t know about the implications of what we do know. So I may not trust the simulation results, but I have learned not to trust my intuition.” One of the most important potential uses of a systems model is to manage systemic risk. Testing various strategies in a toy model rather than the real world might allow decision makers to maximize positive impact, achieve the desired goal, and avoid unintended and adverse consequences.
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One of those adverse consequences might be relatively invisible except via simulation, that is, forcing the system to a state that is more fragile and sensitive to unanticipated shocks. ALTERNATIVE THEORIES: SELF-ORGANIZED CRITICALITY VERSUS HIGHLY OPTIMIZED TOLERANCE In the late 1990s, the mathematician John Doyle and the physicist Jean Carlson proposed an alternative to self-organized criticality (SOC) that they named highly optimized tolerance (HOT). They noted that some systems, such as energy delivery systems that include electrical grids and power generators, are optimized in such a way (often for economic reasons) that they have a split personality: they are both robust and fragile. Without some room for error, they are more likely to exceed their operating limits and cause blackouts. While power grids are created by humans, the same robust and fragile behavior might be true of systems that evolved naturally via selforganization. Like SOC systems, HOT systems can display a distribution of high-consequence events in the form of a power law. However, it is beyond the point of criticality with which HOT is concerned; that is, it can be used to estimate consequences when the upper limit is breached. HOT may therefore be especially applicable to cybersecurity models, in which the consequences of an attack on critical infrastructure are extreme. PATTERN CREATION IN A COMPLEX DYNAMIC SYSTEM We may be able to infer some of a system’s dynamics by observing the patterns that the system creates. In physics, there is a concept known as symmetry breaking. In a physical system, microscopic fluctuations that might cross some critical threshold can determine which of two very different states the system will take. The term breaking comes from the fact that this jump can take the system from a disorderly state (in which those fluctuations are just so much noise) to a more ordered (and less probable) state. This is the physical equivalent of a tipping point. Whether in a physical system or some other system, such a phenomenon can be a driver of pattern formation. Such patterns can also be an artifact of human behavior. For example, assume that, as described in the previous discussion of dynamic VaR, a trader loses money today on a long position in interest-rate futures because rates increased dramatically (when rates go up, prices go down).
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Further assume that the trader has utilized his entire risk limit as measured in terms of VaR. At the end of the day, the risk measurement models used by most firms will assimilate that new piece of data, and recalculation of the trader’s VaR at a new and higher estimate of variance will show an increase in risk. Thus, because the large move increased VaR, the trader starts the next day over limit in terms of risk and must therefore liquidate or otherwise hedge part of his position. This trader and others in a similar situation may set off a causal chain of selling that further exacerbates the subsequent increases in rates. This scenario is an example of a symmetry break in that if the price move had not been quite so large, the traders would have been allowed to keep their positions intact, and forced selling would not have been triggered. THE GLOBAL CAPITAL MARKETS AS SELF-ORGANIZING SYSTEMS If the system we are studying is a financial system, we might imagine the dimensions of the lattice as having some physical meaning other than spatial. Instead of modeling the evolution of biological species, we might instead use asset classes, institutions, sovereign states, or industries as the elements of the system that we wish to simulate. Alternatively, we might use more granular elements that represent individual securities, trading desks, or risk factors. Associations might be abstracted in a manner appropriate to the system under consideration. For example, in a financial network, a trader in Singapore who hedges interest-rate exposure with Eurodollar futures on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange might be considered a near neighbor of another trader who is doing the same thing with an interest rate swaps position in London. Or, they might be indirectly connected by a third trader who arbitrages Eurodollar futures in Chicago against Euribor futures in London. Systems modeling can assist in simulating the effect of structural changes as well. For example, the effect of new rules with an increased command structure on the ability of the financial system to self-organize might be determined to be critically important, futile, or disastrously harmful. In the financial markets, we can imagine an external driver such as a news release or an asset reallocation by a large fund manager triggering communication throughout the financial system. If, say, PIMCO decides to move a substantial portion of its portfolios out of equities and into bonds, this information will race through the financial network at lightning pace: initially in the transactions space, while PIMCO is able to keep its intent secret, and later via social networks as its strategy is revealed or surmised.
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Such communication can be seen to move across system dimensions as well. For example, one might characterize the dimensions of a global capital markets model as asset classes or types of instruments. Specific intelligence regarding the stocks that PIMCO is selling and the bonds that it is buying might leap from an equity dimension and a bond dimension to a volatility-dependent derivatives dimension orthogonal to the other two. On a darker note, more extreme events, such as the failures of Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns, might trigger a less orderly reorganization and precipitate a new state that is very different from the previous one. It might take a correspondingly long time to achieve self-organized criticality, especially since interventions taken by regulators and policy makers will interfere (for good or ill) with the natural evolution of the system. We have some empirical evidence of self-organizing behavior in the form of patterns in price behavior. For example, if we use a mathematical simulation to model interactions between the prices of various securities (or even a single security perturbed by external forces and internal dependencies), it should be intuitively obvious that clustering behavior may manifest itself in the form of serial correlation.10 Such correlation, if it continues over time, will reveal itself in classic chart formations such as trends and trading ranges. It can also lead to volatility clusters observed in nearly all price series, in which anomalous periods of high volatility tend to occur at random intervals. For example, consider the six-month price history of spot gold ending November 25, 2009, as shown in Figure 5-2. Note that prices rose
+15.98% (+546.22%ann.) 1192.40 Last Price High on 11/26/09 1192.40 995.59 Average Low on 07/08/09 909.50
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Figure 5-2 Daily Prices of Spot Gold, May 25, 2009, to November 25, 2009 Source: Bloomberg, L.P.
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15.98 percent during the last four weeks of this period, more than doubling the gains of the previous five months. Although the price of gold in U.S. dollars had been slowly rising because of dollar weakness and fears of systemic failure, the purchase by the Reserve Bank of India of 200 tons of gold from the International Monetary Fund on November 2, 2009, triggered substantial new buying. (At the end date of the chart, rumors abounded that India would purchase another 200 tons.) This significant event touched off a pattern in which successive price movements were highly correlated and a strongly monotonic pattern of price movement was created. During those last 20 trading days, prices fell on only 20 percent of the 20 trading days, and there were no two successive down days. THE GLOBAL CAPITAL MARKETS: STABLE OR CHAOTIC? In practice, it’s difficult to determine conclusively whether a system on the scale of the global capital markets is random or deterministic, stable or chaotic. The traditional method for differentiating random and deterministic systems is to identify similar states that occurred over time and establish whether they evolved in an essentially similar manner. For example, in the simple physical system of a pendulum, the movement over time starting with the peak of the swing always progresses in a predictable manner. However, there will always be some uncertainty in the analysis because few real-life problems consist of pure signal. Instead, they usually include random noise that complicates the identification problem. Characterization of the system perhaps best flows from examination of the physics of the system, that is, whether the system has the characteristics that permit self-organization, to discovering to what extent the system is deterministic and the level of complexity of those interactions. In a forward-looking systems design, intuition and expert knowledge may be a better guide than historical behavior in specifying the nature and vulnerability of a system. For example, Nouriel Roubini proved prescient in his analysis of how the dominoes might fall. As related by the New York Times on August 15, 2008, On Sept. 7, 2006, Nouriel Roubini, an economics professor at New York University, stood before an audience of economists at the International Monetary Fund and announced that a crisis was brewing. In the coming months and years, he warned, the United States was likely to face a once-ina-lifetime housing bust, an oil shock, sharply declining consumer confidence and, ultimately, a deep recession. He laid out a bleak sequence of
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events: homeowners defaulting on mortgages, trillions of dollars of mortgage-backed securities unraveling worldwide and the global financial system shuddering to a halt. These developments, he went on, could cripple or destroy hedge funds, investment banks and other major financial institutions like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.11
Three years later, Joseph Stiglitz, who won the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2001 for his analyses of markets with asymmetric information, warned, “Structurally, things are worse [now than they were last year],” in discussing the treatment of “too big to fail” institutions. This statement, made at the end of September 2009, was in direct contradiction to market behavior and sentiment, both of which seemingly indicated a return to normality. Whether or not a system is stable can best be determined using expert knowledge regarding its drivers, rather than from any stochastic metrics (although the later can provide contrary evidence). SUMMARY In this chapter, we discussed the need for a systems approach to modeling the behavior of large-scale systems such as the global capital markets. We defined various types of systems, such as complex, chaotic, and dynamic, and the process by which complex systems might evolve over time in response to endogenous or exogenous shocks. We illustrated the usefulness of using mathematical simulations to identify emergent behavior of the system that is unknowable from an analysis of its component elements and interconnections. We further posited that the global financial system is a form of a complex adaptive system called a self-organizing system, with all the attendant implications for risk and risk management. WHAT’S NEXT This chapter presages a discussion of agent-based approaches, in which the necessarily uncomplicated rules of the Bak-Sneppen model are replaced by rules that simulate the behavior of agents with more advanced cognitive and decision-making abilities. In the next chapter, we will discuss systemic risk in the global capital markets more specifically.
CHAPTER 6
Belief Systems and the Inadvertent Conspiracy: The Global Capital Markets as System
BELIEF SYSTEMS AND WORLDVIEWS For all the advanced mathematics and technology used by the global financial community, there is still a large subjective element and belief system underlying this quantitative world. A worldview is a set of beliefs that influences how an individual interprets the world and interacts with it. However, as in a Bayesian framework, prior beliefs become posterior beliefs as the individuals who make up the world markets are informed by new events or advances in theory. A scientific belief system is based on observation and reason, but in this age of specialization, a market participant may participate in an inadvertent conspiracy by making decisions based on an incomplete worldview. If such a worldview is widely held, it may artificially promote stability (at least temporarily) through a self-fulfilling prophecy. For example, common belief in the concept of “too big to fail” may have induced financial institutions to take too much credit risk, while common use of stochastic models might have disguised the true risk and encouraged risk-taking behavior. However, if faith in this belief is broken, the consequences can be dire. Systemic risk is as much affected by our worldview as it is by more fundamental forces. So, better awareness of the drivers of systemic risk can enhance decision making and assist in reducing this greatest source of risk. A SYSTEMS VIEWPOINT OF SYSTEMIC RISK The financial crisis of 2007–2008 made the term systemic risk nearly a household term. In finance, systemic risk (not to be confused with systematic risk) is the risk of failure of the entire banking or market system. As 81
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defined by Tom Daula, the chief risk officer of Morgan Stanley, systemic risk is “financial system instability, potentially catastrophic, caused or exacerbated by idiosyncratic events or conditions in financial intermediaries. It is the risk that the financial system fails. It is not the risk that a financial institution fails provided that failure does not result in system instability.”1 In the context of the previous chapter, we might alternatively define systemic risk as the risk that a complex, adaptive, self-organizing system rapidly and unexpectedly evolves to an undesirable state. Depending on the path such a reorganization takes, this new state might be an inferior version of the current state, or it might instead be something entirely new and different. Thus, the choice of an appropriate risk management framework is critical. Economic and financial systems are so complex that a systems approach is required to properly assist decision makers in preventing or mitigating the most adverse outcomes. THE GLOBAL CAPITAL MARKETS AS SYSTEM The first step in creating a conceptual model of any system is defining its boundaries. Although the global economic, financial, and geopolitical systems interact in a number of important ways, they can be differentiated based on the nature of their internal relationships. For example, the relationships between interest rates in different sovereign states in a market system are very different from the laws of supply and demand in a macroeconomic system. Figure 6-1 shows one worldview in which the world economy is portrayed as a complex system consisting of dynamically interacting subsystems, such as national economies, markets, industries, and companies. Even related subsystems may be differentiated on the basis of how freely information can be transmitted across the subsystem (thus facilitating self-organization). For example, one major fund manager recently described the pipeline between the market system and the economic system as clogged because of a dearth of lending. Therefore, drawing a boundary around the markets as a distinct system is reasonable, because the market transactions whose effects flow from one end of the globe to the other in near real time are fundamentally different from the forces of supply and demand that drive economies or the geopolitical forces that drive nations. THE ROLE OF HUMAN DECISION MAKING Any market system is nothing more that the aggregate of all its participants, acting according to their knowledge, biases, preferences, and resources.
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etc NATIONAL ECONOMIES Macroeconomic Data>
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Figure 6-1 Systems Representation of World Economy Source: Quantum 4D, Inc.
The price of a security moves only when a human being (acting either directly or via automated agents) bids for or offers a security. With an economic microscope, we might be able to identify the market drivers for each price as a combination of rational and irrational drivers. At their most granular level, market prices are deterministic; they are completely determined by human actors, acting under external or internal influences. Some of these external influences are incentive-created and imposed by regulators (e.g., to minimize capital usage), while others are internal and a product of rational or irrational bias. If we knew everything there is to know about the fundamental drivers of every security, the rules under which every automated trading system operated, the identity of all market participants, and their exact positions, their capital, their risk limits, their preferences, and even the state of their psyches, we might be able to estimate the new price of every security in response to an external event.
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CHARACTERIZING THE MARKET SYSTEM In the previous chapter, we described various attributes that might characterize a large-scale system such as that of the global markets (e.g., dynamic, complex, or adaptive) and discussed the difficulty of identifying them conclusively. Nevertheless, such an attempt is useful, because it has implications with respect to our ability to predict an imminent shock, prevent it, or mitigate its damage after it has occurred. As Bak and Sneppen demonstrated, it is possible that even very simple interactions in a complex system may lead to emergent behavior and high-consequence events. In the following sections, we will define the criteria for a complex, adaptive, self-organizing system, and provide evidence that the global market system meets these criteria. The Global Markets as a Complex, Adaptive, Self-Organizing System We might consider the global financial markets to be one distinct system, distinguishable from the broader economic system. (These financial markets specifically include equity, fixed-income, interest rate, commodity, energy, and foreign exchange markets in any form or venue.) Depending on how we characterize this market system, the implications with respect to systemic risk might be profound. In brief, the system appears to meet four principal criteria for a complex, adaptive, selforganizing system: • It lacks external control. There is no central command for the global financial markets. Although individual state actors or groups acting in concert attempt to exert control to various degrees via legal and regulatory authority or more heavy-handed means, they have limited ability to force a desirable outcome. • It possesses mechanisms for self-organization. Global financial markets can be well represented by a complex network of elements and links, both literal and abstract. Exchange and over-the-counter trading venues provide mechanisms by which pricing, news, and transactional information are transmitted both locally and globally. Each firm is linked to every other firm through trading relationships, either directly or via exchanges. • It involves complex dynamics. Many of the securities traded have complex structures, as well as nonlinear relationships with related securities. And behavioral effects such as changing appetites for risk contribute additional complex dynamics, initiated as they are by the humans that ultimately make up the system.
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• Its evolutionary path is uncertain. The critical state to which the market system is evolving is difficult to anticipate, and this may lead to surprising and high-consequence events. We can observe this empirically in the form of a number of unanticipated market shocks in recent years, theoretically in the degree of difficulty involved in making accurate market predictions, and statistically in the presence of market features such as fat-tailed distributions and jump-diffusion processes for prices and market volatility. Self-Organization in Markets The global markets are a self-organizing system, that is, a dynamic system that, even in the absence of a designing intelligence, is capable of evolving from chaos (say, after an exogenous market shock) and forming a new structure with a higher level of organization. However, this is not to say that this new structure will necessarily please market participants, nor does it imply that such reorganization will not leave casualties. Examples of self-organization are abundant in every discipline. For example, a bee colony is a biological example of a self-organizing system. Similarly, so-called language death, in which a minor language is assimilated into that of a nearby neighbor, is a sociological example. In both cases, small interactions at a highly granular level eventually cause the system to attain a new and superior state (e.g., the bee colony survives; more people are able to communicate). In The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith described this self-organizing property as the “invisible hand” that regulates economic systems. He posited that the forces of supply and demand, facilitated by competition and motivated by self-interest, would find their own equilibrium if they were unconstrained by government interference or other intervening constraints. However, Standard Oil—the horizontal monopoly created by John D. Rockefeller in the late nineteenth century—provides anecdotal evidence that, at least for a time, such equilibrium might be most unpleasant. In the language of systems analysis, Smith’s statement is an early characterization of a self-organized system in which millions of small transactions (e.g., choices of one product over another by individual consumers) promote price efficiency throughout the economy. However, the idea of an invisible hand is somewhat of a misnomer, in that it implies that some larger, controlling force is managing system evolution. Instead, such evolution is driven by small interactions at a local level that roll up into systemic change.
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At a microscopic level, we might consider the global capital markets to be a deterministic system. If we were able to specify the cascade of consequences of each market driver (including behavioral considerations, such as biases and preferences) down to the level of each individual decision maker, we might be able to create a massively complex model of market behavior. Although this is nearly as impossible as modeling the movements of molecules in a container of gas, market behavior is nevertheless sufficiently deterministic to enable us to assume that markets are capable of adaptive behavior that is somewhat predictable. CONNECTIVITY, COMMUNICATION, AND CONTAGION Today, the global market system possesses one of the most critical characteristics of a self-organizing system; that is, it allows information to flow freely between distinct elements. Such connectivity transforms the behavior of diverse, isolated actors into the fundamentally different behavior of a system, with all its attendant uncertainty. Connectivity has increased dramatically in recent years. Years ago, Russia and China were minor players in the global capital markets. Today, a trader can monitor Turkish derivatives or view his Bloomberg screen in Russian. Traders can trade anything, anywhere, any time. The formerly isolated are now enthusiastic participants and agents for interconnectivity. And even the most isolated state actors, such as North Korea, are economically vulnerable to local and global supply chains, and financially and politically vulnerable to the price of commodities, such as the uranium required for the development of nuclear capabilities. The primary mechanism for connectivity in the global financial system is the transaction. Although traders have social networks and common information services in abundance, transactions are the message packets between elements of the system. Even if each transaction is executed locally, arbitrageurs assist in transmitting such information across products, asset classes, and geospatial dimensions in real time, thus facilitating global synchronization and calibration. And these messages are credible; actions speak louder than words. Specific activities such as real-time algorithmic trading, location arbitrage,2 and the use of common information services result in the nearly instantaneous transmission of information across the globe and force synchronization and calibration within the system’s boundaries. For example, if an over-the-counter derivatives trade is executed in Shenzhen, its interest-rate sensitivity may be hedged on the Chicago Board of Trade
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(CBOT) in note futures or their options. And, since the CBOT’s prices are completely transparent (both on trading screens and via automated execution systems), any resultant shift in rates or implied volatility is apparent worldwide. Consistent with both the efficient market hypothesis (EMH), which postulates that the market price of any security reflects all information known about that security at a particular point in time, and the principles of behavioral finance, each transaction reveals information about both expectations and preferences. For example, each options trade contains the trader’s expectations about how far and how fast a price might move by the expiration date of the option, as well as his degree of uncertainty and discomfort about the outcome. Although EMH has fallen into some disrepute recently, it is nevertheless true that a new transaction reflects a new opinion about the value of a security. Reverse-engineering a change in consensus opinion as reflected in market price often provides more credible information than all the research reports in the world. The same structure that allows efficiency also creates vulnerability. Such high-speed communication across the system can either promote stability or provoke turmoil. When it serves to increase global liquidity, this is called efficiency. When it forces a cascade of adverse reactions, this is called contagion. Recall that macro shocks affect all markets and economies directly, whereas micro shocks permeate throughout the entire system via a process of contagion. While an unconnected system is vulnerable to macro shocks, a highly connected system is also vulnerable to micro shocks, thus increasing systemic risk. There are few obstructed paths throughout the global markets, and as long as information can find a path, it will affect the system’s evolution. COMPLEX MARKET DYNAMICS We can infer that market dynamics are complex, not only from direct knowledge of the codependence of various market elements, but also from empirical observation of patterns in market price movements. There are abundant examples of complex rules of interaction between asset classes and securities based on economic or financial fundamentals. Such rules may be nonlinear, may apply only within a certain range, or may depend on several variables. Consider an economic example: the interaction between corn prices and energy prices. Corn and energy may have a direct relationship
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only at prices at which one can compete with the other—that is, only when natural gas prices are sufficiently high (or corn prices sufficiently low) that ethanol can be produced at a cost competitive with that of natural gas. Thus, corn prices can have a complex direct relationship with the price of energy. And these direct relationships can, in turn, create indirect relationships between the causal parents of corn (e.g., weather) and the causal children of energy (e.g., airlines). Consider also a financial example: the interaction between margining rules and trading activity. Rules designed to limit risk may sometimes exacerbate it instead. Sophisticated risk management protocols can, paradoxically, precipitate a chain reaction of buying or selling that increases potential loss, when risk measures used to define traders’ position limits are a function of market behavior. Besides such fundamental economic and financial evidence, we can also observe empirical evidence of complexity. If we examine the probability distribution of historical returns in almost any security or commodity, we can observe evidence of leptokurtosis (i.e., a distribution with a more acute peak at its mean and fatter tails). Such a distribution provides some evidence of nonrandom, complex behavior, because one might infer that there are mechanisms that generate both positive and negative feedback, leading to higher probabilities of insignificant moves as well as extreme moves. Furthermore, if we examine time series of historical volatility, we can observe volatility clustering, in which periods of high volatility are interspersed with periods of normal volatility. Such patterns are again consistent with nonnormal drivers and complex behavior. Markets and Memory Recall that some of the intellectual foundations of current mathematical finance depend on the assumption that the price-generation process is a memoryless one (i.e., it follows a Markov process). If this assumption is not correct, then the stochastic methods that are so widely used may be based on an invalid worldview. It is reasonable to believe that market and economic systems will exhibit hysteresis (i.e., memory), if only because any market or economic system is nothing more than the sum of its participants, with all their fear and greed, with their history of failures and successes, and with their risk preferences and cognitive biases. Thus, to the extent that human biases and preferences are a driver of market prices, the markets possess memory. For example, traders’ compensation structures are an oft-cited contributor to excessive risk taking.
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Proprietary traders at investment banks are paid an annual bonus based on their performance, and this bonus is generally the lion’s share of their income. Hedge fund managers are paid based on performance as well, generally according to the “two and twenty” rule—that is, a 2 percent annual management fee and 20 percent of earnings, subject to high-watermark rules.3 So, a trader’s personal utility function at any point in time is driven by both his performance and the calendar: if the trader has generated a substantial profit year-to-date and it is now November, he is risking his own money with every trade—a far different value proposition from that in January. Although behavioral effects are often thought of as being suboptimal at best and irrational at worst, such mechanisms may drive exceedingly rational decision making that is not immediately obvious. Memory is present in a more subtle way as well, even for algorithmic traders who design completely emotionless and automated trading strategies. Because their quantitative models are informed by historical data (for example, in calculating market volatility or in setting trading limits), the models, too, have a memory. The Role of Self-Fulfilling Prophesies The inadvertent conspiracy rests on two common beliefs: 1. There are “best practice” models for the valuation of complex derivative instruments that rely on calibration to current market prices to obtain input parameters (e.g., volatility surfaces). 2. If a technique has been making money consistently in the past, it must be based on a model that correctly reflects reality. To some extent, such common beliefs lead to self-fulfilling prophecies that increase causal capacity (the ability to make choices that change the system) and the corresponding magnitude of potential change, while simultaneously decreasing the perception of systemic risk. As a case in point, economist Burton Malkiel recently described some of the conditions that let to the credit crisis: During the 20th century, banks made mortgage loans to individual homeowners and then kept these loans as assets on their balance sheets until they were repaid. This system was known as the originate-and-hold model. That system changed, however, during the 2000s to an originate-and-distribute model. Banks continued to originate mortgage loans (as well as other kinds of loans) but held them only briefly until they could be sold to an investment banking institution, which packaged the mortgages into mortgagebacked securities.4
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Malkiel went on to describe the successive repackaging of different elements of risk (e.g., slicing mortgage-backed securities into tranches with various claims on principal and interest, and credit default swaps that bifurcated credit risk from interest-rate risk). “Through this system, by a kind of alchemy, investment banks produced very highly rated securities on the senior tranches, even though the underlying mortgages might be of relatively low quality or subprime.” Malkiel noted how such a system led to a deterioration in lending standards and the subsequent chain of consequences. But there’s another lesson in this story, as well: this narration also shows a huge increase in systemic risk facilitated by the common use of best-practice valuation models and this inadvertent conspiracy. No investment bank would have commenced the origination and repackaging process unless it was confident of how the marketplace would price the newly created derivative securities days or weeks hence. Yet More Complexity: Human Preferences and Biases Complexity is further exacerbated by behavioral effects, since any market is, ultimately, composed of humans, with their biases, preferences, and sometimes flawed decision-making abilities. The shifting balance between fear and greed causes human biases to be a major driver of change, as evidenced by the existence of sentiment indexes. The market system can be driven by both macro and micro shocks. We have evidence from the field of behavioral finance that risk preferences can sometimes be irrational and complex. Recall that the efficient market hypothesis implies that charting can provide no insights. However, virtually every trader in the world relies on the use of charts. Chart formations may be an indicator of a change in sentiment, with all its market consequences. For example, a support level might indicate the lowest price at which new positions were initiated, and the psychological effect of crossing the boundary from winner to loser (if only by pennies) might affect human behavior. Such emotional dynamics can shift suddenly, as well; there is reason to believe that overconfidence or faith in models, strategies, and government may allow a system to exist in equilibrium for too long (negative feedback), while a corresponding loss of faith and resultant panic may cause the system to jump to a new state (positive feedback). In 1936, John Maynard Keynes used the term animal spirits to refer to human emotions such as confidence that are sufficiently important to be able to generate boom-and-bust cycles rather than just a series of small corrections to a stable system. Far more recently, Yale Professor
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Robert Shiller has coined the terms virtuous cycle and vicious cycle to describe different types of feedback mechanisms. The question may not be, “What causes market shocks?” so much as, “Why is the market stable for prolonged periods of time?”
ROBUSTNESS AND FRAGILITY IN COMPLEX SYSTEMS It’s difficult to predict the evolution of any system under the best of conditions, but the most dangerous system is one that is both opaque and resilient. An outside observer who is unaware of the system’s internal dynamics might be led to a false sense of security regarding the system’s stability. As in the case of a sleeping volcano, it’s difficult to infer from historical metrics alone that a system is stable. Extreme risk comes from not knowing what the system is doing and not knowing how it is changing. The system may have complex interdependencies that cannot be reverse-engineered from outcomes. They may not even be synchronized in time; for example, the elements of a feedback loop might be displaced in time and amplified by the intervening dynamics. And the more complex the dynamics, the more difficult it is to predict outcomes. For example, we might posit that a market system exhibits highly optimized tolerance (HOT) rather than mere self-organized criticality (SOC) because its behavior is expected to be both robust and fragile. The bimodal behavior of some markets—that is, either quiet or volatile— is evidence of both robustness and fragility. (Two examples of such behavior are electricity prices as shown in Figure 4-4 and credit spreads as shown in Figure 3-2.) Paradoxically, the ability of the system to evolve to a significantly different state via a chain of causal consequences might increase while apparent systemic risk appears to decrease. For example, this might occur when open interest in OTC credit default swaps increases, but only because the arbitrage activities of new market participants are reducing market spreads and instrument volatility as they compete for return and push the efficient frontier to less advantageous levels. If it is valid, the HOT hypothesis has far-reaching implications. Traditional indicators of systemic risk, such as volatility and interest rates, may provide little warning of a jump from a normal to a high-risk regime. The hypothesis has policy implications, as well. Perhaps the most effective action that a systemic risk regulator might take should be to ensure that there is sufficient slack in the system to reduce its fragility.
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Traditionally, such slack is imposed at the enterprise level (i.e., by imposing higher regulatory capital requirements). However, like portfolio risk, system tolerance is not the sum of the tolerances of its component elements but depends on their interactions. So, next-generation regulatory requirements might impose new or different constraints, particularly those, such as liquidity requirements, that are related to interdependencies with other enterprises. THE ILLUSION OF CONTROL The magnitude of systemic risk depends on the elements and interconnections of the specific system. Just as in the Bak-Sneppen evolutionary model, the failure of even a single entity may infect a cluster of entities to which it’s linked, triggering a cascade of adverse consequences. Thus, any entity that is either “too big to fail” or “too connected to fail” puts the entire system at substantial risk. A fundamental question remains: how can a self-aware node of a complex system save itself from such systemic risk? With the benefit of systems thinking, an individual enterprise might be able to reduce its exposure in a number of ways. Once some causal cascade has commenced, it might be better able to determine the effectiveness of certain risk mitigation actions along the path. It might dynamically change its risk profile even during an apparently stable period, depending on its estimate of the system’s causal capacity. And it might identify indications and warnings of a structural break and a potential shift to a new risk regime in time to benefit relative to its competitors. However, even the most sophisticated financial institution will not be privy to all the information that might be required in order to properly estimate systemic risk and to protect itself fully—at least while remaining competitive during stable periods. The most accurate and most robust models may require a much higher level of transparency (e.g., details of counterparty and other credit exposure) that might be available only to a regulator. Instead, such an institution might engage with policy makers on improved methods for measuring and managing systemic risk, and specifically include in the discussion interaction with other systems (e.g., geopolitical). Ideally, such methods will acknowledge the selforganizing nature of global markets and reject a command-and-control philosophy.
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SUMMARY The global capital markets make up a distinct system, separate from global economic systems or geopolitical systems. A market system has many of the characteristics required for a complex, adaptive system: interrelations between its elements are instant, nonlinear, and at least somewhat deterministic and predictable. The market system lacks a command-and-control structure, possesses mechanisms for self-organization, involves complex dynamics, and has an uncertain evolutionary path. Because humans are involved, the interrelations are especially complex in that they include both behavioral effects and changing risk preferences. The market system is both robust and fragile, but it is exceedingly difficult to identify the potential for structural breaks or to measure systemic risk from observational metrics alone. WHAT’S NEXT In the next chapter, we discuss the topic of analytic tradecraft and its application to the broader topic of the design of objective models that are less vulnerable to cognitive bias, groupthink, or a flawed worldview.
CHAPTER 7
Analytic Tradecraft and Model Risk
INTRODUCTION The most insidious type of risk to which any complex enterprise is exposed is model risk, or the risk that a model used to inform critical decision making is incorrectly specified or erroneously applied.1 This is so because the decision makers who are consumers of risk analyses are often unaware of the degree of uncertainty surrounding any assessment and of the sensitivity of the optimal decision to model risk. Model risk is a meta-risk that affects the measurement and mitigation of every type of risk. In both the intelligence and financial communities, the consequences of failure to acknowledge and deal with model risk can be catastrophic. If an analytic model fails to represent reality adequately, plausible future scenarios with highly adverse outcomes may not be identified. Failure to identify a risk means failure to mitigate it. Both qualitative analysis and quantitative analysis are subject to model risk, although the sources of such risk may be different. For example, in the financial community, with its highly mathematical models, the source of model risk may be the uncertainty associated with model parameters such as mean and standard deviation or with dependence on key assumptions about price behavior over time, such as a mean-reversion process. Conversely, in the intelligence community, with its greater dependence on qualitative models, the source of model risk may be human failings. Such failings may include the analysts’ own cognitive biases or even secondhand biases such as a field collector’s misinterpretation of information. Thus, creating a model of reality, no matter how quantitatively that model is expressed, involves both art and science. Art is present in the choices made by the analyst in constructing her view of reality for the problem at hand, and science is present in the manner in which the model is quantified. The financial analyst and the intelligence analyst must each be aware of the process of model building, using a structured 94
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approach that serves to minimize model risk while ensuring that the model will serve the purpose for which it’s intended.
ANALYTIC TRADECRAFT In the intelligence community (IC), the best analysts are intensely aware of their vulnerability to model risk and apply structured approaches to analysis to minimize model risk. The community is starting to place a high premium on the value of critical thinking skills toward this end and includes them as an element of tradecraft. Tradecraft is the term applied to the collective skills required in the field of intelligence. Analytic tradecraft is used to refer to the set of skills required for intelligence analysis as opposed to intelligence gathering. Such a structured approach is necessary for making sense of information from diverse sources. Such sources range from the highly qualitative and untrustworthy to the highly quantitative and trustworthy. For example, human intelligence (HUMINT), or intelligence gathered from human sources, is an example of the former, whereas signals intelligence (SIGINT) and image intelligence (IMINT), both of which are types of intelligence gathered via mechanical means such as satellites, are examples of the latter. An intelligence analyst’s model of reality may therefore range from completely subjective and informed only by the creativity, imagination, and expert knowledge of the analyst to completely objective and informed by highly reliable and quantitative data. In either case, the analyst’s task is often hampered by missing data; he is used to information gaps, including “known unknowns” and even “unknown unknowns.” Thus, the community places great emphasis on the use of all available data sources—including both confidential information and open-source intelligence (OSINT)— because one source or another may either fill in those gaps or confirm information that is of uncertain reliability. The use of such “all-source intelligence” serves to minimize model risk. When information is gathered from diverse and orthogonal sources, the fusion of that information may validate or invalidate hypotheses or conclusions and allow a higher degree of confidence in conclusions. Nevertheless, good information alone doesn’t guarantee good models. Models created by intelligence analysts—whether they are used to forecast possible future states or to provide a theory that explains certain observations—are still vulnerable to the quality of the analytic process itself. Although there are statistical methods for measuring the uncertainty
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associated with hard data, the intelligence community must depend on control of the analytic process itself to minimize model risk. CRITICAL THINKING IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY Control is achieved via the use of techniques for performing structured analysis. The principles of these techniques mirror the scientific method used by researchers in other disciplines and are taught to analysts joining the intelligence community. For example, “Analysis 101” is a course that provides new analysts with intensive training in such methods. This training was initially sponsored by the Directorate of National Intelligence (DNI) to provide new analysts with the skills necessary to meet the IC Analytic Standards as defined by the DNI’s Office of Analytic Integrity and Standards (see Table 7-1). As any financial analyst will immediately observe, these standards are oriented toward far less quantitative assessments than those that are typical in the financial space. Intelligence analysts operate under far greater uncertainty than do financial analysts. They are often required to T A B L E 7-1
IC Analytic Standards and Standards of Analytic Tradecraft
IC Analytical Standards 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
Objectivity Independent of political considerations Timeliness Based on all available sources of intelligence Exhibits proper standards of analytic tradecraft Standards of Analytic Tradecraft
1. Properly describes quality and reliability of sources 2. Properly caveats and expresses uncertainties or confidence in analytical judgments 3. Incorporates alternative analysis where appropriate 4. Relevance to U.S. national security 5. Logical argumentation 6. Consistency, or highlights change 7. Accurate judgments, assessments* * Assessment is the preferred term within the intelligence community for the results of an analysis.
Source: For more information, see www.dni.gov/content/AT/Analytic_Standards.pdf
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make a forecast or provide an assessment based on only spotty information of unreliable origin. Unlike a financial analyst, they cannot rely on history for an estimate of the likelihood of extreme events, but must instead identify the most plausible scenarios and likely outcomes based on a fusion of facts, heuristics, and their own expert judgment. Although such analysts may use a variety of tools and technology to enhance their cognitive abilities, the quality of their results often depends on as much on their ability to enforce analytic rigor, proceed with their analysis in a structured manner, and avoid certain cognitive pitfalls as it does on data and subject matter expertise. As cognitive and computer science advance, the intelligence analysis process can and will be become more quantitative. The increasing use of mathematically rigorous models that can explicitly capture and correct for human biases and preferences will improve the ability to make probabilistic predictions. MODELS AND METHODS The models, methods, and tools used by the intelligence community are those that facilitate critical thinking and a structured approach toward analysis. For example, analysts make great use of visualization and link analysis tools to assist them in their sensemaking efforts. Such tools, which create a graphic representation of how the nodes in a network are related, are also heavily used by the law enforcement community to identify patterns best recognized by humans. Similarly, some intelligence analysts use a cognitive portal known as A-Space2 (Analytic Space), which creates a collaborative environment that facilitates information sharing and elicitation of diverse viewpoints. Nevertheless, analysts must be especially careful to avoid certain analytical pitfalls to which all humans are subject and must always think critically about the process of analysis instead of just the task at hand. THE ROLE OF CRITICAL THINKING In the intelligence community, critical thinking can be viewed as a type of quality control for analysts’ cognitive processes as they solve problems and reason to a conclusion. Because the ultimate purpose of analysis is to inform decision makers, both the quality of their decisions and their confidence in those decisions are driven by the quality of the analytical process and its ability to mirror reality accurately. Critical thinking ultimately requires the analyst to adhere to high standards of logic in which she conforms to universally accepted principles
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that allow reasoning beyond facts (i.e., making sound inferences). In the intelligence community, the criteria for critical thinking include clarity, accuracy, and logic. One key element of critical thinking is cohesiveness, which requires that the analysis include those and only those factors that are relevant to the problem at hand. The analyst’s representation of reality should include all relevant information, be sufficiently specific to support the reasoning process (whether human or machine-generated), and acknowledge any missing information that would benefit the analysis. These criteria are especially important in minimizing model risk, as they exclude irrelevant sources of uncertainty and specifically recognize incompleteness where it exists. MINDSETS AND BIASES All analysis that includes subjective elements is vulnerable to mindsets and cognitive biases. A mindset is a mental framework of rules, heuristics, beliefs, and experiences used by an individual to filter, organize, value, and interpret data that might be used to assess a risk or come to a conclusion. Mindsets are essentially mental shortcuts that often speed understanding. However, they may fail the analyst when experience is not a reliable guide or when aspects of the analysis are outside the analyst’s area of expertise. Mindsets can often be subconscious and therefore difficult to challenge or even recognize. They can also be a characteristic of an individual or of a governmental or private-sector institution and its internal culture, resulting in groupthink. Similarly, analysts and institutions may possess biases, that is, preferences for one thing over another. There are value-based biases, in which an analyst might filter data based on an illogical perception of value, and cognitive biases, in which an analyst might form faulty conclusions from available data based on how he processes information. Because so many modeling choices depend on cognitive skills and prior knowledge, they are vulnerable to both value-based and cognitive biases, against which every analyst must guard. For example, a financial analyst may exhibit a value-based bias by considering only statistical models, or an intelligence analyst working in relative isolation may exhibit cognitive bias by failing to identify risk factors that are outside of her experience. Historical experience alone may be of little use here, as enemies and competitors continue to change and refine their tactics, and the quality of results often depends on the creativity of subject matter experts.
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There are a number of different cognitive biases that can jeopardize the quality of the analytical process and decision makers’ confidence in its results. For example, humans often suffer from confirmation bias, or the tendency to value information that confirms their existing beliefs over information that contradicts those beliefs. Such a bias influences the type of data that is collected and narrows the range of competing hypotheses that might be considered. Similarly, a human might also suffer from random bias (also known as conspiracy bias), in which he sees patterns where none exist. In fact, a common phenomenon among new analysts in watch centers (that is, centers tasked with monitoring a particular threat) is the tendency to generate far too many false positives from the massive amount of information freshly available to them. The amount of cognitive bias may also be affected by the agency or corporate culture. Sometimes the reward system for analysts—particularly for financial analysts, whose models may be costly to implement—tends to discourage critical reexamination and instead rewards incremental improvements to existing models. Table 7-2 contains a partial list of cognitive biases that are common to both the intelligence and financial communities. There are a number of additional biases that are more specific to the intelligence community, such as a bias in favor of confidential information and information gathered using covert methods over open-source information or information that is publicly available. T A B L E 7-2
Common Cognitive Biases
Bias
Description
Impact on Analysis
Mitigation Method
Confirmation bias
The tendency to value information that confirms existing beliefs over information that contradicts those beliefs.
This bias may cause the analyst to ignore relevant data or narrow the range of possible hypotheses considered.
Continuously reexamine competing hypotheses, seeking to disprove even those hypotheses that have been previously accepted, and freshly reranking competing hypotheses. (Continued )
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T A B L E 7-2
(Continued)
Bias
Description
Impact on Analysis
Mitigation Method
Anchoring bias
The tendency to value initial information over subsequent information.
The order in which information is assimilated into a conceptual model affects its development.
Reorganize the data set as new information is acquired, and reconsider the problem.
Random bias
The tendency to believe that coincident events must be related rather than accepting the possibility that such a pattern may be random.
This bias may generate false assumptions about causation or overestimate the likelihood of certain events.
Consider chance as a possible explanation, and apply mathematical rigor to prove or disprove a relationship between the events. Explicitly model causality where appropriate rather than depending on correlation.
Availability bias
The tendency to value information that is more readily available, either in human memory or from readily accessible sources of quantitative data.
This bias overweights the impact of readily available data or data that are within the analyst’s area of subject matter expertise and underweights the impact of potentially important but difficult to obtain data.
Objectively determine the data required for the analysis rather than working forward from the available data. Specifically acknowledge the importance of unknowns.
Framing bias
The tendency to present information in a format designed to elicit a specific response or decision.
This bias causes an analyst to skew the results to produce a particular decision.
Maintain objectivity and neutrality, and create a culture within the enterprise that rewards self-criticism.
Statistical bias
The tendency to use statistics blindly and overweight their reliability.
This bias creates overconfidence in results and may cause decision makers to make nonoptimal choices.
Question the basic assumptions on which statistical parameters are based as well as those of the methods used to generate them.
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STRUCTURED ANALYSIS AND THE CONCEPTUAL MODEL An analyst can help ensure the creation of a complete and cohesive model through the use of structured analysis,3 a systematic method for building a conceptual model of reality. A conceptual model is a collection of knowledge and interdependencies used to represent the dynamics of a real-life situation. Such a model can be used forward or backward; that is, it can be used to identify plausible future scenarios or to explain observed events in terms of their root causes. Depending on the question to be answered, an analyst can employ one of two different approaches. Most often, the intelligence community uses hypothesis testing to answer limited questions or explain isolated incidents (e.g., a nuclear test by North Korea). Conversely, conceptual model creation is used to answer more complex questions or to assist with continuing efforts in which the inputs to the model may vary, but the question remains the same. Conceptual model creation is the more encompassing solution, as it involves building a highly structured and well-specified model of the relevant reality. However, constraints such as time and resources don’t always permit such an approach, especially when actionable intelligence is required. Therefore, hypothesis testing takes advantage of cognitive shortcuts and utilizes the creativity and intuition of the analyst to filter and rank competing hypotheses in a timely fashion. In both hypothesis testing and conceptual model development, the intelligence community promotes a structured approach that minimizes model risk caused by cognitive biases or other impediments to objectivity and completeness. At the start of the analytic process, the analyst should select the appropriate approach: hypothesis testing or conceptual model building. If the problem is sufficiently simple and straightforward, the analyst may choose to generate and test competing hypotheses. For example, if an analyst is asked a very specific question, such as, “How many nuclear weapons does North Korea have today?” such an approach might be used. If that analyst were instead asked to create a threat metric or warning system for the use of nuclear weapons by North Korea, then he might instead choose to build a conceptual model. In real life, an analyst may take advantage of both approaches. A need for critical but unavailable data is often a fact of life for an intelligence analyst. In building a conceptual model, the analyst may need to populate the model with a mixture of opinion and fact, substituting expert knowledge and informed guesses for hard data or deterministic relationships.
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STRUCTURING INFORMATION AND HYPOTHESIS GENERATION Before an analyst can generate competing hypotheses, she must structure the information in a manner that enhances cognition. Such structuring enables the use of link analysis and visualization tools, which facilitate the pattern recognition at which humans excel. It is meant to be thoughtprovoking in a way that unleashes the analyst’s creativity and expert knowledge. Some of the visualization techniques used by the intelligence community include the creation of timelines of chronological data, mapping of geospatial data, construction of link charts of associations based on any of a number of characteristics and attributes (e.g., network diagrams or concept maps), and diagramming a decision or process flow. Structuring Information The three steps in structuring information that precede hypothesis generation and testing are as follows: 1. Organizing information into useful sets. Generally, such sets have a hierarchical structure. In threat assessment, the categories might have an inheritance structure in which lowerlevel sets have the attributes of their parents. For example, when analyzing means of transportation, a Hummer inherits the qualities of its parent Motor Vehicles and its parent Transportation Vehicles, but it also has attributes and characteristics of its own. 2. Visualizing the information sets in order to obtain insights. The forms of such visualization may include displaying the information in temporal order, creating link-analysis graphs in which relationships between elements based on common attributes are displayed, and mapping the data into another form (e.g., geospatial). 3. Analyzing the nature of the relationships. The analyst may be able to detect relationships when data are properly organized and visualized or transformed into patterns, trends, and statistics. He may be able to distinguish causality from mere correlation and determine boundary conditions outside of which observed relationships may fail. The best analysts take advantage of several of these methods in order to search exhaustively for nonobvious relationships and eliminate spurious correlations. There are a number of commercial off-the-shelf tools that are used by the intelligence and financial communities for such purposes. Figure 7-1
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Figure 7-1 Sample Link Analysis of Corporate-Human Relationships Source: Quantum 4D, Inc., and Edgar
illustrates the use of one such visualization tool. In it, links between corporations on the basis of humans (e.g., common members of the board of directors) are shown. In counterterrorism efforts, such links might be based on personal relationships, phone communications, or monetary flows.4 One application of such link analysis is Non-Obvious Relationship Awareness (NORA),5 in which, for example, data are mined to identify persons who should be excluded from Las Vegas casinos based on their relationships. Generating Competing Hypotheses A hypothesis is a conjecture that is used either as an explanation of known facts or to predict an outcome based on those facts. Thus, hypothesis generation can be used as either a forensic tool or a forecasting tool. In the intelligence space, the analytic process is often one of identifying competing hypotheses and, by a logical process of elimination and evaluation, identifying the most likely one. In the financial space, the task may be far broader and require the analyst to identify a conceptual model of the global capital markets and their most important drivers and interactions. Unless analytic rigor controls this process, hypothesis generation can lead to model error. If left to their own devices, humans may generate the set of competing hypotheses in a nonsystematic fashion based on their
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own experiences. They may, therefore, be vulnerable to the limitations of their own knowledge, mindsets, and cognitive biases. They may miss scenarios that are outside their experience or that have never before occurred. For example, analysts might have missed the September 11 scenario in which terrorists hijacked planes and used them as weapons because the purpose of nearly all previous hijackings was to obtain leverage in hostage negotiations. TESTING AND REFINING HYPOTHESES To be truly useful in identifying sources of extreme risk in either the intelligence space or the financial space, an analyst should ideally create every plausible scenario of interest, using manual or automated means. Then each scenario can be evaluated for its likelihood and consequences, and solutions that might block or mitigate the worst outcomes can be identified. The process of refining a hypothesis involves specifying the necessary and sufficient conditions for the hypothesis to be valid and the necessary implications if it is. A necessary condition is something that must occur or be true. For example, if the trial hypothesis is that Iran has a nuclear weapon, a necessary condition for this hypothesis is that Iran possesses weapons-grade fissionable material. A sufficient condition is something that must occur or be true if the condition is valid. For the same hypothesis, if Iran can be shown to be successfully enriching U-238, that information is sufficient to assume that it possesses that weapons-grade fissionable material. A necessary implication is something that must occur if the hypothesis is valid. For example, if Iran has a nuclear weapon, it must be storing and securing the weapon—at least if it is operating in accordance with Western standards. The logical rigor and completeness required to test hypotheses can be achieved by the use of a decision tree (also known as a hypothesis tree). A decision tree is a decision support tool that is most commonly used to identify the decisions that are most likely to result in a desired outcome or as a method for estimating conditional probabilities for all possible outcomes. The nodes and branches of the decision tree are populated via a process of tightly controlled questions regarding conditions and implications. The two most basic questions that guide such an inquiry are, “For this hypothesis to be valid, what must be true?” and “If this hypothesis is valid, what do I then expect to be true?”
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Status of Missing Person
Dead Murder
Suicide
Accident
Alive Natural
Kidnap
Runaway
Lost
Figure 7-2 Decision Tree for Status of Missing Person
Each level of each branch of the decision tree must be mutually exclusive, and the levels must be collectively exhaustive. The branches generally start with the broadest attributes that differentiate the hypotheses and branch into more specific attributes that help refine the hypotheses. Figure 7-2 displays a simple decision tree in which every logical branch of a search for a missing person is included. Although this decision tree attaches no probabilities to each branch and contains no outcomes that depend on chance, the tree could certainly be formulated to do both, for example, on the basis of historical experience that is based on the characteristics of the missing person.6 Financial engineers will be familiar with one version of a decision tree: the binomial tree used to price American-style options, which can be exercised at any time. At each step in the tree, the binomial model simulates rational action by the owner of the option—that is, continue to hold the option or exercise it, whichever maximizes expected profit. The quality of the decision tree depends in large part on the expertise of the analyst. For example, if one had created all possible combinations of terrorist objectives, targets, and means of attack in the United States along with prior conditions that must be true for each (e.g., get operatives into the United States, give them flight lessons, obtain a plane, fly the plane), the September 11 event might have been generated as one plausible attack scenario, and observations of some of the necessary preconditions might have generated warnings of precisely that scenario. However, if the analyst did not consider planes as a method of attack, no structured approach would have led to the actual scenario and thereby created actionable intelligence. CREATING AND IMPLEMENTING CONCEPTUAL MODELS Hypothesis testing, although exceedingly useful, may be insufficient for some problems. Instead, if the model of reality required for the problem space is sufficiently complex, if the model will continue to be used in an
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ongoing effort, and if time and resources permit, the creation of a conceptual model—especially one that can be automated—is well worth the effort. For any but the simplest models, such a model can lead to nonobvious outcomes and superior decisions. Steps in Conceptual Model Design The following steps provide a framework for the design of a conceptual model. When critical thinking and a structured approach are applied in each step in the stated order, model risk is minimized. The analyst must first define the problem; she must ensure that the analytic effort is geared toward answering the most appropriate question. The purpose of most models is to inform decision makers by allowing them to better understand complex situations and interactions, and the analyst can achieve this goal by defining the problem in a manner that identifies and quantifies all the important outcomes in the model of reality (even one that is nonlinear and dynamic). Sometimes, a slight restatement of the question to be answered can speed progress in model design. Such a tweak might cast the problem in a revealing new light and speed conceptual model development. The next step is to seek answers by generating and refining hypotheses. If the purpose of the model is to assist a decision maker in selecting from among a number of options, the model must generate every plausible outcome (using decision trees or some other formal approach that enforces completeness) with which the decision maker would be most concerned. If the purpose of the model is to better understand a complex situation, the scenarios should include illustrative cases extracted from the available history. After having identified the purpose of the model and the comprehensive set of plausible scenarios, the analyst must next define output parameters that can be used to inform the decision maker. The output might be the optimal decision, the answer to a true-false question, or even a metric. For example, the decision maker might require a threat-level metric that can be monitored as conditions change. Similarly, he might want to know the sensitivity of the metric to an input parameter or a decision. The next step is to acquire information. The analyst identifies input parameters in order to avoid availability bias and then obtains the requisite data. In this step, any critical information gaps are identified. There are three main categories of inputs: (1) observables (i.e., facts or data that can be directly observed), (2) fundamental assumptions (i.e., knowledge that can’t be directly observed or inferred), and (3) decisions.
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One of the methods that is often used to identify required inputs is to work backward from the desired output and ask the question, “What influences or determines that output?” In this step, it’s also necessary to identify any data that are critical to or would enhance the analysis but are not readily available. Either an effort must be made to obtain these data, or the increase in model error caused by some type of workaround (e.g., substituting expert opinion for knowledge) should be explicitly acknowledged. Such a substitution does not necessarily degrade the model. Sometimes a model that includes an expert analyst’s best guesses (i.e., an expert system) can produce better forecasts than a model that was compromised by including only available data or historical data that are considered unrepresentative of the future. The next step is to structure information. After the analyst specifies all outputs and inputs, she can specify the relationships between them. These relationships, which connect inputs and outputs, can take the form of heuristics, rules, generalizations, equations, or logical operations. They can be completely deterministic, be related by a conditional probability (i.e.,8Y|X9 = P),7 or even be linked by a statistical function such as correlation. Each output can be a function of more than one input, and time can be explicitly included as a variable if the system is dynamic. A conceptual model can include more complex relationships between variables, such as feedback loops (in which an output affects its own input) and competing forces (in which there are multiple pathways between an input and an output that have opposite effects). Such relationships may dampen or amplify the outcome or even demonstrate that the system will tend toward some equilibrium or is inherently unstable. The next step is making assessments. This step answers the question, “Why do I believe that my model represents reality?” In general, this step might consist of backtesting the model against observed data (and in the process calibrating it to history where appropriate) or subjecting it to expert review (i.e., by evaluating whether various outputs are consistent with test inputs). In this stage, experts might test selected hypotheses in the manner previously described in order to spot-check the model. After making assessments, the analyst uses the model to generate the requisite results. For some purposes (e.g., a military operation), the model might be used to reverse-engineer optimum input parameters. For example, depending on the risk of an amphibious assault on Taiwan by the People’s Republic of China, it might identify the ideal location of the U.S. Seventh Fleet and describe the sensitivity of the outcome if the fleet is out of place. Similarly, it might be used to identify optimum decisions (e.g., move the Seventh Fleet) based on the decision maker’s utility function.
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The final step is to communicate the assessment. The results of a model—irrespective of its quality—must be effectively communicated to the decision maker to elicit the optimum decision. The analyst should endeavor to achieve full transparency when informing the consumer of the assessment. He should explicitly detail any uncertainty about input quality and model error so that less mathematical consumers of the results do not confuse mathematical precision with accuracy. The great utility of a conceptual model—particularly for a complex problem—is that the information and relationships with which the analyst informs it can produce surprising results, ones that might not have been anticipated using a less structured process. This is akin to the emergent behavior described in Chapter 5 in a complex, self-organizing system. Similarly, a properly structured model may identify out-of-the-box solutions. Thus, the process of creating a conceptual model reduces model error by attempting to ensure that all plausible outcomes—and only plausible outcomes—are generated by avoiding logical fallacies and cognitive biases. CASE STUDY: AN INTEGRATED CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF DUBAI Figure 7-3 illustrates one version of a conceptual model inspired by the market-shaking events triggered by Dubai World in November 2009. Although it is only a toy model created for illustrative purposes and is very much oversimplified, it touches on the interdependency between the Dubai real estate activities, regional politics, and systemic risk in the global economy and markets. The events are as follows. On November 25, 2009, Dubai World (a holding company owned by the government of Dubai8) issued $5 billion of new debt for the benefit of the Dubai Financial Support Fund, intended to shore up its real estate and financial industries. The principal buyers were two Abu Dhabi government-controlled banks. However, shortly after the announcement of the sale, Dubai World and its property development unit Nakheel PJSC (the developer of palmtree-shaped islands off the coast of Dubai) asked their creditors for a “standstill agreement” in which the maturities of debt that was imminently due would be extended until at least May 30, 2010. At the same time, Dubai’s Supreme Fiscal Committee hired Deloitte LLP to assist it with restructuring Dubai World and its $59 billion in liabilities. Previous to those events, there had been continuing concern by global investors about Dubai’s creditworthiness. Housing prices had
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Level of New Construction in Dubai
Price of Real Estate Assets in Dubai
State of Global
Willingness of Foreign Banks to Make Loans
Economy
Relations with Abu Dhabi and Other Emirates
Regional Economic Instability
Dubai Creditworthiness Uncontrollable Input Willingness of Abu Dhabi to Prevent Default
Controllable Input Intermediate Step Model Output Direct Relationship Inverse Relationship Input Value (Direction)
Figure 7-3 Dubai World Conceptual Model: Regional Economic Instability
declined about 50 percent from their 2008 highs. As shown in Figure 7-4, credit default swaps (CDS) on Dubai’s sovereign debt had traded as high as 977 basis points (bp) on February 17, 2009. At that time, Emir Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, the ruler of Dubai (and also the prime minister and vice president of the United Arab Emirates), turned to the country’s richer neighbor, Abu Dhabi (just 90 miles away), for a $10 billion bailout. Abu Dhabi’s central bank complied, purchasing the entire 4 percent five-year note offering on February 23, 2009. On that day, Dubai’s CDS spread dropped to 720 bp, off 178 bp from the previous day and 257 bp from its high just four trading days before.9 The markets widely considered Nakheel’s ability to pay on a $3.52 billion Islamic bond maturing on December 14 to be a litmus test of Dubai’s ability to pay, so the timing of Dubai’s standstill announcement was a shock. It was probably not an accident, either. Although all eyes were on December 14, the announcement instead occurred just before the U.S.
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Figure 7-4 Global Credit Default Swap History: Two Years Ending November 27,
2009 Source: Bloomberg, L.P.
Thanksgiving holiday on November 26 and the Islamic Eid al-Adha holiday on November 26 and 29, when markets were closed or had diminished trading activity.10 As shown in Figures 7-4 and 7-5, by end of day November 27, Dubai’s CDS were trading at 647 bp, or 329 bp higher than just three days earlier.11 Such an increase in yield implies a huge markdown in price for the $10 billion in notes just purchased in Abu Dhabi. The Dubai event rattled world markets as well; the cost of protecting both emerging-market and G-10 debt against default increased, and stock markets everywhere fell when trading resumed. The U.S. dollar strengthened against all but one of its 16 most-traded counterparts (Japan) in an oldstyle “flight to quality.” After touching an all-time high, gold dropped about $60 per ounce and oil dropped nearly $6 per barrel on November 27, although both recovered most of their losses later in the day. Although countries and companies with direct links to Dubai were the most affected, even those without such links were damaged as perceptions of systemic risk increased. Vietnam’s dong, the world’s worstperforming currency, fell 3.3 percent against the dollar. Even South
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Dubai
Abu Dhabi
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
Japan
United States
F T W T M
11/27 11/26 11/25 11/24 11/23
647 541 440 318 313
176 160 136 100 100
120 114 104 94 94
111 108 90 75 75
80 72 71 72 71
34 33 32 32 32
F T
11/20 11/19
313 304
100 100
93 94
74 78
71 68
32 32
305 304 304
100 100 100
94 99 90
76 75 74
66 65 66
31 30 31
W 11/18 T 11/17 M 11/18
Figure 7-5 Daily Closing CDS Spreads for Select Sovereign Debt Source: Bloomberg, L.P.
Africa’s rand fell 1.1 percent as a result of the secondhand influence of the fall in the price of gold. The astute reader may wonder why the change in spread was not instantaneous; markets are usually far quicker in reacting to bad news. As shown in Figure 7-5, the CDS spread had moved only 122 bp by the end of the day on November 25 (the day of the announcement). In fact, concurrent news stories reported muted reactions; a Bloomberg news story reported that Dubai CDS were trading at 319.5 bp after the announcement, or just 6.5 bp higher than the previous day.12 This delayed reaction may have been due in large part to Abu Dhabi’s complicated relationship with Dubai. Investors have long considered this much wealthier emirate to be a de facto guarantor of Dubai’s debt, although there is no such formal relationship in place. But Abu Dhabi was hurt as well. Its CDS swap rate surged from 100 bp to 176 bp over the same four-day period. But as time passed, analysts and investors became less certain of Abu Dhabi’s response, particularly in light of the less-than-stellar manner in which Abu Dhabi had been treated. On November 25, Rami Sidani, a portfolio manager at Schroeders Investment Management Ltd. in Dubai, said, “Abu Dhabi will help Dubai because Abu Dhabi simply cannot afford the repercussions of Dubai going under.”13 On November 27, Bank of America analysts Benoit Ann and Daniel Tenengauzer wrote, “Dubai’s debt woes may worsen to become a ‘major sovereign default’ that roils developing nations and cuts off capital flows to emerging markets. . . . One cannot rule out—as a tail risk—a case where this would escalate into a major sovereign default problem, which
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would then resonate across global emerging markets in the same way that Argentina did in the early 2000s or Russia in the late 1990s.”14 By November 28, Reuters was reporting that “Abu Dhabi, Dubai’s oil rich neighbor, will ‘pick and choose’ which of Dubai’s assets to underwrite, Reuters reported, citing an unidentified Abu Dhabi official. Abu Dhabi won’t fund all of Dubai’s debt, the official said.”15 Markets—which are notoriously poor at dealing with uncertainty—reacted in a manner consistent with such increasing perceptions of risk. Irrespective of the short- or long-term consequences of the Dubai World event, the observed market reactions and the expert commentary and analysis provide a foundation for the construction of a conceptual model for regional instability in the Mideast. In the conceptual model of Figure 7-3, the modeler transformed a qualitative analysis into this conceptual model. The objective of the model is to measure the level of instability in the Mideast as a function of a number of key variables (both economic and political), such as “Level of New Construction in Dubai” and “Relations with Abu Dhabi and Other Emirates.” This model does not attach a likelihood or other metric to each driver, but it does describe the direction of the sensitivity (i.e., direct or inverse relationship) to each variable. Note that the modeler found it convenient to create a number of intermediate variables, such as Dubai Creditworthiness. Note too that the model includes feedback loops, for example, one in which Abu Dhabi’s political will affects Dubai’s creditworthiness. In addition, note that some variables (e.g., Dubai Creditworthiness and State of Global Economy) can be directly observed and therefore might be used to infer values for some of the other unobservable variables. SOURCES OF MODEL RISK IN FINANCIAL MODELING The financial community is rich in models that represent reality, although the source of model risk is somewhat different from what it is in other disciplines. Just as in any other discipline, errors in financial models result when a securities valuation or risk measurement model is incorrectly specified or erroneously applied. Consumers of risk forecasts, whether they are C-suite executives or regulators, are sometimes unaware of the magnitude of the model risk inherent in the results that inform their most important decisions, ranging from the allocation of risk capital to standards for capital adequacy.
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Because such models are used almost exclusively for forecasting outcomes rather than for explaining observed events, they are particularly dependent on a number of assumptions that cannot be validated with facts. Because such forecasts are usually the results of stochastic models rather than causal models, the implicit or explicit assumptions on which they depend can be subtle. The advanced mathematics on which most models depend may leave consumers with a false sense of security about a model’s validity. Risk forecasts already indicate substantial uncertainty about outcomes (even if parameters such as mean and variance are known with certainty); they are generally expressed in terms of a metric, such as VaR, that is a function of the distribution of possible outcomes (i.e., a continuous representation of possible future states). Therefore, it may not be immediately apparent to the consumer that all sources of uncertainty are not included. Just like decision makers in the intelligence space, financial decision makers need to be aware of the important assumptions that are made by the modeler and upon which the results depend. Such disclosure is especially necessary when more complex mathematics is involved because of the lack of transparency that a black-box model engenders. One example of an erroneously applied model may be the exclusive use of stochastic models to represent reality in the global capital markets. The most fundamental assumption implicit in the use of any stochastic model (financial or econometric) is that past behavior is representative of future behavior, that is, that the system represented by the model is reasonably stable. But changing fundamentals such as public and regulatory policy, credit availability, geopolitical considerations, and even behavioral preferences may precipitate a shift to a new risk regime. In such an event, backward-looking models are likely to over- or underestimate risk. Even if the system is assumed to be stable, another fundamental assumption implicit in many financial models is that price patterns reveal everything, that is, that risk can be modeled using only time series of asset prices and economic indicators. However, the price of a security reflects the net effect of myriad drivers and events. Thus, the assumption that energy prices are stable may implicitly imply that events such as pipeline disruptions are randomly distributed and that their frequency and magnitude are stable as well, even if known facts and common sense indicate otherwise. Erroneously applied models are a major source of model risk in the financial space, but so too are incorrectly specified models. Protocols for generating the parameters that inform such models vary greatly from firm to firm, and no two will generate identical measures of risk for a specific
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portfolio. For example, most risk analysts use a standard term (e.g., the most recent three years) to estimate risk parameters such as standard deviation.16 However, when there is a change in risk regime, such as the one that occurred in late 2008, such protocols may be unjustifiable, and no amount of statistical tweaking is likely to enable them to provide an adequate forecast of risk. Critical Thinking and Financial Modeling Fortunately, the same standards of analytic tradecraft that mitigate model risk in the intelligence community can be applied in the financial community. If we apply critical thinking to every assumption that must be true if we are to rely on a risk measurement model, we can (1) select a model that best represents reality, (2) inform it with the best possible data and knowledge, whether in the form of statistical parameters or expert opinion, (3) be aware of the degree of confidence we can justifiably have in that model, and (4) have some insights into the conditions under which the model might fail. To do so, financial engineers must guard themselves against the same cognitive biases to which intelligence analysts are vulnerable. As noted in Chapter 2, behavioral economists have particularly noted innumeracy, confirmation bias