Facing the Future
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FACING THE FUTURE Agents and Choices in Our Indeterminist Worl...
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Facing the Future
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FACING THE FUTURE Agents and Choices in Our Indeterminist World
NUEL BELNAP MICHAEL PERLOFF M I N G XU
With Contributions by Paul Bartha Mitchell Green John Horty
OXPORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS
2001
OXFORD U N I V E R S I T Y PRESS Oxford New York Athens Auckland Bangkok Bogota Buenos Aires Cape Town Chennai Dar es Salaam Delhi Florence Hong Kong Istanbul Karachi Kolkata Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Mumbai Nairobi Pans Sao Paulo Shanghai Singapore Taipei Tokyo Toronto Warsaw and associated companies in Berlin Ibadan
Copyright © 2001 by Oxford University Press, Inc. Published by Oxford University Press, Inc 198 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016 Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press All rights reserved No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of Oxford University Press Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Belnap, Nuel D , 1930Facing the future • agents and choices in our indeterminist world / Nuel Belnap, Michael Perloff, Ming Xu, with contributions by Paul Bartha, Mitchell Green, John Horty. P cm Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-19-513878-3 1 Agent (Philosophy) 2. Choice (Psychology) 3 Free will and determinism I Perloff, Michael II Xu, Ming III Title B105 A35 2001 128'4—dc21 00-064995
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper
Preface This is a book about the causal structure of agency and action. It frames a rigorous theory by using techniques and ideas from philosophical logic, philosophy of language, and metaphysics with a small "m." This theory, which we sometimes call "the theory of agents and choices in branching time," describes agents as facing a future replete with real possibilities, some of which various agents realize by making choices. It is central to our theory that choices and the actions that they ground are radically indeterministic: Before an event of choosing, there are multiple alternatives open to the agent. Furthermore, since the choice is real, so must be the alternatives, and each alternative must be as real as any other. All we can say before the moment of choice is that the agent will make one of the open choices, leaving behind the unchosen alternatives. After the choice, it is correct to say that they were once possible, but are no longer possible. None of the possible choices is a mental or linguistic figment, nor is any a mere ghost image of "the actual choice." Given that the possibilities relevant for action are always possibilities for our future, the theory also refrains from appealing to "possible worlds" other than the one and only world that we all inhabit. These ideas are in some part rooted in common sense. Without help, however, common sense cannot seem to pull them together into a coherent whole. One of our principal aims is to carry out that job by articulating them in a completely intelligible exact theory. The resultant theory of agents and choices in branching time pictures the causal structure of our world as made up of alternative courses of events branching tree-like toward the future. Each branch point represents a choice event or chance event. On the one hand, each continuation from a branch point is individually possible; on the other hand, it is impossible that more than one of these continuations should be realized. If that sounds obscure, we agree: It is, we think, almost impossible to speak clearly and accurately about indeterminism except in the framework of a rigorously fashioned theory such as the one we propose. The theory of agents and choices in branching time is of real but limited interest without its application to understanding the language of action. We propose a certain linguistic form, a "modal connective," as being unusually helpful to anyone who wishes to think deeply about agents and their actions.1 1
Our usage here is common but not universal. A connective is any grammatical construe-
vi
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The form is "a sees to it that Q," where a names an agent and Q holds the place of a sentence; for example, we think of "Ahab sailed the seven seas" as "Ahab saw to it that he sailed the seven seas." The form is so important to our enterprise—all but three of our eighteen chapters are devoted to its study or use—that we give it an abbreviation, "[a stit: Q]" with "stit" as an acronym for "sees to it that." Stit theory explains the meaning of [a stit: Q] in the idiom of philosophical logic. In doing so, stit theory invokes a certain melding of the Prior-Thomason indeterministic semantics with Kaplan's indexical semantics. The combined semantics make [a stit: Q] roughly equivalent to "a prior choice by a guaranteed that Q." The stit idea is many-sided. We explore its grammar, semantics, and proof theory as logicians do. We delight in the fact that stit does not treat actions primarily as "things" to be counted or named. We explore some of the linguistics of stit (especially how and why its status as a modal connective lends itself to usefully complicated constructions), we consider some applications to difficult conceptual problems, and we argue the ability of stit to illuminate agency in a variety of ways. We look at some ways in which stit might be modified or generalized. In all of this, however, we try never to forget the central constraining thought: There is neither action nor agency nor doings without real choices, choices that find their place not merely in the agent's mind, but within the (indeterminist) causal order of our world. To see to it that Q, an agent must make a real choice among objectively incompatible future alternatives. When we say that an event may have many possible but incompatible outcomes, we thereby come down on the side of "hard" indeterminism as against determinism. There is no consensus on these ideas. Since the eighteenth century became understandably awed by the success of Newtonian science, the presumption of determinism has guided most of the philosophical and scientific explorations of both agency and nature. Taking determinism to be delivered by science as an unquestioned "fact," philosophers since Hume and Kant have worked at developing "compatibilist" theories that hold agency, in the guise of moral responsibility, to be compatible with what James called the block universe. Such theories have often taken possibilities as unreal: as arising from the mind, or from social practices, or from language—for example from consistency with the bits of language called "scientific laws." Our contrasting indeterministic presumption is eloquently expressed by the eminent paleontologist Stephen Jay Gould. I don't think that any deeper or more important principle pervades nature, and lies at the heart of all historical sequences, than this central but underappreciated notion of "contingency"—the great and tion that maps one sentence (or several sentences) into another sentence. For example, when you put sentences (i) "Ahab is captain" and (ii) "Ishmael is not captain" into the blanks of " and ," the result is another sentence, (iii) "Ahab is captain and Ishmael is not captain." That makes the "and" construction a connective. A truth functional connective is one like " and ": If for example you know whether each of (i) and (ii) is true, then you automatically know whether (iii) is true. A modal connective is defined negatively as being one that is not truth functional.
Preface
vii
liberating truth that tiny inputs, virtually invisible and risibly impotent in appearance at the outset, can cause history to cascade down any route in a vast array of entirely different pathways. (Gould 1999, p. 30) This book neither argues for indeterminism nor tries to pick holes in arguments for compatibilism. Our project assumes the indeterminism of the causal order in which agency is embedded, it assumes that actions are based on real choices, and it assumes that choices are therefore not predetermined. Our goal is not to persuade, but to make these ideas intelligible. Although numerous philosophers share our general point of view, not many exact theories share these assumptions and aims. Our strategy is to concentrate almost exclusively on the objectively causal side of indeterminism and agency, which already presents enough difficulties without bringing in noncausal concepts. We therefore lay aside many deeply important aspects of agency and choice that involve intentions, propositional attitudes, or other mental phenomena. We look for ways in which applications of stit theory can engender a better understanding of agency. Seven examples: (i) an analysis of refraining that clarifies how it can be both a doing and a not-doing; (ii) an analysis of imperatives that emphasizes their agentive content; (iii) an extended treatment of deontic logic that insists that obligations and permissions (a) are directed to agents capable of making choices, and (b) are embedded in the indeterministic causal order of our world; (iv) fresh analyses of promising and of assertion, analyses that argue the unwisdom of the doctrine that among all the objective possibilities, a unique course of events constitutes the one and only "actual future"; (v) an exploration of the causal side of the requirement on action that the agent "could have done otherwise"; (vi) the causal structure of joint agency; and (vii) a generalization of stit theory to strategies considered from a causal point of view. In sum: Holding the extra-mental and extra-linguistic status of incompatible possibilities as given, and supposing that the future sometimes depends upon an agent's choices among incompatible options, we offer a tense-modal theory intended to describe some causal aspects of agency in our indeterministic world. Guidance on reading this book. In the spirit of Carnap, each chapter begins with some introductory remarks in order to permit easy skipping of topics not of present interest to the reader. We append the following largescale structural notes as additional guidance. The book divides into six parts of varying degrees of technicality, followed by an appendix. Each of these may be characterized as follows. Part I introduces stit theory. We intend the chapters in this part to be accessible to all those with an interest in our topic. Portions of chapter 2 and chapter 5 do, however, involve willingness to put up with some elementary logical constructions, and chapter 2 offers a brief explanation of the theory of agents and choices in branching time that underlies stit theory. In this part we introduce key grammatical and semantic features of stit, including the distinction
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of the deliberative stit from the achievement stit. Largely concentrating on the achievement stit, the various chapters of part I suggest applications with the help of many pictures, make comparisons with some other work on agency, and, beginning with Anselm's work in 1100, give a little history of the modal logic of agency. This part also contains applications of stit theory to imperatives and to promising. Part II supplies precisely and in detail the nuts and bolts—or, more aptly, roots and branches—of the theoretical structure that supports our account of agents, actions, and our indeterminist world. The three chapters of this part are foundational in character, and involve substantially more rigor, though not much more mathematics. They stress conceptual analysis rather than theoremproving. This part more than any other focuses on the problems faced by any indeterministic theory. Here we argue against the beguiling but harmful doctrine of "the actual future," which says that among the many courses of events that might come to pass, there now exists a privileged such course that will actually do so. This foundational part examines, postulate by postulate, the theory of agents and choices in branching time, and explains in detail the semantic subtleties required of a language spoken in an indeterminist world. Part III offers two applications of the achievement stit: One chapter aims to illuminate the dark idea of "could have done otherwise," and another considers the causal aspects of joint agency. These chapters are a little more technical. Part IV is of the same level of technicality as part III: It offers applications of the deliberative stit, chiefly to help in elaborating such deontic concepts as obligation and permission, which, we believe, are in much need of a theory of agency. Part V uses the already-established theoretical structure of agents and choices in branching time in order to develop an austere (causal, not normative) account of strategies as a kind of generalization of stit. One chapter in this part connects our theory of strategies to Thomason's deontic kinematics. Part V proves a theorem or two, though much of it is, again, conceptual analysis. Part VI provides the technical backbone of stit theory, including proofs of decidability, soundness, and completeness. The chapters of this part are required reading for those who wish to investigate or develop the logical and mathematical properties of theories of agency similar to ours. The appendix gathers, for easy reference, most of the various theses, structures, postulates, definitions, semantic ideas, and systems that are introduced elsewhere and are employed throughout the book. We use boldface to refer to certain of these items: Look in the appendix for its sections §l-§9, for stit theses Thesis 1-Thesis 6, for postulates Post. 1-Post. 10, for definitions Def. 1-Def. 20, and for axiomatic concepts Ax. Conc. 1-Ax. Conc. 3. Although in each section of this book we feel free to refer to any other section, it may be useful to indicate the following dependency-structure among the various parts. Parts I (introduction to stit), II (foundations of indeterminism), and VI (proofs and models) are almost entirely independent. The reader's primary interests may therefore be allowed to determine with which of parts I, II, or VI it is best to begin. Part III (applications of the achievement stit) and part IV
Preface
ix
(applications of the deliberative stit) are mutually independent, whereas each presupposes familiarity with part I. Part V (strategies) requires chapter 2 of part I as minimum background.
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Acknowledgments Our contributors deserve special thanks for giving us permission to use their materials: P. Bartha for contributing chapter 11 and for co-authoring chapter 12; M. Green for co-authoring chapter 6; and J. Horty for co-authoring §2A of chapter 2, which has its source in Horty and Belnap 1995. This essay is also used in a substantially different way in Horty 2001, a book elaborating the normative aspect of choice. Horty 2001 should be consulted by every reader of this book. We add that each contributor has also helped in other ways too numerous to count. Many other people have helped in the research reported in this book. We apologize for the simple alphabetical listings that we offer as sincere but inadequate thanks. The following assisted with the development of ideas and with the preparation of the manuscript during their respective terms as Alan Ross Anderson fellows: M. Allen, D. Bruckner, C. Campbell (who caught many dozens of errors and infelicities during a final proof-reading), K. Davey, U. Ergun (who created many of the figures), C. Hitchcock, C. Jones, J. MacFarlane (who produced the initial draft of the index), J. Roberts, L. Shapiro, A. Staub, V. Venkatachalam (who was responsible for the initial draft of the bibliography), and M. Weiner. In addition, a number of others have helped over the years, especially by commenting on or offering us fresh information in connection with the separate articles on which this book is based: G. Antonelli, L. Aqvist, C. Bicchieri, R. Brandom, M. Brown, D. Davidson, D. Elgesem, R. Gale, A. Gupta, D. Henry, I. Humberstone, D. Kaplan, M. Lange, W. Lycan, D. Makinson, J. Moore, R. Neta, I. Porn, K. Schlechta, K. Segerberg, S. Sterrett, J. Thomson, D. Turner, D. Vanderveken, F. von Kutschera, D. Walton, H. Wansing, and anonymous referees for several journals. Finally, we thank two anonymous OUP referees for encouraging us to turn a heap of articles into a book.
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Contents I
Introduction to stit 1 Stit: A canonical form for agentives 1A Agentives 1B Stit: Simple cases 1C Grammar of the modal logic of agency 1D Mini-history of the modal logic of agency 1E Conclusion and summary
. . . . .
3 5 9 14 18 26
2 Stit: Introductory theory, semantics, and applications 2A Theory and semantics: The two stits 2B Applications of stit, with many pictures
. .
28 29 39
3 Small yet important differences from earlier proposals 3A Von Wright 3B Chisholm 3C Kenny 3D Castaneda 3E Davidson 3F Conclusion
. . . . . .
59 60 65 68 74 78 81
4 Stit and the imperative 4A The theory of fiats 4B Ross's paradox and stit 4C Chellas's theory 4D Agentive constructions 4E Negations of imperatives 4F The many varieties of imperatives 4G Embedding imperatives 4H Conclusion
. . . . . . . .
5 Promising: Stits, claims, and strategies 5A From stit to promising 5B From RR to promising 5C Strategic content of promises and word-givings
97 . 98 . 107 . 116
82
82 84 85 87 89 92 94 96
xiv
II
Contents
Foundations of indeterminism
6 Indeterminism and the Thin Red Line 6A Preliminary considerations 6B Parameters of truth 6C The assertion problem 6D The Thin Red Line 6E Time's winged chariot hurries near
. . . . . . , .
133 134 141 156 160 170
7 Agents and choices in branching time with instants 7A Theory of branching time 7B Theoretical reflections on indeterminism 7C Theory of agents and choices 7D Domain
. . . .
. . . .
177 177 203 210 219
8 Indexical semantics under indeterminism 8A Sources 8B Structure parameters: The "world" of the speakers 8C Interpretation and model: The "language" of the speakers . 8D Points of evaluation, and policies 8E Generic semantic ideas 8F Semantics for stit-free locutions 8G Clauses for stit functors
, . . . . . .
220 . 221 . 226 . 227 . 228 . 234 . 239 . 247
9 Could have done otherwise 9A Could have been and might have been 9B Could have done and might have done 9C Might have been otherwise 9D Might not have done it 9E Could not have avoided doing 9F Could have prevented 9G Could have refrained 9H Might have refrained 9I Had available a strategy for not doing 9J Summary
. . . . . . . . . .
255 . 257 . 257 . 259 . 260 . 261 . 262 . 263 . 265 . 268 . 269
10 Multiple and joint agency 10A Preliminary facts 10B Other-agent nested stits 10C Joint agency: Plain and strict 10D Other-agent nested joint stits
. . . .
271 . 272 . 273 . 281 . 290
III
Applications of the achievement stit
Contents
IV
xv
Applications of the deliberative stit
11 Conditional obligation, deontic paradoxes, and stit 11A Technical preliminaries 11B Semantics of obligation 11C Completeness 11D Conditional obligation 11E Oc-statements versus cO-statements 11F The Good Samaritan 11G Contrary-to-duty obligations 11H Problems with the proposed semantics of obligation . . . .
295
12 Marcus and the problem of nested deontic modalities 12A The parking problem 12B The form of obligations 12C The Anderson/dstit simplification 12D The form of prohibitions 12E Generalized prohibitions 12F Generalization on agents 12G Temporal generalization 12H The outer ought
318 318 319 321 322 325 333 335 335
V
296 298 303 304 306 309 312 314
Strategies
13 An austere theory of strategies 13A Nature of austere strategics 13B Review of choices in branching histories 13C Elementary theory of strategies 13D Favoring 13E Application to finding a strategy for inaction
. . . . .
14 Deontic kinematics and austere strategics 14A Basic concepts 14B From Thomason's deontic kinematics to austere strategics 14C From austere strategics to Thomason's deontic kinematics 14D Remarks
. . . .
VI
341 342 344 345 356 359 364
365 368 370 376
Proofs and models
15 Decidability of one-agent achievement-stit theory with refref 15A Preliminaries 15B Companions 15C Soundness: Validity of refref equivalence 15D Companion sets
381
. . . .
382 385 390 392
xvi
Contents 15E Alternatives and counters 15F Semi-ref-counters 15G Completeness and finite model property
. . 397
. . 401 . . 408
16 On the basic one-agent achievement-stit theory 16A Preliminaries 16B Soundness 16C Companion sets and their alternatives 16D Construction of preliminary structures 16E Completeness
. . . . .
415 . 415 . 417 . 419 . 424 . 428
17 Decidability of many-agent deliberative-stit theories 17A Preliminaries 17B Soundness 17C Completeness and compactness 17D Finite model property
. . . .
. . . .
18 Doing and refraining from refraining 18A Preliminaries 18B Main results
451 . . 452 . . 454
Appendix: Lists for reference 1 Stit theses: Thesis 1-Thesis 6 2 Structures 3 BT + I + AC postulates: Post. 1-Post. 10 4 Branching-time-with-instants definitions: Def. 1-Def. 9 . . 5 Agent-choice definitions: Def. 10-Def. 14 6 Basic semantic definitions: Def. 15-Def. 16 7 Derivative semantic definitions: Def. 17-Def. 20 8 Grammar 9 Axiomatics concepts: Ax. Conc. 1, Ax. Conc. 2, and Ax. Conc. 3
435 435 439 441 445
459
. . . . . . . .
. 459 . 460 . 461 . 463 . 466 . 468 . 469 . 471
. . 472
Bibliography
475
Index
483
Part I
Introduction to stit
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1 Stit: A canonical form for agent ives Among the topics of discussion in this world, none are more common than those concerning the achievements and refrainings, obligations and prohibitions, successes and failures of the agents with whom we share a common space.* "What happened when so-and-so did that?" we ask, or "What should have been done?" Biographies and narrative histories, which form a sizable segment of our reading materials, have as their central concern the doings of agents, their obligations and prohibitions, the outcomes of their choices, and the range of things from which they refrain. Philosophers have long sought to find a distinction between those sentences which attribute agency and those that do not in the verbal configurations we commonly use to talk about such matters. If such a distinction existed it should be a relatively simple matter to uncover some general principle in everyday speech to differentiate Joshua fit the battle of Jericho from Joshua survived the battle of Jericho. We find, to our dismay, that we are no closer now to a linguistic litmus test for agency than was Aristotle. After all, it would have been of some importance for Aristotle's peers to decide between an agentive interpretation of Alexander succeeded to the throne of Macedonia and a non-agentive interpretation. For if Alexander was agentive in the matter of his becoming king, then there was a prior choice of his which led directly to * With the kind permission of Theoma, Belnap and Perloff 1988 is the basis of each section of this chapter except §1D. That section is drawn from Belnap 1991, for the use of which we thank the International Phenomenological Society.
3
4
Introduction to stit
that outcome, and he was likely guilty of regicide; while if he was not agentive in the matter of becoming king, then there was no choice of his that guaranteed his succession to the throne. J. L. Austin said that "The beginning of sense, not to say wisdom, is to realize that 'doing an action', as used in philosophy, is a highly abstract expression—it is a stand-in used in the place of any (or almost any) verb with a personal subject ..." (Austin 1961, p. 126). In his essay he tried to throw light on the question of "doing an action" by looking at the range of cases in which excuses are offered both in everyday usage and in the law, and to arrive at a proper vocabulary for action by "induction" on the proper uses of words. Many years have passed, the lesson has been learned, and it is time for philosophy to go beyond the mere beginnings of sense and progress toward a deeper understanding of an agent doing an action. How then should we proceed? The Austin legacy is of course a particularly rich one that is being carried on in a variety of ways. One way attempts to explain certain facts about language in terms of propositional content and illocutionary forces: "speech act theory" as represented for example by Searle and Vanderveken. That is not our program, as we make clear in many places hereafter, suggesting that a theory of "speech acts" should begin with a prior theory of acts. Accordingly we follow in the wake of Austin's suggestion that when faced with the question of the meaning of a word or a term such as "doing an action," we should "reply by explaining its syntactics and demonstrating its semantics" (Austin 1961, p. 28). A suggestion of this book is that the next step in the progression toward greater sense and wisdom is to have available the sort of clean and well-honed linguistic resource that Austin, and other philosophers, have realized to be necessary. We think that the most promising path to a deeper understanding of an agent making a choice among alternatives that lead to action is to augment our philosophical language with a class of sentences whose fundamental syntactic and semantic structures are so well designed and easily understood that they illuminate not only their own operations but the nature and structure of the linguistic settings in which they function. An example of a doing-an-action sentence that Austin might have had in mind is Ahab sailed in search of Moby Dick.
(1)
It has a personal subject, "Ahab," and an action-like verb, "sailed," and seems to be describing an action in Austin's deliberately wide sense. We take (1) not only to be true, but to be agentive for Ahab, for Ahab's sailing in search of Moby Dick was a direct result of a choice he made among alternatives available to him. On the other hand, although the perfectly ordinary sentence, The Pequod sailed in search of Moby Dick
(2)
is surely true, and though we may be hard pressed to say exactly why, we are not hard pressed to say that it is not agentive: It does not even have a personal subject. Consider now
1. Stit: A canonical form for agentives Ishmael sailed in search of Moby Dick.
5 (3)
Ishmael signed on as a member of the ship's company in total ignorance of Ahab's vengeful purpose; are we then to say that (3) is agentive for Ishmael, but false, on the consideration that both "Ahab" and "Ishmael" are appropriately "personal" subjects? Or is (3) true on analogy with the example about the Pequod? English is not to be trusted in these waters. Since English fails to serve us as an adequate pilot, what we want is a resource sensitive to the difference between those cases using an action-like verb in which agency is ascribed, and those cases in which there is merely the appearance of agency. With decent Austinian respect and regard for the structure of the language, we propose, insofar as is possible, to locate such a resource within English itself, a resource that will also allow us to become clearer about the relation between agentive sentences in their declarative uses and agentives in their imperative uses; for surely Mr. Starbuck, hand me yon top-maul, and
(4)
Mr. Starbuck handed Ahab the top-maul
(5)
are, in context, more than accidentally related. In fact, except for contextdetermined indexicals, they are the same agentive sentence in two different appearances: (4) is an imperative issued to Mr. Starbuck by Ahab, while (5) is an agentive declarative whose truth or falsity is intimately connected to the satisfaction or failure of satisfaction of the imperative.
1A
Agentives
Let us accordingly begin with the following convention: The agentive form that we are about to introduce shall be set off with square brackets [ ... ]. It shall have two open places as indicated, the first to take an agent term, the second to take a declarative sentence (the declarative complement of the new form). The point about the second open place is nontrivial: Having noted that declarative sentences can either ascribe agency or not, we specifically include as possible declarative complements for the second open place both those sentences that do ascribe agency and those that do not ascribe agency. The resulting squarebracket sentence is to say that the proposition expressed by the declarative complement is guaranteed true by a prior choice of the agent. So [the carpenter ... Ahab has a new snow white ivory leg] is to be agentive for the carpenter, and is to say that he is the agent in the matter of Ahab's having a new snow white ivory leg. With what verb or verb phrase shall we replace the ellipsis in that sentential form (it was after all only elliptical)?1 Among the candidate English verb phrases that history suggests are the following: 1
Numerous other philosophers have considered this or similar questions, including at least Anderson, Aqvist, Bennett, Chellas, Chisholm, Danto, Davidson, Fitch, Hamblin, Hilpinen,
6
Introduction to stit i. brings it about that ii. makes it the case that Hi. causes it to be the case that iv. is responsible for the fact that v. lets it be the case that vi. allows it to be the case that vii. takes steps in order that
viii. behaves so that in consequence ix. sees to it that As you can see, these are all grammatically acceptable; but items (i)-(iii) suggest that causal processes are either at work or hovering in the background, whereas we wish to de-emphasize this suggestion. Items (iv)-(vi) give the impression of moral judgment and ethical responsibility, and whereas those are important ideas (none more so), it is inappropriate to build them into the foundation of this enterprise. Items (vii) and (viii) are closer to the mark in their straightforward association of an agent and something made true by the agent, but even these candidates might suggest to some ears that we want you to concentrate on a second, prior action performed by an agent. The English verb form (ix), sees to it that, has, to our ears at least, fewer of the obvious defects of the others, and sees to it that has the definite advantage of suggesting alternatives and choices. So our preferred sentence form is [a sees to it that Q], which for logical emphasis we abbreviate as [a stit: Q], referring to such a sentence as a stit sentence. We intend that "Q" here take up a sentential position, as is proper for a complement of "sees to it that." (Note: In early chapters we use "Q," whereas in later chapters we use "A" or "5," and so on, with exactly the same intention. The slight difference in notation derives from the diversity of the origins of the various chapters, and in order to avoid fresh mistakes, we have thought it best not to enforce uniformity in this particular regard.) It is a consequence of what has just been said that a sentence [a stit: Q] with a as its subject is always agentive for a. Let us enter this important idea as the "agentiveness of stit thesis." Hohfeld, Humberstone, the Kangers, Kenny, Lindahl, Makinson, Melden, Needham, Porn, Talja, Thalberg, and von Wright. Bibliographic access to the literature with which we are familiar can be gained through Thalberg 1972, Aqvist 1984, Bennett 1988, Makinson 1986, and the bibliography of this book. Although we do not undertake to discuss all of these contributions, we do discuss some of them, especially in §1D and chapter 3. Above all, we should be remiss if we failed to note that NB and MP were each introduced to this family of ideas by our teacher, Alan Ross Anderson—see Anderson 1962 and Anderson 1970.
7
1. Stit: A canonical form for agentives AGENTIVENESS OF STIT THESIS. (Stit thesis. Reference: Thesis 1) Q] is always agentive for a.
[a stit:
This is the first of six "stit theses"; you can find a list in §1 of the appendix. By this thesis we intend the descriptive claim that the English sentence "a sees to it that Q," which we abbreviate as [a stit: Q], always describes a as an agent carrying out an action. The complement, Q, may be agentive for a or not. This almost equally important claim is our "stit complement thesis." STIT COMPLEMENT THESIS. (Stit thesis. Reference: Thesis 2) grammatical and meaningful for any arbitrary sentence Q.
[a stit: Q] is
The two theses together emphasize the double aspect of stit: Q in [a stit: Q] may be any sentence at all, but [a stit: Q] is always agentive for a—perhaps difficult to interpret, perhaps contradictory, perhaps merely false, but always agentive for a. So [Ishmael stit: Ishmael sailed on board the Pequod] is agentive for Ishmael and a true sentence, while [Ishmael stit: Ishmael refused to share a room at the Spouter Inn] is equally agentive for Ishmael, but false. The stit sentence [Queequeg stit: the Pequod is fitted out for its voyage], which has a non-agentive as its declarative complement, is agentive for Queequeg but false, for it is not due to Queequeg, but to Peleg, that the Pequod is fitted out for its voyage. At this point you may fairly ask how stit treats other agentive sentences, that is, sentences other than stit sentences that ascribe an action to an agent. Our answer is that if such a sentence is truly agentive, then it can appropriately be paraphrased as a stit sentence. Furthermore, if it is not truly agentive, then to attempt such a paraphrase will tend to reveal this fact. We are therefore led to advance the "stit paraphrase thesis." STIT PARAPHRASE THESIS. (Stit thesis. Reference: Thesis 3) Q is agentive for a just in case Q may usefully be paraphrased as [a stit: Q]. Therefore, up to an approximation, Q is agentive for a whenever Q [a stit: Q}. Given this thesis, we may use the equivalence Q [a stit: Q] as a helpful test. Contrariwise, the helpfulness of the test tends to support the thesis, rough as it is. In any case, we intend this strategy, clarification by paraphrase, as neither definitional nor reductive. It is rather an attempt to isolate, by way of a canonical form, a particular set of English sentences in order to study them more closely as they interact with each other and with other parts of language
8
Introduction to stit
in different linguistic environments, just as a biologist might tag a particular organism to follow its activities as it interacts with members of its own species and with other species in various physical environments. Analogically, most of us are comfortable in saying that an English sentence is conditional if it can be paraphrased into the canonical form "if Q1 then Q2," and then revealing that the sentence The Prophet will tell Queequeg and Ishmael about Ahab provided they stop a minute is in fact conditional by paraphrasing it as If Queequeg and Ishmael stop a minute then the Prophet will tell them about Ahab. EXAMPLE. The sentence (1) is agentive since it can be paraphrased by prefixing an "Ahab saw to it that": [Ahab stit: (1)].
(6)
By Thesis 3, then, since (1) "Ahab sailed in search of Moby Dick" is correctly paraphrased as (6) [Ahab stit: Ahab sailed in search of Moby Dick], both the original and its longer transform are not only true but agentive for Ahab. EXAMPLE. It seems a travesty to paraphrase the sentence about the Pequod, (2), by [Pequod stit: (2)]. Indeed, on their ordinary readings, (2) seems true, while its attempted stit paraphrase seems false. Furthermore, it appears to us that this difference helps us see the non-agentiveness of (2)—helps us to see, that is, that (2) does not ascribe an action to an agent and is therefore non-agentive. EXAMPLE. It strikes us that (3) has two quite ordinary readings, an agentive reading in analogy with the Ahab example, (1), and a non-agentive reading in analogy with the Pequod example, (2). For many purposes the difference is irrelevant or at least of negligible importance; but if one is discussing serious matters of, for example, ethical responsibility, then the difference counts. It matters in such cases whether or not (3), as employed in a particular discussion, can be paraphrased by [Ishmael stit: (3)]. If the non-agentive reading of (3) seems forced, take others. Ishmael sailed over the seas
(7)
is presumably agentive, while Ishmael sailed over the side of the Pequod,
(8)
in its most natural use, would not be agentive. Our agreement on these verdicts tracks our agreement on the effort to paraphrase with stit: It seems right to claim that (7) [Ishmael stit: (7)], and it seems wrong to claim that (8) [Ishmael stit: (8)]. Observe also that there are certainly circumstances under which one would take
1. Stit: A canonical form for agentives [Ishmael stit: (8)]
9 (9)
as true (perhaps he deliberately saw to it that he went flying over the side). Nevertheless, this possibility should not be confused with passing the stit paraphrase test for agentiveness. The truth of the stit sentence (9) does not imply that its complement, (8), is agentive, nor that the stit sentence is equivalent to its complement. Only when (8) is taken as meaning the same as (9) is it plausible to take (8) as ascribing agency to Ishmael.
1B
Stit: Simple cases
We now use the strategy of clarification by paraphrase to demonstrate how stit sentences can help us better to know our way around in some areas in which agency counts. Consider for example Ahab found the White Whale.
(10)
Certainly it is true, but is it agentive? In order to answer we have to address ourselves specifically to the question: Did Ahab see to it that Ahab found the White Whale? As we have seen already, Ahab was agentive in his search for Moby Dick, but was he agentive in finding it? We think not. Although Ahab was a participant in guiding the Pequod to the ultimate outcome, and the major participant, his actually finding the White Whale was due in large part to chance, to natural forces beyond his control. "Time and tide flow wide," remarks Mr. Starbuck. "The hated fish has the round watery world to swim in." Thus, though (10) is true, it is false when paraphrased as [Ahab stit: Ahab found the White Whale]. Therefore, insofar as (10) is true, it is non-agentive; and insofar as it is agentive, it is not true. Consider the following pair: Queequeg struck home with his harpoon.
(11)
Queequeg's harpoon struck home.
(12)
Some careful speakers of English might always use (11) as an agentive and (12) as a non-agentive, whereas most of us are liable to use them interchangeably, sometimes in one way and sometimes the other. But [Queequeg stit: Queequeg struck home with his harpoon]
(13)
[Queequeg stit: Queequeg's harpoon struck home]
(14)
and
come to much the same thing. Such differences between (11) and (12) as there are disappear when they are embedded into stit contexts; the stit sentences (13) and (14), regardless of the uncertainties of their complements, are transparent with respect to agency.
10
Introduction to stit
1B.1
Imperatives
"Clear away the boats! Luff!" cried Ahab. Treatment of such imperatives is by no means tangential to our concerns. We endorse the view that C. H. Hamblin expresses in his masterful study: Imperatives are not only among the most frequent of utterances; they are also, surely, among the most important. If the human race had to choose between being barred from uttering imperatives and being barred from uttering anything else, there is no doubt which it should prefer. (Hamblin 1987, p. 2) Hamblin additionally reports that a full twenty percent of Shakespeare is in the imperative mood. (We happily acknowledge that a study of Hamblin's book set us under way and helped us avoid some threatening reefs.) Imperatives, in our usage, constitute a grammatical category. Following an established tradition, however, we think of each use of an imperative as having a force and a content. With regard to force, Ahab's imperatives may have been orders or commands, which many think the only possibilities; but Ahab might instead have been inviting, requesting, suggesting, advising, ... the helmsman to luff. Putting force to one side, however, we are after the content, about which stit theory has a definite and (as it happens) helpful opinion that we sum up in the "imperative content thesis." IMPERATIVE CONTENT THESIS. (Stit thesis. Reference: Thesis 4) Regardless of its force on an occasion of use, the content of every imperative is agentive. For example, Luff! can have its content represented as The helmsman luffs, which in turn, since it is agentive, can be paraphrased as The helmsman sees to it that he luffs. Thus, Luff! can be paraphrased as Helmsman, see to it that you luff! In this case the application of our thesis is easy because The helmsman luffs, which looks to be the most plausible content for the imperative, is already agentive. Still, there is more to be learned. To luff is to see to it that the bow of the boat is heading directly into the wind. Accordingly, the content of the imperative Luff! can be put into the canonical form [Helmsman stit: the helmsman luffs]
(15)
or equivalently, [Helmsman stit: the boat is headed into the wind].
(16)
The two stit sentences are equivalent, but while the complement of the former is agentive, the complement of the latter doesn't mention the agent at all.2 Unlike Luff! the imperative 2
"Complement" versus "content" sometimes sounds confusing. The (grammatical) complement of [a stit: Q] is Q. Its (semantic) content is an agentive proposition.
1. Stit: A canonical form for agentives Be on deck at dawn!
11 (17)
does not show its content so obviously; the stit apparatus, however, increases in value as problems become more complex. Consider (17) as addressed to the helmsman. The obviously non-agentive The helmsman is on deck by dawn
(18)
cannot, by our thesis, represent its content; we need an agentive form, and fortunately there is already something at hand: the stit sentence, [The helmsman stit: the helmsman is on deck at dawn]. This, in turn, can be transformed back into the imperative Helmsman, see to it that you are on deck at dawn, which we take to be an accurate paraphrase of the original imperative (17). This is important because you might be tempted to think that (18), inasmuch as it displays an agent as its subject, is the content of the imperative (17); but there are many ways in which it might be true that the helmsman is on deck at dawn, while false that he sees to it that he is. Because the content of every imperative must be agentive, a helpful paraphrase will not merely have the name of the addressee as its subject: That name will appear as subject of a sentence of the form [a stit: Q}. We therefore have the following: Since every imperative has agentive content, and since every agentive can be paraphrased as a stit sentence, it must be that every imperative will have a stit paraphrase of the form [a stit: Q]—sometimes with Q an agentive (hence a possible content of an imperative) and sometimes not. These brief remarks do not suffice. We return twice to the topic of imperatives, once in §1C, and again in chapter 4.
1B.2
Deontic contexts
The traditional account (see, e.g., Aqvist 1984) has it that deontic statements have one of the forms
Oblg:Q,i.e. it is obligatory that Q, Frbn:Q, i.e. it is forbidden that Q, or
Perm:Q, i.e. it is Permitted that Q where Q is a declarative. 1-1 REMARK. (On notation) The standard deontic notation is Op, Fp, and Pp. We depart from the standard for good reason: We shall in the course of this book deal with many other modalities, several of which would have an equal right to single letters such as 0, F, and P. We therefore use abbreviations for deontic and other modalities that we hope are short enough for the eye to take
12
Introduction to stit
in at a glance and long enough for the mind to remember. (It helps that we do not often use these longer expressions in the course of complicated calculations in which extreme brevity is a decided advantage.) Among its many virtues, this approach allows such great latitude that it can be connected to every possible action by any agent. On the other hand, agents have in this grammar no distinguished place; if invoked at all, the agent's name is only an accidental feature of the declarative complement. It is an easy mistake to think that Oblg:Q says more than it actually does say. It does not say, for example, who, if anyone, is obliged to see to it that Q. Consider It is forbidden that cooks be on the bridge. It is tempting to read this as though it imposes a prohibition on the cook, but it doesn't, as we can see from the analogous It is forbidden that dogs be on the bridge; in either case the sentence form is not fit to tell us who is to see to it that no cooks (or dogs) are on the bridge. While a deontic language of declarativesentence complements may be satisfactory for impersonal oughts, many within the tradition have seen that agents need to be treated with more care. Perhaps foremost among those who have argued that these standard alternatives are inadequate is Castaneda, for example, in Castaneda 1974 (see additional discussion in §3D). Some deontic logicians have suggested the step of changing the grammar so that Oblg:, Perm:, and Frbn: are taken to be adjectives modifying actionnominals. The fundamental forms are then taken as Oblg:a, i.e., a is obligatory, Frbn:a, i.e., a is forbidden, or Perm:a, i.e., a is permitted, where a stands in place of a term designating an action. So Oblg:a might be instanced by Sailing is obligatory, or Frbn:a by Bringing the boat into the wind is forbidden. Since actions are always the actions of agents, this step is in the right direction, but it still fails appropriately to recognize the agent. Furthermore, there is a considerable loss in expressive power, since clearly understood declarative sentences, Q, are so much easier to come by than are clearly understood action-nominals, a. In order to regain the headway lost in the move from sentences to action-nominals, some have tried adding negative doings such as not-sailings, or disjunctive doings such as luffing-or-flensing; but even with these additions, there remain two features missing from the overhauled model: first, the flexibility that follows from permitting an arbitrary declarative within the scope of a deontic statement, and second, the grammatical means to identify and keep track of the agent. We propose a combination having the strengths of both the declarativesentence complement plan, Oblg:Q, and the action-nominal complement plan,
1. Stit: A canonical form for agentives
13
Oblg:a. We propose to focus on deontic statements that have only agentives for their complements and thus can always be paraphrased into one of the following forms. Oblg:[a stit: Q], i.e., a is obligated to see to it that Q Frbn:[a stit: Q}, i.e., a is forbidden to see to it that Q Perm:[a stit: Q}, i.e., a is permitted to see to it that Q Though Perm:[a stit: Q], for example, is not agentive (in our technical sense), we intend it as quasi-agentive in the loose sense that it involves both an agent and an agentive, and in the stricter sense that like an agentive, it has the agent itself as a recoverable part of its intension. Our proposal calls, then, for a deontic language enriched by the restriction that the complements of obligation, permission, and prohibition be limited to stit sentences, a proposal that forms part of the "restricted complement thesis." RESTRICTED COMPLEMENT THESIS. (Stit thesis. Reference: Thesis 5) A variety of constructions concerned with agents and agency—including deontic statements, imperatives, and statements of intention, among others—must take agentives as their complements. Recall that (i) stit sentences always express an action, (ii) stit sentences never lose or misplace the agent, and (TO) there are no grammatical or metaphysical or semantic restrictions on the declaratives that may be put in place of Q. With these features of stit in mind, applying Thesis 5 to deontic constructions retains, we think, the most valuable features of both the declarative-sentence complement account, Oblg:Q, and the action-nominal complement account, Oblg:a. For example, in context the burden of the prohibition of cooks (or dogs) from the bridge might be Oblg:[the Third Mate stit: no cooks (or dogs) are on the bridge]. Or we might have Frbn:[the cook stit: the boats are lowered]. Question: Does this imply Oblg:[the cook stit: ~(the boats are lowered)]? The application of stit theory to deontic concerns is a topic deserving treatment at length. We return to it explicitly in §2B.9, chapter 11, chapter 12, and chapter 14, as well as more indirectly in chapter 4 (via imperatives) and in chapter 5 (via the idea of promising).
14
1C
Introduction to stit
Grammar of the modal logic of agency
The formal grammar of stit is easy: A singular term goes in one blank, and a sentence in the other. The grammar of English agentives, especially that of imperatives, is more delicate. The first topic is embedding. We all know that declarative sentences can either occur stand-alone or be embedded in a larger context. One may encounter the following standing alone: The Prophet will tell Queequeg and Ishmael about Ahab. One may also find the selfsame declarative as the consequent of a conditional: If they will stop a minute, then the Prophet will tell Queequeg and Ishmael about Ahab. One should bear in mind that exactly the same possibilities exist for the two other "moods" of English, the interrogative and the imperative. With respect to interrogatives, one has for example the two stand-alone interrogatives Did Queequeg and Ishmael give their informed consent to sailing after the White Whale? and
Whom did the Prophet tell about Ahab? One also has these selfsame interrogatives embedded in a (declarative) "dependence" construction: Whether they gave their informed consent to sailing after the White Whale depends on whom the Prophet told about Ahab. When interrogatives are embedded, we tend to call them "indirect questions," a terminology that distracts from the chief point: The purely grammatical phenomenon of the very same interrogative sentence occurring now as stand-alone and now embedded is precisely analogous to declaratives occurring in these ways. Finally, and crucially for our purposes, the English grammar of imperative sentences exhibits precisely the same behavior. For example, start with the stand-alone imperative Mr. Starbuck, hand me yon top-maul. (Of course the "Mr. Starbuck" may be dropped when context makes clear the addressee, and "me" must be supplanted by "Ahab" when the imperative is used by some third party.) Then each of the following is a way to embed this selfsame imperative in a larger context. Mr. Flask, request Mr. Starbuck to hand me yon top-maul.
1. Stit: A canonical form for agentives
15
Ahab ordered Mr. Starbuck to hand him yon top-maul. Mr. Starbuck carried out Ahab's order to hand him yon top-maul; or at least Mr. Starbuck handed Ahab yon top-maul. Did Ahab advise Mr. Starbuck to hand him yon top-maul? Ahab demanded that Mr. Starbuck hand him yon top-maul. Ahab demanded that yon top-maul be handed to him by Mr. Starbuck. Mr. Starbuck refused to hand Ahab yon top-maul. Mr. Starbuck refused Ahab's request (order, advice) to hand him yon top-maul. Mr. Starbuck is obligated (permitted, forbidden) to hand Ahab yon topmaul. There is clearly no doubt, then, that imperatives can be either stand-alone or embedded. In English, embedding any of declaratives, interrogatives, or imperatives is a complicated matter requiring at least inversion and context-driven switching of pronouns. Our deepest comment is this: Embedded imperatives are in truth embedded imperatives. That is, they are constituent or embeddable grammatical transforms of the very same imperative sentences. In a logically perspicuous language, they would be the very same sign designs. Furthermore, agentive declarative sentences are, we think, also syntactic variants of imperatives, whether stand-alone or embedded. Both Mr. Starbuck handed Ahab yon top-maul and the clause embedded in That the top-maul was handed to Ahab by Mr. Starbuck was of no concern to Mr. Flask represent variants on exactly the same theme. The intimidating variety of syntactic structures is a good reason for thinking about stit. In all these cases the paraphrase into canonical form allows us to see that whatever the complications of natural language, we have one and the same agentive sentence, its surface grammatical form varying from context to context. We may put this as a thesis, our last: the "stit normal form thesis." STIT NORMAL FORM THESIS. (Stit thesis. Reference: Thesis 6) In investigations of those constructions that take agentives as complements, nothing but confusion is lost if the complements are taken to be all and only stit sentences. Our recommendation is that both imperatives and agentive declaratives be normal-formed as stits. What, then, of the grammar of stit itself? We think that the best thing to say is that a stit sentence itself is both a declarative and
16
Introduction to stit
an imperative.3 A stit sentence can be embedded wherever a declarative or an imperative can be embedded. We have seen the variety of English sentences that are helped by paraphrase as stits. Let us consider the other direction. Given a stit sentence, [a stit: Q], we should expect to read this piece of notation differently in English, depending on how it is used. Here are some paradigmatic examples of readings of [a stit:
Q}.
• As a stand-alone imperative: a, see to it that Q! • As a stand-alone declarative: a sees to it that Q, a is seeing to it that Q, a saw to it that Q. • As an embedded imperative: a to see to it that Q, for a to see to it that Q, that a see to it that Q, a's seeing to it that Q. • As an embedded declarative: a sees to it that Q, that a see to it that Q.4 These subtle alterations required by English grammar are really required; but they tend to obscure rather than reveal the fact that we can locate the selfsame agentive in a variety of contexts: sometimes as a stand-alone declarative, sometimes as an embedded declarative, sometimes as a stand-alone imperative, and sometimes as an embedded imperative. Our paraphrase of agentives into normal form clarifies that situation. A stit sentence, [a stit: Q], since it displays its agent and appropriate declarative complement publicly and obviously, is the appropriate picture of the underlying agentive partly because it remains recognizably the same in any and every context. A further important feature about the grammar of imperatives, aside from their embeddability, is that they display an agent. As Castaneda (1975) and others have urged, they have the deep grammatical form a to verb. In this respect an imperative is unlike a declarative in general, which may or may not express an agentive proposition and even when it does may not wear its agent on its surface, as the linguists say. But imperatives must show forth an agent, at least in the sense that to be understood, and (the point is crucial) to be used in larger contexts, the agent must be uniquely recoverable from the surface (for example, as the addressee of a stand-alone imperative). Those engaged in the descriptive grammar of English have and are entitled to different views on this matter. Perhaps the work most pertinent to our concerns is Badecker 1987. Badecker surveys some Chomsky theories, which by deriving 3 We are not sure that this use of overlapping grammatical categories is for the best. Let us emphasize again that the aim of applying stit notation is to clarify, not to analyze, and, in particular, not to provide a syntactical criterion for when a certain surface form must be considered an imperative rather than a declarative. Let us also emphasize that "force" versus "content" has no role here, since the topic is purely grammatical. 4 Note that this "see" is not indicative, but rather subjunctive, like "hand" in "Ahab demanded that Mr. Starbuck hand him yon top-maul."
1. Stit: A canonical form for agentives
17
all infinitive constructions by transformation of declaratives are deeply at variance with the spirit of the present book, though our aims are so different from his that it is hard to call the variance a conflict. In healthy contrast, the lexicalist theory that Badecker offers in his chapter 3 awards infinitive constructions independence from declaratives, and thereby more nearly shares our direction; however, there remains the question of whether in agentive infinitive constructions, such as Mr. Starbuck refused to hand Ahab yon top-maul, we should or should not take it that there is a "trace" of Mr. Starbuck heading the infinitive phrase. We certainly need Mr. Starbuck to get the semantics right, but that far from settles the syntactical question for English. In any event, Badecker supplies a helpful framework for addressing this and related questions. A consequence of the fact that a stit sentence is a declarative as well as an imperative is this: It can be embedded wherever a declarative or an imperative can be embedded. For example, with regard to the former, a stit sentence can be embedded under a negation. The result of such an embedding is on the face of it not itself a stit sentence; in the special (and, to a logician, prominent) case of negation, the result of embedding looks at least on the surface like
not like some instance of
But more deeply, for the special case of negation, the result of embedding is not always any kind of agentive; that is, by the paraphrase test for agentives suggested by Thesis 3, to which we hope you have agreed, the declarative it is false that a sees to it that Q is not invariably paraphrasable (or indeed equivalent in truth value with) a sees to it that it is false that a sees to it that Q. Thus, by Thesis 3, (19) is not itself an agentive. In more colorful language that speaks against taking a naive approach to inventing a "logic of imperatives," we may say that the negation of an imperative is not always an imperative. We later discuss the interaction of negation with stit in a number of places; see for example §2B.6 and §2B.8 on "refraining." Finally, let us recall that when concerned with the modalities of agency, it is similarly helpful to use stit sentences to keep track of the agentives. The English Starbuck could have handed the top-maul to Ahab is helpfully paraphrased as [Starbuck could-have-stit: Starbuck hands the top-maul to Ahab], while
18
Introduction to stit Starbuck is obligated to hand the top-maul to Ahab
is paraphrased as Oblg:[Starbuck stit: Starbuck hands the top-maul to Ahab]. In all these cases it is crucial that the content of the order and the obligation, the ability and the action, be all the very same, all captured by a single stit sentence.
1D
Mini-history of the modal logic of agency
Throughout this book we constantly refer to "the action," "the obligation," "the ability," "the order," and so on. This is because English, through its love of the subject-predicate construction, drives us to such usages. We do not believe, however, that English also drives us to wax ontological about actions, obligations, abilities, orders, and so on. We may wish to fashion theories about entities taken to fall under these common nouns. Stit theory is not to be taken as arguing against such a wish. On the other hand, we may not. Stit theory has the advantage that it permits us to postpone attempting to fashion an ontological theory, while still advancing our grasp of some important features of action, obligation, and so on. It does so by invoking a "modal" construction in place of a subject-predicate construction that requires an ontology. By a modal construction we mean an intensional grammatical construct having sentences as both inputs and outputs. A "modal logic of agency" intends that some such construct express agency (or action), as for example our own favored English construct "a sees to it that Q." The modal logic of agency is not popular. Perhaps largely due to the influence of Davidson (see the essays in Davidson 1980), but based also on the very different work of such as Goldman 1970 and Thomson 1977, the dominant logical template takes an agent as a wart on the skin of an action, and takes an action as a kind of event. This "actions as events" picture is all ontology, not modality, and indeed, in the case of Davidson, is driven by the sort of commitment to firstorder logic that counts modalities as Bad. The project has had some successes, all of which we shall ignore, and some failures, most of which we shall ignore. (See Bennett 1988 for an indispensable perspective.) Certain of its failures, however, are to be attributed to the neglect of the modal features of agency. We compare the ontological approach to action with our modal approach in §3E. Here we pursue the modal history. The earliest modal logic of agency of which we have learned was formulated around the year 1100 by a Dominican trained at a famous Norman institution, the abbey of Bec. (The date of c. 1100 is implied by the sources that were conveniently available to us without scholarly digging, namely, the discussion on p. 120 of Henry 1967 together with the "Anselm" entry in the Encyclopedia Britannica of 1968.) We refer to St. Anselm, who succeeded Lanfranc as prior and then abbot of Bec, and then later as archbishop of Canterbury. No mere pale
1. Stit: A canonical form for agentives
19
theoretician nor private saint, the archbishop was deeply involved in controversy with the tyrant William Rufus and later his brother Henry in regard to the matters of lay investiture and clerical homage; he vigorously opposed the former. These controversies were heavily freighted with the concepts of promising and commitment and agentive powers. In order to make clear that his authority in matters spiritual was not at the pleasure of the king, Anselm refused to accept the papal pallium from the hands of William Rufus. Partly in consequence, the archbishop was in effect exiled by the king. Anselm's brief notes on the modal logic of agency were, we think, composed during this bitter exile. In the document that Henry 1967 calls N, Anselm writes: Quidquid autem 'facere' dicitur, aut facit ut sit aliquid, aut facit ut non sit aliquid. Omne igitur 'facere' dici potest aut 'facere esse' aut 'facere non esse.' (p. 124; from N 29.8.10) Paraphrase by Henry: For all x, if 'x does' is true, then x does so that something either is so or is not so. Hence the analysis of 'doing' will in fact be an analysis of x's doing so that p, and of x's doing so that not-p [where 'p' is a clause describing a state of affairs, and 'not-p' is short for 'it is not the case that p']. (p. 124) Anselm goes on to describe a kind of square of opposition that clearly indicates he had in mind a modal logic of agency (to the extent to which that can be said without anachronism), but his work seems to have remained unnoticed until after the stirring of modal logic in this century. If you promise to accept our remark as merely helpful rather than authoritative, we will hazard that Henry 1953 is the first reference to Anselm that appreciates his work as modal, and that Chisholm 1964a (who cites Henry 1960) is the earliest reference to Anselm by an active researcher in this field (see §3B for further discussion of Chisholm). Other references to Anselm on this topic: Danto 1973, Humberstone 1976 (the reference does not appear in the published abstract, Humberstone 1977), the perceptive Walton 1976b, 1976a, and 1980 (which cites Dazeley and Gombocz 1979), and a sterling account in Segerberg 1989. It is amazing (and perhaps a little sad) that over eight hundred years elapsed between Anselm's invention or discovery and the next contributions to the modal logic of agency. The first modern desire for a modal agentive construction seems to have been felt by philosophers working their various ways through the embedding requirements of legal and deontic concepts. One can certainly see the need expressed in the pioneering work of Hohfeld 1919, who introduces locutions such as the following (p. 38). X has a right against Y that he shall stay off the former's land. This Hohfeldian construct plainly embeds the modal agency construction in a "has a right" context. This is true of all of Hohfeld's work: The modal agency construction is always embedded in additional constructions imputing legal rights, duties, powers, and so on. Agency has not yet received a separate modal treatment. (We discuss Hohfeld a bit in §5B.l.)
20
Introduction to stit
The next place we know a modal agentive construct to crop up, much more explicitly but still embedded in the context of a normative expression, is in Kanger 1957:
Ought(Y sees to it that F(X, Y)). (p. 42) Although the locution "sees to it that" is displayed only in a normative context and wholly without comment, it is clear from the general tenor of Kanger's methodology that he intended to be isolating a norm-free concept of agency. The explicit grammatical breakthrough for the logic of agentive modality comes in Anderson 1962, who, reflecting on Hohfeld, introduces for the first time a separate form of expression intended to disengage the concept of agency from normative considerations.5 When on p. 40 Anderson takes
M(x, p, y) to represent the case "when x executes what is regarded as an 'action' ... and y is the recipient or patient of the action executed by x," he suddenly gives us a clean target for some analytic questions that otherwise seem confusing. Anderson sometimes reads M(x, p, y), with perhaps too little attention to the connections between formal and English grammar, as "x does p to (for) y." Evidently here agency is, for better or worse, not separated from patiency. And certainly there is in Anderson no semantic theory of agency or patiency, and only a trace of a deductive calculus (e.g., Anderson points out that the implication between ~M(x, p, y) and M(x, ~p, y) goes only from right to left). That is, Anderson pioneers in isolating agency and patiency, but he does so only immediately to recombine them with deontic concepts. In 1963 each of two logicians, Fitch and von Wright, advanced modal theories of agency, each of them stressing syntactic developments. Fitch 1963 defines "does A" in terms of two other modalities, "striving for" and "causes," and offers a deductive calculus. The work has not been taken up by later logicians and is seldom cited in the published literature. Indeed, although NB was Fitch's admiring and fond student and colleague, he regrets to say that he had to be reminded of this essay by Segerberg 1989, which contains a maximally useful account. Von Wright, beginning in 1963 and continuing at least through 1981, was, we think, the other logician to be a first to treat agency (or action) as a specific modal or quasi-modal topic, always with that specially honest von Wrightian insistence on the lack of finality of the formulation in question, including attending to nonmodal formulations in which complements are taken as terms signifying specific or generic actions, rather than sentences. As in other cases, the work keeps a close eye on deontic logic, to which he contributed so much. We think von Wright did not succeed in disentangling agency from change, 5 Very likely the breakthrough for Anderson came about after correspondence or conversations with his friend Kanger. Somewhat later Anderson visited Manchester, where Henry was. Henry remarked in personal correspondence that during this year of 1965 there was a colloquium involving a number of persons interested in agency, including, e.g., Hare and Kenny.
1. Stit: A canonical form for agentives
21
evince interest in the general problem of embedding of agentives. For instance (but only "for instance"), von Wright 1963 took as a convenient primitive the notation
d(p/p), which is to be read as expressing some such idea as "the agent preserves the state described by p" (pp. 43, 57). Like Anderson, von Wright tends to leave to the reader the task of putting bits of logical grammar together with bits of English grammar. In contrast with Anderson, however, agency here has been separated out from patiency. (We further discuss von Wright in §3A.) Kanger and Kanger 1966 introduce as a separate locution X causes F, where F is supposed to be a sentence, but in a fashion like Anderson's, they logicize about it only by setting down that F may be replaced by its logical equivalents, and that the proposition that X causes F implies that F. Three influential lines of research began about the same time as that of the Kangers, each of which highlighted the separate existence of agentive modalities, namely, those initiated by Castaneda, by Kenny, and by Chisholm.6 Castaneda, whose views concerning deontic logic have informed both philosophers and logicians for many years (since at least Castaneda 1954), has much to say that is relevant to agency as a modality. Though his philosophical concerns led him to pursue goals other than the formulation of a modal logic of agency, he repeatedly urged the fundamental importance of the grammatical and logical distinction between "propositions" and "practitions" (a distinction put as clearly as anywhere in Castaneda 1981); but because there is no possibility of constructing a Castaneda "practition" from an arbitrary sentence, in the way for instance that Anderson's M(x, p, y] or von Wright's d(p/p) each permits an arbitrary sentence in place of p, Castaneda practitions cannot themselves serve as the foundation for such a modal logic of agency. (§3D expands our consideration of Castaneda.) Kenny 1963, in the course of initiating a rich literature on the verbal structure of our causal and agentive discourse, says that any "performance" in his technical sense is describable in the form bringing it about that p. And Chisholm 1964b takes the following as a basic locution on which to found an extensive series of definitions and explanations in the vicinity of agency: There is a state of affairs A and a state of affairs B, such that he makes B happen with an end to making A happen, 6 Of course other work on the theory of action has also influenced the modal logic of agency, but that literature is unsurveyably vast. We note as a passing example that there is hardly a one of our past or present departmental colleagues who has not contributed.
22
Introduction to stit
where the letters stand in for "propositional clauses," and where the subject of "makes happen" can be either a person or a state of affairs. The discussions of Kenny and Chisholm, though relevant to logical questions, are themselves not directed toward the formulation of either proof-theoretical or semantic principles governing their respective basic locutions. They are sufficiently closely connected to our project, however, that we return to Kenny and Chisholm respectively in §3C and §3B. This is as accurate a record as we can manage of the early history of the modal logic of agency. If this story is right, then the following gives its gist. History of the modal logic of agency prior to 1969 Anselm c. 1100
facere esse (x does so that p)
Hohfeld 1919
X has a right against Y that he shall stay off the former's land
Kanger 1957
Ought(Y sees to it that F ( X , Y ) )
Anderson 1962
M(x,p, y) (x does p to [or for] y)
Fitch 1963
Does A
von Wright 1963
d(p/p) (the agent preserves the state described by p)
Kanger & Kanger 1966
X causes F
Castaneda 1954ff, Kenny 1963, Chisholm 1964ff
relevant discussions
As we note in several places previously, in chapter 3 we extend our discussion of certain among these figures by more closely relating their thoughts to stit theory: von Wright, Chisholm, Kenny, Castaneda, and Davidson. Also in §5B there is a little more consideration of some Hohfeldian themes. But for now we leave this early part of the history. The first modal logic of agency with an explicit semantics is, we think, that of Chellas 1969. The primitive locution is to be read as "T sees to it that O," where T is an agent and O takes the place of a sentence (pp. 62-63). Chellas only deploys this locution in one context, namely, as the argument of an imperative operator.7 7
But Chellas does not restrict the complement of an imperative operator to sentences having the form A-TO as is required by our Thesis 4.
1. Stit: A canonical form for agentives
23
As for semantics, Chellas takes as a paradigm the technique made famous by Kripke not long before Chellas was writing; we mean deployment of a binary relation between "worlds" in order to clarify modal concepts. Chellas in particular gives a semantic clause for ATO: is true at the present world just in case O is true at all those worlds under the control of—or responsive to the action of—the individual which is the value of T at the present world. (p. 63) The language that Chellas uses in this pioneering explanation, like the "relative possibility" language of Kripke a few years earlier, is neither familiar in itself nor further clarified by Chellas. Perhaps this is the reason that, like his predecessors, Chellas in practice confines his agentive locution to the imperative context from which his need for it sprang, and does not pause to investigate its separate properties. 8 After Chellas there is a substantial group of logicians all of whom have deployed a binary relation or a pair of binary relations in an effort to generate a semantic understanding of an agentive modality that might be used as the complement of an imperative or of a deontic operator; we know of Porn 1970, 1971, 1974, 1977; Needham 1971; Aqvist 1972; Kanger 1972; Hilpinen 1973; Humberstone 1977; Lindahl 1977; and Talja 1980. For a critique of the line of research being described, with special reference to Porn 1970, see Walton 1975; also of note are Walton 1976b, 1976a, 1980, which develop some insights in an independent and more nonsemantic fashion. The earlier Porn articles and that of Aqvist use only a single binary relation; the idea of using two binary relations seems to be independently due to Needham 1971, Kanger 1972, and Hilpinen 1973. (Unless we have overlooked it, there is no cross-mention; we have not seen Needham's M.A. thesis, but make the inference from Porn 1977.) The reason for the second binary relation is given as this: Agency has not only a sufficient condition aspect but a necessary condition aspect (Kanger 1972, p. 109; Hilpinen 1973, p. 119), and one needs a separate relation for each. The later workers in this mini-tradition play variations on this theme. In our judgment this line of investigation, although initially promising, and although producing some useful insights, has not been much followed up for the following reason: It has remained obscure what one is to make of the binary relations that serve as the founding elements of the entire enterprise. Kanger 1972 says, for example, that one of the relations holds between a person and a couple of worlds or indices when everything the person does in the second world is the case in the first; and the other relation holds when the opposite of everything the person does in the second is the case in the first (p. 109). That is far from clear, and no one in the tradition is, in our judgment, any clearer than that. For a final example, we describe and quote at length from Porn 1977, which among those we mention is the most developed grammatical and semantic 8
We discuss Chellas a bit more in §4A, and we rely on his agentive operator, ATO, in several places—writing it, however, as [a cstit: A] in order to conform to our standard symbolism for the stit sentence.
24
Introduction to stit
treatment of agentive modality. (All page references are to Porn 1977 and all words not inside quotation marks are ours.) Dap is read "it is necessary for something which a does that p" (p. 4). It is said (pp. 7-8) that an equivalent concept is found as the definition of "a sees to it that p" in Chellas 1969, chapter 3, section 4, and in Porn 1971. "Consider all those hypothetical situations u' in which the agent does at least as much as he does in u. If v is such a situation, it may be said to be possible relative to what the agent does in u. ... if p is necessary for something that a does in u, then there cannot be a situation which is possible relative to what a does in u and which lacks the state of affairs that p. ... A natural minimal assumption is that the relation [of relative possibility] is reflexive and transitive." (PP. 4-5) D'ap is read "but for a's action it would not be the case that p" (p. 5), and also "p is dependent on a's action." (p. 7) "For the articulation of the truth of D' a p at u we require all hypothetical situations u' such that the opposite of everything that a does in u is the case in u' ... [the relation must be] irreflexive and serial." (pp. 5-6) Further, to connect the two modalities D and D', a condition is imposed that "requires that worlds which are alternatives to a given world under the relation [for Da] be treated as equals in contexts of counteraction conditionality." (p. 6) C' ap is read "p is not independent of a's action." (p. 7) Eap is defined as the conjunction of Dap and C'ap, and read "a brings it about (causes it to be the case that, effects that) p" (p. 7). Porn says (p. 8) that an equivalent concept is found in Needham 1971, p. 154, an essentially equivalent concept in Hilpinen 1973, section 6, and explicitly in Porn 1974, p. 96. Porn finds unacceptable (p. 7) an alternative E* a p, defined as the conjunction of Dap and D'ap, which Porn says is equivalent to a definition of Kanger 1972. There are three points to be made about this extract. The first is that given the available apparatus, Porn 1977 seems to us to offer the best explanations of and the most detailed working out of the modal logic of agency as based on abstract binary relational semantics. Second, even these best-possible explanations seem difficult. The conclusion one might draw is that one should doubt the likelihood that the abstract relational-semantic point of view itself can continue to serve in the way that was hoped. But third, however, and counting against this conclusion, is that Porn 1977 is evidently formulating, in the context of the relational semantics, the very combination of "negative" and "positive" conditions that much later were built into stit theory (see §2A.2 and §2A.3). Aqvist 1974, 1978 provide a much less abstract and more intuitive semantic setting; these articles are the first of which we know that make the fundamental
1. Stit: A canonical form for agentives
25
suggestion that agency is illuminated by seeing it in terms of a tree structure such as is familiar from the extensive form of a game as described in von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944. Aqvist's account of agency is in some respects akin to that described in this book, in some respects less flexible, and in some respects richer. His aim is not strictly to provide a modal logic of agency; for example, the primitive of Aqvist 1978 is "DO(a, Pa)" to be read "a does, or acts, in such a way that he Ps," and where "Pa" must be an atomic sentence (rather than an arbitrary sentence), and like von Wright, Aqvist wraps agency together with change. But his goal is close enough to warrant (i) a comparison (which is not attempted here) and (ii) a suggestion that the reader consult these sources. A notable relevant article is Mullock 1988. Of decisive importance is the uncommonly rich joint work Aqvist and Mullock 1989, which applies insights derived from the tree structure to serious questions in the law. Aqvist and Mullock 1989 is, as we later say also of Hamblin 1987, required reading. There is one later commentator on the tradition just described who is of special excellence and interest: Makinson 1986. In a series of more than a dozen articles beginning with Segerberg 1980, and including among others Segerberg 1981, 1982, 1984, 1985a, 1985b, 1987, 1988a, 1988b, and 1989, a distinguished modal logician develops a richly motivated and intuitively based formal approach to action by taking a routine as the guiding concept. Segerberg explicitly bases some of the intuitive and formal aspects of his work on studies that in computer science have come to be called "dynamic logic," the influence on Segerberg being primarily through Pratt. Consult Elgesem 1989 for a sympathetic yet critical and penetrating account of Segerberg's line of research. The work is not fully in the modal logic of agency, since it stresses a grammar of (i) terms (including complex terms) for naming "actions" and (ii) predicates for expressing properties of "actions," and thus self-consciously avoids a grammar of nesting connectives. But instead of a complaint this is intended only as a reason for limiting ourselves to a mere mention of what may indeed turn out to be not only valuable in itself but a useful link between the ontological and modal points of view on agency. Mention of Pratt calls attention to the existence of a large and interesting formal literature that we fail to cite as part of this mini-history except insofar as it has influenced Segerberg, namely the work on "dynamic logic" and its cousins that has been done by Floyd. Hoare, Pratt, and other computer scientists (see Segerberg 1989 for a brief entree via Pratt that is written especially with the logic of action in view, and see Pratt 1980 for an excellent fuller account). There are three reasons for excluding this line of investigation from the present survey: (i) we are very far from familiar with the literature, so that making it accessible is best left to someone else. Further, what we know of it (ii) stresses the ontological rather than the modal approach, whereas the latter is the topic of this mini-history, and (in) what we know of it is relevant to action only in the wide sense of "action" that encompasses mechanical action, that is, the sense of "action" that encompasses the action of programs and starter motors. In fact the present modal point of view makes it arguable that this literature is no more relevant to agency than is the literature of any other discipline that gives us
26
Introduction to stit
ways to fill out the sentential complement of "sees to it that": An agent can see to it that the starter engages and passes through various stages, or that a certain recursive program runs, or ... . But it seems best to make explicit our failure to more than barely mention such a large literature just because so many persons think that although it may be arguable, it certainly isn't plausible that it has no special relevance to agency. On the other hand, NB once asked a well-known computer scientist/mathematician after a lecture on parallel processing if he had meant his use of "actor" and "agent" to be anything but an idle metaphor; he was aghast that one should need to inquire. The articles Brown 1988, 1990, and 1992 represent a sustained and important investigation of the modal approach to ability and its connection with action. Brown initially proposed a modal operator that has something of the force of "can do." Horty 2001, which uses [a bstit: Q] for this Brown connective, explains Brown's ideas and relates them to stit theory. Penultimately there is von Kutschera 1986, which articulates in one form or another nearly all of the essential underlying ideas concerning agency on which we base the semantics offered in subseqent chapters. We can describe the extent of von Kutschera's priority only by using some phrases not defined until later. At the very least, one must credit von Kutschera 1986 with the no choice between undivided histories condition, with generalization beyond the discrete, with generalization to multiple independent agents (including the independence of agents condition), with attention to strategies, and with semantics for the "deliberative stit" that we study in Definition 2-5 and §8G.l. It also needs to be remarked that von Kutschera 1986 cites the earlier von Kutschera 1980. Finally there is Hamblin 1987, which in the context of a study of imperatives provides a rich source of formal, informal, and semi-formal ideas on the topic at hand, many of which have influenced the present work; in particular, collegial reflection on Hamblin's "action-state semantics" was the immediate context of the beginning of the research reported in this book. Our own recommendation is that no one ought to try to move deeply into any part of the theory of agency without reading Hamblin.
1E
Conclusion and summary
Although not so grand as Ishmael's, we think our story well worth the telling, and though we have not sailed far, our mainsail has been unfurled and we have caught the first breeze. What we propose is an augmentation of our current linguistic resources with a linguistic form, the stit sentence [a stit: Q], that (i) leads us carefully to attend to the agent of an action, (ii) is capable of taking any English declarative as its complement, (iii) is recoverable as the same stit sentence either as a declarative or an imperative, and (iv) is grammatically suitable for embedding within wider contexts. Among its other virtues, the stit sentence sheds light on refraining and helps to clarify some of the agentive modalities. This linguistic addition, attentive to grammatical form and semantic
1. Stit: A canonical form for agentives
27
structure, promotes greater clarity in the way we talk and think about the phenomena of our world, and thus justifies its added complexity. In succeeding chapters we strive to deepen our understanding of agency by providing stit sentences with careful and well-motivated semantic analyses, and we apply and generalize on it in a variety of ways.
2
Stit: Introductory theory, semantics, and applications In chapter 1 we followed and extended the idea, going back at least to Anselm, of treating agency as a modality—a modality that represents through an intensional operator the agency, or action, of some individual in bringing about a particular state of affairs.* We proposed that using the stit construction as a normal form, when we are confused, is a happy way to clarify some aspects of action and agency. In this chapter we sharpen our understanding of stit—and thereby, if we are right, of agency. The central idea is that the concept of action must be understood in relation to an open future, and we formulate a rigorous theory that tries to understand how action is compatible with and indeed requires irideterminism. In this way we essay a contribution to what Kane 1998 calls ''the intelligibility question" (p. 105). We often label the chosen approach stit theory, because it concentrates on the linguistic form "a (an agent) sees to it that A," which we abbreviate simply as [a stit: A]. Part of the theory, however, has nothing to do with language. This nonlinguistic part instead purports to articulate in a general way how agency fits into the overall causal structure of our world. For reasons that will emerge, we often ponderously refer to this theory as "the theory of agents and choices in branching time,'' or, more briefly but less memorably, as BT + AC theory— or, when endowed with instants or times, as BT + I + AC theory. Stit theory, including its nonlinguistic part, provides a precise and intuitively compelling semantic account of the stit operator within an overall logical framework of indeterminism; the account is then used as a springboard for investigating a number of topics from the general logic of agency, such as the proper treatment of certain concepts naturally thought of as involving iterations of the agency "This chapter draws on several sources. We thank John Horty for co-authoring §2A, which, with the permission of Kluwer Academic Publishers, is drawn from Horty and Belnap 1995. §2B, except for §2B.10, finds its source in a portion of Belnap 1991, for the use of which we thank the International Phenomenological Society, while §2B.10 is based on part of Belnap 1996a, with the permission of Kluwer Academic Publishers.
28
2. Stit: Introductory theory, semantics, and applications
29
operator, as well as interactions of this operator with other truth-functional and modal connectives. The theory of agents and choices in branching time supports more than one semantic candidate for stit. We mention several of these briefly in various later chapters, but only two are primary in this book. One of the two derives from the early work of two of the authors, NB and MP. The other, which is simpler and for certain purposes easier to use, first appeared in von Kutschera 1986, prior to the work of the authors of this book; later one of the authors of §2A of this chapter independently suggested it, in Horty 1989, explicitly as an alternative to the account of stit put forth by NB and MP. The first major purpose of the present chapter, which we carry out in §2A, is to describe in §2A.l the underlying theory of branching time and the tense logic that is appropriate to that theory, and then in §2A.2 and §2A.3 to describe the individual semantics of each of the two stits, together with the theory of agents and choices on which they rest. These discussions are all explicitly intended to be preliminary; later chapters treat B T + I + A C theory and each of the two stit operators with more rigor and in more detail. A second purpose of this chapter, accomplished in §2B, is to offer an equally preliminary exploration, with many pictures, of some applications of the first, more complicated of the two stit operators. In order to distinguish between the two agency operators under discussion, and for other reasons that will soon become apparent, we describe the operator featured in the early work of NB and MP as the achievement stit, represented in this section as "astit"; and we describe the alternative suggested by von Kutschera and Horty as the deliberative stit, represented here as "dstit." When in this book we speak simply of a stit operator—or use "stit" alone as an operator in some sentence—we often mean to generalize over both the deliberative and achievement stit operators, and perhaps others of the same family. Other times, however, we use plain "stit" as meaning one of astit or dstit, context making it clear which stit is at issue.
2A 2A.1
Theory and semantics: The two stits Background: Branching time
Stit theory is cast against the background of an indeterministic temporal framework, in particular, the theory of branching time due originally to Prior 1967, pp. 126-127, and developed in more detail in Thomason 1970 and Thomason 1984.l 1 From time to time in this book we insert the reminder that although we use the phrase "branching time" because of its fixed place in the literature, we never, ever mean to suggest that time itself—which is presumably best thought of as linear—ever, ever "branches." The less misleading phrase, which we occasionally use, is "branching histories," with an essential plural to convey that it is the entire assemblage of histories that has a branching structure. A single history cannot branch, but two histories can branch from each other. As a further occasional reminder, we observe that although in this book we idealize each history as linear, there is a more adequate treatment of branching histories in Belnap 1992. There each history in the branching assemblage is idealized not as linear, but instead as a four-dimensional spacetime. For similar ideas see also McCall 1994, Rakic 1997, and Placek 2000.
Introduction to stit
30
Figure 2.1: Branching time: Moments and histories
The theory.is based on a picture of moments as ordered into a treelike structure, with forward branching representing the openness or indeterminacy of the future and the absence of backward branching representing the determinacy of the past. Such a picture leads, formally, to a notion of branching temporal structures as structures (we sometimes say BT structures) of the form (Tree, <), in which Tree is a nonempty set of moments and < is a treelike partial ordering of these moments—an ordering such that, for any m1, m2, and m3 in Tree, if m1 < m3 and m2 < m3 then either m1 < m2 or m2 < m1. We routinely use m1 < m2 when m1 < m2 but m2 < m1. A maximal set of linearly ordered moments from Tree is a history, representing some complete temporal evolution of the world. If m is a moment and h is a history, then the statement that m 6 h can be taken to mean that m occurs at some point in the course of the history h. Because of indeterminism, a single moment might be contained in several distinct histories: We let H(m) = {h: m & h} represent the set of histories passing through m, those histories in which m occurs. These ideas can be illustrated as in Figure 2.1, where the upward direction represents the forward direction of time.2 This diagram depicts a branching temporal structure containing five histories, h1 through h5. The moments m1 through m4 are highlighted; and we have, for example, m2 E h3 and H(m4) = {h4, h5}.
In evaluating sentences against the background of these branching temporal structures, it is a straightforward matter to define a notion of truth-at-a-moment that is adequate for the truth-functional connectives, and even for the opera2
We represent the directionality of time in pictures by means of up-down, which led us in earlier publications to the language of "downward" and "upward." Many presentations of tense logic, however, use a left-right representation, which is evidently equally helpful. In order to use language that favors neither picture over the other, in this book we always use the neutral words "backward" and "forward." Or almost always: We retain "upper bound" and "lower bound" as too entrenched to abandon.
2. Stit: Introductory theory, semantics, and applications
31
tor Was: that represents the simple past tense: The definitions from standard (linear) tense logic suffice. 3 Since these structures allow alternative possible futures, however, it is not so easy to understand the operator Will:, representing future tense. Returning again to Figure 2.1, suppose that, as depicted, the sentence A is true at m3 and at m4, but nowhere else. In that case, what truth value should be assigned to Will:A at the moment m1? On the approach developed by Prior and Thomason, there is just no way to answer this question. Evidently, Will:A is true at m1—A really does lie in the future—if one of the histories h2, h4, or h5 is realized; but it is false on the histories h1 and h3. And since, at m1, each of these histories is still open as a possibility, that is simply all we can say about the situation. In general, in the context of branching time, a moment alone does not seem to provide enough information for evaluating a statement about the future; and what Prior and Thomason suggest instead is that a future-tensed statement must be evaluated with respect to a more complicated point of evaluation consisting of a moment together with a history through that moment. We let m/h represent such a point: a pair consisting of a moment m and a history h from H( m ) . Since future-tensed statements are to be evaluated at moments and histories together, semantic uniformity suggests that other sentences must be evaluated at these more complicated indices as well. We therefore define a BT model (branching time model) as a pair m = , in which G is a BT structure , and 3 is an interpretation function mapping each propositional constant from the background language into the set of m/h pairs at which, intuitively, it is thought of as true. Where = represents, as usual, the relation between a point of evaluation belonging to some model and the sentences true at that point, the base case of the truth definition for branching temporal models tells us simply that atomic sentences are true where 3 says they are (see §8F.l). 2-1 DEFINITION. (Truth for atomic sentences) for A an atomic sentence.4
m,
m/h
= A iff m/h E J(A)
And the definition extends to truth functions, past, and future as follows (see §8F.2 and §8F.5). 2-2 DEFINITION. (Truth for truth functions and tenses) and 3
We remind the reader that, as explained in Remark 1-1, we use nonstandard notation for various connectives. Taking into account the large number of connectives used in this book, our purpose is to be as easy as possible on both the eye and the memory. 4 It is not usual for languages of this kind to admit the possibility that even atomic sentences might be true at one point of evaluation m/h but false at another point m/h', for different histories h and h' belonging to H(m). What we have in mind are situations such as the following. If, in a restaurant, Karl is offered cake or pie for dessert, it seems that "Karl chooses pie," which is at least not obviously non-atomic, might be true relative to one history through m, but false relative to another. In any case, whether or not relativizing truth for atomic sentences to both moments and histories is actually necessary for evaluating statements of this kind, allowing for the possibility at least does no harm.
32
Introduction to stit
Was: A iff there is an
such that
Will:A iff there is an
such that
and
As usual, we say that a sentence is valid if it is true at every point of evaluation— in this case, every m/h pair—in every BT model. It is easy to see that, as long as we confine ourselves to Was:, Will:, and truth-functional connectives, the validities generated by this definition in branching temporal models coincide with those of ordinary linear tense logic, for the evaluation rules associated with these operators never look outside the (linear) history of evaluation. However, the framework of branching time allows us to supplement the usual temporal operators with the additional concept of settledness, or historical necessity, along with the dual concept of historical possibility. Here, Sett:A is taken to mean that A is settled, or historically necessary; Poss:A, that A is still open as a possibility. The intuitive idea is that Sett:A should be true at some moment if A is true at that moment no matter how the future turns out, and that Poss:A should be true if there is still some way the future might evolve that would lead to the truth of A. The evaluation rule for historical necessity is straightforward (see §8F.4). 2-3 DEFINITION. (Truth for historical modalities) Sett
for
• Poss:A is defined in the usual way, as ~Sett:~A. It is convenient to incorporate this concept of settledness also into the metalanguage: We will say that A is settled true at a moment m in a model m iff m, m/h = A for each h in H(m), and that A is settled false at m iff m, m/h = A for each h in H(m) (see Def. 17). Once the standard temporal operators are augmented with these concepts of historical necessity and possibility, the framework of branching time poses some technical challenges not associated with standard tense logics. On the other hand, it is directly applicable to a number of philosophical issues, such as the representation of indeterminism, for which standard tense logic is no help. Details and references can be found in Thomason 1984 and Zanardo 1996. In this book, chapter 6 and chapter 7 contain extended discussions of branching time as a representation of indeterminism (summarized in §3), while chapter 8 explains the required semantics in exact detail.
2A.2
The achievement stit
The stit operator introduced in chapter 1 is designed to approximate the idea of seeing to it that. More exactly, a statement of the form [a astit: A] should be taken to mean something like:
2. Stit: Introductory theory, semantics, and applications
33
the present momentary fact that A is guaranteed by a prior choice of the agent a. And it is for this reason, because it is used to describe the present momentary outcome of an agent's prior activity, that we characterize this operator as the achievement stit. In order to capture the meaning of the achievement stit, we must be able to speak of an individual agent's choices, and also, evidently, of the present. As a means of representing these concepts, the basic framework of branching time is supplemented with three additional primitives. (See chapter 7 for details, and §3 for summaries.) The first is simply a set Agent of agents, individuals thought of as making choices, or acting, in time.5 Now what is it for one of these agents to act, or choose, in this way? We idealize by ignoring any intentional components involved in the concept of action, by ignoring vagueness and probability, and also by treating acts as instantaneous. In this rarefied environment, the idea of acting or choosing can be thought of simply as constraining the course of events to lie within some definite subset of the possible histories still available. When Jones butters the toast, for example, the nature of his act, on this view, is to constrain the history to be realized so that it must lie among those in which he butters the toast. Of course, such an act still leaves room for a good deal of variation in the future course of events, and so cannot determine a unique history; but it does rule out all those histories in which he does not butter the toast. The second primitive introduced in earlier chapters, then, is a device for representing the constraints that an individual is able to exercise upon the course of history at a given moment, that is, the acts or choices open to him at that moment. Formally, these constraints can be encoded through a choice function, mapping each agent a and moment m into a partition Choiceamof the histories .H(m) through m. The equivalence classes belonging to Choiceamcan be thought of as the possible choices or actions available to a at m; and the idea 5
This book, while expressly designed to contribute to our understand of agency, and therefore of action, has tried to avoid using language that might suggest that the authors understood the ontology of actions. (The relation of stit semantics to some of the previous philosophical work on agency and action is discussed in §1D and chapter 3.) In the present section, we have been somewhat more relaxed in informal passages about using devices such as singular terms that purport to refer to actions as things in the world, but we should nevertheless be understood in exactly the same spirit. For example, when we say "moment of action," we certainly mean to be calling the reader's attention to a particular moment, but we do not intend to suggest that we understand what, if anything, could be meant by saying that there is an x such that x is an action and x is located at that particular moment. Roughly the same remarks hold for "moment of choice," which we are using as interchangeable with "moment of action" in spite of the following: Literary convention easily permits using "moment of choice" for an earlier moment of indecision, while tending to reserve "moment of action" for a later moment shortly after "the action" has commenced. This literary distinction—reminiscent also of Zeno—suggests to us the importance of highlighting the transition from "not-having-acted (or chosen)" to "having-acted (or chosen)" as essentially involving two regions of branching time, not just one, a thought spelled out in §7A.4, and briefly taken up from time to time elsewhere in this book.
Introduction to stit
34
Figure 2.2: An agent's choices
is that, by acting at m, the agent a is able to determine a particular one of the equivalence classes from Choiceamwithin which the future course of history must then lie, but that this is the extent of his influence. As additional notation, we let Choice am (h) (defined only when h E(m) represent the particular possible choice from Choiceamcontaining the history h. And of course, in order for this choice information to make any sense, we must require that any two histories in H( m ) that have not yet divided at m must lie within the same possible choice; the choices available to an agent at m should not allow a distinction between two histories that do not divide until some later moment. The information represented through these choice functions can be illustrated as in Figure 2.2, which depicts a structure containing six histories, and in which the actions available to the agent a at three moments are highlighted. The cells at the highlighted moments represent the possible choices or actions available to a at those moments. For example, a has three possible choices at m1— Choice am = {{h1, h2},{h3},{h4,h 5 ,h 6 } } — a n dtwo at m2. Because h1 and h2 are still undivided at m1, they must fall within the same partition there, and likewise for h4 and h5. At m3 the agent a effectively has no choice: Histories divide, but there is nothing a can do to constrain the outcome. (It may be that the outcome can be influenced by some other agent whose choices are not depicted here; or perhaps it is something that just happens, one of nature's choices.) At such a moment, it would be possible to treat the choice function as undefined for a; but it is easier to treat it as defined but vacuous, placing the entire set of histories through the moment in a single equivalence class. Little more is needed to provide for multiple agents: Given a moment, m, there is Choicea1m, representing the choices available to a1 at m, and there is Choicea2mwhich represents the choices available to a2 at exactly that same moment. The overall box in Figure 2.3, which looks like and is supposed to look like a von Neumann normal form of a game, is a blowup of the single moment m. The vertical split represents two possible choices for a1 at m, while the horizontal split represents two possible choices for a2. Since the choices of a1
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Figure 2.3: Multiple agency
and a2 are simultaneous, however, one must impose the additional constraint that Choicea1mand Choicea2mare "independent": Every combination of a choice by a1 at m and a simultaneous choice by a2 is an open possibility. In other words, no choice by a1 can make it impossible for a2 to make a simultaneous choice. This is illustrated in Figure 2.3 by the fact that from each (inner) box there proceeds at least one history. The independence-of-choices constraint is, of course, to be taken to apply to the simultaneous choices of any number of agents. Gathering the individual primitives into a tuple gives us {Tree, <, Agent, Choice>, which we call an "agents and choices in branching time structure," or, more briefly, a BT + AC structure. (The exact definition is given in §2.) The final primitive is a set Instant of instants partitioning the moments of Tree horizontally into equivalence classes. Intuitively, an instant represents a set of contemporaneous moments from each of the various histories, with the different moments belonging to a single instant thought of as occurring at the "same time" in the different histories. The instant containing the moment m is represented as i(m). It is supposed that each instant meets (intersects with) each history at exactly one moment, and that instants respect the temporal order of histories in the following sense: If the moment at which an instant i1 meets a history h is later than the moment at which i2 meets h, then the same relation holds between the moments at which the instants i1 and i2 meet any other histories. These suppositions about instants amount to strong restrictions on the structure of Tree, satisfiable only if all histories share an isomorphic temporal ordering, which is then inherited by the instants themselves. The point of the restrictions, of course, is to allow for temporal comparisons between moments from different histories. When the basic framework of agents and choices in branching time is supplemented with the Instant primitive, the result is an "agents and choices in branching time with instants" structure, or BT +1 + AC structure, of the form (Tree, ^, Instant, Agent, Choice>, with BT + AC as before; and we can define BT + I + AC models as structures of the form m = , in which 6 is a BT + 1 + AC structure and 3 an interpretation mapping each propositional constant, as before, into a set of m/h pairs. Also, when we combine branching time with instants, but without agents and choices, into a tuple (Tree, <, Instant),
Introduction to stit
36
Figure 2.4: [a astit: A] true at m/h
we have a BT + I structure. It is these structures that provide the backdrop for the semantics of the achievement stit; the claim is that the structures are not just mathematical curiosities, but describe—up to a legitimate idealization—the world in which agents act. Before stating the evaluation rule for the achievement stit, we first require an auxiliary definition. Suppose that the moments m1 and m2 occur at the same instant (i( m 1 ) = i(m 2 )), and consider some moment w prior to both (w < m1 and w < m2). If m1 and m2 lie on histories belonging to the same Choiceawpartition, these two moments are then said to be Choiceaw-equivalent (the underlining to suggest that the equivalent moments occur at the same instant). The idea behind this definition is that, through his choice at w, the agent a can guarantee that whatever moment occurs at the instant i( m 1 ) (= i(m 2 )) will lie within some particular choice aw-equivalence class, but there is nothing he can do to determine which of the moments within that class it will be. Using this auxiliary concept, the rule for evaluating an achievement stit, [a astit: A], at a point m/h of a BT + I + AC model m can now be set out as follows (§8G.3): 2-4 DEFINITION. (Truth for the achievement stit)
9m, m/h = [a astit: A] iff
there is a moment w < m such that (i) for all moments m1 Choice aw-equivalent
to m, we have m, m1/h1 = A for all h1 E H( m 1 ) ; and (ii) there is some moment m2 E i(m) such that w < m2 and m, m2/h2 = A for some h2 E H( m2 ). This formidable definition (which is equivalent to that of §8G.3) can be grasped more easily by reference to Figure 2.4, depicting a situation in which [a astit: A] is true at m/h, as a result of an action by a at the prior moment w, known as a witness, which action is determined as effective by A being possibly false at the moment m2, known as the counter.6 The evaluation rule embodies two requirements, positive and negative, captured by clauses (i) and (ii}. The positive requirement is that, as a result of a prior choice by a at the witnessing moment w, things have evolved in such a way that A is guaranteed now, at the instant 6
A convention for interpreting these figures: When a sentence is written next to a moment, it should be taken as settled true at that moment. Thus, for example, the sentence A is taken as settled true at the moment m in Figure 2.4.
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of TO, to be true. (In a generalization described most thoroughly in §8G.4, the witness for [a astit: A] may also be a chain of moments.) Of course, since a is unable to determine a single history through his choices at w, he could not have guaranteed that we should now have arrived at TO; but he was able to guarantee that we should now have arrived at some moment Choiceaw-equivalentto TO, and A is settled true at all of these. The negative requirement is that it was not yet settled at w that A should now (at i( m )) be true, so that a's action at w did have some real effect in bringing about the present truth of A.
2A.3
The deliberative stit
The primary conceptual difference between the achievement stit and the deliberative stit is this. The truth of an achievement stit, [a astit: A], depends on two separated moments, the first being the moment at which both the stit sentence and the outcome A are evaluated, and the second being the required prior moment of choice or action, at which a guarantees the outcome. By contrast, the deliberative stit is referred only to a single moment: A sentence of the form [a dstit: A] is evaluated at the moment of choice or action, the very moment at which the agent a sees to it that A. We might say that the deliberative stit should be interpreted by something like that A is guaranteed by a present choice of Because it is only the future that can be affected by our actions or choices, it is usually natural to take the complement of a deliberative stit as future tensed; and it is for this reason also that this stit concept is characterized as deliberative. The terminology echoes most immediately the notion of deliberative obligation from Thomason 1981a, but it goes back to Aristotle's observation in the Nichomachean Ethics that we can properly be said to deliberate only about "what is future and capable of being otherwise" (1139b7; see also 1112al9-blO). Since it involves reference only to a single moment-history pair, the truth conditions for the deliberative stit can be stated easily (see §8G.l for a little more detail). 2-5 DEFINITION. (Truth for the deliberative stit) m, m/h = [a dstit: A] iff (i) 971, m/h' = A for each h' E Choice am(h), and (ii) there is some h" E H(m) for which m, m/h" = A. Evidently, clauses (i) and (ii) here are analogous to the positive and negative requirements from the achievement stit. In the present case, the positive requirement is simply that a should act at m in such a way that the truth of A is guaranteed; a should constrain the histories through TO to lie among those on which A is true. The negative requirement, again, is that A should not be settled true, so that a's actions can be seen as having some real effect. In addition to the primary, one-moment/two-moment contrast between the achievement and deliberative stits, there are two other differences that should be mentioned at once.
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Introduction to stit
The first concerns the role of histories. Although the indices at which an achievement stit is evaluated contain both moments and histories, the histories are nearly idle in the evaluation rule, needed only as objects of quantification in deciding whether A is settled true or not settled true at some moment. An achievement stit, if true at some moment-history pair, must be true at every history through that moment; this fact is reflected in the validity of
which tells us that any true achievement stit is settled true. For similar reasons, the theory yields also the validity of
the complement of any true achievement stit must itself be settled true. By contrast, since deliberative stit statements are evaluated at the very moment of an agent's choice or action, histories must play a more central role in their evaluation; they provide our only access to the outcome of the agent's action. The theory therefore yields validities such as the following:
The first of these tells us that a deliberative stit is never settled true; the second that it can be true only if its complement is contingent, again, by contraposition, reflecting Aristotle's idea that there is no deliberating about matters settled by necessity. The final point of contrast between the achievement and deliberative stits concerns the role of instants. These play an essential role in the semantics for the achievement stit, but no role at all in the deliberative stit. Because of this, models for evaluating deliberative stits alone can be simpler than the stit models described earlier: They need not contain Instant as a primitive, and so do not require us to assume a notion of "same time" across different histories in order to make sense of agency. They can be based on BT + AC structures instead of on BT + I+AC structures. One way of understanding the semantic differences between the achievement and deliberative stits that result from the reliance of the former on instants is by considering the following two sentences:
These sentences may seem to express plausible principles of interaction between the two stits, but in fact, both are invalid, as we can see from the model depicted in Figure 2.5. Here [a astit: A] is settled true at the moment m2, with m1 as witness: The positive requirement is satisfied because A is true at every moment Choiceam-equivalent to m2, and the negative requirement is satisfied because there is a moment m4 in i(m2) at which A is not settled true. However, [a dstit: Will:A] is not true at m1h1: Although the positive requirement that Will:A
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Figure 2.5: A countermodel to some stit relations
should be true at m1/h' for each h' in Choiceam1 ( h 1 ) is satisfied, the negative requirement, that there should be some h" in H( m1 ) such that Will: A fail at m1/h", is not. It is easy to see also that [a dstit: Will: B] holds at mi/hi, but that there is no point in the future of m1 along h1 at which [a astit: B] holds. In spite of these contrasts, it is well to keep in mind that each of the achievement stit and the deliberative stit represents, in its own way, a transition from indeterminacy to a determinate outcome due to the choice or action of some agent. In the case of the achievement stit, the settled outcome is at some temporal remove, whereas in the case of the deliberative stit, the outcome is immediate. The sign of this for dstit is the validity of the following:
Even though neither [a dstit: A] nor Will:[a dstit: A] is ever settled true, Was: dstit: A] becomes a determinate, permanently settled fact immediately after the choice is made. (We use the idea of (*) later, on p. 186.)
2B
Applications of stit, with many pictures
We devote the rest of this chapter to using the achievement stit to answer some hovering questions, using pictures whenever we can. It is in fact the possibility of meaningful pictures, we think, that constitutes an advantage of these semantics over those mentioned in §1D. The pictures are a way to give force to the Braithwaite slogan, "no calculus without calculation." So that the pictures can be efficient conceptual supports of calculation, and at the same time convey intuitive significance, please give them the benefit of the doubt by treating as not relevant what is not explicitly drawn. In the following we shall be dealing exclusively with the achievement stit. Since therefore there is no danger of confusion with dstit, we shall write just "stit" instead of "astit."
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Introduction to stit
Figure 2.6: Stit not closed under logical consequence
2B.1
Stit not closed under logical consequence
2-6 QUESTION. (Closure under consequence?) Is what a sees to closed under logical consequence? As a paradigm, is it possible that a sees to the conjunction of A and B but does not see to it that B? Of course it's possible, as Figure 2.6 makes obvious. In this and later figures, we make clear which values are given, and which are calculated. The point of Figure 2.6 is that [a stit: A & B ] holds at the moment m1, but even though B is a logical consequent of A&B, nevertheless [a stit: B] fails there. The crucial fact is that the negative condition for [a stit: A&.B] is satisfied in virtue of the counter, m2, since A&B fails there because of the falsity of A. In contrast, at the only potential witness mo, B is already settled true where each history through mo intersects the relevant instant, i( m1 ). The negative condition for [a stit: B] is therefore violated. B is true, all right; it is just that B is not something to which a has seen. So what a sees to is not closed under logical consequence, and obviously so. There is not the slightest paradox in saying, there is neither "funny logic" nor grammatical subtlety required in calculating, that from the fact that you see to it that there is at least one injured man who is bandaged, it does not follow that you see to it that there is at least one injured man, even though that there is at least one injured man who is bandaged logically implies that there is at least one injured man. To the contrary, it is deeply built into the real-choice-based idea of agency that such cases should be typical.
2B.2
Refraining
2-7 QUESTION. (Refraining) Is refraining both doing and not doing (in the same respect, at the same time, etc.)? The trouble with refraining, as most people appreciate, is that it is often hard to do. The trouble with refraining, as most philosophers appreciate, is that it is hard to pin down because it is both acting and not acting; discussions of this topic in the recent literature show how difficult it is to avoid being confused. Consider the two imperatives:
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Turn not thy back to the compass. Refrain from turning thy back to the compass. These stand-alone imperatives seem to have the same content. That is, they seem to offer the same advice, or create the same obligation, or make the same demand, ..., depending on the force with which they are uttered. Maybe that will help us see what it is to refrain. To refrain from turning thy back certainly entails not turning thy back, that is, not acting in a certain way. But we cannot accept that refraining from turning thy back is the same as not turning thy back, for not turning thy back does not entail refraining from turning thy back: There are plenty of things in the world out there that are neither turning their backs nor refraining from turning their backs. Further, since many things that aren't turning their backs are not even agents, it cannot be that not turning thy back is necessarily acting in a certain way. A standard but often useless analytic technique when faced with this sort of situation is to suggest that therefore refraining from turning thy back is: not turning thy back plus "something else." But what else? One might think the something else is mental, and certainly the mind may come into it, but let us leave it out as long as we can, for surely thou canst refrain from turning thy back without paying attention, without having a plan not to turn thy back, even without intending not to turn thy back. Also one might think that the something else has something to do with obeying or refusing an order, piece of advice, demand, request, and so on, but to think the thought is to reject it: Thou canst refrain from turning thy back to the compass without there being any such injunction anywhere about. If, however, we look for the solution not in something external to the canonical form, but as something already contained in it, we take the first step toward the appropriate solution. As von Wright 1963 says (p. 45), refraining is a doing, it's a kind of action. But of course the action in question is not the action of turning thy back! So maybe, someone might think, refraining from turning thy back is the action of not turning thy back; that sounds kind of right. But it cannot be exactly or clearly right, since we just said that not turning thy back does not entail refraining from turning thy back, and is not even an action, and that sounds right, too. So the problem is still with us: Refraining seems to be not acting (not turning thy back), but also acting (not turning thy back). No wonder von Wright posited refraining (or forbearing) as indefinable in terms of action alone.7 Our perplexity makes us see why it is so tempting to start trying to distinguish Not acting: not turning thy back to the compass 7 Von Wright 1963 tried a definition of the "something else" in terms of "ability," an attempt rejected by Brand 1970, pp. 234-235. The intuitive facts are difficult to disentangle. Even the technical facts are a little complicated. For the achievement version of stit and of refraining explained in this chapter, refraining cannot be defined by combining stit and ability in the way suggested by von Wright. In contrast, if stit is taken as the deliberative stit, then as shown in Horty 2001, von Wright's suggestion is exactly on target.
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Introduction to stit
from Acting: not turning thy back to the compass by beginning to make noises about external versus internal negation, even when we know perfectly well that we do not know what we mean by this distinction; and why it is tempting to invent the-act-of-not-turning-thy-back-to-thecompass, thus enriching our ontology, also without having any sense that we know what we are talking about. In the framework of stit, with its clear recognition that embedding is not only possible but encouraged, there is a natural solution to this puzzle about refraining. It involves a simple series of steps: • "a is turning his back to the compass" is equivalent to "[a stit: a is turning a's back to the compass]." Indeed, this equivalence is, by Thesis 3, our test for a sentence agentive for a, a test that will clearly distinguish "Stubb is turning his back to the compass" from "Queequeg is a native of Kokovoko." • "a is not turning his back to the compass" is equivalent to "~(a is turning s back to the compass)." • Conclude that "a is not turning his back to the compass" is equivalent to "~[a stit: a is turning a's back to the compass]." is turning a's back to the compass]" is not agentive for that is (by a negative use of the stit paraphrase thesis, Thesis 3), it is not in general equivalent to "[a stit: ~[a stit: a is turning a's back to the compass]]." • Recall that refraining is agentive, so that the content of a refraining sentence must, by Thesis 4, have a canonical form [a stit: Q], and equally keep in mind that the negative imperative "Turn not thy back to the compass" must also have an agentive canonical form. • The following are then seen to be equivalent: a refrains from turning his back to the compass and
is turning a's back to the compass]]. • Now you can (literally) see that refraining from turning thy back to the compass is agentive and also (literally) involves an inaction: Refraining from turning thy back to the compass is (actively) seeing to it that thou dost not (actively) turn thy back to the compass.
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But let us continue more generally. We know that any agentive proposition can be expressed in the form [a stit: Q], where Q might or might not itself be agentive. We now add that any refraining proposition can be expressed in the form
whether Q is agentive or not. (English will always demand that the subject of Q is a, but it does not care whether or not Q is agentive for a.) The "Refrain from turning thy back to the compass" example chose Q as agentive, but there is also "Refrain from being (or don't be) on deck at dawn", or "Don't get caught by the cook." Because in these cases Q is not agentive, they have simpler, nonnested analyses, just "[a stit: ~(a is on deck at dawn)]," or "[a stit: ~(a is caught by the cook)]." Without postulating new "negative acts" as ontological items or strange undefined internal versus external negations, all is clear: The agency of "a refrains from seeing to it that Q" flows from the agency of [a stit: ~Q], and the negation comes from what it is that a sees to; namely, that not Q. When Q is itself agentive, this can of course be further filled out, as in the "turning thy back to the compass" example. Now we see the drive for the double use of "a isn't turning a's back to the compass". If taken as non-agentive, it is canonically just is turning a's back to the compass]; but if it is to be taken in an agentive sense, then you will have to read it as: stit: a is turning a's back to the compass]]. English does not have a short and precise way to make the distinction; but the stit locution does the job. Who would have thought that refraining from acting involved an embedding of a non-acting within an acting, a non-agentive within an agentive? Only through attending to the grammar of the canonical form [a stit: Q], which promotes such embedding by its very design, does the truth of the matter become accessible. The concept of refraining is confusing and difficult to think about without the aid of theory and pictures. Figure 2.7 vividly illustrates the differences required, and permits the essential calculations. (This and succeeding pictures represent choices only for a, since only those happen to be relevant to the particular points to be made here.) i. Easiest to see is that [a stit: ~Q] holds at mo, with witness Wo and counter at m1. ii. It will also be useful to note of Figure 2.7 that [a stit: Q] holds at m1, with witness w1 and counter at my,. (Pause to observe that Wo cannot serve as witness for [a stit: Q] at m1. Reason: Q fails at m3, which is choice equivalent for a to m1 at Wo, so that there is a violation of the positive condition for Wo to witness [a stit: Q] at m1.)
44
Introduction to stit
Figure 2.7: [a stit: ~Q] versus ~[a stit: Q] versus [a stit: ~[a stit: Q]]
iii. It is clear that at m2, one cannot attribute a guarantee of the fact that Q holds there to any prior choice of a, for that fact was up to nature. The same is true of m3 and m4: At all of m2, m3, and m4, holds, which is the mere absence of seeing to it that. It is worth noticing that we can make this statement about m4 without even knowing whether or not Q itself holds there; all we need to observe is the failure of Q at moment m3, which is choice equivalent to m4 at Wo for a. It follows that the positive condition for Wo to witness [a stit: Q] at m4 fails in virtue of the failure of Q at m3, and since Wo is the only potential witness for [a stit: Q] at m4, it must be that [a stit: Q] fails at m4, which is to say, it must be that ~[a stit: Q] holds there. iv. Moments m2 and m3 on the one hand, and m4 on the other, are quite different with respect to refraining. Figure 2.7 shows that the moment w1 does stand witness to a's responsibility for his or her own inaction with respect to Q at m2 or m3: Not only does the right-hand choice for a at w1 guarantee that a does not see to it that Q, but the left-hand choice from w1, at which a does see to it that Q, testifies that at w1 a had a real choice concerning his or her seeing to it that Q. The moment m1 stands, that is, as the "counter" required for the truth of the claim that at m2, or m3, a saw to it that he or she did not see to it that Q. v. In contrast to moments m2 and m3, you can tell that in fact at moment m4, a did not actively refrain from not seeing to it that Q. The only potential witness is Wo; but since a did see to it that Q at m1, and since m1 is choice equivalent to m4 at Wo for a, the positive condition fails, and thereby the claim to agency. At 7774 not only does a fail to see to it that Q, but he or she also fails to see to it that he or she fails to see to it that Q. At 7774 you can therefore observe the difference between mere
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not seeing to something on the one hand, and positively refraining on the other, for, as we have calculated, at m4 there is "not seeing to it" without "refraining."
2B.3
Could have A short rushing sound leaped out of the boat; it was the darted iron of Queequeg. Then all in one welded commotion came an invisible push from astern, while forward the boat seemed striking on a ledge; the sail collapsed and exploded; a gush of scalding vapor shot up near by; something rolled and tumbled like an earthquake beneath us. The whole crew were half suffocated as they were tossed helterskelter into the white curdling cream of the squall. Squall, whale, and harpoon had all blended together; and the whale, merely grazed by the iron, escaped.
Queequeg missed. His harpoon did not strike home. But could Queequeg have struck home with his harpoon? Questions of this kind have been notoriously difficult to answer, partly because of an inability to tie down the relevant sense of "could have." 2-8 QUESTION. (Ability) What are we to make of "could have done it"? Consider the vexed example (11) on p. 9, and the consequent result of applying "could have" thereunto: • Queequeg struck home with his harpoon Queequeg could have struck home with his harpoon • Queequeg's harpoon struck home Queequeg's harpoon could have struck home. If you are not clear whether Queequeg's striking home with his harpoon comes to the same thing as Queequeg's harpoon striking home, then you will not be clear whether Queequeg's ability to strike home with his harpoon is about Queequeg's agency or the powers of nature. The one appears more a question of an agent's ability and the other appears more a question of the squall; but paraphrase into canonical form settles the issue: Queequeg could have stit: Queequeg struck home with his harpoon and
Queequeg could have stit: Queequeg's harpoon struck home are both unambiguously concerned with agentive powers. A recipe emerges: Take any sentence, whether agentive, non-agentive, or unclear as to agency, feed it as complement to the stit construction, and the result is bound to be an agentive; feed that intermediate result as the complement of a "could have" and you are bound to have a claim about agency. (Exercise: Carry out this plan for "Queequeg missed.") As notation we suggest
Introduction to stit
46
Figure 2.8: Could have done otherwise
[a could-have-stit: Q] which makes "could have stit" sentences look like the quasi-agentives that they are. The point is that when approaching questions about "could have," first become clear about the complement of "could have," because that is essential to being clear about "could have" itself; further, to focus on the "could have" of agency, paraphrase into canonical form, that is, into a stit sentence. You may think that such canonical forming is too much trouble, and sometimes it is; if you are concerned, however, to give a general account of agentive "could have," then the availability of a canonical form is exactly what is required: (i) Since every stit sentence is an agentive, you will not have explained "could have" unless you explain "could have seen to it that Q" for arbitrary Q. (ii) Since every agentive can be paraphrased as a stit sentence, if you do explain "could have seen to it that Q" for arbitrary Q, you will have done the whole job. Next, refine the question of "could have done it" by letting the "done it" be specialized to "done otherwise." 2-9 QUESTION. (Doing otherwise) How should we understand "could have done otherwise" ? Our chief thought, expanded in chapter 9, is that there are hidden complexities in the use of the phrase "do otherwise." Figure 2.8 helps with the following discussion. Evidently a stit: Q] holds at TOO, with Wo as witness and m3 as counter. The rest of the picture is just like Figure 2.7. Observe in the first place that the other choice available to a at Wo obviously does not guarantee that ~Q, so on that ground alone it was impossible for a
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to see to it that ~Q. That other possible choice only risks ~Q, but does not guarantee it. So in this diagram the agent is in no position to "do otherwise" in the sense of seeing to ~Q. In the second place, the other choice available to a at Wo does not even guarantee that [a stit: ~[a stit: Q]], that is, that a refrains from seeing to it that Q. It is possible, but it is not guaranteed, since nature can take us straight to m4, where we calculated that a does not refrain. If this is what "could have done otherwise" means, then ''could have done otherwise" is by no means a consequence of taking the future as open. One can also see, however, that at Wo there exists a strategy for a such that if (i) a knows about that strategy, and if (ii) a wishes to follow it, and if (iii) a does not run into problems of weakness of the will, then a is in a position at Wo, in this somewhat Pickwickian or conditional sense of (or absence of sense of) "guarantee," to guarantee that he or she does not see to it that Q, that is, that ~[Q stit: Q]. The strategy is simply to make the right-hand choice at each of Wo and w1: Then, no matter what nature has in store, the issue is bound to be ~[a stit: Q]. The exact statement and proof of this principle, which is a much more complicated matter than one might have expected, is the main theorem of chapter 13. Consult also the applications of the idea of a strategy to promising in chapter 5. But proof aside, one should allow that this weakened "strategic" sense is a long way from what your average expert on free will might have meant by "could have done otherwise," though perhaps it is what the most subtle dialecticians of the topic were implying. In any event, the pictures seem to make the discussion easier to follow.
2B.4
Closure of stit under D
2-10 QUESTION. (Closure under c) Is what one sees to closed under material "implication"? No.8 Oddly enough, as Gupta pointed out to us, it depends on the relative order of the witnesses provided for [a stit: P] and for [a stit: P c Q } . If the witness for P is earlier (or the same as) the witness for P c Q , the "detachment" is guaranteed. The detachment might, however, fail when the witness for Pc Q is earlier. This is clear from Figure 2.9 and Figure 2.10: In Figure 2.9 the witness w1 for the seeing to it that P at m0 is earlier than the witness Wo for the seeing to it of the conditional atTOO;in that circumstance one is bound to have [a stit: Q} at TOO witnessed by W0, and with the same counter at m1 serving for and both In Figure 2.10, however, the witness w0 for the seeing to it that P atTOOis properly later than the witness w1 for the seeing to it of the conditional at m0In this case it can be atTOOthat one sees to it that P and sees to it that PcQ without seeing to it that Q. In particular, w1 cannot witness [a stit: Q] at TOO because of the failure of Q at m2, which is choice equivalent toTOOat w1 for a. 8
But see (12) in chapter 11 for the opposite result for dstit.
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Figure 2.9: Do [a stit: P] and [a stit: P c Q ] imply [a stit: Q}7
Figure 2.10: Do [a stit: P] and [a stit: P c Q ] imply [a stit: Q]?
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Figure 2.11: The ten-minute mile
And W0 cannot witness [a stit: Q] at mo, because by then the fact that Q at i(m 0 ) is settled—there is no "counter."
2B.5
The ten-minute mile
2-11 QUESTION. (Ten-minute mile) How is it possible to be the agent of one's own run of a ten-minute mile? The answer is in Figure 2.11. Suppose that a has been steadily running at a ten-minute pace, and at frequent moments (of which there is no last—this is the critical condition) a has the option to drop out of the run. Consider [a stit: Q} at mo as "a sees to it that a finishes the mile in just ten minutes." Evidently [a stit: Q] should be true at mo, but it is equally evident that no single prior moment such as W0 is adequate as a witness. The reason that W0 cannot serve as a witness is not just intuitive. As the picture shows, the positive condition is violated, for Q fails at a moment that comes out of a right-hand side of a box that is later than W0, and hence Q fails at a moment that is choice equivalent to m0 at W0 for a. We therefore need to complicate our semantics (the underlying extra-linguistic theories remaining unchanged) by permitting chains as well as single moments to count as witnesses. The details are a little delicate, but you can catch the idea. It is the whole chain of choices coming right up to the finish line that stands as witness to the truth at mo of "a sees to it that a finishes the mile in just ten minutes." One has only to generalize the positive and negative conditions appropriately; see the discussion of "witness by chains" in §8G.4. Figure 2.11 shows, incidentally, that the successful ten-minute miler is, in a sense just about to be defined, a "busy chooser"!
2B.6
Refraining from refraining I
2-12 QUESTION. (Refraining from refraining) Suppose you want to refrain from
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Introduction to stit
refraining from seeing to it that you juggle sixteen balls in the air. Is there a way in which you can do that without seeing to it that you juggle sixteen balls in the air? We are reminded of the imperative with which Davidson sometimes began a delivery of his intriguing lecture on whether animals can think: He used to say, "Don't bother me with your stories!" Now that there is a picture and a calculation, that is what we say: Don't bother us with your stories about locked rooms or making yourself drunk or having your friend or enemy bind you hand and foot, for except in what are impressively complicated circumstances, it is just not possible for you to refrain from refraining from seeing to it that you juggle sixteen balls without your actually seeing to it that you juggle sixteen balls. Here is the hard fact underlying our Davidsonian impatience with storytellers: If you can tell a story in which [a stit: ~[a stit: ~[a stit: Q]]] holds but [a stit: Q] does not, then it is going to have to be part of your story that it contains a busy chooser, that is, an agent a for whom there is an infinite chain of moments occurring in some definite interval, that is, a chain that is bounded both above and below by moments, and at each of which a has a nonvacuous choice, Def. 14. (That this concept is the relevant one was pointed out by M. McCullagh.) But if you allow us to impose on your stories the condition that there are no busy choosers, then you cannot tell a story in which a refrains from refraining from seeing to it that a juggles sixteen balls but nevertheless fails to see to it that a juggles sixteen balls. Without busy choosers, refraining from refraining from seeing to indeed implies seeing to. In fact the implication goes both ways. We call the statement of equivalence between [a stit: ~[a stit: ~[a stit: Q]]] and [a stit: Q] "the refref equivalence," Ax. Conc. 1. (refref)
We discuss this striking equivalence a number of times in this book, with the mathematical facts being elaborated in chapters 15 and 18. Although a full proof of the refref equivalence is not appropriate to this sketch, Figure 2.12, which serves as a kind of partial "semantic tableau," may help you to appreciate the flavor of verifying the implication from left to right. Suppose that [a stit: ~[a stit: ~[a stit: Q]]] holds at m0. It needs a witness w0 and a counter [a stit: ~[a stit: Q]], which we write at m0'. This in turn needs a witness W0' and a counter [a stit: Q], which we write at m0"; a definite argument is needed, however, that W0' is correctly drawn as later than (or identical to, a possibility expressed by the double lines) W0. A similar argument as to the need for (and placement of) a witness and a counter justifies the remainder of the right side of the diagram. Then a reductio argument permits us to argue that [a stit: Q] can be "moved over" to a moment m1 on the left that is choice equivalent toTOOat W0 for a. The left side of the diagram is part of a subsidiary reductio: The picture as drawn places the witness w1 for [a stit: Q] at m1 as properly above W0, which can be shown to be impossible, provided a is not a
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Figure 2.12: With no busy choosers, [a stit: ~[a sht: ~[a stit: Q]]] implies [a sht: Q]
busy chooser. In fact, if there are no busy choosers, the witness for [a stit: Q] at m1 must be W0 itself. This easily implies that [a stit: Q] must be true at mo, as desired. (See §15C for a full proof.)
2B.7
Modes of action and inaction
Since stit represents agency via a modality, we may ask stit theory to tell us the following. 2-13 QUESTION. (Modes of action) How many (non-equivalent) stit modalities are there? By a "modality" in this context we mean a sentence that can be made from a fixed sentence, Q, by means of stit and negation. With this understanding, the answer is "ten"—provided that there are no busy choosers. The five "positive" modalities are these:
(i) implies (ii) implies (iii), (i) also implies ( v ) , and (iii) is also implied by (iv). Since (with no busy choosers) refraining from refraining from doing collapses
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to doing, there are no more positive modalities. (The deliberative stit, §8G.l, has exactly the same structure; see the diagram in Horty 2001.) The other five modalities—the "negative" modalities—are just the negations of these. One can use the idea of modalities to obtain some further insight into "why" the refref equivalence holds. Let Q <-> The Pequod was scrubbed, and let a = Queequeg. Now think of yourself as building a "semantic tableau." Start at the bottom with Q, and consider what you can consistently add. First, did Queequeg see to it that the Pequod was scrubbed, or not? Evidently either is consistent. Let us conjoin to Q the statement that Queequeg was not responsible for that fact,
Now consider whether Queequeg was causally responsible for the fact that he did not see to it that the Pequod was scrubbed. It could go either way. It might be that Queequeg actually and agentively refrained from seeing to the scrubbing: [a stit: ~{a stit: Q]]. Let us, however, examine the other possibility. Perhaps Ahab confined Queequeg so severely that he had no more causal responsibility for not seeing to the scrubbing than a table has for not seeing to it that the moon rises: ~[a stit: ~[a stit: Q]]. Let us add this conjunct, yielding, so far, the consistent story,
We are now ready for the last step. Queequeg either saw to the last conjunct or not. In our particular story he did not, since his confinement by Ahab stripped him of all agency in the matter of the Pequod being scrubbed. The question, however, is whether on any consistent story you can add that Queequeg saw to the third conjunct. Can you consistently add [a stit: ~[a stit: ~[a stit: Q]]], giving the total story as
The refref equivalence, Ax. Conc. 1, says "no," since it makes that last conjunct equivalent to [a stit: Q], which openly contradicts the second conjunct, ~[a stit: Q}. And contrariwise, if you cannot think of a consistent story for (1), then you are marshaling evidence for yourself in favor of the plausibility of the refref equivalence.9
2B.8
Refraining from refraining II
2-14 QUESTION. (Refref with busy choosers) What happens to refraining from refraining when one does allow a story to make reference to a busy chooser? 9 See §2B.8 for a hint and Xu 1995a for a detailed consideration of what happens to the "modes of action and inaction" when the refref equivalence fails due to the presence of busy choice sequences.
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Figure 2.13: With busy choosers, [a stit: ~ a stit: ~[a stit: Q]]] does not imply [a stit: Q]
Figure 2.13 reveals the failure of the implication from [a stit: ~[a stit: ~[a stit: Q]]] to [a sizt- Q]. There is not enough room to show all relevant assignments; the idea is that aside from the top right-most moment, those jumping out of the right-hand side of a box have Q, and those that are limit points of an infinite chain of busy choosing have ~Q. You can tell that the example of Figure 2.13 deeply involves a busy chooser. We are not going to discuss this awesome garden of forking paths other than to refer the reader to the mirror game of the Example with busy choosers 9-1 on p. 268 and to the elaborations of chapter 18. Also see Xu 1995a for a consideration of deeper levels of complexity of busy choice sequences and how they relate to the modal structure of the logic of agency.
2B.9
Deontic contexts again
As a further illustration of the beneficial consequences of using the canonical form of stit for agentives, we produce a surprise in the course of exploring an aspect of our suggestion in §1B.2 that deontic statements be put in their own canonical form as follows: Oblg:[ stit: Q], i.e., is obligated to see to it that Q Frbn:[ stit: Q], i.e., is forbidden to see to it that Q Perm:[ stit: Q], i.e., is permitted to see to it that Q The standard equivalences for forbidden/permitted continue to make sense, for example,
Frbn:[ stit: Q]
Perm:[ stit: Q],
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Introduction to stit
but it is not equally easy to find either a sensible forbidden/obligation equivalence, or a sensible permission/obligation equivalence, that both satisfies the restricted complement thesis Thesis 5 and is also in accord with the tradition. The first two lines of the following list are clearly false and the second two involve bad grammar: is not agentive for
That (2) fails is illustrated by the following example: Though the cook is forbidden to see to it that the boats are lowered, he is not thereby obligated to see to it that they are not lowered. The point about (Hi) is that since to be obligated is always to be obligated to do something, and since not doing something is not doing something, by our restriction that the complements of deontic modalities be limited to stit sentences, it follows that Oblg:~[a stit: Q] makes no sense. But the solution is obvious: To be forbidden to see to it that Q is to be obligated to refrain from seeing to it that Q, and we know what refraining means. Accordingly, the proper equivalences, forced on us by the restricted complement thesis, are just STIT DEONTIC EQUIVALENCES. (Axiomatics concept. Reference: Ax. Conc. 2) and
The first is illustrated as follows: If the cook is forbidden to see to it that the Pequod is headed up into the wind, then the cook is obligated to see to it that he does not see to it that the Pequod is headed up into the wind, and conversely. Symmetry suggests as well that to be obligated to see to it that Q is to be forbidden to refrain from seeing to it that Q, so that we add the following to the stit deontic equivalences Ax. Conc. 2: Oblg:[a stit: Q] <-> Frbn:[a stit: ~[a stit: Q]]. If the helmsman is obligated to see to it that the Pequod is headed up into the wind, then the helmsman is forbidden to see to it that he does not see it that the Pequod is headed up into the wind, and conversely. And now the surprise: If both the Oblg: and the Frbn: equivalences hold, then by substitution (of ~[a stit: Q] for Q) and transitivity, then must also be added to the stit deontic equivalences Ax. Conc. 2. The equivalence (2) says that the only way to be obligated to refrain from refraining from luffing is to be obligated to luff. Right or wrong? It would seem that the only way the equivalence could possibly hold or fail to hold were if as a matter of (nonnorrmative) stit fact itself, the following—namely, the refref equivalence, Def. 14—held or did not hold:
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55 (refref)
We are therefore led to consider yet once again whether we can think of a case in which the right side holds without the left. Does refraining from refraining imply doing? The mathematics for the achievement stit is disposed of in §15C and chapter 18, and Horty 2001 shows that the refref equivalence holds for the deliberative stit; but we take it that our general point of view commits us only to trying to get clear on the matter, not to already having accomplished that desirable end. In any event, given the refref equivalence, (2) already follows from the "normality" of the obligation modality.
2B.10
Contemplation and action
We briefly consider a thesis of Prior. The thesis of chapter 4 of Prior 1968 is that contemplation and action are incompatible in the sense that no one can find out what anyone is going to decide—under the assumption that there really is action and not just its appearance. We think Prior's argument is absolutely good; all we do is lay out what we take to be its essential elements in present terminology. The contribution of this section is to reveal how little philosophy of mind or epistemology is needed. One only needs to situate the contemplation and the action within the causal structure of the events of our world. As we have seen, if our world permits an open future, then an adequate semantic theory needs to require that truth (as opposed to settled truth) be relative both to a moment and to a history. Suppose that we have a connective $ with at least the following two properties:
The first condition tells us that $ is history-independent (in the natural sense, which we define explicitly in Definition 6-4), so that since truth of c (A) at m/h implies settled truth of c (A] at m, it is enough to say of o (A) that it is settled true (or false) at a moment m. Because of their history-independence, we do not need to mention a history for these sentences. The second condition says that o is a "success" locution. It follows easily from these two provisions that If o (A) is true at m/h, then A is settled true at m/h. Or with equal propriety: If o (A) is settled true at m then Sett:A is settled true at m. o (A) cannot, that is, be true, hence settled true, without the complement, A, being settled true. We are now ready to turn to Prior's argument. Let us substitute for his "finding out" the philosophically more familiar verb "to know," and let us furthermore fix the knower as Autumn Jane. Having made these substitutions, consider the claim that
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Introduction to stit At 3:00 Autumn Jane knows that at 5:00 her father will have seen to it that her dress is clean.10
We introduce just two postulates governing the semantics of knowledge, both of which we think are implicit in the Prior argument. The first postulate about knowledge is one whose point can only be appreciated by keeping in mind the branching of the future: When we have knowledge, it is settled true that we have it. If at a given moment-history, m/h, Autumn Jane knows that P, then this does not depend on the history, h, but must be equally true for every history passing through m. This postulate says that knowledge is history-independent: regardless of P, for each moment, m, "Autumn Jane knows that P" is true on any pair m/h just in case "Autumn Jane knows that P" is true on every pair m/h1 (with h, h1 E H( m ) ). In this way knowledge is quite an ordinary property, like "red" or "six feet tall," and it would appear that the history-independence of knowledge hardly needs a special argument. Many of the standard epistemic, doxastic, and psychological attitudes have exactly the same character of history-independence. If Autumn Jane believes (wonders, asserts, predicts, or guesses) something, then that she has that belief (is in that state of wonder, is making that assertion, prediction, or guess) does not depend on what the future may bring; it is a settled truth about her.11 The second postulate is that knowledge implies truth, by which we mean this: For every moment-history pair, if "Autumn Jane knows that P" is true at that pair, so is P. Given that at 3:00 she knows that at 5:00 her father will have seen to it that her dress is clean, then in fact at 3:00 it is true that at 5:00 her father will have seen to it that her dress is clean. The problem with which Prior is wrestling does not appear to arise unless we have this one among the philosophers' senses of "knowledge" in mind. If knowledge only conveys justified—but perhaps false—belief, or only some justified level of certainty or only some justified certainty as to high probability, or if it merely tends to signal truth but does not betoken an exception-free universality, then there is 10 Please read this English sentence as having the form "Autumn Jane knows that: At-inst5.00:[a stit: Q]" in the sense of §8F.5. The "3.00" in the example only indicates the time at which the knowledge ascription is to be evaluated, and the "will have" is intended as a logically redundant concession to idiomatic English, inserted in this example because 3:00, which is the time of evaluation, is prior to 5:00. It is perhaps worth noting in this regard that At-instl:[a stit: Q] is by no means equivalent to [a stit: At-mstt:Q], even when Q is history-independent. The former requires the witness to be prior to i (regardless of the moment of evaluation), whereas the latter requires the witness to be prior to the moment of evaluation (regardless of i). In the formulation used, the witness—if any—must be prior to 5:00, but in the absence of further considerations—such as those adduced below—need have no special relation to the moment of evaluation. 11 There is some plausibility in taking some psychological attitudes as history-dependent. It may for example be that whether a person intends to do something depends on what the future brings. It takes some doing to see why the same should be true for knowledge, and although we do feel entitled to claim that the plausible thing is to treat knowledge as historyindependent, the alternative is not without interest. As we imply at the very end, one is indeed welcome to see the argument of this section as providing independent support for the idea that knowledge is history-dependent.
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57
no puzzle in supposing that Autumn Jane "knows" what someone is going to do. The puzzle only sets in when it is supposed that knowledge implies truth. We have just given knowledge the properties (i) and (ii) ascribed to o in (3). This licenses us in the first place to speak of the truth of "Autumn Jane knows that P" at moment m1, dropping reference to a history h. And in the second place, it follows that if "Autumn Jane knows that P" is true at m1, then P is settled true at m1. It is therefore impossible that Autumn Jane know something that is not settled true. She can consistently be said to believe it, wonder if it is so, assert it, guess it, and so on, for although each of these shares historyindependence with knowledge, none of these has the "success" property (ii), that of implying truth. But since knowledge does have this second property, Autumn Jane cannot consistently be said to know what is not settled true. Thus, if on Monday Autumn Jane knows that on Tuesday the path will be muddy, then on Monday it is settled true that on Tuesday the path will be muddy. Given this intermediate conclusion, it is plain what we need about the concept of decision: nothing about the torments of the mind in process, but only the colorless fact that at or before the moment of decision it is not settled what decision is made. In making this point, we will use the achievement stit, as we have been doing right along. (Permit us to observe, however, that a deliberativestit version of the following argument is easier to follow, since dstit identifies the moment of choice with the moment of outcome.) On the present theory the required true premiss could be stated as follows: Let m, m1, and w be moments. Let w be the witness for [a stit: Q] at m. Suppose m1 < w. Then at m1 it is not settled that [a stit: Q] will be true at i( m ) "Yes" where some histories through m1 cross i ( m ) , but "no" on others. This is the most elementary of consequences of the negative condition. By contraposition, if it is settled at m1 that [a stit: Q] will be true at i(m), then m1 < w. Further, since "Autumn Jane knows that" has the properties (i) and (ii) of o, and so implies the settled truth of its complement, for any history h through m1, if Autumn Jane knows that it is true at m1/h that [a stit: Q] will be true at i ( m ) , then it is settled true at m1 that [a stit: Q] will be true at i( m ). Therefore, Autumn Jane cannot know that a stit: Q] will be true at i( m ) before the witness for [a stit: Q] at w. "At 5:00 Autumn Jane's father will have seen to it that her dress is clean" is not knowable by Autumn Jane—or anyone else— until after the witness. Note, incidentally, that stit theory certainly allows that at 3:00 Autumn Jane can know that at 5:00 her father will have seen to it that her dress is clean. For example, her father may have taken the dress to an ideally reliable launderer at some point earlier in the day. In this case the witness precedes the moment at which we are evaluating Autumn Jane's state of knowledge. Just to double underline the point we are urging, which is that the argument does not depend on interesting commitments about the mind, we repeat the
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premisses and the conclusion, (i) Like many standard propositional attitudes, knowledge is history-independent. (ii) Knowledge (in the sense that gives rise to Prior's puzzle) implies truth. (iii) No stit is settled to be true at an instant until after its witness. Therefore, (iv) it is impossible to have knowledge of a stit until after its witness. Of course the essential content is that given (iii), the "epistemic" propositions (i), ( i i ) , and not-(iv) constitute an inconsistent triad. For certain other senses or uses of "knowledge" it may be preferable to resolve the inconsistency by keeping not-(iv) while denying (i) or ( i i ) . The important thing is to follow Prior in knowing about the inconsistency before settling matters.
3
Small yet important differences from earlier proposals In chapter 1 we introduced [a stit: Q], the stit sentence, solely to represent agentive sentences.* We stated some theses about stit and agency, and we presented a "mini-history," going back to St. Anselm, of earlier proposals to treat agency through a modal construction. Then in chapter 2 we provided a theory of branching alternative histories as a foundation for two semantic accounts of [a stit: Q]—the achievement and deliberative stits—and we explored some applications of the achievement stit. Here we propose to deal in more detail with some earlier discussions to which we alluded in our "mini-history." Among several proposals in the neighborhood of the stit sentence that we inventoried in §1D, we will concentrate on those of von Wright, Chisholm, Kenny, and Castaneda. As we shall see, their influential proposals differ in small yet important ways from the stit sentence. These differences offer an opportunity for additional discussion of some of the stit theses proposed in chapter 1 and listed in §1: the agentiveness of stit thesis, stit complement thesis, stit paraphrase thesis, imperative content thesis, restricted complement thesis, and stit normal form thesis. We will not here argue for the stit paraphrase thesis, Thesis 3. Rather we will show its value throughout as we use it to distinguish between sentences that are agentive and those that are not. Two of the theses, the agentiveness of stit thesis, Thesis 1, and the stit complement thesis, Thesis 2, are considered, in one form or another, in every section. Von Wright, Chisholm, Kenny, and Castaneda have all pressed for the exclusion of some sentences as complements in agentive sentences. Again and again we shall see the ways in which our understanding of agency and action is increased when we insure that [a stit: Q] *With the permission of Kluwer Academic Publishers, this chapter draws on Perloff 1995.
59
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Introduction to stit
is grammatical and meaningful for any arbitrary sentence Q, and concomitantly that [a stit: Q] is always agentive for the agent We will consider the restricted complement thesis, Thesis 5, specifically for deontic contexts in connection with the proposals of both von Wright and Castaneda. As we shall see, deontic logic is enriched and clarified by the restriction that deontic statements such as obligations, prohibitions, and permissions must take agentive complements. About the stit normal form thesis, Thesis 6, we will say nothing more, except to express the hope that by the end of the chapter you find that its truth and value go without saying. As for the imperative content thesis, Thesis 4, although imperatives come up here from time to time, we defer their direct discussion until chapter 4. Before concluding this chapter, we will have a few words to say about Davidson, whose approach is very different from that of stit theory. Davidson rejects modal treatments, crafting instead a linguistic structure that is obviously extensional, a structure that invites us to focus on an ontology of actions as events.
3A
Von Wright
In §1B.2 we argued the inadequacy of the two standard accounts of deontic statements. The one allows any declarative sentence, no matter how divorced from agency, to occur as a complement in a deontic account. The other lets the complements in deontic statements be action nominals. Take for example a permission statement symbolized by Pa. On the sentence-complement account, one would replace "a" by a sentence such as "Persia is conquered," so that Pa could be instanced by "It is permitted that Persia is conquered." According to the action-nominal account, however, permission would be treated as an adjective that modifies action nominals. So with "a" replaced by the actionnominal, "conquering Persia," Pa might have as an instance "Conquering Persia is permitted." Von Wright's program, along with both Castaneda's practitions and the stit sentence, has, among its goals, providing an acceptable alternative to these two unsatisfactory approaches. In this section we explain just enough of an early proposal of von Wright's to compare it to the stit sentence. Page references are all to von Wright 1966. Both von Wright's sentence form and the stit sentence restrict the complements of deontic statements to a well-defined class of agentives. Both reflect the fact that time and change must be reflected in the structure of agentive sentences. Von Wright, however, incorporates time and change into his language by restricting the complements of agentive forms to T-sentences. As we shall see, that decision, in contravention of the stit complement thesis, significantly weakens his account, particularly in its failure to illuminate the connections between acting and refraining. The T-sentence, which stands at the center of von Wright's language of actions and agents, takes, as complements, two propositions—each of which describes a state of affairs—and yields a sentence that describes an event. An event sentence such as p Tq "describes the transformation of or transition from
3. Small yet important differences from earlier proposals
61
a p-world to a g-world" (pp. 25-26), where the transition is either the alteration of a state into its negation, or the maintenance of a state just as it is. Von Wright tells us that transitions are to be thought of as ordered pairs of states of affairs, whose ordering "is a relation between two occasions which are successive in time" (p. 27). Since between two successive moments a state of affairs may either remain unchanged or be transformed into its negation, there are four elementary state transformations: PTP PT~P ~PTP ~PT~P.
In von Wright's language, just as sentences describing states of affairs appear as complements in T-sentences, so T-sentences appear as complements in sentences of achievement or forbearance. Sentences describing agentive achievements are constructed by prefixing the d operator to a T-sentence, while forbearings or refrainings are described by prefixing the / operator to a T-sentence. Since we began with four elementary T-sentences, there will be eight elementary forms, an agentive doing for each elementary state transformation, and an agentive refraining for each elementary state transformation. For example, we have d(~PTP)
as von Wright's notation for sentences of the form the agent sees to it that a world in which not-p obtains is transformed into a world in which p obtains, while f(~PTP)
is the official notation for sentences of the form the agent refrains from seeing to it that a world in which not-p obtains is transformed into a world in which p obtains. (We ignore truth-functionally compounded T-sentences; that development makes no difference to our story. See Belnap 1999 for additional discussion of T-sentences in connection with the theory of concrete transitions and with special reference to branching space-time.) In order to begin the comparison, let us recall that according to the stit paraphrase thesis the English sentence Alexander tamed Bucephalus, when it is agentive for Alexander, can be represented as a stit sentence of the form [a stit: Q], specifically [Alexander stit: Bucephalus was tamed].
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Introduction to stit
The sentence is settled true just in case there was a prior choice of the agent Alexander that guaranteed the truth of "Bucephalus was tamed." On von Wright's account that same sentence, represented by d(~pTp), is true just in case (i) "... the state described by ~p prevails on the first of the two successive occasions" and (ii) "... the change described by (~pTp) does not happen, as we say, 'of itself, i.e., independently of the action of the agent" (p. 43). That is, on the first of two occasions "Bucephalus was not tamed" is true, on the second occasion "Bucephalus was tamed" is true, and the change did not happen independently of Alexander. Von Wright's agentive sentence forms, with T-sentences as their complements, are an important step forward in our understanding, insofar as they explicitly introduce at the heart of the discussion of agency considerations of time and change. Such considerations focus our attention on the fact that a language adequate to the description of agents and their achievements must deal with the past, present, and—above all—the future. Let us notice that the agent, whose importance is acknowledged in the original English sentence—as well as in von Wright's statement of the truth conditions— is lost in the official idiom; when the agentive sentence occurs as the complement of another sentence the agent is not easily retrievable. The stit sentence, on the other hand, is specific in locating the agent as someone who makes choices among alternatives and by those choices sees to it that a proposition is settled true. The agent is essential in the things which he brings about; if "Alexander tamed Bucephalus" is settled true, it is so because Alexander made a choice, a choice that guaranteed the truth of "Bucephalus is tamed." For these reasons, the stit sentence gives a distinguished place to the agent, by insuring that the agent term always remains easily and obviously recoverable. Further, the agent is essential in the things that he or she forbears from bringing about. Forbearing, or refraining, presents an interesting challenge because forbearing is not doing. As von Wright puts it, "forbearing is not the same as not-doing simpliciter" (p. 45). The problem then is to talk about something which seems to be both a doing and a not-doing and also seems to be neither a doing nor a not-doing. As we saw earlier, von Wright's device for introducing agentive refrainings or forbearings into the language is structurally analogous to his introduction of agentive accomplishments; he simply prefixes each of the four elementary change statements with a refraining operator. Recall that f(p T~p) is the official version of a refraining sentence where the agent refrained from seeing to it that a world in which p obtains was transformed into a world in which p didn't obtain, so when Alexander refrained from setting free Darius's wife is true, von Wright would have us represent it as Alexander forbore to destroy the world in which Darius's wife was held captive (which world does not, on the occasion in question, change of itself into a world where she was not held captive).
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It is surely to von Wright's credit that he faces the problem of refraining directly. For the most part, it is a problem that philosophers interested in the topic have, at best, briefly mentioned before going on to talk about something else. Refraining, as von Wright has clearly seen, is equal in importance to other agentive achievements and equally worthy of philosophical attention. Because the two operators d and f are introduced independently, we have lost the deep and important connection that holds between seeing to it that and refraining. Because that connection cannot be clarified on von Wright's account, he is forced to treat refrainings and agentive accomplishments as entirely different species in the same genus. There is nothing in either the syntax or the semantics of von Wright's sentence forms that helps in any way to clarify or explain their relationship. Exploiting the ability of the stit sentence to clarify the linguistic environments in which agentives are found, we can use the sentence Alexander refrains from freeing Darius's wife vividly to exhibit just how refraining (§2B.2) is connected with doing, how an agent sees to it that something is not done. First, notice that Alexander frees Darius's wife is agentive for Alexander since equivalent to [Alexander stit: Alexander frees Darius's wife]. In contrast, Alexander does not free Darius's wife is not agentive. It is not agentive because it is a mere denial of agency. A denial of agency such as "a does not free Darius's wife" fails quite generally to be equivalent to [a stit: a does not free Darius's wife], since many things, including some that aren't even agents, are not seeing to it that they do not free Darius's wife. Because refraining is agentive, "Alexander refrains from freeing Darius's wife" must have the form [a stit: Q]. It can thus be represented as [Alexander stit: ~[Alexander stit: Alexander frees Darius's wife]]. Using the stit sentence, we can see exactly how it is that refraining is agentive and how it differs from simply seeing to it that some state of affairs obtains. To refrain, an agent a must see to it that a, that very same agent, is not agentive in seeing-to-it-that some proposition holds. Thus, to refrain from freeing the captive, Alexander must see to it that he, Alexander, is not agentive in the matter of freeing Darius's wife. That, of course, is consistent with someone else seeing to it that the unfortunate woman is freed. It is also consistent with her seeing to it that she is freed, that is, with her escaping. The general account of refraining from doing is thus
64
Introduction to stit
which exactly accords with §2B.2. This picture of refraining, in which an agent sees to it that he or she doesn't see to it that some proposition holds, shows in its structure the connection between seeing to it that and refraining. It is equally at home with more modern constructions such as "Don't smoke in bed" and "Don't sit under the apple tree with anyone else but me." When the declarative complement of the refraining statement is not itself agentive, yet has an agent as its grammatical subject, a simpler account is available. For instance, the imperative "Refrain from getting captured by Alexander," as addressed by Darius to his wife, has a simpler non-nested analysis:
in particular [Darius's wife stit: ~Darius's wife gets captured by Alexander]. As it happened, she failed to refrain from getting captured, but Alexander didn't fail to refrain from freeing her. Within deontic contexts, the conceptual gain provided by the stit sentence in accord with §1B.2 and §2B.9 is just as pronounced. In harmony with the restricted complement thesis, Thesis 5, deontic statements must have one of the following forms: Oblg:[ stit: Q]: is obligated to see to it that Q Frbn:[ stit: Q]: is forbidden to see to it that Q Perm:[ stit: Q]: is permitted to see to it that Q.
The equivalences Frbn:[ stit: Q] Perm:[ stit: Q]
Perm:[ stit: Q and Frbn:[ stit: Q]
continue to hold, but as indicated also in §2B.9, what to take as the forbidden/obliged equivalence is not so obvious. Frbn:[ stit: Q]
Oblg[ stit: ~Q]
can be false when ~Q is not agentive for a. For example, a common soldier may be forbidden to see to it that the prisoners are fed without being obligated to see to it that the prisoners fail to be fed. Furthermore, Frbn:[ stit: Q]
Oblg[ stit: Q]
is grammatically unacceptable because, as we just saw, ~[a stit: Q], though the negation of an agentive, need not itself be agentive. The following equivalence, as suggested in §2B.9, seems likely to be the appropriate one: Frbn:[ stit: Q]
Oblg:[ stit: ~[ stit: Q]].
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"The guard is forbidden to see to it that the prisoners are set free" is true just in case "The guard is obligated to see to it that he does not see to it that the prisoners are set free" is true. That is, the guard is forbidden to free the prisoners just in case he is obligated to refrain from freeing the prisoners. Symmetry suggests that whenever the guard is obligated to set the prisoners free, he is forbidden to see to it that he does not set them free. Thus the equivalence Oblg:[ stit: Q]
Frbn:[ stit: ~[ stit: Q
also seems correct. (In §3C we say a bit more about refraining and negation.) In summary, von Wright's form marks a step forward in our understanding as it properly restricts the complements of deontic structures to agentive sentences. But because his agentive forms are constructed by affixing the d operator or the / operator to T-sentences, there is no possibility of the nesting of agentives, something the stit sentence promotes. With the nesting of agentives, we gain the ability to express the connections between such agentives as refraining and doing. With the ability to express these connections, we can demonstrate the value of restricting the complements of deontic constructions to agentives when the complements of agentives are all declarative sentences.
3B
Chisholm
Von Wright, as we have seen, constructs his language of agency and agentive achievements upon a foundation of changes and transitions. One difficulty von Wright faced was providing an adequate account of the connection between doing and refraining. A natural response is to introduce agentive intentions into the syntactic structure of the language. Chisholm, in a series of essays, has elaborated upon just such a sentence form, one whose foundation includes the explicit introduction of agentive endeavors. Such an undertaking, involving as it does the introduction of intentions within the syntactic structure, invites comparison to the stit sentence because stit incorporates all mental considerations into the prior choice of the agent. Chisholm's work on this matter, beginning in 1964, covers more than a decade and is to be found in more than a dozen different places. Though there are terminological changes and subtle conceptual alterations, the basic ideas and their modes of presentation remain sufficiently unchanged to be presented in a unified fashion. For simplicity of exposition we follow most closely the account in Chisholm 1969. Chisholm's enterprise is built on the sentence form He made it happen that
in the endeavor to make it happen that ...
that transforms the ordinary English Joan of Arc joined the Dauphin's forces to defeat the English into
66
Introduction to stit Joan of Arc made it happen that she joined the Dauphin's forces in the endeavor to make it happen that the English are defeated.
This sentence form—Chisholm calls it an undefined locution—has as its official abbreviation (M _,...). There are three open places in the undefined locution: The first is the subject term of the sentence; the second, the complement of "makes happen," is nonintentional; the third, the complement of "in the endeavor to," is explicitly intentional and teleological. We will discuss the grammar and metaphysics of the first open place, then go on to speak about the grammar and metaphysics of the other two open places in the undefined locution. We conclude this section with a brief discussion of when an agent "could have done otherwise." Because the agent term in the undefined locution has no distinguished place either within the structure of that form or in the official abbreviation, it may not be obvious that there are three open places in the undefined locution. There appear to be only two, one represented by the dots and another by the dashes. Chisholm's consistent use of the word "he" as the subject of the undefined locution reinforces this misperception, as does the fact that the agent term is dropped altogether in the official abbreviation (M , ...). The stit sentence, in contrast, insures by its structure that the agent term is always recoverable no matter where it occurs. Though it is not clearly marked, there is no doubt that there is a place in the undefined locution for an individual term. While Chisholm doesn't tell us much about it, he does say that "[t]he subject term of 'makes happen' may designate either a state of affairs or a person" (Chisholm 1964b, p. 615). By allowing terms that refer to states of affairs to appear in the subject place, Chisholm is trying to exploit the similarity of structure between saying that one state of affairs makes another happen and saying that an agent makes-it-happen or sees to it that a certain outcome eventuates. He says in identifying the two that "... any instance of our locution will refer to the agent as a cause, and it will imply that he makes something happen" (Chisholm 1969, p. 206). It may not be a good policy to allow states of affairs to appear in the first open place. For, while it is plausible to say that one state of affairs makes another happen, it will never be plausible to say that one state of affairs makes another happen in the endeavor to make something happen. So though it may be true to say that The French attacking the English at Patay made it happen that the English were routed at Patay, it will never be true to say that The French attacking the English made it happen that the English were routed at Patay in the endeavor to drive the English out of France,
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because no states of affairs endeavor or intend or aim to do anything. Therefore, since there are no true instances of the undefined locution with a subject term that refers to a state of affairs rather than an agent, and since allowing both terms designating states of affairs and agent terms to appear in the same open place offers no conceptual advantage, it is a mistake to allow terms referring to states of affairs to appear at all. Let us turn now to the grammar and metaphysics of the second and third places of the undefined locution. In these two places Chisholm allows the "blanks to be filled by well-formed sentences or, in the case of the second blank, by the subjunctive version of such a sentence" (Chisholm 1971, p. 36). Because he wants to speak of an agent making happen, in addition to an agent makes it happen that , he also allows gerundive expressions to appear in those two places. Chisholm justifies this grammatical decision as follows: For every well-formed sentence, there is a corresponding gerundive expression. Thus for "Socrates is mortal" there is "Socrates being mortal" as well as "Its being the case that Socrates is mortal"; and for "Socrates is mortal and all swans are white," there is "Socrates being mortal and all swans being white" as well as "It being the case that Socrates is mortal and all swans are white." The gerundives of well-formed sentences may be said to designate states of affairs. (Chisholm 1971, p. 39) The stit approach, by contrast, recommends grammatically restricting the complements of agentives to all and only declarative sentences because that approach avoids unnecessary difficulties. Nested gerundives are more confusing and more difficult to understand than are their sentential counterparts. Additionally, gerundives, whether nested or not, pose serious difficulties in deciding their reference. The stit sentence avoids such problems by allowing all and only declarative sentences to stand as complements. Concerning the metaphysics of those two places, Chisholm suggests a restriction on the sentences (or gerundive expressions) that are allowed to occur there; those that refer to actions, he tells us, may not always be acceptable substituends. He argues that because "we are attempting to describe action ... in terms of making things happen in the endeavor to make things happen," we should not normally allow "expressions which themselves refer to actions" (Chisholm 1966, p. 32). In contrast, the stit sentence doesn't rule out agentive sentences as complements; it encourages finding uses for agentive complements. As we saw in the discussion of refraining, such a practice can be actively enlightening. To sum up the last two points: Insofar as Chisholm is willing to have all and only indicative sentences as substituends in those places, it is a point of similarity with stit; insofar as his position is either less restrictive (in that it allows gerunds) or more restrictive (in that it disallows agentives) it differs from stit. These differences aside, both Chisholm's undefined locution and the stit sentence are designed to help clarify such questions as when it is true to say that
68
Introduction to stit
an agent "could have done otherwise." On Chisholm's account, when we say that an agent could have done otherwise, we mean that, although at eight o'clock this morning I did not make it happen that I arranged things in such a way that I would be in San Francisco now, nevertheless it was then within my power to make it happen that I so arranged things. The 'could,' therefore, is 'constitutionally iffy.' And the proposed explication is consistent with saying that for some time there has been a sufficient causal condition for my not being in San Francisco now. But the freedom of the so-called 'actus voluntatis elicitus' is preserved. For we may say that there was no sufficient causal condition this morning for my not undertaking to arrange that I would be in San Francisco now; and from this it would follow that such an undertaking was then within my power. (Chisholm 1969, p. 217) There is in chapter 9 an extensive discussion of various concepts in the vicinity of could-have, with proofs and pictures. Here, we only note that Chisholm has clearly described one clear case of when an agent could have done otherwise. Where Q = "Chisholm boards the plane for San Francisco," then the example has both Q and ~Q as agentive, the point of evaluation at the moment "now" where [Chisholm stit: ~Q] is settled true, and there is a choice for Chisholm at 8:00 A.M. alternative to the one he made that guarantees Q to be settled true at that same instant. That is, at 8:00 A.M. Chisholm had a choice either to see to it that he was in San Francisco that afternoon or to see to it that he was not. But the situation is more complicated than that. This is not all we might mean by "could have done otherwise." Because, by the negative condition, Chisholm need only risk the falsity of an outcome, only one of Q or ~Q needs be agentive for us to correctly picture when an agent could-have-done otherwise. Notice that in each of the cases the freedom of the 'actus voluntatis elicitus' is preserved. We can make these calculations because the stit sentence (i) distinguishes between agentive and non-agentive sentences, ( i i ) focuses attention on the agent, (lii) insists that all and only declarative sentences appear as complements in agentive sentences, and (iv) has a precisely drawn semantics that pictures agents making choices against a background of branching time.
3C
Kenny
Kenny presents his important and influential exploration of agents and their achievements through his discussions of emotion and the will in Kenny 1963. Unlike von Wright, whose language is founded upon a metaphysics of elementary state transformations, and unlike Chisholm, whose starting point involves endeavors and intentions, Kenny's account of agents and actions begins with
3. Small yet important differences from earlier proposals
69
language itself. In this section we shall see how the stit sentence, which is very like Kenny's canonical form, "bringing it about that P" can be used to clarify some important problems in the vicinity of agency, problems that require the full power of the stit sentence for their solution. Kenny proceeds by "considering the special logical properties of the finite verbs we employ to report actions" in the attempt "to isolate a simple and fundamental pattern of description of human activity, which reports of emotional states and reports of voluntary action alike exemplify" (Kenny 1963, p. 151). The finite verbs used to report actions—verbs of action—are those verbs "which may occur in the answer to a question of the form "What did A do?" (p. 154). Because the answers to that question may vary widely, Kenny focuses more specifically on "transitive verbs of action, such as occur in the sentences 'Brutus killed Caesar', 'Wren built St Paul's', 'Mary roasted the beef, and 'Shaw admired Caesar'" (p. 154). After locating a class of sentences in which each member has an agentive subject, a transitive verb of action as its main verb, and an object of the verb, Kenny argues that such sentences, that is, agentive sentences, ought not to be accounted simply as relations of the form Rab. There are at least five important differences, Kenny argues, between action sentences and ordinary two-place relations. We will consider Kenny's five ways later in this section. Having established, to his satisfaction, the distinction between action sentences and other relations, Kenny proceeds to a discussion of the verbs that occur in action sentences. Throughout the discussion Kenny remains constantly aware of the grammatics of his project, that is, of the important connections between the grammar of English sentences to be studied and the grammar of the logic to be used to represent them. Kenny locates three species of verb in the genus verb of action: static verb, performance verb, and activity verb. Static verbs, Kenny tells us, such as "love" "understand," and "fear," do not have continuous tenses, and "where '(o ' is a static verb 'A has od' implies 'A os'" (p. 173). Performance verbs such as "discover," "learn," and "find" do have continuous tenses, and "where 'o' is a performance-verb, 'A has od' implies 'A is not oing'" (p. 173). Activity verbs such as "listen to" and "keep a secret" do have a continuous tense, but " 'A is oing' implies rather 'A has o d ' " (p. 172). Kenny's canonical form, "bringing it about that p," represents any sentence whose main verb is a performance verb. He reasons that "... the primary form of description of a piece of voluntary behavior takes the form of a performance verb ... [and] any performance verb can be replaced by an expression of the form 'bringing it about that p.' where '(p)' describes the state of affairs which is the result of the process" (p. 236). We can see from the quotation that Kenny has already decided to restrict the complement in "bringing it about that p" to sentences that describe states of affairs, more particularly states of affairs that are the results of processes. Once again, the stit complement thesis specifically rejects that restriction. Kenny's own example,
70
Introduction to stit ... when I learn French, I bring it about that I know French, i.e., that I have the capacity to speak French (p. 183)
can be used to reinforce the importance of the thesis. All of the following stit sentences are, in this context, equivalent: [Kenny stit: he learns French] [Kenny stit: he knows French] [Kenny stit: he has the capacity to speak French], though the complement of the first is agentive, the complement of the second describes a state of affairs, and the complement of the third is explicitly dispositional. By allowing any declarative sentence to appear as complement, the stit sentence changes the focus from actions to agents. It is the agent, in this case Kenny, who learns French, is responsible for paying the tuition, or is required to take the examination. The stit sentence reflects this fact by insuring in its semantics that the agent term remains recoverable no matter how deeply the stit sentence is embedded within wider contexts. Exploiting the stit complement thesis yet again we can disentangle Kenny's claim that "'John is taller than James' cannot be rewritten in the form 'John is bringing it about that ...'" (p. 182). Doubtless he means that "John is taller than James" is not agentive for John, because it is not equivalent to "John sees to it that John is taller than James." But he might be interpreted to mean that the sentence "John is bringing it about that taller than James" is incoherent because ungrammatical. Or he might be interpreted to mean that [John stit: John is taller than James], though grammatical and meaningful, will usually be false. "Usually" because if John has tied his legs to a rack and is stretching himself to gain the needed height, the sentence is bizarre but true. The stit sentence provides a way to distinguish the cases. Exploration of the modalities of agency requires breaking away from a picture of actions as events. Kenny, in his perceptive discussion, is considering just that alternative. He tells us that there are two ways of reporting the same event ("A od B" and "B was od by A"), and it is indeed possible to regard the notion of an event as an abstraction from these two forms of expression, designed to enable us to consider an occurrence without commitment to a special interest in either A or B.1 (p. 180) Restating the point with stit, we may say that there are two ways of reporting the same action, both of which can be paraphrased as [a stit: Q] : a sees to it that Q or 1
The symbols "A" and "B," as Kenny uses them, take individual terms for either the subject or the object of a "transitive verb of action."
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71
that .Q was seen to by a, and it is indeed possible to regard the notion of an action as an abstraction from these two forms of expression. Consider now the five ways Kenny claims that sentences of agency and action differ from ordinary relations of the form Rab: i. "Actions exhibit a variable polyadicity which is foreign to relations. [In sentences of action] we can pass from a dyadic relational proposition to a proposition made up of a single-place predicate and a name" (p. 156). ii. "The reverse of the first one. A sentence reporting an action not only can be shorn of one of its terms without making nonsense; it can also have further terms added to it in various ways" (p. 159). iii. "There is always more than one way in which a sentence containing a transitive verb of action may be false" (p. 162). iv. "Whatever is capable of occurring as the first term of a given n-adic relation is capable of occurring as the second or the nth term of the same relation. No distinction can be made between the various terms of a relation corresponding to that which can be made between an agent and the object of an action" (p. 167). v. "If Leonardo had not painted the Mona, Lisa, then one of the terms of the 'relation' would not exist. A relational sentence is equally 'about' either of its terms" (p. 168). Concerning the first and second ways: The stit sentence does not, nor is it meant to, shed light on Kenny's problems about variable polyadicity. One part of the problem is tractable. We can use the stit sentence to "pass from a dyadic relational proposition to a proposition made up of a single-place predicate and a name." We can make the inference, for example, from the canonically formed agentive [Leonardo stit: the Mono Lisa is painted] to the monadic "the Mona. Lisa is painted." This is an instance of the more general truth that [a stit: P] implies P. Further, adding sentential terms in the complement place of a stit sentence is grammatically unproblematic because there is no restriction on the declarative complement that can appear there, but it is logically tricky. Since all declaratives may be used as sentential complements in stit sentences, sentences of any logical complexity can equally stand in that place. But not all such additions yield valid arguments, [a stit: P or Q] does not follow, for example, from [a stit: P] or [a stit: Q]. Where Q is ~P, the case is clear since the tautology (P V~P) is never false. Because its falsity is never at risk, it is not guaranteed to be settled true by a choice of the agent. For example, it is true that [Leonardo stit: he paints the Mona Lisa] implies (by propositional logic)
72
Introduction to stit [Leonardo stit: he paints the Mona, Lisa] or [Leonardo stit: he doesn't paint the Mona Lisa],
but, as Porn 1974 lucidly argues, it is never true that [Leonardo stit: he paints the Mona Lisa or he doesn't paint the Mona Lisa]. Concerning the third way, Kenny says A sentence may be false in more than one way, in this sense, if and only if more than one state of affairs which would make it false may be described merely by the use of terms occurring in the sentence itself along with quantifiers, variables, and the negative operator (p. 163). Kenny's point here has less to do with the differences between agentives and other relations than with the adequate representation of negations in agentive sentences. As we noted in §2B.2, English does not clearly distinguish among various negations of a sentence such as The Mona Lisa is completed. The stit sentence, because it has sufficient structure to accommodate negation, is up to the task: From the comparatively simple ~[a stit: Q], It is false that Leonardo saw to it that the Mona Lisa was completed to the more complicated [a stit: ~ Q ] , Leonardo saw to it that the Mona Lisa was not completed or still more complicated [a stit: ~[a stit: Q]], Leonardo refrained from seeing to it that the Mona Lisa was completed. Because stit encourages nesting, and because stit has the appropriate structure to manage any number of negations, it can even deal with such sentences as [a stit: ~[a stit: ~[a stit: ~Q]]], Leonardo refrained from refraining from seeing to it that the Mona Lisa was not completed. Nor are we left up in the air about the interpretation of this sentence. In §2B.6 and §2B.8 we discussed refraining from refraining in a preliminary way, and in §15C we prove that in the special finite case that we sometimes call "no busy choosers," (see Def. 14), the sentence [ stit: ~[ stit: ~[ stit: ~Q]]] is equivalent to
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73
[a stit: ~Q]. We prove, that is, that the absence of busy choosers implies the validity of the "refref equivalence," Ax. Conc. 1, expressing the idea that to refrain from refraining from seeing to it that ~Q is the same as seeing to it that ~Q. Furthermore, chapter 18 proves the converse, that the presence of busy choosers implies the invalidity of the refref equivalence. Kenny's claim in the fourth way is that any term in a relation can stand equally in any place of the relation, but that the same is not true of agentive or action sentences. But there is no real difference, in this regard, between agentives and other relations. In "The painter of Mona Lisa is of Italian nationality," or "The element hydrogen has an atomic weight of 1," either of which might be symbolized as Rab, confusion may result when the terms are interchanged. The same kind of confusion might result if someone were to say "That the Mona Lisa is painted sees to it that Leonardo." Though inequality of terms is not distinctive of agentive sentences, Kenny has perceptively highlighted the contrast in such sentences between the agentive place and the sentential complement place. With regard to the fifth way, concerning existence and aboutness, the point seems to be that very often individuals are identified and described by reference to an antecedent. Though the antecedent is often agentive, it need not be. From the relational sentence "The annual flow of mud down the Nile doesn't deposit mud in the Nile Delta," we may infer that one of the terms of the relation, the Nile Delta, does not exist. Kenny's canonical form "bringing it about that P" is put to work in his theory of volition. The account has three parts: (i) the agent brings it about that P, (ii) the agent wills that P, and (iii) it is in the agent's power not to bring it about that P. With respect to ( i i ) , stit theory avoids explicit discussion of volition or will. Instead stit deals with an approximation of sees to it that by having [a stit: P] be settled true just in case a choice of the agent, a, guarantees the truth of P. Questions of volition or will are thereby postponed by incorporating all mental considerations into the agent's prior choice. With respect to ( i i i ) , if it means that it was possible at the time the choice is made for P to be false, the claim is correct. For if [a stit: P] is settled true, then it was possible for P to be false at an alternative moment. On the other hand, if (iii) means that it must be in the agent's power to see to it that he or she doesn't see to it that P, then (iii) is wrong. The considerations are similar those at the end of the preceding section. When Leonardo sees to it that the Battle of Anghiari is completed is settled true, it is not a necessary condition that there was a prior choice point when it was possible that Leonardo sees to it that the Battle of Anghiari is not completed is also true. It might have been that Leonardo's students were going to complete the painting at any point at which Leonardo stopped working. Further, if the
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Introduction to stit
force of (in) is that it must be in the agent's power to see to it that ~P, where P is specifically agentive, it is also wrong. When Leonardo sees to it that he paints the Mona, Lisa is settled true, then there was a prior choice point at which it was possible for Leonardo paints the Mona Lisa to be false, but it is not a necessary condition that there was a prior choice point when it was possible that Leonardo sees to it that he doesn't paint the Mona Lisa is true. Further discussion can be found in §2B.2, including a pictorial demonstration of these results in Figure 2.6. The point is that when [a stit: P] is settled true, then at the prior choice point it was obviously possible for P to be false, therefore possible that [a stit: P] would turn out to be false, but neither of these involve a'S power. Therefore, neither the possible falsity of P nor the possible falsity of [a stit: P] need be due to the agency of a. As we have seen, because the complement of the canonical form "bringing it about that P" is restricted to sentences describing states of affairs, that form cannot shed sufficient light on the differences between agentives and other relational sentence forms. Nor can it shed sufficient light on the various negations of agentive sentences. Further, because it does not have a precise semantics, "bringing it about that P" cannot make the fine distinctions between agentive powers and temporal possibilities. The stit sentence, although it can help clarify all those issues, remains only subtly different from Kenny's canonical form.
3D
Castaneda
Von Wright begins his study with considerations of change and alteration, Chisholm with intentions and endeavors, and Kenny with the language of agency and action itself. Castaneda, to whom we now turn, sets out to clarify matters by considering practical reasoning. On Castaneda's account, the language of agents and their achievements takes actions to be the finished products of causal sequences that originate in practical reasoning. Practitions, the contents of practical reasoning, are markedly similar to stit sentences. This similarity is not an accident. It arises from the fact that both practitions and stit sentences are intended, among other things, to function as the descriptive core of deontic constructions. The schematic account that follows merely skims the surface of Castaneda's extensive theories. It is meant to provide just enough background to allow us to make some comparisons with stit. For further discussion of Castaneda's language of action see Castaneda 1974 and Castaneda 1975, as well as the commentaries of Bratman 1983 and Tomberlin 1983a. Castaneda separates practical thinking from theoretical thinking, giving each a different characteristic activity and a different characteristic content. The
3. Small yet important differences from earlier proposals
75
characteristic activity of theoretical reasoning is contemplation and its characteristic content is the proposition. The characteristic activity of practical reasoning is deliberation and its characteristic content is the practition. Practitions are "the nonpropositional purely practical contents of practical thinking"; they appear either as prescriptions or intentions (Castaneda 1976, p. 106). Prescriptions are second or third person contents, while intentions are first person nonpropositional contents of practical thinking. Prescriptions "are, on the one hand, the cores of commands, requests and acts of telling someone to do something; on the other hand, a practition is what one intends, plans, or decides to do" (Castaneda 1976, p. 106). For the purposes of this discussion, we think nothing is lost by talking only about practitions. Castaneda's canonical form for practitions, X to A, with X open for "a name or description of an agent or agents," and A open for "a description of the act or acts to be performed" (Castaneda 1974, pp. 39-40), is very similar to the stit sentence, except that it restricts the second open place to verbs that describe acts. Thus, even though all practitions are agentive, not all agentives are practitions. Castaneda offers an argument for adopting the narrower approach. (The asterisks are a quotational device that produce the name of a content of practical reason, that is, they produce the name of a practition; see Castaneda 1975, pp. 19-20. An obvious typographical error has been corrected in this passage.) Some philosophers, including myself during some periods of reflection, have proposed to analyze all actions as bringings about of some state of affairs. On one view of such a type, the attribution to John of the action of opening the door made by the action proposition *John opened the door* is really the proposition *John brought it about that the door became open*. This view is, however, glaringly incorrect. Clearly, John can bring it about that the door becomes open, without himself opening it, for example, by having Marilyn open it. (Castaneda 1975, p. 98) By now we know that according to the stit complement thesis (Thesis 2), [a stit: Q] is agentive for any arbitrary sentence Q; according to Castaneda's objection some sentences, those that produce obviously false agentives, should be excluded from the complement place. The clear truth of Castaneda's premiss, that there are some complements in agentive constructions that produce absurdities, ought not to lead us to accept the conclusion that such constructions should be excluded from our language. Consider that conjunctions in propositional logic are true when all their conjuncts are. We do not, on that account, exclude those conjuncts that are the negations of one another. We have trivialities and absurdities in the language of our theories because it is good logical practice to include as well formed all those constructions that promise to be illuminating, even if they are absurd, even if they are trivial. Thus, in a stit sentence there is neither grammatical nor metaphysical nor semantic restriction on the declaratives that may be put in place of Q. While
76
Introduction to stit
some resulting stit sentences may be distinctly odd and some obviously false, such cases turn out to be revealing. They further our understanding of agency, of agentive sentences, and of the wider environments in which agentives are found. We have already seen that when Q is a tautology, [a stit: Q] will never be true. The negative condition will never be satisfied, since the tautology is settled true on every history, so cannot be true due to the prior choice of a. Similarly, when Q is a contradiction, [a stit: Q] will never be true. In this latter case, the positive condition will always be violated since there is no history on which a contradiction is ever settled true. We also noticed in previous sections that having these forms available is a significant aid to the understanding of inferences involving agentives. Castaneda's example in his objection to the stit complement thesis does not happen to concern complements that are tautologies or contradictions, but rather a class of English sentences involving two agentive sentences with different agents as subjects. Castaneda's conclusion is that neither one should be allowed to appear as the complement of the other. Again, because there is much to be said about such cases that cannot be said if such sentences are deemed to be ungrammatical, it is not good policy to exclude them. Consider the two agents John and Marilyn and the sentence "The door is open." Let us assume that the English sentence John opens the door, when it is agentive for John, is strongly equivalent to [John stit: the door is open], and is settled true just in case "the door is open" is true due to a prior choice of the agent John. Let us also assume that [Marilyn stit: the door is open] is equivalent to [Marilyn stit: Marilyn opens the door]. When John and Marilyn act jointly, perhaps by jointly heaving a heavy door that neither could open alone, it is settled true that [John and Marilyn stit: the door is open]. What drives Castaneda's intuition is that when John opens the door and
Marilyn opens the door are both agentive, then neither
3. Small yet important differences from earlier proposals
77
[John stit: Marilyn opens the door] nor
[Marilyn stit: John opens the door] will ever be true. We prove as Fact 10-2 that stit theory implies this result; here our aim is merely to make it plausible. Consider just the last example: If John's choice guarantees that The door is open is true, then there is no room for Marilyn's choice. She cannot be agentive in the matter of the open door. On the other hand, when Marilyn's choice guarantees that "the door is open" is true, then [John stit: the door is open] must be false. Marilyn might convince or cajole or seduce John into opening the door. In those cases, she does not see to it that the door is open; instead she sees to it that John is more or less likely to open the door. Notice how much different it is to deny another agent a choice. John can see to it that Marilyn doesn't open the door by barring her way or opening it before she does. She in turn can see to it that he doesn't open the door by locking it. If, however, Marilyn rigs up a Rube Goldberg device on which she pulls a lever that throws a switch that drops a ball that shoves an unconscious John against the door, whereupon his body pushes the door open, then "John opens the door," taken as summarizing this event, is not agentive. On that reading of "John opens the door," [Marilyn stit: John opens the door] is settled true but unproblematic. For when the complement of a stit sentence is not agentive, and the stit sentence is true, there is no difficulty. On the other hand, when the complement Q of [a stit: Q] has an agent-term different from a for its grammatical subject, if the complement is agentive then the stit sentence is always false (see §10B for details). That is an interesting and informative fact, made clear by allowing all declarative sentences to appear as complements of stit sentences. There is a place for the exclusion of complements, not in stit sentences but in deontic constructions. On that point we are in full agreement with Castaneda. Practitions are what agents intend, plan, or decide to do; practitions are the contents of requests and tellings. The stit sentence is also meant to represent all such contents. It is an agent who is obligated to see to it that something is the case. An agent a fulfills an obligation to see to it that Q just when [a stit: Q] is settled true. Castaneda tells us that one of his oldest philosophical theses is that "deontic concepts are modal operators that transform the purely practical, nonpropositional contents of practical thinking into propositions" (Castaneda 1976, p. 106). The restricted complement thesis makes the same point in its insistence that deontic constructions must take agentive complements. One exciting application of this thesis is found in Castaneda 1981: the attempt to solve all the
78
Introduction to stit
deontic paradoxes by enforcing restrictions on deontic complements. A similar project, using the stit sentence as the foundation, is reported in chapter 11. Notice that the restricted complement thesis taken together with the stit complement thesis insures completeness because any declarative whatsoever can occur within a deontic construction. Non-agentives occur only as the complements of agentives. As we have just seen, the stit sentence differs from a practition in one important detail: Whereas a stit sentence can be constructed with any arbitrary declarative as its complement, practitions are designed to be less catholic. As we have also seen, where the two forms agree they are equally useful as complements in deontic constructions, clarifying these and other contexts in which agency is important. Where they differ, however, the restrictions imposed by the practition tend to limit, rather than advance, our understanding of agency and the constructions in which it is important.
3E
Davidson
Because Davidson 1966 has given rise to a substantial literature, our commentary will not be extensive. Several remarks are in order concerning the difference between the stit sentence and Davidson's approach. Though our goals are similar, Davidson intends to clarify the inferential structures in which action sentences appear by looking at the parts from which they are constructed. We have in mind the intention made explicit in the initial description of Davidson 1966 of its own task: I would like to give an account of the logical or grammatical role of the parts or words of [simple sentences about actions] that is consistent with the entailment relations between such sentences — From the modal point of view, it is striking that the aim set out in this passage includes only half of what is needed for a compositional account of meaning. Davidson 1966 sets out to show how "the meanings of action sentences depend on their structure," but does not begin with the aim of showing how the meanings of sentences that contain action sentences depend on their structure. The stated aim does not include, for instance, telling how the meaning of "Jones refrained from buttering the toast" or "Mary demanded that Jones butter the toast" or "Jones, butter the toast!" or "How speedily did Jones butter the toast?" or "Jones brought it about (or saw to it) that Jones buttered the toast" depends on the meaning of "Jones buttered the toast," or perhaps telling how it doesn't if it doesn't. Half the compositional problem has been left out of the initial statement of purpose. The modal logic of agency tends to strike the other way. The modal logic of agency should be interested in larger contexts containing agentive sentences. The fact is that with regard to embedding agentive sentences in larger contexts, it makes a difference that they are agentive, and it makes a difference who the agent is. Embedding contexts care about these things. The reason
3. Small yet important differences from earlier proposals
79
that the action-as-event paradigm has not contributed to our understanding of the embedding of agentives is, perhaps, that its resources do not permit it to do so. Here is a slogan that gives a smallish part of the explanation why: Propositions and sentences have negations, but—in spite of formal tricks to the contrary—actions and events do not have negations. That is why the stit analysis of "refraining," §2B.2, seems so clear in contrast to analyses that invoke, for example, "negative acts." See also the beginning of chapter 5 for an example of how "actions as events" seems to interfere with efforts to analyze the idea of promising. The following observation may also be part of the explanation. At the end of Davidson 1966, the question is raised of the intentionality of action. With clear recognition that what is being addressed is a part of the other half of the compositional problem, Davidson proposes that we introduce intention by means of an explicitly embedding expression such as it was intentional of x that p, where V names the agent and 'p' is a sentence that says the agent did something. Although the proposal presumably requires for its coherence that p display a term for "the agent" in some recoverable fashion, it seems to borrow no other feature from the earlier thesis that the logical form of the embedded sentence involves an ontology of events or actions. The indicated lack of influence of the earlier thesis on the later proposal is contrary to expectations, since generally in compositional semantics a view about the logical form of a "part" of a certain kind both constrains and is constrained by a view about the logical form of an expression that embeds just that kind of part. We think that this is another indication of the difficulty of using the picture of actions-as-events as a guide in understanding the role of agentive sentences when they are embedded in larger contexts. Davidson 1966 canvassed proposals similar to ours and found them wanting for a variety of interesting reasons. We take up four. First, his essay objects that modal constructions do not solve his problems, for example variable polyadicity. We concur, noting only that we are concerned with different problems, for example, as noted earlier, the problem of providing a form for agentive sentences that will show how they contribute to the larger contexts—imperative, deontic, and so on—to which they are peculiar. Second, it is surely correct that "no grammatical test ... in terms of the things we may be said to do, of active or passive mood, or of any other sort, will separate the cases here where we want to speak of agency" (p. 94). But rather than being an objection, that is exactly a reason to promote the stit paraphrase thesis, Thesis 3. Since there is no grammatical test for agency, we gain the most advantage by determining that a sentence Q is agentive whenever it can be paraphrased as [a stit: Q]. Third, Davidson objects that "the doctor may bring it about that the patient has no appendix by turning the patient over to another doctor who performs the operation; or by running the patient down with his Lincoln Continental. In
80
Introduction to stit
neither case would we say that the doctor removed the patient's appendix" (p. 86). But as we noted in §1A, these are not reasons to reject the stit sentence. Rather they are reasons to embrace it, for we want to distinguish between agentive and non-agentive interpretations of the same English sentence. By now it is clear that The doctor removes the patient's appendix is agentive for the doctor if, and only if, it is equivalent to [The doctor stit: The doctor removes the patient's appendix]. Objecting to Chisholm's undefined locution, Davidson suggests that we ... take as our example "Jones batted an eyelash." In this case I think nothing will do but "Jones made it happen that Jones batted an eyelash" (or some trivial variant), and this cannot be called progress in uncovering the logical form of "Jones batted an eyelash." (p. 87) On the contrary, we contend that progress has already been made, and that the stit sentence will likely continue the progress. In English when "Jones batted an eyelash" is not agentive, the appropriate verb is "blink." When "Jones batted an eyelash" is agentive the appropriate verb is "wink." It may be that Davidson is right that "when we understand the verb we recognize whether or not it includes the idea of an agent" (p. 94); but since natural languages are fluid and changing, someday that nice distinction might be lost. Nice distinctions, comfortable enough this year, may be covered by linguistic barnacles, gobbled up by more aggressive phrases, or simply lost in a sea of idle chatter. (Consider that in our time English is losing a word to describe young men of a particularly lighthearted demeanor.) Idealized constructions, on the other hand, keep firm control of their environment as well the individuals and structures that reside there. This permits us to maintain the distinction between [Jones stit: Jones batted an eyelash], which is agentive, and Jones batted an eyelash, but he didn't see to it that he did, which isn't. Apart from philosophical clarification, the difference is important when we are trying to decide whether to respond with a wink of our own or with an eyedropper. Fourth and finally, with respect to Davidson's objection to a "bringing it about that" proposal of Reichenbach 1947, and by extension to any stit-like analysis: If [The astronaut stit: The astronaut flew to the Morning Star] is settled true, then assuming that the Morning Star is necessarily identical to the Evening Star,
3. Small yet important differences from earlier proposals
81
[The astronaut stit: The astronaut flew to the Evening Star] is also settled true, though the astronaut knew that he flew to the former and didn't know that he flew to the latter. On the other hand, if the identity is not necessary, the inference is suspect. (This objection is suggested in Lemmon 1966.)
3F
Conclusion
None of the differences between stit and its predecessors is extensive. Rather they are small and subtle. But, as Reichenbach reminds us, little deviations often lead to deep insights. "It is," he says, "as if nature discloses its fundamental relationships in the minute errors of current theories" (Reichenbach 1980, p. 32). Von Wright's sentence form, Chisholm's undefined locution, Kenny's canonical form, Castaneda's practition, and the stit sentence all attempt to provide the foundations for a modal language of action. The stit sentence advances that project. The stit sentence has no restrictions on declarative sentences to occur as complements. The stit sentence is sufficiently rich to serve as a canonical form for all agentive sentences. The stit sentence equips itself with the resources to maintain focus on the agent. The stit sentence is rich enough to display the value of restricting the complements of deontic statements to agentives. The stit sentence has a semantics that pictures agents as making choices against a background of temporal logic and branching time. As we have repeatedly seen, these minute differences, taken together, yield significant theoretical advantages.
4
Stit and the imperative Suppose that we humans were to be deprived of all forms of speech, except just one that we might choose to keep.* Which would it be? On p. 10 of chapter 1 we cited and endorsed, as a much-neglected truth, Hamblin's confident assertion that we should choose imperatives over all other forms. The central concern of the following is to explore ways that stit can help in the understanding of this important category. Among the factors underlying the relationship between stit and imperatives is the fact that on the one side stit is a theory of agents seeingto-it-that, while on the other issuing and receiving imperatives are distinctive forms of agentive behavior: Agents use imperatives to tell other agents what to do, or what not to do, to advise them about how to act and what to wear, to invite other agents to dinner and to the theater, to request favors and to demand attention. The concerns of this chapter are narrowly defined, focusing primarily on three previous studies of imperatives: Hofstadter and McKinsey's theory of fiats, Chellas's exploration of the logical form of imperatives, and Hamblin's in-depth study of the logic and grammar of imperatives. Our aim is to show both how stit has been informed by these works, and how stit, in turn, attempts to carry forward the projects there begun.
4A
The theory of fiats
We begin our expedition with the pioneering work Hofstadter and McKinsey 1939. They present the fiat as the appropriate form for the representation of imperatives. Although they consider a stit-like form called a directive, Hofstadter and McKinsey choose instead to focus their attention on the fiat. They have located an important difference between a directive, which provides a place for the agent who is to carry out the imperative, and a fiat, which "contains no reference to the agent who is to carry it out" (p. 446). Their decision to *With the kind permission of the American Philosophical Quarterly, this chapter is drawn from Perloff 1995. 82
4. Stit and the imperative
83
focus on the fiat, which makes "the satisfaction of an imperative ... analogous to the truth of [an indicative] sentence" (p. 447), yields a simple and powerful theory of imperatives. The syntax is uncomplicated, using the exclamation point as the only special symbol. The theory is expressively complete in the sense that every indicative can be associated with a corresponding imperative by having an exclamation point appended to it. The semantics incorporates an already developed truth-tabular account developed for indicatives. Imperatives are assimilated to indicatives via the notion of satisfaction. "We understand an imperative to be satisfied if what is commanded is the case. Thus the fiat 'Let the door be closed!' is satisfied if the door is closed" (p. 447). So, the ordinary language imperative chosen by Hofstadter and McKinsey as their paradigm, Close the door!
(1)
is represented by the fiat Let the door be closed!
(2)
Since the semantic configuration of the fiat is designed to be structurally isomorphic to the semantics for classical logic, the fiat (2) is satisfied iff the indicative sentence The door is closed
(3)
is true, and fails to be satisfied iff (3) is false. Extending the semantics to accommodate conjunction, the fiat Let the door be closed and bolted!
(4)
is satisfied iff both (3) and The door is bolted
(5)
are both true; whereas (4) fails to be satisfied if either (3) or (5) is false. Moving to disjunction, the disjunctive fiat Let the door be closed or bolted!
(6)
is satisfied if either (3) or (5) is true, not satisfied iff both are false. One of the items in Ross's searching examination of the theory of fiats in Ross 1941 is his famous counterexample. The counterexample points out that the truth conditions for (6) bring unwanted consequences. For example, the fiat Post this letter or burn it! follows from Post this letter!
(7)
84
Introduction to stit
Ross comments that this result shows us that the theory of fiats "is surely not a logic of such content which we have in mind in the case of practical inferences" (p. 61). The linguistic setting in question, the setting Ross describes as a case of "practical inference," is just the sort of setting where agency is essential. Since the stit sentence is designed to provide a normal form for agency, let us reconsider Ross's paradox with that machinery at our disposal. (For an alternative approach to the constellation of issues surrounding imperatives, see Segerberg 1988b and Segerberg 1990.) Our discussion will depend both on the stit theses listed in §1 and the semantics for stit offered for the deliberative stit, §8G.l, and for the achievement stit, §8G.3 (here it will make little difference which stit is at issue).
4B
Ross's paradox and stit
We may, if we choose, decide that certain constructions are not agentive. In such a case, we may rest content with the classical implication, since, if the nonagentive The letter is posted is true, then The letter is either burned or posted is also true. The imperative content thesis, Thesis 4, however, recommends that we treat the content of any imperative sentence as agentive. (We return to the topic of agentive constructions in §4D.) By the stit paraphrase thesis, Thesis 3, we know that an agentive construction is always appropriately paraphrased as a stit sentence. Further, since stit extends us the opportunity to clarify by normal forming, we are in position to verify that [a stit: The letter is posted] does not imply [a stit: The letter is either burned or posted]. The details are subtle enough to make a demonstration worthwhile. Let us begin by noticing that although
follows from
4. Stit and the imperative
85
the disjunction of agentives portrayed by (8) is not itself agentive. It is not agentive because, by the stit paraphrase thesis, it is not in general equivalent to a sentence of the form [a stit: P\. Since (8) is not agentive, it cannot, by a "negative" application of the imperative content thesis, be the appropriate canonical form for a disjunctive imperative. Further, by a "positive" application of the thesis, there is an alternative close at hand. Stit theory permits us to take
as the appropriate representation of the complement of the imperative (7). But now the situation is entirely changed. The offending inference is no longer valid. Here is an indication that (10) does not follow from (9): Suppose that [a stit: P\ is settled true at a moment mo, and (for the purposes of this proof) suppose that there is only one relevant choice point for a, say w. We call the set of moments later than w that lie on the same instant as mo "the horizon from w at i(m 0 )" (see Def. 9). Suppose Q is settled true throughout the horizon from w at i(m0)- In such a case (PV Q) is also settled true throughout that horizon. But then [a stit: (PV Q)} could not be true at any of those moments, since the negative condition Definition 2-4(ii) would be violated. This account of "Ross's counterexample" is not ad hoc. It is part of the very foundations of stit theory. But that is not the only account accommodated by stit. Another alternative takes [ stit: [ stit: P] V [ stit: Q as the appropriate representation for (7). In such a case, the proof that [a stit: [a stit: P] V [a stit: Q]] does not follow from [a stit: P] relies on an example in which, among all the moments in the horizon from w at i(mo), Q is false somewhere and Q is true wherever [a stit: P] is not true. With Ross's paradox now seeming less paradoxical, and with the need for a less restrictive sentence form in mind, we turn to Chellas's study of the logical structure of imperatives.
4C
Chellas's theory
The theory of fiats sets the study of imperatives on the right path and with a good footing. Fiat theory shares a helpful point of view with stit, and also with Chellas 1969, who puts the matter as follows: ... imperatives are a species of sentence the logical form of which can be investigated by examining the logical properties of their counterparts in a suitably articulated, well-defined language (p. 4). It is to Chellas's forceful and influential study that we now turn. (Horty 2001 provides additional discussion of Chellas's contributions.) We saw earlier that while Hofstadter and McKinsey consider both fiats and directives, they provide
86
Introduction to stit
a formal account only for fiats, and we saw that their semantics is classically based. Chellas supplies imperatives with a modal semantics and is emphatic in the need for adding a temporal structure. The "recognition of temporal elements," he says, "compels us to acknowledge the dependence of imperative obligation upon time; an (imperative) obligation to the effect that such-andsuch be the case may hold at some times and not at others" (p. 77). In stit theory, the temporal structure is portrayed by branching histories. Chellas's logical form for the directive,
is easily seen to be a notational variant of a stit sentence, with the interpretation that T sees to it that O where T is an agent and O takes the place of a sentence. On consideration, however, there are important differences between Chellas's directive and the stit sentence. First, Chellas tells us that ATO is true in this world iff O is true at all those worlds responsive to the action of the agent T. The comparable idea in stit is stated by the positive condition: that [a stit: Q] is settled true when Q is settled true at all those moments choice equivalent to mo (the responsive worlds) for a from the perspective of m (this world). Stit's negative condition for the truth of [a stit: Q} would, in Chellas's terms, say that ATO is true in this world iff O is true at only those worlds responsive to the action of the agent T. This condition was not part of Chellas's original program, and Chellas 1992 reiterates his explicit rejection of this condition as part of a critical evaluation of the stit program.1 Further, in contravention of the restricted complement thesis, Chellas does not restrict the complement of his imperative operator to directives, allowing either fiats or directives to occur as complements for imperatives. Let us now consider one of Chellas's central ideas: "The primary thesis maintained in this essay is that sentences in the imperative mode express obligations" (p. 1). There is, without doubt, a deep and important connection between imperatives and obligations. But, as we shall see in §4F, there are many kinds of imperatives, including advice, suggestions, invitations, and requests, most of which do not establish obligations at all. What, then, shall we say of the relation between imperatives and obligations? By the restricted complement thesis, the complements of both imperatives and deontic constructions must be agentive. Further, by the agentiveness of stit thesis, Thesis 1, we are guaranteed that [a stit: Q] is always agentive for a. Chellas's primary thesis leads naturally to the following: If an imperative obligates a to see-to-it-that Q, then a has been ordered to see-to-it-that Q. When Kathy says to her son Ben Clean your room! 1 Although we retain our conviction that the negative condition is an important part of the concept of agency, in later chapters we find a number of contexts in which it seems good to use the form, [a cstit: Q}, with the no-negative-condition semantics of Chellas 1992. We call it the Chellas stit.
4. Stit and the imperative
87
and by that utterance creates an obligation, in this case the obligation that Ben clean his room, she has succeeded in ordering him to clean his room. When Ben utters the same sentence, he does not succeed in ordering his mother to clean her room. Even if he intends it as an order, he succeeds, at best, in offering a piece of advice, or perhaps making a joke. Without the ability to impose obligations of one sort or another, imperatives must fail to be orders. This approach evidently differs essentially from that of Searle 1965 and Searle and Vanderveken 1985 in its concern with what is accomplished with an utterance rather than with what an utterance is intended to accomplish. We learn some important lessons from Chellas: (i) the need for an agentive form as the complement for imperatives; (ii) the need for a modal semantics for imperatives; (iii) the need for temporal elements in the semantics and (iv) the close relation between obligations and imperatives. All of these lessons are taken account of in the syntax and semantics of stit. Still further progress, however, is possible if we widen our understanding of imperatives. We proceed toward that destination with Hamblin as our guide.
4D
Agentive constructions
In the last several sections, the notions of an agentive and an agentive construction have been invoked repeatedly. The agentiveness of stit thesis guarantees that a stit: Q] is always agentive for a. The stit paraphrase thesis tells us that Q is agentive for a iff Q is appropriately paraphrased as [a stit: Q}. The restricted complement thesis requires that imperative and deontic constructions, among others, take agentives as their complements. We now propose to show how the stit understanding of this important idea continues along the trail blazed by Hamblin 1987. The most striking difference between stit and Hamblin is that Hamblin's tests for agentives look to features of ordinary usage and ordinary language, while stit utilizes the benefits of its theoretical apparatus to separate agentive from non-agentive constructions. (Hamblin credits the distinction between agentive and stative to Vendler 1957 and the application to imperatives to Kenny 1963.) That is, Hamblin is trying to uncover the relevant differences between agentives and non-agentives in the ways we ordinarily speak about such matters. Stit, on the other hand, specifies the distinction with the aid of a theoretical structure. The point in both is the same: to discriminate between those constructions that are, and those that are not, agentive. Let us first look at Hamblin's five tests (pp. 54-56) for distinguishing agentive from stative predicates and then proceed to the stit versions. i. "Agentive, but not stative, predicates can take a 'continuous' tense"; so Ben is running is acceptable, but not ordinarily Ben is knowing the answer.
88
Introduction to stit ii. "Agentive, but not stative, predicates fall under the genus do something." In answer to a question about what Jessica did, you may answer Jessica cleaned the house but not
Jessica was a student. Hi. "Agentive, but not stative, predicates can be augmented with the adverb deliberately, or with adverbs of manner such as carefully, enthusiastically"; We may properly say Mark worked deliberately, but not
Mark rested deliberately, or
Mark slept carefully. iv. "Someone may be persuaded or reminded in respect of an agentive predicate such as to go to bed, but not in respect of a stative one such as to understand the instructions or to be asleep." v. "The present tense of an agentive, but not stative, verb can be used with future reference"; so we might have Kathy leaves for school soon but not
Kathy sleeps soon. Because his approach relies on the vagaries of ordinary speech, Hamblin recognizes that these tests are, at best, indications of the distinction between agentive and non-agentive constructions rather than precise markers. Notice, for example, that "Kathy sleeps soon" passes the first test, fails the third, fourth, and fifth, and remains in doubt with respect to the second. It is perhaps inevitable that attempts to find absolute distinctions in the ways we ordinarily speak are doomed to imprecision. Stit, by contrast, specifies the difference between agentive and non-agentive constructions in terms of the theory itself and validates that account in application. Consider the sentence Jessica trips.
(11)
Is it agentive or not? The stit view is that (11) is agentive whenever Jessica's tripping is guaranteed true because of a prior choice of the agent, in this case Jessica. If (11) is true because of Jessica's prior choice, then it will be appropriately paraphrasable as
4. Stit and the imperative [Jessica stit: Jessica trips].
89 (12)
The same holds true for any sentence Q (by the stit complement thesis, Thesis 2) and for any agent a (by the agentiveness of stit thesis, Thesis 1). Further, by the positive condition, whenever a choice point, w, witnesses that (12) is true at a mo, (11) is settled true at all the moments choice equivalent to TOO (with respect to Jessica and w); and, by the negative condition, there will be a moment on the horizon from w at i(mo) where (11) is not settled true. The relevance of these theses for imperatives is displayed by the imperative content thesis, Thesis 4, that an imperative must have an agentive as its content. Earlier, in §4C, we saw how stit accommodated Chellas's primary thesis. Let us now look at what Hamblin calls the "most fundamental principle behind [his] treatment of imperatives." Hamblin's addressee-action-reduction principle is to the effect "that the meaning of any imperative can be spelt out in plain-predicate agentives" (p. 58). By the stit paraphrase thesis, any sentence Q is agentive iff it is strictly equivalent to [a stit: Q]. So the meaning of any imperative, by this combination of ideas, can be spelled out with stit sentences; and that, as we have repeatedly seen, is the intended application of the imperative content thesis.
4E
Negations of imperatives
Having in hand the basics of stit theory, and a fuller account of the concept of an agentive, we are now prepared to continue our exploration of imperatives, concerning ourselves with negation. Before presenting the stit versions, let us survey Hamblin's classification of imperative negations (pp. 64-71). Hamblin's type 1 negation is the first of five distinct kinds of negations for imperatives. This negation, he tells us, applies to statives as opposed to agentives. Type 1 negation is "the one closest in spirit to propositional negation." In this sense the negation of "Let the door be closed" is "Let the door not be closed." Type 2 negation applies to agentives. Negation of this sort changes an order "from an instruction to carry out that action to an instruction to refrain from doing so." In English, one has the passage from Close the door
(13)
Don't close the door.
(14)
to
For negations of type 3, Hamblin supposes that there "is a natural order of events that will prevail provided nobody, or nobody relevant, interferes." This sort of negation, Hamblin tells us, can be expressed with "the use of emphasizer words" as in Don't actually close the door.
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The idea is that this delicate use of emphasis is supposed to convey an order to let the event occur. Negations of type 4 comprise those "locutions whose role it is to negate ... pressures, enticements or encouragements to undertake a course of action." Hamblin characterizes such negation as what some deontic logicians have called 'external' negation. Type 4 negations transform the order to close the door into the permissive You may refrain from closing the door. Finally, negations of type 5 "may serve to repudiate or withdraw corresponding imperatives," in case the issuer of an imperative wishes not to be committed to the imperative. Thus, I do not order you to close the door is a negation of the fifth type and "different from explicitly permitting noncompliance." Type 2 negations present stit theory with a nice problem. In stit theory there is only one primitive form of negation, sentential negation. It can be used to negate any sentence, whether agentive or not, whether imperative or not. Let us notice that because a stit sentence takes any arbitrary declarative as complement, each stit sentence naturally admits a sentential negation in either of two places. For example, [ sitt: the door is closed]
can be negated either by
or
In (15) the scope of the negation is the declarative complement and the resulting construction remains agentive. That's good, but nevertheless (15) cannot represent the content of the type 2 negation, (14), since (15) evidently answers instead to "See to it that the door is not closed," or perhaps even, in context, "Open the door." In (16) the negation is external, but (16) is no longer agentive. Although (16) expresses not doing, because it is no longer agentive, it cannot transform an order "from an instruction to carry out that action to an instruction to refrain from doing so." (16) cannot be the type 2 negation of (13). Something more is needed, and it is a decided advantage of stit that it gives us that something more. The stit sentence
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91
is both agentive and expresses not-doing. (See also the discussion of refraining in §2B.) Now we can see why the appropriate normal form for (14), "Don't close the door," is (17) rather than either (15) or (16). Type 3 negations invoke a distinction between letting something happen and making it happen. Negations of type 3 assume "a natural order of events." Because in stit the future is open, replete with real choices and real possibilities, it is a matter of policy and not oversight that this type of negation is not accommodated in the foundations of stit. Note that it is not inconsistent with stit theory to characterize some outcomes as "seen to" and others as "allowed to happen" by adding additional concepts to the basic structure. Type 4 negation, characterized by Hamblin as "external negation," transforms an order into a permissive, or may transform an imperative such as (14) into "You may close the door." But these reflect the standard deontic equivalences, equivalences likely to be represented in stit theory, with the obvious abbreviations, as STIT DEONTIC EQUIVALENCES. (Axiomatics concept. Reference: Ax. Conc. 2) Frbn:[ stit: Q] Perm:[ stit: Q] Oblg:[ stit: Q]
Oblg:[ stit: ~[ stit: Q ~Oblg:[ stit: ~[ stit: Q]] ~Perm:[ stit: ~[ stit: Q]].
(There is extensive discussion of agentives in deontic contexts in chapters 5, 11, 12, and 14.) To understand negations of type 5, where the issuer retracts a commitment, we focus on the fact that issuing an imperative is an act, a speech act, something the agent sees to. Therefore, even without a theory of ordering, we may describe Kathy's order that Ben close the door either by Kathy orders that Ben sees to it that the door is closed,
(18)
or, using the stit paraphrase thesis, by the canonical form, [Kathy stit: Kathy orders that [Ben stit: the door is closed]].
(19)
Evidently (19) is a sentence having the form The negation of (20), using Hamblin's negation type 5, is that is, Kathy sees to it that she does not order Ben to close the door. In short, Kathy refrains from ordering Ben to close the door. In stit theory there is only one negation, sentential negation. As we have just seen, however, that negation together with stit can help to represent all the negative forms described by Hamblin that don't depend on a distinction between making and letting. We may go a little further if we permit "ordering" to be paraphrased, roughly, as "seeing to it that the recipient is obligated," so that (20) comes to
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a sees to it that (3 has an obligation to see to it that Q. The next step is to (redundantly) double the stits in (22), just as an analytic device:
The point of this redundant doubling is to permit us to call attention to some possible blanks, one in front of each ingredient sentence:
This normal form of an order makes it evident that in each of the numbered blanks there is room for a negation. A worthwhile stit exercise is to see how instructive it is to fill these blanks with negations in various combinations, thus pulling together into a single schema some otherwise confusing observations. For example, filling 3 and 5 with negations describes the positive granting of permission or authorization, while filling 2 and 5 with negations describes the positive act of refraining from laying on an obligation, which is sometimes thought of as a kind of permission, Finally, filling 1 and 5 with negations describes the non-act of not laying on an obligation, which some also might think of as falling within the precincts of permission. This suggestion is to be compared with the more refined idea of Wansing 1998, according to which agency is made intrinsic to the concept of obligation; see §11H.
4F
The many varieties of imperatives
Having followed Hamblin through the difficulties of agentive constructions and the nature of imperative negation, let us continue our progress by attending to the wide variety of imperatives that he locates. No work that we know has been so sensitive to, or elaborated so thoroughly upon, the varieties of the imperative as has Hamblin 1987. It is, as we saw earlier, easy to think that Close the door!
(25)
has its natural home as an order given by one agent to another. But there are other constructions as common as commands and equally representative of imperatives. Hamblin's list includes demands and requests, as well as advice, instructions, suggestions and recipes. Of course, if an agent has the requisite authority, then, as we said earlier, that agent may use (25) as a command. Absent the appropriate authority, the agent might utter (25) as a request or even a demand. Demands, Hamblin tells us, "lack the authoritative backing of commands, but are altogether too peremptory for requests" (p. 9). The category of imperatives consisting of commands, demands, and requests is, according to Hamblin, willful imperatives. Willful imperatives need no rational justification apart from the social context in which they are issued. Willful imperatives require only that the issuer have the proper social standing or be in the proper
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social relation to the addressee. Nor do willful imperatives need to be acted upon to be imperatives. Hamblin also locates a contrasting class of imperatives, nonwillful imperatives: Advice and suggestions are two examples. When Kathy advises, not orders, Ben to Close the door! her advice is naturally expressed in the imperative. Advice is supposed to serve, at least putatively, the interests of the addressee. It may be rationally justified, argued for, and considered as either serving those interests or not doing so. Suggestions, instructions, and recipes too, are advice-like and nonwillful; that is, they are supposed to be in the interests of the addressee, and can be rationally justified or criticized as serving or not serving the addressee's interests. "Interests" here may be more widely or narrowly interpreted. We might advise you to see to something, not simply because it is prudent, but because it is the wiser or more moral course for you to choose. In either case, the justification for the advice concerns the addressee rather than the issuer of the imperative. Notice further that Kathy's utterance remains a piece of advice whether or not it is ever acted upon, whether or not Ben even seriously considers acting on it. The examples so far given do not exhaust the range of imperatives. There are invitations as well as wishes, maledictions, and exhortations. An invitation, like a command or an order, is willful in that it requires that the issuer have the appropriate social relation to the addressee. For example, Kathy can invite Ben to her party only if she has the ability to give Ben the requisite permission to attend the party. Further, invitations may be made without either the hope or expectation that the addressee will accede to the invitation. So, we can imagine that while Kathy hopes that Ben will attend the party, she invites Jessica to the same party without in any way wanting Jessica to attend. Nor need Jessica attend the party, nor even consider going, for the invitation to be in force. These considerations point to the need for a semantic account of imperatives distinct from either the satisfaction of fiats or descriptions of the psychological states of issuer or addressee. Consider the illumination possible using the stit sentence where the semantic structure is designed to accommodate (i) agentive choice, (ii) the openness of the future, and (iii) the fact that imperatives embed one within another. For example, if, when Kathy says to Ben, You should come to my party!
(26)
and we interpret Kathy's speech act in (26) as "[Kathy stit: Oblg:[Ben stit: Ben comes to her party]]," then, as we learned in §4C, the utterance (26) is an order. If, in contrast, the appropriate interpretation of what Kathy did with (26) is the agentive [Kathy stit: Perm:[Ben stit: Ben comes to her party]], then she has allowed Ben to come to the party. When speech acts such as (26) are properly characterized as advice, as in
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then as Hamblin tells us, they "are accountable" (p. 13). nonwillful imperatives, like advice, are accountable as they involve the issuer and addressee in the asking for and giving of reasons. Kathy may, upon giving such advice, be asked to show how going to the party serves Ben's interests. Her advice may then be judged as good or bad, appropriate or inappropriate, sound or unsound. Of course, she might be asked to give reasons for an order, but then, as Hamblin points out, because an order is a willful imperative, she may properly reply that she has given an order or issued an invitation and that's all there is to it. (If Kathy's speech act constitutes an invitation, we need a more complex analysis. We consider that account at the end of §4G.) Such analyses are not the only ones available using the machinery of the stit sentence; they are only some examples of the possibilities the stit sentence opens up to theorizing.
4G
Embedding imperatives
We have seen that the stit sentence not only accommodates Ross's counterexample, but illuminates the conceptual territory surrounding that inference. We have just seen, in §4F, how the richness and diversity of imperatives is better accommodated in stit theory than by a logical grammar of fiats. There is yet another feature of stit that recommends it: Imperatives embed, and the stit sentence not only allows embedding, it encourages it. 2 Consider the following from Kathy to Ben I advise you to order Jessica to close the door.
(27)
Though we can extract from (27) the fiats Ben is advised to order Jessica to close the door! Jessica is ordered to close the door! The door is closed! there is, in the structure of fiats, neither grammatical nor semantic clarification of the relations among the embedded imperatives. Let us see how stit's positive encouragement of embedding contributes to our understanding of (27). As we already know, the stit sentence facilitates regimenting both the act of issuing an imperative and the content of the imperative. So (27) might be represented as [Kathy stit: Kathy advises Ben to order Jessica to close the door].
(28)
Next, by the restricted complement thesis, the complement of Kathy's advice in (28) must be agentive, represented as 2
See §1C for additional consideration of this fact. That section emphasizes that imperatives embed in exactly the same sense as declaratives and interrogatives.
4. Stit and the imperative [Ben stit: Ben orders Jessica to close the door].
95 (29)
Again invoking the imperative content thesis, we regiment the complement of Ben's order in (29) as [Jessica stit: Jessica closes the door]. Let us now have a look at the full stit canonical form for (27): [Kathy stit: Kathy advises [Ben stit: Ben orders [Jessica stit: Jessica closes the door]]]. You may think that such normal forming is too much trouble, and no doubt it often is. If, however, you want to provide a logical grammar for imperatives, then the availability of such a normal form is just what is required. The stit sentence incorporates an inferential structure appropriate to agents and choice, accommodates the wide variety of imperatives, and is fully adequate to the fact that imperatives may be embedded one within another. Notice too that normal forming can be of significant help in clarifying such commonplace phenomena as issuing invitations. As we promised, we now reconsider Kathy's utterance (26), interpreting her speech act as an invitation. Issuing an invitation is more complicated than simply giving permission. It is a notion sufficiently complex to require attention to both the varieties of imperatives and to the ways in which they embed. If an agent issues an invitation, the addressee not only receives a permission, but also is allowed to obligate the issuer of the invitation in some way. When an agent accepts an invitation, a right has been conveyed from the issuer to the addressee. Contrast that with the case where one agent has the appropriate social standing to give a permission to another, without also being able to transmit the right to obligate. For instance, Kathy might give Ben permission to attend Jessica's party, but because Kathy cannot (usually) convey the appropriate obligations, she might not be able to invite Ben to Jessica's party. When Kathy succeeds in inviting Ben to her party, she bestows a right on Ben. He has the right, upon accepting her invitation, (at least) to obligate Kathy not to deny him access to the party. Notice that this right is important because while Kathy is able, in general, to deny others access to her own party, she is not usually able to deny other agents access to Jessica's party. Some vagueness is surely unavoidable in the issuing and accepting of invitations. For example, when you invite us to dinner it may not be clear, without further discussion, whether or not you are offering us the right to obligate you to pay for the meal. Though invitations may in the rights conferred upon other agents be sometimes more vague, sometimes less so, sometimes stronger, sometimes weaker, we nevertheless make progress when we picture (26) as an invitation having the canonical form [Kathy stit: Perm: [Ben stit: Oblg: [Kathy stit: she does not deny Ben access to the party]]].
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As we saw in §4C, when the issuer of an imperative succeeds in creating an obligation, the imperative is an order. Now we have seen that when the issuer of an imperative, in this case Kathy, simultaneously succeeds in granting a permission and obligating herself, the imperative is a permission.
4H
Conclusion
In the preceding, we have carried forward the exploration into the nature and structure of imperatives by looking at some of the ways in which stit, especially via the stit theses listed in §1, incorporates the insights of previous philosophers concerned with the same issues and builds upon them. With the help of the imperative content thesis, we have seen that the stit sentence is a notational variant of the directive, a construction that (by the agentiveness of stit thesis and the stit paraphrase thesis) is suitable to represent agentive constructions, a task the fiat is unsuited for. Because stit provides a modal logic of agency, it is able to make headway that was not possible so long as the study of imperatives remained more narrowly confined. Imperatives are thus treated as a special case, albeit an important special case, of the language and logic of agency. We have tried to show the appropriateness of the stit normal form thesis, Thesis 6, with respect to imperatives; that is, since imperatives are among the constructions whose contents must be agentive, nothing but confusion is lost if we take those contents to be expressed by all and only stit sentences.
5
Promising: Stits, claims, and strategies To promise is generally to speak; certainly all promisors are speakers, and one supposes that all fully competent speakers are promisors. The work on "speech acts" dating back to Austin's work in the 1940s and 1950s (Austin 1961, 1975) and deepened especially by Searle and Vanderveken (see, e.g., Searle and Vanderveken 1985, Vanderveken 1990, and Vanderveken 1991) has exploited the fact that promising can be located among the many things one can do with words. But promises are not always made by means of speech (they are not always "speech acts"), nor is speaking words such as "I promise" always to promise. What are we to conclude from this combination of "generally but not always" ? We suggest that while the truth of the "generally" warrants the extended consideration of promising as a "speech act" such as one finds in the work of Searle and Vanderveken, the double failure of the "always" also warrants looking for a complementary "speech-independent" account. To promise is to act. This suggests taking "action theory" as a candidate for a speech-independent basis for an account of promising. The suggestion is momentarily confirmed when we observe that the content of a promising, for example, the content of "promising to smile," also seems to be an act, evidently a different act from the promising. The matter is complex, and we may reasonably look to the "acts are events" approach to help us in sorting out the complexities in a "speech-independent" way. Such approaches generally postulate that an action is a kind of event, as in for example the quite different studies Davidson 1966 and Thomson 1977. Versions of the acts-are-events approach often depend on giving names to actions or quantifying over actions. Those reifying approaches, however, (need not but) may easily lead to avoidable questions such as the following. Is the act of promising to smile a "basic" act? If not, is the act of smiling a part of the act of promising to smile? Or is the act of smiling caused by the act of promising to smile? If the act of smiling is the content of the promising, then what was promised when there was no smile 97
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and hence no act of smiling? And so on. Conclusion: It might not be a good idea to assume that the only way to articulate the complexity of a promise is in terms of structures appropriate to events, for example, part-whole or causal relations. All that reification of acts as events may begin by sounding scientific and hardheaded, but after one or two steps it may lead directly to perplex. An alternative idea represents some aspects of the complexity of a promise by structures provided by stit. This gives us a speech-independent approach to the idea of promising that is even more hardheaded, but that does not have to stop to worry about the perils of reification. Without the intent to minimize the potential value of an "acts as events" analysis of promising, we urge that the light of stit shine in corners not—or not yet—illuminated by reifying actions. The purpose of this chapter is to explore that idea. We begin with a kind of triple pincer attack on promising. In the first part of the chapter, §5A, we use stit theory to suggest approaches to the structure of promising. In the second part, §5B, we begin with Thomson's approach in The Realm of Rights, asking how the modal logic of agency might contribute to what is there said about promising, and, more critically, how the point of view of that book can enrich a stit-based account of promising. Then finally, in §5C, we call on the theory of strategies of chapter 13 to make good on what seem to be the common deficiencies of both of the first two sections.
5A
Prom stit to promising
The modal approach of this book features "a sees to it that Q," abbreviated "[a stit: Q]," where a is an agent and "Q" holds the place of a declarative sentence. We repeatedly argue that concentrating on this construction is a good idea. The argument is pragmatic: To do so is helpful. How? And how much? Part of the purpose of this chapter is to help answer these questions.
5A.1
Stit slogans
We have loosely defended a series of grammatical or interpretive "stit theses," as listed in §1. In this chapter we rely especially on the stit complement thesis (any declarative sentence is fair game for stitting), the stit paraphrase thesis (paraphrasability as a stit is a good criterion of agentiveness), and the restricted complement thesis (many constructions need agentives as their complements). Imperative slogans, however, are perhaps more fitting than declarative theses for carrying the stit approach to agency. We consider some on our way to promising. These are intended for application in the course of philosophical rumination—not for use when ordering croissants. Here is the first, and most fundamental. 5-1 SLOGAN. (Feature the agent) Always give pride of place to agents.
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This is a grammatical slogan intended to be philosophically helpful. Natural languages make it easy to lose track of agents by means of their passives and their impersonal rewordings. Example: Shoplifting is forbidden.
(1)
On the surface this looks as if we are classifying the abstract activity of shoplifting as among those that are forbidden rather than permitted. Stit will not let you get away with such superficialities. In order even to express the agentive idea of shoplifting, you will have to put the agent term in its proper place, writing a form such as stit
shoplifts].
The grammar of stit, with its requirement that the agent term be ever present, will force you to keep in mind that which is certainly central; namely, that it is some agent that is being forbidden to do the shoplifting. Let us peel one more layer from example (1). We noted that in (1) the nefarious agency of shoplifting is hidden in the impersonal gerund. It is equally true that the casual adjective "forbidden" itself conceals agency. If shoplifting is forbidden, then there is agency in the forbidding. Stit gives an approach to this tangled topic by suggesting that we start by making the agent of the forbidding explicit: stit: Forbidden([ stit: shoplifts])]. You will naturally and rightly object that a single agent "B" is not plausible here. Two comments are appropriate. First, stit theory from the beginning has made room for joint agency, as is more than likely present in this case. See chapter 10. Second, the point of a philosophically useful grammatical form isn't to reveal all or even the most interesting features of a situation. It only needs to be helpful. And you can see that even without encoding the ins and outs of political science, the stit form makes manifest at least this, that there is more than one agent involved when taxpaying is forbidden. Stit helps.1 The second portion of advice might be put as follows. 5-2 SLOGAN. (Agentives versus non-agentives) Worry about the difference between agentives and non-agentives, and use the stit paraphrase to keep track. Consider the thesis that if you are morally responsible for something, then you could have done otherwise.2 On the stit approach, this falls into two linked parts: If you are morally responsible for something, then you did it; and
(2)
1 Wansing 1998 explores an improvement on this paraphrase, noting that it treats "forbid" in terms of a non-agentive state of affairs. He suggests instead that we build agency into the making of the deontic state, so that the underlying form always features the source as well as the target: "a1 forbids a2 to shoplift"; then we shall never have an impersonal "forbidden" as a primitive notion. See §11H for a little discussion of the idea. 2 We discuss this question in a somewhat different context at the beginning of chapter 9.
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Introduction to stit If you did something, then you could have done otherwise.
(3)
We discuss the complexities of (3) in chapter 9. Here let us consider (2). Stit theory complains about the following ambiguity: Is the "something" in (2) agentive or not? Why is this important? Well, it is nearly a logical truth that if you are morally responsible for the fact that you saw to it that Q, then in fact you saw to it that Q. There needs to be no discussion (or not much) about (2) when "something" is taken agentively, as made explicit in the stit paraphrase. It borders on incoherence to hold someone morally responsible for seeing to something that he didn't see to. But consider the case when "something" in (2) is not agentive at all, but a non-agentive state of affairs. The form is this: If you are morally responsible for the fact that Q, then in fact you saw to it that Q. This, as we also argue in chapter 9, is far from a nearly-logical truth. Our use of italics should make the matter obvious. Consider an example in the vicinity of promising. Your friend entrusted you with some money. You chose to go to the race track. You are morally responsible for the non-agentive fact that you were at the race track, and indeed you did, in this story, see to it that you were at the race track. Further, you are morally responsible for the non-agentive fact that you are in the way of temptation to gamble with your friend's money, and in fact you did, in this story, see to it that you were in the way of temptation to gamble with your friend's money. But do not generalize from this example. Continue the story. You bet your friend's money on a very fine horse with every chance to win, and at wonderful odds. You made a good bet with your friend's money. However, against all odds, the horse lost, and so was your friend's money. Here, because you deliberately put your friend's money at risk, there is reason to say that you are morally responsible for the fact that your friend's money is gone. But that remains true even though you did not see to it that your friend's money is gone. You put the money at risk, with full agency, which is a ground of your moral fault; but its loss was due in part to chance, not entirely to your agency. Some moralists prefer to confuse this issue. They prefer to say "Well, in a way you did see to it that your friend's money is gone." They should resist this temptation. The reason is this. To speak sloppily in this way is to interfere with the enterprise of clearly explaining the connection between the facts that (i) your friend entrusted you with some money, that (ii) the money is gone, that (in) you were fully agentive in putting it at-risk-from-the-chances-of-nature while not fully being the agent of its loss, and that (iv) nevertheless you are morally responsible for the fact that the money is gone. Moralists should stay aware of what an enormous difference there is between moral responsibility for what we do and moral responsibility for complex non-agentive or partly agentive states of affairs. The stit approach helps keep us honest.
5A.2
Preliminary stit account of promising
The third slogan is a good one.
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5-3 SLOGAN. (Try stit) If a form of speech takes a complement that concerns action, try thinking about its complement in terms of the stit paraphrase thesis. That may help in understanding how the complement contributes to the larger sentence in which it is embedded. We take up promising as an extended illustration of Slogan 5-3. What gets us started is that to promise is to do something; "a promised ..." is agentive. Promising is a paradigm "speech act," therefore an act. That it is an act implies that it should or might be enlightening to consider promising as a stit:
[a sitt:_] What goes in the blanks? It seems always best to begin in the safest way, by putting in the selfsame thing we started with:
[aa siit:a promised ...] That may seem like "no advance," but in fact the stit normal form does encourage us to zero in on promising as an accomplishment. What is it that was actually done when the promise was made? How did the world change due to the agency of the promisor? It is no mean beginning to notice that promisings occur at concrete moments with a "before" and an "after," and with alternative possibilities for the future. As a stit, a promise involves a choice that rules out alternative possibilities. These remarks give us a way of asking what occurs when a promise is made: How is the world different, after an occasion on which a promise is made, from what it would have been after some other choice available on that occasion? We come back to this. In shedding light on this question, stit can provide further assistance. When one promises, as we earlier recorded, one does something. In addition, what one promises itself pertains to agency. A helpful but too-strong statement of this is that promising is promising to do, which is to say that the complement of the promising is itself an agentive. This is the essence of the restricted complement thesis, Thesis 5, as it applies to promising. Here is an easy example: Paul promised to pick up Marie at the station at 9:00.
(5)
To see how stit helps (if it does) even in this easy case, let us repeat the applicable version of the restricted complement thesis, which we stated earlier in ordinary philosophical prose: Promising is promising to do.
(6)
Now let us refine that version by applying the stit paraphrase thesis, Thesis 3, which suggests that we word the "promising to do" thesis (6) as follows: 5-4 THESIS. (Stit-complement thesis for promising) We can always paraphrase the complement of "promise" as a same-agent stit.
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Our verdict on this thesis is that it is helpful for the present, but falls short in the end. Here we are exploiting the extent to which it can help. In (5), the paraphrase suggested by Thesis 5-4 is so easy as to not yield much information: Paul promised that [Paul stit: Paul picks up Marie at 9:00].
(7)
The rephrasing forces on us that we need Paul as a double agent, once of the promising and once of the up-picking. With stit he never gets lost in some philosopher's impersonal reductionist neverland. Here is an example where stit helps a little more. Let us start with Paul promised to be at the station at 9:00.
(8)
Here it looks as if the promising is not a promising to do at all, but a promising to be. Stit allows us to put the distinction with maximum clarity. The difference between (5) and (8) is that in the latter, the complement sentence Paul is at the station at 9:00 describes an agentless "state of affairs." That makes it look as if one can promise such a state of affairs in an agent-free sense, and perhaps so. Thesis 5-4, however, bids that we not start at that place. Until we are forced by the data, as we will be, we refrain from wondering what it is to promise a state of affairs. It is more natural, for this example (we'll later come to more difficult examples), to begin with the thought that to promise to be at the station at 9:00 is as much a promise to do something as is the more agentive-sounding promise (5) to pick up Marie at 9:00. Stit makes it clear: Paul promised to see to it that he would be at the station at 9:00,
(9)
or, with the stit made even more explicit, Paul promised [Paul stit: Paul is at the station at 9:00].
(10)
That's clearly a useful paraphrase of (8), is it not? Even though being at the station at 9:00 is not at all the same as seeing to it that one is there at 9:00, nevertheless promising "to be at the station at 9:00" does pretty much come to the same thing as promising "to see to it that one is at the station at 9:00." The stit complement thesis for promising, Thesis 5-4, nicely explains why we should have one paraphrase and not the other. Furthermore, paraphrasing reduces (but does not remove) the temptation to make up a philosophy that tries to construe promising as a relation between a person and an agentless state of affairs. By concentrating on the stit paraphrase, we at least postpone the necessity of such a construal. Let us put the conclusion a little more sharply. Thesis 5-4, which we introduced as a good thing to mean by the thesis (6) that promising is always promising to do, was threatened by promises having the form "promise to be ...," as in (8). We met that threat with the claim that a "promise to be" is at least
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sometimes properly paraphrased by a "promise to see to it that one is ...," as in (9), or, more explicitly, as in (10). To promise to be at the station at 9:00 just is to promise to see to it that you are at the station at 9:00. There is no absence of agency, except on the not-to-be-trusted surface. 5-5 REMARK. (Will-stits are not really agentive) This account is helpful at this dialectic point, but also deeply misleading, as we later see. The content of the promise of (9) is not really a same-time-as-promise stit, as suggested by (10); instead it must be future-tensed in order to make sense. So there is "will-stit" rather than simply "stit"; and "will-stit" is not quite agentive. It is something that you can promise, but it is not something you can do. The stit paraphrase thesis provides the relevant test. Given "Paul will see to it that Q" there is no paraphrase having the form "Paul sees to it that ...." In particular, the best candidate, "Paul sees to it that Paul will see to it that Q," must fail, since according to stit theory, Paul can never make a choice today that guarantees what choice he will make tomorrow (no choice between undivided histories, Post. 8). This way of clarifying thesis, objection, and reply, however, makes it obvious that there is a new and deeper threat to the original thesis that promising is always promising to do. Consider the following. Paul promised Marie that the train would be at the station at (11) 9:00. We intend this as an example in which the complement of the promising is not only non-agentive but entirely outside the control of the agent, Paul.3 It is inevitable, however, that our imaginations stray to ways in which the agent might after all manipulate the time of arrival of the train, which on our account would tend to lead to consideration of cases of a different kind. For this reason we postpone important but complicated cases, and substitute the following example. Paul promised Marie that the sun would shine at 9:00.
(12)
The point of the example (12) is that "what is promised" cannot plausibly be imagined to be a matter in which Paul is agentive. Nevertheless, (12) is perfectly acceptable English. It is not only grammatical, but properly conversational. It is exactly the kind of thing that one person might say to another; and yet it is not conceivable that Paul is promising to make his agency relevant to the shining of the sun. This, then, is a threat to the thesis (6) that promising is always promising to do. It is a threat that cannot be met by an easy insertion of a "see to it that" in analogy with the passage from (8) to (10), for it would be silly to promise to see to it that the sun shines at 9:00, whereas (12) is far from silly. (The conceptual problem evidently concerns the form (12) in its serious 3 It is easy to confuse the question of whether or not a proposition is or is not in the control of an agent with the question of whether or not it is agentive with respect to that agent. The ease with which such distinctions confuse us is exactly a good reason to appeal to logic for some help with agency.
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uses; of course one might also use that form in speaking to a child as a kind of pretense.) The reader who continues on to §5B will recognize that we have in (12) a good case of word-giving in the sense of Thomson 1990. Our aim here, however, is to do as much as we can with the stit apparatus, even though it may temporarily lead us astray in ways that will need to be corrected. And certainly we are not yet at the end of our resources for defending the helpfulness of the thesis that a promising is always a promising to do, that is, a promising to see to it that something. Let us first try insisting that yes, promising that the sun will shine is promising to see to it that something. What could that something be, given that it obviously isn't that the sun will shine? We do not think that stit gives an automatic answer to this question. Nevertheless, consider a concrete situation featuring the promise reported in (12). Imagine some circumstances. What was the point of the promise? Even without supposing that there is anything like a uniform answer to this question, the generalized shape of the story is not so difficult to make out. Say that Marie had been wondering whether or not to take her umbrella. Paul in promising that the sun will shine in effect says "don't bother." That, however, is not precise. There are many ways to say "don't bother" that are not promises. What is special about the promise? Well, as we might say, and as Thomson explicitly makes clear, the promising entitles Marie to rely on Paul's declaration that the sun will shine. We are nearly in a position to break out of the circle. The stit approach suggests looking for something that Paul promises to do when Paul entitles Marie to rely on his word that the sun will shine. Put this way, it is natural to look at the situation when the sun fails to shine, as Paul promised. So suppose that 9:00 comes, and there is Marie huddled in the pouring rain without her umbrella. What then? The first thing to observe is that there is no hint of Paul's "breaking" a promise in this situation as so far described. Presumably "breaking" involves agency, whereas in our story the sun failed to shine without any help from Paul. And yet we cannot let Paul entirely off the hook. To make the example easy to follow, suppose Paul himself had a umbrella, but refused to share it with Marie in the downpour. Suppose he said that all along that was his plan; in promising Marie that the sun would shine he had no idea of helping her out if his declaration turned out false. Then, even though promise-breaking is not to be attributed to Paul, we ought to say that he made a lying promise. We ought to say that the act carried out in uttering a sentence (12) is constituted in part by a conditional promise to do, namely, a promise that Paul see to it that Marie is helped or that her troubles are alleviated or that she receives restitution or recompense for damages (or something) in the case in which the sun does not shine. At the very least, Paul is promising to see to it that he is graceful in taking blame if things go wrong. It is not only that he, as patient, receives demerits if the sun doesn't shine, but that he, as agent, sees to it that he accepts those demerits, even though, as seems important, he might have done otherwise. Clarification: In labeling Paul's act a "conditional promise to do," it is obvious that we intend the condition to apply to the "doing," not to the "promising."
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Warning: A conditional stit is not always a stit (see chapter 11). Further warning: The conditional stit is just about bound to be in the scope of a future tense, and so subject to Remark 5-5 on p. 103. For both of these reasons, and inspired by Thomson 1990, this account of (12), while imbued with some of the spirit of Thesis 5-4, tries not to confuse the spirit with the letter. More of this later. One last example, with a complement of a sort that lies between the agentive complement, "that Paul picks up Marie at 9:00," and the agentless complement, "Paul is at the station at 9:00." Suppose Paul promised to see to it that Marie buys a train ticket.
(13)
This of course makes eminently good sense. According to stit theory, however, the complement should not be rendered by "[Paul stit: [Marie stit: Marie buys a train ticket]]," since one person cannot guarantee the choice of another. In chapter 10 we discuss various ways of understanding such examples, pointing out the many differences among them. According to one of these ways, (13) is usefully paraphrased using some idea of "probability": Paul promised to see to it that it is highly probable that Marie buys a train ticket,
(14)
for the probability is something that Paul can, according to stit theory, reasonably see to. If, however, we think about many choices by Paul, as we did in considering (12), it is natural to point out that there are and will be available to Paul many choice points at which he can render it more or less likely that Marie buys a train ticket. A minimal such notion is this: Paul never makes a choice that excludes the possibility of Marie buying a ticket, if there is available to him another choice keeping that possibility open. If we think about the content in this way, we make at least some objective sense out of saying that Paul's agency is relevant to Marie's buying a ticket. We can do this even though it is (conceptually) impossible for Paul to guarantee that result. So this case lies properly between the cases (5), in which Paul can, at least in approximation, see to what he has promised, and (12), in which Paul's agency is irrelevant. Let us summarize what is easy to see about promising when viewed from the point of view of stit. • The paradigm case of promising, we say, is explicit promising to do, such as when Paul promised to pick up Marie at the station. In this case the complement of the verb "promise" appears to be already agentive, and can therefore apparently be well paraphrased as a stit. Later we deal with the fact that the stit will be embedded in a future tense. • There are also important cases of promising expressed with superficially non-agentive complements, for example promising to be somewhere. In these cases, too, the promise is a promise to do, the sense of which is aptly given by inserting a stit. That is, given "promise that Q," one finds a useful paraphrase in "promise to see to it that Q." Observe that it is not
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Introduction to stit Q itself that is being paraphrased; the non-agentive "to be at the station" is miles away from the agentive "to see to it that one is at the station." Rather, we paraphrase the entire promising construction, changing "Paul promised to be at the station" to "Paul promised to see to it that he would be at the station." In semi-symbols, we paraphrase "Paul promised that (Paul is at the station)" as "Paul promised that [Paul stit: Paul is at the station]." It is a benefit of the imperfect Thesis 5-4 that it leads us to see things in this way.
• There are cases in which the complement of the verb "to promise" articulates something to which the agency of the promisor is relevant but not in the simplest stit-like way. In a word, these cases involve consideration of more than a single choice by the agent. Such cases are perhaps the most frequent in occurrence, and certainly they are far and away the most challenging to a theory of choices in our indeterministic world. One minimal subcase: The content of the promise is to keep open the possibility of the complement. And this is something that the promisor can do. • There are cases in which the complement of the verb describes an entirely non-agentive situation that is obviously beyond the control of the promisor. Even here, it seems that it is of the essence of the promise that the promisor promises to do something. Certainly the promise is not that the promisor see to it that the complement be true; in this case such a thing is impossible. We suggested instead that the act of promising standardly initiates a conditional promise to act appropriately (protect against loss, make restitution, etc.) in case the promised complement turns out to be false. Therefore agency is crucially involved in the content of such a promise. We cannot, however, claim accordance with Thesis 5-4, since, as we have said, we cannot identify future-oriented conditional stits with plain stits. Let us return to the original paradigm case of promising, namely, promising to do. Can the stit approach help any further? Have we gone as far as we can go when we paraphrase (5) as (7)? In fact we can do more, not yet so much with the complement, but with the speech act of promising itself. The clue is that a speech act is or should be an act, and so should be paraphrasable as a stit. To promise is to see to something. Of course there is the easy paraphrase: To promise is to see to it that you promise. But once one starts thinking in terms of stit, it is natural to try to find other more-or-less equivalent complements of the stit that may be more informative. The history of philosophical analysis tells us that none will be absolutely equivalent, but that historical lesson should not prevent us from trying to find helpful alternatives. The way stit helps is by encouraging us to ask: Just what is it that Paul can do when he promises to pick up Marie at 9:00? On the stit account each exercise of agency is a transition, a transition that changes the world. Stit thus encourages asking, How is the world different after Paul has promised to pick up Marie at 9:00? Deeply embedded in the stit theory of agency is the truth that
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one cannot choose today what can only be chosen tomorrow (no choice between undivided histories). For this reason, it is certain that the promise does not guarantee that on the morrow Paul chooses to pick up Marie. So what can Paul guarantee that wasn't guaranteed before his promise? One answer is this: He guarantees that he is obligated to pick up Marie. He was not so obligated before the promise; he is obligated after the promise; and it is the promising that is responsible for this change in the world. It therefore seems helpful to articulate (7) as follows: [Paul stit: 06/0: [Paul stit: Paul picks up Marie at 9:00]].
(15)
In short, Paul's promise is, in approximation, the act of laying an obligation on himself. On this account, that it is done with words is irrelevant. Perhaps promises are typically "speech" acts, but this account points us away from the speech and toward the act, namely, the act of creating an obligation where none existed before. (For much more on mixing deontic logic with stit, see chapters 11, 12, and 14.) The formulation of (15) is natural given only the stit theory as so far elaborated. It is, however, deficient. One of the several things that emerge from the second part of this chapter, to which we soon turn, is that not only Paul but also Marie is agentive in the creation of the obligation on Paul ("uptake"). Also it becomes clear that "obligation," while giving the right (deontic) logic, is not the right word.
5A.3
A final stit slogan
We have gone a long way without mentioning a key theme of the modal logic of agency: 5-6 SLOGAN. (Exploit nesting) Exploit the recursive power of modalities; that is, look for ways in which to clarify by embedding one stit in the scope of another. We recommend this slogan here because it is as important as any in the stit program. We defer its illustration, however, until §5B.3, where we offer an impressive triple stit.
5B
From RR to promising
Thomson 1990 (The Realm of Rights, henceforth "RR") shares with stit theory a reliance on a modal agentive construct that finds its source in Hohfeld 1919. This makes for enough commonalities to have allowed us already, in §5A, to have relied on some of the key ideas of RR, and we shall suggest that conversely the use of some central ideas of stit theory can help to refine the RR account of promising. (When we quote from RR, we make a few small changes in symbolism.)
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Introduction to stit
Claims and duties in RR
RR adopts or adapts Hohfeld with the help of the following modal locutions (our italics): Cx,yP, read: X has a claim against Y that P (p. 41).
(16)
DY,xP, read: Y is under a duty toward X, namely the duty that Y discharges if and only if P (p. 41).
^
Px,vP, read: X has as regards Y a privilege of letting it be the case that P (p. 44).
t18)
>
In doing so RR endorses the following Hohfeld equivalences: Cx,YPittDY,xP. Px,yP iff Not-(Dx,x,YNot-P).
In this representation of claims there are two places, marked by X and Y, for singular terms and one, marked by P, for a sentence. Thus, RR carries the ideas of claims, duties, and privileges with the help of modal operators. The example RR gives for the usefulness of the modal form is that this form makes it easy to express the generalization that claims are closed under entailment. The stit approach helps by suggesting that this generalization may not be straightforward when one mixes agentive and non-agentive complements. The stit approach, even without the introduction of stit notation, makes it natural to question entailment-closure. In analogy with a favorite stit example (see §2B.l), one wonders whether that X has a claim against Y that Y bandage at least one injured person does in fact imply that X has a claim against Y that there is at least one injured person. RR explicitly states the following principle. 5-7 THESIS. (RR's unrestricted complement thesis for claims, duties, and privileges) Any sentence whatsoever may be put in for "P" (see p. 41). This thesis is to be compared with the unrestricted stit complement thesis, Thesis 2, and with Thesis 5-4 for promising. We especially note that even though the two announce different targets, Thesis 5-4 and RR's Thesis 5-7 appear to conflict in spirit, and we will say something about that shortly. We shall see that for promising RR seems to adopt, or nearly to adopt, not indeed our Thesis 5-4, but some restricted complement thesis. We shall wind up endorsing this line, and thereby suggesting, for promising, an account somewhere between our Thesis 5-4 and RR's Thesis 5-7 (see §5C). Our immediate thrust, however, will be to take the foundations of RR as they are, its unrestricted complement thesis, Thesis 5-7, and all, and to follow up what RR makes of promising on that basis. It nevertheless seems best to indicate at this point how the stit approach can help make us wonder about Thesis 5-7, and especially about the quite different ways that agency figures in the three English readings (16), (17), and (18).
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• Claims. The English reading in (16) adds no agentive words or ideas beyond any that analysis may find in the idea of claiming itself. Keep this in mind for contrast. • Duties. The English in (17) uses a definite description, "the duty that Y discharges if and only if P." This use seems to require that for each Y and P there is exactly one duty that Y discharges if and only if P. If this is right, then after all a kind of restriction of complement is being imposed, though certainly not necessarily a restriction to stit complements. One nevertheless observes the presence in (17) of an apparently agentive or quasi-agentive expression, "discharges." • Privileges. In contrast to (17), the English reading provided in (18) presupposes nothing whatsoever about P. Instead, it provides an explicit restriction on the complements of "has a privilege." Not just any complement will do; we are given only a complement of the form "X lets it be the case that P," where P itself is unrestricted. Now "letting" reads as a kind of agentive or quasi-agentive idea, so this is a kind of restricted complement, not indeed a restriction on PX,Y , but only on complements for the English word "privilege." For instance, the form does not allow in any immediate way that X has as regards Y a privilege of eating X's salad, since eating salad is—at least on the surface—not the same as a letting it be that — Sure, that's confusing. That's the point: There is work to be done, and it might not be easy. The considered choice by RR to use the locutions "discharge" and "let" in connection with duties and privileges imply that a simpleminded insertion of stit is not going to suffice. One may nevertheless hope to be guided by the suggestion that arises in applying stit theory to deontic constructions, namely, that being permitted to see to it that P is equivalent to not being obligated to refrain from seeing to it that P (see §2B.9):
Note the delicate placement of the internal negation: neither on the outer stit nor on P. One can imagine that something like the equivalence (19), which unquestionably relies on the restricted complement thesis for deontic constructions, might connect privileges and duties. Certainly this seems to work in the simplest case, the case where the complement of both claim and privilege is restricted to stit. That is, the following seems illuminating. X has as regards Y a privilege of seeing to it that P <-> Not-( Y has a claim against X that X see to it that Not-(A' see to it that (20) P). Since stit theory says that "refraining from doing" is "seeing to not seeing to," stit theory allows the equivalence (20) to be dramatically shortened for an agentive P, as in the following Hohfeldesque example.
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Introduction to stit X has as regards Y a privilege of crossing Y's land <-> Not-(Y has a claim that X refrain from crossing Y's land).
We want to make it plain, however, that although one may reasonably hope that the simple case will provide guidance, and that stit theory will clearly explain to you how you are cheating yourself if you interchange "refraining from crossing" with "not crossing," it would be optimistic to hope for a quick solution to more difficult cases without extensive work.
5B.2
Word-giving in RR
Leaving aside foundational questions as to the relation between agentive or quasi-agentive concepts and those of Hohfeld, we go on to promising. That RR explicitly prefers unrestricted complements helps to explain the conceptual order in RR according to which promising is taken as a species of word-giving, which itself is taken to be a special case of assertion. Here is a sequence of examples that accords with RR. Paul asserts to Marie that he will be at the station at 9:00. Paul gives his word to Marie that he will be at the station at 9:00. Paul promises Marie that he will be at the station at 9:00. This sequence minimizes—and we think is intended to minimize—the need for a restricted complement thesis for promising. In this respect the entire movement is opposite to the spirit of stit theory, in the context of which one would be happy to construe word-giving as a kind of promising (as in our treatment of promising that the sun will shine at 9:00), and asserting as a kind of word-giving.4 But that is not here to the point. Among these three, RR takes assertion—and especially assertion to someone—as a primitive among the array of concepts it develops. It is consonant with the thrust of RR that assertion should be taken as seeing to the existence of some kind of normative state, as we also explicitly suggest in §6E. It is, however, a feature of the RR analysis that definiteness about this seems not required. In any event, the other two members of the triple are given sharp characterizations. Postponing for a while any consideration of promising per se, we begin with two theses of RR, the most important of those that govern word-giving (our italics). The Assertion Thesis: Y gives X his or her word that a proposition is true if and only if Y asserts that proposition to X, and (i) in so doing, Y is inviting X to rely on its truth, and (ii) X receives and accepts the invitation (there is uptake). (p. 298) The Word-Giving Thesis: If Y gives X his or her word that a certain proposition is true, then X thereby acquires a claim against Y to its being true. (p. 302) 4
There is an elementary treatment of assertion in §6E, with emphasis on the special problem of an assertion whose complement is in the future tense.
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This account of word-giving relies not only on the concept of assertion-tosomeone, but also on invitation and acceptance, and on acquiring a claim. The RR account of claims is rich, and we leave it alone. In other passages RR summarizes the account of word-giving as follows: For Y to give X his or her word that a certain proposition is true is for Y to invite X to rely on its truth, which invitation X accepts; and if you issue an invitation to a person to rely on the truth of a proposition, which invitation the person accepts, then surely the person thereby acquires a claim against you to its truth, (p. 302) The arguments for these two theses are sharp, interesting, and persuasive, but here our focus will be more on the form and content of the theses themselves. First, what is it for X to rely on the truth of a proposition? RR does not give us a separable account of this, nor is it obvious that such would be appropriate. The problem about inviting might be raised in this way. If Paul invites Mary to come to a party, then he is inviting her to do something, namely, come to the party, that she could do without an invitation. If in contrast Paul invites Mary to accept his offer of a contract, then he is inviting her to do something that she could not normally do without the invitation. In the former case, we can easily have an account of coming to the party that is separable from the invitation; in the latter case, it is not obvious that we can easily have an account of accepting an offered contract that is conceptually separate from our account of the offer. It looks as if inviting reliance is more easily understood in the second way, not the first. And RR gives the following account of what I do when I invite-yourreliance, not indeed quite generally on the truth of a proposition, but anyhow a reliance on "an expectation about my future behavior": I thereby take on myself a complex responsibility, namely to make that expectation true, or, if I will for some reason be unable to, to take reasonable steps to see that you do not lose by virtue of having accepted my invitation to rely. (p. 95)
(21)
From the stit point of view this passage would give insight into the "doings" that are involved in an invitation to rely. RR, however, emphasizes a different aspect of the situation. When a person accepts an invitation to rely on the truth of a proposition, "then surely the person thereby acquires a claim against you to its truth" (p. 302). This is the connection between the Assertion Thesis and the Word-Giving Thesis. RR puts the matter as follows: In sum, a word-giver B alters the world in such a way that an act of the word-receiver A (uptake) makes A have a claim against B to the truth of the word-given proposition. In other words, the wordgiver B gives the word-receiver A a power by the exercise of which A makes himself have a claim against B. (p. 320) This summary abstracts entirely from the communicative situation (invitations given and received), and puts the matter in a language that is apt for stit.
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We are led to see that on the RR account, at the end of the process what X does when X accepts the invitation to rely is simply this: X sees to it that he or she has a claim against Y that P. Let's write this down: [X stit: X has a claim against Y that P]. That expresses what X "does" in accepting the invitation: X binds Y. So what does Y do? On the RR account, Y's invitation amounts to giving X the power to create the claim. But we do not need to invoke the metaphors "give" and "create." Both are at bottom stits. Working from the inside out, the power is nothing but a can-do: Can:[X stit: X has a claim against Y that P}. That expresses exactly the power that X has when X is in a position to accept the invitation.5 Furthermore, "giving" X the power is also nothing but a stit: [Y stit: Can:(X stit: X has a claim against Y that P]].
(22)
That is what Y does when Y invites X to rely on his or her word: Y sees to it that X can see to it that X has a claim against Y that P. Having gone so far with RR, one can see the likelihood that the time-sequence, represented in (22) by the nesting, has been overspecified. It seems not to matter that Y goes first and X second, that is to say, that Y empowers X. It seems equally all right if X empowers Y: [X stit: Can:[Y stit: X has a claim against Y that P]}.
(23)
Why not? If for instance X asks a solemn question (p. 295 of RR gives an example involving keys on a bureau), there seems no call to ask for an additional act on X's part, after Y's answer, in order to construe Y as having been a wordgiver in the full sense, including uptake. Nor does it seem wrong to think of a situation in which neither act precedes the other, so that we should have a stit that is founded in the simultaneous choices of two agents, a "strict stit" in the sense of chapter 10: [{X, Y} sstit: X has a claim against Y that P}.
(24)
What these three, (22), (23), and (24), have in common is that the complement "X has a claim against Y that P" has come true due to the prior choices of X and Y, both being essential. This important agentive idea, although not attached to any of the stit locutions so far treated, seems to be a common generalization of [a stit: Q] to [F stit: Q], where F is a set of agents, and of [a stit: Q] as witnessed by a moment to [a stit: Q] as witnessed by a chain. Let us describe it by means of an alternative semantic clause for strict stit that builds in both witness by chains and the essentiality of each of a group of agents. (By 5
"A power is an ability to cause, by an act of one's own, an alteration in a person's rights" (RR, p. 57). We have separated the "power" into its two natural components: A can-stit, which represents "an ability to cause," and an expression of a claim, which is one sort of right. The ability to do so is an advantage of stit.
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"alternative" we mean that what follows is an alternative to the "principal" concept of strict joint agency introduced in Definition 10-4 as a definition of [F sstit: Q].) 5-8 DEFINITION. (Alternative account of strict joint stit) [F sstit: Q] is true at a moment-history pair m/h (on this new account) iff there is a chain c of moments that is (i) nonempty and entirely prior to m, and such that (ii) through each moment m1 in c there is a history h1 such that Q is false at the moment coinstantial to m lying on h1; (m) unless a history h2 intersecting c be separated from h by a definite joint choice of the agents in F at some moment in c, then Q is settled true at the moment co-instantial to m lying on h2; and (iv) clause (iii) fails for every proper subset of F: For every agent a in F, there is a history h2 intersecting c that is not separated from h by any joint choice of the agents in F— {a} such that Q is not settled true at the moment co-instantial to m lying on h2. A paradigm instance is the creation of a contract between Paul and Marie by their joint agency, but without any specification of who offers and who accepts. What is required is an antecedent chain of choices separately or jointly by Paul and Marie that witness the creation of the contract—the negative condition (ii) ensuring that the completion of the chain is needed to ensure the contract, and the condition (iv) ensuring the essentiality of each of Paul and Marie. Observe the following delicacy: Clause (iv) refers to the very same chain as is introduced at the beginning of the definition. Thus we leave open the possibility that some other chain may witness the agency of a proper subset of F. It seems to us that although it is perfectly true that word-givings do not require the time sequence imposed by RR, still, nothing of relevance to the themes of RR hangs on this, and indeed the analyses of RR are easier to follow if we simply assume that the time order is as RR presumes.
5B.3
Promising in RR
We move from word-giving to promising. RR almost seems to make a point of not taking the complement of "promise" as an agentive. We think, however, that the details of RR can be improved by taking seriously Thesis 5-4 for promising, even while rejecting it. What, on the RR account, is the difference between a mere word-giving and a promise? We quote four additional requirements from scattered locations on pp. 299-301. 5-9 THESIS. (When a word-giving is a promising) • First, a word-giving is a promising only if the proposition asserted is in the future tense. • Second, a word-giving is a promising only if the proposition asserted has the asserter as its subject.
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• Third, a word-giving is a promising only if the proposition ascribes an act ("B will go to A's office at 4:00"), or a refraining from acting ("B will not go to A's office at 4:00"), or a limited range of states ("5 will be in A's office at 4:00"). • [F]ourth ..., unless the word-receiver cares whether the proposition asserted is true, and indeed wants it to be true, then even if there is uptake, so that a word-giving does take place, what takes place is not an instance of promising. We have two suggestions for modifying the details of the RR account of promising. First, we suggest dropping the fourth condition about caring as beside the point. There is meticulous argument in RR that caring should not be placed as a requirement on word-givings, but there seems to be no parallel argument in RR explaining why this condition should be laid on promises. As far as we can see, though the matter is far from obvious, the same reasons that would lead one to withhold the condition in the one case are equally operative in the other. Certainly the caring condition seems tacked on, and our analytic life seems simpler if we drop it. As RR says in another context, we do not need to build the caring condition into the concept of promising in order to keep it in mind. Our discussion gives it no further consideration. Our second suggestion is to fold the first two conditions into the third, something like Third'. A word-giving is a promising only if the proposition ascribes to B a future act ("B will go to A's office at 4:00")
(25)
We intend this as but the slightest of variants, adding only that the proposition in question ascribes a future act to B—regardless of the syntactic shape of the sentence (if any) that expresses the proposition. There are two connected reasons favoring the suggested changes. (i) The "first" and "second" conditions as formulated in RR pertain to sentences (words), not propositions. It is sentences, not propositions, that are or are not in the future tense (first condition), and it is sentences, not propositions, that have subjects (second condition). The policy of RR, however, is that word-givings concern propositions, not sentences (p. 295). This policy should not be given up when it comes to promises. As everyone knows, the same proposition can often be expressed either in the future tense or otherwise, and can be expressed with one subject or with another. Such differences of modes of expression should not make a difference between word-giving and promising. For example, for many sentences P one finds that the logician's future-tense sentence "It will be the case after an interval of a day that it was the case prior to an interval of a day that P" is altogether equivalent to P. And for many sentences P, one finds that nearly any contained singular term is the subject of an equivalent sentence. But if "Paul promised Marie that she would become taller than Paul" is more like a word-giving than a promise, then so is the equivalent "Paul promised Marie that he would become shorter than Marie." And if "Paul
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promised Marie that he is a bachelor unless he is married" is more word-giving than promising, then so is "Paul promised Marie that he will be a bachelor unless he marries." (ii) For a proposition to ascribe to B a future act, it does not suffice that the proposition be expressed by a sentence that has B as its subject and is in the future tense and ascribes an act to B. We therefore do not think that the first and second conditions of RR accurately express its intent. We think that a good way of expressing that intent in linguistic terms is instead as follows. A word-giving is a promising only if, where B is the promisor, the proposition can be expressed by a sentence
There you have your future tense, your promisor as subject, and your ascription of agency (the stit). The only difference is this: In (26) the three pieces are taken together, not separately. Our replacement is obvious, and worth trying. This replacement is a significant modification of the spirit of RR's unrestricted complement thesis, Thesis 5-7, for it insists that the complement of "promise" must be a future-tensed agentive with the same agent as the promisor. That may sound like the "same subject" condition of RR, but it is not. From the beginning stit theorists have supposed that the agent is a distinguishable or recoverable "part" of the "content" of an agentive. This is no mere verbal matter. See especially §1C and §3A. The replacement, however, is also a significant modification of a restricted complement thesis, Thesis 5, in the sense of Thesis 5-4. In order to appreciate the exact form of (26), one probably needs to read the stit as a "deliberative stit" rather than an "achievement stit," though neither of these constructions is entirely apt except for simple cases. The present point is this: The choices that are available to the agent, and not just the outcome of those choices, are to be envisaged as in the future of the promising. It is easier to get straight on this with the deliberative stit. It is a separate point that Q itself is likely to be well represented by a sentence in the future tense, so that the outcome represented by Q follows after the choice that witnesses the stit. The stit part of the sentence (26) expresses agency. But Thesis 5-9 (its third part) gives three disjuncts. There is in the reach of that third condition not only a promise (i) to do, but also a promise (ii) to refrain; and there is a promise (in) to be. Of these only (i) seems to be covered by (26). What shall we do about the other two disjuncts of the third condition given by Thesis 5-9 as to when a word-giving is a promise? Luckily, however, stit already covers both of these extra cases—and in a unified way. With regard to ( i i ) , a promise to refrain, it is an explicit thesis of stit theory that refraining is expressible by a stit, and is therefore very different from mere not-doing. For example, that X not trespass can be true of nearly everything, whereas only sometimes is X in a position to refrain from trespassing, that is, in a position to see to it that X does not trespass. For the latter, but not for the former, X must certainly be an
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agent in the matter. With regard to ( i i i ) a promise to be, for example a promise by B to be at A's office at 4:00, we think that here above all the distinction that RR intends between (mere) word-giving and promising comes to the fore. If it is merely a matter of where B is. then we have word-giving. But it becomes a promise if it is a matter of B exercising some agency in getting to the office, that is, if it is a matter of B's seeing to it that B is at A's office at 4:00. The central point is this: To the extent that there is a difference between (mere) word-giving and promising, the complement needs to be or at least involve an agentive. A mere agentless state-description will not do. In short, we suggest that a simple promise, when represented in the same style as before, would involve a claim of X against Y that Y will see to it that P. In full dress: Y promises X to see to it that P against Y that will:[Y stit: p]]]
[Y stit: Can:[X stit: X has a claim
Hey, this is a three-stit extravaganza! Its very complexity indicates, in accord with Slogan 5-6, the prospective utility of careful theory in assisting us to find our way. On the other hand, we see by following RR that the simple version of the stit complement thesis, Thesis 5-4, which looks to be exactly right for the English version, must give way at least to the future tense when all is spelled out; and a future-tensed agentive is not, definitely not, itself an agentive. To suggest that it was would be to fly in the face of the principle of no choice between undivided histories, Post. 8.
5C
Strategic content of promises and word-givings
We, following RR, have advanced the future-tensed same-agent stit form as appropriate to the content of a promise in simple paradigmatic cases. This amounts to a slight variation on the restricted complement thesis, Thesis 5, as applied to promises. Because even these cases are complex, we treated no others, even though we noted that simple cases, although revelatory, are perhaps not all that frequent. The dividing line is crisp: In the most complex cases one must attend to many choices, whereas in the simplest cases a single stit-warranting choice suffices. To build a theory of multiple choices and their outcomes is inevitably more difficult than constructing a theory of single choices. How to go on? Our conjecture for a better approximation—one that does not forfeit gains already made—would be that the content of more complex promises can be usefully expressed in terms of the "austere theory of strategies" developed in chapter 13. Briefly, a strategy for a considers a "field" of moments, and is defined for some or all of the moments in its field. The moments at which it is defined are said to be in its "domain," and for every moment in its domain, a strategy for a picks out from among the choices available to a at that moment one or more choices that count as in accord with the strategy. As
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a verbal convenience, we say that the strategy "requires" that the agent choose in accord with the strategy, even though the austere idea of a strategy does not depend on deontic ideas. That, austerely, is it. It is basic to the theory of stit and of strategies that you cannot stit the content of a strategy. This is an elementary consequence of the principle of no choice between undivided histories. It therefore seems that we have a sound theoretical basis for modifying the stit complement thesis, Thesis 2, according to which the complement of stit must be a declarative sentence. We have not, however, laid sufficient groundwork for such a modification. The stit complement thesis is at least in part linguistic, and although in chapter 13 we suggest an abstract theory of strategies, we have not suggested any linguistic devices with which to carry the content of a strategy. Perhaps none are necessary; perhaps it suffices just to consider, at least for a first approximation, sentences, Q, for which there is a strategy such that Q is true at the moment of promising paired with each member of the smallest set of histories that the strategy really guarantees (Definition 13-5). Some such suggestion would appear to cover, for example, future-tensed stit sentences, and also combinations of conditional stits such as "if the sun doesn't shine, I will apologize, and furthermore if it rains, I will lend you my umbrella." It is not, however, sufficient to consider just this first approximation. The difficulty is that the approximation will only work for the simplest cases such as Paul's promise to pick up Marie, (7). It will not work to cover our understanding of Paul's promising something that Paul can influence but cannot guarantee, for example, (13), nor of something over which he has no control, for example, (12). We offer a better approximation, in §5C.2, that is intended to cover these cases uniformly.
5C.1
Promising versus word-giving I: Example
As a first run at the problem, we work through an example that suggests that strategic ideas can help us to judge if there is a difference between word-giving and promising that you do something. Consider the following. (Giving your word that you will do something) Paul gave Marie his word that he will see to it that he is at the station at 9:00.
(27)
(Promising that you will do something) Paul promised Marie that he will see to it that he is at the station at 9:00.
(28)
On the RR analysis, as we have represented it, there is no difference whatsoever, since a promising is analyzed as a word-giving with a future-tensed agentive complement. So long as the complement is a future-tensed same-agent stit, there is, on our version of the RR account, no difference between word-giving and promising. And maybe that is the most useful account. It is just common sense to observe that in many cases we use "I promise you that" and "I give you my word that" interchangeably, with no felt difference of meaning; and it is certainly a theme of stit theory that English grammar is no sure guide. One
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wonders, however, if one can use the theory of strategies to draw a distinction in an interesting and helpful way. Such a theory might permit one to refine the "complex responsibility" of (21) in two different ways, ways that distinguish (27) from (28). Speech act theorists sometimes distinguish the two by saying that assertion or word-giving embodies a fit of words to the world, whereas a promise embodies a fit of the world to the words. (The idea comes perhaps from Anscombe 1957, p. 4.) We shall show that the theory of strategies can help give definite meaning to the distinction drawn by these metaphors. The theory of strategies would allow the following, which we present in rough form. For (27), the word-giving, the content might be represented by a strategy that requires no choices whatsoever that are relevant to Paul's seeing to it that he is at the station at 9:00, but that (29) prescribes that Paul compensate Marie if he does not see to it that he is at the station at 9:00 (see Definition 5-15). This is a "words-to-world-fitting" strategy. Although it does call for some choices involving compensation when the words do not fit the world, the central point is that the strategy does not call on Paul to make choices favoring (objective) possibilities fitting his words. In other words, Paul can follow this strategy without doing or choosing anything that favors his seeing to it that he is at the station at 9:00. We propose this as an explication of the metaphorical phrase, "fit the words to the world." Note also that the word-giving strategy is "primary" rather than "secondary" in the sense of Definition 13-7. That is, it says nothing whatever if Paul makes an excluded choice, for example, if Paul chooses not to compensate Marie. For (28), the promising, the content might be represented by a strategy that (i) prescribes that, if possible, Paul choose in a way that guarantees that he see to it that he is at the station at 9:00, (ii) prescribes that, if possible, Paul keep open the possibility of Paul's later guaranteeing that he sees to it that he is at the station at 9:00, and (iii) prescribes that Paul compensate Marie if in fact he "infringes his promise" by arriving at a moment at which it is no longer possible for him to see to it that he is at the station at 9:00 (see Definition 5-13).
(30)
This is a "world-to-words-fitting" strategy. It calls for choices relevant to getting Paul to the station at 9:00. We propose this as an explication of the metaphorical phrase, "fit the world to the words." Observe that this strategy is, crucially, "secondary" rather than "primary," since it imposes requirements on Paul (that he compensate Marie) when he violates the strategy by infringing his promise. As secondary, the strategy contains a "contrary to duty" (so to speak) component, namely, the compensatory sub-strategy. There is evidently a large difference between the strategies described in (29) and (30), which (inconclusively) suggests that the theory of strategies can help
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clarify the view of those of us who feel that there is an important difference between (27) and (28). It offers hope that there is a useful distinction to be made between word-giving that an action will be performed and promising to carry out that action. It provides a way to try to make rigorous and objective sense out of the metaphorical difference between "fit of words to world" and "fit of world to words."
5C.2
Promising versus word-giving II: Strategic accounts
We put the matter more rigorously, invoking in a preliminary way some concepts not fully developed until chapter 7 and chapter 13. Needless to say, increase in rigor will cost increase in complexity of detail. Consider a promising that P. We already know that not only P, but also the promisor and promisee, play a conceptually essential role. The easiest way to keep this firmly in mind is to consider not just "a promising that P" but something like "X promises Y that P." Even this, however, although enough for English, is not enough for analytic clarity. We must also keep in mind that a promising is a concrete act that occurs at a specific moment in our world. We must keep in mind that there is always a "moment of promising," for we shall find that it plays an important role in the analysis of the strategic content of a promise. For this reason, "X promises Y that P" does not suffice; we make the moment of promising explicit in our analytic target by considering the following instead. (Making the moment of promising an explicit argument is strictly an expository convenience. One could as well take "X promises Y that P" by itself, keeping track of the moment of promising as a (mobile) semantic parameter in the sense of §6B.3.) 5-10 TARGET. (Analytical target) At mo, X promises Y that P. The following is designed to serve as a helpful if greatly oversimplified uniform account of the content of Target 5-10 in terms of a strategy—with the full understanding that the particularities of the account involve a number of decisions on our part. Our aim is to give one more or less helpful account, not to survey a variety of possibilities. The account will be given entirely in the austere language of choices amid branching histories; in particular, there will be no reliance on "beliefs" or "wants" or any other mind-dependent concepts. As elsewhere, the point is not at all to suggest that our objective account suffices. Helpful, yes. Enough, no. This is also the place to observe that we do not in this section aspire to an understanding of the act of promising represented by Target 5-10. Our more modest target is a structural description of the strategic content of that promising. It is as if we undertook to analyze the propositional content of an assertion without aiming to explain the act of assertion. It will be plain that our account has its roots in the "agent-action reduction" program of Hamblin 1987.
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5C.2.1
Double time references
Our account acknowledges that a satisfactory account of the strategic content of Target 5-10 will need to involve "double time references." Let us observe that although we speak here only of promising, the double-time-reference ideas should play a role in understanding the content of a wide variety of "speech acts." Perhaps they even play a role in all, to the extent that (objective) indeterminism enters the picture via either choice or chance.6 So what about "double time references" with regard to Target 5-10? A natural guess is that one of the two references will be to the moment of promising, mo; and that is right. It is perhaps equally natural to guess that the other reference will be to a time at which P is evaluated. It turns out, however, that things are not so simple. The other reference is indeed to a later moment, say m1, at which we are considering the status of the carrying-out of the promise. Easy examples show, however, that there is no simple evaluation of P itself at such later moments. For example, let P be "X will pay $5 to Y" or, with the future tense rendered explicitly as a Prior connective, as follows.7 It will be true that X has paid $5 to Y.
(31)
Feeding (31) into our generalized Target 5-10 gives a more special target: 5-11 TARGET. (Promising to pay $5 in the future) At mo, X promises Y that it will be true that X has paid $5 to Y. In considering whether or not the promise has a "carried out" status at some future moment m1, it seems clear that we do not wish to evaluate the actual complement, (31), of the promising. Instead we want to consider only its ingredient, X has paid $5 to Y.
(32)
When it is settled that (32) is true, the promise has been "carried out." At such a moment, when X has already paid $5 to Y, the future-tensed complement, (31), is doubtless settled false. The former matters; the latter does not. This example, and others that crowd the mind, might suggest that a uniform and nonsyntactical account of Target 5-10 is beyond hope. A close-to-home example such as "X will see to it that X pays $5 to Y" seems especially confusing, no matter how the "sees to it" is handled. We suggest, however, that a natural account can be found in the doctrine of branching histories and its accompanying semantics. If we pay careful attention to these semantics, we 6 Double time references are important, for instance, in understanding bets on objectively indeterminate future events, e.g., "I bet that this coin will land heads." But such ideas may contribute little or nothing to understanding bets on the settled past, e.g., "I bet that the Normans invaded England in 1064." 7 In (31) we use "has paid" instead of "pays" for two reasons. First, the achievement is easier to think about than the process, and just as useful in illustrating a promise. Second, the important feature of the example is a transition from "not-yet-paid" to "now paid," rather than some idealized instant of payment.
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can see exactly how "double time references" work without presuming anything whatever about the various syntactic ingredients of P. The fundament of those semantics is this: Because of indeterminism, the truth value of a sentence may depend both on the moment of evaluation and also on the history of evaluation.8 That is, the metalinguistic predicate "true on" must be relativized both to a moment and to a history, so that one says "A is true on m/h," where h is one of the histories to which the moment, m, belongs. It follows that the sentential complement, P, of Target 5-10 has a rich semantic content in terms of its truth value at each moment-history pair, m/h. In principle, the entire semantic content of P is available to us in explaining the contribution of P to the content of Target 5-10. An essential feature of our account, however, is that promising uses only a small part of this richness; namely, promising uses only the pattern of truth values of P at pairs that feature a single moment,TOO,the moment of promising. The sentential complement, P, of Target 5-10 contributes nothing but its pattern of truth values at the various pairs m o / h , where mo is fixed once and for all as the moment of promising, and where h ranges over all the histories to which this moment belongs. It is striking that this be so. One would have thought that one would have to consider the truth value of P at moments after the moment of promising in order to get the right "world to words" fit. As we saw in considering Target 5-11, however, in looking at these later moments, we are not considering the truth value of P itself. In this special example, we look instead at the truth value, at later moments, of an ingredient of P, namely, (32). We made a point out of the fact that we do not consider the truth value of P = (31) itself. By attending to the pattern of values of P only at the moment of promising, we obtain a uniform account that works for arbitrary P, regardless of syntactic structure. (Naturally, in the context of this book, we presuppose that P exhibits a structure for which it is illuminating to speak of a rigorous branching-histories semantics. We offer no contribution to other aspects of the theory of promises.) We claim that it is possible to forget the grammatical complexities of P, and consider only its pattern of truth values at m0/h, whereTOOis the moment of promising and h is any history through that moment. Our claim is that this pattern supplies exactly the right semantic content for the promising to be a promising that P. We claim that in analyzing the content of Target 5-10, we need use only "P is true on m0/h," where mo is the moment of promising, and h is one of the histories to which that moment belongs. 8 This idea was introduced in §2A, and will be spelled out at length in chapters 6 and 8. If context-dependencies are present, and they must be considered for an accurate understanding of the language of indeterminism, then truth also depends on the moment of utterance, and perhaps also on the place, speaker, etc., in a manner indicated in those chapters. (There is, given indeterminism, no such thing as "the" history of utterance; see §6D and Question 8-4.) The moment and history "of evaluation" must be seen to be separate from these. In these terms, observe that the moment of promising represents a moment of evaluation, not the moment of utterance of a promise-report such as (9) or Target 5-10. With regard to Target 5-10, mo need not be "now," X need not be "I," and Y need not be "you." Compare the treatment of direct-discourse assertion in §6E.
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It may seem as if we are suddenly abandoning the "double time references" theme. If P is evaluated only at the moment of promising, mo, and if we are not allowed to look at specific syntactic constituents of P, what could possibly be the role of later moments? Our (necessarily abstract) answer is this. It is the job of a later moment, say m1, to pick out some among all the histories through mo to be the range of h.9 Typically, we shall wish to know whether or not it is the case that, for all, none, or some of the histories to which m1 belongs, P is true at m0/h. This version of the "double time reference" idea is so central (and so confusing) that we shall postpone illustration in order first to introduce some jargon. 5-12 DEFINITION. (Double time reference ideas) • Sett-true(m 0, m1, A) iff (i) m0 is earlier than (or identical to) m1, and ( i i ) for every history, h, to which m1 belongs, A is true at m0/h. • Sett-false(m0, m1, A) iff (i) mo is earlier than (or identical to) m1, and (ii) for every history, h, to which m1 belongs, A is false at m0/h. • Poss-true(m0, m1, A) iff (i) mo is earlier than (or identical to) m1, and ( i i ) for some history, h, to which m1 belongs, A is true at m0/h. The structure of English tenses makes it difficult to restate these ideas informally. Let us position ourselves at m1, so that we may refer to the earlier moment, mo, with a past tense. Then, approximately, Sett-true(mo, m1, A) iff it is settled true at m1 that A was true at m0. For example, let only one payment of $5 be at issue, let mo be the moment of promising, and let A be "X will have paid $5 to y." Take a later moment, m1, at which X has paid $5 to Y—so that certainly at m1 it is settled that X has paid $5 to Y. Then on the one hand, A is oddly but certainly false at m1, since only one payment is at issue. On the other hand, at m1 it is settled that "X will have paid $5 to y" was true at m0.10 And that is exactly the right idea: Sett-true(mo, m1, X will have paid $5 to Y). In a Prior-like language that permits nesting of tense connectives and modalities, we may put it this way: At m1 it is settled true that at mo X will have paid $5 to Y. In terms of formal Prior-like connectives (see §8F), the sentence is this: At-mom m1 :Sett:At-mom m0 :Will:(X has paid $5 to Y). It is a pity that English, lacking this easy expressiveness, makes the key idea seem more difficult than it is. A picture may help. With reference to Figure 9 By the principle of no backward branching, Post. 3, the family of histories to which a later moment m1 belongs must be a subset of the histories to which mo belongs. In other words, any history that represents a possible continuation from a moment in the future of possibilities of mo already also represents a possible continuation from m0. 10 In any decent tense logic, including that applicable to branching histories (indeterminism), the following is a logical truth: If A, then it has always been true (with mo as a special case) that it will be true that A. If X has paid $5 to Y, then it has always been true that it will be true that X has paid $5 to Y.
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Figure 5.1: Double time references
5.1, suppose that m1 represents a (possible) moment at which X has paid $5 to Y, and that m2 represents a (possible) moment at which it is a settled fact that Y will never be paid. The histories h1 and h2 represent possible continuations after X has paid $5 to Y; observe that these continuations cannot change the settled fact that X has paid $5 to Y. Similarly, h3 and h4 represent possible continuations after nonpayment becomes certain, continuations that cannot change that settled fact. Now let A be "X will have paid $5 to Y." A A A A
is true at m0/h1 is true at m0/h2 is not true at m0/h3 is not true at m 0 /h4
In these circumstances, Sett-true(mo, m1, A), since A is true at m0/h for every history through m1; and Sett-false (mo, m2, A), since A is false at m0/h for every history through m2. The critical point is that the role of a later moment, for example m1 or m2, is not as a place to evaluate A. Instead, the later moment supplies a group of histories over which "h" is to range while evaluating A at m0/h. In double time reference, the earlier moment supplies the moment of evaluation, while the later moment supplies a group of histories of evaluation.
5C.2.2
Strategic content of a promise
Given the ideas of Definition 5-12, we are in a position to explain the content of Target 5-10 in terms of a strategy. We shall also rely on a number of strategic concepts that are rigorously defined in chapter 13. Using these two sources of concepts, we give the explanation in terms of a definition of "strategic content of X's promising Y that P at mo," making plain the four required arguments, X, Y, P, and m 0 —the last being the moment of promising. 5-13 DEFINITION. (Strategic content of X's promising Y that P at m0) We are thinking of mo as the moment of promising; and we are letting S0 be the
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promising-that-P strategy (more fully: the X-promising- Y-that-P-at-m0 strategy) that we are defining. In these terms, we define that S0 is the strategic content of X 's promising Y that P at mo iff the following. First, the "field" for the strategy, S0, must be mo together with all moments, m1, in its future of possibilities. (A promising-that-P strategy is, however, far from being totally defined on that field, or even complete in the sense of Definition 13-14, as will be clear from the clauses that follow.) It must be that s0 is a strategy for X whose domain of definition is some portion of that field. Second, in defining so, we divide up the various moments, m1, in its field as follows. i. Suppose X arrives at a moment m1 such that Sett-true(m0, m1, P), so that no matter the historical continuation of m1, P was true at the moment of promising with respect to that historical continuation. (Reminder: If P is a future-tensed sentence, e.g., "Will: A," and if in this example A is a settled fact at m1, then Sett-true(m0, m1, P).) We say at that moment, m1, that the promising-that-P strategy has been "satisfied." (To say that the promise has been "kept" is to say more than is warranted. Even "carried out" perhaps suggests something extra beyond the causal.) At any such moment m1, the strategy, S0, says nothing: m1 does not lie within its domain of definition. Observe that it already follows that once a promising-that-P strategy is satisfied, it remains so forever. ii. Suppose X arrives at a moment m1 such that Sett-false (mo, m1, P), so that no matter the historical continuation of m1, P was false at the moment of promising with respect to that historical continuation. Then at that moment m1, we say (following Hamblin) that the promising-that-P strategy has been "infringed." (To say that the promise has been "broken" is to say more than is warranted.) At any such moment, the strategy; s0, prescribes that X "compensate" Y in a way that we do not spell out, but that would certainly involve a sub-strategy that would work toward compensation until completed, or perhaps until some "deadline" was reached.11 Hi. Suppose X arrives at moment m1 at which neither Sett-true(mo, m1, P) nor Sett-false(m0, m1, P); that is, whether or not P was true at the moment of promising is historically open at m1. Here is where there might be room for X's agency directed toward P. What the strategy, S0, directs depends on circumstances at m1, which may be one of three kinds. a. There is available at m1 a strategy, s, for X that guarantees the set of histories with respect to which P is true at mo. Then the strategy, S0, must dictate that X make some (any) choice that is in accord with some strategy, s, for X that is available at m1 and that guarantees the set of histories with respect to which P is true at mo. 11
It is not plausible that an account of compensation can be built on nothing more than the semantics of an unarticulated complement, P. It is also not plausible that there should be any rigorous and general theory of compensation.
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b. There is no P-at-m0-guaranteeing strategy available to X at m1, but there is, in the future of possibilities of m1, some moment, m2, at which not only do we have Poss-true(m0, m2, P), but furthermore, at m2 there is available to X a P-at-m0-guaranteeing strategy. Then the promising-that-P strategy, S0, must dictate that X make some (any) choice that keeps open the possibility of arriving at a moment m2 at which there is available to X a P-at-m0-guaranteeing strategy. c. Neither at m\ nor at any moment m2 in the future of possibilities of m1, is there available a P-at-mo-guaranteeing strategy for X. The promising-that-P strategy, S0, must dictate that X make some (any) choice that keeps open the possibility of P-at-m0; that is, some (any) choice that contains a history with respect to which P is true at m0- (These words are meant to include the possibility of a vacuous choice, Def. 14, as in a situation in which there is nothing that X can do.) The most significant feature of this definition is on the surface: In case ( i i i } , when the truth of P at mo is still open, when things could go either way with respect to the truth of P at TOO, then there is a call for agency. X must do something in the direction of making P true at TOO, if possible. X must not choose to guarantee that P is false at TOO. This is the heart of the strategic unpacking of the speech-act idea that a promise involves "fitting the world to the words." This promising-that-P strategy, S0., is "tough" in that it requires compensation for P turning up settled false even if that happens in spite of X's best efforts. Example: "I promise you that Billy will brush his teeth," and Billy fails to cooperate. On the other hand, the promising-that-P strategy we have just defined has a certain looseness in that even when X has a chance to make a single choice guaranteeing that P will be settled true in the immediate future, it permits X to make another choice on which, depending on later choices by X, P might turn out settled false. A more "wholehearted" strategy (Hamblin) would require even more agency on the part of X. The theory of strategies permits us to make many such distinctions. More sophisticated strategies might require, for example, that X pay attention to probability distributions on the various choices available. It is easy to see that there are a variety of different ways for X to "fall off" the promising-that-P strategy defined. The primary way occurs as described in (i), when X makes a choice that fails to be in accord with any strategy that guarantees that P, at a moment at which such a choice is available. There is no special word for this kind of failure; we could invent one, but it seems that which word is appropriate might depend too much on mentalistic considerations. For example, suppose X has the money promised to Y, but gambles it, and wins, and then pays Y after all. X was in a position to pay the promised money, but, by choosing to gamble, X fell off the prescribed promising-to-pay strategy. We
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should not be likely to say in this case that X "broke" the promise, since Y was paid after all, and indeed it seems likely that we might say that X "kept" his promise. Nevertheless, putting at risk the formerly secure ability to keep the promise seems to deserve some sort of evaluative expression. 5C.2.3
Strategic content of a word-giving
In any case, the present account of promising seems already enough to force a division between (i) a word-giving-that-P of the word-to-world-fitting kind, and (ii) a promising-that-P of the world-to-words-fitting kind, even when P has the form of a future-tensed agentive. Since this is a vexing topic, it will be worthwhile to spell out the details. Evidently we should begin with an account of the strategic content of a word-giving. 5-14 TARGET. (Analytic target) At m0, X gives Y his or her word that P. (Later we consider the particular case in which P is a future-tensed agentive.) Here is our account of the content of Target 5-14 in terms of a strategy. Much will be familiar, since we have deliberately copied as much as possible from Definition 5-13. 5-15 DEFINITION. (Strategic content of X's giving his word to Y that P) We are thinking of mo as the moment of word-giving; and we are letting S0 be the word-giving-that-P strategy (more fully: the X-word-giving- Y-that-P-at-m0 strategy) that we are defining. In these terms, we define that S0 is the strategic content of X 's word-giving Y that P at mo iff the following. First, the "field" for the strategy, S0, must be mo together with all moments, m1, in its future of possibilities. (A word-giving-that-P strategy is, however, far from being totally defined on that field, or even complete, as will be clear from the clauses that follow.) It must be that S0 is a strategy for X whose domain of definition is some portion of that field. Second, in defining S0, we divide up the various moments, m1, in its field as follows. i. Suppose X arrives at a moment m1, such that Sett-true(m0, m1, P), so that no matter the historical continuation of m1, P was true at the moment of word-giving with respect to that historical continuation. We say at that moment, m1, that the word-giving-that-P is "vindicated."12 At any such moment m1, the strategy, S0, says nothing: m1 does not lie within its domain of definition. Observe that it already follows as a matter of logic that once a word-giving-that-P strategy is vindicated, it remains so forever. 12 In (ii) we say that a word-giving may be "impugned." We choose "vindicated" and "impugned" for word-givings as parallel to "satisfied" and "infringed" for promises. As we suggest in §6E, the vindicated/impugned pair seems also felicitous for assertions that are less serious than word-givings. In any case, the structurally important points, regardless of English words, are (1) that a matter that is unsettled at the moment mo of word-giving becomes and forever after remains settled at m1, and (2) that some sort of norms kick in at m1.
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ii. Suppose X arrives at a moment m1 such that Sett-false (m0, m1, P), so that no matter the historical continuation of m1, P was false at the moment of word-giving with respect to that historical continuation. Then at that moment m1, we say that the word-giving-that-P has been "impugned." At any such moment, the strategy, S0, prescribes that X "compensate" Y in a way that we do not spell out, but that would certainly involve a sub-strategy that would work toward compensation until completed, or perhaps until some "deadline" was reached. iii. Suppose X arrives at moment, m1, at which neither Sett-true(mo, m1, P) nor Sett-false (m0, m1, P); that is, whether or not P was true at the moment of word-giving is historically open at m1. Here is where there is room for X 's agency directed toward P. Since, however, it is only a matter of word-giving-that-P, and not of promising-that-P, nothing is prescribed for X to choose. No effort of fitting world to words is called for. It just doesn't matter. The last clause, the one dealing with moments at which it is open whether P is true at mo, is where the two types of strategies differ. Here is where the present analysis puts the essential difference between promising that P and word-giving that P. Promising typically requires that the promisor do or choose something at some such moments, moments after the moment of promising and before it is settled whether the promise is satisfied or infringed. Word-giving never imposes any such requirement. The analysis of these two concepts via their strategic content emphasizes this. 5C.2.4
Promising versus word-giving a future-tensed agentive
Let us now consider the special case in which P is a future-tensed agentive, X will see to it that Q.
(33)
Does there remain a difference between the following? At mo, X promises Y that (X will see to it that Q).
(34)
At m0, X gives Y his word that (X will see to it that Q).
(35)
English is not of as much help as we should like. Indeed, a frequently encountered "analysis" has it that promising to do something just is giving your word that you will do it. We may see, however, that even on the oversimplified and partial accounts of promising-that-P and word-giving-that-P, the sharp difference remains. Let the strategic content of (34) be given by Definition 5-13, and let the strategic content of (35) be given by Definition 5-15. Suppose, for a very simple case, that Figure 5.1 on p. 123 pictures the world, and all its possibilities, choices, and chances. Suppose that mo is the moment of promising, or word-giving. Let the splitting just after mo represent some choice or chance beyond the control of X. Let m1 and m2 be (nonvacuous) choice points for X. Suppose that truth values for Q are distributed as follows:
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is true at m1/h1. is not true at m1/h2. is true at m2/h3,. is not true at m2/h4.
In this simple case, one can use stit theory (the dstit variety) to calculate (or just see) that at each of these four pairs, "X sees to it that Q" has exactly the same truth value as Q: "X "X "X "X
sees sees sees sees
to to to to
it it it it
that that that that
Q" Q" Q" Q"
is true at m1/h1. is not true at m1/h 2. is true at m2/h3. is not true at m2/h4.
Also, since m1 and m2 are the only moments at which X has a nonvacuous choice, "X sees to it that Q" is false everywhere else. Therefore, by ordinary tense logic, "X will see to it that Q" must follow along, history for history, when evaluated at the moment of promising or word-giving: "X "X "X "X
will see will see will see will see
to to to to
it it it it
that that that that
Q" Q" Q" Q"
is is is is
true at m0/h1. not true at m0/h2. true at m0/h3. not true at m0/h4.
The strategy for the promise represented by (34) therefore dictates that X must not "turn right" upon reaching either m1 or m2- If he does so, if he chooses h2 upon reaching m1, or if he chooses h4 upon reaching 7712, the strategy for (34) will be infringed, and will call for compensation of Y. We might well say that X has broken his promise to Y since by "turning left," X could have guaranteed satisfaction of the promise. The point is that if X throws away a "last chance," X has violated the strategy that represents the content of a promise, even if later X compensates Y. The strategy for the word-giving represented by (35) is different precisely with respect to what it dictates at m1 and m2. At these moments, it says nothing at all. X is free to choose as he likes, so far as the word-giving strategy goes. If X chooses at m1 or m2 to "turn right," X has not violated the strategy that represents the content of the word-giving that he will see to it that Q. If at mo X has merely given his word to Y that he will see to it that Q, then on the account we have given, X undertakes no responsibility for guaranteeing the truth of (33) at m0. For avoiding violation of the word-giving strategy, it suffices if X compensates Y even after choosing to guarantee that (33) is false at mo!13 13 We have taken the word-giving target from RR. It is therefore essential to observe that the analysis of word-giving to be derived from RR via quote (21) does not give the present result for word-giving. The quote from RR fits our theoretical account of "promising" better than our account of "word-giving." Our aim in choosing to speak of "word-giving" is not, however, to saddle either RR or indeed ourselves with a particular analysis. Its sole purpose is to exhibit how the theory of strategies provides a chance to help sharpen any such analysis—without invoking mentalistic concepts.
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By giving us insight into the difference between two ideas naturally (but not inevitably) associated respectively with the English expressions "word-giving that one does" and "promising that one does," the proposed application of the theory of strategies passes a critical test.
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Part II
Foundations of indeterminism
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6
Indeterminism and the Thin Red Line Indeterminism is essential to the idea of agency as we conceive it.* For this reason we drop our concentration on agency for the space of three chapters in order to give primary attention to some foundational questions concerning indeterminism itself. There are many such; the key problem of this chapter is how to make sense of assertions about future events made at a time when the outcomes of those events are not yet determined. One tempting solution to this "assertion problem" is the "Thin Red Line" of the chapter title, a version of indeterminism that combines two doctrines: (i) the doctrine of an open future filled with real (incompatible) alternatives, and (ii) the doctrine that one of these futures is the real or actual future, the distinguished one among the alternatives that will "in fact" happen (que sera, sera). We argue that this solution will not do: Although "actuality" makes sense for the past and the present, there is no such thing as "the actual future." Our argument is based on a close examination of the basic ideas of a Kaplaninspired indexical adaptation of the Prior/Thomason semantics, which we take to be required of a language to be used in an indeterminist world—such as we believe ours to be. Abandonment of the Thin Red Line leaves unsolved the problem of making sense of assertions about the indeterministic future. We propose a natural solution to this problem based on the point that assertion has normative consequences for the future, no matter what happens, a solution that implies that the Thin Red Line is useless. In the chapter following this one, we go over our grounding theory of the open future postulate by postulate; and then in chapter 8 we explain our semantic point of view, also in detail. There is some repetition between this chapter and those; this one should be taken as introductory. Furthermore, readers not so *Mitchell Green is co-author of this chapter. With the kind permission of Ridgeview Publishing Company, it draws on Belnap and Green 1994.
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interested in rigorous foundations may wish to skip chapter 7 and chapter 8 altogether, or perhaps return to them later.
6A
Preliminary considerations
Before turning to the exact analysis that we think is required in addressing the "assertion problem," we briefly lay out some preliminary ideas: a generalization of McTaggart's A- and B-series, a sketchy account of the Thin Red Line, a clarification of the idea of indeterminism with which we work, and a rehearsal of the basic postulates of branching time theory. Throughout it is essential to keep in mind that we are not considering "second order" indeterminism, that is, indeterminism as a feature of our mind or of our language or of our theories. We are always taking our questions to concern "first order" indeterminism, that is, indeterminism as a feature (if it is one) of the causal order of our world.
6A.1
The A series and the B series
Central to the idea of indeterminism is this: At a given moment in the history of the world there are a variety of ways in which affairs might carry on. Before the toss of the coin there are two things that could happen, either heads up or tails up. This possibility is not merely epistemic, but in re.1 In spite of this it seems clear that the outcomes heads and tails could not be temporally related. Although heads, if it happened, would be subsequent to the coin toss, and tails, if it happened, would be subsequent to the coin toss, surely neither of heads or tails precedes the other, nor are they simultaneous. One may hold that being present, past, or future is an intrinsic property of moments, and thus be a champion of the past-present-future "A-series" of McTaggart 1908. We aim to avoid this question altogether. Instead in considering indeterminism we concentrate on a generalization of McTaggart's "B-series," which describes the before/after relations that moments bear to one another, with no reference to whether any of those moments is past, present, or future. Both sides of the debate about the A-series admit that the B-series captures some of the truth, and surely much of our thinking about our world derives from the presumption that it has the B-series shape. That is to say, thinking of "order" as a generalization of "series," it is natural to think of the B-order of our world as a series, defined by the condition that every distinct pair of moments m1 and m2 are such that either m1 is prior to m2 or m2 is prior to m1. Yet if the B-order is a series, it follows that the events heads and tails cannot both be in our world, even if the coin toss can. (For an introductory account of the Aand B-orders, see Gale 1968, pp. 65-86. For important work on indeterminism 1
Throughout this chapter we shall use hackneyed examples such as coin tosses and the occasional sea battle. In each case the example will serve its purpose only if understood as indeterministic in the sense delineated in §6A 3. Not wishing to prejudge any questions about which concrete situations are really indeterministic, we invite the reader to supply her own examples if the ones that we employ tread on her sensibilities.
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from the point of view of an A-theorist, consult McCall 1976, McCall 1984, and McCall 1994.)
6A.2
Introduction to the Thin Red Line
One common way of conjoining the aspect of indeterminism just formulated with an understanding of our world deriving from a construal of the B-order as a series is to hold that at a given moment in the history of our world from which there are a variety of ways in which affairs might carry on, one of those ways is privileged over against all others as being what is actually going to happen. Not only is it true that the coin could either land heads or tails, and therefore true that it will be the case that either the coin lands heads or the coin lands tails. Not only is it the case that either the coin will land heads, or the coin will land tails. What is furthermore true is that there is, at the time of the toss, a directly referential, rigid, absolute specification of "what, at the time of the toss, is actually going to happen." This specification breaks the symmetry, picking out either heads or tails. Only our limited minds keep us from knowing which. One might express this by saying that our world does not itself branch, leaving open the ontological status of the alternative possibilities required by indeterminism. The thought is bolstered by the fact that when we see heads we are inclined to say, "Aha! So this is what was going to happen. It was therefore true before the toss that the coin was going to land heads." (See Ryle 1954 for motivation of the view that whatever happens was to be.) It used to be said of the British Empire that it was maintained by a thin red line of soldiers in service to the queen. The Russians dashed on towards that thin red-line streak tipped with a line of steel. (W. H. Russell to the London Times from the Crimea, 1854) We shall express the view just sketched by saying that from among the lines along which history might go, subsequent to an indeterministic moment, one of those lines is the course along which history will go, and it is both thin and red, much as it might be inscribed on a blackboard. You may think of the hue as infrared, to capture the idea that the Thin Red Line does not imply that mortals are capable of seeing the future. Our tendency to believe that there is a Thin Red Line is powerful. When we presume that there will be a sea battle, in spite of knowing that there might not be, what we seem to presume is the following: There will in fact be a sea battle even though there need not be. When we wonder, "What does the future hold? Will there be a sea battle or not?" even when we know that there are two possibilities, we seem to be wondering whether there will in fact be a sea battle. Further, belief in an actual future, a Thin Red Line, appears to be consistent with believing that there is indeterminism in the world. There seems nothing untoward in supposing that while there are two things that might become of the coin about to be tossed, it is in fact going to land heads. It would seem to be consistent to say, "The coin will not land tails, but it could. What is
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more, the coin will land heads, but it needn't do so." (See OhrstrOm 1981 for an explicit call for a Thin Red Line; Brauner, 0hrstr0m, and Hasle 1998 for discussion; and Barcellan and Zanardo 1999 for formal development, discussion, and a suggestion of applicability in computer science.) We shall argue that in spite of its stalwartness the Thin Red Line should be forsworn. We shall argue, against an established opposition, that one can make much better sense of an indeterministic, branching structure for our world by abandoning the idea of an actual future as distinguished among the possibilities. We shall furthermore argue that the Thin Red Line doctrine turns out, on closer scrutiny, to have unpalatable consequences. We shall call the view that in spite of indeterminism one neither needs nor can use a Thin Red Line the doctrine of the open future. We intend this terminology to make contact with the intuitions (but not the style) of many decades of thinking about indeterminism, and to make contact with an analogy that we develop in detail between the "openness" of expressions like "the coin will come up heads" and the well-known "openness" of "x1 is brindle." We first lay down constraints upon the notion of indeterminism relevant to the present discussion (§6A.3). Explaining the open future under those constraints involves two related tasks. The first and conceptually prior task is extra-linguistic, requiring the elucidation of a notion of indeterminism that applies to our world (§6A.4). This account will embody an understanding of a B-order that is not a series, but instead is free from any assumption of linearity, an understanding that will explain how this very world, if indeterminism is ever true, is replete with possibility. The second task is a linguistic one, involving the careful development of a semantic theory for temporal discourse in an indeterministic world (§6B). At this point we will have finished our positive development of the open future doctrine. A natural basis for doubt about that doctrine is that it appears unable to make sense of one who asserts that, bets that, or wonders whether there will be a sea battle even when it is clear that there might not be. A special case of this problem is formulated in §6C as the "assertion problem." One superficially reasonable response is to postulate a Thin Red Line. In §6D, however, we argue that the Thin Red Line doctrine, in any of the versions of that doctrine that we consider, has unacceptable consequences, ranging from a mistreatment of actuality to an inability to talk helpfully about what would have happened had what is going to happen not taken place. In §6E we "solve" the assertion problem by arguing that our framework does make sense of such acts and attitudes once we come to see that to assert that A is to do something that has a normative significance no matter how history carries on.
6A.3
Concepts of indeterminism
Among all the numerous concepts of indeterminism, we are concerned with one that is local, pre-probabilistic, objective, feature-independent, de re, existential, and hard.
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We need a local concept of indeterminism. The contrast is with global. Perhaps our entire world is indeterministic or not, or perhaps a law or even an entire scientific theory is indeterministic or not, but we take it to be essential to be able to describe a certain specified transition as indeterministic or not. Here and from now on by a transition we mean an ordered pair of events, the first entirely preceding the second. The earlier is called the initial of the transition, while the later is called the outcome. EXAMPLE. (Throw of a die) This morning we threw a die. It showed six; but there were five other possible outcomes. Then we loaded the die, and threw it again. Again it showed six; but this time, that was the only possible outcome. The first throw-to-six transition was indeterministic. the second was not. We need a concept that can be used in this local and particular way to describe individual transitions from one event (the initial of the transition) to another (its outcome). In this study we simplify by worrying only about the temporal dimension of locality. We will suppress the relativistic considerations arising from the spatial aspects of indeterministic transitions. (See Belnap 1992 for an exploration of indeterminism in a relativistic setting.) The idea of locality just described should rightly make you think of "single case probabilities." But we need a pre-probabilistic concept of indeterminism. Perhaps when the first throw was made there was a 1/6 chance of six. Before the numbers come into it, however, there is the idea that given the throw that in fact came up six, there were five other possibilities. To say that does not require any probability measure; only possibilities are needed. These possibilities are themselves "local." The actual transition was throw-to-six, the other possibilities were the transitions throw-to-one, throw-to-two, and so on. Nothing as global as a "world" or "theory" or even "law" comes in this early, and no numbers representing probabilities are part of this concept. Quite to the contrary, any concept of probability must rest on a concept of possibility (sometimes called "the probability space"). We need an objective concept of indeterminism. We mean that the question of how many possible outcomes there were for a certain throw shall be classed with the question of how many ears there are on a certain Scottie, and contrasted with questions that are explicitly about who thinks what about what, and whether it is reasonable to do so. Our aim is to theorize about a concept of indeterminism that does not require simultaneous explicit theorizing about people and their thoughts or norms or culture. Thus, we are after a concept of indeterminism that does not put the number of possible outcomes of a certain throw in anyone's head, or make it relative to laws or theories, or have it depend on the status of a conversation, or depend on what people care about. All to exactly the same extent as the number of ears on a certain Scottie. The most explicit contrast is with "epistemic indeterminism," also called epistemic possibility, as codifying a form of ignorance. There is a difference between calling a transition indeterministic relative to some feature, and calling it feature-independently indeterministic. By definition a transition is feature-independently indeterministic if there is more than
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one possible outcome for its initial, and otherwise it is feature-independently deterministic. In this study we shall be content with these "feature-independent" ideas because of their foundational role. The feature-relative ideas are, however, of great importance. When every possible outcome of an initial has a certain feature, we may well say that the transition was deterministic with respect to that feature. Given the throw, for example, not only did the die come up six, but it landed on the floor. Since it landed on the floor on every one of the other five outcomes, the transition was deterministic with respect to landing on the floor. This sort of feature-relative determinism (for a particular feature), which is doubtless of enormous importance both for science and common sense, is evidently consistent with feature-independent indeterminism. We want a concept that can apply to a transition de re, without requiring some description under which the initial falls. No matter how you describe the throwing of the die, even if you are confused enough to refer to it as the holding of a martini by that man in the corner, still, it has just six possible outcomes. Take the ancient example: EXAMPLE. (Rest or motion) She remained at rest. But she wasn't tied up. So she could have moved or remained at rest. On the other hand, given the exact history of her beliefs and desires, there was evidently but one possible outcome, not two. Here the initial has been described in two different ways. The first patch of rhetoric suggests free will, the second suggests instead iron-clad determinism. To insist on a concept of indeterminism that is fundamentally de re is to disbar pretending to plausibility of contradictory phenomena via colorful redescriptions. You can't have it both ways. Either her concrete situation, no matter how described and no matter what was "similar" to it, admitted two possible outcomes or it admitted only one. Thinking de re prevents you from evading the problems of indeterminism (or determinism) by switching descriptions—as if you could change the number of ears on a particular Scottie by describing it as very like a whale. For our continuation to have interest we need to consider only the weakest possible indeterminist claim, namely, the existential claim that some transitions are indeterministic. The existential claim is obviously consistent with the commonsense view that numerous transitions are more or less feature-relative deterministic in interesting ways: The stars in their courses bravely run, fire burns here and in Persia, and although the ways of men are various, the same motives are followed by the same actions. A concept is hard if you have a rigorous theory for it, or at least if you wish you had such a theory and are miserable to the extent that you don't. If in contrast you are happy with some interesting stories, some "paradigm cases," or with a sketch of an outline of a skeleton of a never-to-be-supplied theory, the concept is soft. Wittgenstein's concept of game is soft; von Neumann's is hard. We are interested in indeterminism as a hard concept. We want a rigorous theory.
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We will not further discuss these seven characteristics. In the remainder of this chapter, however, and indeed throughout this book, we wish always to be understood with this characterization in mind.
6A.4
Our World and its causal order
Branching time is a rigorous theory about indeterminism. It is also an account of how to talk sanely in an indeterministic world. We introduced the theory in §2A. Here we describe the theory briefly and informally, reserving our detailed treatment for chapter 7. Branching time is not itself an indeterministic theory; instead, it says what indeterminism is, and it says what determinism is, but branching time does not choose between them. Because there is not much point in all the fuss if universal determinism be true, this is almost a quibble, but not quite. It implies a recommendation that one become clear on the difference between indeterminism and determinism before taking a stand. The theory was first adumbrated in print by Prior 1967 (pp. 126-127) in the course of his work on the logic of tenses; 0hrstr0m and Hasle 1995 (p. 189) report that Kripke suggested an early version in a 1958 letter to Prior. It was first carefully formulated in Thomason 1970; see Thomason 1984. We need sharply to distinguish the portion of the theory—the "ontology" or perhaps "metaphysics" or (less pretentiously) "extra-linguistic" portion—that precedes and underlies the semantic development. The theory of this section is therefore quite independent of linguistic concerns. There are three fundamental ideas, already employed in earlier chapters: moments, the causal ordering relation, and Our World.2 First there is the idea of a moment (we use "m"); a moment is an instantaneous concrete event with unlimited (presumably infinite) spatial extent. Among moments, this very moment is what Whitehead called "all Nature now," idealized to a zero temporal thickness. The concept of a moment (we borrow jargon from Thomason) is of course a Newtonian idea. It is distant from our everyday conceptions, and it is nonrelativistic. It inherits from Laplace's demon the implausible presupposition that the fundamental terms of the causal order shall be entire instantaneous world-slices, instead of smallish local events or point events. It is, however, a worthwhile approximation to the truth. Accordingly we shall pretend that expressions such as "this actual moment" have definite worldwide meanings. The second idea is the causal ordering relation, also called the earlier-laterthan relation, m1 \<m2. This is a B-order relation, which we postulate to be branching rather than linear because of indeterminism. We use "<" for the companion proper relation, so that m1 < m2 iff (m1\< m2 & m1 /= m2). The whole idea of branching time as a theory of indeterminism is that there can be incompatible moments each of which might follow upon a given moment, though there are never incompatible moments in the past. Thus, given m1 < m2, it is 2 The term Our World is new to this book, but not the idea, elsewhere we say Tree. We use Our World when emphasizing the thought expressed in the name, whereas we use Tree when we are thinking more abstractly.
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right to think perspectivally of m1 as in the past of m2. On the other hand, one should say that mo is in the "future of possibilities" of m1—not simply in its "future." The reason is that it is intuitive that a future of possibilities, unlike a future history, can contain incompatible moments. The final idea is Our World. Start with this very moment (yours or ours; at this level of idealization it doesn't matter). Now form the set of all moments that are connected to this very moment by means of any zigzag combination of the causal ordering or its converse. That is, include all moments that you can reach by means of a "causal path," no matter how complicated. That is what we mean by "Our World" construed as a set of moments.3 The theory of branching time is, as we give it, a theory only about Our World and not about any other. Thus by "moment" in what follows we always mean "moment of Our World." Moments are thereby not to be confused with creatures of the mind. Moments are mundane. The theory technically has only two primitives, Our World and the causal order. The theory uses these primitives in four postulates: nontriviality, partial order, historical connection, and no backward branching. These, which we introduced in §2A, we summarize in proper form in §3 and study in chapter 7. Here, for easy reference, we briefly repeat their meaning. Nontriviality is a technical postulate that says that Our World is nonempty. Partial order describes the causal relation, /<, as reflexive, transitive, and antisymmetric. This last signals that moments of Our World must be understood as concrete, unrepeatable events rather than abstract "states" or "times." Historical connection says that every two moments in Our World have a common historical ancestor. It is the postulate that describes Our World as one world. Finally, no backward branching says that all branching is forward, never backward. No backward branching reflects the uniqueness of the past. Starting from any moment there is exactly one chain of moments in the backward direction, its past history. The conviction is that although Our World contains alternative incompatible possibilities in the future of possibilities of a given moment, there are no incompatible moments in the past of any moment. A moment may have more than one possible outcome, but not more than one possible "income." A history (we use "h") is defined as a maximal chain of moments, a complete possible course of events stretching all the way back and all the way forward. We may consider a new "same-time" primitive, Instant, that renders all histories isomorphic, so that it makes sense to have a doctrine of linearly ordered instants of time to complement the theory of branching moments. An "instant" of linear time can be defined as a set of same-time-mated moments; see Post. 5. Given Instant, it makes sense to ask what might have happened "at this very instant." The primitive seems convenient both for scientific approximations and for fashioning persuasive illustrations, and earlier chapters have relied upon it in conceptualizing the achievement stit. One may question whether it is finally respectable either scientifically or from the point of view of common 3 In the theory of branching space-time, Belnap 1992 uses "Our World" for a similarly motivated set of point events, instead of moments. In both cases the defined term names a set that exhausts—to the extent admissible for an idealization of the given kind—our world.
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sense. Furthermore, it is not needed for an elementary account of indeterminism, and it may confuse us into thinking that we understand things that we do not understand, such as what it means to identify stretches of time across histories. Nevertheless, for its convenience in making up examples, we include Instant as one of our primitives. Finally, we add a domain, Domain, taken as a set that is big enough to represent (without contradiction) all that there is. There is no reason relevant to our work on indeterminism not to assume that Our World and Instant are subsets of Domain. In sum, we are looking at a "branching time with instants and domain" structure (a BT + I structure) (Our World, /<, Instant, Domain) that is identified with our very own world.
6B
Parameters of truth
As we indicated in §6A, there is a problem about speech acts using futuretensed sentences in the language of branching time. We take up assertion as a special—but surely central—case. Crudely put, "the assertion problem," as we call it, arises because given indeterminism, it would seem as if future-tensed statements "have no truth value." (This dangerous phrase receives a technical definition and an accompanying warning in §6B.7.) The reason that this is a problem is that it seems to make sense to assert a predictive statement even in the face of indeterminism. Since, however, such a statement "has no truth value," how can it make sense to do so? In order clearly to see the nature of the assertion problem, we adumbrate a perspective on a variety of linguistic devices that have been considered by philosophical logicians. All of these devices involve relativization of truth to one or more parameters such as domain, interpretation, and assignment of values to variables as in first-order logic, and to further parameters such as moment, history, world, time, place, speaker, addressee, demonstrated object, presupposition-set, and so on. By speaking in this general way about the relativization of truth to parameters, we hope (i) to elucidate the assertion problem, (ii) to sort out proposals to solve that problem by introducing a Thin Red Line representing the "actual future," (iii) to explain our own discontent with those proposals, and finally (iv) to suggest our own solution. We do not, alas, know how to do all this without introducing some auxiliary semantic ideas, chiefly ideas that are derived from Prior 1967, Thomason 1970, and Kaplan 1989—and of course Tarski. In chapter 8 we go over many of these ideas in detail; our treatment here, which is casual, is intended as a modest introduction.
6B.1
Grammatical and semantic presuppositions
The following grammatical and semantic presuppositions are helpful to our account, where to avoid circumlocution we let L be the language in question.4 4
Because we are not discussing the mathematics of L, it suits our purposes to describe L with some looseness.
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Foundations of indeterminism • We presuppose that the grammar of L is compositional.5 There are some individual constants and some individual variables and some operator and predicate constants, and there are some predications Ft\...tn serving as "atomic" sentences. Although L has both operators and predicates, for simplicity of exposition, we suppose in this chapter that sentential connectives (counting Vxi as such) constitute the only interesting means of composition. Indeed, most of what we say involves only one-place connectives. We let O be a one-place connective, so that when A is a sentence, O ( A ) is also a sentence. • Truth needs to be relativized somehow or other. In first-order logic, for instance, one needs to relativize truth to a domain, Domain, to an interpretation of constants, 3, and (for open sentences) to an assignment of values to the variables, a. We call these relata parameters of truth. When we assemble parameters into a "legal" sequence, for example (Domain, 3, a), we call the result a point (of evaluation). (For a candidate sequence to be "legal" is for the parameters to satisfy conditions such as "the value that a gives to each variable must belong to Domain") • Speaking generally, then, a point of evaluation contains information coded as a legal sequence of parameters, (z1, ..., zn), that is enough to fix a truth value for each sentence of L. To express that A is true relative to (z1, ..., Zn). we write
• Tedious convention: We use "parameter" in two ways, both for a member, z1, of the sequence and also for a position in the sequence. For instance, we might say that some domain, Domain1, is a parameter of truth, but we also think of the first position in (Domain1, 3, a) as "the domain parameter," a position that can also be filled by, say, Domain2. In abstract discussions we let Zi be an arbitrary parameter qua ith position, and we let zi be one of the ways that Zi can be filled. • Semantically, we presuppose that "z1, ..., zn\= A" is explained or defined recursively in the manner due to Tarski. — We suppose that "atomic" sentences Ft1...t m have or are somehow awarded a truth value at each point, (z1, ..., zn), so that "z1, ..., zn \= Ft1...t m " is well defined. — We suppose that there is associated with each sentential connective, say O, a recursive explanation or definition of the truth value of O(A) at each point in terms of the truth value of A at each point. That 5
We are neither arguing nor assuming that English, for example, is compositional. The presupposition instead embodies our view that noncompositional features of language do not bear on the assertion problem in the following limited and revisable sense: If we cannot make headway in the simpler context of a compositional language, then adding noncompositional devices will not help in addressing that particular problem.
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is, for each point, ( z 1 , ..., zn), whether or not z1, ..., zn depends on the following: for each point ( z 1 , ..., z'n), whether or not z1, ..., z'n \= A. In other words, we suppose that our semantic understanding of, for example, O(A) in terms of certain parameters is a well-determined function of our semantic understanding of A in terms of those parameters. In short, the semantics of L is given by a recursive explanation or definition of "z1, ..., zn \= A" Easily lost amid the abstractness is the central idea, derivative from Tarski, that if you wish to give your semantic explanations or definitions by means of a simple compositional recursion that follows grammar, then denotation and truth must be relativized to parameters. It will be important to our treatment of the assertion problem that we keep track of the individual nature and purpose of these various parameters. We do this as an approach to a key question: Given that some philosophers have introduced the "Thin Red Line" (the "actual future"; see §6A.2) to help with understanding the future tense, exactly how does the Thin Red Line work as a parameter of truth? Treating parameters in general will provide a firm foundation when we turn to answering this question. From the point of view of the assertion problem, the most profound division of parameters is into the "mobile" versus the "immobile," a rigorously definable division that we now informally and roughly explain. 6-1 DEFINITION. (Mobile versus immobile parameters) • If L has any connective whose recursion clause requires shifting some parameter, Zi, then Zi is mobile with respect to L. More ponderously, if for some connective, O, there is a point ( z 1 , ..., zi, n ) such that the recursion clause determining whether z1, ..., zi, ..., (A) requires considering whether or not z1, ..., z'i, ..., z'n \= A for some point such that zt is not identical to z't, then the parameter, Zi, is mobile with respect to L.6 • If, however, the value zi of Zi can be held fixed throughout the entire recursion, then Zi is immobile with respect to L. More ponderously, suppose that for every connective, O, of L, "z1, ..., can be defined without considering whethe except perhaps when zt = zi. Then Zi is immobile with respect to L. This division into mobile versus immobile parameters, even though difficult to keep in mind, is essential to understanding the assertion problem as we conceive it. We return to this point. Now we lay nearly all of our cards on the table, all at once, by listing the various parameters of truth whose understanding we think is critical to understanding indeterminism. We divide parameters for L primarily into mobile versus immobile, and then we subdivide them into types that depend on the underlying purpose of each parameter. 6 This (informal) definition takes into consideration that some connective might need to vary some Zi along with Zi.
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Immobile parameters of truth
Semantic values need to be relativized to the following immobile parameters of truth. These parameters are essential to the recursion, but we emphasize their immobility: They can be held fixed throughout the entire recursion. We enumerate them according to their purpose. Structure parameters. The purpose or function of the structure parameters is to represent as much as is needed of the world (or worlds?) of the speakers of L. This representation must of course be described using language, but what is represented should be altogether independent of language. (All of the other parameters are more closely tied to language.) In this chapter, in contrast to the more abstract chapter 8, we are thinking of ourselves as the speakers of L. and so it makes sense for us to fix the structure parameters as 6 = (Our World, \<, Instant, Domain), We are thus here thinking of 6 as a single intended "standard" structure. Each and every structure parameter is immobile, since no structure parameter is ever shifted in the recursive account of u z1, ..., zn \= A." For example, in first-order logic, the domain never needs shifting. What happens to A in other domains or on other interpretations is irrelevant to the recursion. Of course we need to shift structure parameters in defining useful forms of "implication" or "logical truth"; it is just that this shifting plays no role in the recursion clauses defining (parameterized) truth. Interpretation parameters. The purpose of the interpretation parameters is to interpret the various "nonlogical" constants of L, and in this way to represent some of its important semantic features. We collect the interpretation parameters together into "the interpretation parameter," writing 3 as its value. The interpretation parameter is immobile, never being shifted in the course of the truth recursion. In this chapter we think of 3 as fixed, giving a single intended or "standard" value to the constants of L. (We may of course vary 3 if we wish to define something like "A is valid in ©.") Model parameter. The difference between & and 3 is that 6 describes language-independent features, while 3 gives some of the semantics of L by interpreting its constants. We need both, and so use "model" as jargon for an acceptable combination of a language-independent structure and an interpretation: A model m is defined as an appropriate structure-interpretation pair (6, 3). As noted, one may think of m as varying in order to define "implication" or such. We do not, however, need to vary m in our efforts, in this chapter, to become clearer on the nature of the assertion problem: m remains fixed throughout the chapter as representing the intended or "standard" combination of structure and interpretation, the "standard" model. The model, m, thus represents both our world and the constant features of our language.
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Context parameters. The purpose of the context parameters is to represent relevant features of the context of a certain speech act. the context in which a certain expression of L is used. Elaboration of this idea is due to Kaplan, on whom our entire discussion relies. Whenever we refer to Kaplan's ideas by page number, the reference is to Kaplan 1989. We will often say "context of use" in referring to the Kaplan concept, which we represent with "c." Even holding the model, m, fixed as "standard," we should naturally think of many contexts of use; that is the reason that we do not count the context, c. as part of the model. How much information c supplies depends on how rich we take L to be. The individual items determined by c are called "context parameters." For example, if the indexical "I" is present, we need a context parameter for the speaker. The context of use provides what is in fact determined by an idealized speech act using the given sentence as vehicle. The context provides only what Kaplan calls "fact-of-the-matter parameters" (p. 593). They are what they are. and the logician is not entitled to make them up. Context parameters have two dramatically different functions. The first function, which Kaplan entirely makes clear, is to provide a semantic value for context-dependent expressions, such as the indexical, "I," as already mentioned, for other indexicals such as "here" and "now," for demonstratives such as "this," and for connectives anchored in the context such as "actually." Exactly what we may realistically count as a context parameter is one of the principal questions to be addressed when we consider the assertion problem. In order to answer this question, we shall need to ask what counts as the context of an act of assertion. But that must wait. In the meantime, we record somewhat gnomically that for understanding the assertion problem, the context of use will in addition have an "initialization" role, which we explain in due course. In spite of the fact that there are many intended or "standard" contexts of use, context parameters are just like structure and interpretation parameters in one key respect: They are one and all immobile. The context of use is never shifted in the course of the truth recursion. We summarize: No recursion clause needs to shift either model or context in the course of obtaining a parameterized truth value for O(A) recursively based on a semantic account of A. Of course one could invent a connective that requires shifting some structure parameter, interpretation parameter, or context parameter; but we think Kaplan's remark about the last case is applicable to all three cases: Such a connective would be a monster (p. 511). (As indicated in §6E, however, treating "direct discourse" as part of L leads to shifts of context, and therefore renders the context parameter mobile.)
6B.3
Mobile parameters of truth
If L were confined to non-context-dependent atomic sentences and truth functions thereof, then 3)1 would provide enough parameterization for truth for any A without free variables. We could give an adequate account of truth with the help of a locution such as
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read "A is true on m." When context-dependent expressions are part of L, however, (2) is not enough. We need to add the context-of-use parameter, c:
As we learned from Tarski, however, if L has quantifiers, neither m nor (m, c) is enough. And this point must be generalized: (Almost) any non-truthfunctional connective requires additional parameters of truth—each of which will be mobile. This observation leads us to the mobile parameters, made so by the presence in L of some non-truth-functional connective whose recursion clause requires shifting that parameter. As relevant to our discussion of the assertion problem, we include the following types of non-truth-functional connectives: (i) quantifiers such as Vx1, (ii) tenses such as Will:, and (m) historical modalities such as Sett:. These three types of non-truth-functional connectives force us to include the following mobile parameters, each to be shifted by the recursion clauses for one of these connectives: (i) quantifiers shift the assignment parameter, (M) tenses shift the moment-of-evaluation parameter, and (m) historical modalities shift the history-of-evaluation parameter.7 Assignment parameter. The assignment parameter provides an assignment of values to the variables of L in connection with universal quantification or another variable-binding device. Letting a be an assignment, one must define m, c, a \= A. The newly added assignment parameter must be mobile. For instance, as Tarski demonstrated, the value of x1 must be shifted in the recursion clause that explains the manner in which whether or not m, c, a1\= \/x1A depends on whether or not m, c, a2 \= A. In order to fix the truth value of Vx1A (e.g., Vx1-Fx1) at a point (m, c, a1), it is by no means enough to consider the truth value of A (e.g., Fx1) only at the point (m, c, a1) itself. One must consider also points (m, c, a2) at which x1 is assigned a different value. So, since one cannot hold the assignment parameter fixed throughout the Tarski recursion, there must be an assignment-parameter of truth, and it must be mobile—paradigmatically so. See §8A.l for how this observation relates to Tarski's own language of "satisfaction." Moment-of-evaluation parameter. The moment-of-evaluation parameter is needed for tenses. It is not enough to consider only points (m, c, a) in the truth recursion. One must instead define m, c, a, m \= A, where m is the 7
To say that "Vxi " is a non-truth-functional connective may sound strange. We think that avoidance of this plain fact is driven by the desire to support with grammatical rhetoric certain views on ontology or language, perhaps "nominalism" or "extensionalism." If you know what you mean when you say that quantifiers are extensional, and if you find it good to say so, fine. But that is no reason to ignore the fact that quantificational connectives are not truth functional—nor to conceal this otherwise obvious fact by gerrymandering grammar so that one avoids making it explicit that, e.g., Vx1 is a connective.
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moment of evaluation. The moment-of-evaluation parameter must be shifted, and you cannot shift a parameter that doesn't exist. Even when structure and interpretation and context are uniquely fixed, if you have tenses, you must have a parameter to shift in their recursive processing. For instance, the moment-ofevaluation parameter must be shifted in the recursion clause that explains m, c, a, m1 \= Was:A, since that evidently depends on whether or not m, c, a, m2 \= A for some m2, where the moment of evaluation, m2, is earlier than the moment of evaluation, m1. Therefore, there must be a moment-of-evaluation parameter, and it must be mobile. History-of-evaluation parameter. The history of evaluation parameter is needed for the historical modalities. It is not enough to consider only points (m, c, a, m) in the truth recursion. One must instead define m, c, a, m, h \= A. For instance, using Sett: for historical necessity as in Definition 2-3, the history-of-evaluation parameter is shifted in the recursion clause that explains how the truth value of Sett:A at a point (m, c, a, m, h1) is a function of the truth value of A at points (m, c, a, m, h2) encoding a history of evaluation, /i2, that is another history passing through m. Therefore, there must be a history-of-evaluation parameter, and it must be mobile. In line with earlier usages, we employ a just slightly different notation: We shall write
Since we have finished adding parameters, this is our "final" notation. We bind m and h with a slash to remind us that m must be a member of h, and also to emphasize how closely moments and histories are intertwined in our understanding of indeterminism. In terms of pure logic, the three parameters a, m, and h appear to have quite the same status: We are driven to add them because of their role in understanding non-truth-functional connectives, and they are mobile. Because of the first point, we may well say that, unlike the model parameter (which combines structure and interpretation) and the context parameter, they are "auxiliary." We shall see, however, that they are related to assertion in quite different ways. Sorting that out will help us with the assertion problem.
6B.4
The context parameter and the context parameters
As we have said, the purpose of the context parameter is to represent relevant features of the context of a certain speech act, the context in which a certain expression of L is used. As Kaplan makes plain (p. 591), for each speech act there is only one context, c, but this one context has many features. Sometimes we refer to the context (or context-of-use) parameter, referring to the one context. Sometimes, however, we shall think of many context parameters (plural), each representing some one of the many features of the one context. Context parameters have two entirely different functions.
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6B.4.1
First function: Context-dependent expressions
The first function, thoroughly explored by Kaplan, is to provide a semantics for context-dependent expressions, such as the indexical "I," as already mentioned, for other indexicals such as "here" and "now," for demonstratives such as "this," and for connectives anchored in the context such as "actually." How much information the one context-of-use parameter, c, supplies—or, equivalently, how many context parameters there are—depends partly on how rich we take L to be. For example, if the indexical "here" is present in L, the context parameter must supply a place of the context of use, and if L contains "now," it must determine a time at which the speech act occurred. You cannot, however, make up features of the context as you go along. You can reasonably decide to treat "now" or "here" as context-dependent, but that is only because there is in fact a time of use and a place of use. The same cannot be said for "the integer of the context of use," since there isn't one. Nor does "the finger of the speaker of the context of use" make sense, since there are in all likelihood many such fingers. We are insisting that the context parameter provides only what Kaplan calls "fact-of-the-matter parameters" (p. 593), doubtless idealized. We are going to omit all demonstratives and most context-dependent expressions from the mini-language, L, presented here as a help in understanding indeterminism. For this reason, we shall rely very little on the first of the two functions of context parameters. Let us proceed to the second function in order clearly to see what context parameters may sensibly be deployed. 6B.4.2
Second function: Initialization
The assertion problem worries over how we can see the practice of making future-tensed assertions as consistent with indeterminism. We envisage such an assertion as made by means of a sentence considered as stand-alone. There are in contrast sentences considered as embedded (or embeddable) in some construction. The distinction is important because the two call for different semantic treatments. It is, however, difficult to keep in mind since L, in common with the typical languages for which we have a semantics, and in contrast to English, has no syntactic distinction that marks stand-alone sentences from those that are embedded. That is why we have to use semantics in order to make the contrast between sentences considered as stand-alone and sentences considered as embedded (but see Green 2000). The usage is, however, clumsy, and we use "stand-alone sentence" as short for "sentence considered as stand-alone." The semantic difference is as follows. Stand-alone sentences. We always start the evaluation of a stand-alone sentence at the context of use. If a mobile parameter can be fixed by the context, then we automatically do let the context fix it for stand-alone sentences. For example, let us parse "Meg was hungry" as Was:(Meg is hungry),
(5)
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and let us consider (5) as stand-alone. We know that the past tense moves evaluation of "Meg is hungry" backward to an earlier moment; but we need an initial moment at which to start this backward motion. This initial moment is naturally identified as the moment determined by the context of use. We will say that the context initializes the moment of evaluation for sentences considered as stand-alone. This is the second role of the context parameter, adumbrated by Kaplan, p. 595, in (of course) his own vocabulary and in a slightly different connection. The first role of the context parameter is to help with context-dependent expressions, and its second role is to start the process of semantic evaluation of sentences considered as stand-alone at the very context of the speech act that uses that sentence as a vehicle. Embedded sentences. We often evaluate embedded sentences, even the very same sentences that can be used stand-alone, when the mobile parameters take us away from the context of use. For example, suppose that we parse "Meg will have been hungry" as "Will: Was: (Meg is hungry)." Then even though we start by letting the moment of evaluation be fixed by the context of use, by the time that we reach "Was:(Meg is hungry)" (which is exactly the same sentence as (5), but now considered as embedded rather than stand-alone) we are working with moments of evaluation that are in the future of the (unmoved) context of use. 6-2 POLICY. (How to treat stand-alone sentences) Technically, we express initialization-by-context by refusing to evaluate sentences considered as standalone at arbitrary points. Instead, we insist that stand-alone sentences be evaluated only at context-initialized points, where every mobile parameter that can be initialized by context in fact is initialized by context. (That is intended as a definition of "context-initialized point.") The other side of the coin is that we must permit evaluation of sentences considered as embedded at arbitrary (non-initialized) points. Otherwise the mobile parameters would be useless.
6B.5
Classification of mobile parameters
In order to approach the assertion problem more closely, we use the idea of initialization by context as a way of refining our classification of the parameters of truth. We already have the division into immobile versus mobile. Now we ask for each mobile parameter whether or not it can be initialized by context. Here is our answer: • Moment of evaluation, m: mobile, and initialized by context. • Assignment of values, a: mobile, and not initialized by context. • History of evaluation, h: mobile, and not initialized by context.
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At this point we have merely stated how the three mobile parameters are to be classified. Since this classification is crucial to the assertion problem as we eventually describe it, mere statement is not enough. Here is our reasoning. Moment of evaluation mobile, but is it initialized? Yes. The moment of evaluation is initialized by the context of use. We do not want to begin evaluation of a stand-alone sentence, A, at an arbitrary point. Because we are considering a stand-alone sentence, A, as used in a particular context, we must take context of use into account. If A contains any occurrences of, for example, "I" or "here" or "now" or the like, to make sense of A obviously requires a context of use. It is somewhat less obvious that if A contains something like the tenses Will: or Was:, we must begin the evaluation of A at the moment of use. The reason is this. To think of A as stand-alone is to think of it as a vehicle for a possible speech act. A speech act is an act, and an act is a happening. A possible happening has a unique causal position in Our World, in terms of the causal ordering, \<, so that the same must be true for a speech act: Each possible speech act, like any other happening, has its definite causal past and its definite future of possibilities. In our idealization, we fix the place of an event in the causal order of our world by means of a moment. There is nothing conventional about this. The moment of use is a "fact of the matter." To encode this technically we take two steps. First, we introduce a "moment of use" parameter, the very moment determined by the context, c, of use. We let mc be the moment of use. Since the moment of use will be the only context parameter (feature of the context) that we employ in the mini-language, L, it is convenient to replace "the context parameter" by "the moment-of-use parameter." That is, we shall write
instead of "O, c, a, m/h \= A" as in (4) on p. 147. The notation (6) will serve for every sentence, including those considered as embedded. Second, we cater to the special needs of sentences considered as stand-alone. We do this by evaluating them only at points such that the moment of evaluation is identified with the moment of use:
Observe that the moment of evaluation is identical to the moment of use; that is what we mean by a context-initialized point, the kind of point at which we must evaluate A when it is considered stand-alone. Assignment of values is mobile, but is it initialized? No. Typically we don't assert sentences with free variables. Why? Because the context of a speech act does not provide an initial assignment of values to the variables. We are not making a technical remark; of course you can define "assignment of use" as a technical concept in any way you like. In this logicians' sense, one could use context to initialize the assignment-of-values parameter. Real contexts of use,
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however, do not in fact provide an initial value for variables such as x1. Not only is there no fact of the matter, but it is probable that no language on Earth subscribes to a conventional context-of-use-determined assignment of values to its bindable variables.8 There just is no such convention; and if there were, it would have no discernible purpose. We mean that there would be no purpose for the users. It is not germane that pretending that such a convention exists might make things easier for some descriptive logician. We intend to be agreeing with Kaplan 1989, pp. 592-593, which contains the only pertinent discussion known to us. Our chief point, however, is that the context is supposed to be fact-ofthe-matter, and there is no fact of the matter regarding an initial assignment of values to the variables. History of evaluation is mobile, but is it initialized? No. The historyof-evaluation parameter is not initialized by the context of use: Given indeterminism, there is no such thing as "the history of use." The point is that there is a mismatch between the idea of a speech act as a happening, and the idea of a history. On the one hand, a speech act is an ordinary momentary contingent event with an indeterminate future. On the other, a history encodes a possible course of events in absolute concrete detail that stretches far past the break-up of our little solar system. It is therefore only common sense that a speech act has many possible futures, or, in our jargon, belongs to many histories, given indeterminism. The happening of an assertion that perchance uses "The coin will land heads" as its vehicle no more determines one of these histories than any other. A speech act determines "the moment of its occurrence," but not "the history of its occurrence." So since there is no "history of the context," the history-of-evaluation parameter cannot be initialized by context. More accurately, the history of evaluation cannot be initialized by a fact of the matter. Perhaps there could be a language community that adopted a convention according to which the history parameter was initialized as some named history, say Fred, or as some contextually salient history, perhaps (if it makes sense) the history most likely to occur, given what most people in Boston now believe. But we ought to conclude that for serious philosophical studies of indeterminism, evaluation of future-tensed statements should not be entrusted to such a conventionally specified history of evaluation. In appraising our claim that there is no history of the context, one must be aware of a source of false intuitions. When one is postulating possible worlds in the style of Kripke or Lewis, one normally also postulates that "there is no overlap" between worlds. That makes it sensible to speak of "the world of the speech act." Since histories resemble worlds, it is easy to forget that in this 8
We think we are not cheating when we disallow as a counterexample the use of, e.g., the pronoun "he" in English both as bindable by quantificational constructions such as in "If a mathematician is worth his salt, he can solve cubic equations," and also deictically as in "He can solve cubic equations" (said while pointing). By an "assignment" we mean an assignment to (all of) the variables, and by a "variable" we mean an expression that has only the bindable use. Of course a language can employ the same sign design in various capacities, as English does. But "xi", in contrast to English "he," has only the one function.
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crucial respect histories are not like possible "worlds": Unlike worlds, histories overlap, so that a single speech act will typically belong to many possible histories; and that is why the phrase "the history of the speech act" is impermissible. These points will become sufficiently central to our treatment of the assertion problem as to warrant highlighting. 6-3 SEMANTIC THESIS. (Initialization) (i) The moment-of-evaluation parameter is initialized by context, (ii) The assignment-of-values parameter is not initialized by context. (iii) The history-of-evaluation parameter is not initialized by context. In one sense, these statements are true by convention, since we built their truth into the design of our mini-language, L. We nevertheless label them "theses" because at a deeper level they are debatable, and we have given arguments in their favor.
6B.6
Semantic analyses
We still have not said all we need to say about the meaning and use of these parameters of truth, but the rest will make more sense if we first provide some illustrative semantic analyses using the scheme (6). These analyses are parts of a standard recursive definition of truth as given already in §2A.l, all of which are explained in more detail in §8F. Quantifiers. m, mc, a, m/h \= VxiA iff m, mc, a1, m/h \= A for every assignment a1 that does not differ from a except perhaps at the variable xi. Tense connectives. m, mc, a, m/h \= Was:A iff there is a moment m1 in the past of m such that SOT, mc, a, m1/h \= A. Also m, mc, a, m/h \= Will:A iff there is a moment m1 in the future of m along history h such that m, mc, a, m1/h \= A. (Tenses never move off h.) Temporal connectives. m, mc, a, m/h \= At-instt,:A iff there is an instant, i, in Instant such that the denotation of term t at the point m, mc, a, m/h is i, and such that, where m1 is the (unique) moment in i that lies on history h, m, mc, a, m1/h \= A. ("Chase up or down the history h until you hit the exact moment where h crosses the instant named by t; that moment is where you must evaluate A (with respect to h).") For this to make sense, Instant must be a subset of Domain—as indeed it should be. Settled truth and historical possibility. m, mc, a, m/h \= Sett:A iff for every history h1 to which m belongs (that is, for every possible future for m), m, mc, a, m/hi \= A. For Poss:A, change "every" to "some."
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Context-anchored connectives. m, mc, a, m/h \= Now:A iff m, mC, a, m1/h \= A, where m1 is the unique moment at which the history of evaluation, h, meets the unique instant to which the moment of use, mc, belongs. ("Now" is the time of the moment of use.) Also m, mc, a, m/h \= Actuallyl:A iff m, mc, a, m c /h1 \= A for every h1 to which mc belongs. The actuality connective has a subscript to conform to §8F.7, where two distinct actuality connectives are introduced. Actuallyl:A could be read as "It is settled true at this actual moment that A." Examination of these analyses makes it easy to see which clauses force which parameters to be mobile.
6B.7
Open and closed for stand-alone sentences
One can better appreciate the nature of our three mobile parameters and the problems that they cause for assertion if we introduce a little more jargon. (We regret that some of the jargon is not as memorable as one should like.) 6-4 DEFINITION. (Independent, dependent, closed, and open in parameters) • A point, ( z 1 , ..., zn), bears witness to the Zi-dependence of A iff ( z 1 , ..., zn) is such that the truth value of A varies as Zi is (legally) shifted away from Zi while all other parameters are held fixed. A sentence, A, depends on a parameter, Z, iff some point bears witness to the Z-dependence of A. We also say that A is Z-dependent. A sentence, A, is independent of a parameter, Z, iff A does not depend on Z. We also say that A is Z-independent. • A sentence, A, considered as stand-alone is closed in a parameter, Z, in two cases: Either A is independent of Z or Z is one of the parameters that can be initialized by context. We also say that A is Z-closed. We frequently use the following terminology for the two different ways in which A, considered as stand-alone, can be closed at Z: Either (i) A is closed by independence or (ii) it is closed by initialization. A sentence, A, considered as stand-alone, is open in a parameter, Z, iff two conditions are satisfied: Both A depends on Z and Z is not initialized by context. We also say that A is Z-open. In still other words, A is neither closed by independence nor closed by initialization. Note a slippery but critical detail of our usage: "Independence" and "dependence" can apply to sentences however considered, but we reserve "closed" and "open" for sentences considered as stand-alone. Keep in mind that the definition of "closed" is disjunctive: by independence or by initialization. It is evident that virtually all interesting sentences depend on the immobile model parameter, m, and usually also on the context parameter, mc. For the assertion problem, however, we need be concerned only with the relation of stand-alone sentences to mobile parameters. To help the argument, we think of the following three easy sentences as part of L.
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(8)
x1 is brindle.
(9)
Will:the coin lands heads.
(10)
Referring to these sentences as paradigmatic examples, we claim the following. 6-5 SEMANTIC THESIS. (Open stand-alone sentences) i. A sentence such as (8), considered as stand-alone, is closed in all three of the mobile parameters of L. ii. A sentence such as (9), considered as stand-alone, is open in the assignment parameter. iii. A sentence such as (10), considered as stand-alone, is open in the historyof-evaluation parameter. These three semantic theses need arguments, but they can be short. Ad ( i ) . (8) is closed by independence in the assignment parameter (no free variables to interfere with independence) and the history parameter (whether Meg is hungry does not depend on what happens in the future), and (8) is closed by initialization in the moment-of-evaluation parameter. So (8), considered as stand-alone, is closed in all three mobile parameters of L. Ad ( i i ) . That (9) depends on the assignment parameter is evident from standard first-order semantics: Given an understanding of "is brindle" from m, there are context-initialized points such that the truth value of (9) at those points depends on the value of x1, and therefore depends on the assignment parameter. Furthermore, from Semantic thesis 6-3 we know that the assignment parameter is not initialized by context. In other words, (9) is not closed by independence and is not closed by initialization in the assignment parameter. Therefore, by the account of "open" given in Definition 6-4, (9), considered as stand-alone, is open in the assignment parameter. Ad (in). That (10) depends on the history parameter is what sets our "assertion" problem. Pick a context-initialized point such that the moment of use in question is earlier than the relevant toss of the coin, and such that the toss is genuinely indeterministic in the sense of §6A.3. We are also supposing that this indeterminism is well represented (up to idealization) by our branching account of Our World and its causal order as in §6A.4. Finally, we are assuming the account of "Will:" that we gave most recently in §6B.6. It takes all of this to justify the thesis that the truth of (10) depends on which of the many possible historical continuations, starting from the context of use, is given as the value of the history parameter. That is to say: (10) depends on the history parameter. Furthermore, Semantic thesis 6-3, for which we gave arguments, says that the history parameter cannot be initialized by context. Therefore, since (10), considered as stand-alone, is neither closed by independence nor closed by initialization in the history parameter (Semantic thesis 6-3), (10) is by definition open in the history parameter.
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So the assignment and the history parameter are deeply alike: Each of these two parameters is mobile but uninitialized by context, and each offers examples of sentences that, when considered as stand-alone, are open. In the service of setting the assertion problem, we take our semantic claims just one step further. We claim: In the absence of a specific convention, if a stand-alone sentence, A, is open in a certain (mobile and non-initialized) parameter, Z, then there is at least one context-initialized point such that it makes no sense to say that A has a truth value at that point independently of Z. In carefully controlled but more colorful language, we express this claim by saying that if a stand-alone sentence is closed neither by independence nor by initialization with respect to some parameter, Z, then "it has no truth value" at some context-initialized point save relative to Z. More generally, if there is any parameter relative to which a stand-alone sentence is open, we say that by definition the sentence "has no truth value" at any context-initialized point that bears witness to the openness. Use of the expression "has no truth value" is dangerous; we try to minimize the danger of misleading by the upcoming "Observation," and by emphasizing here that the phrase is defined. 9 Because of the definition, we have the following. 6-6 SEMANTIC THESIS. (Stand-alones open in either the assignment or the history parameter sometimes have no truth value) Fix the model, m, and the moment of use, mc. This suffices to give (8), considered as standing alone, a truth value: "m, mc \= (8)" makes sense. So (8) "has a truth value." But m and mc do not suffice to give a truth value to sentences, considered as stand-alone, that are either assignment-open like (9) or history-open like (10), even if their evaluation is restricted, as is appropriate for stand-alones, to context-initialized points. Sentences like (9) or (10) may well "have no truth value." In symbols, i. "m, mc \= Meg is hungry" makes sense since "Meg is hungry" is closed in each of the mobile parameters. We could indeed define "truth" given model and context as follows: For every (or some, or most, or your favorite) a and h, m, mc, a, mc/h \= Meg is hungry. ii. "m, mc \= x1 is brindle" does not make sense since ux1 is brindle" is open in the assignment parameter. The definition proposed in (i) would of course be formally correct; our complaint is that it would not be "materially adequate." Note in particular that in contrast to (i), since "x1 is brindle" is open in the assignment parameter, here it would make a difference whether one framed the definition with "every" or "some" or "most" or "your favorite." In short, it can happen that (9) "has no truth value." iii. "m, mc \= WilL:the coin lands heads" does not make sense. (Ditto.) 9 We do not prejudge whether or not there is a useful connection between our defined idea of "no truth value" and other notions such as those used in cases of presupposition failure, vagueness, ungroundedness, etc.
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We intend Semantic thesis 6-6 to be an obvious consequence or rewording of Semantic thesis 6-5. We have put it this way in order to make an observation that helps us with our approach to the assertion problem. OBSERVATION. (No gaps) To say that open sentences such as (9) or (10) "have no truth value" is not to say that open sentences have some third truth value, or a third special status.10 It is even a mistake to think of open sentences as introducing "truth value gaps" that might sometimes be filled by introducing "supervaluations."11 No one makes these mistakes about assignment-open sentences. As is evident from our strictly parallel treatment of the semantics of assignment-open and history-open sentences, we think that they should never be made. As a preventative against the temptation to start speaking of "truth value gaps," it is healthy to intone that "given a model and a context, an open sentence always has a truth value—once a suitable value is supplied for each parameter in which it is open."12
6C
The assertion problem
In Semantic thesis 6-3, Semantic thesis 6-5, and Semantic thesis 6-6, we have stated some claims, for which we have argued, about the semantics of a language like L designed to illuminate indeterminism. We have stressed the semantics of open sentences considered as stand-alone. These claims are all relevant to assertion as we understand it, but observe that none of our semantic theses 10
It seems to us that Lukasiewicz 1920 and others since have made this mistake about future-tensed sentences, as 0hrstr0m and Hasle 1995 have argued. Consider also the view of Dummett 1991 that no theory is a form of "realism" if it claims that sentences about the future fail to be "determinately either true or false" (p. 7). If "determinately" is read as "settled," the present version of branching time—which was not available for Dummett's consideration—certainly involves that very claim; but it is hard to find a theory that is more explicitly realist than ours. 11 It seems to us that Thomason 1970 makes this mistake. We do not, however, concur with the diagnosis of 0hrstr0m and Hasle 1995, who find a problem in explaining how the disjunction of two "indeterminates" such as "Will:(the coin lands heads)" and "~Will:(the coin lands heads)" could fail itself to be "indeterminate." That article shares the common presupposition that, without a Thin Red Line, branching itself commits one to "the rejection of bivalence" and the inability to employ truth functions (p. 193). The analogy with quantification helps here to lessen the felt need for the presupposition: Evidently there is no problem in labeling "x1 is brindle" and "~(x1 is brindle)" each "indeterminate," whereas their disjunction, being an excluded middle, is infrequently said to be "indeterminate." And certainly there is seldom a call to suggest that the principle of bivalence, or the usefulness of truth functions, fails for the likes of "x1 is brindle." 12 It is all right and even beneficial to say, in ordinary quantification theory, that even given a model, an open sentence such as "x1 + x2 = x3" has no truth value. The mistake that (to our knowledge) is never made is to jump from this observation to think that quantification theory forces philosophy to formulate a theory of "truth value gaps," or of "supervaluations," or of a third truth value that could play a role in truth table calculations. A related mistake that is never made in the case of quantification theory is to think that because its open sentences "have no truth value," quantification theory is somehow wrong (or antirealist, or whatever). Our claim is that the semantics of history-open sentences should be equally free of these mistakes.
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mentions assertion. They are purely semantic. Now we state some claims about how various kinds of open sentences relate to assertion. In the following, when we speak of "asserting A" we intend it as short for "using A as a vehicle of assertion, so that what is asserted is expressed by A." 6-7 ASSERTABILITY THESIS. (Which stand-alone sentences are assertable?) When we ask in the following whether or not a sentence is "assertable," we do not mean anything like "warranted" or "correctly assertable." These meanings are not what is wanted for our assertability thesis. i. Triply closed sentences such as (8) "Meg is hungry" are (paradigmatically) assertable. It makes perfect sense to use one as the vehicle of an assertion. ii. Assignment-open sentences such as (9) "x1 is brindle" are not assertable. It makes no sense to use one as the vehicle of an assertion. hi. History-open sentences such as (10) "Will:the coin lands heads" are genuinely assertable. It makes perfect sense to use them as vehicles of assertions. These claims do not go without saying; we argue for them. Ad ( i ) . The assertability of triply closed sentences is paradigmatic. Semantically, m, mc \= A makes sense for these sentences, so that they have a clear model- and context-dependent truth value, a fact that seems to warrant their eminent assertability. Ad ( i i ) . It makes no sense to assert an assignment-open sentence such as "x1 is brindle." It is literally senseless to use that sentence as a vehicle for assertion. To put the matter a little more circumspectly, such anassignme open sentence is not a proper vehicle for assertion. A purported assertion using such a sentence would be defective. The defect is radical: It is not just that no one could know what was asserted; more than that, nothing is asserted by making such an utterance. Observe that since (ii) is about assertion rather than just semantics, it does not follow from Semantic thesis 6-3, Semantic thesis 6-5, and Semantic thesis 66. We lay (ii) down as a new fact, a fact that describes our practice of assertion (as opposed to mere utterance). No one would understand you if you said, using direct quotation, "Jack confidently asserted the sentence, 'x1 is brindle'."13 13 Red herrings abound. There could be a special convention permitting, e.g., dropping universal quantifiers on stand-alone sentences used as vehicles of assertion, and indeed there is such a convention among some groups of mathematicians and other technical workers. The convention is, however, "merely conventional," requiring addition to our underlying agreements about semantics and the practice of assertion. Furthermore, it remains the case that the convention covers only a few cases. Indirect discourse would offer a separate topic. "Jack asserted that x\ is brindle" makes no sense as a stand-alone sentence (since that sentence is itself assignment-open), but it might make some sense if it is embedded in a quantificational connective: "For some x1, x1 is owned by Mary, and Jack asserted that x1 is brindle." Switching from asserting to uttering is yet another way to change the topic. Of course, using direct discourse, we can truthfully say that Jack uttered the sentence, "x1 is brindle,"
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Ad ( i i i ) . In contrast to the senselessness of claiming that an utterance of an assignment-open sentence could be an assertion, there is, we claim, no radical defect in asserting a typical history-open future-tensed statement such as "The coin will land heads," even under conditions, even known to the speaker, of radical indeterminism. In appropriate circumstances such an assertion is called a prediction. Although we might raise questions about justification and the like, what is predicted by the use of "The coin will land heads" is perfectly well determined by model and context alone, even though on our account the truth of the prediction depends on the history parameter. To put the point in indirect discourse, we are saying that "Jack asserted that the coin will land heads" makes good sense, even if we add that he was not justified in doing so. An analogy with betting may help. It makes no sense to bet on "x1 is brindle," while to bet on "the coin will land heads" seems a paradigm of intelligibility. We are saying that assertion is like betting. It makes sense to assert, or to bet on, the truth of a sentence that is open in the history parameter, but it does not make sense to assert, or to bet on, the truth of a sentence that is open in the assignment parameter. We are finally ready to formulate the assertion problem as we see it, as Assertion problem 6-8(iii). 6-8 ASSERTION PROBLEM. (Tension between semantic and assertability claims) Items (i) and (ii) are background; the problem is stated in ( i i i ) . i. Our semantic account of triply closed sentences jibes with our assertability claims: They do have a definite truth value (given model and context), and they are paradigmatically assertable. ii. Our semantic account of assignment-open sentences fits with our assertability claims: They "have no truth value" (given only model and context) and they are not assertable. iii. Our semantic account of history-open sentences seems severely in tension with our assertability claims almost to the point of apparent contradiction: Like assignment-open sentences, history-open sentences "have no truth value" (given only model and context). But if they have no truth value, it would seem that they would be no more assertable than assignmentopen sentences. After all—if we may be permitted language known to be untrustworthy—it is certain that to assert A is to assert that A is true. We nevertheless claim that, in spite of "having no truth value," it is indeed proper to assert a history-open sentence, and even to assert that it is true. The assertion problem is to eliminate the apparent tension reported in (in). but even in direct discourse we cannot truthfully say that Jack asserted that sentence. (It seems to us that the philosophers' use of "Jack said, 'x1 is brindle'" waffles between mere uttering and asserting, and should therefore not be permitted in discussions such as this.) Another topic would be what happens if we replace "x1" by an English "it," for in that case demonstrative or other conventions are likely to kick in.
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In the end we confront the assertion problem head on, but first we discuss three tempting ways to avoid the problem. These all have in common the view that, contrary to Assertability thesis 6-7(iii), it is not in fact possible to assert a history-open sentence, precisely on the grounds that even given model and context, a history-open sentence has no truth value. Way number one admits that our language contains (something like) historyopen sentences, but argues that they are not assertable. The reasoning might be that the practice of assertion makes no sense unless assertors are reliable, so that it is not part of the practice to assert in the face of indeterminism. Or it might be that assertors should warrant what they assert, and they cannot do that when making a risky prediction. Or it might be that it sounds funny to the ear to say "The coin might or might not land heads, and I assert that it will." All of these suggestions, and their cousins, seem at first glance reasonable, and one could doubtless speak at length on one side and the other, citing details of our practice of assertion and (for the funny-to-the-ear argument) conversation. We do not, however, think the discussion would advance our investigation, since the concepts involved are too soft to help us with understanding a hard concept of indeterminism. The second and third ways of avoiding the assertion problem have something in common: Both claim that our language (or any sensible language?) is free of history-open sentences. Because of the conjunctive nature of our account of "open" in Definition 6-4, two such ways are possible. Way of avoidance number two works as follows: It claims that our language is entirely free of history-dependent sentences, whether stand-alone or not, even given indeterminism. The most common form that this claim takes is the Peircean view that future-tensed statements are intrinsically closed by independence. Put in our terms, it is the claim that Will:A really means Sett: Will:A. If that were true, one would have the advantage of being able to drop the history parameter altogether, since the Peircean future tense can be understood without it: 6-9 DEFINITION. (Peircean future tense) m, mc, a, m \= Will:A iff for every history, h, through m, there is a moment, m1 that lies on h and is later than TO such that m, mc, a, m1 \= Will:A. (There is quantification over histories, but there is no parameter for histories.) The trouble with the Peircean account of " Will:" is that it makes no sense of someone who purports to assert that the coin will land heads even though it might not, that is, who sincerely asserts both that Will:A and that Poss:~Will:A. See the discussion of "Antactualism" in Burgess 1978 for an elaboration of this view. A variation of the Peircean position is offered in McArthur 1974, according to which there are in general two things that could be meant by a use of Will:A: either the Peircean Sett:Will:A or Poss: Will:A. According to this view, which of these two things is meant depends upon the speaker's intentions. We believe this does not help.
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One of the most compelling arguments against the claim that no sentence in our language "really" is history-dependent comes from the analogy with betting. A strict Peircean would have to say that I bet that the coin will land heads
(11)
really means I bet that present circumstances determine that the coin will land heads.
(12)
Surely (11) and (12) are different bets. They are different because one who makes the bet expressed in (11) wins if, and only if, the coin in question lands heads. However, this is not true of the bet expressed in (12). One who makes that bet can lose even if the coin lands heads. If it can be shown that it was historically possible that, as of the time of his speech act, that coin not land heads, then the bettor who speaks in (12) loses. The third way of avoiding the assertion problem is also a way of denying that our language contains any history-open sentences. The third way also drops the history parameter. On this view, the particular history required for evaluating a future-tensed statement is supplied by the context of use, or even by our world itself, independent of context: the Thin Red Line (§6A.2). In the impending §6D, we argue at length against this tempting way to avoid the assertion problem. Then, in our final section, §6E, we directly confront the assertion problem, offering our positive suggestion for its solution. We show how a natural understanding of the speech act of assertion makes comfortable sense out of the practice of asserting historically open sentences, and does so in a fashion that hangs on both to Semantic thesis 6-5(m) that some stand-alone sentences are open in the history parameter and therefore have no truth value (Semantic thesis 6-6(iii)), and also to our Assertability thesis 6-7(iii) that history-open sentences are properly assertable. Having half an eye on the parts of those theses that claim that assignment-open sentences are for that very reason not assertable, we suggest exactly how, in relation to our practice of assertion, being history-open is fundamentally different from being assignment-open. To the extent that we are successful in these enterprises, attempting to avoid the assertion problem seems less inviting.
6D
The Thin Red Line
We turn now to consider the third way of avoiding the assertion problem, namely, the Thin Red Line. In §6A.2 we described and motivated the Thin Red Line as best we could with examples; it might be worthwhile at this point to consult those paragraphs. Here we need to be more abstract. Consider the following. Sure, there are many things that might happen, but only one of them is what really will happen. (Que sera, sera.)
13)
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If one has objective leanings at all, it is easy to feel a need to treat both conjuncts with equal objectivity. It seems good to try to combine objective indeterminism with an objective actual future. One is thereby tempted to continue to represent objective indeterminism by postulating that our world (up to an idealization) is treelike, but to hold in addition that there is a distinguished history, the Thin Red Line, which we abbreviate as TRL. One may posit a TRL without shifting from an objective to a subjective construal of indeterminism (a contrast discussed in §6A.3), and we must understand the TRL proposal in this objective way. The proposal succeeds in avoiding the assertion problem by postulating an "actual history" in addition to the "moment provided by the context of use." Parametrically speaking, one has a point something like (m, TRL, mc, a, m), where we specifically note (i) that the TRL parameter is immobile, and (M) that the mobile history parameter is omitted. In the semantic theory of branching with a TRL, the future tense, Will:A, moves you forward along TRL, the past tense, Was:A, moves you backward along it, and the temporal connective, At-instt:A, moves you to the moment lying at the intersection of the TRL and the instant denoted by t. For instance, for the future tense we have 6-10 DEFINITION. (TRL account of Will.A) m, TRL, mc, a, m \= Will:A iff there is a moment, m1, that lies on TRL and is later than m and is such that m, TRL, mc, a, m1 \= A. The semantics of "actually" is likewise bound to the TRL itself. Talk of possibility or necessity or inevitability is explained without reference to a history parameter by means of quantifications that involve moments that lie off the TRL. For this purpose we introduce two new connectives, Settled-will:A and Possibly-wilLA that take over the jobs formerly performed by Sett: Will:A and Poss: Will:A. 6-11 DEFINITION. (Possibly-wilLA and Settled-will:A) •m, TRL, mc, a, m \= Possibly-wilL: A iff for some m1 such that m < m1 (