For King and Kaiser!: The Making of the Prussian Army Officer, 1860-1914 (Contributions in Military Studies)

FOR KING AND KAISER!

FOR KING AND KAISER! The Making of the Prussian Army Officer, 1860-1914

STEVEN E. CLEMENTE

Contributions in Military Studies, Number 123

G r e e n w o o d Press New York • Westport, Connecticut • London

For Mother

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Clemente, Steven E. For King and Kaiser! : the making of the Prussian Army Officer. 1860-1914 / Steven E. Clemente. p. cm.—(Contributions in military studies, ISSN 0883-6884 ; no. 123) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-313-28004-5 (alk. paper) 1. Military education—Germany—History—19th century. 2. Military education—Germany—History—20th century. 3. Military education—Germany—Prussia—History—19th century. 4. Germany. Heer—Officers—Education—History. 5. Prussia (Kingdom). Armee— Officers—Education—History—19th century. 6. Civil-military relations—Germany—History—19th century. 7. Civil-military relations—Germany—History—20th century. I. Title. II. Series. U571.C54 1992 355\007 , 04309034-dc20 91-35235 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available. Copyright © 1992 by Steven E. Clemente All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the publisher. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 91-35235 ISBN: 0-313-28004-5 ISSN: 0883-6884 First published in 1992 Greenwood Press, 88 Post Road West, Westport. CT 06881 An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. Printed in the United States of America

The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Organization (Z39.48-1984). 10 9 8 7 6 5 4

3 21

Copyright Acknowledgments Bradley, Dermot. Generaloberst Heinz Guderian und die Enstehungsgeschichte des mode men Blitzkriegs. Osnabruck: Biblio-Verlag GmbH & Co. KG, 1978. Demeter, Karl. The German Officer-Corps in Society and State. Bonn: Bernard & Graefe Verlag, 1965. Fishman, Sterling. "Suicide, Sex, and the Discovery of the German Adolescent." History of Education Quarterly (Summer 1970): 170-88. Gauss, Christian. The German Emperor As Shown in His Public Utterances. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1915. Geyr, Leo von. 'The German General Staff, Part 1: The Imperial Period." Military Review (November 1962): 24-25. Meier-Welcker, Hans. Ojfiziere im Bild von Dokumenten Aus Drei Jahrhunderten. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Ansalt, 1964. Messerschmidt, Manfred, and Wolfgang Letter. Militargeschichte im 19. Jahrhundert, 1814-1890, vol. 4, pt. 2 in Handbuch zur deutschen Militargeschichte, Militargeschichtlichen Forschungsamt, gen. ed. Bonn: Bernard & Graefe Verlag GmbH & Co. KG, 1976. Model, Hansgeorg. Der deutsche Generalstabsojfizier. Bonn: Bernard & Graefe Verlag GmbH & Co. KG, 1968. Weise, Leopold von. Kadettenjahre. Ebenhausen bei Miinchen: Verlag Langewiesche-Brant KG, 1978. Wilhelm II. The Kaiser's Memoirs. Translated by Thomas Barra. New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1922. Zabel, Jiirgen-K. Das preussische Kadettenkorps. Frankfurt am Main: Haag und Herchen Verlag GmbH, 1978.

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Contents Preface

ix

Introduction

xi

1.

Tradition

2.

German Secondary Education and Officer Selection

27

Civilian to Ensign: Screening, Selection, and Training

55

A Facade of Education: The Structure and Curriculum of the Cadet Corps

81

3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

8.

1

Paradigms of Character: Life in the Cadet Schools

111

Acceptance into the Fold: War and Life as a Subaltern

School 141

The Crown of Prussian Officer

Education:

The War Academy

171

New Faces-Old Fealty: Conclusion

205

Appendixes

221

Select Bibliography

259

Index

275

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Preface Wise is the author who recognizes the importance of others in the preparation of his work. The University of Oklahoma Library System provided invaluable assistance in the acquisition of materials and saved much travel. The cheerful diligence, particularly of aides Shelly Clement and Joyce Cross, did not go unnoticed. The staffs of the following also played major roles in the initial phase: the Staatsbibliothek Preussischer Kulturbesitz and the Senatsbibliothek in Berlin; the Zentralbibliothek der Bundeswehr, Dusseldorf; the Universi tatsbibliothek at Munich; the U.S. Army Military History Research Collection, housed at Carlisle Barracks; the Library of Congress; and the Military Archives Division of the National Archives. Special thanks go to Professors H. Wayne Morgan, Judith S. Lewis, and Henry J. Tobias who read the initial treatise. Lastly, but certainly at the top of my list of indebtedness, Professor Gordon D. Drummond performed flawlessly as editor and friend. Despite his manifold responsibilities, he found time not only for perusing the revisions, but also for raising and discussing questions that I had failed to address. For his encouragement and criticism, I am eternally grateful. The guilt, however, for any omissions or errors in analysis, research, or mechanics remains solely my own.

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Introduction In every direction we see the necessity to

improve the intellectual development of the army. Gen. Friedrich von Bernhardi, 1914(1) In the second half of the nineteenth century, one sociopolitical force that contributed greatly to the state of increased vigilance within governments of the European powers was socialism. In Prussia the Hohenzollerns had blunted the bourgeois-liberal surges of 1848 and the 1860s, but soon faced an additional threat from the working class drive for political and social equality. As the middle class slowly resigned itself to the continued role of the Prussian king as emperor of a unified Germany, the monarchy and its government nevertheless harbored an enduring suspicion regarding the bourgeoisie's true political loyalty. But in the case of the socialists, suspicion became outright fear. Would the revolutionary fervor of 1848 return and, with the addition of this new and more radical ideology, succeed in destroying the crown and the traditional social order? Increasingly, the imperial regime believed so and came to rely on the army to preserve the conservative status quo against the threat of a socialist or liberaldemocratic takeover. In his classic work on the Prussian army, Gordon Craig observed that the Prussian military after 1871 adopted two policies in an attempt to protect itself and the crown from the "forces of revolution." First, it reorganized the internal bureaucracy in order to remove the most important army matters from the

Xll

Introduction

only military office that had to deal directly with P a r l i a m e n t — t h e War Ministry; and second, it managed the officer selection process in such a way as to ensure that no aspirants with "unorthodox social and political ideas" would invade the closed society of the officer c o r p s — " t h e bulwark of royal absolutism"^). It was the latter policy, officer selection, that formed the initial focus of this study. My original intent was to investigate the question of how the Prussian officer corps, from the reorganization of the 1860s to World War I, used the officer selection and training process to maintain traditional feudal values and preserve as far as possible its social and political homogeneity. It proved impossible, however, to address this central theme without evaluating the entire selection and education system and thereby reaching some conclusions as to the effect the policies that produced the Prussian officer had on the overall quality of the corps. Accordingly, this study expanded (as if by its own power) to include a description and assessment of the professional education that prepared the officers who led the army and the nation into battle. The selection process proved to be a difficult one for the officer corps. How could the increasing officer quotas be met without admitting more middleclass candidates; and if that proved impossible, how could the army ensure the social and political loyalty of a predominantly bourgeois officer cadre? Middle-class aspirants were suspected of harboring liberal views that constituted a potential threat to the traditional order. Consequently, all who evidenced such social or political ideologies had to be rejected regardless of their education or ability. The entire process from nomination through commissioning would seek to make certain of the candidate's loyalty to the crown above all else. In addition, the officer corps worked to guarantee that every available candidate from the preferred c l a s s e s — aristocracy and old officer f a m i l i e s — s e c u r e d a commission. Amid such discrimination, the system underwent changes which the army claimed were designed to raise the admission standards and professional education of its officers. Faced with these seemingly conflicting goals, the officer corps used, altered, bypassed, and, when necessary, ignored the regulations in order to achieve its ends. To understand the shaping process, one also must be aware of the various educational and social origins from which the aspirants emanated, their treatment, and the training and professional education they

Introduc tion

x in

received. Those candidates, noble or middle class, who came from the civilian schools were, as a rule, better educated than their comrades from the Cadet Corps, even if they had not completed the entire secondary curriculum. However, the middle-class a s pirants were more likely to complete their studies while the nobility could, if necessary, rely on official help in bypassing the minimum educational requirements. In comparison, those from the Cadet Corps not only received an inferior education, but often endured brutal physical and emotional treatment that, by reason of their young ages, promoted the formation of a callous attitude toward suffering. While hailed by many contemporary observers as a model to be emulated, Prussian officer education actually declined in quality during the imperial period. Despite the liberal beginnings of Scharnhorst, professional curricula throughout most of the nineteenth century, and especially during the imperial period, were increasingly confined to purely military studies. Providing a broad view of events, ideas, and peoples was, if not publicly scorned, determined by the army to be the business of secondary schools and universities, not the armed forces. The state controlled school system, however, did little below the university level to promote critical thought. Consequently, the officers, some of whom had not completed the last three years of their secondary education, learned little that would aid them in dealing with civilians, contemporary ideas, or anything other than armies, soldiers, and the socialist scourge. Amidst the lessons that glorified war and the Germanic race, obedience and conformity rated far above individual initiative and thought. Although continuously monitored for suspicious behavior, once the candidates were accepted into the commissioning process, the authorities worked to make sure that all met with success. The result was an officer corps that varied widely in education and intellect. While exhibiting martial skill, many who made it to the top echelons lacked sufficient formal training in broad areas outside of military studies. This, along with the rigid authoritarianism, led to a general lack of creativity(3). The middle-class candidates, the majority of whom had completed their secondary education, often found acceptance only in the less glamorous arms (e.g., the engineers and heavy a r t i l l e r y ) , where the opportunities for attaining high command positions were decidedly diminished. The officer corps did not lack for men with impressive qualifications. However, the manipulation

xiv

Introduction

of selection and training allowed many noble and "old officer" candidates to advance beyond their ability. In addition to exerting a subtle influence upon the professional quality of the officer cadre, the selection and training process successfully integrated the middle class into the corps. Despite the fears of the reactionary elements, bourgeois candidates had received from family and school the necessary ideological instruction. Thus, they easily accepted the demand for loyalty to the monarchy and the corps and assumed the proper political and social stance. Even as their numbers came to dominate the corps before World War I, the attitudes and loyalties of the middle-class officers paralleled those of their "aristocratic brothers-in-arms"(4). The so-called "middle-class militarism," which favored a modern authoritarian/military system with a diminished role for the Kaiser, was not yet in evidence — except perhaps, among those few officers, like Ludendorff, who achieved positions that allowed them to observe firsthand the incompetency of the Kaiser and certain noble officers. The overwhelming majority of officers, noble and middle class, held instead to the old "conservative militarism," which argued for a maintenance of the traditional social and political order based upon the supremacy of the crown and its protecter, the a r m y ( 5 ) . As a result, and despite the increased importance of modern technology and the General Staff's willingness to accept more middle-class officers(6), the social and political position of the officer corps in 1914 differed little from that of the mid-nineteenth century. The main domestic enemy, however, was no longer to be found in the liberal bourgeoisie, but rather in the working class adherance to socialism. Regardless of the apprehension of the army high command and the Kaiser, the middle-class officer saw himself as fully committed to preservation of the monarchy and the traditional values of the officer corps as his noble and old officer comrades. Like them, he remained ready to move as quickly against a socialist "mob" as against a foreign enemy. His schooling, selection, and professional training sought to make sure that he would act effectively and without question or hesitation.

Introduction

xv

NOTES 1. Friedrich von Bernhardi, Germany and the Next War, trans. Allen H. Powles (New York: Longmans, Green, 1914), 223. 2. Gordon A. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640-19 45 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1955; reprint ed., 1964), 218-19. 3. Martin Kitchen, The German Officer Corps, 1890-

1914 (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 3. 4. Ibid . , Z / . Der doppelte Militarismus. Die 5. Stig Forster, deutsche Heeresrustungspolitik zwischen Status-quolitik sicherung und Aggression, 1890- -1913 (Stuttgart:: Franz Steiner Verlag , 1 9 8 5 ) , 7. For ia discussion of middleclass nationalist pressure groups during the Wilhelmine period , see Geoff Eley, Reshaping the German Right : Radical Nationalism and Political Change after Bismarck (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1980) 6. Kitchen , Corps, 7 and 24.

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FOR KING AND KAISER!

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1

Tradition The chief strength of the army is the power and force of tradition. Wilhelm

11(1)

During the latter half of the nineteenth century, no army came to be respected as highly as that of Germany, or to be more specific, of Prussia. From an organization deemed too weak to stand up to Austria in 1850, it was transformed by the reforms of the next two decades into an efficient fighting force that scored quick successes in the wars of 1864, 1866, and 1870-71(2). Following the unification of Germany, the army became an important instrument in the quest for empire and a constant reminder of German power. The Prussian officer corps stood as the most visible symbol of that power. Guardians of a military tradition dating back to the Teutonic knights, its leaders nevertheless recognized that the requirements for waging a modern war demanded an even greater commitment from those commissioned to lead the nation into battle. The old days of officering only during wartime had disappeared. Events of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries brought "regularization" and "true professionalism" to the military trade. Few professional officer corps existed prior to 1800, but by the beginning of the following century, every army of any size boasted one(3). In Germany the Prussian corps set the example for the other states while at the same time providing an envied model for most foreign armies. The modern corps originated with the large-scale

2

For King and Kaiser!

participation of the landed aristocracy inhabiting the vast regions of Silesia, Pomerania, Brandenburg, and East Prussia. Initial involvement, however, had not come voluntarily. The process bringing about the domination of the officer corps by the crown began during the reign of the Great Elector, Frederick William of Brandenburg (1640-1688), but was not completed until well into the eighteenth century. The most effective leverage in initiating what was at first a forced partnership between ruler and aristocracy came with the ruling by the Elector's courts that the Junkers' estates constituted a portion of the royal domain(4). Subsequent rulers (kings after 1701) realized the potential of the court rulings and used the resultant confusion and growing impoverishment of many Junker families to force noble sons into the officer ranks. The aristocracy protested at first. But in recognition of this loss of independence, the crown granted them status as the first estate of the land and material as well as social privileges. The most important concession, however, came during the reign of Frederick the Great (1740-1786) when the claim of royal prerogative over the Junker estates was abrogated and full right of ownership restored. In return for these concessions the King expected, and received, "feudal loyalty" (Vasallentreue) and a perennial supply of nobles for his officer corps. As the other nations of western Europe gradually abandoned feudalism, Prussia continued to base its officer corps on the traditional concept of a vassal's bond to his lord. This allegiance to the king above all else remained the distinguishing characteristic of the Prussian corps until the fall of the monarchy in 1918(5). At first the Junkers preferred to send their sons to the cavalry regiments, and these units remained noble enclaves. But many aristocrats could not afford the increased personal expense entailed in the officer's purchase and maintenance of horse and equipment. An acceptable alternative was found in the infantry and light artillery, especially the elite Guards regiments. With the traditions fostered during the wars of Frederick the Great, service in these units became as "chivalrous" as that in the cavalry(6). With few exceptions, the remainder of the complement of officers contained only the sons of those non-noble families with histories of career military service. The bourgeoisie were expected to remain content with their "freedom to earn profits." Initially, Frederick refused to permit any middle-class

Tradi tion

3

officer aspirants to disrupt the social homogeneity of the corps. But like his father Frederick William I (1713-1740), he eventually had to fill wartime shortages with such men who would then be summarily purged when peace returned. Frederick even preferred foreign nobles over Prussian/German middle-class candidates whose primary duty, as the King saw it, was to increase the state's economic w e a l t h ( 7 ) . While the heavy losses of the Seven Years' War (1756-1763) forced Frederick to recruit a large number of middle-class officers, he never accepted their standing as equals alongside the Junkers. The nobles were his "knights." They had sworn allegiance solely to the sovereign who in turn had agreed that the officer corps should remain forever their personal domain. If the King had to resort to the use of bourgeois officers, they would be used to fill the gaps in the less glamorous and highly technical heavy artillery and engineer u n i t s ( 8 ) . Despite the repeated exigencies of war, Frederick never waivered in his repugnance for middle-class officers. There is the story that when officer cadets paraded past him in later years, he would strike bourgeois cadets out of the ranks with his crutch. This animosity even reached the point where he refused to allow noble officers to take middle-class wives. It is therefore not surprising that at the time of his death, middle-class officers numbered less than 10 percent of the corps, and almost all were isolated in artillery and engineer units. Whether hereditary or recently ennobled, aristocrats occupied virtually all of the higher ranks. Middle-class officers made up only 3 percent of the total above the rank of captain(9), and it is safe to assume that most, if not all, originated from traditional officer families. In addition to forcing the recruitment of middleclass officers, the Seven Years' War also revealed the need for an improvement in the education of all those commissioned to wear "the King's Coat." But Frederick wanted only an increase in instruction of practical military value; general education received no emphasis. As a result, the latter was usually of poor quality or nonexistent. The adjustments to military education included the founding of two junior cadet schools in East Prussia (Stolp and Culm) for aristocrats sons, the expansion of instruction at the only complete cadet school (Berlin), and lectures during the winter months on geography and fortification for gifted officers stationed at the larger garrisons. However, both the schools and the lectures were too few to result in any real

4

For King and Kaiser!

improvement. Moreover, many of Frederick's senior officers protested even this modest effort, viewing any increase in intellectual activity as a sign of bourgeois incursion. In disgust, the King remonstrated his commanders, "If experience were all a great general needs, the greatest would be Prince Eugene's m u l e s " ( 1 0 ) . Frederick's uncourtly analogy serves to illustrate the repeated difficulty and frustration experienced by those who worked to improve the general and professional education of the officer corps. The struggle continued into the twentieth century, but in 1800 the corps still served more as a welfare system for the nobility than an organization committed to professional modernization. By the middle of the eighteenth century, the Prussian army had dutifully emulated the other major European powers in setting up technical schools for the artillery and engineer officers. But, as was the case with middle-class officer recruitment, it failed to anticipate the importance of such training in future conflicts. It took the disasters at Jena and Auerstadt to expose the defects of the Frederician system and produce a resolute demand for reform. Serious attention to the questions of officer education and bourgeois recruitment could be ignored no longer. Haj o Holborn postulated that the Prussian army of the nineteenth century owed its creation to four men: Frederick the Great, Napoleon, Gerhard von Scharnhorst, and Neithardt von Gneisenau. Frederick had contributed the tradition and memories of past victories. Notwithstanding, it required the defeat by the French in 1806 and the toil of Scharnhorst and Gneisenau to show that the old ways would provide little else in the new century(ll). Adaptation to the changing demands of warfare became mandatory for survival. However, the Prussian system muddled on much in the fashion of the previous century. By 1806 the percentage of bourgeois officers had only risen from 3 percent to between 8 and 10 percent while the size of the officer corps had grown ten to twelve times. The command structure harbored many old and even decrepit generals (four were past eighty) who often acted independently of any central control. And fully one-fourth of the regimental and battalion commanders exceeded s i x t y ( 1 2 ) . The problem was not the lack of qualified replacements. The well-educated and growing middle class was more than large enough to provide its share of candidates. But Frederick the Great's immediate successors, Frederick William II (1786-1797) and

Tradition

5

Frederick William III (1797-1840), exhibited no great love for the presence of the bourgeoisie in the officer corps, and they, like their famous predecessor, would take action only when forced upon them. Frederick William III found himself in just such a position in 1806. Fortunately for him, and for Prussia, he possessed the statesmen and soldiers with the intellect and skill necessary to carry out the required changes . Those charged with the task of army reform recognized that the officer corps must include more than the nobility and those of the middle class from traditional officer families. To that end, the King announced on July 25, 1807, the creation of a Commission for the Reorganization of the Army to address the nineteen questions he had personally drawn up. In point five he broached the problem of the social composition of the officer corps with the query, "Should not some change be made as regards the admission of bourgeois, and more of them admitted ?"(13) For the next century this question remained at the forefront of army officer selection. With the King's near apologetic suggestion, the aristocracy was now openly pitted against the middle class in the quest for army commissions. Viewed by the majority of the nobility as a struggle for the maintenance of traditional privileges as well as the quality of the officer corps, the extent of the reformers' demands astonished the old guard. On August 6, 1808, a royal decree promulgated from Konigsberg revealed the totality of the reformers' commitment to change. Entitled "Regulations for making Appointments to Vacancies among Ensigns and for the Selection of Officers for the Infantry, Cavalry and Artillery," the order was explicit: Applications for commissions will in future be considered only on grounds of attainments and education in time of peace, and on grounds of outstanding bravery and general outlook in time of war. . . . All advantages hitherto enjoyed by the [noble] Estate in the Army are hereby abolished and all men, regardless of their origins, shall have the same duties and rights. In addition, the regulation stated that henceforth all officer aspirants for each arm of the service would be required to pass a test measuring the extent of their general education(14). While the decree was a bold concession to education and equality, it also included the qualifying

6

For King and Kaiser!

declaration that "the chief requirements of a good officer are not knowledge and technical ability alone but presence of mind, rapid perception, punctuality and accuracy, not to mention proper behavior." As Karl Demeter observed, much could be discerned from this passage concerning the uncertainty of both reformer and conservative on the relative value of the elements of education and family origin(15). The uncertainity, however, existed only in the minds of the reformers who realized they were treading on hallowed ground. The old guard had no doubts about the clear and open threat to their traditional domain and offered immediate resistance. Change came, but only after close scrutiny and, oftentimes, open and fierce opposition. Also in 1808, the new War Ministry gained overall control of the military. Although leadership was shared between the conservative Count Karl von Lottum and the young reformer Scharnhorst, the latter dominated by the force of his high intellect and strong personality. In this pivotal position, Scharnhorst used his influence and skill to initiate a radical change within the Prussian system(16). Gerhard von Scharnhorst (1755-1813) maintained more than egalitarianism as his motive for seeking a liberalization of officer selection and promotion of officer education. The son of a Hanoverian farmer who had served as a noncommissioned officer, he had been fortunate enough to attend a military school and obtain a commission in time to serve in the first wars against revolutionary France. His rationalist sentiment found fertile ground with observations on the reliance the French army placed on education and merit in the selection and promotion of officers. In 1802 he transferred to the Prussian army as a lieutenant colonel in the field artillery. His remarkable ability resulted in rapid advancement to the unofficial post of chief military staff assistant to the King. Once at his post, Scharnhorst did not wait until the 1806 debacle to institute reform. In 1804 he reorganized the Officers' Military Institute in Berlin and renamed it the Academy for Young Officers. He also established a military discussion society in the capital where those who participated included the young Clausewitz. Applying himself with tireless energy, no facet of military science and the Prussian system escaped his knowledge and awareness of the need for change(17). In addition to the 1808 decree on equality in officer selection, Scharnhorst supported another

Tradition

7

order that revoked promotion by seniority in favor of examinations testing the officers' general as well as military education. By such regulations he hoped to promote a new spirit of broad participation, merit selection and promotion, and respect for all types of education — factors he believed were behind the successes of Napoleon's armies. Aided by Hermann von Boyen and Karl von Grolman, Scharnhorst initiated shortly before his death in 1813 a reorganization that transformed the reserves (Landwehr)hr) ) in only one year into an army largely led by middleclass officers and possessing a quasi independence in times of peace. Such changes, he felt, would work to quell the notion that the army and the nation were separate entities. However, the regular army officer corps refused to accept the Landwehr officers as either professional or social equals(18). Class prejudice continued as a major obstacle for the reformers. The belief that the officer corps represented an appendage of the royal house, founded upon the ancient bond between lord and vassal, numbered many influential defenders. In contrast, the reformers believed that equality in selection and advancement based upon education and merit rather than lineage would strengthen the monarchy by promoting a fresh spirit of national participation. As Minister of War from 1814 to 1819, Boyen planned for a regular army officer cadre selected solely on merit and examination with no consideration for birth. As expected, conservatives both in and out of the army reacted in anger and dismay. Their concern was not only for the social classes to be allowed in, but also for those from the traditional sources who might be rejected. As a class, the Junkers resisted the acquisistion of a broad e d u c a t i o n — a notion reinforced by the social upheaval attending the Enlightenment ( 19 ) . If they were suddenly forced to compete with the middle class only on the bases of education and merit, the latter would hold a distinct advantage. Many of noble lineage could expect to be bypassed in either selection or advancement since their parents had regarded as unnecessary or were financially unable to provide for a broad liberal education. In his plans for reform, Scharnhorst had even considered the abolition of entrance exams altogether. Selection would be dependent solely on the completion of a required level of formal schooling. The first major examination, for promotion, would not come until at least five years after commissioning and would include nonmilitary subjects as well as those

8

For King and Kaiser!

of professional importance. The nobility's privileges were to be diminished even in their most hallowed p r e s e r v e — t h e Cadet Corps. Boyen wanted to open the aristocratic military schools to the sons of all civil servants. However, the old guard moved rapidly to head off the invasion. The King agreed to refuse admission to any save those whose officer fathers had fallen in battle or who had received his personal approval. Since most officers with sons of cadet age belonged to the nobility and the King continued to favor them above all others, cadet enrollment remained unaltered(20) . Despite the setbacks, the middle class was making serious inroads into the officer corps. By 1817 bourgeois officers dominated the complement of Landwehr commissions while the numbers were only 4,138 to 3,367 in favor of the nobility in the regular army. With the reductions of the following year, the aristocrats' majority narrowed still closer to parity (3,605 to 3 , 0 5 3 ) . Fearing a complete bourgeois takeover, the Junkers moved quickly to reverse the tide(21). Aided by the general reactionary trend throughout post-Waterloo Europe, the opposition to reform began to bear fruit. In 1819 pressure on the King led to the regular army regaining full control over the Landwehr. Both Boyen and Grolman (Chief of the General Staff) soon resigned their posts in protest over the course of events. With Scharnhorst long dead from wounds suffered in the liberation wars and Gneisenau having lost the King's favor, the path lay open for the Junkers to reestablish unchallenged dominance. Once again, the officer corps assumed the role of feudal defender of the crown which in turn pledged to uphold the prerogatives of its noble protectors(22) . If the reformers exerted any lasting effect upon the corps, it w a s , paradoxically, to strengthen the Junkers' resolve to resist any future incursions. That resolution would be tested repeatedly in the century ahead. The order of August 6, 1808, had technically abolished all class restrictions for entry into the officer ranks. At the same time the authorities had instituted a thorough set of education and examination requirements(23) . Although these regulations remained on the books, the failure at reform meant a return to the old discriminatory selection practices. Lower-class applicants could expect a brusque rebuff, regardless of education, and bourgeois aspirants were admitted only out of necessity and usually into the technical arms. In these units it was felt

Tradition

9

that the middle-class penchant for the sciences would be of greater practical value. In truth, few from the aristocracy had the technical foundation or desire for these positions. Tradition painted the noble as a gallant, mounted, sabre-waving o f f i c e r — n o t a "mechanic" or a gunner. Notwithstanding the Junkers' containment of middleclass encroachment, the question of preparatory education continued to demand attention. In 1825 a Royal Commission chaired by Prince William looked into the state of education for officer candidates and potential staff officers. It found that many lacked sufficient schooling, especially in the sciences. The Commission held the general belief that by age eighteen or nineteen, when most officers received their commissions, the mind was no longer as receptive to many basic technical precepts. As a result, those young men lacking the proper foundation would experience retarded progression in the military training schools and in professional advancement. The committee's recommendations thus included increasing the educational requirements prior to entry. Hedging against the expected opposition, the determination also contained a strong suggestion that, whenever possible, preference should be given to those candidates of old and respected lineage. Also, the state should bear the expense for educating any officers' sons unable to pay their own way. While rendering lip service to equality, the Commission maintained that "the true interest of the army cannot be served if the mediocre and uncultured are merely helped, at state expense, to the point where they learn to claim higher titles without having raised in themselves the capacity for greater achievements"(24). Regardless of personal wealth, the fathers of potential officers from traditional sources believed that the state was obligated to help defray the cost of their sons' education. By the late 1820s they were complaining of the hardships entailed in providing the necessary schooling and, with the support of many in the army, demanding that the state follow the Commission's recommendation. Their petitions prompted the Crown Prince (Frederick William) in 1835 to consult the aging Boyen for advice. The old reformer did not hesitate to offer it. All classes of citizens paid the taxes that maintained the army, he argued. Therefore, the state could not justify granting a particular social group any preferential claim to commissions, but must accept the best qualified. Also, if an officer was to retain the respect of the entire citizenry, he must have

10

For King and Kaiser!

an "adequate cosmopolitan knowledge for the needs of the times"(25). For the general, a sound preparatory education still held greater value than one's social origins . While eloquent, Boyen's counsel was not without effective opposition in high places. General von Hake, the reactionary Minister of War from 1819 to 1833, had privately expressed the sentiment that it was sufficient for an officer to know only how to read, write, and do basic arithmetic. But Frederick William III, like the Crown Prince, also listened to diverse opinions. The result was a directive from the War Ministry on December 17, 1836, instructing all officers to make an effort to increase their general knowledge in order to maintain the respected status of the corps. Frederick William IV's Royal Ordinance of February 4, 1844, reaffirmed his father's position by expanding the educational requirements for those candidates entering from the civilian schools. Concurrently, he ordered an adjustment of the Cadet Corps curriculum in an attempt to bring it more in line with that of the civilian program. In the preamble the King admitted the lack of sufficient general and professional education among his officers. As he saw it, an increase would be of benefit not only to the army, but also to those officers who returned prematurely to civilian life(26). Nothing, however, was said concerning the continued preference for candidates of old Prussian stock over those emanating from the nonmilitary middle class. The spirit of the feudal bond remained inviolate. The overall level of officer education did rise somewhat, but aristocrats in positions of power continued to circumvent the regulations that, if closely followed, would have ended the nobility's dominance of the officer corps. The disrespect for education manifested itself most in the cadet schools. Through these boarding institutions boys springing from the traditional sources were almost guaranteed a commission by age seventeen or eighteen regardless of academic level attained or quality of education received(27). Such entrenched indifference was not likely to change with the issuance of royal decrees. Without the driving force of a king committed to reform or facing a national threat, the conservatives regarded the directives on education as rules to be met with as little effort as possible or evaded altogether. The noted historian Friedrich Meinecke concluded that "the corps of officers turned the intellectual achievements of the day to account, but it did not take them to heart; it adopted the

Tradition

11

practical lessons to be drawn from them rather than the ideal they represented"(28). In the fight against increased educational requirements, the old guard retained a powerful and vocal friend in Prince William. Ironically, the brother of Frederick William IV had chaired the 1825 commission that recommended an increase in requirements. Still, in a letter to Boyen (who had returned briefly as War Minister in 1841) he questioned the ability of the poorer noble and traditional officer families to provide for the additional preparatory education. Such demands, he believed, would increase the number of middle-class officers and bring about a radical alteration of the character of the officer corps. In order to prevent this, William advocated a strengthening of the Cadet Corps and the establishment of free places within the appropriate civilian secondary schools for needy boys from officer families(29). The free seats were never created, and it is not difficult to ascertain why. Such a move would have raised again the problem Boyen had addressed in 1835. Since the civilian secondary schools received part of their financial support from taxes paid by all classes, it would be blatant discrimination to provide a free education to students selected solely on the basis of their social origins and future profession. While state revenues also went toward the maintenance of the Cadet Corps, the admission prejudice practiced by that institution was removed from public scrutiny and thus generated little serious opposition. Given the goals of the 1844 Ordnance, officer entrance requirements still remained at a level below that desired by some of its supporters. The Inspector General of Military Training and Education, von Luck, wanted the standard set at fitness for admission to a university. The approved options, however, fell far short of Luck's request. Each aspirant was required to either present a certificate of eligibility for the final level (Prima) of the classical Gymnasium(30)

or pass the ensign's (Portepeefahnrichs) examina-

tion. Whichever path he chose, this would be the only time the candidate exhibited the breadth of his general knowledge. From then on training assumed a professional line in preparation for the officer's examination. The so-called "division schools" that provided this instruction offered little general education, certainly not enough to make up for the abbreviated secondary study(31). Nevertheless, the officer and noble families who benefited by the regulations evinced no opposition. The desire of most to have their sons commissioned as soon as possible

12

For King and Kaiser!

outweighed any concern over the effects of a curtailed general education. The upheaval of 1848 generated little effect upon officer selection and training. The Frankfurt Parliament called for an end to the cadet and division schools, preferring that the education of those destined for the officer corps be left to civilian secondary schools and specially created departments within the universities. However, such dreams lasted only as long as that ill-starred assembly(32) . Almost as audacious was the proposal made to Frederick by War Minister von Pfuel that some vacancies in the Cadet Corps be held open to the sons of citizens of all classes who had "earned special merit from the fatherland"(33). Other similar recommendations may have been temporarily entertained by the King, who labored under immense political pressure; but soon after the crisis, he reverted to the position that the Cadet Corps should exist primarily for the sons of officers and the nobility. In 1858 Frederick William IV suffered a complete physical and mental collapse. His death three years later elevated William, his brother and regent, to the throne. In William I the aristocracy gained an unwavering ally in the struggle to preserve its position and interests within the officer corps. Having spent his life in close contact with the army, the new monarch cherished deep feelings for the martial spirit and firmly adhered to the old feudal pledges. Historian Gerhard Ritter perhaps best characterized William's commitment to the spirit, if not the original intent of those bonds. Even with the influx of middle-class officers, the members of the corps served on as the "paladins of the Hohenzollern throne, loyal followers of the monarch to whom they had sworn personal fealty; and . . , he in turn would . . . protect their privileges"(34). In William's mind, however, loyalty to the nobility would not prevent improvement. While army conservatives initially questioned his loyalty to their interests, the King moved to upgrade the quality of his officer corps. In 1859 he made attendance at the recently created officer candidate schools, or War Schools (Kriegsschulen) as they were officially known, mandatory for all but a select few from the Cadet Corps who had already received similar instruction at the Senior Cadet Academy in Berlin. Thereafter, both the War School system and the Cadet Corps experienced an expansion that continued after his reign(35) . William's alterations of the system were not made

Tradition

13

with the intention of weakening the nobility and officer families' traditional dominance. He recognized that the officer corps had to increase the number of preparatory schools and improve the training for the large number of officers required by his projected army expansion. Neither William nor his new War Minister, Albrecht von Roon, had any intention of changing the fundamental spirit of the officer corps. Theirs was mainly a problem of numbers. The army had not increased in size since 1820 although the population had grown from 10 million to 18 million. To bring recruitment into step with the burgeoning populace, while at the same time bolstering the concept of universal service, Roon asked for and received an annual induction of 6 3 , 0 0 0 — a n increase of 23,000 above the previous conscriptions(36). Clearly, a parallel expansion of the officer corps would be required. While seeking growth in numbers, William and Roon also wanted the officer corps to become a model for the nation to follow, or as Ritter expressed it, "an educator in the grand style, a shaper of the people's mind"(37). Fearing a disruption of the status quo, many senior officers argued that such was already the case. Educational preparation within the officer corps set a standard not only for the German people, but the world as well. They cited foreign praise for the Prussian officers' respect for education. Moreover, of the military literature emanating from Europe in 1859, about half had been published first in German. Notwithstanding these claims, the generally low intellectual state of the corps justified the call for improvement. The overall academic level had risen slightly, but mostly as a result of increased technical study. In the area of broad intellectual sophistication fostered by a liberal education, few officers could even approach Roon or the soon to become legendary Helmuth von Moltke. Most had not even finished secondary school. The brilliance of a Clausewitz, Boyen, or Gneisenau was no longer in evidence(38). Unfortunately, Roon and Will iam ' s concept of improved training and eiducation also embodied little appreciation for any th ing other than purely military Progressives in the army and Parliament were studies, quick to denounce this promotion of a narrow sp ecialization at the ex pense of genera 1 and cultural education, biat Roon countered that special:ized rath er than general education provided the "spirit" that was the goal of military education. The off icer corps must expand, but not at the expense of the desired social

14

For King and Kaiser!

spirit. To harken to the call that the cadet schools be abolished, that qualified noncommissioned officers be promoted, and that discrimination on the basis of social origin cease recalled images of 1848, not reorganization ( 39 ) . The liberals continued to press for broad changes while the old guard resisted almost all reforms out of fear that any modification threatened the corps' traditional structure. William, caught in the middle, soon revealed his lack of commitment to a real reform of the selection and education process. The required attendance at a War School evoked immediate protest from the conservatives, but it was the War Minister's order of October 31, 1861, and the strong resistance to it led by the Chief of the Military Cabinet, General von Manteuffel, that resulted in William's decision to limit the impact of the new measures. The regulation stated that all a s pirants taking the ensign's examination must produce a certificate of eligibility (Primareifezeugnis) for

the

Prima

level

of

either

a

Prussian

Gymnasium

or

Realschool (Realschule) of the First 0rder(40). Also,

any candidate who received a poor mark due to improper spelling or insufficient knowledge of German grammar would be failed. Traditionally, Prussian officers paid scant attention to such things as grammar and spelling and did not expect their sons to have to do so. Now, however, an officer could finish out his career speaking and writing incorrectly, but his son could not do so and be commissioned(41). The objection to the new stipulations once again had as its basis more than the demand for additional preparatory schooling. Regarding as unnecessary any increase in general knowledge, the opposition also repeated the lamentation that questioned the ability of the impoverished nobility and the traditional officer families to compete with a bourgeoisie able to provide their sons with the best possible secondary education. If, as a result of the increased requirements, the officer corps was taken over by the middle class, what would become of the traditional bond between the nobility and the monarch? The critics wasted little time in addressing these fears to the one person within the army who could best support their case—Manteuffel. In a letter of protest to Roon on November 25, the Baron displayed a deep commitment to the preservation of the feudal foundation of the officer corps, which he felt was in danger from the The increased academic reOctober 31 regulation. quirements would, so he claimed, lead to the exclusion of many aspirants from the traditional social origins simply because they could not afford the cost of the

Tradition

15

additional schooling(42 ) . Two weeks later the King, fully embroiled in the struggle with Parliament over the expansion of the army, attempted to placate Manteuffel and the opposition by requesting that the "character" of an applicant be given equal consideration when selecting future officers. That, however, was not enough for Manteuffel who was concerned about those having the "right" character but insufficient education for entry to the ensign's examination. In his memorandum to the King dated April 18, 1862, he reasserted his belief that the new requirements would exclude too many of the preferred candidates. William's fear of a bourgeois-led army was sufficiently aroused. Five days later he retreated and postponed until October 1865 the date for requiring the Prima certificate. More importantly, he agreed that "special zeal for the service" and a favorable recommendation from the nominating officer should compensate for a candidate's deficiency in preparatory education(43) . Any aspirant so distinguished could count on a royal dispensation in lieu of meeting the necessary requirements . To the relief of the old guard, the King continued to grant dispensations after the 1865 deadline to those preferred candidates without the Prima certificate. William I I , also pressed by the need for more officers, expanded the use of dispensations in order to obtain all available candidates from the nobility and traditional officer families. The motives, like his grandfather's, included more than simply meeting new q u o t a s ( 4 4 ) . No candidate from the established sources should suffer rejection only because he lacked the required amount of schooling. Thus, from the 1860s on the officer corps could count on an official alternative to the education regulation for those aspirants with the desired social origins. The argument raised in the Prussian Landtag in the 1860s that dispensations were just another means of excluding the middle class was not without evidence. While the army claimed that the regulations prevented discrimination in favor of any social group, recruitment figures suggested otherwise. The majority of replacements prior to 1860 had entered from the Cadet Corps, and 65 percent of the second lieutenants in 1859 were of noble origin. In 1861 the relative percentages of new officers in all save the technical arms reflected the reality in favor of the old guard(45) .

16

For King and Kaiser! NOBLES 95% 67% 100% 95% 67% 16% 16%

Infantry Guards Infantry Line Cavalry Guards Cavalry Line Artillery Guards Artillery Line Engineers

COMMONERS 5% 33% 0 5% 33% 84% 84%

Many of the commoners in the nontechnical arms were from old Prussian officer families and could be relied on to uphold the feudal tradition of the corps. Even as the army expanded and more officers were needed, particularly during the wars against Denmark (1864) and Austria (1866), recruitment figures continued to mirror the belief in social exclusiveness. Of the 2,516 ensigns who took the officer's examination in 1862-63, 1863-64, and 1866-67, 49 percent (1,234) held titles. Yet if the candidates are grouped according to their fathers' professions, the prejudice in favor of the preferred classes becomes even more pronounced(46) . Officer Higher official Large landowner Teacher or clergy

835 (33.2%) 657 (26.1%) 498 (19.8%) 179

Lower official Industrialist or Merchant Rentier

151

(6%)

121 (4.8%) 75 (3%)

(7.1%)

By the end of the 1860s, the continued army expansion was making demands that the aristocracy and traditional officer families could not meet. Fearing the increased reliance upon middle-class officers, the military monitored the selection process even more closely. The bureaucratic division between the regular army (Linienarmee) and the Landwehr was abolished. While the reserve militia, led almost exclusively by bourgeois officers, remained, it returned to a more direct relationship with the line. Defended as a move to improve organization, the adjustment allowed the officer corps to better scrutinize candidates for the proper political and social attitudes(47). Despite his closer ties with the Landwehr officer, the line commander continued to look down on his comrades in the reserves for their class and suspected lack of professional competence. But more and more the regular officer corps was forced to take candidates from the same bourgeois sources. Many of the old guard, like Manteuffel, lived in fear of a

Tradition

17

wholesale adulteration of the corps by the middle class. They did not share Roon ' s belief that the historical relationship between the monarchy and the officer corps could be preserved with the increase of bourgeois candidates. To the contrary, their position centered on the notion that the nobility and the old officer families were the only subjects truly worthy of serving as the "King's knights"(48) . The times and needs of the army, however, allowed for no such luxury. The wars of 1864 and 1866 clearly exposed the inadequate supply of officer replacements from traditional stock. Formerly, the middle class candidates found grudging acceptance into the engineers or heavy a r t i l l e r y — b r a n c h e s that were scorned and avoided by most aristocrats for both the lack of prestige and the technical education required(49). But this segregation, both social and professional, was becoming more and more difficult to sustain. The events of the 1860s forced the officer corps to accept, or at least address, the realities of waging modern warfare. Moltke claimed in 1861 that the corps turned away many of the middle-class candidates because they lacked the proper disposition or "sentiment" (Gesinnung)(50). The decline of the nobility in numbers as well as wealth and the growing demand for officers in all branches soon rendered such excuses untenable. By 1895 there would be only 317 hereditary noble family names in Germany. In that year they provided a total of 2,670 officers; of that number, 1,006 came from only 76 families. By 1900 only one in three of the large landed estates in the six east Prussian provinces would be in titled hands(51) . Still, many, like Manteuffel, refused to contemplate any disruption of the old order. The middleclass officers were feared not only as a threat to the nobility's traditional rank as protectors of the crown, but also for their lack of proper military spirit and presumed liberal opinions. Manteuffel's prejudice against the bourgeoisie, referred to as "peasants who have made money" by his friend General von Schack(52), approached the state of paranoia. On one occasion he even questioned the loyalty of a garrison commander upon learning that the latter was on friendly terms with several of the local merchants(53 ) . As Chief of the Military Cabinet, Manteuffel used his influence to retard or block the promotion of officers judged too liberal in their views. He also regularly aided preferred candidates in the procurement of education dispensations. In a letter to his

18

For King and Kaiser !

son he justified these actions by claiming that education was often irrelevant since most officers ended up in nontechnical positions(54) . His real motive, however, was the maintenance of the corps' feudal tradition and loyalty to the crown. Manteuffel remembered the participation of the middle class in the events of 1848 and inferred that a repeat would find many bourgeois officers lacking in true devotion. Prussia was not alone among the German states in clinging to reactionary sentiments. Even Bavaria, considered one of the most broad-minded regions in Europe, did not lack for off:.cers who wished to place class above education in officer selection. But in contrast to Prussia, the die-hards in the Bavarian officer corps found little support in the army or the government. Aided by the tempest of 1848, the other German states possessing officer contingents also had initiated the process of willingly accepting more middle-class candidates. By the 1890s only 15 percent of Bavaria's officers and 19 percent of Saxony's held titles. Wurttemberg, whose army was attached to Prussia's in peacetime as well as in war, totaled only 25 percent aristocracy shortly after unification(55) . In time, and in spite of the resistance offered by the reactionaries, even the Prussian army had to acquiesce to the inevitability of increasing numbers of middle-class officers. However, as a result of Bismarck's political victory over the Landtag in the 1860s and the army's successes in the field during the wars of unification, the officer corps maintained unquestioned control over selection and training. If more of the bourgeois aspirants had to be commissioned, the complete process would make sure that all accepted the doctrine of the officer corps as a closed society owing allegiance only to the crown and characterized by the emulation of the attitudes, customs, manners, and political ideology of the old landed aristocracy(56). The search among the middle class for those young men willing to accept the social and political standards of the officer corps did not prove overly difficult. The victories of 1864, 1866, and 1870-71 generated a pride in the military that pervaded nearly all sections of the middle class within Prussia (and eventually across G e r m a n y ) — a pride that was not observed among the members of the middle classes in the other major powers of the period(57). The following observation, made by Prince Hohenlohe in May 1870, a few months before the war with France, graphically illustrates the exalted position of the army in

19

Tradi tion Prussian

society.

The whole garrison of Berlin had turned out. A great show of princes, generals and so forth. I mingled with the crowd and was struck by the interest manifested by the lowest people in things military. No trace of the former animosity against the military which used to be noticeable among the lower classes. The commonest workingman looked on the troops with the feeling that he belonged or had belonged to them.(58) While many from the working classes would shortly evince a greater loyalty to socialism, the middle class generally came to accept the status quo and sought recognition by the upper class rather than radical change. With final victory and the creation of the Reich, the Imperial German Army, unified under the Prussian model and henceforth known as the Kaiserheer , suddenly became an envied example of efficient organization, successful doctrine, effective weapons, and even practical uniform design. The Prussian use of a General Staff to plan and prepare for future wars prompted similar creations or adaptations in France, Austria, Russia, Great Britain, and the United States(59). But such expressions of international respect did not allay the fear of the old guard in the Prussian officer corps that the forces of liberalism might creep into the commissioned ranks with the middleclass candidates. Their trepidation actually increased with the realization that in the Kaiserheer the Prussian contingent would come into direct contact with armies from the more liberal-minded southern and western states. Unquestionably, Prussia's army corps greatly outnumbered the o t h e r s — P r u s s i a had thirteen; Bavaria, two; and Saxony and Wurttemberg one e a c h — a n d that ratio would increase in their favor during the imperial period(60). The other armies, however, absorbed non~noble officer candidates at a rapid rate, too quickly, the Prussians felt, to retain the social exclusiveness preferred by the Prussian officer corps. This concern prompted the latter's renewed commitment to make sure that all Prussian officer replacements demonstrated the proper political and social sentiments. At the very least, aspirants must exhibit a willingness to accept the corps' conservative principles and become part "of a structure which vitiated the attempts to create a viable democracy"(61). William I and his grandson William II both reigned

20

For King and Kaiser!

in abhorrence of parliamentary democracy and fear of socialism, and it was on the officer corps rather than the constitution that they depended for preservation of the authority of the monarchy. In complete agreement with the wishes of the crown, the army exerted full control over officer selection, and the Kaiser refused to allow the Reichstag, the Prussian Landtag, or any other civilian government agency an effective voice in this vital m a t t e r ( 6 2 ) . All applicants were screened carefully, and priority was given to those from the traditional sources. Middle-class aspirants had to offer more than a successful secondary school Adherance to, or an evident or university record, willingness to accept, the officer corps' principle of supreme loyalty to the king preceded any other qualification. If the corps could not obtain enough officers from reliable sources, then it would seek to make aristocrats in thought of those bourgeois candidates it accepted. The noble, with his direct relationship to the monarchy, habit of commanding others, and the tendency to devote at least a portion of his life to active military service, had given the Prussian officer corps its s tabi li t y (63 ) . The crown and the aristocracy, however, lacked confidence in the new middleclass officer's pledge to put king above all else, thus the constant worry over the lack of aspirants from the tested fount. In 1857 then Prince William complained that the "good elements" were disappearing from the corps. A half-century later War Minister von Einem reflected the incessant concern in his lament that too many sons of old officer families chose industry over the army while the sons of the wealthy middle class flocked to take their places ( 6 4 ) . Fifty years after the reforms of Scharnhorst and Boyen, the Prussian army once again faced the onset of a large-scale middle-class incursion into the officer corps. The expansion of the army and the drive toward German unification allowed for no alternative other than the promotion of deserving noncommissioned officers. But while France, Italy, and even Russia provided schools for the training and commissioning of qualified noncoms, Prussia was loath to do likewise. Only twenty-eight enlisted men gained commissions during the wars of 1864 and 1866(65). It was all the old guard could do just to accept the expanded influx of bourgeois officers without contending with the possibility of reaching into the lower classes. Noncoms continued to entertain little hope of being promoted until World War I when the decimation of officers forced the army to commission them in large numbers.

Tradition

21

The Prussian array of 1871 received worldwide attention for its victories in the wars of unification. But u n d e r n e a t h its seemingly invincible exterior, there existed a sense of uncertainty. With the expansion of the officer corps, which began in the 1860s and carried over into the next c e n t u r y , it became evident early on that the sons of the noble and old officer families could not meet the rising quotas. The middle class had to make up the difference. Moreover, the need for additional officers was complicated by the rapid a d v a n c e of m i l i t a r y technology and the demand for better e d u c a t i o n and training. The officer corps, however, would not allow the changes in warfare to alter its allegiance to the royal house or p r e v e n t the procurement of commissions for e v e r y a v a i l a b l e candidate from the traditionally preferred sources. Once in the officer t r a i n i n g system, Prussian candidates received instruction not only for their future duties, but also in what it meant to be a Prussian officer. As a rule, those of noble and traditional officer origins possessed the "proper spirit" whether or not they had attended one of the cadet schools. Conversely, those aspirants from the m i d d l e class, often with superior preparatory education, were viewed as underschooled in the conservative spirit of the corps. W h i l e the army accepted the significance of education, it was of paramount importance that all candidates e x h i b i t or acquire the officer corps' feudal ideals. For that reason, many from the preferred origins gained commissions despite marginal a b i l i t y or lack of sufficient education. Such discrimination typified the crown and officer corps' dilernraa^the desire to produce better officers while at the same time seeking every available aspirant from the old stock, regardless of their qualifications. The selection and education of officers presented a continuous and complex problem that plagued army a u t h o r i t i e s t h r o u g h o u t the imperial period. NOTES 1. Speech on June 16, 1897, to the King's Grenadiers Regiment. Wolf von Schierbrand, ed. and trans., The Kaiser's Speeches (New York: Harper 8 Brothers, 1903), 170. 2. William Carr, A History of Germany, 1815-1945 (New York: St. Martin's, 1979), 64-67 and 78-124; and K e i t h S i m p s o n , History of the German Army (New York: Military Press, 1985), 60 and 64-69.

22

For King and Kaiser!

3. John Hackett, The Profession of Arms (New York: Macmillan, 1 9 8 3 ) , 99. 4. Eckart Kehr, Economic Interest, Militarism, and Foreign Policy (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1 9 7 7 ) , 98; and Emilio Willems, A Way of Life and Death: Three Centuries of Prussian-German Militarism (Nashville, Tenn. : Vanderbilt University Press, 1 9 8 6 ) , 20-24. 5. Kehr, Militarism, 98; and Kitchen, Corps, xiii. 6. F. C. Endres, The Social Structure and Corresponding Ideologies of The German Officers' Corps before the World War, trans. S. Ellison (New York: State Department of Social Welfare and the Department of Social Science/Columbia University, 1 9 3 7 ) , 7-8. 7. Correlli Barnett, "The Education of Military Elites." Journal of Contemporary History 2 (July 1967):16; and Kitchen, Corps, xiii. 8. Simpson, Army, 29. 9. Karl Demeter, The German Officer-Corps in Society and State, 1650-19 45, trans. Angus Malcolm (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1 9 6 5 ) , 6. 10. Ibid., 6 7 . Schlieffen: The 11. Hajo Holborn, "Moltke and Prussian-German School," in Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler, ed . Edward Meade Earle (Princeton, N.J .: Princeton University Press, 1 9 4 3 ) , 172. 12. David J. Hughes, "Occupational Origins of Prussia's Generals, 1871-1914," Central European History 13 (March 1980):3; Demeter, Officer-Corps, 7; and Kitchen, Corps, xiii. 13. Demeter, Officer-Corps, 12. 14. Ibid., 13; Hackett, Profession , 99; and S. P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge, Press of Harvard University Press, Mass . : Belknap 1 9 5 7 ) , 30. 15. Demeter, Officer-Corps, 71-73. 16. Kitchen, Corps , xiv . 17. Julius Hoppenstedt, Sind wir Kriegsfertig? (Berlin : Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 1 9 1 0 ) , 50; Simpson, Army, 40; and Demeter, Officer-Corps, 72. 18. Max Lehmann, Scharnhorst, vol. 1: Bis zum Tilsiter Frieden (Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1886), 227; Kitchen, Corps, xiv-xv; and Simpson, Army, 43. 69, 19. Demeter, Officer-Corps, x and 69. 20. Lehmann, Scharnhorst , vol. 1, 227- 28; and Demeter, Officer-Corps, 14. 21. Demeter, Officer-Corps, 15-17, 22. Kitchen, Corps, xv~xvi; and Craig, Politics, 63, 6 8 , and 75. 23. Huntington, Soldier, 39-40.

Tradition

23

24. Prussia, Kriegsministerium, ed. Militarische Schriften weiland Kaiser Wilhelms des Grossen Majestat, 2 vols. (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 1897), 1:61-62. 25. Friedrich Meinecke, Das Leben des Generalfeldmarschalls Hermann von Boyen , 2 vols. (Stuttgart: Cotta, 1896-1899), 1:469. 26. Reinhard Hohn, Verfassungskampf und Heerseid: Der Kampf des Burgertums urn das Heer, 1815-1850 (Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1938), 265; Demeter, Officer-Corps, 75-76; Craig, Politics, 79; and H u n t i n g t o n , Soldier, 40. 27. A l f r e d V a g t s , A History of Militarism (New York: W. W. Norton, 1937), 180-81; and Eleftherios Sossidi, Die staatsrechtliche Stellung des Offiziers im absoluten Scaat und ihre Abhandlungen im 19. Jahrhundert (Berlin: E. Ebering, 1939), 69. 28. Meinecke, Boyen, 2:510. 29. William to Boyen, May 9, 1844, in Kriegsminist e r i u m , Militarische Schriften, 1:489-97. 30. A secondary school with Latin and Greek as the core of its curriculum. 31. Demeter, Officer-Corps, p. 77. 32. Ibid., 78; and K i t c h e n , Corps, xvi. 33. Franz Graf von Haslingen, Geschichte des Kadettenhauses in Potsdam, 2nd ed. (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 1907), 55. 34. Gerhard R i t t e r , The Sword and the Scepter, vol. 1: The Prussian Tradition, 1740-1890, trans. Heinz Norden (Coral Gables, Fla.: University of Miami Press, 1969), 139. 35. Demeter, Officer-Corps, 79. 36. Kitchen, Corps, x v i i - x v i i i ; R i t t e r , Prussian Tradition, 116-17; and Carr, Germany, 78-79. 37. R i t t e r , Prussian Tradition, 118. 38. Lascelles Wraxall, The Armies of the Great Powers (London: Win. H. A l l e n , 1859), 100; Vagts, Militarism, 35; and R i t t e r , Prussian Tradition, 117-18. 39. Waldemar Graf Roon, Kriegsminister von Roon als Redner, 2 vols. (Breslau: Eduard Trewendt, 1895-96), 1:25; and R i t t e r , Prussian Tradition, 145. 40. A secondary school offering m o d e r n technical and scientific subjects. After unification it was c o m m o n l y known as the Realgymnasiurn. 41. Hans Delbruck, History of the Art of War, 4 vols., trans. Walter J. Renfroe, Jr. ((Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1985), 4:258; and [Gerhard] von Pelet-Narbonne, "Die Haupt-Kadetten-Anstalt zu Lichterfelde bei Berlin nebst einem Ruckblick auf die Entwickelung des koniglich preussischen Kadettenkorps," s u p p l e m e n t to Mi 1itarwochenbla11, 1878, 311.

24

For King and Kaiser!

See also Demeter, Officer-Corps, 80-81. 42. Manteuffel to Roon, N o v e m b e r 25, 1861, in Demeter, Officer-Corps, 279-80. See also p. 278 for an example of the pressure applied to Manteuffel. 43. Ibid., 82-83 and 281-83. 44. Brian Bond, The Victorian Army and the Staff College, 1854-1914 (London: Eyre Methuen, 1972), 23. 45. R i t t e r , Prussian Tradition, 116, 130, and 28182; and Endres, Structure, 12. 46. Demeter, Officer-Corps, 21-22; Vagts, Militarism, 205; and Hughes, "Origins," 5. 47. Demeter, Officer-Corps, 23-24. For e x p a n d e d citation see Demeter's original work, Das deutsches fleer und seine Offiziere (Berlin: Reimar H o b b i n g , [1935]), 26-28. See also Kehr, Militarism, 61; and Simpson, Army, 60. 48. Demeter, Officer-Corps, 19; and W. M. Simon, Germany in the Age of Bismarck (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1968), 22-23. 49. For examples of the low esteem in which these branches were h e l d , see Theodor von B e r n h a r d i , Aus dem Leben Theodor von Bernhardis, 8 vols. (Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1893-1906), 2:231; and Kenneth Macksey, Guderian, Creator of the Blitzkrieg (New York: Stein and Day, 1976), 22. 50. Bernhardi, Leben, 4:166. 51. F. von Schulte, "Adel im deutschen Offizierund Beamtenstand," Deutsche Revue, A p r i l — J u n e 1896, 185-86; and D e m e t e r , Officer-Corps, 276. 52. Schack to Manteuffel, May 19, 1862, in Demeter, Officer-Corps, 21. 53. Bernhardi, Leben, 5:30-31. 54. Manteuffel to Hans Karl, September 16, 1864, in Edwin von Manteuffel, "Briefe des Generalfeldmarschalls Freiherrn Edwin v. M a n t e u f f e l an seinen Sohn Hans Karl." Deutsche Revue 38, no. 3 (1913):198. For more on Manteuffel's activities, see Craig, Politics, 232-35; and Ritter, Prussian Tradition, 285. 55. Hermann R u m s c h o t t e l , "Bildung und Herkunft der bayerischen Offiziere 1866 bis 1914. Zur Geschichte von Mentalitat und Ideologic des bayerischen Offizierkorps," Militargeschichtliche Mitteilungen , 2 (1970): 87; and Martin Bethke, "Leutnant vor 60 Jahren—ein hartes Brot," Deutsche Rundschau, August 1955, 825. 56. Karl Demeter, Das deutsche Offizierkorps in seinen historisch-soziologischen Grundlagen (Berlin: Reimar H o b b i n g , 1930), 216-17; Craig, Politics, 23638; and F. L. Carsten, "Germany from Scharnhorst to Schlieffen: The Prussian Officer Corps in Politics, 1806-1933," in Soldiers and Governments, ed. Michael Howard (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1957), 81.

Tradition

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57. Gerhard R i t t e r , The Sword and the Scepter, vol. 2: The European Powers and the Wilhelminian Empire, 1890-1914, trans. Heinz Norden (Coral Gables, Fla.: University of Miami Press, 1969), 94. In Great Britain and France respect for the army declined steadily d u r i n g the last half of the century despite colonial expansion. See Victor Bonham-Carter, Soldier True: The Life and Times of Field Marshal Sir William Robertson, 1860-1933 (London: Muller, 1963), 5; and Gwyn Harries-Jenkins, The Army in Victorian Society (London: R o u t l e d g e & Kegan Paul, 1977), 5. 58. [Chlodwig zu Hohenlohe-Waldenburg-Schil1ingsfurst], Memoirs of Prince Chlodwig of HohenloheSchillingsfuerst, 2 vols., ed. Friedrich Curtius, trans. George W. Chrystal (New York: Macmillan, 1906), 2:11. 59. Simpson, Army, 72; R i t t e r , European Powers, 36-37; and Douglas Porch, The March to the Marne: The French Army, 1871-1914 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 39-40. 60. The ratio was 16:2:1:1 in 1891 and 18:3:1:1 in 1910. Simpson, Army, 72; Lieutenant-Colonel E x n e r , "The German Army of Today," Harper's New Monthly Magazine, May 1892, 869-71; and Richard Thirsk, "The German A r m y , " Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States 47 (November-December 1910): 378. For the constitutional arrangement of the military, see Edwin H. Zeydel, ed . , Constitutions of the German Empire and German States (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1919), in The Inquiry Handbooks, vol. 18 (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1974), 22-25; Kitchen, Corps, 1 and 12-15; and William G. Fitz-Gerald, "The German Army," World's Work, March 1906, 7310. 61. Franz Neumann, "Germany and Western Union," Academy of Political Science Proceedings 23 (1949): 262. 62. Freiherrn Lucius von Ballhausen, Bismarck: Erinnerungen des Staatsministers (Stuttgart: Cotta Buchhandlung Nachfolger, 1921), 46. 63. Hugo Freiherr von Freytag-Loringhoven, Krieg und Politik in der Neuzeit (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 1911), 275; Baron Colmar von der Goltz, The Nation in Arms: A Treatise on Modern Military Systems and the Conduct of War, trans. Philip A. Ashworth (London: Hugh Rees, 1913), 83; and von der Boeck [Albrecht von Boguslawski ] , Deutschland: Das Heer (Berlin: Alfred Schall, 1904), 125.

64. Ernst Werner, ed . , Kaiser Wilhelm des Gros-

sen : Briefe, Reden und Ernst Siegfried Mittler

Schriften, 2 vols. (Berlin: und Sohn, 1906), 1:408; and

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Friedrich von Bernhardi, Denkwurdigkeiten aus meinem Lebenn (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 1927), 263. 65. Herbert Rosinski, The German Army (Washington, D.C.: Infantry Journal, 1944), 70. The rigid class structure in England produced much the same attitude as in Germany, although not as severe.

2

German Secondary Education and Officer Selection I am looking for soldiers. W i l h e l m 11(1) A f t e r 1860 and t h r o u g h o u t the imperial era, the Prussian m i l i t a r y hierarchy wrestled with the p r o b l e m of t r y i n g to adjust entrance regulations and officer selection to the needs of an army c o p i n g with the demands of industrialized warfare while at the same time p r e s e r v i n g the social and political exclusiveness of the officer corps. German civil education also was a t t e m p t i n g to meet the requisites b r o u g h t on by the c o u n t r y ' s rapid industrialization.. To understand fully the m o t i v e s and actions of the army in the areas of e d u c a t i o n a l r e q u i r e m e n t s , selection, and t r a i n i n g of its officers, one must also understand the Prussian c i v i l i a n e d u c a t i o n system and the role it played in the m e n t a l p r e p a r a t i o n of the young m e n , the selection process, and the acceptance by bourgeois officers of the corps' feudal values and traditions. The officer corps did not e x p e c t the c a n d i d a t e to be a tabula rasa r e q u i r i n g complete i n s t r u c t i o n in the p r o p e r social and political values. Nor did it care to r e p r o g r a m l i b e r a l thinkers. Aspirants were e x p e c t e d to demonstrate at the very least a willingness to accept the corps' conservative precepts. S u b s e q u e n t training would then finish the m o l d i n g of the final p r o d u c t . The behavior and discipline d e m a n d e d of students in the Prussian secondary schools g r e a t l y s i m p l i f i e d the army's task. A G e r m a n scholar and educator wrote in 1908 that by the t u r n of the century the German school system

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had become the acknowledged world leader from primary through university levels(2). But more importantly for the Prussian officer corps, the system exerted an irregular disciplinary influence upon its students. While, as a foreign observer admitted, German schools did allow for "special privileges to those who have name and wealth," they were decidedly democratic in meting out punishment. From the first day all pupils learned that the primary rule of order was obedience. No German boy escaped this lesson since all males were required to attend at least primary school until age fourteen(3). The primary or elementary school (Volksschule) prepared most young Germans for the practical duties of life, and that preparation included a stiff dose of discipline. The boy was not unfamiliar with such treatment as adults in Germany did not hesitate to assume the role of disciplinarian when both parents were absent. The schoolmaster, however, often treated his charges as if he were an officer or noncom and they were raw recruits(4). Whether harsh or lenient, the punishment and discipline meted out conditioned the boys for the obedience subsequently demanded of them in the army. The eight years of basic education in the primary school (usually from ages six to fourteen) completed the education of many who attended. Although the opportunity existed for further training at a lower trade or technical school, the odds for receiving a secondary or higher formal education remained as high as 1 in 10,000 throughout the imperial period(5). Unlike the elementary schools, a German secondary education was not free. This effectively ruled out those of the lower classes who wished to attend, for while the cost was not exorbitant by bourgeois standards, few farmers and workers could afford i t ( 6 ) . The lower-class student who wanted to continue his formal education at a higher level was not freed of the mandatory age requirement. Since most boys, regardless of whether they transferred from the Volksschule or one of the private preparatory schools (Vorschulen), entered secondary school at age nine, that meant at least five years of tuition and, in most cases, living expenses as well. The German system was not set up for an orderly progression from primary to secondary school. Realistically, the father knew that he must plan on at least six years, the length of the shortest secondary school, since to quit at age fourteen left the boy's education unfinished and placed him at a disadvantage with those who went on(7).

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Thus, at the tender age of nine, a boy's entire future rested upon his father's decision. The farm laborer and urban factory worker usually had weighed the expense of a secondary school long before, and the child remained in the Volksschule. Also entering into the decision was the lack of responsibility felt by the state in p r o v i d i n g secondary school facilities for all who desired to attend. In instances where more applicants than vacancies existed, the father's influence, social rank, and profession played a major part in the boy's acceptance or denial(8). Faced with these financial and social barriers, it was exceedingly difficult for any boy from the lower classes who m i g h t aspire to become an officer to obtain the education necessary for admission to the corps. By means of the often prejudicial admission process, the sons of the aristocracy and the m i d d l e class who entered the secondary schools benefited from the inequality promoted by the German education system. The decision on which type of school to attend also affected the student's personal notion of social status. The German secondary system was in a state of transition during the imperial period as it labored to save the best of the old classical education while seeking to p r o v i d e the technical knowledge necessary for continued industrial and economic expansion. F u n d a m e n t a l l y , there were two types of schools—the six-year and the nine-year. The latter included the Gymnasium, the Realgymnasiurn , and the Oberrealschule. The six-year schools consisted of the Progymnasiurn, the Realprogymnasiurn, and the Real — schule. The nine—year institutions had a like number of classes whose Latin names and the a p p r o x i m a t e ages for each were: Sexta , nine to ten; Quinta, ten to eleven; Quarts, eleven to twelve; Untertertia, twelve to thirteen; Obertertia, thirteen to fourteen; Untersekunda , fourteen to fifteen; Obersekunda , fifteen to sixteen; Unterprima, sixteen to eighteen; and Oberprima , seventeen to twenty. The six-year schools included all but the top three classes(9). As regards status, the Gymnasium stood at the summit of the secondary system. Many of these institutions dated from the Reformation and were considered the guardians of the classical studies. All careers in the learned professions (law, medicine, education, and theology), many in the a r m y , and most in the senior civil service began in one of these schools. The curriculum (see A p p e n d i x 1) centered on the study of Latin and Greek, and despite the technical advances of the age, few changes of any significance took place

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d u r i n g the era of the Kaiserreich. The enormity of the school's prestige explains the p r e s u m p t i o n w i t h i n German society that only its graduates had a c q u i r e d both "education and culture" (classical Bildung). Even those who attended its six-year c o u n t e r p a r t , the Progymnasium, were considered to h a v e a t t a i n e d the knowledge and culture necessary for many commercial and civil positions(10). The full concession to the growing technical requirements of industrialization came with the nineyear Higher Realschool (Oberrealschule), which appeared in 1880. D e v e l o p e d from the Realschule, its six-year c o u n t e r p a r t , the school emphasized technical studies, mathematics, natural science, and m o d e r n languages (French and English). As with all six-year schools, the students were not p r e p a r e d for the u n i v e r s i t y , but for positions in business and industry. However, e x p a n d i n g t e c h n o l o g y and the need for trained engineers, chemists, and the like b r o u g h t the Oberrealschule to a position of great i m p o r t a n c e by the end of the c e n t u r y . For e m p l o y m e n t requiring less s t u d y , the shorter Realschule remained a viable opt ion(11). The compromise between the prestigious classical Gymnasium and the technical Oberrealschule was the nine-year R e a l g y m n a s i u m . This institute resulted from the a t t e m p t by educational a u t h o r i t i e s to p r o v i d e the best from both worlds. R e t a i n i n g the s t u d y of Latin, the R e a l g y m n a s i u m recognized the d e m a n d s of the modern world by d r o p p i n g some of the classical subjects like Greek and increasing the study of French, English, m a t h e m a t i c s , and science. The graduates, along with those of its six-year c o u n t e r p a r t , the R e a l p r o g y m n a s i u m , were e x p e c t e d to take t h e i r places in society in possession of a basic technical knowledge of the m o d e r n world while retaining a "cultured" awareness of the old(12). As the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y d r e w to a close, graduates of the Oberrealschule and the R e a l g y m n a s i u m steadily increased. N e v e r t h e l e s s , the Gymnasium endured as the t r a d i t i o n a l method of p r e p a r a t i o n for state examinations and its graduates the p r e d o m i nant beneficiaries of official state and educational "privileges" (Berechtigungen). As late as 1900, these schools still o u t n u m b e r e d the other nine-year institutions in Prussia: 277 Gymnasien, 85 Realgymnasien , and 26 Oberrealschulen( 1 3 ) . The preeminent position of the Gymnasium was reaffirmed with the M i n i s t r y of Education's 1892 Order of Studies (a p r o d u c t of the 1890 Reich School Conference). The regulation stipulated that graduates of

German Secondary Education and Officer

Selection

31

both the Realgymnasium and the Oberrealschule remained ineligible for admission to a university. While surv i v i n g a concurrent attack against its continued existence, the Realgymnasium was nonetheless singled out for particularly harsh denigration. Not until 1900 did a royal decree place the nine-year schools on equal footing; and the following year German universities began accepting graduates from all three. Prior to this, the only avenue to higher education for the R e a l g y m n a s i u m and Oberrealschule students had been one of the Technical Colleges (Technische Hochschulen) where an a d v a n c e d degree did not appear until the turn of the century(14). H o w e v e r , despite the granting of b u r e a u c r a t i c e q u a l i t y , the social bias died hard. As it was for the senior civil service, the Gymnasium with its dearth of technical subjects persisted as the preferred education for those outside the Cadet Corps destined for the officer ranks. Opportunities a b o u n d e d for secondary school students from the higher classes(15). However, for the purposes of this study only a few merit examination. At the top of the list stood the financial and career advantages gained by the students of the nine-year schools who, upon completion of the final class, took and passed the leaving examination (Abiturientprufung) commonly referred to as the Abitur(16). The test was entirely v o l u n t a r y . A s t u d e n t m i g h t choose instead to forego the exam and exit with the d o c u m e n t attesting to his completion of the nine-year course. Many jobs both in and out of g o v e r n m e n t did not require c o m p l e t i o n of the full curriculum. Yet the prestige and increased chance for career success that the A b i t u r afforded made the examination a logical choice for all who stayed t h r o u g h the n i n t h year. Prior to the reforms p r e v i o u s l y m e n t i o n e d , s t u d e n t s from the Gymnasium securing the A b i t u r c e r t i f i c a t e (Abiturreifezeugnis) maintained an almost total monopoly of the higher state positions, and nearly all of the u n i v e r s i t y students held the diploma(17). The certificate e v e n t u a l l y merited increased consideration even in the officer selection process. In comparison, few holders elected to embark upon a career in agric u l t u r e , commerce, or industry as the degree afforded no distinct a d v a n t a g e in these professions(18) . A d m i n i s t e r e d and controlled by the state rather than the i n d i v i d u a l schools, the A b i t u r examination seldom was g i v e n to a student before the second semester of the O b e r p r i m a year. A p p l i c a t i o n had to be made in writing three months in advance. A c o m m i t t e e consisting of a chairman named by the p r o v i n c i a l school board, the d i r e c t o r of the applicant's school,

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and the permanent faculty of the respective student's Oberprima class judged the merits of each request. Admission was granted only with the unanimous a p p r o v a l of the board and after a thorough review of the candidate's academic and moral qualifications(19). Regardless of his academic record, a student could be turned down for unacceptable behavior. The test was both written and oral (see A p p e n d i x 2) and made great demands upon the scholars' stamina. Supervised by a m e m b e r of the examining committee, the questions had to be answered at length — five hours for the German essay, five for mathematics, three each for Greek and French, and two for Latin. An intermission was allowed only during the math section. Each answer earned one of the following grades: very good (sehr gut), good (gut), satisfactory (be friedigend), barely satisfactoryy (kaum befriedigend), or unsatisfactory (ungenugend). Upon completion of the written portion, the committee a p p r o v e d the successful candidate for the oral exercise and forwarded a detailed report to the provincial school board. A representative from the latter, usually the school inspector (Oberschulrat) examined the results and the committee's determination and gave official permission to proceed with the orals(20). The examination followed in the presence of the inspector and the teachers of the school. Only rarely did superior work negate this portion. The candidate's records for his last two years, his notebooks, essays, and so forth were placed on e x h i b i t i o n and could be introduced into the proceedings. The board normally examined ten candidates at the same time. Each Oberprima teacher served as the chief examiner in his own field, but all, including the inspector, could participate. The specialist in each subject evaluated the student's responses and, along with the other committee m e m b e r s , d e t e r m i n e d the final results. The candidate's academic record and b e h a v i o r in school rated alongside his performance on the exam. While the passing mark was "satisfactory," higher grades in some subjects could offset slight deficiencies in others. Those who passed received the certificate signed by the committee that listed each grade and assigned an overall mark of very good, good, or satisfactory. Those who failed were allowed two more attempts(21). In an average year in Prussia, in this case 1890, only 31 percent of the Gymnasium, 12 percent of the Realgymnasium, and 2 percent of the Oberrealschule students obtained the Abitur(22). Unquestionably, few students from the semiclassical Realgymnasium and the

German Secondary Education and Officer Selection

33

highly technical Oberrealschule perceived any advantage in pursuing the Abitur. The figures for the Gymnasium, while much higher, still reveal the unwillingness (or inability) of many students from that institution to remain for the entire course and suffer the added mental demands. Those who did succeed exhibited not only respect for the advantages to be gained, but also high intellect, mental stamina, determination, and good conduct. Although the Abitur was the most prestigious secondary school examination, one taken three classes earlier meant even more to some students. All who passed this test were given the option of serving in the army under the One-Year Volunteer Service (Einjahrig-Freiwilliger Dienst). In Germany each man was obligated to p a r t i c i p a t e in the defense of his country. Universal service (allgemeine Wehrpflicht) began in Prussia in 1814 and had been reaffirmed by Article 59 of the Imperial Constitution. While not every eligible male received the summons to active d u t y , most secondary students welcomed the o p p o r t u n i t y to reduce their military obligation(23) . The argument in favor of reduced service reasoned that it would be d e t r i m e n t a l to society and those young men who did not plan on a military career to interrupt their secondary studies for two or three years (depending on the branch of service and the conscription law in effect). A c c o r d i n g l y , the students had been given the alternative of serving only one year on active d u t y if they passed the q u a l i f y i n g examination and paid the cost of their own training. In the late nineteenth century this varied from 1,500 to 2,000 marks—a sum equivalent to a full year's study at a university. Some could not afford the additional financial b u r d e n , but the advantages to be gained led most to incur an indebtedness if they failed to secure one of the few government grants. In a d d i t i o n to serving less time on active d u t y , one-year service offered a young man the opportunity to become a lance sergeant major (Vizefeldwebel) and seek a commission in the reserves(24 ) . For many secondary students, the desire to obtain a reserve commission exceeded the importance of the A b i t u r . With the increasingly prestigious position of the military in German society, it was often heard during the imperial period that "the doctorate is the calling card, but the reserve commission is the open door"(25). As a result, the significance attached to acquiring the one-year certificate exerted a marked influence upon the secondary schools. Completion of a six-year school likewise carried

34

For King and Kaiser!

approval for one-year service, although, regardless of the institution, the young man did not have to begin active duty until age twenty. Even the nine-year schools after 1892 adjusted their curricula to accommodate the large numbers of students attending only long enough to obtain the one-year certificate. For those who chose not to attend the final three classes, the attempt was made to provide a well-rounded, if not complete, education in the first six years. The student could then submit to an examination and, if passed, exit with a diploma similar to that awarded by the six-year schools. In 1889-90, before the accommodation, only 368 of the 8,051 students who left German secondary schools at the end of six years departed with an officially completed education. The remainder came from those institutions having nine-year curricula(26 ) . The importance attached to becoming a reserve officer resulted in an increase in the number of schools authorized to award the one-year certificate(27 ) . Many students regarded the reserve commission as a necessary part of their education. Without it, a young man could suffer serious social and career disappointments. Some employers treated the certificate as a diploma and advertised openings only for those who held it. Although regular army officers continued to look down on those in the reserves, the latter saw themselves as members of the elite of German society and slavishly mimicked their "brother" officers in manner and thought(28). Besides assisting in the quest for the one-year certificate, secondary schools promoted the type of behavior sought by the officer corps. The young student knew from the first day that he was not to question those in authority. A contemporary observer noted that "in Germany there is a deadly earnestness about this question of Education." While misbehavior existed, the students learned to confine such activities to periods away from school(29). The state, in turn, exerted strict control and influence over the schools under its jurisdiction. Textbooks required the approval of the authorities, and no author could ignore this in preparing a manuscript. One noteworthy example occurred in 1889 when the Kaiser demanded that modern German history receive increased attention. The material, he felt, should be presented to the students in a manner which braced the notion "that the power of the state alone can protect the individual, his family, his freedom, and his r i g h t s " — a n d the monarchy stood as the living symbol of that power(30).

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Even more important than the textbooks were the teachers. All but the very lowest ranks attained civil service status and were subject to prosecution for misconduct in their private as well as public lives. During the imperial period some observers claimed that the teaching faculties put their positions as "patriotic" civil servants ahead of the promotion of knowledge. A few former students condemned this "hurrah patriotism," but it no doubt exerted the desired influence on those destined for the officer c o r p s ( 3 1 ) . Well aware of the government's position on most matters, the teachers did not balk at promoting the monarchy and political conservatism. In addition to being civil servants, many teachers held reserve commissions and, with the tacit approval of school authorities, transferred much of their military behavior to the classroom. The army had taught them the importance of strict obedience, and they demanded the same from their civilian charges. Instructional methods were stilted and ponderous, with memorization and endless repetition the general rule. As teachers rose to even higher status in the nation, their loyalty to the crown and the officer corps further increased the martial spirit pervading the schools — especially Prussian schools(32). The instructor with a reserve commission emulated his social model, the regular officer, and structured his thought and behavior accordingly. It was only natural for the student preparing for a reserve or active commission to follow the example set by his teacher. In many cases the desired values and behavior were not dissimilar from the training the boy had received at home . The rigid atmosphere of the secondary schools made for an oppressive student life. Most boys were taught from childhood that everyone o b e y e d — " c h i l d r e n obey their parents, the wife obeys her husband, the husband obeys the king, the king obeys G o d " ( 3 3 ) . In school, teachers and administrators became, in effect, surrogate parents, as the system permitted little interference by the family. Discipline was enforced by a plethora of rules: no loitering to and from school; no visits to confectionery shops, beer gardens, or public houses; and no appearances at balls or the theater. Free thought suffered at the prohibition of visits to public libraries, the receipt of newspapers and magazines, and the printing of a school journal or paper. As one foreign observer remarked, minds were not to be poisoned by "trashy literature" and "political, social or religious heresies"(34). If a student desired a good grade report and advancement,

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For King and Kaiser!

he acquiesced to this regime. Excluding university study, all German boys att ending school, regardless of age, remained chil dren in the eyes of society. They were expected to st udy , The obey , and keep their opinions to themselves.

schools provided little time for outdoor activities, physical sports, or social gatherings, but they offered plent of supervisior. Physicalpunishment remained an option in extreme cases of misconduct, and before the turn of the century, every secondary school hool had a Karzer, or lockup, where delinquent students

could be detained for stort. periods of time (35). boyattended attended a asecondary sec It a boy boarding school, he respects to that of followed a regimen similar in many res the cadet academies(36). But regardl ess of where he lived, the strain of study, the stern atmosphere, and the protracted treatment as a child resulted in the appearance of a meatal disorder ternd "over load psychosis." Even mere alarming was the high rate of suicide by secondary students. Ludwing Gurlitt determined that at least. 289 cases occurred in Prussia alone between 1883 and 1889. By the 1890s voices spoke out with growing regularily against a system

that would drive a youth to such extremes. The reformer Gurlitt mounted a piercing attack: Is it not grisly and horrible if a child voluntarily renounces seeing the light of the sun, voluntarily separates himself from his parents and brothers and sisters, from all the joys, hopes, and desires of his young life, because he doubts himself and no longer can bear the compulsions of school?(37)

The grievous loss of life and the effect on mental acuity was not, however, the major concern of military officials. Physical ailments, especially the widespread evidence of poor stamina and increased incidence of nearsightedness, evoked the greatest anxiety. In 1883 a comparison of 1,600 enlistees found that only 2 percent of the rural boys from the primary schools were myopic; common laborers from the city schools, 4 to 9 percent; clerks, merchants, bookkeepers, and such, 44 percent; Realschule graduates, 58 percent; and the primary source of officer candidates, Gymnasium students, 65 percent. Secondary students also exhibited an abnormal number of headaches, nosebleeds, and cases of general physical weakness; and a large number of one-year volunteers were deemed physically unfit for the army. After numerous investigations, and even an inquiry by the Prussian Parliament, the blame for these ailments

German Secondary Education and Officer Selection

37

was placed on the poor lighting and ventilation of the schools, the lack of physical exercise, and the ex cessive amount of homework, especially in the Gymnas ium . Alterations appeared, but the study load did not lessen until the early 1890s(38). The question of the overtaxing of secondary stu~ dents also received attention in France, Russia, and England. But in none of these countries did the load equal that placed upon the German pupil. In comp arison, the education offered at the prestigious Eng lish public schools merited little respect. A civil service commissioner who examined military candid ates for twenty-seven years expressed the belief in 1892 that the average British graduate was about e qual in preparation to "a third class female teleg raph clerk"(39). Even Winston Churchill admitted tur ning in a blank portion on his entrance exam for Har row, but still was accepted(40) . The state of the German secondary schools enc ountered strong opposition from William I I . A m ajor motive for his attack upon the curricula was the d eleterious effect of the schools' demands on conti nued army expansion. In a letter written in 1885, w hile still second in line to the throne, he lashed out with his usual flair for the melodramatic at the stren uous requirements and their harmful influence upon the eyesight of potential officer candidates. Of twenty-one primaner which constituted our class, no fewer than nineteen had to wear glasses. Three of them had to put an additional glass in front of their spectacles when they wanted to see as far as the blackboard! . . . The Latin and Greek t r e a t i s e s — a howling f a r c e ! — w h a t trouble and labor they cost! And what pitiable results were obtained! . . . Away with this rot! War to the knife against such tuition!(41) As Kaiser, William aided the existing movement toward reform. The royal decree of February 13, 1890, called for an end to the domination of the classics and more emphasis upon modern history and the practical subjects. William perhaps did an injustice to the classics in light of his love for all things military. The majority of works read in the schools were accounts of the Greek and Roman wars, and the a u t h o r s — C a e s a r , Livy, Sallust, Virgil, Homer, and H e r o d o t u s — t o l d of heroic warriors dying for king, honor, and the fatherland(42) . The growing importance of a modern education (along with a latent bitterness at having rated no better

38

For King and Kaiser!

than tenth in his own secondary class) may have been partially responsible for the King's actions(43). But his public statements likewise revealed his and the army's concern over the health of future officers and soldiers. On the morning of December 4, 1890, the thirty-one-year-old Kaiser opened the conference of German educators gathered in Berlin to discuss the reform of the secondary schools' curricula. With the support of certain members of the Ministry of Education, William delivered one of the longest and least diplomatic speeches of his reign. Latin and Greek, he said, received entirely too much attention at the expense of the study of German language and modern German history. Not surprisingly, the Gymnasium was singled out for special criticism: "We shall raise young Germans and not young Greeks and Romans. . . . The schools I speak of, especially the Gymnasia , have made superhuman demands. They have . . . given us an oversupply of culture, more than the nation can stand, more than they themselves can stand"(44). William called for a drastic realignment of the secondary system: the maintenance of the Gymnasium for classical culture, but with less Greek and Latin and more German; the opening of more schools dealing with the technical knowledge necessary for industry, commerce, and the military; the abolishment of the Realgymnasium which he saw as teaching a "semi-culture" that provided only a "semi-fitness for the subsequent battle of life"; and an easier Abitur examination. It w a s , however, in his role as Supreme Commander of the Army that William raised the charge that the physical health of the students suffered from the arduous study, thus rendering many of them useless for military service. To remedy the situation, he demanded fewer classes, less homework, and more physical exercise. With the terse declaration, "I am looking for soldiers," the young monarch laid bare the driving force behind his support for reform(45). The Kaiser's strident call did not result in the abolishment of the R e a l g y m n a s i u m — t h e curriculum followed by his own Cadet Corps. Nevertheless, the conference did support a reduction of the time devoted to Latin in the Gymnasium and Realgymnasium and an increased emphasis on German language as well as German literature and history. Although an easier Abitur did appear, the number of classroom hours and homework diminished only slightly. Of special concern to the army, the vacated classroom time was replaced with additional physical exercise. The demand for more schools providing technical education led to the previously mentioned granting of equality after 1900

German Secondary Education and Officer Selection

39

to all three nine-year schools — a giant step for the Oberrealschule, which had not even existed a quartercentury earlier(46). The Prussian officer corps observed the controversy over school reform with great interest. The demand for replacement officers had been a problem throughout the nineteenth century. The increases necessitated by the expansion begun in the 1860s forced the army to address the question of just how much preparatory education was needed to become an officer; or, as most of the old guard viewed it, what was the least a candidate could get by with. The true reformers always had held that the aspirant should obtain a broad and modern education similar to that promoted by Humboldt at the beginning of the century. German pedagogy, however, adhered to the Hegelian philosophy that Greek and Latin must remain at the core of a system that advanced the acquisition of discipline and culture useful to the state rather than the use of knowledge to promote critical and independent judgement. The argument during the last half of the century over what constituted the proper amount and kind of education for officers actually began in 1844. The army reorganization of that year sought to specify clearly what was required and, at the same time, raise officer selection to a level similar to that for other prestigious professions(47 ) . The call for better-educated candidates did not receive a gracious reception from many officers. In Prussia the joke that "he is too much of an aristocrat to know how to read or write" was not without foundation. Even a modicum of communication skills had not been a major requirement for the older commanders. Their careers began at a time when the legendary but poorly educated Blucher depended on Gneisenau to produce the written explanations of his orders. The changes of 1844 did little to alter the old attitudes. During the 1848 upheaval, General von Wrangel actually forbade his officers from writing down orders — asserting that battles were won "with the sword and not with the p e n " ( 4 8 ) . Even late in the century, the Junker-dominated Agrarian League argued that education "poisons the young mind and body" and led to "fear of physical work, in effeminacy and superficiality"(49) . The anti-education crowd in the army viewed officers as doers, not thinkers. Critical and independent thought had little business in the officer corps except in the study of such military subjects as tactics; even then, any officer who promoted significant changes in tactical theory was looked upon with

40

For King and Kaiser!

suspicion. Not surprisingly, officers in charge of the army selection and education process sometimes betrayed an anxiousness over the raising of educational standards. In the late 1860s General von Holleben, the head of the military examinations department, told the British Military Education Commission that "the first and great object of the military examinations has been to secure an educated officer corps, not, however, overeducated; the second object has been to secure a professionally educated officer corps"(50) . As the argument over education increased with the 1860 reorganization, sides were publicly drawn between those in the army preferring lower educational standards and those who demanded additional requirements. Supporting a reduction in qualifications, the Military Cabinet claimed that the poor scores on the entrance examination by those aspirants from the traditional sources could be traced to the 1844 reorganization. Thereafter, the quality of the officer corps had suffered from the practice of accepting candidates more for their education than for their social origins(51). With the Cabinet harboring such sentiments, General von Luck's (Inspector General of Military Training and Education, 1837-44) recommendation of fitness for admission to a university was rejected out of hand during the 1840s reassessment. Many candidates from the preferred sources did not have either the money or the ambition to obtain even the Primareife, let alone suffer through two more classes and the Abitur exam. Of the 117 aspirants tested during a two-month period in 1868, 69 had not reached the Prima level; and some were two or three years away or had used only private tutors. Only 22 of the 69 passed — none without formal schooling. Yet the failures, being from preferred stock, were not only allowed to retest, but also received "special indulgence" in the grading process. The War Ministry grossly understated the situation when it determined the following year that "the educational level of the corps of officers is uneven"(52 ) . The regularity with which Prussian army authorities stretched or evaded the regulations in order to obtain the favored candidates cannot be overemphasized, and unification did not alter the policy. Advocated in principle and often ignored in practice since 1861, the production of the Prima certificate for admission to the ensign's exam was reaffirmed with the Cabinet Order of May 5, 1870. However, the Order, which went into effect on April 1, 1872, once again allowed for

German Secondary Education and Officer Selection

41

circumvention by stating that admission "should" be dependent upon completion of the seventh class (Obersekunda) of a "humanist" (classical) Gymnasium(53). The Decree on the Replenishment of Peacetime Officers of March 11, 1880, attempted to clarify the required standards, but still allowed for the acceptance of preferred applicants with insufficient education. As an alternative to qualifying for the Prima class of the Gymnasium, the Decree permitted a candidate to present the same credentials from one of the other nine-year schools or a graduation certificate from a six-year institution(54) . By this action a boy graduating from a six-year school was equal under the admission regulations to a student who had completed seven classes in one of the nine-year schools. However, general practice continued to allow the aspirant from a nine-year school the same option after six years, and a royal dispensation could compensate for even less preparation. Thus, while claiming to have improved the standards, the authorities sanctioned the continued practice of providing, when necessary, an easier avenue for the favored applicant. The desire to secure every available candidate with traditional origins overrode all other considerations. In comparison with the Prussian practice of selective circumvention of the regulations, Bavaria firmly adhered to the use of increased requirements to improve the quality of its officer corps. While the Prussians haggled over the Prima qualification, and bypassed it when necessary, the Bavarian army promoted the completion of the Gymnasium curriculum and the procurement of the Abitur as the prerequisite for a regular army commission. The fact that 666 (84.3 percent) of the 790 successful candidates between 1872 and 1881 held the Abitur argued for the success of the official commitment to excellence. The Bavarians' respect for education likewise furthered the acquisition of officers on the basis of knowledge first and social origins second. As a result, the participation of the aristocracy in the Bavarian officer corps, a l ready low before unification, dropped from 25 percent in 1872 to 15 percent by 1914(55). Nobles realized that they would have to exhibit more than a "von" before their surname to become a Bavarian officer. Luck's proposal showed that Prussia did not lack for strong proponents of higher standards. During his second term as War Minister in the 1840s, Boyen sponsored the change which provided for a quicker path to a commission for those holding the Abitur and advocated as the minimum the completion of the Obersekunda. But not only did the latter come to

42

For King and Kaiser!

be regularly ignored, the reward offered to those rare few who secured the Abitur was suspended in 1872. The opposition to the admission benefits for Abitur holders eventually led to the decree of November 3, 1880, which stipulated that all candidates, regardless of the level of their education, must take the ensign's examination. As will be shown in the following chapter, this requirement provided the officer corps with even more power in the "weeding out" of those of questionable social or political origins(56 ) . To potential Prussian officers these changes indicated indifference (or at the very least, confusion) concerning the importance of the Abitur or any education above the minimum required. Since one had to take the entrance exam with or without the additional preparation, many aspirants from the nine-year schools saw little use in spending the extra years in study when they could be earning money and building seniority for promotion. Admittedly, considering the other careers open to them, a respectable percentage of all Abitur holders regularly chose a military career (see Appendix 3 ) . Between 1875 and 1899 the figure averaged 6.6 percent of the t o t a l — 5 , 5 8 1 of 85,043(57). However, when compared with the number of noncadet aspirants taking the ensign's exam during the same period — 1 0 , 2 5 9 , one learns that Abitur holders made up only 54.4 percent of those tested (see Appendix 1 1 ) . Disregarding the aberrant fluctuations over the years, not until the mid~1890s did the percentages annually approach those of Bavaria in the 1870s. As the number of middle-class applicants grew, their traditional respect for education rendered itself increasingly evident in the rising ratio of Abitur holders. Still, the large number of aspirants failing to obtain the certificate throughout the imperial period suggests that many of the future officers agreed with those army authorities who believed that the Abitur did not merit the time, effort, or expense. Despite the low educational demands and the circumvention of requirements, the officer corps regularly failed to meet its replenishment and expansion quotas. As the army grew and the number of favored prospects dwindled, it became painfully obvious even to the old guard that an increasing number of middle-class applicants would have to be accepted. To compensate for the attendant threat to the traditional homogeneity of the corps, the close political, social, and religious screening process assumed an ever greater importance over education. At the same time, army

German Secondary

Education and Officer Selection

43

policy worked to ensure that a lack of schooling did not prevent the induction of an otherwise acceptable candidate. To aid in securing all desirable candidates, the ensign's exam became more of a bureaucratic hurdle than a mental and educational evaluation. On November 13, 1890, William II instructed the authorities to conduct the examinations with leniency and reaffirmed the practice of granting the Prima certificate by Royal Prerogative to deficient aspirants from the aristocracy and old officer families. Specific instructions for the lenient grading of the test did not exist, but those involved in the process understood the Order. As the Chief of the Military Cabinet General von Hahnke put it, for the right candidates the examination paled in importance next to the need to "get 'em into uniform quick!" Not until the turn of the century when a slowdown in recruitment allowed the supply of acceptable candidates to approach the quotas and the advantages for Abitur holders were reinstated, did the army evidence a positive interest in the education of its officer applicants. Still, although the number of royal dispensations declined after 1900, over a thousand of these exemptions were issued to infantry hopefuls alone between 1901 and 1912(58). The continued granting of dispensations did not go unchallenged by those demanding better preparation. William responded to the opposition, but only when it became apparent that the officer quotas could be met or near so. The Cabinet Order of March 28, 1899, claimed that from spring 1900 onward the number of exemptions would be reduced(59). But while the number did decrease thereafter, the Royal Prerogative remained, and William did not hesitate to answer favorably a request from any socially "right" candidate. In an apparent move to obtain the best of both worlds, William's continued use of dispensations did not prevent his simultaneous appeal for a bettereducated officer corps. As the shortages eased toward the end of the century, the army finally addressed the Kaiser's ten-year-old call for an improvement in the quality of the candidates' educational preparation. In a move taken to convince potential officers to remain in school, the long overdue regulation issued on April 13, 1900, granted Abitur holders who had not attended a cadet academy an excuse from the ensign's examination. Prior to this, only those few who had spent at least a year at a German university received the exemption. Also, as was formerly the case only for university students, Abitur holders

44

For King and Kaiser!

could now even forego the officer's school if their preparatory time in the ranks and as an ensign had shown them to be "able in service," and they had scored a mark of good on the officer's e x a m ( 6 0 ) . Since the officer's examination dealt only with the military subjects taught at the officer's school, few candidates could realistically expect to gain entrance in this manner. Nevertheless, most of the candidates, by now predominantly middle class, came in with the Abitur in hand. The extra preparation undoubtedly helped some to break into the nobledominated higher ranks. Still, as late as 1912, 35 percent of the civilian candidates did not (or could not) avail themselves of the advantages accompanying a completed secondary education(61). Notwithstanding the army's professed attention to the education of new officers, some in the system remained dissatisfied with the rate of improvement. General von Pfuel, the Inspector General of Military Training and Education, expressed his disappointment in a memorandum dated March 8, 1909, to Baron von Lyncker, the Chief of the Military Cabinet. Pfuel contended that it had become common knowledge that those who needed one still could obtain a royal dispensation from the Prima requirement. However, the examination results of those who did so remained consistently lower than the grades of applicants who had earned the certificate; and their rate of failure was 24 percent compared to 10 percent for those who had adhered to the regulations. The numerous examples of inadequacy provoked an unrestrained assessment from Pfuel: They show a lack of grasp and little critical capacity, and they are unable to arrange their ideas in logical order when writing essays on subjects appropriate to their years. These weaknesses make it plain that they are still a long way from possessing the level of education that an officer needs. . . . In none of the other higher professions would a young man with so little education be accepted . (62 ) For Pfuel it was completely unacceptable that any officer aspirant should be so intellectually inferior. Most of the higher professions required at least the Abitur. Was it too much to demand the same of those destined for the profession most respected in the land? The Inspector General argued that the continued admittance of candidates with the Prima certificate or a dispensation had resulted in an overall reduction

German Secondary Education and Officer Selection

45

in the quality of the officer corps. Only a radical change, he believed, in the attitude of the army could reverse the enduring tolerance of mediocrity(63). The reply Pfuel received was characteristic of fhn.qp ppkinp to aintain thp status status n no. Lvnrker the quo Lyncker e sseeking to mmaintain argued that the presence of many excellent officials

in public life who began thir careers with a commission "without any special schooling" belied importance being placed on increased preparatory education. However, he admitted that the army's policy was partly predioated upon meeting numerical requirements. To attain the necessarty quotas, the standards must not rise since a number of slots repeatedly went unfilled. For Lyncker personally, the insufficient numbers were tolerable "so long as the supply of The Baron thus clung to the character keeps u p " ( 6 4 ) . .. ^.

old position that the army must put social and polilical origins ahead of education in the recruitment of As head of the army bureau exercising officers authority in personnel matters, Lyncker's supreme opinions carried great weight with the Kaiser and, thereby, in the formulation of policy. The power of the old guard to perpetuate social and political preference over intellect is perhaps more easily understood when compared with contemorary conditions in the naval officer corps. The increased interest in German sea power in the 1890s also meant. more officers. But unlike the Prussian army, the Imperial German Navy did not possess ancient and caste-oriented traditions. Unbound by special constraints, the latter exercised a freedom of recuitment never achieved by the Prussians. Then Chief

of the Naval Cabinet, Admiral von Muller, later

recalled led the emphasis placed upon education in naval officer selection: "In this new age, when class differences were being bridged, the higher general level

of education was a constantly more important requisite for the exercise of authority"(65).

pre-

The accuracy of the Admiral 's assessment wa s s u p -

ported by the deands of marine duty. A naval officer needed sufficient intellect and knowledge to master the skills of engineering, navigation, propulsion, and gunnery. No amont of character could make up for an inadequate education. The complexities involved in the command of a modern naval vessel did not forgive incompeientcy. Few of the Junker and old officer offspring possessed the enthusiasm for the preparatory and military schooling necessary to master

the required skills. It was much casier and, in the

end, more prestigious to acquire an army commission. Thus, by 1914 little had changed in either the

46

For King and Kaiser!

educational requirements for potential army officers or the antipathy to improving those requirements felt by many of the higher army officials. While the secondary school system wrestled with the demands of the new age, the officer corps sought, when expedient, to bypass its own limited regulations. Except for officers in the technical arms, most of the old guard continued to view increased scientific as well as general knowledge as superfluous baggage. Fortunately for the army, the middle-class aspirants were only too willing to submit to the extra preparation necessary for the technical branches. The officer corps also continued to assign little value to the development of the powers of critical reasoning. Officers were expected to think, but not too much. Reasoning merited respect only when employed in the solution of problems related to the performance of one's duties. To dwell too much on questions not of direct military importance aroused suspicion. To take an interest in broadening one's general knowledge for any reason could evoke scorn and d e r i s i o n — u s u a l l y from those who had obtained help in getting past the educational requirements for entry into the corps. The quality sought above all others for officer replacements was that alluded to by Lyncker — character. The term appears repeatedly in regard to the selection process, but the full meaning in the Prussian sense must be understood. Traditionally, the word envisions impressions of high moral integrity and strength. One might add General von Bernhardi's description of the demands made by modern warfare: "Each individual must, . . . display a large measure of independent judgement, calm grasp of the facts, and bold resolution"(66). For the Prussian officer, however, these qualities were not enough, nor even the most important. Most aspirants came to the officer corps with the character of those accustomed to hard work. If the secondary schools did nothing more, they cultivated the habit of hard work above all e l s e ( 6 7 ) . The Cadet Corps likewise valued the importance of diligence and commitment. Alfred Vagts wrote that during the Napoleonic-inspired reform period it came down to "a simple class cr i t er ion" (68) . Such a description, while acceptable for that era, is inadequate for the period after 1860. As the middle class secured an ever greater percentage of army commissions, character to the Prussian officer corps came to mean, in addition to the above, a reliable family background and personal commitment to the maintenance of the monarchy. In an age of

German Secondary Education and Officer Selection

47

rising democratic and socialist sentiments, there existed foremost in the thoughts of the high command and the Kaiser the fear and expectation of a coup d'etat emanating from either the Reichstag or the s t r e e t s — or both. The army was therefore counted on not only to defend the fatherland from foreign attack but also to protect the crown from its domestic e n e m i e s — t h o s e whom Bismarck first labelled as Reichsfeinde(69). The fear of internal revolt persisted as the underlying reason for the enduring belief that the officer corps must remain an exclusive class set apart from and above the rest of society. The officer might, as in 1848, have to order his troops to fire on fellow Germans. To do so without hesitation, he must accept the traditional philosophy of unquestioned obedience to the king's wishes. Although the secondary schools taught such patriotism as a matter of course, the officer corps retained its suspicions of the bourgeois officers who came from these institutions. The demand for officer aspirants with the right character never ceased to be of paramount importance to the crown throughout the imperial era. William I had personally witnessed the uprising led by the middle class in 1848. The experience reaffirmed his devout belief that the army must secure its officers from sources which had traditionally shown themselves to be reliable. Four years earlier he had expressed a special kinship with those poorer noble and officer families who "from generation to generation dedicated their sons to the officer profession"(70). Neither he nor the officer corps attempted to mask this favoritism. A popular account of the army published in 1886 expressed without apology the fact that the army looked favorably upon candidates from such origins, and that they could expect preferential treatment in the selection process(71). One might reasonably expect the expansion of the army and the advances in technology that occurred in the late nineteenth century to have resulted in an acceptance of the need to reduce the emphasis of social origins over education. Yet surprising to no one, William II emulated his grandfather's attachment to officer aspirants from the time-honored sources while simultaneously extolling the need for educational reform and more middle-class candidates. As a young prince, he had expressed without reservation his opinions regarding democracy and officer selection. In a conversation with the American-born Countess von Waldersee (Mary Esther Lee) in 1882, he asserted his unequivocal commitment to continued social and political discrimination:

48

For King and Kaiser!

It is my opinion that democratic principles can only create weak and often corrupt pillars of society. A society is only strong if it recognizes the fact of natural superiorities, in particular that of birth, for spiritual and moral superiority are but a germ of life which develops under special favorable conditions.(72) Soon after he ascended the throne, the young Kaiser was forced to accept the inescapable fact that there were no longer enough nobles' and officers' sons to maintain numerical superiority of the officer corps. In the proclamation of March 29, 1890, he conceded the shortage and the need for more candidates from the middle class. But he also let it be known that certain age-old demands would not be compromised. The nobility of character which has at all times distinguished our officers, must and shall survive unchanged. And that is only possible if the aspirants for officer positions are taken solely from those circles in which this nobility of character is present. Next to the scions of the noble families of the land, next to the sons of my honorable officers and officials, who form, in accordance with ancient traditions, the foundation pillar of the officer corps, I behold the bearers of the future of my army also in the sons of such honorable middle the affection for King class families in which and Fatherland, a warm feeling for the soldier's Christian culture are instilled profession, and and cherished.(73) While intelligence, education, and overall ability remained considered qualifications, loyalty to the monarch ranked as the only uncompromised criterion. The King continued to propound the importance of preparatory education, but the decree of March 29 represented the basic sentiment. Young nobles and the sons from traditional officer and higher civil servant families (almost all higher civil servants also held or had held either reserve or active commissions) always would be accepted first and, if necessary, helped to meet the entrance regulations. Only then would the middle-class candidate be admitted. Despite the better education obtained by the majority of bourgeois aspirants, the Abitur or any other evidence of superior intellect and knowledge did not outweigh the demand for character. As the author of a contemporary service manual put it, the officer must be "of that ruling race who exert a controlling

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49

influence, even if they are momentarily out of sight or h e a r i n g " ( 7 4 ) . In William's mind only the sons of his trusted nobles, officers, and senior officials brought such natural traits to the corps. They had been born and bred to command, and he would make sure that nothing prevented them from performing their historical role in the service of the crown. In turn, their natural leadership ability would serve as the model for their less-talented bourgeois counterparts to emulate. If the middle-class officer candidate was to survive in the Prussian officer corps, he had to demonstrate the ability to become an aristocrat in thought as well as action. If he exhibited any questionable social or political beliefs, he was not wanted regardless of his intelligence or unfilled quotas. Like his grandfather, William II relied on the officer corps to stand by the monarch in defending an authoritarian political system against the challenge posed by democratic forces. To prevent a liberal or socialist takeover might involve the shooting of citizens on a much larger scale than in 1848. If that happened, the officer corps' loyalty to the crown would be seriously tested. The King and his generals wanted to make sure that when the time came, the command to fire would be given(75) . Throughout the imperial period Prussian secondary schools provided the officer corps with many welleducated officer aspirants. The difficulty of the curricula and the examinations produced young men fully capable of completing the officer training process. By adjusting the various curricula for those leaving after the one-year volunteer exam, reducing somewhat the emphasis on the classics, improving the facilities, and increasing the amount of physical exercise, the reforms near the end of the century met many of the requirements of both the officer corps and a modern society. However, no attempt was made to improve instructional methods so that secondary students would be taught not only useful information, but how to use that knowledge to reach independent conclusions. Free thought did not occupy a position of importance in the Prussian secondary system. Acceptance of the value of hard work, discipline, obedience, and loyalty to the monarchy were the main goals of the instructors. Those middleclass aspirants who demonstrated to the officer corps that they had learned well these lessons received a favorable, albeit guarded welcome. Those who did not were told to seek another profession.

50

For King and Kaiser!

NOTES 1. From the opening address to the 1890 German School Conference delivered on December 4, in Deutsche Schulkonferenzen, vol. 1: Verhandlungen uber Fragen des hoheren Unterrichts, Berlin 4. bis 17, Dezember 1890 (Berlin: Stenographische Berichte uber die Verhandlungen der Schul-Konferenz, 1891; reprint ed., Glashutten im Taunus: Detlev Auvermann, 1 9 7 2 ) , 7 5 . 2. Friedrich Paulsen, German Education Past and Present, trans. T. Lorenz (London: AMS Press, 1908), 178-79. 3. Robert H. Fife, Jr., The German Empire between Two Wars (New York: Macmillan, 1916), 318 and 323; and James E. Russell, German Higher Schools (New York: Longmans, Green, 1 8 9 9 ) , 151. 4. Willems, Way, 77; and Fife, Empire, 342. 5. Russell, Schools, 135-36. See also Fritz K. Ringer, "Higher Education in Germany in the Nineteenth Century," Journal of Contemporary History 2 (July 1967):128. 6. In 1885 the complete cost ranged upward to 8,000 marks. Annual tuition costs alone from 1892 to 1909 varied from 80 to 150 marks. By the turn of the century, living expenses away from home averaged 1,200 to 1,500 marks per year. Adolf Beier, ed., Die hoheren Schulen in Preussen und ihre Lehrer (Halle: Buchhandlung des Waisenhauses, 1 9 0 9 ) , 1170; and Russell, Schools, 200. 7. James C. Albisetti, Secondary School Reform in Imperial Germany (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983), 32; and Fife, Empire, 330. 8. Russell, Schools, 171. 9. The average for those completing the nineyear courses crept steadily upward after unification. Albisetti, Reform, 126; and Holger H. Herwig, The German Naval Officer Corps (London: Oxford University Press, 1 9 7 3 ) , 4 1 . 10. Russell, Schools, 124-25; and Susanne Charlotte Engelmann, German Education and Re-Education (New York: International Universities Press, 1 9 4 5 ) , 2 1 . 11. Engelmann, Education, 22-23; and Ringer, "Education," 127. 12. Engelmann, Education , 22; and Ringer, "Education," 127-28. 13. Russell, Schools, 425; and Ringer, "Education," 127-28. 14. Paulsen, Education, 210-11; Albisetti, Reform, 237; Wilhelm Lexis, A General View of the History and Organization of Public Education in the German Empire, trans. G. J. Tamson (Berlin: A. Asher, 1 9 0 4 ) , 6 2 ; and

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R i n g e r , "Education," 131. 15. For a list of official p r i v i l e g e s , see Russell, Schools, 427-28. 16. Also known in the various German-speaking areas as the Abgangsprufung, the Rei feprufung , and the Ma turitatsprufung. Ibid., 179. 17. Wilhelm Lexis, ed . , Die deutschen Universitaten , 2 vols. (Berlin: A. Asher, 1893), 1:127; and Ringer, "Education," 129. 18. Wilhelm Lexis, ed., Die Reform des hoheren Schulwesens in Preussen (Halle: B u c h h a n d l u n g des Waisenhauses, 1902), 416. 19. Russell, Schools, 181-83. 20. Ibid. 21 . Ibid. , 184-85. 22. Schulkonferenzen , 1:75; and A l b i s e t t i , Reform, 126. 23. Between 1900 and 1910, over 1 million men presented themselves, but only about a quarter were drafted. U.S. War Department: Office of the Chief of Staff, War College Division, Strength and Organization of the Armies of France, Germany, Austria, Russia, England, Italy, Mexico, and Japan (Washington, B.C.: G o v e r n m e n t Printing Office, 1911), 26. See also Zeyd e l , Constitutions, 22; and J. L. Bashford, "The German A r m y System and How It Works," Nineteenth Century and After, October 1904, 606. 24. Russell, Schools, 189-93 and 212; W r a x a l l , Armies, 72-74; Bashford, "System," 606-12; Exner, "Army," 872-74; W. H. Goodenough and J. C. Dalton, The Army Book for the British Empire (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1893), 77 and 80; Rosinski, Army, 68—69; Henry B a r n a r d , Courses of Instruction in the Science and Art of War in France, Prussia, Austria, Russia, Sweden, Switzerland, Sardinia, England, and the United States, v o l . 1: France and Prussia (Philadelphia: J. B. L i p p i n c o t t , 1862), 281-82; and Gerald F. Talbot, Analysis of the Organization of the Prussian Army (London: Trubner, 1871), 31 and 33. 25. Porch, March, 27. 26. Russell, Schools, 174 and 187-88. 27. For a list of these schools, see Prussia, Kriegsministerium, "Gesamtverzeichnis derjenigen Lehranstalten, welch gemass p a r a g r a p h 90 der W e h r o r d n u n g zur A u s s t e l l u n g von Zeugnissen uber die Befahigung fur den e i n j a h r i g - f r e i w i l l i g e n M i l i t a r d i e n s t b e r e c h t i g t sind," Armee-Verordnungsblatte, 45 page a d d e n d u m to Nr. 28, 1910. 28. A l b i s e t t i , Reform, 26-27; and Engelmann, Education, 24 . 29. Jerome K. Jerome, "The German Schoolboy,"

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Living Age, December 8, 1900, 651. See also Albisetti, Reform, 54. 30. R. H. Samuel and R. Hinton Thomas, Education and Society in Modern Germany (London: R o u t l e d g e & Kegan Paul, 1949) , 71. 31. A l b i s e t t i , Reform, 51; and R i n g e r , "Education," 123. 32. Russell, Schools, 162; Fife, Empire, 342-43; and Samuel and Thomas, Education, 17-18. 33. Lucy Maynard Salmon, "History in the German Gymnasia," Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1897 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1898), 77. 34. Russell, Schools, 165-66. 35. Ibid., 63-64 and 167-68; Salmon, "History," 77; Willems, Way, 77; Sterling Fishman, The Struggle for German Youth: The Search for Educational Reform in Imperial Germany (New York: Revisionist Press, 1976), 106-9; and A l b i s e t t i , Reform, 41-42. 36. For the schedule at a civilian boarding school, see Russell, Schools, 198-210. 37. Ludwig G u r l i t t , Der Deutsche und sein Vaterland.f Politisch-padagogische Betrachtungen eines Modernen (Berlin: Verlag von W i e g a n d t & G r i e b o y , 1902), 98-99, cited by Sterling Fishman, "Suicide, Sex and the Discovery of the German Adolescent," History of Education Quarterly 10 (Summer 1970):176. See also Fishman, Struggle, 106-9; and Albisetti, Reform, 12425. 38. Russell, Schools, 159-60; A l b i s e t t i , Reform, 123; and Fishman, Struggle, 106-9. 39. T. Miller M a g u i r e , "On Military Education in England from a National and an Imperial Point Of View," Journal of the Royal United Service Institution 46 (August 1902):1037. See also A l b i s e t t i , Reform, 120-22. 40. Winston Churchill, A Roving Commission: The Story of My Early Life (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1951), 15-16. For an evaluation of the system in France, see Porch, March, 27. 41. William to a German lawyer who sent him two pamphlets on the shortcomings of German education, A p r i l 2, 1885, cited by S c h i e r b r a n d , Speeches, 209-10. 42. Louis L. S n y d e r , ed., Documents of German History (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1958), 269-70; M a g u i r e , "Education," 1029-30; and Willems, Way, 78. 43. Michael Balfour, The Kaiser and His Times (New York: W. W. Norton, 1972), 79. 44. Schulkonferenzen, 1:70 and 74. See also Albisetti, Reform, 3.

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53

45. Schulkonferenzen, 1:74-75. 43-45 . For a 46. Samuel and Thomas, Education recent account of the 1890 Conference, see Albisetti, Reform, 208-42. 47. Samuel and Thomas, Education , 3; A l b i s e t t i , Reform, 33; and Huntington, Soldier, 40, 48. Endres, Structure 22. 49. Samuel and Thomas Educat ion , 6 . 50. Great Britain, Military Education Commission, Accounts of the Systems of Military Education in France, Prussia, Austria, Bavaria, and the United States (London: George E. Eyre and William Spottiswoode, 1870), 198. 51. Demeter, Officer-Corps, 86-87. Hundert 52. Ibid._, 85. See also W. Nottebohm Jahre militarischen Prufungsverfahrens: Die koniglich Preussische Ober-Militar-Prufungskommission , 1808-1908 (Berlin: n. .p., 1908), 41(#3); and Barnard, Courses, 300-301. 53. Militargeschichtlichen Forschungsamt, gen. ed., Handbuch zur deutschen Militargeschichte, 10 vols., 6th ed . (Munich: Bernard & Graefe Verlag fur Wehrwesen, 1976), vol. 4, pt. 2: Mi 1itargeschichte im 19. Jahrhundert, 1814-1890, by Manfred Messerschmidt und Wolfgang Fetter, 106; [Louis] von Scharfenort, Das koniglich preussische Kadet ten/corps, 1859-1892 (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 1892), 26; and Nottebohm, Prufungsverfahrens, 73-74. 54. Prior to 1882, the Realgymnasium was known as the Realschule erster Ordnung (Real School of the First Order) and the Realprogymnasium as the OberBurgerschule (Higher Burger School). Lexis, View, 55 and 63; Messerschmidt und Fetter, Militargeschichte, 107; and Militargeschichtlichen Forschungsamt , gen. ed., Handbuch zur deutschen Militargeschichte, 10 vols., 3rd ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Bernard & Graefe Verlag fur Wehrwesen, 1968), vol. 5: Von der Entlassung Biswarcks bis zum Ende des Ersten Weltkrieges, 1890-1918, by Wiegand Schmidt-Richberg und Edgar Graf von Matuschka, 198. 55. Ruraschb'ttel, "Offiziere," 91 and 96. See also Leo von Geyr, "The German General Staff, Part 1: The Imperial Period," Military Review 42 (November 1962): 27; Endres, Structure, 20-21; and Herwig, Corps, 46. 56. Manfred Messerschmidt , "Militar und Schule in der wiIhelminischen Zeit," Militargeschichtliche Mitteilungen, 23 (1978):54-55. 57. Wilhelm R u p p e l , Ueber die Berufswahl der Abiturienten Preussens in den Jahren 1875-1899: Eine Statische Studie (Fulda: Fuldaer Actiendruckerei, 1904), 9-10.

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58. D e m e t e r , Officer-Corps, K± and 88-89. 59. Ibid., 89. 60. "Commissions in the German A r m y , " Cornhill Magazine, June 1894, 610; and Schmidt-Rich berg und Matuschka, Entlassung, 199. 61. Demeter, Officer-Corps, 89. 62. Pfuel to Lyncker, March 8, 1909, cited by Demeter, Officer-Corps, 289.Corps, 289. 63. Ibid. 64. Lyncker to Pfuel, March 24, 1909, cited by Demeter, Officer-Corps, 291. 65. Walter Gorlitz, ed., Der Kaisers Aufzeichnungeri des Marinekabinetts Admiral Georg Alexander von Muller uber die Aera Wilhelms II (Gottingen: MusterschraidtVerlag, 1965), 158. See also Herwig, Corps, 52. 66. Bernhardi, Germany, 242. 67. Samuel and Thomas, Education, 18. 68. V a g t s , Militarism, 180. 69. A. J. P. Taylor, fii smarck: The Man and the Statesman (New York: Random House, 1955; reprint ed., 1967), 151, 179, and 222. 70. William to Boyen, May 9, 1844, in Prussia, Kriegsministeriuni, Militarische Schriften we Hand Kaiser Wi1 helms, 1:494. See also Reinhard Hohn, Die Artnee als Erziehungsschule der Nation; Das Ende einer Idee (Bad Harzburg: Verlag fur Wissenschaft, Wirt— schaft und Technik, 1963), 97-98. 71. Hermann V o g t , Das Buch vooi Deutschen Heere (Bielefeld: Velhagen & K l a f i n g , 1886), 147-49. 72. Alson J. Smith, A Viev of the Spree (New York: John Day, 1962), 73. 73 . Hans Meier-Welcker, ed., Offiziere im BiId von Dokumenten aus drei Jahrhuriderten (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt , 1964), 197. See also Schierbrand, Speeches, 157-58. 74. Karl Reisner Freiherr von Lichtenstein, Schiessausbildung und Feuer der Infanterie im Gefecht, 3rd ed. (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 1900) , 164. 75. One can only wistfully s p e c u l a t e at the turn of events had Frederick III, William I's liberal-minded son, not died only a few months after taking the throne in 1888.

3

Civilian to Ensign: Screening, Selection, and Training . . . all the qualities of a nation will be reflected in the army.

Hans von Seeckt(l) As the majority of Prussian officers after 1860 came from the civilian schools, the army deemed it necessary to scrutinize closely the social and political background of these candidates. Most who entered the officer corps in this manner were, of course, from the m i d d l e class. While they professed loyalty to the crown, the old guard still recalled the role played by the liberal bourgeoisie in the 1848 revolution and the constitutional crisis of the early 1860s. Notwithstanding this fear, the continued expansion of the army forced the authorities to fill officer quotas with a steadily increasing n u m b e r of m i d d l e class applicants. The officer corps, h o w e v e r , did not intend to compromise its feudalistic principles, regardless of the army's needs. A candidate displaying the p r o p e r a t t i t u d e and loyalty to the king would be accepted only if the investigation of his background also reflected an u p b r i n g i n g that fostered these traits. An applicant m i g h t exhibit both high intellect and an excellent education, but if a n y t h i n g regarding his social relations or politics aroused suspicion, a nomination would not be forthcoming. Lower-class hopefuls had little chance of overcoming the social barriers which for their caste remained as rigid in the army of 1914 as they had been in 1860. A n y o n e who came from the u r b a n working class p r o v o k e d p a r t i c u l a r distrust. The specter of

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socialism and revolution continued to be an integral factor in army policy. The officer corps viewed itself as the last bulwark against the coming storm; it could not afford to commission those who might be persuaded to join the revolution they had been ordered to quell. The officer corps likewise discouraged the promotion of noncommissioned officers. While every future officer had to spend a short time in the ranks, the duty served only to acquaint the candidate with the operations of a regiment at all levels. The regular noncoms maintained a respected position in the army, but the officer corps believed that very few of their number possessed the qualities necessary for a commission. Although the regulations provided for such promotions, they came only as a reward for distinguished conduct in battle. In recognition of his bravery, the soldier did not have to take either the ensign's or the officer's examination. But, in deference to the prevailing social prejudice, the new lieutenant was then pensioned off or provided with a job in the civil service and a reserve commission(2). No other European army took the routine denial of commissions to qualified men from the ranks to the extreme practiced by the Prussian and, subsequently, the German army. A "ranker" in the British military (unless involved in a special program for the upper class) could earn a commission, but his chances barely exceeded those of his German cousin. In addition to the social prejudice, the financial obligations, as in Prussia, remained a formidable impediment. Also, the enlisted man's accent, relations, and habits often caused him to stand out and, as was similarly the case in Germany, provided a major argument for the opinion that the lower class could seldom provide acceptable officers. As a result of this presumed inferiority, no more than four or five British rankers annually received commissions (usually as ridingmasters or quartermasters) prior to World War I; and they seldom rose above the rank of captain. Field Marshal Sir William Robertson's rise from common private to the top of the military hierarchy was thus more of a miracle than an example of the "equality" practiced by the British s y s t e m ( 3 ) . In contrast to the discrimination practiced by the German and British armies, France exhibited no hesitation in elevating qualified enlisted men to officer rank. As early as 1870, at least one-third of the officer corps had begun their service in the ranks. By the 1880s the Third Republic supported a number of

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Training

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one-year officer training schools for NCOs with two years' service who had earned selection by competitive examination. As the antithesis of the Prussian military, the French army believed that the well-being of democracy required the bridging of all classes within an officer corps based upon merit. Fearing the political and social upheaval that could result from military examples of equality, the Prussian officer corps argued against such promotions. Maintaining sociopolitical homogeneity was difficult enough with the growing numbers of middle-class officers without courting the perceived disaster that would follow from the acceptance of candidates from "just anywhere." Despite the establishment of NCO schools similar to those of the French in arch-conservative AustriaHungary and even Russia (both admittedly pressed by necessity), the Prussian officer corps never conceded the practicality of commissioning officers from the ranks until World War 1 ( 4 ) . In selecting candidates, the Prussian officer corps discriminated on the basis of religion as well as class. Although Article 12 of the Prussian Constitution of 1850 (subsequently incorporated into the Constitution of the Reich) guaranteed religious toleration, the officer corps, in keeping with its general contempt for such documents, successfully evaded the law. Roman Catholicism on occasion hindered or prevented a nomination, but Judaism always meant i ipso facto rejection. To the old guard the Jew represented the worst of the new industrial and financial age. The prejudice permeated all levels of the officer corps and the civil service and resulted in almost total exclusion of the Jew from these professions(5). In addition to the traditional religious and racial resentments, the political activity of many Jews aroused official suspicion. Prior to the 1880s, Jews had generally supported factions regarded as loyal supporters of the government. But more and more they expressed their dissatisfaction with the government's continued discrimination by joining opposition parties. Jews who had once been loyal National Liberals and, in a few cases, Free Conservatives became Progressives. Even more alarming to the government, Jews in ever greater numbers joined the outlawed Social Democratic Party and purchased or staffed many of the opposition newspapers(6 ) . Because of Article 12, no army regulation could officially bar Jews from obtaining a commission. But there also existed none that expressly guaranteed equal consideration. This omission, along with the officer corps' disregard for the Prussian and German

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constitutions meant that practicing Jews had no chance for a regular commission. In response to inquiries, the usual excuse always could be g i v e n — s p e c i a l a l lowances would have to be made concerning diet and observance of the Sabbath. Even if a Jew had been allowed to reach the ensign stage and then passed through a War School, the final election held by the regiment's officers would negate all his prior effort by refusing admission. In imperial Germany anti-Semitism within the officer corps increased to the point that by 1878 no practicing Jew held a regular commission. A reserve commission for an unbaptized Jew was remotely possible in the 1870s, but after 1880 only one (in 1885) broke through the barrier in Prussia and those states under its peacetime military authority(7 ) . Although sixty Jewish officers had served with distinction in the Franco-Prussian War, the officer corps judged their sons to be unfit for a commission. Despite the continued absence of Prussian Jewish officers (while the Kaiser's ally Austria-Hungary counted over two thous a n d ) , War Minister von Heeringen expected the League of German Jews to accept his assertion in 1910 that no Jew had been denied a commission on the basis of race or religion(8). If a young Jew renounced his faith and was baptized, the officer corps would, in exceptional cases, overlook race so long as the applicant satisfied the other social and political requirements. A few converted Jewish officers even rose to high rank. However, without a renunciation of the Mosaic faith, the chances of a Jew obtaining a nomination remained nonexistent throughout the imperial period regardless of the family's wealth or influence. War Minister von Einem conceded to the Bavarian military plenipotentiary Baron von Gebsattel in 1907 that there existed little likelihood of a Prussian commander or officers' mess accepting a Jew. While expressing his regrets, even venturing the opinion that Jewish officers might aid in the struggle against social democracy, he was not prepared to interfere. Einem's true feelings, however, reflected the attitude of most Prussian officers. In 1909, during a speech before the Reichstag, he admitted the officer corps' policy which held that no young man of the Jewish faith was suitable for a commission(9). With this in mind, the basis for the Jews' incredulity over Heeringen's statement the following year becomes clear. Barred from becoming a Prussian officer, some Prussian Jews tried to enter the somewhat more tolerant but decidedly smaller Bavarian officer corps; but even

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there the hope of securing a commission usually faded to d i s a p p o i n t m e n t . One recent estimate puts only 5 a c t i v e and 50 to 100 reserve officers of the Jewish faith in the Bavarian army between 1870 and 1899; most of these held posts in support units(lO). While the strong influence of the Catholic Church in southern Germany no d o u b t affected p o l i c y , the small size of the Bavarian corps p r o v i d e d a c o n v e n i e n t excuse for limiting the number of Jewish officers. Still, their presence at all reveals a nascent liberalism that was entirely absent in the Prussian army. In only one area did the Prussian officer corps allow for the acceptance of practicing Jews. An officer could marry a Jewess, but only if the lady brought wealth to the union. In g u a r d e d fairness, one can find parallels to the discrimination practiced in Germany in other European armies. While the British E m p i r e included subjects with b r o w n , yellow, and black skins, all army officers were white and generally m e m b e r s of the Church of England. There were few Jews and no Jewish generals(11). Since the Prussians accepted some Jews who renounced their faith, they did not a p p e a r so t e r r i b l y different from their "democratic" counterparts. Even the French R e p u b l i c b e t r a y e d a l a t e n t anti-Semitism d u r i n g the decade of self-examination b r o u g h t on by the Dreyfus Affair. In the Prussian army a c o m p l e x bureaucracy supervised the screening, admission, and training of potential officers. A single d e p a r t m e n t , commanded by a general officer with the title of Inspector General of Military Training and Education (GeneralInspekteur des Militar -Erziehungs- und Bi1dungswesen) , maintained official a u t h o r i t y . The cadet schools (Kadettenanstalten) , the officer c a n d i d a t e or War Schools (Kriegsschulen), and the staff college or War A c a d e m y (Kriegsakademie) all came under his comm a n d a n d , with e x c e p t i o n s in the case of the last, reported to him on all matters. He, in turn, r e p o r t e d d i r e c t l y to the king on all things related to Prussian officer examination and training. His proposals concerning administration and finance were s u b m i t t e d for a p p r o v a l to the Minister of War who passed on the accepted suggestions to those d e p a r t m e n t s exercising fiscal and bureaucratic management of the schools. Other t h a n the War A c a d e m y and the Combined A r t i l l e r y and Engineer School (Vereinigte Artillerieund Ingenieur-Schule), the Inspector General's powers lay only in the realm of basic officer p r e p a r a t i o n and education( 1 2 ) . For most of the period under s t u d y , the Inspector General headed a council formed in 1855 under the

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title of Supreme Commission for Military Studies (Ober-Militar-Studien-Kommission). Made up of persons holding various military and state a p p o i n t m e n t s , the Commission did not sit in continuous session, but met periodically to offer suggestions and counsel. For this service they received a small s u p p l e m e n t to their salaries. Ex officio m e m b e r s included the President of the Supreme Military Examinations Commission (OberMilitar-Prufungs-Kommission), the C o m m a n d a n t of the Cadet Corps, and the directors of the War A c a d e m y , the War Schools, and the A r t i l l e r y and Engineer School. High-ranking officers, usually from the General Staff, who had prior e x p e r i e n c e in m i l i t a r y education m a d e up the r e m a i n i n g m e m b e r s h i p . Civilians on the board included the Minister of Education and respected i n d i v i d u a l s from the general b o d y of learned m e n , usually u n i v e r s i t y professors, who also held civil service rank. As was the case for many appointments in Prussia to boards related to e d u c a t i o n , no limit existed for the time an i n d i v i d u a l could remain on the Commission. For m i l i t a r y m e m b e r s , howe v e r , promotions and transfers necessitated periodic changes(13). Otherwise, there seemed to be no desire to change the m e m b e r s h i p in o r d e r to obtain an infusion of fresh ideas. This and the desire of the civilian m e m b e r s not to risk their prestigious positions by pressing for new or unwelcome changes c o n t r i b u t e d to a system that e v i d e n c e d more stagnation than progress. Various subcommittees made up of Commission m e m b e r s formed the special boards of studies for the different military schools. These small groups evaluated curricula and teaching methods and offered recommendations for i m p r o v e m e n t to the Inspector General. Many conservatives in the officer corps felt that the chain of command was too long and the i n d e p e n d e n c e of the Inspector General too great. H o w e v e r , not until 1907 did the ultrareactionary Military Cabinet succeed in taking over the duties of the Studies Commission. In defense of the abrogation of the Commission, the Cabinet a r g u e d that reasons of organizational efficiency justified the move since almost all of the other personnel matters related to officers had gradually come under its jurisdiction. The office of Inspector General remained, but the officer assigned to the post thereafter received his orders from the Chief of the Military Cabinet who also held the position of Adjutant General to the King(14). As a result, it became even more difficult to approach the Kaiser with suggestions in favor of progressive action r e g a r d i n g curricula or officer selection.

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The Inspector General, accustomed to approval of most of his recommendations by the War Ministry, suffered a marked decline in influence with the change. All questions regarding appointments and curricula received even closer scrutiny by a Military Cabinet whose reactionary attitudes replaced the slightly less conservative posture of the Ministry. Equally important, the Military Cabinet, unlike the War Ministry, existed totally outside the purview of the Reichstag. Given time, the Cabinet might have worked to roll back some of the modifications of its predecessor. There would, however, have been little to do since the War Ministry had instituted relatively few progressive alterations in the selection and training process in the previous half-century prior to the transfer. Nevertheless, the hope for true reform and the end of inequality in officer selection stood even less chance for realization once the Cabinet assumed control of the system. One area of the Inspector General's responsibility to which both the War Ministry and the Military Cabinet paid particular attention was the entrance examination for prospective ensigns. Like the ensuing officer's exam, it came under the immediate jurisdiction of the Supreme Military Examinations Commission which owed its existence to a letter of instruction in 1808 by Frederick William 1 1 1 ( 1 5 ) . Unlike the Studies Commission, it had a full-time board of eleven members who served as examiners under the presidency of a general officer. The board's duty consisted only of conducting those examinations necessary for a commission. The first of two sections included four officers who supervised the administering of the officer examination. The remaining section evaluated the exam results of the future ensigns and included at least one civilian member for each subject tested. None of the members could be connected in any way with a military school, and the officers usually came to the board from the War Ministry or the General Staff. The civilians, as with the Studies Commission, came from university faculties(16). The appointments to the Examinations Commission not only reflected high esteem, but also offered security for those who performed well. Between 1860 and 1908 only eighty officers and forty-one professors served on the b o a r d ( 1 7 ) . Once selected, all members quickly learned the importance attached by their superiors to the procurement of every socially and politically acceptable candidate and that in evaluating fitness, these considerations merited as much weight as test results .

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The Examinations Commission exerted an enormous amount of influence on the makeup of the officer corps. The board administered the entrance exam to all young men desiring a c o m m i s s i o n — i n c l u d i n g those from the cadet schools. The president made recommendations to the Inspector General on the raising or lowering of standards, depending upon the needs of the service, and his suggestions usually ended up in the regulations. The confidence placed in the president included the authority to select and, if warranted, to remove any of the "permanent" civilian examiners(18). While incompetence, age, or health always could be given as the reason for dismissal or retirement, this arbitrary control also inferred that neither the examiners nor the exams would be allowed to preclude the entry of those candidates of lesser capacities who otherwise met the desired criteria. The presence on the board of officers from the General Staff and the War Ministry also allowed those departments a measure of influence in the process . While the president of the Examinations Commission dominated the activities of the board, he served only with the approval of the Inspector General. Excluding the technical institutes, the latter also recommended the appointments to nearly all of the higher posts in the various schools under his jurisdiction. Every selection had to be confirmed by the Kaiser in the case of military officials and, before 1907, the Minister of War for civilians. However, the Inspector General assumed full responsibility for the appointments, and his recommendations usually were accepted. An officer so chosen could pass the rest of his career in positions of military education interspersed with short assignments to a field command. The commandants of the various schools and the Cadet Corps almost always had extensive prior experience in officer selection or t raining (19) . Thus, all knew what was demanded of them and the young men in their care. Unfortunately, the resistance to change often accompanying long years of service also hindered educational and social modernization. Conceding the close personal examination of all potential officers, those who came from the civilian schools, as opposed to the Cadet Corps, found the scrutiny of their qualifications particularly exacting. Despite the expansion of the number of cadet schools throughout the period, over 60 percent of the Prussian aspirants examined during the years I8601908 came from civilian schools (see Appendix 1 1 ) .

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To earn a commission in this manner, the applicants had to do much more than present the proper educational credentials. Naturally, the first requirement was age. The regulations stipulated that all candidates must be between seventeen-and-a-half and twentythree at the time of entry. Although, in striking contrast, the army of the United States required its candidates to be at least twenty-one, the British accepted young men at an age near that of Prussia. Throughout the nineteenth century, the general belief among European armies was that the younger candidates adapted more quickly during the training process(20). Since the Prussians permitted application well before the completion of secondary education, many entered at or near the minimum age. Having decided upon an army career, a young man could do nothing until he and his father located a regimental commander willing to support his candidacy. This could be the most difficult hurdle since a nomination required much more than evidence of desire, ability, and education. The officer, usually a colonel, possessed broad powers of discretion in reaching his decision. The status of the father and the family as a whole was considered. In the case of cavalry hopefuls, evidence of personal wealth had to be substantial since these officers provided and maintained their own mounts. As the size of the army grew and the demand for cavalry officers outdistanced the supply of blue bloods, the sons of rich middle-class bankers, industrialists, and merchants began to appear in the mounted arm. But regardless of the type of service, the colonel made inquiries into the aspirant's politics and social relations. Any hint of behavior or attitudes which cast doubt on the young man's loyalty to the monarchy provided grounds for summary rejection(21 ) . An excellent mind and a perfect physique mattered not if there existed the smallest possibility that he also entertained liberal (which in this case was synonymous with subversive) ideas . The formal process began with father and son a t tending a dinner at the regimental officers' m e s s ( 2 2 ) . Here the officers gained their first look at a potential comrade. The young man had to make a favorable impression upon all since his final acceptance would require their approval. If nominated, the next step was the ensign's exam. Originally, the regulations allowed the applicant to take the examination either before or after entry. However, the nominating colonel usually withheld formal approval until the test had been successfully completed.

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The advantage obviously lay with those who took the exam as soon as possible since it dealt only with subjects from the secondary schools. Cramming was difficult, if not impossible, once actual training began. The practicality of early testing received official recognition with the Order of March 11, 1880, requiring the passing of the examination prior to entry(23). All Guards and many cavalry regiments actively recruited noblemen in order to maintain the individual unit's status as a preserve for the aristocracy. The only other aspirants who would be accepted without prejudice came from old officer families. If the attraction of social exclusiveness failed, the regiments attempted to lure the young noble with resplendent uniforms adorned with all manner of medals and trimmings. The enticement of duty in or near one of the large cities with its culture and varied entertainments also served as a drawing card since the elite regiments were assigned to posts in the preferred regions of the country. Like the cavalry units, the Guards expected their aspirants to exhibit evidence of personal wealth or a monthly allowance from their family. A supplemental income of a thousand marks per month was not uncommon for young officers from these regiments(24). Under William I I , money became a major criterion even for many regiments outside of the cavalry and the Guards. The requirement of substantial personal allowances barred a large number of capable but lesswell-to-do commoners whose places were filled by the sons of wealthier middle-class families. Still, many regiments, especially those stationed in remote regions, regularly experienced difficulty in filling their complement of officers(25 ) . But even they would do without or rely on headquarters for transfers rather than take someone who was socially, politically, or financially unacceptable. Prior to the ensign's exam, many candidates participated in a practice thought to ensure success. Throughout Germany a number of men, usually former officers, made their living by preparing the aspirants for this test. Known as military crammers, they provided their customers with information likely to be of value on the examination. Advertisements in most newspapers touted the ability of these tutors to provide "rapid and certain preparation"(26) . The demand for the crammers' services continued throughout the imperial period. Those who enlisted their aid exhibited varied levels of preparatory education. General von Holleben, the head of the

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Examinations Commission in 1870, maintained that anyone who had attended the eighth or ninth class of a secondary school did not require the aid of a crammer, and most of those who had completed only the seventh class should also have been sufficiently prepared. Nevertheless, most of the aspirants visited a "cramming establishment" (Presse) where they were literally "crammed" (eingepaukt) with facts and information known to be of value on the test(27). The time devoted to preparation with a crammer naturally depended upon each individual's education and intelligence. Those who were at or near completion of one of the nine-year schools usually studied only two or three months. Some who arrived from the middle grades required upwards of two years—time which would have been of greater overall value had the students remained instead in the formal classroom. Often, those requiring the most preparation were aristocrats and old officer offspring who had left school with no thought other than spending their remaining active years in uniform. Some among their n u m b e r who lacked the required educational certificate had been assured of receiving a royal dispensation. While the army professed continued opposition to the use of crammers, it did n o t h i n g to halt the practice. In reality, no stigma whatsoever was attached to those who visited one. Many officers rising to high rank began their careers in this way —among them the future Weimar Minister of the Reichswehr Wilhelm Groener who spent several months in the home of a retired army captain(28). A l t h o u g h a questionable practice, other armies accepted the presence of crammers. Churchill employed one after he twice failed the entrance examination for Sandhurst. West Point candidates also found professional tutors ready to assist in preparing for that school's test(29). In Prussia, however, the crammers played a vital role in the quest to make sure that all aspirants from the preferred origins passed the test. Despite the authorities' expressed displeasure at their continued existence, in some cases the service the crammers provided assumed more importance than the colonel"s nomination. A young man of n o b l e or old officer origin who did not possess the intelligence or desire to complete secondary school could be drilled with enough i n f o r m a t i o n to survive the examination. Having received a nomination and likely prepared by a crammer, the candidate made formal application to the Examinations Commission for admission to the ensign's examination. Along with information concerning

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his age, physical fitness, and educational background (including teachers' evaluations), the army demanded that the young man provide a detailed account of his ancestry. If not requiring a dispensation, the applicant included at least the certificate granting permission to begin the Prima grades of an approved nine-year secondary school. Once the date had been set, the aspirant received orders from his regiment to report before the Examinations Commission in Berlin. Prior to German unification, the test was administered quarterly and in the larger garrison towns under the auspices of local boards. However, after 1870 the Commission examined twenty-five to thirty candidates in the capital on a weekly basis for a minimum of nine months out of the y e a r ( 3 0 ) . The change in the exam site did not come about as the result of a drastic increase in the total number of applicants, but rather in response to the increase of applicants from the middle class and civilian secondary schools (see Appendix 1 1 ) . To evaluate their fitness firsthand, and also to make sure that none of the preferred candidates were "mistakenly" failed, the army felt that the tests must not be left to local boards. The expectant examinees reported to the testing location on a Sunday. Tardiness was not tolerated. After the formal introduction of the president of the Commission, the authorities treated the young men as if they were already in uniform. For the enentire period of the examination, they remained at the test center under military supervision. The tests began on Monday at 8:00 a.m. The candidates appeared in evening dress with swallowtail coat and white g l o v e s — t h e standard attire for all important public examinations. At all times the army sought to impress upon the examinees the solemnity of the occasion. Originally, the written portion lasted from Monday through Thursday afternoon; the oral part then took up all of Friday and Saturday. However, by the 1890s the written problems were completed by Wednesday evening and the orals by Friday a f t e r n o o n — t h u s shortening the most mentally demanding portion by a full day. The written test days lasted from 8:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. with fifteen-minute intervals granted between designated sections. During the oral segment half of the candidates were examined each day. Six examinees usually made up each section with the board questioning them as a group for about an hour on each subject of the written portion except drawing—an average of just ten minutes per subject for each candidate. Officers administered the written part while the seven civilian members of the Commission

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held the orals and determined the final results(31). For the written portion the officers dictated the questions, and to improve the odds for success, they came in pairs with each candidate allowed to select one to answer. The time limits ranged from fortyfive minutes to two hours for the German essays. The officers then collected the papers before offering the next pair of questions(32). The required subjects included German, Latin, French, mathematics, history, geography, and drawing (see Appendices 4 and 5 ) . In the German essays the examiners looked for legible handwriting, freedom from spelling and grammatical errors, ease of written expression (as well as proper diction during the o r a l s ) , and knowledge of German l i t e r a t u r e — m a i n l y a general cognizance of its development and familiarity with at least one prominent author. The candidate' use of the language throughout the examination also played a role in determining the final grade. The questions in Latin covered the ancient authors normally read in the sixth and seventh classes of the secondary schools. The aspirants translated Livy and Caesar (with no dictionary permitted in the latter's c a s e ) , performed additional simple translations into German, and answered questions testing grammar. For proof of proficiency in French, grammatical exercises augmented the inquiry into the ability to read and translate from French into German and vice versa. The army added a test in either English (a concession to the Realgymnasium) or Greek in 1883, but the fluency demanded did not approach that for French(33). The mathematics portion included arithmetic, algebra, geometry, and plane trigonometry. Those young men destined for the heavy artillery and engineer corps, almost all of whom came from the middle class, had to earn higher scores in this area than candidates for the infantry and cavalry — another reason for the dearth of aristocrats in the technical arms. The exercise in geography included both physical and political questions, with emphasis on Europe and especially Germany and Prussia. In keeping with the disinterest shown by both the secondary schools and the army in promoting analytical skills, the questions in history tended to emphasize the description of military events and identification of royal personages rather than the use of information to support the reasoning process. In the 1860s the questions revealed a greater interest in Greece and Rome; but under the influence of William II in the 1890s, the essays dealt more and more with recent Prussian and German royalty and military events. The drawing test

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included freehand and geometrical exercises with some hill sketching and topographical markings. To improve his score, the candidate could offer an a d d i t i o n a l subject, for e x a m p l e , a third modern language, chemist r y , or physics(34). With the obvious e x c e p t ions of chemistry, mathematics, and physics, almost all answers appeared in the form of short essays. Foreign observers noted that the examiners attached greater importance to "style, correct composition, and systematic arrangement" than to the knowledge of details. Accord ing to Holleben, the purpose of the test was not so much to measure knowledge as to determine whether the candidate possessed "sufficient intellectual capacity to put his knowledge to a useful purpose"(35). In spite of these claims, an examination of the sample questions in A p p e n d i x 4 leads to another and m u c h different assessment. The problems encompassed such broad areas as to create a m b i g u i t y in the minds of the examinees while simultaneously allowing the graders wide l a t i t u d e for e v a l u a t i o n . Questions of a specific nature that would have tested the candidates' abilities to use information in support of a position are not in e v i d e n c e . Instead, the examinees encountered very general statements. Without a clear line to be pursued, most probably opted to present the information obtained from the crammer in the same arid fashion in which it had been administered. As a result, the test failed to determine the aspirants' powers of analysis. To the benefit of the army, the ill-defined questions permitted the graders a w i d e range of correct answers. In the end, the crammer was vindicated as the examinations produced few failures. The g r a d i n g scale also permit ted the examiners to exercise broad discretionary powers in rating the candidate's work. The marks and their respective numerical values totaled nine in all(36). excellent ( vorzugl ich ) very good (sehr gut ) good (gut ) fairly good (ziemlich gut) satisfactory (be fried igend) mediocre (mittelmassig) insufficient (nicht hinreichend) almost unsatisfactory (fast ungenugend) entirely unsatisfactory ( ganz ungenugend)

9 8 7 b 5 4 3 2 1

Once a v e r a g e d , the scores in each subject were multiplied by a coefficient of importance. Before the

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turn of the century, they were: German Latin French English or Greek mathematics history

5 5 3 3 5 3

geography drawing

3 1

Optional: chemistry, physics, or third modern language...1

The product of this multiplication was the candidate's grade. For example, a mark of very good (8) in Latin (5) equaled 40 points while the same mark in history (3) totaled 24 points. In any of the optional subjects the result would be only a score of 8. The examiners employed the same grading system for both the written and oral portions and then averaged the two scores. Thus, a written score of mediocre in German ( 4 x 5 = 20) could be offset with a mark of fairly good (6 x 5 = 30) on the more subjective and decidedly less demanding oral portion. The outcome would be a respectable final grade of satisfactory. And since a complete failure still received a mark of 1, the candidate was assured of "earning" at least 1 to 5 points on every subject. The total number of points possible after 1883 for all eight obligatory subjects was 252. Prior to the introduction of the English/Greek option in that year, it had been 225. In order to pass, a candidate had to score only a composite of 113 before 1883 and 126 thereafter — an average of 4.5, or less than satisfactory on each test. With two exceptions, one could score a completely unsatisfactory (1) on a subject and still pass if the other grades made up the deficit. The prospective artillery and engineer officers were required to score a 6 or better in mathematics. However, by the early 1890s even this requirement fell victim to the pressing quotas. The remaining exception, which survived to World War I, called for every aspirant to score at least a 4 in G e r m a n ( 3 7 ) . The army debated the inequality of the coefficients, but a change did not come about until 1903 after the demand for additional officers had eased. In that year drawing disappeared from the obligatory portion, and all but one of the remaining subjects received a value of 4 each. The lone exception was German, which remained at 5. In order to compensate for the changes, the Commission readjusted the passing grade to 130, roughly the same below-satisfactory average(38). The board did nothing, however, to correct the unmerited worth assigned to the oral portion. A candidate still could offset a poor score earned

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d u r i n g the long hours of written toil with a higherrated oral performance that totaled less than two hours for all of the subjects. He also continued to receive credit for the complete failure of a subject. If an aspirant e l e c t e d to take an optional exam, the result could only help his final score since the total for passage stayed the same. A l t h o u g h the coefficient remained only 1, the few points received could mean the difference between success or failure. Regardless of whether or not he took an optional, the possibility still existed for an examinee to average less than a satisfactory on each subject and obtain an e l i g i b l e rating. While half-marks were not assigned, it is not difficult to arrive at one of m a n y possible scenarios illustrating the army's toleration of mediocre work: German La t in French English/ Greek mathematics history geography

mark 6 4

4 4

4

4 5

x x x

coefficient 5 4 4

= = =

x x x x

4 It 4 4

= = = =

p o i. n t s 30 16 16 16 16 16 20 130

A c a n d i d a t e could thus score below-satisfactory marks on most of the exam and still pass. An even lower score in any of the subjects might be negated by the optional. From this example one can conclude that even the grading system served as much to aid in the aspirants' success as to e v a l u a t e their abilities. Between 1866 and 1894 a passing grade was achieved by 79 percent of the examinees. Included in this figure were those who had received a royal dispensation from the Prima requirement. But even they did not fair b a d l y considering their a b b r e v i a t e d formal education. In the years 1904-1909, three out of four of this group passed compared to 90 percent of the candidates who held the Prima certificaCe(39). These percentages also i n c l u d e d those who had repeated the examination; but with the leniency afforded them by the examiners, few second-timers failed. If a young man failed the examination, he was always g i v e n a second chance. And while the regulations did not so stipulate, special permission granted yet a third attempt. A waiting period of three months to a year was observed, d e p e n d i n g on the amount of further preparation the Commission felt was necessary.

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But even then, the Commission retested the candidate only on those subjects in which he had scored below a grade of satisfactory (5) on both the written and oral portions. As a further sign of its desire to secure all from the preferred social groups, the army not only approved a third try if necessary, but even a fourth if the aspirant came highly recommended(40). Retest dispensations came easily for a young nobleman or the son of an officer. Middle-class participants generally received a favorable reply to their request, but only after a reexamination of the initial application. Rarely, however, did any candidate need more than two chances. The grading was so lenient that when asked to comment on the French requirements, a crammer claimed that "even a modest attempt at conversation always insures a high m a r k " ( 4 1 ) . Kurt von Bulow, who took the examination in 1894, serves as an example of the value of connections within the system. The young man's father had a "congenial relationship" with the general whose command included the aspiring officer's Grenadier regiment. With a letter of introduction provided by the commander, Bulow prepared in the home of a well-known retired colonel and negotiated the test with e a s e ( 4 2 ) . After all the tests were graded, the Commission notified the nominees of the r e s u l t s — t h e official reports following almost immediately after completion of the oral portion. The speed with which the graders evaluated both the written and oral sections denoted either a highly skilled board or a cursory assessment of each aspirant's work. The report stated whether the candidate had passed creditably (gut) or satisfactorily (befriedigend), or that he had failed (ungenugend) . If failed, the Commission advised the young man of the minimum interval before the next attempt would be permitted and the subjects that required examination. After the successful nominees had likewise received their marks in each subject and the overall grade, the Commission issued military railway tickets to the garrisons of their respective regiments. Each of these units also received a complete report on the performance of its nominee(43). Those nominees denied a retest after a second failure (both a rarity) faced the prospect of eventually completing their military obligation in the ranks. But for those who had done well in school or had worked with a crammer, the chances of final rejection remained slim throughout the imperial period. The young men had surmounted the first social barrier, and due to the demand for additional as well as replacement officers, the purpose of the test

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became the weeding out of only the hopelessly incompetent. The result was an ensign's examination which sought not to determine and obtain the best and b r i g h t e s t , but to pass along as many as possible of those deemed socially acceptable. The nominee now entered the phase of training which made the German system unique. A l t h o u g h he had passed the ensign's examination, the young man did not immediately assume that rank. Almost all future officers had to serve a period of time in the ranks performing the duties of enlisted personnel. The officer corps often referred to the candidate by the term avantageur. However, the official title (sometimes used before the ensign's exam) remained "officeraspirant" (Offizieraspirant) until a Cabinet Order in 1899 changed the designation to the p u r e r German title of Fahnenjunker(44). The first duties of the new recruit simulated those of a p r i v a t e (Gemeiner). But as a rule, his uniform consisted of better cloth, and he wore a sword bayonet with a distinguishing sword knot (Portepee) attached. The treatment of the young aspirant varied with the regiment and its commander, but discipline normally was moderated in his case. For a short time he lived in the barracks. Again, the period varied with the regiment — one week in some or as long as six weeks in others. He paid for his own uniform a n d , if cavalry or light a r t i l l e r y , his mounts and their upkeep. After the one- to six-week period, a b u t t o n was attached to his collar signifying promotion to the d u t y rank of lance corporal (Gefreiter). He then m o v e d out of the barracks and could a c q u i r e a civilian aide for the care of his personal e q u i p m e n t . However, the new lodgings were often l i t t l e b e t t e r than the barracks. Groener, for e x a m p l e , claimed that the ensigns' quarters in his r e g i m e n t had seen initial service as a nobleman's dog kennel(45). While some, like Bulow, alleged that their training differed in no way from that of the enlisted men, it is difficult to p i c t u r e this young noble being exposed to the degradation and abuse conscripts regularly experienced at the hands of officers and noncoms. To have treated him or any other aspiring officer in such fashion would have weakened the class spirit and social exclusiveness the officer corps sought to promote and maintain. Also, a noncommissioned officer had nothing to gain by mistreating one who would shortly become his superior. A more realistic assessment argues that the young man's treatment was tempered by the constant awareness of his future position. He, in turn, knew the manner of b e h a v i o r the officer corps

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expected of him. Since the personality and psychological tests used during the Weimar period did not yet exist, the evaluation of the aspirant's true sentiments rested solely with the officers of the regiment(46) . The wise candidate soon learned what behavior pleased his superiors and adjusted his actions accordingly. Eventually the aspirant earned the duty rank of sergeant and thereafter ate in the mess with the officers who now treated him more like a future comrade during off duty periods. Although the titles avantageur, officer-aspirant, and Fahnenjunker still might be employed on occasion, the usual address was "ensign" (Fahnr ich)—officially shortened from "sword-knot ensign" (Portepeefahnrich) by the 1899 Cabinet 0 r d e r ( 4 7 ) . And while he performed the duties of a sergeant, the respect accorded him in the company of officers surpassed that of the regimental sergeant maj or. The colonel now assigned a young lieutenant or "ensign's father" (Fahnrichsvater) to observe and report on the aspirant's behavior and serve as teacher, critic, and social guide. The newcomer's presence in the mess also allowed the rest of the officers to form an opinion of his social and political fitness for commission. All expected a potential comrade to show that he could properly handle a knife and fork and hold his liquor. To test the latter, the young man usually had to endure drinking bouts lasting five or six hours. In some regiments he also might be goaded into a duel to measure his mettle or even into initiating an affair with one of the local ladies. Viewed as an integral part of his training, the outcome of such activities served in the eyes of the officers as evidence of the candidate's maturity and qualifications for the social duties of his new office(48). Despite the questionable excesses expected of the aspirant, inviolable rules existed in the mess. The new man could not speak until spoken to, smoke until the senior officer had lit up, or "talk shop." Unlike the British officers' mess, the Prussians placed no restriction on conversation concerning women, and if questioned about his own escapades, the ensign had to respond. Of course, any revelations in this area required a certain delicacy lest they provoke a challenge. And while some regiments expected their officers to spend freely, debts for ensign and officer alike could not become a public embarassment. Another source of latent anti-Semitism, the Jewish moneylender nevertheless bailed many an officer and ensign out

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of a distressing financial situation. Some ens igns who borrowed from a fellow aspirant could end u p so deep in arrears that they wound up serving t heir benefactor in much the same way as a batman. St ill, as long as the young man kept his head above w a ter and no scandal ensued, the size of his debts did not concern the other officers or the a r m y ( 4 9 ) . Under almost constant observation, the candi date who reflected the proper spirit and respect for the officer corps and its ideals could expect li ttle harsh treatment, especially in front of the ra nks . Groener's commander caught him eating breakfast in bed on a Sunday but did nothing. This colonel, like many others, even held dances in honor of his ensigns( 5 0 ) . Such activities were prized by the young men fo r it allowed them to be seen in their best uniforms by the area Frauleins. Strutting about on these occasi ons , or in town, they basked in the respect and favor they never had experienced as civilians. An Englis hman who served for a time as a Prussian officer reca lied that the attire offered "the only chance . . . in that country of making a really picturesque appeara nee . The designers of the uniforms . . . are real art is t s and their 'creations' are harmonies of colour and , withal, aggressive"(51). " The amount of time the aspirants served " in the ranks" declined toward the end of the century, Du ring the 1860s and 1870s (excluding the shorter per iods necessitated by w a r ) , the regulations called for six months, and a candidate who had served just s hort of that period when the opening date of the War Sc hoo 1 arrived had to wait for the next class. Gradua H y , however, such strict adherence to regulation di sapFinally , in peared, and the six months became five. 1891 it fell to three months for those who ent er ed from the civilian schools and two months for ca nd i dates from the Cadet Corps(52). As the end of the avantageur period approached, the young man made formal application to his regime ntal commander for a military-qualifications certifi cate y in (Dienstzeugnis) , which attested to his efficienc the duties of basic soldiering. If the colonel and all of the regiment's officers signed the applicat ion , an Imperial Order conferred upon him the formal rank of Sword-knot Ensign, or, after 1899, simply Ens ign . The candidate was thereafter entitled to wear the distinctive badge and silver sword knot that signi fied his official position and p a y — b e t w e e n sergeant and sergeant major. In a few instances he had to wai t briefly for a vacancy on the list of ensigns, but rare were those who encountered this inconvenie nee ,

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even in the most prestigious a r m s ( 5 3 ) . While portrayed as the toughest pre-commissioning training then in existence, the Prussian system evidenced greater concern for the successful passage of all nominated candidates exhibiting the proper character. The ensign's examination strove not to obtain the best qualified, but rather to pass on all but the irremediable cases. Ambiguously broad questions for the nontechnical subjects favored those who had spent time with a crammer and provided the graders with the latitude to approve any answers offering a modicum of relevant information. The grading system permitted excellence in one subject to offset failure in another, and the score on an optional exam to sanction a generally inferior performance. The period spent in the ranks allowed the aspirant to learn the duties of the enlisted man, but the time actually devoted to barracks life was so short in most cases that one never came to understand the hopeless drudgery of the common soldier's existence. Only the reserve officer who passed through the one-year-volunteer program could empathize with the day-to-day despair of the conscript. For the regular officer corps empathy had no place in the command process. With the formal promotion to ensign, a candidate had reached the final hurdles prior to commissioning. The title Fahnrich conveyed to him the confidence that the army had in his military ability and personal commitment to the maintenance of the officer corps as protector of the crown and the fatherland. In its historical origin the appellation alone bred selfassurance. In English Fahnrich does not literally translate to ensign — a rank usually given to a junior officer rather than a candidate. The term appeared in the sixteenth century and, until the beginning of the nineteenth century, designated those within the mercenary armies who carried the banner of the troop (Fahnlein) into the battle. Once there, they were expected to display the colors in a prominent position amidst the thickest part of the fighting(54). Those so selected had proven their leadership, reliability, and b r a v e r y — t h e same characteristics sought in the young officer candidates. Also reminiscent of older times was the sword carried by the ensign and officer. It represented the royal blessing, once bestowed upon those who pledged fealty to their feudal lord, for the new vassal who placed king above all else. While the young ensigns had not yet achieved the final goal, the symbolism served to instill pride in their chosen profession and the constant awareness of the true

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focus of their l o y a l t y . NOTES 1. Hans von Seeckt, Thoughts of a Soldier, trans. Gilbert Waterhouse (London: Ernest Benn, 1930), 76. 2. Commission, Education, 168; and Talbot, Analysis, 39. 3. William Robertson, From Private to Field-Marshal (London: Constable and Company, 1921), 29-31; BonhamCarter, Soldier, 29; Edward M. Spiers, The Army and Society, 1815-1914 (New York: Longman, 1980), 3-5; and Byron Farwell, Mr. Kipling's Army (New York: W. W. Norton, 1981), 73-78. 4. Spiers, Army, 3; J. R e v o l , Histoire de L'Armee Francjaise (Paris: Librairie Larousse, 1929), 208; David B. Ralston, The Army of the Republic: The Place of the Military in the Political Evolution of France, 1871-1914 (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1967), 84; William Murray Black, "The Education and Training of A r m y Officers," Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States 32 (January-February 1903):24; and Emory Upton, Armies of Asia and Europe (New York: D. A p p l e t o n , 1878; r e p r i n t ed., New York: Greenwood Press, 1968), 151-52 and 170-73. 5. Zeydel, Constitutions, 226; Werner T. Angress, "Prussia's Army and the Jewish Reserve Officer Controversy before World War I," in Imperial Germany, ed. James J. Sheehan (New York: New Viewpoints, 1976), 93-95 and 116; and Ulrich T r u m p e n e r , "Junkers and Others: The Rise of Commoners in the Prussian A r m y , 1871-1914," Canadian Journal of History 14 (April 1979):35-36. 6. Angress, " A r m y , " 97-98. 7. Ibid., 93 and 95; K i t c h e n , Corps, 39; and Demeter, Officer-Corps, 225. 8. Von Heeringen to Dr. Horwitz, A p r i l 12, 1910, in Max J. Loewenthal, Das judische Bekenntnis als hinderungsgrund bei der Beforderung zum preussischen Reserveoffizier (Berlin: H. S. Hermann, 1911), 8-9. 9. Ibid.., 103; T r u m p e n e r , "Junkers," 35-36; Kitchen, Corps, 43; and Frederick Francis C a m p b e l l , "The Bavarian A r m y , 1870-1918: The Constitutional and Structural Relations with the Prussian Military Establishment" (Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State U n i v e r s i t y , 1973), 139-40. 10. R u m s c h o t t e l , "Offiziere," 96. 11. K i t c h e n , Corps, 47; and Farwell, Army, 109-10. 12. Theodore Schwan, Report on the Organization of the German Army, no. 2, ed . U.S. War Department,

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Adjutant General's Office, Military Information Division (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, [1894]), 36-38; Commission, Education, 170-72; and Barnard, Courses, 295. 13. Barnard, Courses, 295; Commission, Education, 172; and Schmidt-Richberg und Matuschka, Entlassung, 198. 14. Barnard, -Courses, 295; Commission, Education, 172; Schmidt-Richberg und Matuschka, Entlassung, 198; Exner, "Army," 874; and Nichols, Germany, 317. 15. Frederick William to General von Diericke, August 13, 1808, in N o t t e b o h m , Prufungsverfahrens, 7. 16. Ibid., 80; and Commission, Education, 173 and 178-79. 17. N o t t e b o h m , Prufungsverfahrens, 99-101. 18. Commission, Education, 179. 19. Ibid. , 173-74. 20. Schwan, Report, 22; and Black, "Training," 20. For an account of the British system, see G. J. Youngblood, The Queen's Commission (London: John Murray, 1891). 21. "Commissions," 606; Charles E. H. Vincent, "A Brief Sketch of the System of Officering in the Prussian Army," in The German Army and Navy: Articles from the Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, 2 vols. (Cleveland:1916), 1:797; and The German Army from Within by a British Officer Who Has Served in It (New York: George H. Doran Company, 1914), 41-42. 22. For a personal account, see German Army, 41. 23. B[ernard] Poten, Geschichte des Mi 1itar-Erziehungs- und BiIdungswesens in den Landen deutscher Zunge , vol. 4: Preussen (Berlin: A. Hofmann & Comp. , 1896), 204; and Commission, Education, 181. 24. Endres, Structure, 7, 17, and 23-24. 25. Ibid. 26. Commission, Education, 189. 27. Ibid., 188-89. 28. "Commissions," 606-7; Commission, Education, 189-90; and Wilhelm Groener, Lebenserinnerungen: Jugend, Generalstab, Weltkrieg, ed . Frhr. Hiller von Gaertringen (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & R u p r e c h t , 1957), 37. 29. Churchill, Commission, 25 and 28-29; and James B. F r y , "Admission to the Military Academy," Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States 4 (January-February 1883):105. On the British practice, see Spiers, Army, 24; Barries-Jenkins, Army, 144 and 146-47; Hugh Thomas, Sandhurst, (London: Hutchinson, 1961), 151-52; Y o u n g b l o o d , Commission, 110; and E. S. Turner, Gallant Gentlemen: A Portrait of the British Officer, 1600-1956 (London: Michael

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Joseph, 1956), 243-44. 30. Barnard, Courses, 298; Commission, Education, 181-82; "Commissions," 607; and U p t o n , Armies, 208. 31. Commission, Education, 183; "Commissions," 607: and Groener, Lebenserinnerungen, 37. 32. Commission , Education, 183-84 78, 33. N o t t e b o h m , Prufngsverfahrens, 78. 34. Commission , Education, 182-85; "Commissions," 607-8 and 610-11; and Schwan , Report, 22. 35, Commission , Educat ion , 185. 36, Ibid., 186 ; N o t t e b o h m , Prufungsverfahrens, 48; and "Commissions," 607-8. 37. N o t t e b o h m , Prufungsverfahrens, 78-79 and 83; Commission, Education, 187; "Commissions," 608; and Barnard, Courses, 300. 38, N o t t e b o h m , Prufungsverfahrens, 48. 39. Poten, Preussen, 204; and Demeter, OfficerCorps. 289. 40! "Commissions," 608; and Commission, Education, 187. 41 . "Commissions," 611. 42. Kurt Ernst G o t t f r i e d von Bulow, Preussischer Militarismus zur Zeit Wilhelms II: Aus meiner Dienstzeit itn Heer (Schweidni tz : Hugo Reisse, 1930), 9-10 and 24. 43. B a r n a r d , Courses, 300; Commission, Education, 187; and "Commissions," 607. 44. S c h m i d t - R i c h b e r g und M a t u s c h k a , Entlassung, 89. 45. Groener, Lebenserinnerungen , 38 and 41; Vincent, "Officering," 797; German Army, 41-42; Bashford, "System," 614; William B. Hazen , The School and the Army in Germany and France (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1872), 248; Commission, Education, 181; and "Commissions," 608. 46. B u l o w , Militarismus, 13; and Bethke, "Leutnant," 826. 47. S c h m i d t - R i c h b e r g und M a t u s c h k a , Entlassung, 89; and Hans Caspar von Zobeltitz, Das Alte Heer: Erinnerungen an die Dienstzeit bei alien Waffen ((Berlin: Heinrich Beenken., 1931), 125. 48. H, C. von Zobeltitz, Erinnerungen, 125-29; German Army, 38-40; and John Laffin, Jackboot: The Story of the German Soldier (London: Cassell, 1965), 94. 49. German Army, 49-51; H. C. von Zobeltitz, Erinnerungen, 125-29; Gerold von G l e i c h , Die alte Armee und ihre Verirrungen; eine kritische Studie ((Leipzig: K. F. K o e h l e r , 1919), 49; and E n d r e s , S t r u c t u r e , 24. 50. G r o e n e r , Lebenserinnerungen, 42. 51. German Army, 39-40. 52. G r o e n e r , Lebenserinnerungen, 43; and Messerschmidt und F e t t e r , Militargoschichte, 107.

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79

53. U.S., War D e p a r t m e n t , Adjutant General's Office, Military Information Division, The Military Schools of Europe and Other Papers Selected for Publication, no. 9 (Washington, D.C.: G o v e r n m e n t Printing Office, [1896]), 71-72; Commission, Education, 165-66; B a r n a r d , Courses, 300; and "Commissions," 609. 54. V o g t , Buch, 195; and H. C. von Zobeltitz, Erinnerungen, 124-25.

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4

A Facade of Education: The Structure and Curriculum of the Cadet Corps Education for the youth, Salvation for the Army. Wilhelm 1(1) Prussian army authorities r e g a r d e d the cadet schools as the foundation of the officer corps, and as such, these institutions remained the p r e f e r r e d source for recruits t h r o u g h o u t their existence. Nevertheless, the Cadet Corps generated much discussion after 11860 r e g a r d i n g the q u a l i t y of education it p r o v i d e d as well as the spirit it p r o m o t e d . Any a t t e m p t to do away with the schools, h o w e v e r , i m m e d i a t e l y encountered the bastion of t r a d i t i o n . Likewise, any e n d e a v o r to i m p r o v e the q u a l i t y of the c u r r i c u l u m always faced the a r g u m e n t that an increase of the mental demands could not be allowed to h i n d e r the historical p u r p o s e of the schools—-the commissioning of as many as possible from the p r e f e r r e d social origins. While claiming an ancient t r a d i t i o n , the Cadet Corps did not appear in Prussia until the e i g h t e e n t h century. The French notion of cadet companies for the youngest sons of a noble family became cadet academies for the preparation of the sons of needy Prussian aristocrats for careers as army officers(2) . Various schools had been erected from the time of the Great Elector, Frederick William, and his two successors, but it was King Frederick William I who formally instituted the Corps in 1717 and demonstrated a serious c o m m i t m e n t to the system. And it is to him that the credit belongs for the origins of the cadet tradition. Frederick the Great also held his father's view that

82

For King and Kaiser!

Che king's officers must be educated so that they would not "merely h a v e their p a t e n t as generals to show, but some c a p a c i t y for the office as well." Over the next c e n t u r y , the Cadet Corps became firmly entrenched in the military system as the "nursery for the officer-corps" and the chief source for permanent career replacements(3). The Prussian army expansion that accompanied the wars of unification resulted in a call for more cadet academies. In 1860 there existed four lower or preparatory institutes (VaransCalten) at Potsdam, Culm, Wahlstatt, and B e n s b e r g , each w i t h about 200 cadets, and one Senior Cadet Academy (HauptkadettenanstaJt) in Berlin with 420. In 1868 two new lower schools opened: one in the former castle of the Prince of Schleswig-Holstein at Plon, and the other in the Prince of Nassau' s castle at Oranienstein. At the same time, the senior school also began an expansion— in 1869 the a r m y added a fifth and sixth company of 100 cadets each, and in 1870, a seventh. By 1871 the six lower schools had a combined e n r o l l m e n t of 1,128 while Berlin housed 700.. During this period the Cadet Corps annually provided 190 officers or a little a b o v e 40 percent of the army's requirements(4). As each new army bill after unification brought renewed calls for expansion, the need for more of f i~ cers from the Cadet Corps also increased. In the late 1870s the army added an e i g h t h company of 100 to the senior school's c o m p l e m e n t . To h a n d l e the demands of an enlarged s t u d e n t p o p u l a t i o n , the Senior A c a d e m y m o v e d to a newly erected facility at GrossLichterfelde a few miles outside of Berlin on the rail line to Potsdam. By 1889, with the addition1889, with the addition of a n i n t h c o m p a n y , the n u m b e r of senior cadets stood at 960(5). Despite the steady growth at L i c h t e r f e l d e , the number enrolled at the lower schools remained the same. During the 1880s the Prussian officer corps expanded from about 14,000 to 15,800 while the Cadet Corps gained only the additions to the Senior Academy—for a total of just under 2,100. The number of civilian candidates, mostly m i d d l e class, taking the ensign's examination during the same period far surpassed that of cadets (see A p p e n d i x 11). Not surprisingly, these figures increased the army's fear of a bourgeois*dominated officer corps. By the end of the 1880s, the ratio of cadets to officers stood again at the 1873 proportion of 13.2 per 100. In order to achieve at least the desired, minimum ratio of 15:100, the Cadet Corps was authorized to raise enrollment to 2,370 s t u d e n t s . When the n u m b e r of officers reached

The Structure and Curriculum of the Cadet Corps

83

16,646 in 1890, the cadet limit rose to 2,500 in the attempt to keep pace with the army's expansion(6). The increases in the cadet complement meant enlargement of existing facilities and additional preparatory schools. In 1890 the school at Culm moved to Koslin; new lower schools opened at Karlsruhe in 1892 and Naumburg in 1900(7). By this time the complement at the Senior Academy included ten companies. But despite this growth, by 1900 enrollment still fell short of the approved limit(8). Koslin . . . . Potsdam Wahlstatt Bensberg Plon

. . . . . . . . 200

180 200 180 160

Oranienstein . . . . . . . . . . 180 Naumburg 180 Karlsruhe 190 Gross-Lichterfelde...1000 2,470

The 2,470 total remained through 1903 while the officer corps continued its now somewhat slower rate of growth. Since the 2,500 quota had gone unfilled for thirteen years, the army began to despair of ever achieving the 15:100 ratio. The only other sources for cadets were the few boys who transferred to Lichterfelde from the small preparatory cadet school at Dresden in Saxony and those passing through the Bavarian lower and upper cadet schools in Munich. However, only those from Saxony became part of the Prussian corps, and they never arrived in numbers sufficient to make up the deficits. In each of the years just prior to World War I, the Prussian Cadet Corps supplied about 240 o f f i c e r s — t h e same figure as at the turn of the c e n t u r y ( 9 ) . Although the army contemplated adding another preparatory school, the simple truth was that the traditional cadet families could no longer meet the manpower demands created by the modern mass army. While the number of cadet graduates concerned army authorities, no thought was given to altering the unofficial purpose of the schools' e x i s t e n c e — preparatory officer education for the sons of the nobility and those families with a tradition of loyal service to the crown. The Cadet Corps especially favored those boys whose parents evidenced a hardship in providing the schooling required for officer service. Despite regulations claiming equality in the selection process, the army considered only those middle-class candidates with a family tradition of high military or civil service. The qualifications for selection included a father who was or had been an officer, a distinguished member of the police, or a high-ranking civil servant. Sons of noncommissioned

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officers with meritorious service also were included in the regulations, but rare was the boy from such origins who survived the admission process(lO). The prejudicial selection of cadets continued regardless of the number of vacancies. In the 1870s the spaces left unfilled increased despite the quotas and a more than sufficient number of applicants; and it can be safely assumed that none of those turned away were of preferred stock. However, by the late 1880s an unexpected but welcome increase in the number of acceptable candidates outstripped the capacity of existing facilities, thus the construction of the two lower schools in 1892 and 1900(11). Unfortunately for army authorities, there were only so many noble and old officer families, and procreation within these groups could not keep pace with army expansion. Still, the old guard remained opposed to opening the doors to a rush of bourgeois candidates. Former cadets, many of whom held policy-making posts within the officer corps, believed the Cadet Corps to be the epitome of Prussian officer training, the "traditional hotbed of knightly spirit"(12). Those officers who had begun their careers in this manner provided the social and spiritual foundation of the officer corps. The quest for social exclusiveness emanated from this select group that firmly adhered to the preservation of the feudal spirit of the corps. If the number of cadets from traditional sources could not keep up with the demand, there would be no compromise permitting an adulteration of the paragon of officer training. Military life started at a young age for cadets. If a boy entered the lowest class (Sexta), he was ten to twelve years old (compared to nine in the civilian schools). A student beginning any class above the Sexta had to pass a test over the courses of the preceding grade. One could even bypass the lower school and enter the senior institute so long as he passed the prescribed examination and had not reached age fifteen. The regulations required a royal dispensation for those fifteen and older, but it was seldom granted. Only a few boys entered the senior school without first attending a preparatory i n s t i t u t e — u s u a l l y not over twenty per year. In spite of the desire for more cadets, the army did not approve of these late entries, believing that it would be to the boy's and the army's greater advantage if he remained in the civilian school(13). The cadet school year ran from May 1 to April 3 0 . All boys with provisional appointments, regardless of the class they wished to enter, reported on May 1

The Structure and Curriculum of the Cadet Corps

85

to their respective schools for a physical and scholastic achievement examination. If a child exhibited poor physical development or any other defect that would preclude military service, he returned home with his parents. If deemed fit, the academic evaluation began. The examiners did not necessarily hold membership on any state education commission, but came to their duties on appointment by the commandant of each school(14). The test for those entering the lowest class included two major areas: 1. German: The ability to read and write German and Latin in script. The ability to copy dictation with easily spelled words and without serious errors. Familiarity with important sentence parts, the parts of speech, and modes of declension and conjugation. . . . 2. Calculations: The four basic calculations with abstract numbers, also division by a two- or more digit divisor. The writing and reading of numbers up to and including seven digits. Knowledge of German coinage, measures, and w e i g h t s ( 1 5 ) . While a relatively demanding exercise for a tenor eleven-year-old, the nine-year-olds who tested for the lowest class of a civilian secondary school took a similar examination that included the above plus more spelling and an inquiry into the boy's knowledge of the more important Biblical stories. Aspiring cadets who had spent the previous year in the civilian Sexta normally were advanced to the next grade. Those with no secondary schooling generally prepared with a tutor(16). Boys who tested at a later age and after preparation in a civilian school usually did better than those who had spent time only with tutors. One notable exception was Erich Ludendorff who, after preparing with a live-in tutor, came to Plon in 1877 at the age of twelve and was advanced ahead of his age group. More the norm, Alexander von Degen studied for two years to enter the Gymnasium, and while his tutor expected him to qualify for the third year (Quarta), he did well enough only for the second (Quinta). But after passing through the second and third classes of the civilian school, he took the corresponding cadet entrance exam and, as a result of high scores, was allowed to bypass the fourth class (Untertertia) and enroll in the fifth (Obertertia)(17). Infrequently, cadets had to repeat classes after a poor entrance examination. In 1893 Eberhard von Selasinsky repeated his fourth year upon entering

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For King and Kaiser!

Oraniensteiti, mainly because of his deficiency in English—a language not taught in the Gymnasium and for which he had not adequately prepared on his own(18). As a general rule, however, those boys who had attended civilian schools encountered little trouble with the cadet examinations. The tests served not to weed out the deficient, but merely as a means of determining which class matched the desired candidate's educational level. Prospective cadets who secured provisional acceptance had satisfied the allimportant q u e s t i o n of social origin, and the officer corps could not afford the l u x u r y of taking only Che best from this group. If a boy met the social, physical, and academic requirements, the school addressed the matter of tuition. For the poorer noble f a m i l y , the training of their son for a career as an officer was not only honorable, but quicker and much cheaper than school ing for the learned professions. A f t e r secondary school, law, medical, and theology students studied at a university until their mid- to late twenties, often at a cost of up to 25,000 marks (18966 figures). In comparison, the total cadet school cost was about the same as that for a nonresident Gymnasium s t u d e n t (about 6,000 marks in 1896). By age e i g h t e e n or, at most, twenty, the graduated cadet had only his War School fees remaining—just half of that required for one year at a university. After commissioning, he began earning his own l i v e l i h o o d , albeit a lowpaying one, while those in the university had up to eight years' study ahead of them(19). Despite the reduced cost, many cadet parents still could not bear all of the expense. Tradition and the desired social representation in the officer corps required the state to play a major role in p r o v i d i n g the necessary financial support. Orphans from good families as well as needy sons could count on such aid. As Albrecht von Roon (Prussian War Minister 1859-1873) admitted in his memoirs, the Cadet Corps served as a private "charitable institute" (Wohltatigkeitsanstalt) in a d d i t i o n to its p u b l i c role as a pprofessional school(20). For tuition purposes, the army d i v i d e d cadet places into several categories. At the top of the list stood the Royal Cadets (Koniglich Kadetten), Also known as King's Cadets, these pupils received either full or partial scholarships in varying amounts. The total annual cost for one cadet in the years around 1900 averaged 800 marks. Those not meriting full aid garnered 90 to 450 marks per year. The regulations reserved these grants for: (1) sons of officers and

The Structure and Curriculum of the Cadet Corps

87

policemen, especially those whose fathers had died in battle or from wounds or disease contracted in the field; (2) sons of distinguished noncommissioned officers killed or wounded in battle or with 25 years' service; and (3) sons of distinguished civil servants and reserve officers in the medical and veterinary corps(21). Fathers and guardians made application for aid when the boys were eight or nine. The respective schools then forwarded the requests to the Commandant in Berlin. The special committee that made the final selections included the Inspector General of Military Training and Education as chairman, a delegate appointed by the War Minister, a delegate from the Education Ministry, the Commandant, and the commanding officer of the Senior Cadet School. Candidates chosen for assistance were then classified according to the sums awarded. Upon the committee's recommendation, the Kaiser approved the final determination(22). While the scholarships provided much needed succor to many cadets, the failure to award aid also served as a means of legally barring a less desirable candidate, such as the son of a policeman or a noncommissioned officer. Those who bore full expense at the regular rate were categorized as "pensioners" (Pensionare) . Applications for these places could be submitted by any citizen of the states included in the Reich. The army usually reserved the partial and free positions for citizens of the states included in the Prussian military contingent. And while the army allowed foreigners to apply, they could not be chosen ahead of a qualified native. The successful candidates, regardless of tuition status, were distributed as necessary among the various schools with consideration given when possible to the preference of the family or guardian(23). In addition to the above, there existed a special category of cadets known as "externals" (Hospitanten) or day scholars. The few cadets making up this group did not room in the dormitories but attended all other cadet functions during the day. The annual tuition amounted to only 60 marks; however, those selected who were the sons of officers, professors, or officials serving at the schools paid nothing. In actuality, few in this category did not have a father connected with the school, Lastly, foreigners for which there existed no billets in the full-tuition category obtained appointments on a space-available basis. However, to discourage all but the seriously committed, the tuition for this group totaled almost

88

For King and Kaiser!

twice that of the pensioners(24 ) . At the time of German unification, the Cadet C orps awarded few full scholarships, but over half of the By the early some type of aid. students received 1880s the free positions numbered 200. However, with a growing army making greater demands upon the bud get , the number of students receiving aid b y 1888 had dropped well below half (900) of the enrollment(25). For purel y financial reasons, the authorities were forced to scrutinize assistance requests even more closely. Still, if it came down to the possibi lity of losing a needy but much desired app licant, the army would always come up with enough to see the boy to the ensign's examination. Prussia was not alone in granting aid to the sons of military and civil officials. Bavaria and Saxony, each with its own Cadet Corps, also provided financial assistance; and elsewhere in Europe, France, Italy, and Great Britain did likewise. However, unlike the Germans, and especially the Prussians, these nations normally considered diligent study and academic excellence as a condition for continued a i d ( 2 6 ) . For the Prussians the primary motive remained the constant supply of all available candidates from the desired origins. Loyalty to the monarchy as evidenced by good conduct and proficiency at military and physical drill, not intellectual prowess, served as the chief qualification for sustained financial help. Once in a cadet school, a boy became part of the Prussian army system and subject to its administration and regulations. The immediate head of the cadet bureaucracy was the Inspector General of Military Training and Education. All matters, including the budget, passed through him to the Minister of War. His official approval preceded the selection for all positions, whether administrator, instructor, or student. The day-to-day control of the course of instruction rested with the Cadet Board of Studies, which included three military and two civilian members as well as the Commandant of the Cadet Corps (a major general) who served as president. The military membership was comprised of the Commandant of the Senior Cadet Academy, a field-grade officer of artillery, and an officer of like rank from the General Staff. A delegate from the Ministry of Education and the senior civilian professor at the upper school made up the nonmilitary representation(27 ) . Here again, the makeup of a committee on military education hampered effective civilian input. In the event that he harbored such inclinations, the senior cadet professor would not endanger his position by

The Structure and Curriculum of the Cadet Corps

89

pressing too hard for unpopular changes. And while the remaining delegate offered the chance for an unbiased viewpoint, he could easily be outvoted if his suggestions proved unpopular. Although the Commandant of the Cadet Corps exercised administrative authority, the military director of each school usually operated on his own with regard to daily operations. However, these officers, despite holding at least field-grade rank, could not dismiss cadets. For all but the Royal Cadets, such authority rested with the Commandant who took such action only in extreme and rare cases. Removal of a Royal Cadet rested with the king on the principle that the appointment could be terminated only by the conferring authority(28) . Understandably, the chances of that happening to one so honored remained virtually nonexistent throughout the Corps' history. At the senior school the offices of Commandant and Chief Instructor merged under the title of Director of Studies (Studiendirektor) . The senior civilian professor exercised subordinate authority over the civilian instructors and the daily management of classes in nonmilitary subjects. Excluding the advanced classes comprised of all-military studies, the senior professor supervised the entire academic faculty since, as with the lower schools, teachers who held civil service appointments taught the nonmilitary subjects. In addition to the commandants who, except for the senior school, often held office until retirement, the army assigned infantry officers from the rank of junior lieutenant to captain to the academies as administrators, physical and military drill instructors, and cadet advisers. The lieutenants, along with a few theology students who also served as counselors, were unmarried since their duties included living in the cadet dormitories. As tutors (Erzieher), they watched over the boys and assisted in the preparation of homework and the resolution of personal problems(29). While the Inspector General forwarded all officer and civilian appointments to the king for official approval, the Commandant of the Cadet Corps played a major role in the selection process. A few officers received permanent assignment to the Corps and wore its distinctive uniform with the lace trimming dating from the royal guard of Frederick the Great. Most, however, returned to their regiments after a few years. All officers, whether permanent or temporary, drew a supplement to their pay. The civilian instructors served a probationary period before obtaining a permanent appointment. Remuneration depended upon

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For King and Kaiser!

the individual's rank and included free lodging. Besides instructors and support staff, each lower school had one Protestant chaplain and arranged for primary instruction in Roman Catholicism when requested. The senior school housed chaplains for both confessions(30). The school subdivided each class into sections called parallel classes (Parallelklassen) containing twenty-five to thirty students(31) . The cadets were seated in alphabetical order behind parallel desks facing the teacher and blackboard on a raised dais. Instruction adhered to the accepted method of the period—memorization of material for recitation in class, followed by lectures on the next lesson. Regulations for the senior school directed instructors to begin every class with questions on the previous lesson. Every few weeks, a class period was spent on a general oral examination with the students receiving advance notice and the expected content(32). The teachers also assigned outside exercises and themes, but the daily schedule allocated only thirty minutes in the morning and two hours in the evening for preparation. During these study periods, the cadets could not leave their rooms, and at various intervals the resident officers (or civilian tutors) checked to make sure all were at work and to render assistance if requested. The lesson plans called for the completion of all coursework a full month before the end of the school year. The cadets then devoted the entire time remaining to review for the final examination(33). Both the preparatory and the senior schools used the same grading system. Besides the final exams, the instructors prepared quarterly reports (Censurs) on each student and for each subject. The cadet received numerical predicates for attention, diligence, ability, and, lastly, knowledge. The grades reflected the instructor's general estimate of the cadet's performance rather than a fixed value derived from averaging his marks. At the end of the year, the reports and the final examinations determined the cadet's fitness for promotion to the next c l a s s ( 3 4 ) . The evidence offered reveals a grading system based to a large extent on the subjective impressions of the instructors in areas dealing more with attitude than academics. The teachers knew that the army wanted all cadets to pass, and with such a system they could overlook a performance which justified a failing grade in the civilian schools. In order to advance, a cadet had to score a satisfactory in each subject. Final promotion, however, rested with a board consisting

The Structure and Curriculum of the Cadet Corps

91

of the school commandant and cadet company officers. As a result, it was not unusual for a cadet to be promoted even though his performance dictated otherwise. And while the regulations called for the dismissal of any cadet who failed, such drastic action almost never occurred; the boy just repeated the grade(35). Like those who retook the ensign's exam, cadets received a lenient assessment and, barring a hopeless performance, promotion the second time around. Until the end, duty, obedience, and diligence ranked above scholarshi p. The Cadet Corps curriculum underwent many alterations during the last half of the nineteenth century. Although authorities claimed improved education as the reason for the changes, no one was prepared to support a curriculum that could result in cadet failures. The powers within the officer training system always weighed the academic benefits against the potential risk of losing boys from the preferred sources, and once again, education lost out to "character." On September 1, 1867, the 150th anniversary of its official formation, the Cadet Corps instituted a reorganization of the curriculum that lasted through the turmoil of unification to 1877. The new regulations reiterated the orders of 1850 and 1857 that cadet studies should correspond to those of the Gymnasium in every way except for the absence of instruction in Greek. But despite the directives, the cadet curriculum remained inferior to that of the classical secondary school. While the Gymnasium and its semiclassical companion, the Realgymnasium, had nine classes, the Cadet Corps retained the six in place prior to 1867. The curriculum included additional advanced classes at the senior school; however, only selected honor students studied the purely military subjects. Thus, a stark contrast continued between the cadet and the most popular nine-year civilian curricula(36). Avg. Age 9-10 10-12 1 . Sexta 2. Quinta 11-13 12-14 3. Quarta 4. Tertia 13-15 14-16 5. Sekunda 15-17 6. Prima 16-18 7. Oberprima & Se lekta (military studies only) Cadet Corps

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to

For King and Kaiser!

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obtain anywhere near the education available to the civilian students. A recent study held that the demands of the Sexta year in the Cadet Corps required incoming students to be proficient at the Quinta, or second level, of the nine-year schools(37). But as previously shown, the lowest cadet entrance examination did not even equal that for an entering Sexta student of the civilian schools. When the new curriculum requirements are matched with those of the comparable Gymnasium and Realgymnasium classes, it also becomes apparent that the Cadet Corps could not decide which civilian school to emulate(38). 1867 Cadet Corps Curriculum (Hours per week) a o

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Obviously, Cadet Corps instructors could not cram a nine-year education into six years. In reality, the new curriculum more closely resembled those of the six-year secondary schools. Thus, even if one concedes that some of the civilian aspirants entered the officer corps prior to satisfaction of the Prima certificate requirement, most met or exceeded the prescribed seven years and, as a result, received at least one year above that obtained by the cadets. At the end of their Prima class and after a preliminary test, the cadets took the same ensign's examination that, after 1872, civilians without a

The Structure and Curriculum of the Cadet Corps

93

royal dispensation could not take before the completion of seven years. Those who passed and were at least seventeen earned a promotion to the rank of

acting or "brevet" ensign (charakterisierte Portepee-

fahnrich) and began the same path to a commission (including nomination) as their civilian counterparts. Few cadets failed the exam since the preliminary test worked to reveal any deficiencies. Those not allowed to test, or who had failed, remained at the school for another year or entered the army at a higher enlisted rank. All received the same opportunity as civilian aspirants to retest and, likewise, the same special consideration for repeat attempts(39). For cadets who performed exceptionally well on the ensign exam, two advanced classes awaited them at the senior s c h o o l — t h e Oberprima and the Selekta. Prior to 1877, both contained the same curriculum as the War Schools, the last stop before commissioning. The criteria for selection included conduct as well as test scores; and special circumstances at times played a subtle role. Fedor von Zobeltitz scored a very good on his exam but failed to make the Selekta. He maintained that his nomination for the cavalry and the "von" before his last name created the feeling among cadet authorities of assured acceptance by the chosen regiment. The cadet given his place did not possess noble birth, and the automatic commission accorded Selekta graduates permitted the young man to avoid potential officer election difficulties(40 ) . The reasons for two separate advanced classes were entirely nonacademic. Cadets seventeen years or older who exhibited normal physical and emotional maturation entered the Selekta with the cadet rank of noncommissioned officer (Unteroffizier). Those admitted to the Oberprima were under seventeen, below army height regulations, not sufficiently developed physically, deficient in practical military skills, or lacking in exemplary conduct. They received the cadet rank of lance corporal and served the year under "honored" probation. Even cadets who otherwise merited advancement to the Selekta were held back if the Cadet Corps felt they lacked sufficient maturity to exercise the proper influence over subordinates during their duties as cadet noncoms(41). After the 1867 reorganization, the military curriculum for the advanced classes contained twentyseven required academic hours per week. The courses and hours for each included: arms and ordnance ( 5 ) ; tactics ( 7 ) ; fortification ( 7 ) ; military duties, law, regulations, and correspondence ( 3 ) ; military drawing ( 2 ) ; and topography and surveying ( 3 ) . Those destined

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for the artillery or engineer arms also took two hours of mathematics (an elective for the r e s t ) . In addition to assisting in the supervision of lower classmen, the advanced cadets attended the daily parade, and the Selekta students acted as junior officers during the biweekly battalion drill. While all participated in gymnastics and bayonet training two hours per week, the advanced classes substituted fencing for the two-hour dancing instruction. Everyone took part in the summer swimming classes; however, only the Selekta received riding lessons. Nonacademic activities for the advanced cadets took up two to three hours daily, compared with an hour for all lower classmen(42 ) . Throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, the Oberprima and Selekta classes included such nonmilitary subjects as German literature and philosophy, French, English, and chemistry. However, the move to bring the curriculum more in line with that of the War Schools led to the exclusion of all nonmilitary courses. While studying the same subjects as their War School counterparts, advanced cadets nevertheless took a somewhat different path to commision. In March of each year, both classes took the officer's examination given by the Supreme Military Examinations Commission. Those from the Oberprima who passed entered the army as patent ensigns (patentierte Portepeefahnrich) . While, unlike the civilian aspirants, they did not serve as privates, they still spent capacity the required time in the pseudo-enlisted and had to be subsequently approved by the regiment's of ficers. The few who failed the exam either remained another year at the school or more often entered the army as acting (brevet) ensigns on the same terms as cadets from the P r i m a ( 4 3 ) . Selekta cadets who passed the officer's examination on the first try received their commission immediately or as soon as a vacancy appeared. They also held the unique advantage of not being subject to the vote of approval by the officers of their regiment. Those who failed the test or who were not commissioned because of substandard leadership qualities also became acting ensigns. According to the regulations, seventeen was the minimum age for entry into the Selekta in order for the cadet to reach eighteen before commissioning. But again, the rules served only as a guide. In cases of exceptional conduct or aptitude for military duties, a waiver would be secured. And in rare instances, a cadet could even be transferred from the Oberprima to the Selekta(44). Unlike Prussia's halfhearted try at reorganization,

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Bavaria began a true modernization of its Cadet Corps in 1868 and completed the transformation to a full nine-year liberal arts curriculum by 1874. Just three years later the Prussians also initiated a complete overhaul of their system. The Royal Cabinet Order of January 1, 1877, stipulated that beginning with the 1880 school year, the curriculum for the Prussian (and Saxony) Cadet Corps must conform to that of the Realgymnasium. The only alterations allowed were those necessitated by the special military requirements of the Cadet Corps and the army (see Appendix 6)(45). According to the decree, the six nonmilitary classes of the Cadet Corps would be altered to parallel the Quinta (second) to Obersekunda (seventh) classes of the Realgymnasium. The Order also added a new Sexta (first) class equal to that of the civilian school as well as an Unterprima (eighth). Finally, the military coursework of the Oberprima yielded completely to the liberal arts studies of the last class of the Realgymnasium(46). Class 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th

New Title Sexta Quinta Quarta Untertertia Obertertia Untersekunda Obersekunda Unterprima Oberprima

----Sexta

Former Title

Quinta Quarta Tertia Sekunda Prima

----reorganized

Age 10-11 10-12 11-12 12-14 13-15 14-16 15-17 16-18 17-19

The new curriculum gave the immediate impression that cadets would henceforth receive an education equal to that of civilian students. On paper, at least, it looked that way: 1880 Cadet Corps Curriculum (Hours per week) I II III IV V VI VII VIII 2 Religion 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 German 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 Latin 8 6 6 5 5 4 5 6 French 6 5 4 4 4 4 5 English 4 4 4 3 3 Mathematics 5 4 6 6 6 6 4 5 History 1 1 2 2 2 2 4 3 Geography 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 Natural History 2 2 2 2 Freehand Drawing 2 2 2 opt opt opt opt -

IX 2 3 5 5 3 5 3 -

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1880 Cadet Corps Curriculum (continued) I II III IV V VI VII VIII 2 2 opt opt opt opt Writing 2 2 3 3 Physics Chemistry 3 2 Map Drawing 2 2 Total 28 30 30 30 34 32 32 32

IX 3 3 32

The curriculum also included instruction in gymnastics, dancing (winter), and swimming (summer). Riding remained restricted to Selekta students(47). If completed by all of the cadets, such a curriculum would have signified a remarkable transition in preparatory officer education. While still not equal to the Bavarian course, it nonetheless offered the opportunity for a marked departure from the old system. But like the civilian aspirants, Prussian cadets could enter the officer corps before completion of their secondary education. As most elected to do so, the reorganization's effect was drastically reduced(48) . Under Article 4 of the 1877 decree, completion of the Obersekunda (seventh) allowed a cadet to take the ensign's exam provided he reached age seventeen before April 1 and exhibited normal physical development. Those who passed could enter the army as acting (brevet) ensigns. As before, an exceptional score meant promotion to the Selekta, thus bypassing both of the Prima classes. Only those who were underage, lacking in physical maturation, or whose parents requested it advanced to the Unterprima (eighth) without taking the test. Depending on the family's wishes, a cadet who completed this class had several options. He could take the ensign's exam and become, on the basis of his score and personal conduct, either a patent or brevet ensign. In this case the "patent" designated only the exemption from the duties of a private and immediate promotion to those of a junior noncommissioned officer(49). The Unterprima cadet who scored high on the ensign's exam and exhibited proper conduct earned a place in the Selekta. However, those who wanted to prepare for the Abitur could enter the Oberprima. According to Article 9, these students merited the same level of cadet authority as their Selekta comrades. Graduates of the Oberprima and the Abitur became "actual" (wirkliche) ensigns and went directly to a War School. If they subsequently passed the officer's examination with a grade of good or better, their commission was antedated to that of their promotion to ensign(50).

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Obviously, the new curriculum still did not equal that of the civilian school it claimed to match. Only a handful made it through one or both of the Prima classes. Most looked to begin their military careers as soon as possible, unmindful that wounds or injury could terminate their calling and leave them unprepared for the better civilian occupations. Likewise, few fathers desired to prolong the financial burden. General opinion held that the boy should be out on his own as soon as possible. The officer corps and the Kaiser apparently agreed. The Cabinet Order of May 9, 1888, made significant alterations to Articles 4 through 8 of the 1877 decree (see Appendix 6 ) . A military author of the period claimed that the changes addressed the differences between cadet and civilian curricula, however the modifications did nothing to improve cadet education(51 ) . The amended articles admitted all Obersekunda cadets to the ensign's examination regardless of age. Those seventeen or older and sufficiently developed physically and emotionally still became brevet ensigns or advanced to the Selekta. As before, those below age or deemed physically and emotionally immature advanced to the Unterprima along with cadets whose family had requested such a transfer. Having already passed the ensign's exam, cadets who completed the Unterprima became, on the basis of conduct rather than academic performance, either patent or brevet ensigns or entered either the Selekta or the Oberprima class. As a result of these alterations, the number of cadets completing both Prima classes remained pitifully small(52) . Less than two years later, the unseasoned new Kaiser, William II, added his voice to the curriculum question. In the Cabinet Order of February 13, 1890, he called upon the Inspector General to make further changes to improve the cadet curriculum (see Appendix 7). However, this did not mean a raising of subject requirements. To the contrary, William believed that the curriculum already demanded too much. Instead, he promoted enhancement through "simplification." The course could only benefit from "the eliminating of all superfluous detail so that even the less talented pupils can, with fair diligence, follow the instruction without over-strain and get through . . . in the prescribed time." Clearly, the King sought to diminish the demands of a curriculum already inferior to its civilian model. His motive bore a striking similarity to the reason given for supporting civilian school change at the Reich School Conference the following December. Those

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who entered the Cadet Corps were the chosen ones in his eyes, and the coursework would not be allowed to bar or unduly delay their commissioning. At a time when he was advocating modification of the civilian courses for the army's benefit, it was only logical to demand that the Cadet Corps curriculum also be adjusted to facilitate the passage of all cadets. The Kaiser also attached great importance to the Corps' religious instruction, which emphasized the duty to king as well as to God. All officers must be good Christians, preferably Protestant Christians. Prejudice against the Catholic confession subtly manifested itself in the lower schools' provision for only Protestant resident chaplains while the lone official Catholic chaplain occupied a subordinate position at the senior school(53). Notwithstanding the predominance of the Protestant faith in Prussia, there existed a more valid, yet unspoken reason. No religious leader could be allowed to come between the officers' "loyalty and devotion to their rulers and country, and the proper carrying out of all their duties . . . [as] enjoined by the Commandments of God." Thus, in continuing one author's recent assessment, "royal decisions were moved into the vicinity of divine decrees, . . . and . . . military service received the status of the performance of one's Christian d u t y " ( 5 4 ) . Understandably, William believed the study of history should deal more with modern events that had a direct effect upon Germany; but ancient history and the Middle Ages still provided worthwhile "examples of heroism and historical greatness." Together with a general description of the development of civilization and Germany's place in world affairs, these studies served to prompt an awareness in the cadets of their role in maintaining the strong position of the crown in domestic and foreign politics. Geography was to be used to support these teachings. For the same reasons, the Kaiser assigned to the study of German the central focus of the curriculum. The use of correct grammar remained important, but above all, the instruction was to emphasize German traditions. In comparison, only practical conversational skills merited consideration in the study of modern foreign languages . The army acted almost immediately to institute the King's wishes. A twelve-page directive entitled "Altered Curricula" (Abgeanderter Lehrplane) made the desired changes. Although begun with the 1890-91 school year, full implementation was not completed until the 1893-94 class. These modifications comprised

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the last major reorganization of the C o r p s ( 5 5 ) . 1890 Cadet Corps Curriculum (Hours per week) IV V VI VII VIII IX I II Ill 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 Religion 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 German 7 7 4 4 3 3 6 3 Latin 3 4 8 6 French 4 4 5 3 4 4 4 4 4 English 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 Mathematics 5 2 1 1 4 2 History 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 3 Geography 2 2 2 2 2 2 Natural History 1 *2 opt opt opt 2 2 opt opt Freehand Drawing 2 2 Writing 3 2 2 3 3 Physics 3 3 Chemistry 2 2 2 Map Drawing - **2 26 26 28 30 30 30 30 30 30 Total r 'winter summer Defending these reductions (while drill and physical training remained u n c h a n g e d ) , the army could argue that the cadets had many examinations to pass: the test for promotion to the Senior Cadet Academy, the One-Year Volunteer qualification taken after the sixth class, and the ensign's e x a m ( 5 6 ) . But much the same was demanded of the civilian aspirants. What merits more attention is the dearth of references to academic failure within the Corps. Once again, the major goal of a new curriculum was not educational improvement, but the expeditious passage of all cadets. Another change facilitating the graduation of cadet officers came on the heels of the February 13 decree. With the Cabinet Order of May 2 7 , 1890, those cadets passing the ensign's examination and exhibiting physical and emotional maturity could be recommended for appointment as brevet ensigns or promoted to the Selekta even if they were under seventeen on April 1(57). A few such cases had occurred prior to this, but with official sanctioning, the message was unmistakable. For those who preferred an earlier commission to a better education, the army stood ready to accommodate them. Most cadets chose to take advantage of the new policies and enter the officer corps without completing their secondary education. Between 1892 and 1894, 69 percent entered as e n s i g n s — 5 9 percent as brevet and 10 percent as patent. The small percentage of patent ensigns included those who had completed the

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Unterprima as well as the few who stayed on for the Oberprima and the Abitur. The remaining 31 percent became second lieutenants via the Selekta, normally bypassing both upper classes(58). When the first cadets qualified under the 1877 reorganization to take the Abitur in spring 1885, a military author wrote later that it marked the "crowning achievement" of the 1877 decree and illustrated the equality of the cadet curriculum with that of the Prussian Realgymnasium. However, the memoirs of a famous cadet offer a different appraisal. World War I general Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck (of South Africa renown) recalled that the opportunity to earn the Abitur did not result in a stampede to the testing room. And despite being awarded the first cadet Imperial Commendation for passing the exam at age seventeen ( 1 8 8 8 ) , he claimed that he took it only because the earlier Abitur schedule allowed him to bypass the few months wait for the ensign's test and enter the army at once(59 ) . While possessing exceptional intelligence, LettowVorbeck at the time valued only the short-term military advantage to be gained with the Abitur. Cadets who stayed to obtain the certificate earned no official military award until April 13, 1900. From that date all cadets holding the Abitur received their commission after passing the officer's exam without having to attend a War School. No similar provision existed for civilian Abitur holders(60). On examination, however, the Abitur still remained of dubious military value to the cadet. The officer's exam dealt only with the subjects taught in the Selekta and the War Schools. Since only in very rare cases had the Abitur holder attended the former, a staggering amount of independent preparation was required. Few cadets reckoned the certificate worth the extra effort. The goal of the cadet was a commission, not the Abitur. Likewise, the army wanted the cadets in the officer corps as soon as possible. This attitude resulted in an incomplete secondary education for most cadets. If the young man stayed after the ensign's exam, he did so as a result of deficiencies or his parents' wishes. However, those chosen for the Selekta were only too happy to stay as both they and the army viewed their selection as possessing greater military value than a completed secondary education. With the Cabinet Order of July 20, 1881, the Selekta and the War School courses achieved full synchronization; but the honor accorded those attending the Selekta almost always led to a successful military

The Structure and Curriculum of the Cadet Corps

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career. In 1902 a study of Selekta students graduating in 1872 and 1873 illustrated the course's professional merit. Of the 144 cadets in the two classes, 45 (31.3 percent) were still on active duty, 43 (29.9 percent) had attended the War Academy (Staff College), and 53 (36.8 percent) had achieved command positions of regimental grade or higher (including twenty gen~ erals)(61). The cadets recognized the value of the Selekta on their records. They were not nearly as confident with the Abitur. In addition to future professional advantages, Selekta cadets also received special privileges unique in the officer training process. With good conduct and a passing grade on the officer's examination at course's end, they obtained their lieutenancy without serving any time in the enlisted ranks or having to pass the regimental officers' vote; and well ahead of all other officer aspirants. If, as rarely h a p p e n e d , a Selekta student failed the officer's test, he became a patent ensign and retested in three months. If he passed the first time, but his conduct or physical development was deficient, he held like rank for two to six months before commissioning(62). After 1879 the army administered both the ensign's and officer's examinations for cadets at the new Senior Cadet Academy at Gross-Lichterfelde . While the students continued the practice of taking the oral portion before the Military Examinations Commission, the familiar surroundings for the written no doubt aided the candidates. The army added to this advantage in 1893 when it ordered that the Selekta cadets, like the War School students, were to be examined by their own instructors(63) . A proper attitude and the favored status already accorded them assured all a fairly easy passage. In 1859 a British author advocated that Great Britain adopt a cadet system similar to Prussia's. Considering the generally substandard training found in many Victorian public schools, many in England held similar opinions throughout the remainder of the century. But in Prussia, even from within the army, voices rose in opposition to the Cadet Corps(64). The controversy was not prompted by any apparent lack of professional/technical training. Almost all believed that what the Corps did not p r o v i d e in this area, the rest of the training system — the duties of the ensigns, the War Schools, and the various specialty schools—would complete. The problem for the critics centered around the preparatory education. Even if they did not remain the full nine years, civilian officer aspirants throughout the imperial

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For King and Kaiser!

period revealed themselves to be better educated than most of their cadet counterparts. Not unexpectedly, most former cadets loyally maintained a high opinion of their education. Included among them was Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt who did not enter the Cadet Corps until age twelve ( 1 8 8 8 ) , after civilian schooling, and left four years later. Field Marshal Walther von Brauchitsch took over half of his secondary education at a civilian Gymnasium and did not enter the Corps until age fourteen. Erich von Manstein also came to the Corps at fourteen (1900) and was one of the few cadets to earn the Abitur. Like Rundstedt and Brauchitsch, Manstein praised the academic curriculum, but expressed the belief that the best lesson taught by the Corps encompassed the importance of honor, duty, obedience, and a strong esprit de corps (Korpsgeist) . Blitzkrieg legend Heinz Guderian likewise entered the Corps near the turn of the century with a few years civilian schooling and stayed for the Abitur. He remembered his instructors with feelings of deep gratitude and respect. Despite the rigorous and austere training, he felt the teaching was fair as well as excellent, especially in the O b e r p r i m a — a class attended only by a select minority(65). These are the common recollections of cadets who went on to success in their profession. However, most all of them received at least half of their secondary education from a civilian school. An Englishman who studied as a foreign cadet in the 1880s also had high praise for the general education, claiming that it fostered a love for literature, drama, and the other arts. Any student showing ability in music or art was encouraged to practice and improve his talents. But a closer study of his account reveals a contradictory picture. In comparison with his native land, he opined that if cadets from Woolwich or Sandhurst experienced the Prussian method, they would view it as "only a little better than an English penal establishment." He also admitted that the final exams were "not over-severe" and confessed that "considering the determined slacking to which I devoted myself, I am surprised at the large amount of knowledge the instructors managed to impart to me." His most telling, if not eloquent, assessment came with the description of the general academic atmosphere: "Get on or get out by any means possible"(66). Other foreign observers offered somewhat less restrained criticisms. In 1868 the British military attache to Prussia expressed a decidedly negative opinion of the Cadet Corps in a letter to the head

The Structure and Curriculum of the Cadet Corps

103

of the British legation in Berlin. After thorough consideration, he concluded that military education should not be pursued until after the aspirant had entered the army. The Prussian cadet schools promoted the belief that officers should stand as a class separate from those of equal rank in other professions. For him such training rendered the students "almost incapable" of succeeding in civilian life should they be forced to leave the army. The education they had received was both insufficient and mediocre. He agreed with certain unnamed high-ranking Prussian officers that cadet education could only "narrow the views of those who should not only be officers but also men of the world." Two American generals who made separate tours of the German system in 1871 and 1875 reluctantly reached the same general conclusion(67). While these observations came prior to the adjustments of the imperial era, a U.S. War Department study in 1896 also detected the major academic defect of the cadet curriculum. It concluded that while those cadets who did not remain for the Abitur got the jump on their comrades in the race for a commission, they retained a decided disadvantage if forced to return prematurely to civilian life. Prussians like Louis von Scharfenort, an officer and military writer, argued that while the reorganizations had stressed academics, the chief purpose of the Cadet Corps was not education but rather the "higher demand" of "character building"(68). Although much less likely to publicly criticize their old schools, some former cadets educated after 1877 also admitted the inadequacy of their education. Franz von Lenski , a cadet in the 1880s, exited his school believing that the military institutes provided the best academic as well as the best military preparation for the officer profession. Yet after observing that most of the officers in his field artillery unit held the civilian Abitur, he came to the conclusion that cadet education provided neither the best general academic training nor the best basic preparation for a career as an officer(69). Martin Bethke, commissioned from the Corps in the 1890s, made one of the most descriptive overall a s sessments. Looking back over a half-century later, he regarded the "scholarly equipment" the cadets received more as factual ballast than an introduction to the importance of ideas and logic. Physical accomplishments and military training merited more attention than academics. As a result of the unbalanced emphasis, cadets tended to develop an unjustified

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For King and Kaiser!

"haughtiness." Outside their world lived the "shabby civilians." Former cadets even displayed a condescending attitude toward their fellow officers from the civilian schools. While better educated, the latter were viewed as knowing less about military matters and failing to understand the "class milieu" of the officer c o r p s ( 7 0 ) . In his reminiscences Leopold von Wiese saw things much the same. Even including examinations, he judged cadet academic requirements to be modest. Ultimately, the boys felt that it was "more important to execute in gymnastics than in Latin or mathematics." If anything, conditions had worsened since Hindenburg's time as a cadet, a decade before unification, when "energy and resolution were valued just as highly as knowledge"(71). The Prussian Cadet Corps was not alone in assigning the major role to the physical portion of the boys' education. Victorian public schools also placed an inordinate value on the formation of character. Termed "muscular Christianity," this quest for "manliness and godliness" resulted in more weight being attached to skill at outdoor games than to academic excellence. But such was not the rule in the rest of Europe or even in other German states. In the period after 1848, Bavaria came to accept the supremacy of academics in officer preparation, and the Munich cadet curriculum sought to produce well-educated along with well-developed officers(72 ) . Scharfenort admitted that the overriding goal of the Prussian cadets was not a quality education, but success on the ensign and officer examinations; and he claimed that 85 to 90 percent of them succeeded(73). If accepted, these numbers mean that 10 to 15 percent of the candidates failed and had to subsequently serve out their military obligation in the ranks. And if they failed to finish their education at a civilian secondary school, the former cadets returned to c i vilian life with an incomplete preparation for alternative careers as well as the stigma of failure in a society where being a former or reserve officer was almost a professional necessity. A more realistic view argues that the Cadet Corps did everything possible to make sure all cadets succeeded. With the numerous retests and lenient grading accorded civilian aspirants, it is unlikely that more than a rare few of the cadets failed to complete the course as a result of academic deficiency. For the boys of financially pressed noble and officer parents, the Cadet Corps offered an affordable and honorable alternative to a civilian education.

The Structure and Curriculum

of the Cadet Corps

105

Also of importance, the majority of cadets received their commissions and set out on their own at an earlier age than their civilian counterparts. However, the deficiencies of the institution far outweighed the advantages. The arrogant class spirit promoted by the Corps engendered a subtle division within the officer ranks and alienated many civilians. The quality of education remained inferior to that of the civilian schools and the Bavarian Cadet Corps throughout the imperial period. As a result, the majority of civilian officer aspirants came to the officer corps with better general preparatory schooling than their cadet-trained comrades. In spite of all the wrangling over academic requirements, the cadets grasped the unspoken priorities of their education. Good conduct, leadership qualities, loyalty, obedience, and proficiency at military drill and physical exercise ranked far above the acquisition of knowledge or reasoning skills. A boy who, through excellence in the nonacademic areas, had earned the rank of cadet corporal could be outscored as much as 153 to 126 (of 225 total points) on the ensign's examination and still gain admission to the Selekta ahead of his brighter classmate(74). The underlying indifference to quality education was also evident in the manner of academic instruction. Coursework emphasized the learning by rote of useless detail rather than the use of knowledge as an aid in developing independent and critical thought processes. In the study of history, cadets committed to memory the names of the dynasties that had owned petty German principalities. As with all ancient history, the study of Rome dealt mainly with the importance of generals and battles. The accent in geography was also military, for example, the names of strategic roads and passes where significant military engagements had taken place. German studies included the old heathen gods and their Christian conquerors, while French was learned by reciting Napoleon's speeches to his M a r s h a l s ( 7 5 ) . By obtaining the boys at a young age, the Cadet Corps could more easily instill or reinforce the desired attitudes. Loyalty to the monarchy and the officer corps as its protector was paramount. But the fact that many who did not complete their secondary education still rose to high rank reveals a prejudice in favor of cadet training and raises a question of discrimination within the officer corps against those with superior academic training. Cadets who could not keep up in class, but who exhibited the proper attitude and physical and military skills,

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often were p r o m o t e d over the reservations of the civilian faculty. Once in the fifth class (Obertertia), the Corps transferred them to the senior school where a special class saw them t h r o u g h to the ensign's examination(76). Few failed as long as they projected the desire to please their superiors. Traditionally, cadets held the position of the elite, after the Kaiser's Guards, from the day they entered the Corps. Given this halo effect, failure entered the realm of impossibility for, as one former cadet recalled, "a dispensation from the s o v e r e i g n could still lend a h e l p i n g hand"(77). NOTES 1. "Der Jugend zur Bildung, der Armee zum Heile," S e p t e m b e r 1, 1873, laying of the f o u n d a t i o n stone for the new Senior Cadet A c a d e m y at Gross-Lichterfelde . P e l e t - N a r b o n n e , " H a u p t - K a d e t t e n - A n s t a l t , " 306-7; and V o g t , Buch, 159. 2. Demeter, Officer-Corps, 380. For w i d e r discussion, see Curt Jany, Geschichte der preussischen Armee vom 15. Jahrhundert bis 1914, v o l . 1: Von den Anfangen bis 1740 (Osnabriick: Biblio V e r l a g ) , 543-45 and 72628. 3. B a r n a r d , Courses, 286; Commission, Education, 202; and Fedor von Zobeltitz, Ich hab so gern geleb t. Die Lebenserinnerungen von Fedor von Zobeltitz (Berlin: Ullstein, 1934), 40. 4. B a r n a r d , Courses, 310; P o t e n , Preussen , 341; Commission, Education, 203; and Lorenz von Stein, Die Lehr vom Heerwe sen (1872; r e p r i n t ed., Osnabruck: B i b l i o - V e r l a g , 1967), 205. 5. Poten, Preussen, 341 and 362. 6. Scharfenort, Kade t ten/corps , 36-37 and 39. 7. Georg von A l t e n , ed., Handbuch fur Heer und Flotte. Enzyklopadie der Kriegswissenschaften und verwandter Gebiete, 9 vols. (Berlin: Deutsches Verlagshaus, 1909-1914), 5:216. 8. Boeck, Deutschland, 260. 9. Max van den B e r g h , Das deutsche Heer vor dem Weltkriege (Berlin: Sanssouci V e r l a g , 1934), 107; Oberst-leutnant von B r e m e n , "Das heutige deutsche Heer. Eintellung und G l i e d e r u n g des deutschen Heeres, K r i e g s m i n i s t e r i u m , G e n e r a l s t a b , Militar- Erziehungsund B i I d u n g s w e s e n , " in Deutschlands Wehrmacht, ed . Kaiser Wilhelm Dank Verein der S o l d a t e n f r e u n d e (Berlin: Kamaradschaft, Wohlfahrtsgesellschaft, 1913), 51; and Karl Hermann Freiherr von Brand und Helmut Ekkert, Kadetten aus 300 Jahren deutscher Kadettenkorps

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(Munich: Schild-Verlag, 1981), 159. 10. "Commissions," 609; and Prussia, Kriegsminist e r i u m , Aufnahme-Bestimmungen und Lehrplan des koniglichen Kadettenkorps (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 1899), 1-9. 11. Scharfenort, Kadettenkorps, 19-20 and 37. 12. Balthasar von Aulock-Radau, "Vier Jahre Kadett in Wahlstatt: Jugenderinnerungen," Brilon, 1955. (Mimeographed.) Zentra 1bib1iothek der Bundeswehr, Dussel— d o r f , Nr. Ks. 1594, 2. 13. Exner, "Army," 889; Commission, Education, 2034; Russell, Schools, 171; Barnard, Courses, 310; U.S. War Department, Military Schools, 69; and Kriegsministerium, Aufnahme-Bestimmungen, 6. 14. U.S. War D e p a r t m e n t , Military Schools, 69; and Commission, Education, 206. 15. Poten, Preussen, 348-49; and Kriegsministerium, Aufnahme-Bestimmungen, 23. 16. Russell, Schools, 171; and Jaschke, "Die Aufn a h m e p r u f u n g ins K a d e t t e n k o r p s , " Mi 1itar-Wochenblatt, Nr. 65, 1908, 1533. 17. D. J. Goodspeed, Ludendorff:Sold Soldier, Dictator Revolutionary (London: R u p e r t Hart-Davis, 1966), 9 Henny von Tempelhoff, Mein Gluck im Hause Ludendorff Eine Familiengeschichte (Berlin: August Scherl, 1918) 204-5; and A l e x a n d e r von Degen, Aus der Kadettenzeit Erinnerungen von Alexander von Degen (Leipzig: Reinhold Werther, 1890), 10. 18. E[berhard] von [ Selasen-]Selasinsky , "Aus mei~ ner Kadettenzeit," Deutsches Soldatenjahrbuch (Munich: Schild V e r l a g , 1970), 243. 19. Schulte, "Adel," 186-87; Boeck, Deutschland, 129; Hughes, "Origins," 28; and Lysbeth Walker M u n c y , The Junker in the Prussian Administration under William II, 1888-1914 (Providence, R.I.: Brown U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1944), 14, 19, and 121-22. 20. K r i e g s m i n i s t e r i u m , Aufnahme-Bestimmungen, 5—9; and Roon, Kriegsminister, 1:25. 21. K r i e g s m i n i s t e r i u m , Aufnahme-Bestimmungen, 5—9; U.S. War D e p a r t m e n t , Military Schools, 68-69; and Boeck, Deutschland, 259-60. 22. U.S. War D e p a r t m e n t , Military Schools, 68-69. 23. Ibid.; and K r i e g s m i n i s t e r i u m , Aufnahme-Bestimmungen , 5 . 24. Ibid. 25. Commission, Education, 204; and Scharfenort, Kadettenkorps, 36~37. 26. Lexis, View, 79; U p t o n , Armies, 128, 239-40, and 258; Spiers, Army, 6-7; and B[ernard] Poten, Geschichte des Militar-Erziehungs- und Bildungswesens in den Landen deutscher Zunge , v o l . 1: AlIgemeine

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Uebersicht, Baden, Bayern, Braunschweig, Colmar (Berlin: A. Hofmann & Comp., 1889), 186-87. 27. Commission, Education, 202 and 207; and U p t o n , Armies , 210 . 28. U p t o n , Armies, 210; and Commission, Education, 207-8. 29. Gen. Gunther B l u m e n t r i t t to Alfred Zerbel, "Thoughts Concerning the Instruction Given in Military Schools," trans. D. E. Thompson, Koenigstein, January 2, 1951, Military Reference B r a n c h , Military Archives Division, No. B-322, National A r c h i v e s , Washington, D.C., 1; Commission, Education, 207-9 and 211-13; and Boeck, Deutschland, 261-62. 30. Commission, Education, 212-13; Boeck, Deutschland, 261-62; and Hazen, School, 251-53. 31. At the senior school in 1890, there were twelve Untersekunda , eleven Obersekunda, and three U n t e r p r i m a classes. Seven Obertertia (5th) classes h a n d l e d the overflow and deficient cadets from the lower schools. Poten, Preussen, 362. 32. Commission, Education, 206, 215-16, and 219-21; Hazen, School, 251 and 255; and Ernst von W i l d e n b r u c h , Noble Blood, trans. Charles King and Anne Williston Ward (New York: F. Tennyson N e e l y , 1896), 40. 33. Commission, Education, 219-20 and 228-29. 34. Ibid., 228-29. 35. Ibid., 206-7 and 229. 36. Lexis, View, 54-55; and Brand und Eckert, Ka detten , 131. 37. Brand und Eckert, Kadetten, 131. 38. Scharfenort, Kadettenkorps , 27. 39. Commission, Education, 229-30; and Brand und Eckert, Kadetten, 127. 40. Fedor von Zobeltitz, Lebenserinnerungen, 47. 41. Commission, Education, 230-31. 42. Ibid., 217-219. 43. Ibid., 230-31 and 234; and Brand und Eckert, Kadetten, 127. 44. Ibid. 45. Messerschmidt , "Militar," 55; V o g t , Such, 146; Poten, Uebersicht, 182; Heinrich Meschwitz, Geschichte des koniglich Sachsischen Kadetten- und Pagen-Korps von dessen Begrundung bis zur Gegenwart (Dresden: Carl Damm, 1907), 337; and Friedrich Teicher, Das koniglich Bayerische Kadetten-Corps von der Grundung bis zur Gegenwart (Munich: Theodor A c k e r m a n n , 1889), 109. 46. Poten, Preussen, 346-48; and Scharfenort, Kadettenkorps, 30. 47. Poten, Preussen, 349-58 and 362-65. 48. For the Bavarian c u r r i c u l u m , see Poten, Uebersicht, 189-90. See also Bergh, Heer, 107.

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49. Scharfenort, Kadettenkorps, 33-36; and Poten, Preussen, 346-47. 50. Ibid. 51. Scharfenort, Kadettenkorps, 45. 52. Ibid., 44-46; and Poten, Preussen, 361. 53. Stanley Shaw, William of Germany (New York: Macmillan, 1913), 286; and Boeck, Deutschland, 262. 54. Jurgen-K. Zabel, Das preussische Kadettenkorps (Frankfurt am Main: Haag und Herchen, 1978), 188-89. 55. Poten, Preussen, 367 and 369-78. 56. Ibid., 360. For Che exam for transfer to the senior school, see F. N. Maude, Military Letters and Essays (Kansas City, Mo.: K i m b e r l y , 1895), 20-21; U.S. War D e p a r t m e n t , Military Schools, 70; and Black, "Training," 20-21. 57. Poten, Preussen, 361; and Scharfenort, Kadettenkorps , 46. 58. U.S. War Department, Military Schools, 72. 59. Scharfenort, Kadettenkorps, 43-44; V o g t , flu en, 146; Simpson, Army, 108; Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck, Me in Left en (Biberach an der Riss: Koehlers, 1957), 32; and U.S. War Department, Military Schools, 72. 60. S c h r n i d t - R i c h b e r g

199.

und

Matuschka,

Entlassung ,

61. "Statisches, betreffende K a d e t t e n der J a h r g a n g e 1871/72, 1872/73 und 1871," Mi 1itar-Wochenbla11, Mr. 59, 1908, 1372. 62. U.S. War Department, Military Schools, 71-72. 63. Poten, Preussen, 359. 64. Wraxall, Armies, 242-43; Farwell, Army, 139-41; and H u n t i n g t o n , Soldier, 41-42. 65. Gunther Blumentritt, Von Rundscedt: The Soldier and the Man (London: Odhams Press, 1952), 16-18; W. E. Hart, Hitler's Generals (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Doran, 1944), 114; Heinz Guderian, Erinnsrungen eines Sol da ten, 4th ed, (Heidelberg: Kurt Vowinckel Verlag, 1951), 11; Erich von Manstein, Aus Bin em Soldatenleben, 1887-1939 (Bonn: Athenaum-Verlag, 1958), 21-22; Dermot Bradley, Generaloberst Heinz Guderian und die Enstehungsgeschichte des modernen Bl itzkrleges (Osnabruck: Biblio Verlag, 1978), 18; and Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader, trans. Constantine Fitzgibbon (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1952), 16. 66. German Army, 36-38. 67. Commission, Education, 528-30; Hazen, School, 257-58; and Upton, Armies, 212. 68. U.S. War Department, Military Schools, 72; and Scharfenort, Kadettenkorps, 76, 69. Franz von Lenski, Aus den Leutnantsjahren eines al ten Gerieralstabsoffiziers (Berlin: George Bath, 1922), 8 and 24.

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70. Bethke, "Leutnant," 826-27. 71. Leopold von Wiese, Kindheit-Erinnerung aus meif?en Kadettenjahren (Hanover: P. Steegemann, 1924; reprint ed., Kadettenjahre, Munich: Langewiesche-Brandt, 1978), 54; and [Paul] von H i n d e n b u r g , Aus me in era Leben (Leipzig: S. Hirzel Verlag, 1934), 19. 72. Farwell, drroy, 139-41; Poten, Uebersicht, 18990; and Demetcr, Officer-Corps, 98. 73. Scharfenort, Kadettenkorps, 43. 74. Commission, Education, 232. 75. Gerhard Schultze-Pfaelzer, Hindenburg: Peace, War, Aftermath, trans. Christopher R, Turner (Glasgow: Philip Allan, 1931), 29-30. 76. Endres, Structure, 21-22; and Ernst von Salomon , Die Kadetten (Berlin: Deutsche Buch-Gemeinschaft, 1933), 90-91. 77. Bethke, "Leutnant," 8827.

5

Paradigms of Character: Life in the Cadet Schools Martis et Minervae Alumnis(l) Despite the claimed excellence in nonmilitary studies, academics did not occupy the position of premier importance in the Prussian Cadet Corps. As m i l i t a r y schools founded and supported by the royal f a m i l y , the main role of the cadet houses lay in formation of the character necessary for the hardships of life in the service of the king. The army felt that while there was little cause to question the loyalty of successful a p p l i c a n t s , the extent of their d e v o t i o n to the crown still must be tested. Not only would the rigors of cadet life measure the staunchness of their c o m m i t m e n t , but it also would d e v e l o p in the boys a strong martial spirit which the authorities believed would subsequently be transmitted to the officers of civilian school origin. Put forward as the nascent model soldier and officer, the cadet accepted and even glorified in the fact that his schooling was short on academics and long on h a r d s h i p and austerity. N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g the repeated references to nob i l i t y , all cadets did not hold titles. By 1910 over two-thirds of those who entered came from non-noble origins(2). Each, however, had a family history of service to the crown. While still a child or an adolescent, those accepted recognized the seriousness of the step they were about to take since the Cadet Corps most e x e m p l i f i e d the bond of the officer corps to the monarchy. As future protectors of the crown, most cadets

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retained the Corps' indifference toward general academic education. The Kaiser did not want soldierscholars, but a body of officers trained from childhood to obey their sovereign unto death. Indeed, Herbert Baldus recalled that on his first day as a cadet the boys were told, "This is . . . where you will learn how to d i e " ( 3 ) . Patriotism in the name of the fatherland became synonymous with ancient feudal fealty. In essence, the Cadet Corps served as a fledgling praetorian guard whose members the army dispersed throughout the officer corps to serve as examples for the other officers to follow. Receiving, as a rule, less preparatory schooling than their civilian-educated counterparts, they nevertheless represented the epitome of the officer corps' commitment to the execution of the will of the Kaiser. Although exhibiting the normal emotions of a child taken from home at a young age, and probably for the first time, few former cadets admitted to any serious opposition to becoming an officer. In the unlikely event that he had not acquired a fondness for the army from his family, the boy had observed the general respect for the officer in his circle of German society. Regardless, his desires mattered little. As Fedor von Zobeltitz reminisced, "Every Zobeltitz had worn the king's coat, and no one questioned whether I had the aptitude and inclination for the military profession"(4). As might be expected, any resistance usually came from the boy's mother. Fritz Steifel's mother wanted him to enter the Gymnasium and take up a profession similar to her brother's, a university lecturer. In rare instances did both parents have serious reservations. The von Selasen-Selasinsky family had a long history of army service, but both father (himself an officer) and mother were reluctant to give the boy u p ( 5 ) . Nevertheless, tradition, duty, finances, and the boy's enthusiasm won out. Irrespective of the boy's and the parents' enthusiasm or apprehension, the separation remained a difficult experience for all. Zobeltitz remembered his "moist-eyed, but brave mother" sending her "Liebling" off to Plon. Heinz Guderian and his brother Fritz, ages twelve and ten respectively, left for Karlsruhe together. While the event saddened all, Heinz claimed that nothing could dampen the boys' eagerness. Yet, they and the other boys understood the import of the event. Young Paul von Hindenburg drew up a will before leaving for Wahlstatt. He left his toys to his brother and sister and arranged to have one of his poorer schoolmates continue to receive the breakfast

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roll he had regularly provided. The testament closed with the affirmation, "I hereby confirm that I have written the above in all truth and sincerity"(6) . Likely borrowed from an official document, the attestation nonetheless conveys the boy's awareness of a life's road about to be undertaken. The world of family and carefree playmates had been replaced by allegiance to a higher authority. The first sight of their new home confirmed in the boys' minds the gravity of the task before them. Many of the older cadet academies had once been the castles of princes. Only Oranienstein was not surrounded by some type of wall or fence. Plon was perhaps the most beautiful. Erected in 1636 on a hill between two lakes, the old castle had served as the main residence of the Oldenburgers. In 1867 the fortunes of war resulted in its renovation for use by the Cadet Corps. The great knights' hall became the central dining room, and it is not hard to imagine the new cadets' awe upon first sight of the towering walls adorned with the ancient coats of arms of the Holsteins, Stormarns, and Dithmarschens, along with the Oldenburg cross. The other schools, while perchance not as beautiful, were just as imposing. Each contained dormitories, a chapel, hospital, and various administration and maintenance buildings. And, like Plon, all boasted a great hall which served as the main dining room and included decorations of coats of arms, flags, and other royal and military regalia(7). The Senior Cadet Academy generated a profound impression regardless of whether the boy was just entering the corps or had transferred from one of the lower schools. Before 1878 the school, much of which dated to 1776, was located in the older part of Berlin on the Friedrichsstrasse between the Alexanderplatz and Jarowitz bridge. Built by Frederick the Great along classical lines, the huge pillars and pediment demanded serious contemplation of all who entered(8). The lack of facilities and exercise space resulted in the decision in 1868 and the official order in 1871 to construct an entirely new senior institute. On August 14, 1878, the cadets moved into the new school located ten kilometers southwest of Berlin. Originally the Gross-Lichterfelde Estate, the grounds housed everything for the daily requirements of its occupants including the modern conveniences of pipedin gas and water. But as with the old school, the army did not overlook the importance of inspiring tradition and purpose. Above the main entrance to the administration building stood bronze statues of

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Frederick William I, Frederick the Great, Frederick William III, and the reigning William I; marble busts of the heroes of the Seven Years' War lined the walls of the great entrance h a l l ( 9 ) . Within the imposing structures, the reception process for cadets at the lower schools (and the few who entered the Corps at Lichterfelde) undertook to impart the grim earnestness of their new life. However, for the "old" cadets the annual arrival of the new boys took on the air of a holiday. Excused from classes, they used the rare free time to observe the admission of the apprentices (Stifte) with the condescending confidence fostered by their senior position(lO). The first order of business was a physical exam. In most cases this marked the first time the boys had undressed in front of strangers, and the quicker they accepted the loss of privacy, the better. Ernst von Salomon (who a decade later would be implicated in the assassination of Weimar Foreign Minister Walther Rathenau) remembered his initial fright and embarassment, but claimed that it passed as quickly as the examination( 11) . Notwithstanding his claim to maturity, Salomon and the others had undergone the first of many culture shocks designed to bring about a rapid adjustment to military life. After a successful physical, cursory by modern standards, the next step was the entrance examination. While the parents (generally dressed in formal black) awaited the results, the boys finished the test and took their first cadet meal. Here, along with the food, they experienced the first taste of the treatment they would soon come to expect from upperclassmen. The "swans" harassed the new "ducks" and then forced them to reply, "Excuse m e ! " Afterward, while the parents still waited separately, the boys played and made new friends (or e n e m i e s ) . When the exams had been graded, each boy was called forward and a s signed to a company. If required, the father paid the first half-year's tuition, whereupon the boy officially became a cadet(12). However, one symbolic as well as practical rite remained — the fitting of the uniform. The Cadet Corps used the clothing process as a quasi-formal ceremony signifying the metamorphosis from child to cadet. Widely known as the investiture robing, it was the most solemn part of the admission process. Generally, the uniform had seen repeated use and, with the exception of the dress tunic worn only on special occasions, presented an outwardly drab appearance. The tunics, however, bore the school's distinguishing colors. The cadets at Oranienstein,

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for example, wore the common red shoulder straps and cuff facings, but with yellow piping; at Plon the piping was white. Otherwise, the wardrobe lacked vividness and maintained a seeming indifference to the size of the wearer. As Salomon recalled, "the shirt appeared somewhat gray and the underwear was simply horrible with shoelaces for binding, vest, black tie. . . . The blue tunic, a simple blue, without adornment, almost civilian, the white fatigue dress, a pair of leather house shoes, a pair of boots, half-fitted and hobnailed" ( 1 3 ) . If issued anything too large, the cadet had no a l ternative but to grow into i t ( 1 4 ) . Regardless of the quality and fit, the importance of the occasion and the attendant excitement of the boys reduced the imperfections to insignificance. The child had made the ceremonial break from his past life. As a cadet and future officer, he no longer belonged to his parents or even to himself. Nevertheless, some believed as Hindenburg that life did not truly begin until the boy had put on the "uniform of his K i n g " ( 1 5 ) . Once he had donned the "garb of honor," the cadet expected to wear it the rest of his l i f e ( 1 6 ) . With the fitting over, the time for the parents' departure had arrived. Upon seeing the child in uniform, they realized fully that their son now belonged to the Kaiser. Some former cadets who wrote of their experiences chose to pass quickly over this moment. Walther Schulze, a cadet at Wahlstatt in the 1880s, described little about the separation, as did Zobeltitz(17). Perhaps the recollection of the pain and embarrassment was too difficult even years later. Whatever the case, this marked the first of many acts of false bravado to be played out in the coming years . Those who did write of the separation at some length tended to dwell instead on their parents' behavior. For the mothers who had accompanied the father and the boy to the school, the moment must have been traumatic. Salomon's mother gave up two sons at once, but still managed a smile as she told the lieutenant, "I place my young ones with you." Others were not as strong, if we are to believe Salomon, and cried openly. The fathers always tried to put up the good front with stern but loving admonitions followed by a kiss and a hurried departure. Kurt von Borcke's father reminded him of the importance of his undertaking with the standard counsel to "keep a stiff upper lip, my son, and remember that your profession . . . is the first calling in the world"(18).

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After the parents had left, the officers introduced the fledgling cadets to the reality of their future. Salomon recounted years later the speech his group received from a young first lieutenant: Gentlemen! You have chosen the finest profession that there is on earth. You have the highest goal in sight. . . . We teach you here to fulfill this goal. You are here about to learn what confers significance first to last on your life. You are here to learn about death. From now on you no longer have free will; you have to learn to obey, later to be able to command.(19) With the stark truth of the situation ringing in their ears, the boys were directed to their quarters. If unescorted, the child often experienced an immediate example of what would soon become expected treatment. A foreign cadet remembered his "welcome": I was met . . . by one of the senior cadets , who roughly demanded of me my name. I introd uced m yself with as respect ful a bow as I could accom plish whereup on without an y display of feeling, but rather as one who does w hat he considers to be h is duty , he struck me across th e face with a dog~c hain . This was not; because I was Engl ish , but because I was a newcomer ready to be broken in.(20) While many of the boys had become accustomed to the strict discipline of the civilian school system, they could not have foreseen the treatment awaiting them at the hands of their older schoolmates. Regardless of when he experienced his initial hazing incident, from that moment on the cadet lived in apprehension and even fear as he attempted to adapt to the new surroundings. He was awakened the next morning with the drum roll that accompanied every cadet function (even religious confirmations) and ordered to strip his blouse and wash. Those not responding quickly enough received a "box on the ears"(21). Through this and other such stimulation, the boy quickly learned obedience to all superiors. The company chief assigned one of the older cadets to direct the newcomer in his duties. The instruction administered by these boys, variously nicknamed "wet nurse" or "bear leader," included the proper way to arrange one's locker. The contents would then be torn out and strewn about on the floor for the cadet to put back in place. To cushion the abrupt change in lifestyle, each room's Senior Cadet (Stuben'al teste) had

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been ordered by the company commander to temporarily take the place of the boy's parents. Most, however, were indifferent, too involved in their own affairs, or lacked the proper maturity; sometimes the boy who entered at a later age might be as old as his cadet "parent"(22). The accommodations of the various schools intentionally allowed for no privacy in order to facilitate supervision. In some of the academies, ten pupils of various ages occupied a single room. Between every two rooms was a small apartment for the resident tutor, almost always a young unmarried infantry lieutenant. From his quarters the officer had only to pull one of the two small curtains or panels opening on the rooms to observe the cadets. Sometimes the tutor's quarters looked out on separate study rooms while the cadets slept in a huge dormitory on another floor(23). But regardless of the arrangements, most former cadets would have agreed with Leopold von Weise's recollection that in all of the schools, "there was no corner of solitude"(24) . At night the boys were checked by a nightwatchman who, with the aid of a lamp left burning on the wall, aroused any bedwetters. Even the toilets lacked doors. Baron von Reitzenstein described the pressing atmosphere: "By day and night . . . the restless company. There was never even so much as an hour when this grinding, leveling load was suspended. No movement, no breath, no contrary thought itself without the supervision of a critically guarding troop of foreign e y e s " ( 2 5 ) . This smothering scrutiny even extended to the cadets' mail. Outgoing letters could be read by the Senior Cadet or the resident officer who underlined any "questionable" passages in red and made explanations to the addressee in the m a r g i n ( 2 6 ) . The company officer checked the incoming mail during the daily parade formation. All letters except those of cadet leaders had to be opened in front of the assembled company and, after the boy displayed the sender's name, described aloud. If from a female, the letter often received the officer's personal examination, When Salomon's brother displayed a note from his female cousin, he called out, "Cousin!," but used the masculine Vetter. The captain took it, read it , and, after asking the boy if he exchanged "warm kisses" with his cousin, slowly tore it u p ( 2 7 ) . In fairness, not all of the officers who supervised the cadets were callous or indifferent. In one account of cadet life, Gerard von Godwin revealed that his resident tutor at Culm had the shutters between his and the cadets' rooms nailed shut, remarking "I

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was ordered here as an instructor, not as a spy." For this and his good treatment of the boys, he was well liked. Hindenburg also fondly remembered one of his instructors, recalling that the young subaltern even took part in some of the snowball fights(28). An officer's expression of kindness did not necessarily betray a concern for the educational enrichment of his charges. Selasinsky claimed great confidence in his resident tutor; yet during the two years of the officer ' s tour at the school, he never once checked on the boys' progress during study periods. More concerned with the cadets' "sense of honor" than their education, he dealt swiftly with any conduct offenses and assigned the guilty to "secure youths" who would set the proper example(29). A study of cadet chronicles justifies the conclusion that most of the schools' officers resembled Selasinsky's. One also finds evidence of outright antagonism for the notion that cadets should receive a broad general education. Hindenburg, a cadet prior to unification, recalled that the atmosphere at Wahlstatt fostered the development of mistrust and contempt for intellectual attainments or interests. A student who did well in academics was not looked upon with favor by cadets or officers unless he also excelled in the physical exercises and military drill. And since c i vilian teachers could not punish a cadet, the students granted them only grudging respect. Hindenburg exhibited no shame at his ignorance of nonmilitary subjects, admitting years later that he had not read a nonmilitary book since childhood(30). A foreign cadet later described an incident revealing the importance and intensity of physical education at the academies. Sometimes the instructors felt it necessary to assist the boys in the right Prussian way. One afternoon the sergeant major had me at his mercy, for I was hanging by both hands from a very high horizontal bar, and could not swing up in a sufficiently agile manner. Whereupon he prodded me sharply from behind with the point of his sword, and in the moment of shock I swung back and alighted heavily on his chest. This did not gain me his favor, and the number of extra drills and gyms which I suffered ought to have made me an all-round soldier and athlete.(31) The promotion of physical and military development over academics continued unabated. Even toward the end of the Corps' existence, Hanns Nickol recalled that "book sniffing" was regarded as a "secondary,

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inferior, and questionable application." As a result, the cadets often used the daytime study periods to rest for the activities that f o l l o w e d — g y m n a s t i c s , swimming, and other physical and military e x e r c i s e s — activities that fulfilled their "sense of being" and made them feel like men a "thousand times superior to any grammar school b o y " ( 3 2 ) . Those who showed a strong interest in study usually fell into the same mold as future World War II Field Marshal Fedor von Bock. A cadet at Potsdam in the 1890s, Bock believed that every waking hour must be taken up with the study of military science or officer education since nothing else possessed any practical value(33). Had there existed among the cadets any such inclinations, the school provided little time for nonmilitary intellectual and artistic pursuits. While the daily schedules varied over time and between academies, enough is known to obtain a general picture of a cadet's day. In the lower schools reveille sounded at 5:30 or 6:00 a.m. After washing and dressing, the cadets marched to breakfast. They then returned to clean their quarters and prepare for dress inspection at 7:30. Chapel followed and lasted until classes at 8:00. Everything usually operated a half-hour earlier during the spring and summer months. The class schedule also varied according to the day of the week. The morning periods might last to 11 o'clock on Wednesday and Saturday and noon the remaining weekdays. A break of a few minutes separated the periods, and the boys partook of a small snack sometime in the morning. Prior to the noon meal, the cadets mustered for daily parade in the courtyard. Dress was inspected again; orders and punishments issued; mail handed out and screened; and, weather permitting, the students participated in a pass in review. On Sunday the Church Parade took place without rifles(34). The boys devoted their afternoons to further recitations, exercises including military drill, gymnastics, swimming in summer, fencing, a little singing, dancing instruction, and target practice. Time was allotted for another policing of cadet quarters. Silent study periods occupied a few hours after the evening meal with short periods of little value (except rest) scheduled in the afternoon. Nightly prayers presided over by the resident officer and led by the "cadet of the day" concluded the day's official activities. Taps came at nine or ten depending on the season(35). While resembling that of the lower schools, the schedule at the Senior Cadet Academy allotted slightly more time for instruction and study. But despite

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smaller classes (at most twenty-five), the cadet had fewer classroom hours and less study time than his civilian counterpart(36) . When added to the undeniable reality that most cadets did not even complete the course, the Cadet Corps' lack of serious commitment to providing a sound general education becomes woefully clear . Recognizing the rigorousness of such a schedule, the authorities did not deny the boys free time. Wednesday and Saturday afternoons, as in the civilian schools, were half-holidays, but the cadets still had to drill after lunch. On Sunday afternoons cadets with permission could leave campus; but only fifthclass (Obertertia) students and above could go out alone. Each of the boys received a small allowance, the amount dependent upon class and cadet rank, to use on these excursions. Those fortunate enough usually spent the time with relatives living in the immediate vicinity. On rare occasions an officer would take a group of boys to dinner and the theater or opera. There was also skating in winter and hiking in summer. The older cadets preparing for unescorted leave into Berlin sometimes donned the clandestinely obtained and forbidden officer's trousers and replaced the coarse lining of their coat sleeves with silk — knowing full well that leave would be denied (at the very least) if discovered(37). Official vacation periods mimicked those of the civilian schools. The boys received two weeks at Christmas and again at Easter, five days at Pentecost or Whitsuntide, five weeks in July and August, and two or three days around Michaelmas (September 2 9 ) . However, cadets at the senior school usually spent Michaelmas on field exercises. Whatever the occasion, the cadets used the holidays to escape the schools and return home. Even the serious-minded Hindenburg confessed that he looked ahead to the trips home despite the arduous travel(38). In addition to family reunions, vacations offered cadets the opportunity for a somewhat less spiritual but nonetheless important r e p l e n i s h m e n t — f o o d . Many of the memoirs of former cadets include references to the paucity and poor quality of cadet fare. Foreign observers commented on the numerous snacks and three full meals the boys received, but the increased rations more likely came as a result of such visitors. Walther Schulze commented that it took an exceptional occasion to get anything special from the c o o k s ( 3 9 ) . The boys' thoughts revolved so much around food that letters constantly reminded mothers of the baskets allowed on holidays and family birthdays. A

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foreign cadet described the school meals as "neither of good quality nor sufficient in quantity, and as we were forced to work extremely hard, we felt the pinch." The average fare supported his claim: a breakfast of very weak coffee and black bread; a sandwich at mid-morning; a dinner of small portions of meat, vegetables, and black bread; a late afternoon snack of coffee and bread; and an evening supper of bread and cheese with soup and perhaps a little herring and watered-down b e e r ( 4 0 ) . The lack of nutritious food undoubtedly affected not only the boys' growth but also their studies and physical exercise. Hunger became such a part of cadet life that many ignored the rules of conduct in the attempt to satisfy it. Any scraps left over at meals were collected to either eat later or give to a comrade deprived of food as punishment. With their small allowance and any money obtained from home, the boys would buy provisions in town and bury them nearby, there to await a clandestine foraging party. Sometimes a sympathetic steward slipped food to his favorites in a dark corridor. Hindenburg also never forgot the lean times. On his seventieth birthday during World War I, he began the day by bringing into General Headquarters three cadets who happened by and ordering them to eat their fill from his ample table(41). The covert enterprises to obtain food must be classed more as acts of desperation than boyish sport. Above all else the Cadet Corps prided itself on the maintenance of discipline and the quick execution of punishment. The official discipline process revolved around the Conduct Classes (Censurklassen). Although some foreign observers noted only four, there were five in all, existing, with one exception, independently of the academic classes. Upon entering the junior or senior school, a boy was placed in the third class. While at this level, the cadet could leave the campus only on Sunday afternoons with a written invitation. On his return, he handed in the signed certificate attesting to his having been in the issuer's company(42). Cadets who exhibited good behavior received promotions to the second and first classes. Each step allowed more freedom without signed invitations. No one could be appointed to a cadet rank from the lower three conduct classes. The first class contained only cadets from the upper academic classes and the Selekta at the Senior Academy. When not occupied with school activities, members of this honored group secured leave at any time, and curfew was extended to

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10:30 p . m . ( 4 3 ) . A cadet who did not subscribe to the required behavior standards soon found himself transferred to a lower conduct level. Demotion, however, was usually short-lived since it took only a small offense to bring about punishment, and the offender quickly sought to rectify the situation. Punishment meant not only disgrace in the eyes of one's superiors, but a loss of leave and Sunday afternoons spent in punishment study (Strafarbeitstunde). Those few cadets relegated to the fifth class merited constant supervision as they stood in imminent danger of dismissal. While in class four or five, no cadet could enter the army as an ensign regardless of his overall standing(44). But, if at all possible, the authorities saw to it that any student who made it to the commissioning stage did not remain long in a lower class . The discipline system constituted an integral part of the overall grading system. At the end of each quarter, the professors and officer instructors submitted reports detailing the progress and behavior of each student. Company captains, also contributing their own assessments, would then prepare the inclusive reports detailing each cadet's performance under the headings of behavior, diligence, and progress. From this evaluation, of which a copy was sent to the parents, the commandant in conjunction with the captains determined conduct ranks. Not surprisingly, behavior took precedence over diligence and progress in academics. A cadet's first report came after two quarters (six m o n t h s ) ; thereafter, the door or wall of the study room contained a list of the occupants with conduct ranks noted next to academic levels(45). Each cadet's conduct history followed him into the army in a permanent report labeled Cursum Vitae. Understandably, the cadets quickly recognized the great importance attached to proper behavior. Heinz Guderian wrote his parents in 1902 to let them know of his progress, and before he advised them of his academic standing, he proudly announced that with his first report he had been promoted to the second conduct class. The boys likewise learned that one offense could just as easily wipe out such progress. Godwin told his mother of a cadet demoted for six months after being caught walking with the gardener's daughter. Balthasar von Aulock-Radau lost his secondclass ranking, along with a meal, and had to serve five hours in detention for doing a map drawing for a comrade(46). Given a choice, these cadets would rather have

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received some form of academic punishment. Those who had achieved the second class were the envy of the other cadets; their names were underlined in red wherever they appeared, and they had liberal leave privileges. But above all, demotion meant loss of cadet rank and subjection to mail censorship — both viewed by the boys as worse than academic failings. This reward and punishment system inspired in the cadets the notion that attitude, conduct, and obedience rated more attention than the acquisition of knowledge. With the important exception of promotion to the Selekta, also influenced by conduct, good grades and test scores resulted in few tangible r e w a r d s — good behavior did. Despite the great weight given to conduct ratings and prvileges, some observers viewed the punishment system as fairly tolerant. Hindenburg, as might be expected, remembered his superiors as "understanding, lenient judges." Emory Upton, an American general, toured the schools in the 1870s and reported the discipline "mild and paternal, being adapted to the tender age of the cadets, who rarely show signs of insubordination " ( 4 7 ) . But others who experienced the harsh reality of the order assessed it very differently. Cadets were ordered to refrain from many activities, for example, smoking, wearing jewelry, carrying a large amount of pocket money, associating with improper characters while on leave, indulging in any immoral activity, and appearing in public while improperly dressed. However, these and the other normal military requirements resulted in an inordinately elaborate punishment system that was well in keeping with the Prussian penchant for detail (see Appendix 8 ) . Cadets learned quickly that the list was more than just wall decoration. Fritz Stiefel's smoking cost him a day's arrest and a note of the offense in his permanent record. Another cadet who made the mistake of behaving in a disrespectful manner toward a civilian instructor received several days' detention on bread and w a t e r ( 4 8 ) . While the Cadet Corps officially prohibited corporal punishment, the officers often allowed the boys themselves to administer physical correction. A cadet caught stealing from a schoolmate might be given the choice of a beating with canes by the other boys rather than have the offense recorded and face possible dismissal. Sometimes the cadets elected to administer punishment without reporting the culprit. Godwin wrote of the whipping given to one of their own for tying a dead mouse to the coattail of an officer. By refusing to name the transgressor, the

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boys incurred extra work, but to have done so would have meant much worse for the b o y ( 4 9 ) . The resident lieutenants possessed little official punishment power, the civilian instructors none. Offenses were reported to the company captains who, along with the commandant, ruled on their severity and assigned punishments(50). It was not uncommon, however, for the officers living with the cadets to allow them to resolve problems in the manner already described. While less concerned with academic performance, they still wanted every boy to succeed, and keeping indiscretions off the permanent conduct list was important and no doubt appreciated by both the cadets and the authorities. At the upper school the senior cadets officially aided the officers in the discipline process. Since Selekta students had passed the ensign's examination, they exercised authority allowed by that rank (equal to a noncommissioned officer) and wore the silver sword knot. The most senior of their number became company leaders (Kompagniefuhrer). All Oberprima and a few of the Unterprima (after 1877) students held the cadet rank of lance corporal, and their duties even came to include monitoring junior cadets during study periods. Like other cadet officers, these seniors of the room (Stubenmeister) had no official punishment power, but problems rarely occurred. However, the boys in the lower schools, having not yet learned to accept all hardships, sometimes felt justified in rebelling. The poor food, for example, resulted in a few hunger strikes. Naturally, such acts brought swift reprisals in the form of extra drill and training. But paradoxically, the cadets' collective opposition might be secretly applauded by the officers as evidence of a budding esprit de c o r p s ( 5 1 ) . Another officially prohibited activity that received the tacit approval of the authorities was cadet dueling. Although William II publicly denounced its existence in the officer corps and the Cabinet Order of January 1, 1897, officially barred it, the practice continued(52) . The officer corps knew that the King secretly admired this feudal anachronism and would not press for the punishment of the participants. Since the officer corps also favored its continuation, the cadets felt bound to carry on their own form of the tradition, and the officers permitted the activity. The practice likewise survived in the military schools of other countries (including England and the United S t a t e s ) , however, the cadets of these nations were older than those of Prussia. A left-wing German

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periodical noted that "in the Cadet Corps the young warrior is forged h a r d " ( 5 3 ) . Indeed, the boy learned early that honor ranked with duty. If one wanted the respect of his fellows, he could not hesitate to fight if challenged. To refuse meant ostracism and the eventual determination by the officer corps that he was unsuited for the profession. In the cadet version of dueling, the two boys squared off with their fists while the others formed a circle around them to make sure that they did not quit until blood flowed. The combatants aimed all blows to the face. Leopold von Wiese claimed that even as a cadet he found the practice disgusting. The "bloodthirstiness of the human beasts" as they repeatedly cried "Beat the swine!" horrified him. Yet he admitted that when he was personally involved and did well, he harbored a "wonderful sense of pride," and that the experiences instilled in him the idea that in life "one must be the conqueror." Even the cadets from other lands participated although they did not always understand when to fight and when to submit to hazing by their senior schoolmates(54). While also not officially recognized, the officers viewed hazing as an important part of the discipline process. The world of the officer was harsh and cruel, and a cadet had to learn to discipline himself to endure the physical and mental stress. However, the punishment cadets inflicted upon their junior mates reached dangerous levels and revealed that many learned to inflict pain without any remorse. Regardless of the level of abuse, the honor code prevented anyone from reporting the persecution. Examples of cruelty and even death from hazing also may be found in the histories of contemporary foreign schools; but again, these cadets usually were three to seven years older than the Prussian students(55) . While accepted by the authorities as part of the cadets' instruction in the ideals of honor, duty, and obedience, hazing evoked fear among the boys since the limits were marked only by the perpetrators' sadistic ingenuity. A fundamental part of hazing included the informal nicknames assigned to each cadet class. Although differing somewhat among the lower schools, the cadets' places in the pecking order remained the same. Firstyear cadets were addressed as "dirtsacks"; second, "knapsacks"; third, "breadsacks"; fourth, "senior cadets" or "silver buckles"; and fifth, "mossy heads." When the boys transferred to the senior school, they returned to the "breadsack" level and repeated the process, although hazing did not approach the intensity found at the lower schools. Only the new

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students without lower-school experience were singled out for especially harsh or cruel treatment. The rest already had proven themselves(56). Before becoming a "breadsack," the older boys regarded the new cadet as something of a pariah. He was, however, not ignored. Every new boy had to serve as the personal orderly of an older cadet, keeping uniforms clean and buttons polished. He not only experienced maltreatment at the hands of this cadet, but also could expect random abuse from anyone his senior. He might be slapped for no apparent reason except, perhaps, as a form of greeting. When a boy sought entrance to a friend's quarters and the room senior decided to refuse it, the knock could be met with a kick or a push in the face. Wiese recalled that one of the fifth classes during his tenure at Wahlstatt even included an extortion ring that forced the younger boys to provide them with beer and cigarettes. In winter the older cadets pelted their victims with snowballs containing stones. At mealtime the meat was often so tough that, despite their hunger, none wanted it. Since the rules called for everyone to clean their plates, the younger boys were given the task of eating or spiriting away their elders' leftovers(57 ) . The boys also endured "initiation rites" which crossed the line into the realm of torture. Latent sadism found near free reign as the cadets engaged in cruel activities to test their new comrades' worthiness for acceptance into the Corps. In one rite, known as The Cavalryman (Gardereiter), the perpetrators inserted needles or spring tips through erasers. These were placed in chairs and the victims brusquely pushed down on them. Wiese described a particularly brutal practice referred to as "slides" or "smooth situations" : The deliquent is dragged over a crossbar; each member of the company is entitled and morally bound to work on the body with all his strength and with any instrument of his choosing. The main thing is that blows fell on the back, buttocks, and legs in quick succession. Although the pounding could last for five minutes, the norm rarely exceeded one to two minutes. In Wiese's case, however, that was enough to produce a hernia(58 ) . Every cadet also went through a ceremony signifying the end of his plebe status. A comparison of two accounts illustrates the wide variations of treatment.

Life in the Cadet Schools Cadet Godwin's appearance before Holy Vehm proved relatively mild.

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It was quite dark in the room but for a bluish light from a few soap dishes into which they had poured methylated spirits and then lighted it. The tables were all pushed away, and only one remained in the middle for the execution; but high up on the lockers sat the chief judge . . . and his two assessors, and the brothers . . . stood in front of the lockers . . . forming an avenue through which I had to go; they all had white robes on going right over their heads, but they were sheets which they had taken from the dormitory. As I came in at the door a Vehm-brother seized me by the arm and led me before the judge. The sentence included the pitching of the boy by six cadets using a blanket; a "stomach dance" or twirling of the victim on his stomach; and biting his finger as the blindfolded Godwin "felt for the keyhole." His "stargazing" sentence (pouring cold water down a coat sleeve while the boy looked through it) was rescinded at the last m o m e n t ( 5 9 ) . Such activities were relatively harmless, but the easy treatment in Godwin's case came from having an older friend who looked out for him. Salomon had no such protector. His rite included "stomach dancing with obstacles," a euphemism for serious physical abuse . Each had a whip in hand, a wooden handle on which a leather strap was fastened, and which was used for the beating of clothes. Glasmacher . . . led me to the table. I climbed up with difficulty and lay on my belly. Glasmacher took my head in his hands, pressed me in the eyes and forced my skull hard to the tabletop. . . . Then whizzed the first blow. . . . After that they rained down on the back, shoulders, legs. While less formal hazing continued after this rite, the victims had become comrades in the eyes of their seniors. As Salomon remembered: "The affair was settled, and the ice suddenly broken. No one spoke even once of what had occurred"(60) . Cadets were advised by their tormentors to say nothing of these activities, especially to the officers. Most submitted both to the abuse and the vow of silence. Baron von Reitzenstein recalled one cadet who broke the code of silence and ended up in sick

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bay bleeding and with severe rib bruises. Those who resisted were usually foreign cadets ignorant of the greater brutality that could befall them. One was forced to hold three large dictionaries under each arm, then to stand on tiptoe and bend his knees for about fifteen minutes. When he finally fell from exhaustion, a beating began. He turned on his attacker and thereupon received additional punishment(61). The rare cadet who failed to advance for academic reasons also could expect to be hazed by former classmates unless he was big enough to make the attempt too hazardous for his assailants. The German sociologist Ludwig von Wiese wrote later that during his entire time at Wahlstatt he saw no act of chivalry in the form of protection of the weak. If such acts occurred, the reason generally lay with a cadet having an older brother or a close friend with an older brother in the school(62). Despite the abuse, many former cadets defended the hazing activities. Hindenburg reluctantly admitted that a cadet's life was "consciously and willfully brutal," but justified the treatment as just another part of the maturation process. Erich Ludendorff claimed that little hazing occurred at Plon, but his having been a "room senior" may have prompted a convenient memory lapse. Selasinsky felt that the incidents of "high spirits" had been exaggerated. Yet, he admitted that a senior cadet forced him to do knee-bends with pointed objects under his heels until he collapsed on them from exhaust ion(63). Erich von Manstein expressed the popular argument that the abuse did no harm to the "normal boys." However, the disturbing fact that many former cadets saw the brutal and callous behavior as normal and necessary even years later speaks of the permanent emotional effect of such treatment and goes far in explaining the reputation of the Prussian officer corps for dispassionate conduct. The cadets provided the favored model, and most civilian officer aspirants (both aristocrat and middle class) followed their example. But as the brutality of the schools continued unabated, even some aristocrats came to fear the thought of having to attend a cadet academy. Upon learning of the Kaiser's fall in 1918, one precocious young noble was overheard to remark that "the Junker class may have lost everything in the Revolution, but I, at least, have been saved from the Cadet School"(64). As they learned that hazing would be tolerated so long as the activity did not cripple or kill, some cadets developed a cockiness which led them to test

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the limits of acceptable misbehavior with their superiors, especially the civilian instructors. Although an American observer claimed in 1871 that acts of insubordination hardly ever occurred, the boys did on occasion openly confront the civilians for whom they had little respect. Gerd von Rundstedt once asked a civilian professor at Lichterfelde who was dawdling at the classroom door, "Now are you coming in or going out?" He compounded the transgression by using the familiar "Du." Nevertheless, the civilian's powerlessness to administer punishment resulted in Rundstedt's escape. When the company officer observed the comment "lebhaft," meaning in this case "impudent," in the boy's classbook, he thought it denoted praise since the word also could mean "lively" or "bright." As a reward, Rundstedt received special leave into Berlin!(65) The saucy but lucky Rundstedt also got off early once by claiming that he wanted to go riding with his grandmother who was in the hospital at the time. Sometimes, however, the boys went too far. Even Bavarian cadets, widely believed to be much better behaved than their Prussian brothers, once carried a New Year's revelry (1871) to such extreme that the authorities felt obligated to dismiss four upperclassmen and institute a morals and ethics class(66). Short of taking a life or a marked destruction of property, similar examples of cadet misbehavior did not prompt drastic action by the Prussian Corps. The number of boys from elite origins was too small and the demand for officers too great, and the addition of a morality and ethics course was perceived as unnecessary . As may be deduced from the foregoing, moral and ethical behavior had a perverted definition for cadets. While overlooking the immorality of hazing, they deemed it dishonorable to report it. The cadets also came to regard misbehavior, especially in academic areas, as harmless so long as the end justified the means. A foreign cadet obtained food in payment for "ghosting" English and French papers for his mates (free for his c o r p o r a l ) . Since he believed that cheating was widespread in all the schools, the practice was not viewed as unethical since it facilitated the end g o a l — a commission(67 ) . If the cadets expected to learn proper behavior from the officers, they regularly encountered poor examples. What morals the boys possessed received a serious test as they tried to copy their "gorgeous demi-gods." Each school designated officers to watch over the cadets' morals, but, as one former cadet

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recalled, Their post was much of a sinecure, for most of us had never had any, and those who had had mislaid them after a few hours of cadet life. We were all very eager in acquiring the latest anecdotes about the dissipated ways of exhalted officers of the garrison, and we strove, in our own poor little way, to emulate them.(68) To return drunk from leave earned a cadet almost as much envy from his peers as winning the Iron Cross. Anyone at the Senior Academy became an instant hero with a detailed account of an encounter with the opposite sex. The upper-class cadet officers also had their own clandestine model of the officers' mess where they met on Saturday evenings for beer and cigars. One foreign cadet's promiscuous activity prompted a threat of dismissal. He remained only because the ruler of his country bribed the school's commandant with a high decoration(69) . While former cadets passed off their misconduct as "high spirits," the boys had learned that obedience and discipline were ideals that could be bridged as long as the acts did not get out of hand and result in public defamation of the Cadet Corps. From the above and similar examples, cadets never lost sight of the advantage of having royal connections. At the turn of the century, Fritz von Unruh became the "education comrade" of the Kaiser's son, Prince Oskar. Separated from the other cadets at Plon, the Prince and his classmates received special attention from selected teachers. If a Junker did not have a royal classmate, he could count on serving as a royal page while at the senior school. Such an honor was reserved only for the noble cadets, and not even a poor academic record or "untidy locker" could prevent the assignment during court festivities(70). Manstein claimed that page service gave the cadets the chance to experience "the splendor of the world," even though the boys often had to stand on the royal carriages in bitter cold for several hours. Inside the palace they served either as personal or court pages. Two cadets waited on each royal personage while court pages performed various general duties such as serving at the banquets, keeping open the review path, and standing as doormen. The Decree of April 8, 1878, ordered that those Selekta, Unterand Oberprima, and Obersekunda cadets chosen for page duty must be able, at the very least, to express themselves in a foreign tongue (preferably French or

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English)(71 ) . But even the lack of cadets able to meet this requirement did not justify replacing them with non-nobles. On the days of service, pages arrived early enough to eat a meal so as to prevent their looking with envy upon the food to be served. The Page Steward (Pagenhofmeister) used tablecloths to instruct those boys who were to carry the royal trains. The uniform consisted of a scarlet-red robe of mid-thigh length with silver braids and shoulder straps, lace collar and cuffs; white cashmere knee breeches with silver braids; long white silk stockings and black buckled shoes; an elegant engraved sword; and a plain black academic hat with a white ostrich feather worn if the boy served outside. Still, Zobeltitz, who served during the Persian shah's visit in 1873, felt himself placed on the level of a footman(72). Notwithstanding Zobeltitz's analogy, page service must have been an exciting experience for the fifteento seventeen-year-olds. Hindenburg had the honor to serve the widowed Queen of Frederick William IV in 1865 and received from her a gold watch. Despite the expected claims to the contrary, the non~noble cadets surely envied their Junker schoolmates. Most had no contact with royalty outside of the king's annual visit, the great parades down the Unter den Linden or on Tempelhof Field, and the annual march in celebration of the victory over France at Sedan in 1870. At other times the cadets would be called on for special duty like honoring the legendary Moltke on his ninetieth birthday in 1890 and lining his funeral route the following year(73). Both page service and these special occasions served to remind all of the cadets that even though they, as future officers, would become elite members of German society, the reason for their exalted position remained the service of the monarchy. Broken by intermittent moments of pageantry, cadet life was brutal and lacking in the love and nurturing necessary for proper emotional development. Unlike most civilian secondary school students who lived near or with their families, the cadet normally saw his parents only during the designated holiday periods. The German military system was centered on the belief that it was not "an unreasonable demand that the individual should go through some hardship, selfdenial, self-discipline, [and] subordination for the sake of serving the country that gave him birth, education, and opportunity for prosperity." Many former cadets agreed with the authorities that beginning the process at an early age made even better

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officers. Lettow-Vorbeck concurred and, in addition, viewed the schools as a "blessing for the officers' families" and a positive alternative to the frequent school changes brought on by the garrison transfers of the fathers(74). Addressing the question of emotional development, Albrecht von Boguslawski believed that the Cadet Corps played a major role in the formation of character and the other qualities necessary for "manly" maturation. The esprit de corps promoted by the schools prevented "despondency, pampering, and low mental attitude." Hindenburg echoed these sentiments by giving full credit to the Corps for his success and claiming that the brutal conditions developed character, initiative, and responsibility. Some chose to block out the bad memories. They had made lasting friendships and, as characterized by Hermann Eisenhofer, remembered their cadet years as a "lovelier, more serene" period of "unburdened . . . d a y s " ( 7 5 ) . Not all evaluations of cadet life were so favorable. Understandably, the most vocal criticism came from outside the s y s t e m — m o s t notably, from Social Democrats. They correctly ascertained that the Cadet Corps placed more importance on obedience, adaptability, military bearing, and class consciousness than on knowledge and e d u c a t i o n — m i d d l e class values that could alter "the spirit of the army." Their conclusion argued convincingly that the Corps "makes from the children . . . soldiers of true Prussian worth and c h a r a c t e r — h u m a n machines who endure the highest possible hardships without a murmur [and] blindly obey the commands of their superiors"(76). Although more guarded in their comments, some former cadets expressed similar sentiments. Ludendorf f, who became a lieutenant at seventeen, admitted that the schools made adults out of adolescents who were still in the end emotionally immature. Putting them in a uniform which granted power over those of junior rank left the door open for psychological as well as physical abuse. At the very least, Ludendorff felt, the cadets received one-sided political and even religious indoctrination. While living in the Ludendorff house, Henny von Tempelhoff noticed with each of Erich's visits how quickly his responsibilities "had prematurely stripped him of childhood innocence." Godwin's instructions to his mother shortly after entering the Corps to give away his toys ("Cadets don't play with toys!") revealed the pressure on even the ten- and eleven-year-olds to become adults, mentally if not physically, as soon as possible(77) . Some cadets waited years after its demise to attack

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the system. In 1948 Fritz von Unruh, whose politics had altered drastically over the years, issued a blistering diatribe: "Ten years in a Cadet Corps, the model for later concentration camps, I heard . . . from reveille to evening prayers only of Kaisers, Kings, and their paladins; of 'glory in battle' and joyous duty. . . . But of the tragedy of St. Paul's Church we learned nothing"(78). In his memoirs Manstein took umbrage at Unruh's description of the school at Plon as a "slave institution." But in his defense, Manstein provides revealing, though unintentional, insight into the opinions fostered in many cadets. He argued that the boys had been educated more as "masters . . . in the good meaning." Unruh's description, on the other hand, painted "a mask of fiction . . . malevolent distortion, [and] political fantasy." While the general left open to the reader just what constituted a good master, such a caustic response a generation after the closing of the schools explains the absence of criticism by former cadets during their existence. Baron Manfred von Richthofen made a derogatory reference to his cadet days shortly before his death in World War I, but only after he had become a national hero. Even so, the fleeting remark in Der Rote Kampfflieger infuriated the staff at his former preparatory school (Wahlstatt)(79). Owing to the strong fraternity fostered by the Corps, few former cadets felt comfortable in offering denigrating evaluations even years later. If the system taught nothing else, it taught loyalty to comrades as the highest form of honor, second only to that accorded the monarch. As Scharfenort revealed in his account of the Corps, loyalty served as the linchpin—loyalty to the Kaiser, the officer corps, and the Cadet Corps "unto death"(80). While cadet training sought to prepare the boys for their future roles as officer-managers, it strove above all else to instill this loyalty unto death — whether defending the honor of the Cadet Corps or protecting the crown by shooting revolutionaries. Thus, the Social Democratic Party's condemnation of the Corps evokes no surprise. In defense of their vehement opposition, one socialist told of a cadet who wrote the Kaiser a poem assuring him that he could rely on the cadets "in the struggle against the Social Democrats." In return for such expressions of fealty, William II accorded the cadets the distinction of "sons and heirs of the Blood and Iron civilization"(81). To instruct the boys in their neofeudal loyalty,

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the Cadet Corps constantly reminded the students of the sacrifices made by their forefathers. One of the most representative examples of the effect these exhortations could have on young minds is found in Godwin's account of such an incident. The school's commandant honored the boy before his peers as one whose father, dying on the battlefield of Koniggratz, mustered the energy at the approach of his sovereign, to shout "His Majesty the King, hip, hip, hurrah!" The officer then drove home his point: That was the death of a hero, and may God grant us all a like death, for our first thought in life and our last thought in death must be the King; and it is that, cadets, that we mean to promise when we cry: His Majesty the King, hip, hip, hurrah!(82) The result was as expected. The twelve-year-old (who would die from hazing-induced illness two months afterward) could not conceal his emotions as he wrote home: "Dearest darling mamma, how proud I am of father, and of being a Prussian c a d e t " ( 8 3 ) . Although the Cadet Corps would survive another fifty years, the demand for loyalty remained undiminished. The army expected all officers to uphold the principles of obedience and loyalty to the crown, but the officers from the Cadet Corps endured above all others as the true and faithful guardians. Separated from their families at an early age, poorly fed, semicloistered, and brutalizing or being brutalized by their peers, the cadets grew up in an atmosphere of regimentation, austerity, and almost constant apprehension. Lacking proper emotional nurturing, they developed an abnormal callousness toward suffering along with an arrogant contempt for the "soft" civilian. In the end they bore out Goethe's assertion that "a man, even the best, accustoms his spirit to cruelty and finally even makes, from that which he detests, a law, and from habit becomes hard and almost unrecognizable"(84). The incidents of cadet misbehavior stemmed from necessity ( f o o d ) , the natural adolescent rebellion against authority, the mimicking of poor examples of conduct set by the resident officers, and the everpresent peer pressure which demanded that cadets prove their maturity and group loyalty through such acts as confrontations with the "outsider" civilian professors. The authorities punished these transgressions to maintain order and discipline. Nevertheless, they tolerated a great deal, especially the hazing and dueling, since they viewed such activities as an

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integral part of the d e v e l o p m e n t of cadet spirit. As the acknowledged paragons of the officer training system, the cadets subsequently transmitted their values to the officer corps. All too often the officers of civilian origins believed that to succeed in their profession, they must emulate their comrades of noble blood . NOTES 1. "Brought up in the path of war and wisdom." Inscription on the pediment of the old Senior Cadet Academy. Barnard, Courses, 312; and [Louis] von Scharfenort, Bilder aus der Geschichte des KadettenKorps fur Alt und Jung (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 1889), 107. 2. Bethke, "Leutnant," 824-25. 3. Herbert Baldus to Emilio Willems, in Willems, Way, 78. 4. Fedor von Zobeltitz, Lebenserinnerungen, 34. 5. [Selasen-]Selasinsky , "Kadettenzeit," 242-43; and Degen, Erinnerungen, 3-4. 6. Fedor von Zobeltitz, Lebenserinnerungen, 34; Bradley, Guderian, 15; and Schultze-Pfaelzer, Hindenburg, 27. 7. Fedor von Zobeltitz, Lebenserinnerungen, 35; Karl A l e x a n d e r Prusz von Glinicke, Aus den Memoiren eines Leibpagen (Hameln: C. W. Niemeyer, n.d.), 23; and Commission, Education, 209-10. 8. The best description of the old school is found in Commission, Education, 213-15. See also Barnard, Courses, 312; Schultze-Pfaelzer , Hindenburg, 31-32; Hazen, School, 253-54; and W i l d e n b r u c h , Noble Blood, 32-33. 9. For descriptions, see V o g t , Buch , 158-60; P. Lichtenstein, Die Central-Cadet ten-Anstalt und die Enstehungs-Geschichte des Vorortes Gross-Lichterfelde (Berlin: Richard Eckstein, 1890), 11-17; Scharfenort, Bilder, 105-9; H. H. Whitney, "Cadets of Other Lands," Munsey's Magazine, January 1901, 547; Pelet-Narbonne, "Haupt-Kadetten-Anstalt"; and Poten, Preussen, 342-43. 10. Walther Schulze, Damals, als ich Kadett war: Erinnerungen (Leipzig: Gose & Tetzlaff, n.d.) 4; and Vogt, Das Buch vom deutschen Heere, 150-51. 11. Salomon, Kadetten, 15-16; and Carr, Germany, 283. 12. V o g t , Buch, 150-51. 13. Zabel, Kadettenkorps, 195; Salomon, Kadetten, 22-23; [Selasen-jSelasinsky , "Kadettenzeit," 244; and Poten, Preussen, 341.

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Ik. Zabel, Kadettenkorps, 196. 15. Margaret Goldsmith and Frederick V o i g t , Hindenburg: The Nan and the Legend (New York: William Morrow, 1930), 32. 16. H i n d e n b u r g , Leben, 22. 17. Schulze, Erinnerungen, 5; and Fedor von Zobelt i t z , Lebenserinnerungen, 35. 18. Kurt von Borcke, Das sind win Biographie einer Jugend (Zurich: Amalthea-Verlag, 1940), 38-39; and Salomon, Kadetten , 14. See also Fedor von Zobeltitz, Lebenserinnerungen, 35; and Vogt, Buch, 152. 19. Salomon, Kadetten, 29. 20. German Army, 27-28. 21. V o g t , Buch, 153-54. See also Fedor von Zobeltitz, Lebenserinnerungen, 39; and W i l d e n b r u c h , Noble Blood, 38. 22. [Selasen-JSelasinsky, "Kadettenzeit," 244; and Salomon, Kadetten, 15 and 24. 23. Hans Joachim Freiherr von Reitzenstein, Vergitterte Jugend: Geschichten aus dem Kadettenkorps {Berlin: Ensler, 1920), 13 and 87, cited by Zabel, Kadettenkorps, 201-2; and Barnard, Courses, 312 and 314. 24. Wiese, Kadettenjahre, 48. 25. Reitzenstein, Jugend, 87, cited by Zabel, Kadettenkorps , 202 . 26. Wiese, Kadettenjahre, 34-35 and 45. 27. Salomon, Kadetten, 51. 28. Godwin to Lady Alberta, November 19, 1867, in Paul von Szczepanski, The Prussian Cadet; Letters from a Cadet to His Mother, trans. W. D. Lowe (London: George Routledge 8 Sons, 1910), 60; and H i n d e n b u r g , Leben, 20-21. 29. [Selasen-]Selasinsky, "Kadettenzeit," 244. 30. H i n d e n b u r g , Leben, 19-20; and Goldsmith and V o i g h t , Hindenburg, 36. 31. German Army, 28-29. 32. Hanns Nickol, Der letzte Kadett (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1935), 7. 33. Hart, Generals, 156-58. 34. Adolf von Crousaz, Gescnichte des koniglich preussischen Kadetten-Corps nach seiner Enstehung, seinem Entwicklungsgange und seinem Res til taten (Berlin: H. Schindler, 1857), 320, 322, and 381. See also Black, "Training," 22; U.S. War Department, Military Schools , 70; and Zabel, Kadet tenkorps , 187 and 200201. 35. Barnard, Courses, 317-18; Commission, Education, 209-10; U.S. War Department, Military Schools, 70; [Selasen-jSelasinsky, "Kadettenzeit," 244; Black, "Training," 22-23; and Salomon, Kadetten, 26.

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36. Russell, Schools, 157-58. See also Fedor von Zobeltitz, Lebenserinnerungen , 40; Hazen, School, 254; Whitney, "Cadets," 546-47; and Commission, Education, 221-22. 37. Godwin to Lady A l b e r t a , October 30 and N o v e m b e r 19, 1867, in Szczepanski, Cadet, 40-44 and 54; LettowVorbeck, Leben, 30; Fedor von Zobeltitz, Lebenserinnerungen, 40-41; Boeck, Deutschland, 262; B r a d l e y , Guderian, 16; Commission, Education, 221-22; HHazen, School, 258; and Russell, Schools, 157. 38. Poten, Preussen, 384; Boeck, Deutschland, 262; U.S. War Department, Military Schools, 70; and Hindenb u r g , Leben, 22. 39. Hazen, School, 254; W h i t n e y , "Cadets," 546-47; and Schulze, Erinnerungen, 8. 40. German Army, 29 and 30-31; Hermann Eisenhofer, Einst gab's Kadetten! (Munich: Eduard Pohl, [1932]), 8-9; and W h i t n e y , "Cadets," 546-47. 41. Fedor von Zobeltitz, Lebenserinnerungen, 35; German Army, 29-31; Schultze-Pfaelzer , Hindenburg , 2829; and H i n d e n b u r g , Leben, 24. 42. Aulock-Radau, "Jugenderinnerungen," 5; Ernst Boesser, Erziehung und Unterricht ±m koniglich preussischen Kadettenkorps (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 1894), 9, cited by Zabel, Kadettenkorps, 207; Barnard, Courses, 314-15; Commission, Education, 224; and Hazen, School, 254. 43. Commission, Education, 224-25; Hazen, School, 254-55; and Barnard, Courses, 314-15. 44. Ibid.; U.S. War Department, Military Schools, 70; and Boesser, Erziehung, 9, cited by Zabel, Kadettenkorps, 207. 45. Barnard, Courses, 314—15; Commission, Education, 224-25; and Hazen, School, 254-55. 46. Salomon, Kadetten, 88; Commission, Education, 228; Guderian to parents, June 18, 1902, in B r a d l e y , Guderian, 16; Godwin to Lady A l b e r t a , N o v e m b e r 19, 1867, in Szczepanski, Cadet, 56; and Aulock-Radau, "Jugenderinnerungen," 5. 47. H i n d e n b u r g , Leben, 21; and Upton, Armies, 210. 48. Hazen, School, 255-56; Commission, Education, 228; Degen, Erinnerungen, 72-73; and German Army, 33. 49. Godwin to Lady A l b e r t a , N o v e m b e r 9 and 29, 1867, in Szczepanski, Cadet, 46-53 and 65-68. 50. Commission, Education, 223. 51. Ibid., 223-24; Scharfenort, Bilder, 78; Reitzenstein, Jugend, 52, cited by Zabel, Kadettenkorps, 216; and Wi Idenbr iich, Noble Blood, 36. 52. Schierbrand, Speeches, 169 and 309. 53. Bernard L. M o n t g o m e r y , The Memoirs of FieldMarshal the Viscount Montgomery (Cleveland: W o r l d ,

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1958), 24; Peter Karsten, The Naval Aristocracy: The Golden Age of Annapolis and the Emergence of Modern American Navalism (New York: Free Press, 1972), 40; and "Die militarische Barbarei und ihre Verleidiger III," in Der Volksstaat, Nr. 63, May 31, 1876, cited by Reinhard H o h n , Sozialismus und Heer, vol. 2: Die Auseinandersetzung der Sozialdemokratie mit dem Noltkeschen Heer (Bad Homburg: Max Gehlen, 1959), 213. 54. Wiese, Kadettenjahre, 54-55; and German Army, 31-32. 55. M o n t g o m e r y , Memoirs, 24; Stephen E. A m b r o s e , Duty, Honor, Country: A History of West Point (Baltimore, Md. : Johns Hopkins Press, 1966); R o b e r t Charlwood R i c h a r d s o n , Jr., West Point (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1917); and Karsten, Aristocracy. 56. Borcke, Biographie, 40-41; Fedor von Zobeltitz, Lebenserinnerungen , 36; and A u l o c k - R a d a u , "Jugenderinnerungen," 5-6 . 57. Glinicke, Memoiren, 26; German Army, 28; Wiese, Kadettenjahre, 25 and 56-63; and Goldsmith and V o i g t , Hindenburg, 34. 58. Wiese, Kadettenjahre, 28 and 40; and Goldsmith and V o i g t , Hindenburg, 34-35. 59. Godwin to Lady A l b e r t a , October 10, 1867, in Szczepanski, Cadet, 27-31. 60. Salomon, Kadetten, 63~64 . 61. German Army, 28; and Reitzenstein, Jugend, 57, cited by Zabel, Kade t ten/corps , 216. 62. Goldsmith and V o i g t , Hindenburg, 35-36; and Godwin to Lady A l b e r t a , August 20 and S e p t e m b e r 8, 1867, in Szczepanski, Cadet, 3-6 and 7-8. 63. Goldsmith and V o i g t , Hindenburg, 32; Erich L u d e n d o r f f , Mein militarischer Werdegang: Blatter der Erinnerung und unser stolzes Heer (Munich: L u d e n d o r f f s V e r l a g , 1933), 6; and [ Selasen-]Selasinsky , "Kadettenzeit," 244-45. 64. Manstein, SoIdatenleben , 22; and Goldsmith and V o i g t , Hindenburg, 35. 65. Hazen, School, 256; and B l u m e n t r i t t , Rundstedt, 17-18. 66. Ibid.; and Poten, Uebersicht, 184-85. 67. German Army, 32. 68. Ibid., 33-34. 69. Ibid., 34; Laffin, Jackboot, 93; and Schulze, Erinnerungen , 85. 70. Manstein, So 1datenleben , 23-25. 71. Ibid.; [Louis] von Scharfenort, Die Pagen am Brandenburg-Preussischen Hofe, 1415-1895 (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried M i t t l e r und Sohn , 1895), 131-32; and Fedor von Zobeltitz, Lebenserinnerungen, 39-40. 72. Fedor von Zobeltitz, Lebenserinnerungen, 39-40;

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and Manstein, Sol datenleben, 24. 73. Schultze-Pfaelzer, Hindenburg, 32; H i n d e n b u r g , Leben, 22; L u d e n d o r f f , Werdegang, 6; Fedor von Zobeltitz, Lebenserinnerungen, 44; and B l u m e n t r i t t , Rundstedt, 17. 74. Karl 0. B e r t l i n g , "The Military System of Germany," Outlook, June 15, 1907, 329; and LettowVorbeck, Leben, 23. 75. Boeck, Deutschland, 260; Goldsmith and V o i g t , Hindenburg, 37; Eisenhofer, Einst gab's Kadetten!, 3; and [Selasen-]Selasinsky , "Kadettenzeit," 241. 76. Hohn, Auseinandersetzung, 204 and 213. 77. L u d e n d o r f f , Werdegang, 6; Tempelhoff, Familiengeschichte, 212 and 229; and Godwin to Lady A l b e r t a , September 21, 1867, in Szczepanski, Cadet, 13. 78. From a speech d e l i v e r e d in St. Paul's Church (site of the failed 1848 National Assembly), Frankfurt am Main, May 18, 1948, quoted in part in Zabel, Kadettenkor ps, 1. 79. Manstein, Sol datenleben, 23; and Manfred Freiherr von R i c h t h o f e n , Der rote Kampff1ieger (Berlin: Deutscher V e r l a g , 1933), 27. 80. Scharfenort, Kadet ten/corps , 190. 81. Hohn, Auseinandersetzung, 213. 82. Godwin to Lady A l b e r t a , October 19, 1867, in Szczepanski, Cadet, 37. 83. Ibid., 38. See also December 9, 1867, 70; December 16, 1867, 73-76; and Captain von Wecker to Charlotte Kunzelmann, December 20, 1867, 77-82. 84. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Iphigenia in Tauris, trans. Sidney E. Kaplan (Brooklyn, N.Y.: Barren's Educational Series, 1953), 25.

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6

Acceptance into the Fold:

War School and Life as a Subaltern

The officer who does not do his duty shall go to blazes!(1) For all but a few Prussian ensigns, attendance at a War School (Kriegsschule) marked the last stop prior to commissioning. Here the young men concentrated on those military subjects which prepared them for the officer's examination and subsequent duty as regimental junior officers. The schools first appeared as one of Scharnhorst's reforms with the Cabinet Order of May 3, 1810, which set up three facilities for officer candidates at Berlin, K o n i g s b e r g , and Breslau. By the end of the decade, h o w e v e r , the army had forsaken all three and returned to the exclusive use of the so-called division schools (Divisionschulen) whereby each division maintained responsibility for the preparation of its own ensigns. By 1844 the number of these schools totaled seventeen. The disparity of instruction and the anticipated increase in the number of divisions resulted in the Cabinet Order of February of that year, which reduced the number of schools to one for each army corps (nine at that time)(2). Retaining the "division" designation, the schools survived essentially unchanged until 1859. A brief threat arose in 1848 when the Frankfurt Parliament a t t e m p t e d to place all officer training studies within the civilian universities. However, the failure of the revolution and its attendant assembly ended outside interference and the system carried on as before. Reform did come, but from a traditional and less-

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threatening source(3). On April 6, 1854, Frederick William IV appointed General Eduard von Peucker Inspector General of Military Training and Education. Peucker correctly a s sessed the schools' lack of a coordinated curriculum, inefficiency, and generally poor quality. Even taking into account the projected expansion of the army, the number of division schools was far too g r e a t — m o s t had only ten to fifteen students per class. The instructional staffs, while large, did not receive a sufficient addendum to their pay to entice the best-qualified officers to apply. Owing to the lack of adequate central direction, the authorities of each school acted independently, and instruction suffered as a result. The army did not even have a regulation mandating attendance, although rare was the ensign who failed to do s o ( 4 ) . Under Peucker's direction a new set of regulations, instituted on July 21, 1859, brought about a complete overhaul of advanced pre-commissioning training. Except for the few division schools maintained during the short transition period, the old system gave way to an entirely new order. Three new institutions bearing the title of War School appeared at Potsdam (1859), Erfurt ( 1 8 5 9 ) , and Neisse (1860). Although each was initially designated to train candidates from three specified army corps, this connection disappeared by the early 1870s. The expressed intent of the schools was to prepare students for the officer's examination through the study of professional theory and practical exercises. Attendance became compulsory and was technically open not only to the ensign, but also to those in the enlisted ranks who passed the ensign's examination(5). Despite the professed equality of admission, the improbability of an enlisted man of any rank taking the ensign's examination has already been shown. This discrimination continued in spite of the requirements of the army reorganization of 1860. The increase in manpower demanded so many additional officers that the emergency order of February 6 of that year allowed for a temporary bypassing of the compulsory attendance regulation and even the officer's examination for selected ensigns and reserve candidates. But even then, the fear that the social and political homogeneity of the officer corps might suffer resulted in the suspension of the section of the order regarding the reserves(6). While the emergency order remained available and could be used in times of crisis (e.g., the unification w a r s ) , the practice in peacetime was to adhere

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to the compulsory attendance regulation. In 1865 the army ordered that the previously exempt artillery and engineer ensigns must complete the War School curriculum prior to commissioning. By mixing the members of the various branches, the authorities hoped to promote a general familiarity with the problems inherent to each and thereby enhance the course's overall worth. Bavaria, although still outside the Prussian sphere, saw fit to follow Peucker's example in 1868 and require universal attendance at their War School in M u n i c h ( 7 ) . Along with the addition of candidates from the technical arms, the continued expansion of the Prussian army before and after unification soon began to tax existing War School facilities. The authorities responded by establishing new institutions in all areas of the nascent German nation except Bavaria (whose army operated independently in peacetime). Three new schools opened in the 1 8 6 0 s — E n g e r s in 1863 and Hanover and Kassel in 1867. Unification resulted in additional schools at Anklam in 1871 and Metz in newly annexed Lorraine in 1872. In 1885 the school at Erfurt was moved to Glogau. The 1890s saw the final two additions to the system at Hersfeld (1891) and Danzig (1893). By this time enrollment at each varied from 80 to 128 (see frontispiece). An eleventh school earmarked for Bromberg in 1914 never opened(8 ) . In addition to the rarely used exceptions allowed by the emergency order of 1860, two other routes to a commission bypassed the War School. The army exempted any young man who held the Abitur and had studied for a year at a Prussian university(9). Since all who chose this route still had to pass the officer's examination, they had to prepare on their own for the all-military test or volunteer to attend a War School. Once again, extended preparatory education proved in practice to be more of a hindrance than an aid to rapid commissioning. The candidate who spent his time in a War School instead of preparing for the Abitur and attending a university became an officer at least a year (and generally more) ahead of his better-educated counterpart. In an admirable expression of their own or their parents' regard for the value of increased academic preparation, a greater number of civilian aspirants toward the end of the century (by this time mostly middle class) elected to defer enlistment until they had obtained the Abitur. However, few potential officers, regardless of their social origins, chose to visit a university when,

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by a t t e n d i n g a War School, t h e y could be making a more direct a d v a n c e toward a commission and the subsequent a c c u m u l a t i o n of s e n i o r i t y . The only other War School e x e m p t i o n , and the one most commonly seen, was that g r a n t e d to Selekta (and O b e r p r i m a before the 1877 reorganization) students of the Cadet Corps. H o w e v e r , this a v e n u e did not represent a true e x e m p t i o n as the Selekta c u r r i c u l u m initially paralleled and e v e n t u a l l y equaled that of the War Schools. S t i l l , what m a t t e r e d most to the officer corps were not the few War School e x e m p t i o n s granted or even the increase in A b i t u r h o l d e r s , but rather the middle-class c a n d i d a t e s without a m i l i t a r y heritage who made up a steadily growing p e r c e n t a g e of those e n t e r i n g the schools after 1880(10). As a result of the apprehension these n u m b e r s c r e a t e d , attendance became more than just p r e p a r a t i o n for the officer's e x a m i n a t i o n . The War Schools e n d e a v o r e d to continue the observation and e v a l u a t i o n of each ensign's political and social a t t i t u d e s in order to assess the d e p t h of his l o y a l t y to the crown and the officer corps. The expansion of the War School system l e d , on January 1, 1875, to the creation of a special department— the Inspection der Kriegsschulen—whose d u t y it was to m o n i t o r and s u p e r v i s e the operation, instruction, discipline, and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the institutions. W h i l e under the c o m m a n d of the Inspector General of Military Training and Education, the officer heading this section n e v e r t h e l e s s e x e r t e d great influence on all matters, i n c l u d i n g the a p p o i n t m e n t of staff and instructors. A f o u r - m e m b e r a d v i s o r y board of studies (Obers t udi en - und Examinations/commission,) assisted both the Inspector General and the Inspector of War Schools in all areas c o n c e r n i n g c u r r i c u l u m and e x a m i n a t i o n s . In a d d i t i o n , the Inspector General made an annual tour of e v e r y school, and the respect i v e c o m m a n d a n t s a n n u a l l y s u b m i t t e d a report on the general state of the i n s t i t u t i o n to the Inspector General rather than the War School d e p a r t m e n t . Inc l u d e d in the dossier were examples of drawings and papers p r e p a r e d by the s t u d e n t s — t h e three best, three worst, and three a v e r a g e in each subject — so that an opinion of the i n s t r u c t i o n and p e r f o r m a n c e at each school could be formed(ll). Even t h o u g h the Inspector G e n e r a l possessed more than a m p l e a d v i s o r y assistance, all a p p o i n t m e n t s to the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e and instructional staffs of the schools still r e q u i r e d the k i n g ' s a p p r o v a l . Each ins t i t u t i o n was h e a d e d by a d i r e c t o r , or c o m m a n d a n t , of field officer rank selected from the General Staff.

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The army considered his authority equal to that of a regimental commander. His immediate assistants included an adjutant, who also served as school librarian, and a paymaster (both lieutenants). Eight to twelve captains served as classroom instructors while six to eight lieutenants held the title of inspection officer. The latter supervised the students' discipline outside the classroom and provided instruction in the practical c o u r s e s — r i d i n g , fencing, gymnastics, shooting, and drill(12). The schools employed no civilians as instructors, and an officer could not refuse the temporary assignment. To decline would have been unthinkable in any event since appointment constituted the army's recognition of superior technical and practical qualifications and normally resulted in promotion to the next rank. Those officers exhibiting exceptional ability might be transferred to the General Staff upon completion of their three- to five-year tour at the school. In addition, all received generous pay increases and liberal furloughs between sessions(13 ) . Since it was the general opinion of the authorities that the preparatory education of the officer candidates had been tested with the ensign's examination, the War School course contained only military-related studies. The army asserted that these subjects prepared the candidates for both war and peace. In war the officer's duty naturally would be to lead men in battle, while during peacetime he prepared himself and his men for future conflicts. However, the authorities also emphasized the unique position of the officer in Prussian and German society. The opening pages of one of the study guides advised the ensigns that "the officer must continuously be conscious that he not appear merely as an educated man, but also as the representative of . . . his class"(14). To be an officer meant that one not only held membership in a respected profession, but that he occupied a place in a separate, higher social class ranking second only to the nobility. Even an aristocrat who failed to secure at least a reserve commission compared unfavorably with one who had donned the King's Coat. At the War School the candidate received reinforcement of the lesson in the social importance of the officer. He was instructed not only in his practical duties, but also in the officer's social and political place within the community. Prior to the commencement of studies, all ensigns took a general written test. The professed purpose of the exam was to evaluate the intellectual ability of each student; but it also provided an opportunity

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to investigate political and social views. The ensigns wrote one or two essays on political, historical, or social subjects. From the results the faculty then divided the students into four parallel classes that sought to place together those of comparable ability(15). The separation, however, also had the unexpressed goal of keeping failures to an absolute minimum. Under this form of evaluation and segregation, it became a normal occurrence to see those ensigns with the Abitur in the first parallel class along with any others exhibiting superior intellect. The rest, however, experienced no stigma as a result of their class designation. They attended lectures on the same subjects, but the authorities directed the instructors to tailor their presentations to the respective abilities of each class. In this way the schools adjusted the curriculum not only to challenge the gifted, but, more importantly, to bring along the slow learners. Reducing the maximum class size from thirty to twentyfive in 1873 also improved the students' chances for success(16) . The teaching directives ordered the officers to begin all studies in an elementary fashion. This was due not only to the unfamiliarity of the material, but also, in an extraordinary admission, because many students were seen to "possess only average talents." In addition to lectures, during which the ensigns could take only brief notes, the officers used question periods, essays, and practical "lessons of application." The candidates devoted the last six weeks to putting the acquired knowledge to use in field exercises, although lectures still occurred on an intermittent basis. Initially, the courses had no textbooks, but by the late 1870s, short instruction manuals, or study guides (Leitfaden), were being employed in all of the theoretical classes(17). To ascertain the students' progress, instructors held quarterly oral and written examinations. While receiving no prior notice, any ensign who could count knew when they were imminent. After the tests a report book made the rounds to each instructor who recorded the student's grade in that subject. Like the Cadet Corps teachers, War School officers evaluated their pupils not only on ability and progress, but also on conduct, attention, and diligence. Although students received no marks for the practical subjects (riding, drill, e t c . ) , progress, or the lack of it, was n o t e d ( 1 8 ) . As in every other Prussian military school, conduct rated close attention. Each student, with the

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exception of those whose grades were dangerously low, decided for himself whether or not to observe the twohour e v e n i n g study p e r i o d ; but the officers strictly monitored all candidates for p r o p e r b e h a v i o r and attitude. The official instructions d i r e c t e d that "the minds of the young men must be filled with reverence and affection for their colours; and r e m e m b e r i n g the glorious traditions of our royal house, of our army and of its i n d i v i d u a l parts, they must be incited to emulate the e x a m p l e set them"(19). The ensign attended a War School to obtain the professional competence necessary for the performance of his duties as an officer. But as in every other phase of Prussian officer training, the army assigned equal importance to ensuring that those who wore the officer's epaulets demonstrated u n q u e s t i o n i n g loyalty to the crown and the corps. E x c e p t for minor changes, the War School curriculum remained unaltered until the late 1880s. The course d e v o t e d eight-and-a-half of the ten months to lectures, t h e o r y , and practical application of acquired knowledge. In a d d i t i o n , the students received weekly instruction in r i d i n g , fencing, gymnastics, a n d , if necessary, swimming. Practical instruction also included parade d r i l l , service of field guns, and familiarization with the duties required in branches of arms other than one's own. The 1886 curriculum alloted thirty-two hours for both theoretical and practical instruetion(20).

Sub j ec t Arms and Ordnance Tact ics For t i f icat ion T o p o g r a p h y and S u r v e y i n g Map Drawing Army Organization and Regulations Military Correspondence Riding Fencing Gymnastics Total hours

Lecture hours

Application Total hours

5

2 2 2 2 0

5 4 4

1 0 0 0 0

1 1 2 2 2

2 1 2 2 2

16

16

32

3 3 3 2 4

5

The practical application of acquired knowledge also included exercises performed d u r i n g the final six weeks in the adjacent countryside as well as on school grounds. R e g i m e n t a l d r i l l practice, r i d i n g , and gymnastics did not cease d u r i n g this period. The students visited artillery ranges, technical and

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industrial establishments, and nearby fortresses. The officers delivered informal on~site lectures, but the main purpose of the tours was to permit each student to display his ability to transfer classroom theory to practical application. The candidate kept a journal and prepared a report including sketches at the end of the six weeks. The grade earned for this period was then averaged on an equal basis with the other quarterly marks. The director and all of the instructors met soon after for a final evaluation of each ensign's ability, industry, and conduct(21). The first major change in the War School curriculum came in 1887 when the army opted to add four hours of instruction in French and Russian to the weekly schedule. In French the authorities expected the students to build upon the skills acquired either in the cadet or civilian schools and achieve the ability to communicate effectively both orally and in writing. The instruction in Russian, however, was elementary since most students had had little or no prior exposure to the language. The hope was that the ensigns would use this foundation to improve their proficiency later on. With that in mind, the instructors limited the lessons to reading, writing, and translation of simple sentences(22) . But despite these additions, the system soon experienced alterations which greatly reduced the quality of the curriculum. By 1890 the continued expansion of the army was straining officer procurement. Even with the construction of new War Schools, the complement of junior officers remained insufficient. Rather than accept aspirants from undesired origins, the army elected instead to shorten the commissioning process. In the Cabinet Order of November 13, 1890, William II announced that due to the increased need for officers the length of the War School course would be temporarily reduced from ten to seven months(23). The shortage did indeed exist, but it was the result of the Kaiser and the officer corps' unwillingness to accept the i n e v i t a b l e — n o longer would the traditional sources be able to carry the weight of officer quotas. Opposition from the pro-education military circles came quickly. The army, however, had anticipated their response, and the instructions for the execution of the Order attempted to defend the reduction. The Inspector General stated that the army's main goal remained the acquisition of the right kind of men for the officer corps, and that objective would always take precedence over technical education. Regarding the entirety of officer selection and training, as well as the shortened course, the general argued

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that the goal of the War Schools was not "science" but "the truly difficult task of initiating young men into the basic principles of w a r " ( 2 4 ) . The crown and the officer corps had once again spurned education in favor of the rapid commissioning of preferred candidates. Now, in a new twist, they were cutting professional training. In an attempt to compensate for the reduction in the length of the course, the army simultaneously instituted modification of the curriculum that increased the total per-week hours of instruction. However, the change, which assigned hours to existing practical exercises and even shortened hours in a number of areas, did nothing to offset the loss of three m o n t h s ( 2 5 ) . 1890-91 War School Curriculum Subject Hours per week Arms and Ordnance 5 Tactics 7 Fortification 4 Topography, Surveying, and Map Drawing 6 Army Organization and Regulations 2 Military Correspondence 1 Languages 3 Riding 3 Gymnastics, Fencing, and Bayonet Practice 3 Firing Instruction (rifle and p i s t o l ) , Gun Drill, and Exercises in Regimental Drill and Tactics 4 38 The army instituted the same weekly schedule for the Selekta class of the Senior Cadet Academy; however since the length of the Selekta course remained unchanged, the cadets no doubt acquired a more thorough professional preparation. And despite the reduction in course length, the War School students continued to spend at least a week visiting the various fortifications and military-related installations. Of even greater significance, the schools persisted in devoting the final six weeks to practical field exercises. As a result, classroom instruction occupied just over five m o n t h s ( 2 6 ) . Notwithstanding the pressing demand for officers and the fear of a bourgeois officer corps, the Cabinet Order of March 29, 1893, sought to address the inadequacies of the War School curriculum. But instead of returning to the ten-month course, the decree set eight months and offered no change in the schedule. This token alteration, which was mainly an attempt to quell the lingering opposition to the 18 90 Order,

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served only to reveal that within the higher echelons of the officer corps the desire to obtain the preferred candidates as quickly as possible still outweighed educational and training considerations. The selection of an eight-month term came not so much from the desire to increase training as to ensure that, even with the one-month break between classes, four sessions still could be squeezed into a threeyear period(27). With aspirants having to serve only a two- or three-month enlisted period since the beginning of the decade, the officer corps had reduced the time from entry to commission to under a year. Increasing the course to eight months marked the limit of retreat; when war talk assumed the air of inevitability in 1913, the army quickly reinstituted the seven-month curriculum(28). In the end, all that mattered was that a candidate exhibited an unswerving loyalty to the crown and the officer corps, and that he possessed enough intelligence and common sense to perform his duties. On-the-job training would fill in the blank spaces. Life at a Prussian War School was not particularly harsh. The ensigns' quarters varied in size, but were neither cramped nor spacious. The largest housed six, the smallest only two occupants. Two plainly furnished rooms made up each living area. In the day room each student had his own desk and a locker for uniforms. The furnishings for the sleeping room consisted of a better~than~average bed and washing stand for each ensign. No personal furniture or articles deemed luxuries were allowed. Distributed throughout the dormitories were the quarters for the young unmarried inspection officers whose responsibility consisted of maintaining discipline and monitoring behavior and attitude. No personal servants were allowed, although enlisted aides performed certain tasks for the officers. The campus also included a library and reading room in addition to the lecture halls; rooms containing model works of fortifications and displays of various weapons and ammunition; a gymnasium for the practice of vaulting, jumping, bayoneting, and fencing; a drill ground; and a riding course(29 ) . Most of the social and ceremonial activities centered around the mess. The student mess (the officers had their own) usually consisted of a large dining room and two anterooms open throughout the day for casual reading and chess. The authorities did not require attendance at breakfast or supper; however, all, including the inspection officers, had to attend the two o'clock dinner. While regulations prohibited

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the consumption of liquor on campus, wine could be taken at anytime of the day in the mess, and beer was available at dinner. One or two officers and six of the ensigns managed the student mess which, like all regimental officer messes in Prussia, secured financial support through compulsory deductions from the users' p a y ( 3 0 ) . A normal day began at 6:30 a.m. with roll call a half-hour later. Lectures commenced at 8:00 and continued until 11:00. Between 11:30 a.m. and 1:30 p.m. the students participated in riding, gymnastics, and fencing exercises. Dinner lasted from 2:00 to 3:00 in the afternoon, followed by an hour of gun drill or bayonet practice. From 4:00 to 6:00 the ensigns solved various problems involving the practical application of lecture theory. Special drills in the different arms were held from 3:00 to 5:00 p.m. on Saturdays. From 6:00 to 8:00 p.m. on weekdays and 5:00 to 8:00 p.m. on Saturdays the students enjoyed free time. After another roll call at 8:00 p.m., the young men spent two hours in private study in their day rooms. During this period the inspection officer might visit and offer advice. When not in attendance, the officer assigned one ensign in each room to maintain order. Those students whose conduct and academic performance were satisfactory had the option of foregoing the study period. In addition, after church and dinner on Sundays, the schools released all from duty until lights out at 10:00. The summer schedule generally ran one hour earlier. Vacations included two weeks at Christmas and again at Easter, with ten days set aside for Whitsuntide (Pentecost)(31). Former students claimed that the War Schools made heavy demands upon the ensigns, however their accounts reveal a course permitting many enjoyable interludes. Wilhelm Groener, a candidate at Engers in the mid1880s, alleged the training to be hard, but spoke of numerous furloughs spent among the castles on the Rhine. Fedor von Zobeltitz, who attended Neisse a decade earlier, recalled that the ensigns occupied much of their free time wandering about the city. Martin Bethke, a candidate in the 1890s, offered a description which suggested that the authorities valued the polishing of the social graces as highly as study. The ensigns attended many dances to perfect their Kavalier role, and in the mess they continued to prove their manhood by imbibing large amounts of a l c o h o l — technically a severe breach of regulations(32). Regardless of these apparent contradictions, one War School requirement generally surpassed that of

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comparable institutions throughout Europe. The discipline code was rigid and tolerated none of the mayhem which regularly occurred at French and British officer schools(33). Foreign observers perceived that the merest infraction resulted in the severest punishment. The officer corps believed that the young men (a few not yet seventeen) still required guidance as to proper behavior and cultivation of the subconscious habit of obeying without question the regulations they would soon enforce as officers. To that end, the schools divided the candidates into groups, termed "Inspections" (Appelle), monitored by an officer who also taught one of the practical subjects. The other officers likewise observed and reported any undesired behavior(34). While the schools rarely experienced serious student trouble, the formal restrictions differed little from those of other contemporary military institutions in Europe. 1.

2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

7. 8.

No smoking in the bedrooms or the sitting ro oms [day rooms] during the hours of evening Otherwise, no restrictions during the St udy. ho urs of recreation. Li ghts out at 10:15 and no conversation in th e bedrooms after that time. Vi sitors admitted only during afternoon r e c re at ion hours. Wi ne, beer, or spirits forbidden in rooms, Ca rds, dice, and all games of hazard strictly fo rbidden. Aw ay from school students must conduct themse lves exactly as officers, and not frequent p i aces deemed out of bounds. They must be in by 10 p.m. (11 p.m. with leave) and those re~ tu rning late suffer a fine, De bt and intoxication forbidden and punished by arrest. Repetition of the offense, dis~ mi ssal . We aring of civilian clothes forbidden at all ti mes .

In addition, the instructors advised the students that absence from lectures and failure to complete an assigned exercise equaled a breach of discipline and resulted in similar punishment. Also, the medical officer examined the ensigns once a month. Concealment of either venereal disease or the infected student's sexual partner also led to disciplinary a c t i o n ( 3 5 ) . The unofficial sanctioning of drinking bouts and the routine inspection for venereal disease evokes

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skepticism as to the general self-discipline and moral fiber of the young men chosen for the nation's highest profession. However, the graduated list of punishments cited below, while shorter than that for the Cadet Corps, allowed the authorities many options short of the seldom-invoked dismissal(36). 1. Punishment Parade, which obliged the offender to report in full dress to the officer on duty at fixed hours during the day. 2. Deprivation of leave for three days. 3. Open arrest—the confinement of the offender to his room d u r i n g free time. 4. Close arrest in the arrest room of the school . 5. Arrest in the garrison g u a r d r o o m . 6. Dismissal . Unlike the cadet schools, arrest carried no deprivation of diet (except alcohol), but the special punishments for idleness i n c l u d e d loss of Sunday l e a v e and confinement to the campus d u r i n g vacation periods. In keeping with the army's desire not to lose any candidates, even dismissal did not necessarily mark the end of a nascent career; the ensign's regimental commander could a p p l y for his readmission to a subseq u e n t class(37). Here again, the regulations did e v e r y t h i n g possible to ensure the u l t i m a t e success of those deemed socially and p o l i t i c a l l y indispensable. M i s b e h a v i o r , while punished, remained secondary to the candidate's competency for duty and his loyalty to the monarchy and the officer corps. Students selected for their distinguished behavior and academic success assisted the officers in the discipline process. Each of the Inspections had one ensign designated the "Senior for Duty Purposes" (Dienstaltester). Likewise, each of the four parallel classes included a "Senior of the Class" (Classenaltester) who reported absences and maintained order when the instructor was absent. Minor punishments could be administered by any officer, but every violation had to be reported to the commandant. Only he could order punishment arrest, although any officer possessed the authority to place an ensign under temporary arrest subject to the commandant's final determination(38) . The m a x i m u m arrest for any offense was three weeks, and a court-martial (an aberration) required the approval of the local a r m y corps c o m m a n d e r . Otherwise, the disciplinary authority of the c o m m a n d a n t generally went u n c h a l l e n g e d by the Inspector General. He could

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return a candidate to his regiment for idleness or misconduct (said to happen no more than three or four times a year for all schools) without the approval of his superior; and no appeal process p e r m i t t e d the student to challenge the dismissal. Even if the commandant received a reprimand for abuse of power and lost his position, any disciplinary decisions made while in c o m m a n d , including w r o n g f u l dismissal, remained unaltered. These policies c o n v e y e d to all the officer corps' adherence to total obedience regardless of a superior's orders. An officer could blunder miserably and survive professionally, but disobedience for any reason, however well-founded, would not be tolerated(39) . Even with all the regulations and restrictions, if the ensign exhibited the right a t t i t u d e , some improprieties m i g h t be ignored. Groener claimed that after spending a late night in Cologne, he had to rush after his troop which marched without him to an i m p o r t a n t inspection. A l t h o u g h he barely fell into place before the generals a r r i v e d , his inspection officer took no action against him(40). The failure even to r e p r i m a n d the young man suggests that some of the officers carried allowances to the point of favoritism. While not on the official list of offenses, one act of misconduct was never overlooked—the refusal to duel when challenged. Unofficially sanctioned by the authorities, the practice nevertheless abided by u n w r i t t e n ritualized rules. With any challenge, a board of honor made up of Inspection ensigns and presided over by one of the Inspection officers convened to judge the case. Upon hearing both sides, it determined who had acted i m p r o p e r l y and whether or not the affront merited a duel with sabers. After the confrontation the commandant punished only the ensign who had been judged at fault. These clashes, while hazardous, usually ended without serious injury. Recalling his d u e l , Zobeltitz wrote that the "umpire" terminated the battle after his opponent's head "buzzed" and Zobeltitz's nose b l e d . Honor satisfied, the two combatants subsequently became good friends(41). A tangible, though archaic, symbol of the tradition of the officer corps, the sacred aura s u r r o u n d i n g the duel survived despite the army's a d v a n c e into technical m o d e r n i t y . Any ensign who refused a challenge would be dismissed with no chance for return. On the other hand, any student punished with dismissal after a duel could report back to his regiment with honor and expect acceptance into a subsequent War School class. Even as late as 1911, the guide for instruction in army organization obliquely referred to

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the importance of the duel by advising ensigns of the true seriousness of the "struggle for the purity of honor" and warning that "the officer who defends the honor of his comrades . . . will suffer less in the army than one who does not"(42). If the ensign survived his duels, quarterly reports, and trips to town, he eventually reached the purpose of his War School sojourn—the officer's examination. With one exception, all officer hopefuls had to negotiate this hurdle. The March 11, 1880, order dealing with the replenishment of officers granted i m m u n i t y to those who had performed with distinction in battle. Such exemptions came rarely prior to 1914 and still took into account social and political origins. The army instructed each unit commander to make sure that "by such recommendations no unsuitable elements entered the officer corps"(43). Even bravery in the name of the king did not negate the stigma of lower-class antecedents. At the end of the course, the commandant convened a meeting of the school's officers. They first determined the grade average for the ensign in each of the lecture subjects. The student's marks (the same scale as the ensign's exam) were then m u l t i p l i e d by a coefficient assigned to each subject (Tactics and A r m y Organization combined; Map Drawing separated from Topography and Survey ing)(44). Subj ec t Tactics and A r m y Organization and Regulations Arms and Ordnance Fortification Topography and Surveying Map Drawing Military Correspondence

Coefficient 5 5 4 3 1 3 21

After computation the sum for all subjects determined whether or not the candidate took the final examination. The m a x i m u m score obtainable, based on a grade of excellent (9) in all subjects, was 189 (21 x 9). The total necessary for the preliminary certificate of fitness was 105, an average of 5 (satisfactory) on each. However, the army again granted the ensigns some latitude in the event of an insufficient score. Those who obtained a total of 96 could be a d m i t t e d if their conduct and proficiency in drill, riding, and the other nontheory subjects merited a satisfactory rating. Even if the grade fell to 91, the commandant could refer the

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case to the Inspector General. If the student's conduct had been good, the latter usually granted admission. Those falling below 91 participated in further study. Only in cases of undeniable incompetence or questionable loyalty did the ensigns return to their regiments to serve out the remainder of their obligation in the ranks(45). Prior to unification, the Supreme Military Examinations Commission administered the officer's examination, which included both written and oral sections, in Berlin. However, the disruptions caused by the war in 1870-71 resulted in the army delegating testing authority to the commandant and instructors of each school. This became the official practice with the Cabinet Order of October 26, 1871. The questions, which continued to come from the Commission, did not attempt to evaluate the ensign's proficiency in the practical studies (see Appendix 9 ) . The student answered only two or three questions in each subject and received ample time to compose his essay a n s w e r s — four days for the written portion. The instructors graded their own students' work, thus further reducing the chances for failure(46). The instructors also administered the oral, a l though the president and two members of the Examinations Commission attended as observers. Six students tested at the same time for about an hour in each subject. The Commission members could revise the marks, but they generally accepted the instructors' o p i n i o n s — o p i n i o n s influenced by their extended personal contact with the ensigns. The final grade was also subject to reevaluation. The graders used the same numerical system as for the admission certificate. Again, the regulation called for a score of 105, but a lower score could be accepted. The Commission met to evaluate each candidate, and any ensign with a deficient mark could be passed if his War School grades and character were satisfactory(47 ) . The grading system allowed instructors and the Commission to pass candidates with deficient scores; it also granted them the authority to fail a deficient student who had exhibited suspect social and political views. But again, such rarely happened at this stage since the candidates knew well what constituted proper thought in these areas. They also knew that exemplary conduct, industry, and practical ability would offset marginal classroom deficiencies. As a result, the final determination in some cases depended as much on the subjective evaluation of the candidate's attitude as on his academic performance. The certificate issued to the ensigns who passed

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contained a summary of the marks received, the general overall impression conveyed by the candidate, and a list of any punishments received during the course (see Appendix 1 0 ) . The ensign's regimental commander received a copy of the results, and those candidates who scored an excellent were awarded the King's Commendation (Konigs Belobigung). While of dubious validity, the future William II attained this score and its attendant honor for his exam at Potsdam in 1877(48). Other than the few who received the Commendation, the only candidates acknowledged at the final assembly were those who had failed. The authorities apparently believed that this public humiliation would spur the few failures to increased preparedness for the retest. The reexamination took place after three, six, or twelve months and covered only the failed portions. Even after a second failure, royal permission granted a third try. Those involved in the process retained According to regulations, a the rank of ensign. third failure required the candidate to serve out Few, however, his remaining obligation in the ranks. retest reached this point, and even then, another could be approved. Those who passed but had minor conduct deficiencies returned to their regiments and served a further probationary period(49). For almost all of the candidates, the difficulty of the officer's test proved to be well below that of the ensign's examination. In 1870 foreign observers reported that only 8 percent of the entire officer corps had required a second attempt. For the period 1866-94, the failure rate for first-timers and repeaters was only 2 percent(50). Considering the army's increased officer quotas, the numerous opportunities for subjective evaluations both in the War School course and during the final assessment, the straightforward examination questions, the time allotted, and the repetition of only the failed portions, the low failure rate should evoke no surprise. It also can be assumed with confidence that most of the 2 percent were first-timers who subsequently passed the failed portions. The second time around they were not only more familiar with the test, but received the obligatory lenient treatent in the grading process. Evidence of the disparity between officer candidate and civilian secondary school evaluations surfaces in the record of a future army commander-in-chief . In his Gymnasium leaving exam Hans von Seeckt received a satisfactory in Latin, although his written sample was deficient, on the basis of "encouraging interest and very good comprehension." For Greek he received

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a good with almost the same description. History and geography both rated a qualified satisfactory. While German earned him a very good, his mathematics rated a poor. Described as unsatisfactory, his oral nevertheless resulted in a satisfactory mark on the basis of past performance. Although the entire exercise likewise rated a satisfactory, Seeckt had shown himself to be borderline or deficient in all but one subject. Yet, on leaving the War School his certificate described him as "intellectually . . . gifted . . . . diligent and conscientious . . . with a composed and steady character"(51). The fact that Seeckt's father commanded the garrison near the boy's secondary school (Strasbourg) may have influenced his civilian graders. But his father's position and acquaintance with the governor of the province (annexed A l s a c e ) , Field Marshal Edwin von Manteuffel, no doubt contributed to his glowing War School evaluation. The marked increase in the student's abilities after one year can be attributed only to a combination of professional prejudice and the importance the army placed on proper behavior. Even though he had passed the officer's exam, the ensign did not immediately receive his commission. All successful examinees returned to their respective regiments, and, if a further probationary period had not been ordered, his commander applied to Berlin for the ensign's certificate of fitness for commission (Reifezeugnis zum Offizier). The candidate then had to wait for a vacancy. If he had been awarded the King's Commendation, he was placed ahead of any ensigns also waiting. With the consistent need for Howofficers, the wait, if any, was usually brief. ever, one last hurdle loomed before him. He could not be commissioned until his commander submitted to the king a document stating that the regiment's officers deemed the candidate in possession of the requisite knowledge and skills for his duties and "worthy of admission among t h e m " ( 5 2 ) . This translated to a vote on the candidate, a practice that prompted controversy throughout its existence. The "officer election" dated from 1808 and represented the most public means in the selection process for ensuring the exclusion of political and social undesirables. All candidates met the requirement save those few who obtained their commissions by way of the Selekta class of the Cadet Corps. The colonel of the regiment assembled his officers, and the one who had been placed in charge of the ensigns delivered the examiners' report and then gave his own. The colonel then requested a vote beginning with the most junior

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officer. In a majority veto the decision was final. Minority vetoes required the final decision of the king. Since all of the officers understood that opposing the colonel's nominee courted professional danger, most tallies resulted in unanimous approval. Few candidates ever got this far only to be expelled. The result of such drastic action was a transfer to another regiment (if it would accept him) or, more likely, the reserves and lasting disgrace(53) . Occasionally, and with the colonel's prior knowledge and approval, a regiment vetoed an ensign simply because he had been found to possess insufficient personal wealth. However, in such cases the veto did not result in professional stigma, and another unit accepted his request for transfer. If an officer raised an objection for any other reason, his opposition had to be convincing enough to sway all or the accuser was well advised to sign the approval. The king then certified the document and granted the commission. The ensign became a second lieutenant (Leutnant) and a full member of the nation's military and social e l i t e ( 5 4 ) . The officers' vote and the public's knowledge of its existence played a major role in preserving the feudal prejudices of the officer corps. It barred almost all promotions from the ranks. Those few enlisted men who earned battlefield commissions were either pensioned off or given a lieutenancy in the reserves and a civil service job. Those so "honored" quietly accepted, knowing full well the regiment's officers would never regard them as a true comrade. The election also made it possible to keep practicing Jews out of both the regular and reserve regiments since the latter also voted on their members. Lastly, many intelligent and capable young men who realized that their social and political views differed from those expected by the officer corps likewise recognized the folly of even seeking a nomination(55). Throughout the nineteenth century and up to World War I, the officers' vote remained unchanged. In his memoirs William II argued that the "adoption of the officers' vote . . . guaranteed the needed homogeneity. Harmful outcroppings of the idea of caste were merely sporadic; wherever they made themselves felt, they were instantly rooted o u t " ( 5 6 ) . With his defense William unwittingly admitted the existence of social and political prejudice within the officer corps. The "needed homogeneity" did not translate to ability or education, but referred instead to the belief that the foundation of the corps rested upon just those feudal notions of "caste" he termed

nt )

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"sporadic" and unwanted. Still, the new middle-class officers gladly accepted the honored positions that membership in the caste William claimed to oppose offered them. After commissioning, the new officer began a career that was often demanding regardless of whether he was leading men in battle or suffering the tedium of garrison duty. As a contemporary author described it, "the stewardship completed, the individual's struggle with the life b e g i n s " ( 5 7 ) . Additional short training courses had to be completed, such as cavalry, m u s ketry, and gymnastics. The newly commissioned artillery and engineer subalterns did not receive immediate recognition of their rank. These two branches considered the young lieutenants "supernumeraries" (Ausseretatsmassigen) until they had served one (artillery) or two (engineers) years, completed the United Artillery and Engineer School, and passed a qualifying

examination (Berufsprufung)(58).

Considering the amount of preparatory education and professional study required of officers in the technical arms, it should come as no surprise that the middle class occupied the overwhelming majority of these billets. But regardless of the branch in which they served, the young officers found an arduous life awaiting them. Termed the "oxen tour" by some German contemporaries, the "pull" often ended in premature retirement(59). Luck and influence played equal roles with qualifications in the struggle for promotions. Not until the turn of the century, in the wake of static army bills, did the army concede that extensive premilitary education aided the development and maintenance of a modern military system. The Cabinet Order of February 13, 1900, stipulated that those holding the Abitur were to have their commissions antedated two years (Vorpatentierung) in order to make up for some of the seniority lost by choosing to complete a secondary education(60). No longer would the decision to forego the Abitur offer an advantage in seniority. Those who opted for early entry realized that in addition to the loss of seniority, their lack of education could prove to be a handicap in the race for advancement. Despite the long-overdue official recognition of the importance of a completed secondary education, no regulation called for its inclusion in the evaluation for promotion. In actuality, the officer corps possessed no set rules regarding promotion. Traditionally, influence ranked equally with, and sometimes ahead of, seniority. Without connections, it could take eight years to make first lieutenant, fourteen

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years for captain, twenty-five years for major, and thirty years for lieutenant colonel. The Kaiser could retard as well as push a promotion. Each year the regimental commanders and their respective commanding generals drew up a confidential report on every officer. That of the junior officer was based on his company captain's evaluation, and it was not impossible for a newly commissioned officer of exceptional merit and influence to be placed above senior second lieutenants on the promotion ladder. This latter practice possibly explains the custom of not granting first lieutenants automatic authority over junior officers ( 61 ) . Promotion occupied the thoughts of all officers, but it was not the immediate concern of the freshly commissioned lieutenant. Although he had survived the ensign and election process, the respect of his comrades still had to be earned. The colonel may have exerted pressure to ensure a favorable admission vote, and if resentment existed, the officers could make life difficult for the young man. In the traditionally aristocratic regiments breached by the new industrial and commercial middle class, the officers were slow to accept anyone lacking a family tradition of army service. Some even refused to tolerate those in their midst whose name did not contain a "von" or "von und zu." If coerced into ratifying a bourgeois officer, even the colonel who nominated him could not prevent a concerted effort by the officers to force the young man out. Generally, such treatment culminated in an approved request for transfer(62). Even when accepted by the other officers, the lieutenant still had to observe certain rules of protocol and repeat well-known rituals. If wealthier than his superiors, he refrained from any lavish displays. Etiquette required officers to attend every garrison function, and any subaltern who sat out even one dance risked being ordered to the center of the floor for a lecture by the colonel on junior officers' social duties. In the mess the novice duplicated the drinking tests of his ensign and War School days, but there was none of the wild horseplay which transpired in some foreign officer messes of the period(63). The daily activities of the young subaltern were numerous. One contemporary author claimed that a Prussian officer spent most of his time strolling the streets of the local town or city. While such may have been the case earlier in the century, by 1900 the officer could no longer afford the leisurely attitude toward his profession which survived in the officer corps of certain foreign armies, especially

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that of Great Britain(64). The junior German officer had little opportunity to waste time. His duties included constant training, either his own or that of recruits. He supervised the drilling and delivered lectures on geography, military history, and the different facets of the army. He received further training in fencing with saber or bayonet, gymnastics, and riding which, in turn, he passed on to his men. He submitted essays to his commander on tactics, fortifications, and military history and participated in war games. Even without attendance at the various social functions, his days were often long and his leave might be "borrowed" by a superior. Regardless of the demands, he was expected to show himself superior to his men in every way. Service orders instructed that the officer was to be "teacher and leader in all areas." Retired general Paul von Schmidt expanded upon the goal in 1894: "Whoever wants to be a teacher must know more than his students; whoever shall be a leader must be more capable than the subordinates. . . . He must also be superior to them in character"(65). In addition to his professional and social duties within the garrison, the army expected the officer to observe a rigid code of conduct outside the confines of his post. He wore his uniform at all times. When in Berlin he could not smoke in the area of three fashionable streets; and if he met a royal personage anywhere, he dismounted or descended from his carriage and saluted. Whether on or off duty, he was to remain the model of decorum. For all this the lieutenant merited one of the lowest pay scales in Europe — even lower than in France where a junior officer received the same compensation as a "very minor functionary." Although the army granted raises throughout the imperial period, the amount seldom equaled expenses. As late as 1900, the Prussian subaltern's remuneration approximated that of a sergeant in the U.S. Army, or just one-fifth that of an American second lieutenant ( 66) . Salaries for the young officers were so low that most needed an outside source of income. As a rule, the Guards and cavalry units required an accounting of the aspirant's access to such income as a prerequisite for entry. Officers from other units who had no additional source of funds often did without food or proper heat in winter and went without their coats whenever possible to keep from wearing them out. They might receive a small additional stipend out of special funds provided by the regiment or the Kaiser, but they could not depend on such aid on a

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regular basis. All officers were provided an orderly and traveled at rates below that for civilians. They sometimes obtained discounts on theater tickets and other forms of entertainment; but every time the Kaiser decided to experiment with uniform style, the officers paid the cost. They also had other deductions from their pay for food, drink, tobacco, lodging, and regimental and widows' funds(67). With the constant pecuniary demands, it was not unusual for officers to become familiar acquaintances of the local moneylenders. However, if the debt got out of hand and the officer did not extricate himself, the regiment convened a court of honor. If the problem could not be quickly and descreetly resolved, the officer faced a curt dismissal from the service. Despite the evidence of grossly inadequate compensation, army authorities periodically expressed concern over the presence of luxury within the officer corps. Few, however, outside of the higher ranks and the elite Guards and cavalry regiments could afford to maintain such a lifestyle. Paradoxically, the traditional use of low pay to keep out unwanted elements eventually produced the opposite effect. Friedrich von Bernhardi belatedly assessed the situation in 1911 when he contended that low pay kept many from acceptable social origins from entering the officer corps(68) . For most junior officers low pay and normal financial obligations reduced marriage to more of a business proposition than an affaire de coeur. Matches commonly took place for professional c o n s i d e r a t i o n s — money and promotion. Although against regulations, some officers patronized matrimonial agencies. Upon finding a suitable and willing partner, the couple's first public step was the engagement process. The papers announced the betrothal and gilt-edged cards communicated the event to all friends and professional acquaintances. Next came visits to the various homes for formal introductions. With such an official air to the proceedings, retreat became difficult. By now the young man had spoken with the lady's father, and in return for the social distinction the marriage would provide his daughter, the latter normally agreed to liquidate all of the officer's debts(69). At this point army officialdom entered the picture. Before a marriage could take place, the officer had to obtain the king's permission through his regimental commander. The officer corps required the satisfaction of two criteria. First, the young lady had to be of unblemished reputation and acceptable social status. Just as important was the requirement

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that the woman demonstrate the ability to pjrovide an income that varied in amount throughout the imperial period, but which always totaled well above her future husband's salary. The money not only contributed to the maintenance of the couple's social position, but also served to reduce the likelihood that the lady would become a liability to the state in the event of her husband's d e a t h ( 7 0 ) . Given the caste spirit of the corps, an officer could not marry a woman with origins directly related to manual labor. No matter how skilled or well-off an artisan w a s , his daughter remained unacceptable to the officer corps. On the other hand, marriage to the offspring of a factory owner was p e r m i s s a b l e — even if she had Jewish origins. Such strict requirements led to long engagements, bachelorhood, and even resignation from the service. Many officers entered into casual affairs or had mistresses they could never marry while in the army. As long as the lady understood the circumstances and the liaison did not become an embarrassment to the corps, nothing was said(71). The conduct of garrison officers became the subject of a novel in 1904 that attacked the professed honor and moral character of the officer corps. Published under the pseudonym Lt. Fritz 0. Bilse, Life in a Garrison Town painted a sordid picture of the cruelties, corruption, and profligate behavior of some of the officers at a frontier post. The author, Lt . Fritz von der Kyrburg, clearly patterned the characters after those of his own garrison at Forbach in annexed Lorraine (near M e t z ) . For publishing the work without the permission of his superiors, the young officer was court-martialed, given six months imprisonment, and stripped of his commission. The army retired the officers who had served as his unknowing models and attempted to portray the incident as an aberration(72) . Quite the contrary, the novel stood as one of the few honest fictionalized accounts of officer life and the negative and sometimes dangerous results of the officers' elitist training. If not court-martialed, any officer who offered revelations of immoral or abusive conduct within the corps or made derogatory public comments concerning a comrade or his lady could expect a challenge. Although courts of honor existed to handle such matters, their actions and the rules forbidding dueling did not prevent the continuation of the tradition. Rather, in a blatant show of support for the practice, boards determined whether the parties were close enough in rank to meet as equals "on the field of

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honor"(73). Dueling within the officer corps remained so revered even into the twentieth century that both victor and vanquished gained status. A dueling wound merited as much respect as injuries received in battle. The practice even appeared whereby some officers fraudulently obtained scars in order to enhance their social and professional image(74). While publicly opposing these modern versions of the ancient joust, the Kaiser recognized that they represented an important facet of the feudal tradition of his "knights" and their commitment to the preservation of the monarchy. Consequently, his rhetoric was not followed up with any meaningful countermeasures, and the practice continued until the fall of the royal house. While often penurious, generally arduous, and sometimes lonely, the life of a young officer could also be as hazardous off as on the battlefield. The reward, viewed as enough by most, came with the elite social status. In Prussia, indeed in all of Germany, the officer's uniform conferred upon its wearer a position among the social aristocracy. Every young German learned from his earliest days the importance society assigned to class and title. With the distinct exception of the nobility, no class or title ranked above that of officer. It gained the youngest bearer acceptance into royal and public circles denied others of his age. At social events he stood above all civilians regardless of education or profession. As Demeter so aptly described it, "the plain shoulder boards of a subaltern commanded a deplorable adulation"(75). The new officer was the product of a system which sought to commission all candidates with an approved nomination. The War Schools instructed the young men in their professional duties and ascertained their commitment to the ideals of the officer corps. Those who demonstrated total devotion and proper conduct found the army eager to do everything necessary to aid in the passing of the officer's examination. Once commissioned, however, each officer learned that he was on his own in the race for advancement. While influence and social origins could outweigh seniority, many officers recognized that advancement also depended on something the officer corps had repeatedly relegated to a secondary position of importance—education. Officers from traditional sources who had cut short their secondary or cadet education found themselves in competition with increasing numbers of Abitur holders, mostly middle class, for promotions and assignments to the most prestigious

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professional schools and duties. In an era of transition to increased d e p e n d e n c e upon technology and the acceptance of a world v i e w , intelligence and education e q u a l e d courage and character in importance. The v a l u e of influence and connections r e m a i n e d , but when it came to training for the h i g h e r echelons, the officer corps could no longer afford to ignore knowledge and intellect.

NOTES 1. E x h o r t a t i o n from a War School manual. Prussia, K r i e g s m i n i s t e r i u m , General Inspektion des MilitarErziehungsund BiIdungswesens , ed. , Leitfaden fur den Unterricht uber Heerwesen auf den Koniglichen Kriegsschulen , 13th ed. (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 1911), 2 . 2. Barnard, Courses, 289, 293, and 322; Commission, Education, 237; and Laffin, Jackboot, 50. 3. Demeter, Officer-Corps, 77-78. 4. Bernhard Schwertfeger, Die grossen Erzieher des deutschen Heeres: Aus der Geschichte der Kriegsakademie (Potsdam: Akademische Verlagsgesellschaft Athenaion, 1936), 31; and Commission, Education, 237-38. 5. "Regulations for the Organization of the War Schools" by Minister of War von Bonin, July 21, 1859, cited by Commission, Education, 541-42. See also 237 — 38; and Schwertfeger , Erzieher, 31. 6. D e m e t e r , Officer-Corps, 79. 7. B l u m e n t r i t t , "Thoughts," 9; Messerschmidt und Fetter, Militargeschichte , 104; and Poten, Uebersicht, 182-83. 8. Schmidt-Richberg und Matuschka, Entlassung, 198; Messerschmidt und Petter, Militargeschichte, 106-7; N o t t e b o h m , Prufungsverfahrens, 61, 69, 71, 72, 81, and 82; Bremen, "Heer," 51; Brand und Eckert, Kadetten 127 and 129; Boeck . Deutschland , 264; and Commission, Education, 247. 9. "Regulations," cited by Commission, Education 542. 10. Commission, Education. 193 and 239-40; Bethke, "Leutnant," 825; R u m s c h o t t e l , "Offiziere," 122; and Demeter, Officer-Corps, 267. 11. Boeck, Deutschland, 264; Poten, Preussen, 250; Messerschmidt und Petter, Militargeschichte, 106-7; and Hazen, School, 259. 12. "Regulations," cited by Commission, Education, 541-42. See also 240-41; Hazen, School, 259; and Boeck, Deutschland, 264.

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13. Ibid. 14. Kriegsministerium, Heerwesen, 4. 15. "Instructions regarding the System, Scope, and Subjects at the War Schools," cited by Commission, Education, 549. 16. Ibid. See also 247-48; and Poten, Preussen , 232. 17. "Instructions," cited by Commission, Education, 549. See also 248. 18. "Instructions," cited by Commission, Education, 549 and 551-52. See also 248-49, 259, and 567; Hazen, School, 260-61; and Messerschmidt und Fetter, Militargeschichte, 105. 19. "Instructions," cited by Commission, Education, 557. 20. For detailed descriptions, see Commission, Education, 245-47, 249-50, and 553-56. See also Prussia, Kriegsministerium, General Inspektion des MilitarErziehungs- und Bildungswesens, ed., Leitfaden fur den Unterricht in der Waffenlehre auf den Koniglichen Kriegsschulen, 13th ed. (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mi ttler und Sohn , 1910), vii; and Poultney Bigelow, "The Fighting Forces of Germany," The Cosmopolitan, A p r i l 1890, 656-57. 21. "Instructions," cited by Commission, Education, 552, 556-57, and 565. See also 251-53; Messerschmidt und Fetter, Militargeschichte, 105; and Bigelow, "Forces," 657. 22. Ibid.; U.S. War D e p a r t m e n t , Military Schools, 73; and Poten, Preussen, 379. 23. Nottebohm, Prufungsverfafirens, 81. 24. Demeter, Officer-Corps, 87. 25. U.S. War Department, Military Schools, 73-74; and Poten, Preussen, 251 and 379. 26. Poten, Preussen, 379; and U.S. War Department, Military Schools, 74. 27. N o t t e b o h m , Prufungsverfahrens, 83; and Poten, Preussen, 252, 28. S c h m i d t - B i c h b e r g und Matuschka, Eritlassurig , 198. 29. As a rule, quarters compared favorably with others in Europe. Whitney, "Cadets," 542; and Commission, Education , 242-44. 30. Hazen, School , 259; and Commission, Education, 242-43. 31. Commission, Education, 250-51 and 559. 32. Groener, Lebenserinnerungen , 42-43; Fedor von Zobeltitz, Lebenserinnerungen, 53; and Bethke, "Leut~ nant," 827-28. 33. For examples of discipline at other schools, see Louis Jules Trochu, Oeuvres Posthumes, v o l . 2:

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La Societe, L' Etat, L' Armee (Tours: Alfred Mame e t Fils, 1896), 242; Porch, March , 40; Churchill, Commission, 53; and F. G. Guggisberg, "The Shop": The Story of the Royal Military Academy (London: Cassell 1900), 128-30 and 151-53. 34. Commission, Education, 253-55: and Vincent "Officering," 797. 35. Hazen, School, 261; and Commission, Education, 254-56. 36. Commission, Education, 257. 37. For the procedures involved in a discipline hearing, see ibid., 257-59. 38. Ibid., 254-55 and 256-57. 39. Ibid., 257-58; and Demeter, Officer-Corps, 87. 40. Groener, Lebenserinnerungen, 43-44. 41. Commission, Education, 256-57; Hazen, School, 261-62;', and Fed or von Zobeltitz, Lebenserinnerungen, 54. 42. Hazen, School , 261-62; and Kriegsministerium, Heerwesen , 7 . 43. "Verordnung u b e r die Erganzung der Of f iziere des Friedenstandes vom 11. Marz 1880," cited by Nottebohm , Prufungsverfahrens, 77. 44. Commission, Education, 259-60. 45. Ibid. An example of a g r a d i n g report can be found on 567 . 46. Poten, Preussen , 202; and Commission, Education, 260-61. 47. Commission, Education, 194-95 and 263-66. 48. Ibid., 195; Bremen, "Heer," 51; and Poten Preussen , 204 . 49. Hazen, School , 262; Commission, Education, 19596 and 264-65; Upton. Armies, 209; and Boeck, DeutschJand, 265. 50. Poten, Preussen, 204: and Commission, Education, 195-96. 51. Hans Meier-Welcker, Seeckc (Frankfurt am Main: Bernard & Graefe Verlag fur Wehrwesen, 1967), 17, 18, and 21. 52. B a r n a r d , Courses, 304. See also Commission, Education, 196, 264, and 266. 53. "Commissions," 609; "Some German Views upon the Training of Infantry in Peace and Its Action in War," in The German Army and Navy; Articles front the Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, 2 vols. (Cleveland: n.p., 1916), 1:796-97; W. A. H. Hare, "The Engineer Arm in Continental Armies," in The German Army and Navy: Articles from Che Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, 2 vols. (Cleveland: n.p., 1916), 1:1167; Barnard, Courses, 304; German Army, 40; and Herwig, Corps, 30-31.

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54. German Army, 40; and Commission, Education, 196. 55. Endres, Structure, 18; U p t o n , Armies, 213; and Herwig, Corps, 30-31. 56. Wilhelm II, The Kaiser's Memoirs, trans. Thomas R. Ybarra (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1922), 225. 57. Stein, Lehr, 196. 58. For the technical schooling required of these officers, see Hare, "Engineer Arm"; Captain Stavenhagen, "The Corps of Military Engineers and Pioneers in Germany," trans. C. H. Hunter, Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States 44 (January-February 1909):138-45; U.S. War Department, Military Schools, 74-75; Bigelow, "Forces," 656-58; Barnard, Courses, 324-28 and 351-94; and Commission, Education, 201, 269, and 271. 59. Ernst von Eisenhart-Rothe, "Das Offizier- und Un terof f izierkor ps , " in So War die Alte Armee , ed. Ernst von Eisenhart-Rothe und Franz Schauwecker (Berlin: Frundsberg-Verlag, 1935), 194. 60. Herwig, Corps, 47. 61. Boeck, Deutschland, 133-34; Schwan, Report, 1718; Vincent, "Officering," 799; and Albert Dithey, Der Einjahrig-Freiwillige der Reserve-Offizieraspirant und der Offizier des Beurlaubtenstandes, 52d ed. (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 1917), 93-94. 62. Also common practice in aristocratic British regiments. Turner, Gentlemen, 240; B. De Sales La Terriere, Days That Are Gone (London: Hutchinson, 1924), 108 and 110-11; Kitchen, Corps, 29-30; and German Army, 40-41. 63. German Army, 173; Laffin, Jackboot, 94-95; Count Robert Zedlitz—Trutzschler, Twelve Years at the Imperial German Court, trans. Alfred Kalisch (New York: George H. Doran Company, 1924), 11; Turner, Gentlemen, 240-42; and Barnard, Courses, 108. 64. Turner, Gentlemen, 238; and Edmund Dane, Secrets of Success in War. How Modern Armies Organise, Train, and Fight: A Comparison of the British and German Systems Based on the "Letters" of Prince Kraft zu Hohenlohe Ingelfingen (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1914), 141. 65. German Army, 61, 91, and 139-41; Dane, Secrets, 141-46 passim; Arturo Maillard, "Instruction of Officers in the 48th Regiment, German Infantry," Memo, del Ejercito (Chile), October 1915, cited in The International Military Digest Annual, 1916, 425; Vincent, "Officering," 800; and Paul von Schmidt, Die Erziehung des Soldaten (Berlin: Liebel, 1894), 42. 66. Endres, Structure, 4 and 7; Thirsk, "Army," 383-84; Ralston, Army, 257; Bigelow, "Forces," 658;

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and Ray Stannard Baker, "Making a German Soldier," McClure's Magazine, November 1900, 41. Additional references to pay are found in "Some German Views," 758; Hare, "Engineer A r m , " 1168-69; Schwan, Report, 94; Dane, Secrets, 151-52; and Fitz-Gerald, "Army," 7316. 67. Hughes, "Origins," 13-14; "Some German Views," 758-59; V i n c e n t , "Officering," 800; Thirsk, "Army," 383-84; Exner, "Army," 890; Bethke, "Leutnant," 82830; S c h i e r b r a n d , Speeches, 158; and Otto-Heinrich von der Gablentz, "Das Preussisch-Deutsche Offizierkorps," in Schicksalfragen der Gegenwart, 1 vols., ed . Bundesministerium fur V e r t e i d i g u n g (Tubingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1958), 3:47 and 71. 68. B e r n h a r d i , Germany, 185; and Bethke, "Leutnant," 828. 69. German Army, 73—74. 70. Ibid., 74-77; E x n e r , " A r m y , " 890; W r a x a l l , Armies, 72; and M a r g a r e t Seaton Wagner, Germany in My Time (London: Rich & Cowan, 1935), 7-9. 71. E n d r e s , Structure, 7 and 31; German Army, 7477; Bethke, "Leutnant," 831; and W a g n e r , Germany, 8-9. 72. Lt. Oswald Fritz Bilse [Lt. Fritz von der K y r b u r g ] , Life in a Garrison Town (New York: John Lane, 1904). See also Bashford, "System," 617. 73. Endres, S t r u c t u r e , 30-31; Bethke, "Leutnant," 831; and Bigelow, "Forces," 658. 74. W a g n e r , Germany, 5; and Laffin, Jackboot, 91 — 92. 75. Demeter, Officer-Corps, 246. See also Schulte, "Adel," 187; Dane, Secrets, 152; Endres, Structure, 36; M u n c y , Junker, 1 2 1 ; and W a g n e r , Germany, 4.

7

The Crown of Prussian Officer Education: The War Academy A general staff cannot be improvised on the outbreak of war, . . . it must be prepared long beforehand in peace. H e l m u t h von Moltke (the elder)(l) Rare was the young Prussian officer who did not dream of one day being called to serve on the Great General Staff. This, the zenith of Prussian officer t r a i n i n g , offered those few selected a golden o p p o r t u n i t y to attain high rank and the most prestigious positions in the m i l i t a r y . A l t h o u g h only a small n u m b e r of officers received permanent staff assignments, their a t t i t u d e s , opinions, and ideals carried great weight t h r o u g h o u t the a r m y . As e v e n t s also h a v e shown, they did not hesitate at crucial moments to offer a d v i c e to the Kaiser and the g o v e r n m e n t — a d v i c e that affected German politics and foreign policy as well as army planning(2). The Prussian General Staff achieved world recognition d u r i n g the latter half of the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y for its skill in p l a n n i n g and organization. General C. B. B r a c k e n b u r y , in testimony before the British Parliament in 1887, cited it as "the keystone of the whole German m i l i t a r y organization . . . the cause of the great efficiency of the German army . . . acting as the powerful brain of the military b o d y , to the designs of which brain the whole body is made to work"(3). Under the Staff's direction, officers became managers as well as leaders and tacticians. The comp l e x i t y of m o d e r n armies required increased technical

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knowledge of equipment, railway transport, and rapid mobilization. War in the nineteenth century had advanced to the point that a commander could no longer attend to all of the details involved in the planning and execution of a major military action. The result was increased delegation of power to trained assistants who acted in the name of the commander. Staff duty, whether in the field or in Berlin, provided officers with valuable experience for subsequent commands of their own. Those who served at the different staff levels gained recognition as an elite group within the officer corps. Under the leadership of Helmuth von Moltke (the e l d e r ) , who headed the Prussian (and Imperial) General Staff for thirty years (1858-1888), the system achieved near perfection in the eyes of many foreign military observers. The army's successes in the wars of unification bestowed upon the Staff an aura of "almost mystical invincibility" and resulted in its becoming a much-copied model(4 ) . With the changes in armies and warfare, the major powers in Europe recognized the need for special schools offering advanced training for officers destined for staff duty. It was the Prussians, however, who first seriously embraced the idea(5). The initial attempt came with Frederick the Great's Academie des Nobles in 1765, but it took the devoted interest of Scharnhorst to effectively promote the concept. As the chief military staff assistant to Frederick William III in 1802, he embarked upon a major reorganization of the obscure Officers' Military Institute in Berlin. By 1804 it had reopened as the Academy for Young Officers. To support it, he also initiated a military discussion society where young officers like Karl von Clausewitz debated new theories and heard arguments in favor of reform. Up to that time the staff officers selected by examination were provided only a basic introductory course. To make the training truly worthwhile, Scharnhorst advocated a broad curriculum providing a general professional education for as many qualified officers as possible, not just those destined for duty with the new General Staff (1803)(6). The school seeking to provide such a curriculum opened in Berlin on October 15, 1 8 1 0 — t h e General

War School (Allgemeine Kriegsschule). Scharnhorst, as the de facto head of the War Ministry and General Staff, believed that the new institute should include more than just instruction in military studies. Exercising a line of thought similar to that which led to the parallel establishment of the liberal Humboldt

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University, he argued that a course and teaching method based on the free exchange of ideas produced officers better equipped to deal with the increasing complexities of mass armies; some humanist subjects also must be included. His efforts resulted in a curriculum where officers selected after five years' service, a nomination by their commanders, and an intensive ten-day examination studied history, logic, mathematics, physical science, French, Russian, and literature along with military subjects. Unfortunately, the school, closed during the wars of liberation, reopened in 1815 amid a waning reform spirit. Having lost much of its identification as a preparatory staff college, attendance at the institute soon declined(7 ) . The officer corps' general indifference toward the school remained until the 1850s. However, the reforms initiated by Peucker resulted in the beginning of a marked transformation of the curriculum and its purpose. In 1859 the army renamed the school the War Academy (Kriegsakademie) to distinguish it from the newly created War Schools for officer candidates. Nevertheless, the metamorphosis into an institution deemed necessary for career advancement and staff duty came slowly. Prior to 1860, most officers viewed the Academy as a school providing general instruction in advanced military science and not as a required preparatory course for General Staff duty. Many applied only for the opportunity to spend a few years in the pleasant atmosphere of the capital. Similarly, Bavaria opened a War Academy (modeled after Prussia's) in 1867, but the Munich authorities generally regarded the institute as less important than the Artillery and Engineer School, the War School, or even the Cadet C o r p s ( 8 ) . With Peucker providing the impetus, the transformation began a slow course to fruition. However, Scharnhorst's goal of using the school to raise the general intellectual and educational level of the officer corps yielded to the narrow demand to produce tacticians, managers, and technocrats for the German war machine. Throughout most of the nineteenth century, officers reached the General Staff without visiting the Academy. But by the 1880s, it became widely accepted that General Staff and field staff members should be graduates; by 1900, War Academy attendance was an unwritten requirement. As one former student recalled, officers regarded the Academy as the "open sesame" for the door to the top army echelons(9). With the steadily growing respect accorded Academy

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attendance, graduates received accelerated promotions and choice assignments. The professional recognition and widespread foreign regard for the General Staff fostered an elitist esprit de corps among former students. In turn, the rest of the officer corps revered those holding staff positions. As the course paid more and more attention to purely professional studies, the graduates and their admiring comrades nurtured the growing lack of respect for nonmilitary studies. In his Order of Teaching issued on August 12, 1888, Moltke, then at the end of his career, bolstered this disdain for general intellectual improvement. Expressing an opinion which many in the officer corps accepted as canon, the venerated old soldier held that the Academy curriculum "must aim at a thorough professional education; it must not lose itself in the wide field of general scientific studies"(10). A Service Order for the Academy issued a few years before World War I illustrates the army's continued commitment to Moltke's design. Ignoring the concept of general intellectual cultivation, it asserted that the objective of the course was "to introduce qualified officers from all arms of the service into the higher branches of the military sciences, as well as to sharpen and clarify military judgement." Isolated subjects not of a distinctly military nature, for example, foreign languages and science, were offered only if they translated to practical military application(ll). Following the prevailing sentiment, instructors refrained from any teaching that did not provide such practical knowledge or skill. From 1860 to World War I, all major curriculum changes worked to rid the course of those subjects deemed of no direct military value. The General Staff was not long in recognizing the future of the new War Academy as a preparatory staff school. When Peucker retired as Inspector General of Military Training and Education on November 21, 1872, the General Staff, through Moltke's prestige and influence, gained control of the Academy. The Cabinet Order of the same date, however, did not turn over complete authority. The Inspector General, along with the War Ministry, retained responsibility in a few areas, the most significant being that of finance. But Moltke had gained what he wanted most — determination of curriculum content. The new relationship became evident immediately when all of the top graduates received assignments to the Great General Staff for further training. By the 1890s the Academy's importance had grown to the point that it

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was not regarded as unusual for Chief of Staff Alfred von Schlieffen to quietly appear in the back of a lecture hall and observe the proceedings(12). In their new role Moltke and his successors also managed the Academy's administration. The Chief of Staff appointed all administrative officers and instructors. The director, or commandant, held the rank of general, and throughout the imperial period, all displayed a "von" before their last name. Two officers holding field-grade rank assisted the general. In addition to his normal duties, the senior of the two acted on behalf of the director during the lat~ ter's absence. The other headed those branches of administration controlled by the War Ministry (finance, security, and maintenance), but still answered first to the director. Disciplinary problems rarely occurred since any transgression went immediately to the director's office(13). For the oversight of all academic concerns, the d i r e c t o r p r e s i d e d o v e r a S t u d i e s C o m m i s s i o n (Studien-

kommission der Kriegsakademie) m , which included four staff officers and one officer detailed as recorder. This board reviewed all teaching plans, recommended faculty appointments, annually determined the procedure and questions for the entrance exam, graded the results, and judged the annual retention and ultimate fitness for graduation of each student. The faculty included staff officers for the military subjects and civilian instructors appointed for life by the Minister of War; however, the latter had been recommended by the director and approved by the Chief of the General Staff. Civilian promotions to professorships came from the Kaiser and were based solely on merit. As was the case in other Prussian military schools, students tended to regard the civilians and their lectures as something "to endure"; grudging respect came only if the presentations were extremely interesting(14). Before Peucker, the Academy curriculum had experienced few major alterations. The most notable was in the length of the course. Originally only nine months, by the 18 20s it had been extended to three nine-month classes with students reassigned each year on the basis of previous class performance(15). At the time the elder Moltke attended ( 1 8 2 3 - 2 6 ) , the following curriculum was in u s e ( 1 6 ) .

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Class Tactics Terrain Surveying Conversational French Horsemanship

Analysis of Finites Topography General History Statistics Artillery Second

Class Military Geography Effective Strategic Development Terrain Surveying Conversational French German Literature

Spherical Progonometry "Essentials" of Mechanical Science Analysis of Infinites Science of Fortification Natural Science/Physics Third History of Selected Fortress Warfare General Literature

Class

Campaigns

History of the General Staff Terrain Surveying

While not as broad as during Scharnhorst's tenure, the curriculum still evidenced an attempt to combine military and liberal studies into a course thot would produce well-rounded officers. However, by the 1860s a narrower opinion of the purpose of the "new" Academy had emerged. Peucker wanted a school which provided in the main a technical and professional education. The General Staff held even more strongly to this goal, and after 1872 Moltke worked to achieve that end. The following comparison of the 1871 and 1882 curricula reveals the nascent shift away from liberal studies in favor of the increased emphasis on military subjects(17). First

Formal Tactics Military History Arms and Ordnance Field Fortifications Mathematics History Geography Physical Geography Conversational French Conversational Russian

Class Hours per week 1871 1882 4 4 2 2 3 4 2 3 9 7 4 4 4 4 2 2 6 6 2 6

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Class Hours per week 1871 188 2 4 4 2 5 2 3 1 2 4 4 1 2 6 4 4 4

Applied Tactics Military History to 1815 Permanent Fortifications Military Surveying Military Geography Military Administration Mathematics History Introduction to the History of Philosophy Experimental Physics Conversational French Conversational Russian Third

2 4 6 2

2 4 6 6

0 1 6 2 3 6 3 2 1 2 4 4 2

1 1 6 3 4 4 3 2 0 4 3 4 6

Class

Military Justice Military Hygiene Military History from 1815 Siege Warfare General Staff Service Mathematics Geodesy* History of Literature History of Philosophy General History to 1840 Chemistry Conversational French Conversational Russian "* required only of those taking mathematics option

While impressive at first glance, the curricula did not require enrollment in every subject. Excluding the military courses, only history and mathematics or foreign languages were required studies(18). Since final class ranking was very important, few officers had either the time or the inclination to devote themselves to the humanist studies. By the 1880s the students' lack of interest in these subjects facilitated the General Staff's efforts to reduce the nonmilitary portion of the curriculum. In a letter to Moltke dated January 23, 1884, General Friedrich von Flatow, the Academy's director, proposed that the General Staff limit annual enrollment to 100 and reduce the course to two years with a third year (Selekta) for the best students (no more than f i f t y ) . The suggested curriculum, which follows,

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stipulated enrollment in all subjects, but failed to include almost all of the liberal studies( 19) . First Class Hrs 4

Tactics Military History Arms and Ordnance Fortification Military Administration on

4 4 4

2

Mil i tar y Surveying History

Geography Mathematics or French or Russian

Hrs. 2 3

2 3 4 28-29

Second Class Tactics Siege Warfare Communications A d j u t a n t Service M i l i t a r y Justice Military Hygiene

5 2 2 2 1 1

History Military Geography Mathematics , Physics , and Chemist r y , or French or Russian

Third Class General Staff Affairs Military History Siege Warfare Tactics

6

6 4 4

History M a t h e m a t i c s and Geodesy , or French or Russian

3 2 3 2 2 6 24-25 3 3 3 6 29

According to Flatow's p l a n , t h e r e would be a threeweek practical exercise in s u r v e y i n g after the first class and a two-week exercise in terrain study after the second. Selekta m e m b e r s w o u l d spend a three-week tour with the General Staff u p o n c o m p l e t i o n of the course. N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g Flatow's claim that it would allow increased a t t e n d a n c e , the curriculum meant almost total a b a n d o n m e n t of Scharnhorst's goal. Moltke a p p r o v e d it, and the only real criticism was General Gustav von Blumenthal's a r g u m e n t against a course in adjutant service since, as he saw it, "adjutant service is not a science." But d e s p i t e the lack of opposition, the plan perished with the War Ministry's rejection of the additional annual e x p e n d i t u r e of 100,000 marks(20). A l t h o u g h a few of his suggestions were a d o p t e d , Flatow continued to press for" change even after he

left the Academy in 1886. In 1888 his efforts produced results. Frederick Ill's Service Order of A p r i l 26 and Moltke's aforementioned Order of Teaching of

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August 1 2 , the day he retired, paved the way for a reorganization of the curriculum. In the latter Moltke reaffirmed his support for a course which served only the immediate practical goals of the Staff(21). The outcome was a curriculum greatly resembling Flatow's. When the class of 1890-91 convened, further modifications had produced a course even more narrow in its military orientation than that initially approved by Moltke. The subjects and hours in parentheses in the following schedule of the approved curriculum reflect those lasting only from 1888 to 1890(22). First Class Hrs, Hrs. 3 4 History 4 3 Mathematics, 2 Physical Geography, 2 1 and Physics, 3 or 3 (General Geography) (2) and French or Russian 6 23-25 Second Class

Tactics Military History History of Established Army Organization Arms and Ordnance Fortifications

Tactics Military History Communications Surveying Military Justice Military Hygiene

4 4 2 2 1 1 Third

Tactics 2 Military History 4 General Staff Service 4 Siege Warfare 3 Administration and Law 2 [incl. international law]

2 Military Geography 3 History (3)4 Mathematics and 2 Chemistry/Physics, or 6 French or Russian 25 Class (History) Mathematics Geodesy, and (Chemistry), or French or Russian

(3)

( 2)3

3 (2)

6 21

While the army chose not to adopt Flatow's Selekta class, the new curriculum represented a near-total departure from the liberal/professional education envisioned by Scharnhorst. But some in the system wanted still more reductions. In 1890, as a result of increased enrollment, Chief of the General Staff von Waldersee recommended a shortening of the course to two years(23). Although nothing came of his suggestion, the curriculum did experience further

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significant alterations. In 1898 the authorities introduced Polish for those who could pass an interpreter's examination in Russian or French. In 1900 it was replaced with English, and in 1904 the international situation warranted the introduction of Japanese. Likewise, the renewed importance of sea power brought about the addition of a one-hour course in naval warfare in 1907. With other adjustments, the curriculum by 1912 reflected the total commitment to subjects with a practical military application. Even the general history courses concentrated heavily on the importance of the military in German history and the formation of the Reich(24). First Tactics Military History Arms and Ordnance Naval Warfare Military Hygiene Military Justice History

Class

Hrs 4 Geography and 4 Mathematics, 1 or 1 French, English, 1 Russian,* or 1 3 Japanese""'

Hrs. 1 6 6 10 19-23

* those taking Russian or Japanese were excused from the military hygiene and justice courses, Second Tactics and General Staff Service Military History Fortifications and Siege Warfare Map Drawing/Plotting and Surveying Communications

6 4 2 1 2 Third

Tactics and General Staff Service Military History Siege Warfare History

6 4 3 2

Class 3 History Constitution, Admin., Civil Law, and Finance 1 5 Mathematics, or French, English, Russian, or Jap. 6 24-25 Class Surveying (with astronomical plotting), 4 or French, English, 4 Russian, or Jap. 6_ 19-21

While superior in military content, the course clearly did little to acquaint the officers with the numerous factors involved in the formulation of domestic and foreign policies. Both before and after

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unification, the Prussian officer corps had played a prominent role in these areas. Having learned the art of war and little else, its members' contributions to national policy rested on the notion of the inevitability of armed conflict. But even then, Academy study centered mostly around German plans. Serious examinations of foreign armies were lacking. The study of sea power did not appear until 1907 and, like the inquiry into constitutional and civil law, occupied only a very small portion of the curriculum. Tactics—German tactics—continued as the principal subject, and, as Heinz Guderian recalled, all other courses paled in comparison. Only in this area were officers exposed to foreign practices and theories(25). Surprisingly, the serious study of strategy had ceased. Although offered as a separate subject during his tenure as a student, Moltke believed that a longrange strategy could be developed with common sense and knowledge of military history. As a result, the latter received inordinate attention while lectures on the economic and domestic problems resulting from an extended war and the relationship of politics to strategy were absent(26). The applicatory method, brought to increased prominence by General Julius von Verdy du Vernois in the early 1870s, became the standard guide for examining the history of war. In conjunction with the Studies Commission, instructors selected past campaigns for classroom application to modern situations. By studying the battles of Frederick the Great, the French Revolution, Napoleon, and William I, Moltke felt that an awareness would be imparted of "the unchanging conditions upon which good generalship depends." Unfortunately, as General von Bernhardi lamented in his memoirs, the applicatory method devoted little attention to the drastically different social, economic, political, industrial, and technological conditions of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries(27). Similarly, the course in general history never broadened in scope. Moltke claimed in his 1888 Order that it encompassed the general development of the human race in areas of science, religion, politics, art, and philosophy; emphasis, however, remained as before—the development of Prussia and the Reich and the relationship to foreign events(28). Domestic problems, international relations, and even current events merited scant attention. Thus, the following question in military history, given as a third-year final problem, elicited surprise and bewilderment among the examinees: "The influence of foreign and

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national policies on the decisions of the French Supreme High Command from the middle of August to the beginning of September 1870"(29). Former student and instructor Erich Ludendorff also saw defects in the course; the geography lectures were inadequate, and the quality of the civilian instructors was lacking. Given the old fighter's military prejudice, the criticism may have reflected a scorn for civilians in general. Nevertheless, the military lecturers were not without fault. Most served on the General Staff and taught only part-time. This, along with the large classes (around f i f t y ) , hindered preparation and impeded their acquiring adequate knowledge of the students' abilities, especially as they seldom assigned homework until the latter part of the third class(30). Throughout the period under study, the major world powers looked upon the Prussian War Academy with respect and often envy. But many of their own staff colleges, including by 1900 that of the United States, outlook in exhibited a decidedly more broad-minded curriculum development and teaching methods. Even the Bavarian War Academy, supposedly patterned after the Prussian form, included lectures by local university faculty on political history, the history of art, economics, public law, and other nonmilitary subjects. The study of tactics of foreign armies and the open analysis and even rejection of traditional axioms served as further examples of the Bavarian willingness to learn by questioning established doctrine(31). In fairness, discussions, although guarded, also took place in the Prussian classrooms, and the foreign schools were not always open forums. During / his tenure as director of the French staff college (Ecole Superieure de Guerre), Ferdinand Foch advised his pupils that the theory he taught "would not be open to question"(32). Still, the Prussian students knew that none of their instructors would tolerate criticism of established army policy. Opinions at variance with General Staff doctrine sometimes were presented, but until they became the formulators of policy, students refrained from voicing any distinct opposition. This reluctance paralleled the demand made of every o f f i c e r — a l l discussion ceased once an order had been issued. Academy instructors supplemented military lectures with practical training, which increased with the General Staff's takeover. Students solved surveying problems in the field and visited gun foundries, powder mills, and the fortifications of nearby Spandau. They took part in short excursions to area technical

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institutes and observed the exercises of the Railway Brigade. Before course's end, all made a short trip on a troop train(33). A major curriculum innovation was the opportunity for each officer to spend time during the two summer breaks (July 1 to September 1) with branches of the army other than his own. Prior to 1874 these tours came as a reward for superior academic performance. The Cabinet Order of January 17 of that year extended the option to any student who desired to take part. Those declining spent the time with their respective units, except for engineers and those cavalry officers whose regiments occupied garrisons more than seventy miles from Berlin. The latter were attached to a Guards cavalry regiment, while engineers were assigned to the Inspector General of their arm for practical duty. Most students, however, opted for the alternate service(34). By 1888 the success of the summer alternate service led to a mandatory order. The rules, as laid out by the Chief of the General Staff, specifically defined the assignments(35).

Infantry to Cavalry to Artillery to Engineers to

After First Class

After Second

field artillery field artillery infantry infantry or field artillery

cavalry infantry cavalry cavalry

Class

(Guards)

One can observe from the preceeding routine that none of the officers received an assignment to the highly technical heavy artillery or engineer regiments. Despite the increasing importance of these branches, the short field excursions were the extent of the other officers' exposure to the technical arms while at the Academy. During his days as a student just prior to World War I, Leo von Geyr could not recall any alternate assignments to a technical service regiment(36). The old Junker prejudice against anything smacking of the industrial middle class remained to the end. The technical arms represented the first and major areas of middle-class incursion into the officer corps. Many of the senior officers still looked upon these branches only as necessary evils and wanted to minimize their influence on army policy. And while innovative in Prussia, the study of alternate branches was not as extensive as in France where one-fourth of staff college training instructed the officer in the

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duties of his comrades. The result was a marked superiority of the French in 1914 in cooperation between a r m s — a n excellence the Germans belatedly recognized and quickly sought to emulate(37). The summer after the third class originally served as a time of review for the officers' final examination tour. But as the Academy attempted to keep up with new priorities, the students found this time also occupied with practical studies. By the 1890s those who had studied a foreign language were making trips abroad to improve their communication skills. Students choosing the technical option participated in short fleet tours or naval gunnery exercises. Yet in spite of these improvements, the new century found a reluctance by authorities to reduce instruction in areas rapidly becoming outdated. Tutelage in riding for foot officers remained a significant part of the practical portion of the course right up to World War I. Long held in private and royal stables, it received renewed status with the construction of an all-Academy facility in 1 9 0 7 ( 3 8 ) . As the prestige of the War Academy grew, the attention devoted to selection also increased. Competition intensified as officers acknowledged the career advantages accompanying Academy credentials. While the army possessed regulations for the admission process, there were, as in all other areas of Prussian officer selection and training, exceptions as well as changes. The ordinances never firmly established the service time required for Academy application. Prior to 1894 three years were felt to be sufficient, although the norm approached five. After that year the stipulations directed that the candidate was not to have over five years' service, be above the rank of first lieutenant, or expect to make captain within the next five years. In 1905 the guidelines specified that promotion to captain should not be expected within ten years. With the official indecision, it is not surprising that the regulations received little attention. World War II Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt entered the Academy as a lieutenant with ten years' service in 1903 and advanced to captain promptly upon completion. Some even came to the school as captains or were promoted while there. Time in service ranged from three to fifteen-plus years; and although the average age was twenty-nine, a twenty-three-year-old might be seated next to an old campaigner of thirtyeight(39). In addition to a vita, the applicant provided a written declaration of his intent to study either mathematics or at least one foreign language. A

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testimonial from his regimental or battalion commander described the candidate's preparation for the examination and gave assurances that he possessed: 1. a distinguished practical service and superior military aptitude. 2. a serious inclination toward academic training along with corresponding abilities. 3. the personality and character necessary for prospective employment in the higher positions in the army. 4. strong health and the desire to maintain it. 5. a sense of financial responsibility(40) . After years of observing the army's general indifference to academic prowess and in some instances living on the verge of poverty, the officers were expected to arrive at the Academy possessing a love for study and freedom from debt. The next step was the entrance examination. There were a few temporary deferments: injuries, wounds, passing health problems, or lack of preparation time due to the demands of official duties. While exemptions allowed an officer to be admitted without it, he had to take the exam the next time it was administered and score at least equal to the lowest of his classmates. Such exceptions, however, seldom occurred and were usually the result of the officer in question approaching the upper age limit(41). The examination was neither easy nor overly difficult. Ludendorff claimed that his preparation was not very diligent even with his admitted weakness in French. Schlieffen and Seeckt felt that the majority of officers could pass the exam with a moderate amount of exertion. The competition was most vigorous among the infantry officers whose applications far outnumbered those of the other arms. Many from the cavalry chose not to apply since they were wealthy aristocrats or from the industrial middle class and did not need or desire to make a career of the army. However, most of those in the infantry Guards regiments did seek admission since a large number had come from poor Prussian noble families and planned on staying in the service as long as there existed a favorable chance for advancement(42). In a departure from the officer selection process, the nobility did not receive blatant preferential treatment for assignments to the Academy. Still, an inordinate number of aristocrats were successful, if only because they came to the entrance examination better prepared. They or their regiments could afford

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tutors, and by 1886 only a little over 25 percent of those selected had prepared independently. Officers in the elite regiments stationed near Berlin or other large cities usually had more time for study and easier access to manuals and publications offering study programs and advice for improving one's score. The older officers also had more time to help their unit's applicants. Those candidates who served as regimental adjutants in these garrisons dealt with the General Staff on a regular basis and achieved a high rate of admission(43). Although unintentional, the system once again favored the traditional elites. The entrance examination took place annually in March at each corps headquarters before a committee including the corps' chief of staff as president and several field-grade officers. The subjects included formal and applied tactics, arms and ordnance, fortification, field intelligence (with sketch m a p ) , technical drawing, history, geography, and mathematics or foreign language (translation of a passage from German into the language to be studied). The test lasted four days and, surprisingly, did not include an oral portion. The only aids permitted were a foreign language dictionary or a table of logarithms. Officers serving on the General Staff prepared the military problems, civilian Academy instructors the rest(44). A directive issued in 1888 expressed the exam's purpose: The object of the entrance examination is to ascertain whether the candidate possesses the degree of general education and knowledge requisite for a profitable attendance at the lectures of the Academy. The examination is also to determine whether the candidates have the power of judgment without which there could be no hope of their further progress. The questions set are to be such as cannot be answered merely from knowledge stored up in memory, and should test the capacity for clear, collected, and consistent expression.(45 ) In actuality, however, the widely used practice of cramming was more to fill in the required knowledge than to promote analytical thinking. And since the candidates knew beforehand the areas on which each portion of the test would concentrate, it only remained to memorize the necessary information and practice on the sample questions. Sometime in October the Academy Studies Commission

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determined the examination areas for history and geography. In history the period usually covered no more than a century, while the questions in geography dealt with a designated continent or smaller region. The army provided the prospective examinees with the sources used for these questions. The Commission also prepared outlines for those questions in the military subjects which the candidates prepared beforehand. The guidelines then were sent, prior to December 1, through the General Staff to corps commanders, the

Special Arms (Obersten Waffeninstanzen), the Inspec-

tion Department of the War Schools, the headquarters of the Cadet Corps, and the Imperial Admiralty(46) . The candidates then had three months to prepare the outside assignments and study the selected areas for history and geography. Upon completion of the exam, the examiners forwarded the tests to the chief of staff of the respective corps who assigned identification numbers. He then sent the tests to the Academy to be graded by the Studies Commission. The members evaluated each candidate's work on the basis of its "intrinsic value." The answers had to demonstrate "competency and decision capability" as well as "form, . . . stylistic skill," and "clarity and keenness in the manner of expression." In the sketching and drawing portions, the graders looked for "accuracy, distinctness, and neatness"(47) . The marks assigned, like those used for the ensign and officer exams, allowed a wide range of evaluation(48 ) . 9-excellent 8~very good 7-good 6-fair 5~satisfactory

4—average 3~insufficient 2-almost unsatisfactory 1-completely unsatisfactory

The Commission arrived at the final grade by using the various multiples assigned to each subject. Prior to the turn of the century, the coefficients were fairly even between the military and nonmilitary studies(49 ) . Formal Tactics x 3 Applied Tactics x 4 Arms and Ordnance x 3 Fortification x 3 Field Intelligence x 4

Technical Drawing History Geography Mathematics Foreign Language

x x x x x

1 4 4 3 3

As the new languages appeared and the military subjects were accorded ever-increasing importance, the

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General Staff emphasis(50).

adjusted

Formal Tactics Applied Tactics Arms and Ordnance Fortification Field Intelligence Technical Drawing History

the

x x x x x x x

3 4 2 2 3 1 3

values

to reflect

Geography Mathematics French English Russian Japanese

altered

X X X X X X

2 2 2 2 3 3

Among the military subjects, arms and ordnance, fortification, and field intelligence were reduced in value, but only by a factor of one. In contrast, all of the nonmilitary exercises lost one or, in the case of geography, two points. The values attached to Russian and Japanese reflected not only difficulty, but also their immediate military worth and rarity within the staff system. The Academy director forwarded the graded exams to the Chief of the General Staff for final selection. If a score was extremely bad, a retest might be denied. Otherwise, the process allowed only two tries to achieve a passing score; and in a rare observance of selection regulations, there were no exceptions. Regardless of the various multiples used during the entire period, an average score of 5 (satisfactory) was required(51). The consequence of changing the coefficients thus permitted high grades in the military subjects and preferred languages to offset poor performances in the other disciplines. On the other hand, it was very difficult for the opposite to occur. To his credit, Moltke effectively opposed a suggestion by Flatow that the students be selected solely on the basis of their performance on the military sections of the exam. He also turned down the request that those officers be excluded who did not score above a 5 in tactics or who made less than a 4 in any of the nonmilitary subjects unless a 7 was earned on the military portion. Flatow advocated that the nonmilitary subjects should otherwise be used only in the event of a tie. In rare form, Moltke refused this blatant attempt to denigrate the nonmilitary portion(52). Nevertheless, the changes in the coefficients a decade after his death achieved virtually the same imbalance sought by Flatow. As a result of the adjustment, a candidate could score less than satisfactory on the nonmilitary subjects and still receive a passing score if he showed above average skill in his military work, especially tactics. In comparison with the Prussian process,

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the Bavarian War Academy offered no official help in preparing for its evenly weighted entrance exam which included an oral exercise. The Prussians made no provisions for an oral test or even an interview in order to obtain an impression of the officer's bearing and mental dexterity under stress. The candidates' regimental evaluations almost always contained glowing recommendations. Accordingly, it was not uncommon for an outstanding officer from a remote garrison to be passed over. A famous example was Ludwig Beck who did not obtain a billet until his second try, but who nonetheless went on to become Chief of the General S t a f f ( 5 3 ) . After the wars of unification, the Prussian General Staff began a steady growth that continued until World War I. As a matter of course, enrollment at the War Academy also increased even though the majority of graduates did not obtain permanent assignment to staff duty in Berlin. Between 1871 and 1877 the total for all three classes rose from 148 to over 300. This growth soon outstripped the facilities on the Burgsstrasse. Since expansion there was impossible, the army commissioned the building of a new campus which opened on January 3, 1883. Located on the Dorotheenstrasse, it extended through to the Strasse Unter den Linden and opened onto both avenues. In addition to lecture halls and offices, the complex included a lavishly decorated great hall, officers' mess, and quarters for the director and several administrators. While obviously slanted toward military materials, the library still rated as one of the best in Germany. The new facility soon justified its construction. By 1895 the enrollment totaled 4 0 0 , and by 1910 it stood at 480 with 700 candidates vying for 160 vacancies(54). By the late nineteenth century every officer knew that career advancement and a staff position depended on graduation from the Academy. The few who achieved prominence without it had distinguished themselves in the wars of unification or during colonial actions. The nobility continued to occupy a disproportionate number of seats. The financially distressed aristocracy, mostly in the infantry, needed the promotions, and an Academy record gave them an edge against the increasing influx of well-educated middle-class officers. The "old boy" network assured that if a billet at the Academy came down to the officer's social origins, all else being equal, a "von" generally would get the nod. Despite the bourgeois threat, the nobility continued to dominate General Staff appointments. As late as 1906, titled officers made up

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60 percent of the Staff; by the eve of the war, they still held over 50 percent of the billets, even though the overwhelming majority of officers came from the middle c l a s s ( 5 5 ) . The Guards officers who elected to participate in the selection process remained the most successful candidates. The advantageous position of their garrisons in or near the capital meant not only better preparation for the admission examination, but also the opportunity to develop (if they did not already exist) social contacts that facilitated selection for both the Academy and the Staff. In an unexpected turn of events, the assigning of entrance exam identification numbers (to prevent biased grading) actually worked against those it sought to protect. The predominance of officers from those regiments best able to contribute to the preparation of their candidates revealed the inherent prejudice of the process in favor of those from the traditionally preferred origins. Instructions from the War Ministry on September 2 2 , 1892, attempted to address the admission disparity by recommending that some candidates be selected by attaching less weight to exam scores and more to education, recommendations, military record, and general ability. Those officers who had prepared alone or with little assistance rated a few extra points in the grading process. But of the 120 selected in that year, the guidelines required only 20 to be chosen in this m a n n e r ( 5 6 ) . The ultraconservative War Ministry still feared a bourgeois dilution of the command echelons and, despite its suggestion, supported the continued preponderance of students from the elite and metropolitan garrisons. Notwithstanding the imbalance in favor of the nobility at the War Academy and within the staff system, the officer corps demanded above-average academic ability of every candidate selected. Accordingly, those officers who had taken the shortest route to a commission found that there was a price to pay. At the time of unification, two-thirds of Academy students came from the civilian secondary schools. By 1877 almost half held the Abitur. In 1904 the number had increased to 59 percent, and the significance of a completed secondary education could not be denied. Former Cadet Corps students at the Academy almost always came from the Selekta or Oberprima classes with the latter (5 to 10 percent of the enrollment) normally holding the Abitur. Since Selekta alumni, the pride of the officer corps, generally obtained around a quarter of the billets, only about 15 percent of the remaining seats went to officers who

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had failed to complete their secondary schooling(57). Despite rhetoric to the contrary, education was proving to be a decided asset in career advancement. Although steadily increasing in military importance, few engineer officers attended the Academy. Still, the growing significance of education allowed for improvement even in this bourgeois-dominated arm. Whereas in 1885 only one officer was present, by the mid~1890s around 5 percent of each class were engineers, a ratio that remained steady until World War 1 ( 5 8 ) . While seemingly a small percentage, the number inflates in value when compared with the relative size of the arm and manifests the increasing (albeit reluctant) awareness of the importance of technology in modern warfare. But, as already noted, the Academy still did not recognize the advantages of detailing the other officers to an engineer unit for a short alternate tour. Despite the professed rigors of the selection process and the curriculum, many of the students did not regard life at the War Academy as particularly arduous. Instruction lasted from 9 in the morning until 3 or 4 in the afternoon, after which the students were free to pursue their studies or other interests. Geyr claimed that any who wanted it could have a large amount of free time. Guderian, a cadet Abitur holder, also attended at the turn of the century and recalled a curriculum that did not make excessive demands. Since the instructors assigned little homework, most students remembered their stay as enjoyable if not e a s y ( 5 9 ) . The third year made the greatest demands upon the students, but most still found time to enjoy the entertainments close at hand. As a contemporary described it, "Berlin was Babylon to the provincials who would save for months for a week spent in the cafes and cabarets" (60) . It stood as no less for the young officers. Guderian looked back on the tour as "a truly pleasant stop." Despite their "modest income," he and his wife fondly recalled the period before the rigors of war as "inexpensive and we were able to enjoy the advantages of the great city and its beautiful environment. . . . We found an expanded circle of relations and acquaintances. The perfect harmony of our young marriage made us very h a p p y " ( 6 1 ) . As the third class drew to a close, the students became increasingly involved with their studies. But even then they participated in the Kulminationsfest that celebrated the approaching end of the course. The students compiled a volume containing poetry and humorous personal experiences. In jest or as a way

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of getting even with an instructor or classmate, peculiarities or defects found subtle expression in verse(62). The instructors took it all gracefully since the students knew the consequences of provoking the ire of their mentors. Compared to the examinations for promotion to the second and third classes, the final exam justifiably ranked as the most difficult as well as the most important. For military history and siege warfare, the instructors passed out problems to be solved beforehand; the students performed the remainder of the test "under supervision." However, as with all other major military examinations, the graders also evaluated the officers on personality, character, personal behavior, and general education(63). The final part of the exam, and the one which steadily grew in importance, was in General Staff Service. This test took the form of a three-week exercise tour similar to that annually performed by the General Staff. While under constant observation, the students received marks reflecting talent, knowledge, performance, and endurance under simulated battle conditions. The first few days were spent sketching terrain and undergoing questions on the land from a tactical point of view. The demands increased thereafter as the examiners tested the officers' ability to solve problems under trying conditions. Practical questions involved two opposing armies, each the size of a brigade or infantry division. The students issued all orders necessary for the conduct of the war game, after which the observers a s sessed the results. From these exercises the examiners determined the officers' competence to perform reconnaissance assignments and deal with fluctuating tactical situations(64) . Upon completion of the final tour, the officers returned to their regiments to await the final report which generally took six months to complete. The commander of the exercise tour sent his evaluations to the Academy's director who, with the assistance of the Studies Commission, determined the final ratings and class standings. Results were then disseminated to the Chief of the General Staff, all corps commanders, and each student (along with his certificate). The four ratings possible were: 1. 2. 3. 4.

Qualified Qualified Qualified Qualified

for for for for

general staff duty. higher level adjutant duty. instructor at military schools, line duty.(65)

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The Academy awarded the Emperor's Honor Sword for the highest overall achievement, but the qualification for General Staff duty most concerned the graduates. While not officially admitted, those who received the lowest rating were considered to have failed the course. Among the officers, however, the general feeling persisted that all who did not obtain the top qualification had failed. Only about 30 percent earned that honor and a personal evaluation similar to Ludendorff's: "A clear head, combined with good knowledge, ability, and form." Professional jealousy surfaced as never before. Geyr claimed that those not achieving the top evaluation sometimes suffered from a psychological "disease of the 'transposed' general staff." Resentment against the Academy and the most successful officers produced an inferiority complex which, ironically, appeared most often among those with the second rating(66). Regardless of one's final grade, a War Academy diploma during the imperial period eventually proved vital to career advancement. One contemporary claimed that an Academy record translated to eight years' seniority on the promotion l i s t ( 6 7 ) . A lieutenant who had not finished the course could not advance before someone with greater seniority and might take eighteen years to make captain. But for those officers who obtained the higher ratings, the future was bright. Officers receiving qualification for senior adjutant and military school service went directly to corps and division staff assignments. Those qualified for General Staff duty secured orders, issued on William I's birthday (March 2 2 ) , for probationary training with the Great General Staff in Berlin. This practice began unofficially in 1866, but the Cabinet Order of November 2 1 , 1872, coming on the heels of Moltke's involvement in Academy affairs, made it official(68). During their stay at the "Red Den," the officers gained experience in the practical application of Academy training. In the decade prior to World War I, the number of officers (including the few from Bavaria) attached to the Great General Staff totaled just over 600 with only 250 to 270 holding permanent assignments. While most students spent the entire time in one department, some visited other divisions. The various sections studied the military organization of other European states and the world, German mobilization and deployment, training and the War Academy, and the numerous technical, historical, and bureaucratic concerns of the modern army. Such duty, along with subsequent rotations between ever-higher field

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commands and staff positions, permitted the officers to gain a broad view of the General Staff's duties and philosophy(69). However, those who obtained this valuable experience counted for only a small percentage of the officer corps' total complement. In addition to their regular Staff duties, new Academy graduates performed weekly tactical exercises on maps, solved various extended problems, and participated in two or three field exercises (minor war games) that usually took place in the spring. They were granted access to the materials from which the periodic General Staff histories were compiled in order to further their knowledge of modern military history. Schlieffen even included them in the great annual War Game (Kr iegsspiel) that lasted for weeks in the summer and fall. From these various assignments the Staff sought to increase the individual officer's capacity for work and concentrated effort over extended periods and condition them to dealing rapidly and efficiently with large units and huge amounts of materiel(70) . Just as important was the desire to instill the spirit of the General Staff. After three years at the Academy and two or three years with the Staff, the future commanders, regardless of their social origins, felt themselves to be the aristocrats of the officer corps. At the conclusion of the probationary period, the General Staff tested the officers, and a select few received permanent assignment. Again, personal traits and character, along with the ability to handle stress and make rapid decisions, entered into the evaluations. The remaining officers constituted a welltrained reserve pool subject to recall. Some obtained positions within the War Ministry or on staffs in the field. However, the elite captains who comprised the select few were almost assured that their career rotations would ultimately lead to the highest portals of command(71). By the turn of the century, the Prussian War Academy had solidified its reputation as the model staff college. Its graduates were proficient in military science and epitomized the desired qualities of the officer corps. Imbued with the spirit of the officer caste, they exuded loyalty, obedience, and total commitment. Their advanced training was at least equal, and often superior, to that of foreign contemporaries. In comparison, graduates of the French staff college usually received permanent staff assignments without any rotations to field commands, thus breeding a top echelon familiar only with theory and administration. And despite the French superiority

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in cooperation between arms, the reputation of the school was so poor that even as late as 1912, one observer argued that no more than one-fifth of the students could write correctly(72). The British Staff College remained a pitiful farce for most of the period prior to World War I. Even with a two-year curriculum that covered subjects similar to those of the War Academy, it drew relatively few applicants. Since a combined staff did not even exist until 1904, many in the army regarded the school as unnecessary and a haven for shirkers; although in the 1890s one student found the time to write a history of the American Civil War while another qualified as a barrister. As late as 1893, an officer could take the final examination without even attending, and after that year the school dispensed with the test altogether. The poor caliber of instructors betrayed the army's lack of interest in the c o u r s e — one lecturer (a colonel) in the 1880s regularly confused the Peninsula War with the Waterloo campaign. In the 1870s the most significant change was the permanent addition of a pack of hounds. At the time of the Boer War, Staff College diplomas still merited no particular notice in the War Office. Accordingly, it is not surprising that a German description of English officer training as late as 1912 evoked a less than favorable assessment(73 ) . Outside of the Bavarian War Academy, if any school on the continent equaled or exceeded the Prussian in the preparation of officers for staff duty, it was that of Italy. As early as the 1870s, the War School (Scuola di Guerra) at Turin embraced a comprehensive three-year liberal and military curriculum which culminated in staff duty or, at the very least, advanced promotion. In comparison, the United States at the turn of the century possessed only a one-year Staff College (General Service and Staff C o l l e g e ) , but the army also used numerous "post schools" for advanced professional education and was in the process of creating a War College for the distinguished graduates of the staff s c h o o l ( 7 4 ) . Notwithstanding the relative quality of the Prussian War Academy, defects in thinking often paralleled those of foreign staff schools. In military theory and application, Germany's geographic location fostered a strong belief in favor of the offensive while failing to assign adequate importance to the effectiveness of modern firepower. Defensive tactics tended to be equated with weakness and lack of will. The result was increased adherence to the "cult of the offensive" regardless of the tactical situation or

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potential for l o s s e s — a philosophy that garnered support elsewhere in Europe, even in defense-minded France(75). This school of thought prompted overconfidence among the officers charged with advising the government and the Kaiser. And despite William II's personal support, the significance of sea power continued to be underestimated. Although some officers would subsequently observe naval exercises during the various staff assignments, practical exposure to the fleet while a student at the Academy was confined to those few officers from the technical arms. Academy instructors overemphasized the battles of Frederick the Great and Napoleon while failing to adequately recognize new technical and intelligence-gathering developments which rendered many of the traditional axioms invalid. And while the strength of the armies of Russia and France justifiably merited concern, the General Staff tended to underrate the effect of British naval and mercantile power in a prolonged confrontation(76). Consequently, the study and discussion of these factors received inadequate attention at the Academy. Those charged with the development and approval of the Academy curriculum suffered from the traditional opposition, or at least indifference, to the liberal studies. Moltke's stand on education disregarded the value to the officer of more than a passing knowledge of domestic and foreign affairs. Sociopolitical factors were neither the General Staff's nor the average officer's concern. The steady reduction of subjects thought by Scharnhorst to nurture a broad knowledge of all that serves to create a national spirit reflected the wide acceptance of Moltke's philosophy(77). On the surface the General Staff defended the alterations as attempts to make the Academy a truly professional staff school. But in actuality, the changes marked the continued aversion of many army leaders to any subject that smacked of impractical intellectualism and their outright ignorance of the contribution of these studies in producing well-rounded officers. Martin Bethke, a lieutenant in the 1890s, recalled many years later that the intellectual officer did not receive the respect due him even on the General Staff. The well-read and brilliant General August von Goeben, who had proved his worth during the wars of unification and even had a bat t lecruiser named for him after his death, was never very popular among his peers. By comparison, the intelligent but less-gifted Moltke and Manteuffel were viewed as near demigods in part because their expositions remained

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confined to military spheres(78). For Bethke such evidence denoted a time of transition(79). Granted, the tenure of the more technicalminded Schlieffen reflected a change, but not toward a liberal/military staff education. The coarse, conservative thinking of the eighteenth century still held sway among the majority of policy makers. Now, however, it found expression in the promotion of the idea of the military commander as a fighter/technician rather than a leader schooled in every facet of national p o l i c y — m i l i t a r y , technical, social, political, and economic. With brutal efficiency World War I revealed the d e fects in preparation as well as the shortsightedness of the narrow education obtained at the War Academy. Officers ignorant of important foreign and domestic social, economic, and political factors and holding to outdated military theories attempted to plan and conduct a modern total war. As a result, and despite bravery, discipline, and efficient organization, they found that many of the tactical lessons taught at the Academy had been rendered useless by modern technology(80). To win the new war likewise required a new type of c o m m a n d e r — o n e possessing an awareness of factors which, along with success or failure on the battlefield, contribute to ultimate victory or defeat. Once the French had blunted the modified Schlieffen Plan, an outgrowth of the cult of the offensive, the German high command was forced to rethink established doctrines. The illusion of a short war gave way to the realization that a long and bloody conflict would require the mobilization of all sectors of German society. There were a few officers, among them Ludendorff, who recognized the importance of military, technical, and economic factors. But their lack of a truly broad professional education left them unaware of the social and political implications of a prolonged conflict. Those Prussian officers who donned the crimsonaccented uniform of the General Staff acquired a professional status that was the envy of the rest of the officer c o r p s ( 8 1 ) . The pinnacle of officer training, the War Academy almost guaranteed its graduates high rank and prestigious duty assignments. But in the final analysis, the officer corps had once again failed to recognize the importance of a broad education in the development of those destined to contribute to the formation of army (and in some cases, national) policy. War Academy graduates became army leaders welltrained and disciplined in popular but often outdated

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military axioms and t o t a l l y c o m m i t t e d to their role in the p r e s e r v a t i o n of the m o n a r c h y and the officer corps. On the b a t t l e f i e l d s of the Great War, however, they learned that the rules of old were just that. Of even greater significance, they failed to fully understand the role and e f f e c t of n o n m i l i t a r y factors when planning and waging total war. In the b l o o d b a t h and u p h e a v a l that followed, illusion encountered the unforgiving school of reality. By failing to p r o p e r l y p r e p a r e for and adjust to the changing face of war, the officer corps c o n t r i b u t e d both to the defeat of the army and the downfall of the order it had sworn to defend. NOTES 1. Letter to Spenser Wilkinson, January 20, 1890, in Spenser Wilkinson, The Brain of an Army (Westminister: A r c h i b a l d Constable, 1895), 11. 2. The best study remains Craig, Politics. See also Wiegand S c h m i d t - R i c h b e r g , Die Generalstabe in Deutschland, 1871-1945, Schriftenreihe des m i l i t a r geschichtlichen Forschungsamt [ed.], no. 3 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt , 1962), 15-49; and Walter Gorlitz, History of the German General Staff, 1657-1945, trans. Brian Battershaw (New York: Praeger, 1953; r e p r i n t ed. , Westport, Conn. : Greenwood Press, 1975). 3. Wilkinson, Brain, 39. 4. G e y r , "Staff," 21 and 32. Prior to 1817, the General Staff was known as the General Quartermaster Staff (General quartiermeisterstab). By 1809 it had become a section of the War Ministry with the Minister the highest ranking officer. However, the mid-1820s found authority confused between the M i n i s t r y , the Military C a b i n e t , and the General Staff itself, a situation never e n t i r e l y resolved even after Moltke's a r r i v a l in 1858. Willems, Way, 54-56. See also Carey Brewer, "The General Staff of the Army," Proceedings, United States Naval Institute 82 (January-June 1956): 157; B a r n e t t , "Education," 20-21; Michael Howard, The Franco-Prussian War (London: R u p e r t Hart-Davis, 1961), 18-27 and 455; and J. D. H i t t l e , The Military Staff: Its History and Development (Harrisburg, Pa.: Military Service P u b l i s h i n g , 1949), 65. 5. While Great Britain maintained schools for the training of field command staff officers as early as 1799, attention was not d e v o t e d to the idea of a general staff until after the Crimean t r a g e d y . Still, even t h o u g h the Staff College opened in 1858, it was

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not u n t i l 1901, after the Boer disaster, that the British finally created the Imperial General Staff. Similarly, France had a school by 1818, but it took the humiliation of 1870-71 to reveal the inadequate attention d e v o t e d to it. Even the United States did not pay serious attention to its a d v a n c e d m i l i t a r y education until the 1880s. William Murray Black, "The Military Education of Army Officers," Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States 32 (March-April 1903):216; Timothy K. W e n n i n g e r , The Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army: Education, Professionalism, and the Officer Corps of the United States Army, 1881-1918 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1978), 3-4, 11, and 13; Bond, Army, 182, 212-43, and 333; H u n t i n g t o n , Soldier, 49-50; B. H. Liddel1-Hart , Foch: The Man of Orleans (Boston: Little, Brown, 1932), 19; Hackett, Profession, 104; and John W. Masland and Laurence I. R a d w a y , Soldiers and Scholars (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1957), 83-85. 6. Geyr, "Staff," 21; Simpson, Army, 40; T. N. D u p u y , A Genius for War: The German Army and General Staff, 1807-1945 (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: PrenticeHall, 1977), 30; and Hansgeorg M o d e l , Der deutsche Generalstabsoffizier (Frankfurt am Main: Bernard & Graefe Verlag fur Wehrwesen, 1968)_, 12-13. 7. Gunther Blumentritt, "Mi 1itarisches Schulsystem und Hochschule," Uehrkunde 12 (1959):670; Model, Generalstabsoffizier, 13-14; Detlef Bald, "The Impact of Tradition on the Education of the Military in Germany," trans. Rolf A. Trautsch, Military Affairs, October 1981, 110; Wilkinson, Brain, 147-50; D u p u y , Genius, 30; H u n t i n g t o n , Soldier, 48; Louis von Scharfenort, Die koniglich preussische Kriegsakademie, 1810-1910 (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 1910), 359; and "La Carriere de L'Officier D'^EtatMajor Allemand," Revue Militaire des Armees Etrangeres, N o v e m b e r 1910, 329. 8. The title remained unchanged until the school's prohibition by the Treaty of Versailles. The Nazis reopened it on October 15, 1935. Schwertfeger, firzieher, 31; Laszlo M. A l f o l d i , "The Prussian-German General Staff, 1804-1919," in Essays in Some Dimensions of Military History, vol. 4, ed . B. F. Cooling and Don Rickey (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. A r m y Military Research Collection, 1976), 37; Poten, Preussen, 275; Model, Generalstabsoffizier, 13 and 18; and Rosinski, Army, 164. 9. E. von Selasen-Selasinsky, "Die Kriegsakademie: Personliche Erinnerungen," Deutsches Soldatenjahrbuch (Munich: Schild V e r l a g , 1972), 108; A l f o l d i , "Staff,"

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36; and Rosinski, Army, 165-66. 10. Wilkinson, Brain, 138. See also 151-52, 156, and 158; Schwan, Report, 76; and Nenninger, Schools, 12-13. 11. Reinelt, ed . , Major Kuhns Aufnahmeprufung fur die Kriegsakademie, 5th ed. (Berlin: Liebelschen Buchh a n d l u n g , 1913), 1. 12. Lenski, Leutnantsjahren, 125; Schwertfeger, Erzieher, 34; Poten, Preussen, 285; Messerschmidt und Fetter, Militargeschichte , 119; and Schmidt-Richberg und Matuschka, Entlassung, 196. 13. Poten, Preussen, 275; Schwertfeger, Erzieher, 35-36; and Schwan, Report, 73. 14. Schwertfeger, Erzieher, 72. See also Prussia, Kriegsministerium, Dienstordnung der Kriegsakademie (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried M i t t l e r und Sohn, 1901), 2-3; Wilkinson, Brain, 152-53; Schwan, Report, 73; and Upton, Armies, 216. 15. Kriegsministerium, Dienstordnung, 14; Schwan, Report, 74; and Model, Generalstabsoffizier, 13. 16. B l u m e n t r i t t , "Schulsystem," 670; and Model, Generalstabsoffizier, 14. 17. Poten, Preussen, 284-87. 18. Scharfenort, Kriegsakademie, 218-19 and 390 (#154); and Detlef Bald, Der deutsche Generalstab, 1859-1939: Reform und Restauration in Ausbildung und Bildung (Munich: Sozialwissenschaftliches Institute der Bundeswehr, 1977), 45. 19. Poten, Preussen, 291; Schwertfeger, Erzieher , 55; and Scharfenort, Kriegsakademie, 205-6. 20. Schwertfeger, Erzieher , 54-55; Poten, Preussen, 291-92; Messerschmidt und Petter, Mi 1itargeschichte, 120; and West G e r m a n y , Bundesrainister ium, gen. ed . , Schriftenreihe Innere Fuhrung, Reihe: Bildung, vol. 5: Die Bildung des Offiziers: Dokumente aus vier Jahrhunderten, ed. Jurgen Bertram (Bonn: n.p., 1969), 214-16. 21. Messerschmidt und Petter, Militargeschichte, 120. 22. I b i d . ; Poten, Preussen, 305; and Schwan, Report, 79. 23. Poten, Preussen, 306. 24. Scharfenort, Kriegsakademie, 225-26 and 391 (#155); Schwertfeger, Erzieher, 58; Model, Generalstabsoffizier, 15; and B l u m e n t r i t t , "Schulsystem," 670. 25. Heinz Guderian, Zur Geschichte des Deutschen Generalstabes, N o v e m b e r 1948 (unpublished), 4-5, cited by Model, Generalstabsoffizier, 16; Geyr, "Staff," 24; Schmidt-Richberg und Matuschka, Entlassung, 197; Wilkinson, Brain, 163-64; and Schwan, Report, 77.

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26. Gustav Hillard, "Epilog auf den preussischdeutschen Generalstabsoffizier," Neue Deutsche Hefte, July-August 1964, 93; and Alfoldi , "Staff," 37. 27. Wilkinson, Brain, 165-66 and 181; Bernhardi, Denkwurdigkeiten, 63; Lenski , Leutnantsjahren , 126: and Schwan, Report, 77-78. 28. Schwertfeger , Erzieher, 61-62; and Wilkinson, Brain, 166-67. 29. Geyr, "Staff , " 4. 30. Scharfenort, Kriegsakademie , 378; Ludendorff. Werdegang, 28-29; Geyr, "Staff," 23; and Schwan, Report, 76. 31. Geyr, "Staff," 27; M o d e l , Generalstabsoffizier , 18; and Poten, Uebersicht , 290-91. 32, Liddell-Hart, Foch, 25-26. See also Rosinski , Army , 179. 33. Black, "Education," 212-13; and Schwan, Report , 79. 34, Schwertfeger, Erzieher , 54; and Poten, Preussen, 288. Kriegsministerium, 35. Schwan, Report, 80; and Dienstordnung, 16. 36. Geyr, "Staff," 24. 37. Rosinski, Army, 178-79. Entlassung, 38. Schmidt-Richberg und Matuschka, 197; Selasen-Selasinsky , "Erinnerungen , " 111-12; and Schwertfeger, Erzieher, 67-68. 39. Kriegsministerium, Dienstordnung , ); Reinelt, Aufnahmeprufung, 1; Blumentritt, Rundstedt, 18-19 ; Schwan, Report, 74; Poten, Preussen , 293; Commission , Education, 306; and Scharfenort, Kriegsakademie, 352. 40. Reinelt, Aufnahmeprufung , 1-2; and Kriegsministerium,, Dienstordnung, 6-7. 41 . Ibid. 42. Ludendorff, Werdegang, 27; Rosinski, Army, 78; Lexis, Schulwesens, 340; and G e y r , "Staff," 21. 43. A few of the many publications are included in the b i b l i o g r a p h y . See also Messerschmidt und Petter, Militargeschichte, 121; Laszlo M. Alfoldi, Special Bibliography 12, vol. 1: The Armies of Austria-Hungary and Germany, 1740-1914 (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army Military History Research Collection, [April 1975]), 147-48; and Geyr, "Staff," 21. 44. Examples of the questions can be found in Commission, Education, 577-80; Upton, Armies, 213-16; Aufgaben gestellt in der Eintrittsprufung fur die Kriegs-Akademie (Oldenburg: Gerhard Stalling, 1901, 1904-1908, 1912); and Schwan, Report, 74. See also M o d e l , Generalstabsoffizier, 17; Schmidt-Richberg und Matuschka, Entlassung, 197; Schwertfeger, Erzieher, 66; Kriegsministerium, Dienstordnung, 9-10; Reinelt,

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Aufnahmeprufung, 3-4; and Bruno B l e y h o e f f e r , Praktische Winke fur die Aufnahmeprufung zur Kriegsakademie und fur das Verhalten Wahrend des Besuches derselben (Berlin: Carl Duncker, 1903), 10. 45. W i l k i n s o n , Brain, 153-54. 46. K r i e g s m i n i s t e r i u m , Dienstordnung, 8 ; Senwan, Report, 74-75; Commission, Education, 307-8; and R e i n e l t , Aufnahmeprufung, 2-3. 47. R e i n e l t , Aufnahmeprufung, 4 and 6. See also S c h w e r t f e g e r , Erzieher, 66; S c h m i d t - R i c h b e r g und Mat u s c h k a , Entlassung, 197; and M o d e l , Generalstabsoffizier, 17. 48. Scharfenort, Kriegsakademie, 350. 49. I b i d . 50. R e i n e l t , Aufnahmeprufung, 6. 51. I b i d . , 4; and P o t e n , Preussen, 290-91. 52. Moltke to Flatow, N o v e m b e r 25, 1883, cited by Poten, Preussen, 290-91. 53. Geyr, "Staff," 22-23; M o d e l , Generalstabsoffi' zier, 18; and German Army, 137. 54. Messerschmidt und F e t t e r , Militargeschichte, 120; S c h m i d t - R i c h b e r g und M a t u s c h k a , Entlassung, 197; Poten, Preussen, 285; S c h w e r t f e g e r , Erzieher, 34~35, 53 and 65; S c h a r f e n o r t , Kriegsakademie, 350—52; Boeck, Deutschland, 270; and V. E. M u s p r a t t , "The General Staff in France and G e r m a n y , " The Journal of the United Service Institution of India 40 (1911), 327. 55. M o d e l , Ceneralstabsoffizicr, 17-18; Rosinski, Army, 166; G e y r , "Staff," 21; B e r g h , Hear, 104; and Demeter, Officer-Corps, 29. 56. S c h a r f e n o r t , Kriegsakademie , 345-46; Rosinski, Army, 166; and B e r g h , Heer, 104. 57. Hazen, School, 264; Poten, Preussen, 285, 289, and 306; and D e m e t e r , Officer-Corps, 93. 58. Hare, "Engineer A r m , " 1164; Poten, Preussen, 306; and Geyr, "Staff," 22-23. 59. Geyr, "Staff," 24; and B r a d l e y , Guderian, 3940. 60. W a g n e r , Germany, 2. 61. B r a d l e y , Guderian, 40. 62. Schwertfeger, Erzieher, 70-72. 63. Brewer, "Staff," 159; and Schwan, Report, 80. 64. K r i e g s m i n i s t e r i u m , Dienstordnung, 19; Schwan, Report, 78-80; Black, "Education," 212-13; and Ludend o r f f , Werdegang , 29. 65. Geyr, "Staff," 24; "Carriere de L'Officier," 331; Schwan, Report, 80; and Brewer, "Staff," 159. 66. L u d e n d o r f f , Werdegang , 29; Geyr, "Staff," 23 and 25; and Rosinski, Army, 167. 67. Simpson, Army, 77. See also Bergh, Heer, 115. 68. B e t h k e , "Leutnant," 830; A l f o l d i , "Staff," 37;

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Schwertfeger , Erzieher, 54; Poten, Preussen, 286; and Gunther B l u m e n t r i t t , "Special Work, out of Schedule Training of the Professional Officer in Peacetime," trans. M. Otto, N e u s t a d t , September 1947, M i l i t a r y Reference Branch, Military A r c h i v e s Division, No. B-651, N a t i o n a l A r c h i v e s , Washington, D.C., 19. 69. Most armies utilized two staff levels. The higher (in Prussia, the "Great" General Staff in Berlin) formulated the plans for executing the nation's m i l i t a r y policy. The lower p r o v i d e d the assistants or staffs of field commanders. In 1867 the Prussian Great General Staff was d i v i d e d into two parts. The Haupt-Etat, or p r i n c i p a l b r a n c h , dealt with the actual p l a n n i n g , p r e p a r a t i o n , and training for war while the lower b r a n c h , the Neben-Etat, was i n v o l v e d in research and gathering of i n f o r m a t i o n . In 1898 the division was d i s s o l v e d . Hittle, Staff, 65. For descriptions of the various sections prior to World War I, see S c h m i d t - R i c h b e r g , Generalstabe, 33-35; K i t c h e n , Corps, 2 and 5-6; B e r g h , Heer , 104, 168, and 170; Geyr, "Staff," 25-26; and Lenski, Leutnantsjahren, 165-67. 70. Brewer, "Staff," 159-60; G e y r , "Staff," 26; M u s p r a t t , "Staff," 328; Wilkinson, Brain, 170-71; and Rosinski, Army, 168-69. 71. B r e w e r , "Staff," 159-60; and Rosinski, Army, 168-69. 72. Porch, March, 85; and U p t o n , Armies, 249. 73. Hermann J. von K u h l , Der deutsche General stab in Vorbereitung und Durchfuhrung des Weltkrieges (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried M i t t l e r und Sohn, 1920), 84; B o n d , Army, 116, 141-43, 154, 159-60, and 276-77; Harries — Jenkins, Army, 157 — 58; Bonham — Carter, Soldier, 48; Y o u n g b l o o d , Commission, 153-62 and 229-44; A. R. G o d w i n - A u s t e n , The Staff and the Staff College (London: Constable, 1927), 171-78, 209, and 231; and A[ugustus] F. Mockler-Ferryman , Annals of Sandhurst (London: William Heinemann, 1900), 93-94. 74. U p t o n , Armies, 136-39; and Black, "Education," 216-17 and 219-24. 75. G e y r , "Staff," 28; and Liddel1-Hart , Foch , 28. 76. Rosinski, Army, 164-65; and Geyr, "Staff," 2829. 77. Bald, Generalstab, 45-46; and Messerschmidt und Petter, Militargeschichte, 121. 78. B e t h k e , "Leutnant," 826. 79. Ibid. 80. G e y r , "Staff," 25 and 29. 81. For an i l l u s t r a t i o n , see Simpson, Army, 78.

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8

New Faces—Old Fealty; Conclusion The army, that is nou our fatherland, for here alone have the impure, restless elements who jeopardize everything not yet penetrated. A l b r e c h t von Roon, 1848(1) Prior Co the outbreak of hostilities in 1914, the German array totaled 761,000 men on active d u t y with 4 million f u l l y trained reservists a v a i l a b l e for immediate call-up. To lead this mass of h u m a n i t y , there were almost 26,000 officers in the regular forces and another 25,000 in the reserves(2). Still, apprehension per serve red among army conservatives. Not only did the m i d d l e class dominate the total complement of officers, b u t necessity also demanded that they fill more of the slots in the higher ranks(3). 1860 1872 1898 1913

Nobility Middle class Nobility Middle class Nobility M i d d l e class Nobility M i d d l e class

Higher R a n k s 86% 14% 94% 6% 81% 19% 52% 48%

Total Corps 65% 35% 49% 51% 40% 60% 30% 70%

N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g the number of officers from traditional officer families included in the mid die-class figures, the conservatives continued to harbor reserv a t ions concerning the loyalty of the new bourgeois elements to the traditional social and political

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values of the officer corps. However, the old guard was powerless to prevent the middle class from assuming numerical superiority as the army bills of the imperial period made demands that the traditional officer sources could no longer meet. Seeking to maintain the aristocrats' social dominance, the War Ministry during the Wilhelmine era opposed any further "dilution" of the corps. The General Staff, itself still 60 percent nobility as late as 1906, was sympathetic to the need for close scrutinization of officer candidates. However, it argued that the Schlieffen Plan did not permit the luxury of a small officer corps. Representing the Staff's position, Ludendorff maintained as late as 1913 that the army required three additional corps for the success of the attack, and subsequent inquiries into the causes for its failure cited insufficient manpower as a major reason. But from 1893 until the army bills of 1912 and 1913, the War Ministry resisted anything save a modest increase. Giving reasons such as the naval buildup and the difficulty of raising additional funding, the true motive lay in the Ministry's commitment to steadfast and relentless vigilance regarding the social origins and political persuasions of all officers(4). Despite the War Ministry's opposition, the percentage of middle-class officers continued to increase, and as a result, the nobility tended to withdraw into and monopolize certain units. As late as 1913, sixteen regiments (mostly cavalry) remained exclusively aristocratic, and 61.5 percent of all Prussian regiments contained a majority of noble officers. Eighty percent of the cavalry officers, 48 percent of all infantry officers, and 41 percent of the field artillery officers were nobles. Only fifty-nine officers in the Guards were of middle-class origin. Similar conditions also prevailed in the British army, but democratic ideals tempered prejudices to the extent that the middle class came to occupy a majority of the higher ranks. Not so in the Prussian officer corps where the dearth of liberal notions permitted the continuation of discriminatory selections and class exclusivity gave ground grudgingly. Although some of the Guards regiments accepted a few middle-class Concession Joes (Konzessionsschulzes) in the years just prior to World War I, this did not mean that the middle-class aspirants were particularly welcome. And as war clouds gathered in 1914, the Military Cabinet continued to resist promoting a bourgeois officer to higher rank if a noble or old officer family candidate was available(5 ) .

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The result of the officer corps' discriminatory attitudes and practices w a s , contrary to the conservatives' intentions, a reduction in the potential effectiveness of the army. The Schlieffen Plan required substantial numerical superiority over the French in officers as well as men, but the absence of a significant increase from 1893 to 1912-13 saw the number of officers repeatedly fall short of the projected need. The War Ministry, however, expressed more concern over the potential unreliability of bourgeois officers in a domestic struggle with the "impure elements." Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg (1909-1917), who believed army expansion would provoke a confrontation with France, exploited the Ministry's fear by claiming that increased officer quotas translated to the acceptance of "men from unsuitable classes" which, in turn, "would expose the army to democratization"(6). The shortage of officers had been a continuing problem for most of the imperial period. In 1889 fully 8 percent of the infantry officer billets went unfilled. By the turn of the century, the shortage became even more serious as many young men from acceptable bourgeois elements became disillusioned by the army's prejudice. The result was a significant drop in the number of civilian applicants. Fifty-six infantry regiments received no applications in 1902. By the beginning of the second decade, the gaps had become dangerously wide. The army was short 1,200 lieutenants and captains and 141 lower staff officers in the infantry and artillery, arms heavily dependent on middle-class officers. With plans calling for an increase of 3,000 officers, the War Ministry eventually admitted to harboring serious doubts that enough "qualified" candidates could be found to cover both the existing shortage and the projected increase. However, its reservations did not lead to action until it was too l a t e ( 7 ) . France also experienced a decline in officer candidates after 1900, but mostly as a result of the lingering self-examination initiated by the Dreyfus affair. The Prussians, however, needlessly contributed to their own shortfalls by clinging to the old prejudices identified in Franz Beyerlein's turn of the century novel 'Jena' or 'Sedan'?. One of the characters, a Colonel Falkenhein, expresses the belief that the traditional officer families provided the best material for the officer corps, yet he recognizes the need for "fresh blood from the middle and lower middle classes." The problem is the old guard's fear that these elements will dissolve the traditional bond between the king and his knights. Longing for the

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For King and Kaiser!

old uncomplicated days when the army needed very few non-noble officers, the colonel expresses the wish common among most of his ilk: "If only it were always members of the aristocracy who were readily the most efficient and attained the highest eminence"(8). Such fictional depictions represent an accurate portrayal of the inherent discrimination of a system that prevented many men of high intelligence but low station from cracking the social barrier. Few officers were as courageous as F. C. Endres, who threatened to resign his commission in order to force the acceptance of a brilliant candidate whose father was a peasant(9). Regardless of the corps' unfilled quotas, most of its members felt no obligation to follow Endres's example and thereby risk career advancement by calling attention to the inequities of recruitment policy. A candidate's capacity for dealing with the changing social and technical responsibilities of a modern officer were of secondary importance to character in the Prussian selection and training process. The world of the aristocracy had for centuries revolved around land and service to the monarchy. Narrow interests and the general lack of quality schooling in their traditional domain east of the Elbe fostered a negative reaction to education. This ingrained aversion was reinforced by the participation of many of the educated bourgeoisie in revolutionary movements of the early nineteenth century. The nobility, however, had little to fear from their new and generally better-educated comrades. Even the post-unification "middle-class militarism" favored the authoritarian roles of the government and the army in German so~ ciety(lO). Most, if not all, of the candidates, regardless of their social origins, willingly accepted the traditional role of the crown in German affairs. Thus, despite the massive middle-class incursion, the feudal ideals of the Junkers remained the guiding spirit of the corps throughout the imperial period. In its desire to minimize the importance of education when it conflicted with traditional prejudices or quotas, the officer corps regularly circumvented the Cabinet Order of 1861 requiring candidates to obtain the Prima certificate. And while William II gave lip service to the quest for civilian education reform, his idea of reform did not mean more education, especially if it adversely affected officer recruitment . For William, "better" meant more physical and less mental training, as evidenced by the shortening of academic hours at the military schools. He certainly

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209

opposed (and said so) the policy, practiced by a few regimental commanders, of nominating only those aspirants who had secured a secondary leaving certificate. Nevertheless, the ratio of new officers holding the Abitur increased from one-third in 1880 to two-thirds by 1 9 1 2 — e v i d e n c e that, regardless of the Kaiser's opinions, most of the new candidates (by now overwhelmingly bourgeois) recognized the importance of a completed secondary education(11). While the Abitur did not guarantee high rank, it did aid in the quest and offered to the holder security in the knowledge that should he leave the army, his education would prove vital in obtaining civilian employment. In 1913 Baron Colmar von der Goltz argued in The Nation in Arms that "aristocracy of education" had become "the basis of noble and moral qualities," and that intellect and character were equally important in training and leading troops(12). But in the Prussian selection process, character in the sense of complete loyalty to the king and the officer corps above any constitution or legislative body remained the preeminent criterion. The traditional officer families and the nobility continued to be above suspicion in this respect. It still remained for the middle-class aspirant to prove not only his character in the general s e n s e — l e a d e r s h i p and c o u r a g e — b u t also his true acceptance of the feudal loyalty and ideals of the officer corps. An American author correctly pointed out in the early 1890s that the struggle over education had occurred within all armies(13). Inside the Prussian officer corps this struggle assumed a unique social and political significance. Those aspirants from the politically reliable nobility or old officer families received preferential treatment regardless of education or intelligence. However, by the mid~1880s these two groups were being challenged in ever greater numbers by the better-educated but politically suspect middle class. Thus, the circumvention of regulations persisted as the corps worked to obtain all of the social and political elites who applied. If the army rejected any officer recruits, they came from the middle and lower classes. The authorities often claimed that the shortage of officers prevented higher admission standards, even as the number of aspirants holding the Abitur steadily increased(14) . In actuality, the opposition to raising entrance qualifications reflected the army's fear that to do so would mean the denial of a commission to many young men from the preferred origins. In light of the desire to obtain all preferred

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For King and Kaiser!

aspirants, it is understandable that the old guard resisted those within the officer corps who called for a raising of educational requirements equal to those of the Bavarian army; many aristocrats and sons of traditional officer families might not be able, for mental or financial reasons, to meet the increased demands. As it w a s , the officer corps had consistently fallen short of quotas not from any lack of qualified candidates, but instead because of the social and political prejudices of the selection process. Many potential candidates possessed more than sufficient qualifications, but they also realized that without a socially acceptable and politically conservative history they could not hope to find a regiment that would accept them. Officers like Endres were a rare commodity. Unable to recognize the value of a broad preparatory education, the officer corps nevertheless acknowledged the importance of technology in modern warfare. But the underlying disdain for technical training lingered on in the traditional arms. Many officers looked upon army technical schools as institutions for "plumbers." Consequently, an attempt in 1900 to greatly increase the number of training exercises promoting a closer tactical and logistical connection between line and technical officers failed more from the absence of support than the professed lack of appropriated funds(15). If the middle-class candidates had to be incorporated into the officer corps, most army policy makers felt that as many as possible should occupy billets in the less-glamorous technical arms where high rank was harder to achieve. The result was a division into line units based upon the rooted notion of character and technical units requiring advanced knowledge as well as loyalty to traditional values(16). This division, however, was not rigid. That proved impossible if manpower requirements were to be approached, let alone met, especially in the infantry. Still, the attempt to segregate the middle class as much as possible served to hinder the promotion of many talented bourgeois officers serving in the technical branches. While they were less likely to possess superior educations, officers in the traditional arms (cavalry, infantry, and field artillery) continued to look askance at their well-trained comrades who, in fact, contributed much to the army's modernization and overall effectiveness. The argument above must be construed as an assertion that all officers in the traditional arms were intellectually inferior. Many, including some from

Conclusion

211

the nobility, obtained excellent preparation and participated in continued self-education throughout their service. If stationed in or near a large city or university, many opportunities for improvement lay open to them. But, as former officer Bethke recalled, the average intellectual standard of most line regiments was not high. Those officers possessing the ability and the desire to publish their opinions encountered strict censorship by superiors(17). As a result, the free dissemination of new ideas and constructive criticism suffered greatly, and few cared to risk a career by publishing under a pseudonym. Censorship reflected the lingering suspicion of education as well as unorthodox opinions in many circles of the officer corps. Peucker had regularly encountered this antagonism during his mid-century reorganization of military education. His goal, while not as farsighted as Scharnhorst's, was to ensure that all officers obtained more than "a thorough and deep professional education." He wanted them also to possess "a higher formal education in those sciences which provide more or less a general foundation as well as serve as tools for a professional career"(18). In a repeat of the reactionary response to Scharnhorst f s reforms a half-century earlier, a large portion of Peucker's work suffered steady erosion after his departure. Most officers neither sought nor acquired education of a broad nature once commissioned. Despite the increase of Abitur holders, few officers attended university lectures even if accessible. The majority of those from the Cadet Corps were even worse off as their preparatory education was decidedly inferior to that provided by the civilian schools. Not only was the curriculum of the cadet schools inadequate, but cut off from civilian life, the Corps could more easily promote a rigid, narrow-minded outlook(19). In the realm of advanced officer education, the lack of broad general studies did not go unnoticed. Bernhardi wisely argued in 1914 that through such intellectual stimulation, "the hearers might gain some insight into the legitimacy of war, its relations to politics, the cooperation of material and imponderable forces, [and] the importance of free personality"(20). More and more, however, the curricula of Prussian military schools became concerned only with the narrow matters directly related to battle. Former cadet and officer Gunther Blumentritt admitted the deficiencies when years later he acknowledged that a third of the curricula in the professional schools (War Schools and War Academy) should have included courses in

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For King and Kaiser!

"languages, character and meaning of history . . . economics . . . practical, applied psychology . . . constitution, International Law, the laws of warfare, and general political principles with which the modern officer must be familiar if he wishes to serve the policies of the c o u n t r y " ( 2 1 ) . The obsession with securing all available candidates from the preferred social origins prompted the renewed interest in and expansion of the Cadet Corps. Of the 25,670 aspirants between 1870 and 1914 who elected to forego the completion of their secondary education and take the ensign's exam, 11,204 (43.6 percent) were c a d e t s ( 2 2 ) . Even though the 1877 curriculum change permitted the boys to prepare for the Abitur, most elected not to take advantage of the opportunity afforded them. Still, the overall inferior quality of their education did not hinder entrance into the officer corps, for the Examinations Commission seldom, if ever, failed a cadet. Meanwhile, middle-class aspirants emanating from origins other than traditional officer families did recognize the importance of the Abitur since not only did they have to compete with the preferred candidates for promotions to high rank, but also because many were destined for the technical arms where education was a necessity as well as an attribute. Regardless of education and the branch entered, the major requirement for all candidates remained unequivocal loyalty to the crown. From feudal times the warlord had expected his vassals to exhibit total obedience. William I demanded no less, and William II repeatedly expressed his belief in the exalted power of the sovereign and the close bond between king and army. The day he ascended the throne, William II addressed the military. Three days before he spoke to the people and a week before appearing in Parliament, his words constituted a clear exhortation to unswerving loyalty: So we are bound together — I and the army — so are we born for one another, and so shall we hold tog ether indissolubly , whether , as God wills, we are to have peace or storm. You are now about to swear to me the oath of fidel ity and obed ience, and I vow that I shall ever be min dfu:1 of the fact 1that the eyes of my fore fathers loo k d own upon me from that other world and that I one da y shall have to render up to them an account of the fame and the h onor of the army.(23) For

the

young

Kaiser

the

notion

of

becoming

a

Conclusion

213

benign constitutional monarch was anathema. His abhorrence of the German constitution surfaced during a visit to Munich in November 1891. On the registry book at the town hall, he included, along with his signature, the declaration " Suprema Lex Regis Voluntas" (The king's will is the highest l a w ) ( 2 4 ) . William intended the officer corps and the army to be his shield and, if necessary, his sword against the advance of liberalism and socialism. He sought to maintain within the corps, now mostly middle class, the ancient feudal spirit and disdain for democracy in any form. He conferred symbolic knighthood on the officers of various regiments and, as a speech before a military gathering at Friedrichsruh in April 1891 illustrates, never missed a chance to disparage the importance of Parliament in German history: "The soldier and the army, not parliamentary majorities and decisions have welded together the German Reich. My faith rests in the a r m y " ( 2 5 ) . The constant duty of the officer corps and the army w a s , as William claimed after his abdication, "to cultivate a manly spirit in the German people." In his mind that meant the education of the people away from the "weakness" of socialism and democracy. Whereas in neighboring France officer cadets were inspired to promote liberty, democracy, and the republican spirit, the Prussian officer candidate heard only of the evils of social democracy which, along with liberalism, sought to destroy the privileges and caste spirit of the officer c o r p s ( 2 6 ) . The officer selection process prevented the introduction into the corps of anyone who adhered to democratic tenets, and the training worked to instill in candidates a firm commitment to the traditional values of the corps. The end result was a middle class within the officer corps that imitated the nobility in behavior, attitude, and manners. This sometimes even included the acquisition of the so-called "Potsdam tone" of speech. An authoritarian inflection that was loud, grating, and even barking, its accompanying deliberate misuse of grammar and pronunciation served to illustrate the user's lack of respect for education and i n t e l l e c t u a l i s m — b o t h of which were highly admired by liberals and social democrats(27). The depth of scorn held by officers for these political ideologies, particularly the latter, finds unrestrained expression in War Minister von Einem's memoirs: "I have hated Social Democracy all my life. To this day in not one of its ideas have I discovered a principle which has not been somehow detrimental to state and nation. I have waged the fight against them with the purest

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For King and Kaiser!

conscience and from the innermost convict i o n " ( 2 8 ) . Such sentiment at the highest levels permeated the corps and contributed to further isolation and a strengthening of the caste spirit. By accepting their role as protectors of feudal and conservative traditions, the young officers, both aristocrat and bourgeois, became "the sword knot ennobled" (das Portepee adelt) Josef von Radowitz had characterized as early as 1833(29). They opposed all forms of liberal thought and shared the monarchy's indifference toward the rights of civilians. Most overlooked the abuse noncommissioned officers heaped on enlisted men sympathetic to the "subversive" ideologies and tolerated unjustified acts by soldiers upon the civilian populace. The incident at Zabern in Alsace in 1913 was not an aberration, but a graphic reflection of the officer corps' disregard for democracy and civil liberty(30). The fact that as late as 1913 the officer corps would not hesitate to act with brutal efficiency against civilian demonstrations belied the crown's fear that the middle class would destroy the corps' traditional spirit. William II had publicly admitted the need for middle class officer candidates in the Cabinet Order of March 29, 1890, which called for men from "honorable bourgeois families in which a love for king and country, and a heartfelt devotion to the profession of arms and to a Christian culture are planted and cherished"(31) . He afterward claimed that his actions originated not only from military necessity, but as an attempt to ally the bourgeoisie with the nobility in a united front against social democracy. However, by the 1890s the middle class already constituted a majority of the officer corps, and the effort to indoctrinate them with aristocratic and conservative values had proven successful long before. Nevertheless, after 1900 he still harbored fear of a bourgeois officer corps and returned to emphasizing preferential treatment for "sons of officers from loyal monarchist lineage and from families whose names are registered in the annals of Prussian history"(32) . William's actions were not based solely on the threat of disloyalty. Middle-class candidates who came to the military examinations were, as a group, better educated than those from the aristocracy and old officer families. Consequently, and despite the prejudice in favor of officers from the traditional sources, they were making inroads into the higher echelons on a scale surpassing mere tokenism(33). For centuries the top ranks had remained relatively free

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215

from incursions by the lower classes. Accordingly, the King felt an obligation to preserve as much as possible the nobility's preeminence as defenders of the monarchy. Regarding the threat posed by middle-class officers in positions which influenced army policy, the Kaiser had little cause for alarm. The bourgeois officers who made it to these levels believed themselves to be the professional, if not the social, equals of their noble comrades, and they knew to whom they owed their success and raison d'etre. In 1934 Robert Michels described the widespread adherence by the German bourgeoisie of the imperial period to the values of the old order as "not so much a question of a removal of the old ruling classes by means of the takeover of power by qualified new groups, rather than an amalgamation and fusion of the t w o " ( 3 4 ) . This was especially true for those young men from the middle class who donned the King's Coat. Despite the fears of the crown and the old guard (particularly in the War M i n i s t r y ) , the bourgeois officers posed no threat to the traditional loyalties and values of the officer corps. The selection and training process had seen to that . Accepting the zealousness of middle-class officers in adopting the traditions of the corps, an Englishman who served among them nonetheless observed that they were "more liberal-minded than their very noble comrades." The old guard feared that such openmindedness in military affairs might one day lead to political disloyalty. This apprehension manifested itself in a military training system which sought to repress individual initiative and encourage conformity. Assessing the result upon all ranks, that same Englishman likewise noted that no chance is given . . .. to display initiative. The German character is at no time quick in this direction, and the little that a man may possess when he enters the army is studiously squeezed out of him. On no account may he act and think for himself. He is simply there to do as he is told, whether he understands the motive of this or that operation is of no consequence.(35) While the officer did have to think more than those under his command, he understood as well as they that obedience came before initiative. A young German and former law student put it even more succinctly during the war: "For what counts is always the readiness to make a sacrifice, not the object for which the

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For King and Kaiser!

sacrifice is m a d e " ( 3 6 ) . The only difference between this enlisted man's observation and the officer's creed was that the latter knew full well the reason for his sacrifice. Even with technical advancement and the addition of large numbers from the middle class, the officer corps changed little in the half-century prior to World War I. The official requirements for admission increased slightly, but the army made exceptions when necessary to obtain aspirants from the traditional sources. Cadet schools endured as elite enclaves committed less to education than to the formation of "proper character." The professional schools turned away from liberal curricula out of fear of the difficulty for favored candidates and scorn for the value of a broad education. Officers were to be trained solely for their military duties; subjects like international law, diplomacy, political science, the h i s tory of foreign lands, and economics were considered irrelevant in most military circles. Consequently, many of the high-ranking officers who contributed their opinions to the formation of national policy lacked sufficient knowledge and understanding of potential adversaries as well as the changing conditions and attitudes occurring in a modern industrial age. Adept at organization and often outdated tactics, they lacked powers of innovation and a d a p t a b i l i t y — characteristics promoted by a liberal education and found wanting in the coming war. In a lecture before the British Royal United Service Institution in 1902, T. Miller Maguire offered the following description of an officer's duty. It is the officer man's duty to take care of his humbler neighbors in time of stress and adversity, in times of danger, when he requires all his wits, all his nerves, all his manhood, all his reminiscences of the past, and all his hopes of the future, to enable him to do his duty with anything like credit to himself, fidelity to those who trust him, or fidelity to the interests of the nation whose affairs are in his charge. There is no man who has such responsibility as the officer man, none; there is no man whose mistakes are so final, so irrevocable, so far reaching, so terrible. And, surely, of all men, this is the man who wants education at its altitude.(37) The Prussian officer corps, however, represented the antithesis of much of this democratically inspired definition. Its loyalty belonged first to the Kaiser

Conclusion

217

and King — and after his downfall, to itself. In the final analysis, the success of the corps in maintaining its feudal spirit by means of the selection and education process ultimately contributed to the army's failure. The fealty of officers in a domestic struggle was as much a matter for concern as the need to acquire sufficient numbers for the coming battle with a foreign enemy. In the blind effort to ensure continuation of its traditional position, the officer corps spurned the admission of countless qualified aspirants of equal or greater ability than those from the preferred origins. Professional schools, when not reduced in scope, concentrated more and more on purely military studies out of a disregard for the value of a broad education and the desire to make sure that all who survived the admission process completed the course. As long as all officers remained loyal to the crown, the wide disparity of competence mattered little to the officer corps. German society was in a state of social and political flux, but the officer corps recognized only its oath to guard the Kaiser from those forces, foreign or domestic, deemed a threat to the crown. The education, selection, and training of its members revolved around this pledge. Officers were groomed only for the performance of their duty—and that duty was, a b o v e all, the preservation of a social and political order which had long outlived its worth. NOTES 1. A l b r e c h t von Roon, Denkwurdigkeiten aus dem Leben des Generalfeldmarschalls Kriegsministers Grafen von Roon, 3 vols. (Berlin: Eduard Trewendt, 1905), 1:154. 2. Harold Kurtz, The Second Reich (New York: American Heritage Press, 1970), 77-78; U.S. War D e p a r t m e n t , Strength, 9-10 and 25; and Bashford, "System," 615. 3. Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1960), 94; Bethke, "Leutnant," 824; Demeter, Officer-Corps, 28-29; and Kurtz, Reich, 77-78. 4. Martin Kitchen, A Military History of Germany (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1975), 184-86; Hans Rosenberg, "Die Pseudodemokratisierung der Rittergutsbesitzerklasse," in Moderne deutsche Sozialgeschichte, ed. Hans-Ulrich Wehler ((Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1976), 287-88; Kehr, Militarism, 65-67; Kitchen, Corps, 31-37; V[olker] R. Berghahn,

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For K i n g and Kaiser!

Germany and the Approach of War in 1914 (New York: St. Martin's, 1973), 6-9; Forster, Mil itarisntus , 298; and Hans-Ulrich Wehler, The German Empire, 1871-1918, trans. Kim Traynor (Dover, N.H.: Berg, 1985), 159-60. 5. Kitchen, History, 183; i d e m , Corps, 24 and 2930; Kehr, Militarism, 103; Harries-Jenkins, Army, 23; Janowitz, Soldier, 74; P. E. Razzell, "Social Origins of Officers in the Indian and British Home A r m y : 17581962," The British Journal of Sociology 14 (September 1963):255-56; Bethke, "Leutnant," 825; Hughes, "Origins," 15; and Wehler, Empire, 159. 6. Hans Herzfeld, Die deutscne Rustlingspolitik vor dem Weitkrieg (Bonn: K u r t Schroeder, 1923), 63. See also Hughes, "Origins," 5; Berghahn, Germany, 6 and 15-23; and Kitchen, Corps, 31-37. 7. Kehr, Militarism, 64-65; Berghahn, Germany, 8; Ludwig Freiherrn R u d t von Collenberg, Die deutscne Armee von 1871 bis 1916 (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 1922), 102; and Herzfeld, Rustungspolitik , 154 . 8. Franz A d a m Beyerlein, 'Jena' or 'Sedan '? (London: William Heinemann, 1914), 267-68. 9. E n d r e s , Structure, 20. 10. Forster, Militarismus , 7. 11. Demeter, Officer-Corps, 81 and 88-89; Snyder, Documents, 269-70; Fishman, Struggle, 1-3; and Wilhelm Deist, "Die Armee in Staat und Gesellschaft, 1 18901914," in Das kai serliche Deti tschJ and i Pol itik und Gesellschaft, 1870-1918, ed. Michael Stunner (Dusseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1970), 323. 12. GolLz, Nation, 51-52. 13. J. J. O'Connell. , "Remarks Upon Che Organization of the Armies of Europe," Journal of the Military Service Institution of tne United States 14 (July 1893):773. See also Manfred Messerschmidt, "Die Armee in St_aat und Gesellschaft — Die Bismarckzeit," in Das kaiserliche Deutschlsnd: Politik und Gesellschaft, 1870-1918, ed. Michael Stiirmer, (Dusseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1970), 772-73; and Barnett, "Education," 17. 14. Demeter, Officer-Corps, 92. See also Commission, Education, 197-98; L a f f i n , Jackboot, 92; and Endres, Structure, 21. 15. Hans Speier, "Ludendorff: The German Concept of Total War," in Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from MachiavelJ i to Hitler, ed. Edward Mead Earle (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1943), 313; and C a m p b e l l , "Bavarian A r m y , " 166-67. 16. Kitchen, History, 183. 17. B e t h k e , "Leutnant," 828. See also Demeter, Officer-Corps, 90-92. 18. Eduard von Peucker, Instruction fur den Urn fang

Conclusion

219

und die Methode des Lehrganges auf der koniglichen Kriegsakademie (Berlin: n.p., 1868), 1, c i t e d by B a l d , "Impact," 110.

19. B l u m e n t r i t t , "Special Work," 4-5 and 8-9.

20. B e r n h a r d i , Germany, 7.7.k .

21. B l u m e n t r i t t , "Thoughts," 4-5. 22. Compiled from d a t a in N o t t e b o h m , Prufungsverfahrens, 103-4. 23. Friedrichskron Castle, June 15, 1888, the day of his father's (Frederick III) d e a t h , cited by Christian Gauss, The German Emperor as Shown in his Public Utterances (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1915), 28. 24. Frederick Ponsonby, ed., Letters of the Empress Frederick (London: M a c m i l l a n , 1929), 428. Cited "Suprema lex regis voluntas esto" and S e p t e m b e r 1891 by J. A l d e n Nichols, Germany after Bismarck: The Caprivi Era, 1890-1894 (Cambridge, Mass.: H a r v a r d University Press, 1958), 130. William's exasperated mother wrote to her own mother, Queen Victoria: "He does not understand what a constitution is." Empress Frederick to Victoria, March 21, 1892, cited by Ponsonby, Letters, 436. See also 429. 25. Schulthess' Europaischer Geschichtskalender 32 (1891):72-73 and 85. See also A l f r e d Graf von Waldersee, Denkwurd igkei ten des Gener al f el dinar schal 1 s Alfred Grafen von Waldersee, 3 vols. (Stuttgart: Deutsche V e r l a g s - A n s t a l t , 1922), 2:198; Shaw, William, 294; and Carl Graf von W e d e l , Zwischen Kaiser und Kanzler: Aufzeichnungen des General-adjutant Grafen Carl von Wedel aus dew Jahren 1890-J894 (Leipzig: K o e h l e r & A m e l a n g , 1943), 174-76 and 180.

26. Wiihelm II, Memoirs, 223. See also Porch, March, 78 and 125-26; and K i t c h e n , History, 169. 27. Kurtz, Reich, 39. 28. Karl von Einem, Erinnerungen eines Soldaten, 1853-1933 (Leipzig: K. F. Koehler, 1933), 67. 29. Cited by Demeter, Grundlagen, 216. 30. In 1892 there were several incidents of soldiers firing on civilians. In one, a sentry in Berlin who shot and killed a fleeing drunk received from the Kaiser a personal p h o t o g r a p h , commendation, and promotion to corporal. A l t h o u g h Parliament initiated inquiries, nothing came of them. R e p o r t e d in The Times (London), October 26, 1892, 5, and N o v e m b e r 25, 1892, 5. For an account of the Zabern incident, see Kitchen, Corps, 187-221. 31. K i t c h e n , History, 182. 32. H e r w i g , Corps, 40. See also Demeter, OfficerCorps , 26 . 33. T r u m p e n e r , "Junkers," 39-40.

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34. Robert Michels, Umschichtungen in den herrschenden Klassen nach dem Kriege (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer V e r l a g , 1934), 39. 35. German Army, 14, 16, and 48. See also Endres, Structure, 10. 36. Philipp Witkop, German Students' War Letters, trans. A. F. Wedd (London: Methuen, 1929), 20. 37. Maguire, "Education," 1010.

vAppendix 1 1901 Curricula of the Major Civilian Secondary Schools (Units per class)

Gymnasium* I II III IV

V VI VII VIII IX Total 2| 2|

19

German, and Historical Tales. 4| 3| 3| 2| 2| 3| 3| 3| 3|

26

88| 8|8|8| 7 7| 7|7|

68

Religion .......... 3| 2|

2| 2| 2| 2| 2|

Latin Greek -| - -| 6| 6] 6| 6| 6| 6| French - -| -| 4| 2 | 2| 3| 3| 3| 3| History - | -| 2 2 | 2 1 2| 3| 3| 3|

36 20 17

Geography 2 . . . . . . . . . 2 | 2| 2| I I 1 | 1| -| -| -| 9 Arithmet ic and Mathematics 4| 4| 4| 3| 3| 4| 4| 4| 4|34 Natural Science... 2| 2| 2| 2| 2 I 2| 2| 2| 2| Wr i ting 2 | 2 -| -| -| -| -| -| -| Drawing Total

2|

25 25

2|

2|

29 30 30 30

-|

30

-|

30 30

18

4

-|

8

259

222 Realgymnasium* I II III IV

V VI VII VIII IX Total

Religion .. 3

|

2| 2| 2| 2| 2|

German, and Historical Tales. 4

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

28

Lat in....

8

7

5

5

4

4

4

4

49

5

4

4

4

4

4

4

29

2

3

3

3

3

3

3

18

2

2

2

3

3

3

17

2

2

2

1

-

-

-

11

5

5

5

5

5

5

42

2

4

5

5

5

29

o

-

4

2

16

31 31

262

8

French English

-

-

History Geography

2

2

Arithmetic and Mathematics

4

4

4

Natural Science... 2

2

2

2 -

2

Writing Drawing Total

2

25 25

2 2

-

2

2

29 30 30 30

31

2

2

2| 2|19

Oberrealschule (Higher Realschool) I II III IV

V VI VII VIII IX Total

Religion 3 |29 12

2

2

2

2

2 2

19

German, and Historical Tales. 5 6 French

4 6

4 6

3 6

3 6

3 5

4 4

4 4

4 4

34 47

English

-

-

-

5

4

4

4

4

4

25

History

2

3

2

2

2

3

3

3

18

Geography

2

2

2

2

1

1

1

1

14

Arithmetic and Mathematics

5

5

6

6

5

5

5

5

5

47

Natural Science... 2

2

2

2

4

6

6

6

6

36

2 Freehand Drawing.. -

2

2 2

2

2

2

2

2

6

2

2

16

29 30 30 30

31

31 31

262

Writing Total

25 25

223

Appendixes Realschule (six years) I II III IV Religion

3| 2\

V VI Total

2\ 2\ 2

2\

13

German, and Historical Tales. 6| 5|

5| 5

4| 4|

29

French

6| 6|

6| 5| 4| 4|

31

English

-| -|

-

5| 4| 4|

13

History

-| -|

3

2\ 2\ 2\

9

Geography

2\ 2\

2\ 2\ 2\ 2\

12

A r i t h m e t i c and Mathematics

4| 4

5| 5| 5| 5\

28

N a t u r a l Science... 2\ 2

2\ 2\ 5| 5|

18

Writing

2

2\ -\ -\ -\

6

2\

2\ 2\ 2\ 2\

10

2\

Freehand Drawing.. -| Total

25 25

29 30 30 30

169

*The c u r r i c u l a of the Progymnasium and the Realprogymnasium corresponded to the six lower classes of the nine-year schools.

SOURCE: Wilhelm Lexis, A General View of The History and Organization of Public Education in the German Empire, trans. G. J. Tamson (Berlin: A. A s h e r , 1904), 56-57.

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Appendix 2 Description of the Abitur Examination for the Three Nine-Year Civilian Secondary Schools at the Turn of the Century

The written examination comprises, for all schools, a German essay and the working of mathematical questions, each dealing with a ferent branch; further:

the four dif-

a) for the Gymnasien: a translation from German into Latin, and another from Greek into German. Those pupils who take Hebrew have to give in a German translation of an easier passage from the Old Testament with grammatical explanations; b) for the Realgymnasien: a translation from Latin into German; according to the curriculum of each separate institution, a French or an English piece of work, and namely either an essay or a translation from German; and the treatment of a question in physics; c) for the Higher Realschulen: a French and an English piece of work, and namely in one of these two languages an essay, in the other a translation from German; and the treatment of a question in physics or in chemistry. The oral examination comprises for all the schools, Christian religious teaching, history, mathematics, and further: a) for the Gymnasien: Latin, Greek, and according to the curriculum of each separate institution, either French or English;

226

Appendixes b) for the Realgymnasien: Latin, French, English; and physics or chemistry; c) for the Higher Realschulen: French and glish; and physics or chemistry.

and En-

SOURCE: Lexis, View, , 57-58. For a detailed description of the subject areas questioned, see 58-61.

Appendix 3 Prussian Students from the Nine-Year Civilian Secondary Schools Obtaining the Abitur in Selected Years, 1868-1900, and Number Choosing Military Profession

1868 Abitur Abitur Holders Number of Total Schools Students Holders Choosing Military Gymnasium 198 Realgymnasium ? Oberrealschule Total ?

56,113 19,917

2,336 238

156(6.7%) 19(8%)

76,030

2,574

175(6.8%)

66,029 26,955

2,468 499

131(5.3%) 27(5.4%)

92,984

2,967

158(5.3%)

5,018 1 ,205 29 6,252

206(4.1%) 82(6.8%)

1875 Gymnasium 228 Realgymnasium 80 Oberrealschule Total 308

1880 Gymnasium 249 Realgymnasium 84 Oberrealschule 3 Total 336

75,190 27,066 1 ,656 103,912

= 288(4.6%)

228

Appendixes 1885 Abitur Number of Total Abitur Holders Schools Students Holders Choosing Military

Gymnasium Realgymnasium Oberrealschule

259 89 14

80,019 24,706 5,120

3,567 574 32

164(4.6%) 29(5.1%)

Total

362

109,845

4,173

193(4.6%)

1890 Gymnasium Realgymnasium Oberrealschule

268 87 9

77,811 26,272 4,177

3,657 539 18

296(8.1%) 61(11.3%) 1(5.6%)

Total

364

108,260

4,214

358(8.5%)

77,791 25,148 10,571

4,243 760 154

321(7.6%) 58(7.6%) 2(1 .3%)

113,510

5,157

381(7.4%)

89,257 21 ,433 15,134

4,646 709 315

267(5.7%) 41(5.8%) 8(2.5%)

125,824

5,670

316(5.6%)

1895 Gymnasium 273 Realgymnasium 86 Oberrealschule 24

Total

383

1900 Gymnasium 295 Realgymnasium 76 Oberrealschule 37

Total

408

SOURCES: Compiled from data in Lexis, View, 64; Wilhelm Lexis, Die Reform des hoheren Schulwesens in Preussen (Halle: Buchhandlung des Waisenhauses, 1902), 412-13 and 416-17; and James E. Russell, German Higher Schools (New York: Longmans, Green, 1899), 426.

Appendix 4 Typical Ensign (Portepeefdhnrich) Examination Problems

A choice was allowed between each pair of

questions.

Mathematics , _. , , -, . 4a-3b+c . 5c+4b .a,.= c , „ i , 1. Find the value of —53a-b r + ~^—TTT if -> > 0 = 2-5, andd _-. 2a + 2b c . 2. In 1079 Persian calendars there were in every 33 years eight leap years and 25 ordinary years. What was the average length of the year, and by how much did it differ from the actual length of the year, which is 365.2421227 days? -5 Solve c i .K j. the

,- • equation, •=7x-13 7— = -78x-10 r-^r . H 5x-6 6x-13

4. At a d e p t h of 200 feet below the surface of the earth the temperature is 4.5°, and below this point for each 115 feet of descent the temperature increases 1°. At what d e p t h is the temperature 24.5°? 5. Two similar four-sided figures are in the same proportion as their homologous sides. 6. In a right-angled triangle the hypothenuse = 5, and the area = 6 square units. Find the two angles. 7. The side of a regular nonagon is 1. What is its area? 8. The solution of a triangle when one side and two angles are given.

230

Appendixes

9. To construct an isosceles triangle when the sum of the three sides and the a l t i t u d e are given. 10. Three points A , B, and C being g i v e n , to draw a line through A , so that the distances from B and C to this line are together equal to a g i v e n line. 11. Given the two angles A and B of a triangle, and the sum of the two sides a + b, find a and b. 12. To find the area of a segment of a circle when the chord and the arc are given. History 1. The Peloponnesian war. 2. Marius and Sulla. 3. The two first sovereigns on the German throne after the extinction of the Saxon d y n a s t y . 4. Louis of Bavaria. 5. Napoleon's accession to the throne and as emperor . 6. The first coalition against France.

first

war

with

the

7. The year 1814. 8. Frederick William the First. 9. Athens to the time of the Persian war. 10. Rome under the kings. 11. The relations of Frederick House of Wittelsbach. 12. The House of Hohenzollern .

the

Great

Geography 1. The course of the Oder. 2. The German Jura. 3 . The seasons. 4. The form and m a g n i t u d e of the earth. 5. The journey from Berlin to Rome. 6. The possessions of the English in Asia. 7. The Bohemian mountains. 8. The p r o v i n c e of Hesse.

A p p e n d i xes

231

9. Eclipses of the sun and the moon. 10. The volcanic energy of the earth. 11. The rivers of Africa, 12. The m o u n t a i n s of Scandinavia. German

themes

1 . Why is Sleep called the Brother of Death in mythology? 2. A collision between two railway trains. 3. Why are the Greeks, Romans, and Germans called c u l t i v a t e d nations? 4. A shepherd and a traveller on an ancient battlefield. 5. He who will not work in summer Must in winter suffer hunger. 6. The value of friendship. 7. The influence of geographical circumstances on the civilization of the Greeks. 8. The Gods require many men upon earth for their service; they have reckoned upon you also. French Dictation and translation from tion from German Into French.

French, and

transla-

Latin Translations from Caesar and Livy.

SOURCE: Great Britain, M i l i t a r y Education Commission, Accounts of the Systems of Military Education in France, Prussia, Austria, Bavaria, and the United States (London: George E. Eyre and William Spottiswoode, 1870), 531-35. Numerous other examples are p r o v i ded.

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Appendix 5 Ensign's Examination: Official Description of Expected Proficiency

1. In their own language, good legible handwriting, a

correct style, free from orthographical or grammatical mistakes, facility of expression in writing and speaking; some evidence of a knowledge of German literature.

2. In Latin, facility in understanding the Latin prose writers ordinarily read in the second class of a Prussian Gymnasium. A written exercise in translation from Latin into German; grammatical analysis of some passages. 3. In French, facility in reading and in translating from German into French, and French into German, grammatical analysis of French sentences, and a knowledge of syntax. 4. Mathematics: a. Arithmetic and Algebra—familiarity with the ordinary rules for the extraction of the square root of whole numbers and of fractions; Proportion and its applications including questions in Partnership and Compound Proportion; the theory of powers and roots, with integral and fractional, positive and negative exponents. Equations of the two first degrees, with one or more unknown quantities; Logarithms, Logarithmic Equations, Arithmetical and

234

Appendixes Geometrical Progression, and practice application of the various theories. b. The complete elements of suration of rectilineal circle transformation and the first elements of the bra to Geometry.

in

the

Plane Geometry, m e a figures and of the division of figures; application of Alge-

c. Plane Trigonometry, Trigonometrical functions and their Logarithms. Use of trigonometrical tables. Calculation of particular cases of triangles, regular polygons, and segments of circles. In consideration of the especial importance of this discipline for officers of the artillery and engineers, a higher- predicate (i.e., a greater number of marks) will be reguired in the exercises of candidates for these two services; the knowledge expected in their case will be, though not more extensive, more thorough and deep. 5 3.

Geography: The general principles of Mathematical and Physical Geography, knowledge of our planetary system, of the motions of the Earth, and of the phenomena immediately dependent upon them. Readiness in drawing from memory the outlines of the more important countries, with their principal mountains, rivers, and cities. General outlines of Political Geography, in the case of the mere states out of Europe; a detailed account of the elements of European statistics, more particularly in the case of Germany and Prussia.

6.

History: A knowledge of the more remarkable events in the history of great nations, of the general connection, causes, and consequences of these events; a knowledge of the remarkable men of all such nations down to the present time. Special knowledge of the history of Greece, Rome, Germany, and Prussia, with particular reference in this last case to its external growth, inner development, and the principal events of the most important wars since the middle of the eighteenth century.

7. Readiness

in

general

drawing,

and

in

constructing

Appendixes

235

mathematical figures; some skill in drawing plans of positions and mountains, in the way of preparation for military plan drawing.

8. The

candidate may, in addition, be examined in other subjects which his certificates show that he has been instructed; for example, in Natural Philosophy, so far included in his previous course of instruction.

SOURCE: Henry Barnard, Courses of Instruction in the Science and Art of War in France, Prussia, Austria, Russia, Sweden, Switzerland, Sardinia, England, and the United States, vol. 1: France and Prussia (Philadelphia: J. B. L i p p i n c o t t , 1862), 301-2.

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Appendix 6 Cadet Corps Reorganizations of 1877 and 1888

Royal Cabinet Order of January

18, 1877

I ordain the following regarding the organization and curriculum of the Cadet Corps: (1) The curriculum of the Cadet Corps is to be brought into conformity with the curriculum of the Realschool of the First Order [Realgymnasium], Deviations may occur only when such are made necessary for individual subjects by the special duties of the institution and the interests of the army. (2) The former classes Sexta to Prima of the Cadet Corps are to become identical to the classes Quinta to Obersekunda of the Realgymnasium and receive the corresponding designations. (3) In each of the six lower schools a new Sexta is established. However, no more than 120 boys for all schools may be admitted. An Unter- and Oberprima is established at the Central [Senior] Institute with the curriculum corresponding to that of the Realschool of the First Order. (4) Annually in the spring all cadets who reach age 17 before April 1, have satisfactorily completed the Obersekunda, and are sufficiently developed physically are to be admitted to the ensign's (Portepeefahnrich) examination. (5) Those who pass the examination are recommended for entrance into the army as "acting" or "brevet" (charakterisirte) ensigns or, if among the best qualified, retained for immediate preparation of the officer examination in the Selekta of the Cadet Corps. (6) Those cadets who upon completion of the Obersekunda have not attained the prescribed age in number

238

Appendixes

4 or the presumed physical d e v e l o p m e n t are promoted into the U n t e r p r i m a of the Cadet Corps. (7) Upon completion of the Obersekunda, gifted cadets with good conduct are also a d m i t t e d into the Unterprima at the request of the family even if they have already attained the prescribed age or corresponding physical d e v e l o p m e n t in number 4. In this case they are not for the present to be a d m i t t e d to the ensign's examination. (8) D e p e n d i n g on the request of their families, those cadets who have successfully completed the Unterprima are [1] either a d m i t t e d to the ensign's examination and, if they pass, d e p e n d i n g on the results and their total conduct either recommended for promotion into the army as patent or honorary (charakterisirte) ensigns, or [2] with a view to admission to the Abitur examination, to be promoted to the Oberprima. (9) Those O b e r p r i m a students who are suitable according to their total conduct are designated "sword knot" [junior] noncommissionedd officers (PortepeeUnteroffizier). U n t e r p r i m a students are p r o m o t e d under similar conditions to noncommissioned officers. The Unterprima students designated under n u m b e r 7 are in exceptional cases also promoted to "sword knot" noncommissioned officers. Prima students in the Corps are not subordinate to those in the Selekta. As far as possible, military training is to be p r o m o t e d alongside the academic. (10) With admission of a cadet to the Prima, the family in cases of need shall receive consideration with regard to the cost, as well as r e g a r d i n g the granting of partial assistance. (11) Those cadets who, after c o m p l e t i o n of the O b e r p r i m a , pass the A b i t u r e x a m i n a t i o n , are to be proposed for transfer into the army as "actual" (wirkliche) ensigns with simultaneous assignment to a War School. If they s u b s e q u e n t l y pass the officer's examination with a score of "good," they shall receive with their promotion to second lieutenant a p a t e n t from the date of their transfer into the army. (12) The above stipulated alterations in the organization and c u r r i c u l u m of the Cadet Corps are to be gradually executed according to the existing resources of the b u d g e t and available spaces. Berlin, January 18, 1877 WILHELM v. Kameke

Append!xes

239

Royal Cabinet Order of May 9, 1888 [Altered Only Stipulations 4-8 of 1877 Order] (4) Annually in spring all cadets who have completed the Obersekunda are to be admitted to the ensign's examination. (5) Those among them who turn 17 before April 1 and possess the physical d e v e l o p m e n t necessary for military service are, if they pass the ensign's examination, recommended for transfer into the army as "acting" or "brevet" (charakterisirte) ensigns or promoted into the Selekta according to current regulations for the purpose of immediate preparation for the officer's examination. (6) Those cadets passing the ensign's examination who have not yet attained the age and corresponding physical d e v e l o p m e n t prescribed under 5 are promoted into the Unterprima of the Cadet Corps. (7) At the request of the family the cadets named in 5 who h a v e conducted themselves well a n d , according to their aptitude, offer the prospect of following the instruction of the Prima to advantage may be assigned to the Unterprima. (8) Those cadets who have successfully completed the Unterprima and attained the age and appropriate physical d e v e l o p m e n t prescribed under 5 are, depending on the request of the family, either to be nominated for a p p o i n t m e n t into the a r m y — d e p e n d i n g on their conduct—as "patent" [honorary] or "acting" ensigns; or, with a view to admission in the near future to the Abitur examination, promoted to the Oberprima. In especially exceptional cases they also can be promoted to the Selekta.

SOURCE: [Louis] von Scharfenort, Das Koniglich Preussische Kadet ten/corps, 1859-1892 (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 1892), 33-35 and 45-46.

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Appendix 7 February 13, 1890 Memorandum from William II to the Inspector General of Military Training and Education on the Subject of Curriculum at the Cadet Schools

I consider it necessary that the curriculum of study in the Cadet Corps, which, in his unceasing care for the well-being of the Army, my late grandfather, the Emperor William I, founded on the lines of that given at the Realgymnasien, should be increased and rendered more thorough in the following points: (1.) The aim and object of all, and particularly of military education, is the formation of the character by simultaneous physical, scientific, and religious schooling and training. No branch of the education must be forced at the expense of another. According to my ideas the scientific course of instruction of the Cadet Corps makes, at present, too great demands on a large number of the scholars. The instruction must be simplified all through, especially by a thorough sifting out as regards what is necessary to commit to memory, and the eliminating of all superfluous detail so that even the less-talented pupils can, with fair diligence, follow the instruction without over-strain and get through the whole course in the prescribed time. What is lost in quantity will be gained in quality. The instructors in every subject will proceed straightway to arrange their methods of teaching at each stage according to this idea. (2.) At the same time with simplification, the instruction must be made also more useful. Cadets must not only be given the immediately necessary preparation and preliminary knowledge to follow the military profession, the mental equipment to

242

Appendixes train and teach properly in the Army, the great school of the nation, but also to hold their own in case they should take up any other than the military calling later.

In religious instruction the ethical side must be made prominent, and the main stress laid on bringing up the scholars in the fear and trust of God, so that they will be strict in dealing with themselves and patient in dealing with others. They must be made to realize that the manifestation of their loyalty and devotion to their rulers and country, and the proper carrying out of all their duties are enjoined by the Commandments of God. In the study of history knowledge must be imparted, more than has formerly been the case, in modern events and their effect on our own country. To this end special stress will be laid on German history, particularly of the later and latest periods, while the ancient history, and that of the Middle Ages will be made use of rather as providing examples of heroism and historical greatness, and likewise as giving a general view of the changes and developments of our civilization. The geographical instruction, both political and physical, must be made to exemplify and support the historical studies. Its further object is that the student will know thoroughly all about the geography of his own country and its peculiarities, and also understand and appreciate that of foreign countries. The study of German is the important point of the whole course of instruction. The scholar must be instructed in every step of his progress in the correct use of his mother tongue. Special consideration must be given to the choice, both in German language and literature lessons, of extracts from reading, lectures and essays, bearing on the traditions, civilizations, and classics of ancient times, and the subjects and writings referring to German traditions. The student also will be made acquainted with the literary development of the other important civilized nations by an introduction to certain of their literary masterpieces . In the study of modern languages the student will be encouraged and instructed from the very commencement in the practical use of the tongue. To what extent I have offered for consideration a partial alteration of the curriculum of the Cadet Corps will shortly be made known to you by the War Ministry . I have assigned by the foregoing further tasks

Appendixes

243

on the education and instruction of cadets to the a p p o i n t e d agencies which, on their consultation and action, impose increased requirements. I am, however, satisfied that by their p r o v e n devotion and loyalty, they will be successful in solving these tasks according to my ideas and to my complete satisfaction. With their proposals concerning the manner and method of p r e p a r i n g the military youth and also those in the War Schools for the instructional duties of their profession, I am in agreement. I will that my Order be made universally known to the a r m y , and I have instructed this of the War Minist ry . Berlin, February 13,

1890 WILHELM

SOURCE: Scharfenort, Kadet ten/corps , 47-49; and William Murray Black, "The Education and Training of Army Officers," Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States 32 (January-February 1903):11-12 (partial citation).

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Appendix 8 Prussian Cadet Corps: Regulations for the Discipline of the Corps

Berlin, 8th June

1864

The infliction of punishments in all the establishments of the cadet corps is regulated by the order issued by the commander of the corps, dated 25th June 1852; the spirit of this order, however, is not always observed. Cases are at present under my notice in which young officers, employed as tutors (Erzieher), have, to some extent, overstrained the power of punishment conferred upon them, in the belief that it is necessary to the maintenance of their authority. The authority of a tutor is not secured by his power of inflicting punishment (Strafgewalt). I trust, on the contrary, that the officers will make it their object to secure respect and obedience by acting on higher principles, by displaying kindness towards the pupils, by leading them with gentle earnestness, by working with patience upon their convictions, and by exhibiting self-denial in the endeavor to render them every possible assistance. In this way the tutors will be enabled to fulfill their duty, which is above all things to spare and foster the better feelings of the pupils, and to prevent the commission of offences which must entail punishment. It is only after moral influence has failed, and admonitions and warnings have been found to produce no result, that the tutor should appeal to the force of punishment. This power should only be placed in the hands of a few persons of prudence, experience, and impartiality, who are not liable to be carried to extremes.

246

Appendixes

The captains of companies will, I trust, weigh every case of p u n i s h m e n t , and carefully consider all its circumstances; they should, therefore, keep the management of the pupils chiefly in their own hands— of course resorting to punishment when it is d e s e r v e d , but employing it, not like a master u n d e r the influence of excitement and anxious to v i n d i c a t e his own a u t h o r i t y , but like a p r u d e n t parent actuated by affectionate regard for the welfare of his sons, and a d a p t i n g it in each case to the character of the i n d i v i d u a l and the n a t u r e of the offence. In accordance with the a b o v e p r i n c i p l e s I hereby direct : A. That in future in all the establishments of the cadet corps the a u t h o r i t y of the tutors (subaltern officers) shall be limited to: 1. A d m i n i s t e r i n g reprimands, with or w i t h o u t the additional punishment of entering the r e p r i m a n d in the defaulter book. 2. Inflicting punishment parades (Strafmeldungen) on the cadets of the section i m m e d i a t e l y under their charge . One p u n i s h m e n t parade at the outside appears to be perfectly sufficient p u n i s h m e n t for one and the same offence; but these parades are only to be ordered d u r i n g the recreation hours, never d u r i n g the hours of p r i v a t e study (Arbeitstunden) , meal times, leave of absence, before roll call, or after b e d t i m e . During the instruction lessons the t u t o r s , in their capacity of instructors, have only the r i g h t conferred u p o n every instructor of r e p o r t i n g irregularities through the c o m p a n y report book. B. The inferior disciplinary powers conferred upon the captains of companies, or their r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , comprise : 1. Minor punishments: a. R e p r i m a n d , either in p r i v a t e , before the members of the offender's room, or before the whole c o m p a n y . b. Extra turns of daily d u t y (Straf du jour) . c. Extra guards on week days or Sundays.* d. Punishment parades in a certain u n i f o r m , under the limits a l r e a d y prescribed. e. Deprivation of pocket money for a month.** f. Punishment study (Strafarbeitstunde) on week days . g. Curtailment of leave of absence on Sundays and holidays, either by the offender being

Appendixes

247

made to report himself at fixed hours, or by his being kept in for punishment study. The m a x i m u m curtailment of leave is not to exceed two hours, either at the commencement or before the termination of the time allowed for leave, h. Deprivation of half of the evening meal**; the dinner is never to be curtailed. 2. More serious punishments: a. Forfeiture of leave of absence on one Sunday or two successive holidays, accompanied or not by punishment study. b. Deprivation of the p r i v i l e g e s of the first or second censure class for a period of four weeks at the outside. c. Reduction from the second to the third censure class. d. Arrest in quarters (Stubenarrest) up to three days. e. Company arrest (Kompagniearrest) up to three days, either with ordinary diet or on bread and water. Arrest is not to be inflicted for periods of less than 24 hours; the cadets, however, of the Sexta, Quinta, and Quarta are not to pass the night in the place of confinement, although the time is to be calculated as part of the duration of the punishment. For all the cadets, attendance at lessons is suspended during the period of arrest. C. The higher disciplinary powers comprise: 1. Forfeiture of a portion of the vacation. 2. Corps arrest . 3. Reduction from the third to the fourth censure class. 4. Suspension from the duties of a noncommissioned officer . 5. Reduction to the ranks. 6. Dismissal from the cadet corps. Dismissal from the corps as well as reduction to the ranks, at the Berlin cadet house, in the case of under officers who wear the Portepee, can be inflicted only by the commander of the corps; the other punishments can be inflicted by the commandants of the various institutions, or their representatives. Every tutor will still, as heretofore, have the right of placing a cadet at once under arrest when, in e x t r a o r d i n a r y cases, the necessity arises for such

248

Appendixes

an extreme measure. In such a case the tutor is required to make an immediate report of the step to the captain of the company. It rests with the latter to enforce the performance of the punishment or not, and to determine its duration. All punishments here mentioned are to be entered in the defaulter book against the name of the cadet p u n i s h e d — t h e precise character of the offence, the date of the infliction, and the duration of the punishment being added. In the defaulter book there is to be a page for each cadet, in which the minor and serious punishments are to be entered in separate columns. On the 1st of every month the captains of companies are to send in the defaulter books to the commandant. In conclusion, the commandants of the various schools are requested to exercise equal strictness in preventing the abuse of the disciplinary authority conferred on officers, and the assumption of unauthorized powers of punishment. They are also requested to be careful that the punishments here prescribed and no others are inflicted, and that the infliction of punishment is not made too general. The punishment must at once follow on the offence if it is to be effectual. It is further to be borne in mind that one and the same offence should only be punished beo authority, and therefore more than a single punishment is never to be inflicted for it. I cannot, for instance, permit the deprivation of leave of absence on Sunday, following upon punishment inflicted during the week, to be regarded, not as an actual punishment, but as a resulting consequence of the punishment; it is in my opinion a second and more severe punishment for the same offence, and this is contrary to the judicial e s timate of a punishment.

*This punishment is not cadets no longer mount guard. **These two punishments junior schools.

now

are

inflicted,

only

inflicted

as

the

at the

Appendixes

249

Additional Regulations for the Berlin Cadet House The punishments which can be inflicted upon the Selectaner are: 1. Reprimand in private, in the presence of the Selectaner of the company, or of all the Selectaner in the corps. 2. Punishment parades, extra turns of d u t y , deprivation of leave of absence. 3. Forfeiture of the privileges of the first censure class, arrest in quarters (Stubenarrest). 4. Company arrest up to three days may be inflicted on such Selectaner as do not wear the For tepee . 5. Suspension from the duties of the Selectaner. 6. Reduction to the rank of private. 7. Dismissal from the institution. The last two punishments can only be inflicted by the commander of the corps. In the infliction of punishments upon the Selectaner, who in a year's time will be officers, it is requested that double caution and the most careful consideration may be exercised. The Commandant of the Cadet Corps

SOURCE: Commission, Education, 539-41 .

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Appendix 9

Sample of the Questions Used for the Officer's Examination

I. Tact ics 1. What are the objects of an infantry square? In what different ways can it be f o r m e d ; and how is it formed by the Prussian infantry when the sections of skirmishers occupy a central position in the rear of the column? (To be illustrated by a diagram . ) 2. In what respects does the conduct of an advanced guard d u r i n g an advance differ from that of a rear guard d u r i n g a retreat? What order of march would be a d o p t e d by the commander of a d e t a c h m e n t consisting of two battalions, one company of rifles, two squadrons, and four guns, if compelled to retreat from Thisow to Steinberg by way of Biske? 3. What principles determine the occupation of defiles for defensive purposes? What are the special dispositions to be made by the commander of a detachment consisting of one-and-a-half battalions, two companies of rifles, two squadrons, and four guns, if ordered to defend the two bridges at W e i b u r g against an enemy a d v a n c i n g in superior force from the west ? II. Science of Arms and Ordnance 1. Of

what parts does the fuze of the shells for the Prussian rifled guns consist? What is the object of each part of it, and how is its ignition effected? What are the a d v a n t a g e s and disadvantages of this fuze?

252

Appendixes

2 . What requirements should be fulfilled by carriages for field, siege, and garrison guns; and how are these requirements fulfilled in the case of the Prussian artillery? 3. What are the various effects which can be obtained by the fire of the projectiles of the Prussian guns, and what are the different kinds of objects against which the respective effects are e m p l o y e d ? 4 . A c o m p a r a t i v e description of the needle-gun and of the Chassepot rifle. III.

Fortification

1. On what grounds is a preference g i v e n in field fortification to detached works as compared with continuous lines; and under what circumstances should open, semi-enclosed (halbgesehlossene Werke), or enclosed works be constructed? 2. What are the requirements of a military b r i d g e , and how far are they satisfied in the service pontoon bridge? 3. What are the objects of the caponniere of the main ditch in the polygonal trace; and in order to fulfill these objects, what plan, interior arrangement, and cover from fire should be given to it? 4. What measures does the defender of a fortress adopt after the opening of the second parallel, in order to impede the further progress of the attack? IV. Topography and Surveying 1. What various objects were sought to be attained in the construction of the "Kippregel," and how far does it fulfill the requirements of a useful instrument for purposes of military surveying? 2 . How is the a l t i t u d e of a station calculated, if that of two other points in the trigonometrical triangulation is known, the angle of depression of one of which has been observed. 3. On what principles does the possibility depend of accurately representing elevations and depressions of ground on a plan drawn on a horizontal projection; and in what manner is this effect specially attained in Prussia?

A p p e n d i xes

253

V. Military Regulations and Correspondence 1. Lieutenant

A., of the ~th Regiment of Infantry has been sent with a detachment of 50 men to Z, on the Russo-Polish frontier, to prevent the importation of the Rinderpest. He sends a report to the commanding officer of his battalion on the state of affairs there, and the measures which he has adop ted. 2. What is the object of the courts of honour fEhren~ gerichte) for officers? What is their special constitution, and what is their method of procedure in deciding upon questions of honour?

SOURCE: Commission, Education. 261-63.

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Appendix 10 Specimen of the Final Certificate Given to Students upon Leaving a War School

LEAVING CERTIFICATE From the Royal War School at Hanover for

Ensign A. B. of the

Regiment .

Ensign A. B. has attended the course from the 1st October 1867 to the 31st July 1868 , and has passed the Officers' Examination with general predicate Satis factory. Application is not to be made by the Commanding Officer of the Regiment to the Supreme Examination Commission for Ensign A. B. ' s certificate of fitness for a commission, until the latter has proved himself to possess the necessary degree of strength of character. In the practical subjects of instruction he obtained the following predicates : Gymnastics Fencing Riding Drill Musketry practice Instruction in d u t y

good . ver y good . satisfactory. ver v good . very good. satisfactory. •tory.

A b i l i t i e s : Ensign A. B. has very good natural endowments, and also has a good general education, but owing to want of application has not made the most of his abilities. His physical qualifications

256

Appendixes

are very good. Industry: generally satisfactory, but still at times not sufficiently steady, and requiring the application of a stimulus. Conduct: Ensign A. B. has always shown gentlemanly manners, irreproachable moral conduct, and tact: but his personal character is not yet sufficiently developed, and he consequently requires guidance in this respect. The Director Hanover, 31st July The punishments Ensign A. B. are :

of the War School

1868. which

have

been

inflicted

upon

1. Two days' open arrest, for neglect of duty in not sending in until the afternoon a written exercise which was due in the morning. 2. Three days' close arrest, for repeated neglect of duty in being still in bed five minutes after the signal for getting up.

SOURCE: Commission, Education, note handwritten entries.)

569.

(Italics de-

Appendix 11 Number of Prussian Candidates Examined for Ensign and Officer by the Supreme Military Examination Commission, 1860-1908

ENSIGN Civilians Cadets 1860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 1866 1867 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886

530 447 424 315 371 356 485 639 602 491 431 289 377 206 191 233 291 297 318 343 398 397 433 459 405 357 315

189 178 186 176 199 180 172 94 185 196 175 281 268 265 245 299 272 285 285 244 243 261 209 205 221 214 231

OFFICER Total 719 625 610 491 570 536 657 733 787 687 606 570 645 471 436 532 563 582 603 587 641 658 642 664 626 571 546

Selekta War Schools Cadets 882 647 429 443 386 486 485 641 975 601 619 632 237 831 623 611 563 619 595 627 624 660 679 644 743 729 708

128 20 76 84 77 78 81 20 51 64 62 65 71 75 86 88 89 84 88 90 99 101 104 97 81 83 85

Total 1010 667 505 527 463 564 566 661 1026 665 681 697 308 906 709 699 652 703 683 717 723 761 783 741 824 812 793

258

Appendixes ENSIGN Civilians C a d e t s

1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1893 1894 1895 1896 1897 1898 1899 1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908

361 409 391 511 620 485 586 511 488 426 405 412 408 344 343 344 356 365 331 315 315 89*

288 288 360 285 313 344 369 363 374 322 318 354 385 351 313 345 323 325 332 312 337 337

OFFICER Total

649 697 751 796 933 829 955 874 862 748 723 766 793 695 656 689 679 690 663 627 652 426

War Selekta Schools Cadets

663 851 907 911 1053 1297 959 1086 1179 1087 1017 958 972 970 881 788 857 950 902 899 925 26*

86 79 80 76 76 90 90 88 82 87 89 88 89 88 86 70 61 59 59 59 63 58

Total

749 930 987 987 1129 1387 1049 1174 1261 1174 1106 1046 1061 1058 967 858 918 1009 961 958 988 84

"^incomplete Note: Cadet ensign n u m b e r s a f t e r 1874 include those candidates from the Royal Saxony Cadet Corps lower school at Dresden. Selekta totals after 1873 i n c l u d e those cadets from Saxony who transferred t to the Prussian Senior A c a d e m y .

SOURCE: W. N o t t e b o h m , Hundert Jahre mi 1itarischen Prufungsverfahrens: Die koniglich preussische OberMilitar-Prufungskommission, 1808-1908 (Berlin: n . p . , 1908), 103-4.

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Index Abitur. See Secondary schools, German Academie des Nobles, 172 Academy for Young Officers, 6, 172 A g r a r i a n League, 39 Anti-Semitism, 57-59, 7374. See also names of specific countries A u e r s t a d t , Battle of, 4 Aulock-Radau, Balthasar v o n , 122 A u s t r i a — H u n g a r y , 58 Bavaria: anti-Semitism, 58-59; Cadet Corps, 83, 88, 95, 104-5, 129; class p r e j u d i c e , 18; General Staff, 19: progressivism in military affairs and education, 18, 41-42, 5859, 95, 104-5, 143, 182, 195; War School, 143 Beck, Ludwig (1880-1944), German general and chief of army general staff, 189 B e r n h a r d i , Friedrich von (1849-1930), Prussian

general and historian, 46, 181, 211 Bethke, M a r t i n , 103-4, 151, 196-97, 211 Bethmann-Hollweg, Theobald von (1865-1921), German chancellor, 207 Bilse, Fritz 0. See Kyrb u r g , Fritz von der Bismarck-Schonhausen , Otto, Prince von (1815-98), German chancellor, 18, 47 Blucher von Wahlstatt, Gebhard Leberecht, Prince (1742-1819), Prussian Field Marshal, 39 B l u m e n t h a l , Gustav v o n , German general, 178 Blumentritt, Gunther, German general, 211 Bock, Fedor v o n , German Field Marshal, 119 Boguslawski, A l b r e c h t v o n , 132 Borcke, Kurt v o n , 115 B o y e n , Hermann von (17711848), Prussian general and Minister of War, 7-11, 13, 20, 41

276

Index

B r a c k e n b u r y , C. B., British general, 171 Brauchitsch, Walther von (1881-1948), German Field Marshal and army commander-in-chief , 102 Bulow, Kurt Ernst Gottfried v o n , 71-72

Degen, A l e x a n d e r v o n , 85, 1 1 2 , 123. See also Steifel, Fritz Demeter, Karl, 6, 165 Division schools, 11-12, 141-42 Dueling, 164-65; cadet, 124-25; War School, 154-55

Cadet Corps: administration, 88-89; admission, 83-86; curriculum, 91-101; d u e l i n g , 124-25; hazing, 114, 116, 125-28; opposition, 101-2, 132-33; page service, 130-31; reception, 114-17; reorganizations, 9199; t u i t i o n , 86-88 Cadet schools, 14,59; Bensberg, 82-83; Berlin, 3, 113, 135 n.i Culm, 3, 81, 83, 117 Dresden (Saxony), 83 Gross-Lichterfelde , 82-83, 101, 113-14, 135 n.9; Koslin, 83; Munich (Bavaria), 83, 104-5, 129; Oranienstein, 82-83, 113-14; Plon, 82-83, 113, 115, 130, 133; Potsdam, 8283; Stolp, 3; Wahlstatt, 82-83, 115, 126, 133 Churchill, Sir Winston S. (1874-1965), British prime minister and statesman, 37, 65 Clausewitz, Karl von (1780-1831), Prussian general and military strategist, 6, 13, 172 Combined Artillery and Engineer School, 5960, 160 Crammers, m i l i t a r y , 6465

Einem, Karl von (18531934), Prussian general and Minister of War, 20, 58, 213-14 Eisenhofer, H e r m a n n , 132 E n d r e s , Franz Carl, 208 Ensign e x a m i n a t i o n , 11, 14, 43, 61-72, 75, 9293, 95-97, 99, 105 Examinations. See names of specific exams Flatow, Friedrich v o n , Prussian general, 17779, 188 Foch, Ferdinand (18511929), Marshal of France, 182 France: anti-Semitism, 59; general staff and staff college, 19, 182, 184, 194-95, 199 n.5; officer commissioning, 20, 56-57, 88, 207; officer p a y , 162; secondary schools, 37, 52 n.40 Frederick II, King of Prussia, "The Great" (1740-86), 2-4, 81-82, 89, 113-14, 172, 181, 196 Frederick III, Emperor of Germany (1888), 54 n.75, 178 Frederick William of Brandenburg, "The Great Elector" (16401688), 2, 81 Frederick William I, King of Prussia (1713-40),

Index 3, 81-82, 114 Frederick William II, King of Prussia (1786-97), 4-5 Frederick W i l l i a m III, King of Prussia (1797-1840), 5, 10, 61, 114, 172 Frederick William IV, King of Prussia (1840-61), 9-12, 142 Gebsattel, Ludwig, Baron von (1857-1930), Bavarian military plenipotentiary in Berlin, 58 German School Conference, 1890, 38, 97 Geyr, Leo von, German general, 183, 191, 193 Gneisenau, August Wilhelm Anton, Count N e i t h a r d t von (1760-1831), Prussian Field Marshal, 4, 8, 13, 39 Godwin, Gerard v o n , 11718, 122-24, 127, 132, 134 Goeben, August v o n , Prussian general, 196 Great Britain: antiSemitism, 59; crammers, military, 65; general staff and staff college, 19, 195, 198-99 n.5; officers, 56, 73, 88, 101-3, 206; secondary schools 37, 101, 104 Groener, Wilhelm (18671939), German general and Reichswehr Minister, 65, 151, 154 Grolman, Karl von (17771843), Prussian general and chief of general staff, 7-8 Guderian, Fritz, b r o t h e r of Heinz, 112 Guderian, Heinz, German

277

general and chief of general staff, 102, 112, 122, 191 Gurlitt, L u d w i g , 36 Heeringen, Josias von (1850-1926), Prussian general and Minister of War, 58 Hindenburg und von Beneckendorf , Paul von (1847-1934), German Field Marshal and Reichs-President, 11213, 115, 118, 121, 123, 128, 131-32 Hohenlohe-WaldenburgSchillingsfurst, Chlodwig, Prince zu (1819-1901), German chancellor, 18-19 Holborn , Ha j o , 4 Holleben, von, Prussian general and head of Military Examinations Commission, 40, 64-65 Inspector General of Military Training and Education, 11, 59-62, 87-89, 144, 148-49 Italy: officer commissioning, 20, 88; staff college, 195 Jena, Battle of, 4 "Jena " or "Sedan"? (Beyerlein) , 207-8 K y r b u r g , Fritz von der [Bilse, Fritz 0. ] , 164 Landtag, , Prussian, 15,

20, 36 League of German Jews, 58 Lenski, Franz von, Prussian general, 103 Lettow-Vorbeck, Paul von, 100, 132 Life in a Garrison Town (Bilse) , 164

278

L o t t u m , Karl Heinrich, Count von W y l i c h u n d , 6 Luck, v o n , German general, 11, 40-41 L u d e n d o r f f , Erich (18651937), German general and politician, 197, 206; cadet, 85, 128, 132; War A c a d e m y , 182, 185, 193 Lyncker, Baron v o n , German general and head of m i l i t a r y c a b i n e t , 44-45 M a g u i r e , T. M i l l e r , 216 M a n s t e i n , Erich v o n , German Field M a r s h a l , 102, 128, 130, 133 M a n t e u f f e l , Edwin, Baron von (1809-85), Prussian Field M a r s h a l , 14-18, 158, 196 Marriage of officers, 163-64 Meinecke, Friedrich (1862-1954), German historian, 10-11 Michels, R o b e r t , 215 Militarism, m i d d l e class, 208 Military-qualifications cert if icate , 74 Moltke, H e l m u t h Carl B e r n h a r d , Count v o n (1800-91), German Field Marshal and chief of general staff, 13-17, 131, 171-72, 174-79, 181, 188, 196 M u l l e r , Georg A l e x a n d e r von, German admiral and chief of n a v a l cabinet , 45 Napoleon I (Bonaparte), (1769-1821), 4, 181 The Nation in Arms (Goltz), 209

Index N a v y , Imperial German, 45 N i c k o l , Hanns, 118-19 Officer election, 158-60 Officer e x a m i n a t i o n , 94, 155-57 Officers' Military I n s t i t u t e , 6, 172 One-year V o l u n t e e r S e r v i c e , 33-34 Peucker, Eduard v o n , Prussian general and Inspector General of M i l i t a r y Training and Education, 142-43, 173-74, 176, 211 Pfuel, v o n , Prussian general and Inspector General of M i l i t a r y Training and Educat i o n , 44-45 Pfuel, v o n , Prussian g e n e r a l and Minister of War, 12 "Potsdam tone" of speech, 213 Prim a c e r t i f i c a t e of e l i g i b i l i t y , 11, 1415, 40-41, 43 Prussian General Staff, 60, 62, 88, 193-94, 197, 203 n.69, 206 Prussian M i l i t a r y Cabinet, 40, 60-61 Prussian War M i n i s t r y , 59-62, 87-88, 175, 178, 190, 206-7 R a d o w i t z , Josef v o n , 214 R e g u l a r army (Linienarmee) , I 6 R e i c h s t a g , 20 Reitzenstein, HansJoachim, Baron von, 1 1 7 , 127-28 R e s e r v e a r m y , (Landwehr), 7-8, 16 Richthofen, Manfred, Baron v o n , 133 R i t t e r , G e r h a r d , 12-13

Index R o b e r t s o n , Sir William, B r i t i s h Field Marshal, 56 R o m a n C a t h o l i c i s m , 57, 90, 98 Roon, A l b r e c h t von (18031879), Prussian Field Marshal and Minister of War, 13-14, 17, 86, 205 Der Rote Kanipf f 1 ieger (Richthofen), 133 R u n d s t e d t , Gerd von (1875-1953), German Field Marshal, 102, 129, 184 Russia: general staff and staff c o l l e g e , 19; officer commissioning, 20; secondary schools, 37 Salomon, Ernst v o n , 11417, 127 S a x o n y , 18-19; Cadet Corps, 83, 88 S c h a r f e n o r t , Louis v o n , 104, 133 Scharnhorst, Gerhard Jo~ hann David von (17551813), Prussian general, 4-8, 20, 141, 172, 178-79, 196, 211 Schlieffen, A l f r e d , Count von (1833-1913), Prussian g e n e r a l and chief of general staff, 175, 185, 194, 197 Schlieffen Plan, 197, 206-7 S c h m i d t , Paul von, Prussian general, 162 Schulze, W a l t h e r , 115 Secondary schools, German: Abitur, 31-33, 38, 40-44, 48, 100, 143, 146, 190, 209; German School Conference, 1890, 38, 97; Gymnasium, 14, 29-30, 34, 36-39, 41, 91;

279

Oberrealschule, 29-31, 33-34, 38-39, 41; Progymnasiurn, 29-30, 33-34, 41; Realgymnasiutn, 29-31, 34, 3839, 41 , 91 (See also Cadet Corps: curriculum); Real progymnasium, 29-30, 32-34, 41; Realschule, 14, 29, 30, 33-34, 36-37; Tuition, 28 , 50 n.6 Seeckt, Hans von (18661936), German general and c o m m a n d e r — i n — c h i e f of a r m y , 55, 157-58, 185 Selasen-Selasinsky, Eberhard v o n , 85-86, 1 1 2 , 118, 128 Social Democratic P a r t y , 57, 132-33, 214 Steifel, Fritz, 85, 112, 123. See also Degen, Alexander von S u p r e m e Military Examinations Commission, 6062, 65-71, 94, 101, 156, 212 S u p r e m e M i l i t a r y Studies Commission, 6 60-61 Technical C o l l e g e , 31, 38 T e m p e l h o f f , Henny v o n , 132 Unification, Wars of, 1, 16-18, 172 United States: general staff and staff college, 19, 182, 195, 199 n.5; officer commissioning, 65; officer p a y , 162; War D e p a r t m e n t , 103 Universal s e r v i c e , 33, 51 n.23 U n r u h , Fritz v o n , 130, 133 U p t o n , Emory, American g e n e r a l , 123

280

Vagts, Alfred, 46 V e r d y du Vernois, Julius von, Prussian general, 181 Valksschtile, 28-29, 36 Waldersee, Alfred, Count von (1832-1904), Prussian general and chief of general staff, 179 Waldersee, Countess von (Mary Esther Lee), 47 War A c a d e m y , 59-60, 101; aa Hd m m ii nnHicst t' Tr- aa it- ii noTni , 1 7 4 " 75; curriculum, 17584; entrance exam and selection, 184-90; Lj-iiaj. t r A a u i , 192-93; ,-y £. y*j fina1 exam general staff's in volvement in, 174-75; life at, 191-92; origins, 1 72-73 War Schools, 12, 14, 59, 93-94, 100-101; administration, 144-45; admission, 145-46; A n k l a m , 143; Berlin, 141; Breslau, 141; c u r r i c u l u m , 146-50; Danzig, 143; dueling, 154-55; Engers, 143, 151; Erfurt, 142; G l o g a u , 143; H a n o v e r , 143; Hersfeld,__143; Kassel, 143; Konigsberg, 141; life at, 150-54; Metz, 143;

Index Neisse, 142, 151; officer exam, 155-57; Peucker's reorganization of, 142-43; Potsdam, 142 Wiese, Leopold v o n , 104, 1 1 7 , 125-26 Wiese, Ludwig v o n , 128 William I (1797-1888), Prince-regent of Prussia (1858), King (1861), Emperor of Germany (1871), 9, 11-15, 19-20, 47 114, 181, 212 W i l l i a m II, Emperor of Germany (1888-1918), 1, 27, 196; Cadet Corps, 97-98, 133; civilian education, 34, 37-38, 208-9; d u e l i n g , 124; officer r e c r u i t m e n t , 43, 4749, 64, 214-15; officer vote, 159; opposition to democracy and socialism, 19-20, 133, 212-13; royal dispensations, 15; War Schools, 148 Wrangel, Fried rich, Count von (1784-1877), Prussian Field Marshal, 39 Wiirttemberg , 18-1 9 Zobeltitz, Fedor v o n , 93, 112, 131, 151, 154

About the Author STEVEN E. CLEMENTE is a freelance historian specializing in modern German and European political and military history.

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