Foreign Ministries in the European Union: Integrating Diplomats

Foreign Ministries in the European Union Integrating Diplomats

Edited by

Brian Hocking and David Spence

Studies in Diplomacy General Editor: G. R. Berridge, Professor of International Politics, University of Leicester The series was launched in 1994. Its chief purpose is to encourage original scholarship on the theory and practice of international diplomacy, including its legal regulation. The interests of the series thus embrace such diplomatic functions as signalling, negotiation and consular work, and methods such as summitry and the multilateral conference. Whilst it has a sharp focus on diplomacy at the expense of foreign policy, therefore, the series has no prejudice as to historical period or approach. It also aims to include manuals on protocol and other aspects of diplomatic practice which will be of immediate, day-to-day relevance to professional diplomats. A final ambition is to reprint inaccessible classic works on diplomacy. Titles include: G. R. Berridge DIPLOMACY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 2nd edition G. R. Berridge, Maurice Keens-Soper and T. G. Otte DIPLOMATIC THEORY FROM MACHIAVELLI TO KISSINGER Herman J. Cohen INTERVENING IN AFRICA Superpower Peacemaking in a Troubled Continent Andrew F. Cooper (editor) NICHE DIPLOMACY Middle Powers after the Cold War David H. Dunn (editor) DIPLOMACY AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL The Evolution of International Summitry Brian Hocking (editor) FOREIGN MINISTRIES Change and Adaptation Brian Hocking and David Spence (editors) FOREIGN MINISTRIES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION Integrating Diplomats Michael Hughes DIPLOMACY BEFORE THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION Britain, Russia and the Old Diplomacy, 1894–1917 Gaynor Johnson THE BERLIN EMBASSY OF LORD D’ABERNON, 1920–1926

Donna Lee MIDDLE POWERS AND COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY British Influence at the Kennedy Trade Round Mario Liverani INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST, 1600–1100 BC Jan Melissen (editor) INNOVATION IN DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE Peter Neville APPEASING HITLER The Diplomacy of Sir Nevile Henderson, 1937–39 M. J. Peterson RECOGNITION OF GOVERNMENTS Legal Doctrine and State Practice, 1815–1995 Gary D. Rawnsley RADIO DIPLOMACY AND PROPAGANDA The BBC and VOA in International Politics, 1956–64 TAIWAN’S INFORMAL DIPLOMACY AND PROPAGANDA

Studies in Diplomacy Series Standing Order ISBN 0–333–71495–4 (outside North America only) You can receive future titles in this series as they are published by placing a standing order. Please contact your bookseller or, in case of difficulty, write to us at the address below with your name and address, the title of the series and the ISBN quoted above. Customer Services Department, Macmillan Distribution Ltd, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS, England

Foreign Ministries in the European Union Integrating Diplomats Edited by

Brian Hocking Professor of International Relations Coventry University

and

David Spence Special Advisor in European Security and Defence Policy and Counter-Terrorism The European Commission

Foreword by

The Rt. Hon. Chris Patten Commissioner for External Relations

Editorial matter and selection © Brian Hocking and David Spence 2002 Chapters 1 and 16 © Brian Hocking 2002 Chapter 2 © David Spence 2002 Remaining chapters © Palgrave Macmillan Ltd 2002 Foreword © Chris Patten 2002 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1T 4LP. Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The authors have asserted their rights to be identified as the authors of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2002 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 Companies and representatives throughout the world PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN 1–4039–0359–X This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Foreign ministries in the European Union : integrating diplomats / edited by Brian Hocking and David Spence. p. cm.–(Studies in diplomacy) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1–4039–0359–X (cloth) 1. European Union countries–Foreign relations administration. 2. Foreign ministers–European Union countries. 3. Diplomats–European Union countries. 4. European federation. I. Hocking, Brian. II. Spence, David, 1946– III. Series. JZ1570 .A3 2002 341 .3’3–dc21 10 11

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Printed and bound in Great Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham and Eastbourne

Contents List of Tables

vii

List of Figures

viii

Foreword by The Rt. Hon. Chris Patten, Commissioner for External Relations

ix

Notes on the Contributors

x

Acknowledgements

xii

List of Abbreviations

xiv

1

2

Introduction: Gatekeepers and Boundary-Spanners – Thinking about Foreign Ministries in the European Union Brian Hocking The Evolving Role of Foreign Ministries in the Conduct of European Union Affairs David Spence

1

18

3

Austria Hanspeter Neuhold

37

4

Belgium Rik Coolsaet and Ann-Sofie Voet

60

5

Denmark Knud Erik Jørgensen

75

6

Finland Esko Antola

95

7

France Melanie Morisse-Schilbach

111

8

Germany Elfriede Regelsberger

132

9

Ireland Ben Tonra

146

v

vi

Contents

10

Italy Mario Zucconi

163

11

The Netherlands Duco Hellema

177

12

Portugal José M. Matos Correia

191

13

Spain Ignacio Molina and Fernando Rodrigo

212

14

Sweden Magnus Ekengren and Bengt Sundelius

238

15

The United Kingdom David Allen

250

16

Conclusion Brian Hocking

273

Index

287

List of Tables 1.1 5.1

Images of diplomatic systems The Ministry of Foreign Affairs organisation: principles before and after the reorganisation of 1991 5.2 The number of offices in ministries working with EU matters 10.1 Allocation for MFA-managed and Treasury-managed budgets for cooperation programmes 13.1 Evolution of the Diplomatic Corps and territorial distribution

vii

11 83 90 170 226

List of Figures 5.1 The prime minister’s new organisation 5.2 The EU coordination system in Denmark 5.3 Coordination axes in Danish policy making in Europe 13.1 Organisation of the MAE 13.2 Organisation of the Undersecretariat 13.3 Organisation of the SECIPI 13.4 Organisation of the Secretariats of State for Foreign Affairs and for European Affairs

viii

81 82 86 218 220 220 224

Foreword The boundary between national and supranational in the European Union is a source of unending fascination. Member states accept that they can maximise their potential by pooling certain powers and decisions. But they may differ about the point at which the benefits of integration begin to be outweighed by unwelcome erosion of national sovereignty. The question is particularly difficult when it comes to foreign and security policy, because independence of external action goes to the heart of what it means to be a nation. That is why the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has been a late flowering in the EU garden; why it is still a delicate plant – and why there is still much uncertainty about what should be its ambitions, its structures, its decision-making, its financing, and the mechanisms for its articulation. Is it inevitable that an ambitious European CFSP will limit the potential of national diplomacy and of national foreign ministries – or might it offer a new dimension within which national action can be more effective? What is the most productive relationship between national embassies and external representations of the EU? This timely and welcome book discusses the role of foreign ministries in the changing environment. You might expect foreign ministries, whose very raison d’être is to promote national interests, to resist the notion of common European purposes, or wider international ones. Yet they have been remarkably adaptable. This book suggests that they have developed a ‘boundaryspanner’ function – spanning boundaries, that is, between physical and intellectual frameworks that were traditionally separate but now need to communicate and coordinate. I find this term particularly appealing because it also conjures the image of a spanner in the works, or even Herb Caen’s description of the Bay Bridge in San Francisco as the ‘car-tangled spanner’: foreign ministries, in other words, as part of the problem as well as part of the solution. It is important to understand the role of foreign ministries (and, more widely, national administrations) in the development of CFSP, because the European institutions play a less determinant role in shaping the whole than they do in traditional fields of Community competence. I do not see the crucial role of national institutions as a temporary phenomenon: the dying kick of dinosaurs gradually losing out in the evolutionary struggle. Intergovernmentalism in CFSP is not a waning factor; still less a residue of original sin. It is a political reality in foreign and security policy that architects of a better future neglect at their peril. CHRIS PATTEN Commissioner for External Relations ix

Notes on the Contributors David Allen is Senior Lecturer in European Studies at Loughborough University, UK. Esko Antola is Jean Monnet Chair in European Studies at the University of Turku, Finland. Rik Coolsaet is Professor of International Relations at the University of Ghent, Belgium. He was formerly Deputy Chief of Staff in the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1992–95. José M. Matos Correia is Professor of International Relations at Lusiada University, Lisbon, Portugal. Magnus Ekengren is Senior Lecturer at the Swedish National Defence College and was previously with the Policy Planning Unit of the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Duco Hellema is Professor in the History of International Relations at the University of Utrecht, The Netherlands. Brian Hocking is Professor of International Relations at Coventry University, UK. Knud Erik Jørgensen is Senior Lecturer in Political Science at the University of Aarhus, Denmark. Ignacio Molina is Lecturer in Political Science at the Autonomous University of Madrid, Spain. Melanie Morisse-Schilbach is Research Fellow and Chair for International Politics at Dresden University of Technology, Germany. Hanspeter Neuhold is Professor and Head of the Institute for International Law and International Relations at the University of Vienna, Austria. Elfriede Regelsberger is Research Fellow at the Institut für Europaische Politik, Bonn, Germany. Fernando Rodrigo is Professor of International Relations at the Autonomous University of Madrid and was formerly Deputy Director of the Spanish Centre for International Relations. David Spence works in the European Commission’s Directorate General for External Relations and is currently responsible for European Security and Defence Policy and counter-terrorism. He was formerly responsible for the x

Notes on the Contributors xi

Commission’s programme of diplomatic training for its delegation staff and for EU foreign ministry staff in the framework of the European Diplomatic Programme. Bengt Sundelius is Professor of Government at Uppsala University, Sweden. Ben Tonra is Deputy Director at the Dublin European Institute, University College Dublin, Ireland. Ann-Sofie Voet is Research Fellow in the Department of Political Science at the University of Ghent, Belgium. Mario Zucconi is Professor of International Relations at the Centre for the Study of International Politics (CeSPI) in Rome, Italy.

Acknowledgements Edited books are often long in coming to fruition and that is certainly true of this project, launched in 1997. The book is the product of welldeveloped academic and professional interests of the editors in foreign policy, diplomacy and the European Union as reflected in their collaboration on an earlier volume on the changing role of foreign ministries, also published in this series: B. Hocking (ed.), Foreign Ministries: Change and Adaptation (1999). The idea for the present book came from a conference at Wilton Park in October 1995, ‘Who are the Diplomats Now?’ One of the themes addressed was the response of foreign ministries to patterns of change in their domestic and international environments. As is often the case with such sessions, the more formal proceedings were interspersed with extensive and intensive informal discussions. Stimulated by these, we decided to explore the issue from the perspective of European Union (EU) member states. Indeed, there seemed to be a logic in such a project. If it is the case – as much of the literature suggests – that foreign ministries are in a state of terminal decline, challenged by the combined forces of enhanced international interdependence and the apparent erosion of their role by other, ‘domestic’, agencies of government, then this should be highly developed in the context of the EU. As the integration process develops apace, are national diplomats key actors and are they themselves being ‘integrated’ into an emerging European regional diplomatic reflex? Here, it might be assumed that evidence of the ‘decline’ of foreign ministries and the diplomatic systems over which they preside would be clearly manifested in those states most committed to achieving a ‘common’ foreign policy and to pooling some of their key diplomatic resources within an EU framework. But we shared a sense that the picture might not be quite so simple as the ‘declinists’ suggest, particularly in the context of the EU where the changing role and status of foreign ministries might well provide a valuable casestudy of the responses of the state and its agencies to the linked pressures of regionalisation and globalisation. It was possible that European integration is leading foreign ministries to adapt their role successfully to a changed environment, even enhancing their significance in certain respects. Many debts have been incurred since then and not least of course, to the contributors. Assembling a book involving sixteen authors is no easy task. We all work to deadlines and, most often, those deadlines shift in response to a variety of events beyond our control. Thus some authors were able to submit their chapters relatively early whilst others were forced by circumstance to delay theirs. Our gratitude is extended to the former who subsequently agreed to update their chapters – sometimes more than once. xii

Acknowledgements xiii

Moreover, some of our original team were forced to withdraw and we are particularly grateful to those authors who agreed to join the project in its later phases and to produce chapters at relatively short notice. It was our intention to survey all fifteen member state foreign ministries. In the event, pressure of other commitments led to the withdrawal from the project of the contributors covering Greece and Luxembourg. We are also indebted to the organisations which funded the project. These include the European Commission, the British Academy and Coventry University. Without this support, which, amongst other things, enabled meetings and symposia to be staged, the book would not have emerged. Our thanks to particular individuals whose help was invaluable in the production of the book also need to be recorded here. Armen Georgian performed sterling work on the early drafts of many of the chapters. In its final phases, Steven Curtis, Simon Hall and Edward Hodson assisted with the editorial work and their efforts improved the final manuscript immeasurably. Geoff Berridge, as series editor, was extremely helpful in terms of the provision of general guidance and making suggestions for the improvement of the manuscript – as was the reviewer. Finally, we are grateful to the staff at Palgrave Macmillan for their advice and support in the production of the book. BRIAN HOCKING and DAVID SPENCE

List of Abbreviations ACs AECI BNC CAP CDU CESDP CFSP CMEUA CoCo CoCo HAN COREPER COREU/ CORTESY CSCE DC DCE DES DGES DGIA DGIS DGPZ DIE DREE DTI EC EEA EFTA EIC EMU EPC ESDI

Autonomous Communities (Spain) Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional (Spain) Interministerial Working Group to Assess New Commission Proposals (The Netherlands) Centre d’Analyse et de Prévision (Analysis and Forecast Centre, France) Christian Democratic Union (Germany) Common European Security and Defence Policy Common Foreign and Security Policy Council of Ministers for European Union Affairs (Portugal) Coordinating Committee for European Cooperation (The Netherlands) Coordinating Committee for European Cooperation, attended by High Level Officials (HAN) (The Netherlands) Committee of Permanent Representatives (to the EU) European Correspondents Cipher Network Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe Democrazia Cristiana (Christian Democratic Party, Italy) Direction de la Coopération Européenne (Directorate for European Cooperation, France) Department for OECD matters (The Netherlands) Directorate General for European Cooperation (The Netherlands) Directorate General IA (European Commission) DG for International Cooperation (The Netherlands) DG for Political Affairs (The Netherlands) Department for European Integration (The Netherlands) Direction des relations économiques à l’étranger (External Economic Relations Division, France) Department of Trade and Industry (UK) European Community European Economic Area European Free Trade Association European Integration Commission (Portugal) Economic and Monetary Union European Political Cooperation European Security and Defence Identity xiv

List of Abbreviations xv

ESDP EU FCO FDP FM GDCA ICCA ICEP ICI IEC MAE MAFF MEA MFA NGO OECD OEEC OSCE PCI POCO PP PSOE REIA REPER REZ SCE SECIPI

SGCI

SPD TEU UKRep UN WEU WRR

European Security and Defence Policy European Union Foreign and Commonwealth Office Free Democratic Party (Germany) Foreign Ministry General Directorate of Community Affairs (Portugal) Interministerial Commission for Community Affairs (Portugal) Investment and Foreign Trade of Portugal Institute for Cooperation with Latin America (Iberoamerica) (Spain) Interministerial Economic Commission (Belgium) Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Spain) Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (UK) Ministry of External Affairs Ministry of Foreign Affairs Non-Governmental Organisation Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Organisation for European Economic Cooperation Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe Italian Communist Party Political Committee of the European Union Popular Party (Spain) Socialist Party of Spain Council for European and International Affairs (The Netherlands) Permanent Representation in Brussels (Portugal) Cabinet Council for European Affairs (The Netherlands) Service de Coopération Economique (France) Secretaría de Estado de Cooperación Internacional y Para Iberoamérica (Secretariat of State for International Cooperation and Latin America, Spain) Secrétariat Général du Comité Interministériel pour les questions de coopération économique et européenne (General Secretariat of the Inter-ministerial Committee for European Economic Questions, France) Social Democratic Party (Germany) Treaty on European Union United Kingdom Permanent Representation United Nations Western European Union Scientific Council for Government Policy (The Netherlands)

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1 Introduction: Gatekeepers and Boundary-Spanners – Thinking about Foreign Ministries in the European Union Brian Hocking

Observers of foreign ministries and the systems of diplomatic representation over which they preside have reached very different conclusions as to their role and significance in the rapidly shifting patterns of world politics. On the one hand, there are those who argue that the critical functions that these institutions perform remain in essence unaltered. The implication of this interpretation is that the traditional state-centred diplomatic machinery of representation, intelligence-gathering and communication remains as it has traditionally been portrayed: a key institution of the international system and a major resource through which governments pursue their policy objectives.1 A contrary view, however, asserts that the twin forces of globalisation and regionalisation are challenging governments and have dramatically diminished the significance of these traditional instruments of diplomacy. Consequently, the role of the foreign ministry (FM) has become increasingly marginalised in the face of both internal and external pressures. This divergence of views about diplomacy in general and the role of the FM in particular is echoed in the specific context of the European Union (EU). For many observers, the EU is a complex political system transcending the traditional processes associated with classical diplomacy, and is far removed from preoccupations with its institutional machinery. And yet, whereas foreign ministries – characterised as one of the ‘pioneer ministries’ in the development of the integration enterprise – have been joined in the EU arena by other bureaucratic players traditionally regarded as having a purely domestic policy remit, they remain one of the key ministries in dealing with EU affairs in the majority of member states.2 It is this apparent polarisation of views as to the continuing role and significance of the foreign ministry that provides the context for this book. The justification for engaging in such a project is well supported by the extensive literature on the EU. It is now a familiar proposition that the nexus 1

2

Foreign Ministries in the European Union

between member state governmental and administrative systems and EU processes is critical to an appreciation of the character and development of European integration. The very nature of European foreign policy and diplomacy, as Hill, Wallace and many others have argued, has been recast in such a way that its national and European facets are intertwined: ‘European foreign policy is “a system of external relations”, a collective enterprise through which national actors conduct partly common, and partly separate, international actions.’3 As Hill and Wallace also note, three decades of European Political Cooperation (EPC), and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) ‘have transformed the working practices of West European foreign ministers and ministries’ as the conduct of national foreign policy has evolved into ‘a form of high-level networking with transformationalist effects and even more potential’.4 The implications are as relevant to the organisation and operations of foreign ministries themselves as they are to the pattern of European representation and its interrelationship with national diplomatic representation. A growing EU external presence demands more coordination at the European level but also within and between foreign ministries themselves, and poses questions regarding the nature of the diplomatic role and, for example, the training requirements that underpin it.5 This book was conceived with two related objectives in mind. Firstly, at the broader level, the aim is to reconsider the nature and role of the foreign ministry in the context of rapidly changing international and domestic environments. It might be more appropriate to use the word ‘consider’ rather than ‘reconsider’ in this context, for one of the premises on which the book rests is that we know surprisingly little about this familiar feature of national administrations.6 The reasons for this are to be found in the academic study of international relations and the approaches adopted by varying theoretical persuasions to the study of diplomacy and its institutions and, additionally, in the lack of hard data about the activities of diplomats.7 The resulting tendency has been to adopt stereotypical perspectives of the diplomatic milieu characterised by simplistic assertions and images, most familiarly manifested in arguments about the ‘decline’ of diplomacy and its institutional forms. As the chapters in this volume amply demonstrate, such generalisations demand considerable qualification. Not only is it the case that FMs differ considerably in terms of their place in their respective political and administrative settings, but the precise character of the external roles that they were created to perform have varied from country to country. The more specific objective is to reflect on the response of FMs to the development of European integration. Whereas it would be misleading to assume that the challenges confronting EU member state FMs are solely the product of developments within the European arena, a series of unparalleled new tasks for European foreign ministries have arisen as a result of two specific responsibilities: the coordination of sectoral ministries’ affairs for EU business, and participation in the CFSP. If there are points of similarity and

Brian Hocking 3

dissimilarity in the general response of foreign policy administrations to change, the existing evidence suggests that there are actually significant variations between member states in their responses to these two sets of challenges. The phrase ‘integrating diplomats’ was selected to reflect these interrelated concerns. Its resonances are clear in the EU context. The book focuses on the role of diplomats in the integration process and, simultaneously, raises the issue of whether the integration of national diplomatic institutions might not prove the logical outcome of the process. However individual member states have responded to the processes of Europeanisation, their respective diplomatic systems have played a significant role, albeit at differing phases in the evolution of the EU. The implication, of course, is not that they have been, or are, the sole engines of the integration project. Indeed, the gradual embedding of the ‘domestic’ components of national administrative systems has become a key feature of the EU policy environment and one to which foreign ministries have been required to respond. But these trends have to be seen in a wider context, for diplomats are confronted with broader processes of integration which, whilst obviously related to regionalisation, are part of the general patterns of change associated with globalisation. Thus, at the international level, diplomats have found their work focused increasingly in multilateral forums, and often characterised by highly technical subject matter. At the domestic level, a reflection of the oft-noted evanescence of the domestic–foreign policy ‘divide’, they have found that the policy milieu in which they work is inhabited by bureaucrats from an ever more diverse range of government departments. One of the themes of the management of foreign policy in an era of growing interdependence has been the trend towards a more broadly based foreign policy ‘community’ of which the FM and its diplomatic networks are but one element. The role of the foreign ministry in this context – as we shall see later in this chapter – has frequently been portrayed as one of seeking to integrate incoherent international policies through varying processes of coordination. But beyond the purely administrative context, the nature of much contemporary negotiation demands another, broader mode of integration: namely with societal interests and, in particular, with the representatives of civil society.8 This mode of diplomatic integration, often represented in terms of ‘two-level games’ wherein diplomats become players at both domestic and international negotiating tables, has come to be regarded as a familiar feature of the European as well as the broader negotiating arena.9 In these senses, ‘integration’ presents both a series of interconnected challenges and opportunities for diplomats. In pursuing this theme, this introduction has several objectives. The first of these is to reflect on the nature of foreign ministries as bureaucratic actors, both in general terms and in the European environment. Following from this I set out two models which, I believe, move us beyond the

4

Foreign Ministries in the European Union

tendency to view the developments in national foreign policy administration from relatively narrow perspectives. These I term the ‘gatekeeper’ and ‘boundary-spanner’ image and suggest that the latter captures the role of the FM much more accurately in the context of the complex EU policy milieu. The chapter then proceeds to consider developments specific to intra-EU relations: namely, the implications for foreign ministries of the rise of domestic ministries as major bilateral actors in European interstate relations and the consequent need for a nationally coordinated position in European Community affairs. From this we move on to consider the implications for foreign ministries of the CFSP and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), both of which fall outside the far-reaching integration of the European Community (first) pillar of the European Union and yet are replete with implications for the integration of daily policy making.

Evaluating foreign ministries It has become an accepted premise of the extensive EU literature that institutions matter, that – as Aspinall and Schneider note in their overview of neoinstitutionalist approaches to the EU – they structure political actions and outcomes.10 However, there has been a tendency, it is suggested, to focus on institutional patterns at the European level rather than the national level. Pursuing this theme, Hanf and Soetendorp have noted: Most frequently these developments are examined in terms of how policy-making is organized at the EU level, and how the interaction of national and European-level actors affects the definition of national interest, the resources available for pursuing it, the exercise of influence and the legitimacy of the decisions reached at the EU level. Likewise, interest is focused on the organizational alternatives for organizing the relations between the different institutional actors of the EU.11 Along with many other observers, amongst them Bulmer,12 Richardson13 and Ladrech,14 they argue that EU policy processes have to be regarded as ‘nested games’, in which the policy processes at the national and European levels mutually influence one another through a complex interplay of formal and informal structures and processes which embrace both EU, national and subnational actors. The degree to which national institutional arrangements privilege policy choices and outcomes, both in the European and the broader international contexts, is of major importance here. From this recognition, a considerable literature tracing the impact of Europeanisation on political and administrative structures and processes at the national level has evolved. Hanf and Soetendorp draw a distinction, however, between studies mainly preoccupied with the development of EU-focused transnational subsystems as distinct from the relations between

Brian Hocking 5

national institutions per se and the EU institutional environment. In the pursuit of this goal in the UK context, Bulmer and Burch have adopted a historical institutionalist approach which traces the response of the UK administrative system to EU membership.15 Their analysis of the pattern of departmental roles and relationships in the periods before and after British accession to the EEC underscores the significance of bureaucratic adaptation to an understanding of the impact of European integration on the machinery of government. Interestingly, their conclusion is that, despite the profound effect that the EU has had on British policy, the impact here has been one of ‘slow and steady adaptation’.16 It is this notion of adaptation that provides a central theme of this study. The proposition that bureaucratic institutions adapt to changing policy milieus is hardly a novel one and has received considerable attention at both the European and the broader international levels. For example, the concept of adaptation, derived from Haas’s definition in terms of the ability of actors to respond to new demands, underpins Hanf and Soetendorp’s study of the adaptation of the smaller member states to Europeanisation.17 But the FM has not generally been seen as an institution marked by a high degree of adaptive capacity. Indeed, Manners and Whitman, in their reinterpretation of EU member state foreign policy, conclude that conservatism in foreign policy administration is one of the most notable features of EU member state bureaucracies. They base this conclusion on the observation that ‘without exception the traditional structures of a foreign ministry with a foreign minister in charge of foreign policy have been maintained, if not strengthened’.18 Such a conclusion ignores the significant changes that have occurred within systems of national diplomatic representation, including the FM at their centre, over recent decades. Around the world, foreign ministries have sought to respond to increasing demands against the background of diminishing resources, internal bureaucratic reorganisations, expanding policy tasks, a revolution in communications and information technology and, not least, the expectations generated by transnational civil society organisations and the business community. The proliferation of reviews of foreign ministry and diplomatic service organisation is ample testimony to the demands placed on the foreign policy machinery and its attempts to adapt to them. Not only in the EU context but in other countries and regions, foreign ministries and their diplomatic services are experimenting with new modes of managing their business. Co-location, shared diplomatic premises and staff exchanges between foreign ministries are not solely manifestations of a proto-European diplomatic presence. They reflect experiments (often unsuccessful) in many other settings. But stereotypical views of the foreign ministry and its characteristics – as with the role performed by professional diplomats in the field – are, of course, common. In their evaluation of foreign policy management in Sweden and Finland, Karvonen and Sundelius attribute this in part to the

6

Foreign Ministries in the European Union

acceptance of US-oriented analyses of the consequences of interdependence on bureaucratic structures which are often insensitive to local political environments.19 More generally, however, there is a tendency to group foreign ministries into a uniform category which denies significant variations in their origins, the specific roles that they have been called upon to perform and their political and bureaucratic status.20 As can be seen from the chapters in this book, FMs have not infrequently been founded on the demands of commerce rather than those of ‘high’ foreign policy, and it is by no means the case that they have occupied the apex of their respective bureaucratic hierarchies. Furthermore, against the view of foreign ministries as bastions of conservatism, there are compelling arguments for regarding them as possessing a higher degree of innovative capacity than the more domestically oriented parts of the bureaucracy. One reason is to be found in the fundamental character of national diplomatic systems, with their need to link international and domestic policy environments, a point explored in greater depth below. Associated with this is what Wiseman has noted as the twin characteristics of mobility and the capacity to adapt readily to international environments.21 The point is reinforced by Kramer and Quendler: Diplomats and foreign ministries are more sensitive, more exposed to and are more challenged by the dramatically changed international environment than are other departments of bureaucracy and sectors of society. They therefore might be in a better position to adapt their ‘product’ to the needs of the newly structured ‘international market’.22 Linked to this is a factor related to the FM’s relationship to domestic interests. Despite the fact that the conduct of international policy, as already suggested, demands an ever increasing involvement with a growing range of domestic constituencies, foreign ministries are less likely to be subject to the attentions of interest groups which focus on domestic departments and can act as forces resisting innovation.23 In short, we need to recognise the unique as well as the common features of foreign ministries, whilst resisting the tendency to make assumptions regarding their role and status. This is as true of the EU policy environment as it is of the broader, global context. Here, it is tempting to assume that the pressures of ‘convergence’, reflecting processes of Europeanisation, are producing similar responses in the administrative structures of the member states. It may well be, however, that institutional change is conditioned as much, if not more, by factors relating to the internal character of the state.24 What is most likely to be the case, however, is a pattern of responses that reflects an amalgam of both factors and which ensures that convergence will be overlaid by the unique experiences enshrined in the policy structures and processes of individual states.

Brian Hocking 7

Foreign ministries and the European policy environment The linkage between the European and member state arenas provides one of the distinctive characteristics of EU policy processes, sustaining the image of a complex multilevel policy environment underpinned by intensive and extensive negotiation. The portrayal of the EU in terms of policy networks – despite the ambiguities and imprecisions that surround the term – have become familiar.25 But as Jönsson et al. note, networks are multidimensional phenomena assuming a variety of forms which can only be determined by careful empirical research. One distinguishing feature of what can be termed a ‘diplomatic site’ focusing on an issue and embracing a particular configuration of actors is the degree of governmental involvement. Using Coleman and Perl’s typology, such sites may range from those with a high degree of governmental involvement to private, self-regulatory regimes where interactions between transnational and governmental actors will tend to be relatively sparse and unstructured.26 These variations in the constitution of networks are clearly visible in the context of EU diplomacy. As Keukeleire notes, a focus on the CFSP provides a much more traditional, intergovernmentalist diplomatic environment in which the range of actors is limited and in which foreign ministries play a significant role. This stands in contrast to his depiction of pillar-transcending ‘structural’ diplomacy which has as its core aim the development of structural change in those regions of the world with which the EU has differing forms of relationship and which is ‘centred around quite an extensive agenda of institutionalised dialogue between very diverse actors from the EU and the third states concerned’.27 Notably, the constituent networks on which this dimension of EU diplomacy rests embrace not only a proliferation of governmental actors but a growing range of NGOs and other representatives of civil society. Thus the multifaceted points of contact between member state governments, and between them and the representatives of civil society, has changed significantly the ways in which negotiation is conducted. As with other policy environments, this poses important questions as to management and sequencing in policy processes, where precisely diplomacy occurs and who is engaged in it. A familiar manifestation of this issue in the EU context is the debate over the significance or otherwise of bilateral diplomacy amongst national governments. The notion that bilateralism is redundant is refuted by many observers of the EU and broader European scene including Kohler-Koch who, utilising network governance imagery, argues that the growing significance of core coalitions in the integration process reinforces the need for bilateral diplomacy within the broader multilateral context – that is to say, ‘multiple bilateralism’.28 This does not in itself, of course, mean that national diplomatic systems are unchallenged, for it is obvious that they are, but it does pose more subtle questions regarding processes of

8

Foreign Ministries in the European Union

diplomatic socialisation, whether a European mode of diplomacy is emerging and how that relates to member state diplomacy and the machinery through which it is conducted. Clearly, the complex EU policy environment provides scope for a variety of perspectives on the role of diplomacy and its mechanisms. One of these includes patterns of intra-EU negotiation which, as noted earlier, may be regarded as ‘beyond’ diplomacy with its state-oriented connotations. Thus, for example, Jørgensen cites one observer’s prediction that we are witnessing the end of ‘traditional’ European diplomacy as intra-European diplomacy is replaced by democracy.29 Another perspective rests on the suggestion, noted above, that there is some form of convergence in diplomatic style and practice. This is seen in the working style of the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) and the processes of diplomatic socialisation which have been identified as a key aspect of its operation.30 Apart from this, and the legacy of EPC noted earlier, there are other socialising forces at work amongst the EU member state diplomatic services reinforced by administrative working groups such as the CFSP Committee on Administrative Affairs (COADM). Apart from the latter’s focus on matters of administrative concern to foreign services, it is also concerned with diplomatic training. Yet another perspective is clearly related to the prospect of the development of a putative European foreign policy in the form of the CFSP. Just as the point is often made that this demands a reconsideration of the fundamental characteristics of foreign policy and not simple extrapolations from state-based definitions and criteria, so with diplomacy and its mechanisms. Although we have a reasonable amount of evidence regarding the development of European diplomacy in the field, in the shape of the requirements under the Maastricht Treaty for cooperation and consultation between member state missions and in terms of the role of the Commission Delegations,31 this often rests implicitly on the assumption that a European foreign service would possess characteristics not dissimilar to those of national diplomatic systems. In one sense, of course, this is not surprising. As is frequently observed, the CFSP can be used as a tool of national foreign policy, but it is equally true that the tools of CFSP are largely constituted from the diplomatic resources of member states. Keukeleire suggests that: While declarations of the Council or EU representatives may still be labelled the CFSP’s ‘own’ instruments, most of the other instruments are put at the CFSP’s disposal by member states, or are instigated by member states, in particular by the member state that plays a central operational role in CFSP diplomacy as (temporary) chair of the Council of Ministers.32 But he goes on to make a more telling point. Not only is the image of CFSP too easily cast in terms of an ideal-type of foreign policy, to focus on the

Brian Hocking 9

second pillar may distort our overall perceptions of an emerging European diplomacy. Rather than solely CFSP-focused, an analysis of EU diplomacy should also embrace intra-EU diplomacy and EU ‘structural’ diplomacy referred to above. This suggests that what is most innovative in EU diplomacy may lie outside CFSP and in, for example, the sphere of economic diplomacy with its complex patterns of public and private sector interactions.33 The thrust of this brief analysis directs our attention to two interrelated layers of complexity. On the one side we are confronted by the changing nature of diplomacy as it adapts to shifts in the configuration of both domestic and international environments. A key lesson here is that the idea of ‘traditional’ diplomacy – equated with state-based foreign policy – as a yardstick against which to measure some new mode of ‘European’ diplomacy, is problematic inasmuch as the ‘traditional’ is itself enmeshed in processes of profound change. The second layer of complexity lies in determining the character of what is ‘European’ in this context. The multilayered character of intra- and extra-European diplomacy and its points of intersection, presents us with formidable – if intriguing – analytical tasks. It also suggests a fluid institutional environment in which the roles of national foreign ministries and their networks of international representation are much less clearly defined than some analyses would suggest. This is captured in Hanf and Soetendorp’s identification of the following options for the foreign ministry in a bureaucratic environment marked by a growing diffusion in the management of international and European policy on the one hand, and a concentration into the hands of prime ministerial and presidential offices on the other: ‘To what extent does the foreign office play a role as policy-maker, gatekeeper, respected “honest broker” or simply postmaster?’34 In the next section we explore this issue in terms of two contrasting models: that of the gatekeeper as contrasted to that of the ‘boundary-spanner’.

Gatekeepers and boundary-spanners The notion that foreign ministries and their associated diplomatic networks act as a filter between domestic and international environments sits uneasily with changes in policy processes associated with globalisation and regionalisation. But it seems to possess a surprising degree of vitality. In part, this reflects the fact that there are situations in which the national diplomatic system may indeed act as the primary conduit through which international policy is articulated. More often, however, this is the product of intra-bureaucratic struggles as domestic and international pressures impact on national administrative systems. Peters suggests that the resultant quest for coordination may result in changing claims to the role of ‘central agency’ and it is possible that foreign ministries may assume this role in certain contexts.35 But as the development of the EC/EU illustrates, this is far more likely to be a shared – and contested – honour.

10 Foreign Ministries in the European Union

At the same time, claims to ‘gatekeeper’ status may simply reflect attempts to ward off challenges from other bureaucratic actors. Moreover, it is of questionable historical accuracy on two counts: firstly as suggested earlier, in many national bureaucratic settings, the foreign ministry has simply not been the primary agency in the shaping and implementation of international policy. Second, even in countries with well-developed and influential national diplomatic systems, the management of international policy (and in the case of the EU, intra-European relations) has characteristically involved processes of bureaucratic bargaining in which foreign, finance and trade ministries (amongst others) jostle with presidential and prime ministerial offices for pre-eminence.36 By creating a mythology based on dubious claims to lost pre-eminence in the management of external policy, diplomats may, paradoxically, have provided substance to arguments which see them of decreasing relevance, thereby diminishing the value of the real roles that they perform. As is suggested in Table 1.1, the gatekeeper image rests on a number of linked assumptions, the most fundamental of which is the centrality of the territorial state and the primacy of the control of boundaries and the communication flows that cross them. Associated with this are the frequent claims made for the special qualities to be found in foreign policy, inscribed in its ‘foreignness’, reinforced by its equation with high policy and the pursuit of an identifiable national interest. The assertion of exclusivity in the management of international policy may result in several strategies through which foreign ministries seek to establish control, whilst recognising the need for coordination in the face of a much more diffuse international policy environment. These strategies are most likely to be rooted in the conceptualisation of coordination as a hierarchical, top-down process in which the foreign ministry, aided by the diplomatic network over which it presides, assumes the role of dominant central agency.37 Consequently, it is not simply that this image fails to accord with the essence of the developing EU polity, it has tenuous roots in the historical development of European (and non-European) diplomatic systems. A contrasting image emerges from Ansell and Weber’s identification of actors possessing the capacity to straddle or ‘span’ boundaries.38 The role and importance of these ‘boundary-spanners’ resides in the changing character and significance of boundaries themselves, underpinned by their increasing porosity. However, unlike much globalisation and regionalisation argumentation which suggests that this porosity has rendered boundaries insignificant,39 Ansell and Weber draw a different conclusion. Adopting an ‘open systems’ perspective on sovereignty derived from organisation theory, they suggest that boundaries are fluid and contingent, ‘simultaneously continuous with and demarcated from’, as opposed to being strictly defined by, their environments.40 Rather than fixed and permanent, boundaries reconstitute themselves in response to shifting patterns of interactions. Far from being irrelevant, therefore, they become sites of intense activity as they are

Brian Hocking 11 Table 1.1 Images of diplomatic systems Gatekeeper image

Boundary-spanner image

Setting

State-dominated environment according high salience to territorial boundaries. Assumed priority of ‘high politics’, special qualities of foreign policy and clear identification of national interest.

Complex mixed actor system comprising permeable boundaries and multilayered policy arenas. Boundaries as areas of intense activity. Emphasis on complex, interactive agendas with relatively little issue hierarchy; national interest often hard to identify and/or articulate.

Role

To control domestic–international transactions.

To achieve access and presence; to mediate across porous policy arena boundaries. Facilitative role in management of issue-directed coalitions. Emphasis on shared, cooperative management strategies with public and private sector actors.

Emphasis on exclusive management of external environment. Objectives

Maintaining key role in determining national responses on major areas of international policy.

Assert foreign policy ‘voice’ in diffused international policy management processes.

Strategy

Asserting status inscribed in the ‘specialness’ of foreign policy. Bureaucratic bargaining in response to domestic bureaucratic challenges. Seeking coordinating role defined in hierarchical terms.

Adapting to complexity produced by domestic–international interface. Developing ‘cooperative’ relationships with public and private agencies through policy networks. ‘Coordination’ defined as facilitating information flows and sharing ‘lead’ department status on international issues.

enacted and re-enacted. In such an environment, actors – boundaryspanners – capable of assuming the role of mediators or brokers assume a special significance: ‘They aim at modulating, regulating, and sometimes controlling what kinds of resources, signals, information and ideas pass in and pass out of the semipermeable membranes that are the boundaries of the organization.’41 In doing so they operate both outside and within the organisation, assuming a diversity of forms in both the governmental and non-governmental arenas. Lobbyists, management consultants, think-tanks, epistemic communities: each may discharge such mediating functions.

12 Foreign Ministries in the European Union

This perspective provides an alternative – and, in many policy contexts, more relevant – set of criteria for understanding the role of the foreign ministry in a variety of contexts, including dense diplomatic milieus such as the EU. The continuing need to reconstitute sovereignty, combined with a recognition of the advantages conferred by juxtaposing the qualities inherent in sovereignty-endowed and sovereign-free actors, places a premium on structures able to adapt to environments marked by high levels of uncertainty and ambiguity. As Henrikson argues, it is the very qualities implicit in what he terms the associative nature of diplomacy and diplomatic systems that enable them to perform valuable functions in world politics.42 In this sense, the pattern of relationships between national diplomatic systems has created what he terms one of the ‘constitutive orders’ underpinning the international system, or a public good conferring such benefits as the promotion of international law and precision in international discourse.43 At the same time, as we have seen, changes in the global environment demand that these manifestations of ‘closedness’ (Henrikson underpins his discussion with the imagery of the medieval guild) be balanced with those of openness. If the guild is to respond to the demands of an interdependent or globalising world, then it needs to do what it has done in the past, namely develop strategies for managing change. This it can do, in part, by providing a channel between domestic and international environments in the processes of regime construction, enhancing the transparency of international institutions and, thereby, their legitimacy in the public eye, and assembling and coordinating a range of interests in combating global problems.44 Perhaps most significantly, in a world which is marked by significant levels of cultural conflict, diplomats, through their generic mediative skills are well placed to ‘weave’ understanding out of the conflicts over value and institutions that divide communities.45 Rosenau takes this theme further when suggesting that we are witnessing the emergence of a world constituted by intermingling ‘spheres of authority’ (SOAs) in which people may develop affiliations to a variety of entities alongside the state, none of which can lay claim to be the focus of ultimate loyalty: ‘people will learn to balance diverse and even conflicting commitments in the absence of a terminal state’.46 As they do so, Rosenau sees a crucial role for diplomats who, using their experience and skills, should be well-placed to assist in the creation and legitimisation of new patterns of social contract between individuals and a plethora of SOAs. To repeat the earlier point, what appears to be common to these varying perspectives is the capacity of the national diplomatic system to draw on a combination of generalist and specialist skills and to apply these in boundary-spanning roles. In Table 1.1, we can begin to see some of the dimensions of this alternative viewpoint and their implications for understanding the continuing role of the national diplomatic system. Whereas the gatekeeper image rests on the assumption that its key objectives lie in controlling national boundaries

Brian Hocking 13

and insulating the state from its environments, the boundary-spanner image defines this in terms of mediating within and across spaces represented by the points of interface between the state and its environments. In other words, the logic of boundary control is replaced by a logic determined by an awareness of the limits of control combined with the needs of access to, and presence in, these environments. This, combined with enhanced permeability between domestic and international policy, strengthens the claims of other bureaucratic actors to a voice in international policy and weakens the identity of ‘foreign’ policy as a category in its own right endowed with distinct qualities which, in turn, demand the maintenance of special policy processes. Bureaucratic bargaining rather than the hierarchical model of coordination which, as suggested earlier, is no stranger to the management of the international environment, consequently becomes far more prominent. Coordination, as is clearly demonstrated by the ensuing examination of its significance in the case of the EU, becomes a matter of facilitating information flows and sharing ‘lead’ department status on international issues. Equally, as EU-focused lobbying adopts multiple routes of influence, some within and others outside national channels, the coordination of national policy becomes at once more critical yet more elusive.47 This is hardly surprising given the fact that coordination is an evanescent concept assigned differing emphases by analysts who, it has been argued, tend to be more concerned with its practical manifestations than the concept itself.48 At the most general level, coordination ‘implies that in working together the component parts of a system do not impede, frustrate or negate each others’ activities. Coordination enables the whole to perform better than the sum of the parts or at least to prevent disintegration and fragmentation.’49 But beyond this basic definition lie a variety of differing experiences and strategies, clearly apparent from the country studies in this book. At the ends of the spectrum are to be found modes of positive and negative coordination.50 The former involves the development – or imposition – of a single position on a given issue, an approach likely to bring to the surface bureaucratic and political tensions and conflict. The negative end of the spectrum suggests a much more minimalist definition. This might, as indicated below, simply involve the dissemination of information – admittedly no mean task in a policy environment as complex as the EU. It might also involve coordination by persuasion, achieved as Karvonen and Sundelius suggest, by the dominance of a ‘big idea’ relating to the place of a state in the international system which creates a set of norms governing the behaviour of national actors.51 In the context of the EU, an important ‘big idea’ relates to perspectives on the nature of the Union itself and the place of a member state within it. Where this is seen in foreign rather than ‘extended domestic’ terms, then not only does this have implications for the nature of coordination, but also those departments deemed to be the key element in the coordination processes.52

14 Foreign Ministries in the European Union

Thus, from the perspective of the foreign ministry, coordination has become a central issue in two senses. Firstly, it constitutes a dominating feature of the policy environment in which it operates and presents challenges to which it is forced to adapt. It should be noted, of course, that even in the context of member states, the EU constitutes one part, albeit a highly significant and distinct one, of the challenges presented by increasingly internationalised policy processes. Secondly, the dynamics of coordination and the modes of achieving it offer the possibility of developing strategies for adaptation on the part of foreign ministries – as with other bureaucratic actors.

Conclusion Several points regarding the nature and role of foreign ministries in complex policy milieus have emerged from this discussion. Amongst the more general, but central to an understanding of the issues with which this book is concerned, is the importance of relating the foreign ministry (and the national diplomatic system of which it is a part) to its context. I have argued that there has been a notable tendency to generalise about foreign ministries as actors, to assume that they are locked into a cycle of irreversible decline and that they represent forces of conservatism. A specific manifestation – in the EU context – of such arguments is to be found in the proposition that national administrative systems are treading the path of ‘convergence’ in response to the dictates of Europeanisation. Such views reflect stereotypical thinking, fail to appreciate the distinctive features in the development of national foreign policy systems, and undervalue the innovative and adaptive capacity that such systems are capable of displaying. This is as true of EU member state foreign ministries as it is elsewhere. But the European context adds to the equation the unique demands of responding to enhanced integration. Here, the problems are underscored by the need to adapt to a situation in which the demarcation lines between what is not yet a ‘European domestic policy’ but is neither ‘foreign’ policy, are increasingly blurred. At the centre of this puzzle lies the core issue of policy coordination – a complex one in which policy actors play differing roles depending on the nature of the issues involved as well as the political and bureaucratic cultures in which they are located. This provides the setting within which the foreign ministry is constrained to operate. It is the nature of this setting, and the responses of foreign ministries to it which forms the substance of the following chapters.

Notes 1. G. Berridge, Diplomacy: Theory and Practice (London: Prentice Hall/Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1995) ch. 2; A. James, ‘Diplomacy and international society’, International Relations, 6(6), 1980.

Brian Hocking 15 2. D. Rometsch and W. Wessels, ‘European Union and national insitutions’, in D. Rometsch and W. Wessels (eds), The European Union and Member States: Towards Institutional Fusion? (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996) pp. 330–1. 3. C. Hill and W. Wallace, ‘Introduction: Actors and Actions’, in C. Hill (ed.), The Actors in Europe’s Foreign Policy (London: Routledge, 1996) p. 5. 4. Op. cit., p. 6. 5. S. Duke, ‘Diplomacy without a corps: training for external representation’, DSP Discussion Papers, No. 76 (Leicester: Centre for the Study of Diplomacy, 2001). 6. See Z. Steiner, The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World (London: Times Books, 1982); B. Hocking (ed.), Foreign Ministries: change and adaptation (London: Macmillan – now Palgrave Macmillan, 1999). 7. For discussions on the diplomatic studies literature, see: L. Reychler, Patterns of Diplomatic Thinking: a Cross-national Study of Structural and Social-Psychological Determinants (New York: Praeger, 1979); P. Sharp, ‘For diplomacy: representation and the study of international relations’, International Studies Review, 1(1), 1999; S. Sofer, ‘Old and new diplomacy: a debate revisited’, Review of International Studies, 14(3), 1988; C. Jönsson, ‘Bargaining, negotiation and diplomacy: a research overview’, DSP Discussion Papers, No. 63 (Leicester: Centre for the Study of Diplomacy, 2000); K. E. Jørgensen, ‘Modern European diplomacy: a research agenda’, DSP Discussion Papers, No. 31 (Leicester: Centre for the Study of Diplomacy, 1997); B. Hocking, ‘Catalytic diplomacy: beyond “newness” and “decline” ’, in J. Melissen (ed.), Innovation in Diplomatic Practice (Basingstoke: Macmillan – now Palgrave Macmillan, 1999). 8. For a discussion of this in the context of multilateral diplomacy, see: R. O’Brien et al., Contesting global governance: multilateral economic institutions and global social movements (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). On the relationship between diplomats and NGOs, see: A. F. Cooper and B. Hocking, ‘Governments, non-governmental organizations and the re-calibration of diplomacy’, Global Society, 14(3), 2000. 9. P. B. Evans, H. K. Jacobson and R. D. Putnam (eds), Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics (Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Press, 1993). 10. M. Aspinall and G. Schneider; ‘Same menu, separate tables: the institutionalist turn in political science and the study of European integration’, European Journal of Political Research, 38(1), 2000. 11. K. Hanf and B. Soetendorp (eds), Adapting to European Integration: small states and the European Union (London: Longman, 1998) p. 2. 12. S. Bulmer, ‘Domestic politics and European Community policy making’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 21(4), 1983. 13. J. Richardson, Preface in Y. Mény, P. Muller and J.-L. Quermonne, Adjusting to Europe: the Impact of the European Union on National Institutions and Policies (London: Routledge, 1996). 14. R. Ladrech, ‘Europeanisation of domestic politics and institutions: the case of France’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 32(1), 1994. 15. S. Bulmer and M. Burch, ‘Organizing for Europe: Whitehall, the British State and the European Union’, Public Administration, 76, Winter 1998, pp. 601–28. 16. Ibid., p. 624. 17. Hanf and Soetendorp, p. 7. Their reference is to E. Haas, When Knowledge is Power (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990). 18. I. Manners and R. G. Whitman, The Foreign Policies of European Union Member States (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000) p. 261.

16 Foreign Ministries in the European Union 19. L. Karvonen and B. Sundelius, ‘Interdependence and foreign policy management in Sweden and Finland’, International Studies Quarterly, 34(2), 1990. 20. See B. Hocking, ‘Foreign Ministries: redefining the gatekeeper role’, in Hocking, Foreign Ministries: Change and Adaptation, pp. 2–5. 21. G. Wiseman, ‘ “Polylateralism” and new modes of global dialogue’, DSP Discussion Papers, No. 59 (Leicester: Centre for the Study of Diplomacy, 1999) p. 15. 22. H. Kramer and F. Quendler, ‘The role of diplomacy and foreign ministries in the “new political architecture” of Europe after 1989 – the case of Austria’, Second Pan-European Conference on International Relations, Paris 13–16 September 1995, p. 5. 23. Ibid. 24. See Hanf and Soetendorp on this point: pp. 9–10. 25. See, for example, C. Jönsson et al., ‘Negotiations in networks in the European Union’, International Negotiation, 3(3), 1998, pp. 319–44; F. R. Pfetsch, ‘Negotiating the European Union: a negotiation-network approach’, International Negotiation, 3(3), 1998, pp. 293–317. 26. W. Coleman and A. Perl, ‘Internationalized policy environments and policy network analysis’, Political Studies, 47(4), 1999, pp. 701–7. 27. S. Keukeleire, ‘The European Union as a Diplomatic Actor’, DSP Discussion Papers, No. 71 (Leicester: Centre for the Study of Diplomacy, 2000) p. 25. 28. B. Kohler-Koch, ‘Network governance within and beyond an enlarging EU’; paper presented at the International Political Science Association conference, Quebec City, August 2000. 29. See Jørgensen, ‘Modern European Diplomacy’, op. cit., in which he cites P. Allott, ‘The European Community is not the real European Community’, Yale Law Journal, 24(2), 1990. 30. A. Blair, ‘Permanent Representations to the European Union’, DSP Discussion Papers, No. 68 (Leicester: Centre for the Study of Diplomacy, 2000); J. Lewis, ‘Diplomacy in Europe’s polity: socialization and the EU Permanent Representatives’; paper presented at the International Studies Convention, Chicago, February 2001. For a practitioner’s view, see D. Bostock, ‘Coreper Revisited’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 40(2), June 2002. 31. M. Bruter, ‘Diplomacy without a state: the external delegations of the European Commission’, Journal of European Public Policy, 6(2), 1999; T. Bale, ‘The expectations–capability gap? Studying EU diplomatic co-operation in third countries’; paper presented to the ECSA sixth biennial international conference; Pittsburgh, June 1999. 32. Keukeleire; op. cit., p. 10. 33. See, for example, B. Hocking and M. Smith, Beyond Foreign Economic Policy: the United States, the Single European Market and the Changing World Economy (London: Pinter, 1997). 34. Hanf and Soetendorp, op. cit., p. 9. 35. B. G. Peters, ‘Managing horizontal government: the politics of coordination’, Public Administration, 76(2), 1998, p. 306. 36. I have developed this point in B. Hocking, ‘Foreign ministries: the myth of the gatekeeper’, paper presented at the 38th International Studies Association Convention, Toronto, March 1997. 37. Peters, ‘Managing horizontal government’, op. cit., p. 298. 38. C. K. Ansell and S. Weber, ‘Organizing international politics: sovereignty and open systems’, International Political Science Review, 20(1), 1999, pp. 73–93.

Brian Hocking 17 39. Scholte, for example, regards transboundary activity as the defining quality of globalisation. See: J. A. Scholte, ‘Global capitalism and the state’, International Affairs, 73(2), 1997, p. 431. 40. Ansell and Weber, ibid., p. 77. 41. Ibid., p. 82. 42. A. K. Henrikson, ‘Diplomacy for the 21st century: “re-crafting the old guild” ’, Wilton Park Occasional Paper 1, 1997. 43. Ibid., p. 5. 44. Ibid., pp. 20–30. 45. Ibid., pp. 22–4. 46. J. N. Rosenau, ‘States, sovereignty and diplomacy in the information age’, Virtual Diplomacy Series No. 5 (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, February 2000) pp. 12–13. 47. M. P. C. M. Van Schendelen (ed.), National Public and Private EC Lobbying (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1993) p. 277. 48. Karvonen and Sundelius, p. 82. Amongst the literature on coordination see L. Metcalfe, ‘International policy coordination and public management reform’ International Institute of Administrative Sciences, Second International Conference, Toluca, 27–30 July 1993; D. Spence, ‘The coordination of European policy by member states’, in M. Westlake (ed.), The Council of the European Union (Cartermill, 1995) pp. 353–72; H. Kassim, B. Guy Peters and V. Wright, The National Co-ordination of EU Policy: the Domestic Level (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 49. Metcalfe, p. 7. 50. Kassim, Peters and Wright, p. 14. 51. The example that Karvonen and Sundelius give is of the doctrine of neutrality in the case of Sweden and Finland in the 1980s. Not only did this serve as a significant instrument of coordination but also helped to underpin the position of the foreign ministries in a rapidly changing domestic and international environment. See Karvonen and Sundelius, ch. 4. 52. Kassim, Peters and Wright, op. cit., p. 15.

2 The Evolving Role of Foreign Ministries in the Conduct of European Union Affairs David Spence

As the previous chapter has demonstrated, if the world of diplomacy has changed, the issue of whether the foreign ministry per se is in decline, or is enmeshed in more subtle processes of change and adaptation remains to be determined. But the evidence provided in this book suggests that despite many predicaments and forms of adaptation common to foreign ministries around the world, there are aspects of uniqueness in the European experience. The EU institutional and decision-making structures clearly influence national administrative arrangements. So, the challenge presented to the contributors was to review how two specific EU-related tasks performed by European foreign ministries could lead us to telling conclusions about their current condition. The first is the coordination of European and international aspects of domestic policy, and the second the provision of national input to EU external relations. The term ‘external relations’ covers three areas: traditional ‘first pillar’ areas of trade, development, EU enlargement and technical assistance; ‘second pillar’ policies – the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP); and finally the international aspects of the EU’s justice and home affairs cooperation in the so-called ‘third pillar’.1

Tracking the foreign ministry role in domestic policy arenas There are three integral parts of the machinery of EU policy-making and negotiation. The ‘lead ministries’ are sectoral ministries in charge of specific policy areas. Foreign ministries have a monitoring and coordination role essential to the efficient production and representation of national policy. And the Permanent Representations to the EU play a key role in coordination and policy advocacy in Brussels. In some member states there are additional coordination mechanisms outside the domestic ministerial framework; indeed, there is a markedly increasing role for prime ministers’ offices. The management 18

David Spence 19

of EU business in national systems differs, as the national chapters show. The strength or weakness of the reporting and coordination mechanisms varies with national political and administrative cultures. In particular, they differ according to the importance of the traditional coordinating role of the foreign ministry and the perception of need for a central arbitrator in cases of differences of opinion.2 Lead ministries and their relation to foreign ministries in the first and third EU pillars Lead ministries throughout the EU have acquired such a high degree of freedom in the first and third pillars of EU affairs, that there is fertile ground for testing the hypothesis that European foreign ministries’ gatekeeper role has thereby declined. Across the EU there seems to be little undue interference from foreign ministries in the daily business of negotiating European legislation and policy management. Domestic ministries are in the front line of policy making for European legislation. Like foreign ministries, they enjoy close, cooperative links with their counterparts in other member states.3 And they live in a symbiotic relationship with the European Commission’s directorates-general. As two German academics have put it ‘the interaction and exchanges between national and European institutions have become increasingly intensive and it no longer seems to be justified – except for purely analytical reasons – to differentiate between a “European” level and a “national” level’.4 It follows that coordination in terms of information-flows between ministries is routine, though the degree of efficiency varies from one member state to another. Lead ministries are certainly making international and European policy in their field of competence and there are consequent changes in their own administrative structures. International divisions in domestic ministries, once responsible for all international aspects of the policies within the competence of the ministry, have spawned specialised European coordinating divisions. These are not involved in specific technical negotiations or the implementation of Community legislation. Their function is to coordinate policy principle, as opposed to detail, and to supervise the various European aspects of concern to their ministries. And this is also the case for a whole new area of government concern recently added to the integrated policy framework of first pillar business. Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), cooperation in matters of police, law and order, asylum, immigration, etc. has been a fastgrowing area of European integration since the Schengen acquis was incorporated into the EU after the Amsterdam Treaty. Indeed, timelines were set in the Amsterdam treaty for a merger of this originally intergovernmental area into the first, supranational, pillar of EU business. As their policy sectors become integrated at European level, are domestic ministries therefore making foreign policy? And, if they are, is this to the detriment of the foreign ministry role? Where do foreign ministries fit in?

20 Foreign Ministries in the European Union

They admittedly encroach on the work of the coordination departments in domestic ministries in both first and third pillar areas when it comes to preparing meetings of the Council of Ministers. It is the foreign ministry’s job to ensure that the national input into negotiations is coherently prepared and that due account of other ministries’ priorities is taken. Guidance by foreign ministries is helpful in cases of disagreement between ministries or where the complex implications of a policy decision transcend the responsibility of individual ministries. At the highest level, bargaining and package deals across policy sectors, where the proprietary feelings of a particular ministry may have to be bruised, are par for the course. In the third pillar, as far as the strictly EU-internal issues are concerned, one can observe a similar trend to that in the first pillar, where lead ministries have gained influence and independence of foreign ministries. In the third pillar, where justice ministries and interior ministries responsibilities have only recently begun to be ‘Europeanised’, the initial guidance required of foreign ministries seems to have given way to greater independence. Thus, as one lawyer has commented, ‘the biggest winners are justice ministries, who have carved out separate powers by means of a special committee (the Committee on Civil Law Matters) which need only report to COREPER, not interior ministries. The interior ministries have successfully defended their turf from foreign ministries by ensuring that title IV (first pillar) matters are coordinated by the new SCIFA (the Strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum), not COREPER.’5 However, when it comes to the external dimension of justice and home affairs matters, the foreign ministries swing back into a coordinating role. The Council has itself underlined that ‘the role of COREPER is crucial … since it is the only Committee in a position to assess the overall objectives of the Union’s external policy’,6 and has exhorted member states to take the external aspects of justice and home affairs seriously, arguing that ‘it is advisable that Member States’ diplomatic and consular missions and Commission delegations in third countries should be more aware of Justice and Home Affairs issues and cooperate closely in affirming their external dimension’.7 But the crucial point is that ‘from the evidence, the turf battles that are taking place at national level in all Member States over assuming and/or preserving guidance on the external dimension of internal affairs have now been transferred to Brussels’.8 Despite this, and no matter how diverse the systems of national policy making for EU business, there is a shared recognition of a role for foreign ministries in monitoring, if not supervising, ‘domestic’ policy making. But this role is contested where foreign ministries appear to be defending their own interests, or as it is sometimes supposed, those of ‘foreigners’. Domestic ministries have often to count the costs of the ‘national interest’ (as defined by the foreign ministry) being identified as different from the sectoral interest, as many a bruised national official will testify. There has been

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a consequent growth in centralised coordination departments standing outside the ministerial framework and usually reporting to prime ministers, rather than to foreign ministers. How the seemingly important role of foreign ministries is thereby somewhat undermined by such centralised attempts to take on the coordination and arbitration roles is set out below. First, however, the way in which foreign ministries attempt to perform these roles needs to be clarified. Foreign ministries and coordination EU departments Coordination, of course, remains a prime objective for foreign ministries and effective negotiating results often involve lead ministries leaning on the specific expertise of foreign ministries – the diplomatic skills required for international negotiations, detailed knowledge of how the EU system works and the ability to put national perspectives on policy into European context. That foreign ministries possess such capabilities and that they are clearly the most appropriate coordinators of daily business is generally, though sometimes ruefully, accepted. Foreign ministries therefore provide the formal framework of day-to-day first pillar business. Their European Union Departments monitor the activities of government departments and coordinate between national capitals and Brussels. Management lines usually mirror the two versions of the Committee of Permanent Representatives in Brussels, COREPER I (domestic business – Deputy Permanent Representatives) and COREPER II (external affairs – the Permanent Representatives themselves).9 The European Union departments have three functions in EU domestic policy making: information exchange, consultation and coordination. Routine daily business is essentially a ‘post box’ function involving reception and distribution of material from Brussels, such as Commission reports and proposals, European Parliament Committee reports and motions, reports on meetings, etc. Foreign Ministries are formally the transmission point for material from domestic ministries in national capitals to Permanent Representations, but the widespread use of fax and e-mail has obviously led domestic ministries to take on much of this role in their own policy areas. Diplomats concede this, though their ministries maintain the principle of the ‘gatekeeper’ role. As for coordination of national input into Council Meetings, though lead ministries prepare meetings in which their own minister takes part, each Council is part of a complex pattern of ministerial meetings where trade-offs during negotiations can draw diverse policy areas into package deals.10 The EU departments are doubtless a key part of the process, at least until the role becomes less one of coordination than arbitration, as is further discussed below.

22 Foreign Ministries in the European Union

Bilateral departments EU departments in foreign ministries do not manage bilateral relations with European countries whether EU members or non-members. Likewise, bilateral relations departments are involved to only a limited extent in EU business. As Wallace put it in 1984, already ‘Western European Department in the FCO has neither the staff to monitor the overall flow, nor the standing to intervene’.11 Bilateral relations traditionally fell within the responsibility of Western, Eastern or Southern European Departments, though since most of these third countries are now involved as EU applicant states or part of the tight relations with the EU within the framework of trade and cooperation arrangements, such as the Barcelona process, there is much overlap. Of course, bilateral embassies and bilateral departments in ministries of foreign affairs need to be kept informed of European policy developments. Yet it is clearly impossible, if only for reasons of staffing, for foreign ministries or bilateral embassies to conduct or even monitor closely bilateral relations across the gamut of domestic policy areas now within the EU’s purview. There have been attempts in the UK and Germany to define an enhanced role for bilateral embassies, for example as pre-negotiators within the EU. After all, embassies dealing with issues of domestic relevance within the EU host country are a key source of information on the domestic setting of member states’ European policy making. In general, however, while there is clear recognition of the importance of bilateralism in the EU negotiating framework, this is rarely reflected in a formal redefinition of the role of bilateral desks in foreign ministries or bilateral embassies within the EU, though the recent attempts in at least the UK and Germany to reconsider this may be a pointer to a more general realisation in the future. Despite all this, there is an identifiable increase in operational collaboration on EU matters in bilateral embassies, as evidenced by the weekly meetings of embassy staffs not only in Europe, but also throughout the world. One clear role for foreign ministries and their embassies abroad is the overall principle of coherence in the defence of the EU line.

The Permanent Representations to the European Union Efficient bargaining in Brussels requires a permanent national lobby influencing the Commission’s forward thinking, obtaining early warning of proposals, providing the partners for pre-negotiation and informing and squaring the European Parliament. In performing this role, Permanent Representations are often considered the Brussels extensions of foreign ministries, since the Permanent Representative, if not most of his staff, is customarily a senior diplomat. But this is misleading. Permanent Representations are more sensibly viewed as the extended arm of national capitals in general. Significantly, officials from domestic ministries form the majority of staff in Permanent

David Spence 23

Representations. This was not always the case. The balance has switched from foreign ministry to lead ministry staffing of permanent representations. But if officials responsible for technical issues such as the internal market, agriculture, transport or customs and excise are usually secondees from domestic ministries, the fact that the Permanent Representatives themselves continue to be diplomats, that the embassy structure prevails and that foreign ministries provide an operational role model in Brussels underlines a formal mind-set of European policy making. The question is whether this foreign ministry mind-set is at odds with the nature of European reality. Staffing the permanent representations with domestic ministry staff is evidence of a measure of foreign ministry decline. It is no longer diplomats but others who play the traditional foreign ministry role. Permanent Representations act long before formal notice of new proposals, when they are mere gleams in the Commission’s eye. They act on instruction from domestic ministries, encouraging those proposals that suit national priorities, and attempting to divert the Commission from proposals deemed inimical to their national interest. They make lead ministries’ views known to the Commission and they set out implications for policy of which Commission officials may be unaware or may not have thought through. They mirror the coordinating role of the EU departments in foreign ministries, by providing the main actors in the negotiating and lobbying framework, whether with the Commission, the European Parliament or the other member states in the Council. Admittedly, meetings are highly technical and frequently attended by the appropriate desk officer from lead ministries in national capitals. Ambassadors, the Permanent Representatives themselves, attend the version of the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER II) dealing with external affairs, though not its growing rival in the foreign affairs field, the Political and Security Committee (PSC), which deals specifically with CFSP and ESDP. But the committee also meets as deputy ambassadors (COREPER I), who are always seconded from a key domestic ministry, such as industry or trade. COREPER II remains the coordinator between member states for the General Affairs (foreign affairs) Council and the European Council, the two ministerial foci for EU coordination as well as the ultimate decision-making bodies. It has long been, as the Financial Times once described it ‘an exclusive male club with an accent on classical diplomacy and intimate deal-making, usually over lunch’ adding, with not too great exaggeration, that ‘One of the best-kept secrets in Brussels is that 90% of EU decisions are resolved informally in COREPER before they even reach ministers’.12 The salient point, however, is that apart from the ambassador and those staff dealing with CFSP, and despite their diplomatic status, Permanent Representation staff are not career diplomats and are not part of the line management of foreign ministries, and their colleagues in capitals view them with some circumspection. One Permanent Representative once let

24 Foreign Ministries in the European Union

on, with perhaps tongue-in-cheek, that he is known at home as the ‘traitor’ to, rather than the representative of, the national cause.13 Arbitration By and large, foreign ministries may supervise consultation between domestic ministries on policy issues, but in some member states other ministries claim this role. The German ministry of economics is an obvious case in point. So, there is a diversity of approach to consultation from country to country, and in some the consultation is far from perfect. The absence of well-entrenched procedures for domestic policy coordination between ministries and the propensity of some coalition governments to engender interministerial rivalry certainly make for deleterious effects on their policy making. Lead ministries cannot settle differences with other ministries without some impartial arbitration mechanism. And effective coordination requires a pro-active stance. The coordinator must be the repository of skills and knowledge in European affairs. Ensuring daily consultation, as we saw above, remains a foreign ministry task. But prime ministers’ offices increasingly ensure trouble-shooting and arbitration. The day-to-day coordination provided by foreign ministries and permanent representations is thus merely one part of the coordination function. Ensuring information flows between colleagues with interests in other ministries is essential, but conceptually different from coordination as mediation and conciliation between rival ministerial interests.14 The increasing prominence of the European Union in public policy has led to the creation in most member states of the post of Minister or Secretary of State for European Affairs under the auspices of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Albeit, the nature of the post varies; in some it is more a politicoadministrative post whilst in others it is a ministerial political appointment. The Minister or Secretary of State for European Affairs often plays a specific role in the coordination process in various ways, for example by chairing the specific interdepartmental coordination body where such a body exists.15 Thus, and the following chapters demonstrate this, member states arbitrate between sectoral ministerial interests in a variety of different ways. The French and British systems can be seen as the centralised end of a continuum of European policy coordination, with the decentralised and, at times, uncoordinated German system at the other end. In the UK16 and French17 cases, the Cabinet Office and the SGCI are central coordinators under the direct responsibility of the respective prime ministers. Arbitration is here kept above the interests and objectives of individual ministers and their departments. And overall European strategy is not determined by a ministry with its own interests to defend. Whether the Foreign Office or the Quai d’Orsay could efficiently play the policy mediation role of the Cabinet office and the SGCI is a moot point. After all, other member states do not have

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such overarching coordination mechanisms. In Belgium and Germany, for example, responsibility for coordination and arbitration is shared between the foreign and economics ministries, though it is significant that much of the responsibility for authoritative guidance and mediation is now provided in Germany by the Federal Chancellor’s office (Bundeskanzleramt).18 What does this evidence tell us about the role and significance of the foreign ministry? Significantly, these differing national approaches demonstrate that if foreign ministries still claim to exercise the gatekeeper role, their success in playing this role is far from assured. It may no longer be necessary. This is surely the purpose behind the Anglo-German proposal for streamlining the Council of Ministers and for preparing European Council meetings better through prime ministerial cooperation. As the Financial Times has underlined, the British and German heads of government ‘have more in common than their respective foreign ministries. For example, the foreign ministries have traditionally opposed the idea that a new council of prime ministers’ representatives could take over the work of coordinating sectoral councils.’19 To conclude, it seems true to say that the coordinating role of foreign ministries in the Europeanisation of domestic affairs seems to have gone through two distinct phases. Foreign ministries undoubtedly gained a new role in the first phase where domestic ministries discovered the European (foreign) policy landscape. But, its role in these areas has declined somewhat, by dint of the European workload of domestic ministries and the growth of centralised arbitrators of EU business. The question next to be answered is whether new strength has perhaps been found for foreign ministries through the European Common Foreign and Security Policy. If these reflections on the European implications of domestic policies provide nuance to the view that the foreign ministry has gained in importance through its role in the coordination of first and third pillar business, the issue is whether this may not be the case in the foreign ministries ‘own’ field, foreign policy. This forms the subject of the next part of this chapter.

The growth of CFSP20 The EU is on a fast track to enlargement to 28 members and is already the largest market, aid giver and assistance provider in the world. The trappings of international actorness are thus already in place.21 The need and wish for Europe to be an actor was long recognised by both the outside world and the EU member states themselves, but governments seemingly found it hard to create an institutional response.22 But once EU states had a single trade policy and a single agricultural policy, once they had neared completion of a single market and had their sights firmly set on a single currency, in a word had pooled sovereignty in a whole range of crucial areas, the argument for a European diplomacy to match all this became for many an inevitable next

26 Foreign Ministries in the European Union

step. Indeed, once ‘political cooperation’ had become a common foreign policy, graced by a step-change to European Security and Defence Policy, including regular meetings of EU defence ministers,23 it was foolish to believe that these developments were not changing fundamentally the operational horizons of European diplomats and thereby of foreign ministries themselves. Member states gradually established European Political Cooperation in the 1970s and 1980s and then a Common Foreign and Security Policy in the 1990s, adding the European Security and Defence Policy after 2000. Foreign ministry structures and working methods have perforce adapted to the additional levels of policy making involved. Diplomats with regional or functional responsibilities, whether in capitals or in the field, became obliged to share their traditional prerogative of national foreign policy making and to consult and negotiate with their opposite numbers in member states and the European Commission. The intergovernmental common foreign and security policy working groups were fused with European Community (first pillar) working groups after implementation of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993. Foreign policy makers were, in effect, accepting that the EU’s foreign policy was an amalgam of CFSP and European Community policies. Consequently, many of the tools of foreign policy lay firmly in the first pillar, where the locus of decision-making was decidedly in Brussels and therefore characterised by supranational overtones. Smith argues that the process began with the evolution of European Political Cooperation in the 1970s and 1980s, as the original intergovernmental framework changed (against the wishes of some governments) into an innovative transgovernmental network and thence into a series of rules and procedures leaning heavily on the supranational mechanisms of what later became called the first pillar, despite the seeming attachment to intergovernmentalism.24 One should not exaggerate, of course. The transformed foreign policy mechanisms of the CFSP and the ESDP apply only to those areas where member states are able to identify interests in common or, at the very least, where there is absence of evidence to the contrary. Significantly, this is in the majority of routine foreign policy areas. Where national interests diverge from what is ‘yes-able’ at EU level, they merely agree to keep each other informed of their intentions. There have been many cases of individual member states breaking ranks to pursue their own national priorities. CFSP is thus less a common policy than a set of procedures with which to pursue the objective of systematic cooperation, including ‘joint actions’ to respond to crisis situations, where member states are committed to go beyond declarations and their ‘common positions’ and actually engage in operations. CFSP developed fast, but it clearly did not go far enough to meet the challenges of emerging actorness.25 There was, however, scant willingness to tread the federalist route by transforming CFSP into a European Community based framework with the right of initiative residing in the Commission, qualified majority voting in the Council and a strong European Court of

David Spence 27

Justice to discipline states unable or unwilling to implement decisions.26 Amsterdam, and the subsequent Treaty of Nice of December 2000 retained the principle of intergovernmentalism, with preserved national rights to retain the initiative and not play the common policy game. Qualified majority voting became possible, but it was hedged in with the traditional caveat of national veto.27 Yet the turn of the century witnessed four important innovations, which substantially altered the policy-making environment by moving the locus of decision-making further from national capitals to the Brussels forum. The creation of the post of ‘High Representative of the CFSP’, the establishment of a ‘policy-planning and early-warning unit’ (Policy Unit) under his authority, the addition of a military dimension and the creation of a series of new committees of diplomats began to change the policy environment considerably. Many legitimate doubts have been expressed about the CFSP28 and the ESDP29 and whether they will ever achieve more than symbolic status. One would be foolish to discount the potential flaws in their architecture and results. But the changing role of foreign ministries is coloured by the fact that the procedures of EU foreign policy have been enhanced and ‘Brusselsised’.30 Were foreign ministries boosted in their own traditional domain: foreign policy making, or does Brusselsisation spell decline? Member states have decided that all declarations and démarches under CFSP are no longer made on behalf of the ‘the EU and its member states’ but on behalf of the EU only. Member states have created a ‘Mr CFSP’, and even selected, as first incumbent of that office a senior politician, former foreign minister and secretary general of NATO, Javier Solana. And they have at their disposal since the Helsinki European Council and the Treaty of Nice, a joint foreign policy planning centre and a strengthened system of coordination of external affairs (including military affairs) with new committees and responsibilities in Brussels. And the end is not yet in sight. The essential question is how far what has been attained to date demonstrates enhanced coherence, continuity and visibility of EU policy and how far the ‘community method’ is bowing before the overwhelmingly intergovernmental decision-making mechanisms and methods in all the new arrangements. The implication of the latter would be a clearly enhanced role for foreign ministries. But if foreign policy issues are becoming communitarised, one must assume that the vast amount of extra work created by CFSP represents no more than that: extra work, but not more salience. It may be too early to tell. Suffice it to say that since the Treaty of Nice there has been a new focus of political and administrative effort in Brussels, which has changed the landscape of foreign policy making in Europe. Nice announced the end of the WEU and formalised the new Political and Security Committee (PSC), giving it a crisis management function, by requiring it to ‘exercise political control and strategic direction of crisis management operations’ in addition

28 Foreign Ministries in the European Union

to the already existing obligation to ‘monitor the international situation in the areas covered by the CFSP’ and ‘contribute to the definition of policies by delivering options to the Council’. Nice also introduced ‘enhanced cooperation’ respecting ‘consistency of CFSP’ and ‘between all the Union’s policies and its external activities’. Moves are well under way to produce a Rapid Reaction Force (60,000 operational troops, with a total of 180,000 either in theatre or on standby). The Laeken European Council of December 2001 declared ESDP ‘operational’. There are now also a series of civilian-centred policies in the area of conflict prevention, crisis management, policing, demining, chemical weapons destruction and counter-terrorism. To enforce concrete political measures taken in the second (CFSP) Maastricht pillar, first pillar (EC) treaty articles and methods are often necessary – economic assistance, sanctions and changes in trade policy. The European Commission is ‘fully associated’ with CFSP and vital to external relations in general, largely because the prime tool of EU foreign policy remains the acquis communautaire.31 There remain some ambiguities and contradictions, of course. The obvious need, indeed treaty requirement, to coordinate ‘Community’ and ‘Union’ areas of policy making suggests that foreign ministries are developing an enhanced role.32 Yet, is the newly announced intention to act purposefully together, not just, to quote Commissioner Patten ‘to cluck over the state of the world’33 simply ambition, or reality? The continuing complexity of EU foreign policy-making methods, despite the seeming progress, means the issue is far from settled. One side of the argument goes as follows: the European Community has reached the end of its road to supranationalism. States faced with the prospect of relinquishing sovereignty in such core areas as security and defence policy will always opt to retain it. In security and defence policy they thus opt for the intergovernmental as opposed to the Community method. Further cooperation within Europe will/should thus not be ‘integration’, as we have come to know it, but direct cooperation between governments, and an overriding concern is for the foreign and security policy fields to remain firmly rooted within NATO. This would anchor the role of national foreign ministries. Commission President Prodi advocates an alternative view. The intergovernmental model, he has argued, will turn the Community into an international talking shop, incapable of producing a real pooling of sovereignty around the common interest, or it will deceive the people by constantly creating new bodies, which are exempt from any form of democratic scrutiny – a real government of bureaucrats. Prodi is not alone. A UK think-tank paper on the issue echoes his thoughts: In the long run, a single person should replace the High Representative for foreign policy and the EU Commissioner for external relations.

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This individual would be appointed by the heads of government and report to the EU foreign and defence ministers. But he or she would also serve as a member of the Commission. This new High Representative would help to bring together the intergovernmental and ‘Community’ sides of EU foreign and defence policy, and represent the Union to the rest of the world.34 Conjecture perhaps, but the issue is important for the core purpose of this book, for it firmly impacts on the role and work of foreign ministries. If the prime policy focus is in Brussels and its ‘high representative’ operates from there, commands staff there, and if he had at his disposal the Commission delegations, he would be a power to reckon with – both for the EU’s international partners and for EU foreign ministries. But the appointment of Solana and the development of his role were replete with symbolism rather than pragmatism. After all, the Commission retained control of the purse strings and the delegations in 128 countries and international organisations. And it is also true that the job of the High Representative (HR) was so circumscribed by member state prerogative that it is clear that the final shape of the post is likely to depend on Solana’s personal success, not a far from consensual political will of member states. The treaty itself guaranteed the incumbent of the HR post no special tasks, rights and duties apart from ‘assisting the Presidency’. Significantly, also, there was even no special treaty article assigned to the HR, and his role was explicitly limited to this ‘assistance’ rather than to initiative taking. There was clearly no consensus on more. Despite considerable debate before Solana was appointed on whether the HR should be a senior administrator or a politician, there was no doubt that a ‘Mr CFSP’ was needed. And there is now no doubt that a new locus of foreign-policy making has been created. The profound effect this must have on foreign ministries has not yet been fully assessed. There may be a welter of theoretical, almost theological, debates on the division of responsibilities between the Commission and the Policy Unit, between the High Representative and the External Relations Commissioner and between the Presidency and the High Representative, but these are Brussels-based debates. Few voices are raised to doubt the efficacy of the shift of policy focus from national capitals to Brussels. Does this mean a decline in the foreign ministry role or a strengthening concomitant with the expansion of the policy agenda? The further layer of coordination brought about by CFSP to ensure that deliberations and decisions in the CFSP framework reached the General Affairs Council (i.e. the foreign ministers) having transited through a ‘single institutional structure’ began the shift in focus from capitals to Brussels and gradually enhanced the role of foreign ministries. In European Community (first pillar) affairs COREPER is the coordinating body and negotiating instance of last resort before foreign ministers and heads of state or government meet.

30 Foreign Ministries in the European Union

So, in practice, Council working groups, the Political Committee (political directors) and then COREPER handled CFSP business, with COREPER standing hierarchically above them. Coordination and preparation for Foreign Ministers’ meetings and reconciling the aims of CFSP and the means of the first pillar was the role of COREPER. The institutional roots in the first pillar were clear. Political directors may have remained capital-based and enjoyed a closer daily relationship with foreign ministers, underlining the maintenance of national foreign ministry focus in capitals. But the reality was that their views and decisions were subject to review by the Permanent Representatives meeting in the Brussels-based COREPER. One former Permanent Representative commented on the reluctance of diplomats in the political committee to accept these implications: You cannot separate external economic and trade relations from external political relations. They are closely linked and since the Union is largely a civil power, its main element of pressure frequently is financial aid, economic concessions and trade concessions. These are political instruments which need to be managed in a coordinated way and sometimes coordination between the political committee and COREPER is less than one might wish.35 Here, therefore, was a debate, which only this one ambassador was willing to bring into the public forum. The implication was that coordinating European foreign policy not through political directors but through COREPER implied a shift of focus from national capitals to Brussels. Perhaps, though this was generally denied, it was the beginning of a shift from intergovernmentalism to the ‘Community method’. Shifting the policy focus to Brussels: the contours of the CFSP system New administrative roles have followed the shift in policy focus to Brussels. Central to the preparation of the CFSP and now the ESDP is the network of ‘European Correspondents’, based in national capitals and the Commission, and the CFSP or RELEX Counsellors. The European correspondents form the administrative interface between foreign ministries, the Council Secretariat and the appropriate Directorates General in the European Commission. They are responsible for the COREU cipher network, which exchanges in excess of 25,000 communications per year. The CFSP Counsellors working group, attended by officials based in the Permanent Representations in Brussels (and the Commission) supervise the legal and operational elements of the CFSP. The CFSP counsellors and the political committee initially remained subordinate to COREPER, itself of course Brussels-based. But further transfer of decision making was yet to come. The Political and Security Committee (PSC) is now the lynchpin of the CFSP and the ESDP. It replaced, as Commissioner Chris Patten has put it,

David Spence 31

‘the old floating crap game’36 of the Political Committee with its capitalsbased political directors, cut off from the hurly burly of Brussels business and the Community sphere. The PSC is composed of national representatives at senior ambassador level based in member states’ Permanent Representations. It meets at least twice a week and works in close cooperation with the Secretary General/High Representative and the Policy Unit. It is regularly addressed by key international figures and maintains a formalised relationship with the Russian ambassador to the EU, who enjoys regular monthly meetings unlike the troika meetings of the PSC with a host of countries on a less frequent basis. The task of the PSC is to prepare the emerging ESDP and to deal with CFSP affairs on a day-to-day basis, including the preparation of General Affairs Councils. In the event of a crisis, the PSC is the Council body responsible for a EU response. Such is the workload, that the PSC is already becoming overburdened. This is understandable. Over the two years of its existence it has taken a series of committees under its wing. Not only do the regional based working groups on Asian, Middle-Eastern, African or Mediterranean affairs find themselves under scrutiny by the PSC. Committees on consular issues (fed by developments in the third pillar), on administration of embassies abroad, on UN matters, on counter-terrorism, disarmament, non-proliferation and a multitude of other foreign policy issues also form part of the policy process before the PSC meets. Moreover, a series of new, key committees have emerged as feeder committees to the PSC. The Military Committee, for example, is composed of the Chiefs of Defence represented by their two-to-four star military representatives and responsible for providing the PSC with military advice and recommendations, but also mandated to give advice on their own initiative. It manages all military activities within the EU framework, including the permanent European Union Military Staff, which provides military expertise and support to the CESDP, including the potential conduct of EU-led military crisis management operations. The Military Staff provide early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning for Petersberg tasks37 including identification of European national and multinational forces. They implement policies and decisions as directed by the EUMC. There is an obvious need to evaluate civil–military issues in crisis management, where the Commission and NGOs acting on its behalf might require military assistance. Thus, a further Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management gives priority to implementing targets for policing, strengthening the rule of law and related tasks. This involves meetings with the United Nations, the OSCE and the Council of Europe with a view to identifying areas and principles for cooperation and the avoidance of overlap. As the CFSP agenda and the competence of the PSC have expanded, there have been profound implications for the machinery of policy making and the structure and function of foreign ministries. CFSP and ESDP have

32 Foreign Ministries in the European Union

engendered a new series of meetings for foreign ministry officials in Council working groups and an obligation to cover all foreign policy issues arising. For the larger member states, this has not implied an enormous leap in the geographical and functional spread of foreign policy. But smaller states now need to cover areas where there was previously no identifiable national concern and where there was often no embassy structure to assist in information gathering and policy formation. For them there was more, more policy, more of a role in world affairs, and hence more role for their foreign ministries. The contradiction was that financial pressures emerged during the 1980s and 1990s, and EU foreign ministries embarked on the administrative reform each of the chapters in this book describes and analyses. This pressure for reducing the costs of the administration of foreign policy arose precisely at the time of the creation of several new states within the larger Europe, an increased diversification of foreign policy actors (particularly the inexorable rise of NGOs), and the emergence of the new policy commitments outlined above. The need for cuts thus arose at a time of a seeming need for foreign ministry expansion. The increased pressure on the foreign policy making process is manifest. How has it affected the diplomatic function? Integrating diplomats As the previous chapter suggests, diplomats in the EU are part of the process of integration in two senses. They are ‘being integrated’ and they are catalysts in the integration process. The experts that make up the EU diplomatic community now possess institutional positions and track records, which contribute importantly to how their recommendations are valued by the outside world. National diplomats involved in EU business are authoritative figures in their national foreign ministries, and their expertise on general European matters is widely recognised. As with the Arabists of the UK Foreign Office in former years, they are thus not just any random group of diplomats or experts. They are carefully selected, authoritative and credible actors, both in the domestic and the European arena. They are selected precisely because they will be good at creating a CFSP ‘leading, in time, to a common defence’, and they are thus the lynchpins of this blueprint. The production of CFSP and ESDP from Maastricht, through Amsterdam, the 2000 IGC and the Nice treaty has become their own ‘common policy enterprise’. At a rhetorical level, they say they believe that foreign policy remains the preserve of the nation-state, and that European coordination of foreign policy is beneficial to the EU so long as its development is based on identifiable national interests. But, privately, many admit to the belief that Europe will one day end up with a European diplomatic service, defending not national but European interests, which would then, by definition, amount to the same thing. To a degree, national diplomats dealing with CFSP and ESDP have thus created their own blueprint for diplomatic integration.

David Spence 33

They are arguably members of an epistemic community who use both the advantages of their objective expertise and their institutional position to influence the process of European decision making and thereby foreign ministries themselves. EU diplomats have come to share the reflex of a European response to foreign policy dilemmas. They have created a set of ever-tighter obligations to consult and coordinate as part of the sine qua non of a new setting for foreignpolicy making. EU diplomats have been ready to recommend expansive treaty changes producing clear constraints on national diplomatic practice, so long as careful wording allowed autonomy in cases of vital national interests. True, the de facto dominance of two member states, France and the UK, both former colonial powers with worldwide interests and cultural influence, both nuclear powers, and both permanent members of the UN Security Council, might be seen as inimical to the view that there is a specific European interest into which such national policies should be integrated for the benefit of all EU members. Yet, it is precisely these two countries, which, with the St Malo initiative, engendered ESDP. The lesson is clear. It is not only the smaller countries that need CFSP and ESDP to enhance their national impact, but the larger countries also need CFSP and ESDP – for precisely the same purpose.

Conclusion The long-term influence of all these factors on foreign ministries may be mooted, but not asserted. Politicians and diplomats opted in all the intergovernmental conferences for more and more Brusselsisation, yet simultaneously for a hybrid between federalism and intergovernmentalism. They appointed a titular head of foreign policy in Brussels, presiding over a new foreign policy. They created an intergovernmental (second pillar) decisionmaking process with distinctly supranational overtones, including a measure of qualified majority voting, a shared institutional arrangement with the EC, an operational budget within the EC framework implying enhanced relations with the Commission and the European Parliament as the ‘budgetary authority’, and a set of external policies in existence in the Community which they belatedly found was integral to what the outside world expected of European foreign policy and thus of CFSP. Increasingly, it is clear, however, that national foreign ministries, embassies and diplomats are no longer (if ever they were) the sole or even the most appropriate defenders of national interests abroad. There may be some differences in nuance depending on whether one is considering small or medium states in the EU, and there may be a difference of appreciation depending on the issue area involved. But, by and large, developments in both the Community, first pillar, policy area and the CFSP since Maastricht have shifted the balance between the national and the EU setting of foreign policy from national capitals to Brussels. Pressures for national governments

34 Foreign Ministries in the European Union

and foreign ministries to adapt to the changed policy environment are likely to increase. So the pressure to ‘go it with others’ and the emergence of a European response reflex may well come to outweigh the embedded psychology of national as opposed to European interest. This is all the more likely in that the need for a coherent European security policy, both internal or external, was highlighted by the events of 11 September 2001 and the consequent realisation of the operational implications of what was clearly a cross-pillar issue. The EU faces the challenge of delivering on its promises of full engagement in the struggle against terrorism, at home and abroad, and of ensuring that all its national, intergovernmental and community policies deliver the goods promised in the declarations of its leaders and the conclusions of successive European Councils. The emerging European foreign policy is likely to continue to be the product of consultation, negotiation and bargaining between national diplomats, defending national interests, but there can be no doubt that the locus, focus and public diplomacy of this emerging policy will be in Brussels and not in national foreign ministries. Two questions remain: to what extent will foreign ministries remain key players in this developing policy milieu, and are they able to further adapt to a process of integration whose end-state is often promised but never defined?

Notes 1. The Maastricht Treaty introduced the three-pillar system in 1993. The first, European Community, pillar is based on ‘the community method’, where the Commission has the sole right of legislative initiative and where the Council of Ministers decides, largely, by qualified majority in a process of co-decision with the European Parliament. The second pillar covers the intergovernmental Common Foreign and Security policy, in which the European Commission is fully associated, but where decisions of principle are taken unanimously, though the possibility of qualified majority voting exists, in theory, for operational matters. The third, justice and home affairs pillar is also intergovernmental, but many of the subject areas are set to be folded into the European Community pillar in the coming years. See J. W. de Zwaan and M. Vrouenraets, ‘The Future of the Third Pillar: an evaluation of the Treaty of Amsterdam’ in T. Heukels, N. Blokker and M. Brus (eds) The European Union after Amsterdam (Kluwer, 1998). 2. See D. Spence ‘The Coordination of National Policy-Making’ in M. Westlake The Council of Ministers (Cartermill, 1998) and 2nd edition (Harper) forthcoming. 3. W. Wallace, Britain’s Bilateral Links Within Western Europe (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs/Routledge, 1984). 4. D. Rometsch and W. Wessels (eds) The European Union and Member States; towards institutional fusion? (Manchester University Press, 1996) p. XIII. 5. S. Peers, ‘Justice and Home Affairs: decision-making after Amsterdam’, European Law Review, 25(2) 2000, April pp. 190–1. 6. Council of the European Union, ‘European priorities and Policy Objectives for External Relations in the Field of Justice and Home Affairs’, doc 7653/00 JAI 35, Brussels, 6 June 2000. 7. Ibid., p. 11.

David Spence 35 8. F. Pastore ‘Reconciling the Prince’s Two “Arms”: Internal–external security policy coordination in the European Union’, Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union September 2001. 9. The Political and Security Committee was instituted and confirmed by European Councils following signature of the Amsterdam Treaty and deals specifically with CFSP/ESDP matters. 10. See D. Spence ‘Negotiation, Coalitions and the Resolution of Inter-state Conflicts’ in Westlake op. cit. 11. W. Wallace see note 3. 12. See L. Barber, ‘The Men Who Run Europe’, Financial Times 11/12 March 1995. 13. Ibid. The German Permanent Representative was using play on words in the German, describing himself as the ‘Verräter’ (traitor) rather than ‘Vertreter’ (representative). 14. See Spence, ‘The coordination of EU policy’ in Westlake, op. cit. 15. See Report from the Secretary-General/High representative to the European Council ‘Preparing the Council for Enlargement’ Brussels, 7 June 2001. 16. See Spence, ‘The Role of the National Civil Service in European lobbying: the British case’ in Mazey and Richardson, op. cit. 17. See, in particular, C. Lequesne, Paris-Bruxelles: Comment se fait la Politique européenne de la France (Paris: Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1993). 18. See L. Metcalfe, ‘Comparing Policy Coordination Systems: Do the Differences Matter?’ unpublished paper to the Fifth Erenstein Colloquium 30–31 October 1987 and L. Metcalfe and E. Zapico Goni, Action or Reaction? The role of national administration in European policy-making (London: Sage, 1991). A recent official adumbration of the same line can be found in Report from the Secretary-General/ High representative, op. cit. 19. H. Grabbe and W. Munchau ‘Europe’s New partnership: the relationship between Britain and Germany could reshape the EU’s Future’ in Financial Times 13 February 2002. 20. For a good overview of the origins of CFSP and the problematic issues, see F. Cameron, European Foreign and Security Policy – Past, Present and Future (Sheffield Academic Press, 1999). 21. The term ‘actorness’ is usually attributed to G. Sjöstedt, as outlined in his The External Role of the European Community (Farnborough: Saxon House, 1977). For a development of his ideas see ‘Actors and Actorness: locating the European Union’ in C. Bretherton and J. Vogler, The European Union as a Global Actor (Routledge, 1999) pp. 15–45. On the political attitudes of member states, see C. Hill (ed.) The Actors in Europe’s Foreign Policy (Routledge, 1996). 22. S. Nuttall, European Political Cooperation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992). 23. Albeit ‘informally’ or accompanying Foreign ministers at their formal meetings, and thus not formally as a ‘Council of Defence Ministers’. 24. See M. E. Smith ‘Rules, Transgovernmentalism, and the Expansion of European Political Cooperation’ in W. Sandholtz and A. S. Sweet (eds) European Integration and Supranational Governance (OUP, 1998) p. 304. 25. S. Hoffman, ‘Towards a Common European Foreign and Security Policy?’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 38(2), 2000, pp. 189–98. 26. For a recent sceptical view of the issues involved see Jens-Peter Bonde ‘The Convention – on the futures of Europe’ on euobserver.com 2 March 2002. 27. For a discussion of the shortcomings of the CFSP see A. Spence and D. Spence ‘The Common Foreign and Security Policy from Maastricht to Amsterdam’ in K. Eliasen (ed.) Foreign and Security Policy in the European Union (Sage, 1998).

36 Foreign Ministries in the European Union 28. Ibid. 29. See G. Andréani, C. Bertram and C. Grant, Europe’s Military Revolution (London: Centre for European Reform, 2001). 30. David Allen, ‘Who Speaks for Europe?: The Search for an Effective and Coherent External Policy’ in J. Peterson and H. Sjursen (eds) A Common Foreign Policy for Europe? Competing Visions of the CFSP (Routledge, 1998) pp. 41–58. 31. The French acquis communautaire is accepted usage for the accumulated legislation and political practice of the EU member states. 32. The Treaty on European Union mentions in various places the obligation to coordinate policy. For example, Article J.2 obliges member states to ensure their action in international organisations. Art. J.6 covers cooperation between diplomatic and consular missions. Art. C requires consistency in external relations, security, economic and development policies. Art. 228a links economic sanctions to a prior CFSP decision. 33. C. Patten, Speech to the Institute for European Studies, Dublin, Brian Lenihan Memorial Lecture, 7 March 2001. 34. Recommendation contained in a list of general CFSP/ESDP recommendations in G. Andréani, C. Bertram and C. Grant, Europe’s Military Revolution (London: Centre for European Reform, 2001). 35. P. de Schoutheete, interviewed in European Voice, 4–10 December 1997. 36. C. Patten, op. cit. 37. The ‘Petersberg Tasks’ are humanitarian tasks of a military nature.

3 Austria Hanspeter Neuhold*

The historical background In order to see Austria’s membership in the EU and its consequences for the Austrian Bundesministerium für auswärtige Angelegenheiten (BMaA – Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs) in a proper perspective, it should be borne in mind that the country’s admission to the Union in 1995 marked the fourth fundamental change in Austria’s international status in the course of the twentieth century.1 The German-speaking core of a multinational great power became a small country of precarious economic and political viability after the First World War, the ‘state that nobody wanted’, or as Clemenceau put it, ‘Austria was what remained’. In 1938, Austria disappeared from the map as a result of the ‘Anschluss’, to re-emerge again in 1945 under Allied control. By contrast, Austria’s history, after regaining its full sovereignty under the State Treaty and after adopting permanent neutrality in 1955 may be termed a political and economic success story – that is why many Austrians are still reluctant to abandon neutrality. When joining the EU 40 years later, Austria turned yet another page in its eventful history. Arguably, a new chapter will be opened if and when Austria accedes to a military alliance – be it NATO, the rump WEU, or when all member states, including Austria, agree to the inclusion of a mutual defence obligation in the EU Treaty – thereby terminating what is left of Austria’s neutral status. Austrian diplomacy has a long and rather distinguished tradition, although it is marked by discontinuity.2 The assignment of foreign affairs to a single institution can be traced back to the early eighteenth century.

* The author is greatly indebted to many members of the Austrian diplomatic service, both at the Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Vienna and at representations abroad, for information and comments; without them, this paper could not have been written. An earlier version of this chapter was published as: Hanspeter Neuhold, EU Membership and the Austrian Foreign Ministry (Vienna: Occasional Papers of the Diplomatische Akademie Wien, No. 2/1998). 37

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Previously, different foreign policies were determined by often divergent dynastic, imperial and other political interests. These policies were conducted by different ministers and implemented by their respective chancelleries. At the time, no distinction was made between domestic and international matters. Gradually, however, responsibility for foreign relations came to rest with a single person, the State Chancellor (Staatskanzler), and a single institution, the State Chancellery (Staatskanzlei) which formed part of the Court Chancellery (Hofkanzlei). When Johann Christoph Bartenstein took over the Staatskanzlei in 1726, he found six officials working there.3 By 1742, the process of administrative centralisation of the Habsburg Monarchy’s foreign policy was completed. Most of the credit for the modernisation of the monarchy’s foreign service must be given to Count Kaunitz. He introduced a division of labour mainly along geographical lines by setting up three departments – one for Italy, one for the Netherlands and a general department. Kaunitz also increased the staff of the Staatskanzlei, which he mainly recruited not from the high aristocracy but from civil servant families. Queen Maria Theresa followed a suggestion submitted by Kaunitz and founded the Orientalische Akademie in 1754, which developed into the major training centre for members of the consular and diplomatic service of the Habsburg monarchy. (Re-organised and renamed k. u. k. Konsularakademie in 1898,4 it became the Konsularakademie between the two world wars and was reopened as Diplomatische Akademie in 1964.) The Staatskanzlei became the most important ministry by the end of the eighteenth century. Thanks to the political influence of personalities like Kaunitz and Count Metternich, the Staatskanzlei became even more important during the following decades. Metternich, who not only dominated Austrian foreign policy but also European affairs during the first half of the nineteenth century, reorganised the foreign service in order to make it a more effective instrument of his diplomacy. Within the framework of the Ausgleich (‘Compromise’) with Hungary in 1867, which transformed the Austrian Empire into the AustroHungarian (Dual) Monarchy, foreign policy, together with military affairs and the financial aspects of war, became so-called Pragmatic Matters, each of which was administered by a single ‘k.u.k’ (kaiserlich und königlich – imperial and royal) minister appointed by the Emperor. After the First World War, the Federal Chancellery was at first also in charge of the new Republic’s foreign affairs. The same solution was again adopted at the end of the Second World War for the Second Republic. The Federal Chancellor, who was also responsible for the country’s foreign policy, entrusted its actual conduct to another person who held the title of Foreign Minister.5 By the end of 1945, Austria had only one diplomatic representation abroad – the Amt des Bevollmächtigten (the ‘Office of the Plenipotentiary’) in Prague.6 A diplomatic service had to be built up from scratch. In 1946,

Hanspeter Neuhold 39

Politische Vertretungen (‘Political Representations’) were opened in the capitals of the four victorious Allied Powers: Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union and the USA, whose troops had occupied the country the year before. By the end of 1955, the network of diplomatic and consular representations had grown to 56. However, it was not before 1959 that a separate Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs was established on the Ballhausplatz in a Baroque palace which also houses the Federal Chancellery. For the first ten years after 1945, Austrian foreign policy focused on the State Treaty with the Big Four, which was to bring about the withdrawal of the occupation forces and to restore the country’s full independence. After 1955, Austria tried to quickly establish itself as a ‘normal’ actor in international politics. This was facilitated by its admission to the United Nations as early as 1955 and to the Council of Europe in 1956. Under Chancellor Bruno Kreisky, who headed the Austrian government from 1970 to 1983, permanently neutral Austria played a role in world affairs that exceeded its material potential as a small state. Kreisky conceived Austria’s active foreign and neutrality policy in global terms and conducted a successful Ostpolitik as well as an active policy vis-à-vis the Third World. In particular, Kreisky’s name is associated with efforts to contribute to a peaceful settlement of the conflict in the Middle East. His successors emphasised the European dimension of Austrian foreign policy. Austria was the first of five EFTA members to apply for admission to the European Communities on 17 July 1989. The ‘long march to Brussels’ offered Austrians a first-hand experience of the intricacies of EC decisionmaking.7 After all the obstacles on the EC/EU side had been surmounted (including the Ioannina compromise on qualified majority voting in the Council) and two-thirds of the Austrian voters who took part in the referendum had declared themselves in favour of EU membership, Austria entered the Union on 1 January 1995. Although Austria maintained its permanent neutrality, this was another turning point, as Austria tried to define its place in the new Europe that was taking shape after the fall of the communist regimes in the eastern half of the continent and the resulting end of the East–West conflict. Reluctance to abandon permanent neutrality has so far prevented Austria from completing its integration into Euro-Atlantic organisations by joining NATO and the WEU.8 As opinion polls have shown, popular support for neutrality is still strong and is echoed by the social democrats (Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs – SPÖ) and the Greens, the two opposition parties in the Austrian parliament after the formation of the present coalition government by the Christian democrats (Österreichische Volkspartei – ÖVP) and the Freedom Party (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs – FPÖ) in February 2000. However, despite the magnitude of the changes brought about by admission to the EU, the legal and organisational framework of Austrian foreign policy has remained essentially the same.

40 Foreign Ministries in the European Union

Reform in the Austrian Foreign Ministry Recent developments in the international system pose major challenges to the traditional foreign policy of states, their foreign ministries and the ‘job description’ of their diplomats. The BMaA has not ignored those challenges. At the beginning of the 1990s, it launched three initiatives to prepare the ground for possible adaptations and reforms. Firstly, a consulting firm was asked to analyse the ministry’s possibilities for rationalisation and to make proposals for improving bureaucratic efficiency. Secondly, a sociologist and a psychoanalyst were requested in 1991/92 to undertake an in-depth study of the working conditions of the BMaA’s employees and of the organisation of the ministry as seen by the individuals concerned.9 The answers to a detailed questionnaire and extensive interviews revealed considerable frustration. The highest degree of dissatisfaction was caused by the low level of salaries and weaknesses in the organisation and senior management of the BMaA. By contrast, the ministry’s staff was particularly content with the cooperation between colleagues and their immediate superiors – evidence that a strong corporate identity and an esprit de corps prevailed within Austria’s foreign service. A majority also complained about the lack of objectivity and transparency with respect to promotions. In spite of widespread criticism of other aspects of their work environment, most staff members would nevertheless enter the foreign ministry again if they had to choose a career. Thirdly, this author was invited to write a paper on the consequences of the above-mentioned challenges for the BMaA in 1992.10 After describing those trends, he concluded that the ministry needed additional resources in order to adequately fulfil all the new tasks and to entertain satisfactory relations with all important partners. A comparison of relevant data on a dozen other countries – EU members as well as Finland, Sweden and Switzerland – revealed Austria’s weakness in terms of staff size, budget and number of representations abroad. Alarmingly, Austria came last when the respective budget shares allocated to the foreign ministries in 1992 were compared! The author submitted a number of other proposals concerning ‘selective specialisation’ by regularly updating the expertise of the BMaA’s staff through refresher courses, systematic debriefing before taking up a new assignment and closer cooperation with the scientific community. Modernisation of the ministry’s infrastructure and rationalisation were also suggested. Reforms at the BMaA have so far been conceived as a continuous process instead of a sweeping change at a given point in time. Responses to concrete challenges have been adopted frequently. Recently, decision-making in various areas has been decentralised. Computerisation has been a major innovation. These two measures ought in turn to result in changing attitudes among the officials with respect to assuming personal responsibility and using new technologies. However, despite the qualitative jump of EU membership, the basic structure of the ministry is still considered satisfactory. Proposals for

Hanspeter Neuhold 41

far-reaching transformations in the past, such as the introduction of the desk system, were eventually not implemented. One major reason given was budgetary and personnel limits that could not be exceeded. The question remains whether the potential for rationalisation and decentralisation has been exhausted.11

The legal framework of Austrian foreign policy Under the Austrian Constitution, external relations, which include political and economic representation abroad, and in particular the conclusion of international treaties, form part of the federal legislative and executive competences (Art. 10 para. 1[2] of the 1929 Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz (B-VG) Federal-Constitutional Law or Act).12 However, the BMaA by no means holds a monopoly on the conduct of Austria’s foreign affairs. This clearly results from the Bundesministeriengesetz (Federal Ministries Act) of 198613 on the distribution of competences among the 12 Federal Ministries (including the Federal Chancellery). The Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs is given the general competence to deal with external affairs to the extent they do not fall within the competence of another Federal Ministry. To illustrate, the BMaA’s list of tasks includes matters of international law, the representation of the Republic of Austria vis-à-vis other states and other subjects of international law, including international organisations, as well as matters of economic integration, external cultural relations and development aid. At the same time, other ministries are, to varying degrees, in charge of the international aspects of their domestic competences. For example, the finance ministry is authorised to negotiate loans with the World Bank or other subjects of international law; the interior ministry deals with such matters as migration, inquiries into border incidents and refugees; the ministry for economic affairs and labour shares with the BMaA competences in the area of economic cooperation and integration. In addition, the Federal Chancellery handles, inter alia, the coordination of structural and regional policies including the EU funds in these fields, as well as the coordination of Austria’s comprehensive national defence. However, the actual political weight of the BMaA is not only determined by the distribution of legal competences among the various ministries. Its strength also depends on the professional qualifications and the political clout of the person at its helm, and also on those of the person at the head of the Federal Chancellery. For example, if the head of government and chairman of the ruling party happens to be a former diplomat and foreign minister with a continuing keen interest in world politics like Bruno Kreisky from 1970 to 1983, he is bound to exert a particularly strong influence on the course steered by Austria in international affairs. The political scales were even more tilted at that time in the chancellor’s favour because the foreign office was headed by a career diplomat or another civil servant without

42 Foreign Ministries in the European Union

a power base in the governing party. By contrast, if the post of foreign minister is held – as in the case of the ‘grand coalition’ government between the social and the Christian democrats in power until 2000, when ÖVP chairman Wolfgang Schüssel held these two positions – by the party chairman of the junior coalition partner, who is also vice-chancellor at the same time, the balance is redressed. The problem for a foreign minister with other important assignments is the amount of time and attention he/she may be able to devote to the foreign policy portfolio. This dilemma can be considerably alleviated by the appointment of a state secretary.14 Mention should also be made in this context of a number of foreign policy functions which are entrusted to the Federal President. They range from the external representation of the Republic of Austria to the conclusion of international treaties.15 In practice, however, the president’s political power is rather limited. The Austrian parliament has to approve of the most important categories of treaties before the president may ratify them. Parliament also possesses various instruments of political control, including the right to address written or oral questions to the whole government or individual ministers and to adopt resolutions. However, in political reality, the legislative branch is relegated to a rather subordinate role in foreign policy decision-making as long as the governing party or parties hold the majority of seats which is required to enact legislation. Nevertheless, the Austrian parliament has been paying increasing attention to foreign policy issues. An institution worth mentioning in connection with Austria’s relations with the EU is the Rat für Fragen der österreichischen Integrationspolitik (Council for Questions of Austrian Integration Policy) composed, inter alia, of the chancellor, the vice-chancellor and the foreign minister, members of parliament, representatives of the Länder and the social partners. It was established on the occasion of Austria’s decision to apply for EC membership in 1989 in order to advise the government on integration issues. Finally, another special feature of the institutional framework of Austria’s foreign relations should be noted. The Wirtschaftskammer Österreich (Economic Chamber Austria), the official employers’ association, has set up its own network of trade delegations all over the world. This parallel system of outposts, together with the distribution of international economic competences among several ministries, complicates Austria’s foreign economic relations to some extent. However, the division of labour between the BMaA and its representations abroad on the one hand, and the Wirtschaftskammer’s delegations on the other, is reported to work smoothly most of the time.

Special legal features of Austria’s relations with the EU In a survey of Austria’s EU policy, a few additional peculiarities must be taken into account: the exceptionally strong position of the Austrian parliament in

Hanspeter Neuhold 43

this particular field, the country’s federal structure and its special international status of permanent neutrality. Under the new Art. 23e of the Federal Constitution, the two chambers of parliament may – subject to certain conditions16 – formulate opinions (Stellungnahmen) which are binding on the government member competent to represent Austria in EU negotiations and votes. A deviation from this position is only permissible for imperative reasons of foreign and integration policy. This constitutional amendment has proved counterproductive. A binding opinion leaves the Austrian representative with no scope for negotiating a compromise which includes at least part of the Austrian demands. As a result of the rigidity of the position prescribed by the Austrian parliament, the outvoted Austrian member of government may have to leave the Council table with empty hands. The Austrian parliament has drawn the lesson from these negative experiences and has switched to broader mandates which give Austria’s representatives more leeway in negotiations.17 Similarly, the Austrian Länder may unanimously impose binding opinions on the Federal Government in areas where they have legislative powers (Art. 23d of the Federal Constitution). Austria’s membership in the EU was eventually regarded as compatible with the country’s permanent neutrality. The Union contented itself with a Joint Declaration on the CFSP, which was annexed to the Final Act of the Accession Treaty. In this document, the EU notes the confirmation by the ‘EFTA applicants’18 of their full acceptance of the Union’s acquis communautaire; the new members declare that they will be ready and able to participate fully and actively in the CFSP as defined by the Maastricht Treaty. Another constitutional amendment provided the domestic legal basis for Austria’s participation in the EU’s second pillar. Art. 23f specifies that this participation includes measures which suspend, restrict or completely terminate economic relations with one or more third countries. An amendment to Art. 23f adopted in 1998 establishes, above all, the foundation, under Austrian constitutional law, for the country’s participation in the Petersberg tasks, in particular the so-called peacemaking operations, that were included in Art. 17 para. 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) in the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty. Despite the pacific associations which the term ‘peacemaking’ is likely to evoke, it obviously refers to the nondefensive ‘use of force by combat forces’ that may also entail casualties for the members of these forces. It is not even clear whether such military operations are supposed to require authorisation by the UN Security Council, or whether EU members deem a mandate by the Union sufficient. This latter option would run counter to existing international law, even if troops were used for the purpose of ‘humanitarian intervention’, i.e., in order to protect the nationals of another state from atrocities committed by their own government. The issue of the need for a mandate from the Security Council for

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this type of military action came to the fore in the context of ‘Operation Allied Force’ launched by NATO against Yugoslavia to prevent ethnic cleansing directed against the Albanian majority in Kosovo in the spring of 1999. The internal stage for Austria’s membership was set in a referendum held on 12 June 1994.19 A nation-wide referendum was required under Art. 44 para. 3 of the Federal Constitution because admission to the Union entailed a total revision of that constitution. In fact, more than one of the dominant principles of the constitution were affected: the democratic principle, the rule of law, the separation of powers and the federal principle. A much higher share of the electorate than in Finland and Sweden declared itself in favour of Austria’s entry into the Union: A two-thirds majority (66.58 per cent) of the 82 per cent of the Austrian voters who went to the polls voted ‘yes’.20 A key factor in this strong popular support was the pro-European attitude of the country’s political, economic and intellectual élites as well as that of most other opinion leaders. However, almost immediately after the referendum, this political consensus was jettisoned. The two governing parties started bickering over who should sign the accession treaty.

The organisational structure of the Austrian Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs The BMaA is headed by the Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs who may be assisted by a State Secretary, as was the case under foreign minister Wolfgang Schüssel before he took over as chancellor in early 2000.21 The SecretaryGeneral is the highest civil servant in the Austrian foreign office. The BMaA is divided into seven ‘sections’ (directorates-general): ● ● ● ● ● ● ●

Central Affairs Section (Section I) Political Affairs Section (Section II) Integration Policy and Economic Affairs Section (Section III) Legal and Consular Affairs Section (Section IV) Cultural Policy Section (Section V) Administrative Section (Section VI) Development Cooperation Section (Section VII)

Section I includes, inter alia, the Protocol Department, the Press and Information Department and the Office of International Law (the legal adviser’s department). The major aspects of Austria’s relations with the EU are dealt with by Sections II and III. As already pointed out, with a staff of almost 1,400 (1,962 including local staff) the Austrian foreign ministry can hardly compete with comparable countries; the same applies to the share of the federal budget allocated to it. To make matters worse, under the austerity programmes launched by the last and the present governments in order to meet the convergence criteria

Hanspeter Neuhold 45

for monetary union and to achieve a balanced budget, the BMaA had to reduce its personnel (by 2 per cent in 1996 and 1997) and freeze its expenditures at the level of 1995. In order to achieve a ‘zero deficit’, a top priority of the governing coalition, further annual 2 per cent cuts of staff have been agreed upon for the period from 2000 to 2003. As in other EU member states, the personnel shortage has been aggravated in Austria by the continuous growth of the tasks to be handled by the BMaA as well by the emergence of numerous new states on the territories of the former Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia (and the dissolution of Czechoslovakia) – states with which direct bilateral relations are important to a country that is situated in the middle of the continent. The obvious need for opening new Austrian embassies in Europe and elsewhere can only be met by closing down or thinning out other outposts or by restructuring departments at the BMaA. However, there seems to be little ‘personnel fat’ that can be cut. In any event, additional Austrian diplomatic missions have been established in Bratislava, Ljubljana, Zagreb22 and Kiev 1992, in Sarajevo in 1996, in Riga, Skopje, Tallinn and Vilnius in 1997 and in Hanoi in 1999. Moreover, a consulate-general in Shanghai became operative in 1995. Conversely, the Austrian consulates-general in Frankfurt and Düsseldorf have ceased their operations. Proposals to close other representations abroad were eventually rejected. The dilemma between the prescribed reductions and the growing needs for foreign ministry staff was further exacerbated when Austria took over the EU Presidency in the second half of 1998.23 In addition to hiring temporary staff, senior diplomats were called out of retirement in order to achieve the priority goal of making this presidency – the first to be held by one of the three most recent EU newcomers – a success. An interesting and worthwhile innovation for the BMaA was the opportunity offered by EU states holding the EU Presidency before Austria to junior Austrian diplomats and other civil servants to work in their foreign ministries with a view to gaining first-hand experience to be used in preparing the Austrian chairmanship. This practice began under the Irish and was continued under the following Presidencies. When Austria held the EU Presidency, officials from the countries concerned came to Vienna to help their colleagues in the relevant Austrian departments. Given the widening gap between increasing challenges and diminishing means, the Secretary-General for Foreign Affairs established a task force whose objective was to find ways of maximising the efficiency of the ministry’s limited resources. One concrete result has been an – albeit limited – organisational reform within the BMaA. The structure of most sections has been changed, the number of departments within them reduced. The Integration Policy and Economic Affairs Section, which has been most strongly affected by Austria’s EU membership, has been overhauled and reorganised so as to adapt it to the structures of the EU.

46 Foreign Ministries in the European Union

Moreover, decision-making structures within the central administration in Vienna have been simplified; some routine reports which missions abroad had to submit periodically have been abolished. However, the most far-reaching improvement has been a sweeping reorganisation of the ministry’s computer system which proceeded in parallel with a reform of the BMaA’s work processes (the ‘MEDIA’ project). Since 1998, an electronic documentation and information system (ELAK) has been in place in the ministry in Vienna. Internet as well as Intranet are widely used to transmit and exchange information; e-mail has become the principal means of communication. The BMaA is about to extend ELAK to all its representations abroad in order to further increase efficiency.

The impact of Austria’s EU membership on the Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs In general terms, the effect of Austria’s admission to the EU has primarily not been a ‘decline’ of the BMaA but rather a shift of emphasis in its activities. Moreover, some of the changes were a continuation and reinforcement of trends that had already been discernible in the past. Perhaps the most important substantive consequence of EU membership for Austria has been the fact that it has again become part of a major actor in international affairs. Granted, it is not the dominant core of a great power, as it was prior to the First World War, but it does have a say in EU decision-making. Joining the Union has also meant that Austria has to pay increasing attention to issues which were of little concern to it in the past. In its relations with non-member states, Austria has learnt to act on two levels, that of the EU and bilaterally, and it has become clear that the resulting policies ought to be consistent with each other. Foreign policy is increasingly shaped in a continuous debate within the framework of the Union where Austria can try to gain general support for its specific interests. If it succeeds in obtaining the necessary backing, the matter is included in the agenda of the EU as a whole and will therefore carry much greater political weight vis-à-vis other countries.24 At the same time, this process leaves less room for spectacular unilateral moves and resounding statements which will impress domestic public opinion. Internally, the foreign ministry had been gradually losing two of its main assets as compared with the other ministries before Austria joined the EU in 1995. In particular, officials in the departments which handle the other ministries’ external relations have in the meantime acquired the necessary linguistic skills. Moreover, they have also caught up in respect of the know-how relevant to managing their external relations. This enables them to exploit their ‘functional’ expertise vis-à-vis diplomats with rotating assignments which last for several years at best, although the latter are used to and, as a rule, quite good at familiarising themselves quickly with issues where they

Hanspeter Neuhold 47

have little previous experience. It is also worth mentioning that members of the diplomatic service occupy key positions in other ministries on a temporary basis. Moreover, the present Federal President (Thomas Klestil) is a diplomat by profession, just like his two predecessors (Rudolf Kirchschläger and Kurt Waldheim). In addition to the areas where the BMaA has retained its primary competences – from the CFSP to development cooperation – it performs pivotal coordination functions for Austria’s entire participation in the EU. To this end, at a weekly jour fixe chaired by the foreign ministry, the positions on issues at hand taken by the chancellery and the ministries concerned, the social partners, the National Bank, the Länder and municipalities are reviewed with a view to hammering out consistent Austrian EU policies which can then be further pursued and hopefully implemented at the Union level. This coordination system is reported to work smoothly and to the general satisfaction of the parties involved. However, direct lobbying by the Länder and various non-governmental actors in Brussels also takes place in Austria’s case. Moreover, it remains to be seen whether the relative ‘newcomer’ Austria will be spared the inter-departmental infighting over the main role in shaping EU policies which other EC/EU member states have experienced. For example, the creation of a separate Ministry of European Affairs has not yet been seriously discussed in Austria. Austria’s accession to the Union has had a considerable impact on the dayto-day work of officials at the BMaA. The COREU network has substantially added to the daily ‘information avalanche’ to be read and processed. Today the main problem is indeed not to obtain but to screen information and translate it into appropriate action. Moreover, day flights to Brussels to attend EU meetings have become routine for Austrian civil servants. In fact, inter-ministerial conferences could frequently be held aboard the early morning plane to and on the late evening aircraft from the ‘EU capital’. It stands to reason that the political and economic sections have developed the most intensive contacts with and are most strongly influenced in their activities by EU institutions. In particular, participation in the CFSP and more recently the CESDP, where foreign ministries have by and large maintained their gatekeeping position, has had a far-reaching impact on the BMaA’s work. It is not only the amount of information that has increased in this field. What is new for officials at the Ballhausplatz is that the majority of foreign political issues are now subject to consultation if not coordination and joint action with EU partners; the scope for an individual national Austrian foreign and gradually also security policy has shrunk considerably.25 Most Austrian diplomats seem to be very good at learning by doing in this respect. The CFSP should also lead to a broadening of Austria’s international horizon – not so much of the BMaA’s staff but of the average citizen. Austrians ought to realise that the interests and concerns of both Austria and the EU

48 Foreign Ministries in the European Union

are not restricted to the Union’s eastern enlargement, but also include the Mediterranean area and Northern Europe, as well as developments on other continents. As regards Section IV (legal and consular affairs), a distinction must be made between areas where the BMaA is endowed with exclusive competences and those where it shares them with other ministries. No genuine changes are reported in the first category which focuses on direct assistance to Austrians (for example, help in emergency situations or matters concerning Austrians residing in foreign countries) and has little relevance for international cooperation. The opposite is true for the second category which includes police, asylum, refugee, immigration, legal or health matters. Here, the general trend towards direct communication and cooperation between the ‘functional’ ministries concerned – for instance, the ministries of the interior, of justice or health – and their counterparts abroad as well as with international organisations in their respective fields of activity – has been reinforced by Austria’s accession to the EU, notably within the framework of the third pillar26 and the Schengen Agreement.27 It is also worth noting that Austria’s consular relations have been ‘depoliticised’ in recent years. During the East–West conflict, for example, visa problems with ‘socialist’ states were foreign policy issues and not primarily determined by internal considerations such as public security. Today, Austria has no fundamental differences of opinion with other countries, in particular not with its post-communist neighbours. International cultural affairs are currently dealt with by three ministries in Austria: the Ministry of Education, Science and Culture, the Federal Chancellery and the BMaA. Coordination among these three departments is reported to be satisfactory, in particular at the level of civil servants who have developed smooth day-to-day working relationships. The foreign ministry’s and its cultural section’s assets include a sizeable budget (by Austrian standards – about 70 million ATS) in accordance with a recent announcement, restructured network of 27 ‘cultural fora’ (Österreichische Kulturforen) and the additional contributions of the country’s embassies and consulates throughout the world. More than 40 Austrian libraries (Österreich-Bibliotheken) all over Central and Eastern Europe and five language schools (ÖsterreichInstitute) complete this network. Activities focus on symposia, concerts, theatre performances, exhibitions and audiovisual presentations. They are based on a mixture of cooperation with other partners in major projects (exhibitions, concerts) and the organisation of smaller events with a strong emphasis on topical issues. In order to modernise the structure and methods of Austria’s foreign cultural policy, a new strategic concept has been launched in 2001.28 Many international cultural exchanges take place directly between the persons and institutions concerned, though local diplomatic or consular

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representations often lend a useful hand with regard to organisational details.29 However, the BMaA can provide important assistance to artists and scholars who are at the beginning of their international careers or whose work is less ‘marketable’. The cultural section also considers it one of its functions to launch initiatives on topical and at the same time sensitive issues, such as European integration issues (‘Culture for Enlargement’ and ‘Culture for Stability’) and the dialogue between Christians and Muslims. During Austria’s EU presidency in 1998, it organised a series of events with an emphasis on East Central Europe and on multiculturalism, priorities of particular interest and concern to Austria. Given the limited, subsidiary competences which the Maastricht Treaty (Art. 128 TEC)30 conferred on the EC for the first time, EU membership has not substantially affected Austria’s foreign cultural policy. EU member states still jealously guard their cultural identity. This also applies to Austria which is regarded – not only by many Austrians – as a ‘cultural great power’. At the same time, the delimitation of Austrian cultural identity vis-à-vis Germany sometimes gives rise to problems, especially in the field of literature where Ingeborg Bachmann, Thomas Bernhard or Peter Handke are occasionally mentioned among the ‘German’ writers. Joint cultural initiatives within the EU framework seem easier on an ad hoc basis (for instance, film festivals) and in the areas of film and TV productions than, for example, international theatre festivals or art exhibitions. Within Section VII, in April 1996 a special unit was created which deals comprehensively with development assistance matters within the EU, including relations with the ACP states under the Cotonou Agreement. Within the overall responsibility of the BMaA for Austrian development cooperation, the unit elaborates and coordinates Austria’s position on EU development policy and EU development cooperation activities. It is also charged with assuring the coherence of Austrian development cooperation. The counterpart of this unit is a member of the Permanent Representation in Brussels who specialises in development cooperation affairs. Since 1995, Austria is under the obligation to take part in EC development cooperation, to contribute to its financing and to assure its implementation. This obligation has resulted in a steady increase of Austrian official development assistance payments by up to ATS 1.5 billion per year. Participation in the EU has been a learning experience for BMaA officials working in the area of development cooperation in that it has afforded them new perspectives and enlarged their professional horizons. In 2000, as a result of a redistribution of the competences of the various ministries, the department for aid to the central and eastern central European countries (‘Osthilfe’) was transferred from the Federal Chancellery to the Development Cooperation Section of the foreign ministry.

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EU membership and diplomatic and consular representations abroad It is sometimes claimed that, as a result of the revolutions in the fields of information and transport technology, together with impact of a globalised media, embassies and consulates are becoming increasingly obsolete.31 However, as is the case elsewhere, information of specific relevance to Austria still has to be gathered, analysed and interpreted. Moreover, certain functions of the diplomat have acquired increasing importance, particularly public relations activities. Consequently, the curriculum of diplomatic academies has not only to include the teaching of languages but of communication techniques as well. Mid- or late-career training in the latter field for members of the foreign service also appears necessary. In Austria, these new developments could be observed on the ‘home front’ as well, when officials from the BMaA actively participated in the debate preceding the referendum on EU membership in 1994. They addressed a broad variety of audiences, from students to pensioners’ associations. The diplomatic profession has undoubtedly lost part of its previous glamour. There is less and less time for ‘auto-administration’ without tangible results, for cocktails, receptions and dinners. Not that these activities are a complete waste of time, since they establish and maintain valuable contacts and provide useful information. However, as one Austrian ambassador put it: ‘I am not primarily accredited to the diplomatic corps in country X but to that country.’ Embassies have also been urged to develop strategic concepts and concrete programmes for their work on the basis of which their actual performance can then be assessed. Some Austrian embassies have already implemented this proposal. In this context, it is worth noting that improving efficiency control has been mentioned as one of the Austrian foreign ministry’s major concerns. The quantitative evaluation of the output accumulated during a given period has been considered unsatisfactory. Consequently, cost-performance analysis has been introduced as a first step at headquarters in Vienna. External control of the ministry is carried out by the Audit Office, internal supervision by the BMaA’s Inspectorate-General. The Inspector-General tries to visit all representations abroad during a five-to-six-year period. Particularly for an EU newcomer like Austria, embassies in other member states of the Union are anything but redundant. Relations with those members with which ties were less close in the past had to be established and intensified on various levels and in many areas. For this purpose, knowledgeable Austrian representatives are needed sur place. A Lisbon, Dublin or Helsinki telephone directory or Internet information are often not sufficient for somebody in Vienna or Salzburg who wants to enter into new contacts with the right partners in his/her field of activity in Portugal, Ireland or Finland. Another gap to be filled in relations with some of the other 14 EU

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member countries is the projection of an accurate, up-to-date image of Austria which is not restricted to Mozart, Johann Strauss and Sachertorte – although these clichés may still help to promote tourism. EU membership certainly adds a new quality and new dimensions to the relations among the 15. Austrian diplomats accredited to EU partners have learnt that they have to lobby Austrian interests in various areas bilaterally in order to assure the necessary support when decisions are then taken at the EU/EC level. At the same time, they follow the debate in their receiving state closely in order to find out at an early stage about initiatives the latter plans to take within the framework of the Union. This should also facilitate the trade-offs which permit the two sides to agree on mutual support on the multilateral level.32 Another interesting new aspect is the more systematic exchange of expertise among EU partners before they take concrete steps in a given geographical region or with respect to certain subject matters. For example, Austria’s experience with the Balkans seems to be appreciated by other EU countries, whereas Austria could turn to its Nordic partners or to Spain and Portugal for advice on the Baltic states and Latin America, respectively.33 Bilateral embassies and consulates in non-EU states are still needed in order to represent Austrian interests and to fulfil their other traditional functions there. Contacts, coordination and cooperation – especially the exchange of information – are closer among the representations of EU members in third countries than with those of non-member states represented there. The possibility of joint initiatives – for instance, a common démarche vis-à-vis the host government – gives them additional political weight. A new benefit which accrues to Austrian nationals under Art. 20 TEC is the protection in third countries where Austria is not represented by the diplomatic and consular authorities of any other EU member state on the same conditions as the latter’s nationals. However, Austrian consular services abroad are still necessary. Mutual consular assistance under Art. 20 TEC is no doubt a welcome first step toward closer cooperation. However, joint EU consular representations replacing those of individual member states (let alone a joint European Foreign Service) still seem a long way off. Even within the EU, consular services remain indispensable. With the increased mobility of citizens inside the Union, demand for such assistance must even be expected to grow. A key role is played by Austria’s Permanent Representation to the EU which constitutes a crucial link between the authorities at home and EU organs and institutions as well as with other member states. It is by far the biggest Austrian representation abroad. In line with a tradition developed during the accession negotiations, its staff not only includes officials from the BMaA but also from other ministries, the National Bank, the Länder, the municipalities and the social partners. As a result, only 17 out of a total staff of 72 belong to the foreign ministry. It may be added that, despite the personnel shortage at the BMaA, the ministry is interested in principle in

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seconding Austrian diplomats to EU institutions. However, secondment was practised restrictively until the end of the Austrian Presidency. The situation is different in the case of other missions to IGOs like the UN, where EU members practice the CFSP, coordinate their action and speak with one voice. It is within the framework of the 15 that Austria has to try to have its interests taken into account in the first place. Once a common position is agreed on, which may at times be a difficult process, there remains little scope for negotiations with other states. As a rule, only the member holding the Presidency speaks on behalf of the Union – a system occasionally frustrating for a dynamic head of mission. Moreover, complaints are voiced about the insufficient staffing of one or another Austrian multilateral mission, especially if compared with those of other EU members. Another general trend in modern diplomacy is particularly marked in the multilateral context: the erosion of traditional hierarchical structures and the increasing importance of teamwork instead. This tendency toward ‘internal democratisation’ applies both to relations between the head office and representations abroad and within an administrative unit. Texts are drafted within a short period of time by several authors, including sometimes even ‘outsiders’ such as academic experts, in different places, using electronic information technology. It is not a foregone conclusion that those with a higher rank prevail. Moreover, it is at times difficult to identify the author of a given passage at the end of the drafting process.

Conclusion The overall impression which emerges on the basis of observable facts and interviews with Austrian diplomats at the BMaA and abroad is not one of decline of the Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs but rather one of more or less sweeping changes and more or less rapid and far-reaching adaptation. EU membership has strengthened existing trends which had already affected the role of foreign ministries, but it has also resulted in qualitative transformations of and innovations for the BMaA. Its traditional gatekeeping function of controlling the interactions between the domestic and the international environment has in fact further diminished. By contrast, the Austrian foreign ministry’s political weight has increased by its assuming additional important tasks in coordinating Austria’s EU policies. COREU has substantially added to an existing information load which officials in Vienna and abroad had already found difficult to cope with in the past. The EU framework also constitutes a radically new dimension for Austrian foreign policy, although not to the same degree for the various sections at the BMaA and the diplomatic and consular representations in foreign countries. Similarly, little if any evidence was found for the redundancy of embassies and consulates abroad, although the relevance of some of their activities has also undergone changes. Bilateral embassies continue to have important tasks to perform, both in the capitals of Austria’s EU partners and in third

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countries. Austria’s multilateral diplomacy has been transformed substantially after the country’s accession to the EU without becoming obsolete. EU membership has increased the workload of Austrian diplomats both at the ministry in Vienna and abroad considerably. At the same time, their work has gained in relevance, for the country as a whole as well as for individual citizens. Whether the latter are aware of these developments is another matter. Organisational reforms have so far been gradual and piecemeal rather than fundamental, systematic and sweeping, well in line with the pragmatic approach which is characteristic of most Austrian – and not only Austrian – foreign policy practitioners. Considerable effort was devoted to ensuring a successful Austrian EU Presidency in the second half of 1998. Leading and representing the Union may be regarded as the end of Austria’s ‘apprenticeship’ within the EU from which it wanted to graduate with honours. At the start of the new millennium, the time may be ripe to draw organisational and other lessons from six years of EU membership and not only to engage in a thorough reform debate but perhaps also to implement new concepts at the BMaA.

Appendix 1. Expenditure on the Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs

International organisations International conferences Development assistance Total (Federal Finance Act 2002)

euro 191.59 million (operational budget) euro 50.39 million euro 2.60 million euro 55.20 million euro 299.78 million

2. Number of countries/international organisations where diplomatic service is present Countries International organisations (1 March 2001)

81 6

3. Number of missions abroad Embassies Permanent missions* Embassy office Consulates-general Cultural fora Regional offices for development cooperation

81 (2 closed) 6 1 16 28 (target number) 2

* Austria has Permanent Missions/Representations in Brussels (EU), New York, Geneva, Vienna (all UN), Paris (UNESCO), Strasbourg (Council of Europe). The Permanent Representation at the OECD is part of the Federal Chancellery.

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4. Staff numbers Headquarters Abroad

632 775 1,407

Local staff Total (1 March 2001)

565 1,962

Senior staff Consular and administrative staff Clerical staff Local staff Total (1 March 2001)

469 265 663 565 1,962

Staff categories at the Austrian Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs differ from those of the foreign ministries of most other EU members. The senior staff covers, above all, political, economic, legal and cultural affairs. Source: Austrian Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Notes 1. Hanspeter Neuhold, Austria on the Threshold of the Twenty-first Century: Another Change of International Status? (Oslo: Europa-programmet, 1996). 2. Grete Klingenstein, Institutionelle Aspekte der österreichischen Außenpolitik im 18. Jahrhundert, in: Erich Zöllner (ed.), Diplomatie und Außenpolitik Österreichs. 11 Beiträge zu ihrer Geschichte (Vienna: Österreichischer Bundesverlag, 1977), p. 74ff; Wolf-Dieter Eberwein and Hanspeter Neuhold, The Adaptation of Foreign Ministries to Structural Changes in the International System: A Comparative Study of the Ministries for Foreign Affairs of Austria and the FRG (Vienna: Wilhelm Braumüller, 1981), p. 21ff. 3. Klingenstein, Institutionelle Aspekte, p. 83. 4. Heinrich Pfusterschmid-Hardtenstein, Von der Orientalischen Akademie zur k. u. k. Konsularakademie. Eine maria-theresianische Institution und ihre Bedeutung für den auswärtigen Dienst der österreichischen-ungarischen Monarchie, in: Adam Wandruszka and Peter Urbanitsch (eds), Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848–1918, vol. VI, part 1 (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1989), p. 122ff. 5. Karl Zemanek, ‘Autriche’, in: Faculté de droit-Université de Genève (ed.), L’Etat face à l’organisation mondiale (Geneva: Georg-Librairie de l’Université, 1972), p. 47ff. 6. Ludwig Steiner, Zur Außenpolitik der Zweiten Republik, in: Erich Zöllner (ed.), op. cit., p. 169ff. (p. 170). 7. Hanspeter Neuhold, ‘Perspectives of Austria’s Membership in the European Union’, German Yearbook of International Law. Jahrbuch für Internationales Recht 37, 1994, p. 9ff. 8. However, the WEU has become an ‘empty shell’, whose assets are to be transferred to the EU as a result of decisions taken by the two organisations in the autumn of 2000. The present government refers to Austria’s status as non-membership in military alliances (‘bündnisfrei’), following the example of Finland and Sweden

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9. 10.

11.

12. 13. 14.

15. 16. 17. 18.

19.

20. 21.

22. 23.

24.

after the end of the East–West conflict. It proposed a mutual military assistance commitment within the EU; however, this proposal met with a cool reception, if not rejection, among Austria’s EU partners. Stefan Titscher and Gertrude Wille-Römer, Außen – von innen. BMaA-Studie 1991/92 (Wien, 1992). Hanspeter Neuhold, Internationaler Strukturwandel und staatliche Außenpolitik. Das österreichische Außenministerium vor neuen Herausforderungen (Vienna: Wilhelm Braumüller, 1993). On the basis of discussions with diplomats at the BMaA, this author also wrote a paper on the main goals, values and principal interests of Austrian foreign policy in order to provide a basic conceptual framework for the ministry’s activities. Hanspeter Neuhold, ‘Die österreichische Außenpolitik an der Schwelle zum 3’. Jahrtausend, Österreichisches Jahrbuch für Internationale Politik 13, 1996, p. 120ff. Since 1988, the Austrian Länder (Federal Provinces) also have a limited treatymaking power (Art. 16 of the Federal Constitution). As amended in 2000. Bundesgesetzblatt (Federal Law Gazette) 1986/No. 76 in the version 2000/No. 141. The translations of the legal texts are by the author. At present, the Austrian foreign minister is again a professional diplomat (Dr Benita Ferrero-Waldner), whereas Dr Schüssel has taken over as Federal Chancellor, although his party finished only third behind the SPÖ and its new coalition partner, the FPÖ, in the parliamentary elections of 3 October 1999. Art. 65 para. 1 B-VG. The matter must concern federal legislation. ‘Kurier’ of 10 December 1997. Austria, Finland and Sweden; Norwegian voters rejected EU membership for the second time in November 1994. Wolfram Kaiser, Pekka Visuri, Cecilia Malmström and Arve Hjelseth, ‘Die Volksabstimmungen in Österreich, Finnland, Schweden und Norwegen: Folgen für die Europäische Union’, integration 18, 1995, p. 76ff. After the rejection of Switzerland’s participation in the European Economic Area by Swiss voters in a referendum in December 1992, the Swiss government did not pursue its application for admission the EC/EU any further. On Austria’s ‘long march to Brussels’, see Neuhold, Perspectives, p. 10ff. See also Paul Luif, On the Road to Brussels: The Political Dimension of Austria’s, Finland’s and Sweden’s Accession to the European Union (Vienna: Braumüller, 1995). The percentages for Finland, Sweden and Norway were 56.9, 52.3 and 47.8, respectively. Foreign Minister Ferrero-Waldner would also appreciate the assistance of a state secretary, which, however, is not affordable under the current budgetary restrictions. Die Presse of March 2001. In these cities, Austrian consulates-general were transformed into embassies. On the Austrian EU Presidency, see Höll, Otmar (ed.), The Austrian Presidency of the European Union (Laxenburg: The Austrian Institute for International Affairs, 1998); Schallenberg Alexander and Thun-Hohenstein, Christoph, Die EU-Präsidentschaft Österreichs (Vienna: Manz, 1999). However, one of the lessons Austria learnt from the measures taken by the other 14 EU members against the new Austrian coalition government in 2000 was the lack of traditional, ‘natural’ partners, as is the case, for example, for the Benelux or the Nordic EU countries. The Austrian government is therefore looking for ‘strategic’ partners among the candidates for Union membership in its vicinity. However, messages from Vienna may be received with reservations, if not resentments,

56 Foreign Ministries in the European Union

25.

26.

27.

28.

29.

30. 31.

32.

33.

by nations that were once ruled as parts of the Dual Monarchy by the Habsburgs. Moreover, relations with some neighbouring states are overshadowed by controversies over expropriation decrees enacted after the Second World War by the latter and the safety of nuclear plants on their territories. The emerging CESDP has highlighted the dilemma between Austria’s permanent neutrality and the logic of EU integration which also calls for solidarity in the area of security. At present, Austria finds itself in a somewhat strange position: It is ready, in principle, to also take part in EU peacemaking operations, where the lives of Austrian soldiers may be at risk, in order to help manage crises between or in non-member countries. Yet for the time being, Austria does not pledge, on the basis of reciprocity, assistance to its partners in the Union in the event of an armed attack by an external aggressor. Which has been included, in part, in the first, the supranational pillar within the framework of the progressive establishment of an area of freedom, security and justice by the Amsterdam Treaty (new Title IV of the Treaty establishing the European Community – TEC). Although the number of visas issued by Austrian representations abroad has decreased since 1997, their workload has remained about the same. This is due to more complex administrative procedures required by the Schengen regime. In March 2001, foreign minister Benita Ferrero-Waldner presented a new concept for Austria’s foreign cultural policy (‘Auslandskultur neu’). It contains geographic and substantive priorities and provides for structural reforms, above all 28 ‘Austrian Cultural Fora’ that are to replace the 11 former Austrian Cultural Institutes and cultural sections of Austrian embassies. The 28th forum is to be opened in Belgrade in the course of the year 2001. Decentralisation, flexibility and debureaucratisation in favour of substantive activities are emphasised. The Vienna Philharmonic Orchestra or the Vienna State Opera do not need official assistance for invitations to give concerts or stage opera performances abroad. However, such events may acquire additional political significance if they are scheduled at the same time as an official visit by the president or the chancellor – usually accompanied by a delegation of businessmen looking for orders – to the country concerned, especially if the latter is situated outside of Europe. Which has remained essentially unchanged in the Amsterdam Treaty (Art. 151 TEC). On this issue, see the discussion between Andreas Unterberger and Hans Werner Scheidl; ‘Die begrenzte Bedeutung der Diplomaten im Net-Zeitalter’, Die Presse of 16/17 September 2000, and Ernst Sucharipa; Österreichs Diplomaten im 21. Jahrhundert, Die Presse of 23 September 2000. These tasks remain the same, even though Austria’s relations with its EU partners vary in terms of intensity and quality as a result of such factors as geographic distance, shared history and the other country’s size and power. Knowledge about each other in general and not only in Austria is still insufficient within the Union, as prejudices and clichés die hard even in the minds of those interested in international affairs, let alone of the average citizens who at best spend their vacations in another EU country, where their contacts with the local population are usually limited to waiters and salespersons in souvenir shops. ‘Embassies within the EU will be needed as long as there are national interests. Embassies lubricate the entire machinery, they are the emergency repair shop, monitor and coordinator of the whole web of relations – and they provide the management for the innumerable meetings between high-ranking politicians.’

Hanspeter Neuhold 57 This statement by an unidentified interlocutor in the capital of an EU member state is quoted by Ambassador Karl Th. Paschke, Report on the Special Inspection of 14 German Embassies in the Countries of the European Union (Berlin, September 2000), p. 11. Paschke points out that among EU members a new type of ‘European diplomacy’ with its peculiar functions and other characteristics has evolved over the past few years. Ibid., p. 3.

Bibliography Official publications The Bundesministerium für auswärtige Angelegenheiten publishes an annual report, the Außenpolitischer Bericht, and important documents in the series Österreichische außenpolitische Dokumentation; however, the future publication of this documentation is uncertain for financial reasons.

Other sources Bielka, Erich, Jankowitsch, Peter and Thalberg, Hans (eds) Die Ära Kreisky. Schwerpunkte der österreichischen Außenpolitik (Vienna-Munich-Zürich: Europaverlag, 1983) Böhm, Wolfgang, Lahodynsky, Otmar et al. Der Österreich-Komplex. Ein Land im Selbstzweifel (Vienna: Böhlau, 2001) Brauneder, Wilhelm Österreichische Verfassungsgeschichte (Vienna: Manzsche Verlagsund Universitätsbuchhandlung, 7th edition, 1998) Dachs, Herbert et al. (eds) Handbuch des politischen Systems Österreich (Vienna: Manzsche Verlags- und Universitätsbuchhandlung, 3rd edition, 1996) Derndarsky, Michael ‘The Foreign Office since 1918’, in Zara Steiner, The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World (London: Times Books, 1982) Eberwein, Wolf-Dieter and Neuhold, Hanspeter The Adaptation of Foreign Ministries to Structural Changes in the International System: A Comparative Study of the Ministries for Foreign Affairs of Austria and the FRG (Vienna: Wilhelm Braumüller, 1981) Gerlich, Peter (ed) Österreichs Nachbarstaaten. Innen- und außenpolitische Perspektiven (Vienna: Signum Verlag, 1997) Hanf, Kenneth and Soetendorp, Ben (eds) Adapting to European Integration: Small States and the European Union (New York: Wesley Longman, 1998) Hausmaninger, Herbert The Austrian Legal System (Vienna: Manzsche Verlags- und Universitätsbuchhandlung; The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998) Höll, Otmar (ed.) The Austrian Presidency of the European Union (Laxenburg: The Austrian Institute for International Affairs, 1998) Hummer, Waldemar (ed.) Die Europäische Union und Österreich. Europarechtliche, völkerrechtliche und verfassungsrechtliche Perspektiven (Vienna: Österreichische Staatsdruckerei, 1994) Hummer, Waldemar and Obwexer, Walter ‘Die Verhängung der “EU-Sanktionen” und der mögliche Ausstieg aus ihnen’, in Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht 55, 2000, p. 2ff. Hummer, Waldemar and Schweitzer, Michael (eds) Österreich und das Recht der Europäischen Union (Vienna: Manzsche Verlags- und Universitätsbuchhandlung, 1996) Kaiser, Wolfram, Visuri, Pekka Malmström, Cecilia and Hjelseth, Arve, ‘Die Volksabstimmungen in: Österreich, Finnland, Schweden und Norwegen: Folgen für die Europäische Union’, in integration 18, 1995, p. 76ff.

58 Foreign Ministries in the European Union Kampits, Peter, Die Auslandskulturpolitik Österreichs. Konzepte, Strukturen, Perspektiven (Vienna: Wilhelm Braumüller, 1990) Kicker, Renate, Khol, Andreas and Neuhold, Hanspeter (eds) Außenpolitik und Demokratie in Österreich. Strukturen – Strategien – Stellungnahmen (Salzburg: Wolfgang Neugebauer Verlag, 1983) Kopeinig, Margaretha, and Kotanko, Christoph Eine europäische Affäre. Der Weisenbericht und die Sanktionen gegen Österreich (Vienna: Czernin, 2000) Kramer Helmut ‘Öffentliche Meinung und die österreichische EG-Entscheidung im Jahre 1989’, in: SWS-Rundschau 31, 1991, p. 191ff. Kunnert, Gerhard Österreichs Weg in die Europäische Union (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Staatsdruckerei, 1993) Lantis, Jeffrey S. ‘Negotiating Neutrality: The Double-Edged Diplomacy of Austrian Accession to the European Union’, in Cooperation and Conflict 34(2), p. 152 Lauber, Volkmar (ed.) Contemporary Austrian Politics (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996) Luif, Paul On the Road to Brussels: The Political Dimension of Austria’s, Finland’s and Sweden’s Accession to the European Union (Vienna: Wilhelm Braumüller, 1995) Luther, Kurt Richard and Pulzer, Peter (eds) Austria 1945–95: Fifty Years of the Second Republic (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998) Neuhold, Hanspeter Internationaler Strukturwandel und staatliche Außenpolitik. Das österreichische Außenministerium vor neuen Herausforderungen (Vienna: Wilhelm Braumüller, 1993) Neuhold, Hanspeter ‘Perspectives of Austria’s Membership in the European Union’, in German Yearbook of International Law; Jahrbuch für Internationales Recht 37, 1994, p. 9ff. Neuhold, Hanspeter ‘Die österreichische Außenpolitik an der Schwelle zum 3. Jahrtausend’, in Österreichisches Jahrbuch für Internationale Politik 13, 1996, p. 120ff. Neuhold, Hanspeter Austria on the Threshold of the Twenty-first Century: Another Change of International Status? (Oslo: Europa-programmet, 1996) Neuhold, Hanspeter and Luif, Paul (eds) Das außenpolitische Bewußtsein der Österreicher. Aktuelle internationale Probleme im Spiegel der Meinungsforschung (Vienna: Wilhelm Braumüller, 1992) Nowotny, Thomas ‘Identitätskrise der Diplomaten’, in Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft 17, 1988, p. 183ff. Nowotny, Thomas ‘Österreichs Diplomaten – Ein Berufsstand mit neuen Aufgaben’, in International, 4–5, 1992, p. 6ff. Pelinka, Anton ‘Österreichs Zukunft heißt Europa’, in Europaeische Rundschau 26(2), p. 79ff. Pick, Hella Und welche Rolle spielt Österreich? Vom besetzten Grenzland zum offenen EU-Staat: Die Alpenrepublik im internationalen Blickfeld (Vienna: Kremayr & Scheriau, 1999) Regan, Eugene ‘EU Sanctions against Austria – are they legal?’, in The Bar Review. Journal of the Bar of Ireland 5, April 2000, p. 290ff. Rumpler, Helmut ‘The Foreign Ministry of Austria and Austria-Hungary 1848 to 1918’, in Zara Steiner, The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World (London: Times Books, 1982) Schallenberg, Alexander and Thun-Hohenstein, Christoph Die EU-Präsidentschaft Österreichs. Eine umfassende Analyse und Dokumentation des zweiten Halbjahres 1998 (Vienna: Manz, 1999)

Hanspeter Neuhold 59 Schneider, Heinrich Alleingang nach Brüssel. Österreichs EG-Politik (Bonn: Europa Union Verlag, 1990) Schneider, Heinrich ‘Österreich in Acht und Bann – ein Schritt zur politisch intergrierten “Wertegemeinschaft”?’ in Integration 23, 2000, p. 120ff. Tálos, Emmerich and Falkner, Gerda (eds) EU-Mitglied Österreich. Gegenwart und Perspektiven: Eine Zwischenbilanz (Vienna: Manzsche Verlags- und Universitätsbuchhandlung, 1996) Titscher, Stefan and Wille-Römer, Gertrude Außen – von innen. BMaA-Studie 1991/92 (Vienna, 1992) Trauttmansdorff, Ferdinand ‘Organisatorische Konsequenzen des Paradigmenwechsels in der österreichischen Außenpolitik’, Austrian Journal of Public and International Law 49, 1995, p. 409ff. Waschkuhn, Arno (ed.) Kleinstaat. Grundsätzliche und aktuelle Probleme (Vaduz: Verlag der Liechtensteinischen Akademischen Gesellschaft, 1993) Zemanek, Karl ‘Autriche’, in Faculté de droit-Université de Genève (ed.), L’Etat face à l’organisation mondiale (Geneva: Georg-Librairie de l’Université, 1972), p. 47ff. Zöllner, Erich (ed.) Diplomatie und Außenpolitik Österreichs. 11 Beiträge zu ihrer Geschichte (Vienna: Österreichischer Bundesverlag, 1977)

4 Belgium Rik Coolsaet and Ann-Sofie Voet

The origins of the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) go back to the establishment of a Diplomatic Committee in 1830 – the year in which Belgium emerged as an independent state – by the Belgian revolutionaries in order to gain a voice in the Great Powers’ discussions on the raison d’être of the newly established state. A fully-fledged Ministry was founded on 25 February 1831 and was reformed for the first time in 1841 when three departments came into existence. The first of these dealt with political affairs, the second with trade and the third grouped together several functions – such as finance, disputes, registry and accounting. Many reforms of the internal structure of the Ministry followed, mostly as a result of adaptations needed to conduct economic and commercial diplomacy. At the outbreak of the First World War, the Ministry consisted of four departments and a secretariat-general. The largest department was Foreign Trade and Consulates (with a staff of fifteen), followed by the Political Department (three officers), Chancellery and Disputes and Protocol. The numerous reforms of the interwar period, including changing the name to ‘Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade’ in 1934, reflected the importance attributed to the economic aspects of foreign policy. Consequently, the number of civil servants inside the Political Department, which encompassed the Office of the League of the Nations and the colonial desk dwindled, whilst the Economic Department expanded.

Organisation and issues Since its birth, the organisation and reform of the MFA have been much more influenced by the economic, rather than the political (including security policy), dimensions of its tasks. In economic diplomacy the MFA has often played a decisive role, thus making the MFA at specific moments in its history a primus inter pares amongst the ministerial departments in Belgium. This was, however, not the case for many decades after 1945. Moreover, in the 1970s and the early 1980s, a pervasive impression of the MFA as an 60

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outdated and largely irrelevant department developed. Since the MFA’s activities in the past concentrated so heavily on bilateral commercial negotiations, the gradual emergence of the EEC, an institutionalised free market encompassing its principal trading partners, relieved the MFA of many of its traditional tasks. This marginalisation of the MFA could not be compensated for by a renewed concentration on politico-military matters inside NATO, since public opinion and parts of the political establishment considered Atlanticism as a somewhat outdated approach. Moreover, as a consequence of the domestic process of state reform, the increased competencies of substate entities included the authority to conclude international treaties. At the beginning of the 1990s, a real crisis of confidence existed between the public at large and the MFA, but also between the diplomatic corps and the political and economic establishment in Belgium. The main existential question for the MFA undoubtedly was: do we still serve any purpose? At the turn of the century however, the MFA had secured a new and central position in the Belgian international policy processes thanks to five interconnected processes, some of which will be elaborated upon in more detail below. The first was the loyal acceptance – after much initial hesitation and even outspoken hostility – of the new federal structure of the country. The second was the successful attempt to regain a central position in European decision-making amongst the many different actors involved – Europe now constituting the nucleus of Belgian diplomatic endeavours. The third development was a series of internal reforms capitalising on the inherent strengths of the diplomatic corps, showing these to be worthwhile and thus necessary to all actors involved in diplomatic decision-making. Fourthly, the MFA re-invented – as also occurred in the UK, Germany, the US and other countries – bilateral economic diplomacy and developed an aggressive stance, just as it had in earlier years. The last development was the linkage of the MFA with the new themes in diplomacy, such as human rights, the environment and international law, permitting the MFA to get in direct contact with NGO’s as new partners. The ‘renaissance’ of the MFA in the 1990s was the result of a well thought out strategy by a very small number of officials and political appointees. As a result, in 2000 for the first time in more than two decades, the budget of the MFA started to grow again, not only in absolute terms, but also in terms of its share in the overall state budget.

The MFA and the beginnings of European integration Belgium’s post-1945 European policy rested upon a pre-war economic consensus favouring global multilateral free trade, but which was now accompanied by advocacy of deeper regional economic as well as political cooperation. The signing of the Treaty of Rome had major consequences both for the conduct of diplomacy and the organisation of the Ministry of

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Foreign Affairs. European cooperation meant that the MFA had to adapt gradually to changes in the international environment as well as the European architecture. More was demanded of national organisational structures, especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, the gradual abolition of tariffs among the EEC member states implied that the MFA and its diplomats no longer had to enter into protracted bilateral negotiations to ensure access for Belgian products to the vital neighbouring markets. Now, multilateral negotiations concerning the organisation of this free-trade area became the primary task of Belgian economic diplomacy. Furthermore, although distant overseas markets were never of major importance to Belgium, the development of the common trade policy towards third countries meant that the European Commission took over many of the traditional tasks of the diplomatic service. As a result, export promotion – for long a primary task of Belgian diplomats – faded into the background. Within the MFA, bilateral economic diplomacy was now regarded as a minor task to be performed by the consular corps. This widened the gap between the diplomatic and the consular service. Additionally, after the Second World War, as diplomacy became increasingly multilateral, the number of Belgian diplomatic missions to international organisations grew, from one in 1946 to five in 1958.1 The intimacy of bilateral relations had to make way for the openness of multilateral diplomacy and advocates of bilateral diplomacy felt themselves to be on the defensive.2 Between 1939 and 1973, the number of diplomatic posts (embassies, permanent representations and consulates general) grew gradually from 79 to 136. This resulted from the increase in regional and international organisations and the emerging of new and independent states. The number of diplomats saw an exponential growth as well and increased from 175 officials in 1939 to 379 in the early 1970s. This growth mainly concentrated on Germany, France, UK, the Netherlands and Italy and confirmed once more the importance Belgium attached to its relations with neighbouring countries.3 On the creation of the EEC, the implementation of the Rome Treaty was not entrusted exclusively to the MFA. In several ministries distinct international divisions were created and a separate coordinating Inter-ministerial Economic Commission (IEC) was set up, headed by the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Economic Affairs. Within the IEC, specialised task forces were set up to deal with the specific issues concerning the ECSC, the EEC and Euratom. However, the Permanent Representation to the EEC also represented a parallel coordinating structure, creating an obvious risk of contradictory instructions. In the early 1960s, a clearer division of tasks was made. The IEC assumed coordination of more technical issues, whilst coordination of political issues was entrusted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At the end of the 1960s, the Service on European Integration – now known as P11 – was established within the MFA, in order to strengthen daily

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coordination of all European issues. Eventually, all coordinating mechanisms concerning European integration were concentrated within the MFA, thus ending a somewhat confused decision-making process.4

European supranationalism and Belgian federalism However, this concentration of European decision-making within the MFA did not produce the expected result of strengthening the MFA’s role vis-à-vis the other ministries. The reason for this lies in a series of reforms of the Belgian state, whereby the central (federal) level was hollowed out to the benefit of sub-state levels, which ultimately gained international treaty making power. During the mid-1960s, federalism at the Belgian and the European levels became intertwined. It was clear that the question of Flemish and Walloon identities and interests had not come to a satisfactory and sustainable solution within the framework of the Belgian State. A broader framework was necessary and some proponents of Walloon and Flemish nationalism saw ‘Europe’ as the structure that might offer a solution. Thus the revision of the Belgian Constitution can be seen as a twin-track process. In 1970 a devolution movement in Belgium began which was to evolve through consecutive constitutional reforms. The first of these, in 1970, made it possible to transfer national powers to both supranational organisations (thus ending the ‘illegality’ of the European institutions as seen from the perspective of the Belgian Constitution) and to sub-state levels, called the ‘federated entities’ (Communities and Regions). In this process, the federal state and the federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs lost power on two fronts: to a lower and to a higher level of policy making. In April 1979, a Belgian governmental programme for the first time formally opted in favour of a federal Europe, based on ‘peoples’, ‘persons’ and ‘regions’, without mentioning states. At first sight, the complex constitutional reform in Belgium may give the impression of not being directly linked to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, the opposite is true in at least two respects. First, as noted earlier, in their efforts to legitimise their claims for major power transfers within Belgium, the proponents of devolution discovered that a Europe organised on a regional basis offered an acceptable and even attractive projection of the future political organisation of the European continent. As a result of the constitutional reforms the MFA, as coordinator of European policies, had to adapt to the new structure of the Belgian State and the emergence of new actors. This brought about fundamental changes in the way foreign policy is conducted and coordinated, which shows itself especially in the complexity of the EU coordination mechanisms under the umbrella of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

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The federal structure of Belgium and the consequences for foreign-policy making In 1970, Belgian political parties negotiated the first important constitutional reform of the structure of the Belgian State. This first revision acknowledged the existence of three cultural communities (Flemish, French and German) and three regions (the Flemish Region, the Walloon Region and the Brussels Region). The powers that were granted to the Communities were cultural policy and (partly) the use of languages and education. The Regions acquired powers over certain aspects of socio-economic policy. In the field of international relations, only a principle was laid down, but one that was to become crucial in later reforms. A new article in the constitution stipulated that the power of the Cultural Communities also included international cooperation in their newly acquired areas of responsibility. The idea of extending these acquired powers to international relations was thus applied from the very beginning of the process of federalisation in Belgium, although the Belgian government through the MFA continued to exert Belgian international treaty-making power. Through further reforms in 1980, 1988 and 1983, the international capacity of the Communities and Regions was expanded. This was focused on the areas of foreign investment and foreign trade. There was a partial regionalisation of foreign trade through a transfer of some of the commercial attachés. Of the 135 national attachés, 28 were divided over the three Regions. Within the MFA the gradually increasing claims of Belgian federalists in the international domain were seen as undesirable and ill-advised. The practical consequences and the international law tradition of recognising only sovereign states as international actors presented considerable difficulties. But the domestic forces behind the devolution process were more powerful than these considerations. The 1993 reform laid down the architecture of Belgium as a full federal State. In the international domain it set an historic precedent, since the Communities and the Regions now acquired international treaty-making power over matters in which they have exclusive competence. In 2000–2001, the government concluded a series of new agreements, which provided for the transfer of agriculture, foreign trade and cooperation development to the Communities and the Regions. Practical details for the last two domains still have to be worked out, but will undoubtedly have repercussions on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Not least, the State Secretary for Foreign Trade will lose his or her job as this department is transferred to the Regions. It also implies that the federal export agency for foreign trade, the Belgian Foreign Trade Board, will disappear. The decision to hand over large parts of development aid faced more criticism since the work of combating underdevelopment in the least developed states was not taken into account by the negotiators whose attention was focused on domestic symbolism and financial considerations.

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The federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs had to respond to these developments by transferring certain powers to the Regions and the Communities, whilst the latter were required to adapt their structural organisation to their newly acquired powers. The sub-state levels of government now possess the authority to conclude international treaties in the domains for which they have acquired exclusive competencies. In order to deal with their new tasks, they have all set up specialised agencies, for example in bilateral export promotion and cultural cooperation agreements. An ongoing major overhaul of the Flemish administration will result, in 2002, in a Flemish Ministry for External Policy and European Affairs, encompassing all international activities of this particular sub-state actor. All the federated entities also have their own international representatives, dealing with the specific competencies of the Communities and Regions and operating alongside the diplomats of the MFA. After some initial frictions, the relations between federal diplomats and federated agents in the field now usually work smoothly.

The consequences for the internal organisation of the (federal) Ministry of Foreign Affairs As a result of the domestic devolution movement and the delegation of international policy areas to other departments, especially in the framework of enhanced European integration, the MFA in the 1970s faced the danger of becoming marginalised and losing the central role in foreign policy making it had acquired in the preceding decade. There was a fear that, at best, the MFA’s role would be diminished, with other ministries using its international infrastructure whilst developing their own autonomous diplomacy. To many in the MFA, this seemed almost inescapable, as the boundaries between domestic and foreign policy diminished, particularly in European affairs, the vital area of Belgian foreign policy. This possibility of marginalisation increased even further when in 1974 the European Council was created, enhancing the role of heads of state and government in European politics. Eventually, the MFA succeeded in preserving its central place in European decision-making in Belgium by shifting towards an enhanced coordination role. In the end, given the complex constitutional situation in Belgium, the MFA appeared to many – on the federal as well as on the sub-state level – to be the least ‘dangerous’ arena for coordination of European policies. The growing complexity of the European agenda required enhanced coordination, especially now that the number of actors in Belgium had grown significantly, lest Belgium lose its influence within Europe. Coordination within the Prime Minister’s Office was considered but regarded as giving the federal head of government too powerful a position vis-à-vis his peers at the sub-state level. Since in the end, overcoming its initial hostility, the MFA loyally accepted the consequences of the domestic devolution process, it regained at the same time a central role, by convincing the sub-state levels that the federal

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MFA was a much better instrument of securing their interests than creating a whole new diplomatic apparatus of their own. Consequently, it was able to present itself as a neutral arena, where the sometimes divergent interests of the numerous actors with a say in international relations could be discussed and reconciled. Moreover, all parties recognised the expertise of the diplomatic service in handling international negotiations. In the eyes of the newcomers in the Belgian foreign policy decision-making architecture, diplomacy often appeared arcane and the MFA offered uniquely qualified personnel to deal with it. Moreover, in the last couple of years, the MFA has reached out to NGO’s as new partners in international relations. In doing so, the MFA has tried to deflect the criticism that official diplomacy is unrepresentative. There is no doubt that NGOs have acquired more importance in the diplomatic decision-making process. The extent to which they effectively play a role still differs very much on the issue and the occasion. They clearly have an increasing influence in shaping norms, values and moral standards. After the genocide in Rwanda, the Belgian government has been working through NGOs in order to strengthen the Rwandese judicial system and in ZaireCongo the latter maintained contacts and a Belgian presence in that country when governmental relations were frozen in the 1990s. These examples were not all that surprising, since NGOs have been privileged partners in cooperation development since the 1970s, the Belgian government co-sponsoring a number of their projects in third world countries. Whilst in economic and commercial areas NGOs have been largely absent, in the preparation of WTO meetings starting with Seattle 1999, the MFA has been consulting with both industry and NGOs. The same can be said of certain ‘niche’ projects, such as the active Belgian participation in the worldwide campaign against landmines. Regular formal and informal meetings are now being held on a wide variety of subjects. In October 2001, Foreign Minister Louis Michel even created a special consultative body in order to structure the dialogue with civil society on topics such as human rights, peace, cooperation development and humanitarian action. For all this however, a price has been paid. Diplomatic policy-making processes have become increasingly complicated in Belgium. This is certainly the case for European policy making, which now rests upon a complex scheme of interlinked sui generis mechanisms, spanning three levels: a coordinating mechanism at the governmental level (the Interministerial Conference on Foreign Policy), at departmental level (European coordination, called P11, within the MFA) and, finally, within the Permanent Representation itself. In 1983 already, a ‘liaison office’ was established at the MFA, as a point of contact for the Communities and the Regions. This desk (S04), under the direct authority of the secretary-general of the MFA, is charged with the role of secretariat for the Interministerial Conference for Foreign Policy and the coordination agreements that have been concluded between the different actors and levels involved.

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Many items on the European agenda concern matters that fall within the jurisdiction of the Communities and the Regions. Thus it is obligatory to involve these authorities in shaping the various aspects of Belgium’s European policy, although the federal government retains competence for laying down its basic principles. When the Maastricht Treaty was negotiated, it was on Belgium’s request – together with Germany – that article 146 of the treaty was introduced. This article stipulates that ‘the Council shall consist of a representative of each Member State at ministerial level, authorised to commit the government of the Member State’. This means a representative, who is not a member of the federal government, but of one of the federated entities, can commit Belgium to a decision. For Belgium, this was a crucial issue relating to its federal structure. As there is no hierarchy between the federal government and the federated entities, it was important to be able to send a representative who does not belong to the federal government but to a federated entity. The problem now was to establish a mechanism in order to decide which entity (the federal or a federate one) could represent the country at meetings. Therefore, the rules and procedures, along with processes for coordination between the different partners, are stipulated in a number of cooperation agreements. In order to decide who will represent Belgium in the Council meetings, the configurations in which the Council meets were classified into four categories according to whether the subject matter falls: (1) entirely within the federal jurisdiction (category I): General Affairs, Ecofin, Budget, Justice, etc.; (2) mainly within the federal jurisdiction, but with some implications for Regions or Communities competencies (category II): agriculture (until 2001), internal market, health, energy, environmental policy, social affairs, transport; (3) mainly within the jurisdiction of the Communities and the Regions (category III): industry and research; (4) entirely within the jurisdiction of the Communities and the Regions (category IV): culture, education, tourism, youth, housing. In the Councils of the first and second categories, a federal minister represents Belgium, with a Community or a Regional minister attending the second category Council meetings as an ‘assessor’. A Community or a Regional minister represents Belgium in the Councils of the third and the fourth category, with a federal minister attending the third category Council meetings as an assessor. For the Council meetings of categories II, III and IV, the Belgian position needs to be approved beforehand by the Interministerial Conference on Foreign Policy where all actors involved meet at ministerial level and which constitutes the final foreign policy decision-making body, the MFA providing

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its secretary. Belgium can only vote in the Council if a consensus among all the partners is reached. If not, the country has to abstain. It sometimes happens that the Belgian position needs to be adapted during a Council meeting or in the Committee of Permanent Representatives. This means that the Belgian delegation present at these meetings has the obligation to consult the relevant federal and federated authorities, as consensus remains the main principle of Belgian policy. If a domestically negotiated position needs urgent adjustment, the Belgian representative will either consult with the relevant federal or federated authorities or, exceptionally, take a provisional line which has to be confirmed or invalidated by referendum within three days. Since consensus must be reached before the Council meetings the MFA, thanks to its now recognised coordinating role, plays a crucial role in preparing the official Belgian position and ironing out all possible conflicts between the numerous entities with an interest in European decision-making. Indeed, all meetings are prepared within P11, the European coordinating desk within the MFA’s directorate-general for multilateral political and thematic affairs. P11 is the lynchpin of European policy making in Belgium, organising and presiding over all coordination meetings. These are attended by representatives of the specialised ministries (both federal and federated) according to their involvement in the topic under discussion, by representatives of the federal Prime Minister and Vice-Prime Minister, of the Minister-Presidents of the Communities and the Regions, of the Minister/State Secretary for European Affairs (if the government has appointed one), of the Community and Regional Ministers of external relations, of the Belgium Permanent Representation to the European Union, as well as the Community and the Regional attachés attached to the Permanent Representation. If the items on the agenda only concern federal matters, representatives of the federated entities are also invited, in order to keep all partners of the Belgian state informed. P11 has a huge workload with some 200 coordination meetings a year handling the most diverse subjects, with the sole exception of environmental policy which is coordinated by the Ministry of the Environment. As a Belgian Permanent Representative once noted, the same 100 persons attend most of these meetings, illustrating the highly centralised character of European policy making in Belgium.5 The last level of coordination is within the Permanent Representation itself. It is composed of some 20 diplomats, slightly fewer civil servants from other ministries and some five representatives from the Communities and Regions. As with all Permanent Representations, this staff of 36 is supplemented by civil servants and experts from outside who attend specific meetings. After some initial difficulties, this structure works smoothly. This is due largely to the goodwill and pragmatism of all partners concerned. It also implies, however, a rather weak foundation for the long-term sustainability of Belgian foreign policy decision-making mechanisms. It is doubtful

Rik Coolsaet and Ann-Sofie Voet 69

whether the goodwill displayed by the various entities so far will continue, particularly in a situation where the various levels of government are directed by governmental coalitions of a different political composition. Domestic tensions could easily translate into deadlock in the foreign policy field since all partners involved have a de facto right of veto. Especially in the so-called ‘mixed treaties’, where competencies of both national and sub-state actors are involved, decision-making could become hostage to purely domestic policy calculations.

Belgium and the CFSP Belgian political and institutional adaptation to a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) came without major difficulties and was largely unnoticed for two reasons. The first one is very straightforward. Since Belgium took part in CFSP from its very inception as European Political Cooperation (EPC) within the Davignon Committee in 1969, adaptation was incremental and gradual. The second reason lies in its voluntary and declamatory character. The long standing Belgian Permanent Representative to the EU, Philippe de Schoutheete, correctly pointed out that the EPC was the most elaborate attempt at diplomatic coordination between sovereign states. Its importance should not be minimised, but its impact nevertheless remains limited.6 Even after Maastricht, when its name changed to CFSP, this remained the case. After 30 years of cooperating with the other EU member states within the EPC and CFSP frameworks, Belgian foreign-policy makers have fully internalised the habits of constantly taking into account the views of others. This relates not only to the practice of informing and consulting all member states (through COREU, bilaterally and, of course, through the EU working groups), but also to the definition of Belgian foreign-policy positions in terms of agreed European common positions. Belgian foreign-policy makers still try to convince their partners to accept their views on certain foreignpolicy issues during the political decision-making process leading to such a common position. But once agreement on a common position has been reached the Belgian government will adopt it as its own national position. Any attempt of ‘going it alone’, where preference is given to a national position over a common European position, is out of the question. In Belgian diplomacy, CFSP has never been viewed as a constriction on foreign and security policy making. Quite the contrary. CFSP clearly has been used by the MFA as a ‘multiplier’ for Belgian foreign policy opportunities and the projection of influence. Participation in the CFSP has made it possible for Belgian foreign-policy makers to be involved in foreign-policy issues without having to elaborate a national position where such a position would have been of little value (Albania, Cambodia, the Western Sahara provide good examples). More importantly, CFSP enables a small country such

70 Foreign Ministries in the European Union

as Belgium to pursue foreign-policy objectives which it would be unable to achieve on its own. In the Ministry, the most obvious institutional change was the more generalised presence of the COREU network and the P11 people in internal brainstorming and decision making procedures. The latest example of this was the designation in 2000 of a deputy to the African director with sole responsibility for the European dimension of Belgian African policy. In the 2002 reform of the MFA, CFSP will become a separate desk in the new European directorate. But overall, since in Belgium the ‘political’ aspects of foreign policy – that is, the domains covered by the CFSP – have traditionally been considered of secondary importance compared with the economic dimension, CFSP has not been very helpful for the MFA as a means of strengthening its position within the overall state bureaucracy or enhancing its prestige within the country.

Reforming the MFA In order to secure its newly acquired role in international decision-making, a reorganisation of the MFA was carried out between 1997 and 1999. One of its aims was to sustain the MFA’s claim to be the major channel for the conduct of international relations. Probably the most visible aspect of this reform was the merging of the bilateral geographical desks of the political and economic directorates-general within a new directorate-general for bilateral and international economic relations. In this way, Belgian diplomacy acquired larger desks for simultaneously handling political and, especially, economic bilateral relations. But this was only the most visible part of the 1997 reform. The European desk was reorganised in order to be able to handle European policy in an integrated way, notwithstanding the three pillar structure that came out of the Maastricht negotiations. A number of thematic desks were created or enhanced to permit the MFA to participate in new international negotiations, such as those relating to weapons of mass destruction, environmental issues, human rights and sustainable development. The juridical desk was enhanced as well so as to function as a central reference point for all ministries, federal and sub-state, concerning problems of international law. This reform was, in a sense, restricted to the corporate culture in the Brussels HQ of the MFA. A follow-on reform, in October 1997, was intended to modernise the activities of diplomatic posts by upgrading the role of the consular corps. As with most western diplomatic services, an increased service for Belgian citizens when travelling abroad was one of the main ideas behind this reform. At the end of 2000, a new internal reform was adopted as part of a global overhaul of all Belgian ministries. Amongst the major changes for the MFA was the upgrading of the European desk, which entailed its separation from

Rik Coolsaet and Ann-Sofie Voet 71

the directorate-general for multilateral political and functional affairs. This new European directorate-general will be called ‘European Affairs and Coordination’. This upgrading grew out of the enhanced importance of Europe in world affairs, the growing domestic impact of decisions taken at the European level and also of the increasing complexity of European issues due to the expansion of Councils, committees and commissions. The new European directorate-general will be organised as three separate desks: European integration and coordination (the P11-function, including agriculture and cooperation development), CFSP, and European bilateral relations (separated from their former directorate-general). This reorganisation will be implemented from 2002 onwards. The successive reforms of the MFA capitalised on the inherent traditional strengths of this well-oiled machinery for dealing with Belgium’s interests in the world at large. They made it possible to overcome the lacklustre image of Belgian diplomacy common in the 1980s. Nowadays, the MFA again acts as the switchboard for the international relations of Belgium and its federated entities. However, in as far as past experience can serve as a guide this situation, which at present seems to engender positive results, may not endure since developments in domestic politics are unpredictable and policy decisions not always as rational as one might hope.

Conclusion Contrary to defeatist projections in the 1980s, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs survived the ongoing constitutional reform in Belgium and successfully retained its pre-eminence in foreign-policy making as it emerged as a keyplayer in the vital domain of European integration. Moreover, bilateral diplomacy has not disappeared. In three domains at least, a renewed emphasis on bilateralism can be detected, firstly in a field where it was possibly least expected, namely commercial and economic matters. Despite the widespread thesis of economic globalisation and the marginalisation of the state that runs parallel with it, the Belgian MFA has shown since the mid-1990s a remarkable aggressiveness with regard to bilateral commercial activities. Economic diplomacy once more gained increased attention and acquired a new dynamism and political acceptability.7 Through its 1997 internal reorganisation, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs felt itself better equipped for the increased international competition it faced in world markets. The second domain is represented by the apparent preference of the larger member states for the use of contact groups or caucuses – as in the case of Kosovo – rather than EU-based decision-making processes. The third domain is to be found in the continuing need for bilateralism in the preparations for multilateral diplomacy. In a parallel development based on the conviction that coordination is power, the MFA has concentrated on the enhancement of its coordinating role.

72 Foreign Ministries in the European Union

The need for an elaborate coordination architecture in foreign policy forced itself upon Belgium as a direct consequence of both the domestic devolution process and the ever-widening processes of Europeanisation. Through this, the MFA can steer decision-making, but only up to the point that it retains its image as a neutral ‘honest broker’ in the eyes of the numerous actors in the process. The relations between the MFA and the prime minister are somewhat more complex, since they involve cross-cutting interactions between structural factors, personalities and administrations. The bottom line is that the role of the prime minister in European matters is most likely to go on growing. Since prime ministers are usually the ultimate arbitrators in domestic matters, they will increasingly have to assert this role in the European sphere, since the borderline between domestic and foreign policy will continue to wane due to the ever-widening agenda of European integration. The Dutch scholar Alfred van Staden has rightly pointed out that the place where European policy is prepared in the future will become the most important touchstone for the future importance of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.8 In the case of Belgium, the MFA has built up an undisputed central place in European decision-making, since the crucial preparatory and coordination mechanisms are all situated under its umbrella. The planned 2002 upgrading of the European desk within the MFA to the level of a separate directorate shows not only how vital European policy is for Belgium, but also how strongly felt is the need to secure a central role for the MFA within the European decision-making architecture.

Appendix Basic statistics (as of January 2001) 1. Expenditures (in Belgian Francs) Overall budget (Cooperation Development excluded) Share in federal budget 2. Diplomatic network Embassies Non-resident Ambassadors Consulates-General Consulates Permanent Representations Honorary Consuls 3. Staff numbers Personnel abroad Personnel in MFA

12.123 billion 1.04%

89 1 28 7 13 284

1809 1002

Rik Coolsaet and Ann-Sofie Voet 73 Number of diplomats Of which: ● ● ●

abroad in MFA special assignments

Number of Chancellors Of which: ● ● ●

abroad in MFA special assignments

Number of Cooperation Development Attachés Of which: ● ●

abroad in MFA

401 251 100 50 196 126 54 8 23 22 1

Notes 1. Virally, M. et al. Les missions permanentes auprès des Organisations Internationales, part 1 (Brussels: Bruylant, 1991), p. 46. 2. Van den Bosch, J. ‘La représentation extérieure de la Belgique’, Revue Générale belge, III(2) 1961; Berridge, G. R. Diplomacy. Theory and Practice (London: Prentice Hall, 1995), pp. 32–4. 3. Hoefnagels, M. Secundaire analyse van de Belgische diplomatieke dienst (Brussels: Centrum voor Polemologie, 1974), p. 29. 4. Les conséquences d’ordre interne de la participation de la Belgique aux organisations internationales (The Hague: Institut Royal des Relations Internationales, 1964), p. 57; Franck, C. ‘Interactions entre Intégration européenne et structures politiques belges’, in Lejeune, Y., La participation de la Belgique à l’élaboration et à la mise en œuvre du droit européen (Brussels: Bruylant, 1999), pp. 476–94. 5. Van Daele, F. ‘België in de Europese Unie: mensen en middelen’, in Res Publica, XL(2) 1998, p. 194. 6. De Schoutheete, Ph. Une Europe pour tous (Paris, Odile Jacob, 1997), p. 117. 7. Speech by Minister of Foreign Affairs L. Michel to the MFA personnel, Brussels, 20 July 1999; Note de politique étrangère (Brussels: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 7 December 1999 (point 4.4)). 8. Van Staden, A. ‘Controverse bij een jubileum’, in Internationale Spectator, 52(3) 1998.

Bibliography Annuaire Administratif et Judiciaire de Belgique (Brussels: Bruylant, 1963) ‘België in de Europese Unie’, in Res Publica (1998), 60(2) Clement, J. et al. Het Sint-Michielsakkoord en zijn achtergronden (Antwerp: Maklu, 1993) Coolsaet, R. ‘The transformation of diplomacy at the threshold of the new millennium’ (Leicester: University of Leicester, Centre for the Study of Diplomacy, DSP Discussion Papers, 48, 1998)

74 Foreign Ministries in the European Union Coolsaet, R. ‘ “Trade is War.” Belgium’s economic diplomacy in the age of globalisation’ (Leicester: University of Leicester, Centre for the Study of Diplomacy, DSP Discussion Papers, 62, 2000) Coolsaet, R. België en zijn buitenlandse politiek. 1830–2000 (3rd edn) (Leuven: Van Halewyck, 2001) Coolsaet, R. and Soetendorp, B. ‘Belgium and the Netherlands’, in Manners, I. and Whitman, R., The Foreign Policies of European Union Member States (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001), pp. 128–43 Douvere, F. ‘Organisatie van het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken en Ontwikkelingssamenwerking (1945-heden)’, Unpublished thesis, University of Ghent, 2000 Franck, C. ‘Belgium. The Importance of Foreign Policy to European Political Union’, in Hill, C., The Actors in Europe’s Foreign Policy (New York: Routledge, 1996), pp. 152–65 Franck, C. ‘Interactions entre intégration européenne et structures politiques belges’, in Lejeune, Y., La participation de la Belgique à l’élaboration et à la mise en œuvre du droit européen (Brussels: Bruylant, 1999), pp. 476–94 Hoefnagels, M. Secundaire analyse van de Belgische diplomatieke dienst (Brussels: Centrum voor Polemologie, 1974) Les conséquences d’ordre interne de la participation de la Belgique aux organisations internationales (The Hague: Institut Royal des Relations Internationales, 1964) Kerremans, B. and Beyers, J. ‘De plaats van de federale overheid, Gewesten en Gemeenschappen in de Europese Unie: consequenties van de staatshervorming en de wijziging van artikel 146 TEU’, in Tijdschrift voor Bestuurswetenschappen en Politiek, 1995, 50(11) Standaert, F. Buitenlandse betrekkingen in de federale staat België (Landegem: BW Nevelland, 1995) Van den Bossche, K. ‘De organisatie van buitenlandse zaken tijdens het interbellum’, Unpublished thesis, University of Ghent, 2000

Websites MFA The Flemish Government The French-speaking and Walloon Governments The Brussels Government

http://www.diplobel.org/ http://www.vlaanderen.be/ http://www.cfwb.be/gouver http://gov.wallonie.be http://www.brussel.irisnet.be/

5 Denmark Knud Erik Jørgensen

The Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs is among the oldest ministries in Denmark. It can trace its history as an independent administrative unit back to 1770 when it was created by a separation from the so-called German chancellery.1 The new ministry was assigned the task of cultivating Denmark’s external relations, except those with Germany. It was a child of the Danish absolutist state. In 1995, the ministry celebrated its 225th anniversary.2 With such a long history, terms like ‘change’ and ‘adaptation’ are by no means foreign to the vocabulary of the ministry. Diplomats can claim that ‘we have tried it before’ or that change has been among the few constants in the long history of the ministry. However, this point of departure does not make it irrelevant to inquire into change and adaptation in the post-war period. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is highly regarded in the Danish state administration, and it is generally perceived as being a strong ministry. This current position was achieved by, among other things, participation in OEEC/OECD and the administration of Marshall aid in the 1950s. Since then, the ministry has grown in terms of both administrative units and personnel. In 1946 it consisted of 11 offices in Copenhagen and 38 representations abroad – by 1970 this had increased to 76 representations. In 1995 the ministry had 35 offices and 101 representations abroad. In terms of personnel, the ministry employed around 1,100 in 1970 and around 1,700 in 1995.3 The importance of the ministry is also reflected in the ministerial status of the Foreign Minister who, together with the Minister of Finance, ranks second only to the Prime Minister. Finally, it is very prestigious to work in the ministry and there have been no noteworthy problems in recruiting highly qualified staff. This chapter describes how the ministry has adapted to new challenges. I describe, primarily, changes in the foreign policy process as distinct from foreign policy, which will be described only when appropriate. I focus on the period after the Second World War, but attention will be paid principally to the last 25 years, i.e. the period since Denmark became a member of the European Community. Six factors, half of which are external, have 75

76 Foreign Ministries in the European Union

significantly influenced the position of the ministry. Firstly, the trend towards multilateralism. Denmark is represented in most international institutions – and these are ‘represented’ in Denmark – in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Secondly, the ‘internationalisation’ and ‘globalisation’ of the economy. This trend has fundamentally changed the way in which the ministry promotes exports. Thirdly, the international norm which prompts highly developed countries to commit themselves to contribute development aid to Third World countries. The norm has materialised in the form of Danida, the largest single unit within the ministry. Three internal factors add to the external factors. Firstly, there have been tendencies towards a certain ‘fragmentation’ of the foreign policy decisionmaking system, particularly after the end of the Cold War. The term ‘fragmentation’ reflects the fact that sector ministries have become much more independent in their international activities, and that the Prime Minister’s Department, the Ministry of Defence and the Parliament (Folketinget) have enjoyed a greater say in the foreign policy process. Secondly, two key dimensions of Danish foreign policy have been highly politicised during the last two decades. Security policy was politicised during most of the 1980s, and Danish policy on Europe has been politicised since Denmark joined the European Community in 1972. Thirdly, the erosion of the domestic/foreign policy divide has markedly influenced the position of the ministry. Important aspects of this erosion is an ‘internationalisation’ of domestic politics and a ‘democratisation’ of foreign policy – and thereby the Folketing’s simultaneous decreased/increased influence on policy processes.

Organisation and agendas In this brief outline, I summarise the operational environment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on five key issues. Firstly, the move to international institutions. This trend has characterised the major part of the twentieth century. How did it affect the ministry? Before the Second World War, the ministry was almost inactive in foreign political affairs. Neutrality had served the country well and kept it at a distance from the horrors of the First World War. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the last ‘confetti’ of Danish colonial possessions were sold to the USA and that the Danish south border issue was settled in 1920. The 1919 Commission on the Foreign Service concluded that, ‘foreign policy is now almost identical with trade policy’.4 This conception of foreign policy was in perfect tune with the so-called ‘playing dead’ policy adopted after the war in 1864. When the ministry was involved in politics it was primarily League of Nations politics. After the Second World War the move to multilateral institutions accelerated, and Denmark followed suit. In the first row we find the UN, NATO, OEEC/OECD, and the EC/EU. Both NATO and EC membership contributed to a gradual increase in the ministry’s politico-diplomatic activities.

Knud Erik Jørgensen 77

In the second row we find the Council of Europe, the CSCE/OSCE and Nordic cooperation. Institutionalisation meant a veritable revolution in terms of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ expansion in areas of concentration, global reach and increase in access to and information about international actors. As a result, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ horizons became profoundly more international. Secondly, in parallel to the global process of decolonisation, Denmark began to cultivate relations with the newly independent states in the Third World. The ministry created administrative units to engage in what was called ‘technical cooperation with developing countries’. At the time it was widely believed that during a 10–15 year long phase of transition the Third World would turn into an immense market for Danish export.5 Thirdly, the erosion of the domestic/foreign policy divide has caused considerable changes in the ministry’s work. The erosion prompted attacks by parliamentarians on the executive’s constitutionally guaranteed prerogative to conduct the country’s foreign policy. To some degree, foreign policy has become ‘democratised’. Furthermore, Christensen’s hypothesis is that the ‘tougher’ domestic political climate has had effects on how resources are used in the ministry: ‘For an outsider, it is remarkable how many resources are devoted to writing briefing-notes and memos to high and low to be used for considerations and decisions, and to produce papers for a continuously increasing number of meetings, negotiations, and travels. Whether they are actually used for something, or made “just in case”, one can only guess.’6 Fourthly, economic internationalisation and globalisation have effects on what the ministry considers to be its tasks. Denmark is – to use Katzenstein’s well-known phrase – one of the ‘small states in world markets’. This fact constitutes one of the factors which may explain why foreign economic relations have gained top priority in the ministry. Fifthly, Denmark’s geopolitical location through most of the twentieth century was not conducive to political adventures. In 1864 a major part of the country was lost in war to Bismarck and Emperor Wilhelm’s Germany; in the 1930s Nazi Germany rose to great power status and occupied the country during the Second World War. After the war, the Soviet Union took over the role of big threatening neighbour. How much room for manoeuvre was there left for a small state with less than five million inhabitants? Organisational reforms The Danish foreign ministry has some organisational features which differ from some, but not all, foreign ministries.7 Thus, trade policy is part of the foreign ministry’s portfolio (similar to most countries, different from the UK and Germany, and, to some extent, also different from the Netherlands and Finland); administration of development issues is in Denmark a direct part of the foreign ministry (similar to Finland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland and Sweden – dissimilar to Norway and Germany, and to some extent

78 Foreign Ministries in the European Union

different from Australia, Canada and the UK); export promotion is a fully integrated part of the foreign ministry (similar to Canada, yet different from most other countries); the foreign ministry is responsible for coordination of EU issues (like Belgium, the Netherlands, and Ireland – and different from the UK and Germany). In short, the ministry includes administrative units which deal with trade policy, development policy, export promotion and general coordination of EU issues. According to one interpretation, the ministry has been able to control a fairly high number of administrative functions. However, the scope of functions also means that the ministry is relatively small in terms of administrative units and manpower resources for traditional diplomatic-political functions. Since the Second World War, the ministry has been through several major and minor organisational reforms. The first of these reforms occurred as part of the activities associated with Denmark’s application for EC membership in the early 1960s. The second reform took place in the early 1970s as part of the ministry’s preparations for life in the EC. A significant element of the reform was the upgrading of the ‘Market Secretariat’ to what became the Department for External Economic Relations. At the same time Danida proved to be an ascending star. From the beginning of 1973 it became an independent unit in the First Department. In 1986, the importance of Danida had grown to such an extent that it became an independent department, an indication that the ministry was further away from being a single structure than ever before. The Foreign Service was thoroughly reorganised in 1991. The reform was prepared by a committee created on 1 April 1989, which presented its twovolume report on 24 October 1990.8 The reform was ‘thorough’ in the sense that it introduced, among other things, a new principle for the organisation of the ministry. Having been organised along functional lines from 1849 onwards, the ministry is now organised along geographical/regional lines. As a consequence, the main units are now the so-called North-division and the South-division. Grønnegård Christensen summarises developments: ‘The ministry has gone through a turbulent development for the past 25 years’.9 The reform debate Despite being thorough, the 1991 reform did not address all aspects of the organisational setup in which the ministry is involved. It is, therefore, in a certain sense, appropriate to talk about the contours of an ongoing reform debate. Three issues seem to attract most attention. The one which is of a general nature will be presented here, while the two remaining will be presented in the section on the EU dimension. The 1991 reform did not address issues concerning the political structure of the ministry’s political management.10 Since 1960, ministers have often been assigned specific policy areas in the ministry. These areas have changed over time. Sometimes it has been disarmament, for a decade (until 1977) it

Knud Erik Jørgensen 79

was foreign economic relations (specifically, ‘Market relations’). Now it has become a rule that Social Democratic Prime Ministers appoint a junior minister for development aid issues. Still, there are a number of arguments for change in the ministry’s political management. For some it is a question of the minister’s limited time resources. Indeed, the key problem concerns ‘physical presence’ in Council meetings and other fora.11 Among pragmatic solutions, the most common is that top officials represent Denmark at various meetings when the minister is unable to attend. Some claim that this practice proves that an informal system of secretaries of state has been introduced. True or not, the solution is widely perceived as unsatisfactory. The present sub-optional system is nonetheless likely to continue. Grønnegård Christensen notes that administrative reforms do not attract very much attention from politicians, indeed most reforms of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have been initiated by the ministry’s own top officials. Grønnegård Christensen adds that the structure of political leadership seems to be the most conservative aspect of public administration.12 In sum, contours of a debate are discernible, yet they hardly constitute a systematic debate on means and ends. A newly launched research programme on ‘democracy and power’ might, eventually, end up with proposals having effects on the issues I have described above.

The EU dimension A previous director-general of the Foreign Ministry, Henrik Wøhlk, has pointed out that membership of the EU has fundamentally changed Danish foreign policy, and that membership also has had the ‘most perceptible consequences for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’.13 In this section I describe the consequences and the effects they have had on the ministry. Two EU-related factors have prompted the ministry to reconsider some of its traditional functions. First, the Single European Market is expected to cause an increased ‘Europeanisation’ of Danish companies. More than in the past, they will create branches in other EU member states, and they will cultivate previously neglected markets, meaning that the ministry’s section for export promotion will face new challenges and tasks. Second, the EPC/CFSP involves an increasing number of diplomats. The scope and depth of CFSP is expected to expand, making it even more resource demanding than today. Third, the Danish opt-out on European defence matters does not make European defence a non-issue. An active observer needs to be informed about developments in the ESDP – and because the information flow is less automatic for observers than for members, it requires more resources to obtain information. Finally, Denmark has an explicitly stated interest in some of the issues on the new European foreign policy agenda, in particular relations with the Baltic states and the EU enlargement process. This also requires more resources than issues on the ‘low burner’.

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Coordination roles and problems The institutional triangle consisting of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Prime Minister’s Department and Folketinget hosts some of the most notorious coordination problems. The following sections will therefore be divided into three clusters of relations and coordination problems: relations between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and sector ministries; relations between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Prime Minister’s Department; and relations between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Folketinget. First, it is noteworthy that until 1973 the ministry functioned as Denmark’s undisputed actor on the international scene. Most sectoral ministries were extremely introvert national administrative units. To the degree officials in sector ministries knew about a world outside Denmark, they also knew it was the domain of the Foreign Ministry. Membership of the EC did not have an immediate effect on these relations. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was administratively strengthened by a decision to place a unit for ‘Market relations’ in the ministry. In principle, the unit could have been placed in the Ministry of Economics or in the Prime Minister’s Department. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs continued to coordinate Danish European policies, and sector ministries did not mind this state of affairs, indeed, for some time they appreciated the guidance on behaviour in unknown international arenas. What has changed and what has remained unchanged since the 1970s? First, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ original role has changed significantly. Sectoral ministries have created their own competence, not in the legal sense but in the sense that they no longer need support from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ officials when participating in EU meetings. Sectoral ministries have also acquired significant staff resources to handle EU-affairs; indeed statistics show that sector ministries by 1988 used more resources on international activities than the Foreign Ministry.14 Furthermore, it is somewhat difficult to gauge the degree to which the ministry attempts to influence and coordinate sector ministries. It is equally difficult to ‘measure’ the degree of the ministry’s enforcement of its ‘rulings’. Some point out that the ministry’s coordination role is primarily a feature at the formal level. Others point out examples of the ministry’s coordination of Danish policies: employment of §235 in the Treaty on European Union and negotiations on EU budget reforms. A concrete case, reported in the Danish press, belongs in the same context. Thus, at some point, the Ministry for Social Affairs announced that it was ready to participate in EU programmes which would violate one of the Danish opt-outs negotiated at the European Council meeting in Edinburgh in December 1992. The Foreign Ministry intervened by calling attention to this grave error which was subsequently corrected. Still others point out that the ministry continues to function as ‘transverse coordinator’ but that its effects may no longer be manifest. The reason is that the ministry through hard work has created ‘reflexes’ in sector ministries.

Knud Erik Jørgensen 81

In other words, standard operating procedures rule administrative practices to a degree which makes it less necessary for the ministry to ‘enforce’ coordination on a sector ministry which pursue narrow sector interests (this in contrast to ‘superior Danish interests’). Second, during the first 20 years of Danish EC membership, relations between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Prime Minister’s Department were not characterised by serious coordination problems. Between 1982 and 1993, the combination of a charismatic Foreign Minister (Ellemann-Jensen) and a foreign affairs low-profile Prime Minister (Schlüter) secured a calm, if not actually a non-relationship between the two ministries. The arrival in 1993 of a new Prime Minister (Nyrup Rasmussen) had a significant impact on relations between the ministry and the Prime Minister’s Department. Soon after his arrival, the Prime Minister explicitly stated a keen interest in European politics. He reorganised and strengthened his department – among other things, by recruiting top officials from the Foreign Ministry (see Fig. 5.1). Apart from these innovations, coordination has not been helped by the fact that personal relations between the Prime Minister and his Minister of Foreign Affairs are notoriously bad. Third, relations between the Foreign Ministry and Folketinget are also characterised by coordination problems – problems mixed with and strengthened by disagreements about who should control Danish EU policy making. Whereas many parliamentarians argue that EU politics ‘in reality’ is domestic politics, the Foreign Ministry routinely refers to the constitution’s Art. 3 which gives a clear prerogative to the executive in foreign affairs. Thus, seen from one perspective, we see a Parliament trying to conquer some turf which traditionally has belonged to the ministry. However, from a second perspective, we see a Parliament which has lost a considerable

The Prime Minister

Permanent Secretary

Area 1 Justice Head of Council Figure 5.1

Area 2 Economy Head of Council

Area 3 Foreign policy Head of Council

The prime minister’s new organisation

Source: Mandag Morgen Analyse

Area 4 Administration Head of Council

82 Foreign Ministries in the European Union

part of its legislative power to the Council of Ministers – and which now tries to reconquer some of the powers lost. A logical countermove would have been the creation of an independent secretariat to serve the Folketing in European affairs. Yet, as a Constitutional law expert, Jens Peter Christensen, has noted, ‘Compared with most other countries, the Danish Folketing’s secretariat-resources are remarkable. For some inexplicable reason the Folketing has always seen a special value in being a discount parliament.’15 Instead, the Folketing has been ever more demanding in its relations with the ministry – which apparently has given in to these demands. The ministry’s N1 office consequently uses a disproportionately large part of its resources to service the Folketing’s Committee on Europe. Even worse is that the office often plays the role of task-force, preoccupied with acute political ‘fire fighting’. Needless to say, time for planning, or just thinking ahead, is very limited in such an ‘impossible’ environment. Reform debate The model used for coordinating Danish EU policies has remained fundamentally unchanged since its creation in the early 1970s (see Fig 5.2). It should be emphasised, however, that for some of the key players, this sort of continuity is viewed positively.16 For others, it constitutes a problem. Ersbøll emphasises that many ministries are much more independent in the European arena than they were when Denmark joined the EC. However, as he points out, ‘This change in the Foreign Service’s tasks in Brussels has […] not brought about major adaptations to the 25 year-old organisational model. Issues on the EU agenda are still prepared by inter-ministerial coordination committees, chaired by the Foreign Ministry.’17 Similar points of view have recently been put forward by a researcher from the Danish Institute of International Affairs.18 The second unchanged aspect concerns the organisation of relations between Government and Parliament. European Commissioner Ritt Bjerregaard, notes that ‘The Danish way to deal with issues on the EU agenda has basically not been changed since Denmark joined the EC in 1973. From

EU-level Commission The Commission makes proposals

Figure 5.2

National level Government and its central administration The Special EUGovernment’s committees committee foreign policy committee

The EU coordination system in Denmark

Source: Nedergaard, Denmark’s Administration of the EU, p. 293

EU-level Parliament

Council of Ministers

Parliament’s market committee

Council of Ministers makes decisions

Knud Erik Jørgensen 83

time to time, minor corrections have been introduced, usually prompted by situations where the Folketing has been insufficiently informed, but basically the system is just as it was in 1973.’19 On the other hand, a previous chairman of the Parliament’s Committee on Europe, Ove Fich, was often quoted as saying that relations have been significantly improved, meaning that he does not see any serious problem.

Strategies and responses In this section I describe the different ways in which the foreign ministry has responded to the evolving EU and international changes in general. Organisational reforms Over the years top officials in the ministry have initiated several organisational reforms. They have attempted to avoid being caught off-guard by unexpected developments; to reduce the negative consequences of budget reductions; to use global changes and Europeanisation in arguments for organisational reform. These reforms have seldom, if ever, been initiated by politicians. As part of the most recent organisational reform a single administrative unit was introduced in 1991. It means that most of the ministry’s staff can function in all parts of the organisation. At least in principle, this move creates more flexibility in the organisation, more equal access for all staff types to make a career, and fewer specialists. Previous specialists have taken on new or additional functions; for example, some Danida specialists have been asked to provide an input into the CFSP mechanism. The reform was thorough in the sense that several other historical principles for the ministry’s organisation were abandoned or significantly changed (see Table 5.1). In the old system, a team consisting of three permanent

Table 5.1 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs organisation: principles before and after the reorganisation of 1991 Principles

New structure

Old structure

Service to ministers Structure of department Division of labour Hierarchy Line of command Basic units Directing principles Employee policy

Hierarchical Unity of department Geographical Low Line/staff 35 Decentralisation Unified

Collegiate 3 departments Functional High Line/staff 45 Centralisation Multiple

Source: J. Grønnegård Christensen, ‘Udenrigsministeriets reorganisering’, 1991, p. 93

84 Foreign Ministries in the European Union

secretaries and the director-general of the ministry was responsible for advising the Minister. In the new system, this advice function is hierarchical. Previously, the ministry consisted of three departments (politico-juridical, politico-economical and international development issues). The three departments have been merged into a single department – subdivided into two large units. The principle of dividing the ministry into main units was changed from a functional to a geographical model. This change constituted a break with a 140 year-old tradition – a tradition inaugurated when the Danish absolutist state was abolished in the mid nineteenth century. The ministry is now organised in two main units: the North-division and the South-division. Each unit consists of smaller regional groupings. Hierarchy in the administrative structure, which was previously fairly steep, has been ‘flattened’ by dissolving one layer of the structure (consisting of sections). In line with this, the number of units has been significantly reduced from 45 to 35. Lines of command have not been changed but continue to be divided between ‘line’ and ‘staff’. The management principle has been changed from a centralised to a decentralised one. Staff policy has also been changed. The previous system was characterised by a plurality of career paths. Widespread specialisation resulted in limited flexibility, and mobility between different paths was not common – indeed career-minded staff sometimes realised they were trapped in a dead-end. The introduction of a new unified system means, in principle, that all except a few specialists can work and make careers in the entire organisation. The reform can be seen in several contexts. It can be regarded as an adaptation to the gradual rapprochement between political and economic affairs which has taken place in the EU Council during the last decade. It can also be seen as a method of curbing tendencies to excessively independent behaviour by Danida officials. Christensen points out that organisations tend to move back to their previous forms, among other things, because of vested interests within the organisation. In the case of the foreign ministry this has apparently not happened, although some recent changes can be interpreted in that way.20 In 1994 a secretariat for foreign trade was created outside the two-division structure introduced in 1991. Grønnegård Christensen also interprets the split of the political executive between a Minister for Foreign Affairs and a Minister for International Aid as a re-bureaucratisation, partly because the chief of the South-division ‘effectively acts as a permanent secretary vis-à-vis the Minister of Foreign Aid.’21 Reduce budgets? OK, we reduce tasks! One response to demands for budget reductions has been to relinquish the ministry’s direct responsibility for handling a number of issue areas – i.e. the so-called ‘frontforkortning’. According to former director-general of the ministry Otto Møller, the ministry gave up responsibility for agricultural policy

Knud Erik Jørgensen 85

in the UN, and for agricultural, industrial, regional and steel policy in the EC in 1987.22 Furthermore, the ministry decided to put other EU issue areas on the ‘low burner’, i.e. Foreign Ministry officials continued to monitor such issues but stopped trying to influence sector ministries’ handling of social, consumer, education, culture and health policies. Embassies While it is beyond dispute that relations between the ministry and its embassies have changed, it does not mean that foreign embassies have become redundant. Some top officials tend to claim that the opposite is true. It is acknowledged that the ambassador and embassy staff work on tasks other than those they dealt with previously. Former director general of the ministry, Paul Fischer, emphasises that ‘until our membership [of the EC/EU] it was important to report as much as possible about the EC, and about current domestic affairs. After our membership we have to be more selective’23 – and further – ‘Sure, cooperation in the EU makes a good deal of traditional diplomacy redundant.’24 Thus, the development of modern means of communication has significantly influenced the nature of exchanges between the ministry and embassies. The embassy does not need to report about what was said at a given press conference. Yet, background information about why it was said is most welcome in Copenhagen. In Fischer’s words, ‘We know that they watch BBC and CNN in Copenhagen, and read competent analyses and comments in Le Monde, The Herald Tribune, Financial Times, etc. So, what we shall do is to present something independent, authoritative and analytically interesting in our reports, preferably immediately […] This is particularly relevant for bilateral embassies in other EU member states.’25 The time factor also seems to play a prominent role: ‘After membership of the EC our reporting became adapted to meetings in Brussels, thematically as well as in terms of timing.’26 These changes have probably prompted some to hypothesise about the decline of the bilateral embassy. However, the thesis is not confirmed by officials in the ministry. In other words, some of the traditional tasks have become redundant. The type of questions which interests officials at headquarters is no longer: what is the position of country x? – rather: what is the likely position of country x next year?, and, what causes country x to have its present position? In line with this attitude it is noteworthy that embassies in London, Berlin and Paris continue to belong to the category of the so-called ‘Big Six’, i.e. they are in the same category as Washington, New York (the UN) and Brussels (the EU). Concerning embassies outside the EU it is noteworthy that the CFSP did not reduce the need to establish embassies in newly created states (for instance in the CIS-states). To some degree the CFSP has changed the task of embassies. A considerable degree of Schicksalsgemeinschaft has been created, meaning that the coordination and sharing of information takes place between embassies

86 Foreign Ministries in the European Union

of EU member states. Apart from such matters, the embassy continues to represent Danish interests. Furthermore, officials disagree with the thesis that commercial diplomacy has come to dominate the embassy’s work. It is necessary to add that, in a sense, discussion of ‘the embassy’ tends to be too abstract. In reality, the label ‘embassy’ covers a wide range of quite different units, performing quite different functions. One distinction concerns size. Most Danish embassies are fairly small (four to five people, plus local staff) and some belong to the above mentioned category of the ‘Big Six.’ Another relevant distinction is between the type of issues that the embassy primarily deals with. Thus, some embassies are located in regions designated as ‘trade regions’; other embassies are located in ‘political regions’; and some in ‘development regions.’ To give an example of the latter: the share of tasks concerning development issues is around 66 per cent for Danish embassies in Central Africa.27 Finally, alternatives to traditional representation have been considered. One alternative is the Copenhagen-based ambassador, but it has been concluded that there are too many disadvantages. Another alternative is joint representation, which is also considered as an unattractive option. The joint Nordic embassy compound in Berlin is not an exception here because ‘joint’ merely means sharing certain facilities, not joint representation. Coordination of EU policies Above I have noted that the model for coordination of Danish policies on Europe, grosso-modo, has remained unchanged since the early 1970s. Because the ministry’s interests are well served by the model, the ministry is most unlikely to initiate changes. Thus, whenever possible, the ministry attempts to keep the coordination function in-house. Needless to say, officials are well aware that there is nothing natural about centralised coordination of EU policies or about having the centralising function based in the Foreign Ministry. Yet, part of the strategy has clearly been to argue that

Government

Parliament . . . (electorate)

Foreign Ministry

Committee on Europe

Committee on Foreign Affairs

Sector Ministries

Ministry of Defence Figure 5.3

Prime Minister’s Department

Committee on International Development

Coordination axes in Danish policy making in Europe

Knud Erik Jørgensen 87

a centralised system is the most appropriate for a small state, that the coordination function has historically resided in the ministry and that it is best kept there.28 Furthermore, the ministry is in the comfortable position of being able to point to the undisputed fact that the mixed centralised– decentralised model functions very well – as demonstrated by the high level of implementation of EU directives. Relations with ‘foreign affairs’ Brussels The ministry has been remarkably reluctant to cultivate direct relations with the embryonic EU ‘foreign affairs’ departments in Brussels. This is particularly true concerning the Council Secretariat and the Commission’s External Relations. By contrast, there have (obviously) been Danish diplomats seconded to the EPC/CFSP Secretariat in connection with Danish EU presidencies. The ministry is also, in principle, interested in seconding officials to other EU institutions, but so far the interest has not been translated into action. Senior officials recognise that the ministry has neglected these opportunities. While the ministry has neglected ‘secondment’ opportunities, it has been fully involved in the CFSP mechanism. Participation in this requires considerable manpower, which inevitably poses difficulties for a small ministry. Besides diplomats from the classic functions, it is interesting to see how a number of Danida officials – which previously devoted most of their time to narrowly defined development issues – have become drawn into the CFSP process. The introduction of conditionality means that they monitor receivers of aid and report whether principles of ‘good governance’ are adhered to or not. Domestic constituencies The ministry has actively sought to cultivate domestic constituencies, including relations with NGOs and business. However, the extent of such constituency creation varies between issue areas. Danida has been among the most active in cultivating domestic constituencies: i.e., organisations for development aid, humanitarian assistance, political organisations, etc. The permanent secretary of the South-division, Margrethe Løj29 mentions that in Danida parlance such constituencies are called the ‘external resource base’. The ministry’s section for commercial diplomacy has its obvious links with important business organisations like Industrirådet and Landbrugsrådet. For a long time foreign and security policy was an issue area for which the ministry did not consider it appropriate to create an ‘external resource base’. Developments in the 1980s – marked as they were by a breakdown of traditional foreign policy consensus, the emergence of peace movements, the government’s de facto lower prioritising of security policy, and a general tendency to ‘democratise’ foreign policy – has to some degree changed this lack of interest in an external base. In a way, the Danish Institute of International

88 Foreign Ministries in the European Union

Affairs (DUPI) can be seen as such a base, but until its recent re-activation the institute has been a rather empty shell. Furthermore, it has been pointed out that the steep increase in workload has caused a relative decline in the ministry’s capacity for strategic analysis. As a consequence of this state of affairs some senior officials consider the option of informally delegating the task of producing long-term analyses to external institutions in the state apparatus as well as to institutions like DUPI and the Centre for Development Research.30 Information technology Information technology is one of the means for doing more with fewer resources. Above I have described how information exchange between headquarters and embassies has changed due to the rise of information technology. These changes are obviously not specific to the EU, but membership of the EU significantly increases the amount of information available and also the scarcity of time. Within the field of foreign policy, the COREU network constitutes a veritable revolution in the ministry’s access to information. The 1990 Report on the Foreign Service31 points out that in classic diplomacy, information was a scarce commodity, and that the collection of information was a slow and costly process. In a modern ‘information society’ the problem is not a lack of information but a scarcity of time. Hence the task of handling information has changed from ‘collecting’ to ‘filtering’ or ‘processing’ the immense amount of information. In this connection it should be noted that information technology is a wonderful means of collecting and distributing information. However, a computer is not really capable of ‘filtering’ information. As is so often the case, technology turns out not to be a panacea. If we consider the functions where technology is helpful, it is widely accepted that the ministry has been fairly slow to introduce modern information technology. It is thus indicative that the ministry has been among the slowest in the EU to use the Internet for information distribution.32 On the other hand, it seems that the ministry is currently trying to exploit the advantages of the latecomer. ‘Decline’ of the foreign ministry? The ministry seems to be challenged in a number of ways. It is widely accepted that the ministry does not function as a ‘gatekeeper’ between domestic and international environments. This fact, however, is insufficient to confirm the hypothesis of the ‘decline’ of the Foreign Ministry. The truth is that the thesis has not really been contemplated in the ministry, probably because it has not been considered salient enough. Top officials are very confident that the ministry is performing well and that it is capable of meeting future challenges. On the other hand, there have certainly been some ‘moments of truth’. Thus, a former director general, Otto Møller, notes that ‘Statistics showing that sector ministries, combined, use more resources on

Knud Erik Jørgensen 89

international activities than the entire Foreign Service had an impact on the Foreign Affairs Committee.’33 What it seems to prove however, is that the ministry is operating in an environment, which, compared to the period up to the 1970s, is immensely different.

Conclusion Throughout the twentieth century the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was rather like a living organism, adapting from time to time to changes in the external political climate. Thus, after the First World War, the ministry was asked not to be ‘political’; in the 1950s, demands for guidance in new export markets prompted the ministry to engage in export promotion activities; in the 1960s, development emerged as a new issue in foreign policy and the ministry responded by creating new administrative units which since then have expanded. In the 1980s and 1990s, the ministry sensed a need for the perfect Janus-headed structure monitoring developments on the domestic and international/European arenas simultaneously. The ministry has, during the major part of the twentieth century, made a priority of external economic relations and legal-moral issues, meaning that it has at times consciously created a politico-diplomatic deficit. Membership of NATO and the EC/EU has to some extent levelled the political deficit. The ministry has successfully maintained and defended its position as the coordinator of Danish EC/EU policies. The most recent organisational reform was partly a response to the rapprochement between economic and political dimensions in European integration. In view of this, the reform can be seen as a successful consolidation of the ministry’s position. This success is reflected in the confidence expressed by former director general of the ministry, Paul Fischer: ‘the Foreign Service has so far effectively adapted itself to international developments […]. There is every reason to believe that the Danish Foreign Service possesses the necessary flexibility to adapt to new demands and conditions in the future.’34

Appendix 1 Statistics Expenditure on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 11.176.300.000 DKK (approx. 1.500.000.000 ECU) (figures for 1997). The Foreign Service 1,388.8 International organisations 347.0 Development programmes and aid 9,834.8 Bilateral programmes 4,008.7 Multilateral programmes 1,869.2 Humanitarian assistance and refugees 775.0 Various 491.0 (Source: Forslag til Finanslov for finansåret 1997, Ministry of Finance, 1996)

90 Foreign Ministries in the European Union

Number of countries/international organisations where the diplomatic service is present Countries: 93 International organisations: 7 (Figures for 1 January 1996. Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

Overall number of overseas missions (embassies, consulates, etc.) Embassies: 73 General Consulates: 20 Permanent Representations at international organisations: 7, divided between Brussels 2 (EU, NATO), Geneva 1 (UN), Paris 1 (OECD), Vienna 1 (OSCE), New York 1 (UN), Strasbourg 1 (Council of Europe).35 (Figures for 1 January 1996. Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

Staff numbers, divided between headquarters and abroad and between categories (i.e. administrative, executive, clerical, local staff) Headquarters Abroad Temporary out of duty Total

1,068 1,613 111 2,792

Administrative Executive36 Clerical Local staff Total

815 187 819 971 2,792

(Figures for 27 January 1997. Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

Future staffing projections Data not available.

Appendix 2 Table 5.2 The number of offices in ministries working with EU matters

The Prime Minister’s Department The Danish Ministry of Labour The Ministry of Foreign Affairs The Ministry of Environment and Energy The Danish Ministry of Education The Ministry of Finance The Ministry of Fisheries The Ministry of Health The Ministry for Greenland The Ministry of Industry

1972

1973

1974

1982

1992

1

1

5

13

1 1 14

1 1 16 1

1 3 11 2

2

1 1

1 2 2

1 3 3

2 2 5 2

1

1 1

1 2

1

Knud Erik Jørgensen 91 Table 5.2 (contd.)

The Danish Ministry of the Interior The Ministry of Justice The Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs The Ministry of Communication The Ministry of Culture The Ministry of Agriculture The Ministry of Social Affairs The Ministry of Taxation The Ministry of Environment The Ministry of Transport The Danish Ministry of Defence The Ministry of Economic Affairs The Ministry of Housing Total number of offices Total number of ministries

1972

1973

1

1 1

1 1

7

1

1974 1 1

1 8 1 1 2 1

11 19

1 26 19

40 19

1982

1992

4 1

1 1

9 1 2 7 2 1 1 56 21

1 1 13 2 5 1 1 1 60 22

Source: Nedergaard, Denmark’s Administration of the EU, p. 290 (taken from Hof og Stat, various volumes)

Notes 1. Klaus Kjølsen, Det Diplomatiske Fag. Den danske Udenrigstjenestes Forvaltning, 1700–1770 (Odense: Odense Universitetsforlag, 1991); Paul Fischer and Niels Svenningsen, Den danske Udenrigstjeneste 1770–1990. (Copenhagen: 1970); Klaus Kjølsen, ‘The Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs’, in Zara Steiner (ed.), The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World (London: Times Books, 1982). 2. Nye grænser. Den danske udenrigstjeneste 1970–95 (Copenhagen: Udenrigsministeriet, 1995). 3. Cf. Henrik Wøhlk, ‘Femogtyve år’, in Nye grænser, p. 23; and Paul Fischer, ‘København – Paris – Bonn’, in Nye grænser, p. 85. 4. Rapport fra arbejdsgruppen til undersøgelse af Danida, Copenhagen, May 1981. Rapport vedrørende udenrigstjenesten, Forvaltningsnævnets Sekretariat, 1963. Udenrigstjenesten mod år 2000. Betænkning nr. 1209, Udenrigskommissionen af 1. april 1989, Copenhagen: Statens Informationstjeneste, 1990, vol. 1, p. 176. 5. Jørgen Grønnegård Christensen, ‘Interpreting Administrative Change: Bureacratic Self-Interest and Institutional inheritance in Government’, paper prepared for presentation at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 31 August–3 September 1995, pp. 50–6. 6. Ibid., p. 34. 7. My account is based on ‘Udenrigstjenestens opbygning og ressourceanvendelse i visse andre lande’, in Udenrigstjenesten mod år 2000, pp. 183–230. 8. Udenrigstjenesten mod år 2000. Betænkning nr. 1209, Udenrigskommissionen af 1. april 1989, Bind 1 og 2 (Copenhagen: Statens Informationstjeneste, 1990). 9. Grønnegård, Christensen, op. cit., 1995, p. 14. 10. The issue was briefly touched upon in the Commission’s report, cf. Vol. 1: 184–5 and 214, as yet without effect.

92 Foreign Ministries in the European Union 11. Grønnegård Christensen, op. cit., 1995, pp. 50–60. 12. Jørgen Grønnegård Christensen, ‘Adapting Danish Central Administration to Membership of the European Communities’, paper presented at the OECD conference ‘Adapting Public Administration for Participation in Supranational Bodies’, Alcalà de Henares, Madrid, 1–3 July 1981, Aarhus, Institute of Political Science, University of Aarhus. 13. Grønnegård Christensen, op. cit., 1981, p. 10. 14. Udenrigstjenesten mod år 2000, Vol. 2, pp. 357–66. 15. Jens Peter Christensen, ‘Sandhed med modifikation’, Administrativ Debat, December 1993, pp. 1–4. 16. Thus, the MFA produced an ‘ode to coordination’ for the 1989 Commission’s report, cf. Vol. 1, pp. 169–74. 17. Niels Ersboll, ‘Danmark fra EF til EU’, in Nye grænser, p. 78. 18. Hans Mouritzen, External Danger and Democracy: Old Nordic Lessons and New European Challenges (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1997). 19. Politiken, 6 October 1995; cf. her chronicle in Politiken, 13 September 1995. Concerning debates on EU-issues, Government and Folketing, see the article ‘Dolkestø til diplomatiets duksedrenge’, Weekendavisen, 6–12 January 1995. 20. Grønnegård Christensen, 1981, op. cit. 21. Grønnegård Christensen, op. cit., 1995, p. 16. 22. Otto Moller, ‘Traek af udenrigstjenesten s aendrede arbejdsvilkar – med saerligt henblik pa de interne forhold’, Nye grænser, p. 181. 23. Paul Fischer and Niels Svenningsen, Den danske Udenrigstjeneste 1770–1990 (Copenhagen: 1995) pp. 105–6. 24. Ibid., p. 111. 25. Ibid., p. 105. 26. Ibid., p. 106. 27. Udenrigstjenesten, 1990, pp. 217–41. 28. Knowledge about possible sites for national coordination of policies on Europe was demonstrated in an overview of the organisation and tasks of foreign ministries in ‘certain other countries’ (Udenrigstjenesten, Vol. 2, pp. 183–216). The ministry also produced a plea for continued centralised coordination of Danish policies on Europe (Udenrigstjenesten, Vol. 1, pp. 169–74) – presumably assuming that keeping a centralised system equals keeping it in the ministry. 29. Ellen Margrethe Loj, ‘Udenrigsministeriet somarbejdsplads i 25 ar – og nogle perspektiver for de naeste 23 ar’, Nye grænser, p. 215. 30. Loj, op. cit. p. 215. 31. Udenrigstjenesten, 1990, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 342. 32. A website was launched as late as 1 September 1996, cf. http://www.um.dk. 33. Moller, op. cit., p. 176. 34. Fischer, 1995, op. cit., pp. 118–19. 35. The Danish bilateral embassy is representing Denmark at the UN in Vienna. 36. Staff in income categories 36–42.

Bibliography Official reports and books Betænkning afgivet af Udenrigsministeriets Strukturudvalg af 1966 (Copenhagen: Udenrigsministeriet 1968)

Knud Erik Jørgensen 93 Betænkning om tilrettelæggelse og udvidelse af Danmarks bistand til udviklingslandene. Afgivet af det af Regeringen den 13. januar 1961 nedsatte udvalg; Betænkning nr. 280, 1961 Betænkning om Danmarks Samarbejde med Udviklingslandene. Afgivet af det af Regeringen den 2. april nedsatte udvalg; Betænkning nr. 565, Copenhagen, 1970 Danida-undersøgelsen. Delrapport 1–5 og sammenfatning (Copenhagen: Administrationsdepartementet, 1986) Nye grænser. Den danske udenrigstjeneste 1970–95 (Copenhagen: Udenrigsministeriet, 1995) Rapport fra Arbejdsgruppen vedrørende Udenrigsministeriets Struktur, incl. bilag; Rapport fra Finansministeriets turnusgennemgang (Copenhagen: Administrationsdepartementet, 1979) Rapport fra arbejdsgruppen til undersøgelse af Danida, Copenhagen, May 1981. Rapport vedrørende udenrigstjenesten, Forvaltningsnævnets Sekretariat, 1963. Udenrigstjenesten mod år 2000. Betænkning nr. 1209, Udenrigskommissionen af 1. april 1989, Vols. 1–2 (Copenhagen: Statens Informationstjeneste, 1990) Internet website: http://www.um.dk

Books and articles Brun, Hans Henrik ‘Rutinens magt? Analyse af apparatet i dansk udenrigspolitik’, in Synsmåder i studiet af dansk udenrigspolitik (Copenhagen: Samfundsvidenskabeligt Forlag, 1975) Buus, Axel ‘Udenrigstjenesten under forandring’, Dansk Udentigspolitisk Årbog 1984 (Copenhagen: DJØF, 1985) Christensen, Jens Peter ‘Sandhed med modifikation’, Administrativ Debat, December 1993, pp. 1–4 Christensen, Jørgen Grønnegård ‘Da centralorganisationen blev international’, in Niels Amstrup and Ib Faurby (eds), Studier i dansk udenrigspolitik – tilegnet Erling Bjøl (Aarhus: Politica, 1978) Christensen, Jørgen Grønnegård ‘Blurring the International–Domestic Politics Distinction: Danish Representation at EC Negotiations’, Scandinavian Political Studies, 4(3): 1981, pp. 191–208 Christensen, Jørgen Grønnegård ‘Adapting Danish Central Administration to Membership of the European Communities’, paper presented at the OECD conference ‘Adapting Public Administration for Participation in Supranational Bodies’, Alcalà de Henares, Madrid, July 1–3 1981, Aarhus, Institute of Political Science, University of Aarhus Christensen, Jørgen Grønnegård ‘Udenrigsministeriets reorganisering’, Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Årbog 1991 (Copenhagen: DJØF, 1992) Christensen, Jørgen Grønnegård ‘Interpreting Administrative Change: Bureaucratic Self-Interest and Institutional Inheritance in Government’, paper prepared for presentation at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, August 31–September 3, 1995 von Dosenrode, Søren ‘Den optimale minimalløsning: Danmarks administrative tilpasning til EF’, Nordisk Administrativt Tidsskrift, 74(4): 1993, pp. 454–65 Fischer, Paul and Svenningsen, Niels Den danske Udenrigstjeneste 1770–1990 (Copenhagen: 1995) Heurlin, Bertel ‘Denmark: a new activism in foreign and security policy’, in Christopher Hill (ed.), The Actors in Europe’s Foreign Policy (London: Routledge, 1996)

94 Foreign Ministries in the European Union Holterman, Henrik Danish Foreign policy. Literature in Languages other than Danish 1979–86 (Copenhagen: DJØF Publishing, 1988) Karvonen, Lauri and Sundelius, Bengt Internationalisation and Foreign Policy Management (Aldershot: Gower, 1987) Kjølsen, Klaus ‘The Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs’, in Zara Steiner (ed.), The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World (London: Times Books, 1982) Kjølsen, Klaus Det Diplomatiske Fag. Den danske Udenrigstjenestes Forvaltning, 1700–1770 (Odense: Odense Universitetsforlag, 1991) Laursen, Johnny (forthcoming) Denmark, Europe and the Market: The Making of Denmark’s European Policy 1954–1963 Møller, Jørgen Ørstrøm ‘Danish EC Decision Making: An Insider’s View’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 21(3): 1982, pp. 245–60 Nedergaard, Peter Organiseringen af Den Europæiske Union (Copenhagen: Handelshøjskolens Forlag, 1993) Sørensen, Carsten L. and Christensen, Jørgen Grønnegård Fra formandskab til formandskab (Århus: Politica, 1978) Tonra, Ben ‘The Impact of Political Cooperation’, in Knud Erik Jørgensen (ed.), Reflective Approaches to European Governance, (London and New York: Macmillan/ St. Martin’s Press – now Palgrave Macmillan, 1997)

6 Finland Esko Antola

Historical background Finland gained independence in 1917 as a part of the great upheaval in Russia. Finland had become a Grand Duchy of Imperial Russia in 1809 as a consequence of the Napoleonic wars. Before that Finland was part of the Kingdom of Sweden. During the Russian period autonomy was granted to the extent that Finland had its own currency, Finnish language enjoyed an official position, a national education system was created and a national parliament established. The country thus maintained many elements of statehood even before independence. In foreign relations, however, Finland had to rely on Russian diplomatic representation and had no foreign policy of its own. However, Finland was able to exercise a certain degree of manoeuvrability in the field of foreign economic relations. The post of ‘consular-agent’ serving Finnish interests was established as a part of the Russian Consulate General in London in 1887. A similar position was established in New York. In both instances, post-holders were Finnish citizens but served strictly as part of the Russian diplomatic representation. Their expenses, however, were covered by the provisional Senate of Finland.1 During the last decades of Russian rule the autonomous position of Finland came under increasing pressure, and Finnish intellectuals and political figures distributed information in Western Europe on the situation in Finland. Immediately after the Declaration of Independence, Finland sought to gain formal recognition from major European powers and neighbouring states. This took place mainly by sending delegations to European capitals to present the Finnish case. Soon after the Declaration of Independence a Civil War broke out in Finland, delaying the establishment of diplomatic relations until May 1918. The system of foreign representation had to be established in the absence of any historical experience or tradition. The average age of the first Finnish diplomats was very low, being about 30 years.2 They lacked even fundamental 95

96 Foreign Ministries in the European Union

knowledge of diplomatic rules and practice. The first years of the Finnish diplomatic service were also marked by often severe conflicts between representatives abroad on the future orientation of foreign policy. During the years between the World Wars Finnish foreign policy was characterised by attempts to find policy solutions which could support the strengthening and consolidation of independence. In the early 1920s Finland advocated cooperation with a group of so-called border countries, i.e. other newly independent countries of Central Europe which bordered the Soviet Union. This policy was highlighted by the signing of the Treaty of Warsaw on political cooperation between the bordering countries. The Finnish Parliament, however, refused to ratify the treaty in 1922. Ratification was denied because of conflicting interests between the parties. Finland saw it as an instrument to counter the threat from the Soviet Union while Poland in particular saw the treaty as an instrument to counter Germany, a country which was seen as an ally by Finland.3 After the short period of cooperation between the bordering nations, Finnish foreign policy turned to the League of Nations. As a small country Finland saw great merit in the collective security system of the League. Great interest in the League was justified by the fact that it solved the Aland Question in a way favourable to Finland. The settlement of the Aland dispute was the first victory for Finnish diplomacy. It also opened the way to enhanced Scandinavian cooperation which later, in the 1930s became a major orientation of the Finnish foreign policy. Scandinavian orientation became a viable strategy in particular after the crises of the League in the early 1930s, and in the framework of rising tensions in Europe. The Scandinavian orientation with a strong element of neutrality could not, however, prevent Finland becoming an object of Soviet military aggression in 1939. After the Second World War a complete reorientation in Finnish foreign policy took place. Finland approached the new power structure of the postwar world from a policy of neutrality. A period of adaptive neutrality lasted until the early 1990s when Finland joined the European Union. A major element of reorientation was the attitude to the Soviet Union. Until the war Finland sought support against the Soviet Union, whereas in the postwar years Finland aimed at cooperation with the neighbouring superpower. Finnish–Soviet Relations were at the core of the neutrality policy. The foundation for the new approach was the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union in 1948. The treaty was in place until the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991. Finland placed herself into a position of neutrality as part of the balance of power in Europe. A natural element of that policy was the fact that Finland shared 1,300 kilometres of common border with the Soviet Union, a factor that encouraged neutrality. Neutrality did not prevent Finland from joining European integration efforts. Finland joined EFTA and signed a free trade agreement with

Esko Antola 97

the EC in 1973. However, Finnish European policy constantly stressed that the country approached European integration in a pragmatic way and that she was interested only in commercial relations and economic integration, while avoiding political commitments. A turning point was the Luxembourg Jumbo Meeting between the member states of EFTA and the EC in 1984. Thereafter, Finland began to take an active part in discussions on furthering integration between EFTA and the EC on a collective basis. By the end of the 1990s Finland became perhaps the most ardent supporter of the European Economic Area. The collapse of the European order in 1989 had far-reaching effects on Finnish foreign policy. During his visit to Finland in October 1989, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev unreservedly recognised Finland’s neutral status. He also acknowledged that in past years there had been ‘controversy surrounding the proper interpretation of Finnish neutrality on occasions’.4 The recognition that Finland was an unreservedly neutral country and that there had been controversy between Finland and the Soviet Union over Finnish neutrality on previous occasions, was a major concession to Finnish foreign policy. The recognition came at the last moment but its value was limited because the political environment was soon to change dramatically. Ironically, only two weeks later the Berlin Wall was brought down and the conditions for Finnish neutrality began to change. German unification also had a considerable impact on Finland. The two founding treaties of Finnish foreign policy, the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947 and the treaty with the Soviet Union from 1948 both had direct links to Germany. After German unification, Finland unilaterally renounced the relevance of the key provisions of the two treaties. The Paris Peace Treaty (Section III) contained Articles that had a direct reference to Germany. The treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union for its part contained in Article One a possibility for military cooperation and mutual aid between Finland and the Soviet Union. This was never implemented. The immediate reason for the new interpretation was the four-power agreement on the unification of Germany in September 1990. Even more relevant for Finland was the treaty between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany on partnership and cooperation. The Finnish perception was that references to Germany as an aggressor had lost their relevance in the two treaties concerning Finland’s obligations5 and that references to Germany were no longer relevant either. A new phase of adaptation began and the end result was Finnish membership of the European Union. By the summer of 1991 the European Community membership option gradually began to emerge. In particular the membership requests of Austria and Sweden pushed the course of action in the same direction. The Swedish and Austrian applications also demonstrated that the European Economic Area (EEA) alternative had become obsolete as a working alternative before it was even signed. An equally

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important push towards EU membership was given by the failure of the attempted coup in the Soviet Union in August 1991, and the consequent transformation of the Soviet Union into Russia in December 1991. The signing of the Maastricht Treaty further strengthened the membership option. These events convinced the Finnish government that the transformations in the Soviet Union brought about by perestroika were irreversible, that the European Community was taking a qualitative leap and that enlargement was inevitable. The transformation of Europe challenged the traditional Finnish policy and clearly opened a window of opportunity for a major reorientation. Soon after the demise of the Soviet Union and the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in February 1992, the Finnish government decided to apply for membership of the European Community. A complete reorientation in Finnish integration policy – a 180 degree turn – took place in a period of less than eight months.

The evolution of the structure of Finnish diplomatic representation The inter-war period The first charter on the organisation of the Finnish diplomatic service was issued in 1918, only half a year after the Declaration of Independence. It established three departments (political, commercial and archives) and an additional press bureau.6 At the end of the first year the number of career civil servants was only 17. By 1923 there were 40. By the outbreak of the Second World War the number career diplomats was 85, while total personnel numbered about 200. During the early years of independence, Finnish embassies were concentrated in Europe. In 1918 embassies were established in Berlin, Copenhagen, Oslo and Stockholm. The early beginning of the diplomatic representation network covered the most important capitals in the region. The following year embassies were established in London, The Hague, Madrid, Paris, Rome, Tokyo, Warsaw and Washington. The London, Paris and Washington embassies reflected the idea of establishing representation in major capitals. The network expanded hand in hand with the advancement of the recognition process. The embassy in Warsaw reflected the needs of cooperation between the bordering countries. In the early years of independence Finland did not follow the principle of universal reciprocity. This was not so much because of the lack of interest but because of the lack of money and personnel. Gradually, however, the diplomatic network expanded. By the year 1938 Finland had 20 diplomatic representations around the world employing 54 officials. Finland had more career diplomats abroad than at home: 31. These figures show that most of the diplomatic missions really were one-man embassies. They were not

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perhaps very effective but through this network Finland, as a young country, wanted to ‘show the flag’ in many corners of the world. For obvious reasons Finnish diplomatic representation was concentrated in continental Europe. During the 1930s, however, more remote capitals like Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro hosted Finnish embassies. By the outbreak of the Second World War only Albania, the Holy See and the Irish Free State had no diplomatic relations with Finland.7 Relations with the Soviet Union deserve special attention. The new Soviet Union was the first country to recognise the independence of Finland in 1917. In 1921 a temporary mission was established in Moscow and in 1922 the first Finnish ambassador took office. Economic and political relations with the neighbouring country remained at a relatively cool level until the outbreak of the war. In 1922, a permanent consulate was established in Leningrad. The first organisational reform of the Foreign Ministry took place in 1923. It followed the findings of a special committee which was established to study the organisation of the FM. The number of divisions remained at three: the Department for Political and Foreign Trade Relations created through merging the political and commercial departments. The other two were the Juridical Department and the Administrative Department. This structure lasted only until 1928. Then the political and economic departments were re-established. The political department was divided into three sections: political, press and the League of Nations sections. The division reflected the great emphasis put to the work of the League, seen as a guardian of the interests of small states.8 The post-war period During the Second World War Finland waged her separate war against the Soviet Union in rather loose alliance with Germany. Finland was in a state of war with Britain from 1941 and diplomatic relations with the United States were cut off in 1944. After the war, in 1945, the first new diplomatic representations were opened in London, Moscow, Oslo, Paris, Warsaw and Washington. The reopening of the embassies followed the same pattern as before, concentrating on regional and great power capitals. The number of foreign legations increased rapidly: in ten years their number had reached 25. The network expanded both in Europe and in the rest of the world, By 1955 Finland had established embassies in Canberra, New Delhi, Ottawa, Pretoria, Peking and Tel Aviv. The number of career diplomats in 1955 was 124 of which 70 served abroad, while the total number of employees was 296. Currently the Foreign Ministry employs 1,692 people. In forty years the personnel has grown six times. By 1998 Finland had diplomatic relations with 168 states, while the number of embassies headed by ambassadors was 64. In addition Finland maintained seven permanent missions to international bodies and eight consulates-general.

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The big expansion in personnel took place between 1966 and 1971. In 1966 the Foreign Ministry employed 516 people but five years later the figure was 784. The sharp increase is explained by a new phase of Finnish foreign policy since the mid-1960s. In 1963 Finland made a major foreign policy initiative by proposing the establishment of a nuclear free zone in Northern Europe. This marked the opening of a period of active adaptation, and a new and more active phase of neutralism. By the end of the decade Finland had become a member of the United Nations Security Council, hosted SALT negotiations, and had initiated the process which led to the establishment of the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe. The highlight of that process was the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975. This new active period of foreign policy demanded new resources and the expansion of the Foreign Ministry.

Structural reforms The structure of the Ministry remained on the lines established in the early 1930s. During the war years its functions and organisation had to adapt to circumstances but the organisation returned to its original shape after the war. A reform took place in 1951 when a Protocol Department was established. In the early 1960s an attempt was made to evaluate the system of foreign representation but without success. A new attempt was made at the end of the 1960s. The structure remained unchanged until 1971 when a new Department for International Development Cooperation and the Department for Press and Culture was established. Finally an EU secretariat was added to the structure in 1995. The structure of the Finnish Foreign Ministry before the reform of 1998 was based on a functional model. The ministry was divided into seven departments: political, press and culture, external economic relations, international development cooperation, protocol, legal and administrative departments. The coordination between the departments took place under the supervision of under-secretaries of state, of which there were four: political affairs, external economic relations, international development cooperation, and administrative and legal affairs. At the top of the hierarchy was the Secretary of State. The system of state secretaries was introduced in 1974, in the midst of the expansion of the Foreign Ministry and the new, highly active phase of Finnish foreign policy.

Professionalism All the top positions of the administrative structure were manned by career diplomats, including that of the Secretary of State. This reflects the idea of professionalism which is an important feature of the Finnish diplomatic service. The ministry is almost completely staffed by career diplomats and

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political appointments to diplomatic positions are rare. Professionalism is highly appreciated in the Finnish diplomatic service. Professionalism was emphasised when the system of recruitment was reformed in 1970. The selection process was opened to public competition. This changed dramatically the composition of the diplomatic corps. In the inter-war period the selection of career diplomats was based on very informal recruitment procedures which were much criticised in public. It resulted in a situation where the social and regional backgrounds of personnel were very homogenous: diplomats were recruited from the upper social strata and predominantly from the capital region. The reform of the recruitment system aimed to widen the social background of career officials and to ensure that the most capable people had the opportunity to enter the diplomatic service. An open recruitment policy in which psychological testing is a part of the selection process is still used in the Finnish diplomatic service. The political direction of the ministry at the ministerial level has for most of the time been in the hands of politicians, although from time to time career diplomats have held cabinet minister positions as well. Since the 1960s, a special Minister of Foreign Trade has been nominated. Also, during recent years the cabinet has had a Minister for Development Cooperation. For most of the time ministers for external economic relations and development cooperation have had duties in other ministries as well. The division of labour also reflects political realities. Governments in Finland have almost exclusively been coalition governments and the division of portfolios reflects this. The range of tasks and functions undertaken by foreign ministers is so wide that the division of labour is easily accepted. Moreover it has traditionally been politically one of the heaviest portfolios in the cabinet and therefore a logical object of interest. The cabinet member responsible for the Foreign Ministry enjoys a high status in Finnish politics. He/she has traditionally been regarded as a personal representative of the President who according to the Finnish constitution, has responsibility for conducting foreign relations. In particular during the era of bipolarity and Finnish neutrality under the presidency of Urho Kekkonen (1956–81), the minister of foreign affairs was regarded as a personal trustee of the president. In many nominations the president reserved the right to pick a suitable person to this position. In some cases the nominee was a close political ally of the president, sometimes the choice was a trusted career diplomat whose selection depended on the foreign policy situation and the composition of the cabinet. During recent years this tradition has not been practised.

The reform of 1998 Why reform? The gradual erosion of the Great Power system and, indeed, the collapse of the bipolar system changed dramatically the foundations of Finnish foreign

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policy. In the same way the rise in importance of the economic and social agenda made new demands on the foreign policy administration. Lastly, membership of the European Union redrew the line between domestic policy and foreign policy. These trends were in sharp contradiction to the functional foreign policy administration which dated back to the 1930s and which had never been reformed, only adjusted occasionally. Before the reform of 1998, the scope of both foreign policy and diplomatic representation had expanded without major reforms. New embassies and new tasks were added to the functionalist structure of the foreign ministry and the number of personnel had expanded greatly. The reform of the administration began in the early 1990s. It resulted in a fundamental reorganisation of the ministry from the beginning of August 1998. Initially the main motivation was the erosion of the post-war international order and the widening of the scope of foreign policy. Although the diplomatic network was broadened in a remarkable way during the 1970s, the core of the foreign policy interest remained limited. Europe, the superpowers and the UN system continued to be the key areas of interest in Finnish foreign policy until the end of the 1980s. As a fourth element of Finnish foreign policy, European unification rapidly demanded attention during the 1980s, being an issue which went beyond the traditional framework of neutrality in foreign policy. The globalisation of economic interests also emphasised the need for administrative reforms. From the early 1990s, membership of the European Union became the major motivation for reform. The need to synchronise foreign policy administration with the activities of the European Union was already evident during membership negotiations, while CFSP became another pressing reason for reform. The widening of the foreign policy agenda also called for reform in order to enhance flexibility in administration, which in turn increased the need for administrative and diplomatic skills. Anticipating that an increase in personnel would not be a viable solution to meet these needs, more flexibility and better focusing of resources was sought from administrative reform. The changes also aimed at simplifying contacts and bureaucratic routines between the FM and embassies around the world. As a result, the reform contributed to the rise of regionalism in the foreign service. An embassy operating in a certain region could coordinate its activities with, and report to, a regional office in the FM. The regional office became the main operational body in the FM. The new system The new system abandons the traditional functional system of departments. It is a combination of functional and regional systems and rests on principles of line organisation. The new administrative system maintains the practice of three ministers assigned to the Foreign Ministry. The Minister for

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Foreign Affairs has the main responsibility of leading the operational work. He/she is flanked by a Minister of Foreign Trade and a Minister of Development Cooperation. The practice has both functional and political motivations. The Minister of Foreign Affairs is dedicated to the core issues of foreign affairs including EU matters. Since EU matters and the core issues of foreign policy are time-consuming topics, the other foreign policy domains are divided between two Ministers who cover both bilateral and global issues. The Minister for Foreign Trade has the responsibility of global economic and trade issues, both bilateral and multilateral. The Minister of Development Cooperation handles traditional development cooperation issues on a bilateral basis but also multilateral global issues. The primary assignment of the Minister is the Ministry of Environment. The system of a Secretary of State and four under-secretaries of state has remained unchanged. The innovation is a combination of functional divisions as they were in the old structure and a new structure of divisions by geographic regions. For coordinating the tasks of functional divisions and regional divisions, an Operational Steering Group has been established. The Operational Steering Group comprises the Directors General of Political Affairs, External Economic Relations and International Development Cooperation. Its main task is to coordinate the operations of the main departments and to supervise the work of regional lines. It also coordinates the actions of traditional functional divisions. The Operational Steering Group is in many ways in a key position in the new structure. It meets normally once a fortnight. The principle of line organisation looks rather complicated from the outside. Each department (political, external economic relations and international development cooperation) is divided into divisions (lines) and again into subdivisions. Parallel to divisions of the departments there are regional divisions as well. There are currently four regional divisions: ●

●

● ●

Europe Division, divided into Western European units and a Unit for Central and Eastern Europe. Eastern Europe and Central Asia Division, divided into units for Russia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Nearby regions and Northern Dimension. Asian, American and Oceania Division, divided into their respective units. African and Middle East Division.

The regional approach is an additional innovation in the foreign policy administration. It gradually began to emerge in the 1980s for practical reasons through consultation between embassies in the same region. Initially, coordination took place in the framework of an annual meeting of the ambassadors, organised in Helsinki. Gradually a system of regional meetings has emerged. They are held annually in regions and attended by heads of missions in the regions and also attended by departmental directors and

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representatives from personnel division. Regional meetings aim at maintaining a dialogue between the FM and embassies in the regions.

The EU dimension New phase Finland established diplomatic relations with the EEC in 1965. This marked the beginning of a cautious relationship with European integration institutions. The first step had been the Association Agreement with EFTA in 1961. Until the mid-1980s, Finnish integration policy rested on four main elements: avoidance of supranational institutional obligations; a need to ensure that the competitive position of Finnish export industries was not weakened in comparison with major competitors, primarily the Swedish export industries; a principle of parallelism in international economic arrangements in trade with the Soviet Union in comparison with economic relations with the West; and that the interests of key sectors in the domestic market were taken into consideration in integration actions.9 By the summer of 1991 the European Community membership option gradually began to emerge. In particular the membership request of Sweden in July 1991 prompted the Finnish move in the same direction. The Swedish application was based on economic realities. The Swedish and Austrian applications for full membership also demonstrated that the European Economic Area (EEA) alternative had become obsolete even before an agreement was signed. A reason of at least equal importance in prompting the push for membership was the failure of the attempted coup in the Soviet Union in August 1991 and consequently the transformation of the Soviet Union into Russia in December 1991. In the same month the Maastricht Treaty was agreed, further strengthening the membership option. These events convinced the Finnish Government that the transformation of the Soviet Union was irreversible, that the European Community was taking a qualitative leap and that enlargement was inevitable. The transformation of Europe challenged traditional Finnish policy and clearly opened a window of opportunity for a major reorientation. Soon after the demise of the Soviet Union and the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in February 1992 the government of Finland decided to apply for membership of the European Community. The complete reorientation of Finnish integration policy took place in a period of less than eight months. As a member of the European Union since 1995, Finland has become locked into a process of continuing negotiation and sharing of information to an extent which greatly exceeds the pre-accession situation. Finland is a member of a ‘Diplomatic Republic of Europe,’ which consists of written and unwritten rules and norms that compose a common framework for appropriate behaviour for a member of the republic.10 This membership, more than anything else, has shaped the expectations and priorities of Finland.

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The EU Secretariat As part of the integration process the Foreign Ministry has adapted to a new situation. Integration matters belonged traditionally to the competence of the Department of Foreign Economic Relations, which was tasked with coordinating the free trade agreement and also participated in negotiations for the European Economic Area. During the accession negotiations the Foreign Ministry again had a key role. The delegation was headed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs. By the time of accession an EU secretariat had been established. After the reform of the administration in 1998 it was placed directly under the control of the Secretary of State. There is also a special unit for the coordination of Nordic cooperation. The EU Secretariat is in many ways at the core of the preparations of Finnish EU-policy. The new regulation on the Foreign Ministry lists seven tasks for the Secretariat: (1) to function as a secretariat for the Ministerial Committee on EU Affairs and for the Committee on EU Affairs; (2) coordinating the work of competent ministries in EU affairs; (3) ensuring the flow of information between the Permanent Mission and national ministries and providing instructions to the Permanent Mission; (4) monitoring and analysing developments in the EU; (5) horizontal coordination of EU affairs; (6) preparing issues that do not belong to the competences of other departments in the Foreign Ministry; (7) assisting other Foreign Ministry departments in dealing with policy issues. There have been debates on whether the Secretariat should be located in the Prime Minister’s Office rather than in the Foreign Ministry. EU membership has considerably strengthened the position of the Prime Minister’s Office as a policy coordinator. From the point of view of the Foreign Ministry the situation is rather ambivalent: on the one hand much of the coordination work is really out of the core competence of the Foreign Ministry. The ministry is sometimes seen as a mailbox conveying instructions and policy statements from the Permanent Mission to ministries and vice versa. It has also been argued that this undermines the professionalism of the diplomatic service. The Secretariat also strengthens the position of the Foreign Ministry inside the public service. On the other hand, the core issues of foreign policy have remained in the competence of the Foreign Ministry. CFSP issues are firmly in the hands of the Ministry. CFSP issues have increased in importance in Finnish foreign policy because of EU membership. Coordination with the Ministry of Defence has become more important. From the point of view of the Foreign Ministry, an overall evaluation indicates that what power it has lost through the

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increased importance of the Prime Minister’s Office and the Ministry of Finance, has been offset by the greater role of the Ministry in areas of high security policy.

Coordination of EU affairs Although the Secretariat has the main responsibility in coordinating EU policy, the system of coordination is extensive. It covers both preparation of Finnish positions on EU issues and maintains democratic control as far as is practically possible. The coordination process includes the participation of the Finnish Parliament and a wide range of coordinating bodies at the administrative level. In the Foreign Ministry, EU matters are dealt with by several departments and units. The Political Department is of particular importance. Matters of Common Foreign and Security Policy are in the competence of this Department. Also, the European Correspondent is located in the Political Department. Sometimes the division of labour looks rather complicated. Different aspects of EU matters are dealt with by different divisions and departments: WEU by one division, human rights by another. Common Commercial Policy is in the competence of the Department of External Economic Relations, while development issues are the responsibility of the Department of International Development. Bilateral relations with individual EU member states are the responsibility of the Regional Division of Western Europe and the Legal Department deals with EU law. The coordination system has four levels.11 The basic level of preparation is the relevant ministry. It conveys a proposal to the relevant section. The sections, of which there are 32, are composed of representatives of the relevant ministry and other ministries and public authorities with an interest in the issue. They can also meet in a larger grouping which includes representatives from relevant pressure groups. In section meetings different interests and views are hammered out into a national position. If the section cannot establish a national position, the matter is transferred to the Committee for EU Affairs. The Committee consists of high-level representatives from all ministries, the Prime Minister’s Office, the Office of the President, the Bank of Finland, the Provincial Government of the Aland Islands and the Office of Chancellor of Justice. The Committee has responsibility for coordinating the work of ministries in EU affairs. It discusses wide-scale horizontal matters but also resolves any issues that have not been finalised in the sections. The fourth level of coordination and the ultimate decision-maker in EU affairs is the Ministerial Committee, which is chaired by the prime minister. In the Ministerial Committee, Finland’s final positions on policy issues are decided in the presence of the appropriate Cabinet members. Having

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been discussed at one of the four levels, the Finnish position is conveyed to the Permanent Mission in Brussels by the EU Secretariat of the Foreign Ministry. Parliamentary scrutiny is another part of the procedure. Under the relevant Parliamentary Act, the prime minister must convey to the parliament information on every meeting of the Council of Ministers both before and afterwards. In a similar way ministers have to report to the parliament on their voting behaviour in Council meetings. Parliament also has the right to receive all the information required in order to assess the relevance and importance of issues under discussion, before parliament draws its conclusions. Parliament also has the right to require that the statements of its relevant committees serve as guidelines to the representatives of Finland in EU decision-making. On the basis of its internal rules two Parliamentary Committees have a special role in scrutinising the process. The Grand Committee which serves as the main body in this process. In matters of CFSP, again it is the Foreign Affairs Committee which is the relevant authority.

The resource framework Taking an historical perspective, the budgetary burden of the Foreign Ministry has been modest. Between the years 1956–69 the Ministry accounted for 0.6 per cent of total state expenditure, while a gradual increase has taken place since the mid-1960s. This was due mostly to the introduction of development aid programmes. The highest figure for budgetary expenditure was reached in 1990. During the years of economic crises, expenditure in absolute terms went down until 1996, when there was an upswing. It is easy to conceive the linkage between the amount of available budgetary resources and administrative reforms. Expanding tasks and enlarging the scope of Finnish foreign policy had to be consolidated with declining budgets. An essential element in the reform of 1998 was to increase the efficiency of foreign affairs administration. Budgetary realities are also seen in the figures for staff levels. In 1956, Foreign Ministry personnel numbered 296. In ten years it grew to 516. By 1971 it had jumped to 784. Between the early 1970s and 1998 the number of persons employed by the Ministry doubled. In February 1998 the figure was 1,692. An interesting change in the personnel structure is seen in the share of persons employed in embassies around the world. In the post-war period until the mid-1960s, their share remained at 57 per cent. Since then it has gradually declined and was down to 38 per cent in 1998. Increasingly, the Foreign Ministry has become an office which is based in Helsinki. In 1998 Finland maintained 64 embassies, eight Consulates-General, seven permanent missions and one special mission abroad.

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Conclusion The Foreign Ministry of Finland has recently undergone the most comprehensive reform in its history. The traditional functionalist structure was replaced by a combination of new functionalist structures (divisions) and regional divisions. It is too early to evaluate the results of the reform. Although the reform was deep and took several years to develop it covers only part of the administration. The multilateral sectors remained largely untouched and supporting sections of the bureaucracy (administration, personnel and protocol) are also still awaiting reform. The motivations for reform were many: rapid changes in the international system, budgetary constraints and new demands put on foreign affairs personnel being some of the most important. But Finland’s membership of the European Union has perhaps been the most important factor in prompting reforms. There was a need to synchronise the Foreign Ministry with the demands of CFSP activities. The Foreign Ministry also assumed new and extensive tasks in coordinating Finnish EU-policy. In spite of the ‘Europeanisation’ of the Foreign Ministry, traditional bilateral diplomacy still maintains its important position. The decrease in the number of staff serving abroad has been remarkable since the late 1960s, while smaller embassies do the same work as before. Interviews carried out for this survey revealed an expectation that membership in the European Union might actually increase the role of embassies and the importance of bilateral relations. Another obvious trend for the Finnish foreign service will be an increase in the number of personnel hired locally. This is primarily for financial reasons. An essential part of the foreign service reform process of is the extensive use of modern information technology. Divisions at home and embassies around the world are interconnected via on-line computerised information dissemination systems. The aim of computerising reporting and documentation is to save money and time, and to make the Foreign Ministry live in real time.

Appendix Expenditure on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Total figure (1998) Fmk 3304.2 million. €550.7 m. Category

Fmk (m.)

Foreign representation Development cooperation Industrial development cooperation Cooperation with CEEC Other administration

871.0 1,619.4 18.0 181.0 614.8

€ (m.) 145 270 3 30 102

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Number of countries/institutions where diplomatic service is present (1998) 84

Overall diplomatic missions (1998) Embassies Permanent Representations Special Representations General Consulates

64 7 (UN (3), Nato, EU, CE, OECD) 1 (OSCE) 8

Staff (1998) In Foreign Ministry In Diplomatic Missions Total

1,057 635 1,692

Notes 1. Juhani Paasivirta, Suomen siplomaattiedustus ja ulkopolitikan hoito itsenäistymisestä talvisotaan (Helsinki, 1968), pp. 22–3. 2. Ibid., p. 57. 3. Eino Jutikkala, ‘Ensimmäinen tasavalta’, in Viljo Rasila, Eino Jutikkala and Keijo K. Kulha, Suomen poliittinen historia, 1905–1975 (Helsinki, 1976), pp. 128–9. 4. Speech by M. S. Gorbachev in Helsinki, Finlandia Hall on 26 October 1989. 5. Press Release no. 278, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Helsinki, 21 September 1990. 6. Jukka Nevakivi, Ulkoasiainhallinnon historia (Helsinki, 1988), pp. 34–5. 7. Jukka Nevakivi, The Finnish Foreign Service. 8. Ibid., 1988. 9. See Esko Antola, ‘Finland’, in Helen Wallace (ed.), The Wider Western Europe. Reshaping the EC/EFTA Relationship (London, 1991), pp. 146–9. See also Antola, ‘Finnish Perspectives on EC–EFTA Relations’, in Finn Laursen (ed.), EFTA and the EC: Implications of 1992 (Maastricht: EIPA, Professional Papers, 1990), pp. 165–7. 10. Knud-Erik Jørgensen, ‘PoCo: The Diplomatic Republic of Europe’, in Reflective Approaches to European Governance, ed. Knud-Erik Jørgensen (London, 1997), p. 158. 11. See website: http://um1.tele.fi/ministry/eupaaeng.html.

Bibliography Antola, Esko ‘Finnish Perspectives on EC–EFTA Relations’, in Laursen, Finn (ed.), EFTA and the EC: Implications of 1992 (Maastricht: EIPA Professional Papers, 1990) pp. 165–7 Antola, Esko ‘Finland’, in Helen Wallace (ed.), The Wider Western Europe: Reshaping the EC/EFTA Relationship (London, 1991) pp. 146–9 Jørgensen, Knud-Erik ‘PoCo: The Diplomatic Republic of Europe’, in Reflective Approaches to European Governance (London, 1997)

110 Foreign Ministries in the European Union Jutikkala, Eino ‘Ensimmäinen tasavalta’, in Rasila, Viljo, Jutikkala, Eino and Kulha, Keijo K. Suomen poliittinen historia, 1905–1975 (Helsinki, 1976) Jukka, Nevakivi Ulkoasiainhallinnon historia 1 (Helsinki, 1988) Jukka, Nevakivi The Finnish Foreign Service (unpublished) Paasivirta, Juhani Suomen Diplomaattiedustus ja ulkopolitiikan hoito itsenäistymisestä talvisotaan (Helsinki, 1968)

Interviews Pertti Torstila, Political Director, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Finland, 8 September 1998. Jukka Valtasaari, Secretary of State, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Finland, 11 September 1998. Pekka Wuoristo, Deputy Director, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Finland, 8 October 1998.

Other sources Speech by M. S. Gorbachev in Helsinki, Finlandia Hall on 26 October 1989. Press Release no. 278, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Helsinki, 21 September 1990. http://um1.tele.fi/ministry/eupaaeng.html. http://virtual.finland.fi.

7 France Melanie Morisse-Schilbach

It is not surprising that the first modern foreign ministry in the world was established in France. The reasons are twofold: externally, the near-hegemony of France in Europe necessitated appropriate administrative arrangements between the capital and ambassadors abroad, while internally, the emergence of the French sovereign’s philosophy of ‘l’Etat – c’est moi’ privileged central administration of foreign affairs. Because of this, France was the first state to break with the then existing habit of combining domestic and foreign policy administration in the same department – a common practice among the greater European states until the early eighteenth century.1 The creation of the office of Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in 1626 as a direct adviser to the sovereign, already assisted by a separate department, was the starting point for a rapid growth of foreign affairs administration in France. In 1789, at the time of the French revolution, the ministry had reached a stage of development which others were only to achieve in the nineteenth century.2 The revolution, the period of the Directoire and the Napoleonic Empire affirmed the necessity for an autonomous foreign ministry which finally moved to the Quai d’Orsay palace in 1853. Between the end of the nineteenth century and the First World War, the French foreign ministry assumed, by and large, its current form involving a General Secretary as head of the administration and a Political Director, at that time responsible for both commercial and political affairs.3

Organisation French foreign-policy making and the organisational logic of the Quai d’Orsay The Quai d’Orsay’s organisation reflects the general French bureaucratic structure with its characteristic interconnection between political and administrative élites and patterns of socialisation produced by similar educational backgrounds and recruitment processes. This interconnectedness is 111

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reinforced by the ministerial cabinet system which politicises the higher public service and provides it with a route for political influence. Below the minister’s cabinet is the head of the administration, the SecretaryGeneral – unique in the French administration – who supervises all departments under the direct authority of the minister. Until recently two Assistant Secretaries-General were responsible both geographically and functionally for a department, that is the Department of Political and Security Affairs and the Department of European and Economic Affairs. Four territorial departments (Africa, North Africa and Middle East, America, Asia) are in charge of coordinating all matters concerning relations between France and each of these territories. Finally, operational and supporting departments such as the Scientific, Technical and Cultural Department or the Departments of Legal Affairs, Personnel or the press as well as sections directly attached to the Minister, like the Bureau for Analysis and Planning (Centre d’Analyse et de Prévision, CAP), complete this picture. The creation in 1970 of the Secretary-General as head of administration and the appointment of the two assistants in 1994, with their enhanced coordination role and political duties (for example, representing the minister abroad, receiving foreign ambassadors and ministers), underline the growing interconnectedness between the political and administrative spheres. Introduced to correct the tendency for political decision-making power moving from the minister in persona to the cabinet, the Secretaries-General must be seen as an interlocking institution between the cabinet–minister decision-making circle, of which they are part, and the administration. Nevertheless, the structurally related influence of the Quai d’Orsay in the foreign-policy making process does not guarantee a consistent impact on decision-making. This depends above all on the balance of power between the government and the President, especially in times of cohabitation.4 In this situation diplomats lose some of their freedom of initiative5 and direct contact with counterparts in the Elysée staff.6 While this is certainly true for the first cohabitation in 1986,7 a new ‘culture of cohabitation’ has emerged during the second cohabitation in 1993, and a form of ‘internalised co-administration’ evolved with the third cohabitation period of Gaullist President Jacques Chirac and socialist Premier Minister Lionel Jospin following the legislative elections of 1997. Without preventing ad hoc struggles for hegemony especially in the run up to elections, learning and socialisation processes coupled with the overall aim of both protagonists to protect the international reputation of France from any diplomatic damage, have led to an intense network of permanent consultation between staffs from the Elysée, the Matignon and the Quai d’Orsay even – or perhaps especially – in times of cohabitation. As Samy Cohen concludes, this tendency of co-administration has led to a ‘normalisation’ of foreign policy.8 Interestingly, despite these informal coordination procedures, the role of the Quai d’Orsay often remains a minor one. Under the Fifth Republic’s

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constitution, the President has a freedom of manoeuvre in foreign policy which makes diplomatic activity a prerogative for the presidential staff, the Quai d’Orsay being reduced to a subsidiary role.9 Consequently, the Quai d’Orsay has failed to emancipate itself from presidential diplomatic hegemony and to become an autonomous institution with a distinct policy. According to Cohen, this lack of ministerial self-confidence reflects a norm dominating the strategic behaviour of the Quai d’Orsay, namely that it is better to avoid any policy proposal which could provoke confrontation with presidential policy or which might be ignored by the President.10 The elusive quest for effective administration The reform of the Foreign Ministry’s organisational structure and functions over the last 50 years did not result from the necessity to change its apparently minor role within the French politico-administrative system, but from external pressures. In fact, the main issues confronting the Foreign Ministry since the 1950s consisted of redefining the role of French diplomacy in the aftermath of the era of decolonisation, shaping the growing significance of economic diplomacy and multilateralism and, finally, responding to new technologies, the growing weight of non-state actors in foreign affairs, and the emerging internationalisation of national bureaucratic structures. The Racine Report of 1969 concentrated on internal organisational improvements and personnel reforms. New issues were assigned to the ministry (nuclear and space affairs), the Cultural, Scientific and Technical Department was reorganised and a Legal Department established. French authorities had to find an adequate response to the evolving policy of détente between the USSR and the USA. In this respect, the Bureau of Analysis and Planning was established to provide strategic reflections on traditional diplomatic matters.11 In 1976, President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and his Foreign Minister, Louis de Guiringaud, launched an institutional reform aimed at adapting existing structures to new international requirements, especially the growing importance of economic interdependence in external relations.12 The heart of the so-called Guiringaud reform consisted of the ‘geographisation’ of the Political Department, giving more autonomy to the geographic subdirectorates. The former predominant position of the Political Directorate and the clear separation between the functional and the geographic divisions were considered to be inefficient in the face of growing economic interdependence and the enhanced role of economic diplomacy. With the reform, each geographic directorate became responsible for all questions, political and economic, of a bilateral nature between France and those countries or groups of countries of which they are in charge. Henceforth, the old Directorates of Political Affairs and Economic Affairs were to deal with multinational questions and international organisations, and economic cooperation and commercial relations respectively.13

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In the aftermath of the Cold War, French authorities recognised that ‘geographisation’ had not improved the adaptability of French diplomacy to new developments emerging from the fall of the Berlin Wall. Therefore a reform of the internal structure of the Quai d’Orsay was launched when a new government came to power in 1993. Foreign Minister Alain Juppé appointed a commission under Jean Piqu, advisor to the French Court of Auditors.14 Its report explicitly acknowledged that the role of functional divisions is increasingly important due to the fact that the orientation of national policy is more and more influenced by coordination within international organisations, and political, economic and military crises are for the most part discussed and resolved within these institutions. In his presentation of the reform proposal, Foreign Minister Juppé pointed out that it would depend on the presentation and the quality of work of the French diplomatic service, within formal and informal international committees, as to whether France would be capable of successfully representing its positions in negotiations.15 Based on the ideas of his predecessor, Foreign Minister Védrine announced a fundamental reform of the Quai d’Orsay in 1997. The Jospin–Védrine reform comprised two aspects: politically, it reflected new orientations in French foreign policy, while administratively, it aimed at ‘modernising’ the organisational structures as well as the working method of the ministry and the ‘culture’ of its diplomats. The fusion of the Ministry of Cooperation and Development (Ministère de la Coopération) and the Quai d’Orsay corresponds to the political decision of the new government to give up its pré-carré african. In fact, the new authorities acknowledged that the tremendous cost of maintaining special relationships with the French speaking sub-Saharan African states no longer reflects the realities of Franco-African relations.16 As far as administrative ‘modernisation’ was concerned, the Védrine reform mirrored the objectives of the Juppé reform of 1993/94. A modernisation programme has been launched which will last for several years and be regularly evaluated. It is based on an awareness that other ministries have internationalised their services; that multilateral organisations and international regimes are nowadays the key diplomatic actors; that information sources have multiplied, posing questions about the role of embassies, and that there is therefore a need to change the working practices and habits of the diplomatic corps. Amongst the first measures to be effected, Védrine was successful in stopping the continual budget and staff cuts that hampered administrative performance in the 1990s. Additionally, the Ministry of Finance was persuaded to increase the budget line slightly.17 In order to manage the enormous structural issues, Védrine established three committees: on staff management (training, working methods and distribution of staff),18 on organisational issues (reducing the hierarchical structure and promoting horizontal coordination) and on the administration of the Quai d’Orsay’s buildings, each headed by a high-ranking diplomat.19

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The EU dimension Where does the Quai d’Orsay fit in terms of French bureaucratic responses to European integration? In fact, the role of the Quai d’Orsay differs from that of other ministries in European policy making. A first cut illuminates routine versus non-routine policy issues, while a second distinguishes between Community and intergovernmental affairs. In both cases, governmental coordination rests on a traditional hierarchical mechanism and legacy of the Jacobin state – the inter-ministerial committees.20 The difference between the two cuts is that the role of the Prime Minister’s coordination function is increasingly central in routine and Community affairs, while less dominant in non-routine and intergovernmental affairs. French European policy making in routine and Community affairs In routine European affairs, that is dealing with day-to-day EC legislative matters, the role of the Quai d’Orsay is more that of general observer and advisor in diplomatic negotiations, rather than central actor in the coordination of European policy making. Rather, it is the General-Secretariat of the Inter-ministerial Committee for European Economic Questions (Secrétariat Général du Comité Interministériel pour les questions de coopération économique et européenne, SGCI), attached to the Prime Minister’s office, that is the main player in both the final formulation of a single French position in European negotiations and the implementation of European regulations into national practice.21 The overriding objective of this arbitration system is to arrive at a single, agreed French government position in European-level negotiations. Though this system is effective in the formulation of a coherent French position, it is also the cause of sub-optimal outcomes at the European level because the system impacts on the way officials negotiate French positions in the European institutions.22 In fact, officials are socialised into a system that does not require problem-solving skills because in cases where coordination among ministries has failed, the final solution is automatically transferred to the political level. French officials, therefore, often feel incompetent to negotiate compromises and to adapt to the European method of problem solving. As with the Ministry of Finance, the Quai d’Orsay is able to view the whole range of Community policies without, however, treating many of them fully. While in many other member states’ bureaucratic systems, foreign ministries have a central leading role in the coordination of national European policies, it is interesting to note that the French Jacobin tradition of centralised decision-making processes and inter-ministerial coordination has led, from the beginning of the integration process, to a kind of ‘domestication’ of routine European affairs. Nevertheless, the Quai d’Orsay still has a key role in setting the parameters on French positions in Community policy negotiations, due to the traditional negotiating monopoly of foreign ministries in

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‘foreign’ affairs and the fact that its foreign minister sits in the General Affairs Council of the EU. Furthermore, the officials of the Quai d’Orsay have the advantage of possessing a well equipped and effective bilateral information network in the form of embassies, which gives them an advantage in determining the French position. Also, the Foreign Ministry has a privileged relationship with the Permanent Representation in Brussels due to the fact that the ambassador and his/her deputy are both members of the diplomatic service. French European policy making in non-routine and intergovernmental affairs While the role of the Quai d’Orsay in routine situations is that of a hinge between national administration and European negotiating processes, its role has become more central in non-routine situations defined not only as polity-building measures (Intergovernmental Conferences, IGCs), but also the preparation of and participation in European Councils and the Council of Ministers, and the organisation of the French Presidency of the Council.23 While the role of the Foreign Ministry is less dominant in the preparation of European Councils – this is a prerogative of the Elysée and of the SGCI – it becomes more central when France holds the Presidency of the Council. Though the Elysée defines the overall priorities of the French Presidency, the presidential administrative circle relies heavily on the SGCI and the Quai d’Orsay to carry out the administrative work. The Quai d’Orsay – together with the SGCI – sets the calendar for forthcoming Councils of Ministers, draws up a list of working groups that might be convened, and selects officials who could preside over such groups.24 The role of the Foreign Ministry becomes crucial in times when a small core executive group composed of politicians and top officials from the Elysée, the Matignon, and of the Ministries for Foreign Affairs and Finance, takes charge of French negotiating positions regarding the EC’s constitutional future. Among the administrative members of the group that prepared the intergovernmental conferences leading to the Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties was the Director for Economic and European affairs, whose department, the Sub-directorate for Europe and later the Directorate for European Cooperation, drew up France’s stance on institutional questions.25 With the incorporation of the intergovernmentally organised areas of justice and home affairs, as well as foreign and security affairs in the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty, the Quai d’Orsay gained added competencies and influence. As regards justice and home affairs, the Ministry created its own structures to deal with those aspects of the Schengen agreements concerning the external dimension of the management of common European external borders. The Ministry’s influence in this policy field increased in parallel with the internationalisation of justice and home affairs. The key actors in this respect are the Ministry of the Interior as the lead ministry,

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the Quai d’Orsay as the expert on the external dimension, and the SGCI as the key coordinator between them.26 As far as European foreign and security matters are concerned, the Quai d’Orsay is the leading ministry and claims a monopoly in this genuinely diplomatic task. This is underlined by the fact that, as compared to justice and home affairs, the SGCI is not involved in the formulation of French policy within the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), except for those issues that require consultation with other ministries. This is so where a CFSP ‘joint action’ agreed by the fifteen member states implies the adoption of national measures of a financial nature, when coordination with the Ministry of Finance is required, and in cases where the joint action involves elements of European Community affairs (when coordination is assumed by the SGCI). Another exception is defence where security aspects of the CFSP increasingly require close coordination with the Defence Ministry. The latter is officially associated with certain Council working groups27 and will have a crucial role in the conduct of the emerging European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).28

Strategies and responses of the Quai d’Orsay The adaptive strategies of the central administration towards the evolving EU29 Interestingly, as compared to other French ministries, the Quai d’Orsay did not respond to the requirements of EEC membership with new structures, but absorbed the tasks within existing departments. European policy making was regarded as fitting within the traditional administrative structure. In this respect, the competency for EEC policies was taken over by the then existing Service de Coopération Economique (SCE), located under the Directorate for Economic and Financial Affairs, whereas all matters relating to Community law have been assumed by the Directorate for Legal affairs.30 Change took place during the geographisation reform in the 1970s without, however, resulting in optimal outcomes as regards the conduct of EC affairs. In fact, the organisation of European affairs must be seen as an unintended consequence of the overall objective of adapting structures to changing international requirements. This is evident for two reasons. First, the SCE, as a functional division under the responsibility of the Economic and Financial Directorate, was divided into two sub-divisions, one dealing with EC aid and development policy, the other being responsible for the Community’s commercial policy. Second, all aspects concerning the bilateral economic and political relations with the member states were concentrated in the Sub-directorate for Western Europe, within the independent Directorate for Europe. This separation between functional and geographical issues in the conduct of European affairs rapidly reached its limits.

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In fact, on the one hand, the new European Directorate dealt with everything concerning the European Community, though the Political Director, not its own director, represented the Quai d’Orsay at the political level in the EEC. On the other hand, the heads of the functional Political and Economic Directorates were informed about bilateral affairs by the responsible geographical department.31 With the increasing importance of the EEC it became evident that more effective coordination would be needed between the Subdirectorate for Western Europe and the SCE. This, not surprisingly, has often led to intra-ministerial struggles over leadership in European affairs. With the growing complexity of European affairs and their widespread impact on domestic public policy issues, the authorities recognised that the central place of the Quai d’Orsay in the European policy decision-making system no longer corresponded to France’s requirements. Other ministries refused to accept the leading role of the Foreign Ministry in coordinating the French position, claiming that diplomats had a strong de facto impact on their sectoral competencies. To resolve inter-ministerial struggles, successive governments preferred to place the sensitive issue of managing coordination of European affairs more and more in the hands of the SGCI, considering it to be more neutral than the Quai d’Orsay. Thus began the slow process of the transfer of competencies from the Quai d’Orsay to the SGCI, with the effect that, nowadays, French influence within the Community institutions depends largely on the quality of the relationship between the SGCI and the Permanent Representation in Brussels,32 and less on that between the Quai d’Orsay and its officials in Brussels! Although the Quai d’Orsay began to lose control over the conduct of European affairs, it nevertheless kept its privileged role as the only ministry that received – together with the SGCI – all European EC legislation coming from Brussels. It could therefore preserve its overall view of European issues and its role of relating SGCI positions to the general orientation of French European policy. While this ‘impératif du global’33 weighs heavily in the Community’s external economic relations, it is less evident in the conduct of the European Community’s internal economic affairs such as structural funds, budget affairs or the Common Agriculture Policy. However, even here the Foreign Ministry can become crucial if issues relating to the Community’s internal affairs become politically sensitive, and are therefore transferred from the sectoral Council to the General Affairs Council. Then, it is up to the Quai d’Orsay’s departments to present arguments and negotiating positions to the Foreign Minister who must defend and negotiate such delicate issues within the Council. Interestingly, while the struggle for the central coordinating role in European affairs between the SGCI and the Quai d’Orsay seemed to have been resolved at the expense of the latter, an internal administrative response from the ministry has recently emerged. In fact, it was only in the aftermath of the Maastricht Treaty and the decision of the Balladur government to

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strengthen the role of the SGCI34 that the Foreign Ministry decided to adjust the internal structures of the Quai d’Orsay to become more European.35 The principal proposal for the conduct of European (Community) affairs consisted of concentrating the bilateral (Sub-directorate for Western Europe) and functional (SCE) divisions under a newly established General Directorate for European and Economic Affairs, whose head acquired the rank of an Assistant Secretary-General. The General Directorate included the Directorate for European Cooperation (Direction de la Coopération Européenne, DCE) and the Directorate for Economic and Financial Affairs. The former SCE has therefore left the Directorate for Financial Affairs and has been divided into two subdirectorates (for internal and external Community affairs) under the overarching roof of the DCE in which the geographical Sub-directorate for Western Europe has also been incorporated.36 The geographical and functional aspects of European (Community) affairs were, therefore, brought closer together. CFSP – the domaine réservé of the Quai d’Orsay37 While the Quai d’Orsay is confronted with a serious decline in competency in matters of French European Community policy making, it has, since the beginning of cooperation in foreign and security affairs, strongly opposed any intervention from other departments or governmental institutions in this area. As with Community affairs, the development of EPC did not lead to changes in the administrative structures of the Foreign Ministry which were already established and hard to alter.38 EPC was a matter for the Director of the Political and Security Affairs Department, a functional department, and was strictly separated from the Service de coopération économique responsible for EEC affairs. In political cooperation, therefore, the Political Director was his own master under the overall guidance of the minister and his cabinet and occasionally of the Elysée. The post of European Correspondent39 was assigned to the head of the Sub-directorate of Western Europe within the European Directorate and was responsible to the Director for Political and Security Affairs. Thus, from the beginning, EPC was the exclusive affair of the Directorate for Political and Security Affairs, both at the senior and the desk level. The reforms of the 1970s gave the European Directorate its own independent status within the ministry’s structure. Consequently, the Subdirectorate for Western Europe and the European Correspondent lost their direct link to the Political Director becoming an intermediary institution between the Political Director on the one hand, and the SCE on the other. Since then, what Christian Lequesne calls a ‘hybrid compromise’ has emerged.40 On the one hand, France considered EPC as a matter for sovereign states and therefore a component of its bilateral relations under the Director of Western Europe as European Correspondent. On the other, it was acknowledged that the EPC machinery was a classical multilateral diplomatic affair, involving the Political Director who represents France within the multilateral Political Committee in Brussels.

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In the aftermath of the Maastricht Treaty, the member states’ deliberate choice to separate EPC/CFSP issues from Community affairs led to a de facto structure of coordination between the Community (COREPER) and CFSP (Political Committee) institutions without, however, leading to similar rapprochements within the Quai d’Orsay structures. In fact, the main hurdle for any improved internal coordination of national positions within CFSP – the gap between the Directorate for Political and Security Affairs, dealing with CFSP and the European Directorate department responsible inter alia for European external economic relations – has not been overcome. Instead of bringing European and CFSP concerns closer to each other, the requirements of the Balladur/Juppé reform have led to two main changes. Firstly, at the senior level, European Community and political affairs were each placed under an Assistant Secretary-General with the aim of bringing CFSP and Community affairs closer to each other. Second, at the desk level, European and CFSP issue areas remained divided between two different directorates. The responsibility for CFSP has been re-transferred from the geographic Department of Western Europe into a new CFSP section within a restructured Political and Security department.41 Thus the Political Directorate resumed its initial competence in the day-to-day conduct of CFSP affairs. European external economic affairs, however, remained under the Directorate for European and Economic affairs. The limits of these arrangements have become evident in cases where foreign ministers decided to impose embargoes. Whilst ministers might take the initial decision, implementation falls within the scope of Community business and is, in the French case, handled in the Sub-directorate for Western Europe. In a broader sense, the Quai d’Orsay’s administrative response to CFSP requirements reflects the struggle for competency between the COREPER structure of European Community affairs and the Political Committee structure for CFSP affairs.42 While the Directorate for European Cooperation is responsible for all matters concerning the COREPER structure, the Directorate for Political and Security affairs has the exclusive lead in the Brussels CFSP structure (Political Committee). Both claim overall responsibility for the conduct of French European affairs. The latter because European affairs are considered to be part of foreign and diplomatic affairs, needing a generalist expertise; the former because European affairs are considered to be a kind of domesticated foreign policy, demanding specialist expertise.43 In a broader sense, this struggle for competency is no more than the administrative reflection of the general discussion about what European policy is: either a form of foreign policy or specialised public policy. So far, the Védrine reform has not resolved this issue. The second Assistant Secretary-General has been abolished and this might be interpreted as giving the Political Director, the remaining Assistant Secretary-General, the lead in European and CFSP affairs.44 But the structure at the desk level has

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persisted. The CFSP Section – expanded horizontally to become the main administrative unit dealing with CFSP affairs, both externally and internally – is still under the control of the Political Director, while the closely related area of European external economic relations are still included in the Directorate for European Cooperation. While the necessity of effective interpillar cooperation has led to special agreements between the Community and the CFSP institutions at the European level,45 this, interestingly, has not led to a coordinated response at the national level. In matters concerning European policy towards the Mediterranean and the Middle East, for instance, there are now five different sections involved. There is a special coordinator for the Barcelona process directly attached to the Secretary-General, the Political Director taking the overall lead; the CFSP service with special desks for the conduct of EU–Mediterranean and Middle East policy; the European Cooperation Directorate responsible for all external economic issues (for example, the economic aspects of the Barcelona process), and finally the Directorate for North Africa and the Middle East which has the lead in the conduct of bilateral affairs and the international peace process for the Near East.46 Democratisation and foreign policy: facing new actors and issues There is a growing tendency towards the democratisation of foreign policy due to the ‘invasion’ of economic, financial, cultural and social affairs into the high politics of foreign and security policy. Domestic structures therefore gain in importance in the policy processes.47 Public opinion, the media, pressure groups, multinational enterprises and NGOs representing different domestic economic and social interests, have challenged the image of an independent and isolated decision-making élite in foreign affairs.48 Foreign policy is becoming more and more domestic policy. In this respect, the Quai d’Orsay’s structure has so far failed to adapt to the emerging new doctrine of an ‘ethical’ foreign policy in which human rights and civil crisis management are becoming as important as the growing presence of transnational actors such as humanitarian NGOs in foreign policy. But the conflict over competency is already obvious and the Quai d’Orsay is fighting for overall competency in the management of civil crises. Foreign Minister Védrine was successful in preventing Premier Minister Jospin creating a new inter-ministerial institution proposed by the so-called Faroux mission to manage French responses to international humanitarian crises. Indeed, the Faroux plan proposed a permanent triumvirate including foreign, defence and financial affairs which would have political control over the Agence française du développement, the agency created to respond to civil crisis and linked to the Prime Minister.49 Another aspect of foreign policy democratisation requires the full attention of the Quai d’Orsay. In his revealing study of the transnationalisation of foreign policy and politics in France and Great Britain, Frédéric Charillon

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concludes that foreign policy is more and more dominated by transnational actors and that in consequence, states have to cope with these new actors if they want to keep control over diplomacy and the outcome of policy. In the case of the Second Gulf War, for example, neither the French nor the British governments appeared to be prepared to include new transnational actors, such as firms, humanitarian or religious groups, in their policy strategy, and this was partially responsible for sub-optimal outcomes.50 The Quai d’Orsay’s annual budget for 2001 does not show any improvement here. Only 220 million FF are provided for contact with NGOs, less than a quarter of the amount for external audio-visual policy, for instance.51 In a broader sense, the significance of economic issues in the conduct of foreign policy is going to change. Here, the Quai d’Orsay is seriously engaged in defining a new area of responsibility.52 Though the embassies are formally responsible for contacts between French investors and the authorities of the country in which they wish to invest, this task is increasingly undertaken by the sectoral ministry, national companies and the authorities of the respective state.53 In fact, there is an inter-ministerial struggle between the Directorate for Economic and Financial Affairs of the Foreign Ministry, the Treasury and the External Economic Relations Division (Direction des relations économiques à l’étranger, DREE), the latter officially responsible for cooperation with national enterprises that want to invest abroad. In order to gain in competence and influence, Foreign Minister Védrine wants to involve his department more directly in these economic areas. In this respect, he regularly invites the chief executives of the major French companies to working lunches to discuss their international interests. Furthermore, an Enterprise Mission has been set up within the Directorate of Economic and Financial Affairs of the Foreign Ministry to serve as an interface between the various ministerial and governmental operators and the Quai d’Orsay.54 As far as the contact with the Assemblée nationale is concerned, things have changed recently. Indeed, with the ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999 and the growing weight of the European Parliament in European policy making, France has changed article 88-4 of its constitution regulating parliamentary control over legislation concerning the European Community. In its revised version the article obliges the government to present legislative acts to the Assembly and the Conseil d’Etat immediately after transmission by the Council of Ministers and to integrate the Parliament’s statement into the official French negotiating position in Brussels. This also applies to the second and third Maastricht pillars and has led to enhanced communication between the Foreign Ministry, the SGCI and the Parliament. However, the Assembly has little impact on French CFSP policy. In fact, the Parliament gains more influence via the budget procedure than through this systematised flow of information.55

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Conclusion If negative images of foreign policy are to be reversed, its formulation and management must be made much more open. Institutionally, enhanced ‘connectivity’ is required: within the service (that is across departments at home and with the embassies), outside the service with other ministries, and also with politicians, interest groups, civil society, business and finance.56 In this sense, the debate about the decline of the Foreign Ministry, a traditional feature of French public debate, focuses less on the growing domestication of foreign policy, than on the place the Foreign Ministry holds within the national bureaucratic structure. There is a continual search for a new role for the Foreign Ministry which, however, is not willing to give up its pré-carré diplomatique. In this respect, the process of adapting to the European level is both an effective catalyst for painful adjustments and a testing ground for the overall modernisation process, including utilisation of new technology and contact with actors outside the governmental sphere. As regards Europe, the most important challenges for the Quai d’Orsay are twofold. First, adaptation of traditional negotiating skills to the method of problem-solving common to the European Union is required. This demands the application of a distinct decision-making style that includes diffuse reciprocity, thick trust, mutual responsiveness, a culture of compromise and a consensus-reflex.57 It seems evident that the adaptation of such a new diplomatic culture is more difficult to realise in large member states. Nevertheless, it is this kind of change of the official diplomatic culture that should be at the heart of a ‘Europeanised’ foreign ministry. Second, a new role for its embassies, both within EU member states and within those third countries where the EU pursues a common policy, is needed. For the former, the challenge is related to the growing communication network within COREPER and CFSP structures as well as between national ministries. In fact, with regular day-to-day information and consultation processes, embassies have lost their former information prerogative. For the latter, the existence of national embassies is seriously threatened in third countries where the EU has a genuine European approach and where the Commission has established extended external delegation offices. In fact, this network of ‘EU embassies’ is going to get more intense and diversified, dealing not only with commercial and trade measures – its original functions – but more and more with CFSP affairs.58 For the latter, among the typical tasks of a Commission delegation abroad are the provision of regular political analysis, the conduct of evaluations jointly with member states, the general contribution to policy-making processes, and the organisation of Troika visits and visits from delegations from the European Parliament. These are all tasks traditionally undertaken by national embassies.59

Appendix 1 Present structure of the Quai d’Orsay

Conseiller pour les Affaires religieuses Commission interministérielle France–Allemagne

Ministre délégué chargé de la Coopération et de la Francophonie

Ministre des Affaires étrangères

Ministre délégué chargé des Affaires européennes Inspection générale des Affaires étrangères Délégué pour l’Action extérieure des collectivités locales Direction générale de l’Administration

Secrétaire général adjoint pour les Affaires politiques et de Sécurité Direction des Nations unies et des Organisations internationales Direction des Affaires stratégiques, de Sécurité et du Désarmement Direction de la Coopération militaire et de Défense

Direction des Ressources humaines Direction des Affaires budgétaires et financières Service de l’Equipement

Service de la Politique étrangère et de sécurité commune Mission de liaison avec les ONG

Service des Systèmes d’Information et de Communication Service de la logistique diplomatique

Source: http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr

Secrétaire général

Centre d’Analyse et de Prévision

Haut Fonctionnaire de Défense

Secrétaire général adjoint

Service des Affaires francophones

Service de l’Action humanitaire

Direction générale de la Coopération internationale et du Développement Direction de la Stratégie, de la Programmation et de l’Evaluation Direction du Développement et de la Coopération technique Direction de la Coopération culturelle et du Français Direction de la Coopération scientifique, universitaire et de recherche Direction de l’Audiovisuel extérieur et des Techniques de Communication

Direction de la Coopération européenne Direction de l’Europe continentale Direction d’Afrique et de l’Océan indien

Direction des Affaires économiques et financières Direction des Français à l’étranger et des Etrangers en France Direction des Affaires juridiques

Direction d’Afrique du Nord et du Moyen-Orient Direction des Amériques et des Caraïbes

Direction de la Communication et de l’Information Direction des Archives

Direction d’Asie et d’Océanie

Protocole

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Appendix 2 Statistics (1) Expenditure of the Foreign Ministry Total⫽22,076 million FF (⫹5.3%)

Chapter

Foreign service International organisations International cooperation and development ● Fonds de solidarité (development and aid) ● Cultural and technical cooperation NGOs, decentralised cooperation Military programme Humanitarian assistance/refugees Various Total

Expenditure (in million FF) 1,448 3,991 5,831 1,909 3,922 220 720 2,152 7,714 22,076

(2) Numbers of countries/international organisations where the Foreign Ministry is represented60 Countries: 149 International organisations/regimes: 21 (3) Staff (headquarters–abroad) Total ⫽ 9,471 Headquarters: 3,949 Abroad: 5,522 Source: http://www.france.diplomatie.fr (Budget 2001; La diplomatie des années 2000)

Notes 1. See Keith Hamilton and Richard Langhorne, The Practice of Diplomacy. Its Evolution, Theory and Administration (London, 1995), p. 73. 2. Ibid., p. 74. 3. See Georges Dethan, ‘The Ministry of Foreign Affairs since the Nineteenth Century’, in Steiner, Zara (ed.) The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World (London, 1982), p. 209. 4. Cohabitation means the institutional co-existence of a president and a government from opposing political camps. 5. See Samy Cohen and Michael Clarke, ‘Decision-making in foreign policy, part I: The French ambiguity’, in De la Serre, Françoise, Leruez, Jacques and Helen Wallace (eds) French and British Foreign Policies in Transition. The Challenge of Adjustment (New York, 1990), pp. 204–16. 6. See Robert Elgie, ‘Staffing the Summit: France’, in Peters, Guy, Rhodes, R. A. W. and Wright, Vincent (eds) Administering the Summit. Administration of the Core Executive in Developed Countries (London, 2000), p. 237.

126 Foreign Ministries in the European Union 7. See S. Mesnier, ‘Le Role du Quai d’Orsay de mai 1986 à mai 1988’, in Revue administrative, 256 (1990), pp. 489–98. 8. See Samy Cohen, ‘La diplomatie française dans la cohabitation’, in Esprit, 6 (2000), p. 58. 9. Ibid., p. 206 (fn. 22). 10. See Samy Cohen, ‘Quelles marges de manoeuvre pour la politique étrangère française? Entretien avec Samy Cohen’, in Le Banquet, 11 (1997), p. 23. 11. See Marie-Christine Kessler, La politique étrangère de la France. Acteurs et processus (Paris, 1999), p. 77. 12. Ibid., p. 100. 13. See Georges Dethan, op. cit., p. 216. 14. See Bertrand Dufourcq, ‘La réforme du Quai d’Orsay’, in Revue française d’administration publique, 77 (1996), pp. 25–9. 15. See Jean Picqu, ‘Genèse d’une réforme’, in Revue française d’administration publique, 69 (1994), p. 10. 16. See Marie-Christine Kessler, op. cit., p. 108. 17. See Appendix 2. 18. On training issues it is worth mentioning the so-called Heisbourg Report. In 1998, a Commission was appointed by Prime Minister Jospin and led by François Heisbourg, official advisor to the government, in order to analyse the educational infrastructure of international relations studies in France. In July 2000, the Commission presented a report that was highly critical of the French diplomatic service and the educational infrastructure, based on a comparison between the centralised state machine and the more laissez-faire official training and educational infrastructure in Britain, the United States and Germany. See François Heisbourg, Mission d’analyse et de proposition relative à l’enseignement et à la recherche en ‘Relations internationales’ et ‘Affaires stratégiques et de défense’, Rapport de Mission, Paris, July 2000, and also Michael Clarke, ‘French and British security: mirror images in a globalized word’, in International Affairs, 4 (2000), pp. 725–39. 19. These are Pierre Sellal, Director of the cabinet, Loic Hennekinne, the present Secretary General, and Charles Malinas, member of the Cabinet. See Sylvain Cypel, ‘Quai d’Orsay: la réforme! La réforme!’, in Le Monde of 24 April 2001. 20. Inter-ministerial coordination appears as a combination of organs, meetings and procedures between ministries and the Prime Minister supervised by the cabinet of the Prime Minister and sometimes of the President’s office. See Christian Lequesne and Philippe Rivaud, op. cit., p. 14. 21. See Circulaire no. PRMX9803266 C of 9 November 1998 on the procedure of transposition of Community directives into domestic law, in Journal officiel no. 261, 10 November 1998, p. 16948. 22. See Christian Lequesne and Philippe Rivaud, op. cit. 23. See Anand Menon, ‘France’, in Kassim, Hussein, Peters, Guy B. and Wright, Vincent (eds) The National Co-ordination of EU Policy. The Domestic Level (Oxford, 2000), p. 91. 24. See Christian Lequesne, Paris–Bruxelles – Comment se fait la politique européenne de la France (Paris, 1993), pp. 47–90. 25. See Anand Menon, op. cit., pp. 94–5. 26. For the latter, after the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty a third Assistant Secretary General was attached to the Secretary General of the SGCI allowing for coordination of those issues of Internal Affairs and Justice which require it, e.g. the Schengen agreements. See Jean-Luc Sauron, Die französische Verwaltung und die Europäische Union, la Documentation française (Paris, 2000).

Melanie Morisse-Schilbach 127 27. See Anand Menon, op. cit., p. 85. See also Circulaire no. PRMx9400136 C of the Prime Minister of 21 March 1994 on the relation between the French administration and the institutions of the European Union, in Journal officiel no. 76, 31 March 1994, p. 4783. 28. Following the conclusions of the European summits of Cologne, Helsinki, Feira and Nice, the Council decided on 22 January 2001 to establish the following permanent institutions dealing with European security concerns: a Political and Security Committee, a Military Staff of the EU and a European Union Military Committee. See the respective council decisions in the Official Journal of the European Communities of 30 January 2001 (78/2001–80/2001). 29. The role of the Deputy Minister for European affairs is not analysed here because it is not part of the bureaucratic structure of the Ministry. Apart from his own cabinet, the Minister’s actions and instructions are based on the central administration’s services. Furthermore, its impact does not evolve from smooth and effective coordination and cooperation between the political and the service level but is largely dependent on the political willingness of the President and the government in power to make the European policy one of the priorities of French foreign policy. As an intermediary institution between the Foreign Minister, the President’s office and the government, its primary role is to represent French European interests both within European and national structures. 30. See Christian Lequesne, op. cit., p. 77. 31. See Georges Dethan, op. cit., p. 216. 32. See Jean-Luc Sauron, op. cit., p. 90. 33. See Christian Lequesne, op. cit., p. 82. 34. This mirrored in the Circulaire no. PRMx9400136 C of the Prime Minister of 21 March 1994 on the relation between the French administration and the institutions of the European Union, in Journal officiel no. 76 of 31 March 1994, p. 4783. 35. Apart from purely organisational changes, it is worth mentioning that European affairs were included in the mission of the CAP, initially only responsible for the analysis of traditional diplomatic and strategic issues. 36. See Decree no. 93–1210 of 4 November 1993 on the organisation of the central administration of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, in Journal officiel, 5 November 1993, pp. 265–9. 37. This part draws heavily on Morisse-Schilbach: ‘Domestic Institutions in European Foreign Policy-Making – Do they matter?’, in Levrat, Nicolas and Willa, Pierre (eds) EU External Capability and Influence in International Relations (Brussels, 2001). 38. See William Wallace, ‘National inputs into European Political Cooperation’, in Allen, David, Rummel, Reinhardt and Wessels, Wolfgang (eds) European Political Cooperation: Towards a foreign policy for Western Europe (London, 1982), pp. 46–59. 39. The European Correspondent is inter alia responsible for the inter- and intraministerial day-to-day management of CFSP, for regular contact with counterparts in the other Foreign Ministries by administering the special telex network COREU, and for the preparation of the Political Committee’s sessions in Brussels. 40. See Christian Lequesne, op. cit., p. 85. 41. See Decree no. 93–1210 of 4 November 1993, op. cit. 42. On the struggle for competency that emerged in the aftermath of the Maastricht Treaty see Jan Ole Kiso, ‘COREPER and the Political Committee. Damaging for CFSP?’, in Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 2 (1997), pp. 141–54. 43. This is further complicated by the new security structures in Brussels that strengthen the role of COREPER and the Permanent Representation at the

128 Foreign Ministries in the European Union

44.

45.

46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52.

53.

54.

55. 56.

57.

58. 59.

60.

expense of the Political Director and the central administration. On the aspects of ‘Brusselisation’ of CFSP structures, see David Allen, ‘Who speaks for Europe?: the search for an effective and coherent external policy’, in Peterson, John and Sjursen, Helene (eds) A Common Foreign Policy for Europe? Competing visions of the CFSP (London, 1998), pp. 41–58. See Decree no. 98–1124 of 10 December 1998 on the organisation of the central administration of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, in Journal officiel of 13 December 1998 (source: http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/texteconsolide/PQHYO.htm). See the inter-institutional agreement between COREPER and Political Committee in: Council of the European Union/General Secretariat: Council Guide. I: Presidency handbook, Luxembourg 1996. See Annuaire diplomatique et consulaire de la République française 2000 (Paris, 2000). See Thomas Risse-Kappen (ed.) Bringing Transnational Relations Back In. Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions (Cambridge, 1995). See Samy Cohen, ‘Démocratie et politique étrangère – repenser les termes du débat’, in Annuaire Française des Relations Internationales, 1, Paris, 2000, p. 6. See Le Monde of 26 April 2001. See Frédéric Charillon, La politique étrangère à l’épreuve du transnational. Une étude des diplomaties française et britannique dans la guerre du Golfe (Paris, 1999). See Appendix 2. Marie-Christine Kessler and Frédéric Charillon, ‘France: un “rang” à réinventer’, in Charillon, Frédéric (ed.) Les politiques étrangères. Ruptures et continuités (Paris, 2001), p. 105. See for instance Circulaire of the Prime Minister no. PRMX9500942 C of 17 July 1995 on the coordination of external actions of the State, in Journal officiel no. 168 of 21 July 1995, p. 10806 in which the national ministries are reminded of the central role of the embassies in the preparation of visits and other contacts between officials from the ministries and respective authorities in the third country. See Interview with Dominique Perreau, Director of Economic and Financial Affairs, in Label no. 39 4/2000: ‘French Diplomacy’s New Look’, source: http://www.diplomatie.fr/label_france/…NOMIE/diplomatie_fr/diplomatie_fr.html. See Jean-Michel Dumond and Philippe Setton, La Politique Etrangère et de Sécurité Commune, La Documentation française (Paris, 1999), pp. 67–8. See in detail Richard Langhorne, ‘Report on the 548th Wilton Park conference of 11–14 January 1999 on: Managing Internal Affairs: New Trends?’, London 15 January 1999 (http://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/conferences/reports/ wp548report.html). See Jeffrey Lewis, ‘The methods of community in EU decision-making and administrative rivalry in the Council’s infrastructure’, in Journal of European Public Policy, 2 (2000), p. 261. See Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: The Development of the External Service, COM (2001) 381 final of 3 July 2001. For a detailed discussion about the role of embassies in Europe, see Michael Bruter, ‘Diplomacy without a state: the external delegations of the European Commission’, in Journal of European Public Policy, 2 (1999), pp. 183–205, and Paul Sharp, ‘Who needs diplomats? The problem of diplomatic representation’, in International Journal, 4 (1997), pp. 610–34. France has the second-largest bilateral network of representations in the world, after the United States.

Melanie Morisse-Schilbach 129

Bibliography Documents, official reports, newspaper articles Circulaire no. PRMx9400136 C of 21 March 1994 on the relation between the French administration and the institutions of the European Union, in Journal officiel, 76, 31 March 1994, p. 4783 Circulaire no. PRMX9500942 C of 17 July 1995 on the coordination of external actions of the State, in Journal officiel, 168, 21 July 1995, p. 10806 Circulaire no. PRMX9803266 C of 9 November 1998 on the procedure of transposition of Community’s directives into domestic law, in Journal officiel, 261, 10 November 1998, p. 16948 Circulaire no. PRMX9903860C of 13 December 1999 on the application of article 88–4 of the Constitution, in Journal officiel, 292, 17 December 1999, p. 18800 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: The Development of the External Service, COM (2001) 381 final of 3 July 2001 Council of the European Union/General Secretariat: Inter-institutional agreement between COREPER and the Political Committee of January 1996, in Council Guide. I: Presidency handbook, Luxembourg 1996 Cypel, Sylvian Quai d’Orsay (vols 1–3), in Le Monde, 24–26 April 2001 Decree no. 93–1210 of 4 November 1993 on the organisation of the central administration of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, in Journal officiel, 5 November 1993, pp. 265–9 Decree no. 98–1124 of 10 December 1998 on the organisation of the central administration of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, in Journal officiel, 13 December 1998 (source: http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/texteconsolide/PQHYO.htm) Heisbourg, François Mission d’analyse et de proposition relative à l’enseignement et à la recherche en ‘relations internationales’ et ‘Affaires stratégiques et de défense’, Rapport de Mission, Paris, July 2000 Interview with Dominique Perreau, Director of Economic and Financial Affairs, in Label, 39(4) 2000: ‘French Diplomay’s New Look’, source: http://www.diplomatie.fr/ label_france/… NOMIE/diplomatie_fr/diplomatie_fr.html L’Annuaire diplomatique et consulaire de la République française 1970–2000 (Paris: Ministère des Affaires Etrangère 1970–2000) Le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères: Budget 2001, http:/www.france.diplomatie.fr Ministère des Affaires Etrangères: Le Ministère des affaires étrangères de la France, Paris 1995

Books and articles Allison, Graham and Zelikow, Philip Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd edn (New York, 1999) Baeque, F. de and Quermonne, J.-L. (eds) Administration et politique sous la Cinquième République (Paris, 1982) Birnbaum, Pierre Les sommets de l’état: essai sur l’élite du pouvoir (Paris, 1994) Bourdieu, Pierre La noblesse d’état: grandes écoles et esprit de corps (Paris, 1989) Bruter, Michael ‘Diplomacy without a state: the external delegations of the European Commission’, in Journal of European Public Policy, 2 (1999), pp. 183–205 Charillon, Frédéric La politique étrangère à l’épreuve du transnational. Une étude des diplomaties française et britannique dans la guerre du Golfe (Paris, 1999) Clarke, Michael ‘French and British security: mirror images in a globalized word’, in International Affairs, 4 (2000), pp. 725–39

130 Foreign Ministries in the European Union Cohen, Samy La Monarchie nucléaire (Paris, 1986) Cohen, Samy ‘La politique étrangère entre l’Elysée et Matignon’, in politique étrangère 3 (1989), pp. 487–503 Cohen, Samy ‘La politique étrangère dans les institutions de la Vème République’, in Revue française d’administration publique 77 (1996), pp. 31–5 Cohen, Samy ‘Quelles marges de manoeuvre pour la politique étrangère française? Entretien avec Samy Cohen’, in Le Banquet 11 (1997), pp. 21–35 Cohen, Samy ‘Démocratie et politique étrangère – repenser les termes du débat’, in Annuaire Française des Relations Internationales, Vol 1 (Paris, 2000), pp. 3–11 Cohen, Samy ‘La diplomatie française dans la cohabitation’, in Esprit 6 (2000), pp. 45–60 Cohen, Samy and Clarke, Michael ‘Decision-making in foreign policy, part I: The French ambiguity’, in De la Serre, Françoise, Leruez, Jacques and Wallace, Helen (eds) French and British Foreign Policies in Transition. The Challenge of Adjustment (New York, 1990), pp. 204–16 Cole, Alistair François Mitterrand. A Study of Leadership (London, 1994) Dethan, Georges ‘The Ministry of Foreign Affairs since the Nineteenth Century’, in Steiner, Zara (ed.) The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World (London, 1982) Dufourcq, Bertrand ‘La réforme du Quai d’Orsay’, in Revue française d’administration publique 77 (1996), pp. 25–9 Dumond, Jean-Michel and Setton, Philippe La Politique Etrangère et de Sécurité Commune, La Documentation française (Paris, 1999) Elgie, Robert ‘Staffing the Summit: France’, in Peters, Guy, Rhodes, R. A. W. and Wright, Vincent (eds) Administering the Summit. Administration of the Core Executive in Developed Countries (London, 2000), pp. 225–44 Enjalran, Paulette and Husson, Philippe ‘France. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs: “something new, but which is the legitimate continuation of the past …” (Paul Claudel – le soulier de satin)’, in Hocking, Brian (ed.) Foreign Ministries. Change and Adaptation (New York, 1999), pp. 59–74 Hamilton, Keith and Langhorne, Richard The Practice of Diplomacy. Its Evolution, Theory and Administration (London, 1995) Lewis, Jeffrey ‘The methods of community in EU decision-making and administrative rivalry in the Council’s infrastructure’, in Journal of European Public Policy 2 (2000), pp. 261–89 Kassim, Hussein, Peters, Guy B. and Wright, Vincent (eds) The National Co-ordination of EU Policy. The Domestic Level (Oxford, 2000) Kessler, Marie-Christine La politique étrangère de la France. Acteurs et processus (Paris, 1999) Kessler, Marie-Christine and Charillon, Frédéric ‘France: un “rang” à réinventer’, in Charillon, Frédéric (ed.) Les politiques étrangères. Ruptures et continuités (Paris, 2001), pp. 101–32 Kiso, Jan Ole ‘COREPER and the Political Committee. Damaging for CFSP?’, in Cambridge Review of International Affairs 2 (1997), pp. 141–54 Langhorne, Richard ‘Report on the 548th Wilton Park Conference of 11–14 January 1999 on: Managing Internal Affairs: New Trends?’, London 15 January 1999 (http://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/conferences/reports/wp548report.html) Lequesne, Christian Paris–Bruxelles – Comment se fait la politique européenne de la France (Paris, 1993) Lequesne, Christian and Rivaud, Philippe The Politico-Administrative Institutions of France and the European Union: Towards Fusion? Manchester Papers in Politics, EPRU Paper 3/98, Manchester 1998

Melanie Morisse-Schilbach 131 Mény, Yves and Knapp, Andrew Government and Politics in Western Europe. Britain, France, Italy, Germany, 3rd edn (Oxford, 1998) Menon, Anand ‘France’, in Kassim, Hussein, Peters, Guy B. and Wright, Vincent (eds) The National Coordination of EU Policy. The Domestic Level (Oxford, 2000), pp. 79–98 Mesnier, S. ‘Le Role du Quai d’Orsay de mai 1986 à mai 1988’, in Revue administrative 256 (1990), pp. 489–98 Picqu, Jean ‘Genèse d’une réforme’, in Revue française d’administration publique 69 (1994), pp. 9–16 Rhodes, R. A. W. ‘From Prime Ministerial Power to Core executive’, in Rhodes, R. A. W. and Dunleavy, Patrick (eds) Prime Minister, Cabinet and Core Executive (London, 1995), pp. 11–37 Risse-Kappen, Thomas (ed.) Bringing Transnational Relations Back In. Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions (Cambridge, 1995) Sauron, Jean-Luc Die französische Verwaltung und die Europäische Union, la Documentation française, Paris, 2000. Sharp, Paul ‘Who needs diplomats? The problem of diplomatic representation’, in International Journal 4 (1997), pp. 610–34 Suleiman, Ezra ‘Change and Stability in French Elites’, in Flynn, Gregory (ed.) Remaking the Hexagon. The New France in the New Europe (Boulder, 1995), pp. 161–79 Védrine, Hubert Les mondes de François Mitterrand: A l’Elysée 1981–1995 (Paris, 1996) Wallace, William ‘National inputs into European Political Cooperation’, in Allen, David, Rummel, Reinhardt and Wessels, Wolfgang (eds) European Political Cooperation: Towards a foreign policy for Western Europe (London, 1982), pp. 46–59

8 Germany Elfriede Regelsberger

The conduct of German foreign policy is characterised by a number of similar yet distinct features compared with other EU member states. Germany shares with them the expansion of the foreign policy agenda and a steadily growing variety of actors due to economic interdependence and the gradual erosion of the former domestic/foreign policy ‘divide’. This has created enormous challenges for the Auswärtiges Amt,1 the German foreign ministry. The need to cope with the changed international environment2 and increased coordination efforts at the national level contrast with budget cuts and public criticism of excessively ‘heavy’ administrative structures. Those responsible for daily diplomatic business even publicly3 warn against models of a ‘lean state’ (‘schlanker Staat’), and, as part of it, a ‘lean’ foreign service. This is not surprising given the enormously enlarged agenda the diplomats have to manage. Classical tasks such as judicial and consular affairs have been considerably extended through economic interdependence and the growth of tourism. For Germany, unification added another 17 million Germans to the population. There are also relatively new foreign policy tasks such as ‘lobbying’ for Germany in the host country beyond traditional government circles (‘public diplomacy’) to avoid misperceptions (as in the case of the 1989 upheavals in the former GDR and Eastern Europe), and taking charge of official German visitors who have become particularly numerous. Yet, in contrast to its EU partners, the foreign policy of the newly united Germany was immediately and substantially affected by the changed European environment of the late 1980s. Though continuity became the leitmotiv of official foreign policy and has remained so after the change in government in October 1998,4 an intensive debate and academic stock-taking on Germany’s future place in the world has occurred since then. Not surprisingly, the regional and global interdependencies of German politics, economics and society are identified as the key factors which will determine multilateralism and partnership as key approaches of German foreign-policy making.5 Interestingly, however, these studies focus on German interests and strategies to be pursued in the different international setting while little 132

Elfriede Regelsberger 133

attention is given to structural and procedural aspects of the decision making and implementation processes of German foreign policy.6 A key feature of Germany’s new foreign policy machine is the decision to move more than 50 per cent of the federal government to Berlin. Outside observers7 suggest this represents ‘some kind of culture change’ – albeit difficult to quantify – in the norms, values and identities expressed in the foreign office’s work. Insiders8 interpret the ministerial shifts as a fundamental break which will not necessarily facilitate the management of foreign policy and will, at the very least, alter many conditions of daily diplomatic work.

Organisation and agendas9 Foreign-policy making in the Federal Republic is characterised firstly by constitutional regulations and secondly by legislation. According to the Basic Law (Grundgesetz Article 32,1) foreign relations are the responsibility of the federal government while other federal organs, such as the two parliamentary chambers and the federal constitutional court also have certain rights of participation. Article 87,1 of the German constitution refers to the establishment of a federal foreign service as the adequate administrative component to conduct foreign affairs (Gesetz über den Auswärtigen Dienst, GAD).10 It establishes the fundamentals of both the objectives and organisation of the German foreign service. Para 1 (GAD) sees the foreign ministry as the central agency except for those cases where government decisions have shifted foreign affairs competences elsewhere. One of the most frequently cited examples is Chancellor Adenauer’s letter in the late 1950s which entrusted the Ministry of Economic Affairs with the technical management of EC business while the Auswärtiges Amt remained in charge of the basic principles governing Germany’s commitment to European integration. The decision, valid until the SPD/Green-led government of Gerhard Schröder took over from Helmut Kohl in October 1998,11 indicates what was to become a constant erosion of the Auswärtiges Amt’s competences to the benefit of the specialised ministries. Official sources12 recognise the relative weight of the foreign service without, however, admitting publicly to a decline of its role: the operational desks inside the Auswärtiges Amt (86 in total and after 1998 only 6813) make up only one-third of all government units (250 in total), dealing with foreign and European matters. Other calculations indicate an even greater crossborder involvement of German officials. Almost 50 per cent of all desks in the ministries (in total 1,400) are said to be involved. Similar patterns occur when one tries to figure out the map of government ‘actors’ in the area of foreign cultural policy: they are spread throughout eleven federal ministries! The fact that the ministry of foreign affairs is no longer the ‘monopolist’ is also reflected in the distribution of the financial resources: the Auswärtiges Amt disposes of only one-third of the expenditure on external affairs.14

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Not surprisingly, para 1 GAD entrusts the foreign service with the central coordination function for all questions with significant foreign policy implications. Yet, practice reveals that this is a difficult task to fulfil in a system which favours decentralisation and a focus on issues from the angle of one’s ‘own’ ministry. Another key feature of policy making in the political system of the Federal Republic, the Ressortprinzip (Article 65 Basic Law), i.e. ministerial autonomy, does not necessarily support the coordination efforts of the Auswärtiges Amt and the consistency of policy approaches. Finally, both the course and conduct of German foreign policy are massively influenced by domestic political considerations, such as the existence of a coalition government and the political strength or weakness of its members. The fact that Chancellor Kohl held office from 1982 while Klaus Kinkel only succeeded foreign minister Genscher in 1992, needs no further explanation. Kohl’s strong European commitment and interest in this area of German foreign policy and his constitutional right to establish the government’s directives, Richtlinienkompetenz (Article 65 Basic Law) further strengthened his position. A convergence of views on substantive matters and the established practice that foreign policy in the Chancellery is dealt with by diplomats seconded from the Auswärtiges Amt are said to work as helpful correctives, as perceived by the foreign service. Outsiders,15 however, emphasise the relative political weight of the Liberals and the FDP foreign minister in the coalition government after their failure in the 1994 elections and an even greater influence of the then CDU leader and Chancellor in EU and foreign policy matters. With the general elections of October 1998 a new era in domestic political life began with Joschka Fischer, one of the leading figures in Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, heading the ministry of foreign affairs. In contrast to many of his Green party colleagues he is said to be an advocate of European integration while Gerhard Schröder, the Chancellor of the new SPD–Bündnis 90/Die Grünen government, is said to be less enthusiastic about these ideas as were his social democratic predecessors in the 1970s. Apart from the organisational rules and proceedings mentioned above, the organisation and conduct of the work of the cabinet is determined by a coalition agreement16 which attributes the organisational power for the cabinet to the chancellor while major changes in the organisation and competences of the ministries have to be agreed between the coalition partners. Both sides also agreed to work towards a common position in EU fora. In cases where insurmountable obstacles occur a coalition committee composed of eight members from each coalition partner will try to solve the issue.

Adaptation and reform The years 1996–2000 can be understood as a decisive period of reorganisation of the ministry of foreign affairs with far reaching implications for its

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profile in the future. The scope of this reorganisation is comparable to that undertaken as early as the 1920s. As in other Western countries the restructuring of the foreign affairs ministry was motivated by increased functions and external challenges. At the same time, German unification worked as another driving force. Initially, the management of this historic task brought about an enormous increase in posts for practically all governmental bodies. For the ministry of foreign affairs this meant an increase of 700 posts or around a 10 per cent increase in personnel. The tremendous financial burden that unification produced forced the government to fundamentally reorganise its administration with the aims of reducing personnel and introducing more effective structures and working methods. For the foreign service this meant a gradual cut of existing posts of around 8.5 per cent, so as to return to the 1989 level, i.e. before unification. In quantitative terms, this ceiling meant a closure of 20 missions, particularly consulates, in Western Europe in the late 1990s; 40 missions largely on the territory of the former Soviet Union having to be set up; and 15 per cent of the working units or 100 posts in the Auswärtiges Amt in Bonn having to be reduced. In qualitative terms the reforms aim to improve mutual information and coordination via intensive use of new information technologies, and the creation of larger and less hierarchical working units in order to involve directly all those dealing with one subject. It is hoped that this approach will encourage a certain flexibility in the traditional hierarchical structures of the German diplomatic service and will favour the emergence of a corporate identity and a team spirit – the necessary and so far underdeveloped features of a modern diplomatic service.17 On the other hand, structural reform and personnel cuts at the domestic level will have repercussions on the career model of German diplomacy in that foreign service posts abroad might become too numerous for the limited number of posts available in the foreign service at home. Since the principle of rotation will be maintained for the diplomatic career, frustration among diplomats serving abroad might grow. Difficult working and living conditions of certain posts, attractive offers from the private sector, negative repercussions on families and in particular the long-ignored changing role of women in German society (no longer prepared to be the ‘appendage’ of a husband, ready to follow him everywhere) seem to have already lessened the attractiveness of a diplomatic career and reduced personal commitment. Another element of the modernisation strategy for the German foreign service has to do with the definition and application of criteria to measure foreign policy ‘output’. In 1996, the then foreign minister Kinkel asked the well-known management consultants Roland Berger and Partners to analyse working practices and to develop an adequate control system.18 The report, a thousand pages long and confidential, produced a number of projects attempting to apply criteria developed to measure a foreign policy objective and its achievement in a specific area against the costs in terms of human

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and material resources. The protagonists of this approach, led by the former head of the ‘task force future perspectives of the foreign service’,19 Julius Georg Luy, aimed to channel all relevant resources more effectively and to make the diplomats more aware of the costs they incur.20 Based on the assumption that the existing organisation of the Auswärtiges Amt had produced too many mixed competences and had become so complex that serious problems of coordination and guidance had arisen, the various reform steps aimed to strengthen the regional/country-based aspects or the global character of the given problem. This approach implies the strengthening of the traditional country desks which will be responsible for all bilateral issues of a political, economic and cultural nature in the political Divisions 2 and 3. In contrast, the focus of the economic Division 4 will be the promotion of Germany’s external economic relations and investment policies in a more general way. The establishment of a separate division for the United Nations has also to be understood as an immediate response to the globalisation of foreign policy issues and the importance of multilateral frameworks. Strongly advocated by former foreign minister Kinkel, the head of the UN division also carries explicit responsibility for global issues such as drugs, organised crime, the abuse of asylum, environmental protection, human rights – issues which were perceived as topical by the general public and likely to produce a greater acceptance of foreign policy decisions. Finally, the reform project involved a streamlining of the responsibilities for security and disarmament questions. Initially split into two separate divisions, Germany adopted the model of other Western partners like France and the United Kingdom and re-integrated the responsibilities for disarmament into political Division 2, thus highlighting the central role its head plays in key issues of German foreign policy.

The EU dimension As mentioned above, the foreign ministry carries responsibility for political core areas of the integration process such as the enlargement of the EU, institutional developments or the overall revision of the treaties, such as that of the Intergovernmental Conference of 1996/97. The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU is also undeniably part of the AA’s competence as was its predecessor, European Political Cooperation (EPC). While this area requires basically ‘only’ intra-ministerial coordination, i.e. particularly with those desks covering the EU’s external economic relations, the constant extension and complexity of the EU agenda makes intensive interministerial contacts necessary in order to secure consistency in Germany’s integration policy. The constant diffusion of EU competences and the fragmentation of the actors not surprisingly work against the self-perceived function of the foreign service as guardian of EU integration principles. The foreign ministry’s main instrument in this coordination role is the presidency of the central interministerial Committee of State Secretaries

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(Europa-Staatssekretäre). Meeting at roughly monthly intervals and taking decisions binding on the administration, the State Secretaries from the classical EC ministries, i.e. Foreign Affairs, Economics, Agriculture and Finance,21 attempt to solve highly sensitive and controversial issues of a more general political nature under the authority of the Minister of State responsible for European Affairs – a political post in the foreign ministry traditionally covered by the Liberals since the early 1970s and for a time held by Social Democrat Günther Verheugen. Interestingly, and in line with the division of labour installed under Adenauer as early as 1958 (mentioned above), the secretarial tasks of the Committee of State Secretaries were managed by Department E in the Economics Ministry, which was also responsible for distributing information from Brussels to domestic actors outside the federal government. It also coordinated and transferred instructions to the Permanent Representation in Brussels for Council negotiations.22 The change in government of October 1998 brought about a fundamental change in this traditional division of labour between the minister of foreign affairs and the ministry for economics. Obviously as a reaction to the intra-SPD controversies over the distribution of competences between the ministers of economics and finances, Chancellor Schröder decided to transfer most of the European Division of the ministry of economic affairs to the finance department headed by SPD leader Lafontaine. As this shift of competences included the responsibility for EU-related coordination, the ministry of economic affairs was clearly on the losing side. In contrast, the foreign affairs ministry was on the winning side, as the responsibilities for EU coordination were not left with the ministry of economics but transferred to the European Division, desk E 10 in the Auswärtiges Amt. The aforementioned distribution of responsibilities for coordination in EU matters did not apply to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). From its inception CFSP affairs enjoyed special treatment. Texts for the second pillar of the Maastricht Treaty transit directly between the foreign ministry and the Permanent Representation – this is due to successful lobbying of the CFSP officials against outside pressure. To the extent, however, that issues of a genuinely ‘political’ nature like those of CFSP become interconnected with Community affairs and third pillar competences, e.g. financing CFSP joint actions through the EC budget, combating international crime, drug trafficking, etc., even this traditional domain of the foreign ministry might be reduced or at least require additional coordination efforts between traditionally unconnected strands of the government like Auswärtiges Amt and the Ministry of the Interior.

Strategies and responses In many ways, the Maastricht Treaty on European Union (TEU) had a significant impact on both the substance and procedures of European integration

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in Germany. The ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court in October 1993 on the TEU and a package of constitutional amendments and secondary legislation23 are but the most prominent elements which received considerable publicity. Yet, another decision, central to the question of who the main actors in EC decision making are, remained largely ignored by the wider public: the creation of a genuinely European Division inside the foreign affairs ministry. Until April 1993 EC matters were traditionally dealt with in a sub-division (No. 41) of Division 4 ‘External Economics Policy, Development Policy and European Economic Integration’, while EPC issues were located in Political Division No. 2, its head representing Germany in the Political Committee and the head of Desk No. 200 ‘European integration and political cooperation, Council of Europe …’ acting as EPC Correspondent, the central coordinating agency. The new formula established a new Division E (‘Europaabteilung’) headed by a high-ranking civil servant at the same level as those of the other divisions, with two sub-divisions E 1 and E 2. Initially, CFSP matters were shifted to the new division, becoming desk E 20 ‘CFSP, institutional questions of the EU’s external relations’ in sub-division E 2. The transfer was, however, a limited one and alien to normal bureaucratic practice: the head of the new CFSP desk, the European Correspondent, wore two ‘hats’. As European Correspondent he remained attached to the Political Director, i.e. the head of the Political Division No. 2, his former supervisor, while in other matters he reported to the head of the European Division. Not surprisingly the chosen formula did not bear fruit and was changed only one year later. In June 1994 the functions of the European Correspondent were re-established as they were originally in Political Division No. 2, under the new heading ‘EU-KOR’, while the then mini E 20 desk became a (rather strange) mixture of issues such as the coordination of the EU’s external relations, the role of the European Parliament therein, budgetary matters of CFSP and institutional aspects of CFSP. The turf battles in this particular case are not exceptional for bureaucratic struggles in the area of EC/EU matters inside the foreign ministry. Whenever EC/EU projects are of a political and global nature or EPC/CFSP issues are interconnected with other Community business, clashes of competence arise. Negotiations on the Tindemans Report in the mid-1970s were one example. The run-up to the Stuttgart Solemn Declaration on European Union in 1983 was another case where Political Division No. 2 claimed to have the lead against massive pressure from EC sub-division No. 41. In the end, a German proposal foresaw that the negotiations at European level should be organised in an ad hoc group comprising two representatives from each member state. This was an attempt to reconcile the claims of the various domestic German actors.24 The 1993/94 ‘case’ of the establishment of the Europaabteilung illustrates again the long-standing controversies between the integrationists inside the foreign ministry, i.e. traditionally those covering EC matters and the

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intergovernmentalists, i.e. EPC/CFSP specialists. The initial proposal, as described above, remained half-hearted from the outset. On the one hand it signalled Germany’s comprehensive understanding of the integration process and narrowing of the pillars under the ‘roof’ of the Maastricht Treaty. On the other hand the idea did not go as far as to transfer the responsibility for CFSP from the Political Director to the head of the new European Division. Given the already complex EC agenda and other experiences of a splitting of responsibilities, for example in the European Commission due to staff overload, such a step would have been counterproductive. But the different substance of policies to be covered by CFSP and their anchoring in the two Political Divisions also justify a structure of their own. The importance second pillar issues play in German foreign policy has been reaffirmed by the fact that a Deputy Political Director has been appointed as part of the reorganisation of the foreign service. Whether or not coordination mechanisms work depends largely on the perceptions and personalities involved. At present it seems as if those responsible for CFSP not only constitute an efficient team but keep good working relations with their colleagues in the European Division, thus fostering the requested consistency of Europe’s international relations. In order to respond more effectively to the horizontal nature of foreign policy issues, ‘Task Forces’ have been created in Division E for the intergovernmental conference of 1996/97, for EU-enlargement, and in the UN division, to give but three examples. These Task Forces are seen as an adequate means of facilitating intraministerial coordination. In addition, the European Division has seen some sort of upgrading in that all desks dealing with the bilateral relations of Germany with its EU partners which traditionally belonged to the Political Division 2 were incorporated in the European Division in 1998. Leaving certain intraministerial conflicts referred to earlier aside, foreign ministry officials see the creation of the European Division as an important step in the struggle to keep, if not strengthen, their profile against all those ‘invading’ the EU corridors. This applies first and foremost to the Economics Ministry, which also suffered from the growing role the specialised ministries play in EU matters and which was eager, though unsuccessful in the end, to retain a role in the coordination process. Officials in the Chancellery and those advocating more operational competences for the minister of state for European Affairs to be shifted from the Auswärtiges Amt to the Chancellery25 may not necessarily share the view that ‘only’ the Auswärtiges Amt is able to prepare, formulate and coordinate Germany’s EU policy.26 But the effects of the foreign ministry’s ‘containment’ strategy via the European Division are there. This also applies to all those in favour of a specific Ministry for European Affairs, a long-standing idea which could conceivably act as a super bureaucracy either dominating all other actors or, in a weak configuration, merely duplicate existing coordination mechanisms.

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It is common knowledge that the multilateralisation of Germany’s foreign policy had an impact on the behavioural patterns and working practices of the diplomatic service. The element most frequently referred to is the ‘concertation reflex’, i.e. to consider the reactions of partners before fixing one’s own position. This minimises the danger of extreme positions and facilitates consensus building. The exclusive ‘club’ character and confidentiality of EPC deliberations both fostered this trend and enhanced personal bonds among participants. The institutional novelties of the Maastricht Treaty27 – EU enlargement; fusion of CFSP working groups with those of the first pillar; and the making of the Council into the sole EC/CFSP decision-making body – might seem to hamper this process and create a different, more rational and bureaucratic negotiation style which could become detrimental to CFSP objectives.28 Another effect of EPC/CFSP is the constant ‘education’ of diplomats in European affairs, in that the broad CFSP agenda and CFSP coordination worldwide involves more and more diplomats and makes them aware of the ‘Europeanisation’ of national foreign policy. As a result the diplomatic reporting from posts abroad is said to include CFSP matters to a considerable extent. Some, however, rightly argue that a reasonable balance has to be kept between intra-EU coordination abroad and ‘normal’ diplomatic business, that is, to take care of developments in the host country. The federal government is traditionally among those which favour29 joint representations of EU countries in third countries. Due to mainly French legal constraints the efforts so far had to be limited to a synergy of technical and organisational resources, e.g. in Almaty (Kasachstan)30 and Abuja (Nigeria).31 Furthermore, the German foreign service has established a more substanceorientated cooperation with both EU partners (e.g. France, United Kingdom, Italy, Portugal) and other Western states (Australia, United States) in the Auswärtiges Amt. For a one-year period diplomats from those partner countries work in different desks of the Auswärtiges Amt even going as far as formulating and representing German positions in international negotiations. The view that embassies inside the EU are increasingly superfluous due to the direct links between national ministries and the EU apparatus is not widely shared among foreign affairs officials. The convincing argument is that global political, economic and social interdependence creates new challenges and fields of diplomatic activity (e.g. legal and consular matters are affected by the mobility and free movement of citizens inside the EU). The use of information technologies seems to improve communication between the ministry in Bonn and the missions abroad in that the latter can be more directly involved in the drafting of texts and the supply of information, thus avoiding the time-consuming hierarchical structures of traditional communication procedures. Furthermore, bilateral links between EU member states might gain a certain importance in the process of influencing the decision-making process

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in Brussels. Extensive reporting on the domestic political scene of the host country with the EU agenda in mind could for example help overcome constraints for the negotiations in Brussels and be used to receive greater support for one’s own position. The search for coalition partners among the other EU governments could be enhanced for EC business as well as for CFSP as majority voting gains ground and increases the need not to be outvoted. The issue was discussed in the foreign ministry in the Spring of 1997, and should produce concrete proposals after a meeting of the CFSP staff with the German ambassadors inside the EU. Based on earlier surveys on how to adjust the EU-based embassies to the new challenges, another idea had led earlier to the appointment of an EU specialist in each German embassy inside EU borders, which is part of an Auswärtiges Amt–Brussels–host country triangle established in order to improve communication on topical EU matters between the three sides. This is admittedly not an easy task, and one which receives considerable attention from other EU partners considering adopting the German model. Foreign affairs officials confirm a great interest in an increased German representation in EU institutions. According to (confidential) statistics, Germany traditionally ranks third at A-official level in the European Parliament, the Council Secretariat, the Commission32 and the European Court of Justice. France, Italy and Belgium are regularly better off. The fact that the post of the Secretary-General of the Council was held for a time by a German was said to have increased the share of high ranking German officials in this body. Since 1995/96 the German foreign office has sponsored specific programmes to prepare young people better for the contours of the EU institutions and has offered practical training inside the ministries (particularly Auswärtiges Amt and Economics ministry) to those who are planning to enter the EU services and of course also for the domestic staff. These developments are designed to improve the Europafähigkeit (European expertise) of the constantly growing number of civil servants involved in EU matters. Insiders increasingly issue complaints that the German Civil Service’s administrative framework and the personnel cuts33 in the foreign ministry complicate daily work. To be delegated to multilateral organisations is not necessarily a bonus for the diplomatic career. There is also no adequate personnel reserve34 and obviously no particular stimulus to offer German candidates for specific foreign affairs mandates – a trend which might for example increase through the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy.35

Conclusions Foreign-policy making in Germany, and thus the role of the foreign service, is determined by both legal conditions and domestic political and societal realities. The Foreign Service Act of 1990 is said to offer adequate guidelines to strengthen the foreign ministry’s key position in representing German

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interests internationally. The modernisation process of the late 1990s aimed to prepare the German foreign service more effectively for its changed functions. German unification, the move to Berlin in 1999 and budgetary constraints are perceived as both a heavy burden and as an opportunity for reform. However, the success or failure of the Auswärtiges Amt to fulfil its role in priority fields of German interest such as European integration, humanitarian and peace-keeping efforts and foreign economic relations not only depend on a highly motivated, team-spirit minded diplomatic staff which has modern communication technologies at its disposal; success also depends on the readiness of other public and private actors to cooperate with the traditional representatives of foreign policy and the former’s readiness to view their fragmented interests in the context of Germany’s global foreign policy objectives. The multilateralisation of foreign policy above all via EPC/CFSP meant – at least – a confirmation of the foreign ministry’s central position in the definition and execution of key political issues. The setting up of a genuine European Division inside the Auswärtiges Amt not only signals the importance the German government attaches to its EU membership but also reaffirms the foreign ministry’s traditional role as coordinator and guardian of EU principles. The re-distribution of EU-related competences undertaken by the Schröder Government in October 1998 adds additional strength to this key function of the Auswärtiges Amt.

Appendix 1 German diplomatic missions as of January 1999 Number of diplomatic relations with third countries: 188 Number of missions: 236 Number of embassies: 149 Number of Consulates-General: 62 Number of Consulates/Vice Consulates: 7 Number of representations at international organisations: 12 Number of branch offices: 4 Number of representative offices (Vertretungsbüro): 1 Number of interest sections under Art. 46 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (Schutzmachtvertretung): 1 Honorary Consuls: 327

Appendix 2 Number of personnel of the Auswärtiges Amt as of January 1999 In total: 8637 (including trainees and local staff) In Auswärtiges Amt, Bonn: 2788 Abroad: 5849

Elfriede Regelsberger 143 According to careers: Höherer Dienst: 1525 Gehobener Dienst: 2106 Mittlerer und einfacher Dienst: 2536 Secretarial staff: 1417* Local staff abroad: 966* * Dates as of January 1996, no others available. Source for Annexes 1, 2: Auswärtiges Amt

Notes 1. The name ‘Auswärtiges Amt’ dates back to the year 1870 when Bismarck created the foreign office of the North German Confederation which was initially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Prussia. After 1945 Germany’s return to sovereignty depended on the allied statute of occupation. On 15 March 1951 the department for foreign affairs in the Chancellery was upgraded and installed as an independent ministry, the Auswärtiges Amt. On the history see: Ludwig, ‘Auswärtiges Amt. Ein Überblick’, in: Auswärtiges Amt (ed.): 125 Jahre Auswärtiges Amt Festschrif; Auswärtiges Amt, (Bonn, 1995) pp. 87–103. 2. Between 1989 and 1998 forty new diplomatic missions were established due to the dissolution of the former Soviet Union. 3. As did the then state secretary of the Auswärtiges Amt in charge among other things of the key political departments and administrative affairs: Peter Hartmann: ‘Generalisten im Dienste der deutschen Außenpolitik’, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 22 October 1996, pp. 12–13. 4. As for the policy substance of the newly elected coalition government of Social Democrats and Greens, see: Aufbruch und Erneuerung – Deutschlands Weg ins 21. Jahrhundert. Koalitionsvereinbarung zwischen der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands und Bündnis 90/Die Grünen; Die Grünen, Bonn, 20 October 1998. 5. For further details see the comprehensive studies of the Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellsschaft für Auswärtige Politik published in three volumes: Karl Kaiser and Hanns W. Maull (eds): Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik Band 1: Grundlagen; R. Oldenbourg Verlag (München: 1994). Karl Kaiser and Hanns W. Maull (eds): Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik Band 2 (München: 1995). Karl Kaiser and Joachim Krause (eds): Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik Band 3: Interessen und Strategien (München: 1996). Gottfried Niedhart: ‘Deutsche Außenpolitik: Vom Teilstaat mit begrenzter Souveränität zum postmodernen Nationalstaat’, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B 1–2/1997, pp. 15–23. As for government positions see: Auswärtiges Amt (ed.): Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Dokumente von 1949 bis 1994 (Cologne: 1995). 6. Obvious research deficits are also noted by: Walter L. Bühl: ‘Gesellschafliche Grundlagen Außenpolitik’, in: Kaiser and Maull Band 1, op. cit. pp. 175–201, 191. In late 1998 a valuable and comprehensive volume was published: Wolf-Dieter Eberwein and Karl Kaiser (eds): Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik, Bd. 4 Institutionen und Ressourcen (München: 1998). 7. Cf. Simon Bulmer and William E. Paterson: ‘Germany in the European Union: gentle giant or emergent leader?’ In: International Affairs 1 (1996), pp. 9–32; here p. 19. 8. Fritjof von Nordenskjöld and Julius Georg Luy: ‘Der Auswärtige Dienst auf dem Weg nach Berlin’, in: Auswärtiger Dienst, II (1995), pp. 4–11.

144 Foreign Ministries in the European Union 9. Judith Siwert-Probst: ‘Die klassischen außenpolitischen Institutionen’, in: Eberwein and Kaiser, op. cit., pp. 13–28. 10. Gesetz über den Auswärtigen Dienst (GAD); for its text, historical background and assessment see: Grau and Schmidt-Bremme: Gesetz über den Auswärtigen Dienst. Kommentar (Baden-Baden: 1996), pp. 9–10. 11. See below. 12. Hartmann, op. cit. 13. See below. 14. See also the contribution of State Secretary Hans-Friedrich von Ploetz: ‘Der Auswärtige Dienst vor neuen Herausforderungen’, in: Eberwein and Kaiser, op. cit., pp. 59–74. 15. See e.g. Dietrich Rometsch: ‘The Federal Republic of Germany and the European Union: Patterns of Institutional and Administrative Interaction’, IGS Discussions Paper Series No. 95/2, The University of Birmingham. 16. See Koalitionsvereinbarung, op. cit. 17. See comments made by the former head of the commission for reforming the foreign service, established in 1968, former state secretary Hans von Herwarth, in: Ulrich Grau and Götz Schmidt-Bremme, op. cit. 18. The project team consisted of five external experts and foreign affairs staff. Cf. Jochen Buchsteiner: ‘Die Ressource Kinkel. Wie Unternehmensberater den Erfolg von Außenpolitik messen’, in: Die Zeit, 19 January 1996, p. 9. 19. Established in 1993 as a response to the new international challenges and necessary adjustments in the diplomatic service. 20. Von Nordenskjöld and Luy, op. cit., p. 10. 21. Plus the Permanent Representative and the State Secretary in charge of EC affairs in the Chancellery and – depending on the agenda – equivalent representatives from other ministries. 22. For further details see Rometsch, op. cit., pp. 13–15. 23. Referring e.g. to the new Article 23 Basic Law, which sets the parameters of Germany’s understanding of a European Union and paves the way for greater participation by the Länder in the decision-making process, going as far as to negotiate in the Council in matters of exclusive Länder competences (e.g. cultural policy). For further details: Thomas Läufer: ‘Bundesrepublik Deutschland’, in: Werner Weidenfeld and Wolfgang Wessels (eds): Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration 1992/93 (Bonn, 1993), pp. 299–307. 24. Elfriede Regelsberger and Wolfgang Wessels: ‘The Presidency of the Council of Ministers of the European Communities. National Paper on the Federal Republic of Germany’ in: Colm O’Nuallain (ed.): The Presidency of the European Council of Ministers (London: Croom Helm, 1985), pp. 73–100. 25. Cf. Josef Janning and Patrick Meyer: Deutsche Europapolitik. Vorschläge zur Effektivierung (Gütersloh, 1998). 26. Cf. former State Secretary Dieter Kastrup: ‘Die Zukunft des Auswärtigen Dienstes’, in: Armin Laschet and Peter Pappert (eds): Ein Kontinent im Umbruch. Perspektiven für eine europäische Außenpolitik; Propyläen (Berlin, 1993), pp. 77–89, here: p. 83. 27. As for further details on the CFSP provisions and their implementation see among others: Elfriede Regelsberger, Philippe de Schoutheete de Tervarent and Wolfgang Wessels (eds): Foreign Policy of the European Union. From EPC to CFSP and Beyond (Boulder and London, 1997). 28. Confirmed by the former Political Diector and acting Secretary of State: Wolfgang Ischinger: ‘Die Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik nach Amsterdam – Praxis und Perspektiven’, ZEI Discussion Paper C 14, (Bonn, 1998).

Elfriede Regelsberger 145 29. Confirmed by Secretary of State Hartmann, op. cit. 30. Use of joint infrastructure between the French, German and British diplomatic services. 31. Though only with 14 EU members while the United Kingdom prefers a separate representation because of its special colonial past in Nigeria. 32. Germany ranks second after the UK in leading the EU’s external delegations. 33. Annual personnel cuts: 1.5 per cent since 1993, 2 per cent from 1997 onwards. See also Appendix 1. 34. Though requested in para 6 GAD. 35. As exemplified with the mandates for special envoys (Article 18,5 TEU) to observe the Middle East process, the crisis in the Great Lakes, Cyprus, the implementation of the Dayton Agreement.

Bibliography Official reports Auswärtiges Amt (ed.), 125 Jahre Auswärtiges Amt. Festschrift (Bonn, 1995) Auswärtiges Amt (ed.), Deutsche Außenpolitik 1995. Beitrag des Auswärtigen Amtes zum Jahresbericht der Bundesregierung 1995 (Bonn, 1996) Hartmann, Peter ‘Generalisten im Dienste der deutschen Außenpolitik’, in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 22 October 1996, pp. 12–13 Herwarth, Hans von Bericht der Kommission für die Reform des Auswärtigen Dienstes (Bonn, 1971)

Books and articles Bulmer, Simon and Paterson, William E. ‘Germany in the European Union: gentle giant or emergent leader?’, in International Affairs 1 (1996), pp. 9–32 Eberwein, Wolf-Dieter and Kaiser, Karl (eds) Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik, Bd. 4 Institutionen und Ressourcen (München, 1998) Grau, Ulrich and Schmidt-Bremme, Götz Gesetz über den Auswärtigen Dienst. Kommentar (Baden-Baden, 1996) Nordenskjöld, Fritjof von and Luy, Julius Georg ‘Der Auswärtige Dienst auf dem Weg nach Berlin’, in Auswärtiger Dienst, II (1995), pp. 4–11 Ploetz, Hans-Friedrich von ‘Der Auswärtige Dienst vor neuen Herausforderungen’, in Eberwein and Kaiser, op. cit., pp. 59–74 Rometsch, Dietrich ‘The Federal Republic of Germany and the European Union: Patterns of Institutional and Administrative Interaction’, IGS Discussions Paper Series No. 95/2, The University of Birmingham

9 Ireland* Ben Tonra

The establishment of the Department of External Affairs was formally proposed by legislation in 1923. The Department was initially composed of a group of somewhat iconoclastic individuals. They had been part of the Propaganda Department of the clandestine Irish Government during the independence struggle and who later had accepted the 1921 peace treaty with Britain.1 The establishment of this Department was attacked by some members of the Dáil (lower house of parliament) during the passage of the enabling legislation as a useless impertinence and an extravagance. Indeed, the Department of Finance argued that no separate Department was required. It suggested that such external responsibilities as were necessary might most effectively be devolved upon the office of the President of the Executive Council.2 As late as 1943, and under a new constitution, a leading opposition politician – and later Taoiseach (prime minister) – described the Department of External Affairs as having been ‘the Cinderella of Government Departments’.3 The Department’s early growth was unspectacular. In 1934 there were 15 members of staff accommodated in a hallway at the headquarters of the Department of Agriculture. The Department’s budget in 1932 amounted to 0.34 per cent of government expenditure. By September 1939 resident missions had been established in the United Kingdom, the United States, the Vatican, France, Germany, Belgium, Spain, Italy and Canada. During the war, additional resident embassies were set up in two neutral states: Switzerland and Portugal. In the post-war world, the Department was faced with a multiplicity of new international organisations and the need to expand modestly Ireland’s diplomatic network. Resident missions were thus established between 1945 and 1950 in the Netherlands, Sweden, Australia and Argentina. After the war, it was the Department of External Affairs which was initially tasked with leading Irish policy in the European Recovery Programme (ERP)

* The author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance provided by Evin McLoughlin, Research Assistant, Institute of European Affairs. 146

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and Bretton Woods institutions. This reflected the interests of the then Taoiseach, Eamon de Valera, since he held the External Affairs portfolio jointly with his own from 1932 to 1948. When Ireland’s first coalition government subsequently took office in 1948, the leader of one of the smaller government parties, Sean MacBride, took the External Affairs portfolio. Irish participation in the ERP continued to be coordinated by that Department. Later, however, when the focus of domestic Irish economic policy shifted towards internationalisation, the Department of Industry and Commerce and the Department of Finance were central to the definition of Irish foreign policy interests in the major multilateral economic institutions such as the IMF, IBRD, GATT and OEEC. These additional post-war responsibilities, however, did lead to a reorganisation of the Department. First, the Economic Division was established and the Washington mission was expanded to manage Irish participation in the ERP. Second, the press and information section was augmented to raise sympathetic international awareness of the partition of the island of Ireland into two states. Further expansion took place, when the UN mission was established with Irish membership of that organisation in 1956. Responding to the 1969 outbreak of violence in Northern Ireland, the Anglo-Irish Division was added in 1971. Departmental status The Department’s limited profile within the Irish administration was initially built around its early pursuit of what might be called constitutional diplomacy. Until the state declared itself a republic in 1948, the Department played a role – largely through the office of the Taoiseach – in establishing the status of the country within the British Commonwealth. During the 1939–45 war it helped to define independence through the pursuit of neutrality. At the end of the war its role was partly defined as a publicity agent, dedicated to raising the profile of the state’s position on Northern Ireland. With UN membership in 1956, the Department’s horizons were significantly broadened. It played a key role in developing an Irish profile within the UN organisation through its advocacy of disarmament, its support for UN peacekeeping missions and its votes for decolonisation motions in the UN General Assembly. The Department’s activism at the United Nations served, in part, to define its role as the agent for high global politics, leaving matters such as regional trade and economics to other Departments – especially Finance, and Trade and Industry. As a result, the Department was in many respects distanced from the mainstream of the Irish administration. Today, the Department is seen as the second department of state following Finance. Ministers tend to be either senior party figures – very often deputy party leaders in a single party government – or leaders of significant coalition partners.

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Background to the Department’s role in Europe In the post-war period the Department had only a very limited engagement in regional European politics.4 Ireland had sided with the UK and the Scandinavian states in opposing a federalist orientation to the Council of Europe in 1948/1949. Ireland also rejected the possibility of NATO membership in 1949 and did not seriously consider ECSC membership in 1952 or EEC membership in 1957. When it became clear that EFTA would not address agricultural trade, membership of that organisation too was ruled out. Following a fundamental reorientation of national economic policy in 1958, the then Taoiseach, Sean Lemass, pressed forward a strategy that led, in 1961, to Ireland’s first membership application to the European Communities. The Department of Foreign Affairs ultimately led the accession negotiations for EC entry from 1970 to 1972. This was despite the fact that the earliest focus on Irish EC membership in 1961 had come from the Ministers and officials from the Departments of Finance, Agriculture, and – with considerably greater scepticism – the Department of Industry and Commerce. With EC membership, the Department was assigned the central coordinating role vis-à-vis the Community. In 1973 the European Communities Division was established from what had been the Economic Section. The Department began publication of twice-yearly reports on ‘Developments in the European Communities’ which were at that time submitted to the Joint Oireachtas (parliament) Committee on Secondary Legislation of the European Communities. The self-perceived role of the Department in European matters is that of strategist. Senior Department officials underline the fact that domestic departments such as Finance, Agriculture and Trade pursue – as they always have done – their own clearly defined external agenda. In the EU context the latitude for domestic departments to set their own agenda through the Technical Councils is also acknowledged to be considerable. A distinction, however, is drawn between horizontal and vertical policy dossiers. Where a Department, such as Finance, has an unambiguous responsibility for a policy area (such as EMU), the Department of Foreign Affairs’ voice is marshalled within the normal system of interdepartmental coordination. Where, however, the implications of a policy dossier are evident across a broad section of departmental interests, Foreign Affairs is then drawn more into its function as a coach or referee – seeking to balance varying departmental interests and priorities. This it will often do through its role as chair of key EU-related interdepartmental committees.

Agenda and organisation of the Department of Foreign Affairs It is difficult to disentangle the general agenda of the Department from its European vocation. Its overall role is described as the vindication of Ireland’s international economic, political and cultural interests. The main issue areas

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which the Department sees itself facing are the conflict in Northern Ireland, Irish prosperity in a global economy, international peace and security through the United Nations and assistance to the developing world. However, Irish membership of the European Communities is understood to have been a crucial turning point in Ireland’s foreign policy and one that has had implications for all of Ireland’s foreign policy interests. While European integration was never seen as defining a significant part of the solution to the conflict in Northern Ireland, it was explicitly seen as capable of contributing to a solution. Membership of the EC would eliminate North/South economic borders and would promote greater prosperity and hence stability. Most recently, the European Union’s contribution is one of financial support to the underpinnings of the peace process and intercommunity reconciliation within Northern Ireland and across the border. More broadly, however, membership was seen as redefining Irish foreign policy and not just in the sphere of the international economy where EC competence was clear. In a 1978 parliamentary debate the then Minister for Foreign Affairs insisted that ‘EEC membership is not simply another area of activity in our foreign relations … rather (it is) a new and open ended commitment to construct something wholly new …’5 European Political Cooperation (EPC) was also seen as defining the context within which Ireland related to the rest of the world. Structure and organisation The structural and organisational features of the Department of Foreign Affairs are based firmly in the Westminster tradition inherited by the state at its formation. The individual holding political responsibility for all actions of the Department is the Minister for Foreign Affairs. This individual – who must be a member of the Oireachtas and who is almost always a member of the Dáil – is nominated by the Taoiseach, ratified by the Dáil and then formally appointed by the President. The Minister may be assisted by one or more Ministers of State who are not of cabinet rank but who must also be members of the Oireachtas. These junior ministers may have a functional area of responsibility – such as for development cooperation – but they work directly to an agenda set by the Minister. In recent years, the Minister and his or her Ministers of State also appoint their own small cabinets which offer them political support and advice. These individuals, whose contracts of employment expire with that government, coordinate government policy with similarly placed colleagues from other departments at an explicitly political level. At the head of the Department’s administrative and policy structure is the Secretary-General of the Department. This post is strictly non-political, as are all permanent positions within the Department’s administration. Career civil servants may not be members of, or activists for, any political party or group. A recent structural innovation is the appointment of a Second

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Secretary who currently heads the Anglo-Irish Division of the Department, but who continues to report to the Secretary of the Department. There is then a total of seven Assistant Secretaries who head up the remaining Divisions within the Department. These are: Administration, Protocol and Culture, Political, Economic, Development Cooperation, Legal and the Inspectorate. The diplomatic service The members of the Department’s diplomatic service are appointed through highly competitive national examinations aimed at university graduates and qualified lawyers. This recruitment process for appointment as Third Secretary is separate from that of the general civil service examination at an equivalent level. The focus of the diplomatic service is the representation of Ireland overseas. The diplomatic network is both small and unevenly distributed. While Ireland maintains formal diplomatic relations with 107 countries, there are only 43 Irish embassies overseas with five multilateral missions (EU, OECD, OSCE, UN New York and UN Geneva). There are also seven Irish consulates (with the addition of Cardiff and Edinburgh in 1998) and a network of 65 Honorary Consuls. Diplomatic relations with 52 states are conducted on the basis of non-resident, secondary accreditation. About two-thirds of overseas missions are concentrated in North America and Europe. Together, Asia, Africa and Latin America share fewer than 20 resident missions. There is just one Irish embassy situated in South America. In addition, all missions are relatively small in size. Over half comprise just one or two diplomats with a limited support staff. Only nine Irish missions overseas boast more than four resident diplomats. In total, the Irish foreign service is about half the size of comparable EU partners such as Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece or Portugal. Coordination of Ireland’s international interests Ireland’s overseas profile is shared among a number of other government departments and state agencies. The Department of Finance, for example, plays a crucial role in international organisations such as the IMF, the OECD, the World Bank and others. The Department of Enterprise and Employment is, through its Minister, responsible to the Oireachtas for national agencies such as Enterprise Ireland which, inter alia, is responsible for trade promotion. This Department subsumed most international trade functions from the Department of Foreign Affairs and there is now an established system for the secondment of officials between these two Departments. The Department of Enterprise and Employment is also responsible for IDA Ireland which is the lead agency for the attraction of inward foreign investment. The Department of Justice is responsible for issues related to immigration and visas – in cooperation with the Department of Foreign Affairs. The Department of Agriculture holds responsibility for agencies such as Bord Bia

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(Irish Food Board) and Bord Iascaigh Mhara (Irish Sea Fisheries Board) which, among other duties, promote the sale of these Irish products overseas. With such a profusion of state agencies and Departments sharing some responsibility for Ireland’s overseas interests, it is unsurprising that efforts to coordinate policy is at times problematic. Traditionally, there has been a perceived lack of coherence in the representation of the totality of Irish interests. This is especially so in the linkages between Ireland’s political interests (seen as primarily a responsibility of the Department of Foreign Affairs) and its economic interests (which, as we have seen, rest with a number of state departments and executive agencies). Efforts to sharpen the definition and pursuit of Irish political interests have been matched by an attempt to improve the linkage between these and economic interests. This has entailed change and proposals for change in the Department. Reform and adaptation In the 1970s there were a series of individual changes undertaken to modernise the Department and to equip it to deal with new international issues. First, the English-language title of the Department was modified in 1971. The change from ‘External Affairs’ to ‘Foreign Affairs’ was understood to reflect common practice elsewhere in Europe and was seen as a move away from the nomenclature employed within the British Commonwealth. A division dedicated to development cooperation was also established in the mid-1970s. This reflected the full emergence of post-colonial politics at a global level. Finally, the ‘marriage bar’, under which women were required to resign from the civil and diplomatic services after their wedding, was eliminated. A period of more coordinated reform was not undertaken until the 1990s. Parliamentary supervision of foreign affairs was strengthened in 1993 with the establishment of the Joint Oireachtas Foreign Affairs Committee. This was the first time that through a specialised, staffed committee, parliament could exercise systematic oversight over foreign policy. Initially, this committee incorporated the functions of the previous Joint Oireachtas Committee on the Secondary Legislation of the European Communities. In February 1994 the Tánaiste (deputy prime minister) and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Dick Spring T. D. announced an initiative to draw up a White Paper on Irish Foreign Policy. Its avowed purpose was to ensure that ‘the people of Ireland should have a direct say in, and understanding of, the principles that inform and underpin all foreign policy efforts and initiatives’.6 Following a series of more than half a dozen open public seminars, 64 written submissions, and debates within the Oireachtas Foreign Affairs Committee, the first ever comprehensive Irish foreign policy White Paper was published in March 1996. This document set out the principles upon which Irish foreign policy was based and detailed the lines of that policy across the whole range of the Department’s responsibilities.7

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Also in 1994 the Government initiated the Strategic Management Initiative (SMI). This was a civil service-wide programme to establish clear Departmental objectives and thereby improve resource allocation. In 1997 the Department of Foreign Affairs published its strategy statement entitled ‘Pursuing Ireland’s External Interests’. This document set out the mission statement and primary objectives of the Department and identified its priorities for the future. These were set out in seven sections which included: the context of Irish foreign policy, Northern Ireland, the European Union, Ireland’s global role, economic interests, development cooperation and departmental services.8 One significant reform in recent years – which has aimed at coordinating the pursuit of Ireland’s political and economic interests – is the ‘Ireland House’ concept. Mooted in the early 1990s, the idea is to provide, at a single identifiable location, a base for all Irish interests in major international centres. Since 1993 three such ‘Ireland House’ centres have been formally established in New York, Tokyo and Madrid. The embassy in London is also structured along similar lines. New missions in Hungary, Malaysia and the Czech Republic reflect this approach where Deputy Heads of Mission at these embassies will be officials from Enterprise Ireland responsible for trade promotion. Initially, the Ireland House concept was seen largely in terms of cost savings. The Department of Foreign Affairs and state agencies such as IDA Ireland and Bord Fáilte Eireann (Irish Tourism Board) would be able to share staff and infrastructural costs at a net saving to the Irish exchequer. In practice this has not always proved to be the case. In New York, for example, a prestigious location on Park Avenue certainly augments the status of the Consulate there – but perhaps at a price to other state agencies which might have found more cost-effective accommodation in other parts of the city. Ireland House was also advocated, however, as a means whereby the activities of state agencies might be better coordinated and directed. This can only be determined on a case-by-case basis. In Germany, for example, while the political centre is moving from Bonn to Berlin, financial and industrial centres such as Frankfurt and Düsseldorf will remain the prime locations for key Irish state agencies. In addition to this physical coordination, there is also an effort made towards policy coordination. Ambassadors in Ireland’s nine largest overseas markets chair coordination committees which bring together local representatives of those agencies involved in economic promotion. Their efforts are then reviewed in Dublin by the interdepartmental Foreign Earnings Committee (FEC). This committee brings together senior officials of government departments and state agencies most directly involved in the promotion of foreign earnings and inward investment. Interestingly, while the Ambassadors chair the overseas coordination committees, it is the Department of Enterprise and Employment that chairs meetings of the FEC in Dublin. The recommendation of this committee is also important in the decision-making process leading to the opening of new embassies.

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The European dimension As noted above, the European dimension permeates every field of Irish foreign policy. It is the ‘central framework within which we pursue our foreign policy objectives’.9 As was noted by the then Irish Ambassador to Washington, Mr Padraic MacKernan, ‘Ireland’s accession to the European Community in 1973 was probably the most important and far-reaching development in our foreign policy since independence’.10 Together with the conflict in Northern Ireland, membership of the European Communities was one of the two factors which the Minister for Foreign Affairs, speaking in 1973 noted ‘affect the national [interest] as a whole and change the emphasis which must be placed on the main aspects of foreign policy for the future’.11 Within the Union, the Department’s goal is the effective representation of national interests and concerns. Its function is to ensure coordination in the Irish approach and to pre-empt the creation of contradictory or crosscutting demands being made of the Union institutions or from Ireland’s European partners. The Department also works in the other direction, i.e. in the translation of the EU agenda to the domestic ministries and national agencies. It therefore advises departments of developments within the Union and acts as an early-warning mechanism for legislative initiatives that might impinge across departmental boundaries. The effective execution of the Department’s EU role is also seen as a means of building political capital within the Union. Ireland has held the presidency of the Council of Ministers on five occasions since its accession in 1973 – and most recently in the latter half of 1996. Through the Department’s central role in the presidency it establishes for itself the credibility and goodwill which, as a form of political currency, may be called upon at a later date in pursuit of broader national objectives. Organisational features of the Department in European affairs From time to time, the Minister for Foreign Affairs has been assisted on European issues by a Minister for State assigned, at least in part, to the Department. In advance of and during the 1996 Irish Presidency of the Council of Ministers, this junior minister played an important role in coordinating other government departments’ preparations for the presidency through an interdepartmental committee. He did so, however, in his capacity as a junior minister at the Department of the Taoiseach rather than in his role as a minister at the Department of Foreign Affairs. The key role of the Taoiseach is underscored at a more senior level where he chairs the Ministers and Secretaries Group (MSG). This is the central cabinet-level body responsible for coordinating national policy in the European Union. While the precise membership of the group varies over time (in the 1994–97 government the Minister for Social Welfare – as the leader of one of the three coalition parties – was a key member) it assembles the Ministers and most senior officials of all government departments with a major European interest.

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Within the Department, it is the Economic Division that takes lead responsibility for what might be called – under the Maastricht Treaty – first pillar issues. That Division, headed by an Assistant Secretary, is subdivided into sections handling Community institutions, treaty reform, internal policies and external relations. The Political Division of the Department is responsible for all matters arising under the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union (the so-called ‘second pillar’ of the Maastricht Treaty). That Division also monitors and manages Ireland’s broader international interests through a system of geographic desks and sections covering the UN, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, security and disarmament issues and a new human rights unit. Departmental management and coordination in European affairs While the Economic Division and the Political Division are the leading bureaucratic agencies managing the EU agenda they are by no means the only institutional players. The Department of the Taoiseach, for example, plays an important role – particularly in relation to its European Council responsibilities. A small staff within the Department of the Taoiseach, headed again by an Assistant Secretary, covers EU-related issues for the Taoiseach in close cooperation with the Department of Foreign Affairs. The Taoiseach’s office has also stepped outside the government structure to commission analyses of European issues. In 1995 the Department commissioned a study from Trinity College Dublin on possible models for the election of the EU Commission President.12 Other Departments too play a large role in the European agenda. Through the various Technical Councils, domestic ministries play an important role in setting EU policy. Pre-eminent among these is, of course, the Department of Finance and its role in the Ecofin Council. The Department of Justice is also an increasingly important player through its own responsibilities in the field of Justice and Home Affairs. Ad hoc interdepartmental committees also have a role to play. For example, an interdepartmental committee on drug abuse played a significant role in defining Irish policy at the EU level towards measures designed to tackle the trafficking in illicit narcotics. In sum the EU ‘has involved a range of domestic Departments, at ministerial and official level, in the decision-making process at Brussels. At the same time membership has involved the Department of Foreign Affairs in the dayto-day operations of domestic Departments to an unprecedented extent.’13 One key structure ensuring coordination of national policy across government departments within the Union is the Irish Permanent Representation (PermRep) in Brussels. Many government departments second staff to this mission which is managed and directed by the Department of Foreign Affairs. It is these officials who act as the eyes and ears of their home departments and who play a crucial role in the day-to-day management of interdepartmental interests. The domestic departments place a high value upon their

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representation in the PermRep and the role that the Department of Foreign Affairs plays in coordinating and supporting the work of that mission. Its value can be measured by the fact that during the most recent Irish presidency of the Council of Ministers, the Department of Justice (for the first time) seconded a total of five officials to the PermRep to work on third pillar issues. At the conclusion of the Presidency that Department decided to repatriate just one of those individuals. Reform and adaptation The Department’s adaptation to its increased range of responsibilities arising from membership of the European Union has been both structural and substantive. Structurally it has entailed a substantial increase in staffing, in Ireland’s overseas representation and in its organisation. In his budgetary estimate speech of 1974, the then Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr Garret FitzGerald, noted that an increase in diplomatic staff from 143 to 190 individuals was a direct consequence of additional responsibilities arising from EC membership. The number of overseas missions was significantly increased from its 1972 total of just 20. Residential diplomatic missions were established in Moscow (1973), Tokyo (1973), Luxembourg (1973), Lebanon (1974), Egypt (1974) and Austria (1974). This was justified on the basis of Ireland’s European duties in both the Community sphere and through European Political Cooperation (EPC). This expansion also required some imaginative measures to be taken. For the first time, multiple accreditation was employed on a broad scale so as to increase the reach of a still-limited diplomatic infrastructure. Diplomatic relations were therefore established with 13 states between 1973 and 1975 in the Middle East, Asia, North Africa and Eastern Europe. Exceptional recruitment measures were also employed. A number of senior officials from other government departments were recruited into the Department of Foreign Affairs while the Irish language requirement for appointment to posts within the diplomatic service was relaxed. In 1974 the Minister also suggested that ‘roving ambassadors’ might have to be appointed at a later stage so that – during its presidency of the Council of Ministers – Ireland could deploy senior diplomats on European business to geographic regions such as Northern Africa where no justification for a resident mission could be made. Structural change also occurred. In 1967 the General Political and UN section – which was later designated to handle EPC issues – comprised just four officials. By 1973 the Political Division, as it was now titled, had been restructured along a geo-regional desk system in order to approximate the structure of partners’ foreign ministries. The Division also trebled in size. In 1986 an effort was made to divide the Department of Foreign Affairs into two ministries. As part of a general reshuffle of cabinet responsibilities, a new Department of European Affairs, at full cabinet rank, was planned. The Department of Foreign Affairs would then have been refocused upon

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Anglo-Irish relations and broader multilateral issues. In discussions with the then Taoiseach, the Minister-designate of this new Department raised a number of questions as to the precise division of labour between the two Departments. The scope for overlap and duplication of effort was deemed by her to be considerable. Constitutional difficulties were also raised and, as a direct result of inter-party difficulties within the then coalition government, the proposal collapsed and has not been raised since.14 Most recently, in 1995, a Joint Oireachtas Committee on European Affairs was established to focus upon issues related to Irish membership of the European Union. This committee also took over responsibility for scrutinising the secondary legislation of the Union. Some overlap with the Foreign Affairs Committee on CFSP-related issues has since ensued, but the two committees can and do meet jointly as the need arises.

Strategies and responses The Department’s response to changes in its role and functions has been measured and pragmatic. Never having had a pre-eminent role in the Irish administration, its evolution betrays few, if any, signs of decline. Its links with the rest of the Irish bureaucracy have ebbed and flowed as the needs of Irish policy have evolved. It should of course also be noted that in a small government administration a considerable amount of coordination and cooperation occurs without the need for heavy bureaucratic structures. Across the major departments of state, senior and mid-level civil servants dealing with the European agenda are well known to one another and familiar enough with their respective dossiers to facilitate good information and decision-making flows. The Department of Foreign Affairs has also sought to improve linkages with foreign policy interest groups and the wider informed public. The White Paper on Irish foreign policy should, in particular, be seen in the light of the Department opening itself out into a broader political arena. The impact of Europeanisation Accession to the European Communities and membership of the European Union should, in the Irish case, be seen as having strengthened and empowered rather than threatened the role of the Department of Foreign Affairs. This was recognised from the very beginning of Ireland’s participation. Just after Ireland joined the European Communities in 1973 a new Minister for Foreign Affairs convened the first ever conference of all of Ireland’s Heads of Mission from its embassies worldwide. The avowed purpose was to study the implications of this new European context to the conduct and principles of Irish foreign policy. That exercise has not, to date, been repeated. Nearly 25 years later the Minister for Foreign Affairs reflected upon that impact by noting that membership of the European Union ‘has become the

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biggest single factor in our international relations and is crucial to our economic development … [it] also enhances our ability to exert an influence on the wider international stage.’15 For the Department of Foreign Affairs this broader and deeper level of responsibility has not occurred without some difficulty. As the current Secretary-General of the Department said in 1987 ‘as the scope of what constitutes foreign policy has broadened, and the range of players has grown correspondingly, the task of giving coherence and direction to the foreign policy process is increasingly challenging’.16 In its own mission statement the function of the Department of Foreign Affairs in its EU role is first to advise and support the Minister and the Ministers of State in their EU capacity. Second, the Department sees itself as supporting the Taoiseach in tasks related to the EU agenda – and in particular the European Council. Third, the Department’s aim is to cooperate with other Departments in elaborating a coherent approach to the evaluation and pursuit of Ireland’s national interests within the EU. Finally, the Department seeks greater public understanding of developments in the European Union and their importance to Ireland. The diplomatic impact of CFSP From the beginning of Ireland’s membership of the European Communities, European Political Cooperation was seen as a corollary of membership and as a political rather than as a legal commitment. Its relationship with the broader EC agenda was clearly understood; ‘if the Irish contribution to foreign policy consultation … is a credible and substantive one, this can enhance our credibility when we advance specific solutions or advocate particular policies with regard to issues arising in the Community framework. It is logical to suggest that the reverse would also apply.’17 A number of diplomatic consequences arose. First, the Department had to respond to a greater range and depth of foreign policy issues than heretofore. As one Minister for Foreign Affairs noted in 1973 ‘as a member of the European Communities we must now concern ourselves more closely than at any time in the past with policy issues in many parts of the world, issues upon which we are called on month by month to express a view’.18 Moreover, the clear conviction of Irish foreign policy analysts and practitioners is that EPC and CFSP have improved the effectiveness, broadened the range and increased the capacity of Irish diplomacy. The quantity and quality of information available, the unparalleled access to international decision-makers, administrative expansion and restructuring, and a positive and dynamic diplomatic culture have all been identified as having had significant impact.19 Structural impact of CFSP on the diplomatic network The physical changes wrought in the Department of Foreign Affairs as result of EC membership have already been reviewed. Both the Presidency of

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the Council of Ministers and the responsibilities associated with EPC were associated with more than doubling the number of Irish overseas missions (from 20 in 1970 to 50 in 1997) as well as organisational adaptation within the Department. The impact on individual embassies has also been significant – and has been paralleled by a reassessment of the role of Irish embassies. The Ireland House concept underlines the role and function that Irish embassies are destined to play in the future. The long-standing but evolving economic focus of these missions should not be associated with any diminution in their avowed political function. Indeed, in at least one respect that political function is augmented. Overseas missions may have an important role in pursuing Irish interests within the Union. As the White Paper on Irish foreign policy puts it: ‘Embassies now have an important additional function in influencing the relationship between their host country and the European Union; ensuring that the host country’s policies towards the European Union are as favourable as possible to Irish interests and that the country is familiar with, and responsive to, Irish policies across the whole spectrum of activities covered by the European Union.’20 In other words, the scale of the Union’s relationship with third countries will be a decisive factor in determining the shape of Ireland’s diplomatic network.21 In this latter respect, scope is left open for some level of cooperation with EU partners and institutions. On a value for money basis, flexibility and innovation are invoked as a basis for the possible co-location of Irish missions with those of EU partners. According to the White Paper on Irish foreign policy this is an option which ‘will be fully explored’ in further consideration of diplomatic expansion.22 There has also been discussion of the possibility of co-location with European Commission delegations overseas where Ireland is without diplomatic representation. One crucial difficulty here, however, would be the status of such officials on the diplomatic lists of the host countries. The Government also seeks to strengthen treaty provisions which provide for consular protection being extended to Irish citizens by the embassies of EU partners in countries where Ireland is unrepresented. The Government is ‘actively participating in moves to give clearer and more legally binding expression to such co-operation … to include matters such as the emergency evacuation of EU nationals and the welfare of abducted minors and of people with disability’.23 One key difficulty which the Department faces is a professional and demographic challenge. Successive increases in the Department’s diplomatic staff occurred in somewhat disjointed waves. This has left a legacy of large professional cohorts seeking promotion and advancement to a very limited number of senior posts. This poses some considerable problems in terms of morale and in terms of holding on to professionally talented personnel who see limited prospects for promotion.

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Conclusion The striking conclusion to draw from this study of the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs and the impact of European integration is that the Department, far from withering away, has been strengthened and empowered through its European involvement. European integration has been the key factor in the physical growth and increased substantive reach of the Department. The internationalisation and Europeanisation of domestic ministries has not occurred at the expense of the Department but in parallel with the Department’s own growth. In part, this is due to the peculiarly limited political role – even its ‘immaturity’ – prior to EC membership. In a sense, EC membership provided a core justification for the Department’s existence and development. Moreover, the redefinition of the Department towards greater representation of Ireland’s overseas economic interests fits neatly into the Department’s European role. The Department is therefore well placed, as the Union continues to develop, to continue to act as the strategist and coach for Ireland in the European Union and hence, Ireland in the world.

Appendix: basic statistics 1996 A spending on DFA: approximately 0.5 per cent of total government expenditure. IR 55.061 million. B overseas missions: 180 in total comprised of ● ● ● ●

C ● ●

43 bilateral embassies 5 multilateral missions 67 Irish consulates 65 Honorary Consuls. staff numbers: 975 total staff 246 diplomats split 50/50 between headquarters and overseas.

D future projections: No quantitative projections are available. According to the Government’s White Paper on foreign policy further development of the diplomatic network is a priority. The focus for opening new residential missions will be Eastern Europe, South East Asia, the Middle East and Central and South America. With regard to staffing issues, greater attention is promised in staff training and, more broadly, human resource management. This will be targeted towards in-service and mid-career training.

Notes 1. Dermot Keogh, ‘The Department of Foreign Affairs’, in Zara Steiner (ed.) Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World (Times Books, 1982).

160 Foreign Ministries in the European Union 2. The early development of the Department may be found in Dermot Keogh, ibid. and Patrick Keatinge, ‘The formative years of the Irish diplomatic service’, in Eire–Ireland, 6(3), Fall, 1971. 3. Cited in Patrick Keatinge, ibid., p. 58. 4. Patrick Keatinge, ‘Ireland: neutrality inside EPC’, in Christopher Hill (ed.) National Foreign Policies and European Political Cooperation (Allen & Unwin, 1983, pp. 137–52). 5. Dáil Debates 4 May 1978, p. 352. 6. Speech by Dick Spring T. D. Tanaiste and Minister for Foreign Affairs, leader of the Labour Party to the Party’s Euro-selection Convention for Leinster, 6 February 1994, p. 3. 7. Government of Ireland, Challenges and Opportunities Abroad: White Paper on Irish Foreign Policy, March 1996. 8. Government of Ireland, Pursuing Ireland’s External Interest: Strategy Statement of the Department of Foreign Affairs, March 1997. 9. Ibid., p. 8. 10. Padraic MacKernan, ‘Irish Foreign Policy’, in Administration, 35(2), p. 177. 11. Dáil Debates, 9 May 1973, p. 741. 12. Michael Laver, Michael Gallagher, Michael Marsh, Robert Singh and Ben Tonra, ‘Electing the President of the European Commission’, Trinity Blue Papers in Public Policy, Department of Political Science, University of Dublin, 1995. 13. Padraic MacKernan, op. cit., p. 178. 14. Gemma Hussey, At the Cutting Edge: Cabinet Diaries 1982–1987 (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1990), pp. 196–202. 15. Government of Ireland, Pursuing Ireland’s External Interest, op. cit., p. 3. 16. Padraic MacKernan, op. cit., p. 178. 17. Ibid., p. 181. 18. Dáil Debates, 9 May 1973, p. 748. 19. Ben Tonra, ‘The Victory of Substance over Form’, Irish Political Studies, 9, 1994. 20. Government of Ireland, Challenges and Opportunities Abroad, op. cit., p. 324. 21. Ibid., p. 324. 22. Ibid., p. 325. 23. Ibid., p. 288.

Bibliography Official sources Government of Ireland Membership of the European Communities – Implications for Ireland, April 1970 Government of Ireland Challenges and Opportunities Abroad, White Paper on Foreign Policy, Department of Foreign Affairs, 1996 Government of Ireland Pursuing Ireland’s External Interests: strategy statement of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Department of Foreign Affairs, 1997

Secondary sources Carroll, Joseph T. Ireland in the War Years 1939–1945 (David Charles, 1975) Fanning, Ronan ‘Irish neutrality: an historical review’, Irish Studies in International Affairs, 1(3), 1982 Fisk, Robert In Time of War: Ireland Ulster and the Price of Neutrality (André Deutsch, 1983)

Ben Tonra 161 Hederman-O’Brien, Miriam The Road to Europe: Irish Attitudes 1948–1961 (Institute of Public Administration, 1983) Holmes, Michael, Rees, Nicholas and Whelan, Bernadette The Poor Relation: Irish Foreign Policy and the Third World (Trocaire/Gill and Macmillan, 1993) Irish Studies in International Affairs (Royal Irish Academy, consecutive editions 1979–97) Keatinge, Patrick ‘The Formative Years of the Irish Diplomatic Service’, Eire-Ireland, 6(3), Fall, 1971 Keatinge, Patrick The Formulation of Irish Foreign Policy (Institute of Public Administration, 1973) Keatinge, Patrick A Place Among the Nations (Institute of Public Administration, 1978) Keatinge, Patrick A Singular Stance: Irish Neutrality in the 1980s (Institute of Public Adminstration, 1984) Keatinge, Patrick ‘The Europeanisation of Irish foreign policy’, in Drudy, P. J. and McAleese, Dennot (eds) Ireland and the European Community: Irish Studies 3 (Cambridge University Press, 1984) Keatinge, Patrick ‘Ireland’, in Hill, Christopher (ed.) The Actors in Europe’s Foreign Policy (Routledge, 1996) Keatinge, Patrick ‘Ireland’s foreign relations’, Irish Studies in International Affairs, consecutive editions 1980–96 Kennedy, Michael and Skelly, J. M. (eds) Irish Foreign Policy 1919–1966: From Independence to Internationalisation (Four Courts Press, 2000) Keogh, Dermot, Ireland and Europe: A Diplomatic and Political History (Hibernian University Press, 1990) Keogh, Dermot (ed.) Ireland and the Challenge of Integration (Hibernian University Press, 1989) Keogh, Dermot ‘Ireland: the Department of Foreign Affairs’, in Steiner, Zara (ed.) The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World (London: Times Books, 1982) Laffan, Brigid ‘Irish foreign policy’, in Coombes, David (ed.) Ireland and the European Communities: Ten Years of Membership (Gill and Macmillan, 1983) Laffan, Brigid Ireland and South Africa: Irish Government Policy in the 1980s (Trocaire, 1988) MacKernan, Padraic Ireland and EPC (Royal Irish Academy Conference Paper, November, 1981) McSweeney, Bill (ed.) Ireland and the Threat of Nuclear War (Dominican Publications/ Irish School of Ecumenics, 1985) MacQueen, Norman ‘Ireland’s entry to the United Nations 1946–1955’, in Gallagher, Tom and O’Connell, James (eds) Contemporary Irish Studies (Manchester University Press, 1983) Maher, D. H. The Tortuous Path: The Course of Ireland’s Entry to the EEC, 1948–1973 (Institute of Public Administration, 1986) Marsh, Michael Irish Public Opinion on Neutrality and European Union (Institute of European Affairs, 1992) McCabe, Ian A Diplomatic History of Ireland 1948–1949: The Republic, the Commonwealth and NATO (Irish Academic Press, 1991) McMahon, Deirdre Republicans and Imperialists: Anglo Irish Relations in the 1930s (Yale University Press, 1984) Nowlan, K. B. and Williams, Desmond T. (eds) Ireland in the War Years and After, 1939–1951 (Gill and Macmillan, 1969) O’Brien, Conor Cruise ‘Ireland in international affairs’, in Edwards, Owen Dudley (ed.) Conor Cruise O’Brien Introduces Ireland (André Deutsch, 1969)

162 Foreign Ministries in the European Union Salmon, Trevor C. Unneutral Ireland: An Ambivalent and Unique Security Policy (Clarendon Press, 1989) Sharp, Paul Irish Foreign Policy and the European Community: A Study of the Impact of Interdependence on the Foreign Policy of a Small State (Dartmouth, 1990) Skelly, Joseph Morrison Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations 1945–65: National Interests and the International Order (Irish Academic Press, 1997) Steiner, Zara (ed.) Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World (Times Books, 1982) Sutherland, Peter ‘The context of neutrality: European integration’, Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review, 81(322), 1992 Sutherland, Peter ‘Ireland: Where do we stand on European integration’, Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review, 78(311), 1989 Tonra, Ben ‘Ireland in European Political Cooperation: the victory of substance over form’, Irish Political Studies, 9, 1994

10 Italy Mario Zucconi

As with other Western industrialised countries, Italy’s international landscape has rapidly changed over the past decade. The easing of East–West tensions in the late 1980s followed by the end of the division of Europe on the one hand, and the accelerating pace of European integration on the other, rapidly transformed the country’s broader external environment. In addition, while far away from the frontline of East–West confrontation during the Cold War, Italy found itself on the border of major areas of instability in the years following – protruding as it does towards the unstable Eastern and Southern shores of the Mediterranean and being at the centre of strong migratory pressures deriving from those areas. As in other countries, the changing external environment and new political pressures necessarily produced an adaptation and evolution in Italy’s governmental structures. Much of the pressure to join the European Monetary Union focused on the Ministry of the Treasury and the office of the Prime Minister; and the new dimensions of collective security created pressure and consensus for a profound, if gradual, review of the Ministry of Defence. For a long time, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) remained an exception to the process of adaptation. Until 1999, reform proposals were regularly proposed, duly resisted and systematically shelved. After the Ministry itself made a major attempt at reforming its structure in the early 1970s and after about ten legislative bills had been introduced in Parliament over the next decade, bureaucratic resistance and Italy’s endemic political instability left the MFA resting on structures first established after the unification of the country and later consolidated by the Presidential Decree of 1967. And the recent initiative to restructure the central administration (the Ministry in Rome and the career ladder), but not the budget and only partially the diplomatic network abroad, was spurred above all by a recent decision to reform Italy’s public administration and by changes in the Ministry’s senior bureaucracy. Before these reforms, a substantial change in the Ministry’s competences and responsibilities was in recent years brought about by the Italian 163

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judiciary, after it uncovered widespread corruption in the management of the ‘cooperation’ (official development assistance) programmes. As a consequence of the judicial inquiry, in a few years the cooperation budget – twothirds of the Italian foreign affairs budget in the early 1990s – was reduced to a fraction of what it had been. The restructuring itself, on the one hand introduces the long overdue geographical competencies, while, on the other, appears unable to break a strong, long-lasting tradition of influence from the bureaucracy over the structure and management of the MFA. Altogether, it constitutes a very important step forward.

A structure centred on the foreign service career ‘From Tirana to Maastricht: When will the Foreign Ministry be Reformed?’, asked the title of a conference gathered by a major union organisation in June 1997. No matter how insistent the demand for reforming the Ministry’s organisation (the latter being oblivious to the changes introduced in the structure of the foreign ministries of other industrialised countries), during three decades all attempts at bringing about substantial change failed. In Italy, reforming the foreign ministry implied, first of all, restructuring its central organisation on a geographical basis – but this is the reform which has taken decades to carry out, only being introduced in early 2000.1 All other European Union and G-8 countries had introduced substantial reforms in their Foreign Ministries’ structure in the early 1990s or before. At the end of the decade, Italy finally caught up with them. From 1887 to 1967 Until this recent reform, the basic structure of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs remained that created by the Pisani–Dossi reform of 1887–88 (during the Crispi government, with Francesco Crispi himself as interim minister of foreign affairs). The Ministry’s central administration was then organised on a functional basis with a clear primacy assigned to the Political Affairs Division (Direzione Generale Affari Politici). Crispi abolished the Secretary-General position, at the top of the bureaucratic structure, in order to strengthen the political control over the Ministry itself. Re-established by Crispi’s successors, the Secretary-General was once again abolished when Mussolini came to power. Traditionally, and with a few exceptions over a century, it was the person appointed as Director of Political Affairs that would move to the position of Secretary-General of the Ministry. Responding to new political pressures, at the end of the 1890s a Division of Commercial Affairs, emigration, and schools was added to the Ministry’s structure. The reorganisation of the central administration by geographical areas was attempted by the Giolitti government in 1920. Besides other service structures, the Ministry was then restructured into two main Divisions for

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Political, Commercial and Private Affairs: one for Europe and the Levant, and the other for Africa, America, Asia and Australia. However, in 1932, Mussolini changed back to the old structure by subject areas and established five divisions (Direzioni): Political Affairs, Economic Affairs, Treaties and Private Affairs, Personnel, Italians Abroad and Schools. Two minor reforms introduced in the 1920s eliminated the income requirement (requisito censitario) for access to the foreign service and merged the two pre-existing career grades: the diplomatic and the consular. The 1967 Decree2 In 1967, among other innovations, women were finally admitted into the foreign service. It was also at that time that the preliminary interview for entering the foreign service entrance competition was finally eliminated. Clearly unconstitutional, the interview gave the foreign service the character of a socially exclusive public service career where social skills and connections might substitute for competence and effectiveness. More than just restructuring the MFA and reforming the foreign service, the 1967 Decree organised into a systematic legislative text the wealth of norms and regulations which had emerged during the eighty years since the Pisani–Dossi reforms. The Decree gave much attention to the diplomatic career, introducing or consolidating rules – such as a single career structure of eight steps – aimed more at assuring the political loyalty of the individual foreign service official than at relating individual careers to function. Largely in response to the needs of a spoils system introduced in the management of the Ministry by the Christian Democrats and Socialists, in 1989 another bill allowed more people into senior ranks than there were available positions – creating a problem that remained central to any reform until very recently. Similarly, the constitutional norm that limits active participation in political parties by officials posted abroad was left out in the 1967 Decree and was to be introduced only in the 1990s, when party affiliation had become something to hide in any foreign service official’s career.3 The Decree put into law a number of special privileges and benefits related to posting officials abroad. It substantially strengthened the pyramidal and centralised decision-making structure of the Ministry. It consolidated an approach to administrative structure relating primarily to the official’s career rather than to function. Boxed into such an organisational framework, from 1967 onwards the MFA was to undergo only a growth in size, with the addition and expansion in the 1980s of an international ‘cooperation’ division and with a consistent growth of consular activity.

Foreign policy and domestic politics If the Ministry of Foreign Affairs underwent any adaptation in the post-war decades, it was more a harmonisation with Italy’s domestic politics than an

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adjustment to the changing external environment. While the framework of domestic politics profoundly changed in the last few years, those decades left a legacy that continued to condition the management of the foreign service until very recently – and still does to some extent. The PCI factor In the post-war years, an old custom of dependence of the civil service on political power combined with the presence in Italy of the largest Western communist party – the Italian Communist Party (PCI) – and with the importance of external relations acquired in shaping the country’s domestic political options. Like the then West Germany, Italy, due to its fascist past and to its defeat in the war, after 1945 found in its integration into multilateral structures a way of being rescued politically and of gaining a new international legitimacy. As in the case of West Germany, a divided Europe and a strong bloc discipline became valuable in consolidating that new international legitimacy for the country. Italian leaders worked tirelessly to have the country admitted into the North Atlantic Treaty from its outset. Moreover, Italy was among the proponents of a succession of European institutions and of the European Economic Community in particular. That European policy, in the post-war decades, helped the country cut out a role for itself among the major Western powers.4 As already mentioned, those external frameworks and ties contributed decisively to the selection of the domestic political options in the post-war years. After 1947, the external alignments (Atlantic, Western European) fast replaced the domestic one (anti-fascist) in establishing the boundaries of internal legitimacy. They offered a strong rationale for keeping the PCI out of power. In turn, the PCI’s enduring electoral strength created further incentives to keep Italy tightly integrated into Western multilateral organisations. In contrast with France, where the communists were at their strongest immediately after the war to be replaced later by the socialists, in Italy the PCI grew steadily and peaked in the mid-1970s, when, for a while, it paralleled the strength of the ruling Christian Democratic Party (Democrazia cristiana or DC). ‘Fanfaniani’, ‘Colombei’ and ‘Andreottiani’ The foreign policy bureaucracy and structures were homologised accordingly – and the MFA became a preserve of the DC. Since 1947 and until 1992 – except for the moderate Carlo Sforza (1947–51), Gaetano Martino (1954–55), and the Social Democrat Giuseppe Saragat (1964) – all ministers of foreign affairs came from the Christian Democratic Party, with leaders of the party often put in that position before or after becoming prime minister. (DC leaders such as Alcide De Gasperi, Giuseppe Pella, Antonio Segni, Amintore Fanfani, Aldo Moro, Mariano Rumor, Emilio Colombo, Giulio Andreotti, Arnaldo Forlani and Francesco Cossiga all held the two positions

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in their political career.) In the 1980s, the DC was to yield the prime ministership first to Giovanni Spadolini (Partito Republicano Italiano) and then to Bettino Craxi (Partito Socialista Italiano), but still held on to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1989, Socialist Gianni De Michelis became foreign minister – and quite an activist one. However, with that experience and De Michelis himself ending up in the ‘cooperation’ and ‘Clean hands’ (Mani pulite) judicial inquiries (from 1992 on), the Socialist era of the MFA left little or no legacy. Italy may have moved, after the early 1990s, into a ‘second republic’ (a polity with a lesser role for the old political parties) and the foreign service personnel may prefer today to regard themselves as ‘professionals’ (tecnici). However the most senior foreign service officials continued until very recently to be characterised by the names of the DC foreign ministers who were their ‘patrons’ – as Fanfaniani, Colombei, or Andreottiani.5 Foreign service personnel for long were organised solely into vertical, corporative unions (services, staff, diplomats, etc.) And the main labour confederation, the Confederazione Generale Italiana Lavoratori (CGIL), began establishing a limited presence in the Ministry only in the 1980s. A personnel bred in such an environment and whose prerogatives were strongly protected tended to create inertia and to contribute to the immobility of the institution. For decades, much of the legislative and regulative activity concerning the MFA dealt almost exclusively with reforms of the diplomatic career.

The long-time ‘impossible’ reform If Italian domestic politics and the bureaucracy’s vested interests stood in the way of any substantial restructuring of the Ministry, there was no lack of pressure for change, both from within the Ministry and in Parliament. Having missed the chance to achieve reform with the 1967 Decree, in 1969–70 Foreign Minister Aldo Moro made a major attempt to reform the institution by appointing a working group headed by Ambassador G. Fornari. The criticism then levelled at the existing structure, and the changes suggested to make the Ministry more effective, were the same as those to be offered in the next decades. The Fornari report The working group’s report indicated a number of structures and concepts that needed ‘profound revision’. Among these were ‘the excessive size of the Direzioni Generali; the excessive centralisation of decision-making, that produces slow ministerial activity, downgrades the operational organisms and discourages individual initiative; the inadequate central coordination and relationship between the Direzioni Generali’. The report also criticised the lack of a central analysis and planning office and the lack of regular updating of personnel. The core change suggested by the report included the need

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‘to entrust bilateral issues to operational organisms structured on a geographical basis’ and ‘multilateral issues (or the issues which require a global approach) to operational organisms structured by subject’. The preference, the report concluded, was for an approach based on geographical areas. Reform proposals in the 1980s With the Fornari report left in the drawer, years of ministerial commissions’ work produced only a draft bill in 1987 that entrusted a vague geographical coordination to a proposed new official, a Vice Secretary-General. The remainder of the draft continued to reflect the corporatist interests of the foreign service bureaucracy rather than make the foreign service career consistent with function. More mindful of that need were a number of bills presented by members of Parliament throughout the 1980s. Most of those bills – killed off one after another by strong resistance, by the physiologically slow Italian parliamentary mechanisms, or by the short life of governments and legislatures – based the structural reform of the Ministry on the geographical approach. They also attempted to relate the foreign service career to function by suggesting a reduction of the former to only three ranks. However, rather than any substantial reform of the Ministry’s structure, it was the foreign service career and its relationship to the politics of the country that continued to change. This process reached its peak under Gianni De Michelis in 1989, with the adoption of a decree allowing the ‘career flowing’ (scorrimento di carriera), that facilitated the supernumerary admission of people into the senior ranks, thereby creating a ‘hump’ in the career structure. De Michelis was trying to meet the requirements of a spoils system managed jointly by Christian Democrats and Socialists. In 1989, De Michelis also presented the last proposal for general restructuring of the Ministry – and one mindful of the need for decentralisation, mixed structure (geographic areas and subject matters) and effective coordination among the different divisions. However, following the De Michelis era at the Ministry and before the arrival of the Prodi government there were renewed pressures – with a proposed Decreto organizzativo del Ministero – for a consolidation of the old, 1967, Ministry structure with its centralised decision making, and separated and often uncoordinated divisions. Speaking before the Senate Foreign relations Committee (Commissione affari esteri, emigrazione) in December 1994, the Ministry’s Secretary-General, Ferdinando Salleo, explained why, in his opinion, it was impossible to change the structure of the Ministry. ‘[T]he need to combine’ – he explained – ‘the structure based on issues with the geographical structure must take into consideration the lack of resources, especially in terms of personnel. To think about … a different structure we need twice the foreign service officials we have. As a matter of fact the prevailing structure by subject matter allows a saving of personnel.’6 Perhaps Salleo was expressing his scepticism about the

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possibility of reform. Undoubtedly, however, this was to be a frequently voiced criticism of the present restructuring of the ministry (drafted in late 1998 and enacted on 1 January 2000).

Adaptation: the rise and fall of the Development Assistance Programme (Cooperazione) A most important case of adaptation of the MFA to changing foreign policy requirements was the creation and expansion during the 1980s of the Development Assistance Programmes and of a related division within the Ministry – the Direzione generale cooperazione allo sviluppo first created in 1979, and provided, in its golden age (fiscal years from 1990 to 1992) with a budget much larger than the remaining budget of the Ministry. As already mentioned, those programmes were later brought to a halt by a wideranging judicial inquiry, starting in 1992, and by the subsequent reduced political willingness to fund them. The rise The creation and structuring of this new dimension of Italian foreign policy relates to the country’s accession to the G-7. Italy needed then to strengthen its credentials for admission into the club of the world’s richest countries. Law 49 of 1987 states: ‘Development cooperation is part of [Italy’s] foreign policy.’ In its early period, Italian assistance went to areas left unattended by others (the Horn of Africa.) Divided up into two donor units, one managed by the Ministry of the Treasury (obligatory multilateral assistance) and the other by the MFA (bilateral and voluntary multilateral assistance), cooperation became one of the main sources for illegal financing of political parties in the 1980s and early 1990s. Describing the existing programmeas as ‘a waste of money’, De Michelis, from 1989 onwards, devised a strategy for a more effective economic diplomacy for the country incorporating the cooperation programmes. The cooperation programmes were to become the motor of Italy’s trade policy – they were to help Italian companies penetrate new markets. ‘Cooperation must be used to bring in other money,’ De Michelis used to say. And it is in the years of his tenure at the Ministry that – with Parliament competing with the executive in allocating more money – the MFA-managed cooperation reached its peak (3.831 and 3.663 billion lire for 1991 and 1992 respectively). Including the Treasury-managed amount (a total budget of over 5 billion lire), the Italian development assistance programmes reached, in the late 1980s, about 0.84 per cent of Italy’s GDP (see Table 10.1). … and fall If expansion of the cooperation programmes was rapid, their contraction after 1992 was even faster. Several concomitant causes contributed to its

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downfall. The donor countries agreed on an income ceiling for recipient countries, which cut off a number of recipients of Italian aid. The ‘clean hands’ judiciary inquiries opened a special dossier dealing with the MFA’s management of the cooperation programmes (although remaining limited to the Socialist management of the programmes). As a consequence, the allocation of resources quickly decreased in the fiscal years after 1992. The new, special division of the Ministry remained in place. However, its function in the context of Italy’s foreign policy shrunk dramatically.7 In 1993 the allocation was less than half that of the year before and by 1995 the total cooperation budget had shrunk to 0.14 per cent of the country’s GNP. Moreover, the contraction concerned solely Foreign Ministrymanaged cooperation (by 1997 it was one-seventh of the 1992 level) – while the allocation to the Ministry of the Treasury, related to obligatory multilateral programmes, continued to expand moderately. If that reflects an Italian preoccupation with international ‘rank’, the opposite trend in the two budgets also indicates some loss of foreign policy functions on the part of the MFA.8

Table 10.1 Allocation for MFA-managed and Treasury-managed budgets for cooperation programmes (billion lire)9 Ministry

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

MFA Treasury

3,663 1,546

1,229 1,547

1,170 1,695

797 1,700

690 1,700

642 n/a

707 n/a

790 n/a

672 n/a

From today to tomorrow The years that followed the beginning of the Mani pulite judicial inquiries further solidified the bureaucracy’s hold over the Ministry and over its old structure. That structure protected them and their management of foreign policy. After the years of hubris, starting in 1992 the ruling political parties (Socialists and Christian Democrats) fell into deep discredit – their financial managers and many leaders condemned by judicial courts or under indictment. But the country’s political and institutional crisis also greatly sapped its energies and its ability to seize the opportunities offered by the fastchanging European environment. The rapid succession of governments (often ‘governments of experts’ until spring 1995) and their uncertain support made it difficult to bring forth major foreign policy strategies or to take important and politically risky initiatives. An Italian foreign policy ever more devoid of strong national positions and reduced to following standardised formulas was increasingly left in the hands of the foreign policy bureaucracy.

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Other actors in foreign affairs Not that the international scene was uneventful. The Gulf War, Somalia, the conflict in the Balkans and a new, most important, phase of European integration all came in rapid succession and created important political pressures on Italy. However, the nature of some of those problems was new and it was now primarily the task of other institutions to deal with them. Such was the case of Somalia. Once a major recipient of Italian cooperation assistance, it was now an issue dealt with by the Ministry of Defence. The same is true for former Yugoslavia, for some years very much a collective effort of the European Community and, again, of the military. As indicated in the previous section, with the judicial earthquake shaking the ‘cooperation’ programmes of the MFA, such activity would later become identified largely with the Ministry of the Treasury. Moreover, broader attention was now given (for instance within Law 68 of 1993) to ‘decentralised cooperation’ – the use of local administrations’ resources or the use of multilateral funding by the same administrations for a wealth of small initiatives outside any coordination and general political guidelines.10 The MFA had long managed foreign affairs alongside other, more sectoral or advisory, institutions. Foreign trade is also regulated, analysed and coordinated by a Ministry for Foreign Trade and by the Instituto per il Commercio con l’Estero. A number of ministries have a resident ‘diplomatic advisor’ – a senior foreign service official seconded to them (however, the growing number of those advisors can also be considered an expansion of the Ministry’s influence). The Office of the Prime Minister (Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri) includes a team of career diplomats. In recent times, different cabinets have also included a Ministry of EU Affairs. Absent in the Prodi government (1996–98), such a Ministry (Ministero per gli affari comunitari) was again established in 1998 by the D’Alema government and retained by the Amato government. The Prodi government put at the centre of its domestic and foreign policy agenda Italy’s admission into the European Monetary Union (EMU) with the first wave of countries. Because of the nature of the issue and of the new, special levies necessary to reduce the budget deficit and state debt, the financial and fiscal institutions – including the new, broader Ministry of the Treasury headed initially by the authoritative Carlo Azelio Ciampi – have taken centre stage. To the extent that on such an entry into the EMU Italy has staked much of its international credibility, image and rank, those institutions have become as important actors in foreign policy as they are in domestic policies.11 The MFA at present12 As of early 2000, the MFA managed 118 Embassies (down from 124 in 1994), and 12 Permanent Missions. Its 125 Consular offices (135 in 1994) reflect the

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importance of emigration in the past and outnumber those of any other country in the world. Coming only after France in total number of offices abroad (253), Italy, however, has a lower average of personnel per office (17, including persons under contract, against 45 for France) than other main European and G-8 countries. The total personnel serving in Rome and abroad (including 2,342 people abroad on contract) is about 7,000. Of that total, just over 900 are career diplomats. The MFA’s budget for fiscal year 1998, excluding the ‘cooperation’ budget, was 2.005 billion lire – 0.28 per cent of the state budget. With the ‘cooperation’ included the total budget reached 2.577 billion lire, representing 0.35 per cent of total resources allocated. That 0.28 percentage has been roughly the same in the last two decades. At less than 0.15 per cent of GDP, the allocation for the cooperation programmes is today well below the OECD average (0.25 per cent). A major reorganisation of the embassies and consular offices network took place in the 1990s. Offices were closed in areas where there was excess provision, while the network was strengthened in areas of increasing importance such as Asia and Central–Eastern Europe. The reform of Italy’s public administration and the restructuring of the MFA When taking office in 1996, the Prodi government committed itself to carrying out a reform of the MFA before the end of 1998 – with guidelines similar to those of the De Michelis proposal of 1989. That is new geographical divisions added to the ones dealing with functional areas. A reform of the ‘cooperation’ programmes was also put on the agenda. The commitment was not very different from that of previous governments. But a few new steps were made in the direction of reform after decades of immobility. The thrust came from the initiatives taken to reform public administration in general and from personnel changes at the top of the MFA bureaucracy (in particular the arrival of the new Secretary-General Umberto Vattani). The Prodi government’s reorganisation of public administration in Italy (entrusted on the Ministero della Funzione pubblica, led by Franco Bassanini) was aimed at changing some of its most important characteristics, making it more productive while making the country more capable of competing internationally. Law 59 of 1997, the ‘Bassanini Bill’, delegated reform to the ministries themselves. It sought to reduce the number of ministries, redefining their respective competences and lessen centralised decision making in the present structure. It also planned to move some competences to lower levels of government. Thus, while the regional governments were allowed more freedom to move internationally and especially in the European context, the MFA was to focus on the coordination of that decentralised international interaction.

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The reformed structure of the MFA The choice made from within the MFA was to abandon the linkage between the reform of the Ministry itself and of the foreign service and start with the restructuring of the central organisation. The search for a different allocation of resources, the reform of the career structure (in fact later carried out in part), and other important issues were left to the future. Approved in late December 1998 by the Council of Ministers (it was then introduced in the form of a Presidential Decree), the restructuring project is centred on the geographical approach: one office looks after the different aspects of relations (political, economic, cultural, etc.) with a specific country or region. The different territorial offices are then grouped into Divisions (Direzioni Generali) dealing with the major regions of the world: ● ● ● ● ●

Europe the Americas the Mediterranean and the Middle East Sub-Saharan Africa Asia and Oceania, the Pacific and Antartica.

The approach by subject matter (political affairs, economic affairs, etc.) survived alongside the geographical one, but the related divisions were redesigned in order to better fulfil the task of support for diplomatic action in multilateral fora. New divisions were also added in order to cover issues that have acquired greater saliency. The competences of the reformed and new divisions are: ● ● ● ● ● ●

European integration Multilateral political affairs and human rights Multilateral economic and financial cooperation Cultural cooperation Development Assistance Programmes (Cooperazione allo sviluppo) Italians abroad and migratory policies.

The Cooperazione allo sviluppo Division in fact remains unchanged for the time being as the Bassanini civil service bill provides for specific reform in this area. Two other divisions (bringing the total to thirteen) deal with Administration and Personnel, replacing a single division covering both areas in the old structure. Finally, an enhanced Planning and Analysis Unit is directly responsible to the Secretary-General. European integration to centre stage In addition to the geographical approach, a most important innovation is the Division on European integration (Direzione Generale per l’Integrazione Europea). As indicated above, in the recent past European integration had been dealt with by a number of governmental actors – probably being the foreign policy area where the MFA had most to fear about loss of competency. Moreover, in the recent past coordination among different agencies

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abroad had proved easier than coordination of policies and initiatives at home. The new division was created to correct those problems and to give the foreign policy bureaucracy a coordination role. The Division gathers together competences that were earlier spread in different offices. The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) had been dealt with by the Division of Political Affairs. The related Office IV of the new Division coordinates policies rather than elaborating them. The Balkans are dealt with by the Division on Europe. It is the Division on Asia that participates in CFSP meetings dealing with Timor. Thus, by coordinating policies, the new division creates the conditions for a more effective CFSP. Other offices of the Division deal with sectoral economic and political issues (monetary and fiscal policies, consumer protection, energy, environmental policies, scientific research, trans-European infrastructural works, etc.); external relations of the EU (EU enlargement, Atlantic relations, EU relations with other countries and regional organisations, etc.); financial and development cooperation with third countries (multilateral development assistance programmes, special EU–Italy framework agreement on cofinancing, etc.); cooperation in the judicial and internal affairs (cooperation among judicial systems, migratory policies, Schengen agreement, etc.); institutional affairs (relations with the European Parliament, relations with the Ombudsman, legal analysis of communitarian norms, etc.). With allocation of personnel evolving day by day in the Ministry, the Division on European Integration is already one of the largest in terms of staff. A first, but important, step The reform of the MFA structure was born primarily out of internal conditioning and needs rather than of adaptation to a changing external environment. Long overdue, it eventually came in the context of the general reform of Italy’s public administration. If the recent restructuring was limited solely to the MFA’s central organisation that was also due to a tactical choice: to avoid that one issue became hostage to other ones (larger allocation of resources, personnel, career, etc.) in the search for a comprehensive reform. The result was a first step towards reform, but without progress on other issues, and constrained by conditions and problems often inherited from the past. Of course, more time is needed to assess the effectiveness of the present restructuring and its ability to deal with a fast changing international context and growing international pressures. Moreover, time is necessary for officials (especially senior ones) to adapt to this new structure. Procedures have already been established to avoid conflicts over competences among different divisions and offices (for instance with regard to negotiations, bilateral agreements over immigration, etc.). Even more important, it appears, is that senior officials acquire the mentality and flexibility necessary for interdepartmental cooperation in a structure much more complex than the old one.

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Competing among those offices for competences is unavoidable and a new working method for officials is very necessary. With a larger number of directors general, a frequent criticism concerns the lack of an intermediate role between the directors and that of the Ministry’s Secretary-General. At present, the unavoidable impression is of a restructuring too narrowly focused on the existing bureaucracy and its management of foreign affairs (the reform, after all, was entrusted to the bureaucracy). There are no provisions for flexible forms of management and for broader interaction with expertise from outside the bureaucracy. The small Unit of Analysis and Planning (only six career officials) has been supplied with funds to commission research – but only a tiny amount. An old demand for broader control by Parliament over the organisation of the Ministry and over appointments to the senior positions was not fulfilled.13 However, the reform is a hopeful sign. It has broken the pattern of immobility and started the process of adaptation of the MFA to a greatly changed international environment and contributed to the further evolution of Italy’s position in international affairs.

Notes 1. The main sources for this section are: ‘Osservatorio Permanente sulla Strutture della Politica Estera Italiana’, Rapporto preliminare sulle strutture della politica estera italiana (Rome: 1995), Chapter 3; C. Caggiula and R. Benedetti, Il Ministero degli Affari Esteri (Rome: La Nuava Italia Scientifica, 1992); and E. Serra, ‘La burocrazia della politica estera italiana’, in R. J. B. Bosworth and S. Romano (a cura di), La politica estera italiana (Bologna. Il Mulino, 1991). 2. D. P. R. 18, 1967. 3. These observations are derived from ‘Osservatorio Permanente sulle Strutture della Politica Estera Italiana’, Rapporto Preliminare, op. cit., pp. 34–5. 4. See Luigi Vittorio Ferraris (ed.), Manuale della politica estera italiana, 1947–1993 (Bari: Laterza, 1996), Chapter 1. 5. Still in June 1997, the two main contenders for the position of Secretary-General of the Ministry were derisively defined by the most authoritative Italian daily as ‘two different faces of the same Homo andreottianus who survived the glacial epoch of Andreotti’s power’. M. Caprara; ‘Esteri, ultimo regno degli “Andreottisauri”, and “Farnesina, duello fra andreottiani” ’, Corriere della sera, 17 and 28 June 1997. 6. Senato della Repubblica, 3a Commissione permanente; Indagine conoscitiva sulle strutture e le funzioni del Ministero degli Affari esteri, 6 December 1994. 7. Josè Luis Rhi-Sausi (a cura di); Ripensare la Cooperazione (Rome: Centro Studi di Politica Internazionale, 1996), Chapters 1 and 2. See also, ibid. (ed.), La crisi della cooperazione italiana (Rome: Edizioni associate, 1994). 8. By 1997 the MFA-managed assistance programmes had come practically to a halt. With much of the 500 billion lire budget earmarked for multi-year programmes, there were only 150 million lire for all new initiatives. Information derived from interviews with MFA senior officials. 9. Ministero degli Affari esteri-DGCS, Legge finanziaria 28.12.95, and Ministero degli Affari esteri, Servizio Stampa e Informazione, Il Ministero degli Affari Esteri al Servizio dell’Italia nel Mondo (Rome: 1998).

176 Foreign Ministries in the European Union 10. See Josè Luis Rhi-Sausi, ‘Scenari di riforma della cooperazione italiana’, in RhiSausi, Ripensare la cooperazione, op. cit., pp. 26–8. 11. An example of that increasing spreading of competences among different institutional actors was the Group of Senior Officials charged by the Prime Minister with the task of devising the strategy for Italy’s convergence toward the EMU parameters. The group produced the report Italy’s convergence toward EMU. It was made up of the Secretary-General of the MFA, the diplomatic advisor to the Prime Minister, the Director-General of the Ministry of the Treasury and the Head of the External affairs section of the Banca d’Italia (Italy’s central bank). 12. Most data in this section is derived from Ministero degli Affari esteri, ‘Intervento del Ministro degli Affari esteri, On. Lamberto Dini, in Commissione Esteri del Senato della Repubblica sul bilancio del Ministero degli Affari esteri’, Rome, 21 October 1997; Ministero degli Affari esteri, Il Ministero degli Affari esteri, op. cit. 13. Although there is, in practice, some informal parliamentary involvement in ambassadorial appointments.

11 The Netherlands Duco Hellema

Until the Second World War, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had a relatively weak position within the Dutch political system. In the second half of the nineteenth century, especially in liberal and commercial circles, foreign affairs was even considered an irrelevant luxury. The First World War changed these opinions, and under the dynamic Foreign Minister H. A. van Karnebeek (1918–27), the position of the Ministry was strengthened, especially through the acquisition of the responsibility for foreign economic relations. In the 1930s, however, the status of the Foreign Ministry declined again. The liberal-minded Ministry lost its control over policy making in the field of foreign economic relations to the Ministry of Economic Affairs, a result of growing state interventionism and bilateralism in the world economy. In the 1930s, the Prime Minister, the strong-minded former Shell director H. Colijn, regularly interfered in foreign policy. Just before the Second World War, the Foreign Ministry employed no more than 140 staff members, 60 in The Hague and 80 abroad. The size and status of the Ministry reflected the limited foreign policy goals of the Netherlands before the Second World War: neutrality, defence of its colonial possessions and free trade. Remarkably, the Ministry for Colonial Affairs was larger than that for Foreign Affairs. After the Second World War, the position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs changed. New tasks, resulting from the membership of a growing number of international organisations, the problems with respect to the status of Germany (which would lead to the temporary existence of a department for German Affairs), the Marshall Plan, the international problems regarding the Dutch Indies, all these developments made an extension of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs necessary. The number of personnel in the Ministry began to grow rapidly: not including the Foreign Service it had already reached 188 by 1946, 455 in 1950, and 1,395 in 1975. In 1994 the total number had reached its peak of 3,755 personnel, almost 50 per cent of whom worked at the Ministry itself.1 During the post-war decades the budget of the Ministry had been growing commensurately. Even in recent years, it continued to 177

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increase, though mostly as a result of the growing sums spent on development cooperation and European Union contributions. The budget for 1996 was 9.189 million guilders, 698 million more than for 1995; in 1997 the budget was 9.122 million.2 During the post-war years, the Ministry not only began to grow, its structure changed as well. In 1950 a general reorganisation of the Ministry took place. The traditional division between functional departments was replaced by a geographically based structure, with country desks and regional directions, after the example of the American State Department (which would soon create problems regarding European integration).3 However, during the 1950s the organisation of the Foreign Ministry still reflected specific postwar problems: the Ministry, for instance, had a Department for Economic and Military Aid affairs (which would later transform into a DirectorateGeneral for European Affairs) and a Department for Indonesian affairs. In the mid-1960s, with the first appointment of a Minister (without Portfolio) for Development Cooperation, the Ministry acquired an organisational shape that it would retain until the reorganisation of the mid-1990s, its main structure consisting of three Directorates-General. The first was the ‘classical’ Directorate-General for Political Affairs (DGPZ), which was subdivided in regional Departments, and a Department for NATO and WEU matters. The second DG was for European Cooperation (DGES), created in 1957, mainly subdivided into a Department for European Integration (DIE) and one for OECD matters (DES). The third was for International Cooperation (DGIS), which means development cooperation (divided along both regional and functional lines) and UN affairs. Apart from these three Directorates-General the Ministry consisted of advisory functions and administrative units. The Ministry was and is headed by a politically neutral Secretary-General. Only the two Ministers (of Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation), and the State Secretaries (or Under-Ministers) are politically responsible.4 One could observe a certain political and cultural distinction between the three Directorates-General. Several commentators have concluded that the Directorate-General of Political Affairs (DGPZ) had a conservative–liberal and Atlanticist outlook, at least until the 1980s.5 The Directorate-General for European Affairs (DGES) was, of course, more European-minded; other ministries sometimes criticised it for its ‘communautarian orthodoxy’. Within the Foreign Ministry, it was considered by some to be dull and technocratic. DGPZ and DGES often disagreed. A former diplomat even concluded that the Ministry in many cases did not function as an integrated apparatus: DGPZ and DGES not only disagreed, but did not accept each others’ basic values.6 The Directorate-General of International Cooperation (DGIS) had in many ways a special position and culture as well. From its initiation in 1964, it had a different (more socially engaged) culture compared with DGPZ and DGES, which also led to differences of opinion, especially between DGPZ and DGIS.

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Traditionally, the diplomatic and consular services formed a separate and aristocratic world, but during the Second World War the two were combined into a single Foreign Service. Before the war the Ministry of Economic Affairs had its own network of commercial envoys. In 1950 the the Ministries of Foreign and Economic Affairs concluded a Concordat, which meant that one Foreign Service would perform all diplomatic, consular and economic tasks, under the responsibility of Foreign Affairs. Economic Affairs (the DirectorateGeneral for Foreign Economic Relations), however, could send instructions to them and have a say in the appointment of diplomatic personnel. In 1972 it was decided to integrate the Foreign Service and the Ministry, a decision which slowly materialised during the following years. What this meant was that the distinction in terms of culture, prestige, and recruitment between the Foreign Service and the Ministry itself was finally dissolved. From then on, personal careers had to be mixed – three years in The Hague, three years abroad; a system which has not always been appreciated by staff members. In the mid-1990s, the Netherlands had 135 diplomatic posts with Dutch personnel all over the world. Of the 93 embassies, 28 were located in Europe, 28 in Asia and Australia, 18 in North and South America, and 32 in Africa and the Middle East.7 Thus, in comparison with the pre-war years, the Foreign Ministry flourished after the Second World War, and acquired a central role and an important status. Nonetheless, the Ministry never had a monopoly over foreign relations, neither before nor after the Second World War. On the contrary. The political system in the Netherlands is, among other things, characterised by departmental autonomy. In the post-war decades almost all ministries created international or European Directorates-General or departments and began to maintain their own international contacts. In the field of foreign economic relations the Ministries of Foreign and Economic Affairs continued to fight a long series of demarcation disputes over European affairs and, for instance, development cooperation.8 There is a clear difference in political culture and approach between the two ministries. The Ministry of Economic Affairs has sometimes been less interested in the political goals of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, such as Atlantic unity and, later, development cooperation or human rights. It has sometimes criticised the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for neglecting Dutch economic interests.9 There were similar problems with other ministries: with Finance for instance (over development cooperation), and with Agriculture (over the Common Agricultural Policy).

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European integration The standpoint of the Netherlands towards the process of European integration was, for a long time, primarily based on the Dutch interest in liberalising trade relations in Europe, that is to say in as wide an area of Europe

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as possible. From the birth of the EEC, the Netherlands was in favour of extending the number of Community members, especially by the incorporation of Great Britain. Dutch national interests were thought to be served by a deepening of European integration along ‘supranational’ or ‘communautarian’ lines, the outlook embodied in the Community’s original tasks and institutions, agreed upon in 1957. However, the EEC should remain an economic organisation. Thus, during the first half of the 1960s, the Netherlands resisted French proposals to develop the EEC into a political union. NATO was to fulfil the functions of political and military coordination between the West European countries and their North American allies. These assumptions and goals were reflected in the political and administrative development of policy making with respect to European integration, at least up to the 1980s. Foreign economic relations had always led to demarcation disputes, and policy making with regard to European integration created similar problems. In 1947 Foreign Affairs had become responsible for policy making relating to Marshall Aid and the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). Two years later, however, Economic Affairs became coordinator of matters concerning the European Community for Coal and Steel. With the foundation of the EEC and Euratom came a new round of demarcation disputes. This time it was the Minister of Foreign Affairs who won, though not comprehensively. In 1956 a Coordinating Committee for European Cooperation (CoCo) was created, which was to consist of civil servants from almost all ministries (and later a representative from the Permanent Representation at Brussels). The Minister of Economic Affairs became chairman of this Committee. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was to provide its secretariat and its institutional basis, an uneasy compromise between the two rival ministries. In 1957, as we have already seen, a Directorate-General for European Affairs (DGES) was created within the Foreign Ministry, and its Department for European Integration (DIE) undertook the role of the CoCo’s secretariat. Nevertheless, coordination of EC policy making continued to create problems. In 1963 a ministerial Council for European Affairs (REZ) was established, consisting of those ministers responsible for EC matters. Again, this was not enough to create stability and efficiency in a situation that was further complicated by the increasingly higher profile of the Prime Minister. In 1972, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs seemed to emerge victorious from this long-drawn battle over areas of competence. The Minister of Foreign Affairs became coordinator of a new ministerial council for European Affairs, while the Prime Minister would be chairman. The Under-Minister for European Affairs – first appointed in 1956 – became chairman of CoCo. From now on, CoCo would fall completely under the responsibility of Foreign Affairs. Within the Ministry the Department for European Integration of the Directorate-General of European Integration became the unit which had to support the Foreign Minister’s coordinating tasks and which would serve as

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secretariat for CoCo. Nevertheless, the mandate of the Minister of Foreign Affairs remained limited. The Ministry of Economic Affairs was still responsible for economic policy as a whole, a compromise which could cast doubt on the consequences of the 1972 arrangement. And quite apart from economic policy, the solution of 1972 did not mean that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was to control and direct all sectoral policy making concerning European integration. The arrangement explicitly assumed that in practice the sectoral ministries would have to prepare policy making in their own fields of competence. DIE, as the normal coordinating unit, would remain relatively small. Thus, the coordinating role of Foreign Affairs would be a formal one, especially in specialised, technical matters. Coordinating policies regarding European integration proved to be a difficult task. In previous decades all sectoral ministries had created international or European directorates-general or departments. All ministries had representatives appointed to the Permanent Representation in Brussels. This made the sectoral ministries to a certain extent independent from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Under these circumstances, a complicated and delicate decision-making structure developed. The Dutch system follows the different stages of decision-making in Brussels. The first step is the discussion of new Commission proposals by an Interministerial Working Group to Assess New Commission Proposals (BNC), chaired by a DIE official. This BNC decides which ministry will be responsible for the first round of negotiations in the working groups in Brussels. At this stage the Foreign Ministry plays only a formal and incidental role. When more sectoral ministries are involved in working group negotiations, coordination takes place by means of formal or informal consultation between these ministries.10 Once decision-making in Brussels has passed the working groups and reached COREPER, the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs becomes a more active one. Before COREPER I and II meetings an interministerial ‘instruction meeting’ takes place in The Hague, chaired by a high DIE official, to decide the instructions for the PR and his deputy. These meetings are attended by representatives from all ministries involved. When agreement has been reached in a Brussels working group, the ‘instruction meeting’ in general follows the consensus agreed upon. In cases where no consensus has been reached, the ministry most involved usually prepares a draft instruction. Following the negotiations in COREPER, the preparation of the Council meetings will be discussed in CoCo, chaired by the Under-Minister of European Affairs. The Department European Integration prepares CoCo meetings. Within CoCo the influence of the ministries concerned can be considerable, but it is DIE which formulates the draft conclusions. Most of the time, CoCo discussions mainly deal with issues on which COREPER has not been able to reach consensus (the so-called B-points). The outcome of CoCo deliberations has to be endorsed by the Cabinet. Where no consensus

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has been reached in CoCo, or in the case of very sensitive matters, the Cabinet has to make the final decisions. This effectively means that the Prime Minister, who is the chairman of the Council of Ministers, quite apart from the Foreign Minister, is a second, and important, coordinator of Dutch European policies. Council of Minister debates on European matters are most of the time prepared by the Cabinet’s Council for European Affairs, and in recent years by the Council for European and International Affairs (REIA), more specifically by the ‘sub-council’ for European Affairs, chaired by the Prime Minister. Therefore, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ role in technical matters is, in fact, a modest and formal one. Foreign Affairs has to respect the policy making autonomy of other ministries. However, in the case of non-technical matters, especially matters regarding institutional relations within the EC, the role of Foreign Affairs is dominant from the start. Foreign Affairs, more specifically DIE, interferes when decisions seem to have institutional consequences or side-effects. A former DIE director concluded that DIE is not only the coordinator, but also the ‘institutional conscience’ of the Netherlands’ European policies. It has the task of guarding and defending the acquis communautaire, ‘the rule of law’ within the European Union.11 Other ministries, preoccupied with their own specific interests, are not always enthusiastic about DIE’s communautarian idealism. DIE’s role, and that of Foreign Affairs for that matter, has sometimes been characterised as ‘orthodox’. Nevertheless, all sectoral ministries accept the Foreign Ministry’s coordinating role. The Minister of Foreign Affairs has primary responsibility for coordinating European policy making. Yet he is not the only coordinator. The Prime Minister is of growing importance, a result of both his role as chairman of the Council of Ministers and as participant in the European Council. Issues of great political significance, and matters on which CoCo could not reach agreement are decided upon by the Council of Ministers, chaired by the Prime Minister. In such cases, the Prime Minister becomes the actual coordinating minister. The Prime Minister’s role is, however, constrained by his relatively weak constitutional position compared with other West European countries. His department, the Ministry of General Affairs, is small. Within the Dutch system the Prime Minister is a primus inter pares. This also transpires from the fact that the preparation of European Council meetings is, like the European standpoints of his fellow ministers, part of the CoCo coordination mechanism, for which the Minister of Foreign Affairs has overall responsibility. The final important element in the Dutch decision-making system, which should not be underestimated, is the Permanent Representation. The Dutch PermRep described his role, at least partly, as a sort of ‘shadow coordinator’.12 The Representation consists of delegates from all ministries, which makes it an effective network centre. The PR is sometimes critical of the outcome of CoCo coordination, considering it too much of a domestic

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compromise without giving sufficient consideration to relations in Brussels. In such cases, the PR, being an experienced and influential diplomat, can directly approach his own minister as well as those of other departments. The Dutch decision-making process is a complicated and delicate balance made up of several elements. Depending on the issue at hand, these elements are: the Foreign Minister (and his Under-Minister for European Affairs); the Foreign Ministry with its Directorate-General for European Affairs and the Department of European Affairs, other ministries with their European departments; the Prime Minister and his advisers at the Ministry of General Affairs; the Permanent Representation; the COREPER instruction meetings; CoCo, and the Council of Ministers. In the absence of a dominant political and administrative centre, the balance between these elements is a delicate one. The different actors have to work together harmoniously, and on the basis of trust. This is not always the case. One of the problems of the Dutch presidency of the EC in 1991 was, apparently, the lack of trust and respect between the PR and the top level of DGES. The relationship between Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Hans van den Broek was also a difficult one in those tense days.13

Criticism, proposals and suggestions The problems that arose during the Dutch chairmanship in 1991, and the rejection of the Dutch institutional proposals, led to public debate about a possible decline in the status of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, about conflicts between the Prime Minister and his Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the lack of consistency in Dutch EU policy. There was speculation about reorganisations, about a stronger role for the Prime Minister, or the creation of a Ministry of European Affairs. Some commentators criticised not only the inconsistency and inefficiency of Dutch European policies, but also the lack of parliamentary control, which they saw as a product of the complex and muddled responsibilities regarding EU policy. In recent years, public opinion seems to have become more sceptical about the transparency and legitimacy of the EU decision-making system. In view of these problems, or alleged problems, several suggestions have been made for restructuring the Dutch policy-making system regarding European affairs. One of these suggestions was to transfer the ministerial responsibility for EU policy making from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Prime Minister, which would mean that CoCo meetings and the preparation of Cabinet meetings would take place at the Ministry of General Affairs. A more radical solution would be to transfer the entire apparatus, including the Under-Minister of European Affairs, CoCo, and the Department of European Integration, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to General Affairs. Others have speculated on the possibility of creating a Ministry of European Affairs. A more conservative suggestion would be the transformation of the

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relatively small Department of European Integration of Foreign Affairs into a stronger and larger interdepartmental unit, which would be able to monitor and synthesise Dutch policy making from start to finish.14 These suggestions are all based on the belief that under current arrangements, the Dutch national interest fragments into particular interests and interdepartmental compromise, and that a more comprehensive and strategic Dutch European policy is therefore needed. It is a remarkable line of reasoning, in many ways not typically Dutch. In 1989, the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) was still advocating a more decentralised solution to the same problem, by strengthening the European and international units of the other ministries. This still reflected the traditional Dutch confidence in the communautarian future of European integration. Nowadays, however, this confidence in a supranational or federal development seems to have been eroded, as a result of the growing number of member states and the growing complexity and unpredictability of the EU agenda and decisionmaking system. This is the reason why present-day commentators plead for more strategic and political efficiency and more attention to Dutch national (especially financial) interests, which implies not decentralisation, but rather the centralisation of policy making.

Reorganising the Ministry of Foreign Affairs This more business-like and ‘realist’ kind of argument is evident from the 1995 Foreign Ministry White Papers. At the start of the first Liberal–Social Democratic Cabinet, led by the social-democratic Prime Minister Wim Kok, budgetary conflicts arose regarding aid to the East European and former Soviet states. Against this background, the Cabinet, and the new Minister of Foreign Affairs Hans van Mierlo, announced a re-evaluation of foreign policy and a reorganisation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In September 1995, a first Re-Evaluation White Paper set out the lines of the coming reorganisation. In November these goals were elaborated in a second White Paper.15 In general, the 1995 White Papers stated that Dutch foreign policy had to become more efficient and consistent, which necessitated a more effective coordination, both within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and between Foreign Affairs and other ministries (above all Economic Affairs). Apart from this, the White Papers argued for a more business-like foreign policy. Although the White Papers were still reticent in their use of the words ‘national interest’, they concluded that in view of recent tendencies in the world economy and in the European Union (the return of ‘power politics’), the Dutch government would have to pay more attention to the defence of specific Dutch interests. The White Papers reflected a general feeling that with the end of the Cold War the days of both ‘Great Certainties’ and American leadership were over. Dutch foreign policy had to be redirected

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towards Europe, as Van Mierlo reiterated several times. However, it was concluded that relations within the European Union were ‘hardening’, and the prospects for ‘communautarism’ were dim (and would be even dimmer after a future enlargement of the EU). The most striking outcome of the re-evaluation process of the past years was the integration of the regional sections of the DG for Political Affairs (DGPZ), the DG for International Cooperation and regional specialists of other departments, into new, integrated regional ministries (led by a new Directorate-General for Regional Affairs). Apart from this, new thematic departments were created. Regional and thematic departments would have to cooperate with and influence each other, and the regional departments would have to combine this exchange of information and opinions into integrated regional or country policies. In the field of EU policy, the existing decision-making structure remained more or less the same. As a result of the 1996 reorganisation the DirectorateGeneral for European Affairs was enlarged. In January 1997 the number of DGES personel reached 144. The position of DIE, however, did not change. A new Cabinet council was created. The demarcation disputes of the past years between the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs led to the creation of a new Council for European and International Affairs (REIA), chaired by the Prime Minister, but with the Minister of Foreign Affairs still in the role of coordinating Minister. Although the 1995 White Papers stated that the reorganisation was meant to reaffirm the leading role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, critics argued that its effect was, in reality, to admit the stronger influence of economic interests, and of the Ministry of Economic Affairs. More idealistic goals of Dutch foreign policy, such as human rights, were said to be endangered.16 Minister Van Mierlo’s reaction to these criticisms of the first White Paper was to announce the creation of a Department for Human Rights, Good Governance and Democratisation. The reorganisation of the Foreign Ministry did not significantly affect decision-making in the field of European affairs. The existing situation was more or less endorsed. An interesting aspect of the White Papers regarding European decision-making was the increasing importance attached to bilateral diplomatic representations within the EU. As a result of the growing complexity of European decision-making and the possible hardening of inter-EU relations, the role of the embassies at the EU capitals was considered to be of growing importance. At the time of writing, a reorganisation regarding Dutch European policy making is not unlikely. The present division of labour is in many ways a logical product of the general Dutch constitutional system. Policy making is based on a mechanism without a strong political or administrative centre. The lack of a strong policy-making centre partly reflects a tradition of departmental autonomy and compromise, and perhaps also partly the traditional

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absence of any ‘power-political’ view on European integration. The possible alternative of a strong Prime Minister runs counter to the constitutional traditions of the Netherlands.

Future problems? The European agenda continues to grow. In many fields, domestic and foreign policies are becoming almost indistinguishable. Moreover, relations within the EU are becoming more complicated and more unpredictable. It is not impossible that the Dutch policy-making system in the future could become ‘overloaded’. It will be an ever more difficult task for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to coordinate effectively all these widening fields of European decision-making, given the small size of the Department of European Integration (and the financial constraints of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Two general problems will continue to be raised and debated in the foreseeable future. The first is the coordination of the early, informal phases of decision-making in Brussels, the lobbying activities, especially regarding technical and specialised issues. As a former Director of DIE concluded, there is no actual coordination during these early phases. The Dutch system only becomes effective the moment decision-making formally enters the coordination mechanism.17 The second problem is that of overall, strategic, long-term coordination. Some commentators have argued that as a result of the absence of a strong, dominating centre in the Dutch decision-making process, there is insufficient opportunity and time for overall strategic debate. Informal high-level consultation did not seem to be effective enough. It is one of the reasons why (significantly), after the Dutch chairmanship of 1991, an official new high-level coordination committee was created, the CoCo HAN (the Dutch acronym HAN standing for High Level Officials). CoCo HAN consists of Secretary- and Director-Generals from the ministries most involved, and would especially have to be responsible for coordination of the preparation of Intergovernmental Conferences. CoCo HAN, however, did not meet regularly. P. R. Bot even concluded in 1997 that CoCo HAN, after an encouraging start, was not functioning as it should be.18 Apart from these general problems, new developments within the EU, especially regarding the second and third pillar and EMU, will demand new efforts and new arrangements which could lead to new demarcation disputes in The Hague. Common Foreign and Security Policy is an interesting example. Common Foreign and Security Policy has created specific complications within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs itself. The Directorate-General for Political Affairs (DGPZ) had the responsibility for the preparation of policy and decision-making regarding European Political Cooperation, and later the CFSP. In the past, European Political Cooperation (EPC) created problems between DGPZ and DGES, with DGPZ not inclined to participate

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in the CoCo coordination mechanism. This attitude reflected the Dutch, and especially the Dutch Foreign Ministry’s long-term doubts over EPC. Until recently, European Council meetings were prepared separately by the DGPZ and DGES sector: EPC or CFSP issues on the one hand and communautarian issues on the other. After Maastricht the DGPZ sector began to participate more regularly in CoCo meetings. Nevertheless, as late as 1997, a former Secretary-General of General Affairs concluded that the divisions between DGPZ and DGES had still not been overcome, so that no ‘overall policy coordination’ took place.19 Only recently have CFSP matters become ‘normal’ issues in the general CoCo coordination process. The differences of opinion between DGPZ and DGES begin to pale as a result of, among other things, a deliberate policy to move officials from one DG to the other. The future of the Dutch decision-making system, and its future efficacy, are of course dependent on developments within the EU. The pressure on the coordination system will in all probability increase. Nonetheless, it seems unlikely that major changes will occur. In view of the peculiarities of the Dutch constitutional system, there seems to be no alternative to the present division of labour. Academic and public criticism of the Dutch European policy-making system tends to concentrate on recent particular and almost traumatic experiences, notably the Dutch chairmanship in 1991. The day the Dutch institutional proposals were rejected is still referred to as ‘Black Monday’. Another much debated setback was the unsuccessful nomination of former Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers as the European Commission’s president. Nevertheless, most of the time the coordination system works quite well. In a comparative study the situation in the Netherlands proved to be no more problematic than in other member states.20 The system is flexible, possibly to the point of being complex, but open to all interests involved, and led by a relatively small administrative centre. It respects departmental autonomy and necessitates compromise: it is in many ways typically Dutch. And it is not wholly unsuccessful. Most of the time, the Dutch system provides adequate and consistent diplomatic action and satisfying results.

Appendix The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs Foreign Ministry Personnel 2000 ● ●

total: 3,038 in The Hague: 1,764 (58 per cent)

Diplomatic representations in 2000 ● ● ● ●

103 embassies (and 2 embassy offices) 12 permanent representations 30 professional consulates 1 representation at the Palestine Authority

188 Foreign Ministries in the European Union Budget Ministry of Foreign Affairs Total for 1995: 8.5 billion guilders Total for 1997: 9.122 billion guilders (6.4 Development Assistance) Total for 2000: 10.5 billion guilders (7.6 Development Assistance) Total for 2001: 11.3 billion guilders (8.2 Development Assistance)

Notes 1. Buitenlands beleid belicht. Uitgave 1994 (The Hague: Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, Haag, 1994), pp. 1–7. 2. Fact-sheet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Hague, 1996, and Begroting Buitenlandse Zaken en Ontwikkelingssamenwerking 1997 (The Hague: Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, September 1996). 3. The Schuman Plan, for instance, was dealt with by the German Desk of the Department for European Integration (DEU/DU). 4. C. B. Wels, ‘The Foreign Policy Institutions of the Dutch Republic and the Kingdom of the Netherlands 1580 to 1980’, in C. B. Wels, Aloofness and Neutrality. Studies on Dutch Foreign Relations and Policy-Making Institutions (Utrecht: HES, 1982), pp. 114–47. 5. For instance: J. J. C. Voorhoeve, Peace Profits and Principles. A Study of Dutch Foreign Policy (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1979), p. 72. 6. J. G. van der Tas in H. H. J. Labohm (ed.), De waterdragers van het Nederlandse Europabeleid. Terugblik op 40 jaar DGES (The Hague: Sdu Uitgevers, 1997), p. 196. Former Foreign Minister Chr. van der Klaauw recalls that when he was asked to become head of DGES he did not like the idea. DGES was unattractive, ‘technocratic’, dealing with economic and legal problems. DGPZ was the real core of the Ministry. He accepted, as a loyal servant of the Ministry, but without much enthusiasm (ibid, p. 126). 7. Information from fact sheet on Dutch Foreign Service, http://www.bz. minbuza.nl/, 01-08-1996. 8. Directly after the Second World War, Economic Affairs succeeded in keeping the responsibility for foreign economic relations. 9. Interview with former Secretary-General of Economic Affairs F. W. Rutten, made as part of a research on the Dutch role during the oil crisis of 1973–74, Spring 1997. 10. B. Soetendorp and K. Hanf, ‘The Netherlands: Growing Doubts of a Loyal Member’, in K. Hanf and B. Soetendorp (eds), Adapting to European Integration. Small States and the European Integration (London: Longman, 1998), pp. 37–42. 11. Former DIE Director J. de Visser in Labohm, op. cit., p. 216. 12. PR B. Bot, in Labohm, op. cit., p. 223. 13. M. van Hulten, ‘Zwarte Maandag. Kroniek van een gemiste kans’, in: Labohm, op. cit., pp. 193–210. 14. R. B. Soetendorp, ‘Het Europese beleid vraagt om aanpassing van nationale besluitvorming’, in Nederland in een veranderende wereld. De toekomst van het buitenlands beleid, ed. P. R. Baehr et al. (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1991), pp. 92–105. 15. De herijking van het buitenlands beleid (The Hague: Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, September 1995), and Startnotitie. Naar een nieuw Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (The Hague: Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, November 1995). 16. D. Hellema, ‘Dilemma’s, onzekerheid en onmacht. Het debat over de herijking van de Nederlandse buitenlandse politiek’, in Transaktie, XXV(1), March 1996, pp. 124–35.

Duco Hellema 189 17. 18. 19. 20.

Former Director DIE J. de Visser in Labohm, op. cit., p. 215. PR B. Bot, in Labohm, op. cit., p. 223. Labohm, op. cit., p. 247. L. Metcalfe, ‘International policy co-ordination and public management reform’, in International Review of Administrative Sciences, LX, 1994, pp. 271–90.

Bibliography Official reports Begroting Buitenlandse Zaken en Ontwikkelingssamenwerking 1997 (The Hague: Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, September 1996) De herijking van het buitenlands beleid (The Hague: Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, September 1995) De onvoltooide Europese integratie, Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid (The Hague, 1986) The Netherlands and the Future of the European Union (The Hague: Sdu Uitgevers, 1995) Stabiliteit en veiligheid in Europa: het veranderende krachtenveld voor het buitenlands beleid Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid (The Hague: Sdu Uitgeverij, 1995) Startnotitie: Naar een nieuw Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (The Hague: Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, November 1995)

Books and articles Van den Bos, Jan. M. M. Dutch EC policy making. A model-guided approach to coordination and negotiation (Amsterdam: Thesis, 1991) Van den Bos, Jan. M. M. ‘De ambtelijke coordinatie van Nederlandse EG-standpunten. Een netwerkanalyse’, in Menno Wolters (ed.) Democratie en beleid in de Europese Gemeenschap (Aplhen a/d Rijn: Samson/Tjeenk Willink, 1992) pp. 229–47 Hellema, Duco Buitenlandse politiek van Nederland (Utrecht: Het Spectrum, 1995) Hoetjes, Bernard S. ‘The Netherlands’, in Rometz, D. and Wessels, W. (eds) The European Union and Member States: Towards Institutional Fusion? (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997) pp. 155–84 Labohm, H. H. J. ‘European decision-making in the Netherlands’, in J. Kaufmann (ed.) Effective negotiation. Case studies in conference diplomacy (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1989) Labohm, H. H. J. (ed.) De waterdragers van het Nederlandse Europabeleid. Terugblik op 40 jaar DGES (Den Haag: Sdu Uitgevers, 1997) Moquette, F. G. ‘Van BEP tot BEB. De aanpassing van de bestuurlijke structuren aan de ontwikkelingen van de buitenlandse economische betrekkingen in Nederland sinds 1795’, Academic dissertation, Leiden, 1993 Pijpers, Alfred ‘The Netherlands. The weakening pull of Atlanticism’, in Hill, Christopher (ed.) The Actors in Europe’s Foreign Policy (London: Routledge, 1995) pp. 247–68 Van Schendelen, M. P. C. M. Gelijkhebben of winnen? Nederlandse belangenbehartiging in de Europese Unie (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1995) Soetendorp, R. B. ‘Het Europese beleid vraagt om aanpassing van nationale besluitvorming’, in Nederland in een veranderende wereld. De toekomst van het buitenlands beleid (door P. R. Baehr a.o., Assen: Van Gorcum, 1991) pp. 92–105

190 Foreign Ministries in the European Union Soetendorp, Ben and Hanf, Kenneth ‘The Netherlands. Growing Doubts of a Loyal Member’, in Hanf, K. and Soetendorp, B. Adapting to European Integration. Small states and European Union (London/New York: Longman, 1998) pp. 36–52 Wels, C. B. ‘The Foreign Policy Institutions of the Dutch Republic and the Kingdom of the Netherlands 1580 to 1980’, in Wels, C. B. Aloofness and Neutrality. Studies on Dutch Foreign Relations and Policy-Making Institutions (Utrecht: HES, 1982) pp. 114–47

12 Portugal José M. Matos Correia

Evolution of the political role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Two hundred and sixty-four years have elapsed since, on 28 July 1736, a decision by King D. João V created a department in the Portuguese administration that can be regarded as the direct predecessor of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – the State Secretariat of Foreign Affairs and War. It is also 180 years since those two areas were separated in the aftermath of the Liberal Revolution, giving rise to the State Secretariat of Foreign Affairs. It would be no exaggeration to say that, throughout that extended period, ‘Palácio das Necessidades’ (as it has traditionally been designated owing to the fact that the Ministry has been based in the building bearing that name since 1911) has always assumed a special role in the framework of the Portuguese public administration and acquired a primus inter pares position. There are several explanations for this which are, to some degree, common to other countries. Foreign policy deals with especially sensitive matters and is thus by nature shrouded in a veil of secrecy impenetrable to the common man but arguably necessary for the stability of interstate relations. This is why foreign policy has always eluded the logic of the separation of powers principle to some extent, even within democratic systems. Hence the agents of foreign policy have traditionally been granted considerable autonomy in their work. This autonomy was encouraged by rulers who for a long time laid down as a condition of entry to the foreign service that would-be diplomats and their families must be prepared to live abroad without a salary. However, the determining causes of the special position of the Ministry are mainly linked to the country’s own features and to the decisive function that foreign policy has been called upon to play. A small power, geographically peripheral and politico-economically marginal, Portugal was always extremely cautious vis-à-vis the great power struggles on the European continent, preferring instead to engage with the sea and the material and political potential that lay beyond it. In the course of time geopolitical changes 191

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occurred, but that did not diminish the relevance of external relations. On the contrary, loss of influence and political weight brought about by the disintegration of the Empire, as well as the omnipresent concern with the real intentions of Portugal’s sole neighbour, intensified the importance of foreign relations to national survival. Confronted with a situation presenting numerous threats, Portugal discovered the key to survival as a sovereign state in the ‘intelligent management of its strategic interests’.1 Defence of overseas possessions as a primary concern, differentiation from Spain, and close links with England, the other main European sea power; this is the triptych that defined a policy which remained more or less unchanged until the fall of ‘Estado Novo’ in 1974. This vital role of foreign relations was reflected in the importance placed on the main instrument of that policy – the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). And, in modern Portuguese history, two excellent illustrations of that value can be found: the decennium comprising the Spanish Civil War and the Second World War, and the period of colonial conflict. In the first case the goal was to devise a policy aimed at securing a set of objectives regarded as of the utmost importance: defeat of republican forces in the Civil War and afterwards respect for Portuguese neutrality; and, in a later phase, using the old Anglo-Portuguese Alliance to bring the country closer to the Allies. It is indisputable that the total success of such a policy cannot be ascribed solely to the efforts of a country too small to guarantee for itself the respect of the international community in such a troubled environment. But it is also undeniable that Portuguese diplomatic skill was vital to the success of a complex strategy.2 The visibility of MFA action normally increases in troubled periods. That could also be observed at the beginning of the 1950s with the disagreement between Portugal and India regarding the province of Goa, Damão and Diu, and from 1961 with the colonial conflicts, first in Angola and then in Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau. As the country’s international isolation increased and its refusal to accept the right of the colonies to selfdetermination was widely criticised (mainly in the UN) once more Portuguese diplomacy – and especially the Permanent Mission to that organisation – was called on to perform an extremely difficult task in order to limit the damage provoked by such an intransigent stance and thus mitigate the effects of the ‘cordon sanitaire’ that progressively tightened around the country.3 Such a complex international situation gave added value to the role played by the Foreign Ministry and intensified its ‘gatekeeper’ status.4 The more international pressure increased, the more protection of national interests required a close control of external relations and, therefore, exclusive management by the MFA of external policy. The decisive role of the Foreign Ministry was thus an inevitable outcome of the need to act in a hostile milieu. But it was also facilitated by the non-democratic nature of the political system with its inherent propensity to the strengthening of executive power.

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Foreign policy and democratic transition The fall of the authoritarian regime in April 1974 had major consequences for foreign policy. A centuries-old colonial presence had come to a definite close, and the country was forced to rethink its options in the framework of a turbulent international system. The success of democratic forces in putting an end to the complex developments of the revolutionary period allowed the consolidation of a largely consensual foreign policy centred around three main ideas: participation in the European integration process; building close ties with the new African lusophone states; and extending the Atlantic Alliance (implying a special bilateral relation with the United States, facilitated by the strategic importance of the Lages Base). If to these essential features we add some complementary policies such as intensifying links with Brazil, improving relations with Spain, closely monitoring the situation in the Maghreb and the need to find solutions to a number of legacies of the colonial empire, such as the transition of Macao or the self-determination of Timor, we shall get a clearer picture of what Portuguese external relations have involved since 1976. Contrary to what could be expected, democracy did not have positive effects as far as the MFA was concerned. Indeed, the end of the colonial problem and the consequent normalisation of diplomatic relations with almost every country in the world could have been expected to enhance the status of a department with special skills such as ‘Palácio das Necessidades’. The reality was, however, very different. The guardianship exercised by the military power over the new-born democracy also had consequences for the direction of foreign policy, with many important issues being managed outside diplomatic channels. The best example of that situation can be found in the negotiation of the granting of independence to the former overseas possessions.5 The stabilisation of political life brought about by the entry into force of the 1976 Constitution also failed to bring the desired results for the MFA. The first constitutional government under Mário Soares set out EC membership as the top national priority in July 1976. A long and arduous process followed, but it was conducted mainly outside the Ministry. Due to a variety of political and economic reasons linked to the need to strengthen a still fragile democratic power, accession required sensitive negotiations in multiple fields, largely exceeding the traditional competence of the MFA. As the negotiation process spanned the competences of several governmental agencies, it immediately ran into substantial problems of interministerial coordination.6 The idea of giving that responsibility to the MFA was deemed problematic given the permanent political instability affecting governmental mandates. Coordination thus had to be carried out at a higher level. Consequently, the option presented was to inaugurate a new organisational model, transferring control of the whole process to the top of the Executive.

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This being the case, preparation and direction of negotiations were the task of a European Integration Commission (EIC),7 in accordance with the guidelines defined by the Council of Ministers for European Integration. For technical and administrative support the Commission had at its service an operative branch called the Secretariat for European Integration. Moreover, in order to involve all departments engaged in the negotiation process, an Office for European Integration was established in every Ministry represented in the EIC. This architecture was, nevertheless, placed outside the MFA and integrated into the Presidency of the Council of Ministers. That is, besides having the right to be informed of EIC actions, ‘Palácio das Necessidades’ was only trusted with the duty of promoting initiatives related to the negotiations with direct diplomatic implications and for that reason needing to be placed in the context of the country’s external relations.8 Political responsibility was given to a variety of entities (Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister for European Integration, Minister of Finance and Planning, Minister for European Integration), but the EIC was never directly subordinated to the MFA. Full integration into the European Communities in 1986 changed the whole picture in favour of ‘Palácio das Necessidades’ as we will demonstrate later on. It is also interesting to note what happened with the emerging question of development cooperation with African lusophone countries. In this sensitive domain, the position of the MFA was frequently weakened by the decentralised management system in which it had mainly coordinating functions, and where technical departments assumed responsibility for actions related to their areas of competence (a set-up derived from the experience of Portuguese administration overseas). This is a tendency that has only recently begun to be reversed. All these factors contributed to a new situation, characterised by the intervention of technical departments in a sphere of activity that until then had not been assigned to them. This had an immediate practical effect: the establishment of Offices for International Relations, European Affairs or Development Cooperation. Such a major change was due to three main factors: one of a global nature, namely the much-discussed convergence of internal and international questions from which Portuguese foreign policy is not immune; the other two being a reflection of the political changes the country experienced linked to the rethinking of its strategic foreign policy options and to the decentralisation of political power as a result of democratic transition. These developments had, at least in the initial stage, two direct outcomes: loss of power by the MFA vis-à-vis other Ministries, and the emergence of erratic behaviour fostered by the inadequacy of interdepartmental coordination.

Reforming the Ministry of Foreign Affairs From an institutional point of view and somewhat surprisingly, changes generated by democratic transition did not have a direct effect on the

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internal organisation of the MFA. The political establishment chose a tactic of incremental change, favoring reform by adaptation. The law of 1966,9 a remarkable political and juridical work by Minister Franco Nogueira, continued to regulate the activity of the Ministry, and only adopted changes that were absolutely necessary to put in place a distinct foreign policy. This can be illustrated in the case of two specialist structures in the field of development cooperation – the General-Directorate for Cooperation and Institute for Economic Cooperation10 – and also of the Emigration Institute, an entity designed to deal with problems which affected Portuguese Communities abroad – a question of great political sensitivity bearing in mind the important migratory flow of the 1960s induced by the economic difficulties the country was then experiencing. Such a provisional and reactive model soon showed its inadequacy. The growth of international demands brought about by democratic transition and the ever-growing intervention in foreign affairs of several technical agencies, eased by political instability, made it obvious how unsuitable the internal structure of the MFA was – by then nothing more than a ‘patchwork-quilt’ without any global orientation – and showed how imperative a complete and well thought-out reform was. Admission to the European Community afforded an opportunity. After a first attempt that came to nothing due to the fall of the government which prepared it,11 reform finally took place at the hands of the new executive, in office since mid-1985.12 Enacted in a hurry (entry into force occurred the day before accession) and the victim of an economy drive, the reform of 198513 did not live up to expectations. It is true that politically it favoured the MFA, which, with the forming of a General-Directorate of European Communities won power in an area that up until then had always eluded it. But it is also a fact that decisions taken completely lacked organisational rationality. The main innovation – the creation of a General-Directorate of Political and Economic Affairs – resulting from the aggregation of the functions previously assigned to three distinct entities – General-Directorates of Political Affairs, of Economic Affairs and of External Cultural Relations14 – gave rise to a gigantic and unmanageable structure ‘having to deal with all aspects of Portuguese foreign policy with the exception of matters related to the European Communities and Development Cooperation’.15 In 1992, the first Portuguese Presidency of the EC, though an undeniable political success, further confirmed the imperfection of MFA’s operational structures – overcome only at the cost of enormous efforts and personal sacrifices of all officials. This inefficiency was alleviated only by recourse to a long-standing practice in Portuguese administration: the use of informal networking and personal contacts so as to bypass cumbersome official bureaucratic channels. Internal political conditions were also propitious, namely a long period of governmental stability. The coming into office in late 1992 of a new Minister created a dynamic of innovation, since the cabinet member assuming office,

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José Manuel Durão Barroso, pointed out from the very beginning that one of his top priorities would be to rethink the way in which the MFA was organised. Insisting that in order to ‘guarantee Portuguese diplomacy a more active and interventionist role’,16 it would be ‘vital to implement a global and integrated management of our interests and of our external action goals, by means of an adequate coordination of its various constituent elements (political, economic and cultural)’,17 the minister made it quite clear that in order for ‘Palácio das Necessidades’ to ‘fully assume its duties as the main responsible party for carrying out the foreign policy defined at governmental level, it was essential to comply with the demands prompted by the rapid evolution of international society’.18 Maintaining the opinion that, as regards foreign relations, the ‘MFA is specialist in the political questions, but concurrently generalist in all the others – economic, cultural, etc. – that in some way can be relevant to the sustainment and promotion of our international interests’,19 Durão Barroso undertook a substantial reform, made through a comprehensive set of laws which entered into force on 1 April 199420 and affected almost every domain of the Ministry, both political and administrative. These reforms often resulted in changes to the general structure of public administration, hence giving rise to strong resistance from the department in charge of civil service management. On the political level, reform was based on two essential presuppositions: new functional demarcation of competences, and reinforcement of internal coordination mechanisms. Leaving behind the distinction between political and economic issues, the MFA’s structure was built along a bilateral–multilateral division, deemed more adequate not only because it is nowadays misleading to place politics on one side and economics on the other, but also because that was viewed as a better way to intensify the country’s multilateral intervention, an essential part of Portuguese international strategy considering the new forms of globalisation and interdependence. This was made clear by the choice of national candidates to important international offices, such as the Presidency of the 50th session of the United Nations General Assembly; the General-Secretariat of Western European Union (WEU); the election as non-permanent member of the Security Council for the biennium 1997/98; and the gathering of major events such as the summit of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 1996 or, more recently, the Ibero-American Summit. The chosen option was thus to establish a General-Directorate of Bilateral Relations and a General-Directorate of Multilateral Affairs that, side by side with the General-Directorate of Community Affairs (GDCA)21 which remained unaltered, are today the core of Portuguese diplomacy. Reform also extended to the structures in charge of development cooperation and foreign cultural policy, here further helping to reinforce the MFA’s position. Previously compelled to share power with the Finance Ministry in the first case and the Education Ministry in the second, ‘Palácio das

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Necessidades’ succeeded in attaining exclusive control over the agencies in charge of coordinating both sectors: the Institute for Portuguese Cooperation (resulting from the merger of the Institute for Economic Cooperation with the General-Directorate of Cooperation) and the Camo ˜ es Institute. Changes within the politico-diplomatic level were completed with the creation of a General-Directorate of Consular Affairs and Portuguese Communities, a department dealing with problems affecting the vast number of emigrants scattered all over the world. This entity is the result of a different and integrated view of the set of problems that had arisen in this area, since it unites within one structure the responsibility for all actions intended to support those emigrant communities, as well as to support the management of the major instrument of that policy, namely consulates. Administration was also dealt with under the reforms. This is an area requiring special caution, bearing in mind the unique features presented by a department having to cope with a geographical dispersion that makes it very hard to have both an overall sense of direction and appropriate supervision. The need to introduce some relevant improvements and to guarantee transparency gave birth to a General Administrative Department, a Fund for International Relations and a Diplomatic Institute, this last one dealing, among other things, with a question utterly ignored but of the utmost relevance – the training of young diplomats.22 The success of diplomatic action relies, to a certain degree, on the ability to introduce and maintain coherent national policy-making procedures. It is therefore easy to comprehend how harmful the increasing loss of influence of the Foreign Ministry’s Permanent Secretary had been. Resulting from a systematic shift of his traditional powers to ministerial offices, this has raised some major difficulties, eliminating first-level diplomatic coordination and enhancing political intervention. Faced with a negative situation and the need to put an end to it, a decision was taken to establish a two-headed coordinating structure. This task was ascribed to two figures; firstly to the Permanent Secretary, who was put in charge of human, financial and patrimonial resources; and secondly to a newly created General-Director of Foreign Policy (the establishment of this post is, without a shadow of a doubt, the most significant aspect of the 1994 reform), who took responsibility for diplomatic areas. In this context, while the former is accountable for all the Ministry’s normal work – a natural task for someone who is traditionally seen and legally defined as head of the diplomatic corps – the latter has the incumbency of rationalising action in the politico-diplomatic domain. The General-Director of Foreign Policy is today the centre of the MFA’s structure and his work is organised along three lines: 1. He is in overall charge of coordinating all services and offices whose actions have diplomatic relevance. Such a task – which required the creation of

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a Politico-Diplomatic Coordinating Council which he chairs – assures him an indisputable ascendancy over the other General-Directors without disputing the powers these have over their departments. 2. He is the Ministry’s and the Secretaries of States’ main adviser, since no other official enjoys a similar insight into the whole of Portuguese foreign policy, not only on account of the competences legally ascribed to him, but also because he is endowed with the role of national representation in the Political Committee. 3. He takes responsibility for managing a General-Directorate that, being primarily a coordinating structure, also deals with matters of special relevance or delicacy for Portuguese diplomacy such as CFSP or the question of East Timor. Important political developments took place after the reform was adopted – in the aftermath of the 1995 general elections – resulting in the formation of a Socialist government, thus ending 10 years of social-democratic governments. Significantly, the repercussions inside the MFA were minor. The new Minister, Jaime Gama, did not find it necessary to go beyond some minor adaptations and decided to maintain the inherited structure’s essential features. The only important exception was probably the creation of the Portuguese Agency for Development Assistance (Decree-Law no. 327/99 of 18 August) that took the place of the Economic Cooperation Fund, established in 1991. Such a reality – radically distinct from what took place in almost every other Ministry – is a very telling one, since it seems to signify a global acceptance of the philosophy behind the 1994 reform and also of the idea that permanent changes in the institutional apparatus of foreign policy normally have negative consequences on the latter’s success.

The European dimension and the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs The semi-presidential nature of the political system set up by the constitution has direct consequences upon foreign policy control. Keeping Parliament in a secondary role and giving the President limited and essentially formal powers – thus diverging from the French experience – Portuguese basic law assigns government the exclusive right to conduct foreign relations. This situation at least theoretically benefits the MFA. As in the other member countries, European integration significantly influenced relations among political bodies, emphasising governmental dominance, a situation largely due to the dominant role played by executive power in the European decision-making process. On the other hand, as we have seen, accession to the European Communities meant a radical transformation of Portuguese foreign policy, with inevitable effects on the MFA. It therefore seems important to briefly examine the process by which European policy unfolds.

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It being a governmental responsibility to ‘conduct the country’s general policy’ (art. 182 of the constitution) – and therefore foreign policy – it is the task of the Council of Ministers for European Union Affairs (CMEUA) to assume ‘global political coordination both internal and externally’23 in the context of Portuguese participation in the European Union. All Ministers take part in the CMEUA,24 a natural result of the fragmented capacity of several governmental departments to act at the European level. It is also a consequence of the presence of almost every Minister and/or Secretary of State in the various forms of the European Union Council. Notwithstanding, European integration – as with all other aspects of foreign policy – is indisputably guided by the Prime Minister (in whose office exists a powerful diplomatic presence with special responsibility for information analysis and political initiative) and the Minister of Foreign Affairs (assisted, in this area, by a Secretary of State for European Affairs). The fact that participation in the European integration process has favoured the MFA may seem somewhat paradoxical, especially considering the situation up until 1986. Indeed, diffusion of power to the various sectoral departments should apparently have led to the reverse situation; that is, progressive weakening of ‘Palácio das Necessidades’ ’s status, all the more since in another area facing comparable problems – development cooperation – an evident strengthening of technical agencies had occurred. But it should not be forgotten that the way in which the EU functions favours the role of the MFA, since the sole entity which exercises global competence is the General Affairs Council which only foreign ministers chair. However, internal reasons mainly explain the enhanced role of the Portuguese MFA. Firstly, European issues are nowadays the core of national foreign policy. It is not merely a tactical option, but rather something the country’s future and its international visibility are profoundly linked to. National interest rests largely on the results of an integration process which, while presenting some serious risks, will bring enormous advantages if correctly dealt with. But in order for that to happen, it is a conditio sine qua non to be able to manage effectively the country’s participation in European structures. Success thus depends upon the ability to follow a combined strategy in all domains embraced by community affairs. And, if political leadership at crucial moments has to be exercised by the Prime Minister – and let us not forget that he is the person leading the national delegation to the European Council – regular coordination practices must be the responsibility of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. He too, it should also be remembered, has always played a role in the Council, the most powerful European decision-making institution. Secondly, it is important to note that if ministers exercise at community level the powers assigned to their departments, the evaluation of these ministerial powers needed in order to define national attitude is of a political nature. And this is a task for the MFA. Thirdly, membership of the EU does not only involve permanent negotiations with other partners. In fact, it is an organisation maintaining

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autonomous external economic relations implying, on certain occasions, direct participation of member states, side-by-side with the European Commission, on negotiations with third parties. Such a scenario, which affects the country’s external interests, must be dealt with at least when fundamental issues are at stake, by the MFA. As far as Portugal is concerned, that was the case with the Uruguay Round negotiations and with participation in the Rio Conference. Finally, it is important to emphasise that some of the most intricate problems raised by European integration which appear to have a significant bearing for a country like Portugal, are political (for instance, enlargement, institutional reform or the linguistic issue). All these, on account of their fundamental importance, must be subject to general guidance articulated between the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs and consequently developed through diplomatic channels. But if political factors seem to run in favour of a specialised department such as the MFA, the technical nature of the problems posed by so complex a process point up the difficulties diplomacy normally has in dealing with those matters. Consequently, governmental agencies assume greater importance. Solving this instrumental problem of horizontal coordination – giving the MFA know-how in all domains related to European integration – became a matter of urgency. And the key to explaining how ‘Palácio das Necessidades’ maintained control over European policy is to be found in the solution adopted regarding the internal organisation of the General-Directorate of the EC (now Community Affairs). As a matter of fact, those services25 were built in order to work as an interface not only with European institutions but also with the Portuguese administration, thus allowing an adequate liaison with departments and the European Commission and simultaneously guaranteeing the indispensable linkage with all intervening national agencies. Also of fundamental importance was the need to embrace a different personnel policy. In contrast to the MFA’s tradition, entirely directed and almost completely composed of diplomats as it was, the General-Directorate of Community Affairs was from the very beginning predominantly occupied – even at the highest levels – by technical specialists recruited outside the diplomatic corps. A symbiosis attained in this manner ensures an efficient political and diplomatic framing of action at the European level and, at the same time, global coordination of interests. Endowing ‘Palácio das Necessidades’ with a vast team of experts in the multiple areas of European policy diversifies and clarifies relations between the MFA and the other ministries. The latter always find interlocutors speaking the same type of language and enjoying full knowledge of every dossier, while the former has a droit de regard over every national action with some kind of impact on community affairs. Another two entities deserve separate reference bearing in mind the contribution given to the strengthening of the MFA’s role: The Permanent

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Representation in Brussels (REPER), and the Interministerial Commission for Community Affairs (ICCA). REPER has always played a pivotal part in community issues (as well as in EPC/CFSP). And it would not be an exaggeration to conclude that there are few cases in which an embassy or a permanent representation makes an intervention in foreign policy formulation comparable to that of REPER. In normal circumstances, the decision-making process regarding European issues is clearly a dialectical one, since national positions reflect, to a large measure, proposals presented or advice given by the mission in Brussels, and especially the points of view of the Permanent Representative and of his Deputy, both ensuring Portuguese representation in COREPER. It so happens that REPER is, in itself, a replica of the national administration, gathering diplomats, counsellors and technical attachés coming from almost all agencies and offices, including the Autonomous Regions of Azores and Madeira. It is therefore quite understandable that effective control over the REPER gives the MFA full opportunity to monitor effectively the preferred connecting channel with community institutions. That has in fact occurred, allowing us to conclude that REPER is today possibly the most important Portuguese diplomatic mission26 (which does not necessarily mean the most prestigious one). The work of the ICCA has also been useful in this context. This is an intergovernmental body, assuring horizontal coordination, bringing together high officials and representatives of various ministries, public services and the Autonomous Regions and is chaired by the Secretary of State for European Affairs (or the General-Director of Community Affairs).27 Meeting on a weekly basis, its goal is to establish in an articulate manner the orientations for national action in the various Community institutions, thus also reinforcing the direction exercised by the MFA in this field.28 A last comment of a juridical nature is needed to point out that the internal legislative process favours the Foreign Ministry as well, since all bills, previous to their Council of Ministers introduction are scrutinised by the General-Directorate of Community Affairs and the Cabinet of the Secretary of State of European Affairs in order to check their compatibility with community regulation.

The influence of Common Foreign and Security Policy Throughout the accession negotiations, Portuguese authorities focused mainly on the questions posed by what is today the first pillar, such as Common Agricultural Policy or the economic funds, thought to be of prime relevance to national interests. Therefore, matters of European Political Cooperation (EPC) played second fiddle. The Portuguese government viewed very cautiously national participation in a process which meant major innovations and could also lead to a subordination of Portuguese interests to

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those of other powers with greater weight in international affairs or more influence in the European decision-making process. To a country that, although small, was used to defining and pursuing an autonomous foreign policy, the need to consult with partners on any international question required different mechanisms, both internally and externally. Viewed initially with extreme caution – not to say with distrust – participation in EPC became normal and reached a turning point in the first semester of 1992, with the Portuguese Presidency of the Council of Ministers. Taking place at a very sensitive time in the history of Europe, when the European Union was facing important internal reforms (the Maastricht Treaty) and was called upon to execute a fundamental role in dealing with questions such as support for the newly born Commonwealth of Independent States and the peace process in ex-Yugoslavia, Portuguese performance in the European Communities made it clear that initial Euro-scepticism had been left behind and that the country was committed not only to playing an active role in dealing with the problems raised by the most demanding community dossiers, but also to contributing – by way of the EPC/CFSP – to the EU’s international presence. Involvement in EPC/CFSP had internal political consequences at three distinct levels, which it is important to analyse separately: ● ● ●

enlarging external relations to new areas, changing the internal structure of the MFA, affecting the work of embassies and consulates.

The influence of ECP/CFSP on the evolution of Portuguese foreign policy Reasons associated with the traditional outlines of foreign policy and with the geographical and human dimension of the country led to a concentration of Portuguese diplomacy around the limited set of questions already referred to. Nevertheless, the profound changes in external relations after the 1974 Revolution, expressed in the universal establishment of diplomatic relations and adhesion to a great number of international organisations,29 were frequently more symbolic than of real practical effect. The truth is that a certain parochial vision continued to prevail, discernible in behaviour still predominantly unconcerned with all matters not directly related to that central core. Engaging in EPC/CFSP changed all that, leading to a ‘universalisation’ of foreign policy assuming thenceforth a global nature only comparable to the situation that came about in 1494 when the signature of the Tordesilhas Treaty gave birth to the first worldwide system of international relations.30 This may seem an exaggeration, especially if it is not read in the right context. Indeed, full integration into a demanding system of foreign policy coordination aimed at defining common opinions and actions in every international

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problem forced Portuguese diplomacy to a make a permanent effort to deal with questions that normally escaped the MFA. Aware of the fact that in its partners’ eyes national interests will be evaluated according to the contribution the country gives to European Union collective action, Portuguese diplomacy has sought to demonstrate competence and rigour, intervening actively in the questions it knows well – as in the case of African issues – and also in those that until recently were outside the list of its priorities, such as Yugoslavia. Fully understanding that give and take is the number one rule in this process, Portuguese diplomacy knew that in order to count on the support of the partners when needed, it had to reciprocate. Equally, ‘Palácio das Necessidades’ became conscious of the fact that involvement in EPC/CFSP could bring major benefits to national positions in matters such as the Angolan peace process or self-determination of East Timor.31 And it realised that in this new scenario it would be of great importance to place officials in Brussels, grasping the opportunities offered by the establishment of the CFSP in 1992. Hence the appointment of a Portuguese diplomat to the post of Deputy General-Director for CFSP at the Commission. Previously the instrument of a foreign policy based until recently on ‘splendid isolation’, ‘Palácio das Necessidades’ began to follow the international situation ‘in a broader perspective than that required in a mere consideration of national interests, covering matters that would be secondary in an exclusively national context’.32 In other words, the kind of actions characterising EPC/CFSP have influenced the development of Portuguese foreign policy at two levels: if, on the one hand, CFSP imposes new and more demanding working methods, it broadens the MFA’s horizons on the other, obliging the country to formulate positions on a vast number of bilateral, multilateral or technical issues. From being a country of secondary importance in diplomatic terms, Portugal was thus promoted to a position of diplomatically relevant power. Internally, the direct consequence of these changes was the strengthening of the MFA’s authority, a situation favoured by another element: while in pillar I questions a ‘decentralised management system’ was chosen; EPC/CFSP matters were ‘assigned to the MFA – almost exclusively’.33 The influence of EPC/CFSP on the structure of the MFA Participation in EPC/CFSP made it essential to introduce some significant changes in the internal organisation of ‘Palácio das Necessidades’. Consequently, besides the establishment of the COREU network, it became necessary to install the European Correspondent Service which had been informally functioning since mid-1985 but was only legally created by the reform of 31 December 1985. Faced with the difficult task of finding its own diplomatic space,34 the European Correspondent also had to overcome

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another major problem: integrated into the General-Directorate of Political and Economic Affairs, in a position of hierarchical parity with the functional services, his chances of efficiently concluding a coordinating task that required the capacity to supervise the action of those services were jeopardised. The harmful effects had to be dealt with internally, resulting in a clearly unsuitable solution: the appointment of the European Correspondent as main diplomatic advisor in the Minister’s office. This being an unsustainable situation – especially bearing in mind the birth of CFSP – the 1994 reform came up with a more effective answer by making the new CFSP service directly subordinate to the General-Director of Foreign Policy who, as we have seen, chairs the Political Committee. Factors that place the European Correspondent in a position of political ascendancy over all other bureaux involved in CFSP, endowing him with the power to coordinate effectively Portuguese positions on pillar II issues,35 include: ● ●

●

previous analysis of the COREUs prepared by each sectoral bureau; participation, jointly with representatives to CFSP working groups, in preparation of meetings chaired by the General-Director of Foreign Policy; preparation of CFSP dossiers for each session of the Political Committee, the General Affairs Council and the European Council.

The role of embassies and consulates in the context of EPC/CFSP It is a well-established theme that the traits of contemporary international politics have resulted in the decline of bilateral diplomacy and its replacement by new types of multilateral diplomatic action. This proposition is, however, far from being proven and the experience of European integration seems, on the contrary, to demonstrate the continuing relevance of bilateral relations. In fact, alongside bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, it is possible to identify a third technique of diplomatic activity, bilateral in its procedures but multilateral in its purposes.36 This kind of process assumes special importance when supranational entities such as the EU are concerned, since the utilisation of majority rule emphasises the need for bilateral diplomacy between member states in order to make clear to all partners each country’s point of view and thus guarantee favourable majorities or blocking minorities when the time comes to make a decision. Such diplomatic procedures, although aiming at similar goals, are undoubtedly distinct from multilateral diplomacy, which involves primarily collective processes of negotiation. The fact is that European integration – a dialectical process of political bargaining – has contributed to a negative re-evaluation of the role of Portuguese diplomatic missions in the other members’ capitals. The continuous nature of community negotiations increases the need for direct talks at several levels between both politicians and officials, thus throwing into

José M. Matos Correia 205

question the traditional role of embassies. This is a trend that higher levels of political integration will surely intensify. Conversely, EPC/CFSP mechanisms have helped to give added importance to embassies in third countries and to permanent representations in international organisations. As far as Portugal is concerned that was obvious when it assumed the European Presidency in 1992, but it is also true outside of this context. CFSP is built in order to function not only at various decision-making levels but also ‘on the ground’. The latter is a fundamental aspect of EPC/CFSP, since regular coordination and exchange of information in meetings between heads of mission, chaired by the Presidency, allows a common analysis of political, economic and social developments occurring in third countries to be sent to each foreign ministry. At the same time, such practices work in favour of every mission or embassy, as they can convey useful information and exert a greater influence on political decisions. For Portuguese diplomatic missions the consequences of this new situation have been enormous. Now seen not only as embassies of an isolated, small country but also as the representatives of an EU member, their work increased significantly, both in quantity – which can be seen in the enormous growth of telegraphic and fax communications – and in quality, dealing on a daily basis with issues that in a purely bilateral context would have been ignored or given little attention. This applies equally to consulates. Portugal has always given consular activity special consideration, bearing in mind that the vast Portuguese communities abroad require particular attention. Seen up until then in a bilateral perspective – as the protection of Portuguese nationals in the host country – the vast network of consulates was also profoundly affected by decisions taken at European level, such as the principle of diplomatic protection of community citizens introduced by the Maastricht Treaty, or Portuguese adhesion to the Schengen Agreement. Awareness of the growing relevance of consulates as instruments of foreign policy was evident in the 1994 reform that reversed their tendency to become external bureaucratic branches of public services and emphasised the need to spread their activity to the ‘gathering and handling of cultural, economic and – if circumstances justify it – political information’.37

Is the MFA really in charge of Portuguese foreign relations? In the last quarter of a century Portuguese society has faced enormous changes in every domain. Most of them – democratic transition, granting independence to the colonies and the search for economic development – have had direct foreign policy implications and contributed to altering the MFA’s responsibilities. Probably no other European foreign ministry was confronted with the need to manage such a large number of challenges in such a short period of time. And, albeit with some difficulties, the MFA successfully responded to

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internal and international change and achieved, especially in the last decade, a strengthening of its status as the department ‘in charge of preparation, coordination and carrying out of Portuguese foreign policy’.38 In one sense Portugal is a country with a sui generis position, considering that the relevance of foreign variables seems to be far greater than is normally the rule in comparable states. As a nation bearing the weight of an enduring presence on four continents and the maintenance of the last colonial empire, Portugal has always tried to exploit its geostrategic position in order to enhance its international influence. On the other hand – and somewhat surprisingly – public opinion has shown a growing interest in international affairs, in some cases because of direct interests – as with the EU – in others for sentimental and affective motives, namely regarding the situation in former lusophone African colonies. These two realities unequivocally benefit the Foreign Ministry whose authority on external matters has been widely accepted. However, there remain some problems in specific domains of international activity. Let us take, for example, external economic relations, an area in which the solutions proposed by the 1994 reform39 are not working out as it was hoped they would, thus allowing a progressive presence of the Ministry of Economy, through ICEP40 (Investment and Foreign Trade of Portugal). That is also the case with the ever-present Ministry of Finance, whose increasingly active role at various levels of foreign policy – relations with international financial institutions, development cooperation41 and Economic and Monetary Union42 – gives it a unique status. Another aspect of the problem must also be remembered: administrative and budgetary constraints. With a total of about five hundred diplomats and a budget of around 82 billion escudos – representing just 0.9 per cent of central administration total expenditure and 0.3 per cent of GDP43 – the MFA has always faced significant restrictions that render it very difficult to carry out its huge responsibilities. Nevertheless, the MFA seems, at least for the moment, to be in a strong position. Recent developments appear to confirm such a conclusion. Two of them are symbolic. The first, concerning European policy, is related to the fact that during the Portuguese Presidency of the European Council in 1997, the Schengen Agreement was the responsibility of the Secretary of State for European Affairs and not, as occurred in other member states, of cabinet members in charge of internal affairs or justice.44 The second deals with a very important and sensitive domain – the Secret Services – and consisted in the appointment of a diplomat45 as Director of Military Intelligence,46 a department integrated in the Defence Ministry. Two other factors also deserve special reference, on account of the reflexes they may probably bring to the implementation of foreign policy. The first regards the achievement of an old MFA aspiration in the form of approval for the first time of a National Plan for Development Cooperation.47

José M. Matos Correia 207

Such a document, justified by the need to attain an overall view of the country’s global action in this domain undoubtedly has great political significance, insofar as it deals with an area where the MFA’s control was traditionally weak. It may therefore contribute to reverse that trend, especially when taken together with the establishment of the new Council of Ministers for Development Questions and the creation of an Integrated Cooperation Budget.48 The second – a logical consequence of the MFA’s own reform – has been the legal re-evaluation of powers ascribed to the various sectoral departments with international interests, in order not only to redefine their relation with the MFA’s corresponding services, but also to clearly underline that their activity in the foreign relations sphere must be disclosed in accordance with the guidelines outlined by the Foreign Ministry.49 In short, we can offer an affirmative answer to the question at the head of this final section: the MFA is in control of Portuguese foreign policy. It is undeniable that universal changes affecting foreign ministries have had important effects in Portugal. Today, external relations are not managed only through diplomatic channels. In this sense, the ‘gatekeeper image’ is no longer accurate. Still, ‘Palácio das Necessidades’ has responded well to the changes brought about by a different environment. The MFA’s capacity to maintain control over foreign policy even raises the question of whether we should go so far as to define it as ‘transboundary coordinator’ rather than as ‘transboundary facilitator’. The future may not, however, be so propitious. Increasing integration and progressive transfer of powers to the EU in an ever-growing number of areas can create a set of conditions favourable to a growing role for domestic technical agencies, both in the EU and at the more general international level. It is a plausible scenario and, should it occur, an irreversible one. Foreign ministries still have the capacity to avoid it and should do so, because such a situation would undoubtedly have very negative consequences on the global conception of each country’s true national interests.

Appendix A: Budget A.1. Budgetary evolution 1998: 49.3 MC* 1999: 52.4 MC A.2. Budgetary structure Category Operative Budget PIDDAC1 FIR2 ECF3 Various Total

1998 (MC) 40.0 5.5 2.0 1.5 0.3 49.3

1999 (MC) 40.67 5.80 2.00 3.50 0.40 52.37

208 Foreign Ministries in the European Union 1

Plan for Investment and Development of the Central Administration Fund for International Relations 3 Economic Cooperation Fund * MC = milho ˜ es contos (1 conto = PTE 1,000 = 4.98 Euro) 2

B: Personnel B.1. Headquarters (a) Diplomats (b) Specialists (c) Technical (d) Administrative (e) Auxiliary B.2. Abroad (a) Diplomats (b) Specialists (c) Technical (d) Administrative (e) Auxiliary (f) Locally Contracted

830 237 1 102 361 129 2,345 278 120 9 90 6 1,842

C: International representation C.1. Embassies and Consulates (a) Embassies (b) General Consulates (c) Consulates C.2. Missions (a) Permanent Representations (b) Temporary Representations and Delegations C.3. Regional distribution (a) Europe

(b) North America

(c) Central and South America

(d) Subsaharan Africa

(e) Asia and Oceania

(f) Magreb and Middle East

68 42 22 8 4 27 23 10 7 2 2 6 3 1 9 4 8 14 6 1 8 3 2 8

Embassies General Consulates Consulates Permanent Missions Temporary Missions and Delegations Embassies General Consulates Consulates Permanent Mission Embassies General Consulates Consulates Embassies General Consulates Consulate Embassies General Consulates Consulates Embassies

All figures date from 31 December 1997 and were provided by the MFA.

José M. Matos Correia 209

Notes 1. Jorge Borges de Macedo, História Diplomática Portuguesa – Constantes e linha de força (Lisbon: IDN, 1987) p. 12. 2. ‘The war years revealed a remarkable team of Portuguese diplomats and one of Salazar’s main merits was to surround himself with them’, António José Telo, Portugal na Segunda Guerra, 1941–45, Vol. II (Lisbon: Ed. Vega, 1991) p. 255. 3. One of the most distinguished Portuguese diplomats of that time asserts that ‘few periods in the history of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs equal the dramatic moments and the intense diplomatic activity of the sixties decade’, João Hall Themido, Dez anos em Washington (Lisbon: Dom Quixote, 1995) p. 14. 4. The expressions ‘gatekeeper image’, ‘boundary-spanner’ and ‘transboundary facilitator’ are used here in the sense given to them in the Introduction by Brian Hocking. 5. It is the very Minister of Foreign Affairs of that time – Mário Soares – who reveals that the decolonisation policy was conducted, in its decisive moments, by the Armed Forces Movement (Maria João Avillez, Soares, Ditadura e Revolução (Ed. Público, 1996) p. 315. 6. It is interesting to note that in a previous process of a similar although less politically relevant nature – adhesion to EFTA – negotiations had also been conducted by a technical agency, in that particular case the Ministry of Economy (Calvet de Magalhães, Os movimentos de integração europeia no pós-guerra e a participação portuguesa nesses movimentos (Lisbon: INA, 1981) p. 50. 7. Decree-Law no. 306/177 of 3 August and Decree-Law no. 185/79 of 20 June. Useful information can be found in chapter XVII (The management and coordination of Community Affairs during Portugal’s accession negotiations) of Pedro Alvares’s, The Enlargement of the European Union and the Experience of Portugal’s Accession Negotiations (Oeiras: INA, 1999). 8. Leading to the creation, in 1978, within the General Directorate for Economic Affairs, of a European Integration Bureau. 9. Decree-Law no. 47331 of 23 November 1966 and Decree no. 47478 of 31 December 1966. 10. Creation of these two entities represented the consolidation of a model that endured until 1994. However, in the period following the April Revolution, other solutions had been tried, such as the creation of an office for cooperation at the Presidency of the Republic or even the establishment of a Ministry for Cooperation. 11. The reform, prepared by the then Minister Jaime Gama, was even approved in the Council of Ministers, but never promulgated by the President of the Republic. 12. Decree-Law no. 529/85 of 31 December. 13. It was not just a question of enforcing the already approved restructuring, but of making a new one, very different from the former as regards its essential options. 14. The last of these General Directorates was much more recent, dating from 1982. 15. A Reestruturação do Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, (Lisbon: MNE, 1995) p. 14. 16. ‘Política Externa Portuguesa: principais desenvolvimentos em 1993 e perspectivas para 1994’, in A Política Externa Portuguesa 1994–95 (Lisbon: MNE, 1995) p. 13. 17. Ibid. 18. Ibid., p. 21. 19. ‘Os objectivos da reestruturação do Ministério’, in A Política Externa Portuguesa 1994–95, p. 256.

210 Foreign Ministries in the European Union 20. The main one is the Decree-Law no. 48/94 of 24 February. 21. It is the former General Directorate of European Communities, which only suffered a change of designation. 22. The analysis made here is a very schematic one, ignoring some other fundamental institutions that are nevertheless of scant significance to our study. A general picture of the present MFA’s organisation can be seen in the Appendix. 23. Decree-Law no. 474-A/99 of 8 November (article 33). 24. And also two Secretaries of State among which is naturally the Secretary of State of European Affairs, all without voting rights. 25. Initially regulated by the Decree-Law no. 526/85 of 31 December, the GDAC now functions according to the Decree-Law no. 344/91 of 17 September, amended by the Decree Law no. 408/99 of 15 October. Internal services of GDAC are as follows: Community Institutions; Legal Matters; Economic and Financial Questions; Fisheries and Agriculture; Internal Market; Justice and Internal Affairs; Multilateral External Affairs; Regional External Relations; Intraeuropean External Relations; Scientific, Technological and Industrial Questions; Bilateral Relations; and Information, Training and Documentation. It is important to note that the Decree-Law of 1991 was directly motivated by the need to prepare the first Portuguese presidency, while the one of 1999 preceeded the second presidency. 26. Recently, that determination to reinforce the MFA’s control over REPER became evident with new legislation (Decree-Law no. 234 – B/96 of 28 July) limiting the term of technical departments’ representatives in Brussels to three years. It is obvious that the more officers rotate, the more difficult it will be to acquire a special influence or to consolidate parallel dialogue channels. 27. Legally, competence to chair over the ICCA belongs to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. That only happens in exceptional circunstances. 28. Álvaro de Vasconcelos and Luís Paes Antunes, Report on Portugal in The European Union and Member States (Towards Institutional Fusion?), Dietrich Rometsch and Wolfgang Wessels (eds) (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996) p. 318. 29. Fernando Castro Brandão, Sinopse Cronológica da História Diplomática Portuguesa (Lisbon: MNE, 1984) p. 152. The text can also be found on http://www. min-estrangeiros.pt/mne/histdiplomatica. 30. António José Telo, Do Tratado de Tordesilhas à Guerra Fria (Blumenau: Editora Fure, 1996) p. 14. 31. In this sense, José Medeiros Ferreira, ‘Political Costs and Benefits for Portugal arising from membership of the European Community’, in Portugal and EC Membership Evaluated, José Silva Lopes (ed.) (London: Pinter Publishers, 1993) p. 178. 32. Pedro Costa Pereira, ‘Portugal – Public Administration and EPC/CFSP – a fruitful adaptation process’, in Synergy at work (Spain and Portugal in European Foreign Policy), Franco Algieri and Elfriede Regelsberger (eds) (European Union Verlag, 1996) p. 214. 33. Ibid., p. 207. 34. Pedro Costa Pereira (op. cit., p. 212) reveals that ‘the first European Correspondent acknowledges that his main concern then had been to persuade the other Heads of Service of his Department`s vocation not only for an objective work but also for a substantial one’. 35. Guia Político da PESC (Lisbon: MNE, 1997) p. 12. 36. Calvet de Magalhães, A Diplomacia Pura (Lisbon: APRI, 1982) p. 106. 37. A Reestruturação do Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, op. cit., p. 22.

José M. Matos Correia 211 38. Article 1 of the Decree-Law no. 48/94 of 24 February. 39. Attempts made in order to increase the intervention of the MFA in the economic area then faced an imsurmountable opposition from several departments and particularly from the Ministry of Trade. 40. The recent appointment of a diplomat as vice-president of this institution can however help to put an end to the conflicts with Palácio das Necessidades and improve coordination between both. 41. It is important to underline that as much as 80 per cent of Portuguese O.D.A. is the responsibility of the Finance Ministry which also has joint direct control with the M.F.A over the Portuguese Agency for Development Assistance, the main public financial institution working in the development cooperation field. 42. And let us not forget that, since the Cardiff Summit, Finance Ministers participate in the European Councils from the beginning to the end. 43. These numbers, it should be noted, are good if compared with what happens in other European countries. But percentages are one thing, while having actual money to spend is another. 44. Acordo de Schengen – Presidência Portuguesa, 1 de Janeiro a 30 de Junho de 1997, MNE, Lisbon, 1997. 45. It was not just the appointment of a diplomat but, most significantly, the definition of a political orientation according to which Military Intelligence should, in normal circumstances, be headed by a diplomat, in as much as it deals with the external security of the country. 46. The legal designation is: Service of Strategic Military and Defence Informations. 47. The 1998 Cooperation Programme was approved by Resolution of the Council of Ministers no. 102/98 of 2 July. The one for 2001 is a part of the Resolution of the Council of Ministers no. 174/2000 of 26 October. 48. Integrated Cooperation Budget for 1999 was the first one (Resolução do Conselho de Ministros no. 128/88 14 October). Competencies of the Council of Ministers for Development Questions are defined in article 34 of the Decree-Law no. 474-A/99 of 8 November. 49. For instance, the Decree-Law no. 27/98 of 11 February, regarding the General Directorate of European Affairs and International Relations of the Ministry of Finance; the Decree-Law no. 37/98 of 24 February, regarding the Office of International Relations of the Ministry of Environment; the Decree-Law no. 418/98 of 31 December, concerning the Cooperation Department of the Ministry of Employment and Solidarity; the Decree-Law no. 41/99 of 8 February, concerning the Department of European Affairs and International Relations also of the Ministry of Employment and Solidarity; the Decree-Law no. 324/2000 concerning the Office for European Affairs and External Relations of the Ministry for Social Equipment.

13 Spain Ignacio Molina and Fernando Rodrigo1

The last two decades of the twentieth century have seen a number of extraordinary transformations in the foreign policy of all European states, marked by the significant progress made in supranational integration, growing global interdependence and the end of the Cold War. However, in Spain, changes in the international arena have been enhanced by developments within the domestic framework. The simultaneous processes of democratisation, territorial decentralisation and accession to the European Community/ Union (EC/EU) have had a decisive effect, turning foreign policy making into something more complex and more closely linked to the domestic political sphere. This chapter examines how the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, MAE) has adapted itself to the transformation in Spanish foreign policy making. At first sight, the role of the ministry seems to have been reduced from its traditional status as the only Spanish player in international affairs. However, this does not necessarily imply its progressive decline within the Spanish polity. In fact, the more pluralistic and complex context in which foreign policy is elaborated can paradoxically favour the MAE as a new horizontal actor of the core executive.

The Spanish foreign policy making process In order to understand the changing position of the MAE, it is necessary to bear in mind a diversity of players, both state and non-state, which play a role in the creation and the implementation of Spanish foreign policy.2 As with many other countries, parliamentary control of foreign and European affairs is rather weak. The reasons for this are to be found in the limited experience of democracy, the majoritarian nature of the relations between the government and parliament (Cortes) in Spain, and the decreased politicisation of international affairs after the controversial referendum on NATO. However, the transformation of the legal and political structure of the country towards a quasi-federal system since the 1970s resulted in the territorial organisation of Spain in 17 Comunidades Autónomas (Autonomous Communities, ACs), 212

Ignacio Molina and Fernando Rodrigo 213

which are playing a growing international role, despite the fact that their powers in this field are considerably limited by the constitution. Over the last few years, the foreign activities conducted by the ACs have posed many problems for the government in the coordination of Spain’s foreign policy and, especially, for the MAE, which is responsible for maintaining the unity of foreign policy. In particular, Catalonia, the Basque Country, Galicia, Andalusia, Valencia and the Canary Islands have developed their own strategies in foreign relations concerning cultural and economic issues – for example, by building links with communities of emigrants abroad or by seeking foreign markets through international offices in charge of promoting commerce and tourism. Whilst regional diplomacy may create serious headaches for the MAE, the complex intergovernmental relations in Spain result in a paradoxical benefit. In the EU context, the government itself has argued that the management of European affairs coordination by the MAE is justified by the greater disposition of regional governments to be coordinated by a ministerial body that does not appear to threaten their powers.3 It has to be noted that under the system currently in force, the ACs–Central Government Committee dealing with Issues Regarding the European Communities, includes another ministry from the central government – the Ministry for Public Administration – which in fact presides over this forum. The current framework for decision-making is controlled by the agreement reached on 30 November 1994, which became law in 1997. Originally based on the German model, it makes a distinction between matters under the exclusive jurisdiction of either level of government, and matters of shared jurisdiction, and it assigns the MAE the task of keeping an eye on the implementation of European Community Law by the ACs. The pressure exerted by the peripheral nationalist parties, which took advantage of the failure of the ruling state-wide parties to obtain an absolute majority from 1993 to 2000, has enabled them to create a post within the Spanish Permanent Representation in Brussels. It is a post held by a diplomat exclusively devoted to AC-related matters and to encourage the participation of the Autonomous Communities in certain technical committees within the European Commission. Further steps may mean that the ACs themselves represent Spain in the EU Council of Ministers under some circumstances. However, this progress towards a more advanced framework still faces, in 2002, the reluctance of the central government. Apart from other governmental actors, such as the courts and the political parties which can impose institutional restrictions on the work of the MAE, non-governmental players – private groups and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) – have to be taken into account. Increasingly, the MAE needs to bargain with policy networks of domestic sectoral interests including other government departments, regional authorities and social groups with specific policy interests and which seek to capture institutions for their own benefit. These policy communities are at times opaque and limited in

214 Foreign Ministries in the European Union

scope. However, on other occasions they become politicised and reach the general public through the power of the media, thus obstructing a statist style of decision-making and, at first sight, impairing the autonomy of the MAE. However, they can increase the influence of the Ministry. A clear example are the NGOs concerned with development aid and which, having gained the support of many voters, press for a rise in the budget for development aid, which the MAE is in charge of managing. The central government and foreign policy networks The notion of policy networks, with players that are focused on specific policy sectors, is useful because it graphically demonstrates that domestic interest groups and NGOs rarely have an isolated and unilateral influence on the political power apparatus. In fact, in every sector of activity, communities of interests characterised by cooperation rather than conflict take shape. They include the private players and public agencies that manage the sector and that have direct access to decision-making. Increasingly in foreign policy, as a result of globalisation, defining the national stance involves complex negotiations concerning the coordination of territorial, economic and political interests. Under these circumstances, every interest can look to the mediation of its related ministry, and thereby the MAE has to set the final foreign policy outcome after the politicalinstitutional deliberation with different departments has taken place. This is the reason why determining Spain’s standpoint in an international negotiation or in the EU – in which the Presidency of the Government and the rest of ministerial portfolios and, more rarely, private interests that are directly affected actively take part – is not solely an intergovernmental issue. On the contrary, it is something more complex that obeys the dormant pressures of social groups and, to a lesser extent, of political parties. It is therefore important to take a look at the other ministries that intervene in foreign policy making and that try to influence the MAE or, on occasions, avoid it. Apart from the matters related to European integration which nowadays affect all ministries, but which can only be considered as quasi-foreign,4 the Trade department provides a snapshot of other governmental decisionmakers who intervene in foreign policy.5 This is not the only case. The Ministry for Agriculture and Fisheries has traditionally opposed the idea of being coordinated by the MAE within the EU and seeks to influence (even jeopardise) Spain’s foreign policy towards potential competitors in agriculture and fisheries. On the other hand, an interesting study shows how the particular interests of the Ministry for Industry clashed with other interests and caused great unrest to the Spanish diplomatic service during the complex negotiation of trade agreements with Eastern European countries.6 Another case that deserves mention is that of the Ministry of Defence, which is now in charge of an army that, thanks to NATO, UN peacekeeping operations and European intergovernmental cooperation on security, has

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assumed an overseas role for the first time since the period 1808–98, during which Spain lost its overseas empire. Furthermore, EU cooperation on immigration, on serious crimes or on terrorism has increased the foreign policy role of the Ministry for Home Affairs, just as others regarded as ‘horizontal’ departments, such as the ministries for Justice and Public Administration, are also widening their jurisdiction abroad. The ministries for Economic Affairs and Finance (the Treasury), which exert an indirect but important influence through budgeting and budgetary control, deserve to be mentioned separately.7 But the important fact is that the MAE is still (theoretically) directly responsible for economic relations at the international level. However, these ministries, merged as a single Treasury from 1982 to 2000 and still strongly interconnected, impinge on such relations. Obviously, the ministries for Economic Affairs (that encompasses at present the Secretariat of State for Trade) and Finance have a fundamental role in the drawing up of Spain’s foreign policy, thus resulting in jurisdictional jealousy with the MAE. The occasional conflicts between these departments are normally resolved in favour of the more powerful economic departments, particularly when a given financial dimension is deemed relevant, for example, the decision about the extent and conditions of Spanish aid to developing countries.8 In the case of the EU, the then single Ministry for Economic Affairs and Finance sought, unsuccessfully, the role of coordinating the Spanish Permanent Representation in Brussels, but still top officials within the Treasury and not the MAE have played the main roles in setting the Spanish stance regarding issues as important as the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) or the quinquennial reviews of the EU’s budgetary negotiations. Moreover, the economic minister is the one to preside over the interministerial committees that resolve, in the last analysis, the disagreements regarding EU-related policy between different ministries. However, the fact that nowadays nearly all ministries have a foreign dimension and that many of the traditional differences between domestic and foreign policy spheres have been erased does not necessarily erode the MAE’s authority. In fact, the conclusion reached here is more ambiguous as the loss of the monopoly in international relations is offset by a new role as the overall horizontal coordinator of the decision-making process on issues in which the MAE previously did not intervene. The widening of Spain’s cultural and scientific relations is an example of this opposite trend which leads to certain functions that fall within the scope of the Ministry for Education and Culture being managed by the MAE. Undoubtedly, its role as a moderator in Madrid and Brussels over the EU’s various fields of low politics is paradigmatic of this broadening of its coordinating and monitoring functions. But still, in spite of the possibility of a positive reading, it is obvious that the MAE is hardly able to coordinate such complexity, and this is why it often finds itself simply ignored. In other cases, the endless list of coordinating interministerial committees function merely as information

216 Foreign Ministries in the European Union

exchanges. And to the heterogeneous composition and temporary constitution of these forums, which cannot become effective coordinating instances and much less pro-active decision-making bodies, we have to add the relatively low status that the MAE, or even more the Secretariat of State for European Affairs enjoy in the eyes of the other ministries. One has to bear in mind, for example, that the person currently responsible for the Ministry for Economic Affairs and Finance is the deputy prime minister for economic issues. Therefore, in this situation, the only focus of power left to resort to is the Presidency of the Government itself. This is an ambiguous source of support for the MAE because the office of the prime minister can take an overall diplomatic view and impose on all ministries involved the raison d’état that is considered by the head of government as a priority, thus overcoming the sectoral interests of specific ministries. Nevertheless, the Presidency will tend to overrule the MAE’s jurisdiction, taking advantage of the huge constitutional and political resources at its disposal and of the increasing trend towards summit diplomacy. Moreover, it will do so where the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is keenest on keeping its position, namely high politics. Following Suárez’s (1976–81) complete lack of interest in international issues, it was Calvo Sotelo (1981–82) who began the presidentialisation of foreign policy by personally leading Spain into NATO. But, undoubtedly, it was with Felipe González that the Presidency of the Government adopted an international course that is still maintained by José María Aznar. As for González, his great political weight was reinforced by his international prestige, by international events that took place during his mandate – among which the Gulf War deserves special mention, as it led to the activation of a crisis-monitoring infrastructure in his office – and, lastly, by a personal interest in international and European relations. The two Spanish presidencies of the EC/EU Council (in 1989 and 1995) reinforced this role even more, but the step of attaching the Secretariat of State for European Affairs to the office of the prime minister, thereby reducing the influence of the MAE, was never taken. In the Presidency of the Government, the Private Office (Gabinete), a network of technical and political aides, has been created, which shadows the ministerial agendas in order to constantly monitor them.9 Within this Gabinete there is a sub-department devoted to international and security matters, while the total number of diplomats working in the Presidency of the Government is close to fifteen. However, it should not be assumed that the President has withdrawn from foreign affairs issues and left them in the hands of his team of advisers,10 because such a move would be senseless in a single-party government, in which the President can use his absolute leadership to make his ministers act as his advisors. In fact, González, after certain problems with Morán, his first foreign minister, relating to issues such as his different approach to the US and Israel, appointed ministers whom he

Ignacio Molina and Fernando Rodrigo 217

trusted completely and who, maybe because they were not diplomats, were not as concerned about zealously guarding the autonomy of the MAE. Aznar’s mandate began with an initial phase during which the President did not intervene greatly in foreign policy, although he soon became increasingly interested in international relations, particularly his collaboration with other European prime ministers and the promotion of Spanish culture and language overseas. This seems to be a pattern also followed in the case of González. As the experience of the mandate grows, the President focuses on foreign affairs and is able to create for himself a reserved domain within the field closed off from the MAE. The creation of the new Consejo de Política Exterior in 2000 illustrates this growing presidentialisation of Spanish foreign policy.11 The president chairs and sets the agenda of this Committee for Foreign Policy, which has the role of ‘supporting and advising him as the main coordinator of the government’s external affairs’.12 Moreover, far from convening on a regular basis, the president decides when circumstances merit the committee’s assembly. Therefore, alongside the ministers of defence, economics, and education and culture, the Minister for Foreign Affairs is just one more permanent member of a committee that approves the guidelines of Spain’s foreign policy.13

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs Having examined the challenges and opportunities that the MAE has been facing during the last two decades, we now turn to examine the ministry itself, which has been greatly transformed. First, we analyse internal adaptations regarding its structure and operation; secondly, we explore its budgetary, human and jurisdictional resources. This examination will help us to determine to what extent changes in Spanish foreign policy making have weakened or strengthened the political role of the MAE. However, before drawing conclusions, given the particular relevance of the European integration process, the chapter deals with the EU dimension separately. Structure and functioning of the MAE Although the MAE was reorganised in 2000, the structure of the ministry at present still maintains, in essence, the design that the socialist government launched during the second half of the 1980s. The socialist minister Francisco Fernández Ordóñez can be considered as the main driving force behind the important reorganisation of the ministry starting in 1985.14 Two factors contributed to this. On the one hand, the institutional consolidation of the Secretariats of State, sub-ministerial departments headed by a junior minister, which were first introduced in 1977 and became generalised within the Spanish executive during the mid-1980s. On the other hand, the clarification of Spanish foreign policy priorities that also took place at that time. These were, firstly, Europe, when accession to the EC was imminent

218 Foreign Ministries in the European Union

and NATO membership had been confirmed, and second, cooperation with Latin America, as Spain started to emerge as a modernised country that was not only able to contribute to the development of its former colonies, but also willing to underline its historical linkages with the region through the international commemoration of the Fifth Centennial of Columbus’ Voyage. Diplomatic action in this region (called Iberian America or Iberoamerica in Spanish official jargon) was particularly important, since both the government and important companies in the communications, energy and banking sectors realised that Spain could take advantage of its historical ties. Therefore, from 1985 onward, while horizontal tasks continued to be managed as usual by the Under-Secretariat (Subsecretaría), the MAE has been vertically divided into two of the aforementioned Secretarías de Estado: the Secretariat of State for International Cooperation and Iberoamerica (SECIPI), and the Secretariat of State for European Affairs. Currently, a third Secretariat of State dealing with general foreign affairs also exists (a departmental division that, before 2000, did not enjoy the same rank as the other two, but which, even with a lower administrative standing, has coordinated the political action of the ministry since the mid-1980s). Finally, an attempt to improve the obsolete foreign administration abroad also took place between 1986 and 1988. The reforms, although insufficient,15 included the strengthening of ambassadors as mission coordinators, some changes in access to the diplomatic corps, and the modernisation of embassies in preparation for the first Spanish presidency of the European Council.16

Private Office

Secretariat of State for Foreign Affairs SecretariatGeneral

DGs 44 DGs

CFSP

Secretariat of State for European Affairs SecretariatGeneral

3 DGs

EC (First Pillar)

Office of Diplomatic Information

MINISTER

UnderSecretariat

Secretariat of State for International Cooperation and Iberoamerica (SECIPI)

2 DGs 4 DGs

Home Affairs and Justice

Figure 13.1 Organisation of the MAE

Spanish Agency for International Cooperation

2 DGs

I. Cervantes

Ignacio Molina and Fernando Rodrigo 219

Apart from the Secretariats of State, to be examined below, other minor administrative units are also part of the MAE. Thus, some ad hoc organs, such as the National Authority for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons or the Commission for the Investigation of the Third Reich Gold Transactions, coexist or have coexisted with permanent offices directly attached to the minister. Among the latter, we should mention the private office of aides (Gabinete), the Office of Diplomatic Information and a think-tank concerned with the long-term development of foreign policy (Gabinete de Análisis y Previsión), although this is now formally located within the Secretariat of State for Foreign Affairs. These somewhat politicised units, also introduced during the 1980s, try to compensate for the formal nature of the Spanish governmental structure and procedures.17 The legal rigidities and the hegemony of the bureaucracy within the ministry have minimised their relevance but, at least, the private office and the think-tank have helped to assist successive ministers who do not normally belong to the diplomatic corps and, therefore, lack connections with the senior civil servants of the department. Finally, the Subsecretaría, headed by the Under-Secretary, plays a key role in the MAE and deals with the logistics of the ministry. The Under-Secretary is assisted by the Technical General Secretary who is responsible for departmental common services such as the Inspection, the International Law consultants and different working groups – on the budget, publications, IT, wages or the introduction of the Euro. The Subsecretario has an intermediate political rank between that of the Secretaries of State (junior ministers) and that of the General-Directors, but this is probably the most central administrative position in the whole department. The Under-Secretary controls economic, legal or personnel-related matters and, given his/her coordination tasks, represents the MAE in the weekly committee that prepares the Council of Ministers. Furthermore, the Diplomatic School and three other sectoral Directorates-General (DGs) are also included in this section (see Figure 13.2). One of these, the DG for Consular Affairs and Protection of Spaniards Abroad, manages very important matters such as the network of Spanish consulates abroad, immigration and asylum, or international juridical controversies and cooperation. As will be explained below, this function includes cooperation among EU governments in Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), the so-called third pillar – in which the Secretariat of State for European Affairs, in charge of the EU policy making, surprisingly has no jurisdiction. The Secretariat of State for International Cooperation and Iberoamerica (SECIPI) Cooperation for the economic development of those areas culturally or geographically linked to Spain constitutes the main but not sole role of the SECIPI – after its initials in Spanish: Secretaría de Estado de Cooperación Internacional y Para Iberoamérica. Any reference to the Spanish contribution to this international venture must underline the fact that the country only

220 Foreign Ministries in the European Union

Under-Secretary

DG of the Foreign Service

DGs 34SDGs

DG for Consular Affairs and Protection of Spaniards abroad

DG of Protocol, Orders, and Chancellery 2 SDGs

Diplomatic School

4 SDGs SDG for Justice and Home Affairs

Technical GeneralSecretary Logistic Services of the Ministry

Third Pillar EU

Figure 13.2 Organisation of the Under-Secretariat

Secretary of State Private Office

Spanish Agency for International Cooperation (AECI) SecretaryGeneral

DG of Foreign Policy for Iberian America

DG for Cultural and Scientific Relations 3 SDGs

Institute for Cooperation with Iberoamerica (ICI)

Institute for Cooperation with Mediterranean, Arab and developing countries

2 SDGs 3 SDGs

3 SDGs

Figure 13.3 Organisation of the SECIPI

joined it recently.18 Spain was until 1981, technically speaking, a developing country and even a net recipient of foreign aid as recently as 1977. Therefore, the Socialist governments of the 1980s designed this new area of Spanish foreign policy entirely from scratch (see Figure 13.3). From the former small DG for International Technical Cooperation created in 1970, an autonomous agency was introduced in 1988: the Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional (AECI) that implements policy contents previously decided by the junior minister who heads the SECIPI. This agency has the rank of an Under-Secretariat – that is to say, halfway between the Secretaries of State or junior ministers, and the General-Directors.

Ignacio Molina and Fernando Rodrigo 221

Today, after some minor reorganisations, the AECI is divided into two geographical units: the so-called Institute for Cooperation with Iberoamerica (ICI) and the Institute for Cooperation with Mediterranean, Arab and Developing Countries. A combination of idealism and a small budget, together with autonomy and an absence of leadership marked the initial years of the ICI, which was later transformed into a more efficient although politically dependent agency. For some authors, such as Rosenberg, this change was simultaneous with the Europeanisation of Spanish foreign policy.19 The focus of the ICI is the promotion of economic aid, political assistance during democratisation, and academic relations with the Hispanic world. However, the ICI oversees all functional relations with Latin America, but not foreign policy making regarding each of the individual countries of the region. This is the responsibility of the DG of Foreign Policy for Iberian America (which is now in the same Secretariat of State, but in the past was managed from other secretariats of state). Besides the AECI, the Interministerial Committee for International Cooperation deserves mention as another important organ included in the SECIPI. This committee, created in 1986 and reformed in 2000, attempts to avoid governmental fragmentation regarding development cooperation, playing a central although not always successful role in the coordination of the different departments’ interests – particularly Defence, the Treasury, Education, Health, Employment and Trade.20 Moreover, new coordinating committees concerned with aid to developing countries were institutionalised in 1998, bringing together the central government, domestic NGOs (Council of Cooperation) and regional ACs (Interterritorial Committee). However, there does not yet exist enough trust between the MAE and nongovernmental actors for their relationship to be cooperative and effective. In addition to these tasks related to cooperation and Latin America, the SECIPI is also responsible for other functions such as the coordination of cultural and scientific international relations of the Spanish government.21 Thus, the DG for Cultural and Scientific Relations cooperates (and competes) with the Ministry for Education and Culture in particular. Jurisdictional conflicts between the Foreign and Education ministries increased in 2000 when the SECIPI created a society for the overseas promotion of Spanish culture (SEACEX) and launched the Fundación Carolina, a joint initiative funded by the government, the universities and important banking, publishing, energy and communication companies, to promote fellowships, seminars and scientific exchanges between professors, researchers and artists from Spain, Latin America and other parts of the world. Finally, the international promotion of Spanish as a foreign language is also a novelty of the late 1980s, when the Instituto Cervantes, similar to the British Council or the German Institut Goethe, was created and included in the SECIPI as another autonomous agency. Though the Ministry for Education and Culture participates in its management, the MAE has successfully claimed that the Cervantes

222 Foreign Ministries in the European Union

Institute has an international orientation and, consequently, should be managed by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Since its widely spoken language constitutes one of the most important resources of Spain as an international power, this language-spreading role has become very important for the MAE.22 The political role of the Secretary of State who leads the SECIPI is not a minor one. The above-mentioned executive DGs and autonomous agencies are accountable to him/her, and the Secretary of State also prepares, through an Office of Planning and Evaluation, the main guidelines of Spanish International Cooperation towards developing countries. The domestic social pressure to increase these contributions to 0.7 per cent of GDP has placed this topic on the political agenda since the mid-1990s, thus amplifying the politicisation of the office. This has been reinforced by the growing importance of Spanish diplomacy in the countries of the Hispanic ascendancy. Around 1992, five centuries after the discovery of the New World, the SECIPI became relevant and the junior minister who headed the sub-department at that time was also responsible for organising the Commemorating Commission. From 1991 onwards, this Secretariat of State has also promoted the series of Iberoamerican Conferences, a joint initiative launched by Mexico and Spain consisting of summits in which heads of state or government from the Iberian Peninsula and Latin America annually meet. Not surprisingly, the President of the Government has always maintained close collaboration with the SECIPI and the resulting political trust has led to a relative strengthening of the Secretariat within the whole executive but, at the same time, to a reduced autonomy given the prime minister’s ascendancy in these matters. The Secretariats of State for Foreign Affairs and for European Affairs These two departmental subdivisions were merged during the late 1990s into a single Secretaría de Estado. However, in 2000 the management of general foreign policy and the coordination of Spanish EU-related policy making were once again divided. The Secretariat of State for the European Communities was created in 1985, while foreign policy making was conducted from a different sub-department within the MAE until 1996. Their separation is more rational, although the merger could be officially justified by the functionality of placing under a common authority the different pillars of the EU – the European Communities and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). However, the rationale explaining the creation of that Secretariat of State for Europe and for general foreign policy was rather to be found in administrative austerity23 and the fact that the macro Secretariat of State was always internally divided into two clusters of Directorates-General. Today, two junior ministers – both of them assisted by a Secretary-General, a top official with the rank of Under-Secretary – lead these areas of activity. Three DGs dealing with European affairs operate while four DGs fulfil more

Ignacio Molina and Fernando Rodrigo 223

classical diplomatic tasks. This chapter will examine EU-related policy coordination later. The management of general foreign policy,24 whose organisational design dates back to 1983 and was modified in 1996 and 2000, is divided into four DGs according to a geographical and functional pattern. As for geography or bilateral relations with foreign countries grouped in continental regions, one of the most relevant DGs is that dealing with Iberian America, which belongs today to the SECIPI. According to Rosenberg, it has been somewhat politicised for several years and has also suffered from overlapping jurisdiction with the ICI or the President of the Government himself.25 This overlapping also affects another geographical DG belonging today to the Secretariat of State for European Affairs: the DG for Europe – bearing in mind that through the EU multilateral relations with those countries are increasingly important. Within the Secretariat of State for Foreign Affairs, shared responsibility affects the DG for the Mediterranean, the Middle East and Africa – if we take into account the existence of the Institute for Co-operation with the Arab, Mediterranean and Developing Countries within the SECIPI. In addition, the concentration of diplomats (see below, Table 13.1) in Europe and America demonstrates that the priorities of foreign policy continue to be located in those areas. With regard to the other three Directorates-General with functional or horizontal jurisdiction, the existence of a DG for Security, Disarmament and North America demonstrates that Spanish relations with the USA (and Canada) are profoundly connected to the military and NATO dimensions. The DG for Asia and the Pacific countries shows the growing importance of this region26 and, finally, the DG for International Economic Relations deals with multilateral, bilateral and transport affairs and, consequently, is connected to other ministries such as those for Economic Affairs and Finance or for Promotion of Infrastructures (public works). Before examining the MAE’s involvement in Spanish policy making related to European integration, we turn to the ministry’s resource base. The budgetary and human resources of the MAE27 The financial allocations to the MAE have doubled during the last decade from 0.3 per cent of the state budget in 1987 (43,746 million pesetas) to 0.65 per cent in 1998 (130,035 million pesetas). Nevertheless, this percentage of public spending had already been reached at the beginning of the 1990s and, therefore, the resources of the ministry have stagnated during the last few years – as a consequence of government policy aimed at reducing the public deficit following EMU convergence parameters. The growth of budgetary resources is not spectacular, but it is also true that it parallels changes that have taken place in public expenditure generally. This has increased from 25 per cent of GDP in 1975 to 47.4 per cent in 1994, because of both democratisation and socialist policies. Therefore, to generate accurate comparisons

Secretary of State for Foreign Private Office Affairs Gabinete de análisis (Think-Tank)

Secretary of State for European Private Office Affairs

SecretaryGeneral

Technical Office

SecretaryGeneral

Technical Office

DG for International Economic Relations

DG for Foreign Policy for the Mediterranean Middle East and Africa

DG for Foreign Policy for Asia and Pacific

3 SDGs 3 SDGs

DG for Foreign Policy for North America and for Security and Disarmament

DG of Foreign Policy for Europe 3 SDGs

DG of Coordination of Internal Market and other EC Policies

DG of Coordination for EU General and Technical Affairs 3 SDGs

2 SDGs 3 SDGs SDG for Common Foreign and Security Policy CFSP

3 SDGs

SDG for Institutional Affairs

EC Pillar

Figure 13.4 Organisation of the Secretariats of State for Foreign Affairs and for European Affairs

Ignacio Molina and Fernando Rodrigo 225

we must recognise that similar percentages of the state budget devoted to the MAE – around 0.5 per cent at the beginning of the 1980s and during the 1990s – do not mean that real expenditure on Spanish foreign policy has been constant. Real though moderate budgetary increases have taken place in development aid and when Spain held the EU presidency. However, the problem for the ministry is not only the (modest) amount of money but also the reduced freedom to spend it on political priorities other than the fixed contributions to international organisations and other designated expenses. Thus, 90 per cent of the 130,000 million pesetas – around €785 million – budgeted in 1998 are earmarked for international organisations membership dues (38,000 million pesetas, including 7,000 million for financing peacekeeping operations), public employees’ wages (30,000 million), the upkeep of overseas missions (11,000 million), or sums devoted to miscellaneous expenses (travel allowances or the organisation of official visits). Thus, the MAE can barely allocate 10 per cent of its budget to establish new consulates or embassies, to increase the number of diplomats or even to reserve money for cases of humanitarian emergency. The contrast between the ambitious goals of Spanish foreign policy and such modest available means is illustrated by the fact that Spain is the eighth largest contributor to the UN budget in terms of dues, but falls to seventeenth position in terms of voluntary contributions. Only 0.23 per cent of Spanish GDP is assigned to development aid28 – the management of which involves the MAE although, as noted earlier, the Treasury has the main responsibility in this area. The number of diplomatic and consular representations abroad are fewer than Spain’s level of diplomatic activity demands and, moreover, most missions consist of only one or two diplomats. Although Spain maintains formal relations with 189 states – all the sovereign countries in the world, excluding Bhutan – only 99 embassies have been established, plus 11 missions to international organisations. The contrast with the diplomatic effort of France, Germany and the United Kingdom, with more than 150 embassies each, is apparent. Bangladesh, New Zealand, some European countries (Iceland, Albania, Malta and Cyprus), and most of the former Soviet republics (except for Russia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine) are examples of important countries which lacked Spanish diplomatic representation in 2001. But in addition to embassies, Spanish overseas representation includes 81 consulates, 29 AECI missions, and 34 Cervantes Institute delegations concentrated in American, European and Mediterranean countries. Moreover, the external presence of the Spanish state goes beyond the MAE and its officials: ministries such as Defence, Presidency, Education and Culture or Employment also have sections and attachés in the most important embassies or consulates. For its part, in 1999, the department of Trade and Tourism – located within the Treasury – maintains 82 economic and commercial offices in 66 countries (in addition to Hong Kong and the World Trade Organisation) and 27 tourism offices in 19 countries. Lastly, some regional

226 Foreign Ministries in the European Union

ACs have established delegations in foreign cities such as Brussels and Tokyo. These parallel networks abroad may improve the Spanish diplomatic effort but they also impair the MAE’s capacity to effectively coordinate a coherent Spanish foreign policy. Regarding personnel, the reduced number of MAE officials should also be emphasised. In 2001 Spain had 765 career diplomats, more than 10 per cent of them on leave, compared to Italy or the Netherlands, each with more than 1,000 serving diplomats. Although the Foreign Service expanded rapidly between 1975 (545) and 1980 (653), it has grown slowly since then. And if we consider all civil servants, then in 1996 only 5,637 employees worked for the ministry – 0.27 per cent of all the Spanish public employees. These figures contrast with the 50,000 people serving in the Ministry for Economic Affairs and Finance or the 125,000 in Defence. It is also true, however, that the proportion of highly qualified senior civil servants in the MAE, nearly all of them belonging to the diplomatic corps, is relatively large: in 1992, 191 assistant general-directors and 21 general-directors compared with 378 assistant general-directors and 47 general directors in the Treasury. Furthermore, some of the 670 diplomats currently on active service have also been able to assume senior positions elsewhere in the executive.29 Finally, figures on the territorial distribution of diplomats (Table 13.1) show the significant maintenance of the percentages of diplomats by region – including a third of them in Madrid – over the second half of the twentieth century. To some extent, the supposedly profound transformations of recent Spanish foreign policy are contradicted by these data, since geographical priorities, at least, have remained largely unaltered.30 However, we should also keep in mind that the radical growth of Spanish involvement in Latin America and in multilateral diplomacy is compatible with this stability in the geographical

Table 13.1 Evolution of the diplomatic corps and territorial distribution (%)

Latin America Europe USA and Canada Asia and Pacific Africa Madrid Total % (Total number of diplomats)

1943

1960

1990

16.6 34.1 6.2 3.1 6.2

17.8 29.1 6.9 6.4 7.8

12 29.1 6.0 7.5 9.5

33.8 100 (290)

32.0 100 (422)

35.9 100 (643)

Source: R. Valdivielso, La Carrera Diplomatica en Espana (1939–90) (The Diplomatic Profession in Spain (1939–90) ) (Madrid: Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, 1996), p. 97

Ignacio Molina and Fernando Rodrigo 227

distribution of diplomats. Europe and America were already priorities during the 1940s while the current participation in 150 international organisations – whose headquarters are usually based in Brussels, New York, Vienna or Geneva – has changed in absolute but not in relative terms.

The European Union The European Community pillar In this final section, the drawing up and coordination of the country’s stance in the European Union will be briefly discussed.31 Most attention is given to the European Community pillar, but reference is also made to the two intergovernmental cooperation structures (CFSP and JHA). All member state governments organise their internal decision-making regarding the EU and make their presence felt in the EU Council and its preparatory Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), as well as in the working groups and committees attached to the EU Council and the European Commission. Spain is no exception and has a Permanent Representation within the EU (PermRep), which plays a key role in the coordination of the Spanish negotiators’ action in the different forums of the organisation. However, besides negotiations with other member states in Brussels, the shaping of the stance to be defended by a member state has another dimension, namely the identification of the overall Spanish interest at the intergovernmental and interministerial levels. Every member state has a coordinating system that may be under the control of the Minister for Foreign Affairs (such as in the Netherlands or Italy), the Ministers for Finance and Foreign Affairs jointly (such as in Germany, Greece or Belgium), or an interministerial department closely linked to the Prime Minister (such as the French SGCI or the European Secretariat of the Cabinet Office in the UK). In Spain, the MAE assumes this role rather than the extremely powerful Ministry for Economic Affairs or the Presidency of the Government. Furthermore, in these two major institutions of the Spanish executive there is no internal coordinating body for EU-related issues. The President of the Government acts as a final referee in the coordination of European issues, although his participation is usually limited to the most significant issues and he only assumes broad oversight of these, in consultation with advisors in his Gabinete. Thus, together with the President of the Government, the MAE is the real axis in the system. Within the ministry there are two key units that specifically discharge these coordinating functions: on the one hand, the two Directorates-General of the Secretariat of State for European Affairs that are concerned with European integration; and, on the other, the PermRep in Brussels. The Secretariat of State for European Affairs, operating under different titles, has always been the body responsible for ‘the coordination of the State

228 Foreign Ministries in the European Union

administration’s actions in the European Community institutions’.32 Its first antecedent was the Directorate-General for International Economic Relations, which included a Sub-directorate-General for European Integration, and from 1978 the Ministry (Secretariat of State since 1981) for Relations with the European Communities.33 Since it was created from scratch, it was possible to gather a small but very efficient team of civil servants who came from different ministries. Despite its attachment to the MAE since 1981, it has continued to keep its own separate budget and distinctive headquarters, despite its temporary merger (1996–2000) with the DGs dealing with general foreign policy. Diplomats abound in the Secretariat of State. However, it still comprises civil servants from different sections of the bureaucratic élite. This facilitates the relationship with the PermRep in Brussels and with the different departments within the administration, as well as improving the relationship with the interministerial committees. The two DGs of the Secretariat of State dealing with the EU carry out multiple roles: (1) the monitoring of sectoral policies through the two Directorates-General into which it has been divided since 1998: Coordination for EU General and Technical Affairs and Coordination of Internal Market and other EC policies; (2) decision-making in matters of a legal and institutional nature, although in 1996 the Directorate-General solely responsible until then for this task ceased to exist; (3) a constant relationship, and in theory an exclusive one, with the PermRep in Brussels and with the different departments in the Spanish Administration; (4) participation in the committees for interministerial coordination, which will be analysed next. The fragmentation that exists between ministries leads to difficulties in coordination. Yet in spite of this, the work carried out by the Secretariat of State for European Affairs and its predecessor over the last few years has given them a central role in this respect. As for the interministerial committees, the system in force clearly shows the desire to combine the unity of the state’s external actions through the MAE with the recognition of the functional powers of technical ministries. This results not only from the appointment of civil servants from technical ministries to the Secretariat, but also from the existence of interdepartmental forums which ensure the participation of each sector’s department in decision-making. Only a few months after the birth of the European Economic Community, on 26 July 1957, Franco’s government created the interministerial committee for the study of the European Economic and Atomic Communities. This committee was tasked with assessing the potential impact of the EC’s work on Spain, as well as with bringing Spain nearer

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to economic integration in Western Europe.34 An interministerial committee for relations with the European Communities was later created, which included all ministries that were involved in the various negotiations held by Spain during the 1970s. Afterwards, a Coordinating Council with an executive committee was also created in the last stage before the accession.35 By the Royal Decree of 2 September 1985, the Interministerial Committee for Economic Affairs regarding the European Communities, known today as the Interministerial Committee for EU Affairs, was created. It coordinates the standpoint that has to be defended when the interests of several departments are at stake, and it processes the information that each ministry has submitted about the negotiations it has conducted when, according to the division of powers, the matters pertain to only one department. The committee is chaired by the Secretary of State – or junior minister – for European Affairs, and all ministries take part, formally through their under-secretaries, as well as a representative of the Gabinete of the Presidency of the Government. The fact that members of the committee delegate their presence to administrative posts of lower rank diminishes the political relevance of this forum and therefore complicates coordination.36 The interministerial committee is made up of middle-ranking officials. But there is another interministerial committee comprising officials of higher political status, such as ministers and junior ministers: the Delegated Committee of the Government for Economic Affairs. However, coordination is not usually effected through these committees or in the Council of Ministers which, as the Presidency of the Government, only intervenes in very important matters. The Secretariat lacks the necessary power to coordinate the different ministries, especially in an administration with such a legalistic tradition as the Spanish one. This is why to some extent, in a paradoxical way, the arbitration task falls informally on the members of the Secretariat of State, since they enjoy resources such as their expertise in the EU-related decision-making process, their privileged relations with the PermRep, and their personal links with their ministries.37 When these situational arrangements are not possible, each ministry decides how to negotiate within its own sector, which results in further fragmentation. There is also an interministerial committee to monitor and coordinate activities related to the EU Court of Justice. This committee reviews all legal proceedings taken against Spain or that can affect Spanish interests. It is chaired by the Junior Minister for European Affairs but, as in the Interministerial Committee for EU Affairs, in practice a General-Director is in charge. The other members are represented by civil servants from the relevant departments at the Sub-directorate-General level or even at the advisory member level.38 This means that not only is there no tradition of interministerial committees of a political nature in Spain, but the numerous administrative interministerial committees are witnessing a decline in their relevance because of the substitution of General-Directors for civil servants

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of lower ranks. The consequence of this situation is that this coordination process is not readily accepted by the ministries, which zealously defend their powers. The result is a deeper departmentalisation of the government. When coordination is imperative, departmentalisation is overcome by relying on personal links or camaraderie, thus stressing even more the importance of bureaucratic élites in political management. There are also other interministerial committees related to European integration, which are of a temporary nature or in charge of specialist matters. For example, in March 1997, the Council of Ministers agreed to create an interministerial committee, chaired by the Minister for Economic Affairs and Finance, in order to coordinate the actions to be taken for the progressive introduction of the Euro in Spain. Regarding the most important and controversial European integration issues – which are discussed in the EU Council – the Spanish stance is formally adopted in the national Council of Ministers or, more precisely, during a weekly meeting of the aforementioned Delegated Committee of the Government for Economic Affairs, in which the Junior Minister for European Affairs takes part.39 At this stage of the EU-related decision-making process, coherence in the Spanish stance is crucial and the necessary coordination role can be performed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs himself – if the issue has reached the Council of Ministers – or, more usually, through close consultations with the well-informed Spanish permanent representative in Brussels. However, given the sector-driven character of the EU Council, the lack of coordination in the previous stages often means that ‘the ultimate decision on the Spanish stance concerning an issue that can affect several departments is going to be made by the person responsible for the sectoral Council in which the issue is decided.’40 Nevertheless, in cases where a politicised issue affects several ministries and disagreements between ministers persist, the matter can be taken to the EU Council for General Affairs, in which the horizontal view of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs finally prevails. The ultimate appeal to the European Council comprising the heads of state and of government, and therefore including the Spanish prime minister, is another means of reaching a final decision. Coordination in the intergovernmental pillars In the ‘EC pillar’ two Directorates-General belonging to the Secretariat of State and the interministerial committees already discussed are the bodies in which the viewpoint of the Spanish government takes shape. In the CFSP and JHA areas, the domestic structures and procedures for decision-making and coordination vary. This is due to a lower degree of integration in these sectors and to the different functioning of European institutions when dealing with them. This translates into a reduced leadership role for the European Commission and the existence, in competition with the COREPER, of special

Ignacio Molina and Fernando Rodrigo 231

preparation committees for the EU Council, which substitute the numerous committees and working groups that are characteristic of the EC pillar. In principle, there is no need for intergovernmental coordination, although the degree of power of the ACs in these sectors is growing – as shown by the creation of regional police forces – and there are no formal channels for interministerial coordination. Therefore, the MAE leads in both policy areas. This may seem contradictory in the JHA field, considering the existence of ministries for Justice and Home Affairs. Obviously, in practice, their interests are taken into account because their respective ministers are the final representatives in the EU Councils and, moreover, the implementation of what is being decided at the European level falls under their competence. However, it is surprising that even when Justice and Home Affairs shared the same ministry (1994–96), the Spanish stance was developed in the Directorate-General for Consular Affairs,41 which was located in the MAE’s Under-Secretariat. This is another aspect that requires our attention, because if the idea was to bring the three pillars of the EU together in the same department, ‘it is surprising that the third pillar of the EU Treaty is coordinated through another body within the Ministry’ – other than the Secretariats of State for European Affairs and Foreign Affairs, even when both secretariats were united (1996–2000).42 In any case, albeit in a rather unstructured way, the MAE has a monopoly, at least in formal terms, on the relations between Spain and Brussels. Since 2000, the Directorate-General is called ‘Consular Affairs and Protection of Spaniards Abroad’ and represents Spain in the K4 Committee that prepares the Councils of the EU regarding these subjects. Within this DirectorateGeneral, which is also in charge of issues that are not connected with the EU, there is a Sub-directorate-General that was created in 1996, and is solely responsible for the coordination of these issues in the EU institutions and in the framework of the Schengen agreement.43 The CFSP is also coordinated within the MAE. Since 1987 there has been a Directorate-General for Foreign Affairs, which had initially the status of a Sub-directorate-General, under the responsibility of a political director who represented Spain in the Political Committee that prepared for the Councils of what was then known as European Political Cooperation. As has been said, in 1996 this unit merged with the former Secretariat of State for the EC/EU, but Spanish decision-making as regards the CFSP did not change substantially and now belongs once again to a separate Secretariat of State for Foreign Affairs. It still relies on the political director and on a Sub-directorateGeneral that is in charge of preparing and monitoring the meetings of the Political Committee and the Council of the EU concerning CFSP-related issues. Similarly, this Directorate-General participates in the network of correspondents which is in permanent contact with the foreign offices of all member states.

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Conclusions The extraordinary changes that have taken place in Spain’s international stance over the last two decades of the twentieth century have gone hand in hand with significant alterations in the domestic processes through which foreign policy evolves.44 From a situation in which a small and poorly equipped MAE was capable of monopolising the relatively few diplomatic interactions that took place during the Francoist dictatorship, the ministry is now placed in a much more complex situation. The accession of democratic Spain to nearly all European and worldwide forums has been accompanied by the emergence of new players that erode the traditional role of the MAE which the ministry still, somewhat naively, proclaims. Confronted by the power of its competitors outside the government (ACs and wellorganised interest groups with a foreign orientation) or even inside it (the Presidency of the Government, the Ministries for Economic Affairs and Finance), the MAE has not always been able to impose its views. Poorly endowed, with a low budget, a reduced staff and not much political weight, this ministry has little chance of keeping its traditional leadership as the sole gatekeeper between the domestic sphere and the outside world.45 However, although this is true, it does not necessarily imply a loss of relevance for the MAE. Certainly, the current situation is more complex but it is also true that the MAE’s role must not be analysed in terms of a zero-sum game. Unlike its European counterparts, the MAE did not find any threats which needed to be countered, only possibilities for growth. Secondly, certain elements of continuity have been beneficial to the Ministry, such as the high esteem in which diplomats are held among the civil service élite and the opportunity of making the Ministry heard through the numerous senior officials from the diplomatic service who work in other ministries. Thirdly, its strategic response has consisted in taking advantage of the changes which have occurred globally and in national political systems to become progressively both the coordinator and the referee for other ministries and territorial jurisdictions which lack its international expertise. This is most obvious in the framework of European integration, in which the MAE, despite its limitations, has made good use of its knowledge about the way things work in Brussels to enhance its influence in the PermRep, the COREPER and the EU Council for General Affairs. Finally, the MAE’s role is strengthened through new frameworks for international action in which public activity was non-existent, such as international development aid or Spanish cultural promotion. Globalisation and European integration cannot cease to be a challenge for the future, because although they do not entail a loss of or increase in power they are going to change the MAE’s traditional role into that of a transboundary facilitator. With this new function, the MAE will have to progressively give up the exclusive management of all foreign policy that is considered to be high politics. However, the MAE could in exchange have access to general

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areas of low politics – which previously did not have a foreign-policy dimension, acting as a player that provides information or has a refereeing capacity in complex, overlapping networks at several territorial levels (multilevel policy making). It is a coordination role in a pluralistic policy environment in which the MAE has to deal increasingly with non-governmental players such as development NGOs, and with the rest of the Spanish administration – which is both vertically and horizontally fragmented. This erodes the ability to develop national standpoints and makes it difficult to maintain coherence in the face of competing departmental interests. The success of this change of roles and aims will depend to a great extent on the ability to maintain coherence in both the substantive and operational aspects of foreign policy. The first aspect will depend on the degree of party politicisation of diplomatic priorities, and on the permanence or rejection of the strategies that have been designed by the MAE. Except for some occasional disagreements and a certain and unavoidable politicisation of EU-related affairs, it seems that the consensus over matters of state will prevail. As for the operational dimension, which has been studied in greater detail in this chapter, the first challenge for the MAE is to improve the capabilities and number of its staff. Second, there is a pressing need to design a foreign service focused on trade promotion which the MAE appears to have taken seriously since 2000. Despite improvements to the internal structure of the ministry, jurisdictional frictions persist, making a third priority the achievement of a more coherent ministerial organisation – especially regarding the coordination role in EU policy making. Finally, there is the challenge of reaching an optimal state of harmony with the two major executive powers (the Presidency of the Government and the Ministry for Economic Affairs and Finance), so that it can obtain more political and economic resources without being neglected by them in bodies such as the Delegated Committee of the Government for Economic Affairs (regarding EU policy making), or the new, ‘presidential’ Government Committee for Foreign Policy (regarding international affairs more generally). Undoubtedly, obtaining more resources and influence is one of the aims of the MAE, as with any bureaucratic agency. Moreover, the MAE’s eagerness for an enhanced presence in the foreign arena is reasonable because it has lost economic and staff resources, due to post-Maastricht austerity, precisely when its expansion was at its peak. Nonetheless, the analysis must not be too focused on these quantitative aspects because, important as they are, they cannot show the MAE’s real situation within the government. Obviously, it is not a high-spending ministry but a department whose activities are discharged (alongside other intangible assets), through its staff, its participation in international organisations and its cooperation in development or in peacekeeping operations. Finally, its political weight depends on the significance that political parties assign to this portfolio, which reflects in turn the interest that citizens place in foreign affairs.

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Notes 1. This chapter draws in part on research undertaken into change in Spanish foreign policy, funded by the Spanish CICYT (SEC99-0383). The authors benefited from the advice and criticism of Inmaculada Marrero (University of Granada), Rocío Valdivielso (UNED) and José de Carvajal (Ministry for Foreign Affairs). 2. Ch. T. Powell, ‘Cambio de régimen y política exterior: España, 1975–1989’ (Regime change and foreign policy: Spain, 1975–1989). In Tusell, J. et al. (eds) La política exterior de España en el siglo XX (Spain’s foreign policy during the 20th century) (Madrid: UNED, 2000), p. 448. 3. A. Dastis, ‘La administración española ante la Unión Europea’ (Spain’s administration before the European Union), Revista de Estudios Políticos, 90 (1995), p. 331; MAP, ‘La necesaria y continua adaptación de la administración española al proceso de integración europea’ (la consolidación de un nuevo marco de actuación) (The essential and constant adaptation of the Spanish administration to the process of European integration (the consolidation of a new framework for action) ), in Contribución al análisis de la Administración General del Estado: Ideas para un plan estratégico (Contribution to the analysis of the State’s General Administration: ideas for a strategic plan), (Madrid: Ministerio para las Administraciones Públicas, 1997), p. 167. 4. R. Cotarelo, ‘La política exterior de España’ (Spain’s foreign policy), in P. Román (ed.) Sistema Político Español (Spanish political system) (Madrid: McGraw-Hill, 1995). 5. In the case of Trade (which alternately has been a division within the Ministry for Economic Affairs and Finance and a Ministry in its own right), the friction with the Foreign Office has been particularly relevant. The reason for the disagreements, which in many cases result in a physical separation of Spanish embassies and offices of trade attachés abroad, has a bureaucratic component caused by the traditional rivalry between diplomatic services and official business experts. These business experts have worked through semi-autonomous institutions, whose sole function was to promote Spanish exports, and have asserted their vertical appointment by refusing to be hierarchically coordinated by the ambassadors. See A. Moreno Juste, ‘La administración exterior en la transición de la política exterior española (1975–1986)’ (The foreign policy administration during the transition of Spanish foreign policy (1975–1986) ). In A. Soto et al. (eds), Historia de la transición y consolidación democrática en Espana (Volumen II) (The history of Spain’s democratic transition and consolidation), (Madrid: UNED and UAM, 1995), pp. 239–40. 6. J. I. Torreblanca, ‘Overlapping Games and Cross-Cutting Coalitions in the European Union’, West European Politics, 21(2) (1998), 134–53. 7. C. Arenal, La política exterior de España hacia Iberoamérica (Spain’s foreign policy towards Latin America) (Madrid: Editorial Complutense, 1994), p. 97, note 73. 8. J. Roldán, Las relaciones exteriores de España (The foreign relations of Spain) (Madrid: Dykinson, 2001), p. 29. 9. Powell, op. cit., p. 450. 10. R. Mesa, ‘El proceso de toma de decisiones en política exterior’ (The decisionmaking process in foreign policy), Documentación Administrativa, 205 (1985) 143–63, p. 158. 11. Roldán, op. cit., p. 27. 12. Royal Decree of 21 July 2000. 13. A Delegated Committee of the Government for Foreign Policy had existed since 1979 but had not been institutionalised. The new cabinet committee is weakly

Ignacio Molina and Fernando Rodrigo 235

14. 15. 16. 17.

18.

19. 20. 21. 22.

23.

24.

25. 26.

institutionalised also. It met only twice during its first year, to approve a general strategic plan for external affairs and a programme to promote Spanish relations with East Asian and Pacific countries. Despite the seeming importance of both agreements, they have not resulted in a real budgetary increase to implement them. Moreno Juste, op. cit., p. 247. Powell, op. cit., p. 452; and Roldán, op. cit., p. 29. Moreno Juste, op. cit., pp. 247–9. Notwithstanding this absence of a strategic or proactive tradition in Spanish administration, the government launched an advisory committee on the EU’s future (Consejo para el Debate sobre el Futuro de la UE) in 2001. It is not composed of officials, but of eleven ‘wise men’ who have held important political and institutional positions in the past. With regard to general foreign policy, the MAE and the premiership seem willing to promote the creation of a research institute or a cellule de prospective, which might analyse international affairs and give advice to the executive on issues of world politics. L. Yáñez-Barnuevo, ‘La participación de España en la cooperación internacional para el desarrollo’ (Spain’s participation in international co-operation for development), Documentación Administrativa 227 (1991) 17–40, p. 17; F. Valenzuela, ‘La Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional. Una experiencia de gestión’ (The Spanish Agency for International Cooperation. A management experience), Documentación Administrativa 227 (1991), 41–57, p. 41. R. L. Rosenberg, Spain and Central America. Democracy and Foreign Policy (New York: Greenwood Press, 1992), p. 149. Roldán, op. cit., p. 28. Yáñez-Barnuevo, op. cit., p. 19. J. A. Gimeno, ‘El Instituto Cervantes: el diseño de un nuevo ente’ (The Cervantes Institute: the design of a new entity), Documentación Administrativa 227 (1991) 127–140. In particular, this is so if we take into account that cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs was never conducted from there but by the Under-Secretariat, which refutes the justification of bringing together the three EU pillars in the same unit. For many years, the Spanish MAE has been divided into two macro secretariats with specialised orientations: European Affairs and SECIPI for Latin America. However, neither the former monopolised Spanish EU policy-making nor the latter monopolised relations between Spain and Latin America. Since the reform of 2000 this problem has been ameliorated since the units in charge of bilateral relations with Latin American or European countries are now in the specialised secretariats. However, as previously mentioned, the Under-Secretariat deals with the logistic dimension of the foreign service while the SECIPI coordinates the specialised international relations of Spain. Therefore, depending on the nature (political, economic or regarding developmental cooperation) of a bilateral issue between Spain and a foreign country, the responsible administrative unit within the MAE may change. At the same time, the management of that bilateral issue must respect the guidelines decided by the MAE’s units dealing with functional and multilateral issues (military, economic or scientific and cultural), which, moreover, have to be coordinated with vertical ministries (Defence, Treasury-Trade, Agriculture and Fisheries, or Education and Culture). Rosenberg, op. cit., p. 150. See note 23 above.

236 Foreign Ministries in the European Union 27. The data presented here have been drawn from different sources: Valdivielso (1996), El País Yearbook (several years), bulletins of the Central Registry of Personnel (MAP), and the MAE web site: http://www.mae.es 28. The problems with Spanish development cooperation lie not only with the lack of funds, but also with its ‘quality’: so-called FAD credits (Funds for Aid to Development) are managed by the Ministry of Trade rather than by the MAE. Nevertheless, the AECI is the MAE’s agency that has increased most visibly its budgetary allocations during the last years. Thus, in contrast to an average ministerial growth of 2.5 per cent, the earmarked sums for the Spanish Agency for International Cooperation increased 37 per cent in 1997. 29. However, only five among the 18 foreign ministers over the last 60 years belonged to the diplomatic corps, and only for four months during the last 15 years has a career diplomat has run the MAE. 30. Powell, op. cit., pp. 452–3. 31. For a more detailed discussion, see I. Molina, ‘Spain’, In: Kassim, H., Peters, G. and Wright, V. (eds), The Co-ordination of EU Policy Making: The Domestic Level (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 32. Royal Decree of 28 August 1985. 33. It became a refereeing ministry, provided with the authority that was conferred by presidential trust to withdraw the general interest from the traditional sectoral departments and to be the only negotiator as was requested by the European Commission (R. Bassols, España en Europa. Historia de la adhesion a la CE 1957–85 (Spain in Europe: The History of its accession to the EC 1957–85) (Madrid: Política Exterior, 1995), p. 204). 34. Bassols, op. cit., p. 28. Although it was presided over by the minister responsible for economic affairs, the committee was later integrated into the Foreign Office. This was the starting point of the uninterrupted leadership of the Spanish diplomacy over civil servants in the Ministries for Trade or Finance as regards the coordination of EC matters. According to Bassols, this had the advantage of endowing Spain’s policy towards integration with greater Europeanism and with a generalist view on the conservatism and euroscepticism of other departments and, in particular, of Trade (ibid., p. 47). 35. J. Salas, and A. Betancor, ‘La incidencia organizativa de la integración europea en la administración española’ (The organisational influence of European integration in the Spanish administration), Revista de Administración Pública, 125 (1991), p. 500, note 4. 36. Dastis, op. cit., p. 325. 37. Ibid., p. 331. 38. Ibid., p. 332. 39. However, the lower status of this junior minister, in comparison to that of other ministers who are also present, makes his/her coordination task more difficult (E. Zapico Goñi, ‘La adaptación de la administración española a la Unión Europea: un proceso de evolución y aprendizaje permanente’ (The adaptation of the Spanish administration to the European Union: a constant evolution and learning process), Gestión y Análisis de Políticas Públicas, 4 (1995), p. 55). As regards non-economic issues, the junior minister for European Affairs does not even participate in the Government Committee for Foreign Policy, although it seems that this new cabinet committee will intervene seldom in the domestic EU policymaking process. 40. Dastis, op. cit., p. 339.

Ignacio Molina and Fernando Rodrigo 237 41. According to Dastis, this may be due to the different approaches adopted by the then two Secretariats of State, Justice and Home Affairs, as regards the subjects discussed in the third pillar (ibid., p. 338). 42. MAP, op. cit., p. 164. 43. See Article 17.3.3 in the Royal Decree 1881/1996 on 2 August. 44. F. Rodrigo, ‘Análisis empírico de la política exterior española: formulación, ejecución y resultado’ (Empirical analysis of the Spanish foreign policy: elaboration, implementation and outputs), Mimeo (1999). 45. Interestingly, six months before the third Spanish presidency of the EU (2002), Spain’s two main national newspapers achieved a rare consensus in warning about the lack of political relevance and insufficient resources of the MAE (see ‘El ocaso de Exteriores’ (The twilight of the Foreign Ministry), El Pais, 27 May 2001, and ‘Menos diplomáticos que en 1975’ (Less diplomats than in 1975), El Mundo, 18 June 2001).

14 Sweden Magnus Ekengren and Bengt Sundelius*

In this chapter the experiences of the Swedish Foreign Ministry in dealing with the administrative and political-strategic changes resulting from its new and formalised West European involvement will be analysed. The Ministry’s adaptations of institutions, policies and strategies undertaken in the face of the revitalised European integration phase of the late 1980s and early 1990s will be briefly outlined. Secondly, the demands of the full membership from 1 January 1995 on material and human resources for coordination at home, and on participation in myriad intensive European collaboration networks across multiple sectors will be traced. Constitutional issues, administrative structures, policy processes, the prevailing logic of appropriate procedures and foreign policy strategies have been greatly affected by the new and demanding requirements of EU membership.

The Foreign Ministry facing a revitalised interest in European integration The political background The Swedish neutrality doctrine worked both as a restriction on formalised international engagements and as a domestic policy coordination device. As a committed neutral in the Cold War period, Sweden distanced itself from the West European integration process and exercised close control over all foreign entanglements of a security nature. One vital aspect of this policy was the ability to remain neutral under severe pressure. Swedish involvement with other states or commitment to international organisations were carefully assessed with regard to the implications for the credibility of Swedish neutrality.1 The issue which, during the late 1980s, stirred national debate the most on the meaning and implications of neutrality was European integration. The prospect of being left outside the united West European market after * The authors are grateful to Camilla Norström, Research Assistant at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm. 238

Magnus Ekengren and Bengt Sundelius 239

1992 became an unacceptable vision for most political groups and business leaders. The image of turning into a small, marginalised nation on the northern fringe of a dynamic European continent haunted the domestic scene as the Delors Internal Market target of 1992 approached.2 Nevertheless, the Swedish government declared repeatedly during 1989–90 that it was not seeking membership in the Community. Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson stated in May 1990 that ‘concern for the credibility of our policy of neutrality is the reason why we are not applying for EC membership’.3 In contrast to this authoritative statement, the Swedish government’s position on the issue of adaptation to and involvement in European integration processes evidenced a clear momentum. This relatively speedy departure from the traditional dogma that credible neutrality would be incompatible with membership was made possible through an increasingly positive interpretation of the European security setting. In early December 1990, a parliamentary resolution stated that membership with retained neutrality was in the Swedish national interest. An application was formally submitted by Ingvar Carlsson to the Head of the EC Council of Ministers in The Hague on 1 July.4 Following the September 1991 Social Democratic election defeat, the Conservative party leader Carl Bildt assumed the position of Prime Minister. In his October 1991 cabinet declaration to the new Parliament, he reaffirmed Swedish intent to seek membership of the EC. The transition from an image of Sweden as the committed neutral to a committed European began well ahead of the beginning of the membership negotiations, at least at the top levels of the government. The traditionally important word ‘neutrality’ was erased from official speeches even before Sweden became officially a party to the Maastricht Treaty and to its second pillar. The change of terminology can be seen as a response to the sceptical view of this policy held by the Commission, as expressed in its July 1992 pre-negotiation review statement.5 Later political developments have clearly indicated, however, that the attitude of the Swedish public has not followed the early lead of the government in this fundamental identity shift.6

The ‘stepchild’ institutional relationship For Sweden, the forward-looking governmental bill of 1987 on the new dynamics of West European integration7 and the initiation of the negotiations for a European Economic Area (EEA) in 1989 formed the first phase of the institutional adaptation of central governmental structures. Sweden launched a number of administrative reforms. Over twenty permanent working groups covering different policy sectors were established to undertake a massive adjustment of national laws and directives to conform with the ensuing harmonisation effort inside the EC. This adaptation machinery was comprehensive across policy sectors and unified under the direction of a cabinet level committee chaired by the Prime Minister. A council of

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representatives for various corporate interests was also attached to this new structure. A high-ranking official inside the trade division of the Foreign Ministry was appointed to spearhead this highly exceptional coordination and adaptation process. Ambassador Ulf Dinkelspiel later also became Chief Negotiator in the membership dealings and subsequently Minister for European Affairs during the conservative-dominated Bildt cabinet. At his disposal was placed a new unit for European integration coordination with far-reaching authority. This administrative reform implied a new centralisation of the public administration’s relations with the Community: the Foreign Ministry aspired to control the contacts of the other branches of government with the EC by means of ‘co-participation’ in a growing number of meetings.8 The Foreign Ministry trade department was at an early stage given the overarching EC coordination responsibility within the Swedish government. The department also conducted bilateral trade relations with EC partners. During the EEA negotiations, the political department of the Foreign Ministry was not directly involved in the comprehensive process of adjusting national policy and procedures to conform with EC standards. A special working group for foreign and security policy was appointed under the head of the political department, but this committee was not very prominent. Similarly, the Ministry of Defence did not take part in this adjustment process. There was a clear administrative and judicial drive underway before the 1991 application to become fully integrated into the proposed European Single Market. However, the question of how to secure some influence on EC decision-making concerning the rules for this internal market was left ambiguous until the final phases of the negotiations in 1991. The constitutional proposal of 1994 represented the high point of a series of pre-membership strategic adjustments to the EC. The ambition behind this comprehensive adjustment drive was that Sweden would become a more fully integrated state even before entry than many members had achieved after years inside the Community. The Swedish government aspired to belong to the inner core, together with Germany, France and Holland, and would not accept a position as one of the many peripheral members. The image of a European Munsterknabe in the making could facilitate positive results in the ensuing negotiations, it was also argued. Others saw this accommodating style as demeaning to the national heritage and qualitatively distinct from the traditionally less progressive countries of the European continent.

Foreign Ministry adaptation to membership The primacy of coordination In many ways, the initial years of membership were devoted to keeping Sweden’s head above the steadily rising EU water level. At the same time

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however, some new thinking was articulated inside the relevant ministries on how to improve the administrative and technical capacity for a more proactive and potentially influential posture in prioritised policy areas. After all, a primary argument for membership had been that only through that formal step could Sweden move beyond a series of national adjustments to Brussels towards having a real impact upon EC policy in the making. The reorganisation of the foreign ministry (FM) was done in two stages. The first stage divided the departments into geographical and functional units. The second stage introduced an order-delivery-model in the administrative department, which consisted of a Planning unit and a unit for staff and administration. The new organisation of the FM is characterised by an increasing number of tasks, which makes priority-setting and preparations for the annual work cycle considerably more important. The FM of today is more of a flat and modern organisation than earlier. Due directly to EU membership, the FM responded to change by forming an EU-Coordination Secretariat, an EU-Correspondence unit under the Director-General for political affairs where CFSP related matters are coordinated, a department for European Integration, a department for European Security Policy and a Legal Secretariat for EU-related questions. Within the FM the position of State Secretary for EU-matters was also established. The preparation of EU issues prior to membership always included the Office of the Prime Minister, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Finance. In the new membership situation with a vast array of questions to cover, the domestic ministers have direct responsibility for their respective areas. Calls for central coordination for the sake of a unified external posture soon returned to the forefront of the political and technocratic debate over how best to maximise national influence in the competitive European decision-making arena. Advocates of central coordination noted its value in forging a strong negotiation position in intergovernmental bargainings. National coordination of prioritised policy positions is presented as a substitute for material resources and political weight for a small but ambitious member state. No doubt, the balance struck between central coordination and sector-based autonomy will vary among policy areas and between issues of higher or lower domestic political salience.9 Significant differences are already noticeable between the workings of the Internal Market areas and the interactions within the second pillar. In 1999, the EU-coordination machinery was reorganised. The position of State Secretary for EU-matters in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs was replaced by a State Secretary with the responsibility both for EU-questions and international questions generally in the Office of the Prime Minister. The task of the new State Secretary and his staff is to resolve conflicts between ministries, to coordinate EU-issues of particular political salience, to coordinate the preparation of the meetings with the European Council, to lead the strategic thinking of the government on the long-term development of the Union,

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and to lead and coordinate the Swedish EU presidency in the spring of 2001. The activities falling under this State Secretary are in the FM, now led by a high-ranking civil servant. Moreover, the EU-Coordination Secretariat and the Department for European Integration at the FM have been merged into a new department for the European Union. It is still too early to draw any more far-reaching conclusions about the implications of this latest reorganisation. It will probably mean a weakening of the role of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in determining cross-ministerial political priorities in the Swedish EU work. However, the relatively small staff of the new State Secretary in the Prime Minister’s office (only seven officials have initially been recruited) and the size, competence and central position of the FM, both in the internal machinery and in the Council of Ministers, will most likely imply that the very influential role of this Ministry is maintained, not least in the running of everyday EU matters. The considerable resources that are needed for coordination of Swedish positions in, for example, the EU enlargement and long-term budget negotiations, can in practice only be provided by the FM, being the core of the government-wide web for national EU coordination. The reorganisation could be interpreted as a step towards a more balanced administrative relationship between the FM, the Ministry of Finance and the Office of the Prime Minister, which earlier had to rely almost entirely on FM resources and material. The main body for Swedish coordination of EU relations and policy positions is the Coordination group for EU-relations (EU-beredningen). This permanent committee is, since the autumn of 2000, composed of all the State Secretaries of the Government Offices. The role of the sector level coordinating group, chaired not by the special State Secretary for EU and international matters but by the State Secretary of the Prime Minister, is to settle questions that have not been resolved by the civil servants. In addition, a coordinating group for the current EU business called Fredagsgruppen meets every Friday. The group includes high-ranking civil servants of the Office of the Prime Minister, the FM and the Ministry of Finance and the Swedish EU ambassador. The department for the European Union at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs is the link between the Swedish Permanent Representation in Brussels and the various ministries. It has the responsibility for ensuring that Swedish positions are prepared for all items on the agendas prepared by the EU presidency, and for finalising and transmitting official instructions to the representatives in Coreper and in Council meetings. The final collection of official instructions to Brussels is made at the weekly meeting of the committee of EU coordinators of each ministry, chaired by the head of the division of the new EU department that corresponds to the former pivotal EU-Secretariat. Moreover, this department has the responsibility for giving guidelines for relations between the ministries and the Swedish parliament, in particular the dialogue with its advisory committee on EU affairs.

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The Advisory Committee for European Union Affairs has been established for briefings by the ministers prior to their meetings of the Council of Ministers. This procedure of regular consultation outside the cabinet prior to any major policy initiative accords with the Swedish tradition of building consensus around foreign relations. The Foreign Ministry can still claim exclusive authority in forging a nationally unified position in the area of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). However, to achieve even that more limited coordination end, significant reorganisations were made inside the ministry. Basically, the functionally defined, bilateral departments have been rearranged into a desk system with geographical jurisdictions. The objective was to bring together more effectively the often competing aspects of political relations, commercial and legal matters, and the global development assistance profile. There are now specific units for Africa, America, Western and Eastern Europe, etc. Apart from the minister for foreign affairs, there are two deputy ministers for foreign affairs with special responsibility for trade, development assistance policy and migration policy respectively. The reorganisation of the FM in 1996 was the greatest reorganisation of the FM since 1858. The upgrading as early as August 1995 of the position of the small CFSP coordination unit was a direct result of the experiences of the first half-year of membership. The fact that almost every unit in the Foreign Ministry is affected by CFSP was not realised until one worked inside this network. Initially, this small unit was part of the West European division. The necessary coordination was quickly recognised as being better realised if the unit worked directly under the head of the then Political Department, who participated in the political committee of CFSP. This closeness would give it a better position to pursue the global CFSP responsibility across the jurisdiction of other ministry units. Relations with the CFSP Secretariat and the Commission (DGIA) are coordinated by the Foreign Ministry’s EUcorrespondent. The Commission’s DGIA is not considered to have had any significant impact on the organisation and working procedures of the ministry. Swedish local EU cooperation in third countries has become more intensive. Although the degree of cooperation of course varies from region to region, Swedish officials participate in regular EU meetings in third countries all over the world in order to avoid overlapping contributions with EU partners. The institutional adjustments inside the Ministry for Foreign Affairs aptly reflects the Swedish adaptation process of the first years of membership. Earlier, the EU was seen as only an ‘extra’ question, which could be added to the organisational chart. Quickly, EU coordination concerns became an overarching priority for the ministry as a whole. Contrary to what could be expected, it was within the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and not in the domestic ministries, that one found the greatest surprise over the scope and scale of the changes required after membership. The EU was not merely

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another international organisation, as the often traditionally trained diplomats had to learn quickly through practical experience.10 Changed logic of appropriate procedures The short time spans between EU meetings have challenged the Swedish logic of appropriate procedure. The rapid pace of decision-making in the Council has created difficulties for the strong Swedish tradition of securing wide support for every decision, both within and outside the administration. There is simply less time for officials to anchor at home Swedish actions in the EU.11 One consequence of the high-speed decision race, giving less time for consulting Stockholm, is that officials have been forced to act more independently and on mandates defined in advance. The short time for preparation has been particularly acute in budgetary questions. Many officials have complained about the short notice given to attend meetings, despite the fact that the rule for Council working groups is 48 hours.12 The division of labour between national ministries can no longer be taken for granted, it has to be continuously supervised by means of centralised ‘coordination’ and the spontaneous growth of new normative guidelines. The Union’s impact on traditional ‘tacit’ divisions of subject areas seems to have created new potential coordination issues between ministries: The world was very nicely divided before entering into the EU. Not anymore, because all questions affect each other so we have seen many cases where the desk officer for a certain country at the political, but also here at the trade department, are involved in making instructions. But it is a bit impractical. Swedish EU Coordination Secretariat13 The fact that ministries are not completely aware of each other’s activities, which was not perceived as a problem before EU membership, has, due to the risk of overlapping work in European governance, become an issue which has to be resolved. To what extent is there a fundamentally new situation for national coordination? The new situation is basically due to the fact that ‘we do not control the timetable anymore’, as officials put it. The challenges to national procedures are not only related to harmonising the substance of issues, but also concerns ‘when’ questions. Timetables are seen as more important and constraining as they are outside national control. In the EU, different Swedish departments and ministries follow different timetables for decision-making. Consequently, they all need to formulate standpoints separately in relation to the deadlines of these ‘external’ time disciplines. The temporal Europeanisation of a national government is uneven. This is one of the main underlying reasons why nationally homogeneous actions toward certain policy lines of all ministries have to be upheld by such an active and explicit coordination.

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The role of the Swedish EU coordinator inside the FM sheds further light on the need for very active national coordination due to externally imposed timetables. His is the role of the creator and upholder of those coherent national positions, which are the prerequisites for the image of national homogeneity. The importance and significance of this strongly inward-looking task is underlined by the limited extent to which this official is in contact with other member states. There is no time ‘to wait until every differing view has been settled’ for a homogeneous national action. This is the main reason why the active interference of the EU department is needed. There is simply not enough time, no ‘national interval’, for forging a tacit achievement of complete confidence in autonomous simultaneous national activity. The result is that the traditional sequence of governmental actions is now broken up in the name of ‘coordination’ in all phases. Which problems do you face when coordinating Sweden’s policies? Firstly, I mentioned the timetable of course. One cannot just leave things; one has to know at an early stage what is going on. One has to insert comments from other ministries and from other parts of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Swedish Foreign Ministry: European Correspondent in CFSP14 A fundamentally new situation for Swedish foreign policy-making procedures has been created due to the fact that matters cannot be ignored. There is no longer any ‘automatic’ autonomous national procedural logic. Time is always ‘filled’ with considerations. The concrete outcome is a strong emphasis on national coordinating actions in everyday administrative work. National activities are strongly seen as taking place simultaneously in separate fora. The question is how to synchronise national actions when there is no time between the conclusions of negotiations in the relevant committees. It is no longer sufficient to work out a position in one forum, but to present positions in several fora at the same time and to coordinate them. Swedish Foreign Ministry: OSCE Department15 Even within the confines of the CFSP, the splitting up of national diplomats into working groups means that they continually work on different timetables, or simply working group meeting schedules. The complexity of various timetables, each of which is monitored mainly by the official participating in the particular working group, prepares the ground for the common national foreign policy calendar. Running on different and parallel timetables makes it more difficult to order national preparations into an initial fixing of a national position, followed by a presentation to the outside world. Fraser has argued that ‘the width of the social present is determined by the time necessary to make people take concerted action’.16 In the European

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Union, the national present is, if not disappearing, seriously squeezed in between narrow time slots of demands for quick action. The breaking up of this national ‘linear causality’ is visible in the changed conditions for prediction. New styles of anticipation activities have been created as a result of national planning and CFSP deliberations increasingly taking place in parallel. This simultaneity is in turn made possible by the instant information transmission between the levels. The division of ministerial activities on various EU working groups has given birth to a new technique of prediction of European/international events. Due to time constraints, an increasing number of issues have to be decided at lower ministerial levels. Within each area we hold internal ‘loose threads’ meetings where we try to predict various up-coming issues in one context. Thereafter, the official has to try to act in this ‘spirit.’ Swedish Foreign Ministry: OSCE Department17 Time constraints call for a new style of prediction. With new tools, such as the ‘loose threads’ thinking, national officials are trying to create the feeling that their parallel ‘national’ activities in various EU organs are knit together into a fabric preserving the possibility of synchronised, homogenous ‘Swedish initiatives’ and ‘actions’ in all fora. In a national perspective, succession and duration in European governance is replaced by ‘simultaneity’ and ‘instantaneity’. Due to the number of fora and working groups, and the extent of simultaneous meetings, national positions are to a larger extent than before in a constant formation process. This process, at least for a smaller EU member state as Sweden, can be described as if the national present in officials’ everyday life is to an increasing extent overshadowed or ‘crowded out’ by the European one. The fact that the common EU present in this way is imposed and enforced by the necessity to participate in the given moment of decision, alters the character of traditional ministerial work. EU deadlines are spread deeply into Swedish bureaucracy, forming a discourse of advanced systems of time disciplinary norms and rules. It seems as if the very pace of decision-making is gaining ground in determining the final policy result, at the cost of more substantial factors.18 This phenomena might be an expression of a generally observed trend that space is replaced by pace as the major determinant in international relations.19

Foreign Ministry: gatekeeper or sidelined? At the strategic level, the Swedish neutrality dogma traditionally served as a unifying element of a fairly effective coordination mechanism aimed at defining the parameters for permissible external engagements. The members of the foreign relations community of the state learned through informal socialisation procedures where these outer boundaries were drawn. When in doubt, they could informally consult the political department of the Ministry

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for Foreign Affairs. One of the most significant consequences of abandoning the neutrality doctrine as a guiding dogma for Swedish security policy has been the erosion of this core of the domestic decision regime for foreign policy. The rationale for the normatively privileged position of the traditional diplomat was then also undermined. Considering this loss of domestic legitimacy after the end of the Cold War, it is not surprising that the Foreign Ministry, as an institution in search of a politically central position, has become a strong advocate of the necessity of central coordination of external relations as a means toward enhancing Swedish influence in the EU. It is argued that effective membership requires such a centralising process, unless the national leadership is willing to accept a segmentation of the state into sector-defined and autonomously pursued interactions with Brussels-based networks. The emerging new dogma justifying EU coordination and counteracting Swedish difficulties in adapting effectively to the EU negotiation culture has been characterised with the term ‘common outlook’ (samsyn). The rationale behind this unifying concept is that formalised and regularised central coordination is very difficult in the EU context. The aim of national coordination should instead be to form ‘common outlooks’ that can guide Swedish representatives in the complex and decentralised European policy-making processes. A serious strategic management dilemma is being faced in Stockholm, as in the other member state capitals: to be able to engage effectively in the multiple policy shaping networks and informal decision fora of the community, experienced and specialised Swedish officials must be free to participate without being hampered by central coordination or control mechanisms. Coordination at the cabinet centre may in fact restrict the ability to gain influence in those vital policy-shaping processes. The objective of maximising Swedish influence in the complex pre- and post-choice phases of European decisionmaking stands against the equally important ambition to gain bargaining leverage in the sometimes critical intergovernmental negotiations in the choice stage. It is hoped that at least the Ministry for Foreign Affairs will be able to speak in Brussels with one voice, even if the Swedish state as a whole is unable to do so. At the same time, the permanent delegation in Brussels has grown to over one hundred persons representing all parts of the government. In the future, one may very well expect coordination problems between this mini-cabinet office and the home-based senior officials in the ministry. A further problem has been the serious staff shortages. Many of the most knowledgeable, mid-level officials were quickly recruited into EU institutions. It will require some rebuilding of staff resources before a sufficient number of qualified officers can fill the growing ranks needed to deal in a competent manner with the fast moving, multifaceted EU agenda. If the Foreign Ministry is unable to keep ahead of the pack of national Eurocrats, other ministries will surely pick up the slack in expertise and experience.

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The institutional arrangements for national EU coordination are still in a formative phase, where ambitious government players can position themselves as future activists or gatekeepers. This concern with central coordination appears to be a pressing issue for all European governments. In fact, the real procedures for conducting international affairs are often quite different from the formal structures. ‘Some charts border on the ludicrous; the Ministry functions despite them.’20

Notes 1. B. Sundelius, ‘Das Primat der Neutralitätspolitik: Building Regimes at Home’, Cooperation and Conflict, 23(4) (1989). 2. C. Hamilton, Europa och Sverige – EG-frågan inför 90-talet (Stockholm: SNS förlag, 1987). 3. Dagens Nyheter, 27 May 1990. 4. See statement to Parliament by the Prime Minister, Invar Carlsson, on Sweden’s application for membership of the European Community (14 June), in Documents on Swedish Foreign Policy 1991. See also the statement by the parliamentary foreign affairs committee on 28 April 1992, ‘Sakerhet och nedrustning. Utrikesutskottets betankande 1991/92:UU19’. 5. Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 5 1992. 6. L. Karvonen and B. Sundelius, ‘The Nordic Neutrals entering the EU’, in Lee Miles (ed.), The North Joining the European Union (London: Routledge, 1996). 7. Proposition 1987/88: 66 ‘Regeringens proposition om Sverige och den vasteuropeiska integrationen’ (Stockholm: Parliament Printing Office). 8. M. Ekengren, ‘Statsforvaltninggens europeisering i tid och rum – En studie av den politiska tidens forandring till foljd av EU-samarbetet’, Research-Report 25, (Stockholm: The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 1996). 9. C. Norstrom, ‘Att tala med en rost i EU – en studie av regeringskansliets samordningsvasende for EU-fragor’, unpublished thesis, Department of Government, Uppsala University, 1997. 10. Interviews with officials of the office of the Prime Minister and Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 1995–98. 11. M. Ekengren, and B. Sundelius, ‘The State Joins the European Union’, in K. Hanf and B. Soetendorp (eds), Adapting to European Integration – Small States and the European Union (Harlow: Addison Wesley Longman, 1997). Ekengren, M. The Time of Europe – On the Temporal Logic of European Governance and how it Affects National Policymakers and Institutions (Manchester University Press, 2001). 12. SOU 1996: 6 ‘Ett ar med EU – Svenska statsjanstemans erfarenheter av arbetet i EU’ (Stockholm: Government Printing Office), p. 65. 13. Authors’ interview (Sw 1) 18/3/96. 14. Authors’ interview (Sw 1) 5/9/95. 15. Authors’ interview (Sw 2) 7/9/95. 16. Quoted in: B. Adam, Timewatch (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), p. 113. 17. Authors’ interview (Sw 2) 7/9/95. 18. M. Ekengren, ‘The Europeanisation of State Administration – Adding the Time Dimension’, Cooperation and Conflict, 31(4) (1996). 19. A. Scott, The Dynamics of Interdependence (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1982).

Magnus Ekengren and Bengt Sundelius 249 20. Z. Steiner, ‘Introduction’, in The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World (London: The Times, 1982), pp. 27–30.

Bibliography Adam, B. Timewatch (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995) Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 5, 1992 Carlsson, I. ‘Statement to the Parliament on Sweden’s application for membership of the European Community’, (14 June), Documents on Swedish Foreign Policy 1991 (Stockholm: Government Printing Office, 1991) Dagens Nyheter, various articles Ekengren, M. ‘Statsförvaltningens europeisering i tid och rum – En studie av den politiska tidens förändring till följd av EU-samarbetet’, Research-Report 25 (Stockholm: The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 1996a) Ekengren, M. ‘The Europeanisation of State Administration – Adding the Time Dimension’, Cooperation and Conflict, 31(4) (1996b) Ekengren, M. The Time of Europe – On the Temporal Logic of European Governance and How It Affects National Policymakers and Institutions (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001) Ekengren, M. and Sundelius, B. ‘The State Joins the European Union’, in Hanf, K. and Soetendorp, B. (eds), Adapting to European Integration – Small States and the European Union (Harlow: Addison Wesley Longman, 1997) Hamilton, C. Europa och Sverige – EG-frågan inför 90-talet (Stockholm: SNS förlag, 1987) Karvonen, L. and Sundelius, B. ‘The Nordic Neutrals entering the EU’, in Miles, Lee (ed.) The North Joining the European Union (London: Routledge, 1996) Norström, C. ‘Att tala med en röst i EU – en studie av regeringskansliets samordningsväsende för EU-frågor’, unpublished thesis, Department of Government, Uppsala University (1997) Proposition 1987/88: 66 ‘Regeringens proposition om Sverige och den västeuropeiska integrationen’ (Stockholm: Parliament Printing Office) Scott, A. The Dynamics of Interdependence (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1982) SOU 1996: 6 ‘Ett år med EU – Svenska statstjänstemäns erfarenheter av arbetet i EU’ (Stockholm: Government Printing Office) Steiner, Z. ‘Introduction’, in The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World, (London: The Times, 1982) Sundelius, B. ‘Das Primat der Neutralitätspolitik: Building Regimes at Home’, Cooperation and Conflict, 23(4) (1989) Sundelius, B. ‘Neutralitet och konfliktfylld interdependens’, in U. Nordlöf-Lagerkranz (ed.) Svensk neutralitet. Europa och EG (Stockholm: Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 1990) Sundelius, B. ‘Changing Course: When Neutral Sweden Chose to Join the European Community’, in Carlsnaes, W. and Smith, S. (eds) European Foreign Policy (London: Sage, 1994) Utrikesutskottets betänkande 1991/92: UU 19 ‘Säkerhet och nedrustning’, 28 April 1992 (Stockholm: Parliament Printing Office) Virilio, P. Speed and Politics (New York: Semiotext(e), 1986)

Interviews Interviews with officials of the office of the Prime Minister and Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 1995–98.

15 The United Kingdom Adapting to the European Union within a transformed world1 David Allen

The current structure and role of the FCO reflects a cumulative adjustment to change over a considerable period of time, although the pace of that change has quickened since Britain became a member of the European Union. In the last decade alone, the FCO has been faced with major international changes – the collapse of communism in Europe, the end of the Cold War international system, the widening and deepening of the European Union and the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia – as well as a major domestic change – the election of a Labour Government in May of 1997, after a prolonged eighteen-year period of successive Conservative administrations. The history and role of the Foreign Office in the making and implementation of British foreign policy has been told in a number of places2 and needs only a brief rehearsal here. The Foreign Service can be traced back to 1479 and the Foreign Office to 1782. Until the mid-1960s the UK chose to handle its imperial and post-imperial relationships separately from its dealings with the rest of the world. The Colonial Office, the India Office, the Dominions Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office have all evolved and merged over time to form the Commonwealth Office and, in 1968, the Foreign Office and the Commonwealth Office themselves merged to form the present FCO. The present Diplomatic Service was established in 1965 amalgamating the Foreign Service, the Commonwealth Service and the Trade Commission Service.3 The administration of British aid has a complex history of semi-detachment from the FCO. Overseas aid was traditionally administered by the Foreign Office but in 1964 the Labour Government created a separate Ministry of Overseas Development headed by a Cabinet minister. Since then Conservative governments (1970–74 and 1979–97) have chosen to handle aid through an Overseas Development Administration (ODA) under the overall control of the FCO, whilst Labour governments (1964–70 and 1974–79) preferred 250

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a separate Ministry. In 1997 the incoming Labour government maintained this pattern by establishing a Department for International Development headed by Claire Short with a seat in the Cabinet. The Foreign Office and now the FCO have always had a central role in the management of Britain’s external policies. This role has been challenged by the relative decline of Britain’s position and role in the international system throughout the twentieth century (most spectacularly since 1945) and by the changing nature of international relations – the shifting agenda, the changing basis of power and influence and the growth of interdependence and of multilateral attempts to manage that interdependence. Despite these trends, which have tended to blur the distinction between foreign and domestic politics and policy, the FCO has managed to retain a central role in the shaping and management of Britain’s external policies. The most significant example of Britain’s involvement in multilateral management is, of course, its membership of the European Union that has both challenged and, in many ways, enhanced the role of the FCO.4 The continued strength of the FCO has, in recent years, played a major part in enabling Britain to ‘punch above its weight’ in the international system in general. Britain has always been a major player within the European Union but it is perhaps only since the election of the Labour government in 1997 that Britain has aspired to a significant ‘leadership’ role. Even before he was elected Mr Blair established a clear link between Britain’s world role and the significance of its EU membership when he argued that the aspiration to be ‘a major global player’ would be forfeit unless we accepted Europe as our base.5 Faced with the contradictory pressures of changing demands and diminishing resources, the FCO has firmly resisted ‘external’ attempts to reform it whilst demonstrating an effective willingness and ability to make the necessary internal adaptations. It is a measure of the FCO’s adaptive ability that the Diplomatic Service has successfully retained its separate and unique status within the British administration and that successive Foreign Secretaries have preserved their senior position within the British Cabinet hierarchy. The position of Foreign Secretary remains one of the most important posts in the British government although the particular importance of the relationship between Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary has been modified in recent years by the growing power of the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the significance of the position of Deputy Prime Minister under both Major and Blair.6

Organisation and agendas The general expansion in the number of states in the international system has challenged the FCO’s determination to preserve Britain’s global power status by retaining a global representation. The FCO managed to do this in response to the proliferation of states as a result of decolonisation in the 1960s and 1970s; the new challenges posed by the emergence of new states

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following the break-up of the Soviet Union and of Yugoslavia in the 1990s have proved more testing and the FCO has struggled to keep up with its major European rivals.7 In 1999 Britain maintained 223 posts in 184 countries (compared with just 136 countries in 1968) whilst Germany maintained 208 posts and France 279 posts.8 In April 1999 the FCO had a total of 5,635 UK-based staff of whom 2,295 were serving overseas (whilst Germany had 3,361 and France 5,669 staff serving overseas)9 although these figures partly reflect a continuing British tradition of, and preference for, employing quite high numbers of local staff in its missions abroad. The rapid expansion of tourism and travel along with an increase in the number of states has increased certain of the demands on overseas posts, whilst the increased ease and speed of both travel and communications has raised contradictory doubts about the purpose of, and need for, overseas posts. These and other issues relating to both change and Britain’s declining resources have meant that the FCO has been the subject of a number of formal inquiries and reviews in recent years. The Plowden,10 Duncan11 and Berrill12 Reports in 1964, 1969 and 1977 respectively all made recommendations which the FCO was inclined to resist, whilst more recently the 1992 Structural Review, the 1995 Fundamental Expenditure Review and the 1996 Senior Management Review were all conducted ‘in house’, albeit with the participation of outside consultants, and produced recommendations that the FCO was more inclined to accept. The latter reviews were partly occasioned by a selfperceived need to rethink certain aspects of the FCO’s work (its staffing policies in the face of demands for racial and sexual equality of opportunity and for more rapid career advancement in a Diplomatic Service that had become ‘top-heavy’ as a result of various administrative reorganisations; its postings policies as more FCO spouses were reluctant to sacrifice their own careers in order to accompany FCO staff abroad, and its staff training and development policies as the demands for functional expertise increased); partly by the need to find further financial savings and partly by the general trend of governmental reform (market testing, financial devolution, delayering performance targeting and analysis, etc.) which has developed in recent years. During Mrs Thatcher’s period in office, the FCO was subjected to a continuous level of criticism by a dominant Prime Minister who became increasingly interested, as all long-serving prime ministers tend to, in playing a major role in foreign affairs.13 Mrs Thatcher’s frustration and problems with the European Union, which she associated with the pro-European leanings of the FCO, led her to contemplate, but in fact never to implement seriously, the possibility of building up Downing Street’s foreign policy capabilities as a counter to the central role of the FCO. In Charles Powell, a career FCO official, who became increasingly politicised during his time at No. 10, Mrs Thatcher had an ambitious and effective Private Secretary for Overseas Affairs who was more than capable of assisting her in her occasional forays against the FCO – his part in the drafting of her attack on the EU and its

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President, Jacques Delors, in a speech made at the College of Europe in 1988 is a case in point.14 Mrs Thatcher also appointed a succession of exambassadors to advise her but, by and large, they were always careful not to undermine their previous employers when briefing her. Under Mrs Thatcher, plans for the establishment of a Foreign Affairs Unit along similar lines to the American National Security Council15 were overtaken by the events that led to her eventual resignation. Neither John Major nor Tony Blair so far have shown any similar inclination to side-step either the Foreign Secretary or the FCO. In April 1998 Mr Blair rejected proposals put forward by some of his colleagues for creating a powerful prime minister’s department based upon a reconstructed cabinet office.16 More recently there was a small controversy over the revelation that the Prime Minister had appointed several overseas personal envoys (Lords Levy, Paul and Ahmed). Press comment saw these appointments as indicative of ‘an American style of foreign policy’17 and noted the fact that these envoys were unaccountable to parliament and could be seen to be part of a process that bypassed the FCO. The FCO is staffed largely by members of the Diplomatic Service but with some members of the Home Civil Service. Before the 1997 Labour Government established the Ministry for International Development, the FCO had a Diplomatic Wing and an Aid Wing (Overseas Development Administration). The Diplomatic Wing is staffed by around 6,000 UK-based personnel (around 4,000 in the Diplomatic Service and 2,000 Home Civil Servants mainly in support roles in London) who serve both at home and abroad. In 1999 there were around 2,295 UK-based staff serving abroad and they were assisted in posts by 7,841 locally engaged staff.18 Recruitment to the Diplomatic Service remains extremely competitive with the Diplomatic Wing offering jobs to just 1 in 120 applicants to the Fast Stream and 1 in 86 applicants to the Main Stream. In the Diplomatic Wing, there are twice as many men as there are women (in 1998–99 women accounted for 50 per cent of applicants to the Diplomatic Service and for 38 per cent of those actually recruited)19 and in the senior grades there are still very few women indeed, although, perhaps in recognition of this, numbers began to rise in the late 1990s (by 1999 there were 178 women in the Senior Management Structure compared with 108 in 1995).20 In its publicity the FCO makes much of the fact that in 1995, for the first time ever, female fast stream entrants outnumbered male entrants. The FCO have been forced to accept considerable reductions in budgets and overall staffing levels (21 per cent since 1980) in recent years. The FCO vote (minus the variable costs of peacekeeping operations) is around £1 billion at 1995 prices whilst the Department for International Development (DFID) receives around £2.2 billion (the fifth largest aid budget in the world). The FCO thus has a relatively small budget in contrast to the £20⫹ billion allocated to the Ministry of Defence or the nearly £100 billion expenditure of the Department of Social Security. The FCO has hardly any programme expenditure (unlike the DFID) and so

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budget cuts can be directly translated into staff slots or overseas posts.21 As a consequence FCO morale has been quite badly affected in recent years by the constant budgetary pressures. Staff who have become disillusioned, either by budget reductions, seemingly inconsiderate postings policies or the lack of opportunity for career advancement have been able to find better paid and often less demanding employment in the private sector. The FCO is headed by the Foreign Secretary who is always a senior member of the Government. There are usually at least three junior ministers (four when ODA is situated within the FCO) one of whom, in recent years has been designated Minister for Europe. The FCO is headed by a Permanent Under-Secretary (PUS) who is responsible both for the administration of the FCO and the work of overseas posts through a Board of Management and for strategic policy advice to ministers through a Policy Advisory Board. In recent years the work of the PUS has become increasingly focused on the management of the FCO in London. The post of Political Director, which was initially created so that Britain could play its part in the EU’s system of European Political Cooperation, is now effectively the top policy advisory post. Whereas twenty years ago the PUS would always accompany the Foreign Secretary or Prime Minister on his travels overseas now it is usually the Political Director who clocks up the air miles whilst the PUS stays at home to look after the shop. The FCO carries out its six core functions (foreign policy advice and implementation, management of Britain’s remaining Dependent Territories, public diplomacy including the British Council and the BBC World Service, commercial work, consular work and entry-clearance work) via thirteen Commands (reduced from sixteen after the Senior Management Review), each under the direction of an Assistant Under-Secretary (now known as Directors, e.g. Director-EU). Between the AUSs and the PUS there is a further management layer of Deputy Under-Secretaries (DUS) (confusingly, these are also known as Directors, e.g. Director EU and Economic). It is this layer that has been most criticised in recent years. The trend has been to reduce the number of DUS posts, thereby pushing policy responsibility down as far as possible and making the heads of the various Commands directly responsible both to ministers and the top level of FCO policy management. The Commands are further sub-divided into Departments and Units leaving just a scattering of Departments and Units outside the Command structure (Legal Advisors, Research Analysts, Whitehall Liaison Department, the Policy Planning Staff and Aid Policy and Resources Department). The Commands fall into three broad categories; Geographical (there were seven, there are now five following the recent decision to create unified Europe and Asia Commands), Functional (including three multilateral Commands dealing with the European Union, International Organisations and International Security and two Commands dealing with Public Services and Trade and Investment Promotion) and Administrative Commands dealing with Finance, General Services and Protocol.

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The basic FCO unit remains therefore, the geographical desk within a geographical Department and Command. Although there has been a considerable growth in functional departments in response to the ‘internationalisation’ of a number of traditional domestic issues and to the growth of multilateral forums, the FCO has resisted suggestions that, as a multi-functional organisation, it should reorganise itself around its functions. The Fundamental Expenditure Review of 1995 argued for the preservation of a structure based on regional and multilateral organisation partly because of the high estimated cost of restructuring the FCO and partly because of the continuing logic of geographical specialism. The FCO believes that its knowledge of specific countries and its development of bilateral relationships that span across a number of specific functions adds significant value to the advancement and coordination of British interests. If the FCO were to be reorganised along functional lines then the fear would be that a number of functions could then be ‘hived off’ to domestic ministries along the lines suggested by the CPRS Report (see below). In January 2000, shortly before he became Minister for Energy in the reshuffle that followed the resignation of Peter Mandelson, Peter Hain, then a Foreign Office Minister, published a pamphlet22 in which he advocated the scrapping of Departments based on geographical divisions in favour of ‘issues’ departments dealing with subjects such as human rights, the environment and conflict prevention.23 The FCO faces two types of coordination problem in its management of Britain’s external relations. Firstly it has to ensure effective internal communication and coordination both within the FCO in London and between London and the network of overseas posts. Secondly, as the agenda expands to directly involve many Home Departments in both the shaping and execution of external policy, the FCO has a major responsibility to ensure coherence and consistency across Whitehall. In pursuing this second objective, the FCO also has a clear interest in retaining as much overall control over British foreign policy making and implementation as is possible. Within the FCO, the problems raised by the proliferation of functional and multilateral commands cutting across the geographical divisions is best illustrated by reference to arrangements for dealing with the countries of Western Europe and the EU (see next section). Across Whitehall the coordination of British foreign policy is not in the exclusive control of the FCO. Long gone are the days when all contacts with the outside world were handled by the FCO. Nowadays just as the FCO has sprouted a number of functional departments that in many ways ‘shadow’ the work of Home Departments so, in turn, most Home Departments have developed their own international and European sections. The FCO continues to play a major role in the coordination of all these different aspects of Britain’s external policy but the British system also recognises that, with reference to a number of cross-cutting issues, the FCO is not the unchallenged sole determinant of the overall British interest but merely an ‘interested’ department amongst many others. In these cases, the Cabinet system and the work of

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the Cabinet Office provide consistency and coherence. At the very top of the decision-making process, the British Cabinet is meant to be collegial and the doctrine of collective responsibility pertains. In practice many decisions are delegated down to Cabinet Committees of which the Committee on Defence and Overseas Policy (DOP) and the Committee on the Intelligence Services both chaired by the Prime Minister and the Sub-Committee on European Questions ( (E)DOP), chaired by the Foreign Secretary, are the most important in relation to foreign policy.24 The work of these ministerial committees and of their official counterparts is supported by the Cabinet Office, headed by the Secretary of the Cabinet who is also the head of the Home Civil Service. There are five separate Secretariats within the Cabinet Office of which three (the Overseas and Defence Secretariat, the Joint Intelligence Secretariat and the European Secretariat) have external relations coordination responsibilities.25 The Secretariats are quite small, staffed mainly by home civil servants but also by members of the diplomatic service. The relationship between the FCO and the staff of the Cabinet Office is a close one; in no sense are they rivals although on issues where the FCO is in dispute with other government departments it is the Cabinet Office staff who record the minutes of the meetings at which government policy is thrashed out. It might be expected that the FCO would fit uneasily into the broader Whitehall picture because of the separate recruitment, training and career structure of the diplomatic service and because so many members of the diplomatic service spend so much of their careers in posts overseas. However, whilst there is undoubtedly some rivalry and whilst some members of both the diplomatic service and the home civil service clearly retain prejudiced and stereotyped views of each other, it is hard to find examples of external policy being adversely affected by internal bureaucratic conflict26 involving the FCO as one of the warring parties. On the contrary, the most spectacular inter-departmental dispute of recent times, which had major external overtones, was the Westland crisis,27 which centred on a dispute between the Department of Trade and Industry and the Ministry of Defence. As we shall see below, the FCO is in almost permanent conflict with the Treasury over the allocation of government resources but no more so than any other government department in recent years. The FCO has been the subject of a number of formal enquiries in recent years. The Plowden Report delivered in 1964 ‘provoked the most radical changes and the least controversy’.28 It was responsible both for the creation of the unified diplomatic service and for the eventual amalgamations that led to the establishment of the FCO. Despite the obvious decline in British global influence that was apparent by the mid-1960s the Plowden report was ‘friendly’ towards the FCO in its assumption that Britain should nevertheless maintain the foreign policy capability of a global power. To this end, Plowden recommended improved conditions of employment for the diplomatic

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service which it felt should be maintained at a level approximately 10 per cent above basic requirements so as to allow for enhanced training, leave and travel. These proposals were never implemented and subsequent inquiries were never so generous in their recommendations. In 1969, after the traumas of devaluation and the military withdrawal from east of Suez, the Duncan Report29 was much tougher on the FCO. It set out to achieve savings of between 5 and 10 per cent by distinguishing between two distinct areas of British attention. Duncan recommended that the countries of western Europe plus North America should be grouped together in an Area of Concentration whilst the rest of the world (including Japan and the whole of the Middle East!) would form an Outer Area. Countries within the Area of Concentration and one or two other ‘special cases’ would be served by Comprehensive Posts, which would be staffed in the traditional way, but most of the countries that fell within the Outer Area would be served by considerably reduced Selective Posts from which there would be virtually no political reporting. The main emphasis of diplomacy was to be on commercial work, and the Duncan Report made it clear that it did not consider a foreign policy apparatus suitable for a global power with comprehensive political and commercial interests to be any longer appropriate for Britain. This view of the role of the FCO and the Diplomatic Service was of course strongly contested by the FCO, whose delaying tactics were all that were required as the change of government that occurred in June of 1970 led to the shelving of the Duncan Report. Even more radical, however, was the report produced by the Central Policy Review Staff (CPRS) under Kenneth Berrill.30 Charged with recommending ‘the most suitable, effective and economic means of representing and promoting British interests both at home and overseas’ the CPSR team came up with a proposal that the Diplomatic Service and the Home Civil Service be effectively merged creating a Foreign Policy Group. This suggestion was based on the assumption that the necessary specialisms required to advance British interests were to be found in the Home Civil Service and that the essentially political advice, expensively provided by the Diplomatic Service, was no longer relevant to British needs. In addition, the CPSR Report called for the closing of 55 posts on top of the 30 that had been closed since Duncan reported. The CPRS Report was nothing more than a direct attack on the FCO and all that it stood for and it provoked an enormously hostile response. Typical was the reaction of one of Britain’s senior Ambassadors whose Paris embassy was singled out for particular attack for the ‘lavishness’ of its hospitality. In his diaries, Nicholas Henderson records ‘This is the third such enquiry in the past fifteen years. True, Plowden and Val Duncan did the service no harm but the setting up of yet another and outwardly more hostile enquiry has not been good for morale.’31 The FCO produced a line-by-line rebuttal of the entire report and they were supported in their endeavours by Jim Callaghan, the Prime Minister, who had fond memories of his time as

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Foreign Secretary. The CPRS Report provoked such a hostile reaction, with hundreds of serving diplomats threatening to resign rather than face incorporation into the Home Civil Service, that it probably never stood much chance of being implemented. Despite its spirited and successful defence, the FCO showed in later years that it recognised some of the problems highlighted by the CPRS Report, even if it rejected the proposed solutions. More recently, the FCO has been given a more searching examination by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Commons, particularly over its response to new commercial challenges in the Far East and over its management of public diplomacy via the BBC World Service and the British Council (both of which are FCO responsibilities and paid for under the FCO vote). In the 1990s the FCO has responded to the general climate of government reform by holding its own internal Structural Review in 1992, a Fundamental Expenditure Review (FER) in 1995 and a Senior Management Review (SMR) in 1996. The acceptance and implementation of these more recent reports are part of the FCO’s response to a changing environment to be considered in the final section.

The European dimension In recent years the FCO has faced a number of specific issues in addition to the general problem of managing the consequences of Britain’s general decline in the international hierarchy. The biggest external challenge has arisen from the need to adjust both the procedures and substance of British foreign policy to the growing importance of the European Union. Participation in the European Union has given particular emphasis to the blurring of the boundaries between domestic and foreign policy. A considerable amount of EU business is conducted by officials from the Home Civil Service working in domestic ministries such as the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF). Where once all dealings with foreign governments were conducted through the FCO and Britain’s embassies abroad, now there are direct dealings between domestic ministries and their opposite numbers in the other EU member states.32 This has highlighted a number of issues of both coordination and control33 that have challenged the FCO’s dominant role in the identification and pursuit of the British interests overseas. In the past a separate European Ministry has been proposed and, under Edward Heath in the 1970–74 Conservative administration, a Cabinet minister with EU responsibilities (Geoffrey Rippon) was appointed to support the Foreign Secretary, although, once the accession negotiations were completed, the post was soon abolished. The FCO has always resisted attempts to separate EU business from the overall responsibilities of the FCO and successive Foreign Secretaries have shown little enthusiasm for suggestions that the present Minister of State for Europe be elevated to Cabinet rank.

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A Foreign Secretary stripped of his EU responsibilities would suffer an enormous loss of stature, so central is the EU to so many internal and external policy issues. Nevertheless the idea has been raised again recently34 with the suggestion that senior cabinet ministers (Jacques Delors even suggested deputy prime ministers!) reporting directly to prime ministers might be permanently based in Brussels and charged with sustaining the authority of the European Council between the six-monthly summits. This would indeed have called into question the role of the FCO and of the Foreign Secretary, especially if, as was mooted at the time, the UK candidate had been Peter Mandelson. Proposals to transfer the management of European business to the Cabinet Office (see below) would have had the same effect. The FCO has undoubtedly gained from the centralising tendencies that EU membership has encouraged and Smith has identified the rise of ‘an informal, yet powerful élite comprising Number 10, the FCO, the Cabinet Office and the UK permanent representation (UKREP)’.35 However the British system of coordination, whilst it gives the FCO by far the major role, is also designed to ensure that, where necessary, the FCO is treated as another interested Department and not as the sole determinant of the UK national interest. The role of the European Secretariat of the Cabinet Office which arranges, chairs and records the results of interdepartmental discussions at all levels36 ensures that the FCO cannot claim sole ownership or authorship of EU policy. The Cabinet Office is also responsible for the process whereby Parliament is informed and consulted about EU legislation. The FCO is usually represented in the European Secretariat of the Cabinet Office but only with one official in a team of about seven – the rest coming from the home civil service. However, one has to be careful about making too much of the constraints on the FCO’s role in EU policy-making and coordination. The European Secretariat of the Cabinet Office is quite small, although large by Cabinet Office standards, and it does rely heavily on FCO support. Similarly, whilst UKREP is indeed an unusual embassy, with more than 50 per cent of its staff being drawn from the home civil service, it has always been headed by an ambassador from the FCO and the FCO retains the right to oversee its instructions. The position of Permanent Representative is an extremely powerful one with the incumbent responsible for the day-to-day management of EU business in Brussels as well as usually playing a pivotal role in Treaty negotiations within the Intergovernmental Conference framework.37 The UK Permanent Representative additionally gets to return to London each Friday to participate in EU policy-making meetings both within the FCO and the Cabinet Office – an opportunity resented by many home-based officials and much envied by all other UK ambassadors. Thus, despite the constraints mentioned above and elsewhere in this chapter, the FCO probably has succeeded in retaining a predominant EU role within the UK system. This is partly because in its competent handling

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of EU business the FCO has earned the respect of those working within other government departments, and partly because the FCO itself has been quite relaxed about allowing other government departments to get on with EU business that clearly lies within their exclusive competence. Although Smith argues that ‘as EU business increases, the FCO and the Cabinet Office are losing control and departments are increasingly conducting business with the Commission and other member states directly’38 and that the FCO is incorrect in its belief that it still controls contact with Brussels, it is the contention of this chapter that, on important EU matters, the FCO retains a controlling interest and that it is probably wise not to try and take on business that it is beyond both its competence and its resources. Within the FCO, following several recent reorganisations, EU matters and bilateral relations with individual EU member states are now handled within the same Command, the EU Command, which now has four departments (CFSP, EU Internal, EU External and EU Bilateral) reporting to the FCO Director EU and then (except for CFSP Department, which report to the Political Director) to the Director Economic and EU. CFSP Department, in effect, provide a secretariat for the FCO Political Director who has chief operational responsibility for the UK’s input into the CFSP process. The Wider Europe Command brings together all the Departments dealing with Central and Eastern Europe (except the Balkans, which has a separate Command) and Western European countries which are not in the EU. The Labour Government’s devolution policies may well eventually have an impact on the way that the UK relates to the EU, although the Government seems determined to try and retain London’s control over these matters.39 Each of the devolved administrations has agreed a concordat with the Westminster Government covering their role in international relations in general and the EU in particular. These were agreed without undue difficulty and the arrangements so far seem to be working well. The anticipated problems and disagreements have not so far materialised, with the result that the FCO has now disbanded its short-lived Devolved Administrations Department. Whilst the UK government is determined to remain responsible for international relations, including relations with the EU, it may well find itself under pressure from the devolved administrations as their work develops. Already there have been suggestions that Scotland might seek to expand the level of its separate representation in Brussels40 and this would eventually threaten the role of UKREP and the UK Permanent Representative. Comparison with the growing EU role of the German Länder in this context may well be instructive in the future. In the long term, of course, the possibility of devolution leading to independence would challenge the whole concept of UK foreign policy and the role of the UK FCO. Finally we should mention the recent efforts to broaden the nature of the UK government’s relationship with its EU partners41 because these too may

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challenge the role of the FCO in the future. The Prime Minister is keen to establish stronger links between the centre-left parties in power in a number of the 15 EU states. For a brief period Mr Blair appointed Mr Mandelson, seemingly with Mr Cook’s blessing, to act as a ‘roving ambassador’. But this did not appear to last long or bear much fruit. For his part, Mr Cook set up a powerful committee to increase the Labour party’s influence in Europe.42 The committee, which is chaired by the Minister for Europe (a post which has had a surprising number of incumbents since Labour returned to power), includes policy advisors from Downing Street, the FCO and the Treasury. It represents the kind of development that the FCO has to embrace but, one suspects, with the intention of smothering rather than nurturing a potential challenger to its control of UK relations with European governments. The idea of someone like Mr Mandelson becoming a ‘roving European Ambassador’ was about as pleasing to the mandarins within the FCO as the idea of a foreign policy unit in Downing Street or a Minister for Europe in the Cabinet Office.

Strategies and responses The FCO has responded well to change. As we noted above, its basic tactic has been to resist strongly all attempts to impose reform from outside, whilst internally making some quite radical adjustments to the way that it organises itself and carries out its work. The changes in the substance of foreign policy and the blurring of boundaries between foreign and domestic policy have forced the FCO to work much more closely with other government departments, both within Britain and abroad, and to organise itself for the demands of multilateral as well as bilateral diplomacy and negotiation. The FCO has sought to manage the interface with other government departments as smoothly as possible;43 it has considered and sensibly rejected the idea of charging them for the work that its overseas posts carry out for them; it has instructed those of its departments, such as European Union Department (Internal), who ‘face’ domestic ministries to consult with them about their requirements vis-à-vis FCO posts overseas and it has sought to maintain its position, if not of supremacy, then at least of primus inter pares in the overall direction of British foreign policy. Foreign policy is increasingly about coordination, and the FCO is clearly the most important of the coordinating departments and has made considerable efforts to maintain this position, whilst continuing to argue the case for its separate identity. This has not been seriously challenged since the 1977 CPRS Report; instead, the FCO position was endorsed by the 1994 White Paper on the Civil Service which stated that ‘The Diplomatic Service is a separate branch of the public service with its own particular needs and structure.’44

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The growing complexity of the foreign policy agenda has forced the FCO to develop more and more functional competences, but it has responded to this challenge by firmly sticking to an organisational structure that subsumes functional expertise to geographical and multilateral Commands, and therefore emphasises the importance of the FCO’s coordination role in relation to other government departments. Similarly the FCO, by preserving the pivotal role of the ambassador in overseas posts, has resisted the argument that domestic specialists who are posted overseas should report directly to their ‘home’ departments. Thus, in the name of coherence and consistency, the FCO has successfully defended its role as ‘gatekeeper’ both at home and abroad, even though the participants in the foreign policy process are increasingly drawn from a number of non-FCO sources.45 This is most clearly seen in the key roles that the FCO and the UK Permanent Representation to the EU (UKREP)46 play in the overall management of British policy towards the EU (see previous section). Changes in British society and in the approach to work and working conditions have forced the FCO to reconsider the way that it recruits staff and carries out its business. Attempts to open up the recruitment process have had mixed results; whilst the FCO can point to figures that suggest a steady increase in the employment of women47 and in the decline of candidates from private schools, its record on the employment of representatives of ethnic minorities is not impressive and it attracted highly unfavourable publicity in January of 1996 when its most senior woman, Pauline Neville-Jones, resigned ‘noisily’ after being denied the position of ambassador to Paris, on the face of it because she was both female and unmarried, even though there have been women ambassadors in several countries, e.g. Denmark, Ireland, Netherlands, Chile and South Africa. On a variety of staff matters the FCO is increasingly in competition with a number of other employers for the talents of the young high flyers that it used to recruit with ease. Relatively poor pay, poor conditions of service, long working hours, slim chances of rapid promotion in a service where a number of senior posts have been cut on efficiency and economy grounds have all taken their toll, and the FCO has been relatively slow to respond, leading to reports of growing dissatisfaction and low morale.48 Whether the arrival of a Labour Government intent on ‘opening up’ the FCO to a wider recruitment base and more open and modern working practices49 is likely to restore the once high morale of the Diplomatic Service remains to be seen. Many of the most unpopular changes to the nature of the work, and thus to the prospects of a satisfactory career, have been driven by the constant need to find financial savings. It does not seem very likely that this pressure will be significantly eased in the foreseeable future and so the FCO will continue to be handicapped in its efforts to create a modern service capable of attracting and retaining high quality staff. Recent reports have recognised the fact that, in a number of areas the FCO has been relatively slow to move with the times and efforts have been made

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to catch up. In its use of information technology the FCO has been slow, in comparison to other government departments to adopt advanced methods of electronic communication. However, whilst it has taken a long time to introduce a secure e-mail system,50 the FCO was one of the first British government departments to provide a public service on the Internet. The FCO web site (www.fco.gov.uk) was first established in 1995 and is generally regarded as first rate – a new site was added in December 1997 to serve the UK Presidency of the EU during the first half of 1998. The FCO web site serves both to enhance the ‘public diplomacy’ side of the FCO’s work and to provide instant access to non-classified information for overseas posts. The aim is to get everything online as soon as its embargo is lifted and most speeches or reports delivered to Parliament are now available before they are released to the media through traditional channels.51 As well as seeking to preserve its central role in Whitehall by improving its links with other government departments, the FCO has also had to develop strategies for reforming its own internal structure and management practices, partly in response to changes in the foreign policy environment and partly in response to the general pressures for governmental reform that have developed in the last decade. The FCO strategy seems to have been to try and be seen to participate in this process of change and reform with as much enthusiasm as possible, whilst preserving its separate status and warding off any attempts to downgrade its overall significance by placing organisational emphasis on functional rather than geographical and multilateral coordination tasks. To this end, as well as reemphasising, reinforcing and, where appropriate in Europe and South Asia, reorganising, its geographic Commands, the FCO has also sought to implement a policy of devolving both financial and management responsibility down through Commands to departments and to overseas posts in line with similar developments elsewhere in the government service. The FCO has sought over time to remove a complete layer of senior management (DUS level) by making geographic Commands directly answerable to the PUS and to give more responsibility at departmental level to officials, by encouraging them to brief ministers directly rather than moving documents through several layers of authorisation and control. Attempts have also been made to improve the role of policy planning in the FCO (partly in association with other EU foreign ministries), to better associate the work of the Research Analysts with their customer departments and to reorganise the management structure so that those responsible for policy planning and advice and those responsible for the management of resources are more closely associated with each others’ work. This latter objective has been partly achieved by devolution, and partly by unifying the Policy Advisory Board and the Board of Management and strengthening their links with the Commands as well as their ‘visibility’ to the rest of the FCO. The FCO has revised its mission statement twice in recent years so as to relate its corporate objectives more clearly to its core functions and also

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to facilitate better monitoring of those objectives and their attainment. The FCO Annual Departmental Report is now replete with lists of objectives and targets with regard to political and economic work, as well as commercial, consular, entry clearance and information work and with records of their achievement. Another area where the FCO has been forced to respond to change in recent years concerns the growing interest of the wider public, both at home and abroad, in foreign policy. Domestic publics, particularly in the developed world, are now less trusting of governments and more aware of what they are up to in the foreign policy area. Britain is no exception to this general post-war trend which has, if anything , accelerated since the end of the Cold War. The FCO must now pay more attention to both Parliament and the wider public in Britain whilst the state of public opinion in those countries which Britain seeks to influence is now also a factor that needs to be given far more attention than in the past. The FCO can be criticised for being slow to react to this phenomenon. Commentators noted the persistent refusal of the FCO to either acknowledge or seek to reach a consensus with the significant ‘Falklands lobby’52 which nevertheless exerted influence on British attempts to change its policy on the ownership of the Falkland Islands, and the FCO and the British government in general can be faulted for their failure to seek a broad domestic consensus on a whole host of European Union issues. Similarly the FCO was heavily criticised for its recent attempts to cut the budget and restrict the activities of both the BBC World Service53 and the British Council at a time when the importance of this type of ‘public diplomacy’ was becoming more rather than less significant. However, this issue has now been addressed by the FCO. The Fundamental Expenditure Review devoted a whole section to the growing importance of public diplomacy and to the need for the FCO to develop a public diplomacy strategy statement as well as individual country strategies. The BBC World Service and the British Council are to have their objectives reevaluated with a view to aligning them more closely to the FCO’s aims and objectives, and the FCO Information and Cultural Relations Departments have been restructured. The FCO now has a Public Diplomacy Dept. and EUD(I), a Public Diplomacy Section. David Howell, the then chairman of the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, underlined the need for the FCO to focus on better public diplomacy when he wrote that ‘the emphasis needs to be on building up British-friendly attitudes’54 in those countries that the FCO wishes to influence. He went on to criticise the spending priorities of a Government that continued to spend £29 billion on defence at a time when the major military threat had evaporated, whilst cutting spending on British overseas diplomacy to half the French level and one-third the German level.55 There is some evidence of the FCO seeking to build new domestic constituencies or linkages with Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), and the new Labour government has given considerable emphasis

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to its attempts to build a closer relationship with British business. Although Mr Richard Branson was not appointed, as some newspapers predicted, to the post of British Ambassador to Washington, a ministerial speech in 1997 to the Institute of Export’s Partnership 2000 Conference56 argued that ‘New Labour is determined to bring a more business-like approach to Government and to the Foreign Office’. Derek Fatcett went on to say that ‘the Foreign Office has got the message. Gone are the days when it might be said to stand aloof from trade promotion. Today trade promotion is our largest single activity accounting for 25 per cent of our resources and 34 per cent of our staff overseas.’ Nowadays Commercial work is the responsibility of British Trade International a joint FCO/DTI service. The FCO also runs, jointly with the DTI, an Invest in Britain Bureau and an Export Forum and has recently taken steps to work with the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) both by regular meetings and secondments57 There are now a few more opportunities for interchange with non-diplomats than there were before (in 2000 the FCO employed 6 secondees from non-governmental organisations and announced plans to expand this scheme58) although, aside from the commercial sector, the FCO remains reluctant to involve outsiders in its policy work. Nevertheless, the FCO has recently introduced a series of short-term attachments to overseas posts for business people to work on specific projects or promotions, and it has extended its interchange programme with industry via which it has opened up a number of longer-term positions in Commercial Sections in Embassies for private sector candidates on secondment. In March of 2000 it was revealed that British Nuclear Fuels paid the FCO half a million pounds a year to have one of its own employees work inside the British Embassey in Tokyo negotiating nuclear trade matters on behalf of the government (and British Nuclear Fuels!).59 The growing interest of the wider public in foreign policy has given foreign policy making and implementation an additional dimension which the FCO and its political masters have yet to fully understand. The pressures from the public often seem irrational; over Somalia, the Falklands invasion, atrocities in Bosnia, the question of European integration or the sale of arms to undesirable regimes, the British public seemed and seem to be calling for action and intervention by the British Government but they also have made it clear that additional costs, whether human or financial, will not be tolerated. In the face of these contradictions the Government has been inclined to vacillate and to allow public opinion to gain the upper hand. It is by and large a failure of leadership and of will by government that has left the FCO exposed to the whims of public opinion and the media. The problems that it has faced in pursuing a consistent policy towards the European Union in recent years is a case in point. The FCO alone can not be expected to master this new foreign policy environment but, given a clear lead by government, it can be expected to provide the necessary support. At the time, many observers saw the replacement of Tony Blair’s first Minister for Europe

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(Douglas Henderson) by Joyce Quin as an indication that the FCO would ‘henceforth play a much bigger role in “selling” Europe to a sceptical British public’60 and this was also a task entrusted to one of her successors, Keith Vaz.

Conclusion In most of the areas discussed above, the FCO has developed strategies for responding to change in recent years. These responses tend to resemble ‘fine tuning’ rather than radical reform but they have enabled the FCO and the Diplomatic Service to retain their central position in the making and implementation of British foreign policy. Indeed it has been argued that EU membership has provided opportiunities for the FCO, along with the DTI and MAFF to ‘increase their role and autonomy’.61 It is certainly the case that British influence in the world has continued to decline, although participation in the European Union has, to a certain extent, halted that decline by enabling Britain to benefit from its collective power. In many ways Britain still aspires to maintain the foreign policy of a world power; little attempt has been made in recent years to significantly cut back Britain’s global responsibilities or ambitions. Indeed in 1995 the British Government went to considerable lengths at its ‘Britain in the World Conference’62 to emphasise the fact that Britain retained its global role and should not be thought of as ‘merely’ a European power. It is probably not that surprising, therefore, that Britain should continue to attempt to maintain a foreign ministry and diplomatic apparatus appropriate to a power with global pretensions, albeit at reduced cost. However, this situation may not continue in the immediate future and this chapter will conclude with some thoughts on the impact of the Labour administration which took office in May of 1997. In many ways the new Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, seemed determined to introduce significant changes into both the substance and procedures of British foreign policy. His commitment to make British foreign policy ‘greener’63 and to give the British public a bigger say in British defence and diplomacy, his determination to pursue a foreign policy with an ‘ethical’ dimension64 and his recognition that domestic and foreign policy are indivisible,65 which so clearly informed the government’s approach to the 1998 UK Presidency of the EU Council,66 all suggest further change for the FCO to respond to. His establishment, with the support of the Prime Minister, of an independent institute (The Foreign Policy Centre)67 to generate foreign policy ideas was seen as a direct challenge to traditionalists in the FCO despite the reported support68 it received from Sir John Kerr, the head of the diplomatic service. On the other hand, Mr Cook has moved to strengthen the FCO’s control over Britain’s remaining colonies (British Overseas Territories), following the problems that arose between the Ministry for International Development and the volcano-stricken island of Montserrat; he resisted calls to review the

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position of senior FCO officials involved in European policy making69 (in particular that of Sir Stephen Wall, Britain’s Permanent representative in Brussels) who were regarded in some Labour quarters as being too close to the previous administration, and both he and the Prime Minister have made no secret of the fact that they were advised in opposition by a number of distinguished ex-FCO mandarins (Robin Renwick, David Hannay, Rodric Braithwaite, David Gilmore and Michael Butler) who might have been expected to have kept the interests of their old department in mind when proposing further strategies for change. One area of possible change which previous governments have resisted, concerns developments in the EU and the institutional consequences of pursuing a Common Foreign and Security Policy. The British government, despite finding it increasingly difficult to devote the necessary resources to its foreign policy machine, has not been tempted by the European option of pooling resources, particularly overseas, although Britain and France have recently (outside the EU framework) announced plans to work more closely together in Africa.70 Proposals to establish joint EU embassies and eventually to establish a full-blown European diplomatic service have been stoutly resisted by Britain in favour of retaining a national foreign ministry and diplomatic service, even though, recently, Britain has gone along with an increasing concentration of CFSP activity in Brussels.71 In keeping with this approach, in March of 1999,72 the Foreign Secretary proposed the establishment of a permanent committee of deputy political directors in Brussels to steer and reinforce the CFSP. The idea of this committee was clearly to keep control of the CFSP firmly in the hands of national foreign ministries by boosting the Council of Ministers and the Council Secretariat rather than enhancing the Commission’s external powers. This tendency, along with the appointment of Xavier Solana as the EU’s first High Representative for the CFSP was given an enormous boost by the rapid development of the EU’s Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP) following the Anglo-French initiative launched at St Malo in late 1998. The Treaty of Nice agreed in December 2000 confirmed the creation of a Political and Security Committee (COPS) along the lines of Cook’s earlier proposal. Since Labour came to power there have been reports that the Treasury would like the FCO to consider merging its consular work with that of other EU countries.73 However even if this were to be taken seriously, the FCO has made it clear that commercial work, immigration control and some aspects of political work would have to remain under separate national control. In the 1998 spending review, which saw the budget of the Ministry for International Development rise by £1.6 billion over three years, the FCO also did rather well with a £220 million increase in its own budget – the first real increase for a decade – 74 and this despite fears that the Chancellor would make the FCO pay for its rumoured excesses.75 In November of 1998 the Foreign Secretary announced that the increase in FCO funding, in combination with additional

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resources gleaned from the sale of overseas assets, would be used to increase UK representation in countries applying to join the EU as well as in the Caspian region and the Far East.76 Furthermore, following a review, the FCO won a significant battle with the DTI over the control of UK trade policy.77 A senior FCO official was appointed to run the newly created British Trade International that replaced the DTI-directed Overseas Trade Services.78 The FCO is more likely to counter the Treasury proposals about consular work by giving further consideration to plans that already exist, to shut down certain consulates, and replace them with a telephone hotline to officials based in London. It would take a bigger swing towards further EU integration than the Labour government has so far been willing to consider, for the FCO to come under any serious threat from a Brussels-based alternative. The title of this chapter posed an implicit question about the ability of the FCO to adjust to the general challenge of a transformed world and the specific challenge of EU membership. The conclusion would seem be that, whilst the FCO has undoubtedly proved itself to be a foreign ministry capable of both responsiveness and flexibility (although Peter Hain when an FCO Minister talked of his ‘frustration that the (FCO) machine is geared to responding to new circumstances mostly by incremental shifts in emphasis’79), it has yet to be fully tested by, or called upon to serve, a government willing to adopt a more proactive foreign policy. If the Labour administration is to actively pursue the objectives laid out in Robin Cook’s mission statement,80 of ‘exercising leadership in the European Union, protecting the world’s environment, countering the menace of drugs, terrorism and crime, spreading the values of human rights, civil liberties and democracy and using its status at the UN to secure more effective international action to keep the peace of the world and to combat poverty’, then the FCO just might find its organisation and working practices more fundamentally tested than it has to date. Indeed the aspiration to give British foreign policy an ethical dimension has already been significantly downgraded81 following severe criticism from four Commons Select Committees of the decision to continue the export of military aircraft to Indonesia.82 Nevertheless, a positive start has been made with regard to the European Union. Most observers seem to accept that the EU defence initiative, launched by Tony Blair at the close of the twenty-first Franco-British summit in Saint-Malo in December 199883 has given real substance to his oftstated desire to exert British leadership within the EU.84 The proposals which had been flagged for some time arose from a paper written inside the FCO by a senior diplomat charged with finding ways of revitalising the UK Presidency and maximising the potential of Britain’s future in Europe.85 One of the key recommendations of Robert Cooper’s memorandum (a paper which was worked on by the Cabinet Office and which was also discussed in a series of seminars on EU policy involving both British academics and officials)86 was to use British military assets to develop ‘a European capacity

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to act independently in the defence field’.87 The subsequent development of the defence initiative, along with notable British achievements recorded in both the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties as well as at a number of recent meetings of the European Council, suggests that the FCO is still capable of chalking up successes and defending its turf as Britain faces up to the challenges posed by Europe and the wider world in the twenty-first century.

Notes 1. The author would like to express particular thanks to Mr Ted Hallet, Head of the Western and Southern European Research Group in the FCO for his advice and assistance. 2. See in particular; William Wallace (ed.) The Foreign Policy Process in Britain, (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1975); John Dickie, Inside the Foreign Office, (London: Chapmans, 1992); Michael Clarke, British External PolicyMaking in the 1990s, (London: Macmillan for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1992), Simon Jenkins and Anne Sloman, With Respect, Ambassador: An inquiry into the Foreign Office, (London: BBC, 1985); Ruth Dudley Edwards, True Brits: Inside the British Foreign Office, (London: BBC Books, 1994); Laurence Martin and John Garnett, British Foreign Policy; Challenges and Choices for the 21st Century (London: Royal Institute for International Affairs/Pinter, 1997) 3. Clarke, British External Policy-Making, p. 77. 4. Martin Smith reports that the FCO was ‘thought by many to have had a new lease of life from membership (of the EU) after the shock of the decline of Empire’, Martin J Smith, The Core Executive in Britain (London: Macmillan – now Palgrave Macmillan, 1999) p. 232. 5. Speech at Chatham House, London, 5 April 1995 cited in Hugo Young, This Blessed Plot: Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair (London: Macmillan – now Palgrave Macmillan, 1998) p. 485. 6. Rupert Cornwall, ‘Is being the Foreign Secretary still the best job in the Cabinet?’, The Independent, 19 March 1998; Lionel Barber, ‘Move over, Metternich’, Financial Times, 16 July 1998. 7. For instance the FCO has just 2 diplomats in Uzbekistan compared with France’s 17 and Germany’s 26. In Kazakstan the UK has 3, France 10 and Germany 18, see Financial Times, 16 July 1998. 8. Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1999 Departmental Report: The Government’s Expenditure Plan 2000–01 to 2001–02, Command 4609 (London: HMSO, April 2000) p. 12. 9. Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1999 Departmental Report, p. 121. 10. Report on the Committee on Representational Services Overseas (1962–64) (Plowden Report) (London: HMSO, 1964). 11. Report of the Review Committee on Overseas Representation (1968–69) (Duncan Report), Command 4107 (London: HMSO, 1969). 12. Central Policy Review Staff, Review of Overseas Representation (London: HMSO, 1977). 13. For an analysis of Mrs Thatcher’s role in foreign policy-making see in particular Christopher Hill, ‘United Kingdom: Sharpening contradictions’ in Christopher Hill (ed.) The Actors in Europe’s Foreign Policy (London: Routledge, 1996) pp. 71–7 and Percy Craddock, In Pursuit of British Interests: Reflections on Foreign Policy under Margaret Thatcher and John Major (London: John Murray, 1997).

270 Foreign Ministries in the European Union 14. Dickie, Inside the Foreign Office, pp. 280–3. 15. Ibid., p. 283. 16. Robert Preston and George Parker, ‘Cabinet Office to keep role as independent mediator’, Financial Times, 21 April, 1998. 17. Nicholas Watt, ‘Labour accused of secrecy over special envoys’, Guardian, 29 March 2000. 18. Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1999 Departmental Report, p. 121. 19. Ibid., p. 124. 20. Ibid., p. 123. 21. Andrew Parker ‘Cook moves to cut costs at Foreign Office’, Financial Times, 5 February 1999. 22. Peter Hain, The End of Foreign Policy? British Interests, Global Linkages and National Limits (London: Fabian Society, Green Alliance and Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2001). 23. Nicholas Watt, ‘Hain seeks to end “nationalist” line on foreign policy’, Guardian, 23 January 2001. 24. For a detailed account of the work of the various cabinet committees in the making of European policy see Alisdair Blair, ‘UK Policy Coordination during the 1990–91 Intergovernmental Conference’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 9(2) especially pp. 161–7. 25. Peter Hennessy, The Hidden Wiring: Unearthing the British Constitution (London: Victor Gollancz, 1995) p. 251. 26. See Martin J. Smith, The Core Executive in Britain, p. 234. 27. Lawrence Freedman, ‘The case of Westland and the bias to Europe’, International Affairs 63(1) Winter 1986–87, pp. 1–19. 28. Dickie, Inside the Foreign Office, p. 62. 29. Andrew Schonfield, ‘The Duncan Report and its Critics’, International Affairs, April 1970, pp. 247–68. 30. Central Policy Review Staff, Review of Overseas Representation (London: HMSO, 1977). 31. Nicholas Henderson, Mandarin: The Diaries of an Ambassador, 1969–1982 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1994) p. 126. 32. Martin J. Smith, The Core Executive in Britain, pp. 234–5. 33. For a general discussion of these issues see David Spence, ‘The Role of British Civil Sevants in European Lobbying: the British Case’, in Sonia Mazey and Jeremy Richardson (eds) Lobbying in the European Community’ (London: Oxford University Press, 1992); Brian Bender, ‘Governmental Processes: Whitehall, Central Government and 1992’, Public Policy and Administration, 6, 1991, pp. 13–29: Alisdair Blair, ‘UK Policy Coordination during the 1990–91 Intergovernmental Conference’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 9(2). 34. See Donald Macintyre, ‘Making Europe more democratic will also make it too powerful’, The Independent, 19 March 1999. 35. Martin J. Smith, The Core Executive, p. 233. 36. See Alisdair Blair, ‘UK Policy Coordination during the 1990–91 Intergovernmental Conference’, op. cit. especially pp. 161–7 for a detailed description of official and ministerial EU committees. 37. Alisdair Blair, ‘UK Policy Coordination during the 1990–91 Intergovernmental Conference’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 9(2) July 1998, pp. 159–82. 38. Martin J. Smith, The Core Executive in Britain, p. 234. 39. See ‘Devolution and Foreign Affairs’ a speech by FCO Minister of State, Ms Joyce Quin, to the Northern Ireland Assembly, Belfast, 26 February 1999.

David Allen 271 40. Mark Nicholson, ‘Edinburgh moves closer to European regions’, Financial Times, 5 December 2000. 41. ‘Blair pushes EU links’, Guardian, 26 October 1998. 42. Financial Times, 16/17 January 1999. 43. See for instance the role played by the FCO in the recent Defence Review conducted by the Ministry of Defence, Guardian, 4 July, 1997 and the recent joint publication with the DTI of a White Paper: Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Department of Trade and Industry ‘Free Trade and Foreign Policy: A Global Vision’ Command 3437 (London: HMSO, 1996). 44. The Civil Service: Continuity and Change, Command 2627 (London: HMSO, 1994) 1.7. 45. For an example of the sort of challenge that the FCO has had to rebuff see Tessa Blackstone, ‘Too many Britons abroad’, Guardian, 21 May 1993. 46. Clarke, British External Policy-Making in the 1990s, pp. 102–4. 47. Bruce Clark, ‘Women fill more than half the top diplomatic posts’ Financial Times, 25 March 1996. See also Ruth Dudley Edwards, True Brits, Chapter 6, pp. 97–108. 48. Robert Mauthner, ‘Diplomatic Disquiet’, Financial Times, 24 January 1994. 49. Richard Norton-Taylor, ‘Cook paves way for more mothers as top diplomats’, Guardian, 11 August 1998. 50. David Buchan, ‘FO to spend £56m on technology upgrade’, Financial Times, 28 November 1998; Caroline Daniel, ‘Whitehall logs on to electronic diplomacy’, Financial Times, 13 May 2000. 51. See Dan Jellinek, ‘Civil Surfers’, Guardian, 30 October 1997. 52. See Charles Carstairs and Richard Ware (eds) Parliament and International Relations, (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1991) pp. 86–8. 53. See John Tusa, ‘A Dismal Volte-Face’, The Observer, 17 January 1999. 54. David Howell, ‘Britannia’s business’ Prospect, 15 January 1997, pp. 26–9. 55. Howell, ‘Britannia’s business’, p. 29. 56. Source is the FCO Website: http://193.114.50/texts/1997/nov/13/export.txt. 57. Andrew Parker, ‘Cook seeks more Foreign office-industry ties’, Financial Times, 3 November 1998 and David Buchan, ‘Embassies import help from the private sector to boost exports’, Financial Times, 15 February 1999. 58. Hugh Williamson, ‘Foreign Office may boost secondee scheme’, Financial Times, 28 June 2000. 59. Paul Brown and Ewan MacAskill, ‘BNFL pays to put own man in Tokyo embassy’, Guardian, 8 March 2000. 60. Andrew Parker, ‘A bright light to illuminate us all on European policy’, Financial Times, 6 July 1998. 61. Martin J. Smith, The Core Executive in Britain, p. 235. 62. See Philip Stephens, ‘Wrapped in a bigger map’, Financial Times, 24 March 1995: Martin Woolacott, ‘Jilted Britain looks for a new special relationship’, Guardian, 22 March 1995: Hugo Young, ‘There is a role elsewhere – but not without Europe’, Guardian, 30 March 1995: Ian Davidson, ‘A place in the world’, Financial Times, 29 March 1995. 63. Leyla Boulton, ‘Cook pledges move to “green” Foreign Office’, Financial Times, 27 February 1996. 64. John Kamfner, ‘Government to pledge “moral” foreign policy’, Financial Times, 12 May 1997 but see also Richard Norton-Taylor, ‘Ethical arms policy in Disarray’, Guardian, 24 June 1998. 65. ‘If you want to deliver a progressive domestic agenda, you need to have a European and international component to it’, Guardian, 18 December 1997.

272 Foreign Ministries in the European Union 66. This policy of emphasising the concept of a ‘People’s Europe’ is critically evaluated by Peter Ludlow in his appraisal of the 1998 UK Presidency, see Peter Ludlow, ‘The 1998 UK Presidency: A View from Brussels’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 36(4), December 1998, pp. 573–83 but especially pp. 580–1. For a less critical view of the same UK Presidency see the article by Douglas Henderson on the same edition of the JCMS. 67. See Andrew Parker, ‘Think-tank to redefine “ethical” foreign policy’, Financial Times, 3 March 1999 and Mark Leonard, ‘In the national interest’, Financial Times, 3 March 1999. 68. Stephen Castle, ‘Cook opens up a rival to Foreign Office’, Independent on Sunday, 1 March 1998. 69. John Kampfner, ‘Mandarins face scrutiny from Labour on Europe’, Financial Times, 31 January 1997. 70. Mark Turner, ‘Unscrambling the scramble for Africa’, Financial Times, 10 March 1999; Quentin Peel, ‘White man’s burden sharing’, Financial Times, 11 March 1999; Rupert Cornwall, ‘New entente cordiale as Africa is unscrambled’, The Independent, 12 March 1999. 71. See David Allen, ‘Who Speaks for Europe: The search for an effective and coherent external policy’ in John Peterson and Helene Sjursen (eds), A Common Foreign Policy for Europe?: Competing Visions of CFSP (London: Routledge, 1998). 72. David Buchan, ‘Cook to propose EU foreign policy committee’, Financial Times, 13 March 1999. 73. John Kampfner, ‘Call to share consular tasks’, Financial Times, 2 February 1998. 74. See Jon Hibbs, ‘Cook revitalises Foreign Office with a magic wand’, The Daily Telegraph, 16 July 1998. 75. Martin Bright, James Meek and Andy McSmith, ‘Our man in Moscow’s £80 million folly, Observer, 14 June 1998 and Andrew Parker, ‘Foreign office wins fight on diplomats’ allowances’ and ‘A fairer deal’, Financial Times, 9 December 1998. 76. Ian Black, ‘Cook to recruit 200 envoys in fight for global markets’, Guardian, 28 November 1998. 77. Tom Baldwin, ‘Cook declares trade war on Mandelson’, Daily Telegraph, 11 October 1998. 78. See Andrew Parker, ‘Ambassador to head trade body’, Financial Times, 12 March 1999. 79. Guardian, 23 January 2001. 80. See John Kampfner and Bernard Gray, ‘Cook makes pledge on human rights’, Financial Times, 13 May 1997. 81. Ewan MacAskill, ‘Hain backtracks on ethical foreign policy’, Guardian, 31 March 2000. 82. Andrew Parker and Jimmy Burns, ‘MP’s criticise weaknesses of “ethical” foreign policy’, Financial Times, 13 February 2000 and Vikram Dood and Ewen MacAskill, ‘Labour drops “ethical” tag’, Guardian, 4 September 2000. 83. See Robert Graham and Andrew Parker, ‘Britain and France to press for EU defence pact’, Financial Times, December 5/6, 1998, and Lucy Ward, ‘Blair tries to reassert Britain’s EU role after tax row’, Guardian, 4 December 1998. 84. Robert Preston, ‘UK aims to take leading role at heart of Europe’, Financial Times, 2 October 1998. 85. Martin Walker, ‘The white race in arms?’, Guardian, 27 October 1998, p. 19. 86. See Robert Preston, ‘Cook finds European haven as squalls loom on economic front’, Financial Times, 27 August 1998. 87. Foreign Office memorandum, cited in The Economist, 10 October 1998.

16 Conclusion Brian Hocking

This book has focused on a very specific issue relating to what is often referred to as ‘Europeanisation’: namely its impact on the role and organisation of EU member state foreign ministries (FMs). However, it is often difficult to separate the effects of the broader processes of growing global interdependence from those related to the membership of regional organisations such as the EU since, as one study has argued, ‘European integration interacts and intersects with wider processes of change in the contemporary nation state, international political economy and world politics.’1 As we can see from the foregoing chapters, national foreign policy administration has confronted several ‘layers’ of change as it has sought to adapt to internal and external pressures, but the EU is an arena with distinctive qualities that set it apart and pose particular challenges for member states. One of these challenges relates to the uncertainty expressed by Laffan et al. in terms of the EU’s ‘betweenness’ (poised between politics and diplomacy and the international and the domestic, for example) and the ‘process of becoming’, that is to say its evolution towards an indeterminate end state which may prove to bear little relation to traditional assumptions regarding forms of political order.2 A similar sense of uncertainty applies to national bureaucratic structures as they respond to differential processes of internationalisation. Just as one of the features in the development of the centralised, bureaucratic state during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was the gradual separation of domestic and foreign policy administration, so national bureaucratic structures in Europe are now also engaged in their own ‘process of becoming’. The precise outcome, bound up with both the transformation of the state in response to the impact of globalisation and localisation, and the political momentum towards an ‘ever closer union’, is uncertain. The consequences of such broad change, I suggested in Chapter 1, are likely to be particularly noticeable in the case of foreign ministries, poised as they are on the cusp of domestic and international policy environments. It was also suggested that conventional assumptions about their role and status, and their adaptive 273

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capacity in the face of turbulent environments, are likely to ignore the specific contexts in which foreign ministries have developed and underestimate this adaptive capacity itself. Of course, this is not to assume that adaptive capacity and decline are mutually exclusive but, rather, that if the latter is the ultimate fate of national foreign policy administrations, we have not quite reached that position yet. If this is so, what do the studies in this book reveal?

Categorising EU foreign ministries Whether or not assumptions of ‘convergence’ in EU member state administrative systems are well founded, their characteristics constitute an important starting point for the evaluation of the impact of European integration.3 Clearly, the administrative role and development of foreign ministries reveal the significance of historical context to their current place in the Europeanised policy environment. A simple point of differentiation is to be found in terms of what appear to be strong and weak FMs. Thus, we find, at one end of the scale, FMs occupying a significant position in their administrative hierarchies are at the centre of extensive national diplomatic systems. Forces of domestic and international change may well circumscribe their influence, but it remains significant. In describing the Danish experience, for example, Jørgensen identifies several factors, some external, others internal, that have contributed to what he concludes is a ‘strong’ FM. This general distinction appears to be repeated in many of the national settings. But it is the complex interplay of factors underpinning the variety of experiences outlined in this book, which rewards further research. Another point of differentiation emerges on the domestic front where the fabric of the national administrative culture and the place of the FM within it are significant. Although hard to quantify, the factors of prestige and status within bureaucratic structures are ones that help to explain the role and general significance of the foreign ministry. In many cases, the latter is amongst the oldest departments of state (Austria, Denmark, France, Portugal). In the case of France, Morisse-Schilbach notes that it developed the first of the ‘modern’ foreign ministries and its administrative and political heads are accorded high status. Elsewhere, as with the UK, the foreign ministry has historically shared the conduct of external relations with other major departments (in this case, the former India Office, Colonial Office and Commonwealth Relations Office) but has become the residuary of these former manifestations of an imperial past. Hellema, in the case of the Netherlands, describes a situation of historical weakness. Before 1945, he notes, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs was regarded as weak and, to use his term, a ‘luxury’, reflecting perceptions of the significance of the international environment. Closely aligned to issues of status are those generated by interactions between the political and administrative environments. Not infrequently (as

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in the case of Germany) the foreign ministry has been associated with a political party and has benefited from strong political leadership. Neuhold makes a similar point when suggesting that the political weight of the Austrian foreign ministry can be as vital a factor in its capacity to discharge a significant role as its legal competences vis-à-vis other departments such as the finance ministry. In the French case, Morisse-Schilbach regards what she terms ‘the osmosis between the political and administrative spheres’ – the product of socialisation amongst the political and administrative élites, the interchange between them and the role of civil servants in the cabinet system – as potential strengths in the Quai d’Orsay’s position. In the case of Italy, Zucconi describes a situation where the foreign ministry became, from the late 1940s, a preserve of the Christian Democratic Party (CDP). A succession of high-profile CDP foreign ministers was to result in the association of senior FM officials with the names of their patrons: Fanfaniani or Andreottiani, for example. This, he suggests, was to contribute to inertia and a resistance to reform as other European foreign ministries engaged in a series of restructuring exercises. Another significant element in the equation relates to norms within the bureaucratic culture. Aspirations to assume a dominant role in the management of international policy have resulted in a growing foreign ministry preoccupation with coordination. Yet some bureaucratic environments are more sympathetic to this goal than others. Whereas France and the UK are regarded as valuing the objectives inherent in high levels of policy coordination, others are less inclined to do so. In Germany, for example, Regelsberger points to the principle of ministerial autonomy, which results in both inter-departmental and intra-departmental competition, thus undermining the coordination imperative. Hellema notes a similar culture of departmental autonomy in the Dutch case. Inevitably, this will tend to favour the sectoral ministries over those such as the foreign ministry, assigned a more general role in the development and implementation of international policy and inclined to stress the need for coordination. Elsewhere, the picture is not so clear. Tonra describes a situation where the Irish Foreign Ministry before 1945 was regarded as the ‘Cinderella department’, whereas it has now assumed the status as second in the bureaucratic hierarchy after the finance ministry. In the Spanish instance, the picture that emerges is of a department that has not enjoyed high status, political influence or adequate resources, but which has succeeded in defending its position in the markedly changed environment since the fall of the Franco regime. Closely linked to these internal issues are those relating to the international environment. The significance of a country as an international player is clearly reflected in the role and status of the FM. In the case of Austria, the foreign ministry has had to reinvent itself as the country moved from its position at the core of a multinational empire, to a neutral state after

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1945, and thence to membership of the EU. The larger member states, such as France, Germany and the UK, with historical global links matched by extensive diplomatic networks, have correspondingly prominent foreign ministries. But it is evident that even for the smaller states, changes in their international circumstances have impacted on the foreign policy machinery. Thus Correia attributes the growing perceived importance of Portugal’s international environment since the 1974 revolution to a strengthening of the foreign ministry’s role. In very different circumstances, Tonra describes how the Irish foreign ministry lost its ‘Cinderella’ status as post-war international developments increased its salience. As with Denmark, economic factors have been of central importance. The Irish Department of External Affairs took the lead in formulating policy in the European Recovery Programme, although as domestic policy became internationalised in the context of the post-war multilateral institutions, the baton appears to have passed to the Department of Industry and Commerce. Whereas in the Danish situation, the impact of multilateralism reinforced the traditional image of the centrality of international economic relations to the foreign ministry’s work, in the case of Ireland, a growing activism in the United Nations helped to define the Irish foreign ministry’s role in terms of high politics, leaving trade and economic issues to other departments. Jørgensen also points to the importance of development aid as a dimension of Denmark’s international policy and the fact that the unit responsible for this is located within the foreign ministry. On the reverse side of the coin, the familiar theme of the diminution of the foreign–domestic divide due to growing interdependence and globalisation runs as a leitmotif throughout all the studies in this book. However, whilst this comprises part of the reality that all foreign ministries have had to confront, the picture is more complex than is often presented. Molina and Rodrigo (Spain) make a significant point in arguing for a more subtle evaluation, pointing out that the relationships between the foreign ministry and other departments should not be reduced to a simple zero-sum game. In different ways (and this becomes clear in evaluations of the role of the FM in the EU policy milieu) many of the chapters point to similar conclusions; namely, that the assumption of internecine conflict between foreign and sectoral policy ministries can be greatly exaggerated. To a considerable degree this will depend on the efficacy of coordination processes. Where these are effective, as Allen suggests in the UK case, there is little evidence of internal bureaucratic conflict. A contrasting situation, however, can be found in the case of Italy where intra-bureaucratic tensions (due in part to a relatively high level of politicisation) are more notable. A common mode of bureaucratic – and political – conflict relates to the allocation of resources. Here, foreign ministries are likely to find themselves fighting for funding – alongside domestic departments. The goal of finance ministries is to restrict government spending, whether domestic or international in its nature.

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Overall, the picture of the contemporary foreign ministry that emerges from the studies in this book is marked by paradox. On the one hand, the management of international policy has become more diversified. This is not simply so in purely bureaucratic terms as sectoral departments seek direct access to the international environment, but also in a much broader sense as civil society organisations become increasingly articulate as actors on the international scene. On the other, foreign ministries generally continue to enjoy a high status – partly as a result of their long-standing significance as international representatives of national governments – and they are being asked to do more with fewer resources. In this sense, there is little suggestion that they have become irrelevant. But how does this translate into the more specific realm of the EU?

Foreign ministries and the EU Obviously, the position and role of the foreign ministry in the context of the European integration project reflects the changed circumstances of member states’ international policy environments. The fact that, as Neuhold notes in the Austrian case, foreign policy is now enmeshed in a ‘continuous debate’ within the framework of the Union carries with it implications for both the substance and process of international policy. As with the other smaller states, Austria is part of a major actor on the world stage. This creates added opportunities but also demands – a theme echoed, for example, in the chapters on Sweden, Finland, Ireland and Denmark. One result appears to be that the foreign ministry, at least in some circumstances, has benefited from Europeanisation. Tonra (Ireland) and Correia (Portugal) draw the conclusion that the respective foreign ministries have been strengthened by European integration, whilst Allen (UK), argues that the centralising tendencies in decision-making, which are to a considerable extent the result of Europeanisation, have benefited the FCO. Even in the Belgian situation, where as Coolsaet and Voet demonstrate, the FM is challenged not only by developing supranationalism but also by subnationalism, it has succeeded in establishing what they term a ‘pre-eminent’ role in the shaping and implementation of Belgian European policy. An exception to the overall positive note is to be found in Finland where Antola reports that the main effect of EU membership has been to strengthen the Prime Minister’s Office at the expense of the foreign ministry. Consequently, the latter has come to be regarded, in some circumstances, as merely a ‘mailbox’ between the permanent representation in Brussels and the domestic departments in Helsinki. But as is suggested in the Introduction (Chapter 1), the international policy environment in which foreign ministries are constrained to operate is a complex one and this is even more the case at the specifically European level. Thus the observations on the impact of Europeanisation on FMs tend

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to differentiate between the three pillars of the Maastricht Treaty (Treaty on European Union – TEU). As for the first pillar (internal market, agriculture, environment, etc.) and the third pillar (justice, home affairs, immigration, police cooperation, asylum, etc.), it is clearly the case that EU membership has reinforced the already noticeable trend to ‘domesticate’ the conduct of international policy. Sectoral departments are now well-versed in responding to the internationalisation of their policy spheres and, as is to be expected, this is particularly the case in the EU. The newest example of this is the way in which ministries of the interior, once outside the purview of the European policy-making environment, have been engaged in ever closer cooperation following Maastricht’s introduction of European competence in their policy area. Also, as several authors note, the growing role of domestic ministries in the shaping and conduct of international policy is manifest in the composition of the permanent representations to the EU, in which diplomats constitute a minority. In this sense, as we anticipated, none of the papers sustain an image of the foreign ministry as the unchallenged switchboard through which member state interactions with Brussels are controlled, but neither have they been reduced to marginalised vestiges of a passed age. Not surprisingly, however, it is in the second pillar of the TEU, the intergovernmental processes of the CFSP, where foreign ministries emerge as having the greatest scope for initiative. Finland exemplifies how the CFSP is regarded as having increased the overall significance of the foreign ministry as a bureaucratic actor, compensating for its otherwise diminished status vis-à-vis the Prime Minister’s Department. The significance of the CFSP in this context relates to its general impact on the conduct of foreign policy and is particularly marked in the case of smaller member states. Hence Tonra observes that the CFSP has ‘increased the capacity’ of Irish diplomacy. Greater involvement has brought with it greater demands on the diplomatic system reflected in a doubling of overseas representation between 1970 and 1997. The theme of increased demand for diplomacy producing increased demands on diplomats is echoed throughout the book, although some other foreign ministries have been forced to accommodate these pressures within existing – or even diminished – resources. In Denmark, Jørgensen notes that the pressures resulting from the consultative and joint action requirements of the CFSP have partly been met by the overseas aid unit, Danida, being drawn into CFSP work. In organisational terms, the demands of CFSP have been most typically met by the upgrading and/or relocation within the foreign ministry of a CFSP section or unit. In the case of Portugal, for example, this involved the upgrading of a small unit and its transfer to the political department rather than the West European Division. Such developments appear to reflect evolutionary processes in the way in which national governments have come to regard the CFSP. MorisseSchilbach describes how such conflicting perceptions and interests in the French situation have prevented the bringing together of Community and

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CFSP affairs. As a result, the organisational response of the Quai d’Orsay to the demands of the CFSP reflects a struggle between the COREPER-based structure for European Community matters and the Political and Security Committee-based structure for CFSP issues. It is not unlikely that this struggle will be replicated in tensions between foreign ministries and ministries of defence as the European Security and Defence Policy, announced in the Amsterdam Treaty and fleshed out at European Councils since Helsinki in December 2000, becomes operational. Bilateralism and the EU One of the key themes in most of the member state studies is the role of bilateral diplomacy in the EU environment. In virtually every instance, a strong case is made for its continuing significance, albeit one that is adapting to the needs of governments (and non-state actors) in the changing EU policy processes and the broader global context. Several authors draw attention to the impact of communications and information technology (CIT) and its impact, inter alia, on the relationship between embassies and foreign ministries. The general verdict is that embassies are increasingly involved in the shaping as well as the implementation of policy. But the discussion moves us on from the traditional and often unrewarding debate concerning the demise of bilateralism and the dominance of multilateral diplomacy, for the EU negotiating environment is too complex to permit the acceptance of such simplistic propositions. This is reflected in Correia’s chapter on Portugal, in which he suggests that EU negotiations embrace a mode of ‘bi-multilateral’ diplomacy, ‘bilateral in its procedures but multilateral in its purposes’. The reasons underlying this conclusion are to be found, firstly, in the nature of intra-EU diplomacy. Correia and Regelsberger (Germany) relate the continuing significance of bilateral diplomatic structures to the increase in majority voting and the consequent need for governments to engage in coalition-building on issues of key importance to them. This changes somewhat the potential role of the embassy in member states, however. Rather than gathering and transmitting large quantities of information, which can be found elsewhere, the aim is to provide detailed analysis and interpretation of the position that other governments are adopting on policy issues. A second factor is to be found in the CFSP environment where, as Keukeleire suggests, the much more limited power of the EU in the second pillar means that ‘bilateral diplomatic contacts remain essential for creating the required majorities or consensus, for formulating compromises within the Council, and for mapping and reconciling the member states’ – sometimes contradictory – interests and sensitivities’.4 A third point relates to the role of embassies in third countries and the requirements of the TEU for cooperation between national diplomatic and consular missions and Commission Delegations. We discuss this issue at greater length below, but it is interesting to note that several contributors to

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this book – particularly from the smaller member states – draw the conclusion that CFSP has not reduced the need for embassies in third countries but has actually increased their significance as third states attach more importance to them as part of the EU ‘whole’. To this external pressure for presence must also be added the recurring job of representing the EU as a whole when each member state holds the presidency for a six-month period, and the participation in troikas and regular coordination meeting of EU ambassadorial staff in capitals around the world. Once again, however, the emphasis is on a changing role for the national mission from that of gathering information to sharing information with other missions and Commission Delegations. On an opposing note, Coolsaet (Belgium) identifies another reason for the continuing importance of bilateral diplomacy: namely the greatly increased importance of commercial diplomacy and the search for market share in an increasingly competitive global economy. Clearly, this is one area where there are strict limits to cooperation in the field amongst member state diplomatic missions, and where partnership in politics may take second place to rivalry in economics.

The coordination imperative Coordination has become a dominant theme in contemporary governance. Its salience has been greatly stimulated by the internationalisation and, in the case of EU member states, the Europeanisation of policy processes and the consequent meshing of domestic and international environments. But as many studies have pointed out, modes of policy coordination reflect a range of influences, from institutional cultures and values to pressures from outside the national setting – Brussels being the dominant influence in the EU case.5 Thus, it was to be expected that the contributions to this book would reflect, on the one hand, a general concern with coordination whilst, at the same time, differ in terms of its precise forms and the responses to it demonstrated by foreign ministries. Alongside the not infrequently identified differences between countries such as the UK and France, where coordination is a major value in the bureaucratic system and Germany and the Netherlands where it is less so, there are other interesting sidelights on the coordination issue. In the Swedish case, for example, Ekengren and Sundelius describe how membership of the EU has challenged one of the core values of the Swedish policy processes – consensus building – as an increasingly Europeanised policy timetable has moved outside national control. This simultaneously enhances the demand for coordination but makes it harder to achieve. What clearly emerges is the multilayered character of the coordination problem, reflecting the precise nature of the individual political and administrative systems. The most familiar layer is the horizontal one, comprising the relationships between the foreign ministry and the sectoral departments

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whose capacity to operate in the European and broader international environments has greatly increased. In certain situations, this has challenged the foreign ministry, reduced its freedom of manoeuvre in international and European policy spheres and has often been accompanied by a shift in activity to centralised bodies such as prime ministerial departments. But the picture is more finely drawn than is often suggested. As the chapters on France and the UK suggest, coordination is not an easy task even for centralised agencies such as the French SGCI, nor is it a simple zero-sum game. However, if it is the case that foreign ministries have been adept at responding to these horizontal challenges, they have done so not in terms of successfully asserting their undisputed role of gatekeeper, but through shared modes of coordination suggested in the boundary-spanner image set out in the Introduction. The terms that reflect this are scattered throughout the foregoing chapters. Hence Coolsaet acknowledges that the relative success of the Belgian Foreign Ministry in establishing a coordinating role is dependent on its perceived character as ‘neutral honest broker’ whilst Tonra employs the terms ‘coach’ and ‘referee’ in the Irish case. A second layer of coordination is to be found along the vertical plane, which has grown in importance as subnational regions have come to assume an increasing significance in the EU. As the chapters on Austria, Belgium, Germany and Spain demonstrate, regional authorities are not only concerned to acquire greater influence in the shaping of national policy, but to establish a direct presence in Brussels. In the German case, in addition to the problems of interministerial coordination at the centre, the growing role of the Länder in EU affairs, reinforced by the Single European Act and Maastricht Treaty, has become another facet of the coordination problem confronting the foreign ministry. Since 1987, the right of the Länder to be consulted on issues within their competence, to participate in German delegations and to maintain offices in Brussels, adds to the pressures of fragmentation. The consequence of this is a situation wherein Germany’s European policy making ‘is characterized by a weak horizontal coordination leading to a “bureaucratized policy-making” which lacks … strong political impetus’.6 Vertical fragmentation in policy making is most developed in the Belgian case. Indeed, it has been suggested that the credibility of Belgium as an EU member state ‘will depend on the efficiency of the internal coordination between the federal state, the regions and the communities’.7 Against this background, the Foreign Ministry plays a key coordinating role both at central administrative level and between the centre and the regions and communities. In the Spanish case, the foreign ministry appears to have adopted a less facilitative role in the face of the growing demands from the Autonomous Communities for a voice in Europe and beyond. A third layer of coordination is less well-defined and is emerging against the backdrop of the increasing involvement of civil society organisations, particularly NGOs, in the extended public–private networks that are now

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required in the management of international policy. Foreign ministries are therefore increasingly required to reach out to these organisations, as reflected in processes of engagement with NGOs at the EU level.8 Coordination as strategy Coordination, as suggested in the Introduction to this book, has to be seen not only as a rational political-administrative response to ever more complex policy milieus, but also as a bureaucratic strategy in which public service departments seek to defend their roles and positions as these are challenged by other bureaucratic actors. This is even more so in the case of foreign ministries which have, to a greater or lesser extent depending on their precise circumstances, tended to rely on what they have projected as their special position as the key intermediary between the domestic and international policy environments. Despite the fact that this claim – enshrined in the gatekeeper image – frequently rests on dubious historical foundations, it has served as one strategy for asserting a key coordinating role in government. To a greater or lesser degree, each of the thirteen foreign ministries surveyed here have been forced to adapt to a situation where such claims are of diminishing value for the reasons set out in each of the chapters. The broad themes are familiar, have been discussed in the Introduction and Chapter 2 and need not be set out again here. Suffice it to say that the erosion of policy boundaries, notably the international–domestic divide, has empowered sectoral departments to operate with increasing confidence outside their national settings without the need for specialist diplomatic intermediaries. The integrative pressures of the EU have reinforced this trend to a high degree. At the same time, there are significant variations. Amongst some of the smaller member states, the foreign ministry has – as in the case of Ireland – assumed a more prominent role as a consequence of EU membership. But in every case there appears to be agreement that, whilst foreign ministries cannot assert a position in the policy process based on modes of ‘positive’ coordination, they have been highly active in establishing themselves as significant players in more diffused modes of policy coordination. Indeed, the quest for a coordinating role emerges as the key adaptive strategy. Not unexpectedly, however, there are variations as to the ways in which it is achieved. A first point to make is that some foreign ministries start – as in the case of the UK and France – with an advantage. Not only is coordination highly valued in their political and bureaucratic systems, but the foreign ministry enjoys high status in their administrative hierarchies. But even here, as Allen and Morisse-Schilbach demonstrate, coordination has become a much more diffuse process in which the foreign ministry has had to be pro-active in maintaining its position. What emerges, then, are a number of adaptive strategies tuned to the specific needs of national environments and the impact that EU membership has had on them. In their study of the impact of internationalisation on

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foreign policy management in Sweden and Finland, Karvonen and Sundelius suggest a variety of means through which coordination can be achieved in the conduct of international policy. Utilising and adapting some of these categories and applying them to the EU situation, we can identify at least three strategies for conserving the foreign ministry that emerge from the foregoing studies: expertise, representation and linkage, and persuasion. The first of these, expertise, is, perhaps, the most problematic. As is obviously the case, one consequence of EU membership has been to undermine the claim of foreign ministries to be the sole repository of expertise in dealing with Brussels. Yet an underlying theme in several of the papers is the continued respect that diplomats enjoy in terms of their negotiating skills. Perhaps the most clearly drawn example is that of Belgium, where it appears that the acceptance of a continuing major role for the foreign ministry rests on its skill in mediating between the Communities and Regions as well as negotiating within the external environment. Related to this is the notable adherence to, or development of, geographical desk structures within foreign ministries. As Allen suggests in the case of the UK, where the FCO has resisted pressures to adopt a functional structure, to do so would be to weaken the standing of the foreign ministry in the face of the enhanced role of the sectoral ministries in EU negotiations. It has to be acknowledged, of course, that this may be a relatively slender basis on which to rest, inviting the question as to whether, over time, traditional diplomatic skills will cease to be regarded as sufficiently distinct to sustain the foreign ministry’s position. Ultimately, it is likely to be bound up with the issue of bilateralism within the multilayered policy environment and the degree to which this is accorded a significant role. The terms representation and linkage refer to related but distinct modes of coordination strategy. Their common feature is that they seek to ensure a role for the foreign ministry in the Brussels-focused coordinating stakes by diffusing the presence of the foreign ministry within the national administrative structures. In the case of Italy, Zucconi paints a picture of a reformresistant ministry, which has sought to defend its status against the challenges from European integration by assigning its officials to other departments. Whilst such formal modes of representation of the foreign ministry within the bureaucracy are not unknown, a more common strategy is that of linkages through cooption and exchanges of staff. The linkages within the French administrative system are well known, as are the bases on which they rest. But elsewhere movements of staff between the foreign ministry and other key ministries, particularly prime ministerial offices, are also well developed. This poses the interesting question of the nature of the foreign ministry as an organisational entity and its boundaries within the broader administrative system. It also raises once again the validity of simple conflict-based assumptions regarding the relationship between departments in the management of international policy.

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The third strategy, persuasion, is representative of what might be termed ‘soft’ coordination strategies. Here, the foreign ministry seeks to underpin its influence by instilling the need for coordination within the politico-administrative system. The by-product of what is an objectively sensible bureaucratic principle is the consequent socialising of the bureaucracy into its acceptance as a dominant value. Jørgensen, for example, describes how coordination has become a reflex action in Denmark. The most interesting example cited in this volume is that of Sweden. In the past, the doctrine of neutrality provided a set of values, which both guided the actions of Swedish bureaucrats in their international activities and also underpinned the role of the foreign ministry as ‘guardian of the faith’. The disappearance of this bastion of coordination has, according to Ekengren and Sundelius, been replaced by an ‘emerging new dogma’, namely the need for strong centralised coordination as a means of increasing Swedish influence in the EU.

Images and futures We began with a question and an assumption. The question focused on the reasons for the continued existence of foreign ministries in the light of the rapid changes experienced at both the international and domestic levels over the last half century. More specifically, why do they and their associated diplomatic systems appear able to sustain a role within an increasingly integrated EU policy environment? Part of the answer, it was suggested, was likely to be found in the following assumption: namely, that foreign ministries are more complex phenomena than the literature on globalisation and interdependence might lead one to assume. Assertions of uniform patterns of ‘decline’ demand as much critical examination as do the assertions of the need for national ‘gatekeepers’ in the conduct of international policy and the appropriateness of foreign ministries for this role. The studies contained in this volume appear to sustain this assumption and help to provide some answers to the question. We have seen that foreign ministries, although marked by similarities that are represented in part by the continued existence and commonalities of the diplomatic ‘guild’, are differentiated by their bureaucratic and political cultures, the nature of the long-term patterns of internationalisation that their nation states have experienced and the impact of Europeanisation on their domestic structures and policy processes. To a considerable degree, their continuing and evolving role appears to represent success in responding to change that is underpinned by their boundary-spanning capabilities, which enable them to operate in the shifting boundaries that separate complex policy domains. In an environment which imposes increased demands in the face of diminishing resources and, simultaneously, the challenges presented by the twin processes of diffusion and concentration in the management of international and European policy, foreign ministries have demonstrated a considerable degree of adaptive

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capacity. As we have seen, this has focused on the imperative of coordination in which they have become co-participants rather than exclusive practitioners. In doing so, they follow a long tradition in the development of national diplomatic systems and their adaptation to the changing needs of the state and the international system. This has developed from a situation where the separation between domestic and foreign policy, and the machinery for dealing with them, was very indistinct. The eighteenth to the mid-twentieth century witnessed the increasing institutionalisation of foreign policy management and its separation from domestic policy. Since then, the trend has been towards a renewed integration of the two policy spheres, both in terms of substance and process. In the context of the EU, where national institutions are in a process of flux as national bureaucratic and political competencies merge alongside the interpenetration of national and European competencies, the role of foreign ministries is increasingly subject to patterns of bureaucratic politics. Arguably, their role in boundary management processes will be increasingly valued, but at the same time contested, as the functions of managing relationships across political boundaries and mediating between actors whose perspectives may be internationalised, but whose operating environment is still influenced to a considerable degree by the territorial state, are recognised as critical. Herein lie many of the tensions that surround coordination conflicts. Such a situation clearly poses major issues regarding the functions and structures of foreign ministries, which in some respects are not new (the respective merits of geographical versus functional structures is one instance) but are being played out in new contexts. None of this, of course, should lead to an assumption that these strategies of adaptation will be successful. Even less does it mean that the foreign ministry, as the core of national diplomatic systems and as symbols of the territorial state, will be a permanent feature of the governmental scene. The foreign ministry, as with the nation state and the EU itself, is undergoing a process of evolution the present nature of which I have termed a form of boundary-spanning activity. But the end-state is uncertain. One possibility, as Spence’s Chapter 2 indicates, is that these national diplomatic systems themselves will wither away as Europe-based structures of foreign policy making and diplomatic representation develop. In short, to restate the point made at the beginning of this chapter, we are in a condition of ‘betweenness’ operating at three interlinked levels: that of the European project, the nature of the state as it adapts to the pressures of globalisation and regionalisation, and the role and structure of the foreign ministry itself. Although the final outcome might be the transition from national to Europeanised diplomatic processes in which national diplomatic systems have been rendered redundant, we are presently confronted by a hybrid diplomatic arena in which EU member state foreign ministries play

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a significant role, if one that fails to accord with traditional assumptions and stereotypes.

Notes 1. B. Laffan, R. O’Donnell, and M. Smith, Europe’s Experimental Union: Rethinking Integration (London: Routledge, 2000) p. 189. 2. Ibid., p. 193. 3. On convergence, see D. Rometsch and W. Wessels, ‘European Union and national institutions’ in D. Rometsch and W. Wessels (eds) The European Union and Member States: Towards Institutional Fusion? (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996). 4. S. Keukeleire, ‘The European Union as a Diplomatic Actor’, DSP Discussion Papers, No. 71 (Leicester: Centre for the Study of Diplomacy, 2000) p. 5. 5. See H. Kassim, B. Guy Peters, and V. Wright, The National Co-ordination of EU Policy: the Domestic Level (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000) pp. 252–3. 6. D. Rometsch, ‘The Federal Republic of Germany’ in Rometsch and Wessels, op. cit., p. 76. 7. T. de Wilde d’Estmael and C. Franck, ‘Belgium’, in Rometsch and Wessels, op. cit., p. 59. 8. On this theme see, for example, J. Mackie, ‘Bringing civil society into foreign and security policy’, Challenge Europe: On-Line Journal, 28 February 2001: www.theepc.be/Challenge_Europe/text/memo.asp?ID⫽200.

Index acquis communautaire, 28, 182 adaptation, 5, 6, 274 adaptation strategies, 285 Aland Question, 96 Amsterdam Treaty, 19, 122 Ansell, C. K., 10 arbitration, 24–5 Aspinall, M., 4 Austria, 37–59, 277 admission to EU, 37 and CESDP, 47 and CFSP, 47, 52 and COREU, 2, 47 Council for Questions of Austrian Integration Policy, 42 diplomatic and consular representations abroad, 50–2 EC development cooperation, 49 Economic Chamber Austria, 42 electronic documentation and information system (ELAK), 45 Federal Ministries Act (1986), 41 Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 37, 275: expenditure on, 53; impact of EU membership, 46–9; legal and consular affairs, 48; organisational structure, 44–6; reform, 40–1; staffing, 45 foreign cultural policy, 49, 56n28 foreign policy, 38–9: legal framework, 41–2 historical background, 37–9 international cultural affairs, 48 international cultural exchanges, 48–9 Länder, 47, 51 missions abroad, 53 National Bank, 47, 51 neutral status, 37, 39 Permanent Representation to the EU, 51 referendum on EU membership, 44 relations with EU, legal features, 42–4 Aznar, José Maria, 216, 217

Barcelona process, 22 Belgium, 60–74 basic statistics, 72–3 bilateral diplomacy, 280 and CFSP, 69–70 diplomatic posts, 62 export promotion, 62 federalism, 63 federal structure, 64–5 foreign policy, 64–5 foreign trade, 64 Inter-ministerial Economic Commission (IEC), 62 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), 60–1: and European integration, 61–3; internal organisation, 65–9; reform, 70–71 NGOs, 66 Permanent Representation, 68, 69 state reforms, 63 Berrill, Kenneth, 257 Berrill Report, 252 bilateral departments, 22 bilateral diplomacy, 7, 204, 279, 280 bilateralism, and the EU, 279–80 Bildt, Carl, 239 Bjerregaard, R., 82 Blair, Tony, 260–1 boundaries, 10–11 ‘boundary-spanner’ image, 4, 9–14, 284–5 Bretton Woods, 147 British Trade International, 268 Brusselsisation, 27 Bulmer, S., 4, 5 Burch, M., 5 bureaucratic culture, 275 Carlsson, Ingvar, 239 ‘central agency’ role, 9, 10 CESDP see Common European Security and Defence Policy CFSP see Common Foreign and Security Policy

287

288 Index Christensen, J. P., 82, 83 civil society, representatives, 7 Coleman, W., 7 commerce, 6 Committee for Civil Aspects of Crisis Management, 31 Committee on Civil Law Matters, 20 Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), 8, 20, 21, 23, 29, 30, 120, 181, 230 Committee of State Secretaries, Germany, 136–7 Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP), 47, 267 Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), 2, 4, 7, 8, 26, 33, 69, 85, 87, 105, 117, 205 and Austria, 47, 52 and Belgium, 69–70 Committee on Administrative Affairs (COADM), 8 contours of system, 30–2 and Denmark, 278 and foreign policy, 278–9 and France, 119–21 and Germany, 136, 137, 138, 140, 141 growth, 25–30 impact on Irish diplomatic network, 157–8 influence on Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 203–4 and the Netherlands, 187 and Portuguese embassies, 204–5 and Portuguese foreign policy, 202–3 and Spain, 222, 230, 231 and Sweden, 243, 245–6 and the United Kingdom, 267 Commonwealth of Independent States, 202 communications and information technology (CIT), 279 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), 77 conservatism, 6 consulates, 50 context of foreign ministries, 14 convergence, 6 Cook, Robin, 260–1, 266, 268 coordination, 13–14, 19, 280–2 and foreign ministries, 21–2

as a strategy, 282–4 COREPER see Committee of Permanent Representatives COREU see European Correspondents Cipher Network Council of Europe, 31, 77 Council Meetings, 21 Council of Ministers, 20 Portuguese Presidency, 202 Council of Ministers for European Union Affairs (CMEUA), Portugal, 199 Danish Institute of International Affairs (DUPI), 87–8 Davignon Committee, 69 Delegations, 8 Delors, Jacques, 253 Denmark, 75–94 and CFSP, 278 coordination of EU policies, 86–7 Danida, 76, 78, 84, 87 domestic and foreign policy, 77 embassies, 85–6 EU membership, 79–82 Folketing, 82, 83 information technology, 88 and multilateral institutions, 76–7 overseas missions, 90 Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 75, 274: budget reductions, 84–5; domestic constituencies, 87–8; expenditure on, 89; organisation and agendas, 76–7; organisational reform, 77–9, 83–4; and the Prime Minister’s Department, 81–2; reform debate, 82–3 and the Single European Market, 79–80 and the Third World, 77 DGIA (Directorate General IA) (European Union), 87 diplomatic integration, 3, 32–3 ‘diplomatic sites’, 7 diplomatic socialisation, 8 diplomatic style, convergence, 8 domestic interests, 6 domestic ministries, and international policy, 278

Index 289 domestic policy, 18 role of foreign ministry, 18–21 Duncan Report, 252 Durão Barroso, J. M., 196 EFTA see European Free Trade Association embassies, 50, 52, 140 Denmark, 85–6 Ireland, 152, 158 Portugal, 204–5 role, 279–80 EMU see European Monetary Union EPC see European Political Cooperation Ersbøll, N., 82 ESDP see European Security and Defence Policy EU see European Union European Community for Coal and Steel, 180 European Community pillar, and Spain, 227–30 European coordinating divisions, 19 European Correspondents Cipher Network (COREU), 30, 52, 69, 70, 88, 203, 204 and Austria, 2, 47 European Council, 23, 65, 81, 182 European Economic Area (EEA), 97, 239, 240 European Free Trade Association (EFTA) Association Agreement with Finland, 104 and Finland, 96 European integration, 2 and the Netherlands, 179–83 and Portugal, 199–200, 204 response of foreign ministries, 2, 3 Europeanisation, 273, 277–8 impact at national level, 4 impact on Ireland, 156–7 European legislation, 19 European Monetary Union (EMU), 163, 206, 215 and Italy, 171 European policy environment, and foreign ministries, 7–9

European Political Cooperation (EPC), 2, 26, 69, 136, 140, 155, 158, 201–2, 205 and France, 119 influence on Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 203–4 and Portuguese embassies, 204–5 and Portuguese foreign policy, 202–3 European Recovery Programme (ERP), 146 European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), 4, 26, 31, 33 European Union Council, 199 European Union Departments, functions, 21 European Union (EU), 1–2 and bilateralism, 279–80 external presence, 2 and foreign ministries, 277–80 foreign policy, 26 and Germany, 136–7 policy making and negotiation, 18–19 policy processes as ‘nested games’, 4 relations with Austria, 42–4 and Spain, 227–31 evaluating foreign ministries, 4–6 expertise, 283 external relations, 18 Fatcett, D., 265 Financial Times, 23, 25 Finland, 95–110 Association Agreement with EFTA, 104 coordination of EU affairs, 106–7 diplomatic representation; inter-war period, 98–9: post-war period, 99–100 diplomatic service presence, 199 and EFTA, 96 EU membership, 97–8, 102, 104 EU secretariat, 105–6 Foreign Ministry: organisational reform, 99; professionalism, 100–1; reform of 1998, 101–4; resource framework, 107; structural reforms, 100 foreign policy, 96–7, 100, 105 foreign policy management, 5–6 foreign representation, 95–6

290 Index Finland – continued and Germany, 97 historical background, 95–8 independence, 95, 98 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, expenditure on, 107 neutrality, 97 Paris Peace Treaty (1947), 97 and the Soviet Union, 96, 99 treaty with the Soviet Union (1948), 97 Fischer, P., 85 foreign–domestic divide, 276 foreign ministries categorising, 274–7 and coordination, 21–2, 280–4 and the EU, 277–80 and the European policy environment, 7–9 evaluating, 4–6 response to European integration, 2, 3 role, 1, 2, 3 role in domestic policy, 18–21 foreign policy, 10 Austria, 38–9, 41–2 Belgium, 64–5 EU, 26 Finland, 96–7, 100, 105 France, 111–14, 121–3 Germany, 132–3, 134, 135–6, 140, 141 Ireland, 165–6, 170 Italy, 165–6, 170 Netherlands, 177, 186 Portugal, 191, 193–4, 198–9, 202–3, 295 Spain, 212–17, 223, 226, 232 United Kingdom, 255, 258, 262, 265, 266 foreign policy management, 3 Sweden and Finland, 5–6 France, 111–31, 282, 283 bureaucratic culture, 275 democratisation, 121–2 and EPC, 119 and the EU, 115–17 European policy, 115–17 External Economic Relations Division (DREE), 122 Faroux plan, 121 Foreign Ministry (Quai d’Orsay), 111–14, 115–16, 274, 275, 276: and CFSP, 119–21; and the EU,

117–19; expenditure, 125; and foreign policy, 121–2; reform, 113, 114; strategies and responses, 117–19; structure, 124 foreign policy, 111–14, 121–3 Racone Report (1969), 13 SCE (Service de Coopération Economique), 117 SGCI (General Secretariat of the Interministerial Committee for European Economic Questions), 116, 117, 118, 119 Védrine reform, 120–1 G-7, 169 ‘gatekeeper image’, 4, 9–14, 19, 21, 25, 262, 284 General Affairs Councils, 23, 29, 31 Germany, 132–46 bureaucratic culture, 275 and CFSP, 136, 137, 138, 140, 141 Chancellery, 139 coalition agreement, 134 Committee of State Secretaries, 136–7 diplomatic missions, 142 and the EU, 136–7 Federal Chancellor’s office, 25 Foreign Ministry (Auswärtiges Amt), 132, 133, 276: adaptation and reform, 134–6; and the EU, 136–7, 138–9; number of personnel, 141–2; organisation and agendas, 133–4; personnel cuts, 135; reform, 136; strategies and responses, 137–41 foreign policy, 132–3, 134, 141: multilateralism, 140; ‘output’, 135–6 Foreign Service Act (1990), 141–2 foreign service cooperation, 140 information technology, 135, 140 Ministry of Economic Affairs, 24, 133 representation in EU institutions, 141 unification, 132 globlisation, 12 González, Felipe, 216, 217 governmental involvement, 7 Gulf War Second Gulf War, 122 and Spain, 216

Index 291 Hain, Peter, 255, 268 Hanf, K., 4, 5, 9 Heisbourg Report, 126n18 Helsinki Final Act (1975), 100 Henderson, N., 257 Henrikson, A. K., 12 High Representative, 27 role, 29 Hill, C., 2 historical institutionalist approach, 5 Ibero-American Summit, 196 IDA Ireland, 150 information, sharing, 85–6 information flows, 13, 19 information technology Denmark, 88 Germany, 135, 140 United Kingdom, 263 innovation, 6 integration of diplomats, 3, 32–3 intergovernmentalism, 26–7 international environment, 275–6 internationalisation, 273 international policy, and domestic ministries, 278 Ireland, 146–62, 282 basic statistics, 159 coordination of international interests, 150–1 Dáil, 149 Department of External Affairs: departmental status, 147; diplomatic service, 150; establishment, 146; organisation and agenda, 148–52; reform and adaptation, 151–2; reorganisation, 147; role in Europe, 148; structure and organisation, 149–50 Department of Finance, 154 Department of Foreign Affairs, 154–5, 275: European issues, 153–4, 159; reform and adaptation, 155–6; strategies and responses, 156 Department of Justice, 154, 155 Department of the Taoiseach, 153, 154 diplomatic impact of CFSP, 157 EC membership, 148, 149, 153 embassies, 152, 158 Europeanisation, 156–7

foreign policy, 149: European dimension, 153 interdepartmental committees, 154 ‘Ireland House’ concept, 152, 158 Irish Tourism Board, 152 Joint Oireachtas Committee on European Affairs, 151, 156 Minister for Foreign Affairs, 149, 153 Northern Ireland conflict, 149 overseas missions, 155 Permanent Representation (PermRep) in Brussels, 154–5 policy coordination, 152 Strategic Management Initiative (SMI), 152 structural impact of CFSP on the diplomatic network, 157–8 Technical councils, 154 and the UN, 147 White Paper on foreign policy, 151, 156, 158 Italy, 163–76, 276, 283 Communist Party (PCI), 166 corruption, 164 Development Assistance Programme, 169–70 and EMU, 171 foreign policy, 165–6, 170 foreign trade, 171 Fornari report, 167–8 Ministry of Defence, 163 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), 166–7: adaptation, 169–70; Division of Commercial Affairs, 164; Division on European Integration, 173–4; personnel, 171–2; reform, 163, 165, 167, 168; reform structure, 173; restructuring, 172; structure 1887–1967, 164–5 Presidential Decree (1967), 163, 165, 167 public administration reform, 172 Jönsson, C., 7 Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), 19 and Spain, 230, 231 K4 committee, 231 Karvonen, L., 5, 13

292 Index Keukeleire, S., 7, 8 Kohler-Koch, B., 7 Kramer, H., 6 Ladrech, R., 4 Laeken European Council (December 2001), 28 Laffan, B., 273 lead ministries, 18, 19–21 League of Nations, 76, 96, 99 linkage, 283 Løj, M., 87 Lubbers, Ruud, 187 Luxembourg Jumbo Meeting, 97 Maastricht Treaty, 8, 34n1, 49, 67, 98, 104, 105, 116, 137–8, 139, 140, 154, 202 pillars, 278 Mandelson, Peter, 255, 259, 261 Manners, I., 5 Marshall Aid, 180 Military committee, 31 Minister or Secretary of State for European Affairs, 24 missions abroad Austria, 53 Denmark, 90 Germany, 142 mobility, 6 Møller, O., 88 multilateral diplomacy, 204, 279 national diplomatic representation systems, 5 national diplomatic systems, 285 national institutions, 285 NATO see North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Netherlands, 177–91 bureaucratic culture, 275 and CFSP, 187 CoCo Han (High level officials), 186 Coordinating Committee for European Cooperation (CoCo), 180, 181, 182 decision making process, 183, 186, 187 EU policy making, 183, 185 foreign economic relations, 180

foreign policy, 177, 186 long term coordination, 186 Minister for Development Cooperation, 178 Ministry of Economic Affairs, 179, 181 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 274: Council for European Affairs (REZ), 180; Department for European Integration (DIE), 180, 181, 185; Directorate-General for European Affairs, 180; Directorates-General, 178, 185; and European integration, 179–83; history, 177–9; personnel, 187–8; reorganisation, 184–6 Permanent Representation, 182–3 Prime Minister’s role, 182, 183 Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR), 184 White Papers (1995), 184, 185 networks, 7 NGOs see Non-Governmental Organisations Nogueira, Franco, 195 Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), 7, 281–2 Belgium, 66 Spain, 213–14 Nordic cooperation, 77 North Atlantic Treaty, 166 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), 39, 89, 166, 180, 212, 214, 216, 218 OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development), 75 OEEC (Organisation for European Economic Cooperation), 75, 180 Ordóñez, F. F., 217 OSCE (Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe), 31, 196 Paris Peace Treaty (1947), 97 Patten, Chris, ix, 30 peacemaking operations, 43 Perl, A., 7

Index 293 Permanent Representation Austria, 51 Belgium, 68, 69 Ireland, 154–5 Netherlands, 182–3 Portugal, 200–1 Spain, 227 United Kingdom, 259, 260 Permanent Representations to the European Union, 18, 22–4 role, 23 staffing, 23 persuasion, 284 Petersberg tasks, 31, 43 Peters, B. G., 9 Plowden Report, 252 Policy Unit, 27, 31 Political and Security Committee (PSC), 27, 30–1 Portugal, 191–212, 279 Agency for Development Assistance, 198 and CFSP, 201–5 Council of Ministers for Development Questions, 207 Council of Ministers for European Union Affairs (CMEUA), 199 democracy, 193 EC membership, 193, 194, 195 embassies, 204–5 Emigration Institute, 195 European Correspondent Service, 203–4 and European integration, 199–200, 204 European Integration Commission (EIC), 194 foreign policy, 191, 193–4, 195, 198–9, 202: and CFSP, 202–3: and ECP, 202–3 General-Directorate for Cooperation, 195 General-Directorate of Political and Economic Affairs, 195 ICEP (Investment and Foreign Trade of Portugal), 206 Institute for Economic Cooperation, 195 Institute for Portuguese Cooperation, 197

Integrated Cooperation Budget, 207 Interministerial Commission for Community Affairs (ICCA), 201 Minister for Foreign Affairs, 199, 200 Ministry of Foreign Affairs: budget, 207–8; European dimension of role, 198–201; evolution of political role, 191–4; and foreign relations, 205–7; GeneralDirectorate of Bilateral Relations, 196; General-Directorate of Community Affairs (GDCA), 196, 200; General-Directorate of Consular Affairs and Portuguese Communities, 197; GeneralDirector of Foreign Policy, 197–8; influence of CFSP, 203–4; influence of EPC, 203–4; international representation, 208; personnel, 208; personnel policy, 200; reform, 194–8; structure, 196 National Plan for Development Cooperation, 206–7 Permanent Representative in Brussels (REPER), 200–1 policy-making procedures, 197 Presidency of Council of Ministers, 202 Prime Minister’s role, 199, 200 Secret Services, 206 Powell, Charles, 252 prime ministers’ offices, 18, 24 Quendler, F., 6 Racine Report (1969), 13 Rapid Reaction Force, 28 representation, 283 Richardson, J., 4 Rio Conference 1992, 200 Roland Berger and Partners, 135 Rosenau, J. N., 12 Rosenberg, R. L., 221 St Malo initiative, 33 Schengen Agreement, 205, 206, 231 Schneider, G., 4 Second Gulf War, 122 security policy, 34

294 Index Single European Market, and Denmark, 79–80 Smith, M. J., 259 Soetendorp, B., 4, 5, 9 Solana, Javier, 27 Sotelo, Calvo, 216 sovereignty, 12 Soviet Union, and Finland, 96 Spain, 212–38, 276 Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional (AECI), 220, 221 Autonomous Communities (ACs), 212–13 central government and foreign policy networks, 214–17 Cervantes Institute, 221–2, 225 and CFSP, 222, 230, 231 Council of Ministers, 230 cultural promotion, 221 development aid, 225 and the EU, 227–31 and the European Community pillar, 227–30 foreign policy, 212–17, 223, 226, 232 and the Gulf War, 216 Institute for Cooperation with Iberoamerica (ICI), 221 Institute for Cooperation with Mediterranean, Arab and Developing Countries, 221 intergovernmental pillars, coordination, 230–1 Interministerial Committee for International Cooperation, 221 interministerial committees, 228–30 and JHA, 230, 231 Ministry for Agriculture and Fisheries, 214 Ministry of Defence, 214–15 Ministry for Economic Affairs, 215 Ministry for Education and Culture, 215 Ministry for Finance (Treasury), 215 Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 212, 217–22, 275: budgetary and human resources, 223–7; Diplomatic School, 219; Directorate-Generals, 219, 223; representations abroad, 225; role, 232–3; structure and functions, 217–19; Subsecretaría, 219

Ministry for Home Affairs, 215 Ministry for Industry, 214 Ministry for Public Administration, 213 National Authority for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 219 nationalist parties, 213 NGOs, 213–14, 221 Office of Diplomatic Information, 219 Permanent Representation in Brussels, 213, 215, 227 Private Office, 216, 219 Secretariats of State for Foreign Affairs, 222–3 Secretariat of State for European Affairs, 222–3, 227–8 Secretariat of State for International Cooperation and Iberoamerica (SECIPI), 219–22 Trade Department, 214 Treasury, 225 Spanish Civil War, 192 spheres of authority (SOAs), 12 Strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum, 20 Stuttgart Solemn Declaration on European Union, 138 Sundelius, B., 5, 13 Sweden, 238–49 Advisory Committee for European Union Affairs, 243 central coordination, 241 and CFSP, 243, 245–6 Coordination Group for EU-relations, 242 decision-making, 244 and European integration, 238, 239 Foreign Ministry, 238–40: adaptation to EU membership, 240–46; EU coordinator, 245; reorganisation, 241–2, 243; role, 246–8 foreign policy management, 5–6 neutrality, 238, 239, 246–7 Thatcher, Margaret, 252, 253 three-pillar system, 34n1 Tindemans Report, 138 Tordesilhas Treaty, 202 Treaty of Nice, 27, 28, 267 Treaty of Rome, 61, 62 Treaty of Warsaw, 96 ‘two level games’, 3

Index 295 uncertainty, 273 United Kingdom, 250–73, 276, 282 administration of aid, 250 bureaucratic culture, 275 Cabinet Office, 256, 259 Central Policy Review Staff (CPRS) Report, 255, 257–8 and CESDP, 267 and CFSP, 267 Department for International Development, 251 devolution policies, 260 Diplomatic Service, 253 Duncan Report, 257 and EU membership, 5 Foreign Affairs Unit, 253 Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), 274: budget, 253–4; European dimension, 258–61; Fundamental Expenditure Review, 255; gatekeeper role, 262; history, 250–1; and information technology, 263; mission statement, 263–4; organisation and agendas, 251–8; personnel, 252; recruitment, 262; reform, 263, 264–5; reorganisation, 260; strategies and responses, 261–6; structure and functions, 253–5;

trade promotion, 265 foreign policy, 255, 258, 262, 265, 266 Foreign Policy Centre, 266 global role, 266 Minister for Europe, 261 ministerial committees, 256 Overseas Development Administration (ODA), 250 Permanent Representative, 259, 260 Plowden Report, 256–7 trade policy, 268 Westland crisis, 256 White Paper on the Civil Service, 261 United Nations (UN), 31 and Ireland, 147 United Nations (UN) Security Council, 43 Uruguay Round negotiations, 200 van Staden, Alfred, 72 Wallace, W., 2, 22 Weber, S., 10 Western European Union (WEU), 27, 39, 196 Whitman, R. G., 5 Wiseman, G., 6 World Trade Organisation (WTO), 66