FICHTE Foundation of Transcendental Philo oph t \\u'1#'1Ur~) • - ~ (I infH99)
D AN I EL BR EAZEALE
FICHTE Foundations of Transcendental Philosophy (Wissenschaftslehre) Nuua Methodo (1796/gg) TRANSLATED AND EDITED BY
DANIEL BREAZEALE
CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS ITHACA AND LONDON
Cornell University Press gratefully acknowledges a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities, an independent federal agency, and a subvention from The University of Kentucky, both of which aided in bringing this book to publication.
Copyright © 1992 by Cornell University All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or parts thereof, must not be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher. For information, address Cornell University Press, 124 Roberts Place, Ithaca, New York 14850. First published 1992 by Cornell University Press. International Standard Book Number o-8014-2767-3 Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 92-52745 Printed in the United States of America Librarians: Library of Congress cataloging information appears on the last page of the book.
e
,The paper in this book meets the minimum requirements of the American National Standard for Information SciencesPermanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39-48-1984.
For Rebecca Cecile (finally)
CONTENTS
Acknowledgments Editor's ·Introduction Principles of the Edition and Translation German/English Glossary Abbreviations Key to Symbols and Notes
50 55 61 62
The Major Points of the Wissen.schaft.slehre of 1798-1799 First Introduction Second Introduction
65 77 87
§ § § § § § § § § § § § § § § § § § §
I
108
2
121
3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 39 147 154 167 187 204 224 234 250 258 277 308 332 344 354 420 446
10
11
12 13 14 15 10 17 18 19
[vii]
ix
VIII
Contents
Deduction of the Subdivisions of the Wissenschaftslehre Bibliography Index
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This translation project was begun in Munich in 1g8,5/86 under the auspices of a Senior Research Fellowship from the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation and was further facilitated by grants from the University of Kentucky and the Southern Regional Education Board. Final revisions were made possible by a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities, an independent federal agency. For research assistance and access to original manuscripts, I am grateful to the directors and staff of the J. G. Fichte Archive and the Bavarian Academy of the Sciences. I also thank Felix Meiner Verlag and Friedrich Frommann Verlag (Gunther Holzboog), publishers of the two German editions of Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre nuva methodo, for permission to translate these texts into English. Most of all, I would like to acknowledge my personal debt to the following individuals: Reinhard Lauth, who originally encouraged me to embark upon this project, read the entire first draft of my translation, and has remained an invaluable source of expert guidance and advice; Erich Fuchs, who furnished me with essential philological and editorial information concerning both the manuscripts and the published texts of Fichte's lectures; Ives Radrizzani, whose outstanding French translation of the Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo frequently served as a guide to specific questions concerning the translation and interpretation of the German texts; Frederick Neuhouser, who read much of the second draft of the translation and made many useful suggestions that have been incorporated into this final version; Anthony N. Perovich, Jr., for his valuable corrections to the Editor's Introduction; Robert Rabel, for much-needed advice on the translation of passages from Latin and Greek; Leonard Peters, Acting Vice President for Research and Graduate Studies at the University of Kentucky, for his generous support of the publication of this volume; Yolanda Estes, for welcome editorial assistance; and finally, [ ix]
x
Acknowledgments
Wolfgang Natter, whose patient and insightful corrections of the final draft of ~he translation were absolutely essential to the completion of this project. The extraordinary generosity with which these friends and colleagues have shared with me their time, their energy, and their expertise has been an unfailing source of encouragement and inspiration over the past five years. It is no exaggeration to say that without the support and assistance of the above-mentioned agencies, institutions, and individuals this book would never have seen the light of day.
D. B.
Lexington, Kentucky
FICHTE Foundations of Transcendental Philosophy (Wissenschaft.slehre) nava methodo (17g6/gg)
·EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION
PART I The Origin and Publication of the First Presentation of the Basic Principles of the Wisseruchaftslehre In the spring of 1794 Fichte chose "Wisseruchaftslehre," a word composed ofthe terms for "science" (or "scientific knowledge") and "theory" (or "doctrine"), to designate his own, radically revised version of the transcendental or "Critical" philosophy inaugurated by Immanuel Kant. While conceding that his own version departed in many respects from the "letter" of the Kantian exposition, Fichte insisted that his new system-for all its novelty-was nevertheless true to the "spirit" of transcendental idealism. 1 Fichte arrived at his new philosophical standpoint during the preceding winter, in the course of a full-scale reexamination of the Kantian philosophy. The occasion for this reexamination was a review he had agreed to write for the Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung of an anonymously published attack on the Critical philosophy by "Aenesidemus," a selfdescribed Humean skeptic. The book was widely recognized to be the work of a former classmate of Fichte's, G. E. Schulze (1761-1833), professor of philosophy at Helmstedt. True to its title, Aenesidemw, or concerning the Foundnl.ioru of the Elementary Philosophy Propountkd in Jena by Professor Reiniwld, includi'1, a Deferue of Skepticism against the Pretensions of the Grit~ of Pure &ason, this lengthy work examined and criticized not 1 For Fichu~·s own interpretation of the relationship of his philosophy to Kant's, see, above all, the "Second Introduction" to An Allempt ala New Pr-smi/Jtion of the Wi.ssm
[ J
1
2
Editor's Introduction
only Kant's own writings, but also the radically revised "system" of transcendental idealism developed by K. L. Reinhold under the name Elementarphilosophie. 3 Though Fichte had considered himself a Kant ian ever since his first exposure to the Critique of Pure Reason in the summer of 1790 and had also been profoundly influenced by Reinhold's project of recasting the Critical philosophy as a rigorous system based upon a single first principle, he had nevertheless come to harbor growing doubts concerning the adequacy of any of the existing presentations of transcendental philosophy. It was perhaps for this reason that Aenesidemus was the first work he asked to review after being invited to become a regular contributor to the influential Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung: in order to defend the Critical philosophy against Schulze's attack he would, as he no doubt realized, first have to confront and allay his own doubts concerning this same philosophy. Fortunately for Fichte, the task of reviewing Aenesidemus coincided with one of the rare periods of genuine leisure that he was ever to enjoy, the months immediately following his wedding in October •793· Fichte and his bride spent the following winter and spring in Zurich, in the home of his new father-in-law, Hartmann Rahn, 4 and it was thanks to this opportunity that the young philosopher was, for the first time in his life, able to devote himself solely to philosophical reflection for an extended period. Accordingly, he turned the task of preparing his review into an occasion for reexamining his own previous philosophical commitments and for formulating a new systematic strategy of his own. 5
Giovanni and H. S. Harris (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), pp. 104-35. Regarding Schulze's skepticism, see Frederick C. Beiser, The Fau of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987), pp. 266-84. 'Concerning Reinhold's "Elementary Philosophy" or "Philosophy of the Elements," see Beiser, The Fate of Reason, pp. 226-65, and Daniel Breazeale, "Between Kant and Fichte: Karl Leonhard Reinhold's 'Elementary Philosophy,'" Review of Mewphysics 35 (1982): 78J>-821. Fichte first met his future wife, Johanna Rahn, while he was employed as a private tutor in Zurich in 1788/89, immediately before he spent three years in Leipzig, Konigsberg, and Warsaw. It was during the period between his first and second stays in Zurich that he not only became acquainted with Kant's writings, but also became personally acquainted with the author himself. By the time Fichte returned to Zurich in the summer of 1793, he had already begun to establish a literary reputation for himself on the basis of the astonishing success of his first book, the Attempt at a Critique of All Revelation and because of the controversy surrounding his (anonymously published) writings on the French Revolution and freedom of thought. For information concerning Fichte's career and writings before 1800, see Daniel Breazeale, "Fichte in Jena," editor's introduction to EPW. 5 Fichte's "Rezension des Aenesidemus" eventually appeared in February 1794 in Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung (SW,l: 1-25 = AA l, 2: 41--67; English translation inEPW, pp. 5977)- Concerning the significance of this text, see Daniel Breazeale, "Fichte's Aenesidemus Review and the Transformation of German Idealism," Review of Mewphysics 34 (1981): 545-68.
Editor's Introduction
3
Thus it was in the context of a detailed, private reconsideration of Reinhold's system that Fichte first articulated the general outlines of his own systematic presentation of transcendental idealism. Two of its most striking features were ( 1) a dear-sighted recognition of the role of "practical reason" in the constitution of all experience, including its "theore~ical" portion (that is, the portion that includes our everyday, as well as scientific, knowledge of the external world); and (2) an insistence that the sole adequate starting point for a "scientific" system of philosophy could only be the self-positing activity of the I. 6 Not until after he had arrived at this new standpoint did he find what he considered to be an appropriate name for it: WissenschafLilehre, or "theory of scientific know ledge ."7 In the midst of this fruitful engagement with the writings of Reinhold and Kant, Fichte received an unexpected invitation to succeed Reinhold atjena, beginning in the summer semester of 1794. His initial response to this remarkable offer, which he was certainly in no position to decline, was to request a postponement in assuming the post, on the grounds that it would be inappropriate for him to embark upon his new career without first possessing a well-articulated system of his own to "profess." To be sure, Fichte believed that he had already discovered the starting point and even the main outlines of such a system; yet, as he confessed in a letter to Reinhold of March 1, 1794, he also realized that "it is still far from being clear enough to communicate." When his request for a postponement was denied, Fichte believed that he had no other choice but to try to force his new system into some son of communicable form, no matter how provisional. Thus, barely three months after his 6 See, above all, the fascinating, unpublished document prepared by Fichle for his own use during this period, ~Eigne Meditationen iiber ElementarPhilosophie/Practische Philosophie" (AA II, 3: •g--~66}. Concerning its relationship to Fichte's subsequent development, see Reinhold Lauth, "Genese du 'Fondement de toute Ia doctrine de Ia science' de Fichte a partir de ses 'Meditations personnelles sur l'elementarphilosophie,' " Archive.< de Philosophie 31 ( 197 1}: 5 1-79, a German version of which, "Die Entstehung von Fichtes 'Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre' nach den 'Eignen Meditationen iiber ElementarPhilosophie,' "is included in Lauth's Transz:mdenlale E:fllwicJdungslinien von Descartes bU zu Marx und Dostojnvski (Hamburg: Meiner, 1989), pp. 155-79. See too Peter Baumanns, Fichta Wissenschaftslehre: Problnne ihres Anfangs (Bonn: Bouvier, 1971), pp. 8o-g7. Compare this, however, with Fichte's own later account of the "sudden" nature of his new discovery, as reported by Henrick Steffens and by Fichte's nephew, Eduard F~ehte, and quoted in FichU im Gespriich, ed. Erich Fuchs, 5 vols. (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1978-), 1: 63~4; English translation in EPW, pp. 12-13. Note too that Fichte himself sometimes claimed that the ''basic insight" of the Wissenschaftskhre was discovered several years earlier, during his brief stay in Konigsberg. See, e.g., the version of this "di.'!COvery" reported in § 6 of the "Second Introduction to the Wissenschaftslehre" (SW, 1: 173 = AA I, 4: ~5-26}. 7 The name first appears in Fichte's March 1, 1791, letter to Karl Bilttiger, in which he explains that the purpose of this name is to distinguish his system from the mere "love of knowledge," or "philosophy." Fichte's letters, which are here cited by date and recipient, are published in Reih.e Ill of AA.
4
Editor's Introduction
comment to Reinhold, he was installed at Jena, where he did his best to present the basic principles of his new system to his students. As a result of these events, Fichte had to compress into a few months' time the work of system building to which he had originally intended to dedicate several years of "uninterrupted leisure." The first opportunity to attempt to communicate his new systematic standpoint was not long in .coming, thanks to an invitation he received to deliver a series of informal lectures to his friends and associates in Zurich. These lectures, which deserve to be called the first public presentation of the Wissenschaftslehre, took place in the late winter and early spring of 1794. 8 He himself created the next occasion to articulate some of the outlines of his new position by deciding to write a short book designed to furnish prospective students atjena with a general description of his enterprise and with an account of how such a philosophy was meant to relate to everyday life and to other forms of knowledge. This "invitational" work, titled Concerning tlu! Concept oft.h.e Wissenschaftslehre or of So-called Philosophy, was published in Jena in May 1794. just before Fichte arrived there. 9 Fichte had originally intended to offer during his first semester at Jena, in addition to his public lectures titled "Duties of Scholars," 10 two private courses: 11 one on "theoretical" and one on "practical" philosophy. He immediately abandoned this plan as overly ambitious, however, and concentrated instead upon presenting the "theoretical" portion of his new system, along with its first principles. In planning his lectures on "theoretical philosophy," Fichte was free to proceed as he pleased. As occupant of a chair devoted to "Critical philosophy," he might well have chosen to base his lectures upon readings from the published works of Kant or Reinhold. Or he might have dispensed with a text altogether and simply lectured from his own notes. Instead, he decided to write his own text; or, more precisely, he decided to have the text of his lectures printed and distributed to his students 8 No text of the body of these lectures has survived, though the concluding lecture was published by Fichte himself under the title Uebe-l du Wiirdt des Mtruchen (SW, 1: 412-16 = AA l, 2: 83--89; English translation, "Concerning Human Dignity," in EPW, pp. 83--86). 9 Uebe-l den Begrijf der Wi.sseruchaft.slehre oder der sagannkn Philos"/Jhie (SW, 1: 2981 = AA l, 2: 107-63; English translation in EPW, 94-135). Note that though the work itself is aboul the Wi.sseruchaftslehre (rather than a presentation of it), the original edition concluded with a brief "hypothetical account" of the overall structure of the new system. 10 The first five of these lectures were published in 1 794 under the title Einige Vorle.sungen abeT die Beslimmung des Gelehrlen (SW, VI: 291--346 = AA l, 3: 25-68; English translation, "Some Lectures Concerning the Scholar's Vocation," in EPW, pp. 144~). 11 In contrast with their public lectures, which were free and open to the entire university community, professors at Jena (as at other German universities) also offered private classes, which were open only to officially enrolled, tuition-paying students. By law, professors were forbidden from exempting any student from this tuition charge (unless the student in question had heen officially certified as indigent). Nevertheless, according to an anonymous report, Fichte routinely violated this law and never turned away a student because he was unable to pay the honorarium. See Fuchs, ed., FichU im Gesprikh, II: 101.
Editor's Introduction
5
before each class, in order, as he explained, to allow his listeners to give their full attention to the topic at hand, without having to worry about making notes. According to the original plan, these printed pages were to be distributed solely to the students attending Fichte's private lectures on theoretical philosophy and were not intended to be circulated among the gen~ral public. 12 Since the events and projects of the spring had left Fichte little time to prepare his lectures, he found himself in the difficult position of having to compose them as the semester progressed. Moreover, each portion of the manuscript had to be delivered to the printer far enough in advance so that the printed fascicles were available before the corresponding class meeting. The disadvantages of this method of composition became apparent to the author almost at once, leading him to complain that "no sooner had one sheet been read through than another had to appear, and thus I was forced to let it appear." 13 Indeed, it is difficult to imagine less congenial circumstances for the preparation and publication of a major philosophical treatise. In the years to come, Fichte himself frequently referred to these same extenuating circumstances to explain various shortcomings in the Foundations of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre, which is the title he gave to the printed version of his 1794'95 lectures. 14 By midsummer of 1794 he was already apologizing to an old friend: I am glad that you liked the style in which the invitational work [Concerning
the Concept of the Wissenschaftslehre] was written. Still, it makes me a bit uneasy that you concentrate so much upon the style. This text, and especially the preface to the same, was not written all at once; in order to do be able to do this, one must have made the material entirely one's own, so that one can simply play with it and can freely bear the chains of the system, as if they were not chains at all. I have not mastered my own system in this manner, 12 See the previously mentioned letter to Bottiger, March 1, 1794: "I can now see for myself something I have known for some time: namely, how inconvenient for teacher and student alike it is to have to lecture without a textbook. This only serves to encourage the sort of thoughtless note-taking I would like to abolish entirely-at least so far as my own lectures are concerned. None of the available texts by Kant or Reinhold suits my purpose, nor can I write a textbook of my own between now and the end of next month. Thus the following expedient occurred to me: what if I were to distribute my textbook in installments during the course as a maniLScript for the ILSe of my listeners (since I absolutely wish to delay for a few years any presentation of my system for the public at large)? In any event, I would like to defy the usual sneers with which printed texts that are supposed to be treated as manuscripts are greeted. Isn't this the same as when a professor reads from his own lecture notes? In order to show that I am serious about this, the text should not be published in a regular trade edition at all, but should be distributed only on my instructions to my students and others whom I might designate to receive it." " Fichte to Goethe, September 30, 1794. 14 Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre [henceforth GWL] (SW, I: 86-328 = AA I, 2: 251-461; translated into English as "Foundations of the Entire Science of Knowledge" by Peter Heath in SK, pp. 89-286).
6
Editor's Introduction however, and it will be difficult for me ever to accomplish this, for it is profound. Nevertheless, I will wait for this to happen and will devote effort to the task. Concerning this same point, you will not be satisfied with the textbook I am now writing (which you can read when you arrive). To be sure, I could have written better, but I had to let it go as it stood, since the printer needed the manuscript and I needed a text for my lectures. 15
For some reason (quite possibly the welcome prospect of income from sales), 16 Fichte soon abandoned his original resolve not to issue a public edition of his printed lectures. Accordingly, in September 1794, the first half of the Foundations of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre (Parts I and II) was publicly advertised and offered for sale by the Jena firm of Christian Gabler, albeit with a title page that included the note "a manuscript for the use of his students." In the winter semester of 1794"95 Fichte offered two private courses: one in which he dealt with the "practical" portion of his new system (Part III of the Foundations) and another devoted to "specifically theoretical" aspects of the Wissenschaftslehre. 17 It appears that in these courses he continued his practice of having his text printed and distributed in installments to his students. In any case, by midsummer of 1795 both these two new texts (Part III of the Foundations, as well as the Outline of the Distinctive Character of the Wissenschaftslehre with Respect to the Theoretical Faculty) were available for public distribution and sale, 18 though, "Letter to F. A. Weisshuhn, July •794· The same point is repeated in other letters of the period. See, e.g., Fichte's letter to Goethe of June 21, 1794, as well as his July 2, 1795, letter to Reinhold, in which he begs his correspondent to "bear in mind that what you have received so far is a manuscript for the use of my students. It was hastily written while I was busy with my lectures (in the winter semester I had three lecture courses, all of which had to be worked out almost completely) and with a thousand other diverse activities. I had to see that the written sheets came to an end at the same time as the lectures." 16 See the comment in Fichte's May 26, 1794, letter to his wife, in which, after complaining about his meager income, he went on to express his hopes of earning some additional money from his writings. After reponing that he was engaged "in writing a book for my lectures," he added that he had just received from his publisher a payment of "2 •!. louis d'or = 2 1 Zurich florins" for the first pages. A bit later in the same paragraph Fichte said he hoped to earn as much as 500 florins from his literary activities during the first semester. By June •4-17, '794• in another letter to Johanna, he had already raised the estimate of how much he expected to earn from his textbook to "6oo florins." In this same letter he also divulged his plans to write two more texts ("uhrbUcher"-Pt. III of the Foundations and the Outline of the Di.ttinctive Character of the Wi.s.seruchaftslehre with &spect to the Theoretical Faculty) during the winter semester, the income from which would, he anticipated, alleviate his precarious financial situation. From these passages it appears, first of all, that Fichte almost immediately abandoned his original plan not to publish the Grundlage, and second, that purely financial considerations played at least some role in this decision. 17 Grundri{J des Eigentumlichen der Wi.s.seruchaftslehre in RUksicht auf das theoretische Vt'nll(jgen [henceforth GEWL) (SW, 1: 331-411 = AA I, 3: 137-208; English translation in EPW, pp. 24~-3o6).
8 A one-volume edition of the Foundations, including all three parts, plus the preface to the whole, originally issued along with Pan III, was published by Gabler in September
Editor's Introduction
7
once again, their title pages bore the somewhat unconvincing disclaimer that they were "manuscripts for the use of his students." This caveat was repeated in the general preface to the Foundations, in which the author began with the reminder that "this book was not really intended for the public" and then went on to confess: I myself declare this presentation to be extremely imperfect and defective: in part, because it had to be published in individual fascicles, as I needed it for my lectures, and for the use of my students, where I could augment it through verbal presentation; and in part, because I have sought, insofar as possible, to avoid any fixed terminology-which is the easiest way for literalists to rob any system of its spirit and to transform it into a dried-out skeleton. I shall remain true to this maxim in future revisions of the system, until I have arrived at the final and complete presentation of it. 19 From the very beginning, therefore, Fichte considered the Foundations nothing more than a provisional exposition of the first principles of the Wissenschaftslehre and anticipated that it would soon be replaced by a more adequate exposition. This point was reinforced by the advertisement (almost certainly written by Fichte himself) for the first half of the Foundations, in which the following passage occurs: The author believes he owes it to the public to declare explicitly that the present work, which stems from his lectures, is incomplete in his own eyes.. It will still be several years before he can hope to present this work to the public in a worthy form. Until then, he requests that the book be considered no more than a manuscript the author had printed for the convenience of his students, considering that preferable to having them copy it down as he lectured. It is for this reason that he is reluctant to see it submitted to public criticism. 20 Nevertheless, by the fall of 1795 readers all over the German-speaking world were able to purchase and to study what everyone began referring to simply as "Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre." Fichte himself, however, never intended these published lectures to be an adequate presentation of his entire system; on the contrary, as the very title of the Foundations declares, this work is merely a presentation of the "foundations" or "first principles" of a much larger system, whereas the Outline (which attempts •795· Note that Fichte himself always treated the Outline as an integral part of the system sketched out in the Foundalions. Hence, when a second edition of the latter was finally published in 1802, it appeared in a single volume along with the Outline. 19 SW, 1: 87 = AA I, 2: 252. 20 This advertisement first appeared in the October 1, 1794, "lntelligenzblatt" of the Allgemeine Literalur-Zeilung and is reprinted in AA I, 2: 183.
8
Editor's Introduction
to derive from these first principles what Fichte took to be the assumptions of the CritiiJue of Pure Reason, namely, space, time, and the manifold of sensible intuition) represents an extension into the narrower field of "theoretical philosophy." Accordingly, for the next few semesters Fichte turned his attention almost exclusively to the elaboration of the "practical" portions of his system-specifically, to an examination and presentation of its implications for the theory of "natural right" (or natural law) and for ethics. 21
Fichte's Dissatisfaction with the Foundations of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre As we have seen, Fichte's own doubts concerning the published Foundations were apparent from the start, and these personal misgivings were
quickly confirmed by the public criticism-indeed, ridicule-to which the work was subjected. Fichte's typical response toward any criticism of his system was to attribute it either to personal animosity or to sheer misunderstanding, and he seldom hesitated to blame the latter on the professional incapacities or moral failings of his critics. Nor did he consider failures of understanding to be limited to his adversaries; for, as he soon came to realize, some of the most serious and fateful misreadings of his philosophy were to be found among the more enthusiastic supporters and exponents of the Wissenschaftslehre. 22 Fichte always displayed a starkly ambivalent attitude toward his readers and toward what he considered to be the failure of friends and foes alike to understand and to appreciate his project-if not the execution thereof. Often, he appeared thoroughly exasperated by what seemed to him his readers' almost willful failure to understand his writings, which 21 See the two systematic treatises Fichte prepared during the period 1795/97, treatises that, like the Grundlage, originated as private lecture courses: Grundlage des Naturreclus nach Principien tier Wissenschaftslehre, published in two parts in 1796 and 1797 (SW, III: 1385 = AA I, 3: 313-400 and AA I, 4: 5-165) and Das S,stem der SiUnalehre nach den Principien der Wissenschaftslehre (SW, IV: 1-365 = AA I. 5: 19-317). Both these important works were translated (albeit very inadequately) into English by A. E. Kroeger in the previous century: The Science of Rights (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1869) and The Science of Ethics a.< Brued on the Science of Knowledge (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Triibner, 1897). 22 See, e.g., the following passage from an unfinished and unpublished essay written during the fall of 1800, in which Fichte attempted to take stock of the public reception of his philosophy: "The Foundatioru of the [Enlire] Wissenschaftslehre [ ... ] is useless, at least for those who have spoken in public about it. For, as I gather from almost all public judgments of my philosophy and from the reproaches of opponents who actually want the very same thing that I do, as well as from the objections to my philosophy and from the new efforts that are devoted to philosophy, no one yet possesses any knowledge whatsoever of what I am attempting to do. And anyone who does not already know this and has not learned it from the previously mentioned writings and treatises must necessarily misunderstand the Foundation.> completely, in which case the approval that this work has received here and there is an even worse sign than the disapproval it has encountered" (AA II, 5: 438).
Editor's Introduction
9
he defended as perfectly adequate in their own right. Sometimes, as in the unpublished "Report on the Concept of the Wissenschaftslehre and the Fate of the Same so far" of 18o6, he defended his first presentation in just these terms; 23 more often, however, he displayed a more charitable attitude toward the readers of thu work and assumed at least part of the responsibility for what he considered to be the well-nigh universal failure of readers to understand the Foundations of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre. Rather than defend the Foundations, he more often directed those who raised questions or objections concerning it to his other writings, even as he continued to chide his critics for failing to heed his warning that the work in question was "never intended for anyone" beyond his own students. 24 Ironically, Fichte's published and unpublished writings contain a far greater number of negative comments about this, his most famous and influential book, than about anything else he wrote. In attempting to account for the failure of the Foundations, Fichte tended to blame certain defects in the manner of presentation he had adopted in it. For example, in the preface to the first installment of his AtJ.empt at a New Presentation of the Wissenschaftslehre ( 1797), immediately after rejecting all public criticism of his system as based upon nothing more than sheer misunderstanding, he added: "I am willing to bear all the blame for the Iauer, until such time as people have had an opportunity to become acquainted with the contents of my system in some other form, in which case they may find that the original presentation is not so totally inaccessible after all." 25 Consistent with this self-criticism, Fichte lost no opportunity during the next several years to rectify the inadequacies of his first presentation and to deflect attention from the Foundations. In pursuit of this aim, he directly addressed various criticisms and misunderstandings in a series of polemical essays, some of which include brilliant summaries of the overall gist and strategy of the Wissenschaftslehre. 26 Furthermore, he prefaced each of the two major systematic works he published in the 2 ' "The old presentation [the Foundations] is good and sufficient for the time being." Berichl Uber den Begriff dtrr Wissmschaftskhre und dU bisherigm Schic/uale dtrrse/bn; (SW, Vlll:
I t
I
368). 2 i "What have you found unsatisfactory in my p£e~ious presentation of the Wissmschaftslehre? Surely not the principles? If you are dissatisfied with the manner of deduction, and if you are speaking of the published Foundations, then you are quite right to find much that is unsatisfactory. This text was never intended for anyone but my own students. Friend and foe alike have generally overlool<ed this" (Fichte to Schmidt, Man:h 17, 1799). 25 SW, 1: 420 = AA I, 4: 184. 26 An especially noteworthy example is provided by the Vergleichung de vom Herrn Prof. Schmid aufgestellten Systems mit dtrr Wissmschaftslehu, which Fichte published in the Phillr sophischesjoum.al in the spring of 1796 (SW, ll: 421-58 = AA l, 3: 235-66; partial English translation, "A Comparison between Prof. Schmid's System and the Wissmschajhlehre," in EPW, pp. 31~40).
10
Editor's Introduction
next few years (the Foundations of Natural Right and the System of Ethical Theory) with succinct reformulations of the basic tenets of his philosophy. Such essays and passages, however, were never intended to be anything more than provisional measures, temporary means for correcting the· public's judgment of the Wissenschaftslehre until such time as he could replace the first, inadequate presentation of the foundations of the same with a more adequate and less easily misunderstood new presentation. Thus he frequently announced his intention to provide, at the first opportunity, an entirely new presentation in his private lectures. 27 Before turning to these new lectures, however, let us pause to consider more closely the nature of Fichte's dissatisfaction with his previous presentation. What did he consider to be defective about the Foundations, and how did he himself account for these shortcomings? The chief shortcoming of the first presentation of the foundations of the Wissenschaftslehre, according to its author, was a lack of systematic unity. "It gives off sfarks of spirit," he confessed to Reinhold, "but it is not a single flame." 2 In other words, his complaint concerned the form rather than the content of the presentation (though, of course, for anyone who attaches as much importance to "systematic form" as Fichte did, this is by no means an inconsequential objection). Fichte offered a variety of explanations for the formal inadequacy of the Foundations and the defective character of its presentation. First of all, as we have already seen, he called attention to the (admittedly selfimposed) external pressure he was under at the time, and specifically, to the deleterious effect of the deadlines dictated by the printer. And indeed, one would expect that a work written under such circumstances, in which the separate pages went to the printer before the ink had had time to dry and the first sections were printed and circulated before the later ones were even drafted, might well display a certain lack of formal unity. Second, he called attention to the fact that the Foundations was written at a time when the "discovery" of the Wissenschaftslehre was still fresh (if not still under way) and when the basic outlines, to say nothing of the details, of his system were not yet firmly fixed in his own mind. In this vein, he chastised Reinhold for paying too much attention to the pre27 See, e.g., the following passage from a letter written from Bremen in August 17g6 by one of Fichte's ex-students, Johann Smidt, to J. F. Herbart, who was then attending Fichte's lectures in Jena: "Also write me something concerning Fichte's theory of freedom. I do not know how it looks now, since he has revised it at least three times. The last I heard from him in Jena was that he was no longer entirely satisfied with his previous ideas on this topic-though he himself did not at that time know what he would replace them with" (Fuchs, ed., Fichu im Gesprach, 1: 370). 28 Letter to Reinhold, March 21, 1797: "Your evaluation of mJ presentation, as it has appeared so far, is much too favorable. Or perhaps the content has allowed you to overlook the deficiency of the presentation. I consider it to be most imperfect. Yes, I know that it gives off sparks of spirit, but it is not a singk flame."
Editor's Introduction
I I
sentation of 1794'95 and added: "Concerning the main points I am certain, but once someone has grasped these he does far better to rely on himself rather than on this very immature ~resentation. How much more clearly I understand this science now!" 9 Fichte makes a similar point at the very beginning of the Halle transcript of the Wissenschaftslehre !"OVa metlwdo, where he notes that the new exposition of the first principles of transcendental philosophy would be presented with "a liberty for which the author was not yet sufficiently self-<:onfident at the time that he published his Wissenschaftslehre. "30 A third explanation that Fichte offered for the inadequacy of the Foundations concerns the specific theoretical context within which it was conceived and elaborated: namely, the context determined by (1) Kant's Critiques, (2) Reinhold's attempt to reconstruct the Critical philosophy in the form of a system derived "from a single principle," and (3) Schulze's skeptical criticisms of them both. Above all, it is the Foundations' close reliance upon some of the key ideas and even the terminology of the Elementarphilosophie which Fichte appears to have had foremost in mind when he later remarked that "my published Wissenschaftslehre bears too many traces of the time in which it was written and of the manner of philosophizing which then prevailed. This made it more obscure than a presentation of transcendental idealism needs to be." 31 An example of what Fichte may have meant by this veiled reference is provided by Part I of the Foundations, which purports to present the three "first principles" of the new system. This entire discussion, which is heavily indebted to Reinhold's account of the nature and starting point of a philosophical system and, indeed, has its roots in the rationalism that dominated German philosophy before Kant, 32 is dispensed with entirely in the new presentation of 1796/99· which completely abandons all the talk about "first principles" that was so characteristic of the earlier presentation. Another example of how the presentation contained in the Foundations may have been unduly influenced by "the manner of philosophizing which then prevailed" is the organization of the work into a "theoretical'' and a "practical" portion. A sharp distinction between theoretical philosophy and practical philosophy, which, of course, has its roots in Kant's distinction between the spheres of theoretical and 29
Letter to Reinhold, July 4, 1 797. AA IV, 2: 17. See below, p. 86. 31 Letter to Friedrich Johannsen, January 31, 1801. 32 As' Heinz Heimsoeth points out, "the demand for the 'supreme first principle' of all knowledge runs from Wolff to Kant and from Kant to Reinhold"; hence the demand for a "first principle," which is such a salient feature of the first presentation of the Wissenschaftslehre, is, at the same time, the most backward-looking aspect of it. "Fichtes Systementwicklung in seinen Jenenser Vorlesungen," Blauer fur Deutsche Philosophie 13 (1939): 168. 30
12
Editor's Introduction
practical reason, was also a feature of Reinhold's Elementarphiwsophie (though, the latter's treatment of practical philosophy was, as Fichte noted, perfunctory at best). One of the chief aims of the Wissenschaftslehre was to take seriously the celebrated Kantian dictum concerning "the primacy of practical reason" and to demonstrate not simply the practical primacy of practical reason, but its primacy within the theoretical sphere as well-to show that willing is a condition for knowing, and thereby to demonstrate the unity of theory and practice. Indeed, as Fichte boasted, the biggest advance of the Wissenschaftslehre over the letter (if not the spirit) of the Kantian philosophy was that, by choosing as its starting point the self-positing of the I, it was able to overcome the Kantian distinction between theory and practice and thus to unify in a single presentation speculative, theoretical, and practical reason, thereby displaying "the unity underlying all three Critiques.''33 The Foundations was intended to display this very unity in a revolutionary new manner. Unfortunately, however, many readers were prevented from recognizing this achievement precisely because of its form, more specifically, because of its division into "theoretical" and "practical" portions, a division obviously influenced by the author's intense engagement during 1793/94 with the writings of Kant and Reinhold. Nothing interfered more with the overall project of presenting "philosophy as a whole" 34 than this theoretical/practical structure of the first presentation. Yet another way in which the Foundations was indebted to Reinhold's Elementarphiwsophie was in its method of presentation and in the overall path of the inquiry, which begins with an "absolute first principle" (that is, with something purely intelligible, the productive deed or Act of the I) and then proceeds to the "deduction" of the realm of empirical experience. Though such a method would present no particular problems to those familiar with the rationalistic systematic ideal underlying Reinhold's enterprise, Fichte discovered that many of his students and readers had great difficulty following the path of his argument; indeed, many professed to be unable even to locate its starting point. Accordingly, in his new presentation, he chose to follow what he himself described as a "much more natural path," one that reversed the direction of the previous presentation and proceeded from empirical experience ~~ Fichte to Reinhold, July 2, •795·
,... This is emphasized in the paragraph that stands at the head of the Halle transcript of the Wissenschaftslehre nooo methodo: "In the present lectures, however, the hitherto familiar division between theoretical and practical philosophy is not to be found. Instead, these lee· tures present philosophy as a whole, in the exposition of which theoretical and practical philosophy are united. This presentation follows a much more natural path, beginning with the practical sphere, or, whenever it would contribute to the clarity of the exposition to do so, transforming the practical into the theoretical, in order to explain the latter in terms of the former: a liberty for which the author was not yet sufficiently self
Editor's Introduction
13
to intelligible conditions-from Tatsache to Tathandlung rather than vice versa. 35 Rather than having to begin their study of the Wissenschaftslehre by grappling with an "absolute first principle" asserting that "the I simply posits itself," readers of the new presentation would simply be asked to "think about the wall." To be sure, Fichte's frequent criticisms of the Foundations' form and manner of presentation were never intended to imply that it was false or invalid. Instead, he conceded merely that many readers had found his original presentation obscure and difficult to grasp. Accordingly, he always viewed the task of composing a new one as that of finding new wineskins for old wine and not as that of altering the actual content or principles of his system. In short, his reasons for wanting to replace the original presentation with a new one were entirely pedagogic. Finally, in addition to the external circumstances of its composition and its undue reliance upon outdated principles of presentation, Fichte sometimes attributed the Foundations' failure to meet with public approval (or at least understanding) to his own deficiencies as an author. More specifically, he blamed what he perceived to be his lack of empathy with his readers: "I am so little capable of placing myself in the frame of mind of the reading public; I always assume that many things are selfevident which hardly anyone else finds to be so." 36 To the extent that this represents a fair description of Fichte's limitations as an author, it is difficult to see how he could ever hope to remedy them in any presentation of his system, no matter how "new." And indeed, as we shall see, it was his own growing self-awareness of this "deficiency" which, more than anything else, accounts for his later decision not to publish any of the many subsequent versions of the Wissenschaftslehre, but rather to confine himself exclusively to oral presentations, which permitted him more easily to "empathize" with his listeners and directly to address their doubts and questions. Fichte's Lectures on Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo Fichte did not lecture on the first principles of the Wissenschaftslehre during the 1795/96 academic year (when he was preoccupied with the preparation and publication of his treatment of natural right), though he had "long announced his intention to use a new manuscript as "'"Prompted by the circumstances of the time, the primary aim of the earlier version was to show that all our consciousness has its foundation in the eternally valid laws of our thinking. In addition to this, however, this new presentation also provides us with the intelligible world as a solid substrate for the empirical one" (AA IV, 2: 150; see below, p. 314). Tatsache is the ordinary German word for "fact"; Talhandlung is a word Fichte invented to designate the (self-)productive deed of the I, and in this volume it is translated as "Act." 6 ' Letter to Reinhold, April 22, •799·
14
Editor's Introduction
the basis for his lectures on the Wissenschaftslehre. " 37 Accordingly, for the summer semester of 1796 he announced a private course on "the foundations of transcendental philosophy (or, in the vernacular, Wissenschaftslehre).'''"8 In fact, however, he canceled his classes for the summer semester of 1796 and did not lecture again until the winter semester of 1796/97. Though the reasons for this cancellation are unclear, at least one explanation may be that Fichte found himself unable to complete his total revision of the presentation of the first principles of the Wissenschaftslehre in time for the new semester and was unwilling simply to repeat his lectures of 1794'95. 39 Therefore, it seems likely that he devoted most of his effort during the summer to this "new presentation." In any event, the course catalog for the winter semester of 1796/97 announced that Fichte would be offering a private course on "the foundations of transcendental philosophy (the Wissenschaftslehre) according to a new method and in a more expeditious fashion, according to a manuscript, but based upon his books. [ ... ]During the vacation he will publicly announce the plan of his course on transcendental philosophy." 40 Before the opening of the semester, which officially began on October 17, Fichte wrote to Reinhold that he was busy with "two courses I have taught before, but which I am working on as if I had never worked them out before.'-4 1 That Fichte actually accomplished this total revision, at least insofar as his lectures on the foundations of transcendental philosophy were concerned, is confirmed by another letter to Reinhold written at the end of the winter semester (March 1797), in which he remarked: "I have completely reworked my presentation, just as if I had 37 J. F. Herbart to Johann Smidt, July 1, 17g6. The passage from the letter in which this report is included is worth quoting at length, simply as evidence of how completely Fichte's beuer students were caught up in the spirit of his enterprise. Thus Herbart writes to his friend that "this summer I am chiefly occupied with the task of trying to come to terms once and for all with the WW..nsdtaftslehre-i.e. (though I say this in confidence), to construct one for myself. For the fact is that, even though I would never have amounted to anything at all without Fichte, I am unable to recognize the unqualified truth of even a single page of his book-in the form in which it now srands. I feel that it is permissible for me to whisper this candidly to a friend, and the best evidence that this is permissible is surely the fact that Fichte himself has long announced his intention to use a new manuscript as the basis for his lectures on the Wisseruchajulehre next winter (since the course was not offered this summer). Hence my desire first to seek my salvation on my own is all the greater" (Fuchs, ed., Fichlt im Gespriich, I: 36o). 38 In the advance course caralog (ciUalogus proelectiunum), this course was described as "privalwim.ejundnmeniJJ p!UlosophiLu transcmdmialis (vemacule die Wwenschaftslehre)." For a complete listing of all Fichte"s lectures at Jena, see EPW, pp. 46-49· 39 This is the explanation proposed by lves Radrizzani in the preface to his French translation of the Wiuenschaftslehre now met~Jodn.,: La Doctrine de Ia Selena Now Metlwdo, suiui de ESJai d'une Nouvelle PrlsmJaliLm de Ia DocJjne de Ia Science (Lausanne: Editions de I'Age d'Homme, •9B9). P· •3· [ 40 "privalim: hora III-IV fundnmeniJJ pliilosophiae trans.<eendentalis (die Wissenschaftslehre) nova m.etlwdo, etlonge o;peditiori, secundum dic141a ad/Ubitis suis Ubris txponet. [ • .. ] Puhlice per feriaJ rationem lectinnum suarum in philosophiam tranSJcmdmialem reddet. 41 Letter to Reinhold, August ~7. 17g6.
Editor's Introduction
15
never worked it out at aJI and as if I knew nothing about the old presentation." In this, as well as in each of the two following winter semesters, Fichte lectured on the Wissenschaftslehre nova metlwdo every weekday afternoon from three to four, from which one can calculate that the entire course was divided into approximately sixty one-hour lectures. 42 Before proceeding to discuss the two subsequent series of lectures on Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo, however, let us pause to address a question raised by the course catalog's description of the lectures of 1796/g7: Why did Fichte continue to describe this profoundly different presentation of the first principles of his system as "based upon his books"? Two, by no means incompatible, answers suggest themselves. First, it is possible that by acquainting his students with two different versions of what he always insisted was only one and the same system, he meant to demonstrate a point often emphasized in his public and private comments on his various presentations of the Wissenschaftslehre: the importance of attaching as little value as possible to the "letter" of his system and of seeking instead to discover its underlying "spirit."43 In Fichte's estimation, it was by no means a disadvantage for a philosopher to alter the terminology in which his system was presented; instead, it was a dear virtue and, indeed, for an author such as Fichte, a virtual necessity. Hence he often called attention to his own, explicit decision to eschew any fixed terminology in the presentation of his system and frequently emphasized the fact that "the Wissenschaftslehre possesses no special terminology of its own." 44 And indeed, to the occasional despair of scholars and students, each successive version of his system ( 179af94, •7w/95· 17g6/gg, 18oii2, 18o4J'5, etc.) possesses its own distinctive vocabulary and method of presentation. On the one hand, it is easy to imagine the extreme confusion that must have been produced in the minds of students attending Fichte's lectures on Wissenschaftslehre nova metlwdo when they turned to the Foundations of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre for assistance in unriddling the difficulties of the former! On the other hand, 42 See the discussion of this point by Erich Fuchs in the introduction to his edition of the Krause transcript: J. G. Fichte, Wis:senschaftskhr~ '/WOO m11tlwdo. Kolkgnacluchrift Chr. Fr. Kmu.s~ 1798/gg (Hamburg: Meiner, tg811}, p. xii. '"This point is emphasized in the brief preface that Fichte wrote in August 1801 for the second, one-volume edition of the Foundlllions and Oulline: ''The majority of the philosophical public still does not seem so well prepared for this new point of view that they will find it useless to have the same content available in two very different forms, nor will it be useless for them to learn to recognize this identity of content for themselves" (SW, I: 85 = AA l, 2: 461; English translation, EPW, pp. 238--39}. 44 Fichte to Reinhold, July 4• •797· See too the previously quoted remarks on this topic contained in the preface to the first edition of the FoundatUms and in the preface to the second edition of Concerning the Canup!., in which Fichte reaffirms his initial decision to present his system in a «a form that shuns the fixed letter" and «protects its inner spirit" (SW, I: 36 = AA l, 11: 1611).
16
Editor's Introduction
as Siegfried Berger observed in his pioneering work on the Wil:senschaftslehre nava 111£/hodo, "this difficulty into which Fichte plunged his listeners corresponded precisely with his pedagogic first principle: 'Think for yourself!' " 45 A second possible explanation for Fichte's surprising decision to employ his old textbooks in conjunction with his new lectures is less exalted: perhaps he simply wanted the income from the sales of the older presentation, or perhaps he wished to deplete the existing stock of the older version to dear the way for the publication of a "new presentation" of the first principles of the Wil:senschaftslehre. 46 ln the light of Fichte's undoubtedly sincere conviction that the content of his earlier presentation remained valid, this explanation is perhaps not as cynical as it may appear; and many readers of the Foundations and the Wil:senschaftslehre nava 111£thodo have discovered that the two presentations do in fact complement and illuminate each other-though this is hardly apparent upon a first reading. For the winter semester of t797/g8, which began on October 16, Fichte once again offered a private course of lectures on the first principles of his system, this time described in the catalog as "foundations of transcendental philosophy on the basis of his books, The Foundations of tlU! Wil:senschaftslehre and the Oulline of tlU! Distinctive Character [of the Wissenschaftslehre with &spect to the Theoretical Faculty ].'>47 On the basis of this 45 Siegfried Berger, Uebn nn.. unveriiffenUU:Iut WWenschaftsuhre]. G. FichUs Uman Kolleghandschrifl der Ha/Wclun Universifiibbib/WlN/r Y g 21.) (Marburg: Noslte, ogo8), p. 4· 46 In the fall of 1799, Fichte's publisher, Chrinian Ernst Gabler, reminded Fichte (who was then at worlt on his "New Presentation" of the Wissenscluiftsuhn) that "the original version is not yet completely sold out." After politely asking the author to bear this fact in mind while preparing his "New Presentation," Gabler then went on to suggest that the projected new boolt should include as many references as possible to Fichte's earlier writings-to help deplete the publisher's remaining stoclt. See Gabler's November 1 1, 1799, leuer to Fichte. Anyone who studies Fichte's correspondence isliltely to be astonished by how much of it is de•uted to purely financial problems and questions, including lawsuits with publishers, inquiries about sales and royalties, and so on. To be sure, such a concern is quite understandable on the pan of anyone in Fichte's extraordinary personal and financial circumstances. What is less understandable is how completely these same circumstances have been ignored by succeeding generations of Fichte scholars. This is unfonunate, since it is quite unlikely that one can obtain an accurate understanding of the genesis and evolution of Fichte's philosophy, and especially of the publication history of his writings, by willfully ignoring his peculiar personal circumstances. As an example of the possible distonions produced by such an "ideal" approach to the study of the history of philosophy, consider the claim made by Berger (and many others) that Fichte's decision in 18o 1 to authorize a second edition of the F=ndal.ions demonstrates that "despite his closer acquaintance with all its shortcomings, he must have still considered it to be correct in its fundamental thoughts" (Uebn eiru unveroffentlic/ue WWen.scluiftsuhTI!, p. 95). Then again, as an unemployed ex-professor trying to earn a living as an author, he may have been more concerned with the extra income from a second edition of the F=ndluions than with reaffirming the "correctness" of a worlt whose manner of presentation he himself had criticized so sharply. 47 "privatim: hom III-IV fundamenla philosophiae lran.ucendenlalis ex suit librU (Grundlage der Wi.tsenscluiftsuhre, et, Grundri~ des Eigrnlhumliclun, etc.)."
Editor's Introduction
I
7
description, some previous scholars, beginning with Hans Jacob, 48 concluded that in 1797/98 Fichte did not lecture on the Wissenschnft.Ilehre nava methodb at all, but instead based his course upon the •794'95 presentation of the foundations of his system. All more recent scholars, however, agree that it is far more likely that in the winter semester of 1797/98 Fichte repeated his lectures on the Wissenschnft.Ilehre nava met.hodo from_the previous year, while at the same time making a gTeater and more concerted effort to emphasize the relationship between this new presentation of the foundations of the Wiuenschaft.Ilehre and the older one. This is also suggested by the following description of the course, written by Fichte himself and recently discovered among his papers: Many of my listeners have been unwilling to dispense with the convenience of a printed textbook for these lectures. In order to satisfy this desire, I will this time follow more closely my published books concerning the Wis.sensdiaftslehre (Grundlage tkr gesamJen Wmenschfl. u. Grundri{J des Eigentii.mlichen) than l did in my last lectures on the Wissenschaftslehre, though without dispensing with whatever, as a result of further reflection, I can contribute to the greater clarity of this science. 49 Fichte offered his lectures on the Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo for one last time in the winter semester of •798/99, when the course was described as "foundations of transcendental philosophy (the Wissenschnft.Ilehre) according to a new method, but utilizing his book.s." 50 Though the semester officially began on October 15, 1798, Fichte apparently did not begin his private lectures on the Wissenschaft.Ilehre nova met.hodo until October 25. 51 The course ended on March 14, 1799, at the very moment when the so-called Atheism Controversy was reaching its denouement. By the end of the month Fichte had forfeited !'tis position at the institution that had received him so warmly scarcely five years earlier. 48
See Jacob's preface to Fkhte, Nacllg~lasst!fl€ &hriflnl, Vol. II: Schriflnl aus dm jahrm
179o-18oo (Berlin: Junker und Diinnhaupt, 1937), p. xxix. Note, however, that the an-
nouncement of the 1 7g8/99 lectures, which, thanlr.s to the discovery of the Krause transcript, we can now be certain were devoted to a presentation of the Wissm.uhaftsW.r• nova melh«Ui, also mentions that in his lectures Fichte will be "utilizing his boolr.s" ("tamen sui libris"), though they are not mentioned by name. 49 AA IV, 2: 5· Commenting on this description, the editors of AA IV, ~ cautiously observe that it is quite possible that Fichte simply meant "to emphasize that he still adhered to the fundamental thoughts of the printed Wissmschaftslehr•, so that the latter could still serve as a textbook for his lectures." ..., "privaJim: horn Il/-JV fundamenla philosophiae nova 1n11t.h.o
, adhibiJis tamen suu lihriJ, exponet." 1
tra~lu
(di•
Wissm.tdllifislehr~)
~ The evidence for this is a comment in an October ~4. t']g8,letter from Krause to his father, in which he mentions that the class will begin the next day. The relevant passage is published by Erich Fuchs in his introduction to the Krause transcript, p. x.
18
Editor's Introduction
Plans to Publish a "New Presentation" of the Wissenschaftslehre From the very beginning, Fichte clearly intended to publish his new presentation of the first principles of his system. This time, however, he wished to avoid the mistake he had made by his decision to publish the first version prematurely. Instead, his plan was first to deliver a course of lectures on Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo and then to revise them for publication. 52 But rather than publish these revised lectures in a single volume, he intended to publish them first in installments in the Philosophisches Journal einer Gesellschaft Teutscher Gelehrten, a Journal jointly edited by Fichte and his colleague F. I. Niethammer. 5 And indeed, between February 1797 and March 1798 two introductions to this new version, as well as its first chapter, appeared in four installments in the Philosophisches journal, under the general title "An Attempt at a New Presentation of the Wissenschaftslehre. " 54 No further installments appeared, though Fichte did not abandon his plans for the eventual publication of this new presentation of his system, as he made clear in a public announcement he included in the preface to the second edition of Concerning the Concept of the Wissenschaftslehre, published in the fall of 1798. Here he informed his readers: I will for the present proceed no further with the systematic elaboration of this system; instead, I will first try to elaborate more fully what has already been discovered and to make it completely clear and obvious to every impartial person. A first step in this direction has already been taken in the previously mentioned journal, and I will proceed with this project to the extent that my academic duties permit. I have heard from several sources that many persons have found these essays illuminating, and if the public attitude toward the new theory has not been more generally altered, this might well be due to the fact that the journal in question seems not to have a very wide circulation. With the same aim in mind, just as soon as time permits, I intend to publish a new attempt at a purely and strictly systematic presentation of the foundations of the Wissenschaftslehre. 55
Fichte explicitly reaffirmed this same plan a year later, in his March 17, •799· letter to J. E. C. Schmidt, where he remarks: "For three years I have been working on and lecturing from a new version [of the Wissen2 ' One should recall that all the major systematic works Fichte published while at Jena (the Grundlage, the Grundri/3, the Naturrechl, and the SiUenlehre) were first presented to his students in the form of lectures. "See Fichte's March 21, 1797, letter to Reinhold, in which he remarks: "I intend to have this revised version published in our Philosophischesjoumal." "'Versuch einer neuen Darslellung der Wissenschaftslehre (SW, 1: 419-534 = AA I, 4: 183281). "SW, 1: 37 = AA I, 2: 163.
Editor's Introduction
19
schnftslehre ], the first chapter of which has been printed in the Journal. I intend to have this new presentation published next winter. If you still take exception here and there, I would advise you to wait for this new . . ,, reVISIOn. By the "next winter," however, Fichte had other things to worry about and was living in Berlin, where he had sought refuge in the wake of the Atheism Controversy. Since he had no academic appointment in Berlin, Fichte had to make plans to support himself purely from the proceeds of his literary activities, and among the literary projects to which he frequently referred in his correspondence of this period is the plan to publish the "New Presentation" of the first principles of the Wissenschnftslehre. Other, previously unanticipated projects, however-such as defending himself against the charge of atheism and writing The Vocalion of Man (two projects that were, in fact, intimately related)-took priority during his first year in Berlin. In any case, in August 1799, shortly after he arrived in Berlin, Fichte wrote to his wife (who had remained behind to settle their affairs in Jena): "My plans are currently as follows: As soon as the printing of my Vocation of Man is finished, I shall return tojena, where I will spend the winter working on my philosophy of religion and, so far as it proves possible, on the new version of my Wisseruchaftslehre. I will publish the former by subscription. Even on the wurst scenario, these works should earn enough for us to be able to live well from them for a few years." 56 In another letter to his wife, written a bit later in the fall of the same year, he returned to the subject of his literary projects and remarked: "In addition, I have on hand a fine manuscript, the new version of the Wisseruchnftslehre, which can also be made salable with a minimum of effort and for which I also hope to fetch a good price. Thus there is no reason at all for you to be concerned about our support." 57 Such remarks indicate that, though Fichte had to postpone his plans for publishing the new version of the foundations of the Wisseruchnftslehre, he had by no means abandoned them at this point. Furthermore, it is clear, first of all, that he believed that some revision would be needed before the text would be ready for the press, and second, that he did not anticipate that the needed revision of this "fine manuscript" would require much additional effort. By the beginning of the next year, however, other projects had intervened, and though Fichte still intended to revise the "New Presentation" for publication, this project appears last on a list of four he mentioned in a letter to his publisher,]. F. Cotta.5 8 Here Fichte describes 56
Letter to johanna Fichte, August 20-24, 1799· Letter to johanna Fichte, October 28-November 2, '799· Fichte to Cotta, January 13, 1800. In this letter Fichte lists his current projects in the following order: (1) a critique of the new French Constitution, accompanied by clearer 57
58
20
Editor's
lmroducdon
the new version as "a new (much clearer and smoother) presentation of the Wi.ssenschnftslehre (perhaps as a commentary or something similar, inasmuch as a new, generally unaltered reprint of the sold-out first Wissenschnftslehre is scheduled to appear). The manuscript has been finished for years; I used it in my lectures. It is desired by everyone who knows of its existence. It cannot appear, however, without a proper revision." From the last comment it appears that, Fichte's earlier assurances to his wife notwithstanding, he was beginning to have second thoughts about how much work would be needed to put the "New Presentation" into publishable form. As it turned out, Fichte devoted the first half of 1800 to projects not even alluded to in his January 13 letter to Cotta: an essay for the Philosophisches J{IUrnal, in which he once again stated his views on the relationship between religion and philosophy, 59 and an entirely new book on political economy, which was published in November under the title The Closed Commercial State. 60 Consequently, he was not able to return to the projected revision of the Wi.ssenschnftslehre noua methodo until the faU of 1800, though he assured Cotta (in a letter of August 16, 18oo): "This coming winter I hope to get to work for you on the editing of the new version of the Wi.ssenschnftslehre, which has been finished for years." Even then, Fichte did not turn immediately to this oft-postponed project, but first composed a sharply critical review of C. G. Bardili's Outlines of Primary Logic, a project to which he was driven by Reinhold's unanticipated departure from his period of short-lived enthusiasm for Fichte's Wissenschnjtslehre and conversion to the standpoint of Bardili's "rational reatism.' 061 By the end of October 18oo, however, Fichte had finished the Bardili review and was at last ready to set to work in earnest on the task of revising the manuscript of the Wi.ssenschnftslehre noua methodo. It appears that Fichte's decision to dedicate the winter of 1800 to this effort was, once again, dictated at least in part by external circumstances, namely, by a request to give private lessons on the Wissen-
presenlation o£ his own views concerning the nature o£ a proper constitution; (2) a public reply to Jacobi's Opm letln lo F~hu; (g) a popular introduction to the Wwerucllaft.slehrt, to be titled A Crysl41 Clear Report lo the General Publie Concerning the Aclual Essence of My Phi· losophy; and (4) the new presenlation o£ the Wwerucllaft.slthre. Only the third o£ these projects ever came to fruition. Fichte's Sonnmklu.rer Berichl an das Grassert PubUAum iiJNr das We.sen tier neue.slen PhUo.sopi&U was eventually published in the spring o£ t8o 1, albeit by a different publisher (SW,II: 323-420 = AA I, 7: 185-268; English tr311$lation by John Botterman and William Rasch in Philosophy of Gnman Idealism, ed. Ernst Behler {New York: Continuum, 1987], pp. 39-115). 59 Aur nnem Privatschrtiben (SW, V: 377--g6 = AA I, 6: 36g-8g). 60 lkr ge.sdaltment HandelstooJ (SW, III: 387-513 = AA I, 7: 37-164). '" The issue of the P~ Joumal conlaining Fichte's review o£ Bardili appeared in November 18oo. "Rezension von Bardilis Grundriss der ersten Logik" (SW, II: 4go-503 = AA I, 6: 433-5o).
[ l l
I , -
l
I
l
Editor's Introduction
2I
schaftslehre to a local banker, Salomon Moses Levy. Levy had first
approached Fichte with this idea at the beginning of the summer, but his business activities took him away from Berlin until the fall. Apparently, Fichte decided that it would be convenient to his own purposes to combine these private lessons with the task of revising the Wissenschaftslehre. Moreover, he also appears to have decided at about this same time that the new version of his system should be a strictly scientific (or, in Fichte's language, "metaphysical")62 presentation, one that would dispense entirely with the kind of "critical" discussion of the nature of philosophical reflection and the task of philosophy contained in the published introductions to the Attempt at a New Presentation. Instead, he decided to include all such material in a more "popular" companion volume, the previously mentioned Crystal Clear Report to the General Public, upon which he apparently continued to work during this same period. Thus, on October 21, 18oo, he wrote a letter to G. A. Reimer, the publisher of the Crystal Clear Report, requesting an extension of the deadline for delivery of the manuscript and explaining the del'!Y as follows: "Because of the arrival of someone to whom I am giving a private course on the Wissenschaftslehre I am now occupied with the latter. I had intended to spend this winter preparing a new presentation of the Wissenschaftslehre for the press. I will gain some time if I can proceed undisturbed with this project." Perhaps to make the delay more palatable to his publisher, he then added: "In this way it [the Crystal Clear Report] will also acquire a certain contemporary interest, since it will provide a practically inseparable introduction to the new presentation of the Wissenschaftslehre (for which I will provide no introduction at all, but will instead refer readers to the Crystal Clear Report)." Similarly, in letters written to Schelling during this same period, Fichte excused himself from collaborating on a proposed new "Critical Journal" on the grounds that "I would much rather edit my new version of the Wissenschaftslehre, which seems to me to put an end to all doubts and objections on the part of anyone who is not entirely demoralized." 6 !l At long last, therefore, in the final months of 1800, after repeated postponements, Fichte was able to clear his schedule of everything else and devote himself entirely to the task of presenting the foundations of his system to the public in a new and more adequate form. That he expected to complete this task in a timely fashion is apparent from his November 4, 1800, letter to Cotta, in which he notified his publisher: "I am once again completely involved with the Wissenschaftslehre, and this time I promise to deliver to you something that should unquestionably please 62 See the preface to the second edition of Concerning the Concept (SW, I, 32-33 = AA l, 2: lsg-6o). 63 Fichte to Schelling, October 22, 1800. See too his letter to Schelling, November 15,
1800.
22
Editor's Introduction
you." Fichte then went on to recommend that the publisher make plans for a large edition of the work and to suggest that it might, at least initially, be published by subscription. Along with the letter to Cotta, Fichte included the text of a lengthy public announcement, which he wished to have published in appropriate journals. This neglected document, which is of capital importance for an understanding of Fichte's entire philosophical development, reads (in part) as follows: The Wissenschaftslehre has been lying before the German public for six years now. It has received a very mixed reception: for the most part, it has met with vehement and passionate opposition, though it has also attracted some praise from inadequately trained people and has even found a few gifted followers and co-workers. For the past five years, 64 I have had in my desk a new version of the Wissenschaftslehre, which I have been employing in my classroom lectures on this science. This winter I am busy revising this new presentation, which I hope to be able to publish this coming spring. I wish very much that the public would pruuisionally (that is, until such time as it becomes possible for them to convince themselves on this point) accept the following two assurances from me, and I hope that people will keep both of these points in mind while reading the new presentation: First of all, with the exception of a few individuals (not counting my own students and immediate listeners, to whom the present remarks are not directed), hardly any knowledge whatsoever concerning the Wissenschaftslehre is currently to be found among the educated public. Second, this science represents a thoroughly new discovery, the very Idea of which did not exist previously and can be obtained only from the Wissenschaftslehre itself. This new science can be judged only on its own terms. Concerning the first point: The text that appeared six years ago and was published as a manuscript for the use of my listeners, namely, the Foundations of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre, has, to the best of my knowledge, been understood by almost no one and has been made use of by hardly anyone at all, apart from my own students. This is a text that does not appear to be able to dispense very easily with oral assistance. It seems to me, however, that in my [Foundations oj] Natural Right and [System oj] Ethical Theory I have been somewhat more successful in presenting my thoughts concerning philosophy in general as well. Nevertheless, to judge by all the comments I have heard on this topic since the publication of these two works (including those comments that concern these very works), it would appear that even these books have not helped the public to advance much further in its understanding of the main point at issue. I am not sure why this is so-whether it is because people have usually skipped the introductions and the first sections of these two books, or whether it is because it is simply not really possible to provide the remote conclusions of my system (taken in isolation from the premises from which they are derived) with the same degree of 64 Taken literally, this would imply that the manuscript of the WiJsenschaftslehre nova methodo was first composed in the fall of 1795, a claim that is difficult to reconcile with all the other evidence in favor of a somewhat later dating.
Editor's Introduction
23
self-evidence one can easily give to the first premises themselves. The only texts that seem to have been better understood and appear to have succeeded in raising high expectations concerning the Wi.sseruchaftslehre on the part of many open-minded people are the two "Introductions" to the Wi.sseruchaftslehre, as well as the first chapter of a "New Presentation" of this system, which appeared in the Philosophical journal. At best, however, these essays can do no more than convey a preliminary concept of my project; the project itself, however, is by no means actually implemented and brought to completion in these essays. [ ... ] l have previously stated elsewhere65 that, for my part, l would be willing to shoulder all the blame for the nearly universal lack of understanding (concerning the Wi.ssenschaftslehre] that has prevailed in the past, if, by doing so, I could only move the public to grapple anew with the issues in dispute. As a result of long practice with the most diverse types of individuals, the originator of this science believes he has at last acquired the facility to communicate his science to others; and he intends to do so in the form of a new system, one that was not discovered by means of any further elaboration of the previously existing version of this science, but was discovered in an entirely different manner. [ ... ] By means of this new presentation, which I guarantee will be intelligible to anyone who possesses the capacity for understanding science, l hope that the philosophical public will finally have an occasion to COttkl to terms in all seriousness with the Wi.ssenschaftslehre. [ •.• ] ln conclusion, I hope to make this new presentation so clear and so intelligible that it will require no further assistance in this respect and no newer and even clearer presentation will be needed. I will worry later about such matters as scientific elegance, the strictly systematic arrangement of the parts and the exclusion of any foreign elements, the adoption of a precise terminology, and the creation of a symbolic system of pure concepts (such as that "universal characteristic" which was already sought by Leibniz and which first becomes possible only subsequent to the Wi.ssenschaftslehre). That is to say, l will attend to these matters only after I have found that the age is making some use of this new presentation of the Wi.sseruchaftslehre and has thereby made itself receptive to a purely scientific presentation of the same. 66 Fichte continued to work on this new presentation throughout the winter, as is dear from comments in his letters. 67 At the same time, his "revision" of the new presentation was proving to be more timeconsuming that he originally anticipated and would, in the author's new 65
In the Preface to "An Attempt at a New Presentation of Wweruchaftslehre." "[Ankundigung: Seit sechs Jarhren.]" (AA l, 7: t 53~4). In a note from the publisher, which was appended to Fichte's text, Cotta announced that the work in question "will be published by our firm around the middle of this year" and invited interested parties to help enroll subscribers. As an incentive, he offered "one free copy for every six subscrip66
tions." 67 See, e.g., Fichte's leuer to Schiller, December 2, 1800, in which he reports; "I am presently working on a new presentation of the Wweruchaftsuhre, which-so I hope-will be so dear that anyone with a scientific mind can be expected to unden~tand it." See too the
24
Editor's ImroduClion
estimation, require something more than a simple editorial reworking of the existing manuscript of his lectures on Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo. Abandonment of Plans to Publish the Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo
The first, albeit indirect, hint that Fichte was not progressing as rapidly as he had hoped in his revision of the new presentation is a comment in his December 26, 18oo, letter to Cotta, in which he somewhat tentatively asks his publisher whether it might not be better-allegedly, for purely commercial reasons (in order to obtain the largest possible advance subscription)-to postpone publication of the new presentation until sometime after the Easter book fair, or even to abandon the original plan to offer it by subscription. After receiving Cotta's approval for the delay, Fichte, in his next letter to the publisher (February 14, 1801) added: "I myself, on account of my work, very much wish that the printing of the Wissenschaftslehre can be postponed." And in fact, as this allusion to "my work" suggests, Fichte was encountering more and more difficulties in his efforts to revise the text of his lectures on Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo; indeed, it appears likely that by this point he had virtually abandoned his efforts to rework his manuscript of 1796/gg. In any case, he was increasingly preoccupied with other matters. Accordingly, in the spring of 1801 he directed his literary energies to three other projects: the completion of the Crystal Clear Report, a polemical reply to Friedrich Nicolai's increasingly vitriolic public campaign against Fichte, 68 and a public reply to Reinhold's defense ofBardili and criticism of transcendental idealism.69 A certain amount of confusion is created by the fact that throughout the next few years Fichte continued, both in his private correspondence70 and in his published writings, to make occasional reference to
remark in Fichte's January 31, 1801, letter to Friedrich Johannsen: "I will soon publish my new presentation of the Wissensclwftslehre, which has existed in manuscript for four years and which I used to lecture on in Jena." 68 This work, Friedrich Nicolai~ Leben und sonderbare Meinungen (SW, VIII: 3-93 = AA I, 7: 367-463), was apparently composed during the early spring of 18o1 and was published in May of the same year. 69 J. G. Fickle~ Antwortschreiben an Herrn Professor Reinhold (SW, II: 504-34 = AA I, 7: 291-324) was probably written at the beginning of April 1801. It was published at the end of the same month. 70 In his May g, 1801, letter to Cotta, Fichte suggested postponing publication of the "New Presentation" until the fall book fair, and then went on to add: "Since the greater public has no concept of what I actually want to accomplish in this book, they can also wait for it until after Michael mas •So 1." This ominous predi~tion was made explicit in Fichte's next letter to Cotta (August 8, t8ot), which began as follows: "I have found so much to do in the new version-which actually, in many respects, represents a new discovery of the
Editor's Introduction
25
the long-promised "New Presentation of the Wissenschaftslehre." 11 The "new presentation" in question, however, was no longer the revised version of 17g6/gg, but instead an entirely new version, the so-called Wissenschaftslehre of I801/2 72-which likewise failed to appear as promised. Let us now draw some conclusions from the evidence assembled so far and directly address the question, Why did Fichte first delay and then abandon his plans to publish the Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo? The original delay, that is, the suspension of the plan to publish the Attempt at a New PresentaJion of the Wissenschaftslehre in installments in the Philosophisches Journal, appears to have been directly connected with the Atheism Controversy that eru.gted shortly after the publication of Chapter 1 of the New Presentation. !I This is not to suggest that the Atheism Controversy somehow caused Fichte to reevaluate the philosophical adequacy of his New Presentation and to suspend publication because he had become dissatisfied with the new version; instead, it appears that the public controversy concerning-and misunderstanding of-his article "On the Ground of Our Belief in a Divine Governance of the World" 74 caused him to reconsider the wisdom o~. submitting his new Wweruchafalehre from a variety of middle points-that I cannot, without a certain amount ofrashness in the presentation and expression of the same, tend to the printing in time for the Michael mas fair. Therefore, it would be beuer for us to postpone it so that we can accomplish it with the rullest ripeness and leisure. It will certainly appear around the end of the year." This "new discovery" of the Wweruchafauhre is also mentioned by Fichte in his May 31-August 7• t8o 1, letter to Schelling, where he predicts that it will be published by the end of the year. By November 28, 1801, howe.-er, Fichte had once again revised his estimate of the publication date of the "new .-ersion of the Wweruchafalehre," which he assured Cotta "will be printed without fail in time for the Easter fair," a promise repeated in his December 29, tBot, letter to J. B. Shad, his January '5· 1802, letter to Schelling, and his January 23, 18o2, letter to Cotta. But by April 1802 he informed his long-suffering publisher that "the new presentation of the Wisseruchafalehre can appear only after the fair. I ha.-e lectured on it, and, though thu new engagement with it should prove useful for the contents themselves, it nevertheless prevents me from getting it ready for the printer." Finally, in a letter of June 3, 18o2, he assured Niethammer that the "new exposition should certainly appear this summer." 71 What is apparently Fichte's last public reference to the "New Presentation" occurs in the new preface (dated "August 1801 ") he wrote for the second edition of the Fountlalionsl Oulline. This preface begins by confessing that "in the course of preparing a new presentation of the Wissrnschafalehre it has again become dear to the creator of this science that, for the time being, no new presentation will be able to make thu first presentation superfluous" and concludes with the (unfulfilled) promise that "the new presentation will be published next year" (SW, 1: 85 = AA I, 2: 461). 72 A heavily edited version of the DarsttUung der WWrnschafalehre aus dem Jahre t8o 1 was published by I. H. Fichte in SW, II: 3-163. For a reliable text, see AA II, 6: 129-324. 7 ' See Fuchs's introduction to the Krause transcript, p. vii. Chap. 1 appeared in the first number of vol. 7 of the Phii.osophisclw Journal, which was published in March 1798. The articles by Fichte and Forberg which provoked the Atheism Contro.-ersy were published only six months later in the first number of vol. 8 of the same journal. 74 Uebn den Grund unsers G/auhen an tine goUiiche WeUregierung (SW, V: 177-89 = AA l, 5: 347-57; English translation by Paul Edwards, "On the Foundation of Our Belief in a
26
Editor's Introduction
presentation of the foundations of transcendental philosophy to the scrutiny of what he increasingly took to be an ill-informed and unsympathetic public. After all, in the preface to the first published installment of the Attempt at a New Presentation he had begged his readers to put aside any ideas concerning his philosophy which they may have obtained from his original presentation of its foundations and urged them to give a fair hearing to the new presentation, in which he promised "to take the utmost pains to achieve the greatest possible clarity." He then added: "I will continue this presentation until I am convinced that I write entirely in vain. But I shall be writin~ in vain so long as no one cares to examine my arguments and reasons." 5 One might, therefore, conclude that the public Atheism Controversy, when combined with the growing hostility toward Fichte's philosophy on the part of his professional colleagues, convinced him that, for the moment at least, he was indeed "writing in vain" and that this was why he refused to publish any further installments of the Attempt at a New Presentation. Furthermore, after Fichte (sometime in 1798) originally suspended his plan of revising the Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo for publication in the Philosophisches Journal, a series of other, more pressing projects immediately intervened to occupy all his time and energy for the next several years-beginning, in 1799. with his various public and private responses to the accusation of atheism, and continuing, in the following year, with his work on such projects as The Vocation of Man, The Closed Commercial State, the Bardili review, and the Crystal Clear Report. In addition to these literary projects, he was also occupied during the years 1799 and 18oo with various practical arrangements involved in the move from Jena to Berlin. 76 As a consequence of these projects and problems, the delay in returning to the work of revision proved to be much longer than he had originally anticipated, and during this period his thoughts about the nature of an adequate presentation of the foundations of his system continued to evolve. This last point proved to be the decisive one, the one that explains why revision and publication of the Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo was not merely suspended but was finally abandoned altogether for a completely new attempt to expound the first principles of transcendental philosophy (in the unpublished "Wissenschaftslehre of 1801/2"). By the time Fichte was able to return his full attention to the task of revising the Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo (that is, by the fall and winter of 18oo) his own Divine Government of the Universe," in Nimteenth-Century Philosophy, ed. Patrick L. Gardiner (New York: Free Press, 1969), pp. 19-26. '"SW, 1: 420 = AA !, 4: 184. 76 Fichte left Jena for Berlin in July 1799. In December he returned to Jena to dispose of his home and household possessions, a process that occupied much more time than he had anticipated. Thus he was unable to return to Berlin until March 1800.
Editor's Introduction
27
understanding of what should-and what should not-be included in such a presentation had advanced to the point where it was no longer possible for him simply to revise the presentation of 1796/gg. Indeed, the surviving manuscript of his unfinished attempted revision of 18oo, 77 with its much heavier emphasis upon the "intuitive" character of philosophical evidence (a point also stressed in the announcement of the new presentation, which Fichte wrote in November 18oo) and with its repeated new starts and asides, eloquently reveals just how difficult-and finally, impossible-the task of "revising" the Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo proved to be. Though this document breaks off abruptly with the derivation of "feeling" (i.e., at a point corresponding roughly with § 6 of the Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo), it clearly demonstrates that Fichte was no longer satisfied with the overall method of presentation adopted in his lectures of 17g6/gg. 78 In short, whereas he had originally predicted that the manuscript of the Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo could be made publishable "with little effort," 79 this proved not to be the case at all. Just what were the changes in Fichte's views which account for his growing dissatisfaction with the presentation of 1796/gg? Though there were various minor infelicities, such as the occasional "confusion of ideal and real activity" that Fichte mentioned in his November 15, 1800, letter to Schelling, the underlying problem was more serious. It is hinted at in a letter to Schelling written at about the same time that Fichte was nearing his decision to abandon for good any attempt to revise the Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo. In this letter of December 27, 18oo, he alerted his erstwhile colleague to the pressing need "for an even wider extension of transcendental philosophy, even with respect to the very principles of the same." He added: "I have not yet been able to work out these more extensive principles in a scientific manner; the clearest hint concerning them is found in the third book of my Vocation of Man. As soon as I am finished with my new presentation of the Wissenschaftslehre, my first project will be to carry out this task. In a word, what is still lacking is a transcendental system of the intelligible world." The "intelligible world" is the Kantian name for the realm of free, moral agents, that is to say, the realm of "intersubjectivity." And in fact, as many scholars have noted, the account of intersubjectivity in the Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo, though consistent with the account given in Fichte's earlier Jena writings, 77 Neue Bearbeitung der Wmenschaftslehre (AA II, 5: 331-402). This manuscript was composed between October and December 1800. 78 This is also the verdict reached by the editors of the Halle transcript of the Willen· schaftslehre nova methodo, who conclude that "in his draft of the Wmenschaftslehre of October 1800, [Fichte) had already abandoned the systematic conception of the presentation nova methodo" (AA IV, 2: 11). 79 Fichte to Johanna Fichte, November 2, 1799.
28
Editor's Introduction
is incompatible with and superseded by the very different account of intersubjectivity provided in Book I II of The Vocation of Man. Fichte returned to this same point in another letter to Schelling, written shortly after he had decided to make an entirely fresh start in his efforts to produce a new presentation of the first principles of the Wisseruchaftslehre. In this letter of May 31, 18o1, he explained that "the Wisseruchaftslehre lacks nothing whatsoever insofar as its principles are concerned; yet it is incomplete. That is to say, the highest synthesis, that of the spiritual world, has not yet been achieved. The cry of 'atheism' was raised just as I was preparing to achieve this synthesis." By "synthesis of the spiritual world" Fichte was referring, as he explained in Book II I of The Vocation of Man, to the role played within the intelligible world by the "lawgiver in the kingdom of ends"; that is, he was referring to God. What appears to have happened, therefore, is that sometime between the fall of 1800 and the late spring of 1801 Fichte decided that he could not simply tack his new "theory of the intelligible world" onto a revised version of the presentation contained in the Wisseruchaftslehre nova methodo; instead, he concluded that such a theory, and especially its "highest synthesis," should occupy a central position in any new presentation of the first principles of his system. 80 This, however, as he apparently realized in the winter of 18oo/18o 1, would require a thoroughly new method of presentation. From then on, therefore, Fichte presented the Wisseruchaftslehre as a theory of the absolute and its appearances. We can merely speculate about what accounted for this change in Fichte's views. Though it is difficult to resist the thought that the striking differences between the Jena versions of the Wisseruchaftslehre and the later versions are somehow connected with the Atheism Controversy, a close examination of Fichte's published and unpublished writings of the years 179~18o1 suggests that the decisive turn in his own under standing of his system was already under way in Jena, and that this had at least as much to do with the inner, dialectical development of the Wisseruchaftslehre as with any external events in the life of its author. 81 Nev80 Though the manuscript of the Neue Bearbeiltmg of 1800 shows that Fichte was still trying to follow the basic method of presentation of the Wiuenschaftslehre nova methodo, it includes marginal comments and asides that plainly indicate that he was finding it harder and harder to avoid introducing his new theory of the intelligible world into his presentation ofthe first principles of his system. Thus he remarks at one point in the manuscript (AI\ ll, 5: 585) that "the bond that holds together the entire intelligible world is God. Such an intuition simply must be demonstrated." See too the later, rather plaintive question (p. 400): "Is there not perhaps a pure intuition of God, by means of which my philosophy could all at once receive assistance?" When developed (as it is, for example, in the Wiuenschaftrlehre of 18o1/2), this suggestion becomes the line of demarcation between the jena Wiuenschaftslehre and all subsequent versions. 81 There is, for example, clear evidence that Fichte had already reached a new understanding of the "synthesis of the intelligible world," that is, a new theory of intersubjectivity, by the spring of •799· This is indicated by remarks in his Platner lectures ("Logic
Editor's Introduction
29
ertheless, it seems plausible that Fichte's interest in extending the Wissenschaftslehre in the direction of the philosophy of religion and the theory of the intelligible world should have been at least reinforced and intensified by the controversy over his alleged atheism, and especially by the criticisms in Jacobi's celebrated Open Letter to Fichte. 82 What is beyond dispute is that Fichte was preoccupied with just such questions in the period immediately after his departure from Jena and that, as a result, his understanding of the relationship between the "intelligible" and the "empirical" worlds was substantially altered. This is especially clear in The Vocation of Man, which Fichte began during the summer of 1799 and finished in November. He himself was well aware of this change in orientation and alluded to it in a November 5, 1799, letter to his wife, where he remarked: "In the course of working on my present book [The Vocation of Man} I have looked more closely into religion than ever before." A more striking reference to this change in his views appears in a letter composed almost a year later, where he admits: "l may have erred in some of the final propositions of my system, that is to say, in the derivation; and I will, no doubt, often do so again in the future. I myself have already discovered errors here and there and have publicly retracted them before my listeners, and l also retract them in public, to the extent that I teach something else in my other writings. (As l have, for example, in the Vocation of Man retracted the superficial argument of the Sittenlehre, p. 3oo---and I also did this a year and half ago before my students.)"83 To be sure, other "theoretical" influences were at work on Fichte at the end of 1800, and they too may well have added to his dissatisfaction with the presentation of 1796/99· For example, he was growing more and more alarmed by Schelling's assertions regarding the relationship between transcendental philosophy and an a priori philosophy of and Metaphysics") at the end of the winter semester of 17g8/99. As the editors of AA IV, 4 point out, Fichte's lecture notes, and especially his remarks on § g~~ of Platner's book, provide dramatic evidence of a sudden change in his theory of intersubjectivity in the spring of 1798: whereas the old theory (similar to the one contained in the System of Ethics) is expounded in AA II, 4: ~ 12-27, pp. ~a8-3o of the same text introduce the first version of the new theory (anticipating that contained in Book Ill of The Vocation of Man). Presumably, it was precisely this new understanding of ~the intelligible world" which Fichte intended to expound in the lectures on philosophy of religion he announced for the summer semester of •799· Unfonunately, because of the Atheism Controversy and ensuing events, these Lectures were never delivered. 82 }aL:obi an FichU, March 3-a 1, 1799 (AA Ill, ~: 224-81). For a partial English translation of this document, which played a key role in the development of post-Kantian philosophy, see ~open Letter to Fichte," trans. Diana I. Behler, in Philosophy of German ltka/Um,
PP·85 ''!rl'·
Fichte to Reinhold, September 18, 1Boo. The mention of a "retraction before my students a year and a half ago" is presumably a reference to the above-mentioned changes in the theory of intersubjectivity which Fichte introduced at the conclusion of his lectures on logic and metaphysics in the winter semester of 1798199.
30
Editor's Introduction
nature, as well as by his claims concerning the allegedly "objective" character of intellectual intuition, and Fichte was becoming convincedhowever reluctantly-of the need for some sort of direct or indirect public exposure of Schelling's errors. Another philosophical motive that surely influenced Fichte while he was trying to revise his lectures was his desire to reply to Bardili's rejection of "intuitive evidence," with its attendant call for a philosophy based upon nothing more than "thinking qua thinking." Indeed, the draft of the Neue Bearbeitung of 18oo clearly shows how Fichte was trying to integrate a response to these two very different sorts of "dogmatism" within his new presentation-just as it also shows how difficult he was finding it to accommodate his existing manuscript to this purpose. Nevertheless, the evidence plainly suggests that the most important external philosophical impetus in the evolution of Fichte's philosophical conceptions during this period was Jacobi's public criticism, which not only endorsed the charge of atheism against the Wissenschaftslehre, but raised a new charge as well: nihilism. Similarly, the most important internal reason for Fichte's final abandonment of the 1796/gg version appears to have been that it simply did not lend itself to a revision of the sort he now thought was required, and specifically, that it could not be readily modified in such a manner as to be consistent with his new understanding of the intelligible world-that is, with his new theories of inter personality and of God. The history of Fichte's attempts to lay before the public an accurate, clear, and accessible presentation of the first principles of transcendental philosophy is a history of failure, a story of one broken promise after another. As we have seen, he realized at an early date that the struggle to provide an adequate exposition of his system would be long and frustrating, but he nevertheless hoped to make progress toward this goal. Thus he warned the readers of his first (and, as it turned out, only) public presentation of the foundations of the Wissenschaftslehre: "Having thoroughly reworked this system three times, and having found that my thoughts concerning individual propositions contained therein are differently modified each time, I can expect that as my reflections continue to develop, my thoughts will always continue to alter and to develop." 84 This prediction was only strengthened by the public reception of the Foundations, which convinced the author that a new presentation not only would be a desirable way of keeping the public informed concerning his "further reflections," but would be necessary to correct misunderstandings based upon the original presentation. As the goal of a "definitive presentation" of the Wissenschaftslehre continued to elude him, Fichte consoled himself with the thought that he 84
SW, I: Sg
= AA
l, 2: 254.
Editor's Introduction
31
might be able to achieve his aim by providing the public with several different presentations of his system. Thus, immediately after exclaiming to Reinhold, in a letter of March 2 1, 1797, "How many more times will I revise my presentation!" he went on: "Nature has made up for my lack of precision by granting me the ability to view things in a number of different ways and by endowing me with a fairly agile mind." By this time, however, he had already come to realize that "the presentation of the Wissenschaftslehre will require by itself an entire lifetime. The only prospect that is able to shake me is the thought of dying before I have completed it."85 At the time that he made these remarks, Fichte still hoped to be able to publish a new presentation-or better, a series of new presentations-of the Wissenschaftslehre. And as we have seen, he continued to pursue this goal throughout his first years in Berlin. By 1 8o4, however, he had reached a momentous decision: to continue his striving for an ever more adequate, scientific presentation of his system, but to renounce for the foreseeable future any plans to publish these new presentations. His reasons for reaching this decision are nowhere stated more clearly and poignantly than in a document he drafted for the royal cabinet of ministers to the Prussian government on January g, 1804. 86 This document, which testifies eloquently to Fichte's determination to avoid any possible misunderstanding of his philosophy on the part of the public, and which also explains how and why he could continue to revise his presentation of his system until the year of his death, without any prospect of publishing it, is here translated in its entirety: Pro memoria: A system, the external form of which has recently been brought lO completion, is now available which prides itself on being completely selfcontained, unalterable, and immediately self-evidem and is able lO provide all the other sciences with their first principles and guidelines. This system thereby promises lO eliminate forever all conflict and misunderstanding from the domain of science and to direct the human mind (which obtains its proper strengthening only within this system) wward the field within which it can make endless progress toward ever-higher clarity. This field consists of the empirical world, within which this system promises lO provide the human mind with an infallible guide. Despite the fact that, under the name "philosophy," such a science has been obscurely amicipated and sought since the very beginning of all scientific endeavor, it is nevertheless obvious that such a science has never before existed nor even been attempted. Indeed, the entire wisdom and enlightenment of our own day consists in the bold denial of the very possibility of any such knowledge. Thus it is clear that, if this discovery is really 85 86
Letter to Reinhold, July In AA III, 5: 2 22-24.
2,
•795·
32
Editor's Introduction
what it claims to be, it paves the way for a rebirth of mankind and of all human relationships, a rebirth such as has never before been even possible. By observing the so-called literary public for many years, the discoverer [of this system] has become sufficiently confident that the conditions necessary for understanding a system of this sort have, for the most part, been destroyed by the academic method that has prevailed until now, and he is also convinced that more errors are in general circulation at the present time than perhaps ever before. Consequently, he has no intention of publishing his discovery in its present form and exposing it to general misunderstanding and distortion. He wishes to confine himself to oral communication, so that misunderstanding can thereby be detected and eliminated on the spot. Nevertheless, he does not wish to forego the advantages of the judgment of experts in such matters. Since he lives and lectures in a city where there is an academy of science founded by Leibniz, which still preserves among its members some with an interest in speculation, he cherishes the wish of having this same academy serve as his judge. Accordingly, if only so that this academy will consider the task of sufficient importance and will take it seriously, he proposes that it be charged by His Majesty the King with the task of examining the Wissenschaftslehre. Following the example of another academy (namely, the Paris Academy), the academy may then appoint commissioners to this task; and, in order for these commissioners to become acquainted with the object of their examination in the only way possible and in the only way I myself would consider conclusive, they would have to attend my lectures. I have moved the location of my lectures to my own lodgings, but if the commissioners-to-be should consider it beneath their dignity as public officials to come to my home, then I am prepared to hold my lectures in any appropriate place designated by the academy. In order to protect myself in advance against any negative judgment concerning the form [of my philosophy], I reserve the right to present, first to the academy and its commissioners, and then, if necessary, to the public, a universally comprehensible and immediately illuminating report concerning how the Wissenschaftslehre cannot be judged.
Though nothing came of this rather poignant proposal, Fichte continued to elaborate new presentations of his system in his private lectures. At the same time, he also lectured on more "popular" topics, such as religion, history, and politics. Meanwhile, his disappointment with the public reception of his writings grew ever greater, until finally, in the preface to his published lectures titled Directions for the Blessed Life ( 18o6), he quite openly confessed his reluctance to publish his lectures and bluntly expressed his doubts concerning whether there was any longer any point at all in his attempting to address the public. In the light of the tangled (non)publication history of the Wissenschnftslehre nova methodo, there is a note of undeniable pathos in Fichte's candid explanation of
Editor's Introduction
33
why he decided to publish his Blessed Life lectures in an unrevised form: for, as he explains, "given my way of working, the surest way of never finishing them would be to revise them again." 87
PART II The Discovery and Publication of Two Student Transcripts of the Wissenschaft.slehre nova methodo Given the importance that Fichte himself long attached to the Wissenschaft.slehre nova methodo, as well as its obvious significance for any understanding of the overall development of the Wissenschaftslehre, it is certainly regrettable that his own manuscript of these lectures has not survived (or, in any case, has not been discovered). Nevertheless, we do possess two different, detailed transcripts of Fichte's lectures, on the basis of which it is possible to gain a very good idea of the content of his 1796/gg lectures on "the foundations of transcendental philosophy." Before the era of tape recorders and duplicating machines, carefully transcribed and bound copies of lecture courses played an important role in German university life. Indeed, some students and exstudents amassed large private collections of these so-called KoUegnachschriften. This was especial.ly true in Jena during the 17gos, when it was a common practice for several students to pool their energy and resources by contributing all of their class notes or transcripts from a particular course to the production of a polished, continuously written transcript of the lectures in question. From this final version it was then possible to make additional copies. Indeed, some students routinely augmented their income by preparing transcripts of lecture courses and selling copies.88 Student transcripts of several of Fichte's courses from the Jena period (as weU as even more from his later years) were already known to exist in the nineteenth century, and thus it was not unrealistic of scholars to 87
Die Anweisung zum seligen Leben odn- auch du &ligionslehre (SW, V: 399-400). A clear reference to this practice occurs in the August 13, •799, letter of Hans Bostel to Friedrich Carl von Savigny, who had apparently asked his friend, Bostel, who was then a student in Jena, to obtain for him a transcript of Fichte's lectures. The relevant passage in Bostel's letter reads as follows: "I was unable to find a notebook on the Wwenschaftslehre; therefore, I commissioned a copy of one that is supposed to be very good and accurate. It will be very long, and thus the cost of copying it is 4 thalers-not including the cost of the paper. You will not mind that it is rather expensive, since it is so long. Another person, who also had a copy made by the same man, paid the same amount. I will pay for it out of what I owe you. Meanwhile, you will receive a portion of the text. More portions will follow on Saturday, and thus you will receive the entire text, little by little, over the course of the next three weeks." In Der Brieju>tcluel zwi.Jchen Friedrich Carl oon Savigny und Stephan August Winkelmann (z8oo-z8o4) mil Dokummlen und Bf'i4en au.s tkm Freufllksk,..i.!, ed. lngeborg Schnack (Marburg: Elwert, 1984), p. 278. 88
34
Editor's Introduction
hope that a transcript of his lectures on Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo might eventually turn up in some library or private collection. And indeed, early in the present century, one eventually did surface in the university library at Halle, which had acquired it in 1885 as part of a bequest from a local professor, Gottfried Moritz Meyer, whose fame rested largely upon his extensive collection of philosophical Kollegnachschriften. 89
The existence of this manuscript, titled "Wissenschaftslehre according to the Lectures of Herr Professor Fichte," was brought to the attention of the great Fichte scholar Fritz Medicus, who duly reported the information in a remark in his six-volume edition of Fichte's Selected Works and included a few short quotations from the manuscript in his general introduction to Volume 1. 90 Shortly thereafter, Siegfried Berger devoted his inaugural dissertation to a description and analysis of the contents of this "Halle transcript" of the Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo. Berger's dissertation, which included many direct quotations from the manuscript, was published in 1918. 91 Longer excerpts from the same manuscript appeared in print durin~ the next decade, as appendixes to two works by Emanuel Hirsch. 9 Though these initial reports concerning and excerpts from the newly discovered manuscript excited a certain amount of interest among scholars,93 the full text of this transcript was not published until 1937, when Hans Jacob included it in Volume II (the only volume published) of his edition of Fichte's literary remains. 94 In part because of the war, this edition attracted little attention at the time (except in Italy, where the importance of the Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo has long been rec89 See G. von Goutta, "Gottfried Moritz Meyers Sammlung philosophischer Kollegnachschriften," Kant-Studien 28 (1923): 198-200. 90 Fichte, Werke. Auswahl in seeks Banden, ed. Fritz Medicus (Leipzig: Meiner, 1908-12). See vol. I (1911), pp. lxxx n., cxxi, and cxlvi-cxlvii, and vol. VI (1912), p. 627n. 91 Ueber eine unveroffentlichte Wi=nschaftslehre J G. Fichus. 92 (1) "Ueberschrift und Schlu~ einer studentischen Nachschrift der WL aus demjahre 1798 (Fichtes System der philosophischen Wissenschaften)," in Emanuel Hirsch, Christentum und Geschichte in Fichus Philosophie (Tiibingen: Mohr, 1920), pp. 62-67. This selection consists of the opening paragraph of H and the "Deduction of the Subdivisions of the Wissenschaftslehre" from H. (2) "Die unmittelbar fiir die Religionsphilosophie wichtigen Stellen" and "Fichtes Diktate," in Emanuel Hirsch, Die idealistische Philosophie und das Christentum. Gesammelte Aufsii.tz.e (Giitersloh: Bertelsmann, 1926), pp. 291-307. This selection consists, first, of brief excerpts from§§ 9, 13, 16, 17, 18, and 19 and, second, of the assembled summaries, or "dictata," that occur at the end of each §of the transcript, supplemented by a few other passages. 9 ' In addition to the previously cited works by Hirsch, see Heinz Heimsoeth, Fichu (Munich: Reinhardt, 1923), the first effort to employ the Wissenschaftslehre nova metlwdc as the basis for an overall interpretation of Fichte's philosophy, and Max Wundt, FichteForschungen (Stuttgart: From mann, 1929), which devotes an entire chapter to "the Wissensc":Jtslehre of 1797 ." "Wissenschaftslehre nach den Vorlesungen von Herr. Fichte," in Fichte, Nachgelassene Schriften, II: 341-611.
Editor's Introduction
35
ognized and where an Italian translation of the Halle transcript was published in 1959). 95 Finally, in 1978, the entire text was reedited by Jose Manzana and others and published in Volume IV, 2 of the monumental new edition of Fichte's collected works sponsored by the Bavarian Academy of Science. 96 . There has never been any serious dispute concerning the accuracy and general reliability of this transcript. Everyone familiar with it has concurred with Jacob's judgment that it represents "a carefully prepared" and "intelligently produced" fair copy of a transcript of Fichte's lectures, a transcript that, "with respect to its content and meaning, is a good and faithful one." Moreover, according to Jacob, the text adheres so closely to Fichte's own conventions regarding such matters as punctuation and use of emphasis that one can safely conclude that it was produced by someone intimately acquainted with Fichte's own writings and philosophy. 97 Since the transcript in question gives no indication of the name of the student (or students) responsible for its production, it is commonly referred to simply as the "Halle transcript" of the Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo and is herein identified as "H." Furthermore, it also fails to include any explicit indication of the date of the lectures it records. Consequently, scholars have been forced to comb the manuscript for internal clues to its date-with uncertain results, as we will see below. Meanwhile, in 1980, while on an exploratory expedition to the Sii.chsischen Landesbibliothek in Dresden, Erich Fuchs, a researcher and fulltime member of the editorial staff of the new Fichte edition, discovered another, hitherto unsuspected transcript of the Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo. This manuscript was titled "Fichte's Vorlesungen iiber die Wissenschaftslehre, gehalten zu Jena im Winter 1798-1799," and its title page also provided the name of the student responsible for the transcription: Karl Christian Friedrich Krause, who had attended Fichte's lectures as a student during the winter semester of 1798/99, who later established a professional reputation of his own,98 and among whose 95 G. A. Fichte, Teoria delliJ sciema 1798 "nova methodo," trans. Alfredo Cantoni (Milan: Biblioteca de "II pensiero," 1959). The diclaln to H were translated even earlier by Luigi Pareyson as "La seconda dottrina della scienza (17g8) diG. A. Fichte," RivistadifiliJsofw 41 (1950): 191-202. See too Arturo Massolo, Fichu e liJ filiJsofw (Florence: G. C. Sanzoni, 1948); Luigi Pareyson, Fichte-Il sisleme delliJ liherlii (Turin: Edizione di Filosofia, 1950; 2d, expanded ed., Milan: Mursia, 1976); Pasquale Salvucci, DialeUica e immaginazione (Urbino: Argalla, 1963); and Aldo Masullo, La communilii come fondamenta: Fichu Husser[ Sartre (Naples: Libreria Scientifica, 1965). 96 "Wissenschaftslehre nach den Vorlesungen von Hr. Pr. Fichte," in AA IV, 2, Kolleg· nachschriften 1796-1804, pp. 1-267, ed. Reinhard Lauth, Hans Gliwizky, Jose Manzana, Erich Fuchs, Kurt Hiller, and Pete Schneider (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann, 1978). 97 Editor's "Vorbericht" to Fichte, NachgeliJssene Schriften, II: xi, xxxi. 98 Krause (1781-1832) began his studies at Jena in the winter semester of 1797/98, where he remained until 1So 1, studying theology, philosophy, and mathematics. Though
36
Editor's Introduction
literary remains the manuscript was discovered. Because of the extraordinary interest in this discovery, Fuchs published it only two years later as Volume 336 in Felix Meiner's "Philosophische Bibliothek" series 99 and is currently reediting it for inclusion in the forthcoming Volume IV, 3 of the Bavarian Academy edition of Fichte's works. This second transcript, which is customarily called the" Krause transcript," is herein designated "K." As in the case of the Halle transcript, the general vocabulary and style of the Krause transcript are unmistakably Fichte's own. No other transcripts of Fichte's lectures on Wissenschaftslehre nuva methode have yet been discovered, though there is good evidence that other copies or versions once existed. 100
Comparison of Hand K As we have noted, Fichte first prepared his new presentation of the first principles or foundations of his system for use in his lectures during
he auended lectures by Fichte, Schelling, and A. W. Schlegel, he appears to have been most profoundly influenced by Fichte, especially during the winter semester of 1798/99 (that is, when he was auending Fichte's Lectures on Wissen.rchafl.slehre now methodo and preparing his transcript). On November 18, 1798, he wrote to his father (who greeted his son's report with understan
Editor's Introduction
37
the winter semester of •7g6/g7, and he used the same text in his lectures during the the winter semesters of 1797/98 and 1798/gg-though he may well have revised the entire manuscript, or at least portions of it, during these later semesters. As was his custom, he planned to publish the text of his lectures, albeit in a revised form; and he began to do just this when he published the first four installments of the Attempt at a New Presentation of the Wissenschaftslehre in the Philosophical journal in 1797/g8. In the passages in his letters in which he mentions his plan to publish the new presentation, Fichte often referred to a single manuscript or set of notebooks ("Heft," or sometimes "Heften") that he employed in his lectures on this topic. Some of Fichte's lecture manuscripts have survived, and what they reveal is precisely what one would expect: that he did not always write out his lectures in complete detail and in finished form, though he sometimes did just that; instead, he often jotted down incomplete sentences, key words, abbreviations, and so on, which he obviously then went on 10 develop in an appropriate, extemporaneous manner during the actual delivery of his lecture. (This, of course, explains how equally faithful transcripts of the same course of lectures from two different semesters might differ in many details.) Nevertheless, Fichte's surviving lecture manuscripts are much more than sketches or mere "notes"; they are full-scale productions, in which, despite occasional syntactical gaps and stylistic lapses, the structure of the overall argument is always clearly evident, as well as many of its details. (This, in turn, explains how, for all of their differences, transcripts from different semesters could nevertheless have the same organization and repeat the same arguments, if not always in precisely the same words.) There can be no reasonable doubt that H and K are both transcripts of the same lecture course, and any reader who actua.lly compares the two texts will reach this conclusion very quickly. The similarities are striking: Both manuscripts are roughly the same length; moreover, each is divided into nineteen §§, and each conclud-. with a separate section titled "Deduction of the Subdivisions of the Wissenschaftslehre." Furthermore, each individual § is divided into the same number of sections in both transcripts. The vocabulary and manner of expression are also the same; indeed, the two transcripts occasionally contain virtually identical passages. This is notably true ofthe important summaries that appear at the end of each §. Such congruence is not surprising, since these summaries, unlike the main body of the text of the lectures, were carefully and slowly dictated by Fichte to his students. Hence they are commonly referred to as the "dictata" to the Wis.senschaftslehre nova meth.odo. The two manuscripts also exhibit the same range of references. Both make frequent reference to the "earlier presentation" contained in the Foundations and the Outline; both include references 10 Fichte's Foundations of Natural Right, as well as to his System of Ethical Theory (and in both
38
Editor's Introduction
cases, these references to the latter works occur only in the second half of the manuscript). Neither text, however, includes any reference to the published rcortions of the Attempt at a New Presentation of the Wissenschaftslehre. 01 In addition to Fichte's own writings, both transcripts make reference to the same works by Kant (and usually do so at exactly the same place in the manuscript). Finally, when one turns to the actual content of the two transcripts, the impression that they are simply different versions of the same course (though perhaps not from the same semester) is strengthened, for the argument is precisely the same in both versions. Striking as the similarities between the two transcripts are, there are nevertheless obvious and significant differences between them as well. To begin with, with the exception of the dictata, the two transcripts seldom correspond word for word, even where the detailed execution of the argument is exactly the same. Furthermore, in addition to the "second introduction" (which corresponds to the introduction to H), K also includes a "first introduction," for which there is no parallel in H. 102 Second, for the first three §§, K provides, in addition to the same dictata that appear in H, alternate dictata, which are identified within the body of the text as "( 1798)" and within the compilation of the summary paragraphs (titled by Krause "Major Points of the Wissenschaftslehre 17981799") with which K begins as "older versions" of the same. 103 Though H, unlike K, includes nothing without some parallel in the other tran101 The complete absence of any reference to the AUempt at a New Presentation (which began to appear in the Phirosophisches journal in April 1797 and which one might have expected Fichte to mention in his subsequent lectures on this subject) is something of a mystery. The editors of AA IV, 2 cite this fact as evidence that at least the first portions of H stem from 1796/97-though this does not necessarily mean H is a transcript of the lectures delivered during that semester, since it is surely possible that Fichte simply used lectures from 17g6/97 at some later date, without bothering to update the references. In any case, since K also includes no reference to the AUempt at a New Presentation, this lack cannot be used to date either manuscript in relation to the other. 102 Concerning this "first introduction" (as well as its puzzling subtitle, "as presented in public lectures"), I ves Radrizzani plausibly suggests that it did not form a part of Fichte's actual lectures on "the foundations of transcendental philosophy" (which was, as we have seen, a private course). Instead, Radrizzani suggests that this "first introduction" is a transcription of the text of a public lecture that Fichte delivered before the beginning of the winter semester and that, like the earlier Concerning the Concept, he intended as an "invitation" to attract prospective students to his private lectures on the subject. See the catalog description of the 1796/97 lectures on Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo, which includes the announcement, "During the vacation he will publicly announce the plan of his course on transcendental philosophy." Though no such announcement is included in the catalog description of Fichte's lectures on this subject in subsequent semesters, the content of the "first introduction" of K corresponds precisely with this description. 103 In fact, K's two versions of the dictat for§ 3 are virtually identical. Since the text of the "major points of the Wissenschaftslehre" with which Krause's manuscript actually begins does not differ substantially from the text of the dictata that appear at the end of each § within the main body of the transcript, Fuchs did not include them within the Meiner edition of the text. They will, however, appear in their proper place in AA IV, 3·
Editor's lmroduelion
39
script, the Iauer portions of H do include a great many recapitulations and summaries that do not appear in K. As for content, though the argument is the same in each version, the two manuscripts differ appreciably in the amount of space allotted to different portions of the presentation. As a general rule, the earlier portions of the Wissenscho.ftrlehre nova methodo (especially §§ 1-6) are presented more copiously and clearly in K than in H, whereas the later portions of the presentation (especially §§ 13ff.) are developed in far greater detail in H. (The overall quality of K deteriorates sharply in the later sections, indicating perhaps that Krause was finally growing weary of devoting eight hours a day to the Wmenschaftslehre.) Indeed, this differential unevenness in the quality of the two manuscripts is one of the strongest arguments for producing a combined or conflated edition of the two, as has been attempted in this English translation. Dating the Krause Transcript Since the title page of the Krause transcript of Fichte's lectures on the foundations of transcendental philosophy clearly indicates their date (17g8/gg), the only question concerns when the surviving manuscript was actually composed. Does it represent Krause's actual class notes or is it instead a more polished "fair copy," cpmposed at some point after the lectures or even after the end of the semester? The evidence suggests that Krause himself attended all sixty or so of Fichte's lectures during the winter semester of 17g8/gg, and he quite obviously took copious notes during each class period. In addition, he must have had access to transcripts of earlier versions of the same course, or at least to the dictata from some earlier version (as is indicated by the appearance within his transcript of "older versions" of the first three dictata). It is also possible that Krause may have had access to notes taken by other students attending the same 17g8/gglectures and that he may have consulted such notes in preparing a final version of his Kollegnachschrift. Though the experts are not in ~mplete agreement on the matter, it seems virtually certain that K is a fair copy produced at some point after each of the actual lectures. 104 Thus, the question is not whether the 104 A small bit of evidence that K is a revised, fair copy of Krause's class notes is provided by what appears to be an obvious error of transcription in the first paragraph of§ 14 (K, p. 152), where the word "Erfolgs" occurs instead of the word "Gefiihls," which is dearly required by the contexL As Fuchs points out (in a letter to the present translator), the words EifolgJ and GeJUIW are very similar in German script, especially when hurriedly written. Hence the most plausible way to explain the otherwise puzzling a,ppearance of the former at this point in the text is to assume that K is a fair copy, which Krause transcribed at some later date from notes that he (or someone else) had previously (and hurriedly)
40
Editor's Introduction
transcript was composed after class, but rather, How much time elapsed between the actual lectures and the composition of K? On the one hand, Erich Fuchs argues that the preponderance of the evidence favors his hypothesis that K is a fair copy prepared between the end of the semester (March 14, 1799) and August 25 of the same year; 105 lves Radrizzani, on the other hand, questions the force of Fuchs's evidence and suggests that it is more likely that Krause recopied his notes from each lecture during the course of the semester and did not prepare the transcript all at once. (Indeed, Radrizzani wishes to leave open the possibility that the text of K was transcribed by Krause during Fichte's lectures-though he fails to offer any explanation of the presence within Krause's transcript of "older versions" of the first three diclnill.)
In support of his hypothesis that K was completed by August 25, 1799. Fuchs calls attention to the fact that this date occurs in a marginal note near the beginning of§ •7, where Krause left several blank pages in his notebook with the explanation that "the missing period was not skipped. Instead, the text of the .lecture was copied by mistake into another notebook and will be inserted later." In support of the hypothesis that the transcript was not actually begun until after the end of the semester, Fuchs cites a passage near the end of the "first introduction," which reads as follows: "We shall also discuss, in an explicit and thorough manner, the laws of reflection, in combination and in connection with what proceeds from these laws. (This promise could not be fulfilled because of a lack of time.)" According to Fuchs's interpretation, the sentence in parentheses represents a comment by Krause and refers to the "lack of time" available in •798/99, which Fuchs also suggests may be explained by recalling that the Atheism Controversy was in full bloom at this point and that Fichte may have had to cut short or even cancel some of his lectures because of external circumstances. In any event, if Fuchs's interpretation of this parenthetical remark is correct, then of course Krause could not have inserted this comment before the end of the semester, and hence one would have to conclude that K was composed at some point following the end of the winter semester of 1798/99· In disputing this claim, Radrizzani argues 106 that the reference to the missing portion of the notes and the decision to leave several pages blank for its later insertion, far from supporting Fuchs's conclusion, indicate that K, if it is not the actual notebook in which Krause transcribed Fichte's lectures in class, was at the very least composed during the course of the semester. After all, one would assume that if Krause had taken in class. Funher evidence that K was prepared after Fichte's actual lectures is the ap~arance therein of ahemate dictaJo. for the fir.ot three §§. "'See Fuchs's introduction 10 K, pp. x-xi. 106 See Radrizzani's introduction to his French translation of the Wwmschaftslehre 11000 metiwdD, pp. 27-32.
Editor's Introduction
41
been making a fair copy at the end of the semester, he would have had all his notes on hand and thus would not have been forced to leave several pages blank for later insertion of the missing lecture. On this interpretation, therefore, the date "August 25, 1799" represents merely the date when Krause finally got around to inserting the missing section, not the date he finished recopying the entire manuscript. As for Fuchs's other piece of evidence, the parenthetical remark about the lack of time, Radrizzani points out, first of all, that there is no reason why the uproar over atheism should have interfered with Fichte's lectures on WisseruckaftslehTe naoo metlwdo, since these were presumably based upon a manuscript prepared several years before the winter semester of •798/g9. Nor is there any indication within the text of K that Fichte actually canceled or curtailed any meetings of his class during the winter of •798/99· Radrizzani plausibly suggests that the remark concerning the lack of time might well represent a comment of Fichte's and not of Krause's. In this case, it would refer not to the 1798/gg lectures, but rather to the 17941'95 presentation of the "Foundations of the Entire WissenschaftslehTe." In support of this hypothesis, Radrizzani points out that the remark occurs in the context of an explicit comparison between the published Foundations and the new presentation to be developed in the 1798/99 lectures. The most plausible conclusion seems to be that K represents a fair copy that Krause made during the course of the semester, most probably recopying each lecture directly after each class meeting. This hypothesis simultaneously explains the presence of the "older versions" of the early dictata in the manuscript (which surely must have been added after Fichte's classroom lectures) as well as the blank pages reserved for the missing lecture (suggesting that at the time of K's composition Krause did not have convenient access to the missing notebook). 107 Of course, it still remains possible that the entire manuscript was prepared after the end of the semester and that, for some unknown reason, Krause had to wait until ~gust to insert the missing portion. Dating the Halle Transcript As we have observed, it is not known who composed H or when it was written. A comparison with the handwriting of G. E. Meyer, the professor 107 Funher evidence that K was composed during the course of the semester and not after the end of it is the fact (alluded to by Fuchs and stres.sed by Radrizzani) that an examination of the ink and handwriting of K clearly indicates breaks in composition corresponding more or less precisely to the conjectured beginning and ending of each of Ftchte's individual lectures. In the latter portions of H, a horizontal line is often employed to mark the end of a day's lecture, and Fuchs notes that the variations in the handwriting ofK match these breaks perfectly. See Fuchs, introduction to K, pp. xi-xii, and R.adrizzani, La Doctrine de Ia Scimu N(JI)a Melhodo, p. ~o.
42
Editor's Introduction
in whose collection of Kollegnachschriften H was discovered, reveals that it was not copied by Meyer himself, who was not a student of Fichte's and who appears to have acquired his copy of the transcript only in 1836. The age of this copy, as well as the date of the lectures it transcribes, thus remain open questions. According to Jacob, the paper and style of writing are consistent with the hypothesis that H was prepared atjena during the late 17gos. 108 According to the editors of AA IV, 2, however, variations in spelling and punctuation suggest that H may have been an editorial compilation stemming from several different sets of notes, in which case it might have been composed at any time between the original lectures and Meyer's acquisition of it. The more important question, however, is not when the surviving copy of H was prepared, but which of Fichte's three sets of lectures on the foundations of transcendental philosophy it transcribes. Let us begin by considering the internal evidence. As noted above, H includes specific references to the System of Ethical Theory, which was not officially published until March 1798. From this, Hirsch originally concluded that H could stem only from Fichte's 1798/99 lectures. 109 In fact, however, printed fascicles of this text were distributed to students in Fichte's course on ethics in the winter semester of 1797/98 and were therefore available to students in his course on the Wissenschaftslehre during the same semester. 110 Accordingly, the presence of references to the System of Ethical Theory within H eliminates only the winter semester of 1796/97 as the source of the Halle transcript, which is consistent with the 1797/99 dating proposed by Medicus and Berger. 111 Indeed, the fact that 108 Nachgelassem Schriften, II: xxxi. Jacob also claims that the contents of H, in comparison with those of the published Attempt at a New Presentatian, argue for a later date, since H gives clearer prominence to the fact of self-consciousness as the starting point of the Wissmschaft.slehre than does the published Attempt at a New Presentation. In addition, he also purports to find a significant difference between the vocabularies of the two versions. Thus he maintains (p. xxx) that a comparison of H and the AUempt at a New Presentation reveals that the contents of the latter are further removed from the 1794/95 version than are those of the former. No other student of these texts, however, including myself, has found Jacob's claims on this matter to be convincing. 109 Fichus Religionsphilosphie im Rnhmen der philosoph:ischen Gesamtentwicldung Fichus (GOttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1914), p. 59 n. 3· Hirsch later changed his mind, however, and admitted that H could stem from either 1 797/98 or 1 798199 (Chr:istentum und Geschichte, p. 67n). 110 See editors' introduction to Das System der Sitleniehre, AA I, 5: 7-8. 111 See Berger, Ueber eine unverliffemlichte Wissmschaftslehre, p. g. Medicus, in the same note that first called the attention of scholars to the existence of the Halle Nachschrift (Fichte's Werke, I: lxxx n), asserted that "the notebook stems, at the earliest, from the winter of 1797/gS, but perhaps from the last Jena semester, winter 1798/gg." See too Medicus's remark in the "Nachtrag" to Vol. VI of Fichte's Werke (p. 617n): "Future editors of Fichte's works are hereby notified that the university library at Halle [ ... ] has a transcript of a version of the WL which has not yet been published at all-presumably from the summer [sic} of 1798 (at the earliest from the winter of 1797/98 and at the latest from the winter of 1798/gg)."
I
I 1
Editor's Introduction
43
the references to the System of Ethical Theory appear only in the second half of the manuscript suggests that they were added during the winter semester of 1797/98 (rather than 1798/99), since Fichte began distributing sections of the printed text of the System of Ethical Theory to his students in December •797 (that is, midway through the semester). 112 The Ipost recent editors of H (the editors of AA IV, 2) insist upon a narrower dating, however, and conclude that the Halle transcript ''must stem from the winter of 1798/99• at least in part." 113 As evidence for this, they call attention, first, to the fact that the technical term Potenz ("power'') occurs in§ 16. According to the same editors, this term, which is closely associated with the Naturphilosophie of Schelling and J. W. Ritter, "so far as can be determined, was first empior,ed in Jena in a purely philosophical sense only in the spring of •799·" 1 4 Moreover, they were unable to find any occurrence of the term Potenz in any of Fichte's published or unpublished writings before 1799, and thus they conclude that H is most probably a transcript of the lectures of 1798/99· Second, they note an elliptical reference in § 13 to "a Dutch scholar," whom Fichte praises for having raised a legitimate question concerning the difference between practical and speculative reason. Speculating that this is an allusion to Paulus van Hemert's Ueber die Existence der Principien eines reinen uneignutzigen Wohlwollens im Menschen, a work that first appeared in German translation in the winter of 1798/gg, the editors of AA IV, 2 take this reference to confirm their hypothesis that H could not be a transcript of lectures delivered before 1798/gg. Nevertheless, it seems rather more likely that the bulk of H does in fact stem from 1797/g8, and for the following reasons: First of all, the evidence purportedly furnished by the occurrence of the term Potenz has recently been undermined by the discovery that Fichte himself employed., this term in precisely the same sense in his lectures "Logic and MetaPftysics" in the summer semester of 1798. 115 Hence one certainly cannot rule out the possibility that he also employed it a few months earlier in his "Foundations of Transcendental Philosophy" lectures during the winter semester of 1797/98. 112 On the other hand, references to the Foundalioru of N~uro/ Right, which was certainly available before the beginning of the winter semester of 1797/98, are also confined exclusively to the second half of both Hand K. In any case, the fact that Fichte's citations from the Sytem of Ethics begin only in § 14 does not prove that H derives from the 1797/98 lectures, since the same is true of K as well. The only conclusion that one can safely draw from these references to the System of Ethics is this: they are equally compatible with the 17~i'98 and 1798199 dates, though not with the date of 17g6/97· 1 AA IV, 2:6. 114 Ibid. 115 This is reported by Juha Manninen in his research paper, ~Hilijer und Fichte. Ein Systemprogramm aus dem Jahre 1799," in TmnsUfldemalphilruophie als S,Stem: Die Au.reinandend:r.ung zwi.Jdun 1794 und 1806, ed. A. Mues (Hamburg: Meiner, 198g). See especially pp. 2fi9--73.
44
Editor's Introduction
Second, as for the alleged reference to van Hemert's book: if this identification is correct, then it of course follows that H must stem from 116 The allusion is sufficiently vague, however, to leave open the 1 798/gg. very real possibility that Fichte may have had some other, as yet unidentified, "Dutch scholar" in mind. 117 In any case, this appears to be a rather slim reed to cling to in order to defend the later dating of H. (It is worth noting, incidentally, that the corresponding passage in Kwhich certainly does spring from •7g8/gs-does not include any reference to "a Dutch scholar.") A final piece in this puzzle is provided by the notation "V g8," which appears early in§ 11 of H 118 and is written in a different ink and handwriting than that of the Nacluchrift itself. The editors of AA IV, 2 suggest, quite plausibly, that this is a date, "May 1798." 119 If so, then the question becomes, What does this date represent? The editors of AA interpret it as evidence in support of their hypothesis that the text of H was composed of transcripts from different semesters, with the earlier portions stemming from an earlier semester and the later portions from a later one. Thus, they suggest that the notation indicates when the first portion of the manuscript (that is, up to the point where this date occurs) was copied, while the rest was added at some later date. According to their hypothesis, therefore, the first§§ of H might represent a transcript of the 1797/g8 (or even 17g6/g7) lectures, whereas the latter portions could be a transcript of the 17g8/gg lectures. 120 116 As Radrizzani argues, however, even if one does take this vague remark of Fichte's to be a reference to van Hemert's book, it is still difficult to explain its presence at this point in H (§ 13). One can readily calculate that Fichte would not have reached this point in his lectures until the end of January, whereas, as Radrizzani notes, "one can seriously doubt whether Fichte would at this date have had sufficient time to become aware of the translation of van Hemert's book." 117 This is the opinion of Fuchs as well, who now considers the identification of van Hemert as the "Dutch scholar" in question to be "obsolete" (quoted by Radrizzani, La Doctrine de Ia Science Nwa Melhodo, p. 35). 118 AA IV, 2: 1 16. 119 As Radrizzani, who also treats this notation as an important due for determining the date of H, remarks: "One cannot see what else it could be" (Radrizzani, La Doclriru1 de Ia SciEnct Num Mtlhodo, p. 36). 120 See AA IV, 2: 12. With the publication of K, it is possible to test this hypothesis by comparing the corresponding portions of the two transcripts. What one discovers thereby is that there is no difference between the earlier and later portions of the two manuscripts which would suggest that H is a composite transcript of notes from two different semesters; thus the hypothesis fails. Since K displays the same alleged discrepancies between its earlier and later portions that H does, these same discrepancies cannot be cited in support of the suggestion that whoever trarucribed H was working with various sets of student transcripts. Even less compelling is the suggestion by the editors of AA IV, 2 (p. 12) that their "composite" hypothesis is supported by the words "nach den Vorlesungen" in the subtitle of H. The word Vorlesungen ("lectures") can just as easily refer to a set of lectures delivered in a single semester as to several different sets of lectures.
Editor's Introduction
45
If the notation represents a date at all, however, it could just as well represent the date at which a particular reader of the transcript had reached this point in the text. 121 At the very least, the presence of the date "May 1798" appears to refute the hypothesis that H stems entirely from 1798/99, while the "composite" hypothesis is seriously undermined by the fa!=t that K shows a similar difference between its earlier and later parts. Thus, if one agrees that, on the basis of internal evidence alone, "the beginning parts appear to reproduce an older version and the later parts a more recent version," 122 then one also has to concede that the same could be said of K, which definitely stems in its entirety from 1798/ 99· Thus any alleged differences between the "older" and "more recent" portions of the presentations contained in Hand K would in fact reflect a difference between those portions of Fichte's own lecture manuscript which were composed earlier (presumably, 1796/97) and those that were composed (or revised) at a later date (probably 1797/98). In short, there is no reliable internal evidence that any portion of the main body of the text of H can be traced to the winter semester of 1798/99. Finally, let us consider the evidence of the dictata. As has already been mentioned, these are virtually identical in the two transcripts, except for the additional presence of three "older versions" of§§ 1-3 in K, where they are also labeled by Krause "( 1798)." This date raises several problems. First, why should the "older versions" of the dictata to the first three §§.be dated "1798," when this was obviously the date of the "newer versions" of the dictata for the first three§§ (October-November 1798)? The most likely hypothesis is surely that these alternate versions represent the dictata from the "previous presentation" of 1797/98 and that Krause copied them from someone else's notes, perhaps dated simply "1798" (which was, of course, when the previous presentation ended). 123 '!tt
121 Of course, it might also indicate the date at which a particular copyist had reached this point in the transcription. But this would not explain the different ink and handwritinll, though it would support the •797/98 dating of H. 122 AA IV, •: I •• 12 ' This is the view that Fuchs defends in his introduction to K (pp. xiv-xv). In contrast, Radrizzani proposes in 1A Doctrine de La Scknu N(J!J(J Mtlhodo (p. 26) that the versions dated "1798" actually represent the "newer versions" of the first three diclala and that the undated versions are the ~older" ones. It is, however, impossible to reconcile this hypothesis with the fact that, in the summary of the "Major Points of the Wi.ssenschaftskhrt" with which K begins, these "• 798" vefllions are explicitly labeled "older versions." Radrizzani addresses this inconsistency by suggesting that Krause simply erred in identifying these passages as "older versions." But surely it is at least as likely that he erred when he identified them within the main body of his text as stemming from 1 798. To buttress his hypothesis, Radrizzani calls attention to the fact that the two versions of the dictaJ to § 3, one of which occurs at the beginning of the paragraph and is labeled "( 1798)" and the other of which OCCUfll at the end of the same §, are virtually identical. Radrizzani interprets this puzzling fact as follows (p. 27): When Krause added the "older vefllion" (according to Radrizzani, the version at the end of the §), he simply "failed to recognize" the striking similarities between the two versions, for "if he had, he would have become conscious of his error [that is, his error in thinking that these were two different
46
Editor's Introduction
But if one accepts this hypothesis (and also believes that K and H stem from different semesters), then how can one explain the fact that same dictata appear in H and in K? If we assume that 1796/97 can be ruled out as the date of the lectures upon which H is based, then (according to the above hypothesis) we would expect that Krause's "older versions" of "1798" would correspond to the versions of the dictata found in H. In fact, however, the dictata found in H are virtually identical to those found in K, and H contains nothing similar to the "older versions" included in K. How can this be explained? One possible explanation could be that H and K represent two different transcripts of the same 1798/99 lectures. To accept this explanation, however, one would have to reject all the other evidence in favor of an earlier dating of H; consequently, anyone who insists that the two transcripts derive from two different semesters must propose some other explanation for the appearance of the same dictata in H and in K. Fuchs, for example, suggests that whoever copied the final version of H had access 10 the dictLJta from 1798/99 (though, presumably, not to the Nach.1chrijt of the lectures themselves) and simply substituted these "more recent" versions for the older ones. 124 Another possibility is that Krause simply erred in assigning the date 1798 to his "older versions" of the first three dictata, which might have come from an even earlier version of the same lectures (those of •796/97), in which case it is quite possible that Fichte used the same dictatLJ in 1797/98 and in 1 798/9g--which would explain the otherwise puzzling congruence of the two transcripts on this point. Admittedly, none of these possible explanations is entirely satisfactory, and there remains a certain amount of mystery concerning the precise provenance of the dicmta in H and of the "older ver' sions" in K. Despite the ultimately inconclusive character of all this evidence, it seems safe to conclude that H and K represent two different transcripts, deriving from two different semesters, of Fichte's lectures on Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo. The main evidence for this conclusion was unavailable to the editors of AA IV, 2: namely, the many differences between H and K. Granted, such differences cannot be said to prove that
versions of the dictat to § 3) and would have eliminated the paremhesis [that is, the date "( 1798)" with which he labels the dictat at the head of§ 3]." Once again, however, this hypothesis is undermined by the text of the "major points," where the two (nearly identical) versions of the dicto.l to § 3 occur one after the other-making it extremely diiTicult to believe that Krause could have somehow "failed to recognize" the similarities between the two versions. 12 4 Jntroduction to K, p. xv. This suggestion is not as far-fetched as it might at first appear. There is ample evidence that copies of the dicto.to. to Fichte's lectures circulated quite independently of transcripts of the lectures themselves. See, e.g., Smidt's letter to Herbart, August 10, 17!)6, requesting a copy of the dicto.Ja from Fichte's lectures on natural rights (in Fuchs, ed., Fichu im GeJpriich, 1: 370).
Editor's Imroduction
47
the two texts stem from two different semesters; these differences may, however, be said to establish this beyond any reasonable doubt. As any experienced teacher can testify, different students can often produce strikingly different sets of notes from the same lecture; and one would expect this would be all the more true in the case of a lecturer like Fichte, w~o was noted for his rapid delivery. 125 Yet these Kollegnachschriften are much more than mere class notes. They at least attempt to approximate stenographic transcriptions of Fichte's lectures, and their very length suggests that few of Fichte's words went unrecorded. Yet when we compare the two manuscripts, we find that, with the exception of the dictata, they contain virtually no identical passages and often differ substantially. Not only do the wording and phrasing of the two texts vary to a greater or lesser degree, 126 but entire paragraphs, such as the many summaries that occur in the later portions of H, appear in one text but not in the other. Though the structure of the argument-both in its general outlines and in its detailed execution-is the same in the two texts, the examples that Fichte chose to illustrate his points are not always precisely the same. Nor are the same references always supplied in the two texts (as was noted above with respect to the controversial allusion to "a Dutch scholar"). Finally, though both texts include explicit comparisons between the new presentation of the first principles of Fichte's philosophy and the older version contained in the Foundnt.iuns and the Outline, the comparisons in K are more frequent and more extensive than those in H. Thus I agree with my fellow editors, Fuchs and Radrizzani, in rejecting the hypothesis that H and K represent two different transccipts of 125 See the anonymous report on Fichte's style as a lecturer in Fuchs, ed., Fich.te im &sprach, II: g6: "He never spoke slowly, but was almost always in a hurry." This report, however, should be compared with other, later ones which appear to conflict with it and which emphasize the clarity of Fichte's lectures and the deliberateness of his style as a lecturer. See, e.g., Heinrich Kohlrausch's 1804 report (in Fich.te im Gesprlich, Ill: 217) and the following report, by August Twestan, on Fichte's 1810 lectures ~on the Study of Philosophy": uHis manner of lecturing is a model for academic teachen, and especially for teachers of philosophy. He speaks briefly, simply, and clearly, just as in the introduction to Tlw V0€4h\m of Man; and one can see that he speaks not in order to demonstrate his eloquence, but is concerned only with the subject matter. His speech is precise and is so well organized that it is impossible not to follow him. He knows how to make his lectures dear by means of frequent, but never extraneous, recapitulations and by repeatedly calling attention to how everything is connected to the overall thread of the argument. Furthermore, he speaks slowly and with appropriate pauses, so that it possible for e\IC'!ryone to retain an accurate memory of what he said and to reflect upon it" (Fichu im Gesprlich, IV: 26g). 126 Though the technical vocabulary of the two presentations is in almost all aues the same, there is at least one exception worthy of note: In t 17 (H, pp. 194ff.) the term ln~grij[ occurs in H in rnany passages where K continues to employ the term ZTWckbegrij[ (~concept of a goal}. The former term is never employed in this Jense anywhere in K: indeed, the work "lnlwgrij[" occurs only once in K, in the Fint Introduction, where it has its usual sense of"substance" or vrontent" (K, p. 9). This minor difference is best explained by the hypothesis that K and H are ba5.ed upon lectures from two different semesters.
48
Editor's Introduction
the same set of lectures. 127 Moreover, since K undoubtedly comes from 17g8/gg, then H must be the earlier ( 1797/98) version-a conclusion that follows, as Fuchs notes, "despite all the other indications that have hitherto suggested a later dating for the Halle transcript." 128 At the same time, I also concur with the judgment of virtually all previous editors and scholars, that H and K can nevertheless be treated as two, slightly different transcripts of the same ... new presentation" of the foundations of the Wissenschaftslehre. This conclusion, which is inescapably suggested by a careful study of the content of the two transcripts, is, in turn, reinforced by the fact that all the evidence clearly indicates that Fichte himself employed the same manuscript each time he lectured on Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo, 129 though, like most accomplished teachers, he probably made various revisions, emendations, and new notations in his manuscript each time he employed it, just as he surely added different extemporaneous comments on each occasion. Furthermore, the same evidence plainly suggests that the manuscript was first composed by Fichte in approximately 1796 and subsequently revised here and there in 1797/98 and possibly in 1798/gg as well. 13 Certainly the
°
127 See Fuchs's introduction to K, p. xiv: "The attentive reader of both transcripts will conclude from a comparison of the two that both can be traced to a common foundation, namely the lectures on Wis.senschaftslehre nova methodo based upon 'notebooks'; the same reader, however, will also conclude that these transcripts themselves stem from two (or three) different courses of lectures. [ ... ) Despite all the agreement, with which we are now familiar, between the two versions of the Wis.senschaftslehre nova methodo--agreement concerning content and structure, as well as concerning the order of tt.main thoughts, all the way to the occasional agreement of their formulations-one can with great confidence exclude the possibility that they were transcripts of one and the same set of lectures. The differences in content, dimension, word order, and execution of details are too great" (p. xiv). Radrizzani, though he quarrels with some of the evidence Fuchs cites, arrives at the same conclusion on pp. 35-36 of the introduction to his French translation: viz., that there is no positive proof that H stems from 1798/99• whereas there is considerable evidence that at least parts of H stem from 1797/98 and no reason not to assume that the entire transcript does as well. 128 K, p. xiv. 129 Hence the conclusion of the editors of AA IV, 2: "From a careful study of the Nachschrift, one gains the impression that Fichte's lectures became fixed in a written form over a long period of time, and also that at least the later portions were later revised" (AA IV, 2: 7). 0 " There are, as already noted, minor discrepancies in Fichte's own remarks on this subject: in the "Public Announcement" (signed November 4, 1800), he reports that he has had the manuscript on hand for "five years" (i.e, since November 1795!); in his letter to Schmidt, March 17, 1799, he says he has been working on the new version "for three years" (i.e., since the spring of 1796); in his January 31, 1801, letter to Johanssen, he claims that he has had the manuscript "for four years" (i.e., since the beginning of 1797). See the conclusion drawn by the editors of AA IV, 2: 9: "Most probably, Fichte began the first drafts in the winter of 1795f96 or in the spring of 17g6. In the first part of 1796, however, he had so much to do in conjunction with his work on the Ethics that his work on the Wis.senschaftslehre nova metlwdo did not progress as he had hoped, and thus he had to cancel the projected course on the foundations of transcendental philosophy [originally announced for the summer of 1796]. In the fall of 1796 he could, once again, dedicate himself completely to work on this project. Assuming that he proceeded in his customary
Editor's Introduction
49
dictata were revised, as is confirmed by the presence in K of "older versions," and the references to the System of Ethical Theory must also have
been added at some point after 17g6/g7. Consequently, though K is a transcript of the 17g8/gg lectures and H can be traced back to 1797/98 with a fair degree of reliability, one is nevertheless. entitled to speak of both these manuscripts as transcripts of the "Wissenschaftslehre of 1796/gg," or simply as two different presentations of "the Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo." 131 Accordingly, the present translation treats K and H as two, complementary transcripts of two different sets of lectures deriving from a single manuscript or set of lecture notes. Though Fichte's own manuscript has apparently vanished, we can attempt to reconstruct it by combining in a single text the contents of K and H and, where necessary, emending each in the light of the other. Though some questions still remain concerning the precise wording of specific passages here and there, the general style, vocabulary, and manner of argument of these two transcripts are immediately recognizable as Fichte's own. When appropriately conflated, the two transcripts constitute a complete whole, with no gaps in the argument or any obvious shortcomings in the presentation-a whole that is, from the point of view of anyone trying to understand and analyze the Wissenschaftslehre of 1796/gg, clearly superior to either of the two transcripts considered by itself. The result, I believe, is the closest we are ever likely to come to an accurate and complete version of Fichte's Jena lectures titled "Foundations of Transcendental Philosophy (Wissenschaftslehre) nuua methodo." manner, it follows that his composition of the 'notebooks' was preceded by a preliminary draft, which could be what is referred to by the earliest dates mentioned (winter 179s'96, spring 1796)." Moreover, these sa~e editors quite plausibly interpret the previously quoted passage in Fichte's March 17; 1799, letter to Schmidt, where Fichte reports that he has been working on the new version for three years ("seit drei Jahren Mbe ich eine neiU1 Darstellung bearbeitet"), as evidence that he continued to work on it throughout this period. "'This was also the conclusion drawn by the very first scholar to make a detailed study of the Halle transcript, Emanuel Hirsch (see Fichtes Religionsphilosophie, p. 59n). Hirsch subsequently reaffirmed this conclusion in Christentum und Geschichte, p. 67n, where he wrote: "From the winter semester 1796/97 on, Fichte's Jena lectures were always based upon a single notebook; consequently, with respect to its contents, we may treat the transcript [H] as representing the Wissenschaftslehre of 1796."
PRINCIPLES OF THE EDITION AND TRANSLATION
The Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo is a fascinating and important document that not only occupies a central role in the development of Fichte's philosophy but richly deserves and handsomely repays intensive study in its own right. Hence it is particularly unfortunate that no copy of this text in Fichte's own hand has survived. But this misfortune is at least partially rectified by the fact that we possess two different, though equally detailed, student transcripts of Fichte's lectures on this subject. Though each of these transcripts appears to be "complete," neither is entirely satisfactory, and each contains passages of extraordinary obscurity. Fortunately, the deficiencies of each are, as a general rule, remedied in the other. The first half of the Wissenschaftslehre nova meth.odo, for example, is presented more clearly and in greater detail in K, whereas H's presentation of the second half is generally preferable to that of K. Thus anyone who wishes to understand the Wissenschaftslehre nova meth.odo is advised to study both texts. For this reason, the present translation represents a composite or conflated text of the two. Nevertheless, some readers may object in principle to placing so much authority in the hands of the editor <~.nd may wish to reach their own decisions concerning the adequacy or inadequacy of the two transcripts. Accordingly, the following text provides a complete translation of K, supplemented by the inclusion, within the main body of the text, as well as within the notes, of a great many passages from H. 1 Moreover, these additions from H are all clearly indicated (see below). Thus, with a bit of effort, any reader who wishes to do so can ignore all the insertions from H and can concentrate solely upon the text of K. 1 K has been chosen as the basis for the translation because, of the two transcripts, it exhibits somewhat greater systematic unity and is, on the whole, beuer written. This is also the judgment of lves Radrizzani, whose French translation follows a similar strategy of rendering K in its entirety, supplemented by passages from H. Nevertheless, well more than half of the entire text of H is included in the present English translation.
[50]
Principles of the Edition and Translation
5l
Despite the complexity of the editorial apparatus, every effort has been made to produce an English text that is as accurate and as readable as possible (though these two goals are not always readily reconcilable). For the convenience of readers who may wish to compare the translation with the German originals, the pagination of both H and K has been provided in the margins, and in many instances the original German text is provided in the (numbered) footnotes. The specific principles and conventions governing this edition are as follows. Integration of K and H: The basis of the present edition is a complete and continuous translation of the entire text of K. In addition, a large number of passages from H have been incorporated within the main body of the text, where they are always enclosed within scroll brackets or braces. Additional passages from H are included within the notes. In order to distinguish them from the rest of the editorial apparatus, notes providing supplementary passages from H are always designated by superscripted capital letters, rather than numbers. When one carefully compares the two transcripts, it is a relatively easy task to determine where the insertions from H should be made in the text of K. Whnl and how often such insertions should be made is a more difficult question. Since the two texts are very rarely exactly the same, one must exercise editorial judgment in deciding which passages from H to translate, as well as which to include within the main text and which to relegate to the footnotes. The inserted passages from H include (1) those that have no direct parallel inK and (2) those that clarify, explain, and expand upon points that are inadequately or obscurely presented in K. In addition, H contains a few passages that appear to conflW with the text of K. All such passages are translated in the notes, as are certain passages from H which merely provide interesting alternate formulations of points presented in K.
Editorial interpolations: Occasionally, each transcript contains gaps or ambiguities that cannot be remedied by incorporating material from the other transcript. In such cases, editorial interpolations have been inserted. Such interpolations are always placed within square brackets. Numbering of sections: In his manuscript, Krause experimented with various different ways of indicating the sections of each of the nineteen §§ into which the entire presentation is divided: sometimes employing letters, sometimes numbers; sometimes placing his section numbers at the left margin, sometimes indenting them, and sometimes arranging them as centered headings; sometimes enclosing the section numbers within parentheses, and sometimes not. H displays
52
Principles of the Edition and Translation
similar inconsistencies. The translation, in contrast, follows a single, consistent scheme of placing the section number in parentheses at the left margin of the first sentence of each section. Paragraphing: Whereas the text of H is broken into many short paragraphs, the paragraphs of K (like those of Fichte's own published writings) are typically much longer, though occasionally interrupted by dashes (Gedankenstriche). The translation follows the paragraphing of the original texts, with the following exceptions: (1) Paragraph breaks have sometimes been introduced where a dash occurs inK, and (2) new paragraph breaks have occasionally been introduced into the text of K in cases where the content (as can usually be confirmed by a comparison with H) clearly indicates a change of subject matter in the middle of a paragraph. Every ~aragraph break I have introduced is clearly indicated by the symbol "•." Sentence structure: Though the English translation attempts to preserve the style and feel of the original German texts, the canons of English usage have sometimes made it necessary to break up some of the longer sentences in both H and K. Again, I have attempted to keep such departures to a minimum. Use of emphasis: The manuscripts of H and K are both written primarily in German script, though each employs Latin script on occasion as well. Though usually employed to transcribe foreign words or German words with a foreign root, the Latin script is sometimes used simply for emphasis. In addition, both K and H also employ underlining (and double underlining) as a mode of emphasis. 3 The published German texts of H and K preserve these distinctions by means of elaborate typographical devices (normal type to indicate normal German handwriting, italics to indicate terms underscored in the manuscripts, and small capital letters to indicate words and passages written in Latin script). Though the translation attempts to follow the originals in their use of emphasis, no effort has been made to preserve the distinction between Latin and German script. Thus the words written in Latin script are 2 The paragraphing of K is also interrupted on those occasions when a paragraph break is included within a passage from H which is inserted within a paragraph from K. • Neither K nor H is consistent in the use of either Latin script or underlining. For example, whereas Krause sometimes transcribed the entire text of a dU:tat in Latin script, on other occasions Latin script is employed only for the first line of the dU:tat, and sometimes the entire dU:tat appears in German script. Obviously, here again Krause was simply experimenting with various ways of composing his transcript. (fhe translation ignores these experiments and employs normal type for the dU:tata.) Or, to take another example, whereas the words Jch and Niclu-Ich generally appear within H in Latin script, this convention is not always followed (especially in the latter portions of the text). In contrast, these same two words are almost always written in plain German script in K.
Principles of the Edition and Translation
53
here printed in italics only in cases where the Latin script seems to have been employed for the sake of emphasis and not simply to transcribe a word with a foreign root. Words underlined in K and H are here printed in italics, except in cases where the context clearly atgues against this or in cases (such as citation of names or "mention" of terms) where English employs different conventions from German. In the latter cases, the emphasis is either dropped altogether or else replaced with quotation marks. No new emphasis has been introduced in the English translation. In short, the translation follows the German originals in the use of emphasis, though not slavishly, and is somewhat more consistent in its use of italics for such things as titles, headings, and so on than either of the German texts.
Annotation: As already mentioned, lettered footnotes provide supplementary passages from H. Numbered footnotes provide a variety of different sorts of historical and philological information: ( 1) Some notes identify or provide further information concerning persons, works, circumstances, and events that Fichte mentioned or alluded to in the text of his lectures. (2) Some notes indicate proposed corrected readings of the text-whether based upon a comparison of the printed text with the original manuscript, 4 upon a comparison of Hand K, or simply upon considerations of context and content. (3) Many of the notes address specific issues of translation and include, wherever it would be helpful, citations from the German text. (Note that these quotations reproduce the often eccentric orthography of the originals.) (4) On rare occasions, the notes include a few words of explanation or commentary, but only where the ambiguity of the text makes such commentary indispensable. Page nu,mbers of the German text: The page numbers of the Felix Meiner edition of the text of K are supplied in the left margin of the text. Page numbers of H (as published in AA IV, 2) are supplied, within parentheses, in the right margin. 5 Page references to H are also supplied, again in parentheses, following each of the supplementary passages translated in the notes. Translntion: While my goal has been to make these texts of Fichte's lectures as readable and as accessible as possible to a broad Anglophone audience, I have also attempted to address the more specialized concerns 4 I am especially grateful to Erich Fuchs for his invaluable assistance in identifying such errors of transcription in the Meiner text of K. • Marginal page references to H are supplied only where material from H appears within the body of the translation. That is, a page reference to H is provided at the point of the first occurrence within the text of the translation of a passage from that particular page of H.
54
Principles of the Edition and Translation
of scholars and of readers with some knowledge of the German language: hence the large number of citations from the original German text. Every effort has been made to preserve as much consistency and univocity as possible in the rendering of key terms (indicated in the German-English glossary), though, of course, a sensitive and accurate translation demands a certain latitude and flexibility in this regard as well. As a general rule, long-standing conventions for rendering certain technical, philosophical terms into English (e.g., Vorstellung = "representation" and Anschauung = "intuition") have been respected, though there are some exceptions. For example, Ich is here rendered as "1," rather than as "ego" or "self," and Vermiigen is translated as "power" or "ability," rather than as "faculty." Furthermore, Wissenschaftslehre, which means "theory" or "doctrine" of "science" or of "scientific knowledge," and which is customarily-albeit quite inaccurately-rendered as "Science of Knowledge," is here treated as a term of art and is not translated at all. In this case, as in every other, translation remains a matter of compromise and interpretation. This fact, however, is as much of an incentive as an obstacle to the philosophically inclined translator, who may take some comfort in the fact that Fichte insisted that "my theory should be expounded in an infinite number of ways" and conceded that "everyone will have a different way of thinking this theory-and must think it differently, in order to be thinking this very theory. "6 This, therefore, is the underlying goal and purpose of the present volume: to assist those who wish to "think" Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre nova methodAJ in a new and different way-that is, in English. 6
Letter to Reinhold, July
2,
1795.
GERMAN/ENGLISH GLOSSARY
abbilden ableiten die Absicht der Accident afficieren die Agilitat der Akt anerkennen an hal ten ankniipfen anschauen das Anschauen das Anschauende die Anschauung die Ansicht
auffassen die Aufforderung der Aufgabe aufhalten aufheben aufnehmen aufstellen die Ausdehnung (sich) aussern das Beabsichtigte die Bedingung die Begierde begreifen
to portray to derive intention accident, accidental property or feature to affect, to have an effect on agility act to acknowledge, to recognize to arrest, to bring to a halt to attach, to connect, to tie or to hold together to intuit intuiting, act of intuiting the intuiting subject intuition view, point of view, opinion, way of looking at, appearance, aspect, perspective, the way something looks to grasp, to interpret, to construe (to pick out) summons task, assignment to bring to a halt, to arrest to cancel, to annul to assimilate, to take up, to absorb, to accommodate to present, to exhibit, to display, to set up expansion to express what is intended condition (for the possibility of) desire to comprehend, to grasp, to grasp in or by means of a concept
56
German/English Glossary
das Begreifen das Begreifende die Begrenztheit der Begriff die Beharrlichkeit das Beruhen die Beschaffenheit die Beschriinktheit die Beschriinkung bestehen bestimmbar die Bestimmbarkeit bestimmen das Bestimmen bestimmt die Bestimmtheit das Bestimmuein beweglich die Beweglichkeit der Beweis beweisen das Bewussr.sein das Bild bilden bind en die Causalitiit der Charakter darstellen die Darstellung das Dauerende die Denkart denken das Denken das Denkende der Denk.zwang der Drang die Einbildungskraft die Einschrankung einwirken die Einwirkung empfinden die Empfindung der Endzweck
(act of) comprehending, comprehension the comprehending subject limitation, state of limitation concept constancy (state of) rest structure, constitution, (set of) properties limitation, state of limitation limitation to subsist (to endure) determinable determinability to determine, to specify determining, specifying, act of determining determinate, determined, specific determinacy, determinate state, precision determinate being movable, mobile, changeable mobility proof, argument to prove, to demonstrate consciousness, act or state of consciousness image to form or entertain images, to shape, to form to constrain, to bind causal power, causality characteristic feature, feature, character, nature to present, to expound, to exhibit, to portray presentation, exposition, portrayal that which endures way or manner of thinking to think, to conceive of thinking, act of thinking the thinking subject intellectual compulsion, feeling of being compelled to think in a certain way impetus (power of) imagination limitation, restriction to exercise an effect on effect, influence, efficacious action to sense, to have a sensation sensation final goal
German/English Glossary entgegensetzen entschlie~n
der Entschlu~ entwerfen erblicken ergreifen erkennen das Erkennen die Erkenntnis erweisen die Evidenz flxiert das Fixiertsein die Folge die Forderung fortdauern das Fiihlbare das Fuhlende fUr sich gebunden die Gebundenheit das GefUhl das Gefundene der Gegensatz gegensetzen das Gegensetzen der Gegenstand das Gehaltene der Geist geistJich das Gemiith das Gesetztsein die Gewalt der Glaube glauben das Glied die Grenze die Grofle der Grund die Grundeigen:schaften die Haltbarkeit hal ten handeln das Handeln die Handlung hem men
57
to oppose, to posit in opposition to resolve, to decide
decision to construct, to project to view, to catch sight of, to observe to apprehend to cognize, to recognize cognizing, cognition cognition to demonstrate, to show self-evidence fixed, stabilized, arrested flxedeness sequence, consequence, result demand to endure what can be felt the feeling subje<:t for itself, by itself constrained, bound constraint, constrained state feeling what is found or discovered opposite, opposition to oppose, to posit in opposition (act of) opposing, (act of) opposition, (act of) positing in opposition object that which is brought to a halt mind, spirit mental, intellectual, spiritual mind being-posited power belief, faith, confidence to believe, to have confidence in, to trust, to think element, member, term, link limit, boundary magnitude, quantity ground, foundation, basis, reason elementary qualities stability to bring to a halt, to arrest, to restrain to act acting, instance (mode or type) of acting action to curb, to obstruct, to restrict
58
German/English Glossary
herausgreifen herausreifkn hervorbringen das Hindemiss das Ich die lchheit die Idee die Intelligenz k.ennen die Korperwelt die Kraft die Lehre leiden das Leiden losreif3en mach en das Machen das Machende man nigfalt ig das Mannigfaltige die Mannigfaltigkeit das Material die Materie das Merkmal nachbilden nachmachen nachweisen das Nichtdiirfen das Nichtich das Objekt das Objektive die Praxis das Prinzip rassonieren das Rassonnement realisieren das Recht die Reflexion die Ruhe ruhend die Sache der Satz schweben die Selbstandigkeit das Selbstgefiihl
to select, to choose to wrench out of to produce, to generate obstacle, hindrance the I 1-hood Idea intellect, intelligence to be acquainted with, to k.now corporeal world force, energy theory, account (philosophy, system) to be passively affected passivity, passive state, state of passivity to wrench away, to tear away to produce, to make productive activity, act of producing, productive act the productive subject or agent manifold, multiple manifold, multiplicity multiplicity material, content matter, content attribute, distinctive feature to copy to imitate, to copy to establish, to show prohibition the Not-1 object objective (element) practice, practical activity principle, first principle to argue, to calculate, to reason argumentation, argument, line of reasoning to realize, to make real, to bring into being right, law, justice (act of) reflecting, (act of) reflection repose, state of repose, passive state, stability in a state of repose, passive, stable content, matter, subject proposition, principle to hover, to oscillate self-sufficiency self-feeling, feeling of self
German/English Glossary die Selbsttatigkeit die Sensibilitat setzen das Setzende der Sinn die Sinnenwelt sinnlidi die Sinnlichk.eit die Sittlichk.eit stehend stetig die Stetigk.eit die Stimmung der Stoff der Stofl das Suchen die ·nu die Tathandlung das Tatige die Tatigkeit der Trieb das Tun das Uebergehen iibersinnlich die Unbestimmtheit die Verbindung die Vereinigung das Verfahren verlrniipfen das Vermogen die Vernunft versinnlichen der Verstand verstandlich das Vorbild das Vorhandsein vorschweben vorstellen das Vorstellende die Vorstellung wahrnehmen die Wahrnehmung wechselwirken
59
self-activity. spontaneous self-activity sensibility to posit the (actively) positing subject sense sensible world sensible, sensuous sensibility, sensuousness morality stable constant, continuous continuity mood, disposition matter, material, content, object, stuff impact, stimulus quest deed, act Act the active sutMect or being activity drive doing, instance or type of doing, act of doing .something movement of transition, passage, movement, transition supersensible indeterminacy, state of indeterminacy connection, bond unification, union process, operation to connect, to tie together power reason to make sensible, to sensibilize understanding intelligible model, ideal prefiguration presence, being present to hover before, to have (something) in mind to represent, to have or to entertain representations the representing su~ject representation to perceive perception to interact, to stand in a relationship of re· ciprocal interaction
6o
German/English. Glossary
die Wechselwirkung widersteh.en der Wille die Willkiir wirken das Wirken wirklich die Wirklichkeit wirksam die Wirksamkeit die Wirkung wissen die Wissenschaft das Wollen das Ziel (in sich selbst} zuriickgehend das Zusammenfassen der Zusammenhang zusammensetzen zusehen der Zustand der Zweck
(reciprocal) interaction to resist will choice, free choice, power of (free) choice to act efficaciously, to operate, to have an effect upon, to affect efficacious acting, accomplishment actual actuality effective, effectively efficacy, efficacious power effect to know science willing, act of willing goal, object self-reverting act of combining, combination combination, connection to combine, to assemble, to posit together, to compose to witness, to observe, to look at state goal, end (aim, purpose)
ABBREVIATIONS
AA
EPW GEWL
GWL
H
K
KGS
KRV
SK
sw
WLnm
J
G. Fichte: Gesamtausgabe der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.
Ed. Reinhard Lauth, Hans Jacobs, and Hans Gliwitsk.y. StuttgartBad Cannstatt: Frommann, 1964-. (This definitive edition is published in four parts, each of which consists of many separate volumes. Cited by section, volume, and page number.) Fichte: Early Philosophical Writings. Ed. and trans. Daniel Breazeale. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988. J. G. f"ichte. Grundrif3 des Eigentiimlichen der Wissenschaftslehre in Riicksicht auf das theoretische Vermiigen ( 1795). (Cited according to the pagination of the edition in SW, I.) J. G. Fichte. Grundlage der gesamlen Wissenschaftlehre ( 1794'95).(Cited according to the pagination of the edition in SW, 1.) The "Hallesche Nachschrift" of WLnm (1797/98?). (Cited according to the pagination of the edition in AA IV, 2.) The "Krause Nachschrift" of WLnm (1798/99) =Johann Gottlieb Fichte. Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo. Kollegnachschrift K. Chr. Fr. Krause. Ed. Erich Fuchs. Hamburg: Meiner, 1982. K.ants gesammelte Schriften. Ed. Koniglich Preuf3ischen Ak.ademie der Wissenschaften. Berlin: Reimer/de Gruyter, 1902-. (Cited by volume and page number.) Immanuel Kant. Kritik der reinen Vernunft (First ed. [A], 1781; second ed. [B], 1787). Fichte: The Science of Knuwledge. Ed. and trans. Peter Heath and John Lachs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982 (orig. 1970). Johann Gottlieb Fichtes siimmtliche Werke. Ed. I. H. Fichte. Berlin: Veit, 1845-46. (Cited by volume and page number. The SW pagination is also indicated in the critical editions of many of Fichte's writings in AA, as well as in the English translations of Fichte's writings in EPW and SK.) J. G. Fichte. Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo ( 1796/99). (Usually cited asK or H, above.)
[ 61 l
KEY TO SYMBOLS AND NOTES
{}
All material enclosed with braces or scroll brackets is inserted into the text of K from H.
[]
Everything within square brackets is added by the editor/translator.
A
Footnotes marked by a superscripted letter provide additional, supplementary passages from H. Footnotes marked by a superscripted number provide philological and other information and are added by the editor/translator.
•
This solid square at the beginning of a paragraph indicates a paragraph break introduced into the text of K by the editor/translator.
The numbers in the left-hand margins refer to the page numbers of the text of K, as published by Felix Meiner. The numbers in the right-hand margins (within parentheses) refer to the page numbers of the text of H, as published in AA IV, 2 (and are provided only where material from H appears within the main body of the English text).
Foundations of Transcendental Philosophy (Wissenschaftslehre) N(JlJ(l Methodo (l?g6/gg)
The Major Points of the Wissenschaftslehre of 1798-1 799 Fichte's Dictata to His Lectures on the Wissenschaftslehre Winter Semester 1798-1799 (his last lectures on this topic) 1
§
1
The Concept of the I. Intellectual Intuition. (newer version) Postulal.e: Construct the concept of the I and observe how you accomplish this. It was claimed that if one does what one is asked to do one will discover that one is active and will discover in addition that one's activity is directed upon one's own active self. Accordingly, the concept of the I comes into being only by means of a self-reverting activity; and conversely, the only concept that comes into being by means of such an activity is the concept of the I. By observing oneself while engaged in this activity, one becomes immediately conscious of it; i.e., one posits oneself as selfpositing. As the sole immediate form of consciousness, this immediate 1 This is Krause's title for the general summary he placed at the beginning of his Nachschrift. Krause's subtitle notwithstanding, this was not to be the last time that Fichte lectured on the Wissmsclwftslehre. He began a new series of lectures on the topic in Berlin only a year after his depanure from Jena and continued to deliver new lectures on the Wissmschnftslehre at various intervals throughout the rest of his life. This was, however, his last series of lectures on the topic at Jena. The following summary of the "major points" or "chief propositions" (Haupts;Uu) of Fichte's Wissmsclwftslehre, with which Krause's manuscript commences, is simply a compilation of the carefully dictated summaries ("dict4UJ") that occur at the end of each of the nineteen §§ into which the Wissmschnftslehre nova methodo is divided. For this reason, perhaps, Erich Fuchs did not include this preliminary section in his published edition of Krause's transcript. Though there are some minor differences between the versions of the summaries which appear within the text of the lectures and the transcriptions assembled here, only those changes that seem to involve some shift of meaning are explicitly noted. The translation of these "major points" departs from Krause's manuscript in several
[ 6sJ
66
Major Points of the Wi.ssenschaftslehre
consciousness of oneself must be presupposed in the explanation of all other possible varieties of consciousness. It is called the original intuition of the I. (The word "intuition" is here employed in both the subjective and the objective sense. For intuition can mean two different things: (a) it can refer to the intuition which the I has, in which case the I is the subject, the intuiting subject; or(~) it can refer to that intuition which is directed at the I, in which case the intuition is objective, and the I is the intuited object.) One will further observe that one is unable to posit oneself as acting without positing a sto.te of repose in opposition thereto. Whenever a state of repose is posited, a concept is produced-in this case, the concept of the I. (older version of § 1) All consciousness is accompanied by an immediate self-consciousness, which is called intellectual intuition, and this immediate self-consciousness must be presupposed if one is to be able to think at all. Consciousness, however, is an activity, and self-consciousness, in particular, is the selfreverting activity of the intellect, or pure reflection. Remark: Everything follows as a consequence of carrying out the indicated self-observation. This pure act of reflection, viewed as a concept, is thought of by the I. Accordingly, I posit myself simply by means of myself, and all other consciousness is conditioned by this act of self-positing.
§2
Relation of the I to the Not- I. (newer version) It was claimed that when one constructs the concept of the I one will also discover that one cannot posit oneself as active without positing this activity as self-determined, and that one cannot do this without positing a nwuement of transition from a sto.te of indeterminacy or determinability-
minor respects: (1) The page layout is different. Krause arranged his content headings (whkh, presumably, derive from Krause himself and not directly from Fichte) in a column on the left side of his pages and the summaries themselves in a column on the right side ofthe same pages. (11) As in· the main body of the Nacluchr!fl, two virtually identical versions of§ 3 are also included in the «major points," and here too only one of these (the "more recent" version) is translated. (3) The second paragraph of Fichte's summary of§ 17 is not included in Krause's compilation of "major points" but has been included here. (4) As in the main body of the text, words and passages are occasionally inserted from the text of the dictata appearing at the end of each §of H. Such insertions are always enclosed within braces or scroll brackets.
Major Points of the Wissenschaftslehre
67
which movement of transition is itself the very activity one is here observing (see sections 1 and 2 above). Similarly, one cannot grasp the concept {of the I} which comes into being by means of the determinate activity without determining this concept by means of an opposed Not- I. What is determinable is the same as what was previously called the state of repose (§ 1), for it becomes determined precisely by being transformed into an activity. Moreover, that which, in relation to the intuition of the I, is a concept of the I, is for the Not-I an intuition. More specifically, it is the concept of the act of intuiting (section 4). As a consequence of this opposition, the Not-1 can be characterized as the {real} negation of activity; that is, it can be characterized as "being," which is the concept of canceled activity. The concept of being is thus by no means an original concept, but is a negative one, derived from activity. (older version of§ 2) When this very activity of reflection, through which the intellect posits itself, is intuited, it is intuited as a self-determining agility; and this agility is intuited as a movement of transition from a state of passive repose and indeterminacy, which is nevertheless determinable, to one of determinacy. This determinability here appears as the power to think either of the I or of the Not-1, and thus the concept of determinability necessarily involves the concepts of the I and the Not-I, which are posited in opposition to each other. Accordingly, whenever one engages in self-active reflection each of these concepts appears as something independent of this act, and the characteristic feature of the Not-1 is being, i.e., a negation.
§3 Actual Consciousness. Freedom. One will find that this movement of transition (from what is determinable to what is determinate, § 2) possesses its foundation utterly within itself. The action involved in this transition is called real activity and is opposed to that ideal activity which merely copies the former, and the overall activity of the I is thereby divided between these two types of activity. In accordance with the principle of determinability, no real activity can be posited without also positing a real or practical pawer. Real and ideal activity mutually condition and determine each other. Neither is possible without the other, nor can one comprehend what either of them is without also comprehending the other. In this act of freedom the I itself becomes objective. An actual consciousness comes into being, and from now on anything that is to be an object of consciousness at all
68
Major Points of the Wissenschaftslehre
must be connected to this starting point. Freedom is therefore the ultimate ground and the first condition of all being and of all consciousness.
§4
The Character of the I as the Identity of Practical Power and Intellect. Free self-determination is intuitable only as a determination to become "something," of which the self-determining or practical {power} must possess a {freely constructed} concept. A concept of this sort is called "the concept of a goal." Consequently, for the intuiting subject, the same subject who possesses practical power at the same time possesses the power to form concepts, just as, conversely, the comprehending subject, or {the power of} the intellect, must necessarily be practical. Practical power and intelligence are inseparable. Neither can be thought of apart from the other. The {true} character of the I thus lies in this identity. §5
Intuitability of the Activity of the I by Means of the Synthesis of Resistance. For intuition, who.t is determinable becomes an infinitely divisible manifold, because it is supposed to be the object of a free choice on the part of absolute freedom. This must also be true of what is determinate, since it is a part of this manifold. What is determinate and what is determinable are, to this extent, similar. What distinguishes them is this: In the first case, the action intuited is merely possible, i.e., an action posited by an intellect that is oscillating between opposites; in the second case, the action intuited is {actual, i.e.,} an action posited by an intellect that is bound to a determinate series of the manifold. Action 2 is activity that is constantly resisted, and it is only by means of this synthesis of resistance {with activity} that an activity of the I becomes intuitable.
§6
Drive and Feeling. A free action is possible only if it is guided by a freely constructed concept of this action (§ 4); consequently, in advance of all action, the free 2 Reading "Handlung" for "Hemmung." The summary of§ 5 which appears within the text of the lectures (in both K and H) reads "action'' (Handlung) instead of "constraint" (Hemmung), a word that makes litde sense in this context and is presumably an error in transcription on Krause's part. In fact, the context makes it clear that what Fichte is referring to here is neither "constraint" nor "action" per se, but rather "constrained action."
Major Points of the Wi.ssenschaftslehre
6g
intellect must be acquainted with the possibilities of action. Such an acquaintance can be explained only by assuming the presence within the I, prior to all action, of a drive, within which, precisely because it is only a drive, the inner activity of the I is limited. Since nothing pertains to the I which it does not posit, the I must also posit this limitation, and an or_iginallimitation that is posited in this way is called a "feeling. " 5 Since a free choice or selection is supposed to take place, a manifold of feelings must be present, and these various feelings can be distinguished from one another only through their relationship to the general system of feelings, a system that is likewise originally present.
§7 Feeling of the Object and Intuition of the Ideal. An intuition is necessarily connected with every feeling; for feeling is limitntion, but a limitation that is not opposed to an activity is nothing. That within the I which necessarily remains an activity, however, is its ideal puwer. The point of union between feeling and intuition is this: even as the I feels itself to be limited (in its real aspect), it also feels itself to be engaged in intuiting (in its ideal aspect). To the extent that intuition is directed at the limitation, this limited state of the I becomes a mere object, with no relation to a subject, and the intuition is felt to be constrained in the depiction of the object. A feeling of this sort, however, is impossible apart from an opposed feeling of freedom; consequently, the intuition is also, in another respect, felt to be free, and to this extent it is an intuition of the ideal.
§ 8 The Concept of the I and the Concept of the Not- I.
An intuition of the I is necessarily connected with an intuition of the Not-I, and only through the former does the latter become an intuition at all. In order to explain this intuition of the I, however, one has to assume an alteration in the state of [the I's] feelings, i.e., a limitation of its limited condition, through which the I itself becomes limited in the intuition of the Not-1. From this alteration there arises a feeling of this particular limitation of the ideal activity, from which there then arises an intuition of the same. The ground of the union of the intuition of the I and the intuition of the Not-1 is this: no constraint can be posited within the '"so etwas nennt man ein Gefiihl." The translation interprets K's "so etwas" in the light of the parallel passage in H: "(so ein setzen der urspriinglichen Beschriink.ung)."
70
Major Points of the Wissenschaftslehre
intuition of the Not-/ without also positing .freedom in opposition to it. All free-
dom, however, pertains to the /, and only by means of freedom does the intuition of the I become an intuition of the I. But an intuition accompanied by a consciousness of the intuiting subject is called a "concept." Therefore, the concept of the I and the concept of the Not-/ both arise from the postulated alteration in the system of feeling.
§9 The Thing and the Representation of the Thing. The act of comprehending is a free act of reflection upon the previously derived intuition, and it is posited as a free act. The freedom of the act of reflecting upon intuition cannot be posited, however, unless this act of reflection 4 is itself posited as such. Accordingly, we obtain a twofold view of the act of reflection, and along with this, a twofold view of the object of the same. (That is to say, the double aspect of the act of reflection is present for the philosopher, whereas what is present for the I is the double aspect of the object.) In the first instance, [we are concerned with] the act of reflection as such, without any further reflection thereupon, and this furnishes the object that is present witlwut any help .from the I. In the second instance, [we are concerned with] the act of reflection as a particular determination of freedom, which is itself reflected upon, and this furnishes the representation of the thing.
§ wa Acting as Drawing a Line. Space. The act of comprehending is posited as a freely occurring act; this means that {it} is posited by the intellect as an act that can either occur or not occur, and indeed, as a specific mode of acting in general (for otherwise nothing at all would be posited). Consequently, acting as such or in general is posited, and it is posited as something that can occur or not occur-though acting is not possible "in general" unless one or another 4 "aber die Freiheit der REFLEXION auf sie kann nicht gesetzt werden, autkr in wiefern sie selbst iiberhaupt gesetzt ist." The antecedent of the second sie in this clause is uncertain and might be either "the act of reflection" (die Reflexion) or "the intuition" (die Anschauung), though the context appears to support the former. Indeed, the corresponding passage in H (p. g8) explicidy refers to both and states that "the freedom of this act of reflecting upon intuition cannot be posited except insofar as these (i.e., the act of reflection, as well as intuition itself) are already posited as such." It should be noted, however, that this same passage in H ("autkr er inwiefern die[se] (REFLEXION, Anschauung selbst) iiberhaupt schon gesezt ist"), with its plural subject and singular verb, also appears to be defective.
Major Points of the WissenschaftslehYe
71
specific mode of acting is posited. Consequently, this "acting in general" exists for the intellect only as an instance of free acting-but no instance of "free acting" can be present for the intellect without "acting as such" or "in general" being present for it [as well]. However, the I intuits its sheer acting, considered as such, as an act of drawing a line, and hence it intui~ its indeterminate power to act in this way as space.
§ wb Matter in Space. Since the positing of the object and the positing of acting are necessarily united within the I, the former (the object) and the schema of the latter [i.e., space] must necessarily be united as well. But uniting an object with space is the same as filling space; consequently, all objects necessarily occupy space, that is, they are material. The freedom of the intellect consists in (i.e., expresses itself in) the synthesis of an object, which is determined by the predicates of feeling, with a place in space, which is determined by spontaneity; and, in this way, space becomes continuous, and space, as well as matter, becomes infinitely divisible. The determinacy of the latter (the intellect), without which the former (freedom) is impossible and which is not possible without the former, consists in this: that the object must be posited in some sface or another, 5 and that space must be filled with some sort of matter. There is no space without matter, and vice versa. This is a matter of necessity; but it is a matter of freedom that this object is not situated just in this space and that this space does not belong just to this object.
§ 11
A Rational Being Posits Itself in Space as a Practically Striving Being. Every object obtains its place in space from its relation to the representing subject, and, apart from this relationship, no determination of place is possible. Anything that is supposed to determine the position of another thing in space, however, must itself be in space. Accordingly, a rational being posits itself in space as a practically striving being. This internally felt striving, which obtains the form of intuition through the act of intuiting the object (an act that is necessarily united with feeling), 5
6
"in einen Raum tiberhaupt": that is, "in space as such or in general." ''mit Materie tiberhaupt."
72
M~or
Points of the Wissenschaftslehre
is the original and immediate standard of measure for every determination of place. It is not possible to posit anything in space without also discovering oneself to be in space, but one cannot discover that one is in space unless one posits an object in space.
§
12
Real External Efficacy. Our striving, or our practical acting, is, according to the preceding §, the standard of measure for all spatial determination. Inner or pure force is the efficacy of willing, as intuited immediately and therefore intellectually. Through such willing, the entire free power of the I is focused upon a single point. Outer or physical force is this same energy, but extended by sensible intuition in a temporal series, in which series the manifold of the power of feeling, as determined by the causality of the will, is brought into a relationship of dependence; and it is only through this relationship of dependence that this manifold can be assimilated to the unity 7 of consciousness. A physical force of this sort, however, can be posited only in [the context of] some real efficacy, from which it follows that any determination of the place of things-and thus consciousness itself-is possible only in consequence of some real efficacy.
§ 13 The Intelligible Pure Will. The Feeling of "Ought." The I as an Individual in the Realm of Rational Beings. Real efficacy is possible only in accordance with a concept of a goal; a concept of a goal is possible only on the condition of a cognition; and such a cognition is possible only on the condition of a real efficacy; consequently, consciousness would not be explained by this circle. There must therefore be something that simultaneously is an object of cognition and is efficacious. 8 All these features are united in only one thing: in pure will, which must be presupposed prior to all empirical willing and to all empirical cognition. This pure will is something purely intelligible, but it can express itself through a feeling of "ought," and in this way it becomes an object of thought. To the extent that this occurs, pure willing is assimilated into the overall form of thinking as something determi7 Reading, with the version of this paragraph which appears at the end of§ 12 in both K and H, "Einheit" instead of "Freiheit" ("freedom"). 8 Reading, with the version of this paragraph which appears at the end of§ 13 in both K and H, "das Object der Erlc.enntnil} und Wiirlc.samlc.eit"' for "das Object der Erlc.enntnil} und der Wirlc.samlc.eit" ("an object of cognition and of efficacy").
Major Points of the Wisseruchaftslehre
73
nate in opposition to something determinable. In this way, /, the willing subject, become an individual, and there comes into being for me a realm of rational beings, as what is determinable in this case. Consciousness in its entirety can and must be derived from this pure concept.
§ 14 Willing and Doing. Unification of Cognition of the Object with the Will. The pure will is the immediate object of all consciousness and of all reflection (§ 13). Reflection, however, is discursive; consequently, the pure will must be a manifold. It is not originally manifold, but first becomes so by being related to its own {original} limitation, by means of which it {first} becomes a will. This relation of the pure will to its own limitation occurs within the act of reflection itself, which is absolutely free; and the freedom and entire essence of this act of reflection consist precisely in this act of relating9 {the pure will to the original limitation}. The freedom of this act consists, in part, in the fact that such a relationship is established at all and, in part, in the fact that it occurs in this or that way. Insofar as it is simply thought of, this act of reflection appears as an act of willing; insofar as it is intuited, it appears as a "doing." This same act of reflection is the foundation of all empirical consciousness. In an individual act of such reflection, a rational being views itself in two different ways or under two different aspects. On the one hand, it views itself as limited; on the other, it views itself as active in describing this limitation. The former is its outer aspect, the latter is its inner one; and, as a result, it ascribes to itself a general organ {(a body)} consisting of an inner and an outer organ. Feeling is the relation of limitation to reflection. The source of the limitation is something that exists only for the ideal activity engaged in thinking about the real activity, and the immediate union of cognition of an object with the will is thereby explained.
§ 15 The I's Task of Limiting Its Will by Itself. But a limitation is not a limitation of the I, and does not exist for the I, unless it is one the I assigns to itself. Accordingly, the original/imitation of the will can signify nothing but a task for the I: the task of limiting its own will. The distinctive harbinger of this task within empirical 9
Reading, with H, "Beziehen" for K's "Beziehung" ("relation").
74
Major Points of the Wissenschaftslehre
consciousness can be nothing other than a concept that demands a specific self-limitation, and it is by grasping this concept that feeling and intuition first arise. Consequently, all consciousness begins with the act of thinking of something purely intelligible.
§ 16 The Summons to Engage in Free Activity, Coming from a Rational Being 10 Outside of Us. Viewed from another side, this task of limiting oneself is a summons to engage in a free activity (for it does not appear to come from the individual; instead, it appears to come from a rational being outside of us). We cannot determine ourselves, however, unless our act of selfdetermination is accompanied by an actual act of willing; consequently, consciousness of an actual act of willing is inseparably linked with this perception of a summons to freedom.
§ 17 In its Activity upon Itself the I Discovers 11 Itself as a Willing Subject. As we know, the I is what acts upon itself, 12 and, by virtue of this selfdirected activity, it is a willing subject. "The I discovers itself': this obviously means that it discovers itself to be engaged in acting upon itself. The I discovers 13 itself to be a willing subject in this self-directed activity, because its original nature-which cannot be derived from anything higher, but must instead be presupposed for {the possibility of} any explanation-consists in an act of willing. Every object of {the l's} free reflection upon itself must consequently become its own willing. Every act of reflection is an act of self-determining, and the reflecting subject immediately intuits this act of self-determining. But it intuits this act through the medium of the imagination, and, accordingly, it intuits it as a sheer power of self-determination. By means of this abstract act of thinking (as a power) the I arises for itself as "something"-something purely spiritual, 14 something exclusively ideal-and becomes conscious 10
11
"einer Vernunft."
Reading, with the text of the summary that appears at the end of§ 17 in H, "findet" for K's "fiihlt" ("feels"). 12 Reading, with H, "das auf sich selbst thatige" for K's "das durch sich selbst thatige" ("what is active through itself"), a reading that is confirmed by the rest of this paragraph. " Reading, with H, "findet" for K's "fiihle." 14 "ein rein Geistiges," i.e., something purely "intellectual."
Major Points of the Wisseruchaftslehre
75
of its own activity of pure thinking and willing, and becomes conscious of it as such, {that is, as an activity}. This act of reflection, however, is an act of self-determining; but the previously described act of imagination is an act of the I, and it is therefore determinate. Consequently, in one and the same undivided act, pure thinking is made sensible by the imaginati9n, and what is made sensible by the imagination is determined by pure thinking (reciprocal interaction of intuiting and thinking). This determination produces a self-contained power of the I as a sensible force, as well as a determinacy of this power 15 (concept of substantiality). An object is added in thought to the determinacy of this sensible force, and the Iauer determines the former in an act of thinking (concept of causality).
§ 18 The I in Opposition to Reason and Freedom Outside of Itself as well as in Opposition to Things Outside of Itself. Since the I, when engaged in the act of intuiting its own act of pure thinking, is at the same time determinate, this same pure act of thinking (that is to say, the I as a product of this act of thinking, the I as a free being) necessarily becomes something determinate for the I. But a free being, as such, can be determined only by the task of freely determining itself. When the I thinks of this, it proceeds from a general sphere of freedom as such (as what is determinable) to itself (as what is determinate within this sphere) and thereby posits itself as an individual, in opposition to a {realm of} reason and freedom outside of itself. In this determinate act of thinking, the I is at the same time free, and it thinks of what is determinate only insofar as it does so with freedom; consequently, it also confers freedom upon what is determinate. But freedom within mere determinacy (as in nature) is independent being. 16 In this manner, a being that is independent of the I is attributed to the Not1, which first becomes a thing thereby. Insofar as the Not-I possesses this type of being, it is what endures and is determinable throughout all the different determinations it receives through the freedom of the I. The act of thinking of the I as a free but limited being and that of thinking of the Not-/ as a self-subsisting thing 11 mutually condition each other. The I intuits its own freedom only in the objects of its acting, and it intuits these objects only insofar as it freely acts upon them. "Reading, with H, "denelben" forK's "desselben"("of the 1"). "1ST SEYN DURCH SICH SELBST," More literally: "being through itself' or "se]fSUff.?.rted being," "Au rOR stCH sESn:.HENDEN DINGES." 16
76
M~or Points of the Wissenschaftslehre
§ 19 Articulated Body. Organized Nature. When the limitation of the I is made sensible and is perceived, it appears as a summons to act freely. What is perceived in this case appears to us as a limitation of our physical force-assuming that we confine ourselves to ourselves. Accordingly, a physical force outside of us is posited as what determines this limitation. The physical force in question is governed (this is to be understood practically, that is, only in the sense of positing it as engaged in real activity) 18 by the will of a free individual outside of us, an individual who is determined and characterized by this will. (I.e., the individual in question is this determinate will, from which the existence of a rational being is first inferred.) What is determinable in this case {(what is determined by the freely determining agent and is, for us, a determinacy) 19} provides us with the concept and the perception of an articulated body, a person, outside of us. This, the body, is a product of nature and consists of parts, which consti-
tute this determinate whole only in their union with one another; therefore, nature contains within itself the law that its parts must necessarily unite to form wholes, which, in turn, constitute one single whole. Nature is both organized and organizing; insofar as a sensuous, rational being outside of me is posited, nature is therefore posited. This exhausts the sphere of what must necessarily be present within consciousness. Remark: Nature is {a complete whole and is} explicable {through itself} only insofar as it is both organized and organizing. Otherwise, one will be driven further and further afield by the law of causality, {if one assumes this law as one's explanatory rule}. 18
19
ist)."
"(ist praktisch zu verstehen, nur im wirklichen Activitatsetzen)." "Das Bestimmbare davon (von dem freyen bestimmenden, das fiir uns Bestimmtheit
3
First Introduction (presented in public lectures) 1
This introduction will address the following three questions: I. What is philosophy? II. How will philosophy be dealt with within the context of the system of the Wisseruchaftslehre? III. How has the previous version of this system 2 been altered, and how will the Wisseruchaftslehre be dealt with in this series of lectures?
Re. 1: No mere definition of philosophy will be provided, no mere formula that would simply stand in the way of any further thought. Instead, we will show what philosophy is by proceeding in a genetic manner. That is to say, we will describe how it happens that the human mind begins to philosophize. We will take it for granted that one assumes that things exist outside of oneself. In support of this assumption one appeals to one's own inner state. It is from within oneself that one obtains this conviction: one is conscious of an internal state from which one infers the existence of objects outside of oneself. But of course, one is conscious only insofar as 1 Fichte's coune of lectures on the Wwmschafokhre nooo fnl:tlwdo [henceforth WLnm! was a private course, i.e., one open only to officially enrolled (and paying) students. Public lectures, in contrast, were free and open to the entire university community. Fichte obviously intended this .. public introduction" to the Wwenscll4jtJ/.ehn to allract prospective students to his coune of private lectures and to provide them with some idea ofwhatto expect. The numbers in the left margin of this translation refer to the page numbers of the German text of Krause's typescript as edited and published by Erich Fuchs (K). 2 GWL and GEWL Together, these two published works constitute the "previous presentation" to which Fichte makes frequent reference throughout the present text. Fichte's own page references are to the first editions of these two works, but the translation substitutes references to the texts contained in the fiTSt volume of the readily available SW. The translations of GWL in SK (pp. Sg-~86) and GEWL in EPW (pp. 24!1-!lo6) provide marginal page references to SW, I, as do the editions of GWL and GEWL included in AA I,~ and I, !I·
[ 77]
78
4
First Introduction
one entertains representations; 3 hence all one can say is that one is conscious of representations of things outside of us, and in fact, one really asserts no more than this when one says that there are objects outside of us. No person can immediately affirm that he has senses, but merely that he is compelled to assume something of the sort. Consciousness is concerned only with what can be found within consciousness-and these are representations. 4 • Nevertheless, we do not content ourselves with this, but quickly introduce a distinction between the representation and the object; and we assert that beyond the representation there lies something else, something real or actual. 5 As soon as we become aware of this distinction between the representation and the object, we say that they both exist. All rational beings (even idealists and egoists, so long as they are not standing behind a lectern) continuously affirm the existence of an actual world. Any person who has raised himself to the level of reflecting upon this phenomenon occurring within the human soul must be astonished at the inconsistency this appears to involve. Hence one poses the following question: Why do we assume that actual things exist, beyond and in addition to our representations? Many people do not raise this question, either because they do not notice the distinction between representations and things, or simply because they are too thoughtless to raise such a question. But anyone who does pose this question has thereby raised himself to the level of philosophical inquiry. The aim of philosophical inquiry is to answer this question, and the science that answers it is philosophy. Whether there actually is such a science is a question that must remain undecided for the moment. It is, however, well known that much effort has already been devoted to attempts to answer the previously indicated question; for this has always been the task of philosophy. In trying to answer this question, however, most philosophers have proceeded in a one-sided manner, and hence their answers had to be one-sided as well. They thought, for example, that all they had to do was to inquire ' What Fichte actually says is that insofar as one is conscious, one is a "representing creature" or a "representing being" (ein vorstellendes Wesen). Throughout this translation, all technical occurrences of the term VorsteUung have been rendered as "representation." Fichte's employment of this term is derived from Kant (and Reinhold), for whom it designates the immediate object of consciousness, i.e., that which is "placed before"--vorgestellt-the mind (cp. Locke's "ideas" or Hume's "perceptions of the mind"). Thus the verb vorstellen, which is somewhat awkwardly rendered here as "to represent" or "to entertain representations," means no more than this: to have something "on one's mind," i.e., to be conscious of anything at all. 4 AII paragraph breaks that I have introduced into the text of K are marked by the symbol"•·" • "liege noch etwas wiirkliches." The adjective wirklich, which is often rendered as "real" but is normally translated in this volume as "actual," derives from the verb wirken, the root meaning of which is "to have an effect." Fichte fully exploits this intimate etymological connection between efficacy and reality ("actuality").
First Introduction
79
whether God, immortality, and freedom exist, i.e., whether there is anything actual outside of these representations and corresponding to them. But the question philosophy has to answer is not whether these particular representations possess any reality, but rather whether any of our representations possess any reality whatsoever. In ~aintaining that something else exists in addition to a particular representation, one asserts the objective validity of that representation. Thus, to inquire concerning the objective validity of the Deity means to investigate whether God is merely a thought, or whether there is something else, beyond this thought, which corresponds to it. The question concerning the objectivity of the world is every bit as interesting as those concerning the objectivity of the Deity and of immortality, and if one has not answered the former question one cannot answer the Iauer ones. Philosophy is thus something that is at least conceivable; that is to say, it is conceivable that one might ask about the objectivity of our representations, and it is worthy of a rational being to ponder the answer to this question. The Idea of philosophy 6 is thereby demonstrated, but the only way in which its reality can be demonstrated is by actually constructing a system of philosophy. Just as the human mind can pose these questions, so can it also pose many other ones, which it can then proceed to answer or to attempt to answer. If this occurs in conformity with specific laws it is called "reasoning,''7 and a science comes into being thereby, but not yet philosophy, which is devoted solely to answering the previously indicated question. Re. II: To be sure, people also philosophized in former times, but only in an obscure manner, not yet based upon any clear concept. The question concerning the objective validity of our representations has been particularly insisted upon by the skeptics. It was one of the greatest of these skeptics, Hume, who awoke Kant. 8 Kant, however, constructed no 6 "Die Idee der Philosophic." "Idea" (or "transcendental Idea") is a term Kant employed to designate a "necessary concept of reason to which no corresponding object can be given in sense-experience" (Krilik tier Tti71en Vernunfl, A3271B383 [henceforth KRV and cited according to the pagination of both the first ( 1781 = A) and second ( 1787 = B) editions; English translation by Norman Kemp Smith, Criliqw afPurt R:uuon (New York: Macmillan Press, 1g63)]). Kant's examples indude the concepu ("Ideas") of God, freedom, and immortality. In order to remind readers of the technical, Kantian background of this term, "Idea" is capitalized throughout this translation. 7 "so wird RA.ESON'N'IRT." 8 See Kant's famous remark in the Preface to his Prali!grmlt'1llJ zu eiMT jedm kii.nfligm Mt/4physik ( 1783) about being aw-dkened from his "dogmatic slumbers" by his reading of Hume. In Kant's Gesammelle &hriflen, ed. Konigliche Preu~ischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (tgo:z-to; rpt., Berlin: de Gruyter, 1g68) [henceforth KGS], IV: 200. English translation by Lewis White Beck, Prolegomena lo AfiJI FUluTe Melaphysia (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1950).
80
6
First Introduction
system, but only wrote Critiques, i.e., preliminary inquiries concerning philosophy. 9 Yet when one grasps in a systematic matter what Kant says, especially in the Critique of Pure Reason, one can see that he correctly conceived the question philosophy has to answer, which he expressed as follows: "How are synthetic judgments a priori possible?" 10 His own answer was that, in producing representations, reason acts with a certain necessity and in accordance with certain laws, and whatever is brought about by means of this necessity and through these laws possesses objective validity. Kant, therefore, is not concerned with things in themselves, with some sort of existence possessing no relation to a representing subject. • It was a great misunderstanding to think that what Kant presented in his Critiques constitutes a system. The following objections may be raised against those who believe this: ( 1) All the human mind's modes of acting, 11 as well as the laws governing the same, are not systematically established by Kant, but are merely picked up from experience. Consequently, one cannot be certain: (a) that Kant's list of the laws governing the human mind's necessary modes of acting is exhaustive, since he has not proven them. (b) how far their validity extends. (c) According to Kant, the most remarkable expressions of the human mind-namely, thinking, willing, and feeling pleasure or pain-cannot be traced back to a first principle, but are merely coordinated. (2) The most important task of all, namely, to prove that and how our representations obtain objective validity, has not been accomplished. Kant proves his philosophy only by means of induction and not through deduction. His philosophy states that consciousness would be explained if one were to assume the operation of this or that law, and thus it possesses only hypothetical validity. To what extent may one acquiesce in such a philosophy, and to what extent should one refuse to be content with it? Why must one go any further? A person who ingenuously surrenders himself to the dictates of his own reason has no need of philosophy. Would it not then be better to dispense with philosophy altogether, and indeed, to advise anyone who no longer surrenders himself in this naive manner to his own reason to retain his faith in the truth of his own consciousness? 9 10
11
For Kant's own affirmation of precisely this point, see KRV, Att/B25. See Kant, KRV, Btg.
"Das gesammte Handeln des menschlichen Geistes." In order to preserve the distinction between "das Handeln" and "die Handlung," the former is normally translated as "acting" (or occasionally, as here, "mode[s] of acting" or "instance[s] of acting"), whereas the latter is always rendered as "action."
First Introduction
7
81
• It is a good thing to have an ingenuous confidence in the dictates of one's own consciousness, but such is not the vocation of mankind; instead, it is mankind's destiny to strive constantly for well-grounded cognition. 12 We are ceaselessly driven to seek well-grounded conviction; and anyone who has arrived at the point of philosophical doubt cannot be sent back along the path he has already traversed, but will always seek to ·resolve his doubts on his own. Such a person finds himself in a painful state, which not only disturbs his inner peace, but also interferes with his external acting; for him, therefore, such a state is practically harmful. The idealist who denies the reality of the corporeal world nevertheless never ceases to rely upon this world just as much as the person who believes in its reality. Although the idealist's doubt has no immediate effect upon his life, the contradiction between his theory and his practice is still unseemly. Skepticism can also lead one astray concerning belief in God and immortality, and this has an effect upon one's peace of mind and disposition. One may indeed take some temporary comfort in an incomplete and superficial philosophy; but as soon as one discovers the inadequacies of such a philosophy, one then comes to doubt the very possibility of philosophy itself, and this doubt transports one into a state of even greater distress. The practical goal now is to resolve these doubts and to bring man into harmony with himself, so that he can trust his own consciousness from conviction and on the basis of good reasons-just as he previously trusted it from the instinct of reason. (The overall goal of human education and cultivation is to employ labor to make man what he previously was without the need of any labor at all.) This [practical] goal has been completely achieved by the Kantian philosophy. It is a proven philosophy, and everyone who understands it must admit that it is true. But it is not our vocation to be satisfied with this. We are destined for complete and systematic cognizance. It is not sufficient that our doubts be resolved and that we be consigned to tranquility; we also want science. Human beings have a need for science, and the Wwenschaftskhre offers to satisfy this need. The conclusions of the Wwenschaftskhre are therefore the same as those of Kant's philosophy, but the way in which these 12 "die Bestimmung der Menschheit ist es nicht, sie geht unaufhi:irlich fort auf gegriindete. Erlr.enntnil\." The word Grund means .. ground" or ..basis" or "foundation" or "reason." (The German name for the "principle of su£r.cient reason," for example, is Satz. tk> Gruntkl.) A well-grounded cognition is thus one that has its basis or foundation in some pre\fious one, whereas the ultimate Grund of all lmowledge cannot be deri"ed from anything higher, but must be somehow self~videnL The task ohhejena Wi.ssenscMft.suhr~ is to demonstrate, via a genetic deduction or .. derivation," the connection between ordinary experience and its ultimate "ground." Thus it is the aim of Fichte's philosophy finally to satisfy the perennial human quest for "well-grounded knowledge." For a detailed discussion of the vital connections among "philosophy," ..science," "system," and "ground," see Fichte's important "programmatic" work of 1794, Ueber dm &griff tier Wwt:nJchajt.sUhr~ (SW, 1: 27-81 : AA I, 2: 107-63; English translation in EPW, pp. 84-135).
82
8
First Introduction
results are established is quite different. Kant does not derive the laws of human thinking in a rigorously scientific manner. But this is precisely what the Wissenschaftslehre is supposed to do. It provides a derivation of the laws that apply to any finite rational being whatsoever. Because it is based merely upon experience, the Kantian system merely asserts the laws of human reason, but the Wissenschaftslehre proves these laws. "I prove something to someone" means that I lead him to the point where he recognizes that he has already conceded the truth of some proposition simply because he has previously conceded the truth of some other proposition. Every proof thus presupposes that the person to whom one wishes to prove something accepts something else as already proven, and two people who can agree on nothing are unable to prove anything to each other. Accordingly, since the Wissenschaftslehre wishes to provide a proof of the laws in accordance with which a finite, rational being generates its cognitions, it must base this demonstration upon something. And since it wishes to provide a foundation for our knowledge, 1 ~ it must begin with something that every person will concede. If there is no such thing, then systematic philosophy is impossible. The Wissenschaftslehre calls upon every person to reflect upon what he does when he says "1." According to the Wissenschaftslehre, what happens when one says "I" is this: one supposes that one posits oneself, and that one posits oneself as a subject-object. One cannot think "I" without doing this. The identity of the positing subject and the posited object 14 completely .exhausts the concept of 1-hood, 15 insofar as this concept is postulated by the Wissenschaftslehre. We do not here import into this concept anything else that one might otherwise think of in conjunction with self-positing. The Wissenschaftslehre can do nothing with a person who will not concede this identity. This is the first thing that the Wissenschaftslehre demands of everyone. In addition, it asks one to consult one's own consciousness once again; and it claims that if one does so, one will discover the following: that one not only posits oneself, but also posits something else in opposition to oneself-i.e., that one opposes some" Reading, with Krause's MS, "Wijkn" forK's "Wesen." Thanks to information supplied by Fuchs, I have been able in this English edition to correct some mistranscriptions that apr.;ar in the Meiner edition of the German text. 4 "die Identitiit des Setzenden und Gesetzten": i.e., the identity of the actively positing subject and what is posited by means of this act. This is the same identity that, in the 17941 95 version of his system, Fichte tried (rather unsuccessfully) to convey by the term Thathandlung. The verb setz.en (here translated throughout as "to posit") is a basic term in Fichte's philosophical vocabulary and is employed to designate the act of being aware or conscious of anything whatsoever. The root meaning of setzen is "to place" or "to put," and thus it designates the reflective act in which the I "places" something before itself and thereby attends to it. Though this term does indeed call attention to the action involved in all consciousness, it does not, taken by itself, imply that the conscious subject somehow "creates" the object of which it is conscious. " "Ichheit."
First Introduction
83
thing to oneself. 16 What is thereby posited in opposition is called "NotI," for the only thing said about it is that it is posited in opposition to the I. One cannot yet call it "an object" or "the world," because, before one can do so, one must first show how it becomes an object and a world. Otherwise, ours would be nothing more than yet another variety of Popular Philosophy. 17 Everything else is derived from these presuppositions. Reason lies within the I, finitude in the Not-1. The Wissenschaftslehre maintains that everything that follows from this is valid for all finite, rational beings. The Wissenschaftslehre then proceeds to exhibit the conditions that make it possible for the I to posit itself and to oppose a Not-Ito itself, and this is what proves its correctness. These conditions are the human mind's original ways of acting. Whatever is required in order for the I to be able to posit itself and to oppose a Not-I to itself is necessary. The Wissenschaftslehre demonstrates these conditions by means of a deduction. A deductive proof proceeds as follows: We can assume that it is the very nature of the human mind to posit itself and to oppose a Not-I to itself; but if we assume this, we must also assume much else as well. This is called "deducing," i.e., deriving something from something else. Kant merely asserts .that one always proceeds in accordance with the categories, 18 whereas the Wissenschaftslehre asserts that one must proceed in accordance with the categories-just as surely as one posits oneself as an I. The conclusions are the same, but the Wissenschaftslehre connects them to something higher as well. ( 1) Thus the Wissenschaftslehre seeks to discover within the inner workings of finite, rational being as such 19 the foundation of all the thinking that exists for us. This can be briefly expressed as follows: The essence of reason consists in my positing myself; but I cannot do this without positing a world in opposition to myself, and indeed, a quite specific world: 16 "dap man sich nicht nur selbst setze, sondern claP man sich auch noch etwas entgegensetze." The reader should keep in mind that when the verb "oppose" occurs in this translation, it always means enlgegensetz.en, "to posit in opposition" (hence the term "counterposit"' coined by Peter Heath and John Lachs in their translation of TilL Science of Knqw[. edge). By "opposition," therefore, Fichte does not always (or even usually) mean formal, logical opposition. Indeed, the meaning of "opposition" in this text is often closer to simple "difference," in the sense that, in order to posit or to recognize a difference between x andy, we must oppose them to each other. 17 The so-
84
10
First Introduction
a world in space, within which appearances follow one another sequentially in time. This all occurs in one single, undivided act. When this first act occurs, all the others occur simultaneously. But philosophy, and especially the Wissen.schaftslehre, wishes to become minutely acquainted with this single act. One never becomes acquainted with anything exactly and in detail, however, except by disassembling and dissecting it, and this is also how the Wissenschaftslehre deals with this single action of the I. We thereby obtain a series of interconnected actions of the I; for we are unable to grasp this single action all at once, since a philosopher is a being who must do his thinking within time. In this manner, the need for science is satisfied, and we then obtain a cognition that is not merely discursive and pieced together from experience, but systematic, in the sense that it all can be derived from a single point to which everything else is connected. The human mind strives for systematic cognition, and hence it should follow the promptings of this striving. Anyone who says it is impossible to obtain this says no more than that it is impossible for him personally to obtain it. The method followed in the Wissenschaftslehre also has advantages in respect of clarity, since what hangs together in such a way that everything can be easily surveyed from a single point is always clearer than a diverse aggregate of things, each of which must be perceived separately. (2) Kant did not answer the question, How is it that we come to ascribe objective validity to certain representations? But the Wissenschaftslehre succeeds in answering just this question. We attribute objective validity to a representation whenever we affirm that, in addition to the representation itself, there also exists some thing that corresponds to the representation but is independent of it. What distinguishes the representation from the thing is that I have produced the representation, but I have not produced the thing. The Wissen.schaftslehre asserts that, when we are dealing with representations that are supposed to be present within us necessarily, we are simply forced to assume that something external corresponds to them; and it demonstrates this in a genetic manner. There are two fundamental actions of the I: one is that act by means of which it posits itself, along with all that is required in order to do sonamely, the entire world. The other action is a reiterated positing of what has already been posited by the first act. Thus there is an original positing of the I and of the world, and, in addition to this, there is a positing of what has already been posited. The first action makes consciousness possible in the first place, and thus it cannot itself occur within consciousness. The second, however, is consciousness itself. Thus the second action presupposes the first one; and accordingly, in the second action something is found to be present without any assistance from the I, which then reflects upon what it has found. The thing, which is the
First Introduction
85
result of the first act and which is thus actually a product of the I, makes its appearance in this second act. 20 Consequently, we must distinguish the original thesis, or rather synthesis (since a manifold is posited in this original thesis), from the analysis of this synthesis, which occurs when one reflects upon what is contained in the original synthesis. Experience in its entirety is thus nothing but an analysis of this original synthesis. We can never actually be conscious of the original act of positing, for it is itself just the condition for the possibility of all consciousness. Such, in brief, is the substance, the essence, and the distinctive character of the Wissenschaftslehre. Re. III: (1) The investigations that make up the Wis.senschaftslehre will here be conducted in a new manner, just as if they had never been conducted before. This revised version will profit from the fact that, since the time of the original version, the first principles have been further developed and extended, and this facilitates a clearer understanding of those principles themselves. 21 Moreover, from his conversations on the subject with various people, your instructor has discovered the reason why many still find his earlier statements to be unclear. All the same, consideration will be given to the first presentation as well. (2) The first presentation was made somewhat awkward by the fact that the discussion of the conditions for the possibility of the principles did not present these conditions in their natural order, but was instead divided into a "theoretical" part and a "practical" part. As a result of this division, many directly related issues were separated too widely from one another. This will no longer occur in the present version, [which will follow] {a method of presentation that is just the opposite of that followed by the author in his compendium of 1794, where he proceeded from the theoretical portion of philosophy (i.e., from what had to be explained) to the practical part (i.e., to what was meant to serve as the basis for explaining the former). In the present lectures, however, the hitherto familiar division between theoretical and practical philosophy is not to be found. Instead, these lectures present philosophy as a whole, in the 2
(17)
86
11
First Introduction
exposition of which theoretical and practical philosophy are united. This presentation follows a much more natural path, beginning with the practical sphere, or, whenever it would contribute to the clarity of the exposition to do so, inserting the practical into the theoretical, in order to explain the latter in terms of the former: a liberty for which the author was not yet sufficiently self-confident at the time that he published his Wissenschaftslehre. }22 We will also discuss, in an explicit and thorough manner, the laws of reflection, in combination and in connection with what proceeds from these laws. (This promise could not be fulfilled because of a lack of time.) 23 "To reflect" means to direct the ideal activity of the mind at something; this can occur only in accordance with certain laws, and this determines the specific character of the object of reflection. In the course of these lectures, your instructor will be following a certain path of inquiry, and those who do not think along with him will obtain nothing at all from these lectures, which can be of use only to persons able to think along with them. For those who do not make such an effort to think along with him, the instructor might just as well deliver his lectures in Arabic. 22 Though H contains nothing comparable to the "first introduction" to K, and begins instead with what, in K, is the "second introduction," this introduction is preceded in H by the short paragraph here translated. The first page of H begins with the title, "WISSENSCHAFTSLEHRE, according to the lectures of Prof. Fichte," which is immediately followed by the paragraph translated above, the first words of which are "N.B. And moreover, according to a (.... I" Page references to the text of H (as published in AA IV, 2) are henceforth supplied, within parentheses, in the right margin of the translation. 23 There is some controversy concerning the author of this parenthetic remark. See "Dating the Krause Transcript" in the Editor's Introduction.
Second Introduction
II
12
(1) These lectures will be concerned with the first and deepest foundations of philosophy. {Wissen.schaftslehre and philosophy are one and the same.} Philosophy is not a collection of propositions that can be studied and memorized as such; instead, it is a certain way of looking at things, {a way of viewing things in accordance with certain principles,I} a particular way of thinking, which one must generate-within oneself. Anyone who is not yet able to state correctly what philosophy is concerned with still lacks a correct concept of philosophy. As Kant said, it is an advantage for a science when its task can be expressed in a single formula. Kant himself reduced the task of philosophy to answering the question, "How are synthetic judgments a priori possible?" {(Synthesis occurs when we go beyond our representations and connect something to them: what has to be shown is that one is impossible without the other.)} Your instructor phrases the same question as follows: "How do we come to assume that something external to us corresponds to the representations within us?" These two questions are the same. I know that I am conscious of a representation of something. In addition to this, I also maintain that there exists a thing corresponding to this representation, a thing that would exist even if I did not entertain a representation of it. Yet the connection between the representation and the thing is itself, in turn, nothing more than a representation, i.e., something within me. Nevertheless, we do not merely assert that we entertain representations; we also maintain that things outside of these representations correspond to these representations themselves. Accordingly, the representation of the connection between representations and things would be a necessary representation. In this case, therefore, a connection has already been made; and even though we are not yet aware of the act of connecting, such an act is necessary nevertheless. 1
"Geschichtspunkt nach gewissen Principien."
(17)
(18)
88
Second Introduction
This process, by means of which I go beyond the mere representation to the representation that there actually are existing things, is something that occurs necessarily. All rational beings proceed in this way. Necessary representations are therefore present within a thinking being. Philosophy inquires concerning the basis or reason for these necessary representations within the intellect. 2 ·A (2) Not philosophy itself, but the philosophical task, the tendency toward
philosophy, has its origin in the fad1 that we are conscious, {which cannot be and does not need to be proven}. 8 Among those determinations and states of our consciousness, which we designate under the general name "representations," there are some that are accompanied by a feeling of necessity, while others depend purely upon our own free choice. 4 {This is equally undeniable.} ( 1) No one doubts this fact. There can be no question whatsoever about it, and anyone who still demands a proof of it does not know what he is asking. (Example: Tiedemann, 5 who, in his Theaetetus, wishes to prove that he entertains representations.) (2) Pay careful attention to how this fact is stated: It is asserted that there are representations accompanied by a feeling of necessity, that {we are compelled to assume that} there are things that correspond to these representations. It is not claimed that things {are or that they} exist. We can be consciOtLS only of the objects of our consciOtLSness. (3) Something else is now attached to this indubitably certain fact, namely, the Idea of a ground or foundation. 6 The philosopher asks the following question: What is the foundation of those representations of mine that are accompanied by a feeling of necessity? That there is some foundation is taken for granted. The question is simply, What is this foundation? 2
"fragt nun nach dem Grunde dieser nothwendigen Vorstellungen in der INTELUGENz:• The task of philosophy as a whole may be expressed in the following question: What is the basis of what occurs in consciousness accompanied by a feeling of necessity? (Or, what is the basis of the necessary representations within the intellect?) (p. 18). [Lettered footnotes supply supplementary passages from H. Unlike the passages enclosed within scroll brackets in the text itself, which generally go beyond or clarify the text of K, these supplementary passages represent alternative-and sometimes conflicting-formulations of points and arguments elaborated in K.] A
'"fACTO." 8 Philosophy begins with the fact that we are conscious of ourselves, which cannot be and does not need to be proven (p. 18). • "Willkiihr." 5 Dietrich Tiedemann (1748-1803) was a professor of philosophy at Marburg and author of a work entitled Theiitet, oder iiber des menschliche Wissen, ein Beytrag zur Vemu,YtKritik, which appeared in 1794, the same year as the first part of Fichte's Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre. Tiedemann's work remained a favorite target of Fichte's scorn throughout his Jena period, though, as Radrizzani has pointed out, Fichte's criticism of Tiedemann in this passage appears to be based upon a distorted reading. 6 "die Idee eines Grundes."
Second Introduction
13
8g
{For example, a blow from behind (fact) forces me to look. around for the cause (necessary representation) (since it is possible that I might not have received this blow or that I might have received a weaker or a stronger one). What, however, is the reason that I act in this manner? Why am I forced to in fer that there is something lying beyond and corresponding to these necessary representations of mine? Why does what is contingent appear within my consciousness in just the way that it does and not in some other way? This indicates and is the foundation.} A synthesis is already contained in the very task. that all philosophy assumes, for philosophy proceeds from a fact to its foundation. {Now, however, one can raise a second question:} But how do I ever arrive at the point of proceeding from a fact to its foundation? {Or, how is philosophy possible?} This is an important question, for philosophical inquiry consists precisely in posing and in answering just such questions; and, since this question lies at the foundation of philosophy itself, in order to answer it one has to philosophize about philosophy. The question concerning the possibility of philosophy is thus itself a philosophical question. Philosophy provides an answer to the question concerning its own possibility. Accordingly, one can demonstrate the possibility of philosophy only by arguing in a circular fashion, or, philosophy requires no proof and is simply and absolutely possible. We must now ask. how one arrives at the previous question. What is one doing when one raises 7 this question [concerning the foundation of representations accompanied by a feeling of necessity]? The question concerning the foundation 8 is itself one of our necessary representations. c One seeks a foundation only for contingent things. Philosophy as such, however, seeks the foundation of necessary representations; therefore, it must consider such representations to be contingent. It would be absurd to 'inquire concerning the foundation of something one did not consider to be contingent. "I consider something to be contingent" means that I am able to think. that it might not have existed at all or that it might have been altogether different than it is. Our representations of the universe are contingent in this sense; we think. that the earth might very well have been different than it is, and we can imagine ourselves on 7 Reading, with Krause's MS, "aufwirf" for K's ustreift.~ • unie Frage nach dem Gmnde." This might be betteT translated as "the demand for a reaS(m." Thmughout this entire section, Fichte capitalizes on the multiple senses of the wont Gnmd (both "foundation" and "reason"). Thus, in a previous passage discussing the presence within us of representations accompanied by a feeling of necessity, when he asks "welches ist dieser GTUnd?" his question might just as easily (and more natun.lly) be rendered, "Why do we have such representations?" Once again, it might be helpful to recall that the German name for "the principle of sufficient reason~ is Salz d6 Gn.ndts. c But this very question already belongs to the domain of what appears [within consciousness] accompanied by a feeling of necessity (p. 19).
(19)
i I
I I
go
Second Introduction
another planet. 0 Whether we might still be able to exist without such representations is a question to be answered by philosophy; in any case, it is certain that we consider the universe to be something contingent, for otherwise we could not ask about its foundation, that is, why it is as it is. 9 Experience in its entirety is such a fact. To proceed beyond the facts, i.e., to go beyond experience as a whole {and to connect something thereto, something that by no means lies within the domain of facts or of experience-that is, to specify the ground of experience}: this is philosophy and nothing else, {or it is metaphysics, which is the same thing as philosophy}. A ground or foundation does not lie within what it establishes. Thus the ground of experience lies outside of experience, and philosophy, which establishes the ground of experience, raises itself above experience. Physics encompasses all experience. Philosophy, which goes beyond experience, is therefore metaphysics. Philosophy adduces not a single fact or experience. This assertion has recently been contested by those who talk about basing philosophy upon facts. Philosophy, along with everything that occurs therein, is a product of the pure capacity for thought. Philosophy itself is not a fact; instead, its task is to provide a foundation for the fact of experience.E {Philosophy is a product of the power of free thought, or is the science of experience, which everyone has to produce within himself.} It is doubly unfortunate that some of these philosophers who appeal to facts style themselves "Kantians,'' 10 for Kant said, "I ask about the possibility of experience."ll To be sure, before I can ask about the possibility of something, I have to be acquainted with it; but the basis for the possibility of the thing in question lies beyond the thing itself. That philosophy should raise itself above the level of experience is, therefore, something that has already been explicitly asserted by Kant himself. To ask how we are able to raise ourselves beyond experience to the level of philosophy is to call into question the very legitimacy of philo0 Our representations of the world and of the things around us are, of course, contingent, and yet they are nevertheless necessary. This apparent contradiction can be explained as follows: An individual representation, e.g., my representation of the table standing before me, is accompanied by a feeling of necessity; but it is a contingent fact that precisely this representation should be generated within my consciousness. Something other than precisely this table might have stood in this place (p. 19). 9 "denn nur darum konnen wir nach dem Grunde def!elben fragen." E Facts and experience have no place, as such, within philosophy, for what is to be provided with a foundation is not itself the foundation (p. 19). 10 E.g., Fichte's colleague at Jena and bitter philosophical opponent, Christian Erhard Schmid (1761-1812). For Schmid's system and Fichte's devastating critique thereof, see Fichte's 1796 polemic, Vergleichung des vom Herrn PTof Schmid aufgestellten Systems mit dem der Wissenschaftslehre (SW, II: 42o-58 = AA 1, 3: 235-66; translated in EPW, p. 316-35). 11 See, e.g., KRV, A158/B197·
Second Imroduction
91
sophical inquiry; i.e., it is to call into question the entire process 12 of reason which makes us search for a foundation for everything contingent. Philosophy itself is supposed to provide an a~swer to this question, and to this extent philosophy is self-grounding. {Corollary to this section: What is present within consciousness and ac- (: co!Dpanied by a feeling of necessity is experience in its entirety. Insofar as we inquire about the foundation thereof, we assume the existence of something lying beyond all experience, something that is only produced by pure thought for the purpose of providing a necessary foundation for experience. The legitimacy and necessity of seeking such a founda- tion has its original roots within reason itself, and this is first deduced within philosophy.} Thus the first and highest condition for all philosophical inquiry is to bear in mind that one will encounter absolutely nothing at all within philosophy unless one produces from within oneself everything about which one reasons. Philosophical ideas cannot be given to anyone; they have to be generated within one's own mind. (3) {The question just raised can be answered in two diametrically opposed ways: (A) One can treat the representations accompanied by a feeling of necessity as products of presupposed things in themselves: dogmatism. (B) One can treat them as products of a presupposed representing subject: idealism.} The dogmatist assumes that there are things that exist in themselves; he postulates their existence, for they are not contained within the fact of my consciousness. No dogmatist claims to be immediately conscious of things in themselves, {which are not supposed to be facts of consciousness}. The dogmatist merely claims that one cannot explain the facts of consciousness without presupposing the existence of things in themselves. Neither dogmatists of the old-fashioned variety, nor those Critical dogmatists who consider the material of representations to be something given, l!l seem to appreciate this fact about their own position; for they inveigh loudly against any attempt to go beyond consciousness, even though this is just what they themselves are doing. The idealist accounts for representation on the basis of a representing subject, whose existence he presupposes. This representing subj~ct is not an immediate object of consciousness either, {for' the representations of which we become conscious are mere determinations or states of consciousness (that is, of the representing subject) and are not the representing subject itself}. Ordinary consciousness is always preoccupied 12 Reading, with Krause's MS, "Verfahren" for K's "Verstehen." '" "die sich noch Stoff geben lajkn." "Critical dogmatism" is Fichte's name for the kind of "Kantianism" that explains representations as products of things in themselves.
92
15
Second Introduction
with representations of things outside of us. If a representation of the representing subject is to arise, this must first be produced by an act of self-reflection. I am conscious of nothing but consciousness and its determinations, and these too are representations. All that can appear within consciousness is a representation of the representing subject, not the representing subject itself. • Consequently, both idealism and dogmatism go beyond consciousness. The dogmatist begins with a lack of freedom and ends with the same thing. For him, representations are products of things, and the intellect or subject is something merely passive. F Freedom of acting is sacrificed as well, and a dogmatist who affirms free will is either inconsistent or else a hypocrite. {(The instructor does not know whether any dogmatisteven Spinoza-was ever consistent.)} For my own free acting is something I am conscious of by means of representations: but if representations are impressions produced within us by things, then it follows that my representation of myself as acting freely is likewise dependent upon some thing. {Dogmatism is equally irrefutable from the side of speculation (objectively) and from the side of innermost feelings (subjectively). It rejects out of hand all the idealist's principles and postulates.} One cannotget at the dogmatist by speculative means, for he rejects out of hand all the principles by means of which one might be able to refute him. One has to refute him on the basis of those principles with which he himself begins. The idealist begins with the consciousness of freedom, which the dogmatist interprets as a delusion. The only objections one can raise against the dogmatist, and in respect of which the idealist has an edge on him, are these: The dogmatist does not explain everything he is sup/.:osed to explain. Moreover, one can also say that he is indeterminate; 4 for he cannot deny that we are conscious of freedom, and therefore he has to explain this as an effect of things-which is impossible. Finally, he is unable to offer a clear account of how representations could be produced within any sort of creature by the influence of things. He is unable to provide a genetic account ofthe intellect, whereas the idealist can do just this. {Hence dogmatism is a very arbitrary and problematic way ofthink.ing.G Dogmatism is equally irrefutable from the side of innermost feeling (subjectively); for there is no arguing with anyone who, as a person, has .. Since, according to this system, our soul operates in a purely passiVt! manner, there is no place for freedom within the dogmatic system, so long, that is, as the dogmatist wishes to be consistent (p. 20}. 14 .. unbestimmt."' G Dogmatism is also indeterminale It cannot explain what is supposed to be explained: What is an intellect? It presupposes something that does not appear within consciousness at all, namely, a thing in itself. Moreover, it cannot explain how a representation can be understood as an "effect" of something (p. 21).
(21~
Second Introduction
16
93
not yet been cultivated to the point where he has come to feel that our representations are products of our I or who denies this feeling.} Thus the place to begin a confrontation with dogmatism is not from the side of speculation, but rather from that of innermost feeling. Dogmatism is intolerable to a noble and superior soul, for whom the most lo~ty and important thought is the thought of self-sufficiency and freedom. {This is the aspect of dogmatism which respectable persons find most shocking: that it denies the feeling of freedom or spontaneous selfactivity.} Our consciousness includes the feeling of freedom as well as the feeling of constraint. The former is the consequence of our infinitude; the latter is the consequence of our finitude. The former leads us back into ourselves, whereas the latter directs us toward the world. A person who confounds these two feelings is inconsistent. The human species, as well as the individual, begins with the feeling of constraint. We all begin with experience, but then we are driven back into ourselves, where we discover our own freedom. Everything depends upon which feeling is predominant ina particular person, upon which he will refuse to allow to be taken from him {- the feeling of dependency and constraint (as in the case of dogmatism) or the feeling of freedom and self-sufficiency (as in the case of idealism)}." The conflict between dogmatism and idealism is, in fact, not a proper philosophical conflict at all, for the two systems share no common ground whatsoever. If they remain consistent, each denies the principles of the other, and a philosophical conflict can arise only when both parties agree upon the same principles, while disagreeing merely about what these principles imply. Instead, we have here a struggle between two different ways of thinking. The consistent dogmatist provides himself with his own antidote, for he cannot endure this way of thinking for very long. {The best way to cure a dogmatist and to win him over is to let him remain consistent with himself; for his system must eventually lead him to fatalism, and thereby he will finally be won over to idealism and will transfer his allegiance to the side of the latter.} (4) {According to the preceding section, the system of idealism begins by presupposing the activity of the representing subject; whereas dogmatism considers the behavior of this same subject to be passive. Idealism begins with the representing subject; dogmatism begins with the thing. Granted, the idealist does not discover the feeling of the freedom and self-activity of his I to be immediately present within his consciousness; H Depending, therefore, upon which of these feelings is dominant in a particular per· son-the feeling of dependency and constraint (as in the case of dogmatism) or the feeling of freedom and self-sufficiency (as in the c::ase of idealism)-one will be attracted to one of these two systems and will silence the other, opposed feeling (p. u).
94
Second Introduction
nevertheless, he knows how to locate this feeling within himself and how to produce it through a free act of self-positing. The dogmatist, on the other hand, explains this same feeling as illusory and thereby denies the reality of freedom itself.} The dogmatist's presupposition [the thing in itself} is nothing but a mere thought. Moreover, his presupposition cannot be justified, for it does not even explain what it is supposed to explain. As soon as there appears another system that does explain everything, then there can no longer be any place for the dogmatist's presupposition. The idealist says: Think about yourself, and pay attention to how you accomplish this. You will thereby discover a self-reverting activity. 15 {I.e., you will discover that you determine yourself through your own activity. The idealist starts with this determination of self-activity.} The idealist thus adopts as his foundation something that actually occurs within consciousness, whereas the dogmatist's foundation is something { = the thing in itself} that one can merely think of as lying outside of all consciousness. To this one could object as follows: Everything the idealist demands from me is nothing but a representation of my self-reverting activity; it is therefore not a self-reverting activity "in itself," which occurs apart from my representation of it. {This objection is raised by Aenesidemus. 16} Response: We are not talking about anything more than the occurrence of this representation! 1 It would be futile to try to introduce a distinction between a self-reverting activity and a representation of the same. For an activity of representation apart from representing would be a contradiction. 17 Every active substance should be treated as substance; philosophy has to show where this substrate comes from and where it occurs. Here we are dealing with nothing but an immediate positing of the I, and this is a representation. 15
"eine in dich zuriickgehende Thatigkeit." 16 A reference to G. E. Schulze (1761-1833), professor of philosophy at Helmstiidt, who raised this objection against Kant and Reinhold in 1792 in his anonymously published work entitled Aenesidemus oder uber die Fundament£ der von dem Herrn PTofessur Reinhold in }1!114 geliifertm El.emento.r-Philosophie. Nebst ei~r Vertheidigung tU1 SkEpticismus gegm die Anmaasungen der Vernunftkritik. Fichte responded to Schulze's criticism in his own "Review of Aenesidemus" (1793) (in SW, I: 3-25 = AA I, 2: 41-67; English translation in EPW, pp. 5977· An excerpt from Schulze's Amesidemus is translated by di Giovanni in Between &n1 and Hegel, pp. 104-35). For further information concerning Schulze/Aenesidemus, see chap. 9 of Beiser's Tlu Fate of &ason. 1 &spunse: We are not and could not be speaking of any such self-revening activity in itself and apart from all representation. All representation ceases at this point. What, for example, could "writing" mean if I were to abstract from everything that is required in order to write? (p. 22). 17 "Denn eine Thatigkeit des Vorstellens auser dem Vorstellen ware ein Widerspruch." The text of K appears to be corrupt at this point. A possible emendation, suggested by the parallel passage in H, is to substitute "des Vorstellendes" for "des Vorstellens," in which case the sentence would read: "An activity of the representing subject other than an act of representing would be a contradiction."
(22)
f
~·,
Second Introduction
17
95
The idealist's principle is present within consciousness, and thus his philosophy can be called "immanent." But he also finds that his principle does not occur within consciousness on its own; instead, it occurs as a result of his own free acting. In the course of ordinary consciousness, one encounters no concept of the I, no self-reverting activity. Nevertheles~, one is able to think of one's I when a philosopher calls upon one to do so; and then one discovers this concept by means of free activity, and not as something given} Every philosophy presupposes something, something that it does not demonstrate and on the basis of which it explains and demonstrates everything else. This is also true of idealism. Idealism presupposes the previously mentioned free activity as its first principle, on the basis of which it must then explain everything else; but this principle itself cannot be explained any further. {To be sure, each of these two systems postulates something. But the idealist does not presuppose anything outside of his own consciousness; he merely postulates that this free activity of his I is that principle that cannot be derived from anything else. The first, immediate principle with which he begins is his consciousness of freedom.} Dogmatism is transcendent; it soars beyond consciousness. Idealism is transcendental; for though it remains within consciousness, it shows how it is possible to go beyond consciousness. That is to say, it shows how we come to assume that there are things outside of ourselves which correspond to our representations. Whether one embraces or rejects such a philosophy is something that depends upon one's inmost way of thinking and upon one's faith in oneself. A person who has faith in himself cannot accept any variety of dogmatism or fatalism. This is what Kant often refers to as "the interest of reason." He speaks of an interest of speculative reason and of an interest of practical reason and opposes these two to each other. 18 From the perspective of Kant's philosophy this is correct, but it is not correct in itself; for reason is always one and has only one interest. The interest of reason lies in confidence in one's own self-sufficiency and freedom, and reason's interest in unity and coherence is a consequence of this prior interest. One could call the latter "the interest of speculative reason," because it demands that the whole be constructed upon a single foundation and be connected therewith. K Idealism is more compatible with this interest than is dogmatism. J His [the idealist's] principle is not something given, but is discovered through a free exercise of activity, in the free action of self-positing (p. 2 2 ). 18 See, for example, KRV, A462/B4goff. and A8o4ffi832ff. K The idealist's system thus rests upon his faith in himself or in his own self-sufficiency, or upon what Kant called "the interest of reason." That is to say: for which of these two systems will reason decide when they are weighed against each other? For our reasontheoretical as well as practical-has but a single interest, and this is unity. Thus, when Kant speaks of "two interests," these are merely different modifications of one and the same interest (p. 23).
g6
18
Second Introduction
(5) {The idealist indicates within consciousness that activity of the representing subject which he will use to explain representations. But it goes without saying that he accomplishes this not by referring to a representation that is necessary and therefore discovered within consciousness, but rather by means of a representation that has to be freely and actively generated within consciousness. (It would be contradictory for this free act of self-representation and self-positing to be somehow given.) Against the dogmatist, who treats this same activity as derived from something else (and thus, not as an activity at all), the idealist cannot prove that this activity of the representing subject should be treated as the ultimate foundation of consciousness, nor can he prove that this activity cannot be derived from something higher and that it must instead be treated as the highest principle from which everything else must be derived. On the contrary, the necessity of making this assumption is based upon nothing beyond the idealist's own manner of thinking.} If one is ever willing to concede the truth of idealism's claim and to accept this assertion as one's principle {(i.e., as something that is certain in itself, and not merely as something that is true),} then everything that occurs within consciousness can be strictly derived therefrom. But whether one will, in fact, concede this principle is something that depends upon one's own manner of thinking. [fhis demonstration of the idealist's system or derivation of the contents of consciousness proceeds as follows:] {The representing subject (or I) is a consciousness of many different representations, including representations accompanied by a feeling of necessity (this is the fact in question). But whatever the representing subject may be, it is so only by means of its own self-activity (this follows from the principle); hence it likewise follows that it is also only by means of self-activity that it (the representing subject) is a consciousness of representations accompanied by a feeling of necessity; that is to say, all representations, and specifically, those representations that are accompanied by a feeling of necessity, are products of this representing subject. Insofar as the propositio major (that the representing subject is a consciousness of manifold representations) is concerned, it is simply a matter of differing linguistic usage whether one says "is a consciousness" or "possesses consciousness." The latter, however, is a consequence of dogmatism; for "our I" or "the representing subject" or "consciousness" are all one and the same. Our I is nothing other than consciousness itself. The most important thing is not to misunderstand the propositio minor: "the representing subject is whatever it is only by means of self-activity." This proposition should not be taken to suggest any creation of representations, or the presence of some sort of substrate; it asserts merely that the I posits itself, i.e., that a self-reverting activity is the essence of the I.
(23)
(24)
Second Introduction
97
This activity produces the concept of the I. The I is all that it is only because it posits itself.} One says, "I possess consciousness"-as if consciousness were an accidental property of the I. This distinction between consciousness and the I is introduced rather late, and philosophy must explain the basis for making such a distinction. It is true that I must ascribe to myself other determinations or predicates in addition to consciousness, but still, it is only by means of representations that we become conscious of any actions. Therefore, nothing can exist for us except insofar as we possess a consciousness of it. 19 One can see at first glance that it is correct to say, "My consciousness is I, and I am my consciousness." To be sure, consciousness includes representations accompanied by a feeling of necessity; or rather, the representing subject is conscious of what is present accompanied by a feeling of necessity. But whatever the representing subject might be, it is such only by means of its own spontaneous selfactivity,20 and thus, even those representations that are accompanied by a feeling of necessity are products of self-activity. It is not correct to think that the I becomes conscious by means of something else. The I is nothing but its own activity. The representing subject is identical with its own self-activity, which constitutes its very essence; and thus, in every specific situation, its essence consists in a certain, specific self-activity. The I posits itself: this means that it is a selfreverting activity. A person who cannot abstract from all objects is incapable of ever becoming a philosopher who can penetrate to the foundation of things. Later on we shall see that one must also add [to the I] the thought of a substrate; but until then, we must abstract from this. Since everything the representing subject is supposed to be has to owe its existence solely to self-activity, it follows that those representations that are accompanied by a feeling of necessity are also produced by the representing subject. (6) The foregoing demonstration would be quite sufficient to justify a categorical assertion that those representations that are accompanied by a feeling of necessity are products of the activity of the I, but it does not provide us with a detailed understanding of how this occurs. A sufficient 19 "aber aile Handlungen gehen doch durch die Vorstellung hindurch. Alles was fiir uns sein soli, ist doch nur ein Bewustsein." More literally: "but still, all actions pius through representation. Everything that is supposed to exist for us, therefore, is only a consciousness." 20 "nun aber ist das Vorstellende ... durch Selbstthlitigkeit." Though normally translated simply as "spontaneity" or "spontaneous activity," SelbsuMtigluil is here usually rendered, more literally, as "self-activity" (or ~spontaneous self-activity") in order to emphasize its quite special significance within the context of the Wissmsclw.ftslehre. Note that Fichte's claim in this passage is not that the I "makes the world," but rather that all consdowness involves and springs from an element of free spontaneity.
gS
Ig
Second Introduction
explanation of this would have to display in its entirety that previously postulated act by means of which representations are produced. If idealism is to be a science, then it must be able to accomplish just this task {of explaining how the act of representation occurs}. Let us here consider, in a preliminary manner, how idealism might be able to accomplish this task successfully. Philosophy is concerned, above all, with those representations that are accompanied by a feeling of necessity. Unlike dogmatism, which explains such representations in terms of passivity, idealism explains them with reference to the acting of a free being. And this must be a necessary mode of acting, for otherwise it would be of no use for explaining the representations that need to be explained. At first, one doubts whether such representations could be products of a self-activity, because one is not conscious of any such activity. When most people hear the words "activity" or "acting," they think of an instance of free acting. But there can also be a necessary mode of acting. But should necessary acting still be considered "acting" at all? Would it not be better to call it a state of passivity? (The true dogmatist, who must also be a fatalist, is unable to deny our consciousness of freedom, but he explains this as a delusion. For him, acting occurs only in consequence of some external influence. See Alexander von Joch's-i.e., Hommel's--discussion of the Turkish laws concerning reward and punishment.) 21 The necessity of the necessary mode of acting is conditional on the occurrence of an instance of free acting. It is not necessary as such, for then it would be indistinguishable from a state of passivity. The first, absolutely free and unconditioned instance of acting {considered within idealism} is the self-positing of the 1. 22 Another type of acting might then follow as a necessary consequence of this first acting; and if so, one could then say that this second type of acting is "necessary"-not absolutely necessary, to be sure, for its necessity would be conditioned. L 21 Karl Ferdinand Hommel (17~~-81) was a jurist and professor of law at Leipzig. In 1770, under the pseudonym Alexander von Joch, Hommel published a book entitled AlexandeT von joch be-Jdn RechU Doctur Uber Belohnung und Strafe 711JCh TUriWchen Gmun, in which he not only defended metaphysical determinism, but also denied that he had any personal feeling of his own freedom. In 1793 Fichte included a criticism of Hommel's "fatalism" in the second edition of his own Vers..ch einer Krilik aller Offenbarung (SW, V: 45 = AA l, 1: 139; English translation by Garrett Green, AllemfJI al a Critique of All RnHlalion [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978], p. 45). 22 "das Sezen des lch durch sich selt>St." LAs a science, idealism has the additional tasli. of explaining how the act of repre5t:nta· tion occun. Philosophy as a whole is concerned with necessary representations, which are to be explained on the basis of a type of acting-which must. therefore, be viewed as necessary. To be sure, idealism does not consider the necessary acting of the representing subject to be unconditionally necessary. Its necessity is only conditional; insofar as the first act
Second Introduction
20
99
Freedom and necessity are already present in the first type of acting, that is, in the act of self-positing. It is possible for one to reflect upon objects rather than upon oneself. I am free to do either, but when I do reflect upon myself, I can do so only by means of a self-reverting activity. {When I posit myself, which is possible only by means of an activity that reverts.back upon myself, there arises, purely from this, the concept of the I and no other concept. Hence this concept is necessary, even though it is also free, because the act through which it arose, which preceded it and was therefore first, is a free act. (In contrast, many concepts arise through an outwardly directed activity: e.g., the concept of the world, of heaven, of the earth, of the wall, of the stove, etc.)} This much is already contained in the principle; and thus it might well happen that we will encounter an entire series of necessary actions, all of which are conditioned by the positing of the I. If so, then the proposition, "the I is what it is through and by means of itself," which heretofore has been treated as a merely formal condition, would obtain objective validity as well. {Through this proof that all representations are products of the representing subject23 idealism has not yet done enough to satisfy the wellfounded demands made upon it by science, namely, the demand that it show how, through the acting of the representing subject, precisely these determinate representations appear within consciousness. If it presents itself as a science, then it must show how this can be explained from the principle it presupposes. It can do this only by means of the following inference: The representing subject can posit its own self-activity only in a certain manner, which is demonstrated within consciousness (namely, only through a self-reverting activity). The other (necesssary) representations follow from this. All the necessary actions may be deduced in this way, and the manner in which the representing subject acts is thereby subjected to laws. Idealism thereby becomes Critical or sound idealism, 24 in contrast with that completely groundless variety of idealism which begins with free and lawless acting. Accordingly, this section [ = (6)] would contain within itself the entire system of idealism; and once one has conceded the idealist's principle or major premise, then all that has to be proved is the minor one: that the I cannot posit itself without also engaging in other actions as well. of the representing subject is an instance of free acting, then the entire series of its actions or representations is also free--even if it is at the same time conditioned. These acts and representations must indeed occur in the sequence in which they do occur, because they proceed from the first act. But they are nevertheless free acts, because the first act is free (p. 24). 25 "Durch diesen Beweis, da{J iiberhaupt es so sey." The translation supplies the missing description of the general conclusion that is already supposed to have been established. 24 "ein KRITISCHER oder REEu.ER lDEALISMUS."
(25
l 00
Second Introduction
This proof is based upon on one's own intuition of oneself: Observe all the conditions of your self-reverting activity, and you will discover that many other activities are necessary in addition to the first one-namely, a second, a third, etc.} The I is what it is, because it posits itself through itself. This act of self-positing is possible only in a certain way; and thus this act of selfpositing presupposes another [act of positing], which, in turn, presupposes another, etc. In order to talk about anything mental or spiritual one has to make use of sensible expressions, which gives rise to many misunderstandings, for the signs employed are often arbitrary. Therefore, when one employs a sign, one must first provide an explanation of it. But when one has to explain something for which the words are lacking, one then has to explain the thing itself, i.e., one must explain it genetically. I posit myself, and, in doing this, I pay attention to the fact that I posit myself in a particular manner and that I can posit myself only in this way. Perhaps, however, there are also many other things I can accomplish only in this particular way, in which case we can speak of a "law"; and this is the sense in which one speaks of "laws of intuition," "laws of thinking," etc. Such necessary ways of thinking are the same as laws of thinking. In fact, laws really apply only toan active being, whom we normally consider to be free; and just as we say [to the latter] "you must behave in such and such a manner," so, in an analogous way, we say that a rational being must behave in this way or that, and these constitute the laws of reason. {"This is the manner in which our reason necessarily operates"; in other words, "these are the laws of thinking," and, if this is true, then the results of these laws must agree with experience. For example, the results of these laws of thinking must be that objects are in space, appearances are in time, etc.} The broader task of idealism may thus be described as follows: We have already seen that the positing subject and what is posited are one and the same. I can posit the I only in a certain way; but I cannot do this without also positing a second thing, which, in turn, I cannot posit without also positing a third thing, etc. In this manner we might be able to derive from the first act all those laws that explain how there comes to be a world for us. This is what idealism has to demonstrate.
21
(7) Most idealists before Kant claimed that representations lie within us because we produce them within ourselves. As they understood the matter, representations were something they could either produce or not produce. This sort of idealism is groundless. One can imagine two different paths along which one's reasoning might proceed. One path starts with the familiar structure of the world, i.e., with those necessary representations that occur within conscious-
Second Introduction
tl
l
·i
I; ~
'
)_>
~;
-t
~~
·~
22
10 1
ness. This way of proceeding amounts to no more than feeling one's way by trial and error. This is not a satisfactory method, since the results are always undecided and merely pending, even in one's own eyes. The other path starts with a description of the way in which a representing being acts, and then proceeds to show how certain representation.s come into being in accordance with the laws that govern the acting of such a being. In this case, all one is observing is the manner in which something comes into being. When one proceeds in this manner, one abstracts from everything actual. If one has the correct first principle and if one has inferred correctly from this principle, then the results of one's deductions must agree with ordinary experience. If they do not, this failure does not directly imply the incorrectness of the entire enterprise, but indicates only the presence of a faulty inference somewhere therein-which one must then try to discover. What has to be shown is that the I could not posit itself without also positing much more as well. Uk.e the first law, which established that I can posit myself only in that specific manner, these additional conditions must be established exclusively within self-intuition. This is the path our system will follow. Remark: The system can only call upon everyone to look. within himself while observing how this is accomplished. Nevertheless, it lays claim to universal validity and asserts that every rational being must behave in the manner it describes. This claim is justified; for if one supposes that the essence of reason really does consist in self-positing, then all of those actions whose necessity is established by showing that they follow from this act of self-positing can equally be said to follow from the nature of reason itself, and therefore, every rational being must acknowledge the correctness of the system. M Moreover, in order to understand this system, one has to reproduce within oneself all the actions examined here. For the system· does not enumerate a series of facts, which are simply given as such; instead, it presents a series of actions, while at the same time observing that upon which this series depends. The philosopher is not a mere observer; instead, he conducts experiments with the nature of consciousness and turns to himself for answers to his specific questions. This is a system for persons who are able to think. for themselves. {One of the features of this system is that it cannot be learned in a historical manner.} It cannot be grasped merely by reading and study. Every person must produce it within himself, particularly since no fixed terminology will be introduced. Kant produced so many mere imitators precisely because he did adopt a fiXed terminology. {Unlike Kant's, this system does not have any special terminology of its own, M This system possesses universal vaJidity; it is based upon the nature of all ntionat beings, and it is absolute-possessing its foundation within itself-Co~ it is founded upon ou~ self-activity (p. ll5).
102
Second Introduction
and thus it does not encourage mere imitation. Instead, one can grasp the truth of this system only by reproducing these actions for oneself and producing these self-observations within one's own consciousness. Consequently, it is a system suited only for independent thinkersthough it can also serve to promote independent thinking, especially among young men.} Not that a person already has to be an independent thinker in order to gain entrance into this system: all that is required is an admiration for independent thinking. It is unlikely that young people will already have fallen into those mental ruts that make one incapable of thinking for oneself. One can encourage independent thinking in others by providing them with material for thought. By thinking things throu~h in advance, one may be able to lead them to reflect for themselves. 5
Relation of This System to Experience. Within experience, which this system is supposed to deduce, one encounters objects and the various properties of the same; within the system, however, one encounters the actions of rationality itself! 6 and those modes of action which are involved in the production of objects, for idealism shows that no other means of arriving at objects makes any sense. The philosopher asks how representations of things outside of us arise-as well as how the representations of duty, God, and immortality originate. This amounts to asking how we arrive at those objects that are supposed to correspond to these representations. One could thus call necessary representations "objective representations," for necessary representations are representations that are referred to objects. This applies to the representations of duty, the Deity, and immortality as well. One can in this way inquire concerning the origin of an object for us. Accordingly, philosophy encompasses a system of those actions by means of which objects come into being for us. But do these actions described by idealism actually occur? Do they possess reality, or are they merely invented by philosophy? To begin with, idealism only postulates a series of original actions. It does not affirm that such a series actually exists. To do so would be in violation of the system, which asserts merely that the first action cannot 20 "Man kann zum Selbst[denken] anfiihren; [dadurch] daJl man Stoff giebt woriiber gedacht werden soli, daJl man vordenke, and dadurch zum Nachdenken erwecke." Unfortunately, most of the virtuoso wordplay in this sentence has been lost in translation. 26 "die Handlungen des Vernunftwesens." The term Vernunftwesen refers not to any concrete, rational individual, but rather to "rationality as such," that is, to the essence or structure of rationality, which is shared by all self-conscious subjects.
I
Second Introduction
23
103
exist without a second one, etc. The actions in question thus do not occur separately; for the one action is not supposed to exist without the other. In a single stroke, I exist and the world exists for me. Within the system, however, what is really only one action has to be treated as a series of actions, for this is the only way in which we are able to think about it at all; for we are able to grasp only parts, and indeed, only quite specific parts.N If a rational being experiences things in accordance with certain laws, and if he must proceed in this fashion, then he must also proceed in this fashion within the domain of philosophy as well. One thought must be linked to another. One must therefore request a person who asks the above question concerning the reality of the actions described by idealism to consider what he is really asking thereby. What does he mean by "actually"? What does "reality" mean to him? According to idealism, these terms designate whatever necessarily occurs within consciousness. The question then is, Do these actions occur? Where? How? Not within the realm of experience; for if they did, then they would themselves be items of experience, and, as such, they would not belong within philosophy, which is supposed to display the foundation of experience. Therefore, these actions do not possess the sort of actuality that experience does; nor can one say that they occur within time, for only appearances have temporal reality. {The series of necessary actions of reason disclosed by Critical idealism possesses no reality except this: if one is to succeed in explaining what one is trying to explain, then one necessarily has to assume that these actions do occur. But they require no other sort of reality, for in this system there is no other sort of reality at all except for reality of the sort indicated (i.e., necessity of thinking).} Professor Beck, 27 who has understood the Critiqlu of Pure &ason, still does not want to go beyond experience. But in this case, all philosophy-including his own-would be abolished. Kant, however, does not share Prof. Beck's opinion on this matter; for Kant asks how experience is possible, and with this question he raises himself above experience. {The question has been raised whether the system of Critical idealism also possesses actual reality, that is, whether the actions of reason it describes actually exist. "' On account of our limiLation, the idealist's cognition is, and can never be anything but, discursive; that is to say, he develops his concepts little by little and infers one from the other. Thus he develops his system step by step, even though this constitutes but a singu act within our consciousness. I pruit myself and a world at the same time-in a single stroke
(Pf· ~6-~7).
'J. S. Beck ( 1761-1841) was professor of philosophy at Halle and author of the celebrated, three-volume Erliiut.erndm Awwg.< aw d.m critischm Schriften iks HeTTJJ Prof Kant ( 1793-96). An excerpt from Vol. I I I, Till Standpoint from which tJu CriticDI Philosophy is to B• Judged, is available in an English translation by di Giovanni, in B•twen Kant and Hegel, pp. ll:04-49·
(2·
(21
104
24
Second Introduction
In answering this question, we must distinguish two different senses of the phrase "actually to exist." If one thereby means to refer to a being within experience, an occurrence in space and time, then the answer to the question is no. Reality of this sort by no means applies to the actions described within philosophy, for the foundation or ground, i.e., what I connect with experience (which is what is here provided with a ground), is not itself identical with what is grounded thereby. The philosopher does indeed go beyond all experience.} What does not lie within the realm of experience possesses no actuality in the proper sense of the term; it cannot be considered to be in space and time. Instead, it must be thought of as something that is necessarily thinkable, as something ideal. The pure I, for example, is, in this sense, nothing actual. The I we encounter within experience is the person. Thus anyone who objects to the philosophical concept of the pure I on the grounds that it does not occur within experience does not know what he is demanding. {The question can be truly answered yes only in the sense that the assertions of the idealist possess reality for the philosopher and are themselves the results of necessary thinking.} These actions do possess reality for the person who raises himself to the philosophical level; that is, they possess the reality of necessary thinking, and it is for necessary thinking that reality exists. 28 Experience possesses this sort of reality as well. As certainly as we exist and live, there must be experience. As certainly as we engage in philosophical inquiry, we must think of these actions. Something that does not occur as such within ordinary consciousness is thus present within the consciousness of the philosopher. {The philosopher may and must elevate his consciousness above all experience. (Did not Kant, and, along with him, Prof. Beck himself, engage in rational inquiry concerning the possibility of experience?)} The philosopher's consciousness expands, and {the system of idealism} thereby becomes comprehensive and complete. 29 His thinking extends just as far as thinking can go. One can ask questions that go beyond experience; and indeed, we do ask such questions. But one cannot rationally ask questions that go beyond philosophy; {that is to say, one cannot adduce any reasons or grounds in abstraction from all reason. Such a demand is self-contradictory.} For example, a question such as, "What is the foundation of limitation in 28 '"Wer sich zur Philosophie erhebt, fiir den haben diese Handlungen Realitat, nehmlich die des nothwendigen Denkens und fiir dieses ist Realitat." 29 What the text of K actually says is that '"the philosopher's consciousness thereby becomes comprehensive and complete [ein vollstiindiges, vollendetes]." The text of H, however, makes it clear that by expanding his consciousness to the limits of thinking, the idealist '"finishes and completes" his system and not his own consciousness: '"dadurch sein Bewu~tseyn erweitern, soweit als das denken nur irgend gehen kann, und damit w. das system des ld. geschlo~n und vollendet."
(26)
Second Introduction
105
itself?" 30 is self-contradictory, and thus is an absurdity. A question of this son requires an application of reason in abstraction from all reason. Human beings naturally progress from reality to reality, from one level of consciousness to another, and here we may recognize the following three levels: ( 1.) One connects the objects of experience with one another in accordance with laws, but without any conscious awareness of doing this. Every child and savage searches for a reason for every contingent event, and thereby judges it in accordance with the law of causality, though he is not conscious of this law. (2) One reflects upon oneself and notices that one proceeds in accordance with these laws, and one thereby becomes conscious of these concepts. At this second level it often happens that one takes the results of these concepts to be properties of things. Accordingly, one says things like "things in themselves are in space and time" {-origin of dogmatism}. (3) The idealist observes that experience in its entirety is nothing but an acting on the part of a rational being. 0
25
(8) Idealism begins with the self-positing of the I, or with finite reason as such {and proceeds from there to the individual}. But when we talk about anything "as such," we are employing an indeterminate concept. Thus idealism starts with an indeterminate concept. The idealist then observes the way in which reason becomes determinate when it is limited; and, by means of this act of determination, he allows a rational individual to come into being-an actual rational being, which is something quite different from the indeterminate concept of the I. This individual also observes the world and the things in it, and as he does so, his way of viewing the world is itself observed from the viewpoint of idealism. The idealist observes how there must come to be things for the individuaL Thus the situation is different for the [observed] individual than it is for the philosopher. The individual is confronted with things, men, etc., that are independent of him. But the idealist says, "There are '""was der Grund der Beschranktheit, an sich sei." The reason such a question is "absurd" is because something can-by definition-be "limited" only by something else. And thus it is an analytic truth that limitation can never possess its foundation "in itself." 0 The reason for the different points of view and for the differing opinions and systems that thereby ensue is contained in the following gradations in the progress of our reason and in the development of our consciousness. FirJJ. U:vel: Mankind acts in conformity with the laws of theoretical reason that govern thought, but without being conscious of these laws: e.g., the child, the savage-the common
man~
Second U:vel: Men reflect upon themselves and become conscious of themselves in accor· dance with universal rules. They construct concepts, but they take the results of these concepts to be things in lhmuelllt'J-origin of dogmatism. Third U:vel of consciousness, at which consciousness represents its own representations and concepts to itself as an acting of the representing subject, which acts in accordance with specific rules---<.Ualirm (p. 26).
(27
1 o6
Second Introduction
no things outside of me and present independently of me." Though the two say opposite things, they do not contradict each other. For the idealist, from his own viewpoint, displays the necessity of the individual's view. When the idealist says "outside of me," he means "outside of reason"; when the individual says the same thing, he means "outside of my person." The viewpoint of the individual can be called "the ordinary point of view," or "the viewpoint of experience." Considered from an a priori perspective and within the context of its place within a genetic account, this same ordinary viewpoint is found to arise in the course of acting, and thus it can also be called "the practical point of view." No abstraction occurs in acting; but philosophical speculation is possible only insofar as one engages in abstraction. Thus the philosophical viewpoint can also be called "the ideal point of view." The practical viewpoint lies beneath the idealistic viewpoint. {Hence one must distinguish the idealistic or transcendental viewpoint from the ordinary or practical viewpoint, which appears within the course of ordinary life or in acting. The former commences with the I and takes as its object nothing but the I;~ll in contrast, the world remains present for the ordinary standpoint, which concerns itself with a rational individual. Viewed from the idealistic standpoint, the practical standpoint appears to be subordinate, and this enables one to see why and to what extent the ordinary view is true and why one has to assume that a world exists. Speculations do not disturb the idealist within the course of his active life and do not cause him to commit errors. He is a man like any other; he feels pleasures and he suffers like anyone else, for he possesses the proficiency to transport himself from the speculative viewpoint to that of life. One has not yet achieved a clear understanding, has not yet obtained the true philosophical view of things, and has not yet reached the correct standpoint so long as one continues to think and to expect that daily life is something altogether different [from the standpoint of life as it is characterized from the speculative standpoint].} When the philosopher adopts the practical point of view, he behaves just like any other rational being and is not disturbed by doubt, for he knows how he arrived at this point of view. Only someone who has just begun to speculate, but has not yet reached the point of clarity in his speculations, can be disturbed by speculation. This cannot happen to the Critical philosopher, for the results of experience and speculation are always in harmony. But in order to shift back and forth from one point of view to the other, one needs proficiency; 32 and this is precisely " "Beym ersten fangt das IcH an u. ist bios das lch der Gegenstand."' literally: "The I commences with the former, and only the I is the object." 02 Reading, with H, "Fertigkeit" for K's "Festigkeit'" ("stability").
Second Introduction
107
what the beginner, whose speculations are disturbed by realistic doubt and whose acting is disturbed by speculative doubt, often lacks. {It is by no means the case that idealism disturbs any actual person's belief in the reality of external things. On the contrary, idealism is much more likely to strengthen this belief against all doubt engendered by conf~sed speculation; for idealism indicates the point of view from which one believes in the reality of things and shows why such a belief is necessary so long as one occupies this viewpoint.} {So much for the prolegomena.}
§
1
Preliminary Remarks (1) The attempt to establish a first principle within philosophy has recently encountered strong objection. 1 Some base their objections upon arguments of their own, while others are simply going along with current fashion. Those who maintain that we should not seek any first principle might mean by this that one should not attempt to philosophize in a systematic manner at all, because it is impossible to do so. {[That is, they might mean that] no systematic connection is possible in philosophy; instead, one must here and there accept an unproven proposition. Philosophy is nothing but an aggregate of individual propositions.} The way to remove this objection is by actually constructing a system. Or else they might mean something like this: Every proof begins with something unproven. What does it mean "to prove" something? Anyone with a clear concept of what is involved in a proof will admit that to prove something means to connect the truth of one proposition with that of another, and to do so in such a way that I transfer the truth of some previously known proposition to another one. But if this is what "proof' means, then human beings must possess some truth that neither can nor needs to be proven and from which all other truths can be de1 At the time these lectures were first delivered, the attempt to establish a philosophical first principle had recently been subjected to harsh criticism in two essays that appeared almost simultaneously in the Philosophisches journal einer Gesellschaft Teutscher Gelehrten (to which Fichte himself was a regular contributor and of which he was soon to become coeditor). Presumably, these are the two "recent objections" that Fichte has in mind, though neither is mentioned by name anywhere in these lectures: (1) Paul johann Anselm Feuerbach, "Ueber die Unmaglichkeit eines ersten absoluten Grundsatzes der Philosophie" Philosophisches Journal 2, 4 ( 1795), and (2) Karl Christian Erhard Schmid, "Bruchstiicke aus einer Schrift tiber die Philosophie und ihre Principien," Philosophisches journal 3, 2 ( 1795).
[ 108]
(28)
§I
109
rived. If not, then there is no truth at all, and we are driven into an infinite regress. 2
28
(2) Neither of these opinions seems to have been shared by the better thinkers who reject [this attempt to discover a first principle].~ Prof. Beck also lashes out against the attempt to discover a first principle and contends instead that philosophy must begin with a postulate. 4 But a postulate is also a starting point, which is not further proven, and thus it is a first principle. A first principle is any cognition that cannot be further proven. Thus anyone who states a postulate also states a first principle. Within the expression "first principle;" Prof. Beck places the emphasis upon the word "principle"; accordingly, he declares that a first principle has to be something objective, something that simply has to be "discovered" and then can subsequently be analyzed. But who called upon him to explain the meaning of a "first principle" in this manner? Philosophy cannot be established by attending to what is simply "given"; instead, it can be established only by proceeding synthetically. According to Reinhold, the "principle of consciousness" states a fact, and he claims that philosophy in its entirety should be generated merely by analyzing what is contained within this principle. 5 It is appropriate to find fault with such a procedure. The Wissenschaftslehre begins with an I. But the point is not to analyze this I, for this would produce a purely empty philosophy. Instead, the Wissenschaftslehre allows this I to act in accordance with its own laws and thereby to construct a world. This is no analysis, but instead a 2 "wir werden ins Unendliche getrieben." '"Keine von beiden Meinungen scheinen die belleren die sich dagegen auflehnen zu haben." 4 An insistence that every systematic philosophy must begin by "postulating" something is a central feature of J. S. Beck's "Theory of the Standpoint," as developed most fully in the third volume of his Er{jjutermden Awzugs, entitled Ein:Ug-mOglicher Standpunct, aw welchem die critische Philosophie beurtheilt werden mull ( 1796). In English, see the excerpt translated in Giovanni and Harris's Between Knnl and Hegel, pp. 2o6-4g. 'Karl 'Leonhard Reinhold (1758-t823), Fichte's immediate predecessor atjena, was an influential early popularizer of Kant's philosophy who also developed his own, highly original systematic reformulation of transcendental idealism. Reinhold called his system "Elementary Philosophy" or "Philosophy of the Elements." He first expounded it in 1789 in his Versuch einer neuen Theorie tks menschlichen VorstellungsvermOgens and subsequently elaborated it in Vol. I of his Beitriige zur Berichligung bisheriger Mi{Jverstiindnisse tier Philosophen ( 1790) and Ueber das Fundnmenl des philosophischen Wissens ( 1794). (In English, see the excerpt from the latter, The Foundations of Philosophical Knowudge, translated by di Giovanni in Between Knnl and Hegel, pp. 52-103.) The "principle of consciousness," the "first principle" of Reinhold's system (i.e., the principle from which all the other propositions of his system are to be derived), states that "in consciousness, the subject distinguishes the representation from the subject and the object and relates it to them both." For further information about Reinhold's "Elementary Philosophy" and Fichte's criticism of it, see chap. 8 of Beiser, The Fate of Reason, as well as Breazeale, "Between Kant and Fichte."
110
§I
continually progressing synthesis. It is thus correct, after all, that philosophy must begin with a postulate, {but one that is grounded in an Act6 and not in a fact. (An "Act" is what occurs when I let my I act within itself and observe what happens. A "fact," in contrast, is present within consciousness as something already given or discovered, which can only be analyzed subsequently.)} The Wissenschaftslehre proceeds in this manner as well, and it employs the term "Act" to designate its postulate. This term was not understood; but it means no more-and is meant to mean no more-than this: one is supposed to act internally 7 and observe what one is doing. This means that if one wants to communicate this philosophy to someone else, one has to ask the other person to perform the action in question. In this sense, one does have to postulate something. A fact is something that is simply found to occur in a certain way within experience, where it is accompanied by a feeling of necessity. 8 All one can do with such a fact is to begin to analyze it-if, that is, one wishes to remain consistent and does not wish to assume something else as well (as Reinhold does with his "principle of consciousness"). 9 • The first principle is a postulate. Just as geometrical instruction begins with the postulate that one describe space, so too must the reader or student of philosophy begin by doing something. Anyone who understands the first proposition is put into the proper frame of mind for philosophy. Postulate:
29
Think the concept "I" and think of yourself as you do this. Everyone understands what this means. Everyone thinks of something thereby; one feels one's consciousness to be determined in a particular manner, and it is by virtue of this that one is conscious of something specific. Now one must observe what one does when one thinks of this concept. Think of any object at all-the wall, for example, or the stove. The thinking subject is a rational being; 10 but, in thinking of this object, this freely thinking subject forgets about itself and pays no attention to its own free activity. But this is just what one has to do if one wishes to lift oneself to the viewpoint of philosophy. In thinking about an object, one 6 "Thathandlung." This is a word of Fichte's own coinage and is a key term for under· standing the 1 794'95 version of the Wissenschaftslehre. It is, however, virtually absent from the Wissenschaftslehre nooo methodo (it appears only once in K and three times in H). 7 "man soli innerlich handeln." 8 "Eine Ursache ist etwas nur so gefundenes in der Erfahrung mit Nothwendigkeit vorkommendes." Reading, with H, "Thatsache" ("fact") forK's "Ursache" ("cause"). 9 In his 1794 review of Aenesidnnus Fichte criticized Reinhold for assuming (without any argument) that every representation must consist of two elements: form and matter (or content) (SW, 1: 17-18 = AA I, 2: 58-59; English translation in EPW, pp. 59-'77· See Breazeale, "Fichte's Aenesidnnus Review." 10 "Das denkende ist das Vernunftwesen."
(29)
§ l
111
disappears into the object; one thinks about the object, but one does not think about oneself as the subject who is doing this thinking. For example, when I am thinking about the wall I am the thinking subject and the wall is the object of thought. I am not the wall, nor is the wall I. The thinking subject and the object of thought are thus distinguished from one another. But now I am supposed to think about the I. When I do this, as when I think of anything at all, I am an active subject. {From this we can see that, whether we are concerned with a representation of an object or with a representation of the I, we are active in both cases. Without engaging in the activity of thinking we cannot entertain any thought at all. This is what these representations have in common.} With the same freedom with which I think about the wall, I now think about the I.ll I am also thinking about something when I think about the I; but in this case the thinking subject and the object of thought cannot be distinguished from each other in the way they could be while I was still thinking about the wall. The thinking subject and the object one is thinking of, the thinker and the thought, are here one and the same. When I think about the wall my activity is directed at something outside of myself, but when I think about the I my activity is self-reverting; i.e., it is directed back upon the I. (The concept of activity requires no explanation. We are immediately conscious of it; it consists in an act of intuiting.)A 11 Henrick Steffens, who was present as a student for some of Fichte's lectures during the winter semester of 1798/gg, included in his memoin the following amusing account of the listenen' reaction to these instructions: "I cannot deny that I was awed by my fint glimpse of this short, stocky man with a sharp, commanding tongue. Even his manner of speaking was sharp and cutting. Well aware of his listenen' weaknesses, he tried in every way to make himself understood by them. He made every effort to provide proofs for everything he said; but his speech still seemed commanding, a.s if he wanted to dispel any possible doubts by means of an unconditional order. 'Gentlemen,' he would say, 'collect your thoughts and enter into younelves. We are not at all concerned now with anything external, but only with ounelves.' And, just as he requested, his listenen really seemed to be concentrating upon themselves. Some of them shifted their position and sat up straight, while othen slumped with downcast eyes. But it was obvious that they were all waiting with great suspense for what was supposed to come next. Then Fichte would continue: 'Gentlemen, think about the wall.' And as I saw, they really did think about the wall, and everyone seemed able to do so with success. 'Have you thought about the wall?' Fichte would ask. 'Now, gentlemen, think about whoever it was that thought about the wall.' The obvious confusion and embarrassment provoked by this request was extraordinary. In fact, many of the listenen seemed quite unable to discover anywhere whoever it was that had thought about the wall. I now undentood how young men who had stumbled in such a memorable manner over their fint attempt at speculation might have fallen into a very dangerous frame of mind as a result of their further efforts in this direction. Fichte's delivery was excellent: precise and clear. I was completely swept away by the topic, and I had to admit that I had never before heard a lecture like that oneH (Fuchs, ed., Fichu im Gcpriich, 11: 8). " What distinguishes them [the representation of the I and that of an object} is that, in the case of the representation of my I, the thinker and the thought are one and the samein the concept of the I. I am the object of thought as well as the thinking subject. In the case of other representations, the activity is directed outside of me, but in this case it is directed back upon myself.
112
30
§
I
The concept or thought of the I arises when the I acts upon itself, and the act of acting upon oneself 12 produces the thought of the I an'"d no other thought. The two expressions mean exactly the same: The I is what it itself posits, and it is nothing but this; and what posits itself and reverts into itself becomes an I and nothing else. {Thus it is [only] insofar as I act upon myself and posit myself, [only] insofar as my activity reverts back upon me, that the I arises and that I think about my I. "I am 1," and "I posit myself as 1": these two propositions mean exactly the same thing.} Self-reverting activity and the I are one and the same. These two expressions have precisely the same meaning. This assertion could present difficulties only if one were to understand more by the term "I" than it is supposed to mean in the present context. {Here it is to be noted that we are concerned only with the I for. me, or with the concept of the I for me, insofar as I form it through immediate consciousness. We are not at all concerned here with any other sort of being the I might have-as a substance, a soul, etc. Here we must abstract from all other sorts of being, without presupposing any of them. We are here concerned solely with the concept of the I.} The I is not the soul, which is a type of substance. In conjunction with the thought of the I, everyone surreptitiously thinks of something else as well. One may think, "Before I can do anything at aU [for example, before I can think of the I], I first have to exist." But this notion must be discarded. Anyone who makes such a claim is maintaining that the I exists independently of its actions. Or one may also say, "Before I could act, there had to be some object upon which I could act." But what could such an objection really mean? Who makes this objection? It is I myself. I thereby posit myself as preceding myself. Thus this entire objection could be rephrased as follows: "I cannot proceed to posit the I without assuming that the I has already posited its own being." 13 The concept of the I arises through my own act of positing myself, by virtue of the fact that I act in a way that reverts back upon myself. What has one done when one has acted in this manner, and how did one manage to do this? {Hitherto, people reasoned as follows:} I am conscious of some object, B. But I cannot be conscious of this object without also being conscious of myself, forB is not I and I am not B. But I can be conscious of myself This activity cannot be defined; it rests upon immediate intuition and consists in my beimmediately conscious of myself (p. 29). 2 "ein Handeln im Handeln auf sich selbst." IS "Ich sezte mich also vorher selbst, und der ganze Einwurf lie!k sich so ausdriicken: ich kann das Setzen des Ich nicht vornehmen, ohne ein Gesetztsein des Ich durch sich selbst anzunehmen." Unfortunately, Fichte's play on vornehmen and annehemen is lost in translation.
in~
(3o)
§
31
I
113
only insofar as I am conscious of consciousness. Therefore, I must be conscious of this act of consciousness; i.e., I must be conscious of this consciousness of consciousness. 14 How do I become conscious of this? This series has no end, and therefore consciousness cannot be explained in this manner. The chief explanation for this impossibility is that consciousness has always been treated as a state of mind, 15 i.e., as an object, for which, in turn, another subject is always required. 8 {Until now, this piece of sophistry has lain at the foundation of every system-including Kant's.} Had previous philosophers only realized that they were reasoning in this manner, then perhaps this realization would have helped them arrive at the correct point. The only way to avoid this objection is to discover some object of consciousness which is at the same time the subject of consciousness. One would thereby have disclosed the existence of an immediate consciousness, i.e., an object to which one would not have to oppose a new subject. We can now answer the previously raised question concerning how we become conscious of acting. We observed ourselves and became conscious of doing so, even while we were acting. While I was acting, I became conscious that I was acting. Through immediate consciousness, the self-consciousness of the acting subject is identical with its consciousness of acting. {I posited myself as positing-this is intuition; I represented myself as engaged in the act of representing; I acted and was conscious of my acting: these were one and the same.} While I was think.ing, and along with my thinking, I became conscious thereof; that is to say, I posited myself as an actively thinking subject. Thus, in this very act of consciousness, I posited myself as both the subject and the object of consciousness, and we have thereby discovered the immediate consciousness we have been seeking. I simply posit myself. 16 Such consciousness is 11 "lch mu~ mir also bewust sein des Actes des B, des Bewustseins vom Bewustsein.'' Though "B" could refer to the previously mentioned object {B), it makes more sense to assume that here, as elsewhere in K, it is an abbreviation for Bewusstscin {consciousness). 15 "als Zustand des Gemiiths." 8 Hitherto, people reasoned as follows: We cannot be conscious of things posited in opposition to us, that is, of external objects, unless we are conscious of ounelves, i.e., unless we are an object for ourself. This occurs by means of an act of our own consciousness, of which we are able to become conscious only insofar as we, in turn, think of ounelf as an object and thereby obtain a consciousness of our own consciousness. But we become conscious of this consciousness of our consciousness only by, once again, turning it into an object and thereby obtaining a consciousness of the consciousness of our consciousness, and so on ad infinitum. Our consciousness, however, would never be explained in this manner. Or else one would have to conclude that there is no consciousness at all-so long, that is, as one continues to treat consciousness either as a state of mind or else as an object; for in proceeding in this manner one always presupposes a subject, which, however, one can never discover {p. 30). 16 "lch setze mich schlechthin." This recalls the famous, oft-quoted formula with which the 1 794"95 Grondlage der gesamkri Wwenschaftslehn begins: wdas lch setzt sich selbst schlechthin." Though commonly {and misleadingly) translated "the I posits itself abS(r lutely," this sentence does not imply that the I posits itself in a special (and mys1erious)
114
§I
called "intuition;" 17 and intuition is an act of positing oneself as positing, not a mere act of positing. 18 Every act of representing is an act of self-positing. Everything begins with the I. The I is not a component part of the representation; instead, all representation proceeds from the I. All possible consciousness presupposes immediate consciousness and cannot be comprehended in any other way. The identity of the posited object and the positing subject is absolute {and is what makes all representing possible in the first place}. It is not learned; it is not derived from experience. Instead, it is what makes all learning and all experience possible in the first place. The I is by no means a subject; instead, it is a subject-object. If it were a mere subject, then consciousness would be incomprehensible. If it were a mere object, then one would be driven to seek a subject outside of it-which one will never find. "I," "subject," "soul," and "mind": these are not the same. The I is a subject insofar as it posits something in a representation. {The I becomes an I only by means of an act of self-positing. It is not already a substance in advance of this act of self-positing; instead, its very essence is to posit itself as positing. These are one and the same. Consequently, the I is immediately conscious of itself} The I simply posits itself, {that is to say, without any mediation at all. It is at once subject and object}. In other words, that the I posits itself within immediate consciousness as a subject-object is itself something that occurs immediately, 19 and no reasoning can go beyond this. Reasons can be provided for all the other specific determinations that occur within consciousness, but no reason can be given for immediate consciousness. Immediate consciousness is itself the ultimate reason or foundation upon which everything else is based and to which everything else has to be traced back, if our knowledge is to have any foundation. We must possess some knowledge of this ultimate ground, for we are able to talk about it. We obtain this knowledge through immediate in"absolute" manner. Instead, the force of the adverb schlechthin is to emphasize ( 1) that the sole, or distinctive, activity of the I qua I is to posit or be aware of itself ("the I is Mthing but this act of self-positing"), and (2) that this activity is immediate or unconditioned, in the sense that it occurs spontaneously and cannot be inferred from anything else ("the I simply posits itself'). 17 "Anschauung." This is one of the most common terms in Fichte's technical vocabulary, and, like his use of "representation," it is directly derived from Kant. In the first Critique, Kant defines "intuition" as the means by which objects are "given" to us and thus the means by which a cognition is "immediately related to objects" (see KRV, A1g/B33). Like Kant, Fichte employs the term Anschauung to designate both the mental activity (or power) by virtue of which such "immediate" representations are possible and the "content" of such acts: "intuitions." 18 "ein sich selbst setzen als solches, kein blofks Setzen." 19 "daj3 es sich im unmittelbaren Bewustsein als Subjectobject setze, ist unmittelbar."
(3 1)
§
32
I
115
tuition, and, in turn, we immediately intuit our immediate intuition itself. I.e., we have an immediate intuition of intuition. Pure intuition of the I as a subject-object is therefore possible. Since pure intuition of this sort contains no sensible content, the proper name for it is "intellectual intuition." Kant rejected intellectual intuition, 20 but he defined the concept of intuition in such a way that intuitions could only be sensible; and therefore he said that these sensible intuitions cannot be intellectual. Against those, such as Platner, 21 who claim to intuit the I as a thing, or against those who believe they can intuit an immediate revelation within themselves, Kant is correct. What is intuited in sensible intuition is fixed, passive, and ordinarily in space; but all that is intuited in our intellectual intuition is an acting. Kant too had such an intuition, but he did not reflect upon it. Indeed, his entire philosophy is a product of this intuition; for he maintains that necessary representations are products of the acting of a rational being and are not passively received. But this is something he could have come to realize only by means of intuition.c Kant recognizes that self-consciousness occurs, i.e., a consciousness of the act of intuiting within time. 22 How could he have arrived at such a recognition? Only by means of an intuition-and such an intuition is certainly intellectual. Less rational than Kant's denial of the possibility of intellectual intuition is the behavior of those who have continued to reject intellectual intuition even after its reality has been deduced (e.g., the author of the review, published in 1796 in the Allgemeine Literatur-Zeilung, of Schelling's On the 1). 23 People of this sort will never become conscious of their own freedom of thinking. Anyone who has ever thought of the I has also had a concept of it. How does this concept of the I come into being?
°
2 For Kant's denial of the possibility of "intellectual intuition," see, e.g., KRV, Bxlff.n., 868, B72, 8158, and 8307. 21 Ernst Platner (1744-1818), a professor of philosophy and medicine at Leipzig, is best remembered for his critique of Kantianism and for his defense of a skeptically tinged variety of "common sense" empiricism. Fichte chose Volume I of Platner's Philosophische Aphorismen ( 1793) as the text for his introductory course "Logic and Metaphysics," which he first taught in the winter semester of 17!)4195 and subsequently offered every semester he remained at jena. In relation to the present point, see Fichte's comment in his lectures on Platner (as transcribed by Krause): "In consciousness I appear to myself not as a real thing, but rather as really acting" (AA IV, 1: 225). c Kant, in his system, merely failed to reflect upon this type of intellectual intuition. His system, however, does contain the result of this intellectual intuition: [in the recognition] that our representations are products of our self-active mind (p. ~~~ ). 22 "Bewustsein des Anschauens in der Zeit." 2s The author of this anonymously published review was Johann Benjamin Erhard (1766-1827), a physician-philosopher from Niirnberg who had been one of Fichte's earliest supporters. Erhard's highly critical review of Schelling's (utterly Fichtean) treatise of 1795, Vom Ich als Prinzip tkr Philosoph~ IXkr Uber das Unbedingte im menschlichen Wissen, appeared in the October 1 1, 1796, issue of the Allgemeine Literatur-Zeilung.
116
33
§
I
In order to be able to perceive myself as positing myself, I must presuppose that I have already been posited. 2 I transport myself from a state of repose and inactivity to the activity of self-positing, and I oppose this activity to my previous state of repose and inactivity. Otherwise, one would be unable to notice the representation of activity, which is a wrenching away from a state of repose and a movement of transition to activity. 25 {It is only by wrenching ourselves away from a state of repose and transporting ourselves into the opposite state that we are able to obtain any consciousness (i.e., any intuition) of our activity. Only through this opposite state do we obtain a clear awareness of what "acting" is (for this is something we are quite unable to define). We are able to think about activity only by means of what is fixed, only by means of a state of repose; and conversely, we are able to think about stability only by means of activity.} Consequently, it was only by means of opposition that I was able to become clearly conscious of my activity and to obtain an intuition of it. Acting is, so to speak, "agility," a movement of inner or spiritual passage. 26 Within consciousness, this agility is opposed to a passive state of stability or rest. On the other hand, I can be conscious of this state of repose only to the extent that I am conscious of activity. One must, therefore, observe acting and repose simultaneously in order to be able to observe either of them individually. Indeed, it is only through opposition that it is possible to obtain a specific and clear consciousness of anything whatsoever. 27 Here, however, we are concerned not with this proposition in its general form, but only with the specific, individual case before us. Let me now turn my attention to the state of repose, within which what is really an activity becomes something posited. 28 It no longer remains an activity; it becomes a product, but not, as it were, a product 24 "Urn mich selbst als mich selbst seuend wahrnehmen zu konnen, muflte ich mich schon als gesezt vorausseuen." This sentence provides a good example of some of the features of Fichte's presentation which are lost in translation. Though "presuppose" is, for most purposes, the best and least problematic way of rendering voraussetzen, it fails to display the connection between "positing" (setzen) and "presupposing" (voraussetzen, i.e., "positing in advance"). Yet it is just this connection that one must appreciate in order fully to understand the point of Fichte's claim in this sentence. 25 "sie ist ein Loflreiflen von einer Ruhe, von welcher zur Thatigkeit ubergegangen wird." 26 "AGIUTAET, Uibergehen im geistigen Sinne." 27 Though this principle of "determination through opposition" has its roots in the dialectical tradition, Fichte acquired his understanding of it through his careful study of the writings of Salomon Maimon. Elsewhere Fichte refers to it as "the law of reflective opposition" (§ 2) or "the principle of determinability" (dictat to§ 3). Maimon (1752-1800) was one of the most acute critics of Kant's Critical undertaking-as well as one of its most original interpreters. For more information concerning Maimon's skeptical Kantianism, see cha,p. 10 of Beiser's The Fale of Reason. 2 "in dieser Ruhe wird das was eigendich ein Thatiges ist, ein Geseutes." The ordinary meaning of the adjective gesetzJe is "calm," "composed," or "steady," and this is certainly part of the meaning of the term in this sentence. But gesetzJe is also derived from the past
§
1
117
separate from the activity itself. It does not become any son of matter29 or thing that could precede the l's representation [of it]. What happens is simply that acting, by being intuited, becomes fixed. Such [an instance of stabilized acting] is called a "concept," in opposition to an intuition, which is directed at the activity as such. The subject and the object collapse into each other within this selfreverting activity when it is intuited as a state of repose, and this produces something positive and stable. Neither this coincidence of subject and object, nor the manner in which an intuition is thereby transformed into a concept can be intuited; this is sumething that can be grasped only by 71Uiaru of thinking. Only intuition can be intuited rather than thought. Thinking can only be thought; it cannot be intuited. Indeed, every expression of the mind can be grasped only through itself. This confirms the theory of consciousness we have just been discussing. Being conscious of intuition is what is meant by "philosophical genius." All thinking begins with intuition; accordingly, all philosophizing must also begin with intuition. Kant calls philosophy "rational cognition by means of concepts.''w But this cannot be right, even according to Kant himself; for he says that every concept without intuition is empty.s 1 In addition, Kant also talks about transcendental imagination, and this is something that can only be intuited. The concept arises in one and the same moment with the intuition and cannot be separated from it. It seems to us as if the latter would have to precede the former,s 2 but it seems this way to us only because we refer the concept back to an intuition. n participle of setun, "to posit," and as such it means "that which is posited." Both senses are combined in Fichte's use of das GesetzJes: in contrast to the activity of positing, what is posited within this activity becomes fixed and passive. Note too the relationship between these terms and the usual German word for "law," das Gaelz-again, "that which is posited." """Stoff." 30 KRV. A7 t3fB7ofL 31 KRV. A51iB75· What Kant actually says in this celebrated (and frequently misquoted) passage is that "thoughts without content are empty, and intuitions without concepts are blind." 32 The text of K reads: ~Der Begriff entsteht mit der Anschauung zugleich in demselben Moment, und ist von ihm unzertrennlich. Es scheint uns als ob der erste eher hatte sein miifkn." This passage appears to be corrupt, and thus two corrections have been introduced in the translated text: (1) ~on ihr" ("from the intuition") is substituted for "von ihm" ("from the moment" or, even less plausibly, .. from the concept"); and (2) "der letzte" ("the latter") is substituted for "der erste" ("the former"). D Applying this [general principle of determination via opposition] to the self-positing or internal ac1ing of the I, we oblain an innn intuition of the stability or slaU of repose of the same and, at the same time, an inner intuition of its activity-an intuition of it as both ac~d upon and acting. These coincide. Within this state of repose, however, the positing of the activity is transformed for us into somelhing pruiled, into a product, into a concept. That is to say, when one considers this very same activity, first of all, not as an instance of acting,
118
§
1
Cf. § 1 of the printed Wissenschaftslehre, 88 where the same thing is said in a different manner; for there we proceeded from the concept to the intuition, whereas the path followed here is just the reverse. {Comparison with the instructor's book,
(32)
Foundations of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre ( 1794): § 1. The absolute first principle can only be sought out; it can be neither pr()Uen nor determined. Within the context of the Wissenschaftslehre, to "determine" something means the same as to limit it, and indeed, to restrict it to a' certain region or sphere of our knowledge. But the absolute first principle embraces the entire sphere of our knowledge. This principle is always valid in relation to any consciousness whatsoever. "I posit myself as positing myself." This presupposes that something has already been posited, which can only be inferred and grasped by means of thinking. But this is immediate consciousness, and the I itself consists in just this harmony. "I simply posit myself." This means: "I am conscious of myself, first as the object of consciousness, and then again as the subject, i.e., the subject who is conscious." The discovered and the discoverer are here one and the same. The I is identical with immediate consciousness. "I am." In this context, "to be" means "to be the object of a concept." In contrast to this, "becoming" signifies an acting. When considered as a state of repose, this acting, this activity, is a concept, a being, indeed, a specific being, which the I portrays as a fact-a concept, something simply found. Here we began with the Act and arrived at the fact; but the method of the book is just the reverse. By the expression "in a state of repose" I mean that I find the I to be something posited, a product, something discovered.
but as something stable and fixed, and glimpses and intuits it accordingly as a state of repose (since otherwise we would be unable to intuit it as engaged in acting, as active), thisproduces a product, namely, the cuncept of the I. The concept of the I can only be thought of and cannot be intuited, since only activity that is engaged in acting is intuition. Such an intuition, however, is impossible without simultaneously thinking of its opposite-that is, without thinking of the same activity as previously in a state of repose, i.e., without a concept. Consequently, both are always connected with each other; concept and intuition coincide (pp. 31-32). 33 GWL See SW, I: 91-101.
(33)
§
I
119
One has to begin with being and infer self-positing therefrom, and vice versa. Similarly, one must infer the intuition from the concept, and vice versa. Both must be present together. A state of repose must be connected with the intuition of activity. I obtain the concept only by means of intuition and I obtain intuition only by means of the concept, for both occur simultaneously in the free act of the self-reverting activity. Nothing precedes this act; no "something in itself' is presupposed as the foundation of this act.}
34
§
1
Postulate Construct the concept of the I and observe how you accomplish this. It was claimed that if one does what one is asked to do one will discover that one is active and will discover in addition that one's activity is directed upon one's own active self. Accordingly, the concept of the I comes into being only by means of a self-reverting activity; and conversely, the only concept that comes into being by means of such an activity is the concept of the I. By observing oneself while engaged in this activity, one becomes immediately conscious of it; i.e., one posits oneself as self-positing. As the sole immediate form of consciousness, this immediate consciousness of oneself must be presupposed in the explanation of all other possible varieties of consciousness. It is called the original intuition of the I. (The word "intuition" is here employed in both the subjective and the objective sense. For intuition can mean two different things: (a) it can refer to the intuition that the I has, in which case the I is the subject, the intuiting subject; or (~) it can refer to the intuition that is directed at the I, in which case the intuition is objective, and the I is.the intuited object. Here the word is employed in both senses at once.) One will further observe that one is unable to posit oneself as acting without positing a state of repose in opposition thereto. Whenever a state of repose is posited, a concept is produced-in this case, the concept of the I. § 1 (dictated 1798)
34
All consciousness is accompanied by an immediate self-consciousness, which is called "intellectual intuition," and this immediate 4 ' Every§ in K concludes with a paragraph of recapitulation and summary, indicated (as in the preceding summary paragraph) by a repetition of the § number. These summaries
120
35
§I
self-consciousness must be presupposed if one is to be able to think at all. Consciousness, however, is an activity, and self-consciousness, in particular, is the self-reverting activity of the intellect, or pure reflection. Remark: Everything follows as a consequence of carrying out the indicated self-observation. This pure act of reflection, viewed as a concept, is thought of by the I. Accordingly, I posit myself simply by means of myself, and all other consciousness is conditioned by this act of selfpositing. In this course we will be conducting experiments. I.e., we will compel reason to provide us with answers to specific, systematically calculated questions; then, for the purpose of science and as an aid to memory, we will formulate the results of our experiments in concepts. or dictata were apparently, as the name indicates, carefully "dictated" to the class by Fichte himself, so that the students could transcribe them as accurately as possible. Consequently, though the text of H differs in many respects from that of K, the summary paragraphs are virtually identical in the two versions (though H customarily places the dictata at the beginning rather than at the end of each §). § 1 and § 2 of K each include, in addition, a second summarizing paragraph, with the heading "dictated 1798." Presumably, Krause obtained these alternate dictations from someone who had attended one of Fichte's two earlier courses of lectures on the WLnm, most probably that of the winter semester 1797/ g8. These additional, earlier summaries do not appear in H, nor do they continue in K after § 2 (though § 3 repeats the same summary-it appears once at the beginning and once at the end of the §).
35
§ 2
From the moment we began the Wissenschaftskhre, we have been trying to characterize the I solely in terms of activity and to see how this can be accomplished; for idealism appeals to the acting of the I in order to explain everything that is present within consciousness, and Critical idealism explains this in terms of law-governed, necessary acting. Our present goal is to show as dearly as possible that the activity characteristic of the I is not just any sort of activity, but must be a self-reverting activity. Thus we did not say that the concept of the I comes into being by means of any acting whatJoever, but only by means of a quite specific mode of acting. {The question with which we are concerned remains, How was this process of self-intuition constituted? If A came into being by means of B, then what is the foundation of B, etc.? Thus we always proceed genetically, i.e., by self-observation of the "how."} Let us now reflect upon this. (1) Something else needs to be noticed concerning what was postulated in § 1. We were there concerned with a specific mode of acting, in con-
trast with or in opposition to another, quite conceivable one. We focused our attention upon that act by means of which the concept of the I is brought into being-and upon no other act. We took note of this restriction, and only insofar as we did so were we conscious of the activity in question. Indeed, the act we were concerned with was itself this very act of turning away from all other possible objects and concentrating upon one specific one. Accordingly, all acting can be thought of as a kind of restricting or limiting to a specific sphere. All consciousness of spontaneous self-activity u a consciousness of our own restricting of our own activity; but I cannot intuit myself a.o; restricting my activity in this way without also positing a transition from indetermi~ to determinacy, and thus without at the same time positing this state of indetermi~ and opposing it to the determinate [ 121 ]
(33)
122
36
§
2
condition. 1'A {Nothing determinate is possible apart from what is determinable, i.e., without intuiting the one along with the other.} Much depends upon this point. Limiting ourselves to the thinking of the I, what is determinate is posited as an activity and is present to consciousness as such, and thus it is only by means of activity that we become conscious of what is indeterminate as well. Since what is indeterminate is posited in relation to and along with what is determinate, let us call it "what is determinable." 2 As noted above, activity cannot be intuited apart from stability or a state of repose. Nor can activity be intuited except as a determinate activity; but the concept of a determinate activity is impossible without intuiting a determinable one. • The following objection might occur to someone: Granted that it has been shown that the I can be posited only by means of a self-reverting activity, and granted too that an activity can be posited only in opposition to a state of repose and that a determinate activity can be posited only by positing something determinable: it is still fallacious to infer from this the general principle that there can be nothing determinate apart from something determinable, for one cannot derive a universal from a particular. [Reply:] All consciousness is mediated by the selfpositing of the I, and everything that occurs [therein] is a product of the I's activity. Therefore, whenever a determinate product is encountered, it must be the product of a determinate activity of the I. And thus, since no determinate activity of the I can be posited without positing a determinable activity, the above principle does indeed possess universal validity. (2) {Here too one must avoid that rashness which is such a temptation within a transcendental philosophy, and must not become transcendent. 1 "Alles Bewustsein der Selbsuhatigkeit ist ein Bewustsein unseres Einschriinkens unserer Thiitigkeit, nun kann ich mich nicht anschauen als beschriinkend, ohne ein Uibergehen von der Unbestimmtheit zur Bestimmtheit zu setzen, also ohne die Unbestimmtheit mit zu setzen, und dem Bestimmten engegenzusetzen." A We abstracted from all [other] possible ways of operating and focused our reflection upon a single point: namely, upon ourselves. We restricted our activity to our own I. Thus it was by means of this passage from what is undetermined-in other words, from what is determinable to what is determinate, from what is unlimited to what is limited-that we became conscious of our own activity and obtained an intuition of it. Just as we found above that no intuition of the activity of our I was possible without also intuiting the I in a state of passive repose, so here as well: the movement of transition from what is determinable to what is determinate is not possible unless one also and at the same time intuits or posits something determinable. No intuition or concept of our own activity is possible unless these two spheres are posited in opposition to each other: the sphere of what is limited and the sphere of what is unlimited. The two must be connected with each other (p. 34). 2 "welches wir, weil es in Beziehung auf das Bestimmtsein und mit ihm zugleich gesezt wird, das Bestimmbare nennen wollen."
(34)
§
37
2
123
More specifically, one must not presuppose the existence of any "activity in itself," and then imagine that one is able to think of this "activity in itself' only in the modified form produced by the colored glass of representation. Instead, the activity that concerns us here is nothing but the transition from determinability to determinacy. The "activity in itself' is simply the concept, which, however, is not presupposed; instead, this concept arises merely by means of and along with the intuition of the activity. This activity itself is both concept and intuition.} Moreover, this determinate activity is not a determinate activity as such or in general (which would be self-contradictory); instead, it is a particular determinate activity. (Nothing can be anything at all without being determined in a certain way. In an abstract context one may well talk as if this were not so, but here we are dealing with intuition, not with abstraction.) This act of limiting oneself, positing oneself, immediately intuiting oneself, and becoming conscious of oneself is one single act: the act of intuiting oneself. But the determinate activity ·may not be posited unless the opposed activity, from which the determinate activity is extracted, is also posited along with it. An act of self-positing can [not] be understood unless an act of non-self-positing is posited along with it. This follows from what was said above; but it is also a consequence of the nature of intuition itself. One does not and cannot think clearly of anything at all without also thinking at the same time of its opposite, {i.e., without negating its opposite by thinking "it cannot and should not be this." (To be sure, within everyday life this usually occurs only tacitly. But when we are dealing with difficult objects and are engaged in sublime and abstract meditations, this [explicit] way of proceeding promotes uncommon clarity.)} This will not be proven here, but anyone who thinks clearly of anything will discover this truth within himself. Therefore, in connection with the act of positing the I, one necessarily has to think about the act of not positing the I as well. In accordance with our postulate, the activity that previously had to be posited as determinable activity in general has now been posited as Not1, i.e., as an activity directed at what is opposed to the I. {An act of nonself-positing is therefore posited in opposition to the act of positing the I; a Not-I is opposed to the I -A minus A. In the case of the act of selfpositing, the activity is directed back upon itself. This act of positing the Not-/ is determined by opposition. In the former case, the activity is directed at the subject that actively posits itself as positing, i.e., at what is active (subjectively and objectively). In the latter case, the activity is directed not at a self-positing subject, but rather at something positedsomething stable, in a state of passive repose-which is present without any assistance.} Thus, as surely as the I is posited at all, a Not-I must be posited along with it. The character of the Not-I emerges directly from this
(35)
124
§
2
opposition, for the activity by means of which I arrive at the Not-1 is the sole means I possess for characterizing it. Let us note, first of all, that the activity that posits the I and that which posits the Not-1 are similar, inasmuch as activity of the I is present from start to finish [in both cases]. 3 I am the thinking subject in each case. But they are different in that, in the first case, the I's activity is directed within itself and has as its object that self whose act is this very activity; whereas, in the second case, the activity of the thinking subject must have as its object something in a state of repose, something that does not posit itself (at least not in the same sense in which the I posits itself). (Whether self-positing might still pertain to it in some other sense is not a question that needs to be addressed at this point.) 4 This object is something that is present for the self-positing I we are currently considering. The self-positing I simply encounters it. It does not find it to be a product of its own activity. Instead, the I finds this object to be a product of necessity, though the necessity in question is itself conditional, since it arises only because the I has first posited itself.B (In order to think clearly about the I, I require something to be the Not-1.) {This necessary opposition of spheres, without which no clear intuition-[and hence no clear] thought-is possible, is what Kant calls "synthesis." This is the process of going beyond intuition and connecting concepts thereto. Accordingly, we here proceeded beyond the !-considered as self-positing-and beyond the intuition of its spontaneous selfactivity. By means of this act of opposing, we obtained the concept of the I--considered in a state of repose, as something posited.} The concept of the Not-1 is not a concept derived from experience. It can be derived only from the very action through which it is constructed. The Not-1 is something merely posited, and "being" is its sole determination. (The concept of being will later5 be derived from the concept of activity, which itself admits of no further explanation.) (3) Let us now reflect a bit upon what we have just discovered and consider how we were able to do this. Every act of connecting something with the I, i.e., all synthesis, depends upon something posited in opposition thereto (as we saw in this and the previous §). Before I can intuit 3 "ZufOrderst, da~ die Thatigkeit des lch durch gehe, darin sind beide gleich." Krause later emended this passage by replacing durch gehe ("permeates" or "is present from start to finish") with d.araufgehe ("is directed at"). 4 See below, § g, where a variety of (unfree) "self-positing" is attributed to nature itself. 8 To be sure, activity is present in the Iauer case [that is, when the Not-I is posited] as well, since the activity of the I relates itself to it; and, in this respect, they are similar. The I is [in this latter case]the representing subject, but it is not at the same time what is represented (the object). Accordingly, this second, opposed activity is a product not of freedom, but rather of necessity-albeit a condit.itmal necessity, since it is conditioned by the fact that the I is posited. It has the character of a being and not of a becoming (p. 35). 5 In sect. 4 of the present §.
§ 2
38
125
or think anything, I must posit something in opposition to it. This act of opposing6 provides the basis for all instances of going beyond the I, whether this is a matter of going beyond intuition (as in the previous §) or of going beyond the I itself (as in the present §). In the previous § we began with intuition and then connected the concept to it; in this § we began with the posited I and then went beyond it to posit a Not-1. The question now arises, Does our argument to this point constitute a deduction, or has something once again, as in the previous§, been presupposed? Have we demonstrated that a Not-1 must be united with the I? Or have we once again presupposed something; and if so, what? We reached this conclusion by means of the law of reflective opposition,' and we established this law within intuition.c Thus it could not have been this law that we have presupposed. Instead, we have presupposed the following: We began with the thought that if the I itself is to be, in turn, an object of our consciousness, then a Not-1 must be posited. But does the I have to become an object of consciousness? This has not been proven. {The only thing we have provisionally postulated is that we are conscious of something. Thus it remains undecided whether immediate consciousness must itself be represented, i.e., whether it must be viewed as an object in turn, i.e., whether a transition from the posited I to the pure I is required. This will be dealt with at the appropriate time.} In the previous § we proved that all consciousness must be preceded by immediate consciousness; this immediate consciousness, however, is never something objective, but is always the subjective factor 8 within all consciousness. The consciousness upon which our present argument is based is therefore not immediate consciousness; it is a representation of immediate consciousness, but it itself is not immediate consciousness. Immediate consciousness is an Idea9 and does not appear within consciousness.0 {[It is present] only in the reciprocal interaction of opposed activities-where it is simultaneously subject and object.} The first act of 6 "Dieses Entgegensetzen," that is, this act of positing something in opposition to what· ever I posit. 7 ''das Reflexionsgesez des Entgegensezens." c The reality of this law was demonstrated in intuition (p. 35). 8 "ist nie ein objectives, sondern immer das Subjective." 9 "Es ist IU:PRAESENTATION des unmittelbaren, aber es selbst nicht. Das unmittelbare ist Idee." For the term Idee ("Idea"), see n. 6 to the First Introduction. 0 When the I in a state of repose becomes, in turn, an object of consciousness-that is to say, insofar as the I has passed into a passive stau and is thought of as a mere objectthen it is at the same time the Not-1 as well; neither can exist without the other. But this consciousness is not immediate; it is tni!diated or indirect. An immediate consciousness is never present as an object. The I as an object is a mere Idea 10 and is never present within consciousness (p. 35). 10 Note the conflict between this assertion and the corresponding passage in K, according to which it is the imtni!diate I that is an Idea, not the "I as object." Surely the text of H is either corrupt or in error at this point, since the I, as we will see, can certainly be an object of consciousness (albeit not insofar as it is "immediate").
(36)
126
§
2
thinking of the I was an instance of free acting, but a 11 necessary mode of acting follows from this. We have proven that there is no consciousness of the I without consciousness of the Not-1. We could indeed introduce a postulate at this point [that is, we could simply postulate that the I has to become an object of consciousness], but if we were to do so, we would also have to announce that it is a postulate, in which case it would become part of the first principle we are presupposing. When we have ascended higher 12 we will learn whether it is necessary to introduce such a postulate. [So far] we have neither established nor proven the existence of the Not-1. What we have demonstrated is the reciprocal interaction of the I and the Not-1.
39
(4) We must now compare the new synthesis with the previous one and attach this new link to our chain of inferences. In the previous § we remarked that one is unable to posit an activity without opposing thereto a state of passivity. In the present § we have observed that one cannot posit a determinate activity without opposing thereto a determinable one. Thus the procedure by means of which we accomplished the transition from one term to the other was the same in both inquiries. The action we have now deduced is the same as the previous one; we have simply become better acquainted with it. {By comparing this synthesis with the previous one, we can see that the same thing happens over and over again. The action that occurs is always the first action; indeed, at bottom there is only one action. Only within the system of a Wissenschaftslehre is this single action presented as a series of actions.} And if the action is the same, then that to which the transition is made must also be the same; i.e., the state of repose must be the same thing as determinability, and the latter must be included in the former; for it is precisely when an activity is still determinable as such that it can be characterized as a state of repose and not as an activity. One could call this state of repose or this determinability an "ability" or "power." 13 A power is not the same as that which possesses it; i.e., it is not a substance. We say that a substance possesses a certain power, which is 11 Reading "daraus folgi ein nothwendiges'" for K's "daraus folgi kein nothwendiges.'" What the text actually states is that no necessary acting is implied by the occurrence of the first, free act of self-reflection, but this contradicts the entire argument of this section. But perhaps the text is not corrupt and should be interpreted to mean merely that we have not yet demonstrated that some other act must necessarily occur in order for the I to posit itselfspecifically, that it must become conscious of itself. 12 Fichte frequently employs metaphors of ascent and descent to describe the overall structure of the WLnm. §§ 1-12 constitute the "ascent'" to the axial point of the entire presentation, from which all the subsequent §§ "descend.'" ""Man konnte diese Ruhe oder diese Bestimmbarkeit Vermogen nennen.'" Verm0gen (rendered here as '"power'") is an important term in Kant's philosophical vocabulary, often (albeit misleadingly) translated into English as "faculty" (e.g., by Norman Kemp Smith in his influential translation of the Critique of Pure Reason).
§
2
127
thus one of its accidental properties. 14 Nor is a power the same as an activity. A power is not an action; it is that by means of which action first becomes possible. When an activity is grasped by means of concepts it is transformed into a state of repose. Power, repose, and determinability are one and the same. {The I in a state of repose is the same thing as .(activity considered as) determinability, for a passive state of repose has the same character as a determinable activity. If one removes what is determinate from an activity, then it remains merely determinable; in other words, it is a power-that is to say, that which makes an action possible-or an activity in a state of repose that cannot be further explained but can only be grasped conceptually. This is how activity becomes a state of repose or a power or determinability.} Thus the positing that occurs in the first act [that is, the act of positing a state of repose in opposition to an activity] is the same as the positing that occurs in the second [that is, the act of positing a determinable activity in opposition to a determinate one]. When an activity is intuited in a state of repose it becomes a concept. One could also express this the other way around and note that the situation is the same with determinability. But in this case one must note that this concept [of a determinable activity] is a concept only in relation to the intuition of the I; in relation to the Not-I, it is itself an intuition. 15 In the intuition the activity is in action, whereas in the concept it is not in action; there it is a mere power. 16 When this activity in the form of a concept is related to the Not-I, however, it is then an intuition.E Thus we may obtain two sorts of intuition: inner and outer, that is, intellectual intuition and another sort, which refers to the Not-1. The state of mind with which we are presently concerned contains two separate spheres: the sphere of what is intended and the sphere of what is necessarily {conjoined with this, or a sphere of what is} found, which we will call the sphere of "the given." 17 {Remark: In this context "given" 14 "die Substanz hat Vermogen; es ist Acc1~ENS." Fichte uses this Latin term in the sense in which it was employed within Scholastic philosophy, to designate what has no independent existence of its own and can exist only within (or as a modification of) something else, namely, a substance. The English reader should resist the temptation to read this term as implying contingency. Some "accidents" (or "attributes") are indeed contingent, but others are necessary (or, as the Scholastics called them, "proper"). 1 ~ As a comparison with the corresponding passage in H reveals, this sentence is misleading. It is not the concept of the determinable activity that is an intuition in relationship to the Not-I, but rather the determinable activity itself. 16 "In der Anschauung ist die Thatigkeit in ACTION, im Begriff nicht, sondern da ist sie blofks Vermogens." E This determinable activity is therefore something passive, something that can be grasped only conceptually; and thus, insofar as it is opposed to intuition, it is an act of comprehending or a concept. In relation to the Not-I, on the other hand, it is an intuition (p . .p6). 1 "die eine ist die des Beabsichtigten, die andere die des nothwendig gefunden, welches wir nennen wollen das Gegebne." The clause inserted from the parallel passage in H
128
§
2
means not "given from outside," but rather "encountered by means of the laws of reflection that govern our reason."} Our intention was to posit an activity, and this activity was found to be accompanied by a state of repose. Moreover, our intention was to posit a determinate activity, and this was found to be accompanied by a determinable one. The first sphere thus includes (1) real, self-reverting activity = A, and (2) that which has come into being by means of this activity = B. The sphere of the given likewise includes (1) determinable activity (i.e., activity that is determinable, in the sense that it can turn into actual acting, though it may itself be determined in other respects) = C, and (2) the Not-1 that is produced by means of this determinable activity = D. F {Our terminology is thus as follows: A. The real determinate activity Both as intended. B. The concept of the I C. The determinable activity Both as given. D. The Not-1.} Let us now investigate these in the light of the above account of intuitions and concepts. All consciousness begins with the previously indicated immediate consciousness (see § 1). {Immediate consciousness is the foundation of all consciousness. We have postulated this, since immediate consciousness never appears as an object of consciousness. Instead, it is the subjective factor in all consciousness, the factor that constitutes the conscious subject. It is merely the representing subject 18 of consciousness.} The A that posits itself in and by means of this consciousness is a representation of immediate consciousness, a representation that we who are engaged in philosophical inquiry have freely chosen to produce. (This immediate consciousness is the conscious subject in every act of consciousness, but it is not the subject of which we are conscious. {Nothing that we can be conscious of is immediate consciousness itself; instead, it is presentwithin all consciousness and lies at its foundation, but only as the sub-
} }
oder des GEFUNDENEN oder helps to clarify the meaning of "necessarily" in this sentence. F To the sphere of whnl is intended To the sphere of whnl is given (subjective) pertain: (objective) pertain: Activity Repose Determinate activity What is determinable The concept of the I The concept of the Not-1
("EINE SPHARE DES NOTHWENDJG DAMIT VERBUNDENEN
GEGEBE-
NEN")
Let us call the real, determinate activity that lies within this sphere, i.e., the activity in agility, "A." And let us call what comes into being thereby, i.e., the concept of the I, "B."
Let us call the determinable activity in a state of repose that lies within this sphere "C." And let us call the Not-1 that is produced thereby "D." (p.36)
18
"REPRESENTATIO."
(37)
§
2
129
jective factor, the Idea, something posited in accordance with the laws of reflection.} What the eye sees in this case is the seeing of the eye. {The eye looks at seeing: the eye is immediate consciousness, and seeing is all other consciousness. Consciousness is no more the same as immediate consciousness than is the eye the same as seeing.}) We freely chose to gef)erate this representation, and, if we had wished, we could have concerned ourselves with something else; thus we have left to one side the question of whether there might be some other respect in which such a representation might be necessary. • This A, this observing of the act of self-positing, is an intuition; more precisely, it is an inner, intellectual intuition {or intuition of the I acting within itself-of the A-[an intuition] of the intuited act of self-positing or of self-reverting activity-A}. We have already discovered (in the first §) that no intuition-including intuition A-is possible apart from a concept. What concept must be connected with intuition A? Could it be [the concept of] what is intended ( = B)? Obviously not, {for this intended I is supposed to present itself within consciousness as active, as engaged in intuiting, and thus as self-positing and produced by A,} [and,] since the concept we are seeking must lie within the sphere of what is given, {which is not produced before my very eyes, it must lie in C}. Accordingly, the concept we are seeking must be the one that conditions intuition A; i.e., it must be C = what is determinable, or the activity in a state of passive repose. {The determinable activity, or activity in a state of repose, is thus the concept that lies at the basis of all intuition, for repose can be grasped-can be thought or posited-only in relation to activity. Thus what is given to me by means of Cis the concept of the I, for in order for me to be able to posit myself, a movement of transition from repose to activity must occur.} Thus, in relationship to intuition A, C is the concept that determines A. But in the context of a different relationship, this same concept C can also be called an intuition. {But where does this concept C come from?} It is immediate consciousness itself, which is not intuited but is comprehended or grasped through concepts-and comprehended not as an activity, but as a state of repose. {For activity in a state of repose is a mere concept, which can never appear in intuition and can never be an object of intuition; instead, as a concept or a power, i.e., as something posited, C is based upon immediate consciousness, or rather, C is itself immediate consciousness and therefore is an immediate concept. In this concept the I discovers itself as substance, as something posited, as the determinable, active C, which lies at the foundation of every determinate activity and of every consciousness.} This concept is what is copied in intuition A. (Every act of intuition is an act of copying.) This concept is the most immediate and highest concept, and it is grounded upon intellectual intuition, which, as such, never becomes an object of consciousness, though it does become an
~
(;
130
41
§
2
object of consciousness in the form of a concept.G In and by means of this concept the I discovers itself and appears to itself as something given. I can conceive of myself [that is, I can grasp myself conceptually] in no other way than as an I, i.e., as self-positing, and thus as intuiting. The concept in question is thus the concept of an act of intuiting, and this is the sense in which this concept itself can be called an "intuition." The I is self-positing (a self-positing eye), 19 and it is comprehended as such; i.e., it is conceptually grasped as an intuition. Thus, in relation to A, C is a concept; but it is an intuition in relation to some possible X. I discover myself to be intuiting inasmuch as I discover myself to be intuiting something = X. (For Kant, both outer and inner intuition are merely sensible. Thus, according to him, the I appears to itself only as a determinate object, but I maintain that it appears to itself as a determining subject.) {Accordingly, the I is both a concept and an intuition. This is precisely the point that distinguishes this system from others-including the Kantian system.} In the previous §, C was only a concept; here it is both a concept and an intuition. Later on it will be an intuition. Thus it can mean different things, depending upon the different contexts within which it is posited. In C, the I was found to be self-positing, but it was not found to be active; instead, it was there found to be in a state of repose, something posited as self-positing. Its activity is canceled as such; it is an activity in a state of repose, which nevertheless is and remains an intuition. Since it is always true that an intuition stands over against a concept and is possible only by means of this opposition, this is the case here as well. What is posited in opposition to C is what we previously called D. The characteristic feature of all concepts is repose; but C, considered as an intuition, is already in a state of repose. Thus, since Dis now supposed to be a state of repose in relationship to C, D must be a state of repose in a state of repose.H What then is D? G This immediate concept of the I ( = C) becomes an intuition only insofar as it is comprehended or grasped conceptually. That is to say, the I cannot comprehend itself without positing itself as an intuiting subject. What is comprehended is thus an act of intuiting. In order to arrive at the concept of the I-indeed, in order to arrive at any concept at all-an activity has to be opposed to the I's state of repose; this is thus necessary if the I is to be discooered through intellectual intuition, if it is to be grasped dearly and perspicuously, i.e., if it is to be comprehended. The concept itself, however, can be grasped only through thought (p. 38). 19 "eine sich selbst sezendes Auge." Radrizzani plausibly suggests that "sezendes" may well be a mistranscription of "sehendes," in which case the phrase could be rendered "an eye that sees itself." This emendation is supported by the corresponding passage in H. H Although C, in relationship to A, is an activity in a state of repose, it nevertheless is and remains an act of intuiting, and indeed, a passive intuiting: namely, in relationship to what is opposed to it ( = D). This concept D also possesses the character of passive repose, for it is something given.
§
42
2
131
Insofar as C is opposed to D, C is, to be sure, an activity [in a state of repose], one that can be summoned into actual activity by means of free self-determination. In its essence it is an activity. (C is the activity of the I, considered as a substance. We will explain this in more detail below; at this point it is nothing more than a figure of speech.) {As activity in repose, C is the concept of the I as a substance. But it is only relatively passive; i.e., it is passive only in relation to A. Thus C can also be considered to be active in relation to X. But if this occurs, then a passive state of repose must again be opposed to C. This state of repose which is posited in opposition to what is already a state of relative repose cannot itself be relative, i.e., a mere privation or denial of activity.} D, which is the opposite of this activity, would thus have to be the real negation of activity, not merely the absence or privation of the same. It would have to cancel and annihilate activity; thus it is not zero, but is instead negative magnitude, 21 {something more than nothing}. This is the true character of actual being, the concept of which has incorreclly been considered to be a primitive, immediate concept; for the sole immediate concept is the concept of activity, {and this concept cannot be explained. In contrast, [the concept of] being can be derived. Being is a negative concept:} In relation to an active subject that is posited as lying outside of being itself, being negates; being cancels productive activity: What is cannot be produced or made. 22 {lt must frrst be annihilated, for positive productive activity presupposes negative productive activity, i.e., an act of annihilation. Thus being also negates whau;ver exists; 23 it negates becoming. Before anything can become, it must cease to be.} In relation to the positing subject, being negates goals: l cannot become what I am. Without realizing it, ordinary common sense has always understood this point: Refusing to be content with the existence of the world, it ascended to [the thought of] a creator. Being is the characteristic feature of the Not- I. Activity is what characterizes the I. Dogmatism begins with being, which it interprets as something primitive and immediate. Insofar as the activity of the I is in a passive state of repose in C, the l's activity is annihilated by the Not-I. This activity within C, which is not real activity, but which can be called the "substance" of the I, shows itself to be an activity at least to the extent that it is an intuition. In contrast, Even .as an intuition, Cis already in a state of repose, for it has been posited in opposition to A; and D is also in a State of repose, because it is something given. Therefore, to the extent that Dis the product of C. it is a state of repose in a state of repose."" (p. 38). 20 ~Ruhe der Rube." · 21
GrotJe."
"NEGATIVE 22 ~Sein NEGIRT in
Beziehung auf ein a user dem Sein geseztes Thatiges; durch Sein wird Machen aufgehoben. Was ist kann nicht gemacht werden." 2 ~ "Das SEYN negirt also auch das SEYENDE.M
(3!
what is opposed to C [ = D] could not be an intuition, but would have to be the real negation of intuiting; i.e., it would have to be something intuited-and this would have to be true of the Not-I as well. {This is the true character of the Not-I: as what is intuited it must always be related to an intuiting subject (namely, to C).} This is why it is absurd to treat the Not-I as a thing in itself. It must always be related to an intuiting subject. (5) We saw above how the entire mechanism of the human mind is based upon the necessity of positing one thing in opposition to another. But these opposing terms are one and same, merely viewed from different sides. The I, which lies within the sphere of what is intended, and the Not-I, which lies within the sphere of what is discovered, are one and the same. These simply represent two, inseparably linked, aspects or ways of looking at the same thing, for the I must be a subject-object. Everything follows from this last claim. Two series arise from the original intuition: the subjective series, or the series of what is intended, and the objective series, or the series of what is found. These two series cannot be separated, for neither can exist without the other. To say that these are both aspects of the same thing, i.e., to say that the subjective and the objective [series] "coexist," is to say that they are not merely inseparably linked within reflection, but that they are also one and the same object of reflection. The activity that reverts into itself and determines itself is none other than the determinable activity. These are one and the same and are inseparable. 1 {Thus, for example, B and Care one and the same. B is the concept of the I produced by A. C is the concept of the I, considered as something given; for in order to be able to posit myself as active ( = B), I have to presuppose a transition from a state of repose to one of activity, and this presupposes an activity in a state of repose as such, i.e., a power to become active in one way or another, and this passive, determinable activity is the concept of the I in C. The difference between B and C is simply this: B is the concept of the I which A produces in consciousness before our very eyes; in contrast, C is the concept of the I which is discovered by intuition to be present within consciousness, and hence C belongs to the sphere of what is "given" or "objective." Accordingly, B is produced through freedom, whereas C is produced through original intuition. 24} 1 One can call what is intended "subjective" and what is given "objective," since both are originally present within consciousness. Not only are they always together within reflection, but they are also inseparable as an object of reflection, or as what is reflected upon. There can be no determinate activity without a determinable one, no activity of the I as I without the same as a state of repose, as Not- I. This is always one and the same activity
(p. pg).
2 The translation of this sentence corrects what appears to be an error in the transcription of H, which reads: "Eben so ist A durch Freiheil hervorgebracht, B hingegen durch die urspriingliche Anschauung." In the translation, B is substituted for A, and C for B.
§
43
2
133
The Not-1 is thus nothing other than another way of looking at the I. When we consider the I as an activity, we obtain the I; when we consider it in a state of repose, we obtain the Not-1. One cannot view the I as active without also viewing it in a state of repose, i.e., as Not-1. This is the reason why the dogmatist, who does not think of the I as engaged in activity, has no I at all. His I is an accident of the Not-1. Idealism has no Not-1; for the idealist, the Not-1 is always simply another way of looking at the I. Within dogmatism, the I is a particular type of thing; within idealism, the Not-I is a particular way of looking at the I. {In idealism, therefore, the Not-1 is nothing but an accident. Actually, -(, idealism recognizes no Not-I; its Not-1 is only a particular way of looking at its I. That is to say, it first views its I in intellectual intuition as active, and this furnishes idealism with its I. However, it also views the I in intellectual intuition as passive, and this furnishes idealism with its Not-1. Remark: This is only one way of looking at the Not-1. There is, however, also another way of looking at it, which we will examine later.} §
2
(Dictated 1 798)
When this very activity of reflection, through which the intellect posits itself, is intuited, it, is intuited as a self-determining agility; and this agility is intuited as a movement of transition from a state of passive repose and indeterminacy, which is nevertheless determinable, to one of determinacy. This determinability here appears as the power to think either of the I or of the Not-I, and thus the concept of determinability necessarily involves the concepts of the I and the Not-1, which are posited in opposition to each other. Accordingly, whenever one engages in self-active reflection each of these concepts appears as something independent of this act, and the characteristic feature of the Not-I is being, i.e., a negation.
§
2
It is claimed that when one constructs the concept of the I one will also discover that one cannot posit oneself as active without positing this activity as self-determined, and that one cannot do this without positing a moVement of transition from a state of indeterminacy or determinability-which movement of transition is itself the very activity one is here observing (see sections 1 and 2 above). Similarly, one cannot grasp the concept {of the I} which comes into being by means of the determinate activity without determining this concept by means of an opposed Not-I; and what is determinable is the same as what was previously called. the state of repose (§ 1 ), for it is determined precisely by being transformed
134
44
§
2
into an activity. 25 Moreover, that which, in relation to the intuition of the I, is a concept of the I, is, in relation to the Not-1, an intuition. More specifically, it is the concept of the act of intuiting (section 4). As a consequence of this opposition, the Not-I can be characterized as the {real} negation of activity; that is, it can be characterized as "being," which is the concept of canceled activity. The concept of being is thus by no means an original concept, but is a negative one, derived from activity.
{A few more words of explanation: The concept of activity which occurs here and which underlies all that has been said consists in nothing but the movem.mt of transition fmm what is undetermined to what is determinate; i.e., it consists in an act of wrenching away from a state of repose and a transition to acting. But just as soon as this activity acts in some determinate manner-i.e., once it is "in action"-it is no longer an activity, but is instead the I. This is where the concept of the I enters the picture. For this reason, this activity does not permit of any explanation, but has its foundation entirely within consciousness and must be copied in intuition. Furthermore, concerning the law of reflection which governs all our cognition (namely, the law that states that we cognize nothing-in the sense of knowing what it is-without at the same time thinking of what it is ?Wt): this law was not a postulate that we proposed, but was instead a matter of intuition. And it is precisely this son of cognition, i.e., cognizing something by means of opposition, that is called "determining" something. To be sure, the system still rests upon a postulate, and this is certainly something that should be noticed. What we have postulated is our cognition as such, insofar as this is grounded in immediate consciousness, considered as an object. In shon, what we have postulated is the movement of transition fmm the posited I to the pure I. We will discuss this at its proper time.}
Comparison with
§§ 2
and 3 of the compendium. 26
Had we postulated anything here, it would have been a general cognition of the transition from the I to what is represented. That this cog2
~
"weil es eben zur Thatigkeit bestimmt wird." l.e., §§~and 3 ofGWL (see SW, 1: 101-~g). As always, K and H cite the first, 1794>'95 edition of GWL, for which this translation substitutes page references to the text in SW, 1. 26
§
2
135
nition must be determined objectively is something that is established within intuition. 27 From this necessary determinacy we deduced determinability, and from determinability we deduced the Not- I. The portion of the compendium corresponding to this section proceeded in the diametrically opposite direction. It began with the act of opposing 28 the Not-I [to the I], and this opposition was posited as absolute(§ 2). The act of determining was then derived from this act of opposing (§ 3). Both paths are correct, since the necessary determinacy of the I and the necessary being of the Not-I bear a reciprocal relation to each other. One can proceed from either to the other. Either path is possible. But our present path has this advantage: that the determinacy of the I is also what links the I with the Not-IJ What we have here spoken of as the "relationship between determinacy and determinability" is called "quantity" (or sometimes "quantifiability") in the book. 29 This has given rise to some misunderstandings, for many have taken this to imply that the I is something extended. In fact, all that rea11y possesses quantity is the positing subject itself.K But here we are not yet concerned with this. The third § of the previous exposition would thus correspond to the second § of this one, and vice versa. Another path has a1so been pursued here with respect to the Not-1, which is no longer postulated immediately, but is instead postulated indirect1y. {The Not-1 is also derived in a different manner in § 2 of the book, in which the absolute opposition is supposed to be established by means of Note that the pagination of SW, I is also provided in the critical edition of the same text included in AA l, ~. as well as as in the English translation included in SK. 27 uHauen wir hier etwas postulin, so ware es das [sic] Erkennlnifl ilberhaupl des Uibergehens vom Ich zum Vorgestelhen[.] Dajl diese Erkennlnif\, di~ objective bestimmt sein miljk, isl in der Anschauung nachgewiesen." This obscure passage demands some emendation, which is only marginally facilitated by the parallel passage in H: "Zwar beruhl das System auf einem PoSTUlATE [ •.• ] nehmlich; unsere[r] Erkenntifluberhaupl, in sofern sie sich auf dem unmiuelbaren Bewufltseyn als Objekl betrachtet-grilndelkurz der Obergang von dem gesezten lcH zum reinen lcH." ("To be sure, this system rests upon a postulate [ ... ], namely: our knowledge as such, insofar as this is grounded upon immediate consciousness, considered as an object-in shon, [what we have postulated is] the transition from the posited I lo the pure 1.") 28 Reading, with Radrizzani, "Entgegensetzen" for K's "Entgegengesezlen" (uwhal was opposed"). I The path followed in the compendium is the opposite of the one we are presently following. In § ~ of the book we started with the Not- I, and from § 3 on we progressed to what is determinable, and finally lO what is determinate. Each of these two methods is correct in itself, since they are reciprocally related lo each other. Nevertheless, the present method is preferable since it doubles the connection. The determinacy of the I, with which we begin, is also at the same lime what connects the I and the Nol-l (p. 41 ). 29 See SW, 1: 108-g. K What§ 3 calls "quantity" is the relationship between determinacy and determinability, and refers to the necessary conjunction of two opposites, which must nevertheless be viewed as opposed to each other. Thus "quantity" designates the entire range of activityincluding both determinable and determinate activity (pp. 41-4~).
(42)
45
the logical principle "-A is not = A." Everyone will concede this principle itself at once, but how do I know that it is true? From experience? This is insufficient, for how could this be known from experience? Instead, this [logical] opposition is absolute--becau.re I posit something in opposition and must do so. SDJ p. 1o1, no. 1. This proposition establishes the absolute act of opposing as such. p. 103, no. 6. "The act of opposing [etc.]." One cannot posit acting without also positing a state of repose, nor something determinate without something determinable, nor an I without a Not-1. This is the origin of the unity of acting as well as of the unity of consciousness. p. 104, no. g. The act of absolute opposing is here demonstrated. If this act were impossible, then how could anything be opposed to anything? The I is posited absolutely; hence what is absolutely posited in opposition is the Not-L {If something is supposed to be absolutely opposed, then the question arises, opposed to what? To nothing else but the I, for this is what is immediately posited. Thus the only possible immediate act of opposing is an act of positing something in opposition to the I. This absolute act of positing in opposition is absqlute; thus it cannot be learned from experience, but first appears within experience in the form of something that is opposed [to the l's self-positing], and only then does experience become possible.} p. 105, § 3· "with every step, etc." This is meant simply as a clarification of what occurs within us. {"To prove" means the same as "to establish within intuition." We can analyze only what occurs within us, what is already in us.} The older method continued in this manner and then merely analyzed what occurs. p. 106, no. 1. "insofar as [etc.]." This "insofar as" already includes within itself what is to be derived. To this extent, "insofar as" means "quantity" or "sphere." One could say that if the Not-1 is posited, then the l is not posited. Yet both the Not-1 and the I have to be present within one and the same consciousness, for without an I, the Not-I posits nothing. One cannot understand an opposite without positing its opposite as well. {Instead of "insofar as, [etc.]" it would have been better to say: "if the Not-I is posited," etc. The Not-1 is supposed to appear as a certain quantity or sphere of our activity. But this is not possible unless its opposite, the I, also appears within consciousness at the same time; and within this identity, the I must be simultaneously posited [along with the Not-1], for the Not-1 is nothing at all. But what is posited and what is posited in opposition thereto cancel each other out, and this is therefore a contradiction. "" "dieses entgegensetzen ist absolut---weil ich entgegensetze, und entgegen setzen mufl."
§
2
137
pp. 1 07-g. Resolution of this contradiction.} p. 107, no. 1. If opposites are now to continue to exist alongside each other, the I must possess the power to posit opposites together in one and the same {state or} act of consciousness, {namely, in intuition,} for neither is possible without the other. {No I without a Not-I, no activity apart fro.m repose, etc. This is one and the same act. Neither term is a part of the act, but both originate at the same time and accompany each other.} The I thus possesses the power to proceed synthetically. "To synthesize"31 means "to posit together" or "to combine." But only things posited in opposition to each other can be posited in combination. 32 {In order for an act of combining to occur, opposites must be able to occur alongside each other in one and the same act of consciousness.} Thus, if these terms are to be combined in a single act, then the I must be able to bring opposites-and hence, a manifoldinto being within a single act, and such an act must therefore possess a certain scope or range. 33 {Therefore, insofar as we assume that our activity possesses a certain range or scope, a unified manifold has to exist. 34 For, as the conscious subject, l have to discover that I am active; but this is impossible unless I think of myself as engaged in a movement of transition from repose to activity.} This range of this act within which a manifold is combined and through which the manifold becomes pos-
sible is called "the capadty for quantity" in the book. Consciousness of this mode of acting includes that from which the transition is to be made and that to which it is to be made, as well as the acting itself. {The activity consists in this very movement. I thereby obtain both ( 1) what is discovered, i.e., that from which I make a movement of transition, and (2) that which is, as it were, produced before my very eyes, i.e., what is intended. The activity binds together both of these, what is discovered and what is intended; and in this way makes them both immediate objects of consciousness. To be sure, they are only indirectly glimpsed within the activity; both are included within the same action, which, as such, is merely their vehicle, as it were. Consciousness, however, includes all three: that from which the transition is made; that to which it is made; and the movement oftransitiorl, or the activity itself.} Consciousness is not an act; it is a state of repose and includes a multiplicity-at the same time that it is led to go beyond it. Within consciousness, everything is simultaneously united and separated. This is the meaning of "limits," "divisibility," and the "capacity for quantity," p. 108, no. 8. ~~Reading, with Krause's MS, HSynthesiren" for K's "Synthesis." ·'" "Synthesis soli heifk:n zusammensezen; nun kann aber nur zusammengesen werden, was [et}was entgegengesetzt ist." Rather than emend the fi~t "was," as Fuchs does, Radrizzani suggests that the second wwas" represents merely a careless repetition of the fi~t. ~ "einen Umfang haben." 54 "Es muiJ also ein Mannigfaltiges daseyn, das in Einem beisammen ist."
(43)
46
p. JOg, no. g. "I as well [as Not-1], etc." This might give rise to some misunderstanding. I and Not-1 are only parts of the manifold. They lie within the same consciousness and are not separable from each other; they are partes integrantes. 35 The act of limiting is based upon this: what the one is, the other is not. But this does not mean that either the I or the Not-1 is to be further divided. What this passage should say is that consciousness is divisible into an I and a Not-1. p. JOg. "Only now ... something." To say that the I and the Not-I are now both "something" means that we can now ascribe predicates to them, which occurs only by means of opposition. The only way that anythin~ can be "something" is by being posited in opposition to something else. {p. JOg. "Consciousness contains all reality": I.e., consciousness is that which witnesses acting. All determinability, everything that can subsequently be posited, is included within this act.} pp. JOg-•o, D. All that has been proven is that if the I is to attain consciousness, then it must posit a Not-1; but it has not been proven that the I must attain consciousness. {Concerning this remark, there remains a gap that needs to be filled: namely, we have to provide a deduction of the postulate upon which everything that has been established so far rests. The postulate states: The I appears outside of itself, as it were, and makes itself into an object. Why should and why must the I do this?} (p. 36) ""integral parts." L For anything to "be something" means that one can ascribe a predicate to it, albeit only by means of opposition: What is I is not Not-I (p. 43).
(44)
§ 3
47
The I's action of self-positing is a movement of transition from indeterminacy to determinacy. 1 We must now reflect upon this action in order to discover how the I passes from indeterminacy to determinacy. {What is it that mediates this action of self-positing, that is, this movement of transition from what is determinable to what is determinate?} ( 1) No grounds can here be adduced for this action, for we have reached
the limit of all reasons. 2 All one has to do at this point is to observe what is there to be seen. Everyone will see that nothing mediates [this movement of transition from indeterminacy to determinacy]. The I undertakes this movement of transition because it undertakes this movement of transition; it determines itself because it determines itself. It accomplishes this transition by means of a self-grounding act of absolute freedom, and this is a creation out of nothing, an act of producing something that did not exist before, an absolute beginning. {The I passes from what is determiruJJle to whai is determinate in, as it were, a single bound.} The state of indeterminacy does not contain within itself any foundation or reason for the ensuing determinacy, for each of these two states cancels the other. At moment A, I was undetermined, and this indeterminacy constituted my entire nature. !I At moment B, I am determinate; something new is present, and it has arisen from me. This passage [from indeterminacy to determinacy] is accomplished by means of a self-grounding act of freedom. 1 InK,§~ begins with a summary paragraph under the heading"§ 3 (1798)." Since this paragraph is virtually identical to the summary paragraph that concludes § 3, it has been omitted from the translation. See below, n. 24. 2 "'Hier giebt es keine Griinde; wirsind an der Grenze allerGriinde."There can, in principle, be no Grilntk (reasons) for the ultimate Grund (foundation). ' "denn beide heben sich auf. lm Moment A war ich unbestimmt, mein ganzen Wesen wurde in dieser Unbestimmtheit aufgehoben." The last clause could also be rendered "and this indeterminacy canceled my entire nature."
(4~
140
§ 3
(2) The activity that expresses itself in this freely initiated movement of transition is called "real activity," {for it is an act of generating or creating something on its own. Unlike its opposite, namely, that act of intuiting, which we will call "ideal activity," this real activity was not produced from the preceding state of indeterminacy. This act of absolute freedom is not the content, but rather the form of the act of transition from determinability to determinacy.} The act in which this transition is accomplished is called a "practical act"; and the field within which it expresses itself is called "the field of the practical." We observed this act and are continuing to do so. The activity in which such observation occurs is called "ideal activity." As an idealiter4 active, intuiting subject, I now discover this act of absolute freedom. But I can neither discover nor describe it without positing something in opposition to it. "I determine myself': this means that I transform a possibility into a reality, a power 5 into an activity. I accomplish this absolutely free act of self-determination by means of a {practical} power to determine myself through absolute freedom. A The term "power" signifies the possibility of activity. But one cannot understand this unless one sets forth the law of reflection through which the concept of power originates. Power is nothing but another way of looking at activity. Any particular act can be intuited only when it is explained with reference to a power, and this also applies to the act of absolute freedom. There is no power apart from activity and no activity apart from power. They are one and the same thing, simply construed from two different sides: construed as an intuition, it is an activity; construed as a concept, it is a power. {Something can be said to possess a "practical power" if it possesses the possibility of becoming something else-insofar as this possibility is thought of as in a state of repose, apart from activity. The power we are here concerned with would thus be the concept of absolute freedom, or the very act of intuition. This concept and this act determine each other reciprocally.}
48
(3) The sharp difference between ideal and real activity can be easily stated. Ideal activity is an activity in a state of repose, an act of positing 4 '"mEALITER." Fichte employs the Latin terms idealiter ("in an ideal sense") and realiter ("in a real sense") to designate actions, respectively, of the "ideal" and the "real" powers discussed in the previous section. To act realiter is thus to engage in practical, efficacious action. To act itkaliter is to become aware of the previous sort of action realiter.
~ "ein VermOgen."
Since no act can be clearly intuited unless something is posited in opposition to it, we will posit in opposition to this act of absolute freedom a practical power of absolule freedom (p. A
44>·
in a state of repose, an act that loses itself in the object, an act of intuiting, which is fixed in the object. 6 Real activity is true activity, which is an instance of acting. {Real activity consists in agility, in the transition to acting, and contains within itself the reason why it is determined in a particular way. Thus it is not anythiQg fixed, but is self-determining.} Ideal activity can also be in motion and can also be a movement of transition; indeed, when engaged in intuiting freedom, the ideal activity really is such a movement of transition, but what makes an act of intuiting a movement of transition is not anything that lies within the act of intuiting itself, but is instead derived from the object intuited, which, in this case, is freedom. The intuiting subject obtains only an image or copy [of its object]. Unlike real activity, ideal activity does not possess within itself the ground of its determinate being, and this is why it is in a state of passive repose. The ideal activity has its foundation in the reality 7 that lies before it. {The real activity produces something rea1 8-it is the condition for the possibility of all intuiting. The ideal activity is only an act of mirroring or copying, an act of observing the productive act-an act of representingof grasping something through concepts. It is not our real goal.} These two activities can be comprehended only in opposition to each other. (4) Let us specify more dearly the nature of the ideal and real activities by contrasting them with each other. (A) There can be no real activity of the I apart from ideal activity, for it is the essence of the I to posit itself. In order for the l's activity to be real, it must be [posited] by the I,9 but it is posited by means of the ideal activity. 8 We ascribe force to a natural object; but, since such an object lacks consciousness, we do not say that it possesses this force "for itself." Only the I possesses force for itself. (B) Conversely, there is no ideal activity of the I apart from real activity. An ideal activity is a [real] activity that has been posited by the I 6 "eine i.;_ die Ruhe sezen, ein sich im Objeae verlieren, ein im Objecte fixirtes Anschauen." The translation follows Fuchs's alternate reading of this passage, which substitutes "in der Ruhe" for "in die Ruhe." 7 "in dem realen:• 8 "Die REALE bringt etwas R.EEu.ES hervor." 9 "so mull sie duoch das Ich sein." It appean likely, especially in the light of the next sentence, that the word g.saJ ("posited") should be inserted in this sentence, between "Ich" and "sein." Without this interpolation, the sentence could be translated: "In order for the l's aaivity to be real, it must be produced by the I." 8 There is no real activity (qua activity of the I) without ideal aaivity; for the selfpositing of the I is impossible without ideal activity, and the aa of self-positing is precisely the I-hence the I too would not exist if the ideal activity did not exist (p. 45).
49
and has then itself become an object of reflection and is, in turn, represented by means of ideal activity. Otherwise, the I would be like a mirror, which indeed "represents" things, but does not then turn around and represent itself. • That the ideal activity itself becomes an object in turn is something postulated along with the I. But it is made into an object by real activity. Thus if there is no real activity, then there can be no self-intuition of the ideal activity. Without the real activity, the ideal activity would have no object, nor would it be anything if the real activity had not placed something before it.c {Thus, without real activity, there would be no activity of the I as an object. Ideal activity is the product of the practical power.} (C) Without noticing it, we have already {filled the gap} indicated above; 10 that is, we have shown that immediate consciousness is no consciousness at all, but is a hollow self-positing that produces nothing, an intuition in which nothing is intuited. Thus we have discovered the answer to the question, How is it that the I goes beyond immediate consciousness and forms consciousness within itself? 11 For if the I is to exist at all, then immediate consciousness must, in turn, be posited through absolute freedom. 0 This act of placing oneself before oneself through absolute freedom is a free act; but, if the I is to exist, this same act is also necessary. Accordingly, the ideal activity would be a product of the practical power, and the practical power would be the existential foundation of the ideal activity. Nevertheless, one should not think of these as separated from each other. The ideal is the subjective aspect of the practical; it is that which witnesses the practical; and, since nothing exists for the I except what is observed by the I, it is therefore only thanks to the ideal activity that anything exists for the I. {In §§ 1 and 2 the task was to produce the I. The task of§ 3 is to discover the basis for the I's movement of transition from what is determinable to determination. The former task was based upon the ideal activity, the latter upon the real activity. The former witnessed the productive activity; the latter is the productive activity itself. This real activity is thus the condition for the possibility of all intuiting, for there is no intuiting without acting. Real activity is therefore the foundation of c Conversely, there is no ideal activity apart from a real activity of the I. It is by means of the real activity that the I itself, in turn, becomes an object for itself (p. 45). 10 The "gap" left open by our previous failure to answer the question, "Why must the I apr.;ar to itself as an object?" 1 "wie k.ommt das Ich dazu aus dem unmittelbare Bewustsein herauszugehen, und in sich das Bewustsein zu bilden." 0 How then can the I proceed beyond immediate consciousness? It does this by positing itself, which occurs when immediate consciousness becomes consciousness. This occurs through the act offreedom, that is, through an act in which consciousness places itself before itself and produces itself out of itself- i.e., by means of spontaneous self-activity, which constitutes the essence of the I (p. 45).
(45)
§ 3
143
ideal activity. The ideal activity is the product of the practical power. At bottom, however, these are but one and the same action, simply considered from different points of view. Therefore, if one is what is grasped conceptually, 12 the other is what is intuited, and vice versa. Neither can exist apart from the other, without which it is nothing at all.} 1, the subject who acts realiter, 1 ~ affect myself. First I am undetermined, and then I become determinate. I accomplish this by myself. I grasp and lay hold of myself realiter. Since this is an act of a self-affecting I, this act of [self-]affecting is accompanied by an ideal activity, by an act of intuiting-in short, by consciousness. Precisely because it becomes consciousness, this consciousness becomes an intuition of itself. {An image of this real activity is that of a river that continues to flow even while it mirrors itself in our eye. What our eye does when it observes the river corresponds to the ideal activity. Real activity is also what in ordinary life is called "exerting oneself'i.e., generating, from out of ourselves, as it were, a new effort that exceeds our customary effort.} To say that self-intuition is a product of the practical power means: insofar as I affect [myself] realiter, I observe myself; and this act of observation constitutes self-intuition.
50
(5) It is here taken as established that there is nothing except what is in consciousness. We have seen that there is no consciousness apart from real activity, i.e., without absolute freedom. Everything that can exist exists only in conjunction with and by means of absolute freedom. Without absolute freedom there is nothing. {We began with the proposition, "nothing exists except what is within consciousness." But there is no consciousness without freedom; therefore, freedom is the standpoint of all philosophy, as Kant correctly remarked somewhere, 14 although he does not call attention to this within his own system.} Thus freedom is the ground of all philosophizing, as well as the foundation of all being. Take your stand upon your own self, upon freedom: you will then possess a firm standpoint. Consciousness is immediately connected with freedom; indeed, there is nothing else with which it could be connected. Freedom is the first and immediate object of consciousness. All consciousness reverts into itself. Ordinary common sense recognizes this when it says, "I am conscious of 12
"das Begriffene." , afficire mich selbst, ich der realiter thatige." See above, n. 4 of this §. See Kant's description of the concept of freedom as "the keystone of the whole architecture of the system of pure reason and even of speculative reason" in the Preface to his Krilik der prnJUischm Vemtmfi ( 1786, KGS, V: 3-4; English translation by Lewis White Beck, Critique of Practical Reas011 [Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956], pp. 3-4), as well as his characterization of the Idea of freedom as the "Archimedean point" of reason in his 1796 essay, "Von einem neuerdings erhobenen vornehmen Ton in der Philosophie" (KGS, VIII: 403). ·~ "lch 14
144
§3
something for me. " 15 Nothing is explained if we think of the I as a mere subject, for we will then have to seek a new subject for this subject, and so on ad infinitum. Consequently, we must think of the I as a subjectobject. Such an ideal subject-object, however, does not explain anything either; something else must be added, something that, in relation to this subject, can be a mere object, the object of which I am consciousness. But from where can such an object come? The dogmatist says that the object is "given." Or, if he wishes to combine criticism with dogmatism, he says that the material content 16 is given. But this explains nothing; it is a mere empty word rather than a concept. The idealist says that the object is "produced." Stated in this way, however, this answer does not explain anything either. For even if it is true that the object is the product of the I, insofar as the I engages in real activity, it is equally true that, insofar as the activity in which the I engages is "real" activity, 17 the I is not an ideal being at all, and hence the product produced by the efficaciously acting 118 would have to be "given" to the representing subject-and we would thus be back with the dogmatism with which we began. • Our question can be answered only as follows: The intuiting subject and the productive subject are immediately one and the same. {Above, we have deduced this identity as a product of our ideal power, by virtue of which our I is for itself an immediate subject-object, and thus, we have exhibited an immediate consciousness, which cannot, in turn, be made anew into an object-which is how the dogmatist becomes entangled in an endless circle. Instead, our I, as an immediate subject-object, is the fixed point beyond which philosophy cannot and may not go. I act because I act. I am immediately aware that I am conscious because I am aware that I am conscious-so here as well: We must have something that is the immediate object of this ideal [power], for otherwise such ideal activity would be an empty Idea; and the object in question is freedom, productive activity, the intuiting subject, /-hood in its entirety.} 19 The intuiting subject witnesses its own productive activity. The immediate object of consciousness is no object as such, but is rather the productive activity 15 "Ich bin mir etwas bewu~t." Unfortunately, the point of this sentence depends upon a particularity of the German language (or is it a particularity of German common sense?): that the verb "to be conscious" always takes a reflexive, dative object. 16 "Stoff." A feature of K. L. Reinhold's "Elementary Philosophy" is its distinction between the "content" (given) and the "form" (produced) of experience. For Fichte's critique of Reinhold's way of making this distinction, see his 1794 review of Aenesidemus (SW, 1: 17-18 = AA l, 2: s8-6o; English translation in EPW, pp. 71~2). 17 "in wiefern es REALth3tigen Wesens ist." 18 "das wirkende Ich." 19 "Ich bin mir daher unmittelbar bewu~t. wei! ich mir bewu~t bin.-so auch hier. Wir mii~n etwas haben, das in Beziehung auf dieses IDEALE UNMITI'ELBARES OBJEKT ist weil sonst jene IDEALE Thatigkeit LEERE IDEE ist-u. dieses ist die Freiheit, das MACHEN-das ANSCHAUENDE---
(46)
,,
§ 3
51
145
itself-i.e., freedom. The sentence, "the I posits itself," thus has two inseparably linked meanings: an ideal and a real meaning, which are simply united in the I. There is no ideal positing without real spontaneity, 20·E and the converse is also true. There is no self-intuition without freedom, and vice versa. Nor is there any consciousness without self-intuition. Prior to the act of freedom, there is nothing; everything that exists comes into being along with this act of freedom. But the only way we are able to think of this act is as a movement of transition from a preceding state of determinability to one of determinacy. Thus, from whichever side we look, we are always speaking of the same thing, though we view it in two different ways, and the axis around which everything turns is the act of freedom. But this free act itself is not possible unless it is accompanied, on the one hand, by determinability or immediate consciousness and, on the other, by what is supposed to be produced, i.e., the intuited 1. 21 Neither of these two is separable from the other, and both depend upon absolute freedom. No person can point to the first act of his consciousness, because every moment [of consciousness] is a movement of transition from indeterminacy to determinacy, and thus every moment always presupposes another one. 22 {Accordingly, this act of freedom lies originally at the foundation of everything that exists. All that exists does so by means of this act. But if this is so, then why are we only now calling attention to this origin? Should this not have been presented in § 1? Reply: As finite intellects we are able to think only discursively; and therefore, in order to describe and to intuit this act of freedom, we had to employ the help of something determinable. We could make our immediate consciousness into an object only indirectly-i.e., by means of determinacy-and therefore we had to discuss this first.} 20
Selbstanfangen." ideal self-positing a pan from a real act of affecting or limiting oneself (p. 46). The translation here represents a rather free rendering of the German text, a more literal version of which would be: "Thus, whether we go forward or backward, we are always speaking of the same thing, though we view it in two different ways, and the axis around which everything turns is the act of freedom. The act of freedom, however, is itself impossible if there is nothing on the right (determinability, immediate consciousness) and nothing on the left (what is supposed to be produced, the intuited 1)." Radrizzani plausibly suggests that Fichte, in this passage, was referring to a diagram drawn on the blackboard-which would explain the otherwise puzzling references to "left," "right," "forward," and "backward." 22 See Fichte's announcement of this conclusion in his letter to Reinhold of july 2, 1795: 'The surprising result is now revealed [ ... ): namely, th.at there is no A that is absorbed into consciousness first, nor can there be. Instead, however high one ascends, something higher is always presupposed. For example, every intuition is necessarily posited in the presem point in time; but there is no presenJ point in time without a past one. Hence there is also no present intuition without a past intuition to which it is joined. and there is no first moment, no beginning of consciousness." "REALES
E No 21
What is actually first, realiter, is freedom. But freedom cannot come first in the order of thinking, and that is why we had to begin with the investigations undertaken so far, which lead us to [an investigation of] freedom.
One will find that this movement of transition [from what is determinable to what is determinate] 2 .'1 (§ 2) possesses its foundation utterly within itself. 2'~ The action involved in this transition is therefore called "real activity" and is opposed to that ideal activity which merely copies the former, and the overall {activity ofthe} I is thereby divided into these two types of activity. In accordance with the principle of determinability, no real activity can be posited without also positing a real or practical power. Real and ideal activity mutually condition and determine each other. Neither is possible without the other, nor can one comprehend what either of them is without also comprehending the other. In this act of freedom, the I itself becomes an object for itself. An actual consciousness comes into being, and from now on anything that is to be an object of consciousness at all must be connected to this starting point. Freedom is therefore the ultimate ground and the first condition of all being and of all consciousness. 3 " These bracketed words appear in the copy of this paragraph which Krause included in the summary of the "Major Points of the WisseruchafLslehTe of •798/gg," with which the manuscript of K commences. •• The otherwise nearly identical, alternate version of the summary paragraph for § 3 begins somewhat differently; "This movement of transition, as such, is intuited as possessing its foundation ullerly within itself" (K, p. 46).
§
4
Through absolute freedom, which has just been described, I determine myself to become "something." 1 I engage in an act of positing, and in this condition of determinacy I have a concept. Acting is always2 guided by some concept; thus I act freely whenever I spontaneously construct for myself a concept. Our present task, however, is to obtain a clear understanding of the foundations [of this process]. 52
( 1) In the previous § the act of mere self-affection was construed as real activity.!! This activity was then intuited and was seen to include the proper act of the real activity. The ideal activity is now supposed to witness the I engaged in this act of self-affection; but, at least according to what we know about it so far, it is unable to do this. The real activity of the I could be viewed only as a movement of transition from determinability to determinacy-i.e., [what is observed isJ not an act of pure selfaffection, but determinability and determinacy, and both at the same time. What is determinate allows itself to be cognized only as follows: it is not what is determinable. 4 What is determinate must be intuitable; for only if it is intuitable is freedom possible, and freedom is the condition for the possibility of consciousness. {Absolute freedom-self-determination, practical power-must be intuitable; for, as real activity (i.e., as practical power in action), it must produce something real-a "something," a "being"-and, therefore, 1 "bestimme ich mich zu etwas." That is, I determine myself in a certain way. • Reading, with Krause's MS, "immer" for K's "nur." s "REALE Thatigkeit." • "Das Bestimmte laflt sich nur so erkennen, dafl es das Bestimmbare nicht ist." The translation of this obscure sentence-indeed, of this entire paragraph-is conjectural. As Radrizzani remarks, the attention of the student transcribing Fichte's lecture appean to have wandered somewhat at this point.
[ 1471
(4
q8
§ 4
something intuitable. In the following § we will examine what this "something" might be. For the time being, let us call it "X." I affect myself; I take hold of myself; I wrench myself away from a state of indeterminacy and transform myself into something determinate = X: I am really active precisely thereby, and it is through this product = X that the real activity can itself be intuited.} The ideal activity is, by its very character, however, constrained and arrested and can occur only subsequently to a real activity. Something must be posited in opposition to this ideal activity, something that brings it to a halt; this is something real, 5 and, to this extent, something determined as such.A (This is not yet the place to explain how what is determinate becomes "something.") Let us call this "something" "X," which designates a being, which the ideal activity merely copies, something that annihilates true activity. {Nevertheless, this ideal activity is necessary; for without it, I would not be conscious of the acting of the real activity. The ideal activity is the subject; the real activity is the object. But both acts have their foundation in a single subject, the I; indeed, the identity and the essential character of the I consists precisely therein: namely, in the fact that it can be, for itself, subject and object at the same time, that it posits itself.) It will become apparent that this being [which is copied by the ideal activity] has to be taken in some sense other than as what cancels real activity. Thus we obtain two different senses of "being," and the sort of being with which we are here concerned will turn out to be the sort of being possessed by the concept of a goal. {This operation of the practical power, by means of which what is established becomes an I, 6 presupposes the concept of a goal, which the practical power must construct for itself before it can engage in real activity. The subject of the practical power is thereby transformed into a pawer to form concepts. 7} (2) This X is itself a product of absolute freedom. That is to say, spontaneous self-activity must contain within itself the ground that explains why, on the one hand, there is anything at all that exists with this connection to consciousness, and why, on the other, what exists is precisely "X'' and is not "-X." 5
"eine REELLES., AJn observing the acting of my real activity, the ideal activity is purely passive; it is thus constrained and fixed, and it vanishes into this observation, that is, into its object (p. 47). 6 "wodurch das begriindete zum lch wird." Note that the corresponding passage in K replaces das begrilndete ("what is established") with das begrilndende ("the grounding subject"), which seems to make better sense in this context. 7 "zu einem Vermiigen tier Begriffe."
(48)
§4
53
149
(The term "ground" must here be explained only to the extent that its meaning becomes clear. Later on, the meaning of this term will be deduced.) The ideal activity is constrained in two ways: first of all, by the fact that any X at all exists for it, 8 and second, by the fact that this X is determined in a specific way. To this extent, the ideal activity is passive. 9 [Thus] something else needs be thought of in addition [to the ideal activity and X]: something that constrains or binds the ideal activity and, specifically, binds it to X. This is not X itself, but is freedom. It is freedom that has produced X itself; this means that freedom contains within itself the ground of X. Why is it then that, in this case, the grounding subject 10 is posited as an I? It is the ideally active [power] 11 that engages in this act of positing and that posits the practical [power] as itself. The ideally active [power] must operate in this way because it is acquainted only with what lies within itself. Since it is engaged in forming images, it must posit the practical [power] as similarly engaged. It, as it were, "projects" an image-forming activity into the practical [power], and it is by means of this image [thereby attributed to the practical power] that the ideal discovers itself in the latter. 12 This attribution of intuition [to the practical power] is the point that unites them. I!! The practical [power], however, insofar as it is freely able to initiate action, is not engaged in any activity of mere copying. Consequently, the image formed of the practical [power] is not a copy; it is a prefiguration or model. 14 {To prove this, one need only examine the meaning of freedom. "I act freely": that is to say, "I spontaneously construct for myself a concept of my 8 Although Krause's MS reads "da~ sie fiir ein X da ist," the translation here follows the published text of K ("da~ fur sie ein X da ist"), which seems to make more sense in this context. 9 "leidend." I.e., it is affected by something else. 10 "das Begriindende." I.e. the freely active subject, here considered as providing the "ground" or "foundation" for the constraint (and hence for the determinacy) of the ideal activity. 11 "das ideale ist [es]." Throughout this entire paragraph, Fichte refers repeatedly to "das ideale," "das praktische," and "es," without ever specifying precisely how these terms are to be taken. Though diJs ideale might here refer to the 1 itself (das Ich), i.e., to the "ideal 1," the corresponding passage in H clearly suggests that the reference is to the "ideal" (and "practical") puwer (diJs Vermiigen) of the I, a reading that is confirmed by the dictn.t to § 1 in H. 2 "Es ist bildend, es mu~ das praktische sonach auch sezen als bildend. Es sieht gleichsam ein Bilden in das praktische hinein, und die~ Bild ists, wodurch das praktische dem idealen zu sich selbst wird." 13 Reading "sie" for K's "es." 14 "Nun aber ist das praktische als frei anfangend kein nachbilden, jenes Bild des praktischen ist daher kein Nachbild sondern ein Vorbild." Though the term VtWbild is usually translated here as "model," this translation obscures the connection among Bild ("image"), Nachbild ("copy"), and VtWbild. The last-named designates an image that is not copied from some previously existing reality, but instead precedes it.
150
§4
action." Therefore, the concept of a goal must always underlie every free action. The product ( = some X) is what I am supposed to achieve by means of my own free action. My I, considered as the subject of my practical power (i.e., as forming an image of itself and developing itself accordingly, 15 as self-initiating, and as consciously acting), must therefore always construct for itself in advance the concept of this goal. It requires, as it were, a "model," 16 the realization of which is the goal of the real activity.} The intuiting subject is constrained by its very nature; i.e., it can act only in consequence of something else. The subject that acts realiter is absolutely free; it cannot be a consequence of anything else, but must, with absolute freedom, construct a concept for itself, and such a concept is "the concept of a goal" 17 or "an ideal." One does not claim that anything corresponds to such a concept; instead, one claims that something should be produced in consequence of it. The only way we can think of an instance of free acting at all is to think of it in this way, that is, as an acting that occurs in consequence of a [freely] constructed concept of acting; and when we think of it in this manner, we ascribe intelligence to the practical power. Freedom cannot be thought of apart from intelligence; freedom cannot exist without consciousness. 8 To deny consciousness is to deny freedom, and similarly, to ascribe consciousness is to ascribe freedom. The ground of one's ability to act freely lies within consciousness. {For without consciousness no spontaneous movement of transition to an opposed condition is possible. Absolute spontaneity or freedom is present only in such a movement, which simultaneously-and consciously-serves as the foundation for one being and, at the same time, as the foundation for another. In nature we also find movements of transition from one state to another, opposed state: e.g., a tree in winter and in spring. But such transitions are necessary and have their foundation in the laws of nature; they occur without consciousness and therefore without freedom. Thus consciousness contains within itself the reason why we are able to think of freedom. No acts of self-affecting are to be found among the operations of external nature-which includes nothing that interacts with itself in order to become its own opposite, no self-reverting activity, no self-determination. Why then does this occur within the I?} The I determines itself. The little word "self' refers to "the 1." The I determines itself; in determining itself it already possesses an awareness 15
"als selbst bildenden." "ein Vorbild." "ein Zwekbegriff." 8 Without intellect-i.e., without something that has a concept, a consciousness, of its own activity.....u.ere is therefore no freedom (p. 48). 16 17
54
of itself. Anything that is to determine itself must possess an awareness of itself, and what possesses an awareness of itself is an intellect. 18 The I is aware of its own existence. Here the I appears as something double-and indivisibly so. Such indivisible duality, however, is precisely what constitutes subject-objectivity, or consciousness. Consciousness alone originally possesses synthetic unity. Everything else is synthetically unified 'only {through it}.c A self-determining being exists for itself, and therefore we ascribe freedom to the intellect. {Therefore, "I determine myself' means the same thing as "I am, for myself or in relation to myself, an intellect [aware of] of my practical power." Conversely, it also means the same as "no consciousness or ideal activity or intellect can be thought of apart from freedom or real activity."} Intelligence cannot be separated from the practical [power], but the intellect too must be practical. There can be no consciousness without real freedom. The unity of intellect and practical power is a necessary unity. Consciousness (see § 1) is an act of positing itself idealiter. 19 The term "ideal" simply refers to "an act of positing." All positing is selfpositing; all positing begins with and is mediated through self-positing. The I, as described by previous philosophers, is a mirror. But a mirror does not see, and this is why these philosophers are unable to explain "seeing" or intuition. All they posit is the concept of mirroring. {This remark reveals the basis of all the errors of other philosophical systerns-the Kantian system included.} This error can be rectified only by mearis of a correct concept of the I. The I of the Wissenschaftslehre is not a mirror; it is an eye. (We can always find some external image to il.lustrate everything that occurs within our mind.) A person who is unacquainted with the I also lacks knowledge of what an eye is. The traditional view makes it impossible to understand how the eye is able to see anything at all. The eye, however, is a self-mirroring mirror. 20 It is the 18 "das sich bestimmen soli, muj3 sich selbst haben, and was sich selbst hat, i.st eine Intelligenz.." To make sense of this sentence, one must insert the word uw between da.s and sich. The verb translated here as "to be aware of its own existence" (sich haben) might be more literally rendered as "to possess iiSelf." cOne need only analyze what is involved in saying "the I determines itself': In this phrase the I is tloubkd. It appears as "I" and as "iiSelf." Only what is aware of its own existence can be "for itself."' And whatever is aware of its own .existence also possesses consciousness; it is an intellect. I (the determining subject) determine myself (the I); thus I determine 1. These two aspects are therefore indivisibly linked: the 1 is subject-{)bjectivity, or consciousness. This unity is synthetic; everything else is unified only through it (p. 48). 19 "Die Vereinigung zwischen lntelligenz und praktischem Vermogen ist nothwendiges BewWitsein (§ 1) ist ein sich selbst idealiter sezen." This sentence requires some additional punctuation. Fuchs and Radrizzani both insert a period after Brorwtein. The translation, however, guided by the corresponding passage in H, puts the period after notwendige.r (and also alters its ending, so that It can modify die Veninigung). 20 "In der gewohnlichen Ansicht soli das Auge nicht sehen, etwas d[ur]ch das Auge ist ein sich selbst abspiegelnder Spiegel." This sentence demands some emendation. The
(49)
152
§4
very essence of the eye to be an image for itself, and to be an image for itself is also the essence of the intellect. By means of its own seeing, the eye itself-like the intellect itself-becomes an image for itself. An image is reflected in a mirror, but the mirror cannot see the image. The intellect, in contrast, becomes an image for itself. What is in the intellect is an image and nothing else. But an image refers to an object: wherever there is an image, there must also be something that is portrayed [by this image]. 21 {An image is something that is only subjective. The ideal activity therefore requires an object, something that it copies; and this is the real activity.} The ideal activity has also been described, therefore, as an act of imitating or copying. Whenever a consciousness is assumed, an object of consciousness is also assumed. This object can be nothing but the acting of the I, 0 for the acting of the I is the sole, immediately intuitable object of consciousness; everything else is intuited only indirectly.22 Everything we see, we see within ourselves. We see only ourselves, and we see ourselves only as acting, only as passing from what is determinable to what is determinate. The I is neither the intellect nor the practical power; instead, it is both at once. {The I becomes a real I by acting and observing its own acting, thereby providing the practical power itself with a basis for intuition; that is, the I becomes a real I insofar as it is simultaneously subject and object and simultaneously possesses both ideal and real power.} If we want to grasp the I, we have to grasp both of these; separated from each other, they are nothing at all. {That to which self-activity determines itself-the freely constructed concept of its goal-is thus a "something" = X. Otherwise it would not be possible to intuit the self-determination.} Everything is thus included within the practical I-practical activity23 as well as intuition. We now have a real I and a mere Idea [that is, the concept of a goal]. We must begin with what is real, and thus from now on we will be observing the actual acting of an actual I. This is an actual fact: the I determines itself by means of its concept. Both practical power and intelligence are to be ascribed to the I. translation inserts a period after etwas and simply ignores the next word (the reading of which is only conjectural anyway, as Fuchs notes). 21 "wo ein Bild ist, mufl etwas sein das abgebildet wird." 0 Thus the opposite inference is also correct: There can be no ideality of reality, no ideal activity (consciousness or intellect) apart from practical power or real activity; for the immediate object of the intellect (or ideal activity) is the acting of the I, namely, the movement of transition from determinability, etc. This mode of acting, however, is a product of the practical power; that is, it is a real activity (p. 49). 22 "alles Handeln des Ich ist nur unmittelbar anschaubar, alles iibrige nur mittel bar." The meaning of this sentence is clarified by the parallel passage in H: "Nur dieses is UNMI'ITELBAR anschaubar," etc. 25 "PRAXIS."
Free self-determination is intuitable only as a determination to become "something," of which the self-determining or practical {power} must possess a {freely constructed} concept. A concept of this sort is called "the concept of a goal." Consequently, for the intuiting subject, the ·same subject who possesses practical power must also possess the power to form concepts, just as, conversely, the comprehending subject, or {the power of} intellect, must necessarily be practical. 24 Practical power and intelligence are inseparable. Neither can be thought of apart from the other. The {true} character of the I thus lies in this identity. 24 "Sonach werde dem Anschauenden das Subjea des prak.t[ischen] Verm[ogens] zugleich zu einem Vermogen der Begriffe, so wie umgek.ehrt das Subject des Begriffs oder die lntelligenz nothwendig prak.tisch sein mu~."
(4'
§
55
5
Anything that can be intuited is "something." "Something" and intuition are reciprocal concepts.A What spontaneous self-activity determines itself to become is "something." What kind of "something" is this? This will be the object of our present investigation. ( 1) Up to this point in our inquiry we have been reflecting upon a particular state of the intellect, {namely, upon an intuition of the movement of transition from determinability to determinacy}. Determinability, movement, and determinacy: all these were contained within this simple fact. 1 But how does it happen that what is determinable and what is determinate are intuitable? Such a question could not even be raised within the context of that state of mind with which we were previously concerned; there they were simply intuitable. When I now ask about the possibility of this fact, I thereby go beyond it; I raise myself above it and make what was previously an act of reflection into the object of a new reflection. {Thus this intuition provides us with the object of a new reflection.} At this point, certain questions still remain open: for example, the question concerning how it is possible to raise oneself above the first act of reflection will remain open. Here we will freely execute this [second, higher-order] act of reflection, 8 and if this provides us with [further inA
"Something" designates whatever can be related to an intuition-what is intuitable
(p. 49)1 This represents a somewhat free rendering of the text of K, which is defective at this point and contains several short illegible words (''Es [ ... ] war Bestimmbarkeit, Uibergehen und Bestimmtheit, diefi lag im einfachten FACTUM"). Presumably, the "simple fact" in question is the state of the intellect upon which we have been reflecting = the intuition of the movement from determinability to determinacy. B We will leave unanswered the question of whether this apparently free operation may not also be at the same time necessary--as it may well prove to be in what follows. Here again, in the meantime, a gap will remain (pp. 49-50).
[ 1541
(49)
§5
56
155
formation concerning] the necessary conditions for consciousness, then we will have obtained a great deal. But how are we able to do this? Eventually, we will have to establish the foundation of the act of reflection we are now going to describe, for otherwise our act of understanding would be of no use. Here we will proceed just as we did above {in§ 1 and§ 2}, where we began with a description of original consciousness as an ideal act of self-positing. We then posited the I in this state of self-positing; and though it seemed that all this occurred with complete freedom, we showed that these actions had to occur if an I was to be possible at all. (2) The question now is, How can something that is generated through absolute spontaneity nevertheless become intuitable? That is to say, what is it really? We saw above that the question "what?" always signals an opposition. When I ask "what is X?" I have in mind a sphere containing a manifold, any one of the elements of which might be X. I want to know which of these is X, and thus [before we can answer our present question] we first have to know what is supposed to be posited in opposition to what is produced through self-determination. Determinability and determinacy are related to the ideal activity, which is constrained, and thus is not a deed, 2 but is instead a state of the I. Consequently, what is intuited in this case can be characterized as something that restrains [the ideal activity] or brings it to a halt~ and can be related to the intuition. Perhaps it will turn out to be the case that everything intuitable is something restraining, because ideal activity is the sort of activity which can occur only as a result of something else. The sole thing to which ideal activity is immediately related is real activity. Consequently, whatever it might be that restrains ideal activity, the ideal activity can surely be related to it only indirectly. Accordingly, if the ideal activity is to be explained, then the practical activity has to be constrained; therefore, all limitation that appears within consciousness must spring from the practical activity. Thus, in order to explain the constrained state of the ideal activity, we have to examine the real activity.c 2 "ist nicht That." As Fuchs notes, this might also be an abbreviation for Thiitigkeit, ("activity"). '"sonach ist der Cha[rak]ter des hier angeschauten ein haltendes." c What is delerminable is refi!TTed to the ideal activity, though this occurs indirectly and by means of real activity (for the ideal activity is directly and immediately directed at the real activity, and by means of this it is also directed at what is determinable, that is, at the sphere of real activity). Ideal activity is therefore constrained or halted as such by what is determinable; thus, this activity is not a deed, but is merely a state of the I. Hence what is determinable is what stands in opposition to the product of the ideal activity. What is determinable is what brings the intuition of the ideal activity to a halt or restrains it, and ideal activity is what is restrained or halted thereby. Ideal activity is Hxed, brought to a halt, and constrained by the acting of the real activity within the sphere of what is determinable;
57
(A) As was previously shown, 4 the practical I constructs for itself a concept of its own activity, and such a concept is called "the concept of a goal." 5 The {real} activity of the I is a passage from pure determinability to determinacy. The latter is wrenched out of the total sum of the former, and this part that is wrenched out is the part that is comprehended or grasped through a concept. 6 "The I determines itself": this means that it makes a selection or choice from what is determinable, and this choice is guided by the concept; and to this extent, the I (considered as an intellect) was not free. Let us think of what is determinable as "something." This is an appropriate predicate, ,since what is determinable is intuitable. Absolute freedom makes its selection from this "something" lying within the sphere of the determinable. It cannot be constrained in making this choice, for then it would not be freedom. It can go on like this endlessly-choosing more or less [of this "something"]. No part is prescribed to absolute freedom as the last. This infinite divisibility will have many consequences (concerning space, time, and things). Everything [within this sphere] is infinitely divisible, because it is a sphere for our freedom. 0 The practical activity is not constrained in making its selection, for then it would cease to be freedom; it is constrained in this sense, however: i.e., in that it has to make its selection exclusively from what is determinable. What is determinable does not appear as something that has been produced, either by ideal or by real activity; instead, it appears to be something given for our selection. To say that it is "given" does not mean that it is given to the I as such or in its totality, but rather that it is given to the choosing, practical I. We have seen above7 that what is deconsequently, the ideal activity is related to this sphere purely passively-as a product, a mere observing, an intuition-not as something real. But this intuition would not occur if there were not something to bring the intuition to a halt, i.e., a sphere within which the real activity could show itself to be effectively active; and this sphere, this "something" that restrains intuition, is what is determinable. But precisely because the general character of what is determinable is to be something that fixes the ideal activity and brings it to a halt, it is intuitable--i.e., it is ftsomething." A "something," therefore, is what stands opposed to the ideal activity, what brings it to a halt and constrains it (p. 50). • See sect. 2 of § 4· 5 "wekher der Zweckbegriff hei~t." 6 "der herausgeri~ne Theil is der der begriffen wird.'' 0 What is determinable is therefure infiniuly divilible. It is a sphere that contains a manifold and cannot be simple, precisely because a selection is supposed to be made from it; and, since this selection is supposed to occur with absolute freedom, this manifold must be infinite. If what is determinable were to contain even a single part that could not be further separated or divided, then there would be no alnoluli! freedom. [The character of] what is determinable is therefore entirely and unconditionally dependent upon freedom (p~. 5<>-5•).
See sect.
1
of§
2.
(5o)
§5
58
•57
terminable arises from the laws of ideal activity. Thus one could say that it is given by virtue of the nature of reason. E Freedom consists in this: that one can choose from among everything. Constraint consists in this: that the selection must be made from this total sum. Here we obtain the concept of a determinate sum from which fre~dom makes its selection. A fart of this total sum is called a "determinate activity" or an "action." Remark: (1) We here obtain [the concept of] the total sum of what is determinable. We obtain this by reflecting upon our previous act of reflection, which is now construed as a determinate state of mind; but everything that is included therein thereby constitutes a complete whole. In § 1 there was no mention of the tolality of what is determinable; nor could there have been, since the intuiting subject there lost itself in the sphere of what is determinable. (2) We have here obtained the concept of an action. The act of selfaffection (as described in § 3) was possible in only one way. But now that this act is posited as a passage from determinability to determinacy, it must be possible for this act to occur in a variety of different ways. Selfaffection is an act that has an impact upon itself, 10 and if any diversity is present therein, then something must be posited in consequence of this. Self-determination is supposed to be posited as something manifold; consequently, something has to be posited by means of which it appears as a manifold, and this is acting.F (B) Let us call the action that is selected "X," X is a part of the total sum just discussed, and thus the predicate that applies to this total sum must apply to X as well: action X must be infinitely divisible. But, as always, this chosen part X is characterizable and intuitable only insofar as it is something determinate. X must thus be opposed to what is E But what is determinable is, by virtue of the namre of reason, given to freedom; therefore, freedom,• which is thereby dependent only upon itself, constructs for itself the concept of its own mode of action, and is thus free (p. 51). 8 "sie." Though it is here construed as referring to ~freedom" (dU Frriheil), this pronoun could also refer to "reason" (dU Vtmrnifl). 9 "eine bestimmte Thatigkeit oder eine Handlung." 10 "Die Selbstaffection ist Stojl auf sich selbst." F Remark: (a) Where do we obtain this concept of a total sum? In reflecting upon our previous act of reflection, we construed it as a completed 11 state of our mind, and thereby the preceding determinability and determinacy became complete for us as well-became a Wllllily for us. This does not mean [that we construe this state as] something (absolutely) infinite, as if I could determine myself in only OTll! way; instead, it means that what must occur as a consequence of this act of self-affection, i.e., acting, is infinitely manifold and is possible in an infinite number of ways. ((!) For heaven's sake, one certainly should not think of what is infinitely divisible as any sort of matter, space, etc. I (y) The great advantage of placing absolute freedom at the apex of theoretical philosophy as well [as at the apex of practical philosophy] is now evident (p. 51). 11 "vollendeten." That is to say, it was construed as a self-<:ontained or "complete" state of consciousness, one that was not dependent upon any other state; and thus, in this sense, it could be called a "totality."
determinable, for only on this condition is everything that has been required up to this point possible. 12 {The action of the I is the whole, and this is infinitely divisible. X is a part of this whole; it is what is determinate and is intuitable as such, in opposition to what is determinable. What is determinate is thus distinguished from what is determinable in that the whole ( = what is determinable) is intuitable only on the condition that what is determinate is intuitable. What they have in common must thus be that both are divisible. Therefore, if what is determinate ( = what is intuitable) is divisible, then it is also "something."} What now is the overall character of what is determinate? What distinguishes it from what is determinable? The real activity determines itself to act, and this real activity cannot be intuited: it is not "something"; it is not divisible; it is absolutely simple. {Only acting can be intuited; what is determinable cannot be intuited.} Accordingly, that to which the I determines itself when it affects itself-i.e., acting-must be intuitable. This, however, is not possible unless freedom is constrained in the course of the acting of the practical activity. Yet this freedom must not simply be canceled; it must be and must remain an activity, and thus it must be simultaneously constrained and not constrained; both must occur.C An instance of acting, 1g therefore, would be something within which the real activity would be both constrained and not constrained. What is constrained in this case is the real activity itself, and this passivity on its part indicates the presence of something that arrests its activity and brings it to a halt. Intuition becomes 14 possible only insofar as freedom is arrested. Let us call this action "X." This X must be intuitable; but since acting is freely determinable, it possesses infinite divisibility, 15 and therefore X can be divided into [parts] A and B, each of which can be further di12 This conclusion follows from the aforementioned "principle of determinability": something (in this case, the determinate state or action of the I) can be "determined" or "specified" only by being "opposed" or "posited in opposition" to something else-that is, it can be defined only with reference to its "opposite" (in this case, to "what is determinable"). G Acting (or the movement of transition [from what is determinable] to what is determinate, to "something") cannot be intuited unle.ss freedom is constrained. But this does not mean that freedom is thereby canceled, nor does it mean that (like the ideal activity) it [the real activity] will turn out to be nothing more than an act of imitating something else. Instead, in order for the real activity to be an object of the ideal activity, i.e., in order for the acting of freedom to be intuited, it must limit itself to some portion of the whole. But this constrained freedom must also still remain an activity (pp. 51-52). •~ "ein Handeln." •• Reading, with Krause's MS, "wird" for K's "ist." 15 The translation here follows Radrizzani's proposed emendation and substitutes Teilbarkeit for K's Bestimmbarkeil ("determinability"). This substitution not only makes more sense in the context, but is supported by the parallel passage in H and by the summary paragraph at the end of this § of K.
(51)
(52)
:'
''
§ 5
59
1
59
vided, and so on, ad infinitum. Even if one were to continue this process of division forever, one would never encounter a single point that would not contain both activity and a hindrance to activity. This is what constitutes continuity, 16 a continuous line of acting; and whatever progresses in a continuous line is called "acting."H (We are not yet concerned with time.) 1 Freedom is absolute self-affection and nothing more; but freedom is not something manifold, and therefore it cannot be intuited. A product of freedom is here supposed to be intuitable, however, and thus, in this manner, freedom itself is supposed to be indirectly intuitable. This can occur only if several different acts of self-affection are posited, and these various acts of self-affection would be distinguished from each other only by the multiple forms of resistance posited in opposition to them. But a resistance is nothing apart from an activity; and to the extent that a resistance is overcome, it is absorbed into the I. 18 The I can see nothing but itself, but it can see itself only insofar as it is engaged in acting. But when the I acts it is free; i.e., it is engaged in overcoming resistance} 16 "Stetigkeit." H Constraining 17 is a real arresting of activity, and thereby we obtain an intuition of what is constrained (B), that is, of freedom, as well as an intuition of what constrains it (A). (A) What constrains ( = X) must be something intuitable, since, as an action, it is surely a part of what is determinable. It is a quantum, a manifold, and must, like the totality of which it is a part, be infinitely divisible. That is to say, I can divide part X into A and B, A into C and D, C into E and F, etc. When I proceed in this way I am, to be sure, self-active, but my self-activity is restricted by A and B, and then by C and D, etc. I always proceed from one point to the next. Each of these points arrests my self-activity somewhat and hinders it in its forward progress, but none of them halts it once and for all and in its entirety; instead, my self-activity overcomes the resistance of A, and then moves on to B, etc. Thus there is no point within X which does not include both activity and hindrance-i.e., in which constrained and unconstrained freedom are not simultaneously present. Every possible point contains both. Acting is thus what progresses in a continuous line-
160
6o
§ 5
• Freedom extends its influence continuously, while resistance continuously gives way before it20-granted that some resistance must always remain. (The forward thrust of a movable body in space provides us with an image of this.) Every moment includes both resistance and acting. This acting does not proceed in fits and starts, but continues as a single, constant motion. 21 It remains one and the same act of self-affection, which extends itself further and further by means of intuition. When the act of self-affection is intuited, the simple point of self-affection is extended to a line.K • In following this line, we obtain a sequence of determinate parts. The reason these are "parts" and are construed as such is to be found in the act of reflection, i.e., in the fact that A, B, C, D, etc., were posited in this line, {for the act of dividing depends upon reflection}. But the reason they were grasped in this particular order and not in the reverse order is not to be found in the act of reflection, for this can occur only as a consequence of an act of the subject that acts realiter. Nor is the reason to be found within the real activity, for this multiplicity is precisely what hinders and opposes the real activity. Thus the real activity is constrained in relation to this sequence, and this is what distinguishes what is determinable from what is determinate. • In constructing a concept of its own efficacy, 22 the practical I (which is the sole 23 basis of our explanation) appears to be free in regard to the ordering of the manifold: this constitutes the freedom of the choice. But once this concept has been constructed and has been employed to guide acting, then the sequence [of determinate parts of the manifold] no longer depends upon the practical I, which is itself now constrained in relation to this sequence. In the first case (that is, while the concept is still being constructed), the intuition-which is constrained by its very nature-is set into motion by the practical I and oscillates between opposites, between being and not-being. In the second case (that is, when acting is occurring), the intuiting subject is constrained by the fact that the practical I is itself constrained, and thus it is itself constrained as well. The determinacy of the intellect has its foundation in the deter20 "die Freiheit wirkt ununterbrochen fort; der Widerstand giebt ununterbrochen nach." 21 Reading, with H, "ruckweise" forK's "riickwarts" ("backward"): "Dieses Handeln geht nicht [ruckweise] sondern in einem fort." K This acting of the real activity is "continuity": i.e., self-affection proceeds from only a single point; it encounters resistance, which then gives way. Freedom always proceeds forward without interruption, although it is always accompanied by some resistance-which it constantly overcomes. The whole is therefore a constant progression of acting, always one and the same act of self-affection, which is extended by intuition into a continuous line (pp. 52-53). ~ 2 "Wiirksamkeit." "Reading, with Krause's MS, "all<ein> forK's "alle<s>."
(53) 1
[
§
5
161
minacy of the practicali.L In the first case, {that is, so long as the practical power is still engaged in choosing,} we are concerned with the concept of a merely possible action; in the second case, {that is, to the extent that the practical power is constrained and the sequence is determined,} we are concerned with the concept of an actual action. The que:;tion "What is X?" has now been answered. X is an actual action, in opposition to one that is merely possible.
Corollaries: ( 1) These concepts {of possibility and actuality} are particular determinations of the intellect in relation to the practical power that must necessarily be thought of in connection with the intellect. When the practical power is posited as itself engaged in creating concepts {of a goal, and hence, as free}, then the intellect itself is free as well, and from this there arises the concept of "the possible." When the practical power is posited as actually acting, then it is constrained in relation to the sequence of the manifold; and the intellect is constrained along with it, {and thus there arises the concept of "the actual"}. (2) Everything actual and possible is actual and possible only in relation to the action of the I, for we have derived these concepts of actuality and possibility from the intuition of acting. All intuition-and thereby all consciousness-is conditioned by the intuition of what is actual. Consciousness-or intuition-of what is actual is called "experience"; therefore, all thinking begins with experience and is conditioned thereby. Only through experience do we become something for ourselves; subsequently, we can abstract from experience. Intuition of what is actual is possible only through an intuition of an actual instance of acting on the part of the I; therefore, all experience begins with acting, and only thereby is experience possible at all. 24 If there is no acting, then there is no experience; and if there is no experience, then neither is there any consciousness. How are objects, which are supposed to be external to us, simultaneously supposed to be within us? The Wissenschaft.slehre answers this L The pr-dctical I or real «tlivity «ppears as free only while it is-through a<;ting, through ordering [the manifoldJ--busy constructing a concept of iu goal, which pertains to the sphere of what is determinable. The practical activity, in cooperation with the intellect, arranges those parLS it wishes to remove from the sphere of what is determinable, and [while it is engaged in doing this it] oscillates between being and not-being. But once it has affected itself, the sequence of acting is then determined for it in the concept of the manifold: things must now proceed in a certain order. The practical activity is then constrained to a fixed series of paru-and the intuition of the intellect is similarly constrained along with it (p. 53). •• "also aile Erfahrung geht a us vom Handeln, es ist nur durch sie moglich." The pronoun es in this sentence appears to have no antecedenL The parallel passage in H suggests that the reference might equally well be consciousness (das BtnJJU{Jisein) or the I (das lch). Another possibility, adopted in the translation, is to transpose the two pronouns ("sie ist nur durch es moglich").
(5•
162
§ 5
question as follows: This occurs when we connect what is supposed to be external to us with the immediate object of our consciousness, that is, with everything that is active and free within us. I can be conscious only of my own activity, but I can be conscious of this only as a limited activity.M {This prevents a world of errors and at the same time exposes the nakedness of all previous philosophical systems. Even the Kantian system merely enumerates the logical laws governing our thought of objects (the categories); 25 but in doing this, it always leaves unanswered the question, "Why should we and why must we posit any objects at all?" The Wissenschajtslehre is now able to answer this question: [We posit objects] precisely because we have posited an absolute acting, to which the objects of our experience refer and by means of which these objects are given to us. For it is only by means of such acting-and moreover, only insofar as it is a hindered or arrested activity-that we obtain any consciousness whatsoever of what is actual. Only thereby is experience possible. The Critique of Pure Reason begins with representations and attempts to develop the laws of the same within logic, in conformity with our mind's original forms of thought. But it leaves unanswered the question, "Why do I have any representations of anything at all? How do I obtain a representation?" The Wissenschaftslehre answers this question as follows: [·I have representations] because I discover myself as acting. The I posits itself as acting-as absolutely free. It 26 catches sight of the world within itself. Its ideal activity does not exist apart from real activity.} The Wissenschaftslehre provides the following, superior explication of the Kantian proposition that our concepts refer only to objects of experience: 27 Experience refers to acting. Concepts originate through acting and exist only for the sake of acting; only acting is absolute. Kant does not maintain that experience is absolute; he insists upon the primacy of practical reason, but he has failed to show decisively that the ... The result of the preceding is that both concepiS [of possibility and of actuality I exist only in relation to the acting of freedom: all consciousness is consequendy conditioned by consciousness of whaJ is actu.o.l, i.e., c:r:perimce. All consciousness begins with experience, because all experience begins with acting and is possible only insofar as it is related to the acting of the I, just as it is only through the intermediary of acting that the I is able to think of iiSelf-or to posit itself, or to intuit itself-as free. For the I can become conscious of iiS activity only insofar as it acts, i.e., only insofar as it is limited and iiS activity is hindered; and thus freedom becomes the immediate object of the I only to the extent that the I has indirecdy intuited iiS freedom through this acting and has discovered this acting to be absolute (p. 54). 23 See KRV. A8o/B t o6ff. 26 Reading (with Hans Jacob's 1937 text of H) "Es" for the "Er" that appears in the AA version of H. 27 SeeKRV. A!)tiB75 and A661Bgtff.
r I {
practical is the source of the theoretical. In the essay "Concerning a Presumptuous Tone," which he has recently published in the Berliner Monatsschrift, he does insist upon the supremacy of freedom. 28 Those who claim that human beings can be representing subjects without also being active ones propound a groundless philosophy. It is in the cc:>urse of acting that I first encounter objects. Here it becomes quite clear what it means when we say that "the I sees the world in itself," or "if there is no practical activity, then neither is there any ideal activity," or "if there is no acting, there is no representing."
62
(3) The only sort of action that can be intuited and is, in this respect, really actual is twofold and contains both freedom and limitation, both activity and the cancellation of activity; moreover, both of these are united in every moment of acting. This limitation of acting will eventually lead us to a Not-I-not, to be sure, to anything that is present "in itself," but rather to something that must necessarily be posited by the intellect in order to account for this limitation. More specifically, we may also find that all possible actuality originates from one single actuality. The original source of everything actual is consequently the interaction, or union, of the I and the Not- I. Accordingly, the Not-I is nothinf actual unless it is related to an instance of acting on the part of the I, 2 for only on this condition and only by this means does it become an object of consciousness. The "thing in itself" is thereby abolished once and for all. Moreover, the same thing is true of the I as well: It appears in consciousness only in relation to a Not-1. The I is supposed to posit itself, but it can do this only by acting; acting, however, involves a relationship with the Not-1. The I is something only to the extent that it interacts with the world; both the I and the Not-I are [first] encountered within this relationship. Once one has discovered them, one can then separate them; but each of them, even when considered in isolation from the other, still preserves its original character and can be represented only in relation to the other.N 28
"Von einem neuerdings erhobenen vornehmen Ton in der Philosophie" (May 1796)
(KGS, VIII: 390-4o6. See especially p. 403). 29
"Es diirfte sich auch im einzelnen ergeben, dal} alle mogliche Wiirklichkeit, die es geben kann, aus einem wiirklichen entstehe. Der Urgrund alles wiirklichen ist demnach die Wechselwiirkung, oder Vereinigung des lch und Nichtlch. Das Nichtlch ist sonach nichts wiirkliches, wenn es sich nicht auf ein Handeln des lch bezieht." The point of this passage is to emphasize the intimate connection between reality ( = "actuality" = Wirklichkeil) and efficacious action (Wirk.samknt, from the verb wirken = "to have an effect," "to work," "to be; active" = sich handeln). Throughout this discussion Fichte employs the term Wirklichkeil, rather than Realitiit, in order to emphasize just this connection. Elsewhere in this same text, however, he appears to use these two terms quite interchangeably. N The Not-I is glimpsed by means of and along with acting. In itself, therefore, the Not-I or the "thing in itself' is nothing; it is something only in relation to acting.
On this point the Wi.ssenschaftslehre explicates the Kantian philosophy and at the same time provides it with a deeper foundation. Kant too never sought any knowledge of a Not-I apart from the I, nor of an I apart from the Not-I; both are [required for] Critical idealism, and this is precisely what distinguishes it from all pre-Kantian philosophy. Critical idealism is neither materialism nor dogmatism. It is not materialism, which begins with things; 0 nor is it the sort of idealism that begins with mental substance; nor is it dualism, which begins with the mind and the thing in itself, considered as two separate substances. Instead, Critical idealism {-the Wi.ssenschaftslehre, along with the Kantian system in its totality -} either begins with their reciprocal interaction as such, or else {begins with the absolutely united} accidental properties of both. 30 (Substance and accident are {for Critical idealism originally nothing but} forms of our thinking, {employed for the purpose of explaining consciousness}.) {Unlike materialism, which begins with substances, Critical idealism arrives at them only subsequently.} Critical idealism thereby avoids the necessity of having to deny either of these two. Materialism denies what is mental, while [non-Critical] idealism denies what is material. Nor does this system face the insoluble 31 task of uniting extremes that cannot be united once they have been separated (as in the case of dualism); instead, it discovers the I and the Not-I to be united. Nothing in the Wi.ssenschaftslehre is more crucial than this interaction of the I and the Not-IP (a point that has been best understood by Privy Councillor Schiller, in his "Letters Concerning Aesthetic Education" published in Die Horen). 32 The I is intuitable only in reciprocal interaction with the Not-1. It can be thought of apart from this relationship; Similarly, the I is intuited only by means of acting-only through its interaction with the Not-1. In itself, there is no pure, absolute intuition at all; instead, everything is discovered only insofar as acting occurs. Therefore, the I in itself-apart from any relation to the Not-I and without any interaction through acting-is also nothing, is a mere Idea. The I in itself is indeed more than the Not-I in itself. The latter is nothing al aiL But at the same time, the I in itself-as an Idea-is without any intuition [and thus]lacks reality for me (p. 55). 0 Materialism and, along with it, dogmatism (for when dogmatism is consistent it becomes materialism) start with a thing in itself (p. 55). 0 ' "Der kritische Idealism us geht aus von ihrer Wechselwiirkung als solcher, oder als AcCIDENS beider." The text of K is here modified not only by the insertion (as indicated with scroll brackets) of material from H, but also by the omission of the second als. The corresponding passage in H reads: "geht von dem absolul vereinigten AcCIDENS beyder-oder von der Wechselwirkung des lcH und N.I.--aw." " Reading, with Krause's MS, "unaflosbare" for K's "unauflosliche." P This therefore is the decisive feature of the Wisseruchaftslehre, which it shares with no previous philosophy. It [posits] no I without a Not-1-for it, everything depends upon this reciprocal interaction [of the I and the Not-1]. Kant allows one to infer this, but he did not say it (p. 55). ' 2 J. C. F. Schiller's Ueber die iiesthetische Erziehung des Meruchen in einer Reihe von Briefen was first published in installments in his own journal, Die Horen, in 1795. See especially letters 11-16; English translation by Reginald Shell, Friedrich Schiller on the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters (New York: Ungar, 1965).
(55)
but then it is not actual, but is a necessary Idea. The Not-I, on the other hand, cannot even be thought of [as existing] outside of reason. The I is primary; the Not-I is secondary, and this is why one is able to think of the I in isolation, but not of the Not-1. {The opponents of the Wissenschaftslehre are only too correct and hit th~ mark better than they themselves realize when they contend that the pure I of the Wissenschaftslehre is-considered in itself--nothing. Of course! For what are the characteristics of "being"? [Can one say that] "the I is"? This term designates nothing but "being intuitable." Being intuitable surely does not apply to the pure I. The pure I is a mere Idea, whereas the I obtains actuality-i.e., intuitability, or being-only in connection with or in relationship to the Not-1. Similarly, the Not-I cannot be posited apart from its relationship to our reason-or to the I; i.e., it can be posited only as existing/or us. Remark: The Not-I can certainly be thought of as existing apart from any connection with our individual reason. That is to say, the Not-I might exist even if we did not, but then it would not exist for us. This is why ordinary common sense has resort to [the thought of] a creator when it considers the creation of the world: It is unahle to imagine the Not-/ apart from some relationship to a rational being, i.e., God. To be sure, the creation of the world is explained differently in the Wissenschaftslehre.}
63
(4) The first intuition {of the passage from determinability to determinacy} was impossible without the determinations we have now added; it did not constitute a complete state of mind, but was an empty thought. We would not have been able to think of this first intuition even for the purposes of our philosophy unless we had also mixed with it things that we clearly understand [only] now.Q
For intuition, what is determinable becomes an infinitely divisible manifold, because it is supposed to be the object of a free choice on the Q One could here object that we previously reflected upon intuition taken purely by itself, and that by proceeding in this manner we ensured a specific result. Thus, [the objection would continue,] we gave a false account of the original procedure of our freely acting reason, [since a "pure intuition," in isolation from everything else, has now been shown to be impossible]. Reply: Our previous intuition of the passage from determinability to determinacy was not an actual intuition at all, but an empty thought. Only what is limited, only acting, can be intuited. This also allows us to see that an act of self-positing is possible only if something [else] is presently happening and only if we are able to catch a glimpse of the I as acting. Thus nothing is arbitrarily'' postulated within our system except this: that I must be conscious of myself (p. 56). " "willktihrlich."
(!
166
§
5
part of absolute freedom. This must also be true of what is determinate, since it is a part of this manifold. What is determinate and what is determinable are, to this extent, similar. What distinguishes them is this: In the first case, the action intuited is merely possible, i.e., an action posited by an intellect that is oscillating between opposites; in the second case, the action intuited is {actual, i.e.,} an action posited by an intellect that is bound 34 to a determinate series of the manifold. Action is activity that is constantly resisted, and it is only by means of this synthesis of resistance {with activity} that an activity of the I becomes intuitable. {Remark: Our question was, What is it that is determinate? What is possible is determined only as a specific modification of the intellect, insofar as it oscillates between several opposites. What is actual [is determined only as a specific modification of the intellect,] insofar as it is bound to a particular determinate series [of the manifold]. A pure activity cannot be intuited as such; it can be intuited only insofar as it encounters some resistance, and then it is called an "action." This is because an action has to be directed at some object, which our language correctly designates ''what stands in opposition," for this object is what resists activity.}35 H
(57)
K: "gekniipfte"; H: "gebundene."
~·"welches Objekt in unserer Sprache richtig ein Gegenst.and hei~t; denn dieses Objekt
ist das der Thatigkeit WlllERSTI:HI!:NDL" There are two words for "object" in the German language: das Objtkl and deT ~gemwnd. Fichte here calls attention to the root meaning of the latter: "to stand over against." Note that unlike some other philosophers, notably Hegel, Fichte does not appear to make any systematic distinction between Objtkl and ~gen •wnd, both of which are here translated throughout as "objecL"
I 't
64
We have now seen that all consciousness is contained within and deduced from the following: a subjective factor, or the self-positing subject; an objective factor, or the practical activity [of the I]; and what is objective in the proper sense of the term, i.e., the Not- I. The term "objective" thus has two different senses: (I) In opposition to the ideal activity, what is "objective" is the practical activity. (2) In opposition to the I in its entirety, what is "objective" is the Not-1. Our task from now on is to exhibit the possibility of what we have established so far and to provide a complete account of the conditions of this possibility. Now that we know what our specific goal is, we are already in a position to envision the completion of our task. Our system will be complete once we arrive at the point where we can comprehend that the I posits itself as self-posited; and we will reach this point in our discussion of willing. 1• A
Further Investigations (I) {We have seen that we are in a position to intuit our practical power only as acting, and moreover, only as conditioned by a previously constructed concept or goal. Consequently, we are not concerned with any practical determination in itself; i.e., we are not concerned with formal freedom or with an act of 1 "Wenn wir dahin kommen, wo wir begreifen, da~ das Ich sich selbst seze, als durch sich selbst gesezt, so ist unser System geschl*n, und die~ ist der Fall beim Wollen." "These three points-ideal activity, real activity, and the object (or hindrance)--will provide the foundation for our entire scientific edifice, and everything that follows is already implicit within them. What we still have to show is how the I posits itself as selfpositing: i.e., we have to show that the I contains within itself the foundation of its entire being-and, moreover, that this is contained within willing. This is the goal of our inquiry, and when we have reached this point our entire project will be complete (p. 57).
(57)
168
§ 6
absolute self-affection. Instead, we are here concerned with material freedom. Formal freedom is postulated along with immediate selfconsciousness: or rather, it is identical with it. Formal freedom is immediate self-consciousness itself, and is therefore unintuitable. We can speak only of the conditions that make our intuiting possible, and not of any act of intuiting "in itself." We observe only the act of intuiting. The conditions in question are themselves actions. Intuition and action always go together; both lie within the I as such. The I appears to be as it is, and it is as it appears to be. The action of a practical power cannot itself be intuited, however, but is, as such, conditioned by a previously constructed concept of a goal, for only thereby is it a free action. Thus the question arises, H(JW is il possible to canstruct such a concept?} In the previous § we showed that the intuition of an instance of free acting is conditioned by the intuition of a freely constructed concept of acting [the concept of a goal]. For the construction of this concept, according to what was said in the same§, we are given the sphere of what is determinable. We are acquainted with what is determinable as a {manifold} divisible into an infinite number of possible actions. Inasmuch as it is by means of ideal activity that the I determines this concept [that guides its practical acting], its practical or material freedom (freedom of choice) was said to consist in the freedom to assemble this manifold in various particular ways. 2 •8 The I is nevertheless constrained when it engages in this ideal function of concept [formation]. 3 The construction of concept X can be comprehended only as follows: A manifold is given to the ideal activity, from which it assembles a concept. {This ideal activity surveys the entire field of what is determinable.} It ignores whatever it wishes and grasps hold of whatever it wants. {It takes what it has selected and assembles a whole therefrom, and in this way it constructs for itself a concept of the action 2 "in dem Zusarnmenseuen dieses Mannigfaltigen soli die pralc.tischen, in wiefern es diesen Begriff durch ideale Thatiglc.eit bestimmt, oder die materiale Freiheit (die Freiheit der Wahl) des Ich bestehen." The verb zusammen.selzen, which Fichte here introduces and employs throughout the immediately following §§, is a common word that normally means "to combine" or "to assemble" (which is how it is here translated). Fichte, however, generally uses this term in a narrower and quite specific sense: to designate the I's synthetic activity of choosing or selecting portions of the given manifold and combining them within a single concept: the concept of a goal. Thus the term here always retains something of its root meaning: "to posit together." 8 The sphere to which this concept of a goal pertains is the sphere of what is determinable, considered as an infinitely divisible manifold. This concept comes into being b)' means of material freedom, or freedom of choice, which could thus be described as "the ideal activity of the practical power" (p. 58). '"In wiefern das Ich in dieser FuNcnoN des Begrifs ideal ist, ist es doch gebunden." The term Function is difficult to construe in this context, prompting Radriuani's suggestion that this is probably an error of transcription on Krause's part and that Enlwetfung should be substituted for Function. A more literal rendering of this sentence would be: "Insofar as the I is ideal in the function of the concept, it is nevertheless constrained."
(58)
§6
t6g
to be undertaken.} Its freedom consists in doing just this; but [in order to do this] it has to intuit what is given as something given, and therein lies its constraint. 4 ·c In short, there is here a movement of transition from determinacy to an act of self-determining (or determinability). {But note that this situation is just the reverse [of the movement of transition we discussed earlier]; for here we have a movement from what is determinate to what is determinable, i.e., from c011Straint to freedom. Constraint is synonymous with determinacy, for it consists in the necessity of having to view precisely this [manifold] as the given sphere of a possible action-i.e., it consists in determinacy. In other words, what occurs here is a movement of transition from what provides the conditions to what is conditioned thereby.} The ideal activity is partially constrained (determined) and partially free. Freedom is what is conditioned; constraint is what provides the conditions, {because} if nothing is given, then nothing can be chosen. The construction of the concept of a goal can be imagined in no other way. (2) The question now arises, What is it that constrains [the ideal activity],
65
and where does this come from? All we have learned so far about the sphere of what is determinable is that it must be an infinitely divisible manifold. But if this is the only way in which this sphere can be characterized, then it is nothing at all. Something whose sole distinguishing feature is infinite divisibility furnishes us with no stopping place and with nothing that could constrain the activity of the I. But without constraint, there would be no ideal activity; and without ideal activity, there would be no infinite divisibility. Consequently, the concept of something that is not supposed to be anything more than "infinitely divisible" is a self-contradictory concept. Yet this very concept appears among the conditions for the possibility of consciousness, and thus it would appear that consciousness includes among its conditions something impossible. 0 {In this way, we would never obtain a "something," never anything positive or posited; [instead, we would have a situation] in which something is forever posited in opposition, a situation in which something conflicting is always encountered-and no consciousness could ever come into being in such a case. 4 "ihre Gebundenheit." c But the ideal I or the ideal activity of the I is constrained by the fact that this concept must be assembled [from a specific manifold]. It is free to choose; but in choosing it is at the same time constrained (p. 58). 0 What constrains the ideal activity is the given manifold, or what is determinable; and we are acquainted with this so far [only] as an infinitely divisible manifold. This, however, is nothing at all-a contradiction; for a continuous process of simply dividing would include nothing at all that could be related to the ideal activity or could bring it to a halt, would itself be nothing at all; and, in that case, the ideal activity would itself be nothing. Even if the ideal activity were to continue dividing forever, it would never be able to grasp the manifold as such; instead, the manifold would simply continue to dwindle away, and this would mean that no consciousness whatsoever would be possible (p. 58).
170
§6
In order to become conscious of myself, I have to act freely. But this is impossible apart from the construction of a concept of the action [in question], which is, in turn, impossible apart from a sphere of what is determinable; for, if I am to exercise a free choice, I must be presented with a manifold. [Mere] multiplicity, however, is [nothing more than] opposability. Consequently, if consciousness is to exist, everything in this manifold must not simply be opposed to everything else; for in this case it would be nothing at all. Instead, something positive has flJ be supposed.} Therefore, in order to account for the ideal activity of the practical power, we have to assume the presence of something positive, of something that is not further divisible-i.e., of something real. What is indivisible must therefore be something that, with respect to its reality, is indivisible, though the quantity of the same must indeed be divisible. {This reality constrains the ideal activity or makes it ideal, and this occurs through the reciprocal interaction and interrelation of what is real and what is ideal.} The ideal activity must here be constrained in such a way that it will not be constantly carried away by its own capacity for mobility, 5 • E but will instead be arrested and fixed {-not creative or productive; it is to be directed upon something that is present and stable, upon a "being" of the manifold}. What arrests and fixes the ideal activity is supposed to furnish the material for a selection or choice, {and indeed, for a choice on the part of an intellect}; but one can choose only when one is conscious of what one is choosing, and there is no consciousness of something without opposition. Consequently, there must be some states of mind which are characterized by nothing but unity and identity and which contain within themselves no multiplicity at all {and bear no similarity to any other states, beyond the fact that they are all included within the sphere of what is determinable}. F What is determinable must possess certain elementary qualities 6 (which cannot be broken down any further), and it must possess some sort of being as well. All that can be related to the ideal activity is the act of positing, and is either the activity of the I, the constrained state 7 of the ideal activity, or the being of the Not-1-a being-posited that negates an act of becoming "nicht da~ sie als beweglich fortgeriflen werde." This ideal activity itself is now supposed to be constrained. (It should not, as occurred above in the case of the intuition of the J as movable, be carried away along with itthrough an agility (act) the ideal activity was there carried away along with it) [p. 59]. F Since there can be no consciowness of anything except by means of opposition, there must be states of mind which, in opposition to other states of mind, cannot be further divided and broken down, and which have nothing in common with other mental states, belond the fact that they are all included within the sphere of what is determinable (p. 59). "Grundeigenschaften." 7 "Gebundenheit." 5
E
(59)
I ,
t
and doing. 8 • G This derivation of the possibility of opposition does not contradict the previously affirmed infinite divisibility [of the manifol~]; for I can certainly increase or decrease one and the same being. Later on we will see that what we have just described is precisely what is given through immediate feeling, 9 e.g.: red, blue, sweet, sour. The state of mind involved in such feelings is one of unity rather than multiplicity; divisibility is still present, however: namely, in respect to degree. 10 I can have a sensation of what is red to a greater or to a lesser degree, but I cannot say where red ceases to be red." {Accordingly, in order for the ideal I to be able to construct a concept of its action, a manifold, a "something," must be given [to it], through which it is constrained, or, as it were, "fastened down," and from which it assembles its concept.} How is it possible to posit or to be conscious of such a "something"? How does it become present within the I?
66
(3) This "something" and the consciousness thereof precede all acting, for they provide the conditions that make acting possible. 11 • 1 "The given" is the sphere of all possible acting. But acting is absolutely not anything simple; instead, it is twofold: It includes, so to speak, an expansion of {absolute} self-affection, and it also includes some resistance to the same, which is what brings this process of expansion to a halt and makes it into something intuitable. Acting is what lies within the sphere of what is determinable; every possible instance of acting must include 12 [1] something that pertains to the I (activity) and [2] something that resists it. 8
"ein Gesetztsein[,] durch welches ein Werden und Machen NEGIRT wird." ("Being" here signifies the negation of activity-a being-posited, through which some act of becoming and producing is negated.) The ideal activity becomes ideal in just this way: it is determined, and the practical activity is determined along with it, for its choice cannot extend beyond these elementary qualities (p. 59). 9 "durch das unmittelbare Gefiihl." 10 wdem Grade nach." H In the case of all colors and sounds, as well as in the case offeelings of taste, the mental state is one of unity. Degree is certainly present, yet no one can say how much is required before such a state ceases completely-at what point, for example, red ceases to be red. Hence no movement of transition occurs here; the opposition in this case is purely by means of sensation (p. 59). 11 "denn das Handeln ist dadurch bedingt." 1 This "something" precedes all acting and conditions the concept of acting, for no concept can be constructed where there is nothing-i.e., where there is no manifold. Such a "something" must indeed precede all consciousness of acting, and yet we have previously maintained that the I is conscious of nothing beyond its own activity. Is the I now supposed to be conscious of something that is not an activity? (pp. 59-6o). 12 Though the text of K states that acting itself must be both these things, the context (as well as the- parallel passage in H) makes it clear that we are concerned with two different components contained in every instance of acting, though Fichte sometimes (as in the following paragraph) prefers to characterize these as two different "aspects" of one and the same wsomething." G
(6o)
This "something" is posited not as an actual acting, {but only as a striving; it is only the concept of a possible action within this sphere, and we are considering the I at this point only as a power to act freely}. Hence that aspect of it which pertains to the I cannot be explained by referring to any actual act of self-affection. The I is here posited only as a power to act within the manifold. This power does not appear here merely as one that it is possible for us to conceive, however; but rather it presents itself as something intuitable, and, to this extent [that is, insofar as it can be intuited], "being" can be ascribed to it. {Something is supposed to be given to the intuiting subject, something that brings intuition to a halt.} The characteristic feature of being is determinacy; therefore, an original determinacy, [an original tendency] toward acting as such or "in general" 13 must here be present. • Once posited, the I is free not to act "in general," but only to will to act in this or that specific way: here we arrive at a necessary acting. Activity constitutes the very essence of the I; accordingly, what we are dealing with here is the being of activity. In constructing a concept of its own willing, the I is constrained; but constraint points to the presence of some being-indeed, a being of the I itself. 14 That which constrains [the I], and, to this extent, possesses "being," 15 belongs to the I itself. But here the I is practical (activity), and therefore the being in question is the being of an activity. Two mutually contradictory concepts (namely, being and activity) are here united, and this unity is here treated as something found or discovered} I discover something out of which I assemble [the concept of] my acting. I myself, however, am included in what I discover in this manner; hence activity is here present as something discovered. Activity of this sort is a suppressed activity, 17 and from this it obtains the character of being. Such a "something," however, is a "drive," 18 a selfengendering striving, which has its foundation within that to which it ""Der Character des Seins ist Bestimmtheit, folglich mu~te hier liegen urspri.ingliche Bestimmtheit zum Handeln uberhaupt." 14
15
"ein eigendkhes Sein." Reading, with H,
"SEYENDE
ist" forK's "sezende ist" ("is engaged in positing").
1 The characteristic feature of being, however, is determinacy. Accordingly, the I is not
free as soon as it is posited, but it is free only in making its choice; in constructing the concept of this choice, however, it is constrained. Its power is no longer a mere power, but is a necessary one-not, to be sure, a power that is acting, but rather one whose activity is suppressed. This activity of the I therefore acquires the character of "being" (in the second sense of the term: a "fix.ed" being). This being that suppresses and constrains also pertains to the I (for this is precisely what distinguishes the I from an action); but at the same time, it is something practical-a deed-and therefore it would be the being of an activity. These two apparently contradictory concepts are here synthetically united: here is a deed' 6 (p. 6o). 16 "hier ist That." 17 "ein zuri.ickgehaltene Thatigkeit." 18 "ein Trieb."
l '., .
§
67
6
173
belongs. (See pp. 286-87 of the compendium.) 19 A drive is an activity that is not any type of acting; it is something that arrests, something that determines the ideal activity, a constant inner disposition 20 to overcome what resists it.K (Similar to the disposition of a compressed steel spring.) {Drive and limitation are one and the same.} Wheneve.r one posits a drive, one must necessarily also posit something that hinders activity; for the drive explains the necessity of acting, but the reason 21 the drive fails to become an instance of acting and remains a drive must lie elsewhere. To the extent that the foundation 21 of an activity lies within the subject, one can say that the foundation of a drive also lies within the subject. Insofar as a drive is a drive and not an activity, however, its foundation does not lie within the subject; and since something is present that hinders the activity, the activity is indeed canceled. Consequently, we are unable to escape from this reciprocal relationship.L (4) {Drive precedes all acting and makes acting possible.} What now follows from this drive of the I? If one were to suppose that the I were not limited and that its drive were an activity, then the I would be an act of self-affection and nothing more. The I would not be constrained, and consequently, no ideal activity would be present; ideal and real activity would coincide. We are unable to think of anything of this sort which would pertain to us; instead, it would describe the self-consciousness of God, thought of as unitarJi 22 (See the remark within parentheses on p. 275 of the compendium.) 19 GWL As always in this translation, Fichte's references 10 the page numbers of the first edition of 1794/95 have been replaced with references lo the lexl of the FoundatUm.s of IN Emire Wwenschafuuhr. included in Vol. I of SW. 20 ~eine innere fortdauernde Tendenz." K A drive is a self-engendered striving, a constant disposition toward aaivity; it is not an atting, but only something that determines the ideal activity, only an inner activity that always continues 10 determine i!Self. It is nolan external activity; instead, it is a suppressed activity, which would become an activity just as soon as what resislS it were lobe removed (p~. 00--61 ). 1 "der Grund," in both instances. L The l's drive aims al activity. and it is limited in ilS activity: this is the reciprocal relationship (p. 61). l!l! "des einen gedachten Gotles." The sense of this elliptical comment is clarified by the following parenthetical passage in GWL, p. 275, lo which Fichte himself refers: "{Let us suppwe, for the purpwes of elucidation, that we have lo explain the self-consciousness of God: This is possible only on the presupposition that God refleclS upon his own being. Since, however, in the case of God's self-consciousness, wluJl is rejkcled upon would be everything in one and one in everything, and IN refkcting subject would likewise be everything in one and one in everything, then it would not be possible, in and through God, 10 distinguish the objett of reflection from the reflecting subject, consciousness i!Self from the object of the same; and hence the self-consciousness of God would not be explainedjust as this must remain forever inexplicable and incomprehensible for any finite reason, i.e., for any reason bound by the law of deln'm.inalibn of the objett of reflection.)" "We ue now standing at the limit of all consciousness, and therefore, in order to make
(61)
174
§ 6
Let us now move from this [unlimited] state to the limited one. 2 s Now the I is unable to act; its practical activity is brought to a halt, {and because of the resistance it encounters, it is no longer an activity at all, but is merely summoned to act. A limited I of this sort possesses a drive, with which, however, consciousness is necessarily linked or through which it first acquires its consciousness.} {From this drive we derive the following important result: The I can never be coruciou.s unless a drive or limitation is present.} It is the character of the I to posit itself idealiter, i.e., to intuit itself; and only now is such an act of self-intuition possible, for only now is something present which has been brought to a halt. The I must necessarily be conscious of its drive or state of limitation. Consciousness follows from the presence of a drive. 24 If the I were nothing but activity, and if no limitation were present within it, then the I could not be conscious of its own activity. N Nothing can occur within the I without consciousness. A drive is now present within the 1; consequently, some consciousness thereof must also exist. {What is highest in man is his striving or his drive.} Remark: (A) Ideal and real activity diverge at this point, {i.e., as soon as limitation is introduced,} and the previously described opposition of the two now becomes possible. We are here standing at the limit25 of all consciousness, because we are considering the very origin of all consciousness.0 (B) Ideal activity is possible only as constrained activity. Its immediate object is the practical activity. Its constrained state depends upon the practical activity, which must originally be a striving, and this is the origin of consciousness. P the transition [from what is determinable] to what is determinate, we have to imagine something incomprehensible, something that (for limited, finite beings like ourselves, who can think only discursively) is nothing at all. We must imagine an I that is not limited, an I that is nothing but an act of self-affecting, an I within which ideal and real activity are not separate, but coincide (p. 61). 25 "zur Beschranktheit." 24 "Aus dem Triebe folgt Bewustsein." N If the I were nothing but activity, i.e., if its practical activity were never limited and if nothing that had been brought to a halt were present, then the I would possess no con· sciousness. It would be unable to posit itself. The necessary consciousness of a drive or of what is limited is what fir!it makes the I's self-positing possible (p. 61 ). 2 5- ,.,an der Grenze~" 0 Ideal and real activity separate from each other as soon as limitation is introduced, and this makes both activities possible; for when a drive is present the practical activity becomes intuitable and consciousness [becomes possible] at the same time-and this is the limit of all our consciousness. Within that incomprehensible something that we previously called "X," practical and ideal activity are not separate from each other, but are instead inseparable and identical. Therefore, X includes no limitation or drive: it is God (pp. 61-62). P Practical activity is originally nothing more than the striving of an intellect. Ideal activity exists not on its own, but only by means of its object, practical activity.
I
I
I j
§
6
175
{We have now arrived at the following point: The I is supposed to be able to consider its possible ways of acting, and its possible acting must thus be derived from this particular instance of acting [namely, its act of considering its possible ways of acting]. Every instance of determinate, free acting presupposes the construction of a concept of this same way of acting; and in order to construct such a concept, the free I must, before any acting, have a cognition of its overall possibility of action. But it acquires such a cognition only insofar as it is conscious of the fact that the material for a possible action is immediately given to it, is aware of the origin of what supplies a free being with the "stuff'' for its free choice or for the construction of its concept of a goal, and is aware as well that this material is immediately given to it. 26 This is what we must now explain. The I reaches this point only when it discovers within itself an activity that is constrained without any act of self-determination on the part of the I. Such an action has two components: something that pertains to the I as a subject, and something that resists [its activity], something that lies outside of the I and provides the ground [of this limitation]. We have called such an internally hindered activity, which does not and cannot give rise to any action, a "drive." Thus the I is capable of an action only to the extent that it is capable of possessing a drive. Since everything present within the I is accompanied by consciousness, and indeed, since consciousness is possible only through limitation of the I's activity, then every drive (understood as a limited activity of the I) must not only be accompanied by consciousness, but must also, as something original (that is, as something that precedes all acting), make consciousness possible in the first place. [Every drive must thus] produce an immediate (material) consciousness. What sort of consciousness is this? The answer to this question can be made clear only by means of opposition.}
68
(5) What kind of consciousness is supposed to accompany a drive? In the kind of consciousness with which we have been familiar hitherto, namely, consciousness of intuition, we view real and ideal {activity} as separate. The being of the former is independent of the latter, which merely observes {what is present in the real activity}. But this cannot be the case with the kind of consciousness we are now discussing, for no real being is present in this case. No acting occurs; therefore, ideal and real Practical activity is constrained, and to this extent it is merely a drive or striving. But a coruc.iousness must accompany this drive (p. 62). •• "Diese Erkenntnifl erlangt es aber nur dadurch, dafl es sich bewuflt werde, dalJ ihm das Materiale einer mtiglichen Handlung unmittelbar gegeben sey, u. woher fiir das freye Wesen der STOFF fiirdie Wahl seiner Freiheit, oder zur Entwerfung seines Zwecksbegrifskomme, u. dafl ihm dieses Materiale oder der Stoff unmittelbar gegeben werde." The terms Materiak and Stoff appear to be employed interchangeably in this passage.
(62)
(63)
176
§6
{activity} must, in this case, coincide: what is ideal {-that is, consciousness-} would here have to be its own object, {and we would thereby obtain} an immediate consciousness, and this is a "feeling." One never "feels" an object; an object is "intuited." All objectsincluding instances of acting-are supposed to be something even apart from my consciousness of them.Q To be sure, the transcendental philosopher does not forget that nothing could exist apart from consciousness, but ordinary common sense does not see things in this manner. One distinguishes between acting and consciousness. A feeling that is not felt, however, is nothing whatsoever. Reflection is necessarily and inseparably conjoined with feeling. R A feeling is nothing more than an act of positing a determinate state of the I. {The particular form of consciousness which makes its appearance at this point must necessarily be a feeling. Determinacy is present here, yet it is not an intuition, for the I and the Not-1 are not yet present. To be sure, this determinacy must subsequently be posited, but it is equally true that the I cannot posit anything that does not exist. What then is this mere determinacy-and the consciousness that flows from itwhich is supposed to be posited and is not a reality? Reply: It is a mere affection, a mere state [oft he I]; and a positing of this sort is a "feeling."} We have now described an indirect consciousness of an immediate material, which is just what we required. {In a similar manner.} our previous search for the formal [condition] {required for the explanation of consciousness} led us to the subject-object, to an act of self-positing. I and Not-I a~pear together within this feeling, as we will see in more detail below. 2 Thus it is not only in consequence of an act of selfdetermination that the I and the Not-1 appear together; both are also present in a feeling. Activity and passivity are united in feeling. Insofar as activity is present, the feeling is related to the I; but insofar as passivity is present, it is related to a Not-1-though this is discovered within the 1. 5 In factual terms, feeling is what comes first and is original. At this Q Consequently, it is an incorrect use of language to say that one "feels" objects: one does not feel objects; instead, one "intuits" them. The objects are there whether I entertain any representations of them or not-just as it is also possible to act without being conscious of acting. Indeed, we usually act without giving any additional thought to the intuiting subject (p. 63). R There is no feeling apart from consciousness, however, without a feeling subject and without something felt. Reflection, what is ideal, is here its own consciousness, united with what is real, as its own object: I feel myself-( am at once the feeling subject and what is felt. In the case of intuition, in contrast, I am not also what is intuited (p. 63). 27 See below, § 7, sects. 5 and 6. 5 Just as we previously had to posit a subject-object in order to explain consciousness, insofar as the form of the same is concerned, 28 so here as well, in the case of the matter or content29 of the I, we would have to discover within the I an immediately determinate consciousness, i.e., an immediate material. The situation with the matter or content is precisely the same [as it was with the form]: We may not allow the content of consciousness to
§6
•77
point one can already see how everything can be present within the I and can see that one does not need to go beyond the I. All one would need to assume is the existence of a manifold of feelings, and it would not be difficult to show how our representations of the world could be derived from this manifold.
6g
(6) How is it possible for the I, in advance of all acting, to possess a cognition of the possible modes of action~ 1 {in order to construct for itself the concept of a specific mode of acting}? These possibilities of action require that something positive and incapable of further analysis be present within the manifold--{something that simply is what it is, whose being must lie in something determinate.} something by means of which the manifold itself first comes into being. {In short, we must assume} that there have to be certain basic or elem~ntary qualities.~ 2 A feeling is just such an elementary quality;~~ it is a determinate, limited state of the entire I, beyond which the I cannot go. Feeling is the ultimate limit [of consciousness] and cannot be further analyzed and assembled.T A feeling simply is what it is and because it is. What is given through feeling is the condition for the possibility of all acting on the part of the I; i.e., feeling provides the I with its sphere of action, though not with its object.u Feeling is represented within the sensory world by something that is "feelable" or "tangible," and this is posited as matter.M Matter is be derived from something else, which must then, in turn, be derived from some third thing, etc. lmtead, we must have an immediate object, i.e., feeling. In feeling, the I and the Not· I are present in immediate unity with each other. This does not occur as the result of any actual self-determination, through which some actual action would be possible. Instead, that aspect of feeling which pertaim to the I is striving-a drive, not an action. Activity and passivity are united in feeling. Activity, drive: this is what is related to the I. But insofar as a passivity, a limited being,"" or a hindered activity is present within feeling, then feeling <;an be .-elated to a Not·l, even though this feeling i• discovered within the I itself (p. 63). 28 ~bey der Form urn das Bewul\tsein zu erldiiren." 29 "bey der Materie." 0 ' "ein 8ESCHRANKTSEYN." " "der Handlungsmoglichk.eiten." 2 ' "Grundeigenschaften." ""das Gefiihl ist <eins>.'' Instead of this uncertain reading of the last clause (which could perhaps be rendered "feeling is something unified"), the translation here follows the corresponding passage in H: "Das Gefiihl is so etwas," which might also be rendered:"Feelin~ is just such a positive 'something.'" One cannot go beyond feeling. No action of the I can go beyond feeling, precisely because the entire I is limited at this point: Its ideal and real activities, along with everything contained in the I, are here constrained, and thereby the entire power of the I is originally limited. That which is supposed to be originally limited or constrained cannot be further analyzed and then assembled anew (p. f4). u What is given through feeling is not the object of an acting; it cannot be altered (p. 64). """Die Darstellung de• Gefiihls in der Sinnenwelt ist das fllhlbare, und wird gesezt als Materie."
(64
70
something that I can neither produce nor annihilate; nor can I do anything to make it affect me differently than the way it does affect me in accordance with its own nature, {because this constitutes the original limit of the I's entire power}. To be sure, I am able to come closer to it or to draw farther away from it. Moreover, what is positive has to be manifold, since it is supposed to serve as the object of a free choice. Accordingly, there must be a multiplicity of feelings; or, expressed differently, the drive must be capable of being affected in variety of different waysa point that could also be expressed by saying that the I must possess several different drives. This multiplicity of feelings cannot be deduced or derived from any higher {characteristic of the 1}, for we have here reached the limit {of all consciousness}. The manifold of feelings is postulated along with freedom itself. {If I am to be able to posit myself as absolutely free, there must be a multiplicity of feelings; otherwise there could be no choice, no self-consciousness-no freedom. Feelings provide freedom with its object; consequently, in accordance with the postulate of self-positing, there must be a manifold of feelings.} It is certainly true that the manifold contained within the drive will subsequently show itself to be a natural drive and will be explained with reference to nature; 35 but nature itself is posited only in consequence of feeling. These manifold feelings are completely opposed to one another and have nothing in common. There is no transition from one feeling to another. Each feeling is a specific, determinate state of the I, which would seem to imply that the I itself is manifold. But what then would become of the identity of the I? The I is supposed to relate this manifold [offeelings] to itself and to view this multiplicity as its own. How is this possible? {To be sure, one could say that the I, through the employment of intellect, sees that, despite this manifold, it remains only one in the midst of this multiplicity. Yet this is not a sufficient answer. The I is supposed to survey the manifold and to relate it to itself as a manifold of its feelings. How is it possible to unify this multiplicity of feelings within one and the same consciousness? How can this consciousness compare these feelings with each other, since they are supposed to be opposed states?} Kant provided an excellent answer to the question concerning how the manifold [of intuitions] is unified within consciousness; but he did not explain how the manifold of feelings is unified, even though the answer to the former question is based upon the answer to the latter. He connected all feelings to pleasure and pain (see the CritUJu.e of judgment); 36 however, there must be some middle term between the relation of feelings to pleasure and pain, some intermediary that alone makes this re55 "hinterher wohl wird dieses mannigfaltige im Triebe sich zeigen als Naturtrieb, and wird aus der Natur erklart werden." .,; See especially the Preface and § 9 (KGS, V: 168 and 21gff.).
(65)
§6
179
lation possible.v In order to sense whether A or B provides more pleasure, I must first place them side by side, so that I can compare them. How can both feelings be present for me at the same time? Let us suppose that one samples two wines-not in order to discover which of the two tastes better, but simply in order to obtain knowledge of the differences in the way they "feel." A comparison of this sort would appe~r to be impossible, for while one is tasting one wine, one is not tasting the other. There is never more than one taste present, whereas a comparison requires two. Nevertheless, everyone knows that he can indeed undertake such a comparison. One must pay attention to the manner in which this is accomplished. A tasting of this sort involves activity. One focuses all one's senses upon the object one is tasting and concentrates one's senses upon it. One relates this specific feeling to one's entire sensibility. w The second tasting is accomplished in the same way as the first, and thus there is something to which both tastes are compared and which they have in common: namely, sensibility as a whole, which remains the same in both instances. This account assumes the presence [within us] of a general system of sensibility, which simply has to be there in advance of all experience, but which is not immediately felt as such; instead, it is that by means of which and in relation to which every particular feeling that can be felt is felt. A particular feeling is an alteration in the regular and enduring state of the system of sensibility. This system of sensibility itself is [not] felt, because it is something determinable rather than something determinate; therefore, unless its state is altered, nothing is felt at all. If one thinks of the simple act of feeling as an ideal activity, then it is governed by the law of ideal activity, according to which something is posited only in the movement of transition from what is determinable to what is determinate. 57 This is the case here as well: a particular feeling is something determinate, and, as such, it can appear within consciousness only if it is related to something determinable, which, in this case, is the system of sensibility. Accordingly, the comparison of feelings is accomplished only indirectly; every determinate feeling is compared with the system as a whole,x v Kant's explanation of this, which relates all feelings to pleasure and pain, cannot account for all our positive, determinate feelings; for there must be something intermediate between pleasure and pain, since not all feelings are accompanied by pleasure or pain (p. 65)w Yet both [acts of tasting] depend to a certain extent upon our freedom. That is to say, aclivily is involved in these acts of tasling: all our senses are united through this intuition and everything foreign is dismissed. We see, hear, etc., nothing else; instead, our entire sensibility is concentrated upon the whole system of our feeling (p. 65). 37 "welche nur im Uibergehen vom Bestimmbaren zum Bestimmten etwas sein konne." The translation of this obscure passage is amended in the light of the corresponding passa§:e in H: "als welche nur gesezt ist durch das Uebergehen .... " A panicular feeling is something determinate to the extent that it is posited in opposition to the sysem of sensibility or to what is determinable (p. 65).
180
71
§ 6
{which is immediate and always the same and, as what is determinable, is something empty and confused, which is then altered}. The last pretext for dogmatism is thereby removed. Even feelings are not able to enter us from outside. They would be nothing for us if they were not within us. If any feelings are to be present for us, then the entire system of all feelings must be presupposed a priori. (7) The system of sensibility is not felt as such; every feeling that is supposed to be known must occur as a particular feeling. Therefore, several feelings must already be present before it is possible to construct a concept of a goal, {since, for the purpose of this construction, a manifold must already be present, for otherwise no selection can occur. This manifold is obtained through feeling, and each of these feelings, in turn, is possible only insofar as a system of sensibility is presupposed.} Thus something must already actually have been felt-e.g., a particular smell or taste, which I never felt before, and which presents itself to me as something particular. If this particular smell or taste had never presented itself to me, then I would never have been able to imagine it merely because I possess a system of feelings.v This feeling has a place within the system of feelings; but if it is to be present for me, it must be present as a particular feeling. {If something particular is supposed to have been felt, it must therefore have presented itself to me as something particular; and until this occurs, it cannot appear for me within any possible concept of a goal.} How can a feeling become the object of a concept? {This happens when the practical I assembles a concept from the manifold; in this manner the I becomes intuitable. To be sure, the I is at the same time the feeling subject, but in this relationship the feeling subject is the object of the intuiting subject. Feeling and intuition are distinct from each other.} In the case of intuition, a reality is presupposed; but this is not so in the case of feeling. The reality that is present here is the act of feeling itself. I do not feel something; but rather I feel myself. {Something determinate is and must be present when a concept of a goal is constructed, and in contemplating this, I am merely the intuiting subject; yet it is feeling that provides the original manifold for [the construction of] the concept of a goal.} What then is the nature of the transition from feeling to intuition? I cannot intuit a feeling unless it lies within me; thus, if I am to intuit a feeling, I certainly have to be a feeling Y Each of my feelings is felt as something particular; that is to say, to the extent that the system of my feeling is present and is merely altered in the same distinctive way on each occasion, then I immediately recognize a particular feeling. But if I had never experienced this or that particular feeling, then it would be and would remain completely unknown to me. I could neither imagine it on my own nor become acquainted with it from the descriptions of others; it would be nothing at all for me. For example, a person who has never yet tasted a melon, etc. (p. 66).
(66)
§6
181
subject. An act of reflection simply occurs [at this point]. 38 By means of a new 39 act of reflection, an act that occurs with absolute freedom, the 1, as an intuiting subject, lifts itself above itself to the extent that it is a feeling subject {and looks down upon the latter as the substrate}, and thereby becomes independent. z We have now explained the origin of the material that presents itself for our free choice.
§6
72
A free action is possible only if it is guided by a freely constructed concept of this action (§ 4); consequently, in advance of all action, the free intellect must be acquainted with the possibilities of action. Such an acquaintance can be explained only by assuming the presence within the 1, prior to all action, of a drive, within which, precisely because it is only a drive, the inner activity of the I is limited. Since nothing pertains to the 1 which it does not posit, 40 the I must also posit this limitation, and an original limitation that is posited in this way is called a "feeling.'"'' Since a free choice or selection is supposed to take place, a manifold offeelings must be present, and these various feelings can be distinguished from one another only through their relationship to the general system of feelings, a system that is likewise originally present. 42
Comparison with the Compendium 43 In the older as well as in the newer version, striving or drive is taken to be what is highest and primary in human beings. ~8
"Eo wird schlechthin
REFLECTIRT:·
~· Radrizzani points out that we are here dealing with a single act of reflection and thus
proposes that the word "new" be deleted from this sentence. z I cannot mn.it any feeling of me, but only within myself, and indeed, in such a manner that the act of feeling itself acquires complete reality or becomes an object. Intuition arises only after this, insofar as an act of reflection simply occurs-that is, occu~ with absolute freedom. Intuition occurs when the I, as it were, raises itself above itself and then loob down upon the feeling subject, as the substrate. The I thereby becomes i~. but we will say more about this below (pp. 66-67). 46 Reading, with H and Krause's MS "was es nicht seue" for K's "als was es sich nicht
oulswu
seue.~
41 "so etwas nennt man ein Gefuhl." The translation interprets K's "so etwas" in the light of the parallel passage in H: "(so ein setzen der ursprOnglichen Beschriinkung)." 42 Reading, with H and Krause's MS, "das gleichfalls unpriinglich vorhandene" for K's "das gleichfalls nothwendige unpriinglich vorhandene." 4 ~ As before, a few of Fichte's cryptic citations from GWL have been slightly expanded to make it easier for readers to locate the relevant portions of the earlier text. Fichte's page references to the first edition have been replaced with page references to SW, I.
(67)
73
In the present version, we begin with the immediate object of consciousness, i.e., with freedom, and then go on to display the conditions of the same. Free action is what is most essential to our inquiry. The primary aim of the previous version was to provide an explanation of representations and of the intellect, and thus free action, striving, and drive were there employed merely as a basis for such an explanation. In the present version, the [realm of the] practical is the immediate object, and the theoretical [realm] is derived therefrom. Furthermore, the procedure of the present inquiry is predominantly synthetic, whereas that of the former is more analytic. What is ideal and what is real accompany each other and remain forever separate. In the book, the ideal is specified first, and the real is then derived therefrom. Here, on the other hand, we begin with the practical, which is treated in isolation so long as it remains separate from and unrelated to the theoretical. But as soon as the two come together, they are dealt with in conjunction with each other. Accordingly, the book's division into theoretical and practical parts is here dispensed with entirely. Both versions begin with a reciprocal determination of the I and the Not-1. p. 1 25. "Both the I and the Not-I are posited .... " This passage does not give any consideration to the question of whether this mutual determination is ideal or real. In contrast with the book, here we pay no attention to this question. {Instead, we have exhibited a reciprocal relationship between the I and itself-i.e., between real 44 and ideal activity.} {pp. 246-49, § 5· We are also not yet in a position to deal with this topic here. Some of the things said on pp. 251-52, however, are acceptable even within the present context. What is said on p. 252 is for us now no hypothesis.} p. 252. "The I was to posit a Not-I," etc. That the I "in part does not posit itself' means: it posits itself as limited. I.e., the intellect must posit something real in opposition to itself, because the ideal [activity] is supposed to be limited. But the reason for this limitation cannot lie within the ideal [activity] itself, and therefore it must be referred to the real [activity]. This is how we come to oppose to the I something that lies within the I. p. 252. "A priori, this is a mere hypothesis.... "This proposition is strictly demonstrated in the present version, because ideal and real activity have here been distinguished and separated from each other. p. 254. "The I is supposed to exert causality on the Not-/," etc. Here we cannot yet speak of any such causality, for the concept of causality has not yet been explicated. In the present version, acting is not inferred from the Not-I; instead, the Not-I is inferred from acting. •• Reading "reale" for H's "reine" ("pure").
74
pp. 254-55. "The conflict therefore ... an infinite, unbounded reality." The concept of infinity is here assumed only for the purposes of the presentation. {"The infinite 1": this is to be made comprehensible in terms of its opposite, that is, through the I that is limited by striving.} All that needs to be presupposed in order to explain striving is a purely active being. p: 255· "Insofar as the I posits a Not-1 in opposition to itself, it necessarily posits limits." Where the previous presentation speaks of "limits,"4 the present version speaks of "being halted" or " being constrained." But in this new presentation we do not infer these limits from the Not-1; instead, we infer the Not-1 from the limited state of the I. pp. 261-62. "The result of our inquiries so far.... " Something immediate must be assumed in advance of all free determination, something in which the I and the Not-1 are united: a disposition, a striving, a drive. pp. 271-77. "We explain ourselves.... " (This is an important point and is recommended reading.) The I sees everything within itself; even if it views something as outside of itself, the reason for this must nevertheless lie within the I.AA p. 277. "Without a practical power in the I. ... " This passage also deserves to be reread, but it needs to be read in the light of the new presentation. This new version does not repeat what was said in the earlier one concerning the "check" and the "direction"46 [of the l's activity]; instead, it speaks of "constraint" {of the ideal and real activities}. p. 279. "According to the account just put forward .... " This point would now be expressed as follows: The I is originally self-positing; but if its activity were not limited, it would be unable to posit itself. Consequently, the original activity must be limited, if reflection is to be possible at all. The Not-1 does not impinge upon the I; instead, it is the I that, in the course of its expansion, impinges upon the Not-1. 47 p. 279. "The ultimate ground of all reality for the I. ... " Nothing foreign is incorporated in the I. It receives no impressions or images from the world. What is posited in opposition to the I possesses no force 48 of its own which it could transmit to the I; instead, what is posited in opposition to the I is the l's own limitation, and the reason why the I posits something lies within the I itself. Force does not pertain originally to the Not-1; only being does. The Not-I can initiate nothing; it is capable only 45
"Schranken." The I sees nothing but itself; it alone is the immediate object [of consciousness]. Thus if the I is now supposed to see something outside of itself, it must intuit something else within itself {p. 68). 46 Reading, with Krause's MS and with H, "Richtung" for K's "Nichtlch." 47 "Nichtlch st
(6E
75
of hindering and arresting. The I cannot attain consciousness if it is not limited. The ground of the limitation lies outside of the I, but the I possesses within itself the ground of its activity. I am originally limited, and a manifold of feelings is also present within me from the start. I can do nothing to alter this fact, which conditions and makes possible my entire being, nor can I go beyond this; this is simply the point at which I find myself. Only if I am provided with endless time am I then free and able to do whatever I want within this sphere. pp. 27g-8o. "The Wissenschaftslehre is therefore realistic .... a force existing independently of them .... " Properly speaking, what is felt is not what is opposed to the I; instead, I feel myself to be limited, and the existence of what is opposed to me is first inferred in order to explain this limitation. 49 The positive component in things is nothing whatsoever more than that aspect of them which is related to our feelings: that something is red is a fact that cannot be derived from anything else; but that objects are in space and time and are related to each other in certain specific ways is something that can indeed be deduced. p. 280. "Notwithstanding its realism .... " I cannot exist unless I am limited. But what does this mean? After all, it is only as a result of my own positing that what limits me is external to me. When I reflect upon my own consciousness, I understand the reason why I have to be limited. I could not be conscious of myself if I were not limited and if there were nothing to limit me. But I posit what limits me only insofar as I am already conscious of myself, and therefore, only insofar as I am limited. The possibility of positing A is conditioned by B; but I can posit B only if I am conscious, and thus, only if I am limited by C, etc. I am limited at every point of consciousness; yet I can now reflect upon this fact and can say that my limitation exists only insofar as I posit it. p. 281. "This fact, that the finite mind must necessarily posit something absolute beyond itself. ... " This circle is all that really limits us. Again and again, whenever we posit within ourselves something we take to be external to ourselves, we are then forced to seek something else beyond what we have posited, something that is supposed to be independent of us, etc. A person who is not conscious of this law will conclude that our own representations are all that exist. Such a person is a transcendent idealist; whereas a person who believes that things could exist apart from our representations is a dogmatist. I explain something (A) by connecting it with something else (B), etc. I cannot grasp everything at once, for I am finite. This is what is called "discursive thinking." The finitude of rational beings consists in having to explain things. With respect to its being, as well as with respect to the determinacy thereof, the Not-1 is independent of the practical I. But it is 49
"auf das Entgegengesezte wird erst als Grund der Beschriinkung geschlofkn.""
76
dependent upon the theoretical I, for a world is present only insofar as we posit it. When one is acting, one occupies the practical viewpoint. For acting, the Not-I possesses independent reality; one can alter and combine objects, but cannot produce them. [p. 282.] That "something is related to the practical power of the I" means: it is treated as hindering the same. p. ·282. "The ultimate ground of all consciousness is an interaction of the I with itself. ... " This means: [an interaction between] the ideal and the real I. {p. 282. The I is self-positing, but it cannot posit itself unless it is constrained, without something that hinders its activity, i.e., without a drive.} pp. 283ff. "This relation of the thing in itself to the I forms the basis. ... " Our grasp of the thing in itself is like our grasp of infinite space: it becomes finite as soon as one wishes to grasp it. The thing in itself, i.e., what actually limits us, is an Idea-namely, that I must forever posit myself as limited. 50 p. 286, nos. 1-3. "The striving of the I. ... " When one considers the I by itself, all one discovers within the I is the ground of activity, but no limitation. Considered purely in this manner, the I would become an activity; but no striving would be engendered thereby, for striving is possible only on the assumption that something limits the activity of the I. Consequently, striving cannot be explained merely with reference to the I. p. 287, no. 4· The Not-1 does not approach the I, but vice versa. Therefore we do not need to assume anything more than a "being" of the Not- I. Were we to talk about a counterstriving of the Not-I, then we would have to ascribe an inner force or disposition to the Not- I. (We will have more to say about this below; it is not a topic that can be dealt with here.) Thus the Not-1 should here be represented only as something that merely "is,"51 and the counterstriving of the Not-1 disappears. The I is originally active and expresses its activity as widely as it can. If this activity is arrested at even a single point, a striving is thereby engendered. The Not-1 is in this case a hindrance, a dam: not a counterstriving, but something standing in the way. 52 · 88 p. 287, no. 5· "Hence the forces of both must maintain an equilibrium." The I can go only as far as the Not-1 permits it to go. Later on we will see how the I is also able to penetrate the Not-1. 50 "ist eine Idee, nehmlich da~ ich mich in die Unendlichlc.eit hinaus als beschranlc.t sezen mu~." 51 "ein blo~s Seiendes." 52 "Kein Entgegenstreben, sondern ein Entgegenstehen." 88 The I arrives at the Not-I by means of its own activity, but the reverse of this proposition is not true, though Reinhold supposed that it was; instead, the Not-I serves, as it were, as a dam for the I's activity (p. 68).
186
§6
p. 287, § 7, no. 1. What is called "something" [in this passage] in the book is, in the present exposition, called "that which hinders," i.e., something passive, to which the ideal activity is related.cc pp. 288-go. Recommended rereading. Everything that is present within the I and happens by means of the I can be interpreted as a drive. The ideal activity is a drive for content, 53 because ideal activity is nothing apart from objects. {pp. 289-90 and p. 291, § 8, no. 2, should also be reread.} pp. 311-15. To be reread. cc "Something" means: that which is capable of being the object of an ideal aclivlty or intuition-something that constrains the ideal activity and brings it to a hah (p. 68). ~ 3 "ein Sachtrieb." See § 1·
76
77
§ 7
The chief question is this: Since the I's consciousness is, in its entirety, a consciousness of free activity, how can the I become conscious of its own free activity?A We know that, prior to anything else, the I must construct for itself a concept of its own activity, namely, a concept of its goal; 8 and in order to do this, it must be given a manifold from which to make a free choice or selection. 1 This manifold is given to the I through feeling. Thus we have already answered that portion of our question which concerns the content or material of the I's concept of its goal, for we have [shown how] the I is given the material from which it constructs its concept. The formal portion of the question still remains to be answered, however: How does the I assemble the concept of a goal from the manifold of feeling? (1) What is constructed for the purposes of self-determination, and has
to be constructed if self-determination is to be possible, is a concept; and thus it is an object of the ideal or intuiting activity.c {(We cannot yet speak of real activity, for the concept of a future action has to be A The chief question to be answered by our Wissenscllllftslehre was the following: Since all the I's consciousness is included within the consciousness of its own free activity, lww can the I become conscious of this consciousnes.
(6g)
t88
§ 7
constructed first.)} The distinction between ideal activity and feeling is as follows: Some being has to be given to the ideal activity, a being that is present independently of it and lies outside of it, whereas in the case of feeling, what is real and what is ideal are one and the same. {What is felt is the feeling subject: I feel myself; but the intuiting subject is not what is intuited. The eye, the ideal activity, is nothing at all unless there is something present that it copies.} The ideal activity requires an object outside of itself, an object that fixes this activity. We are here concerned with the concept of a goal; and in this case the object of which I form a concept is not something that is already supposed to exist, though it should nevertheless be something that could exist-and indeed, in conformity with the concept of a goal, should exist. 0 Yet even if one abstracts from this possible [future] object, there always still remains an object of the representation. Our task here is to deduce this actual objectivity. According to Reinhold, the subject, the object, and the representation are all present within consciousness. 2 One first becomes conscious of a representation [as such] through a new act of reflection. One then distinguishes, however, between the subject and the object; thus, whether we are dealing with something real or with something merely imagined, the object of thinking is still distinguished from the thinking subject. This general concept of an object should here be noted. {Even imaginary objects, such as Pegasus, demonstrate that some object must always be opposed to the intuition, or ideal activity, and that the object and the subject are distinguished from each other within the representation. By means of the representation or act of thinking, the intuiting subject and the intuited object are still distinct, even if the latter is something present only within my thoughts.} This, therefore, is the [application to] intuition of a principle that was established earlier:!! something real must always be posited in opposition to the ideal activity, for no intuition would be possible otherwise. {This is the character of an intuition: An intuition, as such, is not identical with the subject, that is, with the intuiting subject. To be sure, this object [the intuition] can be identical with the subject in some other respect, e.g., as an action of the I; nevertheless, to the extent that the I is engaged in acting it is not engaged in intuiting.} 0 Remark: When we talk in this context about an object present external to and independent of the ideal activity, we are not referring to any object actually encountered within experience; for what we are concerned with here is precisely the process of constructing a concept that is supposed to exist [that is, to be embodied in an object) only in the future. When, for example, I want to alter something and give it a new form, this future form is nevertheless present for me within intuition. Sometime in the future I might actually encounter this form within experience-or perhaps not (p. 6g). 2 See n. 5 to § 1. 'See § 3· sects. 3 and 4·
(70)
§
7
189
{Therefore, if the concept of a goal is to be constructed, that is, if it is to become an object of the ideal activity or of intuition,} the concept that has to be constructed must be an "object"4 in the sense just described.
78
(2) The material from which the ideally active subject assembles its concept is supposed to be supplied by the manifold of feeling. But a feeling {is not an object of the ideal activity, [it]} is nothing objective; instead, it is purely subjective. Nor is a feeling anything that can be {intuited or} grasped conceptually, 5 {and thus no concept can be constructed from it}. Feeling and comprehending are opposed to each other. The very things that are united within feeling must lie outside of one another in the concept and in the intuition. Our present task is to explain how the content of feeling 6 can become the object of an act of intuition or comprehension. (This is a very important question, because it will lead us to the object proper-the Not-l-and will provide us with a description of the manner in which the Not-1 is constructed. Our question could also be phrased as follows: How does the I manage to go outside of itself? The distinctive character of the Wissenschaftslehre is revealed in this question. {How are we supposed to accomplish the transition from what is merely subjective-feeling-to something objective, something that can hinder the activity of the I when it is acting? Answer: through the productive imagination, which is simultaneously free and constrained by laws, thanks to which the concept of its action is at the same time also necessary.} The theory of the productive imagination 7 here obtains a new clarity and solidity. The entire sensible world is produced by the productive imagination, in accordance with its own specific laws.) A feeling is not an immediate object of intuition, nor can we freely choose to repeat a feeling, as we can repeat our representation of an object. A feeling is not a thing; it is not something we have to construe 8 or can describe. It is a state [of the 1]. It is nothing substantial; instead, it is an accidental property of a substance. Nevertheless, a feeling appears to be inseparably connected with an object, and it cannot be felt without • "Dieser soeben geschilderte Charakter des Objects mull dem zu entwerfenden Begriffe zukommen.'" Cp. H: "so mull auch dieser Charakter derObjectivitat dem zu entwerfenden Be~f zu kommen.'' "das begriffen wird." 6 "das was Sache des Gefiihls ist." 7 The "productive imagination"(Jwoducliw Einbildungskraft) plays a crucial role in Kant's account of the possibility of experience. It is the active power (or ""faculty") that mediates between and unites thought (concepts) and sensation (intuitions). See the entire "transcendental deduction of the categories," especially KRV, A115-38 and B 15o-56, B 164. 8 ""kein zu construirendes.'' H: "nichts CONSTRUIRBARES" ("nothing that can be construed").
being related to an object.E There must be some reason why this is so, and it is just this connection between feelings and objects which we are going to investigate. {By means of the reproductive9 imagination, we are able to repeat a representation connected with a feeling that we once had, and in this way we are also able to engender a feeling-albeit only a weaker one. Thus, to the extent that there is a necessary connection between representation and feeling, one can start with a representation that has been freely reproduced and proceed from there to feeling.}
79
(3) I am, at the point at which we have arrived, limited; i.e., no expression 10 of activity is possible. A feeling is immediately connected with this limitation. What is limited in this case? I am limited only insofar as I attempt to engage in real activity; and thus it is only real activity that is limited, not ideal activity. {My ideal activity cannot by any means be so limited that it cannot express itself further; on the contrary, it expresses itself in feeling.} Consequently, if anything further is to ensue, it must occur by means of ideal activity. This is the point where ideal activity and real activity diverge from each other, and where each can be described only with reference to the other; for they stand in a reciprocal relationship to each other. The whole, undivided I is present within feeling: we cannot see the I, but we can feel it.~'" As we just said, the ideal activity is able to extend itself further [i.e., beyond feeling], and this means that it does so with the freedom and self-activity characteristic of the I. In the case of feeling, the I's activity cannot express itself in this manner, because it is precisely through limitation that feeling becomes feeling in the first place. The intellect is directed at something independent of itself; it is supposed to manifest itself externally or to "express" itself. 11 How and for what reason? For no reason whatsoever! Intelligence is an absolute activity of the I; it must express itself just as soon as the conditions are present which make it possible for it do so, and these conditions are present whenever the real activity is curbed.c "An ol:>jective representation is connected with a feeling, and this representation is supposed to contain the ground of this feeling; this ground is our own reason, understood as a necessary connection between feeling and representation (p. 71). 9 Reading I!.EPRODUCTIVEN for H's PRODUCTIVEN ("productive"), 10 Reading, with Krause's MS, "Aeuserung" forK's "Anschauung." FIn feeling, ideal and real activity are undivided; they are united and interrelated = X, which we cannot intuit but can only feel (p. 7 1 ). 11 '""sie soli sich a.usern}' Though ii.u.nern means ••to express;~ ..to utter," ..to manifest,'"" etc., it is closely related to au{Jer ("outer," "outside," "beyond") and iiuPerUda ("external"). In order to "express" themselves, the l's drives must go "outside or• the I. o-rhe ideal activity is directed at something foreign, something independent of it It expresses itself for no (external) reason, but only because it lies within the nature of the I to
(71)
§ 7
191
The I, by nature, is a drive; thus we could interpret the ideal activity as the product of a drive toward reflection, or a drive toward an object, or a drive for content. 12 Some such drive must be presupposed in order to account for ideal activity. H A drive of this sort cannot be felt, for a drive can be felt only to the extent that it is not satisfied; but the reflectio.n drive is satisfied on every hand. One must carefully distinguish this drive from the drive to real activity, which frequently goes unsatisfied. {Accordingly, the I is a p·ower of intuition; it simply intuits.} 13 Thus something is intuited simply because it is intuited. (4) The ideal activity is a free activity, whereas, in contrast, feeling is a passive state. But the ideal activity has previously been described as constrained. What kind of freedom are we then concerned with in this case? It is an actual instance of doing something, 14 a production of something new, something that first comes into being through this very activity. The ideal activity is constrained, in the sense that it is not unconditionally free, but must conduct itself in accordance with certain laws. {The reason why the ideal activity posits anything at all is not contained within this activity itself, but lies in something else.} The ideal activity can be characterized as free only insofar as the I attributes this activity to itself. This occurs through the opposition of an unfree state, namely, feeling. 15 Thus, if the ideal activity is posited as an act of wrenching away from a passive state of feeling, then both the opposition and the bond of unity between feeling and intuition are present. No intuition would be present without feeling, and intuition would necessarily follow from feeling. {Both must be comprised in one and the same act of the I. That is to say, they must be simultaneously opposed to and nevertheless united with each other; for the I cannot posit anything except by means of its opposite, which is what makes an intuition of the former possible. This act, in which both [intuition and feeling] are simultaneously present in opposition to each other, is an act of "wrenching away"-a state from which and to which transition is made.} We would thus have here yet another application of the principle that ideal and real activity do not exist apart from each other. In this do so. This activity expresses itself as soon as such an expression becomes possible, that is, as soon as the real activity is limited; thus the ideal activity is alone active [in this case] (p. 71). 12 "Die Natur des lch ist ein Trieb, wir konnen also die ideale Thatigkeit erklaren aus einem Triebe zur REFu:xJON, auch Trieb nach einem Objecte, oder Sachtrieb." A few lines later, Fichte uses the term der Rejlaionstrieb, here translated as "reflection drive." " In order to distinguish this drive from others, one could call it the "ideal drive," or the "drive of the intellect," or the "drive toward representation" (p. 71). 1 ' "es schaul schlechlhin an." 14 "ein eigentliches Thun." 15 "Die~ geschieht durch Gegensatz eines nicht freien Zustandes-des Gefiihls."
(?
192
8o
§7
case, the principle states that feeling and intuition do not exist apart from each other. Feeling is something real; intuition is something ideal. One advantage of this is that it prevents feeling from being omitted from the system of the human mind; instead, feeling is shown to be necessarily connected with this system and to be a necessary component of the same. Every individual point that has been established has to be integrated into the whole. This is what is now occurring in the case of intuition: no intuition is possible unless a feeling is posited along with it {and vice versa}. Thus we obtain the following result: There can be no intuition apart from feeling and no feeling apart from intuition. They are {through the necessary opposition of freedom and nonfreedom} synthetically united and reciprocally determinable. An intuition is nothing unless a feeling is posited in opposition to it. The transition from feeling to intuition {is simple and} is as follows: The ideal activity expresses itself just as soon as it is able to do so, and whenever a feeling is present it is able to express itself; hence it does so. {To be sure, one can still think of a feeling apart from an intuition, for feeling is something original, something not derived from anything else. Ideal and real activity are joined within feeling. But there can be no consciousness of a feeling without intuition; for in consciousness feeling and intuition separate from each other. Consciousness is bound up with intuition, and feeling lies at the basis of intuition-or rather, feeling precedes intuition.} (5) That the situation must actually be as we have described it is a conclusion that follows from its very description. If a free action of the I, practical activity, is to be posited, then a feeling must exist, {for this is precisely the condition for the possibility of our free action}. Feeling, however, exercises no influence upon the other operations of reason unless it is posited, but it cannot be posited except in opposition to intuition. The main question now is, How are intuition and feeling posited in opposition to and in relation to each other? In what act {or state (for we cannot yet say precisely whether this is an act or a state)} of the mind are they compared with each other? (The feeling = A. The intuition = B. Thus there must be some third thing = C, in which feeling A and intuition B are united.) An intuition is itself immediately accompanied by a specific feeling, [the feeling that] this intuition is related to me. 1 That through which an intuition becomes "mine" is itself a feeling. Why, one could ask, do my thoughts, intuitions, etc., not appear to me to be movements of something foreign to me? Why do they seem to me to be mine? {Why do we 1 The relation of the intuition to me, through which it becomes my intuition, is nothing other than a feeling (p. 73).
(73)
§
81
7
193
consider our representations to belong to us?} This is an important question, {which no one has asked until now-not even Kant}. (fhe Kantian synthesis of pure apperception does not attain to the level of this question.) My act of self-positing underlies and is thus bound up with certain other_things. The positing of myself as engaged in intuition is a feeling of myself. Obviously, nothing more is present within this feeling of myself than a feeling: I feel myself, and I feel myself to be limited. I feel myself, and, to the extent that I am engaged in feeling, I am not engaged in intuiting or in thinking. I am then present for myself only in and by means of feeling. By means of ideal activity, I am able to wrench myself away from this limited condition of feeling, but the I that wrenches itself away in this manner is what is limited, {for only on this condition is the act of wrenching away possible}. Just as I must be limited for myself {with respect to feeling}, so must I also be-for myself-the subject that wrenches itselfaway 1 {with respect to feeling}. All the above concerns feeling; 17 therefore, the feeling of selfl 8 is that C which includes within itself both feeling and intuition. It is only through this continuous feeling of myself that feeling and intuition are synthetically united} The act of intuiting is not felt as such, {which would be absurd}. What is felt is the transition from limitation to intuition, that is, the act of determining oneself to engage in intuition-a self-determination that stems from an act of reflection in which the I engages. (6) {We have now become acquainted with the form 19 of intuition.} What then can be present within an intuition? What is the content 20 thereof? No intuition is possible unless the practical activity is limited and {thereby} separated from the ideal activity. The practical activity is, in this case, canceled; but since this real activity also belongs to the I, the ideal activity has to be related to an object, {for otherwise something would be missing from the I as a whole}. ich auch das lo~reijknde sein fiir mich."' ist allein Absicht des Gefiihls." This sentence makes little sense as it stands and hence has been amended (following a suggestion by Radrizzani) by replacing the words "ist allein" with "ist alles in." This reading, which remains conjectural, is guided by the parallel paragraph in H, in which the phrase "in Absicht des Gefiihls" occurs twice. 18 "das Selbstgefiihl." 1 By means of ideal activity, I wrench myself away from this constrained state of feeling. Who is the I that does this? It is the limited I, for the act of wrenching away is not possible otherwise; and to this extent the limitation with respect to feeling is present/or me. Similarly, I am also, for myself, the subject that wrenches itself away with respect to feeling. Therefore, both the intuition and the feeling are mine-thanks to my feeling of self, through which feeling and intuition are united; and this feeling of oneself is the C we have been seeking (p. 73). 19 "das FoRMALE." 16
"mu~
17 "Die~
20
"Materie."
(74)
194
§
7
While I am engaged in intuiting, I feel myself to be simply active {to the extent that the feeling of self is related to this intuition}; [hence] what is opposed to the act of intuiting has to be posited outside of me and thus becomes a Not-1, something that merely limits.K It is only from the philosophical viewpoint that we see that this is supposed to be the Not-1; [considered in itself,] it is merely what limits. {In intuition,} the I has not gone outside of itself. What I intuit is my own limited condition. But this is not intuited as mine; it is not referred to me. I am the felt subject of intuition, and, as such, I am active. Thus it is through limitation that the ideal activity becomes an ideal activity. I am not what is intuited in intuition; I am the subject and not the object of intuition. In contrast with feeling, intuiting is an activity. A feeling of self is connected with the act of intuiting. While engaged in the act of intuiting, I feel myself to be active. What then is the object {of intuition}? It is nothing but feeling itself, the feeling of my own limited state.L This limitation is not posited as my own, however. {I do not appear within the intuition; I am merely the active subject of intuition, and insofar as I am ideally active, I am not limited. On the other hand, only insofar as my ideal activity is limited does it become an ideal activity at all (appear within my consciousness). In intuition, however, I do not reflect upon myself as the active subject; the limitation (that is, the object) is not referred to me, is not treated as "mine," but is instead treated as something simply "in itself." That is to say, even though I and limitation are, as subject and object, opposed to and at the same time united with each other within intuition, I am, nevertheless, not intuited at all. Instead, my own limitation here appears as an object, as something that limits; and it is intuited as such. But it does not appear as "my" limitation, since what sets limits cannot be referred to me, but instead appears as something outside of me, as something limiting.} The object is [thus] posited as something external to me; as Not-I, it is posited in opposition to the I, but no notice is taken of this act of opposing; 21 I do not relate it to myself. As was said above, it is nonsense. to talk about the content [of intuition] being given 22 to the I as a whole. Nothing can be given to the I, for the I has no "limb" 23 to which something "given" could be attached.
K Within intuition, I feel myself to be purely active, to the extent that the feeling of self is related to the intuition; thus I am an active I. Now the object is added. This lies outside of the intuition; and hence, insofar as intuition involves activity and insofar as the I is the intuiting subject or is active, this object also lies outside of the l-and thus in the Not-I. This Not-I, however, is merely something that limits; it is not something that is limited (p. 74). L In intuition, the I does not go outside of itself; it itself is not intuited and does not ap,p,ear within consciousness. It is limited, and this limitation is the object of intuition (p. 74). 1 Reading "Entgegensetzen" for "Entegegengesezte" ("what is posited in opposition"). 22 "gegebensein des Stoffs." "'"kein Glied."
·.~
§7
1 95
If, nevertheless, something is supposed to exist for the I, then there must be, in addition to the general sphere within which the I encloses itself, another, narrower one. The power for which something is present is the intellect, which subsequently posits itself in a particular fashion as "I." The entire world constitutes our general sphere. Within this general sph~re, one must posit another, narrower one. If this narrower sphere is now taken to be the I, then there is something external to the I. {The I encloses itself; nothing foreign can enter into it. Nevertheless, the I also discovered many other things, outside of itself, which, together with the I, entered into this general sphere. In addition to this general sphere of the I, the I must once again enclose itself within another, particular sphere, so that this narrower circle would include those things that do not belong within the wider circle of the I, inasmuch as the ideal activity has posited itself again as an I in particular.
©A Sphe\e
Thus, anything lying outside of sphere B would be the Not-I and, with specific respect to B, would not belong to the I.} The existence of such a narrower sphere {B} is now established. In intuition, the I feels itself only as active. The I's passivity is excluded [from the narrower sphere of the I], and, in this way, an object becomes possible. I feel myself to be limited. I then wrench myself away from this state of limitation. Both the act of feeling and the act of wrenching myself away from feeling occur in the same, undivided moment. The ideal activity cannot be limited; thus, if the real activity is limited, this leaves only the ideal activity, and this isolated acting is an act of intuiting. My state becomes altered by this act of wrenching away; I become free and active, since I am in a passive state while engaged in feeling; but, since all this passivity still remains, it becomes an object {of intuition, and indeed, [is intuited] as an immediately given object, not as one related to the 1}. The alteration this "something" undergoes can be explained only by my freedom in intuition. M M The I is active in intuition and passive in feeling. When the I is considered in these two different ways-i.e., first as passive and limited, and then again as active-then it also has two different objects, and consequently, two different spheres. In fact, however, feeling and intuition are synthetically united in one and the same state, and therefore they have one and the same object: the state of limitation. Feeling and the wrenching away of the ideal activity constitute but a single moment, for the isolated acting of the ideal activity (for this is all that remains after it has wrenched itself away [from the passive state of feeling]) is precisely intuition. Since all that is altered by this act of wrenching away is my own state, this
(7.
196
§
7
Feeling and intuition are synthetically united with each other within the same moment and within the same state; neither exists without the other. From the philosophical viewpoint, the object of feeling is the same as that of intuition. For the I itself, however, these are two different objects, because the I is here considered in two different ways: On the one hand, it is passive, and in this case it is a feeling of limitation; on the other hand, it is active, and what is felt in this case is the object. In short, the intuition is the same as what is felt; but insofar as this is an object of intuition it does not remain something merely felt, but instead becomes something intuited, something "seen," something that is not referred to the I-only in the concept is it once again referred to the 1.24 In this way we can also explain the synthetic unification of the predicates derived from feeling with those derived from intuition-which is otherwise inexplicable. I taste something sweet and posit the existence of a piece of sugar, and then I say, "The sugar is sweet." A feeling is here transferred to an object of intuition, and the two are united with each other in the same moment. {The object is not felt to be sweet; instead, what I actually feel to be sweet is myself. I feel that an object is present only insofar as I am engaged in intuiting.} In this situation, the I itself is only felt and is not intuited; therefore, no act of intuiting appears, as such, within consciousness. In intuition, the I loses itself in the object of intuition, or, as Kant puts it, "intuition is blind." 25 Accordingly, in intuition something hovers immediately before me. 26 I do not ask whence it comes; the object simply happens to be there. This is how the object appears within the act of intuiting, but this act of intuiting does not appear {as such} within consciousness; and, for this reason, when viewed from the ordinary standpoint, the object can be said to be immediately present. N This is the way objects originally
passivity-this limited state-becomes an object of intuition, and indeed, as an immediately
given object, not as one related to the I (p. 75).
24 The translation here follows Fuchs's suggestion, and con trues "B" in this sentence as an abbreviation for Begriff ("concept"), rather than-as elsewhere in K-for Bewusstsein ("consciousness"). See the dictat to § 8, where ''the concept" is defined as "an intuition accompanied by a consciousness of the intuiting subject." 25 KRV, As1/B75· What Kant actually says in this celebrated passage, of course, is that "thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind." 26 "schwebt mir etwas unmittelbar vor." The verbsich vorschweben normally means "to entertain the thought of something" or "to have something in mind" and conveys a certain sense of vagueness, as in the phrase "to have a notion." Though Fichte frequently employs this term in its ordinary sense, he also exploits the root meaning of the verb schweben ("to hover'' or "to oscillate'') to give a semitechnical meaning to this common expression. He then employs it to designate the way in which an intuition, without being related to the I or to any other intuitions (and thus without being assigned any particular spatial position), occupies the attention of lhe imuiting subjecl as something distinct from the latter. In lhese cases, vorschweben is here translated, somewhat awkwardly, as "lo hover before" (one's consciousness). N In its striving, the I is limiled to this feeling or lhat, and it cannot have any feeling without an intuition-though lhe I is not posited as intuiling, that is, the intuition is not
(75)
§ 7
197
present themselves within consciousness. Any philosophy that denies this is groundless. Uacobi 27 calls such an object "an immediate revelation," and in some ways he has understood it better than any other philosopher. His only error is that he posits this object to be something that is "revealed" apart from 1-my relationship to our reason. This is not what it is; instead, the philosopher shows how this immediate revelation is connected with a feeling.} This is, in fact, how we arrive at objects: A feeling is present within us; we are limited, and from this limitation we infer the existence of something outside of us which limits us. But this entire process occurs immediately. In feeling, I discover myself to be limited; but I cannot feel without intuiting, and an object is immediately present for intuition. The same determinations [of consciousness which were present in feeling] are subsequently present when the object is treated as something that affects us from without, but such determinations first appear only when the object is already present. The "something" that hovers before the intuiting subject is, in this case, neither an image nor a thing. It is there without any relation to us. Neither image nor thing, but both at once, it is subsequently divided into the ima~e on the one hand and the thing on the other. It is the raw material 8 for both, an incomprehensible "something" with no relation to us. Within ordinary consciousness, we too affirm the immediate presence of things. related to the I; the I is not conscious of its activity, but loses itself in its object (or, as Kant says, the inluition is blind): for these reasons, the I is forced to posit something immediate, something opposed to and independent of the I, a Not-I that is not related to the I and to which it ascribes the character of "being." The object of intuition is a feeling, but it is a feeling as something intuited, and not as something related 10 the I. An intuition is simply something hovering immediately before the I. The I does not ask whence it comes; it is simply there for the I. Its intuition does not appear, as such, within consciousness; instead, since the I is limited in its feelings, and since it is thereby engaged in intuiting, the object appears to it as something immediately given. The I infers that something limiting exist.s beyond iUelf (p. 75). n Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (•743-181g) was a well-known novelist and essayist, as well as the author of several profoundly original philosophical treatises, in which he attacked philosophy in general and transcendental idealism in particular as "nihilism." Against the claims of speculative philosophy, Jacobi defended the necessity of "faith" or "belier· in every area of human life and expounded his own version of "direct realism.'' Fichte's reference is presumably w a passage on p. 51 of jacobi's 1787 "Dialogue," David Hume ilber dm Glauben Oiler Ideali.mus und Reali.smus, in which Jacobi notes that the honest realist bases his position upon nothing more than "the fact that things stand before him" and adds: "Can he find a more appropriate word to express himself than the word 'revelation'? Indeed, isn't it precisely here that one should look in order to discover the root of this word and the mgin cifils use?" Unavailable for nearly two centuries, the first edition of this important work has recently been republished in a photomechanical reprint edition with an English introduction by Hamilwn Beck (New York: Garland, 1983). 8 " "der Urstoff."
198
84
§
7
At this point, we cannot characterize the intuition any further than as follows: It is something that hovers before the I. To the extent that it can be related to the intuiting subject, but not to the I as a whole, it is "NotI," inasmuch as it is something positive which brings activity to a halt. 29 It can be characterized as a "being," for it transforms the entire activity of the I into ideal activity. The object is not felt; it exists only insofar as I am engaged in intuiting, and what I feel in the act of intuiting is myself. (7) Our task is to explain how a concept of a goal is possible, or at least to explain the possibility of an intuition that could supply the material required for {the construction of} such a concept. Intuition of the sort discussed so far can only be the intuition of an actual object, for it is based upon a feeling oflimitation. How then can there be an intuition of a possible object, as opposed to an actual one? What is there within feeling to which such an intuition {of a purely possible object} could be attached? {Once again, it is through opposition that this intuition of a purely possible object is to be deduced.} {I feel myself to be limited in my striving.} I cannot-feel myself to be limited without at the same time feeling myself to be striving, for my striving is precisely what is limited. Consequently, a feeling of striving, of {inner} impetus, must also be present. The feeling of limitation is, accordingly, conditioned by the feeling of striving, {and, in turn, this feeling of striving is nothing without limitation}; only together do they constitute a complete feeling. {Something twofold is thus present within every true feeling: Limitation means nothing by itself; nor does striving have any significance by itself Limitation and striving must be connected with each other.} Here we originally discover a bond between different things within the I, a bond grounded in the very content [of consciousness]. so The theoretical sphere can easily be derived from the feeling of limitation and the practical sphere from the feeling of striving. Since they are both originally connected with each other, they cannot subsequently be separated, and this is the ultimate reason why there can be no theory apart from practice. The object of the previously described type of intuition is something that limits, something that exists; but every being negates something else. There is nothing limiting without something limited; no being without something that is canceled by this being. {The intuition of a possible object is now to be posited in opposition to this intuition of an actual one, and they will be deduced in this way. The chief difficulty, however, lies in the fact that the proper character of in29 '
0
"etwas positives haltendes." ..eine in der Sache gegriindete Verbindung."
l
i
l I I
l
,! ?J:
~. :.
'1),_,
§
85
7
199
tuition cannot be renounced in our inquiry.} Though the proper character of intuition cannot be canceled, we nevertheless have a propensity to do just this; for intuitions are never present in ordinary consciousness, within which only concepts appear. {For an intuition by itself is nothing whatsoever; and yet intuition is here supposed to be posited pqrely in and for itself, in accordance with its proper character, that is, without any concept and without being posited as a determinate state of the 1.} What is canceled by the being of the object is not the activity of the I. _ No I is posited in intuition, {which is concerned with nothing whatsoever but a "something," with a content apart from any subject}; the I disappears into the object. Intuition is directed at an object, and thus what is excluded by what exists is also an object; it is the ideal, 31 which, as such, is the object of an intuition. {The possibility of an intuition, or, more correctly, the intuition of a possible object, as opposed to an actual one, occurs because the object of an actual intuition is something that exists, 32 something that limits-or, more precisely, it is the limited state of the I. Something else, another object, is excluded by this [actual] object, which therefore cannot be posited apart from something else that is can- (7 celed by the being of the actual object.} The object of the previously described intuition [namely, an actual object] is something that limits, a limitation of the I. But the limited condition of the I cannot be posited as such, for the I itself is not present within intuition. The object is something that simply hovers before the intuition, a mere object without a subject. Something is supposed to be posited in opposition to this object, something that negates it. This is therefore an object in the fullest sense of the word, i.e., something to which the ideal activity is related; but it must also be something that does not exist, something that can explain striving. 0 {Such an object is not; i.e., it is not an actual object, not an object that exists-precisely because it is posited in opposition to what exists. Such an object can be said to exist only in relation to striving.} This {object of intuition} is the ideal. (8) {We thus now have two types of intuition, or rather, two types of objects for intuition: (1) the object of striving, and (2) the determinate " "das Ideal." 32 uein SEYENDES." 0 The actual object of intuition is thus something limiting. What then is it that is limited, that is canceled by the being of the actual object? This is not the I, since the I does not appear within intuition at all and is by no means posited, but rather disappears therein. Instead, since intuition, in accordance with its very character, is directed only upon an object, then it follows that what is excluded by the actually existing object must also be an object; for intuition is supposed to occur, and nothing can be opposed to this intuition but an object, to which the ideal activity is related (p. 77).
200
86
§
7
object.} What then is the distinction between these two objects, the one that explains limitation and the one that explains striving? They are similar in that both are objects of intuition {and both acquire the character of "objectivity"}. What distinguishes them is this: The former is a determinate object; the ideal activity is here constrained in combining the manifold. The object of striving, on the other hand, is a determinable object; the ideal activity is here completely free to combine the manifold in any way it wishes. The latter 33 only sets us a task, i.e., the task of positing something-and indeed, positing something in opposition to the former object, for the I is limited by the first object. In both cases, however, the ideal activity is similarly constrained. Without settling the question of whether the feeling of limitation is a simple feeling or might instead be a combination of several different feelings, it is nevertheless clear from what has already been said that every feeling is indeed divisible with respect to its intensity 34 and that everything contained within intuition is, as it were, infinitely divisible, though such a division is not [actually] possible in the case of an intuition of a determinate object, for such an intuition is directed at something given, {which cannot be freely divided, because its object-and therefore the degree of feeling as well-is determinate}. In contrast, such division is possible in the case of a determinable object, and it must be posited as such, in opposition to the former object. In this latter case, {the ideal activity is not constrained in combining the manifold, for} we are merely assigned the task of positing something; since no content of feeling is given, our task in this case is {only} to search for a feeling. We will see below how a feeling can be found. This latter intuition [the intuition of a possible object] is empty. It is a free act of oscillating or hovering over the {infinite} manifold-a manifold with which the I is familiar only by means of its striving. 35 It is an intuition of the task of positing an object, {which, however, cannot be explained. It is nothing more than a link for our future series of thoughts.} {Similar to this is the concept of the ideal.} The concept of the ideal is an "Idea." 36 An Idea is a concept of something that cannot be comprehended at all, e.g., the concept of spatial infinity. This appears to involve a contradiction, which can be resolved as follows: No concept of the object in question is possible {since, as soon as I try to think about it, it becomes finite before my very eyes}; we can, however, form a concept of ' 3
Reading, with H, "letzte" forK's "erste" ("former"). ""der INTENSION nach." Fichte appears to employ the terms Grade ("degree") and Intension ("intensity") interchangeably. '"Reading "Streben" for K's "Schweben" ("oscillating" or "hovering"), a reading suggested by the otherwise virtually identical passage in H. Without this change, the passage would read: " ... with which the I is familiar only by means of its act of hovering." 36 "eine Idee." See n. 6 to the "First Introduction," p. 79·
(78)
§ 7
201
the rule in accordance with which a concept of this object could be produced as a result of an infinitely prolonged process of advance. E.g., in the case of infinite space: {one can indeed begin to think about it, and it can be expanded ever further; but one cannot think of the infinity itself}. Every space that can be grasped is finite, and this is why we simply attend to what we would have to do if we wished to grasp an infinite space. If we abstract from the rule in question {(or from the individual acts of intuition)}, then we are left with nothing but the {advance, the expansion, the} quest, and this is the object of intuition with which we are here concerned: {the ideal}. (g) In the course of developing our philosophy, we ourselves have now opposed these two types of intuition to each other. Now, however, another question arises: How does the original I think of this? How does it posit these two intuitions in opposition to each other? While it is engaged in intuiting, the I merely feels itself (see above). Intuition is directed entirely at the object {through which the I feels itself therein}. In the intuition of what limits, the I feels itself {or feels its ideal activity} to be limited; in the intuition of what is ideal, it discovers itself to be free. {What does this mean?} Simply by virtue of the fact that it has an object, the ideal activity is always limited. Nevertheless, despite its limitation, it remains an activity, an inner act of forming images, an act of producing something within itself, an act of internal self-intuition.~17 In the first case [that is, in the case of an actual object], the ideal activity is limited with regard to the concept it is supposed to construct; in the second case [that is, in the case of a possible object], it is entirely free: no object or rule is given, but only a task. In intuition, therefore, the I feels itself to be partly limited and partly free. P The I cannot feel itself to be limited, however, without also feeling itself to be free-and vice versa. Each of these two states is determinable only with reference to the other. {In order to have an intuition I must feel myself to be free and limited at the same moment.} Neither feeling can be separated from the other. {The synthetic union of both intuitions follows, in tum, from this.} Both intuitions, that of a determinate object 37
"inneres Bilden, ein Machen in sich, ein innerliches sichanschauen." The ideal activity is always limited by the fact that it posits an object. It is free only as an inner acting or as an act of forming images-an activity that can only be intuited. [In the case of an intuition of a determinate object] the ideal activity is limited and has to intuit the object just as it is. Nevertheless, its activity remains an inner acting, an intuiting of itself as active. [In the case of an intuition of an ideal object] the ideal activity is not limited. It can construct any possible image; no object is present for it which it has to intuit. Nothing is present but a task. Thus, in this case, the I feels itself to be free (p. 78). P
202
87
§ 7
and that of the ideal, are necessarily united with each other; neither is possible apart from the other. Feeling has here been derived as the fundamental state, with which everything else must be connected. Feeling is the first, immediate object of our reflection. The I feels itself, and indeed, it feels itself as a whole; but, as we know, the I is both practical and ideal, and it is through feeling that the practical I and the ideal I are now first separated from each other. The I first feels itself to be practical; in fact, this is the immediate feeling, {the feeling x.a• 'Esox.fJv,}38 within which the feelings of limitation and striving are united. But the I feels itself in its entirety; thus it also feels itself to be ideal, and, to this extent, it feels itself to be engaged in intuiting-within which intuition, once again, limitation and striving must be united,Q and four different elements are again present: a feeling of limitation, a feeling of striving, an intuition of a determinate object, and an intuition of the ideal. {All these are absolutely present alongside one another and are synthetically united within the human mind. For feeling is united with intuition: I feel myself as a whole, and therefore it is not only my real activity that is limited; my ideal activity is limited as well. But what is ideal is intuition. Furthermore, no feeling of limitation is possible apart from a feeling of striving, and thus, neither can there be any intuition of a determinate object without an intuition of the ideal, i.e., without any relationship to our own efficacy. If activity were not canceled or limited, then we could never perceive or intuit any object.} These four elements are necessarily united; none of them can exist apart from the others. Later on we will see that other elements must be added to these.
An intuition is necessarily connected with every feeling; for feeling is limitation, but a limitation that is not opposed to an activity is nothing. That within the I which necessarily remains an activity, however, is its ideal power. The point of union between feeling and intuition is this: even as the I feels itself39 to be limited (in its real aspect), it also feels itself to be engaged in intuiting (in its ideal aspect). To the extent that intuition is directed at the limitation, this limited state of the I becomes 8
"par excellence." The I also feels itself to be active idealiter, however, and, to this extent, engaged in intuiting-within which limitation and the quest or striving for an object must be united (p.Jg). ' Reading, with Krause's MS, "lch, selbst" for K's "lch sich." '
Q
(79)
§7
203
a mere object, with no relation to a subject, and the intuition is felt to be constrained in the depiction of the object. A feeling of this sort, however, is impossible apart from an opposed feeling of freedom; consequently, the intuition is also, in another respect, felt to be free, and to this extent it is an intuition of the ideal.
88
{What we have said so far is not enough to complete our task of [accounting for] the possibility of constructing a concept of a goal, since we have not yet established the possibility even of what was presented in the preceding §. What was said there cannot even support itself yet-to say nothing of anything else.} In the preceding §, intuition was shown to be necessary, and the gy-ound of this necessity was explained as well. In the act of intuition, however, the I loses itself in its object. {There we were dealing with intuition as such, apart from any relationship to a subject. What is still lacking, therefore, is any proof of the I. How can it consciously posit it.self?} How is a concept of free acting still possible? Or, how is it possible for the I to exist for itself? {This question coincides with the previous task of determining how it is possible to construct a concept of a goal.} Thus we must now investigate the I further and must show how the {preceding} intuition must be related to the I, that is, how the I must be present for itself. ( 1) According to what has already been said, there is {necessarily} a manifold of feeling; but a feeling is a specific limitation, and it is impossible for the I {at one and the same moment of time} to feel itself to be limited in a certain respect and also to feel itself to be not limited in this same way-which is just what would happen if a multiplicity of feelings were to be present within the I in one and the same respect. The I would be limited and not limited in one and the same way; it would be opposed to itself and {no limitation,} no reality (material content), 1 would remain. {For the feelings that make up the manifold of feelings are opposed to each other: I cannot have, for example, a feeling of sweet at the same time I am having a feeling of sour. Otherwise, the I would lose its identity. Thus the manifold can be unified only if the various feelings are 1
"Stoffheit ."
[ 204]
§8
205
present in various different ways.} Accordingly, such a manifold of feeling can be thought of only in terms of an alteration in the state of the feeling subject. (This manifold cannot be simultaneous; it must be successive {-which is also how it actually exists-}, though this will become clear only when we reach the deduction of time.) 2 {The manifold must therefore be present not in any single way, but in a variety of different ways, that is, as a variety of different alterations in the state of the 1.} How then is such an alteration in the state of the feeling subject possible? So far we have seen that the I is originally enclosed within certain limits, and from this a world arises for the I. The I is absolutely free to expand these limits {through its self-determination}, and, in doing this, it alters its state and thereby alters its world. However, since we have not yet provided a deduction ofthe possibility ofthis free self-determination/1 this cannot be the type of alteration that concerns us at present. A Could the state of our limitation, along with the world corresponding thereto, perhaps alter themselves on their own? This is hardly to be expected, for it is the character of the world merely to "be" and not to become; it initiates no action. Instead, the situation must be as follows: Some principle of alteration must already be present within our very nature, i.e., within our determinate state-as is the case with plants and animals, {within which alterations also occur. Thus, before I can alter myself by means of an act of self-determination, I must already have been altered. There must therefore exist some sort of intermediary thing, which we call "nature," some sort of force or principle of activity, 4 by means of which I alter myself independently of my freedom and without any consciousness of my self-determination. Could this turn out to be the cause of the alteration in question?} Later on we will see that something of this sort is indeed the case. 5 • Be this as it may, at this point I may ascribe no more than hypothetical validity to this postulate of alteration. However, if it should turn out to be the case that consciousness can be explained only through such an assumption and cannot be explained without it, I would then have the right to postulate it categorically. {In the meantime, however, we may certainly not deny that we are here, once again, assuming something unproven and allowing a gap to remain.} 2
See below,§ 12. 'See the deduction of willing in§ 13. A But is this alteration something the I can freely accomplish? We cannot yet answer this question. We are now only at the point of deriving the possibility of freedom and of explaining the possibility of self-determination; indeed, we will be using this alteration [in the state of the I] to make freedom comprehensible. A free alteration (produced by the I) does indeed take place, but we are not here concerned with this alteration, for then we would find ourselves caught up in the following circle: I am free, because I alter my state; and I alter my state, because I am free (p. 81 ). • "eine Krafft, PRINCIP thatig zu sein." 5 See below, remark A to sect. 6 of this §.
(81)
206
§ 8
(2) An alteration thus occurs in the state of the I. Accordingly, two dif-
8g
ferent feelings, A and B, must be present (both of which are mere feelings of limitation). In the previous § we found that a number of things necessarily follow simply as a consequence of feelings as such, and thus all these same things must here follow in consequence of feelings A and B. Since feeling A and feeling B are different, however, their consequences must also be different. 8 This opens up for us an important prospect, one that reveals more to us concerning the inner workings of the human mind. {Remark: The term "feeling" is always employed here to signify the mere feeling of determinacy; therefore, it is to be distinguished from the feeling referred to as "X" in the previous §.} For the time being, we will concern ourselves with the problem of how these two different feelings are united within consciousness. This will lead us further. We raised a similar question in§ 6, above: How can a manifold or multiplicity of feelings be related to and distinguished from one another? In the course of our previous discussion, we answered this question insofar as it concerns the matter or content [of feeling], but not insofar as the form of the same is concerned. 6 {Here we are concerned not with the union of the two states with respect to their content, but rather with a union with respect to their form, that is, with tJu comparison and union of tMse two states within consciousness. The question is this: To what within consciousness are they supposed to be att.acMd?} In what way are these two different states united? When I talk about "feeling A," I make reference to my entire state; and this is equally true of feeling B. In each case, my own state forms a single, complete whole-though, in the one case, feeling A is subtracted from this whole, and, in the other case, feeling B is subtracted. This provides me with the thread to which both A and B are attached, but to what do I attach this thread itself? We have [discovered] what would bind this state fast, but not how this would be accomplished. 7 •c B Every alteration, however, presupposes the presence of two different feelings, A and B, and thus presupposes the feeling of a manifold. But no feeling is anything determinate unless some other feeling is posited in opposition to it; therefore, whenever a single feeling is presem, a manifold is present as well. But since feelings are different, what arises out of them (i.e., intuitions) must also be different, which is just how we described such a state in the previous § (p. 81 ). 6 "Die~ hat die materiale Schwierigkeit gelosl, aber nicht die formale." 7 "dann habe ich einen Faden, woran ich A und B festhalte; aber woran halte ich diesen Faden fest{?] wir haben ein un< aber kein wie, das diesen Zustand fest halt." c We have already explained (in § 6) how it is possible to unite two different feelingsinsofar as their content is concerned. We already have the "what," but how this union occurs is something that still remains to be explained (p. 82).
(82)
§8
go
207
(3) One should view the union in question here as a union of opposed feelings A and B, or as a union of opposed states of the I. The entire system of sensibility cannot be felt, for it is nothing positive, but is merely a relationship, {a movement of transition from one [state of feeling] to the other. Considered in themselves, these two states have nothing in common with each other, for they are posited in opposition to each other: The only thing they have in common is the I. They adjoin each other at their boundaries, and they can do this only because they are posited in opposition to each other, i.e., because they are [two moments of] a single alteration.} As we have already discovered above, however, an activity of the I can be intuited only as a movement of transition from a determinable to a determinate state. Therefore, one could also say that nothing pertaining to the I is intuitable except the transition [from one of its states to another]. Consequently, this particular transition [from A to B], which cannot be felt, since it is nothing positive, could perhaps be intuited. We do not yet know how-or even if-such an intuition is possible, however. We know only that it cannot be felt. Nevertheless, if any movement of transition is to be present at all, it must exist for the I.D • Let us now, albeit in a provisional manner, make this description somewhat more precise. Here, as above {in§ 6}, we referred to "a general system of sensibility as such." What is this? It is not the same thing as the feelings themselves, for it is precisely from this system that these feelings must be distinguished; and indeed, it is only by being distinguished from and related to this system that feelings first become possible for the I at all. Consequently, the system of sensibility would be [another name for] the "alterability" or "affectability" of the l-and indeed, its alterability or affectability as a system, as something exhaustive and whole, something that constrains the ideal activity {and [thus becomes] a possible object for it}. The system of sensibility would thus be the sum total of all possible alterations, but only insofar as the form of these alterations is concerned, apart from all content. {A feeling is merely something that is felt, something that cannot be described and is possible only through the system of sensibility. This system is originally present for me in advance of all feelings. It is a continuously advancing line, along which the individual feelings are connected with one another. What then can be contained within this system of sensibility? It cannot contain the content of sensibility, for this is nothing but alteration itself, without any reference to the 1; 8 instead, the system of sensibility contains the formal aspect of sensation, as something that limits the ideal activity and is its object. Therefore, this system is a mere concept or Idea, 0 Therefore, this movement of transition must exist for the I, if an intuition of its own activity is also supposed to occur herein (p. 8:.~). 8 "ohne Beziehung rua das lcH."
I
I f
I
!
"'
I ! :
208
§
8
and is consequently something incomprehensible, for it neither alters nor is altered.} (This system will eventually prove to be our body, understood as a system of affectability and spontaneity, though at this point we are concerned only with affectability.)£ The whole [system of sensibility] is made up of nothing but relations, and yet it is supposed to be something; this is implicit in the nature of ideal activity, F and our primary task is to explicate the productive power of the ideal activity-to show, for example, that matter is extended in space and that this matter is nothing other than a relationship to our sensation. We have reached the point where the system of our sensibility comes into being for us. This system of sensibility is explained by our present presupposition (that our feelings are intuited), just as, in turn, the existence of this system supports our presupposition.G {Above, in§ 6, we discovered that every feeling is indirectly accompanied by other feelings, and this occurs by means of the system of sensibility, or by means of a comparison with the enduring state of the I as a whole. How did we come by this system? It was not given to us; instead, we inferred that there had to be something lying between the two feelings, A and B, something through which they are united. This could not be another feeling, since it lies between and mediates both feelings. Thus it must be an intuition = X. Consequently, this intuition X would be an intuition of alteration.} An alteration from A to B is intuited, and thus it is something determinate. But there is nothing determinate apart from something determinable; accordingly, no alteration can be intuited apart from alterability, {and this is precisely the system of sensibility-and in this way the postulate that was previously propounded only problematically would now be deduced}. But if "alterability" is to be something for us, then it can only be something we assemble from the intuition of several alterations. This particular intuition (which we now call "intuition X") is different from the intuition presented in the previous§. It is not just any intuition or intuition "as such"; it is the intuition of a movement of transition. As surely as anything is intuited at all, an object hovers before the intuiting subject, an object that acquires its "objectivity" from the fact that an intuition is referred to it. Consequently, the alterability we are discussing already becomes "something" here, precisely because an intuE Nevertheless, this system of sensibility is very important, for from it we will derive our body, as the system of our affectability and spontaneity (p. 811). • The system of sensibility consists in nothing but relations to our various sensations; nevertheless, thanks to our productive power or ideal activity, this [system as a] whole is transformed into "something" (p. 82). G The presupposition of a movement of transition from alteration to alterability as such is the point of origin of this system of sensibility (p. 83).
§ 8
91
209
it ion is directed at it. (The system of our alterability is our body. This is certainly something and must be extended in space, which occurs only by means of intuition.) Intuition X is an intuition of the I itself. The feeling subject would now be identified with the system of sensibility;9 the I endures throughout every feeling. X would be the intuition of the I, which discovers itself as an object within this intuition. H {Our standpoint is now that of intuition X, within which the unification [of feelings A and B] occurs.} For the present, let us simply ignore the content of this intuition and seek to determine its form, along with whatever is connected with the latter. (4) Let us now display the individual components of intuition X. {A} First of all, it follows from what was said above that, whenever the I engages in intuition, it possesses a feeling of itself {as the intuiting subject}. It is through this feeling of myself that an intuition first becomes my intuition (See previous §). Since this is true of all intuition, it is also true of intuition X. I feel myself to be the intuiting subject; I do not intuit myself to be the intuiting subject, for in the act of intuiting, the I loses itself in the object. What is intuited in X is the I itself, which is at the same time the feeling subject within this intuition. Both {the intuited object and the feeling subject} are thus one and the same. What is the source of this identity {of subject and object}? How does it appear within consciousness? {B} {Furthermore, how is this object distinguished from intuition X ( = the I)?} Finally, how is intuition X itself intuited? That is, as what is the I intuited in this case? According to the previous §, all we can say in answer to this question is that the I is here intuited as intuiting Y. {Thus we would here have two intuitions: I intuit myself ( = intuition X) as intuiting ( = Y).} • {C} The I feels itself to be the intuiting subject (previous §). {In the previous § we also spoke of an intuition of something that limits: intuition Y, without which there is no intuition at all. But now another question has arisen: How does this intuition become mine? This occurs only insofar as I feel myself to be an intuiting subject.} Self-feeling transforms itself at this point into self-intuition. {I intuit myself as the intuiting subject. The intuiting subject is itself intuited.} • What can the object of intuition X be? In the case of intuition Y, I am, in relationship to some thing, the intuiting subject. I am now supposed to observe this intuiting subject. How is this possible? It cannot be 9
"Es ware nun das fiihlende im System der S!:NSIBILITAET erschopft." This system [Qf sensibility] would thus be the feeling subject that is present in every feeling, that which endures throughout all alteration-i.e., the I. Consequently, what would come into being for us through intuition X would be the I. In X, the I discovers itself. Here the I itself becomes an object for the first time (p. 83). H
210
I
§ 8
done immediately (previous §). Intuition X is supposed to unite the opposed feelings A and B. Accordingly, its object must be something common to both feelings; since we are dealing with an alteration in the state [of the I], however, there must be something that endures throughout this alteration. Feelings as such contain nothing that endures in this way, for A and B are opposed to each other, {[and] if A is present then B is simply not present for me at all. What then is it that endures? According to ordinary common sense, the feeling subject is and remains always the same. But we first wish to investigate how we arrive at a feeling subject.} No feeling subject is present at all within feeling A orB, for every feeling is something determinate, whereas a feeling subject, that is, a subject that does nothing whatsoever but feel, is nothing determinate. From what has already been said, it follows that nothing endures except the active subject, and indeed, the subject that acts idealiter. Therefore, the object of intuition X must be the ideally active subject-and indeed, {we must posit it} as such, for we are acquainted with it in no other way. {For something external to the intuiting subject-something that hovers before it and is present without any assistance from the intuiting subject-is always posited in opposition to the act of intuition; and thus it is only by being related to an object that any intuition first comes into being.} But how can this ideally active subject become an object of intuition? All experience consists of constantly changing alterations. What then could .be the origin of anything enduring that could appear among these appearances? 1 This enduring something is nothing other than the I that continues to entertain representations throughout all changes, the {idealiter} acting subject. It does not appear as such, however; instead, since it appears within intuition, it appears to be something objective. This is how it appears within intuition X. Moreover, I must intuit myself, since I unite within myself the opposed feelings A and B, and this intuition would provide me with the background against which I could display feelings A and B. 10• 1 {Thus, in intuition X, the I intuits itself, but not as it is in itself; instead, it intuits itself objectively, as active. In order for activity to be intuitable as such, it has to be fixed, and this occurs in [feelings] A and B, or in intuition Y, where the I appears as continually active. The two feelings, A and B, can therefore be united only through intuition of the 1.} But the difficulty still remains: How can activity be intuited as such? 1 Where then can intuition X obtain an enduring substrate, which appears as enduring in all appearances? (p. 84). 10 "wurde mir den Boden geben, auf den ich A und B auftragen konme." J And this objectivity of the I, which is present whenever the I acts, is the foundation of everything that appears for the I, the ground 11 of all objectivity (p. 84). 11 "der Boden."
(84)
§8
211
In intuition X, the I intuits itself as the subject that is active in feelings A and B, and this result continues to present us with a problem. (5) The activity attributed to the I in intuition X is certainly, as such, a specific or determinate activity; for what is attributed to the I in this case is intuition Y, and the latter is something that limits the I as such. {Thus here too [that is, in X] the I is intuiting in a determinate way, and thus a determinate activity would here be present as well.} Expressed briefly, what we have presupposed is that, in intuition X, I intuit myself as intuiting Y; consequently, I should discover myself to be the same I in both these intuitions, {[for] I am the same intuiting subject in both,} and therefore, there must be some third thing in which X and Y are united. {Or, since intuiting is simply an internal observation of the imageforming subject, how is it that I claim to observe myself, and why do I claim that it is I who form these ima~es? That is to say, why do I call the subject that forms these images "I"? 2 The first question-namely, how, in the case of intuition X, does this become my intuition? How can I claim to be observing myself?-presents fewer difficulties than the second. [In answering the former] we have already been assisted by self-feeling: I feel myself to be the intuiting subject in X.} {The second question was, How does intuition Y also become my intuition? Or, how can I claim that, in the intuition of an image, I am, at the same time, th£ subject that forms or entertains this image? Or why is the subject that intuits Y the same as the subject that intuits X? Reply: because neither is possible apart from the other.} Intuition X becomes mine by means of an immediate {self-}feeling. This, however, is not true of intuition Y, which is mediated by X, and would therefore have to be connected to X, if Y is to be my intuition. Intuition Y would necessarily have to be included within intuition X as a necessary component of the same, and in such a way that X and Y could not be separated from each other, and Y would have to be felt by means of X. {In short, [knowledge of the identity of the intuiting subject in X and in Y would be made possible only] through the necessary connection and unification of both in some third thing, i.e., in selffeeling. More specifically: Insofar as the real activity of the I (or the "real I") is limited, a feeling arises. But the ideal activity remains; it tears itself free and separates itself from the real activity, and in this way there arises an intuition of the limitation in question (that is, intuition Y), which is the sort of intuition discussed in the previous §.} This could occur only in the following way: In Y, the ideal activity would be limited in a particular ' 2 uOder da anschauen so viel i.u als ein inneres Zusehen des Bildenden-wie kommts denn da~ ich behaupte, da~ ich mir zusehe u. da~ ich bilde oder warum ist das Bildende lcH?"
(8~
212
93
§ 8
manner, through which it would be constrained to form one particular image and no other, 13 {that is, it would have to arrange the manifold of intuition in one precise way,} and only in this way would a feeling of the subject that intuits Y become possible as well. For every feeling is a limitation, and the feeling with which we would here be concerned is that of an actual-albeit ideal-limitation. K {/ thereby feel this [limited] activity. But, along with this feeling, an intuition of this limitation of the ideal activity arises as well, because some ideal activity still remains nevertheless, and this is what produces intuition X or the intuition of oneself.} In this manner, this {ideal} activity {or the I} would also become intuitable in X, {because} insofar as it is a limited quantum, it would become something objective. The state of the I would thus now be as follows: I feel myself to be limited, but the activity in relationship to which I feel myself to be limited is one that is actual but at the same time ideal {-an activity that here becomes practical, and is thus no longer a mere striving, as it was above}. Insofar as this is an activity, I can only intuit it, and this provides intuition X. But insofar as this activity is limited, I feel it; and this provides feeling Y. X and Yare inseparably connected with each other; neither can exist without the other. {We thus have both a feeling and an intuition of the present ideal activity = X, the activity of intuiting Y.} It is not possible to feel the ideal activity-nor can it be present at all {and thus, there can also be no self-intuition = X}--unless the ideal activity is limited. The limitation is [provided by] intuition Y. {Thus, no X without Y.} What is limited in feeling is the real I. But as soon as the real I is limited, the ideal activity resumes, and it is the ideal activity that is active in intuition X. {Intuition Y, the necessary foundation of which lies in intuition X, thereby becomes possible.} Here again, we have a synthesis {and thereby obtain, at the same time, an expansion of our system}, just as we previously encountered a synthesis in the course of our general discussion of intuition as such. • The previously described intuition Y is itself here what limits [intuition X]. Intuition Y is an action of the I; it is the intuition of a thing. A feeling arises when this limitation is related to the actual I; but since there is no feeling unaccompanied by an intuition, an intuition of this limited intuition arises along with the feeling of the same. The former intuition is an intuition of the I; the latter is an intuition of the Not- I. {We can now safely conclude that there can be no intuition without self" "gerade so zu bilden und nicht anders." This now produces a feeling of the intuiting subject itself, since a feeling arises whenever a limitation is present. rn this case, there was supposed to be a limitation of the aclual ideal activity, and thus there is something limited (p. 85). K
(86)
9
§8
213
awareness, and vice versa. I.e., I cannot be aware of any object or thing ( = intuition Y) without being aware of myself; but I can be aware of my-
self only by being aware of an object, because when I become aware of an object, I become limited, and I discover myself thereby.} From this we obtain the following synthetic principles: There can be no intuition of the Not-I (outer intuition) without an intuition of the I (inner intuition), and vice versa. Neither of these intuitions is possible, however, apart from a feeling of oneself; for it is within self-feeling that these two intuitions are united, and it is there that the necessary connection between them is revealed. {That is to say, the I intuits itself as intuiting something else.} The limitation we are now discussing is [a feeling of] being compelled to think in a certain way, i.e., to represent something in precisely such and such a manner and not otherwise. I cannot be aware of anything outside of me without also being aware of myself as being aware of it. But neither can I be aware of myself without also being aware of something outside of me, for it is [only] thereby that I am limited. No I without a Not-I, and vice versa. • The intuition of the I and the intuition of the Not-I are thus reciprocally related to each other; neither is possible apart from the other. The reciprocal interaction just indicated never ceases; it is only further determined. With this, we have now answered the question that remained unanswered above: "How is the I able to feel itself in intuition?" Answer: [It is able to do so] only to the extent that it is compelled and limited.L With this preliminary understanding, we are now in a position to penetrate somewhat more deeply into our subject. (6) {According to the previous §,} an intuition necessarily arises when the real activity of the I is limited, since the ideal activity always remains-though the intuition produced thereby is, for the moment, only an intuition of what limits[the activity of the I]. This [i.e., the state that is produced when its real activity is limited] is therefore a quite specific, determinate state of the I. {It is practically limited and idealiter intuiting.} Beginning with this specific state, we can obtain an understanding.ofthe genesis of the intuitions and feelings we have here been discussing. 15 This first state is supposed to be followed by an alteration. L These two intuitions interact reciprocally with each other. I myself become the object of a feeling-! feel my I in the intuition-only to the extent that I fm4 nryulf cmt~fNIW to think ma particular ""']. •• that is, only insofar as I am aware of an object that limits me (p. 86). •• "in so fern ein DENJ<:tWANG statt findet." •~ "Von ihm aus kann eine genetische Einsicht in dasjetzt gesagte gegeben werden." By a "genetic understanding" (or ~insight"), Fichte means an understanding that allows us to understand how something is derived from or grounded in something else-which, in this
214
§8
We do not know how or why this alteration is supposed to occur, but we have in fact postulated its occurrence. 16 The I is {yet again} limited by this alteration in its limited state. {I.e., its entire state is now limited, not only practically, but also idea/iter.} Above, the I was what is limited; this limited I is here itself limited. In the first state (previous §) the I is, and it is something or other; i.e., it is fixed and held fast. A determinate striving is contained within the I, because the I is limited; or activity is negated within the I, and this is what characterizes "being." • The I, however, does not yet exist for itself. {It is arrested, with no reflection upon itself; it disappears into the object. (For being-in relation to an intellect-is the object 17 of the ideal activity.)} No act of reflection of the I upon itself can be derived so long as we occupy the viewpoint just described. It will turn out that the I that is engaged in intuiting will also possess a being for itself. 18 It is this being {of the I = A} that is now limited by this alteration-that is, the being of the I is limited by {feeling} B, in contrast with A, in which only the striving of the I was limited. What is limited is the being of the I, {a being that is constituted only through feeling A}. Feeling B, simply because it is a feeling, is also a limitation of striving, and this is something it has in common with A. Here, however, we will abstract from what these two feelings have in common and will pay attention only to what is distinctive about feeling B; i.e., we will attend only to the alteration. A being exists only for the ideal activity; but the ideal activity is not yet directed at the entire being of the I, and thus, to this extent, neither the being [of the I] nor its ideal activity can be limited at this point. In intuition Y, however, the ideal activity is directed at the being of Y,·M but if the being of the I {in feeling A} is limited {and altered by B}-which, according to what has already been shown, is what must happen-then the being {of the I} in the intuition of Y19 will {likewise} be limited and altered. The limitation and alteration of external being follow from the limitation and altt;ration of my own being {as a feeling, in A}. An intuition sense, provides the "conditions for the possibility" ofrhe former. So undersro<XI, transcendental philosophy, and rhus the entire WissemchafLJlehre, is a quest for a "genedc understanding" of human experience i"n its entirety. 16 "wir haben sie <wiirklich> posrulierr." A study of the manuscript shows that the questionable word in this sentence might also be deciphered as "willkiirlich," in which case the clause would read: "we have freely postulated its occurrence." 17 udas OBJECTIVE." 18 "Es wird sich finden, dall das Ich zu diesem Anschauenden ein Sein fiir sich haben wird." " The ideal acriviry is now directed ar another being of the I, namely, at a being of the intuition = Y (p. 87). 19 Reading, with H, "das SEYN des Ich in der Anschauung des Y"' for K's "das Sein im Anschauen, des Y."
(87)
§8
215
( = Y) of something limited necessarily arises as a consequence of the
95
limitation of my real activity in A (previous §). If this limitation A, which is the basis of intuition Y, is further limited, it follows that anything based upon it must also be limited, and this provides intuition Y. An intuition is produced by the limitation of real activity (previous §). A determinate quantum of such limitation produces a determinate quantum of intuition. If the basis is limited, then whatever is based thereupon is limited as well. ("I am limited in intuition": This means that, in representation Y, I am constrained to order the manifold contained therein in a certain way, and not any other way.N Every limitation provokes a feeling; consequently, this also occurs when the ideal activity is limited in intuition Y.) At first, the only basis of limitation that was taken into consideration was the limitation of the practical power, for it seems odd that the {ideal} activity, which has been established to be unlimitable, could become limited and give rise to a feeling. One might call upon experience 20 for assistance at this point. Within experience, we do indeed find ourselves compelled to think and to construe objects in a particular way. {That is to say, the ideal activity is limited; however, we must know how to derive this result from our principles.} The situation would have be somewhat as follows: the ideal activity would become practicaJ {or real} and, to this extent, would be limited-and this would occur with freedom. 21 {For the time being, we must assume and presuppose this.} Later on, we will show that this must indeed be the case, since otherwise our whole system would collapse. A new feeling will arise from this limitation of the ideal activity, but an intuition will necessarily arise from this feeling. This would be intuition X, which we have been discussing until now. The object of intuition X would be what is limited by the feeling we have just described, and this is the I itself, or the ideal activity of the I. N When limitation A is further limited, this produces a limitation in whatever is based thereupon. Therefore, since what [here] serves as the basis is limited by a limitation of its activity (intuition), the intuition that follows from this is limited along with it; conse· quently, I am constrained in the representation of Y, or my ideal activity is limited (p. 87). 20 Actually, the text of K says precisely the opposite, that "one may not call upon experience" ("Auf die Erfahrung darf man sich nicht berufen"). Both the present context and the parallel passage on p. 87 of H (which contains no "nicht"), however, suggest that this sentence should be amended as is here indicated. In either case, the point remains the same: though one may (or may not) call upon experience for help, this would be to no avail within the context of a systematic account like the present one, within which, as Fichte goes on to point out, the basic "facts of experience" must be established by being derived from philosophical first principles and thus cannot be used to establish the same. 21 "dal\ die ideale Thiitigkeit praktische wiirde, und mit Freiheit hervorbriichte und in sofern beschriinkt wiirde." Again, the translation of this somewhat obscure passage has been guided by the less ambiguous parallel passage in H: "ideale Thiitiglr.eit wird durch ABSOLUTE Freiheit selbst praktisch oder REAL u. hiedurch also beschriinkbar." But note that H states that the ideal activity in this way becomes "limitable," not "limited."
(88
216
g6
§8
At first, the I, as an object of intuition, possesses being-i.e., it is "something." The limitation of the I constitutes state A. 22•0 In {intuition X}, the I is given to itself; it is discovered as an object. The intuiting agency in [intuition] X is the ideal activity, which is directed at this being. (This is a single state, since the I is both what is felt and the intuiting subject. The feeling subject and the intuiting subject are united.} The connection between the subject that feels this feeling and what is intuited is now completely dear, as is the ground of their identity. A determinate feeling produces a determinate intuition, and, along with this intuition, an object of this intuition is also produced-an object that cannot be separated from the intuition. This is the bond. {Intuition Y is the bond of intuition X; i.e., insofar as intuition Y is ascribed to the I, intuition Y is the I. Intuition X is possible only if intuition Y is posited.} I feel and I intuit. I am the same I in both cases, but I am also supposed to be what I intuit. This object ( = I) is bound up with this determinate intuition ( = X); I feel myself to be limited by my own being. To be sure, the subject that intuits Y is not the object of intuition X; instead, the object of intuition X is the being, {the limitation, the state} of the I, {the I as a kind of material}. But the act of intuition is necessarily and inseparably connected with this, and it is by means of this bond that the I proceeds further. 23 Since the intuited object is supposed to be I, it follows that its being is necessarily determined by the ideal activity's act of positing a thing = Y; only on this condition can it be intuited. The result would be as foiJows: An alteration {in state A} produces a feeling of this alteration, as a limitation of the I's ideal activity; from this feeling there then arises an intuition ofthe limited I as such, an intuition within which the I appears as an object as such, and intuition Y appears as a necessary accident of the I, {i.e., as the Not- I}. If no I is present for the I, then no Not-1 is either, nor is there any consciousness. Neither the intuition nor the concept of the I is possible without some alteration in the I's feeling, however, {for the intuition of the I is based upon this change or alteration; hence it must be postulated, for otherwise no I could ever appear, since it is the l's very nature to be purely active. But we become conscious of an activity only by means of limitation or-what amounts to the same thing-through feeling, 22 "es ist etwas. Die Regrenz.theit des lch ist im Zustande A;" This sentence is defective as it stands. The translation omits the ~im.~ Another possibility, adopted by Radrizzani in his French version, is to omit the "ist," thus construing this passage 10 read: "is 'something,' namely, the limitation of the I in state A." 0 The object of this intuition X would thus be what is limited in the feeling, i.e., the 1, whose ideal activity is limited. As the object of its intuition, the 1 is, i.e., it is "something," and this "being" would be the being of illi state A (p. 88). 2 ' "diejJ ist das Rand[,] woran das lch weiter fortgeleitet wird."
§8
217
and moreover, only insofar as several feelings are posited in opposition to one another; which is to say, it is only through an alteration in our state that we become aware of an activity.} Accordingly, some change of feeling is a condition for the possibility of self-consciousness, and, as such, the occurrence of such a change simply has to be postulated. Consequen~y. such a change of feeling, which was previously assumed only problematically, must necessarily be assumed. Remarks:
97
(A) Intuition X is nothing but a reflection upon what was already deduced in the previous §. 24 {I now reflect upon myself, and I accomplish this by means of the alteration that has occurred in my feeling.} (The Wissenscho.ftslehre proceeds as follows: The I posits A; but in order for A to be posited, the I has to reflect upon this, and then it must reflect, in turn, upon its own act of reflection, etc.) Concerning the alteration of feelings: The first limitation = A (see previous §) is an original limitation of my nature. From this limitation, taken by itself, nothing whatsoever follows-not even an intuition of the I. I can, however, expand my nature through my own free acting, and something may well follow as a result of this. I cannot act freely, however, unless I am already an I for myself, or unless it is at least possible for me to be able to be an I; and in order for this to be possible, some alteration must occur within my nature: I must be acted upon, my nature must be affected. {Thus, when I am in state A, I must be capable of being affected or altered or moved, from which there then arises state B. I.e., my nature must be changeable 25 rather than constant.} One does not have to go beyond the I in order to explain this, for a disposition to be affected in this manner may lie within the I itself. Within ordinary consciousness, this [alteration in my feelings] must be explained by referring to the presence of something external to me. (B) The limitation of intuition Y, which has supported our argument until now, means that we are intellectually compelled to think of a certain object in a particular manner, and such compulsion involves a feeling: I feel myself internally compelled to think of things in precisely this or that way. But am I {absolutely} compelled to think of things in a certain way? {Reply: [fhe compulsion in question is] not absolute, but is conditional.} I can abstract from them, or I can think of them in a different way, {e.g., as possessing a different shape or color,} and no intellectual compulsion is involved in this. In this case, however, my portrayal of the thing in 24 "Die Anschauung X ist nichts anderes ab die im vorigen § deducirte Reflexion." Though a more natural rendering of this sentence would be "intuition X is nothing other than the act of reflection deduced in the previous §," the context, as well as the parallel passage in H, make it clear that the sense intended is the one conveyed in the translation. 25 "beweglich."
(8g)
218
§ 8
question will not be adequate to the truth, whereas if my representation is supposed to correspond with the thing, then I am indeed compelled to think in a particular manner. {This, therefore, is the sense in which this intellectual compulsion is conditional: it depends upon whether our representations are supposed to possess truth.} • But what sort of "truth" is this, by which my representation is supposed to be measured? This question concerns the reality we consider to be the foundation of the representation. The truth that is here in question is our own being, or rather the practical aspect of the same, for this is that which is immediately determined and for which no further foundation can be adduced. We construe our own being through a thing outside of us, and when this thing outside of us points to a being within us, then it is portrayed in a manner that conforms to its truth. A certain quantum of limitation outside of me follows as a consequence of a certain quantum of limitation within me.P (C) {The opposed determinations of the 1-the I as representing and the same I as acting-are in this way united. The bond of their identity lies in the fact that they are present together within intuition. I cannot entertain any representations without observing my practical state, and vice versa. I cannot act without intuiting, and I cannot intuit without feeling. Moreover, we can now assume that intuitions X and Yare but one single intuition: I intuit my state as limited (X); but, as a result of my limited state, I also intuit something else as well (in Y): that is to say, I intuit myself as intuiting something else. At bottom, this is only a single intuition.} We still have not resolved the difficulty implicit in the following question: How can a feeling arise from a limitation of the ideal activity? If I wish to represent an object correctly, then I have to represent it in a certain way, {and my power of intuition or the ideal activity is limited thereby}. In saying this, I mean that I might not wish to represent the object correctly and that the necessity of my thinking something is only a conditional necessity, dependent upon my own freedom, {[that is, dependent] upon whether I want to submit myself to this necessity or intellectual compulsion. But how do we intend to deduce this freedom, and not merely assert that it exists?} What sort of freedom is this, and how does it appear [within consciousness]? I am limited in [state] A. The ideal activity that arises as a result of this limitation is also limited. This limited, ideal activity is intuition Y. Strictly speaking, however, intuition Y is {here} nothing but an Idea that we {who are presently engaged in philosophical inquiry} have presupposed; for intuition Y has certainly not yet P But what kind of "truth" is this? Reply: We ordinarily construe our oum being aJ a thing outside of us. From this, therefore, we obtain the principle: A certain quantum of intuition follows from a certain determinate quantum of determinacy (p. Sg).
§8
g8
219
become anything for the I. {The I, according to the preceding §, disappeared in the object and was not present at all.} In order for intuition Y to be anything for the 1, it must be reflected upon anew; the I must posit it anew. Let us assume that this new act of reflection occurs freely. The practical activity permits itself to be entirely suppressed, to the point w~ere no practical activity whatsoever is left and all that remains is a striving toward practical activity. But it is the nature of the ideal activity to remain with me and not to be {entirely} cancelable. In {intuition} Y, the ideal activity is only supposed to be limited, but it cannot be canceled; accordingly, it is only partially limited and is able to wrench itself away from this limited state. In intuition Y, the ideal activity is only partially limited; it can employ its freedom to wrench itself away. We will find out whether it absolutely must wrench itself away or not; and if it does not have to do so, then we will discover under what conditions this is so.Q The I is supposed to be posited as the intuiting subject, but the I is only what is active 26 and nothing else; accordingly, the intuition must be posited as a product of the l's free activity, and only thereby does it become such a product. {Therefore, activity is the mediating link27 between the I and the intuition.} According to the general laws of intuition, however, activity can be posited only as a movement of transition from determinability to determinacy. "I am supposed to posit myself as active": this means that I have to observe my own activity. But the latter is a movement of transition from an indeterminate to a determinate state. Consequently, this intuition can be thought of as free only if it is simultaneously posited as constrained. Freedom is {for the I} nothing without constraint, and vice versa. {Only through the opposition of freedom, therefore, is there any limitation whatsoever.} The act of wrenching away is impossible without something from which one wrenches oneself away. What is posited obtains its determinacy only by means of opposition. How then s:an freedom and limitation of the ideal activity coexist alongside each other? In the following manner: If one reflects upon the determinacy of the practical (real) 1, then one must also necessarily posit Y in such and such a way {-from this precise quantum of determinacy there follows this precise quantum of intuition}; consequently, only the synthesis is necessary. In other words, if a particular representation is to be "true," then 1 must represent its object in such and such a way. But the representing subject is free to engage or not to engage in this synthesis; and, in this respect, the representing subject is under no Is this limitation of the ideal activity conditional or unconditional? (p. go). wdas lltiitige." 27 udall Verbindungsmittel."
Q
26
(go)
220
99
I tl
§8
compulsion,R {for it is not, in itself, necessary that I reflect upon my limited condition, though I am free to do so if I wish}. Thus we now have the above results in a more precise and clear form: I am limited; and it is, to begin with, my practical power that is limited. 28 This limitation is, in turn, limited by the alteration that occurs in the state of [my] feelings. I can reflect upon this alteration or notreflect upon it. This act of reflection is what we have, until now, called "intuition X." If, however, I reflect at all, then I cannot simply posit myself as limited; instead, I must also posit something else as the source of this limitation. This is intuition Y. If I do not reflect in this manner, then I am not present for myself, and consequently, neither is anything external to me present for me, {for I myself am not present}. When I accomplish the free act {of reflection} just described, I immediately become conscious of myself. A reflection upon myself is immediately linked with this act of reflection upon my state and with the inference to something outside of me which follows from this, {and indeed, this occurs in one single act,} not in two separate acts. In [intuition] X, I am supposed to reflect upon intuition Y. If intuition Y is to be mine, then I must reflect upon it in Z, and then I must reflect upon Z in intuition V. This is an important point: as surely as a free intuition occurs, an intuition of the I is just as surely connected with it. I intuit myself as intuiting, and this is how I become an I for myself; but this cannot occur unless I posit myself as constrained, for only in this way do I first acquire stability for myself. 29 One can thus now see why it is necessary to link intuition Y with intuition X. 5 Accordingly, it is only by means of freedom that everything we have said so far first acquires intelligibility and tenability, for the sole thing to which anything else can be connected is freedom. We have also spoken of a feeling {as what is primary and original. Even this limitation of the I, however, or this feeling, is dependent upon freedom.} The I's limited state 30 is freely posited and is then reflected upon. This limited state is a feeling, for a feeling is produced whenever an I is limited; accordingly, feeling itself is also dependent upon freeR The latter, that is, the truth and accuracy of my representations, is dependent upon the freedom of the representing subject, which, to this extent, is under no compulsion and is not limited (p. go). 28 "Ich bin beschrankt, zuforderst praktisch." 29 "dadurch erhalte ich erst Haltbarkeit fiir mich." The term Hallharkeil also means "tenability," which is how it translated in the last sentence in this paragraph. s As surely as I intuit anything at all, an intuition of the intuiting subject must be connected with this intuition. I observe myself and become an I for myself. This act of observation is not possible, however, unless I posit myself as constrained, for only in this way does an intuition acquire stability. Consequently, intuition Y always has to be connected with intuition X (pp. go-g• ). ' 0 "Seine Beschranktheit." Although the obvious antecedent of "seine" in this sentence is "das Gefiihl," such a reading is difficult to reconcile with the conclusion of this same passage ("this limited state is a feeling"). The larger context, as well as the parallel passage in H, suggest, instead, that the correct antecedent must be "das Ich."
§ 8
100
221
dom. Unless a feeling is freely reflected upon, no feeling occurs at all. I must surrender myself to the feeling,s 1 for otherwise, I do not feel it. Admittedly, once a feeling is present, everything else then follows of its own accord; but in order for a feeling to be present at all, that is, in order for a feeling and the results of the same to be present for the I, the I must, as it were, set itself in motion in opposition to the feeling, {so that its ideal activity will be limited}. An ideal activity that is ascribed to the I and is posited with a consciousness of freedom is called a "concept." Consequently, what we have hitherto portrayed merely as an intuition { = X} is actually a concept, {for it is an intuition accompanied by a consciousness of the intuiting subject. This is its distinctive character, which distinguishes it from all other intuitions =. Y.} What distinguishes a concept from an intuition is this: 32 in an intuition the I is posited as constrained, whereas in a concept it is posited as free. Consequently, an intuition by itself is nothing; or, as Kant says, it is blind. On the other hand, a concept by itself is empty, if the I does not find itself to be limited in intuition.
Overview of the Steps of the Argument up to This Point Prior to all inquiry, we must join together within the I an {absolutely free and} unlimitable activity and a limitable activity (ideal and real activity).T The latter becomes limited in a determinate manner. The determinacy is achieved by a particular alteration in the state [of the I], in consequence of which this state becomes limited on every side:
222
§ 8
limited, and this furnishes the concept of the I;u yet neither can it comprehend the I as limited without positing something that limits it, and this furnishes the concept of the Not- I. The I is free and is nevertheless governed by laws. This is possible only if the I freely subordinates itself to these laws. We are here concerned only with the laws of representation.
§8
101
An intuition of the I is necessarily connected with an intuition of the Not-I, and only through the former does the latter become an intuition at all. In order to explain this intuition of the I, however, one has to assume an alteration in the state of [the I's] feelings, i.e., a limitation of its limited condition, through which the I itself becomes limited in the intuition of the Not- I. From this alteration there arises a feeling of this particular limitation of the ideal activity, from which there then arises an intuition of the same. The ground of the union of the intuition of the I and the intuition of the Not-I is this: no constraint can be posited within the intuition of the Not-I without also positing freedom in opposition to it. All freedom, however, pertains to the I, and only by means of freedom does the intuition of the I become an intuition of the I. But an intuition accompanied by a consciousness of the intuiting subject is called a "concept." Therefore, the concept of the I and the concept of the Not-I both arise from the postulated alteration in the system of feeling.
Christmas Vacation
Recapitulation of What Has Been Presented up to This Point 34 The contents of the entire Wissenschaftslehre can be briefly summarized in the following words: u But the ideal activity cannot comprehend this limitation-i.e., it cannot consciously intuit it-unless the ideal activity is itself limited. However, since the ideal activity is free, it cannot be affected by what limits it-i.e., the Not-1. Instead, it approaches the Not-1 and surrenders itself thereto, thereby freely subjecting itself to the compulsion to think in a certain way and in accordance with certain laws. This is how the ideal activity obtains a concept of the I (p. 91 ). "Though this passage appears at the conclusion of§ 8, it was obviously delivered at the resumption of Fichte's lectures following the holiday break. Indeed, in H, it appears at the beginning of § g.
§8
102
223
My ability to be conscious of anything whatsoever has its foundation within me and not within things. I am conscious of something; but I myself am the sole thing of which I am immediately conscious. Everything else belongs among the conditions that mak.e self-consciousness possible. Through self-consciousness, I become conscious of the world. • I am an object of consciousness for myself only insofar as I am engaged in acting. "How is experience possible?" This is just another way of asking how I can become conscious of my own acting. Everything depends upon the answer to this question, and once it has been answered, our system will be complete. Up to this point, we have discovered that if I am to posit myself as acting then I must become conscious of some concept of a goal. The question that still concerns us is this: How is the concept of a goal possible? We have already seen how any concept at all is possible as such. In truth, however, we will not be fully able to understand the possibility of any of the things we have described so far until we have reached the end of our inquiry, for we will always have additional conditions of possibility to exhibit. The possibility of the individual parts will have been demonstrated only when the possibility of the whole has been exhibited. We have shown how a concept is possible, but in doing so we had to presuppose certain things, things that must-and can-be tacitly presupposed. The course of our inquiry has been as follows: My original limitation is a practical one, and from this there arises a feeling. I am not simply practical, however; I am also ideal. The ideal activity is not limited, and, as a consequence of this fact, intuition remains. Feeling and intuition are connected with each other. Some alteration must occur in feeling: this is a condition for the possibility of consciousness. I am [further] limited in this stale of limitation; therefore, I am also limited in intuition Y. Since a feeling arises from every limitation, a feeling must also arise in this case: namely, the feeling of being compelled to think in a certain manner, a feeling accompanied by an intuition of myself. An intuition in which the intuiting subject is itself posited, that is to say, an intuition that is related to the intuiting subject, is called a "concept" of some thing (in this case, the concept of Y).v " In order to pick up the thread where we let it drop, the following brief recapitulation is provided: No consciousness without self-consciousness. No self-consciousness without acting. No free acting without the construction of a concept of a goal. No concept of a goal without a general capacity for concepts as such. In the previous § we showed how any concept at all is possible as such-but only under certain presuppositions, which we tacitly assumed, for our WllimschaftskhTe would now be complete if all these presuppositions had already been fully stated (p. 92).
102
§ 9
In the previous § the question concerning the ground of the unity of the concept and the I was already raised: How is it that I am able to say, "This 1 is my concept"? Until now, the I was construed as the feeling subject, but it must be the comprehending subject 2 as well. The concept must necessarily be united with the feeling, and in such a way that neither is able to constitute a whole apart from the other. {We already obtained such a unification above, where we discovered that it was possible only through self-feeling and discovered that the concept constitutes a necessary component of the latter.} A feeling and a concept are united in self-feeling. I am compelled to look at things in the way that I do look at them, and thus this feeling of compulsion accompanies my feeling of myself. A Thus, until now, the I has been comprehended or intuited as the comprehending subject itself. We now wish to proceed further. I can posit myself as an I only insofar as I posit myself as active. Feeling, however, is supposed to be nothing more than limitation; hence I cannot feel myself to be an I unless another activity occurs as well. From this it follows that consciousness cannot be explained on the basis of feeling alone, {unless, alongside the feeling, an activity is also present at the same time}; therefore, in the concept of Y {or of the object}, I must posit myself as active. {We have claimed that} the ideally [active subject] 3 surren1 Reading, with H, "das ist MEIN BEGRIFF?" for K's "alles ist mein Begriff' ("everything is my concept"). 2 "das Begreifende," i.e., the intelligent subject who grasps things by means of or in terms of concepts. A I feel myself compelled: I must think in a particular manner, and I cannot think at all unless I also feel compulsion. This compulsion, however, is comprehended along with the particular determination [of my state]. But this feeling, this limitation, cannot, by itself, constitute my entire state; instead, my I is surely only active-for otherwise, I would be unable to have a feeling of myself (p. 92). ' "das ideale."
[ 224]
(g2)
(93)
§9
103
225
ders itself to feeling; {the representing-that is, the ideal-subject, which stands opposed to the feeling, submits itself to the limitation or to the intellectual compulsion, but only conditionally; that is, only insofar as I wish to think the truth. For ideal activity cannot, as such, be curbed and limited; instead, what is presupposed is that the ideal activity freely submi_ts itself to the feeling, in the sense that it could also not submit itself thereto.} The specific object of our present inquiry is to understand how this occurs. I posit myself as an I: this means that I posit myself as active. {Every activity has both a material and a formal aspect.} The material aspect of activity (what I intuit when I posit myself as active) is a movement of transition from determinability to determinacy. 8 (The formal aspect of activity is self-affection, which is not under discussion at this point.) The I is to be posited here, within the concept, as an active subject, i.e., as engaged in moving from a particular state of indeterminacy to a particular state of determinacy. We must now become better acquainted with each of these states. {The entire examination, therefore, depends upon knowing what it is that is determinable and what it is that is determinate. We will here begin with the latter. 4 } (A) What is determinate (i.e., that to which the transition is made) is [in this case] the concept of a determinate thing {= Y.· for example, the wall, the stove, etc.}. Within this concept, however, I myself am also determinate, for this quantum of comprehending constitutes my state. {The determinacy of the thing, in itself, is of no concern to us; it concerns me only insofar as I also become determined thereby, i.e., only insofar as this quantum of limitation constitutes my own state, only insofar as I comprehend that it is my concept, through which it becomes a concept of my own limited state.} (B) So far we have observed the following concerning the origin of this determinate thing, that is to say, concerning the origin of this determinate act of comprehending or of my own determinacy within this act of comprehending: I am limited {with respect to my practical power}; indeed, my limitation is complete. The very completeness of this limitation indicates a further limitation of my state of limitation. The practical activity is canceled entirely, but the ideal activity remains, and it is the very essence of the ideal activity to have some object, {to be "fixed" upon 8 This material aspect is intuition Y, or the concept of the Not-1. What consciousness feels in this case is the movement of transition from what is determinable to what is determinate; i.e., I observe how I move from the possibility of engaging in many different actions to one determinate action (p. 93). • What is determinable in this movement of transition is the topic of § 10.
226
§ 9
something. An object arises for me when I am practically limited.} Practical limitation (or "feeling") and intuition are both contained in this state of the I, for each of these is necessarily connected with the other. Moreover, this practical limitation {or feeling} is a determinate limitation, and consequently, the intuition connected with it is determinate as well. {Feeling Y; therefore, intuition Y.· this connection is a necessary one.} (C) Everything we have been talking about until now has, for the time
being, been present only for those of us engaged in philosophical inquiry, and, to this extent, {therefore, our account remains transcendent and dogmatic, and-since such an account of the "I in itself' is meaningless-} it remains empty. If it is to be something, it must become something for the I that is the object of our inquiry. {Through an actual deed, it must exist for the 1.} But how does anything become present for the I? {How does the I appropriate this state to itself?} We have already answered this question in the following way: It is by means of a new feeling = X, namely, a feeling of the necessary connection between intuition Y and feeling Y, 5 a feeling of intellectual compulsion, {a feeling of one's entire state,} that something becomes present for the I {-to the extent that the I freely surrenders itself to this feeling}. This new feeling, however, is also nothing unless it is present for the I, and this entire state is present for the I itself only insofar as it renounces any [further] free transition [to another state].
104
(D) It is necessary that the I surrender itself freely, {namely, as free in and for itself}; [therefore,] it understands that it is free: it is free for itself, it discovers itself to be free. I.e., its act of surrendering itself is accompanied by a representation of itself as also having been able not to surrender itself in this way. On the other hand, the I cannot posit itself as freely surrendering itself unless it actually does surrender itself; for if the I does not actually surrender itself, then nothing is present for it. It is only by means of freedom that I attend to any object whatsoever, for I claim that I also could have not paid any attention to it; this is something I can say, however, only if I have attended to it. {For example, I see a portrait in a room. This representation is accompanied by another representation, namely, that it could have also been possible for me not to pay any attention to this portrait. In order for me to be able to entertain the latter representation, however, I first must have perceived the portrait, and thus focused my free activity upon it; for otherwise, no representation whatsoever of a portrait in this or any other room would be present for me.} This Y here reveals two different aspects, {[and] the entire mechanism of the theoretical puwer is based upon this double aspect. The I must intuit 5
Reading, with Krause's MS, "Gefiihle Y'' for K's "Gefiihle X."
§9
227
Y, if Y is to exist for the I. But now the I posits itself either as intuiting Y or as not intuiting Y; the I cannot do this, however, until it has intuited
the I or has obtained a representation of itself. Therefore, bath freedom and intuition mutually condition each other. The double aspect of the Y is as
follows}: In the first instance, Y is treated as an intuition that is not supposed to be an intuition; in the second, it is treated as an intuition that is supposed to be an intuition. In the first case, Y is a thing, a thing that is also supposed to exist in itself and apart from the I. {It does not exist for the I; it is an intuition without consciousness. The I vanishes into the object.} In the second case, Y is supposed to be a freely produced rep-" resentation of this same thing.c The thing and the representation thereof are thus one and the same-simply viewed from two different sides. In the first case, Y is the condition for the representation; in the second, it is the representation itself. {In the first case, the I is not related toY,· in the second case, in con· trast, it is. Both the thing and the representation are thereby products of the representing subject. This same point can also be expressed as follows: A thing is not present for me at all unless I reflect upon it. If, however, I do reflect, then, sheerly by virtue of this act of reflection, something determinate is necessarily present for me; by virtue of freedom, however, this is present for me only as something contingent-since this freedom is posited by the I. A thing thus presents itself to the I in two different ways: (1) As a being that is absolutely present, something present "as such" or "in itself," without any help from me. (2) As a being that can either be present or not be present, and, to this extent, it is a representation. A thing of this sort is not present without any help from me, for it indicates the occurrence of a free act. On the other hand, the former, that is, the thing in itself, exists without any help from me. Yet another way to express this is as follows: I can abstract from an object and can think of it as not existing, but I cannot abstract from it before it exists for me. A thing is something whose being is posited. 6 Jf I did not exist, a world would certainly still exist; if, however, it is supposed to exist for me, then I tacitly posit myself as well. Whenever I perceive some thing, I myself am present as well. But when I abstract, then I am no longer present for myself.} Ordinary consciousness expresses this same point by saying, "The world would certainly continue to exist even if I did not." (This is an inference; and whenever I make such a claim, I tacitly posit myself as well.) c In the second case, it appears as an actual intuition, insofar as the representation of the same is accompanied by freedom (p. 94). 6 "Ein Gesezt seyn ist das Ding."
228
§ 9
By this path, we have now arrived at the true nature of "objectivity," and we now know why we assume the existence of things outside of ourselves. The first [aspect of Y], in which there is no freedom present, is what we have previously referred to as an "intuition," which, as such, is blind and does not appear within consciousness, though it would be better to call it a "thing," since, when one thinks of an intuition, one also thinks of something else in connection with it, namely, the thing that is intuited. The second [aspect of Y] is the representation of a thing. {An intuition is therefore the thing itself. The intuition and the thing are one and the same.}
105
(E) In the act ofreflectionjust described, we considered the I itselfto be viewing matters in the same way we ourselves viewed them until now. {From where does the I obtain the thing, and why does it consider it to be a "thing" at all? Or, how is the one intuition synthetically united with the other?} The I posits the following: that intuition Y is necessarily connected with feeling Y (which is also present for the I only insofar as the I reflects upon it) and also escapes from this very limitation. It is by means of this connection between intuition and feeling that Y becomes a real thing for the 1. 0 {[The thing] is related [to the intuition] as cause to effect. The I, so to speak, checks whether a particular feeling produces an intuition. It then surrenders itself to the very influence it itself has imagined, and, on this condition-that there is some determinate consciousness of reality-the I becomes immanent [within this consciousness].} Consequently, what we have just provided is a description of what is taken to be transcendent; 7 it becomes a condition for the possibility of my consciousness, that is, for any determinate consciousness of reality. The I calls this product of feeling a "thing" or "reality." Remark: We have presented intuitions X and Y {individually} as two {particular} determinations of the mind. We had to do this in order to obtain any clear insight into the manifold that lay before us, for we are able to think only discursively. {Originally,} however, these two determinations are never present within the human mind in isolation from each other. An I is first present in intuition X. (At least this appears to be the case, judging from our present standpoint, though we will see later on that this is not sufficient.) Moreover, since an I appears only in X, it is also only within intuition X that Y (i.e., a thing) can appear; otherwise, things would have to exist even if I did not, or I would have to exist even 0 The I posits that an intuition = Y is united with a feeling = Y (which is also first present for the I only insofar as the I reflects upon it) and that the ideal activity emerges from this intuition and wrenches itself away, and it is as a result of this that the object = Y becomes a real thing, related [to the intuition]like a cause to an effect (p. 95). 7 "So ist unsere geschilderte Beschreibung des transzendenten genommen."
§9
229
if there were no things. Either alternative is absurd. Consequently, X and Y do not constitute two different states [of the I], but are only two different ways of determining one and the same state, {a manifold within one and same state. There is no thing unless I am. [X and Y] are therefore only two determinations contained within a single state or within a single intuition. Some intuition always follows from a feeling. The I must behave in conformity with this necessary connection.} To assert that an intuition is produced from a feeling without any help from us would be to make a transcendent claim; but all we have said here is that the I, in accordance with the laws of reason, must view the matter in this way.
106
(F) The I posits a necessary connection between a specific feeling and a specific intuition. By what rule {or law} does it proceed in this case? There can be no rule governing this; this connection possesses its foundation within the I itself, which simply must proceed in a certain manner. E {The necessity in question is immediate. The I must proceed in this way-just as surely as it is an I at all.} For what is an object? First and foremost, an object is something that arouses a specific feeling: e.g., green or red. The predicate attached to an object (e.g., it is "red") is not intuited; it is simply felt, and the connection between this predicate and this object occurs within a particular state of our mind.F Furthermore, those properties characteristic of objectivity as such also apply to this object. It is intuited, and it hovers before the ideal activity: this applies to all objects, whether imaginary or real. The truly characteristic feature of an object (or of "reality") is that it is something that is posited in consequence of a feeling. In the future we will consider any additional properties that may also pertain to this object (e.g., extension in space). That an object is in space and occupies a particular position therein follows from intuition. A feeling, however, lies within us and is transferred to an object, which is supposed to lie outside of us. An external object is an interpretation of our own feeling.G What then is the meaning of the expressions "truth," "reality," and "objective validity"? These terms apply only to those representations that have been produced from feeling, or from the first state of the I, E The situation here is unlike that of aesthetic judgment, for which rules can be given. Instead, the necessity of connecting an intuition to a feeling is a necessity that has its foundation within the very nature of our reason (pp. 95-96). F The predicates of an object are not intuited, but felt; and this occurs through the necessary connection of both moments-that is, the moment of feeling and the moment of intuition (p. g6). G Furthermore, through the above synthesis, that is, simply by being posited, the object first of all acquires the character of "objectivity," and, second, that of "reality." We do not know how this object is produced, but we must assume it to be real; and if the representing subject proceeds in this manner, then its representations possess truth and reality (p. g6).
(gt
and are applicable only when the ideal activity has been necessarily determined, that is, only to representations that have been necessitated by feeling.H Whenever a load presses upon an object, a certain pressure is then necessarily present for that object; but an intuition is not necessarily produced whenever a feeling is posited, for the intuiting subject is free. It can also choose not to reflect {upon this feeling]. If, however, it does reflect, then an intuition necessarily ensues. Therefore, whenever truth is present, the I itself is present without any division, as, so to speak, a single system, within which, from any single element, everything else necessarily follows. A certain intuition follows from a {certain] state of feeling, and this constitutes "truth." When I merely imagine something, however, the states of feeling and intuition go their own separate ways, and, to this extent, the ideally [active subject] and the feeling subject are, as it were, torn apart from each other; hence my representation possesses no truth. {Thus, {there is truth] whenever both states, my feeling and my representations, are in agreement.} Truth is agreement with ourselves, harmony. This concept of truth, {which is here applied only partially, that is, to the objectivity of the world,} may be extended still further. Objective validity pertains just as much to our representations of God, morality, right, etc. {-if these are supposed to be true-} as it does to our representations of the world. Both types of representation are based upon feelings, {and consequently they are also true}. The difference between them is that, while our representations of the world are based upon a feeling of our own limitation, our representations of God, etc., are based upon a feeling of our own striving. {Both feelings give rise to representations, which are objectively and subjectively true.} Acting is the middle term that links these two types of feeling. 8 {That is, it is the intermediary between the feeling of our own limitation and the feeling of striving; both feelings have their origin in such acting (as we will see below), for all consciousness whatsoever commences with acting.} In asserting that the representations of God, etc., possess just as much objective validity as the representations of the world, the Wissenschaft.slehre diverges from the letter of Kant's philosophy, {which ascribes only subjective validity to the concept of God. Kant certainly had a correct view of this matter, but he presented it only in a one-sided fashion. In the Wissenschaft.slehre, however, both the world and God are objectively and >I Truth, objectivity, reality: these apply to those of my representations which necessarily follow from a feeling, when the feeling is capable of activating the representing subject, when it exercises causality upon the ideal activity of the representing subject, when the I reflects upon the feeling. This or that determinate intuition follows from this state of the feeling subject; this is truth (p. g6). 8 "Zwischen heiden liegt das Handeln." I.e., what the feeling of limitation has in common with that of striving is that both are related to acting.
(97)
§ 9
107
231
subjectively true.} In his essay "Concerning a Presumptuous Tone," Kant says that one constructs God for oneself. 9 This is certainly true, but one also constructs the world for oneself; {and, to this extent, both are subjective, i.e.,} both are dependent upon reason. There is a world only for reason, just as there is a God only for reason. {Both are produced from a feeling; that is, they necessarily arise when I surrender myself to the feeling in question. For precisely the same reason, however, and in accordance with the spirit of Kant's philosophy, the representations of the world and of God both possess the same sort of objective validity as well, inasmuch as both representations are posited in consequence of a feeling, and both arise as a result of reflecting upon the feeling in question. Both are necessarily just as objective as they are .subjective, i.e., dependent upon our reason.} Nevertheless, these two types of representation differ in two important respects: (1) Every person-just as surely as he exists at all-has to reflect upon his representations of the world. 1 {Every child must do this just as soon as he becomes self-aware and conscious of himself.} Representations of God, however, presuppose [a certain degree of] moral develo~ment.J {I can certainly exist for myself without such a moral education, 0 which is not a necessary condition for the possibility of consciousness as such, but only for a complete or "perfected" consciousness. I recognize the lofty goal that has been assigned to me by reason; but I also realize that I cannot fully achieve this goal unless I assume that a God exists, and I am thereby driven to make such an assumption.} (2) Representations of the world are determined by all the laws ofreason, {which express themselves in the world,} whereas this is not true of the representation of God. One is unable to think of God in any determinate fashion; one can only assume that God exists. There is no concept of God, but only an Idea.K Kant is concerned, above all, with 9 "dal3 man Gou sich mache." See Kant's lengthy footnote on this subject in KGS, VIII: 4<»-40 L What Kant actually .says in this note is that one constructs one's own concept of God. For Kant's well-known denial that the representation of God possesses objective validity, see the discussion of "the ideal of pure reason" in chap. 3 of the "Transcendental Dialectic" (KRV, A5671B596ff., especially A61!tB647 and A66sf86M). 1 As surely as our I is supposed to be an I, we must reflect upon that feeling through which we posit the world as something actual (p. 97). J But one does not necessarily have to reflect upon that feeling through which we posit God; instead, this presupposes the development of a moral way of thinking, through which one becomes capable of acquiring such representations (p. 97). 10 "ohne dieselbe." Though this' pronoun has here been construed as referring to "eine Entwicklung einer moralischen Denkart," it might also be taken to refer to "a moral way of thinking'' or even to "the representation of God." K Every object in nature is presented by means of all the laws of reason. There are concepts of such objects. In contrast, one cannot think of God in any determinate fashion; one cannot comprehend, cognize, or determine God. Instead, one must simply assume that God exists (p. 97).
232
§9
cognition, and, for him, an object is an object of cognizing. 11 Viewed in this light, the Wissenschaftslehre agrees with the letter of Kant's philosophy on this subject after all, for representations of God [etc.] are not "objective" in this sense. For Kant, "reality" means "what is in space.'d 2 Properly speaking, however, this is matter; and, in this sense, no reality pertains to God. {In this sense, Kant is correct when he contends that no objective cognition of God is possible and that objective cognition is limited to the world. If one construes the term "objective" as a synonym for "something real," 13 then, of course, God is not objectively cognizable. But (as we have seen above) your instructor employs the term "objective" in a different sense: An objective representation is a representation that would necessarily have to follow from a certain feeling, if that feeling possessed causal efficacy and were able to effect the ideal activity in such a way as to drive the representing subject to reflect upon the feeling. Consequently, "objective" here means the same thing as "something that is really true." 14 Our task was to observe the freedom of the I in the act of comprehending an object and to do so in terms of a movement of transition from what is determinable to what is determinate. This has been summarized by the instructor as follows:} §g
The act of comprehending is a free act of reflection upon the intuition ( = Y) that was previously derived {in the preceding§}, and it is posited as a free act. The freedom of the act of reflecting upon intuition cannot be posited, however, unless this act of reflection 15 is itself {already} posited as such. Accordingly, we obtain a twofold view of the act of reflection, and along with this, a twofold view of the object of the same. (That is to say, the double aspect of the act of reflection is present 11 .. Kant geht besonders aufs Erkennen aus, und Object ist ihm, was ein Gegenstand des ErkennenS.'' 12 See, e.g., KRV. A373ff. 13
1,.
"'etwas REEu..E.S." '•etwas REELL wahres.n
~ ..aber die Freiheit der REFu:xtoN auf sie kann nicht gesezt werden, auser in wiefern sie selbst iiberhaupt gesezt ist." The antecedent of the second sie in this clause in uncertain, and might be either "the act of reflection" (die ~) or "the intuition" (die Anschauung), though the context appears to support the former. Indeed, the corresponding passage in H (p. gS) explicitly refers to both and uates that "the freedom of this act of reflecting upon intuition cannot be posited except insofar as these (i.e., the act of reflection, as well as intuition itself) are already posited as such." It should be noted, however, that this same passage in H-"aufler inwiefern die[se] (RnLEXTON, Anschauung selbst) iiberhaupt schon gesezt ist"-with its plural subject and singular verb, also appears to be defective. 1
(g~
§9
233
for the philosopher, whereas what is present for the I is the double aspect of the object.) In the first instance, [we are concerned with] the act of reflection as such, without any further reflection thereupon, and this furnishes the o~ect that is present without any help from the I. In the second instance, [we are concerned with] the act of reflection as a particular: determination of freedom, which is itself reflected upon, and this furnishes the representation of the thing.
tI I
\ l
I !
107
108
§
10
{Remark: (A)} Even though a free being must produce from itself everything that is present for it, something must nevertheless necessarily appear to such a being to be "given." What is the origin of this semblance?1 It follows from the very nature of a free being {that something must appear to it that does not appear to be produced by the free being in question. To this extent, those who speak of something "given" are admittedly correct; nothing rational, however, can be thought of in conjunction with this}, for a free being {necessarily} commences with a free acting, which is preceded by no consciousness at all. This free acting becomes an object of consciousness and can subsequently be viewed as a product of freedom; insofar as it becomes an object of consciousness, however, it appears to be something given, and the reason for this lies within the character of the ideal activity, which has to be constrained by something it has not produced. One could also express this point by noting that a free being cannot act at all unless it acts upon something (which is also a product of freedom); but because this {first act of} freedom, {as the foundation of all free acting,} is not itself an instance of acting upon something, it remains in the shadows, {since the ideal activity necessarily requires that some object be present. Consequently, we are not conscious of this original acting, since it precedes all consciousness and first makes the latter possible.} This is why an object must necessarily exist for us. • See The Distinctive Character of the Wissenschaftslehre [with respect to the Theoretical Power], § 3. VII. 2 (Because of the changes in the present pre1 "so mull ihm doch etwas als nothwendig gegeben erscheinen; woher dieser Schein?" A more literal rendering of the first clause would be: "'something must necessarily appear to such a being to be necessarily 'given.' " 2 GEWL Though Fichte cites the first edition of the Grondrill, his original page references have been replaced throughout by references to the edition contained in SW, 1: 329416 (which are also supplied in the critical edition of the text included in AA I, 3: 143-208, and in the English version included in EPW, pp. 243-300).
[ 234]
(g8)
§
10
235
sentation, not everything that is said there is applicable here.) See too the note on p. xx of Kant's Metaphysical First Principles ofJustice. 3
In the preceding § we discussed our knowledge of what is determinate. In this § we will discuss our knowledge of what is determinable. {(B)4} We said in the previous§ that the I posits itself as able either to represent something or not to represent it. What does this mean? {How does the I posit itself in this manner?}A We are able to think of ourselves in this way, because we have often-indeed, for as long as we have been alive-engaged in free actions of this sort. We abstract from the determinate [objects] with which we are now familiar, and thus this is an abstract and, therefore, indeterminate type of thinking. Such thinking can serve merely to guide us to the path leading toward what we are seeking; it cannot convey us to the point that concerns us. 8 • Purely indeterminate thinking is the source of many errors in philosophy. {When one thinks in this way, one surveys a series of inferences but does not see their interconnection; one notices merely the manner-that is, the Jaws-in accordance with which these conclusions are 'MeW.phJSi·
4 ]n K, there are two sections marked "(1)." This is the first, whereas section ( 1) below is the second. The structure of§ 10a-with its two opening remarks followed by two numbered sections-is more clearly evident in H than in K. A The I posits itself as able either to represent something or not to represent it. This was the result of our investigation of the question, "What is it that is determinate?" This raises a new question; "How does the I posit itself in /his manfU'rt" The answer will be found in the following investigation of the question, "What is it that is determinable?" (p. 99). 11 Let us take this opportunity. first of all, 10 say a few words concerning general philosophical procedure, in order thereby 10 uncover the ground of all the previous errors of philosophers: If one answers this question. "How is it possible for the original Ito think of itself as able either to represent or not to represent something?" in a manner that is abstract, and hence, always indetermill3te, this can certainly lead n> to the path toward an answer and a solution, but never to the chief point with which this question is concerned (p. 99).
(gg)
reached, but one never takes note of how the individual links of the chain are attached to one another. One is brought to a halt as soon as one delves into the individual details. While engaging in philosophical inquiry, therefore, one must avoid all abstract, indeterminate thinking.} • We may very well be able to think of ourselves as able to do or not do something; but the original I that we are observing cannot think of itself in this way, since it does not yet have anything from which it would be able to abstract. We are here at the point where all acting begins. c {The above remarks are made only in passing. Now let us turn to the solution of the question itself: What is it that is determinable? or Huw is it possible for the original I to think of itself in the manner described in the previous §, i.e., as able to represent or not to represent something?}
109
(1) The I must now intuit its own determinate act of doing somethingwhich is the only kind of "doing" that can occur here 5-and it must intuit it as such; indeed, since this is supposed to be something that the I does freely, it must be intuited as something the I can either do or not do. {This determinate doing of the I is called "what is determinable."} Determinacy has two different meanings in this context. What we are now discussing is supposed to be "what is determinable," that is, that from which a transition to what is determinate is to be made. Nevertheless, what is determinable is itself determinate in a certain respect: it is an act of intuiting, and its determinacy consists in the fact that it is [at the same time] an act of comprehending: {namely, it is determinate to the extent that it is intuited or comprehended; for in order to be able to intuit or to comprehend it, we have to think of it as something determinate. This constitutes the determinate aspect of what is determinable.} To begin with, let us note the following: (A) The argument here is similar to that of the previous §; indeed, it is only another, completely different, side of the same argument. In the preceding § we said that the object is something upon which I am able to reflect or not to reflect; it would, however, make no sense to say this c In contrast, the I cannot by any means proceed in an abstract way in answering the present question. It cannot abstract. Indeed, it still finds itself standing at the entrance to and starting point of all comprehending (p. 99). '"Das lch mu~ heir sein bestimmtes Thun d.h. dasjenige, was hier allein stattfinden kann." The "determinate doing" in question is, of course, the act of intuiting described in the previous §§. In order to maintain the contrast between das Handeln ("acting") and das Tun, the latter is henceforth translated, not without a certain occasional awkwardness, as "doing," or some variant thereof. ("Deed" = die Tat; "to act efficaciously" or "to have an effect upon something" = wirken.)
§
10
237
unless I had already posited the object-and thus reflected upon it. Here too, {where we are concerned with a determinate acting,} the do- (10• ing or acting6 of the I is supposed to be posited as something that can either occur or not occur; this is not possible, however, unless "doing as such" or or "in general" 7 has already been posited (non entis nulla sunt prae(iicata). 8 {The I cannot say anything at all about its own acting without presupposing the latter. Every predicate [e.g., the predicate "possible") presupposes some subject to which it can be applied-and, in this case, the subject is "acting as such."~ Accordingly, we must necessarily presuppose that the I's doing has already occurred in advance of all reflection upon it and appears, therefore, as something given-as we saw to be the case with the thing in the previous §, and for the same reason. {I cannot posit an instance of acting as "free" unless I am aware of this very acting. This follows from the nature of my act of representing and from the form of my sensibility.} In other words, the "doing" in question is what is determinable, and, as such, it must be presupposed as a condition for the possibility of a transition to what is determinate, insofar as the latter is an act of freedom. 0 {Consequently, something determinable (in opposition to the determinate aspect of what is determinable) must be presupposed as a condition for the possibility of all possible acting, and hence, of all consciousness as well; for before one can talk about a possible act of doing something, "doing as such" or "in general" must already be present.} In order for what is determinable to be intuited, however, it has to be something "objective" (in the broadest sense of the term), something that, in the act of reflecting upon the movement of transition, has already been discovered. (B) [This determinability,] which appears as something given and, to this extent, independent of freedom, must be posited as, in another sense, dependent upon freedom. Insofar as it is something that can either be or not be, it appears to be dependent; on the other hand, insofar as it must be posited as such or in general, it appears to be independent. {In other words, the determinable something that is here given must also actually be something determinable by freedom, insofar as it is supposed to facilitate a choice or an act of determining.} It is viewed in two different ways. Here, therefore, we discover a specific application of the previously stated general principle: that all consciousness arises 6
"Das Thun oder Handeln.'' "ein Thun iiberhaupt." "Nothing can be predicated of what does not exist.'' 9 "das HANDELN iiberhaupt.'' 0 This "doing" is what is determinable, which is intuited as such, that is, as a movement of transition from what is determinable to what is determinate, which constitutes the act of freedom (p. 100). 7
8
from a movement of transition from what is determinable to what is determinate. (C) What is determinable and what is to be determined are, however, synthetically united within consciousness. I posit what is determinable only insofar as I posit myself as engaged in a transition {from what is determinable to what is determinate, that is, only insofar as I posit myself as free}; and I can posit myself in this way only insofar as I posit it [i.e., what is determinable] as given. 10 • E Nothing is given [to me] unless I exercise some effect upon it, for everything that is given to me is first given in the course of free and efficacious acting; 11 but I cannot have any effect upon anything that is not already present for me, {that is, unless I am clearly conscious that it hovers before me and that I posit it as able to be or not to be}. 110
Thus the proposition we have to examine here is the following: "I intuit my own doing as something in which I can either engage or not engage." My doing is the logical subject of the predicate "freedom." Therefore, my doing, as such, {my "possible doing," what is determinable,} is itself an object of intuition in the broadest sense of the term: it takes on the character of an "object," inasmuch as it is something that hovers before the ideal activity. How then will my act of doing something appear as an object of intuition? Kant quite correctly calls a doing that occurs, for example, in accordance with the law of causality, etc., a "schema" 12-a term he employs in order to indicate that this is nothing actual, but is instead something that has to be constructed by means of ideal activity for the purpose of intuition, {as required by the laws of reason. My acting is intuited as "necessary" when it is determined by the (101) laws of reason and not by a feeling.} A schema is merely a kind of "doing"; indeed, [it describes] what I must necessarily do whenever I intuit anything. 13 Our question is therefore this: What is the schema of "doing as such"? How is an act of doing something transformed into an object of intuition {for us by the schematism? (For an object first arises through intuition.)} (2)
10 "nur in wiefern ich es als gegeben seze." Note the significant difference between this passage in K and the parallel passage in H (translated in n. E, below): "nur in wiefern ich mich als das gegebene seue." E What is given in what is determinable and what is to be determined are synthetically united in consciousness. I posit what is given only insofar as I posit myself as engaged in a movement of transition from what is determinable to what is determinate, that is, only insofar as I posit myself as free; and I can posit myself as engaged in a movement of transition or as free only insofar as I posit myself as what is given (p. 100). 11 "Es ist nichts gegeben, auser in wiefern ich darauf wirke, denn erst im freien Wirken wird es mir gegeben." 12 See KRV. A137/B176ff. ""SCHEMA is ein blotks Thun, und zwar mein nothgwendiges Thun in der Anschauung."
·· '•
§
10
239
Here, the object must be derived from intuition, 14 and, with this, we reach the limit of what can be proven from concepts alone.F Our present task is not to observe any determinate kind of "doing" (e.g., "thinking,'' "intuiting," etc.), but rather to observe "doing as such" {-an inner doing, this and nothing more}. What we have to do, therefore, is to describe an "agility," 15 which one can intuit only as a line that I draw.G' Accordingly, inner agility is an act of drawing a line. What we are concerned with here, however, is not any [specific] agility that actually occurs; instead, we are concerned with "agility as such" or "in general," i.e., with a determinable but not determinate power of inner selfactivity and agility. [Even] a line of this sort, however, is determined with respect to its direction. But the [purely determinable] power [we are now discussing] must contain within itself every possible line; therefore, the schema of acting {in general, as a mere power,} must be an act of drawing lines in every possible direction. 16 This is space, and indeed, empty space," though it is never present as such; something is always placed therein. 1 We will soon see why this is so. Here, however, we are concerned only with "doing," and pure, unalloyed doing is also something that never appears [within consciousness]. §
1 11
IO.A
The act of comprehending is posited as a freely occurring act; this means that {it) is posited by the intellect as an act that can either occur or not occur, and indeed, as a specific mode of acting in general (for otherwise nothing at all would be posited). Consequently, acting as such or in general is posited, and it is posited as something that can occur or not occur-though acting is not possible "in general" unless one or another specific mode of acting is posited. Consequently, this "acting in general" exists for the intellect only as an instance of free acting-but no instance of "free acting" can be present for the intellect without "acting as such" 14 Reading, with Krause's MS, "mujJ das Object aus der Anschauung hergeleitet worden" for K's "ist das Object [ ..• J hergeleitet worden." F The answer to this question cannot be derived from concepts; instead, we must turn to intuition (p. 101). 13 "AGILITAET.M Fichte employs this term to designate the pure, inner movement of the I itself, its free movement from one state to another. c We are unable to think or agility as such; we can only intuit it. Thereby there arises a line that I draw (p. 1 o 1 ). 16 "ein nach allen moglichen Directionen mogliches Unienziehen." Following the parallel passage in H, the translation omits the second occurrence of miigliclw. H Therefore, the schema of doing in general, as a mere power, must be a line spread in every direction, and this is space; indeed, as the power of agility or of drawing lines in all possible directions, [it is] emi*Jspau (p. 101). 1 N.B.: It will become evident below that an abstraction has already occurred here, since there is no empty space (p. wm).
240
§
10
or "in general" being present for it [as well]. However, the I intuits its sheer acting, considered as such, as an act of drawing a line, and hence it intuits its indeterminate power to act in this way as space.
Remarks: (1) It has been said that space is a priori. This can mean two different things: On the one hand, it can mean that space exists only by virtue of the laws of reason. In this sense, everything is a priori except feeling and the predicates of the same, {since this is empirical}. On the other (102) hand, when one says that space is a priori one can also mean that it is something that is given in advance of all intuition, something that is merely determinable and that first makes intuition possible. {Every consciousness presupposes something determinable, and this appears to ordinary consciousness as something given, something that precedes all experience.} These two meanings must surely be combined. Kant understands the a priori character of space in the latter sense. According to him, space precedes all experience and is the condition for the possibility of the same. 17 {It lies within us; it is what is determinable.} Professor Beck has recently espoused the view that space is a priori in the former sense, 18 {namely, that space is produced by the intellect through the laws of its reason,} which is also the view defended in the first version of the Wissenschaftslehre.J It is worth noting that the controversy that has recently arisen over space is similar to the controversy concerning the nature of a thing: is it given or is it produced? Both parties to this controversy are right. A thing is determinable; and, to this extent, it is given. It is necessitated by the laws of reason; and, to this extent, it is produced. (2) {It has been said that} space is the (a priori) form of outer intuition. 19 In our view, what is determinable in any intuition-i.e., what is construed 20 whenever an intuition is posited-should be called the "form" [of intuition]. Accordingly, what is determinable within outer intuition would be the "form" of the same. K Whenever anything is intu17 For Kant's exposition of the a priori character (and hence the transcendental ideality) of s,p;ce, see, above all, sect. 1 of the ''Transcendental Aesthetic" (KRV. A22/B37ff.). 1 See Einz.ig-miiglicher Standpuncl, p. 141. This portion of Beck's work is included in the selection translated by di Giovanni in Between Kant and Hegel, p. 2 2 1. 1 The WisJenschaflslehre occupies a middle position between these two views (p. 102). 19 This was, of course, claimed by Kant (see, e.g., KRV. A26/B42). 20 "das was [ ... ] construirt." K What does "form" mean? It means nothing other than what is determinable in every intuition-to the extent that every intuition is an outer intuition or is at least ultimately grounded in an outer intuition. Therefore, it is that through which all outer intuition is subjectively conditioned (p. 102).
§
1 12
10
241
ited, space is intuited. Space is what is {filled or} given shape or form in intuition; it itself does not [actively] form anything. {(And this is the only reasonable sense that these words can have.)} Anything posited as something that can occur or not occur or as something that can be applied or not be applied must appear as something given (see A, above), and it must appear in this way because, in order for us to be able to construe anything from it, it must exist for us. This is space.L But (according to B) it must also appear as something that is determinable and dependent upon freedom, and thus space would appear to be something that has to be united with the object and also not united with it, for only to this extent does what is here determinable appear as simply determinable, that is, as something dependent upon freedom. I can posit this object in this space, and I can also not do so; I can place this object in this space, or I can place some other object there. Freedom of thinking and comprehending consists in just this. This "something" [i.e., space] is simply something determinable; therefore, this synthesis [of the object with space] must be posited as dependent upon freedom, as something that can either occur or not occur. To unite an object with space means to posit an object in space, or to fill space with an object. According to C, neither of these acts is possible apart from the other {(nothing determinate apart from something de- ( 103: terminable, and vice versa)}. I cannot posit myself as freely filling space unless space is present for me, and space cannot be present for me unless I posit myself as filling it. {How is all this to be synthetic.ally unified?} Let us now present the synthesis of the whole. Our first task is to unite what was established in the pre"vious § with what has just been established. It is not possible to reflect upon space without {also} reflecting upon some object in space, for space is the subjective condition for the possibility of an object and, {vice versa, reflection upon} space is itself conditioned by the act of reflecting upon the object. It is not possible to reflect upon an object without also reflecting upon space, but neither is there any space without some object; consequently, they are necessarily united with each other within consciousness. Originally, neither any object nor any space is given by itself; instead, both are given to us at the same time. But an object in space is c.alled "matter," and thus it follows that what is [truly] original is matter.:n If this is so, then what is presupposed {as given} is not merely the object (as in the previous §) or space (as in the present §), but both the object and space. Together, in a single act, they constitute what is {freely} L The space in which the object is freely posited appears to us, however (according to A, above), as something given (p. 102). 21 "folglich ist ursprunglich Materie.''
242
113
~ :. : i
§
lO
determinable in every representation. M {I can think of no object apart from space and of no space apart from matter; therefore, we can never separate matter-even in thought-from a representation. 23} Matter is the synthesis of space with the object. So too at the practical level: I can divide and combine matter, but I cannot think it away or eliminate it, nor can I increase or decrease it, {for space and matter are the necessary conditions for all outer representations}. Wherever our thoughts may carry us, there we discover space, because we think of matter everywhere. {Since, according to what was said above, the union of space with an object constitutes a filled space, it follows that there is no empty space and that empty space can never occur, except as an abstraction.} This proposition is of prime importance. Here we see the origin of the entire corporeal world, 24 indeed, the origin of our entire {actual world}-including the spiritual world; 25 for, as we shall see, our spiritual world is nothing but an abstraction from the corporeal world. {The spiritual world is nothing actual for us; it is merely thought of and inferred by us, by means of abstraction, and hence it is nothing actual. And we also obtain, along with this, a genetic understanding of how it is that we come to assume that something external to us is given [to us]. The Critical philosophy asserts that matter originates for us through the laws of reason-within us, not from without. Therefore, it must know how to refute the ordinary belief of common consciousness and must show that everything objective has its origin exclusively within us. Accordingly, what is established here is how we arrive at matter, and why we feel ourselves forced to assume the existence of external objects corresponding to our representations.} We have now seen how the world must come into being for us. We do not have to assume any given material. Objectivity begins with matter, and everything objective originates within us. I am originally limited; and this limited state, when I reflect upon it, is feeling. In a certain respect, feeling may be taken to be what is given-but only in a certain respect, because it is equally true that a feeling is a feeling only insofar as I reflect upon it. " Therefore, both space and the object are posited as given, since both acts constitute but one and the same moment; taken together, they are but a single, determinable something, and they are necessarily united. [ ... ] Something that fills space is called "matter." Accordingly, matter is what is freely determinable in every representation, that from which the free activity of transition proceeds22 (p. 103). 22
"von welcher das frey thatige ubergeht." "also MATERIE konnen wir nie wegdenken von einer Vorstellung." "der ganzen Korperwelt." 25 "der Geisterwelt." 23
24
§
10
243
{I am originally limited, and from this there arises a feeling, from feeling there arises intuition, and from this there arise representations of objects external to us, representations to which objects outside of us cor- ( u respond. These objects, however, originate only by virtue of the laws of our reason, because, according to these same laws, objects and matter are necessarily united with space; i.e., they fill space. Space, however, is something purely subjective, something in us; therefore, the object too is our product.} The treatment of this point within the Kantian presentation is not quite accurate, and this has given rise to a system according to which space is indeed supposed to be a priori, whereas objects are supposed to enter space only a posteriori. 26 Kant also affirmed that objects are in space a priori, but he reached this conclusion indirectly, {since, in his artificially constructed system, 27 he began only with a priori concepts, and inserted the theory of space only, so to speak, incidentally, since this has to do purely with intuitions and not with concepts}. For him, space is a priori; it is ideal, and consequently, objects must be ideal too. Kant sought to expound everything purely through concepts, which is also why his "Transcendental Aesthetic" is so brief. This, however, will not do. A rational being is not merely a comprehending subject; it is an intuiting one as welL Kant offers an inductive proof of his exposition of space {as follows: Space is something purely ideal; therefore, what is in space, that is, matter, is ideal as well. The account of space in the Wissenschaftslehre, on the other hand, is developed by means of deduction rather than induction.} • Kant does not say that space is given; he says that something lies at the basis of our sensible representations, that there are noumena. He has not clearly explained himself on this point. He calls this [that is, what lies at the basis of sensible representations] "something." But [in fact] this is not something that possesses being; but rather [it is] acting. Nor has Kant given any consideration to the schema of supersensible thoughts. Even though one can have no knowledge of what is supersensible, such thoughts are nevertheless present for us, and thus they must surely permit of some explanation. The schema for what is supersensible is acting. {This, therefore, would be the first synthesis connected with the foregoing: I cannot posit objects and space as produced through freedom; I therefore presuppose them to be given to me in advance.} 26 This is an allusion to the dogmatic "Kantians," such as Fichte's collcage C. E. Schmid and the circle of authors associated with the Annalen tier P~ tmd .US pJU/JJsllfliWchen G.risks, edited in Halle by L. H. Jacob. For a sustained critique of this type of so-called Kantianism, see, above all, sect. 6 of Fichte's well-known "Second lnttoduction to the Wiuensc~lsuhre" of '797 (SW, 1: 468fT.). 2 win seinem kiinsdichen oder aufgestellten Systeme."
244
114
§
10
Space is the form of outer intuition. Form is what is determinable in an action of the I; thus one could also call matter "the form of outer intuition.''N Matter is what is construed and limited in outer intuition. Space is the sphere in which freedom operates, and what limits us within space is the material, which always remains. In order to distinguish between space and matter, one could call space "the subjective form" and matter "the objective form" [of outer intuition]. {Now the second synthesis: On the other hand, objects and space can be presupposed to be given only if I posit myself as free.} If I am supposed to posit myself within space as free, then space is presupposed. The role of freedom [here] is this: What is determined through feeling is posited in any particular place one wishes (if it is something that has been posited as unified) or it is posited as dispersed in many different places (if it is something that has been posited as divided). This synthesis of a determinate place with a determinate intuition is a matter of freedom, which is free to posit the determinate object, i.e., the object determined through the predicate of feeling, in any place in space it desires. {The object thereby becomes movable in space.} Space is empty, in the sense that l-in thought-traverse it, empty it, and place something else therein. Things are movable, because I can posit them in this place or that. One can make a distinction between "absolute" and "relative" space. Absolute, {originally given} space is immovable. Relative space is the determinate position occupied by an object, and this space can be freely moved {-the object can change its place}. From this it will follow that freedom of acting has its origin in freedom of thinking. From the intellect's freedom {to posit a determinate object in a deter- (105) minate place or space} it follows that matter, and, along with it, space, must be infinitely divisible, since otherwise absolute freedom would be curbed, inasmuch as it would at least be limited to thinking of a specific part of matter in a specific part of space. {For this reason, space must also be continuous, [and]} similarly, the continuity of space must also be infinite: I may continue dividing space just as long as I desire, I will always find something more to divide. Were this not the case, then, at some point, space would come to an end, and this would constitute the limit of my freedom. {In this case, freedom would not be absolute, for space is the sphere of freedom. According to what was said above, however,} I cannot think of freedom of acting unless objects are already present for me. {And the same is true of space, since for me space is already filled with objects.} Space is given N If "form" means "what is determinable," then one could also call matter "form," and indeed, the objective form of intuition, because, for freedom, matter is totally unmodifiable (p. 1 04).
§ 10
115
245
to me along with objects. In order to posit a free action, in order to posit an object in any space whatever, the object must already have a space; it already fills a space, but it does not yet occupy any particular position (any determinate place) in space. It simply hovers before the imagination. Both space and the object are already present for me: this is what is determinable {and present as an object as such; and thus freedom is present here}. I posit this object in some determinate place: this is what is determinate; and I think to myself that I could also have posited it in some other place. Nevertheless, if I want to determine the object in a way that accords with the truth, {and if I am supposed to intuit it correctly,} then I have to posit it in this determinate place, {and my freedom therefore expresses itself insofar as I move from what is determinable to what is determinate and fill the space that has become empty through A. See [Outline of the Distinctive Cho.racter of the] Wissenscho.ftslehre, p. 400, no. 1. 2 ~ This is the movement of transition. (All determination of place is mediated and relative.) It is only by means of freedom that an object can be present for me at all. The object has become what it is for me because I have posited it in just this way. I posit the object in a determinate place. What place is this? What determines this place? All determination of place occurs only indirectly and is relative. {That is to say, I am able to determine the place only by means of what adjoins and borders upon the object. Even supposing that I were to continue this process of determining a place indefinitely, moving, for example, from the table to the wall, from the wall to the street, from the street to the ditch, from the ditch to the royal garden, etc.-so that, in the end, I would have filled in just as large a space as you please: this would still be nothing in comparison with infinite space. What is the relation between a determinate, finite space and infinite space? In what place does the latter lie? These are questions to which there neither can nor should be any answer, for even the most enormous thing has no relation to infinity.} • I posit object A next to object B, and B next to C, etc. But how is such a relative determination of place possible? I certainly comprehend how a second object can be determined by a first one, and a third by this second; nevertheless, I still do not understand this process as a whole. Where does this whole lie? {In space, therefore, there must surely be (106) 28 Fichte here refers to the discussion of space in GEWL, § 4, iv, 1, and specifically, to the following passage: "The imaginalion separaus spo.a from the thing tJJLJl acl:uiJIJ1 occupies it by positing (as it should) the possibility of completely different substances with completely different spheres of efficacy in space .t. In doing this, it project! an empty space. But it projects this empty space only experimentally and in passing, in order to fill it again at once with whatever substances and attendant spheres of effiGlC}' it pleases. Consequently, there is no empty space at all except while the imagination is making the transition from filling the space with A to filling it with b, c, d., etc., as it chooses."
something or other that, for me, is first.} All determination of place is subjective. At some time or another, I simply started [at some place] in space. This determination is absolute. It is I who made this place what it is [i.e., the first one]; otherwise it is not determined. The first place in space is determined by nothing but my own doing. 0 {It is I who posit it. I have gathered together or scooped up such and such a quantum [of matter], and I seize a portion of space and place the object therein.} (This may well be the simplest argument for the ideality of space.P {See [Outline of the Distinctive Character of the] Wissenschaftslehre, pp. 401-2, no. s.} Later on, it will become apparent that this [first] place is determined by the place I occupy, and that I am where I am.) {(What then is "substantial" about a thing? Let us elucidate this question with the example of a tree: I remove its branches, and yet it remains a tree. These are only its accidental properties. I imagine that half its trunk is removed and replace it with another. Then I do the same with the other half. Now I take away its roots and imagine other ones in their place: It is and remains a tree. Thus I can imagine entirely different predicates, opposites of the actual ones, and it still remains the same object. What then is it that is "substantial" about this tree? What constitutes its substance? This is nothing more than the space the object fills, a space that is tacitly thought of as filled with matter. I can think away all the properties of the substance, and what is substantial about the object will still remain: the space filled with matter. Where does this leave us? We began with the chief principle of our inquiry: "The intellect is to posit itself as free in a certain respect." But it is not possible for it to posit itself in this way unless it posits itself "in general" or "as such." ( 1) Insofar as it is posited "as such," the intellect is the subject of a logical judgment. (2) Insofar as it is posited as "free," the intellect is the predicate of a logical judgment. (See the previous §.) The intellect, however, is unable to posit itself either "as such" or as "free." What sort of acting, then, does it posit as free? In order for the intellect to be able to posit an instance of acting as "free," the latter must also appear in a twofold way: [1] as such or in general, it appears as the subject of a logical judgment; (2) as free, it appears as a predicate of the' same. Insofar as acting is posited as free, it is an object of intuition, to which the predicate "freedom" is attached. In relation to the object, this free 0 The space in which the first object is posited cannot be determined in itself, however, except by means of my doing; and this determination is absolute (p. 106). P This is the most illuminating argument for the ideality of space (p. 106).
§ 10
247
acting or doing of the intellect is intuited as space. Both the object and space as such must be presupposed, however, if this act of positing a thing within space is something one can do freely. These two momentsthe presupposition [of the object and space] and the predication of freedom to the intellect-are necessarily synthetically united. For in order to be able to predicate freedom of myself, I posit X; and simply because I have posited X, I must predicate freedom of myself. The same is true of space. Space is that in which the object is freely determined. This, however, is impossible unless one presupposes space as such; and conversely, space cannot be posited as such without also predicating freedom [of the I].)}
§ 10.B
tl6
Since the positing of the object and the positing of acting are necessarily united within the 1, 29 the former (the object) and the schema of the latter [i.e., space] must necessarily be united as well. But uniting an object with space is the same as filling space; consequently, all objects necessarily occupy space, that is, they are materiaL The freedom of the intellect consists in (i.e., expresses itself in) the synthesis of an object, which is determined by the predicates of feeling, with a place in space, which is determined by absolute spontaneity; and, in this way, space becomes continuous, and space, as well as matter, becomes infinitely divisible. The determinacy of the latter (the intellect), without which the former (freedom) is impossible and which is not possible without the former, consists in this: that the object must be posited in some space or another, 30 and that space must be filled with some sort of matter. 31 There is no space without matter, and vice versa. This is a matter of necessity; but it is a matter of freedom that this object is not situated just in this space and that this space does not belong just to this object.
See [Outline oj] tM Distinctive Clulracter of the Wissensclulftslehre with Respect lo tM Theoretical Puwer, § 4· ! 2 N .B. Many things are discussed in this book which cannot yet be discussed at this point in the present exposition; consequently, this § of the book must be read in the light of this new presentation. 29 Instead of K's "des Handeln im Ich nothwendig vereinigt sind," H has "des HANDELNt>EN Ich [ .•. ] sind," which would make this fint clause read, "Since the positing of the object and positing of the active I are necessarily united." 30 "in einen Raum iiberhaupt": that is, "in space as such or in general." 31 umit Materie Uberhaupt." 32 sw, 1: 391-41 ..
(107
p. 400, no. 1. The proper act of the representing subject consists in placing things in space; space, however, is always filled and is never empty, except when it is being traversed by the imagination. pp. 400-401, no. 2. Instead of "force, which [necessarily] expresses itself," we would now have to talk about matter, which cannot be posited except in space. Matter is infinitely divisible, and therefore space is as well. p. 401, no. 3· Intensity pertains to feeling; extension pertains to space. Every feeling leads me to matter, which is a quantum and fills a space. (Feeling expresses a relationship to us, to our concepts; for an intuition is present only insofar as a feeling is posited.) Matter is intuitable only insofar as it is a quantum. Matter is not a mathematical point, for it can be divided. The continuity of space and the infinite divisibility of matter must therefore be assumed, because these are conditions for the possibility of freedom. p. 40 1 , no. 4· Feelings are purely subjective. One cannot communicate what "red," "sweet," "bitter," etc., are by means of concepts, because, beyond these predicates of feeling, nothing pertains to objects except that they are matter in space. pp. 401-2, no. 5· Take an object and posit it in space, and then ask, "Where is this object?" This is a question that has no answer, for one possesses no point by means of which one could determine this object. Nevertheless, such a determination does occur, and it is based upon the fact that the first object is posited in absolute space by means of absolute spontaneity. The [position of the] first object we posit in space is determined by nothing except our own thinking. p. 402, no. 6. Imagine an observer. Wherever I look, I presuppose space. When I see that there is an object in a certain space, I incorporate this object into that space. All objective representing consists in the filling of space.
{A Few Remarks on Synthetic Method Our progress hitherto has been synthetic, for [we have been observing how] the I itself assembles its own consciousness from all the conditions that make its consciousness possible. There are several methods of treating a subject synthetically: (1) One can start with a contradiction and then simply try to resolve l ' this contradiction by making certain additional assumptions. This is the type [of procedure] or method followed in the instructor's published Wissenschaftslehre. It is the most difficult method of all, which is why this (108
§ lO
249
particular text was not understood by the public or even by some of those who were present at those earlier lectures. (2) Another method is to begin by posing for oneself a principal task, and then to attempt to accomplish this task by introducing intermediate principles. This is the method we have employed so far [in the present exposition]. Our principal task was to answer the question: "How can the I discover itself to be really active?" It was in order to accomplish this task that we introduced the intermediate principle: "I act only insofar as I construct for myself a concept of a goal." (3) A third synthetic method is [to begin with something that has already been established and then] to try to clarify bit by bit what remains indeterminate and obscure in what went before. This method occupies an intermediate position between the previous two, for what is obscure and indeterminate is precisely what was called "contradictory" within the context of the first method. This third method is the one we have especially employed in our last§, and it is the one we will employ from now on. The aim of our investigation is to present the I as an object of intuition; hence, by following this method, we should become better and better acquainted with our own I.}
§
117
11
According to the previous §, all determination of place is purely relative; the place of any object is determined only by its relation to the place of some other object. But what determines the place of this first object? The determination of the place of the first object is absolute, {and it must be so, if one wishes to avoid circularity}. This first thing, by (108) means of which I determine all other things, is in the place where I have posited it. {It is determined through itself and through my absolute acting.} This assertion still remains imprecise and thus contradictory;A we cannot reject it, however, for it follows as a consequence of what has already been said, and, if such an original act of determining does not occur, then neither do any of the other acts we have already described. Consequently, the act in question must occur, and we must discover the conditions for its possibility. This is the specific task of the present §. {How then is absolute determination of place, which we must assume for the sake of any relative determination of place, possible?} ( 1) Judged in the light of everything established so far, the required act would appear to be impossible. The place of object A [the first object] is
supposed to be determined by my acting, but the only sort of acting that occurs here is ideal acting, for the only sort of acting predicated of the I so far is ideal acting, intuiting, the act of positing an object in space. {This intuition is now supposed to be what is determinate and, at the same time, what regulates acting. Insofar as I place an object in a determinate space, the place of this object is characterized through my acting. What sort of acting on my part is this? We are acquainted only with an act of positing-intuitingan object in this or that determinate place: Is this determinate [acting] A
Nothing is really contained in this assertion, and we cannot think it (p. 108).
[ 2501
118
also supposed to be, at the same time, the source of the determination? 1 Is the rule and law supposed be, at the same time, that which is regulated? This is not possible.} Since this ideal acting is supposed to be determinate, it cannot itself be the source of the determination in question. What determines this mode of acting, that through which the intuiting subject is posited as determinate (namely, as determined to intuit A), must be something that lies outside of the intuiting subject; it must be that toward which the latter is directed. What is self-determining and determinate is the I. The intuiting subject is supposed to be the I; but, in the act of intuiting, the intuiting subject cannot be both what determines and what is determined by this act. On the one hand, what we are concerned with here is intuition. Intuition, however, is, by its very nature, something constrained (since it must have an object), and the reason for the determinateness 2 of an intuition lies in something other than the intuition itself. In the case of an act of intuiting, there can no question of something absolute, 3 possessing its foundation within itself. On the other hand, what we are concerned with here is not intuition in general or as such; instead, we are here dealing with a determinate intuition, one that is supposed to be objective (i.e., to correspond to the truth). An intuition of this sort, however, is constrained in every respect. Why is it that, if we wish to obtain a true representation of an object, we must locate it precisely in this place in space and in no other one? 8 (It can here remain undecided whether the object in question is itself determined by another object or is the first object we posit.) {The answer to this question is contained in what has already been ( 109) said, and thus we will not be presenting anything new here; instead, we will merely be analyzing what was said above and determining it further in order to increase our knowledge. We all claim that any actual thing occupies some determinate space. I must posit it as being where it is. This does not depend upon my "soli ~ugleich auch das BESTIMMENDE [ ••• I seyn?'" "ihres Bestimmtseins." "von AbsoluJsein.'" 8 I posit something in space; it is actually there. We remarked above that the freedom of the intellect consists in this: that I am quite generally able to think of this object as being somewhere other than where it actually is, and the possibility of think.ing of the object in this way is the basis for the possibility of the intellect positing i1self as objectively active when engaged in think.ing-when, that is, it does not wish to proceed in accordance with the truth. Here, however, we are concerned with a determinate representation of place: If my representation is to be true, then I must represent it in this or that determinate place. Therefore, this [determinate representation! cannot depend upon the intuition, or the ideal activity of the I, and upon the rules of the same. What determines the truth of this determination of the object's place? What forces and requires me to think of this object as occupying precisely the place where I intuit it to be? 1
2
5
(p. IOg).
252
§
II
thinking; instead, the object must be posited as something whose spatial position is determined.} (2) As we have seen in one of the foregoing §§,4 the foundation of all
objective thinking lies within my own state; consequently, if my thinking of any object is to be objective, then it must refer to my own state. (To represent something truly is to represent it in a way that serves to explain my own state.)c When we determine the place of something, we engage in objective thinking; therefore, this determination of place must somehow serve to explain a certain state of mine, and every determination of place must originate within me. The testimony of experience on this matter is as follows: One orders things in space according to their lesser or greater distance from and their situation in relation to oneself, that is, according to whether a lesser or greater expenditure of {time and} energy would be required in order to transport oneself to the place occupied by the object {-e.g., an hour, a mile}. (Space can be measured only in terms of time, and vice versa.) In addition, we also take into consideration whether the object lies to our right or to our left, in front of us or to one side. {Consequently, even the place of the heavenly regions is determined in relation to me, as the center: the East is where I see the sun rise, etc.} We should not count this sort of testimony of experience as a proof, however. If all determination of place begins with me, and if all objects in space are determined through me, then I myself, as the subject who determines the spatial position of all representations, must also be in space prior to all representation. I must be given to myself in space.
119
(3) The only representations that possess reality {and objective validity} ( 110) are those that would necessarily be produced from feelings-if, that is, feelings possessed the power of causality {and were able to have an effect upon the representing subject} (see above). 5 In the present case, a particular determination of a place in space is supposed to be objectively valid. (It must be determined in a certain way, because I myself am determined in a certain way, {my determination of the place of an object in space must follow from a feeling of myself as occupying a [particular] place}.) Consequently, I must feel myself to be in space. Space, however, is [only] the form of intuition; it is not felt. Yet it has to be felt. Feeling and intuition must therefore be united {within one and the same I, which we require in order to unite intuition and feeling in one and the same consciousness}; and thus there must be some third thing, which • Sect. F of § g. c I explain my own state to myself: i.e., I think objectively (p. 109). • Sect. F of § 9·
§II
253
serves as middle term between the two. We are already acquainted with something of this sort. As we saw above, 6 every particular feeling presupposes a system of sensibility in general, for it is only in relation to this system that a particular feeling first becomes a particular oneP This system of sensibility is what is determinable as a particular [feeling], and this particular feeling constitutes what is determinate in this case. A particular feeling, however, is a feeling of limitation, and thus the system of sensibility is a system of limitability. 7 Limitation is nothing apart from striving, however, and a feeling of limitation is nothing apart from a feeling of striving. Accordingly, a feeling of limitability is also nothing apart from a general feeling of striving. Something of this sort must thus be posited if an objective act of representing is ever to occur, but this all exists only for feeling. 8 As surely as there is supposed to be intuition, there must be feeling {-and therefore, everything contained in feeling must be present as well}. The feeling subject and the intuiting I are one and the same; both states are necessarily united. But when the I posits itself as intuiting, it posits itself, in its entirety, as intuiting; and when it posits itself as feeling, it posits itself, in its entirety, as feeling. This indivisible state of the I thus possesses a dual nature, and this is why it presents itself under two different aspects. The feeling of the act of feeling and the intuiting of the act of intuiting are united. Everything depends upon this unity, and the point of unification lies within the very nature of the l's activity. The I cannot be ideal without also being practical, and vice versa. Thus there arises something twofold [i.e., feeling and intuiting]. What we are concerned with here is itself an I; 9 hence there is a feeling of feeling and an intuiting of intuiting, and, {since the entire I is felt and intuited,} we thereby obtain something fourfold, {though we are here concerned only with the latter, that is, with intuition. The intuition of intuition and the feeling of feeling are separate and distinct from each other and are posited in opposition to each other, and it is only in one and the same consciousness that they are united. The entire I is now felt and intuited, and this gives us something fourfold: (1) a particular limitation; (2) a [particular] striving; (3) the system of limitation as such; (4) striving as such.} At the same time, we are concerned with the I as an object of intuition. Space and matter constitute the form of intuition. 6
Sect. 6 of § 6. In relation to my entire state, 1 am (again, according to what was said above) supposed to unite two feelings and intuition; this, however, would not be possible if the system of sensibility did not continually endure (p. 1 10). 7 ~das System der Begrenzharkeit." 8 "die$ aber ist nur fiirs Gefiihl." Cp. H: "dies alles liegt nur im Gefiihl" ("this all lies only in feeling"). 9 lbat is, feeling and intuiting are here supposed to be explicitly posited by the (observed) I itself, and not merely by the philosophical observer. 0
254
120
I 1
I
I!
§II
Accordingly, insofar as the I is limited and striving, it is transformed into matter in space. {For there is nothing in space but matter, and thus, if the I is to exercise its practical activity in space, it must also be material. We will have more to say below concerning the I's spiritual nature.} ( 1 1 1) Striving in general is, as such, endless; it aims at causality without end. This is why space must be infinite. This striving is {infinite and} absolutely free; there is no possible re~ct whatsoever in which it could not further determine or arrest itself, and it is thereby that space and matter become infinitely divisible, {to the extent that my striving is thought of as such and as an activity}. This conclusion was presented in the previous § simply as a consequence of the freedom of thinking. It is here traced back to a still higher source: the freedom of striving. Insofar as my striving lacks causality, i.e., insofar as limitation is present, striving is a complete and self-contained, limited quantum. 10 On the other hand, at this point I am {also} free: It is up to me and to my own power of self-determination to extend these boundaries and [thereby] to endow my striving with causality. The space in which I am supposed to exist is subject to my control. The matter in space which I am supposed to be, along with the parts of the same, is dependent upon me. This, insofar as it is articulated, 11 is my body. {The space and matter within which I am and which I myself become within intuition must be free, for the place and position in which I amas space-depend upon my will, upon my movement.} Moreover, I have to assume that I am actually able to divide this matter in space outside of me, not merely that I am able to think of it as divisible. However, I cannot do this directly, simply by willing it; instead, I must operate indirectly, through some intermediary states. The only matter upon which the mere will is able to exercise any [direct] effect is my body-considered not in terms of its organic systems, but rather as something articulated. 12 (We are here concerned with the body insofar as it is that by means of which I am able to perceive and to have an effect upon thin~s. That is to say, I am here concerned with it insofar as it senses and acts, 3 {i.e., insofar as it is the location of my feelings of "sweet," "hard," "red," "loud," etc.}. My body is the system of my feelings, the medium through which intuiting and feeling are united. My will has no effect upon my digestion and circulation, but I can control the movement of my hand or foot.) There is no possible respect in which my striving could bring itself to a halt (p. 1 1 1 ). "so ist es ein geschloJ3nes, begrenztes QuANTUM." "artikulirt." By referring to the body as "articulated," Fichte means to emphasize its caf,acity for deliberate, consciously controlled movement. 2 ' mein Leib, in wiefern er articulirt, nicht in wiefern er organisirt ist." 13 "in wiefern er Sinn ist und Organ." E 10 11
6
§II
255
Therefore, when the system of my limitability is thought of in synthetic unity with my striving, I become for myself an articulated body. f" Intuition and feeling are thereby united; I intuit myself as feeling insofar as I feel myself to be intuiting an object in space. {Therefore, I do not feel myself in space; instead, I intuit myself as the feeling subject, and indeed, as feeling myself in space, and [only] thereby do I intuit myself as feeling objects in space.}
12 1
(4) Intuition is now directed at an object in space, and this will provide us with an important result: only an intuition of a determinate object outside of me is a determinate intuition; moreover, according to our account, it is the first determinate intuition. (The intuition of myself as an object comes only later and is based upon a free act oheflection.) Actual consciousness begins not with us, but rather with objects.G Only later do I intuit and obtain any consciousness of myself, and I do this by abstracting from things and reflecting upon myself. {Therefore, every act of comprehending begins with an intuition of the object and with a concept of the same. Only in the intuition of an object do I first become an intuiting subject at all and comprehend myself. Accordingly, we are not yet concerned with the acting of my body in space; instead, we are here concerned with my body only insofar as it is the means by which I feel and intuit myself in space.} The indeterminate but determinable state of the intellect with which all intuition 14 begins is the intuition of an infinite space filled with matter. (At bottom, this is really an intuition of an infinite striving. It is only the philosopher who posits the temporal priority {of this intuition of the ( 1 1 whole of infinite space}. In fact and within consciousness, this intuition is present in all the moments of consciousness we have displayed so far and in all those that still remain to be displayed.) 15 In this state {of infinite striving and intuiting} I am limited, and the sphere of space and matter is thereby divided for me into two portions; I become something [material] for myself, and at the same time something else outside of me FIn intuition, the system of my limitation and my striving-in their synthetic unity, i.e., as a result of the limitation of my striving-becomes for me my (articulated) body (p. 1 11 ). c Intuition is here directed upon the object, for only this is a thterminale intuition; and indeed, it is the first determinate [intuition], since the beginning of actual consciousness proceeds from objects, and the I loses itself in the latter (p. 1 11). 14 K: "sie"; H: "aile Anschauung." ""in der That aber und im Bewustsein kommt sie vor, im Bewustsein aller der Momente, die wir bisher aufgezeigt haben und noch aufgezeigen werden." This sentence requires some modification or correction as it stands. Unfortunately, the correspondjng passage in H ("im Bewuflseyn abet- kommt sie in synthetischer Vereinigung vor") provides little help. The basic idea here seems to be, as Radrizzani points out, that the intuition of infinite space accompanies and is "synthetically united with" every moment of actual consciousness.
122
(the remaining matter)H also comes into being for me. Since I myself am limited, my intuition of myself is also limited. • This intuition of myself is the portion that determines the whole (and what is determined thereby is the intuition of objects in space and the position of the same), and thus every determination of space begins with a determination of myself within space. I occupy the absolute place; the space I occupy is directly [determined]; all the rest of space is [determined] only indirectly. I intuit myself not as an object of intuition, but rather as engaged in feeling; and as surely as I intuit myself at all, I fall into space, though I do not notice this. All my intuiting of objects is guided and determined by my own being in space-which appears to me as something felt. 1 One originally determines the place of a thing in space by judging this for oneself, that is, by making an estimate of its position, or "eyeballing" it. 16 The standard of measure one applies in this case lies immediately within the eye: I apprehend a larger and a smaller portion of space and measure the former by the latter; i.e., I calculate the quantum of "seeing" needed to reach this place or that; {through my seeing, I "pull" space into myself}. But does seeing possess quantity? Is not seeing, considered as the external schema of inner ideality,J something absolute, {and, if this is so, then would [not] the objects have to pile up on top of-and collapse into-one another}? This is indeed true; what is involved in spatial determination, however, is not simply pure seeing, but instead, {it is united with} the {inner} intuition of a line that I have to draw in order to reach the place in question. I describe this line as follows: I appraise my striving; that is to say, I estimate how much energy {and time} I would have to expend, how many steps I would have to take beyond the place where I am, in order to reach the place occupied by a certain object. (The first standard of measure is unquestionably the step or pace-assuming, that is, that with every step I take I abandon my former place completely and enter an entirely new one.) {My striving is here the standard of measure, and the place where I stand is the terminus a quo. 11 This procedure of H I thereby become something for myself, and something comes into being outside of me, namely, the rest of nature (p. 112). 1 I posit myself not as an object of intuition, however, but as the subject who is active therein. The intuition of myself thus appears as a mere feeling, as what makes [the intuition] necessary, as the determining portion, whereas the intuition of the object appears as the determinate portion [of the entire sphere of space and matter]. Consequently, all determination of space originates with the determination of myself in space-and vice versa. 1 first intuit the object, but in this intuition I must appear to myself as the intuiting subject; I intuit myself only as the feeling subject, however, and I thereby fall into space for myself (p. 112). 16 "nach Gutdiinken, oder wie man sich ausdriickt nach dem AugenmaJk." J To be sure, seeing is something absolute, the outer schema of inner activity (p. 1 12). 17 "starting point."
§II
257
mine is immediate; it cannot be learned, it can only be improved by practice. From this one can see that the way we represent things has an influence upon the way in which our practical power is determined; the thought of objective truth is founded upon this.} With this, we have arrived at the first notable point where the necessary relationship between our representations and our practical power is presented. (5) What determines and what is determined are now synthetically united. I cannot posit anything in space without also positing myself in space; nor can I posit myself in space without a1so positing other things in space, for I can posit myself only insofar as I posit things. {Space itself, however, I posit absolutely.} §11 Every object obtains its place in space from its relation to the representing subject, and, apart from this relationship, no determination of place is possible. Anything that is supposed to determine the position of another thing in space, however, must itself be in space. Accordingly, a rationa1 being posits itself in space as a practically striving being. This internally 18 felt striving, which obtains the form of intuition through the act of intuiting the object (an act that is necessarily united with feeling), is the original and immediate standard of measure for every determination of place. It is not possible to posit anything in space without also discovering oneself to be in space, but one cannot discover that one is in space unless one posits an object in space. 18 Though Krause's MS has "neuerlich" ("recent") here, both H and the summary of the dictata at the beginning of K have "innerlich," which is surely the correct reading.
§
122
123
12
According to the previous§(§ 11), I am able to measure the distance of an object from me according to how much force or energy I would have to expend in order to reach the position occupied by the object. (But how is it possible to measure this quantum, i.e., this suppressed striving, so that one can subsequently employ it to measure other things?) Everyone will surely find that this account is confirmed by experience, but this is not a philosophical explanation, for one can still ask, How is it possible to measure this very exertion of energy, so that one can subsequently employ it to measure other things? This is the question we will be trying to answer in the present §. In order to answer it, however, we will first have to become thoroughly acquainted with the representation of energy or force, 1 and we will have achieved such an acquaintance only when we have shown how this representation becomes present within the intellect. {In order to answer this question we ( 1 13) must first ask, What is "force as such" or "in general"? How does the intellect acquire this concept? Thus, here again, the practical and the theoretical powers border upon each other.} (1) The representation {[or] concept} of force can be derived only from our consciousness of willing and of the causal power2 that is united with willing. Hence the first question we must answer here is the following: What precisely is it that we discover when we discover ourselves to be engaged in willing and when we ascribe to this willing the power of exercising causality 2 within the sensible world? This is something that cannot be derived from concepts alone; {it has to be demonstrated within 1 "die
Vorstellung von Kraft." "Causalitiit" in both instances. Here, as before, Fichte uses this term to designate not so much the relationship between two things or events ("cause and effect") as the causal power of an agent, that is, its capacity to effect a change in something else. Hence it is often rendered here as "power of causality." 2
§ 12
124
259
intuition}. Willing is something immediate and original, which cannot be derived from anything higher.A One has to reproduce for oneself willing as such, along with the form of the same, and one must observe oneself while thus engaged in willing. {Simply will something and observe how you do this. But this command presupposes the following.} To begin with: {(A)} Let one think of oneself as a deliberating subject: Shall I do this or shall I do that? Or shall I, instead, do some third thing? While deliberating in this manner, the actions I am considering appear, within the representation, to be quite determinate. I think of these as possible actions, that is, as actions dependent upon my decision-but cmly as possible ones. B So long as I am engaged in deliberating, the concept of action continues to oscillate between several different [possible] actions and is not yet fixed upon any specific one of them, {since the opposite action has not yet been renounced. Thus, so long as we have not yet made up our ( 1 14) minds, the concept of acting appears to us in this oscillation.} Let one now cease to deliberate, and instead, come to a decision: {The concept of our acting now appears to us as something that is the sole thing that should occur.} What has been willed now appears to be the sole thing that ought to be done, and willing itself now appears as a categorical demand, an absolute postulate of actuality. {(One should not yet think here of the categorical imperative.)} Deliberation concerns nothing but possibility; willing is supposed to bring into being for the first time something new, something that is not yet present. {What is willed is present as something actually demanded; it is a demand placed upon actuality.} Yet this same thing has already become present idealiter; for, in deliberating, I have already confronted my willing with the various events that could possibly ensue-but I have considered them only problematically. Therefore, this new thing [that is supposed to come into being as a result of my willing] can be described as something that has now, for the first time, been "released," for it continued to be held back while I was deliberating. Consequently, willing appears as a process of emerging {from a self-imposed limitation of the power of willing, a limitation from which one is released through willing and which is canceled by directing the will upon something determinate,} and as a process of voluntary limitation, inasmuch as one focuses one's will upon a single new object. In deliberating, our striving is dispersed and is, to this extent, not an act of willing. It is only when this dispersed striving is concentrated upon a single point that it is called "willing." This conclusion A Willing is what is absolutely first and most immediate (p. 113). 8 How do these thoughts appear to us? We certainly have a determinate representation and a determinate concept of the possible actions-as something possible, dependent upon us (p. 113).
260
§ 12
follows from our previously stated principle: that the I discovers itself {and becomes conscious of itself only} in a movement of transition from indeterminacy to determinacy, and only in the course of such a transition can one become conscious of one's own willing. {This act of concentration is the point where the movement of transition occurs. 3 We are conscious of our own willing only insofar as we are engaged in such an act of concentration. In what manner do we become conscious of our own will?-with respect, that is, to the form of the same; for hitherto we have considered only the material of the will.} Deliberating and {determinate} willing are nothing but {determinate} acts of thinking: the first, a problematic; the second, a categorical one. But everything in the l-and thus its willing as well-must be posited by the I. {Therefore, no act of thinking is present in the I unless it posits this act of thinking.} Accordingly, we possess an immediate consciousness of the specific act of thinking we call "an act of willing." I will something only insofar as I think of myself as a willing subject; and I think of myself as willing only insofar as I will something.c These are inseparably linked. The will is something absolutely primary,O something that, with respect to its form, is not conditioned by anything else. {Subject and object are here one and the same. In this case, there is no ( 115) object hovering before the subject (as in outer intuition). The wiii has no schema, for the act of willing is not separated within consciousness from the act of thinking of willing. In contrast, whenever I entertain a representation of an object, I introduce a distinction between the represented object amt myself as the representing subject; in willing, however, I am one: the subject that thinks of itself as willing, as well as the willing subject.} Willing is like feeling, before which, because it is something {absolute and} immediate, there also hovers nothing that might be abstracted from the act itself. {Something immediate of this sort is needed in order to derive therefrom what is mediated. Willing is therefore what is highest and original. Nothing exists if I do not think of myself as willing.} This immediate concept of willinlf serves as the foundation for a system of those concepts Kant calls "noumena" and through which he establishes a system of the intelligible world, 4 {though Kant did not '"ist der Punkt des Uebergehens." c This determinate act of thinking we call "willing" is, accordingly, immediate. Through the act of thinking of willing, I will [something]; and because I will [something], I think of the act of willing (p. 114). 0 Accordingly, the will is something absolute (p. 115). E This concept of my immediate willing (p. 1 15). 4 See KRV, A23~B294ff.
j,
t
125
ground them deeply enough}. These have given rise to many misunderstandings and are not properly integrated into his system. 5 To be sure, Kant does say that one has to think these noumena, but he does not explain how and why one must do so.F For him, they remain qualitates occultae. 6 He maintains that there is no bridge leading from the sensible to the supersensible world. 7 This is a consequence of his onesided treatment of the I in the Critique of Pure Reason, in which he considers the I only as ordering the manifold, and not as producing the same. The Wissenschaftslehre has no trouble in constructing such a bridge. According to the Wissenschaftslehre, the intelligible world is the condition for the possibility of the world of appearances; the latter is constructed upon the basis of the former. The intelligible world, in turn, rests upon its own proper center, namely, the I itself, which is a whole only in the act of willing. All representations originate in the act of thinking of willing. 8 ·G This concept of willing is the foundation upon which everything intellectual or spiritual (i.e., everything that consists in mere thinking) rests, and it is thereby that the I itself becomes spiritual or intellectual. 9 We have already seen {in the preceding §} that the I is corporeal {or ( 1 16) material}. These two different aspects of the I must be united. A concept that ushers us into the intelligible world (a "noumenon") would therefore be something produced solely by thinking {without any feeling or intuition whatsoever}--just as the concepts of external ol>jects, which, we have asserted, are not produced purely by thinking, are called "sensuous" or "sensible" concepts. 10 {What is produced by feeling and intuition are "phenomena," sensible appearances, for I claim that something outside of me corresponds to them. 5 "Sie [ ... ] stehen in dem Kantschen Systeme abgeriflen und getrennt von dem iibrigen da." Literally: "They are isolated and separated from everything else in the Kantian system." F Kant's noumena hover there in complete isolation. He says that you must place something of this sort at the basis of experience; if the "why?" and the "how?" of this are not deduced, however, then this way of proceeding is not a strictly philosophical one (p. 1 1 5). 6 "Occult qualities." 7 See sect. ii of the Introduction to the Criliqtu ofJud.gmml ( 1790) (KGS, V: 175-76); English translation by Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987). 8 "Aile Vorstellungen gehen aus vom Denken des Wollens." I.e., it is through (involuntary) reflection upon or awareness of our own act of willing that we first become conscious of objects. G The world of appearances is erected upon the intelligible world, and the Iauer is based upon the I-which is based upon itself. Only in the willing of the I are the subject and the object simultaneously one and the same. By willing and thinking of willing, the I produces something new (p. 1 15). 9 "wodurch das Ich selbst geistig wird." 10 "sinnliche heiflen."
(B) Thus we ourselves produce our own willing.} Kant denied [the possibility of] intelligible intuition because he failed to answer the question concerning the origin of the noumenon. {Kant says that concepts such as "will," "force," etc., are noumena and that such concepts are simply present. But present for whom? Surely there are not two I's. Noumena and phenomena are both present for the same, undivided 1.} (See Hiilsen's contribution to the prize-essay topic, "What Progress has Metaphysics Made since Leibniz and Wolff?") 1 {How then do I know that such concepts [i.e., "noumena"] are present? The usual answer is: "through immediate consciousness." This, however, surely means nothing other than "through intelligible intuition." I observe myself in the act of thinking, but without any [reference to] space, since otherwise this would be a sensible intuition.} Such concepts could also be called "pure concepts," and the power to produce such concepts 12 could be called "pure reason." {Hence Kant's Critique of "Pure Reason." The Wissenschaftslehre, however, is something entirely different.} Since the Wissenschaftslehre deals with the entire range of consciousness, {with everything that the whole I produces in accordance with its entire power,} it must include an exposition of the concepts of phenomena as well as those of noumena.
i
i
I
(2) In order to make the concept of willing even clearer, let us compare
and contrast it with the concept of wishing. To begin with, something is, {as Kant said, 13} supposed to be able to be brought into being or "realized" 14 by means of willing, whereas the same cannot be said of a wish. To be sure, what is wished for, as well as "wishing" itself, may be taken in two different senses. On the one hand, one may understand that one is wishing for something that does not depend upon oneself, even though one still wants it; or, on the other hand, one may wish for something that does depend upon oneself, though one does not want to take the trouble to bring it into being." Many people who never seriously "will" anything {and never resolve tO'employ the means necessary (117) 11 A. L. Hiilsen (1765-1810) was a student and colleague of Fichte's at Jena. Hiilsen's "examination" of the celebrated prize-essay topic proposed by the Berlin Academy of the Sciences was published in 1796. As Fuchs has pointed out, however, his major discussion of the topic at issue is not to be found in this essay at all, but rather in another one, titled "Philosophische Briefe an Hrn. v. Briest in Nennhausen," which Hiilsen published in 1798 in Fichte's own PhilasophiscMs journal einer Gesellschaft Teutscher Gelehrten, 7, 1: 7 1-1 29; rpt. in Aw der Fruhzeit des deutschen Jdealismw: Texte zur Wissenschaftslehre Fichtes 1794-1804, ed. Martin Oesch (Wiirzburg: Konigshausen und Neumann, 1987), pp. 87-112. 12 "das Vermogen dazu." 13 See the note to sect. iii of the Introduction to the Critique of judgment, KGS, V: 17778n). 14
"soU etwas
REALISIRT
werden kOnnen."
On the other hand, one can understand that what one wishes for is indeed something that depends upon our will and still not resolve to will it (p. 117). H
I 1
l
126
to achieve what they wish} are content to engage in wishing of this latter sort. {Examples of the latter are those who want to be well educated or virtuous without expending any effort and without conquering the passions.} Such impotent wishing is often confused with willing, a confusion that leads to a complete misunderstanding ofthe mighty power of willing. {The first sort of wishing, where one understands that one wishes for something that does not depend upon our will (for example: the wish that someone would give me a thousand thalers), has little to contribute to the present distinction between wishing and willing.} Here we are concerned with "wishing" only in the second of the above senses. Such wishing involves something determinate, distinct from all the opposed wishes. My willing no longer wavers between opposites, as it does when I am deliberating; a wish is firmly attached to an object, {and in this respect it is similar to the will}: all that is lacking is the form of willing. The content is present, but one does not want to resolve to do anything. {As in the case of will,} wishing also involves a demand for an object, but, in this case, the object is not demanded unconditionally. {Wishing always involves a conditional form of thinking: were certain conditions to disappear, then I might well will the same object [for which I now merely wish]. If, for example, no industry and effort were required in order to become well educated [then I might will to be well educated]. But where, in the case of willing, does the uncondititmal aspect of the demand lie, and what ingredients are still missing from wishing?} One can wish not only for the object of willing, which is something that is supposed to be made real, but also for something to cease to exist or not to occur. When I will something, I simply abstract from everything except what I have willed; I renounce everything else. When I [merely] wish for something, however, something always continues to hold me back: fear of exertion, fear of the consequences, etc. Willing involves the concentration {of my striving and thinking-} of the entire {inner} person, with all its powers, {-} upon a single point; {whereas, in wishing, the imagination continues to wander}. An act of intense attentiveness, {that is, the limitation of my thinking to a single point,} provides the proper image of willing, {and such attentiveness comes into being only through an act of willing}! (Many people dream with their eyes open and let their thoughts wander aimlessly from one thing to another. If anything good and right is ever to come into being, one has to think in a determinate manner-one thing after another, and connecting each thought with all the rest.) 1 Expressed in an image: in willing, a person contract.s his entire being into a single point, and everything else, everything outoide of this point, no longer exim for the whole person (p. u7).
127
The object of willing is a determinate series of acting and sensing. "I will something": this means that the present state of my feelings, or the object that is presently in a certain condition, ought to become other than it is. There is no gap, however, between moment A and moment B.J There must be a gradual transition from the one to the other, since otherwise the unity of consciousness would not be preserved and I would cease to be the same I. When we will something, we turn our thoughts in a specific direction and focus all our thinking in this direction, from which the imagination is not allowed to deviate. Our thoughts also have a certain direction when we wish for something, but in this case our imagination is allowed to deviate from the course selected {and is free to detach links from this (118) chain or to skip over them}. The particular concept of energy or force that is united with the will is derived from this act of compelling and forcing the imagination to proceed only in a certain direction. It is impossible to imagine a will without at the same time imagining some impulse, some application of power. tS,K Willing is genuine inner efficacy, an act of affecting oneself. 16 In an act of willing, I seize control of my wandering thoughts and restrict them to a single point. This representation of inner, efficacious acting appears within consciousness as something that hovers between feeling and thinking. L It is what one might call an "intelligible feeling." {It is not a feeling in the proper sense of the word, because it does not involve any limitation, but rather the opposite: it is an act of breaking down the limitations that arise in the course of deliberation, limitations that are now overcome by resolve. This is an intelligible feeling, however, inasmuch as} the imagination, left to its own devices, wanders, and an inner exertion of energy is required in order to constrain it. By constraining my own imagination in this way, I become immediately conscious of this act, of this constraining; and this is how the intelligible world is connected with the world of 1 Everything willed involves a continuous, determinate series of acting and feeling. It involves a transition from one state of feeling to another; or (to express the same point with respect to the intuition of an object) this object should no longer remain, but, rather, another one ought to take its place. The thing ought to become other than it is. There can be no gap, no hiatus, contained in any act of willing; instead, willing is a continuous series in a specific direction (pp. 1 •7-•8). 15 "ohne sich zugleich einen AnstojJ, eine Anwendung von Gewalt zu den ken." K From this act of compelling the imagination not to wander there arises the concept of "force"-the energy to do something-an application of power, an impact (p. 118). 16 "Das Wollen ist wahres inneres Wirken, Wirken auf sich selbst." L We have no specific term to designate this inner, efficacious acting. It oscillates between representation and feeling, and is neither completely one nor completely the other (p. 118).
appearances.M {I limit myself in a certain direction: this would be [an expression of] the pure force of the intellect, insofar as the intellect concentrates itself by this act of willing; consequently, this act of focusing myself upon a single point produces a feeling of force.} This feeling marks the first appearance of inner force; 17 [hence] one might call what appears within this feeling "pure force," or "force applied to itself." It is an effect a rational being exercises upon itself. 18 Remark [ 1]: Concerning the theoretical and practical points of view: {As a human being, I can consider myself from two different points of view: from the theoretical and from the practical viewpoint.} The former consists in freedom of thinking, which, however, is not a lawless freedom, but is, rather, one that proceeds in accordance with rules. This sort of freedom, however, does not apply to acting; for in the case of acting {there is no choice of a direction and no comparison is possible; instead,} the will is focused upon a single object. {Life is based upon the practical point of view, and proceeds from genuine willing. 19 This practical viewpoint, this genuine willing, is more important.} The best way to avoid confusing these two points of view is to take one's stand securely upon the practical viewpoint: really learn how to will. If one is a speculative thinker, then one will also have a secure grip upon the theoretical point of view. Remark 2: Kant once said that it may seem odd to say that a rational being affects itself. 20 But there no longer appears to be anything odd about this once one has become adequately acquainted with the nature of reason, the very essence of which is to act upon itself. A more appropriate question would be to ask how this act of self-affection appears within consciousness. An act of this sort is confronted by some resistance, which has to be overcome; [therefore] this expression [of the act of self-affection] is called "feeling." (3) Let us assume that this will possesses causal power, i.e., that what one wills is supposed to appear immediately within experience. (We are not yet prepared to consider the origin of this assumed harmony, by means of which, through an act of willing, something corresponding to the same is supposed to occur within experience. Here we are considering " In this way, the outer world can be connected with the inner one (p. 1 18). 17 "was in diesem Gefuhle vorkommt, ist die erste innere Kraft." Literally: "What appears in this feeling is the first inner force." 18 "sie ist Wirkung des Vernunftwesens auf sich selbst." Radrizzani plausibly suggests that the word Wirkung in this sentence is a mistranscription of Wirken. So modified, the sentence would read, "It is the efficacious acting through which a rational being affects itself." 19 "a us dem rechten woUen." 20 See KRV, B153·
266
128
§
12
only the representation of causal power, along with the manifold that appears within this representation.) {What is involved in this "causality"?} The state of my feelings alters when I perceive an instance of causality; this is a continuous movement from A to B, which includes no gap or hiatus. {The I advances continuously through a series of feelings, from the state with which it begins, as soon as it wills anything, to the state ( 1 19) that it wills.} If I think of the entire aggregate of {my} feelings as a line, then I will discover along this line no two contiguous points that would be entirely opposed to each other, {since this is supposed to be a continuous series}. {How then is a manifold possible?} • If, however, I were to remove any two segments from this line, these would always be entirely opposed to each other. 21 For example, the state of feeling in consequence of which I am forced to assume that A is unhewn marble undergoes a particular alteration, and, in consequence of [this new] feeling, I am forced to assume that A is a statue. This appears to be incomprehensible. What is involved here, however, is not a matter of comprehending (of thinking) at all; instead, it is a matter of intuiting, and occurs only through a particular operation of the imagination (with which we will become acquainted in the course of our deduction of time). The advance [from one feeling to the next] must be continuous, for otherwise the unity of consciousness would be destroyed; therefore, consciousness remains, because consciousness is a unity. 22 Nevertheless, the various individual feelings are, as such, posited in opposition to one another, and thus several different feelings cannot occur, in one and the same respect, within a single act of feeling. How then is this manifold {of op~osed feelings} supposed to be unified within causality?N We said above ~that the various feelings must be related to a power of feeling, 24 which endures and remains the same throughout the various states. We will again encounter a similar answer here, but in a more specific form than before; and this will explain how 21
"so sind diese im ganzen immer entgegengesezt." "und sonach bliebe Bewustsein, weil das Bewustsein Einheit ist." Radrizzani suggests that there may be a lacuna in the first clause, and proposes to emend this passage to read, "for otherwise the unity of consciousness would be destroyed, and consciousness itself along with it, because consciousness is a unity." N But these various [feelings] must be again related to one another; for otherwise, the unity of consciousness would suffer and would not be possible, since feelings posited in opposition to one another cannot occur [simultaneously] within one and the same I. How then are these opposed feelings supposed to be united and compared with one another? I.e., how can an entire series of feelings be considered as one, as a continuous flow and prop:ession from A to B? (p. 119). 2 See sect. 4 of § 8. 24 "ein in beiden Zustiinden fortdauerendes Gefiihlsvermogen." As with all the other "powers" of the I, the term GefUhlsvennOgen ("power of feeling") designates the ability or capacity of the I to do something or to be affected in a certain manner: in this case, to "feel" or to be aware of feelings. 22
129
we are able to unify our manifold representations in time and why we consider ourselves to be the same sensing subject throughout aJI the changes in sensation. The manifold, however, is not simply supposed to be unified within consciousness in some general way {by the intuiting subject (as occurred above)}; but rather it is also to be thought of as the effect of a single, undivided determination {[or] efficacy} of the will; {i.e., this manifold is supposed to be taken to be a product of the I and is supposed to be related to its will in such a way that precisely this manifold and no other one should result from willing}--for only if we think of the manifold as unified in this way are we able to think of the will as exercising causality. The required unification is possible only if each individual member of the entire aggregate [of feelings] is considered to be conditioned by a certain other member, at the same time that it itself conditions a certain third one. Every possible Bone grasps must be viewed as conditioned by some A. (Conversely, A might well exist even if B did not; forB does not condition A in tum. B is related to some C in the same way that A is related to B, etc.) B, therefore, must also be viewed as the condition for something else = C. B must be viewed as something that could not exist unless it were preceded by a certain A, etc. {In this way, the manifold becomes a series, and} the relationship between these various moments is one of dependence; accordingly, the relationship between the various feelings that make up the manifold of feeling is one of dependence, and only by virtue of this does this manifold become a series. The best illustration of this is provided by the movement {in a particular direction} of a body in space. {In a relationship of dependence, however, every individual member is merely possible and none is necessary, except the first one. Every successive moment is therefore conditioned [by this relationship], but is not determined [by it].} Let us assume that a body is at point A and that I move it to point B. It would not be at point B if it had not been at point A; but this is not to say that it necessarily had to move from A to B. Every preceding member is related to the ones that follow in the same way that what is determinable is related to what is conditioned (or determined), and not in the way that what determines something is related to wlw.t is determined [thereby]. {More specifically, what is determinable is a possible manifold, from which a single member is selected; this member, however, is not produced by the one that precedes. It is not claimed or specified that the member that [actually] follows the first is the only one possible; instead, it is merely conditioned. What is claimed is this: if this [that is, the second member in the series] is to be possible, then the first must be actual.} A considerable number of movements can occur after A, and this entire manifold is conditioned by A. If the object is at point A, l can then move it from A to any other possible point; if, however, it is
268
130
§ 12
not at A, then I cannot move it in any of these possible directions. In relation to any member [of this series], the one that follows is merely possible; it becomes actual only if the will selects precisely this direction. The manifold of feeling is {actually} unified as such or in general by ( 120) this relationship of dependence. {Every possible member I apprehend must be preceded by another, which is pushed to the rear. I cannot think of any one [member of this manifol~.] apart from all of them.} But how is this manifold of feeling united with the I, in the concept {as a product} of the will? 25 Whenever the I appears, there is always some movement of transition, in which the state that follows is not identical with the one that preceded it, {and it is through the I that this transition is explained}. In such cases, the I is the determining subject, i.e., it contains within itself the basis for the movement of transition from determinability to determinacy. {Why is precisely C selected after B, since there are certainly many other possible points? The I, as the determining subject, is the reason for this.} The direction of this movement appears within the efficacy [ofthe 1],26 and where this efficacy ceases, the direction ceases. I appear to myself as an I throughout this entire series [of feelings], for I am what is determinable throughout this entire series. • Here we obtain the concept [we have been looking for]; for, to begin with, everyone can see that what we are talking about here is not the unification of the manifold of feelings, for the multiple feelings always remain discrete. Instead, what we are here discussing is the ideal activity. In unifying the manifold of feeling, this ideal activity proceeds in such a way that something objective is produced from feelings. 0 In this case, unlike that of willing, what is produced [by the ideal activity] is not something that is immediately mine; instead, it is something that hovers before me, {something that is simply found to be as it is,} something that has to be realized in an image, something that has to be schematized. P What has to be made real or "realized"27 in this case is not feeling itself (with regard to its content), however, for the content of feeling is realized in space as an object. Instead, what has to be realized here is the feeling of the manifold in the relationship of dependence. 28 What is the schema 25 K: "mit dem Ich im Begrif des Willens." H: "mit dem leu; in dem Begrife als eines Produkts des Willens." The translation follows the punctuation of H, which seems to make more sense in this context. 26 "In der Wirksamkeit erscheint die Richtung." 0 In discussing the union of the manifold we are talking not about any detnminate feeling, but about the ideal activity, or intuition. This is an activity that ensues from a feeling; consequently, we are talking about something objective (p. 120). PIt is a schema (p. 1 20). 27 "das hier ZU REAUSIRENDE." 28 "sondern es ist das Gefiihl des Mannigfaltigen, im Gefiihle des Mannigfaltigen der DEPENDENZ." This passage makes little sense as it stands and thus requires emendation. The most obvious correction, as incorporated in the translation, is to delete the second occurrence of the phrase Gefiihle des mannigfaltigene ("the feeling of the manifold") and to replace it with Verhaltnis.
§
12
26g
of such a manifold? Temporal succession. There arises for us a time within which we intuit the manifold only to the extent that this manifold exhibits the relationship of dependence-and only insofar as the manifold is intuited in this way is there any time at alL Time is thus the form of the manifold of intuition; 29 it is the sensible intuition of the previously discussed relationship of the manifolc::l [the relationship of dependence].Q {As a result of proceeding in this manner, time comes into being for the imagination. The first, undivided act of willing is repeated and is, as it were, extended over the manifold, and from this there arises a temporal series.} The I determines what is in time; consequently, the I itself falls within time.R Its act of determining occurs within time, along with what is determined by this act; for the I itself is included within the synthesis we are discussing, and this synthesis is not possible without the I. This synthesis, however, is present for that activity of the I which itself hovers [before the I] as something objective; consequently, the I becomes something objective within this synthesis. That by means of which the I is able to determine itself is called "force" or "energy," and indeed (to the extent that there is intelligible consciousness), "pure energy." Here, however, we have treated this act of determining as something sensible and objective, {something assimilated in the form of intuition,} and, to this extent, the energy or force of the I must likewise be characterized as sensible and objective. {It becomes a sensible fur-ce.} The act of self-determination discussed above in sections 1 and 2, which does not occur in any time, is here extended to form a temporal series. Within every heterogeneous manifold, this act of selfdetermination is posited over and over again; yet every time it is posited, it is posited as the same single act of self-determination, and this is the source of the continuity of the temporal series. I determine myself to move from A to B; this act of self-determination is an act that does not occur within any time. An experience occurs as a consequence of this act of self-determination; the transition from A to B occurs within 29 "Form des Mannigfaltigen der Anschauung." The parallel passage in H (translated immediately below in n. Q) inverLS this phrase, to read "Form der Anschauung de• Mannigfaltigen." 'Q Subject and object are here different from each other. The object in this case, however, i• not matter in space, but the relationship of the manifold in iLS unity. This schema appears as temporal succtSSicm, insofar as this relationship of the manifold is intuited as unified through a relationship of dependence."" Ti11U!, accordingly, is only the form of the intuition of the manifold, as unified through de~ndence (p. 120). 0 "Das Object aber ist nicht Materie im Raume sondern das Verhaltni~ des Mannigfaltigen in seiner Vereinigung. Dies ScHEMA erscheint als Uilfolg•, insofern dies Verhiiltni~ des Mannigfaltigen im Verhiiltni~ der DEPENDENZ vereinigt angeschaut wird." R As the determining subject in this •ynthesis of the manifold, the I ii.Self occurs within time (p. 120).
270
131
§ 12
time. This movement of transition is conditioned by the causality of mr. will. Every member of the [temporal] series is considered to be conditioned by the causality of my will. {Consequently, I posit my willwhich I previously (that is, in the first act) posited purely and simplyover and over again; in this way} I extend my will over time, and my force thereby becomes extended as well; 5 it acts, as it were, in fits and starts. 31 It does one thing after another and operates through intermediary states; and this is why I intuit my own force as something limited, 32 something subject to laws that do not depend upon me, and why my own force appears to me as something dependent upon the force of nature. {Consequently, it appears as something given, as a natural force, as a sen- ( 121) sible or physical force; for, in the intuition of an object, it appears to me to be something innate. Therefore, (physical) force in the sensible world is my own will, thought of as something sensible, assimilated to the form of intuition.} My efficacy extends itself through time only insofar it encounters some resistance within nature. I, so to speak, "carry [myself] over into nature," for nature always resists me, and I can overcome its resistance only gradually. My will, as such, is free; I give it to myself. The energy I expend in the sensible world (and through which, for example, I am supposed to move a body) has to be something given to me, however, for this energy appears as an object-not, to be sure, as a mere object, but rather as a subject-object. {Brief recapitulation of the foregoing: In willing, I am immediately conscious of myself. The subject who thinks along with the will is the same as the willing subject. Willing concentrates; to this extent, it is a pure power of the intellect. Our will is also supposed to possess causal power in the world of appearances, however, where it appears as the I's progress through a series of feelings: from the state in which the I began when it willed something, to the state that it willed, these constitute a continuous series. This manifold is supposed to be unified by the intuiting subject and related to the will; that is to say, it is because of the will that precisely these feelings-and no others-are incorporated [within the manifold]. This unification is achieved by means of [the relationship of] dependence, and consequently there arises a temporal series. If something is purely objective, then I can entertain a representation of it only as it is-though I can also change and modify it. Physical s From lhis lhere arises lhe cominuily of lime or of lhe lemporal series: lemporal succession. Thus il is lhanks lo a conlinued and repealed will lhal lhe conlinuous line is divided (p. 120). 31
"ruckweise."
'""Meine Krafl [ ... ] wird dadurch elwas beschrankles in der Anschauung."
energy is also like this; but I cannot even think of a genuine act of willing unless it actually occurs. What then, in truth, is sensible energy, in relationship to our thinking?} In relationship to our thinking, sensible energy is, to begin with, a concept, though not one that arises from an intuition of an object; instead, it is a concept that arises when I think about the manifold [of feelings] as bound together in a certain way. Energy or force is thus a synthetic concept; it is not intuited, but rather it is thought. I acquire this concept of force or energy when I combine the manifold of feeling that is supposed to come into being as a consequence of willing. This concept is neither purely sensible nor purely intelligible, but partially both. The content (i.e., the specific determination of the will) is intelligible; the form in which this determination of my will occurs (i.e., time) is sensible.T The concept of force is {the mediating concept,} the bridge between the intelligible world and the sensible world, and it is by means of this concept that the I goes outside of itself and makes the transition to a sensible world. 3 ~.u By means of this concept, the I represents itself to itself as an object and connects its own consciousness to an objective world. In this way, I become an object for myself, an object ofperception,34 and a sensible world is connected for me with this object that I become. Every view of the world begins with a view of myself as an object. The error committed by all previous philosophers is that they have viewed this knowledge [of myself, that is, of my own force] as something supersensible, despite the fact that all our consciousness begins with a consciousness of what is actual. {The will is absolute and intelligible; but, inasmuch as it is extended over the manifold of feeling, its form is sensible.} Kant classifies this concept of force as a noumenon; 35 and this is entirely appropriate,_ for it does not signify any object of outer intuition, but is, instead, a {mere} concept, that is, something produced exclusively by thinking. Nor, according to Kant, does this concept belong within the intelligible world, for, {according to him,} the intelligible world includes ( 1 22) nothing but freedom. This is correct, but Kant's remarks on this topic are insufficiently precise. TThe form of energy or force is time. My willing is repeatedly extended across the manifold (p. 12 1). 33 "zu einer Sinnenwelt iibergeht." u It is by means of this concept that the I goes outside of itself, inasmuch as it connects a world to its self-consciousness (p. 1 2 1 ). '1-4 "so werde ich mir zu einem Objecte, zu einem Gegenstande der Wahrnehmung." 30 See Critiqu4 of Practical &ascm, Pt. I, Bk. I, Chap. I, § ii (KGS, V: 55-56), and § 88 of the Critique ofJudgment (KGS, V: 453-54). See too KRV, A821B108, where Kraft is induded among the other "pure but derivative" concepts, which Kant calls "the predicables of the pure understanding." ·
132
According to Fichte, there are three types of concepts: (A) Concepts of sensible intuitions. {A concept of this sort is based upon sensible acting.} (B) Intelligible concepts (the [concept of the] will alone). (C) Concepts that occupy a middle position between these two extremes. ({For example,} the concept of force.) {Force is nothing that can be felt; but neither is it anything supersensible (like the will), for it is precisely by means of force that I come into contact with bodies in the sensible world. Force thus involves a combination of what is sensible and what is intelligible.} Kant identifies B and C, because he fails to provide a precise statement of the difference between the sensible world and the intelligible world. 36 (4) The position of an object in space is supposed to be determined by means of an intuition of a quantum of energy or force (previous §). {Do we now understand how this is possible?} To begin with, the possibility of making such a measurement, {i.e., the possibility of determining the place of something,} presupposes the thought of a forward movement in space brought about by absolute selfactivity; i.e., it presupposes the concept of physical force {which is continued and repeated over and over again}. Without this, nothing is movable {and no line can be described, since, in order for me to be able to move myself forward in this way, I must already possess the force [required]}; for it is only by means of this {continuous application of force} that the manifold that is supposed to lie along this line first arises {for us}. We previously described a "doing'' of the I, the schema of which was a line, and we now see more clearly what kind of doing this is. It is a sensible form of doing, for supersensible doing requires no schema.v 6 ' At this point in K, Krause inserts a slightly different version of the same dicllJI that appears again a few pages later, in the customary position, at the end of§ 12 (which is also the version included in the "Major Points," with which K begins). The most significant difference between the two versions is that the first one is shorter and omits the final few lines of the summary paragraph placed at the end of § 12 in both K and H. The few other differences of any significance are indicated in the notes to the dicllJI at the end of this §. It is perhaps worth noting, however, that where this earlier version diverges from the final version in K, it generally agrees with the text of H, suggesting that Krause copied the text of this first version of the dicllJI to § 12 from someone else's transcript of an earlier version of this same lecture (and, at the same time, supporting the thesis that the lectures transcribed in H antedate those recorded in K). v This act of drawing a line, an act that is required for every determination of position, is therefore a sensible doing and must therefore be schematized. And [in] this, its schema, this intelligible [act] must become sensible, for ideal and real activity were separated above, and must therefore be reunited (p. 122).
§ 12
133
273
Pure acting is absolute self-determination; but as soon as one gives a determinate direction to this act of self-determination, one's acting is then made sensible. 37 {In addition to force, however, there are still other conditions for the possibility of this act of measuring: namely, the intuition of myself as immediately feeling in space, which is originally simply discovered.} Sensible doing and the act of schematizing are reciprocally related to each other; "doing" is sensible because it is schematized, and it is schematized because it is sensible. This reciprocal interaction originates in that union of ideal and real activity [achieved] through feeling in a finite being. Our own finitude is revealed to us through feeling. It is through the ideal activity of the imagination that we obtain the view we possess of what is intelligible. 38 According to our presupposition, when I measure [the position of anything] I myself am in space. (I feel myself to be looking into space.) 39 I extend myself through space and can say that, in a certain sense, I immediately feel the space in which I am; accordingly, my feeling of myself provides me with the original standard of measure. In order to imagine myself traversing space in a particular direction, I posit myself within space for a second and third time, etc.; I double myself, triple myself, etc., in space. As a result of this, a line gradually comes into being, stretching from me to the particular object whose distance from me I desire to measure. 40·w From this it follows that such succession must be possible, and the successive manifold must constitute a unity, {that is to say, I always remain in the same space, even in the case of succession}; for otherwise, I would never appear to "double" myself [in the manner described above], but instead, every time I posited myself in a new place I would lose the former one. {How is this possible?} I can posit myself in the manner just described only if the manifold is posited in a relationship of depef1dence. {Hence I could not occupy the second position unless I had moved to it from the first one, etc. In this manner, the spatial manifold is reduced to a single manifold.} We can make this clearer by ( 123) comparing it with the way in which we count. When, for example, I count to 3, I posit 1 and 1 and 1; and when I posit the second 1, I carry the first 1 along with it as well, etc. 37
"versinnlicht man es." This last sentence occurs as a marginal note in Krause's MS. "Ich fiihle mich selbst ais in den Raum hineinschauend." 40 Reading, with Krause's MS, "mefkn" forK's "wifkn.'" w I myself must also be in space. The I, as the original standard of measure, lies at the foundation of every act of measurement. I think of myself as occupying the space immediately adjacent to me in a certain direction-though, in fact, I do not yet occupy this space. Then I continue to think of myself in this same manner, thereby doubling myself over and over again. In this way, a line gradually comes into being as a determinate quantum (p. 122). 38
39
274
§
12
The natural way of moving oneself through space is lO advance step by step: 41 With every normal step I take, I propel my entire body into the immediately adjacent space; when I take half a step (when I creep), I only partially enter this adjacent space; when I take a larger step (when I leap), I jump entirely over the adjacent space. {From this process of striding forward and filling successive spaces we derive the expression "continuity contains no hiatus or gap," since, with every step I take, I fill exactly the same amount of space that I previously filled. If I have filled more space, then I have leaped.} (Thus, in philosophy, when one leaves out the intermediate steps [of an argument], this is called "leaping [to a conclusion]" or "ellipsis.") 42 Neither creeping nor leaping, however, constitutes our natural stride, and thus, among the people, the {usual, natural, and} original unit of measure is the pace or step. But human beings are not all the same size, and therefore it became necessary to invent artificial, objective units of measure. What is successive occurs within time, and every new act of positing myself also occurs within time. {This process of successively filling space by taking equal-sized steps occurs within time, but [each step] takes only a moment. When we grasp an indefinite number of such moments together, we have time.} What is successive and the time in which this succession occurs, are combined. We then pick out and grasp only the formal aspect of this successive process, leaving aside its content, and this is how we become able to think of time. Time and a moment are related to each other in the same way what is determinable is related to what is determinate. 134
(5) We have seen that physical force, along with everything that conditions it and is conditioned by it, is posited only in consequence of a feeling. Thus, it can appear to us only in the course of real acting. Whenever we estimate the spatial position of something, the concept of physical force is always presupposed, and we obtain this concept only insofar as our will is supposed to exercise causality-i.e., only insofar as one actually does act. The advance {of physical force} lOward a goal is called "acting." Acting appears-i.e., it is what it is-only in the form of intuition we have indicated [i.e., in time]. {Does this mean that this force is nothing intelligible?} If one wants to call what is intelligible the "in itself," then what has just been said does not apply to it. (The only thing that is intelligible is our self-determination, which involves no temporal sequence, because it includes no manifold that could be successive.) "In ourselves," we neither 41
"das fortschreiten." "Spriinge, HIATOS."
§ 12
275
act nor exist within time, for the will is nothing manifold. I am sensuous, however, and must proceed in accordance with the laws of intuition; consequently, not much can be made of what is merely intelligible.x Physical force exists for us only in consequence of an instance of physical acting. Things are supposed to obtain their spatial order as a consequence of the concept of our own physical force, however, {since the concept of force or energy arises for us only through acting}; and from this it follows that the act of ordering things in space, and therefore (since we have shown the latter to be a condition for the possibility of consciousness) all consciousness, is possible only within [the context of] consciousness of an actual experience of actual acting. 43 (All abstraction refers to experience and is nothing whatsoever apart from experience.)
§
135
12
Our striving, or our practical acting, 44 is, according to the preceding §, the standard of measure for all spatial determination. Inner or pure force is the efficacy of willing, 45 as intuited immediately and therefore intellectually. Through such willing, the entire free power of the I is focused upon a single point. Outer or physical force is this same energy, 46 but extended by sensible intuition across a temporal series, in which series the manifold of the power of feeling, as determined by the causality of willing, is brought into47 a relationship of dependence; and it is only through this relationship of dependence that this manifold can be x It only seems this way to us [that force is nothing intelligible and is present for us only in the form of temporal succession], and this is entirely a consequence of the laws of intuition; in itself it is not like this. We cannot content ourselves with what is merely intelligible-with what is not in time at all and is not manifold. Nothing but our own will is like this (p. 1 23). 45 K: "sonach ist [ ... ] alles Bewustsein nur moglich im Bewustsein der wirklichen Erfahrung des wirklichen Handelns." Cp. H: "sonach auch das Bewu!Jtseyn ist nur zufolge einer solchen REELEN Wirksamkeit moglich" ("thus it also follows that consciousness is possible only in consequence of such real efficacy"). 44 "UNSER STREBEN, ODER UNSER PRACTISCHES Handelen." Cp. H: "Unser Streben oder unsere Kraftanstrengung" ("Our striving, or our exertion of force"). The version of this dictal at the end of sect. 3 in K also has Kraftanstrengung instead of frraclisches Handeln. H "die [ ... ] Wirksamkeit des Wollens." Both H and the version of this summary paragraph which appears at the end of sect. 3 in K have, instead of "das Wollens" ("willing"), "des Willens" ("the will"). 46 "Aeuflere oder physische Kraft ist eben diese Energie." This is the sole occurrence of the term Energie in K. Elsewhere, the term translated as "energy" (or "force") is always KraJt. 4 "das Mannifgaltige des durch die CAUSAUTAET des Wollens bestimmten Gehiihlsvermogens in das Verhiiltni!J der DEPENDENZ gebracht wird." Instead of Wollens and gebracht, both H and the earlier version of this dictal in K have "durch die CAUSAUTAT des Willens [ ... ] gedacht wird" ("the manifold of the power of feeling, as determined by the causality of the will, is thought as [ ... ]).
assimilated to the unity of consciousness. A physical force of this sort, however, can be posited only in [the context of] some real efficacy, from which it follows that any determination of the place of things-and thus consciousness itself-is possible only in consequence of some real efficacy.
§ 13
In the previous § we discussed the concept of time, which will be explained in the present §. {More precise elucidation of the concept of time, as an appendix [to the preceding§]: The concept of time is of decisive importance for the system of the Wi.5seruchaftslehre, as it is for idealism generally. It displays the relationship of our system to the Kantian system, and specifically, to the Critiqu£ of Pure Reason. Everything depends, above all else, upon the genesis of this concept; because only in this way [that is, by indicating how the concept of time is generated] can Critical idealism be justified.} The task that arises with the solution of the problem of time is to unify the manifold of feeling. This unification is achieved by deriving this manifold from and referring it to a determination of the will. {From this, I certainly see that the [desired] unity arises;} nevertheless, feelings {always} appear {to me} as manifold, as discrete, {as lying outside of one another,} and they occur in a time or in a temporal series in which both feelings and what is felt are supposed to follow in succession, {one after another}. Thus there would [seem to] arise two different times: a time "in itself," and {another} time {in which I take up the manifold}, a time that is supposed to be the sequence of the manifold [for me]. 1 In themselves, the different feelings already occur in time, and then one assimilates them into [another] time. {This could be 1 "eine Zeit an sich, und eine Zeit, in welcher das Mannigfaltige folgen sollte." This point i5 Ie.. obscurely expressed in H, where the contrast between the "two times"-time "in itself" (the order in which events "really" occur) and time "for me" (the order in which I happen to apprehend the manifold of feelings)--is more obvious.. In other words, Fichte is here restating, albeit darkly, the Kantian distinction between the "subjective" and "o~ jective" arden of time.
l 277 I
136
inferred from what Kant says, 2 and it is made explicit by Reinhold, who also recognizes two different spaces. 3 } We will have to examine this subject very carefully in order to avoic:1 [positing] these two different times. {In order to protect ourselves against a double time of this soFt, we add the following remarks:} I am limited in an overall way; such limitation constitutes my very essence (my single and indivisible state for all eternity-where "eternity" signifies the negation of time), and one may not ask any further questions concerning this limitation; this is my original limitation. {This limitation marks and constitutes the limit of reason; for it is precisely our reason itself that asks questions, but reason comes into being only by means of this very limitation. Therefore, so long as one expects a rational answer, one cannot ask any questions concerning this limitation.} • What we were 4 just discussing, however, is an alteration that occurs in this [original] state of limitation. I am limited in my ability to grasp5 my own state, inasmuch as I am able to grasp only discrete quanta, and this limitation too is one concerning which no further questions can be asked: for example, I can grasp things only through five senses, and each of my senses can grasp only what pertains to it. {Here once again, reason comes to an end. For example, I can only taste sweetness; I cannot at the same time hear it, nor can I simultaneously taste what is rough. In other words, I grasp only certain quanta. I cannot feel what is feelable "as such" or "in general," but only in part. I feel what is rough only as something rough, not as something "feelable in general." 6} This is the limitation I encounter in grasping my own state. (My consciousness as a whole is something that comes into being only gradually and bit by bit, through a process of addition; it is merely an analysis of what isjust as surely as I exist at all-already present.) (Whenever we are simply unable to grasp something, this provokes astonishment, which is the basis of the sublime.) The reason why I can grasp only discrete quantities lies entirely within me. {Original limitation is present only insofar as I grasp these discrete 2 See the discussion of the two orders of temporal succession in the Second "Analogy of Experience," especially KRV. Ai8gfB232-A1g71B242. Note that, though Kant distinguishes the "objective" from the "subjective" order of time, he does not refer to the former as "time in itself." ' See Reinhold, Versuch einer neuen Theorie des menschlichen Vorstellungsvenniigens ( 178g), § LIX, p. 389, where Reinhold explicitly distinguishes "pure space" from the representations of empty and filled space. 4 Reading, with Krause's MS, "wurde" for K's "wird." • "Ich bin beschrankt im Auffajkn." In the discussion that follows, the verb "to grasp" is a translation of auffassen, not of begreifen ("to comprehend" or "to grasp by means of concepts"). Accordingly, its meaning here is similar to apprehendierien ("to apprehend"), which is the technical term Kant uses to designate the intellect's activity of "grasping" the manifold. 6 "nicht als Fiihlbares iiberhaupt."
§ 13
279
feelings.} I cannot go beyond this fact; I can only say, "This is how it is, this is how we find ourselves to be." The philosopher cannot determine anything about this a priori; all he can do is point out that, if I were not limited in this manner, then I would be unable to posit any consciousness. {Moreover; if we did not find ourselves to be like this, then our con- ( 125) sciousness could not be explained. [We discover this about ourselves] a posteriori, not a priori, for otherwise, we would become transcendent, like the dogmatist, with his "thing in itself."} The concept of time depends upon these discrete elements lying apart from one another. Yet when I grasp these elements individuaUy, one after another, a [unified] manifold does not yet arise for me; for I am not yet one [unified consciousness] for myself. {Time is dependent upon these discrete, separate elements; but nothing is yet achieved with this, for a [unified] manifold would not thereby arise for me. To be sure, a manifold would be present here, but it would not be present for me; instead, it might perhaps be present for some higher intellect outside of us, who would witness our alterations. But I would still not be a unity for myself. I would become a mere object, but not for myself, but rather, as it were, for an intellect outside of me. For myself, however, I would be nothing at all. Consider, for example, a tree that changes with the various seasons: For whom does it alter itself? [It alters itse!J] for an observing intellect, but not for itself. It is exactly the same with feelings: At the first moment, there is, for example, a feeling of green; at the second, a feeling of red, etc. But the second feeling is not the same as the first one, and the third is not the same as the second, etc. Consequently, these various feelings are not unified-except, perhaps, for an intellect outside of us. I am now supposed to think this manifold; I would not obtain unity in this way either, however. Instead, all that would happen is this:} When I think of X, Y, and Z, I am first {thought} X, then Y, and then Z. Just as X, Y, and Z have nothing in common, neither does the consciousness of X have anything in common with the consciousness of Y or Z. {Thus, here too my essence ([in this case} these thoughts) would remain purely manifold. One might wish to reply, "When I think of Y, I am conscious of my act of thinking." This does not change the situation in any significant way, however, for [these states oJ] consciousness would have no more in common with one another than did the acts of thinking. I would continue to remain something manifold. I would be a unity only for some intellect outside of me, observing my thinking, for whom I would be a mere object, like the above-mentioned tree or any other being that alters itself. No unity, however, would be present for me. To be sure, this flux of alterations does indeed suggest to us one feature of the concept of time: namely, that time must already lie at the
280
§ 13
basis of all change. But the concept of time also has another feature: namely, that one must think of time as several united moments. 7 An I of precisely this sort, one that does not think of itself as a unity, but is able to think of itself only as thinking X, Y, Z, etc., is that of the [so-called] Kantians. To be sure, they talk about the unity of the I, but they never establish the foundation of this unity. Before I can combine anything, I must already possess a pattern for this combination; unity must already be present.} In order for this manifold to appear to thinking as a series, one and the same thing must be completely united with each of the manifold acts of thinking, and this must occur throughout all thinking. This same unitary thing must be present within every act of thinking, {and it must appear as the same in every act of thinking,} for otherwise, no thinking whatsoever would be possible. The "one thing" in question is the intellectual intuition of willing, described in the previous §. This intuition is repeated over and over again throughout all discursive thinking and is what is thought of in every moment of the same. (This provides the basis for an account of memory.) {I relate every [element of the] manifold to my willing, and in this (126) way the manifold is supposed to be present [for me]. In the case of every [element of the] manifold, I must posit this act of willing as one and the same act, since nothing manifold becomes present for me except insofar as it is posited through willing. Through such discursive thinking, this act of willing becomes enduring, and a time thereby arises for us, despite the fact that my act of willing does not occur in any time, since it is not conditioned by anything.} I observe myself within time, 8 but I am not in time, insofar as I intuit myself intellectualiter, 9 that is, as self-determining. In fact, there is but one intellectual intuition, and it does not occur in any time at all. {Now [this intuition] is thought.} Only through discursive thinking does this single intellectual intuition become divided and present within time. No time-no before or after-is involved in my intuition of myself as a willing subject. Only what is conditioned occurs within time, but my willing is not conditioned by anything at all. All thinking occurs within time, and the intuition of the will endures through every act of thinking. This is an inadequate way of expressing the point, which might be put as follows: insofar as I relate this {intellectual} intuition to the manifold of willing, this intuition becomes enduring,A {but this is always the same intuition, simply repeated}. It is 7
"als rnehrere MoMENTE in ElNEM." "lch sehe mich seli>St in die Zeit hinein." "intellectually." Cp. idt:al.iler and rea/iter. A Only insofar as this intuition or willing is related to the manifold acts of thinking does the former become something enduring (p. 1 26). 8 9
~
·37
only in this sense that time can be called the "form of intuition." Time is the form of intellectual intuition; but as soon as intellectual intuition is assimilated to this temporal form, it is "sensibilized" (that is, it becomes sensible). 10 {My will possesses causal power: this produces feelings, which can be grasped only discretely. But all these feelings are supposed to be grasped as results of my willing, and therefore my own act of willing must be added to or posited in conjunction with every [element ofthe] manifold. A'i a result of this repeated positing, my act of willing is extended throughout the entire series of the manifold. This, however, is only a single act of willing, and this is what furnishes the series with unity, from which unity there arises time. But my willing is intuited only insofar as an action is extended throughout this series. Of course, the intuition we are concerned with here is an intellectual intuition; consequendy, this series (i.e., time) constitutes the form of this intellectual intuition, which becomes sensible or objective by means of this extension. To be sure, what becomes objective in this way is not thinking itself, but rather the object of thinking. Indeed, this is the distinguishing feature of what is sensible: that it is different from thinking and intuitingit is the object of the same.} • Time is therefore the mediating link between what is intelligible and what is sensible. Hence there are three types of intuition: (A) Sensible intuition in space. (B) Intelligible intuition of our own willing. (C) A type of intuition in which A and B are united: the intuition of our willing in time. {Remarks;} [ 1] We can now see more clearly what we are really claiming when we
assert the existence of intellectual intuition. We are not claiming that any person could possess only an intellectual intuition. 11 •8 Human beings, along with all other finite, rational creatures, are sensuous, temporal beings. Intellectual intuition {is not an actual intuition at all; instead, it} is what is determinable in every act of thinking, and it must be thought of as the foundation of all thinking. It can be isolated only by 10 "versinnlicht wird." The adjective wrsinnliehl and the verb versinnlidlen (which were introduced in the previous §) occur frequently in the text from now on. The verb means "to render perceptible or tangible" or "to materialize." In the WLnm, these terms assume a quasi-technical sense and are used to designate the absolutely crucial (albeit still obscure) process by means of which what is intelligible becomes something empirical or sensible (an object of sensible intuition). In a sense, therefore, the rest of the Wlnm can be considered an exhaustive account of what is involved in this process of Vminnliehung. 11 "es konne ein Mensch blo~ in der intellectuellen Anschauung sein." Literally: "that a human being could exist solely within intellectual intuition." 8 It is not, however, claimed that "intellectual intuition" exists as an isolated act of the mind, something human beings could be capable of by itself and in isolation (p. 1 ~6).
the philosopher, but not within ordinary consciousness. {Consequently, ( 127) we are acquainted with it only indirectly; it is never encountered by itself within ordinary consciousness. 12} [2] What does "thinking" mean? Or what does it mean to say that one has simply "thought up" something? 13 Is this how noumena come into being? To posit the intelligible within the sensible {manifold through the mediation of time}, as the ground of the unityc of the latter, is an example of such thinking. What is purely "thought of" is not something that is experienced; 14 instead, it is something that must first be introduced into {the sensible manifold} by the experiencer, and thus it is "a priori" in Kant's sense of the term.n The terms "a priori" and "a posteriori" could 15 have two different meanings: (A) On the one hand, one could be referring to the entire system of consciousness, which can be treated as something given (which is how it appears within ordinary consciousness), in which case it is called "a posteriori." But when the philosopher provides a derivation of this same system of consciousness {from the laws of thinking-as present in advance of all experience}, it is then called "a priori," in the broadest sense of the term. (B) On the other hand, {in the narruwer sense,} the term "a posteriori" can designate whatever is present for inner 16 intuition {in the manifold of sensible intuition} in consequence of a feeling. In this context, "a priori" means whatever thinking introduces into the manifold of feeling for the purpose of unifying this manifold. Kant has provided an accurate description of the form of thinking that is involved in the latter procedure, but he has not explained the origin of the material that constitutes this manifold. 17 {"Noumena," therefore, are what is intelligible, insofar as this is made sensible by means of time.} 12 "Sie ist also etwas mittelbares, das sich im gemeinen Bewufltseyn nicht absondern laflt." '""Was heiflt sich den ken, sich etwas den ken?" (H: "was heifl den ken? und zwar sich etwas denken-oder bios etwas den ken?") I.e., what sort of "object" can mere thinking have apart from the sensible content provided by intuition? In ordinary speech, the expression sich etwas denken often means to "imagine" something or "think it up," in contrast with the sort of "objective" thinking involved in "thinking about" the objects of sensible intuition. cAs the mediating link (p. 127). 14 Reading, with Krause's MS, "ist nicht in dem Erfahren," for K's "ist nicht in der Erfahrung." 0 Therefore, this mediating link does not lie in experiencing, but is first introduced by the experiencing subject. Time is therefore a priori in the narrower sense (p. 127). 15 Reading, with Krause's MS, "konnte" for K's "kann." 16 "innere." This is an alternate reading, suggested by Fuchs, of a word that could also be read as "reinen" ("pure"). 17 "aber das Materiale woher es kommt, fehlt."
[3] Concerning the relationship of the various moments of time to one another, see the Outline of the Distinctive Character of the Wi.ssenschaftslehrt, pp. 409-11.18
138
{We now arrive at the most important point, to which all our previous inquiries are related only indirectly, or as aids to understanding. This new inquiry is also more difficult than anything that has gone before, however, and, for this reason, your instructor requests your indulgence if he should now be less successful in making himself understood than previously. First of all, we wish to secure the correct viewpoint.} How is consciousness possible?E This is our chief question. {Answer:} All consciousness isF an immediate consciousness of our own acting, and all mediate or indirect consciousness provides the condition for the possibility of this same acting. This is the provisional answer we have hitherto given to our question, though we have not yet made it {sufficiently} precise. All that has been said so far has merely prepared the way for what is to come. {The formal [aspect] of this question [how does consciousness come into being?] must also explain the material, 19 i.e., the object of consciousness, and this immediate consciousness must be explained on the basis of mediate or indirect consciousness. Our path must ascend from mediated consciousness to immediate consciousness, and we will have reached the end of our inquiry when we have exhibited this immediate consciousness. How dose are we to a solution to this problem? Where do we now (128) stand?} In the course of our previous inquiry we have discovered the following: Consciousness of acting is possible only on the condition of freedom. {"I am supposed to become conscious of myself as acting": this means the same as "I am supposed to be conscious of myself as a free being."} Freedom is possible only on the condition of a concept of a goal; a concept of a goal is possible only on the condition of cognition of an object; cognition of an object is possible only on the condition of acting. '" EPW, pp. 3054i. E"How does consciousness come into being?" This was the first and chief question (p.
12,).
All consciousness is based upon (p. 127). "Aus dem FoRMEULN dieser Frage mup auch zuglekh das MATERIA I.E, das Objekt des BewuPtseyns [ .•• ] erlc.lart werden." An alternate way of construing this obscure passage would be to substitute "Ausscrdem" for "Aus dem" at the beginning of the sentence, in which case it might be translated, "In addition to the formal aspect of this question, the mauer of the same, namely, the object of consciousness, must also be explained." 19
{As we showed in the most detailed manner in the preceding §, cognition of an object is made possible by means of our acting and our consciousness thereof; for only thereby is an actual feeling possible, and a representation of an object first arises in consequence of some actual feeling. In the previous §, the possibility of a complete feeling was derived as the result of the successive application of my own energy or force and the relation of the same to my own willing. From feeling there then arises a consciousness of acting. Reroork: We have consistently spoken of determinate acting or thinking-i.e., of a consciousness that begins with experience. One frequently speaks, however, of "thinking as such" or "thinking in general," of a type of thinking abstracted from all acting-in a state of repose and unaccompanied by consciousness of any other activity. But even this sort of abstract thinking would not be possible unless one had first acted in a determinate manner; for how can I "abstract" unless something is already present? All thinking is determinate thinking, and determinate thinking is possible only within the context of experience. Of course, one can subsequently abstract from experience; I can, for example, think of "man as such." Like all thinking, however, this sort of thinking also begins with determinate thinking. In truth, there is no such thing as an "object as such" or "in general." A particular object, however, is possible only in consequence of a feeling, and a feeling is impossible apart from an instance of determinate acting.} • Hence: (1) The scope of our inquiry, which began at the circumference, with consciousness in its entirety, {which we divided into the spheres of ideal and real activity,} has now been narrowed, and we have moved closer to the center. We now understand which circle we have become caught up in, and it is by calling attention to this circle that we will be able to proceed further. {Free acting is possible only on the condition that a concept of a goal (1 is present; for freedom is a movement of transition from what is determinable to what is determinate, but [in order to accomplish such a movement of transition] I have to know what is determinate-i.e., I have lO possess some concept of a goal. This, however, is possible only on the condition that there is cognition of an object of acting, and such cognition is, in turn, possible only if an action itself occurs. Thus, insofar as it is a priori (in the broader sense of the term, i.e., insofar as it has its basis in the laws of thinking, prior to all experience), the concept of a goal is possible only on the condition of an a posteriori cognition; and an a posteriori cognition, in turn, is possible only on the condition of this concept [of a goal]. Our explanation of consciousness thus coils back upon
itself in the following circle: B (objective cognition) is derived from A (the concept of a goal), and A is derived from B.} Acting is possible only on the condition of cognition of an object, whereas such cognition is possible only on the condition of acting. An understanding of Critical idealism depends upon an understanding of this circle. From this it follows that nothing is explained. The difficulty involved in explaining this can be overcome only through the synthetic unification of both {the concept of a goal and [cognition of] an object}, and we will thereby arrive at the point from which consciousness can be explained. {Reason must therefore contain within itself something that combines the distinctive features of both. Such a synthesis exists only for the philosopher and only in the context of his investigations of the I. For the original I, this is an absolute thesis, and the original I proceeds in a purely analytic manner. In accordance with the proper character of the synthetic method, the previously affirmed [and circularly related] propositions always remain true and must remain so; but, in order to determine them more precisely and to confirm them, some intermediate, unifying term must be introduced between them. Thus, here too the concept of a goal has to be united with the concept of an object.} (In the interest of method, let us display this circle in a simpler forma way of proceeding which is similar to that of mathematicians.) Cognition of an {actual} object refers to a feeling and is necessarily posited in consequence of a feeling;G consequently, instead of positing cognition of an object, we could posit feeling. A concept of a goal refers to acting and is here considered to be a condition for the possibility of acting; accordingly, instead of positing the concept of a goal, we could posit acting. Our circle would then be as follows: No feeling without acting; no acting without feeling. Each of these is necessarily dependent upon the other. {Thus, if we presuppose either of these, there must exist (12 a relationship of dependence between both of them. Remark: One must not lose sight of the mediating concepts involved here. There is no feeling apart from acting: In this case, the dependence is clear. The conclusion that there is no acting unless a feeling is frresupposed is not one that follows so immediately, however. Its truth is established only as follows: No acting is possible without a concept of a goal; no concept of a goal is possible without cognition of an object; no cognition of an object is possible without a feeling. These intermediate concepts mak.e the dependence clear: there can be no acting without a feeling. Furthermore, this shows only that there is a relationship of dependence between G Cognilion of an actual ~ct refers 10 a feeling, does nol exisl wi1hou1 a feeling, and is considered lo be necessary only in consequence of a feeling (p. 129).
286
§ 13
the two propositions that make up the previously indicated circle; it does not establish any synthesis.}
139
(2) This circle could be eliminated only by thinking, in addition, of the relationship of dependence, and in such a way that feeling and acting would be thought of as united in the same stateH and would both constitute integral parts of a single whole. {Therefore, both must be thought of synthetically and must be presented as united.} Feeling is limitation, acting is freedom; consequently, limitation and freedom would have to be {synthetically} united, and united in such a way that neither is possible apart from the other. We would have to indicate a kind of freedom that would not be freedom unless it were limited and a kind of limitation that would not be limited unless it were free. There would have to be some X in which both freedom and limitation would be united. How are freedom and limitation supposed to be united? {Let us begin with a freedom that is not possible apart from limitation. What is the meaning of this combination?} • Freedom may not be abolished. Freedom is an absolute movement of transition from what is determinable to determinacy; {therefore,} the limitation of freedom cannot lie in this transition itself. {Nor can the limitation lie in the fact that the I is forced to do this or that, for, in this case, freedom would cease to exist. Accordingly, the limitation cannot lie either in what is determinate or in the determinate being of the 1.} [Instead,] the limitation would have to lie in the fact that the determinability [with which the movement begins] would it.relfbe a finite quantum, and indeed, in the fact that freedom could never express itself without reflecting upon this quantum, {in the fact that this quantum would be only so large and that only so much would be left over for the free choice, and that the latter would have to be a choice only between this and that. [In short, the limitation would lie in the fact] that no freedom whatsoever would ever come into being if this quantum were not reflected upon.} The unknown X is supposed to explain the limitation of freedom. 20 Imagine a being that is active in any way whatsoever: e.g., a compressed, steel spring that continues to resist the pressure applied to it. Activity is present in such a case, but not free activity. It lies within the spring's very nature [to offer such resistance]: it is determined to act in this way. There can be no question, however, of [such] determinacy in the case of a rational being. It must have chosen to undergo a particular transition. This [particular] movement of transition from indeterminacy to determinacy would have to constitute a [particular] quantum for its free H How can this circle be avoided? Only by eliminating the dependence, so that feeling and acting would be thought of as joined in one and the same state (p. 130). 1!<1 "In dem unbek.annten X liegt, dall die Freiheit beschriinlt sein soli."
140
choice. In addition, the freedom ascribed to a rational being would have to be such that no freedom would be possible without reflecting upon this quantum. If this were so, then (since all limitation expresses itself through a feeling) no free choice would be possible apart from a feeling of limitation.• {There can be no expression of freedom without some expression of ( 131 limitation. Once again, however, this principle is valid only for those of us who are engaged in philosophical inquiry, and only for the purpose of explaining consciousness. It is not valid in and for itself, but only ofand only for-our I.} We have previously discussed limitation in general or as such, which expresses itself through an original feeling (the feeling of [one's] entire state), i.e., through the system of sensibility, {which endures throughout all alterations of feelings and is related to every particular feeling. Consequently,} this system itself {(as a quantum of what is determinable), from which, in accordance with the fundamental law of feeling, a representation would also have to follow,} would {here} be a feeling-and I would possess this feeling only insofar as I were free. Moreover, we have seen that this feeling [of the system of sensibility as a whole] is posited as something in space: namely, as our body. This may also be the case here: the sum total of our determinability would be our body) (Considered as something sensible, 21 this determinate sum of determinability will turn out to be individuality; whereas, thought of as something supersensible, it will turn out to be the ethical law!) It follows from our synthesis that this must be the case, for only in this way is consciousness possible. {Let us now [examine] this circle from both sides:} A limitation that is impossible without freedom is a limitation of freedom itself. It is a direction; more precisely, it is the original direction of freedom upon a single point. 22 This, however, does not accord with the concept of freedom we have here established. We must {therefore} examine this concept more closely than was previously necessary. We previously said that freedom is an absolute movement of transition from determinability to determinacy. Even in § 1,K however, we already saw 1 Accordingly, no free choice-no acting-would be possible apart from a feeling, since the expression of limitation is called "a feeling": that is, a certain quantum of what is determinable (p. 130). 1 This limitation of what is determinable may well be this overall :ryotem of snuibility; the sum total of determinability may well be our body (p. 131). 21 "sinnlich betrachtet." 22 "Richtung und zwar ursprilngliche Richtung derselben ist ein Punct." The translation of this obscure sentence has been guided by the parallel passage in H: "eine urspriingliche Beschrii.nkung der Freyheit auf einen Punkt" ("an original limitation of freedom to a single point). K In the first §§ (p. I 3 I).
288
§ 13
that such a movement of transition is a condition that makes it possible for the ideal activity of the I to intuit anything at all. Consequently, our concept {of freedom} still includes something foreign: namely, the form of intuition, {and, for this reason, freedom is already sensible}. Since we here wish to present 23 freedom in advance of all intuition and to establish it as the condition for the possibility of all consciousness and of all intuition, we must eliminate this foreign element, which is first added through consciousness. Once we have done this, nothing will remain [within the concept of freedom] except what is absolute. 24 But what is absolute {is for us empty and} cannot even be thought of unless we also think o£2 5 something empirical as well, though this cannot be anything that would in any way detract from the purity {of the concept [of freedom]}-that is, [what we must think about in conjunction with freedom is] the temporal series of interdependent moments. 26 {In this way, freedom remains pure, and yet can, at the same time, be thought of, inasmuch as we connect something sensible to it.} Freedom would thus be the power to initiate an absolute beginning. 27 We may not connect freedom to the [temporal] series, {for then the concept of freedom would not remain pure}; instead, it is the series that has to be connected to freedom. In this way, we obtain something absolutely primary, {and .freedom thus transforms itself into} the power abso- (132) lutely to begin {a series}. (It is wrong to define freedom as a choice between a selfish and an unselfish drive-if, that is, we are supposed to be thinking about pure freedom. See Kant's Metaphysical First Principles of justice.) 28 This freedom, however, is supposed to be determinate,L i.e., it is supposed to possess some specific direction, and this means that the power to initiate an absolute beginning has a determinate direction of its own. Freedom can {only} posit precisely this ( = some determinate Y) as the first member of the series: {this constitutes the limitation. But a limitation of this sort is possible only in connection with-and, indeed, is dependent upon-a power to initiate an absolute beginning, and is [thus] "'"aufstellen." Cp. H: "denken" ("to think"). 24 "sonach bleibt nichts iibrig als Absolutheit." As always, what Fichte means by "absolute" is "self-determined" or "not determined by anything else." Thus, freedom is "the power to initiate an absolute beginning" in the sense that it is an ability to initiate something new (a new series of feelings)-something not determined by any prior state of the I or of the world. In this sense, freedom must always involve an element of "absoluteness." 25 Reading, with H, "hinzudenken" for K's "hinzuthun" ("place there"). 26 "die Reihe der Dependenz in der Zeit." Cp. H: "die Rei he der von einander dependirenden Glieder." 27 "und Freiheit ware das Vermogen absolut anzufangen." 28 See sect. I of the Introduction (KGS, VI: 213-14). LThis freedom is supposed to be limited (p. 132).
141
a result of freedom.} In this way, we retain both the power to make an absolute beginning and the limitation. M The limitation consists in the fact that only Y can be the first member of the series; but only the power to initiate an absolute and free beginning can be limited in this manner. There must therefore be a kind of determinacy that applies only to freedom. We said above that if freedom is to remain freedom, then determinacy cannot be prescribed to it in advance. In the present case, however, even the determinacy is considered to be the result of freedom. 29 This might appear to contradict {what was presented above, where the limitation of a free being was taken to be what is determinable, i.e., a quantum or sum total for the sphere of possible free actions}, but it does not; for determinability is posited as a quantum, but a quantum cannot be thought of unless something else, lying outside of this quantum, is also assumed. {We must therefore also assume something that is undetermined but determinable, in relation to which the latter-that is, what is determinable [considered as a specific quantum}-becomes something determinate.} In this respect, what is determinable would also be determinate. What is called "what is determinate" at one moment can, in another respect, also be what is determinable {-a quantum}. The members of the synthesis--determinability and determinacy{which surely had to be united at some point,} would thus be united, and the {first} member, which still has not been indicated or explained, would {therefore} be both {at once}, depending upon how it were viewed: in relation to what lies outside it, it possesses determinacy; insofar as it is supposed to make a free choice possible, it is determinable.~ 0 Our synthetic concept is freedom and determinacy in one. It is freedom, insofar as an {absolute} beginning is made; it is determinacy, insofar as a beginning can be made only in this particular way. (3) {Let us now determine this concept of freedom even more precisely, which will be the final step in our synthetic ascent. (From now on, we M In this way, freedom and limitation remain simultaneously alongside and connected with one another (p. 132). 29 "hier ist ja die Beschriinktheit selbst als Resultat der Beschriinktheit angegeben worden." Reading "Freiheit" for the second occurrence of "Beschranktheit," which makes little sense in this context. Cp. the parallel passage in H: "wir hier die Beschriinktheit zu einem BESTIMMTEN-ZU einer bestimmten Richtung der Freyheit-machen" ("we here make the limitation into something that has been determined-into a determinate direction of freedom"). 0 " "Bestimmbarkeit, in wiefern ihm eine Wahl durch Freiheit moglich sein soil." Literally: "Insofar as a free choice is supposed to be possible for it." This makes little sense, and hence the translation has been emended in the light of the parallel passage in H: "da~ a us ihm doch auch noch gewahlt werden soli" ("insofar as a choice is also still supposed to be made from it").
290
142
§ 13
will be following a descending path. Hitherto we have been climbing steadily upward: we thought of something as a possible consciousness, which, however, we then found to be impossible without some second thing, and then a third one, etc. Continuing in this manner, we ascended steadily from what is conditioned to the condition. But now, after the condition has been presented in its entirety, we will descend from the condition to what is conditioned.)} What has just been shown must now be connected with what was said in the previous §, where we discussed the manifold of feeling insofar as it is related to our exercise of causality and [showed] how we are able to unify this manifold by relating it to and deriving it from our willing. {I ( 133) · · first think my willing into the manifold, and anything whatsoever-a manifold and an individual unit 31-first comes into being for me thereby.} This is the beginning of all consciousness. • We now wish to examine more closely {-with respect to its form-} this state {in which I grasp a manifold by relating it to my single act of willing, and thereby posit it within a temporal series}. It contains two entirely different elements and has, as it were, two different sides. On the one side lies something sensible, the manifold of feeling, {the sensible intuition of an object that changes, as well as the concept of an object}; on the other, {something supersensible,} the intelligible I, the willing subject. Between these two sides, as their unifying {link}, there lies the act of thinking of myself as containing within myself the foundation of the succession of the manifold. {This latter act of thinking joins together both [the above elements], and through it I derive the succession of feelings from my act of willing. This is the act of thinking that was discussed in the preceding §.} How is it possible for me to think of myself in this way, {namely, as willing, as the foundation of the succession of feelings}? {From where do I obtain [the awareness of] myself which is involved in such an act of thinking? We have already explained how the concept of our will's efficacious acting in the sensible world originates; in order to think of myself in this way, however, I already have to be aware of myself as the thinking subject.} This is the question we will now investigate: How do I discover myself? Or-since thinking is an ideal act, which presupposes that its object is given-how am I given to myself? In the previous §, we answered this question provisionally as follows: This act of thinking refers to an intellectual intuition {of myself as a willing subject, and this intellectual intuition is immediate}. This must here be made more precise. What is {this} intellectual intuition itself, and how does it originate? ~I
"wird erst fUr mich iiberhaupt etwa.s-ein
MANNIGFALTIGES
und
EINS."
Origination 32 is a temporal concept, something sensible. Intellectual intuition, however, is not sensible, and thus it can have no origin. It [simply] is, and we can talk about it only by contrasting it with sensible intuition.N {What then is this intellectual intuition itself?} To begin with, intellectual intuition does not appear immediately {and in isolation}; instead, it is ontr, thought of in the indicated act of thinking. 33 Intellectual intuition 4 is what is highest in a finite being, but even a philosopher is able to accomplish this act of intellectual intuition only by means of abstraction and reflection. 0 {We are not acquainted (134) with intellectual intuition through sensible intuition; instead, we have to proceed by means of pure thinking and philosophizing.} Viewed negatively, intellectual intuition is not sensible intuition. The form of sensible intuition is the movement of transition from determinability to determinacy; such movement, however, must be completely absent from the act of willing we are here discussing, insofar as it is intellectually intuited. All that remains is a sheer act of intuiting our own determinate state, which is present but does not come into being. (It goes without saying, that we are here considering only the form of [such] intuition, since the I itself must be preserved.) Consequently, intellectual intuition would be a simple act of intuiting myself as something determinate. But how does this determinacy appear in this case? It is appropriate to talk about "appearance" only in the context of sensible perception. How then does this determinacy appear within sensible perception?P It appears there as an act of willing; according to what was said above, however, willing can be characterized as an "ought" or as a demand. 35 Therefore, this determinacy of the I would have to appear as a determinate, absolute ought, as a categorical demand. This mere form of willing, this absolute demand, is not yet the ethical law. It first assumes an ethical character only when it is related to a free choice within the sensible world, 36 and we are not yet concerned with this. 2
"Entstehen." The only sense in which one can say that intellectual intuition "originates" is this: it orirnates when and insofar as it is posited in opposition to a sensible intuition (p. 133). " "sie wird injedem Denkacte nur gedacht." Reading, with H, '1enem" forK's "jedem" ("every"). 4 ' "Sie." Cp. H: "Dieser" ("This act of thinking is what is highest"). 0 We are acquainted with intellectual intuition only through thinking, through abstraction and reflection, and through the inferences derived therefrom in accordance with the rules of our philosophy (pp. 133-34). P Thus it would be nothing but an act of intuiting ourselves as something determinate; and this is the way we appear to ourselves within sensible intuition-we know nothing of anr,thing supersemible (p. 134). '"ein Sollen, ein Fordern." ' 6 "dieses wird es erst, in wiefern es auf eine sinnlii::he Willkiihr bezogen wird." '
N
143
One could call it "pure will," {which does not come into being, but is already there,} divorced from any of the conditions that make intuition possible. This is what we must place at the basis of the act of thinking described above [the act of thinking which connects the manifold offeeling to my own willing], {and it must be this that I observe within this same act of thinking}. I now know whnt the object of this act of thinking is, but I still do not know Jww such an act can occur {-between pure willing and this act of thinking}. Since this act of thinking is a necessary one, {and since everything that is necessary is grounded in a feeling,} the mediating link between it and willing must be supplied by a feeling of some sort. {Consequently, some feeling must lie between this categorical demand and this act of thinking.} What kind of feeling can this be? A feeling is a limitation of striving; accordingly, striving must extend beyond the sphere of striving that is originally determined by pure willing, and the limitation of this striving by an act of pure willing would produce a feeling of prohibition, of not being permitted37 to go beyond this sphere, a feeling of being obliged {to remain} within this sphere of the "ought." (This act of going beyond the sphere determined by the pure will is itself something sensible, because it is posited in opposition to pure willing, that is, in opposition to what is, properly speaking, the true 1.) Thus we find that freedom and limitation are originally united within a categorical demand, {from which a representation of an object can be easily derived,} and which must necessarily be assumed if consciousness is to be explained. Freedom [is present here], inasmuch as a new beginning has to be made; limitation [is present as well], inasmuch as we are here obliged not to go beyond a specific sphere [the sphere determined by pure willing]. (4) {The question is this: To what extent has the difficulty been resolved? For the time being, we wish to answer this question only provisionally.} The difficulty that faced us was actually this: to explain an act of willing without {presupposing} any cognition of the object {of this act-a pure act of willing-one that is present in itself-therefore something original and a condition for the possibility of all consciousness. Such an act of willing must be possible, because this act of willing, even if it is considered only as an empirical one, already contains within itself cognition of an object.} The reason for the above-mentioned difficulty lay in the fact that we considered empirical willing (i.e., the movement of transition from what is determinable to what is determinate) to be the only kind of willing. This has now been denied; we have now postulated a kind of willing which does not presuppose cognition of an object, but 37
"das Gefiihl des Nichtdiirfens."
§ 13
293
which carries its object within itself and which is not based upon any act of deliberation, {but which is original and is a pure act of willing-an act of willing which is determinate without any assistance from us as em- (135) pirical beings. Such willing is a demand. All empirical willing first arises from this [pure] willing. One commonly says, "I cannot will unless I first possess a cognition of the object I am willing." This, however, is not true, for there is also another kind of willing, one that provides itself with its own object and to which, therefore, no object is given in advance.} With this, the source of our difficulty has been entirely removed. The pure will is the categorical imperative. Here, however, it will not be employed as such, but will be employed only for the purpose of explaining consciousness in general. Kant employs the categorical imperative only to explain consciousness of duty. (5) 38 The empirical will is derived from the pure will, and all other objects are derived from the object of the pure will. Any time we attempt to explain consciousness, we have to assume something that is first and original. This was the case in our previous account of feeling, and it is also the case in our present account of willing: {we have to assume an original act of willing, which simply is what it is}. Every act of thinking, every act of representing, lies between and mediates 39 original willing and limitation through feeling.Q We are able to observe the {modifications of the} ideal activity, because ideal activity is the only thing we are able to intuit or to grasp, {and from this there arise the various states of our mediated consciousness, as well as what is sensible}.
144
(6) Our present task is not to establish a theory of morality, 40 but rather to provide a general account of consciousness, and we can do this only by presupposing the pure will as described above. What we have to show now is how this presupposition will allow us to explain our consciousness of objects. {How does an object arise through this act of willing?} Pure willing, at this point, is not supposed to be anything more than the explanatory ground of consciousness; it is still a hypothesis, not yet an object of consciousness. {One should think of this determinacy of pure willing in the most indeterminate manner possible-as a mere 8 ' In K the following three paragraphs appear at the end of sect. 4, whereas in H they constitute a separate section (sect. 5). The translation from now on follows the numbering of the sections in H, with the result that the following secu. 6-8 actually correspond to sects. 5-7 of§ 13 in K, and sect. 9 corresponds to sect. 8 in K (which is, in fact, the second section labeled "(7)" in Krause's MS) and to the unnumbered MGeneral Survey" in H. 9 ' "liegt zwischen [ ... ] in der Mitte." More literally: "lies in the middle between." QThe ideal activity lies between and mediates original willing and feeling (p. 135). 40 "eine Moral aufzustellen."
294
§ 13
hypothesis, as a qualitas occulta, or however else one may wish-since it does not appear within consciousness at all. We posit it here only as if it were something. (It is the text of all possible philosophy and the ex- (131 planatory ground of all our thinking). Assuming, then, that it exists, what would follow from this?} Later on we will show how pure willing appears within consciousness; here we are concerned only with the consequences that follow when it is presupposed as the explanatory ground of consciousness. All consciousness is sensible; it is an expression of a particular act of the intellect, of the ideal activity, and it is governed by laws-at the very least, {and above all,} by the law of transition from determinability to determinacy. {(As something sensible, the ideal activity is also subject to the laws of space.)} As a result of this affection [of the ideal activity], everything that is thought of necessarily becomes sensible. The indicated pure will, however, is supposed to be something supersensible, yet something sensible is supposed to follow from it. How then is the pure will mediated with sensible consciousness? As we said above, this occurs by means of a feeling,R {a feeling that lies between and mediates pure willing and sensible intuition,} for feeling is what comes first; every action of consciousness commences with a feeling. (We also said above that this is a feeling of striving, of "ought," of a demand, of limitation, and-to this extent-of prohibition.) Feeling, as such, is an expression of the I's limitation; such an expression of limitation, however, is impossible without an expression of striving, since what is limited [in feeling] is precisely striving. Limitation and striving are necessarily united. This general principle must apply here as well. Here, however, what we are concerned with is not limitation as such or in general, but rather the limitation [of the I] by an absolute, pure act of willing, one that does not depend upon the power of free choice, {but originally is. Through this limitation, a striving is supposed to be limited in me.} This would be a striving, a disposition toward willing, 41 which, because of the limitation [imposed by the pure will], is unable to become an act of willing-i.e., a desire; 42 and, since the pure will is categorical, the feeling of this limitation {of desire} would be a feeling of prohibition. Remark: Kant has often (especially in the introduction to his treatise on natural right4 s) spoken as if the desire that strives in opposition to R All thinking is governed by the law of transition from what is determinable to what is determinate, and all consciousness becomes sensible thereby. But pure willing is supposed to be something supersensible, and yet is supposed to have consequences in sensible consciousness and to merge with the latter; and, as we remarked a moment ago, this is supposed to occur through the mediation of a feeling (p. 136). 11 "'eine Tendenz zum Wollen." 12 "'eine Begierde." 13 See sect. II of the Introduction to the Metaphysical Elements ofJustice (KGS, VI: 2 15ff.).
145
the pure will is simply inexplicable. It can certainly be explained, however: it is a condition for the possibility of self-consciousness, for it is the condition for a feeling of pure willing; and only by means of such a feeling does pure willing become pure willing, i.e., a law {for us}, and no consciousness is possible unless pure willing is presupposed. Desire applies to all finite reason. Anyone who wants to be released from desire wants to be released from consciousness. We cannot consider any finite, rational, conscious being to be holy, {[for] every finite, rational creature is conscious of a desire that strives in opposition to the above-mentioned law. Therefore, God alone is "holy" (i.e., without this desire), and, for the same reason, no consciousness can be ascribed to God, or at least this is incomprehensible to us.} God's consciousness cannot be explained. The union of pure willing and desire produces the feeling of an "ought," of an inner, categorical drive toward acting.'"' (Later on we will see what this acting refers to.) {(A) Here again, one must think of the pure will and of the categorical demand of the same in a quite indeterminate fashion; i.e., one must not (137) yet think of a categorical imperative. For we are not yet in the realm of morality; but rather, as is well known, we are at present trying to explain all consciousness as such and in its entirety. (B)} The union of prohibition and desire produces {not an "ought," but merely} a [feeling of] being permitted to satisfy the desire {in a certain respect, without any immediate expression of the categorical drive within the power of feeling}. Whatever is included within the sphere of what I am allowed to do is permitted. {(C)} Thanks to the presence of a desire that is supposed to be limited, pure willing exercises an influence upon the power of feeling. {The "ought" first arises from the unification of pure willing, insofar as this exercises an influence upon our power of feeling, and thus upon some desire, which is thereby restricted to a narrow sphere, from which everything that is prohibited is excluded. Consequently, an "ought" arises when what is permitted accords with pure willing. Consider, for example, [the difference between] natural law and morality:} The theory of natural law or natural right is concerned with what we are permitted to do, rather than with what we ought to do. It refers only to empirical willing. Morality tells us that we ought to do something, which, from the standpoint of natural right, we are merely permitted to do.45 {The Iauer deals with empirical human beings and pennit.s justice toward others; morality, on the other hand, makes justice a duty for the intelligible person.} 44
"Treibens zum Handeln." More literally: "What, from the forum of natural right, is permitted is, from the forum of morality, an ought." 4'
This feeling of "oughl" conlains wilhin itself, in a very compressed form, everylhing we demanded in order lO resolve lhe conlradiclion discussed above: limitalion of our desire, 5 plus lhe freedom lo iniliale an absolule beginning, {underslood as a drive lo be lhe absolulely firsl member [of a series], lhal is, lO produce oul of itself a series in lhe sensible world. Consciousness also confirms lhe presence wilhin us of such a drive, and il does so lhrough lhe unease lhal arises wilhin us when we neglecl lo do enough lO comply wilh and lO heed lhis drive.} This feeling is calegorical, nol merely wilh respecl lo its comem (an absolule demand wilhoul any funher ground), bul also in ils form. As surely as any ralional being exists al all, a feeling of lhis son musl also be presem, {and wilhoul lhis feeling lhere would be no rational being whalsoever. Everylhing is connecled lo lhis immediale "oughl."} Consciousness necessarily follows from lhis feeling. h is lherefore and necessarily a delerminale consciousness, and il musl appear wilhin lhe consciousness of every ralional being.
146
(7) As wilh all feelings, lhis feeling of "oughl" also gives rise lo an inwilion and a concepl. Consequently, lhis feeling musl be lhoughl of. Lel us begin by lrealing il as pure willing. {To be sure, lhis acl of lhinking of lhe "oughl" firsl occurs by means of an inwilion. Bul in order lO increase lhe clarily of whal follows, we will now abslracl from lhis fael and will leap direcdy lo lhinking. The "oughl" is now lo become an objecl of thought; i.e., il is lo be considered as a pure acl of willing, as somelhing inlelligible-as whal I necessarily will; in olher words, il is an "oughl." This pure willing, however, is an "oughl" only insofar as il is a feeling. On lhe olher hand, il can be lhoughl of only in accordance wilh lhe laws of lhinking. The highesl law ( 138) of lhinking slales lhal} every acl of lhinking is a movemem of lransilion from delerminabilily lO delerminacy. Every acl of lhinking is a delerminale activily {wilhin lime}, which wrenches somelhing oul of lhe undifferenlialed mass 46 [of whal is delerminable] and delermines il. {All my lhinking is discursive.} When anylhing is assimilaled inw lhe form of lhinking, {il is and appears lo be a lransilion from whal is delerminable lo whal is delerminale, [and]} il itself becomes delerminale. {Therefore, when I lhink ofwhal is imelligible il lhereby becomes somelhing sensible,· lhal is lo say, I assimilale il to lhe law and lo lhe form of lhe lransilion from whal is delerminable lO whal is delerminale.} (This is lhe firsl ims II contairu the concept of our endless de3ire 46 "a us der Majk herausrei~L"
tp. 1 37).
§ 13
297
portant point one must become clear about in order to understand how something sensible can be produced from what is supersensible.) When we think of willing, we must think of it in just the way in which we have thought of and described it here.T {In this way, willing becomes something determinable precisely because, as a pure act of willing, it was something determinate. Insofar as it was considered to be determinate, it was something intelligible; on the other hand, considered as an object of thought and as something determinable, it becomes something sensible.} (The second important point is that something determinable must be presupposed for every act of determining, and the reason for this is to be found in the form of our sensible thinking.) What is intelligible becomes sensible insofar as it is thought of in conjunction with something determinable. Let us now examine what is determinable [when we think about the "ought"]. As we have seen, the "ought" can be thought of only if a system of what is determinable is presupposed. What is determinable in this case would not exist apart from the task of thinking the "ought"; nor could such a task exist apart from the "ought" itself {-as a pure act of willing}. (What is determinable is introduced only through thinking.) {Hitherto, we were always forced to presuppose such a determinable something in order to explain our thinking. It may well turn out to be the case that everything determinable is nothing more than the determinable something just indicated.} Something determinable must necessarily be posited, and, from this, all the objects of consciousness will be derived, as mediated-that is, as produced by means of an immediate consciousness of the "ought." (Within the context of the Critical philosophy, this {thought of what is determinable in this case} is not a new thought. It is contained in Kant's practical postulate: "I ought to do something; therefore, what I ought to do must be possible." 47 This thought is identical to the Fichtean claim: "I think of my 'ought,' and, as surely as I think of this, I think of my transition from determinability to determinacy; thus, in addition to the 'ought,' I must also think of what is determinable."u Kant's demonstration that "can" follows "ought" is purely analytic, however, whereas philosophy [properly] concerns itself with synthetic thinking. 48 T Therefore, if willing is to be thought of at all, then it is also thought of in this manner, that is, assimilated to this form-just as we also described willing above as actually such a movement of transition (p. 1 38). 47 See Pt. I, Bk.. I, Chap. 1, § 6 of the Critique of Practical Reason, as well as Pt. II (KGS, V:Jlo and 159). "I think. of the 'ought.' As surely as I think. of this, I must think. of this determinability, which I can think. of only in this way; and I must think. of this determinability as something necessary" (p. 1 38). 48 "Das Object der Philosophie aber ist ein synthetisches Denk.en."
147
{Analytic thinking proceeds from the assumption that all consciousness ( 139) is nothing more than an analysis of what is originally given to me within time-which, however, might also not have been the case. Synthetic thinking is the necessary connection of all our consciousness to one single point. To think synthetically of the "ought" with which we are presently concerned means that I am supposed to derive it from and to connect it with something determinable.} I must think of myself as being obliged to dosomething; but, just as surely as I have to think of myself in this way, I must also think of something determinable. This (connection between the thought of the "ought" and what is determinable] is synthetic. • Moreover, the scope of Kant's practical postulate is too narrow, for he limits it entirely to belief in God and immortality; but we will see that consciousness in its entirety is included within this postulate. v At the time he was writing the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant had not yet worked all of this out with complete clarity. The first Critique is concerned only with sensible, objective thinking, and the I appears there not [as it is] for itself, but only as an accident. In the Critique ofJudgment and the Critique of Practical Reason, however, the I is presented [as it is] for itself.) w {But it would have required an enormous effort to revise his Critique of theoretical reason at this point; therefore, it remained as it was.} From this, one can see how a sensible world can originate from the intelligible world in the following way: ( 1) We must think discursively. (2) We must presuppose something determinable for everything determinate. (3) This determinable something we have to presuppose {and which precedes my act of self-determining} acquires the character of objectivity. (It appears as something discovered or given, something present without any assistance from us.)x I become conscious of this movement of transition-be it a transition within thinking or one within willing-as my own accomplishment. Here again, however, this always presupposes something determinable, from which this movement begins; and, to this extent, what is determinable is "given." It does not appear except insofar as I think about it; but when I think and will anything, what is determinable appears as something that conditions my thinking and willing, as something "discovered." v Our entire consciousness depends upon this postulate (p. 139). w Only in his Critique of Practical Reason and Critique of)udgrru:nl does the I become selfsufficient (p. 139). X What precedes all thinking and has w be presufrPt>sed is something determi.no.ble, w which the clw.racter of objectivity is aUached, and it appears as something given, or discuuered (p. 139).
§ 13
299
With this remark, our idealism comes into conformity with reason and explains consciousness. Transcendent idealism claims that things owe their existence only to the imagination. 49 (The Kantian philosophy already asserts that experience is an appearance, but not an illusion.) 50
148
(8) According to the above, this "ought," or determinate, pure willing, is itself something objective, {something "discovered," something "given." Consequently, what is determinate also appears as something objective and present without any help from us.} As something flowing, consciousness originates only with a feeling of some alteration in our state; but this alteration is thought of as an alteration in the state of the willing subject, 5 1 which is here presupposed as something with which we are, as it were, already familiar, since it is simply there. {Original willing is related to this alteration as something that is already, originally there, something that does not first come into being and does not lie beyond the domain of willing. Consequently, this pure act of willing does not (140) first originate through an act of thinking; instead, it [simply] is, and it must exist in advance of all thinking. It is here thought of as determined by a movement of transition from something determinable (i.e., from something that, to the extent it is thought of, is thought of as possessing the power to cause a feeling or an alteration [in our state]), and indeed, as a movement of transition from what is determinable to what is determinate. The thinking subject is unable to discover itself within this movement as the subject that freely directs the same; on the contrary, this movement of transition must also appear as something that exists in itself, something determined prior to all thinking, something that occurs prior to all consciousness.} The manifold of feeling is unified 52 insofar as we posit our own selfdetermination within this manifold. Thus we here have [a whole, consisting of] two halves: (a) the manifold, and (~) our own selfdetermination. We posit the latter within the former, and this is what makes self-consciousness possible. 53 Empirical thinking was described in the previous §. All empirical thinking begins with a perception of some alteration in the state [of the I], but this is perceived only insofar as the alteration is connected with willing. I relate myself to this alteration as what is presupposed for the possibility of thinking. This I is the willing subject, which thereby 49 "Das Dasein der Dinge sei nur Einbildung." For the difference between "transcendent" and "transcendental" idealism, see GWL, § 4• E (SW, 1: 147). 50 See, e.g., KRV, B6g. 51 "wird auf das Wollende bezogen." More literally: "This alteration is related to the willin~<: subject." Cp. H: "the original act of willing is related to this alteration." '!; 2 "ist e ins." "This entire paragraph appears as marginal remark in K.
300
§ '3
possesses the character of something objective. Consequently, pure willing does not originate by means of thinking; on the contrary, it is already presupposed by thinking. When I act efficaciously, 5 4 I actually transport myself from one state of feeling to another, {and my feeling and my thinking are altered thereby}. This is a transition I accomplish 1rj means of my uumfree will. {I discover myself.} Thus, whenever I construct for myself a free conceptwhen, for example, I imagine one object occupying the position of some other object in space-this alteration is one that is supposed to have occurred by means of my own will, in consequence of a concept. The situation, however, is quite different when I observe an alteration in the world of objects-the growth of a plant, for example. This also involves an alteration, but not one that depends upon me. In a case like this, I discover myself merely as the subject observing this movement of transition. How is the movement of transition of my pure willing from its determinability to determinacy 55 related {to consciousness}? This is a transition that occurs without any help from us, for we ourselves first come into being by means of our movement. (I appear to myself as determined to determine myself in one way or another.) The Idea that we ourselves originate within time is contained in this. The I here appears to itself as determined to have to determine itself in just the way it does determine itself, and the movement of transition is here thought of not as free, but rather as necessary. It is something discovered. This determinacy, which constitutes my basic character, 5 6 consists in the fact that I am determined to determine myself in a certain way. For this reason, it assigns me only the task of acting in a certain way; it assigns me an "ought." Man's determinate nature or "vocation"57 is not something he gives to himself; instead, it is that through which a human being is a human being. All {my} thinking is a movement of transition from what is determinable to what is determinate. {I can think only discursively. This is the fundamental law of our thinking, the condition for the possibility of the same.} The object of thinking, however, can be of two different sorts: (A) I receive the object as something {indeterminate and} determinable, which I then proceed to determine through my own thinking-e.g., when I move an object in space to another position. Or, "" '"Wenn ich wiirke." Reading, with H, "von seiner BESTIMMBARKEIT zur Bestimmtheit" for K's "von seiner Bestimmbaren zum Bestimmten" ("from its determinable [something] to what is determinate"). 56 "meinen Hauptcharakter." 57 "Die Bestimmung des Menschen."' 55
§ 13
149
301
(B) the object is discovered to be something completely determinate, which I am therefore unable to think of as determined by my thinking. In this case, I cannot58 think of myself as determining it. {All my thinking, however, is made possible only by the aforementioned transition from what is determinable to what is determinate, and this must therefore be the case here as well.} Consequently, my thinking must appear {to me} to be observing the act of determining 59-{it appears] to be passive. {Let us now apply this to the present case.} I discover myself, for example, to be originally determinate: I ought to do something; in other words, I discover my pure will. {This does not first come into being by means of my own thinking; instead,} this pure will is already given to my thinking, insofar as it is an act of thinking of this sort [that is, the kind of thinking that takes itself to be passively observing an act of determination]. {It must be thought of, however;} but pure will can be thought of only as a movement of transition from what is determinable to what is determinate. {This transition simply occurs as it does, whether I will anything or not. This constitutes the fundamental law of my thinking, [in relation to which] I am a mere observer.OOJ Viewed as it is here, that is, in the context of the fundamental concept of its original determinacy, the I is something intelligible, something "mental" or "spiritual,"61 and it can be determined only negatively, by abstracting from outer intuition. The form of outer intuition-space and matter62-does not pertain in the least to such a being.v But [even] as a spiritual being, the I is still a determinate one, and what is determinable thereto [i.e., what becomes determined as this determinate 58 Reading, with H, "dann kann ich mich nicht als bestimmend denken," for K's "nun kann ich mich aber nur denken, als bestimmend" ("but I can only think of myself as determining"), which would appear to assert the opposite of what the rest of this passage asserts. 59 Reading, with Krause's MS, "Bestimmen" for K's "Bestimmten" ("what is determined''). 60 "Dieses Uebergehen ist nun einmahl so, ich mag wollen oder nicht-es ist das Hauptgesez meines denkens. lch bin nur zuschauend." 61 "etwas intelligibles, ein geistiges." 62 Reading, with H, "MATERIE" for K's "Zeit" ("time"), which is presumably an error on Krause's part. (lime is the form of inner intuition.) Thanks to its complete lack of punctuation, it might still be possible to make sense of the sentence in K ("Die Form der auseren Anschauung Raum und Zeit pa~t darauf gar nicht") by rendering it: "Space, the form of outer intuition, and time do not pertain in the least to such a being." The preceding sentence, however, clearly states that we are here concerned only with abstraction from the form of ouJer intuition; hence it seems best to correct K with reference to H. v The I is here only something intelligible, merely something thought of-apart from space and matter-something purely spiritual. I.e., one must abstract from the form of outer intuition, while continuing to think of something; in this way, one obtains [the thought of] a mind or spirit (p. 141).
150
spiritual being] must also be purely spiritual: a purely spiritual mass {or (141) sphere}. 63 (Sit venia verbo, 64 this "spiritual mass" will later reveal itself to be the realm of rational beings. The I is a determinate portion of this mass; as we shall see below, what is spiritual is divisible.) The I is reason-determinate reason. What is determinable in this case is reason as a whole (my generic essence). 65 ·z I myself am what is determinate {(through a feeling), as what is poJited in oppOJition to this sphere}: namely, I as an individual (for I posit a sphere of rational beings in opposition to myself). We must now compare to each other what is determinable and what is determinate in this case. These are opposed to each other as follows: I am what is determinate, but I am not what is determinable. What is determinable is Not-[. On the other hand, what is determinable and what is determinate are here similar, inasmuch as both are equally spiritual. (I.e., they can be grasped only by thinking; they are both noumena.) How does what is determinate become I? In what sense am I an "1"as opposed to other beings similar to myself? Hitherto we have employed the word "I" to designate self-reverting activity; this will no longer suffice, however, for it serves only to distinguish rational beings from other, irrational objects. (Moreover, as we will see later, self-reverting activity can also be ascribed to the organic products of nature.) Hence, [in order to obtain an adequate concept of the I] something else must be added: the thought of the self-reverting activity must be connected with this self-reverting activity.AA The determinacy I myself produce gives rise to a feeling, and from this feeling there arises the thought of myself. Thus I discover myself to be an object, and I am an object for myself. I can discover myself to be an object, however, only on one condition: namely, that I discover myself to be one individual among many spiritual beings. It is a cardinal principle of Critical idealism that one begin with something intelligible. Proceeding in accordance with this principle, we have finally been driven to [posit the existence of] a pure act of willing. Empirical willing is not sufficient. Each of my empirical determinations re..., "eine Malle des rein geistigen." 64 "lf 1 may be be permitted to say so." "Wesen meiner Gattung." z What is determinable is all reason and freedom, i.e., the realm of spirits, as my generic essence (p. 141 ). AA Until now, "1-hood" signified for us "self-reverting activity." But other beings like me also contain such an activity within themselves; they too are supposed to be able to limit themselves. Indeed, even living66 things-plants, for example-possess a self-reverting activity (but we will discuss this later). Therefore, an additional criterion has to be added: I am an "1" only if the self-reverting activity also gives rise to the thought of the same-a thought that is immediately united with this activity. The thought of myself follows as a consequence of the feeling of my pure willing (p. 141). 66 Reading "lebendige" for H's "leblose" ("lifeless"). 65
fers to my original determinacy, and I can think of these determinations only if I presuppose such an original determinacy. I could not ascribe this power to myself had I not first discovered it; but I can discover it only as determinacy and pure willing. Remarks: (1) I discover myself, therefore, as an object; I am given to myself. (2) What is determinable is a realm of rational beings outside of
me. But I think of rational beings outside of me only in order to explain the manifold. I do not perceive the reason and the free will of others outside of me; this is something I only infer from appearances in the sensible world. Consequently, these other rational beings belong not within the sensible world, but rather within the intelligible one, the world of noumena. 88 (The most striking demonstration of the incompleteness of Kant's Critical philosophy is that Kant has never provided an explanation of this point, {that is, how I come to assume that there are rational beings (142) outside of me}. {According to his system, I cannot answer, "I know this from experience," because, according to Kant, no experience, in the dogmatic sense, of something "in itself" is even possible. He himself also says that reason outside of us is not anything that can be perceived and that no outer intuition of it is possible.}68 He came very close to answering this question in the Critique ofJudgment, for it would be on the basis of the principle of reflective judgment that this assumption [that there are other free, rational beings] could be explained. 69 When it proceeds in accordance with the general laws of thought, that is, in accordance with the categories, the power of judgment simply subsumes- [things under their proper categories]. But there can also be cases where one cannot proceed in this manner and yet must nevertheless make a judgment, and, in such cases, one must proceed in an opposite manner. Kant 88 I discover myself as an object-I am an object for myself. But I cannot do this unless I discover myself to be an individual. Each of my empirical determinations can be derived only from my original determinacy and can be thought of only if the latter is presupposed. We said above that what is determinable is the realm of rational beings. How do I arrive at this claim? Reply: Rational beings are merely thought of. By means of thinking, I project them 67 into the manifold of appearances in order to explain these appearances to myself. (Just as, above, I also had to project myself into the manifold [of feelings] in order to explain this manifold.) For reason-that is, a free act of willing on the part of othen outside of me-is not something I can see or hear or feel, etc.; instead, I think of other rational beings and infer their existence purely on the basis of a perception in the sensible world. I think of them in order to introduce unity into appearances and into my overall experience. Reason, freedom, and rational beings: these therefore belong within the intelligible world, among the noumena (p. 141). 67 "ich denke mir dieselben [ ... ] hinein." 68 See KRV. B59 and A346/B4o4ff. 69 See the Introduction to the Critique of]wl.gment, as well as the treatment of teleological judgments in the second half of the same work.
indicates this, but only in the case of judgments concerning the organic produces of nature. The principle according to which we assume the existence of rational beings outside of ourselves is not presented in Kant's writings as a principle that provides the basis for any cognition; instead, it is presented as a practical principle, which is how he has formulated it in the moral principle that states, "I should act in such a manner that the way in which I act could become a law for every rational being." 70 In order to do this, however, I must first assume the existence of rational beings outside of me; for otherwise, how could I apply this law to them?) {This has led a Dutch scholar71 to ask whether our practical reason is (143)' something different from our speculative reason. Though Kant and all the Kantians have merely laughed at this question, your instructor does not join in their laughter. Such a question is quite natural. Is it possible that only our practical reason possesses any knowledge of [other] rational beings and relates its actions to them? Must not theoretical reason also possess such knowledge? Your instructor replies: it is precisely this command addressed to my practical reason which is also the principle, or cognitive ground, 72 [that permits me] to think of rational beings outside of myself. Thanks to the connection between practical and theoretical reason, by virtue of ics drive toward acting, this same reason is also a basis of cognition 72 and serves as a principle for the theoretical assumption that there are [other] rational beings.} According to the order of thinking, therefore, I myself am the first and highest thing I discover; I cannot discover myself apart from similar beings outside of me, however, for I am an individuaL {It makes no sense to say "I am an individual" unless others are thought of as well.} Accordingly, my experience begins with a realm 75 of rational beings, to which I myself belong; and everything else follows from this. cc This [realm of rational beings] constitutes the intelligible world: it is a "world," inas70 See sects. 1 and 2 of the Grundkgungzur Metaph]JiA der SiUen (1785) (KGS, IV: 402 and 436--!17). English translation by Lewis White Beck, Faundaliuru of the Metaphysics of Mfffai.J (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1959), p. 18 and 55· See too Cri/lq1<e of Practical RM.son, Pt. I, Bk. I, Chap. I. § 7 (KGS, V: 30). 71 The "Dutch scholar" is identified by the editors of AA IV, 2 as Paulus van Hemen ( •756--1825), who raised this question in his 1799 treatise, Ueber die Existence der Principien eines reinm uneigenniitUTI Wohlwollens im Menschen. This attribution, however (which is, of course, incompatible with the hypothesis that H dates from some semester before the winter semester of •798/gg), is very uncertain and has been quite plausibly challenged by Radrizzani in the introduction to his French translation of the WLnm, pp. 34-35· See "Datin~ the Halle Transcript" in the Editor's Introduction. 2 "ErkenntnifJgrund," in both instances. 70 Reading, with H, "Reiche" instead of K's "Rei he" ("series"). cc Properly speaking, all other appearances are first connected to this intelligible world. One can thereby see how all additional expet"ience in its entirety is connected with what is determinable-that is, how the remaining world of experience, including the sensible world, is connected to the realm ofrational beings (p. 143).
much as it is something discovered; it is "intelligible," inasmuch as it can only be thought of and [cannot] be intuited. 00 {These are the conditions for the possibility of the intelligible world: it is there, I discover it, and then I think about it; and, because I think about it, it is discovered-and is therefore a "world." I do not assimilate it to the form of intuition, however; instead, it is for me merely a possible act of thinking-and is there- ( 144) fore "intelligible." Kant has not given an adequate account of what is discovered; that is, he has not explained where the world comes from. For him, the world is merely something that we always think of in conjunction with whatever else we might be thinking of-something that simply has to be assumed.} The world of experience is erected upon the intelligible world. Both worlds {-the intelligible (thought-of) world and the world of experience (discovered)-} occur simultaneously; neither can exist without the other. These two worlds are reciprocally related to each other within the mind., {Precisely because I think of the world of experience, I must also think of the intelligible world, in order to introduce unity into the manifold of our experience-and vice versa.} Both worlds arise from the laws of ideal activity: the intelligible world has its origin in the laws of thinking; the empirical world has its origin in the laws of intuition. Both are something ideal (noumena), but not things in themselves. Both worlds have their foundation in something that is simply and originally present: the determination of the pure will. Thus, if one wants to talk about what exists "in itself," this would be the pure wiii,EE which reveals itself within the empirical world 74 as the ethical law. This was also noted by Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason. 75 (g) {General Overview of the Present §: To what extent has the difficulty indicated above now been removed? And how has this been accomplished?} All my spiritual or mental acting,FF as such, presupposes something to which it is directed. As an act of modifying, it presupposes something modifiable. Expressed differently, my acting always involves a movement of transition 76 from what is determinable to what is determinate; but there must be something fixed, which supports this movement. {There must 00
It is intelligible, for it is discovered in and by means of nothing but a pure act of think-
in~ (p. 143).
E If one wished to assume something in itself, this would be the determination of the pure will, which would be the only "something in itself' (p. 144). 74 "in der Empirie." "See KRV, B430 and A532/B56o-A558/B586. FF All inner acting of the mind (p. 144). 76 Reading, with H, "ein Uebergehen" forK's "ein Uiberschweben." As Radrizzani notes, Uiherschweben ("to hover or float above") makes little sense in this context, since only
I
l
t:
I: l: ,1'
\lt 'I
be, as it were, some guiding thread, some rail along which it can move.} There must be something enduring and constant; and it is this that we have sought and have [now] discovered as an immediate object of consciousness. {One might wish to explain consciousness on the basis of the sensibly constructed concept of a goal; yet this act of constructing is itself a movement of transition and thus must also begin with an original concept, or concept of an object. Before I can undertake my movement of transition, a concept of an object must already be present. I obtain this concept of an object merely from the fact that I am limited in my acting; but this limitation is not possible unless I act; nor, in turn, can I act without a concept of a goal. This is and remains a perpetual circle. Consequently, sensible consciousness cannot be accounted for on the basis of itself alone. Something else is required, something that is elevated above everything sensible. Accordingly, something supersensible has to be assumed, so that this can be related to sensible consciousness as the object of the same. This supersensible something must therefore be something objective, insofar as it is supposed to be something given. It can be something given only insofar as it is something determinate. Consequently, what is supersensible or intelligible must be something determinate. An objective, given, and determinate [supersensible] something of this sort, however, can only be the will, for it alone is the immediate ob- (145) ject of consciousness; it alone is the immediate, real activity of the I. Consequently,} this determinacy of the pure will is the explanatory ground of all consciousness. {I and the realm of rational beings surrounding me constitute the first object of our consciousness, and the rest of the objects of our cognition now follow without difficulty.} • The present § is related to the preceding ones in the following way: The preceding §§ merely paved the way; in this §, we have established the point from which everything else is derived, and the difficulty has now been removed.GG {We now embark upon a new path, in the course of which we will derive all the remaining objects of our consciousness.} § 13 Real efficacy is possible only in accordance with a concept of a goal; a concept of a goal is possible only on the condition of a cognition; and lhbughts-not actions---am "hover." Presumably, this represents a simple error of transc~tion on Krause's part. Thus we finally have a fixed point, and all the previous §§ have served, so to speak, only as an introduaion that allowed us 10 ascend to this highest point (p. 145).
such a cognition is possible only on the condition of a real efficacy: consequently, consciousness would not be explained at all by this circle. There must therefore be something that simultaneously is an object of cognition and is efficacious. All these features are united in only one thing: in pure will, which must be presupposed prior to all empiri· cal willing and to all empirical cognition. This pure will is something purely intelligible, but it can express itself through a feeling of "ought," and in this way it becomes an object of thought. To the extent that this occurs, pure .willing is assimilated into the overall form of thinking as something determinate in opposition to something determinable. In this way, I, the willing subject, become an individual, and there comes into being for me a realm of rational beings, as what is determinable in this case. Consciousness in its entirety can and must be derived from this pure concept.HH HH [ ••• ]
from these pure concepts (p. 145).
§ 14
{Let us begin with a more precise statement of our next task: ( 145) According to § 12,} a feeling is possible for me only insofar as an alteration occurs within the system of sensibility; and this produces an objective cognition.A Such a cognition, however, is possible only in consequence of acting and only insofar as I think of myself as a cause {§ 13}; but I think of myself as a cause only when I relate the manifold of feeling 1 to pure willing, {[that is,] to myself as the willing subject, in or- (146) der to be able to grasp this manifold}. Pure willing is {nothing that could be altered; it is} originally determinate (although it is not empirically determined)B and determining; it is a pure act of willing insofar as it expresses itself as a {feeling of} "ought." An act of willing which is supposed to have empirical consequences-i.e., to produce an alteration in our feelings-must thus itself be empirical, for the determinacy of the feelings is explained by the determinacy of the will {as the ground of the former}; but a will that is not related to such feelings is no will at all. {Something pure and intelligible does not, by itself, explain anything empirical;} consequently, the pure will explains nothing. Our present task is to explain how pure willing becomes empirical willing. {Once again, therefore, we must seek an intermediate term to fill this gap between what is intelligible and what is empirical.} 153
Preliminary Explication by Means of Examples ( 1) I move an object through space and observe this movement. The object is first in one place, then in another, etc. The [position of this] A[ .•• ] produces an objective representation (p. 145). 1 Reading "Gefiihls" forK's "Erfolgs" ("the manifold that results [from pure acting]"). As Fuchs notes, the words Gefiihl.s and Eifolgs are very similar in German script. Hence Fuchs treats this as a simple error of transcription on Krause's part, which, of course, supports the hypothesis that K is a fair copy based upon notes previously taken in class. 8 This willing is nothing empirical within time (p. 146).
[ 308]
object is determined by nothing except my own willing; every determination of place is related to my willing, and this alone is what is absolute. All cognizing and becoming within space depend upon my will.c If this is so, then my will itself must be related to space. Space, however, is something empirical (the form of intuition), which can exist only within experience. The pure will, on the other hand, is supposed to ~ecede experience, and thus it is insufficient for an empirical account. {How then does my pure will become empirical?} (2) A concept' of a goal is possible only by means of objective cognition; but the latter presupposes that a concept of a goal is already present. {In § 13} we succeeded only partially in our attempt to escape from this cirde: {We found that the pure will and the original concept of a goal are one and the same.} A goal has certainly been postulated, but not a sensible one. How does the original goal {or the pure will} become something sensible? Le., how is it related to the sensible world? Were this question raised in order to establish a theory of ethics, it could be formulated, "How does the ethical Jaw obtain applicability?" (See Fichte's [System oJ1 Ethical Tluory.) 2 We are here attempting to derive concepts of the world. These are supposed to be derived from the pure will, but the pure will is of no use for this purpose-precisely because it is pure. {To be sure, we have already given a preliminary and partial answer to our present question, an answer that depends upon the act of thinking.} Thinking as such, as the mere act of thinking of something, 11 is the intermediate link between what is intelligible and the sensible world. Therefore, it must be by means of thinking that the pure will becomes sensible-not simply {(as in the preceding §)}in the sense that some- (147) thing objective would have to be thought of along with and as contained within the thought of the pure will, but also in the sense that the pure will {itselj} would become a {sensible,} empirical will simply as a result of the fact that we think about it. Anything that is thought of is subjected to the laws of thinking. We are not [ordinarily] conscious of these laws, however; we become conscious of them only by means of philosophy. c I push a chair forward, and I observe this movement. What does this mean? Reply: The chair comes to rest in this place, then in this one, etc. What then does this mean? What determines the "this"? Reply: It is determined by nothing other than my own willing: the chair is where I wanted to place it. ln this example of determining place, therefore, the determination of place is related to my willing, and all other positing in space first depends upon my willing (p. 146). 0 The pure will, on the other hand, is not in space. Space first arises only iruofur as feeling and intuition are present, and my pure will is supposed to precede all these (p. •46). 2 1JaJ System der Siumkhre (SW, IV: r-g65, and AA 1, 5: 19-~1' 7). See especially Part II: "Deduction of the Reality and Applicability of the Principle of Ethics," SW, IV: 63-156. '"Das Den ken als solches, als sich etwas Den ken."
310
1 54
§ 14
The pure will has been thought of as an Idea. Do we think of the pure will or not? If we did not think of it at all, then we could not speak of it. If we do think of it, however, then it falls under the laws of thinking and becomes something sensible. In respect to its form, the pure will is viewed as a movement of transition, as something determinate to which something determinable is opposed, and it is in this way that the I becomes an individual. Through this, however, the I is made sensible only in a formal sense. It might also be the case that the pure will could become sensible and empirical materialiter. 4 For the moment, however, this is a mere presupposition.
Preliminary Inquiry (1) Is the {entire} state of the I, prior to all feeling, intuiting, and think-
ing, to be portrayed as what is actually a priori? Nothing actual would be obtained in this way at all; this [prior state of the J] is an Idea (an aid to understanding), 5 something we have to presuppose in order to explain what needs to be explained. The difficulty lies in the fact that we are able to think only in accordance with the laws of thinking. Thus we have to abstract, as much as we are able, from all {the laws of thinking}, and must assimilate this prior state of the I to the form of thinking only to the extent that we simply must do so {in order to be able to think of anything at all-even in the most abstract possible manner}. My will is originally determinate, and this determinacy of my will constitutes my true character as a rational being.E {Will is a relative concept and is related to a hindrance, a force, etc., all of which must be thought of whenever we think of the will.} This determinacy can be viewed in two different ways: (1) It can be viewed as will (with respect to its form), and hence, as a tendency or disposition, as something in consequence of which something else is demanded. (2) It can be viewed as a being, as my own structure or constitution, 6 to the extent that I regard this [determinate] willing as the object of an intuition-though, to be sure, it is not the object of any intuition we already possess; instead, it is the object of an intuition to which we must nevertheless here refer in order to be able to think of anything {at all}. Willing, by its very nature, involves a demand that extends beyond the act of willing, though we cannot yet explain what this is that lies beyond willing. • "in a material sense:· 5 "eine Hiilfslinie." E My will is originally determinate, and only this determinacy of "something"-which is called "will" only subsequently, in contrast with my other powers-constitutes the true character of my essence (p. 147). 6 "als Beschaffenheit meiner selbst."
55
{This is true of every possible type of willing, including empirical willing. For example, after deliberating for a while, I reach a decision to do something or other. Thus I always move from what is indeterminate to what is determinate; I demand something that is supposed to lie outside of me. To the extent, however, that I make this demand, I myself become something: namely, the subject who wills this particular thing. I thereby become constituted in a certain way. 7 I was previously undetermined, but now I am the subject who wills this or that. This is now my constitution, my state. · In the case of pure willing, however, the difference that is implicit in becoming is absent. I do not become anything by means of pure willing; instead, I absolutely am.} Considered in the Iauer respect, this act of willing determines my entire being and essence once and for all, for all eternity. I am nothing but a subject who wills in a certain way, and my being consists in nothing but willing in just this way. {My being and my willing are one and the same, and nothing can be added to or substracted from this.} This constitutes the original reality {(the "root")} of the I. This is the result of all our inquiries: {only an act of willing, indeed,} only the pure will, is capable of being the immediate object of consciousness. {Consequently, this pure act of willing must possess original reality.} We are unable to consider this pure act of willing as an act of willing, however, for no object is present to which it could be related; {nor is there any ideal activity for which this reality could exist, and thus} we are also unable to regard it as a being, for no consciousness is present for which it could exist. {Does this then mean that this pure act of willing is impossible?} Objectiun: Ideal and real activity are certainly united in the I; consequently, the act of willing can be related to the ideal activity. Reply: This is impossible, because the ideal activity is governed by the law [of thinking} according to which it can grasp wholes only bit by bit, or through their parts; i.e., it is impossible because the finite intellect is only discursive. But what we are concerned with here is my entire state or my state as a whole, and thus it too can be grasped only bit by bit. The intellect's acts of feeling, intuiting, and thinking are only movements of transition from one state to another; yet a movement of transition is possible only if the manifold that comes into being includes various elements (the previously indicated feelings), each of which can be grasped only all at once.F If [on the other hand} our [entire] state were to be 7
"ich bin dadurch auf eine gewifk Weise beschaffen." Why then is there no consciousness of this pure act of willing? &pl1: Because the ideal activity is governed by the law according to which it grasps things only bit by bit, or grasps only determinate parts, because the finite intellect can think only discursively. Hence I cannot grasp my state as a whole by means of ideal activity, F
312
§ 14
grasped all at once, then no movement of transition would occur, and therefore no whole would be grasped. {A discrete act of grasping of this sort is called a "feeling,"} but what is our state as a whole? According to what was just said, it is a synthesis of willing and being, a relationship of the two, within which neither can be separated from the other. {It is a being that is the result of an act of willing, and an act of willing that demands a being.} When a single part [of this whole] is grasped and related to the will, this signifies satisfaction; but, since this is only a single part, limitation is signified as well. Consequently, causal power and limitation become inseparable; {they are united in the whole and in every part of the same}. Insofar as causal power is here present, it [this single portion of the whole] exists for us, for we can intuit ourselves only in the course of acting efficaciously; insofar as some limitation is here present, 8 this becomes something feelable, intuitable, and thinkable-a quantum.G My true being consists in the determinacy of my willing, and my entire state is also determined by this determinacy; for time, as well as any process occurring within time, comes into being only as a result of our thinking. I do not undergo any development within time; I am finished and complete, all at once and forever. This entire being is grasped within time, and only thereby does a process of development over time come into being for thinking." {This would answer a question that has not been answered by any previous philosopher: What is the origin of the content or material of feeling? ( 1 Answer: This originates from intuition; intuition, however, already presupposes this content.} Feeling is self-affection. In a feeling, something is done to us; consequently, there must be something within us to which this can be done, and this is our own acting. Our acting, however, is nothing for us apart from limitation, just as there is no limitation for this is able only to grasp various details about my state, i.e., to grasp it in bits and pieces. This dismemberment is not a matter of my free choice; it is dictated by the laws of my thinking and is a consequence of the movement of transition from one thing to another. On the other hand, this same movement of transition would admittedly also be impossible if the various individual elements of this process could not somehow each be grasped all at once. There must therefore be something fixed, and we have previously discovered this to be something indivisible within feeling: red is red (p. 148). 8 "wir konnen uns nur im Wiirken anschauen, dadurch dafJ es begrenzt ist." Cp. H: "durch BESCHRANKTHEIT." G Through the exercise of causality, something comes into beingfor us, for the only thing we can intuit immediately is ourselves. Through limitation, something becomes feelable and intuitable for us; in a word, it becomes a quantum, an object of our feeling (p. 148). H My true being consists in the determinacy of willing. This constitutes my being in its entirety. This is grasped in time, and, in this way, I myself come into being, even though I already exist in advance. This whole is a single being, which is determined by an act of willing, and this constitutes my state as a whole. But only parts of this whole can be and are grasped; therefore, what is grasped is only something limited (p. 148).
156
apart from acting. {If one were to represent our consciousness as a continuous line and were to continue dividing this line forever, one would never find a single point in which acting (freedom) and limitation of acting were not combined.} Anything we can feel consists, {therefore, of our own acting and this limitation}: it exists for us in consequence of acting, and it is an object of feeling only because this acting is Iimited. 1 {Consequently,} all of our consciousness commences with an interaction between acting and limitation. Both exist together, and this is the object of feeling. {7fherefore, "I feel myselr' means the same thing as "I am the feeling subject."} One should not think of time in conjunction with this affection; instead, it is our state {as a whole, prior to all time}. I am originally determined. It [the I] is a being, and indeed, a limited being. Moreover, I can grasp this being only to a limited extent. Doing and limitation are found everywhere. {Later on, we will explain how any feeling at all arises from this constant conjunction of acting and limitation. Let us now turn from real to ideal activity.} • The power of feeling is ideal; it is the source of all intuiting and thinking. All our thinking within time originates from the power of feeling. {Synthetic, discursive thinking originates in feeling, since we are unable to grasp our state as a whole by means of feeling; for feeling is able to grasp our state as a whole only bit by bit, and thus only the parts of the latter exist for feeling.} Remark: We spoke above of the original limitation from which the particular feelings arise and referred to it as "our overall state." We also spoke of an alteration within this state. We now have a much more precise understanding of all this. {What then is it that is limited?} The real activity {of the I} is limited by our willing, by {our} individuality. We are able to extend our thoughts beyond this limit and can also think of rational beings outside of ourselves, {and we thereby first determine ourselves through other rational beings}. The ideal activity is limited [as well]: we are able to grasp our own state only gradually, and indeed, in determinate bits. Thanks to the limitation of the ideal activity, we become something for ourselves. Thanks to the limitation of the real activity, we determine ourselves through reference to rational beings outside of ourselves. When all this is assimilated to external intuition, this provides us with the sensible world. The manifold within me and the manifold outside of me are reciprocally related to one another. Every single thing within me is determined by everything else within me, {i.e., it is what everything else within me is not,} and vice versa; 1 An instance of acting exists for us only insofar as it is intuited as our own acting-as possessing causal power; and, at the same time, it is an object of our feeling only insofar as it is limited (p. 149).
{similarly, I am what the other beings outside of me are not, and vice versa}. But all this comes from [our own] absolute being' and from the absolute limitation of our ability to grasp this absolute being. With respect to reality, I am not everything; with respect to ideality, I am unable to grasp what I am all at once.
•57
(2) {How can a rational being become conscious of its own entire state as a whole? This can occur only by means of ideal activity, since the state of our ( 150) real activity, [as determined by] pure willing, remains eternally unchangeable with respect to all our possible experience-for nothing new can ever be added to nor can anything be subtracted from this state. We will now turn to an examination of how the ideal activity can provide one with a consciousness of one's entire state. This new presentation of the Wi.ssenschaftslehre diverges from the published version in the way that it answers this question. Prompted by the circumstances of the time, the primary aim of the earlier version was to show that all our consciousness has its foundation in the eternally valid laws of our thinking. In addition to this, however, this new presentation also provides us with the intelligible world as a firm substrate for the empirical one.} Now that what is actually real has been presented in isolation from everything else, we must discuss the relationship of what is ideal to the former, that is, to our own state. An ideal activity directed at an object whose existence is already presupposed is called "an act of reflection."K {How does this ideal activity of reflection appear to us?} (A) Reflection is unconditionally free to select {from this intelligible primary matter~ the manifold to which it will direct itself. There is no absolute reason why it chooses one manifold over another. (I exist in accordance with my original being. This original being is what is supposed to be reflected upon here. As a result of this act of reflection and in consequence of the laws governing the same, my own being is transformed into something manifold {-and, in this respect, I am not free, nor am I free in my act of grasping this manifold, inasmuch as I can grasp it only in an atomic fashion, bit by bit}.) The reflecting subject is the I; indeed, it is the ideal power of the I, which is not determined by the previously described determination of the real I. {The I is "something" and is nothing else whatsoever; thus it is originally determinate, but only with respect to its real power. As an 1 Everything, however, is determined by being (p. 149). K An Ukal activity of this sort, i.e., one that refers to and presupposes something intelligible in iLSelf, is called "an act of reflection," which has a firm object in the intelligible world, or in the original state [of the I] (p. 150). 9 "aus jenem intelligiblen Grundstoffe."
ideal power, on the other hand, the I is undetermined.} But it is the very nature of 1-hood to determine itself unconditionally, 10 to be what is absolutely first {in every moment of reflection} and never to be anything secondary {-for otherwise it would not be an I}. Consequently, this act of reflection is absolutely free. This absolute freedom of reflection is itself something supersensible. What is sensible first appears in consequence of the fact that the I is constrained in that it can reflect only upon parts, indeed, only upon certain parts [of the manifold of feeling]. This is the point of union between the supersensible world and the sensible world. {I thereby pass from the intelligible to the sensible world and unify both within one and the same consciousness.} The determinacy produced by this act of reflection is a picture of myself in miniature. There can be no I, however, without absolute freedom; accordingly, absolute freedom must also be included within this picture. Considered from another side, this {supersensible, absolute} freedom of reflection is also empirical, and an empirical I is possible only by means of such freedom. The essence of what is empirical lies in this gradual, step-by-step process of grasping things individually and then combining them. (This is what is sensible.) Freedom, on the other hand, consists in this very process of grasping and combining. (This is what is supersensible.) We here have the synthesis of freedom and empirical sequence. 11 Neither can exist without the other. What is intelligible, {[i.e.,].freedom,} exists only insofar as it is thought of in conjunction with this empirical sequence, in order to unify the manifold contained in this sequence, {for what is intelligible exists for us only insofar as it is posited (151 within this sequence; and conversely,} this sequence is impossible without freedom, since it first comes into being only by means of the freedom of reflection, {for freedom contains within itself the foundation of the sequence. Freedom must have as its object some sequence A, B, C, D, E, F, etc. I cannot be free at all unless I posit a series in this manner. This also allows us to see what the previously mentioned "state of the I as a whole" means, insofar as this is thought of as something actual. This, however, is nothing but a thought; it is something we merely think of within this sequence, in order to explain the same, .and it would not be possible for us to do this without freedom ofreflection. This state [of the I as a whole] is nothing in itself; instead, it is only something thought of, something that exists for a finite, rational being.} Freedom of reflection is {therefore} the true point of origin of consciousness. (B) Within this free and absolutely highest act of reflection, I appear to myself as the willing subject {(inasmuch as I can reflect anew upon 10 11
"sich schlechthin selbst zu bestimmen." "die Synthesis der Freiheit und der Empirie der Reihenfolge."
,/
I I
'i
,I! ~~
f
II l
:i
I '58
I~.
this free act of reflection, whereas all other acts of reflection presuppose the latter)}. This act of reflection does not appear to me as such; instead, it appears as will. {This can be clarified by contrasting it with the previously stated theorem:} We said above that an object of sensible perception must appear to us as something present independently of our reflection, {for, in the act of reflecting upon this object, I must think of myself as able either to engage in reflection or not to do so. I cannot think of myself in this way, however, unless I have already engaged in reflection-albeit without noticing it. This subject (i.e., the act of reflection) to which I attach the predicate "freedom" becomes a thing that is present for me.} • In our present case, the situation is just the reverse: the act of reflection is here not posited as such, nor is it thought of as something separate from its object, {for the object is itself a part of the state of the pure will; reflecting and willing are inseparably united: the object is the will and coincides with the act of reflection}. Consequently, all that appears in this case is the object, and moreover, it appears as part of my own state, and thus as a part of my pure act of willing. Accordingly, what appears is a will and nothing else. Hence I do discover a pure act of willing, but this is now completely identical with the empirical act of willing just described.L • Result: Taken in itself, that is, within the context of a completely transcendental account of consciousness, this means that I do not will within time and that my will is nothing empirical. Yet I do indeed reflect within time upon my pure will, with respect to the sequence {of the manifold} contained within this pure will, and this act of reflection occurs with absolute freedom. This act of reflection itself becomes for me an act of empirical willing within time. This freedom of reflection 12 is precisely what we call "free will" or "freedom of choice," 13 {and this is the act of empirical willing that was described in the preceding§}. • It, {the pure act of willing,} is itself something produced through {the laws of} thinking, {and it arises for me only as a result of my own thinking. It is nothing but a certain way of looking at things. One cannot say, "I am engaged in a certain act of willing 'in itself' "; 14 instead, thought, reflection, and willing are one and the same.} Nevertheless, the thought involved is a necessary one. For this reason, one must not interpret this act of free reflection as an illusion; nor should one want to go beyond it, for one cannot go beyond the laws of thinking. L The will is not something independent of the I; consequently, all that presents itself to me is a free act of willing. This is an act of empirical willing, or the free act of reflection discussed above (p. 151 ). 12 Reading, with H, "diese Freiyheit der REFLEX! ON" for K's ':Jene freie RI:FL.EXION" ("this free act of reflection"). ""Freiheit der Willkiihr, auch Freiheit der Wahl." 14 "ich will AN SICH so." That is, one cannot claim that what is involved in an act of willing is the will "in itself."
(C) All this, {that the act of reflection appears as an act of willing,} is ' true only to the extent to which the entire ideal activity becomes contracted and directed upon a single, originaJM object of reflection. 15 Consciousness is possible only as a result of such an act of contraction. {Actually, we have already discovered this in our description of the will and of what distinguishes willing from deliberating and wishing. Only insofar as my ideal activity or my act of reflection is contracted and directed upon a single point or upon a single part of the original act of willing does reflection appear to me as will.} Does it follow from this that it is also possible that the ideal activitymight not be focused upon a single point {and thus that it might simply flutter here and there}? Yes indeed! Reflection is not only free to choose what it shall be directed upon, it is also free to choose whether to reflect at all. {Therefore, it is also free to come to a rest upon an object of reflection and not to reflect any further.} This freedom, however, is possible only if an act of reflection has already occurred within time. {We will say more below about this power of abstraction.} Wishing and deliberating are possible only insofar as something has already been willed. Consciousness comes into being with an act of willing. {We have said the following: In empirical consciousness things are grasped separately and in isolation from one another; they are dispersed and occur within time. Such empirical consciousness is nothing other than an act of reflection, an act of thinking. The object of this act, however, is something that is simply "there," just as a rational being as such is simply present. This object is an act of willing; and this original object, which appears as an act of willing, coincides with the act of willing only because it is possible for the ideal activity to come to a rest and to be contracted and directed upon a single point. What have we achieved in this way?} Our question was: How is an empirical act of willing possible? A partial answer to this question is as follows: Empirical willing becomes possible through an act of reflecting separately or bit by bit upon individual parts of [pure] willing. N Our entire question {actually} concerns the {possibility} that the will could be determined by an empirical object. 16 Consequently, our question has not yet been entirely answered. M possible (p. 152). 15 "in wieferen die ganze ideate Thatigkeit auf einen urspriinglichen REFU:XIONsgegendstand CONTRAHIRT wird." N Our question was, How is an act of willing within time possible? This question was partially answered by deriving an individual act of willing from our original act of willing as a whole-{ though only] insofar as one reflec!S upon this individual act of willing (p.
152). 16 "Unsere ganze Frage war, nach der empirischen Bestimmtheit des Willens durch ein Object." More literally: "Our whole question concerned the empirical determinacy of the will by an object." The translation is guided by the parallel passage in H: "Denn unsere ganze Frage war eigentlich nach der Miiglichkeil der Bestimmlheit des Willens durch ein EM· PIRISCHES 0bject1"
{Anyone who believes that this is a simple question that can be answered [simply] by saying that "our pure willing becomes empirical insofar as I grasp individual parts of the same by means of reflection~ fails to understand the full scope of this question. As a general rule, a comprehensive and well-grounded philosophy addresses itself less to people's doubts than to their all-too-many-and alltoo-lightly-held-beliefs. Such a philosophy concerns itself with the fact that people assume that far too many things that have long remained unproved and incorrect are already settled.}
159
(3) The act of willing that is reflected upon, or {(what is the same thing)} the act of reflection that was described above as appearing as an act of willing, is only one portion of the pure act of willing. Accordingly, this portion should be distinguished from all the other possible acts of willing; and only if it has been distinguished in this way can it become, for reflection, a determinate act of willing. A particular act of willing is distinguished from other acts of willing by its object, since all willing (i.e., willing qua willing) has the same form. Thus the postulated act of reflection upon the pure will is not possible without some cognizance of objects.0 Where do we obtain such cognition? This is simply another version of our previous question concerning the origin of our concept of a goal. I cannot will at all unless I will some particular object. (We who are already conscious can distinguish between various acts of willing, for we already have cognizance of various objects. What concerns us at this point in our inquiry, however, is the very origin of all consciousness. P • {Concerning this point, one should} compare {what is said here with (15 what is contained in the instructor's} Natural Right. 11 {Here, however, we have to dig even deeper and must investigate the underlying principles, which were only presupposed in this book.}) Solution to the difficulties now facing us: (A) According to section 1 of this §, some being is already connected {originally} with the will as such. {The pure will is to be regarded as the 0 Consequently, [even] in the case of the pure will, some cognition of objects must already be present in order for us to be able to grasp this pure will and its parts (p. 153). P We who are engaged in philosophical inquiry certainly know how various acts of willing are distinguished, because we already have various acquaintances with objects. We have often made such distinctions [between acts of willing], because we are already acquainted with [objects] 1, 2, 3, 4, etc. Accordingly, experience and consciousness are already presupposed. The case of the I is different. Are we not here still standing at the threshold of any consciousness at all? (p. 153). 17 Grundltsge du Nat.urrechts (SW, Ill: 1-385 = AA I, 3: 311-46o, and AA I, 4: 4-165). See especially Part I, "Deduction of the Concept of Right," SW, Ill: 17-56.
l way I am constituted, my state as a whole. I will; therefore, I am a willing subject.} Consequently, reflection upon a being (i.e., upon an object) is also connected with reflection upon the will. {Thus being and willing are connected through an object.} Being and willing are the same thing, merely viewed from two different sides and related to two different powers of the mind. 18 ("I will X": to this extent my thoughts are directed at something outside of me. "/ will": to this extent my thoughts are directed upon myself.) {Accordingly, the act of willing is itself an object; an object is already contained within an act of willing. What then is the difference between reflecting upon willing and reflecting upon being?} Willing (the son of willing described above, in sect. [2,] B, as "empirical willing") is the object of no.thing but a pure act of thinking, and this is the sole act of pure thinking that occurs within actual consciousness. This unique act of pure thinking is identical to the act of empirical willing.Q Being is the object of an intuition, and this intuition is also accompanied by an act of thinking, for there can be no intuition without a concept. The thinking that accompanies an intuition is not an act of pure thinking, however; it is an act of objective thinking; {it is directed at ( 154) an object}. Thinking and intuition are necessarily united, and this is the source of the union of thinking and willing within the I. Therefore, being and willing are necessarily connected. {All idealism is based upon this. This is its central point. Pure thinking and intuiting are united, and, as we have already seen, this alone is the origin of the union of willing and being. Everyone will readily admit that I can also view my own will as [part of] my constitution. Nevertheless, being and wiJiing remain two different things, depending upon which power of the mind is related to one and the same X ( = willing and being). If X is merely lhov.ght of, then it is a will; if, on the other hand, it is intuited, then it is an object-a being. But thinking and intuiting are necessarily connected with each other; consequently, willing and being are also connected with each other. This law is the source of all reality for us-as well as the source of the objective world. That within us to which the representation of what is objective must be connected is an act of willing. A being must also be connected with this act of willing, however, because the latter is grasped by two different powers of the mind: thinking and intuiting. If it is grasped by thinking, then it becomes an act of willing. If it is grasped by intuiting, then it 18
"Gemiithskrafte." An act of pure /AiMing is directed at the pure act of willing; empirical willing itself is this act of pure thinking, which is the only kind of pure thinking that occurs in the proof19 (p. 1 54l· 19 "im Bewei!J." This appears to be an erroneous transcription of ''im BewufJtsein" ("in consciousness"). Q
320
160
§ 14
becomes a being. Through the former, there arises for us an objective view of ourselves. Through the latter, there arises an objective world. Through this law, 20 which states that neither thinking nor intuiting could exist at all without the other, everything becomes attached to our willing. But what kind of being is connected with an act of willing?} Our own being, as well as that of the world, originates in intuition. {According to sect. I, above,} this being {that is connected with willing}, which is here the object of reflection, is pure willing itself; more specifically, it is the latter insofar as it is intuited. {It is and remains the same and is merely looked at differently. Insofar as the portion of the pure will that is gy-asped (i.e., the empirical will) is intuited, and not merely thought of, an empirical being is also connected with it. But what kind of intuition are we talking about here?} • What we are discussing here is quite obviously an outer intuition; {for no object is given to us through inner intuition. Inner intuition only makes it possible to connect what is intelligible with objects; i.e., it (155) merely makes it possible to order it and to assimilate it to the form of intuition,} for time-the form of inner intuition-is only the form of {the empirical intuition ot} what is intelligible. {But time is not the form of the intuition of objects. Objects occur within time only to the extent that freedom is introduced into the world of objects, i.e., only to the extent that the objective world appears as organized. Insofar as it merely accords with the form of[outer] intuition, the world is passive and dead; when freedom is introduced into this world, it becomes an expression and a presentation of freedom. The representative of freedom in the sensible world is the body, which appears as something given, something that conditions all our efficacious acting and all our consciousness. Thls is why we said above that the pure will appears as something given: because I discover my own body as something given to me.} • The form of outer intuition is space, and the object of such an intuition is necessarily matter in space. Consequently, the being we are here discussing would also be matter in space, and an intuition of material being in space would necessarily be connected with the act of reflecting upon {or thinking about} the will, {though we do not know that this being is produced by intuition}. Pure willing is present in advance of all empirical willing, and what we intuit, {that is, being as matter in space,} is pure willing itself, which is observed {only} under the form of sensible intuition. A being that is determined by pure willing, that is matter in space, and that is an expres20 Reading "Durch dieses Gesetz" for H's "An dieses Gesetz," which makes little sense in this context.
§ 14
321
sion of the original energy of our willing itself: such a being is our own body, insofar as it is an instrument. Our willing within time is already assimilated to the form of thinking. {Our body is the enduring presentation of our willing within the material world. This being, which is the pure will as intuited, is not a product of my empirical willing; it is not an alteration in my state. Instead, insofar as the empirical will is under the sway of the power of free choice, then what is witl;tin our control is the result of an original act of willing, which precedes all empirical willing.} • The nature of our empirical willing is such, however, that something is supposed to come into existence immediately as a result of it. (E.g., I can immediately move my hand or my foot simply by willing to do so.) My empirical will, however, is nothing but a particular way of thinking about my pure will; consequently, my hand and my foot must come under the control of my pure will, and this means that they are my pure will itself, in the form of outer intuition, as matter in spaceR {This was described in the treatise on morality as the "first point of our ( 156) efficacious acting within the sensible world. " 2 2J • The most precise empirical concept of the body is as follows: My body (insofar as it is articulated) is what I am able to control simply by my power of free choice, {where I need do no more than will. Note: I have control over my body only insofar as it is articulated, not as an organic system.}. The transcendental concept of the body is as follows: My body is my original willing, assimilated to the form of outer intuition. "My body and I"-"my mind and I": these expressions mean the same thing. Insofar as I intuit myself, I am my body. Insofar as I think of myself, I am my mind. But neither of these can exist without the other, and this constitutes the union of the mind with the body.s &suit: {In order to explain consciousness, there must therefore be an act of reflection, and the object of this act of reflection is the pure will.} An intuition of an object ( = my body) is connected with the act of reflection upon the pure will. {We intuit our original energy, determination, or pure will as our body; i.e., the willing subject is intuited as matter "Our empirical will is so constituted that something has to exist outside of it, in addition to this will itself. If, for example, I will to see, I must have an eye. My eye is controlled by my power of free choice; i.e., it is subject to my empirical will. My empirical will itself, however, is nothing but an appearance, a way of thinking about pure willing; consequently, it must be through the pure will that I control my eye as well. What does this mean? My eye is nothing in itself; instead, it is my pure will itself, as it appears under the form of outer intuition in space21 (p. 155). 21 "nur als Form der aussern Anschauung im Raume." 22 See Das SJSiem der SiUenlehre, § 6 (SW, IV: g8). s "I"-"my body"-"my mind": these all mean and assert the same thing. I am my body and my mind: all are one. I am my body when I intuit myself; I am [my] mind when I think of myself. But I cannot do one without also doing the other; and for this reason I ascribe both to myself. They are distinguished merely as different aspects (p. 156).
322
§ 14
in the sensible world.} All sensible perception begins with the perception of my body. (B) Returning to our main inquiry, we discover that we have still not solved the problem confronting us. Our body is the original presentation T of our entire original act of willing, but we are able to reflect upon it only bit by bit. How is this possible? Through my pure act of willing, my being is given to me all at once, but I am able to reflect upon it only bit by bit. If I could reflect all at once upon my entire will, this act of reflection would be accompanied by a reflection upon my body as a whole; since I cannot accomplish the former, however, then neither can I accomplish the latter. {Therefore, I also have no intuition of my entire body, because I cannot reflect upon my pure act of willing as a whole. Nor have we yet shown how the indicated act of reflecting and thinking bit by bit, an act directed only at a part [of the whole], is possible. Hence we must penetrate even deeper-and indeed, quite abstractly.} • Here we face the following difficulty: I am free when I engage in an act of reflection; but my act of reflection is an act of wrenching something out of the mass [of what is determinable], and thus it is an act of limiting.u A conscious act of limiting is not possible, however, unless I am acquainted with something that is assumed to lie beyond the limits 23 in question. This, however, is not possible, and thus reflection is not possible either. This difficulty could be avoided only if the limitation in question were one that would exist without my first having had to produce it through an act of reflection. It would have to be something that is originally discovered, an original feeling. {My pure will is a whole, and I am free to reflect upon any part of this whole I want. As a result, time comes into being for me, and, as a result of this, something empirical within space comes into being for me; and only thereby does any consciousness at all come into being. But how does what is limited-e.g., parts X, Y, Z, etc.-become present within my pure will? Do I introduce this limitation by means of my own free act of reflection? Certainly not, for this would presuppose some prior experience: I would have to possess in advance the concepts of X, Y, Z, etc. Here, however, we are standing at and discussing the origin of the I's consciousness. Consequently, parts X, Y, and Z must already be found within the pure will and must be contained therein. Accordingly, we have to indicate some original limitation within the pure will itself. TOur body is the sensible presentation [ ... ] (p. 156). u I am free when I engage in reflection. But my act of reflecting is at the same time limited: I cannot reflect upon everything [at once], but only bit by bit (p. 156). 2 ' Reading, with Krause's MS, "Grenzen" for K's "Grenze."
. 't
162
Idealism and dogmatism thus approach each other at this point.} Remark: Until the previous§, our path led continually upward, [from what is sensible] to what is intelligible. Our present path leads in-the opposite direction. {Here we will continue further along our descending path. We have already descended from thinking to intuiting; now we will descend to feeling.} We have seen that thinking cannot occur without intuition. What we have to show now is that {the original limitation of the pure will is caused by a feeling and that} intuition could not occur without feeling. At every point in our inquiry we have encountered something originally present. In the case of the {original} act of thinking, this was the pure act of willing; in the case of intuition, what we found to be originally present was the material [of intuition]. Is something originally present in the case of feeling as well? We said above that I am originally determinate; some alteration has to occur within the system of sensibility. Here is the question: What is the origin of this alteration?v {An answer is possible only by means of the following antithesis:} The alteration in question cannot be produced by me, for I am able to produce an alteration only in accordance with a concept of the samewhich I do not possess in this case. Consequently, this alteration would have to have been externally produced. In that case, however, it would not exist for me at all; it would, {like the dogmatist's "thing,"} be a thing in itself, {in which case it would exist only for another intellect}. Therefore, the alteration in question would have to be something I produced and something I did not produce, and it would have to be both at once. {But how can these coexist?} To the extent that this is something externally produced, limitation would be present. To the extent that this is something I produce, activity would be involved. The task, accordingly, would be to unite limitation and activity. An alteration is nothing in itself. It is something that arises only for discursive thinking.w {Alteration is nothing but an affection mediated through the concept of time;} my pure being does not undergo any alteration whatsoever. Nevertheless, the concept of alteration is present within consciousness, and, to this extent, time arises as well. Our question, therefore, is as follows: How does the concept of alteration originate prior to any freedom of abstraction? {To be sure, I can (158) subsequently obtain this concept [by means of abstraction], but how can it be present here in advance of all knowing and at the very beginning of v We spoke above about the state of the I as a whok. But this is something that could not be grasped without an alteration in this whole system. What then is the origin of this alteration? (p. 157). wIt is something that arises only by means of discursive thinking (p. 157).
all consciousness? Where does it come from? How are we able to presuppose and to think in advance of this concept of alteration, which, in itself, is certainly nothing?} (a) "I perceive a determinate state of myself." {(It does not matter here whether this is an act of willing or a being, something sensible or something intelligible. In short, we are here considering this determinate state in its highest universality. I perceive it:} this obviously means that I relate this determinate state to my state as a whole, i.e., to the entire possible system of my being. {Perception is made possible only by opposing and relating a particular state to my state as a whole-as we illustrated above with the example of wine tasting. 24} All multiplicity in several moments of time is thus based upon something opposed to it, {my entire state} at a single moment. {For example: In moment A, I have a certain perception. Then I perceive something else in moments B, C, and D. A manifold or a multiplicity in several moments is not perceptible at all, however, unless, in moment A, something posited in opposition to this manifold lies at the basis of the same.} (~)This system of my being {necessarily} contains within itself the substrate of what is here perceived separately and in a determinate manner, and this substrate is {therefore} posited along with the system as a whole. This same substrate X is thus opposed and related to itself, and thus it is posited in several different aspects. The best example of this is provided by my own body (here considered only in terms of its articulated parts). I do not have any total feeling of my body. I feel only my individual limbs, and I first obtain a concept of my body as a whole by relating these to each other. I perceive [my body] only when some alteration occurs; I feel [my body] only when I alter one part in relation to the whole.x I can perceive my hand only insofar as I move it to a different position in relation to the whole. Movement, however, is possible only in relation to a state of repose. Repose is the terminus a quo. When I move my hand, I must think of it as having been lying still. In this example, my hand would be the substrate, and repose and movement would be the two different-albeit inseparably connected-aspects of the same. (y) What is the origin of these different aspects of a single substrate X? A transcendental philosophy must show how both these aspects arise {from the original determinacy of the I and} from the laws of thinking. (1 24
See above, § 6, sect. 6. x I obtain a concept of the whole only by means of the concept of the individual members, i.e., by thereby relating these individual members to the whole. For example, I perceive my hand only insofar as it alters or moves. I first feel the individual parts [of my body] only insofar as they are altered in relation to my body as a whole, i.e., [only through their] movement (p. 158).
163
Thus the question remains, What is the origin of this double aspect of X, which is based upon the laws of thinking? (b) This double aspect is {necessarily} an original [feature of substrate X] and not an acquired one, {one that is introduced within time}. Nothing, however, is original except the pure will. Consequently, the pure will itself must possess a double aspect, and we have already indicated something of this sort above. Willing (i.e., force or energy) and limitation are both contained within the pure will, {and, according to the preceding§, the pure will is thereby determined}. If this double aspect of the pure will is what provides us with the foundation for a reflection upon the determinate state [of the I], then it follows that willing and limitation must be {absolutely synthetically} united within this act of reflection. It must be possible-in one and the same moment-to intuit one and the same [substrate] X of my state as both existing and not existing; 25 i.e., it must possible to intuit it as totally opposed to itself, and indeed, in such a way that neither of its opposed aspects would be possible apart from the other. {We wish to posit some possible act of willing. In order to do this, I must regard myself as an empirical act of willing-i.e., as a subject able to posit itself as willing or as not willing. Expressed in terms of an intuition, I must posit an intuition that both exists and does not exist. For example, the movement of my hand is nothing apart from a state of repose. Movement is always related to repose. Movement and repose, however, are opposites, posited in opposition to each other. In order to be able to intuit my hand as having moved, I must at the same time think of it as in a state of repose; indeed, I must do both in one and the same moment. "Existing" and "not existing" are always only two different aspects of one and the same thing.} (e) We are here dealing with the purely formal side of the question concerning the possibility of the object of reflection (i.e., we are concerned with it as an act of reflection as such or in general, {as originally preceding all other acts of reflection}). One can reflect only upon something limited. But what is the origin of this limited object of reflection? The problem is to understand how 26 a manifold {or a limitation} could be contained within the original object of reflection, i.e., within the pure will. We have a precise answer to this question: Limitation too must be originally present, and it is just as original as the pure will itself. The will is related to this [originaU limitation in multiple ways; and, within this relationship, the will itself becomes something manifold. 25
26
"als seiend und nicht seiend." Reading, with H, "wie" forK's "'wo" ("where").
The essence of reflection is nothing more than this relation to this synthesis, 27 which can occur or not occur, and which can occur in various different ways. Y Thus it now becomes possible for us to understand the previously stated claim that I am free to reflect upon whatever I want within the manifold. [fhis is to be explained as follows: I am free to relate my will to the original limitation in any way that I want.} Through this act of reflection, the will is related to its [own original] limitation in a variety of different ways, and a manifold of objects comes into being for reflection. Reflection {considered as something original} is a purely synthetic power. {It is not merely passive, but is active as well; thus it is composed of both activity and passivity.} This proposition is crucial for our entire enterprise. {All experience, (t6o), all consciousness,} every act of empirical willing, thinking, etc., is based upon this synthesis of pure willing and original. limitation, {a synthesis that occurs by means of reflection}. Both {the pure will and the original limitation} are given to empirical consciousness and are present prior to all consciousness. The synthesis {or the relation of the two} is not original, however, but depends upon ;1 {free} act of reflection. {Accordingly, this act of reflection is the original source of all empirical consciousness. This is why Kant made it the chief task of philosophy to answer the question, "How is synthesis possible?" 28-for all empirical consciousness consists in the synthesis of pure will and limitation.} (~)Consciousness is possible only to the extent that it is possible for me to view myself in several different ways or under several different aspects. {But how is it possible for me to observe myself under several different aspects? How is this condition for the possibility of consciousness itself possible?} What we said above in section b--that I must posit myself, under the same aspect, as existing and as not existing, {as able to do something and as unable to do it}-must be {simply} true; for this is a condition for the possibility of consciousness. My pure act of willing is presented in an intuitable form in my bodl. My body is sensible force, which would have to be what can be viewed 9 in various ways. I would have to be able to will the same X that, under another aspect, I would be unable to will; or (considered synthetically, {that is, as something that has been made sensible}) I would have to be 27 "Die Sache der JU:n.EXION ist lediglich diese Beziehung auf diese Synthesis." In comparison with the corresponding passage in H (see the following note), the text of K appears at this point to be seriously adumbrated. v The will is related to this [original] limitation; and, in relation to this state of limitation, the will iuelf becomes something manifold-reflection comi..ts in this relation. What then is dependent upon reflection? Nothing but this relation of the limitation to the pure will, or this synthesis, which can occur or not occur, and which can occur in this way or that (p. 159). ~·See the Introduction to the second edition of the Critiqlu of Pure Reastm (KRV, B•g). 29 Reading, with Krause's MS. "ansehen" forK's "anschauen."
able to do the same thing = X that, under another aspect, I would be unable to do. Therefore, {the entire instrument,} my entire sensible force {-my organ, my body-} must be capable of being viewed in two different ways. This would give us an inner and an outer organ, which would have to be related to each other in such a way that what would happen with the one would be something that could not happen with the other, {so that the inner organ would be free and the outer organ would be limited}. {For example,} everything I perceive, all objects, are nothing more than something that hinders my own {outer} efficacy; but only if my efficacy is present for me can I know that something is hindering it. {Every object in space hinders my outer efficacy, that is, my ability to place another object in this same space. But how do I have any knowledge of what is not present for me? How do I know what is canceled [by the present object]? This certainly does not lie within my consciousness [of the external object]. Consequently, the very efficacy that is hindered must, at the same time, be both possible for me and present for me.} My own efficacy is not present for me through my outer organ; instead, it is copied by the inner one.z (I cannot hear anything unless I make an internal copy of the sound.) This is the basis of all perception. {Limitation and willing (or an instance of free acting) are united in every perception. This is true of original reflection as well. (Such reflection deserves to be called "original" (161) · for two reasons: in part, because consciousness begins with this act of reflection, which has to be presupposed as temporally preceding all other acts of reflection; and, in part, because of its content, inasmuch as this is something new, something that was previously still unknown and that has not arisen through abstraction or reproduction.)} How does this original act of reflection, which everything else presu pposes, occur? Answer: I reflect upon my own act of willing. This appears to me as a "doing,"!l0 and my act of willing is both possible and not possible: it is inwardly possible, but outwardly impossible. "Inwardly" and "outwardly" refer here to my inner and outer organs, which, in turn, are nothing but my own force or energy, viewed under two different aspects. {These then are the two aspects of our willing: viewed from one side, it appears as our own energy; viewed from the other, it appears as our limitation-thanks to our body: for our body is nothing but an entity,!!• or a pure act of willing that is sensibly intuited, and indeed, intuited in a twofold manner. z My efficacy is limited only for the outer organ; it corresponds to my inner organ-by virtue of the reciprocal interaction of both [efficacy and the inner organ] (p. 16o). """diell erscheint mir als Thun." 31 "ein Wesen."
165
Thus my own willing appears to me as an inner doing: I-see an object; i.e., I describe within myself its shape, its surface area, etc. I hear sounds; i.e., I copy them within me-hence there is an inner doing.} • Willing and doing are one and the same. As a mere object of thought, this is an act of willing; as a mere object of intuition, it is a "doing." Here we obtain the answer to the question, How is our causal power, our efficacy in the sensible world, possible? {This is a question no one has yet answered. To be sure, Kant answered it, but his answer was not explicitly formulated as such; it is only implicit in his argument. One ordinarily says, "I act efficaciously in the manner in which it appears to me that I do." This, however, is a transcendent answer to our question, and we would thereby obtain a "body in itself." But, like the sensible world as a whole, our body is certainly nothing in itself; instead, it is a mere appearance. It is what is intelligible, construed in accordance with the laws of thinking and intuition. • Our answer is as follows:} [Taken together,] willing and acting efficaciously~ 2 are no more than willing [taken by itself].AA The perception of our own efficacy is nothing more than the perception of our pure will, insofar as the latter has become an object of thought. All our efficacious acting is nothing but an act of thinking. The only thing we are able to do freely is to think, for we are nothing other than intellects. I cannot will anything that does not come into being. Anything I am able to do but do not actually accomplish is something I do not will;~~ it is a mere, impotent wish. Kant too has answered the question concerning how our efficacy is possible: "The power of desire is the power to become the cause of an object by means of a concept."~4 But he does not explain the origin of this "power of desire." Your instructor employs the term "desiring" in a different sense and opposes it to willing, as the merely ideal act of thinking of wiiling. Kant, in contrast, employs the concept of the power of desire to explain the genesis of both the act of willing and the power of free choice.~ 5 02
''Wollen und Wirk.en." Efficacious acting is nothing whatsoever other than willing (p. 161). ""Ich k.ann nicht wollen, was nicht wird; alles was ich nicht k.ann und nicht wirklich thue, will ich nicht." Following Fuchs's suggestion, the translation omits the italicized nicht (which is not italicized in the MS) from this passage. •• See the note on this subject in the Preface to the Critique of Practical Reason (KGS, V: gn). " "Bei Kant ist das Begehrungsvermogen der genetische Begriff des Wollens und der Willk.iihr." AA
(4) {We still have another question to answer.} As a reflecting subject, I construct an internal description 36 of what I am unable to accomplish externally; this is how perception first arises for me: {that is, I act internally}. How do I obtain this cognition of my own inability to do something? {Must I know in advance that I cannot do something? Answer:} I know this through a feeling. But what then is the origin of this feeling? A,feeling is an act of affecting myself, but not within time. 88 Here there are not things present, things which could exercise a certain effect at one moment and then a different effect at some other moment. This would be a transcendent [explanation of feeling]. Feeling as such, or the power of feeling, is the way in which the {original} limitation of our will is immediately related to reflection {or to the ideal activity}. The will is originally limited; this is how it becomes {something-} a will. Yet (162) this limitation does not [yet] exist for the I, nor does the I itself exist for itself; the whole is [no more than] an Idea, 37 {if it is not reflected upon, if it is not posited}.cc • Now, however, reflection-an absolutely free act of reflectioncomes upon the scene and strives to reflect upon the will in its totality, i.e., under both the previously indicated aspects. {It cannot do this} however; it can describe this [totality of the will] only under one of its two aspects, namely, through that of the inner organ. 38 {Through the outer organ, therefore,} reflection is what is limited in time, and feeling is the immediate expression of this limitation. To the extent that I am an empirical being, I feel. The power of reflection, which is limited within time, {but is not originally limited,} is what can only be empirical. The will is what is originally limited; thus it follows that reflection upon the will would have to be limited,0° {and a feeling arises through this relation of reflection [to the will]. From this it follows that:} There can be no reflection ~art from feeling, and vice versa; for it is {only} by means of reflection 3 that the I subjects something to limitation. {Therefore, if no act of reflection occurred, then neither would any 36
"beschreibe innerlich." We said above that feeling is an affection of ourselves within time (p. 161 ). "Diese Beschranktheit aber ist nicht fUr das lch, and das lch ist nicht fUr sich, das ganze Idee." cc Even the I is nothing if it is not reflected upon, if it is not posited (p. 162). 38 "DieJ3 kann sie aber nur in der einen Rucksicht, im inneren Organ beschreiben." 00 I feel; in other words, the feeling subject, which is surrendered to feeling, is the power of reflection. The power of reflection is limited, but its limitation is not an original one; instead, what is originally limited is the will. Reflecting, therefore, is limited only in the act of reflection upon the will (p. 162). 39 Reading, with H, "lediglich durch das JU:FLECT11lEN" for K's "durch das Geftihl" ("through feeling"), an assertion that at least appears to conflict with everything else Fichte has been saying in this section, as well as with the text of H. 88
37
330
166
§ 14
limitation exist for me, nor, consequently, would any feeling exist. Moreover, if there were no feeling, there would be no limitation; and therefore there would be no partial or bit-by-bit grasping of the pure willi.e., no act of reflection.} This principle was presented above in a different sense-in the context of the relationship of dependence. Here we encounter it in the context of the relationship of reciprocal interaction. 40 {Above, one could have believed that something could well be felt in the absence of any act of reflection.} We have now succeeded in explaining and deriving feeling itself and have, once again, postulated feeling as a condition for the possibility of consciousness. Feeling might thus be said to be something primary and inexplicable; this, however, might provide an occasion for dogmatism.EE For one could certainly extend one's thoughts beyond this limit [represented by feeling], and then one might want to explain feeling with reference to things-which are supposed to affect feeling. In this way, the I itself is41 transformed into a thing. {The Critical idealist, however, is not allowed to remain at this point. He must explain empirical consciousness. His own thinking extends beyond empirical consciousness; he may and must pass into the realm of what is intelligible. At this point, however, all further progress comes to an end. This is a consequence of the nature of his reason itself, for what is intelligible is posited in abstraction from all the laws of thinking. Reason has here arrived at its outermost limit.}
§ 14 The pure will is the immediate object of all consciousness and of all reflection (§ 13). Reflection, however, is discursive; consequently, the pure will must be a manifold. It is not originally manifold, but first becomes so by being related to its own {original} limitation. by means of which it {first} becomes a will. FF This relation of the pure will to its own limitation occurs within the act of reflection itself, which is absolutely free; and the freedom and entire essence of this act of reflection consist precisely in this act of relating42 {the pure will to the original limitation}. 40
"Wechselwirkung." With this, our explanation and derivation of feeling would be complete, and, at the same time, we would have provided our entire structure with a deeper underpinning. Above, feeling was simply po<~tulated as an inexplicable starting point-though it is nevertheless supposed 10 be present within empirical consciousness. But it is dogmatic to proceed in this manner (p. 162). •• Reading, with Krause's MS, "wird" forK's "wiirde." f"f" [ ••• ] fint becomes an acl of willing (p. 16!1). 42 Reading, with H, "Beziehen" for K's '"Beziehung" ("relation"). EE
§ 14
33'
The freedom of this act consists, in part, in the fact that such a relationship is established at all and, in part, in the fact that it occurs in this or that way. Insofar as it is simply thought of, this act of reflection appears as an act of willing; insofar as it is intuited, it appears as a "doing." This same act of reflection is the foundation of all empirical consciousness. In an individual act of such reflection, a rational being views itself in two different ways or under two different aspects. On the one hand, it views itself as limited; on the other, it views itself as active in describing this limitation. The former is its outer aspect, the latter is its inner one; and, as a result, it ascribes to itself a general organ {(a body)} consisting of an inner and an outer organ. Feeling is the relation of limitation to reflection. The source of the limitation is something that exists only for the ideal activity engaged in thinking about the real activity, and the immediate union of cognition of an object with the will is thereby explained.GG =And thus dte immediau: union of an object with the will is explained (p. t61j).
166
§ 15
Review of the Preceding Sections
167
{The purpose of this review is to tie together the various things that ( 1 have been established up to this point. From now on, our path will become more and more level, even if difficulties should still arise here and there.} The spirit of our philosophy is this: {nothing outside of me,} no alleged "thing in itself," can be an object of {my} consciousness; the only object for me is I myself. {This is the chief maxim of transcendental idealism and expresses its deepest spirit.} How can {the actual} consciousness {with which we are acquainted} be explained on this assumption? {Remark: Philosophy is concerned solely with this question, and only insofar as it attempts to answer it is it philosophy at all It would be quite unphilosophical-indeed, it would be absurd-to deny the facts of consciousness.} We can explain anything only insofar as we explain it in accordance with the laws of our thinking, and the answer to the above question must accord with these laws. A From this it follows that our explanation of consciousness is also not intended to be, {as it were,} "valid in itself," {but is valid only for us}; for 5 the question is, How can a rational being account for its own consciousness? {Whenever one engages in any argument at all, one must always do so in accordance with the laws of reason, and these same laws also apply to the philosopher. For this reason, the philosopher must obey these laws within transcendental philosophy as well; for transcendental philosophy possesses no validity in itself, but only in relationship to reason. A If we wish to explain consciousness from a first principle, we must do so in accordance wi1h the laws of our own thinking (p. 163). 8 1herefore (p. 163).
[ 332]
§ 15
333
Remark: Though philosophers have conducted their arguments in accordance with the laws of reason, present-day philosophers in particular seem not to have noticed or to have discovered this fact. Consequently, some of them have charged that one of the major errors committed by transcendental idealism is that it proceeds in the following circle: "It is supposed to provide an explanation and derivation of the laws of reason; yet,jn order to do this, I have to proceed in accordance with these very laws." There is no way to avoid this circle of reason; indeed, this is precisely what shows that there is no "truth in itself." Therefore, an explanation of consciousness also proceeds in accordance with the laws of reason. We are already familiar with these laws, including the most important one, which states that} we must, in accordance with the laws of reflection, presuppose something determinable for everything determinate. We have hitherto applied this law to the I that is the object of our philosophical investigations. But the philosopher himself is also an I, and thus he too is bound by this same law. {As the original object of my own consciousness, I am something determinate. I must connect this determinacy of myself within consciousness with a determinability of myself within consciousness. I thus possess knowledge: (1) of myself, and (2) of myself as something simultaneously determinate and determinable. Therefore, insofar as it is a determinate object of consciousness, the I is already something twofold. In addition, it is something manifold simply by virtue of its 1-hood:} The I is for itself an object of consciousness; consequently, it is both subject and object. We now wish to relate to each other these two [aspects of the 1: the I as subject and the I as object]. To this end, we must relate them to each other as determinable [and not simply insofar as each is determinate].c {In this way, from the simple I, we obtain something fourfold: ( 1) a determinate subject; (2) a determinate object; (3) something determinable with relation to the subject; (4) something determinable with relation to the object.} • As a result, what is ideal is distinguished for us from what is real, and this occurs [purely] in accordance with the laws of thinking. 0 "What is real" signifies only what is objective within consciousness; "what is ideal," only what is subjective therein. Here we are considering each of these as separately determinable, and, by thinking in this manner, we obtain [the thought of] what is purely intelligible. {What is c We wish to relate them to each other, and for this purpose we must presuppi:lse both [that is, the I as subject and the I as object] as purely determinable (p. 164). 0 This occurs in accordance with the law that states: "The ideal and the real I must be distinguished from each other by means of the laws of thinking" (p. 164).
334
§
15
determinable, considered as a whole, is what is intelligible. 1} Consequently, what is intelligible is nothing in itself; it is merely something that has to be presupposed if our explanation of consciousness in accordance with the laws of thinking is to be possible.E {Tiurrejore, what is intelligible originates and enters c011Sciou.mess only by ( 1 11Ulans of transcendental philosophy itself What is intelligible is merely that to which the latter attaches all the objects that appear within consciousness.} Kant also treated what is intelligible in this manner, 2 {which is how one must regard it if one is to avoid falling into the sort of mysticism that turns what is intelligible into something sensible and wants to intuit it}. Indeed, any other way of looking at what is intelligible would be transcendent. {We have now succeeded in determining and in distinguishing from each other the subject and the object, what is ideal and what is real-insofar, that is, as these are viewed simply as what we must necessarily presuppose. What we now want to do is to relate these to each other.} • From the very beginning of our inquiry we have distinguished the ideal from the real activity. What is originally real {or objective} is the pure will. {This is not any sort of "being," for here we are concerned with the I, which is nothing but activity; i.e., we are concerned with spiritual or intellectual objectivity. 3} The pure will is what is determinable; i.e., it is what can be determined in all the various ways in which we are determined. What is {originally} ideal is the power of reflection, which is bound by various laws, including the law that states that we are able to grasp things only successively and are able to think of them only discursively. {Above, we also characterized what is determinable as a power that is compatible with all determinations; in accordance with this, the first thing that is determinable,} what is originally real, the pure will, is the power to be an object; {the second thing that is determinable,} what is originally ideal, the power of reflection, is the power to be a subject. The former is the power to exist {empirically}; the latter, the power to exist {in a pure sense}. 4 {This is the point from which we will proceed: I 1 "dieses bestimmbare ist im ganzen das ll'I'I'El-UGIBLE." I.e., the determinable whole, which is, in mrn, determinable as a determinable subjen and a determinable object. E Here one can see that what is imelligible is not a thing in itself; inuead, it is merely something that-in accordance with the law that states that there can be nothing deter· minate without something determinable-we have to posit in addition to what is deter· minate. We must do this in order to explain what is determinate and connect it with consciousness (p. 164). 2 See, e.g., KRV, A565iB593ff. • "wir reden von der geistigen ObjektivitaL" 4 K: '"das erste ist das Vermogen rein, das zweite empirisch zu sein.'" H: '"das erste ein Vermogen, empirisch zu seyn, das lezte das Vermogen, rein zu seyn." With Radrizzani (and in accordance with the dear sense of the previous sections), the translation here fo].
§ 15
j)
168
335
know that I am a subject and an object, and something determinable pertains to each.} We arrived at this presupposition by means of the laws of thinking, but then {(in the preceding§)} we encountered the following difficulty: ( 166) how can the pure will become a manifold for a possible act of reflection? Our answer was: the will becomes something manifold only through being related to a limitation, which is just as original as the will itself, {which is to say, it has to be presupposed for the purposes of a philosophical explanation of consciousness}. This applies to empirical consciousness as well. Considered as it is for itself, the will is purely unitary. It becomes differentiated only by means of and in terms of the different objects to which it is directed, and this provides the limitation in this case. {This limitation to which the pure will is related is something manifold, and thus, as a result, a manifold is contained in the union [of the pure will and its limitation].} Reflection in its entirety consists in unifying this manifold of limitation. The freedom of reflection lies in the fact that the will can be related to this manifold or not related to it; i.e., it can be related to this or it can be related to that. Insofar as I am limited, however, there is something that I am not; but what I am not is not present for me, {and I cannot reflect upon it}. Nevertheless, the limitation here lies outside of me. How do I become conscious of such a limitation? Anrwer: {There is nothing that I am not, without at the same time being it; from one side, I am not something, which, from the other side, I am; what I am not externally, I am internally.} [Hence] the limitation lies outside of me only in part. I am limited externally, but I am not limited internally; I make an inner copy of my outer limitation. With this, however, our question has still not been completely answered. We must first of all point out the difficulty that still remains and indicate the extent to which it can be resolved. {Our answer will be short and simple, but it will serve to illuminate fully and for the first time what has gone before.} {The following was said in the preceding §:} I make an inner copy of the limitation of my outer organ. "I see an object": this means that there is a certain space I am unable to penetrate, and I describe {internally} the precise area that is occupied, {which is the area I am unable to enter}. According to our theory, the inner organ is never limited, {but is always free}. DiffiCulty: I am supposed to make an internal copy of a limitation of the outer {organ), and thus of a {certain} outer acting {of this outer organ. Yet the very concept of "copying" already indicates that I lows H rather than K, which actually states just the reverse: "the first is the power to exist in a pure sense; the latter, the power to exist empirically."
can make an internal copy only of something that was already present externally, of something with which I assume that I am already acquainted.} I cannot form an image 5 of anything with which I am unacquainted. I am acquainted with the will, but I am not acquainted with this outer organ. {My organ would be the limitation of my will. Consequently, it must actually be possible for me to regard this organ-even insofar as it is an "outer" one-as my own will, as the result of my will; yet, were I to view it in this way, no limitation would be present. Until now, however, we have been acquainted with nothing whatsoever but an act of willing, and this is not any kind of outer organ.} Thus there remains a circle, {something inexplicable}: one refers {something inner} to a limitation of the outer organ; {and, since it is supposed to be copied internally, this limited state of the outer organ must be something positive. Yet this limitation of the outer organ by no means occurs as something positive; it is something purely negative.} Where does this external organ itself come from? The situation {with respect to the entire explanation of consciousness} is as follows: When I perceive something, I am performing an inner act. {For example, I see a shape in space;} the imagination produces an {internal} sketch ofthe spatial shape, etc. 6 It is not hard to comprehend how such a shape can be produced by my [inner] organ {once a percep- (t tion has occurred}, but it is not at all clear how this can be accomplished in a manner that is not supposed to be determined by the outer organ. Nor is it clear why the results of such a process are assumed to be objective. Instead, it seems that these are merely figments of our imagination. 7 Hence nothing is explained in this way. Solution: We cannot remain within the realm of what can be displayed in a sensible form, 8 but must return to the transcendental viewpoint. ( t) We referred above to an original limitation of our activity, 9 a limitation through which alone the will first becomes a will; {for previously the will was something indeterminate, a mere striving, and, as such, it could not be grasped at all}. What is supposed to be limited in this case? {[Answer:] something absolutely self-active.} That which is absolutely self-active, and is nothing but this, cannot be limited in the manner of a being, which may indeed possess an inner force of its own-though, if it does, its force will be a function of its quantity {and will be annihilated • "einbilden." "die Gestalt im Raume wird abgerillen durch Einbildungsltraft, pp." 7 ~Es ocheint wir nehmen nur Einbildungen an." Cp. the corresponding passage in H: "Es ocheint nach dieser Theorie, dati unsre Vorstellungen blot\ etwas eingebildetes waren." 8 "in der Versinnlichung." 9 Reading, with H, "unsrer Thatigkeit" for K's "unseres Wesens" ("of our nature" or ~of our being," which appears to contradict what is said only a few lines later). 6
§ 15
169
i7)
337
by the destruction of its being}. (E.g., a sphere of constantly decreasing size. {Imagine a sphere of a certain volume, and imagine too that this sphere is conscious of the space it occupies. Let us now begin to remove certain portions of this sphere. Would it have any knowledge of this? By no means, for it is conscious only of the space it occupies.}) This is not the case with the intellect, the limitation of which is supposed to occur without canceling its consciousness of the canceled reality. What sort of limitation could this be? (limitation of this sort applies only to activity as such, not to a being.) This can only be a limitation {of what is purely absolute, of something that is nothing but activity, where the limitation is directed at the activity itself; consequently, it can only be a limitation} that occurs through activity itself= the task of limiting oneself. Such a limitation {does not affect the activity itself; it is demanded by this very activity. It} does not impose itself; instead, it occurs only insofar as it is freely assimilated. {If the limitation is not accepted, then it is not present.} • Conclusions from this: (A) It should now be clear what is meant by this limitation of an original wiii,F {through which the pure will itself first becomes something}. What we are concerned with here is the totality of limitation, {which is present in consciousness} as what is determinable in relationship to all the determinations that appear within {individual moments of} time, and which I am supposed to impose upon myself {little by little}. The reason 10 why {I have to impose any limitation at all upon myself} is based uFn {my being,} my finite nature; the reason why l have to impose' upon myself {precisely} this determination or some other one is based upon my own individuality. Any other [explanation] is transcendent. The pure will is merely the will that I ought to have within time.G (See the [System ofJ Ethical Theory, ca. p. 200.) 12 Answer to the question, "Who am l?": {I am the person I make of myself; my determinacy de- ( 168) pends upon my own free decision, which follows from the task of limiting oneself.} But who ought I to be? {This lies in my individuality.} Individuality is not determined by any being; it is determined by a law: by this original limitation of the pure will (p. 167). wder Grund." Reading, with H, "auflegen" for K's "aufnehmen" (assimilate"). G What I am supposed to imp<JSe upon myself gradually over time is my pure will (p. 167)· 12 Da.r Sy.rtem der SiUmlehrt. K's vague reference to p. ~oo of the original edition of this work (SW, V: 155) appears to be an error, even though it does accord with certain remarks later in the same paragraph concerning the "conceptual" nature of the ethical law. It is more likely that the particular passage to which Fichte is referring is the discussion of this question in the opening sections of the SiUmkhre (i.e., ~circa p. ~o" of the 1797 edition, or SW, V: 27ff.). This conjecture is supported by the reference, in H, to "the Introduction to the SiUmkhre." F [ ••• ] 10 11
what I should become is something that is prescribed for all time." {This, as was already said above, is the ethical law.} The pure will is limited: this pure will is not human understanding, for it is certainly not extended in space; it is spontaneity and can be limited only by itself. Therefore, to say that the pure will is limited is to say that a law of willing (an ethical law) is contained within my being as a whole. This is not a qualitas occulta (as it is for Kant); it is a law I make for myself. Selfactivity1 is not limited by any object of perception; instead, it is limited by a concept. Thus the real question becomes, How is this concept {that limits freedom} grasped, and how do we obtain a representation that tells us we should have certain [other] representations?-~
Overview
170
{The dogmatist says, "There exist things in themselves, which affect us and produce within us a cognition of something." Thus,} according to the dogmatist, what is {absolutely} primary is the thing; the concept is secondary. The idealist reverses this; he proceeds from the concept to being, {which is nothing but a certain determination of the concept, an aspect of the same when viewed from another side. (See the Introduction to the [System of] Ethical Theory.) The idealist thus passes from a concept to being; this concept, however, is the concept of a goal, which, according to what was said above, presupposes a being.} Between these two ways of considering the relationship between concept and being, there lies a third, {which must actually exist}: that there exists a concept (which should not be thought of as the concept of a goal) which gives rise to an {objective, given} being. This is the claim with which we are now specifically concerned. {Our task is a transcendental one; applied to what has been made sensible,} [or expressed] in sensible terms, {the situation would be as follows}: I reflect, and I obtain a concept thereby. {(The act of reflection itself becomes a concept.)} Along with this concept, and as a condition of the same, I am also assigned the task of limiting my own outer freedom. I obtain this concept only by engaging in an act of reflection. What {was, in the previous §, already limited and here} is to be limited in consequence of a concept is my outer organ [that is, my body] which is posited as something I myself have restrained {and prevented from H The pure will is not limited by a being; instead, it originally contains within itself the law that determines how it should limit itself throughout all time (p. 168). 1 Self-determinacy (p. 168). J The task, therefore, is to grasp a concept that limits freedom and [to explain] how we originally arrive at the necessity of possessing a certain concept (p. 168).
§ 15
339
accomplishing something}, while the inner organ makes a copy of what the outer organ does not accomplish. {Here is the difficulty: It has been said that I copy inwardly the very thing I am unable to do outwardly. But I can copy only what was already present. In this case, however, I am supposed to copy something internally that I cannot do outwardly. How do I obtain [knowledge of] this inability?} • Our response to this circle is as follows: Even this inability [of the outer organ to accomplish something] is present only through you; it is an inability you inflict upon yourself, and which you must think of in this way in consequence of the necessary limitation of yourself. K It is already present in the task [you assign to yourself]. {Consequently, the (169) outer organ proceeds from a higher, inner one. Here again we have an opportunity to observe the difference between the manner in which the idealist operates and that of the dogmatist.} The dogmatic philosopher {explains everything from the outside in: he} proceeds toward the inside, {from the periphery to the center}. The transcendental idealist [begins at the center and] describes the radii leading toward the periphery. {He shows that we explain everything from the inside, that} everything comes from within; it is of no use to presuppose external things, as we saw in the previous §. General illustration (added purely for the purposes of clarity): {I must view myself in a double light [in terms of my inner and of my outer organ]. Moreover, as we remarked above, neither of these ways of viewing myself can be intuited. I observe my outer organ only through the medium of the inner one. I am limited in my outer aspect, and this limitation is given to me as a task 13 of limiting myself and is nothing but a self-limitation. For example,} if I want to hear someone, {I have to copy his words, and therefore} I must not speak. I am not physicaUy compelled to avoid speaking; the compulsion is only hypothetical, a goal that is a consequence of a self-assigned 14 task, {i.e., to hear}. What is limited is the external organ of speech, but the limitation in question cannot be explained physically. Results: (1) AIJ external influence is completely eliminated, for otherwise we
would be dogmatists. The task of limiting myself in a certain way is present within me. {The outer limitation is first thought of when the task of freely limiting myself in a certain way is present.} I freely describe K This inability is not an inability that exists without our participation. On the contrary, it is something we inflict upon ourselves through the limitation. We must think of ourselves in this way, because this is the only way we can think of ourselves as limited (p. t6g). 1 ~ Reading "AufgabeM for H's "Aufsage" ("saying~). 14 Reading "selbst zugefiigten" for K's "selbst angefiigten~ ("self-attached"). Cp. H: "eine Aufgabe die ich mir selbst zufilge."
17 1
this limitation. The fact that l have any knowledge of this [limitation] is an aspect of my outer power; insofar as I copy this limitation, this is an aspect of my inner power.L (2) The outer organ is given to me by means of this task, for the outer organ is the ideal aspect of the {task of determinate} limitation. {The task of positing an outer organ is original, and is fulfilled just as surely as l posit myself.} The outer organ is already contained in our very task of limitation, and it must be posited in consequence of this task. The point is to explain everything by beginning at the center; we must show that the dogmatist's way of looking at things is not required. Experience could never teach us that we have a body. That we have a body and that it is ours is something we have to know in advance, as a condition for the possibility of all experience and of all acquisition of k.nowledge.M This [knowledge of our body] is a product of mere thinking; only later does the body become an object of perception. {For example, if I want to see my eye, l must already possess the power of vision, as well as an eye. Moreover, l must be able to open my eye and direct it. Nor is this necessity (that l must have an eye, that l must be able to open and direct it) an acquired one; instead, it is present simulta- ( 1 neously with myself. Similarly, in the case of my hand: l must have a hand if I want to move it in a certain direction, etc. These instruments force themselves. upon me originally. They are products of my thinking, and they can be perceived by means of another act of perception.} (2) The difficulty has now been removed. The outer organ must be
present {as determined for me and by me, for otherwise no consciousness of any determination of this organ would be possible}, and we have explained how this is possible: This outer organ is present only insofar as I myself restrict it, insofar as a concept of this outer organ is present in advance of any restriction of the same. This concept is given to me through the task of restricting the outer organ,N and this task is a product of my pure will. N.B.: we are here discussing nothing but an effect of L Inasmuch as I limit myself or describe this limitation, l adopt an ext=nal view of my own power; insofar as I make a copy of this same limitation, I adopt an inlernal view of my own power (p. 16g). ~ Thus we do not require the experience described by the dogmatist; i.e., nothing has to be given: for to posit my outer organ, along with the determinacy of the same, is a task., one which is, from the very beginning, accompanied by its own accomplishment. Therefore, we do not learn or acquire the knowledge that we possess a body." This is something we [must already] know, and such knowledge is a condition for the possibility of all learnin~ and of all experience (p. 16g). 5 Reading, with K, "Leib" for H's "Linie" ("line"). N The outer organ is itself present for me. lt is restricted only insofar as I restrict it. If, however, I am supposed to restrict it, then l must already be acquainted with it as something I am supposed to restrict. But this cognition of the outer organ is given to me through and along with the task of restricting the same (p. 170).
§ 15
34 1
what is free upon what is free. (The fact that one must also view this outer organ as dependent upon something external is, again, merely another aspect of the outer organ. See below.) {I hear only to the extent that I listen, and I specifically notice something only to the extent that I pay attention and to the extent that I am free in this attentiveness. I possess an outer organ only by virtue of the fact that I am limited and think of myself as having to limit myself as an I. This outer organ, however, is constrained and limited by the inner organ; and it is also, in the present context, constrained by something external. For example, my outer organ is constrained and limited by the inner organ when I listen; on the other hand, I would not hear anything at all unless some sounds were present. Consequently, if I am to hear anything, my outer organ must also be limited by something external.} • The inner organ is the soul; the outer organ is the body. {In the relationship in which we have just posited them, the soul is supposed to be able to set the body in motion and to control it. From the transcendental point of view,} these are simply two different aspects of the I. The soul arises when I make myself sensible through the form of inner intuition; the body arises when {the same original something} is made sensible through outer and inner intuition at the same time. • The ultimate source of limitation is {a certain} concept {that I am supposed to describe}, and it is through this concept that intuition enters my entire world. 0 {Here we have arrived at the point we have been seeking.} From the practical point of view, what is primary is the original, pure will. The pure wiii expresses itself through goal conceptsthough not of the sort we were unable to explain above, {[i.e.,] goal concepts that presuppose cognition of a manifold,} but rather through goal concepts that simply exist, as primary and absolutely imposing themselves {upon us}.P {It is through such concepts that we are determined.} A concept of this sort (which is a noumenon) is sensibly realized in the form of our inner and outer organs and, {as we shall see,} in the form of the sensible world. Here the transcendental philosopher touches rock bottom. He must base his explanation 16 upon absolute concepts, concepts that do not presuppose any others for their own explanation.Q These absolute concepts are concepts of a goal, which nevertheless must appear to be something objective, for it lies within my 0 This [concept] is the origin of both feeling and intuition, the source oft he entire world and of the system of the Not-I (p. 170). P The pure will expresses itself through goal concepts that simply exist and that, being primary, force themselves upon us (p. 170). 16 Reading "er mull [ ... ] erkHiren" for K's "er mull [ ... ] erklart werden." QOne wants to explain the determinations of consciousness on the basis of what is intelligible. Concepts of the sort we have been discussing are what is intelligible, and they actually do explain the determinations of consciousness (pp. 170-7 1).
342
172
§ 15
own nature that I am supposed to grasp these concepts. {No concept lies (171) within me in, as it were, a finished and complete form, as something that I merely have to seek out when I need it.} It is sheer nonsense to claim this-or at least to assert it didactically. This concept arises only insofar as I pr~uce it, {and I exist only when I bring the concept into existence}. To say that "it imposes itself upon me" means that the task of producing this concept is contained within my own nature, as soon as I engage in reflection. {Accordingly, if I exist then I certainly produce this concept.} I must engage in reflection, however, if I am to have any consciousness at all! {We had to address the following difficulty: I discover myself to be externally limited, and I make an internal copy of this external limitation. Thus I internally accomplish something that I am unable to accomplish externally. How did I become aware that I am externally unable to do something? I have knowledge of this inability, of this limitation, only to the extent that I am conscious of assigning this limitation to myself. All consciousness begins with this; consequently, my consciousness has its origin in a concept [that assigns me the task] of limiting myself. The limitation in question thus lies in this concept, not in anything external to me.} • Therefore, the limitation we have been discussing, {the limitation from which consciousness starts, is not inflicted upon me; it} is one I assign to myself, in consequence of a concept that is originally present within me. One would thus {at this point} be able to begin an account of the origination of consciousness: I reflect (upon myself) in accordance with the determining ground 17 {contained within feeling}. We cannot inquire concerning the form [of this act of reflection], for it is an act that occurs freely; or, {to express the same thing in sensible terms,} we cannot account for the starting point {of [our] empirical life}. I must grasp a certain limitation of myself, however, {a concept} that contains the task of limiting myself. R This concept is the internal condition for the possibility of reflection, {and without it no act of reflection whatsoever would occur}. But I cannot ask why it is that I grasp precisely {this limiting concept}-[ why] Y, rather than not-Y,·
17
.. nach dem BestimmungsGrunde ... A history of consciouness could begin at this point, which we also wish to do, and in the following way: I reflect (upon myself) in accordance with the determining ground contained within feeling. This reflection is not called into question, since it occurs freely. To express this same thing in sensible terms: I cannot account for the origin of my empirical life; I cannot engage in an act of reflection unless I grasp a concept that assigns me a task, a concept that contains within itself a task for me: the task of limiting mys.elf (p. 171). R
§ 15
343
for the ground of this lies within freedom. The original state of the limited, empirical I is to be engaged in copying {a limitation of} its own will, {in the manner just described. (See Foundations of Natural Right.)} 18
§ 15 But a limitation is not a limitation of the I, and does not exist for the I, unless it is one the I assigns to itself. Accordingly, the original limitation of the will can signify nothing but a task for the I: the task of limiting its own will. The distinctive harbinger of this task within empirical consciousness can be nothing other than a concept that demands a specific self-limitation, and it is by grasping this concept that feeling and intuition first arise. Consequently, all consciousness begins with the act of thinking of something purely intelligible. 18
See §§ 1-3 of Fichce's Grund/4ge des Na/.urrechts (SW, Ill: 17-40).
§ 16
173
Two questions now arise, each of which can be answered only by and in terms of the other. At this point, however, purely systematic interests are less important than comprehensibility, and therefore we will now divide our inquiry {and treat these questions separately, one after the (1 other}, though the results of these separate investigations will coincide.
We have discussed an original concept, which contains within itself the task of self-limitation, {and thus we have spoken of a self-limitation by means of this concept;} and we have also indicated that everything within consciousness, {namely, all consciousness, as well as the manifold of the same, the inner and the outer organs, the soul and the body,} is supposed to be connected with the limitation that follows from this concept. {We will concern ourselves at present solely with this concept.} What then is actually comprehended within this concept from which all consciousness stems? {What is included within this concept? With what does our experience begin?} This question concerns the material or content {of this act of comprehending}. As will be demonstrated, this material consists of a rational being outside of ourselves; for all outer consciousness proceeds from a rational being, just as all inner consciousness proceeds only from something intelligible, from 1-hood.A Sensibility or sensuousness is nothing original; it is only something that has been made sensible. 1 The claim that another rational being exists in addition to ourselves is nothing but a sheer thought, displayed within appearance. This pure A We could certainly show, in a historical fashion, that this "something" is a rational being outside of me. Here too we start not with a sensible world, but rather with an intelli· gible, spiritual being, which is viewed as something that has been made sensible (p. 172). 1 "Die Sinnlichkeit ist nur Versinnlichung, nichts urspriingliches."
[ 344]
§ J6
345
thought is the starting point of experience. For the time being, however, we will set aside this question [concerning the content of this original concept]. • {Another question now arises: How} is a continuous consciousness {of the manifold} connected with this starting point? How does the series of successive representations {which is present in our consciousness} come into being? This question concerns the formal [side of our original concept of self-limitation], and this is the question we will address in this §. {We want to address this question first, since we have hitherto been discussing the formal conditions of consciousness, and thus we will remain within the same sphere.}
Clarification of the Question What is it then, according to what we have presupposed, that arises for self-consciousness? Is this not a consciousness of a particular determinacy, a consciousness {of a certain limitation, of a prohibition,} of an inability to do or to will something? 2 But can consciousness begin with a negation? Can any consciousness be [nothing but] negation? {(It is very important to understand this question.) Reply: This is impossible, for ( 173) otherwise I would be nothing for myself. Looking at what has gone before,} therefore, we have been able to achieve clarity only by means of {a fortunate} subterfuge and by appealing to something else; we have not yet succeeded in deriving any positive self-consciousness. s {What is negative, however, is something mediated; it is merely the limit that pertains to some actual object.} Negation itself is not the object [of consciousness]. We said that our original consciousness is a [consciousness of a] task: the task of inflicting a limitation upon ourselves. But what is the source of the material content of what we are not supposed to do? {I engage in an act of willing. I actually do something internally; I make an internal copy of what is supposed to be an external limitation, and consciousness can [allegedly] be supported by this actual act of doing something, this positive [act]. However,} the above question cannot be answered simply by replying that what is positive is my act of making an inner copy, for we are not conscious of this inner doing; it is not an object {of consciousness}, but is merely an instrument by means of which 2 K: "eines NichtkOnnens, Denkens, Wollens" ("of an inability to do or to think or to will something}. H: "einer gewissen Beschranktheit, des nicht diirfens, nicht konnens oder nicht wollens." As Radrizzani points out, H's "nicht diirfens" ("prohibition") makes much more sense in this passage than K's "Denkens," since what is at stake here is the limitation of the freedom of the real activity, not a limitation of the ideal activity of thinking. Hence the translated passage is here emended in the light of H. ~Reading, with Krause's MS, "SelbstBewu~tsein" forK's "Bewu~tsein."
174
we obtain access to an object. Accordingly, some actual, positive act of willing must be united with the feeling of limitation, and this union of what is positive and negation must be necessary, {because the limitation that is involved in what is negative can come only from what is positive}. The previously discussed concept of our task {of self-limitation} must thus already include within itself an act of empirical willing, which, however, is an act of willing in accordance with the concept of a goal {[since] all wil.ling presupposes a concept of a goal}. Once again, therefore, we return to the question, How is the concept of a goal possible? {We did not resolve this question above. We were driven by this question to the central point, and, from there, to our present point, without being able to answer it.} This time, {however,} this question will be answered. ( 1) If the act that we have described were possible by itself, it would be
able to produce nothing but objective cognition, i.e., a determination of being as opposed to a determination of doing; for, {according to the previous §,} nothing but {determinate} limitation is present here, but being is simply limitation made sensible. (2) All a free being's cognition, however, is necessarily related to its own willing and acting; therefore, a mere consciousness of beings cannot occur originally and in isolation. {(It is very important at this point to know precisely which relationship we are considering.)} • Onec cannot have any cognition {whatsoever} unless, in acting, one directs oneself toward the cognition in question. All cognition is practical, not only with respect to what occasions it, {or from the side of its origin,} but also in relation to {its subsequent employment, or from the side of its relationship to} subsequent acting. Being and acting stand in an uninterrupted relationship of reciprocal interaction; indeed, they are, {from the transcendental point of view,} the same thing, simply (1 viewed from two different sides. {Immediate consciousness is consciousness of nothing but willing and acting;} purely objective thinking (i.e., purely sensible cognition) is connected only synthetically with our consciousness of willing and acting. The point of synthetic unification is as follows: Whatever is merely cognized (i.e., being) is always what is determinable; willing is always what is determinate. What is determinable and what is determinate are inseparably united; therefore, all cognition {-just as surely as it is supposed to be my cognition-} would have to be a cognition of something determinable by my will. • The result is as follows: What is cognized in the first moment of all consciousness is necessarily viewed as an object that presents our free 8
Therefore, consciousness of a mere being (p. 173).
c A free being (p. 173).
§ 16
175
347
will with a choice. (The object was represented above as something that limits and hinders [the activity of the 1]. These various different ways of looking at the object will eventually be united.) Consequently, something of this sort, i.e., something determinable for and by a choice, is necessary for the possibility of the concept of a goal; for the latter is the particular dete_~minacy that results from what is determinable. We have long been acquainted with the form of the concept of a goal, but we were unable to understand how any manifold could present itself for the l's choice in the absence of any empirical cognition. 0 The solution is as follows: The required cognition is originally given [to us]. {The manifold that is present for empirical cognizance is originally present; it imposes itself upon us. It is something intelligible, in consequence of the very nature of pure reflection within consciousness.} (3) {One therefore cognizes something determinable. However,} something determinable by my will exists only insofar as a determinate will is actually present within consciousness, for what is determinable becomes possible only by means of what is determinate; and what is determinate is merely the result of a movement of transition which begins with mere determinability; and what is determinable is precisely that through which the transition occurs. E What is determinable and what is determinate must simply coexist alongside each other. {The terms "determinate" and "determinable" are comprehensible and meaningful only insofar as they are related to and explained in terms of each other.} It is easy to fall into error at this point, for in the course of a consciousness that has already been established 4 it is possible to think of something determinable without having to exercise any choice in relationship to it. Such abstraction is impossible at the inception of consciousness, however. • What is determinable and what is determinate, therefore, must necessarily be the same. Consequently, an {actual} act of empirical willing must, in the same moment, be immediately united with this cognition of an object (which is determinable for some possible will). Within actual 0 Here we find that the object is something determinable by free acting. Something of this sort, something that is determined in and for a choice, is necessary for the concept of a goal, which consists only in the emergence of what is determinate from what is determinable. Here we come ever closer to an answer to the question we answered above only with respect to its form. We still face the problem of understanding the origin ofthe manifold that is present for empirical cognizance (p. 174). E Something is determinable by my will, however, only insofar as I actually will, only insofar as a determinate act of willing is present for some consciousness. According to the above, the two are reciprocally related to each other, for each is possible only by means of the other. What is determinate is nothing but the result of my passage from what is determinable. What is determinable is only that from which I moved toward determinacy (p. •74)· 4 "eines schon angekniipften Bewustseins."
consciousness, choice and the decree 5 of the will appear to us in such a way that the choice seems to precede the act of willing. {The situation within actual consciousness is [really, however,] as follows: the will and the decision always precede the choice. E.g., I am presented with a manifold, which I then proceed to go through and to deliberate upon; however, I know in advance that I am supposed to make a decision.} Here, what is determinable precedes what is determinate; yet when I make a choice I surely know that I am choosing, {that is to say, I discover myself to be reflecting upon an [act of the] will,} and this means nothing less than that I relate my act of deliberating to an act of willing. {I am already acquainted with willing; I know what "willing" means, and I must know this in order to be able to deliberate.} How have I obtained this knowledge of what "willing" means? I possess such knowledge only insofar as I have already engaged in an act of willing and then relate the form of this act of willing to the choice,F {and thus I discover myself to be engaged in an act of willing. I always think, in addition, of a possible act of willing,} but I can become acquainted with an act of possible willing only by means of actual willing. Here, however, we are at the very beginning of consciousness, a point at which the form of willing cannot simply be borrowed [from a previous act of willing]. At this point, therefore, willing and deliberating would have to coincide. • An act of empirical willing appears as a movement of transition from determinability to determinacy. {It has this in common, however, with all other empirical determinations of the mind.} The distinctive character of an act of empirical willing lies in the complete contraction and focusing of my entire being upon one single point, {which is also what distinguishes it from a mere act of thinking}. Such a contraction does not occur in thinking; for as long as one continues to think, one also {alw'2's} continues to oscillate between opposites. (All empirical consciousness is something determinate, but there are two different types of determinacy: incomplete and complete. The former is the sort of determinacy that appears as thinking; the latter appears as willing. While engaged in thinking [of something], one continues to glance at its opposite. When I will something, however, I will precisely this and nothing else. A view of what is "other" is thus included within thinking, but not within wi1Iing. 6 But all determinacy appears as a movement of transition {from determinability}, etc. Consequently, there must also be two sorts of determinability: determinability for thinking and determinability for willing. Moreover, what is determinable 7 for {empirical} willing is thinking '''DECRET." F
G 6
7
I relate this form of the act of willing to the will (p. 1 75). Empirical willing (p. 175). "das andere durchs Denken angeschaute liegt nicht im Wollen." Reading, with H, "das Bestimmbare" for K's "Bestimmbarkeit" ("determinability").
§ I6
349
itself. {To proceed from this determinable something to a higher determinacy is precisely the meaning of "willing."} Willing is, as it were, our empirical power raised to a second power, whereas thinking is the first power of the same.) 8 {Our problem was as follows: Consciousness of an object is possible only in conjunction with consciousness of my causal power or of an act of willing; a,nd, in turn, consciousness of willing is possible only by means of consciousness of an object. We have here asserted that there is an original act of willing, which itself becomes an object of reflection. Consequently, this act of reflection is itself a portion of the original act of willing, and thus what is true of the will as a whole must also be true of this portion of the same: it too presupposes a cognition of an object. Thus, here again, we came up against the same familiar difficulty. What we have said until now has been meant to overcome this difficulty. The cognition that has to be presupposed here is a cognizance of something that is determinable as my own original, pure act of willing. This is the overall realm of reason as such. This totality becomes limited and determined by the thought of a concept that assigns me the task of limiting myself (i.e., it is limited through my individuality).} • What particularly concerns us here is the distinction between empirical willing and pure willing. All that [ideal] activity can ever reflect upon is pure willing, which is the highest thing that is determinable. {What is determinable in this case is the overall realm of reason as such.} This totality is {limited and} determined, prior to anything else, by thinking of a concept that limits me (individuality). H {This provides us with something objective, which, at the same time, is something determinable for the empirical will.} Three distinct levels are present here: (1) The level of pure will, or the level of reason as a whole, as something absolute: the realm of reason. This is the highest thing that is determinable. (2) But the latter is further determined whenever, {in consequence (176) of a concept of having to limit ourselves,} anything is extracted {from it}9 8 "Wollen ist QUASI die zweite Potenz unseres empirischen Vermogens, Denkens ist die erste." The term Potenz. ("power"), originally adopted from scientific and mathematical usages, became current as a technical philosophical term in the philosophical discussions of the Jena circle in the late •7gos and is closely associated with Schelling's Naturphilosophie. It first appeared in print (in this sense) in '799· Its occurrence in this passage (in both H and K) is cited by the editors of AA IV, 2 as evidence that the Halle transcript (like the Krause version) stems from 1798/99· This claim, however, has since been undermined by juha Manninen's discovery that Fichte was freely employing this term in his lectures on logic and metaphysics in the summer of 1798 (as transcribed by the Swedish student B. K. H. Hoijer). Hence it is surely possible that he might also have used it in his lectures on WLnm during the winter semester of •797/98. See Manninen, "Hoijer und Fichte," especially pp. 269-73, which include a good discussion of the special meaning of the term Polenz in Fichte's lectures. H [ ••• ] determined through thinking of a concept of having to limit myself (through my individuality) (p. 175). 9 "dadurch da~ etwas {aus ihm} aufgefa~t wird."'
350
§ 16
through individuality. (3) This individuality is what is determinable for a particular moment of consciousness; i.e., it is what is determinable for a determinate will. An act of empirical willing is a mere act of reflection upon pure willing as such. 1 {This empirical act of willing-appearing as an act of willing-becomes my entire self-activity. Accordingly, it is only an appearance and is nothing in itself.}
177
(4) How is the act of reflection we have just described possible? It is possible only in such a way that the cognition involved in a limitation brought about by a concept, {that is, the cognition of a concept of individuality, which limits me,} is itself impossible apart from an act of willing-and vice versa. The latter point, {that willing is possible only by means of cognition,} is clear and is valid for all consciousness} But the first half of this statement, that cognition is impossible without willing, can be thought of only as follows: An act of willing would have to be contained within the cognition in question, and all that would be grasped within such cognition would be the {given} determinability of the act of willing. {I.e., we are not free to choose whether we will view the matter in this particular manner or not;} willing could not be understood in any other way. {Expressed differently,} the concept that is here involved is that of a summons {to willing, a summons} to free activity. 10 ({Here is revealed a side of our system which is easy [to grasp]:} What is intelligible is the only original, {immediate object of consciousness and it is given along with me myself}. The sensible world is only a certain aspect or way of looking at what is intelligible. At this point we are not concerned with the sensible world, though later on we will explain how the intelligible world is transformed into the sensible world. 11 The question here is, To what extent is what is intelligible determinate? • What is supposed to lie at the foundation is not an empirical act of willing, but rather a pure will-reason as such or the realm of reason in its absoluteness, which has remained unintelligible up to this point. This is what is determinable as something determinate, which, as an individI There are three levels: (A) There is the pure will, the entire realm of reason as something absolute, as the highest thing that is determinable. (B) When this highest thing that is determinable is further determined by selecting something from it in accordance with a concept of having to limit ourselves, this is [the level of] individuality. (C) At the same time, this individuality itself is something determinable for an actual, empirical act of willing, i.e., for an individual moment of consciousness (pp. I 75-76). 1 [ ... ] is very easy to grasp, and its certainty is vouched for by all consciousness (p. I 76). 10 "die~ ist der Begriff der Aufforderung zur freien Thatigkeit." 11 See below, § I 7, Pt. Two, § 2, as well as the concluding pages of the same §.
§ 16
351
uaJ, I am; {consequently,} I cognize myself as an individual. K This cognition {of myself as an individual}, as we saw above, involves a movement from what is determinable to what is determinate; {therefore,} I am a portion of the {realm of} rational being, a portion that has selected itself therefrom, {and this individuality is, in turn, determinable by an act of empirical willing. Remaining at the intermediate level of individuality,} let us pause at this point and consider how individuality is produced from reason, which occurs in such a way that I discover myself to be incapable of or prohibited from doing something, though this very same thing must, nevertheless, actually exist for me originally, {if I am supposed to discover it to be something I cannot do}. The (177) {entire} determinate act that is involved here is a summons to engage in free activity. 12 This summons comes from, and is judged as coming from, another rational being similar to me {(and it will be deduced as such)}. 13 Self-consciousness therefore originates with my act of selection from a general mass of rational beings as such. {This is the deepest point of consciousness: As soon as anyone achieves consciousness, he perceives himself. This perception of oneself is impossible without a concept of a mass of rational beings. Therefore, the concept of selfhood is a concept constructed from the concept of a mass of rational beings.} This concept of selfhood as a "person" is impossible without a concept of a rational being 14 outside of us. Accordingly, this concept too is constructed by an act in which something is selected from a higher and more encompassing sphere. The first representationL I can have is that of being summoned, as an individual, to engage in an act of free willing.) This is the cognition we were seeking, a cognition that already contains willing within itself {and is given precisely through an act of willing}. Cognition of this summons is accompanied by a will. {As surely as I grasp this summons, I must surely will something.} From the perspective of what is sensible: Either I act in accordance with the summons 15 or I do not act in accordance with it. If I have understood this summons, I can, of course, still decide to determine myself not to act [in the manner required]; I can decide to resist the summons and can act K I cognize this determinacy {of the realm of rational beings] as individuality; consequenr..ly, I cognize myself as an individual (p. 176). 12 "ist Aufforderung zur freien Tatigkeit.~ I! K: "diese kommt her und wird so beurtheilt von einem and ern verniinftigen Wesen meinesgleichen.~ H: "diese Aufforderung kllmmt her, (so wird es DEDUCIRT werden) von [ ... ]." 14 ... einer Vernunft." L The first cognition (p. 177). 15 Reading, with H, "der Aufforderung zufolge" for K's "nach dem Willen" ("in accordance with the will'1·
352
§ 16
by not acting at all. Granted, the summons must [first] be understood; then, however, one must act, even if one does not heed this summons. {Consequently, if one has understood this summons, then oqe must act in any case.} In every case, I give expression to my freedom. This is how we must now think of the matter {when we observe this act}. But one can ask an even higher question, namely, What is the transcendental foundation for this claim? {The transcendental ground of this necessity lies in the fact that I cannot think of anything determinable without also thinking of something determinate, nor can I think of anything determinate apart from something determinable. Result: The first concept is my summons to act.} The goal is given to us along with the summons, {and some acting is necessarily connected with the concept of a summons}. From this it follows that individual reason cannot account for itself on the basis of itself alone. This is the most important result [of our inquiry]. {No individual, rational being can subsist 16 for itself.} It subsists only in the whole, by means of the whole, and as a portion of the whole. For how could an individual's cognizance of rational beings outside of himself be accounted for unless he contains within himself some deficiency?M We demonstrated this in the following way: Though we have tried hard {for many §§} to explain the origin of our concept of a goal, our attempts to do so {always} involved us in {the same familiar} circle: 1no concept of a goal is possible without cognition of an object, and vice versa}. Now, however, we have succeeded in answering this question, for it is not a difficult question to answer in [the context of] the ongoing process of reason. 17 All we have to do is indicate the first concep>t()f a_g~~!-.}~ll!this first cQii~l!t <>f _a gQal i;{-;;-ot~o~: tlii~ _'_Ye our!!_~y_~s~CQI}~truct; it is} something we receive. To be sure, it is nQ!._gi~~~-t() __ll_s__ ~~-~-P..~i~!i§!~m..w.IJic~ we can make a selection. {This is the summons to engage in a free ac;ti()ij.}(For·a"discussion con~~quenc~s that follow from i:h1s, see the Theory of Right.) 18 No individual is able to account for himself on the basis of himself alone. Consequently, when one arrives-as one mustat [the thought of] a first individual, one must also assume the existence of an even higher, incomprehensible being.N
·or l:he
16
"bestehen." Cognition of another rational being is brought about by a deficiency that lies in the individual rational being: perception of rational beings like himself but outside of him (p. 177)17 "denn im Fordaufe der Vernunft ists damit nicht schwer." 18 See the corollaries to § 3 of the Grundlage des Naturrechls (SW, Ill: 39-40). N This assertion is very important because of the consequences derived from it in the Theory of Right, which states: The individual cannot develop himself. One individual can be developed only by another one, and the development of the first individual is something that can be accounted for only by assuming a higher, absolute reason (pp. 177-'78). M
§ I6
353
§ 16
Viewed from another side, this task of limiting oneself is a summons to engage in a free activity (for it does not appear to come from the individual; instead, it appears to come from a rational being 19 outside of us). We cannot determine ourselves, however, unless our act of selfdetermination is accompanied by an actual act of willing; consequently, ~t!:':'!L~~ti!!g_~Jggnu~-~~Y I_il}~e~__ ~ith tll_i~ perception of a ~mons to fre~q__m. 20 r lli111iirli: clli.«:!-~!!f!f!!!~y .W!!:S.. ~baJ C:OIJ~f~Q!l;S~es~. ~an originate ~'!itil . wHling .. nor with. cognizing, .taken .. separately;· instead; it must begin wit!!J~Qt.h_at...on.c.<:. But are not willing and cognizmg"mde. penaeiii:ruea~h other? TuJ~ mr~J.9.!!~2-~E~~-~-r.h~s fron~ IJoth,but the cognition from which it arises is a summons to engage in free activ~!!Y;J.e;;ScQgijW,i,"iice of the f~~i t~at '!g~aUS. _given ~0 Ill!, At the same moment, an act of willing is {immediately} connected with this cognition. (178) Willing and cognizing are united in this X. 0
Oiif
19 "EINER VERNUNfT." 20
Reading, with H, "anfangen" for K's "ankniipft werden" ("be connected"). '1be chief difficulty for us lay in the following circle: willing cannot occur apart from cognition, and vice vel1la, Consciousness, therefore, could not begin with either of these, taken individually, but would have to be a joint product of both. Consequently, my willing and cognition would have to modify each other reciprocally, and coriM:iousness would have to proceed from this. This is also the actual situation with coruciousness. Consciousness commences with a single moment, within which cognition and willing are united: the cognition of my summons to engage in free activity. This cognition is given to us, and willing is immediately joined with this cognition, which must, within coruciousness, be immediately united with an act of willing (p. 178).
§ 17
[Part One]
179
For some time now it has been our task to assemble, according to the now familiar rules, the conditions of consciousness, {which we have ( 178f: established,} and, as it were, to construct consciousness before our very eyes-though not in the manner of the geometer, who does not concern himself with the source of his ability to draw lines or worry about the origin of space, A and whose science presupposes the Wi.ssenschaftslehre. The Wissenschaftslehre has to provide itself with the means it employs [in its construction of consciousness], and, in this respect, the system consists of precisely two pans: Up until the point where we showed that the pure will is the true object of consciousness {[and] the foundation of everything else (that is, until approximately§ 13)}, our task was to identify the means by which we were supposed to proceed, {that is, the conditions from which consciousness was supposed to be constructed}. The second part of our system began at that point, and here we are engaged in the actual process of constructing [consciousness]. Our field of inquiry, as well as our foundation, has been established; what we have to do now is outline the method we will be following and then apply it. We have assembled [consciousness] as follows: We began with {the assembly of} the sheer cognition {of an ideal object}, as the starting point of {all} consciousness. {We spoke of an act of reflection and showed how this act of reflection divided,} and then, {in the preceding §,} we added that such cognition is impossible apart from an act of willing, i.e., apart from something posited as willing by a rational being, something that is supposed to be no more than an appear- ( 17g;u ,, ance. {Thus an empirical act of willing is also an appearance of an inner A Thus we are now proceeding exactly like the geometer, who constructs figures in space, without worrying about where he obtained the lines and the space (p, 178)
[ 354]
§
17
355
force or energy that hovers above and transcends the empirical act. 1 From the empirical point of view, however, this same act appears to be an actual act of willing, and this appearance is entirely justified and may not be called into question.} Hence, {in consequence of this determination,} something {outside of me} is connected with the cognition that was first described; and we also have to describe a constantly flowing series or stream of consciousness. What then is actually the object that is supposed to be assumed to lie outside of us? What we are here concerned with is, first of all, an act of going outside of ourselves. At this point we must proceed to a strict deduction and must determine the previously established point in more detail: what sort of "external object" is contained in the cognition described {in the previous §}?
180
(1) In this {immediate} cognition I discovered (among other things) myself as freely determinable. This determinability of myself was taken to be entirely identical with the summons to engage in a free act of willing. {That is to say,} my own individuality arises from the total mass of reason. From this {determinacy that now becomes a determinability} there arises, in turn, a {determinate} act2 that occurs in a single moment. This individuality8 thus appears {within my consciousness} as an {actually occurring} summons to act freely. 3 {Therefore, this intermediate determinability is the same thing as the summons to act.} Individuality is given to me precisely through this summons: individuality = the summons to act freely. Is this true? What does "a summons to freedom" mean? This is a concept that would produce an action on the part of a free being4-if, that is, such a concept were endowed with causal power. This concept is posited in relation to the action of a free being; i.e., they are posited in a relationship of dependence, in such a way that the concept is supposed to occasion the action, {albeit without any compulsion, for then freedom would be sacrificed-and this is why we said "if such a concept were endowed with causal power"}. Such an action, however, is [only] possible, and therefore, we have postulated it only hypothetically. When one becomes aware of the existence of another individual, then this is a concept of that individual which accompanies what is summoned; it is a concept that also includes the latter.c This concept [of a 1 "also dafl EMPIRISCHES Wollen auch aus Erscheinung sey von einer innern Kraft die iiber dem EMPIRISCHEN schwebt": reading "eine" for "aus" in this sentence. 2 Reading, with Krause's MS, "That" for K's "Thatigkeit." 8 This determinability (p. 179). 5 "Aufforderung zum freien Handeln." 4 "eine Handlung des freien W." Though Fuchs completes K's "W" as "W[ollens]" ("willing"), it is here construed, following the similar sentence in H, as an abbreviation for Wesens. c Should one be aware that this summons comes from a free being outside of oneself, then the concept of this individual from whom the summons springs must already be contained within this summons itself (p. 179).
summons] is not supposed to be able to exercise any causality, for if it did, then it would determine us in a purely mechanical manner; instead, it is thought of hypothetically. (We will encounter several concepts of this sort, in which a category is simultaneously applied and not applied. We employ a category5 merely in order to be able to think of something. This is true here as well: The rule that states that whenever we posit anything we have to think of something else in opposition to it is a causal rule. But what is posited in opposition [to my determinable self] in the present case is something free [a freely produced action], and, to this extent, the concept of causality does not apply here. If, however, it could apply, then such and such an action would follow. We have merely indicated the rule governing such thinking.) The summons would thus contain within itself the real ground of a free decision, {if, that is, [the concept of a] "real ground" were applicable in this case}; i.e., it would be the determining agency that intervenes between what is determinable and what is determinate. {According to what has already been said,} the summons {to act freely} and the determinability are supposed to be the same. 6 "Determinability" designates merely the possibility of an act of determining; it does not indicate the ground on the basis of which such an act of determining occurs or does not occur. Determinability is simply the general sphere out of which determinacy can arise; whereas the summons is supposed to provide merely the explanatory ground ofthe determinacy, 0 but is not supposed to contain within itself the basis for the decision. Something is posited in the summons which is not posited in mere determinability, {something (180 that is posited as negated in what is determinable}. Consequently, the summons does not prove to be identical with determinability; {instead, they are completely different from each other}. We further posited, however, that this determinability is also supposed to be posited only as determinability and as nothing else, {and this is the sole source of the asserted [identity of determinability and the summons]. What does it mean to say that "the determinability is only determinability"? This means that} nothing else should appear within consciousness beyond this determinability, and that it should fill consciousness in its entirety. Only under this condition is the assertion in question true, and only un'At this point in the final copy of his transcript, Krause left eight pages blank, with the following self-explanatory note in the margin (dated August 25, 1799): "The missing period was not skipped. Instead, the text of the lecture was copied by mistake into another notebook and will be inserted later." The date indicates when he copied the missing portion into his notebook, not the date of the original lecture, which, of course, would have been sometime in the spring of •799· 6 Reading, with H, "eins sein" forK's "zugleich sein" ("to be simultaneous"), which is, perhaps, as Radrizzani suggests, merely a mistranscription of "gleich sein" ("to be equal"). 0 On the other hand, the summons is supposed to contain within itself the ground on the basis of which the determinacy can be explained (p. 129).
§
1
7
357
der this condition is it possible. {If anything else were to appear within consciousness, then this would have to be considered to be something determinate, and then what is determinable would not fill consciousness in its entirety.} Obviously, it is only under this condition that determinability is identical with the summons. {This, however, will become even clearer.} 181
(2) As surely as this X (which can be considered either as determinability
or as the summons) is comprehended at all, one acts freely. Even my resistance [to acting freely] is an expression of my freedom. Here I necessarily discover myself to be something determinable, something that has to act. (Determinability quaforma.) 7 {As surely as I comprehend this summons and am, along with this act of comprehending the summons, also conscious of the acting that follows therefrom, then acting surely occurs and is traced back to this summons [as the explanatory ground of the acting]. The reason for this is that} determinability cannot be thought of apart from determinacy: neither means anything apart from the other. Even if we understand this point, it is not all that enlightening. So let us now explain it more clearly. I comprehend the summons. What does this mean? What is contained in {the concept of} this summons? I grasp the concept, I have the cognition, that another rational being possesses a concept in which some acting is expected from me, and that, if this concept were able to exercise causality, I would have to act in a specific way as a result. This other rational being possesses a concept that envisages some acting on my part, though he nevertheless cannot treat me as a thing. The concept of a summons to act freely contains within itself the following: (A) I myself am thought of within this concept. (B) An accidental property of mine, my free acting, [is also included within this concept]. • Hence, purely by means of the concept of this summons, I {necessarily} discover myself, as well as my own free acting-though the acting in question is merely possible, a course of acting that I have merely thought of. I discover that I am thought of as acting by another rational being, even though I have not yet actually acted. {(I and my own free acting are both given to me.) With this, however, we have not yet explained everything that needs to·be explained. All that we have shown so far is the possibility of acting freely; we have not yet shown how I discover myself to be actually engaged in acting.} You question me: this means that you want some answer from me. I understand your8 question: this means that I know what sort of action 7 "in respect of its forms." I.e., ~the mere fonn of determinability." " Reading, with Krause's MS, "deine" for K's "diese" ("this").
you want me to perform. But I have not yet reached the end [of the account]; for in the case we have described, I still continue to appear to myself merely as something determinable, but not yet as anything determinate. This {determinability, however,} makes no sense {apart from determinacy}; therefore, as soon as I think of anything else whatsoever, this is something determinate in relation to what is merely determinable. {And, to the extent that a connection is established between the two acts of thinking, between the act of thinking of the possible free action and the act of thinking of the actual one, to this extent consciousness is [self-]identical.} But why should anything else be thought of at all [in addition to myself as what is determinable]? Why is consciousness not complete at this point? We have to show {how [and]} why one moment of consciousness {necessarily} becomes connected with another and how a continuous series comes into being. This general problem is here present in a quite specific and sharply defined form. {We here have the first moment of consciousness: our summons to act freely, to which we connect an actual instance of acting. This, quite properly, raises the following question: Why do we proceed beyond this first moment, beyond the mere summons, and posit something else as well? Why does this summons, by itself, not constitute a complete state of consciousness? This is a very important question for us, because we not only have to explain the starting point of consciousness but must also provide an account of its subsequent development. Let us now go back and analyze what we have already said.} 182
(3) As surely as I comprehend the summons, I discover myself to be a subject who can be described as "having to discover itself to be free." 9 • E {Observation: Here is the chief feature of any real or honest philosophy. 10 Without self-consciousness there is, in addition, no consciousness of an "other." This has been assumed by all Critical philosophy; nevertheless, such philosophy is not honest with itself, 11 for within this philosophy it seems as if one had merely pieced the I together-and this is true even of the Critique of Pure Reason. 12 This, however, is not the true nature of the I. The I must precede all experience; it must be an object for itself; it must be discovered. This has now been demonstrated.} 9 "finde ich mich als Subject, mit dem Pradicate der zu findenden Freiheit." More lit· erally: "I discover myself as the subject to which there pertains the predicate of 'freedom,' which has to be discovered." • As surely as I grasp a summons, I discover myself. I do not discover myself as the subject of a logical proposition with the predicate "I ought to be free." I am present for myself in this concept [of this summons] (p. 181). 10 "einer reellen Philosophie." 11 "ist s[ie] sich nicht real." 12 For Fichte's critical comments upon the "pieced together" I of the "K.antians," see § 6 of the "Second Introduction" to the Attempt at a New PreseniiJtion of the Wi.ssenstN.Jtsuhre.
(•8•1
j
I
§
1
7
359
• "I discover myself': what does this mean? (The necessity of connecting [the predicate of freedom to the subject] must be shown purely through analysis. {In doing this, we will limit ourselves to the first concept of the I.}) What must I cognize in order to be able to say "I discover myself'? 1-hood consists in the absolute identity of what is ideal and what is real. This is what 1-hood is for an intellect 1 ~ that exists outside of the consciousness that is here coming into being-i.e., only for the philosopher, [at least] {until now}. But our question is, How does such an identity come into being for the I we are now constructing? How can we show {that} absolute, immediate {consciousness is} the first point of consciousness? ({With this question, we are finished with our consideration ( 182) of the material or content of consciousness, for what is absolutely immediate within consciousness is the pure will.} We are now dealing only with the formal aspect of the latter, {i.e., with the question, How do we become aware of the pure will?}) {Here, once again, we will be observing the I. 1-hood, as has already been said, is the identity of what is ideal and what is real. Consequently,} "I discover myself' means I discover that what is ideal and what is real are identical. In other words, an act of thinking arises for me; through this act of thinking, there arises for me a being; and through this being there arises an act of thinking. 14 {Popularly expressed,} to say that a being arises by means of thinking means: "I think of something, and it comes into being." Consequently, this is an expression of the will; for willing is nothing but a {determinate} act of thinking, a kind of thinking which, by virtue of this synthesis {within consciousness} of being and thinking, is able to transform itself into a {specific} appearance of willing. Moreover, another act of thinking is generated by the being that is produced {by an act of thinking}, and I immediately perceive this being. {Consequently, "I discover myself," or "I perceive myself," means the following: I discover myself as an identity of what is ideal and what is real, an identity of thinking and being. This means that one of these terms immediately follows from the other and that this reciprocal relationship between being and thinking is contained within the I itself: being follows upon an act of thinking, and, in turn, this being produces an act of thinking.} For example, {I think} "my hand moves." This means that I {am required to} think of my hand as in motion, and it moves. "I will to move my hand": this means that, by means of immediate perception and the power of free choice, I think of my hand as movable. {From the transcendental point of view, "I perceive" 1 ' K: "sie ist eine lntelligenz" ("it is an intellect"). H: "so ist es filr eine lntelligenz." The translation is emended in the light of H. 14 K: "es erscheint mir im Denlten ein Sein durchs Denlten, und durchs Sein ein Denken" ("in 1the act of thinking there appears for me a being that is produced by this act, and through this being there appears an act of thinking"). The translation is emended in the light of the more coherent parallel passage in H: "es entsteht mir ein denlten, ein Seyn durch das Denlten, u. durch das Seyn ein denlten."
t83
and "I will" mean entirely the same thing, but from the ordinary point of view, these are two different things; thus the transcendental philosopher has to indicate the distinction between these two. Not only must he explain that this is only an appearance, he must also account for the necessity of this twofold appearance.} Our present aim is to explain the difference between these two ways of thinking. • Purely semantic accounts of the will [and of perception] are familiar enough. E.g., "willing" is an act of thinking of the concept of a goal, whereas {"perceiving"} is an act of thinking of an objective concept. The former is an act of ideal thinking, the latter is an act of real thinking.F {One could define the difference between the two above-mentioned acts of thinking in this manner, but one would not thereby accomplish what needs to be accomplished. These are only words; one has to go further and has to provide a real explanation. Presented in a genetic fashion, the situation is as follows:} To think of a goal is to think of a movement of transition from determinability to determinacy. To think of determinability is to oscillate among a multitude of mutually opposed moments of reflection. In thinking of a goal, one moves directly from thinking of what is determinable to thinking of something determinate; therefore, thinking of a goal is a free act of thinking, {and the I is conscious of this act of thinking [of a goal] only insofar as it is a free act of thinking}. When I think of a goal, determinability is present only as what is to be determined by my own'thinking, and this determinability takes the form of an unsettled oscillation among a multiplicity of opposed moments of reflection. The willing subject is also the thinking subject, through which this oscillation is first brought to a halt and concentrated upon a single point.c A transition is thereby accomplished to a determinate act of thinking. If we attend to the determinacy, then the I appears to be constrained {in this act of thinking}. This sort of thinking is called "ob- ( t83) ·. jective thinking," and a specific feeling is connected with it. {The feeling arises from the act of thinking; the act of thinking does not arise from the feeling.} If, on the other hand, we attend to the freedom involved in such an act of determining, then it appears to be an act of willing. In fact, to think of a goal is the same as to think of an object; these are simply t~o different sides of the same {act of thinking}. How then do these two different aspects differ from one another? ( l) [In the first,] you pay attention to yourself and to your own freedom. (2) [In the second,] your attention is directed to the determinacy present in this act of thinking (a F To think of willing to move one's hand is to think of a concept of a goal. When I think that my hand actually moves, this act of perceiving involves an objective concept (p. 18~). 0 Determinability is an oscillation between opposed moments of reflection; determinacy is the concentration of this oscillation upon a single point (p. 182).
determinacy that also comes from your own freedom, though you do not reflect upon this fact)." {Recapitulation: (1) We are here in the realm of appearances. Therefore, this distinction between different acts of thinking is, like thinking itself, nothing in itself. It simply represents two different ways in which one and the same thing must necessarily be viewed. The basis of this distinction lies in the fact that I observe myself, and when I observe myself I appear to myself in a certain way. How do I appear to myself? My agility consists in a movement of transition from determinability to determinacy. The determinability in question exists for me, and thus I appear to myself to transcend or to hover above my own determinability. 15 The case is the same with the determinacy: this also exists for me, and I appear to myself to hover above or to transcend this determinacy. Consequently, neither what is determinable nor my own act of hovering appears as a determinate act of thinking, willing, or understanding. Examples of the state of mind we are referring to here are those of absentmindedness and dreaming. This is the state that Leibniz calls that of "confused representations.'' 16 I also appear to myself as actively engaged in wrenching something determinate out of this determinable state. I hover above what is determinable only insofar as this act of wrenching away occurs; and this act, in turn, occurs only insofar as I hover above what is determinable. Both occur at the same time, and only after this act has occurred do I-through an act of reflection-distinguish my act of hovering above my own determinability from my act of wrenching away something determinate. (2) In this act of wrenching away something determinate I appear to myself in a twofold manner. By virtue of my absolute act of determining, I appear to myself as free. This is an act of willing. But if I attend to this act of wrenching determinacy out of determinability, without any regard to the freedom [involved in this act], then the determinacy in question appears as an underlying objectivity, and my own state of mind no longer appears to me as willing, but instead appears as cognition. For example: ( 1) By means of an energy that belongs to my internal energy, I move my hand. This movement is accomplished by determining this internal energy. If I pay no attention whatsoever to the freedom with which I have determined my own energy, then I have a cognition of the ( 1 s4 ) H If I attend to the freedom involved in the act of thinking of something determinate, then this act of thinking appears to me as an act of willing. If I attend only to the determinacy involved in this same act of thinking, without giving any consideration to the freedom, then what arises for me is an act of real thinking and, along with this, a cognition (p. 183). 15 "ich erscheine mir als dariiber schwebend." 16 See Monadolo!fj. §§ 14-21 and 6o.
movement of my hand. (2) I will to move my hand. This means that I attend to the freedom involved in the determination of my inner energy. This produces the act of willing to move my hand. Since the determination of my energy always occurs freely, it follows that I feel my hand move only when I will it to move. Both of these-the actual movement of my hand and my act of willing this movement-are one and the same thing, simply looked at from two different sides. What is the source of this difference? (1) One attends to oneself and to one's freedom (2) One attends to the limitation and the coercion. This provides cognition.} • This is how things appears to those of us who are engaged in philosophical inquiry: we see the identity of being and thinking, {and we view the subject as thinking of itself and determining itself, as perceiving itself and determining itself}. But this is not yet of any help to us here, for we must ascribe to the I we are examining a similar view [of the identity of being and thinking], and we must show that the I necessarily views itself in this way. {And, with this, our task would be completed.} • The I views itself in this two-fold manner; it entertains the representation that its hand ought to move, and it connects this with the representation that the hand does move. This, however, does not produce a representation of my will as containing within itself the basis for the movement of my hand. I.e., the representation of a causal relationship between the will and the perception is not contained therein. 1 For us, of course, a representation of such a causal relationship is already contained in these two representations, for we know that they are at bottom one and the same} We must demonstrate, however, that the actual I is also aware of this identity 17 {-not in a philosophical manner, but in one that is adequate nonetheless. With respect to the representation of an object, our consciousness begins when we discover ourselves to be summoned to act freely; here we ourselves are given. What I discover in this representation is, above ali, 1
The I views iJself in two different ways:
(1) Insofar as one's hand is actually in motion, there arises, from the determinate cog-
nition of this limitation, a representation of the actual movement of the hand. (z) Insofar as the movement of one's hand is freely accomplished, there arises a representation of the act of willing to move one's hand, which directs the actual movement. Thus there here arise representations of both occurrences, "I will" and "it happens," but not a representation of a relationship of causality (p. 184). J The philosopher knows why something happens at the same time that I will it, for he understands that both of these are really the same occurrence. We have shown this as well (p. 184)17 Since Krause left himself a bit more •pace in his notebook than proved to be necenary for transcribing the previou.ly noted mi.sing lecture, a blank page occurs at this point in the MS, accompanied by the note, "Here the manuscript continue• without interruption. Nothing is miS>ing."
myself. As we already know, the "I" signifies an identity of what is ideal and what is real. I never discover myself, however, except insofar as I discover myself to be summoned to act freely. Accordingly, it must be the case that neither being nor acting could ever exist without the other and that both of these are one; they are the same thing, merely viewed from two different sides. I will for my hand to move, and it actually does move. These are simply two different ways of looking at the same event. Willing is a way of thinking of my hand as moving, and cognition 18 is also a way of thinking of my hand as moving. Nevenheless, these two acts of thinking provide me with two different experiences, because the will appears to be the (185) cause of experience, whereas cognition appears to be a fact [produced by] this cause. Here we have an act in which I determine myself. This expression, however, contains two different meanings: [ 1] It signifies an act of "determining" in the active sense of the term, a "doing." If I attend to this aspect, then my active being appears to me as a pure act of willing. [2] But "determining" also has a passive sense, according to which it signifies a limitation. If I attend to this aspect, then I discover myself to be limited. What is present in this case is not a doing, but rather a state of being affected (by myself), i.e., a passive state, which provides me with cognition. Thus what is ideal and what is real, doing and being, would be one and the same. But who asserts this identity? This is a claim made by a philosopher. But if he is a true philosopher and if his philosophy is a true philosophy, he will not simply set his philosophical thesis before us, as if it were some sort of thing; instead, he will examine consciousness itself and will indicate the presence of this union within consciousness itself-albeit not as something "in itself." Consequently, the I itself must actually be conscious of the asserted identity of being and doing. This is what we now have to demonstrate. It is easy to discover this connection within actual consciousness. First, however, we must consider the following:} An act of thinking is connected with an immediate consciousness of the same act of thinking; {this is self-evident and beyond any doubt}. Therefore, the sort of thinking we are discussing here-that is, the sort of thinking which, considered from one side, is {the thought of} a goal and, considered from another, is {the thought of} an object-must, in both instances, be an act of thinking that is accompanied by consciousness. Moreover, this accompanying consciousness must be the same in both cases and must occur in the same moment, since we cannot think of a goal without also thinking of a real object, and vice versa. Both of these are obviously connected in our consciousness of thinking them, since 18
Reading "Erkenntni(l" for H's "Erfahrung" ("experience").
184
neither of them can be thought of as something discrete. If we attempt to think of either apart from the other, then we will think of neither.K {All} other acts of thinking originate from this unified act of thinking, which we wish to call "synthetic thinking," {in order to distinguish it from all other acts of thinking}. In this act of {synthetic} thinking, the I thinks of itself as self-determining; and this act of self-determining cannot, {in turn,} be separated {from the I, unless the I itself were to be renounced. In this act of thinking, therefore, the I itself expresses its entire nature.} The I is an I for itself. {This will make what has already been said even clearer.} Here we have an act of thinking of the object and an act of thinking of the goal. Though these thoughts are distinct from each other, they necessarily occur together within a single consciousness, and the latter, {that is to say, the consciousness of thinking, the consciousness of the indivisible unity of these two acts of thinking,} is called "synthetic thinking."
Rnnark A: As ideal activity, all thinking is directed at some object of thinking. What then is the object of this act of "synthetic thinking"? This object is nothing other than I myself, {and indeed,} I myself as engaged (18( in thinking. (1) I think, and (2) I observe myself thinking. This latter is the act of synthetic thinking. {Moreover, (1) I think of what is ideal and of what is real, object and goal, and (2) I observe both these acts of thinking. This last sort of thinking is synthetic thinking, for what is ideal and what is real, object and goal, are both present within this act of thinking; the object and the goal are here grasped together.} In synthetic thinking, both the former acts of thinking [my thinking of an object and my thinking of a goal] are grasped together in a single moment of consciousness. Accordingly, such an act of thinking is an intellectual intuition, and what is thought of {in this act} is {a determination of pure activity,} something intelligible, something that comes into being {only} by means of thinking. Synthetic thinking thus belongs under the heading of "pure thinking," which we have previously characterized as "merely thinking of something." 19 In contrast, the sort of thinking that is the object of synthetic thinking (which is both ideal and real) IS {merely} something {sensible, since it is} mediated by sensibility. Remark B: Though the I is not pieced together from a manifold ofrepresentations, there is, nevertheless, a certain amount of truth in this way of looking at it. The error lies entirely in the one-sidedness of this assertion. For ideal and real thinking are united within synthetic thinking; therefore, {if they are to be united,} there must be some act of thinking must be thought of together, or else neither of them will be thought of (p. t8!)). "sich etwas denken." See the introductory portions of§ 13.
K They 19
in which they are distinguished from each other. (This is the evidence to which those who make the above claim can appeal.) Nevertheless, {as we said above,} both of these are one and the same act of thinking. This apparent contradiction leads us to an important {[and] surprising} conclusion: that the sort of thinking that introduces distinctions and notes differences and the sort of thinking that overcomes and unites differences20 are themselves one and the same and cannot be separated from each other. Through synthetic thinking, the kind of thinking that introduces distinctions is not simply unified; instead, {in order for such a unification to be possible,} it is first divided in such a way that it cannot be united. 21 But how can this division occur? Insofar as thinking is considered as it is in itself, there surely cannot be two different kinds of thinking, {which could, as it were, be united by being posited together. These are only different aspects22 of a single act of thinking.} The separation occurs in {and through} the unification, and the unification occurs through the separation {of these two aspects}: these two acts cannot be separated. {Synthesis and analysis always go together here. The situation is as follows:} There is within me a first, original consciousness = A. As a consequence of the duality of the mind, this original consciousness is viewed as something twofold, {as Band C. Hence A} B + C. Moreover, C itself is also viewed as something twofold. A, therefore, would be the entire totality of thinking, 23 i.e., the synthesis. (For the Wissenschaftslehre presents nothing but wholes; 24 every moment contains a manifold. {Within the Wissenschaftslehre, thinking is always a whole; it is not something pieced together from its parts. It is presented as a complete totality, and only then is the manifold of thinking presented. Furthermore, this manifold is not already present in a finished form within this totality, so that all the philosopher has to do is disassemble it; instead, this ( 187) manifold first comes into being before the eyes of the-philosopher.}) {Therefore, A is viewed in a dual light, namely, as B and as C.} B is supposed to be my act of thinking of my own thinking, {what is ideal,} the mediated or indirect consciousness of my own thinking, {through which I become conscious of my own thinking}. C is supposed to be the act of thinking of which I am conscious. B and C together constitute A. The division comes only from the original duality of the subject-object. 25 C itsel£ {also} appears as something twofold, as the ideal act of thinking 20
"das verschiedene und vereinigende Denken." K: "erst getrennt ohne vereinigt werden zu kOnnen." H: "sondern es wird durch dajlelbe fiir die Moglichkeit einer Vereinigung zuerst getrennt." Radrizzani suggests that the "ohne" in K is a mistranscription of "urn," which would make the passage in K read, "First divided in order to be able to be united." 22 Reading, with Radrizzani, "Absicht" forK's "Ansicht." 25 "die Mafle des Denkens." 24 "die Wissenschaftsl..ehre stellt immer lautere Mallen auf." 25 "von der ursprungJischen DUPLICITAET, der SUBJECTOBJECTIVITAET." 21
of a goal { = Y} and also as the real act of thinking of an object { = X}: C = X + Y. In relation to C, B both separates and unites these two acts of thinking [ = X and Y]. In relation to both B and C, A also is an act of thinking that both separates and unites [B and C]. Thus we have the entire totality of the manifold. L That is why we have called this type of thinking "synthetic thinking." {The opposed elements would not be posited in opposition to each other and would not need to be united if they were not already united.} The I is posited as the mediating subject that unites these various types of thinking. 26 Yet [before it can do this], synthetic thinking must first portray these various acts of thinking as distinct from one another; therefore, synthetic thinking must also be analytic. This analysis occurs by means of an act of thinking that is hypothetically necessary, {i.e., an act that must necessarily occur if consciousness is supposed to occur,} but which is itself based upon freedom. How then are these opposed acts of thinking related to each other? They are related to each other in the same way what is determinable is related to what is determinate; this is a relationship, however, that gives rise to a successive temporal series. Consequently, time first arises through this act of analytic thinking, which occurs in a single moment, {for two moments [now] arise, and, with this, time itself}. In this way, {time arises before our very eyes:} we obtain a genetic understanding of the origin of time and, at the same time, see that it is something {purely} ideal. • Admittedly, it is difficult to accept the fact that we first "think ourselves into" time. The reason for this difficulty is as follows: I am supposed to think of myself within time, but I am surely unable to do this unless I am already in time. When one speaks in this way, however, one has not abstracted from time at all; instead, one thinks of this supreme act of thinking [as occurring] within time. This is not correct, since what is supersensible does not occur within time, and-for precisely this reason-we are unable to think of what is supersensible, but can employ it merely to explain other things. Here, however, this point can become surprisingly clear for anyone. {Remark: Many people find it difficult to obtain entry into the Wissenschaftslehre precisely because it treats time itself as nothing more than a form of intuition. I myself am not in time. It is by means of thinking that I first extend myself over time, and it is in this way that I bring time into being. One stumbles over this point because one [assumes that one] cannot think of oneself in time at all unless one is already in time. This occurs because one does not think of time with sufficient precision, i.e., because one thinks that this same thinking subject is itself in time. Time, however, is only the form of our intuition. It is the colored glass through L Thus 26
we have here thinking in its entirety, as well as the manifold of the same (p. 187). "das lch wird zwischen beides hineingesezt als vereinigend."
186
which we view everything in time; but the subject who looks through this glass is not in time. This subject is something supersensible, even though it can observe itself only through this very same glass, and thus can discover itself only insofar as it discovers itself within time. At this point it becomes dear that all thinking occurs within time, including the act of thinking by means of which I construe myself.} Every aq of my thinking in which I actually construe myself is an act of thinking of an I, M which {in accordance with the laws of thinking} contains within itself a manifold: the concept of a goal as well as acting. By means of my thinking, the concept of a goal and acting are (1) distinguished from each other and (2) posited in a certain relationship to each other. In what relationship? In a relationship of determinability to determinacy, or in a relationship of dependence. This is a temporal relationship, for what is determinable precedes what is determinate, and the concept of a goal precedes an act of willing. {Let us apply this here: ( 188) We can all engage in an act of willing. Here we find ourselves affected as deliberating, and then we make some decision. Time is already present here; the act of deliberation precedes the actual decision. Does my decision actually occur within time?} Does the [deliberation] really precede the [act of] the will? 27 {If I adopt the ordinary point of view, the answer is obvious: of course the decision occurs within time. But it looks quite different from the transcendental point of view.} The real truth of the matter, as judged by pure reason, is this: no, 28 [deliberation does not precede the act of willing]; willing and deliberating, along with therelationship I posit them to have to each other, are all mere appearances. My consciousness begins not with willing, nor with the concept of a goal, nor with the perception of an object; instead, it begins with all these [at once). It is all these things, and it is only within experience that I first separate them. N Different colors are produced when a single ray of light shines through a prism. No one claims that the ray of light itself consists of these various colors; instead, it is something simple, which becomes differentiated and dispersed by the prism. Accordingly, one may also tolerate talk about the ideality of space {as a form of intuition, by means of which we posit objects in space}; but {it is far less obvious that time itself is only a form, which first arises only through the division of the undifferentiated ray of the intellect, [and that]} when one turns to time and is ., [ ..• ] is an act of thinking of an X (p. 187). ~1st wiirklich erst Entschlull als WiUe." Reading, with Radrizzani, "Du.IBEKATION" for "Entschlull" (~decision"), a reading supported by the context, as well as by the parallel pasin H. 8 "bedeutet wiirklich Wahrheit von der reinen Vernunft, so ist [die] Anwort: nein.'' N My conS<:iousness can begin with none of these, taken individually; it must proceed from them all. In fact, they are originally only one; but, since I proceed from this starting point, I distance myself from the primordial point of consciousness, inasmuch as I view this through the glass of sensible representation and divide it (p. 188). 21
safe
supposed to examine it, here too there is nothing but a single ray, which is not in any time, and that a temporal expanse also first arises only by means of such a prism: our own power of representation. Yet one must comprehend this point. {Those who will not concede that time is a form of intuition can be quite bewildered by the following:} It is, for example, certainly true that the events in the world are connected with one another as causes and effects. But no time whatsoever is contained within the concept of causality, for the effect is absolutely simultaneous with the cause. Even if we think of causality as a merely mechanical relationship, the connection [with the effect] does not come after the cause itself. When my finger presses upon something, a depression is simultaneously produced. Everything that exists is an effect of some cause and is simultaneous with this cause. But what about this cause itself? It is, in turn, an effect of some other cause, and so on, ad infinitum. No time comes into being in this way; everything is present in a single stroke. {Thus there is no time at all, because there is no succession whatsoever between the cause and the effect.} What then is the origin of the time with which we are nevertheless familiar? It arises because we are unable to think of a cause and an effect at the same time, but proceed from the one to the other. This is how thinking produces time, though this is accomplished not by thinking alone, but rather by the original act of intuiting an act of thinking, {namely, the act of thinking of a cause and an effect}. We obtain the various temporal relations by analyzing the concepts produced thereby. {Time, therefore, is and remains a form of intuition.} Both synthesis and analysis are present at the beginning of consciousness, and it is by means of analysis that a manifold comes into being {within consciousness}. There can be no first moment of consciousness, at least none that could be cognized as such, for every moment of consciousness is always part [of a larger whole]. 29 {Instead, a second moment is always connected with the first one, in accordance with the laws of consciousness; for every moment of consciousness is an instance of acting, and for every instance of acting I must always presuppose a concept of a goal. Consequently, for every moment of consciousness I must presuppose another, in which the concept of a goal was constructed. (181 Consciousness is a continuous and coherent whole.} Let us say that a child first becomes conscious at moment X, which would thus constitute the first moment [of his consciousness]. He discovers himself to be a willing subject, but he cannot account for this without presupposing another moment Y, {the moment at which he grasped the concept of a goal}. Consequently, though X is the first moment of the child's consciousness in the eyes of God, for the child himself it is not the first mo29
'"denn alles ist immer ein Stiick."'
187
ment. Instead, he must go on and presuppose another moment Z, etc. {Whenever one wishes to determine the consciousness of the limit [that is, to determine the starting point of consciousness], consciousness thus extends itself by means of this very act of determining. Similarly, consciousness also extends itself in a forward direction; for this reason} no human being knows when he will die. This much is clear; we always think. of a"ditional goal concepts {for some future moment}. But neither has any person ever had any knowledge of when he began. {Accordingly, our consciousness has neither a beginning nor end.} Consciousness itself is simply not in any time at all, and only {what is in} time has a beginning and an end. {Consciousness is not in time, because within consciousness, or within every single moment of consciousness, a concept of a goal must be thought of for the moment in question, as well as for the moment to come.} Time as a whole is merely a certain way of looking at things, one that arises when we start with what we take to be a first act of willing and then connect this act with another, [preceding one,] which is supposed to explain it, and with another, subsequent one, which is supposed to follow from it. {Consequently, every moment of consciousness also includes within itself something of the past and something of the future.} Remark C: What we have described is nothing but an act of willing, and it becomes an act of willing precisely through the synthesis accomplished by relating being to thinking, and vice versa. {Thinking is being, and being is thinking: they are the same thing, simply viewed in two different ways. Consequently, willing, which consists only in relating being and thinking to each other, is only an appearance.} People will not agree with this, however. In response to the question, "Do you or can you will something or other?" everyone will maintain that we can strip everything else from him, but not his personality [i.e., his will]. Nevertheless, willing is nothing more than an appearance. It is precisely what has just been described: the identity of being and thinking. Willing is this entire reciprocal interaction of being and thinking, and it is nothing else. Willing is the starting point of all consciousness, the true center to which everything else is connected. 0 {l discover myself only as a subject engaged in willing.} • Have we not, however, gone astray? We have analyzed the concept of a summons, but we arrived at a second concept and have been discussing something other than the concept of a summons. We have discovered that what comes first is not the concept of the summons, but rather an act of willing. There is no moment at which consciousness first arises; consciousness is an act of willing. Everything else follows from this 0 Willing is the starting point of consciousness, within which everything is connected as a consequence of analysis (p. 18g).
370
§ 17
momenl of will through the mere appearance [of the same] 110 An act of deliberating or selecting does occur, but this is something I posit in addition to the actual determination of myself, so that the latter can be said to precede the act of willing. • One could divide transcendemal idealism imo an "idealism of inner sense" and an "idealism of outer sense," i.e., an idealism of space and an idealism of time.P {The first part is much easier to grasp than the second, and will therefore also be acceptable to many people. But many will find it much more difficult to obtain emrance imo the second pan, even though this has to be accepted if the first pan is to have a solid foundation. Until now we have been trying to show that our consciousness is not discursive insofar as it is outside of all time, but instead becomes discursive only by being dispersed over time. Consciousness begins with consciousness of a summons, though this too can be thought of only in (19' order to explain consciousness.} In short, in the course of the development of consciousness it appears that what conditions {our} will is something that lies within us. At the poim where {consciousness of our} individuality commences, [however,] what conditions the will appears to lie outside of us in another rational being. {In this way, individual reason generates itself from reason xm: e!;oX,t]K. 31 } {We began with a representation of the summons to act freely-a representation that we presupposed. We said, "I discover myself to be summoned.'' We considered the meaning of the words "I discover myself" \ \ and explained what sort of "I" is discovered in this case. "I" signifies the identity of the object and the subject. I-hood can consist only in the fact that a subjective act of thinking ( = "thinking") and an objective one ( = "willing") appear as one and the same act of thinking ( = "synthetic thinking"). We will not here discuss that act of thinking within which willing and the goal (or the act of thinking of a goal) appear as two separate acts of thinking, even though it is true that no act of synthetic thinking can exist in consciousness apart from an act of analytic thinking.} 188
(4) As surely as I am summoned [to act freely] at all, I am supposed to discover myself. But {how is this possible?} In what form do I here discover myself? In the sort of synthetic thinking we have just described, '""an diesen Moment des Willens wird durch die blolle Erscheinung das iibrige angelrniipft." The context, as well as the preceding passage in H, suggest that this obscure sentence should perhaps be emended by reading "Analyse" for K's ''Erscheinung" ("appearance"), in which case it would read, "Everything else follows from this moment of will through mere analysis." POne could divide transcendental idealism into two parts: (1) A transcendemal idealism of ouleT urue, which would establish [the foundation of] everything that appears to us as an object, or as matter in space. (2) A transcendental idealism of inner sense, which would establish that even time is nothin~ in itself. but is only our product (p. 18g). 1 "in the larger sense.''
§•7
371
{where subject and object are grasped together, in the center of all consciousness,} I discover myself to be engaged in thinking of a goal as well as of the object produced by thinking about this goal. Moreover, I discover myself to be thinking of this goal and of this object at one and the same moment-or, more accurately, in no moment at all, but outside of time altogether. We thus have two extreme terms [the thought of the goal and the thought of the object], while synthetic thinking is the middle term, which constitutes the inner nature of each of the two extremes. Furthermore, we will see that each of these two extremes must, in turn, be connected with another, [even more] extreme, term. In this manner, we will find that consciousness contains within itself a fivefold [synthesis], {which connects everything in synthetic thinking and by means of which each element is inseparably united with all of the rest}. Thus we have a synthetic periodum, ~ 2 which is always fivefold. The present inquiry has the advantage of proceeding from the innermost element to the outermost ones, unlike the published Wissenschaftslehre, which begins with the outer terms and proceeds from there toward the center.Q All thinking is included within this {fivefold} synthesis, for every act of thinking is a determinate form of self-consciousness. {In other words, all consciousness is an immediate consciousness of myself. I posit nothing but myself, but I posit myself from a variety of different sides. As we have seen (191 above,} every act of synthetic thinking is also an analysis, through which this same act of thinking is dispersed over time. It is through the relation of these {temporal} relationships {to one another} that I obtain a manifold act of thinking; moreover, it is only through this manifold act of thinking that a manifold becomes present for thinking. {In my present situation, I appear to myself to have engaged in an act of thinking in the preceding moment. This is not a truth; it is merely an appearance. It is nothing more than an act of thinking, a single act of thinking which is dispersed and extended over time by consciousness. Moreover, this can be demonstrated.} Yet surely this way of looking at consciousness is contradicted by the usual view, which asserts, "Before one is able to think of anything in time, one already has to be within time oneself."R {The transcendental philosopher responds by asking, "Who says this? Who makes this claim?" This claim is, of course, made by someone who is thinking synthetic thinking itself.} But [only] someone who is 32 "Period." Fichte here employs this term in its grammatical sense of a complete or "periodic" sentence, which does not display its complete meaning until one has reached the end. Like an act of synthetic thinking, a "period" Cperiodum) is a whole, within which several different, or, in Fichte's language, "opposed," elements are united. Q In the present version of the Wissenschaftskhrt, we begin with the innermost term and proceed from there to the extremes. This is not the path that was followed in the published Wissenschaftskhrt, which began with the extreme terms and then sought to discover the center, i.e., synthetic thinking (p. tgo). R The ordinary person views this matter in the following way, and says, "You do indeed think of your own thinking as something that occurs within time; but in order for you to be able to posit your act of thinking within time, you yourself must be in time" (p. tgt).
already engaged in reflection can speak in this way; indeed, if he were able to think of this situation in any other way, then this would be enough to prove the incorrectness of what we have been saying in this inquiry. {Such a person cannot help but think that the highest act of synthetic thinking occurs within time, for he thinks of this higher act of thinking by means of a lower one-and thinks of this lower act of thinking by means of the higher one itself. Briefly put, the main point is this: We cannot escape from our own consciousness; even the transcendental philosopher, when he wants to explain consciousness, is able to go beyond consciousness only by means of a forced act of abstraction.} It is certainly true that, within experience, we are unable to escape from the form of consciousness. Accordingly, we in fact obtain two series, which exist alongside each other: ( 1) The series of ideal thinking, which originates in the act of thinking of a goal. (2) The series of real thinking, which originates in the act of thinking of an object of our willing. Neither of these series exists apart from the other, and each is made possible only by the other. In order to investigate them philosophically, however, we will have to consider each series individually. 5
I. Concerning the Series of Ideal Thinking
189
{"I think":} In this act of synthetic thinking,~~ I posit myself as constructing a concept of a goal; the latter is also an act of thinking, and hence I think of myself as thinking. Who thinks of me in this way? I do; I think of myself as thinking when I engage in an act of synthetic thinking which has as its object {my own} act of willing. How is the act of thinking of the concept of a goal related to this act of willing? Obviously, it is related to it as a condition is related to what it conditions; consequently, it must precede it in time. Willing stands in a relationship of dependence to the act of constructing a concept of a goal. {Within actual consciousness, this occurs as follows: We will to act; consequently, we deliberate: we construct a concept of a goal and make a decision. Two different representations are therefore present in this case: that of an act of constructing a concept of a goal and that of an act of willing. These two representations are related to each other as a condition is related to (1g: 5 The two series are internally united with each other; neither exists apart from the other, and, without the other, each is nothing at all. Nevertheless, as philosophers, we now wish to separate them, in order to be able to consider and examine each of them individual~ (p. 191). 5 Reading, with H, "injenem synthetischen Denken" forK's "injenem Denken des synthetischen'' ("in this act of thinking of what is synthetic").
§
1
7
373
what it conditions. Constructing a concept of a goal is the condition, and the act of willing is what is conditioned thereby. Time is also involved in this relationship. The transcendental philosopher shows that, in itself, this is not the way things stand and that these relationships are also only an appearance. The true center of consciousness is willing. The construction of a concept of a goal is an act that is only thought to precede the act of willing, as the condition precedes what it conditions. An act of constructing a concept of a goal is therefore presupposed to have occurred in advance of the act of willing which actually does occur.} Furthermore, in this act of constructing a concept of a goal, the I is thought of as engaged in thinking; therefore, what is supposed to precede the act of willing is an act of thinking, indeed, the act of thinking of myself as a willing subject. In order to account for the latter, I must posit or produce another act of thinking [the act of thinking of a goal]. {Therefore, it is through thinking of myself as willing-and only in this way-that an act of thinking of myself is produced. In a certain sense, therefore, the act of thinking of a goal is an act of thinking which must have occurred in advance, though it is not posited originally, but is posited merely in consequence of this [relationship of] dependence.} To say that an act of thinking of a goal is thought of as having occurred in advance [of the act of willing] means that it is thought of not as identical with the latter, but rather as a separate act. lying outside of the present one. • Further analysis of this same act of thinking, in which we will consider first the subjective and then the objective aspect of this act of thinking: Re. 1 [the subjective aspect of synthetic thinking]: This is an act of synthetic thinking, and it posits another act of thinking in opposition to itself: the isolated act of thinking of a goal, {an act that is a discrete part of this very act of synthetic thinking}. ({As has already been said many times,} for Kant the synthesis is the result of a concept and occurs {only} when the two terms to be united are {already} present. This is not the case here; instead, C exists, and C includes, in addition, A and B in their union with each other-a union that, in turn, originates only through the positing of C. Hence C obviously possesses a dual nature: partly unitary and partly twofold. {According to Fichte, synthesis is a process of development, in which something entirely new and not previously present becomes attached to what preceded it. E.g., what is present is A; what is connected to it is B; and the synthesis is C.}) Here we have a consciousness = C. (C = an act of synthetic thinking. What is determinate in the present case is an act of empirical willing.) The act of constructing a concept of a goal [ = an act of pure willing = A] is contained within this act of synthetic thinking, which [also} includes [the thought of] an object that is to be brought about as a result of my willing [ = B).
374
§
1
7
C becomes an act of {empirical} willing when these [i.e., A and B] are united with each other. In their union with each other, however, {pure willing and the object} must also be separated {and posited individually as A and B}. Therefore, A is also posited on its own. A, {or the act of constructing a concept of a goal,} is, however, an act of thinking. Has this act of thinking preceded any [actual] moment, {[and specifically] has it preceded the act of empirical willing}? A is merely posited as having already occurred, {in accordance with the law ·of thinking which states that, for everything determinate, we must presuppose something that determines it}; it is something that is merely produced.T • A certain act of thinking is not actually thought at all; instead, we only think that it is thought. This is the case here: we do not construct [the concept of] a goal; instead, we merely posit that it has been constructed. ijust as matter is presupposed or projected in the case of my sensible perception, so too does my thinking or willing presuppose an act of thinking on my pan. There is an apparently paradoxical saying that expresses this very well: "It is not [actually] thought of; it is only thought of as it would be thought of." 34 This is the situation here: the act of constructing a concept of a goal is only presupposed to have occurred before the act of willing.} Therefore, when the system of reason is completed, 35 this first moment is presupposed. No one becomes conscious of dying or of being born, and thus there is no beginning [of consciousness]. • This act of synthetic thinking consists of two elements, {the act of willing and the act of thinking of a goal}. How are these two elements related to each other? The first element or act is what is determinate or determined; {indeed, it is completely determined, since it is related to nothing but the second one,} whereas the second is what determines the first. How, for example, are we able to distinguish the act of thinking of a present sensible representation from the act of thinking of one that is not present? Or, what distinguishes the present moment from all previous moments? The present moment is {always} simply what is determiTHere we have a consciousness ( = C). The act of synthetic thinking is already contained in the act of constructing a concept of a goal, for the act of synthetic thinking contains within itself an act of [pure] willing and an object, insofar as the latter is supposed to be brought about through willing. Thus, in the union of an act of willing with an object, C becomes an act of empirical willing; but precisely through this union, the act of pure willing and the object are both posited individually as well, as A and B, and are separated from each other. Here we are concerned only with A. But A ( = the act of constructing a concept of a goal) is an act of thinking. This raises a question: Does A (the act of thinking of pure willing) precede the act of empirical willing (if this is assumed to be the first moment of consciousness) or not? A is merely posited as having preceded it, in accordance with the law of thinking which states that, for everything determinate, we must presuppose something that determines it. Accordingly, A is merely our own product (p. 192). •• "Es wird NICHT gedacht, [es wird nur gedacht-] als wiirde gedacht." The words within brackets appear in the margin of H. 5 ' "beim Kniipfen des Vernunftssystems."
§
17
375
nate, and the past moment is {always} thought of as what determines {the present one}. Once the present moment has slipped into the past, then it too will determine {a future moment}, though I do not yet know anything at all about the future.u What is presupposed is thus both what determines and what is determined. This much is clear: the concept of a goal is supposed to be what determines an actual act of willing; the act of willing is supposed to be something determinate, which may well be able to determine [something else}-though we are not [now) discussing this. Consequently, {one should once again carefully note that} the concept of a goal is nothing actual; it is something {that is added to willing and is} posited merely in order to explain willing. The act of choosing a concept of a goal from the manifold of what is possible is thought of as what determines [an act of willing). [Re. 2, the objective aspect of synthetic thinking:) Second, let us examine {the object contained in synthetic thinking, that is,} the act of thinking which is thought about. {The act of thinking of the concept of a goal is an act in which the I makes a selection from what is determinable. Accordingly,} the I, in the manner we have posited, is supposed to exercise its choice (to think) in making a selection from the manifold, in order to determine itself in such a way that the object it wills will actually come into being within the sensible world. Accordingly, the choosing subject36 presupposes itself; it knows in advance {that it is able to determine itself,} that it can choose and that it is able to exercise causality. Therefore, the I is already fully acquainted with itself. In constructing a concept of a goal, the I presupposes itself. This is an important point! {The ordinary, commonsense view is that consciousness arises in the following way: At a certain moment in life (moment A) I construct a concept of a goal, which I accomplish by making a choice from the manifold. At another moment (moment B) I actually will this concept of a goal and act efficaciously. 37 On this view, my consciousness begins with this choice, and in this act of choosing I have in view both the act of willing and the causal power of the same. Consequently, before the choice, I must already know that I can will and act efficaciously. The possibility of choosing presupposes a prior acquaintance with oneself.} • First of all, however, we must ask, How-i.e., as what-does the I necessarily presuppose itself in this act of choosing?v (This question u One could say that the present moment could also determine something else, a future moment. Here we do not yet know this, because we are remaining only in the present, and this is something determinate. Here we are concerned only with the relationship between the concept of a goal and an act of willing. The concept of a goal is what does the determining, and the act of willing is what is determined (p. 193). 6 ' Reading, with H, "das wahlende" for K's "das Wahlen" ("the act of choosing"). ""will ich diesen Zweckbegriff wirklich und wirke." v How, with respect to the form of the same, does the I necessarily presuppose itself in
376
1 91
§ 17
concerns the form of this act; it does not concern itself with what this act is materU1liter.) In this act of choosing, the I itself is merely what is determinable; it possesses no determinacy. It does not ascribe to itself any determinate causal power, that is, any particular power to bring about this or that {specific} result; instead, it simply presupposes that it possesses an overall ability to exercise causality. If one wishes to take note of [the distinction between] "abstract" and "concrete" perceptions,38 then one could say that the moment when the concept of a goal is grasped is an instance of the former. What is involved here is a conc~t of my own overall efficacy, 39 not a perception of any specific efficacy. This is the form in which I discover myself when I construct a concept of a goaL {Here} the I is thought of merely as such or in general; this is an abstract act of thinking, {the essence of which consists in the fact that all that is present here is the form of determinate thinking-not, however, any determinacy}. It40 is an act of oscillating between or hovering above opposites-yet all the while remaining conscious that these are opposites {and that, therefore, only one of them can be chosen}. This is precisely the sort of thinking in which I engage when I construct the concept of a goal for myself. The character of the object follows from the act of thinking thereof, however, for, {from a Critical point of view,} an act of thinking and its object are simply two different ways of looking at one and the same thing. {The object of our abstract act of thinking was the I, which was therefore just as abstract as the act of thinking of the object was. The real I 41 oscillates between opposites, yet in such a way that one is chosen and all the rest are excluded.} • Everyone will agree, simply on the basis of ordinary common sense and without any need for recourse to philosophicaJ principles, that no abstract thinking is possible apart from concrete thinking, {which seems, so to speak, to precede the former}; abstraction presupposes something within which what is to be abstracted is first present. Accordingly, the act of willing presupposed here is something l can infer only insofar as I the free act of the ideal activity? {p. 194). •• K: wMan wolle doch ja ABSTRACTIONEN und CONCRETE Wahrheiten bemerlc.en." IJu:rally: "Let us indeed take note of abstractions and of concrete truths." The translation substitutes, with H, "Wahrnehmung" for K's "Wahrheiten" {"truths") and emends the rest of the sentence in the light of the more coherent corresponding passage in H: "Man unterscheide unter ABSTRACTER und CONCRET£R Wahrnehmung." ~ 9 "meiner Wiirksamkeit iiberhaupt." w One should distinguish between abstract and concrete perception. Concrete perception occurs as a result of an exercise of the will, whereas Q/Jstracl perception occurs in the very act of willing. Whenever one chooses anything, one always takes note of the fact that one could also have willed something else. Therefore, choosing always makes reference to a doing, which is, therefore, always presupposed in the form of an abstract concept of efficacy in gener.Jl, and this abstract concept of efficacy must be posited if a concept of a goal is to be possible {p. 194). 40 "Es." This could be construed as referring either to "the act of thinking" or to "the 1." 41 "das reelle Ich."
(1~
§
17
377
have already encountered it in concreto. 42 Abstract thinking {(the sort of thinking involved in constructing a concept of a goal)} is, {in turn,} related to {another,} concrete act of thinking {(that is, to an act of willing)}, and the former is related to the latter in the same way what is conditioned is related to what conditions it. 4 g {The act of thinking of a concept of a goal presupposes an act of willing and an efficacious acting; and I can presuppose these only insofar as I have already sensed and perceived myself to be engaged in willing and acting efficaciously.} • {Result: Actual} willing presupposes a concept of a goal, and, in turn, the concept of a goal presupposes an {actual} act of willing-which, in turn, presupposes a concept of a goal, and so on, ad infinitum. {In this way,} therefore, we reach no starting point {of consciousness}; one moment drives us on to the next, as happened above in the case of [therelationship between] the concept of cognition and the concept of a goal.x The present circle, however, lies even deeper than the previous one. {Here the concept of a goal not only presupposes cognizance of an object, it also presupposes cognizance of a subject, namely, of the subject here engaged in efficacious acting; and this cognition first becomes possible through a preceding act of actual willing.} • {We reply to this difficulty as follows:} We have already shown that (195) one cannot speak of a series of thoughts and their succession [in time] as if this were something that exists in itself; instead, we can talk only about an appearance of succession for us. Thus we only think of ourselves as thinking in time; we are not actually in time. {I can say, "I do not [actually] think in the manner just described; I only think of myself as thinking in this manner when I am engaged in synthetic thinking."} In the act of synthetic thinking = C, I posit myself as, I discover myself to be, a subject engaged in willing. I posit A as preceding this act (i.e., A is presupposed by C). 45 Hence it is no wonder that I posit in A whatever is 42 "In a concrete form." '""wie Bedingung zum Bedingten" ("in the same way that a condition is related to what is conditioned"). Since this claim appears to conflict direcdy with what is asserted in the preceding and following sentences, the translation, following Radrizzani's proposal, inverts this clause. x Here we have, once again, the same difficulty as before: no concept of a goal.,. without cognition of an object, and vice versa-though now we encounter it from another side (p. .,. "Inbegriff." From here on, the term lnhegriff (in the sense of "the concept in question") is occasionally employed in H to refer to "the concept of a goal" (Zweclrhegriff), and certain otherwise virtually identical passages in K and H differ only in that K has Zweckbegriffwhere H has lnhegriff. (Cp., e.g., H, p. 204: "Nun wird in demselben Acte der entworfene Inbegrif mit gedacht," and K, p. 197: "nun wird in demselben Acte das Entwerfen des Zweckbegriffs mitgedacht.") This small but interesting difference appears to support the conclusion that H and K stem from different semesters. 45 "diesem setze ich A voraus." This is a good example of the inadequacy of the customary translation of vorau.ssetzen as "to presuppose" which obscures the root meaning: "to posit in advance."
•94>·
contained in C. I do this because A is nothing more than the act of thinking of constructing the concept of a goal. I posit A as the cause of C in a purely forO)al sense, 46 without thereby intending to ascribe any determinate causality to A. {We have arrived at the following result: All consciousness is possible only through self-consciousness. My own consciousness of myself is possible only through an act of willing. Willing presupposes a concept of a goal. How is this concept of a goal supposed to be constructed? The concept of a goal is nothing but an appearance and is thought of only in conjunction with consciousness of an act of willing, in which case it is presupposed to have preceded an actual act of willing. Within consciousness, willing itself is viewed in two different ways: ( 1) As an actual act of willing. (2) As an act of constructing a concept of a goal. The reason willing is viewed in this twofold manner is to be found in the principle that states that there is nothing determinate without something determinable. Something determinate is nothing but (the product of] an act of thinking of a movement of transition which begins with something determinable. The act of willing of which one becomes conscious is also something determinate; hence it too must be thought of as (the product of] a movement of transition from something determinable. What is determinable in this case is the act of constructing a concept of a goal. Accordingly, no consciousness of anything determinate is possible unless one at the same time thinks of what is determinable in this case, and a determinate act of willing cannot be thought of at all except in the manner indicated, (in conjunction with an act of constructing a concept of a goal]. Both these acts refer to each other, and the temporal order comes into being purely through the law stating that there can be nothing determinate without something determinable. The temporal order arises by virtue of the dependence of what is determinate upon what is determinable. What was supposed to have existed previously [actually] exists now; it is merely thought of as having previously existed. Here we can see the higher meaning of the principle that states that nothing abstract is possible without something concrete: Ordinary common sense thinks that everything abstract must be preceded by something concrete and that abstract thinking is abstracted from concrete thinking. From this ordinary point of view, these two acts of thinking are thought of as occurring in two successive moments of time. From the transcendental point of view, however, both these acts occur in the same moment of time and are united therein. Concrete [thinking] is 46 "Ich setze es blo~ in die Form der Causalitat." More literally: "I posit it merely in the form of causality."
§
17
379
thought of only as a movement of transition from abstract [thinking]. An act of concrete thinking is an act of determining; but only as an act, as a process of transition, a flowing forth, which begins with something abstract (as what is determinable), does this act of determining become an object of consciousness. In the case before us, the will is what is concrete; but in the act of constructing the concept of a goal the will is present in ( 196) an abstract form. Concrete thinking-in this case, therefore, the act of willing-is something determinate. But something determinate cannot be thought of apart from something that determines it. So here too, in the case of willing: an act of willing can be thought of only as a movement of transition which begins with a determining subject. Determinate thinking becomes determinate thinking only through an act of determining. I determine myself, I observe my own act of determining, and only in this way does such an act become possible at all. Consequently, concrete thinking appears in a twofold way: ( 1) As an act of thinking from which one proceeds to an act of abstract thinking. (2) As an act of thinking one arrives at from an act of abstract thinking. In this manner, we would obtain three different moments of time. (1) The moment when the concept of a goal is directed at some present cognition. This is something concrete. (2) The moment when a movement is made from the first moment to an act of willing. This too is something concrete. (3) The moment that lies between the first moment and the second moment. This is the act of constructing a concept of a goal, and this is abstract.} • (The concept of a goal is directed at some concrete cognition that is already present, and it leads from there to a determinate, concrete act of willing.) Only to this extent can one say, "The I discovers itself," or rather, 47 "The I thinks of itself as discovering itself.''v If one thinks only of synthetic thinking, then the I {does not discover itself; it} produces itself without any consciousness. After both {synthetic and analytic} thinking have been united, however {(as must also always and necessarily occur within consciousness)}, then the I discovers r.:self-if it has already produced itself.z {I produce myself in an act of willing, and, in willing, I presuppose a concept of a goal, though this concept does not occur in advance, but is merely posited as having already occurred, as what conditions the act of willing; for by its very nature, an act of willing always 47 Reading, with Radrizzani, "oder eher" for K's "anstalt" ("instead of"), which is plainly an error on Krause's part, as is confirmed by a comparison with the corresponding pas· sa~e in H. This is nothing but an appearance, and insofar as one understands this expression properly, one can say, "The I discovers itself." To express this point more strictly, one would say, "The I thinks of itself as discovering itself'• (p. 196). z after it has already produced itself (p. 1g6).
192
includes the positing of some demand, which, however, can occur only insofar as some goal is present.} Remark A: This point is characteristic of the Wissenschaftslehre: {I do not think within time;} thinking is introduced into time only as a result of my own act of thinking. My thinking falls within time for me only by virtue of the fact that it becomes an object of my consciousness. This is a point neglected by Kant,AA since the concept of 1-hood was neglected. {Some people failed to give precise enough thought to the fact that consciousness is united with every act of the I, and for this reason they were unable to think of time in the way it is portrayed in the Wissenschaftslehre. They began with thinking, but} thinking already involves time; consequently, one can by no means provide a derivation of time if one confines oneself to a discussion of nothing but thinking. The I itself, however, does not fall within time, and if one knows that consciousness accompanies thinking, then one can succeed in providing a derivation of time. {Only someone who begins with and reflects upon the I, which is not within time, can derive time. Accordingly, all the advantages we have here obtained depend upon the concept of 1-hood.} The Wissenschaftslehre itself does not generate any new cognition. It merely observes the human mind in its original generation of all cognition. {The Kantian system also claims to do this, and it really does do so;} ( 197) the Kantian system does not carry these observations to their conclusion, however, unlike the Wissenschaftslehre, {which claims to do so. This is the source of the distinctive view adopted by the latter system.} Ordinary, commonsense understanding, on the other hand, does something and observes only the product of its own doing. {I.e., it considers only facts within time, without giving any additional thought to the "doing" that generates the facts occurring within time.} It fails to notice that through its own doing it also generates time, etc. The Wissenschaftslehre pays attention to this "doing" itself {and uses it as the basis of its explanations}. This is the synthesis we have been discussing, and the Wissenschaftslehre has to display this synthesis independently of analysis, {through which our thinking is dispersed and which has to be derived within the Wissenschaftslehre}. Only in this way does it obtain a genetic understanding of the origin of our representations. Time is the relationship within which we are required to posit our representations. We observe how the law {requiring us to posit our representations in certain relationships to one another} arises and, along with it, time itself. {As we shall see,} everything else springs from these temporal relations. This is the {highest [and]} most important point of {the Wissenschaftslehre, or} transcendental philosophy. {If you can only understand how time arises, then you will understand the origin of everything else.} AA
This point is not so clear in Kant (p. 196).
l ·'
Remark B: Consequently, when the I thinks of itself in the act of synthetic thinking just described, {in which (unlike the case of analytic thinking) it produces itself through thinking,} it also thinks of its consciousness as a whole and {therefore} of its experience in its entirety. {With its self-production the I simultaneously produces its experience.} Therefore, it simultaneously thinks of what is intelligible and of what is empirical (or of what is "a priori," in the Kantian sense of the term, and of what is "a posteriori"): these are one and the same thing, simply viewed from two different sides. 88
Part Two We are engaged in the presentation of the central thought {of transcendental idealism}: all consciousness is nothing·but self-consciousness. As part of our presentation of this point, we must provide a genetic demonstration that-and how-the sort of consciousness with which we are ordinarily familiar flows from our consciousness of ourselves.cc We 193 have already accomplished some of the preliminary work [required for this task and have established that] the I is thought of only insofar as being and thinking are thought of as absolutely identical, or are united {with each other. According to the published Wissenschaftslehre,} 48 ideality ( 198) , and reality are the same. This, {one should note carefully,} does not mean that the l's being and the l's thinking are thought of as the same, {[i.e.,] it does not mean that "being" and "thinking" are, as it were, predicates of the I}; but rather it means that the I itself arises only through the unification of being and thinking. {Therefore, if one may be permitted to speak in this way, being and thinking are necessary "ingredients" of the 1.} For the I is not yet presupposed; instead, we first wish to witness its origination. This consciousness as a whole and the I are completely identical; they are the same thing, simply viewed from two different sides: within ordinary consciousness {and within experience}, this is an "I"; within transcendental philosophy, this is the identity of being and thinking. {We have already demonstrated that the I arises through the synthesis of being and thinking. We have not yet proven, 88 Thus the intelligible I and the empirical aspect of all experience, i.e., what is a priori (in the Kantian sense) and what is a posteriori, are entirely the same-merely viewed from different sides (p. 197). cc To be sure, we have already presented this point above; here, however, it has to be demonstrated genetically. We have to specify how, from the consciou.me.ss of ourselves, in accordanu with the laws of our consciousne.!s, there flows all the consciou.me.ss that, from the ordinary viewpoint, we consider to be [a consciousness of] something oulside of us. This process will here be clearly expounded (p. 197). 48 See no. 12 of the summary at the end of GWL, § 4 (SW, 1: 11ii6).
however,} that this synthesis constitutes consciousness in its entirety, and this is what we want to demonstrate [now].0° For this purpose, we have already established the following: This act of synthesizing being and thinking is at the same time an act of analysis, and only thereby does an act of synthesis become possible. The manifolds {of} being and {of} thinking, along with the unity of the two, are all posited in one and the same act. If we attend simply to the analysis, we obtain, as it were, two series, {one on either side of the point of synthetic unity}. Moreover, every individual is an I only insofar as he is thought of; and {he is an individual who construes a manifold only insofar as he} is not viewed as thought of and as generated in a single moment, but rather {insofar as he is thought of} as discretely dispersed in a temporal series. This dispersed thinking is unified in the highest synthesis. {Therefore, this can be expressed more precisely as follows:} My immediate act of thinking does not occur within time at all; by means of this immediate act of thinking, however, my mediated thinking is posited within time. {Thinking does not occur within time, but when we, in turn, think about thinking, we view it as taking place within time. We have observed the concept of a goal and the act in which it is constructed: this was the most natural path we could follow in order to obtain a field for the present investigation. (For reasons that will soon become evident, however, we will, from now on, be unable to progress any farther along this path.)} Preliminary Remark Within the act of synthetic thinking a manifold is thought of {not synthetically, but} as a multiplicity of discrete {acts of thinking}. In asserting this, however, we hovered above the act of synthetic thinking itself, which was the object [of our thinking). Let us now descend to the standpoint of synthetic thinking itself, which should become the subjective element that we imitate. The manifold is now to be considered as such, {[i.e.,] as multiple and discrete,} and we will focus our attention upon the characteristic differences {between the various acts of thinking united in synthetic thinking}. We must now 49 constantly keep an eye on the points of unity between each of these acts of thinking and all the others, {and in this way we will again discover the act of synthetic thinking. In conjunction with our previous analysis of synthetic thinking, we assumed an act of synthetic thinking as something with which we were already familiar (= A), which we then proceeded to dissolve into its cqnstituent parts. We now wish to examine these individual elements more closely and to ob00
We have two propositions: ( 1) Self-consciousness is one with all other consciousness; is the identity of thinking and being. It is the first of these propositions which has to be demonstrated here (p. 198). 49 Reading, with H, "nun" forK's "nur" ("only"). (2) Self-consciousness
(•m
serve how each of them is incomplete on its own and becomes complete only through something else.} In this manner, we will once again arrive at the act of synthetic thinking and will reassemble from its parts the act that we have gone through merely analytically. 194
(1) A general regulative principle [must be established}. Here we will be examining a discrete, dispersed type of thinking; {therefore,} we will have to display a variety of specific acts of thinking, which nevertheless are supposed to be synthetically united with one another in such a way that none of them is possible apart from the others. As we examine each of these individual acts of thinking, we will have to determine how it is connected to the synthetic period of which it is a part, as well as how a transition is made from it to another act of thinking. The particular, discrete act of thinking constitutes the immediate object [of our investigation, and the element50 ~:onnecting one of these discrete acts of thinking with another can be called} what mediates this synthesis. {The immediate object must not be confused with the mediating element; therefore,} we must now describe {the characteristic differences between} these components. • All thinking is an active determining, and hence a movement of transition from determinability to determinacy. Only insofar as we think of a particular state of the I in this way [that is, as a movement of transition from determinability to determinacy] will what we are thinking of be an act of thinking on the part of the L Consequently, since it is an act of thinking on the part of the l, the act of objective thinking with which we are here concerned is an act of self-determining. The essence of a discrete [act of objective thinking], therefore, is that the I appears to be completely determined in this case.JEE The mediating element, which is related to a discrete act of objective thinking as what conditions it, would therefore occur in the preceding moment of time, {if the concept oftime (200) were here applicable. For example,} we have before us [an act of synthetic thinking ] A. This is not, as it were, any particular act of thinking, {and is not determined by itself,} but is simply the synthetic unity of the discrete act of thinking a, b, etc. What we wish to investigate now is not A itself, but {the parts of the same, that is,} a, b, etc., which we wish to consider individually and in the most convenient order. [We can con· sider any part we wish;} for example, let us suppose that I am now considering a. {First of all,} I must indicate what kind of an act of thinking !oO "das Glied." Throughout the following discussion, Fichte employs the term G/Ud (translated here as uelement" or "term") to designate the individual acts of thinking ( = a, b, u, ji) which, in their unity, constitute the act of synthetic thinking ( = A). ££The I is engaged in an act of determining, and, since the I is supposed to be the thinking subject itSelf, as weU as an active subject, it is engaged in actively determining itSelf. Consequently, in the act of objective thinking we are now examining, the I appears to be completely determined (p. 199).
this is. This will be of no help [by itself], however, since a is being considered here not as something that exists in and for itself, but rather as a single point within a total synthesis. Accordingly, it [also] has to be shown how a is connected to b, a, tJ, etc., and this is how I have to arrive at A {= the synthetic period}. I thus have to attend to two different things: first of all, to what a is by itself, and second, what it is in relation to a, tJ, etc. FF It is necessary to distinguish these two questions from each other. What truly constitutes a is posited last. 51 What is immediately present and connects a to h, to c, etc., in such a way that a becomes a part of a synthetic [period A] {is not completely determinate; instead, it} is related to a as what conditions it and {is thought of as} preceding it in time. {The will is what is completely determinate. (We are not here concerned with the question of whether or not the will, in turn, may not also determine what succeeds it.)} The concept of a goal is related in just this way {(as what determines it)} to the incompleteness of the will, which is what makes it impossible to account for the will on the basis of itself alone; the concept of a goal conditions the will 52 {and completely explains it}.
(II. Concerning the Series of Real Thinking] 195
(2) Here we begin our examination of the real series. To make our account easier to follow, let us designate the central synthesis, {[that is,] the synthetic period,} A; let us designate the immediately adjacent, real element h; and let us designate the extreme or outermost real term on this side, which is connected to h, g. Looking at the other, {ideal} side of the synthesis, let us designate the immediately adjacent {ideal} element l3 and the outermost {ideal} element, {which is connected to tJ,} as y. Let us now reflect upon h as a particular act of thinking: the act of thinking of a real object [ = g] that is supposed to be produced by the causality of the will. Considered in this way, his obviously an act of real thinking. 5 5 We FF First of all, we must consider what is contained in this a, and then we mwt treat thill as a point within the entire synthesis. This is of paramount imponance, for it is in this way that we will be able to see how a is connected with the rest of the parts and how the synthetic period ( = A) is produced thereby. Consequendy, we must observe what is contained in a and how this is connected with everything else (p. ~oo). 51 "der eigentliche Bestandtheil von A ist das zulezt hestimmt." "' uso ist der Zweckbegriff und die Unvollstlindigkeit des Willens der er nicht a us sich selbst erklart werden kann ist das bedingende zum Willen." The translation of this obscure passage is conjectural. Radriu.ani construes it as follows: "what conditions the will is the concept of a goal and the incompleteness of the will, which is what makes it impossible to account for the will on the basis of itself alone." ""eines REALEN Denkens." I.e., this is an act of thinking which has as its object some· thing real (rather than something ideal, such as a concept of a goal). As Fichte explains below, the immediate object of all "real thinking" is a feeling.
a
must distinguish this act of thinking, considered by itself, 54 from that through which it is connected with something else, {[namely,] with the other acts of thinking}. This act itself is not difficult to describe: [whenever we think of a real object,] we discover that our thinking is constrained, {and feels itself to be constrained, because this is an act of real thinking}. A certain feeling is connected with b, and, in relation to the act of thinking, this is a feeling of having to think in a certain way. This feeling is supposed to produce a certain act of thinking: the thought that this feeling could not be produced simply by thinking, etc. (See above.) {As we already know, we are now involved in the synthesis of what we previously analyzed. We spoke of a first, real element, which is attached to the synthetic period. This element was b. We have already indicated what is supposed to be thought of within b: namely, a real object that is brought into being by the causal power of our will. This raises the question: through what does b become an act of real thinking? This occurs by virtue of a feeling that is connected with the act of thinking. Every in- (20 1) dividual element of the act of synthetic thinking thus contains something twofold: (1) The actual act of thinking. (2) That through which this act of thinking is connected to the other acts of thinking. This is precisely the situation with this act of thinking ( = b), as we have already shown.} What kind of thinking is connected with and conditions the act of thinking we have just described and connects it with the [synthetic] period[= A]? What connects b to A is the fact that the I is supposed to determine this object [the object that is thought of in b] by means of the concept of a goal. {Or, expressed in a popular fashion: an object is connected with self-consciousness only insofar as the object in question is supposed to be produced and determined by me. Thinking of an object is thus a mediated act of thinking.} What mediates 55 {thinking}, generally speaking, {and in this specific case, is the I, thought of as a subject that determines an object by means of its concept of a goal. This} is the medium through which the I views the object and is, so to speak, the eye [of the I]. {The transcendental philosopher expresses this point as follows: All consciousness is self-consciousness; but in order for any consciousness of myself to be possible, another sort of consciousness must be connected with self-consciousness. Thus I see all things within myself and through myself: this is the proposition we have to demonstrate. In b, we have a consciousness of this sort, that is, a consciousness of a real object. The consciousness of the actuality of this object is thought of only by means 5 • 55
''der eigentliche Denkact." K: "Diese Vermittelung." Literally: "this mediation."
g86
§ 17
of my own efficacy, as the medium through which I think of the former. I have knowledge of an object only because I am what determines it, Consider, for example, a sculptor who carves the form of a god from a block of marble (or any other material-this is irrelevant to our inquiry, which is concerned only with the form of this activity). When he does this, he is immediately conscious that he determines the form in question; in contrast, his consciousness of the form of this or that specific god, which is what he wants to produce, is an indirect or mediated consciousness. He sees this specific form only through the medium of his own productive activity.} Through the very process of producing something, 1 see what is produced. {I have no immediate knowledge whatsoever of objects;} the sole thing of which I have any immediate knowledge is my own productive act, {and I obtain an object only by looking at my productive act in a certain way}-just as, in mathematics, proofs are accomplished by means of construction, {and [one] catches sight of the truth through one's very act of producing the proof. This also describes our own original situation: we find something to be constituted in a particular way because we view it through the medium of our own productive act. 56 With this, we return to our inquiry:} The I, as the determining subject, is what mediates the representation of something accomplished by me. How is the I thought of when it is thought of as a determining subject? {In other words, what act of thinking gives rise to the [thought of the] I, as a determining subject?} We now wish to provide a genetic description of how we become conscious of something that has been produced. The I {is the determining subject, and it} immediately witnesses and observes its own act of determining; moreover, within the I's consciousness, something determinate is connected with this act of determining and modifying. Everything can be looked at {by the I} either objectively or subjectively; 57 {so here too:} whenever I observe my own act of determining, I must at the same time catch sight of something determinate. What is determinate is thought in accord with the act of determinin~, which is, {so to speak,} what "lies above" and is immediately present; 5 {whereas the object itself "lies below" and is viewed through the medium of the act of determining}. This relationship [between the act of determining and what is determinate] means that the reason why the object is constituted as it is must lie within the l's own act of determining or in its concept of a goal; the latter is supposed to be the "ground" of the former. This {provides us with a genetic understanding S6 "da~ etwas fiir uns so gemacht sey, liegt darinn, dati wir es durch uruer machen hindurch so erblicken." Note that '111/JChen ("to make") is here translated as "productive act" or "productive activity." 57 " Aile Ansicht ist subjectiv oder objectiv." H: ''die Ansicht des Ich istsubjectiv objectiv." 58 "Enteres ist das obenliegende unmiuelbare." Radrizzani suggests, quite plausibly, that the terms "above" and "below" here refer to a diagram d ... wn by Fichte on the blackboard.
(202
196
of} how we become aware of the "grounding principle" or "principle of suf[u:ient reason"!"o9 {and of what this principle means}. This principle designates precisely this relationship [between the l's act of determining and what it determines]. • {We have now arrived at the deduction of the categories and will begin with the category of "ground."} Simply by analyzing this relationship [of "ground" to "consequent" or "cause" to "effect"], we will find that within it one distinct thing is thought of through another. {The effect is thought of through the cause, and the cause is thought of through the effect.} Therefore, like all categories, this category contains a mediated act of thinking, {an act of thinking in which one thing is thought of through the mediation of another}. To be sure, when we engage in discursive thinking we can either ascend {from the cause to the effect} or descend {from the effect to the cause}. However, {this is not true of the original act of thinking, which must, on the contrary, be thought of as follows:} in this original act of thinking we assume that it is the cause that makes the effect what it is, that being first arises from the cause and then develops further as a result of the same. This act of thinking begins with the act of thinking of myself. I originally discover myself as a willing subject, from which there follows some efficacious acting.GG Since there cannot be an act of determining apart from something determinate, this efficacious acting that lies within me is necessarily connected with something accomplished thereby, 60 {something that lies outside of me. My internal efficacious acting is something subjective, something that determines; but there can be nothing subjective without something objective, nor can there be anything that determines apart from something that is determined. Consequently, I must posit something of the latter sort in addition to my own efficacious acting, and this is what is affected or accomplished thereby.} The relationship in question is thus one in which the determining subject serves as the medium through which what is determined is observed. {The former is the cause of the latter, even though, from the transcendental viewpoint, these are one and the same.} One might want to say that the ground is what determines what is grounded and provides the latter with its quantity. {Ultimately, and strictly speaking,} however, the Wisseruchaftslehre has no knowledge of "what determines" and "what is determined," considered as objects; instead, it has knowledge only of an act of thinking, {through which another act of thinking obtains its quantity; moreover, it has knowledge of 59 ..So kommt der Satz des Gru~ in das Gemiith." Salz del ~ is the ordinary German name for "the principle of sufficient reason." GG Instead, we must think that being proceeds from the effect to the cause. The cause begins with the act of thinking of myself as a willing subject, and, through this act of willin§owhat is intelligible is made real, i.e., an effect is produced (p. 202). "an dieses in mir liegendes Wiirken knOpft sich nothwendig an ein bewiirktes."
388
197
§ 17
this act of thinking only insofar as it does determine the quantity of another. Accordingly, an act of thinking of something determined or determinate must arise in conjunction with an act of thinking of something that determines.} We have already explained why this must occur, for this is a condition for the possibility of self-consciousness, which is a subject-object; {and this division appears everywhere}. Everything established here is simply part of that synthesis through which alone an I can come into being for me. So much for the form {by means (203J of which an act of thinking occurring within me is connected with the act of thinking of an object that is supposed to lie outside of me}. I.e., so much for the question, How is the act of thinking of something determinate connected with the act of thinking of something that determines it? Now let us turn to a consideration of the content involved. • We are familiar with the distinction between the concept of a goal {(the determining agency) 61 } and a real object, and our view of the latter is mediated by the former. A concept of a goal is something produced purely by thinking. A real object is supposed to be the opposite, {[i.e.,] it is supposed to be something that lies outside of thinking}. This has important consequences. First of all, what is objective and real {in the objective constitution62 [of things] is supposed to lie} outside of thinking. But where, outside of thinking, does this lie? [Answer:] It exists in and for feeling. An act of real thinking must be an act of thinking of a feeling; {it must be a portraya1 6~ of feeling,} since ideal thinking only thinks of and portrays itself. {A real act of thinking is supposed to copy an object, and this object is a feeling.} • Here, accordingly, is {the place where the act of going beyond the concept of a goal (as the determining agency) to the constitution of an object (as what is determined) occurs; here is} the place where thinking goes outside of itself, refers to something beyond itself, and becomes64 objective thinking-or, more precisely, intuition. One can summarize the entire task of the Wissenschaftslehre in this single question: How does the I manage to go outside of itself? This too occurs through mediation; namely, when the I first departs from its original and purest [state], that is, from thinking, and then proceeds from there to feeling. {With this, however, the I does not yet get outside of itself, for a feeling lies within the 1.} Feeling is what mediates this process through which the I emerges from itself and assumes the existence of an external world.HH Here then is the place where something that is in no sense whatsoever an act of thinking becomes connected with pure thinking. Here is a progression from thinking to feeling. 61
"dem bestimmenden." "in der objectiven Beschaffenheit." "Darstellung." 64 Reading, with H, "wird" for K's "ist" ("is"). HH [ ••. ] and assumes the existence of an object (p. 62 63
203).
J.·
§ 17
ssg
{The objective constitution of a thing is supposed to be observed by means of the concept in question [i.e., the concept of a goal]; objectivity exists only insofar as it arises from a feeling and refers to a feeling.} When we examine this even more closely, however, it does not appear that our account can hold water; for it is most unlikely that a mere act of thinking, {such as that of thinking of the concept of a goal,} could contain within itself the basis for a feeling. 11 {To this, we reply as follows:} In and by means of the act of thinking just described ( = b), the determining 165 itself becomes something other; it is thereby, as it were, 66 made sensible and becomes a sensuous force or energy. {This does not occur, however, through the mere act of thinking of the concept of a goal; instead, it occurs through the determinacy of a sensuous force.} It is by means of the determinacy of this sensuous force or energy that the concept of a goal is now supposed to become a cause. {For example, let us say that I carve a statue of Mercury. I become conscious of this Mercury only in consequence of the fact that I have constructed a concept of the statue of Mercury that I am going to make. Is this true? By no means; the statue of Mercury does not immediately spring into being for me simply because I construct a concept of it. Instead, I must first employ tools, and this is how the statue comes into being. Accordingly, even my labor [of carving] is nothing but yet an- (204) other way of looking at the concept of a goal; indeed, it is the sensibilized aspect of the latter.} Later on we will provide a genetic account of how this transformation {of the concept of goal (something purely thought of) into something sensible} occurs. First, however, we have to demonstrate that such a transformation must occur; that is, we have to show that the state of the thinking subject at this moment { = b, where the I is thinking of an obJective property, 67} is, nevertheless, a state of real, sensuous thinking. 6 Furthermore, since the constructed concept of a goal69 is also thought of in this same act, and since it is only by means of this concept of a goal that we are able to observe the constitution of the object, 70 it follows that the concept of a goal must also be made sensible in this act of thinking. Consequently, a division arises once again, and the I appears under two different aspects: in part, as the concept of a 11 [ ••• ] could contain the basis for something outside of itself, something not contained within thinking (p. 203). 63 Reading, with H, "das bestimmende lch" for K's "Das Bestimmen des Ich" ("the I's act of determining"). 66 Reading, with H, "gleichsam" for K's '~edenfalls" ("in any case"). 67 "einer objektiven Beschaffenheit." 68 "eines reellen sinnlichen Denkens." A state of "sensuous" (or "sensible") thinking is one in which the thinking subject is thinking of something apprehended through the senses. Hence "sensuous thinking" = "real thinking." 69 Reading, with H, "der entworfene lnbegrir' for K's "das Entwerfen des Zweckbegriffs" ("the act of constructing a concept of a goal"). 70 "die Beschaffenheit des Objects."
'jl
I
tg8
goal and, in part, as a sensuous force.JJ These two aspects are united with and distinguished from each other inasmuch as two different acts of thinking occur: pure thinking and sensuous thinking. These assertions are historically familiar, and the same claim was encountered earlier in our inquiry: What is my body? It is nothing but a certain way of looking at the causal power I exercise as an intellect. {I am originally an intellect; therefore, my causal power is, in this respect, an act of producing something from concepts.} Consequently, my body would be something produced by concepts, because it is by means of an act of sensuous thinking that I would think of myself as a body, extended in space and transformed into matter. KK {Therefore, because this is an act of sensuous thinking, the concept of a goal by means of which I view my own body must also be encountered in a sensible form.} The relationship between the determining subject and what is determined still remains to be explained. Insofar as I am an intellect, I myself am supposed to be the determining subject. My view of the object is mediated through my concepts, {and not vice versa}. This is a relationship of dependence, for the object in this case is dependent upon my concept of a goal. This relationship is certainly encountered within experience, {and it must manifest itself within experience, for otherwise I would not be able to think of myself at all. I am the cause of the act of thinking about my own efficacy; all efficacy proceeds from me. I do not make a certain decision because of the particular character of some object; instead, this object has the particular character it has because I make a certain decision.} The concept that has now been derived is the concept of a real ground, for this transformation [of ideal thinking] into sensuous thinking does occur, {[an~] a thing is "realized" or made real insofar as this transformation 71 occurs within sensuous thinking}. The relationship in question is that of causality. • {Since we have now reached the categories, we want to ask,} What is a "category"? Kant claimed that he was in possession of a definition of this term but did not wish to state it, in order not to expose himself to certain avoidable objections. 72 Kant is an honorable man, and we must take him at his word on this. We can also certainly appreciate these difficulties {that drove him to keep silent}, for Kant was anxious to expound his idealism in a form that would not raise suspicion. This becomes quite clear; for when one compares the different editions of the lJ Here, therefore, we have a division, a duality contained within the concept of a goal, insofar as it: ( 1) enables us to go beyond the intelligible series, and (2) enables us to refer to sensible objects. The latter is a sensible or sensuous force (p. 204). KK And indeed, my body is something produced by concepts, but it is viewed in a very different light, for it is a concept that has become sensible. My body would thus be the power to extend the properties of things into space (p. 204). 71 Reading, with K, "Verwandlung" for H's "Vereinigung" ("unification"). 72 See KRV, A82/B 108-A83/B 109.
I
'I
§
1
7
391
[first] Critique, one finds that Kant has retreated somewhat in the second edition. LL If, however, he had had sufficient confidence in his own facility for linguistic expression, then he would not have had to restrain himself in this ~ay. If he had supplied the definition of the categories, then his system would have appeared in an entirely different light. • {The Wissenscho.ftslehre has no difficulty with this point and finds it easy to provide a definition of a category.} The categories are the ways in which immediate consciousness becomes mediate or indirect consciousness. They are the ways in which the I goes beyond simply thinking of itself and thinks of something else. They do not merely serve, as it were,to tie together {what is manifold}; they are also the means by which something simple is made manifold and appears in a dual manner. • The category of causality connects a concept of a goal with some real property, as something determined. 75 {All consciousness is selfconsciousness. This is the foundation of the Wissenscho.ftslehre. Yet another sort of consciousness is certainly encountered within experience. Where does this come from? It arises from the fact that the I observes itself as something manifold, and it does this in accordance with certain specific rules, i.e., in accordance with laws. The categories are these ways and means by which the I splits itself up and divides itself into a manifold-though in such a way that it nevertheless continues to remain a unity. There are, however, a variety of different ways of unifying the multiplicity contained in the primary synthesis.} There are three basic cate~ories: substantiality, causality, and reciprocal interaction. The categories 4 of relation are the only basic ones; the others do not belong here. I discover myself to be a willing subject (fundamental law) only insofar as something really does come into being by means of my concept [of a goal]. This is the law of my sensuous cognition. The actuality in question exists only insofar as it is supposed to exist by means of my concept; accordingly, it is observed only insofar as my concept is intuited as possessing causal power, i.e., only insofar as something is posited by the category [of causality], which thereby becomes productive. The thought of an effect is first added to that of a concept, thought of as something that exercises an effect. Something comes into being by means of the category [of causality]. {We established synthesis A, within which we discovered a double series: an ideal one and a real one. We began our examination with the u. He was afraid to lay his tranacendental idealism before the scrutiny of the public, and perhaps the source of the difficulty was that he lacked sufficient confidence in the expressive power of language to defend him against the objections that would have followed. Moreover, in the subsequent editions of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant mixed up everything that was contained in the first edition and betrayed transcendental idealism (p. 205). '" "die Kategorie der Causalitiit ist; da an den Zweckbegriff eine Reele Beschaffenheit als etwas bestimmtes gekniift wird." 74 Reading "Kateg0 rien" for "Kategorie" ("category").
392
,,
·~ ~
.II ·d
'I'
I
1j }t
17
series of the real, and indeed, with point b = the representation of a real object produced by the causality of our will. We then viewed this repre- (2c sentation through the medium of our own act of determining, as a determinacy produced by us. Our own act of determining ( IJ) is therefore for us the ideal element that is immediately adjacent to the point of synthetic unity [ = A] in our synthesis. Als should be clear from what has already been said,} tJ itself can be looked at in {two} different ways: as determining [something else] by means of sensuous energy, and as determining [something else] simply be means of thinking. What we have shown is that the latter sort of determining (through mere thinking) must transform itself into the former sort of determining (through sensuous energy), {but we have not yet shown how this occurs}.
II
~~
§
1
99
(3) The concept of a goal, or the I's act of determining, appears in two different guises: {(a)} on the one hand, it appears as something purely ideal, {as a concept, as the act of constructing a concept of a goal; {(f3)} on the other, it appears as something real, by virtue of physical energy. {These are both aspects of the same I.} The reason [for this duality] has already been indicated: this act is ideal insofar as it is considered from the standpoint of the I as an intellect {(it is the I's act of determining itself)}, and it is real insofar as it is related to some effect within the sensible world. Consequently, we would already have something twofold within the real series: the physical ener~ {of the I} and the feeling that is thereby produced within the I itself. M {Subsidiary remark:} The primary synthesis ( = A) consists in the unification of what is ideal and what is real. The immediately adjacent, real element in this primary synthesis would here be the physical force or energy of the I itself, {with which the real object was united;} and our present task would be to unite the mere concept of a goal with this real energy, {in such a way that the physical energy would obtain a purposeful direction only when viewed through the mediation of the act of constructing the concept of a goal' 5 }. We said, "It is only in consequence of something else that you observe what you have produced within the sensible world." In a certain sense, I can say, "There is no consciousness of a sensible world, 76 no consciousness of a sensible product; instead, there is merely a higher consciousness, which transforms itself into the former." {Thus, for example, I have no [immediate) consciousnessofthe sensible [statue of] Mercury [I carve] nor of the letters [I write]; instead, I am [directly] conscious only of my labor [of carving] or of my writing. Through the mediation of such consciousness, I see a sensible Mercury MM { ••• J and the objective element that we have produced, which is a feeling (p. :zo6 ). " "wie nur durch das entwerfen des Zweckbegrifs eine zweckmaflige Richtung der phy· sischen Kraft hindurch gesehen werde." 76 Reading, with H, "Sinnenwelt" for K's "Sensibilitat" ("sensibility").
§ 17
393
or a [written] letter. The latter, as determinate, are synthetically connected with the acts of laboring and writing, as what determines them. This raises another question:} Am I, for example, [directly] conscious of my own act of writing or of the labor involved in [carving something from] a block [of marble]? By no means. Such consciousness {too} is always conditioned by a higher consciousness; it is mediated by the act of constructing a concept of a goal. {Sensible acting too is nothing but an (20'j appearance. Nothing is immediate and secure but pure thinking itself, which alone possesses an objectivity that is made sensible and becomes a sensible doing, to which an object is then connected.} Consequently, some intermediate element intervenes between the concept of a goal and what is accomplished by means of this concept. This mediating element is the physical energy that is conditioned by pure thinking,NN though we will not turn immediately to a discussion of this. • From the preceding, we obtain the following result: Whenever I think of an object, what I immediately intuit is an act of determining my own physical energy. {This energy is the determining agency; and, in accordance with the law governing the relationship of the determining agency to what is determined, I think, in addition, of the properties of the object that are produced by my act of thinking.} But this physical energy is mine {and is an object of my consciousness} only insofar as I view it too through the mediation of the concept of a goal. {This physical energy is related to the concept of a goal in the same way that an object is related to this physical energy. Our view of the physical energy is mediated by the concept of goal, and the object is mediated by the physical energy.} Accordingly, the chief question is this: How does a simple act of sheer thinking become sensible and acquire the aspect of a sensuous force? This {is the basic question concerning every instance in which anything is made sensible, for this} is the first instance in which something is made sensible; therefore, this leads us to the theory of the productive imagination, {which is perhaps the most difficult, though indisputably most important, portion of the Wissenschaftslehre}.
[III. Theory of the Productive Imagination] In order to prepare the way for such a theory, we must first investigate something else. {First of all,} let us actually orient ourselves {so we can see where we stand}. The sort of thinking we have here been discussing was a real act of thinking {of an object}. Such thinking is mediated by another act of thinking, the act of thinking of the determinacy of an ·1
NN
This mediating element is the sensuous energy mediated by the concept of a goal
(p. 207)-
394 200
I
'
'I
i
:I :
I
; I
1
I'
§ 17
efficaciously acting, sensuous energy. 77 This sensuous energy is also ideal in a certain respect; accordingly, we here have a synthesis of what is ideal and what is real. {Observation: A primary feature of the Wissenschaftslehre is that what it establishes is by no means some dead repository of concepts, but instead something living and self-active. For this reason, even the meanings of words are allowed, as it were, to undergo a certain amount of alteration within this system. This is what has occurred in the case of the terms "ideal" and "real."} The concepts "ideal" and "real" possess only relative validity. {To be sure, there is something purely and simply ideal and something else purely and simply real: the former is what is intelligible and the latter is dead matter.} Between these, there lies an intermediary sphere, the elements of which can be considered to be {in a certain (2 respect} ideal and {in another respect} real, depending upon whether one relates them to what follows them, {to what is purely ideal,} or to what precedes them, {to what is purely real. This is also the situation we encounter here. I view the letters I write to be something real and objective. (Granted, with respect to their form, I could also consider them to be something ideal; but we will ignore this for the moment.) I view these letters to be real, however, only by means of the determinacy of my physical energy, i.e., through my act of writing. Accordingly, the determinacy of my physical energy is something ideal-namely, in relation to the letters that are viewed as real. Looked at in a different way, on the other hand, this same determinate energy is something real-namely, in relation to nothing but the pure concept of a goal. Consequently, the claim, "You do not see the letters, but only your act of writing them," contains within itself a synthesis of ideality and reality, in which the act of writing is what is ideal and the written letters are what is real.} This synthesis {of the determinacy of the sensuous energy} and the determinacy {of the real object 78 is related to and} is in turn mediated by another synthesis, within which the pure act of thinking of a concept of a goal is accomplished. 79 • 00 {Therefore, when we connect the previously designated elements b, a, ~. and y with one another, we are not simply connecting individual elements with one another; we are connecting syntheses with syntheses, which is also what oc77 "es ist vermittelt durch das Denken der Bestimmtheit, einer verursachenen sinnlichen Kraft." 78 K: "Diese Synthesis und ihre Bestimmtheit." Literally: "This synthesis, along with its determinacy." Cp. H: "Diese Synthesis der Bestimmtheit der sinnlichen Kraft, mit der Bestimmtheit des realen Objekts." 79 K actually has "vermittelt ist" ("is mediated"), which makes litde sense in this context. Following Radrizzani's proposal, which is based upon the larger context, as well as the sense of the corresponding passage in H, the translation substitutes "accomplished" for "mediated." 00 [ . . . ] mediated by another synthesis, namely, the synthesis that is involved in the act of constructing the pure thought of a concept of a goal, considered as nothing but an act of pure thinking (p. 208).
§ 17
o8),
395
curs when we synthetically unite something determinate with what mediates [its determinacy].} We can see that instead of sticking to our previously announced plan of connecting one individual act of thinking with another, we will be presenting nothing but syntheses. {Dogmatism always remains present so long as one continues to think of thinking as an act in which we think of some determinate object that simply lies there before us. Our thinking alwa6s involves a connection, a movement of thought in a certain direction, 8 an act of synthesis, without which there could be no thinking at all. For this reason, the content of our thoughts is never anything taken by itself, 81 but is always a relationship between two things. This is why it might appear at first glance as if we first think separately of the two elements 13 and b and then relate them to each other; whereas, when we look more closely, we can see that neither 13 nor b exists [by itself]. 13 and b are, in turn, syntheses themselves and are related to other syntheses that lie even deeper. Consequently, we never have anything but interrelated syntheses.} • The mediating synthesis, by means of which the determinacy of the physical energy is supposed to be determined, would now be the act of constructing a concept of a goal. This synthesis contains within itself the following: (1) the constructive, active subject, over against which there stands, insofar as this subject is an intellect {engaged in an act of pure thinking}, the active, sensuous energy; (2) what is determined [in this act] and possesses the actual concept of a goal. {I engage in deliberation and grasp a concept of a goal. Within this act, we must distinguish: (1) my act of constructing, that is, my agility; (2) the fact that I possess a goal.} Each of these is made possible only by the other, and, in a certain respect, this relationship is one of ideality and reality. {The former, the act of constructing [a concept of a goal], would be the [ideal or] subjective element. The latter, the concept that has been constructed, would be the real or objective element.} Nevertheless, one should not yet treat the objectivity involved in this act as something sensible, for here we are talking about nothing but thinking itself, as something that is arrested and persists, 82 and these two [ideal and real aspects of thinking] obviously go together. In constructing [a concept of a goal], {as what is ideal,} one looks toward a future concept of a goal; {indeed, it is for the sake of this future goal that reason engages in an act of choosing}. Therefore, what one has in view in the real [series] 83 is the determinate concept of a goal, once the latter has been grasped. {Both these elements must be found together, for neither makes any sense apart from the other. I 80
"ein Hindenken." "deswegen ist der Inhalt alter unserer Gedanken, nie etwas fiir sich." "es ist blo~ von Anhalten und Bestehen des Denkens die Rede." Cp. H: "von einem Anhalten und Stehen des Denkens" ("of an arresting and abiding of thinking"). 8 ' K: "1m Realen ist der aufgefa~te bestimmte Begriff vom Zwecke." H: "Im realen ists [ ... ]." Reading, with H, "ists" for K's "ist" and taking "es" to refer (albeit ungrammatically) to "die Aussicht." 81
82
(~
cannot make any choice unless I can think of some goal, and I can think of a goal only insofar as I can exercise choice. On the other hand, I can be conscious of a goal only insofar as 1 have chosen it. Whichever direction we look, we find that the thought of a goal and that of a choice always refer to one another. On every side, therefore, there is an identity of what is ideal and what is real. Thus} we could say that the I comes into being for itself by means of a synthesis of itself as something ideal (a purely thinking subject) with itself as something real (a feeling subject). {The chief principle is this: I-hood is self-relation. Ideality and reality are totally united. We also said that the I is an identity of mind and body, a subject-objectivity. Some people maintain that I am my soul, while others claim that I am my body. We will pay no heed to either of these parties. We assert that the I is neither soul nor body; instead, these are [an] I only in the union of both. This union by means of which the I comes intobeing is not a union of a simple subjective element with a simple objective one, for both the subject and the object involved in this synthesis are, in tum, a synthesis of what is ideal and what is real. In this act, therefore, a manifold is united with a manifold. Let us think of two series: an ideal one and a real one. For "ideal series" let us substitute "mind" or "spirit," and for "real series" let us substitute "body." The I arises from the union of these two. Nevertheless, in order to be able to bring this union into existence, I have to think of each of these elements as a part of the I. I must think of myself as a mind; in addition, I must think of myself as a body-i.e., I must think of each of these individually and apart from the other. On the other hand, I cannot think of myself as a part of the I-that is to say, I cannot think of myself as a mind or as a body-apart from a synthesis of what is subjective and what is objective. Consequently, different syntheses, i.e., different manifolds, are united with each other in the union of ideality and reality, by means of which the I comes into being. Only when viewed in this twofold light do the mind and the body come into being for me, and only in the union of both do I become an I for myself. This, however, is no more than a figure of speech, a sensible expression of the point we have now reached. Here we are not talking about "the mind" or "the body"; instead, we are talking about thinking and feeling. Therefore, the synthesis we are concerned with here is a synthesis of (: thinking and feeling. Considered by themselves, each of these two terms is, in turn, a synthesis of what is subjective and what is objective-which is the basic form of every synthesis.} More Detailed Discussion ~
Let us call what lies on one side [of the primary synthesis A] (that is, and y) the "ideal 1," and let us examine this synthesis, ijust as we ex-
§
·201
11
17
397
amined the real I and introduced a mediating link between b and the central point of the synthesis}. The chief task is to learn how the I discovers itself to be engaged in the act of determining a concept of a goal. • To begin with, we know that all other consciousness is based upon this {consciousness of constructing a concept of a goal}. How then do I catch sight of84 this concept of a goal itself? I do this only to the extent that I construct this concept and observe myself while I am doing this. {Therefore, I observe it by means of my own activity.} I am only active and am conscious of myself only as activity. How can you know that you are engaged in thinking? I know what I do and what [J] think only insofar as I observe what I am doing.PP The concept of a goal is not something that is given; instead, I produce this concept on my own, and I know that I am doing this. My act of producing [a concept of a goal] is the proper object of my {immediate} consciousness, {and my mediate consciousness of everything else is attached to the latter, immediate consciousness}. • Thus, once again, our investigation carries us to a still higher level. {The rungs of our ascent to this higher level were as follows: I have knowledge of a real object, but only insofar as my view of it is mediated by my act of determining my own sensuous energy. I obtain knowledge of my sensuous energy only through the concept of a goal; in turn, I obtain knowledge of this concept of a goal only through my own act of constructing this concept, and it is only through my own activity that I am conscious of the latter act.} • I am aware of my concept of a goal only insofar as I catch sight of my own activity of constructing this concept. {One can surely see that everything here depends upon grasping activity as such.} But how is this even possible? How is it possible to grasp this {agility, this} flowing movement that is involved in activity? {(Proper terms to designate this movement are lacking.) This is the chief question: How is this agility supposed to be grasped? Let us pursue our inquiry by means of an analogy: We begin with something sensible, which, however, is derived from something supersensible. 85 Therefore, once this is explained it will be easy for us to answer our chief question, namely, How, in the act of constructing a concept of a goal, is it possible for me to become conscious of my own activity as such-and indeed, in such a way that I am conscious of this activity as a condition for the possibility of this concept?} The sensuous element from which, for the purposes of convenience, we wish to begin Reading, with H, Msehe~ for K's usetze" ("posit"). I am only active, and I am conscious only of this activity. Accordingly, I have knowledge of my own act of thinking only insofar as I view it through the medium of my own doing (p. 210). "'Maus jenem iibersinnlichen." 84
PP
our ascent must be something derived, though it has not yet been derived; nevertheless, it occurs within ordinary consciousness. • {Let us here raise a subsidiary question:} How is movement in the corporeal world 86 possible? {(Anyone who wishes to understand this (! question as one concerning "movement in itself' is quite wrong. The question here is simply, How is such movement supposed to be thought of?) Zeno demonstrated that} it is impossible to think of such movement, {and we want to demonstrate this as well}. Let us say that a body is supposed to move in a line between any two possible points X and Y. {Let X be the terminus a quo andY the terminus ad quem.} But there are infinitely many points between X and Y, since the line between X and Y is infinitely divisible, and therefore, before a projectile can travel from point X to point Y, it must traverse infinitely many points. Such a movement is never co~leted, and thus the body in question never arrives at its destination. No matter how close together one imagines points X and Y to be, {an infinite number of points still lie between them, since space is infinitely divisible. Transcendentally expressed: I think of the projectile as passing through infinitely many points; consequently, when I imagine it, I must think of it as traversing an infinite number of points. But one cannot think of an infinite number of points; therefore, a movement that traverses infinitely many points is also unthinkable. Accordingly, no movement in the corporeal world is possible.} This proof is rigorous and correct; movement is something that is simply unthinkable. Nevertheless, any child can produce a movement for us. This may be true, and yet this fact can still coexist with the above argument; for it may well be that we obtain our concept of movement not by thinking {of an infinite series of points}, but by some other means altogether. For in the concept of movement one does not think of points at all; instead, one thinks of {the whole} line, {and it is for this reason that we are able to think of movement when we occupy the ordinary standpoint}. But how is it possible to think directly of a line without thinking of {this infinite series of} points? {Answer: this is made possible by the power of imagination. 87} This removes the entire basis for the claim that it is [im]possible [to think of movement]. {On the basis of what has been said above, we have long been acquainted with the principle that states that the I is immediately conscious only of its own activity. Here, however, we asked, "How is consciousness of this activity possible?" In order to be able to answer this question, we began with an example: we asked, "How is movement pos- (: sible?" We showed that this is impossible; we demonstrated the impos86
"in der Korperwelt." the projectile never leaves its [original] position (p. 211). "Durch die Einbildungskraft." Note the root meaning of the term Einbildungskraft (usually translated simply as "imagination"): it means "the power to form images." QQ. Therefore
67
§ 17
399
sibility of the same. Despite this, consciousness testifies to the fact that there is movement. Therefore, this [consciousness of movement] must arise in some other way, and this is what we found as well. The projectile is thought of not as traversing an infinite number of points, but rather as traversing a line. This eliminates the entire basis for the argument for the infinity of the movement-that is, the [necessity of] traversing a series of infinitely many points.} Subsequently, this line can indeed be infinitely divided, {and it can be divided in no other way. Thus the line does indeed consist of an infinite number of parts; and a movement along this line is possible only because these infinite parts are not grasped individually, but are instead grasped all at once, by the imagination.} The heart of the matter is that we have grasped these infinite points in a single synthetic act. • {All our representations are representations of a relation. Nevertheless, there must be something that underlies all these relations. Here we have shown that all representations share a common relationship to the infinite. 88} All our representations are {only} representations of relations; {but when we think about these relations themselves, certain laws of thinking are thought of along with them, namely, those laws that are thought of in the relation in question}. Thus89 we must ultimately arrive at something that underlies and provides the foundation {for all these relations}. This, however, is not some object that exists {in itself, but something we have merely added through thought}. We arrive at an original [power] that grasps infinity. 90 It follows that the intellect possesses the power to grasp {absolutely} opposed things in a single act; in other words, it possesses the power of imagination, and {the act in question} is the original synthesis of the manifold {by means of the imagination, i.e., an act of unifying things that are totally different from one another}. What is grasped in this act is only [a manifold of] opposites. [This manifold] is infinitely divisible by the understanding, but it is grasped nevertheless. To this extent, the imagination is a productive power. {The analogy of movement [though space] comprises the entire function of the mind.} • But our chief question here is the following: How does movement become possible through this act of grasping [an infinite manifold] by means of the imagination?RR What the imagination does is combine the manifold {of opposites}, which, in the present case {of movement}, is a "" "hier ist gezeigt worden dati sie in allen Vomellungen auf das Verhaltnill des unend· lichen zu einander kommen." 89 Reading, with H, "also" for K's "aber [ ... J doch" ("nevertheless"). 90 "diell is aber nicht , wir kommen auf etwas unpriingliches was auffallt." This passage is dearly corrupt and must be emended as indicated (or in some other way) to make sense. RR How does movement become possible through the unification, by the imagination, of things that are absolutely opposed to each· other? (p. 212).
400
§ 17
successive series of infinitely many points, which are distinguished from one another only subsequently, by means of analysis {on the part of the understanding. This act of the imagination is the mediating agency; it is what is first and immediate.} In this act of imagination, the infinite series is united with something simple, an energy or force, which is something that is merely thought of and is-for precisely this reason-a mere 91 VOlJ!.I.EVov, {of which one can say, "I merely add it in thought"}. {How is this force united with this act?} This force is {united with all the points in the line; it} is extended throughout the entire series as one continuous movement. {As I move this force successively along the line, it becomes successively united with all the points. But insofar as this (2 power extends through an infinite number of points, an infinite series is always present, though I am unable to observe it. It is true that the same force has been present in al.l these points; but, precisely because there is an infinite number of them, I am unable to observe them all. Thus I have to make a leap at this point: for I do not proceed successively from one point to the next; instead, through the power of imagination, I gTasp them in a single act, as a numberless whole.} Movement is a deed, vitality. 92 This is what concerns us here. {How does movement (i.e., something that moves itself or something that is moved) arise for us in this case?} Movement arises in this case when something simple is viewed through the medium of its progressive movement93 {through a manifold. Every individual point contains something twofold: what is thought of, as wel.l as that through which the latter is mediated. This is also true in the present case. What moves itself is thought of, but it is not set into motion by means of thinking; instead, this occurs by means of the imagination. Insofar as I analyze these points and have the task of uniting this force with every point, I move this force through the entire series of points. In this way, what is in motion itself becomes what is moved.} • How then do I become aware of myself as the subject actively engaged in an act of determining? There is no determinacy without determinability. What is it that is merely determinable in this case? {(These are relative concepts. Something can be determinate in one respect and determinable in another. Nevertheless, there is something to which ev91
udamit wird ein einfaches, eine Kraft vereinigt, die eben deswegen blofl gedacht wird, vO\Jf.L£VOV ist." Cp. H: "hiemit, mit der Bewegung, ist vereinigt ein einfachs, eine Kraft, welche Kraft blo~ gedacht wird (u. deswegen ein NouMEN ist)" ("in this manner, something simple, a force, one that is merely thought of-and is for this reason a noumenon-is united with the movement"). Guided by H, the translation places the words "eben deswegen" after "wird." The translation does not follow H, however, in construing K's "damit" to refer to "the movement," but construes it to refer to '"eine succe~ives Anreihen unendlicher Punkt." 92 "Bewegung ist That, Lebendigkeit." 93 "Bewegung in diesem Faile entstand dadurch da~ das einfache durch ein fon.schreitendes hindurchgesehen wurde." blo~
§ 17
401
erything determinate must ultimately be connected; this is what is purely and simply determinable, which is what we are here seeking. Consciousness also contains a last or final element; this is what is determinate. All the elements that occupy the middle ground between these two extremes can be considered to be either determinable or determinate, depending upon whether they are referred forward [to what is determinate] or backward [to what is determinable].)} What then is it that is simply and originally determinable, from which my consciousness of my own act of determining first proceeds? [Answer:] What is simply and originally determinable is the infinite number of possible ways of acting. 94 As surely as this is supposed to contain within itself [all] the possible ways in which a free being can act, {it must just as surely be infinitely divisible}. This [determinable something] is grasped {solely} by the power of the imagination we have just described, by the power to grasp {things that are absolutely opposed to one another-and to grasp} only things that are {absolutely} opposed to one another. Here we are not talking about things that are opposed to one another in space and time; instead, we are now discussing an opposition that exists within pure thinking, i.e., an opposition purely between various ways of acting. (A spatial synthesis is simply an act of pure thinking which has been made sensible or "sensibilized.") Here the imagination absolutely unifies the infinitely divisible [manifold of] possibilities of action. {In the same way that the imagination, in a single act, combines in a line all the infinitely many points in space (which is the basis of the concept of magnitude); in the same way, moreover, that many moments of time are combined in a single act (which is the basis of the concept of age): so too, in just this way, the same power of imagination, in an act of pure thinking, combines absolutely opposed possibilities of action in one determinable something. Therefore, one could certainly say that} the (214; imagination is the power to grasp what is determinable {as such}, which is something that thinking cannot do, since thinking is purely discursive; nevertheless, there is a specific power to grasp opposites: the power of imagination. • {All} the powers of the I must themselves be deduced {in any correct philosophy; in philosophy one may not simply assume these powers, without troubling oneself any further with the question of where they come from and thinking only of how one could derive something else from them}. Consequently, we must here demonstrate the existence of the power of imagination. This is here deduced, for [we have shown that] there can be no consciousness or any I unless there is a movement of transition which begins with what is determinable, i.e., unless something determinable exists for us; {and this requires something through 94
"Es ist ein unendlich theilbares der Handelsmoglichkeit."
203
which what is determinable could be grasped}. From this it follows that there necessarily exists a power of imagination. 5 5 The opposite of imagining [that is, the opposite of the act of grasping what is determinable] is {sheer} thinking, i.e., the act of grasping something determinate. Neither imagination nor thinking exists without the other; these are simply two different aspects of my total power, {as related (1) to what is determinate and (2) to what is determinable. The first relationship gives us thinking; the latter, the imagination. Both are inseparably united. There is no imagination, nothing determinable, without thinking, without something determinate}-which is merely a much more profound version of {Kant's} claim that there is no intuition without a concept and no concept without an intuition. 95 • In addition, we must note that what is determinable in this case does not somehow exist in advance of the power of imagination; instead, what is determinable comes into being precisely-and only-by means of the imagination {and at the same time as the latter}. Beginning with this highest synthesis, one can say, "I intuit myself as imagining, and in this way I observe {myself as} something determinable." {I am not immediately acquainted with myself as something determinate; it is only through the medium of the imagination that I view myself in this way. The imagination here serves as the tinted glass through which I view myself, just as, previously, I viewed the object through a tinted glass. The difference is that, in the previous case, the object I viewed through the glass was one that was already there, whereas in the present case, the object is projected and produced for me at the same time as the glass.} To this extent, the imagination is absolutely productive with regard to the content or matter [of consciousness],96 just as the I itself is productive in an overall sense. {There are noumena, and these are nothing but (21: our own pure thinking, objectively considered. There is matter, and this is nothing but our own imagination, objectively considered.} Finally, the object of the imagination is what is determinable, {from which alone any movement of transition to a determinate activity is possible; consequently,} the imagination is what conditions all the activity involved in the act of determining, even though this activity is ascribed to the I alone.TT {Observation: The transcendental idealist would accomplish very little if he were simply to say, "We make the object ourselves," and then were to leave it at that. From the ordinary point of view, it is and remains true that we discover objects that appear to be given to us. Thus the claim 55 There is no determinate activity apart from a movement of transition from what is determinable, for the activity consists in just this movement. What is determinable in this case, however, must be grasped as such, and for this one requires something through which it could be grasped: this is the power of imagination (p. 214). 9 ' KRV, A5o/B74. 96 "in Riicksicht des Stoffs." TT [ ••• ] even though this activity is ascribed to the intellect alone (p. 215).
that we ourselves make these objects is meaningless unless one also provides a derivation of why it is that the objects we ourselves construct nevertheless appear within ordinary consciousness as somethin~ given.} Where do I begin, and where does my productive activity 7 begin? I discover myself only as the determining subject. 98 This presupposes something determinable, which is provided to us by the imagination. My productive activity always presupposes the imagination, as well as the product of the same, {i.e., what is determinable}. It is for this reason that something always appears to be given to us, and this is the source of the world's objectivity. {This is why the sensible world must appear to us as something given, because it is the determinable "something" that is produced by the imagination so that it can then be determined by my sensuous energy.} Consequently, the imagination necessarily appears to us as something given. {Furthermore,} the object of the imagination is infinitely divisible. This {infinite} divisibility does not lie within what is determinable (considered as something in itself), as an immanent property of the same; for what is determinable is [the product of] my imagination itself, 99 which merely combines [the manifold].uu Hence to say that what is determinable is infinitely divisible simply means that what is provided byvv the power of the imagination is subsequently divided by the power of judgment-or at least that this act of dividing is posited as one that has to be undertaken 100 {by the power of judgment}. Thus, {just as we previously encountered an interaction between thinking and imagination,} we here in fact encounter an interaction between imagination and judgment, each of which can be described only in terms of the other. One could thus say that imagination is the power [to grasp] wholes [consisting of] {an infinite number of} absolutely {opposed parts}, and that the power of judgment {analyzes the absolutely opposed elements that have been combined by the imagination; in other words,} judgment is the power {to grasp} what is simple. 101 These two powers are reciprocally related to each other: there can be nothing simple apart 97
''mein Machen." Reading, with H, "das Bestimmende"" forK's "das Bestimm" ("what is determinate"). 99 "dieses ist meine Einbildungskraft selbst." As Radrizzani notes, this clause requires some emendation, since (according to what has just been said) it is not the imagination itself that is divisible and determinable, but rather its product. For an alternate way of emending this clause, see the corresponding passage in H, translated below in n. UU. uu This infinite divisibility, however, does not lie within what is determinable, as [an] immanent [property of the same], as in something [that exists]"in itself''; it lies only in the power of imagination through which I view the object (p. 215). vv [ ... ] that what is glimpsed through [ ... ] (p. 2 15). 100 Reading, with H, "als vorzunehmen" forK's "als vorzunehemend." 101 K: "die Einbildungskraft is das Vermogen absoluter Ganzen, die Urtheilskraft des Vermogen des Einfachen." H: "Die Einbildungskraft ist das Zusammmenfafkn ABSOLUTER oo sich entgegengesezten Gangen [sic]. Die Urtheilsk.raft is die ANALYSE der durch die Einbildungskraft zusammengesfallten ABSOLUTE sich entgegengesezten; oder die Urtheilskraft is das Auffasen des einzelnen." 98
204 I I
.I'
from a whole and no whole without an infinite number of simple elements. 102 {All concepts such as "herd," "old age," "heap," etc., consist of individual elements that have been blended together by the imagination. As soon as these different elements begin to be enumerated and separated from one another, the function of the imagination ceases and that of judgment commences.} This recalls the ancient sorites. 103 If one says, "The imagination combines something that is infinitely divisible," then this means: "divisible for the power of judgment." Therefore, for the mind as a whole, the very same thing that appears to be a whole, to be one, also appears to this same mind to be a mere collection of infinitely divisible [parts]. One can never become conscious of the divisions made by the power of judgment {except by means of this very power; (2 thus I must actually engage in judgment}. Therefore, one must not make any judgment if a property is present which does not depend upon a conscious deed and must not say that anything exists in itself and independently of me. • The main objection to this, {[anq] one of the best objections one could raise against the transcendental idealist,} is as follows: "If nature is your own product, then how is it that you are nevertheless able to learn things from nature? If nature is your own product, then how is any research into nature possible? {How could you perform any experiments? You must already be completely acquainted with nature. Therefore, despite what you claim, nature must also contain for you something more, something you did not expect to find. But this is the characteristic feature of posited being. Consequently, you cannot have produced nature." Answer:} Here we do no more than learn about ourselves and employ our faculty of judgment to analyze what is posited by the imagination. {Nature in its entirety is a product of the imagination.} How is movement possible? It is possible only insofar as an {entire} line is constructed {all at once and not the infinite parts of the same, one after another}; similarly, consciousness of an activity [is possibly only] insofar as what is determinable, {[i.e.,] the infinite manifold of my freedom,} is grasped as a mass, as a whole, {and not individually and successively}. • Movement is not yet explained in this way, for I still do not see what it is that moves itself along this line; therefore, consciousness {of agility} also has not been explained, since what is self-actively agile has not yet come into view. ijust as in the previous case of a line, so too in the 102
"ohne unendliches einfache." Taking its name from the Greek word soros ("heap"), this sophistical argument (sometimes known as "the argument of the beard'') denies the possibility of finding any middle ground between parts and wholes composed thereof, on the grounds that it is impossible to say precisely when, for example, a number of individual grains of wheat becomes a "heap"-and, conversely, when a "heap" ceases to be a heap and becomes simply a number of in!lividual grains. 10 '
present case [of our consciousness of our own activity or agility]: something that is in motion is united with what is here determinable, i.e., with this agility, and is viewed through the medium of this same agility. You observe the manifold of choice, and through the medium of the same you also observe a determinate, inner force, the I as something agile.} The I is united with what is here determinable and appears as the subject that mediates the latter, i.e., as the determining I. This determining I is something simple and absolute, something that is produced purely by thinking, a noumenon. When we think of this determining I, we are not thinking of any I that actually determines itself, {as is the case with the concept of a goal}; all we are thinking about here is the form, {what type of act of determining this is and how it occurs,} the sheer power [of the I to determine itself]. This is a remarkable concept, for we simply cannot understand what a "sheer power" 104 could be; nevertheless, this is thought of within consciousness. {Though it is hard to determine what a "sheer power" is supposed to be, this cannot be expressed any better than in the following way:} When we think of a power, what we think of is the sheer form {of "doing"}, not of any determinate acting of this or that type. This is similar to what happens when we think about infinite space. The problem is as follows: How am I supposed to arrive at a cognition of the form of anything unless I have already discovered this form to be realized in something determinate? (In the usual sort of purely formulaic philosophy, one customarily starts with a mere abstraction {without noticing that no abstract thinking whatsoever is possible (217 without concrete thinking}.) How is abstraction possible unless it is preceded by something concrete? {How can I arrive at a cognition of the (216 type and manner of the I's act of determining unless I am first acquainted with certain determinate actions of the I?} {The main object of our present inquiry was to answer the question, (2 17 How is consciousness of agility [i.e, of our own inner activity] possible? In order to be able to answer this question, we first had to address another one: How is movement possible? In order for movement to be possible there must be (a) a power to unite the manifold of opposites, and (b) an act of pure thinking, an energy or force. This was nothing but an example, however, to which we connected our inquiry. We are here concerned with agility. This agility is supposed to be grasped, and here we discover (A) something infinitely determinable, namely, an infinite number of possibilities for action, which, at the same time, appear to us to be given; (B) a power to grasp these various possibilities. From a transcendental perspective, there is not an infinite number of possibilities for action; these exist only subsequently, for the power of judgment. Consequently, this manifold of opposites can be grasped only 104
"ein blofks Vermogen."
by the power of imagination. Only a single act of pure thinking occurs; and, when one is engaged in constructing a concept of a goal, this single act is, in a certain sense, guided thro1.1gh the series [of possible actions], and it is here that an intuition of agility arises. What arose in this way was the form [ofthe act of self-determination], forth is act of self-determining is posited not as anything actual, but only as a form, as something abstract. [Nothing abstract, however,] can exist apart from something concrete. Accordingly, a real act of willing, an act of self- determining, would here have to be presupposed. Since self-determination is present in the concept of a goal, the form of this act of self-determination had to be explained as contained within the concept of a goal. This is how we arrived at the question, "How is an intuition of the mere form [of this act of self-determination] possible apart from an intuition of something actual or real to which this form pertains? I.e., how is something abstract possible apart from something concrete?" In the concept of a goal we find nothing but the form of self-determination, without any content. Why is this form nevertheless assumed to be something that is originally present and employed to explain the will?} • [Answer:] As applied to the act of self-determination, [abstraction] is possible precisely insofar as this act of self-determination is viewed through the medium of the imagination, which grasps the infinitely {divisible} manifold; and [thus] the imagination is here the mediating agency. Similarly, in the act of drawing a line, I project 105 the line through an infinite number of points. {For example, a projectile moves along a certain line. For the reasons stated above, however, this movement cannot be grasped by thinking, for the projectile would have to be thought of as moving through an infinite number of points. Nevertheless, from (2 the ordinary point of view, movement certainly does occur. But the only way in which this was possible is if the infinite series of points was grasped by the imagination in a single act (and in a single line), and [this in turn was possible only] if we assumed the existence of some force that unites itself with all the points on this line. Consequently, I projected this force through the infinite points, and it was by means of this act of projection that a line arose for me. Thus the line arose only insofar as I viewed the noumenon through the medium of the infinite divisibility of space. So too in the present case: the self-determining force is viewed through the medium of the infinite manifold from which a selection has to made, and what is observed in this case is nothing but my own act of thinking, my act of self-determining-which is such only with respect to its form-since the process of self-determination nowhere ceases. Expressed in a popular form: I am in a state of deliberation; should I do this, or should I do that? I.e., should I determine myself in this way 105
"weife [ ... ] hindurch."
205
or that?} Everyone is familiar with this frame of mind, which is the one in which we find ourselves when we doubt or when we choose. It follows that the concept of the power of willing is contained within this very frame of mind; even though nothing is willed in this case, {the possibility of willing is already present}. But how is a concept of this sort possible? {This is willing in the abstract sense, and this sort of willing is made possible} by the fact that when one deliberates one does not restrict oneself to any one thing. {I am always driven, as it were, from one thing to another, and it is precisely through this process that there arises the abstract [concept] of a determination of the will apart from anything concrete.} • This must be understood only in a transcendental sense. ww A representation {of the freedom of the will or of the determinability of willing} should not be assumed to be something that is presupposed {and is passively present in advance; for if we could have assumed this, then we would have proceeded in a purely analytic fashion. The power of imagination never comes to a rest. It continually proceeds from one thing to the next. At every point, one act of determination is completed and a new one is begun, and this holds for the entire state of deliberation, within which determinacy and indeterminacy are continually united with each other. Neither can exist without the other; for this is precisely the state of mind by means of which determinability comes into being, but determinability exists only insofar as determinacy does.} Throughout the entire sphere of imagination, there occurs everywhere an act of quasi determining, which constantly moves from one thing to another; determinacy and indeterminacy are here united. Here we can see how the general concept of determinability first arises. xx &mark [1]: Only by means of the act of thinking just described, an act through which the I ascribes a power to itself, does the I discover itself to be an actual I, separate from the world. {I am nothing but a "doing"; 106 moreover, my activity is only a movement of transition from determinability to determinacy, and I intuit it as such within conscious- (219) ness. This movement of transition is a process of sensibilization; as a result, I intuit my own activity in a sensibilized form, 107 and this is how it becomes a "power" for me. [In this way] I become conscious only of my act of determining, not of my determinate being.} The I that arises in ww We must provide a transcendental account of this, that is, we must explain how a of the will's freedom or of the determinability of willing is possible (p. 218). Consequently, both determinability and determinacy must be united in the state of deliberation, which is why no stable act of determining occurs within this state. (Here we can dearly understand how a determinability arises along with what is determinate.) (p. 218). 106 "Ich bin nichts als ein Thun." 107 "Das Uebergehen ist Versinnlichung, ich schaue demnach meine Thatigkeit in einer Versinnlichung an." re~esentation
this first act [that is, in the act of determining] is transformed into a determinate being. Everything that is present here is an appearance-including l myself (a point that has already been made by Kant, {who said that I discover myself not as I am, but as I appear. 108 This is quite correct, and it is assertions of this sort on the part of Kant which allow us to infer that he had a grasp of transcendental idealism.}). But where does this appearance come from? lt is produced by me. But what am l? {Am I "something," and if so, what? Many people say that} I am a mind, or a soul, or something of this sort. But is this latter way of looking at the I [as a power] also nothing but an appearance, {just another way of looking at the first, original noumenon}? Yes, this too is an appearance, namely, the appearance of a power. {Though many philosophers begin with a "power" or "faculty," such as "the understandinf," etc.} (see, for example, Reinhold's "power of representation"), 10 {this is nevertheless a mistake; for when they proceed in this way they begin with an appearance. For what is a "power" (e.g., the "power of the understanding") if not an appearance?} Now, however, we see how the general or overall [concept of] a power can arise. This is a sensuous concept, produced by a process of sensibilization. {A power arises when I view the self-determining force, the noumenon, through the medium of the manifold.} Within the whole of {ordinary} consciousness l am never present as anything but a power, {because ordinary consciousness is itself a process of sensibilization}. • We wanted to provide a derivation of consciousness of the I's agility-not of consciousness of this agility as a consciousness of something that has already occurred {and serves to explain something else (which is how we have proceeded until now)}, but rather of consciousness of it as something immediately occurring. Above, we argued as follows: I discover my own physical energy as something in motion, and through the medium of the latter I view an object as the result of my causal power. But how does this physical energy or force become mine? {How do I become conscious of it as identical with myself as the subject? This occurs in the following way:} I refer the determinacy of this physical energy to my own act of self-determining, which I {therefore} presuppose as the explanatory ground of the former. This raises a still higher question: How do l become conscious of {the self-determination that is involved in} my act of determining? We have at last explained how this occurs. {l become conscious of this self-determination by viewing this act of deter•os KRV, B •55!156. 109 The "power" (or "faculty") of representation is Reinhold's name for our undifferentiated ability to be conscious of anything at all. Reinhold posited this power in order to explain the unity of the two "subsidiary" powers of "intuition" and "thinking." All Reinhold's treatises on Elementary Philosophy include discussions of the power of representation, but see especially his Versuch riner neuen 'l1letnU deJ mmschlichen Vorstellungsvermiigens (178g).
206
mining through the medium of a manifold, through which my act "flows." We must now explain how this "flowing through" originates. 110} Remark [2] (added for the purposes of clarity): We said above that the usual sort of Critical philosophy contains a yawning gap. It shows only how the moments of time become arranged in a series, and {its proponents believe that} a certain duration arises thereby. This, however, cannot occur; for if there is nothing that fills the individual moments of time, then neither is there anything that fills the entire series. {No matter how many mathematical surfaces, or how many shadows, one piles on top of one another, no thickness will ever arise, because none of the individual surfaces possesses any thickness. In precisely the same way, one may arrange just as many moments next to one another in a series as one wishes, but if none of these moments possesses any duration, then no period of time will arise.} Accordingly, {if any period of time is to be explained,} it must {first} be demonstrated that every individual moment possesses a certain duration {and fills a certain amount of time. What is the origin of this duration that pertains to each of the individual moments?} It arises from the oscillation of the imagination between opposites, {by means of which the intuition of the activity of the I originally obtains duration in every moment}. The imagination consists in just this: it is what allows me to grasp an infinitely divisible manifold. A moment arises only in this act of combining. {The imagination has to grasp a manifold; it begins to oscillate between or to hover above the opposites [that co:1stitute this manifold]. Along with this act of oscillating, there arises the duration that is contained in every moment; indeed, the moment itself first arises precisely by means of the duration of this act, and then, when these moments are arranged in a series, a period of time arises.} • According to the above, an object is viewed through the medium of the concept of a goal, {by means of which I am supposed to produce this object,} in accordance with the category of causality. This relationship is completely simultaneous, since {the concept of a goal and the object} are immediately connected with each other; i.e., no time intervenes between the cause and the effect. {In Kant's writings, it appears as if the cause might occur today and the effect tomorrow! 11 This, however, is incorrect; here we have a case of absolute simultaneity. Consequently, we can- (221) not obtain any duration in this manner.} Where then does temporal duration come from? Does it perhaps arise when several effects are connected with one another? Nothing comes from nothing, and if one effect does not occupy any time, can a thousand effects occupy any time? {No duration is obtained in this way, because one will search in vain for something in the whole which is contained in none of the individual 110 111
"Woher dieses Hindurchflieflen komme." See especially the "Second Analogy of Experience," KRV, At8!;"B:r3::-A:u •/8::56.
410
§ 17
parts of the same.} Temporal duration can arise only if the concept of a goal-including the act in which this concept is constructed-possesses a certain duration of its own. Only through this latter duration, by means of sensuous mediation, does there arise a successive acting, {as} a gradual generation of the product of our acting. This point is not made clearly in Kant's own writings. (See Jacobi's Concerning Idealism and Realism, 112 a work that should be carefully reread. Uacobi shows clearly that no time is contained in the concept of causality; instead, it is contained only in the act of grasping the manifold by means of the power of imagination.})
{We have been speaking of an act of viewing the act of selfdetermining through the medium of a manifold of mutually opposed elements.} This act is the act of thinking of my own substance (not of "substantiality"), 113 to which there pertain the following: [ 1] A noumenon, something that is merely thought of (something one simply thinks of, without directing one's thinking at something given). This {noumenon} is here the self-determining I, with respect to the mere form of the same. [2] A sensibilization of this noumenon, which arises when the imagination unites this noumenon with what is simply determinable. {When the noumenon is viewed through the medium of what is determinable, the concept of substance arises-but not that of substantiality.} • The {concept} of substance contains the following: [A] A substance can be characterized as something enduring, something firm and fixed. This absolute character of substance comes from the {act of selfdetermining, from the} noumenon that is here present. [B] A substance also includes {not determinacy, but} pure determinability, i.e., it can be determined to become anything that lies within its concept. (Insofar as it is determinate, it is an accident.) 114 [C] Finally, a substance {also} ineludes something that fills time, a temporal duration. This arises from the union of what is simple with the manifold-a union that can be grasped by the imagination only in a certain succession. When we think of the individual elements that constitute this determinable manifold, 115 112 Ueber Idealismus und Realismus, the appendix to Jacobi's Dauid Hume Uht!T den Glauben oder Idealismus und Realismus. Ein Gesfrrach ( 1787). See especially p. 101 of the original edition. 11 ~ "Dieser Act ist das Denken einer Substanz: (nicht SuBSTANTIALITAET)." Reading, with H, "meiner" for K's "einer" ("a"). 114 As before, this term is here employed in the sense of an "accidental property" (or predicate) of a "substance.'' 11 ~ "Dieses mannigfaltige Bestimmbare giebt, wenn eins allein gedacht wird." Reading, with H, "einzeln" forK's "eins allein" ("one alone").
(2
§
17
411
this provides us with the accidents, {which, however, we are not discussing here, where we are chiefly concerned with the substance. As will become evident below, neither substance nor accident is possible apart from the other.}
207
(4) Let us now situate ourselves within the standpoint of the present inquiry. {In advance of anything else, let us occupy the standpoint from which we are supposed to proceed. But first, let us consider where we have stood until now:} We began {the present§} by hovering above synthesis A. We then descended to a consideration of the discrete, individual acts of thinking contained in this synthesis and posited only in a certain relationship to one another. We will now shift our standpoint {once more} and will again place ourselves {in the standpoint} abave synthesis A. In {the primary synthesis} ( = A) the I posits itself as thinking in the manner we have now described. We have {until now} directed all our attention only to the intermediate or mediating element [in this synthesis], though we remarked in advance that it is through this mediating element that my act of thinking of myself as what is determinate is united (objectively) with the primary synthesis and my act of thinking of myself as the determining subject is united (subjectively) with the same.YY Thus the same elements we previously considered separately we now wish to consider again in their union with one another. We will now reflect upon this synthesis, which will [thus] appear as something that is merely thought of. {A few additional remarks to explain what has been said: It has often been remarked that many people have great difficulty with claims such as the following: that even thinking is nothing but an appearance; that one act of thinking is the object of another, higher act of thinking, or is an object for a higher form of consciousness; that we do not think within time, but only perceive 116 our own thinking as occurring within time.} It is very difficult for people to comprehend the ideality of time. {If we remain standing at the point where our thinking appears to us to be something that originally occurs within time, then we occupy the standpoint of ordinary consciousness and we consider discursive thinking to be something immediate. This is how we have proceeded until now: We spoke of the act of thinking of a concept of a goal, as if this were something original and ultimate. We also spoke of a certain force or energy, as if this force were determined by itself. But this is not the way things now appear: [we can now see that] all this [both the act of thinking of a vv Through this mediating element, the act of thinking of myself as what is determinable (the object) and the act of thinking of myself as the determining agency (the subject) are united as a single synthesis (p. 222). 116
••hineinschauen."
§ •7
I
goal and the force of the I] is mediated by the primary synthesis [ = A]. These are not immediate determinations of the mind.} In the chain of reflections just concluded, we remained solely within the standpoint of ordinary consciousness, and there we treated the determinacy of [our own] force 117 as something absolute. Now we will no longer proceed in this manner, but will recall that the determinacy of our force is a determination of ourselves and is mediated by the fundamental synthesis that we now place ourselves above. {We now wish to ascend once again to what is immediate, to the point from which we previously descended to the individual, discursive acts of thinking contained in synthesis A. Let us consider the previously described intuition of the act of selfdetermination which is involved in the concept of a goal:} I view my own act of determining ( = the noumenon) through the medium of the manifold contained in the imagination. What is the origin of this act of determining which I am supposed to view in this way? It cannot be given to me; I determine myself on my own, and I am immediately conscious of this act of determining as my own act of determining. This {immediate} consciousness, however, is precisely the central {term within the} synthesis, and the leading thought [of this inquiry] is that it is a law of our thinking that we must connect many other things to this midpoint, {[i.e.,] that we connect thoughts by means of a synthesis. In the concept of a goal I discover myself as a determining subject, but only with respect to the form of the same. Insofar as I act efficaciously in a determinate manner, I view my own efficacy through the medium of my act of determining, and I view the object through the medium of consciousness. I view all this through the medium of the categories.} What we have now derived is certainly not the midpoint [of our synthesis], but something that follows from the categories of substantiality and causality. • Let us begin by describing this midpoint: It is the immediate and self-determining {element of consciousness} and is not viewed through the medium of anything else. {Everything that lies within time is connected to this midpoint.} Consciousness is like a circle: What is intelligible is the midpoint or center of this circle. The circumference of this circle, which includes everything empirical and sensible, is connected to the center in accordance with the necessary laws of thinking. We have now lost our way on the circumference, so let us return to the center and show why precisely these, and no other, radii must be described. At this midpoint, the act of determining something purely by means of thinking is inseparably united with the act of grasping what is infinite by means of the imagination. Both occur in a single act of consciousness. 117 Reading, with Krause's MS, "die Bestimmtheit der Kraft" for K's "von der Bestimmtheit die Kraft."
(i) What is this very act of determining, 118 considered, somewhat arbitrarily, as a {separate,} pure act {- which, to be sure, it is not}? Language fails us at this point, {for we possess only sensible intuition and are bound by the laws of the same}. One might say that this is an act of limiting ourselves, that is to say, an act in which we limit our reflection upon the manifold to one individual, determinate element. But if one says this, then the product of the imagination has already been built into one's very definition and cannot subsequently be removed. [On the other hand,] we could think of our act of determining only as a movement of transition [from determinability to determinacy] or as a process_ of oscillating among several opposed terms. We are trying, however, to describe this activity {by itself, without any reference to determinacy and determinability, [and]} without referring to any of the opposed terms among which it oscillates. {This, however, is impossible, since both determinacy and determinability must be present in every act of thinking in accordance with laws.} [rhus,] in order to accomplish what we are supposed to accomplish, we must either think in accordance with entirely different laws of thought, or else say something that is false. In short, we cannot do what we are supposed to do. {Therefore, our present task is nothing but an Idea: We are not supposed to think of any content of this act of determining; but it is impossible to think of it in this way, since the product of the imagination, i.e., the object, is always contained in this very act. Consequently,} we must here proceed as we must proceed with every Idea; i.e., we will merely describe the law in accordance with which this concept has to come into being. We claim that if the mere determination is supposed to be thought of, then one must abstract from what is determinable. This is impossible, for if one did this, one would have to be thinkin~ of mere 1-hood, i.e., of the act of grasping and apprehending oneself1 9-expressions that already contain within themselves a sensible distinction between the apprehending subject and what is apprehended. {I cannot think of such an act of determining; I can only say how I would have to proceed in order to be able to think of it.} In a similar manner, one often speaks, for example, about an "infinite space," even though this is unthinkable and {all one can think of in this case is how one would perhaps go about thinking of an infinite space; [i.e.,]} one thinks only of the rule in accordance with which infinite space must be described: namely, [the rule that tells us] to continue drawing a line forever. {In the concept of a goal (which is the concept whose possibility we here have to examine) the act of determining is viewed through the medium of the manifold of thinking. Consequently, the concept of a goal 118 Reading, with H, "dieses Bestimmen selhst"" for K"s "dieses Bestimmte selhst" ("'this determinate something itself"). 119 "das sich selhst Fafkn und Ergreifen."
contains within itself an act of self-determining. Where does this come from? It is what is first, what is highest, what is a priori. It is not mediated by anything else; instead, everything else is mediated by it. How is it to be thought of? It cannot be thought of in isolation. In actual consciousness it is always thought of in a sensible form. It certainly cannot be thought of as something supersensible; for in order to be able to think of it in this way, we ourselves would have to cease to be sensuous or sensible beings and would have to become supersensible ones, which is quite impossible. Consequently, it can be thought of only as an Idea. I.e., we can only supply the rule specifying how this act of determining has to be thought of. What this rule tells us is this: when we think of this act we must eliminate (that is, "think away") everything determinable or determinate. We are all conscious of an act of determining, and this act of determining is also present in the concept of a goal-namely, as a movement of transition. If I now try to think away the transition involved, what remains is the act of thinking of this act of determining as what is original and highest. This is an act of apprehending oneself.} This act of self-determining is the absolute beginning of all life and of all consciousness {and all activity}, and-for just this reason-it is incomprehensible, for our consciousness always presupposes something. {As we saw above, our consciousness cannot grasp its own beginning; instead, it always discovers itself in the midst [of its own conscious activity], 120 where the beginning must be presupposed. The reason this act of determining cannot be grasped is because the act of determining and the act of intuiting this act of determining are necessarily united within the I itself by the imagination. Consequently, we must proceed to a higher act of the I, from the standpoint of which it will be possible to observe both the act of determining and the act of intuiting this act of determining.} This reflection raises us {once again} to the standpoint of A. We have already observed the ground of the connection [between the act of self-determining and the act of intuiting the same]. {The act of self-determining can be observed only through the medium of the imagination; for this act is supposed to be thought of as a process of flowing forth, 121 and only by means of the imagination is it possible to think of it this way.} It becomes a flowing forth, however, only through the imagination, precisely because it is the imagination {alone} that unites this noumenon, {this self-determining energy,} with this rather than with that {point of the manifold}, by constantly propelling it {through the infinite series}. One should always keep in mind the consciousness 122 of movement, which is what is most distant [from the 120
"sondern sich immer in der Miue befindet." "als ein Fortfliejkn." Reading, with Krause's MS, "man erinnere sich immer an den B." for K's "man erinnere sich an den B," and also construing "B" as an abbreviation for "Bewusstsein" (which 121
122
.I :
(22.
209
center], the final expression of all productive activity. The entire function of the imagination is simply to make it possible to observe the acting of the I while it is engaged in the act of determining itself. 12 s {We said previously that I can observe myself only as active. This activity is an agility, a flowing forth, a fluttering. (No precise terminology is available to describe this activity.) Where does this agility come from?} No flowing occurs within thinking, but simply a standing still. 124 Insofar as consciousness is supposed to be a consciousness of this flowing, the power of imagination is the basis of all consciousness; and therefore consciousness must originate solely by means of the power of imagination.zz {This is also what actually occurs, and it occurs insofar as the act of selfdetermining, or the absolutely free energy of the I, is conducted through [the manifolq.] by the imagination, which unifies this manifold. In this respect, the imagination is posited, for otherwise there can be no imagination; and in this respect the imagination is necessary, since what generates sensuous consciousness originates through the imagination.} One can now say that the self-positing of the I consists in the unification of an act of thinking and an act of intuiting, {and the I itself first arises by means of this unification; this provides the primary synthesis = A}. (Synthesis A is {therefore procreative; it is} simply the progenitor of selfconsciousness.) This synthesis occurs when imagination and thinking are united in such a way that what is real becomes united with what is ideal. Only in this unity is the I engendered. {We said above that the I [arises] (2,: from the unification of what is ideal and what is real, and here we say that it arises from the synthesis of thinking and imagination. These are simply two different ways of saying the same thing; for what is real is the imagination, and what is ideal is thinking. There is no I without both, and neither could exist without the other.} Thinking and imagining 125 cannot exist separately, for then there would be no I {for which they could exist}. [ii] The form of the act of synthetic thinking ( = A): {Until now} we have viewed the manifold as consisting of elements in a relationship of dependence, {because one point in the manifold was mediated by another. In the synthesis of causality} we viewed the object only through the is the usual abbreviation Krause employed). For some reason Fuchs construes "B" in this instance as an abbreviation for "Begrifr' ("concept"), but, as Radrizzani points out, "consciousness" makes more sense in this context. 12 s "Die Einbildungskraft und ihre ganze Function ist blofl die Moglichkeit des Handeln des Ich in seinem Bestimmen anzusehen." Cp. H: "[ ... ] des Handeln des lch und seinem Bestimmen anzusehen" ("to view the acting of the I and its act of determining"). 124 "lm Denken ist kein Flieflen, da ist Iauter Stehen." zz If, despite this, consciousness of this flowing is supposed to be the basis of all con· sciousness, then it follows that the basis of all consciousness must originate with and be mediated by acting, that is, by the power of imagination (p. 224). 125 Reading, with Krause's MS, "Einbilden" for K's "Einbildung."
'i
~I i: ii I'
i),
!i!
II' "I
::I !l
l]l jd ,,
medium of the concept of a goal, which could occur only insofar as the concept of a goal is, as it were, a tinted and differentiating 126 glass {through which the object arises. This is how things stood in the synthesis of causality, and} this is also what occurs in the case of the category of substance. {Here too the determining subject is viewed only through the medium of the process of pulling together and combining, and only by being viewed in this manner does this subject become an active subject. Thus, here too there is something that mediates and something mediated, as in the synthesis of causality.} The difference between the category of substance and that of causality is that what is determined in the former case is not something that first comes into being by means of this synthesisAAA (as it does in the case of the synthesis of causality); instead, {the object} is presupposed {along with} the pure act of thinking by means of which the act of {self-}determining first comes into being. 127 • Previously, {in the synthesis of causality,} we considered one thing to be, in a certain respect, a mediating subject and something else to be what was mediated thereby. The situation here {in the primary synthesis} is different: the elements of the manifold are thought of alongside one another, {and one is not thought of[only] through the medium of another}. They are thought of in a relationship of reciprocal interaction rather than one of dependence. Such a manifold, however, is not dismembered, in the manner of a manifold whose members are alien to one another; instead, {all the points} mesh with one another and are likewise 128 mediated {by one another-not in such a way that one point is, in a certain respect, only mediating and not at the same time mediated,} but only in such a way {that each is in the same respect mediating and mediated and} the predicates of one apply to the other. Each is viewed through the medium of the other. Accordingly, the original act involved in the present synthesis is, so to speak, "twofold"; indeed, it could not be otherwise with the original act of the I, which is always twofold. {In this duality one thing is viewed through the medium of the other.} Elucidation: {Let us consider more closely what has just been said, and (226) we will discover one of the most important results of the Wissenschaftslehre.} The determination of the mind I am now discussing {is a single point or act, which} contains within itself the main threads and basic elements of consciousness in its entirety. This is a distinctive 126
Reading, with H, "spaltendes" for K's "gespaltenes" ("cracked"). by means of the act of determining (p. 225). "dall ein reines Denken wodurch das Bestimmen erst enstanden ware vorausgesezt wird." This passage actually states "that a pure act of thinking, by means of which the act of determining would first arise, is presupposed." This makes little sense in the present context, however, and is consequently emended in the light of the parallel passage in H: "dall mit dem reinen Denken wodurch das sich bestimmen erst entstanden ware, d. Object vorausgesezt wird." 128 Reading, with H, "gleichfals" forK's "gleichsam" ("so to speak"). AAA [ ••• ) 127
210
, '1
feature of the Wissenschaftsll!hre. Other philosophies present a simple act of thinking in a merely mechanical series, and not, {like the Wissenschaftslehre, a compound act of thinking} in an organic series. Our physics 129 is related to the usual sort of physics in the same way {that our metaphysics is related to the usual sort of metaphysics}: whereas mechanism rules everywhere in the usual physics, {organicism rules everywhere in ours}. The Fichtean variety of physics recognizes no simple force = A; instead, it treats every A as a collection of several forces that reciprocally interact with one another. {Every point represents a concentration of all the forces. This is also the case in our metaphysics.} Accordingly, the Wissenschaftslehre is organic and discursive. The Wifsen.schaftslehre contains nothing but syntheses. The synthesis we are presently considering, {the one we have called "A,"} is the fundamental synthesis, within which discursive thinking first arises. A tree, for example, is constituted by a certain organic force, not by sap, bark, a trunk, etc., {which are products of this organic force}. So here with consciousness: the inner nature of consciousness does not consist of thinking in time or of an endless chain of causes and effects. These constitute, so to speak, the leaves, the sap, and the fruit [of consciousness]; the inner nature of consciousness, {i.e., synthesis A, from which the former are produced,} is originally unitary. • This synthesis { = A} contains two series, both of which begin with A, the act of determining myself. On the one side there arises a determinate being, 130 by means of which a product in the sensible world is observed. Viewed from the other side [of the central synthesis] this is also an act of self-determining, but here it appears as an agility, viewed through the medium of the manifold of that which I could determine myself to become. 888 • Both aspects ofsynthesisA are united in a single moment. No relationship of [simple] dependence is present in this moment, but mediation 129 "Fichtes Physik." Just as Kant found room within his Critical philosophy for a treatment of the "metaphysical fint principles of the natural sciences," in which he discussed, in general terms, the applicability of the categories to nature, so too, Fichte considered "natural philosophy" to constitute a distinct portion of the entire system of the Wissen.chajulehre. Despite the reference to "Fichte's physics," however, he never published anything under this title nor did he ever lecture on this topic, though scattered comments on it can be found in his various published and unpublished writings (for example, in § 19, below). For an informed discussion of "Fichte's physics" which emphasizes the crucial differences between the transcendental theory of natural science developed by Kant and Fichte and the very different sort of speculative NalurphiiM<JfJIIU advocated by Schelling and Hegel, see Reinhard Lauth, IN traruundenlale Nalurkhre FichUs nach den Prinz.ipim der Wi.Jsen.u:hajukhre (Hamburg: Meiner, 1984). "" "Bestimmtsein." 888 We have a double series in synthesis A. It commences with an act of selfdetermining, through the medium of which I observe a determinate being-through the medium of which [in turn] I observe an object in the sensible world. lbis is the first series. On the other side there is again an act of self-determining, which I view through the medium of the imagination as something determinable, as an agility to which I could determine myself. This is the second series (p. 226).
~
211
is present nevertheless. The mediation that is present here is not the sort in which one term is viewed through the other, but not vice versa; instead, they are here related through reciprocal interaction. In a relationship of this sort, a is present by means of b and, in the same respect, b is present by means of a; {both are lenses, and} each is viewed through the other. {This is [a relationship of] absolute simultaneity, reciprocity.} The situation is as follows: First there is a pure act of thinking which determines itself. Within the synthesis, this pure act of thinking is {posited as} viewed through the medium of the imagination and is itself made sensible {thereby}. In this process of sensibilization, the pure concept of a goal is transformed into the determinacy of a sensible force, and what is thereby produced is itself a sensible object.ccc {I am an intellect, and thus my determinations are nothing but acts of pure thinking. Nevertheless, I view myself as a sensuous force, as exercising an effect upon sensible objects and producing sensible products. How is this possible? The dogmatist will answer this question by appealing to the influence exercised upon us by external matter. But we who are not dogmatists must show how pure thinking is transformed into a sensuous force. This has now been accomplished. The transformation in question occurs as a result of the fact that I can observe my own pure thinking only through the medium of-a sensuous vehicle, through which my act of pure thinking itself becomes sensible.} Here we must examine, first of all in a general way, how the intellect comes to ascribe to itself a sensuous force, i.e., a body, and how it is able to ascribe to itself an expression of the force of the latter, {i.e, a determination of this body}. An expression of the body's force is nothing whatsoever but an act of pure thinking, simply viewed through the medium of the imagination. My act of thinking that my hand moves is identical with the {actual} movement of my hand: when I am immediately conscious of this, it is an act of thinking; whereas, when I consider it through the medium of the imagination, it is an {actual} movement. The entire {sensible} world is connected with this process by means of which [the intellect] is made sensible. In the present case, this process of sensibilization extends merely to something determinate. Dogmatists who {consider the world to be something that exists by itself and who} nevertheless retain their moral and religious sentiments have to say that God created the world. {They cannot, however, explain this any further; for no understanding is produced, no matter how the dogmatist construes this claim.} The dogmatists consider God to be a pure intellect, the determinations of which can surely consist in nothing but concepts. This is also how the I has been considered here: it is a ccc In this process of sensibilization, the pure <:oncept of a goal becomes a determinacy, a sensuous force; and what is produced by this sensuous or sensible force becomes a sensible object (p. u6).
(2~
{pure} intellect, and its determinations are nothing but pure concepts. A material world is also present for the I, and therefore these pure concepts must transform themselves into a material world-though only into one that exists purely for the intellect. In the case of God, in contrast, these pure concepts must be transformed into a self-sufficient material world, one that also exists for another intellect {- which is quite unintelligible}. 000 The transcendental idealist has to explain only the former process; i.e., he has to show how the pure concepts {of a finite intellect}, considered in a certain way, transform themselves into material substances, {[that is,] into a material world for this intellect-which is something that can and should be shown by the philosopher}. We have now described this process up to the point where we ourselves are made sensible. {The concepts of the intellect are transformed in the manner described: inasmuch as we view these concepts through the medium of the imagination we arrive at an act of determining ourselves in a sensible manner; and by means of this act of determining, in accordance with the previously indicated laws, we arrive at a determinate object.} A pure concept is made sensible: this was the first element in the synthesis. The imagination is viewed through the medium of pure thinking and {what is determinable} thereby becomes determinate, and there then arises a process of reciprocal interaction, by means of which what is originally determinable itself becomes a whole, a system: 131 this is the second element. {If this determinable [whole] is related to the determining subject,} it becomes a body {for me}. But if it is related to what is deter- (228) minate without any assistance from us, {it becomes} the entire {sensible} world. • The entire structure 132 of the I is based upon the act of determining and what is determined. {1-hood consists in the division of the I into a subjective and an objective [I]. This is the fundamental law. When I become conscious of 1-hood, a split occurs between the ideal and the real, which are originally one. What is real or objective is, in turn, both a determining agency and something determinate.} What is determinable in DDD God is a pure intellect; such an intellect, however, must also possess pure concepts. But how are these concepts supposed to be transformed into matter? To be sure, this is also the situation within transcendental idealism: the I is a pure intellect, and it must therefore also possess pure concepts, and these must transform themselves into a material world. There is a great difference, however, between the alleged sensibilization of the concepts of an infinite intellect and the sensibilization of the concepts of a finite intellect: the sensible world that is produced by the finite intellect exists only for this intellect itself and for no other intellect; accordingly, its pure concepts have to be sensibilized and become matter only for itself. The sensible world produced by God, however, is supposed to be such for an finite intellect-which is quite unintelligible (p. 227). 131 Reading, with H, "zu einem Ganzen, zu einem Systeme" for K's "zu einem ganzen Systeme" ("becomes an entire system"). 132 "die ganze Eintheilung" (more literally: "the entire division").
2 12
this first case lies {on the other side [of the synthesis], in what is ideal,} in substance; and insofar as this is {not grasped simply by the imagination alone, but is also} grasped by pure thinking, it is [grasped] as a whole, for thinking is always a whole. Furthermore, insofar as this determinable whole is referred to the duality of the act of determining and determinate being, it itself appears as a whole in two different ways: in relation to the determining subject, what is determinable is my body; in relation to a determinate being, what is determinable is the entire world. Thus {we here obtain an important result:} I X; I as soul and I as body: these are simply two different aspects of the very same thing. Furthermore, I as body and the sensible world outside of me are also particular aspects of one and the same thing. {I X, body, mind, and sensible world; these are simply different ways of looking at exactly the same thing. This constitutes the spirit of the Wissenschaftslehre.} • Everything in the Wissenschaftslehre is based upon this dual aspect {of consciousness. Consciousness in its entirety is a synthesis, which includes a highest, subjective term X and a lowest, objective one = matter in space.} Between what is highest (I = X), and what is lowest (formless substance) there lie various elements that, in their twofold relationship to what is highest and what is lowest, are subjective {in relation to what is lowest, to matter,} and objective {in relation to what is highest}. However, {all these are one, and} I myself am always the {sole} object {of consciousness; and I continuously divide myself in accordance with the laws of consciousness itself. This is now dearly and plainly evident.} • For myself, I am incomprehensible, a subject-object. Within experience, I divide myself into a subject and an object, which, to be sure, should be thought of as originally one. EEE This I of empirical consciousness can be posited only within time, and when it is posited in this way, it is the soul. When this same I is made sensible in space it is the bodywhich, in turn, is nothing other than the world. Everything {- the pure I, the mind, the soul, the body, the world-} is one and the same, simply regarded each time under a different aspect. • {We assert, first of all, that} in synthesis A pure thinking is viewed through the medium of the imagination, and {second, that in synthesis A} the imagination is viewed through the medium of pure thinking. The duality {contained in the synthesis} arises in this way, and the concept of substantialityFFF becomes complete {thereby as well}; i.e., {(A)} it becomes a self-contained, 133 {limited} quantum. Moreover, {(B)} an accident is related to this substance and viewed through the medium of the EEE When I become comprehensible to myself, or when I become conscious, I divide myself into a sul:!ject and an object, which, to be sure, are viewed as one in my empirical I (p. 228). FFF [ ••• ] the concept of substance (p. 228}. 1 " "geschloflenes.
§ 17
421
latter. {Accordingly, when I view the noumenon through the imagina- (229) tion, and thereby observe its self-contained character, it becomes for me a substance. [On the other hand,] when I view what is substantial through the medium of pure thinking, it then becomes for me, in this respect, an accident.} In relation to the determining subject, the accident related to this substance is the individual act that is selected from the manifold of possible acts {and is then comprehended}. In relation to what is determinate, the accident related to this substance is the particular matter that is chosen from all the rest. {[I.e.,] of all the possible modifications of what is determinate, this one is selected and is related to the substance.} When what is observed is the determining subject, then I am the substance- which is how I appear to myself from the point of view of ordinary consciousness, where I am a body. When what is observed is what is determinate, then the world is the substance. With respect to me, what is,determinate [i.e., the "accident" of my "substantial" body] is my own act-e.g., the movement of my hand. As related to the world, this same determinate something is an accident that is accomplished in the sensible world by the determining subject-e.g., the letters I have written.GGG Remark: Substantiality cannot be thought of apart from causality, nor can causality be thought of apart from substance. {Admittedly, from Kant's account of these it might seem as if this were possible. This is why Platner asked how substantiality could exist without causality. 134} An accident is never anything other than a determinate expression of the inner force, and hence [an instance of] the efficacy of the latter. Substance would be the power to act efficaciously, 135 a power that is always considered capable of producing a variety of different effects. Conversely, efficacy cannot be thought of except in relation to some {inner} force, and the force in question is identical to the innermost core of substance itself. 136 • HHH {There is thus no causality apart from substantiality.} The synthesis of these two categories {of causality and substantiality} is the category of reciprocal interaction, which is based upon the necessity of deriving the external power from the pure power, and vice versa. 111 Reciprocal interaction is the category of categories. Substantiality and causality are coordinated with each other, but both are subordinate to the category of reciprocal interaction. {Everything proceeds from the GGG What is determinate with relation to me is my act; when this same accident is related to the world, then it is the matter that is produced by this determination (p. 229). 154 See Ernst Platner, Philasophischen Aphori.smen, Part I ( 1793), § 768 ( = AA II, 45: 2 1617). 155 "das Wiirkende Vermogen." 156 "ist gleich dem CENTRUM des Innern der SuBSTANZ selbst." HHH This inner force is the inner root and inner substrate (p. 229). 111 The syntheses of causality and subslantiality are thought of together in [the category of] reciprocal interaction, which is necessarily based upon the union of these two categories (p. 229).
422
213
§ •7
category of reciprocal interaction. According to what was said above, our every act of thinking of anything is an act of thinking of reciprocal interaction and interrelations.} • We can think of nothing but relations. To a certain extent, Kant says this too, though without making any broader application of the point; {for he says that} the third category is always produced from the union of the first two-of substantiality and causality, [for example]. m This is correct and well said. Kant certainly wanted to establish a pure idealism. From the purely philosophical point of view, however, where one hovers above the synthesis, one finds that the categories of reciprocity and substantiality are coordinated with causality itself. {However-and this is the important point-from the philosophical point of view one always (23 observes syntheses within the category of reciprocal interaction. The category of reciprocal interaction simultaneously involves synthesizing and analyzing. It is not something given; instead, it produces itself. The question we had to answer was this: How does the immediate selfconsciousness of the I come about, and how does all other consciousness stem from this? We have now answered this question.}
§ 17 As we know, the I is what acts upon itself, 138 and, by virtue of this selfdirected activity, it is a willing subject. "The I discovers itself'': this obviously means that it discovers itself to be engaged in acting upon itself. The I discovers itself to be a willing subject in this self-directed activity, because its original nature-which cannot be derived from anything higher,JJJ but must instead be presupposed for {the possibility of} any explanation-consists in an act of willing. Every object of {the I's} free reflection upon itself must consequently become its own willing. Remark A: {The view we have of our own willing is itself a sensible one.} Willing is first of all a self-active or spontaneous act of determining. Every {intuition of an} act of determining is mediated by the imagination. {All determining} is an active {self-}determining in which one determines a concept of a goal, {an act of determining through which a real, determinate object is posited. Therefore, every act of willing actively determines a concept of a goal, by which, in turn, an object is supposed to be determined. This is what distinguishes an act of willing from a purely objective act of thinking. The opposition between the thing and the concept [of a goal], however, as well as the connection between them, 1 1
~ 7 See KRV, B11o-11. ~ 8 Reading, with H, "das auf sich selbst thatige" for K's "das durch sich selbst thatige"
("what is active through itself"), a reading that is confirmed by the rest of this paragraph. ill [ ... 1which cannot be explained any further [ ... 1 (p. 230).
is something purely sensible, which is made possible by the power of imagination.} Consequently, the entire concept of willing is sensible. Every act of willing is an appearance, and pure willing is presupposed merely in order to explain {actual willing. It is never present within an act of empirical willing, and this is precisely why it is incomprehensible and why we are unable to think of it.} It cannot be grasped by our representations, nor can it be grasped by our language, {for we ourselves are sensible}. ["Pure willing,"] "absolute selfhood," "autonomy," "freedom": these expressions are all equally incomprehensible. Freedom can be described only negatively: as not being determined. {Kant said (and so do we) that freedom, negatively defined, is the power to be the first (: rather than the second [member of a series]. 139 It can be positively defined as the power to make an absolute beginning.} Again, this is a sensible definition. {Therefore, what has to be explained remains incomprehensible to us.} In short, pure willing is what makes it possible for me to think of myself as self-active, {as a cause}-i.e., to think of myself as "1." Pure willing is the material [element] in all consciousness. In order to explain the formal {[element] within consciousness}, one has to presuppose an act of reflection. This ( = X) {is something twofold, which all explanation has to presuppose; it} is the absolute, which is nothing but a foundation or ground {and does not itself possess a foundation in anything else}. It contains within itself something absolutely subjective {( = a power to be subjective, namely, reflection)} and something absolutely objective {( = a power to be objective, namely, pure thinking). Every explanation presupposes this twofold [X] as something that cannot be explained any further. Everything else has to be explained on the basis of these two elements.}
{Continuation of§ 17} 140 Every act of reflection is an act of self-determining, and the reflecting subject immediately intuits this act of self-determining. But it intuits this act through the medium of the imagination, and, accordingly, it intuits it as a sheer power of self-determination. By means of this abstract act of 159
See KRV. A45oiB478. That is to say, freedom is the power to initiate a new series of or states. 14 This heading from H is not included in K, nor is this paragraph included in the transcribed text of all Fichte's dictaJa which appears at the beginning of K (an oversight remedied in the present translation). Despite these omissions, the following paragraph undoubtedly represents a continuation of Fichte's dictated summary of§ 17, as the heading in H indicates. This is further indicated in K by the use of Latin script, and in H by the use of quotation marks. This surmise can also be supported by comparing the text of this paragraph in K with the virtually identical text in H; for no matter how much K and H differ elsewhere, their versions of the summary paragraphs are always nearly identical. thin~
2 14
thinking (as a power) the I arises for itself as "something"-something purely spiritual, 141 something exclusively ideal-and becomes conscious of its own activity of pure thinking and willing, and becomes conscious of it as such, {that is, as an activity}. This act of reflection, however, is an act of self-determining; but the previously described act of imagination is an act of the I, and it is therefore determinate. Consequently, in one and the same undivided act, pure thinking is made sensible by the imagination, and what is made sensible by the imagination is determined by pure thinking (reciprocal interaction of intuiting and thinking). This determination produces a self-contained power of the I KKK as a sensuous force, as well as a determinacy of this power 142 (concept of substantiality). An object is added in thought to the determinacy of this sensuous force, and the latter determines the former in an act of thinkingLLL (concept of causality).
Recapitulation in a Popular Form
''
The I is what is self-determining, what makes itself into something determinate. Therefore, to say that "the I discovers itself" means that it discovers this act of self-determining, {this act of making itself something determinate}; for, despite what the dogmatist says, concepts {of things} do not lie within me in a finished state, as something original. {Therefore, when the Wisseruchaftslehre begins with a concept of the I, this does not mean that this concept lies within us as something original, which is not produced.} To say that "this [concept of the lJ is the first concept" means that even this concept is produced from a manifold that is displayed before us. In order to discover this process of self-production as something determinate, there must be a comparison between my being (what is determinate) and my doing (the process by means of which I make myself into this determinate something). {In order to appear to myself as something determinate, I must (1) make myself into something determinate, and (2) be determinate.} But how do I know that I do this? I know this only insofar as I have immediate knowledge of doing it, and I know that this is I myself insofar as I have immediate knowledge of this being. 143 {Hence I am both the "doing" of which I have immediate knowledge and the "being" of which I have immediate knowledge.} No further response to this question is "ein rein Geistiges," i.e., something purely "intellectual." power, the I [ ... ] (p. 2~p). H• Reading, with Krause's MS, "den.elben" for K's "desselben." ULAn object is added in thought to the determinacy of this sensuous force, and through the IaUer an act of thinking is determined (p. 23 1 ). Id "da~ ich ich selbst das sei, weis ich da~ ich unmiuelbar von diesem Sein wei~." HI
KKK [ . . . ]
(2B~
required. The only remaining question to be answered is this: "How do I know that this being is produced by this doing of mine?" An answer to this question would, {at the same time,} be a deduction of selfconsciousness, along with a deduction of all other consciousness. {This is explained further in the [System o!J Ethical Theory. 144 I write something, and hence I have a representation of my act of writing. But the person next to me is also writing something. How do I know that my act of writing is not that of another person? Does the basis [of my knowledge of this distinction] lie in some objective property of what is written, or does it lie in my own thinking? It obviously lies in my thinking. I have know I- ~ edge of my act of writing only insofar as I know that I will to write something. What is objective is determined by what is subjective. Question: How do I know that a particular being is produced by a particular kind of doing? • Answer:} Doing and being are simply two different sides of one and the same thing. This dual aspect has to exist if an I is to exist at all, for the I first arises from this {duality. For example, I could not say, "This is my act of writing" if I did not view my writing through the medium of my act of determining-that is, unless the duality of doing and being were present. Consequently, I also obtain a representation of the I only insofar as I have knowledge of both doing and being. These are the same thing.} When the I observes its own pure thinking through the medium ofthe imagination, an instance of doing arises for the I. When it thinks, in turn, of what {lies within the synthesis, that is, of what} is presented by the imagination, this becomes a being. Therefore, the I necessarily consists of both pure thinking and pure willing. If an I is posited, this {[that is,] the original character of the act of self-production, the original character of the act of pure thinking, and, along with this, the original character of the act of pure willing-} is posited. {And conversely, as soon as the original character of the pure act of thinking, etc., is posited, the I is positeq as well.} Furthermore, a consciousness of this original character of the I {is also posited}, and insofar as the latter is posited, this (double aspect [of the I] is posited. {Accordingly,} if an I is posited, then a consciousness of the sort just described is {also} posited. {The representation of I-hood rests upon the reciprocal interaction between thinking mediated by imagination and imagination mediated by thinking, between doing and being; and all other consciousness-as well as the system of the same-is based upon this representation of 1-hood.} The [concept of the] I is not a simple concept, for there are no simple concepts whatsoever. The concept of the I is {always} assembled in the manner described. 144
See the Introduction to Das System der SiUml.ehre (SW, IV:
1-111).
§ 18
215
This original synthesis, {by means of which consciousness of the 1- (l and thereby all other consciousness-comes into being,} provides us with a secure standpoint, and we now may either make this synthesis itself into the object of our inquiry or else adopt the perspective of this very synthesis and examine individually the various different acts of {concrete} thinking {contained therein. We may proceed in this manner without hesitation; [indee<j,]} systematic demands require that we do so. {Therefore,} let us now adopt the standpoint of the synthesis itself and examine one of the discrete acts of thinking thought of within this synthesis. Our investigation of this will, in turn, lead us back to the primary synthesis. Our plan is as follows: From the start we have established that the {primary} synthesis {contains something twofold,} a being and an act of thinking, which are necessarily united with each other. More precisely, it contains two opposed types of thinking, one ideal, the other real. The entire difference between these two types of thinking lies simply in the different way in which the intellect is determined in each case. Ideal and real thinking are one and the same thing, {simply viewed from different sides}. We have viewed both types of thinking as necessarily united in 1 the category of reciprocal interaction. These two types of thinking {constitute the main components of the synthesis in question, and,} taken together, they ·completely exhaust the same. Hence, {since with these two types of thinking we have everything that lies within the synthesis, and since this synthesis comprises consciousness in its entirety,} we can be sure that everything present in consciousness is contained in these two types of thinking. Consequently, we can now {quite confidently} begin our reflections from these {two points}, and, in doing so, we will treat each as a distinct act of thinking. For the moment, however, we should note that every act of thinking, {including the one we are 1
Reading, with Krause's MS, "in" for K's "mit."
§ 18
6
427
about to investigate,} takes place in accordance with the {synthetic} rules of thinking; every act of thinking possesses its own {synthetic} scope and constitutes a synthetic period in its own right. {We will now consider each of these particular acts of thinking [i.e., ideal and real thinking] in the same way we have considered the main synthesis until now. The synthetic period contained in the main synthesis is not contained in it alone; instead, all the rules of synthesis are also observed in the subordinate syntheses. The rule exhibited in the main synthesis is as follows: I cannot think of anything without also thinking of something else; I cannot think of _ myself as determinate unless I also think of some sort of determinability. This rule also applies to the subordinate acts of thinking we have discerned within the main synthesis. We now wish to turn our attention to these subordinate acts.} Such an investigation, therefore, will be our (2 next task (for within the Wissenschaftslehre an organic way of thinking always prevails; see above). 2 To be sure, for the purposes of speculation, we always remain free to separate what is manifold in order to obtain a clear understanding {thereof}; we must always remember, however, that we are never dealing with anything but a component of the highest3 synthesis {and that this is not something that exists separately in itself. Consequently,} our present undertaking will {simply} be to expand this [original] synthesis "from the inside out," as it were. {In the previous § we grasped only the innermost point of this synthesis. Beginning with this point, we will now further expand our inquiry in a circle radiating from this center.} In the previous § we carried our investigation only to the point where we assumed that some product of our causal power exists in the sensible world. But {our experience is not thereby exhausted, for it is clear that} the actually given world, {the actual "stuff,"} the sensible world that exists without any help from us, has not yet been deduced. This still remains to be accomplished. {We said that I discover myself to be determined, and through this I discover the object produced by my own act of determining. Through my own act of writing, I am conscious of the letters [I write]. Yet, at the same time, I am also conscious of other objects as well (e.g., of the paper, etc.), and these objects are also my products. From where does this latter sort of consciousness come? It follows that our synthesis must continue further. Expressed differently, the complete synthetic period contains, as we have already seen, something fivefold. As yet, however,} we have presented only a threefold synthesis: {A} On the one side, {in} the ideal {series}, [lies] the concept of a goal. {B} On the other side, {in} the real series, [lies] {the concept of} causality. {C} In the middle lies the concept of {the "absolute" element contained within the cause, the concept of} the purely 2 5
See§ 17, Pt. II, 4, ii.
Reading, with Krause's MS, "der obsersten" forK's "der."
i! t'
428
§ 18
self-active I.A This synthesis has to be fivefold; that is to say, an additional member must be added on either side, {to both the ideal and the real series. This will be our present task.} • More precise characterization of ideal and real thinking-"more precise," because here we will be drawing conclusions from premises that were merely jumbled together above, {in the preceding §}: (Each of these acts of thinking must be characterized individually in advance, because ideal and real thinking are here to be further determined in terms of each other; {therefore, one must be well acquainted with each of them by itself before one can determine their reciprocal influence upon each other}.) Ideal thinking occurs when the act of determining ( = the act of thinking) is viewed through the medium of the imagination and is thereby transformed into a pure movement or into a sheer "doing," though no product of this appears here. (As we explained above, our activity always appearsB as a flowing movement. {We also showed that this aspect of "doing" is a sensible or sensuous one, the foundation of which is to be sought exclusively within the laws of representation. Doing appears in this manner when the mere noumenon is synthetically united with the manifold and, by means of this unification, is propelled through the entire manifold.} In a certain respect, however, this flowing movement appears to be an actual, determinate being, 4 and a product {of doing} then arises as well. Here, {however,} we will abstract from this and will consider this [act of ideal thinking] simply as a "doing," as we did above in our account of the pure concept of a goal.) Nothing is present {within the mind} in this case but a purely ideal act of thinking. {Conversely,} a real act of thinking occurs when an act of determining which has now been made sensible and which lies before us [as such] is once again determined through an act of pure thinking. Within ideal thinking, the act of thinking appears to be entirely free {and views itself in this manner}; within real thinking, it views itself as constrained, and from this there arises a feeling: specifically, a feeling of being compelled to think in a certain way. (1) {I appear to myself to be engaged in constructing a concept of a
217
goal.} When I construct a concept of a goal I freely determine myself: "Should I now do this, or should I do that?" Here, {in the act of deliberation,} my own {self-determining} force is related to each of the possible cases that occur to me. 5 But how do I 6 know that I possess a
J the concept of the absolutely active I (p. 234). Consciousness as a whole appears [ ... ] (p. 234). "ein wurkliches bestimmtsein." 5 "Hier wird meine Kraft an aile diese mogliche Faile gehalten." 6 Reading, with H, "ich" forK's "man" ("one"). Throughout the following section, the text of K rather confusingly mixes first-, second-, and third-person, singular and plural, pronouns, for which (following H) the translation generally substitutes first-person singular references. A [ ••• 8
4
(~
§ t8
35.
429
self-determining force? {I know this because} this force lies within me; it is contained within my own free act of thinking. Here, {in the concept of a goal,} I appear to myself as a sheer noumenon, {as free}. Now I assert "I will this," and {as soon as I maRe a decision} this oscillation, {this continuing process of considering my self-determining force in relation to the manifold,} is brought to an end. My thought is now focused upon a single point, and {a determinacy is brought into being thereby}; once again, this happens as a result of a free act of thinking, etc. I, as a noumenon, here appear to myself in a double light:c (1) Insofar as Irelate my own determinacy to the manifold of choice, {[i.e.,] insofar as the concept of a goal is to be possible,} I appear to be presupposed as a noumenon "as such" or "in general." {In this case, I relate this noumenon to all the different possibilities of action.} (2) [At the same time,] I appear to myself as an empirical consciousness-something produced, generated, determined {in a certain manner within the concept of a goaL The concept of a goal contains a [determinate consciousness] = X, an act of self-determining = Y, and a manifold that is involved in this act of determining = Z. Pure thinking is directed at the first of these. I view an act of pure thinking through the medium of the imagination, and in turn, I view the imagination through the medium of an act of pure thinking. This is what concerns us here. Our goal was to provide a more precise characterization of the acts of real and ideal thinking we have established. We are already familiar with the intermediate concepts that have been presupposed for this purpose. Ideal thinking occurs when an act of determining is perceived through the medium of the imagination; as a result, it is transformed into a do- (236) ing, though no product thereof appears. Real thinking occurs when an act of determining which has been made sensible is, in turn, determined by pure thinking. In the former case, the act of thinking is viewed as free; in the latter case, it is viewed as constrained. These two acts of thinking are absolutely united with each other, and within this unity the distinctive character of each becomes even clearer. The determinacy of thinking which I discover is a determinacy I assign to myself. I view this determinacy through the medium of my own act of determining, and I would know nothing whatsoever about this determinacy apart from this act of determining. Consequently, this determinacy is nothing but my own act of determining myself, 7 viewed as something determinate; and conversely, this act of determining is itself nothing and is not intuited at all except in order to intuit this determinacy. Thus there is no acting without some action that is contemplated, 8 and there is no action apart from acting. Every determination of consciousness has c This determinacy, or this noumenon, can be looked at in two ways (p. 235). Reading "als das Bestimmen meiner selbst" for H's "als durch das Bestimmen meiner selbst." • "So giebt es lr.ein Handeln ohne eine Handlung die beabsichtigt wird." 7
430
'I
I
§ 18
a double aspect: on the one hand, it appears as a determinacy, as something real; on the other, since it cannot be viewed as something determinate except by means of an act of determining, it also appears as an act of determining. There is no act of determining which does not result in some determinacy; nor is there any determinacy except by means of some act of determining, for the former is perceived through the medium of the latter, as a mediating term.} There is a here a conflict between, on the one hand, the expressions we employ and the way we necessarily have to view [what we are describing] and, on the other, the topic we want to think about. {Our means of expression are never adequate to the topic of this inquiry. Despite all our efforts, we can never extend our inquiry beyond the primary synthesis; we always remain within the latter. We cannot obtain any intuition except by means of the power of imagination, and with this we already find ourselves to be within the primary synthesis.} Try as we might, we can never exhaust our investigation of the primary synthesis. Consequently, we could never intuit what is determinate and the determining subject as one and the same, for they are separate within this synthesis. {For us, [therefore,] they will always remain discrete and separate.} To think of them as one and the same is no more than a task. {Thus when we say here that what is determinate and the act of determining are one and the same, this simply means that we are able to think of the rule (or the task) in accordance with which we would have to proceed if we were able to think of them as one. The case is the same with the original I = the subject-object. This is incomprehensible to me, and the reason for this lies within my own finitude. The only way I can think of this I = X is to think of the task of obtaining a concept of this X-a task that can be stated as follows: "Think of the rule in accordance with which you would have to proceed if it were possible to think of X."} • Within the main synthesis this act of determining and the determinate being are one, but we are unable to grasp this. Philosophy necessarily begins with something {unthinkable, something} incomprehensible, with the original synthesis of the imagination. Similarly, it also begins with something unintuitable, with the original synthesis of thinking.n {Therefore,} this {first} act, {with which philosophy begins,} can neither be thought of nor intuited, {for something occurs in consciousness only insofar as the two elements that constitute this original act are separated}. Therefore, once again, all we can do is simply propose this as a task. Everything else is obtainable [within consciousness], because everything else is accomplished within experience. • In short, I engage in "real thinking" when I feel myself to be compelled {and determined} [in a certain way]. The reason for this 0
[ •.. ]
with the original act of thinking (p. 236).
§ 18
431
{compulsion} is that I have determined myself [in this way]. When I think of {this doing, of} this act of determining, 9 I am then engaged in (237) an act of thinking idealiter. Unlike an act of real thinking, an act of ideal thinking is not united with a feeling {-though whether a feeling may not be united with the product of an act of ideal thinking is another question}. We have already assembled these acts of {ideal and real} thinking {from their components; we did this in the preceding§ and will not do it here}. Here we encounter each of these two acts of thinking as a whole in its own right; {each is here already determined for itself,} and we now wish to relate them to each other and to discover how each is determined by the other. {We can freely choose the one with which we will begin our investigation of this relationship.} Let us begin by considering how real thinking is related to ideal thinking.
c218
(2) Considered from one side, my state within the original synthesis is {a determinate one,} an act of real thinking; hence it is impossible that this same state could also be an indeterminate one. Accordingly, the act of ideal thinking, which also occurs within this same state, must itself be determined along with the latter. This does not mean that the act of ideal thinking loses its ideal character. Both [ideal and real thinking] must subsist 10 alongside each other, for otherwise no I could subsist. {Therefore, both real and ideal thinking occur in a single state of synthesis. Real thinking is a determinate act of thinking, and ideal thinking is an indeterminate one. How can something indeterminate be present here? It cannot remain indeterminate; consequently, determinacy must also be related to ideal thinking. This, however, does not mean that, as a result of this determinacy, the act of ideal thinking must lose its distinctive character. Instead, it must subsist together with the act of determining. It should be and must remain an act of ideal thinking, for otherwise I would have no I. The distinctive character of ideal thinking and the determinate being of the same subsist together by virtue of the following:} Freedom as such, the act of determining, the sheer power [of the 1], is itself posited as something determinate. 11 As a soul, the I itself becomes a substance possessing a power that is determined in a certain, specific way. {Its state remains unchanged;} it neither increases nor decreases (we are not referring 9 Reading, with H, "Denke ich dieses zu thun, dieses Be$timmen" for K's "Denke ich dieses bestimmte" ("when I think of what is determinate in this case"). 10 "bestehen." 11 "die Freiheit als solche, das Bestimmen, das bloJk Vermogen wird selbst gesezt als ein bloJks Vermogen." Reading, with H, "als ein Bestimmtes" for the second occurrence of the phrase "eine blojks Vermogen" in K (presumably an error of transcription on Krause's
pan).
432
§ 18
here to mental capacity). 12 {What is a "substance"?} A substance is a sheer power that is itself confined within limits. {How is this a "power"?} It {is nothing actual, but} is a power only insofar as it is looked at through the medium of the imagination. {How is this the determinacy of a sensuous power?} It is a limited power {only} insofar as this act of construing on the part of the imagination becomes determined by {a supersensible act of determining, by} pure thinking. {The underlying ideal [act] does not produce the material component of what is mental or spiritual. This is something that is [already] present within the ideal act itself, which produces only the limitation of this material.} Thus we here have, in a sense, three acts: (1) When I think of myself as an absolutely self-active force or energy, what I think about is the motive power of the substance. This is the result of an absolutely pure act of thinking. (2) When I view this {absolutely} pure {an
219
(3) In this way the I, as mind, becomes something determinate-for we are not yet talking about physical force. One cannot think in a determinate manner (i.e., one cannot think of something determinate), however, without thinking of something determinable. An act of determinate thinking is never anything but a movement of transition from determinability to determinacy. (vide collegium: Logica et Metaphysica.) 15 An act of 12
"GemiithsvermOgen."
"See KRV, A249. 14 "den Stoff." "This is a reference to the "introductory" philosophy course Fichte regularly offered at Jena under the title "Logic and Metaphysics," employing as his text the first volume of Ernst Platner's Philosophischen Aplwrismen. The transcript of these lectures (from the sum-
§
1
8
433
mer semester of 1797), much of which was copied by the same student who prepared the Kollq;nachschrift of K, C. K. F. Krause, includes the following commentary on§ 145 of Platner's book, here translated in full: "/think. I am. 'Bein§' designates something stable and fixed. The being of matter in particular is so constant' that it offers resistance. Thinking is a kind of acting, and acting, as sucb, possesses no constancy, but only agility, in which nothing present at one moment is present in the next. It follows from what Platner says that I discover myself pardy as acting and pardy as existing. Simply by intuiting an instance of acting, I discover myself as acting. I also discover myself as existing, but not in this way. Everything material, everything that constrains activity, is a being. But insofar as it is an act of thinking, all ideal activity is always constrained and fixed. It is always directed at something, and the object at which it is directed is a being. Consequendy, if my act of thinking is directed at myself, then I am a being. "I am awakened to consciousness and have thought of A, B, C, D, etc. In all these thoughts I have remained the same I, the thinking subject. A certain amount of time has elapsed for me while I was thinking these thoughts, and I have always been and remained the same I throughout this time. Here, says Platner, we do indeed encounter constancy, being. But we do not have to resort to this [in order to explain the being of the 1], nor does this really explain anything. Even while I am thinking of A, I must already think of myself as existing. I am the thinking subject who is thinking of A. The act of thinking of A is one of my accidental properties, and all accidents are referred to a substance. Therefore, just as surely as I comprehend that I am thinking of A, I also comprehend myself as existing; i.e., I conceive of myself as being able to think witlwul thinking of A and as being able to feel and to will as well. I construe myself as a substa.nce. I cannot posit any determinacy whatsoever apart from determinability. I cannot posit anything particular without assuming the existence of something general, from which what is particular is supposed to have arisen. Consequendy, I cannot posit myself as determined to think of A without also thinking of myself as generally determinable. This is the act of thinking of [my own] being. Therefore, 'I am' is united with 'I think.' But the representation of a being does not arise as a consequence of combining a manifold of thinking with the identity of the same. "Thus we have now shown that the representation of a being must necessarily be present within the l's representation of itself. Therefore, what we have been talking about here is the being of the I for itself. "The concept of myself does not arise by means of abstraction, as Platner claimed. This claim has been refuted. "The concept of the being of the I does arise by means of abstraction. The concept of the I's thinking arises through a determinate aa of thinking, but the concept of the I precedes all thinking. "'I am, I think': This is supposed to be a feeling. But this 'I am, I think,' as a whole, 17 is not a feeling; it is a thought. It is a feeling only insofar as I discover myself to be limited. I can indeed say, 'I feel myself to be limited.' But I cannot say, 'I have a feeling of myself as such or in general.' Instead, I have to say, 'I intuit myself as such'-and indeed, intellectually. "We have already explained the general nature of intuition: I look at something, and [at the same time] I produce something by means of the power of imagination. This, however, is possible only in cases where absolute opposites are present. The intuition of the I is something entirely different, which consists in my knowledge of my own acting. I have knowledge of my own acting because I myself accomplish it, and I discover myself therein. "Many objections have been raised against this intellectual intuition, and this is surely because Kant expressly denies intellectual intuition. But by 'intellectual intuition' Kant means something entirely different than we do. What he calls intellectual intuition is something that cannot even be thought of: one is supposed to look at something, as in the case of sensible intuition, and yet one is supposed to intuit it in such a way that it thereby comes into being 'in itself.' God-if we could think of God-would possess intellectual intuition of the sort described by Kant. His thinking would be an act of objective creation, a creation of the thing in itself. This is why we cannot think of what Kant describes: because
§ I8
:20
435
thing given. In addition, this same determinacy is supposed to be a limitation of freedom as such; and insofar as it is such a limitation, freedom has to remain. To say that freedom is limited {as freedom} can never mean that freedom can extend only so far and no further; for if this 'were true, then freedom would not be limited as freedom, {but would instead possess its own limits and end, and} there would exist {nothing more than} a specific quantum of freedom. But we explicitly asserted that the determinacy in question is supposed to constitute a limitation of freedom as such; freedom must also {be able to} extend even beyond this limitation, which must not be a purely mechanical limitation of [my]_ force.E Thus, the limitation in question must be such that, though freedom could indeed extend itself further, it does not do so; and the reason it does not do so lies within freedom itself. {It possesses the ground of its limitation within itself; it is limited by itself.} We obtain this concept through the process of assembling it in this manner. A limitation that arises out of freedom is and must be a self-limitation, {and this is what must provide the limitation of freedom as such}. Nevertheless, this limitation is also supposed to be something in itself, {though not anything "objective," a "being"; instead, it is supposed to be} a necessary act of thinking {of a self-limitation}. Therefore, the limit in question (i.e., the one that would come into being {through the determinacy of freedom,} by means of the act of determining what is ideal) would be a necessary act of thinking of a self-limitation. Such a limitation, however, is an "ought," 19 whereas, in contrast, the determinacy of being is a "must." If one thinks [merely] of the fact that this "ought" is something given, 20 then it does not appear to us to be something that we ourselves have produced and whose ground lies within us; instead, it simply is what it is and is present for us because we are compelled to think of it. Nevertheless, this is a determinacy of freedom, a determinacy 21 one does not discover, as one does in the case of real, sensuous thinking. This is a determinacy that one ought to produce; but that one ought to do this is itself something one discovers. Accordingly, this is a task that necessarily has to be thought of, {an Idea}. And it is precisely the essence of an Idea that one {produces nothing by means of it, but} can only construct a rule in accordance with which the Idea in question-the Idea of infinite space, for example-is supposed to come into being, {if it could be brought into being. This task, however, is not one that is left to our own free choice, and it does not depend upon whether we want to impose it E A limitation of freedom as such could be understood only as follows: Freedom would not be thought of as unable to extend itself any further; instead, it would be thought of as quite able to go further, though-since it is freedom-it is not required to do so (p. 239). 19 "ein Sol/en." 20 "man denke an den Charakter des gegebenseins." 21 Reading, with H, "Bestimmtheit" forK's "Best[immung]" ("determination").
434
§ 18
empirical thinking is always an act of making a selection 18 from something determinable. Consequently, something determinable necessarily has to be conjoined with this determinate [state] of myself, as a mind. This is how our synthesis expands. • In passing, {a mme precise determination of the point we have now reached}: A complete synthesis consists of five elements, and we have only three: {the midpoint,} A { = the absolute I} and, on either side thereof, 13 ( = an act of pure thinking, {the act of thinking of my act of determining, of my concept of a goal, of my act of willing}) and b ( = an act of real thinking, {my efficacious acting and the product resulting from the same}). An additional, extreme element must now be added to each side of this synthesis. I am presently within the domain of 13- Here we will necessarily have to begin with something determinable, and then the last element will be attached. We will be unable to become acquainted with what is determinable in this case, however, until we have first become even better acquainted with the determinacy in question, understood as a limitation of a power. • We have now arrived at an important point, one that is easy to understand but difficult to expound. Let us begin by examining more closely our own determinacy qua mind or spirit. What is here to be determined is freedom, pure activity as such. As a consequence of the determination of freedom, there arises for us the following concept: I myself am the free [being] in question, and the determinacy present here is a limitation of myself. Consequently, this is a determinacy that lies outside of me and appears to lie outside of me, {as something not produced by me. Thus it obtains the character of "reality" or objectivity." It becomes a determinacy that appears to exist} without any free contri- (2391 bution on my part, because it is precisely a limitation of my freedom. Consequently, this determinacy would be something "in itself," some-
I I
we cannot think of God and cannot think of the thing in itself. "For us, intellectual intuition is the immediate consciousness of acting. Of course, Kant cannot have anticipated that anyone would employ this term in this way [i.e., to designate our immediate consciousness of our own acting), since his entire philosophy contains nothing on this subject. Everyone can immediately decide for himself whether this immediate act of intuiting one's own acting is something merely fabricated or is, instead, something real; for no one can take a single step without becoming conscious of his own acting. One knows this because one does it. This is intellectual intuition, and it is in this way that I become conscious of myself as a free intellectual being. Doing and knowing are here immediately connected with each other. This intellectual intuition is the foundation of all the rest of my consciousness. "If I had not grasped myself as such or in a general way, then neither could I ever know that I am and remain the same when I entertain different representations. Consequently, my consciousness of the identity of my own I is itself something conditioned. It is conditioned by the fact that an overall consciousness of the I as such comes into being in the manner indicated: insofar as I think, I am." (AA IV, 1: 222-24). 16 "beharrlich." 17 "aber das alles." 18 Reading, with Krause's MS, "ein Herausgr[eifen)" for K's "ein Herausgehen."
upon ourselves or not. 22 We must necessarily impose this task upon ourselves, just as surely as we discover ourselves to be rational beings at all. Thus we have here: (A) Something discovered or given: a task that imposes itself upon us. (B) A determination of freedom as such, which is a determination [only] insofar as one imposes it upon oneself and which we, as rational beings, must impose upon ourselves. (This is the foundation of the entire [System oj] Ethical Theory; accordingly, this same material is there dealt with in a more extensive manner.) 23 }. Thus this "ought" is something that is, as it were, given to us; it is a task that imposes itself. Second, it is a task only insofar as we freely impose it upon ourselves. • Result: I discover myself to be neither limited nor unlimited, but simply free-which is to say, I discover myself to be infinitely selfdeterminable, and, through this {predicate}, all being, {all subsistence, (2 every sort of fixed being,} is completely excluded and nothing remains but the task of limiting oneself in the course of one's own development. F {It is a fundamental principle of the Wissenschaftslehre that all being is something produced or created and that the intelligible foundation that underlies being is not any sort of being, but is pure activity. The Deity 24 is the same sort of pure activity as the intellect, except that the Deity is something that cannot be comprehended. The intellect, on the other hand, is something determinate; it is a concept, and only in this way is self-consciousness possible. But how does this absolutely nonsensible something become a concept? This occurs insofar as I am limited-not limited in the way a being is limited, but only in the sense that I have the task of limiting myself in a certain way.} This task of limiting myself is what makes it possible for me to become a concept for myself and to grasp myself. We were here investigating determinacy merely in order to be able to understand determinability. What then is the determinability in question? {What is determinable as this determinacy [that is present in an act of self-limitation]?} I.e., how does one advance from the act of thinking of determinacy to that of thinking of determinability? From what do I select myself? The determinate I is a pure mind or spirit; therefore, what is determinable in this case is also something of a "mental" or "spiritual" character, 25 i.e., a world of rational beings outside of me. Consequently, 22 "Aber diese Aufgabe isl nichl unsrer Willkiihr iiberlajkn, ob wir sie uns auflegen wollen oder nicht." 2 s See Da.s System tier SiUenlehre, chap. I, "Deduction of the Principle of Morality" (SW, IV: 13-62). FAll thai remains is the task of limiting oneself in the employment of one's own freedom (p. 240). 21 "Die Gottheit." 20 "also auch das Bestimmbare ist Geistigkeit."
§ 18
4Q
437
I myself, as an individual, originate in a genetic fashion. I produce 26 myself as an individual by selecting myself from the {mass of what is determinable, that is, from the} kingdom of rational beings. fl;be "pure I" of the published Wissenschaftslehre is to be understood as reason as such or in general, which is something quite different from personal I-hood.} What is the origin of pure, unlimited 1-hood, and what is the origin of empirical I-hood? The Iauer concept is generated by an act of selecting-just like the concept of this stove. The difference is that the concept of myself as an individual is selected from the sphere of all rational beings. G {From what has been said so far,} it must now 27 be (241-) dear that: {(A) No self-consciousness is possible apart from a consciousness of individuality. (B)} The "ought," or the categorical imperative, is also a theoretical principle. What forces us to assume the existence of rational beings similar to but outside of ourselves? {Whenever we think of something determinate we must also think of something determinable. We are thereby driven to the assumption that there is a world of rational beings outside of ourselves. "I am a person"; this means that I am limited. This limitation is a duty, and individuality consists in being limited in consequence of duty. We have established the principle that self-consciousness arises through the unification of ideal and real thinking, for the I itself first comes into being by means of this unification. These two types of thinking are united in a single act of thinking; therefore, each of them must be determined by the other. A subject, or an individual, is produced when an act of ideal thinking is determined by an act of real thinking.} (4) {Until now, we have related the act of real thinking to the ideal one.} We will now relate the act of ideal thinking to the real one. Determinacy or fixedness 28 is the chief characteristic of what is real-both as an act of thinking and as the subject that comes into being thereby. H When we think of something real our thinking comes, so to speak, to a halt and is no longer in motion, as in the case of an act of ideal thinking. What then is thought of in such an act of real thinking? [Answer: the object of real 26
Reading, with H, "erzeuge" forK's "erzeige" ("come to see"). The relationship between these two concepu (the concept of reason in general and that of individuality) is derived entirely from 1he fact that the concept of the individual is produced by an acl of selec1ing from the mass of the manifold (pp. 24<>-41 ). 27 Reading "nun" for K's "nur" ("'only"). G
28
"fixirtsein."
"In this context, we must constantly bear in mind the character of "real thinking," which consists in determinate fixedness-{and this applies to both] thinking as a subjeclive determinacy and the act of thinking of an object, by means of which a real thing arises (p..
~41).
thinking is,] {according to what was said above,} the productive imagination; moreover, since this is where determinacy enters the picture, [the object of real thinking is] the imagination in the very act of producing something. {Consequently, the imagination is present not as a productive process, but rather as a product, 29 which the philosopher observes from a higher standpoint.} What is thought of in an act of real thinking is thus a product of the imagination, but what is this? The imagination synthesizes [i.e., synthetically unifies] an infinitely divisible manifold; but this manifold is here something stable,~ 0 since it is an object of real activity. For this reason, what we observe is not this manifold itself, but rather the single, unified thint• {that the imagination has synthesized from the infinite manifold}. This {single, unified thing} we observe is {not infinitely divided; instead, it is merely} something that is infinitely divisible: divisible stuff, matter in space. It is precisely by means of this act of unifying the manifold and directing our attention entirely to the unification itself that this manifold becomes transformed into matter. {This is the act of real thinking} to which ideal thinking now becomes related. {The act of real thinking is viewed through the medium of the act of ideal thinking,} and this has an effect upon real thinking, which preserves within itself the imprint of ideal thinking. {These two acts of thinking are inseparably united with each other;} that is to (24 · say, in the very state in which I think in a determinate manner, I also think in a free and spiritual manner, 32 and consequently, this freedom must also exercise some influence upon my determinate thinking and must leave some trace of itself there. What then is this {trace? What is this} product of ideal thinking which is present within what is determinate? This product is nothing other than ideal thinking itself; thus what is {real and} determinate must nevertheless contain within itself an act of self-determining, selfhood, and freedom. • What is real is inert, dead matter, 33 but this is thought of by a freely active being and is a particular determination of the same; consequent1y, it must surely bear within itself some imprint of this free being, and only thereby can what is real become an object for a free being. {This imprint can be nothing but freedom or selfhood. This, however, makes no sense, for matter possesses neither activity nor freedom. Its very essence consists in the determinacy of a mere being. Its} absoluteness cannot be the absoluteness of acting; it can only be the absoluteness of a being, of a being that is what it is by virtue of its very nature, i.e., through its own determinacy. {Insofar as selfhood and freedom are related to this stuff,} matter becomes something {subsisting} in itself.and through itself, a self29
"so k.omt nicht die Einbildungshaft als PRODUCIIU:ND sonde~n als PRODUCT vo~." "etwas stehendes." .!ll "'die eine." 2 g "in demselben Zustande nehmlich da ich bestimmt denke denke ich zugleich geistig und frei." gg "ist liegende todte Mate~ie." go
§ !8
22
439
sufficient, {objective} thing. Whereas matter was previously something I merely entertained the thought of, 34 it [now] becomes for me something given, an object that is present without any help whatsoever from me. {The act of thinking of such an object is a determinacy of myself; but,} since I am nothing but what is free, all limitation lies outside of me, {and it [what limits me] therefore appears to me to be something produced by and through itself}. What limits [me] is now supposed to be something that, by itself, is what it is. Here, as in the case of the necessary task {discussed above}, something is present without any assistance from us. I {as an individual} select myself from a mass of what is determinable; I ' cannot go beyond the boundary of what is limited. {As a determinate individual, I enter the sphere of what is determinable, which thus appears to me to be something that limits me, something that is external to me. Now we can apply here something that was said above:} there is {within consciousness} something that is highest and something that is lowest. {I myself, as an individual determined by my duty, am what is highest; and} what is determinable for spiritual or mental activity, {[i.e.,] what is determinable as an individual,} is the realm of reason. 1 As for what is lowest: I {also} view myself as something real, something that has been made sensible; and the bottom-most sensibilization is my own product {in the sensible world}, and, in addition to this, there is also something determinable outside of me, namely, matter. But from where does this matter come? Does it perhaps come from me myself? Does it simply not occur to me that I myself have also produced matter? No, {at the point where we now find ourselves, matter is not my product, for here I have simply conferred self-sufficiency upon something that previously merely hovered before me}. Insofar as I, {as a self-sufficient being,} think of matter, I must necessarily transfer [my own] selfsufficiency to it; it becomes a being in and for itself, one that subsists on its own. {Both the product of the ideal activity and the product of the real activity exist without any help from us.} The difference between them is as follows: {The product of the ideal activity is a concept (the ethical law), whereas the product of the real activity is a material thing.} By means of the act we have now described, the thing becomes a noumenon, i.e., something produced by an act of free thinking. This very act of absolute thinking is an act of sheer thinking, 35 one that extends throughout our entire consciousness. It is present in {every act of imagining and in} all empirical experience and confers internal solidity upon (2 everything produced by the imagination} ,.. "da es vorher blofl ein mir vorschwebendes war." More literally: "Whereas it previously was simply something that hovered before me." 1 [ ••• 1 is the realm of rational beings (p. 242). 35 "eben das absolute Denken ist ein sich Denken." 1 [ ... 1 and provides everything produced by the imagination with an inner "stuff' or matter (p. 243).
440
223
§ !8
• Kant says that we supply appearance with an underlying substrate and that this is a noumenon. 36 {This is quite correct; because Kant did not describe this synthesis of ideal and real [thinking],} however, this assertion has occasioned much misunderstanding. The product of the imagination and the object of real thinking, 37 the appearance and what appears, are one and the same thing. These are one and the same within actual consciousness and are distinguished from each other only within philosophy. A noumenon lies at the foundation of appearance. More precisely, {it would be better to say that} the entire world is both an appearance and a noumenon. The world is a product of my mind as a whole, which includes both pure thinking and contemplating.38 In actual consciousness, these are treated as a single whole. The noumenon and the appearance are one and the same thing, merely viewed from two different sides in consequence of the necessary duality of the mind.K {I contemplate my own pure thinking as an appearance, 39 and this furnishes me with the world.} The Not-I becomes a substance through this act of pure thinking, but not in the same way that the I became a substance above . In the case of the I, all that was introduced was a limitation; the material was already present, and this manifold that was already present was then limited by an act of real thinking. {I observed my own act of self-determining through the medium of the infinite manifold , and in this way the manifold became a unified and limited whole . Hence what is real came first, and the limitation was thought of subsequently.} Here, {where the Not-I becomes a substance,} in contrast, what is already present is the limitation, and what is introduced in this case is simply what {is supposed to} subsist on its own. {A manifold is already present, and I perceive this manifold only through the medium of a concept of a goal. The manifold here becomes something determinate for me, and I thereby catch sight of an object. This object is, in a certain respect, something that exists by itself, and this "being for itself' is produced by the indicated act of thinking.} • In the deduction [of the productive imagination in the previous § ] consciousness begins with my consciousness of something infinite, and I become a finite being for myself only because I am unable to grasp this infinitude and only insofar as the finitude of empirical thinking is connected with this infinite intuition. Conversely, consciousness of the world begins not with infinitude, but rather with finitude. I become conscious See KRV, A182/B224ff. and A251-52 . Reading, with H, "das Obj. des realen denkens" forK's "das Prod[uct] des reinen Denkens" ("the product of pure thinking"). 38 "dieser ist reines Den ken und Hinschauen." K The world is a product of my mind as a whole, which consists in pure thinking. Pure thinking and the world are one and the same, simply viewed through the duality of a finite nature (p. 243). ' 9 "Mein reines Denken hingeschaut ist Erscheinung." 36
37
§ 18
441
of myself as a whole; however, I do not become conscious of the world as a whole, but only of individual objects. What I grasp [in this case] is my own limitation; only through the IdeaL does {this world becomes a (244) whole,} which possesses absoluteness within itself. In ordinary consciousness one indeed discovers oneself as a whole, but one does not discover the world as a whole. The concept of the universe is assembled only gradually, {and the "absolute" character of the same is introduced into it}. The I comes into being as a substance when an act of ideal thinking is limited; therefore, the essence of the I consists purely in activity. In contrast, the Not-I comes into being {as a sensible determinacy, as a thing,} when an act of real thinking is {idealized and} assimilated by the mind, 40 and thus the Not-I is a being whose essence consists purely in passivity. M (5) All this will become clearer if we think of each of these acts as limited, [and then] unite the ideal act [of thinking] of what is determinate with the determinate act [of thinking] of what is ideal. {But each of these acts of thinking is a synthesis;} accordingly, {we will be} uniting syntheses {with syntheses. (At present, we will be synthesizing the previously described X andY.)} Our plan is simple: It is quite obvious that these acts of thinking constitute but a single act of thinking, one that occurs in a single moment, and hence they must certainly be united. We have already seen what arises from this unity [of ideal and real thinking]: {this is precisely what constitutes I-hood}. The {act of thinking} just indicated is nothing but [a synthesis of] a particular, determinate act of ideal thinking and a particular, determinate act of real thinking. These two acts are {therefore} also inseparable. The I comes into being through the determinacy of ideal thinking. {The Not-I comes into being when the real or determinate [act of thinking] is idealized and determined.} I observe the I by means of the thing and the thing by means of the I. The former occurs insofar as I am able, in intuiting the object, to make freedom, {which characterizes the I,} into something real. 41 The latter occurs only insofar as I make my concept of a goal into something real.N {I cannot act without positing something as the object of my acting; nor can I posit such an object unless I act. This is a relationship of reciprocal interaction, as is the relationship between the I and the Not-1. only through me [ ... ] (p. 244). "vergeistert wird": "is made spiritual." Cp. ''versinnlicht'': "sensibilized." M It is in consequence of this that the world consists of being, of passivity (p. 244). 41 "in wie fern ich die Freiheit in der Anschauung des Objects realisiren kann." N Therefore, the former [the I] arises when I view what is ideal through the medium of the thing and insofar as I can, in the intuition of an object, make the freedom that characterizes the I into something real. The latter [the Not-1] arises when I view the thing through the medium of what is ideal, insofar as I make a concept of a goal into something real (p. 244). L [ ••• ] 40
442
224
§
.s
There is no I apart from a Not-1 and no Not-1 apart from an I.} I do not exist without a world, and my world does not exist without me. Our present task is further to characterize in a certain {dual} manner both the I and the world in terms of their reciprocal relation to-and inseparability from-each other. The42 Not-1 {is further determined} through {its reciprocal interaction with} the I. As we saw above, 43 the I is extended through time, because its acting possesses temporal duration. {And since the I never discovers itself except as acting, it must always think of some time in conjunction with itself.} The I exists at every time that one can think of. Time and the efficacious action of freedom exist only through each other. {We have now said that the I cannot be thought of apart from the (245) ' Not-1; consequently,} just as surely as the I itself is extended over time, the Not-1, considered as something subsisting for itself, is thought of along with the I. Thus the Not-I, considered as a thing, as a noumenon, also occurs within time along with the I; and it [too] appears to be something that exists at every time, for the I is always accompanied by the Not-1. The determinations the Not-1 obtains from the l's freedom, i.e., the accidents of the Not-1, are transformed into temporal relations by the freedom of the I, which is related to them. (We are not yet talking about the organization of nature.) 0 • 44 {We said above that time cannot be explained on the basis of the concept of causality, because} cause and effect are {absolutely} simultaneous. No time originates through the concept of causality; therefore, no time '' originates within nature. P Time originates solely within the I, in the concept of substantiality that is applied to the I when the I employs its power of imagination to run through the various possibilities of action. Insofar as the object is simply an object for the acting I, the object is extended over time along with the I itse]f.Q At the same time, this furnishes the determinability of the object for the efficacy of the I, and this fills the gap to which we have already called attention {at the beginning of this §}. That is, we could not infer [the existence of] anything unless it were a product of the I's efficacy. Within experience, R however, something else is present, a second sort of thing: that upon which we act when we engage in productive activity. {We have here indicated what sort of thing this is;} it is the Not-1, considered as a noumenon, along 42 In K, but not in H, this paragraph is labeled ''(A)," a heading that is here omitted, since this section includes no paragraphs "(B)," etc. 43 See above, § 12, sect. 3· 0 (Here we are not discussing the se]f..development of nature) (p. 245). 44 This topic is discussed in § 19. P Therefore, no time can originate by means of the concept of causality, and nature does not originate within any time (p. 245). Q The thing is extended over time only because the I posits itself within time (p. 245). R Within ordinary consciousness [ ... ] (p. 245).
;,,
§ !8
225
443
with the appearance that is inseparable from this noumenon. This Not-I is present at all times; it is something that is simply given {to us} and is present without any assistance from us. Our efficacy is directed at this Not-I, and this alters the appearance; yet this occurs in such a way that what is permanent therein, which is the objectification of our own selfsufficiency, always remains 45 • 5 {unchanged}, because our own selfsufficiency is {constantly} objectified {in the manner indicated}. • This {(that is, how this occurs)} is something that cannot be grasped conceptually. 46 When I act efficaciously, I certainly alter the entire thing [upon which I act], for the thing in question is always a progression from opposed states to opposed states. And yet this same thing is supposed to remain {the same} forever. Nothing endures but the act of thinking of the thing, {along with what arises from my act of thinking of it, namely,} the noumenon. The identity of consciousness depends upon this. • The indivisible union of the noumenon and the phenomenon can best be explained with reference to the thing, considered as something determinable, something that is supposed to be given to us before we can have any effect upon it. This determinable thing is not formless; instead, it always appears to us to possess some shape or form. 47 The selfsupported subsistence, 48 by means of which it first becomes a thing, is present only as a result of thinking. The form, on the other hand, is produced by the imagination.T This form, however, is nothing but the muddled presentation of all the various possibilities for acting which are expressed in the thing, that is, a muddled presentation of all that I could make from it. 0 [If] I now begin to act upon this thing and alter its form completely, what is it that endures throughout the time I am acting upon this thing, {from the time when I begin to act upon it to the point when my acting is finished}? All that endures is my own thinking, along with the muddled presentation of all the things I could do-though I 45 "so da~ das Dauernde de~lben immer bleibe, an dem unsre eigene Selbstandigkeit ob4ectivisirt wird." This [i.e., the Not-I qua noumenon and appearance] is given to us at all times and is present without any assistance from us. Our efficacy is directed at this Not-I, and in such a way that what is posited remains unchanged, because our own self-sufficiency is always obiectified in the manner indicated (p. 245). 6 "Unbegreiflich ists." 47 Reading, with Krause's MS, "immer als gestaltetes" for K's "nur als gestaltlos." 48 "das Bestehen durch sich selbst." T The determinable something that is supposed to be given and upon which I have not yet exercised any effect is not something formal, something lacking content. 49 Instead, it appears to have some form, to subsist on its own, and it is also by virtue of this that it actually becomes a thing. Insofar as the thing obtains self-sufficiency by means of my thinking, it is a noumenon; insofar as it obtains its form from the imagination and not from thinking, however, it is a phenomenon (p. 245). 49 "ist nichts formales, nicht ohne Sto~." Reading "StoEP' for H's "StoW' ("impact"). u It is the union of the muddled possibilities of action to which I can determine myself (p. 245>·
444
§
1
8
never actually do more than one of these things.v (Example: a tree from which one can cut one piece after another, etc. This example applies only to the efficacy that is present in thoughts.) This is why Fichte has said elsewhere, {in the journal;~ 0} that the substance is the same as {all} the accidents, considered in [their] union with one another. {This constitutes the material of substance;} its form is the unifying act of thinking;~• and this is the ideal act of thinking of the act of determining. In relation to our own possible efficacy, every thing is nothing but a reestablishment of the quantum of this efficacy:~ 2 {It is a thing [only] insofar as I, a subject who possesses self-sufficiency, posit it and transfer thereto [my own] possibilities of action.} • Our task is completed. We had to establish the act of ideal thinking and the act of real thinking as themselves forming a complete synthesis, and this has been done. {The parts of the synthesis, which we previously labeled 13, y, b, and g, are united and determined through one another.} We have indicated what is determinable in each [series, that is, y = what is determinable in the ideal series, and g = what is determinable in the real series], and each of these elements is determined by another. l3 ( = my own determinacy) is united with y ( = the realm of rational beings as such). Moreover, b ( = the determinacy of my efficacious acting, considered as a sensuous act) is united with g 53 ( = the object at which {the determinacy of} this efficacious acting is directed). All these elements are now united with one another, inasmuch as, since54 I am partially an individual and partially a [pure] mind, I am unable to observe myself without also observing a thing-which, when it is adjacent to me, is my own product and, when it is distant from me, is an object (matter). {An object that subsists on its own arises because I am unable to think of my own identity as an active intellect without [also thinking of] a thing, which, in the process of sensibilization, I make into a product of my own v [ , . , ] along with the muddled presentation of all the things I can do, and, in particular, of the one thing I actually do (p. 246). 50 This appears to be a reference to the following passage in the essay "On the Capacity for Language and the Origin of the Same" ("Von der Sprachfii.higkeit und dem U rsprung der Sprache"), which Fichte published in 1795 in the Philosophischesjaurnal einer Gmll.Jch.aft Teutscher Gekhrten: "I explain the concept of substance transcendentally, not through its pn-manmce, but rather through the ~tic unification of all it.s accideni.J" (SW, VIII: 320). "' Reading, with H, "das vereinigende Denken" forK's "das vereinigte, Denken" ("what is unified, the act of thinking"), 52 Reading, with H, 'Jedes Ding ist, bezogen auf die mogliche Wirksamkeit nichts anders als Wiederherstellung des QUANTUMS von Wirksamkeit" for K's 'Jedes Ding ist bezogen auf unsre mogliche Wiirksamkeit und auf nichts anderes als die Wiederherstellung des QuANTUM dieser Wiirksamkeit" ("every thing is related to our possible efficacy and to nothing else than the reestablishment of the quantum of the same"), The emended version, however, retains K's reference to "our own possible efficacy." ''Following the notation introduced in § 17, as well as the text of H, "g" has here been substituted forK's "c." 54 Reading, with R.adrizzani, "[dadurch] dajr' for K's "dajJ."
§
,s
445
physical efficacy.} Conversely, I cannot observe a thing without also observing myself.
§ 18
u6
Since the I, when engaged in the act of intuiting its own act of pure thinking, is at the same time determinate, this same pure act of thinking (that is to say, the I as a product of this act of thinking, the I as a free being) necessarily becomes something determinate for the I. But a free being, as such, can be determined only by the task of freely determining itself. When the I thinks of this, it proceeds from a general sphere of freedom as such (as what is determinable) to itself (as what is determinate within this sphere) and thereby posits itself as an individual, in opposition to a {realm ot} reason and freedom outside of itself. In this determinate act of thinking, the I is at the same time free, and it thinks of what is determinate only insofar as it does so with freedom; consequently, it also confers freedom upon what is determinate. But freedom within mere determinacy (as in nature) is independent being. 5 5 In this manner, a being that is independent of the I is attributed to the Not-I, which first becomes a thing thereby. Insofar as the Not-I possesses this type of being, it is what endures and is determinable throughout all the different determinations it receives through the freedom of the I. The act of thinking of the I as a free but limited being and that of thinking of the Not-I as a self-subsisting thin~ mutually condition each other. The I intuits its own freedom only in the objects of its acting, and it intuits these objects only insofar as it freely acts upon them. SS "1ST SEYN DURCH SICH SELBST." 56
More literally: "being [generated] through itself."
"ALS FUR SICH BESTEHENDEN DtNGJ!.S."
226
227
§ 19
On either extreme of the synthesis that comprises our deduction (as well as comprising consciousness in its entirety) there lies something that is ultimately and supremely determinable. We have connected one such element to each side of our primary synthesis, which is therefore exhausted. At one extreme there lies the world of rational beings, {from which I select myself as an individual}; at the other, the world of sensible objects, A {within which I express myself as an individual. Both are instances of determinability. The former is determinable as I-hood; the latter is determinable as an object.} Moreover, since this primary synthesis is supposed to be a single, unified {whole}, we can foresee that each of these extreme, determinable elements will be determined by the other. In the middle we find A, on one side of which we find ~ and y, and on the other, b and g. This whole synthesis looks like a framework or a series; but consciousness resembles a circle; 8 thus {what is determinable within the ideal series,} y, and {what is determinable within the real series,} g, must mesh with and be determined by each other, for only in this way can we close our circle and {completely} finish our task. Each of these determinable elements must mesh with the other; more precisely, each must be determined by the other, {and this will be the subject of our present inquiry}. We would go astray, however, if we were to proceed diA Previously, we had only three of the elements involved in our fivefold synthesis; therefore, if this synthesis was to comprise all consciousness, we had to attach on either side of the synthesis something that is ultimately and supremely determinable. We have discovered these determinable elements, and now our synthesis is complete. What is determinable as the ideal series contained within this primary synthesis is the realm of rational beings, from which l select myself as an individual. What is determinable within the real series is the sensible world, within which l express myself as an individual (p. 247). 8 Since the primary synthesis is supposed to be a single whole, each of the determinable elements on either end must also be determined by the other. Otherwise our synthesis, and along with it, our consciousness as a whole, would resemble a series or a framework. But this is not what it is; consciousness is not a series; it is a circle (p. 247).
z28
§ 19
447
rectly to a consideration of this [mutual] determination; instead, we must commence our investigation at a {somewhat} deeper level. This is why we 1 return within the primary synthesis to a consideration of the I presented in the previous §, {which is the central point} to which all the various elements of this investigation are to be connected. ( 1) The I itself, as an individual, discovers itself to be determined by a task that it absolutely has to think of, namely, the task of determining itself. {And this is the only way it can discover itself, since the I is free, and since for freedom there are no limits; there is merely the task of limiting itself.} As we noted above, this is what Kant called the "categorical imperative." 2 Freedom is not limited in the same way that being is limited. Freedom must include its own limitation; it must limit itself. Even this determinacy of the I can be looked at from two different sides. (A) Actively, subjectively, and idealiter, it can be looked at as a necessary act of determining. {Only} then is this ought an "ought," that is, a concept that necessarily {has to be thought of}. (B) Objectively {and realitn-}, it can be looked at as something determinate, in which case the determinacy becomes enduring, a state. It becomes the character (the fundamental character)11 and essence of this I. This sort of duality prevails everywhere, even here, within the highest [element of our synthesis]. The act of determining and what is determined, acting and an action: these are simply two aspects of one and the same thing. Here we have {no action, but} only the task of performing some action; one can think of the necessity {of this task}, however, only (248) as a being, as a determinacy. This is contained in the twofold aspect [of the same]. This {twofold} aspect {of the task of limiting oneself} is present from the start and is a necessary consequence of the original duality of the I. We are familiar with the kind of determinacy that is here involved: it is {the determinacy in relation to which what is determinable is the realm of rationaJ beings; it is individuality,} the determinacy of the individual, the act of positing myself as one individual among many. This act of positing myself as an individual is connected with an act of positing other individuals. We are no longer concerned here, {however,} with a mere act of thinking {of this act of positing}; instead, we are now dealing with the perceptibility 4 {of the same}. • As we explained above, one must carefully distinguish between intuiting and pure thinking. {We have done this, and in doing so we found that the act by virtue of which I am present for myself is nothing but an 1
Reading, with H, "wir" forK's "Fichte." See the second remark to§ 13, secL 7· ' "Grundcharakter." These words in parentheses appear as a marginal note in K. • "WahreehmbarkeiL" 2
act of thinking, through which my own efficacious force is thought of within the manifold. When I think of myself as acting efficaciously, I perceive nothing more than that an object in the sensible world is in a certain state, and then (in this context [the context of my efficacious acting]) another state ensues. In such a case, however, I do not say, "There is, within the world, a succession of opposed determinations," but rather, "I am the cause of this succession; the reason for this alteration of states lies within me." Here I do not first think of the state [of the object] and then of myself; instead, I think something-namely, myself-into what is posited in opposition.} • To be sure, I am nothing but a product of my own pure thinking, and it has now been asserted that I select myself from a {mass of} reason {and freedom} outside of me; thus it would appear as if this freedom outside of me were merely something thought of by me. This, however, is not the case. {Here we are not concerned with an act of thinking of the latter;} instead, we are talking about a perception of freedom and rationality outside of me, and this has to be deduced. It is indeed true that a rational being5 outside of us is only a noumenon, {something thought of by us. Yet this is something I must only infer from the phenomena.} Even though I consider everyone to be rational and free, no one demands that I hear or see his rationality; no one demands that I should perceive his freedom and rationality through any of my external senses. On the other hand, one certainly does demand that I infer this from certain phenomena. [In order for this to be possible,] however, the sensible world must include certain unique appearances to which we are required to transfer the thought of rationality 6 -and to which alone it is possible for us to transfer this thought. Such appearances would have to be connected with the act of pure thinking discussed above. Our intention here is to deduce these appearances [of reason and freedom].c (2) The task, therefore, is to describe the act of positing this determi-
nacy, or the act of thinking which is involved in positing oneself as an individual-which is perception and which refers to a perception outside of us. To be sure, it is only as a cause that we insert ourselves within the sensible world through an act of thinking, and, in this respect, other free beings are also {only thought of, only} noumena. To be sure, we think of ourselves in this way only to the extent that we portray our own determinacy 7 as something subjective and ideal; it is necessary, however, that this act of determining should also possess an aspect of objective '"die Vernunft." 6 Reading, with H, "Verniinftigkeit" for K's "Vernunft" ("reason"). c Therefore, there must first be a perception that is connected with the act of pure thinking, and this has to be deduced (p. 248). 7 Reading, with H, "Bestimmtheit" for K's "Bestimmen" ("act of determining").
2
§ 19
:29
449
determinacy, 8 and this is what constitutes perception. From this it follows that I am an individual within a realm of rationality; {consequently, (249) the awareness 9 of myself as something determinate is connected with an awareness of something determinable,} and my own act of thinking is connected with this realm of rationality. Therefore, an awareness of objects is also connected with an awareness of other free beings. 10 {We have to describe the act of positing this determinacy and the act of thinking that is involved in such positing.} In our presentation of this we will not follow the customary synthetic method, for the synthesis is already contained therein. {Here too, as has often happened in other places, we will forego a systematic presentation in the interest of clarity.} A. {According to what wa.s said 'above,} I do not appear to myself as, so to speak, an "I as such" or "in general," in opposition to {the whole of} nature; instead, I appear to myself as a {particular I, as a particular} individual, in opposition to a rational {and free} world outside of myself. This {-that is, as a particular 1-} is the only way 11 I am able to discover myself; i.e., I discover my own being-not the being of a thing, but only the determinacy of the possibilities of acting morally. {This determinacy appears} to be something that is present independently of {and prior to} my act of thinking, and not something produced thereby. As always, such an act of thinking appears to be no more than an act of copying. Unlike the sort of thinking that is involved in thinking of a concept of a goal, this act of thinking does not appear to be determined by itself or to provide a model for some product within the sensible world. I simply am what I am {and have not made myself who I am. I am an individual} without any effort on my part. This is how it appears to me and how it must appear to me. This is the determinacy we are now discussing. {It can only be thought of; it is not an object of an intuition. We claimed, however, that this determinacy is not supposed to be produced by thinking; instead,} this is a determinacy that is supposed to exist in itself, as it is. As such, it is supposed to be sheer necessity of thought; {[but] this determinacy is not supposed to be a mere product of thinking as such}. 12 Remnrk: As in every act of real thinking, I myself am limited and constrained when I think of myself in this way, but only so long as I confine "da~ dieses auch objective Ansicht der Bestimmtheit habe." "Ansicht." "eine Ansicht der Objecte (hiingt) mit der Ansicht der ahderen freien Wesen (zusammen)." I.e., we cannot "look at" or consider others as free and rational subjects without at the same time considering them to be "objects"; they possess an objective as well as a subjective "aspect." 11 Reading, with H, "nur" for K's "nun" ("now"). 12 K: "es soli blofk Denknothwendigkeit sein, als eine solche." H: "Sie soli nicht eine blofks Denkwerk als solches seyn." A simpler way of reconciling these two passages (and the one adopted by Radrizzani) would be to emend the text of K to read as follows: "it is {not} supposed to be a mere necessity of thought as such." 8
9
10
myself to my own self and to my own nature. So long as this remains true, I do not proceed beyond the boundary in question. {(The original will is [in this case] the sole object of reflection.)} The limitation in question, however, is a limitation of freedom; therefore, by employing the very freedom that is here misemployed, I can go beyond this boundary. {(For further discussion of this point, see the [System ofl Ethical Theory.) 1!l} We know that there are two different types of limitation: {1} there is the limitation that is present when, e.g., someone chains me hand and foot, {and one is limited in the use of the parts of one's body}; and {2} there is the sort of limitation that is present when, {e.g.,} someone addresses me {and I feel obliged not to use my own organ of speech}. The former is a limitation of my physical power; the latter is a limitation of my moral power. {This is expressed in the [System ofj Ethical Tlu!ory as (250 follows: I-t a physical limitation is a limitation of my power to do something else; a moral limitation is a limitation of my power to be permitted to do something else. Here we are talking about moral limitation.} It is inhumane to interrupt someone with whom one wants to have a conversation, but it is not physically impossible to do so. It is the latter sort of determinacy, viz., a moral determinacy, which concerns us here. B. To be sure, an I can discover itself only insofar as it discovers itself to be an I as such, possessing the character of the same, which is simply freedom. In other words, an I can discover itself only insofar as it discovers that it ought to act and is able to do so. Let us apply here the distinction introduced above: To say "I am limited" does not mean that I am of such and such a breadth and such and such a height; on the contrary, it means that I am limited in my ability and obligation to act, {not in my being. To say that I discover myself to be limited can mean only that l discover myself to be an I, with the character of the same.} We must provide an explication of each of the distinctive features 15 here ascribed to the character of the I: {that I discover myself to be [1] able to act and [2] obliged to act}. • To begin with, I discover that I am able to act. Considered purely as an acting subject, I have produced myself through the wiH; but I am not given to myself as an acting subject. I can discover myself, however, as a subject that ought to act.n What is the character of the act of thinking of acting? What kind of thinking is this? Acting is {already} a process of flowing forth; therefore, this act of thinking of acting is {already} an act of thinking which has been made sensible. The mere act of constructing 13
See especially§§ 7 and 8 of Das S:JSI.em der Siamkhre (SW, IV: 93-1211). See SW, IV: 230. "Merlunale." 0 I discover that I am able to act; but that I really do act is not something I discover, for I am not given to myself in this way. Insofar as I really do act, I do not discover myself; I produce myself. One should take careful note of this: My acting first follows from a determinate concept of a goaL I can discover myself only as obliged to act (p. 250). 14
15
§ 19
45 1
a concept of a goal, however, does not appear to me to be an instance of acting at all; instead, it appears to be a mere act of thinking. {And the product of my efficacy does not appear to be anything that pertains to me; instead, it appears} to be something outside of me, a thing. How are these [i.e., my concept of a goal and my efficacious act of actually realizing the same] connected with each other? They are connected through the intuition of my own acting; furthermore, according to what was said above, this {acting} must specifically occur {within} intuition, 16 because only in this way can any goal be accomplished.E • Thus I discover my own acting as something given to me, as a possible acting. Suppose that a person had not yet done anything at all (an absurd supposition, which will be posited only for a moment): yet if he should ever do something, it would therefore be postulated that he would already possess a concept of acting. For him, this concept (which he cannot have obtained from experience) would have to be an a priori one. So too in the present case: I discover myself to be a subject who is obliged to act, {an act of discovery} which already includes within itself {my own} acting. This {obligation for me to act} is quite clearly something that has been made sensible and has been constructed by combining the concept of a goal (which is not an instance of acting) with the act of {actually} realizing this goal (which is not something that is discovered). Consequently, this is something that {is assembled from both and} is, so to speak, suspended in the middle 17 between the concept of a goal and the act of realizing the same. What then do I intuit [when I intuit this obligation to act]? What I intuit in this case is something that has been made sensible by the imagination. Acting contains no enduring form, neither of the subject nor of the object. {Neither the I nor what it acts upon is at any moment the same [as it was at the previous moment]. If they are to remain the same, then one must cease to act.} The act of thinking of actingF is entirely sensible, [and thus has a determinate, enduring form,] and such an aspect [of our own acting] is inseparable from synthesis {A}, by means of which consciousness comes into being. {I discover myself to be determinate. This is what comes first.} In addition and in relation to {this} determinate acting, I must now posit something determinable, {from which this determinacy is selected}; and since what is determinate in this case is something sensible, what is determinable must be sensible as well. As we have already seen, what is 16 "Durch die Anschauung meines Handelns, die ins besondere auch drum nach dem obigen Stattfinden mufl." Without emendation in the light of H, this passage would read: "They are connected through the intuition of my own acting, which, according to what was said above, must specifically occur." E ( ... 1 because only through such an intuition can any acting arise (p. 250). 17 "in der Mitte schwebend." F Acting [ ... 1 (p. 250).
452
§
1
9
determinate 18 in this case is my own individuality, my sensuous force; therefore, what is determinable must also appear as something sensible. {Above, what was determinate was individuality, the pure "ought." Here this individuality appears in a sensibilized form.} What is my individuality? It is {nothing other than} the sensible embodiment of my {pure} "ought." 19 It is a summons to free activity, considered as a fact in the sensible world. {The pure ought was a limitation of myself through freedom. Therefore, the "ought" that has been made sensible} is the limitation of my freedom to a particular sphere; i.e., it is {what could best be called} my own "determinate determinability." {The [System of] Ethical Theory states that the object of my duties is by no means my own reason, but is reason as such or in general, external to me [as an individual]. 20 This is how the ought is viewed in its pure form. But because I view myself in a sensible form, I also view this ought in a sensible form;} consequently, the summons to an "ought" must appear as a perception. Such an Idea is wholly unique to the present system, and it represents an entirely original way of explaining [one's] efficacy within the sensible world. This is nothing but the objective, sensibilized perception of a determination of myself: the perception of myself as determined to act upon and in reciprocal interaction with other rational beings. The appearance in question is thus the following: I discover within myself that I am summoned to act freely within a determinate sphere.G The best illustration of this is provided by a question. A question contains within itself both determinacy {(to the extent that I ask precisely this question)} and determinability {(to the extent that I also could have asked some other question). So too in the case of the answer: inasmuch as I provide precisely this answer, it contains determinacy; but it also contains determinability, inasmuch as I could have given a different answer.} Here we encounter "determinate determinability," freedom in combination with a passive state of being affected. {The pure "ought," or the act of thinking of the same, is made sensible and has to be made sensible, because consciousness begins with acting, and because acting is sensible. Consequently, everything that occurs within the sphere of consciousness must be made sensible. Thus the act 18 Reading, with H, "'das Bestimmte" for K's "'das bestimmbare" ("'what is determinable"). As Radrizzani points out, either reading can be defended, since individuality, as here described, possesses both a "'determinable" and a "'determinate" aspect. 19 "'mein versinnlichtes Sollen." 20 "'die Vernunft ausser mir iiberhaupt." See SW, IV: 236. c This is the summons to express one's own freedom (an Idea quite unique to this system), and all the actual freedom and determinacy in the sensible world arises from this, as is here evident. This summons to freedom is only the sensibilized form of the summons to act upon and interact with other rational beings. Summoned by myself to engage in acting, I find myself within a determinate sphere as soon I have comprehended all that is involved in such actint 1 (p. 251). 21 "'wenn ich dieses handeln zusammen fafle."
§ 19
453
of selecting [ourselves from the manifold of reason as such] and being summoned to act freely also appears to us in this way, that is, as an act of pure thinking which has been made sensible. Thus I here encounter in a sensiblized form, namely, as the state of being summoned to limit oneself, 22 what was previously described within the context of pure thinking as the task of limiting oneself. Everything within experience is nothing but a sensible aspect of what is supersensible. What is highest (252) within our consciousness is the act of making a selection from the mass of reason. This is a pure act. But it cannot appear within consciousness in this pure form; instead, it can appear there only as state of being summoned to express one's freedom by acting. The conclusion we draw from this is as follows:} (3) It is obvious that the summons described above 211 must be explained within actual consciousness. This summons can be explained only by referring to a free acting outside of me. (To what is determinate, I attach something determinable, as well as a determining subject. As follows from the laws of thinking, this is only a single phenomenon. So too in the present case: I connect something else with this summons; this is what it means to "explain" it.)" There is a connection between the the proofs of these two assertions [(1) that the summons is something determinate, to which I connect something determinable and a determining subject; and (2) that what is determinable and determining is a free being outside of me]. Considered by itself, {as something that has been made sensible,} this summons is something determinate, even though what is given to me {thereby} is related to my own acting as something determinable. In the case of a question, for example, this question is, in relation to my answer, something determinable; yet, considered in itself, this same question is also something determinate, inasmuch as it asks just this and nothing else. 1 Accordingly, the summons occupies a middle ground and can be construed both as determinate and as determinable. {In relation to an instance of acting, the summons is something determinable; considered by itself, however, it is also something determinate.} Thus, it is something relative, {which can be located, on the one hand, within what is determinable and, on the other, within what is 22 "als ein aufgefordert seyn sich zu beschranken." "'Reading, with H, "oben" forK's "" ("completely"). "This summons must be explained within actual consciousness; within actual consciousness, however, I act in accordance with the law that states that there can be nothing determinate without something determinable. So too in the present case: In accordance with the laws of consciousness, I connect this summons with something that allows me to explain it by assuming a free acting (p. 252). 1 My question is, in relationship to the person I am questioning, something determinable; for I could have asked many questions other than the one I asked, questions that this other person could have answered. Insofar as I ask precisely this question, however, my question is determinate. The same is also true of the answer (p. 25~).
454
232
§ 19
determinate}. If we look at it as something determinate, then, {in addition to its determinacy,} something determinable must be posited as well. {This raises the following question:} What is determinable in this case, and what is the determining agency {that produces what is here determinable}? The latter is nothing but an instance of acting, since acting is all that is thought of within this state [of consciousness]. • {Result:} Consequently, as the ground of the summons that occurs within me, I necessarily think of a free acting that actually occurs outside of me. This, which is a determining subject and is also determinable, is an actual, free being outside of me. This determining subject is necessarily free, since what is discovered in this case is supposed to be an instance of acting, which can be explained only with reference to a free intellect. Ordinary human understanding immediately makes just this inference. {It says, "I am questioned; therefore, a questioner must exist."} Furthermore, it is entirely justified in saying this, for it remains within the realm of appearance, since the summons is a phenomenon. {It is not justified, however, when it wants to infer in this same manner in other cases.} Expressed in a scholastic manner: what we have here is a movement of transition from what is determinate to what is determinable,J and the determining subject who produces the movement of transition from what is determinable to what is determinate is posited in the middle. Thus, starting with this summons {to free activity}, I necessarily infer, {in accordance with the laws of thinking,} that there is a {free} intellect outside of me. The acting of this external intellect appears to me, 24 though this intellect {from which this acting proceeds} does not itself {appear to me}. This {free intellect}, therefore, is {only thought of; it is} a mere noumenon. This free intellect outside of me is {therefore} quite definitely the counterpart to myself, thou~h I arrive at this intellect by a different route (by an ascending one) 2 {than that by which I arrive at myself}. In my own case, I begin with the concept of freedom and then proceed to perform an individual free action. {[I.e.,] I proceed from myself, and only by first constructing a concept of a goal do I then descend to my own free acting.} Here, on the other hand, in the case of a {free} being outside of me, I ascend from an action that appears to the cause of the same, {that is, to a free being outside of me}--which I {do not discover but} merely infer {or think of}, and of which I cannot have any sensation. {This is the reason why I am not you and you are not/.} I am the person who immediately witnesses his own act of constructing a goal, who is a noumenon for himself, and only then proceeds to [the J [ .•• ] from determinability to determinacy [ ... ] (p. 252). 2•
Reading, with H, "erscheint mir" for K's "erscheint in mir" ("appears within me"). Reading, with H, "nur komme ich zu ihr auf einem andern Wege, (nehmlich durch Aufsteigen)" for K's "nur durch eine ganze andre Art des Aufsteigens" ("though [arrived at] through an entirely different type of ascent"). 25
§ 19
455
realm of] sensible appearance. You are the person who presents himself to me not as a noumenon, but as an appearance. I am immediately conscious of my own reason, and I do not simply infer its existence; however, I can only infer that there is another reason outside of me. K {In my own case, I proceed from my own reason [as a cause] to the effect. In the case of a rational being outside of me, I proceed from the effect to the cause, i.e., to the [external] reason. In the latter case, the efficaciously acting subject is only inferred.} The necessity of this inference lies in the movement of transition from what is determinate to what is determinable.L Remark: The acting of a free being outside of me, whose existence I infer in the manner just indicated, is related to the acting that is attributed to me in the same way that a path that has been begun is related to the continuation of the same. What is given to me {through the summons} is a series of elements through which some goal is conditioned, and I am supposed to complete this series. M Accordingly, all acting on the part of a free being is, first of all, a movement through infinitely many intermediate elements, which are {united and} grasped only by the imagination, {since the movement through [these elements] can be thought of only by virtue of the imagination} (as in the case of movement through infinitely many points {contained in a line}). "Someone summons me": this means that I am supposed to attach something to a given series of acting. The other person initiates [this series] and proceeds to a certain point, and this is the point where I have to begin. {He posits me within a manifold series, so that I can complete an acting he has begun. He has carried this acting from point A to point B or C, and he summons me only to carry it to its conclusion.} Here are present infinitely many different possibilities of acting, which are combined only by the imagination. N • {Furthermore:} The acting of several rational beings {in the sensible world} constitutes one single, {large} chain, which is determined by freedom. There is but one single act of reason as a whole. 26 One individual makes a start, another individual joins in, and so on, etc. In this way, K I am the person who is immediately a noumenon for himself and then acts in a manner that becomes sensible. You are the person who does not immediately present himself to me as a noumenon; instead, you reveal yourself to me only in an appearance, from which I first infer the existence of a noumenon. It is only by means of an inference that I come to think of you (p. 253). L The necessity of think.ing in this way lies in the movement of transition from determinability to determinacy (p. 253). M Through the summons, I am given a series of elements through which the goal is posited-a series to which I am supposed to add the still-missing I. This is how the acting of a free being outside of me is always related to the acting ascribed to me (p. 253). N An infinite manifold of acting is contained herein. How can this be thought of? It can be thought of only by means of the imagination, which combines things that are infinitely diverse and opposed to one another (p. 253). 26 "die ganze Vernunft hat nur ein einziges Handeln."'
2 33
infinitely many individuals work toward the overall goal of reason, which is a product of the efficacious action of everyone. This is not a chain of physical necessity, for we a~e here dealing with rational beings, {[and] when rational beings act, they act freely. For this reason, the (2 movement of transition} [from one link of] this chain [to another] always occurs in leaps; each leap is always conditioned by the previous one, but is not determined and actually produced thereby. {Nevertheless, even though one link is not determined by another, the chain still hangs together, because all the links are combined by the imagination. For further discussion of this} see the [S)Iltem of] Ethical Theory, 27 {which states the following: In the series of natural mechanism, everything that can follow from any element in this series does so. This, however, is not the case in a series consisting of the acting of rational beings-nor can this be the case, for if it were, then this would not be a series determined by freedom.} Freedom consists in this: of ail that is possible, only a portion of the same is attached to the chain. 0
(4) Let us now return to the point from which we began, in order to expand the synthesis and determine it in more detail. As a perception (and not something in itself), the summons directed to me was, like every impression {(i.e., like every act of self-affection-though one should not interpret this in a dogmatic manner)}, a limitation of my physical acting and thus of my physical force. Just as, {according to the above,} all being is {a negation; so here too: the summons to free activity is also a negation, namely.} a cancellation of my acting. {My free activity is not simply canceled, however; it is canceled only insofar as I limit myself.} Because this [involves something that] occurs outside of me, I am unable to do it-not that I am unable to do it at all, but rather I am unable to do it ·' purely on my own-though, to be sure, I could do it if I wanted to break through the boundary [represented by this limitation to the I]. This ·' summons signifies and is a limitation of my ph)llical acting in a certain respect. It is clear that, in order to explain this limitation, 1 must assume that there is a physical force outside of me, since what is physical can surely be affected only by something else that is physical. {Here we have fol.lowed a path just the reverse of the one we pursued above, where we ~ .·~ found that in order for me to be able to posit my own efficacy as such 1 also had to posit some product ofthe same. Here, conversely, in order to (25~ explain a product in the sensible world I have to connect it with some sensuous force.} One should pay careful attention to this transition. Pre-
1
1
t
··1· •.·.·
1
27
See SW, IV: '34-35·
° Freedom in this case consists in this: that of all the things that could be produced by the acting of a rational being, only one or more are selected in accordance with its power of free choke (p. 254).
§ 19
457
viously, we were concerned only with acting, {as the unifying link between the concept of a goal and the sensible world}; this provides us with a physical force, which becomes determinate just as soon as my own limitation is taken into account. Just as {an acting occurs [within me] because a summons is directed at me, and} I inferred an acting outside of me from one within me, so now, from a sensuous force, as something determinate, I infer the existence of a determining subject homogeneous with the former (since it was present in the same act of thinking). • The situation now stands as fol.lows: {I discover that I am summoned to act freely.} This discovery that I have been summoned {in this way} is nothing but the sensible embodiment of the task28 of limiting myself. From this {summons} I infer the existence of a rational being {outside of me, who determines this summons}; and, since this {summons} is an instance of sensible acting, I infer that this rational being outside of me 29 possesses a sensuous force of its own. I thereby realize the existence of a rational being as a sensuous force outside of me {in the sensible world. This, that is, the reason that is possessed by others, is something I only infer; I am able to do this only insofar as, within me myself, something appears as an instance of sensible acting, to which I must connect a sensuous force that acts in this sensible manner. But this sensible action itself is nothing but an appearance, from which I infer something supersensible: the reason of others.} (5) We have thus inferred the existence of a determining physical {force}, which is, at the same time, something determinable and which, consequently, did not have to act in just this particular way. Instead, when it engaged in its act of determining it made a choice from an infinitely diverse manifold. In short, this {determining subject} is a physical force of the same sort as my own, one dependent purely upon freedom and determined only thereby in an infinite variety of ways. {This is how it appears to me.} Like everything else I think of, I think of this freely determinable physical forceP as something determinate, as a quantum, as an individual force. At the same time, it also appears to me as something sensible and material, located in space. Consequently, the efficaciously acting subject who produces this summons~10 {that I discover within myself} necessarily presents itself to me as a materially limited body. My act of thinking of a rational being outside of myself is 28 Reading, with H, "versinnlichte Aufgabe" for K's "sinnliche Aufgabe" ("the sensible [or sensuous] task"). 29 Reading, with H, "des Vernunftwesens aujkr mir" for K's "dieses sinnlichen Wesens" ("this sensuous being"). P l think of this rational being [ ... ] (p. 255). 0 ' "das wiirkende zu der Aufforderung."
an act of sensuous thinking; {consequently,} I do not merely think of a body of this sort, I also realize it within sensible intuition. A feeling is connected with this, namely, the feeling of the self-limitation that is attributed to me; and a sensible form is thereby projected by means of intuition.Q Remark: Only philosophy has knowledge of the connection between ideal and real thinking. In the eyes of ordinary, commonsense understanding these are one and the same. The same thing that occurs wherever philosophy recognizes the presence of the duality of thinking occurs in this case as well: No one asks about the connection between the {determinations of his} will and the {movement of his} body, nor has any philosopher wondered about this until now. Instead, one treats the body and the soul as one and the same: e.g., "I have cut myself," and "I think, 'I have cut myself.' " So too in the case of a rational being outside of us: such a being always appears under two different aspects, though we are not aware of this. {The concept of} a certain body {outside of me} and the concept of a rational being {outside of me} are inseparably united within me. To be sure, this concept of a rational being is obviously 31 something we mereJ;r think of. Reason is present within the phenomenon only because 13 have inserted it there by means of thinking. Both of these, {reason and body,} are inseparably united with each other; the former is something I merely think of, and therefore so is the latter. This body too is something within me; it is the same thing as reason, merely viewed from the other side. This is clearly exhibited within transcendental philosophy. {Here we encounter the claim of transcendental idealism in its full audacity. I and my body are absolutely one, simply looked at in different ways. I as "pure 1," in its supreme purity, and I as "body" are entirely the same. The distinction that appears to us is based entirely upon the difference between these ways of looking at [the same thing]. The I, considered as what is purest within me, is nothing but the [I] as grasped by the purest type of thinking. I, considered as a body, am the same not as grasped by pure thinking, but rather only as grasped within sensible intuition and projected into time and space-by means of which the I is transformed into something material.} Result {of what has been said up to this point}: I infer the existence of a rational being outside of me from my own freely produced limitation, i.e., from the task of limiting myself. When considered in a pure fashion, this is a task; when it is made sensible, this same task is a summons to engage in limited activity. What is determinable in this case is the com-
m.
Q This body is therefore something within the sensible world, something I think of as realized. But the reason why I think of this body lies in my feeling, and therefore, in my self-limitation. Along with this feeling, a certain shape is projected into space, a body external to me (p. 255). 31 Reading, with Krause's MS, "offenbar" for K's "ein Ideates." 32 Reading, with H, "lch" for K's "er" ("he").
§ 19
·
459
bined mass of determinate, individual rational beings outside of me; 33 and insofar as I perceive34 this [determinable, rational being], it is a real, physical force, {which presupposes my own physical force, as a determining subject}. What is determinable as a physical force is an object in the corporeal world. Both of these, {the concept of a rational being outside of me and the concept of a body outside of me,} are inseparably united and are one and the same thing, {merely viewed from different sides,} etc. [The union of] limitation and freedom is the {supreme} synthetic midpoint. Freedom outside of me is something I {only} think of; all the rest, {a body outside of me,} is {only} intuited. {The task of limiting oneself, when made sensible, appears as a summons, one that comes from outside of me and summons me to limit myself in a certain way. As a result of this summons, I must infer the existence of a free being outside of me. This free being outside of me is something I have only thought of; therefore, I must make it into something sensible, and thus it becomes an appearance for me: namely, the body of a rational being other than myself.} (6) This rational being is a body, because it appears to exercise an effect. Its body is freely determinable, and it presents itself to me in this way because I have assumed that this is a free being.R {Consequently,} this is (257) a body that is infinitely modifiable. Matter can be modified only by division and movement, however; therefore, this is the sense in which the infinite modifiability of the body of a free being must be understood. Its modifiability must consist in the fact that it is up to freedom to decide what shall be treated as a part and what shall be treated as a whole; in the fact that to every part there pertains a movement of its own, as well as the movement that is posited along with [that of] the entire [body]; in the fact that this body is articulo.ted. {This provides us with the concept of "articulation." I am articulated. I move my entire body: taken by itself, my body is a whole; in relation to nature [as a whole], however, my body is only a part. I move my arm: this too, taken by itself, is a whole; at the same time, however, my arm is also a part of a larger whole, namely, my body, etc. This is also true of the bodies of other rational beings outside of me.} This is also what occurs within experience; all efficacy in the sensible world depends upon this property [the articulation of the body of a free being]. ss Reading, with H, "das Bestimmbare zu ihr ist die zusammen gefa~te Ma~ der bestimmten einzeln Vernunftwesen au~r mir" for K's uncertain and obscure "das bestimmbare zu ihr ist bestimb[ar] VernunftW(esen] auser mir" ("what is determinable in this case is determinable in a rational being outside of me"). s• Reading, with H, "durch mich wahrgenommen wird" for K's "von mir <erblickt> wird" ("I observe"). R The body of a rational being, which arises through a process of sensibilization, is-just as surely as it is the body of a free being-freely determinable (p. 256).
Furthermore, a body of this sort is presupposed by freedom, since it is just this that is freely determinable, 35 and, within consciousness, what is determinable always precedes {the determining subject and the determination} in the series of thinking. It is precisely in this way that this body becomes something that is discovered and given, i.e., an "object" in the proper sense. 5 Such a body is present whenever a subject acts; {free acting presupposes a body}. Therefore, this same body is [a part of] "nature"; more specifically, it is a product of nature-though this last assertion requires some explanation and proof. • According to what was said above, nature is, in a certain respect, a noumenon, and this is true of all nature. Nature is posited through itself; {it simply exists}. It is what it is simply because this is what it is, and only to this extent can it be called "nature" at all. {Spinoza divides nature into natura naturans and natura naturala. 36 For him, natura naturans is the Deity and natura naturata is visible nature. According to our system, nature is simply both--naturans and naturata.} One could say, with Spinoza, that nature is natura naturans-which it is, just as surely as it is nature, subsisting because it subsists. Nature can be called "nature"37 only insofar as it exists through itself. {From the viewpoint of ordinary consciousness,} the articulated body is [part of] nature. Therefore, as judged from this ordinary point of view, an articulated body is presupposed by all consciousness {and all freedom}. But this body [of one's own] is {only} a portion of nature; for, in addition to it, the bodies of other rational beings are present as well, 38 and, as we saw above, so too are objects, {in which I make real the freedom of my acting}. This body is nature; i.e., it is a part of nature. Furthermore, it is a determinate part of nature; indeed, it is a particular part of nature which is determined " Reading, with H, "das Bestimmbare fur die Freyheit" for K's "das bestimmbare zur Freiheit" ("what is determinable in relation to freedom"). sIn this way the lxxly becomes something discovered, a real object; hence the lxxly is already there when the subject discovers it (p. 257). 6 ' I.e., the "creative power of nature," in contrast to "created nature." See the scholia to Proposition XXIX of Part One of Baruch de Spinoza's Ethica, Ordine Geometrico Demonstrala (1677), trans. Edwin Curley, in The Collected Works of Spinoza (Princeton: Princeton University Press, •gBs). p. 434: "Before I proceed further, I wish to explain here-or rather to advise [the reader}-what we must understand by Natura naturans and Natura natura/a. For from the preceding I think it is already established that by Natura naturans we must understand what is in itself and is conceived through itself, or such attributes of substance as express an eternal and infinite essence, i.e. (by P14C1 and P17C2), God, insofar as he is considered as a free cause. "But by Natura natura/a I understand whatever follows from the necessity of God's nature, or from any of God's attributes, i.e., all the modes of God's attributes insofar as they are considered as things which are in God, and can neither be nor be conceived without God." " "hei~t sie so." This might also be construed to read "nature can be called natura naturans [ ... ]." 8 ' Reading, with H, "sind noch Leiber anderer verniinftiger Wesen" for K's "ist der meinige ja auch da" ("my lxxly is also present").
by itself. The proof [that the articulated body of a rational being is a product of nature] is based upon this last point, {which is very important (258) and upon which much depends}. (The existence of something within nature has to be demonstrated by starting with the articulation [of the body].) The body {of a rational being outside of me} is that portion of the corporeal world which is set in motion by the sheer will of a rational being. This body possesses a definite spatial boundary, however, beyond which the sheer will can accomplish nothing, for the rational being in question is {limited and must have its limits, inasmuch as it is} supposed to be a finite being. This rational being now discovers this body, {as limited in a determinate fashion,} and this determinate limitation belongs to this rational being, and specifically, to his body. This limitation is present quite independently of his will {and his freedom}. His body is a limited part of the sensible world, and its limitation must therefore also be present to him independently of his will. Consequently, his body's boundary is also nature and is posited by nature. In other words, this body is a product of nature. I.e., nature produces itself, in conformity with mechanical laws (for freedom, which operates through the will and by means of concepts, is not to be thought of in this context, {since nature contains no freedom of the will, no selfhood}); hence it produces real wholes, 39 such as are wholes in themselves, and this happens through a necessary act of thinking and not simply, as it were, by means of our freedom of thinking. ({This whole produced by nature is posited in opposition to the kind of whole assembled by means of abstraction.} Through the freedom of abstraction, I am able to divide everything, but in this way I obtain only an imaginary whole-as is the case with all abstract concepts.) Real wholes are those I must necessarily assemble in a certain, particular way. We have now arrived at the familiar concept of "organization,"40 {which follows from [the concept of] articulation}. Our deduction [of the concept of organization] descends from something higher: We began with what is highest [in the] ideal [series], with the task of limiting ourselves. We have made this concept sensible in the phenomenon of a summons, which also lies within us. In addition to what is determinate (the summons) and in accordance with the law of substantiality, we have also posited a determinable subject who summons us, and we have transformed the latter into a perception, into a body in the sensible world, through which perception a free action is supposed to become possible. [Furthermore,] the body in question must be an articulated body. Organization follows from articulation and is connected with what has gone before; for since this body is something merely discovered, i.e., is [part of] nature, the articulation [of the same] cannot be anything but the product of a purely natural law. We have 39 40
"reelle Ganze." "der Begriff der Organisation."
237
thus obtained a nature that forms real wholes-in this case, the real whole of an articulated body-and possesses an organized structure:'. T Overview: We began this § as follows: The extreme terms of our synthesis ({on the side of the ideal series,} the realm of rational being and, on the other side, {in the real series, a dead, self-subsisting,} fixed [realm of] nature) must, in turn, reciprocally determine each other. Since both are present within a single consciousness, the realm of rational beings must be viewed and determined through the medium of the realm of nature, and vice versa. {Insofar as the realm of rational being is viewed through the medium of nature,} the result is that a rational being (to the extent that it is something sensible) appears to be a part of nature, a product of the same, as well as an object. On the other hand, has nature in turn perhaps been {further} determined by our operation? Yes indeed, for whereas nature previously appeared to us merely as a single whole, as a Not-I, we have now discovered that we intuit particular objects in nature. Nature now appears to us as a system made up of individual, real wholes, and it appears to us in this way because we had to assume the existence {outside of us} of rational, sensuous beings like ourselves. (7) Much more follows from this. Something else, something quite different, is also realized in nature. {We have determined nature even fur- (259)' ther by means of this operation,} as follows: All the parts out of which we have assembled this body {of a rational being} belong together and constitute a single whole only in their combination. This wholeness {which arises from the combination of the parts} is purely the result of the efficacy of nature; it is nature that has made these {articulated} parts, {which could be posited in a relationship [to one another],} into a single whole. What does this mean? The body of a rational being external to us must necessarily be infinitely divisible, as is obvious from the very concept of matter. All these parts are parts of nature, and therefore each is posited through itself and contains within itself the ground of its own subsistence. Yet, {according to what was presupposed above,} they all constitute a single whole only in their interconnection with one another, and apart from this connection they are nothing at all (as is indicated by the concept of articulation). It is because of nature itself that these various parts exist alongside one another and become something only through their interconnection with one another. This is not a situ41 "wir erhielten eine Natur, welche reelle Ganze, hier die reelle Ganzen eines artikulirten Leibes bildet, welches die Organisation ist." T Organization follows from articulation. I discover my body to be articulated. As something discovered, it can be nothing other than a product of a purely natural law. Consequently, I obtain my body from nature, which forms real wholes, and nature is able to do this by virtue of its organization; therefore, my articulated body is a product of organization (p. 258).
38
ation that could have been artificially produced. Since each individual part has to be considered as posited through itself and [yet] is supposed to be something only by virtue of the interconnection, it follows that the reason for this must lie within these parts themselves. Every part is constituted in such a way that it cannot subsist without the others, nor can all of the other parts subsist without this one. u This posited being of nature, this law of nature 42 is called "organization," and a body that exhibits this sort of connection is called an "organized" body. Consequently, nature-that is, nature as a whole (since every individual, {organized} body is {always} connected with nature as a whole)-is [not only] an organizing power, 43 it is [also] organized. Each of the parts of nature can subsist only insofar as they all exist alongside one another and cannot exist without one another; {thus none of them can exist on its own}. The reason for this lies within the parts {of nature}, as well as within nature as a whole. Like the body of an {individual} rational being, the whole universe is also an organized whole. {Nature as a whole} must necessarily be an organized whole, because individual organized wholes are possible within nature, and these are made possible only by means of the entire force of nature. Individual organized wholes are simply products of the organization of the whole universe. (8) Thus our task would appear to be accomplished,for the two determinable elements at either end of our synthesis have been shown to be determined through each other. The individual within the world of reason v becomes a part of the sensible world; consequently, he is posited within the sensible world and becomes, in a certain respect, one therewith. Conversely, the sensible world receives an analogon 44 of freedom; i.e., the concept of generating or creating appears within the sensible world-though this is {not actual freedom, since this is} a type of creating which occurs in accordance with certain, fixed rules. • Nota Bene how we have obtained this result: {We did not begin with the two extreme terms of the synthesis.} We began simply at one end {of the synthesis}, with the ideal series, {i.e., with the mass of reason}; and then, without noticing it, we proceeded from there, {from a determination of reason outside of us,} to the other, {real} series, to a determination of the sensible world. In keeping with our analogy, we would have thought that we would have had to begin with each element u That these parts form a whole only in their union is not something that could perhaps occur artificially; instead, this occurs through nature, since each part must be considered as posited through itself, and since all of them can subsist only in their interconnection with one another (p. 259). 42 "Dieses Geseztsein der Natur, dieses Gesez der Natur." H: "Dieses Gesetz der Natur." 45 "ist also organisirend." v The individual within the world of union [ ... ] (p. 259). 44 "analogue."
239
individually (i.e., with {g andy, and with} j3 and b, and that we would (260) have been able to discover an intermediate element = X, in which all these elements coincided, only after we had examined each of them individually. It was not necessary for us to proceed in this fashion, [however,] for the law in accordance with which we are thinking here is that of reciprocal interaction, 45 which already contains within itself a concatenation of the efficaciously acting elements, so that one can set out from either side and arrive at the other-so long, that is, as one grasps the former in the proper way. We would not have been able to advance and to achieve our goal, however, if we had set out from the other side, {from the sensible world}. We were able to achieve our goal {by starting from the point we selected} only because freedom and spontaneous activity are what is primary and highest, and if we begin with them it is then easy to show how they are made sensible in the sensible world. w What we have established {here} is a reciprocal interaction. • {1} To begin with, the world of reason interacts with itself. {Popularly expressed,} rational beings exercise an influence upon one another; or, transcendentally expressed, there is within every individual something that requires him to infer that other rational beings exist in addition to himself. • {2} Similarly, the sensible world also interacts with itself, for the law of organization we have established is nothing more than the combined operation of all the natural forces in the universe.x • {3} Both the rational world and the sensible world interact with themselves; in addition, they reciprocally interact with each other, and they also appear {to us} to do so. First of all, nature and freedom mesh with each other within articulated bodies. This occurs by means of the freedom of the individual, and this is how freedom as a whole operates within the whole of nature.v Conversely, articulated bodies are first produced by nature; therefore, as judged from the usual viewpoint, nature produces the very possibility of reason and {consequently} intrudes into the realm of rational being, {into the realm of what cannot be perceived}. 45 Reading, with H, "wei! hier nach den Gesetzen der Wechselwirkung gedacht wird" for K's "da das hier gedachte Gesez das der Wechselwirkung ist" ("for the law thought of here is that of reciprocal interaction"). w We could indeed reach our goal, however, by starting with the point we selected, because this is what is first and highest, and because the determination of the sensible world can be derived from my own freedom (p. 200). x Nature interacts with itself, by virtue of the law of organization, according to which the universe cannot subsist except insofar as all its parts are combined with one another (p. 200). v These two worlds interact with each other in an articulated body. Here nature and freedom mesh with each other; freedom as a whole exercises an influence upon the totality of nature, and conversely, nature as a whole exercises an influence upon freedom in its entirety (p. 200).
• With this, our synthesis is complete, and, since {this is the fundamental synthesis of all consciousness, and since} everything that occurs within consciousness is contained within this synthesis, our task is fully accomplished and our work is finished.
§ 19
40
When the limitation of the I is made sensible and is perceived, it appears as a summons to act freely. What is perceived in this case {appears} as a limitation of our physical force-assuming that we confine ourselves to ourselves. Accordingly, a physical force outside of us is posited as what determines this limitation. The physical force in question is governed (this is to be understood practically, that is, in the sense of positing it as engaged in real activity) 46 by the will of a free individual outside of us, an individual who is determined and characterized by this will. (I.e., the individual in question is this determinate will, from which the existence of a rational being is first inferred.) What is determinable in this case {(what is determined by the freely determining agent and is, for us, (261) a determinacy) 47} provides us with the concept and the perception of an articulated body, a person, outside of us. This (the body) is a product of nature and consists of parts, which constitute this determinate whole only in their union with one another; therefore, nature contains within itself the law that its parts must necessarily unite to form wholes, which, in turn, constitute but one single whole. Nature is both organized and organizing; insofar as a sensuous, rational being outside of me is posited, nature is therefore posited. This exhausts the sphere of what must necessarily be present within conSCiousness. Remark: Nature is {a self-contained whole and is} explicable {through itself} only insofar as it is both organized and organizing. Otherwise, one will be driven further and further afield by the law of causality, {if one assumes this law as one's explanatory rule. E.g., when I try to determine the space occupied by some object, I will be driven on and on-to infinity. Question: Does the world have any spatial limit? If I attend merely to the fact that the world is in space, I will be unable to determine its 46 This parenthetical mark, as well as the parenthetical sentence that follows, appear at the bottom of Krause's page, with asterisks indicated where they should be inserted in the text. In the summary of§ 19 contained in the Hauptsiitu collected at the beginning of Krause's MS, these same two sentences appear (within parentheses) in the text itself. Neither appears in H. 47 "Das Bestimmbare davon (von dem freyen bestimmenden, das fiir uns Bestimmtheit ist)."
boundaries and will not even be able to assert that it is limited, for I will lose myself in infinity. If, however, I attend to the fact that the world is organized, that it is an organized whole, then it does possess boundaries of its own; for, as an organized whole, the world is, as such, complete and self-contained. Wherever one wishes to look, every finite thing is a product of a finite number of self-contained natural forces. In this way there arises [the concept of] a single whole, a universe.} The Kantian antinomies of reason thereby disappear completely {as well}, for these {do not represent any conflict of reason, but} are merely antinomies of free argumentation. 48 In this way, the philosophers of the past based the proof of God upon the existence of the world. They did this out of despair, for they wanted finally to come to a stop somewhere. One must grasp reason as a whole, and then one will find that no conflict is present and that nature is quite absolutely posited by itself as absolute being, opposed to nothing but the absolutely posited 1. This is the perspective that has to be adopted by natural science.z 48 "rauonnemenl." Fichte employs this term in the manner it was employed hy Kant, that is, to designate the sort of undisciplined and groundless argumentation Kant associated with Voltaire and the French philruopJw of the eighteenth century. For Kant's account of "the antinomy of pure reason," see KRV, A4o61B432ff. z Reason is a single whole; anything grasped hy reason must he grasped as a whole. The lis a product of reason; therefore, l hecome grasped as a whole. This is also the case within nature; nature is an absolute whole, just as l am. I am an ahsolute acting; nature is an ahsolute heing. Nothing further can he deduced from nature, and this is the point where all natural philosophy commences (p. 261).
DEDUCTION OF THE SUBDIVISIONS OF THE WISSENSCHAFTSLEHRE
(1) We have now set forth everything that we disc(JIJer {within (262) consciousness} as a given object when we discover ourselves, i.e., everything that is connected with the objective aspect of ourselves. This discovered object is our world. A camplete explication of this world-and {by "complete" we mean} a description of how {what is discovered} is determined by means of all the laws of thinking-constitutes the {specifically 1} theoretical Wissenschaftslehre, or the Wissenschaftslehre of cognition (in the Kantian sense).A It always depends upon what is discovered. This Wissenschaftslehre of cognition must also be contained within our "Foundations,"2 and it is {actually} to be found there, {though only} with respect to its basic features. A particular science [i.e., a particular subdivision of the Wissenschaftslehre] {is distinguished from the entire science only as follows: a 1 "besonderer." The ''theoretical Wisseruchaftslehre" is thus, like the theory of right, the theory of ethics, or indeed, the presentation of the first principles or "foundations" of the whole system, a particul4r part of the entire Wisseruchaftslehre. As such, it constitutes one of
the sulxlivisions of the entire system or "science" in question and is thus one of what
Fichte, in the discussion that follows, calls the "particular sciences." A Wherever objective cognition is present, theory is present as well, and, considered from a transcendental point of view, so too is the theoretical Wisseruchaftslehre (p. 262). 2 "unserer Grundlage." Though this term is singular, it is here translated as plural (and capitalized) in order to indicate that what Fichte is referring to on this occasion is not just any "foundation," but rather the systematic presentation of the first principles or "foundations'' of the entire Wisseruchaftslehre. In this sense, the "Foundations" is the first part of the system whose divisions Fichte now proceeds to sketch. One should recall that the full title of the published WisserucMftslehre of 1794"95 was Grondlage tin gesammten Wissenschaftslehre ("Foundations of the Entire Wisseruchaftslehre") and that the official title of the present lecture course was fundamenta philosophiae lmnssendentalis (die Wisseruchaftslehre) nova methodo ("Foundations of transcendental philosophy (WisserucMftslehre) nova methodo"). Though it is possible (as the editors of AA IV, 2 assume) that Fichte is here employing the term "Foundations" with specific reference to the Grondlage of 17!)4/95• it is more plausible to assume that this is a more general reference to the "first" or "foundational" part of his entire system, and specifically, to its most recent version, as presented in these very lectures on Wisseruchaftslehre nova methodo.
468
241
Deduction of the Subdivisions of the Wissenschaftslehre
particular science} continues until the individual concepts [upon which the science is based] have been completely determined, whereas the Foundations explicates only the most fundamental concepts. 8 Each fundamental concept is then subjected to further analysis within a particular science, and only then is the particular science in question complete-{that is,} when its object has been considered in accordance with all the laws of thinking. {Remark: The Foundations contains only the basic concepts, not everything that occurs within consciousness; and this is also the way in which we have proceeded. Nevertheless, it must be possible to discover everything contained within consciousness simply by analyzing the basic concepts contained in the Foundations.} Simply by means of analysis, one must be able to proceed from the Foundations to every particular science. {When one attends to the discovered object, one obtains the theoretical Wissenschaftslehre, or so-called theoretical philosophy.} The object of theoretical philosophy is nature. Nature can be considered: either as subject to merely mechanical laws of attraction and repulsion (example: Kant's "Metaphysics of Nature")/1 or as subject to organic laws (e.g.: the theory that dea1s with the basis of the existence of human beings, animals, plants, etc.).c Taken together, these two inquiries exhaust the domain of theoretical philosophy, or "theory of the world." In short, theoretical philosoph{; explains how the world is and must be, how the world is given to us. The result of theoretical philosophy is {a system of} pure empirical experience, 4 and, with this, theoretical philosophy comes to an end. {Remark: One very often hears it said that something "conflicts with experience," and this is often said by people who have no precise know!- (2 edge of what experience means. Such knowledge is needed, for its absence is the source of the confusion that continues to prevail concerning this point.} In ordinary life the word "experience" is bandied about by even the most thoughtless persons, for whom even reveries count as experience.E {On the other hand, people often do not want to know about 8 A particular science continues with the determination of an individual [concept] that is included in the fundamental concept, whereas the general science, in contrast, remains at the level of the fundamental concept and the determinacy of the same (p. 262). 'Metaphysische Anfangsgrunde der Naturwissenschaft (1786), KGS, IV: 487-585. English translation by James W. Ellington, "Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science," in Immanuel Kant, Philosophy of Material Nature (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1985). c [Nature can be considered] to be subject to the laws of organicism. This way of investigating nature includes the theory of the basis of our own existence as well as that of other rational beings (p. 262 ). 0 [ •.• ] must be given to us (p. 262). 4 "reine Empirie." E People often speak of "experience" where none is present: e.g., in cases of mistaken inferences and dreams (p. 263).
Deduction of the Subdivisions of the WWm.schaftslehre
469
some experience that does indeed exist.} First of all, we have to determine what experience can be. To determine this would be a great service, one that is accomplished by theoretical philosophy.F {Theoretical philosophy concludes with pure empirical experience;} it establishes what experience necessarily is and can be. (2) In order to discover ourselves we must, {according to the above,}
think of the task of limiting ourselves in a certain way. This task, {this determinate way of limiting oneself, which is contained within the task in question,} is different for every individual, and it is precisely this difference that determines which particular individual one actually is. This is not a task that appears to us all at once and once and for all; instead, it presents itself in the course of experience every time an ethical command is issued to us. 5 But since we are practical beings {and since limitation exists only in opposition to acting}, this summons to limit ourselves also contains a summons for us to act in a determinate way. This applies differently to every individual. Everyone bears his own conscience within himself, and each person's conscience is entirely his own. {Everyone has his own ethical law, his own duties.} Yet the manner in which the law of reason commands everyone can certainly 6 be estab-lished in abstracto. Such an inquiry is conducted from a higher standpoint, {where the individual beings coincide,} where individuality vanishes from view and one attends only to what is universal or general. I must act; my conscience is my conscience, and to this extent the theory of ethics 7 is an individual matter. This, however, is not the way it is dealt with in the general theory of ethics. {If one attends only to what is universal, there arises} the practical Wisseruchaftslehre, which becomes the particular [science of] ethics, 8 {or "ethics" in the proper sense of the term}. That is to say, what is practical is acting as such, but acting is constantly present throughout the Foundations, inasmuch as this entire mechanism [of reason] is based upon [acting]; consequently, the specifically practical Wisseruchaftslehre can only be ethics. Ethics explains how the world ought to be constructed by rational beings, and its result is something ideal (to the extent that what is ideal can be a result), since this is not something that can be grasped conceptually. {[In contrast,] the theoretical Wisseruchaftslehre explains how the world is, and the result of the same is pure empirical experience.} F Therefore, philosophy will have accomplished a great deal and will have performed no small service if it simply explains what experience actually is, and this is just what philosophy does (p. 263). '"sondem im Fortgang der Erlahrung analytisch jedesmal in wiefern ein Sittengebot an nns ergeht." The translation omits the word "analytisch~ ("analytically"), which makes litde sense in this context and is not found in the otherwise identical sentence in H. 6 Reading, with Krause's MS, "wohl" for K's "nicht." 7 "die Sittenlehre." 8 "die insbesondre Ethik wird."
4 70
Deduction of the Subdivisions of the Wissenschaftslehre
Remark: Both theoretical and practical philosophy are [included within] the Wi.ssenschaftslehre. Both are based upon the transcendental point of view: Theoretical philosophy is based upon the transcendental point of view precisely because it deals with the act of cognizing, and thus with something within us,G and it is not concerned with any sort of {mere} being. Practical philosophy is based upon the transcendental point of view because it does not deal with the I as an individual at all, but instead deals with reason as such, in its individuality. {The theory of ethics maintains that individuality is contained within and follows from reason. 9 That I am precisely this specific individual, however, is not something that follows from reason.} The former theory is {in a certain (264_ respect} concrete; the latter is the highest abstraction {present within thinking and involves an ascent} from the level of what is sensible to the pure concept as a motive [for action]. 10
(3) Ethics does not deal with any particular individual; instead, it deals with reason as such or in general. Reason, however, is exhibited in many individuals, who{se forces can} come into conflict with, {have an impact on, and limit} one another within the same world. {Thus,} if the goal of reason is to be achieved through {the unification of the individual goals of} these individuals, then their physical force must be restrained {and limited}, and everyone's freedom must be restricted {so that they will not hinder one another and} so that one person will not interfere with the goal of another and {thereby} thwart {the overall goal of reason}. The theory of right or naturallaw 11 is what arises {from an inquiry into how this can be accomplished}. The nature of this science has been misunderstood for a very long time. It occupies the middle ground between theoretical and practical philosophy; it is theoretical and practical philosophy at the same time. • {It is theoretical, because it speaks of a world-namely, of the world as it ought to be found. If the goal of reason is to be achieved in a moral world, then a juridical world, thanks to which the struggle between efficaciously acting forces is restrained and limited, must already exist.} The juridical world must precede the moral world. Furthermore, the theory of right is practical as well. {Unlike nature,} a just constitution of this sort does not come into being by itself; it must be produced. But unlike morality, this cannot be accomplished by means cognizing, as something within us (p. 263). See § 19 of Fichte's System der Sittenlehre (SW, IV: 254-55). "ist die hochste abstraction, <der des Sinnlichten> zu dem reinen Begriffe als einem MOTIVE." The translation of this obscure passage is guided by the corresponding passage in H: "ist die hochste ABSTRACTION in dem Denlc.en, es ist die Erhebung zu dem reinen Ber,if als einem MoTiv." 1 "die Rechtslehre oder Naturrecht." The word Recht combines the meanings of the English words "law," "right," and 'justice." G [ ••• ]
9
10
2'
Deduction of the Subdivisions of the Wissenschaftslehre
13
4 71
of self-limitation; external means are required. Nor is this something whose presence can [simply] be bidden, since it {does not depend upon a single will, but} first requires the unification of the wills of many different people. {This unification appears to be a product of nature.} (See Kant's Perpetual Peace.) 12 The task of the theory of right can be described as follows: the free wills [of many different individuals] are to be reconciled with one another in accordance with a certain mechanical connection and interaction. No such natural mechanism exists in itself, however, for this depends in part upon freedom. This condition, {this legal constitution,} is brought about {by human beings} through the joint efficacy of nature and reason. Closely related to the theory of right and sharing the same domain is the philosophy of religion. Together, these two constitute a third {part of} philosophy: "the philosophy of the postulates." 1s {There is a postulate that theory addresses to the practical realm: that (265) many free individuals ought to maintain a certain order and enter into peaceful relations with one another. This is a postulate that theory addresses to freedom as well as to reason, and this is how we obtain a theory of right.} The theory of right [is that part of the philosophy of the postulates which deals with] the postulate [that theoretical philosophy addresses to the practical realm,] to freedom. • The philosophy of religion [is that part of the philosophy of the postulates which deals with] the postulate that practical philosophy addresses to the theoretical realm, to nature, which, by means of a supersensible law, is supposed to accommodate itself to the goal of morality." {This is the postulate ofreligion, and} the Wissenschaftslehre has to derive and to explain this postulate {as such}. But it is not the task of the Wissenschoftslehre to apply this postulate within life, {to generate religious sentiments within ourselves and, through us, within other rational beings outside of us}; instead, the latter constitutes the pragmatic part of philosophy and belongs to pedagogics sensu latissimo. 1 (4) Following this division, there still remains one science with which everyone is familiar and which has always-and rightly-been considered to be a part of philosophy, {and which we too consider to be a part of philosophy}. (I do not mean logic, which applies to every science and 12 Zum ewigen Frieden. Ein philosophischer Entwurf (1795), KGS, VIII: 341-86. English translation by Lewis White Beck in Kant, On Hislory (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963), PP· 85-135. " Fichte is here employing the term postulnte in the sense of Kant's "postulates of practical reason." See Book II of the Critique of Practical Reason. H Conversely, there is also a postulate that practical reason addresses to theory: that the sensible world ought to accommodate itself to the goal of reason (p. 265). 14 "in the broadest sense of the term." Cp. H: "In the highest sense of the word."
472
Deduction of the Sulxlivisions of the Wissenschaftslehre
every craft and is the instrument employed in every rational procedure.)1 The science in question is aesthetics. Where does this science belong? The philosophy we have just described, subdivided, and established the foundation of occupies the transcendental viewpoint, and from there it surveys the ordinary viewpoint. {From its transcendental viewpoint, the investigating I looks down upon the I it is investigating, which occupies the real viewpoint.} This constitutes the very essence of transcendental philosophy: that it has no desire to become a way of thinking that could be employed within life; instead, it observes an [actual] I, which embodies within life this system of thinking described by transcendental philosophy. By itself, transcendental philosophy creates nothing. The I it investigates occupies the ordinary viewpoint. Within theory, philosophy takes as its particular object all humans as particular beings; it constitutes a complete and self-contained science when it has presented a human being in concreto, 15 and its perspective applies to every individual. In ethics and the theory of right, human beings are thought of as occupying the real viewpoint} • This involves a clear contradiction: The philosopher {occupies the} ideal {viewpoint and} contemplates human beings {who occupy the real viewpoint}. 16 But the philosopher is, after all, {only} a human being as well, {and, as such, he too occupies only the real viewpoint. How then is he able to elevate himself to the transcendental viewpoint?} A human being can elevate himself to the transcendental point of view, though he does so not as a human being, but rather as someone engaged in a speculative science. 17 There arises for philosophy itself-and within philosophy itself-an impetus to explain its own possibility. K {How can a human being who occupies the ordinary viewpoint raise himself to the transcendental one?} What sort of transition is there from one of these viewpoints to the other? This is a question concerning the very possibility of philosophy. These two viewpoints are diametrically opposed to 1 Logic cannot be considered a part of philosophy; it is merely an instrument of philosophy-and not merely of philosophy, but of every other part of human knowledge as well, and thus of reason as such (p. 265). " "und sie ist geschlo!kn, so wie der Mensch in CONCRETO dasteht." J This portion of philosophy takes as its object all humans as particular beings, and thus it philosophizes for everyone and applies to everyone. To be sure, within ethics and [the theory of] natural right, philosophy takes as its object human beings in the abstract; yet even in this abstraction it thinks of them as occupying the real viewpoint (p. 265). 16 "der ideate Philosoph betrachtet den realen Menschen?" Uterally: "the ideal philosopher contemplates real human beings?" 17 Reading, with Krause's MS, "als treibend eine speculative Wi!knschaft" for K's "als transcenden[entale]r speculativer Wi!knschaftl[er]." K The philosopher can raise himself to and remain within the transcendental viewpoint, but not as a human being; instead, he can accomplish this only as a speculating subject, engaged in a speculative science conducted from the transcendental viewpoint. Consequently, there here arises, at least for the philosopher himself, an impetus to explain to us the possibility of philosophy (p. 265).
Deduction of the Sulxiivisions of the Wissenschaftslehre
244
4 73
each other. If no middle term exists, then-according to our own first principles-there is no means to make the transition {from the one} to the other. It has {now} been demonstrated, {however,} as a matter of faa, (266) that {a transcendental philosophy does exist. From this it follows that these two viewpoints must not be absolutely opposed to each other; instead, they must also be united with each other through some middle term.} [Consequently,] there does exist such an intermediary between the transcendental perspective and the ordinary one. This midpoint is aesthetkS. From the ordinary point of view, the world appears to be something given; from the transcendental ~int of view, it appears to be something produced (entirely within me). 1 From the aesthetic point of view, the world appears to be given to us just as if we had produced it and to be just the sort of world we would have produced. (See "Concerning the Duties of the Aesthetic Artist" in the [System of] Ethical Theory.) 19 To the aesthetic sense, the world 20 appears to be free; to ordinary sense, it appears to be a product of compulsion. E.g., every limitation in space is the result of the limitation of one thing by others, which press up against it. So too, every extension [in space] is the result of an internal striving within the body. On every side, [we encounter both] fullness and freedom. The former does not pertain to aesthetics, whereas the latter does. • This describes the aesthetic sense, but the science {of aesthetics} is something quite different. This science has a transcendental form, {for} it is philosophy. The science of aesthetics describes the aesthetic way of looking at things, {[and] it establishes the rules of aesthetics}. Thus a "beautiful spirit" is not required for this sort of aesthetics. Aesthetic philosophy is a principal part of the Wissenschaftslehre, 21 and, {in this respect,} it is the opposite of all the other philosophy {described so far,} which one could call "real philosophy." 22 The basis for this division lies in the different viewpoints {occupied by the contemplating 1}. In respect of its material, aesthetics occupies the middle ground between theoretical and practical philosophy.L {The concept of the world is a theoretical concept. [The concept of] the way in which the world ought to be made 18 "gemacht (alles in mir)." Radrizzani proposes to delete the words in parentheses (which do not appear in H), on the grounds that they allegedly make no sense in this context and therefore must represent nothing more than a fragment that Krause was unable to complete. 19 See § 31 of Das System der Siuenlehre (SW, IV: 353-56). • 20 Reading, with H, "die Welt" for K's "die Wille" ("the will"). 21 Reading, with H, "Wissenschaftslehre" for K's "Wissenschaft" ("science"). 22 "und ist der ganzen anderen Philosophie, die man die reelle nennen konnte, entgegengesezt." L The basis for the division lies in the different viewpoints occupied by the contemplating I, which [in this case] occupies a position between that of theoretical and that of practical philosophy (p. 266).
4 74
Deduction of the Subdivisions of the Wissenschaftslehre
lies within us and is practical. Aesthetics is therefore practical as well. However,} it does not coincide with ethics; for we are obliged to be conscious of our duties, whereas the aesthetic way of looking at things is natural and instinctive and does not depend upon freedom. {In contrast, the ethical way of looking at things depends totally upon my freedom.} {Remark:} It is by means of this aesthetic viewpoint that one raises oneself to the transcendental viewpoint; and thus it follows that the philosopher has to possess an aesthetic sense, i.e., "spirit," {for without this he will not succeed in raising himself to the transcendental viewpoint}. 23 This does not mean that the philosopher must necessarily be a poet or a fine writer or an accomplished orator, but he must be animated by the same spirit that, when cultivated, serves to develop one aesthetically. 24 Without this spirit one will never make any headway in philosophy, but will trouble oneself with the letters of the same without penetrating its inner {spirit}.M FINITUM MARCH 14, 1799 23 Fo~ more on this subject, see Fichte's unpublished 1794 lectures "Ueber den Unterschied des Geistes und des Buchstabens in der Philosophie" ("Concerning the Difference between the Spirit and the Letter within Philosophy"). For the text of these lectures, which are not contained in SW, see AA II, 3: 315-42 (in English, see EPW, pp. 192-2 15). See too the similarly titled "Ueber Geist und Buchstab in der Philosophie: In einer Reihe von Briefen," which stems from 1795 but was not published by Fichte until 1800. In SW, VII: 27o-3oo=AA I, 6:331-61. English translation by Elizabeth Rubenstein, "On the Spirit and the Letter in Philosophy," in German Aesthetic and Literary Criticism: Kant, FichU, ScheLLing, Schopenhauer, Hegel, ed. David Simpson, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984). pp. 74-9324 "durch defkn Ausbildung man asthetisch wird." Literally: "through the cultivation of which one becomes aesthetic." M From this it does not follow that the philosopher must be a "beautiful spirit," but simply that the philosopher is also animated by the same spirit through the cultivation of which he could become more beautiful. Lack. of such spirit is the [reason why] so many people remain at the level of the letters and are not allowed to penetrate into the spirit of the subject (p. 266).
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Editions of Fichte's Collected Works J. G. Fichte: Gesamtausgabe der Bayerischen Akademie der Wi.ssenschaften. Ed. Reinhard Lauth, Hans Jacobs, and Hans Gliwitzky. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann, 1964-. Johann Goulieb Fichtes nachgelassene Werke. Ed. I. H. Fichte. 3 vols. Bonn: AdolphMarcus, 1834-35. Johann Goulieb Fichtes sammtliche Werke. Ed. I. H. Fichte. 8 vols. Berlin: Veit, 1845-46. Johann Goulieb Fichtes Werke. Auswahl in sechs Banden. Ed. Fritz Medicus. Leipzig: Meiner, 1908--12.
German Editions of the Wissenschaftslehre nova metlwdo Fichte, Johann Gottlieb. "A us der Hallische Nachschrift der W.L: 1. Die unmittelbar fiir die Relgionsphilosophie wichtigen Stellen; 2. Fichtes Diktate." Appendix to Emanuel Hirsch, Die idealistische Philosophie und das Christentum. Gesammelte Aufsiitze, pp. 291-307. Giitersloh: Bertelsmann, 1926. "Ueberschrift und Schluj3 einer studentischen Nachschrift der WL aus dem Jahre 1798 (Fichtes System der philosophischen Wissenschaften)." Appendix to Emanuel Hirsch, Christentum und Geschichte in Fichtes Philosophie, pp. 62-67. Tiibingen: Mohr, 1920. "Wissenschaftslehre nach den Vorlesungen von Herr. Fichte." In Nachgelassene Schriften, Vol. II: Schriften aus denjahren I79o--r8oo, pp. 341-611. Ed. Hans Jacob. Berlin: Junker und Diinnhaupt, 1937. "Wissenschaftslehre nach den Vorlesungen von Hr. Pr. Fichte. In Gesamtausgabe der Bayerischen Akademie der Wi.ssenschaften. Reihe IV, Bd. 2, Kollegnachschriften I796-r8o4, pp. 1-267. Ed. Jose Manzana, Erich Fuchs, Kurt Hiller, and Peter Schneider. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann, 1978. Wi.ssenschaftslehre nova methodo. Kollegnachschrift Chr. Fr. Krouse 1798/99- Ed. Erich Fuchs. Hamburg: Meiner, 1982.
[ 475]
4 76
Bibliography
Translations of the Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo La Doctrine de Ia Science Nova Methodo, suivi de Essai d'une Nouvelle Presentation de Ia Doctrine de Ia Science. Trans. and ed. Ives Radrizzani. Lausanne: Editions de
I'Age d'Homme, 1989. "La seconda dottrina della scienza ( 1798) di G. A. Fichte." Trans. Luigi Pareyson. Rivista difilosofw 41 (1950): 191-202. Teoria della scienz.a 1798 "nova methodo." Trans. Alfredo Cantoni. Milan: Biblioteca de "II pensiero," 1959.
Fichte's Jena Writings in English Translation Fichte: Early Philosophical Writing.s. Trans. and ed. Daniel Breazeale. Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell University Press, 1988. "On the Foundation of Our Belief in a Divine Government of the Universe." Trans. Paul Edwards. In Nineteenth-Century Philosophy. Ed. Patrick L. Gardiner, pp. 1g-26. New York: Free Press, 1969. "On the Spirit and the Letter in Philosophy." Trans. Elizabeth Rubenstein. In German Aesthetic and Literary Criticism: Kant, Fichle, Schelling, Schopenhauer, Hegel. Ed. David Simpson, pp. 74--93· Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984. The Science of Ethics as Based on the Science of Knawledge. Trans. A. E. Kroeger. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Triibner, 1897. Science of Knuwledge. Trans. and ed. Peter Heath and John Lachs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982. The Science of Rights. Trans. A. E. Kroeger. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1869.
Some General Works on Fichte Adamson, Robert. Fichte. Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1881. Baumanns, Peter. J G. Fichte. Kritische Gesamtdarstellung seiner Philosophie. Freiburg: Alber, 1990. Baumgartner, Hans Michael, and Wilhelm G. Jacobs. J G. Fichte: Bibliographie. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann, 1968. ' Gardiner, Patrick. "Fichte and German Idealism." In Idealism Past and Present. Ed. Godfrey Vesey, pp. 111-26. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982. Gueroult, Martial. L'ivolution et Ia structure de Ia doctrine de Ia science chez Fichte. 2 vols. Paris: Societe de )'edition: Les belles lettres, 1930. Gurwitsch, Georg. Fichtes System der konkreten Ethik. Tiibingen: Mohr, 1924. Hinz, Manfred. Fichtes "System der Freiheit." Analyse eines widerspuchlichen Begriffs. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1981. Jacobs, Wilhelm G. johann Gottlieb Fichte. Reinbeck bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1984. Janke, Wolfgang. Fichte: Sein und Reflexion-Grundlagen der kristischen Vernunft. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1970.
Bibliography
4 77
'l G. Fichtes Gesamtidee der Philosophie." In Zur Idee der Transzendemalphilosophie, pp. 73-123. Munich: Pustet, 1965. Mandt, A. J. "Fichte's Idealism in Theory and Practice." Idealistic Studies 14
Lauth, Reinhold.
( 1984): 127-47· Pareyson, Luigi. Fichte. Il sistema della liberta. Turin: Edizione di Filosofia, 1950. 2d, expanded ed., Milan: Mursia, 1976. Philonenko, Alexis. La Liberti humaine dans la philosophic de Fichte. Paris: Vrin, 1966. 2d ed., 1980. - - - . L'Oeuvre de Fichte. Paris: Vrin, 1984. Rockmore, Tom. Fichte, Marx, and the German Philosophical Tradition. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 198o. Rohs, Peter. johann Gottlieb Fichte. Munich: Beck, 1991. Royce, Josiah. "Fichte." In The Spirit of Modern Philosophy, pp. 135-63. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1893. Seidel, George J. Activity and Ground: Fichte, Schelling, Hegel. Hildesheim: Olms, 1976. Weischedel, Wilhelm. Der Aufbruch der Freiheit zur Gemeinschaft: Studien zur Philosophic des jungen Fichtes. Leipzig: Meiner, 1939. Wundt, Max. johann Gottlieb Fichte. Stuttgart: Frommann, 1927. Secondary Literature with Special Relevance to the Wissenschaftslehre of 1796/gg Bader, Franz. "Fichtes Lehre von pradeliberativen Willen." In Transzendentalphilosophie als System, ed. Albert Mues, pp. 212-41. Baumanns, Peter. "Einleitung." In Fichte, Versuch einer neuen Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre, pp. vii-xxvii. Hamburg: Meiner, 1975. Berger, Siegfried. Ueber eine unveroffentlichte Wissenschaftslehre]. G. Fichtes (jenaer Kolleghandschrift der Halleschen Universitiitsbibliothek Y g 21.). Inaugural Dissertation. Marburg: Noske, 1918. Bock, Kurt. "Das Verhaltnis Fichtes zu Kant nach der Rezension des Aenesidemus und den beiden Einleitungen in die Wissenschaftslehre." Philosophisches Jahrbuch 34 (1921): 50-63. Brandt, Reinhard. "Fichtes 1. Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre ( 1798)." Kant-Studien 69 (1978): 67-89. Breazeale, Daniel. "Fichte on Skepticism." Journal of the History of Philosophy 29 (1991): 77-102. - - - . "How to Make an Idealist: Fichte's 'Refutation of Dogmatism' and the Problem of the Starting Point of the Wissenschaftslehre." Philosophical Forum 19 (1988): 97-123· - - - . "The 'Standpoint of Life' and the 'Standpoint of Philosophy' in the Context of the J ena Wissenschaftslehre ( 1794-180 1)." In Transzendentalphilosophie als System, ed. A. Mues, pp. 81-104. Cantoni, Alfredo. "La 'Teoria della Scienza' del 1798 diG. A. Fichte." Pensiero. Rivista quadrimestrial di Filosofr.a 3 ( 1958): 51-68. Dusing, Edith. "Sittliche Aufforderung: Fichtes Theorie der Interpersonalitat in der WL nova methodo und in der Bestimmung des Menschen. In Transzendendentalphilosophie als System, ed. A. Mues, pp. 174-97.
478
Bibliography
Edelmann, Herbert. Der Begriff des lch. Zum Problem des Selbsbewufllseins in Fichtes Wissrnschoftslehre. Inaugural Dissertation. Koln, 1971. Flach, W. "Fichte iiber Kritizismus und Dogmatismus." Zeitschrift fur PhillJsophi.sche Forschung 18 ( 1964): 585-96. Franke, Alfred. "Kann man das System Fichtes im Philosophieunterricht behandeln?" Piidagagi.sche Prcruinz: Unterrichl und Erziehung, Deuuch---Geschichte---Sozialkunde~PhillJsophie 14 ( 196o): 96-103. Griswold, Charles. "Fichte's Modification of Kant's Transcendental Idealism in the Wis.senschaftslehre of 1794 and Introductions of •797·" Awlegung 4, 2 (n.d.): 132-51. Hammacher, Klaus, ed. Der transundent.ale Gedanke: Die gegenwartige Darstellung der PhillJsophie Fichtes. Hamburg: Meiner, 1981. Heimsoeth, Heinz. Fichte. Munich: Reinhardt, 1923. - - - . "Fichtes Systementwick.lung in seinen Jenenser Vorlesungen." Bliitter for Deutsche PhillJsophie 13 (1939): 156-72. Henrich, Dieter. Fichtes ursprii.ngliche Einsichl. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1967. [Trans. David l..achterman. "Fichte's Original Insight." Crmtemporary Gennan Philosophy 1 (1g82): 15-52.] Hohler, Thomas. "Intellectual Intuition and the Beginning of Fichte's Philosophy: A New Interpretation." Tijdschrift voor Filasofie 37 (1975): 52-73. Hunter, C. K. Der lnterpersonalil.iiLrbewei.s in Fichtes .frii.her angewandter prakl.i.scher PhillJsophie. Meisenheim am Glan: Hain, 1973. Jalloh, Chernor Maaijou. Fichte's Kant-Interpretation and the Doctrine of Science. Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1988. Koch, Reinhard. Fichtes Theurie des Selbstbewu{llseins: ihre Enlwicklung von den "Eignen Medit.ationen fiber Element.arPhilosophie" 1793 bis zur "Newm Bearbeitung der W.L" 18oo. Wiirzburg: Konigshausen und Neumann, 1989. l..achs,John. "Fichte's Idealism." American PhillJsophical (!Julrterly 9 (1972):3II-18. Massolo, Arturo. "La W.L. del 1798: Filoso£-.a e genesi." In Fichte e Ia filosofrn., pp. 93-152. Florence: Sanzoni, 1948. Masullo, Aldo. La communitU. come fondamenJo: Fichte Hwserl Sartre. Naples: Libreria Scientifica, 1965. Mues, Albert, ed. Iranszendent.alphilosophie als System: Die Aweinandersetzung zwischen 1794 und 18o6. Hamburg: Meiner, 198'9. Neuhouser, Frederick.. Fichte's Theory of Subjectivi,..,_ Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 19go. Oberbeil, Fritz. Die transundent.ale Synthesis: Entwuif und Geschichte der Hauptfrage in Fichtes Jenrnser Wi.ssrnschaftslehre. Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 1985. Pareyson, Luigi. "Die Wahl der Philosophie nach Fichte." Trans. Horst Seidl. In Epimeleia. Die Sorge der Philosophie um den Mrnschen. Ed. Franz Wiedmann, pp. 3o-6o. Munich: Pustet, 1964. Perrinjaquet, Alain. La conscience de soi com me point de dipart de lo. philosophie dans Ia d.eu:cieme exposition de lo. doctrine de Ia science de]. G. Fichte (ecrits de 1796 a 1799). Memoire presente pour !'obtention de Ia licence es lettres. Neuchatel, 1g85. - - - . "La methode deductive dans Ia seconde exposition de Ia Doctrine de Ia science." Revue de thiologie et de phillJsophie 123 (1991): 275-92. Philonenk.o, Alexis. "Die intellektuelle Anschauung bei Fichte." In Der transcendent.ale Gedanke, ed. Klaus Hammacher, pp. 91-106.
Bibliography
479
Rabb, J. Douglas. ':J. G. Fichte: Three Arguments for Idealism." ldealutic Studie.! 6 (1976): 169-77· - - . ~Lachs on Fichte." Dialogue 12 (1973): 480-85. Renaut, Alain. Le syJteme du droit: PhiloJophie et droit iWns Ia peruee de Fichte. Paris: Presses U niversitaires de France, 1986. Salvucci, Pasquale. Dialettica e immaginaz.ione. Urbina: Argalia, •g63. - - - . "Fichte imerprete di K.am nella 'Seconda inmxluzione alia Dourina della Scienza.' " In Grand lmerpreti di Kant, Fichte e Schelling, pp. g-84. Serie di Leure e Filosofia, Vol. 9· Urbina: Pubblicazioni dell' Universit3 di Urbina, •9s8. Schondorf, Harold. "Der Leib in der Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo.'' In Der Leib im Denken Schopeniw.uerJ und Fichtes, pp. 7o-8o. Munich: Berchmans, 1982. Stolzenberg, J iirgen. Fichw Begrijf der intellektuellen Anschauung: Die Entwicklung in den Wruenschaftslehren wn I793/94 his I8oi/o:z. Stuugan: Kleu-Cotta, 1986. Suber, Peter. "A Case Study in Ad Hominem Arguments: Fichte's Science of Kn(JU)ledge." Philosophy and Rhetoric 23 (1ggo): 12-42. TIIIiete, Xavier. "Erster Fichte-Rezeption. Mit besonderer Beriicksichtigung der imellektuellen Am;chauung." In Der transz.endentale Gedanlu!, ed. Klaus Hammacher, pp. 532-43. Wundt, Max. "Die Wissenschaftslehre von 1797·" In Fichte-Fonchungen, pp. 77141. Stuugan: Frommann, 1929.
Additional Sources Allison, Henry E. The Kant-Eberhard Controversy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973. Baumanns, Peter. FichUs Wissenschaftslehre: Probleme ih.res Anfangs. Bonn: Bouvier, 1974· Beck, Lewis White. Early German PhiloJophy: Kant and Hu PredeceJSorJ. Cam· bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969. Beiser, Frederick C. The Fate of Reason: German Philosqphy from Kant to Fichte. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987. Breazeale, Daniel. "Between K.am and Fichte: Karl Leonhard Reinhold's 'Elementary Philosophy.'" Review of Metaphysics 35 (1982): 785-821. - - - . "Fichte's Aenesidemw Review and the Transformation of German Idealism. Review of MetaphyJicJ 34 (1981): 545-68. di Giovanni, George, and H. S. Harris, trans. Between Kant and Hegel. Texts in tht Developme'nt of Post-Kantian ldealum. Albany: Stale University of New York Press, 1985. Fuchs, Erich, ed. ]. G. Fichte im Gespriich: Berichte der ZeitgenoJJen. 5 vols. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstan: Frommann-Holzboog, 1978--. Hirsch, Emanuel. FichUs ReligioruphiloJphie im &Amen der phiiosophiichen Gesamtentwicklung FichUs. GOningen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1914. Jacobi, Friedrich Heinrich. David Hum~~ iiber den G!Duben oder Idealismw und Realiimw. Ein Gesprach (1787). Rpt., with an introduction by Hamilton Beck, as VoL 11 in a series entitled "The Philosophy of David Hume." New York: Garland, 1983.
480
Bibliography
- - - . Werke. Leipzig: Gerhard Fleisher, 1812-. Rpt., ed. Friedrich Roth and
Friedrich Koppen. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1976. Kant, ImmanueL Critique of Judgment. Trans. Werner S. Pluhar. Indianapolis: Hackeu, 1987. - - - . Crit;iqu£ of Practical Reason. Trans. Lewis White Beck. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956. - - - . Crit;iqu£ of Pure Ri!a.son. Trans. Norman Kemp Smilh. London: Macmillan, 1963. - - - . Foundatioos of the Metaphysics of Morals. Trans. Lewis White Beck. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1959. - - - . Cd.!am1TU!lte Schriften. Ed. Konigliche Preu~ischen Akademie der Wissenschaflen, 1902-10; rpt., Berlin: de Gruyler, 1g68. - - . The Metaphysical Elements of Justice. Trans. John Ladd. Indianapolis: Hobbs-Merrill, 1965. ---."Metaphysical Foundations ofNamral Science." In Philosft!Jhy of Maurial Nature. Trans. James W. EHington. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1985. ---."Perpetual Peace." Trans. Lewis While Beck. In On History, pp. 85-135. Indianapolis: Hobbs-Merrill, 1g63. - - - . Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics. Trans. Lewis White Beck. Indianapolis: Hobbs-Merrill, 1950. Kodalle, Klaus-M., ed. Karl Christian Friedrich Krause (1781-18]:2): Stu.dien zu seiner Philosft!Jhie und zum Krawismo. Hamburg: Meiner, 1985. Lauth, Reinhold. Traruumdentale Entwicklungslinien von Descartes bU zu Marx und Dostojewski. Hamburg: Meiner, 1989. - - - . Die traruz.endentaie Naturlehre Fichtes nach den Primipien der Wissenschaftslehre. Hamburg: Meiner, 1984. Manninen, Juha. "Hoijer und Fichte. Ein Syslemprogramm aus dem Jahre 1799." In Traruumdentalphilosft!Jhie als S~tem, ed. A. Mues, pp. 264-g3. Oesch, Martin, ed. Aw der Friihzeit des deutschen Idealismw: Texte zur Wissenschaftslehre Fichtes 1794-1804. Wiirzburg: Konigshausen und Neumann, 1987. Reinhold, Karl Leonhard. Beytrage zur Berichtigung bisheriger Mis.rventiindnisse der Philosft!Jhen. Vol. I. Jena: Mauke, 1790· - - . Ueber da.s Fundament des philosft!Jhischen Wisseru. 1791. Rpt., Hamburg: Meiner, 1978. - - . Ver.ruch einer neuen Theorie rhs menschlichen Vorstellungsvenni>geru. 1789. Rpl., Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschafl, 1963. Schelling, F. W. J. The Unconditiunal in Human Knowlege: Four Early &says ( 17941796). Trans. FrilZ Marti. Lewisburg, Pa.: Bucknell Universily Press, 198o. Schiller, F. C. S. Friedrich Schiller on the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters. Trans. Reginald Shell. New York; Ungar, 1965. Schnack, lngeborg, ed. Der Briefwechsel zwischen Friedrich Carl von Savigny und Stephan August Winkelmann (18otr-18o4) mit Dokumenten und Briefen aw dem Freundeskreis. Marburg: Elwerl, 1984. Spinoza, Baruch de. The Collected Works of Spinoza. Trans. Edwin Curley. Princeton: Princeton Universily Press, 1985.
INDEX
(Note: Unitalicized page numbers refer to the transcripts of Fichte's lectures, as translated in this volume. Page numbers in italics refer to the editor's introduction and notes.) absolute, absoluteness, 114, 136, 251, 261, !171, 288, jog, 410, 423, 427, 4j8,441 abstnction, 97, 101, 161, 227, 235. 263, 275· 284,291·347.376.405-6, 433n,461,470 accident, 127, 133, 164, 189, 246, 410-11, 421,433no442o444 Su also substance act/action/acting (of the I), 70, So, 84, 116, 152· 163, 171, 2!J9. 243· 28385.450-51, 46g absolute, 162, 250 actual, 128, 161 and being, 346 concept of, 68, •57• 275, 45• free, 70, 9"· g8-gg, 126, 150, t68, •75· 182,234·"38-39·357 future, 187 internal, I I 0 necessary, g8, Ioi, tog, 121, 126, 172, 238 ~nal, 102, 126,234·416-17 physical,275o456 of positing, 84-85 possibilitiesof,69, 172,175, 177,18o-81 possible, 161, '75• 259, 401 productive, 141 sensible, 272, 392 spiritual, 305 &• .W.. activity; freedom; I; limit(s)Jlimi· tation/limited condition Act (Tathandlu.ng), u-IJ, 110, 118 See also I; self-consciousness activity (of the 1), 93, I l l , I 22, u:8, I 3334• 140,225,428,441
absolute, 190 concept of, 131 consciousness of, 111, 162, 187, 283, 397'"i18 determinable, lll7-29, 132 determinate, llii-23, 128, '57 ideal, 27, 67, 73, 14o-49, 15D-52, '55· 162-63, J68-6g, •75-76, '79· 182, 186, 190-9'· '93-95·200-202, 2o8, 211-lll, 218-19, 2U-22, 225, 230,234,268, 273• 293•305, !J''• !J13-14,!J34·364. 439 inner, 173n, 1lh intuiting, 187 limited, 22 1 original limitation of, 1136 outer, 173n practical, 152, 155-56, 163, 167, 174, 192-93, u2, u9, 225 productive, 131, 142,403, 44" pure, 166, 434· 436 real, 27, 67, 73· 140-48, 150-52, '5556, !6o-62, •7!!-76, 182, t87, '90-9•· 193. 195· 201-2,211,215, 221, 273·3•!1-14.334·4!19 self-reverting, 65, 74• 94-95, 97. 99· llt-12, 117-•9- j02 spiritual, 439 &• also act/action/acting; I; thinking/ thought actuality, • 6•-fi!J, •65-66
~us,r-2.94
&e also Schulze, Gottlob Ernst Ludwig; skepticism aesthetic judgment, 229n aesthetics, sciena: of, 472-74
aesthetic sense, 473-74 affectability, system of, 207-8 affection, 176, 217, 3'3· 32!1> 363,452 Srr alstJ feeling; self-affection agility, 67, 116, '33· 141, 239. 361, 395. 397·404-6.4o8. 417 Allg11!11U?im Lileralur-Zeitung, 1-2, 1 15 alteration, 205, 210, 278-79, 300 concept of, 323-114 of feelings, 6g. 205, 207, 213-14, 21617,220,222,266,287,299. :;o8,313 analysis, 85, tog-tt, 136, 278, 358-59. 365-66,368, 371,373·38o, 382, 400,403,468 analytic method, procedure, or thinking 182, 285. 297-98. 365-66, 38o-8t, 383,387,407 animals, 205, 468 antinomies of reason, 466 a posteriori, 243, 282, 381 apperception, pure, 193 a priori, tSo, 240, 282, 284, 310, 381, 414,45 1 Atheism Controversy, 17, 19, 25, 26, 28,40
autonomy, 423 Bardili, C. G .• 20, 24, JO, Beck, Jakob Sigismund, 103-4• 109, 240 becoming, 131 being, 147-48, 165, 170, '7"• 183, 185, 310,319-21,334,346, 359o42425,433no438-39.456 absolute, 314 and activity, 172 actual, 131,428 concept of, 67, 1!14, 131, 134 consciousness of, !H6 empirical, 320, 329 external, 214 free, 234 higher, incomprehensible, 352 intelligible, 344n of the I, 112, •T~>· 214,216,218, 311-12,314,320,407-8·433-34n. 449 of the Not-1, 124, 131, 170, 185, 197n, 198·445 of objects, 199, 216, 211.7, 320 posited, 404 rational, 331. 436 realm of (including being of other rational beings), 72-74, 302-5, 307, 3'3· 344· 351-53· 357. 436-37· 444-47·457·458-59·461-63.46465. See also freedom; I; individual; individual/individuality
sensuous or sensible, 281, 414. See also thing/things, actual supersensible, 414 and thinking, identity of, 357. 362, 369, 38 J. 396, 426 and willing, 311,319,369 See also actlaaionlaaing; doing; l, being of; thinlinglthought belief/faith, 318 in one's own self-sufficiency and freedom, 95, 143 in reality of external thinSl, 107 body, 209,254.320-22,326-28,331, 396.418-tg,4'll as articulated instrument, 176, 25455. 321, 3~4. 327, 45g-61, 462n, 464-65 human, 208, ~t87, 3~8, 341, 345, 390, 421,457-59 as an organic whole, 73• 76, 254,321 union of, with mind or spirit, 321,420 See a/.sn organ: outer; spirit, or mind;· world: corporeal categories (of the understanding), 356, 387.390-91,421-22 deduction of, 83, 162, 387 s~ also causality; ground, foundation, basis; interaction; substance; substan tiality causality, 228, 254· 258. 289, sum, 362', 378.408,455 category of, 387,390-91, 409· 412, 416,421-22 concept of, 75• 182, 424,442 law of, 76, 105, 238, 356, 465 synthesis of, 41 5-16 and time, 368, 442 See also efficacy; willing, act of certainty, of first principles, g6 check (An.rtoj'l), 183 choice, free: freedom or power of (Wil.l:ilr), 68, 88, •6o, 165, 168, 175, t8t, 286-89.316,321,346-48, 359·375·396·435 See also freedom; will; willing, act of circularity, 72, •44• 205n, 284-87, 300-7, 336. 339· 352, 353n. 377· 412, 446,4460 of dogmatism, 144 of human understanding, 184 of philosophkal explanation and rea· son, 89, 333 cognition (Erkmntnu)/knowing (..,.kmn.m), 134-35.346,349-51,361-62, 38o, 470 a posteriori, 284 empirical, 347
cognition (conlinued) immediate, 35& objective, or of object11, 232, 283-85, 3o8-g, 341, 347 of th ct of acting, 348-49, 3&4 of ities of action, 175, 177, 181 practical, 346 .sensible or sensuous, 346, 391 systematic, 84 Set also knowledge concentration/contraction, act of, 2 r,g-6o, 263,26!j,348,36o concept (Begr'!l})lcomprehending (/Mgrtijen), 70, 117-20, 127, 221-24, 23~· 272 absolute, 34 1 first, 352 of the I, 70, 129-30 immediate, 129 indeterminate, 105 intelligible, 27 2 and intuition, 117-19, 123, 1>1g-3o, 11111,4011 or the Not-1, 7o original, 344-45 pure, 2611 sensible or .sensuous, 1161, 408 synthetic, 1171 Set also feeling; goal, concept of; I; intuition/intuiting; thinking/thought; willing, act of consciousness, g6-g7, •37· 371, 381,423, 4116,446,465 absolute, 3&8 actual, 67-68, 78, 146, 255 beginning of, 271, 2go, 327, 346-48, 354·358, 36?-7°·4'4 center of, 371, 373, 4 12 conditions (for the possibility) of, 85, 146, 15&· 169, 237, 283, 295, 345· 3&4 contents of, 176, 359, 467-68 deduction of, 96, 167,307,381, 423 dual aspect of, 420, 429 empirical, 73•lJI7• 330-gl, 348,429 first moment of, 33!'>· 343, 338 history of, 342 identity of, 443 immediate, 65-66, 111, 113-14, 118-2o, 125,128-29,134,142, '44-4!'>• •7576. 223, 200, 262, 28g, 311, ggo, .1J46, 3 59·s6s,397-9B,412,455 inner, 344 inner nature of, 4 • 7 intelligible, a6g levels of, 105 material, 17 5 mediated or indirect, 176, 283, 392-93, 397
obj&t of, 67, 152, 162, 2ljll. 118g, go6, 330,350,354 of objects, 88, 385 of one's state as a whole, 31 1-1 •, !114-
•&
ordinary,g•-92,95. 104, '97· •gg,217, 227,28t-82,398,4o3,4o8,4••12, 441 original, 155, 34&· 365 origin and ground of, 68, g6, 128, 17 4. 292-94·3•4-•5·318,lj22.326, 331·342-43·353·381,4'5·451 outer, 344 possibility of, 229, 27r,, 1183, 1187, 292, 295, 326, ggo sensible or sensuous, 294,1Jo6, 415 unity of, 72, 136, 151, 264, 1166, 275 Set also I; self-consciousness; synthesis constraint/constrained condition (of the I), 156-57· 100, J68-6g, 177n feeling of, 93 See also limits/limitation/limited condition continuity, 159· 266, 270 conviction, 81 Cotta, ]. F., 24
'!r"•
deduction, So, 83, 149, 167, 19.t:, 243, .!155·446 character of, within the Wilsmscha(tsuAre, 8~1. gg, 125, 138, 243, 401 See also categories; proof/proving deed, 172n, 226 degree, 171 , 200 deliberation, 259-fio, 263-64, 293,317, 348,367• .!16g-7o,4o6-7,428-29 demand, 310, 363 categorical, 259, 291-92 dependence, relationship of, 72, 26773,275,285-86, .!155·367• .!178. 390>415 desire, 294-95 See also will; willing, act of determinability, 1!16-27, 133, l.!j!}, 14&· 147. 155. s~-49. 356-r.7. 410, 446 concept of, 67, 127, 407 principle of, 67, 116n, 146 determinable, what is, 121-22, 155, 156n, 100, 165-66, 168-7•· '79· 225, 235-411,2!}3.274· 281, 28g, 2g8, .!j02,346-51,.'J!jT-58·376, .!18687.400-405·410,419-20,424· 4.!14·436·4.!19·444·446, 451-54· 400,46& infinite divisibiUty of, 1!)6, 158, 16g70,403 total .rum of, 157-58
Index determinacy, 133, 135, 147, 155, 169, 176, 236,289.347·361,407,429-30, 436-g8,444·449 determinate, what is, 122, 147-48, 16o, 165-66, 177, 179-80, 225, 238, 250,274,284, 297-gg,goo-go2, gog-1o,g46-51, 357-58•379·4oo402, 410, 4•9-21, 436, 451-54· 400,465 determination/determining, act of, 118, 134· 363,386-87, 39"'·400, 405, 424·432 of place, 72, 2!;0-52, 257, 272, 276 absolute, 246, 2!;0, 256 Su also space: determination or mea· surement of divisibility, 156, 200, dogmatismldogmatisl:!, 30, 91-93. 131, 133, 144, 164, 180, 226, 279, 330, 338-39·340n,395·4•8,424 Critical, 91 vs.. idealism or criticism, 91-g6, g8, 105, 322, 330, 339 doing (instance of doing) (Tun), 191, 237-39· 272-73·3'3·33 1·405, 407,428 and being, identity of, 363, 424-25 con!lCiousness of, 327-28, 397 determinate, 237. 239 inner, 345 intuition of, 236, 327-28 sensible, 393 drive, 69, 172-75, 181, 183, 288, 2g6 categorical, toward acting, 295 consciousness of, 175 for content (Sachtrit-/1), 186, 191 as what is highest or primary, 181 of the intellect, •gm multiplicity of, 178 natural, 178 toward real activity, 191 toward reflection, 191 toward representation, 191n dualism, 164 duration, temporal. See time "Dutch !lCholar," 43-44, 47, 304, 30411 duty, 102, 437, 439, 469 consciousness of, 293 efficacy (Wirk.amkeil), 275, 327-28, 458 of the I, 16o, 290, 300, 386-87, ggo, 412,442-43· 448,455.459 inner, 264 real. 72, 276, 3o6-7 of willing, 72, 270, 275 See als& causality; force Elementary Philosophy, 2, 11-13
Su also philosophy/philosopher, Critical;
Reinhold, Karl Leonhard empiricism/empirical world (Empire), 240, 380, 412, 41i8-69 enduring, what is, 2 10 energy. See force ethical law, 287, 291, 305, gog, 338, 439·469 Stt alto imperative, categorical; morality ethics, theory of, 309. 469-7o, 472 ellistence, 325, 334 actual, 104 experience, go-g•, 100, 161, 210, 284, 34on,363,38•,ggo,442,468-6g deduction of, 162 definition of, 85, 105, 161 ground or foundation of, 90-91, 245, 26g,g26 possibility of, 223, 340, 469 reality of, 104 relationship of philosophy and the Wis· senschafi.
feeling (continued) of prohibition, 294 of pure willing, 295 and reflection, 176, 329-30 of striving, 202, 294 system of, 69, 254 as what is primary and original, 17678, 220, 330 Sa also intuition/intuiting; manifold, the; thinking/thought; willing, act of Feuerbach, Paul Johann Anselfm, 1o8n Fichte, Johann Gottlieb: in Berlin, 19, 26, J1 in Jena, J-4• 28, 4'7 in Zurich, 2, 4 works: Anweisung zum s~ligen ult.m (Guide w IN Blessed Lifo), J2-JJ Bardili Review, 20 Beridu Uhtr lim Bl!griff der Wi.ut!FI.1.Ciwfts· hhu,9 DU Be;sti:mmr.mg deJ Menschen (The Vocatitm of Man), 19, 26-29 "Eigne Mediutionen uber ElementarPhilosophie," Jn Der gesch/ossem Handelst.aal, 2 o, 2 6 Grundlag~ der ge.sam.tm Wissnucha[Wehre (F~
of 1M Enl.irt
Wi.unt-
JCho.ftshhre), J-1), 1j, 16ft, I'J, 22.J'J, 8 5-86, 118, 134-38, 173, 181-86, 240, •48, .'114· 371, 38 1.437 Grundlage deJ Naturreclu.s (Found4titms of Natural. JUghi), 8, 10, 22, J7, 318, 343·352 Grultdriu des EignUil~ der WiuenscJr.aftskhr~ (Oul/.ine of 1M Dittinctive Cho.racln of 1M Wi.unucho.ft.lehr$), 6-'J, 17, ••· J'J, 85-86, :r34. •454s, 28 3 ¥Logic and Metaphysics" (Planter lectures), .ogn, 4]. 432, 433-34n, 4JJ-J411
Stm.nenA:Iarn Beric4t (Sun-Ckar ~). 2()-21, 2
"Vergleichung des von Henn Prof. Schmid aufgestellten Systems mit der Wissenschaftslehre" ("A Comparison between Prof. Schmid's System and the Wi.unuchaftshhre"), 911 Vtrm.:h tiner neuen Dorsullung der Wi<Jenstha{Wehrt (AUempt a1 a New PresenJal.itm of IN Wi.uenscha{tskhrt ), In,
9•
18-19,25-2~J'J-J8
"Von der Sprachflihigkeit und dem Ursprung der Sprache," 444 Wi.uenschaftshhrt nooo 'fTU!/JtodiJ, 13-27, JJ-49
Halle Transcript, 11-12, J4-J9• 4 1-49
Krause Transcript, 35-41 Wwnudwftshhre of 1800, 26-2'], JO "Zurich lectures," 4 finitude, human, 93, 1 84, 273, 295, !P'· 337.430·440 &e also being, rational fivefoldness, 371, ·P7-28, 434 Sn also synthesis; original, highest, or primary flow, flowing, •og. '~99· 355, 379• 397, ' 410, 414-15,428, 450 force (enei"K)') (Krafl), 141, 183, 1148, 258.~~.~6g-72, 325· 401,405, 417,428 concept of, 271-72 feeling of, 265 free, 415 inner, 72, 265, 275, 355· 361-62, 405, 421 of the intellect, 265 natural, 270, 417, 466 ori gina!, 32 1 outer, 72, 275 physical, 76, ~7o-72, 274-71), 408, 4.57-.59·465.470 pure, 72, 265, 26g, 275 self-active, 4311 self-determining. 414, 4~8-29 sensible or sensuous, 26g-7 1, 327, 38g90·392,418,424 form, systematic, 1 o See also intuition/intuiting: form of freedom. 67-68,70, 79, 132, 144-50, 156-57, • 59-oo. 169, 218-1 9 , 227.~38,241· 244-47· :~86-87. :r88,352,423·431·434-36.43839·44'~·445·447·450·454·456.
461,464 absolute, 68, 137, 140, 142-43, 145, 147-48, 150, 157n, a66, 244, 288, 315-16 of acting, 26.5 analagrm (analogue) of, 403
Index freedom (conlinued) as the basis of consciousness, 68, 139. 142-45· 147· 151, 2'<10, 288,366 con~ousnesso~g2, 95· g8, 36162,436 and constraint, 219-20, 222. Su ai.Jo constraint/constrained condition; limit/limitation/limited condition determinacy of, 435-36 feeling of, 69, 93 first act of, 234 formal, 167-68 general sphere or realm of, 75• 156, 445• 447• 453-5!). 465. See al.Jo being: rational; individualfindividuality; rea$<)11; realm of of ideal activity, 71, 218, 227, 429 as immediate object of consciousness, 182 as independent being, 75 ofthe intellect, 2510 intuition of, 75· 141, '59 limitation of, 338 material (practical, real), 168 and nature, 464 object of, 178 of others outside me, 27-29, 75, 303, 445• 448-49· Su o.i.Jo being: rational; l; individualfindividuality possibility of, 2o5n as the power to begin a series, 288-8g, 2g6, 423 as the principle, starting point, and standpoint of philosophy. 143-44. 220, 4~
of reflection, 191, u6-27. Su als<J refl.,ction; thinking/thought of thinking, 265 Su alrc act/action/acting; activity; consciousness; I; task of self limitation genetic account or presentation, 92, 106, 36o,gBg genetic demonstration, 381 genetic description, s87 genetic explanation, 100 genetic origination, 437 genetic procedure or method, 77 genetic understanding, 2 1g, or Jrl, 242, 366,g8o,g87 genius, philosophical, 1•7 given, the (what is discovered), 109, 127119, 132, 156-57· •fis, 171, •94-95, 200,2 34 , • 38, • 4 o,2 4 2, 244 , 27 o, 2g8, ,300. 320, .!J4on, 347· 352-5311, 379·387.397·40J,424·427,43537·442-43·450-51,466-68,473
goal, concept of, .17n, 68, 148, 150, 152, •ss. •s6. 161, •67-69, •75· 18o, 187-89. 198, 204, 223, 283-85. gog, 318, 338, 341-411,346-47, ss•-53.s68-fi9,372-79·384-85, 387-93·395-97·400·409-10,41213, 418, 422, 428-llg, 440-4f, 450-51, 454 See o.i.Jo will; willing, act of God, 28, JO, 81, 102, 165, 173• 174n, 1130-32, 295·418-t9,433-34n, 46o existence of, 79, 231, 436 ground, foundation, basis (Grund), 88-go, 104, 114, 149· 423 category of, 387 principle of, 387 real, 356, 390 Hemen, Paulus van, 41· 304 holiness, 295 Hommel, Karl Ferdinand, g8 Hulsen, August Ludwig, 262 Hume, David, 79 I·
aboolute, 434 absolute freedom of, 315 actual, 152 appearance of, 168, character or essence of, 96-97, 112, 142n, 148. 150-51, 153· 172, •go. 217,261,300,311,358.365.38081,391, 403·425·447·450, 458 as concept and intuition, 129-30 concept of, 65, 6g, 97• 99. 110, 112, 114-15, 119, 124. 129, 132-34. l!U, 261, 4ll2, 424 corporeal, 458 determinable, 333-34, 337 determinacy or determinate state of, 176-78.291.310-11,333-34·337· 383. 402, 431· 448 determinate determinability of, 452 dual aspect of, 151-52, 196, 333, 335·339.341.361-62,365,4'6, 425. 447 empirical, 315 existence for itself of, llfl4, 358. s6f, 4 24·433-34n feeling of, 192-93. 195, 198, 201-2,209 ideal, 185, 202, 253, 333n, 396 identity of, 68, 434n as identity of doing and being, 363 as identity or union of whaL is ideal and what is real, 363, gg6 independence of, 181
I (continued)
individual, 502, 307, 310, .!115· 537,351, 355• 570, 437. 46g. See also being; rational, realm of; individual/ individuality infinite, 183 intelligible, 290, intuition of, 65-66, 164, 18o, 209 limited state of, 183-84, '99• 202, 2045, 2111, 214, 216, 220, 2ll2, 225, 294 and Not- I, 66-67, 95· Stt also Not-I objective aspect of, 26g, 467 original, 201,236,285, .!II'• !P4 original determinancy of, 172, !JtlO-.!IOI, 30.!1·.!1•2-13·323-24 original limitation of, 223, 243, 313, 4.!14· 44'· 465 as philosophical starting point, 10911,424 practical, 152, •56, 16o-61, 18o, 184, 198, 202, 253 pure, 104, 165,420, 437• 459 real, 185, 211-111, 333n, 376, 397 reality of, 152, 311, 314 self-positing of, 65, 95, 97-100, 105, tt2-t6, 118-2o, 123-24, '39· '5'• • 55 • 167, 183, •93· 204, 225, 4 •5 • 425. See also Art; activity: selfreverting; Kif-consciousness spiritual. 254, a61, go•. 424 as subject/object, 82, 1 11, 113-15, 1 o8, '44· •48. 151--52, 333· 370, 3¢· 419-20,430 substance of/substantial, 129, 131, 431, 44 1. Stt o./Jo being: of the I theoretical, 185, 1gB. Stt aLso intellecrf intelligence true, 292 unity of. 280 s~~ aLso activity; body; consciousness; finiiUde; freedom; 1-hood: intellecrf intelligence; self-consciousness; self-determining, act of; spirit, or mind; will Idea, 79· 125, 129, 144, 152, 164n, 165, 185, 200, 207, :n8, 231,300,310, 329·4'3·435.44'·452 ideal, the, '5'· tgB, 200, 333• 392, 39495· 4'5 consciousness of, 6g. 150 and the real, • 70, .!159 ~~ a/Jo activity; intuition/intuiting; thinking/thought idealislnlidealists, 78, 81, 91-96, gS-ooo, 102-7, 121, '3!1> 144, 3'9· .!122, 338·.!190 Critical, 99• 103, 121, 164,277,285, 302, S.!IO
of inner sense (of time), 370 non-Critical or "groundless," 99· 100, 164 of outer sense (of space), 370 pure, 422 scientific, g8-gg starting point of, 105 task of, g8, too transcendent, 184 tr.uucendental, r, 299,332-33·339• 370,381,391n,4o2,404•4o8, 419,458 Stt also Kantianism; philosophy/philosopher: Critical; Wissenst:hn{tslehu 1-hood, 811:, 11'5· .!1.!13· .!145· 359· 370, 38o, 396. 41JI, 419,425, 437· 441 image (Bilii) and thing, 149, 152, 197. 212, 268 imagination/power of imagination, 74-75, 245· 26g,398-409·4•4-15·4•9· 421-22,428,432,455 deduction of, 40 1 and intuition, 266 and judgment, 403-4 productive, 18g, 299,399, 402,438, 440 theory of, tSg, .!193-422 reproductive, 1go and thinking, 40 1-2, 4 15, 420-21 transcendental, 1 17 Su t:lho oscillation or hovering; synthesis; thinking/thought immortality, 79· 81, 1oa imperative, categorical, 259, 293. 295. 437· 447 Stt also ethical law impulse. ~~ drive inability, cognition of, 329, 339· 345 indeterminacy, state of, 121-22, 133. 148 individual/individuality, 72-73, 75• 105, 287.304·350-51·355·437·4.!19· 445·447·449·452-53·455-56. 469"--70 Stt also being: rational; freedom; l; reason: realm of induction, So, '~43 infinitude, human, 93 infinity, 183, 200, 398-99. 440 intellect/intelligence, 68, 92, 150--53• 190, 195·337·390·4•8-19 determinacy of, t6o-6tn, 247 finite, 145 freedom of, 150-51, 181, 297-98 passivity of, 92 See also 1; thinking/thought intelligible, what is, 274-75, 281-82, 309• 320, 330· .!1.!14· 34.!1· 345· 347· 3!)0. 364·381,.!194 intended, what is, 127-29, 132, 137
Index intensity, 200, 248 interaction (reciprocitylreciprocal interaction [Wecluelwirllung]), 125, 135, 164, 170, 173, 182, 19f>, U3, 330, 347n, 357.416, 418,424· 441-42.464 category of, 391, 421-u intuitionlimuiting, 66, 114, 118-20, 12930, 134· 140-41, 151, 158.. 161, 165 , 19 1, , 95 , lii51, ll81, 3 23, 388.402 absolute, 164n and action, t68, 188, 195. 4!',1 character of, 188, 198, 433n concept of, 67 contem of, 193-95 determinate, 255n form of, 193, lii40, 244, 267, 283, 301, 366, 368 ofche I, 111,113-15, 127,209,212-13, 253·341 of the ideal, 6g, 202 immediate, 115 ioner, 127, 129, 130, 213, JZ82, 320, 341 intellectual, 65-66,72, 115, 127, 129, 130n, 133· 275.280-82, 2gD-91· 364.433-34n intelligible, 262 manifold of, 26g of the Not-1, 127 object of, 6g, 176, 194, 228. See also Not-1; thing/things: actual of oneself, 1o 1 original, 132 outer, 127, 130,213, 240, 244,301, 320-21,341 role of, in philosophy, 117, 125, 135-36 sensible, 262, 272, 28t-S2, 291, 4'3· 458 Su iJ/so conceptlcomprehendiog; doing; feeling; imagination/power of imagination; space; thinking/thought; time; willing jacobi, Friedrich Heinrich, 197, 410 works: David Hume iliMr dim Glo.u.bim, 19:711• 410 jacobi an Fichte, 29-~o judgment (power of), 303, 403-5 reflective, 303 Sre iJ/so imagination/power of imagina· tion; thinking/thought Kant, Immanuel, 1, jn, 11, 12, 38, 7!)-81, 83-84, a,, go, 95· 101, 103-4 • 115, 117, 124, 130, 143, 164, 178, 179n, 193, 191), 197n, 22 I, 230-32, 235, 238,240· 243·26o-62, 265.27172,278,282,288, 293-94,297-gS,
so3-5·326,3:~8,334.338,373·
s8o.sgo-g1,4o2,4o8-1o,42123,432·433-34n.439·447·46668.471 works: Critique of judgrnml, •78, 212n, 26m, 298, 303 Critique of Practic.al Reason, 298 Critique of Pun Reason, 2, 8, 8o, 103, 162, 243· 261, "77· 2g8, 305, 391, 409 MeiiJph.ysics of MMoo, 235. 288, 294 MeiiJph.ysics of Nature, 468 Perpetual Peau, 470 "Von eimem neuerdings erhobenen vomehmen Ton in der Philo.sophie," 163, 23 1 Su abo idealism/idealists; K.antianism; K.antian philosophy; philosophy/ philosopher; Critical K.antianism, go, 304 S<.K:alled, g 8o Kantian philosophy, 81, 164, ~77. 381 Fichte's criticism of, 82, 113, 151, 162,
243 See abo idealism/idealists; philosophy/ philosopher: Critical lmowledge (Wwm), immediate, 386, 424 See also cognition/knowing Krause, K. C. F.• )J-)6, 11 law/laws, 100 of intuition, too, 219 mechanical, 461, 468 natural, 150, 295, 461 organic, 468 of reason, loo-IOI, 103,229,231,238, 240, 383-34 supersemible, 471 Su OOD renection: laws of; thinking/ lhoug ht: laws of Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm von, 361 life, 265, limil51limitationllimited condition, 173, t82, 225-:16, 322 and acrionlactivity, 312-13 alteration of, 214-17 and consciousness, 184, 335 and doing, 31 3 and feeling, tgo, 212, 215,230 feeling of, 6g, 195, 200 andfreedom,201, 286-89, 293·43435· 447, 450, 457· See ooo freedom: and constraint and intuition, 212 moral, 450 original, 184, 217, 278 physical, 450
Index limiWiimitationllimited condition (conlin-t) quantum of, 215, 218, 225 and reflection, 183, 342 and striving, •98. 258 and willing, 325-26, 3!10-!jl, !1!15g6, !146 Stt also 1: original limitation of logic, 472-73 magnitude, negative, •3• Maimon, Salomon, 1 uSn manifold, the {multiplicity), 85, 96, •37• 155, 159n, too, 166, 169n, 170, 261,266-67,272,282,324-25, !145· 347· 365-66, g68, !171, g82, !19'· !199-404, 4o8-9. 415-17, 428,440 of feeling. 69. 177-78, 204-6, 267-68, 277· 282, 2!)0, 299, goB, !j11, 324 infinite divisibility of, 68, 165, •6!J, 171, 397· 438 unity of, 267, 27!1• 275-77, 279, 2!)0, 299, 305, 399 and wiiVwilling, 168, 178, 28o, 325, 326n, ggo, 335, 432 Stt also experien<X; imagination/power of the imagination; synthesis mankind, vocation, destiny, or nature of, 81, goo materialism, 164 matter, 177-78, 232, 241, 247-48, !194• 402,4!1!1n.438-!19· 445 as form of outer intuition, 244, 253. !101, !120-21, !174 infinite divisibiliry of, "44• 248, 462 in space, 71, 208, 241-42, 247, 254, 438 Set also space memory, 28o metaphysics, go. 41 7 mind. See spirit. or mind moral development, 1131 moraliry, 230, 295 theory of, 293 Stt also ethical Jaw; ethics, theory of: imperative, categorical movement, 398-400, 405, 428 consciousness of, !124-25, 414 "must,"435 mysticism, 334 nature, 75, 150, 178,205,2310,404,442, 445·459-64.468.471 as organized/organizing, 76, 302, 304, 461-66 philosophy of, •9-,;o, 4J See also Not-1 Nicolai, Friedrich, :14
Not-1, 12!1-"4• 1ll8, l!ll-32. 134-36, 162, 167, 189, 194-95, goa, 44D4•·443 and the 1, 124, 126, '!l!l· 163-65, 182, •85, 2•3, u6, Ulf, 441-43, 445· 462 concept of,6!J, 8g, ann independence of, 75 reality of, 185 Set also being: of the Not-1; manifold, the; nature; objeCIIobjects noumenonlnoumena, 24!1. 200-62, 271, 282, gog, 305,341,400,402, 40,5-6, 4o8,410,414•420,428-a9,4!l2, 4!19-40,442-43·448·454-55·400 objeCI/objects, 78, 124, 166, 188-Sg, 1129, 2!14· 24'· "57· 347. !l55· 416, 419> 440, 444· 400 actual or real, •98-99, 201, 1188, !193• 440 cognition of, 284-85 detenninable, •99->1:00 determinate, 199-~00 external, 77-78, 161-62, 194-97, 229, 242-43·26t,4oa-3 ideal, 254 of intuition, 188-Bg, 195 possible, 198-99, 201 sensible, 446 Set also being; imagination/power of imagination; intuition/intuiting; Not-1; synthesis objectivity, 166, 188, 208, n8-29, 237, 242,268, 270,298-99· 315,3888g.!l9!1·395.434 spiritual or inteUectual, !134 opposing, act of, 124, 111,5-36, 155, •6!J7•· 17gn. •8!1, t88, 191, •94· 200, 324, 401,448 law or principle of, 116, I 16ft, 123-25, '!13-34· lll9 organ, 331 inner, 327,329, 331, 335-36,338, !14'• 345 outer, 73, 3117,329, 3!1•. 335-36, 338, 34o-4 1 • 345 Stt also body organization, concept of, 461-62 origination, concept of, 291 oscillation or hovering (SchUJi'ben}, 68, 100, 166,200, 259·300-6t,g76.409· 429 ~e also imagination/power of imagination ought (Sollm), 72, 1191-92, 295-300, 337• 435-36·447·450,452 &" also feeling
490
Index
passivity/passive state (I..eiden). 93• 98, 363. 44 1 perception, 271, 322, 362, 376, 449, 452, 456 immediate, 359 >ensible, 327, 374• 452 period/periodum, synthetic, 371, 38385,42/ permitted, what is, 295 phenomenon/phenomena, 261-62, 443·448 Philosophistlus Journal einer Gesellschaft Ti!'UlstMr Gekhrtm, 18, 20, 444 philosophy/philosopher; as a science, 78~79• 90 concept and task of. JI-)2, n-'l9· 81, 87-90, 100, 309· 318,332,419, 430,469 Critical, 1o6, 358 Fichte's interpretation of, r-:z, l:l, 242,303·409 relationship to the Wissenschaft.slehre, 8, 297 systematic unity of, 1;: See also idealismlidealisu; Kant, Immanuel; Kantianism; Kantian philosophy; Wi.ssenschaft.slehre empty, tog first principle of, u, 95· 108-to, 118, 126 formulaic, 405 language and terminology of, lJ, Jl, 100-102, 394· 4'3· 4•5· 423, 430 method or procedure of, 235-36, 261 n, 339·363.37'· 401,4/4 need for, 8o-S r, 88 origin of, 88 Popular', 83, 8Jn possibility of, 89-91, 472-73 ofthe postulates, 471 practit:al, 4, 11, 85-86, 157, 182,46871,473 proof in, 82, 95· 101, 108-9, 118 real (rul}, 358, 472-73 starting point of, 430 systematic form of, Sll, 108 theoretical, 4, 11, Bs-86. '57· 182, 468-71, 473 transcendental, 122, 324, 332, 334• 34 1• 36o·371-73·381,458,472 See also dogmatismldogmatisu; idealisml idealists; intuition/intuiting; role of, in philosophy; Kant, Immanuel; reflection; viewpoint/point of view/ standpoint: philosophical; Wi.ssenschaft.slehre physics, 4 17
I,,
plants, 205, goo, 302n, 468 Planter, Ernst, 115, 421, 433n positing, g6 original, 84 Ste also consciousness: 1: self-positing of; self-determining, act of possibility, 161-63, 166 postulate/postulates, 92, 95, 102, 1Qg-1o, 121, 12,5-26, 134-35· 138, 1/8. 20!}. 208, 216-•7. 259· 297-98, 355· 451,471 power (Polem), 349 power, ability, or faculty (V""""gm), 12627, 140, 405, 407-8, 4a1, 431-32 empirical, 349 ideal, 69, 144, 1,52, 314 inner, 340 necessary, 172n outer, 340 practical, 140, 142, 147-53, 161, 168, 1/0. 183, 21!}, 22:0, "57-58 pure, of the intellect, 270 real,67-68, 145,152,314 sensuous or sensible, 432 theoretical, 226, 258 total, 402 Stt also feeling; imagination/power of intagination; intuition/intuiting; reason; reflection; thinking/ thought; willing, act of principle, regulative, 383 productive activity (Mi.idJm), 386 prohibition, feeling of, 292, 345 proof/proving, 82, to8-g, 136, 239, 386 qualitie~.
basic or elementary, 170, 171n,
'77
quantift.ability, 135 quantity, 135-37, 170, 387-88 quantum, t!}gn, 219,212,248,272,312, 420,457 of comprehending, 225 of determinability, 286-87, 289 of e!rtcacy, 444 of striving, 254, 258 Se~ also limiullimitationllimited condition real, the, 78, 141, 148, 170,333, 394-g6, 415, 437 and the ideal, tSa, 333· 359· 390• 392, 394-96 realism, 184 reality, 103, 228-29, 232, 434 of the actions described within philosophy, 103 of the Not· I, 185 See also being
Index reason: absolute, 352n determinate, 302 essence or character of, a3 finite, 105, 3 15 interest of, 95 levels of, 154-55 limits of, 104-5, 139, 27a, 330 and nature, 471 practical, J, 304, 470 primacy of, 12, 162-63 pure, 262 realm of, 75. 349-51, 355· 447-49, 452-!13· 455-57, 470. See al.so being: rational, realm of speculative, 394 system of, 37 4 theoretical, 1 I - I 2, 304 See al.so being: rational; I; freedom; thinking/thought reciprocity/reciprocal interaction. See lntefilction reflection, 66-67, 70, 73, a6, 133, •54· t6o, .a3. '93· 217,220,232. 3'4· 326,330,334-35·423 discunive character of, 73, 322 and feeling, 176, 217 freedom of, 99. tat, 219-20, 230,314'7•322,326, 330-31,335.342 laws of, a6, 12a-29, 134, 140, 333-34 object of, 70, 325, 450 power of, 334 pure, 120 reflective opposition, law of, 125 Reinhold, Karl Leonhard, 2, J, _51l, Io-12, lf, 2f, 31, 109-10, .a5n, t8a, 27a. 4o8 Set al.so Elementary Philosophy; philosophy/philosopher: Critical religion, philosophy of, 29, 471 Set al.so God repose, state of (Ruht), 66, 116-19, 12223, 126-28, 130-31, •33· 324-25 representation, 141, 372, 38o, 399, 433n, and acting, 162-63, 218, 337 consciousness of, 7a deduction of, 162-63 and feeling, tgo, 230 fint, 351 freely produced, 129 laws of, 222, 42a necessary (accompanied by feeling of necessity), a7-a9, 91, !)6-97. too, 102-3 objective validity of, 78-79. a4. a,, 102-3, tgon, 230-32, 24a, 252 and objects or things, 70, 7a. a4, a7, .aa,2.a, 227, 233· 362
491
origin of, 102, 261 positing of, 3a9 power of, 36a, 4oa reality of, 79 sensible, 367n, 374 resistance, 171 synthesis of, 6a, 166 revelation, immediate, 1 15, 197 right (Rtcht): concept of, 230 natural, 295 theory of, 47o-72 Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph, 27, 29-JO, 4J, 115 schemalschematism, 238, 243. 247, :~6a, 273 Schiller, Johann Christoph Friedrich von, 164 utun Concerning Anthelic Edu.calicn, •fl-4 Schmid, Karl Christian Erhard, I08n Schulze, Gottlob Ernst Ludwig, I, 2, I 1,
94"
Stt al.so Aentltidemus; slepticism science: demands of, 97, 120 natural, 461 need for, a1, 84 Stt al.so philosophy/philosopher; WissensdwfLJ/ehre self, 150 self-activity (SelfuliiligkeU), 93-94, 96-97, 121, '4a. '54· lg<>, 337-3a. 350, 427-2a absolute, 272, 336 self-affection, 143, 147-4a, 150, 157, '59-00, .,., '73· 225, 26..J-65, 312, 456 self-apprehension, 414 self-consciousness, 220, 381, 345, 39'• 425 conditions (for the possibility) of, tf4, 217, 3aa.436-37 immediate, 66, 119-20, t6a, 223, 270, 37'·422 origin of, 35 1 See al.so Act; consciousness; freedom; I; willing, act of self-determining, act of, 74• 133, 141, 150, •75· .a,, 193, 205, 254, 26g, 274, 352, 383·4o6.4o8.410,413-14, 416,422-24,429,452 absolute, 272 as what is fint and highest, 4 14 selfhood, 43a-39, 461 concept of, 351, 423 self-intuition, 121, 123, 142-43, 145, '74• 20 1, 201), 2 I 2, 3 I 2 self-limitation, 435, 45a, 471
492
Index
self-observation, 66, 101-2, 110, 119-110, 143· 211,361,386, 391 self-positing. See I, self-positing of self-production, 4114-25, 437 self-reflection, 92 self-sufficiency, 93, 95· 439· 443· 444 sensation, 207 sensibility, 344 general system of, 177-81, 207-9, 253·3n8 sensibili:z.ation/process of making sensible (Versinnlithung), 1181, 1196-97, 341, 345-46,38g.393o407-8,410,418, 4114·439·444·450-53· 459n. 464-65 sensible, what is, 1181, 364, 397 sensuousness, 344 series, 1167, 280, 358 dual, of what is subjective (intended) and what is objective (discovered), 1311. See also thinking/thought: ideal, real mechanical, 4 '7, 456 organic, 4 17 of the real and ideal, 3g6, 427-28, 4611-63 skepticism, 79· 81 Humean, 1 soul, 78, 112, 114, 341, 345• 4o8, 420, 43•· 458 and body, 34'· sg6. 458 space, 70-71, 104-5, 156, 2o8-g, Y32, 239-48, 1152-57,273·301,309· 320-117 a priori character of, 240 continuity of, 71, 247-48 determination or measuremem of, 24551' 256-57· 258. 272-73· 275· Set also determination/determining, act of: of place ideality of, 246n, s67. 370 infinite divisibility of, 244-45, 398, 400 infinity of, 200-201, 254-55,413, 435• 465-66 imuition of, 7 1 positing of objeru in, 72, 184, 229, 241, 256-57·438-39,457 See also body; intuition/intuiting; matter Spinoza, Benedict de, 92, 400 spirit, or mind (Geist), 1 14, 32 1, 3g6, 408, 420,434·436·474 duality of, 365, 440 mechanism or "inner working"' of, 132, 200 system of, 192 vs. letter, 7, n., 474 See also activity; I; intellect/intelligence spontaneity, 145, 150, 208, 247, 338
striving, 172, 174, 183, 185, 199-:.too, 212,214, 254· 256-57· 275·336 feeling of, 198, 202, 230 infinite, 254, "55 limitation of, 292 positing of, 7 1-72 self-engendered, 172 suppressed, 259 subject, the, 114 absolute, 386 active, 163, 2 10 choosing, 375 wmprehending, 153, 224 of consciousness, 12 8 determining, 381, 416, 420-21, 454· 46o-62 feeling, 18o-81, 188, 2og-1o, 253. 255, 3 13·329,396 intuiting, 132, 140-41, 144, 150, 153, 18o-81, 188, 209, 211, 215, 219, 251,255 mediating, 366 productive, 144 representing, g1-g2, g6-g7, 163, 227, 2gon, 248, 26o thinking, 300, 366, 396 willing, 200, 'l70, 28o, 299, 3 I 1, 315, 3 19· goo, s68. 387 See also consciousness; I subUme, the, 278 substance, 94, 129, 131, 410-11, 431-32, 433"·440·444 absolute character of, 41 o and accident, 126-27, 164 category of, 416 concept or, 75· 410 substantiality, 246 category of, 391, 412, 4'll-22 concept of, 42o-21, 424, 442 and time, 442 substrate, 97, 1810, 324, 440 succession, 'l05, 3!)4 summons (Aujf<JI'derung) to free action and/or free self-limitation, 74, 76, 350-53· 355-58, 363, g6g-7o, 453-57·459·461,469 supersensible, the, 24!!. 287, 290, 291n, go6,315·366-67,397·453·457 synthesis, 87, 8g, 1og-10, 124, 126, 137, 212, 219, ngn, 269, 285-86, 326, g65,368,373• g8o,388,gg2, 394-95·412,420,434·441, 444· 446 original, highest, or primary, 85,382, 392.396, 399·402,411-12,41617. 420,426-27, 444· 446-47· 451, 463--65 of willing and being, 312
lndex synthetic method, procedure, or manner of thinking, 1811, 248-49, 285, 18g, 297-98.449 See ai.Jo thinking/thought: synthetic synthetic unity, I!P• 172n, 195n, 196, 201, 202, u8, 238, ~41, 247, 346, 383, 39 I, Se. ai.Jo fivefoJdneS>; thinking/thought systematic form, 84 See alro philosophy/philosopher task or self-limitation, 73-74· 337-45· 349·436, 447.457-59·469 twofold aspect or, 447 See alro freedom thesis, 85 absolute, 285 thing/things, 70, 75, 156, 240, 438,443 actual, 78 external, 184, 11117-118 in itself, So, g1, 94· 105, 119, 164, 185, 279.3113·334"·338.433n unintelligibility of, t63, 434n as noumenon, 443 as phenomenon, 443 reality of, 107, 11118 representation of, 70, 227 thinking/thought, 117, 188, 282, 284,309. 323·374·38!'1·422 ab!lolute, 439 abstract, 376-79 and acting, 450-51 analytic, 365-66, :J7o, 379 and being. See being: and thinking, identity of categorical, 200 concrete, 376-79,426 determinate, ~oo. 43~ discunive, 84. 145. 184, 2118, 28o, 1198, 300· 311,313,387 duality of, 458 empirical, 299, 43~. 440 and feeling, 385, 387-88 form of, 310 free, go of a goal, 300 See ai.Jo goal, concept of ideal, 300, 364, 3711-88, 426-27, 42931, 437-4'· 444-45.458 series of, 372-88 and imagining, 415 immediate, 382 indeterminate, 1135-36 and intuition, 319, 368, 44 7-48 laws of, 100, 161, 2g6, 300, 309, 316, lJ2!). 335• 367,374, 399• 412-13, 427,453-54·467-68 mediated, 382, 387, 393 necessary, 292,361, 432
493
objective, 11511, ~jig. 346, 300, 383, 385. 401 organic, 427 original, 387 problematic, 200 productive, 432 pure, 364, 390·393·405-6,416,418, 425, 432, 444· 453 real, 300, 364, 372, 384-85, 388-go, 393.420-27.429-32·434-35· 437-41·444-45·449.458 series of, 384-93 sensible or sensuous, 364, 389-go, 435.458 supersensible, 243 synthetic, 313, 364-66, 370-76, 379, 38o-85·395·415 See ai.Jo synthesis; synthetic method, procedure, or manner of thinking tTiU15Cendent, 95 transcendental, 95 and willing, 319, 425 TK:demann, Dietrich, 88 time, 104-5, 156, 184, 267, 26g-7o, 2710, 277-8•, 300, 3o1n, 312, 316,320, 322-23·337.366-6g, 371, 377· 38o. 409-10, 442 deduction of, ao5 and duration, 409-10, 442 ideality of, 370, 4 1 1 infinity of, 254 measurement of, 252 .series or (temporal series), 72, 26g, 274· 288, !j61, 374·75· 378,409 See alrti intuition/intuiting transition, movement or (Uebrrgrhm): from determinability to determinacy, 66-67, 116-q, l!jl, '33· 142, '45· '47· '54· 207· 225, 237-38. 268, 286,293, 299-!'JOI, 305,347-48, 36o-61. sas. 40 '• 407, 432, 452-53 law or principle of, 121-23, 134, 179, 219,200,294• 296,301,378,427 from determinacy to determinability, lOg from repose to activity, 129, 137 truth, 218-19, 225, 229-30, 23¥, 251, 333 objective, 251, 257 understanding (Verstand), 361, 468 Sr~ ai.Jo cognition/knowing; thinking/ thought unity, systematic, ro See oi.Jo synthesis; synthetic unity validity, 230-31, 287, 332 hypothetical, 8o objective, •!!o-31, 252
494
Index
validity (continwd) of representations, 78-8o. Set allo representation subjective, 230-31 universal, 101, 350 viewpcinllpoint of view/standpoint: aesthetic, 473-74 Critical, 376 empirical, 355 ideal, 106, 472 of idealism, 105-6 of the individual, 105-6 of life, 106 ordinary, 100, 176, 196. 359-00, 367. 375·378,402, 4 21 ·460, 472-73 philosophical, 110, 194, 422 practical, 100, 185, 265, 341 real, 472 theoretical, 265 transcendental, to6, 176, 336, 341, 346, 359-oo, 367.37s. 387,405,470, 472-74 will, 200, 262, 270, 328, 300, 383-84 absolute character and primacy of, 200,271 causal power of, 72, 258, 265-67, 270, 274· 375 and cognition, 363 empirical, 293, 349· 355 free, 92, goo, 407. Set allo choice, free intelligible character of, 271, 294 original, 337, 450 original determinacy of, 300-303, 3o67, 310-12,337 original limitation of, 323,329, 337n, 343 pure, 72, 292-94, 330, 333· 335, 337. 347·354·359 SH aLw desire; freedom; synthesis; willing willing, 73, 167, 258-65, 269, 280-81, ,316~17, 348-50, 300, g6g, 369, 371-75· 422-23 absolute and unconditional character of, 200,280,294 concept of, 200, 407 consciousness of, 7 4 and doing, 328 double aspect of, 325, 327-28, 378 empirical, 292-9lh soB, 311, ::117-19, 321, 346-47·373-74·423 as what is highest and original, 259-00 immediate/immediacy of, 200 object of, 264 original, 293, 299, 321, 349 pure, 292-94, 2g6, 299,3o8, 3t7,423, 425; as explanatory ground of consciousness, 294
See allo choice, free; freedom; goal, concept of; 1; will wish/wishing, 2lh-63, !I' 7 Wissrnsch.aftskhre:
of cognition, 467 concept and taslr- of, J:l, 81-85, 87, 283, 354-55· 388, 41 3 distinctive character of, 79-85, 164, 189.38o. 366.387.39'·394.41617,4"0 divisions and structure of, 392, 467-74 evolution and revisions of, ~-J J "foundational" portion of, 467-69 overall structure and argument of the new presentation ( =WissrnsdllJ/IS· uhre t1000 metlwdn), 85-86, 101, 167, 182,220-25, 28g-go,3o3,332, 344· 346·354-55· 359· 362,37172, 381-82,393·397·4•7·432, 446-49. 465. See also fichre Johann Gottlieb: worb: Grondiage lin: gt· samtm
Wissrnsduiftskht~
method and evidence of, 82-84, 86, 95. 99, 100-101, wg-•o, 120, 123, 125-26, '35-36. 165,217, 22~j, •48-49. 258-59. 274, 283, 2go, 323, 33 2• 35 2• 354-55· 365, 37'· 38o-81,383.4'3·43o origin and meaning of the name, r, J, 87 practical, 8, 4fl9 spirit of, 332, 420, 474 starting point of, 1og, 424, 430 theoretical, 467-68 universal validity of, • o •, 332 See al.io idealism/idealists; philo50phyl philosopher world, 83-84. gg-100, 177. 195, 205, 223, 227,230,341,420,427,440-41, 466, 468, 473-74 actual, 78 of appearances, 261, 264-65 corporeal, 81, 242, 398, 459· 461 empirical, 29, Jl, 314 external, 388 and the l, 442 inner, 265 intelligible, 2'J-JO, 200-61, 264, 271, 2g6-g8, 303-5·3'4·350 juridical, 470 material, 419 objective, 79, :pg-:zo outer, 265 sensible, 181,261, 271-72,290, 2g6-98, 313, !128, 344n. 350,392,403,421, 4•7.448·456-57·461,463-64 spiritual, 242, 418-19 supersensibie, 261, 315 Zeno of Elea, 398
IJbrary of Congress Cauloging-iD-Publication Data
Fichte, Johann Gotdieb, 1762-1814 [Wi.ssi!'IUChaj'l:i.leh:re nova tTUIIJwdtJ, English] Foundatiorn1 of transcendental phiiOI!Ophy (Wi.sseruchaftslehre) 1IOtA'.I mLIJiodiJ { •7g6/99) I Johann Gottlieb Fichte; edited and translated by Daniel Breazeale. p. em. Trartlll.ation of: Wis.senschaftslehre nova methodo. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN o-8cH4-~767-3 {alL paper) '· PhiiOI!Ophy. l. Breazeale, Daniel. 11. 1ide. B~~:844.W53E5
l9.!J-dc20
1992
