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franz rosenzweig and the systematic task of philosophy Benjamin Pollock argues that Franz Rosenzweig’s The Star of Redemption is devoted to a singularly ambitious philosophical task: grasping “the All” – the whole of what is – in the form of a system. In asserting Rosenzweig’s abiding commitment to a systematic conception of philosophy often identified with German Idealism, this book breaks rank with the assumptions about Rosenzweig’s thought that have dominated the scholarship of the last decades. Indeed, the Star’s importance is often claimed to lie precisely in the way it opposes philosophy’s traditional drive for systematic knowledge and upholds instead a “new thinking” attentive to the existential concerns, the alterity, and even the revelatory dimension of concrete human life. Pollock shows that these very innovations in Rosenzweig’s thought are in fact to be understood as part and parcel of the Star’s systematic program. But this is only the case, Pollock claims, because Rosenzweig approaches philosophy’s traditional task of system in a radically original manner. For the Star not only seeks to guide its readers on the path toward knowing “the All” of which each being is a part; it at once directs them toward realizing the redemptive unity of that very “All” through the actions, decisions, and relations of concrete human life. Benjamin Pollock is Assistant Professor of Religious Studies at Michigan State University. He is author of articles in the philosophy of religion and in modern Jewish philosophy appearing in AJS Review, Jewish Studies Quarterly, and other leading journals, and he is coeditor with Michael Morgan of The Philosopher as Witness: Fackenheim and Responses to the Holocaust.
Franz Rosenzweig and the Systematic Task of Philosophy Benjamin Pollock Michigan State University
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo Cambridge University Press The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521517096 © Benjamin Pollock 2009 This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provision of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published in print format 2009
ISBN-13
978-0-511-50850-9
eBook (NetLibrary)
ISBN-13
978-0-521-51709-6
hardback
Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of urls for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.
or Allison, Asaf, Ayelet, and Hadas
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Contents
Acknowledgments
page xi
Introduction: The Star of Redemption as “System of Philosophy” 1.
System as Task of Philosophy: “The Oldest System-Program of German Idealism” I. System and the Philosophy of Rosenzweig’s Time II. The One and All III. System and the Dangers of Reduction: Jacobi’s Spinoza-Critique IV. Kant’s Groundwork for a System of Philosophy iv.1 The Unanswered Question Regarding Kant’s System iv.2 The Systematic Implications of the Kantian Subject V. Absolute Act versus Absolute Being: Fichte’s Self-Positing “I” VI. Absolute Idealism and the Systematic Standpoint of the “Program” VII. The System-Program’s Lack of Systematicity VIII. System as Philosophical Program IX. Rosenzweig’s Recovery of System as Philosophical Task for His Time X. “My Real Teacher in Philosophy”: Excursus on Hans Ehrenberg’s Early Project of System and the Neo-Kantian Context
2.
“A Twofold Relation to the Absolute”: The Genesis of Rosenzweig’s Concept of System I. The Path to a New System-Concept i.1 “System Is Not Architecture” i.2 System as Dialogue of Absolute Monologues i.3 Rosenzweig, Rosenstock, Weizsäcker, and the “Coitus of Two Sciences” II. “A Twofold Relation to the Absolute”: Rosenzweig’s “Urzelle” vii
1 14 16 21 26 30 30 35 36 41 43 48 54
61 66 69 69 77 83 92
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ii.1 Nature, Revelation, and the Anamnesis of Freedom ii.2 Human Freedom in the System: Realizing God as the “One and All” in the “Urzelle” ii.3 Questions That Remain: From System-Concept to Star 3.
Alls or Nothings: The Starting-Point of Rosenzweig’s System I. Breaking Up the All for the Sake of the All i.1 Fear of Death, Particularity, and the Argument over Nothing i.2 The Particularity of Nothing and the Hope for the All: Rosenzweig’s Alternative to the Systematic Starting-Point of German Idealism i.3 The Particular Nothings of God, World, and Human Being i.4 The Differential as Determinate Nothing: Setting Out on the Path to System between Nihilism and Idealism II. Factuality as Method: The Self-Generation of the Elements out of Their Nothings ii.1 God, World, Human Being: The Elements as Systematic Unities ii.2 Elemental Stability and Instability: The Need for Relation and the Threat of Falling Back into Nothing III. Excursus on Beginning in Difference
4.
“The Genuine Notion of Revelation”: Relations, Reversals, and the Human Being in the Middle of the System I. Reversals into Relations, or, How God, World, and Human Being Realize Themselves in Realizing the All i.1 Elemental Promises in Need of Fulfillment i.2 Reversals into Creation i.3 The Factuality of Creation i.4 Reversals into Revelation i.5 Excursus on the “I” as Medium of Identity within the All i.6 The Factuality of Revelation and the Limits of Factuality Prior to Redemption i.7 Reversals into Redemption i.8 Realizing the All: Redemption and the Futurity of Factuality II. Experiencing System from the Middle ii.1 The Human Being as the Height of Factuality: Reversals, Relations, and Experienced Actuality ii.2 “Already-Being-There”: Experiencing Creation from the Middle
96 102 116 120 120 126
136 144 149 157 157 169 177 181 188 188 194 201 204 210 212 216 225 236 236 239
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ii.3 The Call to I-Hood and the Call to System: Experiencing Revelation from the Middle ii.4 Anticipating the Kingdom: Experiencing Redemption from the Middle ii.5 The Reciprocal Confirmation of Promise and Fulfillment ii.6 The Unity of the All and the Figure of the Star III. Excursus on Questions of Method: Factuality and Reversals, Thought and Experience 5
Seeing Stars: The Vision of the All and the Completion of the System I. The Immediacy of Vision as Complement to Discursive Knowledge: The Model of Intellectual Intuition II. Cyclical Time and the Visualization of the All III. Mirroring the All: Jewish and Christian Liturgical Calendars IV. Beyond Life? The Possibility of an Immediate Vision of the Redemptive All V. The All, the Star, and God’s Face: Vision and Life at the End of The Star of Redemption Conclusion: The All and the Everyday
ix
240 243 244 248 253 258 267 276 283 297 304 312
Bibliography
317
Index
331
Acknowledgments
This book began as a doctoral dissertation project at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. It evolved as it accompanied me through an immensely valuable postdoctoral stay at the University of Toronto, and it attained book form after I joined the faculty in the Department of Religious Studies and in the Jewish Studies Program at Michigan State University. I want to express my deepest thanks to colleagues and friends at each of these institutions for the intellectual, professional, and personal support they have shown me during many years of study. Paul Mendes-Flohr first introduced me to modern Jewish philosophy when I took his course in contemporary Jewish religious thought as an undergraduate on the one-year program in Jerusalem in 1991. Three years later he guided me through my first serious reading of The Star of Redemption, and he has watched over this project ever since, offering encouragement and sage direction along the way. The meticulousness and the humanity with which he writes about GermanJewish intellectual history have set the standard in the field for a whole generation of scholars. Christoph Schmidt’s seminars in German philosophy at the Hebrew University taught me much about how to read philosophical texts with the requisite appreciation for the ideas alive in them. I hope a bit of the excitement with which he teaches philosophy has rubbed off on this book. I still find it both ironic and deeply fortuitous that the first scholar of Rosenzweig’s work to take this project seriously was someone whose reading of Rosenzweig is markedly different from – if not utterly opposed to – my own. Robert Gibbs’s enthusiasm for this project, when it was still in its early stages, was of inestimable value for me. The generosity Bob has shown, as a reader of my work and as a mentor to me during the years since, is exemplary. He has given me renewed faith in the possibility of philosophical conversation through disagreement (“You’re wrong, but …”). I had the privilege of working with the late Emil Fackenheim for a number of years before his death, and I am thankful for all that he taught me about Jewish philosophy, and about what it means to be committed to it. It is also thanks to Emil Fackenheim that I have gotten to know his onetime student and longtime partner in philosophical conversation, Michael Morgan. Mike has been an important teacher and friend to me ever since. He read drafts of this xi
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book and offered both encouragement and valuable criticism. Without his support this book would not have appeared in the form, and at the time, that it has. From early on in this project, I imagined an ideal reader for my work: he or she would be in equal measure knowledgeable about and perplexed by the philosophical problem of systematicity, would be familiar with Rosenzweig, and would at once be so much more philosophically grounded than I that he or she would find in my book a range of weighty philosophical ideas that I did not even realize were there. Now, writers often go about their work with an ideal reader in mind. But I had the distinct good fortune of actually meeting my ideal reader in person, and precisely at the moment when I most needed his critical insight. Paul Franks read numerous drafts of this book. He encouraged me and challenged me on some of the most important questions raised in it. Conversations with him and with Hindy Najman have opened me to the philosophical possibilities inherent to academic life, possibilities that I would have otherwise never thought were there to be pursued. Markus Kartheininger discussed with me many of the questions that appear in this book before they took written form, and he read each chapter as I wrote it, challenging my reading of Rosenzweig and insisting that in my attention to minutiae I not excuse myself from addressing questions of fundamental philosophical import. Martin Kavka read a late draft with remarkable care, and with a keen sense of what I still needed to refine in it in order to realize its aims. Martin also saved me from what would have been some egregious errors of translation. Leora Batnitzky read an early draft of this book and pressed me to think harder about the consequences of what I was saying for contemporary thought. For conversations over these last years that helped me sharpen different aspects of my thinking about Rosenzweig and systematicity, I thank Yehoyada Amir, Peter Eli Gordon, Kenneth Hart Green, Dana Hollander, Axel Hutter, Pini Ifergan, Jens Mattern, Michael Roubach, Eli Schonfeld, Hartwig Wiedebach, and Dror Yinon. I received generous financial support at many different stages during this project, and I am pleased finally to be able to thank my benefactors. While still working on the dissertation version of this book, I received financial support from the Franz Rosenzweig Minerva Research Center for German-Jewish Literature and Cultural History, from the Ignatz Bubis Memorial Scholarship Fund, and from the National Foundation for Jewish Culture. My stimulating two years of work and study at the University of Toronto were graciously supported through a Ray D. Wolfe Fellowship in Jewish Studies and through a Halbert Exchange Fellowship at the Munk Centre for International Studies. I would like to thank the archivists of the Leo Baeck Institute archives at the Center for Jewish History in New York, and of the Landeskirchliche Archiv der Evangelischen Kirche von Westfalen in Bielefeld, for making available to me original sources that greatly informed my research.
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I wish to thank Andy Beck at Cambridge University Press for overseeing the publication of this book with patience and care, and the team at Newgen Imaging Systems for ensuring such a smooth and professional production process. I turn now to some more long-standing debts. Solomon Goldberg has been my friend and teacher in all matters philosophical since we first met almost two decades ago. There is hardly an idea in this book that he has not thought through with me (or for me). I thank my parents-in-law, Larry and Eileen Joseph, for many years of warm support and interest. I thank my parents, Scott and Karin Pollock, for their unwavering encouragement, and for teaching me at a young age that analyzing what seem to others to be the most commonplace, everyday situations always reveals insights worth thinking deeply about. I thank my sister, Annika Pollock, for her sincerity, for her song, and for helping me hone my argumentation skills (even if they still do not hold a candle to hers). I thank Hadas, Ayelet, and Asaf for filling my life with their ideas and their projects, with their antics and their questions, and for thereby constantly reminding me of the path that spans between the everyday and “the All.” To Allison I am thankful for much that I can put into words and for much that I cannot. She and I have grown up together during these years that Rosenzweig’s books and papers have cluttered my desk. I am thankful for her love and support, for her creative talents and her vitality. During the ten years I have worked on this project, through life in four different homes in three different countries, Allison has waited patiently (for the most part) for the auspicious day when I would finish this book and finally clean off my desk. I am thankful that I am at last able to do so – until next time.
Introduction: The Star of Redemption as “System of Philosophy”
his book argues that Franz Rosenzweig’s the star of Redemption is devoted to a singularly ambitious philosophical task: grasping “the All” – the whole of what is – in the form of a system. Since Rosenzweig himself insisted his book be understood solely as a “system of philosophy,” such a claim would certainly appear straightforward were it not for the curious fact that so many of Rosenzweig’s readers, from his time down to ours, have sought to locate the significance of the Star anywhere but in the book’s systematic character. Indeed, the Star’s importance is often claimed to lie precisely in the way it opposes philosophy’s traditional drive for systematic knowledge and upholds instead a “new thinking” attentive to the existential concerns, the alterity, and even the revelatory dimension of concrete human life. In what follows, I will show that these very innovations in Rosenzweig’s thought are in fact to be understood as part and parcel of the Star’s systematic program. But this is only the case, we shall find, because Rosenzweig approaches philosophy’s traditional task of system in a radically original manner. For the Star not only seeks to guide its readers on the path toward knowing “the All” of which each being is a part; it at once directs them toward realizing the redemptive unity of that very “All” through the actions, decisions, and relations of concrete human life. Now, by all accounts, the initial reception of the Star in early-1920s Germany was a source of great frustration for the book’s author.1 For while the book met with no small amount of praise, few of its first readers appeared to have any idea what Rosenzweig was trying to say in it. Rosenzweig’s Christian friends read the book and were convinced that he had finally accepted Christianity as the true path to salvation.2 The German-Jewish community, on the other hand, touted the Star as a nice “Jewish book,” taking it to be, as Rosenzweig bemoaned, “an admonition to
1
2
Cf., Paul Mendes-Flohr, “Franz Rosenzweig and the German Philosophical Tradition,” The Philosophy of Franz Rosenzweig, pp. 13–14. See Rosenzweig’s correspondence with Hans and Rudolf Ehrenberg during the summer of 1919, in Franz Rosenzweig, Der Mensch und sein Werk: Gesammelte Schriften. I.2: Briefe und Tagebücher [henceforth BT 2], pp. 634–43, as well as his letters to Margrit and Eugen Rosenstock during the same period, in Die “Gritli”-Briefe. Briefe an Margrit Rosenstock-Huessy [henceforth Gritli-Briefe], pp. 349–95.
1
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kosher eating.”3 Aiming to curb the confusion surrounding the book, Rosenzweig took it upon himself to clarify the character and purpose of the Star as he understood it, in a 1925 essay entitled “The New Thinking.” In the essay’s opening lines, Rosenzweig declares, [The Star of Redemption] is not a “Jewish book,” at least not in the sense that those buyers, who were so angry with me, think of a Jewish book; for while it deals with Judaism, it deals with it no more comprehensively than it deals with Christianity, and barely more comprehensively than it deals with Islam. Nor does it claim to be a philosophy of religion. How could it do this, given that the word “religion” does not even occur in it! Rather it is merely a system of philosophy.4
In the face of the misunderstandings to which Rosenzweig considered the Star subject, we find, Rosenzweig insists the Star be read neither as a “Jewish book” nor as a “philosophy of religion,” but rather as “a system of philosophy.” Insist as he may about how the Star should or should not be understood, however, we may forgive those first readers of the Star – and indeed, the generations of scholars who have tried to make sense of the book since then – for not feeling entirely satisfied by Rosenzweig’s clarification. It may be helpful to learn that Rosenzweig saw his book neither as “Jewish,” in any conventional sense, nor as a “philosophy of religion.” But for anyone who has struggled through the colossal, cryptic tome which is The Star of Redemption, Rosenzweig’s definitive identification of the book as a “system of philosophy” hardly seems to clarify much of anything. At first glance, Rosenzweig’s statement leaves us puzzled: surely Rosenzweig could have classified his book in a manner that is more precise, more helpful, and – let us face it – more interesting than that! Perhaps it is, in part, because Rosenzweig’s authoritative designation of the Star as a “system of philosophy” has struck scholars as generally unhelpful that it has done little to limit the proliferation of claims concerning what the real message or purpose of the Star is. Indeed, although often acknowledging Rosenzweig’s designation of the Star as a system, scholars of Rosenzweig’s work have long sought to read the Star along different lines than those stressed by Rosenzweig in the opening of “The New Thinking,” to imagine, as it were, a different ending to Rosenzweig’s words of clarification than the one he gave it (“merely a …”). Thus, the Star has been presented as a work of existentialism that takes its lead from the thought of the late Schelling and rivals the writings of Buber, Heidegger, and Tillich. It has been read as a philosophically rigorous argument for revelation as a real religious possibility for the modern individual. The book has been combed, much as it was in Rosenzweig’s own time, for elements that might help guide assimilated 3 4
Rosenzweig to Hans Ehrenberg, March 11, 1925, in BT 2, p. 1026. Franz Rosenzweig, “Das neue Denken,” Gesammelte Schriften 3: Zweiströmland. Kleinere Schriften zu Glauben und Denken [henceforth GS 3], p. 140; translated in “The New Thinking,” Philosophical and Theological Writings, p. 110.
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Jews back to a traditional Jewish lifestyle. The Star has been examined for how it provides the groundwork for interfaith dialogue between those of different religious backgrounds. And most prominently, of late, the Star has been hailed as a monument of early postmodernism, a work that rejects the totalizing character of philosophy’s traditional drive for absolute knowledge, and points to a new dialogical or hermeneutical or deconstructive way of thinking, a way of thinking that celebrates difference and remains open to what is “other.” For the most part, such diverse readings of Rosenzweig’s work do not ignore the fact that what they take to be the Star’s deepest insights are presented within some kind of broad systematic framework. They just claim that what is vitally important or significant in the Star lies not in the book’s systematic character, as Rosenzweig’s statement might suggest, but elsewhere. Thus Stéphane Mosès concedes, in his System and Revelation, that “taken in its totality, the [Star] presents itself as a system that somehow unfolds in front of the reader in the manner of the idealist system itself which Rosenzweig denounces ceaselessly.” But Mosès then feels compelled to add, “Yet all of the innovative aspects of The Star lie in the idea that existence could not be understood as the moment of a system but rather that it is … irreducible to any totalizing thought.”5 When juxtaposed to the diverse interpretations of the Star offered by its most astute readers, therefore, Rosenzweig’s identification of the Star as “merely a system of philosophy” presents us with an interpretive riddle of sorts: why, if the Star really aims to make a point about revelation or existence, about the limits of traditional philosophy, or about the possibility of living a Jewish or Christian life in the modern period, does Rosenzweig place preeminent emphasis on the book’s systematic character? Why does Rosenzweig identify as central to the Star an aspect of the book scholars from his own time down to ours have seen as peripheral, accidental, or even contrary to Rosenzweig’s own genuine intentions? The riddle of Rosenzweig’s designation of the Star as a “system of philosophy” is compounded significantly, moreover, when we compare it to key elements within the Star itself. For if Rosenzweig claims that the Star is a system of philosophy, he thereby identifies his own philosophical project with that of the very same “three great charlatans”6 – Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel – who appear as his philosophical nemeses in the Star. Indeed, by Rosenzweig’s own assertion, the “whole notion of system as the task of philosophy is … nothing self-evident, but rather a discovery of German Idealism.”7 But how can the Star be understood on the grounds of the very philosophical project of German Idealism which Rosenzweig so obviously 5 6
7
S. Mosès, System and Revelation, p. 97. Rosenzweig (citing Schopenhauer) to Eugen Rosenstock, September 4, 1917, Gritli-Briefe, p. 30. See Arthur Schopenhauer, “Über das metaphysische Bedürfnis des Menschen,” Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung vol. II, in Sämmtliche Werke II, p. 206, and Ueber die vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden Grunde, in Sämmtliche Werke III, p. 104. “Das älteste Systemprogramm des deutschen Idealismus,” GS 3, p. 41.
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rejects in the book itself? Does the Star not begin with a scathing critique of philosophy’s quest to grasp “All” that is, a quest which Rosenzweig presents as culminating in the philosophical systems of German Idealism? Is it not precisely the systematic hubris of German Idealism which Rosenzweig attacks in the opening pages of the Star, condemning the way Idealism “weav[es] the blue mist of its All-thinking around the earthly,” the way it “denies everything that separates the individual from the All, [wrapping it up] in the fog of the One-and-All concept.”8? Does the Star as a whole not lead from systematic philosophy’s failure to quell the quintessentially human “fear of death,” through the experience of revelation, and “into [a] life” that is possible not within the cold confines of an Idealist “All”, but rather within the living liturgical communities of Judaism and Christianity? Given how puzzling Rosenzweig’s emphasis on the systematic character of The Star has been for scholars, and how contrary such emphasis seems to be to key elements of the Star itself, it is all the more curious how frequently Rosenzweig revisits this assertion. Indeed, lest one imagine Rosenzweig’s statement at the beginning of the “New Thinking” represents an isolated utterance, it is worth noting that Rosenzweig hardly missed an opportunity to advertise the Star as the system of philosophy he insisted it was. From the moment the core ideas that would later appear in the Star began to crystallize together for Rosenzweig, through the writing of the Star itself, and into the years after the book’s publication, Rosenzweig consistently identifies the Star by its systematic character. In his letter to Rudolf Ehrenberg of November 18, 1917, later dubbed the “ ‘Germ-Cell’ [Urzelle] of the Star of Redemption,” Rosenzweig first announces his arrival at “the ‘systematic.’ ”9 On August 27, 1918, as Rosenzweig prepares to begin writing the Star itself, he sends Gertrud Oppenheim an “unabashed pre-announcement of my system.”10 On August 30, he tells Margrit Rosenstock that for the duration of the war, he “can do nothing more than write my system,”11 and on September 4, he informs Rudolf Ehrenberg that he has “begun to write a book … my system, I must well say.”12 Reflecting on the “defeatist” attitude of his fellow soldiers on September 30, 1918, Rosenzweig notes that one needs “courage … for revolution-making and systemwriting”; and even after scoffing at some of the soldiers around him whom he overhears discussing the meaning of “faith,” on October 11, 1918, Rosenzweig mocks his 8
9 10
11 12
Franz Rosenzweig, Der Stern der Erlösung, p. 4/The Star of Redemption, p. 4. The translations from the Star into English given throughout the book are my own, but in translating I have consulted the Hallo English translation, and thus I cite the page numbers of this translation alongside the German. In 2005, after most of the work on this book had been completed, Barbara Galli published a new English translation. My reference to the page numbers of the Hallo translation in my notes should not be understood as a preference for one translation over the other. GS 3, p. 126. See Der Mensch und sein Werk: Gesammelte Schriften I.1: Briefe und Tagebücher. 1900–1918 [henceforth BT 1], p. 599. Gritli-Briefe, p. 136. BT 2, p. 603.
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own pretentiousness and quips, “How clever one is when he has a system!”13 On February 3, 1919, he tells Bertha Badt-Strauss that after beginning to read Hermann Cohen’s Logic of Pure Cognition in August of the previous year, he “had to stop on account of my own systematic works.”14 On February 9, 1919, as he begins to write the final section of the Star he notes, “It is indeed a kind of system that has never been given before.”15 Six months later, having completed the editing of the manuscript of the Star, Rosenzweig writes to Martin Buber to inform him that “in the last months of the war and in the first of the revolution, August [19]18 to February [19]19, the forces which had been gathered up [within me] released themselves in a greater systematic book.”16 And on November 22, 1920, Rosenzweig tells Margrit Rosenstock that “system of philosophy” is what “I always give now as answer to inquiries” regarding “the * of Redemption.”17 This book emerged out of my growing impression, as I studied the Star, that Rosenzweig meant what he said when he thus designated the Star – at almost every opportunity! – a “system of philosophy,” and that scholars may have passed too quickly over this designation when trying to make sense of Rosenzweig’s monumental work. It gradually became clear to me that understanding what this designation means offers a key to grasping the philosophical aims of the Star in its entirety. In characterizing the Star in this way, I came to conclude, Rosenzweig is not simply offering a general means of classifying his book or a directive against reading the book as a religious or Jewish text. Instead, by designating the Star as a “system of philosophy,” Rosenzweig identifies the specific philosophical task toward which his book is directed. According to Rosenzweig, the German Idealists “discovered” system as the task of philosophy, but in doing so they simply brought to light what Rosenzweig came to consider to be the fundamental problem of the whole philosophical tradition, one which had perplexed philosophers from philosophy’s earliest beginnings up to his own time. What exactly is this task of system? In the pages that follow, I will claim that Rosenzweig understood this task as that of grasping, articulating, and indeed realizing truth as the identity and difference of “All” that is. A “system of philosophy,” as Rosenzweig understood it, seeks to understand all beings both in their plurality as diverse, different beings, and at the same time insofar as they share in a single, common unity. The task of system asks whether it is possible for us to know or to recognize the individual beings around and beyond us each as uniquely particular, as unique unto itself, and at once insofar as it shares an identity in common with all others. The systematic knowledge that is the goal of the task of system would thus know what is as the “One and All,” as both a single unity and as the most 13 14 15 16 17
Gritli-Briefe, pp. 154, 168. BT 2, p. 623. Gritli-Briefe, p. 234. Undated, estimated at end of August 1919, BT 2, p. 644. Gritli-Briefe, p. 686.
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comprehensive diversity. Or, if we wish to use Rosenzweig’s own shorthand, we may say that systematic knowledge knows “the All,” so long as we bear in mind how this designation conveys both the most comprehensive multiplicity (the ALL) and at once the most radical unity (THE All). This task of system demands a rigorous method that enables the thinker to grasp all particulars in their identity and difference; it makes the boldest of claims about the nature of things as a whole. But Rosenzweig will take pains to show that the task of system emerges, all the same, from perhaps the most basic of questions human beings ask themselves: Am I really my own unique individual? Am I really someone and something that no one else is? But how can I be if I share so much, if I share the quality of “being” itself, with all other beings out there? In what sense is my own personal identity intertwined with or intimately related to the identities of all other beings, be they natural, personal, or divine? What kind of responsibility do I have to myself and to these others? Is there a common goal toward which I should strive together with all other beings? How can such a goal be conceived without denying the diversity of desires and aims different individuals and communities set up for themselves? Basic human questions such as these crystallize together for Rosenzweig in the problem of “the All,” in the task of system. When we take seriously Rosenzweig’s own understanding of The Star of Redemption as a system, we thus discover that Rosenzweig does not understand “system” in the way it is so often depicted today: system, for Rosenzweig, is not some kind of totalizing force of intellectual oppression that reduces all difference, and all human individuals, to cogs in a machine, to batteries powering the Matrix. Rather, system, for Rosenzweig, is the philosophical response to a fundamental human problem, a philosophical task: grasping, articulating, and – as we shall soon explain – realizing “the All.” It is to this task that Rosenzweig points, I seek to show in what follows, when he insists that the Star be understood as a “system of philosophy.” The aim of this book is to explore the significance and the ramifications of the philosophical task of system as it is carried out by Rosenzweig in the Star. Along the way, I pursue what are essentially two interrelated objectives, one general and one specific. I aim, first, simply to explicate the task of system which Rosenzweig undertakes in the Star, and to demonstrate how the Star can be fruitfully understood in its entirety as an attempt to articulate “the All” in its identity and difference. I aim, second, to spell out, as precisely and as exhaustively as possible, the specific character of Rosenzweig’s system: its starting-point and presuppositions, its method and parameters, how it may be distinguished from the systems of German Idealism – in short, what is “new” about Rosenzweig’s systematic “thinking,” and why Rosenzweig’s system takes on the peculiar form that it does in the Star. At this point, I would like to make a few prefatory remarks about both objectives.
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The more general claim I will advance, that Rosenzweig’s self-appointed task in the Star is to know “the All” in its identity and difference, already takes what is an unusual stance within the context of contemporary scholarship devoted to Rosenzweig’s thought. In making such a claim I am suggesting that Rosenzweig’s philosophical work be viewed primarily within the context of what he understands to be the German Idealist project of system, rather than as an example of an existentialist or protopostmodern critique of totality in favor of a celebration of difference.18 I am suggesting that the Star’s account of the Jewish and Christian liturgical communities; its forays into the “theological categories” of creation, revelation, and redemption; and even its highlighting of the radical particularity of the individual vis-à-vis the All of philosophy can best be understood as serving the systematic goals of the Star as a whole, rather than as components out of which Rosenzweig constructs a critique of or an alternative to the project of system. To claim that Rosenzweig’s attention to the particularity of the individual, or to the irreducible difference inherent to different kinds of beings (i.e., God, world, human being), is an expression of Rosenzweig’s rejection of the systematic project of Idealism, I will argue, reflects a misunderstanding regarding the nature of that project itself. As will be shown, the task of system in philosophy was never understood as the task of reducing all particulars to a single unity, or of grasping particulars merely as parts of a single totality. The task of “system” which Rosenzweig claimed was the “discovery of German Idealism” is conceived from its inception as the task of grasping all that is in its identity AND difference. Now, the fact that Rosenzweig comes to criticize the Idealists for failing to grasp difference within their systems – much as Hegel and Schelling criticized each other on the same grounds – is another matter. But such criticism in no way marks Rosenzweig’s break from the project of “system”; rather, Rosenzweig carries out his critique of Idealism from within the context of the project of system itself. His critique amounts to the claim that the “systems” of German Idealism did not in fact succeed in fulfilling the task of system they undertook. Thus, to understand Rosenzweig’s concomitant drives to grasp “the All,” on the one hand, and the uniqueness of the individual, on the 18
I am hardly the first to present the Star as standing in some kind of intellectual proximity to the German Idealists, and I have benefited especially from the following works: Else Freund’s Franz Rosenzweig’s Philosophy of Existence, Moshe Schwarz’s [ ממיתוס להתגלותFrom Myth to Revelation], Stéphane Mosès’s System and Revelation, Heinz-Jürgen Görtz’s Tod und Erfahrung, and Ulrich Bieberich’s Wenn die Geschichte göttliche ware: Rosenzweigs Auseinandersetzung mit Hegel, as well as important essays in the field written by Wolfdietrich Schmied-Kowarzik, Shlomo Avineri, Otto Pöggeler, Paul Mendes-Flohr, Myriam Bienenstock, and Reiner Wiehl. What distinguishes my approach from that of earlier scholars, I would submit, is that I claim Rosenzweig’s affinity to the Idealists is neither the result of his particular allegiance to Schelling or to Hegel nor the result of Rosenzweig’s inability (despite his own intentions) to free himself from the Idealist way of thinking; rather it is the result of his enduring commitment to the view that system is the central problem or task of philosophy. Please see my discussion of the polemics in the field over the question of whom Rosenzweig is most indebted to (Schelling or Hegel), and why I seek to remove myself from such polemics, in Chapter 1.
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other, does not demand that we supplement Rosenzweig’s quest for system, say, with his appreciation for the individuality of human existence or his experience of revelation. Instead, it demands that we come to terms with the meaning of the task of system itself as it is worked out in the Star.19 The first objective of my account of the Star as system is thus to return The Star of Redemption to the playing field of systematic philosophy upon which Rosenzweig suggests his book should be placed. We will certainly find that, on this playing field of systematic philosophy, Rosenzweig plays against the German Idealists. But I will suggest that in the attempt to understand how Rosenzweig’s thought breaks from German Idealism as the supreme, culminating expression of the philosophical tradition, scholars have by and large lost sight of the fundamental conception of the task of philosophy which Rosenzweig shares with the Idealists, a conception of philosophy’s task which Rosenzweig does not presuppose as “self-evident,” but rather takes on with full intent and commitment – the task of system. Alongside this general claim regarding the task of system which Rosenzweig takes on in the Star, the account that follows will also assert a specific claim regarding the particular character of Rosenzweig’s own system, regarding the manner in which Rosenzweig carries out this task of system, and regarding the sole standpoint out of which Rosenzweig comes to see this task as realizable. After all, while the “New Thinking” does open with a declaration of the Star’s systematic character, it nevertheless proceeds to point out that “the systematic principle of this philosophy is different” from that of other systems.20 In this context I will propose that Rosenzweig arrives at a conception of system which I will call “system as quintessentially human knowledge.” With this label I wish to indicate Rosenzweig’s rejection of the Idealist conviction that “the All” can only be grasped and articulated through a rise beyond the limits of human finitude to the standpoint of the Absolute. Rosenzweig comes to the conclusion, to the contrary, that only in
19
20
There have been a number of important scholarly works devoted to Rosenzweig’s thought which do indeed reflect on the fact that the Star is a system; see especially, E. Freund’s Franz Rosenzweig’s Philosophy of Existence, M. Schwarz’s [ ממיתוס להתגלותFrom Myth to Revelation], and S. Mosès’s System and Revelation. I would submit, however, that the discussions in these otherwise valuable studies suffer from the fact that they do not inquire sufficiently into the question of what Rosenzweig means by “system.” It is a lack of clarity about the meaning Rosenzweig attaches to the task of system, I will suggest in what follows, that has led these and other scholars of Rosenzweig’s work to make what appear to me to be untenable claims when seeking to reconcile the systematic character of the Star with, say, the critique of totality at the beginning of the Star, and when seeking to distinguish the systematic character of the Star from the systematic character of German Idealism, viz., that the systematic form of the Star is a stubborn vestige of the very kind of philosophy Rosenzweig was trying to get away from but ultimately could not, or that Rosenzweig sought to combine in the Star the virtues of systematic thought with a truth or factical reality that has its ground beyond the system. Please see my extended discussion of the literature on this question at the beginning of Chapter 3. Franz Rosenzweig, “Das neue Denken,” GS 3, p. 141/”The New Thinking,” Philosophical and Theological Writings, p. 112.
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recognizing one’s position as a finite human being within the middle of the All can the philosopher hope to attain knowledge of the All in its identity and difference. It is this conviction regarding the specifically human standpoint out of which systematic philosophy is possible, I will suggest, that leads Rosenzweig to present his system in the form in which it appears in the Star, that is, as a “course” upon which fundamentally and primordially distinct particular beings – divine, worldly, and human – step into relations with each other, relations which will realize “the All” in the redemptive completion of that course. According to Rosenzweig, the German Idealist systems fail to grasp the inherent difference of individual beings – their particularity and finitude – because they assume the unity and, indeed, the divinity of “the All” as primordial or original. Rosenzweig, to the contrary, conceives of this ultimate unity of all that is as the redemptive goal toward which all beings strive. In Rosenzweig’s system, particular beings emerge not out of a common Absolute identity, but rather out of their own particular “nothings.” Our finitude is such, however, that having emerged out of our own respective “nothings,” we remain, according to Rosenzweig, ever at risk to fall back into nothing. It is by stepping into relations with others – with other human beings in the world, and with the ultimate divine other – that we enter into a process of collective unification whereby all beings attain a common, reciprocal securing of their being and are thereby “redeemed” from the risk of falling back into nothingness. The process of the unification of all particular beings through relations, the process of the unification, that is, of God, world, and human beings, spans the whole course of cosmic history, according to Rosenzweig, from creation, through our present moment, and culminating in a redemptive moment in which all beings will have united to form “the All.” Standing as we do in the middle of the course of the gradual unification of “the All,” human beings have the ability to grasp the whole of the system – to know the All – as future, as “not-yet” what it will ultimately be in redemption. In doing so, we come to recognize the truth of the interconnectedness of all beings; we come to understand how everything that is must take on systematic form in order to be what it is – and not to be “nothing.” But in the middle of the course of the All, the human being also experiences revelation – the call or command to enter into loving relations with others which will realize “the All” that is yet to be completed. Revelation, we shall find, summons the individual to a moment of decision: to take her place in the systematic realization of “the All,” or to turn away from the relations that realize the All. It is a decision, we shall see, between “All” and “nothing.” In Rosenzweig’s Star, we will thus find, the human being is called on to realize in her concrete decisions, actions, and relations the very same “system,” the same “All,” which the philosopher can come to know. System, for Rosenzweig, thus not only designates an intellectual or theoretical task to be fulfilled – grasping and articulating the All – but also points to a concrete, practical task to be carried out in the context of everyday life. System comes to designate nothing less than the
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vocation human beings are called upon to fulfill in the world. It is the human being who, by entering into relations of love with others in the world, brings about the actual redemptive unification of all particulars, the actual systematic realization of “the All.” Judaism and Christianity play vital roles, we shall find, in both the theoretical and the concretely practical aspects of the Star’s systematic task. Judaism and Christianity both serve as communal contexts within which, and out of which, the gradual advance of the redemptive relations toward the All is carried out in the world. Moreover, the cyclical shape of their respective liturgical calendars at once gives human beings a context within which they can envision the redemptive end of the system – the “All” in its ultimate unity – from their standpoint in the middle of the system. Once we recognize this task of system as Rosenzweig conceives it for what it is, we shall find, the interpretive riddles and contradictions which have long hampered any attempt to make sense of Rosenzweig’s claims regarding the systematic character of the Star cease to disturb us. It becomes clear, for example, that the task of system properly understood not only is not opposed to the “critique of totality,” but actually demands such a critique as its precondition. It becomes clear that far from being a kind of neutral, dead structure within which Rosenzweig sets his ideas about existence and revelation, Judaism and Christianity, philosophy and faith, system is itself the overarching task, the problem, that leads Rosenzweig to think about existence and revelation, philosophy and faith, Judaism and Christianity, in the interrelated form in which we find them in the Star. In what follows, I hope to show how approaching the Star as the “system of philosophy” Rosenzweig claimed it was offers valuable insights into the character and purpose of the book as a whole. One cannot deny, however, that in declaring the Star to be a system Rosenzweig at once stamped his book as eminently unfashionable. Indeed, the reception of the Star, among readers in Rosenzweig’s time and in our own, exemplifies how the very systematic character which Rosenzweig takes to be essential to the Star’s aims is precisely that aspect of the book that is least appealing, least accessible, and least satisfying to contemporary sensibilities. Who, after all, writes philosophical systems today? On the contrary, it can well be said that one of the very few things that philosophers across the analytic-continental divide have agreed upon since Rosenzweig’s time is that systems are not the business of rigorous or responsible philosophers, that “system” designates a task that is either too epistemologically dubious or too politically dangerous to warrant serious philosophical scrutiny.21 The project of system is one with which we simply do not identify today. And it may be that part of the reason why it has been so difficult 21
Cf., Paul W. Franks, All or Nothing: Systematicity, Transcendental Arguments, and Skepticism in German Idealism, pp. 2–3, and Dieter Henrich’s introduction to Ist Systematische Philosophie Möglich?, pp. 9–10.
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for scholars to take seriously Rosenzweig’s claim about the Star’s systematic character is that we cannot fathom how the same Rosenzweig whom we so admire for challenging the philosophical establishment on behalf of the underdogs of the philosophical world – frightened individuals, strangers, believers, and various sordid “others” among them – could have at the same time taken on that task which has come to epitomize the philosophical establishment more than any other, a task that could hardly be more foreign to our own sensibilities. Now, it is surely the right of each generation of thinkers and scholars to decide for itself “what is living and what is dead” in the thought of the past. But when we declare certain philosophical projects dead prematurely, we risk closing ourselves off to fundamental insights and lines of questioning to which the thinkers of the past are attuned and into which they seek to initiate us, questions and insights which – if fundamental – demand our most serious attention, but which remain otherwise blocked from our view by the regnant assumptions and fashions of our own time and place. It may ultimately be the case that we have good reasons for relegating the task of system to its proper place in the museum of the history of philosophy, where the sometimes-quaint, sometimes-grand ideas of the past are safely preserved for periodic viewing. But such a conclusion should only be drawn, it seems to me, after a thorough investigation of the project of system itself. Moreover, I would submit that Rosenzweig’s Star offers an especially intriguing window through which to explore the philosophical task of system in our time, precisely because Rosenzweig does share so much of the skepticism toward the German Idealist systematic project that prevails today, because he shares our contemporary concern over totalizing modes of thought and action and – nevertheless – takes up this systematic task of philosophy and makes it his own in the Star.22 In an attempt to clarify the conception of system which governs the Star, I will begin, in the first chapter of what follows, with an analysis of Rosenzweig’s 1917 essay “The Oldest System-Program of German Idealism,” in order to determine as precisely as possible the conception of “system as task of philosophy” which Rosenzweig believed himself to have inherited from the German Idealists. My account will seek to show, moreover, how Rosenzweig uses his essay on the “Oldest System-Program” as a means of retrieving the task of system for his own time. When Rosenzweig later makes this task of system his own in the Star, I will thus claim, he does not do so simply because he philosophizes in an era in which the 22
Contemporary philosophical interest in the possibility of systematic philosophy – across the continental-analytic divide – may be said to have enjoyed something of a revival in recent decades, and this book aims to take part, in its own modest way, in this relatively recent trend in scholarship. In the context of the growing scholarship in this area, I have found the following studies especially illuminating for my own work: Dieter Henrich, ed., Ist Systematische Philosophie Möglich?; HansDieter Klein, ed., Systeme im Denken der Gegenwart; Sally Sedgwick, The Reception of Kant’s Critical Philosophy: Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel; H. F. Fulda and J. Stolzenberg, eds., Architektonik und System in der Philosophie Kants; and Paul W. Franks, All or Nothing: Systematicity, Transcendental Arguments, and Skepticism in German Idealism.
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assumptions of systematic thinking still dominate. To the contrary, decades after what he takes to be the breakdown of the Hegelian system through a series of critiques – the scientific critique of positivism, the political critique of Marx, and the existential critiques of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche – Rosenzweig revives the task of system as a response to the plight of philosophy in his own time. Through a reading of Rosenzweig’s correspondence between 1916 and 1918, the second chapter attempts to detail Rosenzweig’s arrival at his own concept of system, whereby he expresses the need to break from the regnant form of system in German Idealism precisely in order to fulfill the task of system which the German Idealists undertook. In this chapter, I will attend to the way Rosenzweig comes to spurn the Absolute standpoint of the Idealists in favor of a quintessentially human systematic standpoint, in which the philosopher attains a view of the whole from the middle of the system in which she stands. Rosenzweig comes to clarify this new standpoint, we shall find, through an intense exchange over the nature of system he conducted with two of his intellectual peers, Eugen Rosenstock and Viktor von Weizsäcker. We will be introduced here, finally, to the specific practical demands Rosenzweig sees system placing upon the individual in the middle of “the All,” demands experienced in the call of revelation. Chapter 3 then begins the task of reconstructing the Star’s account of the identity and difference of All that is on the grounds of the concept of system gleaned from the analyses of the first two chapters. Chapter 3 addresses the starting-point of Rosenzweig’s system in the fear of death and traces the way the human experience of the fear of death leads Rosenzweig to posit the rootedness of all particular beings – divine, worldly, and human – in their respective particular “nothings” rather than in a single Absolute nothing. In this chapter I explore how Rosenzweig’s reflections on the basic particularity of being and nothingness revealed in the fear of death lead him to construct a “factual method” through which divine, worldly, and human beings may be said to generate themselves out of their own particular nothings. Together with the logic of “reversals” we will explore in the fourth chapter, this “factual method” is presented by Rosenzweig as a rigorous systematic method that accounts for difference more faithfully than does the Hegelian dialectical method to which Rosenzweig contrasts it. Chapter 4 analyzes the path of relations the Star charts from creation through revelation to redemption, relations into which particular beings enter and through which they ultimately realize the “true All.” Here, I will devote particular attention to the “reversals” which particular beings must undergo in order to step into reciprocal relations, and to how such reversals offer Rosenzweig the methodological means to grasp the redemptive unification of the All realized by such particular beings without reducing these particulars thereby to mere parts of the All. Chapter 4 will at once highlight the position of the human being in the middle of this course of relations, and the redemptive vocation the human being is called on to carry out as part of the realization of the All.
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Chapter 5, lastly, investigates how Rosenzweig complements the discursive knowledge of the path from difference to the unity of the All as offered in the first and second parts of the Star, with an immediate form of knowledge – vision – that grasps the unity of the All itself. In doing so, Chapter 5 examines the role the liturgical calendars of Judaism and Christianity play in making the entirety of the course of the All visible to the human being who stands in the middle of that course. Chapter 5 ends with an account of how Rosenzweig indeed completes his systematic quest for “knowledge of the All” in the immediate vision of the All in the shape of the “Star of Redemption,” with which the book itself comes to its finale. Finally, the short concluding chapter will revisit the concrete, practical side of the task of system and highlight the “everyday” demands which it places on those readers of the Star who finish the book and return from it “into life.” In attempting to reconstruct the conception of system which guides Rosenzweig in the writing of the Star, I have relied heavily on Rosenzweig’s own statements about system as they appear in his published and unpublished writings. My attempt to demonstrate the way in which the Star comes to articulate the systematic identity and difference of all that is rests on a close reading of the structure and arguments of the Star itself. But in the process of working through the enigmatic style of Rosenzweig’s letters and notebooks, on the one hand, and the thorny details of the Star, on the other, I have become well aware of how many interpretive decisions I have had to make every step of the way. I have often taken certain interpretive positions rather than other plausible ones, no doubt, as a result of my own assumptions about what the task of system entails and about what it would mean to fulfill such a task. Perhaps it is most accurate to say that in order to answer the perplexing, but somewhat naive historical question with which I began work on this project – that is, what did Rosenzweig mean when he labeled the Star a system of philosophy – I have had to engage in a philosophical reconstruction of the task of system as I have found it carried out in the Star. Faithful as this reconstruction tries to be to the letter of the Star, therefore, its spirit is no doubt branded by the assumptions and limitations of the reconstructor himself. Perhaps it will not be taken amiss if I concede that I am less committed to the account I offer of the specific form in which Rosenzweig seeks to fulfill the task of system in the Star than I am to the position that system – that is, “knowing the All” – names the task which Rosenzweig seeks to fulfill in the book, and I can well foresee changing my own views regarding some of the details of my reconstruction in the years to come. My hope is that this work will do its part in showing the importance of asking the question of system in reading Rosenzweig, and in spelling out the demands such a question places on us as interpreters of the Star.
1
m System as Task of Philosophy: “The Oldest System-Program of German Idealism”
n March 1913, the Leo Liepmannssohn auction house offered up for sale a two-page manuscript, a “slightly discolored” but “very interesting treatise about ‘An Ethics,’” hand-written by none other than “Hegel (G. W. Fr.), the great philosopher (1770–1831).”1 The Prussian State Library in Berlin purchased the manuscript, and Franz Rosenzweig found it at the library the following year while conducting research for his book Hegel und der Staat. Rosenzweig read this apparent fragment of a Hegelian essay with great excitement, but something about the text troubled him, too. After comparing the text first to the myriad Hegelian manuscripts amid which he was immersed at the time, and then to other groundbreaking writings of early German Idealism, Rosenzweig arrived at two bold conclusions regarding the character and the authorship of the short text, conclusions which had dramatic consequences both for the fate of the short text itself, and for the way in which the development of German Idealism came to be understood in its light.2 Rosenzweig’s first conclusion was that while the manuscript was unquestionably written in Hegel’s hand, most likely in the early summer months of 1796, neither the ideas presented in the text nor its cavalier style seemed to fit what was known about the melancholic, intellectually uncertain Hegel of the mid-1790s. “Only one person in the philosophical Germany of 1796 possessed this youthful-victorious tone”3 that pervades the text-fragment, Rosenzweig determined, and that was Hegel’s former schoolmate and philosophical brother-in-arms, F. W. J. Schelling. In all likelihood, Rosenzweig surmised, Schelling had sent or shown an original version of the text to Hegel, who, in turn, had copied it over for future perusal. The original had since been lost, and only Hegel’s copy remained. Since the existing copy was in Hegel’s handwriting, Rosenzweig concluded, the text had been mistakenly assigned to Hegel himself.4 1
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Auction entry announcement cited by Dieter Henrich, “Aufklärung der Herkunft des Manuskriptes ‘Das älteste Systemprogramm des deutschen Idealismus,’” in Mythologie der Vernunft: Hegel’s “älteste Systemprogramm des deutschen Idealismus,” pp. 145–6. For a concise account of Rosenzweig’s discovery of the “Oldest System-Program,” see Paul MendesFlohr, “Franz Rosenzweig and the German Philosophical Tradition,” in The Philosophy of Franz Rosenzweig, pp. 2–4. Franz Rosenzweig, “Das älteste Systemprogramm des deutschen Idealismus,” GS 3, p. 10. Hereafter cited as OSP. OSP, pp. 8–10.
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Rosenzweig’s conclusion regarding the authorship of this short text on “An Ethics” sparked a scholarly controversy, at times heatedly polemical, which continues to this day.5 But it is in fact Rosenzweig’s second conclusion regarding this text that most interests us here. For in the wake of his critical analysis of the manuscript, Rosenzweig not only concluded that the assumed authorship of the text should be revised but, additionally, that the text’s received name should be replaced as well. The designation of the text as “An Ethics,” Rosenzweig deduced, was a mistake resulting from the fact that the text’s “first two words – unfortunately underlined – were taken for a title,” and not recognized instead as the last two words of a “sentence beginning on a lost preceding page.” Once this false assumption is removed, Rosenzweig concluded, the guiding theme of the text can be identified: system. The text is not a “ ‘treatise about “an Ethics,” ’ but rather a complete system-program,” indeed, a system-program which precedes by two or three years “the work which up to now has been considered … the first systematic attempt of the Idealistic movement, in a certain sense the first attempt in the whole history of philosophy, to bound the whole philosophical world between the covers of a book, Schelling’s [System of] Transcendental Idealism.”6 As a result, Rosenzweig concluded that the text should no longer be called “An Ethics,” but instead should be recognized for what it is: “The Oldest System-Program of German Idealism.” In his 1917 essay by this name, Rosenzweig published the two-page text itself, together with a demonstration of his own conclusions and a determination of the position the text might be said to occupy within Schelling’s early writings.7 “The Oldest System-Program of German Idealism” will serve as the first station in our quest to determine Rosenzweig’s own conception of system, as well, not least of all because of its name. Before we turn, in later chapters, to a discussion of Rosenzweig’s reshaping of the idea of system, we must first understand the conception of system Rosenzweig believed to have inherited from his philosophical predecessors. And if Rosenzweig sees fit to rename this text-fragment a “systemprogram,” then we may infer that Rosenzweig recognizes the salient features of a system of philosophy programmatically laid out in this text.8 Furthermore, by designating the manuscript not simply as a system program but rather as the oldest system-program, he assigns to this text-fragment – remarkably – a degree of authority unrivaled by even the most prominent systems of German Idealism. 5
6 7
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There are several collections of essays devoted to the debate over the character and authorship of the “System-Program,” the best of which – to my mind – is Das älteste Systemprogramm: Studien zur Frühgeschichte des deutschen Idealismus, ed., R. Bubner. See also Mythologie der Vernunft cited previously, and Frank-Peter Hansen, “Das älteste Systemprogramm des deutschen Idealismus”: Rezeptiongeschichte und Interpretation. OSP, p. 7. Rosenzweig actually finished writing the essay in 1914, but it was first published as “Das älteste Systemprogramm des deutschen Idealismus: Ein handschriftlicher Fund,” Sitzungberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften. Philosophisch-historische Klasse, 1917, number 5. Cf., Moshe Schwarz, [ ממיתוס להתגלותFrom Myth to Revelation], p. 21.
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Rosenzweig’s title implies that we have in this recovered manuscript, if only in fragmentary form, nothing less than the first articulation of the idea of system, the first identification of system as the task of philosophy in German Idealism, and “in a certain sense,” in the entire history of philosophy. The title of Rosenzweig’s essay thus leads us to believe that we may expect to find in Rosenzweig’s own analysis of this two-page text an explanation of what it means – or what it first meant – for system to be the task of philosophy. As we shall discover, this expectation will be fulfilled only in the most unexpected way. The two-page “Oldest System-Program” will reveal to us what it means for system to be the task of philosophy, but it will do so just as much through its systematic failings as it will through its achievement. In fact, the title Rosenzweig assigns to the manuscript not only reflects his insight into the way this text projects the idea of system, but also reflects his recognition of the ways the text does not: the manuscript is not a “system,” but merely a “system-program,” and it presents not the “original” concept of system, but only the “oldest” system-program. We will thus assert, in this chapter, that what Rosenzweig understands as the definitive idea of system in German Idealism can best be revealed by grasping not only the way in which Rosenzweig identifies the notion of system in this text, but also the way in which he finds this notion of system missing. And so we turn to Rosenzweig’s essay, “The Oldest System-Program of German Idealism,” with several questions in mind, in order to discover that definitive idea of system which Rosenzweig identifies as somehow lying hidden in the two “slightly discolored” pages which the Prussian State Library acquired from the Liepmannssohn auction house in 1913. We ask: What does Rosenzweig understand by the notion of system? What does it mean for this two-page manuscript to be a system-program? What degree of originality is granted to this text when Rosenzweig declares it to be the oldest program for a system in German Idealism? How does system define German Idealism over against the rest of the history of philosophy? And finally, what is the significance of the idea of system for Rosenzweig’s own time?
I. System and the Philosophy of Rosenzweig’s Time We begin, actually, with the last question. For before attempting to grasp the meaning of the idea of system which Rosenzweig discovers in the “Oldest SystemProgram,” one might rightfully question the relevance of an idea such as system for the philosophical era in which Rosenzweig comes of age. Indeed, at first glance, no question seems more foreign to the philosophical mood of Rosenzweig’s time than the question of system. If anything unites the disparate philosophical movements which emerged in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries – the movements of positivism and scientism, of neo-Kantianism, of historicism, and of the
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various philosophies of life and of Weltanschauung – it would seem to be precisely the struggle against system.9 Everywhere, it seemed, the particular was held up against the presumptuous totality of the Hegelian system, whether that particular was the particular empirical results of scientific research, the particular rigors of method and epistemology as divorced from the imprecise claims of metaphysics as a whole, the particular value of any given historical era, or, simply, the unique irreducible life-perspective of the particular human being. This struggle against the unity of the system, moreover, often pitted one particular fragment of the system against the other: Weltanschauung philosophers and life-philosophers accused positivists and neo-Kantians of losing sight of the basic questions of human existence in their insistence on the rigors of method and research; neo-Kantians and positivists accused life-philosophers and Weltanschauung-philosophers of being romantic enthusiasts and not philosophers. Thus not only had the absolute subject-object totality of Hegel’s system broken apart by the beginning of the twentieth century, but subject and object themselves had broken up into numerous mutually opposed subjects and objects, each declaring the subject-matter of philosophy, and the practice of philosophy itself, to be something different.10 Into this fragmented state of philosophical affairs surrounding him, Rosenzweig makes the following surprising claim. “Outlasting the overthrow of the Hegelian system,” he asserts, toward the end of the “Oldest System-Program,” “was the common conviction formed in it, that it is the task of philosophy somehow to come to a system.”11 Rosenzweig’s claim regarding the persistence of the idea of system seems most curious when weighed against the prevailing philosophical trends of his time. If we examine the claim closely, however, it does much to illuminate the kind of philosophical baggage which Rosenzweig believed his own time to have inherited from the era of German Idealism. According to Rosenzweig’s statement, what lives on after the period of German Idealism is not a specific completed system, for instance, the Hegelian – to be accepted or discarded – but rather the conviction that system is “the task of philosophy.” Strangely enough, Rosenzweig implies, what lies behind the countless contemporary philosophical attempts to overthrow Hegel’s system, indeed, what may in fact justify such an overthrow, is none other than a tacit agreement with Hegel that it is philosophy’s task somehow to become system. As Rosenzweig goes on to show, however, while contemporary philosophy continues to reflect the conviction that philosophy must become system, it does so only in the most confused, fragmented way. Only in this current situation in which 9
10
11
For an account of the philosophical change in attitude toward the notion of system as task resulting from the development of the empirical sciences, see the chapter “Science” in Herbert Schnaedelbach, Philosophy in Germany 1831–1933, pp. 66–108. On the turn-of-the-century “identity crisis” in philosophy, see Schnaedelbach, p. 92. Cf., Charles R. Bambach, Heidegger, Dilthey, and the Crisis of Historicism, pp. 21–30. OSP, p. 41.
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the completed system of Hegel has been overthrown, but yet the task of system has been preserved, Rosenzweig claims, could ideas gain credence such as that it is incumbent upon philosophy to do nothing but grasp together the “results of the individual sciences.” Even the call “back to Kant,” which became audible with the overthrow of the Hegelian system, was accompanied by assurances that a new, better-secured system would be attained through critical consciousness again in the future. And only since then have the philosophical individual-investigations become accustomed to finding their own justification in that somehow – be it still far away – they “prepare” the future system; indeed, the doubt is raised whether individual investigations as such are scientifically admissible in philosophy. Now, this whole notion of system as the task of philosophy that lies at the ground of these different views is, as said, nothing self-evident, but rather a discovery of German Idealism.12
If the state and direction of contemporary philosophy present a confused picture, Rosenzweig suggests, there is a common ground that rests beneath its myriad views, and this ground is none other than the “notion of system as the task of philosophy,” that task which was “discovered” by German Idealism. But as Rosenzweig describes in this passage, the relationship of contemporary philosophy to this ground is itself vague and ambivalent, and this vague and ambivalent relationship is reflected by the different contemporary philosophical trends in different ways. Scientism and positivism debase the majestic if presumptuous idea that system is the task of philosophy by claiming that the only job left for philosophy is to hold together the different branches of empirical science.13 Neo-Kantianism, on the other hand, does assert the need to attain a more secure and methodologically sound system than Hegel’s; indeed, neo-Kantians find the justification for their “return” to Kantian “critical consciousness” on the very grounds of the quest for system. But at the same time, neo-Kantianism pushes this “system” off into the future, losing the sense of the immediacy of this philosophical task beyond the horizon of epistemological questions raised for the present.14 Finally, the idea of 12 13
14
Ibid. Wilhelm Wundt attributes to Comtean positivism the view that “the task [of philosophy] remains to set together the results of the individual sciences” but himself defines philosophy “as the universal science which has to unify into a contradiction-free system the universal knowledge mediated through the individual sciences,” W. M. Wundt, System der Philosophie, pp. 15, 17. See also the ending of Wilhelm Windelband’s Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie, p. 552: “[Philosophy] can only live on as the doctrine of universally-valid values. It will no longer force itself into the work of the individual sciences. … It has neither the ambition to want to know once again from its side what these have known, nor the desire to patch together a most universal structure out of the ‘more universal individual results’ of the particular disciplines.” Rosenzweig is likely alluding here to the editors’ introduction to the inaugural volume of the neoKantian journal for the philosophy of culture, Logos: Internationale Zeitschrift für Philosophie der Kultur, 1 (1910), p. v: “Our time does not stand under the rule of a system of philosophy, but rather it has its meaning more in the manifoldness and subtlety of philosophical minute-work, which however only reveal their ultimate meaning in the formation of a system. As preparation and
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system remains present – but only vaguely so – as the bogeyman for all those who philosophize from out of the individual standpoint, haunting their consciences with the doubt that their thoughts are not philosophically sound, leading them to justify their philosophizing through the claim that they actually “prepare” some future system, remote as it may be.15 Rosenzweig implies that all these philosophical movements, different as they may be from one another, share two important characteristics: they all share, as the ground of their disparate views of philosophy, the notion that system is the proper task of philosophy, and they all share an unclear representation of or relation to this ground of their view of philosophy. A sharp critique of the prevailing movements of contemporary philosophy can thus be drawn from Rosenzweig’s words: in its repeated attempts to overthrow the Hegelian system, contemporary philosophy has not succeeded in freeing itself from the basic view of the task of philosophy which Hegel put forth; rather it has only succeeded in obscuring the nature of that task. Philosophy in Rosenzweig’s time is still grounded in the same fundamental conviction which pervaded German Idealism system is its task. But contemporary philosophy no longer understands the meaning of this task, and certainly no longer dares to fulfill it. Instead, the task of system in Rosenzweig’s own time is either projected far into the future, or reduced, in the present, to the menial job of holding the sciences together. Thus, even before we have examined what Rosenzweig understands by the notion of “system” in the “Oldest System-Program,” Rosenzweig’s reflections here shed significant light on the impact that a discovery of an “oldest system-program” would have upon the state of philosophy in Rosenzweig’s own time. For if contemporary philosophy is determined by the task of system, and if it suffers, at the same time, from an unclear understanding of this task, then the discovery of the earliest expression of this task in the short program written in Hegel’s hand would be more than a simple scholarly find: it would represent the discovery of the source of the
15
underpinning for this, there is required a philosophical penetration of the most different realms of culture.” Edmund Husserl whose classic “Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft,” appeared in that first volume of Logos, likewise expressed his conviction that philosophy must become rigorous science “precisely in this place, in the beginnings of Logos which … wants to prepare the ground for the future ‘system’ of philosophy” (p. 291). I have taken Rosenzweig’s reference to “philosophical individual investigations” to mean something like the philosophizing out of the individual standpoint popular in Rosenzweig’s time in the form of the philosophy of life or of worldview. I am unsure of this interpretation. It is supported, on the one hand, both by Rosenzweig’s comment at the very end of the “Oldest System-Program” to the effect that the notion of system stamps “all enthusiastic philosophizing on that side, and all aphoristic philosophizing on this side as in principle unscientific” (OSP, p. 44) and by the fact that in the Star Rosenzweig identifies the central problem facing the worldview philosophy embodied by Nietzsche to be its questionable scientific character. But Rosenzweig may also intend here simply the contemporary philosophical vogue of abandoning the attempt to achieve system in philosophy in favor of specialized philosophical investigations, exemplified in the editorial introduction to Logos cited in the previous note.
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very conception of philosophy which vaguely governs Rosenzweig’s own time. It would thereby offer the possibility of clarifying that ruling notion of philosophy which has at once become unclear, the possibility of recovering the meaning of the philosophical task which lies hidden at the ground of the different contemporary views of philosophy. Rosenzweig thus shows us that the very question about the meaning of system which seemed, at first glance, to be least relevant to the philosophical mood of his time is in fact most vital. The purpose of philosophy has become unclear; what remains is a vague, haunting sense that philosophy must become system; what is required is a reacquaintance with the meaning of system as the task of philosophy. This reacquaintance demands a return to the beginnings of German Idealism, for it is here that “the task of philosophy was fixed in a new way”; and yet, Rosenzweig claims, this fixing of the task of philosophy anew is carried out by German Idealism “in connection with … the whole development” of the history of philosophy “up until then.”16 Indeed, as we noted earlier, Rosenzweig asserts that the “notion of system as the task of philosophy” is the “discovery of German Idealism.” Idealism “discovers” system as its proper task – it neither invents this task out of nowhere nor inherits it from the past, but rather the Idealists are the first to uncover that task of philosophy which has always been implicit or hidden within the history of philosophy. Thus Rosenzweig asserts, “only here [i.e., in German Idealism] the idea attained form which had been hidden, since its first design, in that short statement which stands at the beginning of western intellectual history: that ‘all’ ‘is’ water.”17 The notion that system is the task of philosophy stands in the very first utterance of ancient philosophy, but it stands there hidden, according to Rosenzweig, and it remains hidden over the course of the entire history of philosophy until the German Idealists discover it some 2,500 years later and give it articulate form. If this is the case, then the document in which the discovery of the task of system is first recorded, “The Oldest System-Program of German Idealism,” would represent not merely the first articulation of a new conception of the task of philosophy inaugurated by the Idealists, but rather the first articulation of the most original task of philosophy. The “Oldest System-Program” would represent for Rosenzweig that moment in the history of philosophy in which the meaning of the entire philosophical tradition comes to light, in which the task of system hidden in its first words becomes explicit for philosophical consciousness. Given the amount of time it took philosophy to attain clarity regarding its true task, it is perhaps no surprise that the decades following the decline of the popularity of Idealism returned this task to obscurity. But the discovery of a 16 17
OSP, p. 44. OSP, p. 41.
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hitherto-unknown “oldest” system-program by Rosenzweig makes a recovery of this moment of clarity possible. System as task of philosophy can become clear once again, if Rosenzweig can discover the meaning of system anew in the “Oldest System-Program” itself. Our task is to show how Rosenzweig does so.
II. The One and All It may be worth noting, first of all, where Rosenzweig chooses to define the idea of system in his essay on the “Oldest System-Program.” Rosenzweig does so, in fact, only at the very end of the essay, after he has presented the system-program itself and his conclusions regarding its authorship and its position within Schelling’s early writings. One might justly ask how Rosenzweig expects his readers to recognize the “system” in the system-program if Rosenzweig only defines system for them at the end of the article. Such a recognition of system would seem to be made possible, ironically, through the same vague sense of system which Rosenzweig identifies as grounding the present-day conception of philosophy. Everyone, Rosenzweig seems to imply, has some notion of what system is. The task of Rosenzweig’s essay, as we have suggested, is to lead his readers from this vague sense of the meaning of system back to its “oldest” meaning, and the order of the article follows this very scheme: Rosenzweig assumes a vague sense of system at the beginning of the article and defines system precisely only at the article’s end, after he has derived this precise meaning from his analysis of the two-page system-program itself. Rosenzweig does in fact allude to the vague, common sense of system at the very beginning of his article, in a passage that we have already encountered. Before Rosenzweig has even questioned the authorship of the text, he suggests that the character and the dating of the manuscript in Hegel’s handwriting would imply that herein lies “a program for a system” written two to three years before that work which has been considered up to now to be “the first systematic attempt of the idealistic movement … to bound the whole philosophical world between the covers of one book, Schelling’s Transcendental Idealism.”18 Here Rosenzweig points playfully to the most generally accepted sense of the aim and scope of systems of philosophy: systems seek to grasp everything! Systems have the presumption to collect and to order all knowledge, “the whole of the philosophical world” within one volume or, as the case may be, within one set of volumes. Whether one praises systematic philosophy as the only “scientifically admissible” philosophy or indicts it on charges of swallowing up particularity and diversity within its totalizing walls, both the merit and the dangers assigned to philosophical systems seem to rest on just this claim to unity and comprehensiveness. Systems seek to unify the “whole” of philosophy, they seek to reveal knowledge as grasping what is both as a totality 18
OSP, p. 7.
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or an “All” (“whole of the philosophical world”) and as something singular (“one book”), as “One.” Such is the vague, but playfully accessible meaning of system that Rosenzweig articulates at the very beginning of his essay. That this vague meaning of system already points to the true, more precise meaning of system in German Idealism becomes clear only in the closing section of the article, when Rosenzweig reflects on the very historical significance of the system-program which we have observed. Rosenzweig writes: So we really grasp in our program the moment in the history of philosophy where for the first time knowledge of the ultimate truth grew together with knowledge of the whole [of] actuality. Being [das Sein] and that which is [das Seiende] become one united-single problem, stamping all enthusiastic philosophizing on that side, and all aphoristic philosophizing on this side as in principle equally unscientific.19
Rosenzweig here repeats his claims regarding the historical significance of the discovery of system. He reiterates both the significance of the “oldest systemprogram” in relation to the history of philosophy which precedes it, and the way in which the notion of system still haunts contemporary forms of philosophy – the “enthusiastic” and “aphoristic” philosophies of life and of Weltanschauung – with doubts as to their scientific character. But Rosenzweig also sets forth, in this passage, a definition of the idea of system itself. He formulates the meaning of system in two ways. The moment in which system is revealed as the task of philosophy is, according to Rosenzweig, the moment in which knowledge of the ultimate truth grows together with knowledge of the whole of actuality, or, alternatively, the moment in which Being [das Sein] and that which is [das Seiende] become one united philosophical problem. To explain Rosenzweig’s definition, here, we might begin by noting what this more precise definition shares in common with the vague sense of system with which Rosenzweig begins his essay: in both cases, system seeks to grasp the whole. In our present passage, the whole is the “whole actuality” which has “grown together” with the most traditional object of the philosophical quest, the ultimate truth. Rosenzweig thus suggests that what distinguishes the task of systematic philosophy over against prior conceptions of philosophy is, first of all, its view of the relationship between truth and actuality. The notion that system is the proper task of philosophy implies that truth is not wholly transcendent to actuality; it is not to be pursued through the negation of the world, or through a springboarding away from the actual to a realm of ideas. Truth is to be grasped, rather, only in its interconnection with the whole of actuality. What this unification of the “ultimate truth” and the “whole actuality” implies is further disclosed in Rosenzweig’s second formulation of the meaning of system. According to this formulation, Rosenzweig suggests that systematic philosophy is 19
OSP, p. 44.
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not content to inquire solely into the problem of Being, it does not seek merely the single all-embracing concept that encompasses and is common to everything that “is,” but rather, it seeks to grasp the particular which is as such [das Seiende] as well, and it seeks to grasp this particularity together with the unity of the concept of Being. The notion of system thus implies, according to this second formulation, the unification of the question of Being, on the one hand, and of the question of the diversity of particular beings, on the other. System inquires into the unity that holds between the Being which is identical for all that is and the unique difference inherent to each particular being. Thus, what emerges from Rosenzweig’s two concise formulations is in fact a rather precise notion of the task of system. System seeks to grasp the ultimate truth of Being together with the “whole” of actuality, and this whole of actuality is itself not something singular; rather it is a complete collection of particular beings. What discloses itself within the framework of system is the interconnectedness of the one truth with all the particulars of actuality. A system of philosophy is hence nothing less than knowledge of the “One and All” as such and in their interconnectedness; it is the philosophical unification of the conceptual identity which is common to all that is together with the unique difference of each actual particular: system is the unity of the One and All, of identity and difference.20 When we recognize Rosenzweig’s determination of the meaning of system as knowledge of the “One and All,” then we can also recognize the way in which this meaning was already foreshadowed in Rosenzweig’s first loose depiction of system as the attempt to fit the “whole philosophical world” within one book, for here, already, one recognizes the task of system indistinctly as the unity of unity and multiplicity, of the “whole” and “one.” More importantly, when we identify system as knowledge of the One and All, we can also understand how Rosenzweig finds the notion of system embedded within the philosophical tradition, ever-present yet “undiscovered” since its first utterance. In a passage that we examined as separate statements earlier, Rosenzweig points to the presence of the notion of system stretching from his own time all the way back to the time of the pre-Socratics. That passage, in its entirety, reads as follows: Now, this whole notion of system as the task of philosophy that lies at the ground of these different views is, as said, nothing self-evident, but rather a discovery of German Idealism. Only here the idea attained form which had been hidden, since its first design, in that short sentence which stands at the beginning of western intellectual history: that “all” “is” water. Since then, the task of all philosophy has been not just
20
For an alternative interpretation of these lines from the “Oldest System-Program,” see Ernest Rubinstein, An Episode of Jewish Romanticism: Franz Rosenzweig’s Star of Redemption, p. 24. See also, Ulrich Bieberich, Wenn die Geschichte göttlich wäre: Rosenzweigs Auseinandersetzung mit Hegel, pp. 60–1; Myriam Bienenstock, “Auf Schellings Spuren im Stern der Erlösung,” Rosenzweig als Leser: Kontextuelle Kommentare zum “Stern der Erlösung,”, p. 277.
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to express the unity of the whole Being [Sein] but rather to determine it somehow through intertwining with that which is [mit dem Seienden].21
The task of system, Rosenzweig asserts here, is “hidden” in that short sentence which begins the history of philosophy, for Thales’ statement already suggests the fundamental connection (“is”) between the “unity of the whole Being,” that is, “all,” and something particular in actuality, that is, water, and it already thereby declares the task of philosophy to be the grasping of this connection. But Rosenzweig is careful to point out that this task is only “hidden” in Thales’ statement. Thales does not posit the unification and interconnection of the “One” Being with “All” particulars, but instead declares “All” of what is to be determinable by one particular being. The multiplicity of the “All” undergoes a transformation over the course of Thales’ statement through the singular “is”: once “All” is determined as something that “is,” it no longer represents the multiplicity of beings, or the complete collection of all particulars, but rather the all-embracing name for the one “whole Being,” which Thales then declares to be equivalent to water.22 The hiddenness of the notion of system in Thales’ statement is thus reflected in the very ambiguity and malleability of the term “All” itself. For the word “All” can imply both multiplicity – indeed, the most wide-ranging multiplicity possible – and unity; it includes all beings, but it is something singular: it is “the All.” The term “All” can in fact encompass within itself both the One and All whose unification is sought in the task of system, for All is both singular and comprehensively plural: it is itself One and All. One might suggest, therefore, that we shorten our designation of the task of system; we need not say that system seeks knowledge of the One and All, but simply that it seeks knowledge of the All. But the problem is that the term “All” also contains the possibility of meaning only singularity or only multiplicity. It can be understood merely as a singular All over against the multiplicity of particular beings, or as the multiplicity of All beings over against the one Being in which they all participate. Both the ambiguity of the term “All” and the specific direction in which Thales pulls the term are highlighted in Rosenzweig’s citation of Thales: he sets the “all” and the “is” in separate quotations. By so doing, Rosenzweig indicates the fact that “all,” which is cited by Rosenzweig without any definite article [“alles”], need not be understood as something singular [i.e., das All], but it is understood this way by Thales, who declares that all “is” water. 21 22
OSP, p. 41. See Aristotle, Metaphysics A3, 983b: “Most of the first philosophers thought that principles in the form of matter were the only principles of all things; for the original source of all existing things, that from which a thing first comes-into-being and into which it is finally destroyed, the substance persisting but changing in its qualities, this they declare is the element and first principle of existing things. … Thales, the founder of this type of philosophy, says that it is water,” cited in Kirk, Raven, and Schofield eds., The Presocratic Philosophers: A Critical History with a Selection of Texts, pp. 88–9.
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The idea of system is thus “hidden” in the first statement of the history of philosophy, but embedded within this first statement is also the first corruption of the idea of system, and the reason why this idea had to be “discovered” some 2,500 years later. Thales projects the idea of system insofar as he asserts that the truth about being can only be grasped as the union of a conceptual unity and particularized actuality. But he hides this idea insofar as he determines “All” being to be one thing to the exclusion of “all” others, by declaring that “All” “is” water. What is remarkable is that the reduction of “All” that is to one thing in Thales’ statement not only hides the idea of system, so that it must be discovered by German Idealism, but also foreshadows the very criticism brought against system itself after it becomes the ruling conception of the task of philosophy. Thus it is claimed that system by definition ignores or destroys or excludes the uniqueness of each particular by declaring All that is to be One. We may suggest, therefore, that the true idea of system, of a knowing which grasps the One and All, the unity and difference of what is as such and in their interconnection, always carries with it the possibility of hiding itself, of being corrupted into a reduction of All beings to One, of excluding difference through an overeager elevation of the identity which holds together All that is. We thus find the whole problematic character of the task of system already revealed in the term “All,” in what Rosenzweig takes to be the first word of the first statement in the history of philosophy. For if the “All” is grasped in its broadest sense, then knowledge of All represents the highest aim of all philosophy which understands its task as system: the comprehensive and ramified knowledge of the One and All as such and in their interconnection. At the same time, however, the moment the All is taken up, one-sidedly, as the All, as something singular, then it runs the risk of reducing All that is to One thing or one concept, of celebrating the identity of all things at the cost of negating their inherent particularity. Alternatively, if “All” is grasped solely as multiplicity, and not as both unity and multiplicity, then knowledge of All becomes the task of collecting a mere aggregate of particulars: that is, it becomes the very same “holding together of the individual sciences” to which the task of system has been reduced by scientism in Rosenzweig’s time.23 As we shall see, Rosenzweig will take advantage of this multivalence of “knowing the All” in the opening of The Star of Redemption, using the phrase in its broadest sense to designate the very systematic task of the Star itself, and in its narrow, reductive sense to designate what he comes to see as the failings of the attempts at system which precede him. One might surmise that it was precisely a recognition of the pitfalls into which the task of system risks falling, of the dangers inherent to the philosophical unification of the one ultimate truth with the whole of particularized actuality, which 23
Cf. Bambach, p. 27. See also, Section IV.A in this chapter on Kant regarding the difference between grasping the totality of knowledge as a system or as an aggregate.
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led ancient philosophy to pass over or to reject system as the task of philosophy. Whatever the reason, however, it is clear to Rosenzweig that the notion of system as the proper task of philosophy is absent for the ancients. In Plato, for example, particular “realities are always only starting-points in order to advance to the Ultimate [Truth].”24 On the whole, Rosenzweig asserts, the great ancient thinkers, who have often been compared to the German Idealists as the systematizers of antiquity, are in no way systematizers in the sense which the word has taken on over the last hundred years. Because it did not strike them that a path must lead from the ultimate truth to an understanding of the totality of the actual.25
Despite the fact that common usage may refer to the ancients as systematic thinkers, that one often hears reference to the “philosophical systems” of Plato or Aristotle, Rosenzweig explains, the notion of system as the task of philosophy has only taken on its proper meaning since that meaning was “discovered” by German Idealism. The ancients did not possess the notion of system that we have come to understand with Rosenzweig’s aid, the notion that the one truth and the totality of what is actual, the One and the All, must be grasped in their interconnection. The first signs of the surfacing of this notion of system had to await the beginning of the modern period.
III. System and the Dangers of Reduction: Jacobi’s Spinoza-Critique Rosenzweig’s designation of the task of system as the attempt to grasp the One and All of what is, as the attempt to unify the investigation of Being in general together with the investigation of beings in their particularity, has a further implication to which we must now point. One may state this implication as follows: the task of grasping what is both in its unity and as a totality of particulars demands that one grasp not only the difference inherent to every particular being as such, but also the different kinds of particular beings which make up the manifold of what is. Over the course of the history of philosophy leading up to German Idealism a general agreement emerged regarding the nature and the number of the basic kinds of beings. All beings were divided into three fundamental kinds – divine being, physical being, and human souls, or, roughly speaking, God, world, and selves – as a result of which the philosophical study of Being was traditionally divided between a “general metaphysics,” which treated “Being as such,” and three distinct but interconnected fields of “special metaphysics”: theology, cosmology or physics, and psychology. This traditional division of the philosophical investigation of Being had roots reaching as far back as Plato and Aristotle, attained 24 25
OSP, p. 41. Ibid.
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dominance during the Scholasticism of the Middle Ages, and received its classical modern articulation in the metaphysics of Christian Wolff, who asserts, “There are three parts of philosophy. One part treats of God, another part treats of human souls, and the third part treats of bodies or material things. We do not know any other beings except God, human souls, and bodies. Therefore, since we are aware of only these three genera of beings, there cannot be more than three parts of philosophy.”26 In the light of this recognition of God, world, and human selves as the three fundamental kinds of Being, anyone seeking to give a systematic presentation of the unity of Being together with the totality of particular beings would thus have to give an account not only of the nature of unity and particularity as such and in their interconnection, but also of the particular natures of the three different kinds of beings themselves in their identity and difference. The task of system hence demanded that one attain knowledge of God, world, and the human self, each as a particular kind of being [i.e., Seiende], without losing sight of the fact that all three were representatives of the same identical Being [Sein]; and, at the same time, it demanded grasping the identity of God, world, and the human self without losing sight of the particular difference of each. Only by preserving and unifying the identity and difference of the fundamental kinds of being, just as one preserved and unified the identity and difference of the unity of Being and the totality of particular beings could one claim to attain knowledge of the One and All. According to Rosenzweig’s account, we have already noted, the first signs of the notion that such knowledge of the interconnection of the One and the All is the task of philosophy emerged at the dawn of the modern period. Only with Spinoza, Rosenzweig writes, was “the first attempt made to sketch an image of one world growing forth out of one root.”27 The idea of system in German Idealism, Rosenzweig explains, emerged specifically as a response to Spinoza, as a “counterpart to Spinoza’s Ethics.”28 But if Rosenzweig recognizes Spinoza as presenting the 26
27
28
Christian Wolff, “Preliminary Discourse on Philosophy in General,” p. 33. For a fascinating account of the division of metaphysics in Plato and Aristotle and in their successors see Philip Merlan, From Platonism to Neoplatonism. Merlan traces the relationship between the soul and mathematicals as two kinds of intermediate forms of beings between the physical world and the divine, a relationship with roots in Plato’s Timaeus. Out of this relationship there developed two traditions of “special metaphysics,” one divided into physics, mathematics, and theology, and the other divided into physics, psychology, and theology. Cf., Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, pp. 5–8, and The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 80. OSP, p. 42. Rosenzweig identifies Spinoza’s attempt as taking up the “Cartesian suggestion.” He alludes thereby to Descartes’s “The Principles of Philosophy,” in which Descartes declares that “philosophy as a whole is like a tree whose roots are metaphysics, whose trunk is physics, and whose branches, which issue from this trunk, are all the other sciences,” cited from The Philosophical Works of Descartes, Vol. I, p. 211. But cf., Nicholas Rescher’s identification of Leibniz as the thinker who first introduced the term “system” in philosophical discourse, in “Leibniz and the Concept of a System,” Studia Leibnitiana 13 (1981): 113–22. Ibid.
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“first attempt … to sketch an image of one world growing forth out of one root,” why does he not identify the Ethics as the first system of philosophy? What makes system the discovery of the Idealists and not of Spinoza himself? Rosenzweig suggests an answer to this question in his characterization of Spinoza’s philosophical project which we have just repeated. Spinoza attempts to present an image of one world growing out of one root. In so doing, Rosenzweig intimates, Spinoza merely spells out in full the reduction of All to One which Thales first carries out. Spinoza’s is not a system of philosophy that grasps the One and All, the unity and multiplicity of what is; rather, it carries out the reduction of multiplicity to unity. Such was the accepted critique of Spinoza’s philosophy made famous by Jacobi, which the German Idealists inherited, and which Rosenzweig hints to by drawing attention, through his repetition, to the one-sided character of Spinoza’s thought. This critique saw Spinoza’s reduction, furthermore, not only as a reduction of particularity in general to unity, of difference to identity, but also as a reduction of the different kinds of beings to one. Jacobi’s claims regarding Spinozism which are most relevant to our discussion of system may be loosely summarized as follows. First of all, by asserting the identity of God and the natural world in the Ethics, as the respective active and passive sides of the same one Substance, Spinoza loses the unique character of God as that which is absolutely different from the finite world, and as a result, his philosophy leads to atheism. Second, by designating all particular beings – including human beings – as modes of this one Substance, “determined to exist and to act in a definite way from the necessity of the divine nature,”29 Spinoza eliminates that essential characteristic which seems to differentiate the human being from other particular entities in the world, that is, her freedom. Spinoza’s philosophy thus leads to fatalism. Finally, this same relationship between God, the one Substance, and the particular entities that form its modes does not grasp, in any positive sense, the unique way in which particular entities “are”; but rather it assigns them being only insofar as they express the “absolute being” of the one Substance. Particular entities possess being only insofar as they are not particulars; as particulars, they are not, or, they are nothing. Summarizing Spinoza’s account of particulars, Jacobi thus writes, “Individual things … so far as they only exist in a certain determinate mode, are non-entia, the indeterminate infinite being is the one single true ens reale.”30 Instead of representing the first true system, the first true conception of the task of philosophy as the knowing of the One and All, Spinoza’s philosophy – when 29 30
Benedict de Spinoza, The Ethics, I P29, in Complete Works, p. 234. Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, “Über die Lehre des Spinoza in Briefen an den Herrn Moses Mendelssohn,” Werke. Band 1, 1, p. 100, translated into English in “Concerning the Doctrine of Spinoza in Letters to Herr Moses Mendelssohn,” The Main Philosophical Writings and the Novel Allwill, p. 220. Cf., Paul W. Franks and Michael L. Morgan, “From 1914 to 1917,” in Franz Rosenzweig, Philosophical and Theological Writings, pp. 32–3; and Paul W. Franks, “All or Nothing: Systematicity and Nihilism in Jacobi, Reinhold, and Maimon,” in The Cambridge Companion to German Idealism, pp. 96–100.
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viewed through Jacobi’s critical lens – loses both the multiplicity of the All and the specific differences of the three fundamental kinds of being in the identity of its single Substance. It thereby points to the same kind of corruption of the notion of system that we found in Thales. But the very “systematic” nature of Spinoza’s apparent failure forces one to question the possibility of system itself. For Spinoza does attempt to articulate the connection between the One substance and All its particular modes, but this attempt results in the negation of All particulars. One begins to wonder whether the task of system has perhaps been shirked over the history of philosophy from Thales to Spinoza not because of any failing of earlier philosophers, but rather because these philosophers recognized such a task as impossible. Perhaps it is impossible to grasp the One and All without reducing the multiplicity of the All to One substance, or contrarily, without losing the unity of being in the multiplicity of the All. Perhaps it is impossible to grasp the identity which unites God, world, and human being without losing sight of the inherent differences of each. The fact that such fundamental doubts arose surrounding Spinoza’s philosophy meant that anyone who did posit system as the task of philosophy, and anyone who grasped this task of system as demanding knowledge of the One and All as such and in their interconnection, would have to show that the pitfalls of Spinozism could be avoided. He would have to present the task of system as “a counterpart to Spinoza’s Ethics.” This, according to Rosenzweig, was precisely the mission that Schelling took upon himself, a mission made possible by the ground-breaking work of Kant and Fichte before him. Thus Rosenzweig writes: Schelling, who was the first within the Idealistic Movement who grasped the idea of system, thought to set up a counterpart to Spinoza’s Ethics. The intention was to allow the whole philosophical cosmos to come into being out of the concept of the absolute act, as Spinoza had out of the concept of absolute being. Both Kant and Fichte were necessary assumptions of this idea.31
As we shall see in the following section, the significance of Kant’s role in bringing the task of system into full view for the Idealists cannot be overemphasized. Rosenzweig already alludes to the nature of the philosophical revolution which Kant carried out, and which Fichte transformed into the basis for the notion of system as the proper task of philosophy, by formulating Schelling’s first thoughts on system in opposition to the philosophy of Spinoza. Schelling’s first glimpse of the task of system, according to Rosenzweig, took the form of the emergence of “the whole philosophical cosmos” from out of the concept of the “absolute act,” just as Spinoza had allowed it to emerge from out of the concept of absolute being. Rosenzweig implies, thereby, that the discovery of system as the proper task of philosophy; indeed the ascent from Spinoza’s corruption of the notion of system 31
OSP, p. 42.
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to the disclosure of system in its true sense was made possible by this change in the understanding of the principle or ground of all that is from that of an absolute being to an absolute act. In order to make sense of this change and to grasp its significance for the discovery of system in German Idealism, we must examine the systematic implications of Kant’s Copernican revolution in some detail.
IV. Kant’s Groundwork for a System of Philosophy iv.1 The Unanswered Question Regarding Kant’s System The Idealists themselves understood their discovery of system to be the consequence of the revolutionary change that Kant brought about in the focus and direction of philosophical thinking during their time, a change that can be summed up in two words: the subject.32 This turn to the subject as the playing field upon which the search for truth is to be grounded and carried out not only brought the task of system into view for the Idealists, but also determined the direction which the philosophical discourse on system would take from the time of the Idealists up through Rosenzweig’s own day. Our quest to understand the first true notion of system that Rosenzweig assigns to Schelling in the system-program thus demands that we first understand how the development of philosophy through Kant and Fichte led to a new conception of knowledge that made a “counterpart to Spinoza” possible. We must first understand, that is, how Kant’s Copernican revolution in philosophy drew the true idea of system out of its 2,500-year-old hiding place. Kant drew the idea of system out of hiding – but Rosenzweig designates neither Kant nor Fichte as the pioneer who discovered system as the task of philosophy. To understand each’s role on the path to this discovery demands, therefore, that we grasp how Kant and Fichte both made this discovery possible and, at the same time, failed to make this discovery on their own. It is just Kant’s own ambiguous but unquestionably significant relationship to the discovery of system as the task of philosophy that Rosenzweig points to at the beginning of the last section of the “Oldest System-Program.” Here Rosenzweig writes, “It is an unanswered question whether, and in what sense, Kant wanted a system. … But the epoch in the history of philosophy begun by him culminated in a system.”33 32
33
See, e.g., J. G. Fichte’s “Second Introduction to the Wissenschaftslehre,” Sämmtliche Werke I, pp. 468–91; F. W. J. Schelling, “Zur Geschichte der neueren Philosophie,” Sämmtliche Werke I/10, pp. 73–5. OSP, p. 40. Rosenzweig’s handwritten draft of the “Oldest System-Program” article shows that he initially began the last section of the article as follows: “Kant did not want a system. Nevertheless, he … [Ein System hat Kant nicht gewollt. Gleichwohl er hat …].” But this beginning is crossed out in the draft and replaced with the formulation we have in the published version (i.e., “It is an unanswered question …”). See “Das älteste Systemprogramm des deutschen Idealismus,” 1914 (Franz Rosenzweig Collection, AR 3001 [manuscript in series II, subseries III, Box 2, Folder 29], Leo Baeck Institute, p. 41.
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Rosenzweig asserts that it is unclear whether and in what sense Kant wanted a system, and one can certainly claim that such a question remains “unanswered” in Rosenzweig’s eyes only because it seems to be answered in both directions by Kant himself. Indeed, if one were to ask this question of the Kant who wrote the opening pages of the “Architectonic of Pure Reason,” his answer would seem to be affirmative. Furthermore, the “sense” of the system that Kant describes in the beginning of the “Architectonic” not only foreshadows the Idealist notion of system which Rosenzweig determines as knowledge of the One and All, but also refines this notion in a manner which indelibly stamped the task of system which the Idealists sought to fulfill. “Systematic unity,” Kant declares at the beginning of the “Architectonic,” “is that which first makes ordinary cognition into science”; and thus “architectonic,” in being the “art of systems” is at once “the doctrine of that which is scientific in our cognition in general.”34 Kant announces here, in no uncertain terms, that what distinguishes science from ordinary knowledge is that science is systematic knowledge. What, we may ask, makes knowledge systematic for Kant? His answer is as follows: I understand by system … the unity of the manifold cognitions under one idea. This is the rational concept of the form of a whole, insofar as through this the domain of the manifold as well as the position of the parts with respect to each other is determined a priori. The scientific rational concept thus contains the end and the form of the whole that is congruent with it. The unity of the end, to which all parts are related and in the idea of which they are also related to each other, allows the absence of any part to be noticed in our knowledge of the rest, and there can be no contingent addition or undetermined magnitude of perfection that does not have its boundaries determined a priori. The whole is therefore articulated (articulatio) and not heaped together (coacervatio).35
Kant defines system, we see, in terms which foreshadow in important ways Rosenzweig’s understanding of system in his “Oldest System-Program” essay: system is the “unity of the manifold cognitions under one idea”; it is the unity of All cognitions in their relation to One idea. But in Kant’s words, the relation between the One and All is defined more precisely. For in system, the manifold cognitions must be grasped “under” the one idea, or, as Kant goes on to say, only that unity of a manifold which arises “in consequence of an idea (where reason provides the ends a priori and does not await them empirically) grounds architectonic unity.”36 For a body of knowledge to be systematic, Kant suggests here, one must possess from the beginning the idea that holds this body of knowledge together as a whole. 34
35 36
Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, A832/B860, cited from Critique of Pure Reason, p. 691. Henceforth, CPR. Ibid. CPR, A833/B861.
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A system cannot be “heaped together” empirically, part by part, because in constructing a unity of parts from parts alone, one would never know when one had reached the whole which those parts were meant to form. Only grasping the “form of the whole” from the outset permits one to know “the domain of the manifold” and the “position of the parts with respect to each other.” Just like the architect who has an idea of a whole building in her head, or on paper, before the first brick of that building is laid, so the architectonic thinker must have an idea of the whole of philosophy before its parts are examined in themselves. Kant emphasizes, furthermore, one particular aspect of this prior view of the whole as ensuring the completeness and the certainty of the system to be constructed. What holds the parts of a whole of knowledge together, Kant tells us, is the “unity of the end” to which “all parts are related,” and it is therefore the “idea” of that end which enables one to grasp the totality of manifold parts from the beginning. To grasp the form of the whole of a system from the beginning, therefore, is to grasp from the beginning the end toward which all parts are directed, and only insofar as one grasps this “unity of the end” from the beginning, can one’s knowledge be considered science. Kant projects here a model for systematic knowing which is to have tremendous influence on his successors. Here, in germ, one already glimpses the schematic structure of the later systems of German Idealism. For knowledge to be scientific, that is, systematic, Kant determines, it must trace the movement from a single idea that anticipates the whole, through its manifold particulars, to the unity of the system’s end. It is a movement from the One to the All to the One, from identity to difference to identity, wherein the final unity has passed through, and been mediated by the knowledge of the multiplicity of the system’s particular parts. Thus, fifteen years before the “Oldest System-Program of German Idealism” that Rosenzweig presents in his essay, Kant already seems to have laid out that plan for system which would be decisive for German Idealism. Nonetheless, Rosenzweig declares it an “unanswered” question whether and in what sense Kant truly wanted a system. And, indeed, one need only follow the continuation of Kant’s own discussion in the same “Architectonic of Pure Reason” in order to understand the reservations that Rosenzweig ascribes to Kant. For while Kant proceeds to declare categorically that only “the system of all philosophical cognition is philosophy,” or in other words, that any philosophy worthy of its name must be a system, he nevertheless qualifies this definition with an equally categorical disclaimer. “Philosophy,” which Kant has just defined as “the system of all philosophical cognition,” he now claims is a mere idea of a possible science, which is nowhere given in concreto, but which one seeks to approach in various ways until the only footpath, much overgrown by sensibility, is discovered, and the hitherto unsuccessful ectype, so far as it has been granted to humans, is made equal to the archetype. Until then one cannot learn any philosophy,
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for where is it, who has possession of it, and by what can it be recognized? One can only learn to philosophize.37
The picture Kant draws in this passage is striking. Human beings possess the “idea” of philosophy as system, as a “possible science,” but this system is in fact nowhere to be found in this world. The attempts to attain system have resulted, rather, in merely “unsuccessful” copies of the true archetype of system. Human beings may indeed find the path that leads to the approximation to the true system, “so far as it has been granted to humans,” but until then, Kant suggests, philosophy in its true sense cannot even be learned! The true architect of systematic knowledge, that architect who has in sight both the whole of the system and its parts, Kant implies, lives beyond the human realm. And we have been left with faded copies of the divine blueprints. Human knowledge thus seems fated forever to remain in a state of limbo, with the goal of systematic knowledge always in sight on the horizon, but never within reach. And yet, even here Kant’s ambiguous relation to system does not stop vacillating. For in the Critique of Pure Reason, the very systematic unity of knowledge whose realization Kant had to deny to speculative reason, he upholds for reason in its practical capacity. The end of the first Critique hints at a “special kind of systematic unity, namely the moral,”38 and the significance of this turn to the practical for Kant’s view of the task of system seems to depend on whether one reads these comments on practical metaphysics as an appendix to the first Critique, or as an introduction to the second and third. Immediately following the passage in the “Architectonic” that we have just examined, in which Kant denies the possibility of system as something concretely given, and hence denies the possibility of learning philosophy as such, he draws a distinction between two different concepts of a system of philosophy. The first he names the “scholastic concept [Schulbegriff],” which designates the system of cognition that is sought only as a science without having as its end anything more than the systematic unity of this knowledge, thus the logical perfection of cognition. But there is also a cosmopolitan concept [Weltbegriff] (conceptus cosmicus), that has always grounded this term, especially when it is, as it were, personified and represented as an archetype in the ideal of the philosopher. From this point of view, philosophy is the science of the relation of all cognition to the essential ends of human reason (teleologia rationis humanae) and the philosopher is not an artist of reason but the legislator of human reason.39
In opposition to the scholastic concept of philosophy, which unifies the system of knowledge solely toward the end of the unity of that knowledge itself, Kant 37 38 39
CPR, A838/B866. CPR, A807/B835. CPR, A838/B866-A840/B868.
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here posits a cosmopolitan concept of philosophy.40 This concept of philosophy grasps the system of human knowledge in relation “to the essential ends of human reason,” the highest of which is “nothing other than the entire vocation of human beings, and the philosophy of it is called moral philosophy.”41 Such a concept of a system of philosophy which grasps All that is in accordance with the idea of the vocation of the human being, that is, of freedom, is intimately connected to the ideal of the philosopher, in approximation to which every individual “philosopher” seeks to unify all knowledge within herself toward the goal of fulfilling her vocation as a free human being. Kant’s distinction between the scholastic and cosmopolitan concepts of philosophy notwithstanding, several vital questions emerge regarding Kant’s view of this system at the end of the first critique. Does this cosmopolitan vision of system project the very “primacy of the practical” which enabled Kant later to assert the systematic unification of the critiques themselves? Is this the same vision according to which Kant would later declare “the concept of freedom” – known not through speculative reason but rather as a sheer “fact” of reason – to be the “the keystone of the whole structure of a system of pure reason”?42 Is it the same vision according to which Kant later subordinated theoretical philosophy to the demands of the practical that the world be conceived as amenable to the attainment of the “highest good” in it?43 More pressingly, is this concept of a system, unified according to the proper ends of human beings, subject to the same reservations as the system of philosophy which Kant declared to be “merely the idea of a possible science” only a few pages before? Or do Kant’s own critiques make possible not only the “discovery” of the “only footpath” to system, which he seemed to regard with great suspicion in the passage we examined previously, but even the “making [of] this footpath into a highway” upon which “human reason” could be brought “to full satisfaction in that which has always, but until now vainly, occupied its lust for knowledge,”44 as Kant boldly suggests in the closing lines of the first Critique? An examination of Kant’s statements about system thus leaves us, as it left Rosenzweig, with “unanswered questions” regarding whether and in what sense Kant wanted a system. Nevertheless, as we shall see, Kant’s recognition of system as the fundamental problem for human reason had an overwhelming influence on the philosophy that developed after him.
40 41 42
43
44
Named thus, according to Kant, because it “necessarily interests everyone” (ibid.). Ibid. I. Kant, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, in Werke V: 3, translated in Critique of Practical Reason, p. 3. I. Kant, Werke V: 120–46, Critique of Practical Reason, pp. 100–21. Cf., Paul Guyer, “The Unity of Nature and Freedom: Kant’s Conception of the System of Philosophy,” The Reception of Kant’s Critical Philosophy: Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. CPR, A855/B883.
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iv.2 The Systematic Implications of the Kantian Subject It was not only Kant’s recognition of reason’s demand for system that influenced the development of the notion of system in German Idealism. As Rosenzweig notes, Kant pointed to the demand for system in the very manner in which he structured theoretical knowledge within, or at least in relation to, the knowing subject. This was the centerpiece of Kant’s Copernican turn, in which, Rosenzweig tells us, Kant “founded the indissoluble connection of form and content, out of which the concept of system had to emerge.”45 The “indissoluble connection” to which Rosenzweig refers is the connection between the “two fundamental sources” of knowledge “in the mind,” intuition and understanding, wherein the mind receives the content of its knowledge through the manifold of its intuitions and provides the form for its knowledge through the concepts of the understanding.46 By insisting on the “indissoluble connection” between – and not the identity of – the understanding and intuition, by preserving the distinction between the two while locating them both within the thinking subject, Kant changed the focus of philosophical questioning without losing the distinction between the thinking subject and the world that subject observed. For as much as intuition was located within the subject, it still required “things-in-themselves” to appear in order to give it something to intuit. On the other hand, Rosenzweig hints that “the concept of system had to emerge” from such an “indissoluble connection,” insofar as intuition and the understanding were placed within the selfsame subject. And Kant himself tempted his successors to find the point of union between the two sources of theoretical knowledge by suggesting the possibility of a “common but to us unknown root” of intuition and understanding and by asserting that “the manifold representations that are given in a certain intuition would not all together be my representations if they did not all together belong to one self-consciousness.”47 “The concept of system had to emerge” from the “indissoluble connection” that Kant posits between the understanding and intuition for one further important reason, as well. We recall that according to Rosenzweig’s designation, the One and All which system seeks to grasp is not merely a “One and All” of ideas, but rather, system points to a new understanding of the relationship between truth and actuality: it points to the philosophical unification of the unity of the one concept of Being, or of the one “ultimate truth,” with the multiplicity of the “whole of actuality.” Such a concept of the relationship between the unity of thought and the multiplicity of sensible actuality lies at the heart of Kant’s conception of theoretical 45 46 47
OSP, p. 42. CPR, A51/B75. CPR, A15/B29, B132. I have examined Rosenzweig’s conception and adaptation of Kant’s “common root” in an article that has yet to appear in print: “Die ‘geheimnisvolle Wurzel’ von Rosenzweigs System der Philosophie,” which is to appear in Alpha-Bet: Jahrbuch des Franz-Rosenzweig-Zentrums, Herausgegeben von Alfred Bodenheimer und Jens Mattern.
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knowledge. For Kant, cognition is nothing other than the “synthetic unity,” carried out by the understanding, of the “manifold” given “in intuition.”48 In every act of knowing, Kant suggests, the subject carries out a miniature version of the systematic act; he unifies the unity of his own concepts with the multiplicity presented to him through his intuition. The “indissoluble connection” between form and content, understanding and intuition, in Kant’s thought thus points to the very “indissoluble connection” between thought and actuality which the task of system assumes. Our examination of Rosenzweig’s summary of Kant’s influence on the development of the idea of system in German Idealism thus points to several ways in which Kant draws the notion of system out of hiding: his ambivalent position regarding the simultaneous necessity and apparent impossibility of system for human reason, his hints toward the possibility of grounding all knowledge in the self-consciousness of the subject, and his insistence that all knowledge is nothing but the unification of the unity of thought with the multiplicity of actuality. But it was Fichte, and not Kant, who drew those systematic consequences of Kant’s thinking which inaugurated the age of German Idealism. Fichte did so precisely by combining Kant’s insight into the “self-consciousness” which Kant claimed must accompany all our cognitions together with Kant’s insight into the “priority of the practical” in human reason. It was only in the wake of this transformation of Kant’s insights into the firm ground of Fichte’s unified philosophical approach to system that Schelling arrived at the possibility of generating the “whole philosophical cosmos” out of an “absolute act.” It is thus Fichte who leads us from Kant’s ambiguous relation to the notion of system, to Schelling’s discovery.
V. Absolute Act versus Absolute Being: Fichte’s Self-Positing “I” In both expanding on and opposing Kant’s thought, Fichte discovered the ground of theoretical and practical philosophy to be one and the same: the free act of selfconsciousness, an act that the freethinking philosopher could recollect through the same kind of “intellectual intuition” which had enabled Kant to know freedom as a fact of reason. Indeed, Fichte claimed, the “fact” [Tatsache] of freedom that Kant recognized had to be traced back to the one free “act” [Tathandlung] of an original self which grounded and unified the very same system of human knowledge which “Kant envisaged.”49 It was the way Fichte grounded the multiplicity of knowledge in this single, unified original act of the self that had such significant consequences for the Idealist notion of system. According to Fichte, in the original act the self 48 49
CPR, B104. J. G. Fichte, Sämmtliche Werke I: 466, 472, 478; translated in Science of Knowledge, pp. 40, 46, 51. Cf., Paul W. Franks, “Freedom, Tatsache, and Tathandlung in the Development of Fichte’s Jena Wissenschaftslehre,” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 79, 3 (1997): 331–44.
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freely posits itself as an “I.” In so doing, however, the self comes into contact with what is outside it, of which nothing more can be said than that it is a “check” or “limitation” to the I.50 As a result of this contact between the free self and a “limitation” the self comes to feel itself as limited, as determined, and no longer simply as free. The originally absolute self thus discovers difference within itself: it is both a positing, free I and a determined “not-I.” Out of the latter it develops its knowledge of the “system of the world,”51 and out of the former it seeks to shape that “world” according to the goals of freedom. In Fichte’s account of the self, furthermore, the original free act of self-positing not only offers a unified ground for both the multiplicity of the world and the actions of the self; it also posits as goal the systematic reunification of self and world, of I and not-I. For despite the emergence of a not-I within the self, the self is still by definition one self who is simply because it has freely posited itself. As a result, the self seeks to overcome the not-I within itself; it is driven to overcome this division within itself through its own free action. Such a complete overcoming, however, is a goal which the finite self cannot reach. Hence, Fichte writes, “if … we can call this total harmony with oneself ‘perfection,’ in the highest sense of the word, then perfection is man’s highest and unattainable goal. His vocation, however, is to perfect himself without end.”52 By thus radicalizing Kant’s Copernican turn to the subject, by locating both subject and object, theory and praxis, within the self, Fichte revealed in dramatic fashion the possibility of attaining a unified system of knowledge. Here, within the self, one glimpsed both One and All, identity and difference, the unity of the original self, the multiplicity of the objective world grounded in it, and the demand of the self to reclaim its own unity. Fichte himself noted how in his Wissenschaftslehre, “One leads to All and All to One,”53 a movement we have seen anticipated in Kant’s own formulation of the concept of system in the “Architectonic.” Fichte further built on Kant’s systematic considerations from the “Architectonic” in the way he located the philosophical system within the philosopher himself. If Kant envisioned a “cosmopolitan” concept of system unified according to the ends of human reason and “personified and represented as an archetype in the ideal of the philosopher,” Fichte also indicated the intimate link between the notion of system and the philosopher who seeks to attain it. “What philosophy one chooses depends on what kind of human being one is,” Fichte writes. “For a philosophical system is not some dead household effect that one can give up or 50 51 52
53
E.g., J. G. Fichte, Sämmtliche Werke I: 277, 489–90. J. G. Fichte, Sämmtliche Werke I: 490. J. G. Fichte, “Einige Vorlesungen über die Bestimmung des Gelehrten,” Sämmtliche Werke VI: 300, translated as “Some Lectures Concerning the Scholar’s Vocation,” in German Idealist Philosophy, p. 129. J. G. Fichte, “Über den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre, oder der sogenannten Philosophie,” Sämmtliche Werke, I: 59.
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take on as it pleases us; rather it is ensouled through the soul of the human being who has it.”54 What “ensouled” Fichte’s system, so he claimed, was freedom. This grounding of philosophy in freedom was a crucial step toward the crystallization of the idea of system as Schelling would later develop it. It was the step that first made possible what Rosenzweig describes as Schelling’s unfolding of the “whole philosophical cosmos” out of the concept of an “absolute act,” just as Spinoza had done out of the concept of an “absolute being.” We must therefore ask: What is the significance of the difference between grasping the origin of All that is as an absolute being or as an absolute act? And how did the recognition of this difference lead Schelling to the first discovery of the true concept of system? We recall that while Rosenzweig suggests that Spinoza presented the first modern precursor to the notion of system as it was to be developed in German Idealism, Spinoza’s work, when read through the lens of Jacobi’s critique, did not grasp the One and the All as such and in their interconnection, but rather reduced All particularity to One Substance, and in so doing reduced God’s preeminence, human freedom, and the world’s multiplicity, equally, to nothing. In the eyes of Kant, Jacobi, and their successors, the failings of Spinozism were intimately linked to his understanding of the character of being itself. Jacobi designated the “spirit of Spinozism” to be “the ancient a nihilo nihil fit” – nothing comes from nothing.55 What this pithy characterization meant for Jacobi was that according to Spinoza’s Ethics, everything that is has a cause in something else that is, such that all particular entities follow through an infinite but determinate chain necessarily from the absolute nature of the One Substance.56 To claim that “nothing comes from nothing” thus meant that Spinoza understood being as “absolute being,” as having no relation whatsoever to what might be posited outside being, say, to nothing. Everything conditioned by the one Substance would forever remain within the realm of being just as nothing could enter that realm of being from anywhere else. Spinoza’s apparent denial of any relationship between nothing and being was what led his critics to accuse him of fatalism, because the idea of a free act entails precisely that ability to initiate a series of effects without being compelled to do so, or, in other words, freedom entails the spontaneous creation of something out of nothing. Thus Spinoza’s understanding of the one Substance as an “absolute being” amounted to a denial of freedom. In the unity of his one Substance, Spinoza failed to account for the subject. 54 55 56
J. G. Fichte, Sämmtliche Werke I: 434. Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, “Über die Lehre des Spinoza,” Werke. Band 1, 1, p. 18. See Frederick C. Beiser, The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte, pp. 83–5, and Paul W. Franks, “All or Nothing: Systematicity and Nihilism in Jacobi, Reinhold, and Maimon,” in The Cambridge Companion to German Idealism, pp. 97–9. Both Beiser and Franks point out that Jacobi’s a nihilo nihil fit is simply the negative form of the principle of sufficient reason.
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It was Fichte’s grounding of all knowledge in an “absolute act,” according to Rosenzweig, which demonstrated the systematic consequences of the Kantian turn to the subject and which opened up a path for Schelling to oppose Spinoza’s strict determinism with a “counterpart to Spinoza’s Ethics.” As we have seen, Fichte grounds both freedom and necessity not in a determinate “absolute being” but rather in the free self-positing of the absolute self. In so doing, however, Fichte opened himself up to the very opposite criticism of that which was leveled at Spinoza: if Spinoza lost the free subject in the objective being of the one substance, Fichte seemed to lose the world in the subjective ground of his absolute act. Fichte’s supposed system remained caught within a “magic circle” between the original self and its “limitation,” and it constructed its reality out of an I and not-I within the self without being able to say anything about this limitation.57 Furthermore, while Fichte may have pointed to the possibility of a common ground for freedom and necessity, the self and the world, and, hence, the possibility of grounding all knowledge in one act, the system of One and All to which Fichte pointed never reached its conclusion. For Fichte, system did not signify the task of grasping the One and All of what is, but rather, it signified the infinite, never-ending task of striving to transform what is into the system that ought to be. As Schelling came of age in the 1790s, he thus seemed forced to decide between two equally irrefutable and yet equally problematic approaches to philosophy: Spinoza’s dogmatism, which dissolved All that is in the “absolute being” of the one Substance, or Fichte’s subjective idealism, which seemed to lose the multiplicity of the outside world within the subject. By grasping his own task as “a counterpart to Spinoza’s Ethics,” Rosenzweig asserts, Schelling initially limited himself to the Fichtean alternative and thereby failed “to break through the ‘magic circle’ drawn by Fichte.”58 But the very balance in the opposition between Spinoza and Fichte, the very fact that, in Fichte’s own words “neither of these two systems can directly refute its opposite,”59 suggested to Schelling the need and the possibility of attaining a higher standpoint which would grasp both positions as moments within itself. In the mid-1790s Schelling thus sought the grounds of an absolute philosophical standpoint that would both rise above and grasp within itself idealism and dogmatism, subject and object, freedom and necessity, act and being. It is this absolute philosophical standpoint – and it alone – which Rosenzweig recognizes as the standpoint that guarantees the first discovery of the true notion of system as task of philosophy. It was this notion of system which Hegel would later describe in his Phenomenology of Spirit, when he claimed that to understand that “the True is actual only as a system” means grasping the fact “that Substance 57
58 59
Cf., OSP, pp. 42–3. For Fichte on his own “circle,” see Sämmtliche Werke I: 92, 281–2. See also Hegel’s critique of Fichte in the Differenzschrift, in G. W. F. Hegel, Werke 2: Jenaer Schriften, p. 67: “to break through [this] circle is the only interest of philosophical need.” OSP, p. 42. Fichte, Sämmtliche Werke I, p. 429.
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is essentially Subject”; it means grasping the “True, not only as Substance, but equally as Subject.”60 We have thus taken a rather long detour through the systematic ground laying of Kant and Fichte not simply because Kant and Fichte are, as Rosenzweig states, “necessary assumptions” of Schelling’s first idea of system, but also because only by tracing the path from substance to subject, from “absolute being” to “absolute act,” do we begin to understand why Rosenzweig would claim that the true notion of system can only be attained in the act of transcending these two possibilities and reaching a higher standpoint. Spinoza anticipated the notion of system in the relationship he asserted between One substance and All modes, but at the same time he dissolved both the multiplicity of All beings and the specific particularity of God, world, and human being in the “absolute being” of his single Substance. Kant anticipated the notion of system by revealing system as a movement leading from a single anticipatory idea to the multiplicity of the system’s parts and on to the end toward which all of these parts lead, and he did so by pointing to a unique, practically grounded concept of system which was intimately linked to the vocation of the human being embodied in the philosopher herself. But Kant’s equivocation regarding the different kinds of system and the possibility of attaining any one of them left it “unanswered” whether system was in fact the task of philosophy or whether it was rather an illusory goal whose impossibility philosophy should recognize. And Fichte anticipated the notion of system by grounding the multiplicity of All cognitions within the One act of the free self. But he thereby reduced the multiplicity of the world to the invention of the self, and the neverending character of the task of unifying that self projected the very systematicity of his system – its unity and comprehensiveness, its One-and-All nature – into infinity. Thus, Spinoza, Kant, and Fichte – and the early “Fichtean” Schelling as well – all revealed system as the task of philosophy in a certain way, but they kept that task hidden at the same time. System was only discovered, Rosenzweig suggests, the moment German Idealism became Absolute Idealism. System was discovered when German Idealism recognized that in order to attain knowledge of the One and All as such and in their interconnection, in order to grasp God, world, and human being as such and in their interconnection, one had to philosophize from an Absolute standpoint which made it possible to grasp the substantiality of the actual world together with the subjectivity of the human being, the necessity of being together with the freedom of action, which thus made it possible to grasp world and human being as such and yet at the same time from the standpoint of the God which grounded and transcended and encompassed them both. Only thus could one avoid the reduction of All beings to either Spinoza’s singular Substance or Fichte’s singular subject; only thus could one overcome the hesitancy 60
GWF Hegel, Werke 3. Phänomenologie des Geistes, pp. 23, 28, translated in The Phenomenology of Spirit, pp. 14, 9.
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of Kant. According to Rosenzweig, if it was Hegel, in the end, who “carried out that unity of the philosophical system” from the standpoint of the Absolute, it was Schelling who first attained this absolute standpoint, who “in the last pages of the ‘[Philosophical] Letters [on Dogmatism and Criticism],’ completed in the beginning of 1796, designated this position of the ‘Absolute’ beyond the two opposed system-possibilities” suggested by Spinoza and Fichte.61 It was out of this standpoint, according to Rosenzweig, that Schelling wrote the “Oldest System-Program of German Idealism” in the middle of that year.
VI. Absolute Idealism and the Systematic Standpoint of the “Program” It is most significant, therefore, that Rosenzweig declares this two-page text from 1796 to be the “oldest” system-program, because in doing so, he permits us to determine more precisely the concept of system he understood to have emerged in German Idealism. If system in its proper sense only arrives here, in Rosenzweig’s eyes, and not in Spinoza’s or Kant’s or Fichte’s or even Schelling’s own earliest writings, then we can identify the notion of system that he believes to have inherited from Idealism to be the knowledge of the One and All as attainable from the standpoint of the Absolute alone. According to Rosenzweig, this is the standpoint which Schelling begins to point toward in his Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism, and which he outlines in the system-program. It is the standpoint which Schelling articulates in the form of one question, one “problem of all philosophy,’’ which accompanies Schelling over the course of his whole career, a question whose answer, according to Rosenzweig, would yield nothing less than a “finished, closed system,” the question of “how the Absolute can go out of itself and set up a world over against itself.”62 This question, coupled with Schelling’s realization that “in the completed science [one must] deduce … from the original absolute unity which precedes all synthesis, the claim that every synthesis ultimately goes to absolute unity,”63 elevates the structure and movement of the One to the All to the One suggested by Kant to the level of the Absolute. Here, as in Kant’s “Architectonic,” the Absolute must be grasped as a unified whole from the beginning, and yet one must also grasp both the way this Absolute freely breaks up into the manifold parts of the world and how these parts subsequently unite freely into a now differentiated form of the same Absolute out of which they first emerged. As in Fichte, this movement initiated by the Absolute is grasped as a “positing” [setzen], an act, and it thus assumes the very possibility of a “free creating out of nothing” which Spinoza denies; yet this act is carried out by an Absolute that transcends the Fichtean self 61 62 63
OSP, pp. 43. OSP, pp. 37, 12. See F. W. J. Schelling, Sämmtliche Werke I, p. 310. F. W. J. Schelling, Sämmtliche Werke I, p. 297.
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and creates “a world.” It is in this form of an Absolute that emerges from itself to set up a world over against itself, and then returns from out of the multiplicity of this world back to itself as Absolute, Rosenzweig suggests, that “the Philosophical Letters of 1795 first outlined the … connection of I, world, and God.”64 According to Rosenzwieg, it is with a distinct sense of an imminent solution to the “problem of all philosophy,” and of the fulfillment of the task of system such a solution would yield, that Schelling wrote the “Oldest System-Program of German Idealism” soon after the Philosophical Letters. Bearing in mind how Rosenzweig came to identify system as that knowledge of the One and All which would be made possible by the attainment of the Absolute standpoint, we can imagine the great excitement with which he must have read the first lines of the two-page fragment he found: An Ethics. Since the whole [of] metaphysics in the future will rest in morals, of which Kant has only given an example with his two practical postulates, and has exhausted nothing, so this Ethics will be nothing other than a complete system of all ideas, or what is the same, of all practical postulates. The first idea is naturally the representation of myself as an absolutely free being [Wesen]. With the free self-conscious being there steps forth at once a whole world – out of Nothing – the single true and thinkable creation out of Nothing.65
Having traversed some of the ground between Spinoza, Kant, Fichte, and Schelling, we can begin to make sense of what Rosenzweig saw in the opening lines of the fragment that he found. Indicated here is the grounding of system in the practical to which Kant alluded and which Fichte first carried out in his “I,” the identification of “ethics” with “a complete system of all ideas.” Moreover, as a complete system of all ideas which recognizes such ideas at once as “practical postulates,” the program’s opening announces itself as “an Ethics” in the true sense, as a “counterpart to Spinoza’s Ethics,” which had denied its own name by remaining mired in a substantial conception of the Absolute. Yet, here too, Rosenzweig seems to glimpse the move beyond Fichte’s practical position. For while the selfconsciousness of “myself ” may be my first idea, according to the program, the author of the text immediately declares that this consciousness brings with it, “at once,” the consciousness of a world outside the self. And if both “myself ” and the “world” “step forth at once,” then this suggests the grounding of both self and world in something higher, that is, an Absolute, or God, which freely posits both. Precisely this free positing on the part of the Absolute would be the “only true and thinkable creation out of Nothing.” Thus, God, world, and the self; nature and freedom, emerge from the opening lines of this fragment individually and in their
64 65
OSP, p. 13. OSP, p. 5.
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mutual connection.66 It is no wonder, then, that in reading these lines Rosenzweig identified this text as the first concise articulation of “a complete system of all ideas,” which offered the possibility of grasping One and All as such and in their interconnection without reducing the All to one substance or subject, which would grasp the identity and difference of God, world, and human self, and of being and free action.
VII. The System-Program’s Lack of Systematicity The problems begin with the fact that these lines are not all that Rosenzweig reads in the text-fragment. And the first impression one receives upon continuing past these first lines is not the cohesion, the structure, the careful articulation one would expect to find in a “system-program,” but rather just the opposite: one is struck by the lack of cohesion of the whole, by the apparent indecisiveness regarding first principles, and by the multiple possibilities the text offers for combining and grouping the compelling ideas presented in it. It is true that the idea of “system as task,” the sense that the One and All must be grasped philosophically, seems to permeate every line. To this extent, one would have to concur with Rosenzweig that the text could not be understood without a prior conception of the very idea of system that Rosenzweig articulates as knowledge of the One and All. But it is not clear how, if at all, the different ideas of the system-program themselves fit together systematically. And even if we grant that the system-program assumes the idea of system as the task of philosophy, it is hardly irrelevant to the question of the text’s systematicity that it does not construct a system, or even an outline for a system, on the grounds of this idea of system. Instead, every few paragraphs of the text seem to offer a different possibility for grasping the One and All. If the text appears to begin from the perspective hinted at toward the end of the Philosophical Letters, in which world and self, “ideas” and “practical postulates,” nature and freedom, are 66
This is not the only possible interpretation of the first lines of the system-program. Indeed, while O. Pöggeler highlights the way in which the text “lets the free self-conscious I and the world spring out at once in a creation out of nothing” (“Hegel, der Verfasser des ältesten Systemprogramm des deutschen Idealismus,” Mythologie der Vernunft, p. 133), as do C. Jamme and H. Schneider (“Einleitung der Herausgeber,” Mythologie der Vernunft, p. 54), D. Henrich seems to understand the world to spring out of the I itself – and not together with the I as the result of the Absolute self-creation out of Nothing – insofar as he claims that “only out of the I is such creation thinkable” and stresses “the dependence of the world on the I” in the program (“Systemprogramm? Vorfragen zum Zurechnungsproblem,” Das älteste Systemprogramm: Studien zur Frühgeschichte des deutschen Idealismus, p. 11). Rosenzweig seems to hover between both interpretations in his essay, just as he sees Schelling hovering between a practically weighted standpoint and the Absolute standpoint throughout the system-program as a whole. I have inclined toward the “Absolute” reading of the opening of the program because it best highlights what would be new (or “oldest”) about the standpoint Rosenzweig sees becoming manifest in the program. Had Rosenzweig seen in the program simply a further permutation of the Fichtean “I” creating the world out of itself, it would be hard to discern what would be “oldest” about it. For an alternative reading of the opening of the program, see Ernest Rubinstein, An Episode of Jewish Romanticism, p. 21.
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grasped as evenly balanced poles grounded in a higher Absolute standpoint, then it seems to fall back, only a few lines later, into a practically weighted system, by asking, “How must a world be created for a moral being?”67 No sooner has the text fallen back thus into the practical, then it suddenly presents a model of a worldcentered system. Indeed, prescient of attempts in Rosenzweig’s own time to unify the pure principles of philosophy with the manifold data of empirical research, the text suggests that “if philosophy gives the ideas and experience gives the data, we could finally get a physics whose greatness I [would have] expected in later ages.”68 When the text then moves from the objects of physics to those of history, it asserts that contemporary political ideas such as Kant’s “Perpetual Peace” are “only subordinate ideas of a higher idea.” The text does not bother to tell us, however, what this “higher idea” is, and before we assume, on the basis of the beginning of the fragment, that it is freedom, we should follow the text a few lines farther to the point in which it tells us that it is rather the “idea of beauty” that is the “highest act of reason” which “includes all ideas” and “unifies them all,” insofar as “truth and goodness are only siblings in beauty.”69 If we succeed then in acclimating to the idea of transforming the ethical system of the beginning of the fragment into an aesthetically intuited One and All, the text suddenly turns us toward a religious One and All. “Monotheism of reason and of the heart, polytheism of the imagination and of art is what we need,” the text declares, and it proceeds to suggest that only a “new mythology,” a “mythology of reason” which combines the sensible nature of actuality with the purity of philosophy, will lead the “enlightened and unenlightened [to] hold out their hands to one another.” Such a fusion of myth and reason in a “new religion,” the text concludes, will lead to an educational transformation of the whole of humanity into a One and All in which the One-and-All completeness of each individual will coincide with the One-and-All completeness of All individuals together. “Only then,” the text states, nearing its denouement, “is there expected for us equal instruction of all faculties, of [i.e., within] the individual, as well as of all individuals.”70 67
68
69 70
OSP, p. 5. Cf., Rosenzweig’s diary entry of June 3, 1914: “The ground-idea with which he still approached ‘physics’ at that time (how must a world be created for a moral being), is however still Fichtean. The writings of [17]97 then already appear – if Metzger is right – to overcome this construction out of the moral I, and to [re]place it with the theoretical [I],” Franz Rosenzweig Collection, AR 3001 (transcript of diary VI in series II, subseries I, box I, folder 21), Leo Baeck Institute. OSP, p. 5. Cf., Rosenzweig’s diary entry of June 3, 1914, included in BT 1, p. 155: “What is characteristically Schellingian in the climbing-down to physics, is that he does it not simply for the sake of philosophy, but rather also for the sake of physics. … This is more than Fichte and shows how he can become here the ‘theoretician of knowledge’ from out of the “‘moralist.’” OSP, p. 6. OSP, pp. 6–7. In his diary of May 26, 1914, Rosenzweig reacts with excitement to this last line of the system-program: “‘of the individual, as well as of all individuals’ (out of the System of 1796) – Schiller’s concept of ‘totality’ and the revolution’s concept of universality in one!” Franz Rosenzweig Collection, AR 3001 (transcript of diary VI in series II, subseries I, box I, folder 21).
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The so-called system-program thus in no way constructs an outline for a system; instead, it seems to bombard us with conflicting glimpses of possible paths for attaining the One and All. There are ways, of course, of grouping together some of these different glimpses of the One and All presented in the program. To give but one example: emphasis on the “idea of beauty” precisely as an act of reason seems to offer the possibility of both holding on to the practical flavor of the system-program, that is, the extent to which “the whole [of] metaphysics” is to “rest in morals,” and at the same time transcending the freedom of the self in an intellectual-aesthetic intuition of the Absolute which grounds that freedom. What is not explained in this attempt at the unification of the program, however, is why the philosopher would then need a “mythology of reason” to make her thought “sensible”: that is, it is unclear what the relation is among aesthetics, mythology, and religion, each of which seems, separately, to provide the glue that holds a system together. No less troubling than the apparent lack of systematicity in the text that Rosenzweig designates a “system-program” is the fact that, in his essay, Rosenzweig does not even attempt to clear up the confusion of the text. Indeed, because he has declared this text to be the “Oldest System-Program of German Idealism” one would expect Rosenzweig to devote his essay to proving the systematicity of the text itself, to reconciling for his readers the different reflections of the problem of system in the text. But Rosenzweig does nothing of the sort. On the contrary, Rosenzweig uses his essay to emphasize precisely the plurality of system-possibilities with which Schelling seemed to be toying in the years preceding and succeeding the “system-program.” Here Rosenzweig reiterates how Schelling took “ ‘autonomy’ for a long time as the point where theoretical and practical philosophy connect”71 but then presents the possibility that “Schelling believed for a while, in 1795, to have the completing-concept of philosophy in the concept of the organism.”72 Yet, already in that same year, Rosenzweig shows, Schelling suggested that it is rather aesthetics that “ ‘first shows the entry into the whole of philosophy, because only through it can be explained what philosophical spirit is.’ ”73 Rosenzweig recalls, furthermore, that the year 1795 also marked the time when Schelling began to conceive of history as the framework in which the “principle of unity” inherent to humanity is realized.74 And in 1800, when Schelling did spell out the systematic connection between ethics and aesthetics, Rosenzweig claims that Schelling had already begun to see a different systematic task: “Even when he wrote the System of Transcendental Idealism, Schelling had seen another realm, beyond art, where philosophy, in itself incapable of ‘universal validity,’ would become a matter for all: through mythology.”75 71 72 73 74 75
OSP, p. 14. OSP, pp. 14–15. OSP, p. 22. OSP, p. 17. OSP, p. 23.
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The troublesome fact that the very text which Rosenzweig declares to be the “oldest system-program” is itself not systematically constructed has not escaped the attention of scholars. Rüdiger Bubner rightly suggests that it is in large part “because a compelling ordering” of the content of the program “into a systematic outline has not yet been achieved,” that “the struggle over the authorship of the text has not come to rest”76; that is to say, precisely the multiplicity of possible connections between the ideas of the system-program makes it attributable to different authors at once. It is for this reason that Rosenzweig himself has been criticized by many for misleading later scholars regarding not only the author but also the genre of the text. Dieter Henrich declares that “if one takes the system-program at its word philosophically-theoretically … then it cannot be made consistent. … The system-program is certainly not the ‘oldest of German Idealism,’ and in the strict sense it is not a system-program at all.”77 Echoing Henrich’s conclusion, Otto Pöggeler also points to the “inappropriate title”78 which Rosenzweig gave to the text. And in an essay whose title – “System-program?: Preliminary Questions towards the Problem of Attribution” – emphasizes the very confusion surrounding the question of the systematicity of the system-program, Henrich writes, “the title which Rosenzweig gave an anonymous and title-less page, suggests a misunderstanding: it suggests the opinion that one would have at hand the original form of a system-outline in which the theory of Idealism, which was later called ‘Absolute,’ is conceptualized for the first time.”79 Henrich proceeds to claim, to the contrary, that the text is “at least as much a program of agitation as it is a sketch of a system.”80 It is not our task, here, to take sides in the ongoing scholarly debate over the proper title or genre of the “slightly discolored” manuscript which Rosenzweig presents as “The Oldest System-Program in German Idealism.” Our goal is to understand the notion of system that Rosenzweig believed to have inherited from the Idealists, and not to argue the legitimacy or the illegitimacy of this notion. And yet, precisely if we seek to grasp how Rosenzweig understood the notion of system, we cannot afford to ignore the unsystematic character of the “system-program.” For Rosenzweig does not deny that the system-program is unsystematic; his essay does not seek to prove the program’s systematicity – as it seeks to prove Schelling’s authorship – only to be refuted by later scholars. Rather, Rosenzweig’s designation of the text as a “system-program” and his own recognition of the text’s lack of systematicity seem to coexist quite unproblematically in the essay. One can point, 76
77
78 79
80
Rüdiger Bubner, “Einleitung,” Das älteste Systemprogramm: Studien zur Frühgeschichte des deutschen Idealismus, p. 1. Dieter Henrich, “Aufklärung der Herkunft des Manuskriptes ‘Das älteste Systemprogramm des deutschen Idealismus,’” in Mythologie der Vernunft: Hegel’s “älteste Systemprogramm des deutschen Idealismus, pp. 158, 160. Otto Pöggeler, “Das Menschenwerk des Staates,” in Mythologie der Vernunft, p. 177. Dieter Henrich, “Systemprogramm?: Vorfragen zum Zurechnungsproblem,” in Das älteste Systemprogramm: Studien zur Frühgeschichte des deutschen Idealismus, p. 5. Ibid., p. 11
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in fact, to two equally important goals that Rosenzweig sets before himself in writing his account of the system-program. Rosenzweig takes great pains, at the end of his essay, to explain the idea of system that lies embedded in the program and that came to light in Idealism as the task of philosophy. At the same time, however, Rosenzweig devotes most of the essay to showing how all of the different possibilities for system that Schelling entertains over his career lie implicit in this program. Rosenzweig wishes to reform the “image that we had of Schelling up until now” as the “ ‘Proteus of Idealism’ ” who, Hegel claimed, “carried out his development before the public.”81 Rosenzweig suggests that the system-program shows, on the contrary, that even if, in the years following the program the interest in philosophy of nature ruled, then the interest in philosophy of art, and finally the interest in philosophy of religion, still all three forced themselves upon him at the same time and with the same force from the beginning of his breakthrough through the “magic circle.” His system was never quintessentially that of a philosophy of nature. If he constructed the philosophy of art as its conclusion, he still did not forget to permit there to appear beyond it, like a distant mountain, the outlook on the mythology of the future. And from that moment of “breakthrough” on, he recognized in the new religion revealed by a higher spirit “from heaven” – in which the Idealistic philosophy would surround itself with the clothing of a new mythology – the “last great work of humanity.”82
According to Rosenzweig, we see, even if Schelling’s philosophical work “developed” over the course of his career, the ideas that mark the guide posts of that course occurred to Schelling all at once, at the beginning. In the program, as in Schelling’s later development, the philosophy of nature already points to a more fundamental systematic framework within which it functions, and in the program, as in Schelling’s later development, the aesthetic unification of the system already points beyond itself to a realm of myth, a “new religion” appearing “like a distant mountain.” Thus, what is remarkable about Rosenzweig’s analysis of the “systemprogram” is that Rosenzweig is just as careful to point to the different systems implicit in the program – and to the way in which each system-possibility in the program already seems to culminate in the appearance, on the horizon, of a new system-possibility – as he is careful to define the idea of system which underlies them all. The awareness with which Rosenzweig holds together his claims that the system-program contains both the origin of the idea of system and a multiplicity of system-possibilities leads us to the realization that the obvious lack of systematicity in the program, noted by subsequent scholars, does nothing to deter Rosenzweig from asserting the program’s systematic nature. What Rosenzweig understands by the notion of system as the task of philosophy must 81 82
OSP, p. 33. OSP, p. 34.
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therefore be compatible with the text’s lack of systematicity, or rather, with the fact that it presents a multiplicity of system-possibilities.83 In the remainder of this chapter, I will try to clarify this connection between the notion of system as task of philosophy and the multiplicity of system-possibilities presented in the program. I aim to show, as I suggested in the beginning of the chapter, that Rosenzweig’s understanding of system is revealed just as much by the way in which the system-program is not a system as it is by the program’s systematic nature. To do so, we shall see, demands arriving at a more precise understanding of the title Rosenzweig gives the text itself; it demands that we come to understand the way in which the title Rosenzweig gives this text denies the very systematicity which it at once assigns it.
VIII. System as Philosophical Program By attributing the “oldest system-program” not to Hegel, whose handwritten copy has been preserved, but rather to Schelling, Rosenzweig is led to a curious conclusion: the very Idealist who “first grasped the idea of system” never arrived at a “finished system” himself. The irony of this conclusion is not lost on Rosenzweig. He points to the fact that the very “problem of all philosophy” which he finds implicit in the opening of the system-program, the question “of the Absolute’s going out of itself,” is the problem with which [Schelling] never really came to an end, and that prevented him from ever fulfilling that promise given in his first great philosophical text: to set 83
OSP, p. 23. In a diary entry of June 29, 1914, BT 1, pp. 166–7, written while he was composing his “Oldest System-Program” essay, Rosenzweig jots down notes on a transcript from a lecture-course devoted to “Schelling’s Identity-Philosophy” which his cousin, Hans Ehrenberg, had given in 1912–13. Ehrenberg’s third lecture in this course is devoted to Schelling’s System of Transcendental Idealism, and in it Ehrenberg suggests that the difficulty of this text stems in part from the fact that there are “three systems which cross through one another in Schelling’s thinking in 1800,” one which begins with Fichte’s “I”, passes over into the philosophy of nature, and then concludes with a kind of philosophy of spirit; a second which recounts how the “Absolute … divides itself into two thoroughly equal justified parts,” i.e., philosophy of nature, on the one hand, and transcendental Idealism, on the other; and a third which shows theoretical and practical consciousness to find their unity in aesthetic consciousness (“Vorlesungen über Schelling: Identitätsphilosophie,” Hans Ehrenberg Archiv, 3:17-II/X, Lecture III, pp. 7–11). Rosenzweig’s notes show he is particularly interested in the relations among these three different system-concepts, and at the end of his diary entry he lists them together with a fourth system-possibility: “I. I-Nature-Spirit. III. Theoretical-Practical-Aesthetic. II. Absolutism < Nature Spirit . IV. Absolute-Mythology-Revelation.” To this list he then adds the following conclusion: “And this now indeed already prefigured in 1796.” Rosenzweig’s notes suggest that he saw grounds not only to add an additional system-form – one assignable to the “late Schelling” – to Ehrenberg’s list of system-forms confronting Schelling in 1800, but that the “Oldest SystemProgram” suggested to him that all these system-possibilities were already present for Schelling, struggling for supremacy, in 1796 when he wrote his program. On Rosenzweig’s indebtedness to Ehrenberg’s early work and instruction in German Idealism and systematic philosophy, see Section X at the end of this chapter.
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up a “counterpart to Spinoza’s Ethics.” The new 1809 edition of [On the I] had to confess that he had not yet constructed such a “finished, closed system”; and he was never able to withdraw this confession either. Thus, as strange as it may sound, the “system” most balanced in itself that did emerge from him, that short program of 1796, which indeed never arrived before the public, really remained testament to that first moment where he overlooked his future kingdom with one glance. He never attained that inner certainty of the ultimate standpoint, which would have enabled him to take full possession of the claimed inheritance. He remained his life long the pretender, or, to resume the previously dared comparison: the Wunderkind who, promising all, keeping much, still never came to the last resolute simplicity of a man, but rather, remained his whole life, in a certain sense, what he was at the beginning: a genius kid.84
Schelling never does attain a “finished, closed system,” Rosenzweig explains, and as a result his youthful promise goes unfulfilled.85 The closest Schelling approaches to “system” is the system-program itself, a program which ironically – given Schelling’s reputation – never arrived before the public! According to Rosenzweig, Schelling never advances past the position from which he “overlooks his future kingdom with one glance” – he never enters that land of promise himself. Nor is Rosenzweig’s subsequent comparison of Schelling to a “Wunderkind” arbitrary. We have seen how both Kant and Fichte draw a strict connection between the notion of system and the philosopher who constructs it: Kant pointed to the “ideal of the philosopher” in whom the goal of system is “personified,” and Fichte likewise asserted that one’s system of philosophy depends on the kind of human being one is. It is thereby no accident that, according to Rosenzweig, in not completing his system, Schelling fails to attain the “last resolute simplicity of a man”; he remains his whole life the same Wunderkind capable of glimpsing system as philosophy’s task, but not capable of fulfilling it. Such a strange combination of genius and apparent failure in the same thinker gives us cause to reflect. Why does Schelling fail to attain the very system that he is the first to recognize as the task of philosophy? The answer seems to lie in the very first line of the passage cited: it is the problem of system that prevents Schelling from ever attaining the goal of system. Schelling never does “come to an end” regarding the question of how the Absolute emerges from itself to posit a world over against itself, the very same question which, we saw, allowed Schelling to formulate the task of system in the first place. It is as if Rosenzweig believes Schelling sees the problem of system too clearly, understands too well both the necessity and the fundamental difficulty – if not impossibility – of grasping the One and All, of grasping God, world, and human being, in their interconnection to complete such an 84 85
OSP, p. 37. Ernest Rubinstein notes that Rosenzweig writes “about Schelling with evident sympathy, and not a little feeling for the pathos of unfulfilled promise that seemed to haunt this longest-lived of the idealists,” in An Episode of Jewish Romanticism, p. 20.
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undertaking.86 And indeed, it seems to be this very perpetual presence of the problem of system before Schelling’s eyes in Rosenzweig’s account which is revealed in the system-program itself: no sooner is one system-possibility suggested than something appears “like a distant mountain” behind it, pointing to the need to formulate system anew. Each new possibility points to the limitations inherent to the others: the question of “how the world must be created for a moral being” is shown to be one-sided by the possibility of a perspective beyond that moral being, of a perspective which grasps the self and world as emerging together “at once” in “a complete system of all ideas, or what is the same, of all practical postulates.” The “idea of beauty” then suddenly usurps this higher perspective, claiming aesthetics, and not ethics, as the realm in which ideas and practical postulates, truth and goodness are unified. And the notion of a “new religion,” a “mythology of reason,” points to the need and the possibility of unifying the rational and the sensible, the enlightened and the unenlightened, in a way that even aesthetics cannot attain. The problem of system thus constantly breaks up the unity posited in each system-possibility of the system-program and thereby constantly breaks up the unity of the majestic human being that Schelling promised to become through it. With his failure to complete his promise, however, Schelling’s life does attain a kind of unity. It is not the unity of the completed system which holds Schelling’s life together, according to Rosenzweig, but rather the unity of the problem of system. As Rosenzweig tells us, “At the end of his life, Schelling himself saw only the meaning of the task, and not the task itself, differently than he first knew it in early 1796.”87 The idea that unifies Schelling’s life, we see, is precisely that idea which Schelling first discovers and presents in his system-program of 1796: the notion of system as the task of philosophy.88 86
87
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Cf., Martin Heidegger’s assessment of Schelling’s awareness of the magnitude of the problem of system, in his Schelling’s Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom, p. 21: “Schelling’s efforts [were] … dedicated to the foundation, the building of the system of freedom in a formed work. … We already stated that this work got stranded. It got stranded because of essential inner difficulties which Schelling himself saw so clearly.” OSP, p. 44. Of interest in this regard is Rosenzweig’s own reflection on the program years later, prompted by Wilhelm Böhm’s article claiming Hölderlin to be the true author of the program: “At that time, I had read the program only as a program of a life, of a life’s work. If one reads it, with Böhm, as a program for a journal article, it no longer seems absolutely Schellingian. … But as far as the question whether it can be thought of as a program for a journal article, I cannot answer it in the affirmative,” Rosenzweig to Ludwig Strauss, BT 2, p. 1102. Please see the discussion of the meaning of “program” in the coming pages of this chapter. Cf., Wilhelm Böhm, “Hölderlin als Verfasser des ‘Ältesten Systemprogramms des deutschen Idealismus,” Deutsche Vierteljahrschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistegeschichte 4 (1926): 339–426, as well as Ludwig Strauss, “Hölderlins Anteil an Schellings frühem Systemprogramm” together with Böhm’s rebuttal to Strauss, “Zum ‘Systemprogramm’: eine Erwiderung,” both in Deutsche Vierteljahrschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte 5 (1927): 679–734. In his careful and compelling account of the development of Schelling’s philosophy of mythology and of Schelling’s influence on Rosenzweig’s own philosophical project, ממיתוס להתגלות, Moshe Schwarz claims that Rosenzweig identifies in the system-program the “unified basic direction” of Schelling’s whole life work: the systematic construction of a “new mythology” (e.g., pp. 211–12).
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We arrive, thereby, at a curious conclusion. System, Rosenzweig has taught us, is knowledge of the unity of the One and All as such and in their interconnection. Schelling is “the first,” according to Rosenzweig, to grasp this notion of system as the task of philosophy, and the first to glimpse the Absolute standpoint out of which this task may be fulfilled, articulating what he sees in the “System-Program.” In so arriving at the standpoint that makes system possible, it is Schelling – not Spinoza or Kant or Fichte – who first grasps the notion that system is the task of philosophy. And yet Schelling does not succeed in fulfilling this task. Over the course of his whole life, system remains a possibility to be actualized, something promised to be fulfilled in the future, a promise that is fulfilled, in fact, by someone other than Schelling. Noting the future tense of much of the program, Rosenzweig writes, “logic, indeed, the ‘complete system of all ideas,’ and the philosophy of history too appear here within their over-reaching regions, metaphysics and ethics, under the weighty sign of the future. Here too he [Schelling] sees tasks, tasks indeed which he himself carried out only gropingly afterwards, and which only another carried out in great style.”89 Schelling sees tasks, tasks, and more tasks; systems, systems, and more systems. He does so, Rosenzweig suggests, because his thinking remains “under the weighty sign of the future.” He “gropes” for the completion of the system, but it is left to another to carry out this task “in great style.” This other, as the very next line reveals, is of course the same Hegel who, Rosenzweig suggests, copied down a version of the system-program in his own handwriting and thereby preserved it for posterity. For Rosenzweig, the “oldest system-program” is thus the defining moment, the starting point, of two different paths within German Idealism, both of which grasp system as the task of philosophy. It is the defining moment for Schelling’s own path, whereby his whole life is unified in advance by the problem of system, by the notion of system as task. But it is also the starting point of a path leading toward the fulfillment of this task, toward the completion of the task of system, the path of Hegel.90 It is Hegel, not Schelling, according to Rosenzweig, who truly does become “the philosophical conqueror of the actual world,” while Schelling remains “pretender” to that throne.91 If, as Rosenzweig has already told
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While there is no doubt that the idea of a new mythology is present in the system-program, and that this idea fascinated Schelling over much of his career, I cannot agree with Schwarz that Rosenzweig saw in the idea of a new mythology the unifying idea of Schelling’s life work. The idea of mythology is one of the forms of the problem of system – i.e., mythology as a way of unifying the idealism of the philosophers with the sensible realism of common people – in the system-program, but hardly the ruling form of that problem. OSP, p. 34. See Reinhold Mayer, Franz Rosenzweig. Eine Philosophie der dialogischen Erfahrung, p. 19, who also highlights the system-program as a double starting-point within German Idealism: “Rosenzweig recognized this program … both as the core of Schelling’s philosophy and as the starting point of Hegel’s.” OSP, pp. 39, 37.
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us, “we grasp in our program the moment in the history of philosophy where for the first time knowledge of the ultimate truth grew together with knowledge of the whole actuality,” then this moment points directly to Hegel’s systematic accomplishments. “Already here” in the system-program, Rosenzweig continues, “the task was seen, without the ‘how’ of the solution becoming clear, which Hegel later undertook to fulfill through the concept of dialectical method.”92 It is the task of system, of the unification of the One and All, of the “ultimate truth” and the “whole actuality,” which is first grasped in the system-program. But the task is grasped in it without the solution to that task being clear. Only the grasping of system as task of philosophy makes Hegel’s “solution” possible, but the task itself is not the solution. What crystallize within the system-program are therefore the possibility of system and the demand that system be carried out. Its actuality, however, has to await Hegel’s “dialectical method.”93 If we return now to the enduring significance which Rosenzweig assigns to the notion of system for philosophy in his own time, we will recall an intriguing point. According to Rosenzweig, it is not Hegel’s solution to the problem of system that still governs philosophy in Rosenzweig’s own time, but rather precisely that notion of system as task which the system-program first presents. “Outlasting the overthrow of the Hegelian system,” Rosenzweig claims, “was the common conviction formed in it, that it is the task of philosophy somehow to come to a system”; this “task,” furthermore, “has not been forsaken, even today.”94 If Rosenzweig’s own time has inherited a notion of system, Rosenzweig suggests, it is not the systemsolution which Hegel completes, but rather the system-task of the program. This is not to say, however, that Schelling somehow “outlasts” Hegel. For it is only in Hegel’s completed system that the notion of system as the task of philosophy becomes a “common conviction”; only by being fulfilled does the task of system become universally accepted as the task of philosophy. At the same time, however, the completion of a system by Hegel obscures an essential aspect of the nature of system, as well. It obscures just that notion of system as task, as the goal toward which philosophy must “grope.” After Hegel, system is taken to be a “solution,” an orderly collection of answers that are accepted or rejected as the case may be. After Hegel, system is taken to be the organization of the “whole philosophical world between the covers of one book.” What is lost, thereby, is the sense of urgency that accompanies the notion of system as task, the sense that the philosopher is called upon to unify truth and actuality, the One and the All, in her thinking. What is lost is the sense that philosophy is not a collection of answers, but rather a human possibility to be actualized. 92 93
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OSP, p. 44. Rosenzweig’s concession that only Hegel’s “dialectical method” makes the fulfillment of the task of system possible may be a nod to his cousin, Hans Ehrenberg, who claimed as much in his introduction to Hegel’s Jena system. See Section X at the end of this chapter. OSP, pp. 41, 44.
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We now begin to understand the significance of a return to Schelling’s “discovery” of system as the task of philosophy for Rosenzweig’s own time.95 For if Rosenzweig claims that the notion of system as the task of philosophy stands obscurely in the background of all contemporary attempts to philosophize, we can now see that the cause of the present obscurity of this task is not only the fall away from system after Hegel, but also the very completion of the task of system in Hegel’s own work! But Rosenzweig’s recovery of an oldest system-program would offer the possibility of drawing this notion of system as task back into the light, of tearing it free both from the solution-character of Hegel’s complete system and the subsequent breakup of that solution preceding Rosenzweig’s own time. Rosenzweig’s discovery would offer the possibility of recovering that moment when system was task and not solution. It would offer the possibility, one might say, of recovering that first moment when system was a program. We recall the criticism leveled at Rosenzweig by subsequent scholars for assigning a misleading title to the manuscript he found written in Hegel’s hand. The “system-program,” one readily sees, is not systematically constructed; it offers no outline for a system, but rather presents, one after the next, many possibilities for system. In doing so, it assumes system as its task; it assumes that philosophy seeks to grasp the One and All as such and in their interconnection. It is indecisive, only, regarding the proper path that will lead to the accomplishment of this task. It posits the task of system before its readers as a demand for the immediate future, and in the form of multiple possibilities. I would like to submit that Rosenzweig’s designation of this two-page text in Hegel’s handwriting as a “system-program” is not at all arbitrary. Rosenzweig does not call the text an “outline” or a “presentation” of a system – terms with which Schelling characterizes some of his own texts96 – but rather, he recognizes this text as a system-program. What does the term “program” mean? The different meanings of the word “program” derive from the Greek programma, which is itself built from the term gramma signifying something written down, and the prefix pro, meaning “before,” in either a temporal or spatial sense. Out of its Greek origins, one can point to two distinct meanings which the term “program” takes on in modern usage. “Program” has come to mean a “public notice,” that is, something “written” that is set “before” the public, but “program” has also come to mean something akin to a “prospectus,” something written beforehand which is to give an account of what is to follow. This second meaning also contains within it a third, closely 95
96
See Rubinstein, An Episode of Jewish Romanticism, p. 25, where he makes a similar point: “Schelling invites his philosophical descendents to systematize his thought in a way, for example, that Hegel does not. One accepts the perfect system or rejects it; one does not continue in its project. It is Schelling, not Hegel, who left a task that may be taken up again even, as Rosenzweig says, today.” E.g., “Presentation of My System of Philosophy,” “First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature.”
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related meaning: program as “manifesto,” as a declaration of that which is to be done, of a task that is to be carried out.97 The relation of the different meanings of the term “program” to the systemprogram itself is striking. Insofar as Rosenzweig explicitly aims to overturn Schelling’s reputation as one who has “made his development before the public,” he directs us to understand “program” according to the second or third meaning. These definitions, moreover, offer a rather clear picture of what Rosenzweig sees in this text. The system-program is not an outline of a system, but rather a written document which sets the notion of system forth as task into the future, a written document which sets before philosophers of the future the idea that system is the task of philosophy.98 I would submit that if we take Rosenzweig to intend his designation of the text as a “system-program” in the precise sense which we have uncovered, we can then recognize and accept the “unsystematic” nature of the system-program to which later scholars have pointed and of which Rosenzweig was well aware. But we can also recognize and accept Rosenzweig’s own designation as pointing precisely to the way in which system is set forth as a task in the “program” without being fulfilled, the way it demands the carrying out of the task of system without being clear regarding a single possible path which will lead to this goal.99
IX. Rosenzweig’s Recovery of System as Philosophical Task for His Time On the right-hand margin of one of the last pages of Rosenzweig’s handwritten draft of his “Oldest System-Program” essay, Rosenzweig added a note that includes 97
98
99
See Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, newly revised by Henry Stuart Jones and Roderick McKenzie (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1925), Volume II, pp. 1473, 1465, Volume I, p. 358; Brockhaus Wahrig Deutsches Woerterbuch, eds., Gerhard Wahrig, Hildegard Kraemer, Harald Zimmermann (Stuttgart: F. A. Brockhaus, Wiesbaden, and Deutsche VerlagsAnstalt, 1983), V. V, p. 215. See also, The Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), V. VIII, pp. 1438–9. Compare Jean-Luc Nancy’s and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe’s comments about the oldest systemprogram in the introduction to their The Literary Absolute: The Theory of Literature in German Romanticism, p. 33: “A will to System is visible from the first paragraphs of the text forward. … It is indicated, finally, by its announcement in the future, by the announcement of the ‘programmatic’ fact according to which the System is envisaged in the name and in the form of an exigency, a desire, or a will; the System is not there (does not exist). It is ‘to do’ (the goal is ‘practical’ as well), but only as the last thing to do, the last task and the last work of humanity.” My whole discussion of “system as task” in this chapter (and in this book as a whole) has drawn much from Martin Heidegger, Schelling’s Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom. See, e.g., p. 19: “We must consider that under this term (‘scientific world view’) a decisive task of the philosophy of German Idealism is hidden, a task which is best announced by the key word of that philosophy: the system,” and p. 27: “To be sure, the false form of system and the business of constructing systems must be rejected again and again, but only because system in the true sense is one, indeed the task of philosophy.”
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the following reflection: “The relationship of Absolute and disciplines taken up in the system-program shows … a pre-connection 1) with Hegel, 2) but with late Schelling, and thereby 3) with all future philosophy insofar as it is only possible and will only be possible on the assumption of the Idealist movement that has completed-itself and overturned itself.”100 Rosenzweig’s comment identifies three different moments in the history of philosophy that stretch between the date he assigned to the “Oldest System-Program” and his own time: the moment of Hegel, the moment of the late Schelling, and “all future philosophy,” that is, all philosophy subsequent to Hegel and Schelling, of Rosenzweig’s own time and of the future. Future philosophy is only possible, Rosenzweig suggests here, on the assumption of the completion and overturning of the Idealist movement, personified, we might surmise, in Hegel and the late Schelling, respectively. But underlying the differences among these three discrete moments is a common identity, a “preconnection” [Vorzusammenhang] which Rosenzweig sees present in the “Oldest System-Program” itself. Rosenzweig cites the “relationship of the Absolute and the disciplines,” that is, between the unified absolute ground of all beings – the object of metaphysics – and the particular domains of beings grasped by particular sciences. These are the very terms, we shall see, with which his cousin Hans Ehrenberg designated the One and All in his own attempt to revive the task of system. Rosenzweig suggests that this very question of the relation between the Absolute and the particular disciplines of human knowledge, the One and the All, taken up through the task of system, both unites his own time with the time of German Idealism and determines the task of philosophy for the future, as well. By returning to the “oldest” articulation of the notion of system as task of philosophy, Rosenzweig thus recovers the possibility of system as task for the philosophy of his own time. He thereby recovers it not merely for “his time,” as if his time were an abstract, impersonal category, but rather for the particular philosophers of his time, indeed, we might say, for one of those particular philosophers in particular. In the “Oldest System-Program of German Idealism,” that is, Rosenzweig recovers the task of system for himself. Rosenzweig says as much in a letter to Margrit Rosenstock of June 19, 1919. Remarking on the last part of the “Oldest System-Program” in which, we have seen, Rosenzweig articulates both a definition of system and an account of the significance of the discovery of system for the history of philosophy, Rosenzweig writes, “it contains my own ‘System-program.’ ”101 A scant few months after finishing his own self-proclaimed “system of philosophy,” The Star of Redemption, we find, Rosenzweig looks back on his recovery of system in the “Oldest System-Program” as setting forth his own 100
101
Franz Rosenzweig, “Das älteste Systemprogramm des deutschen Idealismus,” 1914 (Franz Rosenzweig Collection, AR 3001 [manuscript in series II, subseries III, Box 2, Folder 29], p. 44. Gritli-Briefe, p. 335.
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systematic task. He sees in his study of the system-program his own decisive step into the task of system itself. The claim that Rosenzweig recovers the notion of system as the philosopher’s task for himself, that Rosenzweig takes this task upon himself as philosopher, raises familiar questions regarding who the decisive “influences” are for Rosenzweig’s own notion of system. These are important questions. There is no doubt that Rosenzweig is influenced by numerous philosophers who precede him, and – as we shall examine more closely in the next chapter – by teachers and friends from his own time. The determination of influences is vital, furthermore, in establishing the context within which Rosenzweig thinks, in establishing the interlocuters with whom he engages in philosophical dialogue. Among those influences from the philosophical past, both Hegel and Schelling loom large for Rosenzweig. As a consequence, however, the scholarly research on Rosenzweig’s relation to German Idealism tends to divide itself along party lines. It tends to ask the question, Is Rosenzweig more indebted to Schelling or to Hegel? Predictably, there is enough material to support the advocacy of either Idealist as Rosenzweig’s primary philosophical influence so that scholars on both sides of the subsequent argument feel vindicated in their conclusions. Hence U. Bieberich can justifiably claim that “Schelling, Nietsche, H. Ehrenberg, Weizsäcker, Rosenstock, Goethe, and whatever other influences one can name, are not there in order to find a way out of the Hegelian edifice of thought [Gedankengebäude] but rather in order to re-structure this edifice anew from within.”102 M. Schwarz, on the other hand, can find good reason to “claim – in explicit opposition to [E.] Freund – that in terms of the construction of his system, Rosenzweig remained faithful to Schelling,”103 while H. J. Görtz can criticize S. Mosès for emphasizing “one-sidedly” “the significance of [Schelling’s] Weltalter for the structure of the Star” instead of “setting the dialectical process of the Star in relation to that of Hegel’s Phenomenology.”104 For a serious philosophical understanding of Rosenzweig’s work, it is certainly necessary to determine the extent and the limits of both Hegel’s and Schelling’s influence. But in this quarrel over which Idealist is more influential for Rosenzweig something essential is lost. What is lost, I would argue, is precisely that which makes Rosenzweig a philosopher and not just an heir to the philosophical insights of others. Rosenzweig is a philosopher not because he continues the philosophical project of Schelling or Hegel; he is a philosopher because he recognizes the philosophical task to which the works of both Schelling and Hegel point, and because he takes that task upon himself – at least for a time – as his personal vocation. That Rosenzweig conceived of his own transformation into a philosopher as a 102
103 104
Ulrich Bieberich, Wenn die Geschichte göttlich wäre: Rosenzweigs Auseinandersetzung mit Hegel, p. 178. Moshe Schwarz, [ ממיתוס להתגלותFrom Myth to Revelation], p. 231. Heinz-Jürgen Görtz, Tod und Erfahrung: Rosenzweigs “erfahrende Philosophie” und Hegels “Wissenschaft der Erfahrung des Bewusstseins,” p. 356.
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consequence of his assuming this task of system can only be shown in the coming chapters. But one can already derive this conviction from the very way in which Rosenzweig declares his article on the “Oldest System-Program” to have been his “own ‘system-program,’ ” preparing the way for his own “system of philosophy.” Thus I believe it is misleading to understand Rosenzweig too narrowly either as being philosophically “faithful to Schelling” or as taking on the “re-structuring” of the “Hegelian edifice of thought” “from within.” It is clear that Rosenzweig owes a philosophical debt to both Hegel and Schelling – he owes them precisely because for Rosenzweig these two thinkers make the notion of system as the task of philosophy clear for the first time, Schelling insofar as he is the first to grasp this task, and Hegel insofar as he is the first to carry it out to completion, and thereby the first to transform the notion of system as philosophy’s task into a “common conviction.” But the notion of system as the task of philosophy does not belong to Hegel or Schelling; it is not Hegelian or Schellingian. Hegel and Schelling point out the demand for and the possibility of system for philosophy, but the task of system transcends their work. Indeed, as we shall see in the coming chapters, Rosenzweig’s own “system” sets out to show the extent to which philosophy must transcend Idealism not in order to denounce the task of system which the Idealists reveal, but rather precisely in order to carry out the task to which they point. We recall that Rosenzweig recognizes the determination of system as the task of philosophy in German Idealism to be neither an invention nor something inherited from the philosophical past, but rather the “discovery” of something “hidden” since the inception of philosophy. Rosenzweig suggests, thereby, that ever since human beings began to reflect on the nature of things, the idea of system has been present for them, even if it has taken the discovery of system in German Idealism to make them aware of it. We might ask: What is this original idea of system? What is the significance of the fact that an original notion of system seems to be present, according to Rosenzweig, wherever human beings reflect? Where did human beings get the idea of system in the first place? According to Rosenzweig, the two-page handwritten text that he found in the Prussian State Library is the “oldest” system program in German Idealism, and “in a certain sense … in the whole history of philosophy.” If we seek to understand the relation of the system-program to an “original” idea of system, then we must attempt to grasp Rosenzweig’s designation of this system-program as the “oldest” of its kind with the same degree of precision that we demanded of his designation of the text as a “program.” We understood the fact that the text is a “system-program” to suggest that it is a written text (gramma) which sets forth into the future (pro) the notion of system as task of philosophy. One cannot help but notice, in this connection, the “written” character of any program. It is curious, therefore, that it is precisely on account of the “written” character of the “system-program” that Rosenzweig raises doubts concerning its origins. One recalls Socrates’ Phaedrus to the effect that “written [discourse] can be fairly called an image” of “the living,
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breathing discourse of the man who knows,” a mere “image” which cannot “yield results that are clear or certain.”105 The system-program is in fact a mere “image” in multiple ways. It is, first of all, a handwritten record of the “discovery” of the notion of system which has remained present but hidden for human beings since they began to reflect. But it is also a mere image insofar as it is a “copy” of that text in which the discovery of system was actually announced, a copy, Rosenzweig asserts, written down by someone other than its author. The original program is lost – and we have access to the ideas of the original only insofar as we possess a copy. A remarkable parallel emerges, I would suggest, between Rosenzweig’s claim regarding the discovery of the notion of system, on the one hand, and his claim regarding the originality of the handwritten program itself. The system-program is that text in which the notion of system that has accompanied philosophy since its inception – hidden as it may have been – is first copied down in writing. The handwritten manuscript itself is likewise a copy of a lost – or hidden – original. Dieter Henrich has pointed out that Rosenzweig’s attribution of the system-program to Schelling depends, almost exclusively, on the absence of the original text, and he questions whether Rosenzweig, who claimed that the Liepmannssohn auction house “could give no information regarding the origin of the handwritten text,” truly carried out a thorough investigation in this regard.106 Whether or not we question the sincerity of Rosenzweig’s investigations into the text’s origin, Rosenzweig does seem to take multiple steps to problematize the originality of the system-program. Indeed, despite the great lengths he takes to demonstrate the position of the program within Schelling’s early works, Rosenzweig’s most significant scholarly move seems not to be the attribution of the program to Schelling, but rather the way in which he undermines the attribution of the program to Hegel. In so doing, Rosenzweig transforms what was thought to be an original into a copy. And Rosenzweig would have known that so long as the “original” program is not found, or so long as the manuscript itself is considered to be a copy, no one can claim with certainty that Schelling or Hegel or Hölderlin or anyone else is its true author. Rosenzweig problematizes the attribution of an original notion of system to any particular Idealist philosopher in a further manner, as well. In his discussion of the first line of the “System-Program,” Rosenzweig makes an astounding insinuation. We recall that Rosenzweig interprets the words “an Ethics,” with which the text begins, not as a title, but rather as the continuation of a previous page or set of pages. What might this previous set of pages have presented? Rosenzweig suggests that “the lost previous part may have contained a general 105 106
Plato, “Phaedrus,” (275c–276b) in Complete Works, pp. 552–3. Dieter Henrich, “Aufklärung der Herkunft des Manuskriptes ‘Das älteste Systemprogramm des deutschen Idealismus,’” in Mythologie der Vernunft: Hegels “älteste Systemprogramm des deutschen Idealismus”, pp. 144–6. Cf., OSP, p. 3.
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preparatory remark on the system of philosophy. The preparatory remark was perhaps totally comprehensive and the short program of the system itself added to it only as a crowning conclusion. Indeed, there is an almost unlimited field left here for speculation.”107 Rosenzweig’s innocent “speculation” here should not be taken lightly. We recall the strange manner in which Rosenzweig balances the multiplicity of systempossibilities present in the program together with the specific notion of system as task which these possibilities assume. In this unsystematic system-program, Rosenzweig identifies the “oldest” expression of the notion of system as the task of knowing the One and All, made possible by the attainment of the Absolute standpoint. But in these lines just cited Rosenzweig makes a suggestion that, in a sense, undermines the very authority which he assigns to the system-program vis-à-vis this notion of system. For Rosenzweig suggests here that a “totally comprehensive … remark on the system of philosophy” may have preceded the fragment that remains of the program. If this is the case, not only does the original manuscript, of which Hegel’s is a copy, remain lost, but Rosenzweig suggests that what may be lost with it is nothing less than a comprehensive account of the notion of system! This lost section and it alone would then be the original Idealist account of system, of which the existing program is merely a “crowning conclusion.” In the very act of recovering the task of system from obscurity, of returning to the defining moment in which system is discovered, we find, Rosenzweig insists on the enduring hiddenness of the true notion of system. I would suggest that the way in which Rosenzweig problematizes both the originality of the manuscript in Hegel’s handwriting and the originality of the notion of system presented in the remaining fragment is closely related to his recovery of system as the task of philosophy for his own time. Rosenzweig reveals the meaning of system as task – and not as solution – precisely by tearing the first discovery of system as philosophy’s task out of the hands of the thinker who fulfilled that task. In so doing he not only revives for philosophy the sense of urgency which accompanied the notion of system as task in Idealism; he also raises questions regarding the originality of the very notion of system written down in the texts of Idealism. He makes it possible, thereby, to question the clarity with which even the Idealists grasped the original notion of system. After all, the Idealists only “discovered” system; an original idea of system has lay hidden before human beings all along. This means, furthermore, that the philosopher who takes on the task of system in Rosenzweig’s time must aspire not to copy the copy of this notion of system in Idealism, but rather to grasp the notion of system toward which both Schelling and Hegel point, to grasp it, if possible, even more clearly than did Schelling and Hegel themselves. Furthermore, the manner in which Rosenzweig insists on the problematic character of the system-program’s originality, I would suggest, is itself implied 107
OSP, p. 28.
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in the very title Rosenzweig assigns to the text. Rosenzweig calls the text the “oldest” system-program and thereby grants the text a dubious attribute: old age. Rosenzweig does not call the text the “original” system-program or even the “first” system-program,108 both of which would express, in a far less equivocal manner, the primacy of the program’s notion of system. As we have seen, however, Rosenzweig seems just as intent on making the originality of this text – and its notion of system – questionable as he does on granting it authority. By giving the text the name that he does, Rosenzweig can imply that the text is old, very old, even the “oldest” articulation of the notion of system and at the same time that it is not original, but rather remains, even in its old age, a mere copy. In our examination of the ambiguous manner in which Kant presents the idea of system in the “Architectonic of Pure Reason,” we saw how Kant himself questions the possibility of attaining the goal of system. Philosophy is system, Kant explained, but as such is merely the “idea of a possible science nowhere given in concreto,” an “archetype” which human beings try to approximate, but which has yet to be matched by the human “ectype.” The human articulation of system, Kant implied, is always a copy; indeed according to Kant, it must be a copy, because only insofar as the philosopher has the idea of the One and All from the beginning of her act of philosophizing, that is, only insofar as the “original system” is somehow present for her before she even begins to construct her system, may she hope to complete her own copy. If Schelling does in fact show the possibility of making the human copy adequate to the original, if Hegel shows how this human copy can reach completion, neither thereby constructs the original system itself, but rather, as we have claimed, Hegel and Schelling point to that original, and they thereby point to the architect whose blueprints they have copied. Our examination of Rosenzweig’s “Oldest System-Program of German Idealism” has thus yielded a complex picture of the notion of system which Rosenzweig believed to have inherited from German Idealism. It has done so by showing how Rosenzweig recovers the idea of system as the task of philosophy, and by showing how his recovery is made possible by the way in which that text both reflects and continues to hide the notion of system whose discovery it announces. We have attempted to show, furthermore, that this very questioning of the text’s notion of system is reflected in the carefully chosen title which Rosenzweig assigns to the text he discovers. In the chapter that follows, we will see how Rosenzweig claims for himself the very task of system he recovers for his own time from the oldest system-program of German Idealism. And we will see how Rosenzweig arrives at the conclusion that taking up this task of system discovered in German Idealism demands that he break away from the specific form in which the Idealists carried out the task of system themselves. 108
But see Section X of this chapter, on the relationship between this “Oldest System-Program” and Hans Ehrenberg’s publication of Hegel’s Jena system in 1915 under the title Hegels erstes System.
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X. “My Real Teacher in Philosophy”: Excursus on Hans Ehrenberg’s Early Project of System and the Neo-Kantian Context This chapter has argued that Rosenzweig’s “Oldest System-Program” essay seeks to revive that task of systematic philosophy for Rosenzweig’s own time which Hegel and Schelling (and for a time Hölderlin) shared in their own. In reassessing the significance of German Idealism for his own time, Rosenzweig was not alone. Indeed, as he well knew, in the very years during which he discovered and published the “Oldest System-Program,” there were a growing number of scholars and students in Germany calling for a reconsideration of that German Idealist philosophy which had been rejected by the philosophers of the fin de siècle. Wilhelm Windelband’s landmark lecture of 1910, “Die Erneuerung des Hegelianismus,” acknowledged the “amazement” with which his generation took in this revival of interest in Hegel among the youth and sought to explain the rise of neo-Hegelianism as a reaction to “the poverty of positivism and desolation of materialism” in his time. The more the younger generation “seeks to raise itself out of the overwhelming mass of particulars and externals to a sense-of-the-whole of all actuality,” Windelband reflected, “the more fascination is elicited by the impressive unity and grandiose closedness of systematic composition in which the Hegelian pan-logism presents itself.”109 One of the members of that younger generation who sought to attain a path back from particulars to a “sense-of-the-whole of all actuality” through an engagement with Hegel’s system was Windelband’s student – and Franz Rosenzweig’s cousin – Hans Ehrenberg. In the early 1910s, Ehrenberg was a Privatdozent at the University of Heidelberg, teaching courses on German Idealism, theology, and systematic philosophy. During these years he composed a number of works whose explicit goal was the revival of the task of system for the philosophy of his time.110 Although Rosenzweig’s stature as a thinker would later overshadow that of his older cousin, Rosenzweig long considered Ehrenberg “my real teacher in philosophy,”111 and at the time of his publication of the “Oldest System-Program,” he intended to dedicate the essay to Ehrenberg. Writing to Ehrenberg of his plans to do so, on March 2, 1917, Rosenzweig said, “The dedication must still be made. … I’ve perhaps never done anything where it belongs as much as here. Indeed, I learned the concept ‘system’ from you, in all these years.”112 Rosenzweig’s expression of debt to Ehrenberg for that concept of system which apparently guided his own writing of the “Oldest System-Program” essay offers us 109 110
111 112
Wilhelm Windelband, “Die Erneuerung des Hegelianismus,” Präludien I, p. 278. For a list of courses Ehrenberg taught during this period, see Günther Brakelmann, Hans Ehrenberg: Ein judenchristliches Schicksal in Deutschland, pp. 31–2. Rosenzweig to Ernst Simon, BT 2, p. 809. Rosenzweig to H. Ehrenberg, March 2, 1917, BT 2, p. 357.
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valuable insight into the context within which Rosenzweig saw himself writing. For in Ehrenberg, Rosenzweig had a mentor in philosophical matters who was determined to revive the project of systematic philosophy at a time when the meaning of that project had become unclear or even anathema to contemporary thinkers. In his “Kant’s Table of Categories and the Systematic Concept of Philosophy,” published in the 1909 volume of Kant-Studien, Ehrenberg declared that “philosophy is nothing without system” and attempted to develop the full range of philosophical concepts dialectically from one another – beginning with the concept of freedom, passing through theoretical philosophy and aesthetics, and culminating in the Absolute – according to the schema of Kant’s table of categories. Ehrenberg viewed this attempt as merely experimental but nevertheless concluded his article with the bold assertion that “here, for the first time, philosophy once more appears consciously systematic and no longer the luggage-carrier of the empirical sciences. It shows at once that it is possible and is time to unify Kant and Hegel.”113 In his 1911 Parteiung der Philosophie: Studien wider Hegel und die Kantianer, Ehrenberg took further steps toward a “preparation for the system” by trying to bring about a synthesis of the philosophical standpoints of Hegel and the neoKantians. Parteiung is an ambitious work which seeks to overcome what it depicts as the mirror-image limitations of neo-Kantianism and Hegelianism – on one side, the neo-Kantian rejection of the Absolute, and the lapsing back into positivism it courts as a result; on the other, the Hegelian subordination of the particular disciplines of science to the overpowering unity of logic – in a theologically grounded account of philosophy. According to this account, philosophy – while grasping the whole in itself – at once grasps itself as a mere part of the whole of actuality. “The possibility of system depends,” Ehrenberg declares, “on philosophy grasping itself as a part of the whole that is, i.e., of the Absolute.”114 If Rosenzweig expressed a debt to Ehrenberg for “the concept of ‘system’ ” which was central to Ehrenberg’s writings at the time, it appears to have been a shared interest in this notion of system which directed both Ehrenberg and Rosenzweig to inquire into the origins of that notion, to seek out the “oldest” or “first” historical moment in which the project of system became manifest. It cannot be coincidental that in precisely those months of 1914 in which Rosenzweig was completing his “Oldest System-Program,” Ehrenberg was preparing for its first publication Hegel’s so-called Jena system, with his own introductory essay, under the title Hegel’s First System.115 In his dating of the “Oldest System-Program,” Rosenzweig thus determines that his manuscript was composed “three or four
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Hans Ehrenberg, “Kants Kategorientafel und der systematische Begriff der Philosophie,” KantStudien 14 (1909): 436, 437–8. Hans Ehrenberg, Die Parteiung der Philosophie: Studien wider Hegel und die Kantianer (1911), pp. 127–8, in reprint (1998), p. 100. Hans Ehrenberg and Herbert Link, eds., Hegels erstes System.
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years before Hegel’s own first attempt in the direction of system, the Jena system which Ehrenberg edited.”116 In the footnotes to the first chapter of this study, I have noted some points in the “Oldest System-Program” essay where Rosenzweig alludes to Ehrenberg’s work on German Idealism and systematic philosophy, but one of Rosenzweig’s nods to his cousin surely occurs when he declares that only Hegel’s “dialectical method” made possible the fulfillment of that task of system which Schelling had discovered. In his introduction to Hegel’s First System, Ehrenberg claimed that the Jena system shows how Hegel’s dialectical method developed out of the need to overcome the finitude of Fichte’s position, on the one hand, and the divorce between the Absolute and the finite in Schelling’s philosophy of identity. “If Fichte awoke Hegel’s refutation in the concept of the Absolute, so Schelling awoke his refutation in the treatment of the individual stations of the system. He finds Schelling here too immediately directed to the Absolute,” Ehrenberg writes. “Through dialectic, Hegel escapes the Fichtean bad infinity and the Schellingian leveling of finite distinctions and sails through unharmed between the destruction of the individual stations of the system and the pressing-down of the Absolute. The great task is solved.”117 Ehrenberg suggests, thereby, that only dialectical method allows Hegel to complete the task of system, reconciling the Absolute through it with the manifold of finite particulars. My impression is that Rosenzweig’s first forays into the systematic philosophy of German Idealism and, indeed, his first steps toward taking up the task of system for himself, might well be seen as his attempt to take part in the renaissance of systematic thought which his cousin sought to initiate in their time. Rosenzweig begins his own path to system, that is to say, as Ehrenberg’s disciple. There is no doubt, moreover, that the manner in which the Star presents the possibility of the philosopher’s attaining a kind of completion of systematic knowledge of “the All” from a point in the middle of the systematic “All” in which she yet lives is indebted to Ehrenberg’s account, in the Parteiung, of philosophy’s grasping itself as part of “the whole.” Rosenzweig’s close personal and intellectual connection to Ehrenberg highlights, by way of contrast, the quizzical relationship the development of his thinking has to the leading philosophical movement of his time: neo-Kantianism. For Rosenzweig to designate his cousin as his “real teacher in philosophy,” despite the fact that he studied with some of the most important and influential figures of the southwestern neo-Kantian school, suggests how utterly detached he felt his thinking was from the professors in whose classrooms he learned. Now, there are reasons not to take Rosenzweig’s sense of distance from neo-Kantianism as wholly authoritative. Heinrich Rickert, in particular, was instrumental in getting 116 117
OSP, p. 7. H. Ehrenberg, “Einleitende Bemerkungen,” Hegels erstes System, pp. xvi, xx.
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Rosenzweig’s “Oldest System-Program” article published,118 and Rickert’s own systematic work contains key themes and concepts too many of which pop up in Rosenzweig’s Star for such overlap to be coincidental.119 Still, Rosenzweig’s relatively constant mockery of the neo-Kantians in his letters120 and his equally telling silence regarding the neo-Kantians in the Star itself – which treats German Idealism as the last great philosophical movement, and as if its reign over the philosophical scene had come to an end only recently (with the innovations of Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche)! – confirms for me the insight we have gleaned from reading Rosenzweig’s “Oldest System-Program”: to Rosenzweig’s eye, neo-Kantian “systems” are by and large signs of the contemporary confusion over the true task of philosophy, a confusion that can only be cleared up through a return to the beginnings of German Idealism and the “oldest” articulations of the task of system found there.121 Hans Ehrenberg was instrumental – so it seems to me – in guiding Rosenzweig to such a conclusion. 118
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The cover page of the original “Oldest System-Program” article in the Sitzungberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften. Philosophisch-historische Klasse introduces the article as “imparted [mitgeteilt] by Franz Rosenzweig” and “submitted [vorgelegt] by Heinrich Rickert.” And see the deliberations in the correspondence between Rosenzweig and Eugen Rosenstock on whether to appeal to Rickert for help in publishing the article: E. Rosenstock to F. Rosenzweig, October 4, 1916, and November 19, 1916, and F. Rosenzweig to E. Rosenstock, October, 1916, and November 30, 1916, BT 1, pp. 247, 255, 301, 302. Rickert intended his System der Philosophie, erster Teil: Allgemeine Grundlegung der Philosophie (1921) to be – as its title suggests – the first part of a system of philosophy. The book opens with a compelling apology for systematic philosophy and its engagement with “the All.” A thorough study of Rosenzweig’s intellectual relationship to Rickert would have to inquire into Rickert’s use of the following concepts and Rosenzweig’s possible adaptation of such concepts (pages in parentheses cite Rickert’s System der Philosophie): the notion of “the And as bond” which makes possible the “synthetic unity of multiplicity” in a manner different from Hegelian synthesis (pp. 61, 70–1, 268–76); the notion of “personal name” (pp. 6–7) and even the Faustian expression of Gefühlsmonismus – “Name is sound and smoke” – against which Rosenzweig will formulate the call of the personal name in the Star (pp. 250–1); the need to distinguish between questions of “Weltanschauung” and “Lebensanschauung” (p. 32); the play on the term Voll-endung (completion, full-ending) (pp. 26, 49); and, of course, the general systematic engagement with “the All” as that which “redeems us from the nothingness of relativism” (e.g., p. viii). I will cite only two examples. Rosenzweig’s estimation of Rickert can be gathered from a comment he makes in a diary entry on July 20, 1922: “Spinoza refutes Descartes, Leibniz refutes Spinoza, Kant refutes Leibniz, Fichte refutes Kant, Schelling refutes Fichte, Hegel refutes Schelling, and Hegel, through the advance of history is ‘more than refuted, he is judged.’ But Nietzsche does not refute Schopenhauer and I do not refute Nietzsche. He who still busies himself today with refutations (e.g., Rickert with Nietzsche, for what is the philosophy of value other than a struggle against the ‘transvaluation [of values]’?), proves in so doing that he is not a philosopher,” BT 2, p. 804. Reporting on a meeting with Jonas Cohn – who was also one of Rosenzweig’s teachers at Freiburg – while still in the midst of writing the Star, Rosenzweig writes, “Now he wants to write his system (‘also,’ I think naturally) and has been working it out for 5 years now. I had to think about mine – probably – for five child-months. But I kept myself from telling him about it; I just couldn’t,” Rosenzweig to M. Rosenstock-Huessy, November 24, 1918, Gritli-Briefe, p. 199. Rosenzweig’s personal and intellectual connection to Hermann Cohen is, of course, an exception to Rosenzweig’s general rejection of the neo-Kantian movement. But Rosenzweig’s appropriation of Cohen’s thought is selective, and I am not convinced that Cohen’s work significantly influenced
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Nevertheless, the development of Rosenzweig’s own concept of system, which we will chart in the next chapter, is in some ways a move away from Ehrenberg’s formulation of their shared philosophical concerns. As a result of both personal and intellectual differences which appear to have moved to the fore in the wake of the failed Baden-Baden project, Rosenzweig drifted away from Ehrenberg for a time during the war years.122 As the next chapter seeks to show, it was rather Rosenzweig’s exchanges with Eugen Rosenstock and Viktor von Weizsäcker which were decisive during these years for Rosenzweig’s advance to that conception of system which he would oppose to the systems of German Idealism and later elaborate in the Star.
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the way Rosenzweig came to view the task of system itself. It should nevertheless be noted that after Cohen’s death, Rosenzweig’s ire over obituaries written by Cohen’s students (Cassirer in particular) was sparked by the failure of these students to acknowledge Cohen’s status as “the single systematic head, … the single philosopher in the German Cathedral … at least since Lotze’s death,” Rosenzweig to his mother, April 17, 1918, BT 1, p. 540. See likewise Rosenzweig’s suggestion, in his “Einleitung in die Akademieausgabe der Jüdischen Schriften Hermann Cohens,” that Cohen was “the only one among his peers [Zunftgenossen] in these decades, to go the way to System. He does so in conscious rejection and unconscious following of the great thinkers, who had, at the beginning of the century, melded together Kant’s thinking and Goethe’s life into the cultural power of German Idealism,” GS 3, 181. But see Rosenzweig’s account of “anticipation” and his criticism of the notion of “infinite task” in Chapter 4, Section II.4. See, e.g., Rosenzweig to H. Ehrenbeng, October, 1916, BT 1, 241–2, and April 29, 1918, BT 1, 547–8. Cf., Wolfdietrich Schmied-Kowarzik, “Hans Ehrenbergs Einfluss auf die Entstehung des Stern der Erlösung,” Rosenzweig im Gespräch mit Ehrenberg, Cohen, und Buber, pp. 67–72.
2
m “A Twofold Relation to the Absolute”: The Genesis of Rosenzweig’s Concept of System
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ur study of Rosenzweig’s “Oldest System-Program of German Idealism” has enabled us to pinpoint the conception of system that Rosenzweig recovered from German Idealism for his own time, and it thereby leads us an important step toward understanding what Rosenzweig means when he designates his own Star of Redemption as nothing other than a “system of philosophy.” We have learned that system, according to Rosenzweig, is the philosophical articulation of the One and All as such and in their interconnection. We have learned that this task of system entails grasping what is, both as a single all-encompassing whole and as a totality of particulars, and that it demands grasping together both the shared identity of all that is and the unique difference inherent to each particular being that is. We have learned, moreover, that understanding the identity and difference of all that is also demands that one grasp the identity and difference of the fundamental kinds of being, that one grasp the identity of God, world, and the human self, without losing sight of the particular difference of each. And we have seen, finally, how Rosenzweig comes to determine the system-program he recovered to be the “oldest” of German Idealism, in part, because he recognizes in it the first written formulation of Absolute Idealism, of the conviction, shared by Hegel and Schelling, that system can only be attained from an Absolute standpoint that transcends the limitations of finite human knowledge and grasps subjectivity and substantiality, thought and actuality, humanity and world, as moments on the path of its own divine self-bifurcation and return to unity. When we arrive at the Star itself in the next chapter, we will indeed discover that by declaring his opus to be a “system of philosophy,” Rosenzweig seeks to present the Star as the fulfillment of the task of system whose discovery by the German Idealists he documented in his “Oldest System-Program.” As do the systems of German Idealism, we will see, the Star aims to articulate knowledge of the One and All as such and in their interconnection; it seeks to present the identity and difference of God, human being, and world. Yet Rosenzweig struggles against no form of philosophy more deliberately in the Star than against Absolute Idealism. This is due, in large part, to the development of Rosenzweig’s thinking about system in the few years between his “Oldest System-Program” and the writing of the Star. During this period, Rosenzweig arrives at a new formulation of system, a conception of system which purports to fulfill the task of philosophy discovered 66
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by German Idealism precisely by breaking out of the specific form system acquired in German Idealism. The goal of this chapter is to trace the contours of the new conception of system which Rosenzweig attains between 1916 and 1918, and to explain the corresponding critique of Idealism which accompanies this new conception of system. One may, I believe, formulate the transformation in the notion of system which Rosenzweig effects during these years as follows: if Absolute Idealism understands system to be the knowledge of the One and All that is possible solely from the standpoint of the Absolute, then Rosenzweig comes to deny to the philosopher the possibility of rising to such an Absolute standpoint as would transcend and at once encompass all finite perspectives within itself. Instead, he suggests that the relationship between the individual and the Absolute must be rethought in such a way as to show that the possibility of Absolute knowledge, and hence of the completeness and comprehensiveness of the system, finds its ground within the individual perspective of the philosopher herself, insofar as the philosopher grasps herself as both a “part” of the All and at the same time a “whole” human being. The significance of this change in the way the standpoint enabling systematic knowledge is understood and portrayed, and the ramifications of this change for how the philosopher must come to formulate the identity and difference of the One and All, can only become clear over the course of this chapter. The extent to which it is this change that leads Rosenzweig to construct a system of philosophy in the form of the Star of Redemption can only be evaluated in the chapters that follow. The period in which Rosenzweig’s new conception of system begins to take form commences with Rosenzweig’s intense six-month-long correspondence with Eugen Rosenstock, ushered in, in the early summer months of 1916, through Rosenstock’s reading of Rosenzweig’s “Oldest System-Program.”1 It reaches its zenith in a letter to Rudolf Ehrenberg on November 18, 1917, identified later as the “Urzelle” of the Star of Redemption, and in Rosenzweig’s explicit declaration and formulation of his new concept of system in a follow-up letter to the “Urzelle,” written to Rudolf Ehrenberg on December 1, 1917. The period concludes, finally, in August 1918, with Rosenzweig’s multiple announcements that he has begun to write his own “system,” the Star of Redemption itself. For we who are trying to reconstruct a picture of Rosenzweig’s conception of system from the years leading up to the writing of the Star, the period between the summer of 1916 and the summer of 1918 offers a collage of correspondence. Indeed, we will discover that Rosenzweig achieves a clear formulation of both his own conception of system and his critique of the Idealist form of system only 1
See Rosenstock to Rosenzweig, May 29, 1916, BT 1, p. 191: “Your paper, this masterpiece of textual illumination, has stirred me more than will appear necessary to you. But – it is all so totally present for me. I have you to thank for a clarification of the revolution 1789–1800 … and this while I finally believe to have taken the redeeming step into system … not as a follower of one of my colleagues from 1800, but nonetheless as one alive with -g, -l, -e [Schelling, Hegel, Fichte].”
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as a result of intense correspondence and cophilosophizing with several close friends and colleagues during these years. Yet despite the philosophical depth and incisiveness of Rosenzweig’s letters, and despite the fact that Rosenzweig’s mother teasingly designated Rosenzweig’s profession in these years to be that of “letterwriter,”2 we may not ignore the specific limitations inherent to the epistolar nature of our material in this chapter. Accordingly, a few words of apology regarding the methodological constraints of what follows might be permitted at this point. If Rosenzweig found himself faced, in his “Oldest System-Program,” with the task of explicating the oldest conception of system in German Idealism out of a mere two-page fragment, we find ourselves faced, in this chapter, with the task of explaining Rosenzweig’s arrival at a new conception of system out of a collection of letters, some personal and some formal, some thoughtful and some confused, written in different moods under different conditions to different correspondents. This incidental or occasional nature of letters has led me to make certain practical decisions and concessions regarding the presentation of material. First of all, I have abandoned a strictly chronological account of Rosenzweig’s thinking between the summer of 1916 and the summer of 1918 and have often presented the content of letters written later before those written earlier in this period. I begin, for example, with Rosenzweig’s letter to R. Ehrenberg from December 1, 1917; turn briefly to a letter to E. Rosenstock from September 1917; and only then turn back to Rosenzweig’s correspondence with Rosenstock from the previous year. I have allowed myself the liberty to do so because my aim in this chapter is not to offer a date-by-date chronology of Rosenzweig’s reflections on system from these two years leading up to the writing of the Star, but rather to provide as coherent and complete a picture as possible of Rosenzweig’s systematic thinking as it emerges from this period taken as a whole. Indeed, while one may certainly speak of a “development” in Rosenzweig’s thinking about system during these years, this development – at least insofar as it is represented in his letters – is not of a purely linear nature. Instead, ideas arise in and disappear from Rosenzweig’s discourse during these years, only to return later as part of an increasingly coherent, comprehensive, and consistent philosophical standpoint. Furthermore, just as Rosenzweig could only really explain the meaning of system embedded in the fragmentary text of his “Oldest System-Program” by relating it to the fully articulated attempts at system in German Idealism, I too must concede from the outset that we will only be able to confirm the interpretation of Rosenzweig’s conception of system given in this chapter when we turn to the Star itself. The letters we examine in this chapter offer vague articulations of Rosenzweig’s thoughts on system during these years, and I aim to shed light on these articulations without overinterpreting them, so as not to make them appear more clear or unambiguous than they are. At the same time, however, I hope to show that as preliminary as these 2
Gritli-Briefe, p. 472.
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meditations on system from Rosenzweig’s letters are, when taken together they do offer us a distinct representation of the One and All which, while not yet thought through rigorously in all its ramifications, nevertheless can be distinguished from the regnant form of system in German Idealism. I thus submit that clarifying both the critique of German Idealism and the articulation of a new concept of system that crystallize in Rosenzweig’s thinking during the period between his “Oldest SystemProgram” and the Star leads us a vital step closer to understanding the concept of system Rosenzweig had before his mind’s eye when he began writing the Star. We will turn first, by way of formal introduction, to Rosenzweig’s most concise formulation of his new concept of system, his letter to R. Ehrenberg of December 1, 1917. We turn first to this letter because it best introduces the specific web of questions surrounding system which occupies Rosenzweig during this period between his correspondence with Rosenstock and the commencement of his writing of the Star, and it best highlights the way Rosenzweig comes to define his own concept of system in contradistinction to the Idealist conception of system which we encountered in the previous chapter. As we shall see, the concept of system Rosenzweig tries to articulate in his letter of December 1917 remains in large part enigmatic, ambiguous. But its very ambiguity will help us to formulate specific questions about Rosenzweig’s new concept of system, questions whose answers we hope to find by piecing together some of the central themes which preoccupy Rosenzweig’s thought as a whole between 1916 and 1918.
I. The Path to a New System-Concept i.1. “System Is Not Architecture” Rosenzweig writes to Rudolf Ehrenberg on December 1, 1917, as follows: His [Weizsäcker’s] concept of system … is in fact just mine and Rosenstock’s as well. I formulate it as follows: System is not architecture, where the stones assemble the edifice and exist for the sake of the edifice (and otherwise for no reason); but rather system means that every individual has the drive and the will to relation to all other individuals; the “whole” lies beyond its conscious circle of vision; it sees only the chaos of the individuals into which it stretches out its feelers. [Whereas] in the Hegelian system every individual position is only anchored in the whole … now the question-mark of the “and” is thrown out in all directions. … But where then does the Absolute remain, which philosophy cannot do without? So Weizsäcker asks and I ask it too. I say: if the “whole” is no longer the content of the system, then it must be the form of the system; or said otherwise: the wholeness of the system is no longer objective, but rather subjective. … The philosopher is the form of philosophy. … And now I believe Weizsäcker too is on the path to the knowledge of subjectivity as the only objective framework of the system.3 3
BT 1, pp. 484–6.
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As we have traversed the path that leads Rosenzweig to the discovery of system as the task of philosophy in the “Oldest System-Program,” and have discovered thereby for ourselves the preconditions for this discovery of system, Rosenzweig’s reflections on system in this letter strike us as familiar and foreign at once. We recognize here the central elements of the concept of system which we encountered in the last chapter. System here continues to name the philosophical task of grasping the relation between the single all-encompassing whole of what is and the manifold particulars within it, between the “One and All.” Rosenzweig’s letter likewise reflects on what we now recognize as the Absolute Idealist conviction that true and certain knowledge of the One and All can only be attained if the philosopher overcomes the relativity of any one particular standpoint and grounds her knowledge of the One and All in a viewpoint that is Absolute. But the concept of system that Rosenzweig advocates in this letter at once flies in the face of the criteria for system which Rosenzweig illuminated for us in the “Oldest System-Program.” Rosenzweig openly opposes what we have learned to identify as the “architectural” presuppositions of system, he questions the manner in which Hegel’s system grounds the individual in the whole, and he seems to rule out the possibility of rising beyond the individual perspective to an Absolute standpoint. Rosenzweig tells us that he shares his conception of system not with Hegel or Schelling, but rather with two of his friends and colleagues: Eugen Rosenstock and Victor von Weizsäcker. At first glance, at least, this notion of system Rosenzweig shares with his friends seems to entail the very kind of standpoint philosophizing whose dubious scientific character and whose lack of awareness of its own systematic presuppositions Rosenzweig highlighted for us in his “Oldest SystemProgram,” or else some kind of Fichtean subjective systematic that articulates nothing of the world outside the subject. In order to make some initial sense of both Rosenzweig’s critique of the Idealist systems and the conception of system he appears to advocate in their stead, let us take a closer look at Rosenzweig’s own words. In doing so, we will first address the negative formulation Rosenzweig gives to his new system-concept and only afterward turn to the positive formulation. Rosenzweig opens his letter by formulating his new concept of system negatively. “System,” he claims, “is not architecture.” In the light of what Rosenzweig has taught us in the last chapter regarding the nature of systematic knowledge, we might rephrase Rosenzweig’s statement here as follows: the One and All of what is cannot be grasped in architectural form. The reason why the One and All cannot be grasped in architectural form, Rosenzweig proceeds to explain, is that the architectural model presents the multiplicity of particular beings within the All as nothing more than “stones [which] assemble the edifice and are there for the sake of the edifice.” The architectural model precludes true systematic knowledge, Rosenzweig suggests, because it loses sight of the unique difference inherent to particularity. Instead of presenting the One and All as such and in their interconnection, it reduces the multiplicity of the All to One single structure.
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The tenor of Rosenzweig’s negative formulation of his new concept of system here is familiar to us from the last chapter. Indeed, Rosenzweig’s claim that a certain formulation of the systematic project fails to grasp particularity and instead reduces all particulars to One recalls the very claim Jacobi and the German Idealists brought against Spinoza: that his exposition of the One and All as a single substance, whose necessary being determines the essence of all its particular modes, amounts to a reduction of all particularity, all freedom, even all divinity, to nothing.4 By identifying the reductive approach to system he seeks to overthrow as architecture, however, Rosenzweig overtly turns the Idealist critique of Spinoza against itself. For we recall that it was Kant whose “Architectonic of Pure Reason” posited the task of system in architectural terms, demonstrating that the possibility of grasping the One and All demanded that the philosopher grasp, from the beginning, “the idea of the whole,” “the unity of the end, to which all parts are related and in the idea of which they are also related to each other,” just as the architect must see the blueprint of an entire building before construction commences.5 And as we saw, it was the Absolute Idealism articulated in the works of Schelling and Hegel which sought to realize the possibility of such an architectural vision of the whole. Only the attainment of the Absolute standpoint permitted Hegel, as Rosenzweig claims here, to “anchor” “every individual position in the whole.” But in the letter before us, Rosenzweig accuses the Idealists of the same shortcomings that they in turn had attributed to Spinoza. Rosenzweig implies that the very Absolute, architectural perspective which purports to grasp the “whole” in its “conscious circle of vision” actually fails to grasp the particulars which make up the All as anything more than “stones that exist for the sake of the edifice.” Indeed, Rosenzweig’s emphasis on the material character of this architectural metaphor suggests that despite the Idealists’ intent to grasp subject and substance together in one systematic perspective, the Idealists in fact fail to transcend the “substantial” view of the One and All they aim to overcome. Where is the individual subject, Rosenzweig seems to ask, amid all this stone and mortar? Rosenzweig’s negative formulation of his concept of system thus defines this concept against the reigning concept of system in German Idealism. But Rosenzweig’s critique of Idealism here leaves us with important questions unanswered. We do not know, for example, why Rosenzweig now views the systems of Absolute Idealism as having failed to grasp the individual as anything more than a part that exists for the sake of the whole. We must assume, from Rosenzweig’s words, that he locates the Idealist failure to grasp particularity in the way Hegel ultimately finds the anchor for every given particular position “only in the whole.” And we can gather from Rosenzweig’s hints that he believes knowledge of the uniqueness 4 5
See Chapter 1, Section III. Immanuel Kant, CPR, A832/B860. See Chapter 1, Section IV.1.
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of particularity to have been lost somewhere in the German Idealist ascent from the particular to the Absolute perspective. We can clarify Rosenzweig critique of the concept of system in German Idealism as architecture if we turn our attention briefly to a letter Rosenzweig wrote to E. Rosenstock on September 18, 1917. In this letter, Rosenzweig criticizes the dialectical relationship Hegel establishes between part and whole within his system. “In Hegel’s system,” Rosenzweig claims, “the system-parts ‘develop’ themselves to the whole in it. … The Telos builds itself up out of the Teloses Telossen … and the drive of these part-Teloses to absoluteness exhausts itself in that they contribute to the construction [Aufbau] of the whole.”6 Rosenzweig’s focus in this letter to Rosenstock is directed upon the dialectical development of the Hegelian system, whereby every successive stage in the system must be shown to “exhaust itself ” in its drive to “absoluteness,” to negate itself as the ultimate truth, in order that the Absolute Spirit which pervades every stage come to realize itself completely. In the resultant systematic structure, Rosenzweig claims, the ultimate “Telos” of the whole, the ultimate end goal of the system, is attained at the expense of the plurality of ends within the system. Each individual end or purpose must come to recognize itself as no absolute end in itself, but rather as merely a step toward the ultimate end, as merely a “part” contributing “to the construction of the whole.” As a result of this sublation of particular ends within the whole, Rosenzweig’s letter to Rosenstock goes on to assert, “there emerges an edifice” in the Hegelian system, “but no kingdom of ends; each does not depend on all others, but rather all merely [hang] together in the whole.”7 Rosenzweig’s claim here is illuminating for us because it makes use of the same architectural metaphor to designate the faults of the Hegelian system that Rosenzweig will invoke two and a half months later in his letter to Ehrenberg of December 1, 1917. We learn here that Rosenzweig defines the Hegelian system as architecture, in which the “stones exist [solely] for the sake of the edifice,” because of the manner in which the particular parts of the Hegelian system are shown to negate their own particular ends in order to construct the whole of the system, and, if we may extrapolate, for the way in which every particular perspective in the system must reveal itself as yielding only partial truth, as forming one step on the path of the Absolute. The letter to Rosenstock of September 18, 1917, thus helps clarify the train of thought that leads Rosenzweig to diagnose the “edifice complex”8 of the Hegelian system in his letter to R. Ehrenberg of December 1917. No less significant for us than this diagnosis, moreover, is the model of system which Rosenzweig 6 7
8
Gritli-Briefe, pp. 36–7. Gritli-Briefe, p. 37. I have italicized here the passage that is underlined in the original letter and have set the passage that is twice underlined in boldface italic. See Mark Wigley’s use of this marvelous term in his study of the architectural metaphors that dominate Derrida’s project of deconstruction, The Architecture of Deconstruction: Derrida’s Haunt.
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juxtaposes against this architectural model in his letter to Rosenstock. Rosenzweig asserts, namely, that the Hegelian system is an edifice and not a “kingdom of ends.” “Kingdom of ends” is the term Kant used in his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals to name the ideal “union of various rational beings” wherein “all rational beings stand under the law that each of them is to treat himself and all others never merely as means, but always at the same time as ends in themselves.”9 Such a union, Kant claimed, allows us “to think of a whole of all ends in systematic connection.”10 What is remarkable about Rosenzweig’s use of Kantian terminology in this letter to Rosenstock is that by juxtaposing the Hegelian “architectural” system against what appears to be a notion of system as a “kingdom of ends,” Rosenzweig actually pits one systematic structure with Kantian roots against another. Indeed, both edifice and kingdom, both the idea of grasping the systematic whole through “the unity of the end, to which all parts are related and in the idea of which they are also related to each other,” and that of conceiving “of a whole of all ends in systematic connection,” were bequeathed by Kant to his systematically minded successors. For Kant himself, of course, it is the human being’s autonomy that grants him the unique character of being an end in itself within the world, but Rosenzweig here seems to suggest that all particular beings, all “system-parts,” be considered both as ends-in-themselves and at once as parts combining to form a systematic whole.11 Indeed, if the architectural model of system posits particulars as parts that must be grasped in relation to the end which unites them into a whole, then by pointing to the notion of a “kingdom of ends,” Rosenzweig would seem to oppose to this architectural model of system a demand for a system which grasps and articulates particular beings not merely as “means” to the common end of the whole, but rather as both means and ends in themselves, as both parts of the greater whole and individual wholes in themselves. What Rosenzweig envisions when he points to this possibility of a systematic whole formed by the totality of particulars which are at once means to the ultimate end of the whole and ends in themselves is as of yet unclear. We do not yet know what it means for each particular being within the One and All to be both part of the systematic whole and an individual whole in itself. But we can understand Rosenzweig’s allusion to the Kantian “kingdom of ends” as a way of pointing out what he believes is wrong with the systems of German Idealism. Rosenzweig 9
10 11
Immanuel Kant, “Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten,” Kants Werke IV: 433, translated as “Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals,” Practical Philosophy: The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, p. 83. Ibid. Rosenzweig even includes such entities as soul, language, and law in his list of such “system-parts” in his letter to Rosenstock of September 18, 1917, Gritli-Briefe, p. 37. On the instability of Rosenzweig’s distinction between the individual entity or thing and the individual human subject during these years, see note 14. The connection between Rosenzweig’s concept of revelation and the Kantian notion of autonomy will be discussed in Section II.2, devoted to the “Urzelle.”
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suggests, namely, that in their quest for system, the German Idealists were obliged to articulate the relationship between particular and whole in such a way that reveals the particular to be both its own end in itself and at one and the same time a part of the systematic whole. But according to Rosenzweig, the Idealists succeed merely in showing how particular beings form parts of the system and fail to grasp the inherent independence, the inherent difference, of every particular being in itself. If German Idealism has in fact failed to grasp the inherent difference of particularity, then a new conception of system is an urgent necessity for philosophy. For if, as we recall, system demands knowledge of the One and the All in their interconnection, if true systematic knowledge requires the philosophical unification of the conceptual identity common to all that is together with the actual unique difference of every particular being, then the systems of Idealism are not in fact “systems” at all in the truest or most technical sense. As audacious as such a claim seems to be, it is implied in the concise assertion with which Rosenzweig begins his letter to Ehrenberg of December 1917: “System is not architecture.” Rosenzweig does not say my system is not architecture; he does not wish merely to add a new notion of system to those already extant; rather Rosenzweig declares system itself not to be architecture. He thereby suggests that the true articulation of system as knowledge of the One and All has not in fact been realized in the architectural form that German Idealism gave to it. Such a bold assertion penned by the same writer who recognized the German Idealists themselves as responsible for the discovery of system as the proper task of philosophy demands more than a critique of German Idealism. It demands a positive formulation of the vision of system that Rosenzweig seeks to articulate in its stead. And just as Rosenzweig’s critique of Idealism focused on what he believed to be the reductive treatment of the individual within the Idealist system, so too his own positive meditations on system in his letter to Ehrenberg of December 1917 begin with the individual. “System,” Rosenzweig asserts, “means that every individual has the drive and will to relation to all other individuals; the ‘whole’ lies beyond its conscious circle of vision.” Rosenzweig’s initial positive formulation of his concept of system here sets a puzzling image before us. At first glance, the representation of the individual Rosenzweig presents seems anything but systematic; Rosenzweig’s description seems antisystematic, antitotalistic, indeed relativistic. After all, this individual is not grounded in the whole; it is certainly not a part that exists solely for the sake of the whole. Rather, this individual simply stands there in relation to other individuals. Before we conclude hastily, however, that Rosenzweig’s account removes all that is systematic from its so-called system, we must pay careful attention to Rosenzweig’s wording here. The individual, Rosenzweig asserts, has the will and drive to relate himself to all other individuals, and although the “whole” lies beyond the individual’s “circle of vision,” it is nonetheless present, beyond the individual,
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in Rosenzweig’s account. Indeed, Rosenzweig’s account of system seems so puzzling, at first, because Rosenzweig does not seem to decide between the individual and the whole. He preserves the individual’s particularity, pointing to its multidirectional relations to all other individuals; he does not simply anchor it in the single all-encompassing whole, as he accuses Hegel of doing. At the same time he preserves the whole beyond the individual, unseen by the individual and yet, strangely enough, still posited by Rosenzweig himself. Rosenzweig’s lip service to the “whole,” however, cannot of course be accepted as an adequate substitute for the kind of comprehensive account of the interconnection of the individual and the whole that would amount to systematic knowledge. Indeed, Rosenzweig’s description of the individual, standing within the whole and yet unable to see the whole, seems to preclude such knowledge. It suggests that every particular individual can only see part of the whole, a part whose truth must be determined in relation to the respective views of the whole seen by all other individuals. If this is the case, however, Rosenzweig has merely traded one systematic failing for another. He has saved the particular perspective that he claims has been lost in German Idealism by giving up the very Absolute perspective which first appeared to grant the Idealists knowledge of the One and All, by leading them beyond the limitations of finite, relative human knowing. Rosenzweig in fact acknowledges that the portrait of system which he has sketched thus far in his letter to Ehrenberg yields only “a philosophical relativity principle.” It is precisely in the light of the inadmissibility of such a principle as the ground for a philosophical system that Rosenzweig’s letter continues, “But where then does the Absolute remain, which philosophy cannot do without?” Even before we turn to Rosenzweig’s answer to his own question, here, we must appreciate what Rosenzweig’s question itself confirms for us about his enduring agreement with German Idealism over the fundamental requirements of system, an agreement that remains intact even as Rosenzweig sharply opposes the specific form system takes on in German Idealism. Rosenzweig, namely, acknowledges the need to demonstrate that his new conception of system preserves the very absolute character of knowledge which he seems to neglect in his initial portrait of the relationship between the individual and the whole. And while Rosenzweig may criticize the manner in which German Idealism loses the perspective of the individual in its rise to an Absolute perspective, he at one and the same time accepts the German Idealist determination that systematic knowledge of the One and the All demands some kind of absolute grounding. He accepts the German Idealist conclusion that only an Absolute perspective grants true knowledge of the whole. How then does Rosenzweig hope to preserve the perspectives of both particular and Absolute, individual and whole, at one and the same time? Rosenzweig’s answer is as follows: “I say: if the ‘whole’ is no longer the content of the system, then it must be the form of the system; or said otherwise: the wholeness of the
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system is no longer objective, but rather subjective. … The philosopher is the form of philosophy. … Subjectivity [is] the only objective framework of the system.” Rosenzweig’s solution here to the problem of how to preserve the identity and difference of individual and whole within his new concept of system flirts with obscurity. But if we consider it together with Rosenzweig’s negative formulation of system as “not architecture,” we may be able to clarify Rosenzweig’s meaning somewhat. Rosenzweig intends to assert, I propose, that while he rejects the possibility of grasping the whole as a kind of objective “content” which reduces being to an edifice, he still sees the possibility of attaining the comprehensiveness and certainty of Absolute systematic knowledge within the whole of the philosopher’s own subjectivity. We notice that Rosenzweig is careful not to present this subjective wholeness of the system as “merely” subjective, as relativistic, as denying knowledge of the world outside the subject, or as a philosophy of the personal standpoint. Indeed, according to Rosenzweig, subjectivity is precisely the “objective framework of the system”; the philosopher has “the Absolute,” and he has the “wholeness of the system” within himself. Rosenzweig thus does not abandon the Absolute, the whole, or objectivity in his new concept of system, but rather, he locates the Absolute, the whole, and the objective within the philosopher himself. Despite the periodic obscurity of Rosenzweig’s letter to Ehrenberg of December 1917, we may conclude, Rosenzweig’s different formulations of his new concept of system, when taken together, do present a picture of the relationship between the individual and the whole, and hence of the One and the All, which we can distinguish from that of German Idealism.12 In German Idealism, according to Rosenzweig, the meaning of every particular is only determined by grasping its place within the whole, by showing the way each particular being sublates its own particular end in order to contribute to the construction of the whole. Grasping the place of every particular within the whole demanded of the German Idealist philosopher, in turn, that he rise above his own particular perspective to trace the movement of the One and All from the standpoint of the Absolute. Rosenzweig offers a different account of the relationship between the particular and the whole. According to him, the individual stands somehow within the whole, but instead of being “anchored only in the whole,” the individual is driven into relations with all other particulars. As such, the individual cannot grasp the whole that is “beyond its conscious circle of vision.” There is no Absolute perspective from 12
Moshe Schwarz also sees in this letter one of the keys to answering the question of “how the two impulses, so opposed to one another, of the form of systematic philosophy, which demands of itself knowledge of the ‘All,’ on the one hand, and the form of subjective, individualistic philosophizing, on the other, are reconciled in the world of Rosenzweig,” [ ממיתוס להתגלותFrom Myth to Revelation], pp. 221–2. Schwarz answers the question by pointing to the relationship of Rosenzweig’s thinking to Schelling’s Weltalter. Elliot R. Wolfson has recently offered an interpretation of this letter in his Language, Eros, Being, pp. 88–9, where he notes Rosenzweig’s “wish to preserve a viable notion of system that will not be subject to his own criticism of the totalizing and essentializing tendencies inherent to Idealist philosophy.”
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whose standpoint the individual can watch the whole system unfold. At the same time, Rosenzweig claims, the individual is an end in itself, the individual has “the ‘whole’ ” within himself, and the possibility of an absolute grounding of knowledge is somehow wrapped up in this individual wholeness. In Rosenzweig’s announcement of his new concept of system in his letter of December 1, 1917, we thus catch a glimpse of a system in which at one and the same time the individual stands within the whole, and the whole stands within the individual. And yet, we must concede, such a “concept of system” raises more questions for us than it answers. We must ask: What is the relationship between the individual who stands within the whole, who is driven into relation to all others, and the individual who has the whole within itself? Are they one and the same or are they different? Conversely, we ask, what is the relation between the systematic whole within which the individual enters into relations with others but which itself stands beyond the individual’s field of vision and the systematic whole within the individual? Are they somehow one and the same, or are they different? Finally, we must ask: even if we grant the possibility of grasping the individual as some kind of whole, for example, as an end in itself, what could Rosenzweig mean when he suggests that the philosopher can actually find the Absolute within his own personal individualized whole? Our first encounter with Rosenzweig’s own “concept of system” from his letter to R. Ehrenberg of December 1917 thus leaves us with many crucial questions unanswered. With these questions in mind, we now turn to seek out answers as we survey the crystallization of Rosenzweig’s concept of system during the period which begins with his correspondence with Rosenstock in 1916 and ends with the writing of the first words of the Star in 1918. Rosenzweig’s letters to Rosenstock and to Rudolf Ehrenberg of late 1917 have helped us determine Rosenzweig’s critique of the systems of German Idealism as a critique of the failure of German Idealism to grasp particularity as such within its Absolute systematic framework. We have learned, furthermore, that giving a positive account of the systematic perspective that Rosenzweig attains in these years, and which he apparently shares with Rosenstock and Weizsäcker, will demand that we follow Rosenzweig’s own development of a new articulation of the relation between individual and whole between 1916 and 1918. For Rosenzweig suggests that this new articulation alone makes possible a concept of system which grasps the identity and difference of the One and the All in a manner that at once transcends the limitations of German Idealism and yet fulfills the very task of system which the German Idealists first discovered.
i.2 System as Dialogue of Absolute Monologues Rosenzweig in fact first explores the idea that the individual has the “system of philosophy” within herself during his correspondence with Rosenstock from the
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year before. On November 11, 1916, Rosenzweig attempts to explain to Rosenstock “how my method [Verfahren] presents itself to me.” He proceeds as follows: I believe there are in the life of every living thing [alles Lebendigen] moments, or rather only one moment, when it speaks the truth. One thus perhaps need not say anything about the living, but rather one must only wait for the moment when it expresses itself. The dialogue which these monologues form among each other … I consider the whole truth. (That they make a dialogue with each other is the great world-secret that is manifest, revealed, indeed the content of revelation [das offenbare, offenbarte, ja der Inhalt der Offenbarung]. … The monologues are in the most actual sense: self-confessions; and just these most private words [Stillstenkämmerleinworte] prove themselves to be the parliamentary speeches of the “great day” of world history …). … So – now you will know why I think in individuals (I prefer to say: in human beings) and not in branches. That each one of these human beings is the whole, this fundamental truth I have just rediscovered for myself in a surprising way from the side, that the whole, … the system of philosophy, is nowhere other than in them, insofar as they at once speak absolute monologue and nevertheless the dialogue.13
Rosenzweig’s reflections on the relationship between the individual and the whole in this letter anticipate by over a year the central features of the “concept of system” that he works out in his letter to R. Ehrenberg which we examined earlier. Here we already have before us the idea that the individual both stands within the ultimate whole and at the same time contains the whole, the “system of philosophy,” within itself. Moreover, Rosenzweig’s rhapsodic articulation of the relationship between these two wholes in the letter sheds light on the questions we have asked regarding that positive formulation of Rosenzweig’s new concept of system we encountered previously. Let us examine Rosenzweig’s statements carefully. According to Rosenzweig, every individual – this individual is designated as a “living thing” in the beginning of the passage, later as “individual,” and finally simply as “human being”14 – speaks the truth at one time in its life. The form Rosenzweig assigns to this speaking of the truth is that of the monologue, a form 13 14
BT 1, pp. 292–3. Rosenzweig’s slippage between these terms for the individual poses a significant difficulty for the interpreter. In fact, Rosenzweig repeats this kind of sliding between what he would later distinguish as “human being” and “world” again and again during these years. As late as the “Urzelle,” Rosenzweig notes that his “terminology is still quite unstable,” and regarding the notation B = B, which will stand exclusively for the human self in the Star, Rosenzweig writes, after having read over the text of the “Urzelle” himself, “From a certain point on, B = B means exclusively human beings: during the relatively very awkward development it still means also the translogical actuality, the transpersonal Godhead,” GS 3, p. 138, translated in Franz Rosenzweig, Philosophical and Theological Writings, p. 70. The difficulty that is reflected in this slippage is twofold. On the one hand, according to Rosenzweig it is revelation and the response to revelation which first make the human being what she is, and therefore it is unclear what one should call her – and it is unclear how she is different from other entities in the world – before revelation. On the other hand, in the Star Rosenzweig will assert that it is the fate of every living thing to be the recipient of divine love at some time. Thus the distinction between human being and world, I might suggest, is a historical distinction, a
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of speaking that is inherently self-enclosed and self-sufficient. Indeed, the speaker of a monologue has no interlocutor with whom she shares the stage; she depends on no other speaker to complete or complement what she has to say; rather the monologue forms a whole in itself. Rosenzweig highlights this self-sufficiency of the monologue at the end of the letter by designating the truth that the individual speaks as an “absolute monologue.” To claim that such a monologic expression of the truth is “absolute,” one might suggest, is to claim that the truth spoken by the individual does not depend on the relations in which it may stand to those who hear it, or to the whole of spoken truths, but rather, the “absolute monologue” is true in and of itself. It is true in itself, Rosenzweig implies, simply because it is no more than a “self-confession”: it is the moment in which the individual articulates that self which is uniquely her own, which can be articulated by no one else. Nonetheless, according to Rosenzweig this absolute yet uniquely individual truth spoken as an isolated monologue forms, at one and the same time, part of a dialogue. Nor is the entry into dialogue inconsequential for what has been identified as the independent truth-content of the monologues. On the contrary, in spite of the absoluteness of the independent truths spoken in monologue, only the dialogue among all monologues amounts to “the whole truth.” In this account of the relationship between the totality of all monologues and the dialogue they form, Rosenzweig thus highlights the necessity of grasping the particular beings that form the totality of All that is both as independent individual wholes, and at the same time as parts of, or as participants in, that ultimate whole. In being parts of this ultimate whole, in speaking parts of the dialogue that constitutes the whole truth, these particulars somehow do not lose their independent character of being individual wholes in themselves; but neither does their being wholes in themselves prevent them from forming part of the whole. Such a formulation of the relationship between individual and whole hints at the very two-sided model of system that Rosenzweig came to formulate in late 1917. Rosenzweig’s use of the term “absolute monologue,” furthermore, seems to offer us a clue as to how we are to understand his later claim, in his letter of December 1, 1917, that “the Absolute which philosophy cannot do without” is to be found within the philosopher herself. In that letter, we found that Rosenzweig denies to the philosopher the possibility of rising above her own perspective as a human individual to the standpoint of the Absolute, to the standpoint of that single unconditioned divine being whose primordial “setting up a world over against itself ” makes possible all subjectivity and substantiality. Here Rosenzweig proposes that in the individual’s monologic self-confession, the individual articulates a truth whose unconditionedness, completeness, and independence are actually comparable, on the individual scale, to the unconditionedness, completeness, and independence of the Absolute distinction that will be dissolved when all living things have received revelation, at the redemptive end of time.
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upon which all individuals depend. The philosopher may not be able to attain the Absolute perspective, but she can grasp the absolute character of the truth of her own self-confession, and she can “wait” and listen for the moments when other individuals articulate their own absolute self-confessions. Does this individual yet whole, absolute articulation of truth describe that individual yet whole philosophical standpoint that makes Rosenzweig’s new concept of system tenable? When one recalls how Rosenzweig came to identify the philosopher herself as “the form of philosophy,” in his December 1917 letter to R. Ehrenberg, one is tempted to answer in the affirmative. But at the end of this 1916 letter to Rosenstock, we notice, Rosenzweig does not claim that it is the expression of absolute monologue alone which grants the individual the possibility of system within herself, but rather, the “whole,” the “system of philosophy,” is present in each individual, according to Rosenzweig, “insofar as they at once speak absolute monologue and nevertheless the dialogue.” Rosenzweig implies, therefore, that the individual human being is curiously not “the whole” insofar as she is an isolated whole speaking an absolute monologue. She is the whole, strangely enough, only insofar as she is both whole and part, insofar as she speaks both absolute monologue and part of the dialogue. Just as he did in his letter to Ehrenberg, Rosenzweig presents us here with two images of the human being – as particular within the whole, and as whole particular. But in this letter to Rosenstock, Rosenzweig explicitly defines the wholeness that amounts to system as a wholeness that grasps within itself the human being both as part of the ultimate whole and as whole in herself. If we now return to reexamine Rosenzweig’s letter to Ehrenberg of December 1917 in the light of what we have learned from this letter to Rosenstock of November 1916, we discern that it is the same individual who has the whole within itself and who at once stands within the ultimate whole. And we may assert Rosenzweig’s conviction to be that only because the individual is both part of the ultimate systematic whole and at once a whole in herself is it possible for her to unite both sides of her person in a systematic perspective that is “more” whole than either whole or part. It is unclear what we are to understand by this “whole” perspective that is somehow “more” whole than the whole individual articulated in absolute monologue. But Rosenzweig’s entire presentation of his new concept of system thus far does seem to depend on precisely such a “whole” perspective that joins the human being as whole and part. For if Rosenzweig did not allow for this kind of third position, we would have to ask how Rosenzweig himself could present both perspectives together, that is, how Rosenzweig could somehow see and present the human being both as a particular within the whole, on the one hand, and as a whole in herself on the other, as he does both in his letter to Rosenstock of November 1916 and in his letter to R. Ehrenberg of December 1917. Thus the perspective of the “whole human being” who grasps herself as both whole in herself and part of the ultimate whole, and who thereby hears the self-confessions of others as both whole monologues and parts of the dialogue, would seem to be Rosenzweig’s own
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philosophical perspective. Yet the very suggestion that in order to grasp how the human being is both whole and part, one needs somehow to view both aspects of the human being from a higher, more whole perspective would appear highly problematic for Rosenzweig, for such a suggestion points to the same kind of dialectical sublation of particular perspectives whose culmination in an Absolute standpoint Rosenzweig seeks to avoid. How then, one may ask, are we to grasp such a third standpoint which at once grasps the identity of the human being as whole and the human being as part but nonetheless does not rise above the human being’s own perspective in a quixotic pursuit of divine knowledge? It cannot be coincidental, in this regard, that just as Rosenzweig seems to point to three different human standpoints in his letter to Rosenstock of November 11, 1916, he likewise points there to three different forms of truth. He begins by describing “the truth” [“die Wahrheit”] that he believes is spoken by all living beings at one time in their lives. This truth, we have come to understand, is the truth of absolute monologue, of the self-confession of the individual that forms a self-enclosed whole within itself. Rosenzweig then points to “the whole truth” [“die ganze Wahrheit”] that emerges only in the dialogue that takes place between all monologues. Beyond these two initial forms of truth, however, Rosenzweig’s letter makes mention of another truth. Rosenzweig notes his own surprise at his “rediscovery” of the “fundamental truth” [“diese Grundwahrheit”] that “the whole, … the system of philosophy, is nowhere other than in [the individual human beings], insofar as they at once speak absolute monologue and the dialogue.” Rosenzweig intimates, thereby, that beyond the truth of the individual as absolute, as whole in itself, and distinguished from the single whole truth formed by bringing these individual truths together, there stands the fundamental truth of Rosenzweig’s own standpoint, that standpoint which grasps the systematic truth of the “whole” individual insofar as it combines the absolute expression of individual truth and the partial expression of the whole truth. This standpoint alone, I have argued, is the standpoint of Rosenzweig’s systematic thinking. According to Rosenzweig, the fundamental truth that corresponds to Rosenzweig’s own perspective is a truth that he has “rediscovered.” A rediscovery implies, of course, an original discovery, and the source of this original discovery is spelled out at the beginning of the passage that we have examined here. The fact that the human being is both whole and part, Rosenzweig suggests there, the fact that the absolute monologues of individual human beings at once “form a dialogue with each other is the great world-secret … indeed the content of revelation.” Rosenzweig here defines the “content of revelation” in striking terms: revelation reveals the fact that the individual human being is both a whole in himself and a part of the ultimate whole, that truth itself is both radically particular for each individual being and at once the ultimate united expression of all.15 But if this is 15
Cf., Ulrich Bieberich, Wenn die Geschichte göttlich wäre: Rosenzweigs Auseinandersetzung mit Hegel, p. 68. Bieberich also explores several additional letters to Rosenstock in 1916 in which Rosenzweig discusses the subject of system, see pp. 59–74.
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the case, then we must conclude that the content of revelation is none other than the fundamental truth that truth is systematic. For systematic knowledge, we have noted time and again, is precisely the knowledge that unites the identity that is common to all that is (i.e., the dialogue) together with the unique difference of every particular being (absolute monologue); it is the knowledge of what is both as One (the whole truth) and as a totality of unique and independent particulars (“every living thing speaks the truth”), that is, as All. And Rosenzweig asserts here that it is revelation itself that teaches the unification, the togetherness of One and All; it is revelation that reveals the “whole, … the system of philosophy” which brings together the human being as part of the singular whole and as absolute individual. Revelation – and not the Absolute standpoint! – is the key to systematic knowledge of the One and All. We do not know as of yet what to make of Rosenzweig’s extraordinary suggestion about system and revelation. As the title of S. Mosès’s classic work on Rosenzweig is meant to imply, at first glance no two terms seem to be further from each other than system and revelation. For if the claim that truth must be grasped as system implies that truth can only be grasped by rigorously thinking through the interconnection of the identity and difference of all that is, revelation, whatever its specific form, certainly seems to imply a reception of knowledge or inspiration that is immediate, that requires no discursive elaboration. Mosès asserts that the “fundamental question around which all of Rosenzweig’s thought must be understood” is whether it is “possible to go beyond this duality of the System and the Revelation? Or again: is it possible to think them together, in a movement that succeeds in articulating each one on the other while preserving their differences?”16 While Mosès’s formulation of Rosenzweig’s philosophical project as an attempt to think system and revelation together is surely correct, what is remarkable about the letter of November 11, 1916 is that here Rosenzweig does not take as his starting point the duality, or the opposition of system and revelation, but rather he begins by positing their identity! Rosenzweig begins by asserting that the “content of revelation,” the “what” which revelation reveals to the human being, is the “fundamental truth” of the “system of philosophy” itself and thereby suggests that it is revelation which grants the human being the possibility of philosophizing from a systematic standpoint wherein she may understand herself at once as a whole individual and as part of the ultimate whole without rising beyond the limits of the human perspective. Exactly how revelation reveals system, how the notion of revelation makes it possible for Rosenzweig to carve out a philosophical standpoint that unites the human being’s whole individuality and her role as part of the world, will only begin to become clear for us when we turn to the “Urzelle” of the Star in the second half of this chapter. The “Urzelle” will claim that the unification of the 16
Stéphane Mosès, System and Revelation: The Philosophy of Franz Rosenzweig, p. 37.
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human being as whole and the human being as part can only be understood as the consequence of each’s prior relationship to the divine, to the Absolute. And the “Urzelle” will depict, furthermore, how the same experience of revelation which awakens the human being as a whole individual at once points her toward the future unification of the “One and All,” a “One and All” whose realization the whole individual has the choice to become “part” of, through acts of neighborly love. Our study of Rosenzweig’s early attempts to articulate the One and All from a human perspective has left many questions unanswered, but it has nevertheless delineated for us some basic features of his concept of system during the years 1916–1917. In place of an Absolute standpoint which reduces the multiplicity of the All to parts of the One ultimate whole, Rosenzweig posits an individual human systematic standpoint which recognizes both the wholeness of the individual and the way in which that individual nonetheless becomes part of the ultimate whole through its relations with others. Such a systematic standpoint is made possible – in a manner which we have yet to grasp fully – not through a rise to the Absolute, but rather through the acceptance of revelation, whose content is none other than the systematicity of all that is. As Rosenzweig engages ever more intently in the development of his systematic standpoint in the fall of 1917, he does not cease to define that systematic standpoint against the very German Idealists who first discovered system as the task of philosophy. But his reflections on system in the months leading up to the “Urzelle” appear to turn away from such metaphysical questions as those regarding the relations between the One and the All, or system and revelation, and turn toward basic structural and methodological questions related to system. It is on the basis of these questions of method and structure that Rosenzweig enters into what seems to have been a three-way exchange with Eugen Rosenstock and Viktor von Weizsäcker in the fall and winter of 1917–1918 devoted to the question of the possibility of scientific unity. In the section that follows, I aim to show that Rosenzweig’s discussion with Weizsäcker and Rosenstock regarding scientific unity played an integral role in enabling him to articulate his systematic standpoint as he did in the “Urzelle” to the Star of Redemption.
i.3 Rosenzweig, Rosenstock, Weizsäcker, and the “Coitus of Two Sciences” At first glance, it is far from self-evident what questions of scientific method have to do with those reflections on the unifying relations between human being as whole individual and human being as part of the ultimate whole which we have identified as central to Rosenzweig’s conception of system during this period. The intrinsic link between questions of system and questions of science only becomes clear when we recall the Kantian architectonic formulation of philosophy that first defined the task of system for German Idealism. Kant’s “Architectonic of Pure
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Reason” defined science as systematic knowledge, determining system to be “the unity of the manifold cognitions under one idea” “which first makes ordinary cognition into science,”17 and Kant thereby asserted that every individual science must have the same “One-and-All” structure, on the individual scale, which we have determined to be the basic structure of the ultimate whole of being grasped in the system of philosophy.18 As we have repeatedly noted throughout the last two chapters, Kant grounded the unity of system or science in the a priori idea of the end of that system or science as a whole, in the “unity of the end, to which all parts are related and in the idea of which they are also related to each other.”19 Insofar as Rosenzweig came to see this architectural structure of system or science as entailing a reduction of the particulars within system to mere “parts,” he came to reject architecture as a model not only for system in the highest sense, but for all science in general as well. Instead, Rosenzweig began to experiment in his letters with a scientific structure that would allow him to preserve the twofold perspective of individual entities while nevertheless pointing toward the possibility of unifying these two perspectives through relation. It is in the rejection of the architectural model for the unity of science, and in the advocacy of an alternative model built out of the connection between two independent scientific perspectives, that Rosenzweig shares a common intellectual quest with Rosenstock and Weizsäcker. It was Rosenstock who first expressed the conviction to Rosenzweig, during their correspondence of 1916, that science must be grasped not as an absolute selfgrounded unity of knowledge, but rather as the connection between two different scientific perspectives on the same entities. Rosenstock began his answer to a question Rosenzweig posed to him regarding the relationship between nature and revelation by claiming that “nature and revelation [are] the same material, the reverse exposure to light [Belichtung].”20 He implied thereby that in order to grasp that which is “exposed” in both nature and revelation, one had to adopt a scientific standpoint that combined two standpoints. These two standpoints, according to Rosenstock, were embodied in the two different methodologies of thought and speech, of understanding and language. Rosenstock proposed a scientific fusion of the understanding and language as an antidote to what he saw as the “senseless sharpening of the autonomy of thought” in philosophy, asserting that “such autonomous knowing … is ‘measureless’ … without a ‘give me (a place) where I can stand.’ ”21 Rosenstock’s Archimedean reference was meant to insinuate that
17 18
19 20 21
CPR, A832/B860. See CPR, A834/B862: “sciences … must not be explained and determined in accordance with the description given by their founder, but rather in accordance with the idea, grounded in reason itself, of the natural unity of the parts that have been brought together.” CPR, A832/B860. E. Rosenstock to F. Rosenzweig, October 28, 1916, BT 1, p. 276. Ibid. The Greek mathematician Archimedes is reported to have boasted, “Give me a place to stand and I will move the earth”; see Pappus of Alexandria, Mathematical Collection, Bk. VIII. Franks and
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philosophy’s attempt to attain certainty by grounding thinking autonomously in itself had ironically left philosophy floating in the air, with no secure grounding in reality for what it purported to know. Just as the human being “walks best on two legs,”22 Rosenstock asserted, knowledge of the real identity of nature and revelation requires a dual grounding which it finds in the interconnection of thought and speech, “because thought and speech constitute a continuous mutual relation of giving and taking … since both are a unified gift to the human race.” In fact, according to Rosenstock, “the fact of science bears witness” not to the “autonomy of thought,” but rather, “only to a certain autonomy of the married pair, language and understanding.”23 In the fall of 1917, as Rosenzweig continued to reflect on the necessity of grounding system within a human standpoint, he himself began to consider the very twopoled structure of science about which Rosenstock had written to him the year before. As we have seen, Rosenzweig sought to formulate his systematic standpoint as quintessentially human in order to grasp the independent wholeness of the individual which Absolute Idealism had neglected, and this human standpoint demanded that the human being as whole individual and the human being as part of the ultimate whole be grasped somehow in their mutual identity and difference. It was in the course of this quest to grasp system through the unity of the human being’s twofold identity, it would appear, that Rosenzweig himself was drawn back to the idea of a two-poled notion of science. But Rosenzweig’s initial comments on the subject betray no broad metaphysical agenda; they are, instead, reflections on the systematic structure of science alone. “The double-poled nature of science goes so far,” Rosenzweig asserts categorically to Rosenstock, on September 2, 1917, “that every scientific stream springs out of a coitus of two sciences. … Of all the sciences, only philosophy has to do with itself … at least it must convince itself of this.”24 And on October 18, 1917, he reiterates his agreement with Rosenstock: “To your doctrine of science [Wissenschaftslehre] belongs the following old hat from me: all scientific originality (…) rests on the unification of two viewpoints, ways of seeing, directions of research, methods, into one work. … In science too there is no Parthenogenese [virgin birth].”25 Rosenzweig’s comments here to the effect that science can only produce knowledge insofar as it brings two sciences into some kind of intimate unification appear to play on a statement of Francis Ba