FROM OPPOSITION TO POWER
FROM OPPOSITION TO POWER
Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party Shelley Rigger
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FROM OPPOSITION TO POWER
FROM OPPOSITION TO POWER
Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party Shelley Rigger
b o u l d e r l o n d o n
To David and Emma
Published in the United States of America in 2001 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 www.rienner.com and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU © 2001 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Rigger, Shelley, 1962– From opposition to power : Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party / Shelley Rigger. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-55587-969-1 (hc : alk. paper) 1. Min jin dang (China) 2. Taiwan—Politics and government—1945– I. Title. JQ1539.A56 R53 2001 324.25124'906—dc21 00-068840 British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library. Printed and bound in the United States of America
∞
The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1984. 5 4 3 2 1
Contents List of Tables and Figures Acknowledgments
vi vii
1 Introduction
1
2 A Brief History of the Democratic Progressive Party
15
3 Roadblocks on the DPP’s Path to Power
37
4 Organization
55
5 Factionalism
71
6 Decisionmaking
91
7 Platform, Policy, and Strategy
119
8 How the Public Views the DPP
155
9 Breakthrough to Power: The March 18, 2000, Presidential Election
173
10 The DPP Enters the Twenty-first Century
205
Appendix: Rising Stars in the Young Generation Selected Bibliography Index About the Book
221 227 228 232
v
Tables and Figures
TABLES 2.1 3.1 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.6 8.7 8.8 9.1 9.2
Factional Composition of DPP Leadership Seat Bonuses in Legislative Yuan Elections Popular Perceptions of the KMT Popular Perceptions of the DPP Parties’ Most Prominent Qualities Which Party Is More Capable of Performing These Policy Tasks? The Influence of Demographic Factors on Party Voting in the 1995 Legislative Election National Identity and Party Identification in the 1995 Legislative Election Characteristics of DPP Supporters, 1991–1996 DPP Vote Shares by Region and Municipality Presidential Election Results by Region and Municipality DPP Vote Shares in Executive Elections by Region and Municipality
26 45 161 161 162 163 164 165 166 168 195 196
FIGURES 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 6.1 6.2 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 9.1
Ideal Versus Poor Performance in SVMM Elections Party Performance in the 1989 Legislative Yuan Election Party Performance in the 1992 Legislative Yuan Election Party Performance in the 1995 Legislative Yuan Election DPP Decisionmaking on Policy Matters DPP Decisionmaking on Personnel Matters Party Preferences Party Antipathy Party Image Dangwai/DPP Vote Share, 1980–2000 Presidential Candidates’ Poll Standings, October 1999– March 2000
vi
46 47 48 49 93 93 157 159 160 169 175
Acknowledgments This book was made possible by the generous (and foresighted) encouragement and financial support of the Smith Richardson Foundation. The kind cooperation of many Democratic Progressive Party members also was indispensable. I especially wish to thank Chen Chu and the late Li Tsung-fan, who first opened the DPP’s doors to me many years ago, and the many DPP legislators, party staffers, and grassroots activists who submitted to lengthy interviews for this project. As always, my southern Taiwan contacts—Mr. and Mrs. Wang Sheng-hung, Chen Yan-chiou, and Huang Tsung-hsiung (Hsiao Lung)— provided hospitality and down-home political wisdom. Thanks also to those who read and commented on the book’s first incarnation at www.dpp2000.com, especially James A. Robinson and Nathan Batto, and to Joachim Ghislain, who designed the website. Jesse Lan (Lan Yu-chen) provided unsurpassed research assistance throughout this project. I cannot thank him enough. Research for this book included in-depth interviews with DPP activists, legislators, and staff members, as well as journalists, non-DPP politicians, and scholars. The interviews were conducted in June and July 1999 and March 2000.
vii
1
Introduction
On March 18, 2000, Taiwanese gathered around their televisions and radios to listen to a historic speech. For the first time, an oppositionparty candidate was about to accept victory in a presidential election. In solemn tones, president-elect Chen Shui-bian began, “The election results for the 10th Presidential and Vice Presidential election of the Republic of China have been declared. The Democratic Progressive Party candidates, Chen Shui-bian and Annette Lu, have been elected.” He continued, “This moment is a dignified and sacred one in the history of Taiwan—because the courageous people of Taiwan, with love and hope, have conquered fear and darkness.” Later in the speech he added, “This election is not only the pride of the people of Taiwan, but it is also the pride of Chinese all over the world. We share the same bloodlines and culture. We hope that through more intimate exchange and interaction, with patience and respect, we can collectively create a harmonized and joyous new era.” Chen concluded, “May the heavens bless the people and may the heavens bless Taiwan—our motherland forever.”1 In these few words, Chen summarized his homeland’s tortuous past, complex present, and contested future. He called his land the Republic of China and he called it Taiwan. He spoke of love and hope— and of fear and darkness. And he pointed to a fundamental paradox: his people are Chinese by ancestry and culture, but their motherland is Taiwan. Listening to Chen’s speech, one could feel the enormous weight of Taiwan’s unique and complicated history. Chen also took note of the historic nature of this election: for the first time, the people of Taiwan had chosen a leader from outside the ranks of the island’s traditional ruling party, the Kuomintang (KMT). The decision to place executive authority in the hands of a Democratic
1
2
From Opposition to Power
Progressive Party (DPP) politician was a milestone on Taiwan’s long journey to democratization. Outside Taiwan the election result came as a shock; few foreign observers expected the DPP to win national office so soon (nor did many Taiwanese, for that matter). Given its long tenure in office and its vigorous efforts to reach out to foreigners, the KMT was a familiar presence to scholars, journalists, and policymakers. The DPP, in contrast, was a new, largely unknown player on Taiwan’s political stage. Most foreign observers focused on the DPP’s weaknesses—its pro-independence views and internal factionalism. For months after the election, citizens, scholars, and policymakers in the West debated fundamental questions about the new government: What was its connection to the DPP? What positions would it take? Which of the DPP’s many political celebrities would wield significant influence over the new president? Helping Western readers understand the Democratic Progressive Party—its history, organization, and ideology—is the goal of this book. The book argues that although the DPP’s highly democratic ideology and organization promote debate and dissention within the party, this is as much a strength as a weakness. It traces the party’s political factions to Taiwan’s institutional environment, and suggests that they play a negotiating role that reduces open conflict and helps hold the diverse political elements within the party together. The book also looks in depth at the DPP’s positions on issues, and concludes that it is a much more moderate force in Taiwanese politics than most observers believe. But to understand Taiwan’s people and politics—and especially its second-largest political party—we must first know something of the island’s past.
TAIWAN: THE ISLAND AND ITS PEOPLE Taiwan sits astride the Tropic of Cancer, off the coast of southern China. About 100 miles away, across the Taiwan Strait, lies Fujian, a province of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The island of Taiwan is about 250 miles long and 90 miles wide at its widest point; Taiwanese say its shape resembles a sweet potato. Officials in Taiwan’s capital, Taipei, also govern a number of small islands and island groups, including Orchid Island to the south, Green Island to the east, the Pescadores (Penghu) to the west, and two small islands just off the coast of mainland China, Jinmen (Quemoy) and Mazu (Matsu). The main island is extremely mountainous. With almost two-thirds of Taiwan covered by rugged peaks up to 4,000 meters in altitude, the
Introduction
3
population is crowded into a broad coastal plain to the west of the mountains and a narrower, more isolated plain to the east. And crowded it is. Taiwan’s population of 23 million lives on just under 36,000 square kilometers of land, making Taiwan the second most densely populated country in the world. The climate in Taiwan is tropical and subtropical, although some high altitude areas support alpine vegetation. Because of the rugged terrain and excellent climate, species diversity in Taiwan, including both plants and animals, is enormous. For example, 5 percent of the entire world’s bird species live in Taiwan.2 Even today, after thirty years of rapid industrialization and severe pollution, deforestation, and urbanization, Taiwan is astoundingly lush. Mountain forests and lowland agriculture provide much of the greenery, but even in towns and cities, plants are irrepressible. Weeds sprout from cracks in asphalt, saplings appear atop concrete skyscrapers, and thick shrubs flourish alongside highways and rivers. Taiwan also produces abundant crops; it exports many agricultural products, including rice, pork, fruit, and sugar. The earliest settlers came to Taiwan from nearby islands in the South Pacific. Most of these people—known today as Taiwan’s aboriginal peoples (yuanzhumin, or “original residents”)—lived on the western plain. Beginning in the seventeenth century, overcrowding in Fujian sparked the migration of Chinese peasants to Taiwan. Chinese settlers seized the western plain from its aboriginal inhabitants, assimilating some and driving the rest into the mountains or to the east coast. Several aboriginal peoples survived in these remote areas, preserving their languages and cultures. Despite strong pressures for assimilation, about 350,000 Taiwanese today identify themselves as members of one of nine distinct aboriginal populations. In the sixteenth century, Chinese pirates plying the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea used the island’s rugged coastline as a hideout, a place where they could live beyond the reach of any government. But in the mid-sixteenth century, the island gained visibility, thanks to European explorers’ growing interest in East Asia. In 1554, the island appeared on a European map for the first time. The map called it Ilha Formosa, a Portuguese phrase meaning Beautiful Island. Portuguese and Spanish conquerors attempted to colonize Taiwan, but made little progress. The Dutch were more successful, and in 1623, China’s leaders, the Ming dynasty, acknowledged Dutch control over the island. When the first Dutch colonists arrived, there were few Chinese living in Taiwan. But during their four decades of rule, the Dutch encouraged Chinese migration, and the number of settlers from the mainland
4
From Opposition to Power
increased rapidly. By 1700, more than 100,000 Chinese were arriving in Taiwan each year.3 The majority of Chinese settlers were from Fujian Province. This population, identified by their language as Hoklo (Minnan) people, became Taiwan’s largest ethnic group, and descendants of Fujianese migrants make up more than 70 percent of Taiwan’s population today. Another ten to 15 percent of today’s Taiwanese are Hakka (Kejia) people, whose ancestors also came from China in the early waves of migration. Today, the divisions between Hoklo and Hakka are blurring, but linguistic and cultural distinctions still exist, reinforced by partial residential segregation in rural areas. In 1661, a new conqueror arrived in Taiwan: the Chinese piratehero Cheng Ch’eng-kung (known in Western histories as Koxinga). Cheng used the island as a base from which to counterattack the Manchu armies that had seized China and established the Qing dynasty in 1644. Cheng’s plan to restore the Ming dynasty failed, but under his leadership, Taiwan experienced a burst of political, social, and economic development. Still, when Qing forces defeated Cheng’s troops and incorporated Taiwan into the Chinese empire in 1683, the island remained politically marginal, a rough-and-ready outpost of which it was said, “There is a small rebellion there every year, a big rebellion every five years.” The rebellions came to an end in 1895, when the Qing dynasty turned Taiwan over to Japan after losing the Sino-Japanese war. For the first time, the island’s residents found themselves governed by a strong state that took an intense interest in Taiwan’s development. In many ways, Taiwanese—who were unaccustomed to heavy-handed leadership—resented the Japanese. However, Taiwan’s economy thrived under attentive Japanese bureaucrats. Japan’s goal for Taiwan was to transform it into a model colony; its Meiji-era leaders hoped to win the respect of the Western powers by proving their ability as colonizers. The result was a colonial government that combined political control, economic development, and cultural assimilation. Still, even as its Japanese rulers improved Taiwan’s economic infrastructure and educational system, they also imposed cultural policies that denigrated Taiwan’s Chinese identity and traditions. Taiwanese reactions to Japan’s colonial rule reflected the ambivalence of a people traded back and forth from one set of rulers to another. Taiwanese were far more likely to speak Japanese than Mandarin, the language of the Chinese government, and innumerable Japanese customs—from food ways to fashion—became commonplace in Taiwan. Yet Taiwanese resented colonization; local elites complained bitterly
Introduction
5
about restrictions on their educational choices and cultural practices. In the 1920s, a home rule movement appeared, in which hundreds of educated Taiwanese demanded autonomy for their island. These grievances found little sympathy in Tokyo, where the Taiwanese were seen as an inferior people, an attitude that justified both paternalism and exploitation. For example, during World War II, Taiwanese recruits joined the Japanese armed forces to prove their worth as subjects of the emperor, even as those same armed forces were enslaving Taiwanese women for sexual servitude, under the euphemistic title “comfort women.” Japan lost Taiwan in 1945, along with the rest of its colonies. The Allied powers arranged for the Chinese government to accept Japan’s surrender of the island, in effect handing Taiwan over to the Republic of China (ROC) and its leader, Chiang Kai-shek. Within months, civil war broke out in mainland China between the ROC’s ruling party, the KMT, and the Chinese Communist Party. In 1949, the Communists defeated the KMT, and on October 1, 1949, Mao Zedong declared the founding of the People’s Republic of China. The surviving ROC government officials and troops took refuge in Taiwan. At first, ROC leaders expected the Communists to advance on Taiwan, but the outbreak of the Korean War convinced the United States to protect the ROC in Taiwan and halt the expansion of communism in Asia. Thus, the “ROC on Taiwan” became “Free China,” a handy ideological and rhetorical foil to the “Red Chinese” governing the mainland. Many Taiwanese welcomed the return to Chinese rule, but their joy was short-lived. From 1945 to 1947, the ROC government viewed Taiwan as a sideshow, a distraction from the critical task of fighting the civil war. ROC officials took money and equipment from Taiwan, ostensibly for use in the war effort, although much was misappropriated. The troops and administrators sent to Taiwan were not the ROC’s best or its brightest. To make matters worse, many ROC personnel sent to Taiwan suspected the Taiwanese were secretly loyal to Japan. There also was a deep cultural divide between the two groups. Many of the ROC soldiers in Taiwan were uneducated conscripts from desperately poor mainland villages, while even peasants in Taiwan were decently fed and clothed and had at least a few years of education. Taiwanese who had idealized mainland China experienced deep disillusionment and disappointment as a result of these early contacts. Before long, many Taiwanese began to view the KMT as just another in the long series of foreign conquerors who had ruled their island. The divide between the two groups was captured in the names they used to describe one another. Those whose families had been in Taiwan for generations were called bendiren (people from this place),
6
From Opposition to Power
or Taiwanese in English. The new arrivals were called waishengren (people from outside provinces), or Mainlanders. In 1947, the Taiwanese rose up against the Mainlanders, and were violently suppressed. The repression liquidated Taiwan’s indigenous leadership, easing the way for the KMT to impose a new political order in the island. Creating that new political order in Taiwan became a much more pressing concern in 1949, when the ROC government suddenly found itself in exile on the tiny island. Beyond ensuring its immediate survival, the ROC’s first priority was to rebuild its military power and recover the mainland. Accomplishing this goal required the cooperation of the Taiwanese people. As a result, KMT leaders devised a strategy that combined two elements: the central government remained firmly under the control of the KMT, but at the local level, elections were used to incorporate Taiwanese into the KMT and enhance the legitimacy of the ROC state. The ROC’s leaders—all of whom belonged to the KMT—used the claim that their government represented mainland China as well as Taiwan to justify their domination of the state apparatus. They insisted that someday they would regain control of mainland China and reestablish the ROC as its legitimate government. To facilitate this plan, ROC government institutions that had existed on the mainland were transferred wholesale to Taiwan. Legislative elections were suspended; representatives elected on the mainland in 1947 retained their seats after the move. Surviving members of the 1947 legislative bodies were still in office in 1990. In theory, this was a temporary arrangement. In practice, it put Taiwan’s government beyond the reach of the people it ruled. In addition, the KMT suspended the ROC constitution, placing Taiwan under martial law. Martial law provided a legal framework for repressing dissent, censoring publications, and outlawing new political parties. In short, the national government imposed by the KMT in Taiwan was highly authoritarian. However, ROC leaders recognized that pure authoritarianism was not the best approach to take in dealing with Taiwan. Recovering the mainland would require more than sullen obedience from the Taiwanese; it would need their active support and cooperation. To obtain this, the KMT employed a strategy that combined authoritarianism with mobilization. First, the government implemented a broad-based land reform program, transforming Taiwan’s tenant farmers into landowners—and KMT supporters. Second, the KMT-led government instituted grassroots elections. These competitive contests for local offices served many purposes. They provided an outlet for political tensions and ambitions, they identified authentic local leaders, and they created opportunities for the KMT to channel patronage to local
Introduction
7
politicians who would pledge their loyalty to the ruling party. In addition, local elections facilitated a “divide and control” strategy, under which the KMT encouraged the growth of local political factions that competed with one another in elections. The ruling party used these factions to manage local politics and suppress the development of independent political forces. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the KMT-led government used this two-sided strategy with great success. By pacifying local political forces and insulating the central government from popular demands, mobilizational authoritarianism gave KMT technocrats broad latitude in creating economic policy. Their efforts laid the foundation for the rapid economic development for which Taiwan is famous. During the era of strong economic growth, Taiwan was relatively quiescent politically. The few dissidents who openly criticized the KMT ended up in prison. Beginning in the late 1960s, subtle changes appeared in Taiwan politics. The Taiwanese were permitted to elect a small number of supplementary legislators, and two non-KMT candidates managed to win seats. In 1971, the ROC government’s confidence was shaken when it was forced to surrender China’s UN seat to the PRC. The loss of international legitimacy undermined the KMT’s rationale for refusing to let Taiwanese elect their leaders. Thus, in the mid-1970s, the KMT launched a reform program aimed at reinvigorating the party and strengthening its ties to the Taiwanese. At the same time, a new opposition political movement was beginning to coalesce. Opposition politicians used electoral politics as a platform for disseminating their demands for democratic reforms, while dissident intellectuals launched a series of publications with similar goals. By the end of the decade, these two threads had become integrated into a unified political force, the Dangwai Movement (outside the party movement). Through the early 1980s, the Dangwai grew in popular support and organizational strength. Dangwai activists worked long hours for little reward. They suffered financial losses, harassment, and imprisonment. In 1979, a group of activists were sentenced to long prison terms for their involvement in a human rights demonstration. During the trial, one defendant’s mother and two young daughters were stabbed to death in their home, even though the house was under police surveillance. Despite the terrible risks, the Dangwai attracted some of Taiwan’s most gifted activists and political leaders. They came from all sectors of Taiwan’s society; their backgrounds and ideologies varied widely. But Dangwai activists shared one common goal: they wanted the Taiwanese to throw off centuries of foreign domination and rule themselves. They wanted democracy.
8
From Opposition to Power
Whether under the Dutch, the Qing dynasty, the Japanese empire, or the authoritarian KMT, the people of Taiwan had never controlled their own fate. In 1986, Taiwan’s democratic activists decided they could wait no longer. On September 28, in direct defiance of martial law, delegates to a Dangwai conference voted to found the Democratic Progressive Party (Minzhu Jinbu Dang). The KMT, weakened by the loss of international recognition and resigned to the inevitability of political reform, did nothing. From then on, Taiwan’s democratization drive gathered momentum. In 1987, the government lifted martial law. By 1992, all the senior legislators had retired, to be replaced by representatives elected by the people of Taiwan. To preserve the idea that some of these legislators represented all Chinese, and not merely specific constituencies in Taiwan, 41 of the legislature’s 225 seats were reserved for members elected at large, according to the proportion of the vote received by each political party. (The legislature also includes eight aboriginal representatives and eight overseas Chinese representatives.) In 1996, Taiwan held its first direct presidential election. And in 2000, after fourteen years of struggle, a Democratic Progressive Party candidate became the president of the Republic of China.
THE LONG ROAD TO VICTORY Chen Shui-bian’s victory in March 2000 was the most important event in the DPP’s history since its inauguration. From the moment the party was founded, its members devoted themselves to becoming Taiwan’s ruling party. Yet despite the rapid-fire political reforms that followed the opposition party’s founding, gaining control of the national government—or even one branch of it—proved extremely difficult. The party has never won a majority of votes in any national election. Even Chen Shui-bian was chosen by less than 40 percent of the electorate; he won because his opponents split their votes between two candidates. In the early months of his presidency, Chen struggled to overcome his party’s weakness in the legislature, in which the KMT held the majority of seats, and to assert his executive authority. On the road to its presidential victory, the DPP encountered numerous obstacles,including many of its own making. To understand why the party was so slow in attaining national office we need to examine its weaknesses as well as its accomplishments. Such an exercise can also shed light on Chen Shui-bian’s difficulties as a minority president. The obstacles and challenges facing the DPP can be analyzed in three categories: contextual obstacles, external obstacles, and internal
Introduction
9
obstacles, which can be thought of as errors. Contextual obstacles are forces beyond the immediate control of an incumbent regime or its opposition that work against the opposition party. For example, international pressures, economic forces, and threats to national security may encourage voters to choose the ruling party over the opposition. Such forces have played an important role in depressing the DPP’s electoral performance. Taiwan’s lack of formal international ties combines with the threat from across the strait to create an environment of tension and insecurity. Taiwanese voters cannot help but take note of Beijing’s clearly stated opposition to the DPP. Indeed, PRC leaders have stated that the DPP’s accession to power could lead to war. For its part, the KMT preserved Taiwan’s security and autonomy for more than fifty years; many voters are reluctant to upset a system that has preserved stability for so long. External obstacles are characteristics of a country’s domestic politics that make it difficult for an opposition party to increase its influence. They include political institutions, as well as the ruling party’s organization and behavior. Some external obstacles are negative, they suppress the opposition party, and some are positive, they promote continued ruling party success. Even today, Taiwan’s democracy is imperfect, marred by negative external obstacles such as corruption, patronage, unequal resources, and administrative and judicial bias. As the island’s politics has become more democratic, however, citizens have grown less tolerant of these abuses. The popular backlash against such practices played an important role in Chen Shui-bian’s successful presidential bid. Although direct manipulation of the electoral system through fraud is rare in Taiwan today, the KMT’s strategy of electoral mobilization promoted corruption. By weaving together networks of local factions and politicians, many of whom engaged in vote buying and other abuses, the KMT managed to win the great majority of elections, even after democratic reforms were well underway. The KMT’s mobilizational practices (which are discussed in detail in Chapter 3) undermined fair competition by ensuring that payoffs—and not issues, party identification, or candidate qualifications—would determine a significant number of votes. Here too, however, the tide is turning. The KMT’s much-touted political machine delivered very few votes for the party’s presidential candidate, Lien Chan, in 2000. Given the chaos within the KMT in the wake of its defeat, it is possible that the party will be unable to repair and refuel its broken machine in time for the next election, the 2001 legislative race. Another important advantage the KMT enjoys is financial. The party has accumulated an enormous fortune, not through fund-raising
10
From Opposition to Power
among its political supporters, but by constructing a vast business empire. As with other negative obstacles, the KMT’s economic advantage has become an embarrassment; during the 2000 presidential campaign, Lien Chan was so stung by his opponents’ criticism on this issue that he promised to put the party’s business empire in trust. Still, the Kuomintang is far from giving up its wealth, or the influence it buys.4 Yet another factor benefiting the KMT is favorable media coverage, a holdover from the days when television and radio broadcasting stations were owned by party and government agencies, and the publishers of major newspapers sat on the Kuomintang’s Central Committee. Even after the government lifted restrictions on independent media outlets, the overwhelming head start enjoyed by established, KMTlinked media companies made it difficult for pro-DPP and nonpartisan publications to compete. The KMT also has used its influence over the civil service and judiciary to promote its candidates. During the 2000 presidential campaign, prosecutors accused government agencies of paying their employees NT$300 (U.S.$10.00) to attend a rally for KMT candidate Lien Chan.5 When a prominent supporter of independent presidential candidate Soong Chu-yu (James Soong) suddenly found himself under investigation for corruption, one cabinet member quit and joined Soong’s campaign to protest what he called politically motivated judicial harassment. In sum, many factors have worked together to suppress the DPP’s performance in the past. However, Chen Shui-bian’s victory in 2000 shows that it is possible to overcome these negative obstacles. In fact, in some cases abuses of democratic procedures backfired and ended up helping the DPP candidate. In addition to these negative obstacles, the KMT benefits from many positive advantages. Above all, the KMT’s strength rests on a broad social base constructed over four decades of single-party authoritarian rule. The KMT assembled a cross-class coalition including farmers, workers, government employees, the military, and big business. The only significant groups left out of this coalition were independent professionals and entrepreneurs in small and medium-sized businesses, and many of these were brought under the KMT umbrella through its network of local factions. Historically, many of the DPP’s victories resulted from tensions within the KMT coalition. For example, when local KMT factions fought among themselves in 1997, the DPP won a majority of municipal executive posts. Indeed, Chen Shui-bian may well owe his election to Soong Chu-yu’s popularity among urban intellectuals, Mainlanders, and certain local factions—all traditional KMT constituencies.
Introduction
11
Another positive attribute that helped the KMT retain the support of many Taiwanese was its willingness to undertake reform after 1985. Under President Lee and his predecessor, Chiang Ching-kuo, the KMT made great strides toward Taiwan’s democratization. To the intense frustration of longtime DPP activists, the KMT has received much of the credit for Taiwan’s democratization, even though the pressure for political change came from the opposition movement. For example, when he stepped down after twelve years as ROC president and KMT party chair, pundits dubbed Lee Teng-hui “Mr. Democracy.” Internal obstacles have plagued the DPP since its founding. To win the presidency, Chen Shui-bian had to overcome not only the KMT’s strong advantages, but also his own party’s liabilities, some of which were self-imposed. These internal obstacles can also be thought of as errors, some forced, others unforced. For example, the unforced error that damaged the DPP’s prospects of winning national power most severely was the decision to call for the independence of Taiwan in its charter and platform. Although the People’s Republic of China has never governed Taiwan, peace in the Taiwan Strait rests on the idea that Taiwan is part of the Chinese nation. As long as Taiwan uses the name Republic of China, it tacitly endorses this idea. But Beijing has promised to use military force against Taiwan if it ever abandons this name or declares formal independence from China. For this reason, and because many Taiwanese believe formal independence is either unnecessary or undesirable, most voters opposed the DPP’s position when it came out in favor of independence in 1991. Many voters came to view the DPP as a reckless party, willing to endanger the country for its own quixotic goal. Endorsing Taiwan independence was the DPP’s most damaging decision, but it is not the party’s only internal liability. Structural weaknesses also contribute to its frustratingly slow progress. Because the KMT was built on a cross-class coalition, the DPP had no choice but to forge a party out of the anti-KMT members of all social sectors. From the beginning the DPP’s supporters have included intellectuals, disgruntled business people, local political bosses, environmentalists, and feminists. Every DPP supporter had his or her own constellation of reasons for supporting the party. Party members shared few interests or ideas beyond the desire for democracy and the dream of removing the KMT from power. Thus, articulating concrete policy objectives that satisfy the party’s diverse constituencies is all but impossible. Organizing the DPP as a catchall party for KMT opponents can be seen as a forced error. Because the Kuomintang’s popular coalition includes a wide
12
From Opposition to Power
range of economic interests and constituencies, the DPP had no choice but to mirror this structure. In effect, however, this decision left the party without a comprehensive policy program. Instead, DPP members relied on the promotion of democratic reform and equal rights for Taiwanese to hold the party together. Finally, the DPP’s organization has contributed to its problems. The DPP is modeled on the KMT’s structure: it has a central committee, party congress, and other Leninist trappings. But it lacks the strong central leadership that has been the KMT’s most significant organizational feature for more than fifty years. Instead, the DPP is a highly democratic party, offering abundant opportunities for party members to offer their opinions and views. Moreover, strong personalities and individual political stars dominate the DPP, and the party’s decisionmaking process is driven by factional negotiation and struggle. As a result, the DPP does not always respond effectively to new policy opportunities and challenges. Without a strong central leadership to guide it, the party tends to fall into embarrassing public squabbles. Despite these many obstacles, the DPP can boast of many achievements. But its greatest and most lasting accomplishment is its contribution to Taiwan’s democratization. Without the DPP and its predecessor, the Dangwai Movement, KMT leaders would have felt far less pressure to democratize. They might well have delayed political reform and extended the period of authoritarianism and repression. Taiwan’s democratic activists pressed their cause peacefully, accepting imprisonment, harassment, and even violence, but never responding in kind.6 They used the tools available to them within the system—elections, peaceful demonstrations, publications, free speech—to make their case. And always, they kept their eyes firmly on their goal: democracy. And so, despite challenges and setbacks, the DPP fought its way from the margins of politics to the center, finally capturing national power in March 2000. This book tells the party’s story, beginning in the early days of the democratic movement, and ending with Chen Shuibian’s victory. Chapter 2 recounts the history of the Dangwai and the DPP and Chapter 3 analyzes the structural factors that have influenced the party’s development. In Chapter 4, I turn to the DPP’s formal organization, and Chapter 5 explains the party’s informal organization, its allimportant internal factions. DPP decisions are products of complex interactions between the formal organization and the informal structures of authority; their operation is the topic of Chapter 6. In Chapter 7 I examine the outcome of this decisionmaking process, the DPP’s policy positions and political strategies. In Chapter 8, I describe where the DPP stands in the eyes of the Taiwanese people. Chapter 9 analyzes the DPP’s presidential win. Finally, Chapter 10 looks to the future.
Introduction
13
NOTES 1. The English translation of Chen’s victory speech is available at the Taiwan Headlines website maintained by the Government Information Office of the ROC. Available online at:http://www.taiwanheadlines.gov.tw/chen/chen01.htm. 2. Oscar Chung, “Our Feathered Friends,” Taipei Review (June 2000): 31. 3. Mei-Ling T. Wang, The Dust That Never Settles: The Taiwan Independence Campaign and U.S.-China Relations (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1999), 17. 4. In July 2000, officials of the Securities and Futures Commission investigated large sales of stock at low prices by KMT holding companies. DPP lawmakers accused the KMT of deliberately driving down the stock market in an effort to damage Chen Shui-bian’s administration. Taipei Times, 12 July 2000. Available online at: http://www.taipeitimes.com/news/2000/07/12. 5. “Workers Paid to Attend Rally, Say Prosecutors,” Taipei Times, 13 March 2000. Available online at: http://www.taipeitimes.com/news/2000/03/13. 6. Opposition demonstrators did clash with police on occasion, and a handful of democratic activists committed suicide to protest the regime. However, compared to other democratizing nations, including South Korea and various Latin American and Eastern European countries, Taiwan’s democratization process was extraordinarily peaceful.
2
A Brief History of the Democratic Progressive Party
On September 28, 1986, members of a loosely organized political opposition group called the Dangwai Movement were meeting in a ballroom at Taipei’s Grand Hotel. Their purpose was to plan strategy for supplementary legislative elections scheduled for December. But when the debate turned to the possibility of founding a political party, the room came alive. A motion was made, seconded, and passed, and Taiwan’s first opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party, was born. The Dangwai activists founded the DPP despite the fact that martial law provisions in effect in the Republic of China specifically forbade the creation of new political parties. Their defiant declaration was the product of years of organizing and preparation. And it was the beginning of a new era in Taiwan’s politics. Until that day in September 1986, a single party, the Kuomintang, or Nationalist Party, had dominated Taiwanese politics.1 The Kuomintang came to Taiwan at the end of World War II, when the island returned to Chinese control after five decades under a Japanese colonial government. From 1945 to 1949, the ruling party looked upon Taiwan as a minor sideshow; its attention was focused on its civil war with the Chinese Communist Party and its efforts to retain control of the Chinese mainland. Between 1945 and 1947, the regime’s inattention and corruption undermined its legitimacy; a gulf opened between the KMT-led government and the Taiwanese people. In 1947, an incident of police brutality sparked an antigovernment uprising that swept the island. The ROC military brutally repressed the rebellion, and the resentment between the two groups—the native Taiwanese and the recently arrived Mainlanders— hardened into a permanent grudge. This event, known in Taiwan as the February 28 Incident, or simply 2-28, set the tone for social and political interactions between the two groups for decades to come.
15
16
From Opposition to Power
In 1949, the Chinese Communist Party drove the last remnants of the ROC government out of mainland China, and they took refuge in Taiwan. From then on, Taiwanese and Mainlanders shared a common land and a common fate. Under U.S. protection, the ROC in Taiwan began to thrive. Until the early 1970s, most major countries (and the United Nations) recognized the Republic of China as the legal government of China. The ROC’s ruling party insisted that it someday would return and reestablish its authority on the mainland. Meanwhile, Taiwan’s economy grew rapidly in the 1960s and 1970s, thanks to several factors: Americans’ bottomless desire for consumer goods, Taiwan’s hardworking people and nimble manufacturing sector, and the skillful economic stewardship of KMT technocrats. Taiwan’s political system was an odd hybrid. At the grassroots level, the regime used competitive elections to identify authentic local leaders and give Taiwanese a feeling of participation. Under martial law provisions instituted in the 1940s, new political parties were banned, leaving local politicians no choice but to affiliate with the KMT. But even as a competitive (if KMT-dominated) electoral culture blossomed at the local level, the central government remained walled off from popular influence. None of the central decisionmaking institutions—the presidency, the National Assembly, and the Legislative Yuan—were subject to popular election. Officeholders elected on the mainland in the 1940s were frozen in office, based on the justification that elections could not be held in their home constituencies. According to the KMT, holding elections in Taiwan alone would disenfranchise the vast majority of ROC “citizens.” The highest officials Taiwanese voters were permitted to elect were members of the Taiwan Provincial Assembly, which existed to maintain the fiction that the ROC’s territory was not coterminous with Taiwan, and municipal (county and city) executives. Meanwhile, the KMT regime was relentless and efficient in persecuting and repressing dissidents who dared to challenge its singleparty rule or its mainland recovery project. By the early 1970s, cracks were appearing in the edifice of KMT control. Internationally, the ROC was losing its fight to represent China, as countries around the world switched their recognition to the People’s Republic of China. In 1971, the ROC lost its UN seat. Domestically, too, the KMT’s power was beginning to wane in the early 1970s. President Chiang Kai-shek, the man at the head of the KMT since the 1920s, was dying. Meanwhile, although the party’s strategy for co-opting and controlling local communities had succeeded in recruiting local leaders into the KMT, the loyalty of these politicians and the local factions that coalesced around them was never strong. By the
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17
mid-1970s, some local factions were eager to leave the KMT nest. These factors combined to give a new political force, the Dangwai Movement, an opening. The Dangwai originated in an alliance between two types of opposition activists: local politicians who shared a strong dissatisfaction with the KMT regime, and dissident intellectuals. From the beginning, these groups embraced distinct—but complementary—strategies and priorities. While the intellectuals parried and thrust at the regime through a network of political magazines and book series, the independent politicians expanded their base of support among the electorate. The differences of opinion between the two groups formed the basis for long-lived factional divisions within the Dangwai Movement and, later, the DPP. Because it is such a prominent feature of the DPP, my discussion of the party’s history will pay special attention to factionalism. A formative moment in Dangwai history took place in 1968, when Huang Hsin-chieh asked Kang Ning-hsiang to run his campaign in the 1969 supplementary Legislative Yuan elections. Huang, who died in November 1999, was a central figure in Taiwan’s opposition movement. As a young man, Huang joined the KMT, but he soon dropped out in frustration over his prospects and threw his support behind Kao Yu-shu, a political independent who managed to defeat KMT nominees to win two terms as the mayor of Taipei. In 1961, Huang joined several other non-KMT politicians on the Taipei City Council. He became one of a small cadre of dissident politicians who managed to win seats in local assemblies during the 1960s. The supplementary elections were necessary to replenish the ranks of senior legislators, whose numbers were dwindling after more than twenty years without elections. Huang decided to contest one of these seats, and he selected Kang Ning-hsiang, a politically astute, hardworking youth to manage his campaign. Upon winning his race, Huang became one of two opposition-oriented legislators elected to life terms in the Legislative Yuan. Kang, his protégé, saw his own political career take flight under Huang’s tutelage. Together, Huang and Kang provided leadership for the budding political movement, but over time, differences in temperament and strategy opened a rift between the two men. The result was the opposition movement’s first factional division. Early in his career, Kang Ning-hsiang benefited, paradoxically, from the central government’s efforts to undercut the nascent opposition movement. In 1967, the ROC government designated the city of Taipei as a special municipality, which meant that its mayor no longer would be elected, and its city council members would have to meet higher educational and professional standards. (A central motivation for
18
From Opposition to Power
the change was to shield the KMT from the embarrassment of being defeated by Kao Yu-shu and others like him.) The changes made several non-KMT council members ineligible for reelection. Kang Ninghsiang, who had worked his way through college pumping gasoline, inherited these men’s political bases. In 1969, he was elected to the Taipei City Council, and three years later he joined his mentor in the Legislative Yuan. When he ran for reelection three years later (after 1969, legislators were elected for three-year terms), Kang called himself a Dangwai (outside the party) candidate. The use of the Dangwai label was significant. Several dissident politicians had used it in the late 1950s, but after the authorities suppressed that group, non-KMT politicians avoided the term. They referred to themselves as wudang, wupai (without party or faction). But Kang and others revived the term, linking themselves to the earlier effort to organize an electoral challenge to the KMT. They also called attention to the authoritarian nature of Taiwan’s political system, in which only one party, the KMT, played a significant role. Another important figure who used the Dangwai name was Chang Chun-hung, an aspiring politician who quit the KMT and made a successful run for the Taipei City Council under the Dangwai label in 1973. In the second round of legislative elections, held in 1972, nonKMT candidates campaigned jointly under the Dangwai label. The Dangwai platform called for democratic reforms; above all, Dangwai activists appealed to the regime to lift martial law and other emergency provisions that prevented full implementation of the ROC’s democratic constitution. They also sought to give all Taiwan residents—Taiwanese and Mainlanders alike—an equal say in determining the island’s future. In the mid-1970s, Huang Hsin-chieh, Kang Ning-hsiang, and Chang Chun-hung were at the center of the opposition movement. Together they published the Taiwan Political Review (Taiwan zhenglun), a venture that soon attracted the talents of two other important opposition figures, Yao Chia-wen and Huang Hua. In 1975, however, a new group of opposition activists came onto the scene, recruited into politics to work as legislative campaign assistants to Kuo Yu-hsin, an opposition politician of 1950s vintage. Kuo’s assistants—including Lin Chengchieh, Hsiao Yu-chen, and brothers Wu Nai-jen and Wu Nai-teh—represented a new generation of activists that was both more intellectual and more ideological than its forebears. Members of this new generation also played a major role as candidates in the 1977 elections. Huang and Kang gathered more than two dozen opposition candidates together under the Dangwai umbrella and helped coordinate their campaigns. Fourteen Dangwai candidates,
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19
including Chang Chun-hung from Nantou County and Lin Yi-hsiung from Ilan County, won seats in the Provincial Assembly. In Taoyuan County, voters chose Hsu Hsin-liang to be their county executive. Hsu, a brilliant young man with strong political instincts, had been a rising KMT star. His outspoken criticism of the ruling party sent his career into a decline. Rather than give up politics, Hsu moved to the Dangwai. The opposition’s success in 1977 revealed growing popular dissatisfaction with the KMT’s authoritarian leadership and waning international prestige. It also rested, importantly, on tensions within the KMT. For years, the party leadership played local factions off one another to secure their obedience and keep competition in check. But several factions recognized the Dangwai’s appearance on the scene as an opportunity to demonstrate their independence. Their unwillingness to exert themselves on behalf of their party’s chosen candidates played an important role in allowing the Dangwai to wedge its foot in the door. Although the 1977 elections represented a major breakthrough for the Dangwai, events in Taoyuan County catalyzed the first public split within the movement. Fearing Hsu would lose the election to a fraudulent vote count, his supporters attacked a police station in Chungli Township. As it turned out, Hsu won the election, but the governmentcontrolled media used the riot to brand the Dangwai as violent and unreasonable. Dangwai activists were divided over how to respond. In Kang Ning-hsiang’s view, the Chungli Incident proved that mass protests were risky. Instead of demonstrating in the streets to overthrow the political system, he believed the Dangwai ought to use elections to press for change. This reflected Kang’s philosophy of “political kung fu.” Kang believed force was useless against a stronger opponent; only artfulness and compromise could succeed.2 Many of the younger activists disagreed. They believed mass movements—even if they sometimes went too far—were a good way to attract attention and turn up the heat under the regime. They were impatient with elections and working within the system, especially in an era when the system clearly was stacked against the opposition. After the Chungli Incident, Kang Ning-hsiang and his moderate supporters grew increasingly estranged from the younger generation of activists. In the 1980s, conflict between the two camps broadened to include debates over Taiwan independence, cooperation versus confrontation, and moderation versus radicalism, but in the 1970s it centered on how much emphasis the opposition should place on mass demonstrations versus electioneering. The government’s decision to cancel legislative elections scheduled for December 1978 aggravated this split. From the beginning, elections tended to unify the opposition. In the absence of
20
From Opposition to Power
elections, calls for direct action and mass movements increased, intensifying the discord between those who were comfortable with such tactics and those who preferred to use them only as a last resort. In March 1978, Kang Ning-hsiang founded The Eighties, a magazine that promoted his moderate, election-centered ideas. The managing editor was Chiang Chun-nan (Antonio Chiang), who later published an important newsmagazine called The Journalist (Xin xinwen). It is important to remember that while the magazine was moderate by Dangwai standards, by the standards of the ROC mass media in general, it was extremely daring. Many of the writers who published in The Eighties—Chen Chung-hsin, Li Hsiao-feng, Lin Cho-shui, and Huang Huang-hsiung—advocated profound social and political change. Later that year, opposition activists led by Huang Hsin-chieh founded the Dangwai Campaign Assistance Group. Their goal was to plan a coordinated campaign strategy to improve the Dangwai’s performance in the December elections. The organization attracted several dissident intellectuals: Lu Hsiu-lien (Annette Lu), Chen Wan-chen, Wang Tuo, and Huang Huang-hsiung. The head of the Dangwai Campaign Assistance Group was Huang Hsin-chieh. Its executive director, Shih Mingteh, and secretary, Chen Chu, were to become leading DPP figures. The 1978 legislative campaign was well underway when U.S. president Jimmy Carter announced the United States’ intention to normalize relations with the People’s Republic of China and cut its ties with the ROC. Taiwan was devastated by this news. Fearing a crisis, the KMTled government cancelled the elections. Kang Ning-hsiang immediately issued a statement urging Dangwai candidates to suspend their campaigns and work with the KMT to defend the Republic of China. Siding with the KMT turned out to be a profound political error, one that put Kang outside the Dangwai mainstream. Many of Kang’s Dangwai colleagues believed the cancellation was unnecessary; they accused the KMT of exploiting the crisis in international relations to avoid what was shaping up to be a tough electoral fight. Those activists who embraced this point of view distanced themselves from Kang, leaving Huang Hsin-chieh to inherit singlehanded leadership of the Dangwai mainstream. Events in January 1979 reinforced the split, as Dangwai radicals took to the streets to protest the jailing of a Dangwai politician in Kaohsiung County.3 Huang Hsin-chieh’s next project was a publication, Formosa Magazine (Meilidao zazhi). Formosa attracted an all-star staff of Dangwai editors, writers, and organizers: Hsu Hsin-liang (who directed the Formosa Magazine Association), Lu Hsiu-lien, Huang Tian-fu, Chang Chun-hung, Yao Chia-wen, Huang Huang-hsiung, Lin Yi-hsiung, Shih
A Brief History of the DPP
21
Ming-teh, Chen Chung-hsin, Chen Chu, and others. According to some sources, Kang Ning-hsiang was invited to take part, but declined, preferring to concentrate his energies on The Eighties.4 Both publications strongly criticized the government, but each had a different emphasis. As Li Hsiao-feng put it, “These two magazines represented two lines within the Dangwai Movement . . . Kang’s The Eighties was seen as a warmer, more temperate line of political discussion, whereas Formosa was viewed as taking an activist, mass-based line.”5 Formosa was more than a magazine; it was an island-wide Dangwai organization, and as such it posed an unprecedented challenge to the KMT-led regime. Formosa staffers opened offices throughout the island, creating a network of local branches capable of organizing prodemocracy activities. In December 1979, Formosa sponsored a demonstration to commemorate International Human Rights Day. The Kaohsiung march became the most famous event in the history of Taiwan’s democratization. During the protest, violence erupted between police and demonstrators, offering a pretext for the prosecution of the Formosa team. Eight members of its staff—Huang Hsin-chieh, Shih Ming-teh, Lin Yi-hsiung, Yao Chia-wen, Chen Chu, Lu Hsiu-lien, Chang Chun-hung, and Lin Hung-hsuan—were indicted on subversion charges and tried in military courts. Another thirty-seven defendants were tried in civil courts. Hsu Hsin-liang avoided prosecution only because he sought political asylum in the United States, where he was traveling when the protest occurred. Prior to the Kaohsiung Incident, the Dangwai Movement had two wings: the moderates, led by Kang, and the activists, led by Huang. Despite the widening gap between Kang and Huang, the two Dangwai camps still recognized their common goals. When the Formosa staffers were arrested, it was Kang Ning-hsiang who pulled together a team of top-notch defense attorneys, all of whom had everything to lose by involving themselves with the politically sensitive case. Among the attorneys who agreed to assist the Formosa defendants were several who ran for public office after the trial was over: Chen Shui-bian, Hsieh Chang-ting (Frank Hsieh), Su Chen-chang, Yu Ching, Chiang Pengchian, and Chang Chun-hsiung. Despite their attorneys’ efforts, however, the leading Formosa activists received long prison sentences, which yanked them off the political stage. In their absence, two new Dangwai subgroups appeared to challenge Kang’s moderates: the defense attorneys and the young radicals. The legislative elections originally scheduled for 1978 finally took place in December 1980. Dangwai candidates included several of the Formosa defendants’ attorneys and family members. The election
22
From Opposition to Power
results showed that the KMT’s harsh reaction to the Kaohsiung Incident had backfired. Voters treated the election as an opportunity to express sympathy for the defendants. Several members of the Wives and Lawyers Club finished first in their districts; others were elected with lower, but nonetheless impressive, vote totals. The Dangwai also did well in the 1981 Provincial Assembly and municipal executive elections, thanks to a well-crafted and well-executed campaign strategy. By the summer of 1982, however, a new cleavage was evident within the Dangwai Movement. In June, a new magazine, entitled Deep Plow (Shen’geng), appeared. It quickly revealed itself as a venue for ideas more radical than those expressed by the Dangwai mainstream. Deep Plow also became a forum for criticizing Kang Ning-hsiang. The Criticize Kang wave attacked the Dangwai moderate on two grounds. First, he was accused of cooperating too readily with the KMT. Articles appearing in Deep Plow accused Kang of “eating the KMT’s rice ball soup” and “pouring water on flames” when he negotiated an end to a Dangwai boycott in the Legislative Yuan. Likewise, a trip Kang made to the United States to encourage better relations was viewed as “doing the KMT’s business.”6 Second, Deep Plow writers criticized Kang’s ideas, including his arguments in favor of working within the system and using parliamentary politics (rather than mass movements) to bring about change. Kang’s most ferocious critic was the intellectual gadfly Li Ao. (Li represented the conservative New Party in the 2000 presidential race.) Kang Ning-hsiang was not, however, without defenders. Some members of the Kaohsiung Incident attorneys group shared his ideas. For example, Yu Ching went with Kang to the United States in 1982, and Hsieh Chang-ting advocated that the Dangwai Movement should cut itself off from the overseas Taiwan independence movement in order to establish credibility as a movement operating within the system. Others of the lawyers, including Chen Shui-bian, were more sympathetic to the activists. Still, as the target of these attacks, Kang’s reputation suffered the most. Rumors circulated that Kang had avoided arrest during the Kaohsiung Incident, not by wisely eschewing confrontational political tactics, but by cozying up to the KMT.7 Nor were the attacks on Kang motivated solely by ideology; personal ambition and competition for power also played roles. As Peng Huai-en put it, “When the moderate faction leader Kang Ning-hsiang used the method of holding the government accountable from within he provoked the activist faction’s doubts. Add to that discord over the distribution of power, and the result was a ‘criticize Kang’ wave.”8 Conflict between the mainstream (Kang) group and the new generation erupted in 1983. The two camps agreed to organize a Dangwai
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23
Campaign Assistance Group (DCAG) to coordinate the opposition’s electoral activities in year-end legislative contests. But they could not agree on the method for selecting candidates for the Dangwai slate. In previous elections, Dangwai leaders had chosen candidates to receive the Dangwai’s recommendation; the selection method was essentially a top-down process. But the Dangwai newcomers preferred a more democratic, bottom-up procedure. Both sides agreed on an internal “primary election” method, but Kang insisted that incumbents should be renewed automatically. Otherwise, he feared, the newcomers might force the moderates off the stage. The new generation activists refused to accept Kang’s condition. They left the DCAG and founded the Alliance of Dangwai Writers and Editors. In addition to arguing over the procedure for recommending candidates, DCAG leaders differed with the Alliance of Dangwai Writers and Editors over the Dangwai’s campaign platform. Dangwai activists in both camps initially agreed to the slogan “Democracy, Self-determination, Save Taiwan” (Minzhu zizhi jiu Taiwan). But the KMT reacted strongly to the idea of self-determination, which party leaders claimed was a veiled reference to Taiwan independence. Rather than antagonize the ruling party and give it a campaign issue to use against them, Kang and other mainstream candidates dropped “self-determination” and campaigned on the theme “Democracy Will Save Taiwan.” Candidates recommended by the Writers and Editors Alliance retained the self-determination clause. Without a coordinated strategy, Dangwai candidates made a disappointing showing in the year-end elections. The Alliance of Writers and Editors, led by Wu Nai-jen and Chiou I-jen, supported several candidates representing the Formosa Line (Meilidao xitong), including relatives of Lin Yi-hsiung, Chang Chun-hung, Huang Hsin-chieh, Hsu Hsin-liang, and Presbyterian church leader (and Kaohsiung Incident defendant) Kao Chun-ming, as well as defense attorneys Chiang Pengchien and Chang Chun-hsiung. These candidates performed reasonably well; four of the seven were elected. Overall, however, the Dangwai fell behind the trajectory established in the 1977 and 1980 elections. Mainstream (moderate) candidates did especially poorly. Even Kang Ning-hsiang, battered by criticism from his Dangwai colleagues, lost his seat in the Legislative Yuan. Political scientist Hu Fu identified four factions within the Dangwai as of early 1984: the Writers and Editors Alliance, the Dangwai Public Policy Research Association (DPPRA, the successor to the DCAG), the Progress Faction (consisting of independent-minded Dangwai politicians Lin Cheng-chieh, Tsai Jen-chian, Tsai Shih-yuan, and their supporters), and the imprisoned Formosa Faction. Later that year,
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From Opposition to Power
activists from the Writers and Editors Alliance founded the publication that gave them their present-day identity, New Tide Magazine. New Tide offered a clear alternative to all the other tendencies within the Dangwai. The faction that sprang up around the magazine was, as Kuo Cheng-liang writes, “the faction with the highest intellectual level, the strictest discipline, the strongest commitment to struggle and the hardest ideology.”9 It emphasized the power of social movements for bringing about political change, it was sympathetic to Taiwan independence, and it opposed the practice of placing parliamentary participation ahead of other goals. When elected officials from the DCAG founded the DPPRA in 1984, the government made no effort to suppress the group. The ROC regime had just endured a series of embarrassments, including financial scandals at home and the assassination of one of its political enemies in the United States, and it needed to alleviate its reputation for reflexive repression. Critics within the Dangwai were not so restrained. The DPPRA’s mainstream leader, Fei Hsi-ping, stepped down after he was attacked by younger generation activists. In his place, two of the Kaohsiung Incident defense attorneys, Yu Ching and Hsieh Chang-ting, took over leadership of the DPPRA. This event marked the defense attorneys’ induction into the inner circle of Dangwai leadership. Part of their strategy was to use the DPPRA to build a foundation for a new political party. To that end, the group began opening offices around the island in the last weeks of 1985. The Dangwai’s various factions decided to work together in provincial and municipal elections scheduled for January 1985. They held a marathon nominating session on September 28, 1984, at which they whittled a preliminary list of eighty-one aspiring candidates down to forty-two recommended candidates. Yu Ching, one of the defense attorneys, played a key role in bringing the factions together. The election results rewarded the Dangwai’s compromises and cooperation: all eleven of its candidates for Taipei City Council were successful, as were half of its candidates for Kaohsiung City Council, eleven of its eighteen Provincial Assembly candidates, and one of its seven municipal executive hopefuls. Altogether, Dangwai and other non-KMT candidates won 30 percent of the vote. The Dangwai’s slogan in 1985 was “New Party, New Atmosphere, and Self-determination Will Save Taiwan.” The slogan revealed the Dangwai’s most important new initiative: founding an opposition party. Still, this successful collaboration between the DPPRA moderates and the activist Writers and Editors Alliance/New Tide Faction did not eliminate the tension between them. Even as they competed in elections
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25
and organized a national network of DPPRA offices, moderate leaders within the Dangwai were negotiating with a KMT government weakened by a series of domestic and international scandals. In talks mediated through prominent scholars Hu Fu and Yang Kuo-shu, Dangwai notables Yu Ching, Hsieh Chang-ting, Kang Ning-hsiang, Huang Tian-fu, Fei Hsi-ping, Chang Chun-hsiung, Chang Peng-jian, and You Hsi-kun urged the regime to relax pressure on the opposition, if only to avoid another Kaohsiung Incident-style disaster. True to form, the more radical Dangwai activists criticized the negotiations. For example, Chen Shuibian, a member of the defense attorneys group who identified more closely with the activist faction, accused his Dangwai colleagues of being “hooked” (goutong) instead of “communicating” (goutong).10 Internal disagreements did not prevent the Dangwai from forging ahead with its plans to found a political party, a project that united all Dangwai factions. In May of 1986, Kang Ning-hsiang and Lin Chengchieh opened a DPPRA branch in Taipei. One of its committees was called the Committee for Organizing a Party and Carrying Out Its Construction. Dangwai activists spent the summer of 1986 planning and strategizing, and on September 28 of that year they voted to found the Democratic Progressive Party. The party represented a coalition of all the camps within the Dangwai: the Mainstream Faction (or Kang Group), New Tide (formerly the Writers and Editors Alliance), and Lin Chengchieh’s Progress Faction. The Formosa Faction was absent at the founding only because the leading Formosa activists were still behind bars. From the beginning, a division of labor existed within the party between the moderate factions, which included a large number of elected officials, and the New Tide Faction, which was more interested in leading social movements than in winning elected offices. The moderates (first the Kang Group and other centrists, and later the Formosa Faction) dominated the party’s decisionmaking apparatus (the party chair and the Central Standing Committee [CSC]), while New Tide activists obtained a disproportionate share of posts in the party bureaucracy. To do so, New Tide cultivated good relations with the first two party chairs, Chiang Peng-chian and Yao Chia-wen, both of whom were elected with New Tide support. The result was that whereas moderates held the top post and a majority of standing committee seats, the DPP’s general secretary and deputy general secretary came from the New Tide Faction (see Table 2.1). New Tide’s hold on the party apparatus worried many moderates, including the imprisoned Formosa Magazine leaders. When these activists emerged from prison in the late 1980s, they immediately joined other DPP moderates in working to diminish New Tide’s influence.
Table 2.1 Factional Composition of DPP Leadership Year/Position 1986–1987 Chair Gen. Sec. Deputy Gen. Sec. CSC
Formosa
New Tide
Other
Chiang Peng-chian 4 members
Huang Er-hsuan Chiou I-jen 7 members
1987–1988 Chair Gen. Sec. Deputy Gen. Sec. CSC
5 members
Huang Er-hsuan Chiou I-jen 1 member
5 members
1988–1989 Chair Gen. Sec. Deputy Gen. Sec. CSC
Huang Hsin-chieh Chang Chun-hung Tsai Shih-yuan 5 members
1 member
5 members
1989–1991 Chair Gen. Sec. Deputy Gen. Sec. CSC
Huang Hsin-chieh Chang Chun-hung Tsai Shih-yuan 5 members
2 members
Chen Han-ching 4 members
1991–1993 Chair Gen. Sec.
Hsu Hsin-liang Chang Chun-hung
Deputy Gen. Sec. CSC
Yao Chia-wen
4 members
Chen Shih-meng Chiang Peng-chian Chiou I-jen 5 members
1994–1996 Chair Gen. Sec.
Shih Ming-teh Su Chen-chang (Welfare State)
Deputy Gen. Sec. CSC
Chiou I-jen
1996–1998 Chair Gen. Sec. CSC
1 member
Chiou I-jen 3 members
1998–2000 Chair Gen. Sec. CSC
You Hsi-kun 2 members
Chiou I-jen 2 members
2000–2002 Chair Gen. Sec. CSC
2 members (1 Centrist, 1 Indep. Alliance)
Hsu Hsin-liang 6 members (3 Welfare State, 2 Justice Alliance, 1 New Era) Lin Yi-hsiung
Wu Nai-teh
6 members (2 Welfare State, 3 Justice Alliance, 1 New Era) Hsieh Chang-ting (Welfare State)
Sources: Kao Ming-tsung, “Minzhu jinbu dang zhengdang zhuanxing zhi fenxi” (An analysis of the DPP’s transformation) (master’s thesis, Chinese Culture University, 1999), and news reports.
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Chang Chun-hung and Huang Hsin-chieh were pardoned and released in March 1988. They immediately joined the DPP leadership. As Kao Ming-tsung writes, “In order to counter New Tide’s hold on the party apparatus, they joined together the elected officials and political personalities of the centrist group and created the DPP’s largest faction by formally founding the Formosa Faction (Meilidao xi).”11 Their martyrdom burnished the Formosa activists’ heroic reputations, while New Tide’s relentless attacks had tarnished Kang’s, so most of Kang’s followers and other centrists soon were absorbed into the Formosa Faction, although some joined New Tide and a few (including Lin Yi-hsiung and Shih Ming-teh) maintained their independence. The Formosa Faction’s rapid rise to prominence sparked a period of intense factional conflict. From 1988 to 1991, this confrontation was so heated that many observers were convinced the DPP would not survive intact. These predictions turned out to be wrong; after 1991, the intensity of factional competition diminished. But the period of discord damaged the DPP’s credibility and hurt its electoral performance for years to come. From the beginning, the Formosa Faction was centered on personalities, not issues. Most of the opposition’s political celebrities have belonged to Formosa at one time or another. In a sense, it was similar to the factions in Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party. Aspiring politicians affiliated with Formosa because they wanted to partake of its political resources: its power in nominations for electoral and party offices, its contacts with political heavyweights, and its connections with local political networks capable of mobilizing votes and raising money. The faction did not impose much discipline on its members, nor did it require them to embrace a particular ideology or platform. The only obligation Formosa imposed upon faction members was to support its leaders in contests for power within the party. Formosa’s leaders thus could mobilize a significant number of votes both within the party and in general elections, which afforded them considerable influence over the young party’s political decisions. Not surprisingly, given its emphasis on winning elections, Formosa tended to shape its positions on issues to fit public opinion. Thus, it pushed a moderate line in party debates on issues, preferring the preservation of the status quo to a more overtly pro-independence line, for example. The New Tide Faction differs from the Formosa Faction on nearly every measure. Until recently, relatively few New Tide activists held elected offices, and even now its candidates rely more on ideological motivation than mobilization to win votes. Because elections are at the center of Taiwan’s political life, New Tide’s weakness in this area has
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From Opposition to Power
Summary: Factionalism from 1968 to 1988 1. The major division was between the Mainstream Faction, led by Kang Ning-hsiang and dedicated to gradual change through elections, and the activist intellectuals who entered the opposition movement in the 1970s and were committed to changing the system from without. (They organized under two names, the Dangwai Writers and Editors Alliance and the New Tide Faction.) 2. A group that would later be called the Formosa Faction, led by Huang Hsin-chieh, was gaining importance in the late 1970s, when its leaders were jailed after the Kaohsiung Incident (1979). As a result, it temporarily lost influence. 3. The defense attorneys in the Kaohsiung Incident trials constituted a significant force within the Dangwai/DPP. 4. Despite their disagreements, the factions cooperated in elections, and all factions took great risks in challenging the ruling party’s authority. All factions participated in founding the DPP.
diminished its influence in the party. In Taiwan politics, “What have you done for me lately?” is a key question, one that until the mid1990s, Formosa leaders answered more confidently than did the leaders of the New Tide Faction. New Tide’s electoral weakness was due, at least in part, to its own ideology, which held that mass movements were at least as important as electoral victories. As Chiou I-jen put it, Elections are an important catalyst, but it is not true that elections are the only way to come to power. I personally do not believe in armed revolution, but I also do not believe that elections can bring us to power. I believe in the power of a popular, democratic revolution. Without a strong mass movement as its foundation, I do not think the DPP can secure its electoral victories.12
New Tide also differs from Formosa in its strong ideological bent and discipline. Even grassroots-level New Tide activists are expected to pay dues, attend meetings, and commit vast amounts of time and energy to New Tide activities. In the early 1990s, a Formosa supporter in a rural town in southern Taiwan told me that the New Tide branch in her village was a “Stalinist organization,” a characterization that— while extreme—captured the atmosphere within the New Tide Faction at that time. For their part, from the moment they emerged from prison, Huang Hsin-chieh and the other Kaohsiung Incident defendants worked to shape the DPP into a tool for enhancing their own influence and pushing
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29
for political reforms. Formosa’s increased power inevitably came at the expense of the other major faction, New Tide. As Table 2.1 shows, the Formosa Faction’s rise to power in the DPP was extremely rapid. In 1986, the faction did not exist. By 1988 it controlled all of the key positions in the party, as well as five out of eleven seats on the Central Standing Committee. Still, Formosa was not able to establish a majority on the CSC, in part because during its leaders’ years in prison, other important political forces had emerged, including both New Tide and the defense attorneys. To counter Formosa’s rising strength, among other reasons, New Tide launched a campaign to make Taiwan independence the DPP’s formal position. By promoting a cause with strong emotional and ideological appeal, New Tide hoped to galvanize its own supporters and discredit Formosa’s pragmatic, centrist strategy. Thus, although there is no doubt that many New Tide activists were completely sincere in their devotion to the independence cause, factional conflict was a key motivation for launching the independence campaign. As Chen Wen-chian (Sisy Chen), a former DPP spokesperson and aide to Hsu Hsin-liang, put it, “The intensification of the DPP’s Taiwan independence line was, fundamentally, in large part a consequence of the struggle for power among factions. . . .”13 For years, the Dangwai and then the DPP had campaigned on the idea that Taiwan should have “self-determination.” Conservatives in the KMT interpreted this as a thinly veiled call for independence, but in fact it was not. From 1986 until 1991, the DPP embraced a variety of positions on the independence issue. Lin Cheng-chieh and Chu Kaocheng, both of whom supported unification, attained high positions in the DPP leadership. Whereas the call for self-determination masked a longing for independence in many DPP members’ hearts, the party’s official policy asked only that the Taiwanese people as a whole—and not a Mainlander-dominated KMT government—decide the island’s future direction. But as the government lifted its speech restrictions and met many of the opposition’s political reform demands, advocating Taiwan independence seemed both more feasible and more desirable. In 1987, at the height of New Tide influence in the DPP, the party adopted a plank in its platform stating that “people have the right to advocate Taiwan independence.” In 1988, the party passed the April 17 Resolutions, which clarified and expanded its self-determination views. One read, “Taiwan’s international sovereignty is independent; it is not part of the People’s Republic of China with its capital in Beijing.” The other said, “Any change in Taiwan’s international status must be approved by the entire Taiwanese people.” In addition, the party listed
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From Opposition to Power
conditions under which the party would advocate Taiwan independence. The “four ifs” were the brainchildren of Chen Shui-bian: If the Kuomintang and the Communists enter into one-sided peace talks, if the KMT sells out the interests of the Taiwanese people, if the Chinese Communists “unify” Taiwan, or if the KMT does not institute real democratic constitutional government, this party should advocate Taiwan independence.14
Formosa Faction leaders, especially Chang Chun-hung and Hsu Hsin-liang (who became an important Formosa figure upon his return to Taiwan in 1989), were wary of independence, which they believed (rightly, as it turned out) would antagonize the KMT and frighten voters. They argued that the DPP should stick with self-determination and preserving the status quo. Hsu even argued that the DPP should accept the national name “Republic of China on Taiwan,” a position that was rejected by his own party but adopted by the KMT. But New Tide kept up the pressure, and Taiwan independence zealots branded the Formosa leaders “unificationists.” New Tide used its tightly knit organization to demonstrate the enthusiasm of the DPP’s core supporters for the independence cause. In legislative elections held in December 1989, New Tide candidates ran as the New Nation Alliance (xin guojia lianxian). At their campaign rallies they welcomed the crowds with “Good evening, citizens of the state of Taiwan (Taiwan guo).”15 The DPP’s pro-independence wing picked up strength in 1990 when the government began to allow overseas advocates of Taiwan independence back into the country. (Ironically, Hsu Hsin-liang had urged exiles to return, for he thought the DPP lacked suitable candidates to compete in elections.)16 They immediately began pressing their cause within the DPP. Although their numbers were small, given the neck-and-neck competition between the leading factions, the returning exiles helped to tip the balance in favor of independence. In October 1990, the DPP passed a resolution stating, “Our country’s actual sovereignty does not extend to mainland China or Outer Mongolia. Our country’s future internal political and constitutional system and its foreign policy should be built upon its actual territorial boundaries.”17 In 1991 the National Party Congress responded to the nationwide debate over constitutional reform by approving a Draft Constitution of the Republic of Taiwan. The showdown between New Tide and Formosa came in October 1991. Hsu Hsin-liang (Formosa) and Shih Ming-teh (who had no factional affiliation) were the front-runners for the party chairmanship. For many DPP activists, Shih symbolized the DPP’s tragic qualities. Originally sentenced to life for his involvement in the Kaohsiung Incident, Shih served
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31
the longest prison term of all the defendants. (He had also served a lengthy prison term before the Kaohsiung Incident.) Initially, Shih had New Tide’s support. Hsu, in contrast, was a seasoned politician who had spent ten years in exile. He represented a more active, pragmatic tendency within the party. In order to secure the chairmanship, Hsu (and the Formosa Faction) decided to accede to New Tide’s core demand.18 They agreed to amend the DPP platform to include the following provision: “Based on the fundamental rights of the people, the establishment of a sovereign Taiwan Republic and the formation of a new constitution shall be determined by all citizens of Taiwan through a national referendum.” In addition, Hsu promised New Tide’s Chiou I-jen the post of deputy secretary-general. Neither of Hsu’s two secretaries general had connections to either major faction. Hsu began backtracking from the independence plank almost as soon as he took over the party chairmanship. He told the KMT that the plank represented the DPP’s position, but that he recognized the impossibility of implementing such a plan unilaterally. He also argued that it was the DPP’s responsibility to inform the rest of the world that not all Taiwanese agreed with the KMT’s plans for unification with mainland China. He also tried to soften the effects of the change by naming the following as the DPP’s “most important responsibilities”: “to compete with the KMT and strive for popular support, to consolidate a domestic consensus, to compete with China, and to strive for international support.”19 None of these gestures muted the effects of the independence plank, however. For better or for worse, the DPP had taken on the mantle of the “party of independence”; this garment would not easily be cast off. Several factors helped to end the acute stage of New Tide-Formosa conflict. First, when Hsu Hsin-liang became party chair, he agreed to share power with New Tide’s most important strategist, Chiou I-jen. In addition, the compromise that allowed Hsu to become the party chair alleviated the tension significantly. By accepting the independence plank, Formosa gave New Tide the opportunity to make the case for independence. If the party’s new stance increased its popularity, New Tide could take credit for that success. If it drove away voters, Formosa’s pragmatic strategy would be proven right. As it turned out, New Tide won the battle, but lost the war. The DPP turned in its worst performance in years in the 1991 National Assembly election, largely, although not entirely, because the independence plank frightened the voters. Since then, DPP moderates have made energetic efforts to distance themselves from Taiwan independence. The party has adopted the position that the status quo is independence, so the party’s goal is to preserve the status quo.
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From Opposition to Power
Nonetheless, many voters (not to mention PRC leaders and international media) still view the DPP as the party of independence. The formation of additional factions also helped mitigate the conflict between Formosa and New Tide. According to Kuo Cheng-liang, the Kaohsiung Incident defense attorneys and other unaffiliated DPP officials found themselves squeezed between the warring Formosa and New Tide factions. To diffuse the conflict and prevent the party from splitting, they formed factions of their own.20 During the 1991 National Assembly campaign, Chen Shui-bian founded the Justice Alliance (zhengyi lianxian), the first faction made up of elected officials. The faction became a haven for political superstars such as Lu Hsiu-lien, Peng Pai-hsien, and Shen Fu-hsiung, who wanted to combine political independence with influence in the party. Thus, the Justice Alliance is looser than other factions, since its high-profile members have little need to cooperate. The faction gained a major boost in 1994 when Chen became Taipei’s first popularly elected mayor since 1967, and another boost in 2000, when Chen Shui-bian ascended to the presidency. Shen Fu-hsiung took Chen’s place as Justice Alliance head. In 1992, Hsieh Chang-ting, Yao Chia-wen, Su Chen-chang, Chang Chun-hsiung, Yu Ching, and others formed another faction of elected officials, the Welfare State Alliance (fuli guo lianxian), merging two small factions, the Hsieh Faction and the Centrists. The Welfare State Alliance is widely viewed as a catchall for unaffiliated party celebrities. About the same time, Chou Po-lun formed the Progressive Alliance (jinbu lianxian). Later, several former exiles who had been active in the overseas group World United Formosans for Independence formed the Independence Alliance (taidu lianmeng). These new factions diluted the influence of Formosa and New Tide and created new opportunities for coalition building within the party. DPP factions continued to multiply in the late 1990s. In 1999, Chang Chun-hung left the Formosa Faction to found New Era (xin shidai). In June 2000, the Formosa Faction effectively dissolved when one of its remaining members, Hsu Rong-shu, established New Energy (xin dongli). It would be a mistake to assume that the growing number of DPP factions reflects increased disharmony within the party. On the contrary, as the number of factions has grown, their competition has become less public and less fierce. The 2000 presidential campaign provided a powerful motive to hang together, and Chen Shui-bian’s victory was an equally powerful reward. Once the election was over, resistance from the KMT majority in the Legislative Yuan provided yet another compelling reason to keep the DPP together. Thus, despite policy disagreements between Chen and some DPP members on such issues as
A Brief History of the DPP
33
cross-strait relations and nuclear power, the behavior of DPP factions and leaders since the presidential election suggests that the party will hold together, at least until elections scheduled for late 2001. Shortly after the presidential election, DPP legislators banded together to form the Mainstream Alliance. The purpose of the alliance was to support President Chen in the Legislative Yuan. Only two factions— New Era and New Tide—declined to participate, and they did so without acrimony. In addition, the factions agreed to give Hsieh Chang-ting a clear path to the party chairmanship, thereby avoiding a public fight over the post. The New Tide candidate, Hung Chi-chang, withdrew from the chair’s race, reportedly in exchange for Hsieh’s promise to support Wu Nai-teh for the post of secretary-general. The factional unity displayed during the presidential campaign continued at the 2000 DPP congress. Two controversial issues could have erupted at the conference. First, some party members hoped to revive earlier proposals to reform the party’s organizational structure. Second, DPP legislator Chen Chao-nan planned to make a formal proposal scrapping the DPP’s pro-independence position. Legislator Chen first suggested the change immediately after the presidential election, offering it as a gesture of goodwill aimed at overcoming Beijing’s opposition to President Chen Shui-bian. When the party congress convened in July, both issues were set aside. The delegates declined to act on the question of structural reform. Instead, they decided to wait for President Chen to take a leading role. And in the end, Chen Chao-nan withdrew his controversial antiindependence proposal, arguing (as did many other DPP leaders) that such a concession was “inappropriate and unfair” so long as Beijing refused to respond to President Chen’s previous overtures and continued to threaten Taiwan militarily.21 DPP politicians have good reason to emphasize unity and harmony. KMT legislators blocked President Chen’s every move in his early months in office, making it clear that only a DPP legislative majority could secure the DPP’s status as the ruling party. To win such a victory will be extremely difficult, and will require the full cooperation of every DPP member and politician. However, there is a chance that voters will be so turned off by the KMT’s obstinacy that the DPP may be able to deprive the Kuomintang of a legislative majority in 2001. Thus, DPP legislators (and potential legislative candidates) have every reason to help their party succeed. Adding to their motivation is the fact that if the DPP increases its legislative presence in 2001, many DPP legislators and deputy cabinet ministers can expect to receive cabinet appointments. Thus, whereas factions will continue to exist and to structure
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From Opposition to Power
competition for party offices and legislative nominations, we can expect the DPP to present a relatively united front to the outside world, at least until the end of 2001. Although the party held only a small share of elected offices in the 1980s and early 1990s, the DPP’s machinations and activism were not in vain. Shortly after the party was founded, the pace of political reform in Taiwan accelerated. The government, under the leadership of President Chiang Ching-kuo and his successor, President Lee Teng-hui, made a series of concessions to the opposition agenda. In 1987, Chiang lifted martial law, legalizing political parties and new mass media outlets. Restrictions on political speech disappeared overnight (although advocacy of communism and Taiwan independence remained off-limits). In 1990, President Lee (who assumed office in 1988, after Chiang’s death) sponsored a National Affairs Conference, at which representatives of the KMT and DPP discussed the future direction of reform. Among other things, they agreed that the national representative bodies—the Legislative Yuan and National Assembly—should be entirely reconstituted with members elected by the people of Taiwan. Such elections were carried out in 1991 and 1992. In 1994, the first direct election was held for a Taiwan provincial governor, along with long-suspended mayoral elections in Taipei and Kaohsiung. And in 1996 the people of Taiwan directly elected their president for the first time. In addition to these highly visible reforms, Taiwan’s political system was reconfigured in innumerable smaller ways to make it more open and democratic.
Summary: Factionalism from 1988 to 2000 1. The Formosa Faction was founded by the Kaohsiung Incident defendants upon their release from prison. It quickly became the largest, most powerful faction. 2. Between 1989 and 1991, New Tide tried to counter Formosa’s influence by pushing for Taiwan independence. The result was the DPP’s decision to adopt the independence plank in 1991. 3. The proliferation of factions after 1991, the independence plank’s failure in elections, and the institutionalization of factional competition combined to alleviate inter-factional conflict after 1991. Ideological debates diminished in frequency and intensity. 4. Between 1991 and 2000, the number of factions multiplied. By 2000, there were half a dozen factions, most of which participated in the Mainstream Alliance in the Legislative Yuan. Their primary function was to structure negotiations over party policies and nominations.
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Although many factors were important in prompting the ROC government to democratize Taiwan’s political system, there is no question that relentless pressure from the opposition, backed by its strong showing in elections, was an essential component of the mix. Paradoxically, however, the institutional reforms in which the DPP played so important a role did not bring the opposition party to power. On the contrary, the DPP’s performance in national elections stagnated at 30–35 percent of the vote. Although its legislative influence grew as the KMT weakened, the DPP still is nowhere near winning a majority of seats in the legislature. It has done better in local races; DPP executives now administer thirteen of Taiwan’s twenty-three municipalities, and the party has controlled Taiwan’s two largest cities (Taipei, under Chen Shui-bian, from 1994 to 1998, and Kaohsiung, under Hsieh Chang-ting, since 1998). Still, even the DPP’s greatest success to date—Chen’s 2000 presidential victory—was accomplished with only 39 percent of the popular vote. It is worth considering why this vibrant and active party has made such limited progress.
NOTES 1. In addition to the KMT, the ROC had two domesticated “opposition” parties prior to the DPP’s founding, the China Youth Party and the China Social Democratic Party. Neither provided any real political opposition or supervision in the pre-reform era, and neither was able to remain relevant after the reforms took hold. 2. Jiuling niandai: Taiwan qiantu zhudao renwu, minjindang 1 (The 1990s: Taiwan’s future leaders, the Democratic Progressive Party, volume 1) (Taipei: Tianhsiang Publishing Company, 1989), 114. 3. Hsu Hsin-liang was impeached and removed from his post as Taoyuan county executive because he participated in these protests. 4. Jiuling niandai, 3. 5. Li Hsiao-feng, Taiwan minzhu yundong 40 nian (Forty years of Taiwan’s democratic movement) (Taipai: Independence Evening Post Publishing Company, 1989), 146. 6. Ibid., 146. 7. Hsu Hsin-liang also saw his reputation tarnished by accusations that he had evaded the fate of his Formosa Magazine colleagues. 8. Quoted in Li, Taiwan minzhu, 188. 9. Kuo Cheng-liang, Minjindang zhuanxing zhi tong (The DPP’s painful transformation) (Taipei: Tianhsia Publishing Company, 1998), 166. 10. Li, Taiwan minzhu, 227. 11. Kao Ming-tsung, “Minzhu jinbu dang zhengdang zhuanxing zhi fenxi” (An analysis of the DPP’s transformation) (master’s thesis, Chinese Culture University, 1999), 71. 12. Quoted in Hsia Chen, Hsu Hsin-liang de zhengzhi shijie (The political world of Hsu Hsin-liang (Taipei: Tianhsia Publishing Company, 1998), 170.
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From Opposition to Power
13. Quoted in Kao, Minzhu jinbu, 72. 14. Kuo, Minjindang, 65. 15. Kao, Minzhu jinbu, 73, n. 53. 16. Hsia, Hsu Hsin-liang, 174. 17. Quoted in Kuo, Minjindang, 66. 18. According to James A. Robinson, another consideration also influenced this decision. By amending the party charter and platform in this way, the DPP hoped to force the KMT to back down on a law outlawing the advocacy of Taiwanese independence. 19. Hsia, Hsu Hsin-liang, 183. 20. Kuo, Minjindang, 166 21. Taipei Times, 16 July 2000. Available online at: http://www.taipeitimes. com/news/2000/07/16/story/0000043942.
3
Roadblocks on the DPP’s Path to Power
In its short lifetime, the DPP has experienced triumph and frustration. In this, it is like any other political party. But for the DPP, frustration outweighs triumph. Even the party’s greatest success—capturing the presidency—was limited, since without a legislative majority, the party could not push through its policy objectives. The fundamental problem facing the DPP is this: after fourteen years in existence, it rarely attracts more than 40 percent of the vote in national or local elections. This is not enough to win a majority in the legislature, and it can bring success in executive elections only if the DPP’s opponents are divided. This state of affairs may well change now that the DPP holds the presidency; breaking the 40 percent barrier is the party’s main goal for the 2001 legislative elections. But doing so will require the party to overcome a number of structural impediments.
THE KMT’S IDEOLOGICAL FLEXIBILITY One of the most vexing problems facing the DPP has been the KMT’s talent for co-opting the opposition’s popular ideas. For example, the KMT, which suppressed democracy advocates for decades, today takes credit for Taiwan’s democratization. In January, Vice President Lien Chan said, “Lee [Teng-hui] is regarded as ‘Mr. Democracy’ by the foreign media, the man who led Taiwan into becoming a democratic country.”1 In fact, although KMT leaders eventually acknowledged the need for reform, without pressure from the opposition, change would have come much more slowly, and with more limited results. A more specific example of the KMT taking over a DPP proposal is the ruling party’s decision in 1993 to pursue a seat in the United
37
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From Opposition to Power
Nations. DPP politicians, particularly Vice President Lu Hsiu-lien (Annette Lu), began agitating for a UN bid in 1990. They argued that Taiwan should seek representation in the United Nations alongside the PRC. When Taiwan independence proved counterproductive as a campaign issue in the 1991 National Assembly elections, the DPP looked to the UN idea as an opportunity to rebuild its credibility in international affairs. In fact, the UN bid was an immediate hit with the public, and it was a very successful issue for DPP candidates in the 1992 Legislative Yuan race. At first, the KMT was unable to embrace the UN concept because hard-liners within the party opposed any move that might undercut the notion that the ROC was the one and only Chinese state. Entering the UN, even in the guise of a second China, was unacceptable to the old guard. But in 1993, Lee Teng-hui and his Mainstream Faction engineered the hard-liners’ removal from power, liberating the party from the ideological straitjacket it had worn since Chiang Kai-shek’s day. Immediately, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs began preparations for a UN bid. Thus, the DPP’s most successful campaign issue in 1992 became a KMT policy initiative a year later. Ordinarily, ideology and historical practice prevent political parties from gobbling up their opponents’ positions. But as a single party driving the entire ROC political system, the prereform KMT needed to be open to a variety of policy paths. Unlike a multiparty system, the ROC’s political market had only one merchant; all policy initiatives came from within the KMT. Thus, over the course of its long tenure as Taiwan’s ruling party, the KMT learned to take a flexible approach to public policy. In its domestic policy, at least, the ROC government was remarkably adaptable. It adjusted its economic policies regularly to capture new opportunities, and its strategy for winning elections was innovative and pragmatic. For many years, the only strong ideological constraint on the KMT was its commitment to mainland recovery and the unification of Taiwan with mainland China. The DPP developed several policy positions aimed at exploiting the KMT’s dogmatism on these issues, advocating direct elections for national leaders and the elimination of the provincial government—both of which were popular with voters but violated KMT hard-liners’ standards for preserving the ROC equals China fiction. Once the hard-liners were driven out in 1993, even these issues were open to negotiation. In addition, the KMT was able to co-opt popular DPP proposals because the voters were willing to give credence to its policy shifts. If the DPP were stronger, with more popular support, it might have been able to resist these hostile takeovers. But at least until March 2000, Taiwanese
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39
were so accustomed to recognizing the KMT as the party of government that only when the KMT took up a policy initiative did most voters believe there was hope of achieving it. Thus, voters have proven quick to put aside their skepticism and reward the KMT for adopting new policies, even at the expense of the opposition party that originated the idea. Only when the KMT fails to act on its promises over a long period of time do voters tend to rate the opposition above the ruling party. For example, the KMT tried—but failed—to steal the DPP’s thunder on anticorruption and environmental issues. It failed because it did not back up its rhetoric with action, and its credibility suffered.2 The KMT has continued its strategy of co-opting DPP proposals under President Chen. In fact, KMT legislators hijacked the new administration’s first major legislative initiative, a proposal to reduce working hours from forty-eight to forty-four per week. Instead of passing the bill offered by the cabinet, KMT legislators introduced a countermeasure. Their proposal, which passed, outdid that of the DPP by offering to cut working hours even further, to eighty-four per every two weeks. The KMT’s flexibility on ideological and policy matters is reinforced by another peculiarity of Taiwanese politics: Taiwan’s political cleavages do not follow socioeconomic fault lines.
THE ABSENCE OF CLASS-BASED POLITICS In most democracies, political parties developed in response to the divergent interests of different socioeconomic classes. Great Britain and several other countries make this distinction explicitly, calling their parties Labour and Conservative. But even where parties have other names, their differences tend to center on their positions on an economically defined left-right spectrum. In Taiwan, however, political parties do not represent class interests. This fact works against the DPP in practice. There are two main reasons for the absence of class politics in Taiwan, and two main results. To begin with, the context in which party politics developed was dominated by political concerns. From the beginning, the opposition’s central motivation was to overturn the KMT’s authoritarian ruling structure. People joined the Dangwai Movement and the DPP because they opposed the KMT, for many different reasons. Each opposition activist has a unique complex of motives combining historical resentment, family tradition, personal relationships, ideological conviction, careerism, commitment to Taiwan independence, a desire to protect the environment, and so on. What unites these disparate individuals is the
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From Opposition to Power
recognition that the most plausible strategy for removing the KMT from power is to offer an alternative. Opposition activists share a political agenda, but their economic interests are anything but uniform. In fact, they often are contradictory. For example, many DPP supporters are entrepreneurs in small, private companies. Their opposition to the KMT stems, in part, from their resentment of the favored treatment the ruling party has given to big business at the expense of small and medium-sized enterprises. At the same time, however, many DPP supporters are environmentalists and labor activists who oppose other aspects of the KMT’s economic policies. Obviously, these groups do not have parallel economic interests. A second reason for the lack of economic politics in Taiwan is the KMT’s economic strategy. Since the 1940s, the KMT has worked to secure a base of support in all socioeconomic classes. When its economic policies have promoted the interests of one group above another, the party has used patronage and pork barrel projects to compensate the losers. The result is a party that, like the DPP, embraces a range of social classes. One of the KMT’s most brilliant successes, both politically and economically, was the land reform program undertaken in the early 1950s. The ROC government purchased large holdings and sold them to the tenants who worked the land on very favorable terms. The policy undercut the political and economic power of the landlord class, secured the political support of individual farm families, and increased agricultural productivity. At the same time, the KMT promoted heavy industry, which benefited both entrepreneurs and industrial workers. The only Taiwanese whose economic contributions economic policymakers consistently undervalued were entrepreneurs in small and medium-sized firms. (The government generally left them on their own, with little access to credit, subsidies, or other government assistance.) However, the party purchased their compliance through pork barrel schemes and kickbacks to the grassroots political networks to which most of these entrepreneurs belonged. Taiwan’s classless politics has important consequences for the DPP. Above all, it forces the DPP to lean heavily on noneconomic issues. But noneconomic issues usually are less important to voters than economic concerns. When the DPP was founded, most Taiwanese were satisfied with the KMT-led government’s economic performance, but many resented its authoritarian tendencies and discriminatory treatment of Taiwanese. Consequently, in the early years the DPP emphasized ethnic justice and democratization. For many voters, these issues were more important than economics, and the DPP’s vote share increased
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41
steadily. However, after 1989, the ROC government implemented many of the DPP’s reform proposals, and the Taiwanese came to play the leading role in the KMT and the ROC government. In effect, the ruling party met the DPP’s demands, which left the opposition casting about for new issues to mobilize its supporters. Finding new issues has proven difficult, and the DPP made its predicament worse when it reformulated the demand for ethnic justice and self-determination into a call for Taiwan independence. Most Taiwanese remain satisfied with the KMT’s economic performance, and many worry that the DPP’s independence platform is unnecessary and provocative. As a result, while the Taiwanese complain about political corruption, environmental destruction, economic inequality, and other issues on which the DPP leads the KMT, they tend to vote on economics and national security, and on these issues, the DPP trails the ruling party. Classless politics also creates another problem: conflicts of interest within the opposition party. The DPP is a coalition of anti-KMT political elements; its members have very little in common, aside from their dislike of the ruling party. As a result, when the party attempts to articulate strong positions on policy questions, it often provokes internal squabbles. The clearest example is the DPP’s reputation as an antibusiness party. DPP moderates find this reputation troubling, but others, including many in the New Tide Faction, believe the DPP should be a voice for labor and environmental concerns. Because there is not a strong consensus on the issue, individual DPP politicians are free to oppose specific industrial projects. When they do, they reinforce the perception that the DPP opposes business interests. For example, in 1998, the German chemical giant Bayer AG cancelled a huge industrial project planned for Taichung County after the county executive, a DPP politician, insisted on subjecting the project to a local referendum. Although the DPP chair favored the Bayer project, the fact that a DPP-led local government opposed it reinforced the DPP’s antibusiness reputation. (The Bayer controversy is discussed in detail in Chapter 6.) The perception that the DPP opposes the interests of business was further reinforced by President Chen’s decisions to cancel a planned dam in southern Taiwan and halt construction of a fourth nuclear power plant. Both projects were aimed at supporting industrial expansion.
THE SVMM ELECTORAL SYSTEM When Japan reformed its electoral system in 1993, Taiwan became the only country in the world still using the electoral formula known by the
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From Opposition to Power
cumbersome name “single, nontransferable voting in multimember districts” (SVMM).3 Taiwan uses the SVMM system for all of its representative bodies: the Legislative Yuan, National Assembly (until the National Assembly was reduced to an ad hoc body in 2000), Provincial Assembly (until 1994, when the last Provincial Assembly election was held), municipal and town and township councils. Under this formula, each voter selects a single candidate, but the great majority of districts have at least two representatives. Districts are drawn along municipal boundaries; in order to maintain equal representation, the number of members elected from each district—the district magnitude—varies according to population. Taiwan’s legislative districts have anywhere from one representative to more than a dozen. To win an SVMM election, a candidate does not need a majority of the votes cast; it is necessary only to finish near the top. The larger the district magnitude, the more candidates enter the race. As the number of candidates increases, the percentage of the vote required to win a seat diminishes. A handful of Taiwanese districts have only one representative; elections in these districts are, in essence, plurality elections. But where the district magnitude is large, the percentage of votes needed to capture a seat can be quite small. For example, in a district with five evenly matched candidates (a modest-sized field by Taiwanese standards), one or more candidates might well be elected with fewer than 20 percent of the votes cast. In one extreme case, a candidate was elected to the Legislative Yuan with less than 3 percent of the vote, in a district in which forty-eight candidates were competing for sixteen seats. The SVMM formula has far-reaching political consequences. Above all, it favors large parties with ample resources to manage candidates and mobilize supporters; in Taiwan, that means it favors the KMT. SVMM elections benefit large, well-organized parties because in order to achieve a legislative majority under this system a political party must plan and execute an intricate strategy. In order to maximize its share of legislative seats, a party must win multiple seats in most districts. To do this, it faces a twofold challenge: first, it must accurately estimate the number of votes it can expect to receive in each district (so as to nominate the ideal number of candidates); second, it must make sure that its votes are distributed evenly among its nominees. If the votes are not distributed evenly, one or two candidates may win with votes to spare, while the rest are defeated. The KMT first competed in SVMM elections in the 1950s. Over the years, the party developed an effective procedure for managing
Roadblocks on the DPP’s Path to Power
43
these elections. The process relies on the cooperation of grassroots political machines; the KMT rewards the local bosses and factions that participate with patronage positions, political endorsements, and pork barrel projects. Prior to each election, potential candidates meet with party leaders and faction bosses to estimate the number of votes the party can capture in each district. (Theoretically, any group of candidates could agree to divide the vote in their district; but in practice, only the KMT has had the organizational resources and vote share to carry out such a strategy on a large scale, although the DPP has made some progress in this area.) The sources for these estimates are grassroots political bosses known by their Taiwanese name tiau-a-ka. These men and women also are charged with delivering the votes they have reported. Those who do so are rewarded with material benefits and enhanced social status. Many voters accept tiau-a-kas’ recommendations because they trust their political judgment; this is especially true in races in which many candidates are competing, since a long ballot makes it difficult to choose a candidate. It also is common for tiau-akas to provide gifts or payments to encourage compliance. Based on the tiau-a-kas’ estimates, KMT officials in each district nominate only as many candidates as they can elect, given the number of votes reported. Once the KMT slate is set, the nominees negotiate a division of turf, assigning to each one a “responsibility zone” containing enough reliable KMT votes to elect the candidate. Apportioning votes correctly is extremely important. A candidate who secures too few votes will lose, but one who secures too many wastes votes that could have helped elect a less popular nominee. If the estimates of vote resources are accurate and no candidate poaches in another’s territory, dividing turf makes elections less costly and more predictable for everyone. Until the mid-1980s, the real competition in most elections was finished long before the voters marked their ballots, because what really mattered was the KMT’s nominating process. Once nominated and assigned to a responsibility zone, a KMT candidate was home free. In the absence of strong competition, SVMM elections actually can reduce conflict within large parties. An SVMM race is not necessarily a zero-sum game; on the contrary, SVMM elections have many winners. Thus, before the DPP came on the scene, the SVMM formula encouraged cooperation among KMT candidates. As competition from outside the KMT increased, however, KMT politicians were less and less willing to risk their own positions to help the party as a whole. They began poaching in one another’s responsibility zones and bidding up the price of votes, which raised the cost of campaigning and increased politicians’ incentives to participate in corruption.
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From Opposition to Power
Executive elections are the Achilles’ heel of the KMT political machine. Unlike SVMM elections, contests for municipal and township executive posts can have only one winner. Thus, they force local factions to compete against one another. For many years, the KMT used a strategy of alternating factions in these offices in order to minimize conflict, but this approach had limited success, especially in the 1970s and 1980s, when local factions began to appreciate their own importance to the ruling party. When an opposition candidate entered an executive race, the local faction that had lost the contest for the KMT nomination now had a new weapon at its disposal: it could refuse to mobilize votes for the KMT candidate—or even throw its support behind the opposition candidate. Beginning in 1977, this kind of behavior became increasingly common. As elections became more competitive, local factions became ever more powerful.
Special Focus: Measuring Parties’ Performance in SVMM Elections Competition from outside the KMT, and especially from an organized opponent such as the DPP, makes SVMM elections much more unmanageable for the ruling party. Nonetheless, the KMT still does a better job than the DPP, which lacks the grassroots infrastructure required to maximize its performance. One way to measure this is to look at the parties’ “seat bonuses,” the difference between the percentage of the vote they receive and the percentage of seats they win. To achieve a large seat bonus—and in order to make every vote count—a party must implement its SVMM strategy skillfully. If opposing parties do not make their votes count, the successful party will end up transforming its share of the vote into a larger share of seats in the legislature. Table 3.1 shows the seat bonuses resulting from Legislative Yuan elections in the 1980s and 1990s. It illustrates two points. First, the fact that the KMT achieved a seat bonus in every election proves that it is better at managing SVMM elections than its opponents. Second, the diminishing size of the KMT’s seat bonuses suggests that it is not as far ahead as it used to be. There is another, more graphic, way to illustrate the KMT’s track record in mobilizing voters for SVMM elections. Figure 3.1 shows how two hypothetical parties’ candidates performed relative to the number of votes required to win a seat. Those who won 100 percent or more of the quota were elected (“quota” refers to the percentage of the vote won by the lowest-ranked successful candidate); those below 100 percent
45
Roadblocks on the DPP’s Path to Power Table 3.1 Seat Bonuses in Legislative Yuan Elections (percentage of seats won minus percentage of votes won) Year KMT Dangwai/DPP Other
1980
1983
1986
1989
1992
1995
1998
+8 –6 –2
+16 –12 –4
+11 –8 –3
+11 –10 –1
+2 0 –2
+4 0 –3
+8 +2 –10
were not. The tall bar at the center of Figure 3.1 shows the ideal outcome for a political party hoping to maximize its share of seats in an SVMM race: all of the party’s candidates won exactly as many votes as they needed to be elected. None were defeated, and none wasted votes. In contrast, a party whose votes were distributed randomly would produce the opposite result: a flat distribution across all categories, with votes wasted at each end. Figures 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 show the actual results of three legislative elections. Clearly, the KMT’s performance comes closer to the ideal than does the DPP’s (or the New Party’s). KMT candidates tended to cluster around the quota: most candidates got close to the percentage they needed to be elected. Relatively few were defeated, and relatively few won by margins wide enough to have elected an additional KMT candidate in the district. The DPP’s performance was less successful. The relatively even height of the bars in the figures shows that some DPP candidates won with far more votes than they needed, while others, who might have been helped by sharing the vote more evenly, were defeated.
CANDIDATE-ORIENTED VOTING A fourth peculiarity of Taiwan politics that hinders the DPP is its weak tradition of party identification and issue-oriented voting. There are both cultural and institutional explanations for this phenomenon. Culturally, Taiwanese strongly value personal relationships and connections, so voting for a person—rather than a party or set of issue positions—is comfortable for many Taiwanese. However, ROC political institutions play a critical role in reinforcing this inclination. Under a different political system, the Taiwanese might well vote on the basis of party identification and issue preferences, but the structure of elections makes this unlikely at present. The institutional causes of Taiwan’s personalistic voting patterns are numerous.
Figure 3.1 Ideal Versus Poor Performance in SVMM Elections
Figure 3.2 Party Performance in the 1989 Legislative Yuan Election
Figure 3.3 Party Performance in the 1992 Legislative Yuan Election
Figure 3.4 Party Performance in the 1995 Legislative Yuan Election
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From Opposition to Power
• Because the SVMM system requires voters to choose among candidates representing the same party, party cues are not very useful. In a study of the SVMM system in Japan, political scientist Thomas Rochon found that whereas candidate-oriented voting was prevalent in Japan, this was the case only where parties nominated more than one candidate in a district. In cases in which only one candidate represented a party in a district, voters were much more likely to say they made their decision on the basis of party identification.4 • The SVMM system mutes the importance of issues in campaigns. Members of a party who are trying to divide their party’s votes evenly are reluctant to compete on the basis of issues, since to do so would damage party unity and coherence. Instead, they try to distinguish themselves on the basis of personal qualities, often dividing the vote according to “image niches.” • Martial law provisions in effect until 1987 prevented the development of party identification by limiting Taiwan to one party. Meanwhile, martial law also allowed the KMT to squelch meaningful discussions of political issues. For more than four decades, Taiwan had only one real political party, a fact that made party identification moot. At the same time, the government-controlled media prevented free-ranging political debate and issue discussions. Since 1987, both party identification and the availability of information about public policy (and political candidates’ positions on the issues) have increased substantially, and issues have become much more important. Taiwan’s authoritarian past also has another effect: until the 1990s, elected officials—even members of the Legislative Yuan—had very little real power. Thus, the positions candidates took on the issues made little real difference, a fact not lost on the voters. • Taiwan’s machine politics encourages candidate-oriented voting. Under this mode of political mobilization, voters look to grassroots political bosses to tell them for whom they should vote. These political bosses tend to emphasize the personal qualities of the candidates they recommend (especially their ability and willingness to provide services to constituents) rather than their positions on issues.
THE LENINIST ORGANIZATIONAL MODEL Taiwan’s political parties show the strong influence of China’s relationship with the former Soviet Union when the KMT was in its infancy. Like its rival, the Chinese Communist Party, the Kuomintang borrowed heavily from the Soviet Communists’ Leninist organizational model.
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Thus, the KMT is led by a strong party chair (who for most of its history also served as the president of the ROC), a central standing committee, and a central committee. When the DPP formed, it too followed this model, emulating the only party it knew well. But unlike the KMT, which concentrated political resources and decisionmaking authority in the hands of the party chair, the DPP is highly democratic internally. The DPP chair and standing committee have few political resources to use to enforce their decisions; as a result, they lead by negotiation and compromise. In short, the DPP’s formal organization is inappropriate for the political conditions it faces. This weakens the party’s effectiveness. (For a detailed discussion of party organization, see Chapter 4; for an analysis of factionalism, see Chapter 5.)
TAIWAN’S UNIQUE INTERNATIONAL STATUS Taiwan’s international status—or its lack—and the hard constraint imposed by its troubled relationship with the People’s Republic of China are extremely important factors helping to shape the DPP’s development. Unlike most other young political parties, the DPP grew up in the shadow of an overwhelming external threat. This danger affected the DPP’s growth in four major ways: 1. The threat of conflict with the PRC makes Taiwanese voters cautious. Given the very real possibility of military confrontation, most Taiwanese prefer to avoid provoking China unless Taiwan’s fundamental interests are at stake. To date, the ruling party has avoided conflict with Beijing, making it a good bet for maintaining peace and stability in the eyes of most Taiwanese. Voters are willing to put the DPP in charge of municipal governments, which do not have much say in cross-strait affairs. But when it comes to national politics, their preference for stability makes the Taiwanese reluctant to give the DPP more power—and even more reluctant to make it the ruling party. Even Chen Shui-bian, whose statements about cross-strait relations were anything but provocative, attracted the votes of only 40 percent of Taiwan’s electorate. 2. One of the central challenges facing the DPP has been to develop issues and positions that can win over new voters. But as we have seen, the KMT’s flexible ideology allows it to swallow up the DPP’s successful policy proposals. One issue on which the KMT did not enjoy flexibility in the past is the definition of the state. Until 1993, the DPP was the only voice in Taiwan offering a strong defense of Taiwanese cultural nationalism and de facto autonomy. Since 1993, however,
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From Opposition to Power
the KMT has eroded the DPP’s leadership even on this issue. Lee Tenghui’s Mainstream Faction marginalized his party’s pro-unification group in 1993, driving several leading unificationists to quit the KMT and found the New Party. Since then, the Kuomintang has moved much closer to the DPP’s position. In fact, Lee Teng-hui’s July 1999 description of cross-strait ties as a “special state-to-state relationship” and Chen Shui-bian’s moderate stance on cross-strait relations leave a narrowing gap between KMT and DPP policies on this issue. 3. The smoldering conflict between Taipei and Beijing gives the KMT a credible and salient argument against the DPP. Whenever the DPP begins gaining political ground, the KMT reminds voters of two facts: First, the PRC leadership says a DPP government in Taiwan is unacceptable because the DPP’s goal is Taiwan independence. Second, China has not renounced the use of force against Taiwan if it attempts to become independent. Beijing reinforces this strategy every time it makes threatening statements against the DPP or launches military exercises aimed at reminding Taiwan of its threat. In effect, if not by design, the PRC leadership and the KMT have worked together to prevent a DPP victory, seen in the fact they have tended to escalate their rhetoric at the same time: in the run-up to elections. This strategy is not infallible, however, as the results of the 2000 presidential race reveal. And despite Beijing’s dislike for Chen Shui-bian, the Chinese leaders’ unwillingness to take strong action against him in the early months of his presidency will make it much more difficult for the KMT to use the PRC threat against the DPP in the future. 4. The PRC threat has had at least one positive effect on Taiwan’s domestic politics: it helped to make the transition to democracy peaceful. Given the threat of military intervention from the mainland if Taiwan’s domestic politics became too chaotic, all the players in Taiwan’s political arena were forced to moderate their rhetoric and behavior. Throughout the transition process, activists on all sides called for restraint. The opposition within Taiwan never seriously considered revolutionary action or political violence, not least because such tactics might well have prompted Beijing to intervene.
NOTES 1. Taipei Times, 10 January 2000. Available online at: http://www.taipeitimes. com/news/2000/01/10/story/0000018971. 2. For example, a China Times poll in early January found that more than half of those polled believed KMT presidential nominee Lien Chan would not
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keep a high-profile campaign promise to put the ruling party’s financial assets in a trust. 3. Some writers use the abbreviation SNTV to label this voting formula. 4. Thomas R. Rochon, “Electoral Systems and the Basis of the Vote,” in Parties, Candidates and Voters in Japan: Six Quantitative Studies, ed. John C. Campbell (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1981), 6–7.
4
Organization
A party’s organization plays an important role in determining how effectively it performs its key political functions: merging citizens’ interests and preferences into a coherent platform and promoting candidates for public office. In the United States, with its presidential system, political parties are large, loosely organized groups whose main goal is to structure the electoral process. In parliamentary systems, parties are disciplined and centralized. They compete for legislative majorities, which allow them to form cabinets and select prime ministers. Taiwan’s political system combines elements of presidential and parliamentary government. Designing party organizations that work well in this hybrid system has not been easy, especially for the DPP. The DPP’s organizational structure is based on that of the Kuomintang, which in turn has the Soviet Communist Party as its model. The KMT is highly centralized. Decisionmaking power is concentrated in the hands of the Central Standing Committee and the party chair. Both parties emphasize obedience, ideology, and centralism, guaranteeing a top-down management style. When the DPP was founded in 1986, the activists who designed its structure took the KMT as their organizational model, but they also wanted to design a party that would be democratic. The result is a hybrid within a hybrid: a democratic party with Leninist institutions operating in a semi-presidential, semi-parliamentary political environment. Making this awkward combination work is not easy, and in many cases informal structures such as political factions have proven more important and effective than the party’s formal organization. The DPP’s organizational structure is defined in its charter, which establishes three layers of party offices (dangbu): central (zhongyang), municipal (including counties [xian] and cities [shi]), and local (townships
55
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From Opposition to Power
[xiang], towns [zhen], and cities within counties [xian xia shi]). The charter also stipulates special party offices for women, youth, aboriginal people, entrepreneurs, and overseas Taiwanese. Each party office includes a representative assembly as well as an administrative staff.
CENTRAL PARTY HEADQUARTERS (MINJINDANG ZHONGYANG DANGBU) The DPP’s top decisionmaking body is the National Party Congress (NPC; quanguo dangyuan daibiao hui). The congress meets at least once each year, although the Central Executive Committee (CEC; zhongyang zhixing weiyuanhui) and the municipal headquarters may call special sessions, which they often do. Members of the congress serve two-year terms. The congress’s members belong to two categories, representatives of party organizations and DPP members holding elective office in the government. The former includes representatives elected by municipal and functional headquarters as well as the secretary-general and all sitting members of the Central Executive Committee and Central Review Committee (CRC; zhongyang pingyi weiyuanhui), chairs (zhuren) of municipal offices, and municipal Review Committee conveners (zhaoji ren). The elected officials category includes municipal executives, DPP members of the Legislative Yuan and National Assembly, and DPP members of the Taipei and Kaohsiung city councils. Formally, the National Party Congress’s responsibilities include amending the party charter and platform; receiving reports from the Central Executive Committee, the Review Committee, the legislative caucuses, and the Municipal Executives’ Alliance; ruling on proposals; electing and recalling Executive and Review Committee members; and ruling on disciplinary cases. In practice, however, like most large legislative bodies, the National Party Congress exercises little actual control over the DPP’s strategy and policy. Its primary function is to legitimate decisions made in the Central Standing Committee and by the party chair. The top administrative official in the DPP is the party chair (zhuxi), the only DPP official elected by the entire party membership. The chair serves a maximum of two two-year terms. The chair is automatically a member of the Central Executive Committee and the Central Review Committee. He or she appoints a general secretary (mishu zhang) and one or two deputy general secretaries. In practice, DPP chairs operate under tight constraints and few have exercised decisive leadership. Elected officials, especially the leaders of
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the DPP’s influential factions, control more political resources than party chairs, and they also play a more important policymaking role in the government. This puts them in a strong position vis-à-vis the party chair. In fact, DPP insiders characterize the party chair’s role as that of a coordinator and negotiator rather than a leader in the conventional sense. The chair’s job is to build consensus among the party’s various factions and caucuses. The most successful party chairs are those—like Lin Yi-hsiung—who excel at negotiating among various party subgroups and who enjoy a high degree of legitimacy across factional lines. Party chairs who initiate new policy directions often suffer the fate of Hsu Hsin-liang: they are attacked from within for overstepping their authority. Similarly, since the Formosa Faction’s heyday (1987–1989), party chairs have come to power through compromises, often appointing members of competing factions to high administrative posts. For example, New Tide Faction member Chiou I-jen served as deputy secretarygeneral under Hsu Hsin-liang (Formosa Faction) and secretary-general under Lin Yi-hsiung (no factional affiliation). In 2000, when Hsieh Chang-ting of the Welfare State Alliance became DPP chair, another important New Tide figure, Wu Nai-jen, was named secretary-general. The party chair is assisted by a ten-member Central Standing Committee (changwu zhixing weiyuanhui) that meets at least weekly. The CSC members are elected from within by the thirty-member Central Executive Committee. The CEC is required to meet only four times a year, making it less influential than the CSC. Potential members of these key committees are nominated by the party’s legislative caucuses and by DPP members holding high government offices. The CEC’s responsibilities include carrying out the decisions of the National Party Congress, planning, rule making, overseeing budget and personnel matters, and supervising the municipal and local headquarters. The most important factor in the selection of CEC and CSC members is the balance of power among party factions, because gaining representation on these committees determines how far a faction will be able to advance its members’ careers. The Central Review Committee has a lower profile than the CEC and CSC. Its members, who are elected by the National Party Congress, are required to have administrative experience in the party or government, or to be trained in law. They are charged with supervising the CEC, preparing regulations and budgets, reviewing the party’s accounts, and deciding disciplinary matters. The Central Party Office also houses the DPP’s administrative apparatus, including the following departments:
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From Opposition to Power • •
• • • • •
• •
International Affairs (coordinates the DPP’s overseas relations and relations with foreigners in Taiwan) Chinese Affairs (manages the DPP’s relations with the PRC, explains the DPP’s position on cross-strait relations, and advises DPP policymaking bodies on PRC matters) Women’s Development Social Development Organizational Development Information (manages press inquiries) Survey Center (conducts a wide variety of public opinion polls, including the surveys that are used in the DPP’s nominating process) Youth Development Secretariat
The DPP also has three auxiliary committees: the Financial Management Committee, the Policy Research and Coordination Committee (charged with maintaining policy consistency among the various offices of the party, such as the central headquarters and the legislative caucuses), and the Taiwan Institute of Democracy.
MUNICIPAL AND LOCAL BRANCH OFFICES The rules governing municipal and local (or second and third tier, respectively) party offices seek to balance the need for coordination and discipline with the party’s highly democratic culture. The emphasis in the party charter is on independence and autonomy for local offices. Article 25 reads, “Every local party office has decisionmaking autonomy on all local matters, so long as it does not violate the party charter or policies.” Second- and third-tier DPP offices make the most of their autonomy; their independent spirit is evident in the diversity of political styles in the various offices, in the positions they take, and in their sometimes troubled relations with the party center. The DPP recognizes twenty-three municipalities (unlike the ROC government, the DPP does not differentiate the cities of Taipei and Kaohsiung from the twenty-one other counties and cities in Taiwan). Municipalities vary greatly in terms of population and DPP popularity; some have large party organizations, while a few have trouble even finding candidates to nominate for public office. Where there are fewer than 500 DPP members in a locality, it can be run directly by its members. Otherwise, members elect a party congress. Many towns, townships, and cities
Organization
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within municipalities—the so-called third-tier—do not have DPP branch offices at all. Third-tier headquarters are most common in urban and suburban areas where the DPP is popular. As of June 1999, there were seventy-seven third-tier DPP offices in Taiwan. The organization of municipal and local branch offices mirrors that of the Central Party Office. Each has a congress that meets annually. Municipal party congresses have seventeen members serving two-year terms. Their members include representatives of local headquarters, members of local executive and review committees, local headquarters directors, as well as the DPP’s elected officials in the municipality. Local party congresses are smaller (five to nine members), but otherwise similar in composition. Likewise, party congresses at these levels share similar functions: overseeing the party headquarters operation, communicating with local DPP caucus members, deciding proposals, and electing executive and review committee members.
REFORM PROPOSALS The DPP’s formal organization is based on the KMT’s Leninist organizational structure. It is not surprising that the DPP adopted such an approach, given the lack of alternative models in Taiwan. But making the Leninist model work has not been easy for the DPP, a highly diverse organization with strong democratic traditions. The DPP still is searching for a formula that will allow it to manage its resources effectively without stifling internal democracy. The most serious organizational problem facing the DPP is the dispersion of power. Its organizational structure is not conducive to strong or decisive leadership. The party charter is loaded with checks and balances designed to prevent authoritarian tendencies from creeping in (for example, party chairs were initially elected for one-year, nonrenewable terms; even now chairs are limited to four years in office). As a result, says Kuo Cheng-liang, “In all the world there is not another democratic party charter so self-irritating and suspicious of leadership and authority.” Continues Kuo, “‘Who represents the DPP, ultimately?’ is a question for which I fear even the DPP has no answer.”1 Whether the DPP really is the most antiauthoritarian party in the world is arguable, but there is no question that although its charter and regulations define an elaborate structure for enforcing party discipline, they also strongly emphasize freedom of speech and debate. Article 27 of the charter seeks to balance democracy and effectiveness:
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From Opposition to Power Members of this party at all levels of organization are free to discuss and criticize within the party its line, strategy, platform, policies and the words and actions of important cadres. Party members at all levels of the organization must not refuse to follow party decisions or participate in activities because they hold different views or opinions.
In practice, the libertarian tendency frequently overwhelms the desire for unity and discipline. DPP members constantly argue with party decisions and violations of party policy are rampant. Disciplining members often carries a political price tag that the DPP is unwilling or unable to pay, and many transgressions go unpunished. Another source of weakness is the party’s structural complexity, which offers many points of access for people with ideas and interests they want to pursue. It is not difficult for an ambitious local politician to pack a third-tier party office with his or her supporters and turn it into a personal political machine. Meanwhile, the party’s informal structures exacerbate intra-party competition. For example, the DPP caucus in the Legislative Yuan has more influence on the party’s positions on national issues than the CEC, the party chair, or the NPC. Likewise, municipal executives rarely consult with national party leaders before making decisions on local issues, although the party may well bear the consequences of those decisions. The Taichung County DPP executive’s decision to oppose a development proposal by the German firm Bayer caused a raft of problems for the DPP’s central leadership, despite the fact that he made the decision on his own, over the objections of the DPP chair. The party’s cumbersome central decisionmaking structure, combined with short terms of office for party chairs, makes these centrifugal forces doubly unmanageable. In an effort to facilitate more effective, decisive leadership, then deputy secretary-general Chiou I-jen proposed a major revision of the party charter in early 1999. The key elements of the reform plan were as follows: •
• •
At the central level, replace the Central Standing Committee, the Central Executive Committee, and the Central Review Committee with a forty-three-member Central Committee (CC; zhongyang weiyuanhui) that would meet every three months. (Some CRC functions would be transferred to the Arbitration Committee.) At the municipal level, replace the municipal executive and review committees with a municipal committee. Extend the term of office of party chairs and Central/municipal committee members from two years to four.
Organization •
•
61
Abolish the third-tier (township/town/city) party offices and rename municipal party offices “municipal party organizations” (change dangbu to dang zuzhi). Turn over disputes between party members and the party or among party units to an arbitration committee.
Although the reform proposal did not pass (it was withdrawn before a vote was taken), it provides important clues as to the DPP leadership’s perceptions of its own weaknesses. Moreover, a revised version of the reform is likely to reappear in the future, because the problems it addresses have not yet been resolved. Much of the proposal is designed to consolidate power and streamline decisionmaking. Creating an enlarged Central Committee would both increase its credibility and diminish its tendency to micromanage party affairs. This, along with the extension of the party chair’s term, would free the chair to act forcefully in day-to-day party management. At present, the chair’s post is too politicized to be fully effective. As a key target of factional infighting, the position does not provide the secure, authoritative leadership the party needs. Reducing the frequency with which factions fight over the post would help strengthen the party chair. The composition of the Central Committee in the Chiou proposal also reflects the true balance of power within the party. It allows various constituencies to elect the CC members in the following proportion: fourteen members from the party’s Legislative delegation, seven from the National Assembly, seven from among city council members, and fifteen from the National Party Congress. The reform could help to institutionalize the relationships among the various elected officials and between officials and the party center.
Special Focus: Grassroots Party Organization and the Problem of Nominal Members Chiou’s proposal recommended major reforms in the DPP’s municipal and local organization. His suggestions reflect the perception, widespread among DPP elites, that grassroots governments and elections are riddled with corruption and do not benefit the nation or the DPP. Too often, they believe, local officials represent entrenched parochial forces far more concerned with preserving their own selfish political and economic interests than with promoting the DPP’s program, ideology, and candidates. The KMT exploited these political tendencies and constructed a top-down political machine with a strong grassroots component. The DPP may once have imagined that setting up basic-level
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offices would help it compete for local influence against the KMT’s deeply rooted machine. However, DPP elites have since decided that the party’s own grassroots offices have all the negative qualities of basic-level KMT offices, while contributing little to the party’s electoral performance. In the view of most of the top party officials interviewed for this study, grassroots (or third-tier) party offices have numerous flaws. They are susceptible to corruption, they tend to be “captured” by individual politicians who use them to promote their own careers instead of the party’s interests, they are prone to factionalism, and they undermine the DPP’s credibility as an alternative to the ruling party. But the thirdtier party officials interviewed for this study rejected these criticisms as unfair and uninformed. In their view, third-tier offices are the point of intersection between the party and the voters; they believe the DPP would be far worse off without them. The debate between DPP elites and grassroots activists seems, on the surface, like a tempest in a teapot. But it merits scrutiny, because it reveals a profound gap between the elite and the grassroots levels about how Taiwan’s elections work and what strategy the party should follow. Third-tier organizations reacted strongly against Chiou’s proposal to eliminate them (or, at least, to downgrade them to the status of party subbranches [dang zhibu]). On June 12, 1999, fifty-eight heads of third-tier party offices from throughout Taiwan met at the Grand Hotel in Kaohsiung to plan strategy to preserve their role in the party. They founded an organization called the National Alliance of DPP Township, Town, and City Party Chairs. The meeting was a window into the third-tier activists’ opinions and needs. The alliance’s basic demands were as follows: • • •
Preserve third-tier party offices. Develop the grassroots strength required to elect the DPP’s presidential candidate in 2000. Allocate one-third of the government subsidy paid to candidates for county council seats and other grassroots elections to thirdtier offices.
The conflict between the first and third tiers of the DPP is rooted in their perceptions of how elections are won. When first-tier leaders look at elections and party recruitment they see the influence of issues, candidate charisma, and party identification. When third-tier activists look at elections and party recruitment they see networks of friends and relatives who are drawn to DPP candidates on the strength of personal
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loyalty. When the first tier looks at the third tier, it sees vote buying, factionalism, and indiscipline. When the third tier looks at the first tier, it sees a small group of elitists who have little appreciation for the dayto-day workings of local politics. Third-tier activists view themselves as the DPP’s fundamental vote-gathering mechanism, as these statements from third-tier leaders, interviewed in June 1999, attest: •
• • •
“The party needs us, because the votes are at the third tier level. People learn about the party’s positions from TV, but the votes are mobilized at the grassroots. We need to build this level, not get rid of it.” (a third-tier officer from Taipei) “We are the front line against the KMT.” (Shihlin, Taipei) “This level—we call it the third level—is where the electoral work actually happens.” (Chiaotou, Kaohsiung County) “We are the most basic level; we are the ones that actually carry out the policies of the party center.” (Puli, Nantou County)
In these activists’ judgment, a significant proportion of DPP votes are won by person-to-person contacts between DPP grassroots activists and their friends, relatives, neighbors, and coworkers. They recognize that this is especially true in local elections (villages, townships, and municipal councils), but they see these elections as the foundation of higher-level (municipal executive and national) elections. First-tier leaders disagree. They see the contributions of third-tier activists as marginal at best. For example, New Tide leader Wu Nai-jen said that the third tier’s overall effect on the DPP is negative. Asked whether their role as vote mobilizers might compensate for their deficiencies, he replied: Actually, we believe their ability to mobilize votes is also very limited. Because, fundamentally, the great majority of people in this society are not going to be influenced by that kind of thing. Only people on the margins of society are influenced. So if you are not able to have influence within your community, your ability to mobilize votes is also very limited. Lots of the channels we use to mobilize votes at the local level do not go through them [the third-tier offices]. If we do go through them, we may end up losing.2
Wu did not deny that personal relationships were important in vote mobilization, but he minimized the importance of third-tier DPP offices in carrying out that work:
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From Opposition to Power In some relatively rural areas, many native doctors and other such people support us. And the votes they can mobilize absolutely exceed the number those third tier party offices can mobilize. They are respected people, so their opinion will be considered very sincerely. Those more marginal people, their opinions are not going to be listened to by most people.3
In short, the DPP party elite does not see the utility of the third tier for electoral mobilization. In fact, DPP leaders would prefer to abolish basic-level elections rather than try to win them. Since the early 1990s, the DPP has supported legislation to eliminate elections at the village and township levels, which they argue are the breeding ground for corruption and vote buying. Many in the party leadership view the third tier as absolutely pernicious. And not all third-tier activists deny their shortcomings. Tsai Yong-chang, a local branch head from Kaohsiung County who organized the 1999 meeting of third-tier activists, admitted that many third-tier offices have strong relationships with individual politicians. But, he argued, opportunistic behavior is inevitable; until the party began requiring new members to register with the branch offices in their hometowns, some politicians signed up members from a wide geographical area and built huge, sprawling organizations to advance their own careers. A third-tier leader from Taipei County cited three main problems facing his organization: We don’t have money, so we can’t do things. For example, 60% of the NT$1,000 annual dues [the local office’s share] was not enough to pay someone enough to live on, and dues have now been reduced to NT$100. Second, our offices are often not that great—many times, it’s the director’s house. Third, factionalism is a problem in our organizations. People get into cliques, and it becomes very personal and very permanent. That’s a big problem.4
A Taipei activist said, “Some headquarters are captured by factions and personalities, which makes the other factions and candidates angry. But I think the majority of party members still are driven by ideology, not interests.”5 Despite these weaknesses, however, the third-tier activists who gathered at the Grand Hotel in Kaohsiung were adamant that their organizations serve a useful and necessary purpose for the DPP. Another major problem that is often attributed to the third-tier headquarters is the proliferation of nominal members (rentou dangyuan). Nominal members are members recruited by a politician or faction boss in an effort to boost his or her influence in the party. These bosses pay the members’ dues and then use the votes they have purchased to
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manipulate primaries and leadership elections. According to Chen Chun-lin, the director of the DPP Survey Center, surveying party members is impossible because huge blocs of members are registered with the same addresses and telephone numbers—usually that of a third-tier branch office. He estimates that as many as one-third of DPP members are nominal members. DPP leaders believe nominal members damage the party’s discipline and unity because they are not committed to its ideals. Their only connection to the party is the local boss, and their support for him may have nothing to do with policy or ideology. Concern about nominal members increased after Chen Shui-bian’s presidential victory, when party membership increased by 50 percent in two months. A Taipei Times article dated June 4, 2000, reported that the surge in memberships “has left senior DPP officials wondering if they are sitting on a time bomb.” DPP organization head Kuo Chun-ming said, “We are very worried about nominal members, who are easily controlled by people maneuvering to change the DPP’s power structure.” The article described two proposals aimed at resolving this problem. First, the DPP is likely to make party nominations less sensitive to members’ preferences. As Chen Chin-te, a leading DPP politician, put it, “If the DPP doesn’t rectify its nomination procedures to avoid influence of nominal members, the quality of the party’s makeup will fall just as its administrative skills are improving.” The second solution would be to increase the number of “real” DPP members. As then party chair Lin Yi-hsiung told the Taipei Times, “The situation [of nominal members] is worsening, but their influence will be diluted if large numbers of independent members join and party membership can exceed one million.” At the grassroots level, this situation looks very different. Thirdtier activists say recruiting members is the hardest thing they do, and it is inextricably intertwined with electoral work. According to local branch head Tsai Yong-chang, getting people to join the party is very difficult, and most members recruited through the local offices are friends and relatives of existing members. Some people get excited about elections and join, but most, he says, “go through personal relations.” A third-tier leader from Taipei County emphasized the difficulty of getting supporters to join: “The DPP only has about 160,000 members [as of mid-1999]—but it has many more supporters and votes than that. People support the party, but they don’t join.”6 A grassroots organizer from Puli agreed: Party building and election work are indistinguishable. In Taiwan, we have elections constantly, and they are our opportunity to build the
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With member recruitment so difficult, it is not surprising that some third-tier activists reject the notion that nominal members are a problem, or even that they exist. To the local organizers, a member is a member. They have little interest in speculating about the motives of the few Taiwanese who can actually be persuaded to sign up. Said a Taipei County branch leader, “You know, this ‘nominal member’ business. I don’t really buy it. I think people won’t join unless they’re willing to join, so if they join they’re real members. We shouldn’t distinguish the two.”8 There also is evidence that the party’s own policies are contradictory. For example, a party activist from Kaohsiung County reported that when a legislator he works for asked to be included on the DPP’s proportional representation list for the Legislative Yuan, he was required to enroll at least 100 new members. The activist observed that the party was, in effect, requiring the legislator to enroll nominal members.9 One might argue that, given the problems created by the party’s efforts to recruit new members, it would be wise to downplay formal membership and emphasize the party’s role as a legislative and electoral instrument. In fact, when Soong Chu-yu formed the People First Party after the 2000 presidential race, he adopted just such an approach. From the time it was founded, however, the DPP has modeled itself on the KMT’s Leninist structure. Enrolling members, collecting dues, holding meetings, and building strong party loyalty are dearly held DPP values. For better or for worse, the party is unlikely to jettison these practices in the near future. The DPP has not yet secured a foothold in grassroots elections, and this adds to the sense that the party needs to attract more members. Despite their best efforts, third-tier organizers have broken the KMT’s monopoly on local elected offices in only a handful of municipalities. There is little doubt that the local headquarters are more likely than any other level of DPP organization to engage in unsavory practices. They are closest to voters, whose demands are not always as noble as political elites might wish. They also operate cheek by jowl with KMT vote brokers, who barely bother to conceal their vote buying, pork barreling, and intimidation. But would the DPP be better off without the third tier? Or does the party need a presence at the local level to counter the ruling party? Can grassroots organizations avoid being polluted by corruption? Some party leaders would like the DPP to use issue positions and excellent candidates—not constituent service and personal relationships—
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to appeal to voters. Although pragmatism is no longer a dirty word among DPP members, few in the party are ready to put aside their ideals to win at all cost. As more local politicians come to see the DPP as a vehicle for pursuing their ambitions, the debate over how to prevent corrupt and self-serving practices from infecting the DPP will emerge again and again.
PARTY CAUCUSES AND THE ALLIANCE OF DPP MUNICIPAL EXECUTIVES The DPP’s formal organization includes a party caucus in the Legislative Yuan (there was a caucus in the National Assembly as well, until that institution reduced itself to an ad hoc body in April 2000) and an organization consisting of DPP politicians who hold executive offices at the municipal level. The legislative caucus is responsible primarily for developing and carrying out the party’s legislative strategy. The Municipal Executives’ Alliance is a venue in which DPP executives consult with one another on local issues and push for national policies to benefit localities. For example, the alliance lobbies for devolution of power and distribution of revenue to county and city governments. According to the party charter, the legislative caucus and Municipal Executives’ Alliance are parallel to one another and to the party bureaucracy. Thus, proposals and arguments brought forward by these three bodies carry equal weight. The caucuses and alliance also play an important role in the party’s decisionmaking process (see Chapter 6.) In practice, however, the legislative caucus has proven more influential, mainly because its members have more time and enthusiasm for party affairs than their counterparts in the Municipal Executives’ Alliance.
PARTY FINANCE Money is a huge problem for the DPP. On January 5, 2000, the party reported NT$226 million (U.S.$7.3 million) in assets: cash, bank deposits, and real estate (DPP-owned offices). Not only does the party have very little money, but to make matters worse, its main opponent has too much. The KMT is known to be one of the wealthiest political organizations in the world; its assets are estimated at more than NT$200 billion (U.S.$6.5 billion). The KMT’s fortune comes from a vast business empire, including many companies in which the KMT holds a controlling share and government subsidies. Donations contribute very little to the
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total. According to a former DPP financial chief, Yang Huang Maysing, the KMT receives three times more in subsidies each month than the DPP gets in a year.10 (Subsidies are calculated according to a party’s vote share in elections.) Until 1997 the DPP depended almost entirely upon contributions from its supporters, who were both few in number and limited in resources. The party operated on a shoestring and was kept alive by its supporters’ enthusiasm and its staffers’ willingness to sacrifice. The situation improved after 1997, when the government began providing subsidies to political parties. According to its charter, dues, donations, and miscellaneous sources finance the party’s activities. Before the creation of subsidies, the party was extremely dependent upon donations, which never met the party’s need. The DPP was chronically in debt and relied on sugar daddies (including the late Huang Hsin-chieh) to keep its office doors open. In 1990, for example, the party’s income came from the following sources:11 dues, 10 percent; contributions from elected officials, 1 percent; sale of goods, 1 percent; donations, 72 percent; endowment for operations, 8 percent; other, 8 percent. At that time, analyst Liu Shu-hui called attention to the lack of financial coordination among the central office, local offices, and individual politicians. He noted that many DPP politicians received substantial and reliable funding from their supporters, but that this was of little help to the central and local offices. Nor were the party offices able to provide financial help to one another or to DPP candidates. Liu concluded that, “establishing a system of subsidies could solve some of the party’s financial difficulties and could also promote internal party unity and effectiveness. It deserves very serious consideration.”12 At present the party benefits from two new sources of income. The most important is the government subsidy, which is allocated according to each party’s electoral performance. According to Yang Huang Maysing, a former finance director of the DPP central office, the party gets about U.S.$4,750,000 per year in subsidy payments. According to Hsiao Bi-khim, the DPP’s director of international affairs until mid-2000, the subsidy is sufficient to pay the expenses of the central office. In addition to the subsidy, the DPP now requires its elected officials to pay a percentage of their income from the government to the party.13 As Hsiao put it, “After all, they campaigned under the party flag.”14 Both of these sources of income ultimately depend on the party’s electoral performance, which only adds to the pressure on candidates, campaign staffers, and party leaders. In addition, the DPP continues intense fund-raising.
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Although the DPP no longer operates under a cloud of debt and uncertainty, its budget still is extremely tight. Recruiting and retaining staff is a constant challenge, because the party cannot afford to pay competitive—or in some cases even livable—salaries to its employees. Meanwhile, the party is almost totally without financial leverage to use in disciplining its candidates. There is very little financial assistance to be had from the party; on the contrary, elected officials are expected to give part of their income to the DPP. Meanwhile, their expenses are very high. According to a 1996 China News Agency report, the monthly salary for a member of the Legislative Yuan was NT$440,000 (approximately U.S.$16,000), including a staff allowance of NT$240,000. One DPP legislator, physician Shen Fu-hsiung, said he hired fourteen aides at his legislative office and maintained two offices in his district, with expenses totaling more than NT$700,000 per month. Shen claimed, “Without income from my clinic, I can barely cover my expenses.”15 I visited Shen’s office and can attest that his operation includes not an iota of extravagance or excess. Nonetheless, his resources are taxed to the limit. And this is without considering the costs of electoral campaigns.
CONCLUSION Organizationally, the DPP tries to incorporate two incompatible imperatives. On the one hand, it aspires to emulate the KMT, which is a centralized, Leninist party with a strong central leadership and powerful— but generally obedient—grassroots political machine. On the other hand, the DPP is highly democratic. It lacks both the resources and the ideological tradition to make the Leninist model work. As a result, informal power centers play a more important role than the formal power structure, and individual actors (including elected officials and local activists) frequently act on their own initiative. Efforts to overcome these problems have not been very successful, not least because party members have not hesitated to oppose reforms that threaten their interests.
NOTES 1. Kuo Cheng-liang, Minjindang zhuanxing zhi tong (The DPP’s painful transformation) (Taipei: Tianhsia Publishing Company, 1998), 159–160. 2. Interview with author, Taipai, July 1999. 3. Ibid. 4. Interview with author, Kaohsiung, July 1999.
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5. Ibid. 6. Ibid. 7. Ibid. 8. Ibid. 9. Interview with author, Taipei, June 1999. 10. Interview with author, Tainan, July 1999. 11. Liu Shu-hui, “Zhengdang jingfei de yanjiu” (A study of party finance), in Minzhu zhidu sheji (Designing democratic systems), ed. Lin Chia-cheng (Taipei: Institute for National Policy Research, 1991), 41. 12. Ibid., 46. 13. Candidates receive NT$30 (about U.S.$1) from the government for each vote they receive. 14. Interview with author, Taipei, June 1999. 15. China News Agency, 14 November 1996, translated in FBIS-CHI96-222.
5
Factionalism
Veteran DPP politician Yao Chia-wen uses the saying sanjiao, jiuliu to describe the DPP. The saying refers to the three religions (Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism) and nine schools of thought in Chinese tradition. It is an apt characterization of the party, which includes members from all corners of Taiwan’s society, representing nearly every point on the ideological compass of the late twentieth century. From the beginning, activists in the Dangwai/DPP movement have shared only one trait: their opposition to the Kuomintang. That factionalism would develop in such a party is hardly surprising. But how does factionalism affect the DPP’s performance? This is a complex question. To use another of Yao Chia-wen’s metaphors, a tiger, a dragon, and a leopard in a cage make a formidable threat—assuming they don’t tear each other to pieces. Many observers, when they look into the cage, emphasize the danger DPP factions pose to one another. They see them as evidence of a weak and fractured party. But despite innumerable predictions of its imminent demise, the DPP has remained united, even as the number of formally structured factions within the party has increased.1 I will argue that the perils of factionalism are not as great as many observers believe; in fact, factions perform certain positive functions within the party. Moreover, by institutionalizing factionalism, the DPP has domesticated it, transforming the fierce predators of intra-party warfare into beasts of burden carrying the weight of compromise and negotiation. A DPP press release dated October 1998 strikes a plaintive note, stating, “foreign observers should not be misled in overestimating the policy differences within the DPP.” The document—issued, it says, in response to “a stream of inquiries on factions and membership orientations in the DPP”—complains that because its factions are public, foreigners assume
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the party is disunited. In fact, the document says, “Factions of the DPP are a reflection of the diverse viewpoints that are openly expressed in this extremely democratic party. . . . Yet despite the differences, the DPP has managed to remain quite unified.” The press release also emphasizes that “beyond elections and internal power alliances, factions as organized political groups have little significance when it comes to public policy.”2 This is one case when the DPP’s propaganda ought to be taken seriously.
ORGANIZATION The DPP’s factionalism is a product of its history. The party began as a congeries of anti-KMT elements working together to bring about political reform. From the outset, different strands within the opposition have had different backgrounds, goals, and strategies. Over the years, these tendencies gelled into factions. Still, factional boundaries are blurry, except in the case of the New Tide Faction. DPP politicians can and do change their factional affiliations and sometimes break away and form new factions. Given the variability and looseness of DPP factional organizations, there are few generalizations that hold true in every case. Overall, however, DPP factions share the following qualities: • Factions are built around personal relationships. The DPP’s former director of international affairs, Hsiao Bi-khim, compares factions to tribes. They are based on personal friendships and loyalties, reinforced by the exchange of political favors and support. Within the DPP, however, politicians and party staffers have dense webs of relationships; they know people in all of the factions, and most have worked with many different factions’ members on policy initiatives and political campaigns. What, then, determines the choice to align oneself with a particular faction? Political aspirants look at the prestige of a faction’s leaders, its size, and its ability to get its members elected to party and government offices. Nonetheless, it would be wrong to assume that joining a faction is purely a calculated, utilitarian decision. Personal relationships—including mentoring relationships between junior and senior DPP politicians—are essential. • Factions are rooted in different political generations. The factions within the DPP reflect successive generations of activists who entered the Dangwai before the party was founded. The pattern since 1986 suggests that the party’s founding institutionalized the opposition’s factional structure; once the party formed, newcomers tended to
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choose among the existing factions rather than create new ones. Nonetheless, the factional structure has continued to evolve, as factions split and senior members recruit political newcomers. The factions and the generations they represent (roughly) are as follows: The Kang (Kang Ning-hsiang) Faction, or Centrist Faction: These politically moderate elected officials entered the Dangwai Movement in the 1960s and 1970s and believed in working within the electoral system. This faction yielded to younger politicians after the DPP’s founding. The Formosa Faction: This faction began with staffers from Formosa Magazine (1979), most of whom had not held elected office (with the notable exceptions of Huang Hsin-chieh and Hsu Hsin-liang). Early on, they differed from the Kang Faction in their willingness to use demonstrations to achieve political reform. Later, after New Tide became its primary competitor, Formosa represented the opposition’s pragmatic, moderate wing. The Formosa Faction effectively ceased to exist in 2000, after the New Era Faction under Chang Chun-hung split off (1999) and Hsu Rong-shu reorganized many of the remaining Formosa supporters into the New Energy Faction (2000). The New Tide Faction: This faction was founded by students who became active in politics in the mid-1970s. These intellectuals emphasized ideological purity and direct action over pragmatism and electoral politics. Before founding New Tide, many of these activists were involved in the Dangwai Writers and Editors Alliance. New Tide has a long-standing leadership core comprising Chiou I-jen (the strategist), Lin Cho-shui (the theorist), and Wu Nai-jen (the organization specialist).3 The Justice Alliance and Welfare State Alliance: These two factions were founded by attorneys who defended the Formosa Magazine staffers arrested in 1979; they have attracted many of the DPP’s political celebrities. Before founding their factions, the leaders were collectively known as the Defense Attorneys Group, although they held different ideas and opinions on some issues. Their founders are Chen Shui-bian (Justice Alliance) and Hsieh Chang-ting (Welfare State Alliance). The Taiwan Independence Alliance: This faction was founded by members of the World United Formosans for Independence (WUFI) who returned from overseas between 1990 and 1995. In a sense, the WUFI was a Dangwai faction in exile. The Mainstream Alliance: After Chen Shui-bian assumed office in May 2000, DPP legislators formed this meta-faction within the legislature to provide unified support to the president. Only the New Tide and New Era factions declined to participate in the Mainstream Alliance. • Factions have formal organizational structures. Unlike factions in the other major Chinese political parties, the KMT and Chinese
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Communist Party, the DPP’s factions are not furtive. On the contrary, they have offices and staffs. They even collect dues from their members! Some factions recruit only legislators, others also include local politicians, while the New Tide Faction even enrolls members from the DPP’s rank and file. • Factions have differences of opinion over policy and strategy, but these differences are not the main focus of their existence or their competition. In Chapter 2, we saw how the debate over electoralism versus direct action characterized the gap between Formosa and New Tide in the early years of the party. It is important to note, however, that both factions have used both techniques. Many New Tide activists have sought election to the legislature and other posts, while Formosa often has endorsed demonstrations and other direct actions. Both factions recognize that the utility of each tactic depends upon the situation; they are much more flexible than the general characterizations imply. Similarly, on the national identity issue, Formosa was often viewed as the pro-status quo faction, while New Tide was known as the pro-independence group. This is true, but it is also true that many Formosa members harbor dreams of independence (the faction ultimately accepted New Tide’s independence platform proposal), and that New Tide’s position on the issue has moved toward Formosa’s over the course of the 1990s.
FUNCTIONS Political factions perform many functions in the DPP, some of them helpful, others harmful. Given the DPP’s history, however, including the fact that factions existed before the party itself, I will argue that factionalism’s net effect on the DPP is at worst neutral, and may even be slightly positive. There are two major reasons for this conclusion: First, factions channel the DPP’s diverse elements into compromises that respect the party’s democratic values. Second, the DPP enjoys a felicitous combination of factions in which the pragmatism of electiondriven factions (Formosa, Justice Alliance, Welfare State Alliance, and New Era) is tempered by the idealism of New Tide. New Tide has prevented the DPP from losing its soul in pursuit of electoral victories, but rarely have the other factions allowed it to impose extreme positions that damaged their electoral prospects.4
Institutionalizing Conflict The greatest benefit factionalism offers the DPP is to institutionalize intra-party conflict. The DPP cannot escape its history as an imperfectly
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blended alliance of anti-KMT political forces; its goal must be to ensure that those forces can find points of consensus and avoid externalizing their conflicts in ways that undermine the party’s unity and credibility. This is the role factions have evolved to fill. While factionalism may not be the ideal instrument for accomplishing these tasks, the DPP has done well to transform factions, which are a given, into conduits for controlled competition and contestation. This is a vast improvement over the Dangwai era, when factions used vicious personal attacks in public forums to damage their opponents. (The best example of this phenomenon was the Criticize Kang Ning-hsiang Movement described in Chapter 2). Yen Wan-chin, the DPP’s director for Chinese affairs, offered a thoughtful defense of factionalism on these grounds: When something comes up about which there are differing opinions, at least the factions will have a discussion within themselves, and they will produce factional representatives to participate in negotiations. That allows the DPP to come up with a unified opinion. It ensures that the DPP will not suddenly fall apart because of differences of opinion. If it were not for the operation of factions, these discussions would have to be carried out in the Central Standing Committee or the National Party Congress, through a process of formal statements or debate, in a way that would make it very easy for the party to split or be badly damaged if it encountered problems.5
One danger facing the DPP today is that its efforts to win votes away from the KMT could undermine its identity as a reform-oriented party. This is especially problematic because the KMT’s flexible ideology allows it to co-opt the DPP’s positions when they prove popular with voters. For example, the DPP’s 1992 proposal to pursue UN membership became KMT policy. Later, in the run-up to the 2000 presidential race, Lee Teng-hui’s two-states theory narrowed the gap between the KMT’s ostensibly pro-unification view on cross-strait relations and the DPP’s independence-leaning position. Thus, it would be easy for the DPP to lose its identity. The New Tide Faction plays a major role in preventing the DPP from compromising too much. As New Tide leader Wu Nai-jen put it: Our function within the DPP is, in my opinion, to bring to the party a consideration of the long-term view. Our feeling is most factions just think about the next election, about their own interests. Because of the way the other factions are organized, they are not able to suggest a long-term view. A party needs someone to contemplate this sort of thing. You can’t have everyone thinking only of this year’s election, then next year’s election. . . . This kind of thing is very important,
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From Opposition to Power don’t get me wrong, but fundamentally, you must have someone thinking about what the situation ten years from now will be like. You need someone who will constantly raise this kind of question for discussion. I personally believe that New Tide’s greatest contribution to the DPP is this bringing up of the long view.6
In addition to these abstract functions, DPP factions perform very concrete tasks in the areas of nomination, electioneering, and policymaking.
Nominations Factions help select DPP candidates for central party leadership posts, caucus positions, and public offices (including both district-based candidacies and the party’s proportional representation list). They use a complex process of bargaining and logrolling to arrive at nominations that satisfy as many party notables as possible. One of the resources party chair candidates have for building coalitions is their power to appoint secretaries general and deputy secretaries general. Of course, the nominating process reflects the size and resources of the various factions; small factions succeed when larger factions need coalition partners. As Yao Chia-wen explained: The advantage of factions is the exchange of votes. For example, if you want to run for the Legislative Yuan, and I want to be the party chair, and someone else wants to be a county council member or county executive, all of us can get together and bargain. So in party building, the benefit of factions is on the organizational side. It helps you organize, it helps with distribution, it lets you bargain with others. These are the advantages. Those of us in the Welfare State Faction—if one of us is seeking an office—if we don’t support that person, it won’t work.7
Party leadership posts. Positions in the DPP leadership are prized; competition for them is very heated, and factions play a key role in structuring this competition. Thus, the top decisionmaking bodies include few members without factional affiliation. Leaders who once eschewed factions (such as Yao Chia-wen, Yu Ching, and Hsieh Chang-ting) have joined or created factions in recent years.8 The factional balance in the Central Standing Committee is a crucial factor in the party’s decisionmaking process, making elections for the CSC (and the thirty-member Central Executive Committee) extremely competitive. In a July 17, 2000, article in the Taipei Times, the DPP’s legislative caucus leader, Lee
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Wen-chung, accused candidates for top party posts of buying votes: “Though there is no concrete evidence, everybody knows that candidates gave money, presents and even foreign holidays to buy votes.”9 Factions also play a key role in electing the party chair. It is not unusual for faction leaders to agree on a candidate in advance, allowing that individual to run unopposed (or without serious competition). This is an example of classic logrolling behavior. In 1991, the New Tide Faction agreed to support Formosa’s Hsu Hsin-liang as party chair in exchange for a pro-independence plank in the party charter. Likewise, there is evidence that in 2000, Hsieh Chang-ting gained New Tide’s support for his candidacy by agreeing to make Wu Nai-teh, a leading New Tide figure, his secretary-general. Shortly before the election, New Tide candidate Hung Chi-chang withdrew from the race. Two recent DPP chairs, Shih Ming-teh and Lin Yi-hsiung, were not affiliated with factions when they entered the competition for party chair. This arrangement has both advantages and disadvantages. Certainly, it is easier for all factions to support a chair who will not favor any. Moreover, because the main responsibility of DPP chairs is to facilitate negotiations among factions and elected officials, a neutral chair is an asset. The disadvantage of selecting chairs with no factional affiliation is that they tend to be weak leaders because they cannot muster organizational support for their initiatives. DPP chairs who had factions behind them (Huang Hsin-chieh, Hsu Hsin-liang) were more effective in moving the party in new directions. On the other hand, Hsu’s efforts to push the party toward Formosa’s point of view created severe internal conflict; in 1997, Lin Yi-hsiung went so far as to call for Hsu’s impeachment. The pattern of alternating the chair’s position between factionbacked leaders and unaffiliated negotiators reflects the party’s tendency to balance the pros and cons of the two models. This pattern continued in 2000, when the Welfare State Alliance’s Hsieh Chang-ting replaced Lin as chair. Party caucus positions. Serving as a caucus convener or whip in the Legislative Yuan or National Assembly gives legislators experience and exposure. Here again, factions play an important role in leadership selection. In the Legislative Yuan, the factions decided to rotate the positions in order to minimize competition and conflict. The caucus elects new leaders in each legislative session, creating plenty of opportunities for representatives of all factions to gain the experience and exposure that comes with assuming a leadership role.
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Elected office. The party’s complex candidate selection process affords factions considerable influence over DPP nominations for public office. Both the nominating process and its outcomes are intensely contested, which helps explain why the DPP amended its nominating procedures thirteen times in twelve years. The development of procedures for selecting party nominees can be broken into three phases. Between 1989 and 1993, the process emphasized member participation and democracy. In the beginning, the party used binding member primaries organized within each locality to choose its nominees. Leaving candidate selection up to rank-and-file members created three serious problems. First, because the DPP had very few members, primary results did not reflect candidates’ popularity among the general population, which hurt the party’s overall performance.10 Second, member primaries gave candidates an incentive to “stack” the party with their supporters, the so-called nominal members (rentou dangyuan), a practice most party leaders considered corrupt.11 Third, because of its grassroots strength, the Formosa Faction dominated the member primaries, a state of affairs New Tide and the Centrists found unacceptable. To counteract these difficulties, the DPP devised a new system, in place from 1994 to 1996. In this phase, the party implemented a twostage primary. In the first stage, the results of voting among party officials (ganbu) were averaged with the results of a vote among party members. The second phase was a general primary open to the entire electorate. The first test of the new system came in 1994, in preparation for the provincial governor’s races. The competition did not advance to the second stage, however, because the trailing candidate dropped out after the first stage. The system did go into effect, however, in the 1996 presidential election. The second stage voting (general electorate) was carried out at forty-nine public meetings at which the candidates spoke, after which votes were collected. (For a detailed discussion of that process, see the discussion of the 1996 presidential nomination process in Chapter 6). The results of this process were problematic. Many DPP officials quickly concluded that the two-stage primary combining cadre, party member, and general public voting was not ideal. One criticism focused on the undemocratic nature of the process, in which the votes of fewer than 200 party officials were given the same weight as those of 50,000 party members. Some party leaders questioned the qualifications of many officials, especially in grassroots organizations. Complaints also centered on the degree to which this system privileged factions. DPP factions enjoy the greatest strength among party staffers; thus, the new system gave factions a disproportionate role
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in the nominating process. This exacerbated the horse-trading and raised the barriers for unaffiliated and centrist candidates. The third phase in the DPP’s nomination procedures began in June 1996, at a National Party Congress that was sharply divided between those who supported Hsu Hsin-liang for party chair and those who wanted Chang Chun-hung to assume the top party post. In the confusion, unaffiliated party delegates pushed through a nominating procedure that eliminated any role for party officials, replacing them with a 50 percent member primary, 50 percent general electorate vote system. This was unacceptable to the mainstream party leadership, which called a special NPC session to undo the damage. The party was unable to reach a consensus at this meeting; instead, it adopted a compromise proposal to base the nominations on an equal weighting of two factors: a party member primary and public opinion surveys. This is the process the DPP used until 2000. In 2001, the weighting was changed to 30 percent for the member primary and 70 percent for the opinion polls. The first step in the nominating process is for party officials to determine the number of candidates to be nominated for each office at their level (e.g., the Central Party Office sets the number of legislative candidates, while municipal offices set the number of municipal council member candidates). This stage has enormous strategic import, since Taiwan’s electoral formula (single, nontransferable voting in multimember districts) rewards parties that distribute votes evenly among exactly as many candidates as the party’s supporters can elect. Next, the party branches receive prospective candidates’ registrations. If there is not a clear consensus as to whom the candidates should be, the appropriate party office carries out a two-stage selection process. In the first stage, party members in each constituency vote. In the second stage, the party’s survey center (or an independent survey organization contracted by the party office if it does not have a survey center) carries out a public opinion survey to identify candidates preferred by the electorate at large. The results are combined to produce the final result. Although the goal of this protracted search for a workable nominating process has been to reduce the influence of factions, they still intrude on this process at several junctures. First, they help recruit candidates to register for nomination. Second, they mobilize support for their preferred candidates in the member primary. An aide to a DPP legislator described the horse-trading at this stage: They sit down with the other factions and divide things up; they say, I can give you this many votes, you give me this many. If we have this many candidates, how many votes does each one have? How many can this one afford to give your guy? We’re talking about party members’
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Although candidates do not formally campaign for the public opinion surveys, affiliation with a political celebrity (usually a faction heavyweight) can produce the kind of media attention that improves a candidate’s performance in polls. In national elections, this factional involvement probably is not damaging to the party’s interests. After all, having the support of a faction guarantees candidates the resources they need to win in the general election. However, party leaders express concern about the influence of local factions (many of which have little or no connection to national factions) in municipal and local elections, where nominal members can influence the member primary adversely. The party’s recent decision to reduce annual dues from NT$1,000 (about U.S.$40) to NT$100 was justified on the grounds that genuine party members were deterred from joining by the high fee, producing a large population of nominal members sponsored by deep-pocketed local politicians. The DPP has struggled to develop nominating procedures that are both democratic and effective in producing viable candidates for public office. Because factions play a role in getting candidates elected, they also must be permitted to participate in candidate selection. As Julian Baum and James A. Robinson wrote in 1995: The selection of candidates without primaries or with modified primaries departed from our expectations two years ago. At that time, those who demanded greater democracy within parties seemed in ascendancy. And in a polity whose major symbols stress democracy, we projected that the trend toward frequent use of primaries and other intraparty democratic practices would be difficult to reverse. As it happened, however, each party’s overriding interest to win elections demanded that leaders modify candidate selection processes in ways calculated to improve the party’s chances in elections. Future nominating procedures are likely to be influenced by this same consideration. The party that wins with current methods probably will continue to use them; the party or parties that lose likely will revise their procedures again.13
Baum and Robinson’s prediction of continued procedural modification was right on target. In fact, the most recent development in the DPP’s nominating strategy was the appearance in early 1999 of the Shih Ming-teh model. Under this approach, the DPP tries to use negotiations within the top leadership circles to avoid competitive nominating
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processes altogether. According to this logic, the main criterion in making nominations should be candidates’ electability. Composing the party’s list for the proportional representation seats in the legislature offers additional opportunities for factional horsetrading. At first, the central secretariat composed the list. But in 1992, a corruption scandal prompted the party to reexamine its procedures. The result was a vote by party members. In 1995 the party added requirements to ensure diversity on the proportional list. Most of the candidates on the list are either national celebrities who prefer not to compete in district elections or representatives of disadvantaged constituencies who lack the resources for constituency races. Legislator Tai Chen-yao offers a good example. Tai was originally elected to the Legislative Yuan to represent the functional constituency for farmers. When parliamentary reform initiatives eliminated the functional constituencies, Tai’s prospects for reelection were grim. The farmers who elected him were not concentrated in a single geographical area, the districts in which he might have run already had strong DPP representation, and Tai was utterly without resources for mounting a campaign for a district seat. An at-large seat allowed him to retain his seat in the legislature. According to Tai’s legislative assistant Wang Chih-lang, factions play a large role in the selection of candidates for the DPP’s list of atlarge candidates: At-large representatives need to be more responsible when it comes to party policies and rules. Also, with at-large representatives, whether they get elected or not has to do with factionalism. Within the DPP, the influence of factions is extremely great. For example, if you want several thousand votes for the Legislative Yuan, it is usually impossible for a person to have those votes all on his own; it’s necessary to go through the factional distribution of votes to get elected. On this, our legislator, Legislator Tai, is unusual. He is the only one who doesn’t have a factional affiliation, yet he is able to be elected. This is quite unusual. In general, for at-large legislators, you need to go through factionalism, you need to go through the distribution of votes among factions, to be elected.14
Special Focus: The DPP’s Survey Center In order to carry out its nominating process, the DPP needs a reliable, accurate method of surveying the public. It has chosen to do this work in-house. Because the stakes are so terribly high for the candidates, the DPP Survey Center is under enormous pressure to conduct high-quality, unbiased polls. Of course, the party’s polling activities also include
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strategic polls targeted at the mass media; these are carried out under a different mandate and to a different standard. But the Survey Center’s confidential polls are very accurate, even allowing DPP analysts to confidently predict Chen Shui-bian’s victory at a time when most political scientists thought such an outcome highly unlikely. The Survey Center has eight full-time staff members. It uses sixty phone lines staffed by trained callers working part-time. The workload is heaviest before elections, but the center holds surveys throughout the year. Most of the surveys are conducted jointly with academic researchers, and callers identify themselves as representatives of a research project, not a political party. But when a survey is to be used for nominating purposes, the callers identify themselves as calling from the DPP. Callers are trained to identify and switch to the respondent’s preferred language (Mandarin, Hokkien, Hakka). Refusal rates are around 30 percent. The Survey Center conducts research in five major areas: • • • • •
Party support rates and party image. Satisfaction ratings for DPP officials, especially municipal executives. Issue preferences. Targeted surveys of social groups (youth, women, etc.). Election-related surveys.
The party also conducts focus groups, but these are subcontracted to a professional polling company, as are many of the municipal party offices’ nominating surveys. The party does not survey its own members, for two reasons. First, member surveys do not reflect the society at large, so they are not very useful for guiding decisionmaking. Second, when the Survey Center did attempt to contact DPP members, it discovered that about one-third of them listed a party office as their address and phone number on their registration forms. Chen Chun-lin, the director of the Survey Center, assumes that most of these members are nominal members; in any case, they cannot be contacted by the polling office. Surveys that are used in the nominating process are very direct. They simply offer the list of prospective candidates and ask respondents to choose their first and second preferences. The candidates pay for the nominating surveys, which helps to reduce frivolous candidacies. The results of the surveys are kept secret, even from the candidates, who are given only their own results and a summary of their competitors’ results. In the past, candidates made one-on-one comparisons based on survey results. They used these findings strategically to
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increase their vote shares. For example, if a survey found Chang San leading Li Szu in the surveys, Li Szu would mobilize her supporters in the member primary by arguing that Chang San “has it made.” Party leaders discovered that the only way to control harmful intra-party competition was to withhold the information.
DRAWBACKS OF FACTIONALISM There is no shortage of discussion about the dangers of factionalism, whether in the DPP specifically or in political parties in general. Some are obvious: Factionalism creates the impression that the party is not unified; it damages the party’s reputation at home and abroad; it draws attention to conflict and dissension, etc. But these are problems of perception, not of substance. They are important only insofar as they undermine the DPP’s credibility and electoral appeal. Factionalism does create some more substantive difficulties for the DPP, however. First, the way DPP factions are structured focuses their attention on superficial concerns. Instead of thinking about the party’s policy direction, faction leaders spend their time composing strategies for promoting their supporters’ political careers. Sometimes it seems they are more interested in horse-trading than in governing. Factionalism is not the only culprit in this dynamic, however. Taiwan’s political institutions put great emphasis on elections, and the DPP, the longtime underdog, is especially vulnerable to the pressure to put winning ahead of more meaningful goals. At the same time, Taiwan’s electoral formula builds in an incentive for factionalism. Single-ballot voting in multimember districts pits candidates of the same party against one another in every district in which the party has a chance of winning more than one seat. It is hardly surprising that candidates running in different districts should create factions for mutual support. Thus, as long as Taiwan uses the SVMM electoral system, there will be a very strong institutional incentive for factionalism in the DPP. Second, factionalism damages mutual trust among party members. As Kuo Cheng-liang puts it, factionalism “makes it difficult for people to take issues and problems at face value.” 15 That is, instead of acknowledging honest differences of opinion, DPP members tend to attribute disagreements to faction-based conspiracies. Kuo cites several examples to make this point: •
When Chen Ting-nan was investigating electoral abuses in 1994, many of the individuals he indicted were municipal council
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•
•
members affiliated with the Formosa Faction. He was accused of trying to purge Formosa’s grassroots electoral workers in order to clear the way for Chen Shui-bian to become the DPP’s nominee for provincial governor. During the 1997 constitutional reform negotiations, New Tide and Formosa argued in favor of a parliamentary system rather than presidentialism. At that time, some in the DPP said they were hoping to thwart Chen Shui-bian’s presidential ambitions. DPP China Affairs director Yen Wan-chin was accused of organizing the 1998 China Policy Debate to embarrass Hsu Hsin-liang.
All of these conspiracy theories, says Kuo, “could not be farther from the truth.”16
GENERATIONAL POLITICS IN THE DPP Political generations have played a crucial role in the DPP, as many important DPP leaders have strong ties to others who entered the movement with them. Until 1992, political factions were correlated strongly (although imperfectly) with generations. For example, most members of the Formosa Faction were politicians who got their start in the 1970s and early 1980s with support from Kang Ning-hsiang and Huang Hsinchieh. New Tide consisted of younger intellectuals who preferred publications and demonstrations to electoral competition. Members of yet another generation, the attorneys who defended the Formosa Magazine activists after the Kaohsiung Incident, founded the Justice Alliance and Welfare State Alliance. Still, as the number of factions increased and their competition became institutionalized in the 1990s, the intensity of the competition diminished. One aspect of this process has been the delinking of factions and generations. The best example of this dispersion of generations is the Formosa Magazine group. Six men and two women worked together on the magazine, then shared the trauma of court-martial and imprisonment. Yet today, the Formosa defendants are scattered throughout the DPP’s various factions, and they hold a variety of positions. The godfather of the group, Huang Hsin-chieh, passed away in 1999. Chang Chun-hung, for many years an important figure in the Formosa Faction, left it in 1999 to establish the New Era Faction. Lu Hsiu-lien (Annette Lu), Taiwan’s vice president, is a member of the Justice Alliance. Chen Chu belongs to the New Tide Faction and heads the cabinet-level Council of Labor. Yao Chia-wen is in the Welfare State Alliance, while Lin Yi-hsiung has
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no factional affiliation. Shih Ming-teh also declined to affiliate with a faction, and in November 2000 he left the DPP altogether. (The Formosa Faction’s longtime leader, Hsu Hsin-liang, was on the Formosa Magazine staff, but his absence from Taiwan in December 1979 spared him from arrest and prosecution. Hsu quit the DPP in 1999.) The decoupling of factional and generational politics does not mean generations no longer are important. Of all the issues addressed in this book, questions about generational politics provoked the prickliest responses from DPP legislators and party officials. Today, the tension created by the generation gap cuts across faction lines, because most factions now include both senior and junior politicians. The core of the problem is finding opportunities for young people within the party given the scarcity of DPP-held posts. In a nutshell, there is not enough room for junior members to advance politically, as long as the senior members are not ready to step aside. It is important to note, however, that one rarely hears young politicians complain about their prospects. Presidential secretary Hsiao Bikhim echoed the statements of many others when she said, “Most of our leaders . . . make the attempt to recruit young people and give them positions of responsibility.”17 Indeed, senior DPP politicians often act as mentors and sponsors for young politicians. In particular, Chen Shui-bian has promoted a number of men and women in their twenties and thirties, including Hsiao. Nonetheless, the party’s slim resources make it difficult to satisfy new recruits’ ambitions. Leading causes of generational tension within the DPP include the following factors: • The party’s senior members are not ready to retire. They believe it is far too early to talk about generational transition. And indeed, by Chinese standards at least, even the most senior DPP politicians are relatively young. Huang Hsin-chieh, the “elder brother” of the opposition movement, was only seventy-two when he died in 1999. Other first generation opposition figures are in their fifties and sixties. In contrast, President Lee Teng-hui was seventy-seven when he was forced to resign his post as KMT party chairman prematurely. At forty-nine, the DPP’s presidential candidate Chen Shui-bian was considerably younger than his opponents Lien Chan (sixty-four) and Soong Chu-yu (fiftyeight). Senior DPP politicians who plan to keep their positions for several more years are reluctant to share resources or cultivate the younger leaders who might become competitors in the future. • The growth in DPP representation in legislative bodies has not kept pace with the increasing number of ambitious young people who share the party’s ideology. This problem is bad and getting worse.
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When the Provincial Assembly was abolished, seventy-nine elected positions vanished. The National Assembly provided an entrée to many DPP newcomers, but it is no longer a standing body. Nor can the DPP provide more opportunities by increasing the number of candidates it nominates. Given the constraints of the SVMM electoral formula, overnomination would hurt incumbents and newcomers alike. Despite the KMT’s loss in the presidential election, most individual KMT legislators expect to keep their seats in 2001, not least because their support comes from their personal political machines and local factions, not from the KMT party per se. • Even under a DPP president, the party’s grasp on the executive branch is weak. Without a legislative majority behind him, Chen could not name large numbers of DPP officials to the cabinet. And because the DPP does not have a strong grasp on the bureaucracy, it cannot use administrative positions to cultivate and season young recruits. (The KMT used this practice to great effect, as the careers of Lien Chan and Soong Chu-yu attest.) Even in municipalities with DPP executives, civil service requirements limit the number of political appointments allowed, while financial constraints prevent DPP executives from creating positions for their protégés. Chen Shui-bian’s mayoral administration in Taipei was something of an exception, as he came to rely heavily on three young advisers, Ma Yung-cheng, Lin Chin-chang, and Luo Wen-chia, all of whom held important government posts. • The party’s financial problems rule out using staff positions in the Central Party Office to nurture young leaders. Unlike the KMT, which has a huge organizational bureaucracy with professional staff posted to every town and township on the island, the DPP can support only a skeleton staff. Employees of the Central Party Office work very hard for little money; party work is a labor of love, not a sinecure. Chen Shui-bian’s election did create a number of new opportunities for DPP members. Although the cabinet includes less than a dozen DPP ministers, the deputy ministerial ranks have a much larger proportion of DPP personnel. Many of these deputy ministers stand to move up into the cabinet if the DPP increases its legislative influence in 2001. Several DPP legislators also expect to move into cabinet positions, which means younger members will fill their seats. The presidential office, too, offers many positions for DPP loyalists, including presidential advisers. President Chen’s “senior advisers” include some relatively junior figures; it is possible they are being groomed for the 2001 legislative race.
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A NEW GENERATION OF DPP LEADERS Although the shortage of political posts and party staff positions available to DPP newcomers is limited, there are many men and women who have become active in the party in the 1990s (see Appendix). These individuals come from many different backgrounds; they belong to different factions and follow different political mentors. Nonetheless, they do share certain characteristics that differentiate them from the previous generations of DPP leaders. First, the DPP members who became active after the party was founded are less influenced by the history of tragedy and sacrifice that shaped the Dangwai generation. They studied politics at the knees of political victims, it is true, and a few of the younger politicians and activists have paid a price for their participation. For example, DPP legislator Lee Wen-chung was expelled from National Taiwan University a few days before graduation because of his participation in the student movement. All have worked extremely hard for little reward. Still, these leaders have never lived with the fear of arrest and imprisonment. Unlike their senior colleagues, they have not feared for their families’ safety at the hands of government thugs or worried about losing their livelihoods. Second, because they became engaged in politics after authoritarianism had begun to give way to reform, younger DPP activists’ view of politics is not so fraught with injustice and suffering. They view politics less as a struggle for freedom and more as a competition over policies and resources. They are more comfortable working within the system, and their views of their identity rest “less on ideological zeal and more on a rational basis.”18 The “Manifesto for the Taiwan Independence Movement in a New Era,” published in 1996, illustrates this difference.19 In the document, younger activists explicitly rejected the worldview of their forebears, which portrayed Taiwan independence as a sacred cause emerging from Taiwan’s tragic history. According to the new era manifesto, Taiwan Independence is not a religious tenet; it is a pragmatic political position. Taiwan Independence is not the product of 400 years of persecution suffered by Taiwanese at the hands of outside political forces, nor is it the product of hatred and fear of Mainland China. Taiwan Independence is not a challenge to the past, but a dream for the future.
In a similar vein, young activists are more interested in policy issues than in the grand causes that motivated the Dangwai and early
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DPP activists. As the new era manifesto put it, “Taiwan Independence is not the sole political objective; it is a mechanism for achieving our ideals for social reform.” Many of the younger legislators began their political careers in social movements, and they have continued to push their early policy concerns in the Legislative Yuan. According to I-Chung Lai, a member of this generation and former director of the DPP office in Washington, D.C., “their ability to devise, or reflect on the social agenda plays important roles in formulating [the] DPP’s social reform policy.”20 Many Dangwai-era politicians gained celebrity and status through martyrdom. Now that White Terror repression has subsided, young politicians emphasize other qualifications, including educational background, professional experience, voting records, policy contributions, and constituent service. Typically, they work their way up through the ranks of elective and administrative positions, paying their dues as they build their careers. Finally, political competition is also different for the younger activists. Unlike their senior colleagues, for whom political activism entailed tremendous risks, the new generation does not view politics as a life-or-death matter. For them, competition, negotiation, and compromise all are normal aspects of politics. Political competition is institutionalized, so participants have faith that today’s loser may be tomorrow’s winner; in any case, she will not be tomorrow’s political prisoner. Few young politicians have suffered personally at the hands of their political opponents. Among senior DPP politicians, this is not the case, as the 2000 presidential and vice presidential teams attest. In 1980, Soong Chu-yu was the ROC government spokesman. He vigorously defended the decision to court-martial the opposition activists, including DPP vice presidential candidate Lu Hsiu-lien. And it was a lawsuit brought by the New Party’s vice presidential candidate (Feng Hu-hsiang, then a KMT member) that sent Chen Shui-bian to prison in 1986.
NOTES 1. The KMT, in contrast, has split twice since the DPP was formed. In 1993, KMT legislators who opposed President Lee’s policies broke away and founded the New Party. In 1999, the KMT expelled Soong Chu-yu (James Soong) for pursuing a presidential bid without its nomination and against its chosen candidate. Soong’s presidential bid attracted support from KMT legislators, former cabinet members, and numerous local political organizers. After the presidential election, Soong did not return immediately to the KMT, but instead founded his own party, the People First Party.
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2. “The Faction of Taiwan Democratic Progressive Party,” DPP Document, October 1998. Available online at http://www.dppmission.org/press/th . . . mocratic%20progressive%20party.htm [accessed June 1, 1999]. 3. Kuo Cheng-liang, Minjindang zhuanxing zhi tong (The DPP’s painful transformation) (Taipei: Tianhsia Publishing Company, 1998), 43. 4. The adoption of the Taiwanese independence plank in 1991 is an important exception. 5. Interview with author, Taipei, July 1999. 6. Ibid. 7. Interview with author, Taipei, June 1999. 8. Yu Ching’s career illustrates how important it is for politicians to have factional affiliations. In 1985 he was the head of the moderate Dangwai faction, the Dangwai Public Policy Research Association, and a candidate for Taipei county executive, one of the highest-profile posts then open to direct election. After Yu won that post in 1989, his lack of factional involvement forced him to the margins. He lost his seat on the CSC after 1991, regaining it only in 1996 after he joined the Welfare State Alliance. 9. Lin Chieh-yu, “Corruption Casts Shadow Over the DPP,” Taipei Times, 17 July 2000. Available online at http://www.taipeitimes.com/news/2000/07/ 17/story/0000044052. 10. Lin Chia-cheng, Minzhu zhidu sheji (Designing democratic systems) (Taipei: Institute for National Policy Research, 1991), 14. 11. Julian Baum and James Robinson, “Party Primaries in Taiwan: Reappraisal,” Asian Affairs: An American Review 22, no. 2 (summer 1995): 93–94. 12. Interview with author, Taipei, June 1999. 13. Ibid. 14. Interview with author, Taipei, June 1999. 15. Kuo, Minjindang zhuanxing, 167. 16. Ibid., 168. 17. Caroline Sorgen, “Laughing in the Face of Convention,” Oberlin Alumni Magazine (August 1999). Available online at: http://www.oberlin.edu/ ~alummag/oamcurrent/oam_august99/hsiao.html. 18. I-Chung Lai, “Taiwan Politics in the New Millenium – Who Are the New Kids on the Block?” Taiwan International Review [DPP publication] 6, no.1 (January–August 2000), 70. 19. The text of the new era manifesto is summarized in Kuo, Minjindang zhuanxing, 76–77. 20. Lai, “Taiwan Politics,” 71.
6
Decisionmaking
Decisionmaking is a broad concept, and decisionmaking in an organization as large and diverse as the DPP is extremely complex and multifarious. This chapter identifies patterns in the DPP’s decisionmaking processes and outcomes, recognizing that decisionmaking varies widely according to many factors, including the policy area in question and the context in which a decision is to be implemented. To illustrate the major decisionmaking patterns that can be discerned from the DPP’s history, the chapter includes case studies from a variety of arenas: electoral strategy, central-local relations, and parliamentary coordination.
FORMAL PROCESS The DPP’s formal process for making decisions and setting policy follows widely used organizational principles. When an issue or problem arises, the party chair asks the professional staff to investigate it and make proposals. The chair presents those proposals to the Central Standing Committee and Central Committee for discussion and amendment. Proposals that pass the Central Committee are supposed to go to the National Party Congress for ratification. On public policy matters, DPP public officials do not need to embrace every party decision, except when core party principles are at stake, in which case they are expected to adhere to the party’s verdict. In practice, however, the process is infinitely more complex than this. The main purpose of this chapter is to explain how decisions are actually made, rather than to recite the rules by which they are supposed to be made. For example, although the Central Standing Committee produces the policy proposals for the party, several constraints limit its ability to
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act decisively. For one thing, it is small. With ten members, the CSC has room for only a handful of the nationally prominent DPP politicians who expect to have a hand in charting the party’s course. In addition, party bodies’ roles are not well defined. As analyst Chen Huasheng writes, “central government representative caucuses (especially the LY caucus) are very autonomous, so that the CSC decisions lack the strength needed to effectively direct and restrain the caucuses.” 1 Chen’s 1991 assessment of DPP decisionmaking still applies: “Add to [the CSC’s weakness] the balance of power and boycotting of factions within the party, and you often have decisionmaking that is sluggish, lacking in effectiveness and unable to avoid leading party employees into difficulties.”2
INFORMAL PROCESS In practice, DPP decisions are the products of a wide range of political forces and pressures, some of which have little official role in the process. Figures 6.1 and 6.2 illustrate the various influences and their relative weights. Figure 6.1 refers to decisions about policy issues; Figure 6.2 refers to personnel decisions. The most important determinant of DPP positions on national issues is the DPP caucus in the Legislative Yuan (LY). There are four main reasons for this. First, according to DPP structure, the LY caucus, municipal executives group, and party bureaucracy are equal in status. Second, the caucus is full of DPP heavyweights: celebrities, faction leaders, heroes of the reform era, local bosses. Many of these individuals also have seats on the CSC or the Central Committee, and they are frequent visitors to the party headquarters. In other words, these are men and women whose views would be influential no matter what offices they held; the fact that they have seats in the LY (which is second only to the presidency in authority) increases their importance even more. A third reason for the LY caucus’s importance in setting DPP positions on issues is that its members are on the front line of national policy and lawmaking. Thus, they personally are responsible for shepherding the DPP’s proposals through the legislative process, and they have a very strong interest in constructing policy initiatives that are both viable in the legislature and popular with the voters. It is impossible for other units within the party to force DPP legislators to support policies they believe will damage their credibility and electoral chances. Thus, especially when it comes to legislation, caucus members take the lead. Fourth, members of the legislative caucus are important because their
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Figure 6.1 DPP Decisionmaking on Policy Matters
’
Figure 6.2 DPP Decisionmaking on Personnel Matters
’
power is rooted in electoral victories and popular support. In Taiwan, votes are the currency of politics. In the DPP, which struggles constantly to preserve and increase its vote share, a candidate who brings votes to the party is like the daughter-in-law in traditional China who gave birth to a son: his or her status instantly increases.
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The combined effect of these factors is to give the LY caucus both a high degree of autonomy in legislative matters and considerable influence on the CSC and, through it, party policy. As political scientist Lin Chia-cheng put it: The relationship between the DPP LY caucus and the central party office is not clearly defined. The DPP LY caucus’s autonomy is considerable, as is its representation on the CSC. As the opposition party, the DPP’s CSC has little experience deciding on proposals, and for this reason the LY caucus [whose members make decisions about legislation constantly] has set its own course.3
Even before the National Assembly was downgraded to ad hoc status in April 2000, the DPP caucus in that body was less powerful than the LY caucus, reflecting the power imbalance between the two institutions. For years, the DPP sought to abolish the National Assembly, and its nominations reflected this priority. The DPP used the National Assembly as something of a training ground; most of its assembly nominees had political ambition but lacked the broad support necessary to win a legislative race. The National Assembly’s main responsibility was to amend the constitution, so on constitutional matters its members had somewhat more authority. As we shall see in the fourth case study, “The National Assembly Self-Fattening Caper,” the party leadership preferred to control its National Assembly delegation, but even this group, which was weaker than the legislative caucus, was capable of defiance. A third force that contributes to decisionmaking is the Alliance of DPP Municipal Executives. These county and city executives gather from time to time to discuss policy matters and political strategy; most of them also command great personal respect and authority in the party. However, they play a smaller role than the legislative caucus for two reasons. First, they are simply too busy managing their municipalities to devote much energy to party debates. Although legislators, too, carry a heavy workload, their burden still is lighter than the one the municipal executives bear. Unlike the legislature, which spends about a third of the year in recess, municipal executives must be on the job fifty-two weeks a year. Legislators manage staffs of perhaps a dozen in Taipei and one or two dozen in district offices. Municipal executives oversee bureaucracies whose employees number in the thousands. Second, municipal executives’ concerns are primarily local; they have little time to worry about the details of the DPP’s national policies. Only when party decisions impinge on local concerns—or affect the party’s core ideology—do the executives mobilize. When local interests are at stake, the party often refrains from making a decision in order to avoid choosing
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between national objectives and the preferences of the executive in the affected locality. This was the outcome, for example, of the Bayer Corporation controversy described in the third case study below. Another contemporary example of how the party responds (or does not respond) to contradictions among its elected officials is the Pinnan Industrial Park controversy. About two-thirds of the world’s remaining 600 or so black-faced spoonbills migrate through the Tsengwen River estuary in Tainan County each year. A number of companies recently began eyeing the site of the birds’ annual stopover as a prime location for developing a heavy industry park. The DPP county executive in Tainan County, Chen Tang-shan, was sympathetic to the project, which would be located in a part of the county that has seen little economic growth. (In fact, the Pinnan area is one of the last unspoiled places on Taiwan’s western plain, but the local economy is based on extremely low-paying enterprises such as salt gathering, fishing, and small-scale fish farming and agriculture.) Tainan County is also represented at the national level by a DPP legislator, Su Huan-chih. As a legislator elected in a multimember district, Su is not as constrained politically as Chen, who must win a majority of votes in the county to be reelected. Thus, he is free to promote the DPP’s traditional environmentalist stance, and in fact Su opposes the Pinnan Industrial Park proposal. This puts the DPP Central Party Office in a difficult position. It has organized meetings between industry and environmentalists, but it has not issued a judgment on the issue, since doing so would mean choosing between Su and Chen. Even after Chen Shui-bian’s March 2000 election, this issue remained unresolved. This case (and others like it) illustrates the DPP’s tendency to let elected officials take the lead in setting policy, on the basis of consensus. Where a consensus cannot be reached, the party avoids decisive action. Ordinarily, factions play little role in decisionmaking on policy issues. As Figure 6.2 shows, their influence on personnel decisions is much greater. (For a full discussion of the role factions play in leadership selection and nominations for public office, see the section on nominations in Chapter 5.) The New Tide Faction is an exception to these generalizations. Unlike the other factions, New Tide has a welldefined ideology and strong policy preferences. It has promoted its preferences in party debates, including debates over Taiwan independence and cross-strait policy. It also has been a voice for labor and environmental causes. New Tide exercises its influence through its representatives in the leading party organs (Central Standing Committee), professional staff in the party headquarters (such as the former perennial deputy secretary-general Chiou I-jen and his successor Wu Nai-teh), and
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other influential bodies (including the LY caucus, where its members outnumber those of any other faction). In short, New Tide wields its influence through the same channels other factions use, but its unity and discipline give it disproportional influence. This is less of a factor today than it once was. The ideological differences between New Tide and the rest of the party have narrowed in the past few years, as the party has reached a consensus on pursuing power through the system and making its position on independence compatible with the widespread public preference for the status quo. The party’s formal leadership also influences decisionmaking, of course. After all, the party charter empowers the Central Standing Committee and National Party Congress to make its decisions. In practice, however, the party’s top leaders and professional staff serve mainly to aggregate the interests and preferences of other party actors. According to longtime DPP politician Chang Chun-hsiung (who later served as Chen Shui-bian’s premier), party leaders must coordinate a delicate process of public and private negotiations in order to produce a stable party consensus. As Chapter 4 explained, party chairs have alternated between those who sought to lead the party (Hsu Hsin-liang) and those who excelled at negotiating a consensus among the key players. In one respect, however, the core leadership is very important. On issues of principle, the CSC takes the lead, and the rest of the party is expected to fall in line. To that extent, the LY and National Assembly caucuses are constrained in the proposals they may endorse. Meanwhile, party staffers below the deputy secretaries general have very few opportunities to guide party policy. In interviews, one department head after another echoed the sentiments of the International Affairs director Hsiao Bikhim, who said her job requires constant consultation with legislators. One final factor must be considered in this description of DPP decisionmaking: the general environment in which decisions are made. The electoral cycle, in particular, sets the tone for party debates. Between elections, debates are more freewheeling, but when elections are near (especially national ones), the party does its best to project a united front. (Hence, major debates such as the China Policy Debate of 1998 often take place just after an election.) As we shall see, many DPP leaders and grassroots supporters had deep reservations about the party’s presidential candidate (Peng Ming-min) in 1996, but few aired their qualms before the election. Likewise, during and immediately after the 2000 presidential election campaign, Chen Shui-bian was effectively in control of the party’s decisionmaking process. Although Chen has been more careful than Peng to build consensus for his positions, there is no doubt that he is playing a larger role than he would have had the party not pinned its hopes for national power on his candidacy.
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CASE STUDIES The following case studies illustrate aspects of the DPP’s actual decisionmaking process. In each case, the process produced a problematic outcome. This is not to say that all DPP decisions are suboptimal. In fact, the DPP makes many decisions that are very successful (the decision to nominate Chen Shui-bian for president in 2000, for example). However, these decisions are generally reached through a process of consensus building within the party; they rarely require public debate. It is when consensus cannot be reached that the party’s decisionmaking apparatus faces its strongest challenges. As the following case studies suggest, the DPP lacks effective channels and processes for making decisions once informal consensus building fails.
Electoral Strategy: The Presidential Nomination of 1996 The DPP’s nomination of Peng Ming-min, along with the conduct of his campaign, qualifies as one of the great blunders in DPP history. Peng’s 21 percent vote share was the party’s second worst performance ever in a national election; he won fewer votes even than DPP National Assembly candidates competing on the same day, who captured 29 percent.4 Peng’s poor performance and unpopular campaign positions alienated voters and did lasting damage to the DPP’s credibility. He made matters worse by bad-mouthing the party after the election (he eventually referred to his decision to represent the DPP in the presidential election as “my disgrace”). Peng’s bid also hurt the party organization: his nomination offended Hsu Hsin-liang, and his campaign undercut the DPP Central Party Office by ignoring its directives. This disaster begs for explanation. This case study will address three specific questions: Why did Peng win the nomination? Why was his candidacy such a failure? How did this experience affect the DPP’s behavior in selecting a candidate for the 2000 presidential election? It also will illuminate several flaws in the DPP’s decisionmaking process. The 1996 presidential nomination process. The first candidate to declare his intention to seek the DPP’s nomination was Hsu Hsin-liang, who revealed in January 1995 that he had longed to be president since primary school.5 According to his biographer, Hsia Chen, Hsu did not expect to face serious competition for the nomination. His plan was to use the campaign to promote his Rising People (xinxing minzu) theory, and if he lost, to prepare himself for the 2000 race. Instead, Hsu found himself facing a very tough competitor in February when Peng Ming-min—who
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returned to Taiwan in 1992 after two decades in exile—threw his hat into the ring. Peng did not meet the party’s technical requirements to become its presidential candidate, which stipulated that candidates must have political experience. However, party chair Shih Ming-teh, fearing Peng would run as an independent, waived the rule. As Hsia puts it, “It took only one sentence from party chair Shih Ming-teh to permit Peng Ming-min to evade party discipline. The risk of splitting the DPP vote that would otherwise have existed exceeded that of letting him come into the system.”6 Hsu did not contest Shih’s decision. The DPP’s procedure for selecting its candidate for the 1996 presidential election included two stages. In the first stage, party officials and party members cast votes in separate balloting. The results of the two elections, which were held on June 17, were weighted equally. The candidates in the first phase included Hsu Hsin-liang (who finished first), Peng Ming-min in second place, and runners-up Yu Ching and Lin Yi-hsiung. In the second phase, the candidates debated one another at forty-nine mass meetings held throughout the island. The final meeting took place in Taipei on September 24. The public was invited to the meetings, and at the end of each one, attendees cast ballots for their preferred candidate. The results of this “open primary” were given equal weight with the combined party official/party member results. Peng Ming-min won these “popular primaries” by a sufficient margin to edge out Hsu for the nomination. The outcome of the nomination reveals the inadequacies of the DPP’s procedures and illustrates the tension between selecting viable candidates and preserving democratic procedures. Peng Ming-min defeated Hsu Hsin-liang in the popular primaries for three main reasons. First, Peng appealed to grassroots DPP supporters’ weakness for heroes and martyrs (he was both), and his engaging, ideological speaking style struck a chord. As a Taiwanese journalist told this author, “Hsu Hsinliang is a politician who talks like a scholar, and Peng Ming-min is a scholar who talks like a politician. That means Peng wins on both scores: he has the clean image of a scholar and the charisma of a politician.”7 Second, many Taiwanese believed Peng to be close to President Lee Teng-hui in age, stature, and education, qualities which might make him more electable. Third, unlike Hsu, who had served the party for several years, Peng had no record. He had never offended or disappointed any party constituency. Hsu, on the other hand, had been involved in several controversies during his tenure as party chair; many DPP members and supporters strongly opposed him. In particular, independence fundamentalists had a deep distrust of Hsu, who they believed could not be
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trusted to defend Taiwan in cross-strait relations. As it turned out, far fewer ballots were cast at the mass meetings than expected, which gave the highly motivated and well-organized independence devotees disproportionate influence on the outcome. Reasons for Peng’s defeat. After Peng became the nominee, tension between his campaign headquarters and the Central Party Office intensified. Two issues, in particular, focused the conflict between them. The first was the party center’s policy of promoting “grand reconciliation” with Taiwan’s other major parties, especially the New Party (this project is explained in detail in the next case study). During the 1994 mayoral and gubernatorial elections, ethnicity emerged as a significant, divisive political force. Party chair Shih Ming-teh sought to defuse this situation—and bring the DPP closer to power—by suggesting a coalition cabinet. When Shih and three other party officials met with leaders of the New Party, DPP members who disapproved of party leaders hobnobbing with the New Party were critical. The Grand Reconciliation project was tied to Shih’s efforts to become the speaker of the Legislative Yuan. In January 1996, Shih managed to tie the KMT candidate in the first round of voting, thanks to the support of New Party legislators, but he failed in the second round. Peng Ming-min, for his part, paid lip service to Grand Reconciliation until early January, then abandoned the idea altogether. The second issue that divided the party leadership from its presidential candidate was the question of Taiwan independence. Both of the DPP’s most recent chairs, Hsu Hsin-liang and Shih Ming-teh, were taking the line that since the Republic of China on Taiwan was an independent country already, the DPP “would not need to, nor would it, declare independence if it came to power [minjindang ruguo zhizheng bubi ye buhui xuanbu Taidu.].” Although the party’s decisionmaking bodies never voted on this wording, it was the DPP’s de facto position. Peng Ming-min, in contrast, was committed to a formal assertion of Taiwan independence. Throughout the campaign, this issue was a source of conflict between the party center and Peng’s campaign staff. In particular, Hsu Hsin-liang argued with Peng’s campaign manager, DPP legislator Yeh Chu-lan. Hsu said Peng should emphasize the differences between his policy positions and those of incumbent candidate Lee Teng-hui, while Yeh believed Peng’s best strategy was to put independence at the center of the campaign. Thus, in mid-January, the Peng campaign abandoned the party’s campaign theme, “Grand Reconciliation, Grand Unity” (da hejie, da lianhe) in favor of a slogan that strongly implied Taiwan independence:
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“Peace, Respect, a President for Taiwan” (heping, zunyan, Taiwan zongtong). Peng’s position had great emotional appeal to the minority of Taiwanese who supported independence, but as an electoral strategy, it was disastrous. Even Chen Shui-bian, the leader of the Justice Alliance and an ally of the pro-independence camp, said just weeks before the election that the DPP’s candidate “cannot make Taiwan independence the centerpiece of the presidential campaign.”8 Nonetheless, he did so. We have already seen the results. After the election the party studied its loss. An internal party document identified several reasons for the defeat. The most important were: •
• •
•
•
The election was unfair; Lee Teng-hui was a “super-candidate” who enjoyed advantages ranging from incumbency to media bias to the KMT’s electoral machine. Voters did not know enough about Peng. The campaign employed an inappropriate strategy, and there was too much conflict between the party and the campaign. The emphasis on independence was much too heavy. The party allowed itself to become subordinate to the campaign; it did not lead, but followed, and its leaders found themselves campaigning on behalf of positions they did not design, some of which they opposed. The party’s organizational apparatus was incapable of conducting a successful national campaign.
In addition, survey data collected by the party after the election paints a devastating picture. By any measure, and on every issue, Peng Ming-min performed drastically below Lee Teng-hui, and often below the third-finishing candidate, KMT maverick Lin Yang-kang, as well. Peng had high negative ratings, low positive ratings, and was not well known or understood by the voters. Indeed, it is clear that without the endorsement of the DPP, Peng would have received an even smaller vote share. Nonetheless, Peng blamed the DPP, and particularly the Grand Reconciliation project, for his defeat. Within a month of the election he was well on his way to repudiating the party altogether. Effects on the 2000 presidential campaign. In the wake of the 1996 defeat, the DPP was determined to learn from its mistakes, and in many ways it did. It redesigned the nominating process, implementing a stopgap procedure for 2000. Under the new rules, a candidate needed to be recommended by forty party officials (including professional staff and
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DPP elected officials). As it turned out, only one candidate was recommended, and he duly received the required three-fifths endorsement of the National Party Congress. If more than one candidate had received a recommendation, the party would have held a members-only primary. The new procedures were designed to encourage a nomination based on negotiation and consensus, rather than competition. In the event party leaders could not reach an agreement, the members-only primary was meant to serve as a backstop. As it turned out, the system worked as planned. Of the 199 party officials authorized to make a recommendation, 168 recommended Chen Shui-bian. This left too few uncommitted officials to recommend a second candidate. The National Party Congress ratified this decision on July 10, 1999. Chen’s overwhelming showing grew out of the nearly universal perception that he was by far the most likely of all the DPP’s luminaries to win the presidency. He had been hugely successful as the mayor of Taipei, racking up approval ratings of over 70 percent. Even his defeat in 1998 was a kind of political and moral victory. Chen lost with a larger share of the vote in 1998 than he had won with in 1994 (the 1994 election was a three-way race). He used his concession speech, in effect, to launch his presidential campaign. The party’s near-unanimous endorsement of Chen did not come without a cost, however. Once again, Hsu Hsin-liang was passed over for the nomination. This time, he did not accept the result cheerfully, but decided to run without the DPP’s approval. On May 7, 1999, Hsu left the DPP to launch an independent presidential bid. Seen from Hsu’s perspective, the presidential nominations in 1996 and 2000 do seem unfair. In 1996, he did not expect competition, not least because Peng did not meet the qualifications for nomination. When Shih changed the rules to accommodate Peng, Hsu was caught unprepared. Between 1996 and 2000, Hsu was sidelined, waiting for the 2000 presidential race, while Chen Shui-bian surged ahead, riding the wave of celebrity created by his tenure as Taipei mayor. However, Hsu had an ace in the hole, a party rule forbidding the nomination of a party member for more than one major office in a four-year period. Technically, Chen was ineligible for the presidential nomination. Unfortunately for Hsu, political expediency once again drove the party to break its own rules. The loss of Hsu Hsin-liang is significant; however, it is not catastrophic. As it turned out, Hsu’s independent presidential run was a dismal failure. Although he did manage to collect enough signatures to win a listing on the ballot—a feat another DPP breakaway, the Taiwan Independence Party (jian guo dang), was unable to manage—Hsu received
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less than 1 percent of the vote. Although it is unfortunate that the DPP could not continue to make use of Hsu’s talents, the political calculation that led party leaders to clear the way for Chen’s nomination was on target. Another lesson that emerged from the party’s self-examination after 1996 was an awareness of the dangers of allowing the presidential campaign to dominate the party. In the first presidential election, DPP leaders found themselves standing on platforms in front of huge crowds, endorsing decisions over which they had no control. The painstaking efforts they had made to distance the party from Taiwan independence fundamentalism were swept away in the Peng Ming-min tsunami. Knowing this was a problem did not, however, prevent a reoccurrence in 2000. Chen’s campaign headquarters played a key—indeed a decisive—role in the DPP’s decisionmaking in the lead-up to the election. Even the most controversial elements of Chen’s platform, including his retreat from his party’s long-standing views on independence, raised only murmurs of criticism from his DPP colleagues. In this case, following the candidate’s lead turned out to be a wise decision.
Strategic Conflict: The Grand Reconciliation/Coalition Government Debate Before and after winning the presidency, the DPP spent considerable time and energy debating whether, and under what conditions, to enter into a coalition government. Since March 2000, the frustration of governing without a parliamentary majority has motivated this discussion, but before Chen’s victory, the catalyst for debates over coalition strategies was opportunity. The fuel that propelled them was the interaction of ideology with factional interests. After three rounds of intense discussion on this issue, the DPP still has not resolved the issue. Round 1. In the wake of the 1994 mayoral and gubernatorial elections, two trends troubled many DPP leaders. First, the ethnic mobilization that had characterized the party in its early years seemed increasingly out of place in mid-1990s Taiwan. Second, many feared that too much domestic political conflict might invite PRC aggression. As a result, the political scientist and DPP strategist You Ying-lung suggested that the party adopt “Politics for All the People, A Coalition Cabinet” (quanmin gongzhi, lienhe neige) as its campaign theme for the 1995 Legislative Yuan race. After some debate, the party adopted a weakened version of the theme: “An Era of Grand Reconciliation, a Coalition Government” (da hejie shidai, da lienhe zhengfu).
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Grand Reconciliation had two goals. On the one hand, it was designed to increase the likelihood that the DPP could build a coalition with other parties; on the other, DPP leaders hoped it would convince politicians and voters that the DPP was a team player, not an instigator of ethnic conflict. However, Grand Reconciliation never became a consensus view among DPP leaders and members, and its opponents criticized the slogan relentlessly. Nonetheless, events in late 1995 encouraged supporters of Grand Reconciliation. Tensions between Taiwanese and Mainlanders ran high during the election, forcing the DPP to disavow “Taiwan chauvinists” in its own ranks. Moreover, the KMT’s legislative majority after the election was razor thin, only three seats, offering the DPP an unprecedented opportunity to exercise power in the legislature. Soon after the election, the DPP Central Standing Committee passed a resolution on coalition government. The resolution argued that in order to respond to internal and external dangers (Beijing was threatening Taiwan at the time), Taiwan’s government should include representatives of all political forces. On December 14, the DPP reached out to the New Party, its logical partner in a coalition to balance the KMT. The gesture—a meeting in the coffee shop at the Legislative Yuan between leaders of the two parties (including representatives of the New Tide Faction)—sparked a powerful backlash in the DPP. The Justice Alliance in particular, in the person of legislator Shen Fu-hsiung, attacked the idea of Grand Reconciliation. When representatives of the New Party went to the DPP Central Party Office to meet with the Central Standing Committee, members of a pro-independence faction threw eggs at the visitors. DPP leaders, recognizing that many party members had misinterpreted their overtures to the New Party, issued a statement reminding party members that Grand Reconciliation referred to all parties, including the KMT as well as the New Party. Despite party leaders’ efforts, criticism of Grand Reconciliation continued. Even the DPP’s presidential candidate, Peng Ming-min, rejected the Grand Reconciliation theme in favor of a focus on Taiwan independence. At the same time Peng Ming-min’s aides were advising him to drop Grand Reconciliation, party chair and legislator Shih Ming-teh was using coalition tactics to put together a bid to become the speaker of the Legislative Yuan. With support from the New Party and independent legislators, Shih tied the KMT candidate on the first ballot; he lost by one vote on the second. Indeed, Shih would have won the first round of voting, except that one DPP legislator, a member of the Justice Alliance, abstained. In February 1996, DPP leaders (party chair
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Shih, Formosa Faction leader Hsu Hsin-liang, and legislative caucus head Chang Chun-hung) reopened negotiations with the KMT and New Party to bring non-KMT politicians into the cabinet. Hsu in particular argued that the leading parties must compete and cooperate. When Peng lost his presidential bid by a very wide margin, he blamed his defeat on the Grand Reconciliation theme. Although this accusation was hardly fair—many other factors played larger roles in Peng’s defeat—it reflected the party leadership’s failure to build a consensus within the party in support of the idea. After the presidential election, Shih Ming-teh stepped down as party chair, and the Central Standing Committee retracted its endorsement of Grand Reconciliation. In Kuo Cheng-liang’s view, the Grand Reconciliation debate is an important event in the DPP’s development because it reveals systemic failures in DPP decisionmaking. Specifically, Kuo points to poor communication among different party actors (central officials and legislators, legislators and grassroots members, et al.) and the party’s confused and ineffective decisionmaking process.9 Kuo also calls attention to the consequences of the debacle. He points to four inferences political actors outside the DPP drew from the Grand Reconciliation debate:10 1. The DPP’s policy positions are not dependable. 2. The DPP is unable to transform its words into action; specifically, DPP members have not overcome their ethnic prejudice. 3. The DPP’s slogans and themes are tactical, not sincere. 4. The DPP center failed to build a consensus for its policy in the lower levels. Round 2. Discussions about coalition government continued even after the CSC dropped Grand Reconciliation as a strategy because the fundamental issue—whether or not it was in the DPP’s interest to enter into a coalition with other parties—remained unresolved. Unless the DPP is able to win both the presidency and a legislative majority, the strategy of using coalition building to increase its influence inevitably will reappear again and again. Different coalition strategies have different institutional implications. Thus, the second round of debate over coalition building was sparked by the DPP’s internal debate over constitutional reform. After Shih Ming-teh resigned his post as DPP chair to take responsibility for the 1996 presidential loss, Chang Chun-hung stepped in as acting chair. Chang pointed out that the KMT’s persistent majority left the DPP with three strategic options: joining a coalition government (with the KMT), forming a balancing coalition (with the New Party), or going it alone.
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The first two strategies would work best under a constitutional system emphasizing parliamentary rule, while the benefits of the third strategy would be greatest under presidentialism, since although the DPP was unlikely to win a legislative majority, winning a presidential election might be possible. Chang (along with the rest of the Formosa Faction) preferred a ruling coalition. The justification for his position lay in Hsu Hsin-liang’s important ideological innovations, the Rising People and Crisis Society theories and the idea of a Taiwan Party. (See the section entitled Special Focus: The Thought of Hsu Hsin-liang, on p. 108.) Ideological developments entered into the debate over coalition strategies and the related constitutional reforms, but pragmatic political concerns also played a role. According to Kuo, Whether or not a particular faction was able to produce a presidential candidate determined that faction’s choice of constitutional system. For example, the fact that the Justice Alliance was the faction most heavily in favor of presidentialism was very closely tied to the fact that Chen Shui-bian [the Justice Alliance founder] was the DPP’s superstar. On the other hand, the appearance of New Tide as the faction most in favor of the cabinet system was related to the fact that this faction stressed collective leadership, did not promote superstars and did not identify with populist politics.11
In 1996, Premier Lien Chan distinguished between coalition cabinets—which he said were not provided for in Taiwan’s political system—and members of various parties participating in cabinets as individuals. This raised an important question for the DPP: should individual DPP members accept cabinet positions under a KMT premier? Acting party chair Chang Chun-hung favored coalition building, while Chen Shui-bian argued the DPP was not ready for coalition government and should continue to seek power on its own. In April, the Central Standing Committee sided with Chen, passing a resolution stating, “We should make a coalition with the people, not the KMT.” The resolution continued, “In the event of a cabinet reshuffle, we forbid any party member to enter the cabinet, so as not to make a coalition cabinet with the KMT.”12 The issue resurfaced only two months later, when Hsu Hsin-liang was elected party chair. In his view, Taiwan needed a stable, unified (read coalition) government if it were to survive the PRC threat and its international isolation. In fact, according to his biographer, Hsu visited Lee Teng-hui the very night he was elected.13 The revived debate broke the party into two camps, each holding divergent views on a number of issues.
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•
Lee Teng-hui transcends party labels; he is a leader for all Taiwanese. Only a strong, unified government in which all major parties have a voice can lead Taiwan through the internal and external crises threatening it. Participating in coalitions would help the DPP establish a reputation for competence, and also would give DPP officials access to government resources.
Opponents of the coalition strategy made counterarguments: • • •
•
•
Lee Teng-hui cannot be separated from the KMT, and the KMT is the DPP’s primary antagonist. The job of an opposition party is to check and balance the party in power. The crises facing Taiwan are not so acute that the DPP should give up its role as an opposition party striving to become a ruling party. Taking cabinet positions would create conflicts of interest within the DPP, and undermine its credibility as an opposition party and critic of the government. The KMT would use DPP cabinet members to split the opposition and gain leverage over it; it would never allow DPP members to control significant resources.
Under Hsu Hsin-liang’s leadership, the supporters of interparty cooperation pushed through the decision to join the National Development Conference (NDC) of 1996. A major goal of the NDC was to develop a consensus among the three major parties in preparation for constitutional revisions to be undertaken by the National Assembly the following year. The NDC was a success—it reached and approved significant resolutions—but some DPP politicians worried that Hsu had given up too much. Still, the NDC committed the KMT to one of the DPP’s long-held goals: eliminating the provincial government. (In the view of the DPP, the provincial government was unnecessary, wasteful, and an invitation to corruption, existing only to help maintain the fiction that the ROC regime represented all of China.) Not long after the NDC, the pendulum swung back in favor of the anticoalition camp. Three events helped reverse its direction. First, the DPP won a by-election for the Taoyuan County executiveship. The victory
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energized hard-liners in the DPP and the KMT alike, both of whom urged their leaders to quit compromising. As a result, the constitutional reform negotiations proved much more difficult—and less fruitful—than expected, handing advocates of coalition building a second setback: the National Assembly failed to implement fully the compromises reached at the National Development Conference. The third blow to coalition building was the DPP’s resounding victory in municipal executive elections held in December 1997. These elections were strong evidence that executive elections are the party’s strong suit. This, in turn, encouraged those who believed a presidential victory offered the best chance for a DPP-led government. The party’s disappointing showing in the 1998 legislative race reinforced this assessment. Round 3. Chen Shui-bian’s election as president of the ROC revived the coalition debate yet again, although in a different form. The president’s choice of a premier (the head of government) does not require the approval of the Legislative Yuan, but the legislature can pass a vote of no confidence against the premier. A successful no-confidence vote forces the president to reshuffle the cabinet, but also permits the president to dissolve the legislature and call an early election. For years, political scientists had argued about how this mixed presidentialparliamentary system would work if different parties controlled the presidency and the legislature. Chen’s election was their first chance to find out. Early in his campaign, Chen Shui-bian decided to downplay his partisan identity. Instead, he promised to assemble an “all people’s government” (quanmin zhengfu). He promised to invite excellent men and women from all political parties (as well as those without a party affiliation) to participate in his cabinet. Chen kept his promise, appointing a former defense minister and KMT member, Tang Fei, to be his premier. Tang’s cabinet included only a handful of DPP members; KMT members held the lion’s share of positions. Still, the “all people’s government” was not a coalition. KMT members were invited to join the cabinet as individuals (the Kuomintang briefly debated whether to permit its members to accept cabinet posts before acknowledging that it had no choice), and there was no agreement between the parties in the legislature. Just after the election, Chen asked Shih Ming-teh to explore a more formal coalition arrangement in the legislature, but the prospects were poor, and the effort was abandoned. In the summer of 2000, after it became clear that KMT lawmakers were planning to block the new administration’s legislative initiatives, the Kuomintang’s acting party chair, Lien Chan, raised the possibility
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of a coalition government yet again. Lien’s plan essentially called for the KMT to take over the cabinet. Nonplussed, President Chen responded by raising the specter of new elections. In short, in the early months of Chen’s presidency, a coalition government seemed as remote as ever. In October, Premier Tang resigned his position, and a DPP stalwart, Chang Chun-hsiung, took his place. The cabinet reshuffle marked the shift from an “all people’s government” to a minority cabinet. The DPP and KMT were on a collision course, farther than ever from forming a coalition. In November, Shih Ming-teh relinquished his DPP membership. The reason he gave was his conviction that the DPP’s failure to form a coalition with other parties made it impossible for Chen Shui-bian to form a workable government.
Special Focus: The Thought of Hsu Hsin-liang14 The rising people theory. In March 1995, Hsu Hsin-liang published “Rising People.” In it he argued that Taiwan’s strength is its skill in economics and trade, but that its politics is mired in the fears and dreams of a bygone era. The central question facing Taiwan, he said, is not whether the Taiwanese people can solve the national identity problem, but whether they can carve an international niche in which Taiwan can survive as a free and independent entity. He criticized Taiwan’s preoccupation with the subjective problem of identity, which he said was misguided given both the risks and the opportunities facing the island. In reality, he argued, Taiwan’s future will be determined by its relationship with the outside world, regardless of how the Taiwanese might feel about their internal situation and problems. Taiwan’s best hope is to move decisively and confidently to use its economic endowments to secure its international position. The crisis society theory. In his writings about the Crisis Society idea, Hsu argues that when people are primarily concerned about national security, opposition parties have a very difficult time gaining power. In his view, the DPP has never admitted—even to itself—how deep and abiding the Taiwanese public’s feelings of insecurity are. As long as the DPP cannot allay these concerns, it will not become the ruling party. Hsu visited parties in similar positions in other countries, including Japan, France, and Germany. In the course of his trips, he developed two strategies aimed at winning the confidence of the voters: joining a coalition government and quelling popular misgivings about the DPP’s pro-Taiwan independence views.
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Taiwan party. Immediately after the 1996 presidential election, Hsu announced his latest idea, the need for a Taiwan Party (Taiwan dang). In essence, Hsu was suggesting that the DPP merge with the Taiwanese wing of the KMT to create a grand coalition party. He argued that at this critical moment in Taiwan’s history—fraught as it is with both danger and opportunity—a unified government capable of decisive leadership is desirable. Hsu Hsin-liang’s ideas were often ridiculed and rarely implemented when he was party chair, but President Chen Shui-bian’s policies owe much to Hsu’s thinking. During the presidential election campaign, Chen embraced Hsu’s assessment that dwelling on Taiwan’s national identity crisis is unconstructive. Instead, he pushed forward a pragmatic, centrist view of cross-strait relations that acknowledged the cultural and historical connections between Taiwan and China, while at the same time emphasizing Taiwan’s commitment to political autonomy. During the campaign, Chen worked tirelessly to allay voters’ feelings of insecurity about the cross-strait issue. Likewise, his enthusiasm for cross-strait economic integration bears no small resemblance to Hsu’s Go West Boldly (dadan xijin) stance at the DPP’s 1998 conference on cross-strait relations.
Central-Local Relations: The Bayer Project Barely a week after winning twelve out of twenty-one municipal executive seats in the 1997 local elections, the DPP stumbled into a crisis. Once again, the disaster had its roots in the DPP’s amorphous decisionmaking process. The central issues were party discipline, the extent to which elected officials were obligated to follow the party line, and the balance of power between the party center and local officials. The controversy revealed that in the absence of well-defined lines of policymaking authority, a local official could hijack the DPP agenda and damage the party’s credibility. Just after the election, then party chair Hsu Hsin-liang appeared on a TVBS news show with the newly elected DPP executive of Taichung County, Liao Yung-lai. The two were discussing a major industrial project slated for construction in Taichung Harbor, on Taiwan’s west-central coast. The project was a facility at which the German chemical firm Bayer AG planned to produce toluene diisocyanate, an ingredient in high-end plastics manufacturing. The ROC government was strongly committed to the Bayer project, which involved an investment of nearly U.S.$2 billion and would help modernize Taiwan’s manufacturing
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industry. The central government gave an expedited environmental approval, arranged the lease of land owned by the provincial government to Bayer, and recommended that the chemical maker apply for special construction permits. For its part, the DPP had not taken a position on the project, although some DPP insiders believe party chair Hsu was inclined to look upon it favorably. (In fact, the DPP has never come out against the Bayer project.) Nevertheless, the topic of conversation on “News: One Hundred Percent” was not the benefits of the project, but its environmental risks. Local residents and environmentalists from around the island were convinced that the plant would produce an unacceptable level of pollution and had the potential for a Bhopal-like release of toxic gases. They feared that in its eagerness to attract the investment, the government had understated the plant’s environmental cost. During his campaign for the county executiveship, Liao promised his constituents that environmental concerns would receive a full hearing from his administration. In particular, Liao insisted that final approval of the Bayer project should rest on the results of a referendum among local residents. Liao’s government would issue construction permits only with the say-so of the plant’s neighbors. In the TVBS interview, Hsu agreed with Liao’s decision to submit the Bayer project to a referendum. Rather than voicing support for the Bayer project, which would have meant contradicting Liao publicly, Hsu assented to the county executive’s procedural suggestion. In a nutshell, by making a unilateral decision to oppose the Bayer project before the party had taken a position, Liao backed the DPP Central Party Office into a corner. Unless Hsu was prepared to violate the harmonious feeling that pervaded the party in the wake of the 1997 elections and expose its internal confusion, he was forced to agree with Liao’s fait accompli. The TVBS interview sparked an immediate outcry from the business community, foreign investors, and government economic officials. They pounced on Hsu’s remarks as proof of what many had long suspected: the DPP opposed economic growth, investment, and industrial development. (These concerns were to come back with a vengeance in October 2000, when Premier Chang Chun-hsiung announced the government’s decision to cancel construction of Taiwan’s fourth nuclear power plant.) Hsu recognized these attacks as a serious challenge to the DPP’s efforts to portray itself as a reasonable party, one capable of continuing Taiwan’s prosperity and stability. On December 5 he met with Bayer executives, and he agreed to sponsor a public hearing for further conversation among the interested groups. According to a Bayer official, the meeting with Hsu was “positive and well intentioned,” with Hsu assuring
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him the DPP felt no animus toward the company.15 Shortly after meeting the Bayer officials, Hsu and his aide, DPP press secretary Chen Wenchian (Sisy Chen), left for a week-long trip to the United States. During the trip, Hsu announced that the DPP would hold a conference on industrial policy in early 1998. The announcement was intended to dispel the impression that the party was antibusiness. Hsu also proposed to overhaul the party’s economic policy. Meanwhile, Chen Wen-chian added, “The center will get involved in the Bayer case” (zhongyang yao jieru Baier an).16 These remarks sparked a new controversy, this one within the DPP. Several important party leaders criticized Hsu’s intervention in the case. Taipei mayor Chen Shui-bian joined the chorus of criticism, accusing Hsu and Chen Wen-chian of losing perspective while abroad. The implication behind Chen’s words was that the U.S. trip had inflated the pair’s sense of their own importance. Meanwhile, DPP deputy secretary general Chiou I-jen reportedly threatened to resign his post, insisting that Liao should be permitted to decide for himself whether to hold a referendum. Chen Wen-chian described Hsu’s reaction to the charges: “His face swelled up and turned red, and he was absolutely dumbstruck.”17 Returning to Taiwan on December 14, Hsu and Chen held a latenight press conference to explain their position. Hsu told reporters the Bayer project was too important to be decided solely by the local government, and that the DPP headquarters “cannot avoid its responsibility to conduct discussions on the referendum issue.” 18 A China News Agency report summarized Chen Wen-chian’s comments as follows: The time has come for DPP officials to sit down and discuss the issue practically and calmly, she asserted. If the referendum takes place, it will inevitably affect the willingness of foreign enterprises to invest in Taiwan due to the uncertainty such a precedent would create, Chen said. She added that if every major project must be affirmed through a public vote, local governments will have difficulty in pushing through major investment projects and in initiating civic construction work.19
In order for the Bayer project to proceed, the Provincial Assembly needed to approve the lease agreement negotiated between Bayer and the provincial government. When the assembly decided not to approve the lease agreement before ending its session on December 18, Bayer suspended the project. According to a company spokesman, the suspension resulted from the failure of the Taiwanese authorities to give a clear time frame for Bayer to begin construction. But Taiwanese officials
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blamed the DPP for creating uncertainty and undermining the project. According to economics minister Wang Chih-kang, the DPP “has always claimed it is not opposed to business” and “it is high time for the opposition party to match its words with deeds.” 20 For his part, Hsu Hsin-liang said he felt “regret and sorrow” over the suspension.21 Bayer finally cancelled the project in March 1998. A number of factors contributed to the decision