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is true if and only if P. However, Mellor insists that the equivalence principle by itself cannot tell us what a proposition’s truthmaker is. Consider the propositions <Murder is wrong> and
14
Heather Dyke
Questions about truth, questions about reality, and questions that link the two domains are among the oldest and most venerable philosophical questions and yet remain some of the most vexed and perplexing of them all. A dominant theme of the chapters in this volume is that things can go badly wrong if we confuse a question about truth with a question about reality, or vice versa, and that this is surprisingly easy to do. Despite their unifying subject matter, the chapters in this volume tackle a broad range of issues concerning truth and reality and offer some new approaches to, and some new perspectives on, some of those old and venerable questions.
Part I
Truth
2
“Unsettledness” in a Bivalent Language A Modest, Nonepistemic Idea JC Beall
1
INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, I suggest a novel, nonepistemic approach towards accommodating the appearance of “unsettledness” or—in some sense—gaps in a bivalent language. Although the suggestion is modest, I think it to be quite plausible. My aim is simply to lay out the proposal, as concisely as possible, and briefly consider a few objections. Accordingly, §2 sets out some terminology. (I should warn that §2 simply marches through some definitions without pause. Readers might prefer to fi rst read §3 and, in turn, return to §2.) §3 sketches the main issue, namely, accommodating the appearance of (some sort of) “gaps” or “unsettledness” in our otherwise bivalent language. §4 and §5 present the main proposal. §6 briefly considers a few objections, and §7 offers a brief review and closing remarks.
2
TERMINOLOGY
The following defi nitions will be used throughout. Not all of the defi nitions are entirely standard or, perhaps, even ideal; however, they will serve to focus the issue. Throughout, we let D be our given (nonempty) domain, α and β any sentences—where sentences, throughout, are meaningful, declarative sentences—and φ(x) any unary predicate. (For simplicity, I put things in terms of unary predicates. The generalization to n-ary predicates should be straightforward but, for present purposes, needlessly multiplies symbols.) We let φ(x)+ and φ(x)- be the extension and antiextension of φ(x), respectively. (We also make the convenient assumption that y ∈ φ(x)- if y is not a sentence. This is not ultimately necessary, though dropping the assumption would require talk of “range of application” and so on, which is ultimately important but, I think, may be set aside here without loss.) Throughout, falsity is taken to be truth of negation: α is false just if ¬α is true. Finally, for convenience, I rely on context to clarify use-mention.
18 JC Beall Definition (Excluded Middle, LEM) α ∨ ¬α is logically true for all α. Definition (Bivalence, BIV) Tr(┌α┐) ∨ Tr(┌¬α┐) is logically true for all α. Definition (Bivalent Language) Language L is bivalent just if φ(x)+ ∪ φ(x)- = D for all objects x ∈ D and all L predicates φ(x). Definition (Standardly Gappy Language) L is standardly gappy just if φ(x)+ ∪ φ(x)- ≠ D for some x ∈ D and L predicate φ(x). Definition (Contraries) α and β are contraries just if α ∧ β is logically false. Definition (Subcontraries) α and β are subcontraries just if α ∨ β is logically true. Definition (Contradictories) α and β are contradictories just if they are both contraries and subcontraries. I should note that the point of setting out these defi nitions is not to foreshadow any sort of proof. Rather, setting out such terminology facilitates a concise presentation of the issue and, in turn, the chief proposal. I turn now to the issue at hand.
3 THE ISSUE: BIVALENCE AND APPARENT UNSETTLEDNESS A challenge that confronts those, like myself, who endorse bivalence, is the apparent “unsettledness” of our language. In a nutshell, there appear to be “gaps,” in some sense. (In what sense there are “gaps” is part of the issue. I will return to this.) Vagueness is one of the driving phenomena behind the appearance of such “unsettledness” or “gaps.” Let Rφ be a “tolerance relation” for (vague) predicate φ(x), so that Rφ x, y only if x and y are relevantly similar. Bivalence—plus plausible other logical assumptions—has the (prima facie untoward) consequence of “sharp cutoffs” for φ(x), namely, SC. ∃x∃y(R φ(x, y) ∧ φ(x) ∧¬φ(y)). But philosophical intuition rails against such cutoffs. That there’s a moment t such that at t you’re a person but, for i as small as you like, at t-i you’re not a person strikes many philosophers as absurd or, at least, too hard to believe. Our usage, one is inclined to think, is simply not that sharp. The swift step, in turn, is to mollify “intuition” by acknowledging “gaps” in some sense. Indeed, be it the prima facie repugnance of SC or background
“Unsettledness” in a Bivalent Language
19
thoughts about meaning and use (and truth), many philosophers are inclined to accept the following, for some b. G. φ(x) is neither true nor false of b. Of course, on standard nonclassical schemes (e.g., Kleene), G itself is puzzling, at least if, as we’re assuming, falsity is truth of negation. Still, be it SC or something else, the appearance of some sort of “gappiness” in our language is a strong one. As such, those who endorse bivalence face the challenge of either accommodating some sort of “gappiness,” some sort of “unsettledness,” or explaining it away. This is the task to which my proposal is aimed. If, as I think, the logic of our language is fairly normal, SC is inevitable, given the “exhaustive,” LEM-satisfying “nature” of negation. The challenge, as above, is to make sense of the strong appearance of “unsettledness” or “gaps,” in some (clearly nonstandard) sense of “gaps.” «Parenthetical remark. In saying that SC is inevitable given the exhaustive, LEM-satisfying “nature” of negation, I am sneaking in a background assumption about truth, which I fully endorse but do not discuss in this chapter. In particular, I am assuming that truth is entirely transparent in the sense that Tr(┌α┐) and α are intersubstitutable in all (nonopaque) contexts, for all α in the language. Though van Fraassen (1966) showed that languages can enjoy LEM without thereby being bivalent, the former implies the latter where transparent truth is involved—at least as far as what can be (truly) said in the given language. Suppose, for example, that we have the validity of α ∨ ¬α. Assuming, as I do, that negation is a nonopaque context, the transparency of truth yields the equivalence of ¬α and Tr(┌ ¬α┐). Hence, α ∨ ¬α is equivalent to Tr(┌α┐) ∨ Tr(┌ ¬α┐), which is just to say that Excluded Middle implies bivalence. This assumption may be dropped without loss, although my remarks about “exhaustive” negation will have to be read so as to ensure not only bivalence, as a true principle expressible in the language but a bivalent language too. End parenthetical.» Of course, there are already a few well-known proposals that purport to accommodate apparent unsettledness in a bivalent language. In particular, classical epistemicist proposals, such as Sorensen’s (2001) and Williamson’s (1994), fi rmly accept—as I do—that our language is bivalent but nonetheless enjoys “gaps.” The “gaps,” on such accounts, are epistemic gaps, gaps in our knowledge, as opposed to “gaps” between truth and falsity (whatever, in the end, that might come to). On these approaches, SC is an inevitable consequence of the exhaustive nature of negation and the logical behavior of our other connectives. On this I agree.1 How, then, does our
1
This is not to say that I endorse the particular logic in question. Both Sorensen and Williamson endorse classical (or, at least, an “explosive”) logic, whereas I endorse a paraconsistent logic to accommodate the transparency of truth (given
20 JC Beall language happen to be “unsettled”? As above, the epistemicist proposal is that our “gaps” are not in the language; they are in our knowledge. In short, we simply do not know the particular point at which we become a person, even though there is one. Moreover, we cannot—we could not—know the given point. The “gaps” in question are not just actual; they’re necessary. My aim is not to evaluate epistemicist proposals or even discuss them in any serious fashion. I mention epistemicism only as one—perhaps the leading—approach to accommodating some sort of “gaps” in a bivalent language.2 I do not have a knockdown argument against epistemicism; I have only the familiar autobiographical reason for rejection, namely, that I fi nd it difficult to believe. Although I accept, with epistemicists, that there’s a point at which I’m a person and before which not, and also accept that we’re actually ignorant of the particular point, I fi nd it difficult to believe that we couldn’t know the given point, even with all actual information (including the sufficient condition for being a person). Autobiography is not argument, but I am motivated to fi nd an alternative course.
4
STARS: AN ABSTRACT OPTION
My aim is to suggest a nonepistemicist account of “gaps” in a bivalent language. I accept, as above, that SC is inevitable—at least given the sort of logic in the background. I also accept that the appearance of “unsettledness” is strong, that the appearance of “gaps,” in some sense, requires explanation. My aim is to offer a modest proposal towards accommodating such appearances, despite bivalence. Given the defi nitions in §2, it is obvious that our language is bivalent only if it is not standardly gappy, in the sense of §2. The task is not to fi nd a way of explaining how gaps, on the standard defi nition, might arise; we are fully embracing bivalence—fully embracing that our language is not standardly gappy.3 The task, rather, is to consider another way in which our language might enjoy “unsettledness” or “gaps,” in some other, suitably related sense of such terms. The terminology, in the end, is neither here nor there. The task, in the end, is to explore a possible phenomenon that,
bivalence). This difference is important in the broader scheme of issues, but it’s not particularly germane here, and so I leave the matter there. 2 Another approach is that of Weatherson (2005). Though I think that this is an interesting approach, as are the epistemicist approaches, I do not discuss it here, chiefly for space reasons. 3 As such, our task is different from that of Soames (1999), wherein “smidget” is introduced to illustrate how gaps, in the standard sense, might arise. That said, I embrace Soames’ basic suggestion (though not his overall account). I return to this in §5.
“Unsettledness” in a Bivalent Language
21
if actual, might well underwrite the appearance of unsettledness, or indeed be the phenomenon of “vagueness.” Before turning to the particular proposal, it’ll be useful to consider the matter in abstract. In short, suppose that our language L is bivalent in the sense in §2. Then there is no b ∈ D such that φ(b)+ ∪ φ(b)- ≠ D. The question at hand, as above, is whether there’s an alternative sense in which L might be unsettled, a sense that isn’t too far from the standard sense. I suggest that there’s a natural, modest sense in which L might nonetheless be “unsettled.” To simplify matters, suppose that L is devoid of “semantic” terms like “true” and the like.4 Suppose that, for every “positive atomic” predicate φ(x) in L, there is a “star mate” φ*(x), which—for simplicity—is also an atomic predicate, though not a “positive” one.5 Now, suppose that the relation between our positive atomics and their star mates is exclusive but not necessarily exhaustive, in the sense that, for all x, EXC. φ(x)+ ∩ φ*(x)+ = ∅ but we need not have EXH. φ(x)+ ∪ φ*(x)+ = D. In other words, we never have some b of which both φ(x) and φ*(x) are true, but we might have some b of which neither φ(x) nor φ*(x) is true. Notice that, given familiar assumptions about negation and validity, EXC will yield φ*(x) ⊢ ¬φ(x) but we will not get the converse, since φ*(x) is simply an atomic governed only by the minimal constraints above—in effect, only EXC. The idea, in abstract, may be put succinctly: for every “positive atomic” φ(x) in the language, there is an atomic contrary. « Parenthetical remark. I should note that it’s not obvious that one must treat the given “star mates” (or, for short, “stars”) as atomic predicates, but I do so for simplicity. If one were to treat * as some sort of connective, the story would be rather complicated. One route might be along da Costa’s “negation” lines, wherein * is interpreted in a noncompositional fashion (da Costa and
4
This isn’t ultimately necessary, but I do not go into the matter here. I leave the notion of a “positive predicate” at an intuitive level. For present purposes, predicates like “is a book,” “is bald,” “is sad,” and so on are one and all positive atomics. 5
22
JC Beall
Alves 1977). Ultimately, though, the end result will have to be such that φ*(x) is, in effect, atomic, and so I simply treat it as such.) End parenthetical.» Of course, given that negation itself is a contradictory-forming operator, in the sense that ¬α is the contradictory of α for all α (see §2), we have φ*(x) ∨ ¬φ*(x) for all given “stars.” But this is simply the result of negation doing its “exhaustive” job. As for our “stars” themselves, while we have it that φ(x) ∧ φ*(x) is logically false for all x and all φ(x), we—importantly—do not, as mentioned above, have that, for all x, the following holds: φ(x) ∨ φ*(x). In other words, given standard assumptions of validity, we will have ⊢ ¬(φ(x) ∧ φ*(x)) for any x, but, notably, ⊬ (φ(x) ∨ φ*(x)). This latter feature, I suggest, is at least one natural sort of “unsettledness” or “gaps,” however modest it may be. The question, of course, is how, if at all, it applies to our actual language.
5
PROPOSAL: “GAPS” VIA STAR MATES
The proposal is that our own language has such “stars.” Although our language is bivalent, there is also unsettledness in a nonepistemic sense; there are “gaps” in the sense that, for some b and vague φ(x), we have the following: ¬φ(b) ∧ ¬φ*(b). In other words, b falls into the “gap” between φ(x) and φ*(x), though—given bivalence—obviously not the (nonexistent) gap between φ(x) and ¬φ(x). We do not, of course, have predicates in English that are spelled with “stars.” What, then, plays the role of “star mates” in our language? My suggestion is that something along the lines of “non-φ(x)” is what does the “star” work in our (natural) language, though it may well be some deviant
“Unsettledness” in a Bivalent Language
23
usage of “not” that results in an atomic “not-φ(x).” For present purposes, I’ll assume the former (“non”) construction. In particular, for each positive atomic predicate φ(x), at least of our base “semantic-free” fragment, we have a star mate expressed by “non-φ(x).” The star mate, as in the abstract sketch above, is an atomic predicate, however much it may superficially look like a molecular predicate. « Parenthetical remark. I should emphasize, again, that this assumption is probably not necessary. If one took “non” to be an operator, it would have to be something other than negation, and, as above, likely have to be noncompositional. As such, it strikes me as simpler to just assume that such “star mates” are atomic predicates in their own right. End parenthetical. » The proposal, as in §4, has it that our star mates, expressed via some atomic “non-φ(x)” construction, are contraries of φ(x), with EXC being their fundamental constraint. The pressing question concerns the satisfaction conditions for such stars. What are they? There might be different, equally viable approaches to this question. For present purposes, I suggest a simple and familiar idea about vague predicates. In particular, setting our “star mates” aside for the moment, I adopt the idea, made explicit by Soames (1999), that “vague” or “unsettled” predicates are those for which our practice has established only a sufficient condition for satisfaction.6 The idea, in short, is that our (vague) positive atomics φ(x) enjoy only some sufficient satisfaction condition ψ(x) so that we have only something of the following sort governing φ(x): ψ(x) → φ(x). Soames’ well-known “smidget” example is intended to show how a language might come to have “gappy” predicates, in the standard sense of “gaps” (see §2). Soames suggests that, in addition to φ(x) getting only a sufficient condition, so too for the molecular, negation-ful predicate ¬φ(x). In particular, Soames’ smidget example has us giving a sufficient condition for Smidget(x), namely,7 x ≤ 20 → Smidget(x) and also a sufficient condition for the molecular (negation-ful) predicate ¬Smidget(x), namely, x ≥ 25 → ¬Smidget(x).
6 NB: Soames’ (contextual) development of the idea is not something to which I’m subscribing but, rather, only his initial setup—or, at least, part of his setup. 7 This is not exactly Soames’ example, but the idea is the same.
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JC Beall
This latter step is curious (at best) on the current proposal, wherein we’re assuming bivalence, and hence that negation itself is fully exhaustive (i.e., that LEM holds). As such, there’s no need to give a sufficient condition for ¬φ(x), as this is already covered by the exhaustive “nature” of negation. Let me emphasize that this is not an objection to Soames’ account or even his “smidget” example. His example is intended to illustrate how we might “enjoy” a standardly gappy language in the sense of §2. For present purposes, I’m assuming that we do not have standard gaps but still think that Soames’ illustration is relevant—not for negation but for our “stars.” The natural suggestion for our “star mates,” which are similarly “vague,” is the same: we have only some sufficient condition for φ*(x): µ(x) → φ*(x). In turn, so long as we do not have ψ(x) ∨ µ(x), we need not have φ(x) ∨ φ*(x). In cases—perhaps “precise” ones—in which we do have ψ(x) ∨ µ(x), then we’ll have φ(x) ∨ φ*(x). But, again, there’s no reason to think that we’d have such “star exhaustion” (i.e., “star excluded middle”) for all such predicates. The proposal, in short, is that we can understand the apparent “unsettledness” of our (bivalent) language along “star” lines. Given bivalence (and other logical features of the language), we do not have “gaps” in the standard sense. Still, our practice, governing “vague” predicates, leaves lots of “star gaps” (as it were); for many (vague) predicates φ(x), there are objects y such that neither φ(x) nor φ*(x) is true of y. This, I think, is a modest way in which “unsettledness” arises in our (bivalent) language.
6
OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES
In this section, I briefly consider a few objections to the proposal. For convenience, I put the objections as if directed against me, so that “you” denotes me. Objection. Your proposal still leaves SC intact and hence fails to remove the untoward consequence of sharp cutoffs. But it’s precisely such “sharp cutoffs” that many want to avoid in accepting that our language is “unsettled.” At the very least, it isn’t clear how you explain—or, perhaps, explain away—why so many fi nd SC to be repugnant. Reply. The answer, in the end, invokes confl ation. Of course we have SC, which, as said, is inevitable given our negation (and other features of our logic). Given bivalence, reflection makes it clear that—assuming other logical features—there’s always a “cutoff” when negation is around
“Unsettledness” in a Bivalent Language
25
to do the cutting; that’s just how negation is, and the job that negation does. Usage may have—and, I think, has—left many “gaps” for predicates, but the gaps are quickly closed by negation. The “gaps” of our (vague) predicates are not standard gaps (as in §2); rather, they are “star gaps,” as it were, that arise from the distinctive suffi cient-condition-only practice that governs vague terms. If we reflect on the role and standard-gap-closing features of negation (which I’m assuming), we needn’t scream in the face of SC. The proposal is that our screams against SC are actually screams against a different but perhaps superfi cially similar principle, namely, SC*. ∃x∃y(R φ(x, y) ∧ φ(x) ∧ φ*(y)). The unsettledness of our language essentially involves our star mates—our atomic “non-φ(x)” constructions—and, so, we would rightly scream if SC* were true. But SC* is not true. Objection. Your proposal has some similarities to the supervaluationist response.8 It too is committed to • It is true that there is a point at which φ(n) ∧ ¬φ(n + 1). But they too seek to avoid this seemingly untoward consequence by asserting “the confusion hypothesis.” They charge that the truth to which they are committed is confused with another, namely • There is a point for which it is true that φ(n) ∧ ¬φ(n + 1). Only the latter is taken to imply the existence of a “sharp boundary,” but they take themselves to only be committed to the supposedly distinct former claim. The question for you: why not, then, simply go with supervaluationism? Reply. I am sympathetic with supervaluationism and certainly have no knockdown argument against it. My chief reason for pursuing a different course is that, as mentioned, I’m committed to bivalence—not simply LEM—and the whole point of supervaluationism is to enjoy a lot of “classical” negation behavior while nonetheless rejecting bivalence.9 What fuels my commitment to bivalence is a background theory of truth
8 This objection is directly from Dominic Hyde (correspondence), and the reply is also indebted to Hyde. 9 Of course, one could have bivalence on a subvaluationist approach, with which I’m also sympathetic; however, this approach will similarly have a notion of truth with which I’m not sympathetic. (And see Hyde, 1997, and Varzi, 1999, for subvaluationism.)
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JC Beall
and commitment to the “exhaustive,” LEM-satisfying behavior of negation. In particular, as in the parenthetical remark in §3, I think that truth is fundamentally a fully transparent device; it is a device Tr(x) such that Tr(x) and x are intersubstitutable in all (nonopaque) contexts, for all sentences x in the language. Given LEM and transparency of truth, we quickly get Tr(┌ α ┐) ∨ Tr(┌ ¬α ┐), which is the principle of bivalence (at least given, as I assume, that falsity is truth of negation). Other “transparent truth theorists,” such as Field (2008), go on to recognize stronger notions of truth in addition to our fundamental transparent one, but I do not, at least as yet, see the need to do so. The reason that such theorists pursue stronger notions of truth arises from a prior rejection of bivalence—for transparent truth theorists, a prior rejection of LEM. If there were no way to accommodate the appearance of “unsettledness” (in some sense of the term) given bivalence, then I would likely go the route of Field or, perhaps, something along the lines of McGee (1991). The current chapter, however, offers a proposal on how we might enjoy “unsettledness” (in a nonstandard sense) while also enjoying bivalence. Objection. An obvious problem is that you still get “sharp borders” with your “star mates” (i.e., the atomic contraries). In particular, any soritical series will be cut up into three disjoint regions: you’ll have the y that satisfy φ(x), the y that satisfy φ*(x), and the y that satisfy neither φ(x) nor φ*(x). But this is just another untoward consequence against which philosophical intuition screams, and so your account fails to resolve all of the relevant problems, notably, “higher-order vagueness.” Reply. I am not sure what to make of “higher-order vagueness,” and so give at most a tentative reply here. The chief reply is that such “sharp borders” are to be expected if, as they are, they’re characterized in terms of negation. In other words, given the “border-drawing” nature of negation, such “borders” are inevitable and, in the end, to be expected—at least if, again, the given result essentially involves negation (e.g., that we have three different regions, etc., where “different” is understood via negation, or more to the point the “neither . . . nor” clause.) On the other hand, there’s no reason to think that we’d have “sharp borders” where this is characterized in terms of our “stars.” Negation has the job of cutting borders; the stars—our atomic contrary predicates—leave matters looser. So long as we do not have “sharp borders” expressed via stars (as opposed to negation), then it seems we have no reason to scream—at least on reflection. Objection. Your proposal is viable only if we have such “star mates” (i.e., atomic contraries) in our language. But why would we have such things? Reply. This is a very important question for which I currently have at best a tentative answer. Pending a full and plausible answer, the proposal remains only an option worthy of further exploration. My current (and
“Unsettledness” in a Bivalent Language
27
only sketchy) answer is twofold. First, we clearly have atomic contraries in our language. Predicates like “good” and “bad” are examples. (If these are not good examples, use examples that are good!) Assuming, as I think plausible, that “bad” is not defi nable in terms of “good” and negation, there must be some reason that we introduced the (atomic) contrary “bad.” (If there isn’t such a reason, then the current objection strikes me as less pressing. I assume that there is such a reason.) Whatever the reason might be, it is not implausible to think that there’d be motivation to generalize to all (say, “positive”) predicates. It is often very easy, though perhaps not always productive, to let the motivation in a particular case serve as motivation for all relevant cases. The conjecture is that we simply specified (only sufficient conditions) for star mates—in particular, “non-φ(x)” (or some such deviant usage of “not” or “non”)—for all of our positive, vague atomics. Of course, the details of this story need to be told, and the account ultimately turns on empirical linguistics. For now, notwithstanding details, I fi nd the basic proposal to be plausible, or at least a viable suggestion.
7
CLOSING REMARKS
I have suppressed a great deal of background assumptions about truth and logic, or at least about my own views on these matters (Beall forthcoming), which details partly motivate the current proposal. Still, there is an independently recognizable project that I’ve tried to briefly sketch and modestly answer. In short, if our language is bivalent, how can we accommodate apparent unsettledness in the language? One answer—or class of answers—is epistemic. Other answers might posit special features of truth. I have shied away from these only given my own background views on truth not because I think that they’re not worthy of serious consideration. Although such answers are interesting and prima facie viable, I have pursued a different one. Specifi cally, the modest suggestion is that, as Soames (1999) notes, we can recognize a sort of unsettledness arising from the fact that vague predicates have only suffi cient conditions of satisfaction. Unlike Soames, we do not also need to say that such predicates have (only) a suffi cient condition for “anti-satisfaction” (as it were), that is, satisfaction of the molecular predicate ¬φ(x). Given bivalence, the “anti-satisfaction” condition of such predicates is already ensured by features of negation (and other background logical features, including contraposition). Where unsettledness arises is in our “star mates,” atomic contraries of our other vague atomic predicates. Although philosophical intuition would rightly scream at SC*, there’s no need to scream at SC, as that’s just negation—in concert with other logical features—doing its sharp-cutting job. Given that we don’t get SC*, there’s no need to scream at all. This chapter, of course, gives only
28 JC Beall a very brief sketch of the idea. There is much work to be done by way of details. Still, I hope to have at least pointed in the direction of a viable, nonepistemic approach to enjoying both unsettledness and bivalence.10
10. Thanks to Colin Caret, Aaron Cotnoir, Hartry Field, Dominic Hyde, Vann McGee, Graham Priest, Greg Restall, Gillian Russell, and Lionel Shapiro for discussion. Thanks, too, to Heather Dyke for her understanding, patience, and the work involved in putting together this volume.
3
Vagueness and Truth Mark Colyvan
1 INTRODUCING THE PRINCIPLE OF UNIFORM SOLUTION It would be very odd to give different responses to two paradoxes depending on minor, seemingly irrelevant details of their presentation. For example, it would be unacceptable to deal with the paradox of the heap by invoking a multivalued logic, Ł ∞ , say, and yet, when faced with the paradox of the bald man, invoke a supervaluational logic. Clearly these two paradoxes are of a kind—they are both instances of the sorites paradox. And whether the sorites paradox is couched in terms of heaps and grains of sand, or in terms of baldness and the number of hairs on the head, it is essentially the same problem and therefore must be solved by the same means. More generally, we might suggest that similar paradoxes should be resolved by similar means. This advice is sometimes elevated to the status of a principle, which usually goes by the name of the principle of uniform solution. This principle and its motivation will occupy us for much of the discussion in this chapter. In particular, I defend a rather general form of this principle. I argue that two paradoxes can be thought to be of the same kind because (at a suitable level of abstraction) they share a similar internal structure, or because of external considerations such as the relationships of the paradoxes in question to other paradoxes in the vicinity, or because of the way they respond to proposed solutions. I then use this reading of the principle of uniform solution to make a case for the sorites and the liar paradox being of a kind. First, as I’ve already indicated, it is uncontroversial that we all subscribe to some version of the principle of uniform solution.1 There may well be disagreement about the application, scope, and details of formulation of
1 It is also clear that this principle has broad applications, across all areas of philosophy where paradoxes arise: philosophy of logic, decision theory, ethics, philosophy of space and time, and so on. See Colyvan (2008) for a recent implicit appeal to the principle to a family of paradoxes in decision theory.
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Mark Colyvan
the principle, but there is no doubt that some version is agreed to by everyone. Such agreement is rare in philosophy, so it is worth pausing over why there should be such agreement here. I take it that it is not merely a matter of simplicity. That is, I take it that the reason philosophers accept some version of the principle of uniform solution is not motivated by a concern to deal with as many paradoxes as possible with a minimum of resources. There are two reasons why this cannot be the motivation. The fi rst is that this motivation makes no reference to, nor does it require that, the two paradoxes in question be of a kind. Simplicity considerations, if anything, would motivate a principle akin to treating all paradoxes with a minimum number of tools—use a hammer for every task, irrespective of whether all the tasks involve nails. The second reason that this cannot be the motivation for the principle of uniform solution is that simplicity considerations notoriously divide philosophers, and it would be extraordinary if the agreement we have over the principle of uniform solution were due to something so controversial as simplicity. I take the motivation for the principle of uniform solution to be a concern for treating the root of the problem—the disease—not just the symptoms. At least, this is what motivates my subscription to the principle, and I suspect that something like this is the motivation for others as well. The idea is that if you do not bring similar solutions to bear on similar paradoxes, you will be merely hiding the problem—masking the symptoms—rather than getting to the heart of the matter and treating the underlying pathology. An example will help. Let’s suppose that you are tempted to treat the paradox of the bald man by stipulating that some specific number, n, hairs on the head is the sharp cut-off between bald and not bald. And further suppose that you are tempted to treat the paradox of the heap by denying that there are any heaps. Both paradoxes are solved. But the concern is that you have not fully appreciated the fact that in both cases the vagueness of the predicates in question gives rise to borderline cases and that these are tolerant to incremental creep. Without addressing the underlying pathology—classical logic’s apparent inability to handle vague predicates—the problem will reemerge under a new guise. The principle of uniform solution, thus motivated, seems like a sound methodological principle to ensure against further outbreaks of trouble. There is still the question of what makes the different instances of the sorites paradox of a kind. Why are the paradox of the heap and the paradox of the bald man the same paradox? And what is the underlying pathology? Clearly both these paradoxes share some underlying form, and the fact that one is about sand and the other about hair is irrelevant. And it’s not too difficult to spell out what this shared underlying form is. But the problem gets more serious when we consider other, more difficult cases. Is the liar paradox of a kind with Russell’s paradox? Is Curry’s paradox of a kind with the liar? Is the totally ordered (numerical) sorites of a kind with the non-totally-ordered (multidimensional) sorites? And the case I turn to
Vagueness and Truth
31
in the last section of this chapter: is the sorites of a kind with the liar? In order to make a start on these questions, let’s revisit an old debate between Russell and Ramsey about the liar and Russell’s paradoxes.
2
THE LIAR AND RUSSELL’S PARADOXES
Russell and Ramsey disagreed about whether the liar and Russell’s paradox were of a kind. Ramsey (1925) stressed that the liar, along with Grelling’s paradox, Berry’s paradox, and other defi nability paradoxes, were linguistic, in that they relied upon thought or language. He argued that the “fault” was ambiguity in key terms such as “defines.” These paradoxes were to be contrasted with set theory paradoxes such as Russell’s paradox and the Burali-Forti paradox. Letting his logicism come to the fore, Ramsey saw the paradoxes of set theory as only relying on logical notions (such as set membership and number). 2 He thus saw two quite different kinds of paradox here: linguistic and logical/mathematical. Russell (1903), on the other hand, focused more on the underlying structure of the paradoxes and saw them all as paradoxes of impredicativity. And we might add as a further consideration in favor of Russell, both the set theory paradoxes and the liar paradoxes admit extended forms (cyclical liar and cyclical set theory paradoxes) that appear to be generated by the same formal feature: essentially the violation of the vicious circle principle (Giaquinto 2002).3 So on one way of looking at the liar and Russell’s paradox, we see a difference: one is about truth, the other about set membership. But on another way of looking at them, they are of a kind: they both depend on self-reference. What is the correct way to classify these paradoxes? Who won the day, Ramsey or Russell? It’s fair to say that although Ramsey’s classification was very influential for a considerable time, more recently it has fallen out of favor. For what it’s worth, I’m inclined to agree with Russell and not with Ramsey here, but the matter is neither trivial nor settled. Agreeing with Russell is one thing, but putting your fi nger on why the liar and the set theory paradoxes are of a kind is not possible without a substantial theory of similarity of paradoxes. Neither Russell nor Ramsey was attempting anything so ambitious as this, yet each, in their own way, was providing a partial theory about the similarity or dissimilarity of the two paradoxes under discussion. What was particularly interesting about Russell’s approach, at least, is that he can be seen to be looking for the underlying mechanism and was considering structural similarities rather
2 Moreover, Ramsey’s logicism prevented him from recognizing another possible distinction: between mathematics and logic. 3 I make more of this point in a later section.
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Mark Colyvan
than the more superficial features of the paradoxes.4 And Russell did not need to invoke logicism or any other substantial philosophical theory to defend his view.5 In any case, let’s run with this (no doubt not entirely accurate) caricature of Russell and Ramsey on the liar and set theory paradoxes. My suggestion is that Russell was more interested in what made the paradoxes tick, whereas Ramsey was more concerned with the details of their construction (whether they were made from linguistic and belief terms or from terms from set theory). What is appealing about determining what makes the two paradoxes tick is that once this is known, a more systematic, unified treatment can be applied. We won’t be merely treating the symptoms, we will know what the real problem is. A brief look at another unifier, Graham Priest, will help to see the benefits of getting at the root of the problem.
3
THE INCLOSURE SCHEMA
Graham Priest (2002, 134), following a suggestion from Russell, has proposed a formal schema that can be used to help classify paradoxes: the Inclosure Schema. Inclosure Schema: There are two properties φ and ψ and a function δ such that (1) Ω = {y|φ(y)} exists, and ψ(Ω) (2) if x is a subset of Ω such that ψ(x), then (a) δ(x) ∉ x, and (b) δ(x) ∈ Ω. Priest sees this schema as a paradox litmus test: if the paradox in question can be made to conform to this schema, then it is of a kind with others that satisfy the schema. It should not be surprising that according to this
4 But in fairness to Ramsey, he probably did not see the fact that the liar involved truth, and Russell’s paradox involved set membership as superficial at all. Indeed, he may well have thought that this difference resulted in two quite different mechanisms. 5 Again, in fairness to Ramsey, it is easy to see reliance on logicism as a defect of Ramsey’s account, but at the time, logicism was a real contender for the philosophical account of mathematics. Invoking such an account to do some work in the classification of paradoxes is perfectly understandable.
Vagueness and Truth
33
way of carving up the territory, many of the usual suspects turn out to be of a kind: Burali-Forti paradox, Russell’s paradox, the liar paradox, liar cycle paradoxes, Berry’s paradox, and Grelling’s paradox, to name a few. But interestingly, one is left out in the cold (Curry’s paradox) and one other has its status in dispute (Yablo’s paradox). Let’s look at Yablo’s paradox in a little more detail, because the debate over it is instructive. Yablo’s paradox also comes in both set- and truth-theoretic versions. Here is the truth-theoretic version: (s1) For all k > 1, sk is not true. (s2) For all k > 2, sk is not true. (s3) For all k > 3, sk is not true. .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
(sn) For all k > n, sk is not true. .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
The above infi nite list is paradoxical and, on the face of it at least, there is no self-reference or cycles of reference. But the paradox is defi nitely liar-like. Indeed, it is a kind of limiting case of longer and longer liar cycles. Why this paradox is so important is that if, as Stephen Yablo (1993) originally suggested,6 it is non-self-referential yet liar-like, then self-reference does not seem to be the culprit after all. The source of the trouble in the so-called paradoxes of self-reference must be elsewhere. Moreover, if Yablo’s paradox is not circular, it fails to fit the inclosure schema and thus fails to be classified as of a kind with the liar. But everyone agrees that this paradox is liar-like. Some such as Priest (1997) and Beall (2001) suggest that, despite initial appearances, the paradox
6 And more recently supported by Roy Sorensen (1998) and Bueno and Colyvan (2003).
34
Mark Colyvan
is self-referential because a fi xed-point construction is required in the derivation of the paradoxical conclusion. There are many interesting points arising from this debate. First, those who argue that Yablo’s paradox is, in fact, circular do so by invoking a quite different notion of circularity than the more intuitive notion, appealed to in liar cycles. After all, “requiring a fi xed-point construction in the derivation of the paradoxical conclusion” is quite different from “refers to another sentence that refers to . . . that refers to the fi rst sentence.” I’m not claiming that thinking of circularity in terms of fi xed-point constructions is illegitimate. Far from it. This seems a perfectly reasonable sense of circularity (or self-reference). I am just noting that the inclosure schema is not doing all the work here; we can do a little massaging of terms like “circularity.” But perhaps most interesting of all are the reasons for thinking that even when the structural features of the paradox (whether it is circular and whether it satisfies the inclosure schema) are in dispute, there can be agreement about whether Yablo’s paradox is liar-like. It is worth spelling out some of the reasons for this agreement. 1. Yablo’s paradox is very naturally seen as the limiting case of longer and longer liar cycles. That is, it bears a certain close relationship with paradoxes that are liar-like. 2. Yablo’s paradox, like the liar paradox, has a set-theoretic analogue.7 3. Yablo’s paradox, like the liar, comes in both unstrengthened and strengthened forms. That is, Yablo’s paradox can be constructed in terms of falsity or in terms of untruth (respectively). 4. And last, but not least, both the liar and Yablo’s paradox use the same basic machinery (i.e., truth, negation, T-schema, etc.). These points of contact between the liar and Yablo’s paradox suggest that features other than internal structural features (as displayed by the inclosure schema) are playing a role. We also saw this in relation to Russell’s paradox and the liar, although there it was less clear because the two paradoxes in question also shared a common structure (as revealed by the inclosure schema). In the case of Russell’s paradox and the liar, the extrastructural feature was that they both admitted extended forms. That is, the two paradoxes had similar, nearby neighbors. There is another point of similarity between all four of these paradoxes: they admit the same kind of solutions. I discuss this issue further in the next section. The important point to note for now is that although the inclosure schema (or other ways
7 Whatever you think about the Russell–Ramsey debate over the liar and Russell’s paradoxes, it is clear that Russell’s paradox is at the very least a set-theoretic analogue of the liar paradox.
Vagueness and Truth
35
of revealing internal structural similarities) is clearly relevant, it cannot be the whole story. There is more to paradox classification than recognizing similarity of structure.8
4 WHAT COMES FIRST, THE DIAGNOSIS OR THE TREATMENT? Let me return to the medical analogy that I used to motivate the principle of uniform solution: we want to treat the disease and not merely the symptoms. The idea is that we don’t want to employ different solutions for what are essentially the same problem, for otherwise we are missing the “mechanism.”9 But sometimes we cannot fi nd the mechanism before we consider treatments. Some psychiatric disorders, I’m told, are like this. The mechanisms are complex and often inaccessible, but classifying the diseases in terms of the treatments they respond to is still helpful. Indeed, it might be argued that insofar as a classification by treatments works, it works because there is a common mechanism, and the treatment is latching onto that mechanism. To give one rather dramatic example, before the days of quick, reliable, and readily available brain imaging, there were two quite different types of acute cerebral disorders that presented identically (or near enough) clinically. Consider a patient with an acute onset of weakness down one side of the body, slurred speech, and relaxed facial muscles on the same side as the weakness. These are classic stroke symptoms, but, as it turns out, there are two quite different mechanisms for this. One is a thrombotic event (a piece of clot that lodges in an intercerebral artery and blocks blood supply to all points distal to the block. The second mechanism is a burst blood vessel in the brain that results in an intercerebral bleed that puts pressure on the nearby areas of the brain (and cuts off blood supply to those regions). There is a very reliable test to tell these two apart: administer an anticoagulant such as heparin. If the stroke were due to the fi rst mechanism (the thrombotic event), the patient would often make a dramatic recovery (if caught early enough) after the heparin. On the other hand, if the stroke were due to the second mechanism (the bleed), then the patient would see a rapid decline after heparin and possibly die. There are, of course, less extreme
8 There is also the substantial issue of the level of abstraction at which the structural similarities are revealed. See N. J. J. Smith (2000) and Priest (1994, 2000) on this issue. 9 In the case of diseases “mechanism” talk is legitimate, but of course in the logical and set-theory paradoxes, such causal language is out of place. But still there is the thought that there is something that is at the root of the paradox—that which makes it tick (to invoke another analogy).
36
Mark Colyvan
cases of this type of diagnosis via cure (or failure to cure), but this one is useful to make the point because the underlying mechanisms are quite straightforward. That’s all well and good for medicine, but what’s that got to do with classifying paradoxes? Well, we might take a leaf out of medicine’s book and consider classifying paradoxes by the methods they respond to (and fail to respond to). For example, here is a reason why we might consider the liar and the set-theory paradoxes as alike: they both respond equally well to hierarchical treatments. They also both respond to three-valued approaches (partial set membership and three-valued logics) equally well. Notice that I’m not claiming that either the hierarchical approach or the three-valued approach is a genuine solution; it’s just that in each case these approaches do about as well and face much the same problems. We could then suggest that the reason for this is that the treatments are latching onto, partially latching onto, or completely missing (as the case may be) the underlying mechanisms. So here we have the beginnings of a classification of the underlying problem in terms of the cure, partial cure, or failed cure (as the case may be). But recall that we are trying to justify the principle of uniform solution. In the context of this justification, isn’t classifying paradoxes by their solutions question begging or vacuous? After all, the suggestion seems to amount to something like paradox A and paradox B are the same paradox because they admit the same solution, therefore we should use the same solution on them. This vacuousness objection would be a fair criticism of simply using successful solutions as a means of classifying paradoxes, but that is not what I’m advocating here. Rather, I am advocating that we should use treatments—successful, partially successful, and unsuccessful—as a tool in the classification of paradoxes. Nor am I suggesting that this should be the only tool. I’ve already suggested that Priest’s inclosure schema is a very useful way to reveal internal structural similarities, and I also mentioned that the relationship to nearby paradoxes can be revealing. Indeed, the latter is closely related to the present suggestion of classifying by treatment. In the next section I examine the connections between these two proposals.
5 THE LOCATION OF PARADOXES IN “DIALECTIC SPACE” So far I have argued that there are a number of methods we might use to show that two paradoxes are essentially the same. Two of these, classification via response to treatments and classification via near neighbors, are related. Let’s return to the (simple) liar and Yablo’s paradoxes, each couched in terms of falsity. I have already noted that one reason for thinking that they are essentially the same (or at least of a kind) is that they
Vagueness and Truth
37
both have nearby neighbors—strengthened liar and strengthened Yablo paradoxes, couched in terms of untruth. But now consider the usual line of reasoning that relates the simple versions and the strengthened versions. Consider a truth-value gap approach to both the simple liar and the simple Yablo paradox. According to this approach, the paradoxical sentences in question (the liar sentence and every sentence in the Yablo list) fail to take a truth-value, and we invoke a suitable logic to support such claims (such as K 3). But, as is well known, this gappy approach suffers serious revenge problems at the hands of the strengthened versions of the paradoxes in question. I want to make it clear that I am not claiming that gappy solutions do not work (at least I’m not claiming that here); I am only pointing out that in both the liar and Yablo’s paradoxes, there are nearby strengthened versions that hit the gappy solution very hard and in much the same way. Now consider glutty approaches to the two paradoxes in question. According to this approach, the sentences in question are both true and false, and we invoke a suitable logic to support such claims (such as LP). As is also well known, these glutty solutions perform better when confronted with strengthened versions of the paradoxes. What this suggests is that although the relationship of the paradoxes to their nearby neighbors is significant, the dialectic connecting the various paradoxes is also important. The way the nearby neighbors respond or fail to respond to proposed treatments tells us something about what makes the whole family tick. Indeed, the very reasons for introducing the neighbors is important. In the cases just discussed, the neighboring strengthened paradoxes were introduced to raise problems for gappy approaches. So I am suggesting that we do not just consider the internal structure of the paradoxes—although that is undoubtedly important—we also consider the external relationships—the relationships to other nearby paradoxes. Moreover, I’m suggesting that we consider these latter relationships in terms of the dialectic that connects them all—the successes, partial successes, and failures of various treatments and the moves and countermoves in the debate that ensues. This proposal is not so neat and tidy as Priest’s elegant inclosure schema. Be that as it may, the added complexity is needed. For a start, the inclosure schema is at best limited in its application; it is only designed to classify paradoxes into two categories: those that fit the schema (the liar-like ones) and those that don’t. What about further classification among those that do not fit the schema? Priest is certainly not suggesting that they should all yield to the same treatment; he is only suggesting that those that fit the schema should be treated similarly. But we can reasonably ask about the similarity of paradoxes that do not fit the schema. Is the prisoners dilemma a Newcomb problem (Lewis 1979)? Is the two envelope paradox a St. Petersburg paradox (Chalmers 2002)? Are the St. Petersburg and the Pasadena paradoxes of a kind (Colyvan 2006; Nover and Hájek 2004)? And, as we will consider in the next section, are the sorites and the liar of a kind (Beall
38 Mark Colyvan and Colyvan 2001; Field 2004; Hyde 2001 and unpublished; Tappenden 1993)? To answer these questions we need something more discriminating than the inclosure schema. This is not a failing of the inclosure schema, of course. It was never intended to answer such questions. To answer these questions we need a more general framework for tackling the questions about similarity and identity of paradox. The proposal I’ve sketched here is a fi rst step towards such a framework.
6
THE LIAR AND THE SORITES
It is not obvious that the liar and the sorites share structural similarity,10 but there are other considerations that push for their similarity. The fi rst point of similarity is that both paradoxes have strengthened forms that raise problems for gappy solutions. So, as is well known in the case of the liar, if you are tempted to advance a gappy solution, whereby the liar sentence is neither true nor false, you face revenge problems in the form of the strengthened liar. The trick here is to take the tripartite division the gap theorist advances—true, false, and neither—and collapse two of the categories, and put pressure on the new bipartite division. The usual way this is done is by defi ning a new predicate, untrue, whereby a sentence is untrue if and only if it is either false or gappy. The revenge problem arises in the form of the strengthened liar sentence: This sentence is untrue. Gaps may solve the original liar but they fall foul of the corresponding revenge problem.11 Moreover, it is agreed by everyone that the strengthened liar is of the same kind as the original liar, and so wheeling in a different solution for the strengthened form of the paradox is not a viable option (for reasons of uniform solution). Now notice how so-called higher-order vagueness and the related higher-order sorites can be seen as a kind of revenge problem for gap approaches to the sorites. Recall that the gap approach to the sorites posits a third category—neither true nor false—to accommodate all the borderline cases. The higher-order problem involves the same trick as sketched above: the tripartite division is collapsed to a bipartite one via a new predicate. In this case, the usual predicate is determinately a heap, where something is determinately a heap if and only if it is not determinately a nonheap and not a borderline case. Now the higher-order sorites is rolled out and we fi nd that the boundary between the categories “determinately a heap” and the (fi rst-order) “borderline case” also
10 Although, see Chase (unpublished) for some reason to suspect that a continuous version of the sorites is structurally similar to the liar. 11 Although I take such revenge problems to be very serious for gap accounts, I am not suggesting that it’s game over for gappy accounts.
Vagueness and Truth
39
allows incremental creep. The dialectic structure is the same as with the strengthened liar, where we think of the higher-order sorites as a revenge problem, analogous with the liar revenge problems. Next it is worth noting that, in both the case of the liar and the sorites, glutty solutions fare better with regard to these revenge problems. But in both cases there is an intuitive revenge problem in the vicinity that would do to gluts what the above revenge problems do to gaps. Take the liar fi rst. Intuitively the predicate in question needs to collapse the three categories of true (only), both true and false, and false (only) to two. The predicate in question would appear to be “true-and-true-only” with the corresponding strengthened liar sentence: This sentence is not true-and-true-only. But here’s the problem for this line of attack on the glutty approach: this sentence is also paradoxical so is both true (only), and not true-and-true-only. The revenge problem one is grasping for can be formulated, but the sentence in question doesn’t convey the meaning you would like. Some have argued that this shows that the glutty solution is somewhat unsatisfying, in that it blocks revenge by what appears to be a trick akin to not allowing the opponent the expressive resources to formulate the relevant revenge problem.12 I won’t enter into that issue here. It is sufficient to note that the intuitive revenge problem for the glut solution does not deliver the serious blow that the analogous revenge problem does for the gap solution and that this lack of revenge is for a very specific reason. Now return to the sorites. The situation here is analogous. We’ve already seen how higher-order sorites can be seen as a revenge problem for gappy approaches. But what about a revenge problem for glutty approaches? Here the new predicate in question would need to be “true-and-true-only a heap,” and the strengthened sorites series would be constructed in terms of this predicate. But as with the liar, there is no problem allowing that borderline sentences are both true-and-true-only and also not true-andtrue-only. These hypercontradictions block the revenge problem in the case of the liar, and they do the same for analogous strategies in the case of the sorites. This is not to say that the glut approach solves the sorites. There is a lot more work to be done on spelling out the details of the glutty solution to higher-order vagueness. All I am claiming for present purposes is that, just as with the liar, revenge problems hit the gappy approach, but the corresponding glutty revenge problems lack any bite. Moreover, they lack bite for the same reason—because of hypercontradictions. I have argued that both the liar and the sorites have nearby neighbors in the form of strengthened forms—the strengthened liar and the higherorder sorites—that play similar roles in the dialectic against gaps (and for gluts). That is, there is a case to be made for the liar and the sorites occupying similar positions in their respective “dialectical spaces.” Also, it
12
For instance, Daniel Nolan has made this point in conversation.
40 Mark Colyvan seems that both the liar and the sorites respond to gappy approaches about as well as each other and that gap solutions have serious difficulties with strengthened forms. And, more tentatively, a case can be made that glutty approaches do somewhat better in the face of the relevant revenge problems in both cases. This suggests that there may be a link between the sorites and the liar via extrastructural considerations. Is this enough to make the case that the liar and the sorites are of a kind and therefore require a uniform solution? So far we have similarity established by two of the three means I outlined in earlier sections. The fi nal one is structural similarity, and that has not yet been established. Is two out of three good enough, or is structural similarity the one that really matters? Perhaps the other two (position in dialectic space and diagnosis by cure) are mere signs of underlying structural similarity? These are interesting questions that are difficult to get much traction on at the present time. But whichever way the answers to these questions fall, I take it that there are some points of contact between the liar and the sorites; these points of contact are sufficient to warrant further investigation into possible structural similarities13 and to keeping an open mind about a uniform treatment of both the paradoxes of vagueness and truth.14
13
See Priest et al. (unpublished) for some preliminary work in this direction. I am grateful to James Chase, Dominic Hyde, Carrie Jenkins, Kristie Miller, Hugh Mellor, Daniel Nolan, Graham Priest, Nick Smith, Roy Sorensen, and Zach Weber for correspondence and conversations on the issues dealt with in this chapter. I am also indebted to audiences at the Truth and Reality Conference at the University of Otago in January 2007, as well as audiences at Macquarie University, the University of Sydney, the University of Miami, the Society for Exact Philosophy Meeting at the University of British Columbia in May 2007, and the Australasian Association of Philosophy Conference at the University of New England in July 2007. This research was funded by an Australian Research Council Discovery Grant (grant number DP0666020). 14
Part II
Reality
4
Biological Realisms Michael Devitt
The species category does not exist. (Ereshefsky 1998, 113) Legitimate species . . . change with the explanatory schemata and practical interests of the biologists. (Stanford 1995, 83) Taxa of higher rank than species do not exist in the same sense as do species. (Eldredge and Cracraft 1980, 327) To the cladist true believer, there is no such thing as a reptile. (Sterelny and Griffiths 1999, 197)
1
INTRODUCTION
Realism issues tend to be confusing because of the bewildering number of “defi nitions” of what realism is. A large part of the problem, I have argued in Realism and Truth (1997), is that doctrines that should be metaphysical have become entangled with epistemological and semantic doctrines. The various realism issues in biology do not seem to have that problem, but there is still some unclarity about the nature of those issues, as David Hull notes. The most active of the issues arises out of the debate between “species monists” who think that there is just one good “species concept”—one good account of what it is to be a species—and “species pluralists” who think that there are many. Hull fi nds the combinations of monism + realism and pluralism + antirealism “quite natural” but the combinations of monism + antirealism and pluralism + realism “somewhat strained.” Still, he notes that “real can be defi ned in such a way” as to remove these strains (1999, 25–26). So he sees the issue as partly a verbal one over defi nitions.1
1
Elliott Sober (1980, 203) struggles with what Ernst Mayr means by “real.”
44
Michael Devitt
My main aim in this chapter is to explore realism issues in biology with particular attention to those generated by the monism–pluralism debate and other taxonomic disputes. 2 To this end I devote a considerable amount of energy to attempting to get clear about what the issues are. In §2, I summarize the various species concepts. In §3, I summarize the motivation for pluralism. In §4, I discuss realism in general, particularly “realism about the external world,” from a perspective elaborated previously (Devitt 1997). In §5, against this background, I define some doctrines of biological realism. In §6, I look sympathetically at Marc Ereshefsky’s moderate pluralistic antirealism (1998), and in §7, unsympathetically at Kyle Stanford’s radical pluralistic antirealism (1995). Both of these positions consist of one of the combinations that Hull finds “quite natural.” They will be compared with Philip Kitcher’s pluralistic realism (1984), which consists of one of the combinations that Hull finds “somewhat strained.” §8 deals with antirealism about genera and higher categories in the Linnaean hierarchy.
2
SPECIES CONCEPTS
Species pluralism arises out of the controversy over which species concept is correct. “The species problem is one of the oldest controversies in natural history” (O’Hara 1993, 231); it is “one of the thorniest issues in theoretical biology” (Kitcher 2003, xii). 3 There are around two dozen species concepts and “at least seven well-accepted ones” (Ereshefsky 1998, 103). Samir Okasha (2002) places them in “four broad categories”: 1. Phenetic concepts. On this sort of view, organisms are grouped into species on the basis of overall similarity of phenotypic traits. This is thought by its proponents to have the advantage of being fully “operational.” Okasha says that phenetic concepts are “the least popular” (2002, 199) and this is hardly surprising because they arise from the “philosophical attitude . . . of empiricism” (Sokal and Crovello 1970, 29). “Phenetic taxonomists have often wanted to segregate taxonomy from theory” (Sterelny and Griffiths 1999, 196). 2. Biological Species concepts (“BSC”). The most famous example of BSC is due to Ernst Mayr. He defined species as “groups of interbreeding
2 I shall not consider any threats to realism that might be thought to come from antiessentialism or from the indeterminacy of boundaries. I argue for biological essentialism elsewhere (2007). Part of this argument is that essentialism is not threatened by the indeterminacy. I think realism is not either, for similar reasons. 3 Although, interestingly enough, an issue that Darwin himself was skeptical about: he talks of “the vain search for the undiscovered and undiscoverable essence of the term species” (1859, 381).
Biological Realisms 45 natural populations that are reproductively isolated from other such groups” (Mayr 1969, 26). Kim Sterelny and Paul Griffiths remark that “If the received view has a received species concept” it is BSC (1999, 188). 3. Ecological Niche concepts. According to these concepts, a species occupies a certain ecological niche. “A species is a lineage . . . which occupies an adaptive zone minimally different from that of any other lineage in its range and evolves separately from all lineages outside its range” (van Valen 1976, 70). Okasha puts the view succinctly: species “exploit the same set of environmental resources and habitats” (2002, 200). 4. Phylogenetic–Cladistic concepts. In this view we “identify species in terms of evolutionary history . . . [with] particular chunks of the geneological nexus. . . . Species come into existence when an existing lineage splits into two . . . and go extinct when the lineage divides, or when all members of the species die” (Okasha 2002, 200). Sterelny and Griffiths claim that “something like a consensus has emerged in favor of a cladistic conception of systematics” (1999, 194). An important feature of the Phylogenetic–Cladistic concept is that it is, as everyone agrees, incomplete. It needs to be supplemented by a theory of speciation, a theory that explains when a lineage has split in two. For this, as Okasha says, it “will have to rely on a concept of one of the other types” (2002, 201). The various species concepts are answers to what Mayr (1982, 253–254) calls the “species category” problem: they are telling us what it is for a kind to be a species rather than a subspecies (variety), genus, or whatever. In claiming this I am not being controversial. However, my claim about the following question is controversial: do these species concepts tell us anything about what Mayr calls the “species taxon” problem? Do they tell us about what it is for an organism to be a member of a kind that happens to be a species? The answer to the “fi rst level” taxon problem tells us why Fido is a dog. An answer to the “second level” category problem tells us why dogs are a species, but poodles aren’t. Now it is common to think that the species concepts not only answer the category problem but also the taxon problem (Dupré 1981; Sterelny and Griffiths 1999; R. A. Wilson 1999a; Okasha 2002). I have argued elsewhere (2007) that this common thought is wrong. But the main point to make here is that theories about the species category are one thing, theories about species taxa, another. In particular, realism about the category is one thing, realism about taxa, another.
3
SPECIES PLURALISM
Now, as I have noted, controversy has raged over which of the many species concepts is right. In the face of this controversy some have argued that we should abandon the monist idea that just one concept is right and hence
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that there is just one species category. Rather we should adopt the pluralist idea that many of the concepts are right, and hence there are many species categories. According to Kitcher, many concepts “can be motivated by their utility for pursuing a particular type of biological inquiry” (1984, 118). Stanford puts the point thus: “certain explanatory demands are inextricably bound to certain species concepts” (1995, 72). And there are many different, but equally legitimate, types of biological inquiry and explanatory demands: “we have independent and legitimate explanatory interests in biology which require distinct concepts of species” (1995, 76).4 Consider BSC, for example. Its popularity is undoubtedly well based. Thus, it had a famous triumph identifying reproductively isolated sibling species of Anopheles mosquitos, so important for understanding the spread of malaria: The sibling species . . . are similar morphologically and inhabit overlapping ranges, so neither a morphological nor an ecological criterion of species division could have been of much use in attempting to unravel this particular mystery. (Stanford 1995, 73) As Kitcher says, “there is no doubting the importance of reproductive isolation as a criterion for demarcating certain groups of organisms” (1984, 118). Yet BSC has some obvious problems as the only criterion. First, it is not good for paleontology: There is a perfectly legitimate paleontological question which focuses on the rates and patterns of morphological diversification within evolving lineages, and paleontologists pursue this question by dividing lineages into species according to morphological changes. (Kitcher 1984, 119) Second, the criterion obviously fails to apply at all to the vast number of asexual species: organisms that don’t breed at all are obviously not members of an interbreeding population. Attempts by Mayr and others to get around this difficulty are very unconvincing, as Kitcher points out (1984, 119–120).
4 As Hull (1997) emphasizes, many biologists require that a species concept be not only theoretically explanatory but also easily applicable: it must be “operational.” Hull rightly points out that “the philosophical arguments against operationism are decisive” but then goes on to be surpisingly tolerant of “operational criteria for theoretical concepts” (Hull 1997, 371).
Biological Realisms 47 Third, hybridization is a big problem for BSC, nicely described by Stanford: Hybridization . . . occurs with significant evolutionary consequences in butterfl ies, in leaf hoppers, in fishes, and in many kinds of birds. . . . In the plant kingdom, however, hybridization achieves full generality: naturally-occurring hybrids are found in every major plant group, and are common among higher plants. . . . The production of fertile offspring often results in the formation of hybrid swarms, that is, highly variable, but stable populations consisting of members of the two parent species. An even more complex arrangement is the syngameon, in which natural hybridization links anywhere from a few to a very large number of species together in one inclusive interbreeding unit. (Stanford 1995, 73–74) Clearly BSC is not going to do the explanatory job for us here: “We should do what plant biologists have already done, and divide species within syngameons on morphological and ecological grounds” (Stanford 1995, 74). Fourth, there are “ring species . . . chains of populations in which each link can breed with its neighbors, but populations separated by a number of links cannot”; for example, populations of black-backed gulls (Sterelny and Griffiths 1999, 189). In other words, being able to interbreed with is not a transitive relation. So BSC will lead to the contradiction that two populations both are and are not members of the same species. 5 These sorts of cases force our attention to “the diversity of biological interests” (Kitcher 1984, 125), motivating different ways to classify organisms into species. And these ways will often lead to different classifications. Thus Ereshefsky claims that the BSC interbreeding and the PCC phylogenetic approaches to species “carve the tree of life in different ways. Many interbreeding species fail to be phylogenetic species, and many phylogenenetic species fail to be interbreeding species” (1998, 105). I have doubts about the extreme form of pluralism urged by Kitcher, doubts that I air in §6. Still, the case for some form of pluralism strikes me as strong. But what bearing does this monism–pluralism issue have on biological realism? As we noted in §1, Hull fi nds the combinations of monism + realism and pluralism + antirealism “quite natural” but the combinations of monism + antirealism and pluralism + realism “somewhat strained” (1999, 25). To assess this, we need to be clear about what biological realism is. And to get clear about that, it will help to start by considering realism in general.
5 For more on the troubles of BSC, see van Valen (1976), Cracraft (1983), and Dupré (1999).
48 Michael Devitt 4
REALISM IN GENERAL
The background issue that is most relevant is often known as “realism about the external world,” concerned initially with the observable entities of common sense but spreading to scientific entities, both observable and unobservable. Let us attend only to scientific entities. What is realism about these entities? Why should we believe it? I have addressed these questions at length in Realism and Truth (1997) and subsequent essays (1999, 2001, 2002). I summarize. Realism is a doctrine with two dimensions. “The existence dimension” is a commitment to the existence of the entities posited by science. There are observable entities like rivers and planets and including biological entities like cats and mollusks. And there are unobservable ones like atoms and photons and including biological entities like dust mites and bacteria. The commitment is qualified, of course, to allow for some errors. Idealists, the traditional opponents of realists, have typically not denied this dimension; or, at least, they have not straightforwardly denied it. What they have typically denied is “the independence dimension.” According to some idealists, the entities identified by the existence dimension are made up of mental items, “ideas” or “sense data,” and so are not external to the mind. In recent times, under the influence of Kant, another sort of idealist has been much more common. According to these idealists, the entities are not, in a certain respect, “objective”: they depend for their existence and nature on the cognitive activities and capacities of our minds; we partly “construct” them by imposing our concepts. Furthermore, because we often differ in our world views and hence differ in our concepts, we construct different worlds. This “constructivism” is the view of the very influential philosopher of science, Thomas Kuhn (1970). Realists reject all such mind dependencies. We can capture the realist doctrine well enough as follows: Realism: Entities of most scientific kinds exist mind-independently. The independence dimension has rightly been the focus of the debate, but we should not lose sight of the importance of the existence dimension. For this dimension identifies the entities that are the subject of the dispute over independence. In particular, the dimension distinguishes a realism worth fighting for from a commitment to there merely being something independent of us, a commitment merely to “fi g-leaf” realism (Devitt 1997, 23). This realism about the external world needs to be kept quite distinct from another doctrine traditionally called “realism.” This other realism is about “universals,” abstract entities such as kinds, properties, or sets. Insofar as this realism arises from the “one-over-many problem” I follow Quine (1948) in thinking it arises from a pseudoproblem (Devitt and Sterelny
Biological Realisms 49 1999, 277–279). Furthermore, I lean towards the view that there are no good reasons for realism about universals—I lean toward nominalism—but I do not try to argue the matter. Indeed, it seems to me best to discuss the issues of realism in biology without any commitment on this vexed, millennia-old, metaphysical issue.6 I shall continue to talk of kinds as if they existed but remain neutral on whether this is a mere manner of speaking that can be paraphrased away or whether it amounts to a real commitment. However, there is one thing that we cannot remain neutral on: if cats exist then so also does the mereological sum of cats, the “cat fusion.” But this cat fusion is no more abstract than a cat. Realism about the external world is a compelling doctrine almost universally held outside intellectual circles. What, then, has persuaded so many philosophers out of it? The tradition provides a clear answer: the problem of extreme skepticism. In the First Meditation Descartes famously doubted the evidence of his senses. Is he right to believe that he is sitting by the fi re? Perhaps he is suffering from an illusion, perhaps he is dreaming, perhaps he is being misled by an evil demon. In the face of such doubts, how can it be rational to believe realism? Idealists think that it is not rational. They see an unbridgeable “gap” between the knowing mind and the objective independent world that the realist believes in. They propose to close the gap between us and the world by abandoning the independence dimension: the world is made up of ideas or is partly constructed by the knowing mind. Only thus, it is thought, could the world be knowable. A semantic variant of this argument can be abstracted from contemporary antirealist discussions (Kuhn 1970; Putnam 1978, 1981). Just as traditional philosophers argued for epistemological doctrines that show that we could not know the realist world, we can see contemporary philosophers as arguing for semantic doctrines that show that we could not refer to the realist world. So the world we refer to cannot be that world but must be a world we make. Abandoning realism and adopting idealism is, however, very costly because idealism is truly bizarre. Thus, consider constructivism, according to which we partly make the familiar world by imposing our concepts. But how could we literally make dinosaurs and stars with our minds? The idea that we could deserves an incredulous stare if anything does. I argue for two other responses to these arguments against realism (2002). First, there is a Moorean response that those arguments proceed in the wrong direction. The arguments are based on speculations about what we could know and refer to. Yet surely realism is much more plausible than these epistemological and semantic speculations that are thought to
6 And even more from commitment on the equally vexed issue of the nature of properties (supposing there are any).
50 Michael Devitt undermine it. So we should “put metaphysics fi rst” and argue from realism against these speculations. The second response stems from naturalism. From a naturalistic perspective, these speculations cannot be supported a priori, and they do not come close to having the empirical support enjoyed by realism. The arguments against realism use the wrong methodology and proceed in the wrong direction. One further aspect of realism debates looms large in biology. Philosophers have been concerned not only with whether the posits of science exist mind-independently but also with whether these posits are “appropriately special” rather than somewhat arbitrary. In particular there has been a concern about whether our scientifi c posits “carve nature at its joints,” about whether there is something in the nature of the world that, in some sense, determines our categorization of it. I take this to be a concern about whether the kind of entity posited by a theory plays a causally significant role, and whether it is partly because an entity is of that kind that it has the characteristics and behavior that it has. Theories need to posit such so-called “natural” kinds if the theories are to be genuinely explanatory.7 And Realists are likely to take it for granted that their paradigm entities—for example, cats and planets—are indeed of explanatory kinds. It is important to see that this requirement that a kind be explanatorily signifi cant is distinct from the requirement that entities of that kind exist objectively and mind-independently. As we shall see in §6, it is easy to name kinds of entities that are more arbitrary than causal-explanatory and yet those entities still exist mind-independently. And if there were kinds of entities that were mind-dependent in, say, a Kantian way, those kinds could still be causal-explanatory. For this reason, it would be better to keep the issue of explanatory signifi cance distinct from issues labeled “realism.” But that has not happened in biology and so I shall not insist on it. It is worth noting also that explanatory signifi cance, unlike existence, comes in degrees: positing some kinds may be very explanatory, positing others, only a little bit explanatory, positing others still, not explanatory at all. Let us call any realism that requires not only mind-independent existence but also explanatory significance an “explanatory” realism. So much for the general issue of realism about the external world. Let us turn now to much more particular realism issues in biology.
7 “[N]atural kinds are the sets that one picks out in giving explanations” (Kitcher 1984, 132 n. 16); “the naturalness (and the ‘reality’) of natural kinds consists solely in the contribution that reference to them makes to [the accommodation between conceptual and classificatory practices and causal structures]” (Boyd 1999, 141).
Biological Realisms 51 5
BIOLOGICAL REALISMS
I have noted in §2 the importance of distinguishing realism issues at two levels to do with species: at the fi rst level of species taxa and at the second level of the species category. At the fi rst level we want to capture commitments of this sort: tigers exist mind-independently, and it is explanatorily significant that they are tigers. The commitment is to entities that are members of kinds that we call “species.” So: 1st Level Explanatory Realism about Species Taxa: Organisms of most kinds, S, that we call “species” exist mind-independently, and it is explanatorily significant that these organisms are members of S. (“Most” allows for the possibility of some errors.) At the second level we want to capture commitment to there being kinds that are mind-independently species and to it being explanatorily significant that they are species. So: 2nd Level Explanatory Realism about the Species Category: Species exist mind-independently, and it is explanatorily significant that they are species. We have in mind, of course, that the kinds we call “species,” such as tigers, are the species in question, but 2nd level category realism does not commit to this: there could be species even if we have been wrong about which kinds are species. Similar pairs of realism issues can, of course, come up for higher categories in the Linnaean hierarchy. We shall consider these issues in §8. Finally, we need to take passing note of the popular view that species are individuals rather than kinds (Ghiselin 1974; Hull 1978). On that view, the species of tigers is an individual constituted by the fusion of all tigers, and any particular tiger is a part of that individual rather than a member of the tiger kind. This would require no change to the defi nition of 2nd level category realism and an obvious change to the defi nition of 1st level taxa realism that would have no significant effect on the realism debate. So I continue to write as if species are kinds. I shall start with Ereshefsky who urges an acceptable sort of biological antirealism. I shall then consider Stanford who urges a highly unacceptable one.
6
ERESHEFSKY’S ANTIREALISM
Ereshefsky’s antirealism concerns the species category not the species taxa: he claims that “the species category does not exist” (1998, 113), but he “does not call into question the reality of those lineages we call ‘species’” (1998, 104): he is a 2nd level antirealist not a 1st level one.
52 Michael Devitt Ereshefsky’s argument, the “Heterogeneity Argument,” starts from species pluralism: “a number of species concepts should be accepted as legitimate” (1998, 103). He takes this pluralism to imply antirealism. So his position is one of those that Hull finds “quite natural.” And Ereshefsky sees himself as being at odds with pluralistic realists like Kitcher (1984) and Dupré (1993) whose positions are among those that Hull finds “somewhat strained” (1999, 25). Ereshefsky rightly points out that “species pluralism implies that the world contains different types of species” (1998, 111). He goes on: What do these different types of species have in common that renders them species? If species taxa lack a common unifying feature, then we have reason to doubt the existence of the species category. (Ereshefsky 1998, 111) Ereshefsky fi nds a suggestion in the literature for what the common feature might be, a suggestion with two components: (i) a similarity in the “process that renders species taxa cohesive entities”; (ii) a similarity of “structure” (1998, 111). He argues that neither component can do the job (1998, 111– 113). He concludes that “what is left as the common feature of species taxa is the term ‘species’” (1998, 113).8 Hence he draws his conclusion that the species category does not exist.9 What could he mean by this conclusion? He certainly does not mean that tigers and the like do not exist: we have noted already that he does not reject 1st level taxa realism. And he seems to accept that there are “different types of species,” each one captured by a different species concept: for example, “interbreeding species,” “phylogenetic species,” and “ecological species” (1998, 115), or, more briefly, “biospecies,” “phylospecies,” and “ecospecies” (1998, 117). So he accepts that there exist organisms that are members of a biospecies, organisms that are members of a phylospecies, organisms that are members of an ecospecies, and perhaps organisms that are members of other types of species. But, then, since biospecies, phylospecies, ecospecies, and perhaps others are all types of species, all of these organisms are members of a species. Indeed to be a member of a species simply is to be a member of a biospecies, phylospecies, ecospecies, or perhaps other types of species. So what entities could Ereshefsky be denying the existence of?
8 Richard Boyd claims that the types of species are unified by “an especially close homeostatic relation between the classificatory practices” (1999, 171); see also R. A. Wilson (1999a, 203–204). 9 In another paper, Ereshefsky gives a related reason for doubting the existence of the species category: the failure of attempts to distinguish species from the higher taxa, in particular the failure to do so in terms of the processes of speciation and interbreeding (1999, 269).
Biological Realisms 53 His response to a “realist rejoinder” points to the answer. In this response, he denies that there is any “distinctive commonality” among biospecies, phylospecies, and ecospecies. He is not satisfied with a disjunctive species category of the sort just illustrated. “A disjunctive defi nition of the species category would not tell us why various taxa are species . . . disjunctive definitions lack ontological import” (1998, 115). What he fi nds lacking in the species category is explanatory significance or anything close to that; the category is too close to being arbitrary. But how could this lack be a lack of existence? I take it that Ereshefsky must be thinking of the species category as an abstract entity, a “universal,” and must be presupposing a sort of selective realism about such entities. Whereas an unselective realist is committed, roughly, to there being a universal for every predicate, a selective realist is committed to there being one for some but not all predicates.10 And Ereshefsky is committed to there being one for a predicate where the objects it applies to share a distinctive commonality, but not for any other predicates. According to his pluralism, species lack that commonality. So the species category, a universal, does not exist. Now, it would be better if we could capture Ereshefsky’s position on biology without commitment to a heavy-duty, highly controversial, metaphysical thesis of selective realism about universals. And we can. We can capture it as the rejection of 2nd level explanatory realism about the species category. And the rejection is not based on denying the existence of anything but on denying the explanatory significance of kinds being species. To see that this antirealism does not arise from nonexistence, it is helpful to note that entities of many kinds exist, even exist mind-independently, where their being members of those kinds is of little or no explanatory significance. Consider cousins, for example. These include first cousins, second cousins, fifth cousins three times removed, and so on. The explanatory significance of being a cousin is surely close to zero. And we get even closer to zero if we consider step-cousins. And there is nothing to stop us naming a totally arbitrary kind: thus we could call anything that is either an acid, a river, or a bachelor a “grugru.” Yet despite arbitrariness and explanatory insignificance, cousins, step-cousins, and grugrus really exist, and do so mind-independently. So, the best metaphysical message to take from biological pluralism is not that the species category does not exist or that it is not “real.” Nor is the best message that species do not correspond “to something in the objective structure of nature” (Kitcher 1984, 128) and are not “an objective feature of the living world” (Sterelny and Griffiths 1999, 180). For
10 Thus, David Armstrong (1978) is a selective realist, holding that empty predicates, negative predicates, and, most pertinently, disjunctive predicates, have no corresponding universal. He thinks that some predicates apply to the world in virtue of many universals. Most importantly, he looks to science to tell us which properties there are.
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according to pluralism to be a species is to be a biospecies, phylospecies, ecospecies, or perhaps other species, and there is nothing subjective or otherwise mind-dependent about that. To think clearly about these realism issues, it is vital to distinguish sharply two sorts of freedom, a freedom we have and a freedom we don’t.11 The freedom we do have is to choose to name any kind we like, whether for explanatory reasons, for frivolous reasons, or for no reason at all; naming kinds is a subjective matter. The freedom we do not have is to choose whether something is a member of a kind, whatever our reason for naming that kind in the first place; kind membership is an objective matter. We have chosen to name cats for very good explanatory reasons and grugrus for no good reason at all. But grugrus exist as objectively and mind-independently as cats. And they existed long before I named them “grugrus.” My naming them “grugrus” didn’t make them grugrus any more than people naming cats “cats” made them cats. In sum, Ereshefsky is best seen as rejecting 2nd level explanatory realism about the species category because that category is not explanatorily, or even otherwise, significant. He is best seen as rejecting this because that is what his argument from pluralism supports without the baggage of selective realism about universals. I noted that Ereshefsky sees himself in disagreement with Kitcher and Dupré who, he claims, “suggest a realistic interpretation of species pluralism: various species concepts provide equally real classifications of the organic world” (1998, 103). Is there an actual disagreement and if so what is it? I only consider Kitcher and set aside any possible disagreement arising solely from Ereshefsky’s selective realism about universals. Kitcher does, of course, call his position “pluralistic realism” but what exactly is “realist” about his position? He sets aside as “trivially true” a realism about the species category (and taxa) that is like the doctrine I have called simply “realism,” requiring only mind-independent existence. He is interested in a stronger realism: Pluralistic realism rests on the idea that our objective interests may be diverse, that we may be objectively correct in pursuing biological inquiries which demand different forms of explanation, so that the patterning of nature generated in different areas of biology may cross-classify the constituents of nature. (Kitcher 1984, 128) Kitcher is clearly a 2nd level explanatory realist about various species categories, for example, about the biospecies, phylospecies, and ecospecies
11 I have suggested elsewhere that the constructivist idea that we make worlds with our theories may arise out of failing to distinguish these freedoms (1997, 245).
Biological Realisms 55 categories. He believes that there are kinds that are mind-independently biospecies and that it is explanatorily significant that they are biospecies; similarly, phylospecies, ecospecies, and some others. Setting aside for a moment a disagreement about the variety of species categories, I assume that Ereshefsky would agree about this (1998, 117). So, pluralism can be combined without any strain at all with a sort of realism. But, of course, explanatory realism about various species categories—biospecies, phylospecies, ecospecies, and the like—is not explanatory realism about the species category itself. For the latter realism to be true it would have to be explanatorily significant that some kinds are species. Yet, according to Ereshefsky’s argument, pluralism has the consequence that the species category is disjunctive and not explanatory. So if Kitcher’s pluralistic realism is about the species category itself and not merely about various species categories then Ereshefsky is indeed in disagreement with him. Is Kitcher’s realism about the species category itself? He certainly does not argue for such a realism. And the message I take from “the moral for philosophy of science” that he draws at the end of his paper is that he rejects this realism: “species” refers not to a natural kind but to a “heterogeneous collection” of natural kinds (1984, 129). If I am right about this, then Kitcher’s pluralistic “realism” is not, in this respect, different from Ereshefsky’s pluralistic “antirealism,” and so they seem not to be in disagreement after all. However, they do differ in their pluralisms and hence in the variety of species categories that they are prepared to be realist about. Kitcher’s pluralism is radical. He follows Mayr in drawing a distinction—a very important one in my view (2007)—between two types of explanation in biology, ones that Kitcher calls “structural” and “historical.” The structural seek to “explain the properties of organisms by means of underlying structures and mechanisms.” The historical seek to “identify the evolutionary forces that have shaped the morphology, behavior, ecology, and distribution of past and present organisms” (1984, 121). Kitcher claims that these two types “generate different schemes for classifying organisms” (1984, 122). He fi nds variations within the two types leading him to posit nine different taxonomies and hence nine distinct species categories (1984, 124). Ereshefsky’s pluralism is more conservative. He is prepared to accept only species categories that are justified by historically motivated taxonomies, for example, the categories of biospecies, phylospecies, and ecospecies. His form of pluralism assumes that all species taxa are genealogical entities. To assume otherwise places species outside of the domain of evolutionary biology. The explanatory backbone of evolutionary theory is the assumption that organisms are connected by genealogy. (Ereshefsky 1998, 107)
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However, this is not really an argument against Kitcher’s radicalism. For Ereshefsky is attending only to the explanatory needs of evolutionary biology, whereas Kitcher is emphasizing that there are other explanatory concerns in biology: there are the concerns of structural explanations. And Kitcher thinks that these explanations motivate taxonomies that are different from those motivated by historical explanations and hence different species categories. Is there an argument against Kitcher’s radicalism? I think so. Suppose that we go along with him about the nine different taxonomies. What about the inference to nine different categories? If the taxa picked out by a certain taxonomy are to justify a certain species category, S, it has to be explanatorily significant that the taxa are S. Now given the role of species in theories of evolution it is plausible to think that a historically motivated taxonomy will justify a species category: as Ereshefsky puts it, “species taxa are the paradigmatic units in which descent with modification occurs” (1998, 107). But why suppose that a structurally motivated taxonomy will justify a category? That is, even if structural explanations demand certain taxonomies, what significance is there for such explanations that some taxon is a species? Consider Kitcher’s example: A biologist may be concerned to understand how, in a particular group of bivalve molluscs, the hinge always comes to a particular form. The explanation that is sought will describe the developmental process of hinge formation, tracing the fi nal morphology to a sequence of tissue or cellular interactions, perhaps even identifying the stages in ontogeny at which different genes are expressed. (Kitcher 1984, 121) It is hard to see how it makes any difference to the structural explanation we seek whether that group of mollusks is a species, subspecies, genus, or whatever. Our interest in structural explanations may demand that we group those mollusks together in our taxonomy, but it does not seem to demand that we assign them to any particular category. So, I am inclined to think that only historically motivated taxonomies can justify species categories and that Ereshefsky is right to be conservative. I return to this disconnect between taxonomies and categories in discussing the higher categories (§8). I have been writing in this section as if, in the pluralist view, “species” is an unambiguous term applying to any kind that is in the various species categories. This seems plausible to me, but perhaps the view should rather be that “species” is ambiguous, applying sometimes to any kind that is a biospecies, sometimes to any kind that is a phylospecies, and so on. If so, “realism about the species category” would also be ambiguous, referring to several different doctrines not to just one. So Ereshefsky would be mistaken
Biological Realisms 57 in responding to the realism issue here as if there were just one doctrine to deny. The only pluralist way to be realist about “the species category” would be to be a realist about biospecies, phylospecies, and so on, a realism that I am supposing Ereshefsky and Kitcher should agree on. There would be no one doctrine, “realism about the species category.” Finally, what should be the fate of the term “species” if Ereshefsky’s argument is right (and “species” is not ambiguous)? When the theoretical chips are down, it should really have no place in biology; it should be replaced by “biospecies,” “phylospecies,” and the like. Still, the chips are often not down and, as Ereshefsky points out, “practical considerations” count in the term’s favor (1998, 118).12 And continuing to use the term may be relatively harmless given that to be a species simply is to be a biospecies, phylospecies, ecospecies, or whatever, and each of these kinds are explanatorily significant. We turn now to Stanford’s antirealism (1995).
7
STANFORD’S ANTIREALISM
Stanford’s main stalking horse is Kitcher. Kitcher has this to say in describing his pluralism: Species are sets of organisms related to one another by complicated biologically interesting relations. There are many such relations which could be used to delimit species taxa. However, there is no unique relation which is privileged in that the species taxa it generates will answer to the needs of all biologists and will be applicable to all groups of organisms. (Kitcher 1984, 113) Stanford interprets remarks of this sort as the view that “judgments of what is biologically interesting can only be made relative to a particular time and theoretical context” (1995, 80–81). In brief, these biological judgments are theory-laden. But then, nowadays, it is common, and in my view correct, to think that all our judgments are theory-laden (Duhem– Quine Thesis). So, we have nothing very controversial so far. The controversy comes in the next step. Kitcher’s view is taken to imply that “the biologically interesting divisions of organismic diversity constitute legitimate species” (1984, 82; emphasis added). So not only are our judgments about species theory-laden, but the species themselves are. So species are
12 Despite the theoretical considerations that support pluralism, Dupré thinks that pragmatic considerations favor a “feeble monism” that leaves the traditional Linnaean taxonomy pretty much in place. We should settle for that taxonomy as a “general purpose reference system” (1999, 18).
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mind-dependent. Furthermore, “what constituted a biologically interesting relation in the past has changed dramatically . . . legitimate species must then change with the explanatory schemata and practical interests of the biologists.” Thus Kitcher’s pluralism is incompatible with his realism about species (1984, 83); we should be antirealist. Set aside whether the controversial Kantian inference from the theoryladenness of judgments to the theory-ladenness of the world is justly attributed to Kitcher—and I don’t think it is13 —it is surely popular.14 Yet, despite this popularity, the inference is startlingly bad. Or so I have argued many times (1997, 1999, 2001, 2002). The inference is a paradigm example of the folly of inferring a metaphysics from an epistemology—of failing to “put metaphysics fi rst” (§4). A realistically inclined biological pluralist will think that, despite many errors in the past and probably a few now, what biologists fi nd interesting really is interesting: that it is an explanatorily significant fact about nature that some kind is, say, a biospecies. The theoretical interests of biologists lead them to posit causal structures that are really there. Now there is, of course, a long and painful history of skeptical challenges to this sort of realism. Stanford does not mount such a challenge but presumably one must underlie his argument. But if it does, its target is all of science not just biology, as Ereshefsky points out (1998, 108). Until new life has been breathed into this general skeptical challenge, realists about anything should be unmoved by arguments like Stanford’s. Finally, is Stanford’s antirealism a 1st level one about species taxa or a 2nd level one about the species category? The answer is not as clear as it should be. Unlike Ereshefsky, Stanford does not give the important category–taxa distinction the attention it deserves. In Ereshefsky’s view “Stanford’s arguments are aimed at the existence of species taxa. He makes no explicit reference to the existence of the species category” (1998, 113–114). I think that Ereshefsky is clearly right about the latter claim but not clearly so about the former. In presenting his argument, Stanford does not distinguish explicitly between antirealism about the species category and antirealism about species taxa.15 Suppose that biologists think that a kind, say tigers, is
13 Although it has to be admitted that Kitcher does evince small, but worrying, leanings toward Kantianism; for example, (1993, 169–173). 14 For evidence of its popularity in philosophy generally and philosophy of science in particular, and in sociology, literary theory, sociology of knowledge and even in feminism, see Devitt (1997, 235–237). 15 Mayr’s distinction is established, but it is often overlooked; for example, in Dupré (1981), Griffiths (1999), and Sterelny (1999). In his brief discussion of Stanford and Ereshefsky on realism, Kevin De Queiroz (1999, 74–75) does distinguish the taxa issue from the category issue, but he does so against a background of a
Biological Realisms 59 a species and that a particular organism, say Benji, is a tiger. The conclusion of Stanford’s argument might be (i) that the fact that biologists think tigers a species constitutes their being so: that is antirealism about the species category. Or the conclusion might be (ii) that the fact that biologists think Benji a tiger constitutes his being so: that is antirealism about species taxa. Or the conclusion might be both. Now it is charitable to take the argument to be for (i) because species pluralism, the key premise of the argument, is a doctrine about the species category not about species taxa. If Stanford’s argument from species pluralism were sound, which I have just argued it is not, it would yield (i) but have absolutely no bearing on (ii). We can see this by considering an even stronger antirealism about the species category than Stanford’s. Suppose, as Stanford does not (1995, 86), that there was nothing in nature that dictated our picking out tigers as a species and so our doing so was completely arbitrary. It would still not follow that Benji’s being a tiger was in any way mind-dependent or constituted by us; think of grugrus (§6). Indeed it would not even follow that being a tiger was not explanatorily significant. Even if our thinking of tigers as a species were guided entirely by our interests and not by nature, it still might be the case that being a tiger was explanatorily significant. And it surely is significant: it features in historical explanations because being a tiger is part of the evolutionary story; It features in structural explanations because a lot of the morphology, physiology, and behavior of Benji is explained by his being a tiger.16 In sum, 2nd level explanataory antirealism about the species category does not undermine 1st level explanatory realism about species taxa. And that 1st level realism is surely right. So it would be charitable to take Stanford to be arguing only for (i) antirealism about the species category. But it is hard not to see remarks like the following as also endorsing (ii) antirealism about species taxa: species are “entities whose existence and classifi cation are not independent of our interests and activities” (1995, 89); “species are not real or mind-independent entities” (1995, 90). So it rather looks as if Stanford has reached an antirealist conclusion about both the species category and species taxa from an argument that should be seen as aimed only at the category.
defi nition of realism that applies only to taxa. The defi nition also takes realism to be a commitment only to mind-independent existence, ignoring the importance of explanatory significance in this debate. 16 It is perhaps worth mentioning that being a member of a certain subspecies or variety is also explanatorily significant: Fido’s being a pitbull explains a lot about his morphology, physiology, and behavior; cf. Cracraft’s description of concern about “the ontological status of subspecies” (1983, 100).
60 8
Michael Devitt ANTIREALISM ABOUT THE HIGHER CATEGORIES
The same pair of realism issues that come up for species can come up for any of the higher categories (“ranks”) in the Linnaean hierarchy, in “the tree of life”: genera, families, orders, classes, phyla, and kingdoms. Thus, consider the kinds we call “genera.” At the fi rst level we want to capture commitments of this sort: Canis exist mind-independently and it is explanatorily significant that they are Canis. So: 1st Level Explanatory Realism about Genera Taxa: Organisms of most kinds, G, that we call “genera” exist mind-independently, and it is explanatorily significant that these organisms are members of G. At the second level, we want to capture commitment to there being kinds that are mind-independently genera and to it being explanatorily significant that they are genera. So: 2nd Level Explanatory Realism about the Genus Category: Genera exist mind-independently, and it is explanatorily signifi cant that they are genera. We have in mind, of course, that the kinds we call “genera,” such as Canis, are the genera in question, but 2nd level category realism does not commit to this: there could be genera even if we have been wrong about which kinds are genera. Let us start with the 1st level. Whatever the troubles for realism about the species category, we found nothing that threatened explanatory realism about species taxa. And we have just pointed out why that doctrine is so plausible. Surely explanatory realisms about the higher taxa are also plausible. Thus, whether or not there is any explanatory significance to the claim that Canis is a genus, surely being a Canis features in historical evolutionary explanations and structural explanations, just as being a Canis familiaris does. And so too, say, being a mammal. This is not to say that membership in a higher taxon is as explanatorily significant as species membership: explanatory significance comes in degrees, as I noted (§4). Still, surely some of the morphology, physiology and behavior of Fido are explained by his being a Canis. In light of this, one wonders what to make of the view that “taxa of higher rank than species do not exist in the same sense as do species” (Eldredge and Cracraft 1980, 327). According to Ereshefsky, this sort of view is part of “The Modern Synthesis.” He describes that Synthesis as holding: “Higher taxa . . . are merely artifacts of evolution at the species level. So while species are real and the ‘units of evolution,’ higher taxa are merely aggregates and ‘historical entities’” (2001, 229). Ereshefsky himself rejects this view (1991, 381), as does James Mallet: “Whether
Biological Realisms 61 species do have a greater ‘objective reality’ than lower or higher taxa is either wrong or at least debatable” (1995, 296). Clearly I think that Ereshefsky and Mallet are right in their rejection, but I do not argue the matter further. Taxonomic disagreements have led to some other surprising claims that bear on 1st level realism. Sterelny and Griffiths point out that “systematics has gone through a long period of controversy, some of it extraordinarily bitter” (1999, 194). They see this as having arisen from “an attempt to have biological classification respect three goals at once.” With 1, the goal is “a maximally efficient information store”; “the full name of the organism encodes the greatest possible amount of information about the organism.” This relates to a “phenetics” taxonomy. With 2, the goal is to “reflect the disparity of organisms and the extent of their evolutionary change.” This relates to an “evolutionary” taxonomy. With 3, the goal is to “describe the branching pattern . . . through which the tree of life has grown.” This relates to a “phylogenetic” or “cladistic” taxonomy. And the problem is that “no classification system can fully satisfy all three criteria” (1999, 195). So can any of these goals be ruled out? Sterelny and Griffiths fi nd problems with the phenetic 1 and the evolutionary 2 (1999, 196–197) and favor the cladistic 3, which they take to be the emerging consensus (1999, 194). Yet 3 generates a surprising claim. Aside from its focus on evolutionary history, cladistics involves “a metaphysical claim” that is very relevant to 1st level realism: real groups in nature are all, and only, monophyletic groups . . . groups that consist of a species and all, and only, its descendents. To the cladist true believer, there is no such thing as a reptile. “Reptile” does not name a real group, for there is no species that is ancestral to all the reptiles that is not also ancestor of the birds. (Sterelny and Griffiths 1999, 197) Now, we should note fi rst of all that the claim that “there is no such thing as a reptile” is a most unhappy way of putting the cladistic point. Of course there are reptiles because there are crocodiles, snakes, and lizards, and to be a reptile is simply to be one of those. Reptiles exist, and do so mind-independently, just as much as cousins, step-cousins, and grugrus. And it is not much more apt to say that reptiles are not a “real group” in nature: there is nothing interestingly unreal about crocodiles, snakes, and lizards. I take it that the best way to put the cladistic point is to say that being a reptile is not an explanatorily significant kind. In general, the cladist is against 1st level explanatory realism for any group that is not monophyletic. Is this restriction to monophyletic groups appropriate? Although Sterelny and Griffiths favor cladism, they are inclined to think that the restriction is too extreme:
62 Michael Devitt there may well be sensible evolutionary hypotheses about all the nonmarine mammals. The group is not a monophyletic clade, because there is no species ancestral to all the land-breeding mammals that is not also ancestral to the whales. (Sterelny and Griffiths 1999, 198)17 This is an evolutionary reason for abandoning strict monophyly. There are other explanatory concerns in biology that seem to demand this too. There are the sort of structural concerns that partly motivate the phenetic 1 and the evolutionary 2. There seems no reason to think that only monophyletic classifications can serve those other concerns. Perhaps being a reptile is explanatorily significant in many cases.18 Doubtless we should not be 1st level realists about some nonmonophyletic groups that biologists have posited, but the cladist’s case that we should not be realist about any seems inadequate at best, reflecting attention only to historical explanations.19 Turn now to 2nd level realism. We might expect taxonomic disputes to play a role in two ways: (I) the pluralism about the species category that we have been discussing may have repercussions for higher categories (ranks); (II) there is the possibility that the just-mentioned dispute between phenetic, evolutionary, and cladistic classifications is relevant. Consider (I). Species are the base taxa in the hierarchy. A consequence of species pluralism is that some kinds are biospecies, some, phylospecies, some, ecospecies, and so on. Then which type of species constitute the base taxa? Could we just say that they all do? In thinking about this, we need to note a range of possible relations that might exist among these types of species. (i) One possibility is that the members of a kind that is of one type of species are always coextensive with the members of a kind that is of another type. This possibility would have no repercussions for the hierarchy, but it is surely not a real possibility. (ii) A possibility that is real
17
Boyd is also skeptical of monophyly (1999, 182). It is also surely explanatorily significant that something is a predator or a parasite. Consider this, for example: “The Lotke-Volterra equations . . . describe the interactions of predator and prey populations” (Sober 1980, 202). But these are not the sort of classifications that concern the cladists. (Thanks to Marc Ereshefsky.) 19 Mishler concludes his summary of the argument for monophyly with this remarkably inadequate claim: “Because the most effective and natural classification systems are those that ‘capture’ the entities resulting from processes that generate the things being classified, the general biological classification system should be used to reflect the tree of life” (1999, 309–310). It is probably the case that the classification systems in all sciences “capture” entities resulting from processes— entities don’t come from nothing!—but it doesn’t follow that they should be classified to reflect those processes. 18
Biological Realisms 63 is that the members of a kind that is of one type might always exclude the members of a kind of another type; for example, sexual and asexual types. So each organism will belong to only one type of species. On this view, the base taxa could include all types of species (Mishler and Brandon 1987). (iii) It seems quite likely that members of a kind of one species type will occasionally include all the members of a kind of another type. In such a case, the tree of life could presumably accommodate both kinds. Still, it seems very unlikely that this arrangement would always be the case. (iv) A real possibility is that the members of a kind of one type will overlap with the members of a kind of another type: some organisms will be members of the one kind only, some members of the other kind only, and some members of both (Ereshefsky 1998, 106). This poses a severe problem for the hierarchy: it seems that we would have to have a distinct tree of life for each type of species; the species of each type are the base taxa for a distinct tree. If this should be the case, the strongest 2nd level realism about a higher category that we could hope for would be one for each type of that category, a position analogous to the Kitcher–Ereshefsky realism about types of species (§6). Now consider (II). In discussing Kitcher’s pluralistic realism, I noted that if the taxa picked out by a certain taxonomy are to justify a certain species category, S, it has to be explanatorily significant that the taxa are S. And, using Kitcher’s mollusk example, it is hard to see how it makes any difference to structural explanations whether a group is a species, subspecies, genus, or whatever. This carries over to the higher categories: there is a general disconnect between taxonomies and categories. So even if we could establish that a certain taxonomy—phenetic, evolutionary, cladistic, or whatever—was theoretically sound, so that classifying organisms in that way served our explanatory purposes in biology, that alone would not justify realism about any category posited by the taxonomy. Just because a taxonomy is right to classify a group of organisms as Canis and a subgroup as Canis familiaris does not show that there is any explanatory significance in treating the former as a genus and the latter as a species. Second level realism about a category requires more: the category itself must do explanatory work. Do the higher categories do any explanatory work? Sterelny and Griffiths think that within the phenetic and evolutionary “taxonomic pictures, the idea of genus, family, order, and so on makes quite good sense” (1999, 201). They do not cite any explanatory work that these categories would do, and so I suspect that they are being too generous. In any case, as noted, they are dubious of these pictures, favoring the cladistic picture instead. Cladists have a very negative view of the higher categories: taxonomic ranks make little sense . . . they do not think there will be any robust answer to the questions, when should we call a monophyletic group of species a genus? a family? an order? Only monophyletic groups should
64 Michael Devitt be called anything, for only they are well-defined chunks of the tree. But only silence greets the question, are the chimps plus humans a genus? (Sterelny and Griffiths 1999, 201) So, on the cladistic picture, all categories (ranks) above species must be abandoned. Ereshefsky agrees although, as we have noted, he abandons the species category as well. He rightly points out that if a certain category is to be acceptable, the taxa of that category must be “comparable” and draws attention to reasons for thinking that this condition is not met (1999, 299). Brent Mishler claims that “practising systematists know that groups given the same rank across biology are not comparable in any way” (1999, 310– 311). In a lengthier critique of the Linnaean hierarchy, Ereshefsky mentions the drive to introduce more ranks, leading to a hierarchy in flux (2001, 215), and to disagreements about the rank of certain taxa (2001, 226). The signs are that, although the higher categories may have some pragmatic value, they are doing no explanatory work. Second level explanatory realism for the higher categories seems to be false. In sum, I have found no good reason to abandon 1st level explanatory realism for the higher taxa, even for those that are not monophyletic. Second level explanatory realism for the higher categories is a different matter. If we go along with Ereshefsky’s species pluralism, as I am inclined to, the strongest 2nd level realism we could hope for with higher categories would be one for each type of genus, family, and so on. But the signs are that these higher categories do no explanatory work, and so 2nd level realism, hence the Linnaean hierarchy, must be abandoned. Finally, we should note that abandoning the Linnaean hierarchy is not abandoning a hierarchy altogether; it is not abandoning a tree of life. It is abandoning the labeling of categorical ranks in that tree (Ereshefsky 1999, 299; Mishler 1999, 311). But, in light of (I) and (II), we may have to accept that there is more than one correct uncategorized tree of life, each reflecting legitimate explanatory concerns.
9
CONCLUSIONS
My main aim in this chapter has been to clarify and assess realism issues in biology with particular attention to those generated by the monism–pluralism debate and other taxonomic disputes. I have approached these issues from a perspective of “realism about the external world,” a commitment to the mind-independent existence of the entities of science and commonsense. However, biological realisms typically have a further commitment: they are committed to what I have called explanatory significance, to the kinds of entities posited by biological theories playing causally significant roles. Throughout my discussion I have emphasized the importance of
Biological Realisms 65 distinguishing between 1st level explanatory realisms about taxa and 2nd level explanatory realisms about categories. Species pluralism is the view that there are several equally good accounts of what it is to be a species. Ereshefsky presents his argument from species pluralism to antirealism as an argument against the existence of the species category. I have argued that it is better seen as an argument against the explanatory significance of that category, hence an argument against 2nd level explanatory realism about that category. Not surprisingly, Ereshefsky sees his “pluralistic antirealism” as opposed to Kitcher’s “pluralistic realism.” Yet, on close inspection, the two positions are similar: they agree that the species category itself is not explanatory but that various types of that category are explanatory. However, they differ in that Kitcher’s pluralism is more radical: Kitcher thinks that structural explanations in biology justify some species categories whereas Ereshefsky thinks that only historical evolutionary explanations can do so. I presented an argument that Ereshefsky is right: even if structural explanations motivate taxonomies they do not seem to show that a species category plays an explanatory role. Stanford’s antirealism is also derived from species pluralism but is much more extreme than Ereshefsky’s: it denies the mind-independence of species. This antirealism rests on a spurious inference from the theory-ladenness of judgments to the theory-ladenness of the world. Since species pluralism is about the species category, it would be charitable to take Stanford’s mistaken argument to be only against 2nd level realism but it looks as if it is also supposed to count against 1st level realism. Finally, I considered antirealism about the higher categories. Despite the urging of cladists, there seems to be no good reason to restrict 1st level explanatory realism to monophyletic higher taxa. However, the signs are that 2nd level explanatory realism about the higher categories is false: the higher categories seem to do no explanatory work. If they don’t, then the Linnaean hierarchy must be abandoned. Furthermore, the case for various taxonomies suggests that we may have to accept more than one uncategorized tree of life. 20
20 Earlier versions of this chapter were delivered at the Truth and Reality conference in Dunedin in January 2007 and at Johns Hopkins University in February 2007. I am indebted to the discussions at those meetings for several improvements. I am also indebted to Marc Ereshefsky for helpful comments.
5
Pleonastic Platonism Alan Musgrave
1
INTRODUCTION
Platonists believe in abstract entities. Abstract entities do not exist in space and time (or in spacetime), are unchanging, and do not interact causally with spatiotemporal things. Why should anybody be a platonist and believe in such entities? My answer to this question is uncharitable and depressing and Wittgensteinian. My answer is that people are tricked by language into believing in abstract entities. I begin with a silly example of the way in which language might trap the unwary into believing in things that do not exist. The example concerns the creeps. The example is meant to be uncontroversial—nobody actually believes in the creeps. I then generalize the lessons of this example to a platonist doctrine called “ontological minimalism.” I prefer to call it “ontological maximalism” or “pleonastic platonism.”
2
CREEPS REALISM
Osama Bin Laden gives me the creeps. I dare say that I am not the only person to whom Osama Bin Laden gives the creeps. So it seems that there is a strange entity, the creeps, which Osama Bin Laden gives to me and, no doubt, to other folk as well. After all, the sentence “Osama Bin Laden gives me the creeps” is true. And it asserts that the three-place relation of giving holds between Bin Laden, me, and the creeps. How can the sentence “Osama Bin Laden gives me the creeps” be true, if there is no such thing as the creeps? The expression “the creeps” is a referring expression, a singular term. So there must be something for it to refer to, if the sentence “Osama Bin Laden gives me the creeps” is to be true. Having gone this far down the royal road to realism about the creeps, creeps metaphysicians might then set to work to tell us about the creeps. They might reflect that the creeps might still exist even if Bin Laden had never given the creeps to me or anybody else—indeed, might still exist even if nobody or nothing had ever given it to anybody or anything. They might wonder whether
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the creeps is an eternal or timeless entity. Or whether it can be located in space, like Osama Bin Laden or I can. Or about the action-at-a-distance that is involved when Osama gives the creeps to me. And so forth . . . Enough! Creeps realism is silly. Nobody is a creeps realist. But if there is no such thing as the creeps, must we conclude that the sentence “Osama Bin Laden gives me the creeps” is false? That seems odd, as well—not quite so odd as believing in the creeps but still odd enough. For Osama Bin Laden does make me feel nervous, a fact that I colorfully express by saying that he gives me the creeps. Are we to say that “Osama Bin Laden makes me feel nervous” is true, whereas “Osama Bin Laden gives me the creeps” is false? Must antirealists about the creeps “distort ordinary linguistic usage by treating claims that seem to be equivalent as not even having the same truth-value” (Thomasson 2001, 327)? We all know how to avoid this oddity. We all know that “Osama Bin Laden gives me the creeps” is an idiomatic way of speaking, which is not to be taken at face value for metaphysical or ontological purposes. It is true enough, to be sure, but what makes it true is the fact that Osama Bin Laden makes me feel nervous or something like that. Given this, what is the relationship between the true sentences “Osama Bin Laden gives me the creeps” and “Osama Bin Laden makes me nervous”? In what sense are they equivalent? They are not logically equivalent. They are not semantically equivalent, one cannot be obtained from the other by the substitution of synonymous expressions (as with “Osama is a bachelor” and “Osama is an unmarried man”). You distort ordinary English usage if you say that the two mean the same thing, that “Osama Bin Laden gives me the creeps” can be translated without loss as “Osama Bin Laden makes me feel nervous.” You distort it precisely by failing to see an idiom for what it is. This is no trivial distortion—idiom, metaphor, and other nonliteral uses of language help make the treasures of literature possible. The most we can say is that the two sentences are materially equivalent, they have the same truth-value. And what guarantees that they have the same truth-value is that they have the same truthmaker: what makes one true makes the other true, too. Notice that where we have idiomatic or nonliteral ways of speaking, meanings and truthmakers come apart. “It is raining cats and dogs” does not mean “It is raining heavily”—they just have the same truthmaker.1 Notice, too, that when A is an idiomatic way of saying B, the relation between them is not an equivalence relation because it is not symmetrical—if A is an idiom for B, then B is not an idiom for A. (I used to
1 Heather Dyke taught me that the idea that meanings and truthmakers can come apart is the foundation of the new B-theory of time. Contrary to the old B-theory, tensed sentences do not mean the same as tenseless sentences, they just have the same truthmakers. So contrary to the A-theory, there are no “tensed facts,” no tenses or tensed properties in reality. See Dyke (2003).
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speak of idiomatic equivalence, but I now think this was a mistake.) After all, it is this asymmetry that lies behind our treating them differently when we come to do metaphysics. Antirealists about the creeps who say that “Osama Bin Laden gives me the creeps” is false are guilty of the same oversight as creeps realists are. They are guilty of plonking literalism and insensitivity to idiom. They are right in thinking that “the creeps” is a referring term that does not refer to anything. They are wrong in thinking that every time we use an empty referring term, we say something false. Idiomatic uses of singular terms are not like literal uses of them. The terms “dog” and “cat” are nonempty referring terms. But nobody should think that they are being used to refer to dogs and cats—ones that are falling from the sky—whenever it is truly said “It is raining cats and dogs.” That empty terms can be used to utter truths is really quite familiar. “Santa Claus” is an empty term. But “Santa Claus does not exist” is true. And so are “I believed in Santa Claus when I was four,” “I was once delighted that Santa Claus had not forgotten me,” and so forth. Idiomatic uses of empty singular terms are similar. Creeps antirealists are right that they are not literally true, of course—just wrong that they are not true. Creeps realists are the real culprits, however. They base an absurdly bloated ontology on their plonking literalism. Talk of the creeps is but one example of idiomatic or nonliteral language use. “Jane arrived in a Porsche” requires for its truth the existence of Jane and the Porsche. Does “Jane arrived in the nick of time” similarly require for its truth the existence of Jane and the nick of time? Are there sakes, and does goodness have one? For goodness’ sake, no. Examples like these can be multiplied and, of course, nobody sensitive to the nuances, idioms, metaphors, and other riches of the English language is fooled by them. We all, somehow, refuse to take these ways of speaking seriously, from an ontological point of view. We all, somehow, fi nd a way of refusing their ludicrous ontological implications. Can it really be that platonism results from the same kind of confusion as belief in the creeps or the nick of time might result from? My uncharitable and depressing Wittgensteinian answer is “YES.”
3
PLEONASTIC TRANSFORMATIONS
Are there properties? It seems crazy to deny it. Suppose it true that Fido is a dog. Now consider “Fido has the property of being a dog.” Obviously,
I prefer to speak of “truthmakers” rather than the more familiar “truth conditions.” The latter tend to hover somewhere in between things in the world (truthmakers) and meanings—as in the idea that “Meanings are truth conditions.”
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this is true, too. The two are equivalent in some sense or other, merely different ways of saying the same thing. But the latter says that the two-place relation of having holds between Fido and a new entity, a property. So the property of being a dog exists, as well as Fido. Instead of referring to this property by means of the defi nite description “the property of being a dog,” we can invent a proper name for it if we like—hence “doghood” or “dogness.” Then metaphysicians set to work to tell us about the property of being a dog, or doghood. Some platonize. They say that doghood does not depend for its existence on its exemplification by Fido. Doghood does not depend for its existence on its exemplification by any critter at all. The property of being a dog does not exist in time, as dogs do. The property of being a dog is eternal or, rather, timeless (outside time). When dogs evolved, the property of being a dog came to be exemplified. But the property would exist even if no dogs had ever evolved to exemplify it. Nor does doghood exist in space, as dogs do. Doghood exists outside space and time. Other metaphysicians (beginning with Aristotle?) try to avoid these platonic excesses. They say that doghood does depend for its existence on dogs, so that if there were no dogs there would be no doghood either. Doghood came into existence when dogs did. (There are no uninstantiated universals.) Moreover, doghood is spatial as well as temporal—it exists wherever dogs do. But doghood is an extraordinary thing that can wholly exist in more than one place at once, whereas ordinary things like dogs cannot be in two different places at the same time. Both parties agree, however, that the property of being a dog does not depend for its existence on us, in particular, on language, on our invention of the definite description “the property of being a dog” let alone the proper name “doghood.” Yet other metaphysicians wonder about this. Perhaps the property of being a dog does, after all, depend for its existence on language, in particular, on our invention of the phrase “the property of being a dog.” Which brings me to what is called “ontological minimalism” (see Thomasson, 2001). This is the idea that the metaphysical excesses of platonism can be avoided by recognizing that the property of being a dog is somehow created by language or thought. The singular term “the property of being a dog” still refers to an entity, but that entity has a lesser metaphysical status than traditional platonic entities. In particular, the property of being a dog was created or invented when the words “the property of being a dog” were created or invented. As language evolves, it spins off an evolving platonic realm (which Popper called “World 3”). I allow that languages, and the words that they contain, are human creations, human artifacts. The idea that once we invent or create a word or phrase, we invent or create an entity for that word or phrase to stand for, is word magic. Ryle called it “Fido-Fido-ism.” It is a kind of linguistic idealism:
70 Alan Musgrave Words yield things, language creates the world (or at least, creates a world, Popper’s World 3). So-called “ontological minimalists” describe entities like the property of being a dog not just as “minimal” but also as “pleonastic.” I had to look this up. In my dictionary a pleonasm is defi ned as “the use of more words than are needed to give the sense,” and to speak pleonastically is to “be redundant.” So it is even worse than the usual word magic, which consists in assuming that whenever we invent a word there must be a thing for it to stand for. It is the idea that by using more words than are needed to give the sense, by using redundant words, you can create an entity of some kind (albeit not an eternal platonic entity). It is bad enough to assume that words make things—it is even worse to assume that redundant ones do. Bloated language yields a bloated ontology. There is nothing minimal, or even sparse, about it from a metaphysical point of view. Rather than call it “ontological minimalism,” I prefer to call it pleonastic platonism. Why should we countenance pleonastic entities? Schiffer (1996, 151– 152) argues that to deny that any singular term refers has unpalatable consequences. What exactly are these? Reference failure views are said to “overthrow . . . our ordinary usage” (Thomasson 2001, 330 n. 8). They “distort ordinary linguistic usage by treating claims that seem to be equivalent as not even having the same truth-value” (Thomasson 2001, 327). In fact, what distorts ordinary English usage is insisting that every use of a singular term is a referring use. Remember the creeps—or rather, remember the singular term “the creeps.” Since “the creeps” is a singular term, if we eschew creeps realism, don’t we have to say that “Osama Bin Laden gives me the creeps” is false? No. We can say that it is just an idiomatic way of saying that Osama Bin Laden makes me feel nervous. It is not to be taken at face value; in particular, its ostensibly referring term “the creeps” is not to be taken as a referring term. This is not to distort ordinary English usage, rather it is to be sensitive to it. What about the property of being a dog, where this is viewed as a “pleonastic entity”? Why not view “Fido has the property of being a dog” as a long-winded, idiomatic, or at least nonliteral way of saying “Fido is a dog”? The two are not logically equivalent, nor are they equivalent in meaning. They are materially equivalent, because they have the same truthmaker. Or perhaps better, they are factually equivalent because they are both made true by the same fact. The fact that Fido is a dog makes “Fido is a dog” true—and it also makes “Fido has the property of being a dog” true (not to mention “Fido exemplifies doghood” as well). So far the only pleonastic entities I have considered are properties. There are others.2 There are propositions, for example the proposition obtained
2 Such is the richness of the English language that there are heaps of others. Here are a few alternative pleonastic equivalents of “Fido is a dog”:
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by transforming “Fido is a dog” pleonastically into “[The proposition] That Fido is a dog is true.” There are events, for example, the event got from transforming “Fido bit Fi-Fi” pleonastically into “[The event of] Fido’s biting Fi-Fi occurred.” There are states, for example, the state gotten from transforming “Fido was angry” pleonastically into “[The state of] Being angry was occupied by Fido.” And of course, there are facts as well, for example, the fact got from transforming “Fido is a dog” pleonastically into “It is a fact that Fido is a dog.” I reject pleonastic platonism. I do not believe in pleonastic entities. Such entities are said to have the following features: 1. They are in some sense language-created. 2. The terms referring to them are guaranteed of reference. 3. To learn of their existence and all there is to know about them, one need only adopt the relevant language game. (Thomasson 2001, 320) Against this, I suggest that no entities other than linguistic ones (for instance, words or sentences) are language-created, that no term is guaranteed of reference, and that adopting a language game does not tell us anything about anything, let alone tell us all there is to know about anything. In support of the idea that pleonastic entities are language-created, Schiffer writes: A trivial transformation takes one from a sentence in which no reference is made to a property to a sentence that evidently contains a singular term whose referent is a property. Thus, from “Fido is a dog,” whose only singular term is “Fido,” we can infer its pleonastic equivalent “Fido has the property of being a dog” wherein the ostensible singular term “the property of being a dog” evidently refers to the property of being a dog. (Schiffer 1996, 149) In support of guaranteed reference, Schiffer writes:
Fido is a dog if and only if Fido has the property of being a dog Fido is a dog if and only if Fido displays the feature of being a dog Fido is a dog if and only if Fido manifests the characteristic of being a dog Fido is a dog if and only if Fido possesses the trait of being a dog Etc. Are properties, features, characteristics, and traits all the same things? Or will analytic metaphysicians squabble about whether the metaphysics of having properties is to be preferred to that of manifesting characteristics?
72 Alan Musgrave The sentence “Fido is a dog,” whether or not it is true, also yields the singular term “the property of being a dog,” which we are assured of referring to the property of being a dog. (Schiffer 1994, 304) In support of complete and a priori knowledge, we are told that whereas to learn about things like dogs we must undertake substantive investigations into the things themselves, to learn all there is to know about things like the property of being a dog “one must only study the language games by means of which they are deposited in our ontology” (Thomasson 2001, 321; see also Schiffer 1996, 159). Such pleonastic entities have “no hidden and substantial nature for a theory to uncover” (Johnston 1988, 38). Do any entities have these three features—language-dependence, guaranteed reference for their singular terms, and complete knowability? In an interesting discussion, Amie Thomasson distinguishes three kinds of “ontological minimalism” (Thomasson 2001, 323–325): 1. An absolutely minimal entity has its existence guaranteed by pleonastic transformation of a sentence whether or not that sentence is true. Examples are properties and propositions. 2. A relatively minimal entity has its existence guaranteed by pleonastic transformation of a sentence provided that sentence is true. Examples are events and states. 3. A linguistically minimal entity has its existence guaranteed by the fact that certain sentences are used in special ways. Examples are fictional characters introduced by fictional uses of language (however these are to be analysed). I fi rst discuss fictional characters, Thomasson’s paradigm case of “linguistically minimal entities.” I argue that fictional characters are not pleonastic entities at all and that pleonastic platonism cannot acquire innocence by association with them. I next argue that Thomasson’s distinction between absolutely and relatively minimal entities is quite unmotivated: pleonastic entities, if there are any, are all absolutely minimal in Thomasson’s sense. Finally, I ask whether we should accept that any pleonastic entity exists. 4
FICTIONAL CHARACTERS
I assume, for the purposes of this discussion, that fictional characters exist. They are social constructs, like money or the rule of the road. They are brought into existence by human activity, specifically by the activity of story telling, if you like, by the language game of fiction. So I accept that the fictional character Sherlock Holmes (to use the favorite example) is, in some sense or other, a linguistic creation.
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But we must carefully distinguish the expressions “Sherlock Holmes” and “the fictional character Sherlock Holmes.” The name “Sherlock Holmes” is an empty name, Sherlock Holmes does not exist, there is no person of that name. But the description “the fictional character Sherlock Holmes” is not empty; it refers (we are assuming) to an entity created by Conan Doyle’s stories, to some sort of social construct. This description has an empty name as a syntactic part of it, but the description is not itself empty. So far we have a defi nite description for the fictional character Sherlock Holmes but no name for it. But, of course, we might coin a name for it as we might for any entity. The standard practice, so as to avoid wasting words, is to call it by the name “Sherlock Holmes.” So we standardly use the same name for two different things, a nonexistent person and an existent fictional character, much as we name ships and buildings after people. As with ships and buildings that have the same names as people, indeed, as with different people with the same name, we must rely on context to resolve ambiguities. Schiffer writes (using a different example): What is remarkable is that this [James Joyce’s] pretending use of the name “Buck Mulligan” should create the existence of something whose name is “Buck Mulligan,” thereby making it possible to use the name in a genuinely referential way in true statements about that referent. The thing brought into existence is a certain abstract entity, the fictional character Buck Mulligan. (Schiffer 2003, 50–51) This remarkable word-magical feat is a chimera, brought about by using the same name for two different things. The description “the fictional character Sherlock Holmes” is not brought about by a pleonastic transformation, and the fi ctional character Sherlock Holmes to which it refers is not a pleonastic entity. “The fictional character Sherlock Holmes smoked a pipe” is not a pleonasm for “Sherlock Holmes smoked a pipe,” as the former is true and the latter false. Of course, the true sentence “The fi ctional character Sherlock Holmes smoked a pipe” nowhere occurs in the Holmes stories. You betray a plonking misunderstanding of the entire language game of fiction if you think that anything said in the Holmes stories about Sherlock Holmes could just as well be pleonastically transformed into a statement about the fictional character Sherlock Holmes. Conan Doyle would insist that the Holmes stories are not about the fictional character Sherlock Holmes but about Sherlock Holmes! Of course, a different fictional character might have figured in a Holmes story. One can tell stories in which storytelling figures, just as one can paint pictures in which pictures figure. In Northanger Abbey fictional characters from The Mysteries of Udolpho are mentioned, not by descriptions of the form “the fi ctional character
74 Alan Musgrave X,” but by the same names that nonexistent people bear in The Mysteries of Udolpho! But nobody is confused. Fictional characters are pretty “abstract,” like other social or cultural constructs, but they have their own robust criteria of reality. We cannot “pleonastically transform” any name into a description (or name) of a fictional character as well—at least, not salva veritate. Whereas “Sherlock Holmes” is an empty name and “the fictional character Sherlock Holmes” is not an empty description, it is the other way round with the name “Alan Musgrave” and the description “the fictional character Alan Musgrave.” The name refers to me, but the description is empty, because there are no fictions about me! (Bill Bartley once told me that there is an awful fi lm, Lord Love a Duck, with an Alan Musgrave in it who lectures in California. But the Alan Musgrave in Lord Love a Duck is not me.) Schiffer is quite right that once fictional characters have been brought into existence, many true statements can be made about them. His examples are (2003, 51; the numbering is mine): I. Joyce created the fictional character Buck Mulligan. II. Buck Mulligan isn’t as well known as certain of Joyce’s other characters, such as Molly Bloom. III. Buck Mulligan isn’t a fictional detective. IV. Buck Mulligan was based on someone Joyce knew. In I the name “Buck Mulligan” appears only as a syntactic part of the definite description “the fictional character Buck Mulligan.” In that context, the name is not being used referentially at all—it refers neither to a person nor to a fictional character. In II–IV it is clear from the context that the name “Buck Mulligan” is being used as short for “the fictional character Buck Mulligan.” Fictional characters are not brought about by pleonastic transformation, as has been explained. Nor have they another alleged feature of pleonastic entities, that their “essential nature” can be uncovered a priori, by armchair perusal of our talk about them—that all there is to know about them is determined by our use of fictional names, so that the study of this “language game” is all that we need to undertake. This is quite false. Consider Schiffer’s own list I–IV of truths about the fictional character Buck Mulligan. Not one of these truths is accessible from a philosopher’s armchair. They all need the attentions of literary historians and/or sociologists of literature. And we have to read the stories to learn that Sherlock Holmes is (in the Holmes stories) a detective or that Mr. Bennett in Pride and Prejudice is not a very sympathetic character. Fictional characters are not timeless platonic entities. Once we accept that Conan Doyle created the fictional character Sherlock Holmes by writing the stories, we also accept that the fictional character Sherlock Holmes did not exist before Conan Doyle wrote the stories. Nor do fictional characters exist
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in all “possible worlds.” Conan Doyle might not have written the Holmes stories, in which case the fictional character Sherlock Holmes would not have existed at all. Finally, fictional characters lack another alleged feature of pleonastic entities, that they do no work in the world, make no causal differences, “come softly into existence, without disturbing the preexisting causal order in any way” (Schiffer 2003, 59). Goodness me, fictional characters can frighten people or make their creators a lot of money! Fictional discourse is an important cultural invention, which does a great deal of work in the world. Think how the lives of children would be changed, if they were never told stories. Schiffer might respond that it is the story telling, the linguistic practice, the “language game,” that does the work, not the fictional characters introduced by it. If so, we need not postulate fictional characters to explain how fiction works in the world, and they are idle posits that should be eliminated. I have been assuming that the best “theory of fiction” has fictional characters as its theoretical entities. That is why I have been granting that fictional characters exist—in much the same way, or for the same kind of reason, that scientific realists grant that electrons exist. If a better “theory of fiction” can be worked out that does not posit them, so be it. There are interesting and formidable problems in working out a theory or theories of fiction. It is work for scientists—historians, psychologists, literary theorists, sociologists. It is up to the literary scientists who posit fictional characters as their theoretical entities to tell us what kind of entity they are and to explain how they work. Fictional characters viewed in this way are neither pleonastic nor platonic entities. They are, then, in the present context, a red herring, and I shall say no more about them. I actually think that the fictions or the stories exist, but the fictional characters introduced by them do not. That is because I am attracted by a kind of if-thenist or postulationist or “disguised inference” view of fictional truth. This says, roughly, that S is true-in-the-fiction F if and only if the conditional “If F then S” is (logically) true. What is F? It consists of the things stated in the fiction F, together with anything else that readers of the fiction F take for granted. So it is true-in-the-fiction that Sherlock Holmes smoked a pipe, and it is also true-in-the-fiction that he had two legs. The former is explicitly stated in the Holmes stories, the latter implied by common knowledge that readers bring to the Holmes stories (that Holmes is a human being, that human beings have two legs).
5
PLEONASTIC ENTITIES
Let us get back to pleonastic entities proper and to Thomasson’s distinction between absolutely and relatively minimal pleonastic entities. I fi nd this distinction problematic. Absolutely minimal entities are supposed to have
76 Alan Musgrave their existence guaranteed by sentences whether or not those sentences are true, whereas relatively minimal entities require true sentences for their existence to be guaranteed. “Fido is a dog” is supposed to generate the property of being a dog whether or not it is true—if it is true the property is exemplified by Fido and if it is not true the property is not exemplified by Fido but exists nonetheless. Similarly with propositions. “Fido is a dog” generates the proposition that Fido is a dog by being transformed pleonastically into “[The proposition] That Fido is a dog is true.” If “Fido is a dog” happens to be false, the proposition that Fido is a dog exists nonetheless and happens to be false, too. Thomasson thinks it otherwise with events and states, which require true sentences for their existence to be guaranteed. But why does “Fido bit Fi-Fi” not generate the event of Fido’s biting Fi-Fi whether or not it is true? If Fido did not bite Fi-Fi, then the event of Fido’s biting Fi-Fi did not occur. Similarly, if pleonastic transformation of “Fido was angry” into “Fido occupied the state of being angry” generates a state, does this state not still exist—unoccupied by Fido—if the sentence happens to be false? If there are false propositions and uninstantiated properties, why are there not unoccupied states and events that do not occur? Thomasson’s distinction between absolutely and relatively minimal entities is quite unmotivated. All pleonastic entities are “absolutely minimal” in Thomasson’s sense: properties, propositions, events, states, and so forth. There is a more important point, which the so-called “ontological minimalists” themselves see. It concerns the alleged language-dependence of pleonastic entities. Such things as properties, propositions, events, states, and so forth, do not depend upon language for their existence. All such things, if they exist, existed long before people evolved and started playing language games. All such things, if they exist, are platonic entities that do not depend upon us and our linguistic doings for their existence. (In this they are to be contrasted with fictional characters—if there were no fictions, there would be no fictional characters—remember that “the fictional character Alan Musgrave” is an empty description!) You cannot soften the ontological excesses of platonism by talking of pleonastic transformations. The fi rst alleged characteristic of pleonastic entities, that they are “in some sense language created,” is a complete nonstarter. (The same goes for Popper’s evolving “World 3.” We cannot create platonic entities, and the world they inhabit does not evolve.) The third alleged characteristic of pleonastic entities was that “to learn of their existence and all there is to know about them one need only adopt the relevant language game.” This is an epistemic characteristic. It represents the chief virtue of pleonastic platonism. If pleonastic entities have this remarkable epistemic feature—that playing the relevant language game assures us that they exist and tells us all there is to know about them—then pleonastic entities avoid the chief worry about platonic entities. This is Paul Benaceraff’s epistemic worry. It is
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plausible to think that we can only fi nd out that something exists if we can somehow interact with it, however indirectly. But if platonic objects are not spatiotemporal and have no causal powers, then how on earth do we get to know that they exist or fi nd out what they are like? “No problem,” says the pleonastic platonist—“All you need to do to acquire this knowledge is to learn how to play the relevant language games.” Platonic knowledge, on this view, is a priori knowledge. It requires no causal interaction, however remote, with its objects. It is a priori in much the same way that knowledge of analytic truths is a priori. You do not have to inspect bachelors, or causally interact with them in any way at all, to know that they are all unmarried. All you have to do is learn that the word “bachelor” is short for “unmarried man.” What are we to make of this? On the one hand, the entities are language-independent—they do not depend on the evolution of language for their existence; they did not pop into existence when folk started playing language games. On the other hand, playing language games assures us that they exist and tells us everything there is to know about them. This really is word magic. Platonic knowledge appears as the rabbit appears from the word-magician’s hat. We play magical “something-from-nothing” language games (Schiffer)—“though not a true ontological free lunch, it is perhaps a case of ‘buy one, get one free’” (Thomasson 2001, 324). As for causal objections to Platonism, they are misguided. Alexander’s dictum that to be real is to have causal powers is misplaced when it comes to pleonastic entities: Schiffer recently . . . proposed that a necessary condition for a concept F securing the existence of Fs as pleonastic entities is (roughly) that introducing Fs brings in no new causal consequences over those that would be entailed without Fs. This fits well with the idea that, in the case of pleonastic entities, we should expect no new causal consequences; the lack of such causal additions is thus no argument against positing them. (Thomasson 2001, 331 n. 11) But it is not a matter of positing these entities, as scientists posit theoretical entities in the hope of explaining phenomena, while always admitting that their posits might turn out not to exist. Pleonastic entities do no explanatory work, because they do no causal work. Nor can it turn out that pleonastic posits do not exist or lack some feature attributed to them. We are supposed to know that they exist and to know all there is to know about them. I think this platonic knowledge is a sham, because its objects—pleonastic entities—are a sham. Any object that we posit or postulate might turn out not to exist. Any name or description that we invent might turn out to be empty. An object that cannot fail to exist is no genuine object at all, for
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there are no necessary existents. Platonic realism is to be contrasted with scientific realism. Scientific posits may be unobservable and “abstract” in various ways. But they are all explanatory and causal, and none of them is a “necessary existent.” In fact, all that we have here are long-winded ways of saying things about what does exist. We need not say that these long-winded pleonastic ways of saying things are false. If it is true that Fido is a dog, then it is also true (if you like) that Fido has the property of being a dog. But this longwinded, pleonastic way of putting it is like an idiomatic way of putting something—its truth does not require the existence of “pleonastic entities,” for what makes it true is just the fact that Fido is a dog. Have I not just committed myself to facts? No, for “It is a fact that Fido is a dog” is just another long-winded way of saying “Fido is a dog.” Nor am I saying that language should be purged of pleonasms, or of idioms, or of metaphors, or of any other nonliteral ways of saying things. Not only do nonliteral ways of speaking help make the treasures of literature possible, as I already said they also make life easier for all of us, in all sorts of ways. It is almost impossible to avoid platonist ways of speaking and apparent reference to platonic entities. All I advocate is that we do not “read off” platonist metaphysics from these conveniences, perhaps necessities, of language. Advocates of the tenseless theory of time do not say that we can, or should, eliminate tensed idioms from language. After all, tensed idioms reflect our temporal perspective on tenseless reality. But the ineliminability, without loss of meaning, of tensed idioms does not mean that tenses or tensed properties exist out there in the world.
6 PLATO’S HEAVEN—A GRAVEYARD FOR LOST IDIOMS AND DEAD METAPHORS? Everybody accepts that sentences like “Osama Bin Laden gives me the creeps” or “George Dubbya invaded Iraq in the nick of time” are idioms, not to be taken literally or at face value when we are doing metaphysics. Could it be that the belief in a platonic realm of eternal, nonspatial, acausal necessarily existing entities arises from lost idioms and dead metaphors? Or, if that seems implausible, could it be that platonism arises from longwinded or pleonastic ways of talking that get taken more seriously than they should by metaphysicians? Or, if “long-winded” is implausible as a general rule, from alternative ways of talking that get taken more seriously than they should by metaphysicians? My caution about “long-winded” being a general rule is prompted by cases where an “abbreviatory defi nition” is introduced, and many words are replaced by few. Suppose “bachelor” is short for “unmarried man.” Still, nobody will suppose that “Osama is a bachelor” says anything different from “Osama is an unmarried man,” or that the shorter form of words should be taken ontologically seriously, or
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that Osama has two properties, the property of being a bachelor and the property of being an unmarried man. Quine famously demanded “No entity without identity”—we should not postulate entities without giving identity-conditions for them. His example, as I recall it, was this. We start with “A tall person might be standing in the doorway” and “A clever person might be standing in the doorway.” We move to “It is possible that a tall person is standing in the doorway” and “It is possible that a clever person is standing in the doorway.” Then we move to “A possible tall person is standing in the doorway” and “A possible clever person is standing in the doorway.” Whereupon Quine asks “Is the possible tall person standing in the doorway identical with the possible clever person standing in the doorway?” We might also ask “How many possible people can stand in the doorway?”—which is worse, when you think about it, than “How many angels can dance on the head of a pin?”! Unfortunately, Quine’s “No entity without identity” is not enough to rule out abstract or platonic entities. There is a way of arriving by pleonastic transformation at abstract entities that do automatically satisfy Quine’s demand—it is called, appropriately enough, abstraction. We start from “concrete” or nonplatonic entities and from an equivalence relation between them—that is, from sentences saying that these entities are in some respect identical with one another. Then we abstract on those equivalence claims to obtain abstract entities or, more precisely, sentences that refer to such entities. Some examples will make the process clear: The direction of line A is identical to the direction of line B if and only if line A is parallel to line B. The shape of A is identical to the shape of B if and only if A is geometrically similar to B. The speed of A is identical to the speed of B if and only if A moves as fast as B. The weight of A is identical to the weight of B if and only if A weighs as much as B. The age of A is identical to the age of B if and only if A has lived as long as B. The meaning of A is identical to the meaning of B if and only if A is synonymous with B. The set of As is identical to the set of Bs if and only if As are exactly the same things as Bs. The number of As is identical to the number of Bs if and only if there are exactly as many As as Bs. And so on, and so forth. In these abstraction schemes A and B stand for the “concrete” entities. On the right-hand sides we have sentences asserting that an equivalence relation holds between concretes—that is, that they are identical in some
80 Alan Musgrave respect. On the left-hand sides defi nite descriptions of new entities (directions, shapes, speeds, weights, ages, meanings, sets, numbers) are introduced. Notice that abstraction schemes state identity-conditions for the new entities that they introduce. Quine was suspicious of meanings, accepted the abstraction scheme for them, and became suspicious of synonymy as well. That was, I think, a mistake. Synonymous expressions exist and so do analytic truths generated by their existence. We are not committed to platonic meanings in saying this—provided we view the abstraction scheme as just a pleonasm and do not take it seriously from an ontological point of view. Are the entities introduced by abstraction schemes (directions, shapes, speeds, weights, ages, meanings, sets, numbers, and so forth) really abstract or platonic entities? It seems so. After all, are there not directions that no line has, speeds that nothing has moved at, weights that nothing has, ages that nobody has lived to, meanings possessed by no word, and so forth? Indeed, wouldn’t there be directions if there were no lines, shapes if nothing had one, speeds if nothing moved, ages if nobody had ever been born, meanings if there were no words, and so forth? The way of the world is not independent of our sayings and other doings because our sayings and doings make a difference to the world. But the way of the platonic world is surely independent of our sayings and doings. On the other hand, there are all these “concrete” things (lines with directions, objects with shapes, etc). And because they exist, we can acquire a priori necessary knowledge of platonic entities introduced by abstraction schemes. There is always an equivalence relation on the right-hand side. Equivalence relations are always reflexive. We know a priori that every line is parallel to itself, that every object is geometrically similar to itself, that everything moves as fast as or weighs as much as or has lived as long as itself, that words are synonymous with themselves, that exactly the same things are As as are As, and that there are as many As as there are As. So if there are lines, physical objects, people, words, we know a priori that there are also directions, shapes, speeds, weights, ages, meanings, sets, and numbers. We do not always need an abstraction scheme, with an equivalence relation on the right-hand side, to get abstract entities. Who can deny that there are colors? After all, red is a color, as we know from the undeniable truth “Red is a color if and only if everything red is colored.” The right-hand side is true if nothing is red. From which it follows that red would still be a color, even if nothing were red. Colors are platonic objects, too. What are we to make of abstraction schemes? Crispin Wright thinks they are conceptual truths and that it is conceptually incoherent to deny any of them: Now, how exactly do these reflections illuminate the sense of incoherence which the ideas that a person might lack an age, a geometric figure a shape, a fi nitely instantiated concept a number of instances, etc.
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are apt to inspire? Like this, I think. When the concepts in question are explained as they are explained: when that is, the obtaining of an equivalence relation between a pair of things of some sort is stipulated as necessary and sufficient for the truth of identity-statements under those concepts, then it is a straightforward consequence of the explanation, coupled with the reflexivity of the relation of the definiens, that, for example, any particular fi nitely instantiated concept has a number . . . The suggestion that a fi nitely instantiated concept might lack a number . . . is thus in confl ict with the form of explanation which abstract sortal concepts of this family receive. . . . Hence the sense of incoherence which such suggestions inspire in us: for the suggestions sound like expressions of scepticism; and no such scepticism requiring recourse to the relevant concepts for its very formulation can be anything but incoherent. (Wright 1983, 151–152) But any expression of scepticism about Xs, for any X, requires recourse to the X-concept. I cannot say that there are no flying saucers without employing the flying saucer concept. Wright must be aware of this, despite what he says. Perhaps he thinks there is something special about concepts introduced by way of abstraction schemes? After all, his rehabilitation of Frege’s Conception of Numbers as Objects rests entirely on the above abstraction scheme for natural numbers, now christened “Hume’s Principle.” Perhaps it is only when we have an abstraction scheme that we can be word magicians and pull metaphysical rabbits out of linguistic hats? How might a skeptic about directions, say, proceed? A skeptic about directions is a person who denies that there are such things, while accepting that there are lines and that some of them are parallel to others. There are two ways for the skeptic to proceed. One is to bite the bullet and say that since there are no directions, definite descriptions of the form “the direction of line X” are always empty. That being so, the left-hand side of the abstraction scheme for directions is always false. But the right-hand side of the abstraction scheme might be true (the skeptic about directions allows this, remember). Thus the abstraction scheme itself is false. Because it is false, it is not a conceptual truth, and it is not something we know a priori. I do not think, pace Wright, that there is anything incoherent about this position. It is the bullet-biting position which Hartry Field, a skeptic about numbers, adopts in the face of the abstraction scheme for numbers (see Musgrave 1986). It is the bullet-biting position that we all might adopt when it comes to the creeps scheme “A gives B the creeps if and only if A makes B feel nervous.” But as the example of the creeps makes clear, there is another, softer way for the skeptic to go. An antirealist or skeptic about the creeps can accept the creeps scheme but only as a codification of an idiomatic or nonliteral way of speaking that is not to be taken at face value for metaphysical purposes. Similarly, the
82 Alan Musgrave skeptic about platonic directions, shapes, speeds, weights, ages, meanings, sets, numbers, and so forth can accept the appropriate abstraction scheme but only as codifying an idiomatic or nonliteral way of speaking that is not to be taken at face value for metaphysical purposes. Thus, for example, the skeptic about numbers can cheerfully accept that the number of fi ngers on my right hand is five, without thereby being committed to the existence of the number five. The skeptic about numbers will just regard “The number of fi ngers on my right hand is five” as an idiomatic or pleonastic or longwinded or nonliteral way of saying “There are five fi ngers on my right hand.” In this way the antiplatonist can “speak with the learned but think with the vulgar” (to invert Berkeley’s unhappy idealist phrase into a happy realist one). David Stove used to say that half of the bad philosophy stemmed from use/mention confusions. It is use/mention confusions that spawn wordmagical philosophy in general (see Musgrave 2001). And use/mention confusions need to be avoided here, too. How can abstraction schemes codify idioms and be accepted as such, as I just said they could? It is words and phrases that are idiomatic, nonliteral, long-winded, or pleonastic. No words or phrases are spoken of in abstraction schemes. An explicit codification of the creeps idiom is not the creeps scheme “A gives B the creeps if and only if A makes B feel nervous” but, rather, “A sentence of the form ‘A gives B the creeps’ is an idiom for a sentence of the form ‘A makes B feel nervous.’” Similarly, what records the pleonasm that gets us to numbers is not the numerical abstraction scheme “The number of As is identical to the number of Bs if and only if there are exactly as many As as Bs,” but rather “A sentence of the form ‘The number of As is identical to the number of Bs’ is a pleonasm for a sentence of the form ‘There are exactly as many As as Bs.’” Once we avoid use/mention confusions, the softer way with abstract platonic objects comes to this. We reject the abstraction scheme for such objects as false. We accept the corresponding metalinguistic scheme as true. (The metalinguistic scheme does not have the false ontological implications of the abstraction scheme because you cannot existentially generalize on referring terms that occur within quotation marks.) Accepting the latter as true explains why two sentences that do not mean the same have the same truthmaker. It also explains why we can speak with the learned while thinking with the vulgar. And it enables us to deplore the Platonist tendency to confuse use and mention, run the two together, and pull metaphysical rabbits out of linguistic hats. This is all old hat. Abe Lincoln, a great metaphysician, said it all. At the risk of boring you with this familiar story, let me remind you of it: “How many legs does this donkey have?” “Four, Mr. President.” “And how many tails does this donkey have?”
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“One, Mr. President.” “And if tails as well as legs were called ‘legs’, how many legs would the donkey have then?” “Five, Mr. President.” “No, Sir, you cannot make a tail into a leg by calling it one!” Every time I try this out on an unsuspecting audience, about half the people answer “Five” to Abe Lincoln’s last question. It is a trick, of course. They confuse Lincoln’s question “ . . . how many legs would the donkey have then?”, in which the word “leg” is used, with the question “ . . . how many [things called] ‘legs’ would the donkey have then?”, in which the word “leg” is mentioned. They agree with Derrida-Da that all we can ever talk about are words. But Derrida-Da recently died, thank goodness, and we must not speak ill of the dead.
7
DISCLAIMER
I have not established that there are no platonic entities. Indeed, given their (alleged) nature, how could one establish this? All I have tried to do is to dispose of a pervasive line of thinking that leads people to suppose that there are platonic entities. That line of thinking is to read (platonist) metaphysics off language or off our language games. I have not established that there are no properties, propositions, events, states, or whatever, when these things are NOT viewed as platonic entities. I have not, in other words, objected to “realist” theories of properties, propositions, or whatever, where the realism is scientific rather than platonic. How does scientific realism differ from platonic realism? Scientists postulate theoretical entities of various kinds to help them explain the world. To do that, they invent descriptions and even names of their theoretical posits. But scientific realists admit that any theoretical description or name they invent might turn out to be empty. Scientists invented the description “the intra-Mercurial planet responsible for the anomalous perturbations in the orbit of Mercury” and even the proper name “Vulcan.” But this was no mere “language game,” and it turned out that both the description and the name were empty. They stood for nothing in the world. They might have stood for something—the theories containing them were not self-contradictory. At which point platonistic philosophers will say they did stand for something in another possible world than the actual one—and off we go again! After all, who can deny the truth of “There is a possible world in which P if and only if possibly P”? But scientists are interested in the world, not in “possible worlds.” So I have not objected to a realist theory of properties, say. Such a theory would have to allow that expressions like “the property of being a dog” or “doghood” might stand for nothing and that it depends on the way the
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world is whether any such expression stands for anything. The difficulty for scientific realists about properties is to explain how fi nding out more about doghood differs from fi nding out more about dogs. In particular, having established that there are dogs, how do we go about establishing the further point that doghood exists as well? (If scientific realism is another name for what is called in philosophy “nominalism,” then so be it.)
6
Anomalous Monism John Heil
But let the wise be warned against too great readiness at explanation: it multiplies the sources of mistake, lengthening the sum for reckoners sure to go wrong. (George Eliot, Middlemarch, ch. XLV)
1
LINGUISTICIZED METAPHYSICS
For much of the twentieth century, metaphysics was held in disdain by a majority of analytic philosophers. Old questions about reality gave way to questions about talk about reality: philosophy took the linguistic turn. The linguistic turn was the product of a philosophical Weltanschauung that encompassed Wittgenstein (early and late), Carnap, Quine, Ryle, Austin, and their many disciples. The movement waned, but its influence has lingered in the practices of analytic philosophers, even those who would regard themselves as opponents of old-style linguistic philosophy. One of these influences can be observed in a persisting tendency to conflate the linguistic and the nonlinguistic. Philosophers move unselfconsciously from observations about descriptions of the world to claims about features of the world itself. Discussion of predicates, for instance, or at least predicates concerning which we are avowed realists, goes proxy for talk of properties. Indeed the thought that predicates might fail to correspond oneone to properties yet nevertheless be used to express truths about genuine, causally operative features of the world is widely taken to be incoherent. When confronted with a predicate, “is in pain,” for instance, that apparently fails to designate a unique physical property shared by everything to which it truly applies (and in virtue of which it applies), we seem compelled to choose from among three equally unpalatable alternatives: I Dualism; pains are states of immaterial substances. II Eliminativism; nothing corresponds to the pain predicate; nothing is in pain. III Reduction; talk of pain can be reduced to, hence replaced by, talk of various physical goings-on. Philosophers are nothing if not resourceful, however. Thanks to the efforts of Hilary Putnam (1967) and Jerry Fodor (1968), among others, we
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have learned that dualism, eliminativism, and reductionism do not exhaust the possibilities. The pain property is a genuine property (so eliminativism is false). Pains are not physical properties, however (reductionism is false). Rather, the pain property is a “higher-level” property “realized by” physical properties (a dualism of substances is false). One and the same higher-level property could have indefi nitely many “lower-level” realizers. The maneuver enables us to account for the failure of reductionist programs while leaving intact the idea that significant predicates stand in a one-one relation to properties.1 Higher-level properties are somehow dependent on and constrained by, but nevertheless distinct from, their lower-level realizers. It is one thing to countenance descriptive, or explanatory, or compositional levels; however, quite another matter to parlay this into a serious ontology encompassing irreducible levels of being. Many philosophers will go with Quine here. We find ourselves deploying certain predicates in “quantifying over” individuals. This apparently commits us to properties corresponding to those predicates. If you want to know what there is, just look at predicates figuring in favored descriptions of what there is. Ontology is a piece of cake.2 This is an exaggeration, of course. Most of the time property talk is not undertaken with full ontological seriousness. Properties are just whatever answers to favored predicates: reference to properties is ontologically innocent. We can speak, for instance, as the Episcopal Prayer Book speaks, of God, “whose property is always to have mercy.” Apparent reference to a property here might be read as a mildly pretentious way of asserting that God is always merciful. In these contexts, property ascriptions could be interpreted as affirmations of commitments to the truth of particular kinds of predication. This is all well and good, until we move from unguarded talk of properties directly to more substantive theses. We can find ourselves encumbered with unfortunate conceptions of what properties there are and how these properties are related. The tendency is abetted by the implicit idea that realism about a given domain requires something like a one-one correspondence between predicates in that domain and properties. If we are to be ontologically serious about properties, let us be ontologically serious from start to finish. It is a bad idea to begin with a relaxed, linguisticized conception of what properties there are, then, from this dodgy foundation, extract substantive ontological conclusions about relations these
1 Antipathy towards reductionism stems, I believe, from a prior commitment to the idea that properties line up one-one with significant predicates. This leads to a hierarchical conception of being, which can then be recruited to buttress antireductionist sentiments. 2 Or is it? Quantum theory affords a striking instance of the gap between accepting a theory as true and uncovering the nature of the theory’s truthmakers. Even among physicists who accept quantum theory as true, there is little agreement over what the world must be like if it is true.
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properties bear to one another and their roles in causal interactions. As Wittgenstein notes, “the first step is the one that altogether escapes notice. . . . The decisive movement in the conjuring trick has been made, and it was the very one that we thought quite innocent” (Wittgenstein 1953, §308).
2
PREDICATES TO PROPERTIES
Putnam’s original defense of functionalism was titled “Psychological Predicates.” Subsequently Putnam rechristened the piece “The Nature of Mental States,” the title under which it has been most frequently anthologized and cited. The move nicely illustrates the unselfconscious ease with which analytic philosophers can slide from consideration of predicates to ontologically loaded talk of properties. Putnam’s arguments provided an important insight into our deployment of psychological terms. Such terms evidently apply truly to many different kinds of actual and possible creature but not in virtue of those creatures’ shared, first-order properties. Instead of concluding that psychological terms are multiply satisfiable, however, we hold fast to the idea that significant predicates must designate unique properties. We are moved to postulate tailor-made higher-level properties that are shared by diverse creatures. These properties are distinct from, but “realized by,” sundry first-order properties. Higher-level, multiply realized properties have posed numerous challenges for their proponents. The nature of the realizing relation has, for instance, remained a mystery. If the realization relation is a genuine relation, must it be multiple? Might there be properties that could have only a single realizer? The idea seems crazy, but why? What of the “causal relevance” of higher-level properties? Available options—epiphenomenalism, overdetermination, “topdown” causation—are all, in one way or another, unattractive. Could it be that we have been barking up the wrong tree? Perhaps we have erred in our initial assumption: our conviction that the only way to take psychological (or biological, sociological, meteorological) predicates seriously is by assuming that such predicates are aligned with distinct families of higherlevel properties. What are the alternatives? Substance dualism and eliminativism are unpromising. Are we left with some form of property dualism? Perhaps not. Suppose we go part of the way with the property dualists. There are properties, all right, properties that figure as truthmakers for what might reasonably be called higher-level predications. Properties answer to such predicates, however, not by lining up with the predicates one-one, but by constituting families of similar properties. The pain predicate, for instance, might be satisfied, not by a single property, being in pain, but by any of a family of similar properties. Think of these properties as including all the different ways of being in pain. If functionalism is correct, the properties will be causally similar; if functionalism tells only part of the story, qualitative similarity will be important as well. In this
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conception, you and an octopus are both in pain, not because you share a single higher-level property, the pain property, but because you and the octopus possess causally, or qualitatively, or perhaps causally and qualitatively, similar properties. My aim here is not to defend this thesis, however (see Heil 2003). My focus, rather, will be historical. In particular, I am interested in how an argument that might naturally have been seen as advancing a thesis starkly at odds with the prevailing conception of mental predicates as names for higher-level, multiply realized properties came to be regarded as a pillar of “non-reductive physicalism,” a conception of mental properties as dependent on, but distinct from physical properties. The culprit, I suspect, is a presumed, but rarely articulated, commitment to the thesis that realism about the mental requires that mental predicates uniquely designate properties possessed by everything to which they apply (and in virtue of which they apply). As a warm-up, it might be useful to consider the origins of the idea that mental and physical predicates designate members of distinct categories of property.
3
THE MENTAL AND THE PHYSICAL
The mind–body problem strikes us as imponderably deep. According to David Chalmers, for instance, this is the last remaining “hard problem” (Chalmers 1996, xi). If the mental and the physical are obviously and dramatically different, however, why has there been so little agreement over the nature of this difference? Why have we found it so difficult to say with any precision what the mental–physical distinction boils down to (Crane and Mellor 1990)? Let me mention one possibility. Nowadays, even dualists are skeptical of Cartesian dualism. The idea that a mind is a wholly immaterial substance has lost whatever appeal it might once have enjoyed. Despite our rejection of Cartesianism, however, we have stuck with Descartes’s classification of properties as either mental or physical. Under the circumstances, it might be worth considering how Descartes was looking at this fundamental ontological distinction. The universe, Descartes held, comprises two kinds of substance: mental and material. Kinds of substance are distinguished by distinctive attributes. Mental substances are characterized by the attribute of thought; a material substance is extended. You could think of attributes as generic characteristics, determinables. A substance possesses an attribute by possessing determinate modes of that attribute. A material body is extended, but to be extended is to be extended in some determinate way; to have shape or size, is to have some determinate shape or size. In common with many of his contemporaries, Descartes distinguishes primary from secondary properties. Primary properties are properties possessed
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by every material thing, including the fundamental things.3 Secondary properties are arrangements of the primaries. The idea, very roughly, is that an object is spherical in virtue of being spherical; an object is red in virtue of its surface’s possessing a particular geometrical structure. For Descartes, extension and its modes are unproblematic. Extension can be exhaustively characterized geometrically. Once we turn our attention to the range of properties that Descartes counts as mental, however, it is more difficult to discern a unifying thread. Mental states and properties include sensations, attitudes, emotions, judgments, and images. It is hard to see this motley collection as constituting anything resembling a fundamental natural kind. To be sure, if you believed, as Descartes believed, that thought and extension were exhaustive and exclusive, the task of distinguishing the mental and the physical is simplified. You need only give a principled characterization of the one and consign anything that failed to satisfy this characterization to the other.4 Physical modes are modes of extension. Their nature is wholly geometrical. A mental mode, then, is just a mode that is not a mode of extension. Once we reject the fundamental Cartesian picture, however, this easy move is no longer open to us. Once we allow that extended bodies might think, the line between mental and physical modes begins to blur. Mental properties start to resemble material secondary properties. In reflecting on the situation, you might gradually come to suspect that the really pernicious aspect of our Cartesian legacy is not Descartes’s commitment to a dualism of substances but his commitment to a dualism of properties. While rejecting the idea that the world comprises mental and physical substances, we have clung to a Cartesian bifurcation of properties. The seeds of an alternative picture can be discerned in Locke and Priestly. There is but a single world characterizable in various ways. Some goings-on in the world answer to mental characterizations, characterizations couched in a vocabulary a Cartesian would classify as mental. These very same features of the world would answer to descriptions couched in a physical vocabulary. Differences among descriptions need not reflect differences among fundamental properties but only differences among families of predicates contrived to serve different purposes. Constraints on the application of mental predicates need not mirror constraints on applications of physical predicates. To the extent that this is so, it would be pointless or impossible to translate or analyze mental descriptions in physical terms, hence impossible to “reduce” the mental to the physical.
3 Or thing: Descartes is most naturally read as advocating a monistic conception of material substance as space itself. Ordinary objects are local “thickenings,” modes not substances. Motion of objects through space is a kind of wave motion. 4 In defending anomalous monism, Davidson (1970b, 211) makes a complementary point: descriptions of the physical are “recessive” relative to the mental.
90 John Heil You might think of this as a kind of neutral monism. It distinguishes the mental and the physical at the classificatory level, the level of predicates, but not in the reality answering to those predicates. And you might wonder who could possibly take such a monism seriously.
4
DAVIDSON AS A “NONREDUCTIVE PHYSICALIST”
In introducing the topic of higher-level, multiply realized properties, the heart of nonreductive physicalism, I invoked Putnam and Fodor. But nonreductive physicalism has another important source: Donald Davidson’s influential paper, “Mental Events” (1970b). “Mental Events” advances a thesis Davidson dubbed “anomalous monism.” According to Davidson, anomalous monism provides a way of coming to grips with a commitment to the following, apparently inconsistent, theses (1970b, 208): (1) “Some mental events interact causally with some physical events.” (“Causal Interaction”) (2) “Events related as cause and effect fall under strict deterministic laws.” (“Nomological Character of Causation”) (3) “There are no strict deterministic laws on the basis of which mental events can be predicted and explained.” (“Anomalism of the Mental”) Events, for Davidson, are physical by virtue of satisfying physical predicates, and mental by virtue of satisfying mental predicates: “an event is physical if it is describable in a purely physical vocabulary, mental if describable in mental terms” (Davidson 1970b, 210). One way to put this, a way that might surprise some of you, is that, by Davidson’s lights, the mental–physical distinction is not a deep one: any mental event or any event satisfying a mental predicate could be given a physical description. This, I think, is the core of the influential doctrine of the supervenience of the mental on the physical. Similarly, some physical events, events answering to physical predicates, could, at least in principle, be given mental descriptions (descriptions incorporating mental predicates). I see Davidson’s anomalous monism as consistent with the ontologically reductive position sketched earlier. If this sounds shocking, that might be because a common interpretation of anomalous monism reads into the doctrine a robust metaphysical thesis with exciting ontological implications. The interpretation I have in mind is largely associated with the work of Jaegwon Kim, particularly Kim’s earliest work on supervenience (see Kim 1973, 1984a, 1984b, 1985, 1989, 1993b). Kim’s reading of Davidson clearly expresses what has subsequently been labeled “non-reductive physicalism.” Kim construes Davidson’s talk of mental and physical predicates as talk of mental and physical properties. Mental–physical supervenience in this way becomes a meaty doctrine about necessitation relations holding among
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families of properties. If, as Davidson contends, mental descriptions cannot be translated into physical descriptions, and if you take description talk to be oblique for property talk, you will read Davidson as holding that mental properties are not reducible to, not identifiable with, physical properties, yet mental properties are somehow dependent on physical properties: mental properties have physical realizers. Now trouble looms. Mental events, Davidson notes, evidently enter into causal relations with physical events. Interpreting Davidson’s talk of predicates as property talk, this amounts to the thesis that events with mental properties can interact causally with events possessing physical properties. Kim puts it this way: The claim “Mental events cause physical events” only comes to the assertion . . . that events with some mental property or other are causes of events with some physical property or other. (Kim 1993a, 20) But according to Davidson, events stand in causal relations by virtue of falling under strict causal laws, and strict causal laws are expressible only in a physical vocabulary. Kim’s translation: one event causes another event in virtue of these events instantiating certain physical properties. It appears to follow, given the “anomalousness of the mental,” that causes and effects can include mental properties, but their being causes and effects must be due only to physical properties they include as well. The upshot: although every mental token might be identical with some physical token—every event possessing a mental property is (is identical with) an event possessing a physical property—mental and physical types (properties) are distinct. Davidson is read as embracing token identity but rejecting type identity, where types are presumed to be properties. The upshot is “non-reductive physicalism”: token identity, coupled with the rejection of type identity, plus the thesis that the mental supervenes on the physical.
5
DAVIDSON AS AN ANOMALOUS MONIST
For most philosophers, this is familiar territory. Some readers will recall the halcyon days of the early 1980s when it looked as though nonreductive physicalism provided a cost-free solution to the venerable mind–body problem. Largely thanks to Kim, however, the initial euphoria subsequently gave way to sober reflection on the mind–body problem in its contemporary guise: the problem of causal relevance (see McLaughlin 1989; Kim 1989, 1993a, 1993c). In the course of sorting out these issues, some philosophers have thought it important to distinguish Davidsonian and Kim-style events. The idea is that, for Davidson, events are, so to speak, dynamic substances, particulars possessing a variety of properties. Some of these properties will figure
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unproblematically in causal transactions; some will not. For Kim, in contrast, events are fi ner-grained: dynamic states of affairs. A Kim-style event is the instantiation, by a particular, of a property at a time (Kim 1973). Suppose a particular, c, at t, instantiates M, a mental property; and suppose, as well, that, at t, c instantiates a physical property, P. Davidson might regard this as a single event; for Kim there are two events: c’s instantiating M, and c’s instantiating P. Kim’s events are distinct but, given supervenience, the mental event depends on the physical event. I could go on about this, addressing, for instance, the nature of supervenience, but I lack the heart. I believe that much of the discussion of anomalous monism and its implications for nonreductive materialism is based on an initial misconstrual of Davidson.5 Anomalous monism is manifestly not a thesis concerning mental properties and relations these bear to physical properties. The mistake is to read Davidson’s unguarded talk of descriptions and predicates—yes, and occasional talk of properties—as ontologically serious talk of properties.6 Davidson is intent on keeping ontology at arm’s length. His interpreters, in contrast, have heard Davidson’s guarded comments about mental and physical descriptions as affording a tidy metaphysical blueprint. My suggestion: Davidson has an ontological side, but this is not it. With these thoughts in mind, we might reformulate Davidson’s three principles: (1´) Some events satisfying mental predicates interact causally with events answering to physical predicates. (2´) When events are related causally, they are describable in a way that invokes a strict law. (3´) Formulations of strict laws exclude mental predicates. Davidson puts it this way: It should now be evident how anomalous monism reconciles the three original principles. Causality and identity are relations between individual events no matter how described. But laws are linguistic; so events can instantiate laws, and hence be explained or predicted in light of laws, only as those events are described in one or another way. The principle of causal interaction deals with events in extension and is therefore blind to
5 A misconstrual that Davidson himself sometimes failed to appreciate, thereby giving rise to the impression that he was missing the thrust of his critics’ arguments; see Davidson (1993). 6 The term “property” occurs twice in “Mental Events” in a single passage (1970b, 214) in which Davidson characterizes supervenience. Subsequent passages, however, make it clear that Davidson is using “property” in the Episcopalian sense.
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the mental–physical dichotomy. The principle of anomalism of the mental concerns events described as mental, for events are mental only as described. The principle of the nomological character of causality must be read carefully: it says that when events are related as cause and effect, they have descriptions that instantiate a law. It does not say that every true singular statement of causality instantiates a law. (Davidson, 1970b, 215) One way to put the thesis is in terms of truthmakers. (Yes, I know: Davidson would not approve; but bear with me.) Truthmakers for mental descriptions will always answer to some physical description. The supervenience of the mental amounts to this thesis together with a consistency constraint on the application of mental predicates: events satisfying the same physical descriptions must satisfy the same mental descriptions. There is, however, no prospect of translating or analyzing mental terms into a purely physical vocabulary. Suppose a mental predicate, “M,” truly applies to an agent. Given supervenience, we know that whatever it is about the agent in virtue of which “M” applies truly would also make true the application of some physical predicate, “P”: two truths, one truthmaker. Supervenience allows distinct applications of the very same mental predicate to be made true by different kinds of physical state—states answering to different physical descriptions. If you read Davidson this way, you might begin to see why a familiar criticism of anomalous monism misses the mark. Suppose you—wrongly, by my lights—took Davidson to hold that mental predicates designate mental properties, and physical predicates pick out physical properties. Suppose, further, you thought that Davidson regarded supervenience as a relation among families of property: mental properties are in some way “grounded in” or “realized by” distinct physical properties. Then, as Kim and others have made clear, Davidson’s account of mental causation would be susceptible to the “qua problem.”7 Consider a particular event, c, and imagine that c is a mental event: event c possesses some mental property; M. Supervenience tells us that M’s presence depends on c’s possessing some physical property; P. So c is both a mental event and a physical event. Now imagine that c causes some event, e, and e possesses some physical property, P´ (we could suppose, as well, that some mental property, M´, supervenes on P´; see Figure 6.1.) Query: does c cause e in virtue of—qua—being P, in virtue of being M, or in virtue of being both P and M? Davidson’s commitments to the nomological character of causation and the anomalousness of the mental imply that it is c’s being P that causes e’s being P´; c’s being P causes, as well—albeit only indirectly via supervenience—e’s being M´. More generally, it appears that, whenever a mental event has a physical or mental
7 Fred Stoutland (1976) was, as far as I know, the fi rst to raise this difficulty for Davidson. Many others followed.
94 John Heil
Figure 6.1 Higher-Level Causation
effect, it does so qua physical, not qua mental. Mental properties are apparently epiphenomenal. If this is a problem for mental properties, it is a problem for any higherlevel property. Particular “token” events could possess such properties, but they—the properties—would seem to make no causal difference to their possessors. An event’s “causal clout” is borne by the event’s fundamental physical properties: properties on which higher-level properties are taken to supervene. The qua problem is a monumental stumbling block for strains of “nonreductive physicalism.” It is not, however, a problem for Davidson. Mental predicates—indeed “higher-level” predicates generally—hold true of objects in virtue of those objects’ possessing assorted properties answering to physical predicates. Pretend, for a moment, that you are in pain in virtue of your C-fibers fi ring: your C-fibers fi ring serves as the truthmaker for “You are in pain” and for “Your C-fibers are fi ring.” Davidson is thinking that, if the fi ring of those C-fibers causes you to walk to the medicine cabinet, it would be no less true to say that your being in pain causes you to walk to the medicine cabinet. Davidson rejects reduction if this is taken to be analytical or explanatory reduction. Translation of pain talk into C-fiber talk, for instance, is hopeless. “Bridge principles” relating mental and physical predicates are not in the cards. Explanations couched in mental terms are not convertible into explanations couched in a physical vocabulary. A rejection of analytical reduction, however, is consistent with acceptance of ontological reduction. One way to put this would be to say that, in a given application, expressions can differ in their truth conditions while sharing truthmakers. Couple this idea with the idea that laws of nature are grounded in fundamental features of the fundamental thing or things. These features will be picked out in the vocabulary of basic physics. Formulations of laws of nature, then, inevitably involve an exclusively physical vocabulary. This is what the “anomalousness of the mental” amounts to. Applying these facts to knowledge of identities, we see that it is possible to know that a mental event is identical with some physical event without knowing which one (in the sense of being able to give it a unique physical description that brings it under a relevant law).
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Even if someone knew the entire physical history of the world, and every mental event were identical with a physical [event], it would not follow that he could predict or explain a single mental event (so described, of course). (Davidson 1970b, 224) You can see how this might work for many ordinary predicates. Consider the color predicate “is red.” It seems likely that this predicate applies to objects by virtue of those objects’ possession of any of an open-ended family of similar physical properties.8 It is unlikely that we could translate color talk into talk of these physical properties. Of course, if the physical properties answering to color predicates are finite in number, we might provide a list and associate items on this list with each color predicate. But this would no more constitute a translation than would the association of a list of all the penguins with the predicate “is a penguin.”
6
DAVIDSON, PHYSICALISM, AND REALISM
Some of you will balk at my reading of Davidson. Others, indifferent to the reading, will regard the position I am ascribing to Davidson as a nonstarter. In some cases this will be because you think that, thus interpreted, Davidson becomes an antirealist about the mental. Although there are undoubtedly difficulties for Davidson’s position—it embodies, after all, a range of contentious philosophical theses—I do not think antirealism is one of them. Davidson accepts that mental ascriptions are often true. It is true that we harbor beliefs and desires and, on the basis of these, form intentions to act. It is true that actions—bodily motions, according to Davidson—are caused by mental events. What is not true is that mental predicates designate nonphysical properties. Mental predicates are satisfied by complex properties, perhaps, but these very same properties also satisfy physical predicates. There is nothing more to the properties’ (or states’, or events’) being mental—or physical—than their satisfying mental and physical predicates, respectively. If it is difficult, or impossible, to distinguish mental and physical predicates in a crisp way, this is not the end of the world. It is not the end of the world because the distinction lacks deep ontological significance. In “Mental Events,” Davidson labels his position “anomalous monism” and repeatedly invokes identity as the relation holding between mental and physical states. Most proponents of identity theories of mind regard themselves as physicalists. So is Davidson, at heart, a physicalist?
8 This is intended merely as an illustration, not as an account of color; see Heil (2003, ch. 17).
96 John Heil To think so is to miss a central tenet of anomalous monism. Suppose I am right in thinking that Davidson regards the mental–physical distinction as ontologically insignificant. A physical state is a state answering to a physical predicate. Such states can also satisfy mental predicates. The only sense in which the physical takes precedence over the mental is that, whereas every state of the world is physical—each answers to a physical predicate—every state need not answer to a mental predicate. Indeed Davidson is at pains to show that there is nothing in principle to keep us from describing any physical state in mental terms. Davidson, in the passage in which he makes this point, mentions Spinoza. Spinoza held that there was but a single substance, God or Nature, possessing an infi nity of attributes. Of these attributes, we are privy to just two: the Cartesian attributes, thought and extension. Ordinary features of the world are modes of thought and modes of extension. But how are these modes related? Spinoza is usually characterized as a “dual aspect” theorist. You could understand this as the view that every property has (at least) two aspects: a mental aspect and a physical aspect. But what are aspects, and how are aspects related? The issues here are complicated, but I believe that a case could be made for the idea that the relation among Spinoza’s aspects is strict identity: every mental mode is strictly identical with some physical mode (and vice versa). Thus interpreted, Spinoza’s position is, as Davidson notes, a close relative of anomalous monism. Neither Spinoza nor Davidson can be seen as advancing reductionism, but neither is a dualist either. There is a dualism, all right, but it is a dualism of conception, not a dualism of substances or properties.
7
MONISM IS NOT PHYSICALISM
We are now in a position to see why Davidson insists that it is misleading to describe the mental as “nothing over and above” the physical. This is not because mental properties are distinct from physical properties. Rather, it is because describing the mental as nothing over and above the physical misleadingly privileges the physical. It suggests that only physical predicates literally hold true of objects. But the same region of the world that makes true the application of some complex physical predicate can make true—make true—the application of some mental predicate. Davidson, like Spinoza, is a monist, not a physicalist: not a reductive physicalist, not a nonreductive physicalist. All this is easy to miss so long as we continue to think that the legitimacy of a given predicate turns on its designating a unique property. This condition is met, if at all, only when we reach fundamental physics. There, predicates do indeed appear to correspond one-one with properties. But this by no means implies that truths about the world require formulation
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in the vocabulary of fundamental physics. Fundamental physics provides us with a way of getting at the fundamental substances and properties, arrangements of which serve as truthmakers for endless other, less fundamental, predicates. None of this makes the world mind- or theory- or language-dependent. The world is “out there” waiting to be considered and described by conscious agents. The significance of our predicates depends on us. It is a contingent fact about us that we use the predicate “is red” to pick out redness and not greenness, or saltiness, or triangularity. But this in no way makes redness, greenness, saltiness, or triangularity language- or mind-dependent. What we have in Davidson is a flat-out realism of outlook coupled with a reluctance to say more than absolutely necessary about fundamental ontology. This very reluctance prevented Davidson from appreciating arguments advanced by his critics and from replying to those arguments in a way that his critics would have found satisfying. All of this comes to a head in “Thinking Causes” (1993), one of Davidson’s last attempts to respond to difficulties Stoutland, Kim, and many others found in his view. In that paper, Davidson makes what he regards as an innocent move that turns out to have disastrous results. Davidson concedes Kim’s reading of Davidson’s “predicates” as referring to properties. If we understand properties in an ontologically serious way, this in effect legitimizes Kim’s longstanding unhappiness with Davidson. The charitable interpretation here, however, takes Davidson to be understanding “property” only in the pleonastic way mentioned earlier: only in the Episcopalian sense in which an object could be said to possess a property, F, insofar as “is F” is truly predicable of it. As I have tried to suggest, bad things happen when you move directly from talk of properties in this deflated sense to ontologically robust conclusions. Davidson’s early reservations about talk of properties undoubtedly stemmed from a stark nominalism inherited from Quine. A nominalist construes property talk as ontologically thin. If you understood properties as sets of objects, for instance, you would not see properties as causally operative features of the world. You might interpret Davidson’s silence on properties as an endorsement of nominalism. Kim reads Davidson as accepting property realism, and Davidson’s talk of predicates as shorthand for talk of properties. But it is more plausible to interpret Davidson’s silence on properties as nothing more than silence on properties. I have suggested that Davidson’s position is consistent with an ontology that includes properties. Davidson tells us, in effect, that the truthmaker for the application of a given mental predicate is going to be the truthmaker for the application of some physical predicate, but he tells us nothing of the truthmakers’ ontology. Other philosophers believe that we have excellent independent reasons to believe that the world comprises, in addition to objects, or substances, properties. As I see it, all this is consistent with Davidson’s considered views. The interpretive mistake is not that
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of reading a nominalist theory as realist, but in reading an ontologically neutral theory as endorsing a linguisticized realism.
8
DÉNOUEMENT
My aim here has been to set the record straight and provide a sympathetic reading of Davidson. If I am right, then many of the most popular lines of criticism of Davidson are off base. This leaves open, of course, the very real possibility that the kind of account I take Davidson to be offering is itself ultimately unsatisfactory. If we are to put Davidson behind us, however, we ought to do so for the right reasons.
7
On the Metaphysical Implications of Some Epistemological Commonplaces Frank Jackson
1
INTRODUCTION
Epistemology is a different subject than those of metaphysics and of the philosophy of language. All the same, there are important links between, on the one hand, what’s evidence for what and, on the other, the right account of certain properties. The reason for this is obvious. Whether or not something is evidence for the possession of property F is a function in part of what F is. Something looking square is a reason for holding that it is square; it is not a reason for holding that there will soon be peace in the Middle East, and the difference lies in part in the difference between the property of being square and the property of peace being imminent in the Middle East. Someone having red hair is not a (good) reason for increasing one’s expectation that he or she is hot tempered but is a reason for increasing one’s expectation that they have Nordic ancestry. Again, the reason for the difference in support lies in part in the nature of the two properties in question. These observations, and the many like them that we might have made to illustrate the point, are relative to one or another presumed background body of evidence. An expert on the Middle East might have agreed with me to post on her Web site a figure that looks square if and only if her examination of all the available information leads her to believe that peace in the Middle East is close at hand. In this special case, something looking square (to me on her Web site) would be a reason for me to increase my expectation that there will soon be peace in the Middle East. But this doesn’t alter the fact that, against a normal background, something looking square is no evidence for peace in the Middle East but is evidence for that thing being square. My purpose in this chapter is to show how some simple observations, commonplaces really, about what’s good evidence for what can impact on some highly contested positions in metaphysics. I discuss color properties and mental properties. It will be obvious how the “method” might
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be used more widely.1 This chapter is an attempt to publicize a way of addressing difficult metaphysical issues by drawing on relatively noncontroversial theses about what’s evidence for what. It is a way that has a long history but one that is currently under a cloud (a judgement confi rmed by the discussion at the conference). I start by giving the line of argument in the two cases listed in an unadorned form. I then discuss some objections that might be brought against it. A number of these objections came up, in one way or another, in the discussion at the conference that spawned this volume. My hope is that I’ve addressed a representative sample of the objections that are responsible for current doubts about using epistemic commonplaces to reach metaphysical conclusions. How is this relevant to a volume on realism and truth? I think Michael Devitt is right when he insists that a doctrine that limits itself to affi rming that “[s]omething objectively exists independently of the mental” is a realism that “is so weak as to be uninteresting.” He calls it “fig-leaf realism” (Devitt 1984, 22). A realism worth affi rming must include inter alia respect for a good part of our ordinary convictions about what’s good evidence for what. A realism about stars and tables which holds that, although stars and tables exist and do so independently of our observations, our opinions about where they are and what they are like are worthless is not an honest-to-goodness realism. This is because it has no substantive answer to the question, What should we be realists about? Tables and stars won’t be a substantive answer on the view in question because the view precisely denies that we have any well-founded idea of what they are like.
2
COLOR
Many philosophers hold that (surface) color properties are reflectance profi les (or some such). 2 The epistemology of color tells us that this cannot be right. Something looking red is a good reason for holding that it is red but isn’t a good reason for holding that it has such and such surface reflectance profi le (or anything along similar lines). What we have, that is to say, is an application of Leibniz’ law, as the following makes explicit. Premise 1. Something looking red is good evidence for its being red.
1 For another application of the method, see Jackson (2006). For how the method can be used to support a controversial thesis about the semantics of names, see Jackson (2007b). 2 Including my former self, see, e.g., Jackson and Pargetter (1987). I did not see the (really very obvious) problem until I wrote “Colour for Representationalists” (2007a). The view that colors are reflectances (or some such) is often known as Australian realism about color. An early defense of it is in Armstrong (1968a, ch. 12).
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Premise 2. Something looking red is not good evidence for its having such and such a reflectance profi le. Intermediate conclusion: being red has a property that having such and such a reflectance profile lacks—looking red is good evidence for the fi rst but not the second. Therefore, being red ≠ having such and such a reflectance profi le. Of course something looking red is defeasible evidence for its being red. We may know that we are under an illusion as happens when white objects look red under red illumination. Also, in certain circumstances, something looking red may be good evidence that it has such and such a reflectance profile. Taken in conjunction with certain experimental results linking looking red with the reflectance in question, a thing looking red is good evidence that it has such and such reflectance profile. However, it remains true that, in normal circumstances and absent special knowledge from optical science, looking red is good evidence for being red but is not good evidence for having such and such a reflectance profile, and that’s all we need to use Leibniz’ law to infer that being red ≠ having such and such reflectance profile. Nonidentity follows from there being at least one property possessed by being red that is not possessed by having such and such reflectance profile.
3
PHENOMENAL PROPERTIES
Many philosophers nowadays hold that phenomenal properties are neurological properties. Until recently, most philosophers of mind held that the possibility of multiply realizing the functional role of any given phenomenal property shows that phenomenal state types could not be identified with brain types. This was the standard reason for replacing the “Australian” mindbrain identity theory with functionalism (see, e.g., Churchland 1988, ch. 2, and the references therein). However, there has recently been a significant change of heart on the question (see, e.g., Papineau 2002, ch. 1; Hill 1991). Sometimes the impetus is the special character of the phenomenal. The idea is that although belief and desire are multiply realizable functional states which should not be identified with neurological states, those mental states with a phenomenology—pain, seeing red, and all the rest—are different. They should be identified with neurological state types. That way we capture their felt character. Sometimes the impetus is what we are said to learn from scientific identities like that of water with H 2O. We wrongly thought, runs this second line of thought, that mental states are multiply realizable because we ran together contingency and aposteriority. What realizes a mental state role is a posteriori but not contingent. This means that multiple realizability is false. In this view, a possible creature, a “Martian,” who writhes and screams
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in exactly the way we do when a leg is broken, and whose internal functional organization and information-processing parallels ours, is not in pain if his functional roles and information processing are realized in very different stuff from ours; he has “fool’s pain” or “twpain,” not pain proper. Sometimes both lines of thought are at work in tandem. Philosophers who urge that phenomenal mental types (or all mental types) are neurological types often describe themselves as scientific or empirical functionalists. The contrast is with commonsense or analytical functionalism: functional role is seen as a kind of reference fi xer for mental types rather than any kind of analysis of the mental. The epistemology of the phenomenal tells us that scientific functionalism cannot be right, and we can see this without needing to enter the debate over the possibility of multiple realizability of the mental. The argument is very like the argument above for color and reflectances. The crucial point is that the kinds of circumstances which normally warrant our believing that someone is in pain, seeing red, itching, or whatever, do not warrant our believing that someone’s brain is in such and such a neurological state. Here is how it looks, highlighting the role of Leibniz’ law: Premise. The kind of evidence that typically warrants believing that the property of being in pain is possessed by x differs from the kind of evidence that typically warrants believing that the property of having a brain with C-fibers (or whatever) fi ring is possessed by x. Intermediate conclusion: being in pain and having a brain with C-fibers fi ring have different evidential properties. Therefore, being in pain ≠ having a brain with C-fibers fi ring.3 I said that our two arguments would be given in unadorned form. I have kept the “to-ing and fro-ing” for the objections and my replies.
4
FOLK OPINION
Objection i You are taking for granted common opinion about what’s evidence for what. Reply No doubt the folk have some wrong opinions on what’s evidence for what. But it is hard to accept that they are wrong about such facts as: looking so
3 Equally, the same line of thought with minor reformulations leads to the conclusion that being pain ≠ being C-fibers fi ring.
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and so is evidence for being so and so, other things equal; and that we often have good evidence for how we feel or how others behave, including what they say that gives us good evidence for someone—sometimes ourselves, sometimes someone else—being in pain, seeing red, or believing in God. Equally, it is hard to deny that this kind of evidence is, except in very special circumstances, no evidence concerning the reflectances of red objects or the neurology of pain and itching. We need to carry out detailed scientific investigations to get evidence about reflectances and neuroscience. In discussion it has sometimes been put to me that the folk do in fact know, for example, the reflectance profi le of red objects. This is because looking red is a reliable indicator of the reflectance profi le, and a reliable indicator theory is the right theory of knowledge. A similar claim is sometimes made about folk knowledge of neurology. But of course our argument was framed in terms of good evidence, not in terms of knowledge. (I would also object to the presumed version of a reliable indicator account of knowledge but there’s no need for me to do that to make my case.)
5
PROPERTIES AND CONCEPTS
Objection ii When David Armstrong argued that surface colors were physical properties of surfaces, reflectances say, he emphasized that he was not offering this as an account of the concept of color. This was of a piece with his treatment of mental state types, where he argued that they are neurological state types, while insisting that the concept of a mental state was to be understood in causal-functional terms (Armstrong 1968a). All you’ve shown, runs the objection, is something about concepts. You may have added to the case for insisting that our concept of color and our concept of the mental are quite distinct from our concept of reflectance and our concept of the neurological, respectively, but you’ve shown nothing about properties. Reply Concepts and properties don’t float free of each other in the way presumed by this objection. When I believe that something is red, I believe that the object falls under the concept RED. But this is to believe that the object is a certain way. Items fall under concepts, and concepts apply to items because of the way the items are. Concepts wouldn’t be any use to us in categorizing our world if that were not the case. What way does something need to be to fall under the concept RED? The red way—of course. To believe that something is red isn’t to believe that it is some way other than red. But, as we’ve already argued, the way I believe the object to be when I believe it to be red is the way supported by the object looking red—defeasibly, other things equal—and that way
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≠ having so and so reflectance, for the reflectance way isn’t supported by the object looking red. I am not saying that concepts and properties line up one-one. The individuation of concepts is a contentious issue but most agree that there are cases where there is more than one concept for a single property.4 Being the smallest prime and being the smallest even number are plausibly different concepts but there’s one property, namely being the number two, that corresponds indifferently to falling under either concept.5 What I am saying is that to believe that something falls under a given concept is to believe that it is a certain way, and this means that concepts don’t float free of properties. For each concept, there is the question of what way something has to be if it is to fall under that concept. This means that drawing the concept–property distinction doesn’t avoid our argument. When we ask the question, What does it take for an object to fall under the concept RED, the answer is not that the object has so and so reflectance for the reason already given. What it takes is something supported by looking red, whereas having so and so reflectance is not supported by looking red. Mutatis mutandis for the case of mental properties.6 What is true is that it would have been a mistake to argue as follows: the concept RED ≠ the concept REFLECTANCE, therefore being red ≠ having so and so reflectance. That this would be a mistake follows from the fact that concepts outrun properties. But our argument did not proceed from the difference in concepts. It proceeded from the difference in epistemic properties as between being red and having so and so reflectance.
6
OPACITY
Objection iii Quine urged many years ago that it is possible to believe that Cicero denounced Catiline without believing that Tully denounced Catiline. All the same, Cicero = Tully. Likewise, he observed that one might believe that the tallest spy is a spy without believing that Orcutt is a spy even in the
4 Everyone agrees about this on the narrow notion of property that relates to fundamental joints in nature, but even on the much more inclusive notion of property at work in this chapter, it is plausible that concepts outrun properties, as we’ll see. 5 Although there’s a use of “property” that we might tag “property concept” as opposed to property in re, according to which if there are two concepts, there are two properties. 6 And mutatis mutandis for the reply to the knowledge argument that contents itself with saying that the argument overlooks the concept–property distinction, see Jackson (2005).
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case where Orcutt = the tallest spy.7 In the same way, runs the objection, there might be evidence for Cicero’s denouncing Catiline that did not apply to Tully’s denouncing Catiline; or, even more obviously, for the tallest spy being a spy that did not support Orcutt being a spy (evidence for the fi rst we get for free but not for the second). But it would be an obvious error to infer from the differences in epistemic properties that Cicero ≠ Tully or that the tallest spy ≠ Orcutt. In short, you are forgetting that epistemic properties induce referential opacity.8 Reply In thinking about these examples, it is important to be careful about what bears the various properties and, in these cases especially, about whether it is a person or a proposition that bears the properties. Those who hold that we can believe that Cicero denounced Catiline, while not believing that Tully did, should not infer that Cicero has a property that Tully lacks: namely that of being believed to have denounced Catiline, observing that Leibniz’ law fails for belief properties. Leibniz’ law applies universally. Rather, they should insist that what has the property of being believed is the proposition that Cicero denounced Catiline, and what lacks this property is the proposition that Tully denounced Catiline. We have, that is, a valid application of Leibniz’ law that shows that the two propositions are distinct despite the fact that Cicero = Tully. In the same way, cases where there is evidence that Cicero denounced Catiline, which is not evidence that Tully did, are cases where there is evidence in favor of the proposition that Cicero denounced Catiline, which does not support the proposition that Tully denounced Catiline. The difference in evidential properties shows a difference in propositions, but that’s consistent with the different propositions concerning one and the same person. Mutatis mutandis for the Orcutt example. Of course, nowadays many philosophers—those who hold certain direct-reference theories about proper names—reject the two proposition position on the Cicero–Tully example. They insist that the proposition that Cicero denounced Catiline is the same proposition as the proposition that Tully denounced Catiline. But they rightly grant in the same breath that this implies that one cannot believe the one proposition without believing the “other.” Similarly, one cannot, according to the stance on proper names of these philosophers, have evidence in favor of the proposition that Cicero denounced Catiline without having evidence in favor of Tully denouncing
7
In a number of places, see, e.g., Quine 1960, § 30. Thus, “it is fallacious to combine Leibniz’s law with sentences containing verbs of propositional attitude—that is, with sentences that are concerned with psychological states like certainty, knowledge, and belief” (Hill 1991, 85). 8
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Catiline. For “they” are one and the same proposition. (I might also add that these consequences are widely seen as a problem for the direct-reference position on names; we return to this issue below.) The situation is as follows. If Quine is right that it is possible to believe that Cicero denounced Catiline without believing that Tully did, the objection wrongly takes certain properties of propositions to be properties of persons. If the direct-reference theorists are right, the alleged datum is not a datum in the fi rst place. I should emphasize that I am not suggesting that one cannot have beliefs about objects and properties, or that one cannot have evidence that bears on whether or not some property is or is not present. Indeed, the master argument of this chapter turns precisely on the fact that among the properties of properties are such properties as being or not being justifiably believed to be present on the basis of so and so evidence. I argued, for example, that being red and having so and so reflectance profi le cannot be the same property precisely because what was good evidence for the presence of one property differed from what was good evidence for the other. The crux of my reply to the objection is only that some cases where we appear to be ascribing a property to an object are, from the Quinean perspective, cases where we are in fact ascribing a property to a proposition. Indeed, it would be very implausible to deny that properties have epistemic properties. It is a commonplace that we marshal evidence that bears on the distribution of properties in our world and that we have beliefs about the distribution of properties.
7
A FALLACY OF EQUIVOCATION
Objection iv Whatever should be said about the Tully–Cicero example, we can construct a similar example except that it applies to properties instead of objects. Here is the case. Mary knows that Fred wants to curry favor with the King by wearing the King’s favorite color. The King’s favorite color is red, but Mary doesn’t know this. Perhaps she thinks it is blue. Now consider the following argument: Premise 1. Mary’s body of evidence supports Fred’s wearing something that has the King’s favorite color. Premise 2. Mary’s body of evidence does not support Fred’s wearing something that is red. Intermediate conclusion. The King’s favorite color has a property red lacks, namely, its being possessed by something worn by Fred is supported by Mary’s body of evidence.
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Conclusion. The King’s favorite color ≠ red. It is clear that the argument commits a fallacy—its premises are true and its conclusion false. This tells us, runs the objection, that we cannot use epistemic arguments to draw conclusions about the identity or nonidentity of properties. Reply The displayed argument commits a fallacy of equivocation. The reading on which premise 1 is true is a reading which takes Mary’s body of evidence to support an item of Fred’s clothing having the property of being the color the King most likes, whatever that property may be. This property is not being red, even in the case where the King’s favorite color is red. It is instead the property x has if and only if there is a property which is the King’s mostliked-color, and x has that color, whatever it may be. It is the property of being a color that stands in a certain relationship to the King’s likings. We can think of it in infinite disjunctive terms: x has the property iff (x is blue and the King’s favorite color = blue) or (x is red and the King’s favorite color = red) or (x is yellow and the King’s favorite color = yellow) or . . . . This means that the intermediate conclusion that follows from the two premises is Intermediate conclusion*. Being the King’s favorite color has a property red lacks, namely, its being possessed by something worn by Fred is supported by Mary’s body of evidence. But now the conclusion that follows is: Conclusion*. Being the King’s favorite color ≠ red. This conclusion is true. What we learn from the example parallels what we learn from the Cicero–Tully example: there’s no problem about using Leibniz’s law with epistemic properties, but one needs to be careful about what has what epistemic property.
8
PROPERTIES AND PRESENTATIONS
Objection v You mentioned that direct-reference theorists about proper names hold that one cannot believe that Cicero denounced Catiline without believing that Tully denounced Catiline. They deny Quine’s claim. But, proceeds the objection, they allow that there is something that needs attention in the example. Although Quine is wrong, the mistake is understandable. What direct-reference theorists say at this point varies, but there is a common
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general shape to their discussion. They distinguish objects from their modes of presentation. Although the proposition that Cicero denounced Catiline is the very same proposition as the proposition that Tully denounced Catiline (and so, by Leibniz’s law “they” have the very same properties including epistemic ones), there is a distinction to be drawn between “Cicero” presentations of Cicero–Tully, and “Tully” presentations of Cicero–Tully. When Fred expresses what he believes using “Cicero denounced Catiline” while insisting that “Tully denounced Catiline” does not express what he believes, there is, unknown to Fred, one proposition believed that is graspable in two ways, and in some sense Fred knows about the “Cicero” way but not about the “Tully” way. We should say something similar, runs the objection, for the example of red and reflectance. There is one property that presents itself in two ways: one way is in its guise as a property of optical physics; the other is in the way it affects those with normal color vision. (And of course something like this is sometimes said in discussions of the knowledge argument.) Similarly, runs the objection, pain may present itself in its neurological clothing or in its sensory clothing. But there is just the one property differently presented. Reply I think that there is a grain of truth in this objection. It tells us that we can distinguish two properties when we discuss color and the sensory and that what I’ve been saying is true for one member of the pair but not the other. But before I go concessionary, let me start with why there is only a grain of truth. Of course properties can and do have properties—it is a property of heat that it is an energy property, of bright yellow that it attracts attention, of a perfect circle that it is hard to draw, and so on. In consequence, there is nothing problematic about a property having a property through which it draws itself in one way or another to our attention: a presentational property if you like. But how does this allow us to identify redness with reflectance so and so? When something looks red to us in normal circumstances, we typically believe that the thing is red, and it is this property we typically believe the thing has. This property is not reflectance so and so. For we do not believe that the thing has reflectance so and so. Maybe reflectance so and so is the property that is presenting itself to us but that’s not the property we believe the thing to have. That is to say, maybe when we believe that x is red, we have a belief of the form: property x has the property which presents in the red-looking way, where the property that presents in the red-looking way = reflectance so and so. But having the property which presents itself in the red-looking way ≠ the property which presents itself in the red-looking way (whatever it is). The reason parallels the one we noted in my discussion of the case where red is the King’s favorite color. The fi rst
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property is the property x has if and only if there is a property which red presents, and x has it. To put it in disjunctive form: x has the property iff (x has property1, and property1 presents itself in the red-looking way), or (x has property2 , and property2 presents itself in the red-looking way), or (x has property3, and property3 presents itself in the red-looking way), or . . . , where one but only one value of propertyi is reflectance so and so. In sum, redness is the property we believe something to have when we believe it to be red, and that property is not reflectance so and so although it may well be the case that (i) it is the property of having the property that presents in a certain way familiar to those with color vision, and (ii) the property that is presenting in that way is reflectance so and so. Mutatis mutandis for the case of phenomenal experience. Now for the concession. If to be red is to have the property that is thus and so, then one might argue that the philosophy of color needs to acknowledge two properties and not one: being red—that’s the property of having the property that is thus and so, and red—that’s the property that is thus and so (reflectance so and so, as we’ve been supposing). The situation would be very like that which some functionalists of the identity theory school hold obtains for phenomenal properties and mental properties more generally. We have the property of having the property that plays a certain functional role and the property that plays the role. There are, that is, two different properties, both of which can be thought of as mental properties. Here is how it looks for the case of pain on the usual pretence that C-fibers fi ring is the state type that, as it happens, plays the pain role:9 Being in pain = being in the state that plays the pain role; The state that plays the pain role = C-fibers fi ring. But it doesn’t follow from this pair that being in pain = C-fibers fi ring. If we call the state that plays the pain role pain, we get, by transitivity, in the way made famous by the Australian materialists: Pain = C-fibers fi ring. In the past I have defended both the Australian materialists’ type-type identity of mental properties with neurological properties (Jackson et al. 1982) and the Australian position that colors are reflectances by appeal to a twoproperty story of the kind sketched above (Jackson 2007a). I now think it is important to distinguish the plausible claim that there are two properties
9 I suppress the complications in formulation needed to cover the fact that roles played may vary from time to time and creature to creature. They don’t matter for our discussion.
110 Frank Jackson which we need to keep track of in our philosophizing about color and mental properties,10 from the much less plausible claim that the reflectance properties and the neurological properties are properly called color and mental properties, respectively. Isn’t red the property we believe things to have when they look the way blood looks, and that’s not reflectance? Isn’t pain the property we believe we have when a pin is stuck into us, and that property is not C-fibers fi ring or anything of that ilk? The identity theorists were wrong about the featured event; what they got right concerned a supporting act. Similar remarks apply, it seems to me, to the case of water and H 2O. I gave earlier, as an example where we have two concepts and one property, the distinct concepts of being the smallest prime and being the smallest even number, each of which corresponds to the single property of being the number two. Many would give as another example