Functional Discourse Grammar: A Typologically-Based Theory of Language Structure

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Author: Kees Hengeveld | J. Lachlan Mackenzie

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Functional Discourse Grammar

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Functional Discourse Grammar A typologically-based theory of language structure

K E E S H E N G EV E L D A N D J. LACHLAN MACKENZIE

1

3

Great Clarendon Street, Oxford ox2 6dp Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide in Oxford New York Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto With oﬃces in Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries Published in the United States by Oxford University Press Inc., New York © Kees Hengeveld and J. Lachlan Mackenzie 2008 The moral rights of the authors have been asserted Database right Oxford University Press (maker) First published 2008 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this book in any other binding or cover and you must impose the same condition on any acquirer British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Data available Typeset by SPI Publisher Services, Pondicherry, India Printed in Great Britain on acid-free paper by CPI Antony Rowe, Chippenham, Wiltshire _________________ ISBN 978–0–19–927810–7 (Hbk.) ISBN 978–0–19–927811–4 (Pbk.) 1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4 2

Contents Preface List of tables and ﬁgures Abbreviations

xi xiv xvi 1 1 1 1 1 3 4

1 Introduction 1.1 Functional Discourse Grammar 1.2 Basic properties 1.2.1 Introduction 1.2.2 Top-down organization 1.2.3 Discourse grammar 1.2.4 Levels of representation 1.2.5 Conceptual Component, Contextual Component, and Output Component 1.3 The architecture of FDG 1.3.1 Overall organization 1.3.2 Levels and Layers 1.3.3 Primitives 1.3.4 Levels and primitives 1.3.5 Implementation 1.4 FDG in its broader context 1.4.1 Introduction 1.4.2 Functionalism 1.4.3 Typology 1.4.4 Language modelling 1.4.5 On using FDG 1.5 Notational conventions 1.6 Structure of the book

6 12 12 14 19 22 23 25 25 26 31 37 41 43 45

2 The Interpersonal Level 2.1 Introduction 2.2 The organization of the Interpersonal Level 2.3 The Move 2.3.1 Introduction 2.3.2 Heads

46 46 48 50 50 52

contents

vi

2.4

2.5

2.6

2.7

2.8

2.9

2.3.3 Modiﬁers 2.3.4 Operators 2.3.5 Frames The Discourse Act 2.4.1 Introduction 2.4.2 Heads 2.4.3 Modiﬁers 2.4.4 Operators 2.4.5 Frames Illocution 2.5.1 Introduction 2.5.2 Heads 2.5.3 Modiﬁers 2.5.4 Operators 2.5.5 Frames The Participants 2.6.1 Introduction 2.6.2 Heads 2.6.3 Modiﬁers 2.6.4 Operators 2.6.5 Frames The Communicated Content 2.7.1 Introduction 2.7.2 Heads 2.7.3 Modiﬁers 2.7.4 Operators 2.7.5 Frames Subacts 2.8.1 Introduction 2.8.2 Ascription 2.8.3 Reference Building up the Interpersonal Level

3 The Representational Level 3.1 Introduction: semantics in FDG 3.2 The organization of the Representational Level 3.2.1 Semantic categories 3.2.2 Subclasses of semantic categories 3.2.3 The structure of representational layers 3.3 Propositional contents 3.3.1 Introduction

58 59 60 60 60 63 64 65 68 68 68 69 81 83 83 84 84 84 85 85 87 87 87 88 102 104 106 107 107 108 113 124 128 128 130 130 135 138 144 144

contents

3.4

3.5

3.6

3.7

3.8

3.9

3.3.2 Heads 3.3.3 Modiﬁers 3.3.4 Operators 3.3.5 Frames Episodes 3.4.1 Introduction 3.4.2 Heads 3.4.3 Modiﬁers 3.4.4 Operators 3.4.5 Frames States-of-Aﬀairs 3.5.1 Introduction 3.5.2 Heads 3.5.3 Modiﬁers 3.5.4 Operators 3.5.5 Frames Conﬁgurational Properties 3.6.1 Introduction 3.6.2 Heads 3.6.3 Modiﬁers 3.6.4 Operators 3.6.5 Frames Lexical Properties 3.7.1 Introduction 3.7.2 Heads 3.7.3 Modiﬁers 3.7.4 Operators 3.7.5 Frames Individuals 3.8.1 Introduction 3.8.2 Heads 3.8.3 Modiﬁers 3.8.4 Operators 3.8.5 Frames Location 3.9.1 Introduction 3.9.2 Heads 3.9.3 Modiﬁers 3.9.4 Operators 3.9.5 Frames

vii

145 151 153 156 157 157 160 162 163 165 166 166 166 171 172 180 181 181 182 208 210 214 215 215 215 230 233 236 236 236 237 241 245 247 248 248 249 254 256 257

viii

contents

3.10 Time 3.10.1 Introduction 3.10.2 Heads 3.10.3 Modiﬁers 3.10.4 Operators 3.10.5 Frames 3.11 Manner 3.11.1 Introduction 3.11.2 Heads 3.11.3 Modiﬁers 3.11.4 Operators 3.11.5 Frames 3.12 Quantity 3.12.1 Introduction 3.12.2 Heads 3.12.3 Modiﬁers 3.12.4 Operators 3.12.5 Frames 3.13 Reason 3.13.1 Introduction 3.13.2 Heads 3.13.3 Modiﬁers 3.13.4 Operators 3.13.5 Frames 3.14 Reﬂexive language 3.15 Building up the Representational Level 4 The Morphosyntactic Level 4.1 Introduction 4.1.1 Purpose and scope of the chapter 4.1.2 Relation to Interpersonal Level and the Representational Level 4.1.3 Relation to Phonological Level 4.2 The organization of the Morphosyntactic Level 4.2.1 Introduction 4.2.2 Hierarchical structure 4.2.3 Grammatical morphemes and secondary operators 4.3 Linguistic Expressions 4.4 Clauses 4.4.1 Introduction 4.4.2 Ordering of hierarchically related units

257 257 258 260 262 262 263 263 265 267 267 268 268 268 269 271 271 272 272 272 272 274 274 274 275 277 282 282 282 283 287 291 291 291 301 308 309 309 311

contents 4.4.3 Alignment 4.4.4 Ordering of non-hierarchically related units 4.4.5 Templates 4.4.6 Dummies and support 4.4.7 Agreement 4.4.8 Subordination 4.4.9 Coreference 4.5 Phrases 4.5.1 Introduction 4.5.2 Ordering of hierarchically related units 4.5.3 Alignment 4.5.4 Ordering of non-hierarchically related units 4.5.5 Templates 4.5.6 Dummies and support 4.5.7 Agreement 4.5.8 Subordination 4.6 Words 4.6.1 Introduction 4.6.2 Ordering of hierarchically related units 4.6.3 Alignment 4.6.4 Ordering of non-hierarchically related units 4.6.5 Templates 4.6.6 Dummies and support 4.6.7 Agreement 4.6.8 Subordination 4.7 Building up the Morphosyntactic Level

ix

316 333 341 347 350 352 372 376 376 377 383 387 389 391 394 396 400 400 405 406 409 411 412 414 414 416

5 The Phonological Level 5.1 Introduction 5.2 The organization of the Phonological Level 5.3 Utterances 5.4 Intonational Phrases 5.5 Phonological Phrases 5.6 Phonological Words 5.7 Phonemes, Syllables, and Feet 5.8 Building up the Phonological Level

421 421 427 430 432 436 443 449 455

References Language Index Name Index Subject Index

463 489 492 496

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Preface At the Ninth International Conference on Functional Grammar (ICFG9), held in Madrid in September 2000, Kees Hengeveld proposed the idea of a Functional Discourse Grammar. At the time it was conceived of as a revised version of Functional Grammar (FG; Dik 1997a, 1997b), a theory of the organization of natural languages developed by the late Simon C. Dik and his colleagues from 1978 onwards, the year in which the ﬁrst book bearing the title Functional Grammar appeared (Dik 1978). The addition of the word Discourse in the denomination of the model was meant to reﬂect the awareness that the impact of discourse features on linguistic form should be given greater prominence in the theory. A number of the features of FDG as presented in this book were already present in Hengeveld’s (2000) presentation, notably: the distinction between an interpersonal, a representational, and a morphosyntactic level of analysis, all of them with hierarchical layering; the actional status of ascription and reference; the top-down operation of the model; the interaction of the grammatical component with the conceptual and contextual components; and the analysis of reﬂexive language use. The ideas were taken up in lively discussion in the years following that conference, not least at ICFG10 in Amsterdam (The Netherlands), ICFG11 in Gijón (Spain), and ICFG12 in São João do Rio Preto (Brazil). This led to such collections as Mackenzie and Gómez-González (2004, 2005), de Groot and Hengeveld (2005), and García Velasco and Rijkhoﬀ (2008), in which a range of scholars from various countries contributed to the development of a new architecture of the theory, with a strong desire to retain the best of FG while increasing the scope and ambition of the model. Just like FG, FDG seeks to reconcile the patent fact that languages are structured complexes with the equally patent fact that they are adapted to function as instruments of communication between human beings. FDG has also inherited from its precursor the desire to achieve maximum typological neutrality: the theory is designed to be equally applicable to languages of all types, and indeed this book presents and analyses data from a very wide range of languages, resorting to exemplifying from more familiar languages only where the comprehensibility of the presentation makes this advisable. However, FDG diverges from FG in so many ways that by now it should be considered a theory in its own right, and it has been recognized as such, as evidenced by encyclopaedia entries such as Hengeveld and Mackenzie (2006, fc.) and special issues of journals on FDG (van Staden and Keizer fc.; Hengeveld

xii

preface

and Wanders fc.; Hattnher and Hengeveld 2007). FDG represents a signiﬁcant advance on FG in separating out the Interpersonal Level and the Representational Level and investigating the full complexity of the former as well as the complex interaction between the two in determining linguistic form. It also diﬀers from its predecessor in regarding the Morphosyntactic Level and the Phonological Level as more than mere expressions of the other Levels, but as having their own principles of organization; these are fully elaborated for the ﬁrst time in this book. And ﬁnally, it diﬀers crucially from FG in being a top-down rather than a bottom-up model. All in all, then, FDG has outgrown its intellectual origins and now oﬀers an autonomous and balanced account of the systematic impact of pragmatic, semantic, morphosyntactic, and phonological phenomena on linguistic form. The present book began life during a joint sabbatical of both authors in Amsterdam in 2004. It then continued to grow in the form of e-mail correspondence, with drafts being sent back and forth between Amsterdam and Lisbon when other commitments permitted. In the last phase Mackenzie was awarded a Visitor’s Scholarship from the Netherlands Organization for Scientiﬁc Research (NWO) for the ﬁrst months of 2007 under project number B30-664, when he was able to work together with Hengeveld on a daily basis in Amsterdam again. Mackenzie also wishes to acknowledge support received in the early days from the Spanish Ministry of Education, the European Regional Development Fund and the Xunta de Galicia under project number BFF200202441 (PGIDIT03PXIC20403PN), and Hengeveld is grateful for support provided by the Amsterdam Center for Language and Communication and the Department of Theoretical Linguistics of the University of Amsterdam. We also wish to recognize the contribution of innumerable colleagues and students who over the past years have contributed their ideas, encouragement, and criticism to our enterprise of developing FDG. We were fortunate enough to be given the opportunity to present FDG at conferences, in postgraduate courses, and in guest lectures at many diﬀerent places, and though we cannot name all those who contributed with their questions, remarks, and criticisms (for there have been so many), we would like to thank in general terms our audiences at ICFG10 (Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 2002), International Conference on Role and Reference Grammar (Logroño, Spain, 2002), LOT Winter School (Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 2003), Journées de Linguistique Fonctionelle (Agadir, Morocco, 2003), ACLC/ILLC-Colloquium (Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 2003), Københavns Universitet (Copenhagen, Denmark, 2003), Århus Universitet (Århus, Denmark, 2003), Örebro Universitet and Södertörn Högskola (Stockholm, Sweden, 2003), Universidad de Castilla La Mancha (Cuenca, Spain, 2003), Workshop on Grammar and Discourse (Ghent, Belgium, 2003), Universidade Estadual Paulista (São José

preface

xiii

do Rio Preto, Brazil, 2003, 2004), SIL International Training Programme (High Wycombe, UK, 2004), ESSE-7 (Zaragoza, Spain), 52o Seminário do GEL (Campinas, Brazil, 2004), ICFG11 (Gijón, Spain, 2004), ICFG12 (São José do Rio Preto, Brazil, 2006), Universidade Federal de Goiás (Goiânia, Brazil, 2006), TWIST Student Conference (Leiden, 2007), Workshop on the Representational Level in Functional Discourse Grammar (Zaandijk, 2007), Università degli Studi del Molise (Campobasso, Italy, 2007), Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 2007), Universidade Federal Fluminense (Niterói, Brazil, 2007), Moulay Ismail University (Meknès, Morocco, 2007) and Universiteit van Amsterdam (Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 2007). Portions of this book were furthermore discussed at various occasions within the context of the Functional Grammar Colloquium at the University of Amsterdam, and these discussions have led to considerable improvements of the relevant parts. To all colleagues and students who participated in these events, our deepest gratitude. We are grateful to John Davey of Oxford University Press for his constant support, his interest, and his advice. Finally, we would like to give our special thanks to Inge Genee, Daniel García Velasco, and Gerry Wanders, who read the entire pre-ﬁnal manuscript and generously gave us their detailed and invaluable comments. We hope they will ﬁnd their highly appreciated feedback reﬂected in the current book. Kees Hengeveld Amsterdam J. Lachlan Mackenzie Lisbon

List of tables and ﬁgures Tables 1. Semantic categories

131

2. Derived nominal expression of basic semantic categories

132

3. Semantic categories 2

136

4. Basic semantic functions

199

5. The Locatives of Avar

253

6. The constitution of a Linguistic Expression

309

7. Classiﬁcation of complement Clauses

363

8. Correspondences between Lexical and Grammatical Word classes

401

9. Examples of correspondences between Grammatical Words and elements of the Interpersonal Level and the Representational Level

402

10. Morpheme classes

404

Figures 1. FDG as part of a wider theory of verbal interaction

6

2. General layout of FDG

13

3. The Interpersonal Level

15

4. The Representational Level

15

5. The Morphosyntactic Level

17

6. The Phonological Level

18

7. Implicational relations between Illocutions

75

8. The representation of semantic functions

195

9. Flexible, diﬀerentiated, and rigid languages

227

10. Parts-of-speech systems

228

11. Nominative-Accusative alignment

325

12. Absolutive-Ergative alignment

325

13. Primative-Secundative alignment

327

14. Directive-Indirective alignment

327

15. Role-based alignment

328

16. Subjects in Nominative-Accusative/Directive-Indirective systems

328

list of tables and figures

xv

17. Subjects in Absolutive-Ergative/Directive-Indirective systems

328

18. Subjects and Objects in Nominative-Accusative/Primative-Secundative systems

328

19. Subjects in Absolutive-Ergative/Primative-Secundative systems

329

20. Alignment within Phrases

387

21. Alignment of arguments with respect to incorporation in Southern Tiwa

409

22. Alignment of arguments with respect to incorporation in Nivkh

410

Abbreviations and symbols Abbreviations used in glosses 1

ﬁrst person

assv

associative

2

second person

attr

attributive

3

third person

aug

augmentative

a

actor

aux

auxiliary

abil

ability

av

actor voice

abl

ablative

avol

avolitional

abs

absolutive

ben

benefactive

acc

accusative

caus

causative

acq

acquired

cert

certain

actnr

action nominalizer

cl

class

adh

adhortative

clf

classiﬁer

adjr

adjectivalizer

cntrl

control

admon

admonitive

coll

collective

advr

adverbializer

comm

commissive

aff

aﬀected

comp

complementizer

ag

agent

compl

completive

agr

agreement

compv comparative

all

allative

cond

conditional

anaph

anaphoric

conj

conjunction

anim

animate

conn

connective

anr

agent nominalizer

cont

continuative

ant

anterior

contg

contingent

aor

aorist

contr

contrastive

appl

applicative

cop

copula

approx approximative

corr

correlative

art

article

cv

conveyance voice

asp

aspect

cvb

converb

ass

assertive

dat

dative

abbreviations and symbols

xvii

decl

declarative

foc

focus

def

deﬁnite

fut

future

deict

deictic

gen

genitive

dem

demonstrative

genr

general tense

dep

dependent

ger

gerund

det

determiner

hab

habitual

hest

hesternal (happening yesterday)

hod

hodiernal (happening today)

hon

honoriﬁc

hort

hortative

hum

human

detrans detransitivizer dim

diminutive

dir

direction

dishort

dishortative

disp

dispensative

distr

distributive

dox

doxastic

drct

direct

imm

immediate

ds

diﬀerent subject

imp

imperative

du

dual

impf

imperfect

dub

dubitative

impr

imprecative

dum

dummy

inabil

inability

dur

durative

inan

inanimate

dyn

dynamic

inch

inchoative

emph

emphasis

incl

inclusive

erg

ergative

ind

indicative mood

ergr

ergativizer

indf

indeﬁnite

ess

essive

indftns indeﬁnite tense

ex

existential

indep

independent

ex.prev

previously existing

iness

inessive

exact

exact ascription

inf

inﬁnitive

excl

exclusive

infer

inferential

exclam

exclamative

ingr

ingressive

exct

exactly

ins

instrument

f

feminine

int

intentive

fact

factual

intens

intensiﬁer

fam

familiar

inter

interrogative

fin

ﬁnite

interp

interpellative

xviii

abbreviations and symbols

intr

intransitive

nonperc non-perceived

intr.abil

intrinsic ability

nonpst

non-past

inv

inverse

nonsbj

non-subject

irr

irrealis

nontop

non-topic

irrat

irrational

nonvis

iter

iterative

non-visual sensory evidence

itive

itive

nucl

nucleus

ld

locative direction

obj

object

lk

linker

objp

objective paradigm

loc

locative

objresp

object of respect

locnr

locative nominalizer

objv

objective

log

logophoric

obl

oblique

lv

locative voice

oblg

obligation

m

male, masculine

obv

obviative

mann

manner

opt

optative

mann.nr

manner nominalizer

part

particle

mir

mirative

partv

partitive

mit

mitigation

pass

passive

ms

male speaker

paus

pause

n

neuter

pc

paucal

narr

narrative

perc

perceived

neg

negative, negation

perm

permanent

newtop

new topic

pfv

perfective

nf

non-feminine

pl

plural

nfact

non-factual

plup

pluperfect

nh

non-human

pm

predicate marker

nml

nominal

pol

polite

nmlz

nominalizer

pos

positive

nom

nominative

poss

possessive

non.a/s

non-nominative

post

posterior

pot

potential

non.inter non-interrogative nonattr

non-attributive

potv

potentive voice

nonf

non-ﬁnite

pred

predicate

nonfut

non-future

prep

preposition

abbreviations and symbols pres

presentative

rls

realis

presup

presupposed

s

prf

perfect

argument of intransitive verb

priv

privative

sbj

subject

proc

procrastinative

sbjv

subjunctive mood

prof

profession

seq

sequence

prog

progressive

sg

singular

proh

prohibitive

sgltv

singulative

prone

prone (to negative characteristic)

sim

simultaneous

sit

situational

propr

proprietive

spec

speciﬁc

prox

proximate

srdir

superdirective

prs

present tense

ss

same subject

pst

past tense

stat

stative

ptcp

participle

sub

subordinator

punct

punctual

subdir

subdirective

q

question marker

subess

subessive

quot

quotative

subl

sublative

subs

subsequent

suppl

supplicative

tam

tense-aspect-mood

tmpnr

temporal nominalizer

realnr realis nominalizer reasnr reason nominalizer rec

recipient

recpst

recent past

red

reduplication

refl

tns

tense

reﬂexive

refr

top

topic

referential

tr

transitivity marker

reinf

reinforcement

u

undergoer

rel

relativizer

uv

undergoer voice

relr

relator

val

validator

rem

remote

vfin

ﬁnite verb

rep

reportative

vis

visible

repv

repetitive

vis.evid visual evidence

res

resultative

voc

vocative

rev

reversative

vol

volitive

xix

xx

abbreviations and symbols

Abbreviations used in representations General

⊂

is entailed by

Interpersonal Level

h

higher social status

HORT

hortative

ILL

variable for an illocution

IMP

imperative illocution

lexeme

IMPR

imprecative

[±A]

± involving the addressee

INTER

interrogative

[±S]

± involving the speaker

± for

± formal

M1

move

± id

± identiﬁable

MIR

mirative

±s

± speciﬁc

mit

mitigation

Motiv

motivation

A

addressee

OPT

optative

A1

discourse act

Orient

orientation

ADMON

admonitive

P1

speech-act participant

approx

approximative

PROH

prohibitive

Aside

aside

R1

subact of reference

C1

communicated content

rep

reportative

COMM

commissive

S

speaker

Conc

concession

SA

subact

Cor

corrective

SUPPL

supplicative

DECL

declarative

T1

subact of ascription

V1

any interpersonal variable

DISHORT dishortative

INTERP interpellative

DISP

dispensative

Y/N

yes-no

emph

emphasis

operator

exact

exact ascription

Expl

explanation

F1

illocution

Feedb

feedback

Foc

focus

head

H

M

operator on a move (etc.) modiﬁer

M

modiﬁer of a move (etc.) function

M

function of a move (etc.)

abbreviations and symbols Representational Level

magn magnitude

lexeme

m

∀

universal quantifying operator

p1

propositional content

past

past

∃

existential quantifying operator

pc

paucal

∅

perc

perception

zero

p

1

permanent property

singular

2

post

posterior

dual

3

pres

present

trial

prog

progressive

A

actor

prox

proximal

Abl

ablative

q1

quantity

ant

anterior

r1

reason

C

comitative

c

Ref

reference

contingent property

rem

remote

s

e1

stative state-of-aﬀairs

sim

simultaneous

s

f1

Circ

circumstance

Cons consequence c

x1

collective individual

xxi

x1

f1

mass individual

x1

set individual

dynamic state-of-aﬀairs

t1

time

distr

distributive

Temp temporal

e1

state-of-aﬀairs

U

undergoer

ep1

episode

v1

Ess

essive

any representational variable

f1

property

x1

individual

h

head



operator

hab

habitual

Û

modiﬁer

infer

inferential

Û

modiﬁer of property

Ins

instrument

l

Û

modiﬁer of location

In

inessive

Û

modiﬁer of manner

L

locative

Û

modiﬁer of a time

l1

location

function

m

plural, more than one

p

m1

manner

function of a propositional content (etc.)

d

e1

f

m t

xxii

abbreviations and symbols

Morphosyntactic Level

Aﬀ1

aﬃx

Adp1

adpositional phrase

Advp1

adverb phrase

PM+N position situated N places after the medial position M-N P position situated N places before the medial position

Advw1 adverbial word Ap1

adjective phrase

As1

adjectival stem

Aw1

adjectival word

Cl1

clause

bal

balanced clause

Cl1

Ppost

postclausal position

pre

P

preclausal position

Vp1

verb phrase

Vr1

verbal root

Vs1

verbal stem

Cl1

dependent clause

Vw1

verbal word

Cl1

deranked clause

f

Vw1

ﬁnite verb(al word)

Gw1

grammatical word

Xm1

morpheme (of type x)

Le1

linguistic expression

Xp1

phrase (of type x)

Np1

noun phrase

Xr1

root (of type x)

Nr1

nominal root

Xs1

stem (of type x)

Ns1

nominal stem

Xw1

word (of type x)

Nw1

nominal word

dep der

P

2

P2+N

P

centre

second position

Phonological Level

position situated N places after the second position

CAP

characteristic accent position

f

falling

position of clause with respect to pre- and postclausal positions

f

foot

h

high

ip1

intonational phrase

l

low

m

mid

pp1

phonological phrase

pw1

phonological word

PF

ﬁnal position

PF-N

position situated N places before the ﬁnal position

PI

initial position

PI+N

position situated N places after the initial position

r

rising

s

stressed

s1

syllable

medial position

u1

utterance

PM

abbreviations and symbols Parts-of-speech

Pro

pronoun

A

adjective

V

verb

Ad

adposition

Adv

adverb

Cont

contentive

DAdv

degree adverb

Det

determiner

Intj

interjection

MAdv manner adverb N

noun

Num

numeral

Grammatical models

FDG Functional Discourse Grammar FG

Functional Grammar

RRG Role and Reference Grammar SFG

Systemic-Functional Grammar

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1 Introduction 1.1 Functional Discourse Grammar This introduction provides a general overview of Functional Discourse Grammar (FDG) as part of a wider theory of verbal interaction. It starts out by describing various distinguishing features of the FDG model in Section 1.2. Section 1.3 goes on to present the architecture of FDG, introducing notions that will be expanded and justiﬁed in the remaining chapters of the book and explaining in general terms how the grammar can be implemented in linguistic analysis. The following Section (1.4) discusses the relation of FDG to linguistic functionalism, the relevance of FDG for language typology and various methodological prerequisites. The penultimate section, 1.5, sets out various notational conventions to be observed in the following chapters, which are brieﬂy previewed in Section 1.6.

1.2 Basic properties 1.2.1 Introduction

There are a number of distinguishing features that set oﬀ Functional Discourse Grammar from other structural-functional theories of language (Butler 2003). These features, which are discussed in the following sections, are the following: FDG has a top-down organization (1.2.2); FDG takes the Discourse Act as the basic unit of analysis (1.2.3); FDG includes morphosyntactic and phonological representations as part of its underlying structure, alongside representations of the pragmatic and semantic properties of Discourse Acts (1.2.4); and, as the Grammatical Component of the theory of verbal interaction, FDG systematically links up with a Conceptual, a Contextual, and an Output Component (1.2.5). 1.2.2 Top-down organization

FDG starts with the speaker’s intention and then works down to articulation. This is motivated by the assumption that a model of grammar will be more eﬀective the more its organization resembles language processing in

2

introduction

the individual. Psycholinguistic studies (e.g. Levelt 1989) clearly show that language production is a top-down process, which starts with intentions and ends with the articulation of the actual linguistic expression. The implementation of FDG reﬂects this process and is accordingly organized in a top-down fashion. This does not mean that FDG is a model of the speaker: FDG is a theory about grammar, but one that tries to reﬂect psycholinguistic evidence in its basic architecture (cf. 1.2.5 below). Two major operations have to be distinguished in the top-down construction of utterances: formulation and encoding. Formulation concerns the rules that determine what constitute valid underlying pragmatic and semantic representations in a language. Encoding concerns the rules that convert these pragmatic and semantic representations into morphosyntactic and phonological ones. The operation of Formulation involves three interlinked processes: the selection of appropriate frames for the Interpersonal and Representational Levels; the insertion of appropriate lexemes into these frames; and the application of operators symbolizing the grammatical distinctions required in the language under analysis. Encoding also involves three processes: the selection of appropriate templates for the Morphosyntactic and Phonological Levels; the insertion of free and bound grammatical morphemes; and the application of operators that play a role in the process of articulating the output of the grammar. Details will emerge from the relevant chapters. Our presentation, in progressing from formulation to encoding and within encoding from morphosyntax to phonology, clearly mimics the sequence found in production. Despite this seductive analogy between the architecture of FDG and the processes of speech production, it is important to emphasize, as pointed out by Hengeveld (2004b: 366–7), that FDG is a ‘model of encoded intentions and conceptualizations’ rather than, as is Levelt’s ‘blueprint for the speaker’ (1989: 8 ﬀ.), a model of language production. FDG aims to understand how linguistic units are structured in terms of the world they describe and the communicative intentions with which they are produced, and models this in a dynamic implementation (Bakker and Siewierska 2004) of the grammar, i.e. the sequence of steps that the analyst must take in understanding and laying bare the nature of a particular phenomenon. This is how our discourse in this book is to be understood, for example where we remark that some operation precedes another one, or that two units are available simultaneously. Note that, although the presentation of the FDG model will focus on the generation of utterances, the model could in principle be turned on its head to account for the parsing of utterances. It is clear that listeners analyse phonetic input into phonological representations, which are subsequently grouped into morphosyntactic constituents, from which meaningful representations are then constructed.

basic properties

3

The top-down organization of the model is a precondition for a grammatical theory that aims at describing discourse units rather than clauses. In a discourse-oriented model the clause is just one of the options that the speaker can use to contribute to the ongoing discourse, for which reason formulation has to precede encoding. This is the topic of the next section. 1.2.3 Discourse grammar

There are many grammatical phenomena that can only be interpreted in terms of units larger than the individual clause. Examples of these are narrative constructions, the use of discourse particles, anaphorical chains, and tailhead linkage. By way of example, consider the following instance of tail-head linkage in Tidore (van Staden 2000: 275): (1)

. . . turus jafa cahi saloi ena=ge turus . . . then Jafa carry.on.the.back basket 3.nh=there then ena=ge paka ine. Ine una oka koi . . . 3.nh=there ascend go.upwards go.upwards 3.sg.m pick banana ‘. . . then Jafa carried the basket upwards and picked the bananas . . .’ “. . . then Jafa carried the basket and went upwards. Went upwards he picked the bananas . . .”

In many Indo-Paciﬁc languages there are several grammatical phenomena that are a faithful and direct reﬂection of discourse organization. In Foley’s (1986: 176) words: ‘A text is a coherent linking of clauses and sentences, and this coherence is achieved by rules of the language which state how clauses and sentences can be joined’. Example (1) illustrates one of these linking devices. Episodes within stories are in Tidore often realized as single linguistic expressions containing strings of clauses. The linguistic expressions are linked to each other by means of tail-head linkage: the last verb of the one linguistic expression is repeated as the ﬁrst verb of the next linguistic expression, as illustrated in (1). The crucial point here is that, as stated in the quotation from Foley (1986), phenomena such as tail-head linkage are governed by rules of the language and thus form part of the grammatical system as it applies to narratives. Grammatical phenomena like these thus clearly show the need for a grammatical model that allows for the treatment of units larger than the individual clause and of the relations that obtain between and within these units. As argued in Mackenzie (1998b), the need for a discourse-oriented grammar also becomes apparent when units smaller than a clause are considered. The following examples illustrate what he treats as holophrases of various types:

4

introduction

(2)

(What are you eating?) A donut.

(3)

Congratulations!

(4) Oh John! The answer in (2), the exclamation in (3), and the vocative expression in (4) all take a non-clausal form. Yet in the appropriate circumstances they all count as full and complete contributions to the discourse. In fact, any further elaboration of (2), for example, would lead to a relatively less natural exchange. These utterances are accordingly not interpreted as reduced clauses, but as being non-clausal right from the start. The model should thus ﬁnd a way of dealing with non-clausal utterances which recognizes the fact that they constitute fully grammatical discourse units. The conclusion that FDG draws from the facts discussed in the preceding sections is that the basic unit of discourse is not the clause but the Discourse Act. Discourse Acts combine into larger discourse structures, such as Moves. These larger structures account for the units larger than the individual clause discussed above. On the other hand, Discourse Acts may be manifested in language as clauses, but also as fully grammatical clause fragments, phrases or words. The latter point is a crucial one: it requires the grammatical model to be capable of mapping the unit of Discourse Act onto morphosyntactic units of various kinds. This mapping procedure in turn requires a top-down approach. Moves and Discourse Acts are notoriously diﬃcult to deﬁne. Anticipating a more extensive discussion in Chapter 2, we here use the deﬁnitions oﬀered in Kroon (1995: 65–6; see also Hannay and Kroon 2005), who following Sinclair and Coulthard (1975) deﬁnes a Move as ‘the minimal free unit of discourse that is able to enter into an exchange structure’ and a Discourse Act as ‘the smallest identiﬁable unit of communicative behaviour’. Note that a Move consists of a single central Discourse Act, which may be supported by one or more Subsidiary Discourse Acts. 1.2.4 Levels of representation

The organization of Moves and Discourse Acts is dealt with at one level of the grammar, the Interpersonal Level. This is one of four levels of organization distinguished in FDG: two levels for formulation (the Interpersonal and Representational Levels, for pragmatic and semantic analysis respectively) and two for encoding (the Morphosyntactic and Phonological Levels). One of the reasons for having these four levels of linguistic organization is that anaphoric reference is possible to any of them. This means that these levels should be

basic properties

5

available as potential antecedents in underlying representations. Consider the following examples: Interpersonal Level (5) A Get out of here! B Don’t talk to me like that! Representational Level (6) A There are lots of traﬃc lights in this town. B I didn’t notice that. Morphosyntactic Level (7) A I had chuletas de cordero last night. B Is that how you say ‘lamb chops’ in Spanish? Phonological Level (8) A I had /tSu"letasdekor"dero/ last night. B Shouldn’t that be ‘/tSu"letasdeθor"dero /’? In (5B) the anaphoric element that refers back to the communicative strategy chosen by A, which is indicative of the presence of an Interpersonal Level in the underlying representation of (5A). In (6B) that refers back to the situation in the external world that is described within (6A). This purely semantic reference shows that the underlying structure of (6A) contains a Representational Level of organization. The anaphoric references in (7B) and (8B) are diﬀerent since they are metalinguistic in nature. They are instances of ‘reﬂexive language’ (Lucy 1993) or ‘messages about the code’ (Jakobson 1971). In (7B) that does not refer to the entity described by chuletas de cordero but to the phrase ‘chuletas de cordero’ as such. This phrase is a morphosyntactic unit, hence the conclusion must be that this phrase is present in underlying structure and can therefore function as an antecedent for anaphoric reference. A similar line of reasoning can be set up for the anaphoric reference in (8B), the only diﬀerence being that here the antecedent is a phonological rather than a morphosyntactic unit. From these facts it may be concluded that the underlying representation of an utterance contains four levels of organization: an Interpersonal Level (pragmatics), a Representational Level (semantics), a Morphosyntactic Level (morphosyntax), and a Phonological Level (phonology). Note that all these levels are purely linguistic in nature. This holds for the Interpersonal Level and the Representational Level too: these levels describe language in terms of its functions and meanings, but only in so far as these functions and meanings are encoded in the grammar of a language. Thus the Interpersonal Level

6

introduction

Formulation

Encoding

Contextual Component

Grammatical Component

Conceptual Component

Output Component

Figure 1. FDG as part of a wider theory of verbal interaction

represents a linguistic unit in terms of its communicative function, and the Representational Level in terms of its semantic category. 1.2.5 Conceptual Component, Contextual Component, and Output Component

FDG as the Grammatical Component in a wider theory of verbal interaction is linked to a Conceptual Component, an Output Component, and a Contextual Component within an overall model of verbal interaction. These non-grammatical components interact in various ways with the Grammatical Component. The Conceptual Component (1.2.5.1) is responsible for the development of both a communicative intention relevant for the current speech event and the associated conceptualizations with respect to relevant extra-linguistic events. The Output Component (1.2.5.2) generates acoustic, signed, or orthographic expressions on the basis of information provided by the Grammatical Component. The Contextual Component (1.2.5.3) contains a description of the content and form of preceding discourse and of the actual perceivable setting in which the speech event takes place and of the social relationships between Participants. The relationships among the Components are sketched in Figure 1. This general design of a wider theory of verbal interaction is again inspired by the extensive research into the processes of speech production embodied in Levelt (1989). His model distinguishes three fundamental modules: the Conceptualizer, the Formulator, and the Articulator. Very roughly, these correspond to our Conceptual Component, Grammatical Component, and Output

basic properties

7

Component respectively. The distinction within the Grammatical Component between formulating and encoding also owes much to Levelt’s own use of these terms, although for him encoding is an aspect of formulation (1989: 11–12). 1.2.5.1 The Conceptual Component

The Conceptual Component is the driving force behind the Grammatical Component as a whole. It is here that is represented the ideational and interactive material presupposed by each piece of discourse under analysis and the various communicative Moves and Discourse Acts that it contains. The Conceptual Component does not include every aspect of cognition that is potentially relevant for linguistic analysis, but only those that aﬀect the immediate communicative intention. Harder (2004: 202) gives various pertinent examples, for example that given in (9): (9) Speaker does his/her duty towards Addressee by conveying relevant bad news (‘John is ill’), mitigated by showing sympathy. This will be expressed in Spanish as (10), an example drawn from Hengeveld (2004a) and also discussed by Harder (2004): (10) Me tem-o que Juan está enfermo. 1.sg fear-1.sg.prs comp Juan cop.3.sg.prs.ind ill ‘I am afraid that Juan is ill.’ There are two vital linguistic facts about (10) that must be captured in the Grammatical Component. Firstly, there is the presence of the indicative mood in the embedded clause, as opposed to the subjunctive mood in (11), which expresses a quite diﬀerent communicative intention, namely the Speaker’s expression of his fear that Juan may be ill: (11) (Me) tem-o que Juan esté enfermo. 1.sg fear-1.sg.prs comp Juan cop.3.sg.prs.sbjv ill ‘I fear that Juan may be ill.’ Secondly, we note the obligatory status of the reﬂexive pronoun me in (10) as against its optionality in (11). Without entering here into the actual analysis (but see Hengeveld 2004a: 15), we may observe that the communicative intention behind (10) is represented rather informally in (9) in language and not in abstract conceptual structures, which we will not go into in this book. See, on the many rivalling proposals for conceptual representation, Pederson and Nuyts (1997) and, for the necessity of distinguishing between semantic (-pragmatic) and conceptual representations, Levinson (1997). Slobin (1996) stresses how thinking for speaking is language-speciﬁc and involves ‘picking those characteristics of objects and events that (i) ﬁt some

8

introduction

conceptualization of the event, and (ii) are readily encodable in the language’ (1996: 76). Examples he gives (1996: 72) of ‘picking characteristics’ are the witnessed/non-witnessed opposition in Turkish or the perfective/imperfective distinction in Spanish. For FDG, however, thinking for speaking is not part of the Conceptual Component. Rather, the selection of the language-speciﬁc distinctions of the type discussed by Slobin is a task of the Grammatical Component, speciﬁcally the operation of Formulation, which has the task of translating conceptual conﬁgurations into the semantic and pragmatic distinctions available within a speciﬁc language. In the informal representation of the language user’s intention shown in (9), the material in normal print corresponds to the pragmatic, interpersonal side of the interaction, while the material in bold print lines up with its semantic, representational side. This distinction corresponds well with Butler’s (2008b: 10) proposal that the Conceptual Component should distinguish a ‘conceptual component proper’ and an ‘aﬀective/interactional component’, an opposition which he tentatively links to neurophysiological notions and the chemistry of brain processes. In turn, this distinction correlates nicely with the two aspects of formulation to be distinguished within the Grammatical Component: the formulation of the Interpersonal Level and that of the Representational Level, dealt with in Chapters 2 and 3 respectively. 1.2.5.2 The Output Component

Let us now turn brieﬂy to the Output Component, which—again to adopt the language of dynamic implementation—converts the ﬁnal structures of the Grammatical Component into output. This output will in the case of speech (the kind of discourse that will primarily be considered in this book) be acoustic in nature and consist of articulatory gestures of the respiratory, laryngeal, and supralaryngeal structures of the human anatomy. With signed languages, which have been shown to have all the grammatical levels required for the description of spoken languages (including a phonological level, cf. Uyechi 1996), the output will consist of manual and other bodily gestures; and with written languages, the Output Component will oversee the motor control required for the production of orthographic expressions. Its function in speech may be seen as translating the digital (i.e. categorical, oppositionbased) information in the grammar into analogue (i.e. continuously variable) form: thus an utterance boundary in the grammar will yield inter alia a pause of so many milliseconds in the Output Component; or a syllable with a ‘falling’ operator will eﬀect a decline in the fundamental frequency of the corresponding segment of the output. The Output Component will accordingly also be the location for long-term settings, such as the tempo at which an individual’s speech, signing, or writing is carried out: allegro forms

basic properties

9

attributable to fast speech, or less accurate signing due to high tempo, or indeed ‘sloppier’ handwriting due to rapid use of the pen or keyboard are the kind of phenomenon to be treated here. The distinction between the analogue nature of the Output Component and the digital nature of the grammar gives us an opportunity to emphasize an important characteristic of FDG. The analysis of linguistic data does not always lead to clear-cut results. Criteria used to distinguish between word classes, for example, do not always give unequivocal classiﬁcations when applied to the forms found in a particular language; and the data drawn from corpus analysis will often show statistical (>0% and <100%) rather than categorical (0% or 100%) distributions. This has led a number of current grammatical approaches to promote the notion of gradience, the position that boundaries between categories are ﬂuid and that categorization should be based upon prototypes rather than on inviolable criteria (for discussion, cf. Aarts 2007); gradience would then be taken to apply within grammar. In particular, this notion of gradience has been extended to the distinction between lexical and grammatical phenomena. From a diachronic viewpoint, it is undeniable that grammatical phenomena derive overwhelmingly and unidirectionally from lexical units, an observation that has been developed and deepened in the substantial literature on grammaticalization. As a corollary of this process, individual phenomena may ﬁnd themselves somewhere on a scale between the initiation and the completion of a historical change and thus sharing properties of both the initial and ﬁnal stages thereof. From a synchronic viewpoint, however, FDG postulates a sharp distinction between the lexical and the grammatical, a distinction that is integral to the way in which items will be represented in our analyses (but see Anstey 2006: 61–70 for a critical examination of this standpoint). The lexical–grammatical distinction will return extensively in Chapters 2 and 3, where it correlates strongly with the opposition between modiﬁers and operators. 1.2.5.3 The Contextual Component

Functional Discourse Grammar is so called because it seeks to understand the structure of utterances in their discourse context, though it is in no sense a discourse-analytical model. The intention developed by the speaker does not arise in a vacuum, but in a multifaceted communicative context. For some FDG-related suggestions as to the many aspects of the sociocultural situatedness of verbal interaction, see Connolly (2004). With the last of the nongrammatical components to be introduced in this chapter, the Contextual Component, FDG as presented here makes no eﬀort to oﬀer anything like a complete description of the overall discourse context. Rather, this Component contains two types of information, both of them limited in scope. Firstly, it houses the immediate information received from the Grammatical

10

introduction

Component concerning a particular utterance which is relevant to the form that subsequent utterances may take. Secondly, it contains longer-term information about the ongoing interaction that is relevant to the distinctions that are required in the language being used, and which inﬂuence formulation and encoding in that language. The inﬂuence on formulation and encoding of both kinds of information, immediate and longer-term, is symbolized by the arrows from the Contextual Component to the Grammatical Component in Figure 1. Just as with the Conceptual Component, we will not go into the internal constitution of the Contextual Component in this book. As examples of long-term settings within the Contextual Component, we may consider the sex of the speech-act participants as well as the social relation between them. These are both relevant for Spanish, as shown in example (12): !

(12)

Qué pálid-a est-ás! what pale-f.sg cop-ind.prs.2.sg.fam ‘How pale you look!’

Here the choice of the forms pálida (rather than pálido ‘pale-m.sg’) and estás (rather than está ‘cop-ind.prs.2.sg.pol’) reﬂects speciﬁcations in the Contextual Component, i.e. the sex of the Addressee and the formality of the relation between Speaker and Addressee respectively. For an account of the grammatical properties of the corresponding utterance in English, as in the translation of (12), no such speciﬁcation is required. FDG adopts what Butler (2008a) refers to as a ‘conservative stance’ on the Contextual Component. Many of the matters that he himself includes in such a Component, like the factors that would induce selection of the informal lexeme kid rather than child in English to designate a child, would not ﬁnd their way into an FDG Contextual Component. There are so many aspects of the context of interaction that could be argued to have an incidental impact upon a speaker’s linguistic choices that modelling them within our theory would deprive it of much of its power. In an informal context, after all, a child may indeed be evoked by means of kid, but nothing prevents the choice of child. For this reason, factors relating to matters of genre, register, style, etc. will be included only where these can be shown to have a systematic eﬀect upon grammatical choices in formulation (as in example (12) above); on the diﬃculties inherent in any attempt to include such factors in grammatical description, see Falster Jakobsen (2005). Further examples of the type of phenomena which call upon the Contextual Component are reﬂexives, anaphora, and instances of narrative chaining, all of which we will deal with at the respective stage of the presentation. In languages with logophoric pronouns, for example, the Contextual Component will have to keep track of the status of (typically human) entities as belonging to a

basic properties

11

particular embedded discourse domain or not. In such languages a systematic formal opposition is made between the two readings of He said that he was ill, according as the second instance of he identiﬁes the creator of the embedded domain (i.e. the referent of the ﬁrst instance of he; this is indicated by the logophoric form) or some other male individual, indicated by the non-logophoric form (see 2.8.3.2.4 for discussion). Similarly, according as a language permits reﬂexive pronouns to apply across larger or smaller stretches of discourse, the Contextual Component will be adjusted to make particular possible antecedents available. Note that the short-term information in the Contextual Component must be continually kept up to date. Anaphoric chains depend upon the availability in the Contextual Component of valid antecedents. As the discourse progresses, so some of these cease to be available while others arise as potential antecedents. The Contextual Component will be responsive to the requirements of the particular language in this respect. This also applies to narrative chaining, where the positioning of a State-of-Aﬀairs within an Episode must be speciﬁed with regard to previous or later States-of-Aﬀairs. Where the anaphora or narrative chaining works forwards in time (cataphora), the Contextual Component will create an empty position constraining the formulator to supply the awaited information. As seen in Figure 1, the input to the Contextual Component does not only come from the result of formulation but also from the result of encoding, in other words the Morphosyntactic and Phonological Levels within the Grammatical Component. This is because, as we saw in 1.2.4, anaphoric reference is possible not only to pragmatic and semantic constructs but also to sections of the actual morphosyntactic structure of clauses and phonological structure of utterances. In the following chapters, we will detail various ways in which there is interaction between the Contextual Component and the various Levels of the Grammatical Component. In 1.2.5 we classiﬁed the Conceptual, Output, and Contextual Components as non-grammatical. Our discussion of the three non-grammatical Components has shown, however, that they are certainly not non-linguistic. Indeed, all three will diﬀer from language to language, according to the impact that each has on linguistic form. The decision whether to include a particular phenomenon in the grammar or in one of the ﬂanking Components will be taken language-speciﬁcally and will be determined by considerations of systematicity. If, for example, every single utterance in a language ends in a lengthened syllable, this should be shown as a systematic aspect of the grammar; if there is a statistical tendency to utterance-ﬁnal syllable-lengthening, this is something to put into the Output Component. If a language expresses all commands as a question about ability (Can you open the window? etc.),

12

introduction

then this is a grammatical fact about that language. If the Speaker may express commands either directly by means of an Imperative Illocution or indirectly as a question about ability, the circumstances determining that choice are a matter for the Conceptual Component while the alternative formulations are a matter for the grammar. We have now seen in general terms how FDG operates as a top-down grammar of the Discourse Act, recognizes four Levels of description and interacts with Conceptual, Output, and Contextual Components. In the following section, we will consider the architecture of FDG in greater depth.

1.3 The architecture of FDG 1.3.1 Overall organization

The general architecture of FDG and the Components that ﬂank the Grammatical Component may now be represented as in Figure 2, in which the Grammatical Component is presented in the centre, the Conceptual Component at the top, the Output Component at the bottom, and the Contextual Component to the right. Note that this ﬁgure ﬂeshes out Figure 1. Within the various Components, circles contain operations, boxes contain the primitives used in operations, and rectangles contain the levels of representation produced by operations. In line with the top-down organization of FDG, we start our discussion of Figure 2 at the top. As mentioned in 1.2.5.1, in the prelinguistic Conceptual Component a communicative intention (e.g. issuing a warning) and the corresponding mental representations (e.g. of the event causing danger) are relevant. Through the operation of Formulation these conceptual representations are translated into pragmatic and semantic representations at the Interpersonal and the Representational Levels, respectively. The rules used in Formulation are language-speciﬁc, i.e. FDG does not presuppose the existence of universal pragmatic and semantic notions. As a result, similar conceptual representations may receive diﬀerent pragmatic and semantic representations in diﬀerent languages. To give just one example: warnings are in some languages encoded as a distinct type of speech act, whereas in others they receive the same treatment as orders. This type of crosslinguistic variation may be expected to be governed by typological hierarchies, just like morphosyntactic and phonological variation. Formulation rules make use of a set of primitives that contains frames, lexemes, and operators (see 1.3.3.2). The conﬁgurations at the Interpersonal and the Representational Levels are translated into a morphosyntactic structure at the Morphosyntactic Level through the operation of Morphosyntactic Encoding. The Morphosyntactic Encoding rules draw on a set of primitives

the architecture of fdg

13

Conceptual Component

Formulation

Frames Lexemes

Templates Grammatical

Interpersonal Level

Representational Level

Morphosyntactic Encoding

morphemes Morphosyntactic Operators

Morphosyntactic Level

Templates

Phonological Encoding

Suppletive forms Phonological Operators

Contextual Component

Grammatical Component

Interpersonal and Representational Operators

Phonological Level

Articulation

Output Component

Output

Figure 2. General layout of FDG

containing Morphosyntactic Templates, Grammatical Morphemes, and Morphosyntactic Operators (see 1.3.3.3). Similarly, the structures at the Interpersonal, Representational, and Morphosyntactic Levels are translated into a phonological structure at the Phonological Level. The phonological encoding rules draw on a set of primitives containing Phonological Templates, Suppletive forms, and Phonological Operators (see 1.3.3.4). By organizing the Grammatical Component in this way, FDG takes the functional approach to language to its logical extreme: within the top-down organization of the grammar, pragmatics governs semantics, pragmatics and semantics govern morphosyntax, and pragmatics, semantics, and morphosyntax govern phonology.

14

introduction

The Phonological Level of representation is the input to the operation of Articulation, which, in the case of an acoustic (as opposed to written or signed) Output Component, contains the phonetic rules necessary for arriving at an adequate utterance. Articulation takes place outside the grammar proper. The various levels of representation within the grammar feed into the Contextual Component, thus enabling subsequent reference to the various kinds of entity relevant at each of these levels once they are introduced into the discourse. The Contextual Component feeds into the operations of formulation and encoding, so that the availability of antecedents, visible referents, and speech-act participants (and possibly bystanders; cf. Rijkhoﬀ 1995) may inﬂuence the composition of (subsequent) Discourse Acts. Note that the representation of these feeding relations in Figure 2 is a simpliﬁcation when looked at from the perspective of the language user. In order to create a contextual speciﬁcation, the Addressee has to reconstruct all the levels of representation within the grammar on the basis of the actual output of that grammar, i.e. the phonetic utterance. Since in this book we restrict ourselves to the perspective of language production and concentrate on the Grammatical Component, we abstract away from this complication by provisionally assuming direct feeding relationships between the Grammatical Component and the Contextual Component. 1.3.2 Levels and Layers 1.3.2.1 Introduction

Each of the levels of representation distinguished within the Grammatical Component in Figure 2 is structured in its own way. What all the levels have in common is that they have a hierarchically ordered layered organization and are displayed as a layered structure. In its maximal form the general structure of layers within levels is as follows: (13) (π v1 : [head (v1 ) ]: [σ (v1 ) ]) Here v1 represents the variable of the relevant layer, which is restricted by a (possibly complex) head that takes the variable as its argument, and may be further restricted by a modiﬁer σ that takes the variable as its argument. The layer may be speciﬁed by an operator π and carry a function . Heads and modiﬁers represent lexical strategies, while operators and functions represent grammatical strategies. The diﬀerence between operators and functions is that the latter are relational, holding between the entire unit and other units at the same layer, while the former are not, applying only to the unit itself. Of course, not all relations between units are hierarchical. In those cases in which units together form a non-hierarchical (equipollent) conﬁguration,

the architecture of fdg

15

(M1 : [(A1 : [(F1 ) (P1 )S (P2 )A (C1 : [(T1 ){} . . . (T1+N ){} (R1 ){} . . . (R1+N ){} ] (C1 ){} )] (A1 ) . . . (A1+N ){} ] (M1 ))

Figure 3. The Interpersonal Level

they are enclosed between square brackets, as exempliﬁed in (13), where the relationship between a head and its argument and a modiﬁer and its argument is indicated by square brackets. The levels diﬀer in the sense that at each level a linguistic expression is analysed in terms of the distinctions relevant to that level. It should be stressed again that the representations at all levels are purely linguistic in nature, so that only those distinctions are provided that are actually reﬂected in the grammar of the language involved. 1.3.2.2 The Interpersonal Level

At the Interpersonal Level the hierarchical structure given in Figure 3 applies. As indicated in 1.2.3, we recognize as a unit of analysis at the Interpersonal Level the Move (M), which may contain one or more (N) Discourse Acts (A). Each Discourse Act contains an Illocution (F), which speciﬁes a relation between speech-act Participants (P, the Speaker S, and the Addressee A) and (except in the case of Expressives, 2.5.2.4.2) the Communicated Content (C). The Communicated Content contains a varying number of Ascriptive (T) and Referential (R) Subacts. Note that the latter two units are operative at the same layer, i.e. there is no hierarchical relation between them; in such cases of equipollence, square brackets are applied. In general, then, at the Interpersonal Level units are analysed in terms of their communicative function. 1.3.2.3 The Representational Level

At the Representational Level the relevant layers are those presented in Figure 4. At this level of analysis linguistic units are described in terms of the semantic category they designate (see Hengeveld 1989, 2004a; Mackenzie 2004c). These categories are of diﬀerent types, such as Propositional Contents (p), which may contain one or more (n) episodes (ep) (see Gómez Soliño 1995), which may contain one or more descriptions of States-of-Aﬀairs (e); the latter, in turn, are characterized by one or more Properties (f1 ), which may contain descriptions of Individuals (x1 ) and further Properties (f2 ). Further classes of semantic category are presented in Chapter 3. Note that, as is indicated by the (p1 : [(ep1 : [(e1 : [(f1 : [(f2 )n (x1 ) . . . (x1+n ) ] (f1 )) . . . (f1+n ) (e1 ) ]) . . . (e1+n ){} ] (ep1 )) . . . (ep1+n ){} ] (p1 ))

Figure 4. The Representational Level

16

introduction

square brackets, the Individuals and further Properties in Figure 4 belong to the same layer, i.e. there is no hierarchical relation between them. The nature of a semantic category is not indicative of the way the linguistic unit describing that category is used within a Discourse Act. Semantic categories, as the name indicates, are categories, not functions. The functional analysis is given at the Interpersonal Level. Thus, the same Property (f) may be either ascribed (T) or referred to (R). The following examples illustrate this point (note that the formal diﬀerence between tall and tallness is accounted for at the Morphosyntactic Level as arising from coercion, cf. 4.6.1): (14)

a. The teacher is tall. (Ascription of Property: T/f) b. Tallness impresses the teacher. (Reference to Property: R/f)

Similarly, an Individual may be ascribed or referred to: (15)

a. Sheila is my best friend. (Ascription of Individual entity: T/x) b. My best friend visited me last night. (Reference to Individual: R/x)

A more elaborate representation of (14a–b) is given in (16a–b): (16)

a. (CI : [(TI ) (pi : (epi : (ei : [(fi : [(fj : tall (fi )) (RI ) ] (CI )) (xi : teacher (xi )) ] (fi )) (ei ) ]) (epi )) (pi )) [(TI ) (RI ) b. (CI : (pi : (epi : (ei : [(fi : [(fj : impress (fj )) (fk : tallness (fk )) (RI ) ] (CI )) (xi : teacherN (xi )) ] (fi )) (ei ) ]) (epi ) (pi ))

Examples like these show that, though there are regular correspondences between the Interpersonal Level and the Representational Level, the two are basically independent of each other, allowing for a wide variety of interactions between them. 1.3.2.4 The Morphosyntactic Level

Figure 5 shows the general maximal template for morphosyntactic frames at the layer of the linguistic expression, where each unit may occur more than once. At this level a linguistic unit is analysed in terms of its syntactic constituents, with, from the highest to the lowest layers: Linguistic Expressions (Le), Clauses

the architecture of fdg

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(Le1 : [(Xw1 ) (Xp1 ) (Cl1 : [(Xw2 ) (Xp2 : [(Xw3 ) (Xp3 ) (Cl3 )] (Xp2 )){} (Cl2 ){} ] (Cl1 ))] (Le1 ))

Figure 5. The Morphosyntactic Level

(Cl), Phrases of several types (Xp), and Words of several types (Xw). Within Words we furthermore distinguish Morphemes of several types (Xm), not shown in Figure 5. As is to be explained in 1.4.4, the notion ‘sentence’ is not applied in FDG. There is no necessary one-to-one mapping between semantic and pragmatic units on the one hand and morphosyntactic units on the other. As argued earlier, Discourse Acts may be expressed as Clauses, Phrases, or Words. To give another example: semantic predications consisting of a unit designating a Property and two units designating Individuals may be realized in one language as a Clause with three constituents and in others as a single Word. Consider the following examples, from English and Southern Tiwa (Allen et al. 1984: 293; the gloss 1.sg.sbj>pl.obj in (18) should be read as ‘ﬁrst person singular subject acting on plural object’). (17)

I made shirts.

(18) Te-shut-pe-ban 1.sg.sbj>pl.obj-shirt-make-pst ‘I made (the) shirts.’ The English Clause in (17) can be subdivided into three syntactic constituents corresponding to the three semantic units mentioned earlier: a unit designating a Property (made) and two units designating Individuals (I, shirts). The same semantic conﬁguration is expressed in Southern Tiwa as a single syntactic constituent, as shown in (18). The Actor argument is expressed by means of a preﬁx on the Verb and does not have to be expressed independently. The Undergoer argument is incorporated into the Verb. The fact that the Undergoer is cross-referenced on the verb shows that it is really an argument of that Verb. Assuming a similar underlying semantic representation for (17)– (18), these examples thus clearly demonstrate that there are many possible mappings between the Representational and the Morphosyntactic Levels. 1.3.2.5 The Phonological Level

The Phonological Level is equally language-speciﬁc, and contains both the segmental and the suprasegmental phonological representation of an Utterance, which is the largest phonological unit considered in FDG. Figure 6 shows the phonological template for an Utterance, with a number of simpliﬁcations for purposes of exposition. Again, every unit may occur more than once.

18

introduction (u1 : [(ip1 : [(pp1 : [(pw1 )] (pp1 ))] (ip1 ))] (u1 ))

Figure 6. The Phonological Level

At this level the linguistic expression is analysed in terms of the phonological units it contains, such as the Utterance (u), the Intonational Phrase (ip), the Phonological Phrase (pp), and the Phonological Word (pw). Again, there is no necessary one-to-one mapping between pragmatic, semantic, and morphosyntactic units on the one hand, and phonological units on the other. Thus, in some languages subordinate clauses are set oﬀ from the main clause by means of a break between two Intonational Phrases, whereas in others they form a single Intonational Phrase with the main clause. To give another and perhaps more pervasive example: Phonological Words at the Phonological Level are not necessarily in a one-to-one relationship with constituent boundaries at the Morphosyntactic Level, as can be illustrated with the following example from Dutch, as pronounced in certain varieties in the Netherlands: (19) Ik wou dat hij kwam. I want.pst comp he come.pst ‘I wish he would come.’ An alignment of the morphosyntactic analysis with the phonological analysis would be as follows (the symbol ‘–’ is used to indicate the beginning and the end of a fragment that is not further analysed in detail, see 1.5 below): (20) (Cli : [ (Npi : –ik– (Npi )) (Vpi : –wou– (Vpi )) (ui : [ipi : [ (ppi : (pwi : –kVAu– (pwi )) (ppi )) (Clj : [ (Gwi : –dat– (Gwi )) (Npj : –hij– (Npj )) (ppj : [ (pwj : –dAti– (pwj )) (Cli )) (Vpj : –kwam– (Vpj )) ] (Clj ))] (pwk : –kVAm– (pwk )) ] (ppj )) ] (ipi ))] (ui )) This example shows that the ﬁrst Phonological Phrase (ppi ) corresponds to the ﬁrst two syntactic constituents of the main clause, while the second corresponds to the embedded clause. Within the second Phonological Phrase there are two Phonological Words (pwj ) and (pwk ), one corresponding to the ﬁrst two syntactic constituents of the embedded clause, the second corresponding to the single remaining syntactic constituent.

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1.3.3 Primitives 1.3.3.1 Introduction

The various operations creating the levels just discussed make use of sets of primitives which serve as the building blocks for their respective levels of application. The rules that constitute the operations within the grammar (formulating and encoding) combine these primitives in order to produce the various levels of representation.

1.3.3.2 Primitives used in Formulation

The operation of formulation has to produce two diﬀerent levels of representation: the Interpersonal Level and the Representational Level. For each of these levels, similar (although distinct) primitives are relevant. These will be presented in brief here: full detail will be given in Chapters 2 and 3. First of all, the set of primitives contains Frames which deﬁne the possible combinations of elements at the Interpersonal Level and at the Representational Level for a certain language. Despite their language-speciﬁc nature, the inventory of frames is expected to be partly predictable in terms of crosslinguistically valid typological hierarchies. Relevant distinctions captured by frames at the Interpersonal Level include, for example, the expressive or communicative nature of Discourse Acts, the encoded conﬁgurations of information structure, and the rhetorical functions of Discourse Acts. At the Representational Level frames capture such matters as quantitative and qualitative valency, the combinations of semantic categories allowed, and possible modiﬁcation structures. Secondly, this set of primitives contains Lexemes; these are given in phonemic form, although for ease of exposition we shall generally simply use orthographic form. Within the set of Lexemes a distinction is made between those that function at the Interpersonal Level (e.g. interjections, proper names, illocutionary adverbs, performative expressions, etc.) and those that function at the Representational Level. Lexemes are independent units that have to be associated with the aforementioned frames (see García Velasco and Hengeveld 2002 for discussion of this issue). In the implementation of the grammar the frames are selected ﬁrst, and only after that are lexemes inserted. This reﬂects the choice the Speaker often has in describing one and the same entity through a variety of lexemes with diﬀerent connotations and/or denotations. It also provides a natural framework for understanding the phenomenon of coercion, through which lexemes that are strongly associated with a particular frame can be forced for expressive purposes into a frame that is usually coupled with lexemes of another meaning class.

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Thirdly, this set of primitives contains interpersonal and representational operators, which represent grammatical expressions in terms of their pragmatic or semantic content respectively. The classiﬁcation of these operators will be addressed extensively in Chapters 2 and 3. Here we just give a number of examples. At the Interpersonal Level, mitigation is an operator at the illocutionary layer, reportative is an operator at the layer of the Communicated Content, approximation (‘sort-of ’) is an operator at the layer of the Ascriptive Subact, and identiﬁability operates at the layer of the Referential Subact. At the Representational Level, examples are subjective modality at the layer of the Propositional Content, tense at the layer of the State-of-Aﬀairs, number at the layer of the Individual, and phasal aspect at the Property layer. 1.3.3.3 Primitives used in Morphosyntactic Encoding

The Morphosyntactic Level is organized on the basis of morphosyntactic templates for Linguistic Expressions, Clauses, Phrases, and Words which are stored as part of the set of primitives relevant for the operation of Morphosyntactic Encoding. The inventory of templates has to be speciﬁed for each language individually, although again the expectation is that crosslinguistically valid generalizations will make this inventory largely predictable on the basis of a limited number of parameters. The second set of primitives relevant at the Morphosyntactic Level consists of grammatical morphemes, which are unmodiﬁable elements such as Auxiliaries, Particles, and Aﬃxes. These grammatical morphemes have to be introduced at the Morphosyntactic Level, since they occupy slots in the morphosyntactic conﬁguration, which is determined at this level. To give an example at the clause layer: in Dutch the main verb normally occurs in second position in a Clause, but when an auxiliary verb is present, this Auxiliary occupies the second position and the main verb occurs in ﬁnal position, as illustrated in (21) and (22): (21) Karel won de wedstrijd. Karel win.pst.sg def game ‘Karel won the game.’ (22) Karel heeft de wedstrijd gewonnen. Karel have.prs.3.sg def game win.ptcp ‘Karel has won the game.’ Examples like these clearly show that it is impossible to determine the order of constituents without taking grammatical morphemes into account. Similar examples can be given at the Phrase and the Word layers.

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Often, various semantic distinctions map onto a single grammatical morpheme. For instance, the accusative case in a certain language may be triggered by the semantic function Undergoer, but also by various types of Modiﬁer, or it may be lexically triggered by certain verbs or adpositions. The other way around, a single semantic category may map onto various morphosyntactic categories, as when the form of the accusative expressing the Undergoer argument is dependent on the noun class of the head of that Undergoer argument. Grammatical morphemes are introduced in their phonemic form when they are regular and predictable. They are introduced by means of a Morphosyntactic Operator, the third set of primitives at the Morphosyntactic Level, in those cases in which their ﬁnal form is not fully predictable and has to be selected from a suppletive paradigm. Morphosyntactic Operators can thus be considered to be placeholders for actual forms or sets of forms. In assigning names to Morphosyntactic Operators we will generally use labels similar to the ones used in glosses, so as to enhance readability. It is important to realize, however, that these names could just as well be represented by numerical codes, like 581, since they trigger forms, and at this level no longer represent meanings. 1.3.3.4 Primitives used in Phonological Encoding

The Phonological Level is organized on the basis of phonological templates for Utterances, Intonational Phrases, Phonological Phrases, Phonological Words, Feet, and Syllables, which are stored as part of the set of primitives relevant for the operation of Phonological Encoding. The inventory of templates has to be speciﬁed for each language individually, and certain languages may lack entire layers altogether (for example, Vietnamese has been claimed to lack the layer Phonological Word, cf. 5.6), although again the expectation is that crosslinguistically valid generalizations will make this inventory largely predictable on the basis of a limited number of parameters. The second set of primitives consists of the suppletive forms that correspond to the Morphosyntactic Operators introduced in the previous section and to unpredictable forms from the paradigms of lexemes. Suppletive forms are introduced at the Phonological Level, since in many languages the form of a morpheme may be aﬀected by the morphosyntactic conﬁguration in which it occurs. Bakker (2005: 3) cites the following example of this phenomenon from Yagua (Payne 1990: 30): (23) a. Sa-juuy Anita. 3.sg.sbj-fall Anita ‘Anita fell.’

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introduction b. Anita ∅-juuy. Anita 3.sg.sbj-fall ‘Anita fell.’

In Yagua, the subject-agreement preﬁx on the verb is sa- when the Subject term occurs in postverbal position (23a), but it is ∅- when the Subject occurs in preverbal position (23b). This means that in this language the form of the third singular subject marker 3.sg.sbj can only be determined after the constituent order of the Clause is established. A third set of primitives potentially relevant at the Phonological Level consists of Phonological Operators. These anticipate aspects of the articulatory, signed, or orthographic output that are not a direct reﬂection of an Interpersonal, Representational, or Morphosyntactic Operator. A good example of a phenomenon for which such Phonological Operators are necessary is intonation. The Phonological Level will distinguish such operators as r(ising) and f(alling) or h(igh) and l(ow), typically applying these to the syllable layer. Depending on the language type, some or all syllables will be marked by such an operator; in tone languages, each syllable will be in principle be marked with an operator (5.7). The ‘digital’ information given by these Phonological Operators provides instructions to the Output Component which then will perform phonologically insigniﬁcant but phonetically necessary operations to ensure a smooth ‘analogue’ intonation contour. 1.3.3.5 Generalizations

There are certain correspondences across the three sets of primitives. Within each set there is a subset of units with a structuring function: the frames used in Formulation and the Templates in Morphosyntactic and Phonological Encoding all serve the purpose of providing an overall organizing structure for their respective levels. Within each set of primitives there is furthermore a subset of units in phonemic form: the Lexemes used in Formulation, the Grammatical Morphemes used in Morphosyntactic Encoding, and the Suppletive Forms used in Phonological Encoding all contribute to the cumulative segmental speciﬁcation of the underlying representations. Finally, within each set of primitives there is a subset of operators: Interpersonal and Representational Operators are relevant to the operation of Formulation, Morphosyntactic and Phonological Operators to the operation of Encoding. 1.3.4 Levels and primitives

For a simple illustration of how a single constituent gets diﬀerent representations at each level, using diﬀerent sets of primitives, consider the example in

the architecture of fdg

23

(24). The constituent these bananas is represented in four diﬀerent ways within FDG, as provisionally indicated in (25). (24)

(I like) these bananas.

(25)

a. b. c. d.

IL RL ML PL

(+id RI ) (prox m xi : [(fi : /b@"nA:n@/N (fi )) (xi ) ]) (Npi : [(Gwi : this-pl(Gwi )) (Nwi : /b@"nA:n@/-pl (Nwi ))] (Npi )) (ppi : [(pwi : /ði:z/ (pwi )) (pwj : /b@"nA:n@z/ (pwj ))] (ppi ))

At the Interpersonal Level (IL, 25a), the constituent is characterized as having a referential function (R). The referent is furthermore assumed by the Speaker to be identiﬁable (+id) by the Addressee. At the Representational Level (RL, 25b) the constituent is characterized as designating more than one (m) Individual (x) with a Property (f) and in terms of the location of its referent (prox). The Property (f) is speciﬁed by the Nominal (N) Lexeme /b@"nA:n@/. At the Morphosyntactic Level (25c) the constituent is characterized as being a Noun Phrase (Np), which consists of a Grammatical Word (Gw) and a Nominal Word (Nw). At this level a Morphosyntactic Operator is introduced, for convenience here shown as ‘this’, which acts as a placeholder in the appropriate syntactic position. The Representational Operator m is converted into the Morphosyntactic Operator Pl(ural), which occurs twice, since it has to be expressed on each of the two Words making up the Noun Phrase. At the Phonological Level (25d) the appropriate plural forms of the Words are introduced, in the case of the noun by adding the appropriate form of the plural suﬃx, in the case of the determiner by selecting the appropriate suppletive form corresponding to the combination of Morphosyntactic Operators. The Phonological Level in this case consists of one Phonological Phrase (pp) containing two Phonological Words (pw). 1.3.5 Implementation 1.3.5.1 Introduction

The various levels of organization are related to each other through rules of Formulation and Encoding, in a dynamic implementation of the grammar (cf. Bakker 2001, 2005). Two principles are crucial in this implementation, and these are discussed in the following sections. 1.3.5.2 Depth ﬁrst

The depth-ﬁrst principle was proposed in Bakker (1999) in the context of FG and is adopted in FDG, but with a somewhat diﬀerent interpretation. In deﬁning its role within the grammar, recall that a basic assumption in FDG is that a grammatical model will be more eﬃcient the more it resembles

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language production in the individual. There is a consensus in the psycholinguistic literature that language production is incremental, in the sense that prelinguistic conceptualizations arise gradually through time (in microseconds, it should be said) and that material is sent ahead for encoding before the entire communicative intention has been fully developed (Levelt 1989: 24–7; see also Mackenzie 2000, 2004b and Harder 2007). In accordance with this, information from a certain level is sent down to a lower level as soon as the necessary input information for that lower level is complete. The grammar would slow down considerably if ﬁrst the Interpersonal Level had to be fully speciﬁed, and second the Representational Level had to be ﬁlled in completely, so that only then could the morphosyntactic conﬁguration be determined, which after that would be mapped onto a phonological conﬁguration. This is not how language production in the individual works, and it would therefore, given the basic assumption mentioned above, not lead to a very eﬃcient model of grammar either. (Fortescue 2004: 169 warns of the dangers of ‘hybrid models’, oriented partly to pattern and partly to process: our model is a pattern model that is inspired by process without seeking to model the latter.) As an example, consider the eﬀect of specifying an illocutionary value at the Interpersonal Level (cf. Risselada 1993: 78–86). As soon as an Imperative (IMP) frame has been selected for the Discourse Act, there are potentially important consequences at all subsequent levels of representation: (i) at the Representational Level, the State-of-Aﬀairs frame will have to designate a controlled State-of-Aﬀairs, and the ﬁrst argument will have to include the Addressee; (ii) at the Morphosyntactic Level, in some languages a speciﬁc constituent order is used, or there may be special imperative auxiliaries or morphological markers; (iii) at the Phonological Level, there may be speciﬁc prosodic patterns that are used with Imperatives (cf. 5.4). All this means that the selection of an Imperative frame at the Interpersonal Level may trigger a whole range of speciﬁcations at subsequent levels, both in terms of formulation and of encoding, irrespective of the speciﬁcation of further elements at the Interpersonal and lower levels. Note, however, that evidence is also available that there is also a role in language production for processes which involve looking ahead to a unit-ﬁnal element: cf. Hannay and Martínez-Caro (2008) for the notion of working up to a clause-ﬁnal position in syntax, Fortescue (2007: 340–1) for morphological processes that involve ‘backtracking’ from a word-ﬁnal position, and again Levelt (1989: 401–5) for look-ahead in phonology. In our modelling of morphosyntax, too, based as it is on observations about the patterning of linguistic units, we will see that counting forwards from an initial position and backwards from a ﬁnal position are both called for. In all these

fdg in its broader context

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ways, and others, we may observe a general analogy between production processes and the sequence of steps involved in a pass through the model of FDG. 1.3.5.3 Maximal depth

The principle of maximal depth states that only those levels of representation that are relevant for the build-up of (a certain aspect of) an utterance are used in the production of that (aspect of the) utterance. This principle, too, is meant to speed up the implementation of the grammar. It avoids the vacuous speciﬁcation of levels of representation that are irrelevant to the production of the utterance at hand. Following up on the example in the previous section, this means that in a certain language there may be a direct connection, circumventing the Representational Level, between the Interpersonal Level and the Morphosyntactic Level in those cases in which the Imperative frame has to be mapped onto a speciﬁc clausal template. Similarly, there may be a direct connection, circumventing the Representational Level and the Morphosyntactic Level, between the Interpersonal and Phonological Levels when the Imperative frame is mapped onto a speciﬁc prosodic pattern. In this way, superﬂuous steps in passing on information within the top-down procedure are avoided. Looking at this from a bottom-up perspective, it means that the expression of underlying structures is potentially based on information from all higher levels, not just from the next one up. Having seen something of the architecture of FDG and of its implementation in the analysis of various phenomena, let us now place it in its broader context.

1.4 FDG in its broader context 1.4.1 Introduction

Functional Discourse Grammar is so called because it adheres to the principles of linguistic functionalism and takes the Discourse Act as its basic unit of analysis. As we have seen, it is a grammatical model that constitutes one component of an overall theory of verbal interaction and aims to be equally valid for all types of language. As a result the notions of functionalism, language typology, language modelling, and Discourse Act all play a central role in FDG. Accordingly, Section 1.4.2 will deal with functionalism, contrasting it with formalism and indicating how FDG is to be located with respect to these two major schools of linguistic thought and to two closely related theories. Section 1.4.3 will turn to linguistic typology, and consider both the inﬂuence of typology upon the theory of FDG and the role it could play in

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typological work. Section 1.4.4, ﬁnally, will present FDG as a form-oriented function-to-form model, showing how it relates to psycholinguistic work on speech production and giving some indications on how a practising linguist can work with FDG. In all three sections, the Discourse Act will play a central role. 1.4.2 Functionalism

FDG occupies a position halfway between radically functional and radically formal approaches to grammatical analysis. Functionalism refers here to an approach to linguistic analysis that is based on the belief that the properties of linguistic utterances are adapted to those communicative aims which the language user, in interaction with other language users, seeks to achieve by using those utterances (Dik 1986). Radical functionalism is an extreme form of this standpoint, denying the cognitive reality of linguistic structure and seeing linguistic form as an ephemeral manifestation of the language user’s attempt to achieve his/her communicative purposes. Radical functionalists tend to support a usage-based linguistics, one which typically involves the detailed examination of corpus data and the extraction of inductive generalizations which typically pertain only to the language under examination. Patterns discerned in these data are seen as emergent rather than as reﬂecting any kind of structure. A major statement of this position is Hopper (1987: 142), who takes a view of structure as ‘always provisional, always negotiable, and in fact as epiphenomenal’. Formalism, by contrast, is strongly committed to the existence of mental structure, the foundations of which are typically regarded as innate. The deeper properties of linguistic phenomena cannot from this perspective be understood directly from data. Rather, the utterances in an actual text or transcript of speech reﬂect (quite imperfectly, it is generally believed) an underlying system that is governed by rules that predict the form taken by idealized linguistic units. Radical formalism is in our terms an extreme manifestation of this standpoint, one that limits linguistic study to the investigation of this covert system, totally independent of the uses to which it is put. For a critique of both radical positions and a plea for the recognition of both ﬂexibility (i.e. variability) and rigidity (i.e. the requirement for rules) in the make-up of language, see Givón (2002: ch. 2). The position taken by FDG lies between these extremes. FDG, like formalist models, seeks to describe the knowledge that underlies a language user’s potential to communicate in his/her language in an explicit and highly formalized way. The language user is seen as having knowledge both of units (e.g. lexemes, auxiliaries, syntactic constituents, phonemes) and of the ways in which these units may be combined (into Discourse Acts, Propositions,

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Clauses, and Intonational Phrases). This knowledge displays a large degree of stability, such that it can be compared across languages, revealing universal trends in linguistic structure, as studied in language typology. However, FDG takes the position that this knowledge of units and their combination is instrumental in interpersonal communication and has arisen as a result of historical processes: forms that have served Speakers well through the ages have sedimented into the repertory now available to language users and are well-adapted to their purposes. The forms that are at language users’ disposal are variable across languages, but do not vary without limits. Rather, the limits on variation are set by the range of communicative purposes displayed by all language users and by the cognitive constraints they are subject to. FDG thus oﬀers not only an inventory of forms but also seeks to clarify how these are combined in verbal interaction. The two sides of the dualist position taken by FDG, i.e. its orientation to both form and function, may perhaps be compared to diﬀerent ways of analysing the bicycle (here disregarding the fact that, while a bicycle is an artefact purposefully invented to satisfy certain needs, language has evolved naturally). One aspect of an FDG-style analysis of a bicycle would be to give a complete and descriptively adequate account of this phenomenon, i.e. one that accurately covers all necessary properties for an object to count as a bicycle: a frame with certain geometrical and engineering properties, a handlebar, pedals, a chain, etc., and of course two wheels (with their various characteristics). The account would make a distinction between allowable variation (for instance in the overall size of the bicycle or in the relative size of the wheels) and impermissible variation (without pedals and chain, the object is a child’s scooter rather than a bicycle; with fewer or more than two wheels it is not a well-formed bicycle, but a monocycle or tricycle, for example). A description of other non-criterial properties of a bicycle, such as a bell or lights, would be added for completeness. These, then, would be elements of the formalist side of the FDG account. What is missing from this description is any indication of how the bicycle is used for human purposes (transportation, diversion, competition, etc.). In principle, such a function-free description is possible, but is less enlightening: it oﬀers no answer to the question why bicycles have been designed to have two wheels, just as the formalist account oﬀers no answer to the question why languages have evolved to have the properties that they do have. What is more, it fails to show how the variation in the weight and structure of bicycles depends upon the uses to which they are put: a bicycle designed to carry shopping will not be suitable for racing and vice versa. Similarly, the formalist account does not clarify how linguistic structures co-vary with the purposes to which they are put in communication.

28

introduction

The both-function-and-form approach (such as FDG adopts within linguistics) oﬀers an understanding of why the unmarked form of the cycle is the bicycle. The monocycle oﬀers the advantages of small size and light weight and of consequently being extremely manoeuvrable in traﬃc; on the other hand, it is relatively dysfunctional in being highly unstable (for the untrained user), in being largely limited to even surfaces and in not oﬀering the possibility of transporting goods. The tricycle is highly stable, can be used in a range of environments and for the transportation of goods; however, it is relatively heavy, obstructive, and diﬃcult to manoeuvre. In this light, the bicycle emerges as a perfect compromise, being of moderate weight, fairly stable (in use), appropriate for ﬂat and inclined surfaces, and oﬀering reasonable facilities for transportation. This example typiﬁes the FDG approach to linguistic forms. FDG recognizes that the forms taken by utterances are variable but that the variation is limited by the (communicative rather than transportational!) needs of users. Let us give a couple of linguistic examples that will be developed in later chapters. There is a strong tendency for the principal units of verbal interaction (Discourse Acts) to contain one element with the pragmatic function Focus (for details, see 2.7.2.2). Only under rather special circumstances will it contain more than one Focus (as in such multiple wh-questions as Who gave what to whom?). In a sense it might indeed seem more eﬃcient to cram many Foci into one Discourse Act, and some languages, such as English, do not forbid this from happening, although others do. Why there should be a preference for one-Focus Discourse Acts is something to be explained in terms of human communicative practices. Similarly, the units describing States-of-Aﬀairs will across languages tend to contain one or two essential participants (arguments) (for details, cf. Chapter 3); certain languages also permit predications with three or more arguments, and certain languages permit predications without any arguments. Again, the question arises why this should be (as with the two wheels of the bicycle). Whereas a formalist description conﬁnes itself to a mere observation of this regularity, the approach taken by FDG calls for an explanation in terms of human cognition and communication. FDG shares with the formalist approach, but not with certain more radical functionalist approaches, that it is concerned with the criterial properties of the language under description. Just as the laws of a country may require that a bicycle be provided with a bell and lights, so social conventions may require linguistic utterances to display certain properties. To the extent that these are not criterial to the functioning of language, these properties fall outside the scope of an FDG. Thus FDG will not concern itself directly with the impact of genre distinctions on linguistic form: the distinction between the style of an oﬃcial letter and that of an informal e-mail, for example, falls

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outside the scope of FDG, since this concerns norms of communication rather than properties of the language system. However, where norms do impinge upon the system, e.g. through the introduction of systematic oppositions that reﬂect interpersonal relations (honoriﬁc morphology, pronouns of intimacy and distance), these must be accounted for. The above will have made clear that FDG is what Butler (2003) refers to as a structural-functional grammar, a term which nicely captures its intermediary status. While accepting that grammar is shaped by use, FDG holds ‘that in synchronic terms the grammar of a language is indeed a system, which must be described and correlated with function in discourse’ (Butler 2003: 30). This standpoint brings FDG into a close relation with two other structuralfunctional approaches, Systemic-Functional Grammar (SFG; Halliday and Matthiessen 2004) and Role and Reference Grammar (RRG; Van Valin and LaPolla 1997, Van Valin 2005). Although there is no room here for a detailed comparison (but see Butler 2003 for an exhaustive comparison of FG, SFG, and RRG, and Gonzálvez García and Butler 2006 for a mapping in multidimensional space of these three approaches and eight others), we may venture the hypothesis that FDG occupies a position intermediate between SFG, which stands closer to radical functionalism, for example in embracing the study of genre, and RRG, which stands closer to radical formalism, for example in seeing itself as ﬁrst and foremost a theory of syntax (Van Valin 2001: 172). A brief consideration of the diﬀerences among the three approaches may help to clarify the aims and ambitions of FDG. A characteristic feature of work in SFG is its orientation to the use of language in social contexts; as explained above, FDG limits itself to systematic grammatical reﬂections of social meanings. SFG furthermore takes ‘the text rather than the sentence’ (Halliday 1994: 4505) to be the object of linguistic description. This does not apply to FDG, which is not a ‘discourse grammar’ in the sense of a grammar of discourse (if such an entity is attainable at all) deriving from text-linguistic analysis. Rather, FDG wishes to understand those systematic properties of the Discourse Act (the minimal unit of communication) that require reference to its being situated within an interactive Move by the language user. FDG also diﬀers from SFG in concentrating on the individual-psychological rather than the social dimension of the language user, although the two aspects are of course closely connected in that social interaction is mediated through individual psychologies. A ﬁnal diﬀerence is one of emphasis: whereas FDG has a strong typological orientation, seeking to provide a general theory of linguistic resources, SFG is more centrally concerned with the description of individual languages, only recently having devoted some attention to implications of particular language descriptions for crosslinguistic generalization (cf. Caﬀarel and Matthiessen 2004). What

30

introduction

emerges is a picture of SFG as an approach that shares FDG’s general aims but is less oriented to cognition and more to the analysis of texts in their social context: indeed many followers of Halliday prefer the contraction SFL, Systemic-Functional Linguistics, dropping the reference to Grammar. Nevertheless, a comparison of FDG with its predecessor, FG, does suggest a certain rapprochement with SFG, especially with respect to the work of Fawcett (2000, 2007). In giving equal emphasis to the Interpersonal Level and the Representational Level, FDG shares Halliday and Matthiessen’s (2004: 29) concern with the omnipresent dual functionality of language as ‘making sense of our experience, and acting out social relationships’. As for the textual metafunction, which Halliday and Matthiessen (2004: 30) see as an ‘enabling or facilitating function’ reﬂecting our ability to ‘build up sequences of discourse, organizing the discourse ﬂow and creating cohesion and continuity’, FDG proposes that grammatically relevant textual relations will be accounted for within each of the levels: at the Representational Level, States-of-Aﬀairs may be grouped into Episodes, and at the Interpersonal Level, Discourse Acts are grouped into Moves. Indeed both the terms ‘interpersonal’ and ‘move’ are inspired by SFG-oriented work. Role and Reference Grammar (RRG), on the other hand, positions itself closer to the formalist end of the spectrum in taking the syntactic unit of the clause as its object of attention, whereas to FDG, being oriented to the Discourse Act, the clause is merely one possible syntactic form. In RRG, the clause receives a single representation, both syntactic and semantic, with information structure being overlaid upon it where relevant. Although FDG recognizes the need for all three types of structure, these are not collapsed into one representation but pertain to three levels of analysis. Apart from a range of technical diﬀerences, the central distinction between RRG and FDG is that the former’s point of departure is the predicate as a syntactico-semantic unit, whereas the latter sees itself as providing an analysis of the Discourse Act as an interactional unit, with predicates being introduced into the emerging structure where called for. Whatever the diﬀerences of emphasis and execution, FG (as FDG’s predecessor) incorporates various aspects of RRG, while proponents of RRG underline the close relationship between their theory and FG. In particular, Van Valin and LaPolla stress that both share a strong typological orientation (1997: 14), that both assume that levels of analysis are structured by means of layering (1997: 46), and that various FG analyses, such as Rijkhoﬀ ’s layered view of the Np, have been important to RRG proposals (1997: 640). The close relationship between RRG and FG also emerges from Butler’s (2003) assessment, and his more recent work on the comparison of models (Gonzálvez García and Butler 2006) shows this to apply equally to FDG. The RRG view of semantic functions

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(cf. Van Valin 2004), for example, has been very inﬂuential on the proposals made here for the treatment of semantic functions (cf. Chapter 3). Finally, brief mention should be made of a model that displays various similarities to our own, Autolexical Syntax as developed by Sadock (1991). In that theory, the lexicon plays a central role, forging connections between autonomous representations of semantics, syntax, and morphology. Although his theory is unlike ours in separating morphology and syntax and in lacking interpersonal and phonological levels of analysis, it shares our rejection of a derivational model, our commitment to multiple orthogonal representations of linguistic phenomena, and our interest in mismatches between the levels. Where Sadock’s model goes further than ours, as presented in the present book, is in presenting and indeed concentrating on the interface conditions between the various levels he proposes; we recognize the importance of such interfaces, but for reasons of space will not enter into a discussion of them in this book. For all the fruitful overlaps with other approaches, the central point is that FDG sees itself primarily as a grammar of the Discourse Act. Its goal is to describe and, as far as possible, explain the formal properties (syntactic, morphological, and phonological) of Discourse Acts from a functionalist perspective. These formal properties reﬂect in various ways the dual purposes of the language communicator: to interact successfully and to impart propositional information. The former is modelled at the Interpersonal Level of the grammar, the latter at the Representational. Together these ‘formulating’ levels form the input to the ‘encoding’ levels (the Morphosyntactic Level and the Phonological Level) which yield corresponding structures. The nature of these levels will be dealt with in detail in Chapters 2 to 5. 1.4.3 Typology

Linguistic typology, the study of the principles underlying variation across the languages of the world, is an essential source of inspiration for FDG. Linguistic typology is oriented to laying bare limitations on variation, otherwise known as linguistic ‘universals’, by formulating statements that purport to be true of all languages. Since data is not currently (and is unlikely ever to be) available about all languages, typologists typically, although not exclusively, work with a principled sample of languages (cf. Rijkhoﬀ et al. 1993). Even so, the problems arise that the amount of information available in descriptive grammars varies enormously from language to language and that the methodology inevitably compares languages that are used in very diﬀerent social circumstances, some of them moreover having a written form while others do not. However, even with these diﬃculties, it has been possible to elaborate a large body of universals, each of which stands in need of explanation. FDG is a theory that

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introduction

is capable of providing a framework for the enunciation and comparison of universals and of oﬀering lines of explanation. A universal, despite its name, very rarely takes the form of a statement such as ‘All languages are . . . / have . . . ’. Rather, they make implicational statements that apply within the grammars of all languages, of the form A ⊂ B, to be understood as saying that property A stands higher in the hierarchy than B, in other words, if a language has property B it will also have property A. This permits of languages with neither A nor B, both A and B, or A only, but excludes languages with B but without A. The universal A ⊂ B could thus be formulated as a negative statement that ‘No language with B will lack A’. Such implication statements may be rendered more complex: where A ⊂ B and B ⊂ C, then A ⊂ B ⊂ C. Where there are multiple implications of this sort, we speak of an implicational hierarchy. The more complex an implicational hierarchy, the more language types are excluded: where n is the number of properties in the hierarchy, the number excluded (m) can be calculated as follows: m = 2n − (n + 1). For this reason, typologists attempt to strengthen their claims by formulating maximally complex hierarchies. Very often, implicational hierarchies do not apply to all languages in the sample; then it is necessary to formulate statistical implicational hierarchies, which indicate the percentage of the sample for which the hierarchy is true. The hierarchies apply in principle to all domains of linguistic organization (see van Lier 2005 on their applicability in various areas). In FDG, as mentioned above, a strict division is made between four levels of analysis within the grammar; within each, the options available are subject to being organized into implicational hierarchies. At the Phonological Level, the inventory of phonemes can, at least to some extent, be treated in this manner: the nearly absolute universal /n/ ⊂ /m/ ⊂ /N/ indicates that languages pattern systematically in their inventory of (at least these) nasal phonemes. At the level of morphosyntax, we ﬁnd universals that apply to the relative distance between aﬃxes and stems: Hengeveld (1989) shows that morphological distinctions pertaining to a range of verbal categories are ordered in terms of relative distance from the stem. The hierarchy in (26): (26) qualitative aspect/agentive modality ⊂ tense/realis-irrealis/quantitative aspect/negation ⊂ evidentiality ⊂ illocution ⊂ mitigation-reinforcement is here to be understood as meaning that morphology with the leftmost meaning has greater proximity to the stem than morphology with the next meaning along, etc.; languages with deviant orderings of morphology are excluded by the hypothesis expressed in this hierarchy. In an FDG framework, two observations should be made about this hierarchy. Firstly, it applies not only to

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morphology but also to the syntax of auxiliary verbs, as for example in English They should (evidentiality) have (tense) begun to (qualitative aspect) work, and indeed FDG treats morphology and syntax at one level, the Morphosyntactic Level. Secondly, the hierarchy also reﬂects the organization of the grammar into levels: the ﬁrst three meanings are accounted for at separate layers within the Representational Level, and the last two (the most peripheral) at separate layers of the Interpersonal Level. As we shall see (2.7, 3.3), FDG distinguishes two types of ‘evidentiality’, reportativity (a category of the Interpersonal Level) and evidentiality proper (a category of the Representational Level). There are also typological hierarchies that apply more purely to semantics. Here the hierarchies indicate, not as in phonology the presence or absence of categories and the implications derivable from those, but rather the degree to which the forms of the language in question enforce semantic distinctions. The classical example in the area of semantics is the hierarchy of colour distinctions developed by Berlin and Kay (1969) and reﬁned in the intervening decades (for quite a radical revision, see Kay et al. 1997). Their original observations, as they relate to semantic distinctions available in languages, may be represented as the semantic hierarchy (27) (these semantic distinctions are said by Berlin and Kay to correlate with physiological properties of the human perception system; this has however been challenged by Saunders and van Brakel 1997): (27)

black and white ⊂ red {⊂ green ⊂ yellow} or {⊂ yellow ⊂ green} ⊂ blue ⊂ brown ⊂ purple and pink and orange and grey

However, this hierarchy is not purely semantic but also morphological in that multimorphemic words for colours (e.g. ‘sky colour’ for blue) are excluded. We ﬁnd a similar combination of semantic and morphosyntactic considerations in Hengeveld (1992)’s discovery of hierarchical relations in the way the languages in his sample express the semantics of non-verbal predication. In the area of non-verbal predication, the following implicational hierarchy is proposed: (28) Locative ⊂ Property ⊂ Status ⊂ Possessive A prediction made by this hierarchy is that, if there is conﬂation in expression, languages will show the same form for constructions adjacent on this hierarchy. In Turkish, for example, all four types of predication are expressed in the same manner (i.e. total conﬂation), whereas Babungo uses one strategy for Locative and one other for the remaining three meanings. Spanish introduces a further complication, using one form (estar) for Locative and contingent Properties, but another for inherent Properties and all remaining constructions in the hierarchy. These observations, concerning semantic distinctions,

34

introduction

clearly pertain to the Representational Level of FDG. Hengeveld (1992) points out that distinctions in this area are also sensitive to the communicative status of the construction as [± presentative], with regard to Locative and Possessive. In FDG, the last-mentioned generalization relates to the Interpersonal Level, where it is understood in terms of the informational status of Subacts (see 2.7.2), with [+ presentative] applying where one Subact is concurrently Topic and Focus. Thus Turkish uses a special strategy for [+ presentative] constructions that involves the introduction of a copula, cf. (29), whereas the formal distinctions in Babungo are indiﬀerent to the presence or absence of presentativeness, cf. (30): (29) Bahçe-de köpek var. garden-loc dog cop ‘There’s a dog in the garden.’ (Hengeveld 1992: 118) (30) Zu˘ w¯ı lùu sh`O. wife poss.3.sg cop there ‘He has a wife.’ “His wife is there.” Implicational hierarchies also apply more generally to the Interpersonal Level. As will be reported in greater detail in 2.5.2.3, Hengeveld et al. (2007) have found that the crosslinguistic comparison of the formal marking of illocutionary distinctions in various languages of Brazil reveals a set of interlocking hierarchies. For example, the presence of a content Interrogative (like English wh-questions) in a language predicts the presence of a polar Interrogative (like English yes/no-questions), but not vice versa. The question now arises as to the status of these hierarchies. Although they can be distinguished at each of the levels of analysis in FDG, they do not in themselves form part of the description of individual languages. Rather, they are derived from such descriptions, so that their theoretical status is that of generalizations that permit empirically falsiﬁable predictions. In other words, they are hypotheses about possible and impossible language systems, since each hierarchy, as mentioned above, excludes certain combinations of values. In addition, they allow linguistic constructions to be categorized in terms of markedness: those that are most restricted in their occurrence, i.e. those that are rightmost in the representation of the hierarchy, are said to be marked. Markedness can manifest itself in various ways: lesser frequency in use, longer forms (i.e. a greater number of phonemes), more syncretism, less suppletion, etc. The use of hierarchies has manifested its value in intralinguistic studies, too. It is to be expected that linguistic forms, in extending their meanings

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diachronically, will gradually move from unmarked to more marked items on the hierarchy. For instance, the extension of the meaning of English will from Desiderative to Future to Evidential can be seen as following the ﬁrst three stages of the above-mentioned hierarchy (cf. Goossens 1987). In language acquisition and language attrition, as well, the expectation is that the order in which semantic distinctions are gained or lost respectively as formally marked categories will follow relevant hierarchies (cf. Boland 2006 and Keijzer 2007 respectively for evidence in this regard). Quantitative studies of individual languages, too, such as that of Pérez Quintero (2002) on subordination in English, may be expected to reﬂect the hierarchies in that more marked, hierarchically lower, categories will be statistically less prevalent than unmarked, hierarchically higher categories. These are thus examples of various ways in which FDG can impact the study of individual languages while remaining under the general inspiration of language typology. The hierarchies that emerge from crosslinguistic and intralinguistic investigations are more than mere descriptive generalizations, however. The hypothesis must be that the hierarchies, although deriving from distinctions made within linguistic systems, reﬂect aspects of the cognition that drives linguistic communication. The assumption is that the crosslinguistically most widespread distinctions, i.e. those leftmost on the hierarchies, are those with the greatest degree of communicative salience and/or cognitive or physical simplicity. In phonology, for example, from the presence of implosive consonants in a phoneme inventory we can predict the presence of explosive consonants, but not vice versa: (31)

explosive ⊂ implosive

This is generally felt to reﬂect the greater articulatory complexity of implosives (superimposing an ingressive airstream on the basically egressive airstream of speech). In morphosyntax, we ﬁnd that languages that have Subject assignment diﬀer systematically with respect to the semantic functions of the units that can undergo Subject assignment, roughly according to the following hierarchy (the semantic functions Locative, Undergoer, and Actor will be explained in 3.6.2 and the details of Subject assignment in 4.4.3): (32) Actor ⊂ Undergoer ⊂ Locative In other words, a language permitting Subject assignment to a unit with a Locative function will also permit Subject to be assigned to Undergoer, but the reverse implication does not hold; examples of such languages are, respectively, English, which does permit Locative Subjects of the recipient type, and French, which does not. The validity of the hierarchy may be understood in terms of the anthropocentricity of language: if Subject assignment is a matter

36

introduction

of perspective-taking, speakers as active human beings will most naturally take the vantage point of an Actor; seeing a State-of-Aﬀairs from the viewpoint of an Undergoer, and then of a Locative requires ever greater cognitive eﬀort. In pragmatics, a prominent distinction, to which we shall return in 2.8.3.2, concerns the identiﬁability of referents. In FDG we distinguish between identiﬁability for the Speaker and identiﬁability for the Addressee; the former is equivalent to speciﬁcity and the latter to deﬁniteness. In the typological and Optimality Theory literature (cf. Comrie 1989; Aissen 2003) it has been observed that the pragmatic notion of deﬁniteness and the semantic notion of animacy interact in determining case-marking in ways that can best be captured using hierarchies. Thus Aissen (2003: 437) proposes the following hierarchy for deﬁniteness: (33) Personal pronoun ⊂ Proper name ⊂ Deﬁnite NP ⊂ Indeﬁnite speciﬁc NP ⊂ Non-speciﬁc NP Although FDG does not recognize Np at the Interpersonal Level (but at the Morphosyntactic Level), the Aissen hierarchy comprises various notions that are central to distinctions made at the FDG Interpersonal Level. In FDG terms, we might break the hierarchy down into two as follows, on the assumptions (to be supported in Chapters 2 and 3) that personal pronouns are to be shown as units with an identiﬁable/speciﬁc operator and an abstract head; proper names as units with an identiﬁable/speciﬁc operator and a lexical head; and the remaining categories as all requiring insertion of a lexical head at the Representational Level: (34)

a. [+id, +s] ⊂ [–id, +s] ⊂ [–id, –s] b. Interpersonal abstract ⊂ Interpersonal lexical ⊂ Representational lexical

FDG derives much of its inspiration from typological work. At the same time, it can provide a coherent model for the kind of language description that feeds into typological investigations. The application of a framework such as FDG, with its multilayered mode of description, to a wide range of languages will permit more reliable comparisons of language systems. Current typological and language-comparative work tends to eschew particular grammatical models, and indeed Dryer (2006) has recognized that most of this activity is based upon what he calls, following Dixon (1997), ‘basic linguistic theory’. By this is simply meant ‘traditional grammar, modiﬁed in various ways by other theoretical traditions over the years’ (Dryer 2006: 212). For Dryer, the functional factors identiﬁed by grammarians serve only retroactively to explain instances of language change; he denies that the user of a linguistic system has any access to such factors. In his view, knowing a grammar involves no more

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than knowing a set of brute facts: the language user is unable to draw the kinds of generalization achieved by typologists. While this is clearly correct, it leaves a number of phenomena unaccounted for. If, as we have suggested, language systems do not vary without limit and the diﬀerences between them as well as the changes they undergo can be described and circumscribed in terms of implicational hierarchies, those hierarchies must be tapping into matters of general cognitive relevance. Similarly, if—as has often been found—there is a correlation between hierarchical position and frequency in use, this again suggests that the hierarchies are reﬂecting cognitive preferences. If FDG sees the hierarchies distilled from applications of its principles to various languages as having explanatory relevance, that is because they together deﬁne a space within which linguistic activity is constrained to operate. 1.4.4 Language modelling

The predecessor of FDG, Functional Grammar (FG), proclaimed itself to be a quasi-productive model of the natural language user (Dik 1997a: 1; for detailed presentations of FG see Siewierska 1991 and García Velasco 2003). This was to be interpreted as meaning that the various steps in the grammar should be understood as having a loose parallelism with the temporal sequence of actions conducted by a language user in producing language. Thus the formulation of a communicative intention was seen as being carried out in anticipation of the Addressee’s interpretation of the linguistic unit. Encoding was then a matter of linguistic choices judged by the Speaker to be likely to have the desired communicative eﬀect upon the Addressee. For FG, the primary linguistic choice was that of the lexical items. These brought with them various frames, which were ﬁtted together into an underlying predication. This procedure was made fully explicit in the computer model of FG (Dik 1992), which similarly generated linguistic expressions by building upwards from a lexical frame. To the basically semantic underlying predication were added operators and functions which further speciﬁed the meaning until every formal property of the linguistic unit could be accounted for. FDG is like FG in emphasizing the parallels with language production (cf. 1.2.2). However, FDG diﬀers sharply from FG in its architecture, taking not the minimal unit (the lexical predicate) but the Discourse Act as the essential constituent of the entire communicative event initiated by the Speaker as its point of departure. FG was justiﬁably criticized for treating communicative notions like Topic and Focus (pragmatic functions) as appendages to a semantically complete representation: terms inherited a semantic function from the predicate frame into which they were inserted, e.g. Agent; they could then be adorned with a syntactic function, e.g. Subject; and, ﬁnally, to this AgentSubject could be appended the pragmatic function Topic. This suggested

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introduction

a primacy of semantics and syntax over pragmatics that ran counter to the principles of functionalism. FDG reverses this by giving pride of place to the Discourse Act. In FDG’s view, each desire to communicate linguistically involves the appearance of a corresponding intention, which is modelled as taking place in the Conceptual Component. This is the impulse that drives the ‘motor’ of the grammar. The intention involves a decision to expend linguistic energy, to perform one or more acts in pursuance of the Speaker’s desire to inﬂuence the thinking and action of the Addressee. These acts typically do not occur in isolation, but form part of a longer-term strategy, and as such are known as Discourse Acts. The grammatical form taken by Discourse Acts (which is the ultimate object of FDG) is often inﬂuenced by the presence of preceding and following Discourse Acts. For this reason, Discourse Acts are modelled as combining into Moves where there is grammatical justiﬁcation for doing so. Moreover, the form of each Move may be inﬂuenced by preceding and following Moves. Detailed justiﬁcation for this approach and the hierarchical structure that follows from it will be given in Chapter 2. Every unit analysed in FDG will thus involve the Discourse Act. This entails a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between FDG and most other models of grammar. Most grammars see themselves as oﬀering accounts of the clause or the sentence, i.e. syntactic units; although there are countless in-depth studies of smaller syntactic units (the noun phrase or the adpositional phrase, for example), and certain so-called text grammars have sought to extend the range of grammatical study to larger units, this is typically done against the background of the clause as the essential unit of analysis. In practice, this was also true of FG. However, FG did purport from the earliest days to take the linguistic expression (Dik 1978: 15) as its object of analysis, foreshadowing FDG’s orientation to units both larger and smaller than the clause. Note in particular that the sentence, as a ‘discourse unit whose composition and complexity is subject to cultural variation and rhetorical fashion’ (Miller and Weinert 1998: 42), plays very little part in FDG. Although easy to recognize in standardized written languages, it has no straightforward counterpart in oral languages or even in the oral use of languages that do have written forms. As such, it will not be treated within FDG. What kind of a language model is FDG? It is a fundamental characteristic of functionalist grammars that they seek to relate language form to language function. Those approaches that have attempted to detect the functions underlying the formal distinctions made in language, such as FG, may for this reason be classiﬁed as ‘form-to-function’: they seek to account for formal properties of syntactic units in terms of their functions in communication. FDG, however, takes a rather more complex position, what we might call a

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form-oriented ‘function-to-form’ approach. It is form-oriented in providing, for each language analysed, an account of only those interpersonal and representational phenomena which are reﬂected in morphosyntactic or phonological form. It is ‘function-to-form’ in positing a range of functions ﬂowing from the Speaker’s communicative intentions, for example a language-speciﬁc set of Illocutions. More speciﬁcally, as shown above, communicative intentions are translated in the process of formulation into one or two rather complex functional representations, and these in turn provide the input to the section of the grammar that deals with the formal aspects of utterances, known as encoding. Formulation involves the strategic arrangement of the communicative intention, which itself is a dynamic, strategic entity, into a temporal sequence of (in principle, discrete) Discourse Acts that may themselves form part of a temporal sequence of larger Moves. As will become clear in Chapter 2, formulation may be restricted to this process, but this usually applies only in the case of relatively simple or ritualized Discourse Acts; in such cases we shall say that only the Interpersonal Level is involved. However, formulation will typically also bring into play the Representational Level, which displays the semantics of the content communicated through the Discourse Acts; Chapter 3 enters into the full detail of this aspect of the formulation process. Formulation is thus distributed over two levels, and deals with the conversion of conceptual material into the functional categories made available by the language system being used by the speaker. In a simple function-to-form approach, there would be no need for the formulation levels. Then one could progress directly from cognitive intentions to encoding, say in the manner of a phrasebook that tells its users how to ask for a beer or complain about cockroaches in their hotel bedroom without giving them any knowledge of the language. It is because of the obvious inadequacy of a direct linking of cognition to expression, which does no justice to the speaker’s knowledge of the formulating potential of his/her language, that FDG adopts a form-oriented function-to-form approach. How does this approach work in practice? What it entails is that, for each language examined, the grammarian will consider all its formal properties (variation in constituent order, the repertory of morphological elements, the distribution of particles, the impact of intonation contours, etc.). Then a determination is made which of these grammatical characteristics regularly reﬂect distinct communicative intentions, for example the desire to indicate the source of one’s observations about reality. If the language possesses a set of forms which reveal this aspect of communicative activity, that is a prima facie indication that formulation will make available a semantic category of evidential distinctions; further grammatical analysis will uncover the precise location of the units to

40

introduction

which these distinctions apply. More generally, those formal distinctions that pertain to constitutive elements of the communicative intention will be seen as encoding the results of formulation of the Interpersonal and Representational Levels. In addition, languages will display characteristics that cannot be brought into correspondence with distinct communicative intentions (cf. Moutaouakil 2004). These will be regarded as ‘a-functional’ and will be accounted for as autonomous characteristics of the Morphosyntactic Level and/or the Phonological Level. For example, the languages of the world divide fairly evenly into those with a syntactic head – modiﬁer arrangement and those with a modiﬁer – head arrangement (in FG terms, Postﬁeld and Preﬁeld languages; cf. Dik 1997a: 397). These arrangements are fairly stable, but have been shown to reverse gradually over millennia (with various mixed structures arising in the interim). The very fact that no preference has arisen for one arrangement over the other strongly suggests that it is a-functional. Neither appears, to use a genetic metaphor, to be better adapted than the other. The Postﬁeld/Preﬁeld distinction will therefore not be derived from deeper communicative motivations, but will be regarded as an autonomous setting at the Morphosyntactic Level, relating to a preference for using unit-initial or unit-ﬁnal positions as basic. Several alternative constituent orders within a language, however, will be seen as ﬂowing from communicatively motivated distinctions, in keeping with the long tradition of such observations and explanations within functionalist grammar. A crucial aspect of the FDG methodology is that the process of formulation as reﬂected at the Interpersonal and Representational Levels will not, for any one language, make distinctions that are not reﬂected in the language in question: thus in a language in which evidentiality is not reﬂected morphosyntactically (or phonologically), it will simply not be indicated as an operator at formulation. Although the theory of FDG makes evidentiality operators available as an ‘etic’ option (since there are demonstrably languages in which relevant distinctions are made), for each language it has to be determined whether they are pertinent, whether they are ‘emic’: and similarly for every other category introduced in this book. In keeping with the discussion of implicational hierarchies above, none of the distinctions made in FDG inherently carries a claim to universality. In the discussion of parts-of-speech, for example, in 3.7, it will be seen that these, too, are subject to a hierarchy such that the theory allows for languages which make no distinctions in this respect at all. A further crucial aspect of the FDG methodology, inherited from its predecessor FG, is that it constrains potential analyses of linguistic phenomena to those that do not involve the postulation of transformations and ﬁlters

fdg in its broader context

41

(Dik 1997a: 18–24). These two restrictions ensure that no underlying structures arise that are later discarded. This is warranted from a psycholinguistic point of view, since in this way underlying structures are ‘recoverable from their outward manifestations’ (Dik 1997a: 23). Furthermore, by applying these constraints there is a limit on possible hypotheses concerning the analysis of a linguistic phenomenon, which strongly enhances the testability of these hypotheses. 1.4.5 On using FDG

It may be useful to conclude this section with some reﬂection on the uses to which FDG can be put by practising linguists of various kinds. Our principal hope is that FDG will oﬀer a structured framework within which it will be possible to enunciate and test linguistic hypotheses. Because FDG provides an overall perspective on linguistic phenomena, comprising four levels of analysis, and being integrated into a four-component model of the natural language user, it will be possible to articulate those phenomena more clearly and with greater sensitivity to their place in the overall scheme of linguistic things. As Jackendoﬀ (2002: 18), in presenting an encompassing framework for language study, rightly emphasizes, ‘Any adequate theory must begin with the fact that even the simplest sentences contain . . . rich . . . structure’ and ‘If one wishes to join the conversation about the nature of language, one must recognize and acknowledge this complexity’. As we stated above, FDG seeks to bring order to this complexity by providing formalizations of its claims. The purpose of these formalizations is to provide a rigorous framework in which linguistic claims can be enunciated, and then tested, substantiated, or disproved, and then submitted to further reﬁnement or sophistication. At the same time, it provides a structure for the observation of linguistic phenomena, and in this way is involved in the entire cycle of research, from observation to prediction, to the testing of prediction through further observation, which leads to new predictions, and so on. A clear example of this cycle pertains to the notion of layering within FDG: the principle of layered structure was ﬁrst developed in FG (cf. Hengeveld 1989, inspired by Foley and Van Valin 1984) for what is now roughly speaking the Representational Level, and only later with the emergence of FDG was the hypothesis formulated that a similar degree of layering might be found at the Interpersonal Level (Hengeveld 2004a and references cited there); this in turn engendered the expectation that notions established for the Representational Level such as operator and modiﬁer could be equally relevant for the Interpersonal Level (Hengeveld 2004b); and later, this led to the proposal that the FDG notion of layering could also link up with the already generally accepted hierarchical organization of morphosyntax and phonology (as in this

42

introduction

book). In short, the parallelisms between the levels themselves have arisen from the cycle of observation and prediction, and provide the basis for new cycles. Although FDG provides precise representations for its claims, the formalisms it uses should not be confused with the formal languages employed by truth-conditional semanticists and in radical formalism. Ultimately, while every eﬀort is made to keep them mutually consistent, clear and usable, the representations are but a means to the end of insightful analysis of linguistic phenomena. As is implicit in what has just been said, one form of work within FDG will engender proposals for the development and improvement of the theoretical apparatus. Of particular interest for the further advancement of FDG will be future studies on the interface issue, the question of how best to connect the four concurrent representations that characterize the current model. It is to be expected that mismatches across the various levels will be of particular importance in this enterprise. As for research primarily oriented to using rather than reforming the model, we may diﬀerentiate various emphases. FDG seeks to provide a framework for typological and language-contrastive and language-contact work that is neutral with respect to any speciﬁc language type. At the same time, it can be employed for the description of individual languages (but always with a view to the implications for other languages), as well as the growth and decline of languages in contexts of acquisition and attrition. FDG lends itself to the investigation of the crosslinguistic distribution of interpersonal, representational, morphosyntactic, and phonological categories, but also to the detailed examination of individual phenomena within a single language. For various FDG treatments of phenomena in single languages, see the articles in van Staden and Keizer (fc.), Hengeveld and Wanders (fc.) and Hattnher and Hengeveld (2007). As we emphasized above, FDG, despite its name, is not a functionally oriented Discourse Grammar (in the sense of an account of discourse relations). Rather, it is an account of the inner structure of Discourse Acts that is sensitive to the impact of their use in discourse upon their form. From this viewpoint, there is little to be gained from an application of FDG as a tool for the inductive examination of texts or segments from the transcription of speech. As Butler (2004) points out, the proper relation between functionalist theories and corpora is for the former to provide hypotheses which can be tested against data; for a ﬁne FDG example, see Anstey (2006). The description of data in corpora need be no more exhaustive than is necessary for the analytical task at hand. As we will show in the next section, FDG provides for the possibility of formally simplifying non-essential aspects of its representations with a view to focusing on the essential questions.

notational conventions

43

1.5 Notational conventions As the formalisms for the various levels are further elaborated in the following chapters, they will become increasingly detailed and complex. Such detail is necessary for the model to achieve precision and predictive power. In order to enhance readability, we apply a number of special conventions within the formalisms. The ﬁrst concerns the use of diﬀerent typefaces for variables at the diﬀerent levels of analysis, tacitly applied in the preceding text: capitals at the Interpersonal Level (e.g. ‘M’ for Move), lower case at the Representational Level (e.g. ‘ep’ for episode), title case at the Morphosyntactic Level (e.g. ‘Np’ for Noun Phrase), and small capitals at the Phonological Level (e.g. ‘pp’ for Phonological Phrase). At all levels operators are given in lower case and functions in title case. Secondly, in many cases not all details are necessary for the analysis of the phenomenon at hand. For these situations we use a special symbol ‘–’ to indicate the beginning and the end of a fragment that is not further analysed in detail. Thus, if we are just interested in the nature of the relation between Discourse Acts within a Move, the analysis of (35) may be as in (36): (35)

Watch out, because there is a bull in the ﬁeld.

(36) (MI : [(AI : –watch out– (AI )) (AJ : –there is a bull in the ﬁeld– (AJ ))Expl ] (MI )) in which it is indicated that AJ is grammatically encoded as an explanation of AI , but no further claims are made as to the internal structure of the Discourse Acts. Similarly, at the Representational Level, if one is interested in the semantic functions of arguments irrespective of their internal complexity, (37) may be represented as in (38): (37)

My neighbour bought a book about bullﬁghting.

(38) (fi : [(fj : buy (fj )) (xi : –my neighbour– (xi ))A (xj : –a book about bullﬁghting– (xj ))U ] (fi )) in which it is indicated that xi is the Actor and xj the Undergoer in the buying State-of-Aﬀairs, but no details are given about the internal structure of these two descriptions of Individuals. In a similar way morphosyntactic representations may be simpliﬁed if, for example, one is interested in Phrases rather than in Words; and phonological representations may be simpliﬁed if, for example, one wants to concentrate on Phonological Phrases rather than on Phonological Words. An example of

44

introduction

the former is given in (20a) above, in which (Npi : (Nwi : ikPro (Nwi )) (Npi )) is reduced to (Npi : –ik– (Npi )), and so on. An analogous reduction of (20b) would yield the following phonological representation: (39) (ui : [(ipi : [(ppi : –kVAu– (ppi )) (ppj : –dAtikVAm– (ppj ))] (ipi ))] (ui )) Another important convention applied within FDG formalizations concerns the use of subscripts for variables. In presenting general frames and templates we use numerical subscripts, indicating that the variable is uninstantiated. In representations of actual examples we use alphabetical subscripts, indicating that the variable is instantiated. Thus, the general frames underlying (36) and (38) are (40) and (41) respectively: (40) (M1 : [(A1 ) (A2 )Expl ] (M1 )) (41) (f1 : [(f2 ) (x1 )A (x2 )U ] (f1 )) Square brackets are used to keep elements together that are in a nonhierarchical relationship with respect to one another, but together are hierarchically subordinate to a higher layer, as in (40), where the two Discourse Acts are non-hierarchically related, but together within the scope of the (M1 )-variable, or as in (41), where three semantic categories are in a nonhierarchical relation, but all three within the scope of the (f1 )-variable. Finally, curly brackets are used in cases in which it is desirable to explicitly indicate the optionality of elements. In running text, words are capitalized when they are used as technical terms as applied within the FDG framework. Thus, we use capitals for analytical units such as Move, Propositional Content, Verb Phrase, and Phonological Word, but also for operators and functions such as Past, Undergoer, Subject, etc., even though the latter are not capitalized in representations. One aspect of our glossing conventions requires brief comment. When giving examples from languages other than English, we supply a morphemic gloss according to the principles of the Leipzig Glossing Rules, ; the glosses listed as an appendix to those rules have been used, supplemented by many more, as required by the data examined (see the list of Abbreviations and Symbols preceding this chapter). The morphemic gloss is followed by a idiomatic translation of the example into English between single quotation marks. In addition, but only where this aids the understanding of the example, we also provide a more literal translation between double quotation marks. For a case in point, see (1) in this chapter.

structure of the book

45

1.6 Structure of the book This book oﬀers a complete overview of Functional Discourse Grammar, understood as the Grammatical Component of the full theory of verbal interaction set out in Figure 2 above. The next four chapters deal at length with the four levels of analysis, beginning with the two formulation levels and moving on to the two encoding levels. Accordingly, Chapter 2 deals with the Interpersonal Level and Chapter 3 with the Representational Level. The overall structure of these two chapters is, as far as this is possible, the same: the aim is to bring out the default relations that hold between the inner workings of each level. Chapter 4 presents the Morphosyntactic Level, working down from the highest to the lowest layers of analysis, and the same technique applies in Chapter 5, devoted to the Phonological Level. The data examined in the following chapters have been drawn from a variety of sources. The principal source has been a wide range of grammatical descriptions of the languages of the world; our intellectual debt to the authors of those descriptions is enormous. Alongside consultation of our own intuitions about languages we know well, we have also had recourse to the Internet as a source of data. For aesthetic reasons, and also in the knowledge that URLs can change or disappear overnight, we have in such cases simply used the indication ‘Internet’. Since this book is primarily oriented to the presentation of a theory rather than the analysis of data (although we hope to persuade the reader that the theory promises interesting analyses), the linguistic examples are cited above all to illustrate the potential of FDG. Our analyses of particular phenomena should therefore be taken as indicative rather than as representing any claim to a deﬁnitive FDG statement (if such were even possible) about the phenomena in question.

2 The Interpersonal Level 2.1 Introduction This chapter is concerned with the Interpersonal Level of FDG. As the name suggests, this is the level that deals with all the formal aspects of a linguistic unit that reﬂect its role in the interaction between the Speaker and the Addressee. Each participant in an interaction does so with a particular purpose in mind. In some cases, that purpose may be very prominent (as in a job interview); in others, the purpose may be merely to sustain social relationships (as in phatic communion). The purposiveness of interaction entails that each speaker will employ a strategy to attain his/her communicative goals. This strategy—of which the speaker may or may not be fully conscious—will have to take account of the fact that language production unfolds in time, and that not all goals can be attained immediately. In most instances of communication, a number of steps will be needed before the ﬁnal goal is achieved. En route, the speaker may have to deal with misunderstandings, interruptions, and irrelevancies, and possibly the rejection of his/her purposes. Achieving one’s communicative purposes thus involves the input of energy, yielding a series of actions governed by the overall strategy; and these actions take place in the knowledge that the Addressee also has his/her own purposes and strategies. The properties of interactions that follow from their strategic, purposive nature are studied in a range of disciplines that fall under the general headings of rhetoric and pragmatics. Rhetoric is fundamentally concerned with the ways in which components of a discourse are ordered towards the achievement of the speaker’s communicative strategy, and also with the formal properties of utterances that inﬂuence the Addressee to accept the Speaker’s purposes. For that reason, those formal aspects of linguistic units that reﬂect the overall structuring of discourse will be accounted for in FDG in terms of rhetorical functions. Pragmatics will here be understood as studying how speakers mould their messages in view of their expectations of the Addressee’s current state of mind. This inﬂuences, for instance, which parts of a linguistic unit will be presented as particularly salient, which are chosen as the Speaker’s point of departure, and which are taken to be shared by Speaker and Addressee. The

introduction

47

inﬂuence of these considerations upon the structure of linguistic units will be examined under the rubric of pragmatic functions. The units to which these functions are assigned together form a hierarchical structure within the Interpersonal Level. The highest node in this structure represents the particular segment of discourse under analysis, with various intermediary layers leading down to components of the individual linguistic unit. Each of the elements of this hierarchical structure represents (or describes) an action, which may itself be internally complex, consisting of distinguishable smaller actions, just as the action of running consists of distinguishable movements by the arms and legs, and within those, distinct movements of the right and left limbs. At the layers of the Move and the Discourse Act the hierarchy crucially also represents the sequence or time course of the actions, which is essential to the realization of the Speaker’s strategy. The positioning of a Subsidiary Discourse Act before or after a Nuclear Discourse Act to which it is attached, determines whether it is understood as an Orientation (as in the ﬁrst element of Football, I don’t really like it) or as a Clariﬁcation (as in the last element of I don’t really like it, football). The sequencing of linguistic actions thus reﬂects the order of their strategic organization by the Speaker. The Speaker’s communicative decisions are not modelled within the grammar as such, but in the Conceptual Component of the wider theory of verbal interaction described in 1.2.5. It is this component that triggers the functioning of the grammar as a whole, starting with the Interpersonal and Representational Levels. The Conceptual Component thus contains the Speaker’s communicative intention and the strategies that s/he wishes to deploy in order to achieve that intention. There will thus be a certain mapping between the content of the Conceptual Component and the contents of the Interpersonal and Representational Levels. However, whereas the contents of the Conceptual Component are in principle unconstrained by language, the frames made available within the grammar restrict the number of expressive choices available to the Speaker. To give one simple example: a Speaker will feel several grades of nuance in the formality of his/her relationship to the Addressee, but in a language such as French must choose between the tu (informal) and vous (formal) forms of pronouns and verbs. At the same time, the possible discrepancies between the Conceptual Component and the initial levels of the grammar allow the Speaker to indicate his/her intention indirectly. The intention to have the Addressee close a window may be expressed directly by means of a mitigated Imperative Illocution (Please close the window), or indirectly by means of a Declarative Illocution (e.g. There’s a draught in here). What the grammar will contain in the former case is an indication of the Imperative Illocution. In the latter case, however,

48

the interpersonal level

there will be merely an indication of the Declarative Illocution, since there is no direct linguistic reﬂection of the Speaker’s intention. The Addressee’s task is to ﬁnd the communicative relevance of this Declarative Illocution, and (if the social relations between Speaker and Addressee are appropriate) to act upon it by closing the oﬀending window. The FDG position on indirect speech acts is thus that the grammar represents communicative intentions only to the extent that they are encoded in the message. Similarly, a Speaker may indicate displeasure with someone by praising him/her ironically (She IS a ﬁne friend!). But only where the language oﬀers a systematic means of displaying irony, for example by means of a recognizable intonation contour (Chapter 5) or a grammatical particle (Chapter 4), will this be reﬂected at the Interpersonal Level as an aspect of the grammar.

2.2 The organization of the Interpersonal Level The Interpersonal Level contains descriptions of all and only those properties of linguistic units that reﬂect, and indeed inﬂuence, their use in verbal interaction. It is modelled in FDG as a hierarchical structure that indicates the partwhole relations among units of discourse. The hierarchical structure shows how Moves are composed of Discourse Acts, how Discourse Acts themselves are built up from component elements, and also how one of those component elements of Discourse Acts, the Communicated Content, itself contains Subacts. The sections of this chapter will follow the hierarchical structure downwards from the largest to the smallest units. Section 2.3 will deal with the Move, and 2.4 with the Discourse Act; the following sections will deal with the components of the Discourse Act, namely the Illocution (2.5), the Participants (2.6), and the Communicated Content (2.7) respectively; 2.8, on the Subact, deals with the components of the Communicated Content. A ﬁnal section, 2.9, demonstrates the gradual build-up of the Interpersonal Level in a dynamic implementation. There is strong parallelism among the structures at the various hierarchical layers within the Interpersonal Level (and exactly the same formula applies to the structures at the Representational Level, see 3.2.3): (i) each layer and each component of each layer is symbolized by an indexed variable (V); (ii) each variable can be expanded by a lexical item or by a complex representation of a lower layer, to be known as the head (H); (iii) each head can be further modiﬁed by one or more modiﬁers (), again either drawn from the lexicon, or internally complex;

the organization of the interpersonal level

49

(iv) each variable can be speciﬁed by one or more operators (π), which will be expressed by grammatical or phonological rather than lexical means; (v) the units at each layer may have a function (), rhetorical or pragmatic. The resultant structure of each layer is as follows: (1)

(π V1 : H (V1 ): N (V1 ))

Note that only the variable is obligatory, i.e. the minimum structure is (V1 ). In each of the following sections, we shall consider which heads H, modiﬁers , operators π, and, where relevant, functions are available for each of the units symbolized by a variable. In this way, we shall determine the inventory of frames that must be assumed for each kind of unit. Applying the structure in (1) to the various layers that will be discussed in this chapter, we arrive at the overall organization of the Interpersonal Level in (2). (2) (π M1 : [ Move Discourse Act (π A1 : [ (π F1 : ILL (F1 ): (F1 )) Illocution (π P1 : . . . (P1 ): (P1 )) Speaker (π P2 : . . . (P2 ): (P2 )) Addressee ( π C1 : [ Communicated Content (π T1 : [. . . ] (T1 ): (T1 )) Subact of Ascription (π R1 : [. . . ] (R1 ): (R1 )) Subact of Reference ] (C1 ): (C1 )) Communicated Content ] (A1 ): (A1 )) Discourse Act ] (M1 ): (M1 )) Move In cases of multiple Discourse Acts within a Move, the linear ordering of the Discourse Acts reﬂects their temporal succession. Within the individual Discourse Act, where units no longer have a rhetorical function but only a pragmatic function, the linear ordering of elements in the structure is arbitrary. Note that in the case of multiple Discourse Acts within the Move, overlaps at the Morphosyntactic Level are possible such that the expression of one Discourse Act, once started, may be interrupted by another Discourse Act before being completed later, as in the case of certain centre-embedded non-restrictive relative clauses, cf. (3): (3)

The game (beginning of AI ), which began at 7.30 (AJ ), ended in a draw (end of AI ).

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the interpersonal level

The description of (3) at the Interpersonal Level will show the Discourse Acts ordered as (AI ) before (AJ ), since (AJ ) starts later. The coreference between the Referential Subacts in (AI ) and (AJ ) triggers the formation and positioning of the non-restrictive relative clause at the Morphosyntactic Level.

2.3 The Move 2.3.1 Introduction

FDG assumes that the largest unit of interaction relevant to grammatical analysis is the Move (M). In terms of its interpersonal status, a Move may be deﬁned as an autonomous contribution to an ongoing interaction (cf. Kroon’s 1995: 66 deﬁnition of the Move as a ‘minimal free unit of discourse’). More speciﬁcally, what is characteristic of a Move is that it either is, or opens up the possibility of, a reaction. In other words, a Move has a perlocutionary eﬀect. Whereas a Discourse Act (cf. 2.4) may provoke a backchannel (i.e. a response that encourages the Speaker to continue), only a Move can provoke a reaction from the interlocutor (an answer to a question, an objection to a point of argument, etc.), and that reaction must itself take the form of a Move. Since Moves may consist of a single Discourse Act, it is not always easy to distinguish between the two. A Move may be grammatically relevant because it corresponds to a single grammatically identiﬁable unit of discourse, or because it serves as the domain for certain grammatical processes, such as reﬂexivization (4.4.9). The alternation of Moves is clearest in conversation. There, a Move will often correspond with a Speaker’s turn. Thus in a simple conversation like the following, each turn corresponds exactly to a Move: (4) A: What is the capital of Latvia? B: Riga. Note that the correspondence between Moves and turns is not perfect, since a Speaker may elect to use a turn to perform two or more Moves, as in B’s turn in (5): (5) A: What is the capital of Latvia? B: Riga. Why do you ask? A: I’m doing my homework. The completeness of a Move in the spoken language will typically be indicated intonationally; the Phonological Level (Chapter 5) will in those cases be sensitive to the extent of each Move as indicated at the Interpersonal Level, for example clearly distinguishing the two Moves in B’s turn in (5). Let us consider the following example from everyday life.

the move

51

A customer’s order in a butcher’s shop may be quite complex in terms of turns, but will still amount to one Move. After each turn, the customer gives the butcher time to fetch or prepare the item ordered in that turn. Accordingly, the naming of each item will show a non-terminal contour, only the last turn having an intonation that indicates closure of the Move. Consider the following dialogue, in which both the Customer and the Butcher perform three Moves each (Cn and Bn respectively): (6)

Customer: Good morning. (Move C1) Butcher: Good morning. (Move B1) What will it be today? (Move B2) Customer: 100 grams of ham Butcher places ready-sliced ham on counter. 200 grams of roast beef Butcher places ready-sliced roast beef on counter. And four meatballs (Move C2) Butcher places four meatballs on counter. Butcher: Here you are. (Move B3) Customer: Thank you. (Move C3)

After the initial exchange of greetings (Moves C1 and B1), the Butcher utters Move (B2), to which the Customer responds with a complex Move consisting of three Discourse Acts. To make life easier for the butcher, s/he breaks the Move up into its component Discourse Acts; the completion of the Move is signalled by the falling intonation on the last Discourse Act. Note that the butcher might also have accompanied the various actions with a backchannel (e.g. yes), but that only the ﬁnal Thank you constitutes a separate Move. The completeness of a Move in the written language will typically be reﬂected in the strategic division of the text recognized as the paragraph. In an argumentative genre, the introductory statement of the paragraph, the units (typically sentences) developing that statement and its conclusion will each typically be Discourse Acts within that Move. In narrative genres a Move will tend to correspond rather well with an Episode (see 3.4). Yet whereas the Episode is an objectively established set of connected States-of-Aﬀairs, the Move remains above all a strategic unit that derives from the Speaker’s communicative intentions. Consider in this respect the following translated narrative fragment from a Dutch television talk show (Redeker 2006): (7)

a. b. c. d. e.

but we had a seamstress and we were calling her Mietje. But I think we were calling everyone Mietje back then you know, I don’t know why, but anyway,

52

the interpersonal level f. so that was also a Mietje. g. And uh- she was from Belgium. h. And there were- she was a Belgian refugee, i. ’cause during during the war, during the First World War j. all those refugees were coming from Belgium, k. and they were coming to Zealand l. and they were looking for work there. m. And so SHE was our seamstress, (. . .)

The main episode introducing the seamstress Mietje is here interrupted twice by interruptions (shown through indentation) which comment on the main storyline. The narrator apparently realizes the need to provide certain types of background information for the addressee to be able to properly understand this part of the story. These interruptions are strategically determined and therefore correspond to separate Moves at the Interpersonal Level. Note that the interruptions are accompanied by ‘push’ (but, ’cause) and ‘pop’ (so) markers (Polanyi & Scha 1983) indicating digression from and return to the main storyline respectively. The complexity of a Move in discourse may vary from silence (for example, where the Reaction to an Initiation is a shrug unaccompanied by any linguistic sign) to a lengthy stretch of discourse. Where linguistic material is present, it will always take the form of one or more Discourse Acts. The general frame for a Move with linguistic content may therefore be symbolized as follows: (8) (π M1 : [(A1 ) . . . (A1+N ){} ] (M1 ): (MI )), where n ≥ 0 Moves may have functions, and these may impinge on their expression, but we will refrain from discussing and representing these functions. The reason for this is that Moves constitute the highest layer of the Interpersonal Level that we consider here, and their functions can only be sensibly studied in relation to the longer stretches of discourse in which they ﬁgure. 2.3.2 Heads

The head of each Move will be one or more Discourse Acts. Discourse Acts have been deﬁned by Kroon (1995: 65) as ‘the smallest identiﬁable units of communicative behaviour. In contrast to the higher order units called Moves, they do not necessarily further the communication in terms of approaching a conversational goal’. Their own internal characteristics will be further discussed in 2.4 below. Of interest here is the possibility of the head of the Move consisting of several Discourse Acts. In such cases, the relationship between these Discourse Acts may be one of two kinds: equipollence and dependence.

the move

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Equipollence holds between two Discourse Acts to which the Speaker gives equal communicative status. Consider the following dialogue: (9) A: What happened yesterday in the Scottish Premier League? B: Celtic won. And Rangers lost. A’s Initiation Move provokes B’s Reaction Move, which in turn consists of two Discourse Acts, each with its own intonation contour (although less distinctly so than in the case of a turn consisting of more than one Move), and each with the same communicative status. The analysis will be as in (10): (10) (MI : [(AI : –Celtic won– (AI )) (AJ : –Rangers lost– (AJ ))] (MI )) In actual practice, it can be hard to determine whether two equipollent units, as in (9B), are two Discourse Acts or two Moves. As a criterion for determining the Discourse Act status of each of these units, we can apply the test of adding modiﬁers such as brieﬂy, indicating a stylistic property of the Discourse Act. As we shall see in 2.4.3 below, adverbials of this type function as modiﬁers at the layer of the Discourse Act. The proposed analysis of (9B) as in (10) is thus supported by the possibility of adding brieﬂy to the second unit: (11) Celtic initially went two goals behind and seemed to be in big trouble but thanks to a fantastic hattrick from their new signing ended up winning. And, brieﬂy, Rangers lost. Compare (12), in which there is only one Discourse Act: (12) Brieﬂy, Celtic won and Rangers lost. Inasmuch as (11) will typically be pronounced as several Intonational Phrases, and (12) as one, we see that Discourse Acts often correspond to one intonation unit, a point to be pursued in 2.4 and 5.4 below. Dependence holds between Discourse Acts to which the Speaker gives unequal communicative status. Dependence is shown in underlying representation through the presence of a rhetorical function on the Subsidiary Discourse Act. A Subsidiary Discourse Act may have various rhetorical functions, such as Motivation, Concession, Orientation, and Correction. Consider a Move such as (13): (13) Watch out, because there will be trick questions in the exam. Here, the Speaker’s strategy is oriented to warning the Addressee. This strategy is implemented by uttering two (intonationally distinct) Discourse Acts in succession, one with an Imperative Illocution and one with a Declarative Illocution (cf. 2.5 below). The presence of the conjunction because indicates that the second Discourse Act is intended to be understood as subsidiary to

54

the interpersonal level

the ﬁrst, speciﬁcally as indicating the Speaker’s Motivation for uttering the Imperative Illocution. A Move such as (13) will therefore be analysed as in (14), with the function Motivation showing the dependency of (AJ ): (14) (MI : [(AI : –watch out– (AI )) (AJ : –there will be trick questions in the exam– (AJ ))Motiv ] (MI )) Compare (15), in which the dependency is in the other direction: (15) There will be trick questions in the exam, so watch out. (15) contains the marker so, which indicates the Nucleus status of the Discourse Act in which it occurs, and will accordingly be analysed as follows: (16) (MI : [(AI : –there will be trick questions in the exam– (AI ))Motiv (AJ : watch out (AJ ))] (MI )) Notice that (14) and (16) indicate the order in which the Discourse Acts are uttered within the Move and that the realization of the Rhetorical Functions is dependent upon the relative positioning of the Discourse Act with the function Motivation with respect to the Nucleus. If the Motivation precedes the Nucleus, realization by because is impossible; and marking of the Nucleus by so is possible only if it follows the Motivation: (17)

*Because there will be trick questions in the exam, watch out.

(18) *So watch out, there will be trick questions in the exam. Subsidiary Discourse Acts are often, as in (13), expressed in ways that are reminiscent of the expression of clause Modiﬁers at the Representational Level, here by a clause introduced by the subordinator because. However, we may observe that there are conjunctions/subordinators that are specialized for the expression of Subsidiary Discourse Acts, such as, in the realm of Motivation, English for, French car, Dutch want, and German denn (cf. also Jadir 2005). Another dependency relation is that between Nucleus and Concession, as in (19), to be analysed as in (20): (19) The work was fairly easy, although (I concede that) it took me longer than expected. (20) (MI : [(AI : –the work was fairly easy– (AI ))(AJ : –it took me longer than expected– (AJ ))Conc ] (MI )) The Concession relation holds not only between units of the Representational Level but also, as is evidenced here by the possibility of inserting the performative predicate concede in (19), between two Discourse Acts (cf. Crevels 2000:

the move

55

32–3). Note that the order of Discourse Acts is again of importance here, as with because and so above. In (21), for example, the relationship does not hold between two Discourse Acts, but between two Propositional Contents at the Representational Level: (21)

Although (*I concede that) the work took longer than expected it was easy.

This is shown by the diﬃculty of adding I concede that to the ﬁrst clause in (21). Returning to Subsidiary Discourse Acts of Concession, note the possibility of marking the Nucleus with but, as in: (22) The work (admittedly) took longer than expected, but it was easy. The subsidiary status of the ﬁrst Discourse Act in (22) is supported by the possibility of adding the modiﬁer admittedly, which engenders the expectation of an upcoming Nucleus: (23) (MI : [(AI : –the work took longer than expected– (AI ))Conc (AJ : it was easy (AJ ))] (MI )) Other Subsidiary Discourse Acts do not relate two entire Discourse Acts, but rather relate one Discourse Act to some constituent part of the Nuclear Discourse Act. This applies for example to the phenomena referred to in FG as Theme and Tail (Dik 1997a: 389–405), as in (24a–b), respectively: (24)

a. My brother, I promise not to betray him. b. I promise not to betray him, my brother.

As with the because and although clauses discussed above, the relative ordering of the elements is vital to an understanding of their functioning. That my brother in (24a) is a Discourse Act is clear from the fact that it is encoded as a separate Intonational Phrase and that it can have its own Illocution (cf. My brother? I promise not to betray him). Constructions such as (24a) arise from the Speaker’s desire, within one Move, to perform the Discourse Act of introducing a referent into the discourse before moving on to a new Discourse Act which is relevant to that referent. The Communicated Content of the Discourse Act constituted by my brother in (24a) will contain only a Subact of Reference. The function of the Discourse Act will be that of Orientation, as it serves to orient the Addressee to the Speaker’s communicative intentions: (25) (MI : [(AI : –my brother– (AI ))Orient (AJ : –I promise not to betray him– (AJ ))] (MI )) The Orientation function is clearly not relevant to the ‘Tail’ in (24b), which occurs after the Nuclear Discourse Act has been completed. It appears to

56

the interpersonal level

result from the Speaker’s self-monitoring, and indeed Geluykens (1987) found that Tails are typical of unplanned spoken interaction. This is supported by the observation that they can also occur in mid-Discourse Act, to correct or clarify a Subact of Reference or Ascription that the Speaker suspects may not be communicatively adequate: (26) I’d like to give your mother—your sister (I mean)—her book back. (27)

Can you drive—(I mean) ride—my bike home?

Nevertheless, since the Speaker is clearly carrying out a Discourse Act of self-correction, instructing the Addressee to replace some element in his/her cognitive representation, we shall represent a Tail as a Discourse Act in its own right and regard it as following the Discourse Act an element of which it corrects. Example (24b) will thus be represented as in (28): (28) (MI : [(AI : –I promise not to betray him– (AI )) (AJ : –my brother– (AJ ))Cor ] (MI )) Note that the Corrective function may be signalled by markers such as I mean in (26) and (27). Frequent use of the Orientational or Corrective strategy in a language may lead to the emergence of a pattern at the Morphosyntactic Level with a preclausal and postclausal position that come to be used for elements that do not represent Subsidiary Acts but pertain to the Nuclear Discourse Act itself. In 4.4.1 these positions will be identiﬁed as the preclausal position Ppre and the postclausal position Ppost , both to be interpreted with respect to the clausal position Pcentre . Let us consider an example. The if-clause in (29) is given by Dik (1997b: 132) as an instance of an Orientation. However, in this sentence the relation between the if-clause and the apodosis holds between two Propositional Contents at the Representational Level, since the Speaker makes going to the movies dependent upon another State-of-Aﬀairs: (29) If you don’t stop crying, then we won’t go to the movies. At the Interpersonal Level, (29) contains a single Discourse Act, with a Declarative Illocution, which is contained in a Move with the strategic status of a warning. The placement of if you don’t stop crying in Ppre , as evidenced by the comma and the presence of then in the initial position of the main clause, is therefore to be understood as an application of the autonomous [Ppre , Pcentre ] structure at the Morphosyntactic Level. Note, in support of this analysis, that (29) could be reported as (30), but not as (31): (30) She warned me that if I didn’t stop crying, then we wouldn’t go to the movies.

the move

57

(31) *If I didn’t stop crying, she warned me that we wouldn’t go to the movies. Something similar can be said about the following example from Imbabura Quechua (Cole 1982: 55), which Dik (1997b: 88) analyses as containing an example of an Orientation in the form of an internally headed relative clause: (32) Ñuka chay punlla-pi chaya-shka-ka sumaj-mi ka-rka. I that day-on arrive-nmlz-top beautiful-val be-pst ‘The day on which I arrived was beautiful.’ Dik reanalyses the topic suﬃx -ka as a marker of Orientation and paraphrases the example as ‘Given my arriving on that day, it was beautiful.’ However one may wish to analyse the semantics of the construction, it is clear that the example contains only one Discourse Act. In FDG, we therefore would analyse ñuka chay punllapi chayashkaka as the Topic of the Communicated Content of that one Discourse Act. The application of the [Ppre , Pcentre ] structure will again be attributed to the Morphosyntactic Level. As Reesink has shown for Usan (Reesink 1987) with respect to units marked by the particle eng, the sequence of an Orientation Discourse Act and a Nuclear Discourse Act within a Move can come in time to be reinterpreted as a single Discourse Act, with the Orientation Discourse Act becoming the Topic of the Communicated Content of that Discourse Act. Both possibilities can be understood from the perspective of on-line language processing: in producing an Orientation Discourse Act, the Speaker awards him/herself time to formulate and encode the following Nuclear Discourse Act; in marking a Subact with typically given information (cf. ñuka chay punllapi chayashkaka in (32)) as Topic, the Speaker similarly postpones the identiﬁcation of the Focus of that Discourse Act. This section will close with a consideration of non-restrictive relative clauses, which manifest yet another kind of dependence between Discourse Acts. Our claim will be that such constructions involve a dependence between two Nuclear Discourse Acts; the attachment of the non-restrictive relative clause to its antecedent will take place at the Morphosyntactic Level, which necessarily contains a template for restrictive relative clauses. Restrictive relative clauses arise at the Representational Level as secondary restrictors within entity descriptions headed by a noun; non-restrictive relative clauses partially imitate their structure, but have a radically diﬀerent origin in the grammar (see Hannay and Vester 1987). Non-restrictive relative clauses, as observed by Dik (1997b: 41–2), admit illocutionary Modiﬁers; as such, and given the fact that they characteristically have an independent intonation contour, they must be analysed as Discourse Acts in their own right, which explains why they can accept adverbials with

58

the interpersonal level

the function of the modiﬁer of an Illocution such as frankly. Consider the italicized portion of (33): (33) The students, who, frankly, had worked hard, passed the exam. Their illocutionary status is also independent of that of the host Discourse Act, as we see in (34), in which the relative clause has a Declarative Illocution and the host clause an Interrogative Illocution, or in the Spanish example in (35), in which the non-restrictive relative clause has an Optative Illocution: (34)

Did the students, who after all had worked very hard, pass the exam?

(35)

Tu madre, que descans-e en paz, your mother rel rest-sbjv.prs.3.sg in peace quer-ía que te cri-aras fuerte. want-pst.impf.3.sg comp 2.sg grow-pst.sbjv.2.sg strong ‘Your mother—may she rest in peace—wanted you to grow up strong.’ (Internet)

Nevertheless, as observed by Dik (1997b: 43), there is a diﬀerence between (34) and (36), namely that the content of the relative clause in (34) is dependent upon that of the host clause, while the relation between the Discourse Acts in (36) is one of equipollence: (36)

Did the students pass the exam? They after all had worked very hard.

Let us propose that the characteristic function of a non-restrictive relative clause is that of providing background information with respect to an Individual introduced in the main clause. We will capture this through the rhetorical function Aside. A further requirement is of course that each of the Communicated Contents of (A1 ) and (A2 ) should contain a Referential Subact R evoking the same entity description at the Representational Level. Example (36) will thus be analysed using the Interpersonal Frame in (37), but (34) and (35) using the one in (38): (37)

[(A1 : [ . . . ] (A1 )) (A2 : [ . . . ] (A2 ))]

(38)

[(A1 : [ . . . (R1 ) . . . ] (A1 )) (A2 : [ . . . (R2 ) . . . ] (A2 ))Aside ]

where an additional condition is that R1 and R2 refer to the same entity at the Representational Level. It is this particular combination of dependency and coreference that triggers the appropriate Morphosyntactic Template at the Morphosyntactic Level. 2.3.3 Modiﬁers

Moves can be modiﬁed lexically, i.e. by elements from the lexicon that specify the Move’s role in the ongoing discourse. These modiﬁers appear in position in (39):

the move

59

(39) (M1 : [ . . . ] (M1 ): (M1 )) Thus, to sum up a narrative monologue, expressions such as to cut a long story short introduce a Move that rounds oﬀ the story, as in: (40)

To cut a long story short, I’m still considering it, but I doubt very much I’ll get there. (Internet)

which may be represented as in (41) (cf. example (23) above): (41) (MI : [(AI : –I’m still considering it– (AI ))Conc (AJ: –I doubt very much I’ll get there– (AJ ))] (MI ): –to cut a long story short– (MI )) Note that the Move contains two Discourse Acts, and that the modiﬁer has scope over both of them. 2.3.4 Operators

Moves can also be modiﬁed grammatically, in which case the grammatical element is represented by an operator in the π-position in (42): (42) (π M1 : [ . . . ] (M1 )) A grammatical element that can modify a Move is English however. The reason to consider this a grammatical particle rather than a lexical element is that it can itself in no way be modiﬁed: (43) *very/exactly/etc. however An example of the use of however in contrasting two Moves with each other is given in (44): (44)

The Federal Trade Commission’s (‘FTC’) recent promulgation of the amended Telemarketing Sales Rule (‘TSR’) has served to cement regulatory compliance as the number one issue for companies that engage in telemarketing. The triple threat posed by the FTC’s new ‘national’ Do Not Call list, the Caller ID transmission rules, and the three percent abandonment rate for predictive dialers promises to further complicate an already confusing array of state and federal telemarketing regulations. However, another issue, one that has been lurking in the background since the advent of the ﬁrst Do Not Call list law in 1989, is also gradually moving to the front burner for major corporations that oversee complex telemarketing operations. Today, with the majority of states having passed DNC registry laws and the FTC federal list looming on the horizon, the importance of reviewing the issue of liability for Do Not Call violations in the outsourced call center scenario cannot be understated.

60

the interpersonal level Be it under federal or state law, when it comes to enforcement of Do Not Call rules, there is no distinction made between the seller of the goods or services in question and the outsourced call center hired to provide telemarketing services. (Internet)

This use of however can be captured by applying a Move operator Contr(ast). Another example in English of a Move operator is in_sum, used with the same function as the Move modiﬁer in the previous section. In actual practice, it may be diﬃcult to distinguish between Move operators and Discourse Act operators, since often the same item may be used for both purposes. Consider the following example: (45) Celtic won; however, Rangers lost. Assuming that (45) is a single Move (answering (9A) above), we see that however here has scope over the second Discourse Act only, and therefore qualiﬁes as an operator of that Discourse Act, but not of the whole Move. The distinction lies in the scope of the operator: only if it ranges over all the Discourse Acts within the Move, as it does in (44), will it qualify as a Move operator. Generally speaking, Move operators are typically constrained at the Morphosyntactic Level to appear either Move-initially or towards the beginning of the Move. 2.3.5 Frames

The conclusion of this section is that the set of primitives makes available the following frames at the layer of the Move: (46) (π M1 : [(A1 ) . . . (A1+n ){} ] (M1 )) where n ≥ 0 Position π is occupied by operators such as Contr(ast) and Sum(mary) Position is occupied by a reduced set of lexical expressions

2.4 The Discourse Act 2.4.1 Introduction

Discourse Acts have been deﬁned by Kroon (1995: 65) as ‘the smallest identiﬁable units of communicative behaviour. In contrast to the higher-order units called Moves they do not necessarily further the communication in terms of approaching a conversational goal’. It is important to emphasize that, just as there is no formal equivalent of the Move, so there is also no one-to-one correspondence between the Discourse Act and any linguistic unit. Everything else being equal, a Speaker

the discourse act

61

need not express more of his/her communicative intention than is required to understand it. In many cases a fragment of a clause (a single Np or Adp) may be enough. FDG will in such cases not take the position that fragmentary utterances are linguistically reduced forms of fuller, clausal expressions. Rather, at the Interpersonal Level, the representation of a Discourse Act will show only those components that have actually been deployed by the Speaker; this directly reﬂects the actional nature of the Interpersonal Level. Let us consider an example from Newmeyer (2003: 689) in this light: (47)

a. A: Who does Johni want to shave? b. B: Himselfi . c. B: *Himi .

(48)

a. Johni wants to shave himselfi . b. *Johni wants to shave himi .

Newmeyer takes this sort of data to argue against a grammatical approach such as FDG in which form is linked to use, since in his view the choice of pronoun in (47b–c) is determined by the same rules as those that regulate the choice of pronoun in (48a–b). In FDG, by contrast, the interpersonal representation of the sole Discourse Act that makes up B’s Move in (47b) will contain an indication of a Declarative Illocution and a Communicated Content containing only one Referential Subact. The ungrammaticality of (47c) is dealt with at the Representational Level, at which the full semantics of B’s utterance is given. It is thus at the Interpersonal Level that the Speaker’s strategic choice of how much semantic content to express is located; in the case of (47b), the Speaker produces a Move with a single Discourse Act, which in turn comprises a single Subact of Reference (cf. 2.8.3 below). The choices available to a Speaker are of course partly determined by the information that is contextually available. This information is contained in FDG’s Contextual Component. The opposite situation obtains when languages show special chaining strategies to express units larger than a single predication or Propositional Content in individual Discourse Acts. An example of such a strategy is shown in (49)–(51) for Turkish (Kornﬁlt 1997: 110; Ersen-Rasch 1980: 107): (49) Hasan i¸s-e gid-ip ev-e dön-dü-∅. Hasan work-dat go-narr house-dat return-pst-3 ‘Hasan went to work and returned home.’ (50)

Reçete-yi al-ıp eczane-ye gid-eyim. prescription-acc take-narr chemist’s-dat go-adh.1.sg ‘Let me take the prescription and go to the chemist’s.’

62

the interpersonal level

(51) Televizyon-u teyze-m-ler-e götür-üp bırak-ınız. tv.set-acc aunt-1.sg.poss-pl-dat take-narr leave-imp.2.pl ‘Take the TV set to my aunt’s family and leave it there.’ Turkish has a narrative converb in -Ip, sensitive to vowel harmony, which is used to signal that the verb form carrying this ending is to be interpreted as if it were carrying the same inﬂectional endings as the next ﬁnite verb. In (49) the narrative verb form is to be interpreted as a Declarative verb form with a third person subject, in (50) as an adhortative verb form with a ﬁrst person singular subject, and in (51) as an imperative verb form with a second person plural subject. Since in each example the illocutionary value for the various subclauses has to be identical, we can conclude that they form a single Discourse Act at the Interpersonal Level, while constituting a unit larger than a description of a single State-of-Aﬀairs at the Representational Level. This unit will be identiﬁed as an Episode in Chapter 3. In languages like English the articulation of discourse into Discourse Acts has repercussions at the Phonological Level, where each Discourse Act generally corresponds to an Intonational Phrase, irrespective of the morphosyntactic counterpart of that Intonational Phrase. Other languages provide morphological evidence that the marking of the illocutionary value of a Discourse Act is independent of the syntactic unit. In Jamul Tiipay, for example, the interrogative clitic =aa can be attached either to a clause or to a noun phrase (Miller 2001: 195–6): (52) Me-mcheyuy-pe-ch aayip=aa 2-relatives.pl-dem-sbj arrive.pl=q ‘Did your relatives come over?’ (53) Maap me-suum-pe-ch=aa your+abs 2-younger.brother-dem-sbj=q ‘What about your younger brother?’ Similarly, in Turkish, we ﬁnd that the interrogative particle mI can occur, with vowel harmony with the immediately preceding vowel, attached to a structural unit of any type: a clause, as in (54a); an adverb, as in (54b); or an interjection, as in (54c) (Kornﬁlt 1997: 5; Lewis 1967: 105): (54) a. Ahmet sinema-ya git-ti mi? Ahmet cinema-dat go-pst inter ‘Did Ahmet go to the movies?’ b. Bugün mü? today inter ‘Today?’

the discourse act

63

c. Tamam mı? OK inter ‘OK?’ The basic frame for a Discourse Act, with variations to be discussed in this section, will be as follows: (55)

(π A1 : [(F1 ) (P1 )S (P2 )A (C1 ) ] (A1 ): (A1 ))

The head of the Discourse Act consists of, maximally, four diﬀerent types of unit: (i) the Illocution (F1 ), (ii)–(iii) the speech-act Participants (P1 )S and (P2 )A , and (iv) the Communicated Content (C1 ). The Illocution (F1 ) is the core of the Discourse Act and can be subdivided into two types, Expressive and Communicative. Illocutions will be discussed at length in 2.5; (P1 )S and (P2 )A will be dealt with in 2.6; (C1 ) is the subject matter of 2.7. Within the remainder of this section on Discourse Acts we ﬁrst discuss possible Heads in 2.4.2, modiﬁers of the Discourse Act in 2.4.3, and operators π on the Discourse Act in 2.4.4. A summary of frames available for Discourse Acts is given in 2.4.5. 2.4.2 Heads

The complex head of an Act contains at least two positions: that for the Illocution (F1 ) and that for the Speaker (P1 )S . In the representation of socalled Expressive Discourse Acts, which give direct expression to the Speaker’s feelings rather than communicating some content to an Addressee, the head does not contain positions for either an Addressee or for a Communicated Content. An example of this is (56), represented in (57): (56)

Ouch!

(57)

(A1 : [(F1 : OuchInt (FI )) (P1 )S ] (A1 ))

As we will argue in 2.5.2.4.2, ouch is the direct expression of the illocutionary value in cases like (56). All other Discourse Acts are Communicative Discourse Acts. In contrast to Expressive Discourse Acts they are other-related, in the sense of requiring the attention of the Addressee, so that the position (P2 )A will be present in the head of the Discourse Act. Within Communicative Discourse Acts we may distinguish an Interactive subclass, to which the structure in (58) will be applied: (58)

(A1 : [(F1 : (FI )) (P1 )S (P2 )A ] (A1 ))

In this structure the symbol stands for a lexical ﬁller of the illocutionary slot (F1 ). An example is (59):

64 (59)

the interpersonal level Congratulations!

We will argue in 2.5.2.4.3 that congratulations indeed occupies the F-slot rather than the C-slot. In Interactives the C-slot may potentially be ﬁlled, as in (60): (60)

Congratulations on winning the race!

In these cases the representation will be as in (61), which diﬀers from (58) in the presence of a Communicated Content: (61) (A1 : [(F1 : (FI )) (P1 )S (P2 )A (C1 ) ] (A1 )) A second subclass of Communicative Discourse Acts consists of Contentive Discourse Acts, characterized by the fact that they always have a Communicated Content. In this type of Discourse Act (F1 ) may be expanded by either an abstract Illocution (ILL) or by a lexical () performative expression. Communicative Discourse Acts will therefore be represented as in (62): (62) (A1 : [(F1 : ILL/ (FI )) (P1 )S (P2 )A (C1 ) )] (A1 )) To summarize, the following complex heads are used in Discourse Acts: (63) (A1 : [(F1 : (FI )) (P1 )S ] (A1 )) Expressive Discourse Acts (A1 : [(F1 : (FI )) (P1 )S (P2 )A {(C1 ) }] (A1 )) Communicative—Interactive (A1 : [(F1 : ILL/ (FI )) (P1 )S (P2 )A (C1 ) ] (A1 )) Communicative—Contentive (A1 : [(F1 : (FI )) (P1 )S (P2 )A (C1 ) ] (A1 )) Performative (A1 : [(F1 : ILL (FI )) (P1 )S (P2 )A (C1 ) ] (A1 )) Abstract 2.4.3 Modiﬁers

Discourse Acts may be modiﬁed by a lexical element which takes the form of a restrictor () on the Discourse Act: (64) (π A1 : [(F1 ) (P1 )S (P2 )A (C1 ) ] (A1 ): (A1 )) Modiﬁers of Discourse Acts allow the Speaker to comment on that Discourse Act. The modiﬁer may indicate the stylistic properties of the Discourse Act (e.g. brieﬂy), or the status of the Discourse Act within the Move (e.g. in addition). Another type of modiﬁer is concerned with emphasizing the Discourse Act, as when words like dammit are integrated into a construction expressing Discourse Acts of various types, such as: (65) Answer me dammit! (66) I want to go home dammit.

the discourse act (67)

65

Did you do it or not dammit?

(68) Let’s go dammit. The emphasizing element dammit occurs with Discourse Acts with all kinds of Illocutions, such as Imperatives (65), Declaratives (66), Interrogatives (67), and Hortatives (68), which shows that it operates at a higher level than the Illocution itself, that of the Discourse Act. Modiﬁers of these types are introduced directly into the Interpersonal Level in the position in (64). Their status as modiﬁers is typically reﬂected in their having a relatively peripheral position in the expression of the Discourse Act. Modiﬁers are typically not allowed in Expressives and Interactives. 2.4.4 Operators

The representation of the Discourse Act contains a position for operators, π in (64). One such operator is that for Irony. Irony will be understood here as involving a strategic choice to (i) formulate at the Representational Level a Propositional Content that is at variance with the Speaker’s actual beliefs and (ii) to indicate this to the Addressee. The latter aspect of Irony involves the Interpersonal Level, since it concerns the Speaker’s attempt to regulate the interaction (and speciﬁcally not to be misunderstood as really meaning the Propositional Content as uttered). In English, for example, an Ironic intention can be signalled by a special intonation contour (see e.g. Bryant and Fox Tree 2002), characterized by being rather ﬂat, with stress on a non-Focal element. An example is (69), in which the Speaker indicates by means of these techniques that s/he is not having fun: (69) This IS fun. The presence of an Iron(ic) operator will cause the Phonological Level to shift the accent placement and engender the desired intonation contour (for details see 5.5). That Iron(ic) has a Discourse Act in its scope, and not an entire Move, is clear from examples like the following, in which only the ﬁrst of the two Discourse Acts in the Move has the Ironic intention and intonation: (70)

This IS fun, don’t you think?

Lexical marking of Irony is found in spoken or informal written Dutch, in which the Subsidiary Discourse Act maar niet heus (literally ‘but not really’) indicates that the previous Discourse Act is to be understood as Ironic; the following examples are not untypical: (71)

a. Dat was dus wel ﬁjn, maar niet heus. that was so rather good but not really ‘So that was rather good . . . not.’ (Internet)

66

the interpersonal level b. Hoe romantisch, maar niet heus. how romantic but not really ‘How romantic . . . not.’ (Internet) c. Alternatieve houtsoorten waren niet voorhanden alternative kinds.of.wood were not available (maar niet heus). (but not really) ‘There were no other kinds of wood available (. . . not).’ (Internet)

As is shown by these examples, maar niet heus, and its equivalent for some users of English not (cf. the Linguist List discussion summarized at ) occurs as a Subsidiary Discourse Act after an Ironic Nuclear Discourse Act. In (71c) we see a Discourse Act containing a negated predication, a fact that indicates the frozen nature of this formula, since niet heus niet voorhanden ‘not really not available’ is not well-formed. In certain users’ speech, this formula can be integrated into the Ironic Discourse Act, so that the following has the intonation typical of a single Discourse Act: (72) Geweldig interessant maar niet heus. terribly interesting but not really ‘How TERRibly interesting!’ For such language-users, maar niet heus has attained the status of an invariable particle and therefore can be seen as an expression of an Ironic operator. Another example of an operator upon a Discourse Act is the Emphatic operator. Consider the following utterances: (73)

a. She has grown! b. Did you say you were pregnant?! c. Hurry up!

We shall regard such utterances as Emphatic Discourse Acts with varying illocutionary values (cf. Moutaouakil’s 2005 analysis of exclamation as an operator at the Interpersonal Level rather than an Illocution). Across the languages of the world, they are associated with an intonation contour involving relatively extreme pitch movements (see Chapter 5) of the type generally reﬂected in writing by the application of an exclamation mark. The Emphatic operator is also relevant at other layers within the Interpersonal Level. Emphasis is thus the result of the Speaker’s intensiﬁcation of a Discourse Act. This applies irrespective of the nature of the Illocution (F1 ), and hence can apply equally to Declarative (73a), Interrogative (73b), or Imperative (73c)

the discourse act

67

Illocutions. This is also visible in the following examples from Spanish, in which emphasis is expressed segmentally through the particle que: a.

!

(74)

Que no me gusta nada esa exclam neg 1.sg.dat please.prs.ind.3.sg nothing that película! movie ‘I don’t like that movie at all!’ !

vienes mañana!? b. ¿ Que si exclam whether come.prs.ind.2sg tomorrow ‘Are you coming tomorrow?!’ !

c.

Que no te marches mañana! exclam not 2.sg.refl leave.prs.sbjv.2.sg tomorrow ‘Don’t you leave tomorrow!’

Further proof for not considering Emphatic an Illocution comes from Tauya. MacDonald (1990: 214) points out that what she initially calls the ‘exclamatory mood’ of Tauya, marked by the suﬃx –Pae, actually consists of the Declarative suﬃx –Pa and the exclamatory suﬃx –e, as in (75) (MacDonald 1990: 214): (75)

Fofe-a-Pa-e. come-3.sg-decl-exclam ‘He’s coming!’

This suﬃx is also used in warnings and greetings (MacDonald 1990: 164–5): (76)

a. OPo-e. ﬁre-exclam ‘Fire!’ b. Pw eisa-e night-exclam ‘Good night!’

The analysis of Emphatic Discourse Acts will thus involve a structure of the following kind at the Interpersonal Level: (77)

(emph A1 : [(F1 : ILL (F1 )) (P1 )S (P2 )A (C1 ) ] (A1 ))

Note that in 2.5 below we will distinguish intensiﬁed Discourse Acts of the type represented in (77) from Discourse Acts with a Mirative Illocution, which are used for the expression of surprise. Opposite in eﬀect to Emphatic is Mitigative, as exempliﬁed by the Mandarin Chinese particle a/ya (cf. Li and Thompson 1981: 313–17). Note that, as with

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Emph, Mit can apply to Discourse Acts with all types of Illocution, Declarative (78), Interrogative (79), and Imperative (80): (78)

W˘o bìng méi zuò-cuò a. 1.sg on.the.contrary neg do-wrong mit ‘On the contrary, I didn’t do wrong.’

(79) N˘ı zi˘ang bu zi˘ang t¯a a. 2.sg think neg think 3.sg mit ‘Don’t you miss her/him?’ (80) Ch¯ı-fàn a. Eat-food mit ‘Eat, OK?!’ 2.4.5 Frames

The conclusion of this section is that the set of primitives makes available the following frames at the layer of the Discourse Act: (81) (π A1 : [(F1 : (FI )) (P1 )S ] (A1 ): (A1 )) (π A1 : [(F1 : (FI )) (P1 )S (P2 )A {(C1 ) }] (A1 ) : (A1 )) (π A1 : [(F1 : ILL/ (FI )) (P1 )S (P2 )A (C1 ) ] (A1 ) : (A1 )) The position π may be occupied by one of the operators Iron(ic), Emph(atic), or Mit(igative) The position may be occupied by members of a specialized set of invariable forms We shall now progress to an examination of the various components of the Discourse Act.

2.5 Illocution 2.5.1 Introduction

The Illocution of a Discourse Act captures the lexical and formal properties of that Discourse Act that can be attributed to its conventionalized interpersonal use in achieving a communicative intention. Communicative intentions include such Discourse Act types as calling for attention, asserting, ordering, questioning, warning, requesting, etc., which may map onto Illocutions such as Vocative, Declarative, Imperative, etc. There is no one-to-one relation between a speciﬁc communicative intention and an Illocution, as languages may diﬀer signiﬁcantly in the extent to which they make use of linguistic means to diﬀerentiate between communicative intentions. Since every

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Discourse Act contains an Illocution, the presence of illocutionary indicators is an important diagnostic for the Discourse Act status of a linguistic unit. The general frame for Illocutions has the following structure: (82) (π F1 : /ILL (F1 ): (F1 )) The head of the Illocution, which is simplex and can be either lexical or abstract, is discussed in detail in 2.5.2. Illocutions may be modiﬁed by lexical material which bears upon the illocutionary predicate, be it abstract or concrete. These modiﬁers, discussed in 2.5.3, occupy the -slot in (82). When the Illocution is modiﬁed by grammatical means, this is captured by operators occupying the π-slot in (82). These operators are presented in 2.5.4. An overview of available frames at the level of the Illocution is given in 2.5.5. 2.5.2 Heads 2.5.2.1 Introduction

As brieﬂy indicated in 2.4.2, the slot for the Illocution of a Discourse Act may be ﬁlled by (i) explicit performative verbs, (ii) abstract Illocutions, or (iii) members of a limited set of interjections and related expressions that by themselves constitute a Communicative or Expressive Discourse Act. We will discuss these three categories one by one. 2.5.2.2 Performative verbs

The familiar distinction between explicit and implicit performatives will be reﬂected in FDG in the choice between a verbal and an abstract expansion of the F-variable. In the following Discourse Acts, the F-variable is speciﬁed by means of the verbs promise and inform respectively: (83)

a. I promise to do the washing-up. b. I am hereby informing you that I wish to resign.

to be analysed as (84) (A1 : [(F1 : (F1 )) (P1 )S (P2 )A (C1 ) ] (A1 )) The possible occupants of the position are drawn from a set of verbs known as ‘performative verbs’, i.e. promise and inform respectively in (83). The necessarily Present-tense form of the verb will be assigned by default at the Morphosyntactic Level in response to the utterance time; both utterance time and utterance location are registered in the Contextual Component, also being required for the appropriate use and understanding of deictic expressions. Against this view it may be objected that the ing-form in (83b) is an expression that originates in an aspectual operator from the Representational

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Level. It should be observed, however, that the ing-form in this particular use has a reinforcing eﬀect rather than an aspectual meaning. This reinforcing eﬀect is captured by an emphatic operator at the Interpersonal Level (see 2.5.4) rather than at the Representational Level. Thus, the fact that this special communicative value of the ing-form arises in the context of performative formulas actually supports our analysis of its interpersonal status in (83b). With a lexical performative predicate ﬁlling the slot for the Illocution of the utterance, the Speaker and the Addressee be both can made explicit, which means that the (P1 ) and (P2 ) positions are ﬁlled: (85) I promise you-guys that I’ll come back. (AI : [(FI : promiseV (FI )) (1 PI )S (m PJ )A (CI : –I’ll come back– (CI )) ] (AI )) Here the Speaker is characterized as being singular (1) and the Addressee as plural (m). Potential ﬁllers of P-positions are discussed in 2.6. 2.5.2.3 Abstract Illocutions

Illocutionary Discourse Acts without a lexical speciﬁcation of the Illocution are ‘implicit performatives’ and involve the choice of a ready-made Illocution, where Illocution, often also called ‘sentence type’, is deﬁned as ‘a coincidence of grammatical structure and conventional conversational use’ (Sadock and Zwicky 1985: 155). Each language makes available a set of illocutionary primitives which diﬀer in which ‘abstract predicate’ (for example Declarative or Interrogative) occupies the position ILL in (86): (86) (A1 : [(F1 : ILL (F1 )) (P1 )S (P2 )A (C1 ) ] (A1 )) The distinction between explicit and implicit performatives is thus that the former involve the introduction of a lexical predicate into the Interpersonal Level, whereas the latter involve the introduction of an abstract predicate. In both cases we consider the indicator of the Illocution, in (84) and ILL in (86), to be predicates, observing that the relation between the units that make up a Discourse Act is comparable to that of a predicate and three arguments, namely the two Participants in the Discourse Act and the Communicated Content. With an abstract predicate, the two Participants generally remain implicit. In keeping with the principles of FDG, no more abstract illocutionary primitives will be posited for each language than are justiﬁed by the grammatical distinctions present in the language. These distinctions may be morphosyntactic or phonological. The following list contains a range of illocutionary categories and their conventional conversational uses, from which the languages of the world make a selection. We illustrate this list here with examples

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of the segmental expression of the illocutionary category involved (see also Hengeveld 2004c): DECLarative: the Speaker informs the Addressee of the Propositional Content evoked by the Communicated Content. Example (87) (MacDonald 1990: 209), as are (88)–(91), is from Tauya: (87)

Ya-ni tei-mene-amu-Pa. 1.sg-erg catch-stat-1.sg.fut-decl ‘I will have it.’

INTERrogative: the Speaker requests the Addressee’s response to the Propositional Content evoked by the Communicated Content, as in the following example (MacDonald 1990: 210): (88) Nen-ni sen-yau-i-nae? 3.pl-erg 1.pl-see-3.pl-inter ‘Did they see us?’ IMPERative: the Speaker directs the Addressee to carry out the action evoked by the Communicated Content, as illustrated in (89) (MacDonald 1990: 212): (89)

Ni-a-e! eat-2.sg.fut-imp ‘Eat!’

PROHibitive: the Speaker forbids the Addressee to carry out the action evoked by the Communicated Content. An example is given in (90) (MacDonald 1990: 213): (90) Yate-Patene! go-proh.sg ‘Don’t go!’ OPTative: the Speaker indicates to the Addressee his/her wish that the positive situation evoked by the Communicated Content should come about, as in (91) (MacDonald 1990: 213): (91) Pei mene-Pe-no. there stay-3.sg.fut-opt ‘Let her be there!’ IMPRecative: the Speaker indicates to the Addressee his/her wish that the negative situation evoked by the Communicated Content should come about, as in the following example from Turkish (Lewis 1967: 115):

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(92) Geber-esi! die.like.a.dog-impr.3.sg ‘May he die like a dog!’ HORTative: the Speaker encourages himself or an Addressee together with himself to carry out the action evoked by the Communicated Content, as in example (93) from Desano (Miller 1999: 73): (93) GuPa-rã wa-rã. bath-anim.pl go-hort ‘Let’s go bathe!’ DISHORTative: the Speaker discourages himself or an Addressee together with himself from carrying out the action evoked by the Communicated Content, as in the following example from Kamaiurá (Seki 2000: 333): (94)

T=a-ha-ume=n. hort=1.sg-go-neg.hort=hort ‘Let me not go.’

ADMONitive: the Speaker advises the Addressee to realize the situation evoked by the Communicated Content, as in the following example from Mandarin Chinese (Li and Thompson 1981: 311): (95) Xi˘aox¯ın ou! careful admon ‘Be careful!’ COMMissive: the Speaker commits him/herself to future realization of a situation evoked by the Communicated Content in which both Speaker and Addressee are involved, as in (96) from Jamul Tiipay (Miller 2001: 191): (96)

Xiikay ny-iny-ma. some 1/2-give-comm ‘I’ll give you some.’

SUPPLicative: the Speaker asks permission of the Addressee to realize the situation evoked by the Communicated Content. The following example from Tucano (Ramirez 1997: 147) illustrates this Illocution: (97)

Apê-ma. play-suppl ‘Let me play!’

MIRative: the Speaker expresses his surprise about the Propositional Content evoked by the Communicated Content, as in example (98) from Kamaiurá (Seki 2000: 156):

illocution (98)

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H-ajme-ma’e te’ an pa. 3sg-have.sharpness.nmlz foc prox mir.ms ‘Wow, how sharp is this (knife)!’

Of these 12, English grammar will contain six. The Declarative Illocution is characterized by intonation and a clausal constituent order in which the clause-initial position PI is not occupied by a verb (99); the Interrogative Illocution by intonation and placement of a Q-word or the ﬁnite verb in PI (100); the Imperative Illocution by intonation and placement of a verb in PI (101); the Optative Illocution by the placement of the invariable let (without the sense of the homophonous Imperative use of the permissive verb let) or the modal may in PI (102); the Hortative Illocution by the placement of the invariable particle Let’s in PI (103a), with the subject position generally not ﬁlled, although many examples are found in current usage (103b); and the Mirative by the presence of a question word in the absence of inversion (104): (99) Mary left the club. (100) a. Who left the club? b. Did she leave the club? (101)

Leave the club!

(102)

a. Let her leave the club! b. May she leave the club!

(103)

a. Let’s leave the club. b. Let’s you and me leave the club.

(104) How beautifully she sang! The other Illocutions are not realized grammatically in English, and therefore will not occur as primitives in the analysis of that language: the Prohibitive and the Admonitive correspond to a combination of the Imperative Illocution with particular choices at the Representational Level, while the Imprecative and the Commissive will typically involve lexical verbs. Note that we treat the MIRative Illocution as diﬀerent from the Emphatic Discourse Act operator discussed in 2.4.4. One reason for this is that the Emphatic operator combines with a range of Illocutions, and thus represents a more general communicative strategy than Illocution itself. Another reason is that Miratives cannot be interpreted as a subtype of Declarative, since the communicative intention behind a Mirative Discourse Act is not to pass on a Communicated Content, as in Declarative Discourse Acts, but pass on surprise about a Communicated Content typically presupposed to be known to the Addressee. This explains the fact that Miratives show a tendency to

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holophrastic expression, i.e. as Communicated Contents with only one Subact. In (105) and (106) respectively, we see a Communicated Content containing just a Subact of Reference and a Subact of Ascription: (105) What a ﬁne day! (A1 : [(F1 : MIR (F1 )) (P1 )S (P2 )A (C1 : [(R1 )] (C1 )) ] (A1 )) (106) How silly! (A1 : [(F1 : MIR (F1 )) (P1 )S (P2 )A (C1 : [(T1 )] (C1 )) ] (A1 )) A pervasive feature of Miratives is their approximation to the form of Interrogative Illocutions, compare Mirative (107) with Interrogative (108): (107) How beautifully she sang! (108) How beautifully did she sing? (107) diﬀers above all from (108) in having its elements ordered at the Morphosyntactic Level by the template that is also associated with DECL Illocutions, rather than the one associated with INTER Illocutions. (107) thus shares one expression feature with the INTER Illocution (the introduction of the Qword how) and one feature with the DECL Illocution (the application of the DECL template). In Marathi, the assimilation goes further, with only the intonation distinguishing Interrogative and Mirative Illocutions (Pandharipande 1997: 15, 265): ˜ (109) Ty¯ane kitt¯ı âmbe kh¯alle? 3.sg.ag how.many mango.3.pl.m eat-pst.3.pl.m ‘How many mangoes did he eat?’ ˜ (110) Ty¯ane kitt¯ı âmbe an.le! 3.sg.ag how.many mango.3.pl.m bring-pst.3.pl.m ‘How many mangoes he brought!’ From a typological perspective, it is expected that the presence versus absence of certain Illocutions is not random, but can be described systematically along a limited number of parameters. For a subset of the Illocutions discussed above, Hengeveld et al. (2007) show that the formally encoded Illocutions of a sample of the native languages of Brazil are distributed according to the conﬁguration of implicational hierarchies shown in Figure 7. All languages in the sample used by Hengeveld et al. (2007) have a Declarative, a Polar Interrogative, and an Imperative Illocution, but in one language, Sanuma, the distinction between Declarative and Polar Interrogatives may remain unexpressed. Using the term Propositional Illocutions to cover both Informing and Questioning Illocutions, i.e. those that have to do with the exchange of information, they speculate that the most basic opposition in

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⊃

DECL Informing ⊃

MIR Propositional

⊃

INTER-POLAR Questioning

INTER-CONTENT PROH

⊃

DISHORT

⊃

⊃

⊃

IMPER

⊃

HORT Behavioural

⊃

ADMON SUPPL

Figure 7. Implicational relations between Illocutions

languages is the one between Propositional and Behavioural Illocutions, i.e. those that have to do with inﬂuencing behaviour, the next step being a split within Propositional between Informing and Questioning. While Polar Interrogatives are available in all languages of the sample, Content Interrogatives are not, so that the presence of a Content Interrogative predicts the presence of a Polar Interrogative. Consider the Kwaza examples (111)–(113) (van der Voort 2004: 297, 240, 241): (111) o"ja-da-tsy-"re. leave-1.sg-pot-q ‘Am I going to leave?’ wa"dy-re. (112) "peDro jere"xwa dilε-"wã Pedro jaguar someone-anim.obj give-q ‘To whom did Pedro give a dog?’ aw"re-da-tara-tsε. (113) dilε-"wã-here someone-anim.obj-int marry-1.sg-proc-decl ‘I’m going to marry someone.’ In Kwaza, both polar questions (111) and content questions (112) occur in the interrogative mood. What at ﬁrst sight may seem to be a question word in (112) is also used as an indeﬁnite pronoun, as can be seen in the Declarative sentence in (113). Thus, no formal distinction is made in Kwaza between polar and content questions. A content question is simply a polar question containing an indeﬁnite pronoun. This ties in nicely with the way in which question words are treated in FDG, as will be shown in 2.8.3.4 below.

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As furthermore shown in Figure 7, the presence of behavioural Illocutions can be predicted in a two-dimensional implicational grid, one parameter concerning the Actor and/or Beneﬁciary of the requested behaviour, the other its negative or positive value. Two logically possible negative Illocutions were not attested in Hengeveld et al.’s (2007) sample: the negative counterparts of the Admonitive and the Supplicative. 2.5.2.4 Interjections and related expressions

2.5.2.4.1 Introduction The head of the slot for Illocution may also be occupied by interjections and related expressions, within both Expressive and Interactive act frames as discussed in 2.4.2 and repeated here: (114) (A1 : [(F1 : (FI )) (P1 )S ] (A1 ))

Expressives

(115) (A1 : [(F1 : (FI )) (P1 )S (P2 )A {(C1 ) }] (A1 ))

Interactives

We discuss Expressives in 2.5.2.4.2 and Interactives in 2.5.2.4.3. Vocatives constitute a special class of Interactives, and are treated separately in 2.5.2.4.4. 2.5.2.4.2 Expressives The meanings of Expressives tend to recur across different languages. Thus we very regularly ﬁnd expressions for Ekman et al.’s (1972) six basic emotions anger (damn), disgust (yuck), fear (help), joy (wow), sadness (aw) and surprise (well, well). These are ways for Speakers to give vent to their reactions to elements of the ongoing communicative situation. One could easily imagine them being produced in solitude, as when one hits one’s thumb with a hammer. They are close to instinctive cries like sighs, screams, gasps, etc. In FDG, however, only those utterances will be considered as Expressives that have language-speciﬁc form. This is apparent, for example, in expressions of pain, which, although barely voluntary, diﬀer formally from one language to another: (116) English French Kannada Evenki Hungarian

ow, ouch aïe ayyo: enu jaj

Further evidence for the lexical status of such expressive forms is their availability for word formation processes: thus from Hungarian jaj one can form frequentative jaj-gat ‘say ouch repeatedly’ (Kenesei et al. 1998: 455) by applying the frequentative aﬃx -gat (1998: 360). Because they do not assume an Addressee and have no Communicated Content, Expressives can be represented as in (114). A speciﬁc instance of this is (117):

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77

(AI : [(FI : yuckIntj (FI )) (PI )S ] (AI ))

2.5.2.4.3 Interactives Like Expressives, Interactives are generally expressed through lexical elements and are available for a restricted set of recurrent situations. An example is (118): (118)

Congratulations!

They diﬀer from Expressives in being clearly directed to the Addressee. Generally speaking, forms such as Congratulations, Thank you, etc. are invariable. The Speaker has no possibility of ‘singularizing’ the apparently plural Congratulations into *Congratulation. This suggests that, like Expressives, Interactives are sent directly from the Interpersonal to the Phonological Level. However, certain languages show limited variability conditioned by contextual circumstances. Thus the choice between the greetings Good morning, Good afternoon, and Good evening in English is dependent upon the time of day; otherwise they are communicatively entirely equivalent. The divisions of the day diﬀer from culture to culture: in the Spanish of Spain, for example, roughly speaking Buenos dias is used till 14h, after which Buenas tardes applies until 21h, when Buenas noches becomes applicable; in the Spanish used in California, however, these terms are applied in keeping with the corresponding English expressions Good morning, Good afternoon, and Good evening. The form of Interactives may also be dependent upon the identity of Speaker and Addressee. In Portuguese, the expression of gratitude is obrigado for a male Speaker but obrigada for a female Speaker (no matter whether s/he is expressing the gratitude of one or more Participants), although there is a tendency, discouraged by many feminists, to generalize the ﬁrst form. And in Dutch, the social relation between the Speaker and the Addressee determines the choice between the familiar dank je for an Interactive of gratitude and the formal dank u, with the alternative form bedankt being neutral as to this distinction. It is this kind of data that justiﬁes the presence of the positions for the two Participants in the Discourse Act frame for Interactives, which act as anchors for the information about the Participants available in the Contextual Component, e.g. in an FDG of Portuguese: (119)

a. (AI : [(FI : obrigada (FI )) (PI )S (PJ )A )] (AI )) [where PI is female] b. (AI : [(FI : obrigado (FI )) (PI )S (PJ )A )] (AI )) [where PI is male]

Many Interactives can be expanded with a Communicated Content. Example (118) above, for example, could be expanded as follows: (120)

Congratulations on winning the race!

A requirement with Interactives is that the C contains presupposed information. This requirement is exploited in the familiar sign (121):

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(121) Thank you for not smoking. in which the reader is enjoined not to smoke by having his/her non-smoking presented as a shared presupposition. Those instances that have a frame including a (C1 ) will require recourse to the Representational Level and the Morphosyntactic Level for the formulation and encoding of that segment of the Discourse Act. The (F1 ) segment, however, is sent directly to the Phonological Component, as explained above. It has been observed that Interactives may display phonological peculiarities that mark them oﬀ as being diﬀerent from other forms. Thus in Babungo (Schaub 1985: 386), where word forms generally commence with a consonant, such Interjections have initial vowels. Interactives, being frequent in communication, are also often subject to phonological reduction. Examples in contemporary languages include the Dutch greeting Dag (from the now almost archaic Goeden dag, lit. ‘good day’) or the comparable Australian English G’day. Historically, Interactives come from the lexicalization of what will have been regularly formed expressions. Thus Goodbye derives historically from God be with you, with a full ﬁnite (subjunctive) predication, etc. Interactives, it appears, may develop into Expressives: thus in Dutch we ﬁnd Goeie morgen (lit. ‘Good morning’), pronounced with an extreme intonation contour, being used to express surprise: the fact that it can be used at any time of day suggests progress towards further arbitrariness. The representation of Interactives may thus be illustrated as follows: (122) (AI : [(FI : SorryIntj (FI )) (PI )S (PJ )A ] (AI )) (123) (AI : [(FI : CongratulationsIntj (FI )) (PI )S (PJ )A (CI : –on winning the race– (CI )) ] (AI )) 2.5.2.4.4 Vocatives Vocatives constitute a special class of Interactives. At the beginning of a segment of discourse, these Discourse Acts serve to gain the Addressee’s attention; in the course of a discourse, the use of a Vocative signals the Speaker’s continuing orientation to the Addressee. Vocatives in their simplest form come close to greetings, which involve invariable Interactives of the type discussed above. Thus (124) will be analysed as in (125), in parallel with Interactives such as congratulations: (124) Hey! (125) (AI : [(FI : hey (FI )) (PI )S (PJ )A ] (AI )) Certain languages may have specialized Vocatives for particular situations: in Dutch, at least traditionally, one calls for service in an apparently abandoned shop by means of the interjection Volk! (lit. ‘People!’).

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Given their orientation towards the Addressee, the (P2 )A slot is often lexically ﬁlled in Vocatives, minimally with a 2nd person pronoun, as in (126), to be analysed as (127): (126) Hey you! (127)

(AI : [(FI : hey (FI )) (PI )S (PJ : you (PJ ))A ] (AI ))

The description of the Addressee may also take the form of a proper name, as in (128), to be analysed as (129): (128) Hey Bert! (129) (AI : [(FI : hey (FI )) (PI )S (PJ : Bert (PJ ))A ] (AI )) Whereas the form Hey or its archaic/formal equivalent O is invariable in English, its form is in other languages subject to variation according to the characteristics of (P2 )A and possibly also the relationship between (P1 )S and (P2 )A . In Marathi (Pandharipande 1997: 332), there is a complex system in which ‘the choice of vocative particles is determined by conditions of appropriateness according to the sex, age and social status of the Addressee relative to that of the Speaker’. In Punjabi (Bhatia 1993: 39), the particle óé is used for calling a male, and nii for calling a female; if one wishes to add rudeness, these are substituted by saalaa ‘lit. brother-in-law’ and saalii ‘lit. sister-inlaw’ respectively. Kashmiri (Wali and Koul 1997: 41–2) similarly distinguishes between polite and impolite Vocatives, and between masculine and feminine forms; but it also has distinct forms for singular and plural, and within the polite class, has a class of honoriﬁc vocative particles. Languages diﬀer as to whether they require a lexical element in the position held by Hey in e.g. (128) or whether the position is ﬁlled by an abstract predicate. English, for example, allows Vocatives without any explicit marking, so that (130) will be analysed as (131), where INTERP is an abstract predicate of Interpellation: (130) Bert! (131) (AI : [(FI : INTERP (FI )) (PI )S (PJ : Bert (PJ ))A ] (AI )) Other languages require marking of the Interpellative Illocution, as for example Kashmiri (see above), or Scottish Gaelic: (132) A Sheumais! interp James.voc ‘James!’

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Note that there is no Subact of Reference involved in this type of Vocative. In calling for James’s attention in (132), the Speaker is not referring to him. None of the operators characteristic of reference, such as deﬁniteness, can be applied. In European Portuguese, in which proper names used referentially are marked by the deﬁnite article, no such article appears in Vocative uses: (133) Vi o João. see.pst.1.sg def.sg John ‘I saw John.’ (134) João, o que est-ás a fazer? John def.sg what be-2.sg.prs prog do.inf ‘John, what are you doing?’ The form corresponding to the Addressee may be marked for its Vocative function. In Fijian (Schütz 1985: 355–6) we ﬁnd the preposition i , which Schütz speculates may be related to the accusative preposition i (1985: 357, n. 15). In other languages, the (P2 )A maps onto a Vocative case at the Morphosyntactic Level: in Marathi (Pandhardipande 1997), for example, the noun in question appears in the oblique form, additionally followed by the suﬃx -no in the plural, e.g. from b¯a.l ‘child’: ˜ (135) ba.l-ân-no child-pl.obl-voc ‘o children’ Like other Interactives, Vocatives may be expanded with a Communicated Content containing a description of the Addressee. Where this is the case, the description is indicated at the Representational Level, and may then of course contain all distinctions that pertain to that level. Consider the following example from Standard Moroccan Arabic (Moutaouakil 1989: 146): (136) Y¯a/Pa man yantaz.iru Zayd-an Pinnahu wasala. interp rel await.prs Zayd-acc dem.3.sg arrive.pst ‘You who are waiting for Zayd, he has arrived.’ Here the (C) corresponds to a predication at the Representational Level (‘you are waiting for Zayd’). Note that the form of the interpellative particle y¯a or Pa is determined at the Morphosyntactic Level, being dependent upon the morphosyntactic environment. Where the relativizer l-lad¯ı is applied, the ¯ Interpellative takes the form Payyuh¯a (Moutaouakil 1989: 146): (137) Payyuh¯a l-lad¯ı yantaz.iru Zayd-an Pinnahu wasala. ¯ interp rel await.prs Zayd-acc dem.3.sg arrive.pst ‘You who are waiting for Zayd, he has arrived.’

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Let us summarize this section by considering the epistolary salutation (138) as a Vocative Discourse Act: (138) Dear John It will be clear that dear here lacks any representational meaning, since even an angry letter to John in which it is clear that John is far from being ‘dear’ to the writer may begin with this word. Rather it is an interpellative particle standardized for this communicative context. In other languages, but not in English, the form of the Interpellative varies with the social relation between writer and reader: in Dutch, for example and by way of a rough approximation, geacht(e) ‘lit. respected’ is used for communication with authorities, beste ‘lit. best’ for colleagues and lief/lieve ‘lit. dear, sweet’ for close friends and relatives. Note that the choice between geacht and geachte is dependent upon the association of this word with a gendered noun (neuter and common respectively) at the Morphosyntactic Level. To return to John in (138), this will be shown as the (P2 )A of the Discourse Act. It will thus be analysed as (139): (139) (AI : [(FI : dear (FI )) (PI )S (PJ : John (PJ ))A ] (AI )) This will bypass the Representational Level and pass to the Morphosyntactic Level (in English only for the ordering of the two component words) and from there to the Phonological Level (or more precisely Graphological Level, since this is written language). 2.5.3 Modiﬁers

Illocutions may be modiﬁed by lexical material which bears upon the illocutionary predicate, be it abstract or lexical. Modiﬁers are restrictive, and will accordingly be represented as restrictors upon the illocutionary predicate. Let us consider an example of the modiﬁcation of a lexical illocutionary predicate: (140)

I promise you sincerely that this is not a trick.

Here sincerely is a lexical modiﬁcation, not of the Discourse Act as a whole, but of the Illocution; it is a sincere promise that is being made: (141) (AI : [(FI : promise (FI ): sincerely (FI )) (PI )S (PJ )A (CI ) ] (AI )) The same analysis, but now with an abstract predicate, is appropriate for (142): (142) Sincerely, this is not a trick (143) (AI : [(FI : DECL (FI ): sincerely (FI )) (PI )S (PJ )A (CI ) ] (AI )) Modiﬁers of the abstract predicate INTER can either be Speaker-related or Addressee-related, in the latter case anticipating the DECL Illocution in the

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Response Move. Thus (144) can mean either ‘I ask you frankly why you did it’ or ‘I ask you to tell me frankly why you did it’. (144) Frankly, why did you do it? (145) (AI : [(FI : INTER (FI ): frankly (FI )) (PI )S (PJ )A (CI ) ] (AI )) The position occupied by frankly in (145) can be occupied by ‘a family of expressions’, as Dik (1997a: 305) observes, such as in all frankness, if I can speak frankly, etc. To the extent that these are restrictive, they can be included among the lexical items available for this type of frame. However, where the relationship is non-restrictive, their analysis as modiﬁers is excluded. Rather, there is a relationship between two Discourse Acts, each with its own Illocution, as in (146): (146) Please tidy your sister’s room, although why am I asking you? (147)

(MI : [(AI : [(FI : IMP (FI )) etc.] (AI )) (AJ : [(FJ : INTER (FJ )) etc.] (AJ ))Conc ] (MI ))

It will be clear that the status of illocutionary modiﬁers is very similar to that of Manner Modiﬁers at the Representational Level (see 3.6.3); after all, they indicate the manner in which the Illocution is being carried out, and languages with manner adverbs typically use these in the modiﬁer position under discussion here. It is noticeable that the possible ambiguity that may arise between interpersonal and representational uses of these adverbs can be avoided by adding some indication of the illocutionary status of the former, as in Dutch, where gezegd is iconic of the illocutionary status of the preceding modiﬁer: (148) Eerlijk gezegd werkt hij niet. Honest said work-prs.3.sg he neg ‘To be honest, he isn’t working.’ (149) Eerlijk werkt hij niet. Honest work-prs.3sg he neg ‘He doesn’t work honestly.’ Explicit performative Discourse Acts in English can be accompanied by the adverb hereby (cf. (83b) above). This adverb, which is interpreted as ‘by means of this Discourse Act’, has pronominal status, and will be analysed accordingly. (150) I hereby state that I wish to resign. (151) (AI : [(FI : [stateV ] (FI ): (AI )Means (FI )) (PI )S (PJ )A (CI ) ] (AI )) For some additional puzzles about illocutionary modiﬁers, now with regard to Latin, see Pinkster (2004).

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2.5.4 Operators

The illocutionary variable F can take an operator. This operator accounts for grammatical emphasis and mitigation of a speciﬁc Illocution. Just as the Discourse Act as a whole can be emphasized and mitigated, in which case these operations combine with any Illocution (see 2.4.5), so also the force of speciﬁc Illocutions can be aﬀected. Thus Vismans (1994: 62) has shown that Imperatives in Dutch can be emphasized by the particle dan: (152)

Doe je werk dan! Do your work emph ‘Go on, do your work.’

Dan is not available for emphasizing other types of Illocution (Vismans 1994: 5). Dutch also has mitigating particles, such as maar, which is restricted to DECL and IMPER Illocutions: (153)

a. Je moet maar gaan ﬁetsen. (DECL) you must mit go cycle ‘You should go for a bike ride, you know.’ b. Ga maar ﬁetsen. (IMP) Go mit cycle ‘Why not go for a bike ride?’ c. *Kun je maar gaan ﬁetsen? (INTER) Can you mit go cycle ‘Could you go for a bike ride?’

A language expressing the emphatic operator morphologically is Evenki, sufﬁxing –r’e:, –k’e: or –e: to a verb stem as in (154) (Nedjalkov 1997: 325): (154)

enu-k’e: be.ill-emph ‘It hurts!’

These suﬃxes are limited in their application to Discourse Acts expressing displeasure: kandar"e: ‘I am sick and tired!’; ngokk"e: ‘it smells bad!’, etc. 2.5.5 Frames

In sum, the following frames may be distinguished for Illocutions: (155)

(π F1 : (F1 ): (F1 )) (π F1 : ILL (F1 ): (F1 )) The head position may be occupied by an abstract illocutionary predicate, a lexical performative verb, or a prefabricated interjection with a speciﬁc illocutionary value;

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the interpersonal level The modiﬁer position may be occupied by expressions specifying the manner of the speech act; The operator position may be occupied by an emphatic or mitigating operator.

2.6 The Participants 2.6.1 Introduction

The two Participants in the interaction, (P1 ) and (P2 ), alternate as Speaker and Addressee. Speaker and Addressee are therefore functions, akin to the semantic functions Agent and Recipient respectively. With abstract Illocutions, where there is no lexical illocutionary predicate, there is generally a corresponding non-expression of the Participants. Nevertheless, even in these cases there are good reasons for requiring that at least one Participant should be represented. Firstly, the distinction between self-related and other-related Illocutions (i.e. between Expressives and all other types of Discourse Act) is correlated with the absence or presence respectively of a Participant in the Addressee function. Secondly, the understanding of references to ﬁrst and second person in the Communicated Content is handled through co-reference with the two Participants in the Illocution. The general frame for Participants has the following structure: (156) (π P1 : Ø/ (P1 ): (P1 )) The head of the Participant slot may be Ø or lexical. The latter case is discussed in 2.6.2. Lexically headed Participant slots may contain lexical modiﬁers , discussed in 2.6.3, and operators π, dealt with in 2.6.4. An overview of available frames at the layer of the Illocution is given in 2.6.5. 2.6.2 Heads

Examples of headed Addressee expressions have already been given in passing in our discussion of Vocatives in 2.5.2.4.4. A head for the Speaker slot is called for in examples such as the following (Levinson 1983: 260): (157)

The company hereby undertakes to replace any can of Doggo-Meat that fails to please, with no questions asked.

The representation of (157) will be shown as follows: (158) (AI : [(FI : undertakeV (FI ): (AI )Means (FI )) (PI : companyN (PI ))S (PJ )A (CI : –the company replaces any can of Doggo-Meat that fails to please, with no questions asked– (CI )) ] (AI )) Note that the Addressee in (157) remains unspeciﬁed, and this is reﬂected in the lack of a head in the Addressee slot in (158).

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The Addressee may be speciﬁed lexically as well, as in the following example from Japanese (Hinds 1986: 257): (159)

Iroiro-to suwan san ni shitsumon shimasu. various Swan Ms to question do ‘I’d like to ask you a variety of questions, Ms Swan.’ “I’d like to ask Ms Swan a variety of questions.”

It follows that the ﬁrst and second person pronouns, where explicit, must also reﬂect a head. The representation of (160) must therefore be as in (161): (160) I request you to complete this form. (161) (AI : [(FI : requestV (FI )) (PI : IPro (PI ))S (PJ : youPro (PJ ))A (CI : –you complete this form– (CI )) ] (AI )) 2.6.3 Modiﬁers

A modiﬁer is possible where there is restrictive speciﬁcation of the head. The Speaker will then be indicating a facet of him/herself or of the Addressee that is relevant to the Illocution, or will be selecting a particular Addressee. Consider such expressions as I Caesar or you there: (162) (P1 : youPro (P1 ): thereAdv (P1 )) 2.6.4 Operators

Many of the grammatical operations upon the expression of Participants in an Illocution will be represented by operators. The Participants in the speech event are also represented in the Contextual Component, where all their grammatically relevant properties are listed. These can be copied as operators onto the appropriate Participant, Speaker or Addressee, in each Discourse Act. For example, we ﬁnd operators for number, relating to both Participants. Among the operators to be distinguished here are: (163)

1 2 3 pc m

singular dual trial paucal plural

Changing ﬁrst the informal representations of pronouns above to a system of abstract features (see de Groot and Limburg 1986), the representation of (164), which assumes a number of co-Participants in the Illocution, will be as in (165): (164)

(In a petition:) We declare that we have no conﬁdence in the management.

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(165) (AI : [(FI : declareV (FI )) (m PI : [+S] (PI ))S (PJ )A (CI : –we have no conﬁdence in the management– (CI )) ] (AI )) It is the application of the plural operator m to the abstract representation that here yields we, in the sense of ‘group containing the Speaker’. In Hortative Illocutions, where the sense is ‘I hereby encourage you to join me in C’, the inclusive form of ‘we’, in languages that make that distinction, is appropriate. In Kwaza (van der Voort 2004: 235) there is a distinction between inclusive and exclusive ﬁrst person plural pronouns (txa’na and tsi’tsE respectively). In this language, the form of the Hortative aﬃx, as -ni or -ja respectively, is dependent upon the number of the Addressee (van der Voort 2004: 311–12); where the Addressee is paucal (2 or 3), the latter is chosen, otherwise it is the former. (166)

Txa’na ja-’ja. we.incl eat-hort.pc ‘Let us eat . . . and not give the food to the others.’

This shows the necessity of marking the number, in Kwaza, on the (P2 ), here with the paucal operator pc: (167) (AI : [(FI : HORT (FI )) (1 PI )S (pc PJ )A (CI : –txa’na ja– (CI ))] (AI )) The grammatical properties of Participants can have consequences at both the Interpersonal and the Representational Levels. The relevant information is available to the language user in the Contextual Component and can be distributed to these locations through the Formulator as required. The distinctions are relevant at the Interpersonal Level when they are applied strategically by the Speaker, for example in languages that employ morphological or other distinctions to indicate a Speaker’s degree of formality to an Addressee. An example is (168), from Spanish, in which the form of the verb (están rather than estáis) betrays that the Speaker is attributing higher (h) social status to the Addressee than to him/herself; this strategic property needs to be represented at the Interpersonal Level (IL). However, the number and gender of the Addressee (plural ‘m’ and feminine ‘f ’) are non-strategic properties, and will be copied from the Contextual Component to the Representational Level (RL): ?

(168)

Están despiertas? 2.pl.cop.prog.pol awake.pl.f ‘Are you awake?’

(169) IL: (AI : [(FI : INTER (FI )) (PI )S (hPJ )A (CI :[(TI ) (RI )] (CI )) ] (AI )) RL: (pi : (epi : (ei : [(fi : [(fj : despiert- (fj )) f (m xi ) ] (fi )) (ei ) ]) (epi )) (pi ))

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Similarly, in Japanese several forms are available for insertion into head position. Hinds (1986: 257) lists 6 forms to evoke the Speaker and 5 for the Addressee, the distinctions pertaining to ‘sex of referent, social status of referent, and degree of politeness’. This would again be captured by operators sensitive to the information on speech-act participants available in the Contextual Component. 2.6.5 Frames

In sum, the following frames are available for Participants in the Discourse Act: (170)

(π P1 : ∅ (P1 )) (π P1 : (P1 ): (P1 )) The head position may be empty, or ﬁlled by self-descriptions or forms of address; The modiﬁer position may be occupied by expressions specifying the identity of the Participant; The operator position may be occupied by indications of number and status.

2.7 The Communicated Content 2.7.1 Introduction

Whereas the Illocution indicates the conventionalized conversational use of a Discourse Act, and the Participants represent the essential Speaker-Addressee dyad, the Communicated Content contains the totality of what the Speaker wishes to evoke in his/her communication with the Addressee. In actional terms it corresponds to what Searle (1969) calls the ‘representational act’ and corresponds to the choices the Speaker makes in order to evoke a picture of the external world s/he wants to talk about. The Communicated Content is thus the unit within which the mapping to the Representational Level takes place. In Discourse Acts in which such a mapping is absent, as in Expressives and certain Interactives, there is correspondingly no Communicated Content. In most situations, the Communicated Content of a Declarative Discourse Act will either be entirely new for the Addressee or a composite of new and familiar information. At times, however, the information may already be familiar to the Addressee; the Speaker’s purpose is to remind the Addressee or for some strategic reason to state the obvious. The German lexical modiﬁer bekanntermassen functions to signal this status, as in (171): (171) Von anderen kann man bekanntermaßen oftmals lernen. From others can one as.is.well-known often learn ‘As is well known, one can often learn from other people.’

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In Lillooet the enclitic =qaP, which attaches to the clause-initial element, similarly indicates presupposition, as in (172) (van Eijk 1997: 204): (172) Níì=qaP s-kxiP´u.ì ‘because’=presup nmlz-Kci7ólh ti=um’@n-c-ás=a det=give-1.sg.obj-3.s.sbjv=reinf ‘Well, it is Kci7ólh who gave it to me, as you should know.’ Bekanntermaßen in (171) will be analysed as a modiﬁer (cf. 2.7.3) and =qaP in (172) as an operator (cf. 2.7.4). Each Communicated Content contains one or more Subacts, so called because they are hierarchically subordinate to Discourse Acts, and yet each is a form of communicative action by the Speaker. The Communicated Content will be represented as follows: (173) (π C1 : [ . . . (T1 )N (R1 )N . . . ] (C1 ): (C1 )) where n ≥ ∅ , but a minimum of 1 Subact is required 2.7.2 Heads 2.7.2.1 Introduction

The Subacts contained by the Communicated Content come in exactly two types. A Subact of Ascription (T1 ) is an attempt by the Speaker to evoke a Property. Despite the word ‘ascription’, it need not be the case that the Speaker is actually ascribing a Property to a referent: in uttering It is raining, for example, the Speaker is merely evoking a meteorological Property without evoking any referent; raining is not being ‘ascribed to’, but simply ‘ascribed’. A Subact of Reference (R1 ) is an attempt by the Speaker to evoke a referent, i.e. a null, singleton, or multiple set of entities or qualities. The number of Subacts in a Communicated Content is minimally one. There is no maximum: the number of Subacts will tend to be aﬀected by the type of communicative event, with informal speech being typically characterized by rather simple Cs, and formal written prose permitting more complex combinations. Subacts carry pragmatic functions, and heads of Communicated Contents can be formulated in terms of conﬁgurations of these pragmatic functions. These conﬁgurations have been called ‘message modes’ (Hannay 1991) or ‘pragmatic articulations’ (Smit fc.) in the FG literature. We will use the term ‘content frames’ in what follows. Before turning to these complex heads in 2.7.2.6 we discuss the individual pragmatic functions that Subacts may carry.

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2.7.2.2 Focus (vs Background)

The Focus function signals the Speaker’s strategic selection of new information, e.g. in order to ﬁll a gap in the Addressee’s information, or to correct the Addressee’s information. The Focus function is assigned only in those cases in which this is linguistically relevant, i.e. when languages use linguistic means to indicate that some part of a Linguistic Expression constitutes the relevant new information. The information not assigned the Focus function constitutes the Background. The linguistic marking of Background rather than new information seems to be very rare. In Smit (fc.) Focus is deﬁned as an update instruction to the Addressee. The Focus function may be assigned to a Referential Subact (174), an Ascriptive Subact (175), several Subacts (176), or the Communicated Content as a whole (177). In these examples the focal status of constituents is manifested in prosodic diﬀerences, to be discussed in Chapter 5. (174)

I saw a heron.

(CI : [(TI ) (RI ) (RJ )Foc ] (CI ))

(175)

The wind is blowing.

(CI : [(TI )Foc (RI )] (CI ))

(176)

Peter had bought a book for Mary. (CI : [(TI ) (RI )Foc (RJ )Foc (RK )] (CI ))

(177)

A train arrived.

(CI : [(TI ) (RI )]Foc (CI ))

All-new sentences like (177) are known as thetic statements (Sasse 1987; Cornish 2004). The other cases are instances of categorical statements, characterized by the presence of both a Topic (see below) and a Focus. Generally speaking, categorical statements have one Focus, as in (174)–(175). Focus assignment is, as Dik (1997a: 328–30) points out, often rather like ﬁlling out a form. Forms typically ask us to provide one piece of information per question. However, in some languages questions such as (178) are possible (cf. Siewierska 1991: 223 for an example from Polish), with (179) as a possible answer: (178)

Who recommended whom to whom?

(179)

Professor Brown recommended Nora to the personnel manager.

In (179) Professor Brown, Nora and the personnel manager are all in Focus. Thus this sentence is a further example of a single Communicated Content with several Foci. The status of multiple questions like (179) is crosslinguistically variable. Whereas there are no restrictions on their occurrence in Malayalam (Asher and Kumari 1997: 21), they are possible in Finnish only as ‘checking questions’, i.e. in metacommunicative use (Sulkala and Karjalainen 1992: 15): Who (did you say) recommended whom to whom?. They are possible but rare in Babungo

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(Schaub 1985: 16–17), ‘hypothetically possible, but never used’ in Koromfe (Rennison 1997: 27) and quite impossible in Ndyuka (Huttar and Huttar 1994: 36) and in Evenki (Nedjalkov 1997: 12). They would appear also to be restricted to those languages or constructions that mark Focus through intonation or through the use of special forms (e.g. Q-words or negative words). Where Focus is indicated by other means, we would not expect multiple Foci per Communicated Content. Thus we may conclude that the assignment of one Focus to each Communicated Content is merely a typological preference, not a universal restriction. The assignment of Focus, of whatever type, to an element of the Interpersonal Level is dependent upon the presence of one or more types of ‘special treatment’ (Dik 1997a: 313) of the expression of that element. Dik distinguishes: (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)

adaptation of the form the presence of a Focus marker (e.g. a particle) unusual position in the sequence of constituents a special Focus construction a special prosodic contour (e.g. tonic accentuation)

An example of adaptation of form is to be found in Tariana (Aikhenvald 2003: 139), in which (to simplify a little) the suﬃx -nhe/-ne is applied to Subjects in Focus. This case marker is thus a marker of pragmatic and syntactic function concurrently. This marking can be overridden by the assignment of the reportative marker (cf. Aikhenvald 2003: 303): (180) Mepuku-nuku katu-pida dhe. net-top.nonsbj piraiba-prs.rep 3.sg.nonf.enter ‘A piraiba ﬁsh entered our net, I’m told.’ The Present Reportative evidential marking here signals that katu is in Focus. Other languages have markers that are specialized in marking Focus. A case in point is Wambon (de Vries 1985: 172), which marks Focus by means of -nde: (181) A. Jakhove kenonop-nde takhim-gende? 3.pl what-foc buy-3.pl.prs.final ‘What do they buy?’ B. Ndu-nde takhim-gende. Sago-foc buy-3.pl.prs.final ‘They buy sago.’

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A third way of marking Focus is by assigning a special syntactic position to the Focus element. Thus in Aghem (182) (Watters 1979: 144), for example, the immediately postverbal position is reserved for Focus; in Hungarian (183) (Kenesei et al. 1998: 166), by contrast, it is the immediately preverbal position that is occupied by the Focus. (182) A m`O ñ1´N énáP. dum rem.pst run Inah ‘It was Inah that ran.’ (183) A vendégek tegnap érkeztek a szállodá-ba. the guests yesterday arrived the hotel-loc ‘It was yesterday that the guests arrived at the hotel.’ Many languages indicate the Focus by employing a special Focus construction. Where this construction takes the form of a cleft construction, this strategy involves the Representational Level as well, since the semantic material is organized in a particular way. In particular, the content is divided into two segments, one of which is in Focus. These two segments are equated with each other. The Communicated Content thus takes on the form of two Referential Subacts and the corresponding individuals are equated with each other at the Representational Level: (184) (C1 : [(R1 )Foc (R2 )] (C1 )) This structure leads to such constructions as (185a–c), cf. Dik (1997b: 291–312) for discussion: (185)

a. It was tomatoes that I bought. b. What I bought were tomatoes. c. Tomatoes were what I bought.

As observed by Dik, it appears to be possible in some languages to Focus upon a predicate by means of such a construction. A construction that comes close to this in English is (186) (Dik 1997b: 314): (186) What he does for a living is teach. However, note that we cannot regard teach here as an Ascriptive Subact, since it is equated with the Referential Subact What he does for a living. Focus assignment, ﬁnally, is strongly associated in many languages with intonational prominence (cf. 5.5), and typically with pitch movement on the characteristic accent position (CAP) of the major lexical item in the Focused element. However, as was already pointed out by Dik (1997a: 461), ‘there is no one-to-one relation between Focus and accent distribution’; his position

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appears to be that phonological prominence is applied above all where structural clues (e.g. the Focus constructions discussed above) are unavailable. This matter will receive more detailed treatment in Chapter 5. 2.7.2.3 Topic (vs Comment)

Another dimension of the organization of information structure is the TopicComment dichotomy. The Topic function, where relevant in languages, is not complementary to Focus, but part of this second dimension. Indeed, as we will show below, in certain circumstances a constituent can be simultaneously Focus (along the Focus-Background dimension) and Topic (along the TopicComment dimension). Topic function will be assigned to a Subact which has a special function within the Discourse Act, that of signalling how the Communicated Content relates to the gradually constructed record in the Contextual Component. The information not assigned the Topic function constitutes the Comment. The linguistic marking of the Comment rather than the topical information seems to be very rare. In Smit (fc.) Topic is deﬁned as the linguistic reﬂection of a ‘retrieve’ instruction to the Addressee. In (187), for example, from Dutch, the antecedent of the Topic dat is located in the Contextual Component: (187) Dat heb ik nooit gezegd. That have I never said ‘I never said that.’ The assignment of Topic function makes it explicit that the other Subacts will in some way further develop the information in the Contextual Component. This deﬁnition predisposes the assignment of Topic to Given information, but this is no more than a default correlation. Dik (1997a: 324) stresses that Topics can also contain information that can be ‘legitimately inferred’ from the Contextual Component (his SubTopics) or information that is no longer active in the episodic memory (his Resumed Topics; Dik 1997a: 327–8), but the link with the Contextual Component is primary. Given the basic function of Topics of relating the Communicated Content to existing information in the Contextual Component, a Communicated Content will generally not consist of just a Topic. Where there is more than one Subact, however, there is the possibility of assigning Topic to one of the Subacts. Again, as with Focus assignment, this is done only where this function has some repercussions on the linguistic realization of the Discourse Act. Thus Mackenzie and Keizer (1991) argued that English (on this basis) lacks a Topic function, since no formal features exist in that language which justify the assumption of Topic function. In Dutch, on the other hand, the expression of a Referential Subact can occur in clause-initial position as a result of the assignment of Topic function, as was shown in (187), in which the clause-initial

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positioning of the anaphor dat ‘that’ can be ascribed to its being the Topic of the ongoing Discourse Act. In English (188), by contrast, clause-initial that is necessarily accented and is used for the expression of Contrast, with (implied) comparison with other possibilities: (188) That I never said. An essential characteristic of the Topic function is that it is assigned to a Subact within the Communicated Content. It should therefore be distinguished from Theme or Tail, analysed above as a dependent Discourse Act of Orientation and Correction (2.3.2; see further below). Consider the following example from Persian (Mahootian 1997: 124): (189)

Doxtar-i ke hæmkelasi-m-e be-heš telefon-zæd-æm girl-dem that classmate-1.sg-cop.3.sg to-3.sg telephone-hit-1.sg ‘The girl who is my classmate, I called her.’

(190) Be mæhin bilit-o dad-æm to Mahin ticket-obj give.pst-1.sg ‘I gave the ticket to Mahin.’ In (189) there is a double reference to ‘the girl’ by means of doxtar-i and beheš, whereas in (190) there is initial positioning of the phrase be mæhin but no corresponding pronoun be-heš. The prima facie analysis of (189) will therefore be as a succession of Discourse Acts, doxtar-i ke hæmkelasi-m-e and be-heš telefon-zæd-æm, with the ﬁrst dependent upon the second, whereas (190) will be analysed as a single Discourse Act, with Topic be mæhin. Persian has another strategy for topicalization, suﬃxation with -ra/-ro/-o, also used to indicate a deﬁnite Undergoer; this suﬃxation is never obligatory. If the head of the topicalized phrase is an adverb, the suﬃxation may or may not be accompanied by clause-initial placement (Mahootian 1997: 121–2): (191)

a. Kæmal emšæb-o inja mi-mun-e Kamal tonight-top here dur-stay-3.sg ‘Kamal is staying here tonight.’ b. Emšæb-o Kæmal inja mi-mun-e tonight-top Kamal here dur-stay-3.sg ‘Kamal is staying here tonight.’

However, if the head is a noun, suﬃxation entails placement in initial position (perhaps to avoid misinterpretation as the marker of a deﬁnite Undergoer), as in the case of the Recipient argument golaro in (192): (192)

Gol-a-ro mæhin ab dad ﬂower-pl-top Mahin water gave ‘Mahin watered the ﬂowers.’

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The preceding examples exemplify several other points about the assignment of the Topic function. Firstly, observe that Topic can be assigned to Subacts that serve to indicate the setting of the State-of-Aﬀairs being evoked, as in (191). The Contextual Component contains information about spatial and temporal coordinates, and these can also be selected for Topic status. Secondly, pragmatic functions tend to take priority over semantic functions at the Morphosyntactic Level; whereas a Recipient not morphosyntactically marked for Topic is indicated by the preposition be (cf. (190)), a Recipient that is marked for Topic is not simultaneously marked for its semantic function (cf. golaro in (192)). Thirdly, it is instructive that there is homonymy in Persian between the marker of deﬁniteness on Undergoers and the marker of Topic: Topic correlates strongly not only with Givenness, but also with expected identiﬁability for the Addressee, i.e. deﬁniteness. The positioning of a Topical element at the beginning of a clause can also apply to an element of a clause embedded within that clause. Consider the following example, also from Persian (Mahootian 1997: 126): (193) Mæšrub goft-æm (ke) næ-xor. alcohol say.pst-1.sg comp neg-eat ‘Alcohol I told you not to drink.’ At the Representational Level, mæšrub will be analysed as an argument of the verb xor, at the Morphosyntactic Level; however, the corresponding noun phrase will appear as a constituent of the higher clause. This raising eﬀect (cf. 4.4.8.5) is treated in FDG as triggered by the pragmatic function of this constituent at the Interpersonal Level, which here too overrules the Representational Level. Multiple Topics are possible in certain languages. Thus in Turkish, in which Topic can be expressed by initial placement, we ﬁnd (194), from Kornﬁlt (1997: 205), in which both kitab-ı and Ali-ye are Topic, as is evident from their placement in front of the subject constituent Hasan: (194)

Kitab-ı Ali-ye Hasan dün ver-di book-acc Ali-dat Hasan yesterday give-pst ‘Hasan gave Ali the book yesterday.’

In this example dün has Focus function, expressed through placement in the preverbal position. This brings us to the following representation of (194): (195) (CI : [(TI ) (RI : Hasan (RI )) (RJ )Top (RK : Ali (RK ))Top (RL )Foc ] (CI )) Not all languages make use of the function Topic, as was mentioned above for English. Others can be described as clearly topic-prominent. Mandarin Chinese clauses, for example (Chao 1968), are based upon the principle of the

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succession of Topic and Comment (with the latter containing the Focus of the Communicated Content). Consider (196) from van den Berg (1989: 38): (196) Wˇomen ch¯ı miàn. we eat noodles ‘We are eating noodles.’ In the context provided, wˇomen, being placed ﬁrst, is Topic, and the rest is Comment. Within the Comment miàn is Focus. In Modern Standard Chinese a Topic may be followed by a pause marker a which van den Berg (1989: 42) interprets as giving the Speaker time to formulate his/her utterance. Van den Berg (1989: 41) gives an example with two Topics: (197)

Wˇomen a j¯ınti¯an a ch¯ı miàn. We paus today paus eat noodles ‘We . . . ah . . . today . . . ah . . . are eating noodles.’

Topic assignment is not restricted to Referential Subacts. Ascriptive Subacts may also form (part of) the point of departure for a statement, as in the following Spanish example, uttered in the context of a question about the amount of rainfall: (198) Llov-er no lluev-e. rain-inf neg rain-prs.3.sg.ind ‘It doesn’t rain here.’ “Raining it doesn’t rain.” The topical Ascriptive Subact is realized through an inﬁnitival copy of the main verb in initial position. In the equivalent Dutch construction a dummy verb is used instead in the ﬁnite position: (199) Regen-en doet het hier niet. rain-inf do.3.sg.prs it here not ‘It doesn’t rain here.’ “Raining it doesn’t do here.” We will return in 4.4.6. to the syntactic analysis of this type of construction. As mentioned in 2.3.2 there is a close connection between Orientations (as Subsidiary Discourse Acts) and Topics. An example of a sequence of a Subsidiary Discourse Act and a Nuclear Discourse Act can be found in Finnish, from Sulkala and Karjalainen (1992: 189): (200) Tuo tyttö, hänessä on jota-kin tuttua that girl 3.sg.iness cop which.partv-too familiar-partv ‘That girl, there is something familiar about her.’

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The Dependent Discourse Act tuo tyttö presents a Referential Subact, with the Np in the neutral nominative case; the Nuclear Discourse Act contains a Topic hänessä, in clause-initial position, and marked for the Inessive case. This formulation is pragmatically convenient for the Speaker and Addressee, but is dissonant with the uniﬁed conceptualization ‘There is something familiar about that girl’. There is therefore some pressure upon Speakers (especially in the written language where there are fewer time restrictions) to express such States-of-Aﬀairs within a single Discourse Act, in which the initially realized Referential Subact is treated as the Topic. This leads to the integration of Orientations discussed by Dik (1997b: 403–4) as a recurrent diachronic process. 2.7.2.4 Contrast (vs Overlap)

A ﬁnal information-structural function to be discussed here is Contrast, which signals the Speaker’s desire to bring out the particular diﬀerences between two or more Communicated Contents or between a Communicated Content and contextually available information. The counterpart of Contrast would be Overlap, signalling the Speaker’s desire to bring out the particular similarities between two or more Communicated Contents or between a Communicated Content and contextually available information. The marking of Overlap rather than Contrast, however, seems to be non-existent. Contrast is often treated as a special type of Focus, but we treat it as an independent function here, since Contrast may combine with both Focal and Topical constituents. For an example of the latter, consider the following example from Wambon (de Vries 1985: 174): (201) A: Nombone ndu-ngup ande-ngup? this sago-and banana-and ‘What about this sago and bananas?’ B: Wembane ndu-nde takhima-tbo, Wemba sago-contr buy-3sg.pst.final ‘Wemba bought the sago, Karolule ande-nde takhima-tbo. Karolus banana-contr buy-3.sg.pst.final Karolus bought the bananas.’ Here the elements carrying the Contrast marker are clearly not new; rather they provide the pieces of knowledge from the Contextual Component that form the points of departure of the two statements in (201b). Another example of this is given in (202): (202) John and Bill came to see me. John was nice, but Bill was rather boring.

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Of this example Dik (1997a: 326) claims that John, nice, Bill and rather boring are all subject to Focus assignment (cf. also Siewierska 1991: 178), and indeed it is possible to pronounce (202) with pitch movement on each of these (cf. 5.4). However, where John and Bill are treated in this way, this is just because the Speaker wishes also to signal the diﬀerences between the two Communicated Contents John was nice and Bill was rather boring, not because s/he wishes to update A’s knowledge with new or correcting information. Thus John and Bill should be treated here as Contrastive Topics, not as Contrastive Foci. The fact that Contrast has often been interpreted as a special type of Focus is probably related to the fact that Focus and Contrast often make use of the same expression format. This is the case of the morphological marker –nde in Wambon, which is used as a Focus marker in example (181) and as a Contrast marker in (201). It is also the case of pitch movement in English. The explanation for this overlap is that both Focus and Contrast (and Emphasis, see below) involve saliency. There are, however, also many languages in which the marking of Focus and Contrast is clearly distinct. Thus, Kham (Watters 2002: 183) has a specialized marker for Contrast: (203) Ao po:-l@ te tam ja:h-si-u li-zya. this place-in contr wheat put-detrans-nml be-cont ‘In this place, as opposed to others, wheat has been sown.’ In Tuvaluan (Besnier 2000: 244–5), ‘the case marker a can mark optionally any noun phrase in the absolutive case or otherwise not marked for case. . . . However, when it is optional . . . , a marks contrastiveness’, as in (204): (204)

Maaua e olo atu, a tino koo seeai. we.du.excl nonpst go deict contr person inch neg ‘We came along, but there was no one left.’

In Bulgarian (Stanchev 1997), a constituent with Contrast function is placed in preverbal position, but before any clitics: (205)

Az kola-ta vchera ya prodadox, a ne dnes. 1.sg car-def yesterday 3.sg.acc sell.pst.1.sg and neg today ‘It was yesterday that I sold the car, and not today.’

A constituent with Focus function, on the other hand, is preferably placed in clause-ﬁnal position (although Contrastive Focus may also appear there): (206) Az vchera v magazina kupix edna kniga. 1.sg yesterday in shop.def buy.pst.1.sg indf book I yesterday bought a book in the shop.’

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Focus may also appear in clause-initial position, but then with intonational prominence, cf. (207) in answer to Ti kakvo kupi na pazara? ‘What did you buy at the market?’: (207)

Domati kupix. tomato.pl buy.pst.1.sg ‘I bought tomatoes.’

In Stanchev’s (1997) analysis, Bulgarian is a language in which the placement of constituents (with respect to the main verb) is very strongly inﬂuenced by their pragmatic functions. Of related interest here is the claim by Dik (1997a: 330) that Focus can be assigned to restrictors and operators from the Representational Level. In principle, in English pragmatically induced pitch movement is applied to the last CAP syllable of the Focused element, here informally shown as capitalization: (208) I like the green CAR. (209) I am rePAINTing it. However, in the context of another Participant’s having said that s/he preferred the red car, the Speaker is likely to shift the stress to the word indicating the concept when expressing Contrast as in (210); similarly, in answer to the question Are you painting the house? the Speaker is likely to say (211): (210)

I like the GREEN car.

(211) I am REpainting it. Dik claims that in (210) (Contrastive) Focus is assigned to the restrictor in the representation of the green car and in (211) to ‘part of the predicate’. We interpret these examples as cases of Contrast assignment rather than as cases of Focus assignment. Note that what the Speaker of (210) likes remains ‘the green car’ and what the Speaker of (211) is doing remains ‘repainting’ the house. What the data in (210)–(211) show is that the assignment of stress at the Phonological Level is sensitive not only to Contrast assignment to these constituents, but also to the information in the Contextual Component. The presence of ‘the red car’ and ‘painting’ in the Contextual Component justiﬁes the switch of stress to the marked position. There are languages in which this local expression of Contrast is not permitted. For instance, in Kham, which was shown to have a specialized marker for Contrast in (203), this marker can only occur at the phrasal layer (Watters 2002: 184): (212)

a. mol-o ka:h-ye te black-nmlz dog-erg contr

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b. *mol-o te ka:h-ye black-nmlz contr dog-erg ‘the black dog’ 2.7.2.5 Combinations of pragmatic functions

We have treated information-structural functions in the preceding paragraphs as pertaining to three diﬀerent parameters: Focus (versus Background), Topic (versus Comment), and Contrast (versus Overlap). In each case it is the ﬁrst value for which we normally ﬁnd linguistic manifestations. These three values, Focus, Topic, and Contrast, may in principle be combined with each other, so that we would expect conﬁgurations like the following to be linguistically relevant as well: — — — —

Focus/Contrast Topic/Contrast Focus/Topic Focus/Topic/Contrast

As indicated earlier, Contrast is assumed to be a subtype of Focus in many approaches, so that the combination Focus/Contrast is not a surprising one. In English this combination is typically expressed through a cleft sentence, as in: (213) It was the zoo that they went to, not the museum. The combination Topic/Contrast was illustrated above for Wambon and English in (201) and (202) respectively. These languages use the same means for expressing this combination of values as they do for Focus. A more salient example of how the combination Topic/Contrast may manifest itself comes from Korean, a language that has a marker that is exclusively used for Contrastive Topics (see Lee 1999). Consider the following example (Pultr 1960: 224): (214)

Na-nWn morW-mnida 1.sg-contr.top not.know-hon ‘I don’t know (but others maybe do)’

The combination Focus/Topic is relevant for the analysis of presentative constructions, which serve the purpose of introducing a new topic into the discourse. The following example is from Saisiyat (Hsieh and Huang 2006: 100): (215)

Hiza= hayza’ ila koSa’en ka SaiSiyat. there ex pfv paus nom Saisiyat ‘Once there were Saisiyats.’

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the interpersonal level

In this language the nominative particle ka is used with a postverbal subject in presentative constructions. In non-presentative constructions the subject is preverbal and the nominative particle is absent (Hsieh and Huang 2006: 99): (216) Takem kas’oehaz ila. frog a.foc.move.out pfv ‘The frog moved out.’ Another example is the following French construction, adapted from Dik (1997a: 317): (217) Il est arrivé trois trains. it aux.prs.3.sg arrive. ptcp.sg.m three trains ‘There arrived three trains.’ This presentative construction is characterized by the dummy subject il, the postverbal position of the single argument, and the absence of agreement of the verb, all of which are in contrast with features of the non-presentative construction illustrated in (218): (218) Les trois trains sont arrivés. the three trains aux.prs.3.pl arrive.ptcp.pl.m ‘The three trains arrived.’ Finally, a constituent that is focal and topical may be presented contrastively, as in: (219)

There is BEER without alcohol, not whisky.

where the combination of the functions Top and Foc leads to the choice of the presentative construction type, while the function Contr is reﬂected in stress assignment. Thus, by separating the three dimensions of information structuring, the aforementioned constructions come out naturally as the expression of combinations of information-structuring functions. 2.7.2.6 Content frames

We are now ready to look at the possible combinations of Subacts with pragmatic functions that may ﬁll the head position of the Communicated Content. We will call such combinations content frames, which are non-hierarchically organized combinations of Subacts, to distinguish them from interpersonal frames, which take care of the hierarchical organization of the Interpersonal Level. Content frames constitute the FDG formalization of Hannay’s (1991) idea of message modes. A few examples based on the distribution of Topic and Focus are the following (observe that SA here stands for any Subact):

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(220) Thetic [(SA)N ]FOC (221) Categorical [(SA)TOP (SA)N (SA)FOC ] (222)

Presentative [(SA)N (SA)TOPFOC ]

Note that the inventory of frames is language-speciﬁc. Thus, in Topic-oriented languages a categorical content frame could take the form in (223), while in a Focus-oriented language it could take the form in (224): (223) Categorical—Topic-oriented [(SA)N (SA)TOP ] (224) Categorical—Focus-oriented [(SA)N (SA)FOC ] Tidore is a strongly Topic-oriented language, as is shown by the following examples (van Staden 2000: 273): (225) turus una=ge, mina mo-sango una then 3.sg.m=there 3.sg.f 3.sg.f.a-answer 3.sg.m ‘Then she answered him.’ “Then he, she answered him.” (226) tagi nde, fangato koliho rea go 3.nh.here 1.sg.m.a go.back not.anymore ‘I won’t come back anymore.’ “Given this going, I won’t come back anymore.” The Topics in these examples are marked in three diﬀerent ways: (i) they occur in ﬁrst position, (ii) they are followed by a locative enclitic or particle, (iii) they are set oﬀ intonationally from the main clause. Both referential (225) and ascriptive (226) Subacts may be treated in this way. Thus, specifying the units in the basic content frame in (223) we arrive at the formalizations in (227) and (228) for (225) and (226) respectively: (227)

[(TI ) (RI ) (RJ )TOP ]

(228) [(TI )TOP (RI )] Kisi is a strongly Focus-oriented language, as illustrated by examples (229) and (230) from Childs (1995: 270–1): (229) MààlóN ó có cùùcúúwó ní. rice he aux sow foc ‘It’s rice he is sowing.’

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(230) PùE´ NndáN yá púE´ N ní. forgetting I forget foc ‘It’s forgetting that I did.’ Focus is marked in two ways in Kisi: (i) the Focused constituent occurs in ﬁrst position, and (ii) a Focus particle occurs in clause-ﬁnal position. This operation can be applied to both referential (229) and ascriptive (230) Subacts. Using the basic content frame in (224), (229), and (230) may be represented as in (231)–(232) respectively: (231) [(TI ) (RI ) (RI )FOC ] (232) [(TI )FOC (RI )] As a ﬁnal example, consider the following Turkish example (Kornﬁlt 1997: 205), discussed before as (194), in which both kitab-ı and Ali-ye are Topic, as reﬂected in their placement in clause-initial position, preceding the Subject constituent Hasan that would occupy that position otherwise, and dün is Focus, as shown by its preverbal position, which is the Focus position in Turkish: (233) Kitab-ı Ali-ye Hasan dün ver-di book-acc Ali-dat Hasan yesterday give-pst ‘Hasan gave Ali the book yesterday.’ For this example a content frame containing multiple Topics and a single Focus is needed, as given in (234): (234) [(T1 ) (R1 ) (R2 )Top (R3 )Top (R4 )Foc ] 2.7.3 Modiﬁers

As with all other units, the Communicated Content can be modiﬁed by lexical material. Potential modiﬁers at this layer include emphatic ones. This type of modiﬁer is pervasive at the Interpersonal Level, in the sense that it applies to all kinds of actional units. At the layer of the Communicated Content this means that the entire content of an utterance is emphasized, as in the following examples: (235) I really don’t like you. (236) Do you really want to hurt me? These are diﬀerent from emphatic modiﬁers of the Discourse Act, in the sense that they do not express irritation, anger, and the like, but intensify the content of the Discourse Act. They furthermore have a more limited distribution, in

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the sense that they are incompatible with certain Illocutions. Another diﬀerence is that their expression is not peripheral, but internal. And lastly, they can combine with Discourse Act modiﬁers, as in: (237)

I really don’t like you dammit!

Other modiﬁers of C express the Speaker’s subjective attitude towards the Communicated Content. Examples are items such as (un)fortunately and luckily. Such content-oriented evaluations are speaker-bound and therefore pertain at the Interpersonal Level. Yet another class of modiﬁers serve to indicate that the Speaker is passing on a Communicated Content expressed or implied by others. Whereas modiﬁers of Propositional Contents at the Representational Level indicate an attitude to what is being communicated (an assessment of the likelihood or obviousness of what is being said, see 3.3.3), modiﬁers of Communicated Contents merely indicate that the Speaker is relaying the views of others. English adverbials with this function include reportedly, purportedly, etc. We already mentioned the German bekanntermassen in 2.7.1. In South American Spanish, we ﬁnd dizque (historically ‘s/he says that’) in a similar function: (238) Lo hizo dizque para ayud-ar. 3.sg.n do.pst.3.sg reportedly to help-inf ‘Reportedly he did it to help.’ Whereas these adverbials do not indicate the source of the report, other modiﬁers of the Communicated Content such as according to reliable sources, in Bill’s words, etc. are more speciﬁc about whose voice is being transmitted. To some extent, this analysis is also appropriate for indications of whose voice is being relayed in direct quotation. At the Representational Level we would wish to regard the quoted speech in (239a) as an argument of say, a position supported by the correspondence with (239b). In the context of a Speaker narrating a dialogue between Bill and Mary as in (240), however, there are reasons to believe that the clauses Bill said and Mary said are to be seen as modiﬁers of the relayed Communicated Content rather than as being part of the head: (239)

a. Bill said, ‘The weather is getting worse.’ b. Bill said that the weather was getting worse.

(240)

< . . . > ‘I’m not leaving yet,’ Bill said. ‘But we’ll be late,’ Mary said. ‘That’s not so important,’ Bill said < . . . >

Notice that Bill said in (240), but not so readily in (239a), can appear in the inverted order said Bill, and the very order of presentation (Communicated

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Content and then source) suggests a head + modiﬁer relation. The modiﬁer status of such clauses unsurprisingly leads to their becoming formally less ﬂexible: consider how the past tense of the Middle English verb quethan ‘say’ has survived in the invariable (mock-)archaic Modern English quoth. We shall analyse (240), therefore, as consisting of a series of Moves, each consisting of one Discourse Act, the Communicated Content of which is the part within quotation marks, each with a modiﬁer indicating the source of that Content (cf. Gonçalves 2003). The Speaker of (240) is, as it were, acting the parts of Bill and Mary alternately. 2.7.4 Operators

The relayed status of a Communicated Content is often indicated grammatically. Thus in Shipibo (Faust 1973) we ﬁnd the suﬃx -ronqui in this reportative function: (241) Cai-ronqui reocoocainyantanque. going-rep he.turned.over ‘Reportedly, while he was going (in the boat), he turned over.’ Such a suﬃx will be represented as a Rep(ortative) operator on the C-variable. In a tale told in Sliammon (Watanabe 2003: 548–92), we note that once the Speaker starts telling the story, almost every Communicated Content contains the clitic k w a attached to the end of the ﬁrst constituent; this clitic is missing again in the Speaker’s ﬁnal Discourse Acts, which provide the ‘moral’ of the story. The story, which was also recorded by Boas (1888), is part of the lore of the Sliammon people; the Speaker is relaying that story rather than telling it. This explains the recurrent use of the reportative marker. Interestingly, where the characters in the story use direct speech, there is no reportative marker in their words. In the context of the story, they are speaking for themselves, not relaying the words and thoughts of someone else. In Lithuanian (Gronemeyer 1997), the active-participial form of the verb is used to indicate reportative status, i.e. that ‘the speaker does not vouch for the validity of the claim, but merely relates what someone else has claimed’. One of her examples is (242): (242) Kadaise cˇ ia buv-˛e didel-i mišk-ai. long.ago here be-a.ptcp.nom.pl large-nom.pl forest-nom.pl ‘Long ago there were large forests here, it is said.’ ‘The ﬁnite copula is strictly excluded under the reportative interpretation’ (Gronemeyer 1997: 100). The copula insertion rule will thus be blocked in Lithuanian under the inﬂuence of the operator Rep(ortative). There is a natural association of the reportative with the third person: a Speaker does not usually communicate what others say about him/herself.

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The marked application of the reportative construction in Lithuanian to the ﬁrst person, for example, engenders an interpretation of detachment and nondeliberateness (Gronemeyer 1997). (243) Aš pa-reš-˛es nauj-a˛ knyg-a.˛ 1.sg.nom pfv-write-a.ptcp.nom.sg.m new-acc book-acc ‘It seems I’ve written a new book!’ Curnow (2002) gives examples of applications of the Reportative from Wintu and Tucano in which the Speaker is drunk or is being born respectively: in both cases, the Speaker is unaware of the State-of-Aﬀairs and can only report others’ say-so. A special property of truly reportative markers, which sets it oﬀ from other evidential categories, is that they often combine with a whole range of Illocutions, as shown in the following examples from Kham (Watters 2002: 297, 298): (244)

kã: ma-zyo-ke-o di. food neg-eat-pfv-3.sg rep ‘He didn’t eat (or so it’s said).’

(245)

ba-n-ke di. go-2sg-imp rep ‘Go (you’re told)!’

(246)

karao di. why rep ‘Why (someone wants to know)?’

Watters clearly shows that adding a reportative marker to an utterance is not the same as quoting that utterance in direct speech, since the shifters in the original utterance orient themselves towards the current Speaker. Compare (247) and (248) from Watters (2002: 298): (247)

r@i-d-y-ã-ke’ h@i d-˜ı:-zya-o. ‘Na-za my-child bring-ss-ben-1.sg-imp thus say-2.sg-impf-3.sg ‘She says to you: “Bring my child to me”. ’

(248)

di. o-za r@i-d-i:-ke her-child bring-ss-ben.3.sg-imp rep ‘Bring her child to her (you’re told)!’

From these facts we may conclude that in utterances containing a truly reportative modality it is the current Speaker who executes the Discourse Act, although on behalf of another speaker. Spanish uses a special construction type for relayed speech as well. Compare the following examples:

106 !

(249)

the interpersonal level Que venga-s a come-r! rep come.prs.subj-2.sg to eat-inf ‘Come and eat! (I’m ordering you on behalf of someone else.)’

(250) Que si vienes mañana. rep if come.prs.ind-2.sg tomorrow ‘Will you come tomorrow? (I’m asking you on behalf of someone else).’ The sentence-initial particle que, identical in form to a subordinator, is used here to indicate that the current Speaker is relaying information on behalf of someone else. Note that, as indicated in 2.4.4, these constructions can also be used for the expression of Emphatic Discourse Acts, but in that case they combine with a diﬀerent prosodic pattern. Another operator is the grammatical counterpart of the emphatic modiﬁer discussed in the previous section. Grammaticalized expressions of Emphasis at the layer of the Communicated Content often ﬁnd their origin in cleft-like constructions. In Scottish Gaelic, a construction is used that is also used for the clefting on non-Nps: (251) ’S ann a dh’fheumas tu rud beag de dh’eòlas ciùil cleft must/need 2.sg thing little of knowledge music.gen ‘It’s just that you must have some knowledge of music.’ Similarly, in Mandarin Chinese we ﬁnd the original cleft pattern for emphatic constructions (Li and Thompson 1981: 591): (252) W˘o shì gˇen n˘ı k¯aiwánxiào de. 1.sg cop with you joke nmlz ‘I’m just joking with you.’ To the extent that these constructions are grammaticalized, they are captured by an Emph(atic) operator at the C-layer. 2.7.5 Frames

To summarize, then, the Communicated Content has the following structure: (253) (π C1 : [(T) N (R) N ] (C1 ): (C1 )) Among the possible occupants of the operator position π are the Reportative and the Emphatic operators. The head of the Communicated Content is occupied by a Content Frame, consisting of a range of juxtaposed Subacts of Ascription (T) and reference (R). Pragmatic functions can be assigned to these Subacts, or to the Content Frame as a whole. Finally, there is a position

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for lexical modiﬁers, to indicate the source of the C, the Speaker’s subjective attitude towards C, or lexical elements emphasizing C.

2.8 Subacts 2.8.1 Introduction

It is a fundamental belief of speech-act theory that reference should be analysed as actional. This position was also taken by Dik (1978: 55), who wrote that ‘referring should be regarded as a pragmatic, cooperative action of a Speaker within a pattern of verbal interaction between that Speaker and some Addressee’. By using the word ‘pragmatic’, Dik sought to link referring to what he saw as the primary function of communication, ‘to eﬀect changes in the pragmatic information’ of that Addressee (Dik 1978: 128). The pragmatic information consists of all the information (long-term, situational and immediate) that communicators bring to bear upon their interaction. FDG endorses this position, but also considers that ascription is actional in the same way. Just as referring involves an attempt by the Speaker to inﬂuence the Addressee’s ‘pragmatic information’, so does ascribing. In exactly the same way as with referring, the choice of lexical material, and the amount oﬀered, derive from the Speaker’s estimate of how best to inﬂuence the Addressee (cf. Mackenzie 1987b). Accordingly, we shall regard both ascription and reference as actional, as the two aspects of the more global action of evocation. We shall say that a Speaker evokes a Communicated Content by carrying out a number (n ≥ 1) of Subacts of Ascription and Reference. The Interpersonal Level thus distinguishes three actional layers: (i) the Move, the execution of an Initiation or Response in interaction; (ii) the Discourse Act, the execution of an illocutionary or nonillocutionary Discourse Act; (iii) the Evocation, the execution of a set of Subacts which make up the Communicated Content. In certain languages, the (T) or (R) status of elements of the Communicated Content is marked explicitly. In Samoan (Mosel and Hovdhaugen 1992: 52, 56), an ascriptive element is typically placed in clause-initial position; placement of a referential element in clause-initial position entails the addition of the presentative particle "o, as illustrated in (255). The basic order is illustrated in (254): (254)

"Ua o tamaiti i Apia. prf go children ld Apia ‘The children have gone to Apia.’

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"O le maile sa fasi e le teine. pres art dog pst hit erg art girl ‘The dog was hit by the girl.’

In Tagalog (Himmelmann fc.), another ascription-initial language, it is the ascriptive element (T) rather than the preposed constituent that is obligatorily marked in cases of inversion. Example (257) shows the use of the predicate marker (pm) ay, which is absent when the predicate is in initial position (256): (256) Ma-saráp ang pag-kain. stat-satisfaction spec ger-eating ‘The food was good.’ (257)

Silá mag-iná ay na-tulog na. 3.pl rec-mother pm rls.stat-sleep now ‘The mother and her daughter fell asleep.’

We ﬁnd the marker –mi or –mali indicating referential status in Sabanê (Antunes 2004: 113–15). In Modern Standard Fijian it would appear that the referential status is indicated by the particle na, as in (258). This particle is absent when a noun is being used non-referentially, as in (259), where the lack of a transitivity marker on the verb indicates the presence of incorporation (Crowley 1985: 136–7, cited in Rijkhoﬀ 2002: 95): (258) Au Nunu-va na wai. I drink-tr part water ‘I am drinking the water.’ (259) Au Nunu wai. I drink water ‘I drink water.’ In Boumaa Fijian (Dixon 1988: 115), a (the corresponding particle) is omitted when a noun is used predicatively, i.e. in the expression of an Ascriptive Subact; cf. (260), from Dixon (1988: 67), which cannot mean ‘I want a horse’: (260) Au via ose. I want horse ‘I want to be a horse.’ 2.8.2 Ascription 2.8.2.1 Introduction

The Subact of Ascription is the Speaker’s attempt to ascribe a semantic category. As mentioned in 2.7.1, we will not say that the Speaker ascribes a Property

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to some referent, since we will allow for Communicated Contents with only an Ascriptive Subact. For example, in (261), represented in (262), the Property ‘rain’ is ascribed, but is not ascribed to any referent, since no Referential Subact corresponds to it: (261)

It is raining.

(262) (C1 : (T1 ) (C1 )) Note that the Interpersonal Level merely records the presence of the Subact. The lexical item rain will be supplied at the Representational Level. It is not the case that every predicate at the Representational Level will correspond to an Ascriptive Subact at the Interpersonal Level. Consider instances of gapping, as in (263): (263)

Peter has a blue car and Mike a red car.

At the Representational Level, the second clause in (263) will be shown as containing a semantic variable for the Property have coreferential with the lexically realized property in the ﬁrst clause. At the Interpersonal Level, however, there is no corresponding Ascriptive Subact. The absence of an Ascriptive Subact will signal to the Morphosyntactic Level to implement ‘gapping’. In this way, the Interpersonal Level shows what the Speaker does, while the Representational Level shows what s/he means. Ascriptive Subacts may occur within Referential Subacts. Consider the noun phrase a blue car in (263). The noun phrase as a whole will be shown as a Referential Subact at the Interpersonal Level, but it clearly contains two Subacts of Ascription: the Property ‘car’ is evoked, as well as the Property ‘blue’. The relationship between these Properties, namely that ‘blue’ restricts the applicability of the Property ‘car’, will be displayed at the Representational Level. At the Interpersonal Level, all that will be shown is that the Referential Subact is carried out by means of two Ascriptive Subacts: (264)

a blue car IL: (RI : [(TI ) (TJ ) ] (RI )) RL: (xi : (fi : car (fi ) (xi ): (fj : blue (fj )) (xi ))

Among the advantages of this representation are that Contrast can be assigned to (TI ), (TJ ) or (RI ), according to the context of use: (265)

a. Peter has a blue (car)Contr and Mike a blue (motorbike)Contr . b. Peter has a (blue)Contr car and Mike a (red)Contr car. c. Peter has (a blue car)Contr and Mike (a red motorbike)Contr .

This will lead to the following representations:

110 (266)

the interpersonal level a. (RI : [(TI )Contr (TJ )] (RI )) b. (RI : [(TI ) (TJ )Contr ] (RI )) c. (RI : [(TI ) (TJ )] (RI ))Contr

2.8.2.2 Heads

The head of an Ascriptive Subact is in principle empty. In (267), for example, the Ascriptive Subact expressed as the verb loves will appear at the Interpersonal Level simply as (TI ), since ascription is carried out through the selection of a lexical item at the Representational Level, where it will be displayed in the scope of an (f) variable. (267) Peter loves Mary. (CI : [(TI ) (RI : Peter (RI )) (RJ : Mary (RJ ))] (CI )) There are exceptional cases in which the Ascriptive Subact can perhaps be considered to occur with a lexical head. This is the case when a Speaker can’t ﬁnd the right lexical ﬁller for a semantic unit at the Representational Level or doesn’t want to disclose the information associated with that unit. Consider the following example from Turkish (Barıs˛ Kabak, p.c.). The context is one in which the Addressee, who is handing in documents, is told that there is a document that should be certiﬁed before it can be accepted: zaman on-lar-ı bırak-ın burda, (268) Tamam, o OK dem time dem-pl-acc leave-imp.pl here diploma-nız-ı=da Pazartesi s¸ ey et-tir-ip diploma-2.pl.poss-acc=top Monday thingummy do-caus-narr öyle getir-in. like.that bring-imp.pl ‘OK, then leave the others here, and have your diploma “thingummied” (certiﬁed) on Monday and bring it like that.’ We interpret this as a strategy by means of which the Speaker indicates incapacity or unwillingness to evoke the relevant Property, as indicated in (269): (269) (TI : s¸ ey (TI )) Note that the support verb et- is introduced at the Morphosyntactic Level through a general verb support rule. Note further that the same element ¸sey may also be used whenever the Speaker doesn’t remember or doesn’t want to use a lexeme describing an individual or object, equivalent to the English noun thingummy, in which case it is used as the head of an ascriptive phrase realizing a referential phrase, as indicated in (270):

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(RI : (TI : s¸ ey (TI )) (RI ))

2.8.2.3 Modiﬁers

Several interpersonal modiﬁers that were shown to be relevant at the layer of the Communicated Content (cf. 2.7.3) show up at the layer of the Ascriptive Subact as well. Consider the following examples (cf. van de Velde 2007 for cases like 271): (271) an allegedly defamatory article (272)

a fortunately slim publication

(273) a really nice example In the last example really indicates emphatic commitment on the part of the Speaker, and in this sense it diﬀers from regular degree adverbs like very. This diﬀerence manifests itself in the fact that the two can be combined, but only in the order reﬂecting the appropriate scope relations, as shown in: (274)

a. a really very nice example b. *a very really nice example

In examples (271)–(274) the scope of the modiﬁers is restricted to an Ascriptive Subact (T) that occurs within the context of a Referential Subact. This can be represented as in (275): (275)

(RI : [(TI ) (TJ : [ ] (TJ ): allegedly/fortunately/really (TJ ))] (RI ))

More speciﬁc to an Ascriptive Subact is the possibility of modiﬁcation by an indication on the Speaker’s part that the Subact only approximates to his/her actual communicative intentions. This involves introducing a hedge to this eﬀect. Examples are the ﬁxed expressions as it were and so to speak, as in (276)– (277): (276)

Leonard is my mentor as it were.

(277)

Leonard is my mentor so to speak.

The italicized expressions indicate that the Speaker is not fully willing to ascribe the Property ‘my mentor’ to Leonard, but that my mentor is close to what s/he wants to say about Leonard. A rather comparable situation is when the Speaker indicates that s/he considers the ascription actually to be inappropriate, as in: (278)

The so-called buﬀet is actually really limited choice. (Internet)

All these modiﬁers can be represented as occupying the modiﬁer slot of the Ascriptive Subact.

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2.8.2.4 Operators

Where approximative expressions of the type discussed in the previous section become grammaticalized, they will be analysed as operators. This analysis suggests itself for English sort-of, which for many language-users has become phonologically reduced to ‘sorda’ (cf. Keizer 2007: ch. 7). Note that this form serves to indicate the approximative status of Subacts of Ascription, irrespective of the part-of-speech of the lexical item that the Speaker ﬁnds to be less than fully precise: (279) Her shirt was sort-of blue. (280) We are sort-of improving. (281) I felt sort-of outside. (282) My sort-of friend has started a rock band. Note that the grammaticalized status of this marker is substantiated by the fact that agreement in (283) is with friends, not with sort: (283) My sort-of friends have started a rock band. Such markers will be analysed as expressing the operator Approx: (284) (approx T1 ) The opposite of approximation obtains when languages apply grammatical strategies to indicate that the property that is ascribed covers exactly what the Speaker means. Leti has such a marker, in the form of an enclitic indicating exactness of ascription. Compare the following examples (van Engelenhoven 2004: 160): (285)

a. vuar=lalavn=e big=mountain=exact b. vuar=lalavn big=mountain

In van Engelenhoven’s words, (285a) ‘designates a referent which is considered deﬁnitely to be a big mountain by the speaker’, while (285b) ‘need not necessarily refer to a big mountain, but may very well designate that in fact the referent is something else but only looks like a big mountain’. Markers such as the one illustrated in (285a) will be triggered by an Exact operator applying to Ascriptive Subacts. Another operator, one that, as we have seen, applies at the A and C layers as well, is Emphasis. Kham has a special emphatic particle that works at the layer of Subacts. In (286) it is applied to an Ascriptive Subact:

subacts (286)

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Ma-che:-d@ z@ ge-li-ke. neg-fear-nf emph 1.pl-cop-pfv ‘We remained (totally) unafraid.’

This marker would be captured by an Emphatic operator, as in (287): (287) (emph T1 ) 2.8.2.5 Frames

To summarize, then, the Ascriptive Subact displays the following structure: (288) (π T1 : H (T1 ): (T1 )) Among the possible occupants of the operator position π are the approximative and the emphatic operators. The head of the Ascriptive Subact is normally empty, but may also be occupied by evasive dummy lexemes. There is a position for lexical modiﬁers which may be of an attitudinal, an emphatic, or a reportative nature. 2.8.3 Reference 2.8.3.1 Introduction

Whereas Subacts of Ascription involve the evocation of a Property, Speakers perform Subacts of Reference in order to evoke an entity. That entity will be of a particular semantic category, may have a certain cardinality, etc.: these distinctions, to the extent that they are relevant for the language under analysis, are made at the Representational Level. At the Interpersonal Level, the distinctions that are made reﬂect the status of reference as an interpersonal activity. Thus many languages distinguish between ‘referent construction’ and ‘referent identiﬁcation’. In the former case, the Speaker wishes the Addressee to introduce the referent into his/her mental model; in the latter, the Addressee is asked to identify (in the sense of re-identify) a referent that is already available to him/her (cf. Dik 1997a: 130). We shall refer to this distinction in terms of the opposition between identiﬁable and non-identiﬁable. Another relevant distinction is between speciﬁc and non-speciﬁc reference: here the issue is whether the referent is identiﬁable for the Speaker or not, respectively. We shall see that this distinction is crucial for the understanding of question-word (Q-word) questions. A further distinction that is frequently made in this context is that between generic and non-generic reference (see Dik 1997a: 176–8 for such a position). The FDG stance will be that genericity is not an operator upon a Referential Subact. The reason is that the construction as a whole has a generic value.

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Within such a construction, the individual Referential Subacts may involve non-identiﬁability, as in (289a), in which the Addressee is asked to construe the concept ‘dog’, or identiﬁability, as in (289b), in which the Addressee has to retrieve the concept ‘dog’: (289)

a. A dog is man’s best friend. b. The dog is man’s best friend.

We will therefore, instead, treat genericity as an operator at the Representational Level (see Chapter 3). Although the part-of-speech ‘noun’ is closely associated with Reference, not every occurrence of a noun involves a Subact of Reference. A test of referentiality will be whether or not a Speaker can refer back anaphorically to a Referential Subact. Consider the following examples: (290) I have lost my dog. He has a curly tail. (291) I want to have a cat. It doesn’t have to be beautiful. (292) I didn’t buy an umbrella. They didn’t have one in the shop. (293) I went to my work. It was boring, as usual. (294) I went in the bus. But it broke down. (295) I went to work by bus. *It (the work) was boring. *It (the bus) broke down. In (295) the nouns work and bus do not express Referential Subacts. However, note that the phrases to work and by bus do express Referential Subacts: both, for example, can be questioned, another test for referentiality: (296)

How did you go to work? By bus.

(297)

Where did you go? To work.

Taken together, these observations strongly suggest that in the bus in (294) involves two Referential Subacts: the Speaker both refers to the Location expressed by the entire phrase in the bus ((RI ), questionable by where) and to the entity the bus ((RJ ), questionable by what). Where a noun is incorporated, and cannot be questioned or referred back to, it will not be associated with a Referential Subact. Thus in (298), there will be no (RI ) corresponding to shoulder: (298) Players are allowed to shoulder-charge their opponent.

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But not all incorporation involves loss of referential status. Smit (2005) shows, following Mithun-Williams (1984), that certain instances of noun incorporation involve the expression of a Referential Subact, with the incorporated element either foregrounded (as Focus) or backgrounded (as Topic). Thus he shows that in Mohawk, incorporation serves to foreground an otherwise peripheral Individual, and the examination of a text from Gunwinggu (Smit 2005: 116) shows how incorporation is used in that language for Topics, with clear reference back to an earlier, Focused, non-incorporated Referential Subact. These analyses can be reﬂected at the Interpersonal Level by assigning the appropriate pragmatic functions to Referential Subacts. 2.8.3.2 Heads

2.8.3.2.1 Introduction The head of a Referential Subact may consist of: (i) one or more Ascriptive Subacts (and possibly one or more Referential Subacts) (ii) a proper name or dummy lexeme (iii) an abstract combination of features for Speaker and Addressee 2.8.3.2.2 Subacts within Subacts The ﬁrst possibility, with Ascriptive Subacts within the Referential Subact, is found in such Nps as in (299): (299)

a. the house (+id RI : [(TI )] (RI )) b. the red house (+id RI : [(TI ) (TJ )] (RI ))

Note that the head is not predicated of the Referential Subact, but merely indicates how the Subact is supported by Ascriptive Subacts. The relationship between the Ascriptive Subacts is not speciﬁed at this layer; the fact that in English red restricts house is indicated at the Representational Level. In languages in which the relationship between Subacts of this type is not restrictive, but appositional or juxtapositional, the looser relationship pertaining at the Interpersonal Level is decisive for the ultimate structure. One such language is Yimas (Foley 1991), in which ‘a noun and a modiﬁer aﬃxed with an agreement suﬃx are simply noun phrases in apposition to each other < . . . > [t]he linking between them is done at the semantic level’ (1991: 190–1). Cf. (300): (300)

imprampat yua-ra ya-n-ampa-wat. basket.cl.pl good-cl.pl cl.pl.obj-3.sg-weave-hab ‘She weaves good baskets, lit. She weaves baskets, good ones.’

In FDG we will interpret imprampat yua-ra as two Referential Subacts (each containing an Ascriptive Subact) correlated with a single entity at the Representational Level.

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Referential Subacts may contain further Referential Subacts, for example in possessive constructions like the italicized Noun Phrase in (301a): (301)

a. b. c. d.

Joan’s father’s car is not working again. So she can’t get to school. So he can’t get to work. So it will have to be repaired.

The data in (301b–d) show that one can refer back to Joan, father or car. Correspondingly, the appropriate representation at the Interpersonal Level will involve recursion: (302) (+id RI : [(TI ) (+id RJ : [(TJ ) (+id RK : Joan (RK ))] (RJ ))] (RI )) She in (301b) refers back to the referent of (RK ), he in (301c) to the referent of (RJ ), and it in (301d) to the referent of (RI ). Again, the status of Joan’s father as restrictor of car and of Joan as argument of the relational predicate father will be shown at the Representational Level. Referential anaphora, which in the preceding text has been used as a criterion for identifying Referential Subacts, works as follows. It involves both a Subact of Reference with its own index (the Speaker is doing something new), but also, at the Representational Level, coindexing (the thing referred to is the same). Example (303) is represented in (304) at the Interpersonal and Representational Levels to show this: (303) I have bought a new car. It is an automatic. (304) (TI ) (RI : [+S] (RI )) (ei : –[ (fi : buy (fi )) (xi )A (TL ) (ej : –[ (xk : (fl : automatic (fl ))(xk ))

(RJ : [(TJ ) (TK ) ] (RJ )) (xj : (fj : car (fj )) (xj ): (fk : new (fk )) (xj ))U ]– (ei )) (RK ) (xj )]– (ej ))

At the Interpersonal Level in (304) it has its own index (RK ); at the Representational Level, however, it has the same index (xj ) as a new car. Consider now (305): (305) I have bought a new car. The old one kept breaking down. Here the structure is similar to the one in as in (304), but (RK ) is expanded by an Ascriptive Subact, with its own index, corresponding to old. The coindexing holds at the Representational Level, but now between between the f-layer unit car and the head position in the noun phrase the old one. This is shown in (306):

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(306) (TI ) (RI : [+S] (RI )) (ei : –[ (fi : buy (fi )) (xi )A (TL ) (ej : –[ (fl : break_down (fl ))

(RJ : [ (TJ ) (TK ) ] (RJ )) (xj : (fj : car (fj )) (xj ): (fk : new (fk )) (xj ))U ]– (ei )) (RK :[ (TM ) (TN ) (RK )) (xk : (fj ) (xk ): (fm : old (fm )) (xk ))U ]– (ej ))

At the Interpersonal Level one has its own index (TM ), at the Representational Level it has the same index (fj ) as car. Consider, ﬁnally, (307): (307)

I talked to the boss yesterday. The bastard won’t give me a raise.

Again, the structure will be basically the same as in (304), with coindexing of the boss and the bastard at the Representational Level. At the Interpersonal Level, the two Referential Subacts are each expanded by an Ascriptive Subact. 2.8.3.2.3 Proper names It was observed in 2.5.2.4 above that proper names can be used in Interpellatives. In such use, they have no referential status, but occupy a Participant slot. Their non-referential status in this use shows up in the fact that they cannot be referred back to. Proper names, however, also occur in Referential Subacts, when the Speaker wishes to make unique reference to an Individual, Location, or Time. Although many proper names are historically derived from semantic material (e.g. Baker, Dances with Wolves, Le Havre), they have no semantic content and as such they will be assigned to the Interpersonal rather than the Representational Level. Thus in (308), John will be shown at the Interpersonal Level as in (309): (308) John was at the party. (309)

(+id R1 : John (R1 ))

Note that the name is marked by the operator ‘+id’ as identiﬁable. As noted in 2.5.2.4, this is reﬂected in certain languages through the use of a deﬁniteness marker. Much play has been made of the possibility of such forms as (310) (e.g. Dik 1997a: 141), which suggest that proper names can behave grammatically like ordinary nouns: (310) There were three Johns at the party. and after conversion they can in some cases even be used predicatively, as in the following example from Clark and Clark (1979) discussed in García Velasco (fc.): (311) My sister Houdini’d her way out of the locked closet. We shall regard such examples as metonyms. Thus, the underlying cognitive representation of (310) would be ‘three persons called John’ and of (311) ‘act in

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a way typical of a person called Houdini’: in these uses ‘John’ and ‘Houdini’ will thus appear, unusually, at the Representational Level (see 3.14 for further discussion). Returning to the normal use of proper names, the position at the Representational Level corresponding to the proper name will remain lexically empty, but may contain semantic information retrieved from the Contextual Component, for example on gender. This will ensure that an adjective will show appropriate agreement with a male or female name, for example, from French: (312) Marie est belle. Marie be.prs.3.sg beautiful.f ‘Marie is beautiful.’ Note, ﬁnally, that in many languages a special ‘thingummy’ form exists for proper names not known to the speaker, such as English Whatchacallum. This is the referential equivalent of the generalized ascriptive lexemes discussed in 2.8.2.2. 2.8.3.2.4 Abstract features Personal pronouns and aﬃxes fall into two classes: (i) those that refer to, or include reference to, the speech-act participants (ﬁrst and second person); (ii) those that refer, anaphorically, cataphorically, logophorically or deictically, to non-speech-act participants (third person and logophoric). Those in class (i) are essentially similar to proper names, and may be regarded as grammatical substitutes for naming oneself and naming one’s Addressee. However, the pronominal systems of the world’s languages permit a range of combinations of Speaker and Addressee that can best be reﬂected in the interplay of abstract features (cf. Dik 1997a: 152–3, following de Groot and Limburg 1986). Thus at least the following combinations are permitted, where [±S] means ‘involving the Speaker or not’ and [±A] means ‘involving the Addressee or not’ : (313)

IL First person singular (+id R1 : [+S, –A] (R1 )) First person plural exclusive (+id R1 : [+S, –A] (R1 )) Second person singular (+id R1 : [–S, +A] (R1 )) Second person plural (+id R1 : [–S, +A] (R1 )) First person plural inclusive (+id R1 : [+S, +A] (R1 ))

RL (1x1 ) (mx1 ) (1x1 ) (mx1 ) (mx1 )

Further reﬁnements are possible at both levels. Thus the degree of politeness accorded to the Addressee may also aﬀect the form of the pronoun/aﬃx; this will be shown by a further operator at the Interpersonal Level. The familiar

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tu/vous distinction in French will be displayed as follows, using an operator [±h(igh)]: (314)

IL RL tu (+id –h R1 : [–S, +A] (R1 )) (1x1 ) vous (+id +h R1 : [–S, +A] (R1 )) (1x1 ) vous (+id R1 : [–S, +A] (R1 )) (mx1 )

Similarly, at the Representational Level, distinctions may be made to account for the sex of Speaker and/or Addressee and further reﬁnements of number (dual, trial, etc.). The close relation between personal pronouns and proper names emerges in European Portuguese, where the Addressee’s proper name appears in the [−S, +A] position in formal use (Cunha and Cintra 2001: 295): (315) O Manuel já leu este livro? def Manuel already read.pst.3.sg this book ‘Have you read this book, Manuel?’ Furthermore, across languages coordinations of personal pronouns and proper names are possible, corresponding to a plural at the Representational Level. If the language displays agreement, this will be established at the Morphosyntactic Level with reference to the Person Hierarchy, which places ﬁrst person higher than second person, and second person higher than third. Compare (316) from European Portuguese (Cunha and Cintra 2001: 287), which also shows a preference for placement of ﬁrst person ﬁrst where a negative characteristic is being predicated, and (317) from French: (316) Eu e Augusto fomos os culpados do acidente. 1.sg and Augusto be.pst.1.pl def responsible of.the accident ‘Augusto and I were responsible for the accident’ (317) Toi et Jacques, quand allez-vous vous mari-er? 2.sg and Jacques when go.2.pl-2.pl 2.pl marry-inf ‘When are you and Jacques getting married?’ Deictic uses of third person pronouns may be characterized as (+id R1 : [−S, −A] (R1 )). This notation will not be used, however, for the various ‘phoric’ uses of pronouns. For anaphoric uses, we shall assume that the Morphosyntactic Level introduces the relevant forms in response to coindexing at the Representational Level. Consider the analysis of anaphoric he in (318): (318) I met Leila’s ﬁancé (RI , xi ) yesterday. He (RJ , xi ) looks very handsome. What triggers the pronominal form at the Morphosyntactic Level is the presence of a Referential Subact, the counterpart of which is coindexed at

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the Representational Level to a previously occurring entity description. In processing terms, the occurrence of he here induces the Addressee to look for a plausible referent in the Contextual Component with which coindexing can be established. There may not, as is familiar, always be a textual antecedent for each anaphor. In such cases, the Addressee will derive a likely coreferent for the pronoun from the information present in the Contextual Component. Consider an example such as (319): (319) I met our new neighbours yesterday. She is an advertising executive. Here the Addressee ﬁnds a plausible referent by making the assumption that one of the new neighbours is a female (cf. Cornish 2002 for further discussion and exempliﬁcation). Logophoric pronouns (see 4.4.9) diﬀer from anaphoric pronouns in not applying across Discourse Acts. Rather, in the languages in which they occur, they most commonly apply within a single Communicated Content. In Fongbe (Lefebvre and Brousseau 2002: 78–82), the logophoric pronoun émì occurs only in what will be analysed at the Representational Level as either an episodical or a propositional argument of one of a closed set of verbs. Émì is coreferential with the subject of that verb, which may be second or third person, but not ﬁrst person. Thus the Fongbe equivalent of (320): (320) You remember that you hid Asiba’s goat. has the logophoric pronoun in the position of you in the embedded clause: (321) Mí ﬂín ã`O émì hwlá Àsibá sín gb´O. 2.pl remember comp log hide Asiba gen goat ‘You remember that you hid Asiba’s goat.’ Cataphoric pronouns diﬀer in processing terms from anaphoric and logophoric pronouns in that the coreference works forwards within its domain of operation. The domain of operation of cataphora is generally the Discourse Act, as in (322a), where the cataphoric relationship obtains between the descriptions of two States-of-Aﬀairs within a single Discourse Act. Where the two predications are in an equipollent relationship, cataphora is not permitted in English, cf. (322b); and where the cataphor is in the main predication, it is again disallowed, cf. (322c–d): (322)

a. b. c. d.

After hei took a shower, Briani went to the movies. *Hei took a shower and Briani went to the movies. Briani took a shower and hei went to the movies. *Hei took a shower before Briani went to the movies.

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Cataphora can be represented in the same way as anaphora, through coindexing. Note ﬁnally that not all anaphora involves Referential Subacts. In the Dutch example (323), het refers anaphorically to the Ascriptive Subact expressed as intelligent (cf. Dik 1997b: 217): (323) Jan is intelligent maar Piet is het niet. Jan be.prs.3.sg intelligent but Piet be.prs.3.sg 3.sg.n neg ‘Jan is intelligent, but Piet is not.’ The Discourse Acts in (323) will be analysed as (324), with the predicates corresponding to (TI ) and (TJ ) being coindexed at the Representational Level: (324)

([A1 : . . . [(TI ) (RI : Jan (RI ))] . . . (A1 )] [AJ : . . . [(TJ ) (RJ : Piet (RJ ))] . . . (A2 )]

To summarize, then, the head of the Referential Subact may consist of a complex of further Subacts, either ascriptive or referential. Alternatively, it may contain a proper name or values for the features [±S, ±A]. Finally, it may be empty, as in anaphoric, logophoric, and cataphoric reference. 2.8.3.3 Modiﬁers

Modiﬁcation within the Referential Subact is limited to the expression of the subjective attitude of the Speaker towards the entity designated within the Referential Subact. Consider ﬁrst the use of the adjectives poor, old, and little in such examples as the following (cf. Butler 2008a): (325)

a. No one was paying attention to the poor fellow. b. No one was paying attention to poor me.

(326)

a. I feel sorry for old Bill. b. Don’t forget to send a letter to little old me.

These adjectives are not to be understood as restricting the application of their heads, as would be the case if they were analysed at the Representational Level. In (325), poverty is not at issue, nor need Bill in (326a) be aged, nor I be small in (326b). Rather, these are modiﬁers at the Interpersonal Level, indicating the Speaker’s subjective attitude with respect to the referent being evoked. Structural evidence for this is found in the possibility of applying these adjectives to proper names, as in (326a), or to personal pronouns, as in (326b), which as we have seen are introduced at the Interpersonal Level.

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2.8.3.4 Operators

The principal operators applying to the R-variable are concerned with the identiﬁability of the referent, as assessed by the Speaker. As mentioned in 2.8.3.1, we will distinguish between two aspects of identiﬁability. The ﬁrst concerns the Speaker’s assumptions about the identiﬁability of the referent for the Addressee: this will be reﬂected in the operators {+id, −id} for identiﬁable and non-identiﬁable respectively. The second concerns the Speaker’s indication of the identiﬁability of the referent for him/herself: this will be reﬂected in the operators {+s, −s} for speciﬁc and non-speciﬁc respectively. The combination of operators {+id, +s} applies in all cases in which the referent is assumed identiﬁable for both speech-act participants, as in (327): (327)

a. She’s looking well today. b. Did the teacher give you homework?

The combination {−id, +s} is appropriate for such cases as (328)–(329): (328) Someone helped me with the crossword puzzle. (329) I have a certain problem with this text. Here the Speaker knows the identity of the referent, but does not assume that the Addressee does. Certain in (329) must be seen as a co-expression of the combination of operators. The operators {−id, −s} combine where the referent is identiﬁable to neither Speaker nor Addressee, as in (330): (330) I am looking for someone to help me. (331) Do you know anything about physics? Note that certain cannot occur in such contexts: (332) *I am looking for a certain person to help me. The fourth combination is also found, i.e. {+id, −s}. This is appropriate in those contexts in which the referent is assumed identiﬁable for the Addressee but not for the Speaker. This combination is naturally associated with the Interrogative Illocution, and the FDG analysis of Content Interrogatives will assume that the questioned item will be marked as {+id, −s}. (333) will therefore be analysed as (334) at the Interpersonal Level, where the {+id, −s}-marked Referential Subact (RI ) will be realized as the Q-word under the inﬂuence of the INTER Illocution: (333) Who stole my bike?

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(334) (AI : [(FI : INTER (FI )) (PI )S (PJ )A (CI : [(TI ) (+id−s RI ) (+id+s RJ )] (CI )) ] (AI )) With a Declarative Illocution, the {+id, −s} combination corresponds to a number of forms in which the identiﬁability to the Addressee is visible in their etymology. Consider the following example from Spanish: (335) Cualquier día puede ocurrir un accidente. which-quier day can.prs.3.sg happen indf accident ‘An accident can happen any day.’ The morpheme -quier is historically derived from quiera, the second/third person present subjunctive of querer ‘want’: the implication is that the Addressee can identify a day, and on that day an accident will happen. Observe that one could also in English say An accident can happen any day you like, in which the context makes it clear that like, like quier(a), is undergoing grammaticalization in this use. For further examples of etymologies that imply reference to the Addressee, see Haspelmath (1997: 134). The attribution of one set of operators to the analysis of what are traditionally known as interrogative and indeﬁnite pronouns ﬁts with the formal properties of languages such as Bininj Gun-Wok (Evans 2003: 273), in which there is ‘triple polysemy between interrogative, indeﬁnite pronoun and negative pronoun uses’ (lumped together by Evans as ‘ignoratives’). In Bininj Gun-Wok, it is the illocution, the intonation, the syntactic positioning of the pronoun and/or the presence of irrealis inﬂection that indicate the intended interpretation of the ignorative. Thus njale is variously glossed as ‘what’, ‘something’, or ‘nothing’. In FDG, the negative reading will be attributable to a negative operator at the Representational Level, but all three readings will appear as (+id −s R1 ) at the Interpersonal Level. Referential Subacts share with Ascriptive Subacts the availability of an operator for emphasis. The Emphatic operator is assigned to Subacts to which the Speaker wishes to draw especial attention. Consider the following examples from English (inspired by Hannay 1991: 143): (336) Did you get a day oﬀ? a. A day oﬀ? The boss gave me a whole week. b. A day oﬀ? A whole week the boss gave me. The constituent a whole week in (336b) is given special emphasis by placing it in clause-initial position. Note that the information status of the constituent is the same in both (336a) and (336b). The emphatic particle z@ in Kham, illustrated in (286) where it applies to an Ascriptive Subact, may be combined with a Referential Subact as well, as in the following example (Watters 2002: 185):

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(337) Na-mi:-ye z@ Na-˜r1:h-ke. 1.sg-eye-ins emph 1.sg-see-pfv ‘I saw it with my own eyes.’ These grammatical expressions of emphasis will be captured by an operator at the R-layer: (338) (emph R1 )

2.8.3.5 Frames

To summarize, then, the Referential Subact has the following structure: (339) (π R1 : H (R1 ): (R1 )) The operator position π is used for operators that have to do with the identiﬁability of the entity designated by the Referential Subact, and with emphasis. The head of the Referential Subact can be ﬁlled by one or more Ascriptive Subacts, proper names, or abstract features representing deictic pronouns. There is a position for lexical modiﬁers which are attitudinal in nature.

2.9 Building up the Interpersonal Level In the construction of the underlying structure of the Interpersonal Level, use is made of frames, lexemes, and primary operators. Frames come in three types: Interpersonal frames, Discourse Act frames, and Content frames. The diﬀerence between them is that interpersonal frames capture the overall hierarchical organization of the Interpersonal Level, while Discourse Act frames and content frames capture the non-hierarchical internal conﬁgurations of Discourse Acts and Communicated Contents respectively. There are a limited number of interpersonal lexemes. These capture the lexical ﬁllers of the illocutionary slot (F), the Participant slots (P), the proper names potentially ﬁlling the slots for Referential Subacts (R), the dummy predicates ﬁlling the slots for Ascriptive Subacts (T), and the various classes of interpersonal modiﬁers. We have also introduced two types of abstract lexemes: abstract illocutionary predicates that may ﬁll the (F) slot, and abstract representations of deictic pronouns that may ﬁll the (R) slot. The third type of primitive is the primary operator. The inventories have been discussed above at the relevant places, and some of these will show up in the following example.

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In keeping with the general architecture of FDG, the process of building up the structure of the Interpersonal Level proceeds in a top-down fashion, i.e. starts with the larger units and then ﬁlls these larger units with smaller ones. We will start at the layer of the Move in what follows, using the Move in (340), discussed brieﬂy in 2.3.3. Note that here the contrast between won and lost is indicated intonationally. For a more precise representation, see the discussion in 5.4. (340)

Celtic won. However, Rangers lost.

This is an instance of a Move consisting of two Nuclear Discourse Acts. Since a Move consists of at least one Discourse Act, we may use the general frame in (341), in which N is 0 or higher in value, thus allowing for Moves consisting of 1 to N Discourse Acts: (341) (π MI : [(A1 ) (A)N ] (MI ): (MI )) The subscript of the Move changes from a numerical to an alphabetical value to indicate that the variable is now instantiated. We may now ﬁll the Discourse Act positions which constitute the head of Move (MI ) with the appropriate Discourse Act frames. As we indicated in 2.4.2, these diﬀer from one another in the absence or presence of a Communicated Content, and the absence of presence of an Addressee. For each Discourse Act in (341) the frame in (342) would be selected: (342) (π A1 : [(F1 ) (P1 )S (P2 )A (C1 ) ] (A1 ): (AI )) Insertion of this frame into the Discourse Act slots in (341) leads to (343): (343) (π MI : [

(π AI : [(F1 ) (P1 )S (P2 )A (C1 ) ] (AI ): (AI )) (π AJ : [(F1 ) (P1 )S (P2 )A (C1 ) ] (AJ ): (AJ )) ] (MI ): (MI ))

Now that the head slot of the Move has been ﬁlled, it is time to specify operators and modiﬁers of the Move, respectively, but these are absent in the case of (340), so that the result is as in (344): (344) (MI : [

(π AI : [(F1 ) (P1 )S (P2 )A (C1 ) ] (AI ): (AI )) (π AJ : [(F1 ) (P1 )S (P2 )A (C1 ) ] (AJ ): (AJ ))

] (MI )) In the next step, the Speaker ﬁlls in the various units of the head position of the Discourse Act frames one by one. We ignore further operator and modiﬁer

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positions for these units, since they are irrelevant for the example at hand. For the head position of the two C-positions a categorical frame of the type given in (345) is selected: (345) [(T1 )FOC (R1 )TOP ] In interaction with the Contextual Component, the Contrast function has to be added to the Focal Ascriptive Subact. The result after ﬁlling in the ﬁrst Discourse Act position is then as in (346). Note that there are no operators and modiﬁers at the layer of this Discourse Act: (346) (MI : [ (AI : [ (FI : DECL (F1 )) (PI )S (PJ )A (CI : [(T1 )FOC/CONTR (R1 )TOP ] (CI )) ] (AI )) (π AJ : [(F1 ) (P1 )S (P2 )A (C1 ) ] (AJ ): (AJ )) ] (MI )) Working further down within the ﬁrst Discourse Act, we have to specify the Subacts. Since the Referential Subact is realized by means of a proper name, this name has to be inserted at the Interpersonal Level. The lexical realization of the Ascriptive Subact, on the other hand, takes place at the Representational Level. This is shown here by instantiation of the variable: (347)

(MI : [ (AI : [ (FI : DECL (F1 )) (PI )S (PJ )A (CI : [(TI )FOC/CONTR (RI : Celtic (RI ))TOP ] (CI )) ] (AI )) (π AJ : [(F1 ) (P1 )S (P2 )A (C1 ) ] (AJ ): (AJ )) ] (MI ))

The same steps apply to the instantiation of the second Discourse Act:

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(348) (MI : [ (AI : [ (FI : DECL (F1 )) (PI )S (PJ )A (CI : [(TI )FOC/CONTR (RI : Celtic (RI ))TOP ] (CI )) ] (AI )) (AJ : [ (FI : DECL (F1 )) (PI )S (PJ )A (CJ : [(TJ )FOC/CONTR (RJ : Rangers (RJ ))TOP ] (CJ )) ] (AJ ): (AJ )) ] (MI )) After thus ﬁlling the head position of the second Discourse Act as well, the Contr(ast) operator that triggers however (see 4.3.4), which is relevant at the layer of this second Discourse Act, may be assigned its position, leading to the full interpersonal representation in (349): (349)

(MI : [ (AI : [ (FI : DECL (F1 )) (PI )S (PJ )A (CI : [(TI )FOC/CONTR (RI : Celtic (RI ))TOP ] (CI )) ] (AI )) (contr AJ : [ (FI : DECL (F1 )) (PI )S (PJ )A (CJ : [(TJ )FOC/CONTR (RJ : Rangers (RJ ))TOP ] (CJ )) ] (AJ )) ] (MI ))

Note that the construction of the Interpersonal Level actually goes hand in hand with the construction of the Representational Level, in the sense that the Representational Level responds to ‘calls’ from the Interpersonal Level. We will brieﬂy go into the interaction between these levels at the end of Chapter 3, after discussing the details of the Representational Level.

3 The Representational Level 3.1 Introduction: semantics in FDG The Representational Level deals with the semantic aspects of a linguistic unit. The term ‘semantics’ is used here in a very restricted way, in two diﬀerent senses. (i) The term ‘semantics’ is limited to the ways in which language relates to the extra-linguistic world it describes. In this sense our use of the term ‘semantics’ resembles Bühler’s (1934) ‘Darstellung’ or Halliday’s (1985) ‘ideation’. As a result, many of the linguistic elements that have been dealt with in the previous chapter can be said not to have any semantics attached to them in this restricted use of the term. Consider the following examples: (1)

A: I insist that Sheila is ill. B: a. That’s not true. (She isn’t.) b. *That’s not true. (You don’t.)

The performatively used speech-act verb in (1A) has the function of indicating the illocutionary value of the utterance in a particular communicative setting, and not that of describing what an individual is doing at a particular moment in time. This is evident from the fact that the subsequent rejection aﬀects the clause embedded under the performative formula only, and not the performative formula itself. In non-performative uses the speech-act verb behaves diﬀerently: (2) A: Peter insisted that Sheila is ill. B: a. That’s not true. (She isn’t.) b. That’s not true. (He didn’t.) The problem that (1) raises for truth-conditional semantics has become known as the performadox (Boër and Lycan 1980; see also Levinson 1983: 257), and applies not only to lexical expressions of Illocution, such as the performative verb in (1), but also to grammatical illocutionary force indicating devices, and to all kinds of modiﬁers at the Interpersonal Level that were discussed in the previous chapter. Compare (3) with (4):

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(3) A: Frankly/Brieﬂy/Finally, Sheila is ill. B: a. No. (She isn’t.) b. *No. (You are not being frank.) c. *No. (That isn’t brief.) d. *No. (That isn’t ﬁnal.) (4)

A: Peter told me frankly that Sheila is ill. B: a. That’s not true. (She isn’t.) b. That’s not true. (He didn’t tell you.) c. That’s not true. (He was not being frank.)

What the interpersonal elements in (3) have in common is that they do not establish a relation with the external world, but function internally to the speech situation. For this same reason they may not be reported (unless in a literal direct speech or free indirect speech report) in the intended readings: (5)

a. *Peter told me that frankly Sheila is ill. b. *Peter told me that brieﬂy Sheila is ill. c. *Peter told me that ﬁnally Sheila is ill.

The impossibility or possibility respectively of elements occurring in an indirect speech report may therefore be used as a diagnostic for their interpersonal or representational status. (ii) The term ‘semantics’ is restricted to the meanings of lexical units (lexical semantics) and complex units (compositional semantics) in isolation from the ways these are used in communication. The use that is made of linguistic units is dealt with at the Interpersonal Level, in terms of Discourse Acts and Subacts that specify the functions of linguistic units. The relevance of this distinction can be demonstrated by considering the notion of reference. Consider the following sentence: (6)

I saw a lion.

There are two ways in which the expression a lion can be considered a referring expression: (i) the Speaker refers to an animal of the lion-class by using this expression; (ii) the expression refers to an animal of the lion-class. In the ﬁrst case we are taking an interpersonal, actional view, in the second a representational, semantic one. To distinguish between these two uses of the notion of reference we will continue to use the term reference for the ﬁrst interpretation and designation for the second one. Once this distinction is made, it is easy to see that an expression that designates a lion is not necessarily used to refer to a lion, as in: (7)

This animal is a lion.

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In (7) the expression denoting a lion is used ascriptively rather than referentially: the designation does not change, but the function does. Using the variables for Ascriptive and Referential Subacts introduced in the previous chapter, and aligning these on top of the relevant units, this may be indicated as follows: (8)

R In the zoo I saw a lion.

(9)

This animal is

T a lion.

In what follows we will indicate the interpersonal status of semantic units in this way whenever relevant. The key term that we introduced in the previous chapter to describe the nature of interpersonal units was evocation, and the one we are introducing here to describe the nature of representational units is designation. The ﬁrst is Speaker-bound and pragmatic, the second not bound to the Speaker and semantic.

3.2 The organization of the Representational Level 3.2.1 Semantic categories 3.2.1.1 Introduction

Given that units at the Representational Level are characterized by the fact that they designate, the diﬀerences between units at this level may be made in terms of the ontological category designated. To the extent that ontological categories are reﬂected in the grammar we will call them ‘semantic categories’, each of which is provided with its own variable, parallel to the pragmatic categories discussed in Chapter 2. It is evident that not all meaning oppositions in languages can be seen as the reﬂection of semantic categories in this sense of the term. The question is therefore how one determines which semantic categories are relevant for the description of a language. We want to exclude purely lexical oppositions, the expression of operators, and the expression of functions. To start with the ﬁrst, although the existence of lexical classes and subclasses is one way in which semantic categories manifest themselves, the fact that there are separate words for e.g. ‘horse’ and ‘cow’ in a language does not mean that we want to distinguish between a ‘horse’ class and a ‘cow’ class of Individuals in that language; the fact that a language has a past and a present tense does not mean that a distinction has to be made between a ‘past’ class and a ‘present’ class of States-of-Aﬀairs; and the fact that a language has a conditional conjunction is by itself insuﬃcient to decide that that language has a ‘Condition’ class of

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third-order entities. This leaves us with distributional criteria, i.e. with criteria that have to do with semantically based morphosyntactic conﬁgurations that are allowed in a language, and it is this type of criterion that we will use in what follows, in line with our form-oriented function-to-form approach (see 1.4.4) to grammar. 3.2.1.2 Four basic semantic categories

There are a number of basic semantic categories which we assume to be relevant for the analysis of any language. For the classiﬁcation of these basic semantic categories we take as our starting point the threefold classiﬁcation of entity types presented in Lyons (1977: 442–7). Lyons distinguishes three diﬀerent orders of entities. An Individual is a ﬁrst-order entity. It can be located in space and can be evaluated in terms of its existence. A State-ofAﬀairs is a second-order entity. It can be located in space and time and can be evaluated in terms of its reality. A Propositional Content is a third-order entity. Being a mental construct, it can be located neither in space nor in time. It can be evaluated in terms of its truth. To these three basic semantic categories we may add a fourth, lower-order category Property, which cannot be characterized in terms of the parameters of space and time. Properties (see Hengeveld 1992; Keizer 1992; Dik 1997a) have no independent existence and can only be evaluated in terms of their applicability, either to other types of entity or to the situation they describe in general. Thus, the Property ‘green’ applies to ﬁrst-order entities, the Property ‘hit’ to two ﬁrst-order entities, the Property ‘recent’ to second-order entities, and the Property ‘undeniable’ to third-order entities. Table 1 lists the basic semantic categories. Various phenomena in the grammars of individual languages can be understood in terms of the entity types designated. Consider the examples in Table 2 of nominalization strategies in English. These examples show that, although there are exceptions, there is a clear relation between the nature of the nominalization process on the one hand and the semantic category designated on the other. Table 1. Semantic categories Description Individual Property State-of-aﬀairs Propositional Content

Variable

Example

x f e p

chair colour meeting idea

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Examples writ-er, employ-er, sing-er inhabit-ant, contest-ant mean-ness, kind-ness, false-ness elastic-ity, rapid-ity, san-ity explora-tion, deci-sion, deple-tion break-age, cover-age hope-∅, wish-∅, belief-∅

f e p

3.2.1.3 Location and Time

In deﬁning the basic semantic categories presented in the preceding section, the way they manifest themselves in the spatial and temporal dimensions turned out to be especially relevant. The concepts of space and time, however, cannot be reduced to any of the semantic types they deﬁne, but rather specify dimensions of those semantic categories, and therefore constitute independent semantic categories. This point has been argued in Mackenzie (1992) for Location and Olbertz (1998) for Time. The relevance of distinguishing these semantic categories may again be illustrated by looking at nominalizations: languages may possess specialized means to form nominal expressions designating Locations and Times. Examples of locative nominalizations are the following, from Kolyma Yukaghir ((10) Maslova 2003: 131) and Basque ((11) Saltarelli 1988: 257): (10) orp-uj-V → orp-uj-be-N climb.iter climb-iter-locnr ‘mountain pass’ (11)

oilo-N hen

→ oilo-tegi-N → hen-locnr ‘hen-house’

Temporal nominalizations are less widespread, but are attested in for example Rukai ((12) Mantauran dialect, Formosan Language Digital Archive) and Supyire ((13) Carlson 1994: 113): alaka-i (12) lo kal-ak@c@l-a@ if tmpnr-stat.nonf.cold-tmpnr because-3.sg.gen koloto. o-kaoθ-inam@ dyn.fin-not.exist-1.pl.excl.obj blanket ‘In the winter, we did not have any blanket.’

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(13) U tèè-kwuu-ní ñyE à mO m´E. his tempnr-die-def.cl neg prf be.long.time neg ‘The time of his death was not long ago.’ There are other phenomena that demonstrate the relevance of distinguishing Location and Time as separate entity types. Consider the following examples, adapted from Mackenzie and Hannay (1982: 48–9): (14)

The place that I met Sheila was in the park.

(15)

The time that I met Sheila was around three o’clock.

In these constructions the designations of the noun phrases the place that I met Sheila and the time that I met Sheila are stated to be identical to the designations of the Preposition Phrases in the park and around three o’clock, respectively, which can only mean that the bare noun phrases have a locational and temporal value similar to that of the Preposition Phrases. 3.2.1.4 Episodes

For many languages the grammar is also sensitive to a semantic category that is actually a combination of lower-layer semantic categories: the Episode. Episodes are thematically coherent combinations of States-of-Aﬀairs that are characterized by unity or continuity of Time (t), Location (l), and Individuals (x). Some of the grammatical phenomena that are sensitive to the category of Episodes are illustrated in the following example, in which the section enclosed in square brackets corresponds to an Episode: (16)

The two Dyaks, paddling in silence up the dark river, proceeded for nearly three hours before they drew in to the bank and dragged the sampan up into the bushes. Then they set out upon a narrow trail into the jungle. It so happened that after travelling for several miles [they inadvertently took another path than that followed by the party under Barunda’s uncle, so that they passed the latter without being aware of it, going nearly half a mile to the right of where the trailers camped a short distance from the bivouac of Ninaka]. (Internet)

The verb happen may be used to introduce a new Episode in a story. Its complement in that case describes the series of States-of-Aﬀairs that constitute the Episode in connected clauses, here the series [they inadvertently . . . Ninaka]. The temporal clause introduced by after serves to link this Episode to the previous one, here [Then they set out upon a narrow trail into the jungle.]. More details on Episodes will be provided in 3.4.

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3.2.1.5 Further semantic categories

Straightforward distributional criteria that were used in the preceding sections to identify semantic categories are the existence of lexical classes and nominalization patterns. Distinct nominalization patterns systematically create designational classes that are treated diﬀerentially in the morphological system of the language under consideration. Examples of nominalizations reﬂecting the semantic categories were given earlier in Table 2. In some languages further types of nominalization are possible. Chichewa (Bresnan 1995) has a distinct strategy for forming manner nominalizations: (17)

yend-ets go-caus ‘drive/ﬂying’

→

ka-yend-ets-edwe cl-go-caus-mann.nr ‘manner of driving/ﬂying’

The same goes for Supyire (Carlson 1994: 114): (18) Pyìi-bíí sàhà ñyE na byíí pi tañjáà children-def not.yet be prog raise.impf their yesterday na m´E. byí-Nká-ni raise-mann.nr-def.cl on neg ‘Children are no longer raised the way they were raised in the past.’ It may therefore be argued that there is a semantic category m (‘manner’) in these languages. Sundanese exhibits a process of reason nominalization (Robins 1959: 351, cited in Comrie and Thompson 1985: 357): (19) dataN → paN-dataN arrive reasnr-arrive ‘reason for arrival’ Supyire similarly exhibits reason nominalizations, as in (20) (Carlson 1994: 548): (20) Sànyi kà-wyiiní li death.announcement.def reasnr-announce.def(cl.sg) it(cl.sg) ` ñyE pùc`Eribílá à ndìré ye? cop female.clan.member.def to which.emph(cl.sg) q ‘What is the reason for announcing the decease to the female clan members?’ Thus, we may assume the existence of a semantic category r (‘Reason’) in these languages. Another type of distributional argument has been illustrated earlier with reference to Location and Time. English has a special type of pseudo-cleft

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construction with a limited distribution that is described in Mackenzie and Hannay (1982). Consider the following examples: (21)

The way that I approached the lion was cautiously/with great caution.

(22) The place that I met Sheila was in the park. (23) The time that I met Sheila was at three o’clock. (24)

The reason that I married her was because she would make me happy.

(25)

The rate that I examined the students was at three an hour.

In all these examples the semantic category designated by a noun phrase is presented as identical to the semantic category designated by a prepositional and/or adverb phrase, expressing Manner, Location, Time, Reason, and Quantity. The ﬁrst four of these have surfaced earlier as relevant semantic categories. This again suggests that these may have a special status in terms of the grammatical organization of languages. We should add a category q (for ‘Quantity’) to cover (25). A ﬁnal example of distributional diﬀerences concerns the possibility of pronominal reference through distinct pronominal forms to various semantic classes. It is remarkable that languages, not counting all kinds of ﬁrstorder question words, often have specialized basic question words for Manner (how), Location (where), Time (when), Quantity (how_many), and Reason (why) at their disposal, particularly in the absence of special basic question words for e.g. condition (‘whif ’), concession (‘whalthough’), or addition (‘whapart’). Instead compound expressions have to be used, such as under what conditions, in spite of what, and apart from what. For a typological study of the distribution of question words across languages see Mackenzie (fc.b). 3.2.1.6 Intermediate summary

Table 3 gives an overview of all the semantic categories distinguished in the preceding sections. We should stress once again that we do not assume all of these categories to be relevant for all languages. They are only relevant if there are grammatical phenomena in the language that are sensitive to the semantic categories involved. 3.2.2 Subclasses of semantic categories

In many cases individual languages exhibit features that indicate that a semantic category is relevant in itself for the grammar of a language, but that there are other grammatical processes that are only relevant to subclasses of that semantic category. A simple example of this is the distinction between set,

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the representational level Table 3. Semantic categories 2 Description

Variable

Example

f x e p l t ep m r q

colour chair meeting idea top week incident way reason litre

Property Individual State-of-aﬀairs Propositional Content Location Time Episode Manner Reason Quantity

mass, and collective expressions: these all designate Individuals, but ones that have distinct properties. Where a language systematically distinguishes between count, mass, and collective expressions, we can say that an ontological distinction is reﬂected in the grammatical system, and we can account for this through the use of subclassiﬁcations of entity type variables, indicated by superscripts preceding those variables, as in: (26) (m x1 ) mass (27)

(s x1 ) set

(28) (c x1 ) collective

∅

water

is

scarce here.

The man

is

doing his job.

The police

are

doing their job.

On the basis of article selection and verb agreement three types of ﬁrst-order entity type descriptions may be distinguished in English. This kind of distinction is not universal. Thus, Samoan ‘does not distinguish morphosyntactically between mass and individual nouns. Samoan nouns translating English mass nouns, e.g. vai “water” can form the nucleus of both singular and plural noun phrases’ (Mosel and Hovdhaugen 1992: 94), as shown in the following example (Mosel and Hovdhaugen 1992: 269): (29) . . . , aua ua mafai ona maua ∅ suavai magalo mo . . . , because prf possible conj get spec.pl water fresh for le taumafa. art food ‘. . . , because it is possible to get fresh water (lit. “waters”) for the food.’ As a result, further subclassiﬁcation of the variable for ﬁrst-order entities does not seem to be necessary for Samoan.

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Note that the fact that a language distinguishes systematically between expression types based on the distinction between subclasses of entity types does not automatically mean that it also has special classes of lexemes for those expressions. For instance, in many classiﬁer languages such distinctions are relevant at the phrasal layer, but not at the lexical layer. Consider the following Yucatec Maya examples (Lucy 1992: 74, cited in Rijkhoﬀ 2003: 28): (30)

‘un-tz’íit há’as one-clf banana ‘a one-dimensional banana (i.e. the fruit)’

(31)

‘un-kúuch há’as one-clf banana ‘a load of banana (i.e. the bunch)’

These examples show that the distinction between count and collective ﬁrstorder expressions is made through grammatical classiﬁers, not through lexical choices. As regards zero-order entities, languages may, for instance, make a systematic distinction between contingent and permanent Properties: (32) (c f1 ) contingent Property (33) (p f1 ) permanent Property This is for instance the case in Spanish, a language in which two diﬀerent copulas are used with adjectival predicates to express this distinction: (34)

La chica es guapa. the girl cop.prs.3.sg pretty ‘The girl is pretty.’

(35)

La chica está guapa. the girl cop.prs.3.sg pretty ‘The girl looks pretty.’

Note that, again, the opposition is not made at the lexical level, since the adjectival predicates in (34) and (35) are identical, but at the phrasal level. Similarly, languages may systematically distinguish between stative and dynamic States-of-Aﬀairs, and hence make a distinction between subclasses of second-order entities, as in: (36) (d e1 ) event (37) (s e1 ) state

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the representational level

A language in which this parameter of dynamicity is clearly reﬂected in the morphological system is Abkhaz. In this language dynamic and static stems enter into diﬀerent tense systems. Consider the following examples (Spruit 1986: 95, 98): (38) D@-z-ba-wá-yt". 3.sg.m-1.sg-see-prog/sit-decl ‘I see him.’ (39) Y@-s-tax`@-w-p". 3.sg.irrat-1.sg-want-prs-decl ‘I want it.’ The suﬃx -wá ‘progressive/situational’ in (38) is one of the ‘Tense A’ suﬃxes, which only combine with dynamic stems. The suﬃx -w ‘present’ in (39) is one of the ‘Tense B’ suﬃxes, which only combine with non-dynamic verbs or with a dynamic verb + Tense A suﬃx (Spruit 1986: 116–17). The suﬃx -p ‘Declarative’ in (39) is furthermore only used with the present tense of nondynamic verbs. One could object here that the diﬀerences illustrated in (38)–(39) are purely lexical in nature, and therefore do not require the positing of two subclasses of second-order entities. However, in Abkhaz many lexemes occur in both stative and dynamic conﬁgurations. In these cases dynamicity or stativity is signalled exclusively by the tense suﬃxes used, as in (Spruit 1986: 95, 96): (40) D-t"w a-wá-yt". 3.sg.m-sit-prog/sit-decl ‘He sits down.’ (41) D-t"w á-w-p". 3.sg.m-sit-prs-decl ‘He is sitting.’ This means that dynamicity and stativity should be seen as properties of the semantic frame for States-of-Aﬀairs, not of lexemes inserted into this frame. 3.2.3 The structure of representational layers

In building up the underlying structure of the Representational Level, use is made of representational frames, which have a layered, hierarchical structure, and are constructed in a stepwise manner, starting with the hierarchically highest layer and ending with the lowest ones. The nature of the highest layer to be selected is determined in part by the requirements of the Interpersonal

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Level. Thus, for instance, the selection of an Imperative Illocution at the Interpersonal Level requires the speciﬁcation of the requested State-of-Aﬀairs at the Representational Level. In the speciﬁcation of this underlying structure, use is made of the general structure for layers that was introduced in the preceding chapter, and which we repeat here for convenience, now with the appropriate lower-case symbols: (42) (π v1 : [h (v1 )φ ]: [σ (v1 )φ ]) in which v = variable, h = head, σ = modiﬁer, π = operator, and φ = function. Square brackets again enclose semantic categories that are in a nonhierarchical relationship, such as the head and the variable of which it is predicated, and the modiﬁer and the variable of which it is predicated. See Smit and van Staden (2007) for this way of organizing the Representional Level. At the heart of the basic standard conﬁguration used at the Representational Level is the description of a State-of-Aﬀairs with a complex head: (43) (π e1 : [(f1 : [(f2 ) (x1 )φ (l1 )φ (t1 )φ . . . ] (f1 )) (e1 )φ ]: [σ (e1 )φ ]) What this formalism shows is that States-of-Aﬀairs (e) are characterized by a complex Property (f1 ) (see Hengeveld and van Lier 2008), which we will call a Conﬁgurational Property, since it is a combination of semantic units that are not in a hierarchical relationship with respect to each other, including, again, Properties (f2 ), Individuals (x), Locations (l), Times (t), etc. The possible combinations of these semantic units of like rank will be speciﬁed later in this chapter in terms of predication frames. Properties headed by a lexical head are called Lexical Properties, and their lexical head is indicated by the symbol . Within a predication frame there is a nucleus and there are dependents. The dependency of the latter is shown by the presence of a (semantic) function. Since the potential combinations of semantic units are language-dependent and may include many diﬀerent sets of semantic units, we may generalize over the structure in (43) in the following way: (44)

(π e1 : [(f1 : [(v1 ) (v)φ n ] (f1 )) (e1 )φ ]: [σ (e1 )φ ])

where v is a variable ranging over variables. Using the general structure for layers in (42), including heads, modiﬁers, operators, and functions, for each of the units in (43), we arrive at (45).

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(45) (π e1 :

[(π f1 : [ (π f2 : (π x1 : (x1 )φ ]: (π l1 : (l1 )φ ]: (π t1 :

(t1 )φ ]: ] (f1 ): [σ (f1 )φ ]) (e1 )φ ]: [σ (e1 )φ ])

(f2 ): [σ (f2 )φ ])

[(π f3 : (f3 ): σ (f3 )φ ) [σ (x1 )φ ])φ [(π f4 : (f4 ): σ (f4 )φ ) [σ (l1 )φ ])φ [ (π f5 : (f5 ): σ (f5 )φ ) [σ (t1 )φ ])φ

State-of-Aﬀairs Conﬁgurational Property Lexical Property Individual Lexical Property Individual Location Lexical Property Location Time Lexical Property Time Conﬁgurational Property State-of-Aﬀairs

It is clear from this representation that (f)-units show up at many places in the semantic structure. Apart from the fact that they may form independent units in the constitution of predication frames (f2 ), they are used to specify the Properties of States-of-Aﬀairs (f1 ), Individuals (f3 ), Locations (f4 ), Times (f5 ), etc. Consider the representation in (46): (46)

(ei : [(fi :

[ (fj : (xi : (li :

go (fj )) [(fk : man (fk )) (xi )φ ])φ [(fl : countryside (fl )) (li )φ ])φ

] (fi )) (ei )φ ]) ‘The man went to the countryside.’ Here the State-of-Aﬀairs (ei ) is characterized by the Conﬁgurational Property (fi ), the Individual (xi ) by the Lexical Property (fk ), and the Location (li ) by the lexical Property (fl ). The Property (fj ) is an independent semantic constituent of the predication frame contained in (fi ), and speciﬁes a relation between (xi ) and (li ). In a horizontal formalization, which is the one we will use later on in this chapter, this structure would be as in (47): (47)

(ei : [(fi : [(fj : go (fj )) (xi : [(fk : man (fk )) (xi )φ ])φ (li : [(fl : countryside (fl )) (li )φ ])φ ] (fi )) (ei )φ ]) ‘The man went to the countryside.’

Note that positions within the predication frame as well as modiﬁer positions may in principle be ﬁlled by any semantic unit, so that there is full recursivity

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within the semantic structure. Consider for instance the following representation: (48) (ei :

(ei )φ ]:

[(fi :

[ (fj : (ej : (ek :

cause (fj )) [(fk : rainfall (fk )) (ej )φ ])φ [(fl : accident (fl )) (ek )φ ])φ

[(fm :

yesterday

] (fi )) [(ti : (fm ))

(ti )φ ])φ (ei )φ ]) ‘Yesterday the rainfall caused an accident.’ Here the (fj ) speciﬁes a causal relation between the States-of-Aﬀairs (ej ) and (ek ), which thus occur as semantic constituents within the predication frame specifying the higher State-of-Aﬀairs (ei ). The modiﬁer-slot of (ei ) is occupied by (ti ), providing it with a temporal speciﬁcation. The horizontal formulation of (48) would be as in (49): (49) (ei : [(fi : [(fj : cause (fj )) (ej : [(fk : rainfall (fk )) (ej )φ ])φ (ek : [(fl : accident (fl )) (ek )φ ])φ ] (fi ))(ei )φ ]: [(ti : [(fm : yesterday (fm )) (ti )φ ])φ (ei )φ ]) ‘Yesterday the rainfall caused an accident.’ For another example of recursivity, consider (50): (50)

(ei :

[(fi :

[ (fj : (xi : (ej :

saw (fj )) [(fk : man (fk )) (xi )φ ]) [(fl : [ (fm : depart (fm )) (xj : [(fn : woman (fn )) (xj )φ ])φ (li : [(fo : building (fo )) (li )φ ])φ ] (fl ))

(ej )φ ])φ ] (fi )) (ei )φ ]) ‘The man saw the woman depart from the building.’ In this example the predication frame (fi ) of the State-of-Aﬀairs (ei ) contains slots for a Property (fj ), an Individual (xi ) and a second State-of-Aﬀairs (ej ). This State-of-Aﬀairs in turn contains a predication frame (fl ) which contains slots for a Property (fm ), an Individual (xj ), and a Location (li ). It will be clear from this example that recursivity at the Representational Level may

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trigger embedded constructions at the Morphosyntactic Level. The horizontal representation of (50) is given in (51): (51) (ei : [(fi : [(fj : saw (fj )) (xi : [(fk : man (fk )) (xi )φ ])φ (ej : [(fl : [(fm : depart (fm )) (xj : [(fn : woman (fn )) (xj )φ ])φ (li : [(fo : building (fo )) (li )φ ])φ ] (fl )) (ej )φ ])φ ] (fi )) (ei )φ ]) States-of-aﬀairs (e) enter into higher layers of organization: they may form thematically coherent sets that we have called Episodes (ep) earlier; and these in turn may constitute the extension of Propositional Contents, i.e. Propositional Contents are mental constructs about sets of States-of-Aﬀairs (cf. Lyons 1989: 171). These higher layers are represented as follows: (52) ( π p1 :

Propositional Content Episode State-of-Aﬀairs (π e1 : [ Conﬁgurational Property [(π f1 : any semantic category (π v1 : (v1 ): [σ (v1 )φ ]) ... ... any semantic category (π v1+n : (v1+n ): [σ (v1+n )φ ])φ [σ (f1 )φ ]) Conﬁgurational Property ] (f1 ): State-of-Aﬀairs (e1 )φ ]: [σ (e1 )φ ]) Episode (ep1 ): [σ (ep1 )φ ]) Propositional Content (p1 ): [σ (p1 )φ ]) (π ep1 :

This representation shows that Episodes are hierarchically superior to Statesof-Aﬀairs, and Propositional Contents hierarchically superior to Episodes. That this is the correct hierarchical arrangement can be demonstrated by means of some examples. As we argued earlier, the verb happen may be used to introduce an Episode. Since Episodes do not contain a Propositional Content layer according to (52), it then follows that the description of an Episode may not contain modiﬁers specifying a propositional attitude, since these specify the attitude of the Speaker with respect to a Propositional Content and therefore belong to the p-layer (see 5.4.3). Example (53) shows that this prediction is correct: (53) It so happened [that (*probably) they inadvertently took another path than that followed by the party under Barunda’s uncle, so that they passed the latter without being aware of it, going nearly half a mile to the right of where the trailers camped a short distance from the bivouac of Ninaka]. The adverb probably cannot be added to the complement in the intended reading, which is the one in which it has scope over the Episode as a whole.

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We may contrast this with a situation in which the same set of clauses is embedded as an argument of the verb believe. Unlike happen, the complement of believe denotes a Propositional Content. In this case the addition of probably with wide scope is perfectly acceptable: (54)

I believe that probably they inadvertently took another path than that followed by the party under Barunda’s uncle, so that they passed the latter without being aware of it, going nearly half a mile to the right of where the trailers camped a short distance from the bivouac of Ninaka.

In the preceding we have concentrated on layers with complex, conﬁgurational heads. Apart from these, we distinguish lexical heads, empty heads, and absent heads. The following examples illustrate the diﬀerences between these for the layer of the Individual: (55)

The man cleaned the windows and ∅ painted the door.

absent

(56)

Mary wants a goodlooking man but I prefer an honest one.

empty

(57)

The man painted the door.

lexical

(58)

The landlord’s brother painted the door.

conﬁgurational

In (55) ellipsis is indicative of an anaphoric relation with the preceding description the man, as represented by the coindexed variable for Individuals (xi ) in (59). In this case the head is simply absent, the variable by itself accounting for the designation. In (56) one has an anaphoric relation with the Property man mentioned earlier in the same sentence, represented by the coindexed variable for Properties (fi ) in (60). In this case there is a head position within the x-layer, but it is ﬁlled with a Property variable, not with lexical material. In (57) the head position is occupied by a lexeme, represented as (fi ) in (61). And in (58) the Individual designated by the noun phrase has the Conﬁgurational Property brother of the landlord, (fi ) in (62). (59)

(xi )

absent

(60) (xi : [(fi ) (xi )φ ]: [(fj : honest (fj )) (xi )φ ])

empty

(61) (xi : [(fi : man (fi )) (xi )φ ])

lexical

(62) (xi : [(fi : [(fj : brother (fj )) (xj : [(fk : landlord (fk )) (xj )φ ])φ ] (fi )) (xi )φ ]) conﬁgurational In what follows we discuss the various layers that make up the Representational Level one by one, in each case starting with a general characterization, and then discussing the heads, modiﬁers, and operators relevant to that layer. We start with the highest units and work down to the lower ones.

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the representational level

3.3 Propositional contents 3.3.1 Introduction

Propositional Contents are mental constructs that do not exist in space or time but rather exist in the minds of those entertaining them. The linguistic relevance of the semantic category of Propositional Contents was illustrated initially in 3.2, where Propositional Contents were argued to behave diﬀerently in nominalization. Propositional contents may be factual, as when they are pieces of knowledge or reasonable belief about the actual world, or nonfactual, as when they are hopes or wishes with respect to an imaginary world. Given their nature, Propositional Contents are characterized by the fact that they may be qualiﬁed in terms of propositional attitudes (certainty, doubt, disbelief) and/or in terms of their source or origin (shared common knowledge, sensory evidence, inference). Lexical expressions of these modal and evidential categories are discussed in 3.3.3, grammatical expressions in 3.3.4. Propositional Contents (p) are not identical to Communicated Contents (C), which were discussed in the previous chapter. Communicated Contents constitute the message contents of Discourse Acts, and are not necessarily propositional in nature, as amply illustrated in the previous chapter. Thus, though the Communicated Content of an act may (and actually often does) correspond to a Propositional Content, it is not identical to it. A major difference between Communicated Contents and Propositional Contents is that Communicated Contents are Speaker-bound, whereas Propositional Contents are not, at least not necessarily. This means that Propositional Contents can be attributed without problems to persons other than the Speaker: (63) Jenny believed that her mother would visit her. (64) Jenny’s major reason for not coming was that her mother would visit her. (65) Jenny hoped that her mother would visit her. (66) Jenny went home because her mother would visit her. (67)

Jenny went home so that her mother could visit her.

In all these examples the embedded Propositional Content is attributed to the Individual Jenny introduced in the main clause. The propositional nature of the parts in italics in examples (63)–(67) shows up in the fact that they may contain elements expressing a propositional attitude. The following examples, derived from a web search, parallel (63)–(67) and all contain the adverb maybe indicating the propositional attitude of an Individual in the main clause:

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145

(68) He believes that maybe the eﬀect of the PeptoBismol® is due to its color. (69)

The reason [they gave] is that maybe the money had come from business which was believed to be linked to the organized crime in Bulgaria.

(70)

Unable to collect from the responsible party, the original card-holder, the credit grantor hopes that maybe the authorized user will pay to keep their credit record clean.

(71) Yeah, glad to be canadian our judges know whats what and they see clearly that the CRIA and RIAA are really just whining millionairs that are upset because maybe their CD sales have dropped over the past years. (72)

I’m so in love with Jesus that I would spend 3 hours today to write this to you so that maybe one day you and I could meet in heaven as brother and sister and talk about the days on earth where we followed Jesus in love.

Recall that it is characteristic of Communicated Contents that they can be qualiﬁed in terms of their reported nature: a Speaker may relay a Communicated Content obtained from someone else within his own Discourse Act. This is not true of the examples above: the addition of an adverb (e.g. reportedly) or the speciﬁcation of a source (e.g. according to John) is impossible or awkward. The general frame for Propositional Contents with a conﬁgurational head is as follows: (73)

(π p1 : [(ep1 ) . . . (ep1+n ){φ} ] (p1 ): [σ (p1 )φ ])

This structure should be read as follows: a Propositional Content with a conﬁgurational head consists minimally of one nuclear Episode (ep1 ), but may contain more than one additional Episode (ep1+N ), which may ({}) be provided with a semantic function (φ). A Propositional Content may furthermore contain modiﬁers (σ, see 3.3.3) and operators (π, see 3.3.4). 3.3.2 Heads

Heads of Propositional Contents can be of the four general types, which we will discuss in the order indicated earlier. (i) Absent head Consider the following example: (74)

John thinks Sheila is ill but that isn’t true.

The verb think takes an argument designating a Propositional Content Sheila is ill, to which anaphoric reference is made in the second clause in (74).

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the representational level

Anaphoric reference is achieved through simple co-indexation of the propositional variable, leading to the representation of that in (75): (75) (pi ) (ii) Empty head For an example of an empty-headed description of a Propositional Content consider (76): (76) There’s an idea—a stupid one—that only rich people have nannies. (Internet) Here the element one refers anaphorically to the head of the preceding noun phrase idea, as represented in (77): (77)

(pi : [(fi ) (pi )φ ]: [(fj : stupid (fj )) (pi )φ ])

(iii) Lexical head For Propositional Contents there are two types of lexical heads, represented in (78) and (79): (78)

(p1 : (p1 ))

(79) (p1 : [(f1 : (f1 )) (p1 )φ ]) The representation in (78) is of a rather exceptional type: it is used for single words that may be used as the full Propositional Content of a message, in particular the words for yes and no. The representation in (79) is used for the description of Propositional Contents though a single lexeme, often by means of nouns in languages that have them. We will treat these two types in this order. Consider ﬁrst the following examples: (80) A: Was Peter attacked by a dog? B: a. Yes. b. No. As suggested in Vet (1986), in answers to yes-no questions, the words yes and no substitute for full Propositional Contents. In a way they are pro-Propositional Contents. So in (80Ba) yes substitutes for Peter was attacked by a dog. One might say that Speaker B assigns a positive truth value to the Propositional Content contained in Speaker A’s question. The words yes and no may be represented as in (81) and (82) in their use illustrated in (80): (81) (pi : yes(pi )) (82) (pi : no(pi ))

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Note that such a Propositional Content counts as a complete ﬁller for a Communicated Content at the Interpersonal Level. They may also be used within questions: (83)

A: Peter was attacked by a dog. B: Yes?

(84)

A: Peter was not attacked by a dog. B: No?

It is furthermore important to note that the basic Propositional Contents in (81)–(82) may enter into an equipollent relationship with other ps, as in the following examples: (85)

A: Was Peter attacked by a dog? B: a. Yes, apparently he was. b. No, probably not.

Several languages have no words for yes and no in this sense and repeat part of the content of a question in their answers. An example of such a language is Scottish Gaelic: (86) A: An tàinig Seumas? q come.pst.dep Seumas ‘Did Seumas come?’ B:

a. Thàinig. Come.pst.indep ‘He came.’ b. Cha tàinig. decl.neg come.pst.dep ‘He didn’t come.’

Note that the utterances Ba and Bb are only grammatical as answers to questions, so that their formation is dependent on information from the Interpersonal Level. A strong argument in favour of the fact that yes and no are propositional in nature, is that in some languages they may occur as the argument of a predicate expressing a propositional attitude, as for instance in Portuguese: (87)

Ach-o que sim/não. ﬁnd-1.sg.prs.ind comp yes/no ‘I think so/I don’t think so.’ “I think that yes/no.”

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the representational level

The analysis presented in (81)–(82) of yes and no in reaction to a statement or a question cannot be transferred to their use in reaction to an Imperative. Consider the following examples: (88) A: Go home! B: a. No! b. *Yes! c. Okay! The use of no in (88Ba) does not assign a negative truth value to the Propositional Content contained in Speaker A’s order (in fact, Imperative Discourse Acts do not evocate a Propositional Content but just a State-of-Aﬀairs). Rather, it functions as a rejection of the preceding order. In this use it is not in opposition with yes but with okay, as (88Bb–c) show. A similar set of examples, but now illustrating two diﬀerent positive and negative reactions to yes/no questions and orders is the following, from Wari" (Everett and Kern 1997: 33, 39): (89) A: Com ta" tamara" ma? sing 1.sg.rls.fut song 2.sg.rls.nonfut ‘Will you sing a song?’ “Do you (say), ‘I will sing a song’?” B: a. "E"e". yes ‘Yes.’ b. "Om. neg.ex ‘No.’ (90) A: Mo tota-∅ ra "e" Xijam run.sg garden-1.sg 2.sg.rls.fut emph Xijam ‘Go make a garden, Xijam.’ B: a. Ma. okay ‘Okay.’ b. Noc "ina-in. dislike 1.sg.rls.nonfut-3.n ‘I don’t want to.’ “I dislike it.” Whereas in the context of yes/no questions Wari" has the possibility of answering with words equivalent to ‘yes’ and ‘no’, in reaction to orders consent is

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expressed by a diﬀerent particle, while dissent is expressed ‘via semantically appropriate negative constructions’ (Everett and Kern 1997: 38). The diﬀerence between the two kinds of ‘yes’ and ‘no’ may be represented as in (91)–(92): (91) (p1 : -no- (p1 )), (p1 : -yes- (p1 )) (92) (A1 : -no- (A1 )), (A1 : -okay- (A1 )) The reason that the second use, represented in (92), is to be considered a lexically realized Discourse Act rather than a Move is that the negative or positive response can be further motivated by additional Discourse Acts, as illustrated in (93): (93) A: Go home! B: Okay, if that’s what you want! The idea of having a positive response as a speciﬁc type of Discourse Act can be stretched a bit further if we consider examples like the following: (94) A: I’m really pissed oﬀ that you lied to me. B: Okay, fair enough, but . . . (95) A: So you are not going to pay the bill? B: Okay, let me get this straight . . . Here the positive response is given in reaction to a Declarative Discourse Act (94) and an Interrogative one (95). We may now argue, following Sadock and Zwicky (1985: 190), that in those languages in which ‘yes’ in reply to a negative question actually has to be interpreted as ‘no’, a famous case being Japanese hai, the word for ‘yes’ is not a propositional ‘yes’ but actional ‘yes’. The following example is from Tuyuca (Barnes 1994: 339): (96)

A: Atí-ri-gari. come-neg-q ‘Is he not coming?’ B: ˜ıh˜ı uh-huh ‘Yes (he is not coming).’

A last diﬀerence between propositional and actional ‘yes’ and ‘no’ is that in languages in which propositional ‘yes’ and ‘no’ can occur as the complement of a propositional attitude verb, this does not hold for actional yes and no. Compare (87) with the following Portuguese example, which is ungrammatical in the intended reading:

150 (97)

the representational level *Ach-o que tá_bem. ﬁnd-1.sg.prs.ind comp okay “I think that okay.”

A second type of lexical instantiation of a Propositional Content occurs when a description of a Propositional Content is realized by means of lexical heads that may be further modiﬁed. Examples are the following: (98) That is a crazy idea. (99) The hope that he is entertaining is unjustiﬁed. Phrases like these are not regularly used as the realization of C, but rather as instantiations of T, as in (98), or of R, as in (99). Their basic underlying structure is as follows: (100) (π p1 : [(f1 : (f1 )) (p1 )φ ]: [σ (p1 )φ ]) That is, a lexical element that describes a Property (f1 ) occupies the head slot of a unit designating a Propositional Content (p). The modiﬁer slot σ may be ﬁlled with units designating various semantic categories such as the Property crazy in (98), the State-of-Aﬀairs he entertains it in (99), and others. The modiﬁer slot thus makes use of semantic categories other than Propositional Contents, in a recursive application of frames. The internal structure of the lower-layer semantic categories that are used as modiﬁers in (98)–(99) is described in later sections. (iv) Conﬁgurational head The conﬁgurational head of a Propositional Content designates one or more Episodes (ep). This is illustrated in (101) for two Episodes that are not in a dependency relation: (101) [He went to London to visit his brother] and [she will go to Paris to take care of her mother]. The representation of (101) is given in (102): (102) (pi : [(epi : –he went to London to visit his brother– (epi )) (epj : –she will go to Paris to take care of her mother– (epj ))] (pi )) The Episode status of the coordinated parts of the Propositional Content (pi ) in (101) can be deduced from the tense marking. Episodes can be set oﬀ from other semantic categories by the fact that they can be speciﬁed for their absolute location in time (see 3.4.4). Both units in (101) have their own absolute temporal speciﬁcation, past in the ﬁrst unit and future in the second, which means that both units are Episodes. At the same time both Episodes fall within the scope of a single propositional modiﬁer. This is illustrated in (103):

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(103) Probably he went to London to visit his brother and she will go to Paris to take care of her mother. These properties follow from the more detailed representation of (103), including operators and modiﬁers, in (104): (104) (pi : [(past epi : –he went to London to visit his brother– (epi )) (fut epj : –she will go to Paris to take care of her mother– (epj ))] (pi ): (fi : probably (fi )) (pi )φ ) There may also be a dependency relation between Episodes within the head position of a Propositional Content, relation, as in (105): (105) He went to London to visit his brother because she will go to Paris to take care of her mother. The two Episodes in (105) may fall under the scope of a single propositional modiﬁer again: (106) Probably he went to London to visit his brother because she will go to Paris to take care of her mother. This leads us to the following representation: (107) (pi : [(epi ) (epj )Reason ] (pi )) In sum, we ﬁnd the following heads for Propositional Contents: (108) (p1 )

absent head

(109) (π p1 : (f1 ) (p1 )φ : σ (p1 )φ )

empty head

(110) (π p1 : (p1 )φ : σ (p1 )φ )

lexical head (pro-Propositional Content)

(111) (π p1 : (f1 : (f1 )) (p1 )φ : σ (p1 )φ ) (112) (π p1 : [(ep1 ) . . . (ep1+N ){φ} ] (p1 ): σ (p1 )φ )

lexical head conﬁgurational head

3.3.3 Modiﬁers

As has been mentioned and illustrated in passing, modiﬁers of Propositional Contents are concerned with the speciﬁcation of propositional attitudes. These attitudes may concern the kind and degree of commitment of a rational being to the Propositional Content, or a speciﬁcation of the (non-verbal) source of the Propositional Content. Examples are the following: (113) Probably/evidently/hopefully/undoubtedly Sheila is ill. Modiﬁers like these may be represented as Property-designating expressions modifying the Propositional Content, as in: (114) (π p1 : [ . . . ] (p1 ): [(f1 : (f1 )) (p1 )φ ])

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the representational level

As argued in 2.7.3, within the category of evidential modality there is a major split between those modalities that are strictly reportative in nature, and those that are not. We use the term ‘reportative’ for the former and ‘evidential’ for the latter. Reportative modality was classiﬁed in 2.7.3 as a category modifying the Communicated Content: a Speaker may relay a Communicated Content obtained from someone else within his own Discourse Act. The following type of example shows that a reportative modality may combine with an evidential one, i.e. a Speaker may relay a Communicated Content that contains a Propositional Content with an evidential qualiﬁcation: (115) Allegedly the area stimulated for the upper plexus would presumably include C7. (Internet) Thus, the combined underlying structure of (115) is as in (116): (116) (CI : [ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ] (CI )φ : allegedly (CI )φ ) (pi : [ . . . ] (pi )φ : presumably (pi )φ ) The hierarchical ordering (with respect to the predicate) is nicely reﬂected in this example, and the reverse order is actually excluded: (117) *Presumably the area stimulated for the upper plexus would allegedly include C7. Similarly, adverbs expressing the degree of commitment of the Speaker with respect to the Propositional Content fall within the scope of reportative modiﬁers, as in the following examples: (118) A lobster dinner at Legal Sea Foods, where, over red Bordeaux, he reportedly muses that maybe he could eventually have his own CNN show. To which Monica is said to have replied, ‘Yeah, you’ll have plenty of time when I ﬁre you.’ (Internet) (119) Even some of C.’s friends reportedly are suggesting maybe he ought to cut back. (Internet) Similarly, while the adverb apparently could mean both ‘someone told me’ and ‘I infer from what I perceive/know’, in the following sentence it can only have the former meaning: (120) If anyone knows or has any contact with C., I would be very grateful if they could get in touch. Apparently he is probably living in lanarkshire. Again, the inverse would be impossible: (121) *He maybe muses that reportedly he could eventually have his own CNN show.

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(122) *Even some of C.’s friends maybe are suggesting reportedly he ought to cut back. (123) *Probably he is apparently living in Lanarkshire. We will show the relevance of these facts for grammatical systems of evidentiality in the next section. The pro-Propositional Contents yes and no can be (marginally) modiﬁed just like full Propositional Contents, as illustrated in (124): (124)

a. Probably yes. b. Possibly no/not.

Propositions headed by a lexical f-category can be modiﬁed by all kinds of other semantic categories, as illustrated earlier with the following examples: (125) That is a crazy idea. (126) The hope that he is entertaining is unjustiﬁed. 3.3.4 Operators

The operator categories relevant at the layer of the Propositional Content can likewise be subdivided into distinctions concerned with the degree and type of commitment with respect to a Propositional Content (subjective epistemic modality) and distinctions concerned with the source of the Propositional Content (evidential modality). The most important subdistinctions to be made within the category of subjective epistemic modality are doxastic, dubitative, and hypothetical. A doxastic modality permits the Speaker to indicate that s/he believes that the Propositional Content s/he is presenting is true. Since this is the usual assumption underlying assertions, this modality type is rarely expressed by grammatical means. The following example from Hidatsa (Matthews 1965) is therefore rather exceptional, since the sentence ﬁnal particle c ‘doxastic’ indicates that the Speaker has reasonable grounds to believe that the Propositional Content he is presenting is true: (127)

Wío i hírawe ki ksa c. woman 3.sg sleep ingr iter dox ‘The woman fell asleep again and again.’

The much more frequently marked dubitative modality allows the Speaker to indicate that s/he has some doubts about the truth of the Propositional Content s/he is presenting, as in the following Mapuche example (Smeets 1989: 431):

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(128) Amu-y chi. go-decl.3 dub ‘Maybe he went away.’ A hypothetical modality presents the Propositional Content as a hypothesis. In the following English examples this modality type is expressed by the particle if, which at the same time functions as a conjunction: (129)

a. If he comes, (I’ll leave) b. If he came, (I would leave)

Note, incidentally, that the distinction between realis and irrealis conditions, as illustrated in (129), is not a subdivision that obtains at the layer of proposition-oriented modality, but at the layer of event-oriented modality. Thus, in (129) the Speaker indicates absence of commitment to the Propositional Content introduced by if, and within that Propositional Content s/he characterizes a State-of-Aﬀairs as real (129a) or unreal (129b) within the hypothesized world. We will come back to the Realis/Irrealis opposition in 3.5.4.3 below, when discussing event-oriented modalities. A wide variety of other subjective modalities may be found. Consider the following examples from Pawnee (Parks 1976: 162): (130) Ti-ku-itka-is-ta. ind-1.sg.obj-sleep-pfv-int ‘I want to sleep.’ “It is going to sleep on me.” and Musqueam (Suttles 2004: 382): c@n ceP m @. (131) p´@qw fut cert go.broke I ‘I’ll certainly go broke.’ In Pawnee (130) a special formation, in which the verb is inﬂected passively (hence the ﬁrst singular object marker) is provided with ‘perfect intentive aspect’ suﬃxes, expresses volitive proposition-oriented modality. The formation is restricted to the ﬁrst person. Note that the indicative mood morpheme ti- shows that this sentence cannot be interpreted as having Optative Illocution, i.e. it is not a wish, but an assertion concerning the Speaker’s wishes. Musqueam (131) has a certainty marker. In addition to subjective modality, there is a class of evidential operators. Evidentiality is relevant at diﬀerent levels and layers. At the layer of the Propositional Content evidential modality concerns the speciﬁcation of how the Speaker has arrived at a certain piece of knowledge as contained in

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the Propositional Content. S/he may have arrived at this knowledge through inference on the basis of sensory evidence, on the basis of inference derived from existing knowledge, or on the basis of general knowledge accumulated in the community. A general marker (ˇc’a) for inference or conjecture is found in Sliammon (Watanabe 2003: 517): ˇ (132) C’a=q @y’ š@=ł@x., na-t-@m=k’w a. infer=die det=bad say-tr.cntrl-pass=rep ‘ “That no good one must have died”, they said.’ Markers of sensory evidence may be subdivided according to the particular sensory mode through which the information was acquired (Palmer 1986: 67; Willett 1988: 57). For instance, Maricopa (Gordon 1986, cited in Willett 1988) distinguishes between visual sensory evidence (133) and non-visual sensory evidence (134): (133) Lima-Pyuu. dance-vis.evid ‘He danced (I saw it).’ (134) Mashvar-Pa. 2SG.sing-nonvis ‘You sang (I heard it).’ The fact that subjective modality and evidential modality occur in the same operator slot is reﬂected in the fact that often they constitute a single paradigm together, as shown in the following Pawnee examples (Parks 1976, cited in Bybee 1985): (135) Tir-ra-ku:tik-∅ ku:ruks. inf-abs-kill-pfv bear ‘He must have killed a bear.’ (136) Kur-ra-u-∅ pi:ta a ku capat. dub-abs-cop-pfv man or indf woman ‘It was either a man or a woman.’ As these examples show, the inferential preﬁx in (135) and the dubitative preﬁx in (136) occupy the same slot, and are therefore mutually exclusive. We have treated markers of reportativity, i.e. markers indicating that the Speaker is relaying information from another speaker, as pertaining to the Interpersonal Level, where they are operators on the Communicated Content, as discussed in 2.7.4. This means that two classes of elements that in the literature are treated as belonging to the same general class of evidentiality are

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actually two diﬀerent categories. Evidence for this position comes from the fact that in several languages reportative and evidential markers may occur in one and the same sentence. Consider the following example from Sliammon (Watanabe 2003: 528, 517): (137) K"w a=t"aPt"θ -m qy"=ta. rep=bleed-det die=vis.evid ‘He bled and he died.’ In (137) the reportative maker k w a combines with the visual evidence marker ta, expressing a situation in which the Communicated Content relayed by the current Speaker contained a Propositional Content for which the original speaker had visual evidence. A similar combination of markers is found in Eastern Pomo (McLendon 2003: 111–12, cited in Aikhenvald 2004): (138) Ka·lél=xa=khí ma·Póral q’á·-ne-·e. simply=they.say=3.pl.ag daughter.in.law leave-infer-rep ‘He must have simply left his daughter-in-law there, they say.’ and in Tsaﬁki (Barbacoan; Dickinson 2002: 7, cited in Aikhenvald 2004): (139) Manuel ano ﬁ-nu-ti-e. Manuel food eat-perc-rep-decl ‘It is said Manuel must have eaten.’ We thus have clear indications that evidentiality is not a uniﬁed category. In fact, we will show in the next section that alongside C-evidentiality (reportativity) and p-evidentiality (evidence for Propositional Content), there is a third type of evidentiality that is relevant at the layer of the State-of-Aﬀairs. A ﬁnal evidential category that is relevant at this Layer is genericity. In many languages this category is expressed through special construction types rather than through speciﬁc morphological markers. We consider this to be an evidential subcategory, since it characterizes a Propositional Content as being part of the body of common knowledge available within a certain community. 3.3.5 Frames

To summarize, the set of primitives for the Representational Level provides the following frames for the layer of the Propositional Content: (140) (p1 : (p1 )) (141) (p1 : [(f1 ) (p1 )φ ]) (142) (π p1 : [(ep1 ) . . . (ep1+N ){φ} ]: [σ (p1 )φ ])

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Heads of Propositional Contents may be special words such as ‘yes’ and ‘no’ (140), Lexical Properties (141) or (combinations of) Episodes (142). The operator position in (142) may be ﬁlled by an operator expressing a propositional attitude. The modiﬁer position in (142) may likewise be ﬁlled by the lexical expression of a propositional attitude.

3.4 Episodes 3.4.1 Introduction

By an Episode we mean one or more States-of-Aﬀairs that are thematically coherent, in the sense that they show unity or continuity of Time (t), Location (l), and Individuals (x). The general frame for Episodes with a conﬁgurational head is as follows: (143) (π ep1 : [(e1 ) . . . (e1+N ){φ} ] (ep1 ): [σ (ep1 )φ ]) This structure should be read as follows: an Episode consists minimally of one nuclear State-of-Aﬀairs (e1 ), but may contain more than one additional Stateof-Aﬀairs (e1+N ), which may ({}) be provided with a semantic function (φ). An Episode may furthermore contain modiﬁers (σ, see 3.4.3) and operators (π, see 3.4.4). In various languages the semantic category of Episodes is very manifestly present in the grammatical system. Consider the following example from Tauya (MacDonald 1990: 218): (144)

Nono ∅-imai-te-pa mai mene-a-te pai aPate-pa nono child 3.sg-carry-get-ss come.up stay-3.sg-ds pig hit-ss child wi nen-fe-pa yene wawi wi nen-fe-pa mene-pa pai show 3.pl-tr-ss sacred ﬂute show 3.pl-tr-ss stay-ss pig aPate-ti tefe-pa PePeri-pa toto-i-Pa. hit-conj put-ss dance-ss cut-3.pl-ind ‘She carried the child and came up and stayed; and they hit [=killed] the pigs and showed them to the children, and they showed them the sacred ﬂutes and stayed, and they hit [=killed] the pigs and put them, and they danced and cut [the pigs].’

All of the verb forms in (144) except for the last one are medial. Via the use of same- or diﬀerent-subject forms maintenance and change of perspective are established. In this way, long chains of clauses may be formed which together constitute Episodes within a larger narrative. The phenomenon is somewhat

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similar to the use of non-ﬁnite narrative verb forms, as in the following English example, adapted from Givón (1995, see also Wanders in prep.): (145) Coming out, stopping to check the mailbox, taking a look at the driveway and pausing to adjust his hat, he walked to his car. The relevance of Episodes is not only visible in their internal constitution, as in (144)–(145), but also through the ways they are connected to each other. The following example from Tidore (van Staden 2000: 414), which we discussed earlier in 1.2.3, illustrates the phenomenon of tail-head linkage: (146) Turus jafa cahi saloi ena=ge turus paka then Jafa carry.on.the.back basket 3.nh=there then ascend ine. Ine una oka koi ena=ge. Oka go.upwards go.upwards 3.sg.m pick banana 3.nh=there pick koi ngge kam-kam tora oma saloi banana 3.nh=there red-ﬁll go.downwards loc basket ngge ma-doya. 3.nh=there 3.nh.poss-inside ‘Then Jafa, carrying the basket, went up; he picked the bananas and ﬁlled the basket with them.’ “Then Jafa carried the basket and went upwards. Went upwards he picked the bananas. Picked the bananas and ﬁlled (downwards) the inside of the basket.” Tidore manifests the verb-chaining strategies that were illustrated for Tauya in (144). These verb chains can be seen as expressing Episodes, in the sense that they contain semantically coherent sets of States-of-Aﬀairs. Verb chains are linked to each other by repeating the last verb or verb complex of a chain as the ﬁrst verb or verb complex of the next chain, thus creating coherence between Episodes. A quite similar phenomenon may be found in many languages in genres such as cooking recipes, where the various major steps to be taken in preparing a dish may be said to constitute the Episodes of the recipe. The following Spanish recipe shows how every new step is clearly demarcated by the result of the previous one: (147)

En una olla coloca el agua, el ajo, cebolla, pimentón, ají dulce, la espinaca y los vegetales picados en trozos, cuando comience a hervir, añada las hierbas aromáticas . . . Una vez blandos los vegetales puedes retirar, si los deseas, los trozos de ajo, pimentón, ají y cebolla, retira las hierbas y comienza a licuar poco a poco las verduras con el caldo. Una vez que tenga consistencia de crema, añade la margarina, la leche, licua bien y lleva nuevamente a la olla.

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‘Put water, garlic, onion, sweet pepper, chilli pepper, spinach and the vegetables cut into pieces in a pan, when it starts to boil, add the herbs. Once the vegetables are cooked you can take out, if you wish, the pieces of garlic, sweet pepper, chilli pepper and onion, take out the herbs and start to blend the vegetables with the broth little by little. Once it becomes thick, add the margarine, the milk, blend well, and put it in the pan again.’ (Internet) Finally, the transition from one Episode to the other may be indicated by particles, as in the following example from Koryak (Chukchi-Kamchatkan, Bógoras 1917: 43–5): (148) Enñaε "an Amamqu"tinu vañvolai"ke. Amamqu"tinak Kilu" thus Eme"mqut’s.people lived by.Eme"mqut Kilu" Ama"mqut gama"talen, ui"ña akmi"ñika gi"linat. Vaε "yuk was.married no childless they.were afterwards Eme’mqut notaitiñ ga"lqalin, va"am-e_he"ti ga"lilin, vaε "yuk to.the.country went river.up.stream he.followed afterwards ganyininiña"linau" i"nalka oya"mtiwilu, ya"nya.eε "en ña"witqatu, partly women appeared.to.him numerous people li"gan mimtelhiyalai"ke, qla"wulu ampalto"lu, even resplendent.with.light men all.in.jackets.of.broadcloth ña"wisqatu ammani"ssalu. Ama"mqut avi"ut gala"lin, women all.in.calico Eme"mqut in.haste came, gaqalei"pilin, gañvo"len vinya"tik kaña"tilaε k. Avi"ut fell.in.love began to.help ﬁshing.with.dragnets in.haste Yu"qyaña"ut gama"talen. Ña"nyeu qa_i"n Yuqyamtilaε "nu. Bumblebee.Woman he.married those indeed Bumblebee.Men I"nalka kmi"ñu gaitoi"vilenau. Vaε "yuk Kilu" numerous children she.brought.forth.them afterwards Kilu" ña"nyen gapkawñivo"len yayisqa"nñik. Ga"lqalin va"amik that.one could.not sleep she.went to.the.river e_he"ti, vaε "yuk galapit_oñvo"len, a"nke gagetañvo"lenau upstream afterwards she.looked.around there she.saw kaña"tilu. Ama"mqut a"nke o"maka kaña"tiykin. the.ﬁshing.people Eme"mqut there together is.ﬁshing Kilu"nak. Amamqu"tinin ña"witqat Gayoε "olen she.visited.them by.Kilu" Eme"mqut’s woman ga_añ_isqu"lin, ya"qam ai"kipa gapi"wyalin. she.trampled.her only with.ﬂy.eggs she.scattered.herself.around. Yuqya"nu ganaε "linau, imiñ kaña"tilu yuqya"nu bumblebees they.became also ﬁshermen bumblebees

160

the representational level ganaε "linau. Ama"mqut niyaqñivo"ykin. Gayai"tilen. Aˇccˇ o"ˇc. became Eme"mqut what.had.he.to.do he.went.home that’s.all ‘Eme"mqut lived with his people. He married Kilu", but they were childless. One time Eme"mqut went into the open country. He followed a river upstream. Then he saw numerous people. Some of them were women. Their bodies were resplendent with the reﬂection of light. All the men wore jackets of broadcloth, all the women wore calico overcoats. Eme"mqut hurried to them. He fell in love, and began to help those people. They were ﬁshing with dragnets. Very soon he married a Bumblebee-Woman. Those people were Bumblebee people. His new wife brought forth numerous children. Then Kilu" became restless, and could not sleep. She came to the river, and followed it up-stream. Then she looked around, and saw those ﬁshermen. Eme"mqut was there with them pulling in the nets. Kilu" approached them. She trampled to death Eme"mqut’s new wife, who scattered around a large quantity of ﬂy-eggs. All the eggs became Bumblebees. The ﬁshermen also turned to Bumblebees. Eme"mqut could do nothing, so he went home. That is all.’

After the introduction of the main Individuals in the ﬁrst line, the story consists of two main Episodes. One starts with Eme"mqut’s moving up the river, the second one with Kilu’s moving up the river. Within each Episode there is a change of scene, when ﬁrst Eme"mqut and then Kilu" arrive at the village of the Bumblebee people. Each of the two main Episodes and each of the two changes of scene are introduced by the ﬁrst linguistic element that is of interest here: the word vaε "yuk. This particle-like element is glossed as ‘afterwards’, but translated in various ways as ‘one time’ or ‘then’, and so does not necessarily imply temporal sequencing. This element introduces thematically coherent parts of the narrative discourse, i.e. Episodes. 3.4.2 Heads

Heads of Episodes can be of the four general types. (i) Absent head Episodes can be designated through noun phrases headed by lexical items such as end in (149). In the case of elision of such a noun phrase, the Episode is designated by just a coreferential variable, in which case the head is absent, as indicated in (150): (149) We went to see a movie last night. The end was rather tragic but ∅ also disappointing.

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(150) (epi ) (ii) Empty head We may use the same context to construe an empty-headed Episode description. (151) is represented in (152): (151)

We went to see a movie last night. The end was a rather tragic one.

(152)

(epi : [(fi ) (epi )φ ]: [(fj : tragic (fj )) (epi )φ ])

(iii) Lexical head The noun end used in the previous examples illustrates a lexical head of Episodes: (153) We went to see a movie last night. The end was rather tragic. (154)

(π epi : (fi : end (fi )) (epi )φ )

(iv) Conﬁgurational head By far the most interesting group of heads for the episodical layer are the conﬁgurational ones. The heads of the examples (144) and (145) given earlier consist of States-of-Aﬀairs which are simply juxtaposed, with no speciﬁc semantic relation being speciﬁed between them. Another example is (155), which may be represented as in (156): (155)

He will go to London and she to Paris.

(156)

(epi : [(ei : –he goes to London– (ei )) (ej : –she goes to Paris– (ej ))] (epi ))

The e-status of the component parts of the Episode in (155) can be deduced from a number of facts. States-of-Aﬀairs can be set oﬀ from other types of entity by the fact that they can be speciﬁed for their relative location in time. Accordingly, each of the units in (155) can be provided with its own relative temporal modiﬁer, as in: (157)

He will go to London before lunch and she to Paris after dinner.

At the same time, the two States-of-Aﬀairs fall within the scope of a single episodical absolute temporal modiﬁer: (158)

Tomorrow he will go to London before lunch and she to Paris after dinner.

In the example in (159), with the boundaries of the individual States-of-Aﬀairs included, one of the States-of-Aﬀairs is explicitly presented as the consequence of another by means of the conjunction so that:

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(159) It so happened that (epi : [(ei : they inadvertently took another path than that followed by the party under Barunda’s uncle (ei )), so that (ej : they passed the latter without being aware of it (ej )), (ek : going nearly half a mile to the right of where the trailers camped a short distance from the bivouac of Ninaka (ek ))] (epi )). In this case there is a dependency relation that may be formalized as follows: (160) (epi : [(ei ) (ej )Cons (ek )] (epi )) In sum, the heads available for Episodes are the following: (161) (ep1 )

absent head

(162) (π ep1 : [(fi ) (ep1 )φ ])

empty head

(163) (π ep1 : [(f1 : (f1 )) (ep1 )φ ])

lexical head

(164) (π ep1 : [(e1 ) . . . (e1+N ){φ} ] (ep1 )) conﬁgurational head 3.4.3 Modiﬁers

In an elaborated version of one of our earlier examples of episodical structure there is a temporal modiﬁer introduced by after: (165) (epi : [–The two Dyaks, paddling in silence up the dark river, proceeded for nearly three hours before they drew in to the bank and dragged the sampan up into the bushes.–] (epi )) (epj : [–Then they set out upon a narrow trail into the jungle.–] (epj )) After travelling for several miles (epk : [–they inadvertently took another path than that followed by the party under Barunda’s uncle, so that they passed the latter without being aware of it, going nearly half a mile to the right of where the trailers camped a short distance from the bivouac of Ninaka–] (epk )). Although not an example of tail-head linkage in the grammatical sense of that term, the clause introduced by after does serve to locate the entire Episode (epk ) temporally with respect to the preceding Episode (epj ). For this reason, it may be represented as a modiﬁer of (epk ), as in the following representation: (166) (epk : [(ei ) (ej )Cons (ek )Sim ] (epk ): [(ti : –after travelling several miles– (ti ))L (epk )φ ]) The fact that this type of temporal modiﬁer locates the Episode as a whole in time is more transparent in cases in which the chronological order of Episodes is interrupted. Consider the following example:

episodes (167)

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It so happened that, before going to Ubuntu Village, (epi : [I had attended a small meeting of a free-market group, the Sustainable Development Network, which has the heretical view that blacks ought to be as rich as whites, that capitalism and science will improve the well-being of people, plants and animals, and, most shocking of all, that this is a good thing. There I heard three small farmers, one from the Philippines, one from India and one from KwaZulu Natal (a Zulu called Buthelezi). They all told the same story.] (epi )) [The story follows] (Internet)

In the Episode preceding (epi ) in (167), the author describes his visit to Ubuntu Village. The temporal clause before going to Ubuntu Village situates the entire Episode (epi ) as preceding the previous Episode in time. This may be represented as in (168): (168) (epi : [–I had attended . . . same story–] (epi ): (ti : –before going to Ubuntu Village– (ti ))Loc (epi )) Individual States-of-Aﬀairs may also be located in time with respect to one another. Compare (167) to the following example: (169) I will have to write this down before I go to bed. Here the temporal clause does not serve the purpose of situating one Episode with respect to another, but delimits the temporal extension of the main clause State-of-Aﬀairs, as indicated in (170): (170)

(ei : (fi : [–I have to write this down–] (fi )) (ei )φ : [(ti : –before I go to bed– (ti ))L (ei )φ ])

We will return in 3.5 below to the temporal localization of States-of-Aﬀairs. 3.4.4 Operators

Similarly, just as Episodes may be located in time through temporal modiﬁers, they may be located in time through temporal operators. Consider the following example again: (171) Coming out, stopping to check the mailbox, taking a look at the driveway and pausing to adjust his hat, he walked to his car. In this example, only the last verb of the string is ﬁnite, encoding the absolute temporal location of the entire series of States-of-Aﬀairs. The other verb forms are non-ﬁnite, the verb ending indicating simultaneity. We may interpret this as an indication that absolute temporal location is a property of Episodes, while relative temporal location is a property of States-of-Aﬀairs, as indicated in the following representation:

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(172) (past epi : [(sim ei ), (sim ej ), (sim ek ), (sim el ), (sim em )] (epi )) Note that simultaneity should be interpreted as occurring in the same absolute time zone, and not as ‘occurring at the same moment in time’. The Statesof-Aﬀairs in (172) are interpreted as subsequent to each other because their order of presentation follows the chronological order of States-of-Aﬀairs, not because the verb form as such expresses subsequence. In the preceding we have argued that absolute tense is an operator at the layer of the Episode, while relative tense is an operator on States-of-Aﬀairs. In support of this idea there are data from languages which have special narrative constructions, in which absolute tense is marked within one State-of-Aﬀairs, usually the ﬁrst, and relative tense is marked within all other State-of-Aﬀairs. The following example is from Swahili (Ashton 1944: 133). In this case the relative verb forms indicate chronological subsequence rather than simultaneity: (173) Ni-li-kwenda soko-ni, ni-ka-nunua ndizi sita, 1.sg-pst-go market-loc 1.sg-subs-buy banana six, ni-ka-la tatu, ni-ka-mpa mwenz-angu tatu. 1.sg-subs-eat three 1.sg-subs-give companion-1.sg.poss three ‘I went to the market, and bought six bananas; I ate three and three I gave to my companion.’ After indicating that the ﬁrst State-of-Aﬀairs in the series occurred in the past by using the preﬁx li-, the remaining States-of-Aﬀairs within the Episode can be marked as having taken place subsequent to the last-mentioned State-ofAﬀairs by means of the preﬁx ka-. Many languages lack an absolute tense system, but for those that have one it seems that the minimal system of absolute tense oppositions is a two-way system comprising a past/non-past opposition. Finnish exhibits such a system (Sulkala and Karjalainen 1992: 299): (174)

Istu-i-n keittiö-ssä. sit-pst-1.sg kitchen-iness ‘I sat in the kitchen.’

(175)

Istu-∅-n keittiö-ssä. sit-nonpst-1.sg kitchen-iness ‘I am sitting in the kitchen/I’ll sit in the kitchen.’

(176) Osta-∅-n huomen-na auto-n buy-nonpst-1.sg morrow-ess car-acc ‘I’ll buy a car tomorrow.’

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As example (176) illustrates, in order to make explicit reference to the future, a temporal adverb with future meaning has to be added to a construction containing the non-past tense marker. Note that even in many ternary systems the encoding of future reference is optional. It has been claimed in the literature that there are also binary tense systems exhibiting a non-future/future opposition, but most of these systems seem to be modal rather than temporal in nature, exhibiting a realis/irrealis opposition. We return to such systems in our discussion of event-oriented modality in 3.5.4.3. Many languages make more subtle distinctions in either the past, the future, or both, as regards the remoteness in time of the State-of-Aﬀairs described. Thus Garo makes a distinction between a non-imminent future (177) and an imminent future (178) (Burling 2004: 122–3): (177)

Ang-na i-ko nang-noa. I-dat dem-acc need-fut ‘I will need this.’

(178)

Cha·-ja-ni gimin okri-najok. eat-neg-gen because hungry-imm.fut ‘Because of not eating, I will soon be hungry.’

Amele distinguishes a past tense for States-of-Aﬀairs that happened earlier on the same day, another for States-of-Aﬀairs that happened the day before, and yet another for States-of-Aﬀairs that happened earlier than yesterday. Dahl (1985) coined the terms ‘hodiernal past’ and ‘hesternal past’ for the ﬁrst two, respectively. These three tenses are illustrated in (179)–(181) below for Amele (Roberts 1987: 227–8): (179)

Ija hu-g-a. I come-1.sg-hod.pst ‘I came (today).’

(180) Ija hu-g-an. I come-1.sg-hest.pst ‘I came (yesterday).’ (181) Ija ho-om. I come.1.sg-rem.pst ‘I came.’ 3.4.5 Frames

In sum, the set of primitives for the Representational Level provides the following frames for the layer of the Episode:

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(182) (ep1 : [(f1 ) (ep1 )φ ]) (183) (π ep1 : [(e1 ) . . . (e1+N ){φ} ]: [σ (ep1 )φ ]) Heads of Episodes may be Lexical Properties (182) or (combinations of) States-of-Aﬀairs (183). The operator position in (183) may be ﬁlled by an operator expressing absolute tense. The modiﬁer position in (183) may likewise be ﬁlled by lexical absolute temporal expressions.

3.5 States-of-Affairs 3.5.1 Introduction

States-of-Aﬀairs are entities that can be located in relative time and can be evaluated in terms of their reality status. States-of-Aﬀairs can thus be said to ‘(not) occur’, ‘(not) happen’, or ‘(not) be the case’ at some point or interval in time. States-of-Aﬀairs are distinguishable by this temporal feature from Individuals on the one hand and Propositional Contents on the other. Compare the following examples: (184) *The chair was at six o’clock. (185) The meeting was at six o’clock. (186) *The idea was at six o’clock. The general frame for States-of-Aﬀairs with a conﬁgurational head is as follows: (187) (e1 : [[(f1 : [ . . . ] (f1 )) . . . (f1+N : [ . . . ] (f1+N )){φ} n ] (e1 )φ ]) 3.5.2 Heads

(i) Absent heads Units designating a State-of-Aﬀairs may consist of just a variable in cases of anaphoric reference. Some languages have special forms for anaphoric reference to an antecedent that does not designate a concrete object. Thus, Spanish has masculine and feminine personal pronouns which are used for anaphoric reference to a concrete object designated by a masculine or feminine noun. Antecedents of the (f), (e), (ep), and (p) type trigger the use of a special neuter pronoun, insensitive to the masculine/feminine distinction. Consider the following example:

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167

(188) María vio salir a la mujer y Paco Maria see.pst.pfv.ind.3.sg leave anim.u def woman and Paco lo vio también. 3.sg.n see.pst.pfv.ind.3.sg too. ‘Maria saw the woman leave and Paco saw it too.’ The anaphoric pronoun lo in (188) refers back to the embedded State-ofAﬀairs of the woman’s leaving, which means it has the underlying representation in (189), where co-indexation triggers the anaphoric expression, and the nature of the variable ensures that the appropriate pronoun is selected: (189) (ei ) (ii) Empty heads Empty heads occur in such constructions as the following: (190) I went to an interesting lecture but she went to a boring one. In the underlying representation of (190) the presence of a co-indexed Property variable indicates the empty head position, triggering the dummy expression one in English. (191) (ei : (fi ) (ei ): (fj : boring (fj )) (ei )) (iii) Lexical heads Descriptions of States-of-Aﬀairs may also take lexical heads, as in the following examples: (192) (ei : (fi : meeting (fi )) (ei )) (193) (ei : (fi : wedding (fi )) (ei )) (194) (ei : (fi : war (fi )) (ei )) In some languages this type of noun phrase triggers certain grammatical processes that are diﬀerent from the ones triggered by ﬁrst-order noun phrases. Spanish is again a case in point: (195) La mesa está en la sala 15. def table cop.ind.prs.3.sg in def room 15 ‘The table is in room 15.’ (196) La reunión es en la sala 15. def meeting cop.ind.prs.3.sg in def room 15 ‘The meeting is in room 15.’

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the representational level

Spanish has two copulas, estar and ser. One of the situations in which the two are used contrastively is illustrated in (195)–(196). In locative constructions with an Individual as its argument the copula estar is used (195), while in those in which a State-of-Aﬀairs occurs as the argument the copula ser is used (196). A somewhat diﬀerent manifestation of this phenomenon is found in Abkhaz (Spruit 1986: 97; p.c.). Consider the following examples: (197) D@-ps`@-w-p’. 3.sg.sbj-dead-prs-decl ‘He is dead.’ ∅-gaza-rá-w-p’. (198) Á-mc-ho a-ra art-lie-tell-inf 3.sg-stupid-nmlz-prs-decl ‘To tell lies is stupid.’ “To tell lies is a stupidity.” In (197) the Property ‘dead’ is predicated of an argument designating an Individual. In (198), by contrast, the argument is a State-of-Aﬀairs. In the latter case the adjective cannot be predicated directly of the argument, but has to be nominalized ﬁrst, yielding a classifying instead of a Property-assigning construction. (iv) Conﬁgurational heads As we have shown in preceding sections, in many cases a slot that can be occupied by a lexical head can also be occupied by a conﬁgurational head. This is particularly relevant in the case of States-of-Aﬀairs. Conﬁgurational heads of States-of-Aﬀairs will be called predication frames in what follows, and their internal structure will be the topic of 3.6.2. They are characterized as units of the f-type in view of the existence of pairs such as the following: (199) The man saw the game. (200) The man saw his team beat the opposition. The verb see, when used to describe direct perception, takes a State-of-Aﬀairs (e) as its second argument. This argument can be expressed lexically, as in (199), or conﬁgurationally, as in (200). The parallelism between these two situations is shown in the following representations of this argument:

states-of-affairs (201) (ei : (fi :

game

169 (fi )) (ei )∅ )

(202) (ei : (fi : [(fj : beat (fj )) (xi : –team– (xi ))A (xj : –opposition– (xj ))U ] (fi )) (ei )∅ ) In both cases the variable for States-of-Aﬀairs is restricted by the Property (fi ), which in (201) is realized by means of a lexeme and in (202) by means of a predication frame, consisting itself of a unit denoting the (lexical) Property (fj ) and two units denoting the Individuals (xi ) and (xj ). A conﬁgurational head of a State-of-Aﬀairs takes the following general format: (203) (e1 : [[(f1 : [ . . . ] (f1 )) . . . (f1+N : [ . . . ] (f1+N )){φ} n ] (e1 )φ ]) In cases like (202) only the (f1 ) position is ﬁlled. If more than one slot is ﬁlled the relation between the units may be one of equipollence or dependency. A typical example of an equipollence relation between the Conﬁgurational Properties in the head position is that of core serialization. Consider the following example from Neger-Hollands (Jansen et al. 1978): (204) Fan som ﬂigi gi mi. catch some ﬂies give me. ‘Catch some ﬂies for me!’ “Catch some ﬂies give me.” In the absence of ditransitive predication frames, Neger-Hollands uses secondary verbs in serial verb constructions to introduce additional Individuals. Since the two verbs in the construction do not share the full set of arguments, this is a case of ‘core serialization’ in Foley and Olson’s (1985) terms, i.e. the two predicates relate to two diﬀerent subsets of the arguments within the clause. This may be represented as in (205), where coindexation shows the coreference relations. Note that for both verbs the Actor argument is understood to be the Addressee. (205)

(ei : [[ (fi : [(fj : fan (fj )) (xi ) (xj : ﬂigi (xj ))] (fi )) (fk : [(fl : gi (fl )) (xi ) (xk )] (fk ))] (ei )φ ])

The construction as a whole describes a single State-of-Aﬀairs (ei ), which is evident from the fact that the complex State-of-Aﬀairs necessarily has a single temporal interpretation. This restriction can be illustrated by means of the following examples from Numbami (Bradshaw 1993):

170 (206)

the representational level a. E i-ma teteu i-ndomoni aiya. 3.sg rls.3.sg-come village rls.3.sg-seek 2.sg ‘He came to the village to look for you.’ “He came to the village looked for you.” b. *E i-ma teteu ni-ndomoni aiya. 3.sg rls.3.sg-come village irr.3.sg-seek 2.sg ‘He came to the village will look for you.’

In these examples, the realis is used for the non-future and the irrealis for the future. Verbs are marked either both for realis, as in (206a), or both for irrealis, as in (206b), but a core serialization never contains a combination of the two. Within our approach this can be explained as a result of the fact that temporal speciﬁcation is an operator on a State-of-Aﬀairs, not on the Properties characterizing that State-of-Aﬀairs. Thus, it is the full set of Conﬁgurational Properties characterizing a State-of-Aﬀairs that falls under the scope of a single operator. An example of a dependency relation between the conﬁgurational f-units making up the head of a State-of-Aﬀairs is given in (207): (207) Sliding down a rope, he left the tree house. In constructions expressing the means by which a State-of-Aﬀairs is carried out, such as sliding down a rope in (207), there is a necessary overlap in arguments of the two predicates, and the means-expression cannot be speciﬁed independently for its temporal orientation. The following examples are ungrammatical ((208b) only under the intended reading): (208)

a. *She sliding down a rope, he left the tree house. b. *Having slid down a rope, he left the tree house.

An example such as (207) may be represented as in (209): (209) (ei : [[ (fi : [(fj : leave (fj )) (xi ) (xj : house (xj ))] (fi )) (fk : [(fl : slide (fl )) (xi ) (xk : rope (xk )] (fk ))Means ] (ei )φ ]) Summarizing, we found the following heads for States-of-Aﬀairs: (210) (e1 )

absent head

(211) (π e1 : [(f1 ) (e1 )φ ]: [σ (e1 )φ ])

empty head

(212) (π e1 : [(f1 : (f1 )) (e1 )φ ]: [σ (e1 )φ ])

lexical head

(213) (e1 : [[(f1 : [ . . . ] (f1 )) . . . (f1+N : [ . . . ] (f1+N )){φ} n ] (e1 )φ ]: [σ (e1 )φ ]) conﬁgurational head

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3.5.3 Modiﬁers

States-of-aﬀairs may be further qualiﬁed as regards the properties of their occurrence. The major modiﬁcations concern: relative time of occurrence, place of occurrence, frequency of occurrence, reality status, physical setting, cognitive setting. The following examples illustrate: (214)

Sheila works in London.

(Location)

(215)

Sheila went out before dinner.

(Relative Time)

(216)

Sheila goes to London frequently.

(Frequency)

(217)

Sheila is actually a guy.

(Reality)

(218) Sheila fell ill because of the heavy rainfall.

(Cause)

(219)

(Purpose)

Sheila stayed home so that she could watch television.

All these modiﬁers have in common that they occupy the modiﬁer slot (σ) in the following conﬁguration: (220) (π e1 : [(f1 : [ . . . ] (f1 )) (e1 )φ ]: [σ (e1 )φ ]) But there are diﬀerences as to the semantic category of the modiﬁers: Location (l) in (214), Time (t) in (215), Property (f) in (216)–(217), State-of-Aﬀairs (e) in (218), and Propositional Content (p) in (219). That these modiﬁers act at the layer of the State-of-Aﬀairs description and not at the layer of the Episode can be demonstrated by the fact that they occur within the scope of episodical absolute temporal expressions like last year, last week, yesterday, etc.: (221) Last year Sheila worked in London. (222) Yesterday Sheila went out before dinner. (223) Last year Sheila went to London frequently. (224) In the past Sheila was actually a guy. (225) Last week Sheila fell ill because of the heavy rainfall. (226) Yesterday Sheila stayed home so that she could watch television. As mentioned in 3.4.4, temporal modiﬁcation of States-of-Aﬀairs is diﬀerent from temporal modiﬁcation of Episodes, in the sense that absolute location in time is a property of Episodes, while relative location in time is a property of States-of-Aﬀairs. This explains why the two can be combined, as in (222). Certain types of Manner expressions, depictives, and secondary predications also belong to the class of modiﬁers of States-of-Aﬀairs. These will,

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the representational level

however, be discussed in 3.6.3, where they will be presented in contrast with similar modiﬁers at the Property layer. State of aﬀairs descriptions with a lexical or an empty head may be modiﬁed by all kinds of modiﬁers typical of referential phrases, as in: (227) the meeting that I attended (228) the interesting meeting (229) yesterday’s meeting 3.5.4 Operators

Most modiﬁer categories at the layer of the State-of-Aﬀairs description have a grammatical counterpart in the form of an operator category. The following classes of operators may be distinguished: Event Location, Relative Tense, Event-oriented Modality, Event Perception, Polarity, and Event Quantiﬁcation. We will illustrate these one by one. 3.5.4.1 Event Location

Location is less commonly expressed by means of operators, and has therefore for a long time not been recognized in the FG-literature as an operator category. In recent work, however, de Groot (2000) has noticed the existence of an operator category Absentive in several European languages. These languages have a special periphrastic construction type indicating that the subject is away from a reference point that either coincides with the location of the Speaker or with a previously established reference point. Consider the following opposition in Dutch: (230) Jan is viss-en. Jan cop.prs.3.sg ﬁsh-inf ‘Jan is away ﬁshing.’ (231) Jan is aan het viss-en. Jan cop.prs.3.sg at def ﬁsh-inf ‘Jan is ﬁshing.’ Sentence (230) can only be used when the subject is out of sight, while the progressive periphrasis in (231) can be used whether the subject is within or out of sight. The phenomenon is certainly not restricted to European languages. Consider the following examples from Tübatulabal (Voegelin 1935: 119–20): (232) A’a"c-ïmı"n. bath.pfv-prox ‘He bathed here.’

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(233) A’a"c-ïkı"n. bath.pfv-rem ‘He bathed there.’ In Tübatulabal it is possible to indicate through special verb inﬂections whether a State-of-Aﬀairs took/takes place at the place where the current Speaker is (232) or at any other place away from the current Speaker’s current location (233). Categories like these are captured by e-operators, since they specify the location where the State-of-Aﬀairs as a whole takes place. In this respect they diﬀer from directional operators, which modify the internal structure of the State-of-Aﬀairs and are therefore treated as f-operators, to be discussed in 3.7.4. 3.5.4.2 Relative Tense

As we indicated earlier, absolute time reference is a property of Episodes, while relative tense is characteristic of States-of-Aﬀairs (for a related view, see Harder 1996). Some languages have a system of relative tense only, and have to specify the absolute location in time through lexical means when needed. An example of a language with a relative tense system is Hausa, which has markers of anteriority, simultaneity, and posteriority. Consider the following examples taken from the Hausa online grammar: (234) Jiya da 3:00 sun shiga. yesterday at 3:00 3.pl.ant enter ‘Yesterday at three they had entered.’ (235) Gobe da 3:00 sun shiga. tomorrow at 3:00 3.pl.ant enter ‘Tomorrow at three they will have entered.’ In (234) and (235) the same temporal speciﬁcation of anteriority is used. It is the lexical speciﬁcation of the absolute temporal location of the Episode with respect to which the anteriority is interpreted. Other languages do have an absolute tense system, but use relative tense markers in subordinate clauses. Such a language is Imbabura Quechua. Consider the following examples (Cole 1982: 143, see also Comrie 1985: 61): (236) Marya Agatu-pi kawsa-j-ta kri-rka-ni. María Agato-loc live-sim-acc believe-pst-1 ‘I believed that María lived in Agato.’ (237) Marya Agatu-pi kawsa-shka-ta kri-rka-ni. María Agato-loc live-ant-acc believe-pst-1 ‘I believed that María had lived in Agato.’

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the representational level

(238) Marya Agatu-pi kawsa-na-ta kri-rka-ni. María Agato-loc live-post-acc believe-pst-1 ‘I believed that María would/will live in Agato.’ The suﬃx -j in (236) indicates that the State-of-Aﬀairs described in the subordinate clause is simultaneous with the one in the main clause, the suﬃx -shka in (237) with the one that it is anterior to it, and the suﬃx -na in (238) with the one that it is posterior to it. 3.5.4.3 Event-oriented modality

Event-oriented modalities describe the existence of possibilities, general obligations, and the like, without the Speaker taking responsibility for these judgements. This is best illustrated by means of the following sentence, which contains both a proposition-oriented and an event-oriented modal expression (Lyons 1977: 808): (239) Certainly he may have forgotten. Through the epistemic proposition-oriented modal adverb certainly the speaker commits him/herself to the truth of the Propositional Content he may have forgotten, which itself contains the epistemic event-oriented modal verb may that describes the existence of the possibility of the occurrence of the State-of-Aﬀairs he has forgotten. Although the two epistemic judgements contained in (239) are non-harmonic (Lyons 1977; Coates 1983; Bybee et al. 1994), no contradiction arises, since the two judgements pertain to diﬀerent layers: the Speaker expresses his/her certainty about the existence of an objective, logical possibility. For this reason epistemic proposition-oriented modality has been called ‘subjective’ and event-oriented modality ‘objective’ (Lyons 1977: 797–804; cf. also Halliday 1970; Coates 1983). For a further illustration of this distinction, consider the following example from Ngiyambaa (Donaldson 1980: 256): (240)

Gali:-Ninda-gila Niyanu baluy-aga. water-priv-dub 1.pl.nom die-irr ‘We’ll probably die for lack of water.’

Ngiyambaa has both an irrealis marker and a special marker for dubitative modality. Both may occur in a single sentence, as illustrated in (240), which may be paraphrased as ‘I guess (DUB) the unrealized (IRR) State-of-Aﬀairs of our dying for lack of water will take place’. Thus, the dubitative gives the Speaker’s subjective assessment of a Propositional Content containing an objective speciﬁcation of the unrealized status of a State-of-Aﬀairs. Eventoriented modalities are not only epistemic in nature, but may be facultative, deontic, or volitive as well.

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Epistemic event-oriented modality characterizes States-of-Aﬀairs in terms of the (im)possibility of their occurrence in view of what is known about the world. Although many diﬀerent shades of meaning could be deﬁned within this domain, grammatical encoding of this type of modality is generally restricted to a realis versus irrealis opposition. An example of this type of opposition may be found in Mapuche (Smeets 1989: 307): (241) Trür amu-a-y-u üyüw. together go-irr-decl-1.du.sbj over.there ‘Together we will go over there.’ (242) Trür amu-∅-y-u üyüw. together go-rls-decl-1.du.sbj over.there ‘Together we went over there.’ In spite of the translation the Mapuche irrealis cannot be interpreted as a future tense morpheme, since it has a whole range of additional shades of modal meaning, including probability. The opposition between realis and irrealis is sometimes further obscured by the fact that the realis domain is occupied by certain tenses, as a result of which the modal category irrealis stands in opposition to the temporal categories past and present. This is, for instance, the case in Ngiyambaa, where there is ‘a three-way tense system, involving two contrasts, one of actuality (actualis versus irrealis) and, within the actualis category, one of time (past versus present)’ (Donaldson 1980: 160). Again, the category of irrealis cannot be interpreted as a simple future tense, since it is also used for stating probabilities, as in: (243) YuruN-gu Nidjal-aga. rain-erg rain-irr ‘It may rain.’ or ‘It will rain.’ In order to avoid such ambiguities some languages make a distinction between a ‘certain future’ and an ‘uncertain future’, where the latter might perhaps better be interpreted as an irrealis form, as in the following examples from Garo (Burling 1961: 27f.): (244)

ANa re"-aN-gen. 1.sg move-dir-fut ‘I will go.’

(245)

Re"-ba-nabadoNa. move-dir-irr ‘He may come.’

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the representational level

Facultative event-oriented modality characterizes States-of-Aﬀairs in terms of the physical or circumstantial enabling conditions on their occurrence (Bybee et al. 1994; Olbertz 1998). This type of modality is often referred to as root modality (Coates 1983). An example is (246): (246)

It can take three hours to get there.

In contrast to facultative participant-oriented modality, to be discussed below, the possibility of the occurrence of the State-of-Aﬀairs does not depend on the intrinsic capacities of a participant, but follows from the circumstances in which the State-of-Aﬀairs takes place. This sense can most easily be detected in impersonal constructions such as (246). Deontic event-oriented modality characterizes States-of-Aﬀairs in terms of what is obligatory or permitted within some system of moral or legal conventions (cf. Allwood et al. 1977: 111). In contrast to deontic participantoriented modality, the obligations expressed by means of deontic eventoriented modality do not rest upon a particular participant, but represent general rules of conduct. This sense of general applicability can most clearly be identiﬁed in impersonal expressions such as the Turkish modal periphrases (van Schaaik 1985) illustrated in (247) and (248): (247)

Bura-da ayakkabı-lar-ı çıkar-mak var. dem-loc shoes-pl-poss take.oﬀ-inf ex ‘One has to take oﬀ one’s shoes here.’ (lit. ‘There is taking oﬀ of shoes here.’)

(248) Avuç aç-mak yok. hand open-inf ex.neg ‘Begging prohibited.’ (lit. ‘There isn’t begging.’) Volitive event-oriented modality characterizes States-of-Aﬀairs in terms of what is generally desirable or undesirable. This category seems hardly ever to be encoded by specialized markers, but rather to group with deontic modality. An exception to this, however, is the Tauya avolitional, which ‘[ . . . ] implies that the action or state speciﬁed by the verb would be undesirable’ (MacDonald 1990: 202f.): (249) Tepau-fe-Pate-e-Pa. break-tr-avol-1-decl ‘It would be bad if I broke it.’ 3.5.4.4 Event perception

In 3.3.4 we discussed inferential evidentials, among which there is a class of elements indicating that a conclusion has been arrived at on the basis of

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177

sensory evidence. Closely related to this latter class is Event Perception, a category that signals whether or not a State-of-Aﬀairs was witnessed by the Speaker. To illustrate the diﬀerence between the two, consider the following examples: (250)

Sheila saw Peter leave.

(251) Sheila saw that Peter had left. The diﬀerence between these two sentences is that in (251) the complement clause describes the conclusion that Sheila arrived at on the basis of perceptual evidence (for example, the absence of Peter’s car), while in (250) the complement clause describes the State-of-Aﬀairs that was directly perceived by Sheila. Dik and Hengeveld (1991) formalize the diﬀerence between these two constructions by analysing the complement in (251) as belonging to the p-category, and the one in (250) as belonging to the e-category. A range of diﬀerences between the two constructions can be accounted for in this way. The same distinction obtains with respect to the grammatical expression of perceptual evidentiality: parallel to (251) there is a category that obtains at the layer of the Propositional Content and signals inference on the basis of perceptual evidence; and parallel to (250) there is a category that obtains at the layer of the State-of-Aﬀairs and signals direct perception or its absence. Tariana has evidential markers for both direct perception and inference on the basis of perceptual evidence. Compare the following examples (Aikhenvald 2003: 294, 300): (252) Waha ikasu-nuku h˜i-nuku alia-naka. we now-top.non.a/s dem.anim-top.non.a/s ex-vis.prs ‘Here we are right now (talking).’ pathesedape mawáRi (253) Pi-tedua-Ru-nuku 2.sg-cousin-f-top.non.a/s day.before.yesterday snake di-hña-nikha-niki. 3.sg.non.f-eat-infer.recpst-compl ‘The snake ate up your cousin the day before yesterday.’ Tariana has portmanteau morphemes simultaneously expressing tense and evidentiality. The visual evidential in (252) is used when the Speaker sees or is looking at the State-of-Aﬀairs described. The inferential evidential in (253) is used when the Speaker observed the evidence, not the State-of-Aﬀairs itself, and on the basis of that evidence arrives at a conclusion. Thus, the person uttering (253), the mother of the person addressed, has seen the remains of her niece, but did not witness the actual killing. A similar distinction obtains in Turkish (Lewis 1967: 122). This language uses a special realis suﬃx indicating that the Speaker personally witnessed the

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the representational level

State-of-Aﬀairs described, as in (254). In all other cases another realis suﬃx is used (255). (254) Kar ya˘g-dı-∅. snow rain-rls.perc-3 ‘Snow has fallen.’ (255)

Kar ya˘g-mı¸s-∅. snow rain-rls.nonperc-3 ‘Snow has fallen.’

3.5.4.5 Polarity

Another category that is relevant at the e-layer is polarity. We exclude Prohibitives, which pertain to the Interpersonal Level, and concentrate on the simple negation of the occurrence of a State-of-Aﬀairs. In polarity systems, the negative value is generally marked, and the positive value is not. The same is true of Tidore, which uses a sentence-ﬁnal particle to express negation, and no marking for positive polarity (van Staden 2000: 232): (256) Una=ge kolano ua. 3.sg.m=there king neg ‘He is not a king.’ Apart from a basic positive-negative polarity opposition, there are a number of more speciﬁc values that can be assigned to this category. Although generally not considered as such, several phasal aspectual particles can be seen as expressing certain types of polarity, as suggested in van Baar (1997: 50–1), who presents the following classiﬁcation of polar elements: (257)

a. b. c.

pos pos posneg

neg

∅ already still

neg negpos pos neg

not not yet no longer

Except for the ﬁrst and the last item in this series, the values represented are binary and have to be read in the following way: the basic value is presented in normal typeface, and the contrasting preceding or following situation is presented in superscript. Thus, the value of not yet can be interpreted as ‘negative anticipating a positive State-of-Aﬀairs’ and already as ‘positive following a negative State-of-Aﬀairs’, etc. A language presenting various types of evidence for this analysis is Tidore. The ﬁrst piece of evidence concerns question formation. In forming alternative questions, the three pairs of positive/negative elements presented in (257) behave in a parallel fashion (van Staden 2000: 150):

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(258) Ngon wako bolo ua? 2.sg return or not ‘Are you coming home?’ (259) Oyo rai bolo yang? eat already or not.yet ‘Have you eaten yet?’ (260) Coma moju bolo rewa? add still or no.longer ‘Will you have some more?’ Furthermore, all three negative elements in (258)–(260) participate in a Focus construction with double negation, while the three positive elements do not (van Staden 2000: 236, 237): (261) Una kama wo-tagi se mina ua. 3.sg.m neg 3.sg.m.a-go obl 3.sg.f neg ‘He does not go with her.’ (262) Kama mansia dofu yang. neg people many not.yet ‘There are not yet many people.’ (263) Ona kama bicara se nyanyi se megarona nde 3.pl neg talk and sing and whatever 3.nh.there rewa. not.anymore ‘They did not speak, or sing, or whatever anymore.’ 3.5.4.6 Event quantiﬁcation

A last category of operators relevant at the e-layer concerns the speciﬁcation of the frequency of occurrence of a State-of-Aﬀairs. West Greenlandic is a language that is particularly rich in this domain. Consider the following examples (Fortescue 1984: 279–84): (264)

Quli-nut innar-tar-put. ten-all go.to.bed-hab-ind.3.pl ‘They habitually go to bed at ten o’clock.’

(265)

Qimmi-t qilut-tar-put. dog-pl bark-hab-ind.3.pl ‘Dogs bark.’

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the representational level

(266)

Saniqquti-qattaar-puq. go.past-iter-ind.3.sg ‘He went past several times.’

(267)

Api-qqip-puq. snow-repv-ind.3.sg ‘It snowed again.’

The habitual morpheme -tar is used to characterize a State-of-Aﬀairs as a habit (264) but is also used in generic statements (265). The iterative morpheme -qattaar indicates the recurrent occurrence of a State-of-Aﬀairs (266), and repetitive -qqip expresses that a State-of-Aﬀairs is identical to a previous occurrence (267). The examples given so far all quantify over time intervals, which is understandable in view of the fact that States-of-Aﬀairs are temporal units. In some cases, tense and event quantiﬁcation are encoded in a single portmanteau morpheme, as for instance in English used to or in the habitual past in Amele (Roberts 1987: 228): (268) Ija ho-l-ig. I come-hab.pst-1.sg ‘I used to come.’ In a similar way, event quantiﬁcation may interact with event location, as in the case of distributive aspect. Consider the following example from Tarma Quechua (Adelaar 1977: 142): ˙ (269) Xa:bam išgi-ˆca-ru-n. frost fall-distr-pfv-3 ‘It has frozen a little in several places.’ The distributive marker in (269) indicates that the State-of-Aﬀairs described in the sentence took place at various places at the same time, which means that the quantiﬁcation here concerns the spatial rather than the temporal regions. 3.5.5 Frames

In sum, the set of primitives for the Representational Level provides the following frames for the layer of the State-of-Aﬀairs: (270) (e1 : [(f1 ) (e1 )φ ]) (271) (e1 : [[(f1 : [ . . . ] (f1 )) . . . (f1+N : [ . . . ] (f1+N )){φ} n ] (e1 )φ ]: [σ (e1 )φ ]) Heads of States-of-Aﬀairs may be Lexical Properties (270) or (combinations of) Conﬁgurational Properties (271).

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The operator position in (271) may be ﬁlled by operators expressing event location, relative tense, event-oriented modality, event perception, polarity, and event quantiﬁcation. The modiﬁer position in (271) may be ﬁlled by lexical expressions specifying the relative time of occurrence, the place of occurrence, the frequency of occurrence, the reality status, the physical setting, or the cognitive setting of the State-of-Aﬀairs.

3.6 Conﬁgurational Properties 3.6.1 Introduction

As we indicated in 3.2.3, Properties (f) play a crucial role in the construction of semantic representations. Conﬁgurational Properties constitute the inventory of predication frames relevant to a language, and non-Conﬁgurational Property layers host the lexemes of a language. Given this crucial role of Properties at the Representational Level, we will distribute our discussion of them across two main sections. In this section we dedicate ourselves to Conﬁgurational Properties only, while in 3.7 we will discuss Property units with a lexical head. The need to recognize Conﬁgurational Properties as a layer was ﬁrst recognized by Vet (1990) and Cuvalay-Haak (1997) as a ‘situational concept’ and a ‘core predication’ respectively. In the most common type of simple State-of-Aﬀairs the subcomponents are a Property (f) as it manifests itself in time and the Individuals (x) for which this Property holds (see Hengeveld 2004d). Zero-order and ﬁrst-order entities thus enter into the constitution of second-order entities, as in: (272)

Sheila (x) is ill (f).

But this is just one of the many possible conﬁgurations. Consider the following example: (273)

The heavy rainfall (e) caused (f) a lot of damage (e).

The State-of-Aﬀairs described in (273) as a whole consists of a Property (f) which establishes a relation between yet two other States-of-Aﬀairs. In our formalism this means that the State-of-Aﬀairs variable (e) is restricted by a predication frame of the form given in (274). Note that in this representation we indicate, through vertical alignment, in what interpersonal function a certain semantic category is used. This is necessary, since many restrictions on the combination of semantic categories are dependent on the speciﬁc function in which these semantic categories are used, thus showing that formulation is a coordinated process taking into account both the Interpersonal and Representational Levels.

182 (274)

the representational level T R (f1 : [(f2 ) (e1 )φ

R (e2 )φ ] (f1 ))

The general format that can be used for Conﬁgurational Properties is as follows (where v is a variable over variables): (275) (π f1 : [(v1 ) (v)φ n ] (f1 ): [σ (f1 )φ ]) Languages may diﬀer markedly from one another in the nature and number of predication frames that are allowed both with respect to their quantitative valency (n), and with respect to their qualitative valency. The diﬀerences in qualitative valency concern both the semantic categories (v) that may be combined, and the semantic functions (φ) that these may carry. These issues will be addressed in 3.6.2. Modiﬁers (σ) and operators (π) of Conﬁgurational Properties are discussed in 3.6.3. and 3.6.4. 3.6.2 Heads 3.6.2.1 Quantitative restrictions

The combinatorial possibilities of semantic categories are not universally given and have to be determined for each individual language. First of all there are quantitative restrictions that have to do with the minimal and maximal number of units that make up a predication frame. As regards the minimal number of units, there is a noteworthy split between languages that allow the ascriptive use of zero-order expressions with zero valency, and others in which the minimal valency is one. Consider the following examples from Spanish: (276)

Est-á llov-iendo. aux-3.sg.prs rain-prog ‘It is raining.’ “Is raining.”

(277)

Est-á nev-ando. aux-3.sg.prs snow-prog ‘It is snowing.’ “Is snowing.”

and Turkish: (278) Ya˘gmur ya˘g-ıyor-∅. rain rain-prog-3 ‘It is raining.’ “Rain is raining.”

configurational properties (279)

183

Kar ya˘g-ıyor-∅. snow rain-prog-3 ‘It is snowing.’ “Snow is raining.”

These examples show that for Spanish we may assume a zero-place predication frame for event-descriptions, whereas for Turkish we may not. This example also serves to illustrate another important distinction. Consider the English equivalents of (276)–(279): (280) It is raining/snowing. In the absence of a semantic referential argument, English requires the insertion of a dummy subject in zero-place constructions. Since this is a semantically empty element, we may say that from a semantic perspective English allows zero-place predications, like Spanish, but that, unlike Spanish, it requires the insertion of an element in the subject slot at the Morphosyntactic Level. Now consider the opposite situation: some languages allow constructions in which the existence, presence, or availablity of an entity may be asserted by simply presenting that entity through a ﬁrst-order entity description, as shown in the following example from Tagalog (Schachter and Otanes 1972): (281) Marami-ng pera. lot-lk money ‘There is a lot of money.’ “A lot of money.” The example from Tagalog contains just a referential phrase, which is evident from the fact that in (281) the linker -ng is used, which systematically joins head and modiﬁer within Noun Phrases. In other languages the existence itself has to be ascribed to that entity through a separate lexical expression, as illustrated in the following examples from Yagaria (Renck 1975): (282) Sole" yale bei-d-a-e. plenty people sit-pst-3.pl-ind ‘There were many people.’ “Many people sat.” (283) Yo" bogo-ko" hano-d-i-e. house one-loc exist-pst-3.sg-ind ‘There’s only one house.’ “One house exists.”

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In Yagaria existence is expressed by lexical verbs. The lexical nature of these verbs may be derived from the fact that diﬀerent verbs are used for animate (282) and inanimate (283) subjects. This means that for Tagalog we may assume the existence of a predication frame that contains just the description of a ﬁrst-order entity, whereas for Yagaria existentials pattern with regular one-place predication frames. Again we may contrast this semantic distinction with a similar syntactic one. Consider the following example: (284) There is a lot of money. In the absence of a semantic ascriptive predicate, English uses the dummy element there, itself supported by the dummy verb to be. Since these are semantically empty elements, we may say that from a semantic perspective English allows predicate-less predications, like Tagalog, but that, unlike Tagalog, it requires the insertion of an element in the predicate slot at the Morphosyntactic Level. Apart from the minimal valency, there may be restrictions on the maximum valency that a language allows in combination with a single predicate. In many serializing languages the maximum valency of a verb is two, and serialization is required to expand that valency indirectly, as in the following example from Mandarin Chinese (Li and Thompson 1981: 366): (285) W˘o gˇei n˘ı dào chá. 1 give you pour tea ‘I’ll pour you some tea.’ “I pour tea give you.” As we indicated in 3.5.2, cases of core serialization like this one make use of two (two-place) predication frames, together constituting the head of a Stateof-Aﬀairs. 3.6.2.2 Qualitative restrictions: semantic categories

The qualitative restrictions on frames for States-of-Aﬀairs concern the semantic categories of the component units and the way the relations between these component units are expressed, in terms of their semantic functions. In this section we will deal with the former. For a ﬁrst illustration consider the following Dutch examples: (286) Hij is in Frankrijk. he cop.3.sg.prs in France ‘He is in France.’ (287) *Het boek is op de tafel. the book cop.3.sg.prs on def table ‘The book is on the table.’

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(288) Het boek ligt op de tafel. the book lie.3.sg.prs on def table ‘The book is lying on the table.’ The ascriptive use of a Locative phrase in Dutch is allowed when the phrase involved designates a spatial region rather than an object. Thus in Frankrijk ‘in France’ in (286) can be used ascriptively, but op de tafel ‘on the table’ in (287) cannot. In order to ascribe this Location to the subject, a lexical predicate, such as lig- ‘lie’ in (288) has to be used. As argued earlier, the diﬀerence between spatial regions and objects can be captured through the use of distinct variables: ‘l’ for spatial regions and ‘x’ for objects. The sentences in (286) and (288) may thus be said to make use of the predication frames in (289)–(290): T (289) (fi : [ (fj : (li : Frankrijk (li ))Loc T (290) (fi : [ (fj : lig- (fj ))

(fj ))

R (xi : boek- (xi ))∅

R (xi )φ ] (fi )) R (xj : tafel- (xj ))Loc ] (fi ))

Now compare this with the situation in Turkish (Kornﬁlt 1997: 242) and in English: (291)

Kitap masa-da-∅-∅. book table-loc-prs-3 ‘The book is on the table.’

(292)

The book is on the table.

Both Turkish and English allow the ascriptive use of a Locative phrase designating an object rather than a spatial region, i.e. both of the following predication frames are available to the formulators within the grammars of these languages: T R (293) (f1 : [ (f2 : (l1 )Loc (f2 )) (x1 )∅ ] (f1 )) T R (294) (f1 : [ (f2 : (x1 )Loc (f2 )) (x2 )∅ ] (f1 )) The diﬀerence is that in Turkish under certain circumstances no support verb is required, whereas English under all circumstances requires copula support, which applies at the level of morphosyntactic encoding. This is not the place to give an exhaustive listing of all possible predication frames, but we will list below a range of possible predication frames for English together with an illustrative example. Note that we restrict ourselves here to considerations of quantitative valency and of the nature of the semantic

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categories involved. After that we will turn to the semantic functions of the component units within predication frames. 3.6.2.2.1 Zero-place Property Zero-place Properties, illustrated and discussed above, are actually not conﬁgurational at all, and we are just presenting them here for the sake of completeness and contrast. They are lexically headed and ascribe a Property directly to the main State-of-Aﬀairs, as in the following example: (295) T (f1 : rain (f1 )) ‘It rained.’ 3.6.2.2.2 One-place Property For one-place Properties we do need predication frames of the general type given in (296). The semantic category of the argument may vary, leading to variants such as those illustrated in (297)– (300). (296)

T (f1 : [ (f2 )

(297)

(f1 : [ (f2 ) (x1 )φ ] (f1 )) ‘The boy is swimming.’

(298)

(f1 : [ (f2 ) (f3 )φ ] (f1 )) ‘That colour is ugly.’

(299)

(f1 : [ (f2 ) (e1 )φ ] (f1 )) ‘It was a pity that she had to leave.’

(300)

(f1 : [ (f2 ) (p1 )φ ] (f1 )) ‘Her hope faded away.’

R (v1 )φ ] (f1 ))

A full representation of a State-of-Aﬀairs with, for instance, the predication frame given in (297) would be as follows: (301)

T (ei : [(fi : [ (fj : swim (fj )) ‘The boy is swimming.’

R (xi : [(fk : boy (fk )) (xi )φ ]φ ] (fi )) (ei )φ ])

The dependency relation between the units is shown through the presence of a function marker on the dependent unit (xi ) and its absence on (fj ). The ascriptive function of (fj ) imposes restrictions on the lexical items that it can take (see 3.6.2) and will trigger its expression as the main predicate at the Morphosyntactic Level. The referential function of (xi ) also imposes

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restrictions on the lexical items it can host, and will trigger its expression as a Noun Phrase. The representation in (301) incidentally also shows that predication frames are not only used to build descriptions of States-of-Aﬀairs, but also those of other semantic categories, such as Individuals. Thus, (xi ) in (301) is expanded by means of a one-place predication frame. We will return to this issue in 3.8.2. A special class of one-place Properties concerns those exempliﬁed in (302)– (304): (302)

That woman is an aunt of my friend.

(303) The man is inside the house. (304) That girl is fond of chocolate. The predication frames for the italicized parts of these expressions have the general structure of (305): (305) (f1 : [(f2 ) (v1 )φ ] (f1 )) A speciﬁc property of this type of frame is that it cannot itself serve as the basis for a main predication. In order to form such a predication, a further predication frame has to be formed on the basis of (305) to create yet another one-place Property recursively, with the result given in (306): (306) (f1 : [(f2 : [(f3 ) (v1 )φ ] (f2 )) (v2 )φ ] (f1 )) This leads to the representation in (307) of example (304): T T R R (307) (fi : [ (fj : [ (fk : fond (fk )) (xi : –chocolate– (xi ))φ ] (fj )) (xj : girl (xj ))φ ] (fi )) This structure should be read as follows: the predication frame at the highest layer indicates that the Individual (xj ) ‘that girl’ has the Conﬁgurational Property (fj ) ‘fond of chocolate’; to create this Conﬁgurational Property (fj ) the lower-layer predication frame indicates that the Property (fk ) ‘fond’ exists relative to the Individual (xi ) ‘chocolate’. In this conﬁguration (xi ) thus constitutes an inner argument, and (xj ) an outer argument. For another example consider the representation in (308) of example (303): T T R R (308) (fi : [ (li : [ (fj : inside (fj )) (xi : –house– (xi ))φ ] (li )) (xj : man (xj ))φ ] (fi )) which should be read in this way: the Individual (xj ) ‘the man’ is ascribed the complex Location (li ) ‘inside the house’; this Location itself is evoked by indicating that the Property (fj ) exists relative to the Individual (xi ) ‘the house’.

188

the representational level

As we will show below, the distinction between inner arguments and outer arguments that we make in these cases is reﬂected in the assignment of semantic functions. 3.6.2.2.3 Two-place Property Two place Properties receive the general treatment presented in (309). Some more speciﬁc instantiations are given in (310)– (315), in which the nature of the semantic categories designated varies: (309)

T R R (f1 : [ (f2 ) (v1 )φ (v2 )φ ] (f1 ))

(310) (f1 : [ (f2 ) (x1 )φ (x2 )φ ] (f1 )) ‘She kicked him.’ (311) (f1 : [ (f2 ) (x1 )φ (l1 )φ ] (f1 )) ‘Charles lives in Antwerp.’ (312) (f1 : [ (f2 ) (x1 )φ (e1 )φ ] (f1 )) ‘He saw his neighbour walk down the street.’ (313) (f1 : [ (f2 ) (x1 )φ (p1 )φ ] (f1 )) ‘He didn’t believe that she was ill.’ (314) (f1 : [ (f2 ) (e1 )φ (e2 )φ ] (f1 )) ‘The heavy rainfall caused a lot of problems.’ (315) (f1 : [ (f2 ) (e1 )φ (t1 )φ ] (f1 )) ‘The meeting lasted three hours.’ A full representation of a State-of-Aﬀairs based on (315) would be as in (316): T R R (316) (ei : [(fi : [ (fj : last (fj )) (ej : –meeting– (ej ))φ (3 ti : –hour– (ti ))φ ] (fi )) (ei )φ ]) ‘The meeting lasted three hours.’ 3.6.2.2.4 Three-place Property Three-place Properties, for languages that have them, are represented according to the general predication frame in (317). More speciﬁc instantiations are given in (318)–(321): (317)

T (f1 : [ (f2 )

R (v1 )φ

R (v2 )φ

R (v3 )φ ] (f1 ))

(318) (f1 : [ (f2 ) (x1 )φ (x2 )φ (l3 )φ ] (f1 )) ‘Sheila put the book on a shelf.’ (319) (f1 : [ (f2 ) (x1 )φ (x2 )φ (e1 )φ ] (f1 )) ‘The woman forced the man to leave.’

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(320) (f1 : [ (f2 ) (e1 )φ (x1 )φ (e2 )φ ] (f1 )) ‘His strange behaviour reminded me of his illness.’ (321) (f1 : [ (f2 ) (x1 )φ (x2 )φ (p1 )φ ] (f1 )) ‘John told me that he had forced Mary to leave.’ Examples such as (319) and (321) show embedding, which is the result of the recursive application of semantic representations containing predication frames. Consider the representation of (319) in (322): (322) (ei : [(fi : [ (fj : force (fj )) (xi : [–woman– (xi )φ ])φ (xj : [–man– (xj )φ ])φ (ej : [(fk : [ (fl : leave (fl )) (xj )φ ] (fk )) (ej )φ ])] (fi )) (ei )φ ]) ‘The woman forced the man to leave.’ Here the main State-of-Aﬀairs (ei ) is based on a three-place predication frame (fi ). The third argument position is occupied again by the description of a State-of-Aﬀairs (ej ) based on a one-place predication frame (fk ). Note the coreference relation between the second argument (xj ) of the main predication frame and the ﬁrst of the embedded predication frame. 3.6.2.2.5 Four-place Property Four-place predication frames seem to be rare crosslinguistically. The best examples that come to mind are derived causative constructions in languages which have three-place predication frames and extend these to four-place frames by applying the causative derivation, as illustrated for Turkish in (351) (Kornﬁlt 1997: 332): (323) Ben Hasan-a sürahi-yi dolab-a koy-dur-du-m I Hasan-dat pitcher-acc cupboard-dat put-caus-pst-1.sg ‘I made Hasan put the pitcher into the cupboard.’ Such constructions are based on the general predication frame given in (324): (324)

T R R R R (f1 : [ (f2 ) (v1 )φ (v2 )φ (v3 )φ (v4 )φ ] (f1 ))

with the subtype in (325) for example (323): (325)

T R R R R (f1 : [ (f2 ) (x1 )φ (x2 )φ (x3 )φ (x4 )φ ] (f1 ))

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the representational level

3.6.2.2.6 Relational Property A special type of predication frame is needed for what may be called Relational Properties. In these, a phrase marked with a relator such as an adposition or a case marker is used ascriptively, as in the following examples: (326) This play is by Shakespeare. (327) Mary is in London. (328) This tea is from Sri Lanka. The parts in italics in these examples correspond to Ascriptive Subacts. They are not arguments of the verb to be, which we treat as a support verb that is introduced at the Morphosyntactic Level. Evidence for this view comes from languages that can express constructions like the ones in (326)–(328) without the intervention of a copula. The following example of a locative relational Property is from Ket (Castrén 1858: 103): (329) Xus-kei-di. tent-loc-1.sg ‘I am in the tent.’ And example (330), from Imbabura Quechua (Cole 1982: 115), illustrates a possessive relational Property: (330) Chay wasi ñuka-paj-mi. dem house 1-poss-foc ‘That house is mine.’ “That house is of me.” Note that expressions such as by Shakespeare in (326) as a whole designate a Property, while at the same time containing a referential expression, Shakespeare. This example may therefore be continued as in (331): (331) This play is by Shakespeare. He was a great dramatist. To account for this double nature of the construction we may represent the relational Property itself in the following way: (332) T R1 (f1 : (v1 )φ (f1 )) This representation can be read in the following way: a Property (f1 ), used ascriptively (T), is realized through reference to a semantic category (v1 ) with the semantic function φ. Xuskei ‘in the tent’ in (329) can then be represented as:

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191

(333) T R1 (fi : (xi : –xus– (xi ))L (f1 )) to be paraphrased as: ‘a Property fi , such that ‘in the tent’ of fi ’. Incorporating such a Property expression into a general predication frame, we obtain (334). A number of more speciﬁc instantiations are given in (335)– (338): T R R (334) (f1 : [ (f2 : (v1 )φ (f2 )) (v2 )φ ] (f1 )) (335) (f1 : [ (f2 : (x1 )φ (f2 )) (x2 )φ ] (f1 )) ‘The play is by Shakespeare.’ (336) (f1 : [ (f2 : (t1 )φ (f2 )) (e1 )φ ] (f1 )) ‘The meeting is at six o’clock.’ (337) (f1 : [ (f2 : (l1 )φ (f2 )) (e1 )φ ] (f1 )) ‘The meeting is in room 106.’ (338) (f1 : [ (f2 : (e1 )φ (f2 )) (e2 )φ ] (f1 )) ‘It is because she left him that he started drinking.’ 3.6.2.2.7 Classiﬁcation The next set of predication frames have to do with the expression of class membership, as illustrated in the following examples: (339)

That man is a painter.

(340)

A cat is an animal.

Again, many languages would not need a copula in this construction type, which means we can interpret the part in italics as corresponding to the Ascriptive Subact. An example is (341) from Turkish (Gerjan van Schaaik, p.c.): (341) O adam çok iyi bir doktor. dem man very good indf doctor ‘That man is a very good doctor.’ The predication frame needed for this type of construction is diﬀerent from the one used for one-place Properties above. In classifying constructions, the ascriptive part is phrasal, not lexical. Compare the following constructions from Dutch: (342) Jan is schilder. John cop.prs.3.sg painter ‘John is a painter.’ “John is painter.”

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the representational level

(343) Jan is een schilder. John cop.prs.3.sg indf painter ‘John is a painter.’ The Ascriptive Subact schilder ‘painter’ in (342) is a bare noun, while een schilder ‘a painter’ in (343) is a noun phrase. The translations show that the distinction cannot generally be made in English, as in many other languages. The diﬀerence between the two constructions is not only reﬂected in the absence versus presence of the indeﬁnite article een, it can also be demonstrated by diﬀerences in the syntactic behaviour of the two constructions. First of all, the bare noun in (342) does not take a plural form when used with a plural subject, cf. (344), while the noun phrase in (343) does, as shown in (345): (344) Jan en Piet zijn schilder. John and Pete cop.prs.3.pl painter ‘John and Pete are painters.’ “John and Pete are painter.” (345) Jan en Piet zijn schilder-s. John and Pete cop.prs.3.pl painter-PL ‘John and Pete are painters.’ Secondly, the bare noun cannot be modiﬁed, cf. (346), but the noun phrase can, as shown in (347): (346) *Jan is erg goede schilder. John cop.prs.3.sg very good painter ‘John is a very good painter.’ “John is very good painter.” (347)

Jan is een erg goede schilder. John cop.prs.3.sg indf very good painter ‘John is a very good painter.’

To account for these diﬀerences, the predication frame for classiﬁcation will be as in (348). Some speciﬁc instantiations are given in (349)–(351): (348)

T R (f1 : [ (v1 ) (v2 )φ ] (f1 )) (where (v1 ) and (v2 ) are of the same semantic category)

(349) (f1 : [ (x1 ) (x2 )φ ] (f1 )) ‘John is a teacher.’ (350) (f1 : [ (f2 ) (f3 )φ ] (f1 )) ‘Yellow is a nice colour.’

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(351) (f1 : [ (t2 ) (t3 )φ ] (f1 )) ‘Now is not a good moment.’ The ascriptive nature of the predicative noun phrases is evident from the fact that they can only be referred to anaphorically by means of elements that are used for predicates: (352)

a. John is a teacher. That’s what he is. b. John went swimming. That’s what he did.

(353)

a. John is a teacher, and so is Peter. b. John went swimming, and so did Peter.

3.6.2.2.8 Identiﬁcation The classifying constructions just illustrated diﬀer from identiﬁcational constructions like the following: (354)

My teacher is Peter.

Identiﬁcational constructions diﬀer from classiﬁcational ones in that the noun phrase following the copula is not used ascriptively, as follows from (355)– (356), which are ungrammatical under the intended readings: (355)

*My teacher is Peter, and so is my brother.

(356)

*My teacher is Peter. That’s what he is.

This means that neither of the two noun phrases in (354) is used ascriptively. Nor can the verb to be be considered to be the manifestation of an Ascriptive Subact, since there are languages that can express the same type of construction without the intervention of a copula. The following example is from Hixkaryana (Derbyshire 1979: 132): (357)

Romuru moson1. 1.sg.son dem.prox ‘This is my son.’

Thus, we may conclude that the identiﬁcational predication frame is related to two Referential Subacts at the Interpersonal Level, as indicated in the general frame given in (358), illustrated in (359)–(363): (358)

R R (f1 : [ (v1 ) (v1 ) ] (f1 )) (where both instances of (v1 ) and (v2 ) are of the same semantic category)

(359)

(f1 : [ (x1 ) (x1 ) ] (f1 )) ‘John is my best friend.’

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(360) (f1 : [ (f2 ) (f2 ) ] (f1 )) ‘Yellow is my favourite colour.’ (361) (f1 : [ (p1 ) (p1 ) ] (f1 )) ‘The reason that I’m here is that I have no other place to go to.’ (362) (f1 : [ (l1 ) (l1 ) ] (f1 )) ‘The place that I met Sheila was in the park.’ (363) (f1 : [ (m1 ) (m1 ) ] (f1 )) ‘The way he approached the lion was cautiously.’ 3.6.2.2.9 Existence We discussed existential constructions above to illustrate the typological diﬀerences between languages as regards their availability in the language. The general existential frame proposed there is repeated in (364). Some illustrations are (365)–(367): (364)

R (f1 : [ (v1 ) ] (f1 ))

(365) (f1 : [ (x1 ) ] (f1 )) ‘There are lions.’ (366) (f1 : [ (e1 ) ] (f1 )) ‘There are courses that help you become more assertive.’ (367) (f1 : [ (t1 ) ] (f1 )) ‘There are periods of my life I wouldn’t want to do all over again.’ 3.6.2.3 Semantic functions of arguments

3.6.2.3.1 Introduction In the preceding overview of possible predication frames, we have left semantic functions out of consideration. In this section, we enrich these frames with semantic functions. We shall ﬁrst consider the semantic functions associated with the arguments of Properties, moving on to those associated with classiﬁcations, identiﬁcations, and predications of existence. It is important to recall that FDG does not assume a priori that underlying semantic representations are identical across languages, but that they have to be determined for each language individually, based on the grammatically relevant distinctions that are made within that language. This applies with particular force to the repertory of semantic functions found in individual languages. A semantic function speciﬁes a relation between a nucleus and a dependent. In representing this relation we attach semantic functions to the dependent, as in (368):

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195

(368) (f1 : [(f2 ) (x1 )A (x2 )U (x3 )L ] (f1 )) This does not mean we interpret these functions as being more relevant to dependents than to nuclei. It is just a convention to give a unilinear representation that includes the various relations between the nucleus and each of its dependents. A far more appropriate representation of this situation would be the one in Figure 8. We will assume the representation in Figure 8 to be the one intended by the conventional representation in (368). Semantic functions are grammatical reﬂexes of the cognitive awareness that the participants in a State-of-Aﬀairs (i) play diﬀerent roles in that State-ofAﬀairs (in which case the State-of-Aﬀairs is treated in grammar as a Property); (ii) play the same role in the State-of-Aﬀairs (in which case the State-of-Aﬀairs is treated as a classiﬁcation or identiﬁcation); (iii) cannot be seen as playing a role in a State-of-Aﬀairs (in which case that State-of-Aﬀairs is presented in a predication of existence). We will consider each of these possibilities in turn. 3.6.2.3.2 Semantic functions in Property-designating frames The notion of participants playing distinct roles is clearest in dynamic two-place Properties concerning external reality, where a distinction can be made between a participant playing a more active role, the Actor, and another, the Undergoer, playing a more passive role (see Foley and Van Valin 1984 for this terminology). Thus in (369): (369)

Beckham kicked the defender.

Beckham is identiﬁable as having the semantic function Actor and the defender the semantic function Undergoer, and in English this is reﬂected in their grammar: when combined with the active form of the verb, the Actor is attributed Subject function and the Undergoer appears in immediately postverbal position. The prototypical Actor is volitionally involved in the State-of-Aﬀairs and (x1)

A (f2) U

L

(x2)

Figure 8. The representation of semantic functions

(x3)

196

the representational level

the prototypical Undergoer is non-volitionally aﬀected by the State-of-Aﬀairs, but that in the grammar of English these are mere prototypes can be seen in the possibility of overriding these expectations by adding further lexical material but without aﬀecting the essential grammar of the clause, as in: (370) Beckham unintentionally kicked the defender. (371) The defender wanted Beckham to kick him so that he would get a red card. As Foley (2005) has shown, Actors and Undergoers are associated with other, less prototypical, semantic Properties, and languages diﬀer in the extent to which they allow non-prototypical actors to group with the Actor in terms of their grammatical behaviour. English, for example, allows the Actor function to be assigned to volitional agents but also to non-volitional forces, i.e. to non-sentient causes: (372) Caesar destroyed the city. (373)

The storm destroyed the city.

The storm may not be volitionally involved in the destruction, but it is not aﬀected by the State-of-Aﬀairs either and therefore is associated with the Actor rather than the Undergoer function. The assumption here is that while there is a cognitive awareness of a diﬀerence in roles, this diﬀerence is reduced in the representational grammar of English to the opposition between Actor and Undergoer. The distinction between Actor and Undergoer is, as was mentioned, characteristic of dynamic States-of-Aﬀairs, i.e. those that designate a change of state, for example with verbs such as kick and destroy. Not all States-of-Aﬀairs are dynamic, and FDG makes a fundamental distinction between dynamic and non-dynamic States-of-Aﬀairs. The former require the input of energy, whereas the latter do not. Examples of non-dynamic States-of-Aﬀairs are verbs such as lie (as used in (374)) or adjectives such as ugly. An important characteristic of non-dynamic states is the absence of an Actor: however, an Undergoer, in the sense of an entity that ‘undergoes’ a Property, is present. In two-place Properties it is accompanied by an entity with the semantic function Locative, a function typically attributed to a participant with the semantic category Location, as in (374), where Easter Island has the function Undergoer and in the Paciﬁc Ocean Locative. (374)

Easter Island lies in the Paciﬁc Ocean.

The application of the semantic function Undergoer is justiﬁed by the fact that the entity undergoes localization, without any volitional involvement.

configurational properties

197

A Locative function is also found in dynamic States-of-Aﬀairs, where alongside the Actor–Undergoer opposition already discussed, we also ﬁnd Actor– Locative and Undergoer–Locative oppositions. Thus in (375): (375)

The president waved to the crowd.

we ﬁnd a volitionally involved Actor (the president), no Undergoer, but a Locative (to the crowd). In dynamic States-of-Aﬀairs, locative roles cover a range of spatial distinctions, namely Ablative (indicating the source of movement), Perlative (indicating the path of movement), Allative (indicating the end point of movement, and covering further distinctions such as Recipient, Beneﬁciary, and spatial Goal), and Approach (indicating a point towards which there is movement). (375) could thus be analysed as Actor (the president)–Allative (to the crowd). The fact that a dynamic State-of-Aﬀairs need not contain an Actor (although conversely a non-dynamic State-of-Aﬀairs cannot contain one) is clear from examples like (376): (376)

The apple fell from the twig through the branches to the ground.

Here the apple is not volitionally involved in the dynamic State-of-Aﬀairs and thus qualiﬁes as an Undergoer. The Locative speciﬁcation in (376) is a complex one, consisting of three components, which trace the apple’s ‘journey’ from its initial to its ﬁnal positions: Ablative (from the twig), Perlative (through the branches), and Goal (to the ground). In three-place dynamic Properties, the cognitive awareness of diﬀerence is necessarily divided over the three semantic functions, allowing only the constellation Actor–Undergoer–Locative. Consider the following examples: (377)

The committee gave the prize to the youngest candidate.

(378)

The wind blew the leaves into the kitchen.

In (377), there is a straightforward association of Actor with the committee, Undergoer with the prize, and Recipient, a more speciﬁc instantiation of Locative, with the youngest candidate. In (378), the non-volitionally aﬀected participant (Undergoer) is clearly the leaves, which given the constellation Actor– Undergoer–Locative qualiﬁes the wind, despite its non-volitional character, as Actor, and into the kitchen emerges as Goal. Since Actor is debarred from non-dynamic States-of-Aﬀairs, we accordingly do not encounter three-place non-dynamic States-of-Aﬀairs. The notions developed for two-place States-of-Aﬀairs transfer to the description of one-place States-of-Aﬀairs. As is well known, dynamic oneplace States-of-Aﬀairs are classiﬁed as either ‘unergative’ or ‘unaccusative’: the

198

the representational level

former corresponds to the presence of a sole Actor argument, the latter to that of a sole Undergoer argument, as in (379) and (380) respectively: (379) The students are working. (380) The bomb exploded. In (379), the students are volitionally involved in the State-of-Aﬀairs, while that is not the case for the bomb in (380). Since something happens to the bomb, it is non-volitionally aﬀected and therefore counts as an Undergoer. Although the distinction between Actor and Undergoer is neutralized in the English clauses above (through Subject assignment), it becomes apparent in Dutch, in which the perfect in unergative clauses is formed with the auxiliary hebben and in unaccusative clauses with the auxiliary zijn: (381) De studenten hebben gewerkt. def student.pl aux-pl.prs work.ptcp ‘The students worked.’ (382) De bom is ontploft. def bomb aux-3.sg.prs explode.ptcp ‘The bomb exploded.’ The sole argument of a dynamic one-place State-of-Aﬀairs can also bear the semantic function Locative, in the more speciﬁc sense of Recipient. Consider the following examples from Icelandic (Barðdal 2001): (383) Honum sárnaði. 3.sg.m.dat became.hurt ‘He became hurt.’ (384) Honum stendur. 3.sg.m.dat stands ‘He has an erection.’ Thus A, U, and L may all occur as the sole argument in a dynamic one-place predication frame. As for non-dynamic one-place States-of-Aﬀairs, the single participant is never volitionally involved and therefore receives the role Undergoer or Locative. This can best be illustrated by the following examples from a language in which agreement on the verb is sensitive to semantic functions only, not to the grammatical relation of Subject (see 4.4.3.4). Consider the following examples from Chickasaw (Munro and Gordon 1982, cited in Bickel fc.): (385)

Malili-li. run-1.sg.a ‘I ran.’

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199

Table 4. Basic semantic functions Dynamic States-of-Aﬀairs

Non-dynamic States-of-Aﬀairs

Quantitative valency

Semantic functions

Examples

Quantitative valency

Semantic functions

1

A U L A+U A+L U+L A+U+L

(379), (381), (385) (380), (382) (383), (384) (372)–(373) (375) (376) (377)–(378)

1

– U L – – U+L –

2 3

2 3

Examples

(386) (387)

(374)

(386) Sa-chokma. 1.sg.u-good ‘I’m good.’ (387)

An-takho’bi. 1.sg.loc-lazy ‘I’m lazy.’

As these examples show, agreement on the verb distinguishes between Actors (385), Undergoers (386), and Locatives (of the Recipient type, 387). The latter two examples are non-dynamic, but diﬀer in the fact that in (386) the single argument is in a state, while (387) could be paraphrased as ‘it lazies to me’, presenting the single argument as experiencing the laziness as the result of an internal process. The basic system that emerges from the preceding is shown in Table 4 (for further detail, see Hengeveld and Heesakkers, n.d.). A(ctor), U(ndergoer), and L(ocative) are general indications of (groups of) semantic functions which we hypothesize to be of universal relevance. But individual languages may display further reﬁnements within each of these categories and thus expand the repertory of semantic functions which their predication frames attribute to arguments. Thus in Tagalog a grammatical distinction is made between those Actors which control the dynamic State-of-Aﬀairs and those which do not. Whereas, as we saw above, this is expressible in English through the possible addition of inadvertently or by mistake, the distinction between controlling Actor and non-controlling Actor is reﬂected in Tagalog in the choice between the dynamic and the potentive voices of the verb (Himmelmann 2004): (388) Ang iták ay i-putol ko ng saging. spec bolo pm cv-cut 1.sg.poss gen banana ‘I cut bananas with the bolo.’

200

the representational level

(389) Na-i-luto ko na. rls.potv-cv-cook 1.sg.poss now ‘I happen to have cooked it already (by mistake).’ Tagalog also distinguishes grammatically among three kinds of Undergoer, again with reﬂections in the verb voice chosen. There is a distinction between aﬀected Undergoer (390, with Undergoer voice), non-aﬀected Undergoer (391, with Locative voice), and Undergoer in movement (392, with the Conveyance voice) (Himmelmann fc.; Himmelmann 2004): (390) Patay-ín natin itó-ng dalawa-ng Hapón. dead-uv 1.pl.incl.poss prox-lk two-lk Japan ‘Let’s kill two Japanese!’ (391) Buks-án mo áng pintó. open-lv 2.sg.poss spec door ‘Open the door.’ (392) I-balik nilá ang bata. cv-return 3.pl.poss spec child ‘They returned the child.’ Finally, English recognizes at least three diﬀerent dynamic semantic functions within the role Locative, reﬂected in example (376) in diﬀerential prepositional marking: from for ablative, through for perlative, and to for allative. Similarly, non-dynamic location (essive) is generally marked by yet another preposition, at. Tariana, by contrast, encodes ablative, essive, and allative in the same manner (Aikhenvald 2003: 148): (393) Na-pidana uni-se. 3.pl.go-rem.pst.rep water-loc ‘They went into water.’ (394) Nawiki pa:-putSita-se nehpani-pidana. people one-cl-loc 3.pl.work-rem.pst.rep ‘People were working on a clearing.’ (395) H˜ı wyaka-se ka-nu-kaRu dhuma-naka dem.anim far-loc rel-come-pst.rel.f 3.sg.f.hear-prs.vis waku-nuku. 1.pl.speech-top ‘She who came from far away understands our speech.’ In FDG this means that the Tariana formulator makes use of a single predication frame for these constructions with the semantic function Locative, while

configurational properties

201

the English formulator makes use of three diﬀerent ones, with Essive, Ablative, and Allative. The three major semantic functions and the associated distinctions within them have so far concerned States-of-Aﬀairs that concern external reality. Let us now return to internal reality, the domain of psychological processes and states, or experiences. Experiences typically involve two participants, an experiencer and the phenomenon being experienced. It has been observed that experiences tend not to have their own grammar, but that their grammar is modelled upon those of non-experiences. Since neither the experiencer nor the phenomenon is volitionally involved, we might expect that the grammar of experience will be restricted to the roles Undergoer and Locative, and indeed this is regularly found. In Spanish (396), for example, the experiencer of gustar ‘please’, used in non-dynamic States-of-Aﬀairs, is marked as a Recipient (with the preposition a or the dative case of a clitic pronoun), in keeping with the analysis, and the phenomenon appears as an Undergoer. In Portuguese (397), however, with the etymologically related verb gostar ‘like’, it is with the experiencer that the Undergoer role is associated and the phenomenon appears as an Ablative, indicating the source of the pleasure with the preposition de ‘from’: (396) Me gust-an las fresa-s. 1.sg.rec please-3.pl.prs def.pl strawberry-pl ‘I like strawberries.’ (397)

Eu gost-o de morango-s. 1.sg.nom like-1.sg.prs from strawberry-pl ‘I like strawberries.’

Thus the same constellation of Undergoer–Locative is linked diﬀerentially to the experiencer and the phenomenon. Note that the construction type illustrated in (397) is allowed in some colloquial varieties of Spanish too. In other languages, the Undergoer role is associated strongly or exclusively with the experiencer. Consider Imbabura Quechua, in which the Undergoer marking (the accusative case) is found on the experiencer, too (Cole 1982: 103, 108): (398) tayta-ka ruwana-ta awa-rka-mi. father-top poncho-acc weave-pst-val ‘Father wove a poncho.’ (399)

Juzi-ta rupa-n. José-acc be.hot-3 ‘José is hot.’

202

the representational level

In (399), José is a true Undergoer in being non-volitionally aﬀected by the State-of-Aﬀairs. Another example is German, where with a verb such as frieren ‘be cold’, occurring in a one-place non-dynamic State-of-Aﬀairs, the experiencer is associated with the only possible role, cf. Table 4 above, the Undergoer. Where the verb is impersonal, as in (400) and (401), the Undergoer appears in the accusative case, which is associated with the Undergoer in two-place States-ofAﬀairs; where a personal form of the verb is chosen, as in (402), the nominative case appears, reﬂecting the assignment of Subject to the Undergoer: (400)

Mich friert. 1sg.acc be.cold-3.sg

(401) Es friert mich. 3.sg.n be.cold-3.sg 1.sg.acc (402) Ich frier-e. 1.sg.nom be.cold-1.sg ‘I am cold.’ In English, however, experiences, both dynamic and non-dynamic, tend to be moulded on the Actor–Undergoer model: the experiencer or the phenomenon being experienced can be attributed to either of the roles: (403) Snakes frighten many people . (404) Many people fear snakes . In (403), many people are aﬀected by the feeling caused by snakes: this makes the attribution of the Actor and Undergoer roles very natural. In (404), although many people is not active, it is the association of the Actor role with humanity (or sentience, Foley 2005) which motivates the attribution of experiencer to the Actor and the equally counter-intuitive attribution of phenomenon to Undergoer—counter-intuitive because the snakes are not aﬀected in any way. But the analysis of many people as an Actor in (404) is justiﬁed by the fact that the grammar treats it as though it were like any other Actor, i.e. in allowing it to appear as a by-phrase in the passive equivalent: (405) Snakes are feared by many people. A last semantic function to be discussed concerns the one carried by the ‘internal argument’ of the one-place Properties identiﬁed in 3.6.2.3.2, such as the one illustrated in (406):

configurational properties (406)

203

the father of the boy, the boy’s father

In these cases the boy is an argument of father. The semantic relationship is a general one, and can be paraphrased as ‘someone is father with reference to/considered in relation to the boy’. Mackenzie (1983: 38) proposes the label Reference (Ref) for this semantic function. The underlying representation of (406) would thus be as in (407): (407)

(xi : [(fi : [(fj : father (fj )) (xj : –boy– (xj ))Ref ] (fi )) (xi )φ ])

This frame is particularly manifest in languages with special constructions for relational nouns, covering inalienable possession, kinship relations, locative expressions, and the like. The following example is from Kamaiurá (Seki 2000: 56): (408)

kunu’um-a r-up boy-nucl relr-father ‘the boy’s father’

In this example the Ref argument is expressed in the nuclear case, while the relationality is marked on the relational noun itself. In the predication frames discussed so far, Actor, Undergoer, Locative, and Reference (or their more speciﬁc subcategories) are semantic functions indicating the role of semantic units that are referential and arguments of an ascriptively used predicate: in (409), for example, the semantic units marked at the Representational Level as A, U, and L all correspond to Referential Subacts at the Interpersonal Level: (409)

Mary (A) submitted her poetry (U) to the competition (L).

We now move to relational Properties, instances where the Ascriptive Subact at the Interpersonal Level corresponds to a semantic unit which itself bears one of the semantic functions distinguished in the preceding section or some other, more abstract, semantic function. All the instances are non-dynamic and in each case the ascriptively used semantic unit takes an Undergoer argument. Here are some examples that we discussed earlier with the Actor and Locative functions, and the more abstract Cause function, which in English is realized as because: T R R (410) (f1 : [ (f2 : (x1 )A (f2 )) (x2 )U ] (f1 )) ‘The play is by Shakespeare.’ (f2 )) (e1 )U ] (f1 )) (411) (f1 : [ (f2 : (x1 )L ‘The meeting is at six o’clock.’

204

the representational level

(412) (f1 : [ (f2 : (x1 )L (f2 )) (e1 )U ] (f1 )) ‘The meeting is in room 106.’ (413) (f1 : [ (f2 : (e1 )Cause (f2 )) (e2 )U ] (f1 )) ‘It is because she left him that he started drinking.’ 3.6.2.3.3 Semantic functions in frames for classiﬁcational, identiﬁcational, and existential constructions The next type of predication frame to be considered covers instances of classiﬁcation and identiﬁcation, as found in such examples as (414) and (415) respectively: (414) John is a teacher. (415) John is the teacher. Recall that, in classiﬁcation, there is at the Interpersonal Level a relation between an ascriptive and a Referential Subact, while at the Representational Level, the frame consists of two ontologically identical semantic units. The relation is one of classiﬁcation, and the units are identical for the simple reason that an Individual can be classiﬁed only as an Individual, and not—except perhaps metaphorically—as a State-of-Aﬀairs or a Property: (416) John is a teacher (x1 ). (417)

*John is an explosion (e1 ).

(418) *John is a high temperature (f1 ). The entity classiﬁed undergoes classiﬁcation, and as such bears the semantic function Undergoer. The other semantic unit indicates the Property assigned to the Undergoer and as such bears no semantic function. Consequently, we may specify the semantic functions in the basic predication frame for classiﬁcation as follows, where v is a variable over variables: (419)

T R (f1 : [(v1 ) (v2 )U ] (f1 ))

As with the relational Properties discussed above, the copula be is inserted at the Morphosyntactic Level. Not all languages have a classifying construction. In Scottish Gaelic, for example, apart from a rather archaic classifying construction (see Adger and Ramchand 2003), the meaning of classiﬁcation is carried by one of two relational Property constructions, one for temporary and one for permanent classiﬁcation, with in each case the Undergoer being assigned a Locative Property: (420) Tha mi nam thidsear. cop.prs 1.sg in.1.sg.poss teacher ‘I am (working as) a teacher.’ “I am in my teacher.”

configurational properties

205

(421) ’S e tidsear a tha annam. cop.prs 3.sg teacher rel cop.prs in.1.sg ‘I am a teacher.’ “A teacher is in me.” These constructions can be represented as based on the predication frame in (422): (422)

R T (f1 : [ (f2 : (x1 )L (f2 )) (x2 )U ] (f1 ))

In Abkhaz (Hewitt 1979: 46), the meaning of classiﬁcation is also associated with a diﬀerent type of construction, namely a two-place Property ‘exist as’: (423) W@y rc"ay˚`@-s d`@-q"o-∅-w-p". dem teacher-advr 3.sg.sbj-ex.prev-cop-prs-decl ‘He is a teacher.’ “That one is (there) as a teacher.” based on the predication frame for two-place Properties in (424): (424)

T R R (f1 : [(f2 ) (x1 )U (x2 )Circ ] (f1 ))

In many languages constructions with identiﬁcational meaning are closely related in form to classiﬁcational constructions, but quite distinct in meaning and use, as in (425): (425)

R R (f1 : [ (x1 ) (x1 )] (f1 ))

In such identiﬁcation constructions, the two semantic units represent alternative ways of viewing the same entity. There is no relation of property assignment, and hence neither of the semantic units contracts a semantic function. Consider the following example from Hixkaryana (Derbyshire 1979: 36) and its analysis: (426) Rowt¯ı mokro. my.brother that.one ‘That is my brother.’ (427)

R1 R2 (fi : [ (xi : (fj : rowt¯ı (fj )) (xi )) (xi : (fk : mokro (fk )) (xi ))] (fi ))

What happens here is that at the Interpersonal Level there are two Referential Subacts, R1 and R2 , which both refer to the same entity (xi ); at the Representational Level there are simply two coindexed units of the same type.

206

the representational level

Certain languages lack an identiﬁcational construction. Hengeveld and Mackenzie (2005: 17–18) argue that in such Abkhaz examples as the following (Hewitt 1979: 46; Spruit 1986: 124): (428) W@y Zaìra ∅-l-a-w-p". dem Zaira 3.sg.nh.sbj-3.sg.f.obj-identical-prs-decl ‘That’s Zaira.’ “That is identical to Zaira.” the verb –a/–ak’w is a two-place lexical stem meaning ‘be identical to’, so that in this language the identiﬁcational meaning (just like the classiﬁcational meaning) is to be analysed as involving a two-place Property. In Scottish Gaelic either a copular or a locative construction is used, only the former one being an identiﬁcational construction: (429) Is e-san mo bhràthair. cop 3.sg-emph my brother (430) ’S e mo bhràthair a tha ann. cop 3.sg my brother rel cop in.3.sg ‘He is my brother.’ The second construction is becoming dominant, suggesting a disappearance of the identiﬁcational construction from the language. The ﬁnal type of construction to be included is the existential frame, which at the Interpersonal Level is characterized by a C containing only a single Referential Subact. The analysis at the Representational Level contains only a corresponding semantic unit, without a semantic function, since it is not the argument of any predicate: (431)

R (f1 : [ (v1 ) ] (f1 ))

The expression of the existential construction diﬀers from language to language: frequently they are signalled by a special particle (Tagalog may) or by an impersonal form of a verb (Portuguese haver). If the existential clause also has a Location, that will regarded as a modiﬁer of the (e1 ) and not as an argument, since it displays the mobility (and the omissibility) typical of the former: (432)

R T (ei : [(fi : [ (xi : [–lion– (xi )φ ]) ] (fi )) (ei )φ ]: [ (li : Africa (li ))L (ei )φ ]) ‘There are lions in Africa.’

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3.6.2.4 Inventory of predication frames

Updating the frames listed earlier with the semantic functions of their component parts, we come to the following typology of predication frames, from which languages will make a selection, as well as potentially adding further analogous frames: 1.

zero-place Property T (f1 : [ (f2 ) ] (f1 ))

2. one-place Property T R (f1 : [ (f2 ) (v1 )A ] (f1 : [ (f2 ) (v1 )U ] (f1 : [ (f2 ) (v1 )L ] (f1 : [ (f2 ) (v1 )Ref ]

(f1 )) (f1 )) (f1 )) (f1 ))

3. two-place Property T R R (f1 : [ (f2 ) (v1 )A (v2 )U ] (f1 )) (f1 : [ (f2 ) (v1 )A (v2 )L ] (f1 )) (f1 : [ (f2 ) (v1 )U (v2 )L ] (f1 )) 4.

5.

three-place Property T R R (f1 : [ (f2 ) (v1 )A (v2 )U

R (v3 )L ] (f1 ))

four-place Property T R R (f1 : [ (f2 ) (v1 )A (v2 )U

R (v3 )L

6. relational Property T R (f1 : [ (f2 : (v1 )A/U/OTHER (f2 )) 7.

classiﬁcation T R (f1 : [ (v1 ) (v2 )U ] (f1 ))

8. identiﬁcation C R R (f1 : [ (v1 ) (v2 ) ] (f1 )) 9. existence R (f1 : [ (v1 ) ] (f1 ))

R (v4 )OTHER ] (f1 )) R (v2 )U ] (f1 ))

208

the representational level

3.6.3 Modiﬁers

The preceding typology of frames for Properties abstracts from the possibility of adding modiﬁers at the (f) layer. These modiﬁers permit the introduction of lexical expressions which introduce further participants into the State-ofAﬀairs; these further participants are cognitively present in the Conceptual Component, but the available set of frames oﬀers no place for them as arguments. In English, an example of a modiﬁer at this layer is a Beneﬁciary, naming a person or institution for whose beneﬁt (or sometimes against whose interests) the State-of-Aﬀairs is eﬀected. The modiﬁer status of the Beneﬁciary (in bold) is apparent from examples like (433), in which all three positions associated with the predicate give are already exhausted, with you (A), Mary (L), and these ﬂowers (U): (433) Will you give Mary these ﬂowers for me? (fi : [(fj : give (fj )) (xi )A (m prox xj : ﬂower (xj ))U (xk )L ] (fi ): (xl )Ben (fi )) At the Morphosyntactic Level, the semantic function Beneﬁciary is typically indicated by the preposition for, but under certain circumstances it may also be treated there as an Object: (434)

I bought her a new coat. (= I bought a new coat for her.)

The Beneﬁciary is regarded as a modiﬁer at the (f1 ) layer above all because it represents a participant in the State-of-Aﬀairs for which the grammar oﬀers no room as an argument. A similar motivation lies behind regarding Comitative (C) and Instrument (Ins) as modiﬁers at this layer: (435) John went to Paris with Mary (fi : [(fj : go (fj )) (xi )A (xj : Paris (xj ))L ] (fi ): (xk )C (fi )) (436) John cut the meat with a knife (fi : [(fj : cut (fj )) (xi ))A (xj : meat (xj ))U ] (fi ): (xk : knife (xk ))Ins (fi )) Apart from additional participants, the modiﬁers of Conﬁgurational Properties may also designate certain types of Manner. Manner is relevant to various layers, but with diﬀerences in behaviour. As observed by Himmelmann and Schulze-Berndt (2006), drawing on Geuder (2000), the attachment points of Manner adverbials can vary considerably. Consider the following examples and their analyses: (437) John walked slowly. (fi : [(fj : walk (fj ): [(mi : –slow– (mi )) (fj )φ ]) (xi )A ] (fi )) In this case, the Manner expression modiﬁes only the predicate walk: it is the walking that was slow, but this by itself does not make John a slow person. The usual interpretation of (438), however, is diﬀerent:

configurational properties

209

(438) John stupidly answered the question. (ei : [(fi : [(fj : answer (fj )) (xi )A (pi : –question– (pi ))U ] (fi )) (ei )φ ]: [(fk : stupid (fk )) (ei )φ ]) John’s answer may have been very intelligent, but it was stupid of him to answer the question at all (rather than insist on remaining silent). Here it is therefore the State-of-Aﬀairs which is characterized as stupid, as reﬂected in the fact that the manner expression occupies the position of the e-modiﬁer. Diﬀerent again are examples like (439): (439) John angrily left the room. (ei : [(fi : [(fj : leave (fj )) (xi )A (li : –room– (li ))U ] (fi ): [(mi : –angry– (mi )) (fi )φ ]) (ei )φ ]) which cannot be paraphrased as *It was angry of John to leave the room and in which the Manner expression does not modify merely the ‘leaving’: there is no question of John performing an ‘angry leaving’. Rather, (439) is understood as meaning that the Conﬁgurational Property that is the head of the State-ofAﬀairs had the Property of being ‘angry’—perhaps John slammed the door or kicked at the cat! In certain languages where there is no morphological distinction between adjectives and adverbs, e.g. in German as discussed by Himmelmann and Schulze-Berndt (2006: 2), there is no formal distinction between (439) and (440): (440)

John left the room angry.

where the adjective angry clearly applies only to John and is understood as a secondary predication or ‘depictive’ or ‘participant-oriented adjunct’ in Himmelmann and Schulze-Berndt’s terms. In FDG, (440) will be analysed at the Representational Level as (441). (441) (ei : [(fi : [(fj : leaveV (fj )) (xi )A (li : roomN (li ))U ] (fi )) (ei )φ ]: [(fk : [(fl : angryA (fl )) (xi )U ] (fk )) (ei )φ ]) Here the State-of-Aﬀairs variable (ei ) is restricted by two predication frames. Angry is the predicate of the second one. Note that this is thus not a Manner expression, but a secondary predication, with a coindexed participant (here xi ) occurring in both the primary and the secondary predications. Thus, of the various examples discussed here, only (439) contains a modiﬁer of a Conﬁgurational Property. The modiﬁer in (437) applies at the layer of a lexically headed Property (see 3.7), and those in (438) and (440) at the layer of the State-of-Aﬀairs. A ﬁnal modiﬁer category at this layer concerns those elements that quantify the internal temporal constituency of a State-of-Aﬀairs. The most prominent

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the representational level

member of this category is Duration, which resembles Event Quantiﬁcation in that it quantiﬁes, but diﬀers from it in that it does not quantify over States-ofAﬀairs, but rather deﬁnes the internal temporal extension of a single State-ofAﬀairs. Examples are the following: (442) He has lived here for ten years. (443) He waited for three hours. 3.6.4 Operators

The operator categories at the layer of Conﬁgurational Properties characterizing States-of-Aﬀairs belong to three diﬀerent categories: Aspect, Participantoriented modality, and Quantiﬁcation. We will discuss these one by one. 3.6.4.1 Aspect

Aspectual distinctions specify the internal temporal constituency of a Stateof-Aﬀairs, and therefore operate at the layer of the Conﬁgurational Property characterizing that State-of-Aﬀairs. Aspect is diﬀerent from relative tense in that it does not have a situating function: an aspectually characterized Stateof-Aﬀairs still can be located at any point in time. In FDG this is reﬂected in the fact that relative tense is a higher operator than aspect, the latter being part of the Conﬁgurational Property characterizing a State-of-Aﬀairs. Following Dik (1997a), we make a distinction at this layer between the Perfective–Imperfective opposition on the one hand, and a series of Phasal Aspect distinctions on the other. To start with the latter, these indicate the relation between the temporal reference point and a phase within the development of a State-of-Aﬀairs. Consider the following examples from Welsh (Awbery 1976, cited in Dik 1997a with his informal gloss): (444) Mae ef ar weld y ddrama. is he on seeing the play ‘He is about to see the play.’ (445)

Mae ’r dyn yn gweld y ci. is the man in seeing the dog ‘The man is seeing the dog.’

(446) Mae ’r dyn wedi gweld y ci. is the man after seeing the dog ‘The man has seen the dog.’ In (444) the State-of-Aﬀairs is characterized as being about to happen at the reference point (Prospective Aspect), in (445) as happening at the reference

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point (Progressive Aspect), and in (446) as having happened before the reference point (Resultative Aspect). In each case the aspectual speciﬁcation relates the Conﬁgurational Property to a temporal reference point. Other possibilities in the domain of Phasal Aspect are the Ingressive and Egressive Aspects. The Perfective–Imperfective opposition indicates whether a State-of-Aﬀairs is presented as a single whole (Perfective), or as viewed from within (Imperfective). The combination of the two helps to show how diﬀerent States-of-Aﬀairs relate to one another in their temporal development. Consider the following Italian example: (447)

Gianni leggeva quando entrai. Gianni read.pst.impf when enter.pst.pfv ‘Gianni was reading when I came in.’

This combination of aspect indicates that the State-of-Aﬀairs of entering was rounded oﬀ within the time span of the State-of-Aﬀairs of reading. The need to treat aspectual distinctions as operators on Conﬁgurational Properties of States-of-Aﬀairs is manifested, among other things, in their interaction with the Aktionsart of predication frames. Thus, a stative predication frame like someone know someone becomes dynamic when combined with ingressive aspect, as in someone get to know someone, as is evident from the tests in (448)–(449): (448) *John knew his colleagues quickly.

(−Dynamic)

(449) John got to know his colleagues quickly. (+Dynamic) Similarly, the application of a Prospective, Progressive, or Resultative operator to a dynamic predication frame in English turns it into a non-dynamic one with respect to higher processes. Consider the following examples (see Steedman 1977): (450)

What he did was run. (+Dynamic)

(451)

*What he did was going to run/be running/have run. (−Dynamic)

The perfective/imperfective distinction may aﬀect the momentaneousness of an SoA, as in (452), where the imperfective value of the progressive cancels the momentaneousness of reach (see Comrie 1976: 43): (452)

a. The soldiers reached the summit. (+Momentaneous) b. The soldiers were reaching the summit. (−Momentaneous)

This feature-changing property of many aspectual categories indicates that they can be analysed as operating internally within the State-of-Aﬀairs.

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the representational level

3.6.4.2 Participant-oriented modality

This type of modality aﬀects the relational part of the utterance as expressed by a predicate and its arguments and concerns the relation between a participant in a State-of-Aﬀairs and the potential realization of that State-ofAﬀairs (cf. Foley and Van Valin 1984: 215). Participant-oriented modalities are better known from the literature as agent-oriented modalities. Although widely used, this term is not too felicitous in that it suggests that only controlling participants in dynamic States-of-Aﬀairs may be subject to this type of modalization. That this is not the case is apparent from such examples as: (453) John wants to be young again. The term participant-oriented modality is neutral as to the State-of-Aﬀairs type in which this class of modal expressions occurs. Three main subcategories of participant-oriented modality may be distinguished on the basis of the domain of evaluation they are concerned with: Facultative, Deontic, and Volitive. Facultative participant-oriented modality describes the ability of a participant to engage in the State-of-Aﬀairs type designated by the predicate. In some languages a distinction is made between intrinsic (‘be able to’) and acquired (‘know how to’) ability, as shown in the following examples from Mapuche, which has separate auxiliaries for these two types of ability (Smeets 1989: 219): (454) Pepí kuθaw-la-n. intr.abil work-neg-decl.1.sg ‘I am not able to work.’ (455)

Kim tuku-ﬁ-n. acq.abil put.at-obj-decl.1.sg ‘I know how to put it.’

Spanish makes the same distinction. Intrinsic ability is expressed by the modal verb poder ‘be able to’, acquired ability by the verb saber ‘know (how to)’ in its modal use. Inability may also acquire the status of a separate category, as in the Turkish Impotential (457), which may be compared with its Potential (456), used for ability (Lewis 1967: 151): (456)

Gel-ebil-di-∅. come-abil-pst-3 ‘He was able to come.’

configurational properties (457)

213

Gel-eme-di-∅. come-inabil-pst-3 ‘He was unable to come.’

Deontic participant-oriented modalities describe a participant’s being under the obligation or having permission to engage in the State-of-Aﬀairs type designated by the predicate. Obligation seems to be encoded by grammatical means more often than permission. The following example is from Imbabura Quechua (Cole 1982: 151): (458) Miku-na ka-rka-ni. eat-oblg cop-pst-1 ‘I must eat.’ “I am to eat.” Volitive participant-oriented modality describes a participant’s desire to engage in the State-of-Aﬀairs type designated by the predicate. The following example is from Guajajara (Bendor-Samuel 1972: 95): (459)

Za-hem r@m. 1.pl.incl-leave vol ‘We want to leave.’

The diﬀerence between event-oriented modality (3.5.4.3) and participantoriented modality is that event-oriented modality characterizes States-ofAﬀairs as generally desirable, obligatory, etc., while with participant-oriented modality the desire originates from a speciﬁc participant, the obligation rests on a speciﬁc participant, etc. Given that they operate at diﬀerent layers, the two may be combined, as in: (460) You have to be able to swim (to participate in this course.) Here a general obligation concerning the abilities of a participant is speciﬁed. The scope diﬀerences are reﬂected in the following underlying representation of the relevant layers of (460): (461) (obl ei : (abil [(fi : [(fj : swim (fj )) (xi )A ] (fi )) (ei )φ ]) Alongside event-oriented and participant-oriented modality, we have recognized a category of propositional modality, which deals with propositional attitudes and inferences. The following example from Turkish (Lewis 1967: 151), containing all three types of modality, illustrates the diﬀerences between them: (462)

Anlı-y-abil-ecek-mi¸s-im. understand-∅-abil-irr-infer-1.sg ‘I gather that I will be able to understand.’

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the representational level

In this example the ability suﬃx -abıl (preceded by an obligatory intervocalic -y-) expresses a participant-oriented modality. The ﬁrst singular subject is said to have the capacity of engaging in the relation expressed by the predicate. The irrealis suﬃx -ecek expresses an event-oriented modality. The State-of-Aﬀairs described by the sentence is characterized as non-actual, which is in this case, but not necessarily, reﬂected in the translation by means of a future tense. The inferential suﬃx -mi¸s expresses a proposition-oriented modality. It signals that the Speaker does not fully commit him/herself to the Propositional Content of his assertion. 3.6.4.3 Quantiﬁcation

As the grammatical counterpart of the Duration modiﬁers in 3.6.3, some languages have grammatical means to express the internal temporal extension of a State-of-Aﬀairs. The following example is from West Greenlandic (Fortescue 1984: 282): (463) Ukisi-uar-puq. stare-cont-3.sg.ind ‘He stares continuously.’ The equivalent nature of modiﬁer and operators of duration shows up in the fact that in West Greenlandic continuous aspect does not have to be expressed when a lexical expression of duration is present. This is illustrated in (464) (Fortescue 1984: 242): (464) Nalunaaqutta-p akunnir-a naa-llugu clock-rel space.between-poss.3.sg complete-sim qia-vuq. cry-3.sg.ind ‘He cried for a whole hour.’ Here the duration is described in a simultaneity clause and not marked on the main verb qia ‘cry’ itself. 3.6.5 Frames

In sum, the set of primitives for the Representational Level provides the following frame for the layer of the Conﬁgurational Property: (465) (π f1 : [(vi ) . . . (v1+N ){φ} ] (f1 ): [σ (f1 )φ ]) Heads of Conﬁgurational Properties are combinations of semantic categories of a wide range of quantitative and qualitative valencies. The operator position in (465) may be ﬁlled by operators expressing aspect, participant-oriented modality, and/or quantity.

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The modiﬁer position in (465) may be ﬁlled by lexical expressions specifying additional participants, manner, and/or duration.

3.7 Lexical Properties 3.7.1 Introduction

Having discussed Conﬁgurational Properties in 3.6, we will now turn our attention to Lexical Properties (henceforth simply ‘Properties’). As has become evident in earlier sections and will be reaﬃrmed in later ones, semantic categories may in general, among other strategies, be designated by Lexical Property expressions, either in head or in modiﬁer position. To illustrate this once more, let us start with the following three Property expressions: (466) (fi : man (fi )) (467) (fj : intelligent (fj )) (468) (fk : high (fk )) The latter two are used in the formation of (469): (469) (fj : intelligent (fj ): [(fk : high (fk )) (fj )φ ]) ‘highly intelligent’ in which (fk ) is used as a Property of a Property. (467) and (468) may then in turn be used to characterize an Individual, as in (470): (470)

(xi : [(fi : man (fi )) (xi )φ ]: [(fj : intelligent (fj ): [(fk : high (fk )) (fj )φ ]) (xi )φ ])

This simple example clearly shows the importance of Properties in building up semantic representations of other semantic categories through their application in predication frames at diﬀerent levels of semantic organization. The kind of Property slot that classes of lexical items, parts-of-speech, may or may not occupy depends not only on the position that slot occupies within the underlying semantic representation, but also on the interpersonal function with which that slot is used. A large part of 3.7.2 on the heads of Properties will be dedicated to the issue of the distribution of parts-of-speech. 3.7.3 then looks at the possible modiﬁers of Properties, and 3.7.4 goes on to discuss operators of Properties. 3.7.2 Heads 3.7.2.1 Introduction

Before turning to the issue of parts-of-speech, we will ﬁrst indicate in 3.7.2.2 what kinds of lexical head may be distinguished as regards their complexity.

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the representational level

Particularly relevant in this respect is the issue of compounding. After that we will deﬁne parts-of-speech in terms of the distinctions made at the Interpersonal Level and the Representational Level in 3.7.2.3. 3.7.2.2 Simple and compositional heads

Simple heads have been exempliﬁed throughout this and in the previous section. Simple lexical heads may be dropped, leading to empty-headed constructions, as in the following Spanish example: (471)

un-a casa antigu-a y un-a modern-a indf-f.sg house(f) old-f.sg and indf-f.sg modern-f.sg ‘an old house and a modern one’

The noun phrases in (471) may be represented as in (472): (472)

(xi : (fi : casa (fi )) (xi ): (fj : antigu- (fj )) (xi )) & (xj : (fi ) (xj ): (fk : modern(fk )) (xj ))

Note that coindexation of the variables (fi ) for the heads in (472) makes the Property casa available in the second noun phrase. The presence of the empty head shows up in the agreement of the adjective moderna with the understood feminine head casa. Heads are complex when two or more lexical elements together express a single concept, as in the case of composition (for an earlier treatment of compounding in FG, as applied to Turkish, see van Schaaik 1992). Endocentric and exocentric compounds may be represented in the following way: (473) (f1 : (f2 : (f2 ): (f3 : (f3 )) (f2 )) (f1 )) (474)

(f1 : (f2 : (f2 )) (f3 : (f3 )) (f1 ))

Endocentric Exocentric

In (473) (f3 ) is a modiﬁer of (f2 ), with the result that the head of (f2 ) is the head of the compound. In (474) (f2 ) and (f3 ) together constitute the head of (f1 ). Examples from Dutch are given in (475) and (476) respectively: (475)

was-machine washing-machine ‘washing machine’ (fi : (fj : machine (fj ): (fk : was (fk )) (fj )) (fi ))

(476)

zoet-zuur sweet-sour ‘sweet and sour’ (fi : (fj : zoet (fj )) (fk : zuur (fk )) (fi ))

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217

This treatment of compounding also applies to nuclear serialization. In 3.6 we dealt with core serialization as a combination of two or more Conﬁgurational Properties of States-of-Aﬀairs. Nuclear serialization concerns the combination of two Lexical Properties to form a compound Property expression. The following example from Nêlêmwa (Bril 2004: 15) is particularly telling in this respect: (477)

Hla diya hââhuux-e mwa eli. 3.pl do be.recent-tr house dem.anaph ‘They built this house recently.’

As shown in (477), Nêlêmwa uses transitivity markers. In this example the transitivity marker occurs on the second verb, which when used by itself would be intransitive. This shows that the two verbs together are treated as a transitive predicate. The treatment of compounding suggested here does not apply to synthetic compounding. Consider the following example: (478)

sword-swallower

As Booij (2005: 90), from whom example (478) is taken, remarks, this type of compound raises the problem that swallower does not occur as a word on its own. A further property is that sword is an argument of swallow. Anticipating discussion of cases like this in 3.8, we analyse this type of compound in the following way: (479)

(xi : [(fi : [(fj : swallow (fj )) (xi )A (xj : –sword– (xj ))U ] (fi ))])

Note that we use a conﬁgurational two-place Property frame as the head of the Individual (xi ), which also ﬁgures as an Actor argument within the predication frame itself. The resulting verbal expression is then subjected to -er derivation in the morphosyntactic encoder. 3.7.2.3 Parts-of-speech

3.7.2.3.1 Introduction The issue of parts-of-speech is one that is relevant not only at the Representational Level, but also at the Morphosyntactic Level. We correspondingly make a distinction between lexeme classes at the Representational Level, and word classes at the Morphosyntactic Level. This distinction is necessary since there is no one-to-one relation between lexeme class and word class. We can illustrate this by repeating example (479) with the lexeme class indications: (480) (xi : (fi : [(fj : swallowV (fj )) (xi )A (xj : –swordN – (xj ))U ] (fi )) (xi ))

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the representational level

This underlying semantic representation has two lexical elements, of the lexeme classes verb and noun. The output after processing by the morphosyntactic encoder will be of the word class noun (Nw), with the following structure: (481) (Nwi : [(Nsi : sword (Nsi )) (Vsi : swallow (Vsi )) (Aﬀi : er (Aﬀi ))] (Nwi )) Similarly, consider the following representation: T (482) (fi : danceV (fi ): (fj : beautifulA (fj )) (fi )) ‘dance beautifully’ In this underlying semantic representation the modiﬁer of the verb dance is given as an adjectival lexeme. At the Morphosyntactic Level, this will be expressed as an Adverbial Word. There are thus several morphosyntactic processes that can be interpreted as means to adapt the class of a lexeme in such a way that the resulting word can be used appropriately in the grammatical environment in which it occurs. In this section we will concentrate on lexeme classes, leaving the discussion of word classes for Chapter 4. The architecture we have developed so far allows us to come to a precise characterization of the functions of lexeme classes in terms of their distribution across slots in the underlying Interpersonal and Representational conﬁgurations. We will ﬁrst consider the potential functions of lexemes in 3.7.2.3.2, then consider how lexeme classes can be deﬁned in terms of these functions in 3.7.2.3.3, and after that go into the question of lexical derivation in 3.7.2.3.4. 3.7.2.3.2 Functions of lexemes In deﬁning the function of a lexeme we use two main parameters: (i) its status as a head or as a modiﬁer; and (ii) the Subact status of this category at the Interpersonal Level. Further subdivisions may then be sensitive to the nature of the semantic category designated. Let us start with the combination of parameters (i) and (ii), limiting ourselves to independent Referential and Ascriptive Subacts, i.e. those that are not embedded within other Subacts. Cross-classifying this parameter with the distinction between heads and modiﬁers at the Representational Level, we arrive at four possible functional slots, which are represented in (483)– (486) (see Hengeveld and van Lier 2008). Recall that the symbol represents a lexical head: (483)

T (f1 :

(f1 ):

T [σ

(f1 )φ ])

(484)

T (f1 :

(f1 ):

T [(f2 : (f2 ))

(f1 )φ ])

lexical properties

(485)

R (v1 :

T [(f1 : (f2 ))

(v1 )φ ]:

T [σ

(v1 )φ ])

(486)

R (v1 :

T [(f1 : (f2 ))

(v1 )φ ]:

T [(f2 : (f2 ))

(v1 )φ ])

219

A close look at these representations shows that all lexical elements are the heads of representational layers of the f-type. This is another way of saying that lexical items designate properties. Only when used as the main predicate of a clause does this f-unit correspond directly to an independent Ascriptive Subact. In all other cases it corresponds to an Ascriptive Subact within higher Ascriptive or higher Referential Subacts. Thus, limiting ourselves ﬁrst to these higher Subacts, the functions of the lexical items () in (483)–(486) may be deﬁned as in (487)–(490): (487)

head of an f-unit that is used as an independent Ascriptive Subact (483)

(488)

head of an f-unit that is a modiﬁer of an f-unit that is used as an independent Ascriptive Subact (484)

(489) head of an f-unit that is the head of a representational unit that is used as a Referential Subact (485) (490) head of an f-unit that is a modiﬁer of an f-unit that is the head of a representational unit that is used as a Referential Subact (486) These deﬁnitions are precise yet cumbersome, so (491)–(494) will be our shorthand versions: (491)

head within an independent Ascriptive Subact (483)

(492) modiﬁer within an independent Ascriptive Subact (484) (493) head within a Referential Subact (485) (494) modiﬁer within a Referential Subact (486) where the notions head and modiﬁer refer to the use of the Lexical Property at the Representational Level, not at the Interpersonal Level. These functions ﬁnd their lexical counterparts in example (495), which may be represented as in (496): (495)

The tall girl sings well.

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the representational level

(496) (ei : [(fi : [

T (fj : R (xi : (fi )) (ei )φ ])

singV T [(fl : girl (fl ))

(fj ): (xi )φ ]:

T [(fk : well (fk )) (fj )φ ]) T [(fm : tall (fm )) (xi )φ ]) ]

None of the functions identiﬁed so far is suﬃcient to directly deﬁne lexeme classes. Let us illustrate this for the function of head within an Ascriptive Subact. In many languages various classes of lexemes can be used in this function. Compare the following Dutch examples: (497) Jan werk-t. Jan work-prs.3.sg ‘Jan works.’ (498) Jan is timmerman. Jan cop.prs.3.sg carpenter ‘Jan is a carpenter.’ “Jan is carpenter.” (499) Jan is ziek. Jan cop.prs.3.sg ill ‘Jan is ill.’ (500) Jan is net-jes Jan cop.prs.3.sg well.organized-advr ‘Jan is well-organized.’ These sentences illustrate the use of a Dutch verb (497), noun (498), adjective (499), and Manner adverb (500) as the head of an independent Ascriptive Subact. The predicates in examples (497)–(500) are represented as (501)–(504): T (501) (f1 : werkV

(fi ))

T (502) (fi : timmermanN

(fi ))

T (503) (fi : ziekA

(fi ))

T (504) (fi : netjesAdv

(fi ))

Thus, at the Representational Level four lexeme classes may go into the same slot. At the Morphosyntactic Level, however, three of these require copula

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221

insertion, and only verbs can directly be used predicatively. We may thus deﬁne the verbal lexeme class on the basis of the fact that it can be used in the relevant function without further morphosyntactic adaptation. Similar deﬁnitions can be given for the other classes of lexemes in relation to their distinguishing functions. The various classes of lexemes also diﬀer to a considerable extent in the kind of element that can modify them. Consider the following examples: (505)

Jan werkt hard. Jan work-prs.3.sg hard ‘Jan works hard.’

(506)

Jan is voormalig timmerman. Jan cop.prs.3.sg former carpenter ‘Jan is a former carpenter.’ “Jan is former carpenter.”

(507)

Jan is erg ziek. J. cop.prs.3.sg very ill ‘Jan is very ill.’

(508)

Jan is erg net-jes J. cop.prs.3.sg very well.organized-advr ‘Jan is very well organized.’

In Dutch, adjectival and adverbial heads may be modiﬁed by the same degree adverbs, but verbal and nominal heads mainly take their own classes of modiﬁers. These may be represented as in (509)–(512): (509)

(fi : werkV

(fi ): [(fj : hardAdv

(fj )) (fi )φ ])

(510) (fi : timmerman-N (fi ): [(fj : voormaligAdj (fj )) (fi )φ ]) (511) (fi : ziekAdj

(fi ): [(fj : ergAdv

(fj )) (fi )φ ])

(512) (fi : netjesAdv

(fi ): [(fj : ergAdv

(fj )) (fi )φ ])

Note that in these cases the interpersonal status of the unit under consideration is irrelevant. We ﬁnd the following constructions side by side: (513) een erg ziek kind indf very ill child ‘a very sick child’ (514)

Het kind is erg ziek. def child cop.prs.3.sg very ill ‘The child is very ill.’

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the representational level

In (513) erg ziek as a whole is a modiﬁer within a Referential Subact, in (514) it is the head within an Ascriptive Subact. There are further classes of modiﬁer at higher layers of semantic organization. Consider the following representations: (515)

T (fi : –she has been drinking– (fi ): [(fk : continuous (fk ))) ‘She has been drinking continuously.’

(516) (ei : –she has been drinking– (ei ): ‘She has been drinking again.’

T [(fk : again (fk ))

(fi )φ ])

(ei )φ ])

(517)

T (epi : –she has been drinking– (epi ): [(fk : today (fk )) ‘She has been drinking today.’

(epi )φ ])

(518)

T (pi : –she has been drinking– (pi ): [(fk : probable (fk )) ‘She probably has been drinking.’

(pi )φ ])

These conﬁgurations diﬀer from the ones in (509)–(512) in that in the latter the modiﬁer modiﬁes a lexical head, while in (515)–(518) it modiﬁes a nonlexical head. These heads are of increasing representational complexity: Conﬁgurational Property in (515), State-of-Aﬀairs in (516), Episode in (517), and Propositional Content in (518). As we have shown throughout this chapter, each of these layers takes its own class of modiﬁers. The fact that these modiﬁers indeed constitute separate classes is evident from the fact that they may be combined with one another, as in (519): (519) She probably has been drinking continuously again today. The ordering of the lexical modiﬁers in (519) reﬂects their diﬀerences in scope, as we will show in 4.4.2. The functional conﬁgurations discussed so far all concerned independent Subacts. We will now turn to Embedded Subacts, i.e. Subacts occurring within other Subacts. This notion is relevant for the analysis of lexemes occurring within predication frames with an ‘internal argument’, as discussed in 3.6.2.3.2. Recall that, for instance, relational adjectives receive the treatment illustrated in (520): (520) (fi : [ (fj : fond (fj )) (xi : –chocolate– (xi ))Ref ] (fi )) ‘fond of chocolate’ Here the Property (fj ) fond takes the internal argument (xi ) chocolate. This combination of elements then constitutes a Conﬁgurational Property (fi ) that

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223

may be applied recursively to an external argument in a one-place predication frame:

(521)

T T R (fk : [ (fi : [ (fj : fond (fj )) (xi : –chocolate– (xi ))Ref ] (fi )) (xj )φ ] (fk )) ‘He is fond of chocolate.’

A variety of elements may go into slots such as (fj ) in (521), such as the ones in (522)–(526): (522)

(I had never heard of her) before we met.

(523)

(I met her) inside the building

(524)

the aunt of my friend the football trainer

(525)

the inside of the building

(526)

a person fond of chocolate

If we combine the general predication frame for these expressions with an indication of the interpersonal status of their components, we get the following picture:

(527)

R T T R (v1 : [(f1 : [ (f2 : (f2 )) (v2 )φ ] (f1 )) (v1 )φ ]: [σ

(528)

R (v1 : [(f1 : (f1 ))

T T R (v1 )φ ]: [(f1 : [ (f2 : (f2 )) (v2 )φ ] (f1 )) (v1 )φ ])

(529)

(v1 : [ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ]

(v1 ):

(v1 )φ ])

T T R [(f1 : [ (f2 : (f2 )) (v2 )φ ] (f1 )) (v1 )φ ])

The head of the Referential Subact in (527) hosts lexical elements such as the ones illustrated in (524)–(525). (524) is represented as (531): R T T R (531) (xi : [(fi : [ (fj : aunt (fj )) (xj : –my friend the football trainer– (xj ))Ref ] (fi )) (xi )φ ]) The modiﬁer position in (528) hosts Conﬁgurational Properties modifying within a (lexically headed) Referential Subact. It hosts lexical elements such as the one illustrated in (526), and represented in (532):

224

the representational level

R T T R (532) (xi : –person– (xi )φ : [(fi : [ (fj : fond (fj )) (xj : –chocolate– (xj ))Ref ] (fi )) (xi )φ ]) ‘a person fond of chocolate’ Note, again, that the uses of the lexemes given by way of illustration here are their distinguishing uses, not their sole uses. Thus, all three may be used predicatively, but then require copula support. Finally, the modiﬁer position characterized in (529) hosts modiﬁers of complex representational layers, just like the direct lexical modiﬁers in (515)– (518). The diﬀerence is that in (529), as in (527)–(528), the lexical elements are used indirectly, in the (f2 ) position within the modiﬁer slot. This class includes before and inside in (522)–(523). Compare the following representation of (523) with the one of a simple lexical modiﬁer in (516): T T R (530) (ei : –I met her– (ei )): [(fi : [ (fj : inside (fj )) (li : –building– (li ))Ref ] (fi )) (ei )φ ]) ‘I met her inside the building.’ 3.7.2.3.3 Lexeme classes Now that the principal functions of lexemes have been identiﬁed, the question arises how lexeme classes are distributed across these functions. Let us ﬁrst assume that a language diﬀerentiates maximally in the sense that it has lexical elements for every single functional speciﬁcation; we would then end up with a list like the following, in which preposed superscripts indicate subclasses of modifying lexemes in terms of the head they modify: In Independent Subacts:

(533)

T (f1 :

Verb

(f1 ):

[(f2 : V Adverb

(f2 ))

(f1 )φ ])

(534)

T (f1 :

Noun

(f1 ):

[(f2 : N Adjective

(f2 ))

(f1 )φ ])

(535)

T (f1 :

Adjective

(f1 ):

[(f2 : Adj Adverb

(f2 ))

(f1 )φ ])

(536)

T (f1 :

Adverb

(f1 ):

[(f2 : Adv Adverb

(f2 ))

(f1 )φ ])

(537)

R (v1 :

[(f1 : Noun (f2 ))

(v1 )φ ]:

[(f2 : v Adjective

(f2 ))

(v1 )φ ])

lexical properties

(538)

(f1 :

[............]

(f1 ):

T [(f2 : f Adverb

(f2 ))

(f1 )φ ])

(539)

(ei :

[............]

(ei ):

T [(f1 : e Adverb

(f1 ))

(e1 )φ ])

(540)

(epi :

[............]

(epi ):

T [(f1 : ep Adverb

(f1 ))

(ep1 )φ ])

(541)

(pi :

[............]

(pi ):

T [(f1 : p Adverb

(f1 ))

(pi )φ ])

225

And in Embedded Subacts:

(542) (543) (544)

R (v1 : R (v1 : R (v1 :

T T R [(f1 : [ (f2 : Noun(f2 )) (v2 )φ ] (f1 )) (v1 )φ ]: [σ (v1 )φ ]) T T R [(f1 : Noun (f1 )) (v1 ): [(f1 : [ (f2 : f Adjective (f2 )) (v2 )Ref ] (f1 )) (v1 )φ ]) T T R [. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ] [(f1 : [ (f2 : Adposition (f2 )) (v2 )Ref ] (f1 )) (v1 )φ ])

Languages do not necessarily have specialized lexeme classes for all the functions listed here. Some languages use a single class of lexemes in more than one function. Others lack lexical items for a certain function and have to resort to syntactic solutions instead. The former are called ‘ﬂexible’, the latter ‘rigid’ in Hengeveld (1992) and Hengeveld et al. (2004). By way of illustration of these two situations, consider the following examples, which concern the distribution of lexemes across the functions of head and modiﬁer within Ascriptive and Referential Acts, i.e. the functions identiﬁed in (533) and (537). In Warao (Romero-Figeroa 1997: 49, 50, 119) the same lexical item may be used as the head within a Referential Subact (545), as a modiﬁer within a Referential Subact (546), and as a modiﬁer within an Ascriptive Subact (547): (545) yakera beauty ‘beauty’ (546)

Hiaka yakera auka saba tai nisa-n-a-e. garment beauty daughter for she buy-sg-punct-pst ‘She bought a beautiful dress for her daughter.’

226 (547)

the representational level Oko kuana yaota-te arone yakera nahoro-te . . . we hardness work-nonpst although beauty eat-nonpst ‘Although we work hard and eat well, . . . .’

The situation in Garo (Tibeto-Karen; Burling 1961: 27, 33) is rather diﬀerent. It has classes of nouns and verbs, but no adjectives and only a limited number of manner adverbs. In order to modify a head noun within a Referential Subact, a relative clause has to be formed on the basis of a verbal lexeme, as illustrated in (548) and (549). In (548b), the verb ca" ‘eat’ is turned into the predicate of a relative clause by the addition of the relativizing suﬃx -gipa. The notionally adjectival but morphologically verbal lexeme da"r ‘big’ in (549b) receives exactly the same treatment. Thus we can say that the function of modiﬁcation within Referential Subacts is achieved in Garo by means of relative clauses, not by lexical modiﬁers. These relative clauses are built on the basis of verbs that fulﬁl the function of ascription within the relative clause, in the same way as they do in main clauses. (548)

a. Ca"-gen-ma? eat-fut-int ‘Will you eat?’ b. ca"-gipa man.de eat-rel man ‘the man who eats.’

(549)

a. Da"r-an-gen. big-itive-fut ‘It will get big.’ b. da"r-gipa man.de big-rel man ‘the big man’

In a similar way, in order to modify a head verb within an Ascriptive Subact, in most cases a manner adverbial clause has to be created on the basis of a verb, as illustrated in (550) (Burling 1961: 29): (550)

a. Bi.a gar-e kat-an-aha. 3.sg throw-sub run-itive-pst ‘Throwing he ran away.’ b. Rak-e dok-aha. strong-sub hit-pst ‘He hit hard.’

lexical properties Language

head within Ascriptive Subact

head within Referential Subact

Warao

Verb

Non-Verb

English

Verb

Noun

Adjective

Adverb

Garo

Verb

Noun

−

−

modifier within Referential Subact

227

modifier within Ascriptive Subact

Figure 9. Flexible, diﬀerentiated, and rigid languages

The subordinating morpheme -e is added to the verb gar- ‘throw’ in (550a) and to the notionally adjectival but morphologically verbal lexeme rak- ‘strong’ in (550b). These verbs constitute Ascriptive Subacts within the respective subordinate clauses, which as a whole fulﬁl the function of modiﬁcation. The diﬀerence between Warao and Garo is that Warao has a class of ﬂexible lexical items that are used in several functions, whereas Garo lacks open classes of lexical items for the modiﬁer functions, and resorts to alternative compositional strategies to compensate for the absence of a lexical solution. This diﬀerence is represented in Figure 9. As Figure 9 shows, Warao and Garo are similar in that they have two main classes of lexemes. They are radically diﬀerent, however, in the extent to which one of these classes may be used in the construction of underlying representations: the Warao class of non-verbs may be used in three functions, while the Garo class of nouns may be used as the head of a Referential Subact only. On the basis of a comparison of ﬁfty languages, Hengeveld et al. (2004) conclude that the diﬀerences between languages as regards their ﬂexibility and rigidity can be described by means of the following implicational hierarchy: (551)

head within ⊂ head within ⊂ modiﬁer within ⊂ modiﬁer within Ascr. Subact Ref. Subact Ref. Subact Ascr. Subact

The more to the left a function is on this hierarchy, the more likely it is that a language has a separate class of lexemes to realize that function and the more to the right, the less likely. The hierarchy is implicational, so that, for example, if a language has a separate class of lexemes to fulﬁl the function of modiﬁer within a Referential Subact, i.e. adjectives, then it will also have separate classes of lexemes for the functions of head within a Referential Subact, i.e. nouns, and head within an Ascriptive Subact, i.e. verbs. Similarly, if a language has no class of adjectives, it will not have a separate class of lexemes for the function of modiﬁer within an Ascriptive Subact, Manner adverbs. The hierarchy in (551), combined with the distinction between ﬂexible and rigid languages, leads to the classiﬁcation of parts-of-speech systems in

228

the representational level PoS head within system Ascriptive Subact 1

head within Referential Subact

modifier within Referential Subact

modifier within Ascriptive Subact

Contentive

2

Verb

Non-Verb

3

Verb

Noun

Modifier

4

Verb

Noun

Adjective Adjective

5

Verb

Noun

6

Verb

Noun

7

Verb

Manner Adverb

Figure 10. Parts-of-speech systems

Figure 10. Figure 10 shows that languages can display three diﬀerent degrees of ﬂexibility (systems 1–3), and three diﬀerent degrees of rigidity (systems 5–7). Of the languages discussed earlier Warao would be a type 2 language, English a type 4 language, and Garo a type 6 language. Note that the term ‘contentive’ is used for lexical elements that may appear in any of the four functions under discussion here. What the preceding discussion shows is that in order to identify lexeme classes we ﬁrst have to identify the relevant functions, and then study the way in which lexemes are distributed across these functions. The studies we just reported on were limited in scope, in the sense that only four such functions were studied, while we distinguished many more, which may also either participate in lexical ﬂexibility or be absent in a language. Let us just give two more examples of ﬂexibility in other domains. First of all, it is evident that for many languages it is not useful to make a distinction between all the classes of adverbs listed in (533)–(541). They have a single class of adverbs, characterized as the lexeme class that modiﬁes any head but a nominal one, be it simple or complex. As a second example, consider the following examples from English, as discussed in Mackenzie (1992, 2001): (552)

The outside of the oﬃce needs painting.

(553)

I met him outside the oﬃce.

(554)

I’ll wait for you outside.

The use of outside in (552) corresponds to the function identiﬁed in (542), the one in (553) to (544), and the one in (554) to (539). The basis for this ﬂexibility is that the frames in (542) and (544) are similar in the sense that both have an internal argument, while (544) and (539) share the feature of (spatiotemporally) modifying a State-of-Aﬀairs.

lexical properties

229

3.7.2.3.4 Derived lexemes In the preceding we have concentrated on basic lexemes. Processes of derivation can expand the lexeme inventory of a language. Not all of these, however, produce new lexemes. In our approach, some of them produce words rather than lexemes, as we argued in 3.7.2.3.1. The latter involve operations that adapt the form of a lexeme that has been inserted into a underlying semantic slot it was not designed to occupy, and produces the appropriate word form. For example, if a basically transitive lexeme is inserted into a one-place predication frame, it will in some languages have to be adapted so as to show its intransitive use. Other examples are participle formation to show embedding as a modiﬁer, or nominalization to show embedding in a referential slot. These processes have aptly been called ‘word-class changing inﬂection’ (Haspelmath 2002: 230) to distinguish them from other derivational processes. As long as these processes are productive and predictable, they will be dealt with in the morphosyntactic encoder. We will go into this issue in more detail in 4.6.6. Other derivational processes do more than just adapt a lexeme to an environment it was not designed for, but add independent aspects of meaning. The following miscellaneous examples of such derivational processes are from Turkish (Kornﬁlt 1997: 446), (555)

di¸s- → di¸s-çitooth tooth-prof ‘dentist’

Tuvaluan (Besnier 2000: 596), (556)

konaa- → konaa-gooﬁedrunk drunk-prone ‘readily drunk’

Spanish, (557)

perro- → perr-itodog dog-dim ‘small dog’

and Evenki (Nedjalkov 1997: 303): (558)

tev- → tev-lgeload load-rev ‘unload’

Such derivational processes, with a semantic import that goes beyond the adaptation of a lexeme to a slot, will be dealt with in the lexicon, as a process

230

the representational level

of extending the set of primitives, and not in the grammar, as a process of preparing lexemes for morphosyntax. 3.7.3 Modiﬁers

In the previous section we showed that Lexical Properties can be modiﬁed by other Lexical Properties. The lexeme class of the lexical modiﬁer is in these cases determined by the lexical class of the head. Thus we have: (559) dance beautifully (560)

extremely famous

(561)

very astonishingly

(562)

former neighbour

Especially relevant is example (562), which is an example of what Bolinger (1967) calls ‘reference modiﬁcation’, but which we interpret as property modiﬁcation. Compare (562) with (563): (563)

rich neighbour

In (563) an Individual (x) is characterized as having the Properties ‘neighbour’ and ‘rich’. (562), on the other hand, cannot be paraphrased as describing an Individual with the Properties ‘neighbour’ and ‘former’. Rather, it is the Property (f) ‘neighbour’ that is restricted in its application by the Property ‘former’, and these together constitute a Property of an Individual. The two adjectives in (562) and (563) may be combined, as in (564): (564)

a rich former neighbour

which may be represented as: (565)

(xi : [(fi : neighbour (fi ): [(fj : former (fj )) (fi )φ ]) (xi )φ ]: [(fk : rich (fk )) (xi )φ ])

What this representation shows is that only the adjective former modiﬁes a Property (fi ); the adjective rich modiﬁes an Individual (xi ). It also shows that former neighbour constitutes a Conﬁgurational Property, which is consistent with the fact that it may be referred to anaphorically as a single unit: (566) a rich former neighbour and a poor one A language in which the diﬀerence between the modiﬁcation of Properties and of Individuals shows up clearly is Dutch. As we showed in 3.6.2.2.6, in this language bare nouns may be used as predicates, alongside noun phrases that may be used predicatively:

lexical properties (567)

231

Jan is timmerman. Jan cop.prs.3.sg carpenter ‘Jan is a carpenter.’ “Jan is carpenter.”

(568) Jan is een timmerman. Jan cop.prs.3.sg indf carpenter ‘Jan is a carpenter.’ In our analysis in 3.6.2.2.6, the predicate in (567) is of the f-type, while the one in (568) is of the x-type. We thus predict that the predicate in (567) may combine with f-modiﬁers, but not with x-modiﬁers, and this is indeed the case: (569)

Jan is voormalig timmerman. Jan cop.prs.3.sg former carpenter ‘Jan is a former carpenter.’ “Jan is former carpenter.”

(570)

*Jan is rijk-e timmerman. Jan cop.prs.3.sg rich-agr carpenter “Jan is rich carpenter.”

The latter type of modiﬁcation is possible, of course, with an x-type predicate: (571)

Jan is een rijk-e timmerman. Jan cop.prs.3.sg indf rich-agr carpenter ‘Jan is a rich carpenter.’

Finally, note that Dutch obligatorily shows Adjective-Noun agreement in the case of referent modiﬁcation (571), but not necessarily in the case of property modiﬁcation (569). Since Lexical Properties may be modiﬁed by other Lexical Properties, and the resulting complex Properties may be used to characterize other entity types, it is not diﬃcult to ﬁnd examples like (572), represented in (573): (572)

a very amazingly good book

(573) (xi : [(fi : book (fi )) (xi )φ ]: [(fj : good (fj ): [(fk : amazing (fk ): [(fl : very (fl )) (fk )φ ]) (fj )φ ]) (xi )φ ]) In this example the modiﬁer of the head noun shows recursive embedding of Lexical Properties. In example (574) from Dutch both the head and the modiﬁer of the noun phrase are each internally complex, as shown in the representation in (575):

232

the representational level

(574)

de wereldwijd bekend-e voormalig hacker def worldwide famous-agr former hacker ‘the world-famous former hacker’

(575)

(xi : [(fi : hackerN (fi ): [(fj : voormalig (fj )) (fi )φ ]) (xi )φ ]: [(fk : bekend (fk ): [(fl : wereldwijd (fl )) (fk )φ ]) (xi )φ ])

Note incidentally the absence of agreement on voormalig- ‘former’ and its presence on bekend- ‘famous’ in (574). Modiﬁers of Lexical Properties may themselves designate other semantic categories. This is, for instance, relevant for a class of modiﬁers that usually combine with movement verbs, as illustrated in (576): (576)

He went up(wards) / down(wards) / in(wards) / out(wards) / right(wards) / left(wards) / home(wards) / back(wards) / east(wards) / west(wards) / etc.

The modiﬁers in (576) all indicate directional orientation (see Foley and Van Valin 1984). They are diﬀerent from directional arguments, which were treated in 3.6.2.3, as is evident from the fact that they can co-occur with this type of argument, as in: (577)

He went down to the station.

(578)

He walked up to the church.

These modiﬁers are of the l-type, i.e. they designate Locations, which, incidentally, explains why we get homewards and not housewards (see below in 3.9). Thus, the verb-modiﬁer combination in (577) may be represented as in (579): (579)

(fi : goV (fi ): [(li : (fj : down (fj )) (li )) (fi )φ ])

The close relationship of these modiﬁers with the verbs they modify shows up not only in the fact that they are restricted in use to movement verbs, but also that many languages encode directional meanings lexically. Thus, in Spanish (577) and (578) would be rendered as in (580) and (581): (580) Baj-ó a la estación. go.down-ind.pst.pfv.3.sg all def.f.sg station(f) ‘He went down to the station.’ (581) Subi-ó a la iglesia. go.up-ind.pst.pfv.3.sg all def.f.sg church(f) ‘He went up to the church.’ In other languages the close relationships shows up formally as a tight relationship between verb and modiﬁer. In German there are separable verbs of the type:

lexical properties (582)

233

hin-gehen away-go ‘to go away from where the Speaker is’

(583) her-kommen here-come ‘to come to where the Speaker is’ (584)

her-unter-kommen here-down-come ‘to come down to where the Speaker is’

3.7.4 Operators

Operators on Lexical Properties are narrow-scope operators qualifying through grammatical means the meaning of the lexical item introduced by the (f) variable. The nature of the operator depends on the nature of the lexical head. The following seem to be recurrent combinations of operators and lexical classes: Lexical Properties headed by nouns combining with nominal aspect, Lexical Properties headed by verbs combining with directionality, and Lexical Properties headed by adjectives combining with grading. Nominal aspect (Rijkhoﬀ 2002) concerns modiﬁcations of the Seinsart of a nominal Property. Rijkhoﬀ deﬁnes Seinsart as the way in which a nominal Property behaves with respect to the features Shape and Homogeneity. There are important crosslinguistic diﬀerences in this domain. We will limit the discussion here to two of Rijkhoﬀ ’s types, and refer to Rijkhoﬀ (2002) for full discussion. One type of noun is the set noun. This is a noun not intrinsically designating a singular object, but a set of objects, which may be either a singleton set or a collection. The noun by itself may therefore be interpreted as either singular or plural. A numeral co-occurring with such a noun speciﬁes the size of the set, rather than multiplying over its members, so that the noun is not speciﬁed for plurality, as in Georgian (Fähnrich 1986: 158, cited in Rijkhoﬀ 2002: 39): (585)

or-i mc.eral-i two-nom writer-nom ‘two writers’ “one set of two writers”

It is typical of languages with set nouns that they display ‘number discord’ (Rijkhoﬀ 2002: 105), as shown by the following Georgian examples (Harris 1981: 50–1, cited in Rijkhoﬀ 2002: 109):

234

the representational level

(586) K.nut.-eb-i gorav-en. kitten-pl-nom roll-3.pl ‘The kittens are rolling.’ (587)

Sam-i k.nut.-i gorav-s. three-nom kitten-nom roll-3.sg ‘Three kittens are rolling.’

Notice the singular agreement on the verb in (587), which indicates that here agreement is with the set, not with its members. Languages with set nouns may have speciﬁc markers to indicate that the set is to be interpreted either as a singleton set or as a collective set. Rijkhoﬀ (2002: 102–3) cites Oromo as an example. Consider the following examples (Stroomer 1987: 77): (588)

a. c’irreesa ‘doctor/doctors’ b. c’irr-oota doctor-coll ‘doctors’ c. c’irree-ttii doctor-sgltv ‘doctor’

Rijkhoﬀ interprets the collective suﬃx in (588b) and the singulative suﬃx in (588c) not as number markers but as nominal aspect markers: they indicate whether the nominal Property should be interpreted as a collective set or as a singleton set. This distinction would then be comparable to the one in English between the nouns police and policeman. The grammatical speciﬁcation of this opposition may then be captured by operators on a Lexical Property, as indicated in (589): (589) (coll/sgltv fi : N (fi )) Another type of nominal Property is displayed by the sort noun. While individual object nouns and set nouns have in common that they designate individual objects or sets of objects that have shape, this feature is absent with sort nouns. As a result, the noun cannot enter into direct construction with a numeral, but has to combine with a sortal classiﬁer ﬁrst in order to become countable. This is for instance the case in Nung (Saul and Freiberger Wilson 1980: 23, cited in Rijkhoﬀ 2002: 42): (590) slóng tú lu.hc two clf child ‘two units with the property child’

lexical properties

235

Here again we may say that the classiﬁer aﬀects the nature of the Lexical Property by converting a general noun into, for instance, a set noun or a noun designating a singleton set, often employing more speciﬁc subdistinctions, such as the shape of the object. Lexical directionality was discussed already in 3.7.3 and combines particularly well with verbs. Here it may suﬃce to show some examples in which directionality is expressed grammatically. Mokilese (Harrison 1976) is especially rich in this respect. It has suﬃxes relating movement to the location of the Participants in the speech event (towards the Speaker, away from the Speaker, towards the Addressee), horizontal movement (up, down), and multiple movement (reciprocal, separating, distributed). Here are some examples, one from each group: (591)

a. aluh-do ‘walk towards the Speaker’ b. aluh-da ‘walk up’ c. aluh-pene ‘walk towards each other’

These may be represented in general terms as: (592)

(dir fi : V (fi ))

Mokilese also marks lative arguments on the verb, and directionality may be combined with marking of this argument, parallel to what we showed to be the case with lexical modiﬁers of direction and lative arguments. An example of this is (593) (Harrison 1976: 202): (593) Ih il-la-hng poh-n oaroahrr-o. he go-dir-all top.poss shore-def ‘He is going towards the shore.’ In which la indicates direction away from the Speaker, and hng signals the presence of an allative argument. Grading is the grammatical counterpart of degree modiﬁcation and captures e.g. intensiﬁcation strategies such as that illustrated in the following Spanish example: (594)

fácil- facil-ísimeasy easy-intens ‘easy’ ‘very easy’

Grading may also take the form of narrow-scope negation, as in the following example of litotes: (595)

a not unintelligent girl

Cases like these may be represented as in (596):

236

the representational level

(596) (neg fi : unintelligentA (fi )) ‘not unintelligent’ 3.7.5 Frames

In sum, the set of primitives for the Representational Level provides the following frame for the layer of the Lexical Property: (597)

(π f1 : (f1 ): [σ (f1 )φ ]) Heads of Conﬁgurational Properties are lexical items that enter into diﬀerent classes depending on the function(s) they fulﬁl. The operator position in (597) may be ﬁlled by a operators expressing nominal aspect, direction, and grade. The modiﬁer position in (597) may be ﬁlled by lexical expressions of property modiﬁcation, manner, and degree.

3.8 Individuals 3.8.1 Introduction

Semantic units introduced by the variable (x1 ) designate concrete, tangible entities of the type recognized by Lyons (1977: 442) as ﬁrst-order entities. These are known in FDG as ‘Individuals’ (cf. Vossen 1995). They are deﬁned as occupying a portion of space, such that no two Individuals can occupy the same place. The expressions ‘Individual’ and ‘entity’, being themselves countable nouns, abstract away from the distinction made in some languages between countable and non-countable entities (‘things’ and ‘stuﬀ ’), as we have illustrated in the preceding section. However, all kinds of concrete phenomena are meant, irrespective of their countability properties. The notion of Seinsart discussed in the previous section is relevant not only to the classiﬁcation of nominal Properties, but also to the Individuals they describe. For instance, if a language can designate individual objects directly through a class of nominal Properties, then there is a direct match between a certain class of nominal Properties and a certain class of Individuals. Where it is relevant to draw distinctions among classes of Individuals with respect to their Seinsart the distinctions in question are marked as superscripts to the left of the (x) variable, cf. 3.2.2 above. Rijkhoﬀ (2002) recognizes six such Seinsarten (general, sort, mass, singular object, set, and collective), but for exempliﬁcatory purposes we will here distinguish, where relevant, only (c x) and (m x), for ‘countable’ and ‘mass’ respectively. Thus in English the applicability of the operator ‘1’ (singular) will be dependent upon the presence of an Individual of the subclass ‘countable’; and the selection of the quantity

individuals

237

(q) expressions much and many will be dependent upon their applying to an Individual of the subclass ‘mass’ and ‘count’ respectively: (598) (1c xi : [(fi : treeN (fi )) (xi )φ ]) (599)

(m xi : [(fi : wineN (fi )) (xi )φ ]: [(qi : much (qi )) (xi )φ ])

‘a tree’ ‘much wine’

(600) (m c xi : [(fi : grapeN (fi )) (xi )φ ]: [(qi : many (qi )) (xi )φ ]) ‘many grapes’ 3.8.2 Heads

The head of an Individual may be (i) absent, (ii) empty, (iii) lexical, or (iv) conﬁgurational. (i) Absent heads As we saw in Chapter 2, pronouns and personal names are introduced at the Interpersonal Level, cf. the following representation of a Referential Subact John: (601) (RI : John (RI )) A semantic unit corresponding to this Subact will contain no lexical information and therefore will have no head. The unit cannot be merely omitted, however, since it partakes in the valency of its semantic environment: (602) John arrived. (603) IL: (AI : [(FI : DECL (FI )) (PI )S (PJ )A (CI : [(TI )Foc (RI : John (RI ))] (CI ))] (AI )) RL: (past epi : (sim ei : [(fi : [(fj : arrive (fj )) (1xi )A ] (fi )) (ei )φ ]) (epi )) The headless unit (1xi ) at the Representational Level (the operator ‘1’ is relevant for agreement in English) corresponds to the Subact (RI : John (RI )) at the Interpersonal Level. Anaphors, cataphors, deictic expressions, whether explicit or implicit (i.e. zero-realized) will be treated in the same way as elsewhere, i.e. through coindexation at the Representational Level. Where the head is empty, it follows that no modiﬁcation is possible. And this is indeed what we ﬁnd: any qualiﬁcation of John in (604) can only be of the interpersonal type (cf. the discussion of cases like poor John in Chapter 2; see also Butler 2008a, Hengeveld 2008); otherwise the qualiﬁcation is nonrestrictive, as in (604): (604)

John, poor guy, he has nowhere to stay.

As we saw in Chapter 2, non-restrictive modiﬁcation is handled at the Interpersonal Level as involving a separate Discourse Act, as in (605), in which we recognize two Discourse Acts: that expressed as whose train had been delayed is linked to the Discourse Act expressed as John ﬁnally arrived:

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the representational level

(605) John, whose train had been delayed, ﬁnally arrived. (ii) Empty heads Let us now turn to Individuals with empty heads. In such cases as (606), the expression the yellow one contains an anaphor one which refers back not to a referential item but to a previously mentioned semantic item; in other words, the relation is between units, speciﬁcally Properties (f1 ), shown at the Representational Level: (606) I liked the red car, but Mary preferred the yellow one. One will be analysed as a pluralizable pronoun, rather than as a numerator, cf. (607)–(608): (607)

*I liked the red and the green cars, but Mary preferred the yellow two.

(608) I liked the red and the green cars, but Mary preferred the yellow ones. As with all pronouns, one will be introduced at the Morphosyntactic Level. Whereas absent heads cannot take modiﬁers, empty heads can, which permits the desired analysis of the yellow one in (606) above: (609) (1xi : [(fi ) (xi )φ ]: [(fj : yellowA (fj )) (xi )φ ]) where (fi ) is coindexed with (fi : carN : (fi )) in a preceding State-ofAﬀairs In other languages, (fi ), receives zero-expression, cf. Dutch: (610) Mij beviel de rode auto, maar Marie had een voorkeur me pleased the red car but Marie had a preference voor de gele. for the yellow ‘I liked the red car but Marie preferred the yellow one.’ Nevertheless, in such languages the same style of analysis will be given in order to account for the semantic anaphora that is intended by the language user. (iii) Lexical head The third kind of head is the unmarked type, with lexical ﬁlling of the head, most typically by a noun: R T (611) (xi : [ (fi : presidentN (fi )) (xi )φ ]) ‘the president’ The x-variable indicates that this representational layer designates an Individual; this Individual has the lexically expressed Property fi , which shows that

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designation, in contrast to the cases of empty heads, is achieved by lexical means. This structure may be further expanded, in ways to be discussed below, with operators and modiﬁers. This shows an important general principle as regards the construction of representational layers in general. The lexical head in (611) is not simply a lexical item, but is part of a one-place predication frame such as the ones we introduced in 3.6.2.2.2. Thus, to the opening variable (xi ) in (611) we apply the predication frame in (612): T (612) [(fi : presidentN (fi )) (xi )φ ] ‘xi is president’ thereby predicating the property ‘president’ of (xi ). In (611) this predication is used in a Referential Subact, but the same predication frame might have been used in a main predication, as in: (613) This man is president. (614)

R T [(fi : presidentN (fi )) (xi : –man– (xi ))φ ]

These examples, and others that will appear in later sections, show that the application of predication frames is fully productive across the Representational Level. (iv) Conﬁgurational head Where the language user employs more than one lexical item within the head position, we ﬁnd the fourth type of head, the conﬁgurational head. In a language such as English we ﬁnd many nouns designating parts of wholes, members of kinship systems, etc. that take an argument, typically with the semantic function Ref. These were discussed at some length in 3.6 and 3.7. The appropriate analysis of such examples is shown in (615): (615)

(xi : [(fi : [(fj : brother (fj )) (xj : [(fk : kingN (fk )) (xj )φ ])Ref ] (fi )) (xi )φ ]) ‘the brother of the king’

Here the head is conﬁgurational because brother is a relational noun. The head of (xi ) as a whole is a Conﬁgurational Property, as is clear from examples like (616), in which the Conﬁgurational Property ‘brother of the king’ is predicated of ‘he’: (616)

He is brother of the king.

Apart from these cases in which relational nouns express a conﬁgurational property, there are languages that use verbal descriptions of States-of-Aﬀairs

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to characterize an Individual. In Hupa, for example, it often happens that an Individual entity is characterized in terms of a State-of-Aﬀairs in which it is typically involved. Consider the following example (Golla 1985: 58): (617) mi-de"-xo-∅-le:n 3.sg.poss-horn-3.sg.obj-indftns-plenty ‘cow’ (lit. “Its horns are plenty on it”) At ﬁrst sight it might seem that the expression in (618) is not a noun phrase but a clause in the indeﬁnite tense. However, as shown in (618), the same expression may take a possessive preﬁx, which a clause could never take, thus clearly showing the phrasal nature of the expression (Golla 1985: 59): (618) whi-mi-de"-xo-∅-le:n-" 1.sg.poss-3.sg.poss-horn-3.sg.obj-indftns-plenty-1.sg.poss ‘my cow’ (lit. ‘My “its horns are plenty on it” ’) In other words, the Individual (a ﬁrst-order entity) is being characterized in terms of a State-of-Aﬀairs (a second-order entity) in which this same Individual participates. Example (617) may accordingly be represented as in (619), which shows that the same entity is referred to twice: R T R R R (619) (xi : (indef ei : [(fi : [ (fj : le:n (fj )) (xj : –de"– (xj ): (xk )POSS (xj ))U (xi : –xo– (xi ))L ] (ei )φ ])) Further support for the presence of an (e) variable in such examples is the fact that the construction used to designate an Individual may contain a spatiotemporal modiﬁer, as in (620) (Golla 1985: 58): (620) q"an-ch"i-wil-chwil recently-3.sg.sbj-tns-grow.up ‘young man’ “He has grown up recently.” The similarity between such examples and kinship nouns such as the one in (616) above is shown by such examples as (621) from Iwaidja (Pym and Larrimore 1979: 58–9, cited by Evans 2000: 123). This example contains a kinship verb which carries the expression of an operator Past. Since this is an absolute tense operating at the episodical level, the underlying representation is as in (622): (621)

Nabi Na-buôagbu-ñ

1.sg 1/3-be.older.sibling.to-pst ‘my late younger brother/sister’

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R T R R (622) (xi : (past epi : (ei : [(fi : [ (fj : buôagbu (fj )) (xj )U (xi )Ref ] (ei )φ ]) (epi ))) Note the coreference of the argument with the Reference function within the predication frame with the variable of the Individual description as a whole. (623) Nabi a-bana-maóyarwu-n. 1.sg 1/3-fut-be.father.to-nonpst ‘my future son’ “I will be his father.” The State-of-Aﬀairs (ei ) in (619) contains a coreferential (xi ) that is referred to in a second Referential Subact and may therefore be considered internally headed. Coreferentiality is also possible without there being a second Referential Subact, in which case the conﬁgurational head is not itself internally headed. This is the case of so-called ‘headless relative’ clauses in English, such as what you read in (624), in which an Individual (xi ) is identiﬁed through a State-of-Aﬀairs in which it is involved, as represented in (625) (cf. Van der Auwera 1990: 151ﬀ.): (624)

I will read what you read.

R T R (625) (xi : (ei : [(fi : [ (fj : readV (fj )) (xj )A (xi )U ] (fi )) (ei )φ ])) To recapitulate, then, the head of an Individual-designating unit may be: (626) (x1 )

absent

(627) (x1 : (f1 ) (x1 ))

empty

(628) (x1 : (f1 : (f1 )) (x1 ))

lexical

(629) (x1 : [(e1 /f1 : [(f2 : (f2 )) . . . ] (e1 /f1 ))] (x1 ))

conﬁgurational

3.8.3 Modiﬁers

All types of Individual-designating unit may in principle be qualiﬁed by modiﬁers, except for those with an absent head. We may distinguish between lexical and complex modiﬁers. In languages with adjectives, many are found as the head of lexical modiﬁers in Individual-designating units, cf. (630), since this is the position that deﬁnes adjectives, cf. 3.7.2.2: (630)

(1xi : [(fi : manN (fi )) (xi )φ ]) ‘the man’

(631)

(1xi : [(fi : manN (fi )) (xi )φ ]: [(fi : oldA (fi )) (xi )φ ]) ‘the old man’

(632) (1xi : [(fi : manN (fi )) (xi )φ ]: [(fi : oldA (fi )) (xi )φ ]: [(fi : richA (fi )) (xi )φ ]) ‘the rich old man’

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the representational level

A couple of observations may be made. Firstly, where more than one modiﬁer is present, these are ‘stacked’ into each other: (632) is thus to be understood as ‘a man who is old such that that old man is rich’. In English the order of the modiﬁers, ceteris paribus, reﬂects this stacking in the sense that the most deeply stacked modiﬁer is placed furthest from the head by the morphosyntactic rules. In French, in cases where more than one adjectival modiﬁer is placed after the noun, distance again tends to indicate degree of stacking, but now in a mirror image to the situation in English: une personne âgée riche ‘a person old rich’ is more natural than une personne riche âgée. The relative positioning of modiﬁers (of otherwise equal complexity) is governed by semantic principles, a point which in itself provides justiﬁcation for the Representational Level. As a rule, the more objective qualiﬁcations tend to appear closer to the head than more subjective ones, cf. a beautiful old Swiss gold watch in which the succession of modiﬁers reﬂects increasing objectivity of description (cf. Rijkhoﬀ 2008). Secondly, just like heads, the modiﬁers encountered at this layer are analysed as entering into one-place predications with the (x1 ): in (631) above, for instance, the modiﬁer involves the assignment of the Property (fi : oldA (fi )) to (xi ) in a one-place predication frame of the type [(f1 ) (x1 )U ]. Correspondingly, these modiﬁers can also appear as the predicate in a full clause, cf. The man is old, The old man is rich, etc. This possibility is generally not available to modiﬁers of (f1 ) discussed in 3.7.3: corresponding to the medical student there is no *The student is medical. Modiﬁers may be of other semantic categories as well. An example of a locative modiﬁer and its representation is: (633) the man in the moon (1xi : [(fi : manN (fi )) (xi )φ ]: [(fi : [(fj : inAdp (fj )) (1lj : (fk : moonN (fk )) (lj ))Ref ] (fi )) (xi )φ ]) Some languages have specialized attributive forms to express locative and temporal modiﬁers. Consider the following German examples: (634) in all-en hiesig-en / dort-ig-en Läde-n in all-dat.pl here.attr-dat.pl there-attr-dat.pl shop-dat.pl ‘in all shops over here/over there’ (635)

die heutig-en Künstler def.pl.m today.attr-pl artist ‘the present-day artists’

This formation is very productive, witness the existence of such diverse forms as gestr-ig ‘yesterday-attr’, morg-ig ‘tomorrow-attr’, letzt-wöch-ig

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‘last-week-attr’, nächst-jähr-ig ‘next-year-attr’, ob-ig ‘up-attr’, untr-ig ‘down-attr’, rück-wärtig-ig ‘back-wards-attr’, mehr-seit-ig ‘more-side-attr’. Turkish exhibits a similar process (Lewis 1967: 69–70): (636)

izmir’-de-ki büro-muz küçük, Adana’-da-ki daha Izmir-loc-attr oﬃce-1.pl.gen small Adana-loc-attr more büyük-tür. big-assv ‘Our oﬃce in Izmir is small, the one in Adana is bigger.’

(637)

s¸ imdi-ki durum now-attr situation ‘the current situation’

(638) okul ça˘g-ın-da-ki çocuk-lar school age.poss-loc-attr child-pl ‘children who are of school age’ A prominent type of modiﬁer is the so-called possessive modiﬁer. Only instances of alienable possession will be analysed as modiﬁers, cf. (639)–(640). This type of modiﬁer is based on a predication frame for relational properties (see 3.6.2.2.6). Since the relationship is very often not one of prototypical possession, we follow Li and Thompson (1981) in using the semantic function Ass(ociative) rather than Poss(essor) for these cases. In cases of inalienable possession, as in (641)–(642), possessors are regarded as internal arguments and are given the semantic function Ref introduced earlier. (639) the teacher’s dog (640)

(1xi : [(fi : dogN (fi )) (xi )φ ]: [(fj : (1xj : [(fk : teacherN (fk )) (xj )φ ])Ass (fj )) (xi )φ ])

(641)

the teacher’s arm

(642)

(1xi : [(fi : [(fj : armN (fj )) (1xj : [(fk : teacherN (fk )) (xj )φ ])Ref ] (xi )φ ])

Modiﬁers may also take the form of restrictive relative clauses or participial clauses, in which case a description of a State-of-Aﬀairs in which an Individual is involved is used to described that Individual, as in: (643)

the man sweeping the pavement

which may be represented and paraphrased as in (644): (644)

(1xi : [(fi : manN (fi )) (xi )φ ]: (sim ei : [(fj : [(fk : sweepV (fk )) (xi )A (1xj : (fl : pavementN (fl )) (xj ))U ] (fj )) (ei )φ ])) ‘a man such that he engages in sweeping the pavement’

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There are cases in which the absolute tense marking within a relative clause is independent of that of the relative clause, in which case the relative clause does not represent a State-of-Aﬀairs but an Episode. An example is given in (645), and the relevant representation for an Individual is given in (646): (645)

I see that man who was sweeping the pavement yesterday.

(646)

(1xi : [(fi : manN (fi )) (xi )φ ]: (past epi : (ei : [(progr fj : [(fk : sweepV (fk )) (xi )A (1 xj : (fl : pavementN (fl )) (xj ))U ] (fj )) (ei )φ ]) (epi ): (ti : yesterdayAdv (ti )) (epi ))) ‘a man such that he engaged in sweeping the pavement yesterday’

At the Morphosyntactic Level, the assignment of Subject to the A argument of sweep and the absence of the absolute tense operator are the factors determining the form sweeping in the case of (643). In (645), the absolute tense operator triggers a ﬁnite clause and the ﬁnite verb phrase was sweeping as well as the introduction of the relative pronoun. In languages in which numerals are lexical rather than grammatical elements, they are treated as modiﬁers. In some cases they are simple modiﬁers, comparable to adjectives, in other cases they are complex, comparable to relative clauses. Kayardild (Evans 1995: 235) illustrates the ﬁrst strategy: (647)

dathin-a kiyarrng-a jungarra nal-da banga-a that-nom two-nom big.nom head-nom turtle-nom ‘those two big turtle heads’

Rijkhoﬀ (2002) notices that within Nps modiﬁers of quality, quantity and localization show increasing scope, which is nicely reﬂected in the ordering of the demonstrative, numeral, and adjective in (648), our representation of (647) in which these scope relations are shown in the relative ordering of modiﬁers (and operators): (648) (rem xi : –nal_banga– (xi ): –jungarra– (xi ): –kiyarrng– (xi )) The second type of numeral modiﬁer is illustrated for Fijian (Milner 1972: 23) in (649): (649) e dua na gone indftns one spec child ‘one child’ “The child is one/There is a child.” Numerals in Fijian can be used predicatively only, which means that the Np reading and the clausal reading of (649) are not formally distinguishable out of context. For the Np reading we may assume the internally headed representation given in (650):

individuals

(650)

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R T R (xi : (Indef ei : (fi : [ (fj : dua (fj )) (xi : [–gone– (xi )φ ])] (fi )) (ei )φ ]))

3.8.4 Operators

The operators that apply to the (x) variable cover the same areas of meaning as the modiﬁers discussed in the previous section: localization, quantiﬁcation, and—to a lesser extent—qualiﬁcation. In the actual expression of a noun phrase at the Morphosyntactic Level, the operators of the Representational Level are merged with those applying to, typically, Referential Subacts at the Interpersonal Level: the latter cover such interpersonal categories as identiﬁability (deﬁniteness) and speciﬁcity (Brown 1985). Operators of localization deal with distinctions among demonstratives, indicating ‘the relative distance between the real-world counterpart of a referent and a certain reference point, which usually coincides with the speaker’s position’ (Rijkhoﬀ 2002: 178). Although demonstratives thus reﬂect aspects of the speech situation, the distinctions made within the category are semantic oppositions. The category of demonstratives is in this regard comparable to that of absolute tense, one of the types of operator applied to the (ep) variable, see 3.4.4 above. The distinction between, for example, Present and Past tense is a semantic opposition that may be operative within a language and serves to localize an Episode relative to the speech situation—but these categories do not refer directly to the speech situation. So it is with demonstratives: a form like English this, in identifying an Individual as being close (‘proximate’) to the Speaker, does not refer directly to the Speaker, but enunciates a semantic distinction which is interpreted by the Addressee relative to the Speaker’s location. This pen is thus roughly equivalent to ‘the pen which is near the Speaker’ where which is near the Speaker is a modiﬁer and this is its grammatical equivalent. Standard English has a rather simple demonstrative system, with an opposition between proximate (this/these) and distal (that/those), the actual form being chosen being dependent upon the absence or presence of the quantifying operator m (= plural). The French demonstrative (ce/cet/cette/ces; the form is conditioned by number, gender and the phonological properties of the following word) knows no obligatory distinctions: cet homme may be interpreted as ‘this man’ or ‘that man’; optionally, an Np-ﬁnal clitic -ci (proximate) or -là (distal) may be attached: cet homme-là ‘that man’. However, other languages may display a rich system of distinctions, grammatically encoding phenomena such as degrees of distance (here, there, and yonder), visibility, shape, and height, as well as (typically in languages spoken by small communities) features of the language user’s physical environment. Where such marking can be

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shown to be grammatical rather than lexical, the distinctions must be shown as operators. The spatial distinctions carried by demonstrative operators are frequently carried over into other domains, so that proximal demonstratives become associated with the present time and distal with non-present time or even with attitudinal matters, proximal typically being linked to positive and distal to negative characterizations: (651) I think you should get to know this pretty girl I met last night. (652) I had dinner with that (awful) Harry Jones last night. We will return to demonstrative operators when discussing the designation of Locations and times. Turning now to quantifying operators, we may expect to ﬁnd ‘general quantiﬁers’ such as all, some, every, each, and their equivalents. These operators may have restrictions as to the count/mass properties of the Individual to which they apply. Thus, in English, some (∃) co-occurs with (c xi ) and (m xi ), all (∀) with (m c xi ) and (m xi ) (where ‘m’ as an operator = plural), and each and every (distr, for distributive) only with (1c xi ), where ‘1’ = singular. Note that a negative marker such as no as in no people or no cheese is also seen as a quantifying operator (see Dik 1997a, Kahrel 1987), indicating the quantity zero, and accordingly is represented as ∅. Cardinal and ordinal numbers may be analysed as operators when they are not lexical expressions. But they too often have properties that justify analysis as a lexical item. Consider the following data: (653) *We are all/some/every/each. (654) ?We are many. (655)

?We are few.

(656) ?We are three. (657)

We are third.

Whereas all, some, every, and each cannot occur in predicative position in English, the other quantifying expressions can, which suggests a lexical analysis—although the examples are marked as dubious and are typically expressed as There are many/few/three of us. It would appear that in English all, some, every, and each are fully grammaticalized, the remaining quantiﬁers and numerators less so, with ordinal numerals such as third being fully lexical. The classiﬁcation of a quantifying element as lexical or grammatical will thus be a matter for close inspection from language to language.

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Here, then, are some typical quantifying operators: (658) Name Existential Universal Distributive Zero Singular Plural Numeral

Symbol ∃ ∀ distr ∅ 1 m {2, 3, 4, . . . }

Corresponding to qualifying modiﬁers we must reckon with the possibility of a class of qualifying operators. Qualifying meanings in general seem to be too speciﬁc to regularly enter into processes of grammaticalization, so that qualifying operators on the (x) variable are not often found. An exception to this are cases of productive and predictable diminutive formation. The following example is from West Greenlandic (Fortescue 1984: 317), a language which has several options to express this type of meaning: (659)

qimi-iraq dog-dim ‘puppy’

3.8.5 Frames

In sum, the set of primitives for the Representational Level provides the following frames for the layer of the Individual: (660) (π x1 : [(f1 ) (x1 )φ ]: [σ (x1 )φ ]) (661) (π x1 : [(f1 : [(f2 ) (v1 )φ ] (f1 )) (x1 )φ ]: [σ (x1 )φ ]) (662) (π x1 : (v1 : [ . . . (x1 ) . . . .] (v1 ))) Heads of Individuals may be Lexical Properties (660), Lexical Properties with an internal argument (661), or higher layers of organization, such as States-of-Aﬀairs and Episodes in which the Individual is involved (662). The operator positions in (660)–(662) may be ﬁlled by operators expressing localization and quantiﬁcation. The modiﬁer positions in (660)–(662) may be ﬁlled by lexical expressions specifying qualities, location, quantity, and associations of the Individual.

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3.9 Location 3.9.1 Introduction

Alongside Individuals, which are concrete, tangible entities, languages also recognize a class of Locations (for the background to the distinction between Individuals and Locations, see Mackenzie 1992: 254–5). In the Conceptual Component, we must assume that the conceptualization of Individuals such as ‘blanket’, ‘rock’, or ‘Martin Luther King’ diﬀers in a corresponding manner from the conceptualization of Locations such as ‘environment’, ‘north’, or ‘Atlanta, Georgia’. However, one and the same phenomenon in external reality may be construed mentally as either an Individual or a Location, depending upon the conceptualizer’s goals. Consider the example of a house: to a prospective buyer, that house may be conceptualized above all as a location, as a place to live; to the real estate agent, in contrast, the house will be conceptualized above all as an Individual, as a commodity to be sold. Notice that this very distinction is more or less reﬂected linguistically in the use of the words home and house: the former is specialized to occur in designations of Locations, the latter in designations of Individuals: (663) (1li : [(fi : homeN (fi )) (li )φ ]) (664)

‘a home’

(1xi : [(fi : houseN (fi )) (xi )φ ])

‘a house’

This distinction is further reﬂected in the fact that house is a clear member of the part-of-speech Noun, while home displays various properties that overlap with the class of (spatial) adverbs: (i) the ability to occur as an invariable form without determiners (665); (ii) neutrality with regard to the distinction between Locative and Allative (666); (iii) compounding with the Approach morpheme -wards (667); (iv) the possibility of being co-ordinated with an (other) adverb: (665) He cycled home/down/*house. (666)

I stayed/went home; I stayed in the house/went into the house.

(667) She headed homewards/downwards/*housewards. (668) My team always wins, home and away. Other languages have other ways of reﬂecting this distinction. In Finnish, for example, the word talo ‘house’ is inﬂected for spatial cases like any other noun: talossa (inessive), talosta (abessive), taloon (illative); the word koti ‘home’, however, unusually uses the essive and the partitive cases respectively for the meanings ‘at home’ (kotona) and ‘from home’ (kotoa), although the illative is used for the meaning ‘to one’s home’ (kotiin); cf. Kracht (2004: 85). More generally, the distinction between Locations and non-Locations can have clear grammatical consequences. In Hawaiian, the form taken by

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prepositions marking Subject, Object, and Stative Agent is sensitive to this distinction (Kracht 2004: 79–80). Interestingly, Locations and place names (toponyms) are identical in this respect. Place names will be regarded as unique identiﬁers of Locations, just like personal names, and therefore inserted at the Interpersonal Level (see 2.8.3.2.3). Some support for this parallel treatment of both types of name comes from Fijian. In this language several grammatical processes are sensitive to the presence of a proper name. One of these concerns article selection. Fijian has a dedicated ‘proper article’ (k)o and it uses this article both for personal names and place names, as shown by the following contrastive examples (Schütz 1985: 320, 314): (669)

a. o Mere b. proper.art Mere (personal name)

na tagane common.art man

(670)

a. o Suva proper.art Suva (place name)

na koro common.art village

b.

Personal names and place names are accordingly treated in FDG in the same way at the Interpersonal Level. The diﬀerence between them obtains at the Representational Level, personal names being mapped onto x-units, and place names onto l-units. Locations are identiﬁable in English by the fact, ﬁrst noticed for toponyms by Whorf (1945: 5), that anaphoric reference to them, in the context of the semantic function Location, involves there or here rather than in/at/to it/them: (671)

Ever since I saw that ﬁlm about Lisbon, I wanted to live there/*in it.

(672)

Ever since I saw that ﬁlm about the capital of Portugal, I wanted to live there/*in it.

(673)

As soon as I spotted the magniﬁcent piano, I wanted to sit at it/*there.

There in (671)–(672) will accordingly be analysed as (li )L and at it in (673) as (xi )L . 3.9.2 Heads

(i) Absent heads At the Representational Level, designations of Locations that correspond to proforms, deictics, and question words will appear as in (674)–(675), possibly with a relevant operator: (674)

IL: (−id −s Ri ) RL: (li ) ML: somewhere

250 (675)

the representational level IL: (AI : [(FI : INTER (FI )) (PI )S (PI )A (Ci : [ . . . (+id −s Ri ) . . . ] (Ci ))] (AI )) RL: (li ) ML: where

(ii) Empty heads Under parallel circumstances to those that obtain for Individuals, a Locationdesignating unit may have an empty head. Consider the old one in (676) (676) Do I go to the new station or to the old one? which will be analysed as: (677)

(1li : [(fi : stationN : (fi )) (li )φ ]: [(fj : newA (fj )) (li )φ ])All (1lj : [(fi ) (lj )φ ]: [(fk : oldA (fk )) (lj )φ ])All

where the two mentions of (fi ) are coindexed. (iii)

Lexical heads

Locations with a lexical head will be represented as follows: (678) (l1 : [(f1 : (f1 )) (l1 )φ ]) Examples of simple Locations are those involving such English lexemes as airport, battleﬁeld, and quay, and the most general locational lexeme of all, place. (679) (li : [(fi : airportN (fi )) (li )φ ]) (680) (li : [(fi : placeN (fi )) (li )φ ]) In addition, Location-identifying adverbs such as away, aloft, and inside (when used non-relationally and not as a preposition) will receive the same analysis: (681) (li : (fi : awayAdv (fi )) (li )) (682) (li : (fi : insideAdv (fi )) (li )) Like Location nouns, they designate a place in the sense of identifying an area of space, but make a greater appeal to the context for their interpretation. Historically, they typically arise from constructions involving Locationdesignating nouns, cf. away < prep + way, aloft < prep + loft ‘air, sky’, inside < adverb + side. (iv) Conﬁgurational heads Where a Location is deﬁned in terms of another kind of entity, the following representation is called for:

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(683) (l1 : [(f1 : [(f2 : (f2 )) (v1 )Ref ] (f1 ) (l1 )φ ] This kind of conﬁgurational Location involves a partitive relation: thus in the following examples top designates the highest part of what is designated by its Ref argument, and similarly for inside and capital (in the sense of ‘politically most important city in a country’): (684) (li : [(fi : [(fj : topN (fj )) (xi : [(fk : mountainN (fk )) (xi )φ ])Ref )] (fi )) (li )φ ]) ‘the top of the mountain’ (685) (li : [(fi : [(fj : insideN (fj )) (xi : [(fk : boxN (fk )) (xi )φ ])Ref )] (fi )) (li )φ ]) ‘the inside of the box’ (686) (li : [(fi : [(fj : capitalN (fj )) (lj : [fk : country (fk )) (lj )φ ])Ref )] (fi )) (li )φ ]) ‘the capital of the country’ In our approach to lexeme classes, presented in 3.7.2.3.3, what distinguishes lexical adverbs from lexical adpositions (as opposed to the grammatical ones that express semantic functions) is that the latter resemble the nouns in (684)– (686) in taking an argument with the semantic function Reference. Thus inside of the box or inside the box as a Preposition Phrase in English is representationally parallel to the inside of the box. Here are some examples of Locationdesignating adpositional phrases: (687)

(li : [(fi : [(fj : aboveAdp (fj )) (mxi : [(fk : treeN (fk )) (xi )φ ])Ref )] (fi )) (li )φ ]) ‘above the trees’

(688) (li : [(fi : [(fj : insideAdp (fj )) (xi : [(fk : boxN (fk )) (xi )φ ])Ref )] (fi )) (li )φ ]) ‘inside the box’ The parallel between adpositional and nominal lexemes in such locational semantic units has been commented on in various contexts. It is generally agreed that adpositions originate historically, across the languages of the world, in one of two sources. The major source is from relational nouns designating a Location, typically a body part (e.g. back, foot, etc.), a division of a larger entity (top, bottom, side, etc.), or a geometrical concept (e.g. interior, exterior, etc.). The remaining adpositions either defy etymological analysis (Kahr 1975: 43) or can be traced to a verbal origin, often resulting from a serial verb construction. Thus in the Kwa languages as described by Aboh (2005), there are two types of adposition: a limited number of prepositional P1s (which are etymologically deverbal and assign case) and an extended number of postpositional P2s (which are denominal and occur as the head of the adpositional phrase). Both P1 and P2 can occur in the same adpositional phrase, as in (689), from Gungbe (Aboh 2005: 624):

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(689) Asíbá zé kw´E ãó távò l O´ jí. Asiba take money P1 table det P2 ‘Asiba put money on the table.’ In this example, ãó belongs to a closed class of general locative prepositions and jí is one of the larger class of more speciﬁc postpositions glossed as ‘top’, deriving from a noun (ò)jí meaning ‘above or sky’ (Aboh 2005: 642). The appropriate analysis for ãó távò l´O jí ‘on the table’ would therefore be as in (690), with the semantic function L(ocative) expressed as the grammatical preposition ãó: (690) (li : (fi : [(fj : jíAdp (fj )) (xi : (fk : távòN (fk )) (xi ))Ref )] (fi )) (li ))L Strikingly similar phenomena apply in Persian (Pantcheva 2006), where again two classes of spatial adposition must be distinguished, one grammatical and one lexical and denominal. The former class has four members: daer (Essive), aez (Ablative or Perlative), be (Allative), and ta (Approximative); the latter is much larger. Lexical adpositions take a Reference argument. For some, the Reference function may be marked by the ezafe morpheme, for others, there is no marking; this is reminiscent of the requirement, option or prohibition of of as a marker of Reference in English: out *(of), inside (of), underneath *of. Any lexical adposition can be combined with any grammatical adposition, cf. (691): (691) æz ru(-ye) miz from face-ezafe table ‘oﬀ the table’ “from the table’s face” (692) (li : [(fi : [(fj : ruAdp (fj )) (xi : [(fk : mizN (fk )) (xi )φ ])Ref )] (li )φ ])Abl Languages with case-marking rather than adpositions or with a combination of adpositions with case-marking will not be treated diﬀerently at the Representational Level; these are all matters dealt with at the Morphosyntactic Level (see Chapter 4). Consider the case-marking in Avar (Kracht 2004: 81) as presented in Table 5. It is clear that the lexical forms for the ﬁve spatial meanings are those reﬂected directly in the essive case. Thus static position translated as ‘at’ may be represented as follows, where Essive has zero realization: (693) (li : [(fi : [(fj : -qAd (fj )) (xi : [(fk : (fk )) (xi )φ ])Ref )] (fi )) (li )φ ])Ess In the position occupied by Essive we may also have Ablative, Allative, or Perlative, realized as -e, -(ss)-a, and -(ss)a-n respectively.

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Table 5. The Locatives of Avar Spatial meaning on at under in in a hollow

Essive

Ablative

Allative

Perlative

-da -q -ň’ -ň -∅

-d-e -q-e - ň’-e -ň-e -∅-e

-da-ssa -q-a - ň’-a -ň-a -∅-ssa

-da-ssa-n -q-a-n - ň’-a-n -ň-a-n -∅-ssa-n

Locative adpositional constructions (as in English, Gungbe, and Persian) and locative agglutinative morphology of the type represented by Avar are thus analysed as involving an amalgamation at the Morphosyntactic Level of one of the subtypes of the semantic function Locative and a lexical adposition. However, in languages with spatial case-marking in which the morphology is not as agglutinative as in Avar and in which a single morpheme covers both the spatial distinctions expressed by the adpositional lexemes of Avar and the semantic function, an alternative analysis is possible. This alternative analysis postulates a larger set of semantic functions, each of which indicates a spatial distinction. In Hungarian (de Groot 1989: 16–18), the inessive case (meaning ‘in’) takes the form -ban, with vowel harmony variations; the elative suﬃx (meaning ‘out of ’) is -ból and the illative (meaning ‘into’) is -ba. Although it may seem appealing to analyse these as agglutinations of -b ‘in’ and essive, ablative, and allative suﬃxes respectively, examination of other such sets (for the meanings ‘on’ and ‘near’) shows that this is not possible: -ban, -ból, and -ba must analysed as monomorphemic. The meaning ‘in’ cannot be associated with a lexical morpheme, and therefore must be given the more abstract analysis as a semantic function. The analyses that suggest themselves for Hungarian a medencében ‘in the pool’, a medencéb˝ol ‘out of the pool’ and a medencébe ‘into the pool’ are therefore as follows, with ‘In’ as a semantic function of interiority: (694) (l1 : [(f1 : (x1 :medencé (x1 ))In (f1 )) (l1 )φ ])Ess (695) (l1 : [(f1 : (x1 :medencé (x1 ))In (f1 )) (l1 )φ ])Abl (696) (l1 : [(f1 : (x1 :medencé (x1 ))In (f1 )) (l1 )φ ])All The type of analysis proposed in this section is supported by the observation that verbs tend to select for the outer semantic function (here Ess, Abl, and All) (Kracht 2004: 63). A static verb like remain will typically require an Essive argument, i.e. remain in, *remain from, *remain into. On the other hand, it will not have any requirements as to the inner semantic function (here In). Thus remain in/on/near/under are all grammatical.

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Finally, we must consider conﬁgurational heads of Locations which are clausal in nature. This applies where a Location is identiﬁed in terms of a State-of-Aﬀairs located at that Location. A straightforward example would be the italicized section of (697), which can be paraphrased as ‘the place in which you hung that picture’: (697)

I like where you hung that picture. (li : (past epi : (ei : [(fi : [(fj : hangV (fj )) (xi )A (1 dist xj : [(fk : pictureN (fk )) (xj )φ ])U (li )L )] (fi )) (ei )φ ]) (epi )))

The structure is that of a ‘headless relative clause’: to the variable (li ) is assigned the State-of-Aﬀairs (ei ) which itself contains another occurrence of the variable (li ). This structure here occurs as the Undergoer of the verb like. It can also occur as a Locative adverbial clause: (698) Where I live, you cannot ski. (li : (ei : (fi : [(fj : live (fj )) (xi )U (li )L ] (fi )) (ei )φ ])) 3.9.3 Modiﬁers

Modiﬁcation of semantic units with locational designation is possible at two points. Firstly, the Location-designating lexeme itself may be modiﬁed, shown as σf in (699)–(700); secondly, the entire locational expression, including any argument, may be modiﬁed, shown as σl : (699) (l1 : [(f1 : (f1 ): σf (f1 )) (l1 )φ ]: [σl (l1 )φ ]) (700) (l1 : [(f1 : [(f2 : (f2 ): σf (f2 )) (v1 )Ref ] (f1 )) (l1 )φ ]: [σl (l1 )φ ]) The class of σf modiﬁers are modiﬁers of Properties such as those that we discussed in 3.7.3. For contrastive reasons we will discuss those that modify locative Properties together with σl modiﬁers. Let us consider examples of each kind of modiﬁer, beginning with σf modiﬁers occurring in non-relational Locations, as in (699). Modiﬁers of the lexical item aﬀect only that item, and therefore are used only attributively. Here are some examples: (701) main road *That road is main. (702)

former shop *This shop is former.

The representation of these Locations will thus be as follows: (703) (li : [(fi : roadN (fi ): [(fj : mainA (fj )) (fi )φ ]) (li )φ ])

location (704)

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(li : [(fi : shopN (fi ): [(fj : formerA (fj )) (fi )φ ]) (li )φ ])

The following examples show σf in conﬁgurational Locations: (705)

the very top of the tree

(706)

the deepest inside of my soul

Again, these modiﬁers pertain only to the lexical item (f2 : (f2 )) in (700), as is apparent from the impossibility of: (707)

*The top of the tree was very.

(708)

*The inside of my soul is deepest.

Similar modiﬁers are also available for adpositional lexemes, as in the following examples from Portuguese: (709)

O museo ﬁca mesmo em_frente à estação. def museum is.located right opposite prep.def station ‘The museum is situated right opposite the station.’

and Dutch: (710) Het ﬁets-pad liep pal naast de snelweg. def cycle-path run.pst.sg right next.to def motorway ‘The cycle path ran right next to the motorway.’ The Portuguese intensifying modiﬁer mesmo and the Dutch modiﬁer pal (which is specialized in this function) indicate that the topological relations indicated by em frente a and naast respectively hold with particular geometrical precision, and thus serve to modify only those prepositions. We therefore use the following representations for (705) and (710) respectively: (711) (li : [(fi : [(fj : top (fj ): [(fk : very (fk )) (fj )φ ]) (xi : [(fl : tree (fl )) (xi )φ ])Ref ] (fi )) (li )φ ]) ‘the very top of the tree’ (712) (li : [(fi : [(fj : naast (fj ): [(fk : pal (fk )) (fj )φ ]) (lj : [(fl : snelweg (fl )) (lj )φ ])Ref )] (fi )) (li )φ ]) ‘pal naast de snelweg’ Non-relational spatial adverbs can also be modiﬁed in this way: (713) far away (714)

right inside

with the representations:

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the representational level

(715) (li : [(fi : away (fi ): [(fj : far (fj )) (fi )φ ]) (li )φ ])L (716) (li : [(fi : inside (fi ): [(fj : right (fj )) (fi )φ ]) (li )φ ])L Modiﬁers of the σl type take the entire semantic unit in their scope. Here are some examples: (717)

simple, nominal a dilapidated workshop (li : [(fi : workshopN (fi ) (li )φ ]: [(fj : dilapidatedA (fj )) (li )φ ])

(718)

conﬁgurational, nominal the unpainted side of the house (li : [(fi : [(fj : sideN (fj )) (xi : [(fk : houseN (fk )) (x1 )φ ])Ref ] (fi )) (li )φ ]: [(fl : unpaintedA (fl )) (l1 )φ ])

(719) simple, adpositional dangerously close (li : [(fi : closeA (fi )) (li )φ ]: [(fj : dangerousA (fj )) (li )φ ]) (720)

conﬁgurational, adpositional dangerously close to the spectators (li : [(fi : [(fj : closeA (fj )) (xi : (fk : spectatorN (fk )) (xi )φ ])Ref ] (fi ))] (li ): [(fl : dangerousA (fl )) (li )φ ])

In the case of the Locations with nominal heads in (717) and (718), this type of modiﬁer can be used predicatively, as shown in (721) and (722): (721) The workshop is dilapidated. (722)

The side of the house is unpainted.

3.9.4 Operators

Locations, especially where the lexical element is nominal, may display much the same range of operators as Individuals (cf. 3.8.4). Thus we ﬁnd operators of localization applying to Locations, to specify them further, e.g. (prox li ) for here and (dist li ) for there, with similar distinctions in other languages. Other languages may have many more distinctions, covering such matters as degrees of distance, visibility, and prominent features of the physical environment. We also ﬁnd operators of quantiﬁcation applying to Locations, although in English there are fewer than apply to Individuals: (distr li ) everywhere, (∃li ) somewhere, and (∅i ) nowhere. Remaining operators need to be supported by the noun placeN : (∀li ) all places, (2li ) two places, etc.; Mackenzie (1992) argues that placeN has become grammaticalized in this function.

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3.9.5 Frames

The set of primitives for the Representational Level makes the following frames available for Locations: (723)

(π l1 : [(f1 ) (l1 )φ ]: [σ (l1 )φ ])

(724)

(π l1 : [(f1 : [(f2 ) (v1 )φ ] (f1 )) (l1 )φ ]: [σ (l1 )φ ])

(725)

(π l1 : (v1 : [ . . . (l1 ) . . . .] (v1 ))) Heads of Locations may be Lexical Properties (723), Lexical Properties with an internal argument (724), or higher layers of organization, such as States-of-Aﬀairs and Episodes in which the Location plays a role (725). The operator positions in (723)–(725) may be ﬁlled by operators expressing localization and quantiﬁcation. The modiﬁer positions in (723)–(725) may be ﬁlled by lexical expressions specifying qualities and quantities of the Location.

3.10 Time 3.10.1 Introduction

Languages have specialized expressions for designating temporal categories. Some are linked for their contextual interpretation to the moment of speech (e.g. today, next year), others establish relative positions on the time line (before Friday, duration), while yet others relate to a socially established calendar (Monday, Christmas Day). Some temporal expressions identify a point on the time line (moment, 12 a.m.), others a stretch on that line (period, April). In FDG, all these expressions have in common that they are introduced by the variable (t): (726)

(ti : [(fi : momentN (fi )) (ti )φ ])

(727)

(ti : [(fi : [(fj : beforeAdp (fj ) (tj : [(fk : FridayN (fk ))Ref ] (tj )φ ])] (fi )) (ti )φ ])

Any talk of a time line implies that time is conceptualized as involving an imaginary spatial construct (the line) on which any number of points or stretches can be placed. This metaphor is familiar from the work of Reichenbach (1947) on tense and temporal expressions. The relationships among points and stretches of time are indeed typically expressed by morphosyntactic devices that have their origins in spatial location, and this will be reﬂected in FDG by assigning the semantic function L(ocative) to such expressions as on Saturday or until 31 December.

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the representational level

3.10.2 Heads

As with Locations, the head of a Time expression may be (i) absent, (ii) empty, (iii) simple, or (iv) conﬁgurational. (i) Absent head At the Representational Level, designations of Times that correspond to proforms, deictics, and question words will appear as in (728)–(729), possibly with a relevant operator: (728) IL: (−id −s Ri ) RL: (∀ti ) ML: always (729)

IL: (AI : [(FI : INTER (FI )) (PI )S (PI )A (Ci : [ . . . (+id -s Ri ) . . . ] (Ci ))] (AI )) RL: (ti ) ML: when

(ii) Empty head Under parallel circumstances to those that obtain for Locations, a Timedesignating unit may have an empty head. Consider next in (730): (730) Will this be a cold winter or a moderate one? which will be analysed as: (731) (1 ti : [(fi : winterN (fi )) (ti )φ ]: [(fj : coldA (fj )) (ti )φ ]) (1 tj : [(fi ) (tj )φ ]: [(fj : moderateA (fj )) (tj )φ ]) (iii) Lexical head Examples of Time expressions with a lexical head are yesterdayAdv and whileN as in (732) and (733) respectively: (732) I saw him yesterday. (ei : [(fi : [(fj : seeV (fj )) (xi )A (xj )U ] (fi )) (ei )φ ]: [(ti : [(fk : yesterdayAdv (fk )φ ]) (ti )) (ei )φ ]) (733) I spent a while with her. (ei : [(fi : [(fj : spendV (fj )) (xi )A (ti : [(fk : whileN (fk )) (ti )φ ])U (li : [(fl : [(fm : withAdp (fm )) (xj )Ref )] (li )φ ])L ] (fi )) (ei )φ ]) The general format for such expressions is thus: (734) (t1 : [(f1 : (f1 )) (t1 )φ ])

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259

(iv) Conﬁgurational head Examples of conﬁgurational Time expressions are nouns and adpositions which require an argument, such as duration and after: (735)

the duration of the ﬁght (ti : [(fi : [(fj : durationN (fj )) (ei : (fk : ﬁghtN (fk )) (ei ))Ref ] (fi )) (ti )φ ])

(736)

After the meal, (we had a brandy). (ti : [(fi : [(fj : afterAdp (fj )) (ei : (fk : mealN (fk )) (ei ))Ref ] (fi )) (ti )φ ])

The semantic function L(ocative) borne by after the meal in (736) should be more narrowly speciﬁed as Essive. Mackenzie (2001: 128–30) argues that in an example such as (737): (737)

The war lasted from Monday for six days until Saturday.

the sequence of Time expressions exactly parallels the Ablative–Perlative– Allative sequence of spatial Locatives in (738): (738)

John walked from his ﬂat via the park to the station.

This parallel lies at the heart of the localist hypothesis, which analyses Time expressions as resulting from a consistent metaphorical extension from space to time (Lyons 1977: 718–19). This metaphor is reﬂected linguistically in the fact that in English, but also quite generally across languages, the subtypes of the Locative and Temporal functions will receive the same or similar expression, whether the unit is (l1 ) or (t1 ). Thus in both (737) and (738), Ablative is realized as from. The combination of Allative with (l1 ) admittedly gives to, while the combination of Allative with (t1 ) yields until or its variant till. Nevertheless, to is also possible in this meaning (cf. from Monday to Saturday), there is a close historical link between to and till, and semantically speaking, both share telicity. Perlative is expressed diﬀerently, appearing as for with Time expressions. For English Time expressions, we may recognize the following grammatical prepositions: (739)

Essive Ablative Perlative Allative

at from for until, till, to

cf. cf. cf. cf.

at the weekend from Monday for six days until Saturday

At times the selection of the preposition is aﬀected by the type of Time noun: thus, for essive Locatives, on appears with days (on/*at Saturday), and in with months and years (in/*at January; in/*at 1999), but at is retaining for hours (at 2 o’clock, at midnight). The Time prepositions of English not listed as grammatical will accordingly be regarded as conﬁgurational; here are some examples:

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(740)

(ti : [(fi : [(fj : prior_toAdp (fj )) (ei : [(fk : mealN (fk )) (ei )φ ])Ref ] (fi )) (ti )φ ])Ess ‘prior to the meal’

(741)

(ti : [(fi : [(fj : duringAdp (fj )) (ei : [(fk : matchN (fk )) (ei )φ ])Ref ] (fi )) (ti )φ ])Ess ‘during the match’

(742)

(ti : [(fi : [(fj : beforeAdp (fj )) (tj : [(fk : eighth_centuryN (fk )) (tj )φ ])Ref ] (fi )) (ti )φ ])Abl ‘from before the eighth century’

(743)

(ti : [(fi : [(fj : afterAdp (fj )) (tj : [(fk : midnightN (fk )) (tj )φ ])Ref ] (fi )) (ti )U ])All ‘till after midnight’

As with Locations, so the conﬁgurational head of a Time expression may be clausal in nature, again involving a headless construction. Consider (744), in which the Speaker indicates his/her liking for a time of the year: (744)

I like when the leaves fall from the trees. (ti : (ei : [(fi : [(fj : fallV (fj )) (xi : [(fk : leafN (fk )) (xi )φ ])U (xj : [(fl : treeN (fl )) (xj )φ ])Abl ] (fi )) (ei )φ ]: [(ti ) (ei )φ ]))

As Declerck (1996) points out, the Time interpretation may yield to a simple State-of-Aﬀairs interpretation in examples like (745): (745)

I liked when you gave him a cookie.

in which the Speaker is understood as having liked not so much the time of giving but the State-of-Aﬀairs itself. The structure in (744), with a Locative function, is also available for the analysis of adverbial clauses of Time such as the following: (746) When the news arrived, no one was shocked. (1ti : (ei : [(fi : [(fj : arriveV (fj )) (pi : [(fk : newsN (fk )) (pi )φ ])U ] (fi )) (ei )φ ]: [(ti )L (ei )φ ])L 3.10.3 Modiﬁers

As with Locations, so with Times too we must make a distinction between modiﬁers of the Time-designating lexeme (σf ) and modiﬁers of the entire Time expression (σt ); (747) and (748) show the placement of these modiﬁers in lexical and conﬁgurational Time expressions respectively: (747)

(t1 : [(f1 : (f1 ): [σf (f1 )φ ]) (t1 )φ ]: [σt (t1 )φ ])

time (748)

261

(t1 : [(f1 : [(f2 : (f2 ): [σf (f2 )φ ]) (v1 )Ref ] (f1 )) (t1 )φ ]: [σt (t1 )φ ])

σf serves to narrow the meaning of the lexical item, as for example very in (749), while σt qualiﬁes the entire head of the Time expression, as for example exciting in (750): (749) the very moment (1ti : [(fi : momentN (fi ): [(fj : veryA (fj )) (fi )φ ]) (ti )φ ]) (750)

these exciting times (prox m ti : [(fi : timeN (fi )) (ti )φ ]: [(fj : excitingA (fj )) (ti )φ ])

The noun time and a number of salient time nouns (moment, minute, hour, day, month, year) may be modiﬁed, like any other, by a relative clause: (751) The time at which he arrived was fairly late. (752)

The day on which she left was unforgettable.

However, these nouns may be followed by a complete subordinate clause, shown in italics in the following examples; this is not a relative clause, since it lacks any anaphoric gap: (753)

The time that he arrived was fairly late.

(754)

The day she left was unforgettable.

In this case, the clause must be seen as an argument of the noun, which thereby enters into a conﬁgurational frame of the type shown in (748) above: (755)

(ti : [(fi : [(fj : timeN (fj )) (sim ei : [(fk : [(fl : arriveV (fl )) (xi )A ] (fk )) (ei )φ ]: [(ti ) (ei )φ ])Ref ] (fi )) (ti )φ ]) ‘the time that he arrived, the time he arrived’

This distinction between clauses modifying a temporal head noun and those occurring as the argument of a temporal noun shows up very neatly in Mokilese (Harrison 1976: 260): (756)

Ngoah suh-oang John anjoau-o ma ngoah in-la sidow-a. I meet-all John time-rem rel I go-dir store-def ‘I met John when I went to the store.’ “I met John the time at which I went to the store.”

(757)

Ih dupukk-oang ngoahi mwoh-n oai japahl-do Mwoakilloa. he pay-all I front-poss my return-dir Mokil ‘He paid me before I returned to Mokil.’ “He paid me front of my returning to Mokil.”

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the representational level

In (756) we ﬁnd the noun anjoua ‘time’ restricted by a ﬁnite relative clause, in (757) the relational noun mwoh ‘front’ with a nominalized argument. This diﬀerence may be represented as in (758)–(759): (758) (ti : [(fi : anjoau (fi )) (ti )φ ]: (ei : (fj : [(fk : in- (fk )) (xi )A (li : [(fl : sidow(fl )) (li )φ ])All ] (fj )) (ei )φ ]: [(ti )L (ei )φ ])) ‘the time I went to the store’ (759) (ti : [(fi : [(fj : mwoh- (fj )) (ei : [(fk : [(fl : japahl- (fl )) (xi )A (li )All ] (fk )) (ei )φ ])Ref ] (fi )) (ti )φ ]) ‘before I returned to Mokil’ 3.10.4 Operators

As with Locations, the operators available for Time expressions are the same as those for Individuals: those of localization, as in English this Tuesday or that century, and of quantiﬁcation, cf. a moment/moments/every moment etc. All those moments will thus appear as: (760) (∀ dist m ti : [(fi : moment (fi )) (ti )φ ]) Where the head is absent we ﬁnd such forms as: (761)

always never some time once twice

(∀ t1 ) (∅ t1 ) (∃ t1 ) (1 t1 ) (2 t1 )

3.10.5 Frames

The set of primitives for the Representational Level makes the following frames available for Times: (762) (π t1 : [(f1 ) (t1 )φ ]: [σ (t1 )φ ]) (763) (π t1 : [(f1 : [(f2 ) (v1 )φ ] (f1 )) (t1 )φ ]: [σ (t1 )φ ]) (764)

(π t1 : (v1 : [ . . . (t1 ) . . . .] (v1 ))) Heads of Times may be Lexical Properties (762), Lexical Properties with an internal argument (763), or higher layers of organization, such as States-of-Aﬀairs and Episodes in which the Location plays a role (764). The operator positions in (762)–(764) may be ﬁlled by operators expressing localization and quantiﬁcation. The modiﬁer positions in (762)–(764) may likewise be ﬁlled by lexical expressions localizing or quantifying the period of Time.

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3.11 Manner 3.11.1 Introduction

Alongside Locations and Times, another notion which is frequently designated by dedicated linguistic forms is the manner in which a State-of-Aﬀairs is carried out. In other words, languages permit us to talk about not only ‘where’ and ‘when’, but also ‘how’. For this reason, FDG recognizes a variable (m) for cases where a language has specialized expressions for designating Manners. One strong piece of evidence for the existence of Manners as a linguistic category in English is that in equative (identifying) predications, Manners can only be equated with Manners: (765)

The way in which she acted was also how I would have handled it.

The two italicized sections of (765) are Manner expressions and cannot be replaced by any other kind of expression without destroying the equative nature of the whole Clause. Manner expressions should be distinguished from other closely related categories. Questioning with How? oﬀers an insuﬃcient criterion, since such questions can also elicit expressions with the semantic functions Means and Instrument: (766)

How did he start the engine? By turning the ignition switch. (fi : [(fj : turn (fj )) (xi )A (1xj : –ignition switch– (xj ))U ] (fi ))Means

(767)

How did he cut the meat? With a knife. (1xj : [(fi : knife (fi )) (xj )φ ])Instr

(768) How did he answer the question? Stupidly. (mi : [(fi : stupid (fi )) (mi )φ ]) Another test to be considered is clefting: Means and Instruments can be the Focus of a cleft construction, while Manner expressions modifying a Lexical Property, as in (771), cannot: (769)

It was by turning the ignition switch that he started the engine.

(770)

It was with a knife that he cut the meat.

(771)

*It was slowly that he walked.

Note, however, that Manner expressions that modify Conﬁgurational Properties (see 3.6.3) can be clefted, at least to judge by (772), cited by Cheng (1991: 62; see also Mackenzie 1998a: 248):

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the representational level

(772) It was very angrily that John left the room. The criterion that works best, at least in English, appears to be the possibility of paraphrasing the expression with a phrase of the form in a . . . way. This excludes expressions of Instrument and Means: (773) a. with a knife

b. *in a knife way

(774)

a.

b.

(775)

a. stupidly

by turning the switch

*in a switch-turning way

b. in a stupid way

Manners also need to be distinguished from Circumstances. Modiﬁers with the semantic function Circumstance designate States-of-Aﬀairs that occur simultaneously with the modiﬁed State-of-Aﬀairs (cf. Dik et al. 1990: 33). Thus in the following example from Spanish (Matsumoto 2003: 404): (776) El globo subi-ó por la chimenea def balloon rise-pst.pfv.3.sg.ind through def chimney ﬂot-ando. ﬂoat-ger ‘The balloon ﬂoated up the chimney.’ “The balloon rose through the chimney ﬂoating.” ﬂotando plays the role of a Circumstance with respect to the State-of-Aﬀairs of rising, suggesting an analysis as a secondary predication (see 3.6.3): (777)

(ei : [(fi : [(fj : subir (fj )) (xi : –globo– (xi ))U (li : –chimenea– (li ))PERL ] (fi )) (ei )φ ]: [(fk : [(fl : ﬂotar (fl )) (xi )U ] (fk )) (ei )φ ])

This kind of construction is typical of so-called ‘verb-framed languages’. It has been claimed that in these languages, in contrast to ‘satellite-framed languages’ like English, the manner of motion is not expressed within the main verb (Talmy 1991) but separately. In our view, however, such elements as ﬂotando in (776) above do not indicate a Manner, since they cannot be paraphrased in the same way as Manner modiﬁers: *ﬂotandamente (‘ﬂoatingly’), *de una manera ﬂotante (‘in a ﬂoating manner’). Rather the concept underlying (776) is formulated grammatically as a State-of-Aﬀairs with a primary (with subir ‘rise’) and a secondary (with ﬂotar ‘ﬂoat’) predication frame, which given the fact that they fall within the scope of the same tense operator are necessarily simultaneous. One last distinction needs to be made, between Manners and Comparisons. In English, Comparison is typically signalled by the preposition like, as in (778): (778)

She sings like a nightingale.

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The same preposition is used in anaphoric and cataphoric references to Manners: (779)

A: Joan talked to me cheekily. B: She talks to everyone like that.

(780)

The argument runs like this: . . .

In (779), B’s answer does not compare the way Joan talks to everyone with the way she talked to A, but s/he means that Joan talks to everyone in that very same way, i.e. cheekily; analogously, what follows the colon in (780) is not similar to the argument, it is the argument. It would appear that we can indicate Manners indirectly by comparing: in (778) above, the manner of her singing is understood ﬁguratively, through the simile like a nightingale. It is then a small step to reinterpreting like as a literal marker of Manner. Having demarcated the semantic category Manner, let us now turn to the internal structure of Manner expressions. 3.11.2 Heads

(i) Absent head At the Representational Level, designations of Manners that correspond to proforms, deictics, and question words will appear as in (781)–(782), possibly with a relevant operator. Consider the following examples from Dutch: (781)

IL: (+id +s Ri ) RL: (mi ) ML: zo ‘like that’

(782)

IL: (AI : [(FI : INTER (FI )) (PI )S (PI )A (Ci : [ . . . (+id −s Ri ) . . . ] (Ci ))] (AI )) RL: (mi ) ML: hoe? ‘how?’

(ii) Empty head Whereas empty heads are easily attested for designations of Locations and Times, comparable examples with Manner expressions are ill-formed: (783)

*I marked the exam in the old way, but he did it in the new one.

(784)

*He answered a little cheekily, but she answered very.

(iii) Lexical head If a Manner expression has a lexical head, the item in question may be of various categories. Let us consider the Manner expression carelessly in (785):

266 (785)

the representational level John drove carelessly.

This is to be interpreted as ‘in a manner that is careless’: (mi ) is said to have the Property ‘careless’, suggesting analysis as an adjective: (786) (mi : [(fi : carelessA (fi )) (mi )φ ]) The suﬃxation of -ly is inﬂectional, being almost fully regular when an adjective ﬁnds itself in this environment; as such, the process is properly situated at the Morphosyntactic Level. For arguments that Spanish -mente is similarly attached in morphosyntax, see Torner (2005). This is thus a case of word-classchanging inﬂection (Haspelmath 1996) as discussed in 3.7.2.3.4. The lexical item may also be drawn from the class of nouns, as in the Manner expression in (787): (787)

John drove with great care. (mi : [(fi : careN (fi )) (mi )φ ]: [(f1 : greatA (fi )) (m1 )φ ])L

In languages lacking manner adverbs, this may be the only resource available. (iv) Conﬁgurational head The general noun for Manners, comparable to place and time in the preceding sections, is way. Like place and time, way (but not apparent synonyms like manner, fashion, etc.) enters into conﬁgurational constructions: (788) The way (that) she drives (mi : [(fi : [(fj : wayN (fj )) (sim ei : [(fk : [(fl : driveV (fl )) (xi )A ] (fk )) (ei )φ ])Ref ] (fi )) (mi )φ ]) As with Locations and Times, the conﬁgurational head of a Manner expression may represent a clause as in (789): (789) I admire how you live. (mi : (sim ei : [(fi : [(fj : liveV (fj ): (mi ) (fj )) (xi )φ ] (fi )) (ei )φ ])) A similar analysis may also be appropriate for such nominalizations as the italicized portion of (790): (790)

Annette’s dancing was beautiful.

Since the nominalization in (790) means how she danced rather than, say, that she danced, Dik (1975: 117) criticized then current semantic proposals for not making explicit that it is here the manner of dancing that is being described: ‘this means that this manner must be explicitly represented in semantic structure’, he wrote. A possible representation that satisﬁes this demand is accordingly: (791) (mi : (ei : [(fi : [(fj : danceV (fj )) (xi )A ] (fi )) (ei )φ ]) (mi ))

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267

3.11.3 Modiﬁers

As with Locations and Times, a distinction can be made between modiﬁers of the Manner-designating lexeme (σf ) and modiﬁers of the entire Manner expression (σm ), as shown in (792): (792)

(m1 : [(f1 : (f1 ): [σf (f1 )φ ]) (m1 )φ ]: [σm (m1 )φ ])

Adverbs intensifying the degree to which a Manner applies will be analysed as σf , i.e. as in the representation of the Dutch example (793) given in (794): (793)

erg netjes very neat-advr ‘very neatly’

(794)

(mi : [(fi : netjesMAdv (fi ): [(fj: ergDAdv (fj)) (fi )φ ]) (mi )φ ])

Adjectives qualifying a Manner, as in the new method, will be placed in the σm position, as in (795): (795)

(1 mi : [(fi : methodN (fi )) (mi )φ ]: [(fj : newA (fj )) (mi )φ ])

As with the Time nouns time, day, moment, etc. discussed in 3.10.3, so the noun way in English can take either a regular modiﬁer, expressed as a relative clause, as in (796), or an argument, expressed as a subordinate clause introduced by that (797) or zero (798): (796)

the way in which the work was done

(797)

the way that the work was done

(798) the way the work was done The forms in (797) and (798) will be shown as follows: (799)

(1 mi : [(fi : [(fj : wayN (fj )) (sim ei : [(fk : [(fl : doV (fl )) (xi )A (ej : [(fm : workN (fm )) (ej )φ ])] (fk )) (ei )φ ])Ref ] (fi )) (mi )φ ])

3.11.4 Operators

As with Locations and Times, the operators available for Manner expressions are the same as those for Individuals. Operators of localization will apply in the analysis of the expression like this: (800) (prox mi ) Operators of quantiﬁcation can also apply, as in the following representation of various ways for the public to react:

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the representational level

(801) (m mi : [(fi : [(fj : wayN (fj )) (ei : [(fk : [(fl : reactV (fl )) (xi : [(fm : publicN (fm )) (xi )φ ])A ] (fk )) (ei )φ ])Ref ] (fi )) (mi )φ ]: [(qi : (fn : variousA (fn )) (qi )) (mi )φ ]) 3.11.5 Frames

The set of primitives for the Representational Level makes the following frames available for Manners: (802) (π m1 : [(f1 ) (m1 )φ ]: [σ (m1 )φ ]) (803) (π m1 : [(f1 : [(f2 ) (v1 )φ ] (f1 )) (m1 )φ ]: [σ (m1 )φ ]) (804) (π m1 : (v1 : [ . . . (m1 ) . . . .] (v1 ))) Heads of Manners may be Lexical Properties (802), Lexical Properties with an internal argument (803), or higher layers of organization, such as States-of-Aﬀairs in which the Manner plays a role (804). The operator positions in (802)–(804) may be ﬁlled by operators expressing localization and quantiﬁcation. The modiﬁer positions in (802)–(804) may be ﬁlled by lexical expressions of degree and quality.

3.12 Quantity 3.12.1 Introduction

Languages may permit the designation of Quantities. This term is designed to cover both amounts of an uncountable phenomenon or numbers of countable phenomena. Indeed the words amount and number are typical heads of Quantity expressions; in relational use, they will occur in expressions with a conﬁgurational head. Note the use of the variable (q1 ) in (805), as a ﬁrst analysis of a large amount of cheese: (805) (qi : [(fi : [(fj : amountN (fj )) (xi : [(fk : cheeseN (fk )φ ]) (xi ))Ref ] (fi )) (qi )φ ]: [(fl : largeA (fl )) (qi )φ ]) Quantities arise from the hypostatization of the results of measurement (whether that be counting, estimation or comparison). They can be talked about, for example in mathematical or ﬁnancial discourse, but typically an expression like a large amount of cheese will be used in contexts where what is being designated is cheese rather than an abstraction, as in (806): (806) Felicity eats a large amount of cheese every day. Where the designation is an Individual, as in (806), the appropriate representation is therefore one with an internal head:

quantity

269

(807) (xi : (qi : [(fi : [(fj : amountN (fj )) (xi : [(fk : cheeseN (fk )) (xi )φ ])Ref ] (fi )) (qi )φ ]: [(fl : largeA (fl )) (qi )φ ])) This representation reﬂects the fact that the Undergoer of eat in (806) is an Individual. Similar representations will be oﬀered for lexical mensural classiﬁers. Rijkhoﬀ (2002: 48) gives the following example from Thai (drawn from Hundius and Kölver 1983: 170): (808) náamtaan s˘aam thûaj sugar three lump ‘three lumps of sugar’ (809) (xi : (3 qi : [(fi : [(fj : thûajN (fj )) (xi : [(fk : náamtaanN (fk )) (xi )φ ])Ref ] (fi )) (qi )φ ])) This also points to the correct representation of instances in which the cardinal number is the head and the quantiﬁed noun its modiﬁer. In the following example, from Scottish Gaelic, the noun triùir ‘threesome, set of three’ is used to quantify over human entities: (810) triùir pheathraichean three.hum sister.gen.pl ‘three sisters’ “a threesome of sisters” (811) (xi : (qi : [(fi : [(fj : triùirN (fj )) (mxi : [(fk : piuthairN (fk )) (xi )φ ])Ref ] (fi )) (qi )φ ])) 3.12.2 Heads

(i) Absent head Designations of Quantities that correspond to proforms, deictics, and question words will appear as in (817)–(818), possibly with a relevant operator. Consider the following examples from Dutch: (812)

IL: (Ri ) RL: (magn qi ) ML: zoveel ‘so much/many, that much/many’

(813) IL: (AI : [(FI : INTER (FI )) (PI )S (PI )A (Ci : [ . . . (+id −s Ri ) . . . ] (Ci ))] (AI )) RL: (qi ) ML: hoeveel? ‘How much?’

270

the representational level

(ii) Empty head Like with Manner expressions, empty-headed Quantity expressions seem to be limited to arguments expressing Quantities rather than objects: (814)

*Felicity eats a large amount of cheese every day and I a small one of meat.

(815) The road measures 40 metres and the path 20. The latter example may be represented as in (816): (816) (40 qi : [(fi : metreN (fi )) (qi )φ ]) (20 qj : [(fi ) (qj )φ ]) (iii) Lexical head An example of a Quantity with a lexical head has already been given in (816). Another would be the degree adverb in (817), represented in (818). Degree adverbs will be seen as indicating the Quantity of application of their head: (817)

highly intelligent

(818) (fi : intelligentA (fi ): [(qi : [(fj : highA (fj )) (qi )φ ]) (fi )φ ]) Similarly, lexical quantiﬁers should also be analysed as heads of (q1 ) expressions, as in (819): (819) frequent interruptions (ei : [(fi : interruptionN (fi )) (ei )φ ]: [(qi : [(fj : frequentA (fj )) (qi )φ ]) (ei )φ ]) (iv) Conﬁgurational head Nouns such as number, amount, volume, population (in the sense of ‘number of inhabitants’), dose, etc. typically occur in the frame oﬀered by the (q1 ) variable; other nouns such as bag (e.g. of coal) or lump (e.g. of sugar), which usually designate Individuals, can be used to indicate ‘quanta’ (cf. Lyons 1977: 434). Where these nouns occur with a Reference argument, they together form a conﬁgurational head, as in (807) above or as in (820): (820) the volume of traﬃc (qi : [(fi : [(fj : volumeN (fj )) (ei : [(fk : traﬃcN (fk )) (ei )φ ])Ref ] (fi )) (qi )φ ]) Another such noun is rate, a prominent meaning of which is ‘frequency relative to a stretch of time’, as in his rate of success (i.e. how frequently he is successful in any time period). This indicates that designations of frequency can be analysed as Quantities of time. Like place, time, and way, rate can also take a State-of-Aﬀairs as its argument, as in the italicized portion of (821):

quantity (821)

271

At the rate that he works, we’ll be ﬁnished before lunch. (qi : [(fi : [(fj : rateN (fj )) (sim ei : [(fk : [(fl : workV (fl )) (xi )A ] (fk )) (ei )φ ])Ref ] (fi )) (qi )φ ])

The conﬁgurational head may also be expressed as a clause in (822): (822) It’s amazing how much he eats. (qi : (sim ei : (fi : [(fj : eatV (fj )) (xi )A (qi )φ ] (fi )) (ei ))) Our introduction of a variable for Quantities also helps to understand socalled ‘degree relatives’ (see de Vries 2002: 16), such as: (823) (Jill spilled) the milk that there was in the can. In expressions like (823) the noun phrase refers to the quantity of milk that was in the can, rather than to the milk itself, and may therefore be represented as in: (824) (qi : (xi : [–milk– (xi )φ ]): [(qi ) (xi )φ ]: (sim ei : [(fi : [(xi ) (xj : [–can– (xj )φ ])L ] (fi )) (ei )φ ])) 3.12.3 Modiﬁers

Quantities can be modiﬁed in the same way as other semantic categories, as in (825)–(826) (for (826) cf. Wiese fc.): (825) a generous dose of medicine (1 qi : [(fi : [(fj : doseN (fj )) (xi : [(fk : medicineN (fk )) (xi )φ ])Ref ] (fi )) (qi )φ ]: [(fl : generousA (fl )) (qi )φ ]) (826) twelve large sacks of cement (12 qi : [(fi : [(fj : sackN (fj )) (xi : [(fk : cementN (fk )) (xi )φ ])Ref ] (fi )) (qi )φ ]: [(fl : largeA (fl )) (qi )φ ] 3.12.4 Operators

Operators of localization and quantiﬁcation can apply to Quantities. For the latter, consider (827) from Dutch: (827) drie liter melk three litre milk ‘three litres of milk’ (3qi : [(fi : [(fj : literN (fj )) (xi : [(fk : melkN (fk )) (xi )φ ])Ref ] (fi )) (qi )φ ]) Note that liter is not marked for plural here, unlike most nouns following a numeral in Dutch.

272

the representational level

3.12.5 Frames

The set of primitives for the Representational Level makes the following frames available for Quantities: (828) (π q1 : [(f1 ) (q1 )φ ]: [σ (q1 )φ ]) (829) (π q1 : [(f1 : [(f2 ) (v1 )φ ] (f1 )) (q1 )φ ]: [σ (q1 )φ ]) (830) (π q1 : (v1 : [ . . . (q1 ) . . . .] (v1 ))) Heads of Quantities may be Lexical Properties (828), Lexical Properties with an internal argument (829), or higher layers of organization, such as Individuals, in which the Quantity plays a role (830). The operator positions in (828)–(830) may be ﬁlled by operators expressing localization and quantiﬁcation. The modiﬁer positions in (828)–(830) may be ﬁlled by lexical expressions of degree and quantity.

3.13 Reason 3.13.1 Introduction

We showed in 3.2.1.5 that for some languages there is evidence for the existence of a semantic category Reason, which may show up in dedicated nominalization patterns, as e.g. in Yami (Rau 2002: 175): (831) saway i-saway escape reasnr-escape ‘escape’ ‘reason to escape’ or the existence of a Reason question word such as English why. Reasons could be considered a special type of Propositional Content, as they represent the thoughts that drive a human agent to act in a certain way. 3.13.2 Heads

The usual head types can be found for Reasons as well. (i) Absent head Designations of Reasons that correspond to proforms, deictics, and question words will appear as in (832)–(833), possibly with a relevant operator. Consider the following examples from Dutch: (832) IL: (Ri ) RL: (ri ) ML: daarom ‘therefore’

reason

273

(833) IL: (AI : [(FI : INTER (FI )) (PI )S (PI )A (Ci : [ . . . (+id −s Ri ). . . ] (Ci ))] (AI )) RL: (ri ) ML: waarom? ‘why?’

(ii) Empty head The head position of a Reason may remain empty, as in: (834) He had a good reason but she had a bad one. to be represented as in (835): (835) (1 ri : [(fi : reasonN (fi )) (ri )φ ]: [(fj : good (fj ))(ri )φ ]) (1 rj : [(fi ) (rj )φ ]: [(fk : bad (fk )) (rj )φ ]) (iii) Lexical head The number of possible lexical heads seems to be extremely limited, the noun reason itself being the prime candidate, as illustrated in the ﬁrst part of (834). (iv) Conﬁgurational head The noun reason can be used as the lexical centre of a Conﬁgurational Property as well, in such constructions as the following: (836) his reason that he left (837) the reason for which he left where the that-clause in (836) is a Ref-argument of reason, while in (837) it is a relative clause, as represented in (838) and (839) respectively: (838) (ri : [(fi : [(fj : reasonN (fj )) (ei : [(fk : [(fl : leave (fl )) (xi )A ] (fk )) (ei )φ ])Ref ] (fi )) (ri )φ ]) (839) (ri : [(fi : [(fj : reasonN (fj ): (ei : [(fk : [(fl : leave (fl )) (xi )A ] (fk )) (ei )φ ]: [(ri )Reas (ei )φ ])) The conﬁgurational head may also be expressed as a clause in (840): (840)

It’s unclear to me why he left.

in which the italicized part is the headless equivalent of the reason for which he left in (837). This may be represented as in (841): (841) (ri : (ei : [(fi : [(fj : leaveV (fj )) (xi )A ] (fi )) (ei )φ ]: [(fk : (ri )Reas (fk )) (ei )φ ])) Note that in (839) and (841) the relativized element is a modiﬁer of the evariable, as restrictive Reason clauses are modiﬁers of States-of-Aﬀairs. Thus, when the reason that is unclear in (840) is identiﬁed, the answer might be as in (842):

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the representational level

(842) He left because his mother is ill. which would be represented as in (843), with the Reason clause modifying the main State-of-Aﬀairs, for which it provides xi ’s reason: (843) (sim ei : [(fi : [(fj : leaveA (fj )) (xi )A ] (fi )) (ei )φ ]: (ri : (ej : [(fk : [(fl : illA (fl )) (xj : [–his mother– (xj )φ ])] (fk )) (ej )φ ]: [(ri ) (ei )φ ]) 3.13.3 Modiﬁers

As mentioned before, the propositional nature of Reasons makes them suitable to be modiﬁed by elements expressing a propositional attitude. This is true of Reason clauses, in which the modiﬁer takes an adverbial form, and for nominal Reason phrases, in which it takes an adjectival form: (844)

He left because apparently his mother is ill.

(845)

The apparent reason for his leaving is that his mother is ill.

3.13.4 Operators

Quantifying operators may apply to Reasons as well, as in the following example: (846) I have three reasons for being late: . . . In this context Spanish seems to prefer to use the numeral predicatively, as in: (847)

Las razon-es son tres: . . . def.pl.f reason(f)-pl cop.prs.ind.3.pl three ‘There are three reasons: . . .’ “The reasons are three: . . .”

Given the propositional nature of Reasons, demonstratives never have a localizing interpretation, but can only be interpreted as textual, as in: (848) He gave three reasons for being late. These (reasons) were the following: . . . 3.13.5 Frames

The set of primitives for the Representational Level makes the following frames available for Reasons: (849) (π r1 : [(f1 ) (r1 )φ ]: [σ (r1 )φ ]) (850) (π r1 : [(f1 : [(f2 ) (v1 )φ ] (f1 )) (r1 )φ ]: [σ (r1 )φ ])

reflexive language

275

(851) (π r1 : (v1 : [ . . . (r1 ) . . . .] (v1 ))) Heads of Reasons may be Lexical Properties (849), Lexical Properties with an internal argument (850), or higher layers of organization, such as Conﬁgurational Properties in which the Manner plays a role (851). The operator positions in (849)–(851) may be ﬁlled by operators expressing localization and quantiﬁcation. The modiﬁer positions in (849)–(851) may be ﬁlled by lexical expressions indicating a propositional attitude.

3.14 Reﬂexive language We have now gone through all the semantic categories that enter into the Representational Level proper. However, when we talk we do not necessarily talk only about the external world (the narrated event); we may also talk about what happens in communication itself (the speech event) and its products. Jakobson (1971) appropriately characterizes these two situations as ‘message about the message’ and ‘message about the code’. Examples of these are the following: (852)

He said: ‘You’re a crook’.

(853) That’s not a tomayto, that’s a tomahto. In (852) we have a message about a message: through the use of a reported speech construction a Discourse Act produced by someone else is repeated in its original form. Since this construction entails that something that is a unit at the Interpersonal Level is now being talked about, we may say that an interpersonal unit enters the Representational Level. Similarly, in (853), taken from Sweetser (1990: 140), we have a message about the code. Here it is the choice of a certain pronunciation that is being commented upon. This may be made explicit in a metalinguistic conditional, as in (854) (Sweetser 1990: 140): (854)

OK, I’ll have a tomahto, if that’s how you pronounce it.

The architecture of FDG allows us to deal with cases like these in a straightforward way. Recall from 1.3.1 that all four levels of organization (Interpersonal, Representational, Morphosyntactic, and Phonological) within the Grammatical Component feed directly into the Contextual Component of the model. Once stored there, all units may be accessed by the Formulator and be re-used in posterior messages. In this way units of the Interpersonal, the Morphosyntactic, and the Phonological Levels may end up at the Representational Level, since once they have been produced, they become entities that can be talked

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the representational level

about metalinguistically. The term ‘reﬂexive language’ (see e.g. Lucy 1993) is particularly appropriate for the use of language to talk about language. In principle, all interpersonal, morphosyntactic, and phonological units may thus enter the Representational Level. We will not provide an exhaustive overview here, but give a few examples which show how reﬂexive language may be dealt with. First consider the following example: (855) He said that there was some history of threats of domestic abuse in the family. In (855) the current Speaker reports what a past speaker has said: the current Speaker thus transmits the original Communicated Content of the past speaker to the current Addressee. This may be represented as in (856): (856) (ei : [(fi : [(fj : sayV (fi )) (xi )A (CI : (pi : –there is some history of threats of domestic abuse in the family– (pi )) (CI ))U ] (fi )) (ei )φ ]) By using this representation we now predict that modiﬁers typical of Communicated Contents at the Interpersonal Level such as reportedly and unfortunately (see 2.7.3) may occur within the complement clause, given the availability of this modiﬁer slot in the underlying representation. And this is indeed the case: (857)

He said that reportedly there was some history of threats of domestic abuse in the family.

(858) He said that unfortunately there was some history of threats of domestic abuse in the family. These may be represented as in (859): (859) (ei : [(fi : [(fj : sayV (fi )) (xi )A (CI : (pi : –there is some history of threats of domestic abuse in the family– (pi )) (CI ): reportedly/unfortunately (CI ))U ] (fi )) (ei )φ ]) In German this type of conﬁguration triggers the use of the subjunctive, as shown in the following example (Frankfurter Rundschau 04.06.2004): (860) Der Angeklagte hingegen—ein kleiner, gedrungener Mann mit T-Shirt und breiten Hosenträgern—behauptete, die 30-Jährige habe ihn provoziert, indem sie zu ihm gesagt habe: “Halt doch das Maul, du dreckiger Deutscher!” Daraufhin habe er ihr gesagt, sie solle hingehen, wo sie hergekommen sei. Nie und nimmer aber habe er den Satz mit dem Vergasen gesagt. Das sei ein ganz normaler Streit auf dem Flohmarkt gewesen, wo es eben rauh zugehe.

building up the representational level

277

‘The defendant, on the other hand—a short, thick-set man with a T-shirt and broad braces, claimed that the thirty-year-old had provoked him by saying: “Shut up, you bloody German!”. After that he had said to her that she should go back to where she came from. Never had he said the sentence about the gassing. It was just a normal quarrel at the ﬂea market, where things regularly get rough.’ The verb behauptete ‘claimed’ introduces the reported Communicated Content C, here realized as a series of clauses each containing a subjunctive verb form, through which it remains clear that each of these clauses forms part of the report. We can account for this in the following way: (861) (ei : [(fi : [(fj: behaupt- (fj )) (xi : (fk : Angeklagte- (fk )) (xi )φ )φ (rep CI : [. . . .] (CI ))φ ] (fi )) (ei )φ ]) Interpersonal units often enter the Representational Level through complementation strategies, as illustrated here. In 4.4.8.3 we will go into this issue in more detail, when talking about the formal reﬂections of the various embedded interpersonal units. An example of a phonological unit being referred to at the Representational Level consider the following representation of the part how you pronounce it in (862): (862) (mi : (ei : [(fi : [(fj : pronounceV (fj ): (mi ) (fj )) (xi )A (pwi )U ] (fi )) (ei )φ ])) As indicated here the second argument of pronounce is of the category Phonological Word (pw), as discussed in Chapter 5. Finally, the Morphosyntactic Level is involved in such metalinguistic statements as the following: (863) My brother-in-law, if that’s the right word for him, hasn’t been around for ages. Here the anaphoric element that refers back to the nominal word (Nw) brother-in-law.

3.15 Building up the Representational Level When constructing the underlying structure of the Representational Level, use is made of frames, lexemes, and primary operators. Frames come in two types: representational frames and predication frames. The diﬀerence between them is that representational frames capture the hierarchical organization of the Representational Level, while predication frames capture non-hierarchical conﬁgurations of semantic units.

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the representational level

As shown at various places in this chapter, in many cases a slot that can be occupied by a predication frame can also be occupied by a lexeme: both are units of the f-type, i.e. units designating Properties. Predication frames designate Properties in a conﬁgurational way, while lexemes do so in a nonconﬁgurational way. Compare the following two conﬁgurations: (864) The man saw the game. (865) The man saw his team beat the opposition. The verb see, when used to describe direct perception, takes a State-of-Aﬀairs (e) as its Undergoer argument. This argument can be expressed lexically, as in (864), or conﬁgurationally, as in (865). The parallelism between these two situations is shown in the following representations: (866) (ei : [(fi :

game

(fi )) (ei )φ ])

(867) (ei : [(fi : [(fj : beat (fj )) (xi : [–team– (xi )φ ])A (xj : [–opposition– (xj )φ ])U ] (fi )) (ei )φ ]) In both cases the variable for States-of-Aﬀairs is restricted by the Property (fi ), which in (866) is realized by means of a lexeme and in (867) by means of a predication frame itself consisting of a unit designating a Property (fj ) and two units designating the Individuals (xi ) and (xj ). For a second illustration of the parallelism between lexemes and predication frames, consider the following examples: (868) I bought ﬂowers for the girl. (869) I bought ﬂowers for that boy’s girlfriend. The Beneﬁciary in (868) and (869) is in both cases an Individual (x). This Individual is described lexically in (868), and conﬁgurationally in (869). Their representations in (870) and (871) are parallel, in the sense that in both cases the Property (fi ) is attributed to (xi ): (870) (xi : [(fi :

girl

(fi )) (xi )φ ])

(871) (xi : [(fi : [(fj : girlfriend (fj )) (xi : –boy– (xi ))Ref ] (fi )) (xi )φ ]) We will make use of this parallelism between lexemes and predication frames below. In keeping with the general architecture of FDG, the process of building up the structure of the Representational Level proceeds in a top-down fashion, and runs partly parallel to the build-up of the Interpersonal Level. In certain respects the Representational Level responds to calls from the Interpersonal Level: the selection of a certain Illocution may impose restrictions on what

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is a possible representational frame. In other respects the Representational Level calls upon the Interpersonal Level. Once a certain predication frame has been selected the various positions in this frame have to be ﬁlled through evocational Subacts within the Communicated Content. Consider this simple example of an Imperative Discourse Act: (872)

Take this book to the library!

Imperative Illocutions require the Communicated Content to be mapped onto a State-of-Aﬀairs at the Representational Level. This State-of-Aﬀairs represents the action the Speaker wants to be carried out by the Addressee. Crucially, Imperatives lack the layer of a Propositional Content, since they are not about the exchange of information. There is thus a call from the Interpersonal Level to realize a description of a State-of-Aﬀairs: (873) (π ei : [(f1 ) (ei )φ ]: [σ (ei )φ ]) Notice that in (873) the subscript of the e-variable is alphabetic, not numerical, indicating that (ei ) is the instantiated variable representing the State-of-Aﬀairs the Speaker has in mind. Within the conﬁguration there are three slots that can now be ﬁlled with further material: the operator slot (π), the Property slot (f1 ), carrying the numerical subscript to indicate that it has as yet not been instantiated, and the modiﬁer slot (σ). In the next step, the Speaker selects a predication frame that best ﬁts his/her conceptual needs, and inserts it into the Property slot (f1 ), which now becomes instantiated, as reﬂected in the nature of the subscript: (874)

(π ei : [(π fi : [(f2 ) (x1 )A (x2 )U (x3 )L ] (fi ): [σ (fi )φ ]) (ei )φ ]: [σ (ei )φ ])

Within the predication frame we now have four positions that can potentially be ﬁlled. In the context of an Imperative in English, however, the Actor is normally not expressed. This is reﬂected at the Interpersonal Level in the absence of a Referential Subact corresponding to this Actor. This position therefore does not have to be replaced by a more complex structure, though the variable will be instantiated, as the referent is recoverable from the immediate context. Each of the three remaining positions will be expanded, with the following structure as the result: (875)

(π ei : [(π fi : [ (π fj : take (fj ): [σ (fj )φ ]) (xi )A (π xj : [(f3 ) (xj )φ ]: [σ (xj )φ ])U (π xk : [(f4 ) (xk )φ ]: [σ (xk )φ ])L ] (fi ): [σ (fi )φ ]) (ei )φ ]: [σ (ei )φ ])

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the representational level

There are a number of uninstantiated f-variables left now. In this case, all of these are instantiated by lexical means: (876) (π ei : [(π fi : [ (π fj : take (fj ): [σ (fj )φ ]) (xi )A (π xj : [(π fk : book (fj ): [σ (fj )φ ]) (xj )φ ]: [σ (x1 )φ ])U (π xk : [(π fl : library (fl ): [σ (fl )φ ]) (xk )φ ]: [σ (xk )φ ])L ] (fi ): [σ (fi )φ ]) (ei )φ ]: [σ (ei )φ ]) Thus, by recursive application of the insertion procedure, triggered by the non-instantiated semantic slots, we arrive at a complete semantic structure at the Representational Level. In the preceding we have skipped an important aspect of the construction of the Representational Level: the insertion of operators and modiﬁers. In our top-down implementation these have to be inserted step by step for each relevant layer. The selection of operators and modiﬁers precedes the selection of heads, since they have scope over their head and are therefore hierarchically higher: the head is always one step down in a conﬁguration like the following: (877) (π v1 : [(v2 ) (v1 )φ ]: [σ (v1 )φ ]) The head of (v1 ) is (v2 ) in (877), so that the operator and modiﬁer of (v1 ) have scope over (v2 ) and therefore have to be inserted ﬁrst according to our strict hierarchical principles. In Chapter 4 we will show that in morphosyntax this hierarchical superiority of operators and modiﬁers is reﬂected in their ordering with respect to the head of the layer at which they apply. Combining the hierarchical approach to the construction of the layers making up the representational level with the hierarchical approach to the insertion of modiﬁers and operators before heads at each layer, the following steps can be distinguished in the creation of the underlying semantic representation of (878). Operator and modiﬁer positions irrelevant to the analysis have been left out to save space. Stepwise additions are indicated in bold. (878) Take this book to the library today! 1. 2. 3. 4. a b c d

(π e i : (post ei : (post ei : (post ei :

(ei )φ ]: [σ (ei )φ ]) (ei )φ ]: [(ti : [(f2 ) (ti )φ ]) (ei )φ ]) [(f2 ) (x1 )A (x2 )U (x3 )L ] (fi ))] (ei )φ ]: [(ti : [(fj : today (fj )) (ti )φ ]) (ei )φ ]) [ (fj : take (fj )) (xi )A (π xj : [(f3 ) (xj )φ ])U (xk : [(f4 ) (xk )φ ])L ] (fi )) (ei )φ ]: [(ti : ([fj : today (fj )) (ti )φ ]) (ei )φ ])

[(f1 ) [(f1 ) [(fi : [(fi :

building up the representational level 5. (post ei : (fi : [ a (fj : take (fj )) b (xi )A c (prox xj : [(f3 ) (xj )φ ])U d (xk : [(f4 ) (xk )φ ])L ] (fi )) (ei ): (ti : (fj : today (fj )) (ti )) (ei )) 6. (post ei : [(fi : [ a (fj : take (fj )) b (xi )A c (prox xj : [(fk : book (fj )) (xj )φ ])U d (xk : [(fl : library (fj )) (xk )φ ])L ] (fi )) (ei )φ ]: [(ti : [(fj : today (fj )) (ti )φ ]) (ei )φ ])

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4 The Morphosyntactic Level 4.1 Introduction 4.1.1 Purpose and scope of the chapter

The preceding chapters have shown in some detail how Discourse Acts and Propositional Contents are analysed at the Interpersonal Level and the Representational Level respectively. Both those levels are concerned with formulation, i.e. with the translation of conceptual intentions into the languagespeciﬁc structures that underlie linguistic forms. We have seen that there can be a considerable degree of parallelism between the two levels but also that they can diverge in important respects, as might be expected, given that they diﬀer in their functionality. In this and the next chapter, we turn to the matter of encoding, a task that is divided over the Morphosyntactic Level and the Phonological Level. The task of the Morphosyntactic Level is to take the dual input from the Interpersonal Level and the Representational Level and to merge the two into a single structural representation which will in turn be converted into a phonological construct at the next level; that ﬁnally will be input to the articulator, the Output Component of the overall model. To some considerable extent, the Morphosyntactic Level is dependent on its input: the input structures provide information to which the Morphosyntactic Level applies its own principles of organization. It must pass on to the Phonological Level an exact coverage of that information, such that an interpreter will be able to reconstruct the input structures exactly. In other words the Morphosyntactic Level cannot add or subtract semantic or pragmatic information. The input contains lexical information that must be preserved (even if it is subject to morphological alteration) in the output. In addition the input contains a range of non-lexical information: (i) information about dependencies, e.g. modiﬁer-head and nucleus-dependent relations; (ii) information about functions, e.g. the semantic relations between arguments and predicates or the pragmatic relations between Subsidiary and Nuclear Discourse Acts; (iii) information about operators, each applying to its own domain; and (iv) abstract information of the type that must be converted into proforms of various kinds. The Morphosyntactic Level must accordingly be set up in such

introduction

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a way that this information is preserved and represented correctly at the right places in syntactic and morphological structure. The purpose of this chapter is to show how this complex task is achieved and also to indicate which tasks have to be left to the Phonological Level. It will be shown that, just like the Interpersonal Level and the Representational Level, the Morphosyntactic Level is hierarchical in its internal organization, although it will be stressed that the degree of hierarchy (or ‘conﬁgurationality’) diﬀers according to the type of language being accounted for. The chapter will then go on to show how the various morphological types that have emerged from research in language typology can be handled according to the same set of principles. The remainder of the chapter will deal with each of the layers of morphosyntactic organization in turn, adopting the top-down order familiar from the preceding chapters. Each layer will be analysed with regard to the linear ordering of its constituents, to alignment (in the sense of the selection of a privileged argument, e.g. Subject), and to such issues as subordination and agreement. Within the lowest layer, that of the word, ﬁnally, we will consider such speciﬁcally morphological issues as the distinction between inﬂectional and derivational morphology and the rendering of proforms. 4.1.2 Relation to the Interpersonal Level and the Representational Level

The relation between the Morphosyntactic Level and the two input levels is governed by three principles, those of Iconicity, Domain Integrity, and Functional Stability. Each in its own way, these contribute to maximizing the parallelism between the structures, thereby enhancing the transparency and easy interpretability of linguistic structure. Although language is a symbolic construct and thus could tolerate a maximally arbitrary relation between function and form, in actual languages we observe a range of phenomena that betray a certain homology of function and form. One such phenomenon is iconicity, which we will illustrate with the correspondence between the order in which Moves and Discourse Acts (at the Interpersonal Level) and Propositions and Episodes (at the Representational Level) are introduced and the order in which they are expressed. Although there is some circularity here (since the ordering of units stipulated at the formulation levels is of course dependent upon the actual sequence of forms encountered), the possibility of adding modiﬁers that speciﬁcally indicate the position of a unit in a sequence (ﬁrstly, secondly) or of operators that allude to the relative ordering of States-of-Aﬀairs in a temporal sequence (e.g. operators for Anterior, Subsequent, or Simultaneous States-of-Aﬀairs) suggests that there is ordering in physical and mental experience (i.e. in the Conceptual Component) that should be reﬂected at the higher layers of the Interpersonal Level and the Representational Level. Notice that iconicity does

284

the morphosyntactic level

not apply to lower layers: the components of the conﬁgurational heads of Communicated Contents (content frames) and Conﬁgurational Properties (predication frames) are ordered by grammatical convention, not by the Conceptual Component. Iconicity applies straightforwardly in an example such as the following: (1) The game began at 7.30 and it ended in a draw. Here we have a Move consisting of two Discourse Acts which are ordered in keeping with the chronological sequence of the States-of-Aﬀairs evoked by each Discourse Act. The Interpersonal Level will order the Discourse Acts accordingly, and this order will be directly reﬂected at the Morphosyntactic Level, where we will have a Linguistic Expression consisting of two coordinated clauses. However, as mentioned in 2.2, where two Discourse Acts are connected through a shared referent, the Speaker has the option of treating one as nuclear and the other as subsidiary. Let us reconsider the example discussed in 2.2: (2) The game (beginning of AI ), which began at 7.30 (AJ ), ended in a draw (end of AI ). to be analysed at the Interpersonal Level as: (3) (MI : [(AI : [ . . . (RI vi ) . . . ] (AI )) (Aj : [ . . . (RJ vi ) . . . ] (Aj ))Aside ] (Mi )) with an additional indication that at the Representational Level the referents (vi ) of the two Referential Subacts (R) are coindexed. Here iconicity is overruled in the interests of giving greater prominence to one piece of information (the Speaker judging the result to be more important than the time of kick-oﬀ). The information sent to the Phonological Level is that the Move (MI ) consists of two Discourse Acts, one of which (AJ ) is subsidiary to but also interrupts the other (AI ). The Phonological Level will treat this as an instruction to give an intonation contour to each segment of (AI ) and to (AJ ), yielding three intonational phrases in all, two with a non-ﬁnal contour and one with a ﬁnal contour. What remains for the Morphosyntactic Level is to integrate the two Discourse Acts syntactically, which is achieved by applying a general mould for relative clauses. The details may wait until 4.5.5, but the resultant clause structure at the Morphosyntactic Level will appear basically as follows: (4) (Cli : [(Npi : [(Gwi ) (Nwi ) (Clj : [(Gwj ) (Vpi ) (Adpi )] (Clj ))] (Npi )) (Vpj ) (Adpk )] (Cli )) This structure is also required for restrictive relative clauses of the type italicized in (5), which—save for some details to be discussed later—are morphosyntactically identical to non-restrictive relative clauses:

introduction (5)

285

The game which began at 7.30 ended in a draw.

In (5), which began at 7.30 will form part of the same intonation contour as the surrounding material The game . . . ended in a draw. The role of the Morphosyntactic Level is thus to assign the same structure (4) to both types of relative clause while that of the Phonological Level is to ensure that the Aside status of (AJ ) in (3) is reﬂected in the prosody. This is an example of how iconic order, which remains a default preference, may be overridden by other independent communicative strategies. Another principle that constrains the Morphosyntactic Level to reﬂect the organization of its input levels is domain integrity. This refers to the crosslinguistic preference for the units that belong together at the Interpersonal Level and at the Representational Level also to be juxtaposed to one another at the Morphosyntactic Level. In other words, modiﬁers should ideally be placed in expression next to the heads that they modify; and functions and operators should be realized by elements that are close to the morphosyntactic units to which they apply. This means that there is a preference for a one-to-one relation between the hierarchical structure of the input levels and that of the Morphosyntactic Level: the realization of one Subact of Reference, for example, should not be interrupted by that of another Subact of Reference or of a Subact of Ascription. This principle applies as a default, i.e. the correspondence between the levels will be such as to guarantee, everything else being equal, that domain integrity will be respected. Nevertheless, many languages show instances where domain integrity is overridden by other communicative strategies. Here are some simple examples from English: (6)

a. Are you going to town? b. Where are you going to?

(7)

I am now going to town.

(8) The guy has arrived who’s going to ﬁx my lock. In (6a) the integrity of the Verb Phrase (Vp) are going is violated by the placement of are in clause-initial position to signal an Interrogative Illocution. In (6b) there is in addition to non-integrity of the Vp a violation of the integrity of the Adposition Phrase (Adp) to where (which itself is ill-formed), given the clause-initial placement of the question-word in English. In (7) the Vp am going loses integrity by being interrupted by an Adverb Phrase (Advp) now. And in (8) the integrity of the Np the guy who’s going to ﬁx my lock is broken by the placement of the modiﬁer in clause-ﬁnal position. Examples (6a) and (6b) involve the clause-initial position (to be known as PI —for Initial Position),

286

the morphosyntactic level

whose special functionality frequently causes domain integrity violations, attracting elements away from their domain. Example (7) shows another common source of such violations, the placement of modiﬁers—where these do not occur in clause-initial or clause-ﬁnal position, they may penetrate into other syntactic domains. Example (8), ﬁnally, shows the role of the clause-ﬁnal position (to be known as PF ) as a placement option for bulky modiﬁers. Languages diﬀer with regard to domain integrity. Whereas the presence of Interrogative Illocution may lead to infringement of domain integrity, as we saw above for English, in other languages it may signalled by clauseinitial or clause-ﬁnal particles that do not violate domain integrity, or may be indicated only through prosodic contours at the Phonological Level. Many, probably the majority of, languages leave the equivalents of English wh-words in situ, preserving domain integrity, and many do not permit modiﬁers to interrupt domains, or to be postponed to a clause-ﬁnal position: Japanese, for example, does not allow extraposition of relative clauses of the type shown in (8) above. On the other hand, other languages allow relatively massive violations of syntactic domain integrity, relying for example on morphological agreement and government to signal interpersonal and representational connectedness; we shall see some examples below, when discussing so-called nonconﬁgurational languages. FDG will assume that domain integrity applies even to such languages, but that it will have less resistance to other forces determining constituent order. In morphology, it would appear that domain integrity is generally well respected across languages. The major exception is formed by inﬁxes, which are crosslinguistically less frequent than suﬃxes and preﬁxes, both of which do respect domain integrity. Thus in Tagalog the inﬁnitive form with Actor agreement verbs is created by placing the inﬁx -um- between the ﬁrst consonant of the verb stem and the following vowel: the verb sulat ‘write’ appears as sumulat in the active inﬁnitive. A third principle to be discussed here is that of functional stability, the requirement that constituents with the same speciﬁcation, be it interpersonal or representational, be placed in the same position relative to other categories. In certain languages, the positioning of a constituent bearing the Focus function is determined by the position with respect to the verb. In Turkish, for example, a Focus-bearing constituent is placed in immediately preverbal position, with the tense-bearing verb position also being ﬁxed, namely as clauseﬁnal; although this is generally backed up by prosodic means, immediately preverbal position is a suﬃcient indication of Focus status without further marking being required. In Dutch, there is a strong preference for a particular relative ordering of (l1 ) and (t1 ) modiﬁers where both apply to the same Stateof-Aﬀairs, namely (t1 ) before (l1 ):

introduction (9)

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a. Ik zag hem vorige week in het park. 1.sg see.pst 3.sg last week in def park ‘I saw him in the park last week.’ b. ?Ik zag hem in het park vorige week. 1.sg see.pst 3.sg in def park last week c. Vorige week zag ik hem in het park. last week see.pst 1.sg 3.sg in def park d. ?In het park zag ik hem vorige week. in def park see.pst 1.sg 3.sg last week

In morphology, the principle of functional stability is of considerable importance in the sense that in complex words the relative order of meaning-bearing elements will strongly tend to be ﬁxed. This is important in the analysis of words such as the following from Turkish (Lewis 1967: 124), in which the suﬃx -mi¸s occurs twice in succession, once as a resultative and once as an evidential marker: (10) Gel-mi¸s-mi¸s-∅. come-res-nonvis.pst-3.sg ‘He is said to have come.’ It is the position closer to the stem that marks oﬀ the ﬁrst occurrence of the suﬃx as ‘resultative’ and the position further from the stem that indicates the evidential nature of the second occurrence. The principle of functional stability, to the extent that languages apply it, is translated in FDG into structural templates, which, as we shall see, apply to each of the layers of analysis. At each, a series of slots will be introduced which constrain elements with the same functional speciﬁcation to appear in the same relative positions. The general relation between the Interpersonal Level and the Representational Level on the one hand and the Morphosyntactic Level on the other is one of a mapping from the former to the latter. The eﬀect of iconicity, domain integrity, and functional stability is for the relations to be basically as simple and as stable as possible. Nevertheless, as we will see in the sections from 4.2 onwards, a range of factors cause the actual mappings encountered in the languages of the world to show considerable complexity and variety, under the inﬂuence of competing factors of diﬀerent strength. 4.1.3 Relation to Phonological Level

The output of the Morphosyntactic Level serves as input to the Phonological Level of organization. The latter also receives input directly from the Interpersonal Level and the Representational Level, the former typically having

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the morphosyntactic level

greater impact on its suprasegmental aspects. The hierarchically structured output of the Morphosyntactic Level maps onto a hierarchical structure at the Phonological Level. Again, much as with the mappings discussed in the previous section, there is a preference for one-to-one relations, with for example the phrase at the Morphosyntactic Level corresponding to the phonological phrase, but discrepancies are certainly possible, and will be dealt with in Chapter 5. In previous chapters we have seen how lexemes can be introduced at the Interpersonal Level and the Representational Level. Where the phonemic form of these lexemes undergoes no further internal change (this will be dependent upon the morphological typology of the language concerned, see 4.2.3 below), these may be immediately shown as phonemic representations. This also applies to those items introduced at the Morphosyntactic Level whose phonological form is not subject to further internal processes. One of the tasks of the Phonological Level is therefore to take the phonological material introduced at the three previous levels and to integrate it into a phonological structure. Consider (11), as a clause in English: (11) John must try. All three words in this sentence can be displayed in their phonological form at the Morphosyntactic Level: A

(12) (Cli : [(Npi : (Nwi : /dZ n/ (Nwi )) (Npi ))Subj (Vpi : [(Vwj : /m2st/ (Vwj )) (Vpj : (Vwk : /traI/ (Vwk )) (Vpj ))] (Vpi ))] (Cli )) This is because the element John, being a personal name, is introduced at the Interpersonal Level and is not subject to further morphological or phonological processes; the element try, as a lexical item, is introduced at the Representational Level and can already take the form /traI/, since its bare lexical form is identical to its ﬁnal phonological representation; and the element must, to be classiﬁed as an auxiliary verb, is introduced at the Morphosyntactic Level, where—being invariable (*musts, *musting, etc.)—it can already take the form /m2st/. Let us, however, consider a slightly more complex example with the same basic morphosyntactic structure, now showing how it appears at the Phonological Level: (13) (ipi : [(ppi : [(pwi : /hI/ (pwi )) (pwj : /kA:nt/ (pwj )) (pwk : /swIm/ (pwk ))] (pp1 ))] (ipi )) ‘He can’t swim.’ Here, as we shall see below, neither of the words he and can’t receives its deﬁnitive form until the Phonological Level. The Morphosyntactic Level in such

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cases oﬀers a structure anticipating the ﬁnal expression, in which each of the elements does however already occupy its position in the appropriate syntactic order. The Morphosyntactic Level thus indicates relative syntactic order as well as providing the Phonological Level with the information it needs to produce the ﬁnal forms in (13). The morphosyntactic structure corresponding to (13) will accordingly be as follows: (14)

(Cli : [(Npi : (Nwi : he (Nwi )) (Npi ))Subj (Vpi : [(Vwi : can (Vwi )) (Gwi : not (Gwi )) (Vpj : (Vwj : /swIm/ (Vwj )) (Vpj ))] (Vpi ))] (Cli ))

This structure displays the linear sequence of two phrases. The occupant of the ﬁrst position cannot yet have its deﬁnitive form, since this is dependent upon its syntactic function (Subject), which—as the representation shows—is not assigned until this Morphosyntactic Level (see 4.4.3 below). It will be the task of the Phonological Level to produce the phonemic sequence that associates the two morphosyntactic elements ‘he’ and Subj. A further factor that the Phonological Level must bear in mind in English when dealing with such cases is the pragmatic function passed down from the Interpersonal Level: the presence of a Focus or Contrastive function will in this case entail the form /hi:/, while their absence is indicated by the form /hI/. The word position (Nwi ) is occupied in (14) by the orthographic form he, which must, crucially, be understood as a placeholder for the entire range of phonological forms available to express the third person singular masculine pronoun (including at least /hi:, hI, hIm, Im, hIz, Iz, hImself, Imself/). The occupant of the second position is a phrase consisting of two words and another phrase. The forms of the ﬁrst word cannot have its deﬁnitive form, in the sense that when followed by negation the phonological form is /kA:n/; if not followed by negation, as in He can swim, Ability would be expressed as /kæn/. The second word is inserted into the structure in response to the Negative operator at the Representational Level, but is not deﬁnitive either, since depending on the circumstances it will appear as a contracted form or not. At the Phonological Level, a clitic—a separate word at the Morphosyntactic Level with its own distribution—becomes part of the same phonological word as the element to which it attaches. The actual form required (pwj : /kA:nt/ (pwj )) is brought about through a process known as lexical priority (the preference for a ready-made form over one created by the application of rules; cf. Dik 1997a: 345). The occupant of the only word slot within the embedded (Vpj ), ﬁnally, has already acquired its deﬁnitive form /swIm/ at the Representational Level, just like /traI/ in the previous example. The ability operator is expressed not only as ‘can’ but also as a requirement that the immediately following verb should appear in its stem form; this will also apply to /m2st/ in (12) above as an expression of Obligation.

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the morphosyntactic level

Consider now (15): (15)

John must have been swimming.

for which we assume the following morphosyntactic structure: A

(16) (Cli : [(Npi : (Nwi : /dZ n/ (Nwi )) (Npi ))Subj (Vpi : [(Vwj : /m2st/ (Vwj )) (Vwk : /hæv/ (Vwk )) (Vwl : be-Part (Vwl )) (Vpj : (Vwm : /swIm-IN/ (Vwm )) (Vpj ))] (Vpi ))] (Cli )) This structure is the morphosyntactic expression of the following conﬁguration at the Representational Level: (17)

(infer pi : (epi : (ant ei : [(prog fi : [(fj : swim (fj )) (xi )A ] (fi )) (ei )U ]) (epi )) (pi ))

in which the following operators apply to the following layers: (i) Infer(ential) to the Propositional Content (pi ); (ii) Ant(erior) to the State-of-Aﬀairs (ei ); (iii) Prog(ressive) to the Conﬁgurational Property of the State-of-Aﬀairs (fi ). Thus (iii) is within the scope of (ii) and both are within the scope of (i). These scope relations will not be reduplicated at the Morphosyntactic Level, but rather will help to determine the forms found there. As we will show below, morphosyntactic expression proceeds in a top-down fashion, which in this case means that higher operators are expressed before lower ones. Thus, Inferential is realized ﬁrst as the invariable form /m2st/ plus the above-mentioned requirement that the following word within the Verb Phrase should appear in the stem form. Anterior is realized as a form of have (here, given the requirement imposed by Inferential, the stem form) plus the requirement that the following verb take the suﬃx -Part[iciple]. The verb that actually occurs is triggered by the Progressive operator, which is realized as a form of be (plus the suﬃx-Part imposed by Anterior) plus the requirement that the following verb take the suﬃx /-IN/. A deﬁnitive form of the verb be cannot be inserted here, hence the analysis with the placeholder; at the Phonological Level we will ﬁnd /bIn/ corresponding to be-Part. The verb swim is given in the form of a placeholder for the alternative forms {/swIm, swæm, sw2m/}. Note, ﬁnally, that the suﬃx /-IN/ is already in its deﬁnitive form and can be introduced at this level. Swimming is here analysed as a Verb Phrase rather than a Verbal Word because of the possibility of placing it in clause-initial position, where in English only phrases or sequences of phrases may appear: (18) Swimming they must have been. These few examples have served to show that the phonological representations that constitute the ultimate output of the grammar (and the input to the Output Component) are made up of elements that are introduced as soon as they

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attain their deﬁnitive form. As a result, FDG can show exactly to which level or levels of organization each component part of an utterance must be ascribed. Note that in what follows we will only make a distinction between phonemic forms and placeholders in those cases in which we are explicitly discussing the division of labour between the two. Where this issue is not at stake, we will use orthographic forms for both.

4.2 The organization of the Morphosyntactic Level 4.2.1 Introduction

Having looked at the relation between the Morphosyntactic Level and the other levels of the grammar (and thereby inevitably seen something of the internal workings of the former), let us now turn to a presentation of the Morphosyntactic Level as such. We will consider the various layers that need to be assumed in the hierarchical make-up of this level. An important point here will be the claim that languages may diﬀer in the extent to which they impose hierarchical organization upon their morphosyntactic structure. This will bring us to a hoary issue in functional linguistics, whether or not to recognize a Vp in the sense of a grouping of verb and non-subject arguments, concluding that this, too, is a matter in which languages may diﬀer in a principled manner. The section will conclude with a discussion of the morphological typology of languages, drawing upon two dimensions of variation: the degree of semantic transparency, i.e. the extent to which there is in a language a oneto-one correspondence between units of meaning and units of form; and the degree of synthesis, i.e. the extent to which languages permit more than one lexical unit to occur within a single morphosyntactic word. We will consider the repercussions of these distinctions for FDG and end with an FDG view on another parameter of typological analysis, the diﬀerence between what have become known as head-marking and dependent-marking languages. 4.2.2 Hierarchical structure

The general schema for the Morphosyntactic Level of a Linguistic Expression consisting of at least one Clause is as follows, where each constituent unit may occur more than once: (19) (Le1 : [(Cl1 : [(Xw) (Xp1 : [(Xw) (Xp2 ) (Cl2 )] (Xp1 ))(Cl3 )] (Cl1 ))] (Le1 )) Le = Linguistic Expression Cl = Clause Xp = Phrase (of the type x) Xw = Word (of the type x)

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We will show below that not all Linguistic Expressions contain a Clause. In (19) we see a hierarchy of layers of analysis that shows many parallels with the hierarchical organization of the Interpersonal Level and the Representational Level. Thus the largest unit of analysis, a Linguistic Expression, is seen as consisting of Clauses; in turn, each Clause may consist of one or more Words, one or more Phrases and, as an instance of recursion, one or more Clauses; each Phrase can similarly consist of one or more Words, one or more Phrases and one or more Clauses (the two last-mentioned again involving recursion). The Word will also have its internal structure, namely as a series of morphemes (or placeholders for morphemes). The structure given in (19) shows the possibilities allowed by the theory and is therefore highly abstract (or etic) in various ways. Firstly, the number of the items constituting any layer is unspeciﬁed, and the items are unordered and unlabelled. In the (emic) grammar of any particular language, the number of items of a particular kind to be found at each layer will be speciﬁed; the linear order of those items will be laid down; and each of the resultant positions will be labelled by means of a subscript. Secondly, as emphasized in our discussion of the Interpersonal Level in Chapter 2, FDG covers units of all degrees of morphosyntactic complexity or simplicity. Thus no more hierarchy will be assumed than is required for satisfactory analysis. Let us brieﬂy consider what is meant by the various morphosyntactic categories introduced by (19). Each of the categories will be discussed in depth in the following sections of this chapter. A Linguistic Expression is any set of at least one unit; where there is more than one unit within a Linguistic Expression, they will demonstrably belong together in their morphosyntactic properties. These units may be Clauses or Phrases. Consider the following examples from Kashmiri (Wali and Koul 1997: 75): (20) Paga:h yizi jal1d nat1 ne:r1 b1 kunuyzon. tomorrow come.imp soon otherwise leave-fut 1sg alone ‘Come early tomorrow, otherwise I will go alone.’ (21) (Lei : [(Cli : [(Advpi : (Advwi : paga:h (Advwi )) (Advpi )) (Vpi : (Vwi : yizi (Vwi )) (Vpi )) (Advpi : (Advwj : jal1d (Advwj )) (Advpi ))] (Cli )) (Clj : [(Gwi : nat1 (Gwi )) (Vpj : (Vwj : ne:r1 (Vwj )) (Vpj )) (Npi : (Nwi : b1 (Nwi )) (Npi )) (Advpj : (Advwk : kunuyzon (Advwk )) (Advpj )) (Clj ))] (Lei )) Here two Clauses (Cli ) and (Clj ) are linked paratactically within one Linguistic Expression (Lei ). Neither could be used on its own due to the use of the correlative strategy. The morphosyntactic organization corresponds to two Discourse Acts within one Move at the Interpersonal Level, with the fact that

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they can be understood as a conditional implication (‘If you do not come early tomorrow, I will go alone.’) strengthening the case for regarding (20) as forming a single unit. The following example of a Linguistic Expression is from German: (22) Je kürzer desto besser. corr short.compv corr good.compv ‘The shorter the better.’ Here we have two adjective Phrases linked by the correlative pair je . . . desto, thus illustrating a Linguistic Expression which does not contain a Clause: (23) (Lei : [(Api : [(Gwi : je (Gwi )) (Awi : kürzer (Awi ))] (Api )) (Apj : [(Gwj : desto (Gwj )) (Awj : besser (Awj ))] (Apj ))] (Lei ) (22) would be used in a context where brevity is being praised, for example in giving advice to a public speaker. Again the intimate connection between the two elements, linking relative lack of length to relative quality, strongly supports regarding (22) as one Linguistic Expression. The Clause is a grouping of one or more Phrases characterized, to a greater or lesser extent, by a template for the ordering of those Phrases and, also to a greater or lesser extent, by morphological expressions of connectedness (notably government and agreement); in addition, the Clause operates as a domain for several morphosyntactic processes. While for each language analysed, the identiﬁcation of Clauses will be dependent upon languagespeciﬁc criteria, we believe that it is justiﬁed to posit the Clause as a universal category of morphosyntactic structure. Note, however, that Discourse Acts realized by single Phrases will not be regarded as minimal or reduced Clauses. This means that in particular Linguistic Expressions the Clause layer can— where there is no evidence for its presence, as in (22) above—be dispensed with, and that structures of the following kind are permitted, in addition to the structure shown in (19) above: (24)

(Le1 : (Xp)n (Le1 ))

Clauses are characterized, in keeping with the principle of functional stability (see 4.1.2 above), by templates that play an important role in determining the linear sequence of the Phrases and other units that make up each Clause. These templates interact with other constituent order principles to be presented in 4.4 to determine the ultimate sequence that will be passed on to the Phonological Level. Assignment of a Phrase to a position in the template will result from an often complex interplay between their morphosyntactic

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category (as Np, Vp, etc.) and their function. That function may be: (i) inherited from the Interpersonal Level (covering such pragmatic functions as Topic, Focus, Contrast, etc.); (ii) inherited from the Representational Level (covering such semantic functions as Actor, Undergoer, Locative, etc.); (iii) assigned at the Morphosyntactic Level (covering such syntactic functions as Subject and Object). The assignment of syntactic functions at the Morphosyntactic Level will be dealt with in 4.4.3. For any one Clause in any one language, the template to be chosen will be drawn from the available primitives at the Morphosyntactic Level, much as with the choice of frames at the Interpersonal Level and the Representational Level. This could mean, of course, that the number of possible templates in any one language will be immense, and indeed, given the possibility of recursion, potentially inﬁnite. For this reason we must allow for the possibility, in a dynamic implementation of our model, of one template calling upon another for the creation of ever more complex structures. Thus the template for an (Np1 ) can call upon another template for a Clause to account for the occurrence of relative Clauses. There is a nursery song one of whose verses runs as follows—and further verses follow which add more complexity: (25) This is the cat that killed the rat that ate the malt that lay in the house that Jack built. in which the Np the cat . . . built can be represented making use of an Np template consisting of a Nominal Word (Nw) and a Clause (Cl), with the Clause containing an Np position that may be ﬁlled again by this Np template: (26) (Npi : [(Nwi : cat (Nwi )) (Cli : [ . . . (Npj : [(Nwj : rat (Nwj )) (Clj : [ . . . (Npk : [(Nwk : malt (Nwi )) (Clk : [ . . . (Npl : [(Nwl : house (Nwl )) (Cll ) (Npl )) . . . ] (Clk ))] (Npk )) . . . ] (Clj ))] (Npj )) . . . ] (Cli ))] (Npi )) This is how FDG reﬂects, at clausal layer, the notion of recursion, with a ﬁnite stock of templates permitting an unbounded number of possible conﬁgurations. The various templates that can be observed will, where possible, be reduced to a small number of macrotemplates. These, it will be assumed, provide the skeleton of the morphosyntax of the language under examination. In a sense, the familiar SVO, SOV, etc. characterizations of languages can be seen as highly schematic macrotemplates. We will, however, transfer to the Morphosyntactic Level a formalism that showed its value in our discussion of the Representational Level (cf. 3.2.3). Just as the optional addition of States-of-Aﬀairs may be

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shown as in (27), so the possibility of adding an in principle unlimited number of Adposition Phrases to a template can be shown as in (28): (27)

[. . . (e1+n ) . . . ]

(28) [. . . (Adpp1+n ) . . . ] Thus, English (29) would satisfy the macrotemplate in (30): (29) I saw him in London on Thursday with his mother in a car on several diﬀerent occasions. (30) (Cl1 : [(Np1 ) (Vp1 ) (Np2 ) (Adpp1+n )] (Cl1 )) Similarly, the representation of (31) would satisfy the macrotemplate (32): (31)

John must have been swimming.

(32) (Vp1 : [(Vw1+n ) (Vp2 )] (Vp1 )) where the actual value of n is 3, the maximum being 4, given that examples like must have been being observed display the maximum complexity available. Copula insertion (to be presented in greater detail below in 4.5.6) is one example of how the Morphosyntactic Level responds to mismatches at the Representational Level. Where, for semantic reasons, any kind of non-verb, for example a Noun or Adjective, is used as the main predicate in a predication, there is a mismatch between the deﬁnitional function of the nonverb (see 3.7.2.3) and its actual use. By inserting a verbal copula, as in English, the Morphosyntactic Level mitigates the mismatch at that level. In Hengeveld and Mackenzie (2005: 21–2) it is argued that in an example of a presentative like (33): (33) There is beer without alcohol. the Communicated Content at the Interpersonal Level contains only a Referential Subact: (CI : [(RI )TOPFOC ] (CI )) (cf. 2.7.2.6). If the (RI ) were to be realized as only an Np, there would be no place for marking the tense of (33). The Morphosyntactic Level resolves this by introducing the dummy copula. (For a thorough treatment of such existential constructions in FG, see Hannay 1985.) The analysis of adverbs like quickly in (34) should also be seen as a matter of resolving a mismatch: (34)

That dog runs quickly.

Here a Manner with the adjective quick as its head modiﬁes the Verb run, as is clear from the following analysis at the Representational Level:

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(35) (pres ei : [(fi : [(fj : runV (fj ): [(mi : [(fk : quickA (fk )) (mi )U ]) (fj )U ) (dist 1 xi : [(fl : dogN (fl )) (xi )U ])A ] (fi )) (ei )U ]) The mismatch between the Verb-modifying function of the adjective and its expected Noun-modifying function is resolved at the Morphosyntactic Level by marking it with the suﬃx -ly. Note that not all dialects of English require this marking (dial. The dog runs quick), which suggests it is indeed a morphosyntactic rather than a deeper property of the English language. A Phrase (Xp) is characterized by the fact that it is headed by a lexical item that is passed on from the Interpersonal Level or the Representational Level. There is no necessary one-to-one correspondence between the lexeme classes recognized in a language and the Phrase types and corresponding word classes recognized within that same language. A language with a highly ﬂexible lexeme class may have a variety of Phrase types. Consider the following example from Mundari (Evans and Osada 2005: 354–5): (36)

Buru=ko bai-ke-d-a. mountain=3.pl make-compl-tr-pred ‘They made the mountain.’

(37)

Saan=ko buru-ke-d-a. ﬁrewood=3.pl mountain-compl-tr-pred ‘They heaped up the ﬁrewood.’

The lexeme buru can be used as the head within a Referential Subact (36) and as the head within an Ascriptive Subact (37), and can thus be characterized as a contentive lexeme. Yet the morphosyntax of Mundari makes a clear distinction between the Phrase expressing the Ascriptive Subact and and the one expressing the Referential Subact, traditionally called ‘Verb Phrase’ and ‘Noun Phrase’. We will use this traditional terminology, but do not commit ourselves to the view that a Verb Phrase is headed by a verbal lexeme, and a Noun Phrase by a nominal lexeme, though the result in syntax will be a Verbal Word and a Nominal Word. The Verbal Words in (36)–(37) carry suﬃxes for aspect, transitivity and predicativity, while the Nominal Words lack aﬃxation (note that ko is a second-position clitic, not a suﬃx). Thus, the two instances of buru in (36) and (37) may be represented as in (38) and (39) respectively: (38) (Npi : (Nwi : buruCont (Nwi )) (Npi )) (39) (Vpi : (Vwi : buruCont (Vwi )) (Vpi )) The Nominal and Verbal Word templates will then be diﬀerent as regards their possibilities for suﬃxation.

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By extension, we will apply this analysis to isolating languages, where the diﬀerences between Verb Phrases and Noun Phrases are visible not so much in diﬀerent word forms but rather in diﬀerent conﬁgurational properties. The following examples are from Samoan (Mosel and Hovdhaugen 1992: 80): (40)

"Ua m¯alosi le l¯a. prf strong art sun ‘The sun is strong.’ “The sun strongs.”

(41)

"Ua l¯a le aso. prf sun art day ‘The day is sunny.’ “The day suns.”

The lexeme l¯a can be used as the head within a Referential Subact (40) and as the head within an Ascriptive Subact (41), and can thus be characterized as a contentive lexeme. Yet the syntax of Samoan makes a rigid distinction between the Phrase expressing the Referential Subact and the Phrase expressing the Ascriptive Subact. In the former the contentive is preceded by an article, in the latter by a tense/aspect particle. Thus the contentive lexeme is a Nominal Word in syntax in (40) and a Verbal Word in syntax in (41). The extent to which the Clause is divided into Phrases will diﬀer from language to language in response to the structuring of the Interpersonal Level. The frequently mentioned distinction between conﬁgurational and non-conﬁgurational languages (cf. Hale 1983; Heath 1986; Golumbia 2004) is, as we shall see, in FDG not simply a matter of diﬀerent syntactic analyses varying in degree of hierarchy. To give an example of nonconﬁgurationality, let us consider Blake’s analysis of Kalkatungu, in which ‘there are in fact no noun phrases, but . . . where an argument is represented by more than one word we have nominals in parallel or in apposition. . . . Each word is a constituent of the Clause’ (Blake 1983: 145; quoted by Rijkhoﬀ 2002: 19–20). We will slightly rephrase this by saying that in Kalkatungu there are Noun Phrases, but that these do not provide a slot for modiﬁers. In such a language, then, Noun Phrases would have the following maximal structure: (42) (Np1 : (Nw1 ) (Np1 )) Consider a Clause such as the following, from Kalkatungu (Blake 1983: 145): (43) Cipayi icayi yañi tukuyu yauntu. this.erg bite white.man “dog.erg big.erg ‘This big dog bit/bites the white man.’

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Whereas in the conﬁgurational language English a Phrase such as this big dog cannot be broken up, in Kalkatungu each of the three ergative-marked elements of (43) and the two other elements can appear in any position in the Clause. Thus (43) represents only one of 5 × 4 × 3 × 2 × 1 = 120 diﬀerent word-order possibilities. The three Words cipayi, tukuyu, and yauntu share “ ergative marking, which allows the Addressee to understand that they belong together semantically: for this reason, they will be shown as one unit at the Representational Level, bearing the semantic function Actor. Nevertheless, there is morphosyntactically no reason to assume that such a unit corresponds to a Phrase, as it would in English. Rather the choice of word order is fully determined by other factors than connectedness at the Representational Level; word-order choices, where they are not simply arbitrary, must be determined by factors from the Interpersonal Level. Accordingly, the three Words in question will correspond to diﬀerent Referential Subacts at the Interpersonal Level, evoking—without any ordering or dependency—‘this one’, ‘a dog one’, and ‘a big one’. The example will therefore be analysed as follows at the various levels, with the Morphosyntactic Level quite directly reﬂecting the Interpersonal Level: (44)

IL: (CI : [(TI ) (RI ) (RJ ) (RK ) (RL )] (CI )) RL: (ei : (fi : [(fj : icayiV (fj )) (xi : [(fk : tukuyuN (fk )) (xi )U ]: [(fl : yauntuN “ ) ]) (x : [(f : yañi (f )) (fl )) (xi )U ]: [(fm : cipayiN (fm )) (x i U A j n N n (xj )U ])U ] (fi )) (ei )U ]) ML: (Cli : [(Npi : (Nwi : cipayi (Nwi )) (Vpi : (Vwi : icayi (Vwi )) (Vpi )) (Npj : (Nwj : yañi (Nwj )) (Npj )) (Npk : (Nwk : tukuyu (Nwk )) “ )) (Npk )) (Npl : (Nwl : yauntu (Nwl )) (Npl ))] (Cl i

Some support for this approach to nonconﬁgurational languages comes, perhaps paradoxically, from Legate (2003), who argues in a formalist framework for an analysis of Warlpiri, the ﬁrst language to be identiﬁed as nonconﬁgurational (Hale 1983), as being conﬁgurational after all. She argues, for example, that the placement of adverbials in Warlpiri is not free but follows the ordering principles enunciated for a strongly hierarchical view of Italian syntax by Cinque (1999), in an approach which closely parallels—as Cinque himself points out—the semantic layering originally used in FG and taken over in FDG. In this light, we take Legate’s observations to support the notion of a hierarchically structured Representational Level for such languages. In addition, Legate argues that the syntactic units of Warlpiri are all moved by transformation from their underlying positions to a number of ‘higher’ positions characterized by pragmatic functions as Illocution Phrase, Focus Phrase, or Topic Phrase: this in turn supports the notion of the relative

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placement of units in such languages being sensitive to the pragmatic function of interpersonal units. The notion of non-conﬁgurationality at the Phrase layer, in languages for which the Phrase is a relevant category, is linked to another important issue, the question whether any Phrases should be inherently grouped into a higherorder ‘superphrase’, a VP constituent in the sense of a syntactic grouping, in relevant Clauses, of the verb and its non-subject arguments (note that we will use the capitalized form VP to refer to such a constituent rather than Vp, which in FDG is a Phrase that may consist of just a verb or another lexical element used predicatively); this would add conﬁgurationality to such a series of Phrases in the same way as phrase structure lends conﬁguration to a set of words. As shown in (19) above, FDG does not recognize a layer of morphosyntax between the Phrase and the Clause. At the Representational Level, there is no combination of the arguments of a predicate that would correspond to a VP, nor is there a similar grouping of the Subacts within the Communicated Content (but see Smit fc. for a diﬀerent view). However, it can happen that more than one Subact has the same pragmatic function. As we will see, this can be the basis for certain languages to treat them as a syntactic grouping. Although many syntactic approaches assume a VP, it is not universally valid across the languages of the world. The matter is discussed by Van Valin (2001: 119ﬀ.). He argues that the presence of highly ‘free’ constituent order in a language (such as for example Lakhota) does not entail the non-existence of a VP. Rather he proposes that the recognition of a VP is determined by three tests: (i) is there evidence of a pro-VP in the language, like English do so?; (ii) is permutation possible, i.e. can the alleged constituent appear in diﬀerent positions in the Clause while retaining its integrity? (iii) can the alleged VP be coordinated with another grouping of the same structure? On this basis, the grouping catch a ﬁsh for dinner is indeed a VP in English: (45)

a. I caught a ﬁsh for dinner and Bill did so too. b. I said I would catch a ﬁsh for dinner, and catch a ﬁsh for dinner I did! c. I caught a ﬁsh for dinner and baked it in the oven.

Van Valin (2001: 121) then examines the situation in Lakhota, and ﬁnds that this language yields a negative answer to all three questions. Where, then, does the VP grouping of English come from? Note that the crucial test examples all involve the coordination of Discourse Acts; what is more, the second Discourse Acts in (45) are all dependent for their occurrence (and grammaticality) on the presence and particular type of the preceding Discourse Act. In addition, as already noted by Van Valin and LaPolla (1997: 527–8), the Illocution of the respective Discourse Acts must be the same:

300 (46)

the morphosyntactic level a. *I caught a ﬁsh for dinner and did Bill do so too? b. *You said you would catch a ﬁsh for dinner, and catch a ﬁsh for dinner did you? c. *He caught a ﬁsh for dinner and did bake it in the oven?

These observations are pointers to the involvement of the Interpersonal Level. Note that in (46a), the Communicated Content of the ﬁrst Discourse Act will contain four Subacts, one of which will be Topic so that the others will not have a pragmatic function on that parameter (i.e. will belong by default to the Comment). In this light, do so in (46a) can be seen as representing a communicative unit corresponding to the group of Subacts that are Comment in the preceding utterance. In the formulation of Bill did so too, the Conceptual Component draws upon information registered in the Contextual Component arising from the Comment section of the immediately preceding utterance. In (46b), catch a ﬁsh for dinner again represents a Comment (again in the sense of a group of non-Topic Subacts), but in this case, arguably for purposes of emphasis, the Speaker draws from the Contextual Component not just the information but also the form of the Words and now deploys it as the Topic of the second Discourse Act (this supports the observation in 3.14 that the Contextual Component may on occasion store actual Word sequences). In (46c), ﬁnally, we see a variant of Discourse Act coordination in which the second Discourse Act is presented without any explicit Topic because it is shared with the preceding Discourse Act. What this discussion suggests is that VP in English is a reﬂection of the division of the Communicated Content of Discourse Acts into Topic and Comment, and corresponds to a grouping of non-Topics. Van Valin and LaPolla (1997: 218) come to much the same conclusion, namely that what they call ‘the actual focus domain’ (in FDG, the Comment) ‘includes exactly what would traditionally be considered the VP’. Nevertheless, there is evidence that the VP does have some autonomous status in the structure of the English Clause, namely the fact that Topics that are not Subject are not treated in the same way—and Subject is of course complementary to VP. Consider the following data: (47)

A: What about that ﬁsh? B: a. Well, I caught it for dinner and Mary baked *∅ in the oven. b. Well, it was caught for dinner (by me) and baked in the oven (by Mary).

In (47Ba), the ﬁsh is Topical, and yet the expression of the Comment Subacts (I , caught, for dinner) cannot be coordinated with those of the second Clause (Mary, baked, in the oven). This is only possible if, as in (47Bb), the Topic

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is also Subject. The conclusion may then be that Subject relates to VP in the same way as Topic to Comment: just as Comment is an epiphenomenon that does not require systematic marking, so the VP can be regarded as an epiphenomenon, namely the totality of Phrases that remain within a Clause after one of them has been assigned Subject function, discounting of course Phrases with a modifying function. To conclude this section, then, we have seen that the morphosyntactic Component allows crosslinguistic ﬂexibility with regard to the issue of conﬁgurationality: languages may diﬀer in the extent to which semantically related Words are grouped into Phrases, and to which Phrases are grouped into larger units. 4.2.3 Grammatical morphemes and secondary operators

The aim of FDG is to provide an account of structure which is equally valid for all types of languages. Diﬀerences in the linear order within the Clause and within the Phrase will be dealt with in 4.4.2 and 4.5.2 respectively. Here will we focus on morphological typology and on the distinction between headmarking and dependent-marking languages. Morphological types can be deﬁned according to the two parameters of semantic transparency and synthesis. Along the ﬁrst parameter we may distinguish isolating, agglutinating, and fusional languages. Isolating languages are semantically transparent in the sense that in the ideal type of an isolating language there is a one-to-one relation between a Word and a unit of meaning, whereas in agglutinating languages there is ideally a one-to-one relation between a morpheme and a unit of meaning. Fusional languages are semantically opaque in the sense that there is no one-to-one relation between a unit of form and a unit of meaning. Along the second parameter we may distinguish between polysynthetic and non-polysynthetic languages. Polysynthetic languages allow the presence of more than one lexical element within a single Word, while non-polysynthetic languages do not. The two parameters are basically independent of each other: the ﬁrst is primarily concerned with the status of grammatical elements in the language, whereas the second has to do with the status of lexical elements. As a result, polysynthetic languages can be either fusional or agglutinating just like nonpolysynthetic languages. The only restriction in terms of combinations of the two parameters is that a polysynthetic language cannot at the same time be isolating. The types distinguished here are of course idealized: many languages exhibit features of more than one morphological type. Examples from languages of these diﬀerent types are given below: Fijian (48, Milner 1972: 42) exempliﬁes an isolating language, Turkish (49, van Schaaik p.c.) an agglutinating language, Spanish (50) a fusional language,

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the morphosyntactic level

and Southern Tiwa (51, Allen et al. 1984: 293) a polysynthetic language. The glosses clearly reveal the morphological structure of the languages involved: in (48) the gloss is a word-by-word translation, in (49) it is a morpheme-bymorpheme translation, in (50) a one-to-many translation; and in (51) the gloss reveals the presence of two lexical elements within a single word. Note that (51) is a case of syntactic incorporation (cf. Smit 2005), as the incorporated object is cross-referenced on the verb. (48) Mo dou kauta mada yani na cina. imp 2.pc take mit away art lamp ‘Take the lamp away.’ (49) Anlı-y-abil-ecek-mi¸s-im. understand-conn-abil-irr-infer-1.sg ‘I gather I will be able to understand.’ (50)

Lleg-ó. arrive-ind.pst.pfv.3.sg ‘He/she/it arrived.’

(51)

Te-shut-pe-ban. 1.sg.sbj>pl.obj-shirt-make-pst ‘I made (the) shirts.’

Let us now consider how each language type will be handled by FDG. The analysis of (48) at the Interpersonal Level and the Representational Level will be as in (52): (52)

(AI : [(mit FI : IMP (FI )) (PI )S (PJ )A (CI : [(TI ) (RI : [−S,+A] (RI )) (+s RJ )] (CI ))] (AI )) RL: (ei : [(fi : [(fj : kauta (fj ): (li :–yani–(li )) (fi )U ) (pauc xi )A (xj :–cina–(xj ))U ] )fi )) (ei )U ])

IL:

The lexical items kauta, yani, and cina are available at the Representational Level and are transferred to the Morphosyntactic Level without change. The grammatical Words mo, mada, and na are inserted at the Morphosyntactic Level, in direct translation of the Illocution ‘IMP’ and the primary operators Mit and +s respectively. Finally, the combination of (RI : [−S,+A] (RI )) at the IL and (pauc xi ) at the Representational Level yields dou ‘2nd person paucal’ at the Morphosyntactic Level. It is characteristic of an isolating language that the translation from the Interpersonal and Representational Levels to the Morphosyntactic Level is maximally simple and that the deﬁnitive form of morphemes is already available in formulation or is ﬁnalized at the

the organization of the morphosyntactic level

303

Morphosyntactic Level; there is thus no need for placeholders of the type discussed in 4.1.3 above. Here is the Morphosyntactic Level analysis of (48): (53)

ML: (Lei : (Cli : [(Gwi : mo (Gwi )) (Vpi : [(Gwj : dou (Gwj )) (Vwi : kauta (Vwi )) (Gwk : mada (Gwk )) (Advpi : (Advwi : yani (Advwi )) (Advpi ))] (Vpi )) (Npi : [(Gwl : na (Gwl )) (Nwi : cina (Nwi ))] (Npi ))] (Cli )) (Lei ))

To summarize, the characteristics of an isolating language are as follows: (i) there is a one-to-one relation between Words at the Morphosyntactic Level and units at the Representational and Interpersonal Levels; (ii) there is no need for placeholders; (iii) Words have no internal layering. Turning now to the agglutinating language Turkish and example (49) (van Schaaik p.c.), which we repeat here for convenience as (54): (54)

Anlı-y-abıl-ecek-mi¸s-im. understand-conn-abil-irr-infer-1.sg ‘I gather I will be able to understand.’

we note that there is again a one-to-one correspondence between the elements of the Interpersonal and Representational Levels and the morphemes at the Morphosyntactic Level. Here are the representations of (54) at the Interpersonal and Representational Levels: (55)

(AI : [(FI : DECL (FI )) (PI )S (PJ )A (CI : [(TI ) (RI : [+S, −A] (RI ))] (CI ))] (AI )) RL: (infer pi : (epi : (irr ei : [(abil fi [(fj : anlıV (fj )) (1xi )A ] (fi )) (ei )U ]) (epi )) (pi )) IL:

In Turkish, the actual form of the morpheme is determined by the phonological process of vowel harmony. As a shorthand for the phonological representation, the vowels subject to vowel harmony are capitalized: AbIl, −EcEk, −mI¸s, and –Im. These four morphemes are in a one-to-one relationship with the primary operators Abil, Irr, Infer and the combination of (RI : [+S, −A] (RI )) at the Interpersonal Level with (1xi )A at the Representational Level respectively. The connecting intervocalic glide –y– is inserted at the Phonological Level in response to the phonological environment: it will be absent from the Morphosyntactic Level. All this reﬂects the morphological transparency of this language. The morphosyntactic analysis of (54) will be as in (56) (for further details see 4.6.5 below on Word templates): (56)

(Lei : (Cli : (Vpi : (Vwi : [(Vsi : anlı (Vsi )) (Aﬀi : AbIl (Aﬀi )) (Aﬀi : EcEk (Aﬀi )) (Aﬀi : mI¸s (Aﬀi )) (Aﬀi : Im (Aﬀi ))] (Vwi )) (Vpi )) (Cli )) (Lei ))

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the morphosyntactic level

To summarize, the characteristics of an agglutinating language are as follows: (i) there is a one-to-one relation between morphemes at the Morphosyntactic Level and units at the Representational and Interpersonal Levels; (ii) there is no need for placeholders; (iii) Words have internal layering. The Spanish example (50), which we repeat here for convenience as (57), exempliﬁes a fusional language: (57)

Lleg-ó. arrive-ind.pst.pfv.3.sg ‘He/she/it arrived.’

The bound grammatical morpheme -ó must be inserted at the Phonological Level, being the expression of the placeholder ‘indpastpf3sg’ introduced at the Morphosyntactic Level. Let us consider the Representational and Interpersonal Level representations: (58)

(AI : [(FI : DECL (FI )) (PI )S (PJ )A (CI : [(TI ) (RI : [−S, −A] (RI ))Top ] (CI ))] (AI )) RL: (past epi (sim ei : [(pf fi : [(fj : ÎegV - (fj )) (1xi )A ] (fi )) (ei )U ]) (epi ))

IL:

Here there is a many-to-one relationship between on the one hand the presence of the Illocution DECL (cf. 4.5), the primary operators Past and Pf and the combined presence of (RI : [−S, −A] (RI )) and (1xi )A , and on the other hand the single morpheme -ó. This is typical of the lack of transparency of this language. This means that the Morphosyntactic Level will suﬃx a placeholder ‘indpastpf3sg’ to the verbal stem /Îeg-/. The Phonological Level will convert this to an accent-bearing suﬃx -ó. Here is the Morphosyntactic Level analysis of (59): (59) (Lei : (Cli : (Vpi : (Vwi : [(Vsi : /Îeg/ (Vsi )) (Aﬀi : indpastpf3sg (Aﬀi ))] (Vwi )) (Vpi )) (Cli )) (Lei )) To summarize, the characteristics of a fusional language are as follows: (i) there is a one-to-many relation between a morpheme at the Morphosyntactic Level and multiple units at the Representational and Interpersonal Levels; (ii) placeholders are required; (iii) Words have internal layering. Turning now to the Southern Tiwa example (51), we immediately note similarity with the agglutinating type exempliﬁed in (49). However, a distinctive feature of this example is that two lexical items that are semantically distinct are united within the same Word. Let us consider the Interpersonal and Representational Level analyses of this example, repeated here as (60): (60) Te-shut-pe-ban 1.sg.a>pl.u-shirt-make-past ‘I made (the) shirts.’

the organization of the morphosyntactic level

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(AI : [(FI : DECL (FI )) (PI )S (PJ )A (CI : [(TI ) (RI : [+S, −A] (RI )) (RJ )] (CI ))] (AI )) RL: (past epi : (sim ei : [(fi : [(fi : peV (fi )) (1xi )A (mxj : (fj : shutN (fj )) (xj ))U ] (fi )) (ei )U ]) (epi ))

(61) IL:

Among the morphosyntactic primitives of Southern Tiwa, there will be a Word template (62): (62) (Vw1 : [(Aﬀ1 ) (Ns1 ) (Vs1 ) (Aﬀ1 )] (Vw1 )) which will permit translation of the Interpersonal and Representational Level representations into the morphosyntactic representation (63): (63) (Lei : (Cli : (Vpi : (Vwi : [(Aﬀi : ti (Aﬀi )) (Nsi : shut (Nsi )) (Vsi : pe (Vsi )) (Aﬀj : ban (Aﬀj ))] (Vwi )) (Vpi )) (Cli )) (Lei )) To summarize, polysynthetic languages like Southern Tiwa are characterized by: (i) a lack of isomorphism between the Interpersonal and Representational Levels on the one hand and the Morphosyntactic Level on the other hand; (ii) internal layering of Words. Depending on the fusional or agglutinating nature of the language placeholders may or may not be required. Let us now turn to the distinction between head-marking and dependentmarking languages, which was introduced in Nichols (1986). According to this approach to language typology, entire languages, or particular constructions within them, may be classiﬁed according as head or dependents display morphosyntactic marking of the relation between them. Nichols shows that each language as a whole will tend to use one or the other type of marking and that crosslinguistically there is a certain tendency for languages to adopt head-marking rather than dependency-marking, although both types are found in suﬃcient measure. She criticizes grammatical theories for usually assuming dependent-marking to be basic, perhaps because the Indo-European languages most familiar to western grammarians are all dependent-marking. In FDG terms, a careful distinction needs to be made between, on the one hand, head–modiﬁer relations and, on the other, nucleus–dependent relations. Typical examples of the former are the relations between noun and attributive adjective, between noun and alienable possessor, and between adjective and degree adverb. For these, FDG predicts that, if one of the two members of the pair is morphosyntactically marked, it will be the modiﬁer. This is in keeping with the correspondence between functional markedness and morphosyntactic marking: just as a modiﬁer is functionally marked in being an optional speciﬁcation of the head, so we may expect it to be the bearer of morphological marking reﬂecting its modifying role. Nucleus–dependent relations are those between a predicate and its argument(s), whether that predicate be verbal, nominal, or adpositional. Here the

306

the morphosyntactic level

relation is not one of an expansion of a head with an optional modiﬁer: the arguments and the predicate are in an equipollent relationship determined by the relevant predication frame and together constitute a head. It might appear, since semantic functions are shown as subscripts on arguments, that FDG is nevertheless biased towards dependent-marking in the same way as other theories criticized by Nichols (1986). Nevertheless, as pointed out in 3.6.2.3, this is merely a representational convention: the semantic function holds between the nucleus and the dependent and should be understood as characterizing that relation:

Nucleus

Semantic function

Dependent

At the Morphosyntactic Level, the expression of the semantic function, which expresses the relation between nucleus and dependent, can be attributed to either. As an example of dependent-marking, consider the following example from Chechen (Nichols 1986: 61): (64)

Da:-s woQa-na urs-∅ tü:xira. father-erg son-dat knife-nom strike.pst ‘The father stabbed the son.’

The two arguments of the verb and the instrument modiﬁer are all dependents of the verb as nucleus of the predication, and in this language are marked for the semantic function that links them to the nucleus. Compare now the following example of head-marking from Abkhaz (Nichols 1986: 61, Hewitt 1979: 36), in which the nucleus contains three preﬁxes, one for each of the semantic relations between the nucleus and its three arguments (none of which is morphologically marked): a-š◦ q◦ ’`@ (65) A-xac’a a-pè◦ `@s def-man def-woman def-book ∅-l`@-y-te-yt’. 3.nh.abs-3.f.dat-3.m.erg-give-fin ‘The man gave the woman the book.’ Nucleus–dependent relations also obtain between nominal and adpositional predicates and their arguments: thus in John’s brother and under the table, the heads are brother and under respectively. In consistently nucleus-marking languages, as we shall call them, it is the nucleus that bears the marking of

the organization of the morphosyntactic level

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the dependency. In Jarawara (Dixon 2000: 489; 2004: 314–15), for example, the gender-marking on the head of an expression of inalienable possession (i.e. in which the possessee takes the possessor as its argument at the Representational Level) is for about 50 per cent of inalienably possessed nouns determined by the gender of the possessor. Thus man- ‘arm’ is marked as feminine if the person whose arm is being described in feminine: (66)

Manira man-i Manira arm-f ‘Manira’s arm’

With alienable possession in Jarawara, where the relationship is between head and modiﬁer, the gender-marking on the head is determined by the inherent gender of the possessed noun. As an example of the marking of an adpositional predicate as nucleus, consider (67), again from Abkhaz (Nichols 1986: 60, Hewitt 1979: 103): (67)

a-j`@yas a-q’n`@ def-river 3.nh.poss-at ‘at the river’

FDG thus generates the expectation that where there are relations between a nucleus and its dependents, then, if there is marking of the relationship, either the nucleus or the dependent, or indeed both, may be marked. An instance of double marking (of nucleus and dependent) may be observed in Hungarian two-place verbs with a deﬁnite second argument, which are nucleus-marked for both the ﬁrst and the second argument, as well as dependent-marked for the roles of these arguments (see de Groot 1989: 20–1). FDG also generates the expectation that with head–modiﬁer relations, the modiﬁer rather than the head will be marked, and indeed marking of the head is rather rare. Bickel (in prep.) states that of the 157 languages he investigated, head-marking in this sense is found in only 3. An example of this rare type is Persian, in which the head is marked by the ‘ezafe’ marker -e (Mahootian 1997: 68, see also 3.9.2): (68) ketab-e jaleb book-ezafe interesting ‘an interesting book’ To conclude this section, then, we may state that FDG is capable of hosting languages of all morphological types and of showing how exactly they diﬀer from one another in how the Morphosyntactic Level interacts with the Interpersonal Level and the Representational Level. Furthermore FDG generates speciﬁc predictions as regards what is usually considered to be headdependent marking. The way in which FDG representations are built up

308

the morphosyntactic level

leads to a further subdivision of the markings of relation between head and modiﬁers on the one hand, and nucleus and dependents on the other.

4.3 Linguistic Expressions A Linguistic Expression is any set of at least one unit that can be used independently; where there is more than one unit within a Linguistic Expression, they will demonstrably belong together morphosyntactically, while, crucially, one is not part of the other. The units that may combine in this way may be Clauses or Phrases, which do not only combine with themselves but also with each other. Consider the following examples from Kashmiri (Wali and Koul 1997: 138): (69) SO cha t’u:t ja:n geva:n yu:t mohn1 o:s. she is corr much.good sing.prs.ptcp rel Mohan was ‘She sings as well as Mohan used to sing.’ (70)

Yuth vOsta:d t’uth tsa:t.h. rel teacher corr disciple ‘The disciple is as the teacher.’

These examples both illustrate mutual dependency. Given the use of correlative elements, neither of the two units in (69) and (70) could be used independently, yet neither is a constituent of the other. We will call this situation ‘equiordination’. Apart from these cases of mutual dependency of two units, Linguistic Expressions may also contain one unit that could be used independently and one that could not. Van der Auwera (1997) illustrates this by means of the following examples from Tauya (MacDonald 1990: 227) and English: (71) Peima ﬁtau-fe-e-te wate tepau-a-Pa. carefully throw-pf-1/2.sg-ds neg break-3.sg-ind ‘I threw it carefully and it didn’t break.’ “Me having thrown it carefully, it didn’t break.” (72) As for the students, they have heard the news yesterday. The Tauya example in (71) illustrates the phenomenon of cosubordination (Olson 1981), a phenomenon that we touched upon when discussing Episodes in 3.4. Here the ﬁrst Clause could not occur on its own, yet it is not a constituent of the second Clause, which could occur on its own. In (72) the Clause could be used independently, but the introductory Noun Phrase could not; yet the latter is not a constituent of the former.

clauses

309

Table 6. The constitution of a Linguistic Expression

Clause Phrase

Mutually dependent

One-way dependent

No dependency

Equiordination (69) Equiordination (70)

Cosubordination (71) Extra-clausality (72)

Coordination (73) Listing (74)

A ﬁnal situation in which two or more units form a Linguistic Expression is one in which neither is a constituent of the other, each could occur on its own, but the combination of units forms a single formal unit. The following examples illustrate this situation: (73)

Celtic won and Rangers lost.

(74)

(Can I take your order?) A Big Mac, French fries, and a Coke.

The coordination of two Discourse Acts in (73) is realized morphosyntactically as an explicitly marked coordination of two Clauses. (74) is a typical example of listing. Note that we have deliberately chosen a context in which the list cannot be interpreted as an incomplete Clause. The various examples of the constitution of a Linguistic Expression can be summarized as in Table 6. These can be represented as follows: (75)

(Le1 : [(dep Cl1 ) (dep Cl2 )] (Le1 ))

Clausal Equiordination

(76)

(Le1 : [(dep Cl1 ) (dep Cln-1 ) (Cln )] (Le1 ))

Cosubordination

(77)

(Le1 : [(Cl1 ) (Cln-1 ) (Gw1 ) (Cln )] (Le1 ))

Coordination

(78)

(Le1 : [(Xp1 ) (Xp2 )] (Le1 ))

Phrasal Equiordination

(79)

(Le1 : [(Xp1 ) (Cl1 )] (Le1 ))

Extra-clausality

(80) (Le1 : [(Xp1 ) (Xpn-1 ) (Gw1 ) (Xpn )] (Le1 ))

Listing

Note that the superscript used for dependent Clauses is here just shorthand for the speciﬁc templates that individual languages may require for dependent Clauses.

4.4 Clauses 4.4.1 Introduction

Ignoring the speciﬁc order in which constituents occur, a Clause in a conﬁgurational language like English has the following formula:

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the morphosyntactic level

(81) (Cl1 : [(Xw) (Xp){φ} (Cl){φ} ] (Cl1 )) where each constituent may occur more than once. In other words, a Clause in such a language consists of a sequenced conﬁguration of Words (Xw), Phrases (Xp), and other (embedded) Clauses (Cl). (For a foundational FG study of positional syntax in English, see Connolly 1991.) Phrases and Clauses may carry a syntactic function (φ). The semantic dependency relations among these items have been speciﬁed at the Representational Level and therefore need not be reduplicated here. Since, as we have argued earlier, lexical elements are always the heads of Phrases at the Morphosyntactic Level, Words at the Clause layer can only be grammatical ones, such as conjunctions, particles, and the like. In this section we consider the internal constitution of Clauses. The linear order of elements within the Clause will be considered from two diﬀerent perspectives. As we argued earlier, the Interpersonal Level is organized on the basis of two types of frame: interpersonal frames and content frames. The former take care of the hierarchical organization of the Interpersonal Level, the latter of the non-hierarchical organization of the Subacts within the Communicated Content. Similarly, the Representational Level is organized on the basis of representational frames, taking care of the hierarchical aspects of the Representational Level, and of predication frames, taking care of the non-hierarchical organization of Conﬁgurational Properties. This may be shown as in (82)–(83):

interpersonal frame content frame (82) (M1 : (A1 : [(F1 ) ..(C1 : [(T1 ){} (T1+N ){} (R1 ){} (R1+N ){} ] (C1 ): (C1 )) ] (A1 ): (A1 )) (M1 ): (M1 ))

representational frame predication frame (83) (p1 : (ep1 : (e1 : [(f1 : [(v1 ) (v1+n )φ ] (f1 ): [σ (f1 )φ ]) (e1 )φ ]: [σ (e1 )φ ]) (ep1 ): [σ (ep1 )φ ]) (p1 ): [σ (p1 )φ ]) Given the overall and systematic top-down organization of FDG, we will assume that the ordering of elements in morphosyntax also proceeds in a

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311

top-down manner, and will therefore start in 4.4.2 with the morphosyntactic expression of the hierarchically organized parts of the Interpersonal and Representational Levels, starting with the highest layers and working down to the lowest ones until we touch upon the content and predication frames. The expression of the latter is not sensitive to hierarchical ordering, but to alignment, an issue we will discuss in 4.4.3 before discussing the actual ordering of the elements constituting content and predication frames in 4.4.4. We will thus assume that there are morphosyntactic counterparts, to be called templates, presented in 4.4.5, to hierarchical and non-hierarchical frames, though as we will see these may partly interlock. Obligatory positions in templates for which no material is available from the Interpersonal and Representational Levels are ﬁlled with dummies, which will be treated in 4.4.4. We are then ready to treat agreement relations in 4.4.7. Since agreement may be sensitive to order, it can only be dealt with as this stage. After thus concluding the discussion of the organization of main Clauses, we will pay attention to the form and structure of subordinate Clauses in 4.4.8, and coreferential relations within and between Clauses in 4.4.9. 4.4.2 Ordering of hierarchically related units

In the top-down and hierarchical approach outlined above, we predict that the optimal way to proceed in a dynamic implementation of encoding interpersonal and representational units, excluding those that are in a conﬁgurational rather than hierarchical relationship, is as follows: (84)

M /πM → A / A /πA → F /πF → C / C /πC → φep /σep /πep → φp /σp /πp → φe /σe /πe → σf /πf

That is, we start by putting functions, modiﬁers, and operators of Moves into the appropriate clausal (and extra-clausal, see below) positions and end with operators and modiﬁers of Conﬁgurational Properties of States-of-Aﬀairs. Within each group functions are expressed before operators and modiﬁers, since functions are external to the unit to which they apply. Thus, we obey the principle of iconicity (see 4.1.2) when ordering hierarchically related units. When starting out the process of placing elements in the appropriate position, three positions are immediately available: the Clause-initial position (PI ), the Clause-medial position (PM ), and the Clause-ﬁnal position (PF ). The two peripheral positions (PI and PF ) are psychologically salient (Gernsbacher 1990) and their deployment in communication has been much studied within the functional-linguistic framework (cf. Mackenzie 2000, Hannay and Martínez-Caro 2008). Some systems of constituent order can be systematically described starting from just these two positions. The Clause-medial position is

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the morphosyntactic level

less salient as it is not a uniquely identiﬁable position, given the varying numbers of constituents a Clause may contain. The relevance of this distinction was shown in Hengeveld et al. (2004). Further clausal positions can be deﬁned relative to these three absolute positions, such as the postinitial (PI+1 ), penultimate (PF-1 ), and postmedial (PM+1 ) positions within the Clause. These can only be ﬁlled when the absolute position relative to which they are deﬁned has been ﬁlled already. Note that, at the outset, the postinitial (PI+1 ) and penultimate (PF-1 ) relative positions coincide superﬁcially with the absolute medial position (PM ), as follows: (85)

PM P PI+1 PF-1 PF I

Note furthermore that some languages have an absolute second position, P2 , which we will come back to later. The combinations of Clauses with extraclausal constituents give further opportunities to distinguish positions at the Clause margins, as illustrated in (86) and (87): (86) As for his ideas, I don’t like them. (87)

I don’t like them, his ideas.

The positions involved here are actually not clausal positions, but positions within the Linguistic Expression (Le). For reasons of exposition we will deal with their ordering here. The relevant positions could be deﬁned as PI and PF within the Linguistic Expression, the Clause itself occupying the medial position, as indicated in (88), in which the bar (|) provisionally indicates the Clause boundary, in anticipation of a more systematic treatment in 4.4.5. (88) Linguistic Expression: PI | Clause | PF I M F Clause: | P P P | To distinguish between PI and PF at the layer of the Linguistic Expression and of the Clause, we will use Ppre for the preclausal position, Pcentre for the clausal position, and Ppost for the postclausal position within the resulting expression, with the result given in (89): Pcentre | Ppost (89) Linguistic Expression: Ppre | | PI P M P F | Clause: These are the positions the encoder has to work with when starting to put elements into the appropriate positions in a top-down manner: three absolute positions, and two relative ones. Only when elements have been put into any of these positions do new relative positions become available.

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As an illustration of how this aﬀects the expression of modiﬁers in a topdown approach, consider the following constructed example: (90) Finally ( A ), she honestly ( F ) reportedly ( C ) has been drinking again. Example (90) contains a series of interpersonal modiﬁers. It is clear from the example that these are placed in a centripetal manner, i.e. starting from the outside. The relatively highest modiﬁer has to be in the outermost non-clausal position (Ppre ). If this modiﬁer is not present, the next modiﬁer down may occupy this position, as illustrated in (91): (91)

Honestly, she reportedly has been drinking again.

Interpersonal modiﬁers prefer this Clause-external position when it is available, i.e. not occupied by a higher modiﬁer. When this position is not available, the next candidate goes to the PM position, as in the case of honestly in (90). That this is Clause-medial position PM and not the postinitial position PI+1 can be deduced from the fact that PI has not yet been ﬁlled at this stage, so that no further positions can be deﬁned relative to it. Once PM is ﬁlled, new relative positions can be deﬁned with respect to it and host other modiﬁers, as in the case of reportedly in (90). These patterns may thus be represented as in (92) and (93): (92) (93)

Ppre ﬁnallyA honestly

F

| PI | |

PM honestlyF reportedly

C

PM+1 reportedlyC

(=90) (=91)

Now consider the placement of representational modiﬁers in (94a–c): (94)

a. Probably (σp ), she has been drinking continuously (σf ) again (σe ) recently (σep ). b. Probably (σp ) she has been drinking continuously (σf ) again (σe ) recently (σep ). c. She probably (σp ) has been drinking continuously (σf ) again (σe ) recently (σep ).

In these examples of grammatical orderings of modiﬁers the same principle applies. Representational modiﬁers prefer to stay within the main Clause, and they too are positioned within the Clause in a centripetal manner, by starting from the left and the right edges, ﬁlling in absolute positions ﬁrst and thereby creating new relative positions, as shown in the following representations of (94a–c):

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the morphosyntactic level

(95)

Ppre | PI P M ... σ p probably | | probablyσp | probablyσp

a. b. c.

PF-2 continuouslyσf continuouslyσf continuouslyσf

PF-1 againσe againσe againσe

PF recentlyσep (=94a) recentlyσep (=94b) recentlyσep (=94c)

When (90) and (94) are conﬂated, the result is as in (96): (96) Finally, she honestly reportedly probably has been drinking continuously again recently. In this unnatural, yet grammatical example it becomes clear that the placement of interpersonal modiﬁers precedes the placement of representational modiﬁers, witness the position of probably to the right of the series of interpersonal modiﬁers counting from the left edge. This is represented in (97): (97)

Ppre ﬁnallyA PF-1 againσe

| PI PM PM+1 PM+2 . . . PF-2 F C σp | honestly reportedly probably . . . continuouslyσf F P recentlyσep

As we indicated already in 3.7.2.3.2, we ﬁnd a lot of evidence across languages that functions, operators, and modiﬁers are indeed placed centripetally. If there is morphosyntactic marking of Illocution, for example, we observe a strong tendency for Illocution markers to take either Clause-initial or Clauseﬁnal position, or both. As pointed out in 2.5.2.3, in English the nature of the occupant of the Clause-initial position is a good guide to the Illocution of the Discourse Act. Other languages have speciﬁc markers for yes-no questions, which in Polish is Clause-initial (the particle czy) and in Mandarin Chinese Clause-ﬁnal (the particle ma; Li and Thompson 1981: 547ﬀ.). In Russian, a yes-no question is signalled phonologically; an alternative is placement of li immediately after the Clause-initial constituent (Meyer and Mleinek 2006); in Ute (Givón 1984: 219; 277), yes-no questions are formed by adding the clitic -a(a) after the ﬁrst Word of a Clause (even if it is part of a Phrase). In Wolof (Torrence 2005: 67) the question particle ndax may occur in either Clauseinitial or Clause-ﬁnal position. Truly Clause-medial indicators of illocutionary status are to our knowledge not found. Relations between Discourse Acts, as expressed by rhetorical functions, are also typically expressed by Clause-initial or Clause-ﬁnal elements. Coordinators, for example, are usually found in Clause-initial position with respect to a non-initial series of coordinated Clauses; an interesting case is Scots but, which may be found Clause-ﬁnally, cf., from the online Dictionary of the Scots Language, s.v. but adv.:

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315

You can get maist things on video these days. Ye have tae look aroon but.

Adverbs acting as modiﬁers of Discourse Acts are similarly encountered above all in either of the extreme positions of the Clause. Thus we ﬁnd not as an irony signaller in Clause-ﬁnal position He’s cute not, and similarly for the emphasizer dammit. All these phenomena point towards a preference for phenomena that are situated higher in the hierarchy to be expressed in either initial or ﬁnal position within the Clause. The position may be ﬁxed: the interrogative particles czy in Polish and ma in Mandarin Chinese, for example, can only appear in initial and ﬁnal position respectively, just as English ironic not can only be Clause-ﬁnal. Some modiﬁers, however, display more freedom to appear in either initial position (where they indicate the interpersonal role of what is to follow) or in ﬁnal position, often as an adjustment of what has been said to the ongoing interaction. In languages that are predicate-initial or predicate-ﬁnal, we might expect to ﬁnd two possibilities. Where the languages in question are rigidly predicateinitial or predicate-ﬁnal, hierarchically related units will be obliged to situate themselves at the opposite end of the sequence. An example of a strongly predicate-ﬁnal language is Korean, in which it would appear that a Discourse Act modiﬁer like tahaynghi ‘fortunately’ can only occur Clause-initially (Lee 2001: 58): (99) Tahaynghi John-i Mary-ka chayk-ul ilk-key hayessta. Fortunately John-nom Mary-nom book-acc read-nmlz cause.pst ‘Fortunately, John caused Mary to read a book.’ However, no language seems to be so strongly predicate-initial that it disallows hierarchically related units in initial position. Thus predicate-initial Scottish Gaelic permits the act-modifying gu fortanach ‘fortunately’ to precede the predicate: (100) Gu_fortanach bha caraid a’ fuireach faisg orm. Fortunately be.pst friend prog dwell near on-1.sg ‘Fortunately, there was a friend of mine living near me.’ And similarly in Tagalog we ﬁnd (Nagaya 2006): (101) Sa=kasamaang-palad bhumiagsak si=Gaga sa=pagsusulit. Unfortunately av.failed nom=Gaga dat=examination ‘Unfortunately Gaga failed the examination.’ Where the language is less strongly oriented to initial or ﬁnal position of the predicate, we might expect hierarchically related units to precede or follow the

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the morphosyntactic level

verb respectively. Consider Japanese as a predicate-ﬁnal language that (primarily in conversational interaction, Hinds 1986: 166) allows ﬁnal placement of a modiﬁer of the Discourse Act: (102) Datte, nodo ga itai mono, hontoo-ni. and throat nom hurt thing really ‘And I have a sore throat, really.’ (Hinds 1986: 167) As for the Representational Level, the same observations hold. As we saw in 3.5.3, a modiﬁer of an Episode may be combined with a modiﬁer of a State-ofAﬀairs. In example (103): (103) Yesterday Sheila went out before dinner. the Episode-modiﬁer yesterday occurs in initial position and the State-ofAﬀairs modiﬁer before dinner in ﬁnal position. If both were to be combined in ﬁnal position, note that yesterday (despite being formally simpler) prefers to occur in absolute ﬁnal (i.e. a more peripheral) position: (104) Sheila went out before dinner yesterday. (105) ?Sheila went out yesterday before dinner. Example (105), if used, could only be justiﬁed by application of Contrast to before dinner, i.e. if the reﬂection of a pragmatic function outweighs that of hierarchical structure. This situation is related to non-hierarchical aspects of order, which we will return to in 4.4.4. 4.4.3 Alignment 4.4.3.1 Introduction

We use the term alignment to refer to the way in which non-hierarchically related pragmatic and semantic units map onto morphosyntactic ones. Foley (2005: 385) refers to this as the ‘mapping problem’ and deﬁnes it as: ‘how to align lexically speciﬁed arguments of a predicate with their formal, structural realizations’. Many theories take recourse to grammatical relations to account for alignment, assuming universality for these. In FDG grammatical relations are also recognized, and formalized as syntactic functions at the Morphosyntactic Level, but they are not assumed to be universal. Syntactic functions are relevant only in those cases in which the formal properties of linguistic units cannot be reduced to the pragmatic and the semantic categories and functions underlying them, i.e. they are relevant when there is neutralization of semantic and pragmatic distinctions (see e.g. Bakker and Siewierska 2007). In cases where there is no such neutralization, we will not assume the presence of syntactic functions in the morphosyntactic representation of a Clause

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(see also Falk 2006). Given the organization of FDG, we may, as a result, distinguish three basic types of alignment: (i) interpersonal alignment: in this type of alignment the morphosyntactic organization reﬂects the organization of the Interpersonal Level, either in terms of the pragmatic functions (Topic, Focus, etc.) of Subacts, and/or in terms of their reference (deﬁniteness, speciﬁcity, etc.); (ii) representational alignment: in this type of alignment the morphosyntactic organization reﬂects the organization of the Representational Level, either in terms of the semantic functions (Actor, Undergoer, etc.) of semantic categories, or in terms of their designation (animacy, person, etc.); (iii) morphosyntactic alignment: in this type of alignment the morphosyntactic organization is not a direct reﬂection of the organization of the Interpersonal and/or the Representational Level, but exhibits its own organization in terms of the syntactic functions (Subject, Object) of morphosyntactic constituents, and/or in terms of complexity/weight (Word, Phrase, etc.). Given these three types of alignment we might classify languages as having an interpersonally organized grammar, a representationally organized grammar, or a morphosyntactically organized grammar. But these can just be considered as tendencies. As with the types of languages recognized in e.g. morphological typology and word-order typology, languages often exhibit mixed systems of alignment, for instance one in which referentiality (interpersonal) and animacy (representational) together produce certain alignment eﬀects; or one in which agreement is representational in nature, but conjunction reduction is morphosyntactically determined (see Keenan 1976 on coding and behavioural properties of Subjects). Nevertheless, to show the eﬀects of the three types of alignment, we will discuss them one by one, looking at a number of examples of relatively pure alignment of the three types. 4.4.3.2 Interpersonal alignment

An interesting example of interpersonal alignment may be found in Tagalog (cf. van der Auwera 1981). The alignment system of this language has provoked a lot of interest and conﬂicting analyses in the literature, but we will here follow Bickel (fc.), who argues that, in order to account for the occurrence of an Np with the preposed clitic ang, ‘all that matters is that the NP has speciﬁc reference and that it is the most topical element in discourse’ (Bickel fc.: 8). Bickel is clearly referring here to notions that we have identiﬁed in Chapter 2 as being interpersonal in nature. Consider the following examples:

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the morphosyntactic level

(106) bumilí ang=lalake ng=isda sa=tindahan. pfv.av.buy spec.top=man obl=ﬁsh loc=store ‘The man bought ﬁsh at the/a store.’ (107)

binilí ng=lalake ang=isda sa=tindahan. pfv.uv.buy obl=man spec.top=ﬁsh loc=store ‘The/a man bought the ﬁsh at the/a store.’

(108) binilhan ng=lalake ng=isda ang=tindahan. pfv.lv.buy obl=man obl=ﬁsh spec.top=store ‘The/a man bought ﬁsh at the store.’ Although the ang-marker can be said to be interpersonal in nature, it clearly interacts with the Representational Level when it comes to expressing the predicate of the sentence: the form chosen for the predicate depends on the semantic function of the representational unit which corresponds to the speciﬁc Topical Interpersonal Subact. Thus in (106) the predicate shows that the Topic is an Actor, in (107) that is an Undergoer, and in (108) that it is a Location. Since ang-marking masks the expression of the semantic function of the argument involved, it is only through the form chosen for the predicate that the semantic function of this argument can be retrieved. Thus, we ﬁnd the following correspondences between the Interpersonal Level, the Representational Level, and the Morphosyntactic Level in (106)–(108): (+i +d RI)TOP (ei:(fi: [ (fj: bili (fj)) (xi: –lalake– (xi))A (xj: –isda– (xj))U ] (fi)): (xk: –tindahan– (xk))L (fi)) (ei)) (–sa=tindahan–) (–ng=isda–) (–bili–) (–ang=lalake–)

(+i +d RI)TOP (ei:(fi: [ (fj: bili (fj)) (xi: –lalake– (xi))A (xj: –isda– (xj))U ] (fi)): (xk: –tindahan– (xk))L (fi)) (ei)) (–bili–) (–ng=lalake–) (–sa=tindahan–) (–ang=isda–)

(ei:(fi: [ (fj: bili (fj)) (xi: –lalake– (xi))A (–binilh-an–) (–ng=lalake–)

(+i +d RI)TOP (xj: –isda– (xj))U ] (fi)): (xk: –tindahan– (xk))L (fi)) (ei)) (–ang=tindahan–) (–ng=isda–)

In order to account for these facts there is no need to postulate syntactic functions. The morphosyntactic encoder just has to know what the Topic is in order to mark the corresponding unit with ang, and what the semantic

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319

function of the ang Phrase is in order to select the appropriate form of the predicate. Not only coding properties but also behavioural properties can be dealt with in this way. Conjunction reduction, which applies to ang Phrases, can be deﬁned in terms of the Topic notion directly. If ang-marking is determined at the Interpersonal Level, we expect it to be insensitive to the argument/modiﬁer distinction that is relevant to other types of alignment, since the argument/modiﬁer opposition is irrelevant at the Interpersonal Level. And indeed Tagalog allows a wide range of semantic units to be expressed as the speciﬁc Topic, including modiﬁers of the Stateof-Aﬀairs, such as the Locative modiﬁer in (104). Another example is the following, in which the ang-Phrase (here realized in a special demonstrative form) is an Instrument (Himmelmann 2005): (109)

ipang-pù-putol ko na lang itóng kutsilyo. ins-impf-cut 1.sg.poss now only prox.lk knife ‘I will just cut it with this knife.’

The preﬁx ipang- in this example consists of the conveyance voice marker i - and the instrument marker pang-. The combination is sometimes considered to constitute a single marker of instrument topics (see Himmelmann 2005). The fact that the marking is independent of the argument/modiﬁer distinction also shows up in the fact that both argument and non-argument expressions with the same semantic function occur with the same type of marking on the predicate. Thus, Locative arguments and Locative modiﬁers acting as speciﬁc Topics will both be marked by the locative form of the predicate. 4.4.3.3 Representational alignment

4.4.3.3.1 Introduction Representational alignment systems may be sensitive to the semantic function of a semantic category, or to the designation of such categories. We will discuss both types of alignment here. 4.4.3.3.2 Semantic function A language in which alignment is highly sensitive to semantic functions is Acehnese. Durie (1985: 190) explicitly presents Acehnese as a subjectless language, showing that its syntax is sensitive to semantic functions rather than to grammatical relations. Arguments may have one of three semantic functions: Actor (A), Undergoer (U), and Recipient (R). Actors and Undergoers (in both cases mainly human ones) are crossreferenced on the verb through clitic pronouns. The Actor clitics precede the verb, the Undergoer clitics follow the verb. This is also true of Actors and Undergoers in one-place predication frames (Durie 1985: 55–8):

320

the morphosyntactic level

(110) Lôn teungöh=lôn=jak. 1 middle=1.a=go ‘I am going/walking.’ (111) Gopnyan galak=geuh that 3.pol happy=3.pol.u very ‘He is very happy.’ (112) Gopnyan na=lôn=timbak=geuh 3.pol aux=1.a=shoot=3.pol.u ‘I shot him.’ The Actor in (110) is cross-referenced on the verb through a proclitic, the Undergoer in (111) through an enclitic, and both are present to mark the Actor and Undergoer in (112). Freestanding Actors are furthermore marked by means of the preposition lê, while for Recipients the preposition keu is available. In the absence of cross-referencing on the verb for Recipients, this is the only expression of this semantic function (Durie 1985: 182): (113) Keu=jih ka=geu=jôk buku=nyan lê=gopnyan. to=3.fam inch=3.pol.a=give book=that by=3.pol ‘He (polite) gave him (familiar) that book.’ Note that the inanimate Undergoer is not cross-referenced on the verb. One further factor is that when any argument is topicalized, it occurs without its preposition. The Topic position in Acehnese is the one immediately preceding the verb. The absence of the agentive preposition lê in this position was illustrated in the earlier example (110). The absence of the dative preposition is shown in (114) (Durie 1985: 182): (114) Gopnyan ka=lôn=bi peng. 3.pol inch=1=give money ‘I have given him some money.’ The dative marking in (113) seems to contradict the analysis, given the fact that the Recipient is in preverbal position. However, it is not obligatory to have a Topic, as shown by the fact that one can be added to a sentence like (113). Compare the following examples (Durie 1985: 182): (115) Keu=gopnyan lôn hana=galak=lôn. dat=3.pol I neg.aux=like=1 ‘I don’t like him.’

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321

(116) Gopnyan (*lôn) hana=galak=lôn. 3.pol I neg.aux=like=1 ‘I don’t like him.’ The unmarked Recipient in (116) does not allow a following unmarked argument, while the marked Recipient in (115) does. We may describe these facts without having recourse to grammatical relations. The organization of argument expression in Acehnese is primarily organized in terms of the semantic functions of arguments. Secondarily, in the presence of Topic assignment at the Interpersonal Level semantic functions are not expressed. Thus the interaction between the three levels may be illustrated as in the following representations of (112)–(114): (ei:(fi: [ (fj: timbak (fj)) (xi: –1– (xi))A (–lôn=timbak=geuh–)

(ei:(fi: [ (fj: jôk (fj)) (xi: –3.POL– (xi))A (–geu=jôk–) (–lê=gopnyan–)

(ei:(fi: [ (fj: bi (fj)) (–lôn=bi–)

(xi: –1– (xi))A

(xj: –3.POL– (xj))U] (fi)) (ei)) (–gopnyan–)

(xj: –buku– (xj))U (xk: –3.FAM– (xk))R] (fi)) (ei)) (–buku–) (–keu=jih–)

(xj: –peng– (xj))U (–peng–)

(RI)TOP (xk: –3.POL (xk))R] (fi)) (ei)) (–ø=gopnyan–)

4.4.3.3.3 Designation The second type of representational alignment is called hierarchical alignment, since its organization is dependent on hierarchies of animacy and person. A good example of a language exhibiting this type of alignment is Plains Cree, as described in Wolvengrey (2005). The following examples serve to illustrate some features that are crucial to this type of alignment system (Wolvengrey 2005: 423): (117)

Ni-wîcih-â-nân-ak 1-help-drct-1.pl.3.pl ‘We help them.’

(118)

Ni-wîcih-iko-nân-ak 1-help-inv-1.pl.3.pl ‘They help us.’

In (117) and (118) the same person markers are used for ﬁrst person plural (ni-nân) and third person plural (-ak), in exactly the same positions, regardless of

322

the morphosyntactic level

the semantic functions (Actor and Undergoer) of the participants. In order to correctly assign a semantic function to the two participants a person hierarchy has to be taken into account, which ranks second person over ﬁrst person over third person. If the higher-ranking person is the Actor, the verb is inﬂected as being direct (drct), if the lower-ranking person is the Actor, the verb is inﬂected as being inverse (inv); see also Nedergaard Thomsen (2005) on Mapudungun. Thus, since in (117) ﬁrst person ranks over third person, and the ﬁrst person is the Actor, the direct construction is used, while in (118) the third person is the Actor and the inverse construction is used. When there are two third persons one is marked as proximate (prox) and the other as obviative (obv). The proximate third person ranks over the obviative third person, so that the resulting person hierarchy is as in (119) (Wolvengrey 2005: 424): (119) 2 → 1 → 3.prox → 3.obv A third person is marked as proximate when it is the Topic at the Interpersonal Level, and obviative when it is not, so that (119) may be rewritten as: (120) 2 → 1 → 3.top → 3.nontop The result of this arrangement is that the interpretation of the semantic functions of participants may be reversed through the direct-inverse system or through the proximate-obviative system. When both are applied simultaneously, the interpretation of the semantic functions does not change, thus opening up the possibility of expressing all possible combinations of pragmatic and semantic functions, as the following examples illustrate (Wolvengrey 2005: 425): (121) Câniy-∅ kî-wîcih-ê-w Mêrî-wa. Johnny-prox tns-help-drct-3 Mary-obv ‘Johnny helped Mary.’ (122) Câniy-wa kî-wîcih-ê-w Mêrî-∅. Johnny-obv tns-help-drct-3 Mary-prox ‘Mary helped Johnny.’ (123) Câniy-∅ kî-wîcih-ikw(-w) Mêrî-wa. Johnny-prox tns-help-inv-3 Mary-obv ‘Mary helped Johnny.’ (124)

Câniy-wa kî-wîcih-ikw(-w) Mêrî-∅. Johnny-obv tns-help-inv-3 Mary-prox ‘Johnny helped Mary.’

clauses

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In (121) Johnny is Topic-Actor, in (122) NonTopic-Undergoer, in (123) TopicUndergoer, and in (124) NonTopic-Actor. Similarly, Mary is NonTopicUndergoer in (121), Topic-Actor in (122), NonTopic-Actor in (123), and Topic-Undergoer in (124). The system may be illustrated by means of the following multilevel representation of (121) and (123): (RI)+TOP (ei:(fi: [ (fj: wîcih (fj)) (–wîcih-ê-w–)

(RJ)–TOP

(xi: –Câniy– (xi))A (–Câniy-Ø–)

(xj: –Mêrî– (xj))U (–Mêrî-wa–)

(RI)–TOP

(RJ)+TOP

(xj: –Mêrî– (xj))A (ei:(fi: [ (fj: wîcih (fj)) (–Mêrî-wa–) (–wîcih-ikw(-w)–)

] (fi)) (ei))

(xi: –Câniy– (xi))U ] (fi)) (ei)) (–Câniy-Ø–)

Note that in Cree the importance of notions such as animacy and person is also manifest in ditransitive constructions. In these, it is always the Recipient that is treated as the Object, being higher in animacy (Wolvengrey, p.c.). This is typical of the primative-secundative alignment type that we will discuss in 4.4.3.4.2. Hierarchical alignment is also relevant for the analysis of languages for which the grammatical relation of Subject is relevant but the grammatical relation of Object is not. In this type of language the Undergoer argument may align in diﬀerent ways depending on its place on a designational hierarchy. Thus, in Spanish the marking of an Undergoer is dependent on its humanness and speciﬁcity. Consider the following examples: (125) Busco una casa. look.for-1.sg.prs indf house ‘I’m looking for a house.’ (126) Busco una secretaria. look.for-1.sg.prs indf secretary ‘I’m looking for a secretary.’ (127)

Busco a una secretaria. look.for-1.sg.prs hum.spec.u indf secretary ‘I’m looking for a secretary.’

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the morphosyntactic level

The sentence in (126) is used in the case of non-speciﬁc reference, and would for instance be appropriate in an advertisement. Sentence (127) is used in the case of speciﬁc reference and would be appropriately used by someone looking for a known person. The marker a is used for deﬁnite and indeﬁnite reference as long as it is speciﬁc, and for persons and pets, but not for other animals. 4.4.3.4 Morphosyntactic alignment

4.4.3.4.1 Introduction Morphosyntactic alignment may be sensitive to the syntactic functions assigned to morphosyntactic constituents, or to the complexity of these constituents. We will discuss these two situations one by one. 4.4.3.4.2 Syntactic function In those cases in which the organization of morphosyntactic units cannot be reduced to the pragmatic and semantic categories and functions underlying them, syntactic functions become relevant. Consider the following examples: (128) The man walked. (129) The man fell. The constituent the man is Actor in (128) and Undergoer in (129), but it is nevertheless expressed in the same way in both examples. However, in other circumstances this diﬀerence in semantic functions is relevant, as shown in the following examples: (130) The man saw a dog (U). (131) The dog was seen by the man (A). (132) the seeing of the dog (U) by the man (A) This identity in form of the constituent the man in (128) and (129) can thus not be attributed to the semantic function of this constituent. The similarity in form of the constituent the man in (128)–(129) cannot be attributed to the pragmatic function of the constituent either, since in both cases it may be Topical, Focal, or neither. Thus (128), for example, may be an answer to any of the following questions: (133) What did the man do? (134) Who walked? (135) What happened? In cases such as these, where there is neutralization of semantic and pragmatic oppositions that are otherwise relevant in the language, the neutralized

clauses 1-place Actor

325

2-place

Nominative

Undergoer

Accusative

Figure 11. Nominative-Accusative alignment

behaviour of morphosyntactic constituents may be described in terms of their syntactic function, which, depending on the type of neutralization, may be either Subject or Object. The grammatical function Subject may, as shown above, be relevant for the analysis of the expression of one-place predication frames, in the sense that languages may neutralize the distinction between Actor and Undergoer arguments in this type of frame. In languages such as English one may furthermore argue that the grammatical function of Subject is relevant even for the expression of zero-place predication frames, as it rigidly inserts a dummy subject in these constructions as well: (136) It is cold. (*What is cold?) Since in this case the subject does not correspond to any underlying semantic or pragmatic unit, it can be considered a truly morphosyntactic category. The notion of Subject is equally relevant to Nominative-Accusative and to Absolutive-Ergative languages, as shown in Van Valin and LaPolla (1997), among others. The diﬀerence is that in Nominative-Accusative languages the neutralization is between the Actor/Undergoer argument of one-place predication frames and the Actor argument of two-place predication frames, while in Absolutive-Ergative languages it is between the Actor/Undergoer argument of one-place predication frames and the Undergoer argument of two-place predication frames. This is shown in Figures 11 and 12. The relevance of the syntactic function Subject does not only follow from the neutralization facts as such, but may also be manifested by special operations leading to diﬀerential assignment of the Subject function to arguments with diﬀerent semantic functions. This is, for instance, the case with passivization in Nominative-Accusative languages, when a non-Actor argument is made into the Subject: 1-place Actor Undergoer

2-place Ergative

Absolutive

Figure 12. Absolutive-Ergative alignment

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the morphosyntactic level

(137) The man gave the book to the boy.

(A-Subject)

(138) The book was given to the boy by the man. (U-Subject) (139) The boy was given the book by the man.

(R-Subject)

In Absolutive-Ergative languages one ﬁnds anti-passivization, turning a nonUndergoer argument into the Subject of the Clause, as in the following examples from Basque (Hualde and Urbina 2003: 431): (140) Gutun hau zuk idatzia da. (U-Subject) letter this.abs you.erg write.prf.det aux.3.sg ‘This letter has been written by you.’ (141) Ni gutun asko idatzia naiz. I letter a.lot.abs write.prf.det aux.1.sg ‘I have written a lot of letters.’ “I am written a lot of letters.”

(A-Subject)

The same type of reasoning can be set up for the syntactic function Object. Consider the following examples from Kham (Watters 2002: 67–8, 313): (142)

Na:-∅ no:-lai Na-∅-r-˜ı:h-ke. I-nom he-obj 1.sg.sbj-3.sg.obj-see-pfv ‘I saw him.’

(143)

Na-lai ca-o u-cyu:-na-o-k@. I-obj good-nmlz dum-look1.sg-3.sg-opt ‘May he look favourably upon me!’

(144)

Na-lai b@htanji y-ã:-ke-o. I-obj potato give-1.sg.obj-pfv-3.sg.sbj ‘He gave me a potato.’

What these examples show is that the opposition between the Undergoer in a two-place predication (142) and the Recipient in a two-place (143) or threeplace predication (144) is neutralized, in the sense that they receive the same case marker and trigger the same agreement patterns on the verb. This is the only way in which these arguments can be realized in Kham and is called Primative-Secundative alignment in Haspelmath (2007). Given the neutralization involved this system has to be interpreted as involving a syntactic function Object. The system may be represented as in Figure 13. This is diﬀerent from Directive-Indirective alignment, illustrated in the following English examples:

clauses 2-place

3-place Secundative

Undergoer Recipient

327

Primative

Figure 13. Primative-Secundative alignment

(145)

He bought a book (U).

(146)

He spoke to Sheila (R).

(147)

He gave a book (U) to Sheila (R).

Just on the basis of these examples there would be no justiﬁcation for postulating an Object function for English, since there is no neutralization involved here: Undergoers behave as Undergoers, and Recipients behave as Recipients, as shown in Figure 14. There is, however, the possibility of assigning the Object function to the Recipient argument, with the result known as ‘dative shift’ shown in (148): (148) He gave Sheila the book. which shows neutralization of the grammatical properties of the Undergoer (in a two-place predication frame) and the Recipient (in a three-place predication frame), parallel to the situation in Kham illustrated above. This neutralization manifests itself in the order of the constituents involved and the absence of prepositional marking on the Recipient. Many languages have special verbal derivations, usually called an applicative, to mark the shift in Object function. The following example is from Standard Indonesian (Cole and Son 2004: 341): (149) Saya memanggang roti untuk Eric. 1.sg a.bake bread for Eric. ‘I baked bread for Eric.’ (150) Saya memanggang-kan Eric roti. 1.sg a.bake-appl Eric bread ‘I baked Eric bread.’ We may thus set up the following steps showing an increasing relevance of syntactic functions. Let us start with a system with representational 2-place Undergoer

Directive

Recipient

Indirective

Figure 14. Directive-Indirective alignment

3-place

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the morphosyntactic level

alignment that is completely role-based, such as that shown for Acehnese in 4.4.3.3.2, cf. Figure 15: 1-place A

2-place

3-place

Actor

U

Undergoer

R

Recipient

Figure 15. Role-based alignment

In the next step, displayed in Figures 16 and 17 respectively, the syntactic function Subject becomes relevant, in either a Nominative-Accusative system or an Absolute-Ergative system, in each case with Directive-Indirective, which, as shown above, is actually role-based: 1-place A

2-place

3-place

Subject

U

Undergoer

R

Recipient

Figure 16. Subjects in Nominative-Accusative/Directive-Indirective systems

1-place U

2-place

3-place

Subject

A

Actor

R

Recipient

Figure 17. Subjects in Absolutive-Ergative/Directive-Indirective systems

Examples of languages exhibiting this type of alignment are English and Basque respectively. Adding the grammatical function of Object then leads to the conﬁguration displayed in Figure 18 in a Nominative-Accusative language that has Primative-Secundative alignment, such as Kham: 1-place

2-place

3-place

A Subject R U

Object Undergoer

Figure 18. Subjects and Objects in Nominative-Accusative/Primative-Secundative systems

clauses 1-place R

2-place

3-place

Subject

U A

329

Undergoer Agent

Figure 19. Subjects in Absolutive-Ergative/Primative-Secundative systems

In Absolutive-Ergative languages, however, the eﬀect is diﬀerent. If in a language the Undergoer in a two-place predication behaves like the single argument in a one-place predication (Absolutive-Ergative alignment), and the Recipient in a three-place predication behaves like the Undergoer in a twoplace predication (Primative-Secundative alignment), then in fact the Subject behaviour of the single argument in a one-place predication and the Undergoer argument in a two-place predication is cumulatively extended to the Recipient argument in a three-place predication, which now takes precedence over the Undergoer in Subject behaviour, as shown in Figure 19. The syntactic function Object is thus irrelevant in this type of system. Note that the result of the conﬁguration in Figure 19 is that the only argument of a one-place predication, the Undergoer of a two-place predication, and the Recipient of a three-place predication all receive the same treatment, as argued convincingly in Dryer (1986: 818), who cites the following examples from Tzotzil (Aissen 1983: 277, 280): (151)

Vinik-on. man-abs.1.sg ‘I am a man.’

(152)

Mi cˇ -a-mah-on. q asp-erg.2.sg-hit-abs.1.sg ‘Are you going to hit me?’

(153) Mi mu š-a-ˇcon-b-on l-a-ˇcitome. q neg asp-erg.2.sg-sell-ben-abs.1.sg the-your-pig ‘Won’t you sell me your pigs?’ The absolutive ﬁrst singular marker -on marks the single argument of the one-place predication frame in (151), the Undergoer argument of the twoplace predication frame in (152), and the Recipient argument of the three-place predication frame in (153). If a language makes use of syntactic functions, this does not mean that its grammatical organization depends in all respects on these. In Chickasaw (Munro and Gordon 1982, cited in Bickel fc.) agreement-marking on the verb shows full representational alignment, as illustrated in the following examples:

330

the morphosyntactic level

(154)

a. Malili-li. run-1.sg.a ‘I ran.’

b. Chi-sso-li. 2.sg.u-hit-1.sg.a ‘I hit you.’

(155)

a.

Sa-chokma. 1.sg.u-good ‘I’m good.’

b.

Is-sa-thaana. 2.sg.a-1.sg.u-know ‘You know me.’

(156)

a.

An-takho’bi 1.sg.r-lazy ‘I’m lazy.’

b.

Iss-am-a 2.sg.a-1.sg.l-give ‘You give it to me.’

The same markers are used for Actor, Undergoer, and Recipient irrespective of the valency of the frame in which they occur. The semantic functions of the arguments are suﬃcient to trigger the right expression here. But in its system of switch reference there is Nominative-Accusative alignment, i.e. the single argument of an intransitive predication aligns with the Actor argument of a two-place predication, as shown in the following examples: (157)

Top-at tiwwa-li-kat sa-hotolhko-tok. bed-nom lie-1.sg.a-sub.ss 1.sg.u-cough-pst ‘Lying in bed, I coughed.’

(158) Alhponi’ aa-sa-bashafa-kã Bonnie-akot kitchen loc-1.sg.u-be.cut-sub.ds Bonnie-contr.nom sa-bashaﬃ-tok. 1.sg.u-cut-pst ‘I got cut in the kitchen, and Bonnie did it.’ From the above we may derive some crosslinguistic generalizations as to the accessibility of diﬀerent types of argument for the Subject or Object function. We follow Van Valin and LaPolla (1997: 317–18) in distinguishing between the accessibility hierarchies for Nominative-Accusative and Absolutive-Ergative languages, and add the Recipient. (159) Absolutive-Ergative—Subject Assignment U ⊂ A ⊂ R (160) Nominative-Accusative—Subject Assignment A ⊂ U ⊂ R (161)

Nominative-Accusative—Directive-Indirective—Object Assignment U ⊂ R

(162) Nominative-Accusative—Primative-Secundative—Object Assignment R ⊂ U

clauses

331

An important question now is how languages choose which argument becomes the Subject or Object, in those cases in which they have a choice through (anti-)passivization, dative shift, or the use of an applicative construction. After all, if these choices were determined entirely at the Interpersonal and Representational Levels we would not have to postulate syntactic functions in the ﬁrst place, as argued above. The most plausible answer to this question is that the actual factors triggering the choice of Subject and Object assignment apply in the Contextual Component, outside the Grammatical Component as such. Bolkestein (1985) and Bolkestein and Risselada (1987) argue that the key factor to understanding these choices is cohesiveness, which concerns the extent to which referents have already been invoked in the preceding discourse or can be inferred from it. This type of information is stored in the Contextual Component and has to be called upon in the process of morphosyntactic encoding. 4.4.3.4.3 Complexity Just as interpersonal alignment may be determined by the (referential) properties of interpersonal Subacts rather than by their function, and representational alignment may be determined by the (designational) properties of semantic categories rather than by their function, so morphosyntactic alignment may be determined by the complexity of a constituent rather than by its syntactic function. Thus, many languages have a special Clause-ﬁnal, often optional position for subordinate Clauses, irrespective of the question whether that Clause is a complement Clause, a relative Clause, or an adverbial Clause. English is an example of such a language: (163)

a. That he has left is a pity. b. It is a pity that he has left.

(164)

a. That man that you met in the train yesterday has left. b. The man has left that you met in the train yesterday.

(165)

a. The man left because he can’t stand smoke. b. Because he can’t stand smoke the man left.

In (163a) the Subject complement Clause is in the Subject position, but it generally prefers the Clause-ﬁnal position, with a dummy in the original Subject slot, as in (163b). In (164a) the relative Clause is in modiﬁer position within the Np, but it may be extraposed, again to the Clause-ﬁnal position, as in (164b). The adverbial Clause in (165) may occur both Clause-initially and Clauseﬁnally, but other things being equal is preferably placed Clause-ﬁnally. The functions of the subordinate Clauses are diﬀerent in these three cases, so it is their morphosyntactic constitution that determines the preferred placement.

332

the morphosyntactic level

As we will see later, this tendency is stronger at the Phrase layer than at the Clause layer. Consider the following examples: (166)

a. the singing detective b. the detective who is singing

Just as languages may have a special position for heavy constituents, so they may have a special position for light constituents such as clitics: morphosyntactic words that are phonologically dependent. The special position may be available irrespective of the categories expressed by those clitics. French, for example, has a special preverbal position that hosts not only pronominal clitics ((167)–(169), partly taken from Miller and Sag 1997), but also a negative clitic (170): (167)

a. Marie voit Jean. Marie see.prs.3.sg Jean ‘Marie sees Jean.’ b. Marie le voit. Marie 3.sg.u see.prs.3.sg ‘Marie sees him.’

(168)

a. Marie donne un livre à Anne. Marie give.prs.3.sg indf book to Anne ‘Marie gives a book to Anne.’ b. Marie lui donne un livre. Marie 3.sg.rec give.prs.3.sg a book ‘Marie gives her a book.’

(169)

a. Marie connaît la ﬁn du ﬁlm. Marie know.prs.3.sg def end of.def movie ‘Marie knows the end of the movie.’ b. Marie en connaît la ﬁn. Marie obl know.prs.3.sg def end ‘Marie knows the end of it.’

(170) Marie ne connaît pas la ﬁn du ﬁlm. Marie neg know.prs.3.sg neg def end of.def movie ‘Marie doesn’t know the end of the movie.’ In the second stage of top-down clausal ordering to be discussed in the next section we will come back to this aspect of morphosyntactic alignment.

clauses

333

4.4.4 Ordering of non-hierarchically related units 4.4.4.1 Introduction

As we argued in 4.4.2, the ordering of Clause constituents starts out with the top-down placement of hierarchically related units, and after that places nonhierarchically related units. The two resulting conﬁgurations may partly interlock. In determining the position of non-hierarchically related units several factors may play a role, as we illustrated above in our discussion of alignment: (i) interpersonal factors: pragmatic functions, reference; (ii) representational factors: semantic functions, designation; (iii) morphosyntactic factors: syntactic functions, complexity. All these factors may play a role simultaneously within one language, but in order to single out the eﬀects of each group, we will discuss them here separately, which in each case, given the role of other factors, will lead to partial orderings of constituents. 4.4.4.2 Interpersonal factors

In 2.7.2.6 we gave examples of a Topic-oriented language, Tidore, and a Focusoriented language, Kisi. The examples from Tidore are repeated here (van Staden 2000: 273): (171) Turus una=ge, mina mo-sango una. then 3.sg.m=there 3.sg.f 3.sg.f.a-answer 3.sg.m ‘Then she answered him.’ “Then he, she answered him.” (172)

Tagi nde, fangato koliho rea. go 3.nh.here 1.sg.m.a go.back not.anymore ‘I go and I don’t come back anymore.’ “Given this going, I won’t come back anymore.”

Apart from the segmental marking, the Topics in these examples are marked through their occurrence in Ppre . As one would expect in a system that is strongly driven by pragmatic functions, referential (171), and ascriptive (172) Subacts may occur in this position, and both are resumed within the Clause. It is their Topic status that is crucial for their placement. Thus we get the following partial orderings: | Ppre (173) una=geTOP (174)

tagi_ndeTOP

PI (=171) (=172)

334

the morphosyntactic level

The examples from Kisi (Childs 1995: 270–1) are repeated in (175)–(176): (175) MààlóN ó có cùùcúúwó ní. rice he aux sow foc ‘It’s rice he is sowing.’ (176) Pù´ENndáN yá pú´EN ní. forgetting I forget foc ‘It’s forgetting that I did.’ Focus is marked in two ways in Kisi: (i) the Focused constituent occurs in intitial position, and (ii) a Focus particle occurs in Clause-ﬁnal position. This operation can again be applied to both referential (175) and ascriptive (176) Subacts, leading to the following partial orderings: PI (177) MààlóNFOC

... ...

PF níFOC

(=175)

(178) Pù´ENndáNFOC . . .

níFOC

(=176)

In Tzotzil (Aissen 1992), if a Topic and a Focus constituent are present, the Topic occurs in the initial position and the Focus in the post-initial position. The language is otherwise predicate-initial, so that the verb now ends up in the third position: (179) A ti prove tzeb-e sovra ch’ak’bat. top def poor girl-top leftovers was.given ‘It was leftovers that the poor girl was given.’ Thus, if there is only a Topic or a Focus, the predicate is in post-initial position, and if there is neither a Topic nor a Focus, it is in initial position. In our top-down and centripetal approach, this suggests that, if in a language the placement of constituents is driven by pragmatic functions, the placement of these constituents should precede the placement of other constituents, and we predict that the former have a preference for placement at the Clause margins. This ties in neatly with what we saw earlier with respect to the morphological expression of interpersonal alignment, which often masks the expression of semantic functions. Thus, (179) may be shown as: PI+1 PI (180) A_ti_prove_tzebeTOP sovraFOC 4.4.4.3 Representational factors

As we mentioned above, the semantic functions and designation of semantic categories at the Representational Level may also play a role in the placement

clauses

335

of units. These factors relate primarily to the placement of arguments, and to a much lesser extent to predicates, as these, being the nucleus, do not carry semantic functions. There are reasons, however, why in this type of system we would want to start out with the placement of the predicate. Firstly, in many languages a Clause may consist of just a predicate, often containing referential markers which make the lexical expression of arguments potentially superﬂuous, as in the following example from Abkhaz (Hewitt 1979: 50) (see also 4.2.3 on nucleus-marking languages): (181) Y@-s`@-l-te-yt’. 3.nh-1.sg.dat-3.f.erg-give-fin ‘She gave it to me.’ Secondly, the placement of certain types of argument is often relative to the position of the predicate. In Movima (Haude 2006), which has a hierarchical alignment system, the order in which the arguments are placed after the Clause-initial predicate depends on their place on the animacy hierarchy. The one higher on that hierarchy follows the predicate immediately, while the one lower on the hierarchy follows afterwards, as illustrated in (182)–(183) (Haude 2006: 277): (182)

Tikoy-na=sne os mimi:di. kill-drct=f.abs art.n.pst snake ‘She killed the/a snake.’

(183)

Tikoy-kay-a=sne os mimi:di. kill-inv-v=f.abs art.n.pst snake ‘The/a snake killed her.’

We illustrate the phenomenon with contrastive examples in which one of the arguments is realized by a clitic pronoun. However, the same placement rules apply in constructions in which both arguments are realized by noun phrases (Haude 2006: 278). The human participant here outranks the non-human participant and thus immediately follows the verb. The direct/inverse marking indicates the semantic roles of the participants. The main point here is that the constituents of the Clause can arrive at their place eﬀectively if we start out with the predicate in PI and then put the highest-ranking participant in PI+1 , and the next one in PI+2 : PI PI+1 PI+2 (184) Tikoy-naPRED sneHUM os_mimi:diANIM Thus it is useful in representational-based placement systems to start out with the placement of predicates (and, more generally, nuclei) before dealing

336

the morphosyntactic level

with the placement of arguments (and, more generally, dependents). Note that we deliberately use the term ‘predicate’ and not ‘verb’ here, since there are languages without a proper class of verbs, and since in languages with a class of verbs there are of course predicates other than verbal ones. These considerations lead Hengeveld et al. (2004) to classify languages as predicateinitial, predicate-medial, or predicate-ﬁnal, rather than as VSO, SVO, SOV, etc. Placement of constituents with respect to their semantic functions is illustrated for Turkish in (185) (Kornﬁlt 1997: 90): (185) Hasan-∅ kitab-ı Ali-ye ver-di-∅. Hasan-nom book-acc Ali-dat give-pst-3.sg ‘Hasan gave the book to Ali.’ Turkish has a syntactic function Subject but not a syntactic function Object. The placement of the U and R arguments in (185) is therefore not attributable to syntactic factors. The order represented in (185) may be changed as a result of pragmatic function assignment, but in neutral contexts the Recipient precedes the predicate and is itself preceded by the Undergoer. Again these are relative positions, since in the absence of a Recipient the Undergoer would occupy the position before the predicate, as illustrated in (186) (Kornﬁlt 1997: 89): (186) Hasan-∅ kitab-ı oku-du-∅. Hasan-nom book-acc read-pst-3.sg ‘Hasan read the book.’ Thus the relative ordering of U and R can be shown as follows: PF-2 PF-1 PF (187) (188)

kitab-ıU

Ali-yeR kitab-ı

U

ver-di-∅PRED oku-du-∅

PRED

(=185) (=186)

4.4.4.4 Morphosyntactic factors

The morphosyntactic factors involved in the ordering of Clause constituents concern the syntactic functions of constituents and the morphosyntactic nature of those constituents, in particular their level of complexity and weight. Word-order typology traditionally deﬁnes basic word order in terms of S, O, and V, thus suggesting that these are the relevant categories across languages, but as we have tried to show, these categories are not universal, and in languages in which they do play a role they may not be decisive for the ordering of constituents. But there are of course many languages where they are highly relevant for ordering. Consider the following Dutch examples:

clauses

337

(189) Ik zag hem. I see.pst.sg him ‘I saw him.’ (190) Ik heb hem gezien. I have.prs.1.sg him see.ptcp ‘I have seen him.’ (191) De boek-en werden door Jan gelezen. def.art book-pl pass.aux.pst.pl by Jan read.ptcp ‘The books were read by John.’ In Dutch Declarative Clauses, with one exception to be discussed below, the PI position is reserved for the Subject, a syntactic function, and the absolute P2 position for the ﬁnite verb, a morphosyntactic category. If there is just a lexical main verb, it takes the second position, but if there is an inﬂected auxiliary verb, this verb takes the second position and the lexical verb takes the ﬁnal position. The latter is actually a position for non-inﬂected lexical predicates in general, since non-verbal predicates take that position too: (192) Hij is al heel lang ziek. he cop.prs.3.sg already very long ill. ‘He has been ill for a long time already.’ Thus, the morphosyntactic encoder has to know whether during the hierarchical part of the placement procedure a ﬁnite auxiliary verb has been inserted, before it can put the lexical predicate into the appropriate slot, which is a purely morphosyntactic condition on ordering. Starting out with verb placement is therefore appropriate at the Morphosyntactic Level, just as starting out with predicate placement is appropriate at the Representational Level. The rigid morphosyntactic character of the ordering of the Clause-initial constituents is also evident from the fact that, in circumstances in which there are no lexical ﬁllers for PI , a dummy pronoun is inserted, as illustrated in (193) for a zero-place construction and in (194) for a construction with an extraposed subject: (193) Het regen-t. it rain-prs.3.sg ‘It’s raining.’ (194) Het is waar dat het regent. it cop.prs.3.sg true conj it rain-prs.3.sg ‘It is true that it rains.’

338

the morphosyntactic level

The only circumstance in which this pattern is interrupted is when a nonsubject constituent with Contrast function is placed in initial position. In this case the Subject goes to the immediately postverbal position (P2+1 ) and does not allow any intervening material. Compare the following examples with (189): (195) Hem zag ik. him see.pst.sg I ‘Him I saw.’ (196) Gisteren zag ik hem. yesterday see.pst.sg I him ‘Yesterday I saw him.’ The fact that the pragmatic function of a constituent here overrules syntactic factors is consistent with what we said earlier about the relative application of rules, where those that are based on interpersonal factors have to precede those that are morphosyntactically based. This is shown in the following partial representations: (197)

PI ikSUBJ

P2 P2+1 VFIN zag

. . . PF

(198)

ikSUBJ

hebVFIN

(199)

hemFOC

zagVFIN ikSUBJ

(=195)

(200) gisterenFOC zagVFIN ikSUBJ

(=196)

(=189) gezienPRED

(=190)

Now consider the situation in three-place predications. For Dutch the Object function is relevant, as shown in the following examples: (201) Ik gaf het boek aan het meisje. I give.pst.sg def book to def girl. ‘I gave the book to the girl.’ (202) Ik gaf het meisje het boek. I give.pst.sg def girl def book. ‘I gave the girl the book.’ The Object is in PM or in a relative position to the right of PM , as shown by the fact that the Object moves to the right if a hierarchically higher modiﬁer is occupying PM : (203) Ik gaf gisteren het boek aan het meisje. I give.pst.sg yesterday def book to def girl ‘I gave the book to the girl yesterday.’

clauses

339

(204) Ik gaf gisteren het meisje het boek. I give.pst.sg yesterday def girl def book ‘I gave the girl the book yesterday.’ These examples may thus be represented as in (205)–(208): (205)

PI P2 PM subj Vﬁn ik gaf het_boekObj

PM+1

(206) iksubj gafVﬁn het_meisjeObj subj

Vﬁn

(207)

ik

(208)

iksubj gafVﬁn gisteren

gaf

gisteren

het_boek

Obj

PF aan_het_meisjeR

(=201)

het_boekU

(=202) R

aan_het_meisje

het_meisjeObj het_boekU

(=203) (=204)

The relevance of the Object function is also evident from the occurrence of dummy Objects in the case of extraposition with certain verbs: (209) Ik betreur het niet dat je gekomen bent. I regret.prs.1.sg dum not conj you come.ptcp aux.prs.2.sg ‘I do not regret it that you have come.’ (210) Ik wist het niet dat je Engels kon praten. I know.pst dum not conj you English can.pst speak.inf ‘I didn’t know you could speak English.’ Turning now to the non-Subject/non-Object arguments in (201)–(202), we observe that they are at the right edge of the Clause. That these arguments are actually in a (relative) Clause-ﬁnal position is evident from the fact that, when there is a verb in Clause-ﬁnal position, this argument cannot normally be separated from that verb, while other splits are allowed: (211) Ik heb (gisteren) het boek (gisteren) aan het meisje I have (yesterday) def book (yesterday) to def girl (*gisteren) gegeven. (yesterday) given ‘I gave the book to the girl (yesterday).’ (212) Ik heb (gisteren) het meisje (gisteren) het boek I have (yesterday) def girl (yesterday) def book (*gisteren) gegeven. (yesterday) given ‘I gave the girl the book (yesterday).’ We may now give the following placements for Dutch verbs, Subjects, Objects, and non-Subjects/non-Objects, which show the placement of Subjects in PI , of ﬁnite verbs in P2 , of Objects in (a position relative to) PM , and of predicates (including non-ﬁnite verbs) and the non-Subject/non-Object in (a position relative to) PF .

340

(213)

the morphosyntactic level PI P2 PM Subj Vﬁn ik heb het_boekobj

PF-1 PF Rec aan_het_meisje gegevenpred

(214) ikSubj hebVﬁn het_meisjeobj het_boekU

gegevenpred

(=211) (=212)

Deviations from this pattern again have to do with pragmatic function assignment: (215) Ik heb aan het meisje het boek gegeven. I have.prs.1.sg to def girl def book give.ptcp ‘I have given the book to the girl.’ The occurrence of the Object to the right of the recipient in (215) is allowed when the Object is used contrastively (Geerts et al. 1984: 990). Thus again we see that the ordering in terms of semantic and syntactic functions may be overruled by pragmatic considerations. The second position also plays a signiﬁcant role in the morphosyntactic organization of various languages when it comes to clitic placement. P2 , often referred to as the Wackernagel position in deference to Wackernagel (1892), is in several languages associated with clitics, which may cluster by expanding this position to the right, as in the Czech example (216): (216) Ne-chtˇeli=jsme=vám=ho dát. neg-want.pst.1.pl=1.pl= 2.sg.dat=3.sg.n give.inf ‘We didn’t want to give it to you.’ The existence of a special clitic position has already been mentioned above as an example of morphosyntactic alignment based on the complexity of the constituent rather than on its function. A clitic position may not only be deﬁned with respect to the Clause margins, but also relative to another position, that of the predicate. In European Portuguese, there is considerable evidence to suggest that the clitic (cluster) in that language is located in the above-mentioned Wackernagel position, while the position of the predicate may vary (Mackenzie fc.a). In French, however, the position of the clitic cluster is best deﬁned in terms of the (verbal) predicate, which (except in the imperative mood) it always precedes. Compare the following translational equivalents in Portuguese (217) and French (218): (217)

a. Dei=lh=o. give.pst.1.sg=3.sg.dat=3.sg.m.acc ‘I gave him/her it.’ b. Não=lh=o dei. neg=3.sg.dat=3.sg.m.acc give.pst.1.sg ‘I did not give him/her it.’

clauses (218)

341

a. Je=le=lui=ai donn-é. 1.sg.nom=3.sg.m.acc=3.sg.dat=aux.prs.1sg give-ptcp ‘I gave him/her it.’ b. Je=ne=le=lui=ai pas donn-é. 1.sg.nom=neg=3.sg.acc=3.sg.dat=aux.prs.1sg neg give-ptcp ‘I did not give him/her it.’

In European Portuguese, the clitic cluster remains in Post-Initial Position, whether the Initial position is occupied by the verb (as in 217a) or a negative (as in 217b)—note that the negative não is not a clitic. In French, by contrast, the position of the clitic cluster (je=le=lui and je=ne=le=lui respectively) is determined as immediately preceding the verb, in this case the auxiliary ai. 4.4.5 Templates

In 4.4.2 we discussed the hierarchical aspects of clausal order, and in the preceding sections the conﬁgurational aspects. In many cases various of the factors discussed contribute to clausal orders which can be interpreted as the result of the interlocking of various partial orders. In this section we bring the various factors together in the form of templates governing clausal order. Before moving to the actual templates, recall that so far we have been working with four absolute positions: PI , P2 , PM , and PF , and relative positions deriving from these, without claiming these four to be relevant for all languages. In the examples we have given it was clear that languages make use of the initial position and its expansions to the right, the second position and its expansions to the right, the ﬁnal position and its expansions to the left, and of the medial position with expansions to the left, to the right, or in both directions. Most languages actually make use of a combination of absolute starting points, but some are logically excluded: PM can only exist if either PI or PF exists as well, and P2 can only exist if PI exists as well. Furthermore, in languages that use PM but not PI , PM can only branch to the left, since otherwise it would be PI . The other way round, in languages that use PM but not PF , PM can only branch to the right, since otherwise it would be PF . Finally, PI+1 does not exist if P2 exists. Theoretically, we then have the following possibilities: (219)

one absolute position a. PI PI+N ∅ b. ∅ ∅ two absolute positions c. PI P2 P2+N d. PI PI+N ∅ e. PI PI+N ∅ f. ∅ ∅

∅ ∅ ∅ PM ∅ PM-N PM

∅ PF-N PF

P

M+N

∅ ∅ PF-N PF PF-N PF

342

the morphosyntactic level three absolute positions g. PI P2 P2+N I h. P P2 P2+N I I+N i. P P ∅ I I+N j. P P ∅ k. P PI+N ∅ four absolute positions l. PI P2 P2+N m. PI P2 P2+N I n. P P2 P2+N

PM ∅ PM PM-N PM PM-N PM

PM+N

PM PM-N PM PM-N PM

PM+N

PM+N PM+N

PM+N

PF-N PF-N PF-N PF-N

∅ PF PF PF PF

PF-N PF PF-N PF PF-N PF

Leti (van Engelenhoven 2004) is a good example of a language with three absolute positions, as in (219k). It also strictly separates hierarchical ordering and conﬁgurational ordering: hierarchical ordering is from the left and the right, while conﬁgurational ordering starts from the middle. From the left, discourse particles, modal adverbs, and temporal/locative modiﬁers are placed. If there is more than one temporal/locative modiﬁer an adverbial one precedes a prepositional one. The ordering that starts from the left thus reﬂects the hierarchical order of modiﬁers, while at the same time taking into account the syntactic weight of constituents. From the right, the indicative enclitic, if present, occurs in ﬁnal position, and is preceded by a maximum of three aspectual and modal adverbs of like rank that may be placed in varying orders, thus again reﬂecting the hierarchical ordering. The following examples illustrate some possibilities (van Engelenhoven 2004: 239, 208): (220) Rèkna side la=Agustus tujublas ra-sèka=e=lo let’s_say usually dir=August 17 3.pl-dance=exct=loc Servaru. Serwaru.exct ‘Let’s say they usually do a speciﬁc war dance in Serwaru on 17 August.’ (221) Apo püata-samtua=de n-vava upu Pui=o. seq woman-adult=dem 3.sg-carry.name grandparent Pui=ind ‘And the old lady was called Lady Pui.’ PM is occupied by the predicate, which may be expanded to the left with a Subject and to the right with an Object. Further expansion with Locative arguments through the use of Preposition Phrases is to the right of the Object, as shown in the following example (van Engelenhoven 2004: 231): (222) Püata=e n-vèvla=e tani=la ròna=e. woman=exct 3.sg-forge=exct earth.exct=dir vessel=exct ‘The woman makes the vessel out of clay.’ “The woman forges the clay into a vessel.”

clauses

343

Thus we may deﬁne the following general template for Declarative verbal Clauses in Leti, now adding information about the nature of constituents to the absolute and relative positions: (223)

PM PI PI+1 PI+2 PI+3 PM-1 PM+1 (Cl1 :[ (Gw1 ) (Advp1 ) (Advp2 ) (Adp1 ) (Np1 )Sbj (Vp1 ) (Np2 )Obj PM+2 PF-3 PF-2 PF-1 PF (Adp1 ) (Advp5 ) (Advp4 ) (Advp3 ) (Gw2 )] (Cl1 ))

From this template many simpler ones may be derived. Thus, (220)–(222) would require the following templates: PI+1 PI+2 PM PF PI (224) (Cli :[ (Advpi ) (Advpj ) (Adpi ) (Vpi ) (Adpi ) ](Cli ))

(=220)

PM-1 PM PM+1 PF PI (225) (Cli :[ (Gwi ) (Npi ) (Vpi ) (Npj ) (Gwj ) ] (Cli ))

(=221)

PM+1 PM+2 PM-1 PM (226) (Cli :[ (Npi ) (Vpi ) (Npj ) (Adpi ) ] (Cli ))

(=222)

Note that there is no ﬁxed relation between a position and a constituent type. Thus, PI is ﬁlled with an Adverb Phrase in (224) and with a Grammatical Word in (225); PF is ﬁlled with an Adposition Phrase in (224) and with a Grammatical Word in (225). This is a result of the fact that certain items, when present, have priority over others in hierarchical placement, while, when absent, they leave a slot available for items lower in the hierarchy. Similarly, the templates given here contain information relating to morphosyntactic aspects of ordering only. We indicate the categories of constituents, and thus their weight and complexity, and we indicate the syntactic functions of constituents. Positions are not characterized functionally (e.g. PI as the position for modal adverbs), since this is representational information not available at the Morphosyntactic Level. Rather, modal adverbs, when available, are sent to that position by the morphosyntactic encoder, thus forcing the next lower modiﬁer to go to the postinitial position PI+1 , rather than to the initial position PI . Leti provides a nice example of a strict separation of hierarchical ordering and conﬁgurational ordering: hierarchical ordering is centripetal, starting from the Clause margins, while conﬁgurational ordering is centrifugal, starting from the predicate. This may be represented graphically as follows:

344 (227)

the morphosyntactic level Hierarchical

Hierarchical PI PI+1

PI+2

PM-2 PM-1 PM PM+1 PM+2

PF-2

PF-1 PF

Configurational

Other clean splits between hierarchical and conﬁgurational ordering may be found in certain predicate-initial and predicate-ﬁnal languages. Consider the Tagalog example (228) that we discussed earlier (Nagaya 2006): (228) Sa=kasamaang-palad bhumiagsak si=Gaga sa=pagsusulit. Unfortunately av.failed nom=Gaga dat=examination ‘Unfortunately Gaga failed the examination.’ Here the conﬁgurational ordering is a continuation of the hierarchical ordering: (229)

Hierarchical

Configurational

Sa=kasamaang-palad bhumiagsak

si=Gaga

sa=pagsusulit.

And in the Hidatsa example (230) (Matthews 1965) the same happens starting from the right edge: (230) Wíra i apaari ki stao ski. tree it grow inch rem.pst cert ‘The tree must have begun to grow a long time ago.’

Configurational

(231) Wíra i

apaari

Hierarchical ki

stao

ski.

Combinations of hierarchical and conﬁgurational ordering are not always as clear-cut as in the examples just presented from Leti, Tagalog, and Hidatsa. More complex interlockings are particularly common among so-called SVO languages. We prefer to call these ‘predicate-medial languages’, since neither are the functions Subject and Object universal nor is the category of verb available in all languages. Adapting the argument to our terminology, it has been observed that predicate-medial languages subdivide into two types, those that share syntactic characteristics with predicate-initial languages and those whose syntax is closer to predicate-ﬁnal languages (Comrie 1989: 96; Dik 1997a: 409–11). The division is partly due to the fact that predicate-medial languages may develop out of predicate-initial languages or out of predicate-ﬁnal

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345

languages. Examples of predicate-medial languages with a predicate-initial origin are Breton and Colloquial Arabic; the Romance languages developed a predicate-medial order from predominantly predicate-ﬁnal Latin. Given a superﬁcial string of constituents in which the predicate is neither in initial nor in ﬁnal position, the predicate may be in any of the following positions: PI+1 P2 PM PF-1 (232) a. pred b. pred c. pred d. pred In many predicate-initial and predicate-ﬁnal languages the predicate may appear in PI+1 and PF-1 , but then only when it is pushed away from its position at the Clause margin, for instance by a pragmatically salient constituent or a higher-layer modiﬁer. These are the situations represented in (232a) and (232d). In predicate-medial languages the predicate may be either in P2 position (232b) or in PM position (232c). Type (232c), with the predicate in medial position, was illustrated for Leti. Type (232b), with the predicate in second position is one of the patterns relevant for Dutch, as illustrated earlier. This latter language will be used here to illustrate a complex interlocking of hierarchical and conﬁgurational ordering, using all four absolute positions recognized so far. We argued in 4.4.4.4 that in Dutch the ﬁnite verb is in an absolute second position P2 . If PI is available, i.e. not occupied by a modiﬁer or a pragmatically marked non-Subject, the Subject will go to that position; if it is not, the Subject attaches directly to the right of P2 , and is thus in P2+1 : (233)

a. Ze kwam gisteren. she came yesterday b. Gisteren kwam ze. yesterday came she

We also argued that Objects are in (a position relative to) PM , and that the placement of the (non-ﬁnite) predicate and the non-Subject/non-Object argument starts out at the right margin of the Clause. The latter claim is reﬂected in the fact that, when there is a verb in Clause-ﬁnal position, the non-Subject/non-Object argument has to immediately precede it. What we have not discussed so far is how Clause-internal modiﬁers are placed. Consider again the following example: (234) Ik heb het boek gisteren aan het meisje gegeven. I have.prs.1.sg def book gisteren to def girl give.ptcp ‘I gave the book to the girl yesterday.’

346

the morphosyntactic level

In our hierarchical approach to placement, the auxiliary verb heb- ‘have’ and the constituent gisteren ‘yesterday’ have to be placed before all other constituents. The auxiliary verb can go directly to the absolute P2 position. The adverbial constituent gisteren cannot be placed relative to PI , PF or P2 , since in (234) it is separated from these positions by other constituents that are still awaiting placement in the process of conﬁgurational ordering. The constituent yesterday can therefore only be in the Clause-medial absolute position PM . If this is true, then the Object constituent also has to be in the middle ﬁeld, given that it may occur on both sides of the adverbial. Compare (234) with (235): (235) Ik heb gisteren het boek aan het meisje gegeven. I have.prs.1.sg gisteren def book to def girl give.ptcp ‘I have given the book to the girl yesterday.’ In (234) het boek ‘the book’ is thus in PM-1 , and in (235) it is in PM+1 . In the absence of a modiﬁer it is in PM itself. Combining these observations, we conclude that the following positions are relevant for Dutch Declarative Clauses, thus illustrating the maximally complex system (219n): (236) PI P2 P2+N PM-N PM PM+N PF-N PF Hierarchical ordering in Dutch makes use of PI , PM , and PF for modiﬁers, and P2 for operators. Conﬁgurational ordering makes use of all these positions as well, as long as they have not been occupied already. In the latter case, it makes use of relative positions. Thus predicates go to P2 when available, but otherwise to PF or the last position available relative to this position. Subjects go to PI when available, and otherwise to P2+1 . Objects go to PM when available, otherwise to a position relative to PM . Non-Subject/Non-Object arguments go to PF when available, otherwise to a position relative to PF . Further factors playing a role in conﬁgurational placement concern the pragmatic functions of constituents and the complexity of constituents. The pragmatic function Focus is connected with PI , the pragmatic function Contrast with PF or the last position available relative to this position. Complexity plays a role in the placement of ﬁnite embedded Clauses, which prefer the PF position, thus pushing any other constituent that might want to go there to a position relative to PF . Thus, the general template for Dutch Declarative main Clauses is used in a highly dynamic way, the only constant element being the presence of a ﬁnite (f) verb (Vw) in P2 , as indicated in (237), in which the position that is obligatorily ﬁlled as well as its obligatory ﬁller are printed in boldface. (237) PI P2 P2+N PM-N PM PM+N PF-N PF (f Vw1 )

clauses

347

The placement of constituents other than the ﬁnite verb is dynamically calculated in the morphosyntactic encoder, taking into account their hierarchical status, their pragmatic functions, their semantic role, their syntactic function, and their morphosyntactic complexity. 4.4.6 Dummies and support

In some languages dummy elements occur in situations in which no interpersonal or representational material is inserted in an obligatory clausal slot. The reason for this may be that this material is not available at all, or that for some reason it has gone to another position. A dummy may replace an argument or a predicate. Dummies that do not correspond to any material at the Interpersonal Level or the Representational Level are illustrated in (238)–(239): (238)

It is raining.

(239) There is beer without alcohol. In (238), which is based on a zero-place predication frame, there is no argument at all that can occupy the preverbal subject slot, which has to be obligatorily ﬁlled. The dummy pronoun it serves here as a default Subject. In (239) a predicate is missing. As argued in 3.6.2.1, non-lexical existentials are characterized by being the expression of a single Referential Subact at the Interpersonal Level. In the case of (239) this Referential Subact corresponds to the constituent beer withour alcohol. In the absence of an Ascriptive Subact, the dummy there is inserted, which, being non-verbal in nature, subsequently needs the verbal support of a copula. Dummies also occur when a certain slot remains unﬁlled because the constituent that would normally go there has gone elsewhere, for instance for information-structural reasons or due to morphosyntactic complexity. Consider the following examples from English and Dutch respectively: (240)

It is a pity that you have to go.

(241)

Viss-en doen we hier niet. ﬁsh-inf do.prs.pl we here not ‘We do not ﬁsh here.’

In (240) the embedded Subject Clause is placed in Clause-ﬁnal position due to its complexity. As a result, the preverbal Subject position remains unﬁlled with interpersonal and/or representational material, and is ﬁlled by the placeholder it. In (241) the predicate vissen is focused and for that reason placed in initial position. Since there has to be a ﬁnite verb in P2 , the dummy verb doen acts as a placeholder for the lexical predicate. Other languages use a copy of the lexical

348

the morphosyntactic level

predicate as a dummy in these circumstances, as in the following Spanish example: (242) Llov-er no llueve. rain-inf not rain.ind.prs.3.sg ‘It doesn’t rain here.’ In Hungarian dummies are used to facilitate the expression of pragmatic functions. Consider the following example (de Groot 1981: 51): (243) János azt mond-t-a, hogy a taxi öt-re jöjjön. János dem say-pst-objp conj def taxi ﬁve-subl come ‘János said that the taxi would come at ﬁve.’ Hungarian has special positions for Topical and Focal elements. Topical elements are in Clause-initial position, Focal elements in preverbal position. In cases of complementation, a demonstrative element refers cataphorically to an appositional complement Clause that follows the main Clause. The fact that the demonstrative occupies the Focus position of the main Clause signals that the complement Clause is Focal. The occurrence of dummy Objects in the absence of a corresponding argument at the Representational Level, i.e. with one-place predicates, seems less common than the occurrence of dummy Subjects in the absence of a corresponding argument, i.e. with zero-place predicates. Yet in some circumstances languages do actually use them. In Dutch there is a restricted use of the following construction: (244) Eet/wandel/werk ze. eat/walk/werk.imp them ‘Have a nice meal/walk/day of work.’ “Eat/walk/work them.” With certain intransitive verbs in Dutch a third plural dummy object is used, with the eﬀect of turning what would otherwise be an order into a wish. Dummy placement can only take place after all constituents corresponding to units at the Interpersonal Level and the Representational Level have been assigned a place in the clausal template. Only at that point will it be clear whether all obligatory slots in a template have been ﬁlled. It also means we have to indicate which positions in a template are obligatory. Here again we may ﬁnd interesting crosslinguistic diﬀerences. Consider the following examples from Dutch: (245) Het is duidelijk dat ze niet zal komen. it is clear that she not will come ‘It is clear that she will not come.’

clauses (246)

349

Gisteren was het duidelijk dat ze niet zou komen. yesterday was it clear that she not would come ‘Yesterday it was clear that she would not come.’

As we illustrated earlier, in Dutch declarative main clauses the Subject goes to PI , unless this is occupied by a modiﬁer or pragmatically marked non-Subject, in which case it goes to P2+1 . This means we need the following templates for (245)–(246): P2 (=245) P2+1 PM-N PM PM+N PF-N PF (247) PI (Np1 )Subj (f Vw1 ) . . . (248)

PM-N PM PM+N PF-N PF P2 P2+1 PI f (Xp1 ) ( Vw1 ) (Np1 )Subj . . .

(=246)

Obligatory positions are indicated in bold, and obligatory instantiations of positions are indicated in bold. Thus these representations indicate that in Dutch (i) PI and P2 always have to be ﬁlled; (ii) the ﬁnite verb goes to P2 ; (iii) a Subject of the category Np goes to PI ; (iv) unless this position is already occupied, in which case it goes to P2+1 . We may now also describe the following construction with two dummies: (249) Regen-en doet het hier niet. rain-inf do.prs.3.sg het here not. ‘It doesn’t rain here.’ In (249) the lexical zero-place predicate regenen is placed in initial position for pragmatic reasons. It leaves the P2 position empty, thus triggering the insertion of the dummy verb doen. Since the (dummy) Subject het cannot go to PI it has to go to P2+1 , following template (248), in which the two obligatory positions are now both ﬁlled with dummies. Compare now (245) and (246) with their counterparts in English: (250) It is clear that she will not come. (251) Yesterday it was clear that she would not come. In English the Subject position can be deﬁned as the preverbal one. The (ﬁnite) verb is in PM , so the Subject is in PM-1 . As we illustrated earlier, modiﬁer placement in English makes use of PI and PF and positions relative to these, but, as (251) illustrates, this does not aﬀect the position of the (dummy) Subject. Thus we need only one template to account for the placement of dummy Subjects in English: PM+N PF (=250) PM (252) PI PM-N . . . (Np1 )Subj (f Vw1 ) . . .

350

the morphosyntactic level

PM+N PF (253) PI PM PM-N f (Xp1 ) (Np1 )Subj ( Vw1 ) . . .

(=251)

4.4.7 Agreement

Once all slots in a clausal template have been ﬁlled, either by material from the Interpersonal Level and the Representational Level or by dummies, rules of agreement are applied, where relevant. Agreement is a mechanism by which information properly pertaining to a single element of the Clause is copied to one or more other elements. We will distinguish here between argument agreement and operator agreement. An example of the former is Subject agreement on verbs, an example of the latter is negative harmony. Argument agreement should be distinguished from cross-reference. The latter obtains when person marking on the verb is suﬃcient by itself and may optionally be expanded by a lexically realized argument. The following example is from Kabardian (Colarusso 1992: 77): (254)

∅-w-a-s-Pw a-ta-aG-´s. 3.abs-2-dat-1-say-prolonged-pst-decl ‘I told it to you.’

The preﬁxes on the verb are capable of referring by themselves, and we therefore treat them as the bound expression of Referential Subacts. This analysis does not change when the arguments are expressed overtly, as in (255) (Colarusso 1992: 75): (255) wa sa a-r ∅-q’@-s-ž@-w-Pa-aG-´s. you me 3-abs 3.abs-aff-1-again-2-say-pst-decl ‘You said it to me.’ In (255) there are in each case two Referential Subacts referring to a single participant. These are thus cases of apposition, and the referential elements on the verb cannot be considered cases of agreement. True non-referential syntactic agreement is very uncommon (Siewierska 2004: 268). We do ﬁnd agreement in languages such as French, as in the following example: (256) Nous chant-ons. we sing-1.pl ‘We are singing.’ in which the subject pronoun may not be dropped, unlike the situation in Kabardian. In situations like these we apply a mechanism which copies the relevant features of the Subject Noun Phrase to the verb. The morphosyntactic representation of (256) without copying would be as follows:

clauses (257)

351

(Cli : [(Npi : (Nwi : /nu/ (Nwi )) (Npi ))Subj (Vpi : (Vwi : /Sãt/-pres (Vwi )) (Vpi )] (Cli ))

in which the pronoun and verb stem are given in their phonological form, and a secondary operator acts as a placeholder for the expression of present tense on the verb. With copying the situation is as follows: (258) (Cli : [(Npi : (Nwi : /nu/ (Nwi )) (Npi ))Subj (Vpi : (Vwi : /Sãt/-pres<1.Pl> (Vwi )) (Vpi )] (Cli )) in which the copied feature is attached to the placeholder for Tense, with which it will fuse in the morphological expression. The copied feature is presented between angled brackets, following the convention introduced in Dik (1997a). The copying rules have to apply after dummy insertion, to ensure that sources and/or targets for the agreement feature are available. Operator agreement obtains when the expression of an operator goes hand in hand with adaptations in form of elements within its scope. An example that we will come across when discussing subordination in 4.4.8.4 is consecutio temporum. Another example, occurring less frequently, is the phenomenon of negative concord, a remarkable feature of Nunggubuyu (Heath 1984). Negation in this language is expressed through one of a number of negative Words. Most of these aﬀect the form of all Phrases within its scope, in the sense that verbs take diﬀerent subject preﬁxes and tense markers and nouns obligatorily occur with their noun class marker, which in positive contexts is sensitive to the semantic and pragmatic functions of the Noun Phrase. Consider the following example from Nunggubuyu (Heath 1984: 527): (259) Yagi ana:-"-ji n g a-bura-n g i . not cl-"-here 1.sg-sit-irr ‘I will not stay here.’ The presence of the noun class marker ana on the adverbial noun ji shows that the Noun Phrase is in the scope of the negator yagi. The subject preﬁx n g a on the verb takes a form that is diﬀerent from its counterpart in positive sentences, and the same goes for the irrealis marker n g i . We may account for this by copying the negative feature to the heads of the various Phrases within the scope of negation. Consider ﬁrst the representation of (259) without applying the rule of negative harmony: (260) (Cli : [(Gwi : /yagi/ (Gwi )) (Npi : (Nwi : [(Aﬀi : cl (Aﬀi )) (Nsi : /ji/ (Nsi ))] (Nwi )) (Npi )) (Vpi : (Vwi : (Aﬀj : 1sgsubj (Aﬀj )) (Vsi : /bura/ (Vsi )) (Aﬀk : irr (Aﬀk ))] (Vwi )) (Vpi )] (Cli )) Since the forms of the classiﬁer, the subject preﬁx, and the tense suﬃx are all sensitive to the presence or absence of a negative particle, they are introduced

352

the morphosyntactic level

in the form of the secondary operators Cl, 1SgSubj and Irr in (260). When a negative particle is present, the negative feature is copied to these secondary operators, as in (261): (261) (Cli : [(Gwi : /yagi/ (Gwi )) (Npi : (Nwi : [(Aﬀi : cl (Aﬀi )) (Nsi : /ji/ (Nsi ))] (Nwi )) (Npi )) (Vpi : (Vwi : (Aﬀj : 1sgsubj (Aﬀj )) (Vsi : /bura/ (Vsi )) (Aﬀk : irr (Aﬀk ))] (Vwi )) (Vpi )] (Cli )) The phonological encoder then selects the appropriate form of the morphemes in producing the phonological representation of the Clause. 4.4.8 Subordination 4.4.8.1 Introduction

Clauses may occur as constituents of other Clauses as adverbial, complement, or predicate Clauses. Their form, and in some cases also their templates, may be radically diﬀerent from main Clauses. We ﬁrst look at these various forms in 4.4.8.2. An important question from an FDG point of view is which interpersonal, representational, and morphosyntactic factors are responsible for the choice of a certain type of subordinate Clause. This is the topic of 4.4.8.3. The expression of operators within subordinate Clauses may be dependent upon the presence of certain operators within the main Clause, as in the case of sequence of tenses, to be discussed in 4.4.8.4. Finally, in some cases semantic constituents of a subordinate Clause may behave as pragmatic or syntactic constituents of the main Clause, as in the case of displacement and raising, to be discussed in 4.4.8.5. We will mainly focus on complement clauses in this section. 4.4.8.2 The form of subordinate Clauses

Not all languages have subordinate Clauses, and some make less use of them than others, using paratactic constructions instead. The latter situation would be the only option in a language without subordination. Pirahã has been claimed to be an example of such a language (Everett 2005: 629): (262) Ti kobai-baí "áoói, hi "íkao-ap-áp-iig-á. I see-intens foreigner he mouth-pull-up-cont-decl ‘I really watch(ed) the foreigner ﬁshing (with line and hook).’ “I watched the foreigner intensively. He was pulling (ﬁsh) out by (their) mouths.” In other languages we ﬁnd certain types of subordinate Clauses that are exactly like main Clauses, as in the following examples from English and Cofán (Fischer 2007: 393): (263) Sheila thinks [Peter is ill].

clauses (264)

353

[Chandia na’en-ni-ngae qquen su-’fa]=ni=nda=gi ja-ya. clear river-loc-mann so say-pl-loc-newtop=1 go-irr ‘If they say (go) to Chandia Na’en, I’ll go.’

In (263) the subordinate Clause itself is identical to a main Clause, and we need very little additional machinery to account for it. In the Cofán example (264) a regular verb-ﬁnal Clause now ends with the case marker =ni and the New Topic marker =nda, both clitics attaching to clausal constituents. This subordinate Clause being the ﬁrst constituent of the main Clause, the Clause layer subject clitic =gi attaches to it. Despite these markings, the subordinate Clause is internally fully identical to a main Clause. The further marking it receives is external to it, and identical to the kind of marking a regular Noun Phrase would receive. So again, to account for this type of subordinate Clause, we need little additional machinery. Many languages, however, have subordinate Clauses that are formally distinct from main Clauses, and in several cases they have more than one type of subordinate Clause. Ignoring relative Clauses here, which will be dealt with in 4.5.8, subordinate Clauses may be broadly distinguished from one another by (i) the presence or absence of a conjunction; (ii) the presence or absence of special verb forms; and (iii) the presence of absence of special marking of arguments. In (263) and (264) neither a conjunction nor a special verb form is present, and the arguments are expressed as they would be in a main Clause. We will now discuss some examples of the presence of the elements (i)–(iii). The use of conjunctions is illustrated for Spanish in (265)–(267): (265)

Juan no sab-e [que Pedro est-á Juan neg know-3.sg.ind.prs conj.fact Pedro cop-3.sg.ind.prs enfermo.] ill. ‘Juan doesn’t know that Pedro is ill.’

[si (266) Juan no sab-e Pedro Juan neg know-3.sg.ind.prs conj.nfact Pedro est-á enfermo.] cop-3.sg.ind.prs ill. ‘Juan doesn’t know whether Pedro is ill.’ (267)

Juan no viene [porque Pedro est-á Juan neg come.3.sg.ind.prs because Pedro cop-3.sg.ind.prs enfermo.] ill. ‘Juan is not coming because Pedro is ill.’

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the morphosyntactic level

The subordinate Clauses in Spanish diﬀer from main Clauses in the presence of a conjunction in PI . There are two diﬀerent conjunctions for complement Clauses, a factual (265) and a non-factual (266) one, which shows that a conjunction may, apart from conjoining two Clauses, participate in the expression of meaning. This is certainly the case for adverbial conjunctions, as in (267), which simultaneously serve the purpose of expressing the semantic function of the adverbial Clause within the main Clause. In all cases the conjunction can be said to be in the PI position of the subordinate Clause, pushing other material to the right, but not aﬀecting the relative order of those elements. The opposite situation obtains in Nama (Hagman 1973: 257), a language in which the conjunction is in PF , as shown in (268): ´ ´ [/"aé//amsà xuú-kxm/xií ` (268) //"˜ı˜ıp ke "am"a-se kèrè =/om he decl true-advr rem.pst believe Windhoek from-1.du hãã !xáis-à]. come.pfv conj-acc ‘He really believed that we had come from Windhoek.’ Conjunctions may also be in P2 , as in the case of the Czech conditional conjunction =li ‘if ’ in (269). This conjunction cliticizes in second position, where it is followed by an object clitic in the clitic string (de Bray 1969: 505): (269) [Chceš=li=ho vid˘et], . . . want.prs.2.sg=cond=3.sg.m.acc see ‘If you want to see him, . . . ’ In our approach to clausal constituent order, these placements can be accounted for in terms of the same principles that were applied for main Clause ordering. Since hierarchical ordering precedes conﬁgurational ordering, the placement of the conjunction precedes the placement of conﬁgurational units. Therefore the conjunction is necessarily placed in an absolute position, and other constituents have to shift away from that position: to the right of PI in (265)–(267), to the left of PF in (268), and to the right of P2 in (269). Speciﬁc templates are needed in those cases in which the constituent order in subordinate Clauses is diﬀerent from the one in main Clauses. This is crosslinguistically quite exceptional, an example being Dutch, the main Clause orderings of which we discussed earlier in this chapter. Consider again the following example and the representation of its constituent order: (270) Ik heb gisteren het boek aan het meisje gegeven. I have.prs.1.sg gisteren def book to def girl give.ptcp ‘I gave the book to the girl yesterday.’

clauses

355

(271) P2 PM PM+1 PF-1 PF PI f (Cli : [ (Npi )Subj (Vwi ) (Advpi ) (Npj ) (Adpi ) (Vpi ) ] (Cli )) Ik heb gisteren het_boek aan_het_meisje gegeven The subordinate counterpart of (270) is (272): (272)

dat ik gisteren het boek aan het meisje heb conj I.nom yesterday def book to def girl have.prs.1.sg gegeven give.ptcp ‘that I gave the book to the girl yesterday’

In contrast with main Clauses, in which the ﬁnite verb obligatorily goes to P2, in subordinate Clauses it is the Subject that obligatorily goes there, and the ﬁnite verb is placed in Clause-ﬁnal position to form an single constituent with the main verb, as illustrated by the following examples: (273) *dat gisteren ik het boek aan het meisje heb gegeven that yesterday I the book to the girl have given (274)

*dat ik gisteren het boek heb aan het meisje gegeven that I yesterday the book have to the girl given

The remaining constituents keep the same possibilities as to their placement, so that (272) may be represented as follows: (275)

PI P2 PM+1 PF-1 PF PM (Gwi ) (Npi )Subj (Advpi ) (Npj ) (Adpi ) (Vpi ) dat gisteren het_boek aan_het_meisje heb_gegeven ik

The diﬀerences as regards the clausal templates of Declarative main Clauses and subordinate Clauses may thus be summarized as follows: PI P2 P2+N PM-N PM PM+N PF-N PF f ( Vw1 ) ] (Cl1 )) ( cl1 : [ (277) P2+N PM-N PM PM+N PF-N PF PI P2 sub ( cl1 : [ (Gw1 ) (Np1 )Subj (Vp1 ) ] (Cl1 ))

(276)

decl

Following conventions introduced earlier, obligatory positions and ﬁllers are represented in bold face, and the subtype of the Clause is indicated in superscript preceding the opening variable. It is noteworthy that the number of obligatory positions and ﬁllers is larger in subordinate Clauses, a phenomenon that may be observed frequently crosslinguistically.

356

the morphosyntactic level

Lezgian has a wide range of non-ﬁnite verb forms used in subordination, some illustrative examples of which are given in (278)–(280) (Haspelmath 1993: 362, 369, 384): (278) Da˘gustan.di-n fol’kolor.di-n ilim.d-a q’il.i-n Daghestan-gen folklore-gen sciend-iness head-gen mesPela-jr.i-kaj sad [fol’klo.di-n proza.di-n žanr-ijar problem-pl-subess one folklore-gen prose-gen genre-pl klassiﬁcirovat’ awu-n] ja. classifying do-anr cop. ‘On of the main tasks in Daghestanian folklore studies is [classifying the genres of folklore prose].’ (279)

Nabisat.a-z [ktab k’el-iz] k’an-zawa. Nabisat-dat book read-inf want-impf ‘Nabisat wants to read a book.’

(280) Dide Anni.di [˘gül.ü-z ﬁ-daldi] muallimwil-e mother Anni.erg husband-dat go-cvb.post teachership-iness k’walax-na. work-aor ‘My mother Anni worked as a teacher until she got married.’ The nominalized predicate in (278) is used in a predicate Clause, the inﬁnitive in (279) in a complement Clause, and the posterior converb in (280) in an adverbial Clause. Instead of speaking of non-ﬁniteness, we prefer to use the term deranking (Stassen 1985, Cristofaro 2003). A deranked verb form is one that cannot be used in a main Clause, and is the counterpart of a balanced verb form, which can be used in a main Clause. These functional deﬁnitions can be applied crosslinguistically, while no crosslinguistically valid deﬁnition of ﬁniteness can be given. The form of the deranked verb as such is something that has to be accounted for at the Word layer, and will be discussed in 4.6. The question here is whether special clausal templates are needed to handle Clauses containing balancing or deranking verb forms. In the case of Lezgian, for the ordering of constituents within the subordinate Clause no special templates are needed. The positions it makes use of in subordinate Clauses are the same, though the rules that assign constituents to these positions are diﬀerent, in the sense that the language is more strictly verb-ﬁnal in subordinate Clauses, the ordering of main Clause constituents being more sensitive to information-structural

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considerations. It is, however, necessary to make a distinction between ﬁnite and non-ﬁnite subordinate Clauses in Lezgian with respect to their behaviour in higher Clauses: deranked Clauses go to canonical positions, or to PI if they are heavy, while balanced subordinate Clauses go to PF . Consider the following examples (Haspelmath 1993: 302, 371): (281) [Abur muq’uf.da-ldi k’el-un wa ezber-un] za they skill-srdir read-actnr and cram-actnr I.erg kwe-z k’ewelaj meslät q˜ alur-zawa. you.all-dat strongly advice show-impf ‘I advise you strongly to read and study them carefully.’ (282) Selim.a dide.di-z laha-na [ˆxi, wiˇc šeher.di-z fe-na]. Selim.erg mother-dat say-aor conj self town-dat go-aor ‘Selim told his mother that he was going to town.’ While the deranked complement Clause in (279) is in preverbal position, in (281) it is in PI due to its heaviness. The balanced subordinate Clause in (282), on the other hand, can only go to PF . Thus, we need to distinguish between (bal cl1 ) and (der cl1 ) in Lezgian, not so much because their internal structure is diﬀerent, but because they behave diﬀerently with respect to their placement in higher Clauses. A ﬁnal issue concerning deranked subordinate Clauses concerns the realization of arguments within the subordinate Clause. Here we may distinguish two diﬀerent cases: (i) an argument cannot be realized within the subordinate Clause, (ii) an argument is realized in a way that is diﬀerent from its main Clause marking. We will illustrate both cases with examples from Turkish. The ﬁrst case is illustrated in (283)–(284), which show deranked constructions in which the Subject argument cannot be expressed, while all others can (Kornﬁlt 1997: 51, 55): (283) Ben [öl-mek-ten] kork-uyor-du-m. I die-inf-abl fear-prog-pst-1.sg ‘I was afraid to die.’ (284) Ahmet [çok çalı¸s-arak] hedef-in-e ula¸s-tı-∅. Ahmet very work-cvb.mann aim-3.sg.poss-dat reach-pst-3.sg ‘Ahmet attained his goal by working hard.’ The absence of an argument is obligatory, as illustrated in (285)–(286) (Kornﬁlt 1997: 56; Geoﬀrey Haig, p.c.):

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(285) *Ben [Ahmet öl-mek-ten] kork-uyor-du-m. I Ahmet die-inf-abl fear-prog-pst-1.sg ‘I was afraid for Ahmet to die.’ (286) *[Ahmet çok çalı¸s-arak] Zeynep hedef-in-e Ahmet very work-cvb.mann Zeynep aim-3.sg.poss-dat ula¸s-tı-∅. reach-pst-3.sg ‘Zeynep attained her goal by Ahmet working hard/because Ahmet worked hard.’ In constructions such as (283)–(284), there is obligatory coreference between an argument of the main Clause and an argument of the subordinate Clause. Since in FDG coreferentiality is dealt with at the Representational Level, this property does not have to be accounted for at the Morphosyntactic Level. Yet in the morphosyntactic representation of these Clauses, we cannot simply leave out the position for the missing Noun Phrase. It is not just any argument that can be left out in these subordinate constructions, it has to be the Subject (Kornﬁlt 1997: 55). Consider the following examples (Boz¸sahin fc.; Geoﬀrey Haig, p.c.) and their underlying representations: (287) Çocuk [köpe˘g-i sev-mek] ist-iyor-∅. child dog-acc pet.inf want-prog-3.sg ‘The child wants to pet the dog.’ (ei : (fi : [(fj : ist (fj )) (xi : –çocuk– (xi ))A (ej : (fk: [(fl : sev (fl )) (xi )A (xj : –köpek– (xj ))U ] (fk )) (ej ))U ] (fi )) (ei )) (288) Köpek [çocuk tarafından sev-il-mek] ist-iyor-∅. dog child by pet-pass-inf want-prog-3.sg ‘The dog wants to be petted by the child.’ (ei : (fi : [(fj : ist (fj )) (xj : –köpek– (xi ))A (ej : (fk: [(fl : sev (fl )) (xi : –çocuk– (xi ))A (xj )U ] (fk )) (ej ))U ] (fi )) (ei )) In (287) the Actor slot of the subordinate Clause is coreferential with the Actor slot of the main Clause, while in (288) the Undergoer slot of the subordinate Clause is coreferential with the Actor slot of the main Clause. The fact that in the latter case passive formation is triggered shows that the empty slot in the subordinate Clause carries the Subject function, which is taken care of at the Morphosyntactic, not at the Representational Level. The morphosyntactic templates underlying (287) and (288) show this as follows:

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(289) main

(

PI PF-1 [∅ PF-1 PF ] PF (=287) nonﬁn cli : [ (Npi ) ( clj : [ (Npi )Subj (Npj ) (Vpi ) ] (Clj )) (Vpj ) ] (Cli )) Çocuk köpe˘g-i sev-mek ist-iyor-∅.

(290) main

(

PI PF-1 [∅ PF-1 PF ] PF (=288) nonﬁn cli : [ (Npi ) ( clj : [ (Npj )Subj (Adpi ) (Vpi ) ] (Clj )) (Vpj ) ] (Cli )) Köpek çocuk_tarafından sev-il-mek ist-iyor-∅.

Note that the Subject Noun Phrase is present in the template, but not assigned to a position, to indicate that it is the subject properties of the Noun Phrase that are at stake here, not its positional instantiation. Mapping of the coreferential argument to this Np slot during the alignment process then triggers the active voice in the case of (287) and the passive voice in the case of (288). The realization of arguments in Turkish deranked Clauses can also diﬀer from that in main Clauses in the sense that they are expressed in a diﬀerent form. Consider the following examples (Kornﬁlt 1997: 56, 57): (291)

a. Ahmet-∅ ev-e dön-dü-∅. Ahmet-nom house-dat return-pst-3.sg ‘Ahmet returned to the house.’ b. [Ahmet-∅ ev-e dön-ünce] Zeynep okul-a Ahmet-nom house-dat return-cvb.sim Zeynep school-dat gid-ebil-di-∅. go-abil-pst-3.sg ‘When Ahmet returned home Zeynep was able to go to school.’

(292)

a. Ahmet-∅ bütün i¸s-ler-in-i yava¸sça Ahmet-nom all task-pl-3.sg.poss-acc slowly yap-ar-∅. do-aor-3.sg ‘Ahmet does all his work slowly.’ yava¸sça b. [Ahmed-in bütün i¸s-ler-in-i Ahmet-gen all task-pl-3.sg.poss-acc slowly yap-tı˘g-ın]-ı duy-du-m. do-rls.nmlz-3.sg.poss-acc hear-pst-1.sg ‘I heard that Ahmet does all his work slowly.’

In (291b) the marking of the arguments of the subordinate Clause is realized in the same manner as with the arguments of the main Clause in (291a). This is not the case in (292b), where the Subject argument has the genitive

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case marker rather than the nominative case marker in (292a). Furthermore, the genitive argument is cross-referenced on the deranked predicate through the third singular possessive marker. In this respect, the overall structure of the Clause resembles that used for Noun Phrases with a possessor, as in (293): (293) Ahmed-in kitab-ı Ahmet-gen book-3.sg.poss ‘Ahmet’s book.’ Yet the deranked Clause cannot be directly compared to a Noun Phrase, since in many respects it behaves like a main Clause: the Undergoer argument is marked with the accusative suﬃx, and the modiﬁer yava¸sça ‘slowly’ is adverbial, not adjectival. Given this mixture of features, we have to decide whether to treat nominalizations like that in (292b) as a syntactic nominalization or a lexical nominalization. In the former case, the nominalization has to be treated as a Clause, in the second case, as a Noun Phrase. This problem is well known from the literature (e.g. Mackenzie 1987a, 1996; Koptjevskaja-Tamm 1993; Haspelmath 1996, Malchukov 2004). The position we take here is the one defended in Mackenzie (1996). A nominalization is clausal if the expression of operators and modiﬁers follows the clausal rather than the phrasal pattern. The nominalization in (292b) accordingly counts as a clausal nominalization, which diﬀers from lexical nominalization in Turkish in that modiﬁers of the latter are expressed as adjectives (Kornﬁlt 1997: 450), as can be seen contrastively in the following examples (Geoﬀrey Haig, p.c.): (294) [Asker-ler-in hemen yarın soldier-pl-gen immediately tomorrow dön-me-si]-ni isti-yor-∅. return-nmlz-3.sg.poss-acc want-prog-3.sg ‘The soldiers want to return tomorrow without delay.’ (295)

yarın-ki önemli çık-ı¸s için tomorrow-adjr important go.out-nmlz because ‘because of tomorrow’s important excursion’

Example (294) contains a clausal nominalization, in which the temporal modiﬁer yarın ‘tomorrow’ appear in its adverbial form. In the lexical nominalization in (295), on the other hand, this adverbial is adjectivalized before it can combine with the nominalized verb. The latter type of nominalization will be further dealt with in 4.5.3.

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The expression of arguments is not conclusive for classiﬁcation of a nominalization as lexical or clausal, since this can be handled by the alignment system as a case of diﬀerential argument marking, adapted to the conditions for speciﬁc types of subordinate Clauses. Thus, the genitive in (292b) can be seen as the expression of the Subject in the context of this type of clausal nominalizations. The following examples of another type of lexical nominalization in Turkish conﬁrm this analysis (Comrie and Thompson 1985: 364–5): (296)

a. Hasan-∅ mektub-u yaz-dı-∅. Hasan-nom letter-acc write-pst-3.sg ‘Hasan wrote the letter.’ b. Hasan-ın mektub-u yaz-ma-sı Hasan-gen letter-acc write-actnr-3.sg.poss ‘Hasan’s writing of the letter’

(297)

a. Mektub-∅ Hasan tarafından yaz-ıl-dı-∅. letter-nom Hasan by write-pass-pst-3.sg ‘The letter was written by Hasan.’ b. mektub-un Hasan tarafından yaz-ıl-ma-sı letter-gen Hasan by write-pass-actnr-3.sg.poss ‘the letter’s being written by Hasan’

Note that many languages exhibit alignment shifts in nominalization, e.g. from nominative-accusative alignment to absolutive-ergative alignment, as in Russian (Koptjevskaja-Tamm 1993). In order to trigger the appropriate expression of arguments in diﬀerent types of Clauses, these again have to be classiﬁed into subtypes, such that the encoder knows which rules to invoke to express the arguments properly. 4.4.8.3 Interpersonal and representational triggers

An important question is now how languages, if they have more than one morphosyntactic template available for the expression of subordinate Clauses, choose between those templates. We will show here that this choice is to a large extent determined by interpersonal and representational factors. In order to show this, we have to return brieﬂy to the various interpersonal and representational units that may underlie subordinate Clauses. We noted at several places in Chapter 3 that the Representational Level is recursive in nature. As a result, a representational frame may contain units of any level of complexity. Consider the following examples containing a predicate clause, a complement clause, and an adverbial clause respectively:

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(298) (ei : [(fi : [ (ej : [(fj : [ (fk : lose (fk )) (xi )U ] (fj )) (ej )U ]) (ek : [(fl : [ (fm : hesitate (fm )) (xi )U ] (fl )) (ek )U ])U ] (fi )) (ei )U ]) ‘To hesitate is to lose.’ (299) (ei : [(fi : [ (fj : saw (fj )) (xi : [(fk : man (fk )) (xi )U ])A (ej : [(fl : [ (fm : depart (fm )) (xj : [(fn : woman (fn )) (xj )U ])A (li : [(fo : building (fo )) (li )U ])So ] (fl )) (ej )U ])U ] (fi )) (ei )U ]) ‘The man saw the woman depart from the building.’ (300) (ei : [(fi : [ (fj : leave (fj )) (xi : [(fk : man (fk )) (xi )U ])A ] (fi )) (ei )U ]: (fm )) (ti : [ (ej : [(fl : [ (fm : return (xj : [(fn : woman (fn )) (xj )U ])A ] (fl )) (ej )U ]: [(ti ) (ej )U ]) (ei )U ]) ‘The man left when the woman returned.’ In (298) (ej ) occupies the predicate position, in (299) an argument position, and in (300) a modiﬁer position. Its internal complexity in the form of a predication frame is reﬂected in clausal structures at the Morphosyntactic Level. Argument and modiﬁer positions may be occupied by any of the representational layers distinguished in Chapter 3. But interpersonal layers, too, may enter the Representational Level when communicative units are referred to, as we argued in 3.14 when discussing reﬂexive language. As a result, we may classify subordinate constructions in terms of the interpersonal or representational layer that underlies them. In the case of complementation the semantics of the matrix predicate determines what kind of interpersonal or representational unit it can take as a dependent; in the case of adverbial subordination it is the semantic function or lexical conjunction that restricts the layers with which it may combine. The layers distinguished at the Interpersonal Level and the Representational Level that may potentially underlie a subordinate Clause are listed in (301) and (302):

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(301) Interpersonal layers underlying subordinate Clauses a. (πM1 : (πA1 :[. . . (πC1 : [(T1 )(R1 )] (C1 ):(C1 ))](A1 ):(A1 ))(M1 ):(M1 )) b. (πA1 :[. . . (πC1 : [(T1 ) (R1 )] (C1 ): (C1 ))] (A1 ): (A1 )) c. (πC1 : [(T1 ) (R1 )] (C1 ): (C1 ))

(302) Representational layers underlying subordinate Clauses a. (π p1 : (π ep1 : (π e1 : (π f1 : [(f2 ) (x1 )] (f1 ): σ (f1 )) (e1 ): σ (e1 )) (ep1 ): σ (ep1 )) (p1 ): σ (p1 )) b. (π ep1 : (π e1 : (π f1 : [(f2 ) (x1 )] (f1 ): σ (f1 )) (e1 ): σ (e1 )) (ep1 ): σ (ep1 )) c. (π e1 : (π f1 : [(f2 ) (x1 )] (f1 ): σ (f1 )) (e1 ): σ (e1 )) d. (π f1 : [(f2 ) (x1 )] (f1 ): σ (f1 ))

A higher layer generally contains all lower layers. As a result, subordinate constructions can be classiﬁed in terms of the highest layer they contain. Furthermore, since every layer brings along its own set of operators and modiﬁers, we can predict that operators and modiﬁers pertaining to the highest layer a subordinate Clause contains, as well as all lower ones, can be expressed in that subordinate Clause. Modiﬁers and operators pertaining to layers higher than the highest layer the subordinate Clause contains are barred from expression in that subordinate Clause. Let us illustrate this for complement Clauses and the occurrence of modiﬁers within them (for earlier relevant work on Irish, see Genee 1998). Complement-taking predicates (CTPs) express similar interpersonal and representational functions and meanings to modiﬁers, which helps us to classify them as taking an argument of a certain type. The classiﬁcation of complement Clauses in Table 7 therefore takes the function or meaning of the CTP as its point of departure in providing examples of relevant types of complementation. The following examples, the grammatical alternatives of which were found on the internet, illustrate the use of (combinations of) subordinate Clauses (between square brackets) of the types listed above, and show that the highest Table 7. Classiﬁcation of complement Clauses Type of Clause

Function/Meaning of CTP

M A

Situating a Move in the wider discourse (e.g. conclude, summarize) Relating Discourse Acts to one another (e.g. add, go_without_saying, ‘be_ ﬁrstly’) Transmission and reception of Communicated Content (e.g. say, hear) Situating Episodes with respect to each other (e.g. end_with, happen) Propositional attitude (e.g. believe), Inference (e.g. seem) Direct Perception (e.g. perceive), Volition (e.g. want) Aspect (e.g. start), Participant-oriented modality (e.g. able)

C ep p e f

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modiﬁer available for the layer concerned, given in italics, can indeed occur in these complement Clause, while higher ones cannot. The ungrammaticality judgements here relate to the use of the modiﬁer with scope over the subordinate Clause only. The predication frames needed for the various types of complementation are also given. (303) M-complement: (f1 : [(f2 : concludeV (f2 )) (x1 )A (M1 : [(A1 ), (A2 ) . . . ] (M1 ) (M1 ))U ] (f1 )) While it is diﬃcult to make generalizations about such a diverse public, it is easy to conclude [that, in sum these actions have led to a net loss of vegetative cover relative to pre-settlement conditions, as well as a substantial change in the type of vegetation present. At the same time, public consciousness regarding the importance of urban vegetation has certainly risen in the last ten years, although how much of that awareness has translated into changed behavior vis a vis urban plants in Quito is an open question.] (Internet) (304) A-complement (f1 : [(f2 : go_without_sayingV (f2 )) (A1 : [ . . . (C1 )] (A1 ): (A1 ))U ] (f1 )) It goes without saying [that, in addition (*in sum), issues such as quality and a customer-oriented approach will be kept in mind.] (Internet) (305) C-complement (f1 : [(f2 : sayV (f2 )) (x1 )A (C1 : [(T1 ) (R1 )] (C1 ): (C1 ))U ] (f1 )) He said [that reportedly (*in addition) there was some history of threats of domestic abuse in the family.] (Internet) (306) ep-complement (f1 : [(f2 : happenV (f1 )) (ep1 : (e1 : . . . (e1 )) (ep1 ): σ (ep1 ))U ] (f1 )) It happened [that after two years of us being there, (*reportedly) we found ourself [sic] in the right time at the right place, but we were not picked up by Taliban and said, come on, now, we are going to cover the war with us.] (Internet) (307) p-complement (f1 : [(f2 : believeV (f2 )) (x1 )A (p1 : (e1 : . . . (e1 )) (p1 ): σ (p1 ))U ] (f1 )) We believe [that possibly (*reportedly) as much as 60 percent (or more) of the population already believe that the government is hiding what they know about worldly visitors.] (Internet) (308) e-complement (f1 : [(f2 : wantV (f2 )) (x1 )A (e1 : (f3 : . . . (f3 )) (e1 ): σ (e1 ))U ] (f1 )) Lili wanted me [to come over after lunch (*possibly)]. (Internet)

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(309) f-complement (f1 : [(f2 : continueV (f2 )) (x1 )A (f3 : [(f4 ) (x1 )A ] (f3 ): σ (f3 ))U ] (f1 )) The police continued [to shoot indiscriminately into the crowd (*after lunch)]. (Internet) This approach not only accounts for the fact that the modiﬁers and operators that can be expressed in a complement Clause are determined by the type of that Clause, but also provides the means to account for diﬀerences in the form and behaviour of complements. As argued in Hengeveld (1989, 1998), many diﬀerences in the form of subordinate Clauses can be accounted for in terms of their underlying interpersonal and representational diﬀerences. Consider the following examples from Nama. In Nama subordinate constructions may take three diﬀerent forms. Direct quotation, in which the complement Clause has the status of a Discourse Act (A), is achieved by repeating the original sentence and providing it with the quote particle tí (Hagman 1973: 255): (310)

"Oo-s ke //"˜ı˜ısà //xaápá kè m˜ı˜ı [/"úú-ta then-3.sg decl she again rem.pst say not.know-1.sg "a tí]. prs quot ‘She said again: “I don’t know” ’

Where the complement Clause is a Communicated Content (C) or Propositional Content (p), it takes the case-marked complementizer !xáis-. Complement Clauses of this type may not take the optional Declarative marker ke, which, as illustrated in (310), is allowed in direct quotation. The following examples illustrate a C-complement (311) and a p-complement (312) (Hagman 1973: 257): ` (311) Ts˜ı˜ı //"˜ı˜ıp-à-kxm ke kè m˜ı˜ıpa [! u˜´ u˜ -kxm and 3.sg.m-acc-1.du.m decl rem.pst tell go-1.du ta !xáis-à]. impf conj-acc ‘And we told him that we were going.’ (312)

//’íip ke "am"a-se kèrè =/om [/"aé//amsà xuú-kxm he decl true-adv rem.pst believe Windhoek from-1.du /xií hàa !xáis-à]. come pfv conj-acc ‘He really believed that we had come from Windhoek.’

When the complement Clause is the expression of a State-of-Aﬀairs (e) or a Conﬁgurational Property (f), it is deranked, taking the form of a nominalization, as in (313)–(314) (Rust 1965: 64, Olpp 1977: 112):

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(313) [!Gû-s] ke káíse a !gomba te. go-nmlz decl very prs diﬃcult to.me ‘It’s very diﬃcult for me to go.’ (314)

llÎb ge [xoas-a] a }an. he decl write-acc prs can ‘He can write.’

Thus, the selection of complement Clause types in Nama is triggered by the nature of the interpersonal or representational layers underlying them. From a crosslinguistic perspective, a strong generalization that can be made is that a subordinate Clause is more likely to be of the deranked type the lower the layer on which it is based (see Hengeveld 1989, 1998). Deranking is the formal counterpart of the diminishing number of primary operators to be expressed morphosyntactically, as visualized in (301)–(302), and may therefore come in diﬀerent degrees. Thus, the Nama complement Clauses are deranked in the sense that the Declarative marker cannot be expressed within them and that their subordinate status is marked by a conjunction, but they are less deranked than nominalizations in that tense and aspect can be expressed within them, something that is not possible with the nominalizations in (313)– (314). In view of the generalization given above concerning the degree of deranking and the hierarchical status of the layer underlying a complement Clause, the following examples can be seen as typological extremes. Example (315) is from Evenki (Nedjalkov 1997: 1): (315) Bejetken gun-e-n min-tyki [amin-in boy say-rls-3.sg I-all father-3.sg.poss eme-d’eri-ve-n]. come-sim.ptcp-acc-3.sg.poss ‘The boy told me that his father was coming.’ This language uses a deranked complement clause for indirect speech, which is the expression of an underlying Communicated Content, and thus one of the highest layers that can be embedded. Our generalization predicts that complement clauses expressing lower layers (ep/p, e, f) in Evenki will all be of the deranked type, and this is indeed the case. The opposite situation holds in Modern Greek (Evangelos Karagiannis p.c.): (316) Sinéxyise [na katevéni]. continue.pfv.3.sg conj go.down.impf.3.sg ‘He continued going down.’

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This language uses a balancing complement clause for the lowest type of embedding, the one concerning Conﬁgurational Properties. Our generalization says that in this language complement clauses expressing higher layers (e, ep/p, C, A, M) will also be expressed by balancing clauses, and this turns out to be the case too. There are a number of other properties of subordinate Clauses that inﬂuence their expression. Hengeveld (1998) shows that time dependency, presupposedness, and factuality also play a role in some languages in the selection of a Clause template. These factors are reﬂected in underlying representations in the presence of certain primary operators, which serve as additional triggers for certain templates. We will not go into these issues here, and refer to Hengeveld (1998) for further details. 4.4.8.4 The expression of operators in subordinate Clauses

There may be diﬀerences in the expression of operators between main Clauses and subordinate Clauses. We refer here not so much to the possibility of expressing operators, which depends on the nature of the interpersonal and representational layers underlying the subordinate Clause, but to diﬀerences in the form in which available operators are expressed. One such diﬀerence has already shown up in examples (265)–(266) from Spanish, where the choice of the conjunction for complement Clauses is aﬀected by modal operators. For another illustration of this phenomenon consider the following examples from Jacaltec (Craig 1977): (317)

a. Xal naj [tato chuluj naj presidente]. said he conj will.come def president ‘He said that the president would come.’ b. Xal naj [chubil chuluj naj presidente]. said he conj will.come def president ‘He said that the president would come.’

The complementizer tato in (317a) indicates that the current Speaker considers the original speaker unreliable, whereas the complementizer chubil in (317b) indicates that the current Speaker considers the original speaker reliable. This distinction pertains to the ﬁeld of reportativity, an operator category of the Communicated Content underlying indirect speech complements. Another possible diﬀerence between main and subordinate Clauses as regards the expression of operators, namely sequence of tenses (consecutio temporum), is an instantiation of what we have earlier identiﬁed as operator agreement, now obtaining across the boundary of a main and subordinate Clause. Consider the following example from Amele (Roberts 1987: 48):

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the morphosyntactic level

(318) Naus uqa ege [qila bele-q-an fo=ec] sisil-t-en. Naus he I today go-1.pl-fut q=nmlz ask-1.sg/3.sg-rem.pst ‘Naus asked me whether we would go today.’ “Naus asked me whether we will go today.” The main Clause in (318) is in the remote past tense, but the subordinate Clause is in the future tense, which shows that this is a relative tense, in which a State-of-Aﬀairs is presented as posterior to the reference point established by the remote past marker of the main Clause. In such circumstances English in most cases applies a rule of sequence of tenses, through which the absolute tense marking of the main Clause is superimposed on the relative tense marking of the subordinate Clause. This means that in English a rule is required that copies the past feature of the main verb to the future feature of the subordinate verb, which will then be expressed as a future in the past. In Nama such a copying rule does not apply, leading to an identical expression of the future operator in both main and subordinate Clauses. 4.4.8.5 Raising

In some cases a constituent semantically belonging to a subordinate Clause appears as a constituent of a superordinate Clause (see for early discussion in FG, Dik 1979 and Bolkestein 1981). As with alignment in general, the triggers for this dislocation may be interpersonal, representational, or morphosyntactic in nature. Potential interpersonal triggers are pragmatic functions and definiteness/speciﬁcity; potential representational triggers are semantic functions and animacy; and potential morphosyntactic triggers are syntactic functions and degree of complexity. Note that, though we use the traditional terms ‘raising’ here, we do not want to suggest that the phenomenon involves the transformation of one basic conﬁguration into another derived one, as will become clear from our analysis below. Interpersonal triggering of raising is illustrated by the following examples from Hungarian (de Groot 1981: 51): (319)

a. János azt mond-t-a, [hogy a taxi öt-re jöjjön]. János dem say-pst-objp conj def taxi ﬁve-subl come ‘János said that the taxi would come at ﬁve.’ b. János öt-re mond-t-a, [hogy a taxi jöjjön]. János ﬁve-subl say-pst-objp conj def taxi come ‘János said that the taxi would come at ﬁve.’

Two features of Hungarian are relevant for the interpretation of this example. As illustrated in 4.4.6, Hungarian has special positions for Topical and Focal elements. Topical elements are in Clause-initial position, Focal elements in

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369

preverbal position. Secondly, in cases of complementation such as the one illustrated in (319a) a demonstrative element refers cataphorically to an appositional complement Clause that follows the main Clause. These two facts taken together show that in (319a) the demonstrative azt occupies the Focus position of the main Clause, signalling that the complement Clause is Focal, while the temporal expression ötre ’at ﬁve’ occupies the Focus position of the complement Clause itself. Under these circumstances placement of the Focal constituent of the complement Clause in the Focus position of the main Clause is allowed, in which case the demonstrative does not occur, as illustrated in (319b). Similarly, placement of the Topic of a complement Clause in the Topic position of the main Clause is possible, as illustrated in (320) (Kenesei, Vago, and Fenyvesi 1998: 178): (320) A könyv-et Anna mond-t-a [hogy fel-olvas-s-a def book-acc Anna say-pst-obj conj pfv-read.prs-obj Péter-nek]. Péter-dat ‘Anna said she would read the book to Peter.’ Representational triggering of raising can be illustrated with examples from Tuvaluan. The phenomenon itself is illustrated in (321) (Besnier 2000: 110): (321)

a. E see mafai loa [o puli ana fooliga nonpst neg can indeed conj forgotten 3.sg.poss features i au]. to 1.sg puli b. E see mafai loa ana fooliga [o nonpst neg can indeed 3.sg.poss features conj forgotten i au]. to 1.sg ‘I will never forget what he looked like.’

In (321a) the absolutive argument ana fooliga ‘his features’ of the subordinate clause appears in a main clause position, preceding the conjunction o. In Tuvaluan the raised Noun Phrase can have any semantic function, except for Possessive and Standard of Comparison. This restriction may be a result of the fact that these are semantic functions of Noun Phrases embedded within other Phrases. An illustration of semantic functions otherwise allowing raising is given in (322) for Actor (322b), Undergoer (322c), and Location (322d) (Besnier 2000: 114)

370 (322)

the morphosyntactic level a. E maasani [o ave nee Sina te tamaliki ki nonpst used-to conj send erg Sina art child to loomatua]. old.woman b. E maasani Sina [o ave te tamaliki ki te nonpst used-to Sina conj send art child to art loomatua]. old.woman c. E maasani te tamaliki [o ave nee Sina ki nonpst used-to art child conj send erg Sina to loomatua]. old.woman d. E maasani te loomatua [o ave nee Sina nonpst used-to art old.woman conj send erg Sina tamaliki ki ei]. child to ana ‘Sina often sends the child to the old woman.’

te art

te art

te art

Besnier (1988: 773) states that ‘a noun phrase can be raised out of a subordinate clause only if it denotes an entity that is actively involved in bringing about the situation denoted by the entire sentence’ or that is ‘responsible for the performance of the action denoted by entire sentence, or for the inception of the state denoted by the sentence’ (Besnier 1988: 762). This explains why the second of the following two sentences is ill-formed (Besnier 1988: 763): (323)

a. E kkaﬁ nee ia [o see fakatavale nee au]. nonpst capable erg he conj neg caus.defeated erg 1.sg ‘He is capable of not getting defeated by me.’ b. ??E kkaﬁ nee ia [o fakatavale nee au]. nonpst capable erg he conj caus.defeated erg 1.sg ‘He is capable of getting defeated by me.’

Every Noun Phrase that complies with this general semantic restriction is the potential target of raising in Tuvaluan, which may thus be said to apply representational triggers in the raising process. Raising triggered by morphosyntactic factors can be illustrated by means of the following Spanish sentences:

clauses (324)

371

a. Parece [que Juan escribió ese libro]. seem.ind.prs.3.sg conj Juan write.ind.pst.pfv.3.sg dem book ‘It seems that Juan wrote that book.’ b. Juan parece [hab-er escrito ese libro]. Juan seem.ind.prs.3.sg have-inf write.pfv.ptcp dem book ‘Juan seems to have written that book.’ c. Ese libro parece [hab-er sido dem book seem.ind.prs.3.sg have-inf be.pfv.ptcp escrito por Juan]. write.pfv.ptcp by Juan ‘That book seems to have been written by Juan.’

Raising is restricted in Spanish. Only the Subject of the subordinate clause can raise, and it can raise only to the Subject position of the superordinate clause. The Undergoer argument of the subordinate clause can therefore raise only after passivization. As with Subject assignment in general, there may be all kinds of contextual and therefore extragrammatical factors that trigger the choice for a raised or a non-raised construction type. This does not aﬀect the basically morphosyntactic analysis of the phenomenon in languages like Spanish. Raising has several consequences for the proper placement of constituents in morphosyntactic templates. Following our top-down approach, the template for a subordinate Clause is selected before the placement of the constituents pertaining to that Clause. The latter is only possible if the raised constituent can be placed in an absolute position or in a position relative to an already instantiated position. Let us apply this idea to the Spanish examples in (324). Subjects usually occur before the verb in categorical statements in PI or a position relative to PI , unless they are heavy, in which case they go to the absolute Clause-ﬁnal position PF , which is what has happened in (324a), to be represented as follows: (325) PI PM

PF

(=324a) PI PI+1 PM PM+1 (Cli : [ (Vpi ) (Clj : [ (Gwi ) (Npi )Subj (Vpj ) (Npj ) ] (Clj ))Subj ] (Cli )) parece que Juan escribió ese_libro The subordinate Clause in PF has Subject function, triggering third person singular agreement on the main verb. The predicate is in PM in (324a), leaving PI vacant, since Spanish does not require a dummy Subject constituent. In the raised variants (324a–b) this position is occupied by the raised Subject,

372

the morphosyntactic level

which now behaves as the Subject of the main Clause, as in the following representation of (324b): (326) PI

PM

(Cli : [ (Npi )Subj Juan

PF

(=324b) ∅ PM PM+1 (Vpi ) (Clj : [ (Npi )Subj (Vpj ) (Npj ) ] (Clj ))] (Cli )) parece haber_escrito ese_libro

As in other cases of unexpressed Subjects discussed above, we still need to know what the Subject of the subordinate Clause is in order to trigger active or passive encoding, which is why there is a non-realized subordinate Subject in (324b). Subject assignment is diﬀerent in (324c), which may be represented as follows: (327) PI

PM

PF

(=324c) ∅ PM PM+1 (Cli : [ (Npi )Subj (Vpi ) (Clj : [ (Npi )Subj (Vpj ) (Adpi ) ] (Clj ))] (Cli )) ese_libro parece haber_sido_escrito por_Juan

In cases in which PI has already been occupied during the process of hierarchical ordering by e.g. one or more modiﬁers and or a conjunction, then the raised Subject will go to the ﬁrst position available to the right of these, i.e. it will go to PI+N . This is illustrated in (328): (328) Según esta revista Juan parece hab-er According.to dem magazine Juan seem.ind.prs.3.sg have-inf escrito ese libro. write.pfv.ptcp dem book ‘According to this magazine Juan seems to have written that book.’ Thus, our approach to placement allows us to ﬁnd either an absolute or a relative position for raised arguments outside their proper domain. 4.4.9 Coreference

A ﬁnal issue concerning clausal organization that we will look at relates to coreferentiality and its consequences for the form of clausal constituents, particularly the choice of reﬂexive pronouns, the possible controllers for these pronouns, and the domain within which coreference exerts its inﬂuence. We will again make a distinction between three potential triggers of reﬂexivity: interpersonal, representational, and morphosyntactic triggers.

clauses

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In cases in which reﬂexivity is triggered interpersonally, we predict that the antecedent may be deﬁned in terms of its pragmatic function, while the domain of application is an interpersonal unit, such as a Discourse Act (A) or a Move (M). Lezgian seems to be a good example of such a language. Consider the following example (Haspelmath 1993: 414): (329)

ˇ C’exi buba laha-na x“i, wiˇci-z k’wal-e waP, big father say-aor conj self-dat house-iness not balxun.di-z ksu-z k’an-zawa. Balxun.di-k hawa serin balcony-dat sleep-inf want-impf balcony-subess air fresh x“iz že-da. ja, anal wiˇci-z da˘g.d-a awa-j cop there self-dat mountain-iness be.in-ptcp like be-fut ‘Grandfatheri said that hei wanted to sleep on the balcony, not in the house. On the balcony the air is fresh, there hei will feel like he is in the mountains.’

Note that the reﬂexive wiˇci can be used across Clause-boundaries, the antecedent ˇc’exi_buba ‘grandfather’ being in the ﬁrst Clause, and the reﬂexive occurring in both the ﬁrst and the second Clause. Haspelmath (1993: 411) furthermore notes ‘that it is not possible to put any syntactic limits on the positions that the antecedent may occupy’, giving examples of attributive genitives controlling the reﬂexive: x“u-n.i-kdi Rahman.a-n (330) I“xtin šadwal wiˇci-z-ni such pleasure self-dat-also become-nmlz-subdir Rahman-gen cˇ in-a-ni šad qh wer hat-na. face-iness-also glad smile appear-aor ‘Since such a pleasure had also happened to himi , a happy smile also appeared on Rahmani ’s face.’ The main restriction on reﬂexivization is that the controller must be pragmatically salient (Haspelmath 1993: 411), which within FDG we would deal with in terms of pragmatic functions. The example in (329) furthermore suggests that the domain of application of reﬂexivization is the Move, since (329) consists of two Discourse Acts, the second serving as an explanation for the ﬁrst. In cases in which reﬂexivity is triggered representationally, we predict that the antecedent may be deﬁned in terms of its semantic function, while the domain of application is a representational unit, such as a Propositional Content (p) or an Episode (ep). Chechen seems to have such a system, given the existence of examples like the following (Nichols 1994: 67; stretch of direct speech omitted):

374

the morphosyntactic level

(331) As ‘. . . ’ šiega a:lˇcaè, cunax cca do:š Pa dina, I.erg refl.all said.temp this.loc one word and say.cvb daPajtin-ˇcu de:ke Pa ca èožuš, šien vežeraš-cin sbj.send-obl part.all and neg look-cvb refl.gen brothers-ins huma je:kan dow Pa dina, šü:ge jo:llun quarrel and make.cvb you.all sbj.be.prs.ptcp thing divide.inf qajkina san ma:ra. called my husband.nom ‘When I said “ . . . ” to himi , my husbandi took that as suﬃcient reason and, without even looking at the portion that had been sent (to him), started a quarrel with hisi brothers and called you to divide their possessions.’ Nichols (1994: 68–9) notes that ‘control is basically semantically determined: the most animate or agentive NP is the favored controller’. This coincides with the fact that (331) describes an Episode, a semantic unit, which seems to serve as the domain of application of reﬂexivization. Note furthermore that clause boundaries do not restrict reﬂexivization, and that the controller follows the reﬂexives in (331). In cases in which reﬂexivity is triggered morphosyntactically, we predict that the antecedent may be deﬁned in terms of its syntactic function, while the domain of application is a morphosyntactic unit, such as a Clause. Koromfe illustrates this type of trigger, as in this language only Subjects can be the antecedent of a reﬂexive (Rennison 1997: 108): pa d@ gIllE a sallE kebre. (332) D@ 3.sg.hum give 3.sg.hum self art plate.sg big.sg ‘He gave himself the big plate.’ pa a sallE kebre d@ gIllE bi. (333) D@ 3.sg.hum give art plate.sg big.sg 3.sg.hum self child.sg ‘He gave the big plate to his own son.’ The morphosyntactic nature of reﬂexivization is furthermore reﬂected in the fact that the domain of application is a single simple Clause, i.e. it does not apply across any clause border. This includes the border introduced by nonﬁnite subordinate Clauses. Coreferential marking restricted to subordinate Clauses is often referred to as logophoricity. A language employing logophors is Babungo, and its logophors are diﬀerent from reﬂexives. In the absence of true reﬂexive pronouns, Babungo uses a periphrastic strategy involving the noun Nwáa ‘body’ within Clauses to indicate coreference (Schaub 1985: 110):

clauses

375

(334) M`@ s`O Nwáa Nw¯aa. I wash.pfv body my ‘Ii washed myselfi .’ shè" Nwáa w¯ı. (335) Nw´@ kàw he love.pfv only body his ‘Hei only loves himselfi .’ This strategy seems to be restricted to Subject controllers. In the case of coreferentiality across the border of a subordinate clause Babungo (Schaub 1985: 111) uses logophoric pronouns, which, too, are controlled by the main clause Subject: l¯aa yì táa jwî. (336) Nw´@ gì he say.pfv conj 3.log fut come ‘Hei said that hei would come.’ ´ u. l¯aa yì g1g¯ (337) Nw´@ yé he see.pfv conj 3.log fall.prog ‘Hei saw that hei was falling.’ l¯aa k1´ v˘@N sáN yí m¯e. (338) Nw´@ ny1`N he run.pfv conj neg.imp they beat 3.log neg ‘Hei ran away so that they should not beat himi .’ The examples above have shown that the various levels of organization in Functional Discourse Grammar help to account both for the varying nature of the controller (deﬁned in terms of pragmatic, semantic, or syntactic functions), as well as for the various domains of application of reﬂexivization strategies (interpersonal, representational, or morphosyntactic units). These features help us to generate the correct form of a pronoun. Recall that pronouns in FDG are represented in terms of abstract features, which are introduced at either the Interpersonal or the Representational Level for deictic and anaphoric uses respectively. The expression of these feature sets can now be made sensitive to (i) the presence of a certain type of controller, within (ii) the appropriate domain of application. In languages with interpersonal and representational triggers this means that the appropriate forms can be generated directly by the morphosyntactic encoder, while in the case of morphosyntactic triggers the choice of the correct form can only be made after the morphosyntactic template has been ﬁlled.

376

the morphosyntactic level

4.5 Phrases 4.5.1 Introduction

If we ignore the speciﬁc order in which constituents occur, a Phrase in a conﬁgurational language like English has the following maximum formula, in which every constituent may occur more than once: (339) (Xp1 : [(Xw) (Xp)(Cl)] (Xp1 )) In other words, a Phrase in such a language potentially consists of a sequenced conﬁguration of Words (Xw), other Phrases (Xp), and embedded Clauses (Cl). As regards Words, we have argued earlier that lexical elements are always the heads of Phrases at the Morphosyntactic Level. The reverse is not true: there are Phrases without a lexical head. When Phrases occur within Phrases the structure in (339) is applied recursively, to the extent that languages allow recursion. And the occurrence of Clauses within Phrases allows us to account for various types of subordinate Clauses. Among the subtypes of (Xp)s we distinguish Verb Phrase (Vp), Noun Phrase (Np), Adjective Phrase (Adjp), adverb Phrase (Advp), and Adposition Phrase (Adp). By a Verb Phrase we understand a Phrase with a Verbal Word as its head, and not the combination of verb and object, as the term is traditionally used. We do not assume that these Phrase types are universally present, neither do we assume, as argued in 3.7.2.3, that there is a one-to-one relation between Phrase types and lexeme types. In discussing the various properties of Phrases we will illustrate these properties by referring to the various subtypes of Phrases, but we do not aim at an exhaustive treatment of all of them. We will treat Phrases (and similarly Words, in 4.6) by applying the same principles as we applied in our treatment of Clauses. That is, we will build up the morphosyntactic templates of Phrases in a top-down and centripetal manner, until we touch upon conﬁgurational units, which are integrated into morphosyntactic templates in view of their alignment properties. The latter are much less relevant at the Phrase layer than they are at the Clause-layer, since most Phrases are based on underlying representations with a single argument, which is furthermore not expressed independently. The exception to this are cases of complex Phrases based on lexically derived heads, such as lexical nominalizations. Given the parallelism in our approach to Clauses and Phrases, the organization of this section runs parallel to that of 4.4. In 4.5.2 we start with the morphosyntactic expression at Phrase layer of the hierarchically organized corresponding parts of the Interpersonal Level and the Representational Level, starting with the highest layers and working down to the lowest ones.

phrases

377

In 4.5.3 we discuss the alignment properties of the conﬁgurational frames underlying Phrases. The ordering of the elements pertaining to these frames is discussed in 4.5.4. The morphosyntactic templates resulting from these steps are discussed in 4.5.5. Obligatory positions in phrasal templates for which no material is available from the Interpersonal and Representational Levels are ﬁlled with dummies, such as copular verbs or dummy nominal heads, which will be treated in 4.5.6. We are then ready to treat agreement relations in 4.5.7. Finally, we will pay attention to the form and structure of subordinate Clauses within Phrases in 4.5.8. 4.5.2 Ordering of hierarchically related units

If we restrict ourselves to Phrases with a lexical head, the parts of the Interpersonal Level and the Representational Level to be expressed in a hierarchical manner in a dynamic implementation of the grammar may be summarized as follows: (340) R / R /R

→

φv /σv /πv

→

φf /σf /πf

T / T /T

→

(φv /σv /πv

→)

φf /σf /πf

(341)

Referential Subacts (340) evoke a semantic category (v) which contains a (lexical) Property (f), as in (342), where (x) is the more speciﬁc instantiation of (v): (342) RI (xi : [(fi : man (fi )) (xi )U ]) ‘(I saw) a man.’ Ascriptive Subacts (341) often map directly onto a Lexical Property (f), as in (343): (343) TI (fi : see (fi )) ‘(I) saw (a man).’ But Ascriptive Subacts may also evoke other semantic categories (v) which are in turn restricted by a Lexical Property (f), as in (344), where (x) is the more speciﬁc instantiation of (v): (344) TI (xi : [(fi : man (fi )) (xi )U ]) ‘(He is) a man.’

378

the morphosyntactic level

Cases like these were discussed in 3.6.2.2.7 and 3.6.2.2.6 on classifying and relational predication frames respectively. The two strings in (340)–(341) are not completely independent of each other. Referential Subacts, especially, generally contain Ascriptive Subacts. For instance, Adposition Phrases which correspond to a Referential Subact may have a lexical adposition as their head, which corresponds to an Ascriptive Subact and takes an argument that corresponds to a Referential Subact again, as in (345): (345) RI TI RJ (li : [(fi : [(fi : outside (fi )) (lj : [–city_centre– (lj )U ])Ref ] (li )U ]) ‘(He lives) outside the city centre.’ Similarly, Noun Phrases corresponding to a Referential Subact generally contain one or more Ascriptive Subacts, as shown in the following more elaborated version of (342): (346) RI TI TJ (xi : [(fi : man (fi )) (xi )U ]: [(fj : big (fj )) (xi )U ]) ‘(I saw) a big man.’ Given this added complexity of Referential Subacts, the majority of our examples will illustrate this type of Subact. Note that in both cases mentioned here the Sub-Subacts are in a conﬁgurational relationship within the Referential Subact, so that a choice will have to be made as regards which Sub-Subact has to be developed ﬁrst in morphosyntax. This point can be illustrated by means of the following constructed and somewhat overloaded, yet grammatical example and its interpersonal and representational counterparts: (347)

the allegedly defamatory so-called articles

(348) (+id RI : [ (TI : [ ] (TI ): so-called (TI )) (TJ : [ ] (TJ ): allegedly (TJ ))] (RI )) (m xi :

[(fi : article (fi ))

(xi )U ]: [(fj : defamatory (fj ))

(xi )U ])

In (347) two Properties are ascribed to the Individual (xi ): ‘article’ and ‘defamatory’. Each of these Properties at the Representational Level is evaluated at the Interpersonal Level (see 2.8.2.3), with the modiﬁers so-called and allegedly assessing the appropriateness of the two ascriptions. These ascriptions are in an equipollent relationship at the Interpersonal Level. The question which of

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379

these has to be developed ﬁrst is answered at the Representational Level. In order to respect (340), the Ascriptive Subact (TJ ) (allegedly defamatory) has to be assigned a position ﬁrst, since (fj ) is a modiﬁer (σ) of (xi ), the instantiation in (348) of the variable (v) in (340). And in view of (341), the modiﬁer allegedly has to be assigned a position before the modiﬁer defamatory is sent down to morphosyntax. This joint application of (340) and (341) explains the orderings found in the following series of examples: (349)

a. b. c. d. e.

the allegedly defamatory so-called articles the defamatory so-called articles the so-called articles the articles articles

These orderings are the only ones possible for the given combination of elements in the intended readings. We may explain this ordering restriction, as shown most fully in (349a), as follows. The article, if present, expresses an interpersonal operator of type πR and has to be located ﬁrst according to (340), going to the initial position. Then, as we just argued, (TJ ) has to be developed ﬁrst. (TJ ) as a whole forms an Adjective Phrase, which goes to the ﬁrst relative position available counting from the initial position. Within the Adjective Phrase the interpersonal modiﬁer allegedly, being of type T , is the ﬁrst item to be assigned a position according to (341). It goes to the ﬁrst position within the embedded Phrase. The second part of (TJ ), the adjective defamatory, is placed next, and again takes the next available position to the right within the embedded Phrase. The modiﬁer within (TI ) has to be expressed next, according to (341). It forms an Adjective Phrase that goes to the next position available. Finally, the head of (TI ) is also the head of the Phrase as a whole and is put in the next position available. In the absence of any of the elements just discussed, the remaining items move to the left, as illustrated by (349b–e) or any other possible combination. Note that by applying this procedure the only absolute position we need for the examples in (349) is PI , introduced in the previous section. The only other position needed for English Noun Phrases is PF , which is used for heavy constituents and another class of modiﬁers to be discussed below. While we used notions such as PI and PF in the previous section to indicate the position of Words, Phrases, and Clauses within Clauses, we use them here for the position of Words, Phrases, and Clauses within Phrases. (349a–e) may thus be represented as follows:

380

the morphosyntactic level

(350) a. PI

PI+1

(=349a) PI (Npi : [ (Gwi : the (Gwi )) (Api : [(Advpi : (advwi :allegedly(advwi )) (Advpi )) PI+2 PI+1 (Awi :defamatory (Awi ))](Api )) (Apj : (Awj : so-called (Awj )) (Apj )) PI+3 (Nwi : articles (Nwi )) ] (Npi ))

b. PI PI+1 (Npi : [ (Gwi : the (Gwi )) (Api : (Awi : defamatory (Awi )) (Api ))

(=349b)

PI+3 PI+2 (Apj : (Awj : so-called (Awj )) (Apj )) (Nwi : articles (Nwi )) ] (Npi )) c. PI PI+1 (Npi : [ (Gwi : the (Gwi )) (Api : (Awi : so-called (Awi ))(Api )) PI+2 (Nwi : articles (Nwi )) ] I

(=349c)

(Npi ))

I+1

d. P P (Npi : [ (Gwi : the (Gwi )) (Nwi : articles (Nwi )) ]

(=349d) (Npi ))

I

e. P (Npi : [ (Nwi : articles (Nwi )) ]

(=349e) (Npi ))

English thus illustrates what Rijkhoﬀ (2002) calls the Principle of Scope, which predicts the iconic reﬂection of hierarchical relations at the Morphosyntactic Level. One of the typological correlates of this when applied to the Noun Phrase is that in the overwhelming majority of languages determiners take a position at one of the Phrase margins. For a further illustration, and one involving more positional complexity, let us consider the order in Noun Phrases in Basque. Consider the following example (Aitor Arana, p.c.): (351) herri hon=eta=ko hiru biztanle zaharr=ak land dem=inan.loc=attr three inhabitant old=def.pl ‘the three old inhabitants of this country’ In Basque Noun Phrases lexical modiﬁers follow the head noun, and nonlexical modiﬁers occur in initial position. The class of non-lexical modiﬁers includes phrasal and clausal ones. Most numerals can only occur in the position immediately preceding the head noun. The deﬁniteness marker occurs on the last element of the Noun Phrase, and not necessarily on the head noun, as (351) shows: if there is lexical modiﬁer it will appear on that modiﬁer, and if there is a series of modiﬁers it will appear on the last one. And in the

phrases

381

exceptional case in which a numeral occurs as the last item (which is obligatory with the numeral bat ‘one’ and an option with the numeral bi ‘two’) it will appear on the numeral, as in the following example (Aitor Arana, p.c.): (352)

herri hon=eta=ko biztanle zahar bi=ak land dem-loc.inan=attr inhabitant old two-def.pl ‘the two old inhabitants of this country’

The phrasal nature of the deﬁniteness marker is also a property of case markers and the like. As Trask (2003: 113) puts it, ‘ . . . nouns cannot in fact be directly inﬂected at all: in Basque, it is noun phrases, and only noun phrases, which can be inﬂected’. We therefore prefer to analyse these markers as Phrase-layer (as opposed to Clause-layer) clitics: particles that cliticize to the last element of the Phrase, irrespective of the nature of that element. There are two more such clitics in (353)–(354): the locative particle eta acts as a postposition, and the attributive particle ko enables a Postposition or Adverb Phrase to act as a nominal modiﬁer. The interpersonal and representational structure of (351) is given in (353): (353)

(TJ ) (+id RI : [ (TI ) (3 xi : [(fi : biztanle (fi )) (xi )U ]: [(fj : zahar (fj )) (xi )U ]: (TK : (RJ ) (TK ))] (RI )) [(fk : (prox xj : [–herri– (xj )U ])L (fk )) (xi )U ])

In the hierarchical placement of the various elements of this structure the expression of the identiﬁability operator on the Referential Subact (RI ) comes ﬁrst: it goes to the last position within the phrasal template, PF . In the next step there are three candidates for placement: the numeral operator and the two modiﬁers all operate at the same layer. The order of placement is determined by alignment considerations to be discussed in the next section. In this case the two modiﬁers could be placed in any order, but whatever this order would be, the complex modiﬁer goes to PI , while the lexical one goes to PF-1 . The numeral can then be placed relative to the complex modiﬁer in PI+1 . The ﬁnal element to be placed is the nominal head. One could argue that in (351) it is in PI+2 , in PF−2 , or in PM . In the absence of further evidence, we will assume a medial position in cases like these. We thus may propose the following template for (351): (354)

(=351) PI (Npi : [ (Adpi : [–herri_hon=eta=ko] (Adpi )) PM PI+1 (Gwi : hiru (Gwi )) (Nwi : biztanle (Nwi )) PF PF-1 (Api : (Awi : zahar (Awi )) (Api )) (Gwj : ak (Gwj )) ] (Npi ))

382

the morphosyntactic level

Of course the Adposition Phrase (Adpi ) has to be developed further, again using a phrasal template. The result would be as follows: (355) (=351) PF-1 (Adpi : [ (Adpj : [–herri_hon=eta] (Adpj ) PF (Gwk : ko (Gwk ))] (Adpi )) This contains another Adposition Phrase, to be developed as: (356) PF-1

(=351)

(Adpj : [ (Npj : [(Nwj : herri (Nwj )) (Gwl : hon (Gwl )) (Npj )) PF (Gwm : eta (Gwm ))] (Adpi )) And then the Noun Phrase (Npj ) is developed again as: (357)

PM PF (Npj : [ (Nwj : herri (Nwj )) (Gwn : hon (Gwn ))] (Npj ))

(=351)

with the cumulative abbreviated result being: (358)

[ PI PI+1 PM PF-1 PF ] (=351) [ PF-1 PF ] F-1 F [P P ] [PM PF ] [ [ [ [herri hon]= eta]= ko] hiru biztanle zaharr= ak]

When adding a further interpersonal modiﬁer of the Referential Subact, the result is as predicted, given the principles of hierarchical ordering: since it is in the same category as the deﬁniteness marker, it has to be placed immediately after or before the placement of the deﬁniteness marker and relative to it. Consider the following example (Aitor Arana, p.c.), in which the intended reading of the modiﬁer gaixo ‘poor’ is the interpersonal one (cf. 2.8.3.3): (359) herri hon=eta=ko biztanle zahar gaixo-ak land dem=loc.inan=attr inhabitant old poor-def.pl ‘poor old inhabitants of this country’ The interpersonal adjective gaixo is placed here relative to and immediately preceding the deﬁniteness marker -ak, pushing the representational adjective zahar to the left, as we would predict on the basis of the principles of hierarchical ordering. Now let us turn to an example of the order of Words within Verb Phrases. The following example is from Hidatsa (Matthews 1965), and has a Verb Phrase containing the analytic expression of three diﬀerent operators from the Representational Level:

phrases (360)

383

Wíra i apaari ki stao ski. tree it grow inch rem.pst cert ‘The tree must have begun to grow a long time ago.’

As in many languages (see Foley and Van Valin 1984; Bybee 1985), the semantic scope of the operators (πf inch, πep rem.pst, πp cert) is reﬂected in their surface order. It will be clear from this example that in a top-down approach the auxiliaries in Hidatsa are placed from right to left, as shown below: (361) (=360) PF-3 PF-2 (Vpi : [ (Vpj : (Vwm : apaari (Vwm )) (Vpj )) (Gwj : ki (Gwj )) PF PF-1 (Gwk : stao (Gwk )) (Gwl : ski (Gwl ))] (Vpi )) 4.5.3 Alignment

Units making up a Phrase may be equipollent, i.e. not hierarchically related to one another, (i) because they are modiﬁers and operators of like rank; (ii) because they are part of the same predication frame. The former case was illustrated for Basque in the preceding section, especially in (351) and its underlying representation in (353), the Representational Layer of which is repeated here for convenience: (362) (3 xi : [(fi : biztanle (fi )) (xi )U ]: [(fj : zahar (fj )) (xi )U ]: [(fk : (prox xj : [–herri– (xj )U ])L (fk )) (xi )U ]) In terms of the hierarchies in (340)–(341), the πx operator ‘3’, the σx modiﬁer (fj ), and the σx modiﬁer (fk ) are all of the same rank. Their coding properties may be sensitive to various interpersonal, representational, and morphosyntactic considerations. For instance, in the case of Basque the major factor determining the placement of modiﬁers within the Noun Phrase is the morphosyntactic complexity of the modiﬁer. Units may also be equipollent because they are part of the same predication frame, as illustrated in examples like the following, discussed in 3.6.1: (363) the brother of the king (xi : [(fi : [(fj : brother (fj )) (xj : [(fk : king (fk )) (xj )U ])Ref ] (fi )) (xi )U ]) (364)

before the meeting (ti : [(fi : [(fj : before (fj )) (ei : [(fk : meeting (fk )) (ei )Ref ]) (fi )U ]) (ti )U ])

(365)

the idea that the world is round (pi : [(fi : [(fj : idea (fj )) (pj : [–the world is round–] (pj ))U ] (fi )) (pi )U ])

The equipollent units in (363) within (fi ) are (fj ) and (xj ), in (364) (fj ) and (ei ), and in (365) (fj ) and (pj ). Again, the coding properties of these units may

384

the morphosyntactic level

be motivated by interpersonal, representational, or morphosyntactic factors. Note that there are other pairs of equipollent units in these examples, such as (fi ) and (xi ) in (363), but since in cases like these one unit remains unexpressed they are less interesting from the point of view of alignment. Some cases of equipollence thus reﬂect the relation between a modiﬁer and its head, while others have to do with the relation between a dependent and its nucleus. It is precisely this distinction that languages may or may not mark explicitly in the alignment of units within Phrases. Consider the following examples from Tariana (Aikhenvald 2003: 128, 123): (366) waha panisaRu we abandoned.village ‘our abandoned village’ (367)

a. nu-pitana 1.sg-name ‘my name’ b. kuphe i-pitana ﬁsh indf-name ‘the name of a ﬁsh’

(366) illustrates inalienable possession, which is expressed through mere juxtaposition, while (367) contains examples of inalienable possession, expressed through pronominal preﬁxes. In (367a) the inalienably possessed noun has the ﬁrst person preﬁx. In the presence of a nominal possessor, the inalienably possessed noun takes the indeﬁnite preﬁx (367b). Recall that in 3.6 we analysed alienable possession as in (368), while inalienable possession would be represented as in (369): (368) the king’s book (xi : [(fi : book (fi )) (xi )U ]: [(fj : (xj : [(fk : king (fk )) (xj )U ])Ass (fj )) (xi )U ]) (369) the king’s brother (xi : [(fi : [(fj : brother (fj )) (xj : [(fk : king (fk )) (xj )U ])Ref ] (fi )) (xi )U ]) The embedded Noun Phrase the king is a modiﬁer of the head book in (368), while it is a dependent of the nucleus brother in (369). The pronominal preﬁxes in the Tariana examples (367) thus mark the argument of a nucleus, not the modiﬁer of a head. Interestingly, it uses the same preﬁxes as in other cases in which arguments have to be marker on their nuclei. Compare the following examples (Aikhenvald 2003: 123, 67, 229): (370)

nu-pitana 1.sg-name ‘my name’

phrases (371)

nu-dalipa 1.sg-near ‘near me’

(372)

Nu-ñha-ka. 1.sg.a-eat-recpst.vis ‘I have eaten.’

385

These examples show that the same pronominal marker is used in relational Noun Phrases (370), Adposition Phrases (371), and Clauses (372). In each case this marker expresses the (ﬁrst) argument of the nominal, adpositional, and verbal nuclei respectively. It comes as no surprise that nominalizations pattern in the same way, as in the following examples (Aikhenvald 2003: 467): (373) nu-dokola-Ri 1.sg-bend-nmlz.nonpst ‘my joint (of human body)’ (374)

nu-mheta-Ri 1.sg-think-nmlz.nonpst ‘my thought/opinion’

(375) nu-peya-Ri 1.sg-be.in.front-nmlz.nonpst ‘what or who is in front of me’ The alignment of arguments is thus fully symmetric across Phrase and Clause types in Tariana. Modiﬁers of heads are never treated in this way. A quite diﬀerent system is found in Lango. In this language modiﬁers are treated in one way, arguments within Phrases in another, and arguments within Clauses in yet another. Alienable possessors are treated in the same way as lexical modiﬁers, in that they all take the attributive particle à, as illustrated in the following examples (Noonan 1992: 154, 181): (376)

gwôkk à lóc`@ dog attr man ‘the man’s dog’

(377)

dwôN dyàNN à cow attr big ‘the big cow’

(378)

àjwât´E à têk 1.sg.hit.pfv-3.sg attr hard ‘I hit him hard.’

386

the morphosyntactic level

Inalienable possessors, by contrast, do not take the attributive particle (Noonan 1992: 157): (379) bàd dàktàl arm doctor ‘the doctor’s arm’ Inalienable possessors, the arguments of prepositions, and the subjects of nominalizations are all treated in the same way in that they are expressed through the same set of associative person markers (Noonan 1992: 81, 107, 213): (380) Nut-´@ neck-1.sg.ass ‘my neck’ (381) bòt-´@ to-1.sg.ass ‘to me’ (382) dákô kwânn´E-rˆE woman read.inf-3.sg.ass ‘the woman’s reading’ Alienable possessors are expressed through a diﬀerent set of suﬃxes (Noonan 1992: 79): (383) b`ONO` -ná dress-1.sg.poss ‘my dress’ Arguments within Clauses do not share any of the properties mentioned above. They are expressed through their own set of suﬃxes on the verb, as illustrated above in (378). English exhibits a third type of system, one in which arguments and modiﬁers within Phrases are treated in the same way, as in (368)–(369) above, while a diﬀerent strategy is used for arguments within Clauses. A fourth type of system is one in which no distinction is made between the three types of constituent. This is the case in Berbice Dutch Creole. Consider the following examples (Kouwenberg 1994: 177, 159, 208, 525): (384) eni brantE they burn.pfv ‘they burnt’ (385)

eni bangki they bench ‘their bench’

phrases Lango

Tariana

English

BD Creole

modifier (Phrase)

A

A

A

A

argument (Phrase)

B

B

argument (Clause)

C

387

B

Figure 20. Alignment within Phrases

(386) di jErma papa def woman father ‘the woman’s father’ (387) a. di minggi angga def water in ‘in the water’ b. mEE di bicycle with def bicycle ‘with the bicycle’ These examples show that simple juxtaposition can be used in all the relevant contexts. The only exception in Berbice Dutch is a specialized possessive pronoun in the third person singular, which has the same distribution as its English counterpart. The four types of system may now be compared with each other as in Figure 20. We have not come across one other logical possibility: languages in which modiﬁers within Phrases and arguments within Clauses are treated the same way, while arguments within Phrases are treated diﬀerently. 4.5.4 Ordering of non-hierarchically related units

We already encountered the issue of the ordering of non-hierarchically related units in our discussion of the Basque example in (351) above, repeated as (388) here: (388) herri hon=eta=ko hiru biztanle zaharr=ak land dem=inan.loc=attr three inhabitant old=def.pl ‘the three old inhabitants of this country’ What this example illustrates is that morphosyntactic factors may inﬂuence ordering at the Phrase layer. Complex modiﬁers go to Phrase-initial position, while simple modiﬁers go to a position relative to PF . Apart from adnominal Phrases, participial and relative Clauses count as complex modiﬁers for this rule (Trask 2003: 146, 149):

388

the morphosyntactic level

(389) atzo ni=k erosi-ta=ko liburu=a yesterday 1.sg-erg buy-ptcp-attr book-def.sg ‘the book I bought yesterday’ (390) lore-ak eman di-zki-o-da=n neska ﬂowers-def.pl give 3.abs-pl-3.sg.dat-aux=comp girl ‘the girl I have given the ﬂowers to’ We may represent these orderings schematically as: PM (391) PI atzo_ni=k_erosi-ta=koCL liburu=a

(=389)

(392) PI PM (=390) CL lore-ak_eman_di-zki-o-da=n neska Interpersonal factors may also play a role in the ordering of equipollent units. Thus, as Dryer (2005: 371) notes, in Asmat (Voorhoeve 1965: 140) contrastively used adjectives precede the head noun, while non-contrastively used adjectives follow: (393) akát ów good people ‘good people (in contrast to bad people)’ (394) ów akát people good ‘good people’ These examples show that the head is not in a position relative to one of the Phrase margins, but in the medial position, as in: PM (=393) (395) PI +CONTR akát ów (396) PM PF (=394) ów akát−CONTR In French some adjectives that normally follow the head, precede it when emphasized, as in the following examples: (397) une voiture rouge superbe a car red magniﬁcent (398) une SUPERBE voiture rouge a magniﬁcent car red

phrases

389

as represented in: (399) PI PM PF-1 PF une voiture rouge superbe (400)

(=397)

PI PI+1 PM PF (=398) une SUPERBE voiture rouge

Semantic factors, too, may play an important role in the ordering of modiﬁers. In English evaluative adjectives precede objective ones. If both are present, age adjectives go in the middle. Thus, (401) is correct but (402) is not: (401)

a nice old black car

(402)

*a black nice old car

These orderings can be explained in terms of the designation of the adjective, as indicated in: (403) PI PI+1 PI+2 PI+3 PI+4 EVAL AGE OBJV car a nice old black

(=401)

Within the physical class, further meaning distinctions can be made, as illustrated in the following examples: (404)

a. the navigable deep rivers b. the deep rivers navigable

In (304a) the adjective navigable precedes the head and designates a permanent Property. In (304b) it occurs in the ﬁnal position also used for complex modiﬁers, and designates a contingent Property. Examples like these may be represented informally as: (405)

a. PI the b. PI the

PI+2 PI+3 PI+1 (=404a) OBJ/PERM OBJ/PERM navigable deep rivers PI+2 PF (=404b) PI+1 deepOBJ/PERM rivers navigableOBJ/CONTG

It thus seems that to a large extent English is semantically organized as regards the positioning of modiﬁers within the Noun Phrase. In all, we have shown in this section that in the ordering of units of like ranks within Phrases may be sensitive to interpersonal, representational, and morphosyntactic factors. 4.5.5 Templates

In deﬁning overall templates at the Clause layer we made use of four absolute positions: PI , P2 , PM , and PF . So far we have given illustrations at the Phrase

390

the morphosyntactic level

layer of all of these but P2 . There are certain languages in which this position is relevant at the Phrase layer as well. In languages such as Serbian (Mili´cevi´c 2004) sentences such as the following occur: (406)

Mo=me=je prijatelj Marko posetio juˇce. my=me=cop friend Marko visited yesterday ‘My friend Marko visited me yesterday.’

Under certain conditions Serbian clitics that logically belong at the Clause layer are attached to the ﬁrst Word (rather than the ﬁrst constituent) of the sentence in a clitic string that may contain a variety of items. If the ﬁrst Word of the sentence is not a constituent by itself but forms part of a larger Phrase, the clitics may under certain conditions interrupt that Phrase and can then be said to occupy the second position within the Phrase. Thus, in (406) the Phrase moj . . . prijatelj ‘my friend’ is interrupted by the ﬁrst person pronominal clitic me ‘me’ and the copula/auxiliary clitic je. This becomes clearer when (406) is compared with (407), in which the word order is adapted: (407) Juˇce=me=je posetio moj prijatelj Marko. yesterday=me=cop visited my friend Marko. ‘My friend Marko visited me yesterday.’ In a sense, then, (406) exhibits the opposite process to raising: Clause-layer elements are lowered into the Phrase. We may translate this into our formalism by assuming that Clause-initial Phrases in Serbian have a P2 position available into which Clause-layer elements may be lowered. The interesting thing here is that elements are involved that are assigned a position in both the hierarchical and the non-hierarchical processes. Consider the following examples (Schütze 1994: 11): (408)

Ja=mu=ga ni-sam dala. I=3.sg.m.dat=3.sg.acc neg-aux.pst.1.sg given ‘I did not give it to him.’

(409)

Ni-sam=li=mu=ga dala? neg-aux.pst.1.sg=q=3.sg.m.dat=3.sg.acc given ‘Did I not give it to him?’

In (408) there is a subject pronoun ja in ﬁrst position, which hosts the clitic string =mu=ga and is followed by the Verb Phrase ni-sam dala. In (409) the subject is dropped, and another phonologically prominent element has to go to the ﬁrst position of the Clause, the negative auxiliary nisam. The clitic string now ends up in the second position within the Vp. The clitic li is a hierarchically high operator, being the expression of the Illocution

phrases

391

at the Interpersonal Level. It has to be placed before all other elements in (409). In our approach this means that the second position is an absolute position, since there is no other element relative to which the interrogative clitic can be placed. The next element to be assigned a position is then the negative auxiliary that goes to the ﬁrst position of the Verb Phrase. Only after that can the remaining elements be assigned a location. They are in an equipollent relationship to one another, and their placement depends on alignment considerations. The internal ordering within the clitic string seems semantically motivated (Recipient before Undergoer). The main verb probably goes to the Phrase-ﬁnal position. The overall analysis of (409) would then be: (410)

PI

(=409)

PI P2+1 P2 ﬁn (Cli : [(Vpi : ( Vwi : nisam (Vwi ) (Gwi : li (Gwi )) (Nwi : mu PF P2+2 (Nwi )) (Nwj : ga (Nwj )) (nonﬁn Vwi : dala (Vwi ))] (Cli )) Note that it is crucial in this representation that the Verb Phrase involved is in the clausal PI position. A similar analysis would apply to interrupted Noun Phrases such as the one illustrated in (406). 4.5.6 Dummies and support

Dummies at the phrasal layer remedy the absence of certain interpersonal or representational elements that are necessary for the formation of an appropriate phrase structure, or supply grammatical material that is necessary for an interpersonal or representational unit to occur in a certain slot. There are at least four contexts in which languages require dummies: (i) the absence of a verbal element at the Interpersonal Level or the Representational Level in the realization of an Ascriptive Subact; (ii) the absence of a nominal element at the Interpersonal Level or the Representational Level in the realization of a Referential Subact; (iii) the absence of an interpersonal or representational operator in the realization of an Ascriptive Subact; (iv) the absence of an interpersonal or representational operator in the realization of a Referential Subact. The ﬁrst situation can be illustrated by means of the following Spanish examples and their underlying representations: (411) Este hombre es un carpintero. dem man cop.prs.ind.3.sg indf carpenter ‘This man is a carpenter’

392

the morphosyntactic level

T R (ei : [(fi : [ (xi : (fj : carpinteroN (fj )) (xi )U ) (xj : (fk : hombreN (fk )) (xj )U ) ] (fi )) (ei )U ])

(412) Este armario es de madera. dem cupboard cop.prs.ind.3.sg of wood ‘This cupboard is made of wood.’ “This cupboard is of wood.” T R (ei : [(fi : [ (fi : (xj : maderaN (xj ))So (fi )) (xj : (fk : armarioN (fk )) (xj )U )U ] (fi )) (ei )U ])

In the underlying representation of both (411) and (412) the main Ascriptive Subact does not map onto a representational unit containing a verbal lexeme. In cases like these Spanish requires the support of a verbal copula, which then serves as the carrier of TMA distinctions. Such a copula is inserted into the morphosyntactic structure by the morphosyntactic encoder. The driving force here is the fact that Spanish does not have templates for (main) Clauses that do not contain a Verb Phrase. Once a clausal template is selected and there is no lexical verb that can go into the head slot of the Vp, the encoder inserts the dummy verb which has the actual lexical predicate as its complement. The Vps in (411) and (412) would then look as follows: (413)

PI PI+1 (=411) (Vpi : [(Vwi : ser-prs.ind.3.sg (Vwi )) (Npi : [(Gwi : un-m.sg (Gwi )) (Nwi : carpintero-sg (Nwi ))] (Npi ))] (Vpi )) ‘es un carpintero’

(414)

PI+1 (=412) PI (Vpi : [(Vwi : ser-prs.ind.3.sg (Vwi )) (Adpi : [(Gwi : de (Gwi )) (Npi : (Nwi : madera-sg (Nwi )) (Npi ))](Adpi ))(Vpi )) ‘es de madera’

Many languages do not need verbal copula support, or do not need it in certain circumstances. See Hengeveld (1992) for extensive discussion. The second situation can be illustrated by means of the following English example and its underlying representation: (415)

a red car and a blue one (xi : (fi : carN (fi )) (xi )U : (fj : redA (fj )) (xi )U ) & (xj : (fi ) (xj )U : (fk : blueA (fk )) (xj )U )

There is a coreferential relation between the heads (fi ) of the descriptions the two Individuals (xi ) and (xj ), as a result of which the lexical ﬁller of the head position of the second one may remain empty. In morphosyntax, however, the corresponding Noun Phrase without a nominal head is not allowed in English. As a result, the dummy one has to be inserted to ﬁll the gap, and subsequently

phrases

393

carries the number distinction. The two conjuncts in (415) thus obey the same morphosyntactic template: (416) (Npi : [(Gwi : a (Gwi )) (adjpi : (adjwi : redA (adjwi )) (adjpi )) (Nwi : carsg (Nwi ))] (Npi )) ‘a red car’ (Npj : [(Gwj : a (Gwj )) (adjpj : (adjwj : blueA (adjwj )) (adjpj )) (Nwj : onesg (Nwj ))] (Npi )) ‘a blue one’ Again, many languages do not require this type of dummy. The third type of situation obtains, for example, in Samoan (Mosel and Hovdhaugen 1992: 365). This language has a semantically empty tense particle e, of which it is claimed that ‘ . . . in independent Clauses it does not indicate any particular aspectual or temporal relationship . . . but expresses that the State-of-Aﬀairs generally exists without referring to its inception, duration, or completion, or its location in time.’ Samoan has a ﬂexible parts-of-speech system but a rigid morphosyntax, which helps to tell the functions of lexical items apart. The absence of a tense particle would lead to ambiguity, which is resolved by inserting a dummy particle. The following examples illustrate the use of the particle (Mosel and Hovdhaugen 1992: 365, 364): (417)

E ’ai=na ∅ le gata. genr eat=ergr abs spec snake ‘Snakes are edible.’

(418) E ono o=na ∅ tausaga. genr six poss=3.sg spec.pl year ‘He is/was six six years old.’ “Six are/were his years.” (419) E alu Ø le pasi i Apia. genr go abs spec bus dir Apia ‘The bus goes to Apia.’ Thus, in the absence of a semantically motivated TMA particle, the Samoan morphosyntactic encoder inserts the dummy particle into the relevant slot in the Vp-template. The fourth situation can be illustrated by means of some examples from Muna. Consider the following examples (van den Berg 1989: 103): (420)

Ne-gholi o pae, o kenta, o kambulu bhe kalei. 3.sg.rls-buy art rice art ﬁsh art vegetables with banana ‘She bought rice, ﬁsh, vegetables and bananas.’

394

the morphosyntactic level

(421) Inodi o moghane. I art man ‘I am a man.’ (422) O dahu no-kotou. art dog 3.sg.rls-bark ‘A dog barks.’ (423) O kapoluka no-bisara-mo art tortoise 3.sg.rls-pfv ‘The tortoise said . . . ’ In many circumstances (roughly, when not following a particle or a verb, or when not otherwise identiﬁable as a Noun Phrase) Muna Noun Phrases are introduced by the semantically empty article o. Rijkhoﬀ (2002: 92f), following Greenberg (1978), identiﬁes the element o and similar elements in a wide range of languages as Noun (Phrase) markers, which have no other function but to indicate that the constituent involved is a Noun Phrase. The situation here is somewhat more complex, in the sense that the Noun Phrase marker is not a substitute for other markers that are semantically motivated, but is sensitive to the wider clausal context in which the Noun Phrase occurs. 4.5.7 Agreement

We described agreement in 4.4.7 above as a mechanism by which information pertaining semantically to a single element of the construction under consideration is copied to one or more other elements. We also mentioned there that a distinction has to be made between agreement on the one hand and crossreference on the other. This distinction is relevant at the Phrase layer as well. In many languages optional (pro)nominal possessors are cross-referenced on the possessum, as in the following Turkish example: (424)

(Hasan-ın) kitab-ı Hasan-gen book-poss.3.sg ‘Hasan’s book’

In this example the third person singular possessor Hasan is cross-referenced on the possessum kitab-. The fact that the lexical possessor can be left unexpressed shows that the possessive suﬃx has referential force of its own, which will be reﬂected in the presence of a Referential Subact at the Interpersonal Level. The situation is diﬀerent in Maasai. In this language nominal possessors follow the possessum and are preceded by a morpheme that shows agreement

phrases

395

in gender with the preceding possessum and agreement in number with the following possessor. This is illustrated in the following examples (Storto 2003: 5–6): (425)

a. òl-díà l`OO´ -ìn-kìtúàk det.sg.m-dog poss.pl.m-det.pl.f-women.acc ‘the women’s dog’ b. òl-díà l`OO´ -ìl-l´Ewà det.sg.m-dog poss.pl.m-det.pl.m-men.acc ‘the men’s dog’ c. ìl-díà-ín l`OO´ -ìn-kìtúàk det.pl.m-dog-pl poss.pl.m-det.pl.f-women.acc ‘the women’s dogs’ d. ìl-díà-ín l`OO´ -ìl-l´Ewà det.pl.m-dog-pl poss.pl.m-det.pl.m-men.acc ‘the men’s dogs’

As these examples show, the form of the possessive marker l`O´O marks the masculine gender of the possessum and the plurality of the possessor, and is insensitive to the number of the possessum and the gender of the possessor. In this case the possessor cannot be left unexpressed. It can be replaced by a pronominal possessor, which is diﬀerent in that it shows agreement in both gender and number with the possessum. Maasai thus qualiﬁes as a language marking (two-way) agreement between possessor and possessum. A similar distinction applies with respect to agreement in gender and class: in some cases the gender or class markers actually reﬂect the natural gender or natural class of the semantic category designated by the noun; in other cases the agreement marker reﬂects the grammatical gender or class of the noun. For the ﬁrst case, consider the following example from Swahili, cited in Aikhenvald (2000: 38): (426)

ki-faru m-kubwa cl7-rhinoceros cl1-big ‘a big rhinoceros’

The word faru in Swahili belongs to class 7, which covers basically inanimates (Ashton 1944: 14), yet the class marker on the adjective is a class 1 marker, which covers animates. Agreement is thus with the natural class of the referent, and not with the grammatical class of the noun. Agreement with the grammatical class of a noun is illustrated by the following Spanish examples:

396 (427)

the morphosyntactic level un-a persona buen-a indf-f person(f) good-f ‘a good person’

(428) un-∅ ediﬁcio alt-o indf-m building high-m ‘a high building’ The fact that the persona belongs to the feminine noun class and the noun ediﬁcio to the masculine noun class cannot be predicted on the basis of their meanings. The agreement is automatic and triggered by inherent features of the head noun. The procedure accounting for grammatical agreement within Phrases is identical to the one we proposed for agreement at the Clause layer. For a proposal as to how FDG could deal with semantic agreement, see Dikker (2004) and Dikker and van Lier (2005). 4.5.8 Subordination

Phrases may contain other Phrases or Clauses, which within the higher Phrase may act as arguments or modiﬁers: (429) the president’s suite

(Phrase—modiﬁer)

(430) the president’s son

(Phrase—argument)

(431) the assertion that he made yesterday (Clause—modiﬁer) (432) the assertion that the world is ﬂat

(Clause—argument)

Various grammatical phenomena are sensitive to the modiﬁer–argument distinction. To mention just two: in English the embedded Phrase in (429) may appear in adjectival form, while the one in (430) may not: (433) the presidential suite (434) *the presidential son The embedded Clause in (431) may alternatively be realized as a non-restrictive relative Clause, but the one in (432) may not: (435) the assertion, which he made yesterday (436) *the assertion, which the world is ﬂat These diﬀerences reﬂect the basic distinction between arguments and modiﬁers that we applied in Chapter 3 to constructions like these.

phrases

397

Some languages use basically the same templates for subordinate Phrases and Clauses as they do for independent Phrases and Clauses, and we need very few additional rules to account for these. In other languages subordinate Phrases and Clauses may diﬀer in form from independent ones. Let us once more return to the Basque examples we discussed earlier: (437)

herri hon=eta=ko hiru biztanle zaharr=ak land dem=inan.loc=attr three inhabitant old=def.pl ‘the three old inhabitants of this country’

(438)

atzo ni=k erosi-ta=ko liburu=a yesterday 1.sg-erg buy-ptcp-attr book-def.sg ‘the book I bought yesterday’

(439)

lore-ak eman di-zki-o-da=n neska ﬂowers-def.pl give 3.abs-pl-3.sg.dat-aux=comp girl ‘the girl I have given the ﬂowers to’

Subordinate Phrases in Basque are accompanied by the attributive particle =ko, showing its dependent status, as in (437). Clauses may occur in participial form, as in (438), in which case they have to be accompanied by the attributive particle again. Clauses may also occur in ﬁnite form, as in (439), in which case they are accompanied by a complementizer =n. In all cases the embedded Phrase or Clause has to appear in the initial position of the Phrase that it forms part of. The templates for Phrases and Clauses in Basque to a large extent serve to accommodate subordinate Phrases and Clauses as well: the attributive particle and complementizer simply go to the ﬁnal position of the template, and push all other elements to the left. Yet the templates have to be identiﬁable as being of the subordinate type, in order to account for their initial placement in the higher phrasal template. More subtle subdistinctions will have to be made in English, where phrasal and clausal modiﬁers go to Phrase-ﬁnal position, except for bare participial modiﬁers, which participate in the ordering relative to Phrase-initial position just as lexical modiﬁers do: (440)

the old man / *the man old

(441) the singing man / *the man singing (442) *the in the garden man / the man in the garden (443)

*the singing a song man / the man singing a song

(444)

*the who sings a song man / the man who sings a song

398

the morphosyntactic level

The English morphosyntactic encoder will thus have to be sensitive not only to the non-ﬁnite status of the participial modiﬁer, but also to the question whether arguments of the participial form are expressed. Some languages do not allow the modifying use of certain relational Phrases. Consider the following example from Hungarian (de Groot 1989: 191): (445) a kert-ben lev˝o ﬁú / *a kert-ben ﬁú art garden-iness cop.ptcp.sim boy / art garden-iness boy ‘the boy in the garden’ ‘the boy in the garden’ “the in the garden being boy” Languages such as Hungarian thus require a rule of copula support in these circumstances as well. Just as at the Clause layer, we ﬁnd raising phenomena at the Phrase layer, particularly raising of inalienably possessed arguments from the Phrase layer to the Clause layer. Particularly telling are the following examples from Dinka (Andersen 2007: 110): léc (446) Mòc à-Wèr ˜ ˜ ˜ ˜ man decl-be.white tooth.pl.objresp ‘The teeth of the man are white.’ “The man is white with respect to his teeth.” `ic. (447) Mòc à-cé.. Wò..t mèer ˜ ˜ ˜ ˜ man decl-aux.prf house illuminate stomach ‘The man has illuminated the room.’ “The man has illuminated the house with respect to its stomach.” In Andersen’s terminology, Dinka has a so-called ‘object of respect’, which designates the body part with respect to which the predication holds. Under certain circumstances this object is marked tonally, as in (446). Positionally the object of respect is characterized by the fact that it occurs in the position immediately preceding or following the lexical verb. When the preverbal position is occupied by a regular object, it will go to the postverbal position, otherwise it will go to the preverbal position. For the morphosyntactic analysis of examples like these, the Dinka clausal template should be considered ﬁrst. In Dinka all clausal absolute positions identiﬁed earlier (PI , P2 , PM , and PF ) are relevant: PI for the placement of conjunctions and Topics; P2 for the placement of ﬁnite verbs and the placement of the Subject, if not Topic, relative to it; PM for the placement of non-ﬁnite verbs; and PF for the placement of adverbial modiﬁers. The general maximal template would be as follows:

phrases (448)

399

PI P2 PM-1 PM PI+1 P2+1 Top ﬁn nonf (Cli : [(Gwi ) (Npi ) (Vw) (Npj )Sbj (Npk )Obj (Vpi ) PF PM+1 InalP (Npl ) (Xp1 )] (Cli ))

The underlying semantic and pragmatic representation of (447) would be as in (449): (449)

(T) (R)Top (T) (R) (ei : (Perf fi : [ (fj : mèer (fj )) (xi : –mòc– (xi )U )A (xj : (fk : [ (fl : `ic (fl )) ˜ ˜ ˜ ‘illuminate’ ‘man’ ‘stomach’ (R) (xj : –Wò..t– (xj ))Ref ] (fk )) (xj )U )U ] (fi )) (ei )) ‘house’

In the hierarchical part of the placement procedure the Perfect operator will trigger the insertion of an auxiliary in P2 . This means the lexical predicate will be expressed in a non-ﬁnite form and goes to PM . The Aargument is Topic and therefore goes to P1 , leaving the Subject position in the overall template unoccupied. The Undergoer argument now has to be distributed across two positions: the possessor is treated as an Object and therefore goes to the position immediately preceding the lexical verb, leaving the postverbal position available for the possessed. The result is as in: (=447) PI P2 PM PM-1 PM+1 Top ﬁn nonf InalP (Cli : [ (Npi ) ( Vw) (Npk )Obj ( Vpi ) (Npl ) ] (Cli )) `ic. Mòc Wó..t àcé.. mèer ˜ ˜ ˜ ˜ While the treatment of body parts as clausal constituents seems to be obligatory in Dinka under all circumstances, in Tariana it is obligatory if the possessive phrase logically belongs to an argument that is not the subject. The result is then a double object construction, as illustrated in the following example (Aikhenvald 2003: 157):

(450)

(451)

Diha-pasi-nuku di-whida-nuku du-pisa-taka 3.sg-aug-top.non.a/s 3.sg.nf-head-top.non.a/s 3.sg.f-cut-oﬀ du-pe 3.sg.f-leave ‘She cut oﬀ the head of him—the big one . . . ’

400

the morphosyntactic level

4.6 Words 4.6.1 Introduction

The following maximally elaborated formula may be used for the template of a (Morphosyntactic) Word, ignoring the speciﬁc order in which elements occur, and assuming that every element may occur more than once: (452)

(Xw1 : [(Xm)(Xw) (Xp) (Cl)] (Xw1 ))

A Word maximally consists of a sequenced conﬁguration of Morphemes (Xm), other Words (Xw), Phrases (Xp), and Clauses (Cl). The latter three categories may come as something of a surprise, but, as we will show below, are needed to account for polysynthetic languages, which play an important role in this section. In 3.7.2.3 we made a distinction between Lexemes and Words: Lexemes are operative at the Representational Level, Words at the Morphosyntactic Level. There are various reasons to make this distinction. The ﬁrst is that a single Word at the Morphosyntactic Level may correspond to various Lexemes at the Representational Level. Recall our semantic analysis of the Word sword-swallower in 3.7.2.3: (453) (xi : [(fi : [(fj : swallowV (fj )) (xi )A (xj : [–swordN – (xj )U ])U ] (fi )) (xi )U ]) In this case there are two Lexemes at the Representational Level, each with its own Lexeme class assigned, which yield a single Word at the Morphosyntactic Level. A second reason to make a distinction between Lexemes and Words is that the opposite may also hold: a single Lexeme at the Representational Level may correspond to various Words at the Morphosyntactic Level. This is true of, for instance, idioms like kick_the_bucket ‘die’, which at the Representational Level forms a single meaning unit of the f-category, while at the Morphosyntactic Level it corresponds to three diﬀerent Words. A third reason to distinguish between Lexemes and Words is that, even in languages which make no distinctions at all between Lexeme classes, there are a variety of Word classes. Recall the following Mundari examples (Evans and Osada 2005: 354–5): (454)

buru=ko bai-ke-d-a mountain=3.pl make-compl-tr-pred ‘They made the mountain.’

(455)

saan=ko buru-ke-d-a ﬁrewood=3.pl mountain-compl-tr-pred ‘They heaped up the ﬁrewood.’

words

401

Table 8. Correspondences between Lexical and Grammatical Word classes Lexical Word class

Example

Grammatical Word class

Example

Verb Noun Adjective Adverb Adposition Conjunction Particle

exterminate horseshoe terriﬁc aloft under while hey, wow

Auxiliary Verb Pronoun Proadjective Proadverb Grammatical Adposition Grammatical Conjunction Grammatical Particle

must, should, be I, it, that such there, then of, at that, because just, even

In (454) the ﬂexible Lexeme buru is used referentially and occurs without any inﬂection. In (455) it occurs with a series of suﬃxes which are speciﬁc to the predicative function in which it is used in this sentence. These examples show that, although there is no reason to distinguish Lexeme classes in Mundari, there is reason to distinguish Word classes, each with its own Morphosyntactic Template. A fourth reason to distinguish between Lexemes and Words is that there are many Words that have no corresponding Lexeme. This is the case of all grammatical Words, which either correspond to an operator or a function at the Interpersonal or Representational Level or are introduced as dummies or support elements. These often behave in the same way as Words that do correspond to a Lexeme. These Words will be introduced at the Morphosyntactic Level and will be classiﬁed according to the analogy between their syntactic distribution and that of Words with lexical content. Pronouns, for instance, display much the same distribution as the Lexeme class Noun but correspond to abstract features at the Interpersonal Level and/or the Representational Level. The correspondences may be represented in Table 8. The examples of Grammatical Word classes given in Table 8 all correspond to functions, operators or units with an abstract head at the Interpersonal or Representational Level, or to nothing at all in the case of the copula be, which, as shown in the previous section, is introduced at the Morphosyntactic Level in response to particular conﬁgurations of the Interpersonal and Representational Levels. Table 9 oﬀers, by way of example, some correspondences between Grammatical Words introduced at the Morphosyntactic Level and elements of the Interpersonal and Representational Levels. As is already clear from Table 9, the correspondence may be with: (i) an entire semantic unit, as in the case of you and there; in such cases the morphosyntactic form will be termed a proform;

402

the morphosyntactic level Table 9. Examples of correspondences between Grammatical Words and elements of the Interpersonal Level and the Representational Level Form

Interpersonal Level

Representational Level

must you such there at because

– (R1 : [−S, +A] (R1 )) – (R1 ) – –

Inferential operator (x1 ) Operator prox on (f1 ) (dist l1 ) L function on (l1 ) or (t1 ) Cause function on (e1 ) or (p1 )

(ii) an operator, as in the case of must and such (for this analysis of such, see Mackenzie 1997); in such cases the form will be termed an auxiliary; (iii) a function, as in the case of at and because; here the form will be termed a relator. Note that the term ‘auxiliary’ is not restricted to Grammatical Verbs. In Hebrew, the optional copula in such examples as the following may be assigned to the class of Pronouns (Grammatical Nouns), being identical to Pronouns in other, more prototypical uses, and agreeing in number and gender, although not person, with the argument (cf. Hengeveld 1992: 190–1; Junger 1981: 117, 122, 130): (456) Dan (hu) gadol. Dan 3.sg.m big ‘Dan is big.’ (457)

Sara (hi) mora. Sara 3.sg.f teacher ‘Sara is a teacher.’

(458) Yossi ve Dan (hem) xaver-im. Yossi and Dan 3.pl.m friend-pl.m ‘Yossi and Dan are friends.’ (459) Ata (hu) hexašud. 2.sg.m 3.sg.m def.suspect ‘You are the suspect.’ Auxiliary Adjectives are found in Turkish, as in examples like the following (Hengeveld 1992: 189; Lewis 1967: 143):

words (460)

403

a. Ev-in bahçe-si var-dı. house-gen garden-poss.3.sg cop.pos-pst.3.sg ‘The house had a garden.’ “lit. There was the house’s garden.” b. Ev-in bahçe-si yok-tu. house-gen garden-poss.3.sg cop.neg-pst.3.sg ‘The house did not have a garden.’ “lit. There wasn’t the house’s garden.”

The copulas var and yok are classiﬁed as adjectives, since they have the same inﬂectional possibilities as lexical adjectives, for example in being incapable of carrying inﬂection for future tense. If the Representational Level indicates a future tense, the verbal copula ol- must be used, which is negated regularly by the verbal suﬃx –mı: (461)

a. Ev-in bahçe-si ol-acak-∅. house-gen garden-poss.3.sg cop-fut-3.sg ‘The house will have a garden.’ “lit. There will be the house’s garden.” b. Ev-in bahçe-si ol-mı-yacak-∅. house-gen garden-poss.3.sg cop-neg-fut-3.sg ‘The house will not have a garden.’ “lit. There won’t be the house’s garden.”

On this basis var and yok will be regarded as Auxiliary Adjectives. Once a systematic and principled distinction is made between Lexemes and Words, productive derivational processes may be interpreted as a way of ﬁtting Lexemes into syntactic slots for which they are not designed. Consider the following pairs of examples from English and Turkish (Kornﬁlt 1997: 328) respectively: (462)

a. John closed the door. b. The door closed.

(463)

a. Hasan kapı-yı kapa-dı. Hasan door-acc close-pst ‘Hasan closed the door.’ b. Kapı kapa-n-dı. door close-intr-pst ‘The door closed.’

In English the Verb close can be used both transitively and intransitively. In Turkish, the intrinsically transitive Verb kapa has to be detransitivized before it

404

the morphosyntactic level Table 10. Morpheme classes Morpheme Stem Root Aﬃx

Lexical

Dependent

+ + −

− + +

can be used in an intransitive context. In FDG the latter (productive) process is seen as obtaining within the grammar, as a morphosyntactic coercion eﬀected by the introduction of a two-place Lexeme into a one-place Predication Frame, leading to an intransitive Verbal Word. This issue will be pursued further in 4.6.6 below. To the extent that Words are made up of Morphemes, these too can be categorized into diﬀerent classes. We will distinguish the following basic units in strictly morphosyntactic terms. A stem (Xs) is a Morpheme with lexical content that may occur as the sole lexical component of a Word; a root (Xr) likewise is a Morpheme with lexical content, but one that may only occur in conjunction with another Root or Stem, i.e. is dependent on another Root or Stem. An aﬃx (Aﬀ) is a Morpheme with grammatical content, and may only occur in conjunction with a Stem. Together these three types of morpheme may be deﬁned as in Table 10. Note that Roots are deﬁned in diﬀerent ways in diﬀerent traditions. We use the most restrictive deﬁnition here. Depending on the language involved, Lexemes may map onto Roots or Stems, the latter distinction being morphosyntactically rather than semantically motivated. Roots (Xr) and Stems (Xs) may be subdivided into verbal Roots (Vr) and Stems (Vs), nominal Roots (Nr) and Stems (Ns), etc. Aﬃxes of course can be subdivided into Preﬁxes, Suﬃxes, Inﬁxes, and Circumﬁxes, but this will be reﬂected in our representations by their position rather than by their categorization. Our treatment of Words below will follow the pattern that we used for Clauses and Phrases above. The ordering of Morphemes within the Word is ﬁrst considered from a hierarchical perspective in 4.6.2. Then we consider the alignment properties of equipollent units in 4.6.3. Since we are considering the Word layer here, this means that we are entering the domain of incorporating languages, which are the only ones that manifest lexically realized equipollent units at this layer. This type of language will also be the focus of our attention in 4.6.4, where we consider the order of equipollent units. In 4.6.5 we summarize the ordering rules proposed at the Word layer in the form of Templates. 4.6.6 further explores the idea presented above that much of derivational morphology can be interpreted as the formal reﬂection of coercion eﬀects. It

words

405

also considers a number of cases in which Morphemes appear to be expletive, in the sense that a Morpheme position has to be obligatorily ﬁlled with a dummy Morpheme in the absence of semantic material. In 4.6.7 we consider the limited possibility of having agreement within Words, while in 4.6.8 we go into the embedding of Words and higher units into the Word layer. The last two issues are again relevant to incorporating languages only. 4.6.2 Ordering of hierarchically related units

The ordering of Morphemes within Words is most transparent in agglutinating languages. Consider the following example from Tsaﬁki (Barbacoan; Dickinson 2002: 103) and its underlying representation: (464) Manuel ano ﬁ-nu-ti-e. Manuel food eat-perc-rep-decl ‘It is said Manuel must have eaten.’ ] (AI )) (465) (AI : [(FI : DECL (FI )) (PI )S (PJ )A (rep CI ) (perc ei : [–Manuel ano ﬁ–] (ei )) Three abstract elements have to be expressed in this situation: the Declarative Illocution, the Reportative operator on the Communicated Content CI , and the Perception operator on the State-of-Aﬀairs ei . If we apply our hierarchical approach the Illocution has to be expressed ﬁrst, then the Reportative operator, and then the Perception operator. This can be achieved straightforwardly by using a Word template for the Verb in (464) with a ﬁnal position PF and a number of positions relative to it: (466)

PF-3 PF-2 PF-1 PF πe πC (Aﬀk )ILL ] (Vwi )) (Vwi : [ (Vsi ) (Aﬀi ) (Aﬀj ) ﬁ -nu -ti -e

(=464)

For an example of the formation of a Nominal Word consider the following Nivkh example (Savel’eva and Taksami 1970: 203, cited in Mattissen 2003: 240) and its underlying representation: (467)

h@-ula-bal-do˜ dem-high-mountain-all ‘to that high mountain’

(468) (dem li : (fi : bal (fi )) (li )U : (fj : ula (fj )) (li )U (li )U )Dir According to our basic rules of hierarchical placement the Semantic Function, being external, has to be expressed ﬁrst and goes to PF . The demonstrative comes next and goes to PI , followed by the modiﬁer, which occupies a

406

the morphosyntactic level

position relative to PI , and is followed by the head which takes the next relative position available. This leads to the following template: (469)

PI+1 PI+2 PF PI (Nwi : [ (Aﬀi ) (Asi ) (Nsi ) (Aﬀj ) ] (Nwi )) h@ -ula -bal -do˜

(=467)

In fusional languages the situation is less transparent, since a single Morpheme may express various categories at the same time. From our hierarchical approach to morphosyntactic expression it follows that the categories fused in a single Morpheme should always be hierarchically contiguous. Thus, we would not expect a single morpheme to express πf and πp , while another expressed πe , for the simple reason that the iconic reﬂection of hierarchical scope diﬀerences would become impossible in such a situation. Boland (2006: 232–4) checked this prediction for a large sample of languages and found that it was indeed conﬁrmed without exceptions. 4.6.3 Alignment

The issue of alignment at the Word layer is relevant for incorporating languages, since only in these languages may equipollent units occur within a single Word. Alignment conditions then determine what kind of arguments and modiﬁers may be incorporated. These conditions are sensitive to the same type of factors as we found to be relevant for alignment at the Clause layer: (i) interpersonal factors such as pragmatic function and deﬁniteness; (ii) representational factors such as semantic function and animacy; (iii) morphosyntactic factors such as syntactic function and heaviness. We will give a few examples to illustrate how these factors may inﬂuence alignment within Words, without aiming at completeness. Interpersonal factors can be shown to be active in Nivkh. In this language, certain types of argument (see below for details) may be incorporated when they have the same focus value as the verb, but not if they have a diﬀerent informational value. Consider the following examples (Savel’eva 1966: 125, cited in Mattissen 2003: 107): (470)

T’a ku-ñivG-@z-ja. proh dem-person-call-imp.sg ‘Don’t call that person.’

(471)

ku-ñivx t’a j-@z-ja. dem-person proh 3.sg.u-call-imp.sg ‘That person, don’t call him/her.’

In (471) ku-ñivx ‘that person’ is (re)introduced as a Topic and occupies the initial position in the Clause rather than the position of the incorporated

words

407

argument position within the verb, which is now occupied by an undergoer preﬁx. Representational factors can be shown to be especially active in Southern Tiwa (Allen et al. 1984). The most signiﬁcant representational factor is animacy. The presence or absence of a modiﬁer in some circumstances has an inﬂuence on the possibility of incorporation, but if we exclude modiﬁed Noun Phrases the generalization is that incorporation is obligatory with inanimate and non-human animate Objects (472)–(473) and with inanimate intransitive Subjects (474), optional with human Objects (475), and excluded with all Animate Subjects (476) and with Objects headed by a proper name (477) (Allen et al. 1984: 293–301): (472)

a. Ti-shut-pe-ban. 1.sg.sbj>sg.obj-shirt-make-pst ‘I made the/a shirt.’ b. *Shut ti-pe-ban. shirt 1.sg.sbj>sg.obj-make-pst

(473)

a. Ibi-musa-tuwi-ban. 3.pl.sbj>pl.obj-cat-buy-pst ‘They bought cats.’ b. *Musan ibi-tuwi-ban. cats 3.pl.sbj>pl.obj-buy-pst

(474)

a. I-k’uru-k’euwe-m. 3.sg.sbj-dipper-old-prs ‘The dipper is old.’ b. *K’uru i-k’euwe-m. dipper 3.sg.sbj-old-prs

(475)

a. Ti-seuan-m˜u-ban. 1.sg.sbj>sg.obj-man-see-pst ‘I saw the/a man.’ b. Seuanide ti-m˜u-ban. man 1.sg.sbj>sg.obj-see-pst ‘I saw the/a man.’

(476)

a. *I-musa-k’euwe-m. 3.sg.sbj-cat-old-prs b. Musan i-k’euwe-m. cats 3.sg.sbj-old-prs ‘The cats are old.’

408 (477)

the morphosyntactic level a. *Ti-Jesse-m˜u-ban. 1.sg.sbj>sg.obj-Jesse-see-pst b. Jesse ti-m˜u-ban. Jesse 1.sg.sbj>sg.obj-see-pst ‘I saw Jesse.’

These examples clearly show the working of an animacy hierarchy interacting with the opposition between Subjects and Objects. The above examples thus also serve to illustrate a morphosyntactic factor that is operative within the process of incorporation in Southern Tiwa. Since this language allows the incorporation of transitive Undergoers as well as intransitive Subjects, it can be said to exhibit absolutive-ergative alignment in its system of incorporation. Another language showing this type of alignment in its incorporation processes is Bininj Gun-Wok, as illustrated by the following examples (Evans 2003: 451): (478)

Al-ekge al-gohbanj ba-gurlah-bimbu-ni. f-dem cl-old.person pst.3>3-skin-paint-pst.impf ‘That old lady used to paint buﬀalo hides.’

(479)

Ga-wardde-djabdi. 3-rock-stand.up.straight.nonpst ‘There is a rock standing up straight.’

Nivkh, on the other hand, allows the incorporation of Undergoers but not of intransitive Subjects, and thus shows nominative-accusative alignment in its system of incorporation, as illustrated in the following examples (Otaina 1978: 32, 34, cited in Mattissen 2003: 134, 137): (480) T@f tiv-d¸. house cold-ind ‘The house is cold.’ (481)

Atak k’e-seu-d¸. grandfather net-dry-ind ‘Grandfather dried the net.’

The languages can be further compared with respect to their systems of ditransitive alignment. Southern Tiwa has directive-indirective alignment, i.e. the Undergoers of transitive and ditransitive constructions are treated in the same way. Nivkh has primative-secundative alignment, i.e. the Undergoer argument of a transitive construction and the Location argument of a ditransitive construction are treated in the same way. Consider ﬁrst the following examples from Southern Tiwa (Allen et al. 1984: 303):

words (482)

Ti-seuan-m˜u-ban. 1.sg.sbj>sg.obj-man-see-pst ‘I saw the/a man.’

(483)

˜I-‘ay. Ti-‘u‘u-wia-ban 1.sg.sbj>sg.obj-baby-give-pst 2.sg-all ‘I gave the baby to you.’

409

In (482) the Undergoer of the transitive construction is incorporated; in the ditransitive construction in (483) it is likewise the Undergoer that is incorporated. Now consider the following examples from Nivkh (Otaina 1978: 34, cited in Mattissen 2003: 137, 142): (484)

Atak k’e-seu-d¸. grandfather net-dry-ind ‘Grandfather dried the net.’

(485) Objezd¸t`ik k’e atak-asqam-d¸. bay_watcher net grandfather-take_away-ind ‘The bay watcher took the net away from grandfather.’ In (484) the Undergoer of the transitive construction is incorporated, while in (485) the Location argument of the ditransitive construction is incorporated. Note that Nivkh allows the incorporation of a wide range of Location arguments, including Source, Recipient, and Direction. Parallel to clausal systems of alignment (see 4.4.3), the alignment of arguments with respect to incorporation in Southern Tiwa and Nivkh may now be represented as in Figures 21 and 22. We may thus conclude that the alignment principles outlined in 4.4.3.4 with respect to the organization of the Clause can also be fruitfully applied to the organization of the Word. 4.6.4 The ordering of non-hierarchically related units

Generally there is only one argument that is incorporated into a Verbal or Nominal Word. The ordering of this argument with respect to the verbal stem 1-place

2-place

3-place

U Incorporated A

Not incorporated

R

Figure 21. Alignment of arguments with respect to incorporation in Southern Tiwa

410

the morphosyntactic level 1-place A R

2-place

3-place

Not incorporated Incorporated

U

Not incorporated

Figure 22. Alignment of arguments with respect to incorporation in Nivkh

is then a matter of non-hierarchical ordering. There is a strong tendency for incorporated dependents to precede the nucleus, as in the Nivkh and Southern Tiwa examples given earlier. A further Nivkh example is the following (Krejnoviˇc 1937: 30, cited in Mattissen 2003: 240): (486) ñ-@tk-ruvN-eKlN-gun 1.sg.poss-father-sibling-child-pl ‘my father’s brother’s children’ The semantic representation of (491) would be as in (492): (487) (m xi : [(fi : gunN (fi )) (1xj : [(fk : eKlNN (fk )) (1xk : [(fl : ruvNN (fl )) (xl )Ref ] (xk )U )Ref ] (xj )U )Ref ] (xi )U ) In the process of hierarchical ordering the plural operator is expressed ﬁrst and occurs in rightmost position. In the process of ordering non-hierarchically related units, the highest nucleus (gun) occurs in the rightmost position available, with its dependent (ñ-@tk-ruvN) occurring to its left. Within this dependent the nucleus ruvN again occupies the rightmost position, with its own dependent ñ-@tk occurring to its left again. And this process is repeated for the nucleus @tk and its dependent ñ. The resulting syntactic template at the highest level is: (488)

PF-2 PF-1 PF (=491) (Nwi : [ (Nwj : –ñ@tkruvN– (Nwj )) (Nsi : eKlNN (Nsi )) (Aﬀi : gun (Aﬀi )) ] (Nwi ))

and this template is applied recursively, but without the suﬃx position, in subsequent steps. Cross-referencing pronominal argument aﬃxes can also be considered to be the expression of non-hierarchically related units. Consider the following example from Yimas (Foley 1991: 228): (489) Wa-mpu-Na-r-akn. 3.sg.abs-3.pl.erg-give-pfv-3.sg.dat ‘They gave it to them.’

words

411

Yimas cross-references the A, U, and L arguments on the verb, and the ordering of the aﬃxes is sensitive, among other things, to the person hierarchy: ﬁrst and second person dative arguments are expressed through preﬁxes, while third person dative arguments appear as suﬃxes. The morphosyntactic encoder thus has to apply alignment rules that are sensitive to person features. Kiowa also expresses up to three arguments on the verb, but in contrast to Yimas, the combination of arguments is expressed by a portmanteau morpheme occupying a ﬁxed position. Consider the following example (Harbour 2003: 546): (490) á-O˛O˛. 3.pl.a>3.sg.u>3.pl.loc-give ‘They gave it to them.’ In Kiowa the ordering of pronominal elements of like rank thus is not an issue. 4.6.5 Templates

The cumulative eﬀects of hierarchical and non-hierarchical ordering are reﬂected in the Word templates that are available as morphosyntactic primitives in the grammar of a language. Consider the following Chukchee example (Skorik 1961: 103, cited in Mattissen 2006: 292): (491) T@-tor-taN-p@lw@nt@-pojg@-pela-rk@n. 1.sg.a-new-good-metal-spear-leave-prs.1.sg>3.sg ‘I am leaving a good new metal spear.’ (492) (pres ei : (fi : [(fj : pela (fj )) (xi )A (xj : (fk : pojg@ (fk )) (xj )U : (fk : p@lw@nt@ (fk )) (xj )U : (fk : taN (fk )) (xj )U : (fk : tor (fk )) (xj )U )U The Undergoer argument tor-taN-p@lw@nt@-pojg@ ‘a good new metal spear’ is itself a complex Word, which acts as a Phrase (see 4.6.8 below) incorporated into the Verbal Word. Its internal organization may be represented as in (493), which starts out with the placement of the head in PF and then succesively places modiﬁers in a leftward direction: (493)

(=491) PF-3 PF-2 PF-1 (Npi : (Nwi : [(Asi : tor (Asi )) (Asj : taN (Asj )) (Ask : p@lw@nt@ PF (Ask ))(Nsi : –pojg@ (Nsi ))] (Nwi )) (Npi ))

At the level of the Verbal Word both PI and PF are relevant positions, as is evident, among other things, from the existence of verbal circumﬁxes in Chukchee. In the hierarchical placement of elements the Pres operator has to

412

the morphosyntactic level

be expressed ﬁrst. It goes to the ﬁnal position in the template for Verbal Words, but as a placeholder, as its form is sensitive to agreement with the Actor and Undergoer arguments. With respect to the placement of non-hierarchically related units, the verbal stem is placed in the position immediately preceding the tense marker. The complex Nominal Word expressing the Undergoer in (491) precedes this verb, while the Actor goes to PI : (494)

(=491) PI PF-2 (Vwi : [ (Aﬀi : t@ (Aﬀi )) (Npi : –tortaNp@lw@nt@pojg@– (Npi )) PF-1 PF (Vsi : pela (Vsi )) (Aﬀj : pres (Aﬀj ))] (Vwi ))

4.6.6 Dummies and support

There is reason to assume that at the Word layer, too, there may be slots that have to be ﬁlled obligatorily and which in the absence of interpersonal or representational material are ﬁlled with dummy morphemes. Tariana provides a straightforward example of this phenomenon. Consider the following examples (Aikhenvald 2003: 123): (495)

a. nu-pitana 1.sg-name ‘my name’ b. kuphe i-pitana ﬁsh indef-name ‘the name of a ﬁsh’

As discussed in 4.5.3, pronominal inalienably possessed arguments are expressed in Tariana through preﬁxes on the noun expressing the possessor, as illustrated in (495a). When the argument is itself expressed by a Noun Phrase, there is no cross-referencing on the noun expressing the possessor, but the slot for the pronominal preﬁx is ﬁlled with an indeﬁnite preﬁx. as shown in (495b). This can be accounted for by having a rule of dummy insertion apply when, after the insertion of the interpersonal and representational material that has to be expressed, an obligatory morpheme slot in the Word template remains unﬁlled. An example of dummy subject and object marking comes from Kiowa. Compare the following examples (Harbour 2003: 563, 564): (496) Áá gya-s´Ol. poles 3.pl-set_up ‘Poles are set up.’

words (497)

413

Gya-sál. 3.pl-be.hot ‘It’s hot.’

(498) Áá gyat-bó˛ú˛. poles 1.sg>3.pl-see ‘I saw the poles.’ (499)

Gyat-hóú-ai. 1.sg>3.pl-travel-go.oﬀ ‘I ran oﬀ.’

Example (496) illustrates the regular expression of a plural subject in a Clause based on a one-place predication frame. The same preﬁx is used in (497), which is based on a zero-place predication frame. This example illustrates the use of the plural as the unmarked number in Kiowa (see Harbour 2003). In (498) a portmanteau morpheme is used which expresses the two arguments in a two-place predication frame: in this case a ﬁrst singular A acts on a third plural U. Certain verbs which are used in a one-place predication frame nevertheless require a transitive portmanteau morpheme, as illustrated in (499). This is the morphological parallel to the Dutch Clause-layer object dummies discussed in 4.4.6. Alongside dummies, which ﬁll the gap left open by the absence of material from the Interpersonal and Representational Levels, there are support morphemes that help Lexemes that by themselves are not suitable for use in certain underlying functions to acquire the wordform required for that function. In the introduction to this section we gave the example of productive intransitivization in Turkish, but many other examples can be given. Consider the following example, discussed in Sadock (1985: 389): (500)

They american-ize-d Belgium.

in which the adjective American is causativized as a result of being introduced into a two-place predication frame. Coercion eﬀects like these allow speakers to creatively adapt the expressive potential of their lexicon to new contexts. In Krongo, when a noun (Phrase) is used predicatively, it has to be verbalized, as illustrated in the following example (Reh 1985: 242): (501)

Àakù m-àa-nímyà. 3.sg.f f-impf-woman ‘She is a woman.’

This can be dealt with in the morphosyntactic encoder as a process that applies when a semantic category headed by a nominal lexeme is inserted into the Verb Phrase slot in a morphosyntactic template.

414

the morphosyntactic level

4.6.7 Agreement

In cases in which an argument is incorporated and the language shows agreement with the kind of argument that is incorporated, then the result is that agreement on the verb is with the argument that is incorporated into that verb. This phenomenon is illustrated in the following example from Southern Tiwa (Allen et al. 1984: 293): (502)

Te-shut-pe-ban. 1.sg.sbj>pl.obj-shirt-make-pst ‘I made (the) shirts.’

Southern Tiwa has portmanteau morphemes which express the person of the Actor and number of the Undergoer in a single form. The fact that the portmanteau morpheme te- is used in (502) shows that the incorporated Undergoer is treated as a regular argument, triggering agreement on the incorporating verb. 4.6.8 Subordination

Subordination at the Word layer occurs when a Word incorporates another Word, a Phrase, or a Clause. An example of Word incorporation was given above in 4.6.5. West Greenlandic provides another example of this process. It is diﬀerent from the other polysynthetic languages that we have discussed in this section in that the verbal element of the incorporating polysynthetic complex cannot itself be used as a free-standing verb, but belongs to a large set of verbalizing suﬃxes, which are generally considered to be derivational in nature, but which could also be considered to be lexical roots in our use of that term. The result of polysynthesis is, however, a Verbal Word, just as it is in the cases discussed above. Consider the following examples, taken from Kristoﬀersen (1992: 153, 154) (square brackets indicate the morphosyntactic unit (part of) which is incorporated): (503)

(*Utuqqarmik) [palasi]-rpalup-puq. old.one.sg.ins priest-be.like-decl.3.sg ‘He is like a(n old) priest.’

(504) [Illu-mut angisuu-mu]-kar-puq. house-sg.all big.one-sg.all-go-decl.3.sg ‘She went to the big house.’ In (503) a bare nominal Stem occurs as part of a Verbal Word. It is uninﬂected, and cannot take external modiﬁers. The example contrasts with the one in (504): here an inﬂected Nominal Word angisuu-mu is incorporated, which

words

415

furthermore can take an external modiﬁer. This is thus a case of a Word embedded in another Word. Phrase incorporation into a Verbal Word was illustrated in 4.6.5 with the following example from Chukchee (Skorik 1961: 103, discussed in Mattissen 2006: 290): (505)

T@-[tor-taN-p@lw@nt@-pojg@]-pela-rk@n. 1.sg.abs-new-good-metal-spear-leave-pres.1.sg>3.sg ‘I am leaving a good, new, metal spear.’

In this case a noun with its modiﬁers is incorporated within the Verbal Word. It is also cross-referenced on the Verbal Word itself. Together these facts point to the phrasal status of the incorporated noun and its modiﬁers. Phrase incorporation into a Nominal Word is illustrated in the Ainu example (506) (Shibatani 1990: 74): (506)

e-pon-no-poro-setaha 2.sg.poss-slight-advr-big-dog ‘your slightly big dog’

Given the facts that the stem poro is modiﬁed by the derived degree expression ponno, and that the resulting combination as a whole modiﬁes the nominal stem setaha, it follows that the Nominal Word in this example incorporates an Adjective Phrase. The analytical counterpart of (506) would be as in (507) (Shibatani 1990: 74) which conﬁrms the phrasal status of the adjectival modiﬁer: (507)

pon-no poro e-esetaha slight-advr big 2.sg.poss-dog ‘your slightly big dog’

Clause incorporation is a possibility too, as illustrated in the Bininj Gun-Wok example (508) (Evans 2003: 536): (508)

Ga-[ganj-ngu-nihmi]-re. 3-meat-eat-ger-go.pst.pfv ‘He goes along eating meat.’

In (508) the nominal ganj ‘meat’ is clearly an argument of the incorporated verb, not of the incorporating verb. The embedded clausal nature of the incorporated unit is furthermore reﬂected in the gerundial ending with which the incorporated verb is provided. Chukchee (Skorik 1948: 83, in Spencer 1995: 459) allows Clause incorporation as well:

416

the morphosyntactic level

(509) @nko m@t-mec-[qora-g@rke]-pl@tko-m@k. then 1.pl.sbj-almost-deer-hunt-ﬁnish-aor.1.pl ‘Then we almost ﬁnished hunting reindeer.’

4.7 Building up the Morphosyntactic Level In building up the Morphosyntactic Level, use is made of Morphosyntactic Templates, free and bound Grammatical Morphemes, and Morphosyntactic Operators. Morphosyntactic Templates capture the ordering patterns within a language at the layers of the Linguistic Expression, the Clause, the Phrase, and the Word. Grammatical Morphemes are inserted at the Morphosyntactic Level since they occupy slots in the various morphosyntactic conﬁgurations. When a grammatical morpheme is to undergo further phonological adaptation, it is inserted in the form of a Morphosyntactic Operator, which serves as a placeholder that will be replaced by the appropriate phonemic form at the Phonological Level. The Morphosyntactic Level, as all other levels, is built up in a top-down, hierarchical fashion. The highest layers of analysis are constructed ﬁrst, and ﬁlled in successively by lower morphosyntactic layers. The highest layer we identiﬁed in this chapter is the Linguistic Expression. As we argued in 4.3 above, a Linguistic Expression is any set of at least one unit that can be used independently; where there is more than one unit within a Linguistic Expression, they will demonstrably belong together morphosyntactically, while, crucially, one is not part of the other. Only in the latter case does a Linguistic Expression diﬀer superﬁcially from a Clause, so we will take this situation as our point of departure by using an example given earlier in 4.3: (510) As for the students, they have heard the news already. This example has the following Interpersonal and Representational conﬁgurations: (511) (MI : [ (AI : [(FI : DECL (FI )) (PI )S (PJ )A (CI : (+id RI ) (CI ))] (AI ))Orient (m xi : [(fi : student (fi )) (xi )U ]) (AJ : [(FJ : DECL (FJ )) (PI )S (PJ )A (CJ : [(TI ) (+id RJ ) (+id RK )] (CI ))] (AJ )) ] (MI )) (pres epi : (ant Neg Pos ei : [(fj : [(fk : hear (fk )) (xi )A (pi : [–news– (pi )U ])U ] (fj )) (ei )U ]) (epi )) A few remarks are in order with respect to these representations: as for the students is a Subsidiary Act with the function of Orientation, and has its own Illocution; there is anaphoric reference in the main Clause to the participant in

building up the morphosyntactic level

417

the Orientational Act, as indicated by coindexation; the particle already is the expression of the operator Neg Pos introduced in 3.5.4; and the auxiliary verb have is the expression of the operator Ant(erior) in the presence of a higher episodical tense operator Pres(ent). The mappings between the units at the Interpersonal and Representational Levels are as in (512): (512)

[(RI ) ] (m xi : [(fi : student (fi )) (xi )U ])

[ (TI ) (RJ ) (RK ) ] (pres epi : (ant Neg Pos ei : [(fj : [ (fk : hear (fk )) (xi )A (pi : –news– (pi ))U ] (fj )) (ei )U ]) (epi ))

The two discourse acts AI and AJ form a single Linguistic Expression, since the adpositional phrase as for the students depends on the main Clause without being part of it. The basic Morphosyntactic Template that we have to select for this particular conﬁguration is given in (513), as explained in 4.3: (513)

Ppre | Pcentre (Lei : [ (Adp1 ) | (Cl1 ) ] (Lei ))

The index for the Linguistic Expression is given an alphabetic value here, since it is now instantiated. It contains positions for an Adposition Phrase and for a Clause. Since it is the highest in order, we will elaborate the clausal layer ﬁrst. The instantiated Clause makes use of the following Morphosyntactic Template, in line with the observations in 4.4 concerning the relevance of the initial, medial, and ﬁnal positions for English clausal templates: (514)

PI PM PM+1 PM+2 PF ﬁn (Cli : [ (Np1 ) ( Vw1 ) (Vp1 ) (Np2 ) (Advp1 ) ] (Cli ))

There is a separate position for the Grammatical Morpheme have in this template, which is treated as a Verbal Word, not as a Phrase, as it occupies a position in the template independently of the main verb, i.e. it need not occur contiguously with it, as illustrated in (515): (515)

The students have already heard the news.

On the basis of information from the Contextual Component, the Morphosyntactic Encoder decides on Subject and Object assignment. The overall result is then as in (516): (516) | Pcentre | | PI PM PM+1 PM+2 PF | (Lei : [ (Adp1 ) | (Cli : [ (Np1 )Sbj (ﬁn Vw1 ) (Vp1 ) (Np2 )Obj (Gw1 ) ](Cli )) | ] (Lei )) Ppre

418

the morphosyntactic level

The clausal constituents can now be assigned a position in this template following the rules of hierarchical and non-hierarchical ordering explained in 4.4. In the process of hierarchical ordering the auxiliary have goes to PM , and next the particle already goes to PF . In the process of non-hierarchical ordering the main verb is placed relative to the medial position, the Object immediately follows, and the Subject goes to PI . Note that (520) shows that already could alternatively have gone to PM+1 , immediately following the auxiliary verb, as allowed by the principles of hierarchical ordering. Each of the Phrases has to be elaborated now. Let us concentrate on the adpositional phrase in Ppre . The template for the Adposition Phrase is as in (517): (517)

PI PI+1 (Adp1 : [ (Gw1 ) (Np1 ) ] (Adp1 ))

The adposition used is the direct expression of the Orientation function of AI . Since its form is not sensitive to further processes, it can be inserted directly into the (Gw1 ) slot in (517) when the adpositional phrase is instantiated: (518) (Adpi : [(Gwi :/"æzf@/ (Gwi ) (Np1 )] (Adpi )) There is now a further slot for a Noun Phrase, which uses the template in (519): (519)

PI PI+1 (Np1 : [ (Gw1 ) (Nw1 ) ] (Np1 ))

and the Nominal Word that occurs within this template makes itself use of the template in (520): PF-1 PF (520) (Nw1 : [ (Ns1 ) (Aﬀ1 ) ] (Nw1 )) In accordance with the principles of hierarchical ordering, the expression of the +id Operator of RI in (511) goes to the (Gw1 ) slot in (519); a Morphosyntactic Operator pl representing the expression of the plural operator of the ﬁrst instance of (xi ) in (511) goes to the (Aﬀ1 ) slot in (520); and ﬁnally the head noun of (xi ) in (511) goes to the (Ns1 ) slot in (520). Since the ﬁrst and last of these three elements are not sensitive to further phonological adaptation, they can be inserted in their ﬁnal phonemic form into the Morphosyntactic Templates. The result of these insertions is given in (521): (521)

[PI

PI+1

[PI PI+1 (Adpi : [(Gwi : /"æzf@/(Gwi ) (Npi : [(Gwj : /ð@/ (Gwj )) (Nwi : [PF-1 PF [(Nsi : /"stju:dInt/(Nsi )) (Aﬀ1 : Pl (Aﬀi ))] (Nwi ))] (Npi ))] (Adpi ))

building up the morphosyntactic level

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Other phrases are elaborated in a similar manner, as illustrated in 4.5. The insertion and elaboration of the auxiliary verb have requires some further steps. First, since this is an irregular verb, it is not inserted in its phonemic form, but in the form of a Morphosyntactic Operator that is itself a translation of the primary operators Pres(ent) and Ant(erior) in (511). This Morphosyntactic Operator is inserted into the slot for the ﬁnite verb within the clausal template where it acts as a placeholder for the form that will ultimately be selected at the Phonological Level. Second, the agreement features have to be copied from the Subject Np to this placeholder, as explained in 4.4.7. The result is as in (522): (522)

(ﬁn Vwi : have (Vwi ))

On the basis of the instruction ‘have’ the Phonological Encoder then selects the appropriate ready-made form from the set of phonological primitives. The full morphosyntactic representation of (510) is then as in (523) shown on page 420:

420 (523)

the morphosyntactic level As for the students, they have heard the news already. Ppre PI (Adpi : [(Gwi :/"æzf@/ (Gwi ) PI+1 PI (Npi : [(Gwj : /ð@/ (Gwj )) PI+1 PF-1 (Nwi : [(Nsi : /"stju:dInt/(Nsi )) PF (Aﬀ1 : /s/ (Aﬀi )) ] (Nwi )) ] (Npi )) ] (Adpi )) Pcentre PI (Cli : [(Npj : (Nwj : /ðeI/ (Nwj )) (Npj ))Sbj PM (ﬁn Vwi : have (Vwi )) PM+1 (Vpi : (Vwi : hear (Vwi )) (Vpi )) PM+2 PI (Npk : [ (Gwk : /ð@/ (Gwk )) PI+1 (Nwk : (Nsj : /nju:z/ (Nsj )) (Nwk )) ] (Npk )) PF (Gwl : /O:l"redI/(Gwl )) ] (Cli ))

5 The Phonological Level 5.1 Introduction For each Discourse Act the Phonological Level provides a representation that serves as input to the Output Component. The Phonological Level will be presented here as a partner of the Morphosyntactic Level in being one of the two manifestations of encoding. Whereas the Output Component, the ‘articulator’, ultimately deals with such ‘analogue’ matters as formant frequency, intensity, duration, and spectral characteristics (reﬂecting individual voice quality, momentary mood swings, etc.), the Phonological Level is ‘digital’ in parallel with the levels discussed in earlier chapters, containing representations in phonemes that are ultimately based in binary phonological oppositions. This applies most clearly to individual phonological segments (with reference to minimal pairs) but will also be taken to apply to prosodic contrasts (e.g. rising vs falling Intonational Phrases, low vs high Phonological Phrases, etc.). The relationship between the abstract, ‘digital’, categories of phonological and actual acoustic features is, as Hirst and Di Cristo emphasize, ‘far from simple’ (1998: 5) and will not be pursued here. Suﬃce it to say that a number of processes that apply quite generally, irrespective of the structure of the unit under analysis, such as Utterance-ﬁnal phenomena as creaky voice in Japanese or breathy voice in Finnish, will not be represented phonologically but assigned to the articulator, which clearly has language-speciﬁc properties too. Just as with the other levels, we will take the position that phonological representations are hierarchical in nature, following Nespor and Vogel (1986): for details see 5.2 below. As will become apparent there, we will assume that there are certain default correlations between the layers we postulate for phonology and the layers recognized at other levels. The assumption that not all layers are necessarily relevant to every Utterance, an assumption also made for the other levels, will apply here too. Going further, we will also contend that certain languages lack some of the layers that are required for other languages. We will also allow for the possibility of recursion of the type proposed for the Morphosyntactic Level (cf. Chapter 4), for example permitting, where necessary, the occurrence of Phonological Words within other Phonological

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the phonological level

Words. We here follow Schiering et al. (fc.) in their proposal that the Prosodic Hierarchy of Nespor and Vogel (1986), which had been assumed to apply to all languages, should be loosened to allow for both the omission and the recursion of layers of analysis; Anderson (2005: 48) similarly reinterprets the prosodic hierarchy as a set of violable constraints. The Phonological Level receives input from all three other levels and is entirely dependent for its operation upon these levels, to the output of which it applies its own primitives. These primitives encompass (i) the prosodic patterns that apply at each layer of analysis (for example the language-speciﬁc division of Intonational Phrases into Phonological Phrases with particular pitch characteristics); (ii) an inventory of segmental sequences (the ‘grammatical lexicon’) expressing particular conﬁgurations of morphemes or placeholders introduced at other levels (for example stressed /o/ in Spanish as an expression, for a particular verb class, of the conﬁguration IndPastPf3Sg, as discussed in 4.2.3); and (iii) a set of tertiary operators (for example those indicating a rising or falling Phonological Phrase), which will have their ultimate eﬀect in the Output Component, just as secondary operators at the Morphosyntactic Level have their eﬀect at the Phonological Level. Let us now consider the nature of the input from each of the other levels. The input from the Interpersonal Level will consist partly of items already assigned their phonological form at that level. It was argued in Chapter 2, for example, that proper names, having reference but no semantic meaning, are introduced as segmental sequences at the Interpersonal Level: it will be the task of the Phonological Level to integrate these into an Utterance, possibly incorporating morphemes reﬂecting the rhetorical, pragmatic, or semantic function of the proper name. In addition, certain Expressives (Wow!) and Interactives (Thank you) will arrive directly from the Interpersonal Level as ready-made sequences of segments (/waU/ and /"θæNkju:/ respectively). The input will also, for many languages, include an abstract illocutionary predicate, to which the Phonological Level will often react by assigning a particular contour to the corresponding Intonational Phrase into which the components of that Phrase will be inserted (cf. 5.4 below). For many languages, again, the distinctions between Focus and Background, between Topic and Comment, and between Contrast and Overlap are reﬂected at the layer of the Phonological Phrase (cf. 5.5 below), typically in the presence or absence of extra pitch prominence on a Syllable within that Phrase. The task of the Phonological Level in such languages is to ensure the correct association of the Focus, Topic, or Contrast element(s) with that Syllable. This association then has knock-on eﬀects for the realization of the remainder of the unit in the Output Component. Another Interpersonal-Level distinction that may be captured phonologically is that between speciﬁc and non-speciﬁc reference: Torrence (2005: 71)

introduction

423

shows that the ambiguity of (1) in Wolof is ‘resolved’ by the assignment of distinct intonation contours according as b-enn xaj is intended as speciﬁc or not: (1) B-enn xaj, gis-u-më-kó. cl-one dog see-neg-1.sg-3.sg ‘Not a single dog did I see.’ or ‘A particular dog I didn’t see.’ And in Tongan, as shown by Anderson and Otsuka (2006), deﬁniteness is expressed as reduplication of the ﬁnal vowel of the Np to which it applies, which in turn aﬀects the stress, which always applies to the penultimate Syllable in a Tongan word (Anderson and Otsuka 2006: 27), the reduplicated vowel constituting a Syllable of its own: (2)

a. Na’e holo ’a e fale. tns collapse abs refr house ‘A house collapsed.’ /"na.Pe "ho.lo "Pa.e "fa.le/ b. Na’e holo ’a e falé. tns collapse abs refr house ‘The house collapsed.’ /"na.Pe "ho.lo "Pa.e fa."le.e/

Let us now consider the input from the Representational Level. Where there are meaning oppositions that are not discriminated at the Morphosyntactic Level (cf. Nespor and Vogel 1986: 249–71 for discussion of various examples in the framework of Prosodic Phonology), the Phonological Level must have means to bring out such distinctions. To use a familiar example, where the Morphosyntactic Level delivers (3a) as (3b), there are two possible analyses at the Representational Level, namely (4a) and (4b): (3)

a. old men and women b. /"@Uld "mæn-pl ænd "wUm@n-pl/

(4)

a. (mxi : (fi : manN (fi )) (xi ): (fj : oldA (fj )) (xi )) & ((mxj : (fk : womanN (fk )) (xj )) b. (mxi : (fi : manN (fi )) (xi ): (fj : oldA (fj )) (xi )) & ((mxj : (fk : womanN (fk )) (xj ): (fj ) (xi )))

In certain languages, this distinction may be reﬂected morphosyntactically, cf. Portuguese, in which the adjective follows the noun or series of nouns to which it applies, and in which further disambiguation is achieved through concord: (5)

a. homen-s velh-o-s e mulher-es (= (4a)) man-pl old-m-pl and woman-pl

424

the phonological level b. homen-s man-pl c. homen-s man-pl

e and e and

mulher-es woman-pl mulher-es woman-pl

velh-o-s (= (4b)) old-m-pl velh-a-s (‘men and old women’) old-f-pl

In English, however, the combination of a preposed adjective and no agreement makes (3a) ambiguous. In ways that will become more explicit below, English will distinguish one Phonological Phrase (pp) for the meaning in (4a) and two such Phrases for the meaning in (4b), both occurring within a single intonational phrase (ip), as in (6a) and (6b) respectively: (6)

a. (ipi : (ppi : /"@Uld "men ænd "wImIn/ (ppi )) (ipi )) b. (ipi : [(ppi : /"@Uld "men/ (ppi )) (ppj : /ænd "wImIn / (ppj ))] (ipi ))

Another example is lenition (generally speaking, the replacement of a consonant by a less sonorous one) in Scottish Gaelic, which is very often indicative of a close relation at the Representational Level. Consider the following example: (7)

a. Tha an nighean math air bruidhinn. cop.prs def girl good at talking ‘The girl is good at talking.’ b. Tha an nighean mhath air bruidhinn. cop.prs def girl good asp talking ‘The good girl has been talking.’

In (7a), math ‘good’ does not belong to the representational unit headed by nighean ‘girl’ and does not lenite, retaining its lexical form /ma/, introduced at the Representational Level; in (7b), however, it functions as modiﬁer of nighean and therefore does lenite, yielding /˜va/ at the Phonological Level. The input from the Morphosyntactic Level already contains a considerable amount of phonological speciﬁcation. The lexical items introduced into the formulating levels and carried over to the Morphosyntactic Level take the form of phonemic sequences which, depending upon the type of language, may already be marked for one or more of the following: (i) characteristic stress position (cf. Dik 1997a: 453ﬀ.) (ii) characteristic tone patterns (iii) characteristic quantity indications In so-called ‘free stress languages’ (cf. Hirst and Di Cristo 1998: 12), one Syllable in a lexical item will bear the stress in citation form, sometimes distinguishing between forms that would otherwise be homophones, cf. English compactV /k m"pækt/ and compactN/A /"k mpækt/. The stress is known

A

A

introduction

425

as characteristic because it can, in such words as sixteen /sIks"ti:n/, change position within a Phonological Phrase as shown in (8): (8) sixteen years (ppi : /"sIksti:n"jI@z/ (ppi )) In ‘ﬁxed stress languages’, where the stress is always assigned to a positionally deﬁned Syllable of the Phonological Word, as in Finnish (ﬁrst Syllable) or Polish (penultimate Syllable), the lexical form will contain no explicit marking of stress. In a tone language, such as Thai or Rawang, each Syllable is characteristically associated with a tone, which can serve to distinguish lexical items in the same way as stress does in English. Thus in Rawang (LaPolla 2006: 8), we ﬁnd that the relationship between a particular verb and its nominalization is indicated by a change of tone: compare dvsh¯ı ‘a spirit who can make you die’ and dvshî ‘cause to die’. The tone is known as characteristic because tones in certain languages can change in particular conﬁgurations, a phenomenon often referred to as ‘tone sandhi’. Mortensen (2002: 5) gives the following example from Jingpho (with tones represented here as superscripted numbers): (9)

pZaP55 ‘caterpillar’ mut31 ‘grey’ Phonological representation: (ppi : /pZaP31 mut31 /(ppi )) ‘grey caterpillar’ Lexical representations:

In ‘ﬁxed tone languages’, such as Vietnamese, no such processes are observed. The lexical tones will survive into phonological representations without change. Note that there are also languages like Mandarin Chinese, which have both lexical tone and lexical stress (Kratochvil 1998); like Swedish, with tonal accent (where the initial stress of a disyllabic word bears either high or low tone; Gårding 1998); and like Japanese, with accentual tone (where disyllabic words may bear tone or not, and if they do, can attribute accent to the ﬁrst or second Syllable; Haraguchi 1977). These distinctions are all lexically distinctive, and will be marked as characteristic of the lexical words in those languages, as shown in 5.7 below. Finally, various languages use oppositions of characteristic quantity (the length of vowels and consonants) to distinguish lexical items. Minimal pairs from Finnish, for example, include /tili/ ‘account’ vs /ti:li/ ‘brick’; or /korpi/ ‘wilderness’ vs /korp:i/ ‘raven’ (Sulkala and Karjalainen 1992: 380). These oppositions apply to the (nominative case) citation forms: the application of distinctions at the Morphosyntactic Level can lead to changes at the Phonological Level, cf. tyttö /tyt:ø/ ‘girl, nom.’ vs tytön /tytøn/ ‘girl, gen.’; vapaa

426

the phonological level

/vapa:/ ‘free’, vapa-in /vapain/ ‘free-sup’ (Sulkala and Karjalainen 1992: 392, 394). In ‘ﬁxed quantity languages’, such as German, the quantity of vowels and consonants survives into phonological representation without change. Particular languages can display combinations of the above distinctions and others, too: a remarkable example is Dinka (Andersen 2007: 110), in which derivation and inﬂection are ‘manifested as changes in the quality, the length, the voice quality and the tone of the root vowel and as changes in the ﬁnal consonant of the root’, all within one Syllable. Much of the terminology of the Phonological Level suggests a very close relationship between it and the Morphosyntactic Level, with the use of such terms as Intonational and Phonological Phrases and Phonological Words. Nevertheless, the relationship between the two encoding levels is not straightforward. Where there is a disparity, the division of an Utterance into Intonational Phrases tends to reﬂect the analysis at the Interpersonal Level, just as the division into Clauses at the Morphosyntactic Level tends to reﬂect the analysis at the Representational Level. The attribution of an exclamative operator to every Subact (reﬂecting a very forceful, possibly angry delivery) may, for example, be reﬂected in the division of an Utterance into several intonation contours: (10) I hate that man!!! IL: ( . . . (CI : [(Emph TI ) (Excl RI : [+S, –A] (RI )) (Emph +id RJ )] (CI )) . . . ) RL: (pi : (ei : [(fi : [(fj : hateV (fj )) (1xi )A (rem 1xj : (fj : manN (fj ))U )] (fi )) (ei )) (pi )) ML: (Cli : [(Npi : (Nwi : /aI/ (Nwi )) (Npi ))Subj (Vpi : (Vwi : /heIt/ (Vwi )) (Vpi )) (Npj : [(Gwi : /ðæt/ (Gwi )) (Nwj : /mæn/ (Nwj ))] (Npj ))] (Cli )) PL: (ui : [(ipi : (ppi : /aI/ (ppi )) (ipi )) (ipi : (ppi : /heIt/ (ppi )) (ipi )) (ipi : (ppi : /ðæt/ (ppi )) (ipi )) (ipi : (ppi : /mæn/ (ppi )) (ipi ))] (ui )) Note that the emphatic operators do not inﬂuence the morphosyntactic structure but only the prosodic structure. Other diﬀerences will be presented in the relevant sections below. What emerges from a comparison of languages is that they frequently diﬀer in whether a particular distinction in formulation is expressed morphosyntactically or phonologically. In general there would appear to be a certain tradeoﬀ between the two encoding levels, such that a distinction that is encoded morphosyntactically need not also be encoded phonologically and vice versa. Where an illocutionary distinction such as the presence of an Interrogative Illocution is marked morphosyntactically, for example by a particle or a verb form, there may be no need for phonological indication. In Garo (Burling 2004: 67), for example, the ‘intonation of questions formed with a question word is not much diﬀerent from the normal statement intonation’. If the ﬁnal

the organization of the phonological level

427

particle -ma or -ni is omitted, however, then a rising intonation is required to distinguish the intended Illocution. In tone languages, which use pitch to distinguish lexical items, we may accordingly expect more use to be made of morphosyntactic means for illocutionary distinctions. In the tone language Khoekhoe, for example, the attribution of Focus to a Subact has an eﬀect only on the morphosyntactic structure, the expression of the Subact in question being placed in Clause-initial position; there is no eﬀect upon the intonation (cf. Haacke 2006). Of particular interest in this context is the non-tone language Wolof, which Rialland and Robert (2001) have shown not to have any intonational marking of Focus. In this language, a Contrast element is placed in Clause-initial position, followed by a marker that is inﬂected in agreement with the Subject of the Vp which follows this marker. Here is an example (Rialland and Robert 2001: 897): (11) Lekkuma mburu mi, ceeb bi laa lekk. eat.neg.1.sg bread def rice def contr.1.sg eat ‘I didn’t eat the bread, it was the rice I ate.’ In the non-tone language English, in a reading out of the translation of (11), even with the morphosyntactic indication of Contrast by means of the cleft construction, the status of the rice is also brought out intonationally. But in Wolof, Rialland and Robert ﬁnd that ‘focus’, as they call it, ‘has no eﬀect on the melodic contour of the sentences’ and that versions with and without Contrast are ‘equally ﬂat’; they remark that ‘[t]he complete absence of intonational marking of focus . . . is . . . remarkable in a non-tone language and seems quite rare from a typological point of view’ (2001: 899). The relation between the two encoding levels is one of partial parallelism. Shattuck-Hufnagel and Turk (1996: 194) come to the following conclusions, which fully apply to our view of the interaction between the Morphosyntactic Level and the Phonological Level of FDG: ‘The morphosyntactic hierarchy inﬂuences the signal indirectly, via the constraints it imposes on the choices that the Speaker makes among the prosodic possibilities for a given utterance; [t]hese prosodic choices are also inﬂuenced by many other factors; [f]or this reason, the prosody of a particular utterance of a sentence cannot be predicted reliably from the text alone; thus, it is necessary to determine the prosodic structure that the Speaker actually used for each particular spoken utterance.’

5.2 The organization of the Phonological Level As mentioned above, FDG assumes a hierarchical view of phonological structure. This is in keeping with the tradition of Prosodic Phonology, in which ‘each constituent of the prosodic hierarchy draws on diﬀerent types of

428

the phonological level

phonological and nonphonological information’ and ‘the resulting prosodic constituents are not necessarily isomorphic to any constituents found elsewhere in the grammar’ (Nespor and Vogel 1986: 2). The hierarchy proposed by Nespor and Vogel (1986: 11) recognizes ‘seven units, from large to small’: the Utterance, the Intonational Phrase, the Phonological Phrase, the Clitic Group, the Phonological Word, the Foot, and the Syllable. Syllables in turn consist at least of segments, but syllables are not regarded as a hierarchical unit, since they ‘do not serve as the domain of application of phonological rules’ (1986: 12), as all the others do; alternatively, syllables may be divided into morae, a mora being a unit such that light syllables have one mora and heavy syllables two. While accepting the principle of a hierarchical phonology, other authors have questioned the universality of Nespor and Vogel’s seven units, frequently referred to as ‘domains’. Schiering et al. (fc.) have adduced examples of one language (Vietnamese) that does not require all the domains in the proposed hierarchy and of another (Limbu) in which there is necessarily recursion of domains. In Auer’s (1993) proposals for a phonological typology, he ﬁnds evidence for a maximum of eight domains (intonational phrase, prosodic phrase, phonological phrase, clitic group, phonological word, phonological stem, syllable, and mora), but remarks that in some languages higher domains may be necessary, that intervening categories between syllable and phonological word may be called for, and that mora is not relevant to all languages. Given the consensus on the necessity of hierarchical structure and the continuing debate on the number of layers required, FDG will operate with a ﬂuid view of the hierarchy within the Phonological Level, proposing a basic hierarchy but admitting the possibility of (i) non-instantiation of any of the layers, (ii) recursion of any of the layers, or (iii) addition of further layers in any one language. Layering at the Phonological Level may thus be shown as follows; note that small capitals are used at the Phonological Level to indicate analytical categories, and that every unit may occur more than once: (12) (π u1 : [ (π ip1 : [ (π pp1 : [ (π pw1 : [ (π f1 : [ (π s)N ] (f1 )) ] (pw1 )) ] (pp1 )) ] (ip1 ) ] (u1 ))

Utterance Intonational Phrase Phonological Phrase Phonological Word Foot Syllable Foot Phonological Word Phonological Phrase Intonational Phrase Utterance

the organization of the phonological level

429

In other words, an Utterance (u1 ) consists of one or more intonational Phrases (ip1 ), which themselves are composed of one or more Phonological Phrases (pp1 ); each pp contains one or more Phonological Words (pw1 ), and these are composed of one of more Feet (f1 ), which in turn are made of at least one syllable (s1 ). Each layer not only covers a potentially longer stretch of speech than the layer below it but is also characterized by phonological phenomena that are typical for that layer alone. These distinctions will be detailed in the following sections, in which each layer will be dealt with in turn. The Utterance (5.3) names the full stretch of speech under examination and thus is in a default relation with the Move at the Interpersonal Level; Utterances are typically separated by longer pauses than items lower in the hierarchy and it has been suggested that Utterances may display paratones (at least in certain forms of discourse). The Intonational Phrase (5.4) is the domain of a single intonation contour, i.e. a systematically recognizable pattern of falling or rising overall pitch, often correlating with a particular conﬁguration at the Interpersonal Level, and—where the Morphosyntactic Level provides an ambiguous output—indicating the intended relations between Discourse Acts within a Move or between States-of-Aﬀairs within an Episode. The Phonological Phrase (5.5) is a grouping intermediate between the Intonational Phrase and the Phonological Word and is the domain of various phonological operations that apply to a grouping of Phonological Words without extending to the entire Intonational Phrase. The Phonological Word (5.6) is also the domain for a number of more local phonological processes, such as ﬁnal devoicing in various Germanic and Slavic languages; generalizations that apply to the Phonological Word may mean that more than one morphosyntactic Word is in correspondence with a single Phonological Word or conversely that a single morphosyntactic Word corresponds to more than one Phonological Word. The Phonological Word will consist of one or more Feet, each of which in turn represents a grouping of Syllables (5.7); it is the grouping of Syllables within Feet that gives a language its characteristic rhythmic features. What emerges from Auer’s (1993) typological work on the prosodic phonology of some thirty-four languages is that languages vary on a complex scale between two prototypes: word-based languages and syllable-based languages. Because the lower end of the phonological hierarchy appears to be the one with the greater degree of language-speciﬁc variation, we will in the following sections devote most attention to the higher layers, which are also those that generally most strongly reﬂect major distinctions made at the Interpersonal Level and the Representational Level. Since we will be progressing from higher to lower layers, the amount of detail given about lower layers will be added gradually, with no more detail being given per layer than is necessary for the understanding of that layer.

430

the phonological level

5.3 Utterances The Utterance (u1 ) is the largest stretch of speech covered by the Phonological Level. The decision whether to label a stretch of speech as an Utterance is an analytical choice which is impossible to operationalize precisely. Nevertheless, we may venture the relative observation that an Utterance will tend to be separated from surrounding Utterances by a more substantial pause than the Speaker uses to separate intonational Phrases from one another. In Hayes’s view (1989: 219), it is characteristic of Utterance boundaries that the pause between them will never be interpreted by the Addressee as a hesitation. An Utterance may in addition typically display pitch distinctions which help to mark it oﬀ as a self-contained group of Intonational Phrases. These have been identiﬁed as ‘paratones’ (Brown and Yule 1983: 101), a word derived from ‘paragraph’. Paratones are deﬁned for English by Thompson (1994: 65–6) as ‘topic-related structural units of spoken discourse which are characterized phonologically by relatively high pitch on the ﬁrst prominent syllable and by extra low pitch on the ﬁnal tonic syllable, commonly followed by a signiﬁcant pause’. Good examples of paratones in monologic speech are news items in radio or television news broadcasts. Brown and Yule (1983: 106) warn, however, that ‘[f]ailure to mark out explicitly the structural organisation of what a Speaker wishes to communicate may make the Addressee’s task of interpretation more diﬃcult, perhaps, but, by itself, would not necessarily constitute a failure to communicate’; in our terms, not every Move will be explicitly marked in speech as an Utterance by means of a paratone. The relatively prominent pitches observed for English by Thompson at the beginning and end of Utterances appear to have some crosslinguistic validity: thus Venditti (2005: 191) recognizes for Japanese a comparable notion of ‘ﬁnality’, marking the last of a series of Intonational Phrases, commenting that this notion ‘is subjective by nature, and will depend on several acoustic and stylistic factors which, in combination, signal that a given Phrase is ﬁnal. These factors include, but are not limited to: ﬁnal F0 [fundamental frequency, KH & JLM] lowering, segmental lengthening, creaky voice, amplitude lowering, long pauses, stylized ‘ﬁnality’ contours, etc. For Bininj Gun-Wok, Bishop and Fletcher (2005: 342–3) ﬁnd that Utterances are characterized by their ‘potential for ﬁnal lowering and substantial pause . . . the ﬁnal two syllables of the Utterance generally undergo phonetic lengthening as a correlate of the boundary.’ Although it is noticeable that the descriptions of the phonological and phonetic eﬀects of Utterance demarcation across the three languages English, Japanese, and Bininj Gun-Wok show clear similarities, there are differences in the devices adopted. Thus in Mandarin, a tone language, Jun (2005: 433) reports that ‘an utterance is not always marked by a boundary tone’, just

utterances

431

as ‘there is no tonal event marking a prosodic unit within an utterance’, i.e. an Intonational Phrase. A paratone, or its equivalents in other languages, will be represented in FDG as an operator on the (u)-variable. An Utterance with an f-operator (where f stands for falling) will be realized with the ‘relatively high pitch on the ﬁrst prominent syllable’ and the ‘extra low pitch on the ﬁnal tonic syllable’ which Thompson (1994) sees as being characteristic of paratones in English. If the Intonational Phrase containing the ﬁnal tonic Syllable also has an foperator (for instance because it expresses a Declarative Discourse Act), the eﬀect will be cumulative, leading to that ‘extra low pitch’, as in the following representation: (13) (f u1 :[(ip1 :[(h pp1 ) . . . (ppn )](ip1 )) . . . (f ipn :[(pp1 ) . . . (ppn )](ipn ))](u1 )) where the tonic Syllable in the ﬁnal (pp) of the ﬁnal (ip) (here indicated for clarity in italics) will display a deeply falling pitch because of the double eﬀect of the two f-operators. Note that our approach to Utterance boundaries is distinct from that of Nespor and Vogel, who given their commitment to generative grammar (1986: 19–21), basically take (invented) morphosyntactic sentences as their point of departure in determining the extent of a ‘phonological utterance’. They (1986: 238) for instance discuss example (14) as involving a special rule of ‘utterance restructuring’ whereby the two adjacent Utterances That’s a nice cat and Is it yours? are joined into a single Utterance with a ﬂapped [R] as the realization of the phoneme /t/ (the transcription is ours, not theirs, KH & JLM): (14)

a. That’s a nice cat. Is it yours? b. /"ðæts@"naIs"kæ[R]IzIt"jO:z/

This example might be analyzed proﬁtably in FDG as the uniﬁed prosodic expression of a single Move with two Discourse Acts, each with its own Illocution (DECL and INTER respectively), so that (14b) would constitute a single Utterance at the Phonological Level, composed of two intonational Phrases. The pattern for the Utterance will be as follows, where π may be f(alling), but potentially also rising or neutral; in particular languages but also in particular Utterances in languages that do permit an operator in this position, the operator may be absent: (15)

(π u1 : (ip1 n≥1 ) (u1 ))

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the phonological level

5.4 Intonational Phrases Utterances are composed of one or more Intonational Phrases (ip1 ). An Intonational Phrase is characterized by internal and external properties: internally, it contains a nucleus, i.e. a pitch movement localized on one or more Syllables which is essential to the characterization of the Intonational Phrase as a whole; externally, the Intonational Phrase is separated from other Intonational Phrases by a pause, typically less long than the pause used to separate Utterances from each other. This pause may also be associated with (or possibly replaced by) a terminal pitch movement, and various other rhythmic or durational indications. Just as the Utterance will often, but not always, coincide with the Move, so the Intonational Phrase will typically, but not necessarily, coincide with the Discourse Act. As mentioned above with respect to example (10), this default correlation may be overridden by the desire to reﬂect emphatic operators intonationally or alternatively by a very fast speed of delivery that condenses more than one Discourse Act into one intonation contour (cf. Bolinger’s 1989: 97 example I didn’t make you lose it what are you talking about!, which he describes as a ‘macro-constituent answering to a mood or passion’). To return to the type of examples from English given in 2.3.2, (16) will be represented with two Intonational Phrases and (17) with one: (16)

Celtic won. And Rangers lost. ((ui : [(ipi : /"seltIk"w2n/ (ipi )) (ipj : /@nd"reIndZ@z"l st/ (ipj ))] (ui ))

(17)

Celtic won and Rangers lost. ((ui : (ipi : /seltIk"w2n@ndreIndZ@z"l st/ (ipi )) (ui ))

A

A

Modiﬁers of Discourse Acts (cf. Section 2.3.3), such as however in (18), are typically assigned to their own intonational Phrase: (18) Celtic won. However, Rangers lost. ((ui : [(ipi : /"seltIk"w2n/ (ipi )) (ipj : /hAU"ev@/ (ipj )) (ipk : /"reIndZ@z"l st/ (ipk ))] (ui ))

A

Where the modiﬁer interrupts the expression of the Discourse Act, the parts before and after the modiﬁer will normally each be treated as an Intonational Phrase, although there is also the option of integrating the modiﬁer into the Intonational Phrase of the head (cf. Section 2.4.3 on integrated modiﬁers)—as is reﬂected in alternative punctuation options in English: a. Celtic won. Rangers, however, lost. (ui : [(ipi : /"seltIk"w2n/ (ipi )) (ipj : /"reIndZ@z/ (ipj )) (ipk : /hAU"ev@/ (ipk )) (ipl : /"l st/ (ipl ))] (ui ))

A

(19)

intonational phrases

433

b. Celtic won. Rangers however lost. (ui : [(ipi : /"seltIk"w2n/ (ipi )) (ipj : /"reIndZ@zhAUev@"l st/ (ipj ))] (ui ))

A

Integration also appears to be relevant to the relations among Discourse Acts within a Move. Thus the sequence of an Orientation Discourse Act and Nuclear Discourse Act, or of a Nuclear Discourse Act and Corrective Discourse Act may be subject to a similar process. Di Cristo (1998: 211) considers the following example from French in which he distinguishes (in our terms) two possible divisions of the Move into Discourse Acts, as reﬂected in two possible divisions of the Utterance into Intonational Phrases: (20)

a. Mon voisin il est toujours malade. 1sg.poss neighbour 3.sg.m be.prs.3sg always ill ‘My neighbour, he’s always ill; or: My neighbour is always ill.’ b. ((ui : [(ipi : /m˜Ovwaz˜E/ (ipi )) (ipj : /ilEtuZurmalad/ (ipj )] (ui )) c. ((ui : (ipi : /m˜Ovwaz˜EilEtuZurmalad/ (ipi )) (ui ))

Here (20b) is the phonological realization of the combination of an Orientation Discourse Act and Nuclear Discourse Act, while (20c) corresponds to a single Nuclear Discourse Act. It has been noted (cf. Dik 1997b: 403–4) that the increasing prevalence of the second option (20c) in French is leading to a situation whereby the verb may be reinterpreted at the Morphosyntactic Level as being subject to head-marking (as discussed in Section 4.2.3). For remarks on the integration of elements following the Nuclear Discourse Act, see Dik (1997b: 405). As Cruz-Ferreira (1998: 175) points out with regard to European Portuguese, integration will be resisted if the result causes semantic ambiguity; in other words, its operation is constrained by the need to respect the analysis at the Representational Level: (21)

a. Ela comeu a galinha. 3.sg.f eat.pst.3.sg def.f chicken b. ((ui : (ipi : /"El5ku’mew5g5"liñ5/ (ipi )) (ui )) ‘She ate the chicken.’ c. ((ui : [(ipi : /"El5ku"mew/ (ipi )) (ipj : /5"g5liñ5/ (ipj )] (ui )) ‘It ate, the chicken.’

Similarly, the distinction between direct and indirect speech, where that is not signalled morphosyntactically, will be reﬂected in the choice between a single Intonational Phrase (with integration of the indirect speech) or separate Intonational Phrases for the quotative element and the quotation, cf. Dasc˘aluJinga (1998: 243) on the following Romanian data:

434 (22)

the phonological level a. Mama spune cît e de bun. Mother say.prs.3.sg how be.prs.3.sg of good b. ((ui : (ipi : /"mama"spune"k1tjede"bun/ (ipi )) (ui )) ‘Mother says how good it is.’ c. ((ui : [(ipi : /"mama"spune/ (ipi )) (ipj : /"k1tjede"bun/ (ipj )] (ui )) ‘Mother says, “How good it is!” ’

Each Intonational Phrase will contain a global pitch movement, generally upwards or downwards (or neither); these will be represented as operators upon the (ip) variable. In addition, there will be various local pitch movements (often conﬁned to stressed Syllables in stress languages), with particular importance typically being attached to the ﬁnal pitch movement; these local pitch movements will be represented as operators on the relevant Phonological Phrase, cf. Section 5.5, not as operators on the Intonational Phrase. Global pitch movement correlates in many languages with the Illocution chosen at the Interpersonal Level, while local pitch movement is in correspondence with the assignment of pragmatic functions. In tone languages, as Abe (1998: 362) points out, ‘[t]ones by their nature resist being perturbed by intonation’— after all, they serve to distinguish lexical meaning. Nevertheless, although tone languages very often resort to morphosyntactic means of indicating illocutionary distinctions and pragmatic functions, they seem generally also to use global and local pitch movements to indicate these interpersonal matters, but without contaminating the system of lexical oppositions borne by the tone system. It would appear that the majority of languages associate a globally falling pitch movement with DECL and IMP Illocutions and a globally rising movement with INTER Illocution. Where this is not the case, authors explicitly indicate that the language in question is unusual: thus Gordon (2005: 305–6) remarks that ‘[c]ontrary to the dominant cross-linguistic pattern, Chickasaw speakers usually end a statement with a ﬁnal rise in fundamental frequency’ and that ‘both wh- and yes/no-questions in Chickasaw end in a pitch fall commencing immediately after the nuclear pitch accent’. However, it should be noted that the interpersonal nature of a Discourse Act may be reﬂected in a combination of morphosyntactic and phonological properties. Thus, in English, a question designed to check the validity of a Propositional Content may take the morphosyntactic form of a statement but the phonological form of an Interrogative Illouction (i.e. a globally rising movement): (23)

a. You like that book? b. ((ui : (ripi : /jU"laIkðæt"bUk/ (ipi )) (ui ))

intonational phrases

435

Note that a globally rising movement is indicated by the tertiary operator r, and a globally falling movement by the tertiary operator f. Since the status of a wh-question is indicated in English by a distinctive wh-word, its status as a question need not be additionally signalled by a rise, hence the preference for the (unmarked) falling intonation in wh-questions. Where such content interrogatives are not signalled morphosyntactically (as for example in languages in which their form is identical to that of an indeﬁnite pronoun, cf. 2.5.2.3), they are likely to have a rising intonation; cf. Haspelmath (1997: 171) on Mandarin Chinese, for which only intonation disambiguates the two readings of the following sentence: (24)

T¯a b˘a shénme sh¯u di¯u le. 3.sg acc what/something book throw pfv ‘What books did she throw away?’ (ripi ) ‘She threw away a certain book.’ (fipi )

In other languages with such ignorative forms (cf. 2.8.3.4) we may similarly expect the Interrogative Illocution to be signalled intonationally. Let us now consider the structure of Intonational Phrases in a polysynthetic language like West Greenlandic. In such languages the majority of morphosyntactic Phrases consist of one, relatively complex Word; correspondingly, the Phonological Phrases that compose the Intonational Phrase also tend to coincide with Phonological Words. According to Nagano-Madsen and Bredvad-Jansen (1995: 129), ‘[i]ntonation in West Greenlandic Eskimo is characterized as terminal tonal contour which appears on each word’, where word, then, may be safely reinterpreted as Phonological Phrase. It becomes apparent from Fortescue (1984: 340–3) that each non-ﬁnal Phrase has its own continuative tonal contour (and that this is the only use of pitch variation in the language), with the illocutionary status of the entire Discourse Act being indicated by the contour of the ﬁnal Phonological Phrase, which is invariably placed on the antepenultimate mora of that Phrase. The patterns for the intonational Phrase will appear as follows: (25) (π ip1 : (pp1 n≥1 ) (ip1 )) where π may be f(alling) or r(ising). Further operators may prove necessary for the description of particular languages. Before continuing, let us say a few words about the representation of intonation by means of operators. The Phonological Level will not show the ‘melody’ of the Intonational Phrase, but rather provide a number of indications at each layer which the articulator, the Output Component of the overall model, will convert into a smoothly ﬂowing result. There is considerable variation between how individual speakers within one language, or in general speakers

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of one language rather than another, will realize an Intonational Phrase with a rising or a falling tone. What is important is that the overall direction of the Phrase is distinctive and this is determined above all by the orientation of the ﬁnal movement. Many of the complexities in reaching that end point can be understood as resulting from operators applying at lower layers. It is to these that we now turn, beginning with Phonological Phrases.

5.5 Phonological Phrases The Intonational Phrase consists of a number of Phonological Phrases (pp1 ). Just as the Intonational Phrase typically corresponds with the Discourse Act at the Interpersonal Level, so there is a default relation between a Phonological Phrase and a Subact within the Communicated Content. A pattern frequently encountered in stress languages (such as English) is that each Phonological Phrase, no matter what the degree of its own internal layering, will contain one Syllable that is more strongly stressed than the surrounding Syllables, including any other stressed ones. One of the Phonological Phrases within an Intonational Phrase, often the last in sequence, will then display local pitch movement on that most stressed Syllable. This pitch movement is systematically used to indicate additional interpersonal distinctions to those marked at the layer of the Intonational Phrase. The Syllable in question is generally known as the nuclear Syllable and is the primary location for the global fall or rise within the Intonational Phrase discussed in the preceding section. In tone languages, in which pitch movement is used for lexical distinctions, Phonological Phrases tend to have a diﬀerent raison d’être, namely as the domain of tone sandhi (cf. 5.1 above); cf. Hoo Ling Soh (2001), who claims that the division of intonational Phrases into Phonological Phrases in Shanghai and Hokkien Chinese (tone languages) is additionally sensitive to deﬁniteness, a feature from the Interpersonal Level in FDG. Let us consider the Phonological Phrase in the stress language English. Whereas both DECL and IMP Illocutions in English are characterized by a globally falling pitch at the layer of the Intonational Phrase (fipi ), the fall on the nuclear Syllable tends to be much more marked with the IMP Illocution. This will be indicated by assigning an additional falling tertiary operator to the Phonological Phrase containing the nuclear Syllable. The articulator will interpret such an indication as pertaining to the nuclear Syllable, such that the double indication of fall leads to a more marked result. Consider the following example from English, which may be understood either as a Declarative (probably in the past tense) or as an Imperative with an explicit subject:

phonological phrases (26)

437

a. You hit the ball. b. DECL: (ui : (fipi : [(ppi : /jU/ (ppi )) (ppj : /hIt/ (ppj )) (ppk : /ð@"b l/ (ppk ))] (ipi )) (ui )) c. IMP: (ui : (fipi : [(ppi : /jU/ (ppi )) (ppj : /hIt/ (ppj )) (fppk : /ð@"b l/ (ppk ))] (ipi )) (ui ))

A A

The operator on an Intonational Phrase will manifest itself in the nuclear Syllable, i.e. the Syllable /b l/ in the ﬁnal Phonological Phrase (ppk ) in (26b): (ppk ) in (26b) therefore does not need to be marked as falling by means of an operator of its own. In (26c), however, the IMP Illocution is signalled by a combination of an f-operator on the Intonational Phrase as a whole plus an additional f-operator on (ppk ). The result is an instruction to the articulator to reinforce the eﬀect of the fall on /b l/. These distinctions serve to distinguish between the two Illocutions. The relationship between falls and rises at the two layers need not be reinforcing, however. Tertiary operators at higher layers are reﬂected in the outermost direction of pitch movements, just as the formal reﬂections of higher secondary operators are located outside those of lower secondary operators. The operator at the (ip) layer therefore determines the ultimate direction of movement. Consider now Utterance (27a), which has been analysed as containing two Intonational Phrases. The ﬁrst is marked by the tertiary operator r as globally rising—as is appropriate for the expression of a dependent Discourse Act—but its ﬁnal Phonological Phrase has been shown as falling:

A

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(27)

a. If you’re unsure, call me. b. (ui : [(ripi : [(ppi : /If/ (ppi )) (fppj : /j@r2n"SU@/ (ppj ))] (ipi )) (fipj : (fppk : /"kO:lmI/ (ppk )) (ipj ))] (ui ))

Given that higher operators determine the outermost direction of pitch movements, the eﬀect of this combination will be for the nuclear Syllable /SU@/ to fall and then rise; in the actual realization by the articulator, the falling-and-thenrising pitch movement may be concentrated on the nuclear Syllable or divided over more than one Syllable within the Phonological Phrase. The Imperative Illocution of the second Discourse Act is again reﬂected in f-operators at the (ip) and (pp) layers, just as in (26c). Whereas pitch movement typically reﬂects illocutionary contrasts, pitch height in a Phonological Phrase is in very many languages associated with the expression of pragmatic functions. Certain languages, as we saw in 2.7.2.2, assign Topic, Focus, or Contrast constituents to particular positions in the morphosyntactic order or employ special syntactic constructions to highlight elements bearing Focus or Contrast. These strategies may have repercussions for the process of phonological encoding, since it applies to the output of

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the Morphosyntactic Level. Whereas the use of a special syntactic strategy for pragmatic functions may be an unequivocal marking of pragmatic status, we ﬁnd that such a strategy is very frequently backed up at the Phonological Level. Thus the English cleft construction mentioned in 2.7.2.5 as expressing the combination of Focus and Contrast is normally associated with an Intonational Phrase in which the Phonological Phrase containing the expression of the Focus-Contrast element is marked as high. Thus one possible representation of an Utterance of example (28a), taken from 2.7.2.5, is as in (28b): (28)

a. It was the zoo that they went to, not the museum. b. (ui : [(ripi : [(ppi : /"Itw@z/ (ppi )) (hppj : /ð@"zu:/ (ppj )) (ppk : /ð@tðeI"went:U/ (ppk ))] (ipi )) (fipj : [(hppl : /"n t/ (ppl )) (ppm : /ð@mju:"zi:@m/ (ppm ))] (ipi ))] (ui ))

A

The eﬀect of (28b) is for the ﬁrst Intonational Phrase to have a rising pitch in its ﬁnal Phonological Phrase (cf. Hirst and Di Cristo 1998: 27 on ‘unﬁnished utterances or continuatives’), but with a preceding high pitch on /zu:/; the articulator will react by letting the pitch fall again after this Syllable so that it can rise again on the Syllables /"went:U/. In the second Intonational Phrase, there will be high pitch on /"n t/ and a falling pitch, induced by the f-operator on (ipj ), on /"zi:@m/. Contrast may also be combined with Topic: Lee (1999) indicates that the combination of Contrast and Topic in Korean and Japanese is associated with high tone on the element expressing that combination. As we have seen, then, in addition to the pitch movement indicated by the operators f and r, Syllables may be characterized by relative pitch with respect to the overall contour of the Intonational Phrase, namely as high or low, shown by the operators h and l respectively, cf. (28b). Consider example (29a):

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(29)

a. That I deny. b. (fipi : [(hppi : /"ðæt/ (ppi )) (ppj : /aIdIn"aI/ (ppj ))] (ipi ))

in which, let us assume, Contrast is assigned at the Interpersonal Level to the Subact that and Focus to the Subact deny. Where the Focus falls in the ﬁnal Phonological Phrase, as here, its presence is not indicated separately from the pitch movement induced by the operator on the Intonational Phrase. In (29b), accordingly, it is the falling (nuclear) tone paralleling the DECL Illocution that also indicates the Focus status of deny. The Contrast is reﬂected in the high and relatively steady pitch of the expression of that. Now consider (30a), discussed in 2.7.2.3 as indicating Contrast on that and Focus on never: (30)

a. That I never said. b. (fipi : [(hppi : /"ðæt/ (ppi )) (ppj : /aI"nev@/ (ppj )) (lppk : /"sed/ (ppk ))] (ipi ))

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Again, the Contrast-bearing that receives high tone. The Focus on never leads to the fall induced by the f-operator on (ipi ) being located in the second-last Phonological Phrase; the l-operator on the ﬁnal Phonological Phrase has the eﬀect of keeping the pitch low after the fall in the preceding Phrase. We now see that Focus is indicated by realizing the overall contour (i.e. falling or rising) of the Intonational Phrase on the last Phonological Phrase not marked as high or low. In (30b) that is (ppj ). In English, the syntax of the Clause usually is geared to ensuring Clauseﬁnal placement for the element associated with Focus assignment; the default eﬀect on the Phonological Level is thus for the ﬁnal Phonological Phrase to indicate both the Illocution and the placement of the Focus, as in (31): (31)

a. I saw [a heron]Foc . b. (fipi : [(ppi : /aI"sO:/ (ppi )) (ppj : /@"her@n/ (ppj ))] (ipi ))

Where more than one Focus applies within a Communicated Content, this may still be expressed as a single Intonational Phrase (here we follow Brown and Yule 1983: 165). Since English typically does not rearrange the syntax to accommodate such cases, it is at the Phonological Level that the non-ﬁnal Focuses will be marked, as in the following phonological representations of examples (176) and (177) from 2.7.2.2, repeated here for convenience as (32) and (33) respectively: (32)

a. [Peter]Foc had bought [a book]Foc . b. (fipi : [(fppi : /"pi:t@/ (ppi )) (ppj : /h@d"bO:t/ (ppj )) (ppj : /@"bUk/ (ppj ))] (ipi ))

(33)

a. [A train arrived]Foc . b. (fipi : [(fppi : /@"treIn/ (ppi )) (ppj : /@"raIvd/ (ppj ))] (ipi ))

In (32b), the eﬀect is to produce falling pitch on /pi:/ (typically extended to the following Syllable /t@/) and again, because of the f-operator on (ipi ), on /bUk/, in the ﬁnal Phonological Phrase. In (33b), similarly, we will hear two falling Syllables within the same (ipi ). Of particular interest in this context is an Utterance such as (34a), in which the entire Communicated Content is in Focus. (34a) diﬀers from (33a) in having a Topic, namely the train. English signals this particular conﬁguration as follows, i.e. with the Comment marked with a steady low pitch: (34)

a. [[The train]Top arrived]Foc b. (fipi : [(fppi : /ð@"treIn/ (ppi )) (lppj : /@"raIvd/ (ppj ))] (ipi ))

The f-operator on (ipi ) would normally induce a falling intonation on the Syllable /raIvd/; however, this is rendered impossible by the presence of the

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l-operator on (ppj ), cf. (30b) above. The articulator will interpret this as an instruction to keep the fundamental frequency low after the fall on the Syllable /treIn/. Such examples have been much discussed in the literature (for ample references and the statement that the processes concerned are ‘still not fully understood’, see Hirst 1998: 60) and are often said to involve de-accentuation of the post-nuclear material; here we interpret the eﬀect on the ﬁnal Phonological Phrase as a lack of pitch movement rather than of accentuation. Whereas, as we have seen, English tends to prefer phonological to morphosyntactic means for signalling pragmatic functions, other languages with more ﬂexible syntax can arrange the constituents in such a way that the ﬁnal (or some other) position comes to house the element with the pragmatic function. Thus European Portuguese (cf. Cruz-Ferreira 1998: 173–4) in (35) signals Focus function with a word order that permits the Focus to correspond with the ﬁnal Phonological Phrase, as in English; in (36), however, the Contrastbearing Subject ela is placed ﬁnally, signalling its interpersonal function, and now attracts the falling tone of the ﬁnal Phonological Phrase: (35)

a. Eu preﬁr-o que ela [venha]Foc . 1.sg prefer-1.sg comp 3sg.f come.3.sg.prs.sbjv ‘I would prefer her to come.’ b. (fipi : [(ppi : /ew"prﬁru/ (ppi )) (ppj : /"kjEl5/ (ppj )) (ppk : /"v5ñ5/ (ppk ))] (ipi ))

(36)

a. Eu preﬁr-o que venha [ela]Contr . 1.sg prefer-1.sg comp come.3.sg.prs.sbjv 3sg.f ‘I would prefer that she should be the one to come.’ b. (fipi : [(ppi : /ew"prﬁru/ (ppi )) (ppj : /"kv5ñ5 / (ppj )) (ppk : /"El5/ (ppk ))] (ipi ))

In other languages, the syntactic position for Focus is not ﬁnal, yet is associated with falling intonation. In Hungarian, for example, it is the immediately preverbal position that is occupied by the Focus (unless the verb itself is in Focus). Here the Phonological Level will mark the post-Focus Phonological Phrases as low, so that the falling tone of the Intonational Phrase is appropriately assigned to the last Phonological Phrase not so marked, i.e. (ppj ) in the following example, already cited in 2.7.2.2 as (185) (Kenesei et al. 1998: 166): a. A vendégek tegnap érkeztek a szállodá-ba the guests yesterday arrived the hotel-loc ‘It was yesterday that the guests arrived at the hotel.’ b. (fipi : [(ppi : / "vEnde:gEk/ (ppi )) (ppj : /"tEgn p/ (ppj )) (lppk : /"e:rkEstEk/ (ppk )) (lppl : / "sa:l:oda:b / (ppl ))] (ipi ))

A

A

A

A

(37)

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Downing (2006) has shown that in Chitumbuka, the Focus element does not display speciﬁc phonological features: rather it is the non-Focus elements, in our terms the Background, that are marked. Syntactically, a Focus or Contrast element can appear Clause-initially in Chitumbuka: (38)

ma-búuku [β]a-ka-pása [β]áana 6-book 2-tam-give 2-child ‘They gave the children books.’ (answering ‘What did they give the children?’)

In this language, every Word lexically contains a Syllable with high tone. The phonological eﬀect of Focus assignment, as Downing describes it (2006: 61), is not to heighten the pitch of the Focus element, but to lower the high tone of the (following) non-Focus elements (a process known as downstep). This can be shown by indicating all the Phonological Phrases following the Focus elements as follows: (39) (lpp1 : [ . . . (pw1 : [ . . . (hsn ) . . . ] (pw1 )) . . . ] (pp1 )) such that the low pitch at the pp layer will lower the tone of the high Syllable inside each post-Focus pw. The eﬀect of the higher-placed operator l is in this language to lower the high tone of the Syllable (sn ). In 2.4.4 it was mentioned that one way to signal an ironic intention can be through intonation, for example in an ironic rendering of (40a). Given a nonironic intention, we might expect a representation at the Phonological Level such as that given in (40b). A Speaker may signal that an ironic interpretation is intended by promoting the communicatively insigniﬁcant word is to the status of a Phonological Phrase and locating the nuclear Syllable there, as in (40c): (40)

a. That is interesting. b. (fipi : [(ppi : /"ðætIz/ (ppi )) (ppj : /"IntrIstIN/ (ppj ))] (ipi )) c. (fipi : [(ppi : /"ðæt/ (ppi )) (rppj : /"Iz/ (ppj )) (lppk : /"IntrIstIN/ (ppk ))] (ipi ))

(40c) will lead the articulator to produce a rise-fall on the second Phonological Phrase (cf. the fall-rise in (27b) above), with the l-operator on the ﬁnal Phonological Phrase keeping its pitch from rising again. In Chapter 2, mention was made of the Emphatic operator, which applies to Discourse Acts, Communicated Contents, or Ascriptive Subacts. In many languages, emphasis can be expressed (rather iconically) by extra intonational prominence. The prominence may be cumulative, as in English (41) or (42), where the falling and rising operators on the Intonational Phrase are reinforced by parallel operators on the Phonological Phrase:

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(41)

a. Horrible! b. (fipi : (fppi : /"h rIbl/ (ppi )) (ipi ))

(42)

a. Really?? b. (ripi : (rppi : /"rI@lI/ (ppi )) (ipi ))

A

Alternatively, the eﬀect of emphasis may be to shift the stress to an earlier unstressed Syllable within the same Phonological Phrase, as in French (43): (43)

a. Formidable! b. (fipi : (ppi : (pwi : [(ssi : /fOr/ (si )) (sj : /mi/ (sj )) (sk : /dabl/ (sk ))] (pwi )) (ppi )) (ipi ))

In French, the unmarked position for the stressed Syllable (ss1 ) in a Phonological Phrase is the ﬁnal Syllable; emphasis is indicated by assigning stress to a non-ﬁnal Syllable. See Hirst and Di Cristo (1998: 33) for an overview of the strategies for the phonological expression of emphasis found in a range of languages. Not all languages use the Phonological Phrase for the expression of information from the Interpersonal Level. Let us close this section by looking brieﬂy at Acehnese (Durie 1985: 30), in which the Phonological Phrase is characterized by nothing else than that it must contain a stressed Syllable, which is always the ﬁnal Syllable in that Phrase, the only exceptions being a few enclitics that are ‘extrametrical’, i.e. their Syllables are not integrated into a Phonological Phrase but simply occur as part of the complex head of the Intonational Phrase. It will be clear, then, that Acehnese has no need of a Phonological Word layer. Here is an example from Durie (1985: 61), where | is the symbol he uses to indicate extrametricality of the following material, in this case Syllable (sp ): (44)

a. teungöh=geu=peu-jak aneuk=miet|=geuh middle=3=caus-go child=small=3 ‘He is walking his child.’ b. (fipi : [(ppi : [(si : /teun/ (si )) (sj : /göh/ (sj )) (sk : /peu/ (sk )) (ssl : /jak/ (sl ))] (ppi )) (ppj : [(sm : /a/ (sm )) (sn : /neuk/ (sn )) (sso : /miet/ (so ))] (ppj )) (sp : /geuh/ (sp ))] (ipi ))

However, even in Acehnese there is some interaction with the Interpersonal Level. Undergoers in that language are cross-referenced by enclitic pronouns (Durie 1985: 201). These pronouns are usually attached to the verb but may be attached to a following modiﬁer if the latter is part of the Comment, cf. the enclitic geuh in (45): (45) keu=lôn hana=galak lê|=geuh dat=1.sg neg.be=like anymore=3 ‘He doesn’t like me any more.’

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We may conclude from the preceding discussion that the pattern for the Phonological Phrase will appear as follows, where π is drawn from the set {f, r, h, l, n}: (46)

(π pp1 : (pw1 n≥1 ) (pp1 )) or (π pp1 : (s1 n≥1 ) (pp1 ))

5.6 Phonological Words The Phonological Word (pw1 ), for those languages in which such a category needs to be recognized, is a segment of phonological structure which displays at least one phonological characteristic that is criterial for its status as a Phonological Word and which (possibly together with other Phonological Words) forms a Phonological Phrase. The characteristics that distinguish Phonological Words diﬀer immensely from language to language, as shown by Dixon and Aikhenvald (2002: 14–18), who distinguish segmental features (such as the requirement in some languages that a Phonological Word contain at least two Syllables), prosodic features (for example, the word as the domain of nasalization in certain languages), and restrictions on the domain of phonological rules (such as palatalization). Unsurprisingly, given the diversity of criteria for wordhood at this level, it has also been claimed that languages exist without any need for a Phonological Word layer, i.e. where there is no evidence for a criterial phonological characteristic; in 5.5, we saw that this applies to Acehnese. Schiering et al. (fc.) ﬁnd that no layers are necessary in the analysis of Vietnamese between the Syllable and the Phonological Phrase, and this may apply more generally to tone languages. On the other hand, they argue, more than one word layer may be needed for certain languages: they report Peperkamp’s (1997) ﬁnding that the stress placement rule in Neapolitan Italian is straightforward if the word is analysed as a recursive domain (i.e. with a structure that recognizes words within words at the Phonological Level) and themselves contend that in Limbu, ‘multiple nonisomorphic word domains can be motivated’. The Phonological Word is so called, of course, because of its rough correspondence to the morphosyntactic Word. In Chapter 4 it was shown how languages have been typologized into four classes according to their morphological characteristics. Generally speaking, the correlation between morphosyntactic Words and Phonological Words is best in isolating, agglutinating and fusional languages. For example, with regard to our example in 4.2.3 of an isolating language, Fijian, Dixon (1988: 21) observes, using stress as the criterial property of Phonological Words, that ‘[o]ften the two units do coincide’, though one morphosyntactic Word may correspond to two Phonological Words (as in (47a)), and two morphosyntactic Words may correspond to one Phonological Word (as in (47b)):

444 (47)

the phonological level a. réi.-ta"ína rejoice.at-tr b. í+na at+art

As a contrasting example, consider now the agglutinating language Turkish— again to use stress as criterial—which has a good correlation between morphosyntactic and Phonological Word, with primary stress being placed on the ﬁnal Syllable of the morphosyntactic Word, no matter how complex, so that in (48) it falls on the Syllable /dan/ (Kabak and Vogel 2001: 316): (48)

kitap-lık-lar-ım-ız-dan book-case-pl-1-pl-abl ‘from our bookcases’

However, personal and place names and various other classes of Word may ˙ form exceptions to this rule, cf. Istanbul, stressed on the second Syllable and Ankara, stressed on the ﬁrst. In addition there is a closed classes of aﬃxes (listed by Kabak and Vogel 2001: 328), which cause word stress to be moved to the Syllable immediately preceding them. Kabak and Vogel (2001: 329) show, however, that these exceptions can be dealt with such that the Phonological Word survives as the domain of stress assignment. In polysynthetic languages, by contrast, it is not unusual for a single morphosyntactic Word to correspond to several Phonological Words. In Yimas (Foley 1991: 80), Phonological Words are characterized by a number of properties, notably the presence of primary stress. Although with nouns and adjectives there is a high coincidence between morphosyntactic and Phonological Words, this does not apply to verbs. Thus the verb in (49)—proved to be a single morphosyntactic Word by the presence of the negative ta—divides into three Phonological Words, as shown by the number of primary stresses: (49) MamparNkat ta-mpu-"park-mpi-"kapik-mpi-"wark-ra. branch-5-pl neg-3.pl.a-split-seq-break-seq-tie-v.pl.o ‘They didn’t split the branches, break them and tie them.’ In languages without polysynthesis, too, instances are readily found of morphosyntactic Words that correspond to more than one Phonological Word. An example is given by Booij (2005: 163) of the Dutch morphosyntactic Word in (50), which corresponds to two Words at the Phonological Level: (50) rood-achtig (spelled roodachtig) red-approx (ppi : [(pwi : /"ro:t/ (pwi )) (pwj : /"Axt@G/ (pwj ))] (ppi )) ‘reddish’

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Evidence for the (pw)-status of /"Axt@G/ can be drawn from the fact that /"ro:t/ displays Final Devoicing (the lexical form of the adjective being /"ro:d/, as is proved inter alia by the inﬂected forms /"ro:d@/ rode ‘red, attr. (unless indef. neut. sing.)’, and /"ro:d@r/ roder ‘redder’). As Booij points out, there is an alternative to the form in (50), namely rodig ‘reddish’, in which the suﬃx /@G/ -ig does not form a Phonological Word of its own, and which is correspondingly pronounced /"ro:d@G/. Phonological Words can be subject to ‘gapping’, as in the following example from Dutch, in which the Word rozeachtig ‘pinkish’ was interestingly misspelled as two separate orthographic words: (51) Dit is een mooi-e ketting van rood-∅ this be.3ps.prs indf beautiful-attr necklace of red-nonattr en roze achtig-e tint-en. and pink approx-attr colour-pl ‘This is a beautiful necklace with reddish and pinkish colours.’ (Internet) That there is ‘gapping’ here is apparent from the non-attributive form of the adjective rood, realizing with ﬁnal devoicing as /"ro:t/. This phenomenon must accordingly be seen as involving the absence of a Phonological Word boundary (cf. Vigário 2003 for corresponding phenomena in European Portuguese). At the Morphosyntactic Level the Word roodachtige will be analysed as in (52a), i.e. as one Word containing the suﬃxes /"Axt@G/ and /@/; at the Phonological Level, however, /"ro:t/ rood, /"rOz@/ roze and /"Axt@G@/ achtige will all appear as Phonological Words, as shown in (52b): (52)

a. (adjwi : [(adjmi : /ro:t/ (mi )) (mj : /"Axt@G/ (mj )) (mk : /@/ (mk ))] (adjwi )) b. (ppi : [(pwi : /ro:t/ (pwi )) . . . (pwj : /"rOz@/ (pwj )) (pwk : /"Axt@G@/ (pwk )) . . . ] (ppi ))

Similar phenomena apply to certain (but not all) preﬁxes, cf. (53), for English: (53)

a. (ppi : [(pwi : /"eks/ (pwi )) (pwj : /"ækt@/ (pwj ))] (ppi )) ex-actor b. (ppi : (pwi : /Igz"ækt@/ (pwi )) (ppi )) exacter

where (53a) consists of two Phonological Words, cf. also an ex and current friend, but (53b) of one—with corresponding eﬀects on the segments corresponding to orthographic ex (i.e. /"eks/ vs /Igz/. And the same phenomena are found with compounds in English (cf. Booij 2005: 176), each constituent of which corresponds with one Phonological Word, cf. (54): (54)

(ppi : [(pwi : /"set/ (pwi )) (pwj : /"θI@rI/ (pwj ))] (ppi )) ‘set theory’

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the phonological level

In Modern Greek, however, as Nespor and Vogel (1986: 112–13) point out, compounds are single Phonological Words. The relationship between morphosyntactic and Phonological Words becomes more complex when clitics are taken into account. Clitics, which cannot be dealt with here as fully as they deserve (but cf. Anderson 2005), are forms which are treated as Words at the Morphosyntactic Level and are ordered as such by the templates applying to that level; at the Phonological Level a clitic is treated as part of the Phonological Word formed by its integration. Phonologically (although not morphosyntactically) they are thus like aﬃxes. Consider the following example from French: (55)

Donne-m-en (spelled Donne-m’en) /dOn"m˜A/ give.imp-1.sg.rec-indf ‘Give me some.’

The clitics me and en are positioned with respect to each other and the verb at the Morphosyntactic Level, as indicated in (56a). The whole Phonological Phrase consists of one Phonological Word, which is, in keeping with a general rule for Phonological Phrases in French, stressed on the ﬁnal Syllable, as indicated in (56b): (56)

a. (Cli : [(Vpi : (Vwi : /dOn/ (Vwi )) (Vpi )) (Npi : (Nwi : me (Nwi )) (Npi )) (Npj : (Nwj : /˜A/ (Nwj )))] (Cli )) b. (ui : (fipi : (ppi : (pwi : [(si : /dOn/ (si )) (sj : /m˜A/ (sj ))] (pwi )) (ppi )) ipi )) ui ))

The integration of a clitic may or may not have segmental eﬀects upon either itself or the element to which it attaches: thus the form of the genitive clitic in English, as /s/, /z/, or /Iz/, is dependent upon the nature of the immediately preceding phoneme; and in rapid speech attachment of the clitic /mI/ to /"gIv/ ‘give’ can aﬀect the form of the latter, yielding /"gImI/ ‘gimme’ (for further details of the possible phonological eﬀects of cliticization, see Schiering 2005). Kabak and Vogel (2001) consider clitics in Turkish, for example as in (57), in which the copula appears in its clitic form: (57)

Kaba-y-dı-nız. rude-cop-pst-2.pl ‘You were rude’

The stress here falls on the second Syllable /ba/, suggesting—given the conclusion reported above, that Turkish Phonological Words are stressed on their ﬁnal Syllable—that example (57) indeed consists of more than a Phonological Word. They analyse the whole as a ‘Clitic Group’ (a layer they take to lie

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between the Phonological Word and the Phonological Phrase, and already argued for by Nespor and Vogel 1986). For many languages, however, it appears adequate to regard the clitic as being integrated into the Phonological Word, as is argued for Dutch by Booij (1996). A distinction is drawn between proclisis and enclisis, according to the direction of attachment (rightward and leftward respectively). Booij (1996) shows that while proclisis is possible in Dutch, there is a preference for enclisis in that language; only the latter involves actual integration into the Phonological Word. Other examples of enclisis are such phenomena as the cliticization of articles to the preposition rather than the following noun in such instances from German as (58): (58)

Zu-m Wohl! to-def.n.dat.sg well-being ‘To well-being, i.e. Cheers!’

or the preposition to the preceding verb in such Leti instances as (59), from van Engelenhoven (2004: 202): (59)

Aumtïètnalo kevïake. a=u-mtïètna=lo kevïaka=e s=1.sg.sit=loc suitcase=indexer ‘I sit on the suitcase.’

and of the attachment of the demonstrative to the preceding word, ‘regardless of that word’s syntactic aﬃliation’ (Anderson 2005: 16–17), in Kw akw ’ala: gw ax.ňux.w . (60) Y@lkw @mas=ida b@gw an@ma=x.=a ’watsi=s=a cause.hurt=dem man=obj=dem dog=ins=dem stick ‘The man hurt the dog with a stick.’ Mackenzie (fc.a) argues that clitics in European Portuguese, although apparently sometimes proclitic and sometimes enclitic, are in fact always enclitic to the occupant of the morphosyntactic PI position. Alleged instances of mesoclisis (where the clitic is situated between two suﬃxes of the verb in the future or conditional tense) are also re-analysed as instances of endoclisis. Even in a strongly preﬁxing language like Acehnese (Durie 1985: 29), the only true clitics are enclitic: apparent proclitics are simply unstressed because they are nonﬁnal in their Phonological Phrase—cf. the discussion of Acehnese in 5.5 above. As we saw in Chapter 4, the input to the Phonological Level from the Morphosyntactic Level consists of an ordered sequence of elements, some of which already have a phonological form shown as a sequence of phonemes, and some of which have an abstract form (termed ‘morphosyntactic operators’). One of the tasks of the Phonological Level is to convert all placeholders

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into phonological form and to integrate them into a Phonological Word. To achieve this, the Phonological Level has a store of primitives at its disposal which provide phonemic material with which to replace the placeholders in the input. This store of primitives constitutes the ‘grammatical lexicon’ of the language under analysis. As the reader will recall, placeholders are included in the Morphosyntactic Level only where the intended expression is not deﬁnitively established at that level. Let us now consider this process, focusing as a simple example on the phonological realization of the placeholding morpheme Past in English, which involves both lexical and phonological conditioning. The formation of the past form of a verb will be dependent upon a distinction indicated in the lexicon between regular and irregular verbs. In the lexicon, a regular verb has only one phonological form; an irregular verb has several. Thus the lexical verb sing is in eﬀect shorthand for the options {/sIN/, /sæN/, /s2N/} plus a statement of the conditions for the use of each. A conﬁguration such as (61a) at the Morphosyntactic Level accordingly entails the choice at the Phonological Level of (61b): (61)

a. (Vwi : sing-Past (Vwi )) b. (pwi : /"sæN/ (pwi ))

In the case of a regular verb such as loot, there is only one form provided by the lexicon, namely /lu:t/. In creating the past tense of this form, the Phonological Level adds a suﬃx, the choice of which is sensitive to the nature of the ﬁnal phoneme of the lexical item. In (62b), representing looted, the suﬃx /Id/ is attached after the alveolar plosive /t/: (62)

a. (Vwi : /"lu:t/-Past (Vwi )) b. (pwi : /"lu:tId/ (pwi ))

The application of a placeholder at the Morphosyntactic Level indicates that no deﬁnitive form can be added at that level. In Spanish, for example, the deﬁnite article with singular feminine nouns is displayed as a placeholder because its form is dependent upon the ﬁrst phoneme of the word following it: el if a stressed /a/ follows, la elsewhere: (63)

a. el alma (/"alma/) def.sg.f soul ‘the soul’ b. la mujer def.sg.f. woman ‘the woman’

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Mutatis mutandis, similar remarks apply to the English singular indeﬁnite article a/an, the French singular masculine demonstrative determiner ce/cet, and generally to all cases of suppletion. Let us consider (64) from French, already discussed in 4.4.7 as (256): (64)

Nous chant-ons. we sing-1.pl ‘We are singing.’

We saw there that examples like this presuppose a mechanism at the Morphosyntactic Level which copies the relevant features of the Subject Noun Phrase to the verb, yielding (65): (65)

(Cli : [(Npi : (Nwi : /nu/ (Nwi )) (Npi ))Subj (Vpi : (Vwi : /SA˜ t/-pres<1.Pl> (Vwi )) (Vpi )] (Cli ))

The representation at the Phonological Level shows how the two placeholders Pres and <1.Pl> are fused: (66)

(ui : (fipi : (ppi : [(pwi : /nu/ (pwi )) (pwj : /SA˜ t˜O/ (pwj ))] (ppi )) ipi )) ui ))

The pattern for the Phonological Word diﬀers from those of higher layers in not requiring any tertiary operators in the languages we have considered; in 5.7 below, however, we will see that operators are required for accentual tone languages such as Japanese. The Phonological Word will therefore appear as follows: (67)

(π w1 : (f1 n≥1 ) (pw1 ))

where it is shown as consisting of a number of Feet. It is to Feet, and the Syllables that compose them, that the following section turns.

5.7 Phonemes, Syllables, and Feet In preceding examples, we have shown phonological representations rather informally, namely in the form of sequences of phonemes, and where appropriate indicating which Syllable bears primary stress, as in example (41b), which—with the addition of the Phonological Word layer—may be shown as (68): (68) (fipi : (fppi : (pwi : /"h rIbl/ (pwi )) (ppi )) (ipi ))

A

The purpose of this section is to explore the layers that may apply at lower layers than that of the Phonological Word. In a stress language such as English, phonemes group into Syllables, and Syllables into Feet, and these call for the

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application of corresponding layers of analysis. Let us work from the phoneme back up to the Foot, as the layer immediately under that of the Phonological Word. Phonemes group into Syllables. A Syllable consists maximally of three parts, ordered incrementally as follows: an onset, a head, and a coda, whereby the head and the coda together form the rhyme. Certain languages require an onset, others permit Words without one. With respect to codas the opposite holds, in the sense that while many languages permit Words without one, there are also a few that do not allow one. The head is obligatory and is necessarily a sonorant, i.e. either a vowel or a sonorant consonant, as in the case of the /l/ in the last Syllable of (68). The Syllable may be classiﬁed as either heavy or light, the criteria for this distinction varying from language to language. In some, the distinction is a matter of the moraic structure of the rhyme, where a mora is a unit of duration: bimoraic rhymes yield a heavy and monomoraic rhymes a light Syllable. Certain languages, however, including many from the Salishan group, may display Phonological Words that lack any sonorants: in Bella Coola (now preferably known as Nuxálk), ‘[m]any words consist solely of obstruents, cf. p’xwlht “bunchberry” ’ (Nater 1984: 5); lh indicates a lateral fricative [ń]). Consider the following ‘somewhat contrived’ example, with the lateral fricatives indicated as /ń/ (Nater 1984: 5): (69) Cń-p’xwńt-ńp-ńńs+kw-ts’. have-bunchberry-tree-plup-poss+rep-then ‘Then he had in his possession a bunchberry plant.’ Such examples have been analysed in diﬀerent ways. One possibility is to regard the Syllable layer as simply not being relevant for them (see the discussion in Bagemihl 1991); so again we countenance the possibility of a layer not being instantiated in a particular language (type). A problem for the division of Phonological Words into Syllables is the existence in many languages, English included, of ambisyllabicity: this arises where the coda of (sn ) also functions as the onset of (sn+1 ). In a possible pronunciation of a Word such as horrible, for example, one way of indicating Syllable divisions is as follows: (70) (pwi : (fi : [(ssi : /h r/ (si )) (sj : /rIb/ (sj )) (sk : /bl/ (sk )] (fi )) (pwi ))

A

As Maddieson (2005a: 54) points out, speakers are more certain about the number of Syllables in a Phonological Word than the exact placement of the divisions between them. In our approach, we will permit adjacent Syllables to share phonemes in the way shown in (70); it is the articulator (Output Component) that will reduce such sequences to single phonemes (through a

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process of degemination). However, it will have to be sensitive to the presence of morphosyntactic structure too, to avoid degeminating in such cases as soulless in (71), which involves a morphologically complex Word, a situation that blocks degemination: (71)

ML: (adjwi : [(nmi : /s@Ul/ (mi )) (mj : /lIs/ (mj ))] (adjwi )) PL: (pwi : (fi : [(ssi : /s@Ul// (si )) (sj : /lIs/ (sj ))] (fi )) (pwi ))

In stress languages, Syllables will diﬀer in the relative stress assigned to each (which, as we will see, forms the basis for Foot structure), where stress may be realized by the articulator as a diﬀerence in loudness, pitch, duration, or intensity or some combination of these. A fundamental diﬀerence is made between stress languages with derivable and non-derivable stress, the ‘free stress’ and ‘ﬁxed stress’ languages of 5.1 above. In the former, the assignment of stress is derivable from the position of the Syllable in the Phonological Word; in the description of such languages, FDG will not mark the Syllable in question but will leave it to the articulator to assign the appropriate stress. In the latter, where assignment of stress is not so derivable, FDG will mark stress by means of the stress operator s, as shown in (68) above. In an examination of a database of 500 non-tone languages, Goedemans and van der Hulst (2005a) established that the majority of those languages (281/500; 56.2 per cent) have stress distributions that are derivable from the position of the Syllable within the Word; there are strong preferences for stressing penultimate (110/281; 39.1 per cent) and initial (92/281; 32.7 per cent) syllables. Even in languages with variable stress, a dominant pattern may be discerned, such as a preference in Spanish for penultimate stress (Goedemans and van der Hulst 2005a: 63). Goedemans and van der Hulst (2005b) ﬁnd that for the remaining 219 languages of their sample, all but 26 have stress that is predictable given the relative weight of the Syllables. Heavy Syllables, as deﬁned above, tend to attract stress. Where a heavy and a light Syllable co-occur, the heavy one will attract the stress; where two heavy or two light Syllables co-occur, so-called right-edge languages have a preference for stressing the second of two heavy and the ﬁrst of two light Syllables, while left-edge languages prefer to stress the ﬁrst of two equally weighted Syllables, whether these are light or heavy (Goedemans and van der Hulst 2005b: 66); unbounded languages diﬀer in not considering edges when calculating the placement of stress. In addition to this classiﬁcation of languages, there are right-oriented and left-oriented languages, which place the stress anywhere in the last or ﬁrst three Syllables of the Word respectively. On this basis, some familiar languages emerge as follows: English as rightoriented, French as right-edge, Russian as unbounded, Basque as left-edge,

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and Mandarin Chinese as unpredictable. Although the study of weightsensitive stress systems has revealed the extent to which stress is derivable from Syllable weight, FDG will maintain the option of indicating the location of stress in such languages by means of the s-operator, since, as shown by Goedemans and van der Hulst (2005c), the factors they have shown to determine ‘weight’ are highly variable, also including non-phonological matters such as the lexical vs. non-lexical status of the Syllable. As discussed in 5.1 above, FDG lexical entries in free-stress languages will contain an indication of characteristic stress position, which can be adapted under the inﬂuence of rhythmic factors. Languages diﬀer in the extent to which the divisions between Words and between morphemes at the Morphosyntactic Level are retained in the division of Phonological Words into Syllables. In Acehnese, in which there is no layer of the Phonological Word (cf. 5.5 above), Syllable boundaries will correspond well with the division into meaning units at the Morphosyntactic Level. In French, by comparison, the division of the Phonological Phrase into units is strongly inﬂuenced by the language’s preference for Syllables with CV structure. Consider the following example, in which we abstract from possible layers intermediate between Phonological Phrase and Syllable (the presence of the Foot layer in French is currently a matter of controversy: Jun and Fougeron’s 2000 model makes no such assumption, but this is contested by Montreuil 2002): (72)

le-s ancien-s élève-s def-pl former-pl pupil-pl ‘the former pupils’ (ppi : [(si : /le// (si )) (sj : /z˜A/ (sj )) (sk : /sj˜E/ (sk )) (sl : /ze/ (sl )) (sm : /lEv/ (sm ))] (ppi ))

Only the ﬁnal Syllable of this example has a coda, and the result is that units are created (with the exception of (si )) which have no correspondence to morphosyntactic units. In stress languages, Syllables group into Feet, where the Foot is a layer intermediate between the Syllable and the Phonological Word, such that each Foot has one strong Syllable and a number of weaker Syllables. The recurrence of strong Syllables tends to show enough isochronicity in speech to create a sense of rhythm, and it is this that is represented by the Foot layer. A fundamental distinction is drawn between trochaic Feet, in which the ﬁrst Syllable in the Foot is strong, and iambic Feet, in which the last Syllable is strong. Goedemans and van der Hulst (2005d) ﬁnd that of the 184 languages in their sample that have a clear Foot type, 153 (83.2 per cent) have trochaic Feet, and they consider the theoretical option that all iambic systems can be

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reanalysed as trochaic ones. Languages without rhythm, 98 in their sample, may be regarded as lacking a Foot layer—although Goedemans and van der Hulst (2005d: 74) are prepared to admit Feet to such languages if they ‘silently’ condition other aspects of the phonology. Feet diﬀer in their strength with respect to each other within a Phonological Word. Consider the following Phonological Phrase from English: (73)

agricultural entrepreneurs (ppi : [(pwi : [(fi : [(ssi : /æg/ (si )) (sj : /rI/ (sj ))] (fi )) (sfj : [(ssk : /k2l/ (sk )) (sl : /tS@/ (sl )) (sm : /rl/ (sm )] (fj ))] (pwi )) (pwj : [(fk : [(ssn : / n/ (sn )) (so : /trI/ (so )) (sp : /prI/ (sp )] (fk )) (sfl : (ssr : /n3:z/ (sr )) (fl ))] (pwj ))] (ppi ))

A

We see that the Phrase breaks into two Phonological Words; these in turn each divide into two Feet. All the Feet are trochaic, as is apparent from the fact that their ﬁrst Syllable bears the s-operator. In each case the Feet themselves diﬀer in strength: in the ﬁrst Word, the Foot /k2ltS@rl/ contains the Word’s primary stress and the Foot /ægrI/ contains its secondary stress; in the second Word, the Foot /n3:z/ bears the primary stress and the Foot /entrIprI/ contains the secondary stress. Thus primary stress results from the coincidence of a strong Foot and a strong Syllable within it, and secondary stress from the occurrence of a strong Syllable in a Foot not marked as strong. In tone languages, it is the Syllable that is the basic location of tonal distinctions. Tertiary operators such as {h, n, l, r, f}, all but one of which, namely m(iddle), have already been introduced for the characterization of Intonational and Phonological Phrases, apply again at this layer. Consider the following examples from Thai (Maddieson 2005b: 58): (74)

a. b. c. d. e.

kh áá ‘tradeV ’ (h si : /kh a:/ (si )) h¯¯ (n si : /kh a:/ (si )) k aa ‘get stuck’ kh àà ‘galangal’ (l si : /kh a:/ (si )) h k àá ‘leg’ (r si : /kh a:/ (si )) h k áà ‘declarative politeness particle for female speakers’ (f si : /kh a:/ (si ))

In a tonal accent language like Swedish (cf. 5.1) above, it will be necessary to combine operators, such that a stressed Syllable (ss1 ) will additionally be marked for high or low tone (examples from Gårding 1998: 114): (75)

a. tank-en tank-def ‘the tank’ (fi : [(hssi : /th aNk/ (si )) (sj : /En/ (sj ))] (fi ))

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the phonological level b. tank-en thought-def ‘the thought’ (fi : [(lssi : /th aNk/ (si )) (sj : /En/ (sj ))] (fi ))

In an accentual tone system like Japanese, by contrast, we ﬁnd that tone applies (from the lexicon) to the Phonological Word and that the s-operator can then apply within Words with a high tone (the only tone in Japanese) to either the ﬁrst or last Syllable. The following example is developed from Hirst and Di Cristo (1998: 10): (76)

a. káki ‘oyster’ (hpwi : [(ssi : /ka/ (si )) (sj : /ki/ (sj ))] (pwi )) b. kakí ‘fence’ (hpwi : [(si : /ka/ (si )) (ssj : /ki/ (sj ))] (pwi )) c. kaki ‘persimmon’ (pwi : [(si : /ka/ (si )) (sj : /ki/ (sj ))] (pwi ))

It may seem that the layers lower than that of the Phonological Word are of purely formal interest with little signiﬁcance for a functional analysis of language, but in fact these layers of the Phonological Level interact with the other levels in the same way as higher layers. Let us consider the formation of comparative forms of adjectives in English and the relevance of the phonological category ‘Syllable’ to their formation. There is an alternation between two ways of expressing the comparative form of a gradable adjective (abstracting from individual cases of suppletion as in good > better, etc.): one involves an Adjective Phrase of the form more /mO:/ Adj, while the other calls for the morphological option of appending the suﬃx -er /-@/. Which form is chosen is dependent upon the phonological characteristics of the adjective: the suﬃx is preferred where the stem is monosyllabic or disyllabic with an unstressed second Syllable, cf. /"@Uld/ ‘old’ /"@Uld@/ ‘older; /"laIvlI/ ‘lively’ /"laIvlI@/ ‘livelier’. Where the stem has three or more Syllables, the syntactic option is taken: /p@"sIst@nt/ ‘persistent’ /"mO: p@"sIst@nt/ ‘more persistent’. Where a disyllabic stem has a stressed second Syllable, both forms may be found for several adjectives. The choice seems to be lexically determined and arbitrary: we ﬁnd /p@"laIt@/ ‘politer’ /@U"bi:s@/ ‘obeser’ /@"l3:t@/ ‘alerter’ /p@"ti:t@/ ‘petiter’, alongside corresponding forms with more; however, /@"freId@/ ‘?afraider’ and /2p"set@/ ‘?upsetter’ seem ill-formed. Since the choice is largely determined by the phonological neighbourhood, it is at the Phonological Level that the phenomenon has to be dealt with. Let us consider the following examples:

building up the phonological level (77)

a. John is bigger than his brother. b. *John is more big than his brother.

(78)

a. John is more intelligent than his brother. b. *John is intelligenter than his brother.

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We hold that more in (78a) is lexical, since it can be modiﬁed by adverbs as in (79): (79)

a. John is much more intelligent than his brother. b. John is markedly more intelligent than his brother.

and because more takes the than clause as an obligatory complement, as demonstrated by the ungrammaticality of (80): (80) *John is intelligent than his brother. The predication frame underlying (78a) and (79a–b) will therefore appear as follows: (81) (f1 : [(f2 : [(f3 : Adj (f3 ): [(f4 : more (f4 ): [(f5 : Adv (f5 )) (f4 )U ]) (f3 )U ]) (x1 )Standard )] (f2 )) (x2 )U ] (f1 )) Our hypothesis is now that frame (81) also underlies (77a); note that in (82), much and markedly do not modify big but rather indicate the degree of diﬀerence in exactly the same way as more is modiﬁed in (79a–b): (82) John is markedly bigger than his brother. On this basis, we assume that the same frame applies to (77a) as to (78a). This means that at the Morphosyntactic Level (77) will appear as though it were (the ill-formed) *John is more big than his brother. It is the Phonological Level which, having access to the phonological structure of the Utterance, applies the appropriate form, as a suﬃx, in the same way as it applies rules of lexical priority. The patterns that apply to Feet and Syllables may now be shown as follows: (83) (π f1 : [π s1 n≥1 : / . . . / (s1 ))] (f1 ) where π = {s, ∅} π = {h,m,l,f,r; s, ∅}

5.8 Building up the Phonological Level In the construction of the Phonological Level, use is made of prosodic patterns, an inventory of segmental sequences, and tertiary operators. Prosodic patterns come in various types, corresponding to the layers that characterize

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the ultimate phonological representation; which patterns are required for a particular language is an empirical question. In a language in which all the layers discussed in the preceding sections are instantiated, the Utterance pattern captures the conﬁguration of Intonational Phrases (ip) within the Utterance, the ip pattern captures the conﬁguration of Phonological Phrases (pp) within Intonational Phrases, the pp pattern captures the conﬁguration of Phonological Words (pw) within Phonological Phrases, the pw pattern captures the conﬁguration of Feet (f) within Phonological Words, the f pattern captures the conﬁguration of Syllables (s) within the Foot, and the s pattern captures the conﬁguration of phonemes within the Syllable. The inventory of segmental sequences applies to replace non-phonological material inherited from the Morphosyntactic Level at the pp and pw layers, as has been argued in 5.6 and will again be demonstrated below. Tertiary operators apply to variables at the various layers. Which operators are required per layer is again an empirical question to be determined from language to language, but in preceding sections we have found evidence for operators at all u, ip, pp, pw, f, and s layers. In keeping with the general architecture of FDG, the process of building up the structure of the Phonological Level advances in a top-down fashion, starting with the largest units and then ﬁlling these with smaller ones. We start with the Utterance, analysing example (84), which one must imagine being produced in a situation in which the Speaker knows that the referent of he is under pressure to leave his work. In other words, the question is asking for justiﬁcation of the compulsion to resign, as expressed by the Word forced. (84)

If he doesn’t want to go, why should he be forced to submit his resignation?

Since the number of ips in an Utterance is unlimited, we can use the pattern in (85), but now with the subscripts on the variable (u) alphabetic rather than numerical, to show instantiation: (85) (ui : (ip1 n≥1 ) (ui )) If there is no paratone, as we may expect here, the operator on u will not be instantiated. We may now ﬁll the Intonational Phrase positions which constitute the Utterance with appropriate ip patterns, developing the general pattern for ips: (86) (π ip1 : (pp1 n≥1 ) (ip1 )) Utterance (84), let us assume, consists of two Intonational Phrases (although other analyses would be possible with either very rapid speech or very emphatic speech). The result is the following structure:

building up the phonological level (87)

457

(ui : [(r ipi : (pp1 n≥1 ) (ipi )) (f ipj : (pp1 n≥1 ) (ipj ))] (ui ))

Note that the ﬁrst ip has a rising contour, reﬂecting its status as a dependent Discourse Act within the Move at the Interpersonal Level, and that the second ip has a falling contour, reﬂecting its status as a wh-question. Notice again that the instantiation of the u and ip variables is shown in the use of alphabetic rather than numerical subscripts. The next step is to develop the Phonological Phrase layer within each Intonational Phrase, using the pattern in (88): (88) (π pp1 : (pw1 n≥1 ) (pp1 )) Probably as a partial reﬂection of the presupposed nature of the information in the if-Clause, the Speaker—let us assume—divides the ﬁrst ip into two pps, but partitions the second ip, which represents the Nuclear Discourse Act, into four pps. The result is as follows: (89) (ui : [(r ipi : [(ppi : (pw1 n≥1 ) (ppi )) (f ppj : (pw1 n≥1 ) (ppj ))] (ipi )) (f ipj : [(h ppk : (pw1 n≥1 ) (ppk )) (ppl : (pw1 n≥1 ) (ppl )) (ppm : (pw1 n≥1 ) (ppm )) (l ppn : (pw1 n≥1 ) (ppn )) (l ppo : (pw1 n≥1 ) (ppo ))] (ipj ))] (ui )) Notice that (ppj ) bears the operator f: this will ensure that the articulator produces a fall-rise contour, as explained in 5.5. The fall may be limited to the ﬁnal pw of the pp, namely /"g@U/, or spread out over the entire pp. In ipj , the ﬁrst pp carries an operator ‘high’, as frequently applies to the wh-word in wh-questions. And the presence of the operator ‘low’ on (ppn ) and (ppo ) indicates that the fall of Intonational Phrase (ipj ) comes in the preceding pp not marked for height, i.e. (ppm ). The desired eﬀect, then, is for the pitch in ipj to start high and then to fall in ppm , staying low in ppn and ppo . No prediction is made for the pitch in ppl , which could remain at the same height as ppk , with the voice falling in ppm ; alternatively it could also fall but with a rise at the end to prepare for the fall in ppm . Both options can be taken by speakers (i.e. by the Output Component in our overall model) without communicative diﬀerence and the representation allows for them both. The next step is for the pws within the pps to be instantiated, using the pattern shown in (90): (90) (π w1 : (f1 n≥1 ) (pw1 )) In this particular example all the pps correspond to one pw except for ppj , which consists of three Words. We will therefore only develop that one here, to clarify how that applies. (Notice that in English pws do not have operators.) The following representation may be given for ppj : (91) (f ppj : [(pwj : (f1 n≥1 ) (pwj )) (pwl : (f1 n≥1 ) (pwl )) (pwm : (f1 n≥1 ) (pwm ))] (ppj ))

458

the phonological level

The Phonological Words are only partially in correspondence with the morphosyntactic Words. This is because of the occurrence of clitics in the Utterance, namely both occurrences of he and both occurrences of to, as well as the occurrence of n t, and of be. The sequence of Phonological Words in the example (let us assume, because non-clitic pronunciations of all these clitics—with n t being replaced by not—are in principle possible) will thus be as follows: (92) /"IfhI/ /"d2znt/ /"w nttU/ /"g@U/ /"waI/ /"SUdhIbI/ /"fO:sttU/ /s2b"mIthIz/ /rezIg"neISn/

A

What the Phonological Level ‘inherits’ from the Morphosyntactic Level, however, is a mixture of phonemic and morphosyntactic information: the former where the deﬁnitive form is already available at that level, the latter where the deﬁnitive form has to be supplied from the inventory. The information received from the Morphosyntactic Level will be as follows, paring it back to the sequence of morphosyntactic Words: (93) (Cli : [(/"If/) (he)Subj (do-3.sg.pres) (not) (/"w nt/) (to) (/"g@U/)] (Cli )) (Clj : [(/"waI/) (/"SUd/) (he)Subj (be) (/"fO:s/-Part) (to) (/s2b"mIt/) (/hIz/) (/rezIg"neISn/] (Clj ))

A

Notice that (he)Subj , as explained in 4.1.3, is a placeholder for the forms {/hi:, hI/} from which the Phonological Level must make a choice; similarly (to) is a placeholder for {/tu:, tU/}, (not) for {/not/, /nt/}, and (be) for {/bi:, bI/ and others not relevant here}. The choice is in the case of (he) determined by the input from the Interpersonal Level: where (he)Subj corresponds to a Referential Subact that is in Focus or Contrast or is subject to emphasis, the form /hi:/ will be selected, as in (95): (94) It is heFoc /hi:, *hI/ who has been chosen. Similar remarks apply to (to) and (be). None of the occurrences of (he), (to), or (be) in (85) is subject to any of these pragmatic functions: for that reason the analysis will display the forms /hI, tU/, and /bI/ respectively and none of them will be analysed as forming a Phonological Word. The auxiliary verb (do) is introduced at the Morphosyntactic Level, where it also takes the agreement aﬃx 3.sg.pres. As shown in example (61) above with regard to the verb sing, do cannot be represented as a sequence of phonemes at the Morphosyntactic Level because its form is not deﬁnitive. The presence of this placeholding representation in the input stimulates the Phonological Level to supply from its inventory of unpredictable forms the form that corresponds to the combination with the suﬃx 3.sg.pres, namely /d2z/. To this

building up the phonological level

459

form is appended, within the same Phonological Word, the clitic /=nt/, which is already in its deﬁnitive phonological form. Finally, the morphosyntactic operator Part (participle; cf. (16) in 4.1.3) is converted to the phonological form /t/ by selection of the phonologically conditioned appropriate form from the set {/d, t, Id/} (after a check that /"fO:s/ is not subject to the principle of ‘lexical priority’). The representation shown here, it should be stressed, shows a pronunciation that reﬂects an average tempo of speech, given the proposed division into Phonological Words. The consequence is that the Phonological Level is not called upon to permit any deletion, in keeping with the principles of FDG. Thus, for example, as expressions of (be-3.sg.pres), /z/ is regarded as an alternative version of /Iz/ rather than as resulting from deletion of /I/. We assume, however, that in allegro speech, the Output Component does have the option of deleting phonemes, assimilating neighbouring phonemes to each other, or reducing vowels to /@/. Thus we assume that possible deletions in the pronunciation of example (84), e.g. as in (95), which retains the division into Phonological Words, will be handled by the articulator: /"IfI/ /"d2zn/ /"w n@/ /"g@U/ /"waI/ /"SUdIbI/ /"fO:st@/ /s2b"mItIz/ /rezIg"neISn/

A

(95)

It will be apparent from (95) that each of the pws in example (84) corresponds to one Foot, except for the last in the Utterance (pwq ), which contains two stressed Syllables, /re/ with secondary stress and /"neIS/ with primary stress. Based on the structure of Feet repeated in (96): (96) (π f1 : [(π s1 n≥1 : / . . . / (s1 ))] (f1 )) we arrive at the representation in (97): (97)

((pwq : [(fq : [(s sy : /re/ (sy )) (sz : /zIg/ (sz ))] (fq )) (s fr : [(s saa : /neIS/ (saa )) (sbb : /n/ (sbb ))] (fr ))] (pwj ))

We are now ready to give the full analysis of example (84), following steps in a top-down manner; stepwise additions are shown in bold: 1. (ui : (ip1 n≥1 ) (ui )) 2. (ui : [(r ipi : (pp1 n≥1 ) (ipi )) (f ipj : (pp1 n≥1 ) (ipj ))] (ui )) 3. (ui : [(r ipi : [(ppi : (pw1 n≥1 ) (ppi )) (f ppj : (pw1 n≥1 ) (ppj ))] (ipi )) (f ipj : [(h ppk : (pw1 n≥1 ) (ppk )) (ppl : (pw1 n≥1 ) (ppl )) (ppm : (pw1 n≥1 ) (ppm )) (lppn : (pw1 n≥1 ) (ppn )) (l ppo : (pw1 n≥1 ) (ppo ))] (ipj ))] (ui )) 4. (ui : [(r ipi : [(ppi : (pwi : (f1 n≥1 ) (pwi )) (ppi )) ((f ppj : [ (pwj : (f1 n≥1 ) (pwj )) (pwk : (f1 n≥1 ) (pwk )) (pwl : (f1 n≥1 ) (pwl ))] (ppj )))] (ipi )) (f ipj : [(h ppk : (pwm : (f1 n≥1 ) (pwm )) (ppk )) (ppl : (pwn : (f1 n≥1 ) (pwn )) (ppl )) (ppm :

460

the phonological level

(pwo : (f1 n≥1 ) (pwo )) (ppm )) (l ppn : (pwp : (f1 n≥1 ) (pwp )) (ppn )) (l ppo : (pwq : (f1 n≥1 ) (pwq )) (ppo ))] (ipj ))] (ui )) 5. (ui : [(r ipi : [(ppi : (pwi : (πfi : [(πs1 n≥1 : / . . . / (s1 ))] (fi )) (pwi )) (ppi )) ((f ppj : [(pwj : (πfj : [(πs1 n≥1 : / . . . / (s1 ))] (fj )) (pwj )) (pwk : (πfk : [(πs1 n≥1 : / . . . / (s1 ))] (fk )) (pwk )) (pwl : (πf1 : (πs1 n≥1 : / . . . / (s1 )) (f1 )) (pwl ))] (ppj )))] (ipi )) (f ipj : [(h ppk : (pwm : (πfm : (πs1 n≥1 : / . . . / (s1 )) (fm )) (pwm )) (ppk )) (ppl : (pwn : (πfn : (πs1 n≥1 : / . . . / (s1 )) (fn )) (pwn )) (ppl )) (ppm : (pwo : (πfo : (πs1 n≥1 : / . . . / (s1 )) (fo )) (pwo )) (ppm )) (l ppn : (pwp : (πfp : (πs1 n≥1 : / . . . / (s1 )) (fp )) (pwp )) (ppn )) (l ppo : (pwq : [(πfq : (πs1 n≥1 : / . . . / (s1 )) (fq )) (πfr : (πs1 n≥1 : / . . . / (s1 )) (fr ))] (pwq )) (ppo ))] (ipj ))] (ui )) 6. (ui : [(r ipi : [(ppi : (pwi : (fi : [(s si : /If/ (si )) (sj : /hI/ (sj ))] (fi )) (pwi )) (ppi )) ((f ppj : [(pwj : (fj : [(s sk : /d2z/ (sk )) (sl : /nt/ (sl ))] (fj )) (pwj )) (pwk : (fk : [(s sm : /w6nt/ (sm )) (sn : /tU/ (sn ))] (fk )) (pwk )) (pwl : (f1 : (s so : /g9U/ (so )) (f1 )) (pwl )) (ppj ))] (ipi )) (f ipj : [(h ppk : (pwm : (fm : (s sp : /waI/ (sp )) (fm )) (pwm )) (ppk )) (ppl : (pwn : (fn : [(s sq : /SUd/ (sq )) (sr : /hI/ (sr )) (ss : /bI/ (ss ))] (fn )) (pwn )) (ppl )) (ppm : (pwo : (fo : [(s st : /fO:st/ (st )) (su : /tU/ (su ))] (fo )) (pwo )) (ppm )) (l ppn : (pwp : (fp : [(s sv : /s2b/ (sv )) (sw : /mIt/ (sw )) (sx : /hIz/ (sx ))] (fp )) (pwp )) (ppn )) (l ppo : (pwq : [(fq : [(s sy : /re/ (sy )) (sz : /zIg/ (sz ))] (fq )) (s fr : [(s saa : /neIS/ (saa )) (sbb : /n/ (sbb ))] (fr ))] (pwq )) (ppo ))] (ipj ))] (ui )) The complete phonological representation may be more easily surveyed in the following form: (ui : [ (r ipi : [ (ppi : (pwi : (fi : [ (s si : /If/ (si )) (sj : /hI/ (sj )) ] (fi )) (pwi )) (ppi )) (f ppj : [(pwj : (fj : [ (s sk : /d2z/ (sk )) (sl : /nt/ (sl )) ] (fj )) (pwj )) (pwk : (fk : [ (s sm : /w6nt/ (sm ))

building up the phonological level (sn : /tU/ (sn )) ] (fk )) (pwk )) (pwl : (f1 :

(s so : /g9U/ (so ))

(f1 )) (pwl )) (ppj )) ] (ipi )) (f ipj : [ (h ppk : (pwm : (fm :

(s sp : /waI/ (sp ))

(fm )) (pwm )) (ppk )) (ppl : (pwn : (fn : [

(s sq : /SUd/ (sq )) (sr : /hI/ (sr )) (ss : /bI/ (ss )) ] (fn ))

(pwn )) (ppl )) (ppm : (pwo : (fo : [

(s st : /fO:st/ (st )) (su : /tU/ (su ))

] (fo )) (pwo )) (ppm )) (l ppn : (pwp : (fp : [

(s sv : /s2b/ (sv )) (sw : /mIt/ (sw )) (sx : /hIz/ (sx ))

461

462

the phonological level ] (fp )) (pwp )) (ppn )) (l ppo : (pwq : [ (fq : [

(s sy : /re/ (sy )) (sz : /zIg/ (sz ))]

(fq )) (s fr : [

(s saa : /neIS/ (saa )) (sbb : /n/ (sbb ))

] (fr )) ] (pwq )) (ppo ))] (ipj ))] (ui ))

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Language Index Abkhaz 138, 168, 205–6, 306–7, 335 Acehnese 319–21, 328, 442–3, 447, 452 Aghem 91 Ainu 415 Amele 165, 180, 367 Arabic, Colloquial 345 Arabic, Standard Moroccan 80 Asmat 388 Avar 252–3 Babungo 33–4, 78, 90, 374–5 Basque 132, 326, 328, 380–3, 387, 397, 451 Bella Coola 450 Berbice Dutch Creole 386–7 Bininj Gun-Wok 123, 408, 415, 430 Breton 345 Bulgarian 97–8 Chechen 306, 373 Chichewa 134 Chickasaw 198, 329, 434 Chinese, Hokkien 436 Chinese, Mandarin 67, 72, 94, 106, 184, 425, 430, 435, 452 Chinese, Modern Standard 95 Chinese, Shanghai 436 Chitumbuka 441 Chukchee 411, 415 Cofán 352–3 Czech 340, 354 Desano 72 Dinka 398–9, 426 Dutch 18, 20, 51, 54, 65, 77, 78, 81, 82, 83, 92, 95, 121, 172, 184–5, 191, 198, 216, 220–1, 230–1, 238, 255, 265, 267, 269, 271, 272, 286–7, 336–40, 345–6, 347, 348–9, 354–5, 444, 445, 447 Eastern Pomo 156 English passim Evenki 76, 83, 90, 229, 366

Fijian 80, 108, 244, 249, 301, 443 Finnish 90, 95, 164, 248, 421, 425 Fongbe 120 French 35, 47, 54, 76, 100, 118, 119, 242, 245, 332, 340–1, 350, 388, 433, 442, 446, 449, 451–2 Garo 165, 175, 226–8, 426 Georgian 233 German 54, 87, 103, 202, 209, 232, 242, 276, 293, 426, 447 Greek, Modern 366, 446 Guajajara 213 Gungbe 251–3 Gunwinggu 115 Hausa 173 Hawaiian 248 Hebrew 402 Hidatsa 153, 344, 382–3 Hixkaryana 193, 205 Hungarian 76, 91, 253, 307, 348, 368, 398, 440 Hupa 240 Icelandic 198 Indonesian, Standard 327 Irish 363 Italian 211, 443 Iwaidja 240 Jacaltec 367 Jamul Tiipay 62, 72 Japanese 85, 87, 149, 200, 286, 316, 421, 425, 430, 438, 449, 454 Jarawara 307 Jingpho 425 Kabardian 350 Kalkatungu 297–8 Kamaiurá 72, 203 Kannada 76 Kashmiri 79, 292, 308 Kayardild 244 Ket 190

490

language index

Kham 97–8, 105, 112, 123, 326–8 Khoekhoe 427 Kiowa 411–13 Kisi 101–2, 333–4 Korean 99, 315, 438 Koromfe 90, 374 Koryak 159 Krongo 413 Kw akw ’ala 447 Kwaza 75, 86 Lakhota 299 Lango 385–7 Latin 82, 345 Leti 112, 342–5, 447 Lezgian 356–7, 373 Lillooet 88 Limbu 428, 443 Lithuanian 104–5 Maasai 394–5 Malayalam 89 Mapuche 153, 175, 212, 322 Mapudungun, see Mapuche Marathi 74, 79–80 Maricopa 155 Mohawk 115 Mokilese 235, 261 Movima 335 Muna 393–4 Mundari 296, 400–1 Musqueam 154 Nama 354, 365–8 Ndyuka 90 Neger-Hollands 169 Nêlêmwa 217 Ngiyambaa 174–5 Nivkh 405–10 Numbami 169 Nung 234 Nunggubuyu 351 Oromo 234 Pawnee 154–5 Persian 93–4, 252–3, 307 Pirahã 352 Plains Cree 321–3 Polish 89, 314–15, 425

Portuguese 77, 80, 119, 147, 149–50, 201, 206, 255, 340–1, 423, 433, 440, 445, 447 Punjabi 79 Quechua, Imbabura 57, 173, 190, 201, 213 Quechua, Tarma 180 Rawang 425 Romanian 433 Rukai 132 Russian 314, 361, 451 Sabanê 108 Saisiyat 99 Samoan 107, 136, 297, 393 Sanuma 74 Scots 314 Scottish Gaelic 79, 106, 147, 204, 206, 269, 315, 424 Serbian 390 Shipibo 104 Sliammon 104, 155–6 Southern Tiwa 17, 302–5, 407–10, 414 Spanish 7, 8, 10, 33, 58, 67, 77, 86, 95, 103, 105, 123, 137, 158, 166–8, 182, 183, 201, 212, 216, 229, 232, 235, 264, 266, 274, 301, 304, 323, 348, 353–4, 367, 370–1, 391–2, 395, 422, 448, 451 Sundanese 134 Supyire 132, 134 Swahili 164, 395 Swedish 425, 453 Tagalog 108, 183–4, 199, 200, 206, 286, 315–19, 344 Tariana 90, 177, 200, 384–7, 412 Tauya 67, 71, 157–8, 176, 308 Thai 269, 425, 453 Tidore 3, 101, 158, 178, 333 Tongan 423 Tsaﬁki 156, 405 Tucano 72, 105 Tübatulabal 172–3 Turkish 8, 33–4, 61–2, 71, 94, 102, 110, 176, 177, 182–3, 185, 189, 191, 212–13, 216, 229, 243, 286, 287, 301–4, 336, 357–61, 394, 402–3, 413, 444, 446 Tuvaluan 97, 229, 369–70 Tuyuca 149 Tzotzil 329, 334

language index

Vietnamese 21, 425, 428, 443

West Greenlandic 179, 214, 247, 414, 435 Wintu 105 Wolof 314, 423, 427

Wambon 90, 96–9 Warao 225–8 Wari’ 148 Warlpiri 298 Welsh 210

Yagaria 183–4 Yagua 21–2 Yimas 115, 410–1, 444 Yucatec Maya 137 Yukaghir, Kolyma 132

Usan 57 Ute 314

491

Name Index Aarts, Bas 31 Abe, Isamu 434 Aboh, Enoch 251–2 Adelaar, Willem F. H. 180 Adger, David 204 Aikhenvald, Alexandra Y. 90, 156, 177, 200, 384–5, 395, 399, 412, 443 Aissen, Judith 36, 329, 334 Allen, Barbara J. 17, 302, 407–8, 414 Allwood, Jens 176 Andersen, Torben 398, 426 Anderson, Stephen 422, 446–7 Anderson, Victoria 423 Anstey, Matthew P. 9 Antunes de Araujo, Gabriel 108 Arana, Aitor 380–2 Asher, Ronald E. 89 Ashton, Ethel O. 164, 395 Auer, Peter 428–9 Awbery, Gwenllian M. 210 Baar, Tim van 178 Bagemihl, Bruce 450 Bakker, Dik 2, 21, 23, 316 Barðdal, Jóhanna 198 Barnes, Janet 149 Bendor-Samuel, David 213 Berg, Marinus E. van den 95 Berg, René van den 393 Berlin, Brent 33 Besnier, Niko 97, 229, 369–70 Bhatia, Tej K. 79 Bickel, Balthasar 198, 307, 317, 329 Bishop, Judith 430 Blake, Barry J. 297 Boas, Franz 104 Boër, Steven E. 128 Bógoras, Waldemar 159 Boland, Annerieke 35, 406 Bolinger, Dwight 230, 432 Bolkestein, A. Machtelt 331, 368 Booij, Geert E. 217, 444–5, 447 Boz¸sahin, Cem 358 Bradshaw, Joel 169 Brakel, Jaap van 33 Bray, R. G. A de 354

Bredvad-Jensen, Anne-Christine 435 Bresnan, Joan 134 Bril, Isabelle 217 Brousseau, Anne-Marie 120 Brown, Gillian 430, 439 Brown, Richard 245 Bryant, Greg A. 65 Bühler, Karl 128 Burling, Robbins 165, 175, 226, 426 Butler, Christopher S. 1, 8, 10, 29–30, 42, 121, 237 Bybee, Joan L. 155, 174, 176, 383 Caﬀarel, Alice J. R. 29 Carlson, Robert 132, 134 Castrén, M. Alexander 190 Chao, Y. R. 94 Cheng, Lisa L.-S. 263 Childs, G. Tucker 101, 334 Cinque, Guglielmo 298 Cintra, Luís F. Lindsey 119 Clark, Eve 117 Clark, Herbert H. 117 Coates, Jennifer 174, 176 Colarusso, John 350 Cole, Peter 57, 173, 190, 201, 213, 327 Comrie, Bernard 36, 134, 173, 211, 344, 361 Connolly, John 9, 310 Cornish, Francis 89, 120 Coulthard, Richard M. 4 Craig, Colette Grinevald 367 Crevels, Mily 54 Cristofaro, Sonia 356 Crowley, Terry 108 Cruz-Ferreira, Madalena 433, 440 Cunha, Celso 119 Curnow, Timothy Jowan 105 Cuvalay-Haak, Martine 181 Dahl, Östen 165 Dasc˘alu-Jinga, Lauren¸tia 433 Davey, John xii Declerck, Renaat 260 Derbyshire, Desmond C. 193, 205 Di Cristo, Albert 421, 424, 433, 438, 442, 454 Dickinson, Connie 156, 405

name index Dik, Simon C. x, 26, 37–41, 55–8, 82, 89–92, 96–100, 107, 113, 117, 118, 121, 131, 177, 210, 246, 264, 266, 289, 344, 351, 368, 424, 433 Dikker, Suzanne 396 Dixon, R. M. W. 36, 108, 307, 443 Donaldson, Tamsin 174–5 Downing, Laura J. 441 Dryer, Matthew S. 36, 329, 388 Durie, Mark 319–20, 442, 447 Eijk, Jan van 88 Ekman, Paul 76 Engelenhoven, Aone 112, 342, 447 Ersen-Rasch, Margarete I. 61 Evans, Nicholas D. 123, 240, 244, 296, 400, 408, 415 Everett, Daniel 148–9, 352 Fähnrich, Heinz 233 Falk, Yehuda N. 317 Falster Jakobsen, Lisbeth 10 Faust, Norma 104 Fawcett, Robin 30 Fenyvesi, Anna 369 Fischer, Rafael 352 Fletcher, Janet 430 Foley, William A. 3, 41, 115, 169, 195–6, 202, 212, 232, 316, 383, 410, 444 Fortescue, Michael 24, 179, 214, 247, 435 Fougeron, Cécile 452 Fox Tree, Jean E. 65 Freiberger Wilson, Nancy 234 García Velasco, Daniel x, xii, 19, 37, 117 Gårding, Eva 425, 453 Geerts, Guido 340 Geluykens, Roland 56 Genee, Inge xii, 363 Gernsbacher, Morton Ann 311 Geuder, Wilhelm 208 Givón, Talmy 26, 158, 314 Goedemans, Rob 451–3 Golla, Victor 240 Golumbia, David 297 Gómez-González, María de los Ángeles x Gómez Soliño, José S. 15 Gonçalves, Sebastião Carlos Leite 104 Gonzálvez-García, Francisco 29, 30 Goossens, Louis 35 Gordon, Lynn 155, 198, 329 Gordon, Matthew K. 434 Greenberg, Joseph H. 394 Gronemeyer, Claire 104–5

493

Groot, Casper de x, 85, 118, 172, 253, 307, 348, 368, 398 Haacke, Wilfrid H. G. 427 Hagman, Roy Stephen 354, 365 Haig, Geoﬀrey 357–60 Hale, Kenneth L. 297–8 Halliday, Michael A. K. 29–30, 128, 174 Hannay, Mike 4, 24, 57, 88, 100, 123, 133, 135, 295, 311 Haraguchi, Shosuke 425 Harbour, Daniel 411–13 Harder, Peter 7, 24, 173 Harris, Alice Carmichael 233 Harrison, Sheldon P. 235, 261 Haspelmath, Martin 123, 229, 266, 327, 356–7, 360, 373, 435 Hattnher, Marize M. D. xi, 42 Haude, Katharina 335 Hayes, Bruce 430 Heath, Jeﬀrey 297, 351 Heesakkers, Tanna 199 Hengeveld, Kees x, xi, 2, 7, 15, 19, 32, 33–4, 41, 42, 71, 74–6, 131, 139, 177, 181, 199, 206, 218, 225, 228, 237, 295, 312, 336, 365–7, 392, 402 Hewitt, Brian G. 205–6, 306–7, 335 Himmelmann, Nikolaus P. 108, 199–200, 208–9, 319 Hinds, John 85, 87, 316 Hirst, Daniel 421, 424, 438, 440, 442, 454 Hoo Ling Soh 436 Hopper, Paul 26 Hovdhaugen, Even 107, 136, 297, 393 Hsieh, Fuhui 99–100 Hualde, José Ignacio 326 Huang, Shuanfan 99–100 Hulst, Harry van der 451–3 Hundius, Harald 269 Huttar, George L. 90 Huttar, Mary L. 90 Jackendoﬀ, Ray 41 Jadir, Mohamed 54 Jakobson, Roman 5, 275 Jansen, Bert 169 Jun, Sun-Ah 430, 452 Junger, Judith 402 Kabak, Barı¸s 110, 444, 446 Kahr, Joan Casper 251 Kahrel, Peter 246 Karagiannis, Evangelos 366

494

name index

Karjalainen, Merja 90, 95, 164, 425–6 Kay, Paul 33 Keenan, Edward 317 Keijzer, Merel 35 Keizer, M. Evelien x, 42, 92, 112, 131 Kenesei, István 76, 91, 369, 440 Kern, Barbara 148–9 Kölver, Ulrike 269 Koptjevskaja-Tamm, Maria 360–1 Kornﬁlt, Jaklin 61–2, 94, 102, 185, 189, 229, 336, 357–60, 403 Koul, Omkar N. 79, 292, 308 Kouwenberg, Silvia 386 Kracht, Marcus 248–9, 252–3 Kratochvil, Paul 425 Krejnoviˇc, E. A. 410 Kristoﬀersen, Lars 414 Kroon, Caroline 4, 50, 52, 60 Kumari, T. C. 90 LaPolla, Randy 29–30, 299–300, 325, 330, 425 Larrimore, Bonnie 240 Lee, Chungmin 99, 438 Lee, Sun-Hee 315 Lefebvre, Claire 120 Legate, Julie Anne 298 Levelt, Willem J. M. 2, 6–7, 24 Levinson, Stephen C. 7, 84, 128 Lewis, G. L. 62, 71, 177, 212, 213, 243, 287, 402 Li, Charles N. 67, 72, 106, 184, 243, 314 Lier, Eva van 32, 139, 218, 396 Limburg, Machiel 85, 118 Lucy, John A. 5, 137, 276 Lycan, William G. 128 Lyons, John 131, 142, 174, 236, 259, 270 MacDonald, Lorna 67, 71, 157, 176, 308 Mackenzie, J. Lachlan x, xi, 3, 15, 24, 92, 107, 132, 133, 135, 203, 206, 228, 248, 256, 259, 263, 295, 311, 340, 360, 402, 447 Maddieson, Ian 450, 453 Mahootian, Shahrzad 93–4, 307 Malchukov, Andrej 360 Martínez-Caro, Elena 24, 311 Maslova, Elena 132 Matsumoto, Yo 264 Matthews, George Hubert 153, 344, 382 Matthiessen, Christian M. I. M. 29–30 Mattissen, Johanna 405–6, 408–11, 415 McLendon, Sally 156 Meyer, Roland 314 Mili´cevi´c, Jasmina 390

Miller, Amy 62, 72 Miller, Jim 38 Miller, Marion 72 Miller, Philip H. 332 Milner, G. B. 244, 301 Mithun-Williams, Marianne 115 Mleinek, Ina 314 Montreuil, Jean-Pierre 452 Mortensen, David 425 Mosel, Ulrike 107, 136, 297, 393 Moutaouakil, Ahmed 40, 66, 80 Munro, Pamela 198, 329 Nagano-Madsen, Yasuko 435 Nagaya, Naonori 315, 344 Nater, Hank F. 450 Nedergaard Thomsen, Ole 322 Nedjalkov, Igor 83, 90, 229, 366 Nespor, Marina 421–3, 428, 431, 446–7 Newmeyer, Frederick J. 61 Nichols, Johanna 305–7, 373–4 Noonan, Michael 385–6 Nuyts, Jan 7 Olbertz, Hella 132, 176 Olpp, J. 365 Olson, Michael L. 169, 308 Osada, Toshiki 296, 400 Otaina, G. A. 408–9 Otanes, Fe T. 183 Otsuka, Yuko 423 Palmer, Frank R. 155 Pandharipande, Rajeshwari V. 74, 79–80 Pantcheva, Marina 252 Parks, Douglas R. 154–5 Payne, Doris L. 21 Pederson, Eric 7 Peperkamp, Sharon 443 Pérez Quintero, María Jesús 35 Pinkster, Harm 82 Polanyi, Livia 52 Pultr, Alois 99 Pym, Noreen 240 Ramchand, Gillian 204 Ramirez, Henri 72 Rau, D. Victoria 272 Redeker, Gisela 51 Reesink, Ger P. 57 Reh, Mechthild 413 Reichenbach, Hans 257 Renck, Gunther L. 183

name index

495

Rennison, John R. 90, 374 Rialland, Annie 427 Rijkhoﬀ, Jan N. M. x, 14, 30, 31, 108, 137, 233–6, 242–5, 269, 297, 380, 394 Risselada, Rodie 24, 331 Robert, Stéphane 427 Roberts, John R. 165, 180, 367 Romero-Figeroa, Andrés 225 Rust, F. 365

ˇ M. 405 Taksami, C. Talmy, Leonard 264 Thompson, Sandra A. 67, 72, 106, 134, 184, 243, 314, 361 Thompson, Susan 430–1 Torner, Sergi 266 Torrence, William Harold 314, 422 Trask, R. L. 381, 387 Turk, Alice E. 427

Sadock, Jerrold M. 31, 70, 149, 413 Sag, Ivan A. 332 Saltarelli, Mario 132 Sasse, Hans-Jürgen 89 Saul, Janice E. 234 Saunders, Barbara A. C. 33 Savel’eva, V. N. 405–6 Scha, Remko 52 Schaaik, Gerjan van 176, 191, 216, 301, 303 Schachter, Paul 183 Schaub, Willi 78, 90, 374–5 Schiering, René 422, 428, 443, 446 Schütz, Albert J. 80, 249 Schütze, Carson T. 390 Schulze-Berndt, Eva 208–9 Searle, John 87 Seki, Lucy 72, 203 Shattuck-Hufnagel, Stefanie 427 Shibatani, Masayoshi 415 Siewierska, Anna 2, 37, 89, 97, 316, 350 Sinclair, John M. 4 Skorik, Pjotr J. 411, 415 Slobin, Dan I. 7–8 Smeets, Ineke 153, 175, 212 Smit, Niels 88, 89, 92, 115, 139, 299, 302 Son, Min-Jeong 327 Spencer, Andrew 415 Spruit, Arie 138, 168, 206 Staden, Miriam van x, 3, 42, 101, 139, 158, 178–9, 333 Stanchev, Svilen B. 97–8 Stassen, Leon 356 Steedman, Mark J. 211 Storto, Gianluca 395 Stroomer, Harry 234 Sulkala, Helena 90, 95, 164, 425–6 Suttles, Wayne 154 Sweetser, Eve E. 275

Urbina, Jon Ortiz de 326 Uyechi, Linda Ann N. 8 Vago, Robert M. 369 van der Auwera, Johan 241, 308, 317 Van Valin Jr, Robert D. 29–31, 41, 195, 212, 232, 299–300, 325, 330, 383 Velde, Freek van de 111 Venditti, Jennifer J. 430 Vester, Elseline 57 Vet, Co 146, 181 Vigário, Marina 445 Vismans, Roel 83 Voegelin, Charles L. 172 Vogel, Irene 421–3, 428, 431, 444, 446–7 Voorhoeve, C. L. 388 Voort, Hein van der 75, 86 Vossen, Piek 236 Vries, Lourens de 90, 96 Vries, Mark de 271 Wackernagel, Jakob 340 Wali, Kashi 79, 292, 308 Wanders, Gerry xi, xii, 42, 158 Watanabe, Honoré 104, 155–6 Watters, David E. 97–8, 105, 123, 326 Watters, John R. 91 Weinert, Regina 38 Whorf, Benjamin Lee 249 Wiese, Heike 271 Willett, Thomas 155 Wolvengrey, Arok 321–3 Yule, George 430, 439 Zwicky, Arnold M. 70, 149

Subject Index Bold type indicates the page where a technical term is explained most extensively if this is diﬀerent from its ﬁrst occurrence. Absent head see Head, Absent Absentive 172–3 Absolutive-ergative see Ergative-absolutive Accessibility hierarchy 330 Accusative-nominative see Nominative-accusative Active see Voice Actor 195–204, 207, 318, 319–21, 369–70, 408–9 Admonitive 72 Addressee see Speech Act Participant Adjective 224–5, 230–2 Auxiliary 403 Evaluative 389 Interpersonal 121, 382 Objective 389 Relational 187, 222–4 Adjective Phrase 376, 379–80 Adposition 223, 251–2, 259–60, 383 Adposition Phrase 376, 378, 384, 387 Adverb 224–5 Attitudinal 103, 315 Degree 221, 230, 267, 270 Directional 232 Illocutionary 81–2 Location 248–50 Manner 221, 230 Modal 142–3, 144–5, 151–3 Reportative 103 Temporal 161, 316 Adverb Phrase 376 Adverbial Clause 226 Aﬀective content 8, 111, 237 Aﬃx 286, 404 Agreement 216, 231, 234 Clause Layer 350–2, 367–8 Phrase Layer 394–6 Word Layer 414 Agglutinating 301, 303–4, 405–6, 444 Aktionsart 211 Alignment Clause Layer 316–32, 335, 361 Phrase Layer 383–7 Word Layer 406–9

Ambiguity 82, 423 Ambisyllabicity 450–1 Anaphora 4, 10–11, 14, 116–17, 120, 166–7, 230, 237–8, 249, 265, 269, 272, 369 Animacy 184, 317, 321–4, 335, 407 Answer 80–1; see also Yes and no Anti-passivization 326, 331 Applicative 327, 331 Apposition 115, 350 Approximation 111, 112 Argument 14, 181–207, 357, 383–7, 396–9 Articulation 8, 14, 421 Ascriptive Subact 15, 88, 108, 108–13, 218–30, 377 Frame 113 Function 89–99 Head 110–11 Modiﬁer 111 Operator 112–13 Aside 58 Aspect Nominal 233–5 Verbal 210–11 Associative 243 Attitude, subjective see Subjective attitude Attributive form 242–3, 397 Autolexical Syntax 31 Auxiliary 346, 390, 392, 401 Backchannel 50–1 Background 89 Basic Linguistic Theory 36 Beneﬁciary 197, 208 Boundary tone 430–1 Case marking 80, 90, 96, 97, 198, 202, 248, 252–3, 353 Cataphora see Anaphora Categorical statement 89, 101 Causative 189 Cause 171, 203–4 Centre Position 311–12 Centripetal ordering 314, 343–4 Circumﬁx 404

subject index Circumstance 264 Classiﬁer 137, 269 Classiﬁcation construction 168, 191–3, 204 Clause 16, 292, 293–4, 309–75, 415–16; see also Agreement, Alignment, Constituent order, Coreference, Dummy, Subordination, Template Clefting 99, 106, 133 Clitic 319–21, 332, 340–1, 354, 381, 390, 446–7 Clitic Group 446–7 Coercion 16, 217–18, 229, 403–4, 413 Collective 136, 234 Colour terms 33 Comitative 208 Comment 92–6, 300–1, 442–3 Commissive 72 Communicated Content 15, 87–107, 144–5 Complement 363–6 Frame 88, 100–2, 106–7 Head 88–102 Modiﬁer 102–4 Operator 104–6 Complementation 142–3, 144, 162, 276–7, 353–75 Complexity 331–2, 346, 357, 397–8 Component 6–12 Conceptual 7–8, 12, 38, 47 Contextual 9–12, 14, 92, 94, 331, 371 Grammatical passim Output 8–9 Compound 445–6 Endocentric 216 Exocentric 216 Synthetic 217–18 Conceptual Component see Component, Conceptual Concession 54–5, 59–60, 82 Condition 56–7, 154, 275, 354 Conﬁgurational Head see Head, Conﬁgurational Conﬁgurational Property 15, 139, 168–70, 181–215, 222 Complement 363–4 Frame 214–15 Function 170 Head 181–207 Modiﬁer 208–10 Operator 210–14 Conﬁgurationality 297–9 Conjunction 223, 353–4, 367, 397

497

Constituent order Clause Layer 222, 290, 311–16, 333–47 Phrase Layer 242, 377–83, 387–91 Word Layer 405–6, 409–12 Contextual Component see Component, Contextual Contingent Property, see Property, Contingent Contrast 59–60, 96–100, 109–10, 338, 340, 388, 427 Controlled State-of-Aﬀairs see State-of-Aﬀairs, Controlled Converb 62, 356 Coordination 309 Copula 167–8, 295, 391–2, 398, 402–3 Copying see Agreement Coreference 358, 372–5 Corpus-based research 35 Correction 56–7, 93, 433 Correlative 293, 308 Cosubordination 309 Count 236, 268 Cross-reference 17, 335, 350, 360, 410–11, 412 Darstellung see Level, Representational Dative shift 327, 331 Dative subject 198–9 Declarative 71, 73–5 Deﬁniteness 80, 423; see also Identiﬁability Degemination 451 Degree 221, 230, 267 Deixis 119 Demonstrative 245–6, 256, 262, 267, 274 Deontic modality see Modality, Deontic Dependence 53–8, 139, 308 Dependent-marking 305–8 Depth-ﬁrst principle 23–5 Deranking 356, 366 Derivation Lexical 229–30, 444–5 Syntactic 295–6, 360–1, 403–4, 413 Diachrony 35, 78 Diminutive 247 Direct-inverse see Alignment, Clause Layer Direction 232, 235 Directive-indirective see Alignment, Clause Layer and Alignment, Word Layer Discontinuity 285 Discourse Act 4, 15, 31, 37, 60–8, 93, 431, 432 Communicative 63–4, 69 Complement 363–5 Contentive 64 Expressive 63, 69, 76–7, 78, 422

498

subject index

Frame 68 Function 53–8 Head 63–4 Interactive 63–4, 77–81 Modiﬁer 64–5 Operator 65–8 Subsidiary 53–8, 66, 95 Vocative 78–81 Discourse grammar 3–4 Dishortative 72 Domain integrity 285–6 Dummy Clause Layer 183–4, 325, 337, 347–50 Phrase Layer 167, 391–4 Word Layer 412–13 Dummy lexeme 110, 115 Duration 210, 214 Dynamic State-of-Aﬀairs see State-of-Aﬀairs, Dynamic Emphasis 64–5, 66–8, 73, 83–4, 102–3, 106, 111, 112–13, 123–4, 316, 426, 441–2 Empty Head see Head, Empty Encoding 2, 6, 12–13, 20–2, 23–5, 39–41, 282, 421 Endocentric compound see Compound, Endocentric Episode 15, 52, 133, 142, 150–1, 157–66, 222, 374 Complement 363–4 Frame 165–6 Function 151 Head 160–2 Marker 159–60 Modiﬁer 162–3 Operator 163–5 Epistemic modality see Modality, Epistemic Equative construction 191–4 Equiordination 308–9 Equipollence 14, 53 Ergative-absolutive see Alignment, Clause Layer and Alignment, Word Layer Event location see Localization, State-of-Aﬀairs Event perception see Evidentiality Event quantiﬁcation see Quantiﬁcation, State-of-Aﬀairs Evidentiality 151–6, 176–8 Exactness 112 Exclamatory see Emphasis Existential construction 183–4, 194, 206, 295, 347

Exocentric compound see Compound, Exocentric Experiencer 201–2 Expletive see Dummy Expressive see Discourse Act, Expressive Extra-clausality 309 Extrametricality 442 Factuality 144 Facultative modality see Modality, Facultative Filter 40–1 Final Position 102, 311–12, 331 Flexible Lexeme see Lexeme, Flexible Focus 28, 89–92, 286, 348, 368–9, 406, 427 Contrastive 96–7, 99 Multiple 89 Narrow 98 Predicate 347–8 Focus construction 90–1, 179, 263 Focus marker 90 Focus-oriented language 101–2, 333–4 Focus position 91 Foot 452–3 Form-oriented function-to-form approach 39 Formulation 2, 6, 12, 19–20, 23–5, 39–40 Formalism 26–31, 40, 298 Frame 19; see also Layer, Interpersonal and Layer, Representational Frequency 171 Function 14, 49, 139, 401–2; see also Layer, Interpersonal and Layer, Representational Pragmatic see Pragmatic Function Rhetorical see Rhetorical Function Semantic see Semantic Function Syntactic see Syntactic Function Functional explanation 37 Functional Grammar x–xi, 30, 38 Functional stability 286–7 Functionalism 2, 13, 26–31, 38–41 Fusional 301, 304, 406 Gapping 109, 445 Gender 395; see also Sex reference Gradience 9 Grading 235 Genericity 113, 156 Grammatical Component passim Grammatical Word 401

subject index Habitual 180 Head 14, 48, 139, 218–28; see also Layer, Interpersonal and Layer, Representational Absent 143 Conﬁgurational 143 Empty 143 Lexical 143 Head-marking 305–8, 335 Hesitation 430 Hierarchical alignment see Alignment, Clause layer Hierarchical ordering 310–11, 341–4, 377–83, 405–6 Hierarchical structure see Layer Holophrase 3–4, 62, 73–4 Honoriﬁcity 10, 79, 86 Hortative 72, 73, 86 Iconicity 283–5, 290 Ideation see Level, Representational Identiﬁability 36, 94, 114, 122, 317, 423 Identiﬁcation construction 193–4, 205–6, 263 Idiom 400 Ignorative 123, 135, 249–50, 258, 265, 269, 273, 435 Illocution 15, 24, 47–8, 58, 63–4, 68–84, 105 Abstract 64, 70–6 Frame 84 Head 69–81 Modiﬁer 81–2 Operator 83 Illocutionary adverb see Adverb, Illocutionary Imperative 71, 73, 74, 437 Imperfective aspect see Aspect, Perfective-imperfective Implicational hierarchy see Typological hierarchy Imprecative 71, 73 Incorporation 17, 114–15, 405–16 Indeﬁniteness see Identiﬁability Indicative 7 Individual 131–2, 236–47 Frame 247 Head 237–41 Modiﬁer 241–5 Operator 245–7 Quantiﬁcation see Quantiﬁcation, Individual Inference 154–5 Inﬁx 286, 404

499

Inﬁnitive 356 Information structure 88–102, 299–300, 422, 437–41 Initial Position 92–3, 98, 102, 311–12 Initiation 50 Instrument 208, 319, 263–4 Interactive see Discourse Act, Interactive Interjection 76–81 Interpellative 79 Interpersonal Level see Level, Interpersonal Interrogative 34, 62, 71, 73–5, 122–3, 147, 314, 426 Interrogative pronoun 135, 427; see also Ignorative Intonation see Prosody Intonational Phrase 18, 62, 432–6 Irony 65–6, 315, 441 Isolating 297, 301–3 Iterative 180 Kinship verb 240–1 Language acquisition 35 Language attrition 35 Layer 14–18, 298 Interpersonal 48–9, 124–7; see also Ascriptive Subact, Communicated Content, Discourse Act, Illocution, Move, Referential subact, Speech Act Participant Morphosyntactic 291–301, 416–20; see also Aﬃx, Clause, Linguistic Expression, Phrase, Stem, Word Phonological 427–9, 455–62; see also Foot, Intonational Phrase, Phonological Phrase, Phonological Word, Syllable, Utterance Representational 138–43, 277–81; see also Conﬁgurational Property, Episode, Individual, Lexical Property, Location, Manner, Propositional Content, Quantity, Reason, State-of-Aﬀairs, Time Lenition 424 Level 4–6, 12, 30, 375 Interpersonal 4–6, 12, 15, 19–20, 23, 46–127 Morphosyntactic 4–6, 12, 16–17, 20–1, 23, 282–420 Phonological 4–6, 13, 17–18, 21–3, 421–62 Representational 4–6, 15–16, 19–20, 23, 128–281

500

subject index

Lexeme 19, 217–30, 400 Flexible 225–30, 400–1 Rigid 225–30 Lexical Head see Head, Lexical Lexical Property 15, 215–36 Frame 236 Head 215–30 Modiﬁer 230–3 Operator 233–6 Lexicon see Primitive Linguistic Expression 16, 38, 292–3, 308–9 Listing 309 Localist hypothesis 259 Localization Individual 242–3, 245–6 Location 256 Manner 267–8 State-of-Aﬀairs 171, 172–3, 180 Time 262; see also Temporal localization Location 132, 135, 184–5, 248–57 Frame 257 Head 249–54 Modiﬁer 254–6 Operator 256 Locative 196–207, 257, 318, 369–70, 408–9 Logophoricity 10–11, 120, 374–5 Manner 134–5, 171, 208–9, 230, 263–8 Frame 268 Head 265–6 Modiﬁer 267 Operator 267–8 Mass 136–7 Maximal depth principle 25 Means 170, 263–4 Medial Position 311–12 Medial verbs 157–8 Message mode see Communicated Content, Frame Metalinguistic expressions 5, 11, 275–7, 362–7 Mirative 72, 73–4 Mitigation 7, 67–8, 83–4 Modality 151–6, 171–6, 212–14 Deontic 176, 213 Epistemic 153–4, 171, 174–5 Evidential see Evidentiality Facultative 176, 212–13 Volitive 176, 213 Modelling 37–42 Modiﬁer 14, 48, 139, 218–28, 384–7, 396–9; see also Layer, Interpersonal and Layer, Representational

Momentaneous state-of-Aﬀairs see State-of-Aﬀairs, Momentaneous Morpheme 17, 20, 292, 400, 404–5, 422; see also Aﬃx, Root, Stem Morpheme order 32, 287 Morphological type 301–5; see also Agglutinating, Fusional, Isolating, Polysynthetic Morphosyntactic Level see Level, Morphosyntactic Morphology see Level, Morphosyntactic Motivation 53–4 Move 4, 15, 50, 374, 431 Complement 363–4 Frame 60 Head 52–8 Modiﬁer 58–9 Operator 59–60 Multiple questions 89–90 Multiple topics see Topics, Multiple Narrative constructions 10–11, 61–2, 158 Nasality hierarchy 32 Negation see Polarity Negative harmony 351 Neutralization 316, 324–8 Nominal aspect see Aspect, Nominal Nominalization 131–3, 168, 266, 356–61 Nominative-accusative see Alignment, Clause layer and Alignment, Word layer Non-hierarchical ordering 310–11, 311–16, 341–4, 377–83, 405–6 Non-verbal predication 16, 33–4, 129, 184–5, 190–4, 204–7, 220, 231, 391–2, 402–3 Noun 224–5 Location 250 Predicative 192 Relational 187, 203, 223, 239–40, 251–3, 261–2, 266, 270, 273, 306–7, 383–7 Noun class 395–6 Noun Phrase 376, 378–82 Noun Phrase marker 108, 394 Noun Root 404 Noun Stem 404 Nucleus 139, 194–5 Number see Quantiﬁcation, Individual Number discord 233–4 Numeral 244–5, 269 Predicative 244, 246

subject index Object see Syntactic Function Operations 12; see also Articulation, Encoding, Formulation Operator 14, 20, 49, 139, 401–2, 422, 435; see also Layer Operator agreement 350–2, 367 Optative 71, 73 Optimality Theory 36 Orientation 55, 93, 95 Output Component see Component, Output Overlap 96 Paragraph 51 Parataxis 352 Paratone 51, 430–1 Participant see Speech Act Participant Participial Clause 243, 387–8, 397–8 Parts of speech 217–30 Passive see Voice Passivization 325, 331, 361 Pause 430, 432 Pause marker 95 Perception verb 177 Perfective aspect see Aspect, Perfective-imperfective Performative expression 64, 69–70, 128–9 Permanent Property see Property, Permanent Person 85–6, 321–3 Phoneme 449–55 Phonological Level see Level, Phonological Phonological Phrase 18, 436–43 Phonological Word 18, 277, 443–9 Phonology see Level, Phonological Phrase 17, 292, 296, 376–99, 411–12, 415; see also Agreement, Alignment, Constituent order, Dummy, Subordination, Template Pitch movement 434–7 Place name 249 Placeholder 289–91, 292, 303, 304, 305, 351, 448–9 Polarity 178–9, 235–6; see also Yes and no Polysynthetic 301, 304–5, 435, 444 Pop marker 52 Portmanteau 177, 180, 406 Position 311–12; see also Template Possession Agreement 394 Alienable 243, 384–7 Inalienable 243; see also Noun, Relational

501

Postclausal Position 56, 312 Pragmatic articulation see Communicated content, Frame Pragmatic Function 89–99, 368 Pragmatics see Level, Interpersonal Preclausal Position 56, 312 Predicate-ﬁnal order 336, 344–5 Predicate-initial order 336, 344–5 Predicate marker 107–8 Predicate-medial order 336, 344–5 Predication Frame see Conﬁgurational Property Preﬁx 404 Presentative construction 34, 99–100, 101 Presupposedness 87–8 Preverbal Position 102 Primative-secundative see Alignment, Clause layer and Alignment, Word layer Primitive 12, 19–23, 229–30 Proform 401 Progressive aspect see Aspect, Progressive Prohibitive 71 Pronoun 118–21, 166–7, 401, 402 Proper name 117–21, 237, 249, 422 Property 15, 131 Conﬁgurational see Conﬁgurational property Contingent 137, 389 Lexical see Lexical property Permanent 137, 389 Propositional attitude 144, 147, 149–50, 151–6, 274 Propositional Content 15, 131, 142, 144–57, 222 Complement 363–5 Frame 156–7 Head 145–51 Modiﬁer 151–3 Operator 153–6 Prosodic Hierarchy 421–2 Prosodic Phonology 423, 427–9 Prosodic Template 422 Prosody 421–62 Prospective aspect see Aspect, Prospective Purpose 171 Push marker 52 Qualitative valency see Valency, Qualitative Quantiﬁcation Conﬁgurational Property 214 Individual 85–6, 244, 246–7 Location 256

502

subject index

Quantity 270, 271 State-of-Aﬀairs 171, 179–80 Time 262 Quantitative valency see Valency, Quantitative Quantity 135, 268–72 Frame 272 Head 269–71 Modiﬁer 271 Operator 271 Quantity, Phonological 425–6 Question see Interrogative Quotation 103–5, 365 Raising 368–72, 398–9 Reaction 50 Reason 134–5, 272–5 Frame 274–5 Head 272–4 Modiﬁer 274 Operator 274 Recipient 197, 319–21, 336 Recursion 140–1, 150, 189, 231, 294, 361, 421, 443 Reference 202–203, 239, 398 Reference modiﬁcation 230–2, 254–5 Referential Subact 15, 88, 107–8, 114, 218–30, 377 Frame 125 Function 89–99 Head 115–21 Modiﬁer 121 Operator 122–4 Reﬂexive language see Metalinguistic expressions Reﬂexives 10, 61, 372–4 Relational adjective see Adjective, Relational Relational noun see Noun, Relational Relative Clause 226, 284–5 Headless 240–241, 254, 260, 266, 271, 273 Internally-headed 57, 240–1 Non-restrictive 49, 57–8, 237–8 Restrictive 243–4, 261–2, 273, 387–8, 396–7 Relative temporal localization see Temporal localization, Relative Relative tense see Tense, Relative Relayed speech, see Reportative Remoteness 165 Reportative 90, 103–6, 111, 152–3, 155–6, 275–7, 378

Representational Level see Level, Representational Resultative aspect see Aspect, Resultative Resumption 93, 95–6 Rhetorical Function 53–8, 314–15 Rigid Lexeme see Lexeme, Rigid Role and Reference Grammar 29–31 Root 404, 414 Salutation 81 Second Position 312, 337–40, 340–1 Secondary predication 209 Seinsart 233–5, 236–7 Semantic Category 130–43, 182–207; see also Layer, Representational Semantic Function 182, 194–207, 306; see also Actor, Beneﬁciary, Comitative, Instrument, Locative, Recipient, Reference, Undergoer Semantics see Level, Representational Sequence of tenses 367–8 Serial verb construction 169–70, 184, 217 Set 136, 233–4 Setting 94 Sex reference 10, 77, 86–7 Sign language 8 Singulative 234 Sort 234–5 Speaker see Speech Act Participant Speciﬁcity 122, 317, 323–4, 423 Speech Act Participant 14, 15, 77, 84–7 Frame 87 Function 84 Head 84–5 Modiﬁer 85 Operator 86–7 State-of-Aﬀairs 15, 131, 139, 157, 166–81, 222 Complement 363–4 Controlled 196, 198, 370 Dynamic 137–8, 196–7, 211 Frame 180–1 Function 162 Head 166–70 Modiﬁer 171–2 Momentaneous 211 Operator 172–80 Stative 137–8, 196, 211 Stative State-of-Aﬀairs see State-of-Aﬀairs, Stative Stem 404 Stress 424–5, 436, 451–2, 452–3

subject index Structural-functional model of grammar 29 Subact 88, 107–8, 436; see also Ascriptive Subact, Referential Subact Subject see Syntactic Function Subjective attitude 103, 121 Subjunctive 7 Subordination Clause layer 331–2, 352–72 Phrase layer 331–2, 396–9 Word layer 414–16 Subsidiary Discourse Act see Discourse Act, Subsidiary Suﬃx 404 Summary 59–60 Suppletion 448, 454–5 Supplicative 72 Switch reference 330 Syllable 450–5 Syllable-based language 429 Syntactic Function 35, 208, 310, 316–17, 324–31, 338–40, 371–2, 374, 398–9, 407–8 Syntax see Level, Morphosyntactic Synthetic compound see Compound, Synthetic Systemic-Functional Grammar 29–30 Tail-head linkage 3, 158–9 Template 20–1, 293–4 Clause layer 341–7 Phrase layer 389–91 Word layer 411–12 Temporal concord 170 Temporal localization Absolute 162–3, 171, 257 Relative 163, 166, 171, 257 Tense Absolute 150, 163–5, 173 Relative 161, 163, 173–4, 210 Thetic statement 89, 101 Thinking for speaking 7 Time 132, 135, 257–62 Frame 262 Head 258–60 Modiﬁer 260–2 Operator 262

Tone 425, 434, 453–4 Top-down organization 1–3, 37, 310 Topic 57, 92–6, 299–300, 317, 322–3, 348, 369 Contrastive 96–7, 99 Focal 99 Multiple 94 New 99 Topic-oriented language 94–5, 101, 333 Transformation 40–1 Transparency 301–5 Turn 50–1 Typology 27, 31–7, 42 Typological hierarchy 32–7, 75–6, 227, 330 Unaccusative 198 Undergoer 195–207, 318, 319–21, 336, 369–70, 408–9 Unergative 197–8 Utterance 17, 430–1 Valency Qualitative 184–207 Quantitative 182–4 Variable 14, 48, 139 Verb 224–5 Verb Phrase 290, 299–301, 376, 382–3 Verb Root 404 Verb Stem 404 Vocative see Discourse Act, Vocative Voice 199–200, 317–19, 325–6 Volitive modality see Modality, Volitive Weather expression 182–3, 186, 325 Word 17, 218, 277, 292, 296, 400–16, 443–4; see also Agreement, Alignment, Constituent Order, Dummy, Subordination, Template Word-based language 429 Yes and no 146–50, 153 Actional 148–50 Propositional 148–50 Zero Phrase 359

503