Future NATO Security: Addressing the Challenges of Evolving Security and Information Sharing Systems and Architectures (NATO Science Series: Science & Technology Policy)

FUTURE NATO SECURITY

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Series V: Science and Technology Policy - Vol. 40

ISSN 1387-6708

Future NATO Security Addressing the Challenges of Evolving Security and Information Sharing Systems and Architectures

Edited by Martin Edmonds Centre for Defence and International Security Studies, Lancaster University, UK

and

Oldrich Cerny Institute for Security Studies, Prague, Czech Republic

IOS Press

Ohmsha

Amsterdam • Berlin • Oxford • Tokyo • Washington, DC Published in cooperation with NATO Scientific Affairs Division

Proceedings of the NATO Advanced Research Workshop on Future NATO Security 8-10 March 2003 Prague, Czech Republic

© 2004, IOS Press All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without prior written permission from the publisher. ISBN 1 58603 392 1 (IOS Press) ISBN 4 274 90630 2 C3040 (Ohmsha) Library of Congress Control Number: 2003113474

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Preface and Acknowledgements The workshop was the result of a meeting in July 2002, between the NOS, International Staff members, and outside specialists, on the role of NATO, in addressing emerging transnational terrorist threats, following the New York Twin Towers and Pentagon attacks on September 11,2001. Olda Cerny and Martin Edmonds soon joined as Co-Directors. Bruce Jones developed the proposal and produced a comprehensive subject and speaker programme. Over one hundred suitable participants were identified and contacted, of whom some forty took part, providing a wide spectrum of senior operational contributions from, amongst others, the FBI, Europol, and the London Metropolitan Police, up to multilateral ambassadorial level. Vilemov Castle could not have provided a more conducive venue for discussion, nor could its Director Vladimira Rubinsteinova and her staff have been more helpful. All the participants, whether housed within the castle grounds or the nearby village, were most complimentary about the level of comfort and standard of catering. The workshop structure was set out to NATO in the proposal. Day one was open to all participants, whereas day two was restricted to participants from NATO member states only. The programme was sequential with participants invited to address each session with a sub-topic selected from a list of relevant themes. Each contributor made a short intervention and this was followed by open discussion. The proceedings and discussions were professionally recorded on audio tape, as well as noted in writing by three rapporteurs. The speakers also provided a hard copy of their presentations or copies of their slides from overhead Power Point presentations. NATO has years of intellectual and practical international security investment and is committed to addressing the new threats, including that of transnational terrorism, under the 1999 New Strategic Concept. Through the legacy of Cold War functions and responses, however, some mechanisms can be inhibited and lack the necessary innovation to operate as effectively as they should, especially in pressing current circumstances. In particular the lack of working experience between military forces and domestic policing when addressing transnational terrorist and other threats to today's society became evident and demanded a fresh approach and novel, innovative ideas within NATO circles to compensate. It was recommended unanimously under the NATO Prague Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism, sections 16.1.2, 16.1.4 and 16.2.1 that: 1. The 'Vilemov Group' should reconvene again in 2003 with an agenda of further deliverables and objectives. 2. A NATO Core Advisory Group on NATO Future Security should convene in Brussels later in the year. It should provide a scientific method for the development of new concepts, focusing on processes for NATO to better achieve convergence between security means and ends. Making use possibly of the Long-Term Scientific Study (LTSS) format, it should address security-related issues such as redefining terminology, surveys, audit and identification of NATO centres, resources, assets and agencies, and external groups, including NGOs. To help ensure that the Vilemov process of exchange and dialogue continues, it was agreed that e-mail bulletins and updates amongst the participants should be continued more regularly and formally. It is urged strongly through the Scientific Affairs Division that the Secretary General's Office be asked to endorse and agree the implementation of the

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recommendations, and enable the process started at Vilemov, to continue its momentum and move forward the key issue of NATO Future Security. No Advanced Research Workshop involving participants from over fifteen different countries could ever succeed without the dedication and effort of a number of people. For the preparation of the Workshop and for inviting a very select number of experts in the field, the Organiser and Co-Directors are indebted to Chris Donnelly and a number of his interns, but especially Michael Simm and Barry Adams. For ensuring all the necessary logistics for the Workshop were in place at Vilemov Castle, and for making sure that the participants were well looked after, a deep debt of gratitude is owed to Vladimira Rubinsteinova, the Vilemov Castle Manager, her thoughtful and considerate staff, and the caterers. For helping in the preparation of the Workshop from both intellectual and procedural perspectives, and for their constant encouragement, the Directors owe especial thanks to Chris Donnelly and Fernando Carvalho Rodrigues, and their respective secretarial staff, Rosemary Cameron and Liz Cowan, before and during the Workshop, and subsequently. For their invaluable help in the preparation of this volume, the Editors wish to record their particular thanks to the three Rapporteurs at the Workshop, Jack Wishart, Pauline Elliott and Barry Adams for their accounts of the discussions, to Lesley Brier for her detailed transcription of the audio tapes, and to Corbin Miller and Pauline Elliott for their help with proofreading and copy-editing the final manuscript. Martin Edmonds and Olda Cerny

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Introduction For over forty years, NATO has been the corner-stone of European security, a regional defensive alliance that linked the forces of North America to those of Europe in the face of a military threat from the former Soviet Union and its Warsaw Treaty allies. The demise of the Warsaw Treaty, soon followed by the collapse of the Soviet Union radically altered the perception of the threat, though Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which stipulated that an attack on any one member would be treated as an attack on all, remained very much in force. It was the basis upon which forces assigned to NATO became engaged in operations in the Balkans. But the event that radically altered both the perception of threat and raised the issue of the security of NATO members was the Al Quaeda terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre in New York City and the Pentagon on the morning of 11 September 2001. Since then, the fight against transnational terrorism has become the first priority for the United States and its NATO allies, a strategic objective confirmed at the November 2002 Prague Summit. The fight against this threat will require a complex set of instruments, of which NATO's military structures and doctrines are only a part". Terrorism is not a new phenomenon; it has existed over time. What is different today is that the sources of terrorism are multifarious and supported materially and financially by mutually supportive transnational network of religious, political and ideological groups. Terrorists no longer focus on political targets as in the past, and see any thing or any body as fair game. For this reason, they are prepared to employ means and weapons, including weapons of mass destruction, indiscriminately against both public (state) property and figures and private, civilian assets. Targets are selected for their symbolic value, ease of attack, ('soft' targets), and for the potential to cause the maximum of destruction and disruption. Vulnerable, high value, civilian targets, such as information networks, energy sources, transportation systems, tourist attractions, retail stores etc. are a high priority. National terrorism was a matter for the domestic police and internal security agencies. Transnational terrorism presents governments with a very different security challenge, one that requires new collaborative structures, common doctrines, and information and intelligence sharing between states. Against a military threat, the NATO allies have proved themselves collectively to be well prepared; against an uncertain terrorist threat using a range of military and non-military means and directed against primarily civilian targets, the NATO allies have made relatively little progress, though it is recognised that it has the potential to make a significant contribution in the fight against terrorism. Current NATO structures require to be looked at and new ones introduced. This also involves the NATO partner states and those closer to the terrorist 'front line', the Mediterranean dialogue states, as well as equivalent agencies within the European Union. The creation of an Intelligence Steering Group at NATO Headquarters is a positive step forward in the counter-terrorist strategy. In particular military forces assigned to NATO have to find ways of collaborating with national domestic police and security forces as well as those of Europol and Interpol. These arrangements should include not merely sharing intelligence information, but especially gaining access to the latest computer hardware technologies and security-related software to keep costs down and reduce duplication and redundancy. The NATO members must find ways of being able to operate, and above all communicate, interoperably. Above all, any future structures and operational procedures within NATO must be done within a legal framework, particularly with regard to the deployment of armed forces in internal security operations.

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NATO has a long way to go when addressing these fundamental problems when addressing the threat of transnational terrorism. It is still at an early stage in the process of thinking through what needs to be done. The first step is to recognise and understand the nature of the threat and to balance that against the experience, capabilities and assets currently at the alliance's disposal. The contributions to this book and the discussion that they stimulated help set the parameters of the task. Above all, however, it offers not just sets of pertinent questions or possible solutions, but most importantly highlights the extent of the challenge facing NATO and the urgent need for innovative and constructive thinking. One agreed way forward would be to bring together the expert participants at the Vilemov Workshop to form a NATO Advisory Panel to meet on a regular basis to advise and inform NATO on ways of addressing and dealing with the modem terrorist threat.

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NATO Advanced Research Workshop on NATO Future Security Vilemov Castle, Czech Republic 8-10 March 2003

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS ADAMS, Barry BOIX ALONSO, Luisa BORKOVEC, Zdeneck BOWMAN, M.E. (Spike) CARVALHO RODRIGUES, Fernando CERNY, Olda CONESA, Pierre COSIDO GUTIERREZ, Ignacio DE ROBERTIS, AntonGiulio DENOFSKY, Barry DONNELLY, Chris EDMONDS, Martin ELLIOTT, Pauline ERAN, Oded FLURI, Phillip IONESCO, Paul JONES, Bruce KARMON, Ely KENDRY, Adrian LENOIR, John LINDE, Julius LINDLEY-FRENCH, Julian LOJDQUIST, Fredrik MORATO, Diana NAVARRETE PANIAGUA, Manuel PAWLOSKI, Richard PAYNE, Timothy W.C. PETROV, Valentyn PONCELET, Jean-Yves RICCI, Lavinia ROSNER, Kevin SCHWERZEL, Jeffrey SIMANCAS CARRION, Mariano SIMM, Michael STANKOVICIUS, Ignas STOIBER, Benedikt SWALLOW, Paul TRETERA, Eliska WISHART, Jack WITSCHEL, Georg

NATO Research Fellow, Brussels, Belgium NATO Research Fellow, Brussels, Belgium MOD, Czech Republic FBI, Washington DC, USA NATO Scientific Affairs, Brussels, Belgium Institute for Security Studies, Czech Republic French Ministry of Defense, Paris Guarda Civil, Madrid, Spain Bari University - Comitato Atlantico, Italy Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Ottawa, Canada NATO Special Adviser, Brussels, Belgium Director, CDISS Lancaster University, UK Executive Secretary, CDISS Lancaster University, UK Israeli Ambassador to the EU DCAF, Geneva Foreign Intelligence, Bucharest, Romania Director, Defence Consultancy, UK International Institute for Counter Terrorism, Tel Aviv, Israel NATO, Political Affairs, Senior Defence Economist, Brussels, Belgium US Attorney's Office Washington DC Constitution's Protection Bureau, Riga, Latvia Geneva Center for Security Policy, Geneva, Switzerland MOD Intelligence Co-ordination, Stockholm, Sweden NATO Research Fellow, Brussels, Belgium Guarda Civil, Counter-terrorism Unit, Madrid, Spain Space Imaging LLC, Regional Director Ankara, Turkey NATO SHAPE School Rome, Italy National Security and Defence Council, Kiev, Ukraine NATO Research Fellow, Brussels, Belgium NATO Research Fellow, Brussels, Belgium OECD, Paris NATO Research Fellow, Brussels, Belgium Europol, The Hague, Netherlands NATO Research Fellow, Brussels, Belgium Security Service, Vilnius, Lithuania NATO Research Fellow, Brussels, Belgium Metropolitan Police, New Scotland Yard, London, UK FBI Legate, US Embassy Prague Czech Republic. NAC Rapporteur, Edinburgh, Scotland MFA, Berlin, Germany

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Contents Preface and Acknowledgements Introduction List of Participants Session 1. The Step Change to Transnational, Strategic Terrorism Introduction Bruce Jones Discussion of Session 1 Session 2. The Context and Anatomy of the Threat September 11 2001 and its Aftermath: A European Perspective Georg Witschel Historical, Regional, Religious Causes and Origins of Terrorism Pierre Conesa Terrorism and its History of 'Strategic Provocation': A Challenge to the Democracies AntonGiulio De Robertis Discussion of Session 2 Session 3. The Components and Ingredients of the Threat Weaponry, Doctrine, and Operational Consequences Ely Karmon The Economic and Financial Dimensions of Transnational Terrorism Adrian Kendry Discussion of Session 3

v vii ix 1 3 7 13 17 20 29 32 39

Session 4. Primary and Consequential Targets - New Public Service Organization (PSO) Stakeholders Information Security Factors 47 Julius Linde Security Challenges for the 21st Century: Protecting Critical Energy System Infrastructure (CESI) 49 Kevin Rosner Discussion of Session 4 64 Session 5. The Role of Official Stakeholders The Role of Official Stakeholders Oded Eran Transnational Terrorism - Police, Interpol and Europol Paul Swallow The US Marshals' Posses: A Model for Countering Transnational Terrorism John Lenoir Counter-terrorism in the European Union: Legal and Operational Measures Manuel Navarrete Paniagua Discussion of Session 5

71 74 77 80 82

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Session 6. The Dynamics of Defence and Military Organizations The Dynamics of Defense and Military Organizations Fredrik Lojdquist Procedural Interoperability Paul lonescu Discussion of Session 6 Session 7. Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence The Case for NATO's Transformation to Meet the Terrorists' Threat Julian Lindley-French Escaping from the Limitations of the Legacy Responses Adrian Kendry Discussion of Session 7 Session 8. Creating Asymmetric Doctrine Internal Security and Terrorism Spike Bowman Creating Asymmetric Doctrine: The Role for Security Forces of a Military Nature Ignacio Cosido Asymmetric Doctrine Barry Denofsky Discussion of Session 8 Session 9. Operational Considerations Increasing Contribution to Security and Counter-terrorism Operations Zdenek Borkovec Discussion of Session 9

85 88 91 95 99 101

113 119 121 123

127 129

Session 10. Structures Discussion of Session 10

139

Author Index

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Future NA TO Security M. Edmonds and O. Cerny (Eds.) IOS Press, 2004

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SESSION 1

The Step Change to Transnational, Strategic Terrorism Introduction by Bruce Jones Gainsborough Court, Folkestone, CT20 2UB, UK

The first topic that we are considering is the nature and circumstances of the stepchange to trans-national strategic terrorism. This is the generic transition from tactical-bilateral to theatre-strategic-level terrorism, a threat without race, nationality, or homeland. When we talk of a strategic-level threat, this denotes the three or four-star command level, civil and military assets and budget resources required to counter the risk of terrorism. It also relates to the scale of catastrophic devastation and secondary consequences in the event of such an attack. Any terrorist strike on this scale, whether using chemical, biological or radiological agents, or the more subtle means of a cyber attack against our data-processing, communications or power distribution would certainly, in Europe, be transnational involving at least two nations and the resources of many others to contend with the resulting effects. The shape and scale of conflict and terrorism are changing, and so is the nature of our response. In the early part of the 20th century wars had evolved from national undertakings to those - in the phraseology of the time - of treaties and compacts. In World War II this was formalized further into international alliances, for instance Allied Powers, Europe, the direct successor to which NATO is and under whose umbrella we are assembled. Until now, we have focused on the ethos of regional collective security as the cornerstone of our defenses. Counter-terrorism, by contrast, is a war and conflict fought and won by intelligence and information with all its implications. The need now is to move forward in the next stage and engage in this struggle more actively and realistically through what we should term 'Collective Intelligence and Information' - an aim to which we have so far attached somewhat limited importance and urgency. Transnational terrorism is also termed the 'Asymmetric Threat'. It is a threat to which we have no ready remedies or solutions, despite the fact that numerous official and government organizations are searching for ' one-size-fits-air answers and 'silver bullets'. Our responses and counters to the 'asymmetric threat' have to deal with the actual world and the contingencies of here and now. We have to work within the constraints of the legalities of the regional and national conditions of each particular area of risk or conflict, whether these are recent war zones, emerging democracies or, indeed, our own homelands. No two nations, problems or provinces, however similar, are exactly the same, and each requires different and specialized solutions. Against a

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B. Jones /Introduction

particular potential threat or in one geographical area there may be the call on international expertise in financial, engineering, information technology, or linguistic and communications skills, as well as in standard military and security skills. In a single area, operatives may be mostly civilian; in another, exclusively military; and everything between the two. Sections and detachments might be, and are, composed at times of more senior officers, majors and colonels with a few junior personnel. Others are composed of middle ranks, captains and sergeants. In every circumstance, these are carried out with full involvement with the civil authorities, police and law enforcement officers and under the rule of law. In this way, our responses will in each case be different, dissimilar and uneven. Thus they are by definition - asymmetric and, from these, an associated truly asymmetric doctrine can be developed. I mentioned earlier that formalized alliances come to an end; I have also emphasized the need for the development of asymmetric approaches. In our operations, the key component that ensures the smooth running of international alliances and organizations is the discussion and negotiation that is carried out within and around them, not merely in Council meetings, but in overlapping, informal and dissimilar fora as well. The way that these function and work successfully should be an authoritative model for the way that we approach these issues and also an example of how this workshop and associated groups should proceed.

Future NATO Security M. Edmonds and O. Cerny (Eds.) IOS Press, 2004

Discussion of Session 1 Fernando Carvalho Rodrigues It is a good sign, and a sign of our times, that it is the NATO Science Programme hosting a gathering of people with your expertise, and to be first to do so. We hope in the Science Programme that this workshop will be the first of regular meetings that you may want to put forward as proposal to NATO. Also, it is part of the NATO Science Programme output to publish the proceedings of the workshops and to establish a network of experts around this important area. We are now starting to ask people, when they gather together on the different security issues and if they feel so disposed, to organise amongst themselves an advisory group on the topic of security. This advisory group would meet under the auspices of the Security Programme, and would issue recommendations in an agreed format to governments through the NATO structures. Why are we going this way? Because, when the Science Programme dealt only with the science of certainties and not, as it appears now, with the science of the plausible, we were content to produce from each workshop a book and create a network of experts. The philosophy was that the network would increase the cohesion and the socio-economic integration within the alliance and, now, with the new alliance partner countries. But in the present day, we no longer feel completely satisfied if we only get these two things, a book and a network. This is because we feel that in the uncharted territory of security, experts have to be heard at higher political level. So, if you feel it within yourselves and that from amongst you a limited number, say five or six, would be able to contribute to an advisory group in this area, then I would be extremely pleased. Again, if you make your point that you want to have this group to hold regular meetings, say once or twice every year, that also will be very welcome, Chris Donnelly When NATO produced its new strategic concept, it listed in some considerable detail, and with some considerable foresight, all the new security threats that faced the alliance and which we had to deal with in the immediate future. These included the issue of terrorism. Unfortunately, a week later, we went to war in Kosovo and the issue of terrorism became a secondary matter. The events of 11 September 2001 in the US brought it fully back into the focus. For me, this conference is important for two reasons: because we are now coming to address these new security threats, we need help to frame the right questions to ask. We need help to understand how these new security threats fit together; how to tackle the issue; how to deal with the issue of terrorism; and how to separate the various aspects of the problems and study them. We have very little experience in doing this and I, for one, will be very happy to come away from this conference with a list of questions, let alone a list of answers. The second reason that this workshop is important is that this is the first such occasion and we need these meetings to help us identify the direction NATO itself should take. NATO has to change; the super-tanker has to change its track. We need to understand what issues we should be addressing, what issues we should not, and what issues to leave to other agencies, institutions and national or international organisations. So, what you will be discussing over the next couple of days will have implications for every aspect of the alliance, including, even, things such as structuring military reform and so on.

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Discussion of Session I

Martin Edmonds I direct the Centre for Defence and International Security Studies at Lancaster University. The Centre has its own research agenda, but it is only fairly recently that we have turned out attention to the issue of new emerging threats. In fact, at the moment, we are involved with Loughborough University and George Mason University in Washington DC on a study of managing the uncertainty of emerging threats and the question of the methodology behind future equipment capability. I shall be quite honest and say that I am here to learn from this workshop. I look to get some guidance on the sorts of issues that we should be looking at in this parallel project. I would like to reiterate, however, what has already been said in terms of thanks to the NATO Scientific Affairs Division for supporting this initiative. I recognise, as Chris Donnelly has already pointed out, that it has a great potential and as Professor Fernando Carvalho Rodrigues has also mentioned, if we get it right now, there is the opportunity for further workshops in order to try to refine the sorts of questions and maybe some of the answers that we have to address in the new and uncertain world in which we live. I look forward to this workshop immensely even if I do so with some trepidation because ultimately the book, or the record, of our deliberations is likely to fall upon my shoulders. Spike Bowman I come to this forum from a slightly different perspective. I am a lawyer, not a practitioner. I am not an agent of the FBI, but a person who brings, or at least who tries to bring, the law to the crisis management issues that we face today. I would like to give a peculiarly American example of some of the problems that we face. My grandmother moved West in a covered wagon. She lived a very long time and before she died she saw a man walk on the moon. I was always amazed at the things that changed in her lifetime - the technology that developed and so forth - and, of course, things have changed a great deal more since she died. One of the things that I think is instructive, or has been to me, is that, while the technology has been changing and while our lives have been getting more comfortable - we have got televisions and telephones, and cell phones and all sorts of gadgets to play with - all of the technology that we became comfortable with has also represented another dimension of the threats that we have to face today. My primary work is concerned with terrorism, and there I see the technology that we all enjoy being employed against us. I think it is something that we all have to look at in a different way today. The things that we like about our lives, and what has made us comfortable, has also become a threat to us. The communications of terrorists are very easy, the Internet is anonymous, cell-phones and satellite phones are ubiquitous and, today, we have to leam how to cope with things that we never use to have to cope with. I look forward from hearing from all of you today, and to hear the types of things that you are working with. My work is crisis management and I have a hard time getting ahead of the game. For those of you who are here to try and look to the future and try to understand how we are going to deal with threats, I think you will be a great help to me. I look forward greatly to listening to you and, while I am here, if there is anything that I can answer for you on behalf of the FBI, I would be happy to do so. Paul Swallow I also approach this issue from a different perspective in that I am a practitioner. I

Discussion of Session I

work in Scotland Yard and I am responsible for examining the emerging threat as it affects the UK. I work in an intelligence branch of the police called the Special Branch and we do this work in conjunction with the Security Services. Hitherto, we have not had any military involvement or any interest from the armed forces, which is why, when I first met Chris Donnelly when he was explaining that NATO is charged is seeing what role it can contribute in this area, I was extremely interested. I am very honoured to be able to assist in any way I can.

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Future NATO Security M. Edmonds and O. Cerny (Eds.) IOS Press, 2004

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SESSION 2

The Context and Anatomy of the Threat September 11 2001 and its Aftermath: A European Perspective by

Georg Witschel Auswertiges Amt, Berlin, Germany

Terrorism did not begin on September 11, 2001. Europe and the United States, as well as other continents, have a long and sad history of terrorist attacks. The IRA in Northern Ireland, the ETA in Spain, the Brigate Rosse in Italy, the ' 17 November' in Greece and the Rote Armee-Fraktion in Germany are just a few examples of terrorism in Europe after 1950. Regarding the United States, we remember the terrible bombing in Oklahoma City in 1994 and, even if we limit our brief historical survey geographically to New York's Financial District, we find that not even the 1993 truck bombing of the World Trade Center was the first terrorist event there. As far back as September 16, 1920, unknown perpetrators exploded a horse cart filled with explosives in the South of Manhattan, killing 40 and wounding many more. Yet, we have to realize that 11 September 2001 has changed the world. Not that everything has changed. To the contrary, as UN Secretary General Kofi Anan has pointed out, all problems of the world existing on September 10, 2001 are still with us. But there is certainly a new quality of an old problem, which we have to face after that fatal date in September 2001. Terrorism has grown to an unprecedented size and quality. Or, in other words, 11 September (9/11) has become a symbol and a metaphor for the new threats looming on the horizon. Even without the use of weapons of mass destruction (and there is no doubt that Osama Bin Laden would have used such weapons if he had them) more than 3,000 people were killed in less than two hours, innocent people from more than 60 countries without distinction and without mercy. Since then, a number of smaller, but still very murderous attacks has been committed by al Qaeda, persons or groups related to, or supported by, al Qaeda or the so-called non-aligned Muhajeddin. They include the attack on a synagogue in Djerba/Tunisia, killing mainly German and French tourists, the attack on a French oil tanker off the Yemen shore, the bombing of a bus carrying French submarine-engineers in Karachi/Pakistan, the blowing up of a discotheque in Bali/Indonesia, the hostage-taking in a musical theatre in Moscow, and the double attack on Israeli tourists in a Mombasa hotel and on board an Arkia flight leaving Mombasa airport - the last using surface-to-air missiles and missing the airliner, with over 260 passengers on board, by only a few meters. Despite of some differences and variations with regard to the perpetrators, their motives, political aims and modus operandi, all of the aforementioned attacks have something in common. They are all acts of terrorism - premeditated, politically motivated violence - perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents. Beyond that, they share a number of commonalities and seem to indicate some trends that have to be analysed carefully in order

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G. Witschel / September 11 2001 and its Aftermath: A European Perspective

to find appropriate counter strategies. All of these common denominators are inter-related and most of them are of a rather recent nature involving: 1) the increasing dominance of religiously motivated terrorism; 2) the globalization of terrorism; 3) modern business-like leadership structures; 4) asymmetric warfare using the victim mostly as part of a communication strategy; and, 5) the inseparability of internal and external security. Recent developments in international terrorism There is an increasing dominance of religiously motivated terrorism. More and more religiously motivated terrorism has superseded other forms, or rather motivations, of terrorism. Compared with the 1980s and even 1990s, so-called ideological terrorism, which aimed at the revolutionary change of social structures as well as the so-called ethnonational terrorism, striving for the liberation of a certain territory seem to have been relegated somewhat to the backstage. Religiously motivated terrorism is certainly not limited to Islam. It seems also to have made headway in Judaism, Christianity and nonmonotheistic religions such as Hinduism. However, at least for the time being, only terrorism motivated by Islamism reaches beyond borders or certain regions. The shift from a more traditional ideological (social-revolutionary) terrorism to religiously motivated forms coincides with a certain geographical shift from Europe and Latin America to Northern Africa, the Middle East and Central and South Asia.5 It also coincides with a number of new characteristics regarding organization, structures, membership and areas of operation. However, even September 11 and more recent events such as the bombing attacks in Bali and al Ghriba/Tunisia should not obscure the fact that ideological and ethno-national terrorism still exists in various parts of the world - not least in South Asia -and that there is a number of groups (such as Hamas and Hezbollah in the Middle East), which might fall into two or more categories. We have to take into account that religion is more often the motivation for terrorist acts than it has been in the last few decades. The Globalization of Terrorism Increasingly, terrorism goes global.6 Al Qaeda, as the most striking example, is a truly global network, which co-operates more or less closely with national or regional groups such as the GSFP in Algeria or the Jemiah Islamiyah in Indonesia. Furthermore, there is evidence of an ad hoc co-operation in various parts of the world with so-called non-aligned Muhajeddin, individual persons or small groups, who are not part of the al Qaeda-network and do not belong to any other, larger and somehow hierarchically structured group. This globalization is not only a relatively recent phenomenon, but it must also be seen as a dangerous development well beyond the more traditional forms of national, or even international, terrorism. National terrorism has a very long history and is characterized by at least two phenomenon: perpetrators and victims are unusually of the same nationality or are at least subject to the same authority and their political aim is limited to changing certain political conditions within national boundaries or in a limited area under the rule of an external state (e.g. colony, occupied territory). Typical European examples are, or were, the German Rote

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Armee Fraktion, the French Action Directe, the Greek '17th November', the Basque ETA and the IRA. Some, or probably most, of these groups had some international elements, ranging from ideological (international solidarity of the working class etc.) to financial, training, and providing safe heavens. Yet, these were primarily national, with some international elements. Looking beyond Europe, particularly to Middle-Eastern groups such as the PFLP, Hamas and Hezbollah, there are good examples of the internationalisation of terrorismeven if some of them currently confine their attacks to a limited geographical area. According to the RAND-St Andrews Chronology, international terrorism means "incidents in which terrorist go abroad to strike their targets, select victims or targets that have connections with a foreign state (e.g. diplomats, foreign businessman, offices and facilities of foreign corporations), or create international incidents by attacking airline passengers, personnel or equipment." After all, it is less the difference in political objectives but in the selection of targets that distinguishes national from international terrorism. In order to achieve their aims, international terrorists systematically attack international targets so as to get more media attention and in the hope of attracting more support. The hijackings of several commercial airliners in the early seventies were quite a successful terrorist strategy, bringing the occupation of Palestinian territories through spectacular media coverage to worldwide attention. International terrorism usually builds on a far more extended support network (financing, logistics) than national terrorism. Good examples for these international support structures are the Sri Lankan LITE, the IRA and, certainly, Hamas and Hezbollah. Al Qaeda and the most recent developments go beyond mere internationalisation, however, on a number of counts: 1) the aim is to overthrow the international order, not just a government or an occupying power; 2) the ideology (in the case of al Qaeda, Islamism) is per definitionem transnational; 3) its membership is truly international; 4) its structures are decentralized, networks rather than hierarchical organizations; and 5) financing and logistics are maintained through worldwide legal and illegal sources, using related groups and contact persons far less than in the more 'traditional' national and international terrorism through states. It might appear paradoxical that al Qaeda, with its rather anti-modern ideas and its opposition to the open society, went global, whilst the communist groups in the 1970s had been preaching international revolution and had a rather parochial range of action. But that does not change the fact that the 3rd millennium gave birth to global terrorism. Nor does it alter the fact that terrorists striving for a rather medieval world readily use all the achievements of globalization, such as international telecommunications, unimpeded, real time money transfers, swift, international air transportation, easily accessible flying schools, and so on. After all, it seems that one of the downsides of globalisation is the emergence of global or transnational terrorism. Modern, business-like leadership structures A major characteristic of the modern terrorist organization is the lack of central authorities, or clear hierarchies. This is especially true of al Qaeda, but also of a number of other groups that are only loosely connected, with very flat hierarchical structures and no 'military-style', leadership structure. This lack of hierarchy is possible because - unlike in the more traditional forms of ideological and ethno-national terrorism - only a loose political, ideological or dogmatic framework exists. There are only very few leading principles as, for example, the hate against America, against Israel or against countries and governments supporting those states.

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Furthermore, some rather vague ideas of revitalizing basic religious values and - in the case of al Qaeda, but also Hamas and Hezbollah - the establishment of an Islamist Empire, or a Taliban-style Kalifat-State as a response to the perceived dominance of the 'Western World'. Since there is no need for a detailed ideological or dogmatic framework, there is also no need to gain the support of parts of the population of a certain country or at least parts of the politically active layers of society. Consequently, there is no need to focus on certain, limited targets as, for example, leading politicians, members of the military and other key figures of the establishment. Asymmetric Warfare; the Victim not as Target, but as Part of a Communication Strategy 11 September 2001 has been a perfect example for asymmetric warfare. Only 19 suicide attackers and a financial input of probably only some US$500,000 killed more than 3,000 civilians and caused a material damage of at least US$40 billion. If this were not enough, the repercussions of 11 September resulted in a major decrease in world economic growth. On a smaller scale, Tunisia has witnessed a temporary decrease of income from tourism of up to 50 % after the bombing of the al Ghriba synagogue, and Indonesia has suffered a tremendous economic set-back after the murderous attack in Kuta Beach/Bali. Terrorists were thus able to inflict major damage to an enemy that was, and is in terms of manpower, military equipment and money, vastly superior. It is not only the (rather tactical) asymmetry of means available to terrorists on the one hand, however, and attacked states on the other hand, but also the asymmetry of warfare in a more strategic sense. Unlike in conflicts such as the Algerian war of independence or the Chinese revolution, terrorism is not any more conceived as an inevitable (because of military weakness) pre-stage to guerrilla warfare and finally open war aimed at achieving a political objective against the will of an adversary. Modern terrorism seems rather to target, through psychological effects (causing terror in its original meaning: instilling great fear), the economy, by increasing the psychological burden and the economic costs for combating terrorism and, ultimately, forcing the attacked state(s) to capitulate. Ideally - from a modern terrorist's point of view - an enemy vastly superior on all counts, could be forced to accept the political claims of a relatively small group of nonstate actors without even a short military conflict. Recent events, such as those in Tunisia, Karachi, offshore Yemen and Bali seem to indicate such a new tendency, if not strategy, of international terrorism. Probably, due to the hardening of targets especially in the United States, terrorist attacks on so-called 'soft targets' like tourist or international trade facilities have increased. Since there are so many such targets all over the world, it is impossible to protect them sufficiently. Even with more sophisticated intelligence it will hardly be possible to predict the exact venue or time of a terrorist attack on a discotheque, a musical theatre, a container ship, or an oil storage facility. Furthermore, a successful attack on a 'soft target' might well entail the same overall results as an attack against a 'hard target'. It sends a shock wave proliferated by the international media all over the world, intimidating not only the local population or those being geographically close to the scene of a terrorist attack, but also people thousands of miles away, deterring them from visiting or investing in the country where the actual attack took place. The Media play a tremendously important role, therefore, in almost any terrorist strategy. In fact, the victims themselves have no particular importance for the terrorist, except as part of a communication strategy proliferated by the media, as conveyors of a triple message:

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• the message that the government is not capable to guarantee security in the country • the message that tourists, foreign communities, investors, should avoid the country • the message that the war against terrorism has not been, and will not be successful. These messages get through because the terrorists can select from a huge number of possible targets, all of them with major importance on local and regional economies, and because they have enough human and financial resources to attack those targets at almost any time and anywhere. European States (and not only they) face a particular dilemma in this respect, which has been reflected in the ASEAN leaders' declaration adopted in Phnom Penh on 3rd November 2002: "We call on the international community to avoid indiscriminately advising their citizens to refrain from visiting or otherwise dealing with our countries, in the absence of established evidence of possible terrorist attacks, as such measures could help achieve the objective of the terrorists". Indeed, on the one side, many European countries have a legal obligation to advise their citizens properly on possible risks of travelling or investing abroad and on the other side, an over-reaction in terms of unnecessary warnings might - involuntarily - promote the objectives of terrorists who want to destabilize national economies. The dilemma is further accentuated by the fact that states have to take precautionary measures against terrorism on a permanent basis (if they fail once it is perceived as a major defeat by the general public), whilst for terrorists one or a few successful attacks suffice to promote their agenda considerably. Inseparability of internal and external security 11 September has taught another terrible lesson. No country on our globe is immune from the scourge of modern terrorism. Even a mighty army, good relations with neighbors or vast oceans cannot protect our cities and citizens from major terrorist attacks. The security of any country is not any more almost exclusively in the hands of governments, politicians, diplomats, or generals, but increasingly of private actors. Terrorists, but also warlords and the bosses of international organized crime pose more and more a direct risk to the life and limb, health and wealth of the average citizens on our globe. Whilst state-sponsored terrorism still exists, albeit on a much lower level than in the 1960s and the 1970s, it is more and more the threat by non-state actors that characterizes modem terrorism. This double challenge - the inseparability of internal and external security and non-state actors as a major threat for national and international security - has still not been tackled in a sufficient manner. More than ever, a comprehensive strategy for preventing and countering terrorism - both on national and international level - is needed. Preventing and countering terrorism In the aftermath of September 11 2001, most countries realized that terrorism is an international, in fact global, challenge and that, at least in most cases, a merely national, or even regional, counter-strategy would not suffice. As a consequence, a number of unprecedented coalitions were forged and decisions taken in the international arena - both on the regional and global level. However, some of the achievements in the post 9/11 period have been tainted by the failure of the international community to achieve consensus on the definition of terrorism. This lack of consensus is unfortunately not only a legal problem, limited to the august halls of the United Nations General Assembly, but a practical one. State support for terrorist organizations (considered by their state sponsors as 'freedom fighters') has decreased, but not disappeared (the US National Strategy for

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Combating Terrorism names 7 countries as state-sponsors of terrorism). As a consequence, international co-operation in combating terrorism still is far from being satisfactory. The global coalition against terrorism One of the most important achievements of the post 9/11 US diplomacy was the creation of a global coalition against terrorism, including all five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, the whole western world, many states of the Arab world and of the G 77, including India and Pakistan. Even if this coalition is in fact rather a coalition against Usama Bin Laden, al Qaeda and the Taliban, it is of tremendous importance for combating international terrorism. It is not an alliance based on common values, however, but rather a coalition based one.

Future NATO Security M. Edmonds and O. Cerny (Eds.) IOS Press, 2004

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Historical, Regional, Religious Causes and Origins of Terrorism by

Pierre Conesa, Ministry of Defense, Paris

More than a world tour of local causes of terrorism, I would like to pay attention to new geopolitical and social trends that flood or help several forms of terrorism. I shall not limit my paper to the kind of terrorism that specifically affects us, but consider also those regions in which terrorism is a cause of conflict. The Increasing Number of 'Grey Areas' in which Terrorism can find a Haven Osama Bin Laden, after his departure from Saudi Arabia, went to Somalia, Sudan and Afghanistan. Today, he could be refugee in any number of tribal zones or in Baluchistan in Pakistan. So, he has made lengthy journey through a number of 'Grey zones'. All over the world, small forgotten conflicts have claimed innumerable victims, often unseen by the media and remain of no concern to the 'civilized' world. With the ending of the Cold War and the disappearance of the Soviet Union, the West has largely lost interest in all the 'grey' areas of the world, and controlling them is no longer an economic or strategic priority. Felonious activities have developed in these bankrupt areas and have become sources of new wealth from which terrorist organizations can profit and establish their sanctuary as in areas such as Somalia, Pakistan or the Caucuses. Over the last 10 years, since the demise of the Soviet Union, concepts such as 'globalisation', a unipolar versus a multipolar world, and 'the end of history' have gained credence. But few researchers have taken the trouble to examine the increase and spread of the 'grey' areas. This reflects the uncertainty about changes that still defy analysis: crises with no immediate political or military outcome that persist while the international community looks on, powerless and unconcerned. A map of this 'Grey' world would cover a great many regions: First, there is the whole of the Caucasus, North and South, reaching as far as the Black Sea (former Soviet Armenia, Georgia, etc). This region has entered a period of turbulence. Although the war in Chechnya is the part that has attracted the most media attention, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan have failed to settle their problems. The region was colonized by Tsarist Russia in the 18th century but has now reverted to its traditional concerns. Second, further East, there are troubles that stretch from Tajikistan, through Afghanistan, to the North of Pakistan and the Iranian part of Baluchistan, supposedly started with the Soviet intervention in Kabul in 1979. In fact the crisis is much older. Pakistan has only had a civilian government for half of its 50 years existence, with a military regime the rest of the time, and its future is uncertain. For example: • In the Kurdistan area, largely speaking, a crisis could erupt at any time. • In sub-Saharan Africa, most states, with the possible exception of South Africa, are slowly falling apart.

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•

In the Andes or the Amazon (Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, Brazil) and the Golden Triangle (Southeast Asia), the authorities have no hold over areas controlled by drugtraffickers who can use bombs to exert pressure on the government. • In the Far East, the Dutch succeeded in uniting the Indonesian archipelago (with its 13,000 islands) to form a single colony under the authority of the Javanese, but this also is now falling apart. The independence of East Timor was just a taste of what is to come and the Bali attempt is very important in this context. Between 300m and 350m people inhabit the several million square kilometres of the states mentioned above. In addition to being geographically remote, many of the conflicts in these areas share several geopolitical features. By way of illustration: • Somalia is ethnically and religiously homogeneous, but it has not evolved into a common entity shared by the various tribes. On the contrary, they continue to fight to prevent a state from coming into existence. • Likewise, in the Yemen, the reunification of the North and South has not enabled central government to take control and unite the whole of the country. Such crises affected the march of Empires - the furthest point that imperial conquest reached - in geopolitical peripheral zones, with a patchwork of populations and religions, many of whom have taken refuge in mountainous areas (the Caucasus, in Russia; the Balkans, Kurdistan and Lebanon, under the Ottoman Empire; the plateaux of Indochina under the Siamese and Vietnamese Empires). In these regions, there is an old tradition of military and terrorist resistance to imperial power. Many crises have sociological roots that ensure they will endure. Unarmed people are easy prey if there are no public authorities or if the rest of the population has never been disarmed (Afghanistan, Yemen, Colombia). Vendettas between clans - a usual and often refined way of settling disputes, as can be seen from Yemeni, Pakistani, or Somali codes of honour - fuel the ethnic origins of conflicts. Whole generations have never experienced anything other than war and the problem of child soldiers bodes ill for the future. Surrender does not always secure the safety of former combatants, as witnessed in the April 19 Movement in Colombia. The actors in these crises are free agents, guided not by a single political aim but rather by their own particular strategy, as anyone can see in Chechnya, where warlords are sometimes kidnappers and sometimes fighters for independence. Their alliances, dictated by circumstance, are as volatile as they are unpredictable. Holding elections is sometimes quite pointless - in Angola, for instance. The leading players are warlords, illegal (drugtrafficking) organizations, or companies of international standing with stakes in a particular area - De Beers for diamonds, oil companies and so on - as well as mercenaries, who may act on behalf of any of the other players. More 'Grey' Areas? It seems safe to assume that the number of 'grey' areas will spread. These are turbulent times for large multiethnic states. A crisis in the Chinese Empire is plausible. The difficulties in Tibet suggest that armed resistance is still possible, particularly in Xinjiang, on the marches of Central Asia. The fallout from the demise of the old Soviet Empire is not over. The part of Central Asia that once belonged to the USSR is inhabited by a wide variety of ethnic groups - there are 128 nationalities in Uzbekistan alone. It is also the meeting point of Russian, Persian and Chinese spheres of influence. Countries have gained independence without asking for it, the victims of other people's histories. The Russians and other Slav settlers have left. Foreign armies have occupied the area and now once long-closed frontiers

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are opening. At the outer reaches of the Empire, in Moldova and Transnistria, conflicts have not been settled. They are just on hold. The future of Kurdistan depends on the solidity of the surrounding countries. There is every reason to wonder about the future of Iraq. The majority of its population is made up of Kurds or Shi'ite Arabs, ruled by a Sunni minority. And what of Syria, with its Alawite minority? I do not want to suggest that in any 'Grey' zone there is a nest of terrorists. I just want you to pay attention to the fact that these areas could become backyards for terrorists. New Religious Trends and Terrorism My second point is focused on the religious roots of new kind of terrorism. Islamist groups are occupying the front page of media. But all the main religions are concerned by terrorist acts. There is no use to talking just about Islam; let us talk about the religious aspect of Northern Ireland crisis, or the religious background of Timothy MacVeigh, the perpetrator of the Oklahoma City bomb. Today, there is a kind of sectarian trend in all the great religions, which lead sometimes to terrorism's legitimisation. It could be risky to use the concept of a 'sect' in religions in which there is no official hierarchy or theology, as it is in Sunni Islam or in Protestantism. But if one takes the 'sectarian' concept as a social concept meaning: a way of socialization in which the believers are completely taken under the leaders' wing. Believers thus live together, generally cut off from their relatives, waiting for instructions and help from the group which provides everything (just mention the al Qaeda organization compared with the state functions). The future 'kamikaze', or suicide bomber, is sometimes likely to be completely separate from his family (consider for example, Mohamed Atta, the Egyptian whose family discovered after 9/11 his terrorist activities). Then, there is likely to be a network of strong relationships between believers surrounding the Guru in whom they see a new prophet (Ben Laden, Djamel Zitouni in Algeria's GIA's, Rabin Kahane, Aoum Shinrikyo etc. ...). These believers will also adhere to a millenarist and apocalyptic ideology that promises the heaven after sacrifice. Sometimes they make a collective suicide pact ('Guyana' or Secte du Culte Solaire in France) that translates into a mortifying attitude. In a way, sacrifice of a member of the group is a step towards Apocalypse and further Paradise. When he acts as a terrorist, the paradise is waiting for him (see Mohamed Atta's testament) and his family will benefit from help and thanks from the group (Palestinian 'kamikaze', or the Tamil 'kamikaze' in Sri Lanka). There is usually a feeling of universal plot against the sect that explains the attitude of 'aggressive self-defence' among some sects which leads them to take up arms as in the case, for example, among some American supremacists (Dravidian sect) or Jewish groups. This feeling seems no sense in engaging in political dialogue with others and justifies some terrorist acts (for instance the attitude of radical Israeli settlers such as Banish Goldstein, the doctor who fired on Muslim believers in Hebron in 1994). The terrorists' ideology is definitely racist (see for example some leaflets of Hamas which speak of Jews as "Monkey children" and some Rabin Kahane's utterances which speak of Palestinians as 'dogs' or 'flies' "which everybody must kill"). This ideology prepares people to sacrifice and sometimes to suicide attacks (for example, LTTE in Sri Lanka, or Hamas or Hezbollah 'kamikazes'). The number and type of innocent victims are of no importance.

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Violence is often turned against believer of the same religion because they are looked as 'false believers' or 'hypocrites', (as, for example in Algeria or in Pakistan, in Ireland Protestant against Catholic in Ireland, Orthodox against Roman Catholic in Bosnia). Remember that Ishtak Rabin was assassinated by an extremist Jew, and not by a Palestinian. All great religions are contaminated with sociological trends. For example: • The Islamist terrorism is well known; • The Christian terrorism in Ireland or in the USA with clinic bombings; • Terrorist attacks have never been fully studied; • Jewish radicalism (Kahan, Bettar groups...) is hidden behind official state policy; • Hinduism is concerned mainly after the electoral victory of the BJP; and • The Aoum Shinrikyo sect was a bastard variant of Shintoism and the cult of Shiva. In that sense, sectarian organizations seem to me a very interesting way to explain some terrorist attitudes. The Aoum group in Tokyo carried out the first non-conventional terrorist act in history, and an American extremist committed the first massive terrorist act inside American territory. It is not possible to limit the 'war against terrorism' to some of these religious trends. Hezbollah or Hamas are religious terrorist groups, but they are facing religious and xenophobic attitudes from radical Jews, mainly Israeli settlers. The rule of a radical government, as is currently the case in India with the BJP, or in Israel with the religious coalition, generally encourages terrorism. To day, there are 25 times more victims of terrorist attack in Israel than there were 20 years ago. Terrorism means a way of acting violently against civil populations using nonmilitary means. It is a global challenge and no terrorist can be 'legalized' (let us remember the Hotel King David during the Israeli war of independence, or Fellagha's terrorism against French people during the Algerian War of Decolonisation). Today, the GIA's leaders say that they are using the same means as those of the FLN during the war against France, and that these are legitimate and 'legal' because former Muhajeddin have betrayed the Algerian people by a corrupt and authoritarian regime. Conclusion Unfortunately, terrorism is a global challenge that must be fought in all its forms and with the same strength and determination. The new international disorder constitutes the background of international terrorism. Mafias and terrorists groups understand perfectly well the extent of 'Grey' areas and illegal international relations have become both their background and state borders provide them with protection. At the same time, they themselves have become an obstacle to justice.

Future NA TO Security M. Edmonds and O. Cerny (Eds.) /OS Press, 2004

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Terrorism and its History of 'Strategic Provocation': A Challenge to the Democracies by AntonGiulio De Robertis University of Bari, Rome

I shall start with the role played by the terrorism in the state system of the XIX Century because it looks like that after the optimistic forecast made in the early nineties following the fall of the Berlin wall and because the substance of a the well-known article by John J. Mearsheimer entitled, "Back to the future", is coming true. Terrorism was a practise largely adopted in the XIX Century and connected to the 'strategy of provocation' adopted by groups of opponents to an overwhelming state or government power. The objective was to push the authorities to (over)react by taking measures unacceptable to their neighbours or to the international society as a whole, and as a consequence entail an intervention by another power able to stand against the one the terrorists alone were unable to face. There are several examples of that in the enterprises of the Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire in Albania, Macedonia etc. in the XIX Century as well in Tzarist Russia during roughly the same period by activists fighting against the autocracy of the Kremlin. The elements of the terrorism where basically two: the inability to confront openly and directly the ruling power and the extreme discomfort, pain or sufferance inflicted on its subjects by those in power. The difference between the terrorism of the XIX Century and today is, first, the enormous increase and expansion of the interdependence and communications between all countries with the result that no main political controversy can anymore be contained within a local context. Then, the development of technologies has made relatively easily available weapons of an enormous destructive capacity as well as means of delivery able to cover long distances in very short time. In this situation, the ability to contain a terrorist threat by timely countering his possible instruments of attack is a matter for the military and technical specialist; but the fact that the prevention measures to be adopted would have to act mainly inside the threatened country involves heavy implications in the field of the rights and liberties of any single citizen. Further, the ability to face or prevent any specific terrorist attack the most effective way to avoid this danger is to reduce drastically the area of consensus and support for these warriors and even more to work, politically this time, to eliminate the conditions of strain and discomfort that generate the terrorist warriors and their supporters. The real and truly effective prevention of a terrorist danger is metaphorically to 'dry the water of the lake of sympathies' where they, adapting a Mao Tse Tung's well known similitude, could swim fast and escape their hunters as fishes. But in order to achieve this result, it is necessary to assess clearly the economic and political standards of our democratic societies and to assure to all the people involved in the global network of the today's international system at least the potential full enjoyment of these same standards. Here, therefore, is a preliminary general question that I have never heard explicitly mentioned in the several debates that have been held these days about the terrorist problem.

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What has to be the nature of the international society and what its mechanism of working it out? In my opinion, the great legacy of the victors of the Second World War is the establishment of democracy as the basic political concept underlying any program of societal engineering. According to Franklin Roosevelt, the most influential leader in the planning of the coalition against the Axis powers, this principle had to apply after the war not only to the countries to be 'reconstructed' physically, economically, politically etc. once the fighting had finished, but also to the international society as a whole. To move from principles to concrete praxis in such a complex field was not easy, but a first step was made by agreeing the Charter of the United Nations Organisation. In that document, they tried to combine the need for the effectiveness of the organization with the exigency that any single member could feel it was participating in the adoption of decisions of the organization and were bound to them. In this perspective we cannot ignore the problems of those peoples and more specifically of those ethnic groups who lay under the rule of a dictatorial government or of a government authority they felt extraneous as an expression of a different people. It has to be admitted that, at least until 1989, but also well after, the armed opposition to this type of rulers was largely accepted if not also supported by the Western democracies. In these situations the use of force against a national government authority was illegal, but the lack of legitimacy of the order opposed was used to justify, in our eyes, this illegality, and the elements engaged in the struggle were considered 'freedom fighters'. The question today is; how does this type of operations have to be evaluated after the eleventh of September 2001? Our awakening to the dimension of the terrorist menace has increased our consciousness about the dangers that can hide inside an area of illegality allowed for the 'freedom fighters' and so our support for these endeavours has become at least problematic. The point is that the tensions originated by the situations used to produce the 'freedom fighters' still hold and, if not faced, can become further sources of terrorist action. The answer to this problem - we currently ear from Western circles - is the spread of democracy. This is perfectly right, but this concept needs to be dropped in to the complex reality of what I would call a 'double dialectic' - national and international. The author of an interpretation of the traditionally called 'domestic jurisdiction' of a country aiming to support the rights of an oppressed minority or introduce into a nation's democratic debate different political forces, needs a legitimacy that is easily recognised and largely acknowledged. The ways to get this legitimacy have to pass through a wide consensus of all the international community able to make legal the above-mentioned interference. We can discuss if the United Nations Organisation, with its present statute, is really the right body where to search for, and build, this consensus; but if we want a stable and peaceful international system we cannot avoid sticking to a source of legality that is generally accepted and acknowledged. As it is in the international dimension, so also is it in the domestic one; legitimacy is an unavoidable requirement for the actions adopted to confront and destroy the terrorist. Perhaps this is the most challenging step of this confrontation for our societies, because they need to fight a threat plunged deep inside themselves by effective means, but at the same time be respectful of all the liberties and the guarantees of their citizens. This fight, even more in its domestic than in its international dimension, that has to be waged by covert operations and intelligence services. It will be absolutely necessary to devise an effective juridical instrument able to save the substance of the rights and the freedom of every citizen and defend the real nature of the society. If this guarantee does not operate, we will have lost at least one main pillar in our fight against terrorism, having proved ourselves unable to defend our system and respect its basic characteristics. In order to attain the required (desired) result, it will be necessary to

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shape a set of rules establishing ad hoc special security bodies or dedicated juridical procedures that are able to guarantee a full democratic control of all the operations started, as well a right evaluation of the goals and results by a responsible legally invested, authority. I like to remind those here that Italy is particularly proud of her success in the fight against the Brigate Rosse one that was achieved without any derogation from her democratic juridical standards. The problem of the Brigate Rosse was relatively easily resolved because the conditions of the country were such as not to generate irreconcilable hostility or, even, cause desperation in any meaningful section of the Italian society. This is not the case, however, in most in the areas faced with the risk of terrorism throughout the world. This is why I think that, together with the search of instruments and means with which to fight terrorism in action or when preparing to take action, it is necessary to initiate a second type of pre-emption. This would be a political pre-emption, aimed at resolving the hard conditions prevailing in the unhappiest societies of our world. Such action would thereby deprive the terrorist of his breeding ground. Also, there is a need to avoid what I would define as the 'Robin Hood' effect - that is to push to the wrong side forces that were originally well motivated but deprived of any breathing space. This program is not so demanding as to be impossible to cope with. The hottest spots are very well known and, to start with them, would help dry up a greater part of the operations and means of today's terrorists. In any case, the solution to these problems is also a challenge for our democratic societies. The ability of our societies to survive with all the characteristics of freedom, respect for the basic citizen's rights etc., means that we must avoid over-reacting to the original XIX Century 'Strategy of Provocation' of terrorists who could work inside the body politic, unleash a process of corruption, and achieve a change to the nature of democracy.

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Future NATO Security M. Edmonds and O. Cerny (Eds.) [OS Press, 2004

Discussion of Session 2 Bruce Jones The fact, or the theory, behind all this is that al Qaeda and similar groups try to elevate the political and economic cost of our defending ourselves against them to a level where we give in before we have fired a single shot. I do not know whether this is right, but at least we should discuss it, because it would be a completely new kind of phenomenon. In the old days - Algeria and so on - you had terrorist attacks, you had guerrilla warfare, and you had open warfare; but will that be true in the case of al Qaeda? Or, will we not perhaps break down because the economic costs and the psychological costs are just too high? Maybe the last point is the inseparability of internal and external security. No country on our globe is immune anymore to a major threat posed by terrorism. Major threats are not just a matter of killing a few people and nothing more; they are like the attack on the World Trade Centre. These atrocities are not any longer attributable to states. There is still statesponsored terrorism, yes, but state-sponsored terrorism is no more relevant than it was, five, ten or fifteen years ago. So, the non-state actor might well be the security challenge of the 3rd Millennium as was, maybe, the Warsaw Pact for the NATO fifteen or twenty years ago. I do not think that we have really reacted in an appropriate manner to that new challenge coming from the non-state actor, one that simply lets the old distinction between internal and external security disappear. Richard Pawloski Some comments from the street, so to speak. One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter. You are looking at the evolution of what you might consider as the old versus the new terrorist. The new generation is one where you are focusing on Islam and radical religions. But remember, secularism versus a radical religion may be the bottom line here, and what you might be seeing in Islam, today, could have been the story 300 years ago in Christianity. The point here is that you are dealing with both ignorance and a desire. This is not just ignorance, but a mentality. You might find that poverty can be a cause, but you will end up finding terrorism at higher levels of classes because there will be focus, a mindset. There will be just one opinion: 'My Jesus is better than your Jesus', or something of this sort. Then, you find out that terrorism is in our schools, with a high level of children who are educated and come from good families. You find this is something other than ignorance; no tolerance for change and the subjugation of women are characteristics of this lack of tolerance. These radical religious-type situations are now commonplace and not only in Islam. Secularism and all the secular factors of legal and social involvement seem to help. On the other hand, the old terrorist was committing suicide because he wanted to make changes to a specific audience, and because he felt there was no other voice he could make heard. Suicide today is such an enormous goal, such a high goal, that all you can expect is death. So, the terrorist is looking to die; he is not looking to live. The only goal is such a high goal that he can only gain martyrdom. In this sense of martyrdom, you find that the answer is death anyway; there is no chance of survival; and there is no desire for survival. So, there is another aspect of this, which is this incredible discussion about business rules and business games. It is becoming this and, therefore, if we apply business models to this type of activity; it is an interesting phenomenon from this perspective. What is happening is that there is a manipulating group in the middle, the brokers and the businessmen who are living for this violence. Somehow, I see a middle ground of professionals who are helping this along and are living with these changes and living within this environment. We in the West are not focusing on it. This is, maybe, where the emphasis of law has to be. There are many forces and applications that manipulate these

Discussion of Session 2

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situations of injustice, intolerance, or whoever becomes the so-called terrorist. If you do not have that belt loaded with dynamite, you just are just an emotional person. After a while, things may change, but something is happening in this present world that enables vehicles by which technology, communications and other things become real. Now, is this a professional group living a sort of life as Provisional IRA manipulators who are making money from both sides? There is a strange new breed that we do not know anything about. Ely Karmon I think the question of 'grey zones' is very important. It has been developed by the Americans, but what is a 'Failed State'? There is a very big research programme undertaken by the CIA and European, researchers on the problem of Failed States. There are two states that must be included, but we must be very careful about them. One is Pakistan, which is a huge state with a nuclear capability, and the other is Indonesia, which is the biggest Muslim country. Indonesia is very moderate, but the focus now is on radical Islamic groups, which could make Indonesia become very dangerous region. There is also the fact that what has been described as a trend of globalisation is being helped by the Internet culture to which these groups have adapted very quickly, in spite of their religious conservatism. There is still a difference between what has been described as sects and the radical extremist, especially right wing groups. They are local, yet they act only in their own countries or their constituency. Generally, they do not go international, even then they harboured feelings that the Americans were their enemies. The Aum Shinrikiyo attacked the Japanese establishment and the Japanese people, so I think we must distinguish between these two trends: those who go international are of interest, I think, for NATO, as an international organisation. The remarks by Ambassador Witschel, I think very accurately described the phenomenon of globalisation. The al Qaeda network is a very loose network; they are now using a new concept, which they refer to as non-territorial. This non-territorial concept, or non-territorial Islamic nation, is everywhere where there are Muslims. Every small community, irrespective of whether it is in the United States, in Britain, or in the Czech Republic, is therefore compelled to make Jihad in order to fulfil its duty. Every group, in fact, is independent but they form part of the great nation of the world that they must conquer. I think that the anti-globalisation movement, which is a big, legal movement in general, with some anarchists and violent fringes, are now rethinking their strategy. Many of these groups have to decide what to do in the future - to go more legal or to go more violent, in light of what they saw on 9/11. I think there is a small sign of negative development: some days ago in Italy a Red Brigade member was killed by the police. A policeman was also killed and a Red Brigade woman was arrested. I heard from a journalist, who called me two days ago, that she read out in court a declaration that they see themselves as a new brigade allied to the Islamic radical movements. This could be a sign that some of the anti-globalisation, leftist, new revolutionary movements perhaps are trying to imitate this new Islamic trend. Paul Swallow I would like to agree with Ambassador Witschel here, in that we have not made many steps in being able to co-operate internationally to fight against the al Qaeda group. Just as a sideline, we talk about informal and loose networks. I heard it described as 'franchised terrorism', in that anybody could really pop up and offer themselves as a member and do something for the cause and then disappear again subsequently with little chance of being caught depending on how involved they were, which I thought was a fairly accurate observation. In the old days, and speaking from a British perspective, we fought against the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), but this was an organisation we understood. It

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had rules that we all could sign up to, it had a head, orders, and leadership, and it could be controlled from the centre very accurately. We also found that it was easier to combat on an international scale with French, German, and Dutch colleagues. That is conspicuously absent, I think, from the emerging threat known as al Qaeda, because of its loose, sporadic nature. We find it extremely difficult to know how to deal with it internationally. If this is the purpose of this advanced research workshop, I wonder if this is an area that perhaps NATO could address. The civilian police are not doing very well; they have to rely on informal networks as opposed to formalised networks, and there may be a role for the alliance, here. Barry Denofsky It was interesting to listen to Ambassador Witschel's comments about the nature of the structure of al Qaeda, and their ability to meet anywhere, to do anything almost at a moment's notice, with very little structure in place, and to provide for the types of communications that we are most comfortable with. But, in that vein, I seriously doubt that Osama bin Laden is setting up conferences like this and having meetings and bringing people around at a multi-national level to discuss plans for the future. But I think it is that which creates the greatest dilemma for all of us. Chris Donnelly mentioned at the beginning in his opening remarks this big ship, NATO, and how it moves. I wonder, as we talk about some of these issues, how we should address them. How do we get our nations to sit down, as we are doing today, and talk about some of these issues in a way that can actually have a meaningful impact on the threat? The threat is changing so fast and when we meet in a forum like this, we talk about these issues - and there are many other forums, probably at this very moment taking place around the world. But we do not seem to have the ability to get to the root of the problem and find ways to address these issues, because of our multi-national, and multi-lateral approach to many of these concerns. So I guess I am really asking the question, how do we bring those issues that we are dealing with into reality when we have got a situation that is changing faster than we are able to respond? AntonGiulio De Robertis I have one question to Ambassador Witschel who mentioned that stopping terrorism would be at a cost to the West. Surely we also have to take into consideration that there are some imbalances in the calculations. Perhaps we need to work more to solve problems in order to deprive the terrorists of the arguments they are putting in front of some of their followers. This brings me back to this alternative: who do we have as an enemy - terrorism, as such, or Islamic radicalism? We need to think in which terms to deal with the Islamists and how to find a dialogue with them. I do not think we have made enough efforts from the West's side to establish a dialogue with the Right - by which I mean the healthy part of the Islamic culture and, its leadership. As scholars, we are striving for a dialogue and to have an understanding of, and find common ground with, those people that we have against us. Julian Lindley French This is a freethinking forum, so let me put forward two questions, both of which are pretty direct. On the subject of drivers and deterrents, it seems to me, Ambassador, that you mentioned hate against America, and hate against Israel, as drivers for these terrorist groups. You did not mention hate against Europe. I wonder whether every European perceives the same level of threat as does the United States. There are some Europeans who are still under the illusion that a strong strategy might be to appease these people in a way and not to join in an effective counter-terrorism strategy. My own fear is that too much of Europe has been on strategic vacation for the last twelve years and that we need to wake up

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to this threat. Until we stand up tall and face this, we cannot talk about a structure. The threat drives structure; perception of the threat drives structure; and, at the moment, we do not have a clear consensus on the concept of coercion to be used against this kind of terrorist group. Second, is the question of deterrence. I was impressed by the use of businesslike organisations, of flat hierarchies in your presentation. Can these people be deterred? If they are so logical, because theirs is a rational choice, are they, therefore, deterrable? Or are they impervious to deterrence? Martin Edmonds In the discussion so far, the one thing that has impressed me is the focus that seems to have been placed very much upon those terrorist groups that have a global capacity and a global capability. They display particular characteristics that have been identified already by Ambassador Witschel. What is going through my mind is that the threats are not always necessarily from those groups that engage and threaten Western society and others with weapons of mass destruction. Threats come in all guises and in all forms. Sometimes, a relatively minor threat in the perception of the public can generate an enormous disruptive capability to the functioning of society. In my introduction, I mentioned that we are engaged in an exercise of defining the terrorist threat. The threats we identified encompassed a series of premeditated actions, or clearly intended actions, that have been deliberately planned, first, to cause death or injury, and to incapacitate or inflict psychological harm to the citizens of a country. Second, threats can be made to cause major disruption to the normal functioning of a democratic society. Third, they can be made to prevent citizens from going about their lawful business. And, last, but not least, they can be used to cause serious degradation to the environment within which people live. Al Qaeda might, in fact, be engaged in threats that cover all of these objectives; but within any state there are a number of relatively small groups that focus on, for example, just simply the desire to disrupt the normal functioning of society, They use as their means "weapons of mass disruption" rather weapons of mass mass destruction. These are smaller, often single-issue groups, but their capacity, their potential and their capability are quite considerable. In terms of NATO's responses, maybe the fact that it is a multi-national organisation, with its past history of being a military-related one, means that it instinctively looks at big guys, the al Qaedas of this world, armed with weapons of mass destruction. To continue to do so, without recognising those other groups that have the capacity for weapons of mass disruption, would be an error. Whether NATO is the appropriate organisation to do that, however, or whether it should be done at a lower level is a question that should not be overlooked or ignored. Adrian Kendry Barry Denofsky said that these groups are not organising seminars and preparing. I think that the incident of the attack on US Navy ship in the Yemen and the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Centre and Pentagon were very well prepared and extremely well organised, with a lot of intelligence. I am sure that people gathered and stayed together in order to organise. Not all of them were involved, because they were not in on the secret; but somebody, a group of five, six, ten people, for a long period of time, at least for two, three or four years, prepared and organised these operations. We know, for instance, the attack on the Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania took four years, from 1994 to 1998, to plan. These are people who know how to work with intelligence and plan operations. Now, the threat to Europe has to be compared with the threat posed to the United States and Israel. I think that we must understand that these Islamic extremists originated

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during the first Afghanistan war. Even before the end of the Afghanistan war and the victory against Soviet Union, they decided to focus their attention against the United States and to attack the enemy, which is the United States as the world's greatest superpower. They were operating inside the United States already by 1988 or 1989 and had also attacked China and the Russians in Chechnya. So, they know that all those who are not, according to their ideology, considered as friends are, by definition, their enemies. As far as deterrence is concerned, I made a study of Iranian terrorism. I found that they stopped their terrorist activity for 10 months. This 10-month period of non-terrorism, or non-use of terrorism, started after the G8 Summit in Halifax, Nova Scotia. This was because, for the first time, Russia became a member of the G7 group. Also, for the first time, the G7 plus Europe plus Russia issued a very strong anti-Iranian communique / document. They became afraid. However, after that summit, political dialogue with Europe continued as before and they returned to terrorism. This leads me to the fact that, without a state as a base, even al Qaeda cannot proliferate. Afghanistan and even Pakistan were part of their base/sanctuary. Now, they are looking for another base, perhaps in Pakistan, or in the Yemen. Without a state base, they cannot proliferate as an international terrorist organisation at the level that they have achieved in the past. Spike Bowman We must make sure that we do not overlook one thing when talking about terrorism: this is that is one size does not fit all. It is very true that those who attacked the USS Cole and carried out the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon were very well organised. They were also well financed and they were together for a considerable period of time. But al Qaeda itself is a very small organisation. They have provided a great deal of ideology to much of the world, but I think that we need to keep in mind that there is a whole bunch of others out there. First of all, there is no evidence that the ones who attacked the Pentagon and the World Trade Centre on 9/11 were al Qaeda members themselves. They were financed by al Qaeda, and they came together some place, somehow. One of the things that we have seen, and from which we are learning a great deal more these days, is that, starting with the end of the Afghan war when the Arab extremists who went to fight there came from 43 different countries, they put aside a lot of social and cultural differences to be able fight effectively together. They learned how to live together. They fought together and they worked in camps together. Then, they went back home and, after a fairly successful guerrilla campaign, demonstrated to a lot of unsatisfied people in the world, that this kind of activity could be successful against very powerful countries. Subsequent to that, Osama Bin Laden put together the training camps in Afghanistan and any numbers of people, between ten and twenty thousand, have been to those camps, and have passed through them. We have had debriefings from a lot of people who have explained that those men and women (mostly men) who went to them came from different backgrounds, different countries, and different places. They showed up at a specified time, went together into a camp at the same time and, to the extent there is any organisation, for most of them it was because of the timing that they showed up in those camps, not because they are necessarily members of al Qaeda. They then dispersed and went back to wherever they wanted, may be together or may be not; but that loose networking is still effective. They understand how to get a hold of each other and they talk to each other. In the United States, two groups of people under arrest and indictment are being prosecuted right now, who are not al Qaeda. But there are those who have attempted to go to al Qaeda, to go to Afghanistan to fight. They were those who were trained, not all of them but most of them, in Afghanistan in the camps, but they are not organised members. They are not financed by al Qaeda. One known terrorist, who recently came across the border from Canada into the United States, said he was not

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financed by al Qaeda. He would have been, he thought, if he had asked for money. And that is the point, I think, here: there is a lot of money out there to finance these people, the question is, where is the money? How is it being paid? It is not being paid with a cheque written by Osama bin Laden. I think that is a point we need to keep in mind. Adrian Kendry I would just like to make a quick response to what Julian Lindley French said, which was very interesting. I am not sure that nihilism is the right term to describe the motivations of those we are talking about, because I suspect that from what we've heard there are actually some very coherent thoughts and ideals and ideologies. Although I understand what you mean by nihilism, I think maybe that it does not quite impart the right sort of sense and, as you know, is it impervious to deterrence. One of the things that interests me is what kind of deterrence are we talking about? We may need to be very careful in differentiating between anti-terrorism and counterterrorism. We need to be clear about the nature of deterrence and what we are seeking to deter, and whether we think that we identify certain kinds of threats which have higher probabilities associated with them. Therefore, we force groups such as this to look for lower order probabilities of success and consider what are the implications for the financing and the affordability of this kind of activity. Valentin Petrov The international terrorism phenomenon can be compared with a disease. Even with a small disease, when there is a lack of treatment, although immunity may cause the destruction of the tissues, there is little outcome. Terrorism is a reaction to the global disease of the growing gap between the rich and poor worlds or, as some researchers put it, between the North and South. In different regions of the world, the opposition lies along specific political and religious lines, but at the same time it would be incorrect to look for the origins of terrorism in these external features. The root causes of terrorism and its transformation into a global threat are conditioned by world economic processes. The poorest states cannot provide normal living standards for their citizens. As a consequence, social and state institutions, through which their social problems could be settled, are absent. That is why distressed and disillusioned people seek an avenue for their ideological, religious or political fundamentalism. We are looking for a solution to combat the motives behind terrorism and the infrastructure of terrorism. We must understand the reasons for terrorism, which lie in its background, namely the conditions that create a favourable situation for extremist ideologies. The war on terrorism is like the Greek Myth about the Hydra: when one head was cut off it came up with two heads instead. Bruce Jones Now, we will follow the structures and virtual networks, which is rather what the inference is on the way that the al Qaeda network works. The IRA was mentioned earlier. In the IRA, the brigade structure was really, in the initial stages, their downfall, because it was a route map that enabled penetration and monitoring and so forth. The FLN in Algeria went more for a cell structure, with cut-outs earlier on and that was a lot more successful. We have only made passing comment on questions to do with the clash of civilisations. Is it a clash of civilisations, or is it a clash of conditions and perspectives? One train of thought is that Islam is a prescriptive and authoritative religion and Christianity and other religions differ. Christianity is a contemplative religion, so you have the phenomenon where the Archbishop of Canterbury in England says, "Well, we are against the war", so people say, "Oh, that's interesting". But, if a Muslim cleric goes and makes some pronouncement, it

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immediately becomes a Fahtwa, and you are failing in your obligations if you do not carry it out. During the 1970s and 1980s, the period of the hijack and siege phenomenon, different sorts of people would be engaged - criminals, terrorists. However, the worst people to deal with were religious fanatics. This was because their hostages counted for nothing. It was only then, with completely insane people who were not seeing things in any sort of perspective at all, that people recognised that they were an equivalent sort of danger that needed to be dealt with. All these different countries to be treated equally in terms of a clash of cultures have their own particular conditions. Sudan, Algeria, the Balkans and Bosnia, all have their own specific and repeated characteristics of how these things happen. The sort of tactics and situations, for example, in Algeria now are the same as happened with the French in the 1960s. It is not particularly different, either, in Sudan, which has always been isolated and extremist. According to the area and country, there have always been particular templates. In some countries, for example, in Saudi Arabia, or in Algeria, the social conditions are such that there are highly educated people but no work. In other areas, as in Afghanistan and Pakistan, there is little or no education and the people who are exploiting this are the religious extremists and clerics acting as educators, even though there is visible opulence and wealth and a great deal of disparity. These sorts of conditions are the same as prevailed in Tsarist Russia just before the revolution. These are, therefore, all very fertile grounds for bringing matters forward. Once people get on an airplane and go somewhere else, whether to become a refugee, to study, to get better work, or whatever, they are very much open territory for exploitation. They are dislocated from their normal backgrounds and anchors that prevent them from getting in harm's way. The broad range or terrorist techniques is also worth mentioning. Al Qaeda, is very much like the IRA. They are able to go and pose a very wide spectrum of threats. For example, the mining of ships - it is the most cost effective technology; a $10,000 mine will sink a ship worth, several hundred million dollars. It is a very effective technology; put it on a speedboat with a suicide driver and you have a Kamikaze vessel. Shoulder-launched weapons and very large bombs can be used over a very wide area, anywhere. These weapons up the ante for any other terrorist organisation. We have seen this in Belfast and recently extreme Protestants left a very, very large incendiary bomb a few weeks ago, which was luckily defused. People have to follow suit. The reason why the IRA blew up Lord Mountbatten was because they were being outshadowed at the time by other terrorist organisations. The terrorists have to follow suit, to 'up the ante'. What al Qaeda has not done yet is to use any form of coercion, whatsoever. They have not yet sent a sample of radioactive material to somebody or a picture or a diagram of what they propose to do and said, "get out of Northern Ireland" or, "get out of, Gaza". When somebody threatens coercion, there really will be an interesting situation. I think also we are facing a situation where the United States is the only alleged superpower in the world. It is alleged because, although it had the characteristics of a superpower, it did not have the where-with-all to be so because it was unwilling to take casualties, to deploy troops, and to take risks. Therefore, it had many of the characteristics of a superpower, but if it did not actually do the business at the end of the day, it was a viewed as a paper tiger. On the other hand, the terrorists who were prepared to conduct a 9/11 - type attack are prepared to annihilate us. That is what they want to do. They welcome it, and they want to do it. So, apart from anything else, if we look at any form of terrorist or special forces attack, there is the formulation of a plan, confirmation of reconnaissance, insertion, execution and, extraction. The big problem with most of these things is extraction. If there's nothing left to extract, then a great deal of your problem has dissipated and it is a

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false multiplier. It then opens a great many more opportunities that previously would have been impossible.

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Future NA TO Security M. Edmonds and O. Cerny (Eds.) IOS Press, 2004

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SESSIONS

The Components and Ingredients of the Threat Weaponry, Doctrine, and Operational Consequences by

Ely Karmon, International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, Israel

Introduction One of the main questions when speaking of future terrorism is, what will be the probability of the use of non-conventional weapons (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear) by terrorist groups, compared with the classical use of conventional weapons? Conventional Means In my evaluation, the conventional weapons and tactics will continue to represent the main threat, in the next two-three years. However, the conventional means tend more and more to achieve a mass destruction effect. This is a trend that has already been observed since the early 1990s (the first World Trade Centre (WTC) bombing in 1993, the Oklahoma City bombing, the bombings of the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, etc), but it has accelerated since the 9/11 attacks (the Djerba synagogue in Tunisia, the Bali tourist resort bombings, the Mombassa, Kenya, bombing and the attempt to down a civilian plane with a missile). The main danger is represented by the suicide attacks, to which the security and police services have not found, until today, a practical operational solution. It should be noted that all al-Qaeda terrorist attacks have been suicide operations. Most of the spiritual and political leaders of the radical Islamist organizations present the suicide operations, or 'martyrdom' operations, as 'preparedness to martyr for the sake of Allah', 'blessed heroism', part of 'the blessed jihad'. Many times this modus operandi is presented as the 'love of death as compared with the love of life of the Westerners'. Hassan Nasrallah, the Secretary-General of Hezbollah, said the "Jews have a basic weak point - they like to live and are not prepared to die for what they believe in". Below are a number of points about suicide attacks that need to be taken into account: • On the international arena, suicide attacks are relatively rare because they are used as a strategic weapon and are prepared over a long period of time.

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However, it is possible that the limited number of attacks is also due to a high number of foiled, or failed, operations • In local arenas, as in Israel and Sri Lanka, suicide attacks have become the preferred, almost day-to-day weapon with a consequence that their effect has become somehow mitigated. • It is mistaken to assume that only religious groups use suicide attacks. The experience in Israel - Fatah suicide operations today, Lebanese left-wing groups in the past - in Sri Lanka the Tamil Tigers (LTTE), and in Turkey the PKK, are examples of secular organizations that have used, or continue to use, suicide operations. • There is a definite pattern of copycat phenomenon from one area to another and from one organization to another. The PKK learned from the LTTE, the groups in Chechnya, Kashmir, or Xingiang, China copied it from the Hezbollah, the Palestinians or from al-Qaeda. • Suicide operations are directed at more and a wider range of targets: for example ships, planes, high buildings, tourist resorts. • The main threat, however, is that of possible suicide attacks against nuclear or chemical facilities with a plane or truck loaded with explosives. This method can produce a non-conventional effect of mass destruction and, even, annihilation. There are also other modus operandi that could be used in the near future; for example: • Missile attacks can be directed against civilian or military aircraft, including when they are flying over inhabited areas. This method has been already used in the early 1970s by Palestinian groups, and is not confined only to the Mombassa attempt. • Unmanned small drones or planes packed with explosives • Nano-technology (very small explosive planes or cars) used against very important people (VIPs) and especially against sensitive targets. The Threat of Chemical and Biological Attacks Our evaluation is that known terrorist organizations do not have, at this stage, the capability to produce or acquire real non-conventional weapons. Even in the event that they did achieve a level of competence to produce and use simple, low-level chemical, biological or radiological agents or devices, the number of victims would be limited to several dozens or hundreds, like in the case of the sarin gas attack by the Japanese Aum Shinrikiyo in March 1995 in the Tokyo subway (twelve people dead and several thousands wounded, the majority only slightly). From all the data published concerning the findings in al-Qaeda bases in Afghanistan, it seems that there is no serious production or purchase of non- conventional agents or weapons, although there is a clear interest to acquire or perhaps develop such a capacity. There is, therefore, only the danger of limited, low-level chemical, biological or radiological attacks in the near future, but we should also be prepared for a strategic surprise of the kind Aum Shinrikiyo provided at the time. It must be stressed, however, that the political and psychological consequences of such limited attacks would be enormous for the country involved and the international community. The anthrax letters of September-October 2001 in the US have shown how significant can be the psychological, social, economic and political

E. Karmon / Weaponry, Doctrine and Operational Consequences

damage for a campaign that has produced 'only' five people dead and some 25 injured. We should nevertheless distinguish between the chemical and biological threat. The Chemical Threat I would include in this category also the radiological threat: it is more immediate and more direct, because it is easier to acquire or to develop, taking into consideration the experience of the terrorist organizations. Its effects are visible immediately and therefore more suitable for an attack whose goal is to have an immediate political and media effect and limit the number of victims to the place of the attack. The effect of the attack will be greater in a closed stadium or big closed commercial space, rather than in an open space. The Biological Threat This is more insidious and not immediate but, depending on the agent used, can cause a large number of victims, not only in the perimeter of the attack, but in the city or even the country involved. It can be indeed a mass killing weapon. In both cases, the weak point for the terrorists is the dissemination device, like in all the known incidents and attacks of the past 30 years. It seems to me that the attempts to use cyanide (by the Tunisian and Moroccan groups arrested in Italy in 2002) or ricin, by the cell arrested in the UK lately, show the low-level of scientific/technological preparation and operational thinking of the groups involved in these attempts. Therefore, it can be evaluated that chemical or radiological attacks, based on a classical explosive device as disseminator, could be used, although the experience we had in Israel with the Hamas attempting to introduce poisons in the explosive belts of suicide bombers did not succeed, because the agents evaporated. Operational Consequences Intelligence, more than in the past, becomes the most important aspect in the fight against the terrorist attacks, especially in the prevention of mass destruction ones. The international cooperation, on the intelligence and operational level, must be enhanced and perfected to achieve real-time exchange of vital alert information. New methods of quick control and identification of suspected persons and their background must be developed. There is a need for huge investments in Research and Development (R&D) and defensive measures, especially in the detection of chemical and biological agents. The accent must be put in the defense of potential targets in the nuclear/chemical industry. There is also need of co-operation in the educational and propaganda effort in order to convince the constituencies where terrorists find their recruits of the nefarious consequences of terrorist activities in the modem global environment.

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The Economic and Financial Dimensions of Transnational Terrorism by

Adrian Kendry, Economic Adviser, NATO Political Affairs, Brussels.

I want to talk about what we know about the economic and financial dimensions of the organisation of terrorism and what is it that we know about the efforts that have gone into counter terrorism in terms of financial activities. It turns out this is a very fast moving story and in fact there are some things to report from the last three days about new developments and initiatives. In doing this, I have a number of particular topics I want to look at: first, I want to say something about NATO's role in counterterrorism activity. Thus far, this is not the end of the story. A number of us might think that it is really the beginning of the story, but some things that, second, would lead me on to say something specifically about the work of the NATO Economic Committee as far as counter-terrorism has been concerned. Third, I have some big questions - some strategic questions - to ask, many to which I do not know the answer. I am not claiming that these are the right questions, but some of them are certainly the kinds of questions that people with whom I have mingled on both sides of the Atlantic would like to know the answers to. They introduce some rather disquieting features about the budgetary and economic implications of some of the measures that we are either adopting or some of the measures that we might be thinking of adopting. Fourth, this specifically would therefore turn our attention to thinking about what we can say about the funding of transitional terrorism and what can we say about the financial implications of organising the deterrence of terrorism. Fifth, I shall make a few remarks about international co-operation, as far as we can say anything about this at this time. Sixth, I would like to turn to some of the interesting issues relating to the costs and benefits associated with counter-terrorism policy. There is some interesting work that has come out of the United States recently with which I have been fortunate enough to have some kind of interaction. This again raises some rather disquieting questions. Finally, I shall look at some of the costs and benefits associated with a counter-terrorist policy. On the 6 March, the Counter-terrorism Committee at the UN was visited by the NATO Assistant Secretary General for Defence Planning. As part of his 'information package' was the kind of thing in his brief, as it were, that he would be able to refer to in terms of what, so far, we can say about NATO's role in counter terrorism. Counter-terrorism is a topic that clearly is present at the highest levels of NATO's committee structure. Recently, Sir Jeremy Greenstock gave a presentation on this subject at the North Atlantic Council and addressed the military concept for the defence against terrorism. He made a clear delineation between the various approaches to defending against terrorism, and anti-terrorism from a defensive point of view and the consequence management in terms of thinking about what happens after an attack. This would cover such issues as retaliation and reconstruction. Furthermore, what should be the nature and direction of a counter-terrorist policy on a

A. Kendry / The Economic and Financial Dimensions of Transnational Terrorism

more offensive basis and what can we say about the role of the military forces operating nationally or within the framework of the alliance. Then, there is a regular process of information and intelligence exchange and the partnership action plan on terrorism. There have also been some interesting developments that have been occurring with regard to, NATO's activity in the Balkans particularly in terms of the border control issues Soon after the events of 9/11, there was a conference organised by the United Nations Economic Commission of Europe with the OSCE. This raised some of the conceptual foundations of analysing the economic dimensions of terrorism, partly from the point of view of thinking about how would nations co-operate and partly from the ways that could prevent the kind of free-riding behaviour that is a classic phenomenon within alliances. Networks and hierarchies, from the point of view of looking at the financial organisation of terrorism and counter-terrorism are important and can help in learning lessons from what kind of the resource implications from a vital part of the work that we do. A very interesting practical matter to note here is that there was the first of the Economic and Financial Dimensions of Terrorism Special Reinforced Committee meetings under the Economic Committee at NATO in October 2002. This was very much a speculative venture, but it is fair to say that not all nations within the alliance were convinced initially that this would be a fruitful meeting to convene. Interestingly, however, as a result of this meeting and the outcomes we now have unanimous agreement among all of the allies that there should be a further meeting of this kind to take place later in 2003. In addition to this particular meeting, there are annual meetings of the Reinforced Economic Committee on the Balkans and the Middle East. It is there that the kinds of issues, such as our current understanding of the relationship between organised crime and terrorists groups and their funding within the Balkans, are discussed and assessed. Despite these initiatives, it is fair to say that at this stage there has been little more happening on the counter-terrorism front than a year ago. Whether that is because, literally, there has been a decline in terrorist activity or whether it is just because NATO lacks the right kinds of information is not entirely clear. There are a number of further questions that need to be posed. One very important question is what are the resource implications arising from the desire to integrate information and information sharing among public and private sectors, public and private agencies, in their efforts to find ways of preventing terrorism. Clearly in societies were the private sector is independent and is not required to report information under any kind of statutory basis, - yet may well have all kinds of information which is very relevant to official public policy - this kind of question is really very important indeed. What might constitute an economically efficient allocation of responsibilities among the different institutions in the counter-terrorism effort, this question I think is of great contemporary importance. This is partly because of the major debate about the centralisation, as opposed to the decentralisation, of public activity directed towards counter-terrorism. This is clearly what is happening in the United States and is associated with the Office of Homeland Security and all of the questions about the interaction between the FBI and the CIA. Here, there are some very important budgetary and economic questions to ask. One of the ways we might think about this is in terms of the economic dislocation and economic instability that is provoked by counter terrorism. From the point of view of the NATO alliance it would be very useful to have some sense of

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what could be the potential economic cost arising from certain kinds of terrorist actions, In what ways might NATO, as an alliance, co-ordinate its efforts in a superior way to try and deal with this problem. This raises perhaps an even deeper question about what is the economic cost of long-term deterrence? If deterrence is just seen to be a short-term, short-lived strategy, then it might send out the wrong kind of signals. A further question is that of deterrence as the only strategy. Is it the best strategy? If deterrence is linked to an increasing centralisation of effort to deal with terrorism, does this in some sense possibly make it more likely that terrorist action will be focused upon these centralised efforts or bodies? There are some very serious questions that can be asked about the best way to organise our efforts to deal with terrorism. A classic question is, what are the economic implications of transforming the present European military force structures in such a way that these new transnational threats can be met? And, what would our efforts connected to counter-terrorism tell us about the way in which we should undertake that kind of reorganisation? There are also some other questions. Have economic conditions provoked an upsurge in terrorist activity? Is there a linkage between radicalism and economic deprivation? People talk about the fact that by 2020 there may be as many as 25 million young people in the third world, unemployed between the ages of 16 and 30. These kinds of questions are obviously interesting, but not necessarily cause and effect; but they are still ones that we might want to ask. Another important question is, will the costs of preventing terrorism, in some sense, outweigh the costs arising from the financing of terror? If there is a cost incentive, it would seem to be a case for the terrorist organisations vis a vis the costs of their prevention. We have to be very clear, therefore, as to what the benefits are or what the benefits we perceive to be by applying resources in various different ways. We may not like to grapple with the financial implications of death and destruction, but all governments effectively eventually have to do this, because these are real resources coming from public, that is to say the tax payers, contributions. In broad terms, what can be said about the funding of transnational terrorism? I have to case studies to illustrate my point, but in general terms it would appear to be the case that state-sponsorship is declining. We continue to make reference to illegal income generation, particularly coming from a range of sources - for example smuggling, trafficking of migrants and so on. Some of this does not necessarily involve people engaged in illegal activities but people seeking asylum who can be used by some terrorist groups for financial gain. The trafficking of women, drugs, weapons, are all conventional criteria for which people are paying attention to, as the means of not only assisting organised crime, but also actions connected terrorism. The question then, of course, is whether or not there is a significant linkage between organised crime and terrorist activities. It is a question that continues to be debated in a number of places. Business operations are frequently a source of income generation. Some of these business operations are sort of legal, but they give rise to illegal applications of the funds thereby generated. Some of them are legitimate, if questionable, but it is often difficult to identify precisely the point at which one can appropriate or apprehend the funds because of the kind of legitimacy that is accorded to some of the operations. Charitable contributions are another complex area. It is one area where it's not entirely clear at what point the funds may be perverted or diverted. We need to be careful about interfering with the charities, particularly the various sorts of Islamic charities lest this might then be seen as an attack on Islamic principles. Diasporas we

A. Kendry / The Economic and Financial Dimensions of Transnational Terrorism

know to be a very important potential source of terrorist funding. It is another complex area. Many will be familiar with the way in which the Hawala system operates. This has been identified as a key area of potential movement of money between terrorists groups that have some kind of inter-relationship. Again we have to be extremely careful here, in my judgment, because we know that the Hawala system is historically based upon trust. It is a rather sophisticated communications system, has minimal records and operates with an extensive network where there is little regulatory structure. I would like to offer a couple of brief, and not systematic, comments about the funding of terrorism. If we take a look at what we might we might be able to say about the funding of Hezbollah, then we can identify that it is not just from the lower classes, or the lower socio-economic classes in Lebanon that one would see funding emanating internally. It is in fact Shi'ite middle class contributions that are also notable, partly because of the perception that Hezbollah is engaged with anticorruption and social infrastructure projects. Obviously, the main source of funding is often identified with the Iranian Treasury. The connivance of Syria in this regard is often seen as an important point in terms of the actual money flows that reach Hezbollah. Hezbollah here is viewed as a bargaining chip in the future resolution of the Golan Heights dispute with Israel. Perhaps the most interesting question, and one to which I shall return, is what can we say about the total Iranian funding - which accounts for 30-5-% of the total - and how is it actually distributed between the three wings of the Hezbollah? What does this funding constitute in terms of total assets of Hezbollah and what is the value to be associated with real estate holdings by the organisation in places as far afield as Latin America, Africa, Asia, etc? We could also observe that there are interesting oil swap arrangements with Iran and there are all kinds of covert trading connected with drugs and arms as well. Another organisation, which is currently receiving a lot of attention, is Ansar al Islam in Northern Iraq, whose objective is to eradicate the PUK and KDP and establish a Sunni fundamentalist regime. This, again, raises some very interesting questions if you were take a look at funding issues. For example, there has been evidence of significant financial support from al Qaeda since its inception in late 2001. This source is probably growing in importance. Many questions have been raised about whether Iraq under the Saddam Hussein regime has seen this as an important organisation and that, therefore, there might have been support coming from Baghdad. There is not much evidence for that, however, but there is the question whether or not Iran might be prepared to support Kurdish Muslims. If there had been, it is probably weakening. Nor is there much evidence of local extortion. Nevertheless there is the perception that Western European mosques may be contributing to the organisation. These are a snap shot of some of the issues that come up when we are looking at the funding and financing of terrorism. What can we say about international co-operation in counter terrorism? As mentioned above, there was a special meeting of the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) at the United Nations, which is concerned with the ways to remove obstacles for international co-ordination, globally, regionally, and sub-regionally, to implement counter-terrorism programmes. The CTC wants to see improved contacts among international organisations, and it is interesting to note that the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 on counter-terrorism, implies prevention. In contrast, NATO's Military Committee Fight Against Terrorism doctrine also includes the defence against terrorism and consequence management.

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At the NATO Military Committee's Fight Against Terrorism meeting in March 2003, there were presentations not only from the UN Counter Terrorism Committee, but also from the International Monetary Fund with its global standards for counter-terrorist financing. Also contributing were: the International Civil Aviation Organisation that was looking at standards to apply to aviation, airports, travel documentation; the International Maritime Organisation that was dealing with shipping and ports; and the World Customs Organisation. These were among the organisations making presentations or issuing statements, which, of course, gives rise to a big question, how to avoid duplication in the efforts among all of these international organisations? It is interesting to note the decision to move the counter-terrorism sections of the FBI and the CIA in the United States to one site - a sort of single complex - to improve co-ordination of tracking information and analysis. I come back to my earlier point about thinking about the implications of this in terms of the economically efficient organisation of this kind of effort. In addition, there is to be a joint intelligence centre which is going to remain at Langley, Virginia, just outside Washington DC, for the time being until it moves into a designated complex, the Terrorist Threat Integration Centre. The next question is, under what circumstances might deterrence actually be counter- productive in terms of dealing with terrorist threats? Recently, there has been some kind of movement internationally to deal with financial intervention to counterterrorism. On 28 September 2001, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1373 in which all states were required to "limit the ability of terrorists and terrorist organisations to operate internationally" by freezing assets and denying them a safe haven. In October of that year NATO's Fight Against Terrorism Committee established eight special recommendations that would constitute the international standards upon which the member countries would protect financial systems against terrorist funding. These standards and the issue of non-compliance remain central to the Committee's work to the present day. European States submitted in the autumn of 2002 further names to the UN Resolution 1267 Sanctions Committee for acknowledgment of asset freezing but this has given rise to some very interesting differences of opinion. Trans-Atlantically, for example, it is sometimes said that the European approach, as it is constituted at present, involves a clearing house process that is rather cumbersome in terms of the way in which names of suspected organisations and individuals are actually dispatched to the UN 1267 Committee. It is also interesting to note that some members of the EU do not have the legal structures that would enable them to block the assets of internal terrorists. In fact, the EU as it is presently constituted there is a big discussion about the legal interpretation of whether it has a mandate to be able to direct States to unblock this kind of restriction on information. One of the big differences of opinion between Europe and the United States is that Europeans often see that there are 'firewalls' or divisions between the various categories of organisations, such as Hamas or Hezbollah. The United States typically sees that funding is often very fungible between these kinds of organisations, and that therefore ultimately funds do land up in terrorist organisations, even if they supposedly appear primarily in the social welfare category to begin with. In early March 2003, the United States announced the formation of a new Executive Office for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crime. The Office will coordinate with other offices within the US Treasury and Government and is tasked with the following responsibilities:

A. Kendry / The Economic and Financial Dimensions of Transnational Terrorism

•

to identify, block and dismantle sources of financial support for terrorism and other criminal activities, including money laundering; • to co-ordinate with international partners to expand the scope and intensity of action against the misuse of domestic and international systems; • to work in concert with the Treasury's International Affairs Task Force on Terrorist Financing; • to develop and implement the National Money Laundering Strategy; • to assist in the development of policies and regulations in support of the US Patriot Act; • to represent the US in international organisations directed at the financing of terrorism; and • to give guidance to the Office of Foreign Asset Control, concerned with US trade and economic sanctions, targeting and blocking financial transactions and terrorists' assets, drug traffickers, and foreign ,states threatening US national security. It is interesting to see how this is meant to be tightening up what have already been informed about both within the United States and of its engagement with other international organisations. It demonstrates the continuing efforts that are being directed towards international co-operation. Several decades ago, there was discussion about the control of the Bank of England over offshore funds; the famous advisor to the Bank of England, eventually coined something that became known as 'Goodhart's Law'. This determined that when you sought to control something - that is to say, when you put all of your machinery and all of your efforts into controlling certain types of assets - before you knew it, it had appeared elsewhere, rather like trying to press down a bubble. Of course, some people have been saying this with regard to al Qaeda and some of the other organisations. We have just been too slow internationally in recognising the movement of assets by terrorist organisations that have diversified into diamonds, gold, and other kinds of commodities. We need to be aware of the intelligence that goes into the planning of these kinds of activities; these people are smart, they are literate, they are articulate, and we should not demean them or ourselves in thinking that they cannot work out these things for themselves. Finally, there has been some interesting work being done in Santa Monica, California by Benjamin Zycher. Who has been trying to estimate the cost of a 'severecase' terrorist attack in the United States? He has used data that come from Israel have applied them to making an estimate of what would be the effect of the use of a weapon of mass destruction. A 'severe attack' may be not completely catastrophic, but on the basis of some assumptions he has come up with a calculation of the annual costs of a successful WMD attack upon some significant installation in a densely populated area. Such an attack would give rise maybe to annual costs in excess of $180 billion. The way that he has calculated this, in the world of economic policy, has been to set about trying to estimate what is the value of a loss of life and injuries that comes about from an attack of this form (assumed to be 15,500 deaths and 114,000 injuries extrapolated from Israeli data - total, $66 billion). Then, what is the value of the physical damage that would be commensurately associated with the attack? This he has calculated to total $17 billion or 25% of the total cost of loss of life and injuries. Next, what is this going to do to national income, as a result of these kinds of attacks? This has been calculated at $100 billion or 1% of GDP. Finally, how should we think about the role of the state, the Federal Government in terms of their activities towards counter-terrorism? Is this a kind of counter-terrorism activity a collective good, a so- called public good. Should we be

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thinking about the representation of special interests, which can see, economic rents or profits to be derived from certain kinds of supplying counter- terrorist deterrence? If you look at what the US Federal government has been doing in the last year, together with the contribution from the States and local governments, it turns out that one can identify somewhere in the region of about $95 billion which have been directed in 2002 towards counter-terrorism efforts in the United States. This is an interesting figure because if you ask how is this to be funded, it turns out that the answer is it is either to be funded by taxes now or in the future. The present administration in the United States takes a very interesting view about taxes that might eventually be raised to fund the growing US Federal Government deficit. This is a serious issue in connection with this kind of policy, but if you ask an economist to try and explain how much it actually costs to raise $1 dollar towards meeting the outlay on counter-terrorism, it turns out that, conservatively, the disruption to the private sector is usually valid at around $2. It is possible to go all the way up to $5 dollars here, so $2 is not an over-estimate of the marginal cost of government spending in terms of its impact upon the private sector. This, then, gives you $95 billion multiplied by 2, which is $190 billion dollars as a rough kind of annual economic annual cost imposed upon society by counter-terrorism efforts. If state and local expenditures are added, it is possible to arrive at a figure of around $196 billion. In some measure, this tells us is that, at the present time, about $196 billion are being spent in order to buy about $183 billion worth of terrorism damage. If the authorities should be successful in preventing the act from occurring - and what is not in this analysis is the kind of probability risk analysis of what kind of risk factor should we associate with different sorts of levels of potential terrorist action - it is reasonable to question whether the United States can afford to fight the war against terrorism on a regular basis. Whether or not Europe can afford to fight the war against terrorism depends upon what we want to estimate as the likely kind of damage. These considerations may be unthinkable for many people in Europe, but should really be doing more of this, because, if nothing else, it is an educational process. If you try to do something else that is going to be costly, such as engage in a war against Iraq, that also imposes a financial burden. There are various estimates that could be talked about and these have to be set in the context of the outlays on counter terrorism. Then it is necessary to think about what this means not only in terms of the economic impact and how far does it retard the economy, but also about other budgetary priorities. This is a very important topic and one where I do not see enough evidence of serious thinking and serious analysis. I cannot say that, at the present time within the headquarters of NATO, we are spending a sufficient amount of effort on the subject. This is not surprising given the constitution of the organisation, but I truly am not aware that on an international basis enough serious analytical effort is going into thinking about the instability effects of this kind of investment into the counterterrorism effort.

Future NA TO Security M. Edmonds and O. Cerny (Eds.) IOS Press, 2004

Discussion of Session 3 Paul Swallow I want to support Dr Karmon's assertion on the importance of intelligence. This was important in relation to the Ricin case we had in London. This is an area I work in but we had no idea about this group and what they were doing until we had intelligence from the French authorities. You are absolutely right; had we not had the intelligence we wouldn't have known of their existence. But I also wanted to respond to Adrian Kendry and just seek clarification of one part of his presentation. In his presentation he mentioned NATO's role in the funding of transnational terrorism. As you know, we have a large team in Scotland Yard that does just this. Are we duplicating the work that NATO wants to do? Could NATO contribute to our work somehow in this? You did not mention the word police one in your presentation; and counter-terrorism is a criminal, judicial, police-type thing as opposed to military. Adrian Kendry I think that the simplest answer to the particular point you have raised is that NATO sees terrorism and the related issue of weapons of mass destruction as a threat to stability of the alliance and also, maybe, to the partner states. It has been decided politically within NATO that these kinds of instabilities therefore require some response on an alliance-wide basis. Certainly your observations about which organisations would have the comparative advantage or would have the competence or the authority to investigate and assess aspects of terrorist organisation and financing are well taken. NATO cannot be the primary organisation. I mean it is not a primary intelligence-gathering organisation. However, NATO would seem to be able to play a valuable and vital role, for example within the structure of the Economic Committee, in disseminating information and some results of other work among the allies, That in itself, I think, is important because of the issue of stability. What we have done within the economic committee is to raise the questions about the potential for instability and how, if one looks at, say, critical infrastructure protection, or at certain kinds of contingency threats, one should not lose sight of the impact of economic disruption. Martin Edmonds earlier referred to sort of weapons of mass disruption, as opposed to destruction, and I would venture to say that within the Economic Committee structure these disruption effects are taken very seriously together with what we know about the organisation of these kinds of groups. The limited resources available to the Economic Committee and within the Political Affairs division to deal with this, inevitably mean that we cannot take a primary role, We have no mandate and no particular competence that would enable us to be able to do that, but we may have a very valuable role in terms of our interaction with a range of organisations and, international agencies. There have been other cases where it's been clear that NATO does sort of have a cache that makes it perhaps sometimes uniquely valuable because of it has transatlantic status in co-ordinating bits and pieces of information and approaches and dealing with primary agencies. But I see no role within the Economics Directorate or the Economics Committee at NATO for being able to get their hands on involvement or engagement. It is not our mandate and could not possibly be. But I do think that the smaller allies and partner countries gain an enormous amount because they themselves do not have the resources that would enable them to be aware of these kinds of things.

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Chris Donnelly Firstly, NATO as an institution needs knowledge itself and understanding, so that the member nations representatives sitting around the table, and the civil servants who fulfil their decisions, have the necessary background knowledge to inform them on decision-making. But there is another function as well which is a less obvious one. Adrian Kendry referred to NATO as an information exchange agency. NATO has official mechanisms, like the Political Committee and so on, which actually has technically nothing to do with this, but in fact has everything to do with it. This is because that is where the nations share their knowledge and opinions of political and military-political events. This is what creates the common culture of defence thinking. For years we talked about inter-operability, but what we have actually done at NATO by getting people there and working together is to create a body of people literally under one roof, from different agencies within their own countries, both military and civilian, all speaking common languages, who really get to understand one another and to trust one another. It is this basis of individuals trusting one another that the real exchange of information takes place. Our task is, now, how do we turn this common defence culture which we have built up very effectively, into a common security culture, which we have not got? Barry Denofsky Chris Donnelly's comments raise a couple of further issues. I was struck by Adrian Kendry's presentation on the role that NATO is playing and all of the different committees which are looking at terrorist financing. It is interesting that terrorism is now the top of everyone's agenda. Everyone is in the intelligence business; everyone has got an analytical capacity and everyone is largely doing a lot of the same kinds of things. But what I was struck with was the absence in the presentation of the role of civilian intelligence, something that has traditionally been ignored. Civilian intelligence communities of all of our nations, all of a sudden seem to be in competition to go out and do the same kinds of things. What's missing from all of this is that we still look as though this was a military alliance. As Chris Donnelly was just saying, we now need to look at this whole new dimension of the security environment. How are we bringing intelligence to the table? Where does it come from? Adrian Kendry made the comment that NATO is not a collection agency, but many of our services and many of our countries do have collection capabilities. How does that information move itself back, in and around and get utilised by those who need it? The problem is that we have never really had the debate about what the consumer really wants. That is a bigger issue that perhaps will take place at another point in time, but I just wanted to make that observation because I think it is an important distinction. The other point I wanted to make refers back to Dr Karmon's comments about suicide terrorism. I remember being involved in many terrorist activities in times gone by when we were looking at the potential use of groups which cross that chemical, biological threshold. What would it take for somebody to go out and do something? We concluded, at that time, that the likelihood of it happening was very rare. Nobody would do it as no rational person would do it. The problem was we were not dealing with rational people, and while we had seen some isolated cases and situations of people using chemicals there was nothing that really prepared us - even though we

Discussion of Session 3

did some modelling exercises and looked at a lot of issues, for the event that took place in Tokyo. Then, all of us started to react, which then goes back to the same question of terrorists and suicide bombings. Are these suicide attempts isolated cases? We can look at the World Trade Centre and we look at the Pentagon bombing, but for many of us we do not have the experiences that prepares us for the suicide bomber the person who is going to walk in totally not caring about who is going to live or die, or be hurt or not be hurt. Anywhere. Cornelius Wientjes I want to say just a few words on the role of NATO, as I see it. There are two things I would like to say: first of all, NATO is, of course, very much an information exchange organisation. It is also both a political organisation and a military organisation. Basically, what is going on in NATO is the exchange of information between nations. Now, interestingly of course, NATO has two bodies that are dealing with research and science and technology: the Research and Technology Organisation, which is working in the defence research area, and the Science Committee, with its substructure, working on civil science and technology. This workshop is an excellent example of what these communities in NATO can do. They can bring people from the NATO nations together in order to discuss how science and technology and research and information exchange can help the nations fight terrorism. This is exactly what we are doing here, now that both organisations - the Research and Technology Organisation as well as the Science Committee - have identified the topics that might be the most relevant in the fight against terrorism. They are organising all kinds of activities in order to address these issues. I think that this is the way forward for these communities in NATO and this can be very helpful thing. The other matter I would like to address briefly is that for the last couple of months I have been very much involved in activities that are aimed at supporting the invited nations. These are the seven nations that have been invited to become members of NATO, and to help them to start up the organisation and the structure at a national level that are needed in order to effectively operate within the NATO organisation. I have been very much impressed by the enormous dynamic that has been generated just by inviting these nations to join NATO. All of a sudden, a whole range of issues is now being openly discussed in these nations that were probably there before but were somehow under the surface. By joining NATO states become a member of the club, one that is really involved in prioritising. Today, of course, the very high priority is in the counter-terrorism area. This is producing some very strong dynamics, and I am sure this is not only applying to the invited nations, but also applying to all the NATO nations. This is a very important mechanism. Ely Karmon I would like to answer the question raised by Barry Denofsky, that about suicide bombers. It is a very important question and I would like to make it very, very clear that suicide bombing is not irrational and is not a fanatic's act. This is an organised strategy by a leadership which is aware that this is the best weapon at this moment in time with which to fight the enemy. This was the same in Sri Lanka with the Tamil Tigers, the same with the Hezbollah, and the same with Hamas. This is a decision made at the highest level of the organisation, and it stops the moment the leadership considers this is no longer necessary. The PKK used women suicide bombers, not against civilians, like the Palestinians, but against the police and military camps. The

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moment the PKK leader was in prison, there was a wave of attempts at suicide operations. Then, from prison, he gave the order to stop the suicide bombings, and they stopped. The most active and the most sophisticated organisation using suicide terrorism were the Tamil Tigers. They had a battalion of 600 people just for this purpose. But the moment they decided to negotiate, their leader gave the order to stop suicide bombing. In Iran, which is supporting the suicide bombers of Hamas, Hezbollah and others, is the country where the suicide bombings began. During the war with Iraq, they used young people, fourteen and fifteen year olds, to march on the mines of the Iraqi Army as martyrs, simply to die in order to permit the armoured cars of the Iranian Army to advance. In Teheran, there is a fountain with blood, which is a memorial to the thousands of these martyrs. Today, there is a huge opposition movement in Iran. There are thousands of families who have this as an example. Why did the Iranian opposition never use the suicide bombers except to attack the conservatives? Even the Mahujadeen, which fights from Iraq against the Iranian government, has never used suicide bombing. In the case of the Iranians and Syrians, this is a decision taken at the highest level of the organisation or the State. Spike Bowman Everything that Ely Karmon has said is true; but I still think it is dangerous to think that all terrorists are highly organised. There are a great many dissatisfied people around the world who are willing to commit terrorist acts simply because they are dissatisfied. They do not necessarily have to belong to a group and have a hierarchical direction to do things. In the United States, we see a number of people who have indicated that they are willing, under certain circumstances, to commit suicide bombings. Some of them have no allegiance, or affiliation, that we can find to any terrorist group. Some of them have contacts with many terrorist groups, but have no allegiance to any one of them. So, just by way of a caution, not all the threats out there are hierarchically organised. Pierre Conesa I wish to make a few remarks about the terrorists' funds and the European Union, which is the most important free trade and economic market in the world. It is the one area in which one can count the most important members of a fiscal and financial 'paradise', namely, Monaco, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Cyprus, Jersey, etc. I must say that terrorist funding is using the same network as 'dirty' money. If we are not able to control the 'dirty' money network, we will not be able to control the terrorists' funding system. Sometimes, I must emphasize, this funding is 'clean' money, not 'dirty' money, since it comes from charitable sources. So, we have to address that problem. This means that we must not just talk in terms of intelligence services. For me, the most important administration in these new intelligence operations is the Customs authorities because, surprisingly, they have the most important information about financial networks. For example, the customs people are not participating in the intelligence community, which seems to me surprising because funding, in the struggle against the terrorist, is a central issue. The important question is when will they belong and become a member of the intelligence community?

Discussion of Session 3

Ignacio Cosido Gutierrez I agree with the analysis of Ely Karmon, in the sense that the probability of a nonconventional attack is not very high. However, it is important that we must work with the worst-case hypothesis in this way and have the capacity to manage attacks that display these characteristics. From the Spanish experience in the fight against ETA, it is quite difficult to fight against the threat of terrorism in because first, they do not need too much money with which to undertake any operation, and it is less difficult to get financial support laundered money, garnered from organised crime. Terrorists will use any and all sources of funds, irrespective of their origins. Georg Witschel I agree with Adrian Kendry that the policy on suicide attacks is something that is being adopted by the top management. However, what I would like to know is whether the Tamil LTTE suicide bombers - those who did the bombing - were normally from the very lowest stratum of the population. They were usually poor, but they got compensation, or their families got compensation. So, the terrorists used the poorest people for this purpose. This is also true for the suicide bombers used by Hezbollah in Israel. But is there a kind of mix? Certainly, the dispatchers are from a higher social stratum. But, what about the suicide attackers in your area? I believe that NATO simply should keep away from analysing and discussing the financial and economic repercussions of terrorist attacks. NATO has no comparative advantage on issues of terrorist financing, I believe that this should be dealt with in either the OECD, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), to some extent other international financial institutions, or the group which is made up of the major banks dealing with these issues; but it should certainly not be within the NATO. Ely Karmon I do not know the Tamil Tigers' set-up very well, although from what I do know they have a special permanent battalion of some 500-600 people who know from the beginning that they were recruited for this (suicide) task and that they are waiting for their mission orders. So, they live separately; they are trained separately as a unit; and they even have an identity, by which I mean a kind of identity card. If they are stopped by the police, they show their ID card and the policemen turn and run away they did so in Sri Lanka, at least. Then, they continue on their way to their target. In Israel, they are recruited more on the personal basis until the last moment. Most of them have been young people and drawn from the poorer strata of society. Nowadays, there are more of the worst types with disturbed personalities. Some potential suicide bombers are recruited through personal connections. Specialised recruiters approach and look in Mosques for those who are open to indoctrination. They know how to find the people who are susceptible and able to do this kind of operation. We have more and more cases where people, after they accepted the invitation to become a suicide bomber, regret it at the last moment. But it is very difficult for them to change their mind, because they have written their last wills and have become isolated from their families. So, although there is the expression of motivation, sometimes this motivation disappears at the last moment. This is why we have a lot of arrests and detainment of would-be suicide bombers. Again, this is a strategy I, beg to contradict. I do not know many suicide operations that are conducted on a personal basis. I do not say that there are not persons, who are ready to do it - we have, for instance, the suicide acts of Buddhists

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Discussion of Session 3

as a personal gesture - but not organised waves of suicide bombing operations. This could only be done by a small organisation such as the Islamic Jihad. Hamas is a huge organisation, as is Hezbollah; so, there are different levels of organisation. The PIJ, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, is mainly using this method. The Hamas also has the suicide bombers and so on, and sometimes they specialise in this kind of operation. Adrian Kendry I do not doubt what has been said about OECD, FATF and WEU, but the facts are that the nations have wanted this kind of investigation and analysis. This was undertaken when we were running the first meeting of the Economic Committee. It is fair to say that it was not necessarily clear that all of the members of the Alliance were in agreement. But, as a result of the papers that were published and the meetings that took place, there is now a unanimous call for there to be further large meetings over a couple of days on the subject. This comes from the Capitals, as you are all very well aware. It is not we, ourselves, who say that we would like to organise these meetings. We think there might be some marginal benefit. What has happened, is that the various delegations have contacted the Capitals and the Capitals have instructed them to support these meetings and all of the apparatus. Personally, I believe that there is value-added here, and the reason I do so is, despite all this excellent work being done by various people, because I have seen with my own eyes that we can sometimes over-estimate exactly what people know in particular groups and organisations. Within this kind of structure on a transatlantic basis I really think there is some value-added. Julian Lindley French I have been very moved listening to what I have been told about the gap between the nature of the threat and the nature of our responses - particularly the Americans' response that this whole gamut of military transformation is directed at some kind of state-based threat. However much it is packaged, it is still State-based in the nature of its driving element. And yet, the discussion in this workshop is that is very, very low tech in its delivery and requires much more human intelligence, much more penetration, and much more understanding culturally of the sources of the threat. It seems to me that the Europeans are, therefore, trapped in a paradox. There is much pressure to go down the American military road, even if that American military road might not actually be addressing the threat itself. I cannot quite draw the direct link between the kind of transformation, or transformed force, that we hear about from Washington on the one hand and stopping the kind of threat that is emerging on the other. I fear that the Europeans will find themselves more and more having to fill this particular capability gap in their planning. One final point: it seems to me that the US has trapped itself in a dilemma. Every threat the US will face will be, by definition, asymmetric, because no one state is going to confront the US Army, Air Force, Marines and Navy. No one person, no state, no group of states would dare; so, it promotes asymmetry. But even with transformation, even with the doctrinal changes that Washington talks about, it seems to me the US cannot do it alone. I think the US might have to acknowledge that and recognise that NATO might have a key role in plugging a gap in their own force structure.

Discussion of Session 3

Kevin Rosner Just one comment on the recommendation that the OECD - having myself just come from the OECD - undertakes this sort of analysis. My experience has been by way of example: several months back, I proposed within the framework of the programme on co-operation with the Russian Federation, to undertake a study of the relationship between the issue of Russian economic security and the energy element therein. I did so because the term 'security' appeared in the title. Believe me, I followed the OECD protocol to the very end, but the idea was ultimately dismissed. The OECD feels very comfortable in doing economic analysis, but it is very queasy when approaching issues that are seen to be in other, more defence-related, domains. I shall be speaking briefly later about the energy component of an economic system within the bureaucratic structure of the OECD. This is that the IEA is charged with energy questions and prohibits the OECD institutionally from addressing those issues, other than doing so from a policy standpoint. By way of another example, there is financial market analysis with respect of non-transparency in share trading in Russian oil companies, etc, etc. I do not know what the answer to the question is, but I am not very confident that, if presented to the OECD, you would get anything, other than a major delegation that is willing to pay for it. Bruce Jones I think the only thing I can add to this discussion is that the Vietcong had the concept of 'nominated suicides'. That is also something to contemplate. This ends Session three, after which we move on to Session Four, in which we are talking about Primary and Consequential Targets, New Public Service Organisation Stakeholders.

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SESSION 4

Primary and Consequential Targets - New Public Service Organization (PSO) Stakeholders Information Security Factors by

Julius Linde Constitutional Protection Bureau, Jurmala, Latvia

One of the main factors creating a threat to information systems is the possibility of criminal action on-line in global and local computer networks. The importance of this threat in Latvia is growing because of the increase in the dependence of state institutions on computer systems. Threats to Latvia's information systems can appear as the result of both intentional and unintentional actions, because of the user's lack of experience or carelessness. Intentional criminal activities include hackers' illegal actions with the aim of obtaining unauthorized access to information resources in order to destroy, steal or otherwise manipulate them. The above-mentioned actions are particularly damaging, for they can be implemented in the so-called information warfare in the internet network. According to the implementation of these attacks, they can be divided into logical attacks on information systems influencing their functioning, the use of operator systems' flaws and loading separate resources, and semantic attacks that change the content of the information. Such attacks can paralyse the state economy and damage the state strategic interests. The opinion and judgment of the Latvian state joint-stock company, the State Information Network Agency, (Latvian abbreviation VITA) and the Communication Ministry's Information Department on the existing and potential threat to national security and risk factors are based on VITA's preparedness to cope with crisis situations. Being the state data transmission network operator, VITA creates and maintains an intranet computer network, the Baltic countries' special communication system and the special communication system of the Republic of Latvia. Potential crisis situations and possible threats that fall within VITA's responsibility are constantly connected with the guarantee of information security and communications stability. Threats to information systems are characterized according to Regulations No. 106 of Latvia's Cabinet of Ministers of March 21, 2000, "Regulations of Information Systems' Security", and they can be divided as follows: • logical-level threat where illegal access to information systems takes place, avoiding logical protection; • physical threat, for example, in cases of fire, floods, electricity supply interruption and attacks on electronic communication systems, as well as if environment is changed above the fixed norms. According to VITA's draft operational and development plan, the following measures are planned and are being implemented in close cooperation with national security and risk factors in the sphere of information security:

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electronic data storage is created, including storages of the state electronic documents and reserve copies of the state major registers; • public key cryptography means are created in order that users can ensure confidentiality and integrity in the data transmission sphere. The necessary preconditions for e-services granting and receiving are created, VITA plans to maintain a public key infrastructure and grant a time sealing service; • new, secure communication channels are created, communication channels are dubbed; and, • 100% VITA traffic data encryption. VITA functions develop in an evolutionary way according to clients' growing requirements. First of all, in meeting the state administration's needs (e-administration conceptions in the sense of the back office). VITA claims the role of the executive institution as the point of reference for the state administrative departments, (eadministration conceptions in the sense of the front office). The above recognise that VITA, according to the Latvian Cabinet of Ministers' Regulations No.352, is an important state organization. The state agency VITA, within the responsibility for data security and designs, implements Latvia's national information systems protection policy. The National information systems protection plan envisages the following: • defining critical telecommunications and information accessibility infrastructure elements (the points less protected against violent actions, mutual connection and substitution); • destructive actions enumeration, including enumeration by means of the special VNDPT (Data Transmission Network of State Importance) monitors; • data security audit and risk analysis; • immediate informing of the responsible institutions of the noticed destructive actions; • preparations of action plan for interrupting of destructive activities, as well as for system functioning and information renewal after destructive action; • public educating on data security issues (carried out also by private sector); • designing recommendations for legal acts' amendments, using the previous experience. VITA prepares an annual report on the National information systems protection plan, including chapters on risk analysis, security audit and statistics. VITA submits this report to the Communication Ministry's Constitution Protection Bureau and Crisis Control Center, thereby providing the necessary information on the state's preparedness for crisis situations in one of the main telecommunications infrastructure segments. In the information technology protection sphere, both physical (access control) and logical (computer programs and equipment) protection methods are used. In 2002, for protection of the local computer networks of the State border control regional departments, 30 'Fire Wall' devices were installed. In order to secure all the local computer networks' connection points, 39 more devices were necessary. Within the state investment program IA-22, a new computerized border control information system is being designed with an increased protection against the illegal use of information and technical resources, data coding and, in the near future, a reserve data transmission channel will be completed. Access by officials from Interior institutions to information resources is only restricted and fixed by the institution's instructions.

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Security Challenges for the 21st Century: Protecting Critical Energy System Infrastructure (CESI) by Kevin Rosner, OECD, Paris

You may not be interested in war, but war is interested in you " - Leon Trotsky

Europe's system of energy configurations including power plants and electricity grids, transmission lines, oil and gas pipeline networks, and other interdependent power generation and distribution facilities is uncomfortably exposed to threat. From low-level conventional attacks on high-level physical assets, for example on congested transmission lines in densely populated urban areas, to cyber attacks on the information systems which control electric power and pipeline throughput, the only certainty is that these threats are mutating in order to avoid early detection or interdiction. A major interruption in the supply of vital natural resources and the debilitation, if not destruction, of critical energy system infrastructure (CESI) that generates, refines, transmits, and transports these resources not only entail potential severe economic and human hardships to directly affected national infrastructures but also carry with them associated vulnerabilities for the global economy as a whole. Recent emphasis on threats to energy supply and CESI has focused on up- and mid-stream infrastructures in the Persian Gulf, the Caspian Sea basin, and the South China Sea. However, attention must also be drawn to terrorist threats1 to mid-and downstream CESI in import dependent European NATO member, partner and allied states and be incorporated into building comprehensive and transnational strategies for dealing with the security challenges of the 21st Century. A broader threat assessment to European energy security must also account for the asymmetric demand-supply relationship between the Russian Federation many NATO members. If one includes as a separate subset those states formally invited to join NATO at the Prague summit in November 2002, the field of states-at-risk increases exponentially with a corresponding increase in the number of potential weaknesses and vulnerability points. While the present trajectory of Russia-NATO, Russia-EU, and in particular RussiaUS relations is favorable Russian policy far from impervious to change. Policy planners must therefore construct an effective strategy for denying rogue, non-state actors an ability to generate crises in critical energy delivery and supply networks and to develop a deep and predictable strategy with Russia in helping to secure Europe's energy future. The defining task for CESI protection is to develop and refine a comprehensive strategy for • anticipating and pre-empting, • intervening and reacting, and See Annex I for an overview of terrorist strategies and motivating factors for terrorist organizations against oil and gas installations. The comments while applicable to all regions were initially directed to an assessment of terrorist activities against pipeline infrastructures in Central Asia.

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•

ultimately ensuring the prompt recovery to interruptions in supply and delivery. A rigorous planning system must: • catalogue and define high risk CESI • analyze the costs and effects of proposed solutions • construct pragmatic modalities for prevention and response mechanisms particularly on a transnational basis in the European theatre • adapt solutions and investments as necessary based on peer-to-peer dialogue • identify best practices drawn from instituted CESI protective measures in European and non-European geographic domains. Strategy formulation and its implementation must be long-term in vision and holistic in approach. Co-operation with institutional architectures focused on energy transport security, such as GUUAM or the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation while positive is alone insufficient. The key to success in protecting CESI is the development a continuous planning system (CPS) that remains relevant in the face of ever changing circumstances. Benign co-operation must be augmented with active, ongoing, and ever present collaboration. A second strand of formulating strategies for protecting CESI should include an analysis of activities undertaken by those outside of the international community of democratic nations in protecting their own energy assets. For example, assessment of security measures taken by a number of states in the volatile Persian Gulf region may render energy transport and distribution intelligence heretofore left unconsidered. CESI is a fundamental building block to all modern societies because their assets, systems, and functions are so vital to national security that their disruption or destruction would have a debilitating effect on everything from defense installations, banking and financial electronic infrastructures, water supplies, chemical plants, to police and fire installations as well as to institutions charged with emergency preparedness and readiness. By definition all CESI has some level of risk. The question becomes what risks are unacceptable, to whom, based on a variety of assessment criteria. A short list of unacceptable CESI physical asset risks may include: • large power generators particularly dams and nuclear facilities. Policymakers and industry representatives recognize that a security breach at a nuclear power plant endangers not only the reliability of the energy system but also the physical safety of large regions and their populations. • major pipelines and electric distribution facilities. The 62,000-km former Soviet Union (FSU) oil and gas network is the largest integrated hydrocarbons transport system in the world interconnecting 17 countries. Risks to the security of this system and its interconnections with non-FSU networks are of major and absolute concern to European energy security and global economic stability. Certain congested power lines are criticalnot only to the operation of the power grid-but also to its security. Downstream population centers, industrial, chemical, water, and agricultural networks are all vulnerable to breaches in energy transmission. • large, fuel storage facilities, strategic energy reserves and refineries. Like power plant regulations, CESI protection has focused on mitigating environmental problems and not defending against non-traditional security challenges such as terrorism.2 The use of computational techniques and models for the process of prioritising infrastructure vulnerabilities can improve resource allocation and enable better analysis of interdependencies among critical systems.3 2

Brown, Matthew, " Safeguarding the Nation's Energy," National Council of State Legislatures, 2002. Further, A checklist of CESI and CIP steps which should be evaluated through a vulnerability assessment is included in Annex II to this paper.

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Physical asset protection is but one aspect of a comprehensive CESI plan. Just as the revolution in information technology has transformed global markets and those who control them-financial intermediaries evaluating, administrating, and executing currency trade, commodity purchases, and financial asset management over loan and portfolio investmentso too has control over energy supply and delivery systems been ceded to cyberspace. Advanced, post-industrial societies and economies are critically dependent on linked computer information and communication systems that serve as the foundation for economic activities in all modern, market-based economies. Control over these cyber networks is far from secure. Cyber attack strategies on CESI can be a major force multiplier and equalizer for small states and non-state actors if not in particular due to the relatively modest costs for waging cyber war.4 The following are but two concrete examples of cyber attacks that could occur on European CESI: • In the late 1990s, a US National Security Agency staged a mock attack on systems that control the power grid and found that a relatively unsophisticated cyber attack could bring it down. In follow up in 1997, the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection issued its report warning that through mutual dependencies and interconnectedness, critical infrastructures could be vulnerable in new ways, and that vulnerabilities were steadily increasing, while the costs of attack were decreasing. But internet control systems remain vulnerable and national energy providers continue to rely heavily on them. • While many governments and commercial organizations insulate the sensitive parts of their computer systems from external cyber intrusion it is harder to protect computerized systems from an inside job. This second example illustrates the devastating effect that cyber attack could have had on the Russia-Europe energy nexus. In early 2000, "officials say, a disgruntled employee of Gazprom-the world's largest producer natural gas producer which singularly provides Europe 20% of its entire gas consumption- helped a group of hackers seize for several hours the corporation's computer systems, including those regulating gas flow through the firm's pipelines. Gazprom subsequently denied press reports of the break-in. And, officials add, the politically powerful corporation was furious when the information was made public. "Heads rolled in the Interior Ministry after the newspaper report came out," said another senior official. But, this person added, "We were very close to a major natural disaster."5 Risk assessment to Europe's energy infrastructure must include a vulnerability assessment on CESI from cyber attack. As stated earlier, an additional threat assessment to European energy security must also account for the asymmetric demand-supply relationship between the Russian Federation and many European states. Northeastern Europe, South East Europe, and Western Europe all consume vast quantities of Russian or Russian controlled transit hydrocarbons. On a national basis European import dependence is already an established fact: 9 out of 33 European countries are more than 95% dependent on imports and only five are either self-sufficient or net exporters.6 In the European Union, fossil fuels make up fourfifths of its total energy consumption and almost two-thirds of which it imports. As stated earlier, natural gas from Russia alone represents 20 percent of EU consumption. Natural gas, which in 2000 made up one-third of imports, is expected to double by 2020. The EU's 3

Don, Bruce and Mussington, David, " Protecting Critical Infrastructure" RAND Corporation, Review http://www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/rr.08.02/infrastructure.html Shimeall, Timothy, et.al " Countering cyber war" NATO Review, Winter 2001/2002, p. 17. 5 Quinn-Judge, Paul. " Cracks in the System" Time, Vol.159, No.24, 17 June 2002 6 Stern, Jonathan, " Security of European Natural Gas Supplies: The Impact of Import Dependence and Liberalization, " London, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, July 2002:4. 4

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own energy supply covers barely half of what it needs, and estimates in the absence of either decreasing demand, increased efficiencies or a substantial increase in the percentage of energy generated from non traditional resources, European energy imports will be much higher in 30 years' time amounting to 70 percent of total needs. 90 percent of oil is likely to be imported.7 If managed properly, the Russia-European hydrocarbon relationship could positively contribute to CESI protection. If neglected and left to market forces alone, this relationship could contribute to increasing CESI vulnerabilities and contribute to the growing, asymmetric demand-supply relationship between European states and the Russian Federation. There is any number of ongoing bilateral dialogues occurring on global energy security. For Europe, ratification by Russia of the European Energy Charter on enhancing energy security, the Russia-European energy dialogue, and a host of other institutional arrangements are dedicated to enhancing Russia-European energy co-operation. However, in an increasingly globalising world dependent on hydrocarbons to fuel growth and expansion, the relationship between economic security and energy availability will only increase beyond its present significant magnitude. I can only briefly mention several trends in with direct impact on the Russia-EU, Russia-NATO member energy dialogue.8 First, privatisation of Russia's oil sector is a positive development for Europe's energy security but the political economic, and geopolitical ambitions of Russia's 11 major vertically integrated companies (VICs) must be highly scrutinized and understood on a case by case basis. Mikhail Khodorkovsky, President of YUKOS (Russia's second largest VIC) has already warned 'the West' that they should not underestimate Russia's oil potential and its ability to shift its emphasis away from Europe towards fulfilling accelerating demand in Northeast Asia.9 Second, a key constraint on effective energy resource development is market access. While the Russian state has relinquished control over production in many instances, it still extends large influence through its control over major transport routes.10 Transneft and Gazexport combined control 95% of Russia's oil and gas exports. There has been no measurable relinquishment of control of Russian hydrocarbon transport networks by these entities and quid pro quo by the Russian government. Transneft and Gazexport strategically advance Russian foreign and economic policies. These policies are by nature highly susceptible to changes in Russia's leadership. Gazprom and Russia's oil majors have been extremely active in seeking energyrelated investments in former CMEA/CIS states. Continuation of reliable energy supply and economic growth in transition countries demands large influxes of foreign direct investment (FDI). In 2001, LUKoil acquired refineries in Ukraine, Romania, and Bulgaria; YUKOS purchased a major stake in Transpetrol, a Slovak crude pipeline operator.11 These ex-Russia mid-and-downstream asset acquisitions could be powerfully significant in exerting economic leverage and influence over sovereign states' policies that reach well beyond the energy domain.

7

"Towards a European strategy for the security of energy supply", Brussels, Commission of the European Communities, COM 321 final, 26.6.2002. A more complete list of Russia energy supply and geo-strategic security issues are elaborated on in Annex III. 9 Pragmatism in Russian Foreign Policy, CIS-Barometer, No.32, Hamburg, Korber Foundation and the Research Institute of the German Council on Foreign Relations, January 2003. 10 Transition Report 2001, Energy in Transition, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, November 200, p. 75 " Hill, Fiona " Russia: The 21s' Century's Energy Superpower? " Washington DC, Brookings Institute, February 2003 8

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The Economic Impact Finally, I have been asked to comment on the economic importance of vulnerability of modem societies due to disruption of energy supply. While a short list of probable targets has already been identified, the economic costs of terrorism to post industrial society presents an entire subset of economic criteria that contribute to risk assessment and intervention strategies for CESI. First, the economic effects of terrorism and the responses they elicit are significant. Prominent in this argument is that: 12 Terrorism imposes a negative supply-side shock on the economy that raises costs and inefficiencies. Short term costs include the loss of human and non human capital, uncertainty and apprehension in financial markets including at least short term market volatility which leads to higher investment costs for industry as investors move out of riskier assets (i.e. stocks and variable bond grades) into more secure financial instruments such as short-term treasury bonds, gold or cash). This consideration has particular significance for investment in oil and gas infrastructure that is, by nature, long-term, capital intensive, and often subject to geographic areas considered both politically and economically unstable. Expenditures on security divert labour and capital resources towards the production of necessary but less productive activities. Diversion of labour and capital into protecting human and non-human assets, higher insurance premiums, travel delays, transport and shipping delays all divert productive inputs away from where they would be otherwise more efficiently utilized. This category of economic factors must be calculated almost exclusively on an individual facility or asset basis to arrive at the proper calculation of a ' risk premium' for investment in enhanced security and protective measures.13 Conclusion In summary, the potential weaknesses in and protection of CESI in NATO's European theatre of operations are numerous, complex, and vastly outstrip existent architectures for ensuring continuous energy flow to states in these regions and moreover CESI protection. Therefore the following recommendations in the form of specific modalities are proposed. A small combined joint task force (CJTF) of scientific, economic, and political officers should work to: • collaborate with NATO members, allies and partners in cataloguing high priority CESI • identify critical weaknesses leading to system vulnerabilities and suggest best practices for protecting CESI based on peer-to-peer dialogue • focus on the downstream impact of breaches in energy supply and disruption on critical defense, industrial, and financial infrastructures • measure the economic and human costs of CESI debilitation and/or destruction • estimate time required for real CESI recovery • launch a CPS based on active collaboration with NATO members, allies and partners

12 13

The Economic Costs of Terrorism, Washington DC, United States Congress, May 2002. Summary comments on the economic costs of terrorism, as applied to the events in the United States can be found in Annex IV to this document.

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Annex I THE RISKS OF TERRORISM TO CESI There is very little, publicly available, serious in-depth research on the use of terrorist attacks on CESI. Unfortunately, I have further been unable to identify a good database on this specific subject other than the US State Department's annual report on Patterns of Global Terrorism. Therefore, the following observations are drawn largely from the comments of Ely Karmon, and ICT Senior Researcher, on the risks of terrorism against Oil and Gas Pipelines in Central Asia.14 Over the period 1980-2000 90 incidents concerning pipelines, oil and gas facilities, and personnel involved in the discovery, exploration, and construction of these resources were recorded for this period. These incidents are divided by continents as follows • •

Middle East - 16 (Iraq - 2, Kuwait - 4, Lebanon - 5, Saudi Arabia - 1, Turkey - 4) Africa and North Africa - 18 (Algeria - 3, Angola - 6, Congo - 1, Mozambique - 3, South Africa - 2, Sudan - 3) • Latin America - 29 (Argentina - 2, Colombia - 19, Ecuador - 2, Guatemala - 1, Peru - 2, Suriname - 1, Venezuela - 20) • North America - 2 (US - 1, Canada - 1) • Europe - 17 (Belgium - 3, Cyprus - 1, Germany - 7, Norway - 1, Spain - 4 UK - 1) • Asia - 6 (Afghanistan - 2, Japan - 2, Philippines - 1, Thailand - 1) Looking to the targets attacked by terrorist, we acquire a better understanding of the methods used by them: • • • •

•

14

Bombings of pipelines - 17. It should be noted that this number includes bombing of NATO military pipelines in Europe in the 1980s, by left wing radical organizations. Bombings of oil fields and other facilities - 9 (including one car-bomb). Bombings of offices of private or national oil companies - 9. 15 Kidnappings - 23. Some kidnappings were intended to achieve the cancellation of oil research or exploitation of existing oil fields, others to protest oil or general policies, and many for ransom. There were cases of kidnapping 20 to 30 people in one operation, mainly in regions were strong guerrilla organizations were active. Killings - in many cases personnel of oil or other involved companies were killed during the attacks. The worst known case is the bombing of the Ocensa pipeline, again in Colombia, in October 1998, which provoked the death of 71 persons and the injuring of more than 100

Karmon, Ely " The Risk of Terrorism against Oil and Gas Pipelines in Central Asia" presented at a Symposium on The Oil and Gas Routes from Caspian-Caucasus Region: Geopolitics of Pipelines, Stability and International Security organized by the Landau Network Como, Italy 10-11 December 2001 15 For example, on March 2, 2003 a large car bomb explosion took place in Venezuela near the home of US Chevron's environmental protection manager who has been active in the opposition-government debate that has severely curtailed Venezuela's hydrocarbon production. Reported by Coleman, David "Early Morning Bomb Explosion rocks Chevron executive's residential district," V.Headlines.Com http://www.vheadline.com/readnews.asp?id=3746

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Finally, terrorist strategists were always aware of the importance of oil and gas resources for their own political and economical needs. Terrorist organizations have used attacks on such resources for various goals: •

By attacking oil and gas facilities they can provoke serious economic hardships and endanger the internal stability of the governments they are fighting, thus facilitating their quest for power;

•

In many cases, the targeting of these resources is seen as an important step in the fight against foreign powers which have vested strategic interests in these regions, which support the legal government, or against international companies involved in the development and exploitation of oil and gas resources;

•

Finally, they see the possibility to use the financial wealth from oil revenues, or the threat to curtail the oil and gas flow, for purchase of weapons, or to increase their economic and social influence among the population they want to control.

Therefore for NATO European members, partners, and allies data accumulation and active and regulator interactive consultations between a consortium involving private oil and gas entities, grid and transport operators, national ministries of energy, economics, and defense could be coordinated through NATO in providing the basis for the construction of a database delineating behaviors and strategies of known and potential terrorist individuals, groups and organizations operating throughout the region.

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Annex II CATALOG OF HIGH-RISK CESI AND CIP PREEMPTIVE/RESPONSIVE MEASURES It is clearly recognized that critical energy system infrastructure and its associated generation facilities, cyber control and network installations, pipelines, and storage facilities are potential targets of terrorism. The central aim of assessing security issues which may confront CESI is for integrating present and emerging threats into a continuous planning system (CPS). A major challenge facing CESI is that vulnerability assessments must undertaken within regional, national and transnational parameters given the interconnected transport, supply, and import dependency requirements of European and CIS states. Catalog Critical oil production facilities Major oil pipeline pumping stations and integrated cyber network control installations Major physical oil pipelines (particularly those with no known redundancy sub-system)16 Oil transport river crossings Oil transport terminals Oil storage facilities including those for strategic reserves Oil processing/refining facilities Critical gas production facilities Major gas pipelines Liquification facilities Branch network and cyber network control facilities and installations Large power generation stations fueling large grid based systems Nuclear facilities Hydroelectric power facilities Gas fired electric generation facilities Coal fired electric generation facilities Power transmission lines Large, physically coupled power transmission networks (particularly those near large, urban centers) CIP Measures Prevention Measures17 A. • •

Identification and analysis of major national CESI based on downstream Network interconnections and cross-border transit points based on geophysical, geostrategic and geoeconomic considerations Major population concentrations' concerned

16 For specific pipeline security measures see " Trans-Alaska Pipeline: Ensuring the Pipeline's Security", Briefing Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Water, Power, and Offshore Energy Resources, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, US House of Representatives, Government Accounting Office, November 1991 17 This information has drawn heavily from Jenkins, Brian Michael "Protecting Public Surface Transportation Against Terrorism and Serious Crime: An Executive Overview, The Mineta Transportation Institute College of Business, San Jose University, October 2001

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• • • • •

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Defense and national security interconnectedness and dependency Emergency readiness and response mechanisms dependent on the national energy grid Critical industrial infrastructures affected by supply/transmission disruptions Related cyber control networks for major generating facilities Particular attention to facilities and installations with no redundancy/contingency planning for supply/transmission disruptions

B. Collation of national and international CESI intelligence, crime strategies and statistics for understanding of how specific groups, local criminal operators, thieves and vandals have successfully approached and/or breached CESI. Noting that terrorism is borderless but actions are often replicated, this step may well serve in developing preventive strategies for CESI debilitation and/or destruction C. Examination and improvement of procedures for personnel background checks, verification of truthfulness in reporting personal histories for those particularly with key access to generation, transmission, command and control CESI facilities D. Improving liaison between local police, fire, rescue, and national military security establishments. Multimodal communications are essential B. Establishment of CESI crisis monitoring and management plans and introduction of computerized system (pipeline, transmission, and distribution) layout networks C.

Conducting mock conventional and cyber-attack exercises to assess CESI vulnerabilities

D.

Establishment of rigorous procedures for detection, inspection, and destruction of suspicious vehicles, packages, objects located at or near CESI

E.

Emphasis on construction or procurement of physical assets and technologies that reduce human, security operating costs.18 This list may include • • • •

Fencing, concrete or earthen work bulwark construction at yet under protected generating plants, transmission facilities, loading and terminal facilities Access control, alarm systems, and CCTV (closed circuit television) monitoring high risk-volume CESI technologies including security system integration systems Ingress corridors for emergency repair, response, and interdiction vehicles Introduction of protective lighting, and intrusion lighting at high risk CESI facilities19

18 Stidger, Ruth. W. "Protecting Our Systems" Gas Utility Manager Magazine, December 2001. " What does increased security cost? In the US with large companies (25,00 employees or more), the American Society for Industrial Security estimates an annual security budget of $ 10 million or more. At the other end of the spectrum utilities with fewer than 1,000 employees may spend $ 100,000 a year. 19 Ibid.

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Response and Recovery A. Establishment of CESI crisis monitoring and management plans including introduction of computerized system (pipeline, transmission, and distribution) layout networks where presently unavailable. These plans must include • Procedures for notification and activation of crisis management teams and must indicate the roles and responsibilities of all involved • Must address shutdown procedures • Must address procedures for contacting victims' families/relatives • Must be capable of restoring service or reverting to alternative routing • Must be capable of issuing public information • Must be capable of an interagency, transnational basis for collectively responding to CESI disruptions or destruction on a transnational basis

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Annex III RUSSIA-EU STRATEGIC ENERGY SUPPLY AND CESI ISSUES FOR FURTHER REVIEW Any energy supply threat assessment to NATO member states, particularly those in continental Europe, necessitates an understanding of the nexus between Russian foreign policy and its energy complex. Russian national security, and the doctrines that define and underline its strategic objectives, tie the effective implementation of policies that advance Russian national security to the stable economic development of the state. Presently, and into the foreseeable future, Russian ' stable' economic growth is largely a function of Russian success in the energy field: oil, gas, nuclear, and electricity transmission. Among delineating the most prominent issues, which should be addressed within the context of an effective transnational CESI protection strategy for NATO members, partners, and allies, an effort should be made to actively engage the Russian Federation in this process. The following are simply an ad hoc list of observations and issues that could assist in defining the context of these discussions. (1) An overview of the commercial activities between Russia's largest VICs, Gazprom and NATO member states, partners, and allies with particular attention paid to Russian acquisitions in mid-and-downstream oil and gas assets in regions considered geo-strategicaly important to NATO. The threat here is that Russia is trying to reconstruct a virtual buffer zone between itself and more powerful Western European nations through the acquisition and control of energy supply and CESI throughout what it considers its ' near abroad'. For example: • The announcement that in January 2003 that Russia was cutting off oil deliveries to Latvia's Ventspils oil terminal. While the Russians argue that this decision has been based on commercial considerations, in response to Ventspil's high transit tariffs and the opening of Russia's Primorsk terminal, the move is largely seen as leveraging energy deliveries on Latvia to lower the market value in Ventspils-Nafta, the Latvian-owned company. Latvia had already announced its intention to sell a 38 percent stake in the company. Ventspils is the largest oil terminal in the Baltic states. Nicholas Redman of the Economist Intelligence Unit in London and CDISS, Lancaster University, stated in a RFE/RL interview, "I think it's quite ironic that in the year that Latvia received the NATO invitation, [we] see fairly naked economic-political pressure from Russia. But look at the motive here. The motive is to gain control of Ventspils Nafta and, with it, the pipeline running between Russia and Latvia."20 • "Powerful Russian economic interests have always been present in Eastern Europe, especially in the energy sector. In fact, Bulgaria is completely dependent on Russian gas supplies. Thus, Russian foreign policy has come to rely on the influence wielded by its energy sector, which many analysts refer to as 'Russia's gas diplomacy'. Furthermore, Russian strategies involve the financing of puppet local companies. Topenergy, for example, was set up as a Russian-Bulgarian join venture, but actually the blocking quota of 54 percent belongs to the Russian giant Gazprom, whereas only 28.3 percent is owned by Bulgarian enterprises. This control enabled Gazprom to sell gas to Bulgaria for a price one third higher than that offered to Germany."21 Mite, Valentinas," Russia: Moscow Halts Oil Exports to Latvia's Ventspils, Seeks Ownership" RFE/EL, 10 January, 2003 Staneva, Milena " Russia's New Strategy for Control over Eastern Europe" CSIS Prospectus, Vol. 3, No. 3, Fall, 2002

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• "The wave of mergers and acquisitions in new European petrochemicals markets has started to be felt in central Europe. The need to secure feedstock supply to reach competitive production capacity drives petrochemicals companies closer to local oil firms, their natural allies. Oil companies in the region are also looking to expand through increasing supply revenues and diversifying production. Russian oil and gas companies have been expanding their business to petrochemicals. Through its petrochemical subsidiary Sibur, Gazprom, the Russian gas giant, has already started to establish a presence in Hungary, while Lukoil, the biggest Russian oil company, has been moving into the petrochemicals sectors of Romania and Bulgaria. Other Eastern countries where Russian petrochemicals companies are active are Croatia, the Czech Republic, Ukraine and Lithuania, not to mention expansions of their derivatives operations in Russia".22 (2) Assess and detail patterned interaction between the Russian Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Finance and Economy, and the commercial expansion of Russian oil interests and integration into up-, mid-, and down-stream hydrocarbon development in areas of strategic concern to NATO and its members. Within this scope it is important to note: • Russian foreign policy has remained focused on incorporating the country into Western and global institutions rather than undermining or counterbalancing the West. Engaging the Russians on CESI protection, strategy formulation, and implementation could positively advance these trends. Further in pursuing NATO's mission of peace and stability in its theatre of operations Russia's positive, long term influence in contributing to energy supply stability and CESI protection throughout the region and globally is key. • Russia's influence goes well beyond its borders through its strengthening of energy ties with China, Saudi Arabia, India, Pakistan, Iran and Iraq among many others. Putin is positioning Russia to be a dominant energy player particularly in the Middle East in the wake of the turmoil that will ensue after the present Iraqi conflict is resolved. The victory of the 'coalition of the willing' over Saddam Hussein does not guarantee a positive extension of US and other Western commercial interests in the region. On the contrary, it will provide the Russians a direct opportunity to fill a space riddled with anti-American sentiment. Russia is ready and well prepared to fill this space. • One should not forget that, " The political order that emerged under Boris Yeltsin in the 1990s may have been an electoral democracy, but it most certainly was not then and is now a consolidated liberal democracy."23 Power is consolidated in Putin's leadership, but highly subject to continuation of his domestic, high level approval ratings. On policies, outside of advancing Russia's economic interests, Putin's popularity among the intelligentsia, power ministries, and general public is far more fragile. Moreover, democratic or sudden change in Russia's leadership must certainly be taken into account in securing energy supply and CESI protection over the longer term. • Assessment should include understanding as precisely as possible the individuallevel connections between official foreign policy - Gazprom - and its electricity monopoly RAO UES. "There is little question that the less-than-gentle efforts of these and other Russian corporate interests to acquire large equity stakes in pipelines, refineries, power grids, and other stratgegically significant economic entities accord well with Putin's desire to increase Russia's influence throughout the post-Soviet space." 24

22,,

Development of Eastern European markets", WWW.Petrochemistry.Net/Eastern Europe For further development of this tactical line of thinking see Colton, Timothy and McFaul, Michael "America's Real Russian Allies" Foreign Affairs, Vol. 80, No.6, November December 2001 :p. 50. 24 Levgold, Robert "Russia's Unformed Foreign Policy" Foreign Affairs, Vol. 80, No.5, September October 2001, p. 70. 23

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• According to Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, " I can say on the basis of my own experience that about half of the time in all negotiations conducted by our government (and the Foreign Ministry of course) is dedicated to economic cooperation and proper political lobbying for Russian business interests."25 (3) Analyze and quantify the downstream impact of a negative change in Russian foreign-energy and economic security policy on NATO member, partner, and allies. 1. Clearly, increasing commercial ties between the Russian private sector and states in NATO's theatre of operations is a positive development. A strong argument could be put forth that advancement of Russian policies that would risk, or undermine, these ties is unlikely. However, prudent planning must take contradictory developments into energy-defense planning. 2. Recognize that the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences has recommended a reorientation in Russia's foreign policy towards a wider use of economic leverage. "There are individual examples of its efficient use-in particular, with regard to Belarus, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan. Foreign policy should also be used to create favorable conditions for the expansion of Russian oil and gas producing companies."26 Yet the key, overall objectives of these policies and their sustainability are far from transparent providing a fertile, necessary field for analysis particularly with respect to the foreign policy-energy policy nexus.

25

26

Mikheev, Vladimir, Stepanov, Andrei "Igor Ivanov: We are better Pragmatic Thinkers Now" Trud, No.7, 23 January 2003. " Russian Experts Make a Forecast of Russian Foreign Policy " Izvestia, No.3-M, January 2003

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Annex IV

MEASURING THE COSTS OF CESI DEBILITATION OR DESTRUCTION 27 Measuring the physical repair and/or replacement of CESI is apparent if applied to a particular physical asset or series of assets, i.e. the destruction of a major oil trunk line, mining and destruction of specific oil field production facilities, or the destruction of a specific generator. However, measuring the greater macroeconomic effects of a terrorist attack on CESI or the costs of a longer term supply shutdown are much more difficult to ascertain. Part of this has to do with the interconnected nature of CESI. Whereas destructive, environmental and economic impact costs can be assessed for on a particular asset within the framework of its national economic infrastructure, the overall downstream impact states connected to the same CESI must be thoroughly modeled. As a result, this paper has suggested • the identification and cataloging on a national basis critical, unacceptable riskrelated CESI • the enhancement in understanding the interconnected nature and opportunities for rerouting energy supplies and transmission (particularly gas) • creation and/or elaboration of a matrix detailing dependent non-CESI infrastructures. These may include • large, industrial plants; • financial market infrastructures; • communications' facilities; • transportation hubs; • national security and defense-related facilities; • human service and support infrastructures; and • large, well defined population centers dependent on congested transmission lines and networks with no provision for redundancy in the event of CESI debilitation/destruction • the creation of economic models to better understand the macroeconomic, downstream impact of CESI debilitation and/or destruction on a national and regional basis in both the short and long term. These models may incorporate an economic impact assessment on, but not limited to, • the cessation in financial trading and transactions • an impact on consumer and investment behavior • the replacement costs for physical assets such as buildings and other public/private property • an impact on service industries such as airlines, travel, lodging, tourism, restaurants, postal services, and insurance industries • the institutionalization of CESI protective measures.

27

For a thorough assessment of the costs of terrorism to the US economy in the wake of the events of 9/11 from which the majority of macroeconomic indicators discussed above were drawn see citation 12.

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The economic costs for pre-emptive, protective CESI measures, including the introduction of new technologies, physical barriers, monitoring equipment, etc., can be considered a security tax in macro-economic terms or as a levy on service provided. Costs of specific measures taken by, for example public utilities, are easier to calculate than the macroeconomic opportunity costs of the diversion of capital assets into these important but non-productive activities. Consultation with specialized associations in oil, gas, nuclear and electric generation and transmission would be fruitful as a first step in the calculation of these costs.

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Discussion of Session 4 Chris Donnelly In response to Kevin Rosner's paper on Energy, one question that immediately arises is whether the issue of nuclear power has been considered? In Russia, the short answer to that is 'no'. However, I would like to respond to that by saying if in fact there is an inclination to shut down, or to encourage the Russians to shut down nuclear power facilities throughout CSE. In terms of high-level CEI risk assessments of attacks, debilitating or otherwise, vastly increases the human, as well as the financial, costs not only again nationally but also in the downstream side of things. Secondly, knowing that a nuclear threat exists -1 have not examined the issue in detail - and is not fully acknowledged, but I see it as a trend. Bruce Jones I think the points that I would make would be that as far as the various new stakeholders go - that is to say local government, public services, power generation, transportation, and even down to agriculture - we really tend to look at things in terms of their impact on the economy. If the power goes out for a couple of days, this is not inter-related to anything else. We may not have the radio, but we shall still have the TV. Nobody is seeing this in terribly sophisticated terms, culturally, than we perhaps did in the 1950s. The question of water treatment, banking and finance, hospitals, government systems going down, telephone exchanges going down, transportation systems not working, and the effect that matters are exacerbated by 'just in time' approaches to servicing, stock holding, spares and so forth. Certainly, as with the snow in the United Kingdom recently when, after about a few centimetres of snow, people were getting stuck on freeways within a few miles of London for tens of hours. It does not, bode well if we look at the United Kingdom and consider what happened during the foot and mouth outbreak. I think we, as human beings, would probably fare a lot worse than the animals did. What do you do when 20 percent of your emergency centre personnel are causalities or cannot attend or are prevented from attending? How many people have standby alternative emergency centres, whether they are a large corporation, a government department, or a local government department? How many people can operate 24/7 in an emergency centre to keep things going? How many have trained staff, competent staff, enough staff, as well as competent trained staff, as well as support staff - even if it is just catering and cleaners? So, it is all rather a complex matter; in civil defence terms, we are looking at the survival phase, or the recovery phase - who knows? It is still an evolving picture. Julian Lindley French Just looking at this list here. Apart from education and sport, this is the entirety of society. Indeed, it implies a profound reorganisation of society, which in turn means changing the nature of the open society in response to the threat. This is a very deep political problem. How far are we prepared to change the nature of who and what we are, to stop the terrorists changing the nature of what we are? This is a very deep political dilemma that our countries, particularly in Europe, have to address. Europeans have not even begun to address the problem, partly because they realise the sheer depth and complexity of the issue itself. Chris Donnelly Julian Lindley-French is right. We should remind ourselves that we did have all this at one point in most European countries, during the Second World War. That is exactly what happened; the issue is therefore a sociological one, in a sense. How do we recreate in a

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peacetime situation the preparedness for what might happen: the readiness to take risks without destroying the nature of the society that we want to preserve? Oded Eban 30 years ago, I received a letter bomb. I guess that I what I went through is something that nations go through. The first phase is panic and a state of alertness, which is abnormal. As you go along, the state of alertness reduces itself, because this is a sort of a defence mechanism. Otherwise, you cannot cope with life. That is precisely what happens at a national level. What happens to us, daily? What happened to the United States on 11 September 2001? The issue is finding equilibrium between getting totally crazy about security on the one hand and allowing normal life to continue on the other. If you go to extremes, you can bring a nation, or a society, to almost a standstill. You tell them that no one can go to a cinema because there is a threat, or you stand in line for one hour in order to be searched and for your purse to be checked. All precautions are taken against all these threats, but who can count on them being eradicated? There are simple things to do: what does it take to blow up a pipeline? What does it take to contaminate an open water source? People will therefore stop drinking water from the faucet; instead, they will somehow - I do not know how - store bottles and bottles of water. I think that we need to pay attention to the psychological impact of what we are discussing. I am not so sure that enough attention is being given to the balancing act of all the precautions that have been talked about. Maybe our Dutch colleague from NATO can expand on that, or we need to have a sort of special session to deal with the psychological impacts of terrorism on societies. Paul Swallow Yes, you are quite correct. We are driven by newspaper headlines. The journalists will come up with a story, such as a threat of a gas attack. We, the police, will assess it with the security services, and will discover that the ability to execute such an attack is minimal. And yet we have to be seen to be doing something. We had another example at London's Heathrow Airport, which was ringed with light infantry tanks last April 2002 based on information that everybody who worked in the intelligence field thought was improbable. This assessment was disagreed with at a high level in the government and, therefore, we had to do it. You are quite correct; we do need to have greater faith in the intelligence services to advise people. That is the link that is being missed, because the intelligence services, by dint of their very nature, are rather covert and hidden. Once you start producing a representative of a security service, then it becomes a target for press interest. Perhaps it is just a UK phenomenon, but the UK intelligence services - the Security Service, MI5 and MI6 - have the police to do this work for them. We are also the ones who have to sit round in fields outside Heathrow Airport pretending we are looking for somebody with a Stinger missile, which they do not have. I have no answer to your question, but you are quite correct that we do need to manage the fear of the threat, as opposed to the threat itself. Bruce Jones It is a question of managing information and using information in all its senses and implications. Since the first Gulf War, the way that the press and media industry behave has been quite incredible. The generation of news is in a state of permanent hiatus. If this was applied to what was happening during the student riots, and not just those in Paris in 1969, life as we know it would probably disintegrate. It is a case, therefore, of there being no bad questions, only bad answers. The answers to sorting this one out are quite profound.

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Chris Donnelly I think the implications go beyond that and back to an earlier comment. It might well be, following this line of argument, that it is virtually impossible by passive measures to protect against the threat which might face us without destroying society. Therefore, part of this balance has to be what are you going to do actively to go out and destroy the threat physically wherever it is. That is back to the issue of the reform of armed forces and the reform of NATO itself. Cornelius Wientjes A word in response to what Ambassador Oded Eban has just said. The issue is one of striking a balance between security measures drawn up by public statesmen and government officials concerning threats and the measures taken to face them on the one hand, and the disruption and concern caused by precisely those measures that are, of course, intended to preserve society, on the other. This balance is a very difficult issue and was, of course, a major topic at the workshop I mentioned earlier today on the social and psychological aspects of terrorism, which was held one year ago. One of the follow-ups of this workshop has been that, under the authority of the Science Committee and in collaboration with the Russians, an Advisory Committee has been installed on the social and psychological issues of terrorism, which will meet on 25 April 2003. This meeting will precisely address these issues by looking at three case histories: the London Tube episode; the sniper episode in the Washington area; and the theatre hostage-taking in Moscow. George Witschel I have some further, random observations. One is, of course, the fact that, since the end of the Cold War, most of our societies have drastically reduced their preparedness for any major emergency. Whilst we had during the Cold War period quite elaborate systems to deal with a major impact on our societies, we might now have only some dormant structures, if any at all. We have reduced it close to zero and now we might have to pay a price for it. My second point is that, at the same time if you look back, say, at the 1950s or '60s, we stockpiled for use in the event of an emergency. Normally, a good factory had a big stockpile of raw materials in its own courtyard; nowadays, there is nothing like that. So Osama bin Laden probably pre-empted the market economy just in time and just in place, etc., which in any event is so easily disrupted. My third point is that I think one can strike a balance, because neither al Qaeda nor other terrorist organisations will be able to undertake more than, let us say, a multiple attack at the same time and cover three or four major issues. They will not, however, be able, as did the old Soviet Union or Warsaw Pact, to cover a whole country or a vast area. The predicament is big, due to a network of computers, energy, communications etc. But it is probably not comparable to that of a major conventional attack by several States. I think we can meet the challenge, but only if we are properly prepared. My last point is that I see a major task for NATO in that area. I see it, certainly, in the area of a CBW attack. Only a limited number of NATO members, new members on probation and relatively wealthy nations have the necessary equipment to detect or to deal with a CBRN attack. NATO has the planning capabilities to send, let us say, Slovak or German Fox tanks to Luxembourg, if something were happening there. I see NATO, also, for a number of other challenges, which might have to be met in the event of a major attack on traffic resources and energy resources etc. I see a huge potential for co-operation with the EU and with national authorities. It is all still pretty dormant. In Germany, for example, you have again the Lander involved, who are hardly

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aware, and do not want to be too much aware, of the threat because it costs them money. The German Federal Republic itself is pretty much aware, but the Ministry of Interior does not want to pay out either, so it has taken Germany about six months to come up with a draft emergency plan, at least for a bio terrorist attack. Again, Osama bin Laden would love us for our slow reaction. Ely Karmon My comments are exactly related to what George Witschel has just said. He spoke about a threat to water systems and the need to manage the psychological threats that can affect and influence the perceptions of huge populations. I do not give advice to NATO, but I think if I did, I would argue that NATO is the only organisation that can produce sufficient units with which to deal with non-conventional - especially chemical, biological radiological and nuclear - threats. A month ago, I was at a conference on monitoring security for large sport events. They also spoke of the Olympics and who is responsible for protecting this huge audience from terrorist threats. I think only in terms of military organisation and a flexible one, because Slovakia does not have the means that other countries, such as the United Kingdom or Germany, have to produce, for such eventualities. Martin Edmonds I would like to pick up on something that Paul Swallow said a moment ago. This is the role of the media, and how they can create impressions in the Press and on television and radio, that generate fear and apprehension, rather than help the public to come to terms with and take a balanced, reasoned view the terrorist threat. In my part of the United Kingdom, the Northwest, the local County Council authority decided to set up an Emergency Planning Group. Rather than just being a group that talked around the subject, without initiating any positive action, they decided that they should run an exercise concerning a terrorist radiological attack in and around the seaside resort of Blackpool. All of this was fine for the authorities, because they were seen to be doing something practical and it was thought a very positive move. The regional press covered the exercise and the planning behind it and reported on the event. Ideally, this should have helped to assure the public that the local authority was taking the terrorist CBRN threat seriously. Unfortunately, the wind was in the 'wrong' direction and the exercise demonstrated how ill prepared the authorities and emergency services were. The consequence of the whole episode proved to be counter-productive; the media had a field day, and the public is now even more concerned than it was before. The experience does raise the question of the role of the media and how much they can be constrained from enhancing fear among the general public of terrorism. There is no greater fear than fear itself. We are, of course, talking about censorship here, whilst at the same time expecting the media to help provide a public service. I notice incidentally we do not have the media down for discussion in this particular session, but it is an issue that I think has to be addressed. Adrian Kendry I would like to thank Kevin for his extremely interesting and thought-provoking presentation. Many things came to my mind, but I guess the most important for me was thinking about the so-called science of risk management and what Kevin was saying about critical energy security infrastructure protection. I have two questions with regard to this: the first is whether, in your OECD study, there was any explicit or implicit attempt to assess the sorts of catastrophic failures, damage or attacks in terms of assessing both the, the depth and the length of the disruption. The second is that I wondered, when you are

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looking at Russian energy hydrocarbon vulnerability, whether are you aware of the Russian authorities' taking steps to assess the kinds of consequences that would follow? Kevin Rosner In answer to your first question, it is a short, "no". Actually, one of the recommendations of this paper is that economic models should be created after high priority, critical energies supply infrastructure has been identified in order to assess not only their onsite, but also their downstream, economic impacts. So, that is one of the firm recommendations. The second question had to do with whether or not the Russian authorities have been assessing the impacts on their own energy infrastructure. I do not mean to dodge the question, but I do not know the direct answer. I do know that there are, within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Gas companies in particular, and' I trust' the major oil companies number of different analysts looking at the protocols that the Russian Federation has with each of its supply delivery partners. These people are working on a full-time basis to make sure that, when commercial decisions are made, they can be maximised for foreign and economic policy advantage. I suspect I have not answered the question directly, but I do think you will also find in Annex 3 to my paper that I strongly recommend that the Russians be actively engaged in providing such an assessment on CESI infrastructure. It would in fact prove a very positive step in engaging them in an area where they have demonstrated some expertise. As far as their willingness to communicate how much they do, or do not, know is another issue altogether. However, I see it as an opportunity to build a security framework, and not an opportunity to highlight Russia's threat in terms of energy supply or supply disruption to European nations. Adrian Kendry Thank you; that is very interesting. I have just one quick comment. Under the auspices of the NATO/Russia Council, there is the continuing development of the various working groups, particularly the working group on defence reform. What Kevin Rosner has just said could very well be incorporated as part of a programme of dialogue. This could be extremely useful. Julian Lindley-French It seems to me that the flipside of the balanced response that we are talking about here is also firm, political leadership. It also appears that there are no criteria within the NATO countries for reacting to threat or terrorism. The US and the UK could be accused of sometimes over reacting to threats, as Paul Swallow has suggested, but I would suggest that many continental European partners do not react at all. This seems to me a profound strategic irresponsibility to hide behind public opinion as a reason for not doing anything, especially when that public opinion is so ill informed. Public opinion in Europe has been out to lunch strategically for 12 years. It is about time that leaders start bringing these people back to the reality of the world in which they live. Maybe, NATO could get involved in producing alliance-wide criteria for reacting to public management of such threats. Georg Witschel I think there is a big rift between the two sides of the Atlantic that has grown a bit bigger, not just in terms of Iraq, but in the perception in the United States that terrorism is the number one issue, or number two in UK. It might still be pretty high up in most of the other European countries, where it is generally somewhere in the middle. It has fallen back to priority ten, twelve, or fifteen. Part of my job, therefore, is time and again to remind, at

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least the people in my office, that terrorism is around. It is even more difficult if you talk with a Ministry of Interior or a Ministry of Health - with all the others involved on the interior front - because it is costly. Combatting terrorism it is not very attractive in political terms, and you will not gain many votes with preparations for, let us say, a cyber attack or an attack on a dam. It is evoking memories of the Cold War and, even, the Second World War. Bruce Jones I shall just round that off by talking about civil defence and emergency planning. In military terms, it is a norm that one has theatre-level assets. These are whatever sort of equipment or weaponry it might be - bridging equipment, artillery, missiles, etc. - that are operated at a theatre level. They go in, either as an offensive system or as a defensive weapon, where they are needed. They are costly, and you do not keep them in reserve; no one country can afford them all themselves. Referring back to the biological and radiological threat, what we are talking about is an NBC, CBRN, or WMD, attack. Are we prepared for a radiological attack, which is a much higher level threat than was ever envisaged in the fall-out from a nuclear warhead? As far as biological warfare is concerned, it is not mass life threatening. Epidemics have been seen in many of our countries for at least a generation. It is not the!930s diphtheria and so forth; how we would be able to cope with that today when there was mostly horse transport around and people did not travel all that far. They stayed in their villages or whatever, and there were not so many commuters. That is further food for thought.

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The Role of Official Stakeholders The Role of Official Stakeholders by Ambassador Oded Eran, Israeli Ambassador to the European Union

NATO is currently conducting a dialogue with seven Mediterranean countries. I am not so sure that I am the true representative of this seven, but I would still like to make comment on behalf of the issue of the Mediterranean dialogue, as it pertains to the issue of the role of official stakeholders. Two phrases and a reversal of the words of Mark Anthony, - "I came to praise NATO, not to bury it" - The two phrases that have caught my attention were 'collective, information and intelligence' to which I would like to add the word 'action'. The second phrase was whether or not NATO provided 'added value' to combating terrorism'. I would like to deal with it very shortly from the dialogue point of view. I would like to digress for a minute on this point. The current level of cooperation in the Middle East, right now is poor, it is inadequate, and it lacks methodological approach. It lacks any organisation on every possible issue, and especially on the issue of combating terrorism. This is a result of obvious political constraints, not necessarily only between Israel and its neighbours, but among all the Middle East regional states. The region, which boasts the producers of terror, is also its victim. It lacks experience over regional co-operation in many issues, whether economic, political or cultural. Most of the region's States, including my own, Israel, are very sensitive to issues of sovereignty. They are reluctant to co-operate because, among other reasons, of the perception that some of these issues that have to do with terrorism touch upon their sovereignty, not only when it comes to gathering and sharing intelligence but also when it comes to action taken on, or needed to be taken on, this issue. The issue of sovereignty is very important to all of us in the Middle East region. What is needed, among other things, is an educational process that will show these states, which are participating in the NATO Mediterranean dialogue, that there is benefit in sharing and in co-operating and co-ordinating, What NATO's added value to this process is, of course, the other organisational instruments and legal instruments. There are treaties against terrorism, and there are organisations that deal with specific aspects, but I doubt whether they are sufficient to deal with all or even some of these issues. The provisions are inadequate making them incapable of dealing with financial issues and indeed this is the case. I do not think that there is any mechanism that deals with the international financial aspects of money, being transferred or laundered. From personal experience, there is no co-operation between central banks on this issue at all because there is no international mechanism or

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organisation that is supposed to deal with this problem. It is not the IMF; it is not the OCDN. I know of no other organisation that can deal with this issue and so I think that NATO can serve as, at least, a temporary substitute especially with regard to the Mediterranean NATO, dialogue. The dialogue gives at least two channels to discuss this and other issues: one is the 19 plus seven and the other is the 19 plus one. There is also the 19 plus n, which is a tool that can be used in the absence of a comprehensive agreement among the seven to co-operate on any particular issue. In the 19 plus one it is certainly possible to increase the inter-agency co-operation and co-ordination on the national level even in a country like Israel, which wrestles on an hourly basis with the issue of terrorism. The co-ordination and co-operation between the various governmental agencies still leaves a lot to be desired in addressing some of the potential threats. I am sure that there is no co-ordination in Israel between the Ministry of Agriculture and the National Advisor on Terrorism. I am not so sure that this is the case. Equally, I am not so sure that there is a total awareness of the various dangers. To begin with, I certainly recommend the strengthening of the co-operation at the 19 plus one level and we would certainly learn, or exchange, views on the experience of NATO members or least people who represent their co-ordination effort, such as in Sweden for example There is the need to bring back, both at the national level and the, the international level, people, or mechanisms, like the Customs, telecommunication, transportation, and central banks. I think that NATO should be more pro-active in the Mediterranean dialogue, generally speaking, and specifically on the issue of terrorism. We can differ among the 19 and the seven and also among the seven themselves about the root causes of terrorism, but there can be no argument on differences of opinion about the threat and the risks involved to the societies on both sides of the dialogue. Given the political sensitivities, my recommendation would be to start activities with the least politicised agencies, such as Customs for example. There you can start dialoguing about methodology, about equipment and about practices; then you can move to such areas as health, where the professional aspect is very clear and you are quite far from the political aspects of the issue. I am quite optimistic that even if it cannot be done in the beginning on the 19 plus 7 dialogue, you can do it on the 19 plus n, because I am sure that we could reach some sort of co-operation, co-ordination on the less politicised issues between, for example, Israel and Jordan, between Israel and, to some extent, Egypt, and maybe, even, with North African countries, although they are less involved in this issue. I am sure that the Jordanian authorities and the Egyptian authorities will understand the need to co-ordinate on issues such as water contamination, because we do share with others water resources, and that can be more than just a national problem. Basically, my approach is a bottom-up one, taking into consideration the political circumstances. Yet, it has to be understood that without the political determination, it will be very difficult to achieve even this minimal co-operation. Here, NATO can also help in being a sort of bridge or a facilitator in order to launch, at a later stage, something that is more heavily politicised, such as meetings of Heads of Secret Services. It is not necessary to bring all seven into such a dialogue; but if you can bring in two or three, we can then make contact with all of the other six on a bilateral level. The point is whether or not they can be brought into, or a part of them brought into, a dialogue - even if it is not all seven. You bring them in threes or fours, and I think that this will be very important. NATO could serve, as I have said, as a facilitator, to serve as a bridge, and as a sort of clearinghouse. For that purpose, I

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think that, NATO has to take on its role, generally speaking, on the issue of fighting terrorism and information gathering. From what I have gathered from this workshop so far is that it is not clear to the members what the role of NATO is. Once you decide on this, you can then decide what is the role that you want to play vis a vis the Mediterranean countries. I strongly recommend that you do use the dialogue that exists. I know of very few other mechanisms where you can bring the Middle East, together, and be able to talk about certain issues in countering terrorism.

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Transnational Terrorism - Police, Interpol and Europol by

Paul Swallow, Metropolitan Police Service, United Kingdom1

Introduction In this paper I shall address the police's response to terrorism at the transnational level, particularly Interpol and Europol. I would, however, like to make a few opening observations on terrorism itself. Firstly, terrorism as a concept is a relatively recent phenomenon, and it is enormously difficult to define. One commentator has noted 103 different definitions of terrorism in use in legal documents since the 1930s. Yasser Arafat said that "someone who fights for his country cannot be considered a terrorist", but this is a view that would not be shared in other parts of the Middle East. Secondly terrorism is often considered an attack on the state itself, and the motivations of terrorists are very powerful, often carried out in the absolute belief in the rightness of their cause. Normal 'constraints' on the limits of criminal behaviour do not seem to apply, and I offer the example of suicide bombers as evidence of this. Because of this, terrorism has often been treated as a category apart from other crimes. This is reflected in both the size and scope of mechanisms established to counter terrorism, and in the strength of the legal powers states have furnished themselves with to deal with it. The reason that I am making these points is to highlight the fact that if terrorism is a comparatively new and elusive concept, then cooperation between police agencies across national boundaries (and there are at least 105 identifiable bodies with policing powers in the EU) is an even more recent and complex phenomenon. There are in Europe at least three major and over 20 minor transnational policing structures, arrangements and bilateral agreements. But in terms of dealing with terrorism, there are three: ICPO-lnterpol, the Police Working Group on Terrorism (PWGT), and more recently, Europol. I would like briefly to discuss each of these. Interpol Once described by a German colleague as the "great grandmother of all international policing organisations", it is the earliest of these. I would like to elaborate on this organisation in a little detail, because of its influence and, as I shall demonstrate, it was Interpol's structural flaws that brought about the development of parallel bodies. Interpol can trace its origins to 1914, when Prince Albert 1 of Monaco became the victim of a crime, the perpetrators of which fled to France. Due to the inability of The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the Metropolitan Police Service.

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the Monegasque police to deal with this, he called together the first International Police Congress in Monaco. Instead of using an established protocol of governmental and diplomatic channels to do so, he contacted an eclectic mix of police officers, lawyers, magistrates and other interested people in fourteen countries, on an almost random basis, including the use of newspaper advertisements. This is extremely significant for the later development of Interpol because in so doing, Prince Albert set the tone for the organisation as being nothing more than an informal club of policing agencies, which at its heart Interpol still is today. The First World War impeded its development, and the organisation was restarted in Vienna in 1923. After the Second World War the organisation moved to Paris and in 1989 to its present position in Lyons. Interpol today facilitates international police co-operation by providing a channel of communication between police forces and law enforcement agencies in 179 different countries. Having no operational role, the organisation has been described as the "most fabulous police post box in the world". Yet despite its potential, Interpol does have operating problems. Firstly, its legal status is not clear. It was not founded on an internationally agreed treaty or convention, but was developed by police agencies as a functional response to a given operational need. Secondly, its constitution, written in 1956 not by international lawyers but by police officers, has been described as out of date and "not well worded". There are uncertainties over the precise definition of its membership, and there are logistical problems in terms of voting rights faced by those wishing to modernise the organisation. Thirdly, and most significantly for this discussion, Article 3 of Interpol's Constitution forbids it from dealing with matters of a 'political, military, racial or religious' nature, and this has in the past been interpreted by the organisation as including immigration, terrorism and Nazism. Interpol adhered to this principle until comparatively recently, and it caused great harm to the organisation's reputation. For example, until 1985 and the issuing of the 'Red Notice' for Josef Mengele, Interpol had refused to assist in the hunt for Nazi war criminals. Following the terrorist outrage against Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympic Games in 1972, Interpol refused to assist the German police in their enquiries. The resultant debate caused the decision to clarify Interpol's position in respect of Article 3 in 1984. Despite this, Interpol's assistance in terrorist matters cannot be guaranteed as the General Secretariat retains the right to invoke Article 3. The Police Working Group on Terrorism (PWGT) Because of Interpol's Constitution and due to the rise in terrorist crime in the 1970s (Carlos the Jackal and the Red Army Faction, for example), a few European police forces set up an informal counter terrorist network, the Police Working Group on Terrorism (PWGT). This body allowed them to operate, as they always had, at the practitioner level, free from what they might have seen as political interference. The PWGT still exists today, embracing the European Union states, plus Norway, Switzerland, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and the Czech Republic. It has no formal constitution, Headquarters building or permanent secretariat and it is an effective mechanism to co-ordinate the international effort against terrorism.

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Europol The most significant developments in European police co-operation however are outlined in the 1992 Treaty on European Union (TEU). This set up the Justice and Home Affairs 'pillar' of the EU and, most significantly, it formalised the existence of 'Europol', the European policing agency inaugurated by the European Council summit in 1991 and based in The Hague. Once established, Europol had been given to practitioners to develop, but it took some time for it to do so. Despite this, it has become an effective criminal intelligence co-ordinating agency, with a full legal basis and a convention recognised under international law. In 1999, Europol was given a role in co-ordinating the fight against international terrorism. Again, however it got off to a slow start. Member States were hesitant to impart terrorist intelligence or information to it. This was particularly evident after September 11, when the JHA Council tasked Europol with dealing with the European aspects of the tragedy. However, states seemed reluctant to cooperate with Europol, particularly in terms of providing it with intelligence, preferring to use traditional and informal mechanisms instead. This limited its ability to respond.

Conclusion In terms of dealing with international terrorism, and because of Interpol's deficiencies, the police have hitherto found informal mechanisms, such as direct contact or by using the PWGT, the most effective way of working trans-nationally. However, as the EU emerges around us and as Europol's capabilities and resources develop, it is likely that this body will assume an increasingly important role in dealing with international terrorism. But for the time being, however, the emphasis is still on informal networks.

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The US Marshals' Posses: A Model for Countering Transnational Terrorism by John Lenoir, US Attorney's Office, Brooklyn, New York

The Model Modern terrorism has blurred distinctions between enemy and criminal, and responsibilities for public safety. The September 2001 attacks in the United States focused attention on the respective roles of the military, law enforcement, and the intelligence communities. The US was suddenly at war against enemies who, like criminals, live among us, wear no uniforms, and eschew jurisdictions and borders. In the US, military and intelligence resources have directed their considerable resources against threats from abroad. American law enforcement is essentially a local matter. There is no national constabulary and no operational co-ordination among the 17,000 various law enforcement arms of municipal, county and state political entities. This was starkly apparent in the absence of even radio communications among the police, fire and other first responders at the World Trade Center and Pentagon attack sites. The US response in the aftermath of the attacks went little noticed, but was brilliant in its simplicity and economy. The US Marshals' Service, with aircraft normally used to transport prisoners, deployed Special Deputy US Marshals to various parts of the country to secure critical installations. These special deputies were law enforcement officials from various agencies deputized as federal marshals for this mission. This deployment of special deputy marshals was an adaptation of an innovative American approach to public safety born of necessity in the frontier West - the posse. This paper suggests that today, law enforcement personnel of specific localities constitute a ready reserve from which a national, or transnational force can be called upon for counter-terror deployment on very short notice.

History In 1789, one of the first acts of the American Congress was to create the post of United States Marshal. Each Federal judicial district was to have a US marshal. And like ambassadors and federal judges, the US Marshal was to be appointed by the President, on the advice and consent of the Senate. The Marshal was for a time the only federal law enforcement authority outside of the nation's capital. The US Marshal for a state or territory was responsible for collecting taxes and taking the census, as well as enforcing federal law and carrying out federal court orders. The US marshals carried out these responsibilities in their federal districts with the broad authority akin to that of the county sheriff of English Common Law

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tradition. While the national government granted marshals broad authority, it provided little financial support. Resourceful marshals used their authority and stature in their districts to call upon citizens to assist in law enforcement operations whenever circumstances required. The citizens were designated Special Deputy US Marshals and granted temporary authority to carry out law enforcement operations related to the mission for which they were called. These were the posses: temporary, special purpose police forces. In the 19th Century, the posses established themselves as part of the lore of the American West by effectively countering the criminal bands that preyed on the new communities, stagecoaches and trains. The genius of the posse system was in its efficiency. The entity would form around a specific mission, and disband when the job was done. Posse members typically brought their own equipment and transportation - guns and horses. The Principle Evolves... Federal law enforcement infrastructure grew dramatically in the United States in later years with the emergence of agencies with more specialized missions and responsibilities: the FBI, Drug Enforcement Administration, Border Patrol, Postal Inspection Service, etc. Each new agency was tasked with a specific area of law to enforce, and authority was limited to that area of responsibility. State, county and municipal governments enhanced their general law enforcement capabilities with increasing standards of recruitment and training. Today, local departments are highly professional and well equipped. Large city police departments, such as the New York City Police Department (NYPD) with about 40,000 officers, hardly need resource assistance from the US Marshal. However large or good the forces are, they are strictly limited to the jurisdictional boundaries of the city limits or county line. Other federal law enforcement agencies have overshadowed the Marshals in the public consciousness and federal appropriations. This is despite the fact that the approximately 2,800 Deputy US Marshals nation-wide are responsible for finding and apprehending more wanted persons in America than all other federal law enforcement agencies combined. The US Marshals, now organized under the US Marshals' Service headquartered in the Washington D.C area, remain the only federal law enforcement officials outside of the nation's capital with direct authority from the President. The Director of the US Marshals' Service and each of the US Marshals for the 94 federal judicial districts throughout the United States and territories, are Presidential appointees who have been confirmed by the Senate, still just like ambassadors. Congress has codified the broad police powers exercised by the early Marshals in statutes that grant current Marshals sheriff-like powers in enforcing federal law in the various states. The authority to raise posses has also been retained through statutes that empower a US Marshal to deputize and invest others with authority as Special Deputy US Marshal. The Posse as Task Force Today, deputation is generally limited to granting broad, cross-jurisdictional police authority to other law enforcement officials for specific purposes. 1,800 law

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enforcement officers from a variety of state, local and federal agencies, for instance, augmented security in Washington, DC for the inauguration of President George W. Bush. Their authority to act as law enforcement officials in Washington DC was provided by the US Marshal for the District of Columbia, who administered the oath of temporary office as Special Deputy US Marshals. Over 1,200 such special Deputy Marshals provided the extraordinary security for the 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City, Utah. Marshals have deputised police officers who have been called to respond beyond their jurisdictions to an area hit by natural disasters. But, not all deputations are occasioned by hurricanes or major spectacles. About 9,000 police and sheriff officials were deputized as Special Deputy US Marshals in 2002. Most of these deputations were for authority to serve on joint task forces. These task force initiatives combine the resources of federal, state and local agencies to address a specific crisis of criminality, such as drug trafficking. The investigative and enforcement missions of such task forces reach beyond municipal, county and state jurisdictional limits. Deputation of local police officials accords them the same nation-wide authority as the federal agents with whom they work. These task force special deputations are typically made for one-year, renewable terms. The principles of the posse, as evolved with the Marshals, are rapid assembly and temporal deployment of officers who have been made available by agencies with limited jurisdiction for cross-jurisdictional missions. The ability of the Marshals' Service to quickly muster a national task force from the ranks of local peace officers and specialized federal agents is of interest to military planners in the United States. In recent counter-terror scenario exercises within the US conducted by the Department of Defense, the Marshals Service demonstrated capabilities to bring together disparate police elements to an impacted area for large-scale civilian evacuations. The model may well be applicable to meet security interests of an expanding NATO. In the context of global terrorism, security means being able to field law enforcement and paramilitary forces to reduce vulnerability to terrorism, identify, locate and eliminate terror threats and limit effects and manage consequences of a terror strike. With appropriate standards for training, skills and abilities, law enforcement and paramilitary personnel of the several jurisdictions can be qualified for special counter- terror assignments. Such cross-jurisdictional forces would need NATO-wide authority to enforce the law and carry out specific missions wherever they were deployed. The convening authority would have the benefit of experienced men and women assembled for a mission. And like the posse, they come with their own transportation and equipment, and go back home when the mission is completed.

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Counter-Terrorism in the European Union: Legal and Operational Measures by

Manuel Navarrete Paniagua Guarda Civil, Ministry of Interior, Madrid

I am going to focus on counter-terrorism co-operation within the European Union and highlight two important points, some aspects of which have been discussed above. In particular, I want to talk about Europol, which has a long history - well, a short history, really - but long history of co-operation within the European Union. This was especially so after 11th September 2001 when many things changed. I shall explain very briefly what measures within the European Union have been taken. In so doing, I shall address the range of the measures taken by the European Union and draw a distinction between their judicial and the pre-judicial aspects. However, I propose to focus mainly on the second one, because I think it is the more important and, in effect, deals with the co-operation between the police and the member states of the European Union. When I talk about co-operation within the European Union, it has to be borne in mind that it is not something that just emerged recently and also that there are very different approaches as to what co-operation means within the current fifteen member states. As Paul Swallow has already pointed out, there are more than 30 different police and security services among the member states. Often, they are quite reluctant to cooperate in the fight against terrorism. The fundamental reason for this is that most of them are unable to co-operate at the judicial level though at the pre-judicial level there is a legal basis for cooperation within the European Union. Within the framework of the legal and judicial scope, we now have the introduction of the European Arrest Warrant, which is a very important mechanism in the fight against terrorism. A second development is that we have a new framework for the fight against terrorism. For many years within the European Union, we discussed how to define 'terrorism', and eventually followed the example of the United States and decided that we did not want to define terrorism. Instead, we wanted to say what is terrorism and what are the means that have to be put into place in our counter-terrorist policies. This is why we do not have a common definition of what is a terrorist crime for the whole European Union. A third development is also very important: this is a framework decision to set up joint investigation teams. This now means that the Spanish police and other European police forces can co-operate with each other on judicial issues and, share information and intelligence that can be used in a court, for example, in the United Kingdom. Also, Europol can be incorporated into these joint investigation teams. One important tool is that there is a common European database on terrorism. Every six months, we now have a list of terrorist organisations and suspect persons who are supposed, or allegedly supposed, to be terrorists. This is very important because the main purpose of this list is to be able to freeze the assets of terrorist organisations and individuals.

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The most important thing that we have discovered is that states have honoured their commitments to cooperate against terrorism within the European Union. However, we have discovered that there is a gap between the judicial aspects of fighting terrorism and the pre-judicial. This has to do with what can be done before a terrorist crime has been committed. For many years, countries have felt that something illegal act had to be committed - a crime - before the police could react. After llth September 2001, everything changed because we think that now our society can be satisfied if a terrorist group, that has the ability to kill 3,000 or 4,000 human beings, should be stopped before hand and be sent to court. We still have to try to catch the terrorists after they commit their crimes, but I think we have now to work hard to prevent another September 11th ever happening again. The European Union, therefore, has to adopt a pro-active role. We have to take preventive action to dissemble and disband terrorist groups and neutralise the threat. This is the change in approach on which some of the member states of the European Union are now working. We need to see more necessary pre-judicial preventative initiatives whilst also bearing in mind that we have to try and gather as much intelligence as possible and convert it into evidence to be used against those people who are being accused of terrorism. Therefore, we have to combine actions with intelligence methods. Everything has changed after September llth, also, with regard to police cooperation with European Union. There has been a tremendous amount of activity within the Justice and Home Affairs Council of the European Union. On llth September 2001, Belgium held the Presidency of the European Union. Previously, we had attended two or three meetings of the Counter-Terrorist Working Group. We attended every two or three months, but during the Belgian Presidency we had at least seven meetings of the Working Group. After that, during the Spanish Presidency, we had many more than seven meetings. We also had meetings of the Ministers of Interior. There was an enormous amount of activity to give us the judicial tools and new measures with which to combat terrorism. One important point here is to highlight the extent of co-operation between the police and security services. We now have a catalogue of security measures in the European Union. Every six months it is revised and brought up-to-date. We are trying to use more methods, including the Schengen system, in the fight against terrorism. We are trying to set up a reaction plan in order to find a common action plan in the fight against a terrorist attack or a terrorist threat. Also, we are trying to improve our cross-border controls. To summarise, the European Union has taken a number of pre-judicial measures to reinforce its operational activities in the fight against terrorism. These include: an improvement in cooperation between the police and security services; the establishment of multi-national teams; the standardisation of information exchanges; the reinforcement of Europol's role in the fight against terrorism; a permanent evaluation of the threat, including chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons of mass destruction; and coordination of liaison officers within the European Union.

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Discussion of Session 5 Richard Pawloski Is there scope for a system in NATO akin to the system of Marshals in the United States, perhaps with attendant judges able to administer swift retribution? Chris Donnelly How far do you think we are with the idea put forward by John Lenoir? How far are you from creating an actual European Marshal' Service, for want of a better alternative? Manuel Navarette Very far away, I think. I think the philosophy is clear, but still we have to go a long way in order to have at least one clear idea of what we want. I think there is a big gap between the real situation and what we have to do, but something is being done. Oded Eran I understand that there are all these efforts at co-operation within the fifteen EU members. My question is whether you are contemplating co-operation between the fifteen EU states and others? Manuel Navarette Well, in fact there are measures in this direction that are being taken right now within the fifteen member states but we are now trying to incorporate the candidate countries within these measures. But this is a political issue to resolve. However, we are also trying to encourage taking these measures with our NATO allies; we have very close relations with the United States, with Canada, and also with Russia. We are trying to co-operate with these measures with each of these three countries and also with anyone else who would be willing to join this effort. Oded Eran If I may just follow this, because some of the Mediterranean countries will already have an association agreement with the EU. Within these association agreements there are the tools that you could use, for example, on issues of money laundering, or on cooperation, among other things, between police forces. I think that you should pay attention to the existing tools; you do not have to invent anything new. Barry Denofsky If I could make two very quick comments: the first is in response to the Ambassador's comments about the Mediterranean Dialogue. Many of us in NATO have been trying to find ways to work very co-operatively with the seven countries in the region. Last year, we actually extended an invitation, unsuccessfully as it happens, to all of the seven Heads of Service to come to Brussels to meet with our Special Committee. I think in part this was because we had not thought enough about how we might relate to many of these organisations. Many of them did not understand, first of all, what our Committee was, let alone how NATO operates, or some of the objectives we had. So, we are going to take another shot at it this year under the Czech Chairmanship of our Committee, to invite them all again. But perhaps this time the invitations will be extended at one level below the Heads of Service, where we can meet and talk. But it goes back to the idea of NATO plus N. I think that is probably the answer. We have

Discussion of Session 5

tried to look at the NATO 19 plus 1, but with mixed reviews, and to NATO 19 plus 7. We agreed, actually, the other day that if we get 19 plus 4 or 5 we are going to go ahead with it, anyway. So there is the N factor coming in. I think that the recommendation that was put forward is something that we can work with. Hopefully, we shall get someone showing up for one of our meetings. The other quick observation I wanted to make refers back to the comment by Paul Swallow about a common analysis requirement. I think that is a challenge that we all face. Managing an analytical branch, as I do, it is a challenge, even within my own government, to find assessments that will cross boundaries and meet the objectives of our consumers. I think it is something that we all face, though in trying to look at how we can best share intelligence as an intelligence community, we produce assessments all the time but are restricted by all kinds of rules and regulations about where and with whom we can share it. We are trying to find new ways, however, of enhancing co-operation with police and many other organisations. We are all producers in many ways, but we do not yet have the right mechanism that allows us to share the kinds of intelligence and information products that people need to have. In my own government in Canada, after 9/11, we had the police and everybody running around talking about al Qaeda, but few people actually knew what they were really talking about. So, we started to produce some assessments that simply put things into context and perspective. I think there is much more we can do to co-operate in those areas. Julian Lindley-French I think we might be moving towards a NATO / EU division of labour, here. Surely, if the EU could put in the field 60,000 Guarda Civil, or whatever you want to call them, people who are also EU Civil Servants, it would be a massive European contribution to the security management cycle. If, indeed, we could add a further 60,000 police officers funded by the EU as European Civil Servants, again that would be a massive contribution to the joint effort. It would avoid the very duplication that we have in a NATO response force. It does seem to me that this is an area where the EU and NATO can co-ordinate and operate effectively as partners, and stop competing with each other. Juris Linde Just to add to that, it would not necessarily be a 60,000-man standing force, but just a ready reserve of people who are trained over a weekend once a month, like a kind of National Guard. They would just go to training and have a minimum level of equipment. They would also have a communication capacity, such as cell phones or beepers or whatever, and be capable, if their agencies are willing, of being allowed to take action on the basis of a phone call. You would not, then, have to pay them 24/7 to be part of a standing police force. Paul Swallow I have just got to kill this Deputy Marshal idea in Europe straight away. The reason it works in the United States is because it is all one country. America is a one nation state. We still have fifteen European nation states, soon to be twenty-one. Thomas Hobbes identified nation states in 1650; the whole point of a nation state is that the human community is the only one with exclusive right to the use of force. Could you imagine the French allowing the German police to make arrests and to police demonstrations in France? No; there is no way the Irish would allow the British to go

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and police inside Ireland, so the idea of a multi-national team at the moment is just a non-starter. The other point is that all of these things are dependent on the harmonisation of national legislation with time limits The Euro Warrant and all these things are built in, but we are still struggling in the UK, for example, with what to do to allow surveillance teams to operate. It is highly unlikely that a French surveillance team could follow suspects on a ferry or through the Eurotunnel into the UK. We still have not resolved the issue of what to do with their firearms, because the police in the UK are not habitually allowed to carry guns. The French police are, but it would be impractical, nay stupid, to make them hand their guns over at the Waterloo Terminus. So, it is all prepared: the groundwork is in place and we have identified the problems; but you just have to allow this laborious, intricate piecing together of legislation to take place. We are eight years from the Treaty of Amsterdam; give it twenty or thirty years - your guess is as good as mine here. The problems are foreseen; it is just a question of time. Julian Lindley French The NATO Rapid Reaction Force is designed for deployment in and around Europe. One of the major problems in say, Kosovo, had been in finding police officers and others for civil society reconstruction. It seems to me that if NATO is providing the forced entry heavy forces, the EU could play a very important role in this aspect of civil society reconstruction in and around Europe and indeed further afield in conjunction with NATO. It is essential to have a division of labour. Fernando Carvallho Rodgrigues There is an analogy in the way the brain is wired. The neural links form a 'small world connectivity'. NATO and the EU do not share information as they ought. The conference is an example of 'small world connectivity' and this needs to be fostered.

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SESSION 6

The Dynamics of Defence and Military Organisations The Dynamics of Defense and Military Organisations by Fredrik Lojdquist, Ministry of Defense, Stockholm

I propose to list a number of truisms that are self-evident, but sometimes are very easily forgotten, of the legislative and bureaucratic constraints in the practical activity of combating terrorism. I shall speak somewhat of the Swedish experience of intelligence coordination. Of course, some of these things are particular to Sweden, but I think also there might be some experiences that are faced by other countries as well. I shall also mention that there is a certain inherent incompatibility between certain goals that we are trying to maximise but also through a lack of expediency or efficiency, we have at the same time the need to have a high protection of our sources of information, and secrecy. There is a need to make trade-offs all the time. There is no perfect solution for anything, a factor that it is important to keep in mind. It is interesting that there is a clear distinction between traditional issues and what a EU official referred to as second and third level issues. We all have Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs who deal with the traditional issues of security, and with so-called second pillar issues. We also have Ministries of Justice or Home Affairs, or Interior that deal with domestic security issues, and we have a Head or Commissioner of police who speaks for police and internal security forces. The European Union has a long way to go before the second and third pillars meet. I think this goes for many of our countries as well. This is our experience, and my personal experience working now in the Swedish Ministry of Defence. Recently, we had- a major White Paper in Sweden on intelligence, which was published in 1999. As a consequence of this, the Secretariat, for which I am now working, was set up. It is quite a small outfit; we are only six people, but we report to a Steering Committee. This Committee, which I mention by way of providing some background, consists of five State Secretaries: the State Secretary of the Prime Minister's office and the State Secretaries from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Defence. These are the primary stakeholders. There may, in future, be other ministries involved, maybe the Ministry for Economics, for instance, or even the Environment because there are also environmental issues to be taken into account. In the Steering Group there is also a Supreme Commander and several Director Generals of the Intelligence Service and the Swedish Security Service. The latter is a police force, and is part of the police organisation. This is one of the issues that we are, are facing, namely, that the Swedish security services is a police organisation and we have a law that regulates what is called Military Intelligence. All intelligence in Sweden that is defined as military intelligence even though it does not mean that it necessarily deals with military

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issues, by law comes under the authority of the Ministry of Defence. The task is to monitor the range of security threats and risks facing Sweden, to assess and evaluate the intelligence, and to propose appropriate action if needed. Accordingly, the requirement is to task the military intelligence community and to ensure also that special attention is paid to Swedish participation in international operations. If we look at some of the main issues and challenges that we have faced in Sweden, and are facing still, and we look back over the first two years of this process of re-tasking the intelligence community towards the new threats, it is possible to be able to follow the new international intelligence security political environment. This also means, for Sweden, a new geographical scope, one that is much wider than we have taken in the past. Sweden needs to able to follow processes in geographical areas where we are perhaps not used to. There is also the re-tasking of more hard-core military matters to address this broader scope of terrorist and security issues. Another issue is to make sure that intelligence reporting is relevant to its customers. There are many different kinds of customers. A customer in a Ministry, or a State Secretary, needs something different from someone working in a government agency. An important consideration is the need to narrow the gap that has, to a certain extent, existed between the Ministries or Government offices on the one hand and the agencies on the other, because we are now facing a new situation. During the Cold War, the task of military intelligence was very well defined; this is now no longer the case. This means that we also have to take up more time to present new information. The constraints experienced in the government offices are also different. So, we have a different task in training our customers to become better customers and also to get them to request what is possible to deliver and so they know what they can get. This also includes new customers, people who, in the Ministries, are perhaps not used to receiving, or have not been exposed to, intelligence before. The same goes also for the people who work in intelligence agencies. They have been used to producing for a different set of customers than they have today and they do not always know what the constraints are of a civil servant working in a Ministry, what he needs, how much time they can realistically spend on reading intelligence, and so forth. It also includes co-ordination between intelligence and security services and other agencies that are perhaps not traditionally seen as intelligence agencies or consumers of intelligence. This can be, for example, the Customs authority, and can cover such issues as organised crime, migration and so forth. It is important to bring people together, because often these are the routes, or even the actors involved, not only in terrorism or but also in money laundering, smuggling or something like that. Intelligence agencies are involved in all of those activities; they have in a manner of speaking, a 'big shop'. To this end, we have, somewhat on a experimental basis, set up a number of ad hoc groups not dissimilar to the sort of circle of people gathered at Vilemov, people who normally perhaps would not have met before or not used to meeting. It would also include people from military intelligence and those who are investigating organised crime, for instance. This is something that perhaps does not happen naturally, and we have quite good experience of the synergy effects of this initiative. I must say the problems and challenges ahead, which we are still dealing with, are, of course, that the traditional concept of something being either military or civilian and the dividing line between them is blurred. We have a Swedish Defence Bill that will come out next year. We also have a Commission working on this now which I think will quite dramatically redefine the whole concept of military defence, or defence, as it were. Also the line between internal and external security has been blurred which means that we must have some kind of division of labour. There are also aspects of the rule of law to be followed in this respect, if there has to be an overlap between military intelligence and the security service on terrorism. For

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instance, now that Swedish Military Intelligence has to deal with terrorism - something they did not do ten years ago - and it is a learning process, they also have to accept that there is a certain amount of overlap. But it is also a question of culture; it is not always easy to get people who have been wearing different kind of uniforms, or people working in uniforms, to work together with people without uniforms. These are real issues that need to be dealt with. So also are the legislative issues. For quite good reasons, we have the Law on defence intelligence in Sweden that explicitly excludes the possibility of military intelligence working on matters that fall within the competence of the police. They argue that there are historical explanations as to why this is the case in Sweden, but from a security perspective we need some sort of law that addresses the fact that there are certain constraints that prevent Swedish intelligence looking at a multi-faceted threat. One obvious example would be the Balkans. The people who are threatening Swedish troops in the Balkans are connected with terrorist organisations. They are involved in criminal activities in Sweden such as smuggling drugs to Sweden, threatening the families of the Swedish soldiers who tried to something about it on the ground in the Balkans. They are involved in all kinds or activities, but these are the same people. After a while you discover that these same people have been followed and been monitored by different Swedish agencies that have, perhaps, not always been talking to each other. So, there is room for improvement in co-ordination. In short, there are organisational and legislative issues that need to be addressed. Then there is the issue of both horizontal and vertical co-ordination. Because you also have to learn from and trust agents, government agencies need to communicate with each other. But there has to be a certain insight and control from the government Ministries. What is communicated and to whom is an issue of culture. There are people with different backgrounds who do not necessarily work well together. With the issue of incompatible goals and irreconcilable attitudes, it is easy to forget, when we get a little bit excited about finding solutions, that there are issues of secrecy, protection of sources and so on.

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Procedural Interoperability by

Paul lonescu, Foreign Intelligence Service, Bucharest

Introduction With the aim at contributing to this debate with an intelligence perspective on the reassessments needed in risk evaluation and insuring security, I will focus my remarks on the necessity of procedural interoperability, with the suggestion that we consider them as potentially relevant for the second session of our workshop on 'The Context and Anatomy of Threat'. General Observations Concerning the preventive aspects of identifying developing threats, allow me to being with a few general considerations: The twentieth century left us with what some experts have called "a symptom of conceptual uncertainties". We must recognize that 'globalization' has presented us with a new state of affairs that compels us to rethink our security strategies. Our core problem is that we knew the world we left behind very well, but we are still unclear on how to manage the security of the world we are now entering. One thing is obvious: the policies and strategic concepts that have served us well during the Cold War, especially in security and defense, no longer suffice. We simply cannot afford to prepare to fight the last war. In a globalising world it is not only prudent, but also necessary to try to identify the global consequences of threats, irrespective of their 'national' or 'local' character. We have already learned that transnational threats cannot be fought successfully with national means alone. By the same token, threat prevention through the use of so- called 'sanitary corridors' no longer corresponds to our current security requirements. In this regard, it is sufficient, I think, to remind ourselves of the tremendous change in the character of threats since the Cold War - from traditional to non-traditional, from national to transnational - and the required change in our manner of dealing with them. Accepting the changed nature of the terrain in which we operate, we must now concentrate our attention on the accurate and thorough identification of developing threats and emerging crises. The Challenge Facing the West A short review of a few facts may help to indicate the challenge we face. In the 1990s, local conflicts involved more than 10 million people. Half of the conflicts listed in the year 2000 were categorized as 'state versus nation'. In the same interval, countries like India, Pakistan, Columbia, China, Russia, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Sudan have experienced between six and 32 internal conflicts, each. From 1995 to 2000, internal wars increased

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from 40 to 178. In 1999, 65 states were registered with displaced populations whose number totalled more than 20 million people, not to mention the 42 countries registered as having minors enrolled as active soldiers, the 94 registered as practicing torture, and the 63 with strong censorship. If we take into account one connection only - namely the linkage between refugee status and potential terrorism - we can begin to see the major local and general threat facing us all. As Professor Paul Wilkinson noted in an article, "national separatist, unification and irredentism and other forms of ethnic-religious interstate conflicts are the predominant modes of lethal collective violence in the modem world, and they spawned a high proportion of the domestic and international terrorism experienced over the past 30 years". One important conclusion from this might be that the right way of developing a complex approach to these maturing threats is profound interdisciplinary study, involving all responsible actors, and aimed at achieving consistent predictability in security. Unfortunately, that was not our approach towards the case of the former Yugoslavia. We are all familiar with the result - civil war and all of its consequences. At the same time, all institutions responsible for national and common security should understand that strategic generalizations could be totally unproductive - even counterproductive - especially when you mix analysis with particular interests in risk evaluation. It is not sufficient to consider only a list of possible emerging crises and destabilizing processes that could degenerate into either traditional or asymmetric threats The Role of Peacekeeping We have to introduce a different scale for measuring potential dangers with global effects, for example, the degree of disorder they will provoke in international affairs. It is relevant in this context to mention that, at the moment, peacekeeping forces are active in 38 countries, and these blue/green helmets seem to be the only tool at the disposal of the international community. Or at least the only one the use of which countries with strong regional strategic interests can easily agree upon (as for example, the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council). One question we can raise in our talks is how beneficial it would be if the 'world map' of blue/green helmets is extended continuously. Is it or is it not in our security interest to permit the conditions that require the never-ending multiplication of peace enforcement missions? Of course it is not. Shall we work towards preventing such a trend? Yes, of course. In our discussions today, and hopefully these will not be the last ones dedicated to these critical topics, we should keep at the forefront of our thinking the need either to engineer new collective means to consolidate the order in international affairs, or to find a modus operandi. Procedural interoperability This is a valid approach to such a modus operandi, due to the fact that for all practical purposes none of the 'Official Stakeholders' (whose roles have just been examined in Session Five) can successfully manage to fulfil their national and general tasks in the field of security alone. At a time when sharing intelligence and assessments has been widely recognized as a necessity for insuring a coherent approach to current threats at national level, as well as a

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precondition for any successful collective security format, it falls upon us to ensure that the right procedures are in place. Such a construction would need to establish a distinctive role for Intelligence and Security Services, including their precise contributions in terms of intelligence in accordance with their specific practitioner expertise. Opportune intelligence is, of course, the foremost factor in identifying and mastering a crisis, irrespective of the stage in which we begin to deal with it. But a continual strategic assessment is indispensable for projecting global security while avoiding the great majority of maturing threats. I strongly believe that it is imperative for us to initiate an interactive reflection process that could lead us to a multi-dimensional approach to our security in the general benefit of all the participants. I also believe that NATO is the right institution to nurture such a multilateral program, especially given its new articulated preoccupation for global security and the fact that it already has the necessary strategic vocation to make it workable. Considering the fact that the states and emerging actors are still evaluating their policies in the light of the end of the Cold War and the impact of accelerating globalization, and given that it is necessary to harmonise their interests through a common effort, a first step could be to establish a common acquis in security. By this I mean common priorities, common assessment procedures, and common means of addressing maturing threats. In other words, we should start by fixing the minimum standards that will allow us to prevent or manage misunderstandings or artificial rivalries based on lack of communication and compromise.

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Discussion of Session 6 Richard Pawloski What is the role of the Mafia now in the world of terrorism? Are they adapting it, or are they seeking legitimacy to save their funds? Is there any input on that, the Mafia being an ex-Cold War type of organisation? Julius Linde A quick question on the relationship between organised crime and terror. Is this not an Achilles heel of terror, because surely we can do business with organised crime? Spike Bowman It is, but you cannot say that we can focus on organised crime as a blanket statement. To give you an example, the United States looks at Russia and says we can identify 50 organised crime families there and the Ministry of the Interior comes to us and says that you are 500 short, you know. Georg Witschel On the subject of governments, organised crime and terrorism, from a purely abstract or academic point of view, I would say that they would not mix because organised crime usually does not want to overthrow the government. They want to have a quiet framework and if they kill somebody it will be a targeted killing because some prosecutors and policemen, some politicians, are standing in their way. However, that rather nice abstract differentiation between terrorism on the one hand and organised crime on the other hand seems to be more and more blurred. I think one good example would be Columbia, where you have an almost complete overlapping of organised crime and terrorism. In other cases, you have a certain industry in fake passports, or they might buy weapons etc.; and in some cases, obviously from an operational/co-operation on single issues, you are in some kind of increased complexity. So it is mixing up more and more. With regard to drugs from Afghanistan, it is a huge business. Figures for the last poppy harvest in Afghanistan was probably one billion US dollars, and I think the sales price in Western European should be something like 100 billion US dollars or Euros. Who will profit? Organised crime, the warlords in Afghanistan and, I presume, that some Taliban structures and terrorist structures will also take their share. From a political point of view of the foreign and security policy, organised crime comes into the equation. It is part of a challenge not just from police, from judicial view, but more and more also from a foreign and security policy view, unfortunately. Pierre Conesa That question is very interesting and, when you look, for example, all around the world, you will find many kinds of relationships between organised crime and the terrorists. Sometimes they can co-operate, for example on passport and the smuggling. Alternatively, they will be behind a bank raid. We had an example in France, with the GIA, which sometimes attacked banks to get money just to finance Islamic groups. There is also competition between them sometimes on some illegal traffic, on diamonds, on drugs etc., as, for example, with Kurds in France. We had some assassinations, which were probably the result of competition in drug distribution; and in Algeria, the situation seems to be different, by which I mean that the people concerned, the GIA's groups, are mainly coming from small-time drug traffickers, small-scale smuggling, and not from the organised crime syndicates.

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Organised crime is a threat to the government. The last case is that of Columbia, in which sometimes there are feuds, one criminal gang against the other. For example, kidnapping activity is flourishing in Columbia. The criminal gangs at last discovered that it was more interesting to kidnap an organised crime leader than some of the Colombian people they were used to kidnapping because the pickings were more lucrative, In that case, there was real fighting between them. Adrian Kendry My question to Fredrik Lojdquist concerns this very interesting new defence and security policy, which is going to come into effect. I wondered if you could say a little bit more about whether or not you think it will embrace, and will contain, many of the issues which have been discussed here in terms of the new direction of integration. Fredrik Lojdquist I cannot really offer any firm conclusions and no reports have been published. There is only the first Report of the Commission, which is preparing this defence Bill that will be published shortly. However, I think that the Swedish Military task today is defined as dealing with a military attack on Sweden. I have no personal insight, but I think this will be changed and it will be reformulated into something to defend Sweden against a seriously armed attack or something like that and also to include terrorist attacks. I think the tradition in Sweden where we have quite a strong division between what we call military defence and civilian defence will be redefined. The whole concept of military defence needs to be redefined and the defence politicians are giving this serious thought in Sweden at the present moment. John Lenoir Just a brief note that was prompted by something that Ambassador Eban mentioned regarding peace keeping forces - the blue helmets and white helmets. It seems to me that such a response is not really adequate for the kind of the armed terrorists or criminal-like organisations such as the Muhajeddin. A force of blue helmets to deal with that would be wiped out. So it seems to me that the whole philosophy behind a peacekeeping force has to be changed to deal with the nature of the terrorist threat. Bruce Jones I shall add just a couple of observations about what we have just been speaking about earlier, that the strengths of NATO are in its culture and the structures that are in place. It has changed and it has developed over the years quite dynamically, dealing for example with the EU and with the OSCE. I would say that NATO actually does what it is meant to do a lot better than either of those organisations. It has got a great deal of professionalism in dealing with emergency planning, disasters, including combating disasters, disaster reaction right the way through to Russia through its structures. Security is on the agenda in NATO. At present, it is more focused on physical and procedural security. NATO has no intelligence assets, but it is able to task and to collate. It is able to analyse further, standardise and disseminate. What it can do is leverage the efforts of smaller stakeholders and involve them in complementarity and get them to contribute and be involved with the overall picture. There is also the question has been touched on of training and education on intelligence and security. NATO has the potential of tasking from spotting the gaps that there are in our intelligence gathering. We also have the task of establishing overall information intelligence requirements in reverse, with all the different players operating at a non-classified level. We can make sure that we are all singing from the same hymn-sheet,

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that is to say, that we are talking about a near real time common operating picture. We are talking in the same language about the same things. Now, are these are all in the context of what we are talking about? Are they broadly easily achievable? Are they realistically achievable? That, perhaps, is what we have to bear in mind, and what we shall concentrate on and develop more tomorrow. The question is, where do we go from here?

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SESSION 7

Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence The Case for NATO's Transformation to Meet the Terrorists' Threat by

Julian Lindley-French Geneva Centre on Security Policy, Geneva, Switzerland

I want to place military operational considerations within a context of emerging lessons learned a year and a half since the tragic events in New York, Washington and indeed County Pennsylvania, on 9/11 2001. These events changed, or at least should have changed, our perception of threat and security. Its nature emphasised the need for security at many levels and across a broad functional spectrum. There is now a need for new thinking and a comprehensive civil-military approach, founded first and foremost on information dominance. Given the need generated by this threat for interagency co-operation within States and inter-institutional co-operation beyond States, it seems to me that there is both a threat to, and an opportunity for, NATO provided by this watershed in security. Is NATO a new security platform for the co-ordination and projection of credible coercive power with global reach, or merely a European legacy response? Chris Donnelly captured this issue well when he called for a common culture of defence thinking to enable information exchange. In order to generate a common security culture, or rather a new common security culture, nothing less will do, because strategic situational awareness is the first priority in this war against catastrophic terror in which we are all engaged. Thus my core message is as follows: we are on the threshold between an emerging perception of the magnitude of the threat we all face and the impact of that perception on the contentions about the urgency and, indeed, the extent, of the change needed. The Americans have clearly crossed that threshold. Canadians and Europeans, I believe, have not. At least some Europeans show a strategic pretence, if you like. Many in Europe wish to remain on the strategic vacation they have been enjoying these past twelve years. The result is two patent absurdities: first, the loading of ever more security tasks on ill-equipped and poorly postured structures by way of appearing to act - the ultimate in free loading, if you will. Second, the need for the transatlantic security community has never been greater and yet we are about to veto each other in the UN Security Council with untold damage to the world's primary security relationship. How on earth have we got ourselves in this mess at this time is cause for concern. To bin Laden it must appear little more than the self-implosion of the West's political will. Let us hope that in the weeks and months to come, some of our leaders rise above the mediocrity from which they all too patently suffer, to see a bigger

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picture than an assertive, pre-emptive unilateralist or, indeed, false European-ness. Indeed, if the Europeans and North Americans were truly blessed with leaders with foresight, the scope and nature of the threat posed by catastrophic trans-national terrorism would not only put events in Iraq in true perspective, but also drive and shape a radically a different NATO. It would be an alliance recognised by all members as vital to the comprehensive security model that is essential in winning this struggle. This does not necessarily mean, however, a revolutionary different NATO; but it would certainly signal a radically different NATO. However, any enhancement of the West's security, be it through NATO or, indeed, through the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), is dependent upon all those involved in the current efforts to find some way to step back from the brink. There is no way around this. We can build no structures until we have political consensus; right now we simply do not have it. Therefore, if we can build a new NATO, what would it look like? At its core, the new NATO would be built around information and intelligence co-ordination, reinforced by a flexible force and operational planning capability. This would enable NATO to be able to put together variable coalitions of the willing and be able and prepared for multiple missions at relatively short notice. All this would be backed up by a deployable C4I capable and flexible enough of interfacing with civilian capabilities both governmental and non-governmental. It is a complex, but necessary, picture - nothing short of a new concept of force projection. I might also add the need for the protection of the homeland to ensure sufficient political robustness to project power. Much of the debate is focused purely on advanced expeditionary warfare and the capabilities therein. If our home bases are vulnerable to attack, it would fundamentally undermine our ability to act whether as States or as an alliance. In clearly defined co-operation with other international organisations, factors such a capability would require integrated forces across the civil-military mission spectrum. They would range from conflict attack prevention to coercive diplomacy, which we are seeing in the Gulf region today. This would enable a forced entry capability through global counter-terrorism against the PKO's and PSO's in high intensity, nonpermissive and permissive environments, right through to the very complex business of civil society reconstruction. In the international security challenge we all face, no single State, not even the mighty US, can handle this on its own. It needs allies; it needs NATO. Certainly, a new broader NATO will need a new lighter and more flexible shape. The reforms of Prague are a first step, but no more. The move away from geographical commands to functional commands will need to be completed, and the Prague capabilities commitments will finally have to honour DCI, and not humiliate it. If not, I fear the hawks in the US, who are killing NATO through designed indifference, will maintain their unholy alliance with those in a certain foreign ministry in a certain European country who want the alliance to die by design. First, though, we must bridge the political divide within the alliance in which some States are beginning to realise, as Pierre Conesa and George Witschel have pointed out, the scale of the threat and those who would prefer not to be disturbed. There is no hiding place for any of us. The threat is real. While Ely Karmon pointed out that catastrophic terrorism is more an intent than a fact at present, it is a reasonable planning assumption that we live in a world in which ever nastier people will likely get their hands on ever more

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destructive power. They will also use the means of open societies in an attempt to devastate all or part of them. As Adrian Kendry and Kevin Rosner have alluded to, the key words are flexibility and transformation. The environment is flexible and we must be flexible because the enemy is fundamentally flexible. First, he offers a threat that can be generated either locally and/or worldwide; second, he can achieve tactical supremacy - even battle space dominance - at a point and time of his choosing. Third, he has highly redundant systems. Fourth, he is constantly reconnoitring weak points to attack, to which we offer a myriad and particularly critical national infrastructure. Fifth, he draws no moral distinction between civilian and military targets; indeed, he prefers civilian targets as part of its strategy of intimidation. Sixth, the terrorists can reconstitute rapidly and withstand critical losses, generate potentially massive destructive power at minimal cost, and thereby exact such high strategic leverage. Terrorists can exact such a high ratio strategic leverage so that some traditional allies are quietly considering whether their security is best served by being part of the global war on terror or, alternatively, by maintaining a distance from it. At the same time, asymmetry has caused a profound intellectual dilemma for political leaders and defence planners, alike. Schooled in the rigours of symmetry, it is a dilemma that is reflected in the asymmetric means employed for delivering catastrophe to the unsuspecting. It is a tactic favoured by the enemy. Indeed, the response of both the Americans and Europeans is that the most European of North American countries, Canada, simply has not got it as yet. In essence, the terrorist strikes at a strategic gap between excessive American heaviness and excessive European lightness on the one hand and between America's strategic concept and Europe's want of a strategic concept on the other. For that reason, the terrorist exacerbates, even generates, the emerging divide in the use of coercion, not only on both sides of the Atlantic but also between the Europeans. This then spills over into policy choices. Europeans are wondering how or whether to confront other security challenges. NATO, in all this, operates in such an environment that it is the only organisation that can bridge the strategic concept gap, which is progressively condemning the West to be less than the sum of its parts. Therefore, the new NATO must become the West's security one-stop shop for the co-ordination of a credible security response against catastrophic terror. There must be no false political pretensions; it will never be a transatlantic European Union, but to that end I would contend the alliance must be refocused on its essential new security mission. In particular, this means moving away from competing institutions. The EU has a role in many parts of the security spectrum, but not the truly violent. For NATO, it means ending the pretence of burden sharing between states and militaries at very different levels of power and capability. It also means Europeans recognising more than the threat they are prepared to afford and America recognising more than the threat that they can immediately destroy. The new NATO would be a forum for collective intelligence and the basis of action founded upon a common threat assessment. The new NATO would act on the basis of what Paul lonescu's procedural operability was designed to achieve, namely, Bruce Jones's common operating picture, which is the mission statement in the new strategic environment in which we find ourselves. Ultimately, the new NATO would be all the more vital for the strategic rehabilitation of Europeans and the reengagement of European public opinion with strategic reality, albeit within an effective framework for the provision of plausible security - a security 'soft landing' if you will.

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To conclude, 'incrementalism' has its place; but this is a time for something more. NATO, in return, must frankly sell itself better to key constituencies. This group represents a good start. NATO needs more future study groups to lift its bureaucratic perspective from the immediate. However, above all, the member countries must stop using NATO as a cheap strategic dustbin and cease maintaining their pretence of action by loading an under-funded and under-staffed bureaucracy with ever more missions that they have no intention of actually carrying out. Events of late demonstrate the urgency of the hard policy, funding and, indeed, planning choices that we must confront. These choices need to be made and made now. It would be tragically ironic, therefore, if one of Osama bin Laden's greatest sworn enemies offered him and his fanatics his easiest and greatest victory - the end of a consistent, credible, coercive Western security capability.

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Escaping from the Limitations of the Legacy Responses by

Adrian Kendry Economic Advisor, NATO Headquarters, Brussels

In following Julian Lindley-French's paper, one should, of course, really just pause and reflect up on the message that has come from his very eloquent words. However, I propose to address issues in terms of transatlantic co-operation regarding armaments, export licensing - those kinds of considerations. In some sense, this would be a rather more nuts and bolts approach to some of the issues that have been raised by Julian Lindley-French. What seems to me to be fundamental to Julian's arguments is the way that we think about transatlantic co-ordination and co-operation in respect of the issue of standards, inter-operability, armaments - these kinds of issues - and of force planning and force equipment. If we take a look at the United States, although the so called transformation revolution is sometimes over-hyped from this side of the Atlantic, Americans will tell you that the notion of the transformation of US Forces is into network centric warfare equipped, battlefield dominant and digitised systems and units. This is sometimes greatly exaggerated, however, even within the different branches of the armed Services, let alone across the various Services. There is a danger that Europeans can be somewhat mesmerised. I know there has been some suggestion that the NATO Ambassadors should go and take a look at these network-centric configurations as a means of demonstrating precisely the nature of the implementation of the kind of technologies that the United States has been pursuing over the years. But in terms of their applicability and relevance to the transformation of European security and European force structures, as Julian has been signalling, it is less obvious. It seems to me that what Julian has been saying is that if we wish to conceive of a new NATO, one that bridges these kinds of almost extreme developments that are associated, even rhetorically, with the United States and Europe, we have to find some kind of common ground. We need some means of communicating interoperably and not just in terms of C4I in its technical manifestation. In that regard, one of the most important things that we should do is to create a much greater and effective dialogue about what precisely does exist. What is applicable; what can be shared; what should we have in common; and what can be literally partitioned in ways that meet the security needs of the particular areas in question. The confusion, or the 'fog', of the present international circumstances, seems to compound this growing sense that we cannot communicate with each other on both sides of the Atlantic. This is partly because of the feeling that somehow the United States has such technological dominance that Europe, as a consequence, is in no position to make any kind of contribution whatsoever. Many know that this is not really true in terms of the capabilities that are contained within many of prime contractors, systems integrators and defence manufacturing manufacturers and the suppliers that make up the European technological industrial base.

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The really big question goes back to political will and the essence of what precisely it is that we need to do in terms of identifying threats and missions, We can only then make the appropriate transformation to what it is that we are going to produce. In that sense, the legacy responses, and the way in which we are limited, are in terms of our imagination. There is a limit to the holistic, flexible approach by which to be able to do this. I wish I could be more optimistic about the translation of what Julian has said into some kind of effective means by which, within the organisation and together with assistance and influence from outside, we could go down this path and begin to conceive of ways to communicate better. We could then not just discuss limitations in terms of technological deficiencies that are perceived to exist within European force structures. We would not just agonise further about if, and when, we are going to introduce into the Alliance a ground surveillance system, as for example one of the much touted and important aspects of the new Defence Capabilities Initiative. We would really work from the top down as well as from inspiration from the bottom up. We would then really begin to explore the kinds of profound issues and specific questions about security and defence reorientation. For example, we would be able to discuss issues such as a division of labour, which is a much-maligned phrase that raises hackles, together with questions about whether or not existing allies, not to mention new allies, would have any kind of niche capabilities to contribute. Also, we could all recognise that the new NATO does not have to have everybody doing everything and, instead, could have partitioned tasks. Fundamentally, what is it that we are really looking for? What is it that we expect not only of the 'Old Europe', but also the 'New Europe' to make at least one passing reference to that historic phase which has now become part of the lexicon of insults in our transatlantic dialogue? These are profound questions. I am a mere functionary sitting within NATO Headquarters, who moves between one committee and another, trying to make some kind of minimal contribution to some of the thinking about these concepts. It seems to me, though, that Julian's 'manifesto' could literally be pinned up as the '95 Thesis' on the doors of the NATO cafeteria. These issues are so profound that we need to think operationally how we would begin to translate them into effective change and effective transformation. They relate to technology transfer, inter-operability, and arms export controls. In a way, I think that these are secondary to the issues that have been raised by Julian Lindley-French's paper. I do not wish to deflect us from thinking about how we might deal with his various points in moving forward and transforming NATO. I have to say that I absolutely agree with his thesis that from my observations and experience, NATO is actually the only organisation that can do that which needs to be done and is potentially able to do that which he has identified. My question is; will NATO ever have the kind of motivation from the nations in order to transform it in to something that is going to be truly effective in meeting the security challenges that were identified yesterday and the challenges that will be with us for quite some time?

Future NATO Security M. Edmonds and O. Cerny (Eds.) IOS Press, 2004

Discussion of Session 7 Bruce Jones Adrian, thank you very much indeed. I think one point that certainly needs mentioning is that NATO, and its armed forces, as it currently stands is able to fulfil a very wide spectrum of roles, from peacekeeping, disaster relief, internal security, to high intensity conflict. These is a very broad spectrum of missions, and it is really a question of harnessing them and getting them together to deal with the job in hand. I was interested in what Adrian said about network centric warfare; it seems also that this is another divide between the United States and Europe because very few - almost nobody - has the finances or the will, to get fully involved with network centric warfare. It will simply mean that other military forces involved in any United Statesled major force projection in the future would largely be incompatible. They would not be able to play and would not be on the same network. Equally, it is the reverse of 'asymmetric' warfare; it is symmetric and the sorts of skills that in fact are required are human, grass roots intelligence. It is about getting people living and working on the ground - village policemen, postmen, traffic wardens, ticket sellers, people at gas stations etc. - and being involved in the overall operating picture. You cannot rely on technology for that; you do not just need experienced, skilled, seasoned troops, but these others, however small their role or contribution, who are educated and in the picture. They must have a stake and some sort of ownership in this; they must be involved. So, to relying on technology is unwise. Also, because of the sort of career patterns that we have now in the armed forces, people do not stay particularly long. Indeed, they tend to be more and more streamlined so that they will just have one set of skills and become 'compartmentalised'. This takes us very far away from this sort of intelligence gathering idea. This is my particular approach, and whereas network centric is a very neat, ordered, way of looking at things we are now concerned with asymmetric threats. Ignacio Cosido Gutierrez I would like to add that the challenge for NATO lies in a combination of the two factors that we have on the table. In one way, the capability gap between Europe and the United States in military terms, combined with the political failure of NATO in the difficulties we have in making decisions, raises doubts as to whether or not the Alliance can survive. NATO can survive with just one of these two factors, but not with the two combined. In one way, the United States does not need any European co-operation when conducting any military operation; the Americans simply do not need it. In another, not only do they not need Europe, but they are also finding growing political difficulties obtaining the political support in policy decision-making. So, in reality, we work in these two ways in the sense of trying to improve the best compromise of military operational capabilities, whilst and at the same time trying to find a political consensus. NATO is not a very good at this. Pierre Conesa I do not think that the 9/11 event has changed as much as has been suggested so far. Speaking as a European, I am obliged to say that most of the European countries have been attacked in their homeland by terrorists well before 9/11. I can quote examples from France, Great Britain, Italy, Germany, etc. So, if there is an anti-terrorist

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concept, it was a European one first. We do not want to hear today that European countries are not concerned with the terrorist threat. My second point is that the crisis has nothing to do with anti-terrorism. If one has to deal with terrorism, we should first exert pressure on Pakistan or Saudi Arabia or Israel. It is not possible, at present, to enter a dialogue with Iraq, even though it is a major threat behind terrorist acts. If we want to deal with proliferation, all right; but let us all fight the same battle. With reference to NATO, do we all have the same concept? Do we have a common conceptual concept in the war against terrorism? I do not know. We had a common concept against the Soviet Union, and that was the basis of our common warfare. When talking about terrorism, for example, when the British had to deal with internal conflict and IRA terrorist attacks they had to deal also with the surprising attitude of the American government over Irish immigrants financing the IRA. We, in France, have had the same problem with ETA. Cornelius Wientjes I shall move on a little bit from the technology side. I cannot resist the opportunity to exercise some public relations at this moment. I am not completely sure that people are aware of what NATO has in terms of its capacity for reflection, or its instruments with which it is able to organise its reflections on its role in respect of these new threats. NATO created many years ago an instrument, a mechanism, for this type of very important reflection on its role on new challenges, on the technology drive, on the confrontation of the technology drive, on military operations, on doctrine and so on. The mechanism was created in 1956 by Doctor Carl von Karman. It was a long-term scientific study. This type of reflection is typically the kind of reflection that is addressed by the long-term scientific studies that are conducted under the aegis of the research and technology organisation of NATO. I would really like to recommend to those from NATO Headquarters to speak with us from the research side about the possibility of setting up a research advisory group on this issue. I think that it would be a unique format for this type of dialogue. Julian Lindley-French I take Cornelius's point fully. But I think we have to go further, partly because of where that operates within the NATO bureaucracy. I think we have to have it very much the top level. The EU does it with its Future Studies Group. I sometimes think that the EU outsails NATO in these areas, because of the organisational level at which these future studies operate. However, I think your proposal is well taken. For me, the key question is whether or not, in effect, NATO can continue to exist and operate without political consensus. We can talk about C4SI and network centric warfare, networking enabling capabilities, battle-space dominance etc. - all the things that are currently lying around - but without that overall decision-making nexus it is very hard to see the technical approach really being realised. We are very far from the days when consensus could be guaranteed on most subjects. It seems to me that the basic problem is that NATO was designed as a collective defence organisation. It is now trying to move into collective security, which, by definition, is inherently far more political. It operates in an environment where the systems have not caught up with the political evolution of what is going on, not just within Europe, but also across the Atlantic. It has to do that to survive - to be both environmentally and politically relevant.

Discussion of Session 7

I disagree with Pierre Conesa fundamentally on this. Iraq has everything to do with the war on terror, because of the spillover into every other facet of NATO's existence - in fact of all our existence. What is happening at present is that we are marching blindly into the re-nationalisation of security. I see the end of institutions playing a role in security, be it the EU or NATO. NATO has been profoundly damaged by all of this. Anyone who believes that somehow this crisis will end and we shall go back into a status quo is fundamentally misguided. Even more so, the EU has been fundamentally damaged by this development. The political identity upon which the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is built, which is different from NATO's, has been so profoundly damaged that I cannot see it recovering as a meaningful policy for five to ten years. This is because the essential trust that was needed to build the things has gone. Trust between leaders and between key countries has gone. Maybe this has done us a favour; maybe it has finally triggered a serious debate about all the ambiguities with which we lived in the 1990's. After all the pretence that somehow we agreed on strategic concepts and strategic methods, we shall now, finally, get down to a debate which really is about what we are prepared to do for our security. For Europe, the key question is; what are we Europeans prepared to do for our security in the world today? What strikes me about the current situation is that we Europeans whinge like mad about the United States, but the gap between our vital interests worldwide and our ability to do anything about them is huge. It is one thing to tell Americans that they are wrong and that they are too heavy handed; it is another then to be fully aware that we have no alternative to offer. I think that by working through NATO, a) we can help shape American policy in the way they perceive of their security methodology, and b) we can bring the Europeans back to closing that most important of gaps between our vital interests and our inability to defend them. Chris Donnelly I would like to draw out some of the aspects of what I have heard. You comments remind me of something from Frederick the Great, who said that a world without arms is like music without instruments. Which is the European issue and one between the US and Europe. We had, in the Cold War, a concept of defence that was absolute. It was military and it was a case of winning, or losing. But we also had concepts of security that were different. The US concept of security was also absolute. You were either totally secure or not secure; the European concept was relative. To the vast majority of European countries, whose populations actually had their faith in their national institution destroyed within living memory, the reliance on armed forces as a means of ensuring security was destroyed or 'rubbished'. That was not true for the US, nor was it true for the UK. So, the European concept of security became relative. It was something to be achieved by integration. If the Europeans have a problem, it is that they think that this solution should be applied to everybody else as well. But that is a very different view of security. Since 9/11, what the US seems to be doing is to be re-establishing the absolute concept of security. Americans are trying to find some way of re-establishing absolute security again. The European problem of music without instruments seems to have several specific elements to it. First, you have got the tradition of territorial defence and conscription built into national structures. Some countries would find it hard to change. For example, Norway would find it hard to exist without the Army being part of society, because it was specifically developed that way for historical reasons.

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Second, we have all now got 50-odd years of investment in governmental structures, ministries, and stovepipes, of course, which were very sensible during the Cold War. But they reflected the Cold War. They are no longer relevant, arguably, to what we do today. Third, is the point, raised by Adrian Kendry, that defence spending has become social security, not national security, driven. Fourth, our intelligence and security community has got a long-standing investment in personnel. In some countries, this is financed by projects, rather than a sort of steady state, not to say Cold War, mentality. With the best will in the world, how do you turn a Russian speaker into an Arabic speaker? Finally, the strategic community, - the scientific community - has been very, very slow to change, to develop, and to look at the future. It has continued to work along all lines and on all patterns of investment. But it has got the same problem as everybody else. So put those two together and ask, how we tackle these problems? You have got, on the one hand, terribly deep structural problems in European societies in the way they organise their armed forces and security services and so on, to say nothing of the new Europeans, the Eastern European and Central European countries, now joining Europe. They have a particular problem, which is that things are going to take a terribly long time - a decade or more - to deal with even if we are lucky. Can those nations develop the political will and the capability in this respect not to 'cop out'? There is this, on the one hand; but on other hand, you have got these different concepts. These are really deep underlying different philosophical approaches that have, in the past 18 months particularly - and you could argue over the past few years - led us in very different directions. One tool we have with which to tackle it is the scientific community - the thinking community. It is the only free agent and the only element that does not have a vested interest in the status quo. How do we use it to bridge these practical and philosophical gaps? Julian Lindley-French These are fundamental questions. My first statement is that the politicians, the political leaders, have to create the framework for free thinking in the scientific community. Most European leaders have not given a green light on this. Basically what they are saying is that Europeans have a product-led approach to security. Which means that we have a certain product and are prepared to adjust incrementally. However, we would rather not know about the market in which it exists and, until we have that, any basic change in thinking then government think-tanks, and strategic and scientific communities are not permitted to really go, if you like, into blue sky studies. They argue, what is the point? Is it yet another 'shelf stacker'? We have got enough 'shelf-stackers' around, produced by people like me. I think there is a huge divide here. I think the Americans are genuinely market-led in the way they perceive global security. I am not saying that their conclusions are always right because the vested interest process in the United States means that they present a lot of legacy systems as being transformation. There is a gap between the rhetoric and the reality of what the military gets at the end of the pipeline. So, I am not saying that they are entirely right. My second point is that I think the process of European integration, which I support, has affected Europe's ability to think globally. I think we are so obsessed and have been so obsessed - with building Europe that we have forgotten the rest of the world. We have almost found ourselves trapped into a strategic vacuum and until there is some event, or leadership, to lift the European perspective beyond the

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European theatre, which surely has to come, then we shall go on doing this. My fear is that the event will indeed be a major catastrophic terrorist attack in Europe when we shall lose several thousand Europeans. Then, finally, tragically that might wake up European leaders to say, " Well, we cannot isolate ourselves any longer; we cannot avoid going through the task of developing the kind of tools and capabilities that can give us some coercive ability in that field. The paradox for me is that, if we could get into this game and start generating the kind of capabilities that are relevant to the threat, they will, by definition, change our concept of security. This is because I think capability generates responsibilities, and responsibilities actually change the concept. It is a bottom-up approach to how we see the world in which we live. But I think there is a fundamental divide. This is why I find the current French position so bizarre, because I know that France fundamentally agrees with the UK and is much closer to the UK on a worldview than is generally thought. The divide is that there are certain countries, Germany in particular, where this is really about, not Iraq, but about what role Germany, a country that has the world's third largest economy, plays in providing global security. I have a fundamental faith in Germany. I believe Germany is a model democracy and I have no problem with Germany reforming its armed forces and developing a much more capable military that can play a full role in international affairs. Too much of what I hear from Berlin right now and from several other European states is really not an alternative way of providing security but a way of not providing it at all and of avoiding the realities with which we are confronted. In practical terms, I think we have to break up planning sections into what I would call a final state. We are trapped in an interim world in which we have to use the product-led approach and perform niche capabilities specialisation. We are trapped in a NATO that now has five different levels of military capability. We have to recognise that NATO is no longer an equal organisation in military technical terms. NATO is a hierarchy, with the Americans up there at the top. The British and the French are somewhere in the middle. The continental Western Europeans, the new members and the NATO partners are down at the bottom. Stitch that together in one defence planning cycle and we shall need to have very flexible planning regimes with much more flexible capabilities. We have to stitch together the willing. We have to recognise that we are not always going to have the Alliance operating at 19+ N or 19 + 7 or whatever. There will be coalitions of the willing and the Alliance must be able to enable those to be formed without falling apart politically. If some states wish to stand apart, what the EU would call "constructive absenteeism", but would help from time to time, we have to change decision-making mechanisms to permit that kind of flexibility. I know it is difficult, but I see no alternative. We have to start working up, through strategic and scientific communities, a vision; it is a planning vision. The governments of Europe are responsible for ensuring threat-relevant capabilities with global reach, either autonomously, where the Europeans can act indeed as Europeans if the Americans are over-engaged elsewhere, or, above all, in a combined capacity through a fundamental inter-operability with United States forces. It seems to me absolutely crazy. For all the faults of the United States' current administration, - and I am no fan of this administration and I have big problems with some of its people - if the Europeans were to damage the essential link with a power the world has never known, but still one that is an essential force for good in the world. Thank Goodness the US is the dominant power in this world and not some other power.

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We have to accept niche capability options, ones that we have to build. We also need top cover. We need groups such as this to develop 'blue sky' concepts that can get the Europeans out of the bunker and start them moving towards a 'road map' towards the future. We have to be very firm when we hear that old cliche, "Well Europe has a different strategic concept". Let us identify those who have a different strategic concept and those who have no concept at all. It is to those people who have no concept at all that we address, because, otherwise, we shall go on trapped in the strategic pretence with which Europe is currently and sadly mired. Bruce Jones To an extent, we are in uncharted territory, because Europe is beginning to get a corporate identity. It no longer has its old identity. How Europe reacts to future circumstances is difficult to say. It is inward looking; it is looking at itself. It is trying to get a new sort of identity. Adrian Kendry I want to respond to something that has been raised by Chris Donnelly and Julian Lindley-French. It seems to me to be something fundamentally important that we could really spend quite a bit of time discussing, which is about the role of the scientific community. This is a question of comparative freedom vis a vis other kinds of communities. It is a relative freedom from the sort of status quo-vested interests that Chris Donnelly was referring to and how it might be used to bridge the gaps. What might it look like in a European context compared to the US context? Having spent some time in the United States and Europe, I have the impression - a gut feeling if you will - that the way in which ideas can be discussed and translated comes from the enormous explosion in the growth of private knowledge and technology. In the US, the possible conceptualisations and usage of such technology in security dimensions comes from different organisations, universities, think tanks, which are dedicated institutions towards the creation of knowledge and technology. The way in which they then find their place in discussions with the security community, something along the lines of freedom on information act, has something to do with the openness of the American political culture. This, of course, has nothing to say, of enormous capabilities that exist in the generation of technological and scientific ideas within Europe. But the impression that one gets, going back to what Julian was saying about market-led versus product-led ideas, is that it might partly be seen as a cultural thing. However, I think it has a lot to do with the legacy of the Cold War era and the way in which we protect what we perceive to be the technologies that are fundamental to security. Paradoxically, that kind of protection leads to a lack of flexibility and imagination of the kind that is fundamental to that which Julian Lindley-French was saying earlier in his approach. So, I think the organisation of knowledge and its dissemination is fundamental. Julian Lindley-French I would like to refer back to our discussion about civil authorities and military authorities. We have not heard the phrase 'law enforcement' or 'civil rights' yet, but perhaps the next panel will bring us back to that. When Adrian Kendry was talking about the 'capacity gap' between the military forces, I am thinking of an enormous and growing capacity gap between the military capacity and civil law at least in the United States. There, we are trying to look at the problem. We have found that it is an

Discussion of Session 7

enormous task to try to integrate civil authorities in any kind with the domestic deployment of military in the United States. It is so overwhelming that the civil authorities are in no way integrated into the C4I concept of operations, into the military apparatus. I do not know whether it is any better in Europe, but in the United States there is an enormous gap. Oldrich Cerny Coming back to what Ely Karrnon said about the perception of security, I think that it is very true of these parts of Europe and of Eastern Europe. Security is something where there is an absolute lack of informed public debate. Security is still a concept that evokes among the majority of the public a totalitarian past, with images of secret communist police and corrupt traffic cops. It is not perceived in all its dimensions. The majority of people views it as a sort of sacred commodity, which is owned by a very narrow group of people who are not even visible behind the stacks of files stamped 'top secret'. Bruce Jones Yes, the perspective of security in different countries is very important. At a conference I was chairing and speaking at recently in the United States people questioned me in great detail as to why people in the United Kingdom did not feel kind of paranoid about having a security service such as MIS. Did not this intrude? Did not they feel that their private lives were being impinged upon? There's a great deal of difference in the perspective in different countries. The security service is seen as quite a respectable organisation; so, even, is the Special Branch. In other countries, careers in these sorts of intelligence fields are not seen as good. They are seen as being shady, unrespectable and with lots of downsides arising from the fact that you are a civil servant and you cannot even tell your friends and family what you get up to. It is not somebody that sits to the left of the garbage collector, so we all have very different, perspectives. I was going to make a couple of further comments. Firstly, my definition some time ago of a asymmetric threat was that to which there is not a corresponding high cost, high-tech counter technology with an appropriate programme budget. We are talking here of low tech equipment and we go back to things such as the intelligence cycle in which we can go and train people in different countries and make sure that we at least have parity and are singing with us from the same song sheet. This is not over complicated It then comes down to surveillance and source protection, which is obviously sensitive, by any criteria. But that is where the filling is in the sandwich; it is where the nitty-gritty is. The other stuff that we are able to work collectively on intelligence - is not over complicated. Equally everybody is able to have a common operating picture nowadays, of different sorts, so why cannot we get this further down the line with as many people included as possible? Julian Lindley-French For me, this is a kind of 'muddy boots' intelligence, which I think is essential in this war. Really, it reinforces the need for a very strong Anglo-French intelligence relationship. I think that Britain and France, working together, can bridge the gap between the American approach, and this fundamental penetration of these low-tech asymmetric operatives.

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The reason why I am driving this point, now, about the need for Europeans to change, so firmly and forcefully, is partly because of the threat and partly because of the American defence budget. The implications of American defence expenditure and the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), for all its weaknesses, not to mention the US defence R & D budget at $80 billion, are significant. If we do not do something quickly, the Americans are going to be 'over the horizon'. There is no point sitting around with a legacy of capabilities and say, "Well, we shall see what happens". The decision will already have been made, Bruce Jones Yes, they are over the horizon. But they are going to get further over the horizon and that is a danger for Europe because it has nothing to fill a gap that is getting wider. The other thing is that in many aspects of defence technology, it is technology led. There is, for example, the development of smokeless powder, cartridges, whatever it might be, that pushes it one step further. In certain technologies in the United States you do see people just going and dreaming things up, that you research and develop just for the hell of it. Often, it can be very obscure, but what is the threat that it counters? It is one thing to sell the technology and another is how much technology is needed, for the best is very definitely the enemy of the good. How much technological detail is needed? How much does it cost? The 50 percent of the cost is usually spent on the top five or ten percent performance. Do you need it? Who are you competing against? Equally, if the programmes are for export, as the DGA did from the outset and wrote in export capabilities and potential into programmes, it increases the production run. This then reduced the cost and correspondingly made it more available to anybody else. It is in the interests of the United States that it should have network centric warfare. The other thing that is having a beneficial effect, to go back to the question of security, is the argument that one man's freedom fighter is another man's terrorist is no longer to the same extent another man's freedom fighter. Take, for instance, post 9/11 on St Patrick's Day. The Sinn Fein leader, Mr Gerry Adams, is not being invited to the White House because of his involvement and that of his colleagues, with the FARG. So, there is progress on this; there is becoming an overall perspective on the situation. Chris Donnelly Coming back to my point about how we mobilise the science community and the academic community to start changing the system, to start changing attitudes. We can identify the problem areas, but how do we turn peoples' attention to it and how do we feed that into policy? I would like to ask Cornelius Wientjes, therefore, if he could tell us more about the NATO scientific structure to see if we can somehow exploit that as a start. Then we can look at other ones such as the organisation that Julian Lindley French is with in Geneva, or the Marshall Centre. There are many institutions around, but the evolution is extremely slow, and in many cases very limited, because there has been no systematic effort to change things. Perhaps, this is what we should now be doing. Cornelius Wientjes I would be very happy to say a few words on how we pursue scientific things in NATO's Research and Technology Organisation (RTO). Very briefly, in the RTO, we have seven panels that focus on different technology areas. There is one among these

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seven that does not specifically focus on technology but on defence-related analysis, defence-related strategic analysis, operational analysis etc. This is the Studies Analysis and Simulation (SAS) Panel. One of the types of meetings that are organised by the SAS Panel is what I have just mentioned as the long-term scientific study. I also mentioned that this was designed in the '50's by Dr Theodore von Karmen. This type of study has a very peculiar format. It is carefully developed by the Study Director who, in advance of calling the meeting, has extensive contacts with people he chooses. There is an extensive preparation of the project by the Study Director in collaboration with the people he has selected to work with him in terms of writing a discussion paper. This discussion paper is intended to be very provocative and it is this discussion paper that will then be circulated at the actual meeting, which takes a week to 10 days. It has a very similar format to this workshop and organised and convened in a very isolated place - no bars around and no entertainment available, except, beautiful countryside. There is a very rigid and strict programme that has to be followed. Of course it is at the discretion of the Study Director how this is actually organised, but, basically, the idea is that the paper written by the Study Director provokes discussion among the audience. The audience is again selected by the Study Director. Usually what we do is that we have a very mixed audience of technologists, scientists, operational analysts, political scientists, journalists, laymen, and, sometimes, people from the church. We aim to have people who can contribute to a deeper level of analysis and, in principle, be able to participate. This is done, of course, in a very structured way. The paper is discussed and then discussed again and again. Eventually, the final report is written after revision, and then passed along to our two masters, who are the Military Committee and the Conference of National Armaments (CNAD) Directors. Both are on the North Atlantic Council. That was the format of this type of meeting. The types of issues that are typically addressed are, basically two: first of all, analysis of the technology drive, technological developments, projections of technological developments over periods of 15 or 20 years and assessments of its impact on military doctrine, and military operations. That is one type of study. The other type of study would typically assess new threats and new challenges and address, again, their implications in terms of how NATO should respond. That is basically what we have to offer. Chris Donnelly May I ask a technical point? The key here seems to me to be where you present the report. Are you limited to only being able to present it to the armaments directors and the Military Committee? Cornelius Wientjes Those two bodies are our masters so we certainly have to present a report to them first. But if there were to be a proposal to go further than that, for example to the Foreign Ministers or to Council, then that would be of course for the Military Committee to decide, but it would be very strange if they did not agree. In the days of the old NATO, when the only responsibility was military, that was perfectly reasonable. But now that security is no longer just military but lots of other things as well, the impact of this is being lost on those concerned and perhaps we could suggest that an amendment would be in order here.

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Julian Lindley-French Let us be clear about this: we are not only in the research business, but we are also in the prescription business here. You need something that is almost a mix between 'high polities' with a big, high profile report on the future of everything, backed up by some of Europe's and indeed North America's leading analysis and use of media. It has to go way outside the house, and I certainly think right now there is a need for this kind of high profile, public access analysis that is media friendly and can get the message across more and more about purpose. Politicians can then use it. As it happens, I was Chairman of a task force on a European defence book inside the EU. That started out with the same idea, but of course the moment it got to close to being anything too serious, the member states said, "stop, hold on a minute, that's not having our name on it thank you very much". You say this, but do we need this kind of 'high polities' right now? High profile figures maybe a political figurehead with a strong band of well-established analysts writing report on behalf of the Alliance, but where do we go next? A new strategic concept, threats analysis, capabilities - the whole thing. That is the kind of political manoeuvring that NATO needs to get into, if it is going to survive. Bruce Jones I would say very, briefly, that part of its policy is the difference in various countries in their relationship between the armed forces and the police. By this, I mean that there are considerable constraints in the United States, whereas in the United Kingdom we have had the military supporting the police in counter-terrorist operations for a long time. It is an accepted practice, but it differs in each particular country. In France, it is a different situation where there is the Gendarmerie Nationale and security operations on-going with troops patrolling on the streets. We do not have that in the United Kingdom. Barry Denofsky I have attended a lot of NATO meetings for the past seven years and this is probably one of the first ones I've been to where I see kind of the free flowing, open exchange of ideas. At the many, many meetings I have been to, nobody says anything; it is very, very frustrating, having chaired several of them, trying to generate some ideas for four or five hours of a session around a large conference room. However, I think there is a problem, and part of the problem is the fact that while we talk at one level about what NATO should be and we almost come away with the impression that it is something that we actually understand. In fact, I would suggest many of us really do not. There are many organisations, many components of NATO, I mean, the scientific and research community, I knew nothing about that, but then when I also listen to reports up through the Military Committee, you start to wonder where does it fit? Where do we all fit in? NATO is no longer just a military alliance. We are trying to look at all of the security aspects. I would go further to suggest that this little committee that I belong to, which has been in existence for 50 years, celebrated it's anniversary on December 2nd last year. I would bet most of the people in this room know nothing, or maybe a little, about what our committee actually does. And yet, here we are, representing all of the civilian intelligence components of all of the 19 countries. We produce assessments on a regular basis. Probably many of you, most of you, have to wonder how much we are actually trying to do. How much of it is posturing and how much of it is politics. Security today is on everyone's agenda. It is top of the list; but is it just because it is fashionable now to be talking

Discussion of Session 7

about security and intelligence and all of the other related issues? Do we really want to change? We have been asking these questions ourselves for a long time, and I am not really sure. I chaired a committee last year trying to look at how we might do things differently in our own kind of little world, and, at the end of the day, what you had was status quo because people did not really want to change. I have to wonder; do we really mean a coalition of the willing? Are we really willing? Is there really an appetite to change, to move this big ship, as Chris Donnelly would say? Fernando Cavalho Rodrigues From my side of the house, I can just tell you this: this meeting and the science division sponsoring this meeting, would have been unthinkable a couple of months ago, even to get the approval of the panel for this meeting. My friend, Cornelius Wientjes, is my witness that I had to carry my momentum around and, although I move slowly, the subject matter helps. The fact that you are meeting here at all is real proof that things are changing. Otherwise, you would not meet here or, for that matter, anywhere else, and not, certainly, under the auspices of the science programme. If you produce your work, it will percolate to other areas, to the NATO Ambassadors and numerous other places. I remind the co-directors of this meeting that there is always the possibility of carrying the work forward with an advisory group and that can go to Council; but that is up to you.

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SESSION 8

Creating Asymmetric Doctrine Internal Security and Terrorism by Spike Bowman, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington DC.

I am going to approach the subject of internal security and terrorism from the perspective of law enforcement. I come at it from a rather different perspective than most law enforcement personnel because I am a retired military officer. I spent 27 years in the United States Navy, where I was a former intelligence officer, a former educator and prosecutor. In a way, I have sort of been around the landscape on this stuff; some people would say I have not been able to hold a job. When I look at the threats that we have today, I know we are focusing on terrorism. But I look at a lot of threats and, unfortunately, I see most of them blending together at one point or another, particularly the organised crime syndicates with terrorists and their weapons of mass destruction. I see weapons proliferation folding into terrorism. So, I look at an entire range of what we call national security threats in the United States. I am looking at a number of these things here, which, as I say, fold back into terrorism. All of them, however, are of interest from two perspectives: one is the international perspective, and the other is the domestic perspective. The difficulty I have is trying to figure out which is which, because organised crime has both an international dimension and a domestic dimension to it. Terrorism has a domestic and an international dimension. All of these threats have that sort of thing. The reason that I bring it up here is because, from my perspective, and probably from the perspective of Manuel Navarette, who is a police officer, it makes a difference whom you are looking at and from where the threat is originating. What each of these has in common, of course, is that they all have some kind of a trans-national aspect to them. All of them have pieces that at least originate from somewhere else, and most of them have pieces that go across borders - many, many borders. By way of example, if you look simply at the 19 hijackers from 9/11, you can figure out, as we have now done, where the pieces fit. Manuel Navarette has also been busy on that, because the Guarda Civil found parts of this in Spain. We, and the CIA, have found parts of it in Germany and we have found parts of it in Saudi Arabia. It is all of these things that fold across many, many borders. These threats have no physical boundaries. The people who engage in them have no responsibilities to any higher power and, more importantly, there is no one who has the hierarchical responsibility for all of these threats. That is one of the fundamental problems that we focus on today. One last piece, which does not seem to fit, but does, at least, for the United States and for most of the NATO countries, is that many of the things that we are concerned about could be determined by just one, unpopular speech. People have said, "I support so and so" or, "I think 9/11 was a good thing that happened"; we have heard lots of statements like that, and we have heard them in many places, but it does not mean that the person who said

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them, is necessarily a terrorist. Nor does it mean a person who said those things would support terrorism. That is one of the things that we have to look out for in the United States; especially when we also have to make sure that we protect peoples' personal rights under what we call First Amendment - such as the right to free speech and free assembly and so forth. At the same time that we look at the person who is uttering those words or doing some kind of action that we do not really approve of, we have to make sure that it is protected, and not an unprotected, activity. When that happens, they tend to get fairly difficult. Now, as you look at this type of threat and try to figure out how we have traditionally approached solving those that have a trans-national character to them, the preferred means of solving an international problem has been through diplomacy. But, as you look at each one of these things you see that diplomacy has very limited utility. Up to the point of there is coercive diplomacy that may be available, in some respects, if your target is, for example, Hezbollah, or al Qaeda, which have spread all across the globe. Coercive diplomacy has, at best, limited application. The second thing has been political persuasion. Here we are talking about countries that get together and try to persuade other countries to act in a certain manner because it would be good for the community. Again, these, threats have no physical boundaries. They have no higher authority that they report to. Therefore, political persuasion has very limited utility and the same goes for economic persuasion. Again it is the sort of thing that just does not fit neatly into the pattern of international states that we have had for the last several hundred years. Then, finally, you come to the use of force. I used to say force does not have much applicability here but President Bush's decision to turn the 9/11 situation into a war on terror made me stop and refocus. How was I to look at this? Previously, the US did not have much of a way to use force against a terrorist or against an organised drug cartel that occupies many dimensions in the international scene. Obviously, there is some utility to the use of force in certain circumstances, but they are going to be very few. Afghanistan clearly was one in which the use of force was useful. It has not, however, solved the problem; it has only solved a part of the problem. There are other places where this sort of thing might be useful. Yemen has a tribal government and the government of the country itself occupies a very small part of the country. The rest is ruled by warlords. The same is in Somalia and both of these countries have a number of terrorists who find a safe harbour in them. So, maybe the use of force may have some more limited applicability in other places. That brings me to the last one, which is law enforcement. For international problems, law enforcement has always been the poor stepchild because it has been the least useful for resolving international problems. However, I am going to suggest that one of the most useful ways of solving some of these problems is going to be law enforcement. There are lots of problems associated with it, but I want to suggest that it is extremely important with two qualifications. First, law enforcement agencies generally do not see themselves as instruments of foreign policy. Their utility is therefore self limiting. If law enforcement is really going to be useful in foreign policy, then law enforcement organisations need to have a restructured thought process. Second, the same goes for the reciprocal side of it. Foreign policy establishments of most countries do not tend to think of law enforcement as an instrument of foreign policy either. So, if it is to be useful, then the foreign policy establishments also have to have a re-education process. That said, there are some significant problems with law enforcement. First of all, law enforcement agencies are all focused on domestic law and laws are not the same from one country to another. The jurisdiction of organised crime and terrorism is really an open question, because organised crime may have pieces that cross as many as a dozen borders. For example, heroin is smuggled from Afghanistan into Great Britain. How many countries have jurisdiction in that situation? Clearly, a lot do. One of the questions that has to be

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addressed is whether or not a law enforcement agency has jurisdiction over the most important part of it. Can it get jurisdiction over the person who actually runs the operation? That is a very difficult part of it; the same goes for the venue. If an agency were to apprehend somebody, where is that person going to be tried? How are the laws going to affect this person, because the most heinous acts may have been perpetrated in some other country, but the venue is not really where you would like it to be? A very difficult problem is access to information. These advanced terrorists and organised crime syndicates occupy many parts of the world as they go about their business. The pieces of information, and the threads have to be pulled together somehow. Consider how long it has taken the US intelligence agencies to get information on the 19 hijackers behind the 9/11 attacks and in the places that the have been to. We are learning things very slowly and access to information is very difficult, especially when the information is not within your jurisdiction. The same goes for evidence. The evidence for all of these acts of terrorism etc is going to be located in multiple places. For example, the money to support the 19 hijackers was paid out to them through various banks in different countries and passed through many different hands. Different people opened bank accounts in the United States in different names. Trying to get all this information together when you are talking about multiple international transactions, especially when money can be easily transferred is very difficult. If it can be secured, and you have the evidence the next hurdle is to try and make sure that it is useful in a court; having information is not the same as having evidence. Information has to have a quality that a court can accept and not all of the evidence measures up to the variable standards of our respective countries. Finally there are the issues of extradition and witnesses. If a witness is, for example, in Somalia, there is not to much of a way you are going to get that person into a court in the United States, the United Kingdom, Spain or wherever. It is a very difficult problem, and if there is a person located in Somalia or Yemen that you want to bring to court, the government of that country has to be asked. Invariably, the answer will be 'no'. These are some, but not all, of the problems associated with law enforcement. However, there are also some positives. First, the threats are universal. Organised crime, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and so on, are things that every one of our countries is concerned about for exactly the same reasons. What happened in New York could happen in any country in the world. One of the more devastating aspects of that is that, if it happened in another part of the world, the damage to the economy of any other country is going to be greater than it was in the United States - and it was bad enough in the United States. Although our laws are different there is also much similarity, so at least we understand what is bad out there. Most of our countries have laws that are similar enough that we will support each other in trying to gather evidence and get witnesses. We also have law enforcement as an institution, one that is broadly similar in most countries in the sense that they all have policemen who have a common purpose. All policemen have a purpose in trying to uphold the law and to create a situation in which society is stable. Policemen therefore have a natural tendency to co-operate with each other. Perhaps of greatest importance is the fact that law enforcement is internationally acceptable. It is much more acceptable than, for example, sending troops into a country. Finally, law enforcement has the salubrious effect of promoting the rule of law in the world. All of us come from countries that are well developed in their legal structures but not all the world has well-developed legal structures. Law enforcement has a positive effect on society in general. The question then becomes one of, how to make law enforcement effective on the international scene. There are two things that have to be done, or two tracks that have to be followed. One is an international track, and the other is a domestic track. Internationally, we have to create

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situations in which states and their law enforcement agencies are able to help each other. We have to be able, for example, to stop criminals and terrorists being able to transfer money anonymously around the world. We are not going to do anything in the immediate term about the money launderer. But we can in international banking force money to be transferred with transactional data so we know to whom it is going and where it came from. There is no reason in the world why we cannot have that sort of system. Many countries insist on it, but not all. Another thing that can be done is to harmonise our laws more. We have been trying to do this for a number of years and we see a lot of this in international treaties whereby countries sign up to treaties such as airplane hijacking with the provision that those who sign up to it must enact laws to implement those treaties. We have been doing this sort of thing for quite a number of years and with some high degree of success, but we need to push that a little bit further. Next, we need to try and harmonise our investigative and evidentiary standards, so that when Spain, for example, follows a lead and arrests somebody there and finds evidence of something that happened in the United States, they will be able to use that evidence, and vice versa. We need to be able to give information and evidence to Spain or Great Britain or whomever in a way that they can use it. It is a matter of training, getting our police forces together and trying to harmonise the way we do business. This also includes the need to have electronic access protocols. Indeed, this is getting to be more and more important because, with the advent of the Internet, you can do almost anything. You can get any kind of information off it and there is a lot of destructive energy that can be put out through the Internet. We have not seen a lot of it yet, but we have seen a fair amount. We have seen libraries completely crash and we have seen bank accounts that have been pillaged. We need to be able to in these days of instantaneous communication to have some kind of a 'hot pursuit' type of mechanism, right now. For example, when we find somebody has done something that is unlawful in the United States through the electronic media and it emanates from, say, Great Britain, the only thing the US law enforcement agencies can do is go to Great Britain and ask, please try and catch this thing within your borders. So what has happened by then? It has gone. We have to have an electronic access protocol that allows the police to follow the threat without having to stop and seek permission from different authorities. Finally we need to have training. We have to have lots and lots of training. In fact, the United States is trying very hard to do that. We have, for a number of years, brought, foreign police officers to the United States for training at Quantico. We also have international law enforcement academies now in Budapest and in Thailand, and I think we are developing another one in Hawaii. This is, not because the United States is chauvinistic; it is because we would like other people to be able to do the things the same way we do. We have very highly developed forensic mechanisms and so on for investigation, and we want other people to have them. Turning now to the United States domestic needs, and here I am going to be a little more parochial. I shall just focus on those things that are not necessarily peculiar to the United States but they are things that all states have to investigate. The US has organised crime and terrorism, of course, but everybody has that. The US also has hate crimes from white supremacists and it has anarchists who do not like government, period. They just do not like government and they do a lot of things to try and disrupt it, including taking advantage of our legal systems to file suits against judges and lawyers and so on. They are completely capricious lawsuits but they really tie up the legal system. Then there are prolife activists who are very violent; they kill people and they kill abortion doctors. There are also the animal rights people who are equally violent as are the environmentalists rights people. In fact, in the last two years, environmentalists have really gone into arson in a big

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way and have caused over in the past two years 45 million dollars worth of damage in arson alone. These are things that US law enforcement agencies have to investigate. As one looks at them, you see that organised crime and terrorism spreads across the board. Those are the international types of things that have to be addressed, but not all terrorism of course is international. The US found that out in Oklahoma City. The others that have been mentioned are probably all going to be perpetrated by US persons who are involved in them. It makes a big difference how these activities are addressed because, to make law enforcement effective, you not only have to have all of those things from training up through harmonising laws, but also have to build up public a respect for what the law enforcement officer is doing. This means that the public has to have confidence that the law enforcement officer, who, by the very nature of his business, is intrusive in looking at people, does it in a way that the people can respect. If he does not have that, he will not have the support of the people at which point the law enforcement officer becomes ineffective. So, domestically, one of the things that I have to do as an overseer of much of what the FBI does on the intelligence side, I have to make sure that our investigations are conducted in a way that shows respect for the individual. Now, do I then accord to US citizens a little bit more 'right' than aliens who come to the United States? Not much, if any at all; so when visitors come to the United States, the Constitution is going to give them a lot of protection that, other countries may not offer an alien. The US does but its law enforcement agencies are going to investigate whoever is there, whether it is a US person or an alien with procedures that are designed to give respect to the individual. They also have to make sure that they have a reason to investigate; that is, they do not open a case and investigate people simply because they look suspicious. The US has procedures whereby a reason has to be given before a person is put under investigation. In the FBI, numbers are given to different types of offences. So, if there is a 199 offence, for example, it is that of international terrorism. The investigating officer has to be able to say he has the standards to open a 199 case. In the US system, there is a regulatory scheme that tells the police officer not only what he has to do to open an investigation but also how he can conduct the investigation. There are lots of ways of being intrusive in an investigation and not all of them are permitted. Just because a case is opened - and, first of all, for a case to be opened requires the approval of a superior - and if it is one that somebody is being only minimally looked at, it will not be kept open for more than 90 days without another higher level approval. Unless justification can be made to go to the next level, the case will be closed since by going up a level would lead to the use of more intrusive techniques. The US requires accountability for the decision-making and for being intrusive into people's rights. Every effort is made to ensure that every investigator, who is investigating a person, does it the right way or he will be held accountable for his actions. Finally there is a process of oversight. The US has more oversight processes for intelligence investigations than for purely criminal ones. This is because purely criminal cases are more or less publicly viewable at any time; intelligence cases are rarely publicly viewable, so what is done in the United States for intelligence investigations, is to have a required mechanism of oversight within the agency. I am responsible for determining whether there has been a violation in the FBI and, if there is a violation, then I am responsible for sending that violation to the FBI's Office of Professional Responsibility. They will take whatever action they think is appropriate. In addition, we have a higher-level legislative and executive branch oversight from the Department of Justice because the FBI is an agency of that Department. Lastly, there is a Presidential Oversight Board that receives all of the

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violations. They determine whether the FBI is systematically doing something wrong or not. Once or twice a year the FBI reports to the Congress of the United States who look and see what it has been doing, and how it is engaged in intrusive activities, particularly covert electronic surveillance and physical searches. The FBI does give protection to a large number of people for the reasons that have been mentioned above. The oversight mechanisms that are employed are not perfect but then neither are our investigators perfect. Everybody makes mistakes and sometimes it just does not come out the right way. But the importance of this cannot be over sold on the domestic scene. I have been in government service for 35 years and there is one thing that I have learned about the American people, who are extremely, extremely jealous of their rights, which is that they are very tolerant of investigators who are intrusive, even with electronic surveillance. They are only tolerant on the condition that they understand and can see that those investigators are guided by regulations and that those regulations are enforced. As long as they know that there are boundaries within which the FBI can operate and within which it does operate, then the American people have been very, very tolerant of it. The FBI has enormous intrusive powers within the United States. So, basically if the FBI can do two things in helping establish the utility of law enforcement as a mechanism. One mechanism is that of foreign policy. This is not easy to do and requires an awful lot of co-ordination. It requires leadership at some place, and perhaps NATO is the place where leadership can be exerted. If we can do that, then half the battle is won. The other mechanism is to have the support of the domestic population of each country. To the extent that these two conditions are fulfilled, it is possible for states law enforcement agencies to work very closely together. This is already achieved on a bi-lateral basis with a number of countries, for example, the Canadians and the Americans, and the British and the Americans, work very closely together. It is does work, and it can work. If we can do both these things, then law enforcement can be a significant instrument of foreign policy. Why is this important? Again, because there are different gradations of terrorism. There is some high magnitude, high-level terrorism that law enforcement will not be able to touch. But there is also an awful lot of terrorism, organised crime and so forth at a lower threshold for which the higher levels of foreign policy will not be effective. By enforcing the laws that are common to all of us, it would be effective. The challenge is that if you can put both the high order and the low order foreign policy tools together, you can get a more or less complete package.

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Creating Asymmetric Doctrine: The Role for Security Forces of a Military Nature by Ignacio Cosido Guarda Civil, Ministerio del Interior, Madrid, Spain

Traditionally, a clear division has existed between the tasks assigned to the armed forces and to the internal security forces. On the one hand, it was the responsibility of the armed forces to protect territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence from external attack, usually by another state. On the other hand, security forces were responsible for the protection of the citizens' rights and freedoms and internal security, and for the fight against crime. The problem is that the dividing line between what has traditionally been regarded as external and internal risks is vanishing to a great extent with the emergence of new threats such as terrorism, organised crime, drug trafficking or clandestine immigration. Thus, the conventional distribution of tasks between the armed forces and security forces has been overridden by the new reality. Moreover, none of the traditional security instruments, neither police forces nor the armed forces, is in a position to offer an entirely efficient answer to the new threats. In order to face up these new threats, especially the threat posed by terrorism, we should pursue three basic courses of action: to establish a new framework for cooperation between the armed forces and security forces, to strengthen the intelligence community and to reinforce internal security instruments. The overlapping of internal and external risks should not lead to confusion or to an encroachment as regards the distribution of tasks between the armed forces and security forces, but to the setting up of a stronger and more efficient cooperation framework between both institutions. It should be emphasized, also, that the co-operation between the armed forces and security forces should move in two directions. Thus, in external anti-terrorist action, where the armed forces assume the leading role and the control of the operations, components of the security forces could complement the capacity of the armed force with, inter alia: riot control units; criminal investigation teams; information specialists; military police forces and border surveillance units. In this case, it is the components of the security forces that would be fully integrated and under military command. Therefore, the establishment of this co-operation framework requires the definition of a legal framework to regulate as accurately as possible both the participation of the armed forces in internal security matters and the potential cooperation of the security forces in foreign missions. Regulations should be adapted in each country to the peculiarities of their constitutions. We need to promote new internal security instruments in order to efficiently face the challenges of terrorism. In my opinion, security forces of military nature, like the Spanish Guarda Civil, the French Gendarmerie Nationale or the Italian Carabinieri, are the most flexible and efficient instruments to face the new transnational threats. The disappearance of the former Soviet Union and the absence -admitted by the allied doctrine itself - of immediate threats against the member states' territory, has led in

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the last decade to a new concept of armed forces with a clear foreign vocation that have abandoned to a great extent their traditional territorial defence mission. However, although the threat of territorial aggression by another State keeps being virtually non-existent in the medium term, the attacks of 11 September 2001 show that our territories are not safe from a potential terrorist attack. Moreover, as long as terrorist attacks are unpredictable, all the preventive measures taken to prevent or hinder as far as possible the eventuality of new attacks are essential to safeguard our security. The need to prevent attacks in our own territory forces us to develop a new concept of internal defence very different from the concept that prevailed during the Cold War. This new concept should include, by way of examples, a great variety of issues: a more efficient protection of external borders to prevent the illegal entry of immigrants and illicit trafficking of every kind; an improvement in the safety of information and communications networks of strategic importance; an improvement in the security measures in airports and other means of transport, as well as in nuclear power stations and other premises that are critical from the point of view of security; a stricter control over the financial system to prevent money from flowing into terrorist movements and other organised crime groups. In order to perform internal security tasks, states should be able to deploy forces throughout the whole of their national territory that can cope with these preventive tasks, equipped with technical means for border control and surveillance, and capable of confronting highly organised and dangerous groups. All these characteristics are beyond local police forces, and even some state security forces, whose main role is to guarantee the security of citizens. In order to face these new threats, governments need: new instruments able to combine police methods and capacities characteristic of military organizations; flexible instruments able to adjust to the intensity and have the kind of response appropriate to the seriousness of the threat; and versatile organizations able to act in the fields of national defence and internal security that become a vehicle for the above mentioned co-operation between the armed forces and the security forces. These forces could be deployed not only within the national territory; some specialised units could act as a complement to the armed forces in their operations abroad. The military nature of these forces makes this co-operation easier to a great extent, both through the participation of their members in international military missions, and the potential involvement of elements of the armed forces in internal security tasks when their support becomes essential. The existence of these intermediate forces between police forces and the armed forces allows governments to give a more flexible and gradual answer to the new threats, thus minimising the risks posed by an excessive intervention of the armed forces in internal security matters, and the negative effects this intervention could have on our democratic systems. To sum up, we believe that security forces of military nature are the instrument that can be best adapted to the emerging threats that, like terrorism, constitute nowadays the main danger our societies, our democratic systems and international stability itself face. Regardless of the nature of these forces, whether civil or military, there is no doubt that it is necessary to develop a new concept of internal defence founded, not on armed forces devoted to missions abroad, but on robust forces operating in the whole of the national territory, able to cope with the variety of tasks this new concept comprises, equipped with advanced technology, and with a response capacity beyond that of police forces.

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Asymmetric Doctrine by Barry Denofsky, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Ottawa.

The following statement was contained in the report of a Canadian government committee examining the role and functions of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, "...this period of unprecedented change on the international scene does not mean that some security and intelligence capacity is no longer necessary. Quite the contrary, it means that security and intelligence capacity must be more flexible and even more capable of anticipating and understanding (the threat environment) than ever before". Expressed several years ago, this observation is even more germane today when considering the broad and growing range of security concerns facing NATO nations and partner countries. The issue is no longer limited to a military threat; now there are a number of major asymmetrical dangers - especially the threat of terrorism - and includes transnational crime, narcotics, money laundering, kidnapping, illegal migration, and a variety of related activities. Asymmetrical threats represent a danger to the Alliance as well as to the individual nations that form, or are working in partnership with, NATO. In providing a response, methods must be devised for more effective and expedient sharing of security intelligence among the membership, and security and intelligence activities must incorporate the civilian agencies of individual members as much as possible. Military intelligence has served NATO well over the years, and will continue be central to Alliance security and policy considerations. However, with the increased membership and changing nature of threat facing individual members of NATO and the Alliance in general, a much broader and more diverse security and intelligence response must be made available. Intelligence and law enforcement have become more "connected" as a consequence of the asymmetrical threats - initially with transnational crime and later with terrorism - and have expanded to include customs, immigration, and many new agencies with investigative responsibilities. The threat took on a globalization dimension with the internationalisation of terrorism, and was given a large boost by the events of 9/11. The need exists to more closely associate individual, national security and intelligence agencies with NATO-related responsibilities. Information must be shared, not merely for individual needs but also for NATO-wide protection. A wider dissemination and a better understanding of the threat(s) to the Alliance are urgently required. However, it is readily acknowledged that for several reasons the sharing of security intelligence is subject to constraints, among them: • some intelligence agencies prefer to share information bilaterally within NATO, rather than 'at 19', to ensure protection of sources and methods - in that sense, it is a strict enforcement of a key principle of NATO Security Policy, namely the Need-toKnow, • others have considerable intelligence of interest to NATO, but because the information was obtained from third parties, it cannot be shared without originator consent; and,

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some agencies face legal or organisational constraints, which limit their sharing of intelligence with NATO - e.g. they lack a well-developed analytical capability to look at threats from a strategic, as well as an operational, perspective. Compounding these constraints, NATO has no mechanisms to bring together foreign intelligence agencies within its walls. Whereas security intelligence agencies have a defensive role to play domestically, foreign intelligence agencies exist to promote the interests of the country they represent - raising a number of questions. Today, however, the requirement for more, not less intelligence, makes it incumbent on all of us to find new ways to effectively incorporate and encourage the contributions of all civilian intelligence organizations in meeting NATO expectations. How are these questions to be addressed? The recent creation of an Intelligence Steering Group at NATO Headquarters is a step in the right direction, but does it include all the stakeholders? How does the Group define NATO intelligence requirements, and should the Group be able to task as well? If so, should the tasking be given to a service or services - given that there could be legal constraints for many in accepting requirements of this nature? Or should the taskings be given on a national basis, with the assigned nation responsible to ensure that governments reply as requested? It must be kept in mind that not all member agencies have analytical resources or, because of legislative constraints, they cannot share information readily. Thus, the recently created analytical cell at NATO HQ takes on greater significance and should have greater support. The cell is staffed by volunteers from member services and is currently located in the NATO Office of Security. Alliance members must be encouraged to provide intelligence data to NATO's analytical cell, which can turn it around and send it out across the Alliance. A common understanding of the asymmetrical threats is a priority requirement. In conjunction, there is a need to establish secondments, conferences, speakers, and cooperative intelligence arrangements (inter-agency conferences, combined intelligence ops centres) for special events such as occurred for G-8 Meetings, and the NATO summit that took place in November 2002, in Prague. Greater experience of people working together could lead to the development of more common doctrine. The remarks by the past Chair of the NATO Special Committee at a meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 15 January 2003 should be kept in mind. "We have built upon this response (to terrorist threats), further improved our intelligence contribution to the Alliance, and worked in a more co-ordinated fashion with military intelligence." The Special Committee is a significant means of increasing the contribution to Alliance's intelligence requirements and assessments.

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Discussion of Session 8 Martin Edmonds My claim to experience is to have sat through 39 years of tedious student classes, read several thousands of dull student essays, edited a variety of papers for a journal and for various books. I say this because I tend very quickly to 'lose the plot' and, when I do, I simply think the only way out of it is to go back to basic principles. If you will bear with me, and I hope I'm not repeating what has been said over the last two days, it certainly clears my mind and brings me to what Barry Denofsky said in his presentation. If we start with NATO, its strength was always that it was a regional defence alliance and military alliance of Sovereign States. I just juxtapose that with the current situation where there is clearly a definable threat that crosses national boundaries. It is a trans-national threat, but the response is still that of a defensive military alliance among a group of sovereign states. My second thought in this 'back to basic principles' is that NATO was a regional military alliance that responded, or was intended to respond, to external threats of a conventional, symmetrical nature. But, as we have discussed at length yesterday, the threat now is of an asymmetrical nature. The threats themselves are varied; they are ubiquitous; and we have even identified them as being international. My third principle was that NATO, of course, is a military alliance, but the threats that are faced today are both of a military and of a civil nature, and the responses should be not only military but also civil, involving police forces and other civilian agencies. Fourth, and to some extent this is where today's situation and that of the past have something in common, which is intelligence. But in the past, as has been mentioned, the intelligence concern was mostly with the Soviet Union and was of a military nature. The current situation is one in which the intelligence requirements are not of an external threat but, to a certain extent, of an internal threat and not just of a military nature but of a very varied nature involving organised crime and so on. My fifth is that today NATO is essentially a co-operative arrangement - and here I am picking up on the discussions that what is needed in response to the threat of terrorism, organised crime and so on. The need, however, is for less of a co-operative arrangement and more one of a collaborative and possibly an integrated arrangement among member states who have the common concern about the international terrorist threat. The sixth one is of course, that NATO was primarily a defence arrangement involving standing armies and armed forces. In recent years there have been changes from a defensive posture in central Europe to a power projection capability in support of the international community and United Nations initiatives. But the threat is one that we recognise not of a military nature but of a security nature, and one that is across the board. It will involve many different government departments and institutions, political, economic and social. It is not purely defensive any longer and does not involve purely standing armies. With regard to NATO, the external threat was from organised Soviet armed forces where the objective was reasonably clear and identifiable. To some extent one could appeal to the laws of war in the event that the external threat materialised in terms of military action. Today, the threat is from individuals to groups who do not necessarily - and, it is very difficult to identify always what their objectives are - conform to any semblance of international legality, or laws of war. Finally, NATO, as far as John Doe in the street was concerned, did not impinge too much on the freedom of the individual. Yes, perhaps there were certain inconveniences in that there were places you could not visit, but it did not impinge heavily on the freedom of the individual. As Spike Bowman reminded us, the need to combat terrorism, through law

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enforcement, will involve a much greater impingement on the rights of the individual. Of course, in the United Kingdom, there is the debate about whether or not people should be expected to carry identity cards. I went through these basic principles because they helped me to sort out, reasonably systematically, what we have all been discussing. I have tried to juxtapose the problems that we are addressing at the moment with what NATO is and has been. My conclusion, very obviously, is, as Julian Lindley French has pointed out, that something has to be done. Like Julian I believe it has to be done now. The question, then, is what should be done and who should do it? Perhaps one of the first questions that has to be asked is whether NATO has the right structure? Does it have the membership, has it the history, and has it mechanisms that would enable it to do what needs to be done in respect of the myriad of threats and problems that it now faces? Possibly not; even probably not. Here is a sort of conundrum; does NATO wait for the governments of the member nations to decide, collectively, that NATO should change? Or do those who are permanent members or employees of NATO, who see the problems, report back their findings to the governments of the member nations and say 'please change us because we cannot deliver what it is that we think that you expect'. What can NATO do? I think immediately or in the short term, the initiative within NATO has been taken by Fernando's, Scientific Affairs Division. The task is to look seriously and in depth at the problem and convince ourselves what needs to be done before hoping that, whatever conclusions we arrive at, will be picked up by the respective member nation governments and persuade them that time is running out. Fernando Carvalho Rodrigues I do not claim any expertise here, none whatsoever. I have been changing jobs every six years so I cannot take the blame. I was born, however, in a village, much smaller than Vilemov, and I woke up on this spring morning and it took me a couple of seconds, or maybe minutes, to identify the cuckoo's song. I got worried about that, you know. We have this beautiful day, and in the profession of weather forecasting they have had a problem for years; why is it that the anti-cyclone in or over Greece and the depression over Iceland controls the weather in Vilemov in the Czech Republic? What is the mechanism that transforms local events into becoming one with global consequences? For the weather, we know that from the late 80s what transports the momentum from the Atlantic to anywhere in Europe. On military matters, I have listened to the three interventions. For military matters, there was a mechanism that transformed local events into global events. That mechanism was, and is, called NATO. It transported the concerns of nations, no matter how small their economies were, into a global perspective. What I have heard in the three presentations is what brings me to an argument of necessity. To transform local security issues into global concerns you have to have an instrument. Out of necessity, I might argue that NATO could afford that mechanism, because the other guys, those who have been building up the threat, have that mechanism. That guy, somewhere in, for example, Lisbon can go and blow up a building in Canada. We do not have a mechanism for what is a global concern. That is what I learned from your three interventions. There is no mechanism for this local threat to bring global responses. The mechanism of al Qaeda is like the mechanism, on reflection, of the cuckoo song of this morning. What I heard from you is that it is the mechanism that will bring any local maniac into a global perspective. These people have the mechanism, and you gentlemen have told me that you do not. From a military perspective, there was this mechanism; it was NATO. So, I think NATO has this argument of necessity and, out of

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necessity, NATO has to provide the mechanism for security to go from local business into global consequences. Bruce Jones That actually brings me onto what I was going to say next, namely, that I had a conversation before this meeting with the number two in NATO Office of Security. She said that her UK Head of Service had spoken to the hierarchy at NATO and asked what NATO's intelligence requirements were. The answer came back that there are none. She then encouraged me to find out what NATO's intelligence requirements should be, but I think it is really a question of NATO knowing how it can help you. For example, I am in Gibraltar or wherever it might be, Slovenia or somewhere, what do I want? What can NATO bring to me that other people cannot? NATO is a large international organisation. Europol can do a lot, but what would make my day that much easier? What is it that NATO can give? What can NATO provide? Or what can NATO facilitate me to do? It could be training, qualifications, or development of a doctrine. These are all things that NATO is adept at doing. It also has a framework for matters to do with civil defence, warning and monitoring and so forth. Julian Lindley-French Just a mere closing comment. I was grateful to Martin Edmonds for his comments. It seems to me that systemic change requires fundamental systemic adaptation and one can very easily look to the past to explain why change is not possible in the future. I think the move to global collective security from regional collective defence fundamentally changed the relationship between the client and the service provider. That is happening today. It also makes the relationship between insiders and outsiders much more pluralistic. This is part of that process and I would strongly plead, as a final statement, that we continue this process. It is part of bringing policy makers, those who advise on policy, and those who carry out policy much closer together in a more transparent way. I would go as far as to say that not only do we need to involve outside people and outside agencies, but also NATO should not be scared of involving outside money. There is a lot of money floating around out there for this kind of initiative and if it is only a problem of money that prevents us developing our very important work that can be solved. There are plenty of foundations that we can look to. If NATO provides seed money, we can leverage that. There are plenty of other Centres, like my own, which would be happy to be part of a NATO-led network that can develop this kind of thinking forum. So, Chairman, with your permission I would like to close by saying that this has been a very fulfilling and exciting couple of days and I think it would be shame if we lost the momentum that we've generated.

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SESSION 9

Operational Considerations Increasing Contribution to Security and Counter-terrorism Operations by

Zdenek Borkovec Director, Security Policy Department, Ministry of Defense, Prague

This presentation is based on the fact that NATO, as an organisation, is definitely able to contribute to the fight against terrorism. Only one general precondition must be granted: this is that any policy must have the consensus of all member states. By using examples, I shall try to disclose some current and potential problems that can make NATO contributions more complicated. Although I am not a scientist, but a mere civil servant dealing mostly with matters of finance, I shall do my best to describe my general understanding of this problem. For those who do not know me I would like to introduce myself. My name is Zdenek Borkovec. I served as a defence advisor in NATO for the last three and a half years. In December last year, I returned to Prague where I was appointed as a Strategic Policy Director, in the Ministry of Defense. It is from this position that I am making this presentation. Since the terrorist attack against the US on 11 September 2001 the West's responses have passed through a substantial development which has been, from my perspective, in some respects controversial and paradoxical. On the one hand, just after 11 September, we witnessed a great solidarity with the United States. We activated Article 5 of the Washington Treaty for the first time in NATO's history and positively responded to eight US requests. However, on the other hand, we also witnessed a painful discussion within the Alliance on the issue of planning the alliance's defence, which was also seen as a crisis of Alliance cohesion that was a fresh experience and one that required the members to analyse the situation. Nevertheless, I would be very cautious when using the word 'crisis. To me, it seems more as a confrontation between ambition on one hand and political reality on the other. I also think the aspects of the alliances' internal confrontation will accompany our fight against terrorism for a long time, because the assessment of the risks of terrorism, the urgency of the need to combat it, and use of possible forms to combat it cannot be in line with the all the allies. It is a paradox that, when we are able to agree politically on the concepts of the stance against terrorism, we lose our consensus on its implementation. This makes us more vulnerable. So, in this unhappy situation, we are trying to combat the terrorist who does not acknowledge the authority of the United Nations Charter, is not bound by Washington Treaty, and can use our resolution against us. Although we can deploy huge capabilities within the Alliance, it would be very unfortunate if we were not able

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to use them against terrorists, for whatever reason. The situation is a long-standing story and we are only at the very beginning. For example, we will have to implement the military concept for defence against terrorism as prepared by the military staff and agreed by Heads of States and governments during the NATO Prague Summit. Although this concept was prepared and agreed as a consequence of the 11 September terrorist attacks, there are some aspects of it that are positive in the defence against terrorism that are very important on the basis that prevention is much better than dealing with the consequences. First of all, we must have the same perception of potential risks and, more importantly, we must have the same perception of the practical outcomes of the globalisation of the Alliance. 'Globalisation' is fixed in determining guidance for the military concept. I quote, "The Alliance should seek to have the full range of the capabilities and should be ready to deploy them as and where required to deal with circumstances as they arise". The present is showing us the potential issue in the future and is one that needs a lot of discussion to find a common understanding and united approach. For example, NATO's response to the concept of terrorism is a similar case; while it was accepted at the Prague Summit without any problem, its implementation in the light of what I have mentioned, could be an issue. The globalisation concept, as such, can serve as an effective tool in our fight against terrorism. Are we able to achieve both national and cross-Alliance agreement on the use of force? The Czech Republic is able to contribute to NATO's Response Force, the NRF. It is able to continue to offer forces by its unique experience and defence capabilities. However, we can also accept complex political discussions to achieve an effective operational level and sustainability. The Czech Government, according to current legal arrangements, is able to send troops abroad immediately. The problem is that within a period of 60 days, there is the need to have Parliamentary approval. The political decision-making process will likely create some additional difficulties. Another example is the NATO defence planning system. I see it as a problem because NATO's defence planning system is old fashioned. For the past forty years it was created for a Cold War era and mainly for collective defence under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. I think it is a time to change it. If this defence planning system were good and efficient, we would not need any additional initiatives such as the DCI or PCC. I would also like to mention the problem we have to resolve arising from the Prague Summit concept of 'renegade' countries. This concept, which was agreed by the Military Committee last year, means that it is impossible to use the NATO Integrated Air Defence System for hijacked civil aircraft. It is good for those nations who have their own supersonic aircraft, but bad for those who do not, including some of the central European countries. Due to this unusual situation, we are in cooperation with former Warsaw Pact states. The fight against terrorism is an extraordinary task, so we must therefore be able to use extraordinary means. I am not sure if the 'renegade' concept is the right example, we would be happy if we could solve such situation in the future by collaboration. Let me to summarise: NATO has huge military capabilities and is able to contribute to the fight against terrorism. Our armed forces have been upgraded, but also a certain upgrading of NATO defence planning is needed. In spite of these facts, NATO's political and military ambitions are not in line with reality. The terrorist threat can weaken the Alliance and make it vulnerable and unable to act properly in a given situation. We must therefore ask ourselves whether or not now is the time to reopen NATO's strategic concept.

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Discussion of Session 9 Bruce Jones I think the question of civilian government access to NATO capabilities is a particularly difficult one. We have these various emergency procedures and undoubtedly they would be called upon if there were a catastrophic attack. But there does not seem at the present moment that they are actually being harnessed to go ahead. Martin Edmonds I can perhaps offer something on the means at the disposal of terrorists across the spectrum from conventional means of warfare, that is to say, land, sea and air based systems. There is the terrorist with his Stinger surface-to-air missile, picking off the odd civilian aircraft. I understand that these are the sorts of weapons that are fairly readily available around the world, so much so that the United States is now trying to buy back from the alliance in Afghanistan all those missiles that they had provided when they were fighting the Taliban. These weapons and many like them are available in considerable numbers. How you get them all back? How do you limit access to them? The AK47 is ubiquitous, of course. My friends in South Africa tell me that if you want an AK47, the going rate is about 40 US dollars. For an extra 10 dollars you can have the man as well! These are available across the border in Mozambique. It is just a small example, but there are many conventional means of warfare at the disposal of the terrorists. We have already seen the Limpet mine delivered by terrorists to the side of a warship from inflatable craft. I recently had the good fortune to spend some time on HMS Illustrious during exercises. During my visit there was a surprise emergency exercise as the aircraft carrier was passing out the Clyde. The captain went completely berserk because the Royal Navy had arranged for some Marines in inflatable dinghies to come zooming from the shore (near Dunoon) where they had been lying in wait, and before the crew knew what had happened these inflatable dinghies were all round the ship and could easily attached magnetic mines to the hull causing irreparable damage. These mines are also readily available and ships, both naval and merchant, are particularly vulnerable unless adequate provisions are taken for their protection. Coming down the scale, the so-called weapons of massive destruction are, of course, chemical, biological and radiological devices. I would strongly recommend, an article by Malcolm Dando in the Journal, Defence and Security Analysis, where he provided a very sobering and frightening account of how very, very easy it is for people to develop these devices, particularly biological and toxins, and then have them distributed. Basically, if you have got a kitchen, you have all that is necessary. These toxins and biological agents can cause widespread death and they also are very easily accessible. The smallpox virus I understand is particularly easy to cultivate. Weapons and devices of mass disruption are the things I want to emphasise, however. I do not think terrorists are necessarily always intent on inflicting death; they have more of an interest in promoting and generating fear. Sometimes it is just the fear of preventing modern society from functioning normally. For example, you cannot get to your loved ones because for some reason or another the traffic has been disrupted, or the railway system has broken down, and so on, This sort of bloodyminded action requires a certain amount of devious imagination. I am not a terribly imaginative person, but I can still come up with some sort of fairly colourful ideas as

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to how to disrupt the normal functioning of society: interference with civil aircraft, their ground control, luggage handling, security checks: and, similarly, with merchant ships, motor vehicles; obstructing rail transport and underground systems, and so on. Targeting the provision of utilities, in particular, can cause frustration and in some cases fatalities, as for example electricity 'brown-outs' and 'black outs' and the 'outing' of telecommunication systems. What would modern society do without access to mobile phones, for instance? A friend and colleague, who sadly is no longer with us, but who was also well known to Chris Donnelly, Professor John Erickson, conducted a study on terrorism about 25 years ago. This was at a time when there was great concern in the West about Soviet Spetznaz Forces infiltrating the West and causing massive disruption and damage. The question he asked was; how many Spetznaz would it take to render the United Kingdom simply inoperable - to bring the country to a standstill? To find an answer, he engaged the services of somebody from the SAS and somebody from the Parachute Regiment. He never told me the techniques that would have been used or what the targets were, but he did say that it would involve only half a dozen men or so with a certain amount of explosives. About a dozen targets were identified virtually to bring the whole of the UK, albeit temporarily, but nevertheless inconveniently, to a halt. It might be a useful exercise if more people addressed that sort of question today, especially when our society is that much more complex and interdependent. Then, there are devices designed to cause frustration and inconvenience. I became so concerned about this that I invited some of my graduate students earlier in the year to consider a little exercise in class. I challenged them to cause as much inconvenience and frustration as they could if each were given six tubes of 'super glue'. After some discussion, they came back and decided that centre city's ATM cash machines were probably the best target given the 'weapon' at their disposal. They would certainly cause immense frustration to those people who had ceased to go into banks and when eventually if they did go into the banks, there would be mass frustration for the bank tellers who likely could not cope with the demand. A terrorist is still somebody who has that interest because it encumbers ordinary people daily. It might be that this will draw attention to their cause, or it might not. But it is certainly something that they can do anonymously and repeatedly over a fairly long period of time. Causing frustration and inconvenience, for example, in hotels, public meeting-places, even sporting venues. Then, not necessarily down at the bottom, there is one terrorist activity that concerns me especially is that of action causing environmental degradation. The target here is the agro-economy. Agroterrorism is something that we should be particularly concerned about. We have seen the devastating effects in the United Kingdom of BSE and, Foot and Mouth disease on people's lives and local economies. There was the instance some time ago of a disgruntled individual with a grudge who went around a supermarket with a hypodermic syringe and injected a poison into a packet of orange juice. As a precaution, the supermarkets ordered every packet of orange juice to be removed and destroyed and a new, fresh delivery ordered. This mindless act was fairly easy; indeed, you only have to say you have done it, without specifying where or how many packets, and the country is without orange juice for a period of time. I do not know whether anybody has done a counter-terrorism study in the sense of asking the question, "if I were a terrorist, what I would do? Why would I do it? And, what would be my targets?" During the most dangerous period of IRA bombings and shootings,- in the mid-1970s, I became involved in a study for the

Discussion of Session 9

Ministry of Defence in which I was asked to help try and work out a means by which to anticipate what an IRA target was likely to be, and what would be the most probable means. The research was conducted on the basis of a statistical analysis of what they had done in the past. Unfortunately, the sample, though large over a period of three years, was still not sufficiently big for the results to be statistically significant. Just doing that exercise, however, gave me an insight, not necessarily into how a terrorist operates or what his motives are, but into what were the independent variables that made it easy or less easy for him, or her, to attack. I remember one potential target that we focused on was that of the judges in Northern Ireland; as symbols of authority, they would be fairly obvious targets. The question then was, where would a judge likely be attacked: at his home? On his way to the courts? Where? Since judges always changed their itinerary and modes of transport and had military and police protection, it was difficult to generalise. However, from the statistical evidence, it seemed as though rain was probably the best deterrent; terrorists evidently did not like getting wet - or at least Irish ones did not. We added rainfall as an independent variable and found that the bombings and the attacks diminished whilst it was raining and then increased again when the sun came out. There is a lot of work to be done here. I am sure Paul (Swallow) and his colleagues at Scotland Yard will have done something along similar lines. But it might not be such a bad idea if more people did it, as terrorists would appear to operate in our midst even more. Anyway, there are some of the notions of means, but I am quite sure I have scarcely scratched the surface. Bruce Jones I think the actual orchestration of attacks is an interesting subject. If you take 9/11, for example, it was mid-week and after the last public holiday of the summer. It was first thing in the morning and clear flying weather. It was also good weather for filming, the crashing of the first aircraft orchestrated for coverage of the impact of the second. The IRA always used to detonate bombs immediately before lunch on a Thursday or Friday, so that it was covered by the evening papers, then by the daily papers, and followed by the Sunday papers. It was also covered by television current affairs programmes over the week-end. So, the time of year, time of day, day of the week and time of year are all important. The winter is popular with terrorists, because they can wear hoods and mufflers and not appear conspicuous; they can become virtually invisible. They probably will attack some likely target, but it needs a bit more application to work out precisely where. I think that one thing we should bear in mind is the imagination and pattern of the types of attack that al Qaeda have used. They have used conventional car bombs, they have always used conventional attacks, and combinations of the successful elements of other previous attacks. If we talk about 9/11, there was the hijacking and destruction, and multiple hijacking and destruction by the PLO, as I recall, in 1974 of a number of passenger aircraft and the destruction at Dawson's Field in Jordan. We also have the hijacking by the GIA of an Air France aircraft a few years ago in Algeria. That plane was refuelled in Marseilles with the precise plan of crashing it onto the Isle de France in Paris. But that was seen as an area weapon. I believe in the United States it was recognised that a plane could come in and be used, not quite so precisely as a pinpoint high accuracy weapon, in an in-bound flight for this sort of purpose. But the gap was not translated that one step further to seeing that the plane could be on a 'long burn' and is taken over an hour before it lands. There are various indicators: it is on an internal flight and is taken over almost immediately it has taken off.

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We are also talking about a very broad spectrum of weapons and the delivery means that are used. It took the Sinn Fein leader, Gerry Adams, and his IRA friends some 20 or 30 years to work out that it did not really help to blow up police stations, hotels, or whatever the IRA did in Northern Ireland. They were really rather unimportant. The thing that hurt was blowing up city office blocks and causing billions of pounds worth of damage; that is what hurt. Suddenly, everything that people had believed in and fought for, or fought against, for 30 years, was up for grabs again. So, to attack downtown New York, to attack economic targets was perhaps a lift from that particular copybook. We were also talking about sea mines strapped to the front of a dinghy. This is a very cost effective, very effective weapon. 75 percent of the United Kingdom, if not more, is within about 5 kilometres of a navigable waterway, so there are plenty of opportunities there. We need to do a bit of lateral thinking to see what is at risk. Martin mentioned the various means of chemical and biological contamination. One thing I would say about product contamination is that it is something that it was a threat about fifteen years ago, but very rapidly, and very unobtrusively, the subject has been eradicated. There are seals and so on put on most food and other products packaging. Some things we can find solutions for, but others are much harder. Cornelius Wientjes Now that we are discussing all these unpleasant means of creating terror, I would like to expand a little bit on an issue that was mentioned before, also by Martin Edmonds, namely that, in a way, we could see terrorism as a means of social and psychological warfare. The objective of the terrorists is, of course, to inflict damage, as much as they can, and to cause as many casualties as possible but with the prime objective of weakening our societies. Their aim is to weaken our sense of social cohesion, to destroy our social capital, to sow fear and distrust and anxiety and generate feelings of insecurity. These are ultimately what the objectives of the terrorists are. In order to be able to face that type of threat better, irrespective of the means of delivery that are being used, it is important that we also have a better understanding of how disruptive these are to our social capital. What are the vulnerabilities in our societies in terms of the individual and the societal aspects? There is another aspect that I would like to mention in this respect. If we focus only on these threats and if we focus only on the precautionary side and are too preoccupied with the means of risk minimisation, that in itself may well serve to create distrust and feelings of insecurity and cause social disruption. If we do not act in the right way, and fail to strike the right balance, we are, in effect, helping the terrorists in achieving their goals by undermining the resilience of our societies. It is very important to find a balance between how to respond to the threat and how to retain and build up the resilience of society. In this respect, several people yesterday and also today mentioned what was called this morning the 'intelligence illiteracy' among the populations in the NATO countries. There is obviously, in many NATO countries, a lack of understanding of what security really is and what the terrorist threat is really about. There is a serious lack of preparedness for what might happen. Several people have suggested that it might be necessary to alert the people and to make them more aware of what the threat is. I agree that this is important; but I also would like to emphasise that, in doing so, the risk should not be neglected, because it also has a 'down side'. The precautionary principle itself carries inherent risks. In thinking about this, I have also been thinking about how this advice could be communicated to the NATO

Discussion of Session 9

governments, to make sure their people are more alert to what the threat is and what governments could, or should, be doing. How this advice could be given to governments is difficult; one option that I would like to lay before you is that we support the Advisory Committee on Social and Psychological aspects of terrorism. It next meets on 25 April 2003. This Committee has a mechanism of directly providing advice to the NATO Council. What we could do is to bring this issue up with the Committee and ask them whether they would be able to provide a recommendation to the Council and to the Ambassadors in the Council, for the nations to reflect on this issue. Adrian Kendry Listening to this interesting exchange, promoted I think by the comments that Martin Edmonds was making, I wonder how we actually set about framing a kind of a rational programme to contend with economic, psychological, and infrastructure vulnerabilities. There is a limit on the resources available for meeting a range of threats to which we would attach a range of probability rankings. I am reminded of when there was work on this kind of risk ranking in respect of risk management analysis. I am mindful of some interesting work undertaken by a friend of mine, who was a Pro-Vice Chancellor at the University of Bath, who used to do some very interesting work on catastrophic events. These are where there are extremely low probabilities but an exceptionally high disutility attached to them if they occurred. He tried to couch this in terms of looking at earthquakes and things like that. One of the interesting things coming out of the events of 11 September was a comparison of the kind of its overall impact and how it disrupted the US economy when compared with, say, the Kobi earthquake. We have limited resources, inevitably, to deal with a range of threats that will have different implications, according to what kinds of means we think are being employed for whatever purposes. Going back to the tactic that was offered by Martin, it seems to me that we could profitably think more deeply about this. I am aware that the Civil Contingency Secretariat at the Cabinet Office who spend quite a bit of time looking at these kinds of issues. But it does seem that we need to have some kind of systematic basis upon which we are going to set about trying to analyse these issues. The difficulty, otherwise, is that we will inevitably tend to be anecdotal and episodic with the result that we shall come up with a set of variables that seem to be applicable in just one set of circumstances. If we are concentrating on the consequences of the fact that terrorism is with us, and is going to remain with us, the less time we spend thinking about how we might deal with tackling the root causes, and deal with the consequences of a range of different kinds of actions the better. Then, some kind of systematic approach to analysing these things seems to me to be absolutely of a priority. By and large, I am not really aware that this has happened much since 11 September 2001.1 have to say from the things that I have seen, there have been one or two attempts to do this, but there has not been quite the systemisation available in open sources. I am not denying that this probably has been done among the intelligence services, but it may be a good question to pose to people around the table. What kinds of systematic risk assessment has been undertaken by the intelligence services in the aftermath of 11 September that gives us some kind of rational basis for action and for strategy?

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Barry Denofsky Just a comment on my own Service. First of all, we do look at a lot of these issues, and we do analyse them. We do not circulate them very widely, to be very honest. Again, it comes back to the bilateral, the trilateral and the quadrilateral, and some of the groups a little larger than that. We look at how information will be protected and how it will be shared. We have recognised, however, that we do have to share information. We do a lot of these things. You may not see a lot of it, and you probably never will, but I think there are opportunities as well. I was thinking about it when I listened to some of the comments earlier. My service has a website and I publish both classified information, which is the primary part of my job, and a lot of unclassified information. We are now trying to find new ways of producing products of value to the police and other agencies, which is largely unclassified, but these are for official use only. Some things we do not want to see showing up on a bus going to some place. In fact, some of it is not classified, perhaps even much higher than unclassified, but it does bring forward a service point of view and an opinion on a lot of issues. I also contract work out. I have many academics and others write on some of these issues that we then take back and publish. This gives us an opportunity to present to the Canadian population and others who look at our website a different perspective on security issues that they might not find elsewhere. There are numerous papers and we get a lot of very positive feedback. Last year, we had something like close to 800,000 'hits' on our website alone. We get a lot of people taking some of the products we have done and using them in other academic journals and things of that nature. So, I think there is a positive side and there may be other opportunities for us to look at how we communicate the message. Most people do not really need very sensitive tactical intelligence. What they want is the assessment of what does this mean? How do we put this into perspective? How do we react? We see it in Canada, but perhaps even within the NATO context where NATO perhaps can be publishing things that are little different from the kinds of products that we send in, which have a very small circulation. It takes a lot of time and extra effort. I have analysts now who spend a lot of time looking at a classified report simply thinking about how we could declassify it, or bring the classification down so that we can get wider dissemination. The higher the classification, the smaller the audience. We now recognise, and have done so for a long time, that we cannot afford to be sitting on intelligence. It is no good to us if no one else can use it. If we are the only ones who have it, it does not really pay any bills at the end of the day. I think there are opportunities, but we have to find new ways to capitalise on them. Spike Bowman From the perspective of the FBI, and I think this pretty much goes for the entire intelligence community in the United States, the problem is that what you are asking about is like the old adage of the blind men who were asked to touch the elephant and then describe it. What you describe depends on which part of the elephant you touch. I guess everything that Barry Denofsky says is absolutely correct. Information is the key to all this. One of the problems is the amount of information that we get and the question of how much of it is valid information. Not a single day, literally, goes by when we do not have a report of some American interest in an Embassy building or Consular building or IBM business or something overseas that is under surveillance with people taking pictures of it and taking notes. Not a single day passes when we do not have at least one of those. When US forces went into the caves in Afghanistan we

Discussion of Session 9

found tons of documents, which we are still looking at. These documents describe US facilities in great detail. In fact, there is even an al Qaeda training manual for terrorism. It describes in detail what they want to do, and there is also information in it about chemical, biological and radiological weaponry. We have had to focus on those things and determine what the likelihood is of any particular one of those things being useful. Of course we had the Anthrax problem in the United States and everybody focused on that as the big problem. Then, when we started researching it, we found out that it really takes a lot of skill to 'weaponise' anthrax. Instead of looking at anthrax, therefore, we are now looking at things such as smallpox, which is much easier to spread. We are concerned with things like that and have taken into account what some of the ramifications of a smallpox attack would be. This has even forced us to go back and look and try and figure out how valid the smallpox vaccinations are that we were given when we were young, because they have stopped giving them 20 years ago. Every day, we get hundreds of reports from people, most of them completely bogus. But there will be reports that the Houston oil refineries are going to be attacked; we therefore have to go figure out what it means to attack a Houston oil refinery. How big a problem would it be, and how many thousands of people would die if it happened in the middle of night, when nobody could escape or something. The answer to your question is, that we have done a lot in looking at the assessments and so forth, but they have been forced assessments. They have been almost all situation specific, because, things such as the Metro system in Washington DC or the New York Subway and runnels, have all received threats. We have to look and figure out what the damage would be if a certain type of gas, for example, were released or a certain type of chemical and how people could be evacuated in safety. It is all forced; there is nothing systemic about it. The fact of the matter is that we do not have time to be systemic; we are reacting to the threats as we get them. Chris Donnelly The issues Martin Edmonds raised and some of the points that others, such as Spike Bowman, have just mentioned, lead on to the issue of cost. If cost is going to be involved, the issue is who is going to bear the expense. This then raises the issue of the relationship between government and business in respect of security provision. This is an area that we could well explore more thoroughly firstly, because business has always been seen as an element of national policy, in some countries more than others. This is certainly the case in the UK. For example, throughout the whole of the 19th Century, business, to a large extent, led foreign policy. Many business enterprises, such as the East India Company, were effectively almost independent states, with their own armed forces. I am not suggesting we should go quite that far, although plenty of businesses in Russia today are going in that direction. But, in terms of looking at our own societies, there is a good case to be made for much greater involvement of business with governments in tackling security issues. One aspect is that, secondly, businesses will be the first to suffer after the victims themselves who have been killed or injured. It was business, rather than government, which suffered, for example, the after-effects of the Bali bombing. Another aspect, in terms of what Cornelius Wientjes was saying about the vulnerability of society, is how much the commercial world rests on confidence - the illusion of the piece of paper in your pocket that we call money. Consider the disproportionate effect 9/11 had on the economy in the US in what, by wartime standards, were very limited levels of destruction actually caused.

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Thirdly, another aspect of business is that there is a relationship, particularly among the larger business corporations and multi-national companies, between the managers and their employers. This gives them a degree of control over the employers' actions. Business is a way of education and also a means of gathering intelligence and information about a state of affairs in a country or an area. If business is going to invest in a given area, it will want government help and assurances when making assessments whether that area is going to be vulnerable to a terrorist attack. Finally, security is a business in its own right, with few exceptions. I am not sure if the US Office of Security and Commerce will be one of them, though I imagine it might. The actual relationship between governmental agencies and the business world has not really evolved that dramatically in the last few years. However, I would say that it would probably be seen in most places as being inadequate. Is this an issue that might be developed? Richard Pawloski I think it is. Security, as an industry, is one that always expands. There are always more burglar alarms, more things to do with security services provided as the years go by. This is something that cannot be said about any other sector. However, as far as expenditure goes, it is, in very many cases, the last on the list; it is just an overhead cost that people do not want to have to pay. Obviously, you do not want your stock being stolen if you can possibly help it, but other than that, in very direct terms, people do not invest in security. Undoubtedly if any major attack on a large corporation causes major damage, that company will seek a lot of money from the government to try to get compensation and prevent it happening again. Chris Donnelly That is a worthwhile investment. Martin and I live in an area of UK in which the biggest employers are the arms manufacturers. If we are saying that the patterns of investment expenditure on security should shift from security being only a matter of defence we would see a reduction in weapons systems and armies in some sectors, but maybe an increasing in police forces and or other kinds of security. There are enormous implications for government, here. Julian Lindley French Most discussions of security, I think, tend to be underestimated. This is just a personal feeling; I cannot back it up with any evidence. The problem depends on the state of the art, the technologies that you are dealing with, and their marketability. When industry takes the lead, you are going to do it their way. What you are doing goes back to the requirements process. Right now, I am thinking that one of the most important things that could be around would be to be able to walk through a small area and have your entire body analysed. The idea is that if you have any weaponry or chemicals on your person, it could be detected faultlessly as you just walk through. Richard Pawloski And then there would still be the question of whether you are thinking about hijacking or not. There are certain thresholds that need to be met, that could be applied with great rewards if the business community knew which way to go. What they are doing, now that we are into the micro-management of fingerprinting, eye scans and so on? They are working everything probably in the wrong direction, but that is where the money is. The question needs to be asked, what are the strategic goals at a higher

Discussion of Session 9

level? What are the three most important things, if it were possible for them to be invented, that would solve our terrorism fears? If those things were available, why have they not been introduced, or a tender submitted, which says, 'gentlemen you go after this you will have rewards that you can't imagine'? There are probably some very good thinking people who know these things, particularly in law enforcement. They probably know clearly what they want, but it is not yet accepted, or acceptable. It is probably in 50 different areas, so there is need of leadership here. If you wait for the manufacturers to find out, they will carry on basically with what their existing product lines are, and that may not be the right answer. Chris Donnelly There is a case I can think of right now where we have a lot of contractors in the Middle East servicing military equipment - more than ever before. Is a contractor as loyal to that unit as a soldier? They wanted to replace a lot of this maintenance activity with private contractors. You have now got to ask the question as people are being pulled out, who owns this person? Of course, the companies are interested in liability and maybe not the life of the individual. They want to know who is responsible for him, in that sense. Right now, within the Middle East, Lockheed Martin is pulling families out and doing a back-track on it. That capability might shut down a particular defence situation. There are a lot of basic issues that have to come out of this. The easiest way is to state where the vision is: state what do you really want and then let people chase it with enormous amounts of grants, R & D activity, and focus on that. Then you will get there. There seems to be a lot of activity right now, particularly in electronic work and things like that, to develop X-rays and sensors. There are fifty different companies addressing the problem right now, but they will never put it all together. They will hide their patents, whereas a single major tender would allow them to bring that capability together. John Lenoir I want to go back to the theme of capability gap between the military and civil law enforcement authorities and the necessity for the greater integration of the two. In the past, the US Marshal Service was besieged with contractors calling to sell software and hardware. But it is really out of date for civil law enforcement and we have a long way to go before we get to any level of communication capacity and information sharing. We need to understand one another. It is the old 'connect the dots type of thing', but using anomaly detection software. But the software is not there; we do not have it, and we do not use it in law enforcement. To do so, we would need to get a comfortable level of capacity, but we are light years behind the military in these areas. This is certainly an area where there needs to be an enormous investment. We can, I think, save a lot of money if there is sharing between the military and law enforcement. It makes no sense for law enforcement to spend a lot of money on research and development when the military already has the equipment and capability. We just simply need to get access to it; that is a real challenge.

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Future NATO Security M. Edmonds and O. Cerny (Eds.) IOS Press, 2004

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SESSION 10

Structures

Discussion of Session 10 Bruce Jones One definition of terrorism incidentally means "using or threatening violence or action against people, property, business or everyday life for political, religious or ideological reasons". That is taken from the small print my insurance company attached to my car insurance. Perhaps it is as good as anybody else's. We now approach the issue of structures. Chris Donnelly What I would like to do in this session is to explore structures in a somewhat parochial fashion vis a vis NATO. What I would like to look at is the question where we go from here. What can we do to improve the structures and the tools that can be used. By 'we' I mean the people around the table. I want to turn the debate so far, where we have been looking at the theory and practice on a large scale, to what we can do to improve and affect the issue of making the organisations, which form part of our armoury in the fight against terrorism, better. There are three elements. Firstly - and I shall confine myself in this respect to NATO - what are the existing NATO tools that can be used? Cornelius Wientjes has identified one of them, but there are others, which can equally be developed. Several NATO agencies outside the science programme now need to be addressed. Therefore, one of the things that we can take away is not to examine the existing efforts that NATO is doing in its terrorism task force, but to look at how we change and amend other institutions within the organisation, which people have not so far targeted. How we can improve their impact by focusing what they study, and by changing whom they report to with their studies. The second element is, what are the other national tools that we, as individuals, could all point to, or draw on, when we are addressing this problem, and which we are not already dealing with? I am not therefore talking about intelligence and security services and so on, but instead what other national institutions are there out there that need to be re-focused and to concentrate their efforts on this issue, On the one hand, if we are talking about think-tanks, universities, and so on, there are quite a lot who are already doing work that is relevant to this issue. Governments in various countries have already financed studies, and have been talking to people who are fairly centrally located, people such as Ron Asmus in the United States, who is in a good position in Washington to have a good overview of what is being done. His comment was that, as far as the US is concerned, where there is arguably the greatest attention being given to fighting terrorism, the strategic community of intellectuals and thinkers is represented still only by a very few people. Only a very small percentage turned their attention to looking at the new issues - not just looking at the issue of, 'terrorism', but the whole structure of which terrorism is a part in terms of the new threats to security. This includes, for example, the future of the Middle East and so on. In his view, it will take years to shift the

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focus of attention and to be looking for ways of effectively tackling this problem. We are, in other words, in our strategic community of intellectuals, still, in the main, addressing past problems. How do we alter that? This is the question; what institutions can we tackle? Julian Lindley French volunteered his institution to do something. What other ones could you identify, that we would like to see involved? The third aspect is, what tools can be created? What tools can we set up to work on this issue? It would be nice to be able to set up a brand new institute, but if we cannot do that - and we certainly cannot do it immediately - then perhaps what we can do as a result of this session is to set up a virtual institute between us ourselves. This could be a website dealing with this issue, to which we subscribe, which we support, and put our papers on. It would keep us in contact with one another. We could use that to create a flexible, informal, and, I would expect, probably effective group, who may even be able to tailor itself into becoming, more formally, an advisory group to NATO. So, as a third point, I would also be interested in who would be prepared to be part of such a group. Who would like to be associated with it, and contribute to it? Does anyone see any objections to this; are there any negative points? This will only work if we, ourselves, are prepared to commit to it. There are two other aspects to the structures issue that I would like to add. I am putting only questions, not answers. Bruce Jones talked about how there was a need for improved information exchange. Generally speaking, in NATO, as we mentioned yesterday, there are two basic mechanisms for exchanging information: one is a formal mechanism, the formal structures, the committees etc. The other is the informal structures - the corridors, the cafeteria, the tennis court. It is the mechanism of creating the informal structures that seems to me to be worthy of exploring further. That is to say, this may be something to which we can even contribute. Paul lonescu commented that it was the methodology of setting up the organisation, rather than the role for which it was originally intended, which was now the important thing. I think that it is, in NATO's case, demonstrably true. So, my fourth question is, what can we do, other than what I have simply described, to improve the development of informal structures within NATO and other institutions? What should be done, and is there any other method that I have missed out? Is there any other way to achieve an improved information exchange? Finally I would like to pick up a point raised by Martin Edmonds. This is the issue of the media. It seems to me that in the last few years we have entered what is, in effect, a new stage. The media have become ever more important. We now have an order of magnitude difference in the importance of the media, compared with, say, 15 years ago. Nowadays, it is not just that the media is an aspect that has to be taken into consideration, it is that the media have become, in effect, an altogether new and additional environment in which everything has to be accommodated. It is an environment that, if ignored, will prevent us accomplishing what we set out to achieve. Therefore, in this understanding of the word 'information', our information policy and the efforts we have to put in information or public diplomacy - or whatever else you want to call it - now has to be so much greater than ever before. None of us is yet prepared and geared up to do this. How do we alert our establishments? How do we come to terms with that? It is another aspect of the changing nature of the world we live in. How do we cope with it? How do we afford it, because the only thing that is certain is that it is going to be - whatever it costs more expensive if we ignore it.

Discussion of Session 10

Bruce Jones I recently held a workshop where I addressed the question of the role of the media and battle damage assessment. Whether it is battle damage assessment or any other form of activity, terrorist activity or whatever, the rules are the same. There are a number of decision loops and timetables. If jet fighters go on missions, and munitions are dropped; they either hit or do not hit what they were supposed to and, allegedly, cause collateral damage. There are then accusations, so you have first of all got the disinformation cycle. This is the accusation fed by the opposition that we have done whatever it is that we should not have done. Next, you have got the press reaction cycle and their various deadlines and whether we are talking about whichever news broadcast it might be. On top of that there is the ordinary military operational cycle where collateral damage is a low priority; what they want to know whether the target has been hit and decide whether or not to go out and attack the target again. What you have then got to do is raise that question as a higher priority, allocate resources and assets whether to go out again on reconnaissance to see what actually has happened. At the same time you have got to debrief the crew and 'sensitise' them to make sure that they know about these issues and can report them quickly. You then have the local command decision cycle, but within the headquarters. There you have got to work out what actually has happened and how you are going to respond to it. Very often this means referring back to a capital city or theatre command. If it is 3 o'clock on a Sunday you have to get hold of somebody responsible to make that decision and determine what you are going to say, because things are spun so heavily. There is so much direct interest in almost all the details that you have to take into account all these particular considerations, decisions, and decision cycles. Our responses to them have to be co-ordinated and synchronised. They have to be built up, often asymmetrically, so that it may be a Captain or a Staff Sergeant, speaking to somebody who is very high up in a national government, for example in a Secretary of State's office or something. So, that is the sort of way that these press questions work. We have to be alert to them, whether it is an incident regarding collateral damage or some complete fake and bogus doctored picture on the Internet showing an atrocity or some alleged incident - it amounts to the same thing. We have got all these different components to deal with, and we need to get our ducks in a row and respond. Chris has mentioned NATO, civil society and institutions that are in society whether academic or government, semi-government or business. We have also moved onto new institutions that we might persuade to address these particular subjects. I invite people to think about his questions for a moment and respond. The first thing that Chris asked for was whether there were any objections, as to whether this is, or is not, the way to proceed? Paul Swallow I suppose one reason that I am here is that I heard Chris Donnelly speak at a conference in Granada at the beginning of last year. On that occasion, he explained that the nature of security in the West was changing and that NATO had been given in 1998 a new role in security by the NATO Council. A sub-set of that was counterterrorism, and international organised crime. Speaking as a simple police officer, this was news to me. The phrase used at the time, which I have used several times since, is that security now means 'banks and not tanks'. Chris Donnelly also used the analogy this morning of turning the NATO tanker round and pointing it away from its traditional role into new fields.

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Chris then invited me to Brussels, and I spoke to some of his colleagues about what the police do. There was considerable confusion, I think, as possibly this was the first time any of them had heard of this new role, particularly the role that the police do and the operational gap between the two. I took this message back to the police in the various forums on which I sit. I have to admit that the police and the civil side had a similar incredulous reaction. They were not able quite to comprehend how the police could get involved in this role. I thought about it and, personally, have had to struggle to find a gap in the market that is not already covered by the police and intelligence services and the links we have with our own state military structures if we need them in any particular circumstances. The final point I want to make here is to say that I described yesterday the problems that the police have had in co-operating internationally. We heard Spike Bowman explain why that is the internal focus of the police. They are there to support their nation-state; they are not structured to co-operate internationally. There is no policy drive for them to do so, except at the practitioner level where, for example, we deal with Manuel Navarette's Interpol teams extremely effectively. But judicial cooperation, and federal co-operation comes later. They know we do it, because we have to, and they trust us not to mess it up for them. I have four particular areas which I feel cause a great deal of trouble and where we need new ground breaking. One, that Bruce has mentioned, was last year, when an intelligence source informed an FBI base somewhere in the Middle East that a given ship, sailing a given route, with a given cargo of sugar, was going to sail into the Port of Bristol in the West of England. We learned that it would be containing a nuclear device. We got this via the Bureau and from the US Naval Intelligence Service. The US Naval Intelligence Service, which has an amazing data base and search software, came up with three possible ships. It also advised us that they did not think that such a threat was actually practicable. This was not the view taken by the British government and the ship was tracked, using US resources. When it approached the UK, a decision was made that the ship should be stopped and searched. The problem was it was in French international waters at the time. We had to contact the Navy, the Military, and the police in the South of England and, eventually, after considerable effort we managed to get this together. The ship was duly stopped and 52 seamen were terrified witless by Royal Marines shimming down from helicopters. Of course, it contained absolutely nothing, but the logistics surrounding that event highlighted an area that we had never explored before. This was an operation that the British police certainly were not structured to undertake but they somehow managed to pull it off. But given circumstances like that, I think NATO would be ideally placed. It would have the links directly into the Military and links into world wide structures. It would have been far better able to coordinate the operation. That was just one example over Christmas of last year which I think, probably, from the little I know about NATO, could have been done in half a day but which took us five. The second area where I feel that NATO could make a direct contribution is in co-operation with the military police. During the course of my work, I frequently come across the military police. We, in the civilian police, are very adept at assessing risks and assessing threats to civilian targets. We probably get one threat to Buckingham Palace once a week and a threat to the Houses of Parliament once a fortnight. We have to assess them, because each one has to be taken seriously. I think

Discussion of Session 10

that here there is a great role that NATO could take on in training and categorising such threats. The third area I have called civil contingency; it involves emergency planning. I think Martin Edmonds gave the example in his own county, in Blackpool, displaying how unaware it was of its own inability to respond to a terrorist chemical attack incident. In the UK, we are not particularly well equipped. The police officers that are called out in the aftermath of a bomb come from the anti-terrorist branch, but there are only 80 of them for the whole of the UK. I would think that possibly only 20 of them would be on duty at any one time. By the time they get from their homes into the Yard, get their CBN kit, and disappear to the site it would be too late. We have never been tested, but there are concerns over this. In fact, at the end of March 2003 we are running our first ever CBN incident. We have taken over a tube (Underground) station in the East End of London, and are going to run a full, CBN exercise. There are issues around that, of course; the public will get terrified when they see what is going to happen. The likelihood of a CBN attack happening of course, is probably remote, but nonetheless we are running this exercise and that will throw up a lot of issues. Here again, NATO with its resources and, possibly, with its capability, could to respond much quicker than civilian police forces are able to. The baseline is whether or not there is a gap to be bridged. There are these four areas and, possibly acting as a good broker, NATO could turn a fresh eye on how the police do it. The civil police are not currently doing it very well. We do it informally, rather than formally, so there might be another route here for NATO to bridge the gap. NATO could co-ordinate internationally in a way that the civilian police do not seem able to, other than by bi-lateral arrangements between individual officers. Cornelius Wientjes When the member nations signed up to NATO's new strategic concept, which includes many new threats to security including organised crime and so on, there was no real idea of what NATO could do in that area. That is not a criticism, by the way, rather than the alliance's general commitment to the fact that this is the way the world is going. We simply had to react to it in some way. Some of the suggestions that have been made by Paul Swallow are very useful. Another encouraging example would be the Guarda Civil setting up a relationship with the Ukrainian Border Guard. This was initially a NATO opening, because the Ukrainian Border Guard was, of course, a military organisation and part of the old system. It therefore came within NATO's remit of military organisations and the people thought of themselves as military. The Ukrainian Border Guard had a navy every bit as large as the Ministry of Defence, but totally separate. That is a project that effectively has been developed and is still, in part, being done by NATO with the bulk done by the EU and by member nations such as Spain. Finding such examples takes a bit of doing. Paul Swallow has just identified one with the ship that we would not have thought of until the event happened. Getting that kind of example - and in this instance the mechanism to get it into the NATO system would be for the UK government and the Foreign Office - available and bring it into the NATO system would be difficult. The UK would have to say that this is what happened to us, so what procedures should we develop? If one of the nations picks this up and presents it to NATO on those grounds, it will be taken on, in a way.

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Within this group, there is very little we could do as more than one nation has already been involved. I, for one, do not know if that has actually happened or not. Bruce Jones I think the sort of areas that come to mind are standardisation and setting up doctrine on some of these particular issues and then of training. There is not at present a training budget for matters to do with security within NATO. There are many dialogue countries and partner countries that would like to be included in a centralised training programme and be part of the big picture. I think that this is definitely something we should think about. Obviously, a location, which is readily accessible to a number of different people and not controversial, would be a place to do it. I think another question on the civil defence side is that, quite apart from the assets and the expertise, catastrophic events in any particular country would cross external boundaries. You would then need some external staff able to respond effectively and deal with it at that sort of level. Individual countries have difficulty with this command and control co-ordination central staff. Who would co-ordinate them? It becomes rather a difficult problem. However, I see NATO having a definite input to any particular endeavour regarding terrorism and counter-terrorist operations, which are, to a large extent, a combined affair. That is to say, there must be a finance input, there is data processing or an information technology input, and there is also a linguistics input. Quite apart from the police investigation, the legalities, the international liaison, and the military side of it, NATO might be able to see things moving forward. Adrian Kendry Chris Donnelly posed various questions, the first of which was, what existing tools are there that can be used? He then asked, can we change the focus within the organisation? I found the earlier comments by Barry Denofsky instructive, particularly his comments about the kind of analytical work being done and the way that things are developing. It seemed to me, therefore, that there was fertile ground to explore in terms of changing the focus within NATO itself. The comments about the Special Committee, its role and as an information process, brings me back to it being the stovepipe that Chris Donnelly referred to. It leads into barren pastures that are only broken by this kind of informal gathering, and along the NATO corridors or in the cafeteria. I used to think, when I first arrived in NATO, that the cafeteria was an offlimits kind of place, because it was where people were presumed to be idling away their time, where drivers were waiting for Ambassadors, or where people, who were temporarily between assignments, just hung out. But as the weeks and months passed by, it made a different impression on me. I see signs of that changing throughout the Political Affairs Division whilst we have been going through immense internal change and also responding to enormous external changes. I think that the questions about changing the focus of where various groups of people report, and how can we somehow introduce a dynamic element into the question of NATO civilian and military engagement in the strategic concept of dealing with counter terrorism and organised crime, are crucial. Chris Donnelly raised questions about national institutions. I just want to offer a little anecdote here because I suspect that this is something that I should follow up as a kind of a third step. The first step was that back in November 2001, on a trip to London to do kind of things that one might expect - namely going to the Ministry of

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Defence and the Foreign Office and things of that kind - I tried to see people in the Home Office. I wanted talk to people there, particularly the Chief Economist working on issues where I thought there might be some sort of correspondence between what we were trying to do, and he was. First of all, he was absolutely amazed that anybody from NATO should be coming to see him. In fact, he had not long been in post and had to make some kind of cross-references to be sure that in some sense I was allowed in the building. No one had ever seen a NATO person appear and they did not even know what one looked like. In appearing and talking to him, he was incredibly nervous about anything that he might want to discuss with me. For example, apart from asylum seekers and elements of that nature, he did venture to say that they were doing some studies on the psychological impact of hate messages, which we have already heard mentioned earlier by Spike Bowman. They were actually looking at some of the economic consequences of this, so I said that this could be really interesting and could we stay in touch. When I got back, I sent him an official letter to which he responded by saying that he had been advised that there was no basis for having any kind of discussion with us. The second stage was that I had some occasion to ask questions about innovation policies that they were going to feed into the Economic Committee's assessment of the Balkans. At that point, he ventured to say that in time there might be some basis upon which I could visit the building and we could have some kind of discourse. What this indicated to me was that there were institutional organisational barriers that were very real and meaningful and that that there was a struggle going on in the hearts and minds of many different people, and many different groups. Chris Donnelly talked about Ron Assum's comments about the US strategic assessment by the intellectual community. I am not sure that I share that assessment. I am not as well informed as Ron would be about the whole structure of these things - but it seemed to me that Rand is a place where a lot of work is taking place. They are researching into different types of agro-terrorism, and biological terrorism, the general consequences of this we know ourselves. The National Defence University has done similar work through the National Institute of Strategic Studies. I suspect that some of the things that go on in the right-of-centre think tanks, in institutes, which is relatively foreign territory for NATO for reasons that we all know are connected with the history of NATO are well researched. We could make some progress in that sort of field, finding out who is doing what, and how that plays into issues of law enforcement and their relationship to security and NATO. That is an interesting one, because I know people are engaged in looking at the analysis of law enforcement and in all its various manifestations. What then of my own profession? What do I know about people working in law enforcement and terrorism from an economic point of view ? I do not really know very much at all. In fact I think that this kind of symbiosis, or unholy alliance, may be something that would be ground breaking. The final point is the question of the role of the media in changing the environment. How can we somehow greatly improve engagement and public diplomacy with the media? That, too, is an interesting question, because almost the very first thing that I was told when I arrived at NATO in late August 2001 was essentially to stay away from the media. The media were to be handled by our professionals within the Office of Information and Press. I understood the basis for this. However, as time has gone by, such is the avalanche of things that beats down upon the very professional and capable Office of Information and Press, that we are

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probably missing opportunities to engage in effective public diplomacy and dialogue. NATO could take a more pro-active stance and try to steer the debate in a way that we would like to see it steered, rather than merely always being reactive. John Lenoir Obviously, military advisors appear at every level in NATO Headquarters and perhaps even in a more formalised Council. But is there a similar arrangement for law enforcement, in the sense that we have a Legal Attache to the Czech Republic from the FBI. Is there any kind of corresponding presence of law enforcement in NATO. For example, would we have member nations legally represented? One step would be for member nations to have a law enforcement person assigned to NATO Headquarters. Each of the countries' legal representatives would simply be a liaison person just to begin the kind of dialogue and co-ordination that Paul Swallow and the police could contact in a situation that might need some NATO assets. Is there someone who is a point of contact, a law enforcement point of contact, in NATO Headquarters who could then make the appropriate phone calls? Chris Donnelly No. This is one of our problems in NATO. When NATO was set up, world security, until fairly recently, could clearly be divided into internal and external issues. Spike Bowman asked if was there a difference any more, and the answer again is, 'no'. Indeed, the difference between the two has become blurred. The tradition that NATO has always brought unto itself, and the traditional agencies set up to deal with external security issues - foreign ministries, ministries of defence and associated necessary agencies such as the security services - saw intelligence specifically as being a military matter and the responsibility of the armed forces. National delegations occasionally bring in other people, for example from the ministries of finance. They do not always come from the military, they can occasionally come from interior ministries, but that is not normally the case. The logic is that, if you take the strategic concept from 1999 to its logical conclusion, these people who we have traditionally brought into NATO are no longer sufficient. We should find ways of bringing in, on a regular basis, interior ministry people and the intelligence, foreign, and civilian foreign intelligence services. Of course, under the interior ministry, you would bring in law enforcement personnel, but we are not there yet. I know of no proposals to do so. That is the value of a workshop such as this. We could even begin to debate the ideas a) whether this could be 'doable', and b) whether it is a good idea. But we are also the victims of something that Julian Lindley French referred to yesterday. This is his point that NATO and the EU should begin to decide who does what. This is where we were in 1998, when we were already a long way down that track. It was then generally thought at the time that the EU would develop Justice and Home Affairs activities and NATO would develop into military security. The EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy would, in fact, be based upon 'soft security' and NATO would do the hard bit. When, in 1999, the nations put their names to the new strategic concept, it was in that sense, not that NATO thought it was going to take over dealing with organised crime or even though it had an idea about what it could contribute.

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Bruce Jones Well, it seems that this forum has a consensus. If anything, we have developed the preamble for such a recommendation. What would it cost? It seems like a simple first, but an essential first, step. Chris Donnelly This sounds like a first task for an advisory body that we might set up. Oldrich Cerny You mentioned and advisory group, or a Research Institute. My question is, apart from the distribution of material, to whom would such an advisory group be responsible? What channels would it use, and how much would it cost? Chris Donnelly On the issue of how much would it cost and who would pay, I have no idea. It is nevertheless an important consideration. Secondly, I do not know what the technical difficulties are of setting up a website. I am a technological ignoramus. It is simply the idea that we have here a group of people, some of whom have met before on a couple of occasions, but we have never produced, in the past, this ongoing group, which I would now like to suggest we do. The idea of a website was simply one way of keeping in touch. But it is put forward without any real knowledge on my part of what is required. How it could have an impact? Well, I can think of several ways how it could have an impact within NATO. If we form ourselves into a useful body of people we can ask Fernando to accept this is an advisory group, an informal advisory group, Now, an advisory group has two features: one is an advantage, the other a disadvantage. The advantage is that it can say anything it wants; the disadvantage is that it can be totally ignored. But at least with a group of specialists producing ideas, in practice these cannot actually be ignored. In practice with people - that will not be me because I will have gone - working on the inside in NATO as part of the group, it can have some impact. The main problem that I have seen in the past with advisory groups is that the key is not just the quality of the group and having a mechanism to think together and get advice; but getting that advice to exactly the right person to deal with it. This is not always the boss. I know we can do it. The second aspect of this is, of course, that we all have contacts that go out beyond our position here, particularly into the scientific and academic world. This gives us, in fact, a lot more to bring to such a group than just our own brain-power. We could become the centre of a networking system. It will only work as much as people are interested, but I think I have seen sufficient interaction in the group over the past two days to say with some confidence that in this instance it could work and could be very interesting. It is an idea; maybe we would want to offer a vote on it. Who would like to be involved if we decide to do this? I just throw it out as a thought, but I would like to see something to emerge. We have met at various seminars before, official and unofficial, organised by official and by independent bodies; and then we all go away. We all have our own worlds, but there is another thing here; it is crossing these otherwise stovepipe boundaries. It would be nice not to lose the opportunity that we have seen here. If this conference had gone in a different way, I would not have suggested it. But it seems to

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have created such a dynamism and synergy that it would be nice to take advantage of it. That is but one idea. Maybe there are other ideas of how to do it. How much it would cost, I do not know; I have no idea what it costs to set up a website. Barry Denofsky In my remarks this morning, I talked about some of the challenges that we are facing. I do not, however, want to give the impression that we have not made progress. We are making, and have made, a lot of progress in the last couple of years. First of all, we are more integrated now into NATO, our little Committee, than we have ever been. We are spending more time trying to explain who we are and what we are doing. We have become more involved with the military. We now attend meetings of the NATO Intelligence Board, the DEH, and the Deputy Head of Delegation meetings. I went to Norfolk Virginia last year representing the Committee at the National Intelligence Board meeting. Their representatives at a military level now come to our meetings on a regular basis. Chris Donnelly has come and given presentations; others from the political committee have sat in. There is a much more open exchange. We have attended, and been invited to, meetings at SHAPE and NATO C3 A. A whole range of things is happening. I mentioned the small analytical cell that was established; it is still an ad hoc cell but it has now been in place for a year. We started off producing weekly assessments, but most of them are now becoming bi-weekly. What is happening is that we are taking all the assessed intelligence and assessments that our Committee prepared based on submissions from our respective nations. Then we have given the latitude to the small cell to pick and choose from there, so we can produce much more timely, incisive pieces that will go to the Council and to many others. Because our Committee reports directly to the Council we do not have any kind of go-betweens. We have an ability to get some products forward and there is much greater demand today for intelligence. One of the issues that we are currently struggling with - and I think it is an important one - is that inside NATO, at that formal level, you have the creation, of an intelligence steering committee. There is also talk about creating something more formal in terms of an intelligence cell. No one is quite sure exactly how that is going to work, but when I look back at the creation of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Centre, it came out of the Washington Summit. Almost the instant it was created, it was staffed. So, I know things can happen. It is a matter of how you get the item on the table and how you get people to address these many issues that are out there. The difficulty that we are now facing is that we recognise in our Committee and amongst our respective organisations that we have to become more involved in NATO. We have to find ways of putting more intelligence on the table and sharing it around. But our Committee is, I think, unique compared with many Committees in NATO, in that we do not have a permanent home inside NATO. We come together four times a year in a formal sense. We have a secretary who operates out of the NATO Office of Security and who provides the administrative support for us. But because of that, we do not have a voice on a daily basis, much like other committees would have. So, I think there are things there that need to be addressed. The other thing is that we believe that if we were to have a more formal intelligence cell, then it should be staffed by intelligence professionals, people with the background, the analytical and the operational training. Then, you can make the best use of this information. The dilemma you now run into is that the minute you

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create a formal cell, it becomes - and here I am talking about things I do not know very much about - an international staff. Priorities are decided in a different way and it is staffed in a different way. While we may have views about the kinds of people we think should be appointed, all of a sudden that is taken out of our hands when something more formal is created. Or so I am told, anyway. I go back to make one comment about a website. We created back in Canada, much as the States has done, a secure Intranet where we have invited many departments and agencies to become a part of it. These include the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and other departments such as Immigration, Customs - you name it they are there. On that website my service has created a kind of a little NATO icon, and now we are posting all of the intelligence products that our Special Committee prepares. That is the contributions from all the intelligence services within the 19 countries to that one little site. The police, customs people, immigration people, etc. now have a chance, therefore, to have a look at what is going on in NATO from an intelligence point of view, things that they never had access to before. We are trying to find new ways are open to new suggestions. Because we already had the Intranet, the cost to us was minimal; all we had to do was to create a little icon. Then I had to have staff actually post in the material. The site is opening up a whole new opportunity for questions and dialogue by many in our community that never had any interest in, or any knowledge of, what was going on in NATO. The cell itself is very small. Right now, there are five people. We all submit long in-depth products but we have also asked everybody, following the events of 9/11. We have asked every nation to submit their kind of perception of what is going on in their countries in relation to the threats, whether they think the threats are growing, are they changing? Do we need to be concerned? We have started to ask for information on Iraq as well, so what you have got now is all the countries - well, those countries that have something to contribute - will then send in something on a regular basis. The analysts that are in there are pulling that material quickly off the information that comes in and then they are packaging up in a nice little report that which is quickly going out. One other thing I should mention that has been very important for us is the whole new partnership we have with all of the partner nations and the EAPC. We have been encouraging all of these countries to share intelligence with NATO. The problem was that in the past we had issued this kind of request and had asked for it on a number of occasions. Some of these partner states were not quite sure whom they are sending it to, or what was going to happen to their information. It was coming into NATO, but not very much was actually happening to it. Now, what we are doing, is channelling that information into this little cell, so we have the information from member nations of NATO and we have got information coming to us from a variety of foreign and domestic services in many of the EAPC countries. That is also being incorporated into these little packages that are going forward to the Secretary General's Office and to others. One of the things that we have not done well, but what we are trying to improve, is to capitalise on the information network that is inside NATO. BI, whatever that stands for, is the military intelligence network. There is a dilemma there, because it is not something that can be compartmentalised. Consequently, some of us are still concerned about the security of our information. Does every soldier on the battlefield need to have access to all of these sorts of things? We are looking at the technical side as to whether we can compartmentalise, which would allow us to post all of our intelligence products on to that site. Then it would be available for

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everybody who has access from a military perspective. So, we are making progress; but it is going to take a little bit of time. Spike Bowman What should be done? I am not smart enough to be able to answer that, but perhaps it would help if I were to I mention some of the ways that we use our military in the fight against terrorism. I think there are some lessons to be learned here. In the first place, the military, at least in the United States and probably in most other countries, has among the best command and communication systems in the world. We use them frequently when we are deployed overseas, simply because they have the best and most secure systems. NATO has inter-operable communications capabilities and those capabilities are probably only going to get better. One of the things that I am always reminded of is that the Internet, which everybody uses so much, was actually developed as a means of communication by the US Department of Defense. They are now working on the next generation of whatever that form of electronic communication will be. In the United States, and again I think probably this is true in most countries, the military is the 600 pound gorilla when it conies to logistics. They have mobile hospitals, mortuary services, air-lift, rapid response, doctors, nurses and so on. So, when we have a catastrophic event in the United States we will call on the American military just about every single time to supply whatever it is that is needed. They do not operate under their own command; they operate under command structure, but they do not operate in command of whatever the incident is. They operate in support of the civilian authorities there. When you are talking about terrorism, the terrorists that we look for are not going to be in your neighbourhood. They are going to be somewhere halfway around the world. The task of getting a terrorist and bringing him from some distant place for trial purposes, requires a fair amount of logistical strength. Sometimes it means airplanes; occasionally it has meant naval ships. We call upon the military for logistic support. A couple of years ago I received a call informing me that the Nepalese police had a person in custody who they had identified as being a man who had rocketbombed the American Embassy in Indonesia a number of years before. They said they could only hold him for 48 hours. I had to have an airplane that had enough speed to get to Nepal in the time that was required; I got that from the US Air Force. We have talked a lot about chemical, biological, and radiological-type weapons in the United States. The military is prohibited by law from executing the Law of the United States, which means that they are not permitted to serve as law enforcement officers. They are, however, the people who are going to be on the front line if there is a radiological, chemical or biological threat to them when they are in some place, such as Afghanistan. So, not unsurprisingly, they have developed probably the best capabilities in the United States as first responders to those types of events. Although the FBI has the responder units, and prepares for the same contingencies, the armed services are much more sophisticated than the FBI for much of it and they are able to deploy to more places faster. Again, we call upon them for some of those things; there are statutory provisions in the United States that specifically call on them for those particular threats. Referring back to the ship that was stopped, you are undoubtedly correct if you push that through a military-type channel. You are going to get things done a lot faster. One of the questions is training for these people. We have a luxury in the United States that we have a military service that is also a law enforcement service; this is the United States Coast Guard. We can put Coast Guard officers on naval

Discussion of Session 10

vessels so that, if there is a need to stop some ship on the high seas for law enforcement purposes, we pull down the Navy Ensign and haul up the Coast Guard Ensign. The Coast Guard officer is then placed in tactical command of the situation, and he takes over for a law enforcement function. They are very, very good at it. They are very professional. We have been doing this for a very long time, so there is a lot of experience. From the American perspective, we can impart to anybody in the world on boarding the tools with which to look for things and so forth. With regard to whether there is a law enforcement officer at NATO, the answer is no there is not. However, an interesting thing has happened in the recent past with the US. In the past, the American Military has never, ever wanted an FBI agent to deploy with them. The reason for that is they have their suspicions that some FBI Agent is going to say, 'well you pulled the trigger at the wrong time, I'm going to have to arrest you, or report you, or something like that.' Of course, when we deploy like that, we are not going out to look at the US soldiers; we are going out for other reasons. Nevertheless, they have always been worried about that. However, about a year and a half ago I was in Baltimore Maryland, watching my daughter swim in a swim meet. I was paged, so I went outside. I always carry a secure phone with me and I went outside to call my office. They passed me through to a general officer in an Afghanistan Air Force base. We had two FBI agents there who were sent there against his wishes. We knew that he did not like them being there but there were a lot of people being processed through the base and we were the people that had the most information about al Qaeda and about specific individuals. So we put the two agents in there. His phone call to me was that they were trying to take 'my' FBI agents away; stop them. The reason for his call was that we were the ones with all of the knowledge. We had the case histories of Al Qaeda, we knew how they functioned, we knew who their members were, we knew what to look for, we had their descriptions and we had pictures of many of them. Since that time, every single theatre military theatre commander in the United States has asked for an FBI agent on his staff. The NATO mission is changing. You are going to develop a doctrine for this sort of thing, I am here to tell you hat you are going to have to have law enforcement officers there because they are the ones that are going to have the type of knowledge that is going to allow them to serve that mission. Adrian Kendry Richard Palowski raised the question how we might engage with some organisation that could assist us in managing a web site and developing these kinds of things. What can we say about the NATO Defence College in Rome or the NATO SHAPE School in Oberammegau as possibilities for partnership? The NATO Defence College in Rome particularly intrigues me because I did try to create some potential for cooperation with it some time ago. The idea was basically squashed before we could even get started. What happened to the dichotomy between the EU and NATO in 1999 was that the bombs started to fall in Kosovo. What we have to obviously beware of is that all of our discussions over these last couple of days will not just be blown away by the conflict in Iraq. That will then be occupying peoples' attentions enormously. So, we face the possibility that we could become so preoccupied with other things in the weeks and months to come that the ideas flowing of this initiative do not get lost. The workshop does have enormous potential long-term benefits to all of the communities represented here. Because we can see this war against Iraq coming, we have got to

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find a way to anticipate and essentially try to mitigate the effects of those kinds of preoccupations. Chris Donnelly As far as the NATO Defence College is concerned, the issue is that it is the responsibility of the Military Committee. It has been kept effectively as a training establishment of the military staff. Over the years, it had become an agency in addition to helping to integrate some of the new members and partner personnel. In doing so it has, in effect, moved from being a training organisation to being an educational organisation. As such, it seems that it would be a good place to conduct research and locate, effectively, a NATO think tank, given that we need all the help that we can get now in generating new ideas in this area. Wording to that effect was included last Autumn in the military instructions to the NATO Defence College, taking advantage of a new Chairman of the Military Committee, General Kaufrnann, who was favourable to the idea. It remains for us to do something with this when we have the time. The Deputy Secretary General personally is interested in pursuing this. So, the weapon is ready; we now have to have a projectile put in it. What we have generated here over the last couple of days could well provide some of that ammunition. Bruce Jones I think we have gone all the way through the subject. Chris Donnelly mentioned proposals; I have a modest proposal that the workshop should be embodied into a permanent NATO Advisory Group the meets regularly to provide advice and guidance and direction on security development, including studies, standards criteria, methods and doctrine, training and security, education and awareness. Who would like to propose that as a resolution? Adrian Kendry Can I offer a benchmark instead? Keep it simple - "To provide advice and guidance on security development". Bruce Jones Proposed by Paul Swallow. Seconded, by AntonGiulio de Robertis. Those in favour raise their hands. I am pleased to say it is carried unanimously. I think we should all congratulate ourselves, and each other, very warmly on that. Let me conclude matters in saying thank you very much indeed to everybody around the table for your very strong participation, the imagination which has been devoted to the proceedings and, indeed, the frankness, openness and lack of inhibition that has been displayed in the contributions to the last two days. I have found it all most illuminating and I think we should carry on the good work.

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Author Index Borkovec, Zdenek Bowman, Spike Conesa, Pierre Cosido, Ignacio Denofsky, Barry De Robertis, AntonGiulio Eran, Oded lonescu, Paul Jones, Bruce Karmon, Ely Kendry, Adrian Lenoir, John Linde, Julius Lindley-French, Julian Lojdquist, Fredrik Navarrete Paniagua, Manuel Rosner, Kevin Swallow, Paul Witschel, Georg

127 113 13 119 121 17 71 88 1 29 32,99 71 47 95 85 80 49 74 7