Irina Georgescu Fuzzy Choice Functions
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Irina Georgescu
Fuzzy Choice Functions A Revealed Preference Approach
ABC
Dr. Irina Georgescu P.O. Box 1-432 014700 Bucharest, Romania E-mail:
[email protected]
Library of Congress Control Number: 2006939263
ISSN print edition: 1434-9922 ISSN electronic edition: 1860-0808 ISBN-10 3-540-68997-4 Springer Berlin Heidelberg New York ISBN-13 978-3-540-68997-3 Springer Berlin Heidelberg New York This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilm or in any other way, and storage in data banks. Duplication of this publication or parts thereof is permitted only under the provisions of the German Copyright Law of September 9, 1965, in its current version, and permission for use must always be obtained from Springer. Violations are liable for prosecution under the German Copyright Law. Springer is a part of Springer Science+Business Media springer.com c Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007 The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. Typesetting: by the author and techbooks using a Springer LATEX macro package Cover design: Erich Kirchner, Heidelberg Printed on acid-free paper
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Acknowledgement
This book started as a PhD thesis: “Rational Choice and Revealed Preference: A Fuzzy Approach”. I want to thank my supervisor Professor Christer Carlsson from Turku Centre for Computer Science, Institute for Advanced Management Systems Research, Abo Akademi University, Turku, Finland for his guidance and support that he has given me during four years of PhD studies, 2001-2005. He has shown a large and consistent interest in my research and our discussions have been valuable and constructive. I would like to especially thank Professor Hannu Nurmi from Turku University for advice on the material in the book, for useful comments and criticism and for being a guide in all stages of writing it. He indicated the general line of the book, provided me with reference materials and corrected with patience several inconsistencies of the manuscript. This book would not have been written without his initiative. I am very grateful to Professor Janusz Kacprzyk from the Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw for suggestions on extending the approach in the book and for recommending new reference materials. In addition, I acknowledge the effort and support of my colleague Xuemei Qiu from Turku Centre for Computer Science in the application part of the book.
VI
Acknowledgement
I am indebted to the staff of Springer-Verlag, who guided me through the printing stages and provided valuable advice.
Bucharest, November 2006
Contents
1
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1
2
Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
9
2.1 Choice Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
9
2.2 Revealed Preference from Consumers to Choice Functions . . . . 14 3
Classical Revealed Preference Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 3.1 Binary Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 3.2 Crisp Choice Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 3.3 Revealed Preference and Congruence Axioms. Consistency Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4
Fuzzy Preference Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 4.1 Fuzzy Sets and Fuzzy Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 4.2 Continuous T-norms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 4.3 Operations with Fuzzy Sets and Fuzzy Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 4.4 Properties and Indicators of Fuzzy Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 4.5 An Extension Theorem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
5
Fuzzy Choice Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 5.1 From Fuzzy Preferences to Exact Choices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 5.2 Fuzzy Choice Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
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Contents
5.3 Rational and Normal Fuzzy Choice Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 6
Fuzzy Revealed Preference and Consistency Conditions . . . . 107 6.1 A Fuzzy Approach to the Arrow–Sen Theorem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 6.2 Conditions F α and F β . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119 6.3 Quasi-transitivity and Condition F δ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127 6.4 Other Consistency Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131 6.5 The Fuzzy Arrow Axiom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
7
General Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145 7.1 The Hierarchy of Axioms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147 7.2 A Particular Class of Fuzzy Choice Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154 7.3 A Fuzzy Analysis of the Richter Theorem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
8
Degree of Dominance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169 8.1 Dominance in Banerjee’s Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171 8.2 Degree of Dominance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173 8.3 New Congruence Axioms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
9
Similarity and Rationality Indicators for Fuzzy Choice Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189 9.1 Similarity of Fuzzy Choice Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191 9.2 Rationality Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200 9.3 Revealed Preference and Congruence Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211 9.4 The Arrow Index of a Fuzzy Choice Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220 9.5 Consistency Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
10 Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233 10.1 Fuzzy Choices Support for Agent–based Automated Negotiations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234 10.1.1 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235 10.1.2 Fuzzy Choices in Automated Negotiations . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
Contents
IX
10.1.3 Numerical Illustration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240 10.1.4 Van de Walle et al.’s Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242 10.2 Reducing Adverse Selection by Fuzzy Choices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245 10.2.1 The Harmfulness of Adverse Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246 10.2.2 Conventional Solutions for Reducing the Effects of Adverse Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247 10.2.3 A Multiple Criteria Decision Making Model . . . . . . . . . . . 248 10.2.4 Numerical Illustration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251 10.2.5 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255 10.2.6 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256 10.3 Application 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257 11 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271 Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279
1 Introduction
A main topic in welfare economics is the rational behaviour of a consumer when, faced with various prices and incomes, he has to make a choice. The theory of consumption establishes the framework in which the rationality of consumers is defined and the principle on which it is based. By [109], “the rationality of a consumer may be described by postulating that a consumer has a definite preference over all conceivable commodity bundles and that he chooses those commodity bundles that are optimal with respect to his preference subject to budgetary constraints”. Samuelson’s theory of revealed preference expresses the rationality of a consumer in terms of some preference relation associated with a demand function. The foundation of this theory is built on The Weak Axiom of Consumer Behavior [87] and on The Strong Axiom of Consumer Behavior [63]. The second axiom assures that the demand function can be reconstructed from a revealed preference relation. To make a rational choice is a more general problem that goes beyond the theme of consumer. In economics, social life, medicine, psychology, etc. there are several cases when an agent has to make rational decisions. For instance, when the members of a society vote different candidates in an election, a plausible hypothesis is that, having a desideratum, each of them is rational in the act of choice.
Irina Georgescu: Fuzzy Choice Functions, StudFuzz 214, 1–8 (2007) www.springerlink.com
c Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007
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1 Introduction
For this reason, even if the revealed preference theory appeared in the context of consumers, its concepts and results are true in a larger context offered by the theory of choice functions. Following a suggestion of Georgescu–Roegen [57], Uzawa [108] and Arrow [8] have developed a revealed preference theory in an abstract context, with no economic interpretation. The work of Uzawa and Arrow was continued by Sen with his fundamental results concentrated in [91], [92], [93] (see also [94]). In this approach there is no demand function and the basic elements are an arbitrary set X of alternatives and a choice function C defined on a family B of available sets of alternatives (B ⊆ P(X)). By the rationality of C we mean to find a preference relation Q on X such that for any available S the choice set C(S) coincides with the set of Q-greatest elements of S. To a choice function C there are associated more preference relations, each of them leading to a different notion of rationality. In [8] The Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference W ARP and The Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference SARP are formulated. W ARP and SARP are abstract versions of The Weak Axiom of Consumer Behavior and of The Strong Axiom of Consumer Behavior. The results obtained by Uzawa, Arrow, Sen and others are based on the hypothesis that the domain of the choice function C should contain all finite subsets of the universe X; in fact it suffices to assume that the domain of C contains the pairs and the triples of alternatives. An important contribution to the development of choice function theory belongs to Richter [84] by introducing The Weak Congruence Axiom W CA and The Strong Congruence Axiom SCA and by proving the equivalence between rational and congruous choice functions. For the choice functions whose domain includes the finite sets of alternatives, Arrow–Sen theorem [8], [91] establishes the equivalence between the congruence axioms W CA, SCA, the revealed preference axioms W ARP , SARP and other four conditions of rationality. Richter’s result does not use the above–mentioned hypothesis.
1 Introduction
3
Richter’s line was followed by Hansson [61] and Suzumura [100] that created a revealed preference theory for arbitrary choice functions. They introduced a new axiom of revealed preference HARP and the equivalence of SCA and HARP was established. The classic theory of revealed preference is founded on two main concepts: the preference relations and the choice functions. The axioms and the main results of the theory express various connections between preferences and choices. On the other hand, in social and economic life there exist complex processes subject to several parameters in which the preferences and the choices of the individuals and groups of individuals can manifest indecisively, without answers of type “yes or no”. In this case we deal with vague preferences and vague choices. The vague preferences will be modelled by fuzzy preference relations: they show the degree to which an alternative x is preferred to an alternative y. A vague preference can lead to an exact choice (from a set S of alternatives a non–empty subset is selected) or to a vague choice (the degree to which an alternative x is chosen from S is specified). The first contribution on fuzzy preference relations belongs to Orlovsky [79] and a vast literature has been dedicated to this subject (for an exhaustive overview see the monograph [40] as well as [86], [69]). Some authors build their results on the thesis that social choice is governed by fuzzy preferences (hence modelled through fuzzy binary relations) but the act of choice is exact (hence choice functions are crisp). They study choice functions generated by fuzzy preference relations [15], [16], [17]. An important direction is the study of the fuzzy preference structures, concept that allows for an axiomatic approach to the fuzzy preference relations (see [32], [33], [34], [35]). Some papers discuss the topic of fuzzy choice functions. Usually fuzzy choice functions are associated with fuzzy preference relations [104], [86] [69]. In this case the fuzzy choices are the consequence of the fuzzy preferences.
4
1 Introduction
In [14] Banerjee studies fuzzy choice functions that are no longer defined by a fuzzy preference relation. In this way the act of choice is primordial and the preferences are defined by choices. The domain of a Banerjee fuzzy choice function C is the family of all non-empty subsets of a universal set X of alternatives and the range of C is a family of non-zero fuzzy subsets of X. Then any non-empty subset S of X is an available set of alternatives. We have no information about the alternatives in S except that they can be chosen. This book has the following goals: • to develop the main themes of revealed preference theory (rationality, revealed preference, congruence, consistency) for a large class of fuzzy choice functions; • to explore new topics (degree of dominance, similarity, indicators of rationality) specific to a fuzzy approach to choice functions; • to show the manner in which some problems of multicriterial decision making problems can find natural solutions in fuzzy revealed preference theory (Chapter 10). This book targets the study of fuzzy choice functions in a very general form. In our approach the domain of a choice function will be a family B of non-zero fuzzy subsets of X; if S ∈ B and x ∈ X then S(x) can be viewed as the availability degree of the alternative x. In this way the alternatives are singled out by their degree of availability. As in [14], the range of a fuzzy choice function contains fuzzy subsets of X. Of course the class of fuzzy choice functions we consider includes that of Banerjee. Banerjee fuzzifies only the range of a choice function; in order to obtain a more general context we use a fuzzification of both the domain and the range of a choice function. In Chapter 2 some choice problems are discussed and an overview of revealed preference theory from consumers ([87], [88], [63], [111]) to an axiomatic approach ([8], [84], [85], [91], [92], [93], [100], [101], [102], [108], [109], etc.) is traced.
1 Introduction
5
Chapter 3 refers to notions and classic results of revealed preference theory (crisp choice functions, G–rationality, M –rationality, revealed preference and congruence axioms, consistency conditions etc.). Chapter 4 discusses continuous t–norms, fuzzy sets and fuzzy relations and their properties. In the last part of the chapter a fuzzy version of the Szpilrajn theorem is proved. Chapter 5 has three sections. The first section deals with exact choice functions generated by fuzzy preference relations. Some properties of the Orlovsky function [79] are presented in detail. The second section introduces the fuzzy choice functions, the preference relations associated with them and formulates the axioms of revealed preference W AF RP , SAF RP and congruence W F CA, SF CA. W AF RP and SAF RP (respectively W F CA and SF CA) are fuzzy versions of the classical axioms W ARP and SARP (respectively W CA and SCA). Following [61], [100] we also consider the axioms W AF RP ◦ and HAF RP (a fuzzy version of HARP ). The fuzzy versions of classical axioms establish relationships between the fuzzy choice functions and various preference relations associated with them. These relationships reflect the way in which the fuzzy choices determine vague preferences and how in their turn these preference relations influence the act of choice. The third section of the chapter deals with M -rational, G-rational, M -normal and G-normal fuzzy choice functions, extending some results obtained by Suzumura in [100] for crisp choice functions. Chapter 6 is devoted to a fuzzy revealed preference theory following the line introduced by Uzawa, Arrow and Sen. The class of fuzzy choice functions studied in this chapter is subject to hypotheses (H1) and (H2); they come naturally from the assumption that the domain of choice functions includes all finite sets of alternatives. In Section 6.1 we study the relations between the axioms W AF RP , SAF RP , W F CA, SF CA and four other rationality conditions. The main result (Theorem 6.7) establishes equivalences or implications between these properties; some are true for an arbitrary continuous t-norm
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1 Introduction
and other for the G¨ odel or the Lukasiewicz t-norms. Section 6.2 is concerned with consistency conditions F α and F β, which are fuzzy forms of Sen’s properties α and β [91], [92], [93]. We prove that a fuzzy choice function satisfies F α and F β if and only if W F CA holds. Section 6.3 deals with condition F δ, a fuzzy form of Sen’s condition δ. The main result (Theorem 6.23) asserts that for a G–normal fuzzy choice function, the fuzzy preference relation R is quasi-transitive if and only if F δ holds. Other consistency conditions (F α2, F γ2, F β(+), path independence) are discussed in Section 6.4. The last section of the chapter introduces the Fuzzy Arrow Axiom F AA and establishes the equivalence between F AA and the full rationality of fuzzy choice functions. Chapter 7 studies the revealed preference properties for arbitrary fuzzy choice functions ignoring the hypotheses (H1) and (H2). The investigation follows the trend of the Richter–Hansson–Suzumura theory [84], [61], [100]. In Section 7.1 we prove two main theorems: (1) the axioms W F CA and W AF RP ◦ are equivalent; (2) the axioms SF CA and HAF RP are equivalent. Section 7.2 is devoted to the analysis of a particular class of fuzzy choice functions for which the equivalence between W AF RP ◦ , G–normality, M –normality and two other algebraic conditions holds. The last section of the chapter investigates how the Richter theorem can be extended to a fuzzy choice function theory. In Chapter 8 a notion of degree of dominance of an alternative with respect to a fuzzy subset is introduced, extending Banerjee’s notion of dominance. In the literature several notions of dominance have been studied, but with respect to a fuzzy preference relation [69]. The degree of dominance proposed here refers to the act of choice, and not to a preference relation. In Section 8.1 we mention briefly the setting in which Banerjee formulated his concept of dominance. In Section 8.2 a concept of dominance for the type of fuzzy choice functions studied in this book is introduced. We prove that the degree of dominance of an alternative x ∈ X with respect to a fuzzy set can be expressed by means of a degree of dominance of an alternative with respect to fuzzy
1 Introduction
7
subsets of type [x, y], y ∈ X. In Section 8.3, new congruence axioms F C ∗ 1, F C ∗ 2, F C ∗ 3 are formulated based on the degree of dominance introduced in the previous section and we prove that F C ∗ 1 implies F C ∗ 3 and F C ∗ 2 implies F C ∗ 3, generalizing the results of Banerjee [14] and Wang [112]. We introduce a new revealed preference axiom W AF RPD and we prove the equivalence W AF RPD ⇔ F C ∗ 3. Chapter 9 treats new concepts: similarity and various indicators of rationality for fuzzy choice functions. The similarity of fuzzy choice functions expresses the degree to which two acts of fuzzy choice are “similar”. The results of Section 9.1 establish the relationship between the similarity of fuzzy choice functions and the similarity of the fuzzy preference relations associated with them. In Section 9.2 two indicators of rationality RatG (C), RatM (C) and two indicators of normality N ormG (C), N ormM (C) are studied. The revealed preference and congruence indicators W AF RP (C), SAF RP (C), W F CA(C) and SF CA(C) are the topic of Section 9.3. They evaluate the degree to which the choice function C verifies the axioms W AF RP , SAF RP , W F CA, respectively SF CA. The last two sections of Section 8 are dedicated to the study of the Arrow index A(C) and to the consistency indicators F α(C), F β(C). Each of these indicators measures the degree to which a choice function verifies a condition of rationality or consistency. Chapter 10 is devoted to the possible applications of fuzzy choice functions and the fuzzy revealed preferences associated with them. Three distinct applications are discussed, showing the importance of the notions introduced in the previous chapters for decision making processes, by ranking the alternatives according to multiple criteria. The applications try to model economic situations in which partial information or human subjectivity generate vague choices and vague preferences. The mathematical modelling of these situations is done by fuzzy choices examples where criteria are represented by available fuzzy sets of alternatives. For each case one builds a fuzzy choice space, determines the fuzzy choice function and computes the degree of dominance of
8
1 Introduction
alternatives for each fuzzy subset of the universe of alternatives. This leads to a ranking of alternatives with respect to each criterion. The decision-maker will rely on the information obtained in such way.
2 Preliminaries
This chapter consists of two sections. The first section contains some examples of choice problems (consumption theory, voting theory etc.). In the second section some fundamental ideas of the revealed preference theory and some moments in its development are presented.
2.1 Choice Problems In economic and social life, individuals or groups of individuals face several alternatives from which they have to choose one or more. A set X of alternatives is structured by several criteria or attributes according to whom the choice is made. When the choice is related to a criterion (attribute) S one does not consider the whole set of alternatives, but only those alternatives that are compatible with S. Therefore a criterion (attribute) S induces an available set of X (denoted also by S) consisting of the alternatives compatible with S. From the available set S one chooses one or more elements: the set C(S) containing the chosen elements will be called the choice set. C(S) will always be a non–empty set of S. If an alternative x belongs to S then we say that x can be chosen with respect to S; if x belongs to C(S) then we say that x is chosen with respect to S. In interpretation, the elements of C(S) represent “the best options” with respect to criterion S.
Irina Georgescu: Fuzzy Choice Functions, StudFuzz 214, 9–23 (2007) www.springerlink.com
c Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007
10
2 Preliminaries
Then the act of choice is represented by a rule that associates with an available set of alternatives one of its non–empty subsets. The case when the choice set C(S) consists of several alternatives corresponds to the situation when the decision–maker is indifferent between several “best” alternatives. According to [109], p. 31, the choice can be seen as an act in two stages: “However, since a single selection will often have to be made from the alternatives in S, we may consider that the selection is to be made in two stages: First the set C(S) is selected from S, and second, an element is selected from C(S) by some random device. Thus, the concept of a choice on a budget space may be considered, in this context, to formalize the first stage, the deterministic part, of choice theory”. Some authors admit the possibility that the choice set C(S) is empty for some S ([85] p. 31): “For some purposes one might want to allow C(S) to be empty. For example, if the problem is choosing how big a piece of cake to eat, when any length less than a foot is possible, then there may well be a superior choice for any length picked”. In such cases, the admissible sets S for which C(S) is non–empty are called decisive. In the following we shall present some examples of choice problems: Example 2.1. Consumer theory In consumer theory there is the question of choosing the commodity bundles according to prices and incomes. For a better understanding of the basic concepts of the consumer theory, we shall consider an economy with one consumer and n commodities (see e. g. [73]). A commodity bundle is a vector x = (x1 , . . . , xn ) where each component xi is a non–negative real number that represents the quantity of commodity i that will be consumed. By the way of defining it, a commodity bundle can be assimilated with a point from the n–dimensional space Rn +. We can consider the space of commodity bundles X = Rn + . Therefore X is the set of commodity bundles from which the consumer has to make a choice.
2.1 Choice Problems
11
A price vector has the form p = (p1 , . . . , pn ) where the component pi ≥ 0 denotes the price of commodity i (i = 1, . . . , n). Given an income m > 0, a n commodity bundle x must verify the budget restriction px = i=1 pi xi ≤ m, i. e. the value of commodities x1 , . . . , xn evaluated at the prices p1 , . . . , pn should be less or equal than m. The inequality px ≤ m is a budget restriction that the consumer has to take into consideration when choosing an alternative x. Then a price vector p and an income m determine the following available set of alternatives: B(p, m) = {x ∈ Rn + |px ≤ m}. A subset of X having the form B(p, m) is called a budget set. By modifying the price vector p and the income m one obtains another available set. Let us denote by B the family of all budget sets. Following [109] a demand function is a function C that verifies the following conditions: (D1) The vector x = C(p, m) is a commodity bundle in X defined for any price vector p and any positive income m; (D2) Any positive commodity bundle x is chosen for a suitable p and a suitable income m, i. e. x = C(p, m); (D3) The commodity bundle x = C(p, m) verifies the budget equation pC(p, m) = m for all p > 0 and m > 0. Condition D1 says that the domain of C consists of all pairs (p, m) where p is a price vector, and m is a positive income. In fact, by identifying the pair (p, m) with the budget set B(p, m), one can say that the domain of C is the family B of all budget sets. Then C can be viewed as the function C : B → X. Condition D2 shows that for any positive x there exists B(p, m) ∈ B, such that x = C(B(p, m)), i.e. any positive commodity bundle is in the range of C. The real number C(p, m) is the only alternative chosen from the available set B(p, m) and by (D3), it verifies the budget equation px = m. Sometimes the demand function C must verify the Lipschitz condition with respect to m (see [109], p. 11).
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2 Preliminaries
Example 2.2. A voting problem Social choice theory studies the way the individual preferences become decision problems at the level of society. Suppose we have a society composed of the individuals 1, 2, . . . , n whose preferences regard a set X of social states. The preferences of the i-th individual are expressed by a preference relation Qi defined on the set of the states. If x, y ∈ X then xQi y shows that the individual i considers the state x at least as good as the state y. A profile has the form (Q1 , . . . , Qn ), where Q1 , . . . , Qn are the preference relations corresponding to the individuals 1, . . . , n. P rof (X) is the set of profiles on X. There are several approaches to the way the social decision can be generated by a profile (Q1 , . . . , Qn ). We shall mention two of these approaches. (I) ([9], [94], [74]) The individual preference relations Q1 , . . . Qn are aggregated in a collective preference relation by which the social decision is made. To each profile (Q1 , . . . Qn ) one associates a preference relation f (Q1 , . . . , Qn ). The assignment (Q1 , Qn ) → f (Q1 , . . . Qn ) determines a function f defined on the set of profiles mapped on to the set of preference relations on X. f is called social welfare function. Usually the assumption is that both the individual preference relations Q1 , . . . , Qn and the collective preference relation f (Q1 , . . . , Qn ) have the same properties. In [9], Q1 , . . . , Qn and f (Q1 , . . . , Qn ) are assumed to verify the properties of completeness and transitivity. (II) The social decision based on the individual preference relations Q1 , . . . , Qn is expressed by a function that assigns to any non–empty subset of social states S ⊆ X a non–empty subset of S, F (S, Q1 , . . . , Qn ). This mechanism is expressed by a function (called social choice function) F : (P(X) \ {∅}) × P rof (X) → P(X) defined by the mapping (S, Q1 , . . . , Qn ) → F (S, Q1 , . . . , Qn ). For any set S of social states, F (S, Q1 , . . . , Qn ) will represent “the best” alternatives of the society chosen from S based on the individual preferences Q1 , . . . , Qn .
2.1 Choice Problems
13
Example 2.3. Let us consider the graph from Figure 2.1:
b
e
2
5
2
1 c
6
a
2
f
1 h
1 1
7 d
1
g
Fig. 2.1. An optimization problem
On each edge of the graph a non–negative real number is written down. The length of an edge can have different meanings: a distance, a time interval between two events, a cost, etc. From a node x to a node y one or more routes can be traversed (in case they exist); the length of a route is the length of the edges that compose it. The issue here is how to choose the routes of maximum length between any pair of distinct nodes. For any edge (x, y) of the graph let us denote by Sxy the set of the routes between x and y, and by C(Sxy ) the set of routes of maximum length between x and y. For example, between the nodes c and h we have the following routes: (c, e, h) of length 3; (c, d, f, h) of length 4; (c, d, g, h) of length 4.
14
2 Preliminaries
Then, from the set of alternatives: Sch = {(c, e, h), (c, d, f, h), (c, d, g, h)} the subset C(Sch ) = {(c, d, f, h), (c, d, g, h)} will be chosen. We deal with a choice problem. The non–empty subsets Sxy will form the family B of available sets of alternatives, and C(Sxy ) will be the choice set of Sxy . The universe X of all alternatives will be the union of all non–empty sets Sxy . More explicitly, let us suppose that the nodes represent towns and the lengths of the edges represent distances between towns. Then Sxy is the set of the routes from x to y, and C(Sxy ) consists of the routes of maximum length from x to y.
2.2 Revealed Preference from Consumers to Choice Functions One of the dominant paradigms of social choice is the revealed preference theory. The classical economic theory has as a basic assumption the rationality of the consumer behaviour, as an optimizing behavior subject to some budgetary constraints. Revealed preference is a concept introduced by Samuelson in 1938, in the attempt to postulate the rationality of a consumer’s behaviour in terms of a preference relation associated with a demand function. The observable variables regarding the behaviour of a consumer are prices, quantities purchased and income, while the unobservable variables are his preferences. In revealed preference theory first choices are given, then preferences are defined by choices. The consumer reveals by choices his/her preferences, hence the term revealed preferences [88]: “By comparing the costs of different combinations of goods at different relative price situations, we can infer whether a given batch of goods is preferred to another batch; the individual guinea-pig, by his market behaviour, reveals his preference pattern - if there is such a consistent pattern”.
2.2 Revealed Preference from Consumers to Choice Functions
15
Unlike the results of his predecessors Marshall and Hicks, who proposed a parametric analysis of the demand functions, Samuelson’s theory of revealed preference was meant to construct a theory of demand functions based only on observable variables. Samuelson’s non-parametric approach of the theory of demand functions was less subject to errors than the Hicksian and Marshallian parametric approaches to the same theory. The paradigm of revealed preference theory is emphasized by Suzumura [103]: “If the choice behaviour of an agent is guided systematically by some underlying preferences, that fact will infallibly reveal itself in his actual choices, so that by observing his choices under alternative specifications of environmental conditions, we may possibly reconstruct his underlying preferences. This was indeed the original insight of Samuelson that propelled him to open the door to the splendid edifice of revealed preference theory for a competitive consumer”. In the previous section, Example 1, we have formulated a problem of choosing the commodity bundles taking into consideration the prices and the income. Let X = Rn + be the set of alternatives, B the family of the budget sets and C : B → X a demand function. Suppose p1 , p2 are price vectors and m1 , m2 are incomes. Let x1 , x2 be two distinct commodity bundles. We say that x1 is revealed preferred to x2 (in the sense of Samuelson) if there exist two budget sets B(p1 , m1 ) and B(p2 , m2 ) such that x1 = C(p1 , m1 ), x2 = C(p2 , m2 ) and p1 x1 ≥ p1 x2 . In other terms, x1 is revealed preferred to x2 if x1 is chosen when x2 is available. We can explain this definition by the fact that if p1 x1 ≥ p1 x2 , then the consumer can buy the commodity bundle x2 at the price p1 , but he has chosen the commodity bundle x1 instead.
16
2 Preliminaries
The notion of revealed preference introduces a binary relation R on the set X of the alternatives. (1) x1 R x2 iff x1 is revealed preferred to x2 . Also, R can be extended to a binary relation R: (2) x1 Rx2 iff x1 = x2 or x1 R x2 . Let us notice that R is irreflexive ( not xR x for all x ∈ X), while R is reflexive ( xRx for all x ∈ X ). Let x, y be two commodity bundles. We say that x is indirectly revealed preferred to y if there exist the commodity bundles x1 , x2 , . . . , xs such that xR x1 , x1 R x2 , . . . , xs R y. ˆ y. Then R ˆ is a transitive binary relation In this case we shall denote xR ˆ y, y R ˆ z implies xR ˆ z for all x, y, z ∈ X. on X, i. e. xR Proposition 2.4. For the commodity bundles x1 , x2 the following are equivalent: (1) x1 is revealed preferred to x2 (i. e. x1 R x2 ); (2) There exists an available set S ∈ B such that x1 = C(S) and x2 ∈ S\{x1 }. Proof. The following assertions are equivalent: (a) x1 is revealed preferred to x2 ; (b) x1 = x2 and there exist B(p1 , m1 ), B(p2 , m2 ) ∈ B such that x1 = C(p1 , m1 ), x2 = C(p2 , m2 ) and p1 x1 ≥ p1 x2 ; (c) x1 = x2 and there exists B(p1 , m1 ) ∈ B such that x1 = C(p1 , m1 ) and p1 x1 ≥ p1 x2 ; (d) x1 = x2 and there exists B(p1 , m1 ) ∈ B such that x1 = C(p1 , m1 ) and p1 x1 ≥ m1 ; (e) there exists B(p1 , m1 ) ∈ B such that x1 = C(p1 , m1 ) and x2 ∈ B(p1 , m1 )\ {x1 }.
2.2 Revealed Preference from Consumers to Choice Functions
17
Proposition 2.5. For the commodity bundles x1 , x2 the following are equivalent: (1) x1 Rx2 ; (2) There exists S ∈ B such that x1 = C(S) and x2 ∈ S. Proof. By Proposition 2.4, the following equivalences hold: (a) x1 Rx2 ; (b) x1 = x2 or x1 R x2 ; (c) x1 = x2 or there is S ∈ B such that x1 = C(S) and x2 ∈ S \ {x1 }; (d) there is S ∈ B such that x1 = C(S) and [x1 = x2 or x2 ∈ S \ {x1 }]; (e) there is S ∈ B such that x1 = C(S) and x2 ∈ S.
The notion of revealed preference is tightly connected with the rational behaviour of a consumer, that means to reach an optimum with respect to a preference relation. Assume that p is a price vector and m an income. Following [109], a commodity bundle x0 is called optimum with respect to a preference relation Q in a budget set B(p, m) if x0 ∈ B(p, m) and x0 Rx for any commodity bundle x ∈ B(p, m). A demand function C is derived from a preference relation Q on X if for any price vector p and for any positive income m the commodity bundle C(p, m) is optimum with respect to Q in the budget set B(p, m). Samuelson’s theory of revealed preference offers a way of defining the raˆ tional behaviour of a consumer. The preference relations R (or R ) and R defined above reflect the preferences of a consumer that result from the demand function C. Beside them, some conditions on these preference relations are needed, that should express a rational behaviour. The first condition of this type was introduced by Samuelson [87]. Weak Axiom of Consumer Behaviour W ACB For any distinct commodity bundles x1 , x2 , if x1 is revealed preferred to x2 , then x2 is not revealed preferred to x1 .
18
2 Preliminaries
W ACB says that if x1 = C(p1 , m1 ) and x2 = C(p2 , m2 ) are distinct, then (3) p1 x2 ≤ p1 x1 ⇒ p2 x1 > p2 x2 . In terms of the preference relation R defined above, the axiom W ACB is briefly written: If x1 R x2 then not x2 R x1 . One notices that we have the equivalences not x2 Rx1 iff x = y and not x2 R x1 . Then we can express W ACB in the equivalent form (4) If x1 R x2 then not x2 Rx1 . W ACB is a rationality condition from which several properties of the demand functions are deduced (see [89], p. 107–117). At the same time, it does not ensure that the demand function C is derived from the preference of a consumer. Houthakker [63] formulated a stronger form, called the Strong Axiom of Consumer Behaviour, managing to extend Samuelson’s results for an arbitrary number of commodity bundles. In terms of commodity and prices, this condition can be formulated: Strong Axiom of Consumer Behaviour (SACB) If p0 x0 ≥ p0 x1 , p1 x1 ≥ p1 x2 , . . . , pn−1 xn−1 ≥ pn−1 xn then pn x0 > pn xn . By using the notion of revealed preference, SACB can be expressed like this: If commodity bundle x0 is revealed preferred to commodity bundle x1 , commodity bundle x1 is revealed preferred to commodity bundle x2 , . . . , commodity bundle xn−1 is revealed preferred to commodity bundle xn , then xn is not revealed preferred to x0 , i.e. x0 R x1 , x1 R x2 , . . . , xn−1 R xn ⇒ not xn Rx0 (for x0 = xn ). An equivalent form of SACB is: For all distinct commodity bundles x, y the following implication holds: ˆ y ⇒ not yRx. (5) xR
2.2 Revealed Preference from Consumers to Choice Functions
19
Houthakker [63] proved that any demand function C that verifies the Lipschitz condition is derived from the preference relation R. Then for any price vector p and positive income m, the commodity bundle C(p, m) is optimum with respect to R in the budget set B(p, m). This way the rationality of C is ensured by reaching the optimum for the preference relation R associated with C. It is obvious that SACB implies W ACB. In the presence of the Lipschitz condition, W ACB does not imply SACB [109]. In [109] there are given conditions under which a demand function that verifies W ACB verifies SACB. From the above discussion, one notices that there exist elements that can be extracted from the consumer theory and put in an abstract context. Instead of commodity bundles one can consider an arbitrary set of alternatives and the budget sets can be replaced by an arbitrary family B of available sets. A demand function will correspond in the abstract context to a demand function C : B → X. If S ∈ B then C(S) will be the alternative chosen from S. Following the examples of choice problem from the previous section, we need to enlarge the concept of choice function. We can admit now that we can select a non–empty subset of S. Accordingly, an act of choice will be represented by a choice function C : B → P(X). Once defined this choice problem, we can naturally formulate the revealed preference theory and the notion of rationality in a context more general than the consumer theory. For this it is necessary to establish a criterion of optimality with respect to a preference relation Q on the set X of alternatives. Such criterion will ensure that the act of choice is rational with respect to the preference relation Q. There exist two ways of defining the optimality with respect to Q: the choice of the Q–greatest alternatives and the choice of the Q–maximal alternatives. The first one is the generalization of the condition of optimum for a commodity bundle in a budget set.
20
2 Preliminaries
The notion of rationality does not impose any kind of condition on preference relation. At this level of generality, we cannot say much about the rationality. In real situations ( consumer theory, voting theory, etc. ), the preferences should possess some properties: reflexivity, transitivity, etc. Propositions 2.4 and 2.5 indicate how the revealed preference relations ˆ can be defined for the case of an arbitrary choice function C R, R and R too. From (4) and (5) we notice how the axioms W ACB and SACB can be formulated for a choice function C. The Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (W ARP ) corresponds to W ACB, and The Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference (SARP ) corresponds to SACB. With respect to the domain of the choice function, the axiomatic theory of revealed preference followed two main routes: The first direction was inaugurated by Uzawa [108], [109] and Arrow [8]. Their axiomatic approach started from the assumption that the domain of the choice function contains all finite subsets of a universal set of alternatives [8]: “It is the suggestion [...] that the demand-function point of view would be greatly simplified if the range over which the choice functions are considered to be determined is broadened to include all finite sets. Indeed, as Georgescu– Roegen has remarked, the intuitive justification of such assumptions as the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference has no relation to the special form of the budget constraint sets but is based rather on implicit consideration of two–element sets”. This direction was continued by Sen [91], [92], [94] and many others ([10] etc.) A remarkable result is Arrow–Sen theorem [8], [91] that establishes the equivalence between the full rationality of a choice function, the revealed preference axioms W ARP , SARP , the congruence axioms W CA, SCA (see [84]) and other conditions. In fact, as Sen noticed [91], the proofs of these results assume that the domain of the choice function includes all pairs and triples of alternatives. The presence of the pairs of alternatives in the domain of the choice function makes it possible the definition of a new preference relation
2.2 Revealed Preference from Consumers to Choice Functions
21
¯ which equals R under special circumstances on X (called “base relation”)R, and which represents an efficient instrument for proving the equivalence of different axioms. The second direction belongs to Richter [84], [85], Hansson [61] and Suzumura [100], [103]. They consider choice functions defined on arbitrary families of sets of alternatives. Suzumura maintains ([103], p. 27) that under the assumption that the domain of the choice functions is a non-empty collection of non–empty subsets of a universe of alternatives X, “the theory of rational choice functions developed on this minimal domain condition applies to whatever choice situations we may care to specify: Choice of consumers in a competitive or noncompetitive market, of government bureaucracies, of voters, and of whatsoever”. Significant results can be proved in this general framework too. For example, a theorem belonging to Richter [84] establishes the equivalence between the property of full rationality and the congruence axiom SCA. Also the axioms W ARP and SCA are equivalent. Axioms SARP and SCA are not equivalent in this case. Hansson [61] introduced another axiom of revealed preference HARP that, according to [100] is equivalent to SCA. HARP is formulated in terms of C–connected sequences of available sets ([61], [100]). In the approach of several authors, the preference relations verify the transitivity property. On the other hand, it was noticed that in some cases this condition is too strong. Such example is called the “threshold effect” remarked by Georgescu–Roegen [56]. An individual is indifferent towards two temperatures that are one degree apart, but is not indifferent towards two temperatures that are several degrees apart. It follows that in this case transitivity does not hold. The “threshold effect” illustrates the intransitivity of the indifference relation. The following example belonging to Luce [72] is very suggestive for the intransitivity of the indifference relation:
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2 Preliminaries
“A person may be indifferent between 100 and 101 grains of sugar in his coffee, indifferent between 101 and 102, . . ., and indifferent between 4999 and 5000. If indifference were transitive he would be indifferent between 101 and 5000 grains, and this is probably false”. We notice that the transitivity of the strict preference relation does not imply the transitivity of the preference relation. Therefore the transitivity has been replaced by weaker conditions (quasi–transitivity, semi–transitivity, pseudo–transitivity, etc.) imposed on a preference relation. Theorems of rationality of fuzzy choice functions with respect to preference relations that verify such conditions have been given by several authors [66], [11], [12], [13], etc. Besides the rationality of a choice function, another issue is to study how the act of choice behaves with respect to the modifications of the admissible sets. These are the consistency conditions that establish how the choices are influenced by the expansion or the contraction of an available set, and by different set–theoretical operations (union, intersection, etc.). We notice that the terms of “expansion” and “contraction” regard the inclusion of the available sets. We shall focus mainly on the consistency conditions α, β, γ and δ of Sen [91], [92], [93]. Consistency condition α known also under the name of Chernoff property [27] is a typical condition of contraction consistency. It says that for a subset S1 of S2 , if an alternative is best in S2 then it is best in S1 . In [92], consistency condition α is illustrated by the following example: “if the world champion in some game is a Pakistani, then he must also be the champion in Pakistan”. Consistency condition β says if alternatives x and y are best in S1 and S1 ⊆ S2 then x must be best in C(S2 ), if y is. By [92], this condition states that “if some Pakistani is a world champion, then all champions of Pakistan must be champions of the world”. Then we have a case of expansion–consistency.
2.2 Revealed Preference from Consumers to Choice Functions
23
Condition γ expresses the idea that if alternative x is best in every member of a family of available sets, then x will be best in the union of these sets. We remark here not only the expansion–consistency, but also the behavior of the choices with respect of the union of available sets. In [8], Arrow stated that for social choice theory, the rationality conditions must be independent from the path of choice. The mathematical formulation of the path independence condition (P I) was given by Plott in [82]. Plott starts from the idea that if we look at the act of choice from a dynamic point of view, then we have a procedure of the type “divide and conquer” (see [82], p. 1079). An available set splits into subsets of alternatives and the choice is made with respect to each of these smaller available sets; we put together the chosen alternatives and then we make a new choice from this union. According to path independence, the final result is independent from the way in which the initial available set has been decomposed in available subsets. Plott proved [82] that the transitive rationality of the choice implies the path independence, but the converse implication does not hold. If the choice sets always have just one element, then the path independence is equivalent to the complete and transitive rationality. T. Bandyopadhyay [10] introduced a notion of sequential path independence equivalent to transitive rationality.
3 Classical Revealed Preference Theory
In the previous chapter we sketched out some historical moments of the revealed preference theory from its analytical form in consumption theory to the axiomatic treatment in the abstract context of the choice functions. We also discussed some of the main ideas of this theory. Starting from them, this chapter is a short overview of the revealed preference theory in a mathematical language. The first section contains definitions and basic results on the binary relations. In Section 3.2 a choice problem is mathematically formulated. The (crisp) notion of choice function is introduced and the main preference relations associated with a choice function are defined. The concepts of rationality and normality are discussed. Section 3.3 studies the axioms of revealed preference, the axioms of congruence and the consistency conditions, and some important connections between them are recalled.
Irina Georgescu: Fuzzy Choice Functions, StudFuzz 214, 25–47 (2007) www.springerlink.com
c Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007
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3 Classical Revealed Preference Theory
3.1 Binary Relations Let X be a non–empty set. We denote by P(X) the family of all subsets of X. A binary relation on X is a subset Q of the cartesian product X × X. Then P(X 2 ) is the family of all binary relations on X. Let x, y ∈ X. If (x, y) ∈ Q then we shall denote xQy and we say that x is in relation Q with y. We can consider X a set of alternatives. Then a binary relation Q on X can be interpreted as a preference relation; xQy means that alternative x is at least as good as alternative y. To a binaryrelation Q on X one assigns its χQ : X 2 → {0, 1}: 1 if (x, y) ∈ Q χQ (x, y) = 0 if (x, y) ∈ Q. The mapping Q → χQ is a bijective correspondence between the set P(X 2 ) 2
of binary relations on X and the set {0, 1}X of the functions X 2 → {0, 1}. A binary relation will be identified with its characteristic function. Let X = {x1 , . . . , xn } and Q a binary relation on an arbitrary set X. We define the Boolean matrix MQ = (mij )1≤i,j≤n by 1 if xi Qxj mij = 0 otherwise . Then the binary relation Q is uniquely determined by the matrix MQ , therefore we can identify Q with MQ . If Q1 , Q2 are two binary relations on X then the union Q1 ∪ Q2 and the intersection Q1 ∩ Q2 will be defined by Q1 ∪ Q2 = {(x, y) ∈ X 2 |(x, y) ∈ Q1 or (x, y) ∈ Q2 } Q1 ∩ Q2 = {(x, y) ∈ X 2 |(x, y) ∈ Q1 and (x, y) ∈ Q2 } The complement ¬Q of a binary relation Q is defined by ¬Q = {(x, y) ∈ X 2 |(x, y) ∈ Q}. The inverse relation Q−1 is given by Q−1 = {(x, y) ∈ X 2 |(y, x) ∈ Q}.
3.1 Binary Relations
Let {Qi }i∈I be a family of binary relations of X. The union the intersection
27
Qi and
i∈I
Qi of this family are defined by
i∈I
Qi = {(x, y) ∈ X 2 |(x, y) ∈ Qi for some i ∈ I};
i∈I
Qi = {(x, y) ∈ X 2 |(x, y) ∈ Qi for all i ∈ I}.
i∈I
The product (=composition) of the binary relations Q1 , Q2 is introduced by Q1 ◦ Q2 = {(x, y) ∈ X 2 |(x, z) ∈ Q1 and (z, y) ∈ Q2 for some z ∈ X}. We shall denote Q1 = Q and Qn = Q ◦ Q ◦ . . . ◦ Q for any n ≥ 2.
n−times The diagonal of X is the relation ∆ = {(x, x)|x ∈ X}. Proposition 3.1. Let Q1 , Q2 , Q3 , Q be four binary relations on X. Then (1) Q1 ◦ (Q2 ◦ Q3 ) = (Q1 ◦ Q2 ) ◦ Q3 ; (2) Q ◦ ∆ = ∆ ◦ Q = Q; (3) Q1 ⊆ Q2 implies Q ◦ Q1 ⊆ Q ◦ Q2 and Q1 ◦ Q ⊆ Q2 ◦ Q; (4) (Q−1 )−1 = Q; −1 (5) (Q1 ◦ Q2 )−1 = Q−1 2 ◦ Q1 .
Proposition 3.2. For any family {Qi }i∈I of binary relations on X and for any binary relation Q on X we have (1) (
Qi )−1 =
i∈I
(2) (
Q−1 i ;
i∈I
Qi )−1 =
i∈I
(3) (
Q−1 i ;
i∈I
Qi ) ◦ Q =
i∈I
(4) Q ◦ (
i∈I
Qi ◦ Q;
i∈I
Qi ) =
Q ◦ Qi .
i∈I
Remark 3.3. The composition of the binary relations is not commutative. Indeed, if we consider X = {1, 2, 3}, Q1 = {(1, 2)} and Q2 = {(2, 3)} then Q1 ◦ Q2 = {(1, 3)} and Q2 ◦ Q1 = ∅.
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In order to obtain an appropriate description of the individual and collective preferences it is necessary to differentiate the binary relations according to different properties. In this way, according to [96], p. 2, the relation “at least as good as” must fulfill the following conditions: “First, it must be “transitive”, i. e. if x is at least as good as y, and y is at least as good at z, then x should be at least as good as “y”. [...] Second, the relation must be “reflexive”, i. e., every alternative x must be thought to be at least as good as itself. [...] Third, the relation must be “complete”, i. e. for any pair of alternatives x and y, either x is at least as good as y, or y is at least as good as x (or possibly both). A man with a preference relation that is complete knows his mind in choices over every pair”. A binary relation Q on X is said to be reflexive if xQx for all x ∈ X; irreflexive if for some x ∈ X we do not have xQx; symmetric if xQy implies yQx, for all x, y ∈ X; antisymmetric if xQy, yQx implies x = y for all x, y ∈ X; transitive if xQy, yQz implies xQz for all x, y, z ∈ X; total if xQy or yQx for all distinct x, y ∈ X; complete if xQy or yQx for all x, y ∈ X. A binary relation is complete if and only if it is reflexive and total. A preorder on X is a reflexive and transitive binary relation on X. A weak order is a complete and transitive binary relation on X. Of course a weak order is a preorder. According to the terminology of Sen [91], [92], a regular relation is a complete and transitive relation, i.e. a weak order. A binary relation Q on X is said to be a partial order if it is reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive. Q is a strict partial order if it is irreflexive and transitive. An equivalence relation is a binary relation that is reflexive, symmetric and transitive. If Q is an equivalence relation on X and x ∈ X then x/Q = {y ∈ X|xQy} is called the equivalence class of x. The set X/Q of the equivalence classes is called the quotient set of X by the equivalence relation Q.
3.1 Binary Relations
29
Proposition 3.4. Let Q be a binary relation on X. Then (1) Q is reflexive iff ∆ ⊆ Q iff ∆ ⊆ Q ∩ Q−1 ; (2) Q is irreflexive iff Q ∩ Q−1 ⊆ ¬∆; (3) Q is symmetric iff Q = Q−1 ; (4) Q is antisymmetric iff Q ∩ Q−1 ⊆ ∆; (5) Q is transitive iff Q ◦ Q ⊆ Q; (6) Q is total iff Q ∪ Q−1 = X 2 − ∆; (7) Q is complete iff Q ∪ Q−1 = X 2 . The following two propositions express in the language of the characteristic function the composition and some properties of the binary relations. They will be used in the next chapter in order to define fuzzy versions of these notions. Proposition 3.5. If Q1 , Q2 are two binary relations on X then χQ1 ◦Q2 (x, y) = (χQ1 (x, z) ∧ χQ2 (z, y)). z∈X
Proposition 3.6. Let Q be a binary relation on X. Then (1) Q is reflexive iff χQ (x, x) = 1 for all x ∈ X; (2) Q is irreflexive iff χQ (x, x) = 0 for some x ∈ X; (3) Q is symmetric iff χQ (x, y) = χQ (y, x) for all x, y ∈ X; (4) Q is transitive iff χQ (x, y) ∧ χQ (y, z) ≤ χQ (x, z) for all x, y, z ∈ X; (5) Q is total iff χQ (x, y) = 1 or χQ (y, x) = 1 for all distinct x, y ∈ X; (6) Q is complete iff χQ (x, y) = 1 or χQ (y, x) = 1 for all x, y ∈ X. One can prove easily that any intersection of transitive binary relations is transitive. For any binary relation Q, the intersection T (Q) of all transitive binary relations that include Q is called the transitive closure of Q. Proposition 3.7. Let Q be a binary relation on X. Then a binary relation Q∗ is the transitive closure of X iff the following conditions are fulfilled: (1) Q∗ is transitive;
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3 Classical Revealed Preference Theory
(2) Q ⊆ Q∗ ; (3) If Q is a transitive binary relation that includes Q then Q∗ ⊆ Q . ∞
Proposition 3.8. For any binary relation Q on X it holds T (Q) =
Qn .
n=1
The following proposition gives an expression of the transitive closure by using its characteristic function. Proposition 3.9. For any x, y ∈ X it holds ∞ [χQ (x, t1 )∧χQ (t1 , t2 )∧. . .∧χQ (tn , y)]. χT (Q) (x, y) = χQ (x, y)∨ n=1 t1 ,...,tn ∈X
Let Q be a binary relation on X. We assign to Q two binary relations on X: I = IQ = Q ∩ Q−1 : the symmetric part of Q; P = PQ = Q ∩ ¬Q−1 = Q \ Q−1 : the asymmetric part of Q; Then we have for any x, y ∈ X: χI (x, y) = χQ (x, y) ∧ χQ (y, x); χP (x, y) = χQ (x, y) ∧ ¬χQ (y, x). If we interpret the binary relations as preference relations on the set of alternatives X then: I is the indifference relation associated with Q. xIy: x is at least as good as y and y is at least as good as x. and P is the strict preference associated with Q; xP y: x is at least as good as y and y is not at least as good as x. Remark 3.10. The preferences are modelled by an arbitrary binary relation Q and the strict preferences by PQ . In order to stress out the distinction between preferences and strict preferences, for a binary relation some authors use the terminology of weak preference relation. Then xQy spells out “x is weakly preferred to y”. An alternative terminology is: “y is weakly dominated by x” for xQy, and “y is strictly dominated by x” for xPQ y. Proposition 3.11. If a binary relation Q is complete then for all x, y ∈ X, (x, y) ∈ PQ iff (y, x) ∈ Q.
3.2 Crisp Choice Functions
31
Proof. We prove that PQ = ¬Q−1 . By definition, Q is complete iff Q ∪ Q−1 = X 2 . This is equivalent with the following assertions: ¬Q−1 ∩ (Q ∪ Q−1 ) = ¬Q−1 ∩ X 2 iff (¬Q−1 ∩ Q) ∪ (¬Q−1 ∩ Q−1 ) = ¬Q−1 ∩ X 2 iff (¬Q−1 ∩ Q) ∪ ∅ = ¬Q−1 iff ¬Q−1 ∩ Q = ¬Q−1 iff PQ = ¬Q−1 . Consequently, (x, y) ∈ PQ iff (x, y) ∈ ¬Q−1 iff (y, x) ∈ ¬Q iff (y, x) ∈ Q.
A binary relation Q is called acyclic if for any natural number n ≥ 2 and x1 , . . . , xn ∈ X we have (x1 , x2 ) ∈ PQ , . . . , (xn−1 , xn ) ∈ PQ ⇒ (xn , x1 ) ∈ PQ . If Q is complete then (xn , x1 ) ∈ PQ iff (x1 , xn ) ∈ Q. It follows that a complete binary relation Q is acyclic iff for all x1 , . . . , xn ∈ X it is true that (x1 , x2 ) ∈ PQ , . . . , (xn−1 , xn ) ∈ PQ ⇒ (x1 , xn ) ∈ Q.
3.2 Crisp Choice Functions In social and economic activities, the individuals or groups are often confronted with the situation of choosing between several alternatives. These alternatives can be goods that are going to be purchased, job offers, candidates in elections, etc. We admit that the alternatives are elements of a set X called universe. They are differentiated by attributes or criteria. Each attribute or criterion determines a non–empty subset S of X; S consists of those alternatives that possess a certain attribute or that verify a certain criterion. According to a certain attribute or criterion, the choice will be made from the corresponding subset S and not from the entire universe of alternatives; the chosen elements form a non–empty subset C(S) of S.
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3 Classical Revealed Preference Theory
Then a choice problem consists of: a) a universe X of alternatives under the control of an agent; b) a non-empty family B of non–empty subsets of X; the members of X can represent possible decisions for the agent; c) a mechanism by which the agent may choose from an available set S a subset C(S); it is necessary to impose the condition that at least an element of S has to be chosen, therefore C(S) will always be non–empty. A choice space will be a pair (X, B) where X is a non–empty set of alternatives and B is a non–empty family of non–empty subsets of X. A set S ∈ B can be taken as an available set of alternatives. In the terminology of consumer theory, the pair (X, B) is called a budget space; the elements of X are called bundles and the sets of B are called budgets. As we have seen before, any available set S can be considered as representing a criterion or an attribute on the alternatives. A choice space (X, B) is finite if the set X of alternatives is finite. In this framework we can formulate a choice problem: given S ∈ B choose one or more elements in S; we can relate it to the notion of choice function or consumer. A choice function or a consumer on (X, B) is a function C : B → P(X) which to any S ∈ B assigns a non-empty subset C(S) of S. C(S) can be taken as the set of bundles or alternatives chosen subject to S; it will be called the choice set of S. If x ∈ S \ C(S) then we shall say that the alternative x is rejected with respect to S. The elements of C(S) are interpreted as “the best alternatives in S”. In accordance with the definition of the choice function, several elements can be chosen from an available set S ∈ B. This definition covers several real situations. For instance, in case of parliamentary elections, from a list of candidates of a political party several individuals can be chosen.
3.2 Crisp Choice Functions
33
Let C : B → P(X) be a choice function such that for any S ∈ B, C(S) has exactly one element x, i. e. C(S) = {x}. By identifying the set {x} with its element x, we can consider that X is the range of f , that means f : B → X. By definition, a choice problem has the form ((X, B), C) where (X, B) is a choice space and C is a choice function on (X, B). Considering the available sets as criteria in decision–making, a choice problem can be viewed as a decision–making problem. A significant part of choice function theory [8], [91], [92], [93] has been developed under the following hypothesis: (H) B contains all non-empty finite subsets of X. It is important to know if the behaviour of the decision–maker is rational . Accordingly, it is necessary to introduce a concept of rationality of the choice functions. This is done by connecting the choices of the decision–maker with his preferences. Mathematically speaking, a preference is represented by a binary relation Q on the set X of alternatives. For each available set S ∈ B one has to specify what “the best alternative” means starting from a preference relation Q. The choice of those elements from S which are “the best alternatives” will ensure the rationality of the act of choice. Let S be an available set. An element x ∈ X is a maximal element of S with respect to Q ( or Q–maximal ) if there is no y ∈ S such that yPQ x. In other words the alternative x ∈ S is Q–maximal if there is no alternative y ∈ S which is strictly preferred to x in terms of Q. The set of the Q–maximal elements in S will be denoted by M (S, Q): M (S, Q) = {x ∈ S|(y, x) ∈ PQ for all y ∈ S}. An element x ∈ S is a greatest element of S with respect to Q (or Q– greatest) if for any y ∈ S we have xQy. Then x ∈ S is Q–greatest in S if for all y ∈ S, the alternative x is at least as good as the alternative y. The set of Q-greatest elements of S will be denoted by G(S, Q): G(S, Q) = {x ∈ S|(x, y) ∈ Q for all y ∈ S}.
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3 Classical Revealed Preference Theory
We define two types of rationality of a choice function, corresponding to the two notions of Q–optimality from above. Therefore, the choice of the Q–maximal elements means maximal–rationality, while the choice of the Q– greatest elements means greatest–rationality. Let (X, B) be a choice space and C a choice function on (X, B). C is said to be G–rational (resp. M –rational) if there exists a preference relation Q on X such that for any S ∈ B we have C(S) = G(S, Q) (resp. C(S) = M (S, Q)). In this case we say that C is G–rationalizable (resp. M –rationalizable) by Q and that Q is the G–rationalization (resp. the M –rationalization) of C. The basic idea of greatest–element rationalizability is that the chosen alternatives are as least as good as all alternatives in an available set S, while in the case of maximal–element rationalizability the chosen elements are not strictly dominated by any alternative in S. The concept of rationality can be refined with the respect to the properties of Q. If Q has a property P and Q is the G–rationalization (resp. the M – rationalization) of C then we shall say that C is P –G–rational ( resp. P –M – rational ). For example, if Q is a transitive preference relation then C is said to be transitive G–rational (resp. transitive M –rational). Example 3.12. ([100], p. 158) Let X = {a, b, c} and B = {S1 , S2 } where S1 = {x, y}, S2 = {y, z}. Let us consider the choice function C on (X, B) defined by C(S1 ) = {x}, C(S2 ) = {y, z} and the following binary relations on X: Q1 = Q1 = {(x, y), (y, z), (z, y)}; Q2 = {(x, y), (y, z), (z, y), (x, z), (z, x)}; Q2 = {(x, y)}. It is easy to see that C(S1 ) = G(S1 , Q1 ) = G(S1 , Q2 ); C(S2 ) = G(S2 , Q1 ) = G(S2 , Q2 ); C(S1 ) = M (S1 , Q1 ) = M (S1 , Q2 ); C(S2 ) = M (S2 , Q1 ) = M (S2 , Q2 ). Therefore C has two G–rationalizations Q1 , Q2 and two M –rationalizations Q1
and Q2 .
Lemma 3.13. [100] Let Q be preference relation on X. Then
3.2 Crisp Choice Functions
35
(i) G(S, Q) ⊆ M (S, Q) for any S ∈ B; (ii) If Q is complete then G(S, Q) = M (S, Q) for any S ∈ B. The previous lemma shows that the notions of complete G–rationality and complete M –rationality coincide. Let Q be a regular preference relation (=reflexive, transitive and total). If Q G–rationalizes (= M –rationalizes) the choice function C then C is said to be full rational ( or regular rational). For a preference relation Q on X let us consider the functions GQ : B → P(X); MQ : B → P(X) defined by GQ (S) = G(S, Q), resp. MQ (S) = M (S, Q) for any S ∈ B. Sometimes we will use the notation G(., Q) instead of GQ and M (., Q) instead of MQ . In general GQ and MQ are not choice functions. Example 3.14. Let X = {a, b, c}, A = {a, b}, B = {b, c} and B = {A, B}. Consider the binary relation Q on X defined by Q = {(a, a), (a, b), (b, c)}. Then Q−1 = {(a, a), (b, a), (c, b)} ¬Q−1 = {(a, b), (a, c), (b, b), (b, c), (c, a), (c, c)} PQ = Q ∪ Q−1 = {(a, b), (b, c)}. An easy computation gives G(A, Q) = {a}; G(B, Q) = ∅; M (A, Q) = {a}; M (B, Q) = {b}. It follows that M (., Q) is a choice function on (X, B), while G(., Q) is not a choice function. Proposition 3.15. [96] Let (X, P(X) \ { ∅}) be a finite choice space. If Q is a reflexive, transitive and total (=regular) preference relation on X then GQ and MQ are choice functions on (X, B).
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Proposition 3.16. [96] Let (X, P(X) \ { ∅}) be a finite choice space and Q a reflexive and complete preference relation on X. Then the following are equivalent: (1) GQ is a choice function; (2) Q is acyclic. Under these circumstances MQ is a choice function too. So far we have presented two ways in which two choice functions correspond to a preference relation Q on X : Q −→ GQ and Q −→ MQ . Conversely, the choice functions can induce preference relations on the set of the alternatives: Let C : B → P(X) be a choice function. Following [91] we shall present some preference relations generated by C: R = {(x, y)|x ∈ C(S) and y ∈ S for some S ∈ B} P = PR = {(x, y)|(x, y) ∈ R and (y, x) ∈ R} I = IR = {(x, y)|(x, y) ∈ R and (y, x) ∈ R} P˜ = {(x, y)|x ∈ C(S) and y ∈ S − C(S) for some S ∈ B} ˜ = P ˜ = {(x, y)|(y, x) ∈ P˜ } R R ˜ and (y, x) ∈ R} ˜ I˜ = {(x, y)|(x, y) ∈ R Assuming that hypothesis (H) holds we also define ¯ = {(x, y)|x ∈ C({x, y})} R ¯ and (y, x) ∈ R} ¯ P¯ = PR¯ = {(x, y)|(x, y) ∈ R ¯ and (y, x) ∈ R} ¯ I¯ = IR¯ = {(x, y)|(x, y) ∈ R Remark 3.17. In terms of the characteristic function the binary relations R, ¯ can be expressed: P˜ and R
(i) χR (x, y) =
(χC(S) (x) ∧ χS (y));
S∈B
(ii) χP˜ (x, y) =
(χC(S) (x) ∧ χS (y) ∧ ¬χC(S) (y));
S∈B
(iii) χR¯ (x, y) = χC({x,y}) (x).
3.2 Crisp Choice Functions
37
We shall denote by W (resp. P ∗ ) the transitive closure of R (resp. P˜ ). Relation R (called revealed preference in [95]) has been introduced by Samuelson in 1938 (see [87]); he associates R to a demand function. Samuelson’s theory of revealed preference studies the rationality of a consumer in terms of the preference relation R. In an axiomatic context it has been resumed by Uzawa [108] and Arrow [8]. Its intuitive significance is obvious: x is weakly revealed preferred to y if x is chosen and y is available. Relation P˜ (called strong revealed preference in [95]) has been defined by Arrow in [8]. It has the meaning: x is strongly revealed preferred to y if there exists an available set from which x is chosen and y is rejected. ¯ appears in [108] and [8] and corresponds to a concept of Base relation R binary choice: x is preferred to y if x is chosen from the available set {x, y}. Besides these the following revealed preference relation R∗ on X is defined [100]: R∗ = {(x, y)|x ∈ S or x ∈ C(S) or y ∈ C(S) for all S ∈ B} Remark 3.18. In terms of characteristic functions we can write χR∗ (x, y) = [(χS (x) ∧ χC(S) (y)) → χC(S) (x)] S∈B
In interpretation, x is R∗ –revealed preferred to y if “there is no choice situation in which y is chosen and x is available but rejected” [100]. Example 3.19. Let X = {a, b, c, d}, A = {a, b, c}, B = {b, c, d}, B = {A, B} and the choice function C on (X, B) defined by C(A) = {a, b} and C(B) = {c, d}. By applying the definition of R we obtain R
=
{(a, a), (a, b), (a, c), (b, a), (b, b), (b, c), (c, b), (c, c), (c, d), (d, b),
(d, c), (d, d)}. R can be represented as a matrix:
1110
1 1 1 0 R= 0 1 1 1 0111
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3 Classical Revealed Preference Theory
From this it follows
R−1
1100
0011
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 , ¬R−1 = = 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0011 1100
from which
0010
PR = R ∩ ¬R−1
0 0 0 0 = 0 0 0 0 0100
1100
IR = R ∩ R−1
1 1 1 0 = 1 1 1 0 0011
By applying the definition of P˜ we obtain: P˜ = {(a, c), (b, c), (c, b), (d, b)} or as a matrix
0010
0 0 1 0 . P˜ = 0 1 0 0 0100 As above we obtain
1111
1101
1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 ˜ ˜ . R= , I = 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1011 1111 ¯ cannot be defined. Since B does not contain all two–element sets of X, R
3.2 Crisp Choice Functions
39
Example 3.20. Let X = {a, b, c} and B = {{a}, {b}, {c}, {a, b}, {a, c}, {b, c}}. Let us consider the choice function C defined by C({a}) = C({a, b}) = {a}, C({b}) = C({b, c}) = {b} and C({c}) = C({a, c}) = {c}. It follows immedi¯ is given by ately that R
110
¯= R 0 1 1 . 101 Let us study now the following situation. The choice function C induces the revealed preference relation R; in its turn, R induces the functions GR and MR . If C = GR (resp. C = MR ) then we say that the choice function C is G–normal (resp. M–normal ). The normality is a special case of rationality: the choice function C is rationalized by the revealed preference relation R. We present now some results that connect the G–rationality and the M – rationality: Proposition 3.21. [100] Any M –rational choice function is G–rational. Proposition 3.22. [100] If C is a choice function on (X, B) then C(S) ⊆ GR (S) ⊆ MR (S). The previous proposition shows that GR and MR are always choice functions. Proposition 3.23. [100] For any choice function C the following are equivalent: (1) C is G–rational; (2) C is G–normal. According to the previous proposition, the concepts of G–rationality and M –normality coincide. Proposition 3.24. [100] Any M –normal choice function is complete G– rational (=complete M –rational).
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3.3 Revealed Preference and Congruence Axioms. Consistency Conditions The revealed preference axioms are conditions on the rationality of a choice function C; they are stated in terms of the revealed preference relations associated with C. The Weak Axiom of Consumer Behavior and The Strong Axiom of Consumer Behavior were introduced in the classic consumer theory by Samuelson [87] and by Houthakker [63], respectively. They establish the behavior of a demand function with respect to a revealed preference relation.The Strong Axiom of Consumer Behavior is a sufficient condition such that the demand function of a competitive consumer be determined by a transitive and complete preference relation. The axioms W ARP and SARP are abstract versions of The Weak Axiom of Consumer Behavior and The Strong Axiom of Consumer Behavior, respec˜ and tively. The present form, due to Arrow, uses the preference relations R, R P ∗. Let (X, B) be a choice space and C a choice function on (X, B). W ARP (Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference) If (x, y) ∈ P˜ then (y, x) ∈ R. SARP (Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference) If (x, y) ∈ P ∗ then (y, x) ∈ R. W ARP has the following significance: if there exists an available set S from which x has been chosen and y has been rejected, then for any other available set S , if y has been chosen then x cannot be chosen. Remark 3.25. Let C : B → X be a singleton choice function. Then R = {(x, y)|x = C(S) and y ∈ S for some S ∈ B} P˜ = {(x, y)|x = C(S), y ∈ S and x = y for some S ∈ B}.
3.3 Revealed Preference and Congruence Axioms. Consistency Conditions
41
Then, for any distinct x, y ∈ X, (x, y) ∈ R iff (x, y) ∈ P˜ . It follows that for a singleton choice function C : B → X, W ARP and SARP have the following equivalent form: W ARP For any distinct x, y ∈ X, if (x, y) ∈ R then (y, x) ∈ R. SARP For any (x1 , x2 ), . . . , (xn−1 , xn ), (xn , x1 ) ∈ X 2 , if (x1 , x2 ) ∈ R, . . . , (xn−1 , xn ) ∈ R then (xn , x1 ) ∈ R. Example 3.26. ([103], p. 57) Let X = {x, y, z} and B = {S1 , S2 , S3 } where S1 = {x, y}, S2 = {y, z} and S3 = {x, z}. Let us consider the choice function C : B → P(X) defined by C(S1 ) = {x}, C(S2 ) = S2 and C(S3 ) = {z}. An easy computation gives R = {(x, x), (y, y), (z, z), (x, y), (y, z), (z, x), (z, y)} P˜ = {(x, y), (z, x)} P ∗ = T (P˜ ) = {(x, y), (z, x), (z, y)}. We remark that C verifies W ARP ((u, v) ∈ P˜ implies (v, u) ∈ R, but does not verify SARP ((z, y) ∈ P ∗ and (y, z) ∈ R). An equivalent form of these two axioms of revealed preference has been given by Hansson [61] and Suzumura [100] by using the notion of C– connectedness. A sequence (S1 , . . . , Sn ) in B is called C–connected if Sk ∩ C(Sk+1 ) = ∅ for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n} where Sn+1 = S1 . In this context, the two axioms have the following equivalent form: W ARP For any C-connected pair (S1 , S2 ) in B, S1 ∩ C(S2 ) = C(S1 ) ∩ S2 holds. SARP For any C-connected sequence (S1 , . . . , Sn ) in B we have Sk ∩ C(Sk+1 ) = C(Sk ) ∩ Sk+1 for some k = 1, . . . , n − 1. Also in [61], [100] another revealed preference axiom appears: (Hansson’s Axiom of Revealed Preference) For any C-connected sequence (S1 , . . . , Sn ) in B Sk ∩ C(Sk+1 ) = C(Sk ) ∩ Sk+1 for all k = 1, . . . , n − 1.
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3 Classical Revealed Preference Theory
We remark that these forms of the axioms W ARP , SARP as well as the axiom HARP are stated in terms of the choice function C and not using the revealed preference relations associated with C. In [8] it was also studied the following condition (Arrow Axiom) : AA For any S1 , S2 ∈ B, the following implication holds: [S1 ⊆ S2 ] ⇒ [S1 ∩ C(S2 ) = ∅] or [S1 ∩ C(S2 ) = C(S1 )]. Following [8], AA has the following interpretation: “if some elements are chosen out of the set S2 and then the range of alternatives is narrowed to S1 but still contains some previously chosen elements, no previously unchosen element becomes chosen and no previously chosen element becomes unchosen”. The strong congruence axiom was introduced by Richter [85] and its weaker form by Sen [91]: W CA (Weak Congruence Axiom) For any x, y ∈ X and S ∈ B, if x ∈ S, y ∈ C(S) and (x, y) ∈ R then x ∈ C(S). SCA (Strong Congruence Axiom) For any x, y ∈ X and S ∈ B, if x ∈ S, y ∈ C(S) and (x, y) ∈ W then x ∈ C(S). For example, W CA means that if an alternative x is chosen from an available set S and an alternative y can be chosen from S, and if y is revealed preferred to x ( in the sense of R ), then y is also chosen from S. Example 3.27. ([100], p. 154) Let X = {x, y, z} and B = {S1 , S2 , S3 }, where S1 = {x, y}, S2 = {y, z}, S3 = {x, z}. Let us consider the choice function C on (X, B) defined by C(S1 ) = S1 , C(S2 ) = S2 , C(S3 ) = {x}. By computation we get R = {(x, x), (y, y), (z, z), (x, y), (y, x), (y, z), (z, y), (x, z)} W = T (R) = {(x, x), (y, y), (z, z), (x, y), (y, x), (y, z), (z, y), (x, z), (z, x)}. C verifies W CA: for every i ∈ {1, 2, 3} we have u ∈ Si , v ∈ C(Si ), (u, v) ∈ R ⇒ u ∈ C(Si ).
3.3 Revealed Preference and Congruence Axioms. Consistency Conditions
43
We observe that (z, x) ∈ W , x ∈ C(S3 ), z ∈ S3 but z ∈ C(S3 ) therefore C does not verify SCA. Now we shall recall three results from [91]. Proposition 3.28. [91] Assume hypothesis (H) holds. Then W CA implies that R is a regular preference relation; if C is G-normal then the converse is also true. Example 3.29. Let X = {x, y, z} and B = P(X) \ {∅}. Let us consider the preference relation Q = {(x, x), (y, y), (z, z), (x, y), (y, x), (x, z), (z, y)}. Q is reflexive and total. Take the choice function C = G(., Q) associated with Q. C is G–rational, therefore G–normal (cf. Proposition 3.23), therefore it verifies consistency condition α (cf. Proposition 1.28). By computations we obtain C({x, y}) = {x, y} and C({x, y, z}) = {x}. We notice that x, y ∈ C({x, y}), {x, y} ⊆ {x, y, z} but “x ∈ C({x, y, z}) iff y ∈ C({x, y, z})” does not hold. Therefore C does not verify consistency condition β. Proposition 3.30. [91] If hypothesis (H) holds then W CA is equivalent to ˜ R = R. The following Arrow-Sen theorem establishes the equivalence between W CA, SCA, W ARP , SARP and other conditions of rationality. Theorem 3.31. [91] (Arrow-Sen) Assume hypothesis (H) holds. For a choice function C : B → P(X) the following assertions are equivalent: (i) R is a regular preference and C is G–normal; ¯ is a regular preference and C is G–normal; (ii) R (iii) C verifies W CA; (iv) C verifies SCA; (v) C verifies W ARP ; (vi) C verifies SARP ; ˜ (vii) R = R;
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3 Classical Revealed Preference Theory
¯=R ˜ and C is G–normal. (viii) R The previous theorem is stated in the form given in [91]; some implications or equivalences have been established by Arrow in [8]. Remark 3.32. The Arrow–Sen theorem has a remarkable meaning: (a) firstly, it is established that the axioms W CA, SCA, W ARP and SARP are equivalent ( in the presence of hypothesis H ); (b) secondly, each of these four axioms is equivalent to the best rationality situation expressed by (i) and (ii): the G–normality of C and its full– rationality; (c) thirdly, if one of these four axioms is fulfilled then the preference rela¯ and R ˜ associated with C coincide. tions R, R In [8] the following theorem was proved: Theorem 3.33. Assume that the hypothesis H holds. For a choice function C the following assertions are equivalent: (1) C verifies Arrow Axiom; (2) C is full-rational. It is easy to see that conditions (1), (2) in Theorem 3.33 are equivalent to each of the eight conditions in Arrow–Sen theorem [103]. We remark that all these results are valid in the presence of hypothesis H. In fact, it suffices to use the weaker hypothesis that the domain of the choice function includes all two-element sets and all three-element sets. Investigation of the properties of rationality, congruence and revealed preference axioms in the general case, without hypothesis (H) is a direction started by Richter [85] and continued by Hansson [61], Suzumura [100] and others. We will recall first an important theorem of Richter [85]. Theorem 3.34. Let C : B → P(X) be an arbitrary choice function. Then the following are equivalent:
3.3 Revealed Preference and Congruence Axioms. Consistency Conditions
45
(i) C verifies SCA; (ii) There exists a regular preference relation Q on X such that Q is the G-rationalization of C. This result says that for an arbitrary choice function C, SCA is equivalent to the full–rationality of C. The following two results can be found in [100]: Theorem 3.35. Conditions W ARP , W CA and R ⊆ R∗ are mutually equivalent. Theorem 3.36. Conditions HARP and SCA are equivalent. Besides rationality and normality, a choice function can be related to consistency. Consistency conditions determine the choice by varying between subsets and supersets of available sets. Now we shall recall the consistency conditions α, β, γ, δ introduced by Sen in [91], [92], [93]. Let C : B → P(X) be a choice function. Condition α . For any pair of sets S, T ∈ B and for any x ∈ S, if x ∈ C(T ) and S ⊆ T then x ∈ C(S). That is, “if x is best in a set it is best in all subsets of it to which x belongs” [91]. Condition β . For any pair S, T ∈ B and for any x, y ∈ C(S), if S ⊆ T then x ∈ C(T ) iff y ∈ C(T ). That is, “if x and y are both best in S, a subset of T , then x is best in T if and only if y is best in T ” [91]. Condition γ . Let M ⊆ B, V the union of all sets in M (V =
M) and
x ∈ X. If x ∈ C(S) for all S ∈ M then x ∈ C(V ). That is, “if x is best in each set in a class of sets such that their union is V , then x must be best in V ” [91].
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3 Classical Revealed Preference Theory
Condition δ . For any pair of finite sets S, T ∈ B and for any (distinct) elements x, y ∈ C(S), if S ⊆ T then C(T ) = {x}. That is, “if x and y are both best in S, a subset of T , then neither of them can be uniquely best in T ” [91].
We notice that consistency condition α expresses the behaviour of the choice function at the contraction of the available sets of alternatives, while consistency conditions β, γ and δ express the behaviour of the choice function at the expansion of the available sets. Moreover, consistency condition γ shows how the choices are made with respect to the union of the available sets. Besides these properties, in [93] other consistency conditions are studied: Condition α2 . For any S ∈ B and for any x ∈ S, if x ∈ C(S) then x ∈ C({x, y}) for all y ∈ S.
Condition α2 means that if the alternative x is best in S then x is best in {x, y} for all y ∈ S. Condition γ2 . For any S ∈ B and for any x ∈ S, if x ∈ C({x, y}) for all y ∈ S then x ∈ C(S). Condition β(+) . For any pair of sets S, T ∈ B such that S ⊆ T and for any x ∈ C(S) and y ∈ S, if y ∈ C(T ) then x ∈ C(T ). Path Independence (P I) . For any pair of sets S, T ∈ B, C(S ∪ T ) = C(C(S) ∪ C(T )).
Path independence condition, studied by Plott [82] expresses the idea that the act of choice should be independent of the manner the available sets of alternatives split up.
3.3 Revealed Preference and Congruence Axioms. Consistency Conditions
47
We recall from [91], [92], [93] some propositions on consistency conditions. Later they will be analyzed in the fuzzy framework. Proposition 3.37. If hypothesis (H) holds then a G-normal choice function verifies condition α. Theorem 3.38. Assume hypothesis (H) holds. Then a choice function verifies W CA iff it verifies conditions α and β. A preference relation Q is quasi-transitive iff the strict preference relation PQ is transitive. Theorem 3.39. Assume hypothesis (H) holds. For a G–normal choice function the associated preference relation R is quasi-transitive iff condition δ is verified.
4 Fuzzy Preference Relations
This chapter is devoted to the study of fuzzy relations, a mathematical concept which models fuzzy relations. The first section presents the definition of fuzzy sets and fuzzy relations together with a short discussion on their significance. Section 4.2 studies the continuous t–norms and the residuated structure induced by the real interval [0, 1]. In Section 4.3 there are defined operations with fuzzy sets and fuzzy relations, while Section 4.4 deals with the main properties of fuzzy relations and the associated indicators. The last section of the chapter deals with a fuzzy version of a theorem belonging to Szpilrajn. This result will be used in Chapter 7 for a fuzzy approach of a Richter theorem in classical consumer theory.
4.1 Fuzzy Sets and Fuzzy Relations The modelling of precise phenomena in the real world is done in accordance with the laws of bivalent logic: a sentence is true or false. The classical set theory is the theoretical base for modelling the precise phenomena. A set can be described by a sentence in the bivalent logic; consequently, an object belonging or not belonging to a set verifies or not verifies the property expressed by this sentence.
Irina Georgescu: Fuzzy Choice Functions, StudFuzz 214, 49–74 (2007) www.springerlink.com
c Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007
50
4 Fuzzy Preference Relations
Meanwhile there exist many real situations (social, economic, etc.) described by imprecise properties. Attributes as “tall men”, “almost true”, “a real number close to 10” lead to sentences out of the area of “true or false”. The membership of an individual to the set of “tall men” does not follow the criterion “yes or not”. These imprecise attributes will be called vague; the precise attributes will be called exact or crisp. Then it arises the necessity to define a concept of “set” for modelling the vague attributes. The answer was given by L.A.Zadeh in [117] by introducing the concept of fuzzy set. According to Zadeh (see [117], p.339): “The notion of fuzzy set provides a convenient point of departure for the construction of a conceptual framework which parallels in many respects the framework used in the case of ordinary sets, but is more general than the latter and, potentially, may prove to have a much wider scope of applicability, particularly in the fields of pattern classification and information processing. Essentially, such a framework provides a natural way of dealing with problems in which the source of imprecision is the absence of sharply defined criteria of class membership rather than the presence of random criteria”. Now we shall introduce the basic notion of fuzzy set. Let X be a non–empty set. For any subset A of X we consider the characteristic function χA : X → {0, 1} defined by 1 if x ∈ A χA (x) = 0 if x ∈ A. A subset A of X is determined by its characteristic function. In fact, the assignment A → χA establishes a bijective correspondence between the set P(X) of the subsets of X and the set {0, 1}X of the functions of the form X → {0, 1}. The membership of an element x to the set A ⊆ X can be expressed in terms of χA :
4.1 Fuzzy Sets and Fuzzy Relations
x ∈ A ⇔ χA (x) = 1
51
(4.1)
A subset A of X is called a crisp set. The crisp sets are determined by bivalent properties; then an element x of X either belongs or does not belong to a crisp set A. The existence of vague properties leads to the necessity of introducing a notion of “vague subset” of X for which the membership is no longer a bivalent property. Starting by the representation of crisp sets by their characteristic functions L. A. Zadeh defined the notion of fuzzy subset of X. By definition, a fuzzy subset of X is a function A : X → [0, 1]. For x ∈ X, the real number A(x) from the interval [0, 1] is called the degree of membership of x in A and represents the degree of truth of the statement “x belongs to A”. We denote by F(X) = [0, 1]X the family of fuzzy subsets of X. Since {0, 1}X ⊂ F(X) and P(X) and {0, 1}X can be identified by the bijection A → χA we can consider that P(X) is a subset of F(X); we write then P(X) ⊆ F(X). Example 4.1. ([120] p.12) We intend to represent by a fuzzy set the “the real numbers close to 10”. For this purpose, let us consider the function A : R → [0, 1] defined by A(x) =
1 , x ∈ R. 1 + (x − 10)2
Then A is a fuzzy subset of R and A(x) represents the degree to which the real number x is “close to 10”. In [96] p.16, Sen observed then often the preferences of individuals have no fixed meaning, being interpreted as “satisfactions, desires, values”. There exist several factors that can lead to vague preferences. A large number of attributes can determine the vagueness of preferences; some of the attributes have a more important role in evaluating an option. The criteria for evaluating the alternatives can be to some extent incomparable to one another. We add
52
4 Fuzzy Preference Relations
A( x )
1
5
10
15
x
Fig. 4.1. Real numbers close to 10
to this the partial information on the object of preferences and the human subjectivity as well. All of these are arguments for the study of vague preferences. If the exact preferences are represented by crisp relations on the set of alternatives, then the vague preferences must be modelled by a concept of fuzzy sets. A binary fuzzy relation on a set X is an element of F(X 2 ), i.e. a function Q : X 2 → [0, 1]. For x, y ∈ X the real number Q(x, y) ∈ [0, 1] represents the degree to which x is in relation Q with y. Q(x, y) = 0 means that x and y are not related at all, and Q(x, y) = 1 means full relationship between x and y. If X = {x1 , . . . , xn } then a fuzzy relation Q on X will be represented by a matrix A = (aij ) of dimension n × n defined by aij = Q(xi , xj ) for any i, j = 1, . . . , n. Example 4.2. ([120], p. 62) Let us consider the statement “the real number x is much bigger than the real number y”. We intend to represent this vague property by a fuzzy relation on the set R of the real numbers.
4.2 Continuous T-norms
53
Let Q : R2 → [0, 1] be the fuzzy relation defined by 0 if x ≤ y Q(x, y) = (1 + (y − x)−2 )−1 if x > y. Then the real number Q(x, y) can be interpreted as “x is much bigger than y”. If X is a set of alternatives then the vague preferences on the elements of X will be represented by a fuzzy relation Q on X: we will call Q a fuzzy preference relation. For x, y ∈ X, the real number Q(x, y) will represent the degree to which the alternative x is at least as good as y.
4.2 Continuous T-norms The notion of t-norm was introduced by Schweizer and Sklar in [90]. The tnorm models the intersection of two fuzzy sets and the conjunction in fuzzy logic [40], [60], [18]. There is a vast literature dedicated to t-norms and to their applications to fuzzy set theory [18], [40], [60], [68]. In this paragraph we shall recall some notions and properties of t-norms. The basic reference for fuzzy preference relations is the monograph [40]. We shall present next some notions and results of fuzzy relations theory with regard to a continuous t-norm. Let [0, 1] be the unit interval. For any a, b ∈ [0, 1] we shall denote a ∨ b = max (a, b) and a ∧ b = min (a, b). More generally, for any {ai }i∈I ⊆ [0, 1] we denote
ai = sup{ai |i ∈ I}
(4.2)
ai = inf {ai |i ∈ I}
(4.3)
i∈I
i∈I
Then ([0, 1], ∨, ∧, 0, 1) becomes a bounded distributive lattice. Furthermore, [0, 1] is a distributive complete lattice.
54
4 Fuzzy Preference Relations
A triangular norm (=t-norm) is a binary operation ∗ on [0, 1] such that for any a, b, c ∈ [0, 1] the following axioms are verified: (T 1) commutativity: a ∗ b = b ∗ a; (T 2) associativity: a ∗ (b ∗ c) = (a ∗ b) ∗ c; (T 3) monotonicity: If a ≤ b then a ∗ c ≤ b ∗ c; (T 4) neutral element 1: a ∗ 1 = a. An immediate consequence is that a ∗ 0 = 0 for any a ∈ [0, 1]. A t-norm ∗ : [0, 1]2 → [0, 1] is said to be continuous if it is continuous as a function on the unit interval. With any continuous t-norm ∗ we associate a new binary operation → on [0, 1]: a→b=
{c ∈ [0, 1]|a ∗ c ≤ b}
(4.4)
The operation → is called the residuum or the implication associated with ∗. We list here the most well-known continuous t-norms and their corresponding residua: Lukasiewicz t-norm a ∗L b = max (0, a + b − 1); a →L b = min (1, 1 − a + b) 1 if a ≤ b a ∗G b = min (a, b); a →G b = b if a > b G¨ odel t-norm
Product t-norm a ∗P b = ab; a →P b =
1 if a ≤ b b/a if a > b
Let ∗ be a continuous t-norm. The properties mentioned in the following three lemmas reflect the main connections between the t–norm ∗ and its residuum →. Lemma 4.3. [18], [60] For any a, b, c ∈ [0, 1] the following properties hold: (1) a ∗ b ≤ c ⇔ a ≤ b → c; (2) a ∗ (a → b) = a ∧ b;
4.2 Continuous T-norms
55
(3) a ∗ b ≤ a; a ∗ b ≤ b; (4) b ≤ a → b; (5) a ≤ b ⇔ a → b = 1; (6) a = 1 → a; (7) 1 = a → a; (8) 1 = a → 1; (9) a ∗ (b ∨ c) = (a ∗ b) ∨ (a ∗ c); (10) a ≤ b implies b → c ≤ a → c and c → a ≤ c → b; (11) a → (b → c) = b → (a → c) = (a ∗ b) → c; (12) (a → b) ∗ (b → c) ≤ a → c. Definition 4.4. A residuated lattice is an algebraic structure (A, ∨, ∧, ∗, 0, 1) with four binary operations ∨, ∧, ∗, → and two constants 0 and 1 such that (1) (A, ∨, ∧, 0, 1) is a bounded lattice; (2) (A, ∗, 1) is a commutative monoid; (3) ∗ and → fulfill the residuation property, i.e. a ≤ b → c iff a ∗ b ≤ c for all a, b, c ∈ A. In accordance with Lemma 4.3 (1), ([0, 1], ∨, ∧, ∗, →, 0, 1) is a residuated lattice (see [18], [60]). Let us notice that the property (2) of Lemma 4.3 does not hold for any residuated lattice (see [18], Theorem 2.36, p. 44). Lemma 4.5. [18], [60] For any {ai }i∈I , {bi }i∈I ⊆ [0, 1] and a ∈ [0, 1] the following properties hold: (1) a → ( (2) (
ai ) =
i∈I
(3)
(ai → a) ≤ (
ai ) → a;
i∈I
(a → ai ) ≤ a → (
i∈I
(5) (
(ai → a);
i∈I
i∈I
(4)
(a → ai );
i∈I
ai ) → a =
i∈I
i∈I
ai ) ∗ a =
i∈I
ai );
i∈I
(ai ∗ a);
56
4 Fuzzy Preference Relations
(6) (
ai ) ∗ (
i∈I
(7) (
j∈I
ai ) ∗ (
i∈I
bj ) =
(ai ∗ bj );
i,j∈I
bj ) ≤
j∈I
(ai ∗ bj ) ≤
i,j∈I
(ai ∗ bi ).
i∈I
The negation operation ¬ associated with a continuous t-norm ∗ is defined by ¬a = a → 0 =
{c ∈ [0, 1]|a ∗ c = 0}
(4.5)
Recall the negations associated with Lukasiewicz, G¨ odel and product tnorms ([18] p. 31): Lukasiewicz t-norm ¬a = 1 − a G¨ odel and product t-norms 1 if a = 0 ¬a = 0 if a > 0 Lemma 4.6. [18], [60] For any a, b, c ∈ [0, 1] the following properties hold: (1) a ≤ ¬b ⇔ a ∗ b = 0; (2) a ∗ ¬a = 0; (3) a ≤ ¬¬a; (4) ¬0 = 1, ¬1 = 0; (5) ¬a = ¬¬¬a; (6) a → b ≤ ¬b → ¬a; (7) a ≤ b ⇒ ¬b ≤ ¬a; (8) ¬(a ∨ b) = ¬a ∧ ¬b; (9) If ∗ is the Lukasiewicz t–norm then ¬¬a = a. The biresiduum ↔ of a continuous t-norm ∗ is defined by ρ(a, b) = a ↔ b = (a → b) ∧ (b → a). for any a, b ∈ [0, 1].
(4.6)
4.2 Continuous T-norms
57
The biresidua corresponding to the Lukasiewicz, G¨ odel and product tnorms are ([18], p. 31): Lukasiewicz a ↔ b = 1 − |a − b| G¨ odel 1 if a=b a↔b= min(a, b) otherwise product a↔b=
min(a,b) max(a,b)
Lemma 4.7. ([18]) For any a, b, c, d ∈ [0, 1] the following properties hold: (1) ρ(a, 1) = a; (2) a = b ⇔ ρ(a, b) = 1; (3) ρ(a, b) = ρ(b, a); (4) ρ(a, b) ≤ ρ(¬a, ¬b); (5) ρ(a, b) ∗ ρ(b, c) ≤ ρ(a, c); (6) ρ(a, b) ∧ ρ(c, d) ≤ ρ(a ∧ c, b ∧ d); (7) ρ(a, b) ∧ ρ(c, d) ≤ ρ(a ∨ c, b ∨ d); (8) ρ(a, b) ∗ ρ(c, d) ≤ ρ(a ∗ c, b ∗ d); (9) ρ(a, b) ∗ ρ(c, d) ≤ ρ(a → c, b → d); (10) ρ(a, b) ∗ a ≤ b; (11) a ∧ b ≤ ρ(a, b); (12) ρ(a, b) ∗ ρ(c, d) ≤ ρ(ρ(a, c), ρ(b, d)). Lemma 4.8. Let X be a non-empty set and f : X → [0, 1], g : X → [0, 1] two arbitrary functions. Then (1) ρ( f (x), g(x)) ≥ ρ(f (x), g(x));
x∈X
(2) ρ(
x∈X
x∈X
f (x),
x∈X
x∈X
g(x)) ≥
x∈X
ρ(f (x), g(x)).
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4 Fuzzy Preference Relations
4.3 Operations with Fuzzy Sets and Fuzzy Relations The operations of the crisp sets are based on the Boolean structure of {0, 1}. In defining the operations of fuzzy subsets of X one will start from some operations on [0, 1]. For any continuous t-norm ∗, ([0, 1], ∨, ∧, ∗, →, 0, 1) is a residuated lattice. From this algebraic structure one will define the operations on F(X). Let us fix a continuous t-norm ∗. Let A, B be two fuzzy subsets of X. We define the fuzzy subsets A ∩ B, A ∪ B, A ∗ B and A → B of X by (A ∩ B)(x) = A(x) ∧ B(x)
(4.7)
(A ∪ B)(x) = A(x) ∨ B(x)
(4.8)
(A ∗ B)(x) = A(x) ∗ B(x)
(4.9)
(A → B)(x) = A(x) → B(x)
(4.10)
for any x ∈ X. Similarly, for any A ∈ F(X) we define ¬A ∈ F(X) by (¬A)(x) = ¬A(x) for any x ∈ X. 0 and 1 will be the constant fuzzy subsets 0(x) = 0 and 1(x) = 1 for any x ∈ X. Proposition 4.9. (F(X), ∪, ∩, ∗, →, 0, 1) is a residuated lattice. Proof. Straightforward, by using the definition of the operations of F(X). One notices that by the restriction of the operations ∪, ∩, → of F(X) to its subset P(X) one obtains the Boolean operations ∪, ∩, →.
4.3 Operations with Fuzzy Sets and Fuzzy Relations
59
Let {Ai }i∈I be a family of fuzzy subsets of X. Let us define the fuzzy subsets Ai , Ai of X by i∈I
i∈I
(
Ai )(x) =
i∈I
(
Ai (x)
(4.11)
Ai (x)
(4.12)
i∈I
Ai )(x) =
i∈I
i∈I
for each x ∈ X. This way F(X) becomes a complete residuated lattice. If A, B ∈ F(X) then let us denote A ⊆ B if A(x) ≤ B(x) for any x ∈ X. This notion extends the inclusion of the crisp sets. For any x1 , . . . , xn ∈ X denote by [x1 , . . . , xn ] the characteristic function of {x1 , . . . , xn }.
1 if y ∈ {x , . . . , x } 1 n [x1 , . . . , xn ](y) = 0 if otherwise Let A, B ∈ F(X) and a ∈ [0, 1]; we define the functions A + B : X → R
and aA : X → R by (A + B)(x) = A(x) + B(x) and (aA)(x) = aA(x) for any x ∈ X. If X = {x1 , . . . , xn }, A ∈ F(X) and ai = A(xi ), i = 1, . . . , n then A = a1 χ{x1 } + a2 χ{x2 } + . . . + an χ{xn } . A fuzzy subset A of X is non-zero if A(x) = 0 for some x ∈ X; A is normal if A(x) = 1 for some x ∈ X. The support of A ∈ F(X) is defined by supp A = {x ∈ X|A(x) > 0}. If A, B ∈ F(X) then we denote I(A, B) = (A(x) → B(x));
x∈X
E(A, B) =
(A(x) ↔ B(x)).
x∈X
I(A, B) is called the subsethood degree of A in B and E(A, B) the degree of equality of A and B. Intuitively I(A, B) expresses the truth value of the statement “A is included in B.” and E(A, B) expresses the truth value of the statement “A and B contain the same elements.”(see [18], p. 82 and p. 85).
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4 Fuzzy Preference Relations
Example 4.10. ([18], p. 83) For Lukasiewicz, G¨odel and product t-norms we have
{1 − A(x) + B(x)|x ∈ X, A(x) > B(x)} (Lukasiewicz) I(A, B) = {B(x)|x ∈ X, A(x) > B(x)} (G¨ odel) I(A, B) = {B(x)/A(x)|x ∈ X, A(x) > B(x)} (product) I(A, B) =
Example 4.11. ([18], p. 85) For Lukasiewicz, G¨odel and product t-norms we have E(A, B) = E(A, B) = E(A, B) =
{1 − |A(x) − B(x)||x ∈ X} (Lukasiewicz) {A(x) ∧ B(x)|x ∈ X, A(x) = B(x)} (G¨ odel) {A(x)/B(x) ∧ B(x)/A(x)|x ∈ X} (product)
Lemma 4.12. ([18], p. 84-85) For any A, B, C ∈ F(X) we have (i) I(A, A) = 1; E(A, A) = 1; (ii) I(A, B) = 1 iff A ⊆ B; (iii) E(A, B) = 1 iff A = B; (iv) E(A, B) = E(B, A); (v) I(A, B) ∗ I(B, C) ≤ I(A, C); (vi) E(A, B) ∗ E(B, C) ≤ E(A, C); (vii) For any x ∈ X, E(A, B) ∗ A(x) ≤ B(x). Proof. We prove only (v). By applying Lemma 4.5 (7) and Lemma 4.3 (12) we have I(A, B) ∗ I(B, C) = [ ≤
(A(x) → B(x))] ∗ [
x∈X
(B(x) → C(x))]
x∈X
(A(x) → B(x)) ∗ (B(x) → C(x))
x∈X
≤
(A(x) → C(x)) = I(A, C)
x∈X
Besides I(., .) there exist plenty of indicators expressing the inclusion of one set into another. A large class of such indicators was axiomatically developed in [98], [29].
4.3 Operations with Fuzzy Sets and Fuzzy Relations
61
We have seen that fuzzy relations model vague preferences: if x, y ∈ X are two alternatives, then the real number Q(x, y) shows the degree to which x is preferred to y. In other words, Q(x, y) is the degree to which x is “at least as good as” y. To a fuzzy relation Q on X one assigns the fuzzy relations PQ and IQ on X defined by PQ (x, y) = Q(x, y) ∗ ¬Q(y, x) and IQ (x, y) = Q(x, y) ∗ Q(y, x) for any x, y ∈ X. PQ is called the strict preference relation associated with Q, and IQ is called the indifference relation associated with Q. Then the real number PQ (x, y) (resp. IQ (x, y)) means the degree to which the alternative x is preferred to the alternative y (resp. the degree to which the alternatives x and y are equally preferred). We can consider also operations with fuzzy relations: they will be the operations of the complete residuated lattice F(X 2 ) defined above. We define the fuzzy relation ∆ on X (the diagonal of X) by 1 if x = y , ∆= 0 if x = y for any x, y ∈ X. If Q is a fuzzy relation on X then the fuzzy relation Q−1 (the inverse of Q ) will be defined by Q−1 (y, x) = Q(x, y) for any x, y ∈ X. Let Q1 , Q2 be two fuzzy relations on X. Their product Q1 ◦ Q2 will be a new fuzzy relation defined by (Q1 ◦ Q2 )(x, y) = Q1 (x, z) ∗ Q2 (z, y) for any x, y ∈ X.
z∈X
Proposition 4.13. Let Q, Q1 , Q2 , Q3 be fuzzy relations on X. Then (1) Q1 ◦ (Q2 ◦ Q3 ) = (Q1 ◦ Q2 ) ◦ Q3 ; (2) Q ◦ ∆ = ∆ ◦ Q = Q; (3) Q1 ⊆ Q2 implies Q1 ◦ Q ⊆ Q2 ◦ Q and Q ◦ Q1 ⊆ Q ◦ Q2 ; (4) (Q−1 )−1 = Q; −1 (5) (Q1 ◦ Q2 )−1 = Q−1 2 ◦ Q1 .
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4 Fuzzy Preference Relations
Proof. To exemplify we shall prove only (1). For any x, y ∈ X (Q1 ◦ (Q2 ◦ Q3 ))(x, y) = Q1 (x, u) ∗ (Q2 ◦ Q3 )(u, y).
u∈X
=
Q1 (x, u) ∗ (
u∈X
=
Q2 (u, v) ∗ Q3 (v, y))
v∈X
Q1 (x, u) ∗ Q2 (u, v) ∗ Q3 (v, y)
u,v∈X
A simple computation shows that ((Q1 ◦Q2 )◦Q3 )(x, y) has the same value.
Let us define Qn = Q ◦ Q ◦ . . . ◦ Q for any natural number n ≥ 1.
ntimes Lemma 4.14. Let Q be a fuzzy relation on X. Then for any natural number n ≥ 2 and x, y ∈ X the following holds: Qn (x, y) = Q(x, t1 ) ∗ . . . ∗ Q(tn−1 , y). t1 ,...,tn−1 ∈X
Proposition 4.15. Let Q be a fuzzy relation on X and {Qi }i∈I be a family of fuzzy relations on X. Then (1) (
i∈I
(2) (
Qi )−1 =
i∈I
i∈I
Qi ) ◦ Q =
i∈I
(3) (
Q−1 i ; (
Qi )−1 =
i∈I
(Qi ◦ Q); Q ◦ (
i∈I
Qi ) ◦ Q ⊆
Q−1 i
i∈I Qi ) = (Q ◦ Qi );
i∈I
(Qi ◦ Q); Q ◦ (
i∈I
i∈I
Qi ) ⊆
i∈I
(Q ◦ Qi ).
i∈I
Proof. We shall prove only the first equality in (2). For any x, y ∈ X we have (( Qi ) ◦ Q)(x, y) = [( Qi )(x, z) ∗ Q(z, y)] i∈I
z∈X
=
i∈I
z∈X
=
[(
Qi (x, z)) ∗ Q(z, y)]
i∈I
Qi (x, z) ∗ Q(z, y)
z∈X i∈I
=
Qi (x, z) ∗ Q(z, y)
i∈I z∈X
=
i∈I
(Qi ◦ Q)(x, y) = (
i∈I
(Qi ◦ Q))(x, y).
4.4 Properties and Indicators of Fuzzy Relations
63
4.4 Properties and Indicators of Fuzzy Relations We have seen that fuzzy relations model vague preferences. The properties of the fuzzy relations studied in this section (reflexivity, transitivity, etc.) throw a better light on the way collective or individual preference relations are connected with various alternatives. Beside these properties, several indicators of a fuzzy preference relation are defined, which correspond to the properties of reflexivity, transitivity, etc. These indicators have the following significance: instead of checking whether a fuzzy relation Q has the property P , we evaluate the degree to which Q verifies P . For instance, the degree of transitivity T rans(Q) will measure the extent to which the fuzzy relation Q is transitive. From the fuzzy logic point of view, T rans(Q) will measure the degree of truth of the statement “the relation Q is transitive”. We fix a continuous t-norm ∗. Let X be a non–empty set and Q a fuzzy relation on X. Q is said to be: reflexive if Q(x, x) = 1 for all x ∈ X; irreflexive if Q(x, x) = 0 for all x ∈ X; symmetric if Q(x, y) = Q(y, x) for all x, y ∈ X; ∗–transitive if Q(x, y) ∗ Q(y, z) ≤ Q(x, z) for all x, y, z ∈ X; total if Q(x, y) > 0 or Q(y, x) > 0 for all distinct x, y ∈ X; strongly total if Q(x, y) = 1 or Q(y, x) = 1 for all distinct x, y ∈ X; complete if Q(x, y) > 0 or Q(y, x) > 0 for all x, y ∈ X; strongly complete if Q(x, y) = 1 or Q(y, x) = 1 for all x, y ∈ X. The above properties come from the ones in Proposition 3.6. One can see that some crisp notions have more fuzzy versions: total and strongly total for (crisp) total, complete and strongly complete for (crisp) complete. A regular fuzzy relation is a ∗–transitive and strongly complete fuzzy relation. The following proposition is obvious. Proposition 4.16. Let Q be a fuzzy relation on X. Then (a) Q is reflexive iff ∆ ⊆ Q;
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(b) Q is symmetric iff Q = Q−1 ; (c) Q is ∗–transitive iff Q ◦ Q ⊆ Q; (d) If Q is ∗–transitive then Qn ⊆ Q for any n ≥ 1; (e) If Q is reflexive then Q ⊆ Qn for any n ≥ 1. Proposition 4.17. If Q is a strongly complete fuzzy relation on X then PQ (x, y) = ¬Q(y, x) for all x, y ∈ X. Proof. Let x, y ∈ X. Since Q is strongly complete, Q(x, y) ∨ Q(y, x) = 1 hence by Lemma 4.5 (5) and Lemma 4.6 (2): ¬Q(y, x) = (Q(x, y) ∨ Q(y, x)) ∗ ¬Q(y, x) = (Q(x, y) ∗ ¬Q(y, x)) ∨ (Q(y, x) ∗ ¬Q(y, x)) = Q(x, y) ∗ ¬Q(y, x) = PQ (x, y). Proposition 4.18. Any intersection of ∗–transitive fuzzy relations is ∗– transitive. Proof. Let {Qi }i∈I be a family of ∗–transitive fuzzy relations on X. Denote Q= Qi . For any x, y, z ∈ X we get i∈I
Q(x, y) ∗ Q(y, z) = ( ≤
Qi (x, y)) ∗ (
i∈I
Qi (x, y) ∗ Qi (y, z) ≤
i∈I
Qi (y, z)) ≤
i∈I
Qi (x, z) = Q(x, z).
i∈I
Let Q be a fuzzy relation on X. Denote by T (Q) the intersection of all ∗–transitive fuzzy relations that contain Q: T (Q) = {Q |Q ⊆ Q and Q is transitive}. According to Proposition 4.18, T (Q) ∗– transitive fuzzy relations that contains Q. T (Q) is called the ∗–transitive closure of Q. Remark that T (Q) = Q iff Q is ∗–transitive. Proposition 4.19. Let Q be a fuzzy relation on X. Then T (Q) =
∞ n=1
Qn .
4.4 Properties and Indicators of Fuzzy Relations ∞
Proof. Let Q =
65
Qn . Then Q is the ∗–transitive closure of Q iff the
n=1
following three conditions are fulfilled: (a) Q ⊆ Q ; (b) Q is ∗–transitive; (c) If Q1 is a ∗–transitive fuzzy relation that contains Q then Q ⊆ Q1 . Since Q1 = Q we have Q ⊆ Q . One notices that ∞ ∞ ∞ Qn ) ◦ ( Qm ) = Qn+m ⊆ Q , Q ◦ Q = ( n=1
m=1
therefore Q is ∗–transitive.
m,n=1
Let Q1 be a ∗–transitive fuzzy relation such that Q ⊆ Q1 . For any n ≥ 1 ∞ Qn ⊆ Q1 . we have Qn ⊆ Qn1 ⊆ Q1 since Q1 is ∗–transitive. Then Q = n=1
We have proved that T (Q) = Q . Corollary 4.20. For any x, y ∈ X, ∞ T (Q)(x, y) = Q(x, y) ∨
Q(x, t1 ) ∗ . . . ∗ Q(tn , y)
n=1 t1 ,...,tn ∈X
Proof. By Proposition 4.19 we have ∞ ∞ n Q (x, y) = Q(x, y) ∨ Qn+1 (x, y) = T (Q)(x, y) = n=1
= Q(x, y) ∨
∞
n=1
Q(x, t1 ) ∗ . . . ∗ Q(tn , y).
n=1 t1 ,...,tn ∈X
Remark 4.21. If Q is reflexive then T (Q) is also reflexive. If we denote Q0 = ∆ ∞ Qn . then in this case T (Q) = n=0
In the approximate reasoning we can distinguish variables that are not identical, but have close behaviour becoming “identifiable”. Therefore we need some concepts to express situations when fuzzy sets and/ or fuzzy relations are “identifiable”. The notions of similarity and δ–equality are very satisfiable to describe such situations.
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Let X be a non–empty set. A fuzzy relation Q on X is said to be a similarity relation if it is reflexive, symmetric and ∗–transitive. If x, y ∈ X then Q(x, y) will be called the similarity degree of x and y. Let A, B be two fuzzy subsets of X. Recall the definition of the degree of equality of A and B: E(A, B) = (A(x) ↔ B(x)). The assignment x∈X
(A, B) −→ E(A, B) defines a fuzzy relation E on the set F(X). By Lemma 4.12 (iii)-(iv), E is a similarity relation on F(X). E(A, B) is the similarity degree of A and B (with respect to the similarity relation E). If A, B are two fuzzy subsets of X and 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 then we shall say that A, B are (∗, δ)–equal (A =δ B in symbols) if E(A, B) ≥ δ. Remark 4.22. Assume that ∗ is the Lukasiewicz t–norm. It is easy to see that a ↔ b = 1 − |a − b| for any a, b ∈ [0, 1], therefore E(A, B) = (1 − |A(x) − B(x)|) = 1 − |A(x) − B(x)|. x∈X
Thus A =δ B iff
x∈X
|A(x) − B(x)| ≤ 1 − δ. In this way we obtain the
x∈X
notion of Cai δ–equality, studied in [23] and [24]. If Q is a crisp relation on X then the sentence “Q is reflexive” is a statement in the bivalent logic: it is true or false. For a fuzzy relation Q on X it is more appropriate to place the sentence “Q is reflexive” in the setting of a fuzzy logic [60], [18], etc.. Then instead of saying that Q is reflexive or not we shall consider the degree of truth of that statement. This will be a real number in the interval [0, 1] and it will express “how reflexive” the fuzzy relation Q is. The indicators introduced by Definition 4.23 represent degrees of truth which correspond to properties of fuzzy relations such as reflexivity, symmetry, etc. Definition 4.23. [18] Let Q be a fuzzy relation on X. We define the following indicators: (a) the degree of reflexivity of Q: Ref (Q) = Q(x, x); x∈X
4.4 Properties and Indicators of Fuzzy Relations
67
(b) the degree of symmetry of Q: Sym(Q) = (Q(x, y) → Q(y, x)) = (Q(x, y) ↔ Q(y, x)); x,y∈X
x,y∈X
(c) the degree of ∗–transitivity of Q: T rans(Q) = (Q(x, y) ∗ Q(y, z) → Q(x, z)); x,y,z∈X
(d) the degree of strong totality of Q: ST (Q) = (Q(x, y) ∨ Q(y, x)); x=y
(e) the degree of strong completeness of Q: SC(Q) = (Q(x, y) ∨ Q(y, x)). x,y∈X
It is easy to see that the first three indicators can be written in the form ([18], p. 191): Ref (Q) = I(∆, Q) Sym(Q) = E(Q, Q−1 ) T rans(Q) = I(Q2 , Q). Lemma 4.24. For any fuzzy relation Q on X the following assertions hold: (a) Ref (Q) = 1 iff Q is reflexive; (b) Sym(Q) = 1 iff Q is symmetric; (c) T rans(Q) = 1 iff Q is ∗–transitive; (d) ST (Q) = 1 iff Q is strongly total; (e) SC(Q) = 1 iff Q is strongly complete. Proof. We shall prove (c) for example: T rans(Q) = 1 iff Q(x, y) ∗ Q(y, z) → Q(x, z) = 1 for all x, y, z ∈ X; iff Q(x, y) ∗ Q(y, z) ≤ Q(x, z) for all x, y, z ∈ X; iff Q is ∗–transitive. Remark 4.25. The five indicators introduced in Definition 4.23 correspond to the five properties of fuzzy relations from Proposition 4.16. They express the extent to which a fuzzy relation Q verifies these properties. The following example holds true when ∗ is the G¨ odel t–norm ∧:
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4 Fuzzy Preference Relations
Example 4.26. (I) Let X = {x, y} and the fuzzy preference relation given by the matrix
Q=
ab
cd where 0 ≤ a, b, c, d ≤ 1. Then Ref (Q) = a ∧ d; Sym(Q) = b ↔ c; T rans(Q) = 1; ST (Q) = b ∨ c; SC(Q) = a ∨ b ∨ c ∨ d. (II) Let X = {1, 2, 3} and the fuzzy preference relation Q on X defined by the matrix:
1
1 1 2 3
Q = 31 1 1 1 2 2
1 3
.
1
By computation we get 1
1 1 2 3
Q2 = 21 1 1 1 2 2
Therefore T rans(Q) = I(Q2 , Q) =
3
1 3
.
1
(Q2 (i, j) → Q(i, j)) =
i,j=1
1 1 1 → = . 2 3 3
Proposition 4.27. Let Q be a fuzzy relation on X and x, y, z ∈ X. Therefore (a) Ref (Q) ≤ Q(x, x); (b) Sym(Q) ∗ Q(x, y) ≤ Q(y, x); (c) T rans(Q) ∗ Q(x, y) ∗ Q(y, z) ≤ Q(x, z); (d) If x = y then ST (Q) ≤ Q(x, y) or ST (Q) ≤ Q(y, x); (e) SC(Q) ≤ Q(x, y) or SC(Q) ≤ Q(y, x).
4.4 Properties and Indicators of Fuzzy Relations
69
Proof. To exemplify, we prove (c). By the definition of T rans(Q) we have T rans(Q) ≤ Q(x, y) ∗ Q(y, z) → Q(x, z) from where, by applying Lemma 4.3 (1), one obtains T rans(Q) ∗ Q(x, y) ∗ Q(y, z) ≤ Q(x, z). The following two propositions show how the five indicators defined above are preserved by the fuzzy equality E(., .). Proposition 4.28. Let Q1 , Q2 be two fuzzy relations on X. Then (1) Ref (Q1 ) ∗ E(Q1 , Q2 ) ≤ Ref (Q2 ); (2) ST (Q1 ) ∗ E(Q1 , Q2 ) ≤ ST (Q2 ); (3) SC(Q1 ) ∗ E(Q1 , Q2 ) ≤ SC(Q2 ); (4) Sym(Q1 ) ∗ E(Q1 , Q2 ) ≤ Sym(Q2 ); Proof. (1) For any x ∈ X we have Ref (Q1 ) ∗ E(Q1 , Q2 ) ≤ Q1 (x) ∗ (Q1 (x) ↔ Q2 (x)) ≤ ≤ Q1 (x) ∗ (Q1 (x) → Q2 (x)) = Q1 (x) ∧ Q2 (x) ≤ Q2 (x). It follows Ref (Q1 ) ∗ E(Q1 , Q2 ) ≤
Q2 (x, x) = Ref (Q2 ).
x∈X
(2) Let x, y ∈ X such that x = y. Then ST (Q1 ) ∗ E(Q1 , Q2 ) ≤ (Q1 (x, y) ∨ Q1 (y, x)) ∗ E(Q1 , Q2 ) = = Q1 (x, y) ∗ E(Q1 , Q2 ) ∨ Q1 (y, x) ∗ E(Q1 , Q2 ) ≤ ≤ Q1 (x, y) ∗ (Q1 (x, y) → Q2 (x, y)) ∨ Q1 (y, x) ∗ (Q1 (y, x) → Q2 (y, x)) = = (Q1 (x, y) ∧ Q2 (x, y)) ∨ (Q1 (y, x) ∨ Q2 (y, x)) ≤ Q2 (x, y) ∨ Q2 (y, x). From this we have ST (Q1 ) ∗ E(Q1 , Q2 ) ≤
(Q2 (x, y) ∨ Q2 (y, x)) = ST (Q2 ).
x=y
(3) Similarly as (2). (4) Let x, y ∈ X. Then, by Lemma 4.3 (2) Sym(Q1 ) ∗ E(Q1 , Q2 ) ∗ Q2 (x, y) ≤ Sym(Q1 ) ∗ Q1 (x, y) ∗ E(Q1 , Q2 ) ≤ ≤ Q1 (x, y) ∗ (Q1 (x, y) → Q1 (y, x)) ∗ E(Q1 , Q2 ) = = Q1 (x, y) ∗ Q1 (y, x) ∗ E(Q1 , Q2 ) ≤ ≤ Q1 (y, x) ∗ E(Q1 , Q2 ) ≤ Q2 (y, x).
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4 Fuzzy Preference Relations
By Lemma 4.3 (1), Sym(Q1 ) ∗ E(Q1 , Q2 ) ≤ Q2 (x, y) → Q2 (y, x) for any x, y ∈ X, therefore Sym(Q1 ) ∗ E(Q1 , Q2 ) ≤
(Q2 (x, y) → Q2 (y, x)) = Sym(Q2 ).
x,y∈X
Proposition 4.29. Suppose ∗ is the G¨ odel t-norm ∧. Then for any two fuzzy relations Q1 , Q2 on X we have: T rans(Q1 ) ∧ E(Q1 , Q2 ) ≤ T rans(Q2 ). Proof. Let x, y, z ∈ X. Then by Proposition 4.27 (c) T rans(Q1 ) ∧ E(Q1 , Q2 ) ∧ Q2 (x, y) ∧ Q2 (y, z) = E(Q1 , Q2 ) ∧ T rans(Q1 ) ∧ Q1 (x, y) ∧ Q1 (y, z) ≤ ≤ E(Q1 , Q2 ) ∧ Q1 (x, z) ≤ Q2 (x, z). By applying Lemma 4.3 (1), for any x, y, z ∈ X we have T rans(Q1 ) ∧ E(Q1 , Q2 ) ≤ (Q2 (x, y) ∧ Q2 (y, z)) → Q2 (x, z) from where T rans(Q1 ) ∧ E(Q1 , Q2 ) ≤
[(Q2 (x, y) ∧ Q2 (y, z)) → Q2 (x, z)] =
x,y,z∈X
T rans(Q2 ).
Proposition 4.30. Let Q be a fuzzy relation on X. For any x, y ∈ X we have T rans(Q) ∗ T (Q)(x, y) ≤ Q(x, y). Proof. Let n ≥ 1 and x, y, t1 , . . . , tn ∈ X. Applying several times Proposition 4.27, (c) we get T rans(Q) ∗ Q(x, t1 ) ∗ . . . ∗ Q(tn , y) ≤ Q(x, y). Therefore T rans(Q) ∗ T (Q)(x, y) = T rans(Q) ∗ [Q(x, y) ∨
∞
Q(x, t1 ) ∗ . . . ∗
n=1 t1 ,...,tn ∈X
Q(tn , y)] = = T rans(Q) ∗ Q(x, y) ∨
∞
n=1 t1 ,...,tn ∈X
Q(x, y).
T rans(Q) ∗ Q(x, t1 ) ∗ . . . , ∗Q(tn , y) ≤
4.5 An Extension Theorem
71
Remark 4.31. By Proposition 4.30, for all x, y ∈ X we have T rans(Q) ≤ T (Q)(x, y) → Q(x, y) = T (Q)(x, y) ↔ Q(x, y) hence T rans(Q) ≤ (T (Q)(x, y) ↔ Q(x, y)) = E(Q, T (Q)). x,y∈X
4.5 An Extension Theorem A classical Szpilrajn theorem [106] asserts that any strict partial order is a subrelation of a strict total order. The first result in formulating a fuzzy version of Szpilrajn theorem was established by Zadeh in [118]. A fuzzy version of Szpilrajn theorem was also obtained by Gottwald in [58] for t-norms without zero divisors. Paper [19] contains an analysis of Szpilrajn theorem in fuzzy orderings context with respect to a t-norm ∗ and a ∗-equivalence E. In particular Szpilrajn theorem is the main tool for proving a well-known theorem of Richter [85] that establishes the equivalence between rational and congruous consumers. In this section we will formulate and prove a fuzzy version of Szpilrajn theorem, that will be later used for a fuzzy analysis of Richter theorem in consumer theory. Theorem 4.32. (Szpilrajn [106]) Any strict partial order can be embedded in a strict total order on X. An important problem is to see to what extent a fuzzy version of Szpilrajn theorem holds true for an arbitrary continuous t-norm. Our extension theorem will be later used for the fuzzy analysis of Richter theorem in consumer theory. Let R, Q be two fuzzy relations on X such that R ⊆ Q. We say that the extension Q of R preserves the irreflexivity of R if Q(x, x) = 0 for each x ∈ X such that R(x, x) = 0. A fuzzy relation R on X is a strict partial ∗-order if it is irreflexive and ∗-transitive; a fuzzy relation is a total strict ∗-order if it is total, irreflexive and ∗-transitive. In this section we shall prove that any ∗-transitive fuzzy relation R on X can be extended to a total ∗-transitive fuzzy relation Q on X preserving the
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4 Fuzzy Preference Relations
irreflexivity of R. From this one infers that any strict partial ∗-order on X can be extended to a total strict ∗-order on X. This result can be viewed as a fuzzy version of Szpilrajn theorem. ¯ will be Let ∗ be a continuous t-norm. If R is a fuzzy relation on X then R the fuzzy relation defined by
¯ b) = R(a,
1 if a = b R(a, b) if a = b
¯ for any a, b ∈ X. It is obvious that R ⊆ R. ¯ is also ∗-transitive. Lemma 4.33. If R is ∗-transitive then R ¯ b) ∗ R(b, ¯ c) ≤ R(a, ¯ c). If a = c Proof. Let a, b, c ∈ X. We shall prove that R(a, ¯ c) = 1 and the inequality is trivially verified. Assume a = c. If then R(a, ¯ b) ∗ R(b, ¯ c) = R(a, b) ∗ R(b, c) ≤ R(a, c) = R(a, ¯ c). a = b, b = c then R(a, ¯ b) ∗ R(b, ¯ c) = 1 ∗ R(b, c) = R(b, c) = Supposing a = b, b = c we have R(a, ¯ c); the case a = b, b = c follows similarly. If a = b = c then the R(a, c) = R(a, inequality is obvious. Lemma 4.34. Let R be a ∗-transitive fuzzy relation on X and p, q two distinct elements of X such that R(p, q) = R(q, p) = 0. Then there exists a ∗-transitive fuzzy relation R on X fulfilling the following conditions: (i) R ⊆ R ; (ii) R (p, q) = 1; (iii) R preserves the irreflexivity of R. Proof. The fuzzy relation R is defined by ¯ p) ∗ R(q, ¯ b)] R (a, b) = R(a, b) ∨ [R(a, ¯ p)∗ for all a, b ∈ X. It is obvious that R ⊆ R and R (p, q) = R(p, q)∨[R(p, ¯ q)] = R(p, q) ∨ 1 = 1. R(q, In order to prove the ∗-transitivity of R one remembers that
4.5 An Extension Theorem
73
¯ p) ∗ R(q, ¯ y))] ∗ [R(y, z) ∨ (R(y, ¯ p) ∗ R (x, y) ∗ R (y, z) = [R(x, y) ∨ (R(x, ¯ z))] = [R(x, y) ∗ R(y, z)] ∨ [R(x, y) ∗ R(y, ¯ p) ∗ R(q, ¯ z)] ∨ [R(x, ¯ p) ∗ R(q, ¯ y) ∗ R(q, ¯ z)] ∨ [R(x, ¯ p) ∗ R(q, ¯ y) ∗ R(y, ¯ p) ∗ R(q, ¯ z)] and R(y, ¯ p) ∗ R(q, ¯ z)]. R (x, z) = R(x, z) ∨ [R(x, The following inequalities follow from hypothesis and by Lemma 4.33: R(x, y) ∗ R(y, z) ≤ R(x, z) ≤ R (x, z); ¯ p) ∗ R(q, ¯ z) ≤ R(x, ¯ y) ∗ R(y, ¯ p) ∗ R(q, ¯ z) ≤ R(x, ¯ p) ∗ R(q, ¯ z) ≤ R(x, y) ∗ R(y, R (x, z); ¯ p) ∗ R(q, ¯ y) ∗ R(y, ¯ z) ≤ R(x, ¯ p) ∗ R(q, ¯ z) ≤ R (x, z); R(x, ¯ p) ∗ R(q, ¯ y) ∗ R(y, ¯ p) ∗ R(q, ¯ z) ≤ R(x, ¯ p) ∗ R(p, ¯ q) ∗ R(q, ¯ z) = 0 R(x, ¯ q) = R(p, q) = 0. since R(p, Therefore R (x, y) ∗ R (y, z) ≤ R (x, z) hence R is ∗-transitive. Assume R(x, x) = 0, then, by Lemma 4.33 one gets ¯ p) ∗ R(q, ¯ x)] = R(x, ¯ p) ∗ R(q, ¯ x) = R(q, ¯ x) ∗ R (x, x) = R(x, x) ∨ [R(x, ¯ p) ≤ R(q, ¯ p) = R(q, p) = 0. R(x, Corollary 4.35. Let R be a strict partial ∗-order on X, p, q ∈ X, p = q and R(p, q) = R(q, p) = 0. Then there exists a strict partial ∗-order R such that R ⊆ R and R (p, q) = 1. Theorem 4.36. Let R be a ∗-transitive fuzzy relation on X. Then there exists a total ∗-transitive fuzzy relation R∗ on X such that (i) R ⊆ R∗ ; (ii) R∗ preserves the irreflexivity of R. Proof. Let C be the family of ∗-transitive fuzzy relations Q on X such that R ⊆ Q and Q preserves the irreflexivity of R. Obviously R ∈ C. C is partially ordered w.r.t. the inclusion ⊆ of fuzzy relations. We shall prove that (C, ⊆) is inductive. i.e. every totally ordered family {Qi }i∈I ⊆ C has an upper bound in C. Let {Qi }i∈I be a totally ordered family in C, i.e. for all i, j ∈ I we have Qi ⊆ Qj or Qj ⊆ Qi . It suffices to prove that Q = Qi belongs to C. i∈I
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4 Fuzzy Preference Relations
Let x, y, z ∈ X. According to Lemma 4.5 (6) we have: Q(x, y) ∗ Q(y, z) = [
i∈I
Qi (x, y)] ∗ [
Qj (y, z)] =
j∈I
(Qi (x, y) ∗ Qj (y, z)).
i,j∈I
Let i, j ∈ I so Qi ⊆ Qj or Qj ⊆ Qi . Assume for example that Qi ⊆ Qj , hence Qi (x, y) ∗ Qj (y, z) ≤ Qj (x, y) ∗ Qj (y, z) ≤ Qj (x, z). This inequality holds for any i, j ∈ I, hence Q(x, y) ∗ Q(y, z) ≤ Q(x, z). Thus Q is ∗-transitive. If R(x, x) = 0 then Qi (x, x) = 0 for any i ∈ I hence Q(x, x) = Qi (x, x) = 0. It is obvious that R ⊆ Q hence Q ∈ C and (C, ⊆) i∈I
is inductive. By Zorn’s Lemma there exists a maximal member R∗ in C, i.e. R∗ ⊆ P and P ∈ C implies R∗ = P . According to the definition of C, R∗ is ∗-transitive, R ⊆ R∗ and R∗ (x, x) = 0 for each x ∈ X such that R(x, x) = 0. Now we shall prove that R∗ is total, i.e. R∗ (x, y) > 0 or R∗ (y, x) > 0 for all distinct x, y ∈ X. By absurdum assume R∗ (p, q) = R∗ (q, p) = 0 for some distinct p, q ∈ X. By Lemma 4.34 there exists a ∗-transitive fuzzy relation R on X such that R∗ ⊆ R , R (p, q) = 1 and R preserves the irreflexivity of R∗ . One remarks that R∗ preserves the irreflexivity of R: R(x, x) = 0 ⇒ R∗ (x, x) = 0 ⇒ R (x, x) = 0. Hence R∗ R ∈ C. This contradicts the maximality of R∗ , hence R∗ is total. Corollary 4.37. If R is a strict partial ∗-order on X then there exists a total strict ∗-order R∗ on X such that R ⊆ R∗ . This corollary is a fuzzy version of Szpilrajn theorem.
5 Fuzzy Choice Functions
The economic and social life is governed by complex phenomena, that might have exact and/or vague components. According to the relationship exact–vague, there have been studied the following situations: (a) exact preferences and exact choices; (b) vague preferences and exact choices; (c) vague preferences and vague choices. The first situation represents the subject of the classic theory of choice functions [9], [94], [96], [103]. In the second situation, even if the preferences are vague, the act of choice is characterized by the precise specification of the chosen alternatives [15], [16], [17], [69], etc. There are cases when both the preferences and the choices are vague (e. g. in different moments of a negotiation when the option is not definitive [70], [71], [67]). This is related to the third situation. The first section of this chapter concerns the situation (b); exact choice functions associated with various fuzzy preference relations are studied. With the score functions nine such functions are defined [16], but the results of this section are based mainly on the Orlovsky function [79]. A characterization of
Irina Georgescu: Fuzzy Choice Functions, StudFuzz 214, 75–106 (2007) www.springerlink.com
c Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007
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5 Fuzzy Choice Functions
the Orlovsky function is presented in terms of some properties of the fuzzy preference relations. With the Section 5.2 the study of the relationship between the fuzzy choice functions and the fuzzy preference relations begins, therefore we discuss the situation (c). We introduce a general class of fuzzy choice functions that includes the ones studied by Banerjee [14]. With a fuzzy choice function several revealed preference relations are associated, and the revealed preference axioms W AF RP , SAF RP , HAF RP and the congruence axioms W F CA, SF CA are formulated. Section 5.3 studies the rationality and the normality of the fuzzy choice functions, notions that have a central role in this book. They represent the mathematical modelling of the rational behaviour of an act of choice. Two concepts of rationality are studied (M –rationality and G–rationality) and two concepts of normality (M –normality and G–normality) as a special case of rationality. In line with Arrow’s impossibility theorem [9], several papers studied the problem of aggregating the individual preferences into collective preferences (e. g. [94], [96]). Some authors studied the way the individual preferences aggregate into a collective choice function ([103]), while other authors ([3], [4], [7]) studied the way the individual choice functions aggregate into a collective choice function. The fuzzy choice functions introduced by us in this chapter could be a propitious framework for the treatment of this problem in fuzzy context.
5.1 From Fuzzy Preferences to Exact Choices In this section we shall consider vague preferences and exact choices. This situation is mathematically modelled by fuzzy preference relations and by
5.1 From Fuzzy Preferences to Exact Choices
77
crisp choice functions. We shall study how with a fuzzy preference relation we can associate various crisp choice functions. Let X be a universe of alternatives and B a family of available subsets of X, i.e. (X, B) is a choice space. Throughout this section H will be a non–empty family of reflexive fuzzy preference relations on X. Example 5.1. [79] An agent wants to choose a non-empty set C(S) from each available set S ∈ B. Based on an expertise he has to find a way to evaluate how “an alternative x is preferred to an alternative y”. Suppose n experts are consulted in saying without ambiguity that “alternative x is preferred to alternative y” (for any x, y ∈ X). Herewith each expert i produces a crisp preference relation Qi on X. The agent will combine the evaluations of the n experts. Following [79], for any x, y ∈ X denote by Q(x, y) the fraction of the number of experts that preferred x to y in the total number n: Q(x, y) =
card{i|(x,y)∈Qi } . n
For the agent the real number Q(x, y) ∈ [0, 1] represents the degree of preference of x with respect to y. In this way we have obtained a fuzzy preference relation Q : X 2 → [0, 1]. In his choice, the agent will rely on the fuzzy preference relation Q obtained by the aggregation of the results of the n experts. The agent’s choice will be exact and will be modelled by a crisp choice function C associated with the fuzzy preference relation Q. This situation when the exact choices are based on vague preferences leads to the notion of preference–based choice function. A preference-based choice function (P CF ) is a function C : B×H → P(X) such that for any A ∈ B and Q ∈ H, C(A, Q) is a non–empty subset of X. For any fuzzy preference relation Q ∈ H we obtain a crisp choice function C(., Q) : B → P(X). Intuitively, C(A, Q) is the set of alternatives chosen from the available set A when the fuzzy preference relation Q is taken as basis.
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If for any Q ∈ H the crisp choice function C(., Q) verifies a property P then we shall say that the P CF C verifies P . For example, C verifies the consistency condition α if for any Q ∈ H, for any A, B ∈ B and for any x ∈ X we have x ∈ A, x ∈ C(B, Q), A ⊆ B ⇒ x ∈ C(A, Q). In what follows let us suppose that the set X is finite. We shall present a simple way to obtain a P CF . A function with the form W : X × B × H → R is called score function. By a score function, with every triple (x, A, Q) ∈ X × B × H one can associate a real number W (x, A, Q) named the score of the alternative x based on the action of Q on A. Let W be a score function. For any A ∈ B and Q ∈ H we denote: CW (A, Q) = {x ∈ A|W (x, A, Q) ≥ W (y, A, Q) for all y ∈ A} The assignment (A, Q) → CW (A, Q) defines a crisp choice function on (X, B) (due to the finitude of X). CW (A, Q) represents the choice set of the alternatives with higher score. The first P CF has been obtained in this way by Orlovsky [79]. The Orlovsky score is defined by OV (x, A, Q) = miny∈A min(1 − Q(y, x) + Q(x, y), 1) for any A ∈ B, Q ∈ H and x ∈ A. Then the P CF Orlovsky COV is defined by COV (A, Q) = {x ∈ A|OV (x, A, Q) ≥ OV (y, A, Q) for all y ∈ A}. Remark 5.2. The Orlovsky score can be written: OV (x, A, Q) = (Q(y, x) →L Q(x, y)) y∈A
for any x ∈ A, where →L is the Lukasiewicz implication. The following score functions are defined by [16]: M F (x, A, Q) = {Q(x, y)|y ∈ A \ {x}}; mF (x, A, Q) = {Q(x, y)|y ∈ A \ {x}}; M A(x, A, Q) = {Q(y, x)|y ∈ A \ {x}};
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{Q(y, x)|y ∈ A \ {x}}; SF (x, A, Q) = y∈A\{x} Q(x, y); SA(x, A, Q) = y∈A\{x} Q(y, x); M D(x, A, Q) = {Q(x, y) − Q(y, x)|y ∈ A \ {x}}; mD(x, A, Q) = {Q(x, y) − Q(y, x)|y ∈ A \ {x}}; SD(x, A, Q) = y∈A\{x} (Q(x, y) − Q(y, x)) mA(x, A, Q) =
for any x ∈ A. Remark 5.3. In [16], M F (x, A, Q) is interpreted as “max for x in A, defined in terms of Q”, mF (x, A, Q) as “min for x in A, defined in terms of Q” and M A, mA, SF , SA, M D, mD, SD have the significance “max against”, “min against”, “sum for”, “sum against”, “max difference”, “min difference” and “sum difference”, respectively. The P CF ’s associated with these nine score functions will be defined as follows: CM F (A, Q) = {x ∈ A|M F (x, A, Q) ≥ M F (y, A, Q) for all y ∈ A}; CmF (A, Q) = {x ∈ A|mF (x, A, Q) ≥ mF (y, A, Q) for all y ∈ A}; CM A (A, Q) = {x ∈ A|M A(x, A, Q) ≤ M A(y, A, Q) for all y ∈ A}; CmA (A, Q) = {x ∈ A|mA(x, A, Q) ≤ mA(y, A, Q) for all y ∈ A}; CSF (A, Q) = {x ∈ A|SF (x, A, Q) ≥ SF (y, A, Q) for all y ∈ A}; CSA (A, Q) = {x ∈ A|SA(x, A, Q) ≤ SA(y, A, Q) for all y ∈ A}; CM D (A, Q) = {x ∈ A|M D(x, A, Q) ≥ M D(y, A, Q) for all y ∈ A}; CmD (A, Q) = {x ∈ A|mD(x, A, Q) ≥ mD(y, A, Q) for all y ∈ A}; CSD (A, Q) = {x ∈ A|SD(x, A, Q) ≥ SD(y, A, Q) for all y ∈ A}. For A ⊆ X and Q ∈ H we shall define the set of pairwise dominant alternatives in A given Q by P D(A, Q) = {x ∈ A|Q(x, y) ≥ Q(y, x) for all y ∈ A}. P D(A, Q) can be empty for some A and Q.
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Proposition 5.4. [16] For all A ∈ B and Q ∈ H, COV (A, Q) = CmD (A, Q). Proof. One distinguishes two cases. Case a P D(A, Q) = ∅. Then for any x ∈ A we have (1) x ∈ P D(A, Q) ⇒ x ∈ COV (A, Q); (2) x ∈ P D(A, Q) ⇒ x ∈ COV (A, Q). The properties (1) and (2) follow according to the implications: x ∈ P D(A, Q) ⇒ Q(x, y) ≥ Q(y, x) for all y ∈ A ⇒ OV (x, A, Q) = 1 ⇒ OV (x, A, Q) ≥ OV (y, A, Q) for all y ∈ A ⇒ x ∈ COV (A, Q). Also x ∈ P D(A, Q) ⇒ Q(x, y0 ) < Q(y0 , x) for some y0 ∈ A ⇒ OV (x, A, Q) ≤ 1 − Q(y0 , x) + Q(x, y0 ) < 1 ⇒ OV (x, A, Q) < OV (x0 , A, Q) = 1 for some x0 ∈ A ⇒ x ∈ COV (A, Q) since, for x0 ∈ P D(A, Q) we have OV (x0 , A, Q) = 1. By (1) and (2) it follows P D(A, Q) = COV (A, Q). Also for any x ∈ A we have (3) x ∈ P D(A, Q) ⇒ Q(x, y) ≥ Q(y, x) for all y ∈ A ⇒ mD(x, A, Q) ≥ 0; (4) x ∈ P D(A, Q) ⇒ Q(x, y0 ) < Q(y0 , x) for some y ∈ A ⇒ mD(x, A, Q) < 0 Let us show that CmD (A, Q) ⊆ P D(A, Q). Let x ∈ P D(A, Q), therefore mD(x, A, Q) < 0. Let y ∈ P D(A, Q). Then mD(y, A, Q) ≥ 0, so mD(x, A, Q) < mD(y, A, Q). Therefore x ∈ CmD (A, Q). For proving the converse inclusion consider two subcases: (i) |P D(A, Q)| = 1, hence there exists exactly one element x0 in P D(A, Q). Then by (3) and (4) mD(x0 , A, Q) ≥ 0 and mD(y, A, Q) < 0 for all y ∈ A \ {x0 }, hence mD(x0 , A, Q) ≥ mD(y, A, Q) for all y ∈ A, i.e. x0 ∈ CmD (A, Q).
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(ii) |P D(A, Q)| ≥ 2, then there exist at least two distinct elements in P D(A, Q). Let x1 , x2 ∈ P D(A, Q), x1 = x2 . Then Q(x1 , y) ≥ Q(y, x1 ), Q(x2 , y) ≥ Q(y, x2 ) for all y ∈ A hence Q(x1 , x2 ) = Q(x2 , x1 ). Let x ∈ P D(A, Q), hence there exists x ∈ P D(A, Q) such that x = x , therefore Q(x, x ) = Q(x , x). Thus mD(x, A, Q) = {Q(x, y) − Q(y, x)|y ∈ A \ {x}} ≤ Q(x, x ) − Q(x , x) = 0, i. e. mD(x, A, Q) = 0. For any y ∈ A we have: • if y ∈ P D(A, Q) then mD(y, A, Q) = 0 (by the previous computation) • if y ∈ P D(A, Q) then mD(y, A, Q) < 0 (by (4)). Therefore for any x ∈ P D(A, Q) we get mD(x, A, Q) = 0 ≥ mD(y, A, Q) for all y ∈ A, hence x ∈ CmD (A, Q). In both cases (i) and (ii) we have established the inclusion P D(A, Q) ⊆ CmD (A, Q). It follows P D(A, Q) = CmD (A, Q). Case b P D(A, Q) = ∅. Let x ∈ A. Then Q(x, y0 ) < Q(y0 , x) for some y0 ∈ A, therefore 1 − Q(y0 , x) + Q(x, y0 ) < 1, from where it follows that OV (x, A, Q) ≤ min(1 − Q(y0 , x) + Q(x, y0 ), 1) = 1 − Q(y0 , x) + Q(x, y0 ). Then OV (x, A, Q) = =
min(1 − Q(y, x) + Q(x, y), 1)
y∈A\{x}
(1 − Q(y, x) + Q(x, y))
y∈A\{x}
=1+
(Q(x, y) − Q(y, x))
y∈A\{x}
Let x, z ∈ A. The following assertions are equivalent: • OV (x, A, Q) ≥ OV (z, A, Q) • 1+ (Q(x, y) − Q(y, x)) ≥ 1 + y∈A\{x}
•
(Q(x, y) − Q(y, x)) ≥
y∈A\{x}
(Q(z, y) − Q(y, z))
y∈A\{x}
(Q(z, y) − Q(y, z))
y∈A\{x}
• mD(x, A, Q) ≥ mD(z, A, Q). It follows COV (A, Q) = {x ∈ A|OV (x, A, Q) ≥ OV (z, A, Q) for all z ∈ A}
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= {x ∈ A|mD(x, A, Q) ≥ mD(z, A, Q) for all z ∈ A} = CmD (A, Q). With this, the proposition has been proved. Corollary 5.5. Let A ∈ B and Q ∈ H. If P D(A, Q) = ∅ then P D(A, Q) = COV (A, Q) = CmD (A, Q). Proof. See the case (a) of the proof of Proposition 5.4. By definition, a fuzzy relation Q is Banerjee–transitive if for any x, y, z ∈ A we have Q(x, y) ≥ Q(y, x), Q(y, z) ≥ Q(z, y) ⇒ Q(x, z) ≥ Q(z, x). Proposition 5.6. For any fuzzy relation Q on X the following are equivalent: (1) Q is Banerjee–transitive; (2) For all x, y, z ∈ X, if Q(x, y) ≥ Q(y, x) and Q(y, z) ≥ Q(z, y), with strict inequality holding at least once, then Q(x, z) > Q(z, x). Proof. (1) ⇒ (2). For example, we assume that Q(x, y) ≥ Q(y, x) and Q(y, z) > Q(z, y). Since Q is Banerjee–transitive, Q(x, z) ≥ Q(z, x). We assume by absurdum that Q(x, z) = Q(z, x). Since Q(z, x) = Q(x, z) and Q(x, y) ≥ Q(y, x), applying again (1), we get Q(z, y) ≥ Q(y, z), contradicting Q(y, z) > Q(z, y). Similarly, we can show that Q(x, y) > Q(y, x) and Q(y, z) ≥ Q(z, y) imply Q(x, z) > Q(z, x). (2) ⇒ (1). Let x, y, z ∈ X such that Q(x, y) ≥ Q(y, x) and Q(y, z) ≥ Q(z, y). We shall prove that Q(x, z) ≥ Q(z, x). Assume by absurdum that Q(x, z) < Q(z, x). In accordance with (2), from the inequalities Q(z, x) > Q(x, z) and Q(x, y) ≥ Q(y, x) one gets Q(z, y) > Q(y, z), contradicting Q(y, z) ≥ Q(z, y). A fuzzy relation Q on X is acyclic if for n ≥ 2 and for x1 , . . . , xn ∈ X the following implication holds:
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Q(x1 , x2 ) > Q(x2 , x1 ), Q(x2 , x3 ) > Q(x3 , x2 ), . . . , Q(xn−1 , xn ) > Q(xn , xn−1 ) ⇒ Q(x1 , xn ) ≥ Q(xn , x1 ) To each fuzzy relation Q on X the following crisp relation Q∗ on X is associated: Q∗ = {(x, y) ∈ X 2 |Q(x, y) ≥ Q(y, x)}. One remarks that Q∗ is complete, i.e. (x, y) ∈ Q∗ or (y, x) ∈ Q∗ for all x, y ∈ X. Lemma 5.7. For any fuzzy relation Q on X the equivalences hold: (1) Q is Banerjee–transitive iff Q∗ is transitive; (2) Q is acyclic iff Q∗ is acyclic. Proof. (1) Obvious. (2) Since Q∗ is a complete crisp binary relation for any x, y ∈ X we have (x, y) ∈ PQ∗ iff (y, x) ∈ Q∗ iff Q(y, x) < Q(x, y). Then the following assertions are equivalent: – Q∗ is acyclic; – for any n ≥ 2, for any x1 , . . . , xn ∈ X, (x1 , x2 ) ∈ PQ∗ , . . . , (xn−1 , xn ) ∈ PQ∗ ⇒ (xn , x1 ) ∈ PQ∗ ; –for any n ≥ 2 and for any x1 , . . . , xn ∈ X, Q(x1 , x2 ) > Q(x2 , x1 ), . . . Q(xn−1 , xn ) > Q(xn , xn−1 ) ⇒ Q(x1 , xn ) ≥ Q(xn , x1 ). Lemma 5.8. Let Q be a fuzzy preference relation on X. If Q is Banerjee– transitive then Q∗ is acyclic. Proof. It is obvious that if Q is Banerjee–transitive then Q is acyclic. According to Lemma 5.7 it follows that Q∗ is acyclic. Remark 5.9. For any A ∈ B and for any Q ∈ H we have P D(A, Q) = {x ∈ A|xQ∗ y for all y ∈ A} = G(A, Q∗ ).
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Proposition 5.10. Let Q ∈ H. The following assertions are equivalent: (1) Q is acyclic; (2) P D(A, Q) = ∅ for any non–empty subset A of X. Proof. According to Proposition 3.16, Lemma 5.7 and Remark 5.9, the following assertions are equivalent:
Q is acyclic; Q∗ is acyclic; G(., Q∗ ) is a choice function; G(A, Q∗ ) = ∅ for any non–empty subset A of X; P D(A, Q) = ∅ for any non–empty subset A of X.
For a given P CF C we consider the following conditions: Pairwise StrictDominance (PSD) For all Q ∈ H and x, y ∈ X, Q(x, y) > Q(y, x) ⇒ C({x, y}, Q) = {x}. Pairwise Weak Dominance (PWD) For all Q ∈ H and x, y ∈ X, Q(x, y) ≥ Q(y, x) ⇒ x ∈ C({x, y}, Q). Reward for Pairwise Weak Dominance (RPWD) For all A ∈ B and Q ∈ H and x ∈ A, Q(x, y) ≥ Q(y, x) for all y ∈ A ⇒ x ∈ C(A, Q). Let us notice that P W D is equivalent with: for all Q ∈ H and x, y ∈ X, P D({x, y}, Q) ⊆ C({x, y}, Q). Lemma 5.11. Let C be a P CF . If C verifies P W D and γ2 then P D(A, Q) ⊆ C(A, Q) for all A ∈ B and Q ∈ H.
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85
Proof. Let A ∈ B and Q ∈ H. One notices that x ∈ P D(A, Q) iff Q(x, y) ≥ Q(y, x) for all y ∈ A iff x ∈ P D({x, y}, Q) for all y ∈ A. According to P W D we have P D({x, y}, Q) ⊆ C({x, y}, Q) then by applying the equivalences that have been proved and γ2 it follows: x ∈ P D(A, Q) ⇒ x ∈ C({x, y}, Q) for all y ∈ A ⇒ x ∈ C(A, Q). Theorem 5.12. [22] Suppose that H is a non–empty set of fuzzy preference relations reflexive and acyclic. Let C : H → P(X) a P CF . The following equivalences hold: (1) C = COV ; (2) C verifies P SD, P W D, α2 and γ2 . Proof. (1) ⇒ (2). We prove that COV verifies the following four conditions. Let Q be a reflexive and acyclic fuzzy preference relations and A ∈ B. (a) COV verifies P SD; Q(x, y) > Q(y, x) ⇒ COV ({x, y}, Q) = P D({x, y}, Q) = {z ∈ {x, y}|Q(z, w) ≥ Q(w, z)} = {x} for all w ∈ {x, y}; (b) COV verifies P W D: Q(x, y) ≥ Q(y, x) ⇒ x ∈ COV ({x, y}, Q); (c) COV verifies α2 : x ∈ COV (A, Q) ⇒ x ∈ P D(A, Q) ⇒ Q(x, y) ≥ Q(y, x) for all y ∈ A; ⇒ x ∈ COV ({x, y}, Q) for all y ∈ A (d) C verifies γ2 : if x ∈ COV ({x, y}, Q) for all y ∈ A then Q(x, y) ≥ Q(y, x) for all y ∈ A, i.e. x ∈ COV (A, Q). (2) ⇒ (1). Let A ∈ B and Q ∈ H. We prove that C(A, Q) = COV (A, Q). Since Q is acyclic, according to Proposition 5.10, P D(A, Q) = ∅. Then, by Corollary 5.5, COV (A, Q) = P D(A, Q). It is sufficient to prove that C(A, Q) = P D(A, Q). By applying Lemma 5.11, P D(A, Q) ⊆ C(A, Q). Suppose by absurdum that the inclusion C(A, Q) ⊆ P D(A, Q) does not hold;
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5 Fuzzy Choice Functions
then there exists x ∈ C(A, Q) and x ∈ P D(A, Q). Then Q(y0 , x) > Q(x, y0 ) for some y0 ∈ A, hence, by P SD, we get C({x, y0 }, Q) = {y0 }. Since x ∈ C(A, Q) we get by α2 , x ∈ C({x, y0 }, Q) = {y0 }, so x = y0 . This contradicts Q(y0 , x) > Q(x, y0 ). It follows that C(A, Q) ⊆ P D(A, Q). Therefore P D(A, Q) = C(A, Q).
5.2 Fuzzy Choice Functions In [14] Banerjee studied a revealed preference theory for the case of vague preferences and vague choices .His motivation is the following: “If preferences are permitted to be fuzzy, it seems natural to permit the choice function to be fuzzy as well. This also tallies with experience. For instance, a decision–maker, faced with the problem of deciding whether or not to choose an alternative x from a set of alternative A, may feel that he/she is inclined to the extent 0.8 (on, say, a scale from 0 to 1 ) toward choosing it. Moreover, this fuzziness of choice is, at least potentially, observable. For instance, the decision–maker in the example will be able to tell an interviewer the degree of his/her inclinations, or demonstrate these inclinations to an observer by the degree of eagerness or enthusiasm which he/she displays. Hence, while there may be problems of estimations, fuzzy choice functions are, in theory, observable”. Now we shall present the framework in which the theory of Banerjee is developed. Let X be a non-empty set of alternatives, H the family of all non-empty finite subsets of X and F the family of non-zero fuzzy subsets of X with finite support. A Banerjee fuzzy choice function is a function C : H → F such that supp C(S) ⊆ S for any S ∈ H. This notion has the following interpretation [14]:
5.2 Fuzzy Choice Functions
87
“For all S ∈ H, C(S)(x) will be taken to represent the extent to which x belongs to the set of chosen alternatives when the available set of alternatives is S”. We remark two main characteristics in the definition of the Banerjee choice function: (a) the available sets of alternatives are crisp subsets of X; (b) the choice of an alternative x from an available set S is evaluated by a real number C(S)(x) ∈ [0, 1]. In (a) the crisp aspect is preserved: we have no information about the alternatives in S except that they can be chosen. The vagueness of the act of choice appears only in (b). We shall extend the notion of fuzzy choice function by changing the point of view on (a). The available sets will represent the vague attributes or vague criteria. Mathematically, they will be fuzzy subsets of the universe X of alternatives. If a fuzzy subset S of X will represent a vague criterion and x is an alternative, then the real number S(x) means the degree to which the alternative x verifies the criterion S. S(x) will be called the availability degree of x. For example, suppose that X is a set of objects where the green colour appears in four nuances a, b, c, d. The numbers 0, 13 , 23 , 1 indicate the intensity of color green of the nuances a, b, c, d. Then the attribute “green” will be represented by a fuzzy subset V of X whose range is the set {0, 13 , 23 , 1} ⊆ [0, 1]. V (x) =
1 3
indicates that the object x has the nuance b.
The act of choice means that with each available fuzzy set of alternatives S and for each x ∈ X a real number C(S)(x) ∈ [0, 1] is assigned. C(S)(x) is interpreted as the degree to which the alternative x can be chosen with respect to criterion S. Now we shall formalize this thesis. Definition 5.13. Let us consider a pair (X, B) where X is a non-empty set and B is a non-empty family of non–zero fuzzy subsets of X. The pair (X, B)
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5 Fuzzy Choice Functions
is called a fuzzy choice space. A fuzzy choice function (=fuzzy consumer) on (X, B) is a function C : B → F(X) such that for each S ∈ B, C(S) is non-zero and C(S) ⊆ S. The same definition of a fuzzy choice function can be found in [80]. A fuzzy choice problem has the form (X, B, C) where (X, B) is a fuzzy choice space and C is a fuzzy choice function on (X, B). In terms of fuzzy consumers, X is the set of bundles and B is the family of fuzzy budgets ; the pair (X, B) is called a fuzzy budget space . Let x ∈ X be a bundle and S ∈ B be a fuzzy budget; the real number C(S)(x) can be interpreted as the degree to which the bundle x is chosen subject to the fuzzy budget S. The fuzzy set S ∈ B offers an availability degree S(x) for each x ∈ X. The degree C(S)(x) to which x is chosen subject to S naturally belongs to the interval (0, S(x)]. Remark 5.14. Let H be the family of all non-empty finite subsets of X. H can be identified with B0 = {χK |K ∈ H} and (X, B0 ) is a fuzzy budget space. A Banerjee fuzzy choice function C : H → F induces a fuzzy choice function C : B0 → F by putting C (χK ) = C(K) for each K ∈ H. Thus C and C can be identified hence our definition for fuzzy choice functions includes Banerjee’s. Banerjee fuzzifies only the range of a choice function; in our approach both the domain and the range of a choice function are fuzzified. In this case one obtains a very general framework for the fuzzy choice functions and the results have a much deeper meaning. Example 5.15. (I) Generalized Orlovsky function. Consider ∗ an arbitrary continuous t–norm. Let (X, B) be a finite fuzzy choice space and H a non–empty family of reflexive fuzzy preference relations on X. For any A ∈ B, Q ∈ H and x ∈ X we define the generalized Orlovsky score by
5.2 Fuzzy Choice Functions
OV G(x, A, Q) = A(x) ∗
89
[A(y) → (Q(y, x) → Q(x, y))]
y∈X
= A(x) ∗
[A(y) ∗ Q(y, x) → Q(x, y)]
y∈X
For any A ∈ B and Q ∈ H let us introduce the function COV G (A, Q) : X → [0, 1] by COV G (A, Q)(x) = A(x) ∗
[A(y) → (OV G(y, A, Q) → OV G(x, A, Q))]
y∈X
= A(x) ∗
[A(y) ∗ OV G(y, A, Q) → OV G(x, A, Q)]
y∈X
for any x ∈ X. The assignment (A, Q) −→ COV G (A, Q) defines a function COV G : B × H → F(X). Next we prove that COV G (., Q) is a fuzzy choice function. Let A ∈ B and Q ∈ H. Then the set U = {x ∈ X|A(x) > 0} is non–empty. Since U is a finite set, there exists x0 ∈ U such that OV G(y, A, Q) ≤ OV G(x0 , A, Q) for any y ∈ U. Notice that A(y) = 0 for y ∈ U and (A(y) ∗ OV G(y, A, Q)) → OV G(x0 , A, Q) = 1 for y ∈ U , therefore COV G (A, Q)(x0 ) = A(x0 ) > 0. It follows that COV G (., Q) is a fuzzy choice function on (X, B) for any Q ∈ H. In case when B is a family of non–empty crisp subsets of X and ∗ is the Lukasiewicz t–norm, one finds the Orlovsky function COV . Therefore, COV G is called the generalized Orlovsky function. The computation of the generalized Orlovsky function We will exemplifythe generalized Orlovsky function for the following data: X = {x, y}, Q =
1β
, 0 ≤ α, β ≤ 1, A = aχ{x} + bχ{y} , 0 ≤ a, b ≤ 1.
α1 OV G(x, A, Q) = A(x) ∗ [A(x) ∗ Q(x, x) → Q(x, x)] ∗ [A(y) ∗ Q(y, x) →
Q(x, y)] = a ∗ (b ∗ α → β). OV G(y, A, Q) = b ∗ (a ∗ β → α). COV G (A, Q)(x) = A(x) ∗ [A(x) ∗ OV G(x, A, Q) → OV G(x, A, Q)] ∗ [A(y) ∗ OV G(y, A, Q) → OV G(x, A, Q)]
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= a ∗ (b ∗ b ∗ (a ∗ β → α) → a ∗ (b ∗ α → β)) COV G (A, Q)(y) = b ∗ (a ∗ a ∗ (b ∗ α → β) → b ∗ (a ∗ β → α)). (II) Consider again ∗ an arbitrary continuous t–norm. Let (X, B) be a finite fuzzy choice space and H a non–empty family of reflexive fuzzy preference relations on X. For any A ∈ B, Q ∈ H and x ∈ X we give next the generalized score functions
M F G(x, A, Q) = A(x) ∗
[A(y) ∗ Q(x, y)];
y∈X\{x}
mF G(x, A, Q) = A(x) ∗
[A(y) → Q(x, y)];
y∈X\{x}
M AG(x, A, Q) = A(x) ∗
[A(y) ∗ Q(x, y)];
y∈X\{x}
mAG(x, A, Q) = A(x) ∗
[A(y) → Q(x, y)]
y∈X\{x}
corresponding to the score functions M F , mF , M A, mA introduced in Section 5.1. We also introduce the generalized P CF ’s associated with the generalized score functions from above. CM F G (A, Q)(x) = A(x) ∗ A(x) ∗
[(A(y) ∗ M F (y, A, Q)) → M F (x, A, Q)];
CmF G (A, Q)(x) = A(x) ∗
[A(y) → (mA(y, A, Q) → mA(x, A, Q)] =
[(A(y) ∗ mA(y, A, Q)) → mA(x, A, Q)];
CM AG (A, Q)(x) = A(x) ∗
y∈X
y∈X
A(x) ∗
[A(y) → (mF (y, A, Q) → mF (x, A, Q)] =
[(A(y) ∗ mF (y, A, Q)) → mF (x, A, Q)];
CmAG (A, Q)(x) = A(x) ∗
y∈X
y∈X
A(x) ∗
[A(y) → (M F (y, A, Q) → M F (x, A, Q)] =
y∈X
y∈X
A(x) ∗
[A(y) → (M A(y, A, Q) → M A(x, A, Q)] =
y∈X
[(A(y) ∗ M A(y, A, Q)) → M A(x, A, Q)].
y∈X
(III) In Example 5.1, the evaluation of the n experts was expressed by n crisp preference relations Q1 , . . . , Qn on the set X of the alternatives. Each
5.2 Fuzzy Choice Functions
91
preference relation Qi leads to a crisp choice function Ci : B → P(X) (e.g. by taking Ci = G(., Qi )). If S ∈ B, x ∈ X then x ∈ Ci (S) means that the expert i appreciates that x is chosen from S. In order to combine the evaluations of the n experts, the agent will choose for example, the following expression: for any S ∈ B and x ∈ X, C(S)(x) =
1 n card{i|x
∈ Ci (S)}
C(S)(x) is the fraction of the number of the experts which appreciate that x is chosen from S. One obtains this way a fuzzy choice function C : B → F(X). The domain of this choice function consists of (not necessarily all) non–empty crisp subsets of X and the range of non–zero fuzzy subsets of X. Although a part of fuzzy choice function theory will be developed in this general setting, in order to extend Uzawa–Arrow–Sen theory we need some natural hypotheses. In this book we work mostly with the following hypotheses: (H1) Every S ∈ B and C(S) are normal fuzzy subsets of X; (H2 ) B includes all fuzzy sets [x1 , . . . , xn ], n ≥ 1 and x1 , . . . , xn ∈ X. For the crisp case (B ⊆ P(X)) hypothesis (H1) asserts that any S ∈ B and C(S) are non-empty, hence (H1) is automatically fulfilled in accordance with the definition of choice function; for the same case, (H2) asserts that B includes all non-empty finite subsets of X. Now we fix a continuous t-norm ∗. The following definitions will be formulated in the fuzzy set theory associated with the t-norm ∗; we shall use the residuated structure ([0, 1], ∨, ∧, ∗, →, 0, 1). The following three definitions introduce the main fuzzy revealed preference relations used in fuzzy choice function theory. They generalize to fuzzy sets the crisp revealed preference relations defined in Section 3.2. Definition 5.16. Let C : B → F(X) be a fuzzy choice function on (X, B). We define the following fuzzy revealed preference relations R, P, I on X by (i) R(x, y) = (C(S)(x) ∗ S(y)); S∈B
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5 Fuzzy Choice Functions
(ii) P (x, y) = R(x, y) ∗ ¬R(y, x); (iii) I(x, y) = R(x, y) ∗ R(y, x) for any x, y ∈ X. By interpreting the t–norm ∗ as a conjunction, R(x, y) is the degree of truth of the statement “there exists a criterion S such that alternative x is chosen with respect of S and alternative y verifies S”. Definition 5.17. Assume hypothesis (H2) holds. Let C be a fuzzy choice function on (X, B). We define the following fuzzy revealed preference relations ¯ P¯ , I¯ on X by R, ¯ y) = C([x, y])(x); (i) R(x, ¯ y) ∗ ¬R(y, ¯ x); (ii) P¯ (x, y) = R(x, ¯ y) = R(x, ¯ y) ∗ R(y, ¯ x) (iii) I(x, for any x, y ∈ X. ¯ y) is the degree of truth of the statement “at least the alternative x R(x, is chosen from the set {x, y}”. Definition 5.18. Let C be a fuzzy choice function on (X, B). We define the ˜ P˜ , I˜ on X by following fuzzy revealed preference relations R, (i) P˜ (x, y) = (C(S)(x) ∗ S(y) ∗ ¬C(S)(y)); S∈B
˜ y) = ¬P˜ (y, x); (ii) R(x, ˜ y) = R(x, ˜ y) ∗ R(y, ˜ x) (iii) I(x, for any x, y ∈ X. P˜ (x, y) is the degree of truth of the statement “there exists a criterion S with respect to which x is chosen and y is rejected”. Preserving the results from the crisp case, we denote by W the transitive closure of R and by P ∗ the transitive closure of P˜ . Easy calculations show that the fuzzy revealed preference relations introduced by these definitions extend the corresponding crisp revealed preference
5.2 Fuzzy Choice Functions
93
relations. We kept the notations used for crisp choice functions in order to see how Uzawa–Arrow–Sen theory is generalized to fuzzy choice functions. Remark 5.19. Let C : H → F be a Banerjee fuzzy choice function and C : B0 → F the associated fuzzy choice function. For any K ∈ H and u ∈ X we have C (χK )(u) ≤ χK (u) hence u ∈ K ⇒ C (χK )(u) = χK (u) = 0. Assume ∗ is the G¨ odel t-norm ∧. Thus the fuzzy revealed preference relation R associated with C (cf. Definition 5.16 (i)) has the following form R(x, y) = (C (χK )(x) ∧ χK (y)) K∈H = {C(K)(x)|K ∈ H, x, y ∈ K}. In this case R coincides with the fuzzy revealed preference relation defined by Banerjee in [14], Definition 2.5. Remark 5.20. Assume the conditions of Remark 5.19 are fulfilled but ∗ is the Lukasiewicz t-norm ∗L . According to the definition of the Lukasiewicz t-norm, for any a, b ∈ [0, 1] we have a ∗L ¬b = max (0, a − b). Let P˜ be the fuzzy revealed preference relation associated with C according to Definition 5.18 (i). An easy computation shows that for any x, y ∈ X we have P˜ (x, y) =
(C (χK )(x) ∗L χK (y) ∗L ¬C (χK )(y))
K∈H
=
{max(0, C(K)(x) − C(K)(y))|K ∈ H, x, y ∈ K}.
This shows that in this case P˜ coincides with the fuzzy relation defined in [14], Definition 2.6. Remarks 5.19, 5.20 show that in [14] appear some fuzzy revealed preference relations corresponding to the G¨ odel t-norm and some others corresponding to the Lukasiewicz t-norm, resulting a framework that combines the reasonings and the two t-norms. Definition 5.21. Let C be a fuzzy choice function on (X, B). We define the fuzzy preference relations R∗ and R1 on X by
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5 Fuzzy Choice Functions
(i) R∗ (x, y) =
[(S(x) ∗ C(S)(y)) → C(S)(x)];
S∈B
(ii) R1 (x, y) =
[¬S(x) ∨ C(S)(x) ∨ ¬C(S)(y)]
S∈B
for any x, y ∈ X.
Remark 5.22. By Lemma 4.3 (11), R∗ (x, y) can be written R∗ (x, y) = [S(x) → (C(S)(y) → C(S)(x))]. S∈B
An easy computation shows that both R1 and R∗ are fuzzy generalizations of the crisp relation denoted by R∗ . We observe that for each x ∈ X, R∗ (x, x) = [(S(x) ∗ C(S)(x)) → C(S)(x)] = 1. S∈B
Lemma 5.23. R1 ⊆ R∗ . Proof. Let x, y ∈ X and S ∈ B. By Lemma 4.3 (9) [¬S(x) ∨ C(S)(x) ∨ ¬C(S)(y)] ∗ (S(x) ∗ C(S)(y)) = = [¬S(x) ∗ S(x) ∗ C(S)(y)] ∨ [C(S)(x) ∗ S(x) ∗ C(S)(y)]∨ ∨[¬C(S)(y) ∗ S(x) ∗ C(S)(y)] = = C(S)(x) ∗ S(x) ∗ C(S)(y) ≤ C(S)(x). Therefore by Lemma 4.3 (1) we get ¬S(x) ∨ C(S)(x) ∨ ¬C(S)(y) ≤ (S(x) ∗ C(S)(y)) → C(S)(x). The last inequality holds for any S ∈ B hence by definitions of R∗ and R1 , we obtain R1 (x, y) ≤ R∗ (x, y). Example 5.24. Assume ∗ is the G¨ odel t-norm ∧. Let us take X = {x, y} and B = {A} with A = 0.2χ{x} + χ{y} and the fuzzy choice function C : B → F(X) defined by C(A) = 0.1χ{x} + χ{y} . In this case R1 (x, x) = ¬A(x) ∨ C(A)(x) ∨ ¬C(A)(x) = ¬0.2 ∨ 0.1 ∨ ¬0.1 = 0.1. Since R∗ (x, x) = 1 it follows that R1 (x, x) = R∗ (x, x), hence R∗ and R1 are distinct. Lemma 5.25. P˜ ⊆ R.
5.2 Fuzzy Choice Functions
95
Proof. For any x, y ∈ X we have: P˜ (x, y) = [C(S)(x)∗S(y)∗¬C(S)(y)] ≤ [C(S)(x)∗S(y)] = R(x, y). S∈B
S∈B
Lemma 5.26. Assume hypotheses (H1), (H2) are fulfilled and C : B → F(X) is a fuzzy choice function. ¯ ⊆ R; (i) R ¯ are reflexive and strongly total. (ii) R and R ¯ for any x, y ∈ X we have Proof. (i) By the definition of R and R ¯ y) = C([x, y])(x) = C([x, y])(x) ∗ [x, y](y) ≤ R(x, (C(S)(x) ∗ S(y)) = S∈B
R(x, y). (ii) For any x ∈ X, C([x]) ⊆ [x] hence for each y ∈ X: 1 if y = x C([x])(y) ≤ [x](y) = 0 if y = x. ¯ x) = Since C([x]) is a normal fuzzy set, C([x])(x) = 1. Hence R(x, ¯ is reflexive. C([x])(x) = 1 so R Let x, y be two distinct alternatives. For any z ∈ X we have 1 if z ∈ {x, y} C([x, y])(z) ≤ [x, y](z) = 0 otherwise . ¯ y) = C([x, y])(x) = Since C([x, y]) is a normal fuzzy set it follows that R(x, ¯ x) = C([x, y])(y) = 1, hence R ¯ is strongly total. 1 or R(y, ¯ ⊆ R and R ¯ is reflexive and strongly total it follows immediately Using R that R is reflexive and strongly total. Now we shall consider the following axioms of fuzzy revealed preference:
W AF RP (Weak Axiom of Fuzzy Revealed Preference) P˜ (x, y) ≤ ¬R(y, x) for all x, y ∈ X;
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5 Fuzzy Choice Functions
SAF RP (Strong Axiom of Fuzzy Revealed Preference) P ∗ (x, y) ≤ ¬R(y, x) for all x, y ∈ X.
Now we shall state two axioms of congruence for fuzzy choice functions:
W F CA (Weak Fuzzy Congruence Axiom) For any S ∈ B and x, y ∈ X the following inequality holds R(x, y) ∗ C(S)(y) ∗ S(x) ≤ C(S)(x).
SF CA (Strong Fuzzy Congruence Axiom) For any S ∈ B and x, y ∈ X the following inequality holds W (x, y) ∗ C(S)(y) ∗ S(x) ≤ C(S)(x).
Axiom W AF RP says that the degree to which there exists a criterion S with respect to which x is chosen, y verifies S but is rejected is less or equal than the degree to which for any other criterion S fulfilled by x, y cannot be rejected. Axiom SF CA expresses the fact that the degree to which alternative x is chosen with respect to criterion S, y verifies S and x is revealed preferred to y is less or equal than the degree to which y is chosen with respect to S. Similar interpretations can be given to the axioms SAF RP and SF CA. Generalizing [84], a fuzzy choice function is said to be congruous if it verifies SF CA. Remark 5.27. Axioms W AF RP , SAF RP , W F CA, SF CA are fuzzy versions of axioms W ARP , SARP , W CA, SCA in crisp choice function theory. Fuzzy versions of the above axioms are found in [14] in the form imposed by the context. Remark 5.28. Since P˜ (x, y) ≤ P ∗ (x, y) and R(x, y) ≤ W (x, y) for any x, y ∈ X the following implications hold true for any fuzzy choice function C: SAF RP ⇒ W AF RP ; SF CA ⇒ W F CA.
5.3 Rational and Normal Fuzzy Choice Functions
97
If P˜ (respectively R) is ∗-transitive then P˜ = P ∗ (respectively R = W ), therefore in this case: SAF RP ⇔ W AF RP (respectively SF CA ⇔ W F CA). The next two axioms W AF RP ◦ and SAF RP ◦ extend to fuzzy choice functions the form of W ARP and SARP formulated in terms of C-connected sequences ([100]). W AF RP ◦ For any x, y ∈ X and S1 , S2 ∈ B [S1 (x) ∗ C(S2 )(x)] ∗ [S2 (y) ∗ C(S1 )(y)] ≤ E(S1 ∩ C(S2 ), S2 ∩ C(S1 )). SAF RP ◦ For any x1 , . . . , xn ∈ X and S1 , . . . , Sn ∈ B n n−1 [Sk (xk ) ∗ C(Sk+1 )(xk )] ≤ E(Sj ∩ C(Sj+1 ), Sj+1 ∩ C(Sj )) k=1
j=1
where Sn+1 = S1 . Remark 5.29. In the crisp case W AF RP ◦ has the form: if there exist an element x ∈ S1 ∩ C(S2 ) and an element y ∈ S2 ∩ C(S1 ) then S1 ∩ C(S2 ) = S2 ∩ C(S1 ). This is exactly the axiom W ARP formulated in terms of C-connected sequences, hence W AF RP ◦ is a generalization of W ARP . Similarly, SAF RP ◦ generalizes SARP . We add the axiom HAF RP as a fuzzy extension of HARP : HAF RP For any x1 , . . . , xn ∈ X and S1 , . . . , Sn ∈ B: n n−1 [Sk (xk ) ∗ C(Sk+1 )(xk )] ≤ E(Sj ∩ C(Sj+1 ), Sj+1 ∩ C(Sj )) k=1
j=1
where Sn+1 = S1 . It is clear that HAF RP implies SAF RP ◦ .
5.3 Rational and Normal Fuzzy Choice Functions In the previous section we associated with a fuzzy choice function several fuzzy preference relations. Then vague preferences appear as a consequence
98
5 Fuzzy Choice Functions
of the act of choice. This section deals with the inverse route: the choices are derived from vague preferences. To a fuzzy preference relation Q on the set of alternatives we will assign two constructions: one of them fuzzifies the notion of Q–maximal element, the other fuzzifies the notion of Q–greatest element. For some fuzzy preference relations, these constructions provide fuzzy choice functions. Then we obtain two correspondences from fuzzy preference relations to fuzzy choice functions. In this way we can introduce two concepts of rationality: M –rationality and G–rationality of fuzzy choice functions. By rationality, a fuzzy choice function C is recoverable from a fuzzy preference relation. A special case of rationality is normality: C is recoverable from the fuzzy revealed preference relation R associated with C. The results proved in this section concern the connections between these four notions: M–rationality, G–rationality, M–normality and G–normality. Assume ∗ is a continuous t–norm. Let Q be a fuzzy preference relation on the universal set of alternatives X and B a non-empty family of non–zero fuzzy subsets of X. Definition 5.30. For any S ∈ B let us define the fuzzy subsets M (S, Q) and G(S, Q) of X: (i) M (S, Q)(x) = S(x) ∗
[(S(y) ∗ Q(y, x)) → Q(x, y)]
y∈X
= S(x) ∗ (ii) G(S, Q)(x) = S(x) ∗
[S(y) → (Q(y, x) → Q(x, y))];
y∈X
[S(y) → Q(x, y)].
y∈X
Remark 5.31. Assume Q is a fuzzy preference relation and S = χU with U ∈ P(X). An easy computation shows that (Q(y, x) → Q(x, y)) if x ∈ U M (χU , Q)(x) = y∈U 0 if x ∈ U.
5.3 Rational and Normal Fuzzy Choice Functions
99
Q(x, y) if x ∈ U G(χU , Q)(x) =
y∈U
0 if x ∈ U.
If Q is a crisp relation on X (Q : X 2 → {0, 1} ) then Q(y, x) → Q(x, y) = ¬PQ (y, x) hence we have M (χU , Q)(x) = 1 if and only if ¬PQ (y, x) = 1 for all y ∈ U G(χU , Q)(x) = 1 if and only if Q(x, y) = 1 for all y ∈ U . Therefore Definition 5.30 generalizes to fuzzy choice functions the Qmaximal point sets and the Q-greatest point sets. The real number M (S, Q)(x) (respectively G(S, Q)(x)) represents the degree to which the alternative x verifies the property of being Q–maximal (respectively Q–greatest) with respect to criterion S. In general the functions M (., Q) and G(., Q) are not fuzzy choice functions; there might be some S ∈ B such that C(S) is the zero fuzzy set. Proposition 5.32. Suppose ∗ is the G¨ odel t-norm. Let Q be a reflexive and transitive fuzzy preference relation on a finite set X and B ⊆ F(X). Then G(., Q) and M (., Q) are fuzzy choice functions on (X, B). Proof. Suppose by absurdum that G(., Q) is not a fuzzy choice function; then there exists S ∈ B such that G(S, Q)(x) = 0 for any x ∈ X. Choose an element x1 ∈ X such that S(x1 ) = 0. Since 0 = G(S, Q)(x1 ) = S(x1 ) ∧ [S(y) → Q(x1 , y)] = 0, y∈X
S(x1 ) = 0 and X is finite, it follows that there exists a(x1 ) ∈ X such that 1 if S(a(x1 )) ≤ Q(x1 , a(x1 )) 0 = S(a(x1 )) → Q(x1 , a(x1 )) = Q(x , a(x )) if S(a(x )) > Q(x , a(x )) 1 1 1 1 1 It follows that Q(x1 , a(x1 )) = 0 and S(a(x1 )) > 0. Since Q is reflexive, one obtains x1 = a(x1 ). Denote y1 = x1 , y2 = a(x1 ). Applying the same reasoning to y2 we can find y3 ∈ X such that S(y3 ) > 0 and Q(y2 , y3 ) = 0. Consequently one finds a sequence y1 , y2 , . . . , yk , . . . such that S(yk ) > 0 and Q(yk , yk+1 ) = 0 for any k. Suppose there exist two indices i and j such
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5 Fuzzy Choice Functions
that i < j and yi = yj ; then, according to the transitivity of Q, Q(yi , yj ) ≤ Q(yi , yi+1 )∧. . .∧Q(yj−1 , yj ) = 0, contradicting the reflexivity of Q. Therefore in the sequence y1 , y2 , . . . all the elements are distinct, hence it must be infinite, contradicting the fact that X is finite. Accordingly, G(., Q) is a fuzzy choice function. Since G(S, Q) ⊆ M (S, Q) for any S ∈ B one obtains that M (., Q) is a fuzzy choice function. Definition 5.33. A fuzzy choice function C on (X, B) will be called Grational (respectively M -rational) if there is a fuzzy preference relation Q on X such that C(S) = G(S, Q) (respectively C(S) = M (S, Q)) for any S ∈ B. In this case we say that Q is the G–rationalization (respectively the M – rationalization) of C. According to Definition 5.33 G–rationality and M –rationality express the fulfillment of a principle of optimality by the choice function C. G–rationality (respectively M –rationality) means that C evaluates the choice of the Q– greatest (respectively Q–maximal ) alternatives. Lemma 5.34. (i) G(S, Q) ⊆ M (S, Q) for each S ∈ B; (ii) If Q is strongly complete then G(S, Q) = M (S, Q). Proof. (i) Let x ∈ X. Then for each y ∈ X, S(y) ∗ Q(y, x) ≤ S(y) implies S(y) → Q(x, y) ≤ (S(y) ∗ Q(y, x)) → Q(x, y) (by Lemma 4.3 (10)); it follows immediately that G(S, Q)(x) ≤ M (S, Q)(x). (ii) For any x, y ∈ X we have Q(x, y) = 1 or Q(y, x) = 1. We notice that 1 if Q(x, y) = 1 S(y) → (Q(y, x) → Q(x, y)) = S(y) → Q(x, y) if Q(y, x) = 1 = S(y) → Q(x, y) then M (S, Q)(x) = G(Q, S)(x) for any x ∈ X.
5.3 Rational and Normal Fuzzy Choice Functions
101
A fuzzy choice function C is totally rational (resp. full rational) if there exists a fuzzy relation Q on X which is reflexive, ∗-transitive and total (resp. strongly total) such that C = G(., Q), i.e. C(S)(x) = S(x) ∗ (S(y) → Q(x, y)) y∈X
for any S ∈ B and x ∈ X. Remark 5.35. Let C : B → F(X) be a G–rational fuzzy choice function and Q a fuzzy preference relation such that C(S) = G(S, Q) for each S ∈ B. By Lemma 5.34 (ii), if Q is strongly complete M (S, Q) = G(S, Q) for each S ∈ B; in this case we say that C is strongly complete rational. Lemma 5.36. Any M -rational fuzzy choice function is G-rational. Proof. For any fuzzy relation Q on X let us define a fuzzy relation Q by Q (x, y) = Q(y, x) → Q(x, y) for any x, y ∈ X. Then for any S ∈ B and x ∈ X: G(S, Q )(x) = S(x) ∗
[S(y) → Q (x, y)]
y∈X
= S(x) ∗
[S(y) → (Q(y, x) → Q(x, y))]
y∈X
= M (S, Q)(x). Then G(S, Q ) = M (S, Q) for any S ∈ B and the lemma follows immediately. For any fuzzy choice function C on (X, B) let us consider the associated revealed preference relation R and define the functions G∗ : B → F(X) and M ∗ : B → F(X) G∗ (S)(x) = G(S, R)(x) = S(x) ∗
[S(y) → R(x, y)];
y∈X
M ∗ (S)(x) = M (S, R)(x) = S(x) ∗ for any S ∈ B and x ∈ X.
[(S(y) ∗ R(y, x)) → R(x, y)]
y∈X
Lemma 5.37. Let C be a fuzzy choice function. Then (i) G∗ (S) ⊆ M ∗ (S) for any S ∈ B;
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5 Fuzzy Choice Functions
(ii) For any S ∈ B and x ∈ X, C(S)(x) ∗ C(S)(x) ≤ G∗ (S)(x); (iii) If ∗ is the G¨ odel t-norm, then C(S) ⊆ G∗ (S) ⊆ M ∗ (S) for any S ∈ B. Proof. (i) By Lemma 5.34 (i) for Q = R. (ii) Let S ∈ B and x ∈ X. By the definition of R, C(S)(x) ∗ S(y) ≤ R(x, y) for any y ∈ X. Then C(S)(x) ≤ S(y) → R(x, y) for any y ∈ X, hence C(S)(x) ≤ [S(y) → R(x, y)]. y∈X
Since C(S)(x) ≤ S(x) it follows that C(S)(x) ∗ C(S)(x) ≤ S(x) ∗ [S(y) → R(x, y)] = G∗ (S)(x). y∈X
(iii) By (i) and (ii). According to Lemma 5.37, G∗ and M ∗ are always fuzzy choice functions. Definition 5.38. A fuzzy choice function C is G-normal (respectively M normal) if C(S) = G∗ (S) (respectively C(S) = M ∗ (S)) for any S ∈ B. Normality is a particular case of rationality. If in the case of rationality, the fulfillment of the optimality is done with respect to an arbitrary preference relation Q, in the case of normality this is done with respect to the fuzzy revealed preference relation R. If C is G–normal (respectively M –normal) then it is G-rational (respectively M –rational). Proposition 5.39. Suppose ∗ is the G¨ odel t–norm. Any M -normal fuzzy choice function C is G-normal. Proof. Let S ∈ B. By Lemma 5.37 (iii), C(S) ⊆ G∗ (S) ⊆ M ∗ (S) = C(S) hence C(S) = G∗ (S). The following result emphasizes a remarkable property: G–rationality is equivalent with G–normality. Proposition 5.40. Suppose ∗ is the G¨ odel t–norm. For a fuzzy choice function C the following are equivalent:
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103
(1) C is G–rational; (2) C is G–normal. Proof. (1) ⇒ (2) Assume there is a fuzzy relation Q such that C(S) = G(S, Q) for any S ∈ B. For any x, y ∈ X: R(x, y) = [C(S)(x) ∧ S(y)]
S∈B
=
[S(x) ∧ S(y) ∧
S∈B
(S(z) → Q(x, z))].
z∈X
For any S ∈ B we have: S(x) ∧ S(y) ∧ (S(z) → Q(x, z)) ≤ S(x) ∧ S(y) ∧ (S(y) → Q(x, y)) = z∈X
= S(x) ∧ S(y) ∧ Q(x, y) ≤ Q(x, y).
Thus R(x, y) ≤ Q(x, y). We have proved that R ⊆ Q. For any x, y ∈ X we have C(S)(x) ∧ S(y) ≤ R(x, y), hence C(S)(x) ≤ S(y) → R(x, y). Hence C(S)(x) ≤ [S(y) → R(x, y)]. Since C(S)(x) ≤ S(x) it follows
y∈X
that C(S)(x) ≤ S(x) ∧
[S(y) → R(x, y)].
y∈X
Since R(x, y) ≤ Q(x, y) we have S(y) → R(x, y) ≤ S(y) → Q(x, y) for any x, y ∈ X, hence S(x) ∧ (S(y) → R(x, y)) ≤ S(x) ∧ (S(y) → Q(x, y)) = C(S)(x). y∈X It follows that C(S)(x) = S(x) ∧ (S(y) → R(x, y)) for any x ∈ X, y∈X
y∈X
hence C is G-normal. (2) ⇒ (1) Obviously. Proposition 5.41. Suppose ∗ is the G¨ odel t–norm. Let C be a fuzzy choice function on (X, B) such that C(S) is a normal fuzzy subset of X for any S ∈ B. If C verifies W AF RP ◦ then C is M -normal. Proof. By Lemma 5.37 it suffices to prove that M ∗ (S)(x) ≤ C(S)(x) for any S ∈ B and x ∈ X. Let y ∈ X such that C(S)(y) = 1; then S(y) = 1. By the definition of M ∗ (S) and Lemma 4.5 (2) we have M ∗ (S)(x) = S(x) ∧ [(S(z) ∧ R(z, x)) → R(x, z)] ≤ z∈X
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5 Fuzzy Choice Functions
≤ S(x) ∧ [(S(y) ∧ R(y, x)) → R(x, y)] = = S(x) ∧ [R(y, x) → R(x, y)] = = S(x) ∧ [ (C(B)(y) ∧ B(x)) → R(x, y)] =
B∈B
= S(x) ∧
[(C(B)(y) ∧ B(x)) → R(x, y)] ≤
B∈B
≤ S(x) ∧ [(C(S)(y) ∧ S(x)) → R(x, y)] = = S(x) ∧ [S(x) → R(x, y)] = = S(x) ∧ R(x, y) = = S(x) ∧ [C(T )(x) ∧ T (y)] = =
T ∈B
[S(x) ∧ C(T )(x) ∧ T (y)] =
T ∈B
=
[S(x) ∧ T (y) ∧ C(T )(x) ∧ C(S)(y)].
T ∈B
According to W AF RP ◦ , [S(x) ∧ C(T )(x)] ∧ [T (y) ∧ C(S)(y)] ≤ S(x) ∧ C(T )(x) → T (x) ∧ C(S)(x), therefore S(x) ∧ T (y) ∧ C(T )(x) ∧ C(S)(y) ≤ C(S)(x) for any T ∈ B, hence M ∗ (S)(x) ≤ C(S)(x). Corollary 5.42. Suppose ∗ is the G¨ odel t–norm. Let C be a fuzzy choice function on (X, B) such that C(S) is a normal subset of X for any S ∈ B. If C verifies W AF RP ◦ then C is G-rational as well as M -rational. Proof. By Propositions 5.39 and 5.41. Proposition 5.43. Suppose ∗ is the G¨ odel t–norm. Any M -normal fuzzy choice function C is strongly complete rational. Proof. For any S ∈ B, C(S) = M ∗ (S). Let us take the fuzzy relation R◦ on X defined by R◦ (x, y) = R(y, x) → R(x, y) for any x, y ∈ X. If R(y, x) ≤ R(x, y) then R◦ (x, y) = R(y, x) → R(x, y) = 1; if R(y, x) > R(x, y) then R◦ (y, x) = R(x, y) → R(y, x) = 1. Thus R◦ is strongly complete. By a similar argument used in the proof of Lemma 5.36 we have M ∗ (S) = M (S, R) = G(S, R◦ ) and by Lemma 5.34 (ii), G(S, R◦ ) = M (S, R◦ ). Then C(S) = G(S, R◦ ) = M (S, R◦ ) for any S ∈ B, hence C is strongly complete rational.
5.3 Rational and Normal Fuzzy Choice Functions
105
The following figure summarizes the results of this paragraph.
G
normal
M
normal
M
rational
WAFRP 0 G
rational
Fig. 5.1. Properties of rationality and normality
The following example illustrates a fuzzy choice function which is neither M –rational nor G–rational. Example 5.44. Let X = {x1 , x2 , . . . , xn , . . .} and B = {[x1 ], . . . , [xn ], . . .}. We consider the fuzzy choice function C on (X, B) defined by 1 if x = x n C([xn ])(x) = n 1 if x = x . n for any n = 1, 2, . . . and for any x ∈ X. We compute the fuzzy preference relation R: ∞ 1 if n = m (C([xk ])(xn ) ∧ [xk ](xm )) = n R(xn , xm ) = 0 if n = m k=1 If Q is a fuzzy preference relation on X then for any n = 1, 2 . . . G([xn ], Q)(x) = [xn ](x) ∧ ([xn ](y) → Q(x, y)) y∈X ([xn ](y) → Q(xn , y)) if x = xn
=
y∈X
Q(x , x ) if x = x n n n = 0 if x = x
0 if x = xn
n
By taking Q = Rwe will have for any n = 1, 2, . . . 1 if x = x n G([xn ], R)(x) = n 0 if x = x n
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5 Fuzzy Choice Functions
For any n = 1, 2 . . . we will have M ([xn ], Q)(x) = [xn ](x) ∧ (([xn ](y) ∧ Q(y, x)) → Q(x, y)) y∈X (([xn ](y) → Q(y, xn )) → Q(xn , y)) if x = xn
=
=
y∈X
1 if x = x
0 if x = xn
n
0 if x = x
n
We notice that C = G(., R) = G(., Q) and C = M (., Q) for any preference relation Q on X, therefore C is neither G–rational nor M –rational. The following example shows that Proposition 5.40 does not hold in case when ∗ is the product t–norm. Example 5.45. Let X = {x, y}, B = {A, B} where A, B ∈ F(X) are given by A = 23 χ{x} + χ{y} , B = χ{x} + 13 χ{y} . Consider the function C : B → F(X) defined by C(A) = 12 χ{x} + χ{y} , C(B) = χ{x} + 13 χ{y} .
We compute the fuzzy preference relation R: R =
1
1 2
2 3
1
.
We observe that G(A, R)(x) =
1 3
= C(A)(x) = 12 ,
hence C is not G–normal.
If we take the fuzzy preference relation Q =
1
3 4
11 G–rational: G(A, Q)(x) = 12 ; G(A, Q)(y) = 1; G(B, Q)(x) = 1; G(B, Q)(y) = 13 .
, we notice that C is
6 Fuzzy Revealed Preference and Consistency Conditions
In Chapter 5 we formulated the following axioms: W AF RP (Weak Axiom of Fuzzy Revealed Preference) SAF RP (Strong Axiom of Fuzzy Revealed Preference) W F CA (Weak Fuzzy Congruence Axiom) SF CA (Strong Fuzzy Congruence Axiom) These are fuzzy versions of the revealed preference and congruence axioms (W ARP , SARP , W CA, SCA) in classical consumer theory. We work in a fuzzy set theory corresponding to a continuous t-norm; thus the formulation of these axioms depends on the t-norm. Chapter 6 studies various connections between these four axioms and properties of rationality and consistency. Generally we attempt to know to what extent classical consumer theory can be extended to fuzzy choice functions. The results of this chapter follow the line Uzawa–Arrow–Sen and will be obtained under hypotheses (H1) and (H2). We recall that under the hypothesis that the domain of the consumer contains the pairs and the triples of alternatives, the Arrow–Sen theorem asserts the equivalence between W ARP , SARP , W CA, SCA and other four conditions of rationality (see Theorem 3.31). The first section of the chapter tries to answer the question to what extent the Arrow-Sen theorem can be extended to fuzzy case. The equivalent
Irina Georgescu: Fuzzy Choice Functions, StudFuzz 214, 107–144 (2007) www.springerlink.com
c Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007
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6 Fuzzy Revealed Preference and Consistency Conditions
properties of the Arrow-Sen theorem lead to eight conditions for fuzzy choice functions. The main result of the section (Theorem 6.6) establishes equivalences or implications between these conditions. Some are true for an arbitrary continuous t-norm and others for the G¨ odel or the Lukasiewicz t-norm. Section 6.2 deals with consistency conditions F α, F β, the fuzzy forms of Sen’s properties α, β [91]. The formulation of F α uses the subsethood function I(., .) and F β is stated in terms of ∧ and ↔. We prove that a fuzzy choice function verifies F α, F β if and only if W F CA holds for C. We also study the fuzzy choice functions verifying a special hypothesis (U ); in the crisp case, this hypothesis says that C(S) is a singleton for each subset S. Under this hypothesis we prove that W F CA and F α are equivalent. Section 6.3 is concerned with condition F δ, a fuzzy version of Sen’s condition δ. The main result (Theorem 6.22) shows that for a G–normal choice function, the associated fuzzy preference relation R is quasi-transitive if and only if condition F δ holds. In Section 6.4 we study some other consistency conditions F α2, F β(+), F γ2. We prove that a fuzzy choice function is G–normal if and only if it verifies F α2 and F γ2. Condition F P I is introduced as a fuzzy version of ¯ is the path independence property P I [93]. The fuzzy preference relation R quasi-transitive provided F P I holds. The Arrow Axiom (AA) was formulated by Arrow [8] in order to characterize the full rationality of crisp choice functions. The Fuzzy Arrow Axiom (F AA) which is an extension in a fuzzy context of AA is enunciated in Section 6.5. The formulation of F AA uses the subsethood degree I(., .) to model the inclusion of the fuzzy choice functions and the degree of equality E(., .) to model their equality. The main result of the Section 6.5 (Theorem 6.37) is the proof of the equivalence between F AA and the full rationality of the fuzzy choice functions. We obtain a generalization of Arrow theorem [8]. Further on, we connect Theorem 6.37 and Theorem 5.7 (1) and (2), by establishing the equivalence between the full rationality, F AA, W F CA and SF CA.
6.1 A Fuzzy Approach to the Arrow–Sen Theorem
109
Throughout this chapter assume hypotheses (H1) and (H2) hold. Next ∗ will denote an arbitrary continuous t–norm. In case ∗ is a particular t–norm, this fact will be mentioned.
6.1 A Fuzzy Approach to the Arrow–Sen Theorem In this section we will study various relations between the axioms of revealed preference and congruence. Our aim is to investigate if the Arrow–Sen theorem (Theorem 3.31) is true for fuzzy choice functions. Some equivalences and implications of this theorem hold true in the fuzzy set theory based on a continuous t-norm, others for the G¨ odel or the Lukasiewicz t-norm. Particularly, for the G¨ odel t-norm we prove that a fuzzy choice function C verifies SF CA if and only if the associated fuzzy relation R is a regular preference and C is G–normal. This shows that a strong form of Richter’s Theorem [84] holds if hypotheses (H1), (H2) are fulfilled. In the following ∗ will denote an arbitrary continuous t–norm. When a result is proved for a particular t–norm (G¨ odel, Lukasiewicz, etc.), this fact will be specified. Let C be a fuzzy choice function. In this chapter we shall denote by Cˆ the fuzzy choice function G∗ = G(., R) defined in Section 5.3. By Lemma 5.37 we ˆ have for the G¨ odel t–norm that C(S) ⊆ C(S) for any S ∈ B. Proposition 6.1. If the fuzzy choice function C verifies W F CA then R is a regular preference
1
on X.
Proof. We shall prove the following assertions:
(a) R is reflexive.
1
We use “regular preference” instead of “regular fuzzy preference”.
110
6 Fuzzy Revealed Preference and Consistency Conditions
(b) R is strongly total.
These two assertions follow by Lemma 5.26. (c) R is ∗-transitive. Let x, y, z ∈ X. We shall prove that R(x, y) ∗ R(y, z) ≤ R(x, z). Denote T =[x, y, z]. Since 1 if u ∈ {x, y, z} C(T )(u) = 0 otherwise. it follows that C(T )(x) = 1 or C(T )(y) = 1 or C(T )(z) = 1. We study separately these three cases. (c1 ) C(T )(x) = 1. Then
R(x, z) =
(C(S)(x) ∗ S(z)) ≥ C(T )(x) ∗ T (z) = 1.
S∈B
Therefore R(x, z) = 1 and the inequality R(x, y) ∗ R(y, z) ≤ R(x, z) is obviously verified. (c2 ) C(T )(y) = 1. By W F CA we have R(x, y) ∗ C(T )(y) ∗ T (x) ≤ C(T )(x). Since T (x) = C(T )(y) = 1 we have R(x, y) ≤ C(T )(x) hence R(x, y) ∗ R(y, z) ≤ R(x, y) ≤ C(T )(x) = C(T )(x) ∗ T (z) ≤ R(x, z). (c3 ) C(T )(z) = 1. By W F CA we have R(y, z) = R(y, z) ∗ C(T )(z) ∗ T (y) ≤ C(T )(y) R(x, y) ∗ C(T )(y) = R(x, y) ∗ C(T )(y) ∗ T (x) ≤ C(T )(x) therefore R(x, y) ∗ R(y, z) ≤ R(x, y) ∗ C(T )(y) ≤ C(T )(x) ∗ T (z) ≤ R(x, z).
6.1 A Fuzzy Approach to the Arrow–Sen Theorem
111
¯ Lemma 6.2. Let C be a G–normal fuzzy choice function. Then R = R. Proof. For any x, y ∈ X we have ¯ y) = C([x, y])(x) = C([x, ˆ R(x, y])(x) = [x, y](x) ∗
([x, y](z) → R(x, z)) =
z∈X
= ([x, y](x) → R(x, x)) ∧ ([x, y](y) → R(x, y)) = R(x, x) ∧ R(x, y) = R(x, y). Proposition 6.3. Let C be a G–normal fuzzy choice function. If R is ∗transitive then C verifies W F CA. Proof. Let S ∈ B and x, y ∈ X. We must prove that R(x, y)∗C(S)(y)∗S(x) ≤ C(S)(x). Since ˆ C(S)(x) = C(S)(x) = S(x) ∗
(S(z) → R(x, z))
z∈X
it suffices to prove that R(x, y) ∗ C(S)(y) ≤ (S(z) → R(x, z)). z∈X
Let z ∈ X. Since C(S)(y) ∗ S(z) ≤ R(y, z) and R is ∗-transitive, then R(x, y) ∗ C(S)(y) ∗ S(z) ≤ R(x, y) ∗ R(y, z) ≤ R(x, z). Thus R(x, y) ∗ C(S)(y) ≤ S(z) → R(x, z) for each z ∈ X, therefore the desired inequality follows. By Proposition 6.3, if C is a G–normal fuzzy choice function and R is a regular preference then C verifies W F CA. Proposition 6.4. Assume that ∗ is the Lukasiewicz t-norm. If C is a fuzzy ˜ then C verifies W F CA. choice function such that R = R Proof. Suppose by absurdum that C does not verify W F CA then there exist S0 ∈ B and x, y ∈ X such that (a) R(x, y) ∗ C(S0 )(y) ∗ S0 (x) ≤ C(S0 )(x).
112
6 Fuzzy Revealed Preference and Consistency Conditions
˜ y) = ¬P˜ (y, x) then we have Since R(x, y) ≤ R(x, 0 = R(x, y) ∗ P˜ (y, x) = R(x, y) ∗ =
(C(S)(y) ∗ ¬C(S)(x) ∗ S(x)) =
S∈B
(R(x, y) ∗ C(S)(y) ∗ ¬C(S)(x) ∗ S(x))
S∈B
therefore R(x, y) ∗ C(S)(y) ∗ S(x) ∗ ¬C(S)(x) = 0 for each S ∈ B. But ¬¬C(S)(x) = C(S)(x) because ∗ is the Lukasiewicz t-norm, hence we get R(x, y) ∗ C(S)(y) ∗ S(x) ≤ C(S)(x), contradicting (a). ˜ ⊆ R. Lemma 6.5. Assume that ∗ is the Lukasiewicz t-norm. Then R Proof. First we shall establish the inequality ˜ y) ≤ C([x, y])(x). (a) R(x, Since C([x, y])(t) ≤ [x, y](t) =
1
if
t ∈ {x, y}
0 otherwise
and C([x, y]) is a normal fuzzy set we have C([x, y])(x) = 1 or C([x, y])(y) = 1. If C([x, y])(x) = 1 then (a) is obviously verified. Assume C([x, y])(y) = 1. Then ˜ y) = ¬P˜ (y, x) = ¬ R(x,
(C(S)(y) ∗ ¬C(S)(x) ∗ S(x)) ≤
S∈B
≤ ¬(C([x, y])(y) ∗ ¬C([x, y])(x) ∗ [x, y](x)) = ¬¬C([x, y])(x) = C([x, y])(x) and (a) is also verified. We remark that C([x, y])(x) = C([x, y])(x) ∗ [x, y](y) ≤ R(x, y). ˜ y) ≤ R(x, y). Thus, by (a), R(x, Proposition 6.6. Assume that ∗ is the Lukasiewicz t-norm. If C verifies ˜ W F CA then R = R.
6.1 A Fuzzy Approach to the Arrow–Sen Theorem
113
Proof. Using Lemma 4.5 (5) we get R(x, y) ∗ P˜ (y, x) = R(x, y) ∗ =
(C(S)(y) ∗ ¬C(S)(x) ∗ S(x)) =
S∈B
(R(x, y) ∗ C(S)(y) ∗ ¬C(S)(x) ∗ S(x)).
S∈B
By W F CA, R(x, y) ∗ C(S)(y) ∗ S(x) ≤ C(S)(x), hence, for any S ∈ B we have R(x, y) ∗ C(S)(y) ∗ ¬C(S)(x) ∗ S(x) = 0. It follows that R(x, y) ∗ P˜ (y, x) = 0. We have proved that R(x, y) ≤ ˜ y). ¬P˜ (y, x) = R(x, ˜ y) ≤ R(x, y). By Lemma 6.5, R(x, For a fuzzy choice function C let us consider the following statements (i) R is a regular preference and C is G–normal; ¯ is a regular preference and C is G–normal; (ii) R (iii) C verifies W F CA; (iv) C verifies SF CA; (v) C verifies W AF RP ; (vi) C verifies SAF RP ; ˜ (vii) R = R; ¯=R ˜ and C is G–normal. (viii) R We remark that the previous properties are the fuzzy versions of the equivalent conditions of the Arrow–Sen theorem (see Theorem 3.31). A natural problem is to obtain a fuzzy extension of the Arrow-Sen theorem. The following theorem establishes some relations between the assertions (i)(viii). This extends to the fuzzy case a significant part of the Arrow–Sen theorem. Theorem 6.7. Let C be a fuzzy choice function. (1) Conditions (i), (ii) are equivalent.
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6 Fuzzy Revealed Preference and Consistency Conditions
(2) Implication (i) ⇒ (iii) holds; if ∗ is the G¨ odel t-norm ∧ then the implication (iii) ⇒ (i) also holds. (3) Conditions (iii), (iv) are equivalent. (4) If ∗ is the Lukasiewicz t-norm then conditions (iii),(v), (vi), (vii) are equivalent; (5) Implication (viii) ⇒ (vii) holds. ¯ hence (i) ⇔ (ii) holds. Proof. (1) By Lemma 6.2, R = R, (2) By Proposition 6.3, if C is G–normal and R is a regular preference then C verifies W F CA, thus (i) ⇒ (iii) holds. Now we shall prove that for the G¨odel t-norm (iii) ⇒ (i) is true. In accordance with Proposition 6.1, R is ˆ a regular preference. By Lemma 5.37 (iii), C(S) ⊆ C(S) for any S ∈ B. Let ˆ ˆ S ∈ B. We shall prove that C(S) ⊆ C(S), i.e. C(S)(x) ≤ C(S)(x) for each x ∈ X. Since C(S) is a normal fuzzy set C(S)(z) = 1 for some z ∈ X; we also have S(z) = 1. Thus ˆ C(S)(x) = S(x) ∧
(S(y) → R(x, y)) ≤ S(x) ∧ (S(z) → R(x, z)) =
y∈X
S(x) ∧ R(x, z) = R(x, z) ∧ C(S)(z) ∧ S(x) ≤ C(S)(x). ˆ The last inequality follows according to W F CA. Therefore C(S) ⊆ C(S) ˆ so C(S) = C(S). (3) By Remark 5.28, the implication (iv) ⇒ (iii) is obvious. Since W F CA implies the ∗-transitivity of R (see Proposition 6.1), it follows that R is equal to its transitive closure W . Thus W F CA implies SF CA, hence the implication (iii) ⇒ (iv) is proved. (4) Assume that ∗ is the Lukasiewicz t-norm. First we will prove that (iii) ⇒ (v) holds. Suppose by absurdum that C does not verify W AF RP , so P˜ (x, y) ≤ ¬R(y, x) for some x, y ∈ X. Then, by Lemma 4.6 (1), P˜ (x, y) ∗ R(y, x) > 0. In accordance with Lemma 4.5 (5)
6.1 A Fuzzy Approach to the Arrow–Sen Theorem
P˜ (x, y) ∗ R(y, x) = [
115
(C(S)(x) ∗ S(y) ∗ ¬C(S)(y))] ∗ R(y, x) =
S∈B
=
(C(S)(x) ∗ S(y) ∗ ¬C(S)(y) ∗ R(y, x))
S∈B
therefore C(S)(x) ∗ S(y) ∗ ¬C(S)(y) ∗ R(y, x) > 0 for some S ∈ B. Since ¬¬C(S)(y) = C(S)(y), by Lemma 4.6 (1) we get R(y, x) ∗ C(S)(x) ∗ S(y) ≤ C(S)(y), contradicting W F CA. In order to prove the converse implication (v) ⇒ (iii) we assume by absurdum that C does not verify W F CA, i.e. there exist S0 ∈ B and x, y ∈ X such that R(y, x) ∗ C(S0 )(x) ∗ S0 (y) ≤ C(S0 )(y). By Lemma 4.6 (1) we obtain R(y, x) ∗ C(S0 )(x) ∗ S0 (y) ∗ ¬C(S0 )(y) > 0. Thus P˜ (x, y) ∗ R(y, x) =
(C(S)(x) ∗ S(y) ∗ ¬C(S)(y) ∗ R(y, x)) ≥
S∈B
≥ C(S0 )(x) ∗ S0 (y) ∗ ¬C(S0 )(y) ∗ R(y, x) > 0, therefore, by Lemma 4.6 (1), P˜ (x, y) ≤ ¬R(y, x), contradicting W AF RP . The implication (vi) ⇒ (v) is always true (see Remark 5.28). We shall establish the implication (v) ⇒ (vi). If we assume (v), then (iii) holds, since we have proved that (iii) and (v) are equivalent. Thus C verifies W F CA. By Proposition 6.1, R is a regular preference. Applying Proposition 6.6, we ˜ hence R ˜ is a regular preference. We shall prove that P˜ is ∗obtain R = R, transitive, i.e. P˜ (x, y) ∗ P˜ (y, z) ≤ P˜ (x, z). In accordance with the definition ˜ x) ∗ ¬R(z, ˜ y) ≤ ¬R(z, ˜ x). Since ∗ is of P˜ , this inequality can be written ¬R(y, the Lukasiewicz t-norm, by Lemma 4.6 (1), this last inequality is equivalent to ˜ x) ∗ ¬R(y, ˜ x) ∗ ¬R(z, ˜ y) = 0. R(z, ˜ is strongly total, we have R(y, ˜ x) = 1 or R(x, ˜ y) = 1. If R(y, ˜ x) = 1 Since R ˜ x) = 0 and the previous inequality is obvious. Consider the case then ¬R(y, ˜ y) = 1. R ˜ is ∗-transitive then R(z, ˜ x) = R(z, ˜ x) ∗ R(x, ˜ y) ≤ R(z, ˜ y). R(x,
116
6 Fuzzy Revealed Preference and Consistency Conditions
˜ x) ∗ ¬R(y, ˜ x) ∗ ¬R(z, ˜ y) ≤ R(z, ˜ y) ∗ ¬R(y, ˜ x) ∗ ¬R(z, ˜ y) = 0. Therefore R(z, It follows that P˜ is ∗-transitive then P˜ is identical to its ∗-transitive closure P ∗ . Thus it is obvious that W AF RP ⇒ SAF RP . (iii) ⇔ (vii) By Propositions 6.4 and 6.6. ¯ (by Lemma 6.2). Then R ¯=R ˜ implies (5) If C is G–normal then R = R ˜ R = R. The equivalence (i) ⇔ (iii) proved in Theorem 6.7 (2) for the case of the G¨ odel t-norm can be viewed as a fuzzy extension of Richter theorem (assuming hypotheses (H1), (H2)). Example 6.8. As seen above, Theorem 6.7 establishes some connections between conditions (i)-(viii) in Section 6.1. The example presented in this section is constructed with the aim to clarify these connections and the limitations of Theorem 6.7. Let X = {x, y} and B = {[x], [y], [x, y], A} where A ∈ F(X) is defined by A = 0.3χ{x} + χ{y} . Consider function C : B → F(X) defined by
C([x]) = χ{x} ; C([y]) = χ{y} ; C([x, y]) = 0.25χ{x} + χ{y} ; C(A) = 0.25χ{x} + χ{y} . C is a fuzzy choice function fulfilling (H1) and (H2). We determine first the fuzzy relation R associated with C. According to Definition 5.16 (i)
R(x, y) =
(C(S)(x) ∗ S(y))=
S∈B
= (C([x])(x) ∗ [x](y)) ∨ (C([y])(x) ∗ [y](y)) ∨ (C([x, y])(x) ∗ [x, y](y)) ∨ (C(A)(x) ∗ A(y)) = = 1 ∗ 0 ∨ 0 ∗ 1 ∨ 0.25 ∗ 1 ∨ 0.25 ∗ 1 = 0.25.
6.1 A Fuzzy Approach to the Arrow–Sen Theorem
117
Analogously R(x, x) = R(y, y) = R(y, x) = 1, thus 1 0.25 R= 1 1 It is clear that R is ∗-transitive, reflexive and strongly total. We check now if the fuzzy choice function C verifies W F CA. For all a, b ∈ X and S ∈ B we must have the inequality (a) R(a, b) ∗ C(S)(b) ∗ S(a) ≤ C(S)(a). For a = b this inequality is always true; consider only the cases a = x, b = y and a = y, b = x. Case a = x, b = y. Since R(x, y) = 0.25 we have to prove that for any S ∈ B the following inequality holds: (b) 0.25 ∗ C(S)(y) ∗ S(x) ≤ C(S)(x). −S = [x]. We have C(S)(y) = C([x])(y) = 0, hence (b) is verified. −S = [y]. We have 0.25 ∗ C([y])(y) ∗ [y](x) = 0, hence (b) is verified. −S = [x, y]. We have 0.25 ∗ C([x, y])(y) ∗ [x, y](x) = 0.25 = C([x, y])(x). −S = A. We have 0.25 ∗ C(A)(y) ∗ A(x) = 0.25 ∗ 1 ∗ 0.3 ≤ C(A)(x) = 0.25.
The case a = y, b = x follows similarly. In conclusion C verifies W F CA. The fuzzy relation R being ∗-transitive, R = W then C verifies also SF CA. We check now if condition (i) is verified for C. R is a regular preference, then we investigate if C is G–normal: ˆ C([x])(x) = 1 = C([x])(x) ˆ C([x])(y) = 0 = C([x])(y) ˆ C([y])(x) = 0 = C([y])(x) ˆ C([y])(y) = 1 = C([y])(y)
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6 Fuzzy Revealed Preference and Consistency Conditions
ˆ C([x, y])(x) = [x, y](x) ∗ [([x, y](x) → R(x, x)) ∧ ([x, y](y) → R(x, y))] = R(x, y) = 0.25 = C([x, y])(x) ˆ C([x, y])(y) = R(y, x) = 1 = C([x, y])(y) ˆ C(A)(y) = A(y) ∗ [((A(x) → R(y, x)) ∧ (A(y) → R(y, y))] = 0.3 → R(y, x) = 1 = C(A)(y) ˆ C(A)(x) = A(x)∗[((A(x) → R(x, x))∧ (A(y) → R(x, y))] = 0.3∗R(x, y) = 0.3 ∗ 0.25; C(A)(x) = 0.25.
For the G¨ odel t-norm we have ˆ C(A)(x) = 0.3 ∧ 0.25 = 0.25 = C(A)(x), hence Cˆ = C. For the Lukasiewicz t-norm ∗L ˆ C(A)(x) = 0.3 ∗L 0.25 = max(0.3 + 0.25 − 1, 0) = 0 = C(A)(x) and for the product t-norm ∗P ˆ C(A)(x) = 0.3 ∗P 0.25 = 0.3 × 0.25 = C(A)(x). This example shows that the implication (iii) ⇒ (i) in Theorem 6.7 is false in the case of the Lukasiewicz or product t-norms; meanwhile it confirms that the equivalence (i) ⇔ (iii) is true for the G¨ odel t-norm . ˜ According to Definition 5.18 (i) we have We compute now P˜ and R. P˜ (y, x) =
(C(S)(y) ∗ S(x) ∗ ¬C(S)(x)) =
S∈B
= [C([x])(y) ∗ [x](x) ∗ ¬C([x])(x)] ∨ [C([y])(y) ∗ [y](x) ∗ ¬C([y])(x)]∨ ∨[C([x, y])(y) ∗ [x, y](x) ∗ ¬C([x, y])(x)] ∨ [C(A)(y) ∗ A(x) ∗ ¬C(A)(x)] = = (¬0.25) ∨ (0.3 ∗ ¬0.25). Similarly, P˜ (x, y) = 0. Hence P˜ =
0
0
(¬0.25) ∨ (0.3 ∗ ¬0.25) 0
For the Lukasiewicz t-norm ∗L we have
6.2 Conditions F α and F β
119
P˜ (y, x) = (1 − 0.25)∨ max (0.3 + 0.75 − 1, 0) = 0.75, hence 1 0.25 0 0 ˜= = R. ,R P˜ = 1 1 0.75 0 For G¨ odel and product t-norms 1 00 ˜= ,R P˜ = 1 00
1 1
= R.
It follows that for the G¨ odel and product t-norms the equivalence (iv) ⇔ (vii) in Theorem 6.7 does not take place.
6.2 Conditions F α and F β Conditions α and β were introduced by Sen [91] for crisp choice functions. In this section we will consider fuzzy versions F α and F β of these conditions and we will prove that a fuzzy choice function C verifies F α and F β if and only if C verifies W F CA. We consider a class of fuzzy choice functions verifying a new hypothesis (U ). In the crisp case (U ) expresses that C(S) is a singleton for each fuzzy set S. Among results under hypothesis (U ) there is the equivalence between F α and W F CA. Let ∗ be an arbitrary continuous t-norm. First we will recall the (crisp) conditions α and β. Let C : B → P(X) be a crisp choice function. Condition α . For any S, T ∈ B and for any x ∈ X, we have the implication x ∈ S, x ∈ C(T ) and S ⊆ T ⇒ x ∈ C(S). Condition β . For any S, T ∈ B and for any x, y ∈ X, we have the implication x, y ∈ C(S) and S ⊆ T ⇒ x ∈ C(T ) if and only if y ∈ C(T ).
120
6 Fuzzy Revealed Preference and Consistency Conditions
These two conditions can be extended to the fuzzy case. Let C : B → F(X) be a fuzzy choice function on (X, B). Condition F α . For any S, T ∈ B and x ∈ X we have I(S, T ) ∗ S(x) ∗ C(T )(x) ≤ C(S)(x). Condition Fβ . For any S, T ∈ B and x, y ∈ X we have I(S, T ) ∗ C(S)(x) ∗ C(S)(y) ≤ C(T )(x) ↔ C(T )(y) where ↔ is the biresiduum of the t-norm ∧.
It is obvious that conditions F α, F β generalize α, β. A weak form of conditions F α, F β can be given as: Condition F α . For any S, T ∈ B and x ∈ X, if S ⊆ T then S(x) ∗ C(T )(x) ≤ C(S)(x). Condition Fβ . For any S, T ∈ B and x, y ∈ X, if S ⊆ T then C(S)(x) ∗ C(S)(y) ≤ C(T )(x) ↔ C(T )(y). Since S ⊆ T iff I(S, T ) = 1 clearly F α ⇒ F α , F β ⇒ F β . Although F α , F β are closer to α, β, the use of subsethood degree I(A, B) in F α and F β gives a better expression of the behaviour of fuzzy choice functions. Proposition 6.9. If C is a G–normal fuzzy choice function then C verifies F α. Proof. Since C = Cˆ it suffices to show that for any S, T ∈ B and x ∈ X the following inequality holds: ˆ )(x) ≤ C(S)(x). ˆ I(S, T ) ∗ S(x) ∗ C(T By Lemma 4.3 (2) we have for any u ∈ X S(u)∗(S(u) → T (u))∗(T (u) → R(x, u)) = S(u)∗T (u)∗(T (u) → R(x, u)) = S(u) ∗ T (u) ∗ R(x, u) ≤ R(x, u).
6.2 Conditions F α and F β
121
Using Lemma 4.3 (1) one infers (S(u) → T (u)) ∗ (T (u) → R(x, u)) ≤ S(u) → R(x, u). Therefore ˆ )(x) = I(S, T ) ∗ S(x) ∗ C(T = (S(u) → T (u)) ∗ S(x) ∗ T (x) ∗ (T (u) → R(x, u)) ≤ u∈X
≤ S(x) ∗
u∈X
[(S(u) → T (u)) ∗ (T (u) → R(x, u))] ≤
u∈X
≤ S(x) ∗
ˆ (S(u) → R(x, u)) = C(S)(x).
u∈X
Assume that ∗ is the G¨ odel t–norm ∧ for the rest of the chapter. Proposition 6.10. If the fuzzy choice function C fulfills condition F α then ¯ R = R. ¯ ⊆ R is always true. We prove that Proof. By Lemma 5.26 (i) the inclusion R ¯ y) for any x, y ∈ X. Let S ∈ B. Then, by F α R(x, y) ≤ R(x, I([x, y], S) ∧ [x, y](x) ∧ C(S)(x) ≤ C([x, y])(x). We remark that I([x, y], S) = ([x, y](u) → S(u)) = u∈X
= ([x, y](x) → S(x)) ∧ ([x, y](y) → S(y)) = = (1 → S(x)) ∧ (1 → S(y)) = S(x) ∧ S(y).
Thus the above inequality becomes S(x) ∧ S(y) ∧ C(S)(x) ≤ C([x, y])(x). Since C(S)(x) ≤ S(x) we have C(S)(x) ∧ S(y) ≤ C([x, y])(x) for each S ∈ B therefore ¯ y) R(x, y) = (C(S)(x) ∧ S(y)) ≤ C([x, y])(x) = R(x, S∈B
122
6 Fuzzy Revealed Preference and Consistency Conditions
Proposition 6.11. If a fuzzy choice function C verifies W F CA then conditions F α, F β are fulfilled. Proof. By Theorem 6.7, W F CA implies the G–normality of C, hence, by Proposition 6.9, condition F α is verified. Assume by absurdum that C does not fulfill F β, hence there exist S, T ∈ B and x, y ∈ X such that I(S, T ) ∧ C(S)(x) ∧ C(S)(y) ≤ C(T )(x) ↔ C(T )(y) = = (C(T )(x) → C(T )(y)) ∧ (C(T )(y) → C(T )(x)). Therefore I(S, T ) ∧ C(S)(x) ∧ C(S)(y) ≤ C(T )(x) → C(T )(y) or I(S, T ) ∧ C(S)(x) ∧ C(S)(y) ≤ C(T )(y) → C(T )(x).
Assume the first case holds, hence, by Lemma 4.3 (1) (a) I(S, T ) ∧ C(S)(x) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ C(T )(x) ≤ C(T )(y). We remark that I(S, T ) ∧ C(S)(x) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ C(T )(x) ≤ C(S)(y) ∧ S(x) ∧ C(T )(x) = = C(S)(y) ∧ S(x) ∧ C(T )(x) ∧ S(y) because C(S)(y) ∧ S(y) = C(S)(y). Since C(S)(y) ∧ S(x) ≤ R(y, x) one obtains (b) I(S, T ) ∧ C(S)(x) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ C(T )(x) ≤ R(y, x) ∧ C(T )(x) ∧ S(y). By (a) and (b) one infers R(y, x) ∧ C(T )(x) ∧ S(y) ≤ C(T )(y) contradicting W F CA. Proposition 6.12. If C fulfills conditions F α, F β then W F CA holds. Proof. Let S ∈ B and x, y ∈ X. Since I([x, y], S) = S(x) ∧ S(y) we have S(x) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ R(x, y) = S(x) ∧ S(y) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ R(x, y) = = I([x, y], S) ∧ S(x) ∧ S(y) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ R(x, y) =
6.2 Conditions F α and F β
123
= I([x, y], S) ∧ [x, y](y) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ S(x) ∧ S(y) ∧ R(x, y) ≤ ≤ C([x, y])(y) ∧ S(x) ∧ S(y) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ R(x, y) because I([x, y], S) ∧ [x, y](y) ∧ C(S)(y) ≤ C([x, y])(y), by F α. Replacing R(x, y) with its expression in Definition 5.16 (i) we obtain S(x) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ R(x, y) ≤ ≤ C([x, y])(y) ∧ S(x) ∧ S(y) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ =
(C(H)(x) ∧ H(y)) =
H∈B
[C([x, y])(y) ∧ S(x) ∧ S(y) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ C(H)(x) ∧ H(y)].
H∈B
In accordance with F α: C(H)(x) ∧ H(y) = C(H)(x) ∧ H(x) ∧ H(y) = I([x, y], H) ∧ [x, y](x) ∧ C(H)(x) ≤ C([x, y])(x).
Therefore, by F β and Lemma 4.3 (2): C([x, y])(y) ∧ S(x) ∧ S(y) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ C(H)(x) ∧ H(y) ≤ ≤ C([x, y])(y) ∧ S(x) ∧ S(y) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ C([x, y])(x) = = I([x, y], S) ∧ C([x, y])(x) ∧ C([x, y])(y) ∧ C(S)(y) ≤ ≤ [C(S)(x) ↔ C(S)(y)] ∧ C(S)(y) ≤ ≤ C(S)(y) ∧ [C(S)(y) → C(S)(x)] = C(S)(y) ∧ C(S)(x) ≤ C(S)(x). These inequalities hold for each H ∈ B therefore S(x) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ R(x, y) ≤ C(S)(x). Hence the fuzzy choice function C verifies W F CA. Theorem 6.13. For a fuzzy choice function C the following are equivalent: (1) C verifies conditions Fα, Fβ; (2) W F CA holds for C. Proof. By Propositions 6.11 and 6.12.
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6 Fuzzy Revealed Preference and Consistency Conditions
Remark 6.14. The previous theorem generalizes to fuzzy choice functions a result of Sen (see [91], (T8)). This is one more argument that F α, F β are the appropriate versions of α, β and not conditions F α , F β . In crisp consumer theory a special case is made by consumers C : B → P(X) with the property that C(S) is a singleton for any S ∈ B. We generalize this case considering fuzzy choice functions C : B → F(X) that verify: (U ) For any S ∈ B, C(S) = [x], for some x ∈ X. For fuzzy choice functions C that verify (U ) there is a unique x ∈ X such 1 if y = x that C(S)(y) = 0 if y = x. Proposition 6.15. If a G–normal fuzzy choice function C verifies (U ) then R is a regular preference. Proof. Assume C is G–normal. By Lemma 5.26 we know that R is reflexive ¯ and strongly total; by Lemma 6.2, R = R. Let x, y ∈ X. Then ¯ y) = C([x, y])(x); R(y, x) = C([x, y])(y). R(x, y) = R(x, But C([x, y]) is a normal fuzzy set so C([x, y])(x) = 1 or C([x, y])(y) = 1 because C([x, y])(t) ≤ [x, y](t) =
1
if
t ∈ {x, y}
0 otherwise.
Thus, by (U ), we have exactly one of two cases: R(x, y) = 1 and R(y, x) = 0. R(x, y) = 0 and R(y, x) = 1. Now we prove that R is ∧-transitive. Let x, y, z ∈ X. We will establish the inequality R(x, y) ∧ R(y, z) ≤ R(x, z). The case R(x, z) = 1 is obvious. Consider R(x, z) = 1. Since R(x, z) = C([x, z])(x) and C verifies (U ), we must have R(x, z) = 0.
6.2 Conditions F α and F β
125
Assume by absurdum R(x, y) ∧ R(y, z) = 0 hence R(x, y) = R(y, z) = 1 and R(y, x) = R(z, y) = 0 because of (U ). Therefore, since C is G–normal C([x, y, z])(x) = [x, y, z](x) ∧
([x, y, z](u) → R(x, u)) =
u∈X
= R(x, x) ∧ R(x, y) ∧ R(x, z) = R(x, y) ∧ R(x, z) = 0 and similarly C([x, y, z])(y) = R(y, x) ∧ R(y, z) = 0 C([x, y, z])(z) = R(z, x) ∧ R(z, y) = 0. Since C([x, y, z])(u) ≤ [x, y, z](u) =
1
if
u ∈ {x, y, z}
0 otherwise
and C([x, y, z]) is a normal fuzzy set we have C([x, y, z])(x) = 1 or C([x, y, z])(y) = 1 or C([x, y, z])(z) = 1. Contradiction. Then R is transitive. Remark 6.16. Assume C is a G–normal fuzzy choice function fulfilling (U ). ¯ Thus P = P¯ . We prove P¯ = R. ¯ By the proof of Proposition 6.15, R = R. For any x, y ∈ X we have ¯ y) ∧ ¬R(y, ¯ x) = C([x, y])(x) ∧ ¬C([x, y])(y) P¯ (x, y) = R(x, ¯ y) = C([x, y])(x). R(x, According to (U ) we have one of the cases (see the proof of Proposition 6.15) C([x, y])(x) = 1, C([x, y])(y) = 0; C([x, y])(x) = 0, C([x, y])(y) = 1. A simple computation shows that each of these cases leads to C([x, y])(x) = C([x, y])(x) ∧ ¬C([x, y])(y), ¯ y) = P¯ (x, y). Hence P = P¯ = R ¯ = R. so R(x, Proposition 6.17. Let C be a fuzzy choice function verifying (U ). The following assertions are equivalent (1) W F CA holds for C;
126
6 Fuzzy Revealed Preference and Consistency Conditions
(2) C verifies condition F α. Proof. (1) ⇒ (2) By Theorem 6.7 W F CA implies the G–normality of C. In accordance with Proposition 6.9 C verifies F α. (2) ⇒ (1) Let x, y ∈ X and S ∈ B. We prove that (a) R(x, y) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ S(x) ≤ C(S)(x). It is easy to see that I([x, y], S) = S(x) ∧ S(y). Applying F α for [x, y] and S we get C(S)(y)∧S(x) = S(x)∧S(y)∧C(S)(y) = I([x, y], S)∧[x, y](y)∧C(S)(y) ≤ C([x, y])(y), hence R(x, y) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ S(x) ≤ C(S)(y) ∧ S(x) ≤ C([x, y])(y). Let H ∈ B. Applying again F α for [x, y] and H we get C(H)(x) ∧ H(y) = H(x) ∧ H(y) ∧ C(H)(x) = I([x, y], H) ∧ [x, y](x) ∧ C(H)(x) ≤ C([x, y])(x) hence C(H)(x) ∧ H(y) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ S(x) ≤ C(H)(x) ∧ H(y) ≤ C([x, y])(x). Since these last inequalities hold for each H ∈ B we infer R(x, y) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ S(x) = [ (C(H)(x) ∧ H(y))] ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ S(x) =
H∈B
[C(H)(x) ∧ H(y) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ S(x)] ≤ C([x, y])(x).
H∈B
We conclude that R(x, y) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ S(x) ≤ C([x, y])(x) ∧ C([x, y])(y). If x = y then C([x, y])(x) ∧ C([x, y])(y) = 0 because of (U ), then R(x, y) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ S(x) = 0 ≤ C(S)(x). If x = y then R(x, y) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ S(x) = C(S)(x) ∧ S(x) ≤ C(S)(x). Hence the inequality (a) is proved.
6.3 Quasi-transitivity and Condition F δ
127
6.3 Quasi-transitivity and Condition F δ This section deals with a fuzzy form F δ of Sen’s condition δ. For a G–normal fuzzy choice function C we prove that the associated fuzzy preference relation R is quasi-transitive if and only if condition F δ holds. Let Q be a fuzzy relation on X and PQ be the strict preference relation on X defined by PQ (x, y) = Q(x, y) ∧ ¬Q(y, x) for any x, y ∈ X. If R is the fuzzy revealed preference relation associated with a fuzzy choice function C (cf. Definition 5.16) then PR = P . Let ∗ be a continuous t–norm. A fuzzy relation Q on X is quasi-transitive if PQ (x, y) ∗ PQ (y, z) ≤ PQ (x, z) for any x, y, z ∈ X. Proposition 6.18. Let Q be a reflexive and strongly total fuzzy relation on X. If Q is transitive then Q is quasi–transitive. Proof. By the definition of PQ we have PQ (x, y) ∗ PQ (y, z) = Q(x, y) ∗ ¬Q(y, x) ∗ Q(y, z) ∗ ¬Q(z, y) for all x, y, z ∈ X. Hence PQ (x, y) ∗ PQ (y, z) ≤ Q(x, y) ∗ Q(y, z) ≤ Q(x, z), Q being transitive. We remark that Q(z, x) ∗ Q(x, y) ≤ Q(z, y) hence Q(z, x) ∗ Q(x, y) ∗ ¬Q(z, y) ≤ Q(z, y) ∗ ¬Q(z, y) = 0 so Q(z, x) ∗ Q(x, y) ∗ ¬Q(z, y) = 0. According to Lemma 4.6 (1), Q(x, y) ∗ ¬Q(z, y) ≤ ¬Q(z, x) hence PQ (x, y) ∗ PQ (y, z) ≤ Q(x, y) ∗ ¬Q(z, y) ≤ ¬Q(z, x). Therefore PQ (x, y) ∗ PQ (y, z) ≤ Q(x, z) ∗ ¬Q(z, x) = PQ (x, z), i.e. Q is quasi-transitive. For the rest of the section suppose that ∗ is the G¨ odel t–norm ∧. Let C : B → F(X) be a fuzzy choice function on (X, B). Definition 6.19. We say that the fuzzy choice function C verifies the condition F δ if for any S = [a1 , . . . , an ], T = [b1 , . . . , bm ] in B and for any distinct x, y ∈ X the following inequality holds
128
6 Fuzzy Revealed Preference and Consistency Conditions
I(S, T ) ≤ (C(S)(x) ∧ C(S)(y)) → ¬(C(T )(x) ∧
¬C(T )(t)).
t=x
Remark 6.20. By Lemma 4.3 (1) the previous inequality is equivalent to ¬C(T )(t)). I(S, T ) ∧ C(S)(x) ∧ C(S)(y) ≤ ¬(C(T )(x) ∧ t=x
An easy computation shows that in case of crisp choice functions condition F δ is exactly condition δ. Proposition 6.21. Assume the fuzzy choice function C is G–normal and verifies condition F δ. Then the associated fuzzy revealed preference relation R is quasi-transitive. Proof. We prove that for all x, y, z ∈ X the following inequality holds (a) P (x, y) ∧ P (y, z) ≤ P (x, z) = R(x, z) ∧ ¬R(z, x). Recall that R is reflexive and strongly total in accordance with Lemma 5.26. Since C is G–normal one gets ˆ C([x, y, z])(x) = C([x, y, z])(x) = R(x, y) ∧ R(x, z); ˆ C([x, y, z])(y) = C([x, y, z])(y) = R(y, x) ∧ R(y, z); ˆ C([x, y, z])(z) = C([x, y, z])(z) = R(z, x) ∧ R(z, y). By the definition of a fuzzy choice function, C([x, y, z])(x) = 1 or C([x, y, z])(y) = 1 or C([x, y, z])(z) = 1. If C([x, y, z])(y) = 1 then 1 = R(y, x) ∧ R(y, z) ≤ R(y, x), R(y, z) hence R(y, x) = R(y, z) = 1. One gets P (x, y) = R(x, y) ∧ ¬R(y, x) = 0 so (a) is trivially verified. Similarly, if C([x, y, z])(z) = 1 then P (y, z) = 0 and (a) is verified. Let us consider the case C([x, y, z])(x) = 1 hence R(x, y) = R(x, z) = 1. Then (a) is equivalent to P (x, y) ∧ P (y, z) ≤ ¬R(z, x). By Lemma 4.6 (1), this last inequality is equivalent to (b) P (x, y) ∧ P (y, z) ∧ R(z, x) = 0. Since C is G–normal we have C([x, z])(x) = R(x, z) = 1 and C([x, z])(z) = R(z, x). In accordance with condition F δ and Lemma 4.6 (7), (8) the following
6.3 Quasi-transitivity and Condition F δ
129
hold R(z, x) = R(x, z) ∧ R(z, x) = I([x, z], [x, y, z]) ∧ C([x, z])(x) ∧ C([x, z])(z) ¬C([x, y, z])(t)) ≤ ¬(C([x, y, z])(x) ∧ = ¬(
t=x
¬C([x, y, z])(t))
t=x
= ¬(¬C([x, y, z])(y) ∧ ¬C([x, y, z])(z)) = ¬(¬(R(y, x) ∧ R(y, z)) ∧ ¬(R(z, x) ∧ R(z, y))) ≤ ¬(¬R(y, x) ∧ ¬R(z, y)) = ¬¬R(y, x) ∨ ¬¬R(z, y) Thus one gets P (x, y) ∧ P (y, z) ∧ R(z, x) ≤ P (x, y) ∧ P (y, z) ∧ (¬¬R(y, x) ∨ ¬¬R(z, y)) ≤ ≤ ¬R(y, x) ∧ ¬R(z, y) ∧ (¬¬R(y, x) ∨ ¬¬R(z, y)) = = (¬R(y, x)∧¬R(z, y)∧¬¬R(y, x))∨(¬R(y, x)∧¬R(z, y)∧¬¬R(z, y)) = 0 and the inequality (b) was proved. Proposition 6.22. If C is a G–normal fuzzy choice function and R is quasitransitive then condition F δ holds. Proof. Suppose by absurdum that F δ does not hold, i.e. there exist S = [a1 , . . . , an ], T = [b1 , . . . , bm ] ∈ B and x, y ∈ X such that (a) I(S, T ) ∧ C(S)(x) ∧ C(S)(y) ≤ ¬(C(T )(x) ∧ ¬C(T )(t)). t=x
We observe that (b) C(S)(y) ∧ C(S)(x) ≤ C(S)(y) ∧ S(x) ≤ R(y, x). If R(y, x) = 0 then, by (b), C(S)(x) ∧ C(S)(y) = 0, contradicting (a); hence R(y, x) > 0. Thus ¬R(y, x) = 0 and P (x, y) = R(x, y) ∧ ¬R(y, x) = 0. Since S(t), T (t) ∈ {0, 1} we have S(t) → T (t) ∈ {0, 1} for each t ∈ X hence I(S, T ) = (S(t) → T (t)) ∈ {0, 1}. t∈X
I(S, T ) = 0 contradicts (a), hence I(S, T ) = 1. Then S ⊆ T so {a1 , . . . , an } ⊆ {b1 , . . . , bm }. If x ∈ {a1 , . . . , an } then C(S)(x) ≤ S(x) = 0 contradicting (a); then x ∈ {a1 , . . . , an }. Similarly, y ∈ {a1 , . . . , an }.
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6 Fuzzy Revealed Preference and Consistency Conditions
By (a), ¬C(T)(t) > 0 for each t = x. Since 1 if C(T )(t) = 0 ¬C(T )(t) = 0 if C(T )(t) > 0 we must have ¬C(T )(t) = 1, hence C(T )(t) = 0 for each t = x. But C is G–normal, so C(T )(y) = T (y) ∧ (T (z) → R(y, z)). z∈X R(y, z) if z ∈ {b1 , . . . , bm } Since T (y) = 1 and T (z) → R(y, z) = 1 otherwise it follows that 0 = C(T )(y) = R(y, b1 ) ∧ . . . ∧ R(y, bm ). Thus R(y, z1 ) = 0 for some z1 ∈ {b1 , . . . , bm }. R(y, x) > 0 implies z1 = x; of course z1 = y. R being strongly total, R(z1 , y) = 1, therefore P (z1 , y) = R(z1 , y) ∧ ¬R(y, z1 ) = 1. Applying the same procedure with y instead of x and z1 instead of y there exists z2 ∈ {b1 , . . . , bm }\{y, z1 } such that P (z2 , z1 ) = 1. If z2 = x then according to the hypothesis of quasi-transitivity, 1 = P (x, z1 ) ∧ P (z1 , y) ≤ P (x, y). This contradicts P (x, y) = 0, so z2 = x. In conclusion, z2 ∈ {b1 , . . . , bm } \ {x, y, z1 }. By induction there exists a sequence z1 , z2 , . . . , zk , . . . of elements of {b1 , . . . , bm } such that zk ∈ {b1 , . . . , bm } \ {x, y, z1 , . . . , zk−1 } for any k = 1, 2, . . . (z0 is taken y). Thus the terms of the sequence (zk ) will be distinct, contradicting the finitude of {b1 , . . . , bm }. The contradiction shows that F δ is verified. Summing the two previous propositions we get Theorem 6.23. If C is a G–normal fuzzy choice function, then R is quasitransitive if and only if condition F δ is verified. Remark 6.24. Theorem 6.23 is the generalization for fuzzy choice functions of a Sen result (see [91], (T 10)).
6.4 Other Consistency Conditions
131
6.4 Other Consistency Conditions In [93] there exist other consistency conditions besides properties α, β, γ, δ. In this section we study conditions F α2, F β(+) and F γ2, fuzzy versions of conditions α2, β(+) and γ2 for crisp choice functions [93]. Then a fuzzy choice function is G–normal if and only if conditions F α2 and F γ2 are verified. If a fuzzy choice function C verifies F β(+) then the associated fuzzy preference relation R is transitive. We will prove that for a fuzzy choice function C, the path independence condition C(S ∪ T ) = C(C(S) ∪ C(T )) implies the ¯ quasi-transitivity of R. Throughout this section C will denote a fuzzy choice function on (X, B). We introduce condition F α2, a fuzzy form of the property α2 in [93].
Condition F α2 For any S ∈ B and for any x, y ∈ X, C(S)(x) ∧ S(y) ≤ C([x, y])(x).
The following proposition shows that condition F α2 is obtained by relaxing condition F α. Proposition 6.25. Condition F α implies condition F α2. Proof. By condition F α we have I([x, y], S) ∧ C(S)(x) ∧ [x, y](x) ≤ C([x, y])(x) for any S ∈ B and x, y ∈ X. Observing that I([x, y], S) ∧ C(S)(x) ∧ [x, y](x) = S(x) ∧ S(y) ∧ C(S)(x) = C(S)(x) ∧ S(y) one gets exactly condition F α2. Proposition 6.26. The following statements are equivalent: (a) Condition F α2; (b) For any S ∈ B and x ∈ X, C(S)(x) ≤
y∈X
¯ (c) R = R.
(S(y) → C([x, y])(x));
132
6 Fuzzy Revealed Preference and Consistency Conditions
Proof. (a) ⇔ (b) For any S ∈ B the following conditions are equivalent: • for any x, y ∈ X, C(S)(x) ∧ S(y) ≤ C([x, y])(x); • for any x, y ∈ X, C(S)(x) ≤ S(y) → C([x, y])(x); • for any x ∈ X, C(S)(x) ≤ (S(y) → C([x, y])(x)). y∈X
Thus (a), (b) are equivalent. ¯ y) = C([x, y])(x) and R ¯ ⊆ R (cf. Lemma 5.26 (i)) the (a) ⇔ (c) Since R(x, following properties are equivalent: • Condition F α2; ¯ y); • for any S ∈ B and x, y ∈ X, C(S)(x) ∧ S(y) ≤ R(x, ¯ y); • for any x, y ∈ X, (C(S)(x) ∧ S(y)) ≤ R(x, S∈B
¯ y); • for any x, y ∈ X, R(x, y) ≤ R(x, ¯ y). • for any x, y ∈ X, R(x, y) = R(x, In conclusion, condition F α2 and (c) are equivalent. Now let us consider the following property.
Condition F γ2 For any S ∈ B and x ∈ X, S(x) ∧
(S(y) → C([x, y])(x)) ≤ C(S)(x).
y∈X
Since for any S ∈ B and x ∈ X we have ¯ y)) ¯ (S(y) → R(x, G(S, R)(x) = S(x) ∧
y∈X
= S(x) ∧
(S(y) → C([x, y])(x, y))
y∈X
condition F γ2 can be expressed ¯ • For any S ∈ B and x ∈ X, G(S, R)(x) ≤ C(S)(x). Proposition 6.27. The following properties are equivalent: (a) C is G–normal; (b) C verifies conditions F α2 and F γ2.
6.4 Other Consistency Conditions
133
¯ hence condition Proof. (a) ⇒ (b) Since C is G–normal, by Lemma 6.2 R = R F α2 is verified. For each S ∈ B and x, y ∈ X we have
S(x) ∧
(S(y) → C([x, y])(x)) = S(x) ∧
y∈X
¯ y)) (S(y) → R(x,
y∈X
= S(x) ∧
(S(y) → R(x, y))
y∈X
ˆ = C(S)(x) = C(S)(x). Then condition F γ2 is verified. ¯ (by Proposition 6.26) and F γ2 holds we get (b) ⇒ (a) Since R = R
ˆ C(S)(x) = S(x) ∧
(S(y) → R(x, y))
y∈X
= S(x) ∧
¯ y)) ≤ C(S)(x). (S(y) → R(x,
y∈X
ˆ ˆ The inequality C(S)(x) ≤ C(S)(x) always holds, then C(S)(x) = C(S)(x) for each S ∈ B and x ∈ X. Now we consider a fuzzy version of the property β(+) in [93].
Condition F β(+) For any S, T ∈ B and x, y ∈ X, I(S, T ) ∧ C(S)(x) ∧ S(y) ≤ C(T )(y) → C(T )(x).
Proposition 6.28. F β(+) implies F β. Proof. For any S, T ∈ B and x, y ∈ X
134
6 Fuzzy Revealed Preference and Consistency Conditions
I(S, T ) ∧ C(S)(x) ∧ C(S)(y) ≤ I(S, T ) ∧ C(S)(x) ∧ S(y) ≤ C(T )(y) → C(T )(x) and similarly, I(S, T ) ∧ C(S)(x) ∧ C(S)(y) ≤ C(T )(x) → C(T )(y). Then condition F β follows immediately. Proposition 6.29. If F β(+) holds then for any S, T ∈ B and x ∈ X we have C(S)(x) ∧ C(T )(x) ≤ C(S ∪ T )(x). Proof. Let y ∈ X such that C(S ∪ T )(y) = 1; then S(y) ∨ T (y) = 1 hence S(y) = 1 or T (y) = 1. Assume S(y) = 1. Then, by F β(+): C(S)(x) = I(S, S ∪ T ) ∧ C(S)(x) ∧ S(y) ≤ C(S ∪ T )(y) → C(S ∪ T )(x) = 1 → C(S ∪ T )(x) = C(S ∪ T )(x). Similarly, if T (y) = 1, then C(T )(x) ≤ C(S ∪ T )(x); therefore C(S)(x) ∧ C(T )(x) ≤ C(S ∪ T )(x). Proposition 6.30. If C verifies F β(+) then R is transitive. Proof. Let S, T ∈ B and x, y, z ∈ X. Take w ∈ X such that C(S ∪ T )(w) = 1; since C(S ∪ T )(w) ≤ S(w) ∨ T (w) we have S(w) = 1 or T (w) = 1. Assume T (w) = 1. Exactly as in the proof of Proposition 6.29 one gets (a) C(T )(y) ≤ C(S ∪ T )(y). Applying F β(+) it follows that C(S)(x) ∧ S(y) = I(S, S ∪ T ) ∧ C(S)(x) ∧ S(y) ≤ C(S ∪ T )(y) → C(S ∪ T )(x) hence by Lemma 4.3 (1) (b) C(S)(x) ∧ S(y) ∧ C(S ∪ T )(y) ≤ C(S ∪ T )(x). In accordance with (a) and (b) the following inequalities hold:
6.4 Other Consistency Conditions
135
C(S)(x) ∧ S(y) ∧ C(T )(y) ∧ T (z) ≤ C(S)(x) ∧ S(y) ∧ C(S ∪ T )(y) ∧ T (z) ≤ C(S ∪ T )(x) ∧ T (z) ≤ C(S ∪ T )(x) ∧ (S ∪ T )(z) ≤ R(x, z). These inequalities are true for all S, T ∈ B, hence R(x, y) ∧ R(y, z) = [ (C(S)(x) ∧ S(y))] ∧ [ (C(T )(y) ∧ T (z))]= =
S∈B
T ∈B
(C(S)(x) ∧ S(y) ∧ C(T )(y) ∧ T (z)) ≤ R(x, z).
S,T ∈B
For the rest of the section let us assume that B = F(X) \ {∅}. We say that the fuzzy choice function C is path independent if for any S, T ∈ B the following equality holds (F P I) C(S ∪ T ) = C(C(S) ∪ C(T )). Condition F P I extends to fuzzy setting the path independence property P I for crisp choice functions (see [93], p. 68). We recall that the available fuzzy sets can be interpreted as vague criteria. F P I indicates that the fuzzy choice is independent of the manner such criterion can be decomposed into subcriteria with respect to which the choice takes place. ¯ is quasi-transitive. Proposition 6.31. If F P I holds then the fuzzy relation R Proof. Let x, y, z ∈ X. We must prove that P¯ (x, y) ∧ P¯ (y, z) ≤ P¯ (x, z), i.e. ¯ y) ∧ ¬R(y, ¯ x) ∧ R(y, ¯ z) ∧ ¬R(z, ¯ y) ≤ R(x, ¯ z) ∧ ¬R(z, ¯ x). (a) R(x, ¯ x) > 0 or R(z, ¯ y) > 0 then ¬R(y, ¯ x) = 0 or ¬R(z, ¯ y) = 0 so (a) If R(y, ¯ x) = R(z, ¯ y) = 0 then, since R ¯ is strongly is trivially verified. Assume R(y, ¯ y) = R(y, ¯ z) = 1. Thus total, R(x, ¯ y) = 1; C([x, y])(y) = R(y, ¯ x) = 0 C([x, y])(x) = R(x, hence C([x, y]) = [x]. Similarly, C([y, z]) = [y]. According to F P I we can write
136
6 Fuzzy Revealed Preference and Consistency Conditions
C([x, y, z]) = C([x, y] ∪ [y, z]) = C(C([x, y]) ∪ C([y, z])) = C([x] ∪ [y]) = C([x, y]) = [x]; C([x, y, z]) = C([x, y] ∪ [z]) = C(C([x, y]) ∪ C([z])) = C([x] ∪ [z]) = C([x, z]) hence C([x, z]) = [x]. This yields ¯ z) = C([x, z])(x) = [x](x) = 1 R(x, ¯ x) = C([x, z])(z) = [x](z) = 0. R(z, ¯ z) ∧ ¬R(z, ¯ x) = 1 and the inequality (a) holds. Then R(x, Proposition 6.32. If F α holds then C(S ∪ T ) ≤ C(C(S) ∪ C(T )) for all S, T ∈ B. Proof. Let S, T ∈ B and x ∈ X. First we prove that (a) C(S ∪ T )(x) ≤ C(S)(x) ∨ C(T )(x). Assume T (x) ≤ S(x) then C(S ∪ T )(x) ≤ S(x) ∨ T (x) = S(x). By F α we get C(S ∪ T )(x) = I(S, S ∪ T ) ∧ C(S ∪ T )(x) ∧ S(x) ≤ C(S)(x) ≤ C(S)(x) ∨ C(T )(x). If S(x) ≤ T (x) then (a) follows similarly. We apply again F α:
C(S ∪ T )(x) = C(S ∪ T )(x) ∧ (C(S) ∪ C(T ))(x) = I(C(S) ∪ C(T ), S ∪ T ) ∧ C(S ∪ T )(x) ∧ (C(S) ∪ C(T ))(x) ≤ C(C(S) ∪ C(T ))(x) Thus C(S ∪ T ) ≤ C(C(S) ∪ C(T )). Remark 6.33. In case of crisp choice functions the converse of Proposition 6.32 also holds (see [93], Proposition 17). An open problem is whether the converse of Proposition 6.32 holds true.
6.5 The Fuzzy Arrow Axiom
137
6.5 The Fuzzy Arrow Axiom In this section we study the Fuzzy Arrow Axiom, a generalization of the Arrow Axiom to fuzzy choice functions. The main result of this section establishes the equivalence of the Fuzzy Arrow Axiom and the full rationality of fuzzy choice functions. This result is connected with Theorem 6.40, resulting that W F CA, SF CA, Fuzzy Arrow Axiom and the full rationality are equivalent (under hypotheses H1 and H2). Throughout this section we shall assume that hypotheses H1, H2 are verified. Let (X, B) be a (crisp) choice space. Recall that a choice function C on (X, B) verifies the Arrow Axiom (AA) if for any S1 , S2 ∈ B the following implication holds: [S1 ⊆ S2 ] ⇒ [S1 ∩ C(S2 ) = ∅] or [S1 ∩ C(S2 ) = C(S1 )]. In order to obtain the fuzzy form of AA it is convenient to write the above implication in the equivalent form: [S1 ⊆ S2 ] and [S1 ∩ C(S2 ) = ∅] ⇒ [S1 ∩ C(S2 ) = C(S1 )]. This way of expressing the Arrow Axiom leads to the following definition: Definition 6.34. Let C be a fuzzy choice function on a fuzzy choice space (X, B). We say that C verifies the Fuzzy Arrow Axiom F AA if for any S1 , S2 ∈ B and x ∈ X we have I(S1 , S2 ) ∗ S1 (x) ∗ C(S2 )(x) ≤ E(S1 ∩ C(S2 ), C(S1 )). Intuitively, this axiom says: The maximum degree that, for some x, S1 and S2 , x is chosen from S2 , x belongs to S1 and S1 is included in S2 , is less than or equal to the degree that the set of alternatives chosen from S2 , and also in S1 is equal to the set of alternatives chosen from S1 . Remark 6.35. If S1 ⊆ S2 then the previous inequality becomes: S1 (x) ∗ C(S2 )(x) ≤ E(S1 ∩ C(S2 ), C(S1 )) hence it is clear that AA is a particular case of F AA.
138
6 Fuzzy Revealed Preference and Consistency Conditions
Remark 6.36. We observe that F AA is formulated in terms of the functions I(., .) and E(., .). From the previous remark we can see the reason why in formulating F AA we started from the second form of AA and not from the first. The following results are true for the G¨ odel t–norm. ¯ is transiLemma 6.37. If the fuzzy choice function C verifies F AA then R tive. Proof. Recall that C verifies H1 and H2. Let x, y, z ∈ X and S = [x, y, z] ∈ B. ¯ y) ∧ R(y, ¯ z) ≤ R(x, ¯ z), i.e. We must prove that R(x, C([x, y])(x) ∧ C([y, z])(y) ≤ C([x, z])(x)
(6.1)
If x = y or y = z or x = z then (6.1) is trivial hence we may assume that x, y, z are distinct. First we shall prove that C([x, y])(x) ∧ C([y, z])(y) ≤ C(S)(x)
(6.2)
Suppose that C([x, y])(x) ∧ C([y, z])(y) ≤ C(S)(x). We shall prove that this condition implies C([x, y])(x) ∧ C([y, z])(y) ≤ C(S)(y). In order to obtain this last property we assume by absurdum that C([x, y])(x) ∧ C([y, z])(y) ≤ C(S)(y)
(6.3)
According to F AA we get C(S)(y) = I([x, y], S) ∧ [x, y](y) ∧ C(S)(y) ≤ E([x, y] ∩ C(S), C([x, y])) ≤ ([x, y](x) ∧ C(S)(x)) ↔ C([x, y])(x) = = C(S)(x) ↔ C([x, y])(x) ≤ C([x, y])(x) → C(S)(x). By Lemma 4.3 (1), C(S)(y) ∧ C([x, y])(x) ≤ C(S)(x), therefore by (6.3) C([x, y])(x) ∧ C([y, z])(y) ≤ C(S)(y) ∧ C([x, y])(x) ≤ C(S)(x). Contradiction, hence C([x, y])(x) ∧ C([y, z])(y) ≤ C(S)(y). From this last property one can infer in a similar way that C([x, y])(x) ∧ C([y, z])(y) ≤
6.5 The Fuzzy Arrow Axiom
139
C(S)(z). Thus C(S)(x) = 1, C(S)(y) = 1 and C(S)(z) = 1 contradicting that C(S) is a normal fuzzy subset of X (by H1). Then (6.2) was proved. Applying again F AA one gets C(S)(x) = I([x, z], S) ∧ [x, z](x) ∧ C(S)(x) ≤ E([x, z] ∩ C(S), C([x, z])) ≤ ([x, z](x) ∧ C(S)(x)) ↔ C([x, z])(x) = = C(S)(x) ↔ C([x, z])(x) ≤ C(S)(x) → C([x, z])(x). By Lemma 4.3 (1), C(S)(x) = C(S)(x)∧C(S)(x) ≤ C([x, z])(x). Therefore using (6.2) one obtains the inequality (6.1). Theorem 6.38. If C : B → F(X) is a fuzzy choice function then the following are equivalent: (1) C is full rational; (2) C verifies F AA. Proof. (1) ⇒ (2). Assume C is full rational, i.e. C = G(., Q) for some reflexive, transitive and strongly total fuzzy preference relation Q. Let S1 , S2 ∈ B and x ∈ X. We must prove that: I(S1 , S2 ) ∧ S1 (x) ∧ C(S2 )(x) ≤ E(S1 ∩ C(S2 ), C(S1 ))
(6.4)
For any S ∈ B and s, t ∈ X we have in accordance with C = G(., Q): [S(y) → Q(s, y)] ≤ S(t) → Q(s, t) C(S)(s) ≤ y∈X
hence, by Lemma 4.3 (1) C(S)(s) ∧ S(t) ≤ Q(s, t)
(6.5)
Let z, v ∈ X. By (6.5) we have I(S1 , S2 ) ∧ S1 (x) ∧ C(S2 )(x) ∧ C(S1 )(z) ∧ S2 (v) ≤ ≤ [C(S1 )(z) ∧ S1 (x)] ∧ [C(S2 )(x) ∧ S2 (v)] ≤ Q(z, x) ∧ Q(x, v) ≤ Q(z, v) because Q is transitive. Hence, by Lemma 4.3 (1) I(S1 , S2 ) ∧ S1 (x) ∧ C(S2 )(x) ∧ C(S1 )(z) ≤ S2 (v) → Q(z, v). This inequality holds for each v ∈ X hence
140
6 Fuzzy Revealed Preference and Consistency Conditions
I(S1 , S2 ) ∧ S1 (x) ∧ C(S2 )(x) ∧ C(S1 )(z) ≤
[S2 (v) → Q(z, v)]
(6.6)
v∈X
We also have I(S1 , S2 ) ∧ S1 (x) ∧ C(S2 )(x) ∧ C(S1 )(z) ≤ C(S1 )(z) ∧ I(S1 , S2 ) ≤ S1 (z) ∧ [S1 (z) → S2 (z)] = S1 (z) ∧ S2 (z) ≤ S2 (z). Then using (6.6)
I(S1 , S2 ) ∧ S1 (x) ∧ C(S2 )(x) ∧ C(S1 )(z) ≤ S2 (z) ∧
[S2 (v) → Q(z, v)] =
v∈X
C(S2 )(z) In accordance with Lemma 4.3 (1) and Lemma 4.5 (2) we get for any z ∈ X: I(S1 , S2 ) ∧ S1 (x) ∧ C(S2 )(x) ≤ C(S1 )(z) → C(S2 )(z) = = [C(S1 )(z) → S1 (z)] ∧ [C(S1 )(z) → C(S2 )(z)] = C(S1 )(z) → (S1 (z) ∧ C(S2 )(z)). We have proved the inequality
I(S1 , S2 ) ∧ S1 (x) ∧ C(S2 )(x) ≤ C(S1 )(z) → (S1 (z) ∧ C(S2 )(z))
(6.7)
Let y ∈ X. Using I(S1 , S2 ) ≤ S1 (y) → S2 (y) and (6.5) we obtain I(S1 , S2 ) ∧ S1 (x) ∧ C(S2 )(x) ∧ S1 (z) ∧ C(S2 )(z) ∧ S1 (y) ≤ ≤ S1 (y) ∧ [S1 (y) → S2 (y)] ∧ C(S2 )(x) ∧ C(S2 )(z) = = S1 (y) ∧ S2 (y) ∧ C(S2 )(x) ∧ C(S2 )(z) ≤ [C(S2 )(z) ∧ S2 (x)] ∧ [C(S2 )(x) ∧ S2 (y)] ≤ ≤ Q(z, x) ∧ Q(x, y) ≤ Q(z, y). By Lemma 4.3 (1) we get for any y ∈ X: I(S1 , S2 ) ∧ S1 (x) ∧ C(S2 )(x) ∧ S1 (z) ∧ C(S2 )(z) ≤ S1 (y) → Q(z, y) hence I(S1 , S2 ) ∧ S1 (x) ∧ C(S2 )(x) ∧ S1 (z) ∧ C(S2 )(z) ≤
y∈X
[S1 (y) → Q(z, y)].
6.5 The Fuzzy Arrow Axiom
Then I(S1 , S2 ) ∧ S1 (x) ∧ C(S2 )(x) ∧ S1 (z) ∧ C(S2 )(z) ≤ S1 (z) ∧
141
[S1 (y) →
y∈X
Q(z, y)] = C(S1 )(z). According to Lemma 4.3 (1) we get for any z ∈ X
I(S1 , S2 ) ∧ S1 (x) ∧ C(S2 )(x) ≤ (S1 (z) ∧ C(S2 )(z)) → C(S1 )(z)
(6.8)
From (6.7) and (6.8) it follows that I(S1 , S2 ) ∧ S1 (x) ∧ C(S2 )(x) ≤ (S1 (z) ∧ C(S2 )(z)) ↔ C(S1 )(z) i.e. the inequality (6.4). ¯ (2) ⇒ (1) Assume C verifies F AA. It suffices to prove that C = G(., R). Let S ∈ B and x ∈ X. We must prove that C(S)(x) = S(x) ∧
¯ z)] [S(z) → R(x,
(6.9)
z∈X
Let z ∈ X. According to I([x, z], S) = S(x) ∧ S(z) and F AA we have C(S)(x)∧S(z) = S(x)∧S(z)∧C(S)(x) = I([x, z], S)∧[x, z](x)∧C(S)(x) ≤ ≤ E([x, z] ∩ C(S), C([x, z])) ≤ [x, z](x) ∧ C(S)(x) → C([x, z])(x) = ¯ z). C(S)(x) → R(x, By Lemma 4.3 (1) ¯ z) C(S)(x) ∧ S(z) = C(S)(x) ∧ S(z) ∧ C(S)(x) ≤ R(x, ¯ z) for any z ∈ X. We conclude that hence C(S)(x) ≤ S(z) → R(x, ¯ z)]. C(S)(x) ≤ S(x) ∧ [S(z) → R(x, z∈X
In order to prove that the converse inequality we consider y ∈ X such that C(S)(y) = 1 (because C(S) is a normal fuzzy set), then S(y) = 1. Thus ¯ ¯ z)] ≤ G(S, R)(x) = S(x) ∧ [S(z) → R(x, z∈X
¯ y) = 1 → R(x, ¯ y) = R(x, ¯ y) = C([x, y])(x). ≤ S(y) → R(x, On the other hand, by I([x, y], S) = S(x) ∧ S(y) and F AA ¯ G(S, R)(x) ≤ S(x) = S(x) ∧ S(y) ∧ C(S)(y) = = I([x, y], S) ∧ [x, y](y) ∧ C(S)(y) ≤ E([x, y] ∩ C(S), C([x, y])) ≤
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6 Fuzzy Revealed Preference and Consistency Conditions
≤ ([x, y](x) ∧ C(S)(x)) ↔ C([x, y])(x) ≤ C([x, y])(x) → C(S)(x). ¯ By Lemmas 5.26 and 6.37 it follows We have proved that C = G(., R). ¯ is reflexive, transitive and strongly total, hence C is full rational. that R
Now we shall connect Theorem 6.7 and Theorem 6.38. Lemma 6.39. Let C be a fuzzy choice function on (X, B). If C = G(S, Q) and R is the fuzzy revealed preference relation associated with C then R ⊆ Q. Proof. Let S ∈ B and x, y ∈ X. Then C(S)(x) = S(x) ∧ [S(u) → Q(x, u)] ≤ S(y) → Q(x, y). u∈X
By Lemma 4.3 (1), C(S)(x) ∧ S(y) ≤ Q(x, y) for each S ∈ B, therefore R(x, y) = (C(S)(x) ∧ S(y)) ≤ Q(x, y). S∈B
Theorem 6.40. If C : B → F(X) is a fuzzy choice function then the following are equivalent: (1) C is full rational; (2) C verifies F AA; (3) C is G–normal and R is reflexive, transitive and strongly total; (4) C verifies W F CA; (5) C verifies SF CA. Proof. (1) ⇒ (4) Assume C = G(., Q) for some fuzzy relation Q on X which is reflexive, transitive and strongly total. Let S ∈ B and x, y ∈ X. We shall establish the inequality: C(S)(y) ∧ S(x) ∧ Q(x, y) ≤ C(S)(x) (6.10) Since C(S)(x) = S(x) ∧ [S(u) → Q(x, u)] it suffices to prove that u∈X
C(S)(y) ∧ S(x) ∧ Q(x, y) ≤ S(u) → Q(x, u)
(6.11)
6.5 The Fuzzy Arrow Axiom
143
for each u ∈ X. By Lemma 4.3 (1) this inequality is equivalent to S(u) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ S(x) ∧ Q(x, y) ≤ Q(x, u) By Lemma 4.3 (2): S(u) ∧ C(S)(y) = S(u) ∧ S(y) ∧
(6.12)
[S(z) → Q(y, z)] ≤
z∈X
≤ S(u) ∧ [S(u) → Q(y, u)] = S(u) ∧ Q(y, u) ≤ Q(y, u). Hence S(u)∧C(S)(y)∧S(x)∧Q(x, y) ≤ Q(x, y)∧Q(y, u) ≤ Q(x, u) because Q is transitive. Then (6.12) is proved. By Lemma 6.39 and (6.12) we obtain C(S)(y) ∧ S(x) ∧ R(x, y) ≤ C(S)(y) ∧ S(x) ∧ Q(x, y) ≤ C(S)(x). Therefore C verifies W F CA. (3) ⇒ (1) Obvious. The other equivalences follow by Theorems 6.7 and 6.38. By establishing the equivalence between the full rationality, (FAA) and the fuzzy congruence axioms W F CA, SF CA, the above theorem represents the maximal form in which the results from crisp revealed preference theory (on the line Uzawa–Arrow–Sen) can be extended to fuzzy choice functions. On the other hand, the above conditions are not equivalent with the axioms of revealed preference W AF RP , SAF RP (see Example 6.8). We introduce now two more axioms:
Fuzzy Chernoff Axiom (F CA) For any S1 , S2 ∈ B and x ∈ X, I(S1 , S2 ) ∧ S1 (x) ∧ C(S2 )(x) ≤ I(S1 ∩ C(S2 ), C(S1 ))
Fuzzy Dual Chernoff Axiom (F DCA) For any S1 , S2 ∈ B and x ∈ X,
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6 Fuzzy Revealed Preference and Consistency Conditions
I(S1 , S2 ) ∧ S1 (x) ∧ C(S2 )(x) ≤ I(C(S1 ), S1 ∩ C(S2 )).
It is obvious that the Fuzzy Arrow Axiom F AA is equivalent to the conjunction of F CA and F DCA. F CA (respectively F DCA) is a fuzzy form of the Chernoff Axiom CA (respectively Dual Chernoff Axiom DCA) (see [103], pp. 31 and 41). Proposition 6.41. For any fuzzy choice function C : B → F(X) the following conditions are equivalent: (1) C verifies F CA; (2) C verifies consistency condition F α. Proof. (1) ⇒ (2). By F CA: I(S1 , S2 )∧S1 (x)∧C(S2 )(x) ≤ I(S1 ∩C(S2 ), C(S1 )) ≤ (S1 (x)∧C(S2 )(x)) → C(S1 )(x). Using Lemma 4.3 (1) we obtain I(S1 , S2 ) ∧ S1 (x) ∧ C(S2 )(x) ≤ C(S1 )(x). (2) ⇒ (1). Let S1 , S2 ∈ B and x, y ∈ X. Then, by (2): I(S1 , S2 ) ∧ S1 (x) ∧ C(S2 )(x) ∧ S1 (y) ∧ C(S2 )(y) ≤ ≤ I(S1 , S2 ) ∧ S1 (y) ∧ C(S2 )(y) ≤ C(S1 )(y) hence, using Lemma 4.3 (1) we get I(S1 , S2 ) ∧ S1 (x) ∧ C(S2 )(x) ≤ (S1 (y) ∧ C(S2 )(y)) → C(S1 )(y). Since this last inequality holds for any y ∈ X it follows that I(S1 , S2 ) ∧ S1 (x) ∧ C(S2 )(x) ≤ [(S1 (y) ∧ C(S2 )(y)) → C(S1 )(y)] = I(S1 ∩ C(S2 ), C(S1 )).
y∈X
Corollary 6.42. Any full rational fuzzy choice function C verifies condition F α.
7 General Results
In the previous chapter we studied under hypotheses (H1) and (H2) revealed preference axioms W AF RP , SAF RP , congruence axioms W F CA, SF CA and some consistency conditions. This line of enquiry follows Uzawa–Arrow– Sen theory that starts from the assumption that the domain of the choice function contains the finite sets of alternatives. Richter, Hansson, Suzumura and their followers investigated the choice functions’rationality and revealed preference and congruence conditions without this hypothesis. The purpose of this chapter is a fuzzy approach of revealed preference and congruence axioms for fuzzy choice functions in the general case, following Richter–Hansson–Suzumura theory; we will work ignoring hypotheses (H1) and (H2). As we have seen in Section 5.2, axioms W ARP and SARP written in terms of C-connected sequences lead to new revealed preference axioms W AF RP ◦ , SAF RP ◦ . We also introduced axiom HAF RP . In Section 7.1 we prove two main theorems: 1. The axioms W F CA and W AF RP ◦ are equivalent. 2. The axioms SF CA and HAF RP are equivalent.
Irina Georgescu: Fuzzy Choice Functions, StudFuzz 214, 145–167 (2007) www.springerlink.com
c Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007
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These two theorems extend two results of Hansson [61] and Suzumura [100] from the theory of choice functions: the axioms W CA and W ARP (respectively SCA and HARP ) are equivalent. Another proposition asserts that W F CA ⇒ W AF RP and SF CA ⇒ SAF RP . According to the first theorem we have W AF RP ◦ ⇒ W AF RP . These results are summarized in a diagram that illustrates the hierarchy of axioms and other conditions of rationality. Section 7.2 deals with a particular case of fuzzy choice functions. For them we establish the equivalence between W AF RP ◦ , G-normality, M -normality and other two properties expressed by algebraic identities. Particularly the implication W AF RP ⇒ W AF RP ◦ fails hence W AF RP and W AF RP ◦ are not equivalent. A classical Richter theorem [84] asserts that a classical choice function verifies SCA if and only if it is rationalized by a reflexive, transitive and total preference relation. Section 7.3 investigates to what extent Richter’s theorem can be extended to fuzzy choice functions. We work here in a fuzzy set theory based on an arbitrary continuous t-norm ∗. We use the notion of totally rational fuzzy choice function, i.e. a G-rational fuzzy choice function which is rationalized by a reflexive, ∗-transitive and total fuzzy preference relation. A fuzzy choice function is said to be congruous if it verifies SF CA. First we prove that every totally rational fuzzy choice function is congruous. To prove the converse implication is an open question. We need to define the notion of semirational fuzzy choice function in order to construct the proof on the fuzzy level. We find a surprising result: any fuzzy choice function is semirational; to prove that, we essentially apply our fuzzy version of Szpilrajn theorem (Theorem 4.36).
7.1 The Hierarchy of Axioms
147
7.1 The Hierarchy of Axioms In this section we study arbitrary fuzzy choice functions with respect to the connections between different axioms of revealed preference and congruence. The results will be summarized in the final diagram. Proposition 7.1. Let ∗ be a continuous t–norm. Then the following hold: (i) W F CA ⇒ W AF RP ; (ii) SF CA ⇒ SAF RP . Proof. (i) Let C : B → F(X) be a fuzzy choice function fulfilling W F CA. For any x, y ∈ X we have
P˜ (x, y) ∗ R(y, x) = [
(C(S)(x) ∗ S(y) ∗ ¬C(S)(y)] ∗ R(y, x)
S∈B
=
[R(y, x) ∗ C(S)(x) ∗ S(y) ∗ ¬C(S)(y)]
S∈B
≤
(C(S)(y) ∗ ¬C(S)(y)) = 0
S∈B
because R(y, x) ∗ C(S)(x) ∗ S(y) ≤ C(S)(y), by W F CA. Thus P˜ (x, y) ∗ R(y, x) = 0, hence P˜ (x, y) ≤ ¬R(y, x). (ii) Suppose C verifies SF CA. For any x, y ∈ X: T (P˜ )(x, y) ∗ R(y, x) = ∞ = [P˜ (x, y) ∨
(P˜ (x, t1 ) ∗ . . . ∗ P˜ (tn , y))] ∗ R(y, x) =
n=1 t1 ,...,tn ∈X ∞
= [P˜ (x, y) ∗ R(y, x)] ∨
[P˜ (x, t1 ) ∗ . . . ∗ P˜ (tn , y) ∗ R(y, x)].
n=1 t1 ,...,tn ∈X
But SF CA implies W F CA, hence by (i), P˜ (x, y) ∗ R(y, x) = 0. For any n ≥ 1 and t1 , . . . , tn ∈ X we have, according to Lemma 5.25: P˜ (x, t1 ) ∗ . . . ∗ P˜ (tn , y) ∗ R(y, x) ≤ R(x, t1 ) ∗ . . . ∗ R(tn−1 , tn ) ∗ P˜ (tn , y) ∗ R(y, x) = = R(y, x) ∗ R(x, t1 ) ∗ . . . ∗ R(tn−1 , tn ) ∗ P˜ (tn , y) ≤
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≤ T (R)(y, tn ) ∗ P˜ (tn , y) = = T (R)(y, tn ) ∗ [C(S)(tn ) ∗ S(y) ∗ ¬C(S)(y)] =
S∈B
[T (R)(y, tn ) ∗ C(S)(tn ) ∗ S(y) ∗ ¬C(S)(y)] ≤
S∈B
≤
(C(S)(y) ∗ ¬C(S)(y)) = 0
S∈B
because T (R)(y, tn ) ∗ C(S)(tn ) ∗ S(y) ≤ C(S)(y) (by SF CA). Thus P˜ (x, t1 ) ∗ . . . ∗ P˜ (tn , y) ∗ R(y, x) = 0 for any n ≥ 1 and t1 , . . . , tn ∈ X, therefore T (P˜ )(x, y) ∗ R(y, x) = 0. By Lemma 4.3 (1), T (P˜ )(x, y) ≤ ¬R(y, x).
Remark 7.2. Let C be a fuzzy choice function, S ∈ B, x, y ∈ X and ∗ a continuous t–norm. By the definition of R R(x, y) ∗ S(x) ∗ C(S)(y) = [ (C(T )(x) ∗ T (y))] ∗ S(x) ∗ C(S)(y) =
T ∈B
[S(x) ∗ T (y) ∗ C(T )(x) ∗ C(S)(y)].
T ∈B
Then W F CA is equivalent with the following statement • For any S, T ∈ B and x, y ∈ X S(x) ∗ T (y) ∗ C(T )(x) ∗ C(S)(y) ≤ C(S)(x). For the rest of the section assume that ∗ is the G¨ odel t–norm ∧. Theorem 7.3. For a fuzzy choice function C : B → F(X) the following are equivalent: (i) C verifies W F CA; (ii) R ⊆ R∗ ; (iii) C verifies W AF RP ◦ . Proof. (i) ⇔ (ii). The following assertions are equivalent: • R ⊆ R∗ ; • For any x, y ∈ X: (C(S)(x) ∧ S(y)) ≤ [(T (x) ∧ C(T )(y)) → C(T )(x)]; S∈B
T ∈B
7.1 The Hierarchy of Axioms
149
• For any x, y ∈ X and S, T ∈ B : C(S)(x) ∧ S(y) ≤ (T (x) ∧ C(T )(y)) → C(T )(x). • For any x, y ∈ X and S, T ∈ B: C(S)(x) ∧ S(y) ∧ T (x) ∧ C(T )(y) ≤ C(T )(x). In accordance with Remark 7.2, (i) and (ii) are equivalent. (iii) ⇒ (i) Assume that C verifies W AF RP ◦ . Let x, y ∈ X and S, T ∈ B. By W AF RP ◦ one gets S(x) ∧ T (y) ∧ C(T )(x) ∧ C(S)(y) ≤ E(S ∩ C(T ), T ∩ C(S)) = = [(S(u) ∧ C(T )(u)) ↔ (T (u) ∧ C(S)(u))] ≤ u∈X
≤ (S(x) ∧ C(T )(x)) ↔ (T (x) ∧ C(S)(x)) ≤ ≤ (S(x) ∧ C(T )(x)) → (T (x) ∧ C(S)(x)) = = [(S(x) ∧ C(T )(x)) → T (x)] ∧ [(S(x) ∧ C(T )(x)) → C(S)(x)] = = (S(x) ∧ C(T )(x)) → C(S)(x) because (S(x) ∧ C(T )(x)) → T (x) = 1 (by Lemma 4.3 (4)). It follows that S(x) ∧ T (y) ∧ C(T )(x) ∧ C(S)(y) = = [S(x) ∧ T (y) ∧ C(T )(x) ∧ C(S)(y)] ∧ (S(x) ∧ C(T )(x)) ≤ C(S)(x) in accordance with Lemma 4.3 (1). According to Remark 7.2, C verifies W F CA. (i) ⇒ (iii) Assume C fulfills W F CA. By Remark 7.2, for any S, T ∈ B and x, y, u ∈ X we have S(x)∧T (y)∧C(S)(y)∧C(T )(x)∧S(u)∧C(T )(u) ≤ S(u)∧T (y)∧C(T )(u)∧ C(S)(y) ≤ C(S)(u). Thus, by Lemma 4.3 (1): S(x) ∧ T (y) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ C(T )(x) ≤ (S(u) ∧ C(T )(u)) → C(S)(u) = = (S(u) ∧ C(T )(u)) → (T (u) ∧ C(S)(u)) and similarly, S(x) ∧ T (y) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ C(T )(x) ≤ (T (u) ∧ C(S)(u)) → (S(u) ∧ C(T )(u)) The last two inequalities give S(x) ∧ T (y) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ C(T )(x) ≤ (S(u) ∧ C(T )(u)) ↔ (T (u) ∧ C(S)(u)). This inequality is true for each u ∈ X, hence
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S(x) ∧ T (y) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ C(T )(x) ≤ E(S ∩ C(T ), T ∩ C(S)) so C verifies the axiom W AF RP ◦ . Corollary 7.4. W AF RP ◦ ⇒ W AF RP . Proof. By Proposition 7.1 and Theorem 7.3. From Theorem 7.3 one obtains as a particular case the result from [100] that says that the axioms W ARP and W CA are equivalent. The axiom W ARP has two fuzzy versions: W AF RP and W AF RP ◦ . According to Corollary 7.4, W AF RP ◦ ⇒ W AF RP . In the next section we obtain that the converse implication W AF RP ⇒ W AF RP ◦ is not true (see Remark 7.8). Theorem 7.5. For any fuzzy choice function C : B → F(X) the following are equivalent: (i) C verifies HAF RP ; (ii) C verifies SF CA. Proof. (i) ⇒ (ii) Assume C verifies HAF RP . For any S ∈ B and x, y ∈ X we shall prove that (a) T (R)(x, y) ∧ S(x) ∧ C(S)(y) ≤ C(S)(x) The left hand-side in (a) can be written T (R)(x, y) ∧ S(x) ∧ C(S)(y) = ∞ = [R(x, y) ∨ (R(x, z1 ) ∧ . . . ∧ R(zn , y))] ∧ S(x) ∧ C(S)(y) = n=1 z1 ,...,zn ∈X
= [R(x, y)∧S(x)∧C(S)(y)]∨
∞
[R(x, z1 )∧. . .∧R(zn , y)∧S(x)∧
n=1 z1 ,...,zn ∈X
C(S)(y)]. Then proving (a) is equivalent to establishing the following two inequalities: (b) R(x, y) ∧ S(x) ∧ C(S)(y) ≤ C(S)(x); (c) For any integer n ≥ 1 and z1 , . . . , zn ∈ X: R(x, z1 ) ∧ R(z1 , z2 ) ∧ . . . ∧ R(zn , y) ∧ S(x) ∧ C(S)(y) ≤ C(S)(x).
7.1 The Hierarchy of Axioms
151
The axiom HAF RP implies W AF RP ◦ then, by Theorem 7.3, C verifies W F CA. Then (b) is verified. According to the definition of R R(x, z1 ) ∧ R(z1 , z2 ) ∧ . . . ∧ R(zn , y) ∧ S(x) ∧ C(S)(y) = =[ (C(S1 )(x)∧S1 (z1 ))]∧. . .∧[ (C(Sn+1 )(zn )∧Sn+1 (y))]∧S(x)∧ S1 ∈B
C(S)(y) = =
Sn+1 ∈B
T (S1 , . . . , Sn+1 )
S1 ,...,Sn+1
where T (S1 , . . . , Sn+1 ) = C(S1 )(x) ∧ S1 (z1 ) ∧ C(S2 )(z1 ) ∧ . . . ∧C(Sn+1 )(zn ) ∧ Sn+1 (y) ∧ S(x) ∧ C(S)(y) = = [S(x) ∧ C(S1 )(x)] ∧ [S1 (z1 ) ∧ C(S2 )(z1 )] ∧ . . . ∧ [Sn (zn ) ∧ C(Sn+1 )(zn )]∧ n+1 ∧[Sn+1 (y) ∧ C(S)(y)] = [Sk (zk ) ∧ C(Sk+1 )(zk )] k=0
with S0 = S, z0 = x and zn+1 = y. According to HAF RP : T (S1 , . . . , Sn+1 ) ≤ E(S ∩ C(S1 ), S1 ∩ C(S)) ≤ ≤ (S(x) ∧ C(S1 )(x)) ↔ (S1 (x) ∧ C(S)(x)) ≤ ≤ (S(x) ∧ C(S1 )(x)) → (S1 (x) ∧ C(S)(x)) = = (S(x) ∧ C(S1 )(x)) → C(S)(x). We also have T (S1 , . . . , Sn+1 ) ≤ S(x) ∧ C(S1 )(x) hence by Lemma 4.3 (2) T (S1 , . . . , Sn+1 ) ≤ (S(x) ∧ C(S1 )(x1 )) ∧ [(S(x) ∧ C(S1 )(x)) → C(S)(x)] = = S(x) ∧ C(S1 )(x) ∧ C(S)(x) ≤ C(S)(x). This inequality holds for all S1 , . . . , Sn+1 ∈ B hence R(x, z1 ) ∧ R(z1 , z2 ) ∧ . . . ∧ R(zn , y) ∧ S(x) ∧ C(S)(y) = = T (S1 , . . . , Sn+1 ) ≤ C(S)(x). S1 ,...,Sn+1
Condition (c) was proved so the proof of (i) ⇒ (ii) is finished. (ii) Assume C fulfills SF CA. Let S1 , . . . , Sn ∈ B and z1 , . . . , zn ∈ X. We shall prove that the following inequality holds: n (d) [Sk (zk ) ∧ C(Sk+1 )(zk )] ≤ E(S1 ∩ C(S2 ), S2 ∩ C(S1 )) k=1
where Sn+1 = S1 . We remark that
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(e)
n
[Sk (zk ) ∧ C(Sk+1 )(zk )] =
k=1
= S1 (z1 )∧[C(S2 )(z1 )∧S2 (z2 )]∧. . .∧[C(Sn )(zn−1 )∧Sn (zn )]∧C(S1 )(zn ) ≤ ≤ S1 (z1 ) ∧ R(z1 , z2 ) ∧ . . . ∧ R(zn−1 , zn ) ∧ C(S1 )(zn ) ≤ ≤ S1 (z1 ) ∧ T (R)(z1 , zn ) ∧ C(S1 )(zn ) because C(S2 )(z1 ) ∧ S2 (z2 ) ≤ R(z1 , z2 ), . . . , C(Sn )(zn−1 ) ∧ Sn (zn ) ≤ R(zn−1 , zn ). Let z ∈ X. We shall establish the inequality n (f) [Sk (zk ) ∧ C(Sk+1 )(zk )] ≤ (S1 (z) ∧ C(S2 )(z)) → C(S1 )(z) k=1
= [S1 (z) ∧ C(S2 )(z)] → [S2 (z) ∧ C(S1 )(z))].
By Lemma 4.3 (1), (f) is equivalent to n (g) [Sk (zk ) ∧ C(Sk+1 )(zk )] ∧ S1 (z) ∧ C(S2 )(z) ≤ C(S1 )(z). k=1
Let us denote by the left hand side member of the inequality (g). It is obvious that ≤ C(S2 )(z1 ) ∧ C(S2 )(z) ≤ S2 (z1 ) ∧ C(S2 )(z) ≤ R(z, z1 ). By (e) we have ≤ T (R)(z1 , zn ) therefore ≤ R(z, z1 ) ∧ T (R)(z1 , zn ) ≤ T (R)(z, z1 ) ∧ T (R)(z1 , zn ) ≤ T (R)(z, zn ) because T (R) is transitive. According to (e), ≤ C(S1 )(zn ). We also have ≤ S1 (z), therefore ≤ T (R)(z, zn ) ∧ S1 (z) ∧ C(S1 )(zn ) ≤ C(S1 )(z), the last inequality following by SF CA. Then (g) was proved. In accordance with (e) we can write n [Sk (zk ) ∧ C(Sk+1 )(zk )] ∧ S2 (z) ∧ C(S1 )(z) ≤ k=1
≤ S1 (z1 ) ∧ T (R)(z1 , zn ) ∧ C(S1 )(zn ) ∧ S2 (z) ∧ C(S1 )(z) ≤ ≤ S2 (z) ∧ (C(S1 )(z) ∧ S1 (z1 )) ≤ R(z, z1 ) ∧ S2 (z). n [Sk (zk ) ∧ C(Sk+1 )(zk )] ≤ C(S2 )(z1 ) hence by using It is obvious that k=1
W F CA n [Sk (zk ) ∧ C(Sk+1 )(zk )] ∧ S2 (z) ∧ C(S1 )(z) ≤ k=1
≤ R(z, z1 ) ∧ S2 (z) ∧ C(S2 )(z1 ) ≤ C(S2 )(z).
By this last inequality one infers
7.1 The Hierarchy of Axioms n
(h)
153
[Sk (zk ) ∧ C(Sk+1 )(zk )] ≤ (S2 (z) ∧ C(S1 )(z)) → C(S2 )(z) =
k=1
= (S2 (z) ∧ C(S1 )(z)) → (S1 (z) ∧ C(S2 )(z)).
From (f) and (h) we get for each z ∈ X: n [Sk (zk ) ∧ C(Sk+1 )(zk )] ≤ (S1 (z) ∧ C(S2 )(z)) ↔ (S2 (z) ∧ C(S1 )(z)). k=1
Then (d) follows immediately. In a similar way we can show that n [Sk (zk ) ∧ C(Sk+1 )(zk )] ≤ E(S2 ∩ C(S3 ), S3 ∩ C(S2 )) k=1
... n
[Sk (zk ) ∧ C(Sk+1 )(zk )] ≤ E(Sn−1 ∩ C(Sn ), Sn ∩ C(Sn−1 ))
k=1
then HAF RP follows. The proof is finished. Theorem 7.5 is an extension to fuzzy choice functions of a result from [100] that establishes the equivalence between the axioms HARP and SCA. The results of this section can be summarized in Figure 7.1.
HAFRP
SAFRP 0
WAFRP 0
R* includes R *
SFCA
WFCA
SAFRP
WAFRP
Fig. 7.1. Hierarchy of axioms
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7 General Results
7.2 A Particular Class of Fuzzy Choice Functions In this section a particular class of fuzzy choice function is studied with emphasis on the rationality conditions discussed in the previous section. Let X = {x, y} and B = {A, B} where A, B ∈ F(X) are given by A = αχ{x} + χ{y} ; B = χ{x} + βχ{y} (0 ≤ α, β ≤ 1). Consider the function C : B → F(X) defined by: (7.2.1) C(A) = γχ{x} +χ{y} ; C(B) = χ{x} +δχ{y} (0 ≤ γ ≤ α, 0 ≤ δ ≤ β). One notices that C is a fuzzy choice function that depends on the parameters α, β, γ, δ. In this section we shall investigate the way C verifies or not some properties (W AF RP , W AF RP ◦ , G–normality, M –normality) with respect to parameters α, β, γ, δ. From this analysis we obtain that W AF RP does not imply W AF RP ◦ , therefore these two axioms are not equivalent. At the same time we conclude that the axioms SAF RP and HAF RP are not equivalent. First we compute the fuzzy preference relation R: R(x, x) = R(y, y) = 1; R(x, y) = (C(A)(x) ∧ A(y)) ∨ (C(B)(x) ∧ B(y)) = β ∨ γ; R(y, x) = (C(A)(y) ∧ A(x)) ∨ (C(B)(y) ∧ B(x)) = α ∨ δ. Thus
1
β∨γ
. α∨δ 1 We also compute the fuzzy relation R∗ : (7.2.2) R =
R∗ (x, x) = R∗ (y, y) = 1; R∗ (x, y) = [(A(x) ∧ C(A)(y)) → C(A)(x)] ∧ [(B(x) ∧ C(B)(y)) → C(B)(x)] = = α → γ; R∗ (y, x) = [(A(y) ∧ C(A)(x)) → C(A)(y)] ∧ [(B(y) ∧ C(B)(x)) → C(B)(y)] = = β → δ. Hence
7.2 A Particular Class of Fuzzy Choice Functions
(7.2.3) R∗ =
1
α→γ
β→δ
1
155
.
Proposition 7.6. The fuzzy choice function C defined by (7.2.1) verifies W AF RP ◦ if and only if β ∧ (α ∨ δ) = δ and α ∧ (β ∨ γ) = γ. Proof. The following conditions are equivalent: • R ⊆ R∗ ; • α ∨ δ ≤ β → δ and β ∨ γ ≤ α → γ; • β ∧ (α ∨ δ) ≤ δ and α ∧ (β ∨ γ) ≤ γ (by Lemma 4.3 (1)); • β ∧ (α ∨ δ) = δ and α ∧ (β ∨ γ) = γ (since γ ≤ α, δ ≤ β). According to Theorem 7.3 the desired equivalence follows. Let us compute the fuzzy relation P˜ : P˜ (x, x) = P˜ (y, y) = 0; P˜ (x, y) = [C(A)(x) ∧ A(y) ∧ ¬C(A)(y)] ∨ [C(B)(x) ∧ B(y) ∧ ¬C(B)(y)] = = β ∧ ¬δ; P˜ (y, x) = [C(A)(y) ∧ A(x) ∧ ¬C(A)(x)] ∨ [C(B)(y) ∧ B(x) ∧ ¬C(B)(x)] = = α ∧ ¬γ. Therefore
(7.2.4) P˜ =
0
β ∧ ¬δ
α ∧ ¬γ
0
.
Proposition 7.7. The fuzzy choice function C verifies W AF RP if and only if α ∧ β ∧ ¬δ = α ∧ β ∧ ¬γ = 0. Proof. The following assertions are equivalent: • C verifies W AF RP ; • P˜ (x, y) ≤ ¬R(y, x) and P˜ (y, x) ≤ ¬R(x, y); • β ∧ ¬δ ≤ ¬(α ∨ δ) and α ∧ ¬γ ≤ ¬(β ∨ γ); • α ∧ β ∧ ¬δ = 0 and α ∧ β ∧ ¬γ = 0.
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Remark 7.8. Let us take α = 1, γ =
1 2, β
= δ =
2 3.
Since ¬δ = ¬γ = 0,
by Proposition 7.7 one can infer that C verifies W AF RP . We remark that α ∧ (β ∨ γ) = 1 ∧ ( 23 ∨ 12 ) =
2 3
= γ, hence, by Proposition 7.6, the axiom
W AF RP ◦ does not hold. In conclusion the implication W AF RP ⇒ W AF RP ◦ fails and W AF RP , W AF RP ◦ are not equivalent conditions. Remark 7.9. We observe that α ∧ β ∧ ¬γ ∧ ¬δ β ∧ ¬δ . (7.2.5) T (P˜ ) = α ∧ ¬γ α ∧ β ∧ ¬γ ∧ ¬δ Since α ∧ β ∧ ¬δ = 0 and α ∧ β ∧ ¬γ = 0 implies α ∧ β ∧ ¬γ ∧ ¬δ = 0, T (P˜ ) = P˜ , therefore by Proposition 7.7 we also obtain the equivalence C verifies SAF RP if and only if α ∧ β ∧ ¬δ = α ∧ β ∧ ¬γ = 0. In our case B has two members A, B then the axioms W AF RP ◦ , SAF RP ◦ and HAF RP are equivalent. Then using again the argument in Remark 7.8 the implication SAF RP ⇒ HAF RP does not hold. Proposition 7.10. For the fuzzy choice function C defined by (7.2.1) the following are equivalent: (i) C is G-normal; (ii) C is M -normal; (iii) α ∧ β = γ ∧ δ. Proof. We compute the values of G∗ (A) and G∗ (B): G∗ (A)(x) = A(x) ∧ [A(x) → R(x, x)] ∧ [A(y) → R(x, y)] = α ∧ (β ∨ γ) G∗ (A)(y) = A(y) ∧ [A(x) → R(y, x)] ∧ [A(y) → R(y, y)] = α → (α ∨ δ) = 1 and similarly, G∗ (B)(x) = 1 and G∗ (B)(y) = β ∧ (α ∨ δ). Applying Lemma 4.3 we also compute the values of M ∗ (A) and M ∗ (B): M ∗ (A)(x) = A(x) ∧ [(A(x) ∧ R(x, x)) → R(x, x)] ∧ [(A(y) ∧ R(y, x)) → R(x, y)] =
7.2 A Particular Class of Fuzzy Choice Functions
157
= α ∧ [(α ∨ δ) → (β ∨ γ)] = = α ∧ [α → (β ∨ γ)] ∧ [δ → (β ∨ γ)] = α ∧ (β ∨ γ) ∧ (δ → (β ∨ γ)) = α ∧ (β ∨ γ). ∗
M (A)(y) = A(y) ∧ [(A(x) ∧ R(x, y)) → R(y, x)] ∧ [(A(y) ∧ R(y, y)) → R(y, y)] = (α ∧ (β ∨ γ)) → (α ∨ δ) = 1 and similarly M ∗ (B)(x) = 1 and M ∗ (B)(y) = β ∧ (α ∨ δ). It follows that G∗ (A) = M ∗ (A) and G∗ (B) = M ∗ (B) and each of (i), (ii) are equivalent to • α ∧ (β ∨ γ) = γ and β ∧ (α ∨ δ) = δ • (α ∧ β) ∨ (α ∧ γ) = γ and (β ∧ α) ∨ (β ∧ δ) = δ • α ∧ β ≤ γ and α ∧ β ≤ δ • α∧β ≤γ∧δ • α ∧ β = γ ∧ δ. Theorem 7.11. Let C be the fuzzy choice function defined by (7.2.1). Then the following assertions are equivalent (i) C verifies W AF RP ◦ ; (ii) C is G-normal; (iii) C is M -normal; (iv) α ∧ β = γ ∧ δ; (v) α ∧ (β ∨ γ) = γ and β ∧ (α ∨ δ) = δ. Proof. According to Propositions 7.6 and 7.10 it suffices to establish the equivalence of (iv) and (v). Suppose first α ≤ β. Then α ∧ β = γ ∧ δ if and only if α = γ ∧ δ if and only if (α = γ and α ≤ δ). Since α ≤ β we have α ∧ (γ ∨ β) = (α ∧ β) ∨ (α ∧ γ) = α ∨ γ = α β ∧ (α ∨ δ) = (α ∧ β) ∨ (β ∧ δ) = α ∨ δ
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7 General Results
hence [α ∧ (γ ∨ β) = γ if and only if α = γ] and [β ∧ (α ∨ δ) = δ if and only if α ∨ δ = δ if and only if α ≤ δ]. It follows that for α ≤ β, (iv) if and only if (v); the case β ≤ α is similar.
7.3 A Fuzzy Analysis of the Richter Theorem The goal of this section is to investigate how we can generalize Richter’s theorem to fuzzy choice functions. First we prove that every totally rational fuzzy choice function is congruous, which extends an implication of Richter’s theorem. The attempt to generalize the converse implication of Richter’s theorem leads to the notion of semirationality and to the following result: every fuzzy choice function is semirational. A strict partial ∗-order on X is an irreflexive and ∗-transitive fuzzy relation on X. The notion of similarity relation has a crucial role in the analysis of fuzzy phenomena. A ∗-similarity relation E on X is a reflexive, symmetric and ∗-transitive fuzzy relation. If E is a ∗-similarity relation on X and Q a fuzzy relation on X then E is called a congruence w.r.t. Q if E(x, u) ∗ E(y, v) ∗ Q(x, y) ≤ Q(u, v) for all x, y, u, v ∈ X. If E is a congruence w.r.t. Q then E(x, u) ∗ Q(x, y) ≤ Q(u, y) and E(y, v) ∗ Q(x, y) ≤ Q(x, v) for all x, y, u, v ∈ X. Let E be a congruence w.r.t. Q. Define a (crisp) binary relation on X: x ≈ y ⇔ E(x, y) = 1. It is easy to see that if ≈ is an equivalence relation on X, then one can consider the quotient set Y = X/≈ . [x] will denote the equivalence class of x ∈ X. ˜ on Y defined by Let us consider the fuzzy relation Q ˜ (7.3.1) Q([x], [y]) =
(E(u, x) ∗ E(v, y) ∗ Q(u, v)) for any x, y ∈ X.
u,v∈X
˜ is correctly defined, i.e. Lemma 7.12. The fuzzy relation Q
7.3 A Fuzzy Analysis of the Richter Theorem
(7.3.2)
(E(u, x) ∗ E(v, y) ∗ Q(u, v)) =
u,v∈X
159
(E(u, x ) ∗ E(v, y ) ∗
u,v∈X
Q(u, v)) for all x, y, x , y ∈ X such that x ≈ x and y ≈ y . Proof. Let us denote by α and β the left and the right members in (7.3.2) respectively. Let u, v ∈ X. Then E(u, x) = E(u, x) ∗ E(x, x ) ≤ E(u, x ) E(v, y) = E(v, y) ∗ E(y, y ) ≤ E(v, y ) because E(x, x ) = E(y, y ) = 1. Therefore E(u, x) ∗ E(v, y) ∗ Q(u, v) ≤ E(u, x ) ∗ E(v, y ) ∗ Q(u, v) ≤ β. This inequality holds for any u, v ∈ X hence α ≤ β. The converse inequality follows similarly. ˜ is also Proposition 7.13. If Q is a ∗-transitive fuzzy relation on X then Q ∗-transitive. Proof. Let x, y, z ∈ X. By Lemma 4.5 (5) ˜ ˜ Q([x], [y]) ∗ Q([y], [z]) = [
E(t, z)∗Q(s, t))] =
(E(u, x) ∗ E(v, y) ∗ Q(u, v))] ∗ [
u,v∈X
and
(E(s, y) ∗
s,t∈X
(E(u, x)∗E(v, y)∗Q(u, v)∗E(s, y)∗E(t, z)∗Q(s, t))
u,v,s,t∈X
˜ Q([x], [z]) =
(E(u, x) ∗ E(t, z) ∗ Q(u, t)).
u,t∈X
Let u, v, s, t ∈ X. Since E(v, y) ∗ E(s, y) = E(v, y) ∗ E(y, s) ≤ E(v, s) E(v, s) ∗ Q(u, v) ≤ Q(u, s) R(u, s) ∗ Q(s, t) ≤ Q(u, t)
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7 General Results
it follows that E(u, x) ∗ E(v, y) ∗ Q(u, v) ∗ E(s, y) ∗ E(t, z) ∗ Q(s, t) = E(u, x) ∗ E(v, y) ∗ E(s, y)∗E(t, z)∗Q(u, v)∗Q(s, t) ≤ E(u, x)∗E(v, s)∗E(t, z)∗Q(u, v)∗Q(s, t) ≤ ˜ E(u, x) ∗ Q(u, s) ∗ E(t, z) ∗ Q(s, t) ≤ E(u, x) ∗ E(t, z) ∗ Q(u, t) ≤ Q([x], [z]). But this inequality holds for all u, v, s, t ∈ X therefore ˜ ˜ ˜ Q([x], [y]) ∗ Q([y], [z]) ≤ Q([x], [z]).
˜ Proposition 7.14. If Q(x, x) = 0 then Q([x], [x]) = 0 for all x ∈ X. Proof. For x ∈ X we have ˜ Q([x], [x]) =
(E(u, x) ∗ E(v, x) ∗ Q(u, v)) = 0
u,v∈X
because E(u, x) ∗ E(v, x) ∗ Q(u, v) ≤ Q(x, x) = 0. ˜ is a strict partial Corollary 7.15. If Q is a strict partial ∗-order on X then Q ∗-order on Y . Let C be a fuzzy choice function. Recall that C is totally rational if C = G(., Q) for some reflexive, ∗–transitive and total fuzzy preference relation on X. C is congruous if it verifies SF CA, i.e. for any S ∈ B and x, y ∈ X, we have C(S)(x) ∗ S(y) ∗ W (y, x) ≤ C(S)(y). The following result generalizes a part of Richter’s theorem. Theorem 7.16. Every totally rational fuzzy choice function is congruous. Proof. Assume that the fuzzy choice function C : B → F(X) is totally rational, i.e. there exists a fuzzy relation G on X which is reflexive, ∗–transitive and total, and such that
7.3 A Fuzzy Analysis of the Richter Theorem
C(S)(x) = S(x) ∗
161
(S(v) → G(x, v))
v∈X
for all S ∈ B and x ∈ X. First we prove that for any x, y ∈ X, the following inequality holds: (a) R(x, y) ≤ G(x, y). Let S ∈ B. The total ∗–rationality of C yields C(S)(x) ≤
(S(v) → G(x, v)),
v∈X
hence C(S)(x) ≤ S(v) → G(x, v) for each v ∈ X. Particularly, C(S)(x) ≤ S(y) → G(x, y), hence, by Lemma 4.16 (1), we get C(S)(x) ∗ S(y) ≤ G(x, y). This last inequality holds for any S ∈ B, therefore
R(x, y) =
(C(S)(x) ∗ S(y)) ≤ G(x, y).
S∈B
Let S ∈ B and x, y ∈ X. We must prove that (b) C(S)(x) ∗ S(y) ∗ W (y, x) ≤ C(S)(y). Using Corollary 4.20 we compute the left term of (b): C(S)(x) ∗ S(y) ∗ W (y, x) = = C(S)(x) ∗ S(y) ∗ [R(y, x) ∨
∞
(R(y, u1 ) ∗ . . . ∗ R(un , x))].
n=1 u1 ,...,un ∈X
In accordance with (a) we get the inequality:
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7 General Results
(c) C(S)(x) ∗ S(y) ∗ W (y, x) ≤ ≤ C(S)(x) ∗ S(y) ∗ [G(y, x) ∨
∞
(G(y, u1 ) ∗ . . . ∗ G(un , x))].
n=1 u1 ,...,un ∈X
Since G is ∗-transitive, G(y, u1 )∗. . .∗G(un , x) ≤ G(y, x) for all u1 , . . . , un ∈ X therefore
(G(y, u1 ) ∗ . . . ∗ G(un , x)) ≤ G(y, x).
u1 ,...,un ∈X
This inequality holds for any n ≥ 1, hence ∞
(G(y, u1 ) ∗ . . . ∗ G(un , x)) ≤ G(y, x).
n=1 u1 ,...,un ∈X
Then G(y, x) ∨
∞
(G(y, u1 ) ∗ . . . ∗ G(un , x)) = G(y, x)
n=1 u1 ,...,un ∈X
hence the inequality (c) becomes (d) C(S)(x) ∗ S(y) ∗ W (y, x) ≤ C(S)(x) ∗ S(y) ∗ G(y, x).
Now we will establish the inequality (e) C(S)(x) ∗ G(y, x) ≤
(S(v) → G(y, v)).
v∈X
It suffices to show that for any v ∈ X we have (f) C(S)(x) ∗ G(y, x) ≤ S(v) → G(y, v). Let v ∈ X. We notice that
7.3 A Fuzzy Analysis of the Richter Theorem
163
C(S)(x) ∗ G(y, x) ∗ S(v) = = S(x) ∗ [
(S(u) → G(x, u))] ∗ G(y, x) ∗ S(v) ≤
u∈X
≤ S(x) ∗ [S(v) → G(x, v)] ∗ G(y, x) ∗ S(v) = = S(x) ∗ S(v) ∗ [S(v) → G(x, v)] ∗ G(y, x) ≤ ≤ S(x) ∗ G(x, v) ∗ G(y, x) ≤ ≤ G(y, x) ∗ G(x, v) ≤ G(y, v) because S(v) ∗ [S(v) → G(x, v)] = S(v) ∧ G(x, v) ≤ G(x, v) and G is ∗transitive. In accordance with Lemma 4.3 (1) we obtain the inequality (f). Thus the inequality (e) was proved. From (e) we can infer (g) C(S)(x) ∗ S(y) ∗ G(y, x) ≤ S(y) ∗
(S(v) → G(y, v)) = C(S)(y).
v∈X
Now the desired inequality (b) follows from (d) and (g). Thus C is congruous. Let C be a (crisp) choice function on (X, B) with B ⊆ P(X). We shall relax the criterion in the definition of the rational choice function. We shall say that C is semirational if there exists a binary relation G on X which is reflexive, transitive and total, and such that for any S ∈ B we have (7.3.6) C(S) ⊆ S ∩ {x|(x, y) ∈ G for all y ∈ S}. But C(S) ⊆ S hence the previous relation is equivalent to the condition (7.3.7) C(S) ⊆ {x|(x, y) ∈ G for all y ∈ S}. We shall extend this new concept to the fuzzy setting.
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7 General Results
Let C be a fuzzy choice function on (X, B). C is called ∗–semirational if there exists a fuzzy relation G on X reflexive, ∗-transitive and total, and such that for any S ∈ B and x ∈ X we have (7.3.8) C(S)(x) ≤ (S(y) → G(x, y)). y∈X
Recall that ∗L is the Lukasiewicz t–norm. Let us consider the Lukasiewicz t-conorm ⊕ (see [68], p. 11): (7.3.9) a ⊕ b = min(a + b, 1). Then the operation ⊕ is associative, commutative and a ⊕ 0 = 0 ⊕ a = a for any a ∈ [0, 1]. In this case the negation is given by ¬a = 1 − a hence ¬¬a = a for any a ∈ [0, 1]. Lemma 7.17. ([60]) For any a, b, c ∈ [0, 1] the following hold: (a) a ≤ b implies a ⊕ c ≤ b ⊕ c; (b) a ⊕ (b ∧ c) = (a ⊕ b) ∧ (a ⊕ c); (c) a ⊕ (b ∨ c) = (a ⊕ b) ∨ (a ⊕ c); (d) a ⊕ ¬a = 1. The following result seems to be surprising. Theorem 7.18. Assume that ∗ is a continuous t-norm. Then every fuzzy choice function is ∗-semirational. Proof. Assume C : B → F(X) is a fuzzy choice function. Let us consider the fuzzy relation P on X defined by (a) P (x, y) = W (x, y) ∧ ¬W (y, x) for any x, y ∈ X. We shall prove that P is ∗-transitive. Let x, y, z ∈ X. Then P (x, y) ∗ P (y, z) = [W (x, y) ∧ ¬W (y, x)] ∗ [W (y, z) ∧ ¬W (z, y)] ≤ W (x, y) ∗ W (y, z) ≤ W (x, z)
7.3 A Fuzzy Analysis of the Richter Theorem
165
because W is ∗-transitive. We also have P (x, y) ∗ P (y, z) ∗ W (z, x) = [W (x, y) ∧ ¬W (y, x)] ∗ [W (y, z) ∧ ¬W (z, y)] ∗ W (z, x) ≤ W (x, y) ∗ ¬W (z, y) ∗ W (z, x) = W (z, x) ∗ W (x, y) ∗ ¬W (z, y) ≤ W (z, y) ∗ ¬W (z, y) = 0.
In accordance with the property of negation these inequalities infer P (x, y)∗ P (y, z) ≤ ¬W (z, x) hence P (x, y) ∗ P (y, z) ≤ W (x, z) ∧ ¬W (z, x) = P (x, z). Thus P is ∗-transitive. Now we shall define the fuzzy relation J: (b) J(x, y) =
1 if x = y
W (x, y) ∧ W (y, x) if x = y
.
We shall prove that J is a ∗-similarity relation on X. It is clear that J(x, x) = 1 and J(x, y) = J(y, x) for any x, y ∈ X. For any x, y, z ∈ X such that x = y, y = z and x = z we have J(x, y) ∗ J(y, z) = [W (x, y) ∧ W (y, x)] ∗ [W (y, z) ∧ W (z, y)] ≤ W (x, y) ∗ W (y, z) ≤ W (x, z) and similarly, J(x, y)∗J(y, z) ≤ W (z, x). Thus J(x, y)∗J(y, z) ≤ W (x, z)∧ W (z, x) = J(x, z). This inequality is obviously true for the other cases, hence J is ∗-transitive. Then J is a ∗-similarity relation. Now we shall prove that J is a congruence w.r.t. P , i.e. for all x, y, u, v ∈ X, J(x, u) ∗ J(y, v) ∗ P (x, y) ≤ P (u, v). Assume x = u, y = v hence J(x, u) ∗ J(y, v) ∗ P (x, y) = [W (x, u) ∧ W (u, x)] ∗ [W (y, v) ∧ W (v, y)] ∗ [W (x, y) ∧ ¬W (y, x)] ≤ W (u, x) ∗ W (y, v) ∗ W (x, y) = W (u, x) ∗ W (x, y) ∗ W (y, v) ≤ W (u, v), because W is ∗-transitive. We also have
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7 General Results
J(x, u)∗J(y, v)∗P (x, y)∗W (v, u) ≤ W (u, x)∗W (y, v)∗¬W (y, x)∗W (v, u) = W (y, v) ∗ W (v, u) ∗ W (u, x) ∗ ¬W (y, x) ≤ W (y, x) ∗ ¬W (y, x) = 0 hence J(x, u) ∗ J(y, v) ∗ P (x, y) ≤ ¬W (v, u). Thus J(x, u) ∗ J(y, v) ∗ P (x, y) ≤ W (u, v) ∧ ¬W (v, u) = P (u, v). Hence J is a congruence w.r.t. P . Now let us consider the equivalence relation ≈ on X: x ≈ y ⇔ J(x, y) = 1. Let Y = X/≈ be the quotient set of X w.r.t. ≈. By Proposition 7.13 we can consider the following ∗-transitive fuzzy relation P˜ on Y : (c) P˜ ([x], [y]) =
(J(u, x) ∗ J(v, y) ∗ P (u, v))
u,v∈X
for any x, y ∈ X. In accordance with Theorem 4.36 there exists a total ∗transitive fuzzy relation R on Y such that P˜ ⊆ R. Let us define the following fuzzy relation H on X: (d) H(x, y) = J(x, y) ⊕ R([x], [y]) for any x, y ∈ X. Let G be the ∗-transitive closure of H. Since H(x, x) ≥ J(x, x) = 1 for each x ∈ X, H is reflexive so G is also reflexive. We also have G(x, y) ∨ G(y, x) ≥ H(x, y) ∨ H(y, x) ≥ R([x], [y]) ∨ R([y], [x]) > 0 because R is total. Hence G is also total. Of course G is ∗-transitive. For any S ∈ B and x ∈ S we shall establish the inequality (e) C(S)(x) ≤
v∈X
(S(v) → G(x, v)).
7.3 A Fuzzy Analysis of the Richter Theorem
167
In order to prove (e) it suffices to show that for any v ∈ X the following inequality holds: (f) C(S)(x) ≤ S(v) → G(x, v).
By Lemma 4.3 (1) the inequality (f) is equivalent to the condition (g) C(S)(x) ∗ S(v) ≤ G(x, v). Let v ∈ X. In accordance with the definition of R we have (h) C(S)(x) ∗ S(v) ≤ R(x, v) ≤ W (x, v).
But H(x, v) = J(x, v)⊕R([x], [v]) ≥ J(x, v)⊕P˜ ([x], [v]) = J(x, v)⊕
[J(x, s)∗
s,t∈X
J(t, v) ∗ P (s, t)] ≥ J(x, v) ⊕ [J(x, x) ∗ J(v, v) ∗ P (x, v)] = J(x, v) ⊕ P (x, v) because J(x, x) = J(v, v) = 1. Using Lemma 7.17 one gets
J(x, v)⊕P (x, v) = [W (x, v)∧W (v, x)]⊕[W (x, v)∧¬W (v, x)] = (W (x, v)⊕ [W (x, v)∧¬W (v, x)])∧(W (v, x)⊕[W (x, v)∧¬W (v, x)]) ≥ W (x, v)∧[W (v, x)⊕ W (x, v)] ∧ [W (v, x) ⊕ ¬W (v, x)] = W (x, v) ∧ [W (v, x) ⊕ W (x, v)] = W (x, v). Thus W (x, v) ≤ J(x, v) ⊕ P (x, v) ≤ H(x, v), hence, by (h), we obtain C(S)(x) ∗ S(v) ≤ W (x, v) ≤ H(x, v) ≤ G(x, v). Hence (g) was proved and C is ∗-semirational.
8 Degree of Dominance
In the literature of fuzzy preference relations there are several ways to define the dominance (see [40], [69], [86]). In general the dominance is related to a fuzzy preference relation. For a fuzzy preference relation there exist a lot of ways to define the degree of dominance of an alternative [14], [15], [16], [17], [40], [69], [79], [86]. The concept of dominance in [14] is related to the act of choice and is expressed in terms of the fuzzy choice function. This chapter aims at introducing a notion of degree of dominance of an alternative x with respect to an available fuzzy subset S of the universe X of alternatives. The degree of dominance defined here refines Banerjee’s notion of dominance [14]. Banerjee’s notion of dominance expresses the dominant position of some alternatives in the set of alternatives. In the decision making processes a differentiation of the alternatives according to various criteria is most of the times necessary. In the real world there are cases when these criteria are vague due to the partial information that the decision-maker possesses. The representation of these vague criteria within the choice problems is done by the available fuzzy sets. If x is an alternative and S is an available fuzzy set that corresponds to a criterion then the degree of dominance DS (x) is a number that belongs to the unit interval. This number expresses the position of alternative x with respect to the other alternatives as a result of the act of
Irina Georgescu: Fuzzy Choice Functions, StudFuzz 214, 169–187 (2007) www.springerlink.com
c Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007
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choice. If an alternative has the degree of dominance equal to 1 then it will be dominant with respect to criterion S. With the degree of dominance one can establish a hierarchy of alternatives with respect to the criterion defined by S. The difference between Banerjee’s notion of dominance and the degree of dominance introduced in this chapter is that our notion takes into account all the alternatives, not only the dominant ones. At the same time, when there are no dominant alternatives (DS (x) = 1 for any x ∈ X) one can select the alternatives with the maximum degree of dominance. Briefly, the motivation of introducing the degree of dominance resides in: • the degree of dominance is a concept that allows for a direct hierarchy of alternatives in accordance with the criteria of choice; • it is an instrument by which all available alternatives, not only the dominant ones can be ranked; • it helps to formulate new axioms of congruence that refine Banerjee’s [14]; • it offers simple computations for the ranking of alternatives in concrete problems (see Chapter 9). The results of the chapter are obtained in the framework of the G¨ odel t-norm. Section 8.1 is an overview of the context in which Banerjee’s concept of degree of dominance was formulated. Banerjee [14] formulates a fuzzy revealed preference theory for his fuzzy choice functions. In this context he studies three congruence axioms F C1, F C2, F C3. In the same setting, Wang [112] establishes deeper connections between F C1, F C2, F C3. These three axioms are formulated in terms of dominance of an alternative x in an available (crisp) set S of alternatives. In Section 8.2 we introduce our notion of degree of dominance. Given a fuzzy choice function C, with each fuzzy available set and each alternative x, one associates the degree of dominance DS (x) of x with respect to S. The real number DS (x) gives us information about the position of x with respect to all
8.1 Dominance in Banerjee’s Framework
171
alternatives y of X. If DS (x) = 1 then we find Banerjee’s notion of dominance. Another notion introduced in this section is the degree of dominance DSQ (x) of x in S in terms of a fuzzy preference relation Q. DSQ (x) corresponds to Banerjee’s notion of dominance of S in terms of Q. In Section 8.3, starting from the concept of degree of dominance defined in the previous section, the congruence axioms F C ∗ 1, F C ∗ 2, F C ∗ 3 for the class of fuzzy choice functions defined in this book are formulated. In Banerjee’s context, conditions F C1, F C2, F C3 are implied by these three axioms. We prove that F C ∗ 1 implies F C ∗ 3 and F C ∗ 2 implies F C ∗ 3. The degree of dominance allows us to formulate a new revealed preference axiom W AF RPD . We prove that the axioms W AF RPD and F C ∗ 1 are equivalent. This theorem parallels a result of Theorem 6.1 which asserts that the revealed preference axiom W AF RP ◦ is equivalent to F C ∗ 3. One result of this section shows that under very loose conditions the degree of dominance of x with respect to S can be expressed in function of the degree of dominance of x with respect to fuzzy subsets of type [x, y], y ∈ X. Section 8.3 concludes with an example that shows the relevance of the concept of degree of dominance for the process of decision making, by establishing a ranking of alternatives with respect to multiple criteria.
8.1 Dominance in Banerjee’s Framework The process of decision making deals in real life with vague preferences, modelled by fuzzy relations. Orlovsky initiated a theory of choice based on fuzzy preference relations [79]. He defined a notion of degree of dominance as a mode of selecting the best alternatives. Several authors have proposed other notions that express the dominance of an alternative [15], [16], [17], [40], [69], [79], [86]. These notions start from a fuzzy preference relation. In [14] Banerjee develops a theory of revealed preference for a class of choice functions whose domain is the family of all non-empty finite subsets
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of a universe of alternatives X and whose range consists of non-zero fuzzy subsets of X. We need to emphasize that Banerjee’s notion of dominance is directly related to the choice function, not to the fuzzy preference relation. The degree of dominance defined in this thesis extends Banerjee’s notion of dominance. In this section we make a short overview of the results in [14], [112]. Let X be a universal set of alternatives, H the family of non-empty finite subsets of X and F all non-zero fuzzy subsets of X with finite support. Recall that a Banerjee fuzzy choice function is a function C : H → F such that supp C(S) ⊆ S for any S ∈ H. The fuzzy revealed preference relation R associated with a fuzzy choice function C is defined by ([14]): (7.1.1) R(x, y) = {C(S)(x)|S ∈ H, x, y ∈ S} for any x, y ∈ X. It is obvious that C(S)(x) ≤ R(x, y) for any S ∈ H and x, y ∈ X. Let C be a fuzzy choice function, S ∈ H and x ∈ S. x is said to be dominant in S if C(S)(y) ≤ C(S)(x) for any y ∈ S. The dominance of x in S means that x has a higher potentiality of being chosen than the other elements of S. It is obvious that this definition of dominance is related to the act of choice, not to a preference relation. Banerjee also considers a second type of dominance, associated with a fuzzy preference relation. Let Q be a fuzzy preference relation on X, S ∈ H and x ∈ X. x is said to be relation dominant in S in terms of Q if Q(x, y) ≥ Q(y, x) for all y ∈ S. Let S ∈ H, S = {x1 , . . . , xn }. The restriction of Q to S is Q|S = n (Q(xi , xj ) ∧ (Q(xi , xj ))n×n . Then we have the composition Q|S ◦ C(S) = j=1
C(S)(xj )). In [14] Banerjee introduced the following congruence axioms for a fuzzy choice function C: F C1 For any S ∈ H and x, y ∈ S, if y is dominant in S then C(S)(x) = R(x, y).
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173
F C2 For any S ∈ H and x, y ∈ S, if y is dominant in S and R(y, x) ≤ R(x, y) then x is dominant in S. F C3 For any S ∈ H, α ∈ (0, 1] and x, y ∈ S, α ≤ C(S)(y) and α ≤ R(x, y) imply α ≤ C(S)(x). In [112], Wang proved that F C3 holds iff for any S ∈ H, R|S ◦ C(S) ⊆ C(S). Then F C3 is equivalent with any of the following statements: ◦ For any S ∈ H and x ∈ S, (R(x, y) ∧ C(S)(y)) ≤ C(S)(x); y∈S
◦ For any S ∈ H and x, y ∈ S, R(x, y) ∧ C(S)(y) ≤ C(S)(x). In [112] it is proved that F C1 implies F C2, F C3 implies F C2 and F C1, F C3 are independent.
8.2 Degree of Dominance In this section we shall define a notion of degree of dominance in the framework of the fuzzy choice functions introduced in this book. This kind of dominance is attached to a fuzzy choice function and not to a fuzzy preference relation. It shows to what extent, as the result of the act of choice, an alternative has a dominant position among others. We fix a fuzzy choice function C : B → F(X). Recall that the fuzzy revealed preference relation R on X associated with C is defined by R(x, y) = (C(S)(x) ∧ S(y)) S∈B
for any x, y ∈ X. Particularizing this definition for the case when C is a Banerjee choice function we obtain the fuzzy relation defined by (7.1.1). As seen in the previous section, the concept of dominance appears essentially in the expression of congruence axioms F C1-F C3. We define now the degree of dominance of an alternative x with respect to a fuzzy subset S. This will be a real number that shows the position of x among the other alternatives.
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Definition 8.1. Let S ∈ B and x ∈ X. The degree of dominance of x in S is given by DS (x) = S(x) ∧ = S(x) ∧ [(
[C(S)(y) → C(S)(x)]
y∈X
C(S)(y)) → C(S)(x)].
y∈X
If DS (x) = 1 then we say that x is dominant in S. Remark 8.2. Let S be a crisp subset of X. Identifying S with its characteristic function we have the equivalences: DS (x) = 1 iff S(x) = 1 and C(S)(y) ≤ C(S)(x) for any y ∈ X iff x ∈ S and C(S)(y) ≤ C(S)(x) for any y ∈ S. This shows that in this case we obtain exactly the notion of dominance of Banerjee. Remark 8.3. In accordance with Definition 8.1, x is dominant in S iff S(x) = 1 and C(S)(y) = C(S)(x). y∈X
Remark 8.4. Assume that C verifies (H1), i.e. C(S)(y0 ) = 1 for some y0 ∈ X. In this case C(S)(y) = 1 therefore DS (x) = C(S)(x) for any x ∈ X. y∈X
Lemma 8.5. If [x, y] ∈ B then D[x,y] (x) = C([x, y])(y) → C([x, y])(x). Proof. Since C([x, y]) ⊆ [x, y] we have C([x, y])(z) = 0 for z ∈ {x, y}. Then D[x,y] (x) = [x, y](x) ∧ [C([x, y])(z) → C([x, y])(x)] z∈X
= [C([x, y])(x) → C([x, y])(x)] ∧ [C([x, y])(y) → C([x, y])(x)] = C([x, y])(y) → C([x, y])(x). Proposition 8.6. For any S ∈ B and x, y ∈ X we have (i) C(S)(x) ≤ DS (x) ≤ S(x); (ii) S(x) ∧ DS (y) ∧ [C(S)(y) → C(S)(x)] ≤ DS (x).
8.2 Degree of Dominance
Proof. (i) According to Lemma 4.3 (4), C(S)(x) ≤ ( hence C(S)(x) ≤ S(x) ∧ [(
175
C(S)(y)) → C(S)(x)
y∈X
C(S)(y)) → C(S)(x)] = DS (x).
y∈X
(ii) By Lemma 4.3 (12) the following inequality holds for any z ∈ X: [C(S)(z) → C(S)(y)] ∧ [C(S)(y) → C(S)(x)] ≤ C(S)(z) → C(S)(x). Thus [C(S)(y) → C(S)(x)] ∧ DS (y) ∧ S(x) = = [C(S)(y) → C(S)(x)] ∧ [C(S)(z) → C(S)(y)] ∧ S(x) ∧ S(y) = = S(y) ∧ S(x) ∧ ≤ S(x) ∧
z∈X
([C(S)(z) → C(S)(y)] ∧ [C(S)(y) → C(S)(x)]) ≤
z∈X
[C(S)(z) → C(S)(x)] = DS (x).
z∈X
Remark 8.7. By Proposition 8.6, DS (x) > 0 for some x ∈ X. Then the assignment S → DS is a fuzzy choice function D : B → F(X). According to Remark 8.4, if C verifies (H1) then C = D. It implies that the study of the degree of dominance is interesting for the case when hypothesis (H1) does not hold. Remark 8.8. For S ∈ B and x ∈ X we define the sequence (DSn (x))n≥1 by induction: DS1 (x) = DS (x); DSn+1 (x) = S(x) ∧
[DSn (y) → DSn (x)].
y∈X
By Proposition 8.6 (i) we have C(S)(x) ≤ DS1 (x) ≤ . . . ≤ DSn (x) ≤ . . . ≤ ∞ DSn (x). The assignments S → DSn , n ≥ 1 DS∞ (x) ≤ S(x), where DS∞ (x) = n=1
and S → DS∞ provide new fuzzy choice functions. The following definition generalizes Banerjee’s notion of dominant relation in S in terms of Q. Definition 8.9. Let Q be a fuzzy preference relation on X, S ∈ B and x ∈ X. The degree of dominance of x in S in terms of Q is defined by DSQ (x) = S(x) ∧ [(S(y) ∧ Q(y, x)) → Q(x, y)] y∈X
If DSQ (x) = 1 then we say that x is dominant in S in terms of Q .
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Example 8.10. Consider the set of alternatives X = {x, y} and the criterion S = aχ{x} + bχ{y} for which the choice function is given by C(S) = αχ{x} + βχ{y} , 0 < α < a < 1, 0 < β < b < 1. We intend to calculate the sequences (DSn (x))n≥1 , (DSn (y))n≥1 . Case β ≤ α DS1 (x) = DS (x) = a ∧ (β → α) = a DS1 (y) = DS (y) = b ∧ (α → β) = b ∧ β = β DS2 (x) = a ∧ (β → a) = a, DS2 (y) = b ∧ (a → β) DS3 (x) = a, DS3 (y) = b ∧ (a → β) In general DSn (x) = a, DSn (y) = b ∧ (a → β) for n ≥ 2. The case α ≤ β is treated analogously.
8.3 New Congruence Axioms The congruence axioms F C1, F C2, F C3 play an important role in Banerjee’s theory of revealed preference. The formulation of F C1, F C2 uses the notion of dominance and F C3 is exactly the Weak Congruence Axiom (W CA). In this section we introduce the congruence axioms F C ∗ 1, F C ∗ 2, F C ∗ 3 which are refinements of axioms F C1, F C2, F C3. Axioms F C ∗ 1 and F C ∗ 2 are formulated in terms of degree of dominance. F C ∗ 3 is Weak Fuzzy Congruence Axiom (W F CA) defined in Section 5.2. F C ∗ 1 For any S ∈ B and x, y ∈ X the following inequality holds: S(x) ∧ DS (y) ≤ R(x, y) → C(S)(x). F C ∗ 2 For any S ∈ B and x, y ∈ X the following inequality holds: S(x) ∧ DS (y) ∧ (R(y, x) → R(x, y)) ≤ DS (x). F C ∗ 3 For any S ∈ B and x, y ∈ X the following inequality holds: S(x) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ R(x, y) ≤ C(S)(x).
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177
The form F C ∗ 1 is derived from F C ∗ 3 by replacing DS (y) by C(S)(y). By Remarks 8.4 and 8.7, DS (x) (respectively DS (y)) can be viewed as a substitute of C(S)(x) (respectively C(S)(y)). If hypothesis (H1) holds, then by Remark 8.4, DS (y) = C(S)(y) and by Lemma 4.3 (1) axioms F C ∗ 1 and F C ∗ 3 are equivalent. Remark 8.11. Let S ∈ B and x, y ∈ X. Thus C(S)(x) ∧ S(x) ∧ DS (y) = C(S)(x) ∧ DS (y) = C(S)(x) ∧ S(y) ∧ [C(S)(z) → C(S)(y)] z∈X
≤ C(S)(x) ∧ S(y) ≤ R(x, y) hence, by Lemma 4.3 (1), S(x) ∧ DS (y) ≤ C(S)(x) → R(x, y). Therefore, if F C ∗ 1 holds then S(x) ∧ DS (y) ≤ R(x, y) ↔ C(S)(x). Remark 8.12. Assume F C ∗ 3 holds. Then for any S ∈ B and x ∈ X: [S(x) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ R(x, y)] ≤ C(S)(x). y∈X
Assume that R is reflexive (for example if (H1), (H2) hold). Since C(S)(x) ≤ S(x) ∧ C(S)(x) ∧ R(x, x) it follows that C(S)(x) = [S(x) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ R(x, y)]. y∈X
Remark 8.13. Notice that F C ∗ 3 appears under the name W F CA (Weak Fuzzy Congruence Axiom). Proposition 8.14. F C ∗ 1 ⇒ F C ∗ 3. Proof. S(x) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ R(x, y) ≤ S(x) ∧ DS (y) ∧ R(x, y) ≤ C(S)(x), hence F C ∗ 1 ⇒ F C ∗ 3. Example 8.15 shows that F C ∗ 3 does not necessarily imply F C ∗ 1. Example 8.15. Let X = {a, b} and A = aχ{x} + bχ{y} , C(A) = sχ{x} + tχ{y} , B = cχ{x} + dχ{y} , C(B) = uχ{x} + wχ{y} , where 0 < s ≤ a, 0 < t ≤ b, 0 < u ≤ c, 0 < w ≤ d. Then C is a fuzzy choice function on (X, B) where B = {A, B}.
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Applying Definition 5.16 (i) one obtains: R(x, x) = s ∨ u, R(x, y) = (s ∧ b) ∨ (u ∧ d), R(y, x) = (t ∧ a) ∨ (w ∧ c), R(y, y) = t ∨ w. We compute now the degrees of dominance: DA (x) = a ∧ (t → s) DA (y) = b ∧ (s → t) DB (x) = c ∧ (w → u) DB (y) = d ∧ (u → w). If F C ∗ 1 holds then DA (x) ∧ A(x) ∧ R(x, x) ≤ C(A)(x), i.e. a ∧ (t → s) ∧ (s ∨ u) ≤ s. If we assume t = w < s < u < a then a ∧ (t → s) ∧ (s ∨ u) = a ∧ 1 ∧ u = u > s, hence F C ∗ 1 does not hold. The axiom F C ∗ 3 holds iff the following inequalities are verified: (1) A(x) ∧ C(A)(y) ∧ R(x, y) ≤ C(A)(x) (2) A(y) ∧ C(A)(x) ∧ R(y, x) ≤ C(A)(y) (3) B(x) ∧ C(B)(y) ∧ R(x, y) ≤ C(B)(x) (4) B(y) ∧ C(B)(x) ∧ R(y, x) ≤ C(B)(y). The first condition can be written: a ∧ t ∧ [(s ∧ b) ∨ (u ∧ d)] ≤ s. By distributivity this inequality is equivalent to a ∧ t ∧ u ∧ d ≤ s. But s ≤ a hence a ∧ t ∧ u ∧ d ≤ s iff t ∧ u ∧ d ≤ s. We have proved that (1) is equivalent to (1’) t ∧ u ∧ d ≤ s. In a similar way (2), (3) and (4) are equivalent to (2’) s ∧ w ∧ c ≤ t (3’) w ∧ s ∧ b ≤ u (4’) u ∧ t ∧ b ≤ w. If t = w < s < u < a the inequalities (1’)-(4’) are verified, hence F C ∗ 3 holds. Thus F C ∗ 3 does not necessarily imply F C ∗ 1. Proposition 8.16. F C ∗ 3 ⇒ F C ∗ 2. Proof. Let S ∈ B and x, y ∈ X. By R(y, x) ≥ C(S)(y) ∧ S(x), Lemma 4.3 (10), (2) and F C ∗ 3 we get for any z ∈ X:
8.3 New Congruence Axioms
179
C(S)(z) ∧ S(x) ∧ [C(S)(z) → C(S)(y)] ∧ [R(y, x) → R(x, y)] = = S(x) ∧ C(S)(z) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ [R(y, x) → R(x, y)] ≤ ≤ C(S)(z) ∧ (C(S)(y) ∧ S(x)) ∧ [(C(S)(y) ∧ S(x)) → R(x, y)] = = C(S)(z) ∧ S(x) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ R(x, y) ≤ ≤ S(x) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ R(x, y) ≤ C(S)(x). Hence, by Lemma 4.3 (1): S(x) ∧ [C(S)(z) → C(S)(y)] ∧ [R(y, x) → R(x, y)] ≤ C(S)(z) → C(S)(x). Since this inequality holds for any z ∈ X we obtain: S(x) ∧ DS (y) ∧ [R(y, x) → R(x, y)] = = S(x) ∧ S(y) ∧ [C(S)(z) → C(S)(y)] ∧ [R(y, x) → R(x, y)] ≤ ≤ S(x) ∧
z∈X
(S(x) ∧ [C(S)(z) → C(S)(y)] ∧ [R(y, x) → R(x, y)]) ≤
z∈X
≤ S(x) ∧
[C(S)(z) → C(S)(x)] = DS (x).
z∈X
Proposition 8.17. If F C ∗ 1 holds then DS (x) ≤ DSR (x) for any S ∈ B and x ∈ X. Proof. By absurdum, assume that there exist S ∈ B and x ∈ X such that DS (x) ≤ DSR (x) = S(x) ∧ [(S(y) ∧ R(y, x)) → R(x, y)]. y∈X
Since DS (x) ≤ S(x), there exists y ∈ X such that DS (x) ≤ (S(y) ∧ R(y, x)) → R(x, y) hence DS (x) ∧ S(y) ∧ R(y, x) ≤ R(x, y), i.e. R(x, y) < DS (x) ∧ S(y) ∧ R(y, x). According to F C ∗ 1 we have DS (x) ∧ S(y) ∧ R(y, x) ≤ C(S)(y). By the definition of DS (x), DS (x) ≤ C(S)(y) → C(S)(x), therefore DS (x) ∧ S(y) ∧ R(y, x) ≤ C(S)(y) ∧ [C(S)(y) → C(S)(x)] = C(S)(x) ∧ C(S)(y) ≤ C(S)(x) ∧ S(y) ≤ R(x, y).
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We have obtained the contradiction R(x, y) < R(x, y), hence the proposition is proved. Theorem 8.18. Assume that the fuzzy choice function C fulfills (H2). Then axiom F C ∗ 1 implies that for any S ∈ B and x ∈ X we have DS (x) = S(x) ∧ [S(y) → D[x,y] (x)]. y∈X
Proof. By Proposition 8.17 one gets R D[x,y] (x) ≤ D[x,y] (x) ≤ R(y, x) → R(x, y)
for any x, y ∈ X. Hence, by Lemma 4.3 (10), (11) S(y) → D[x,y] (x) ≤ S(y) → (R(y, x) → R(x, y)) = ((S(y) ∧ R(y, x)) → R(x, y). Thus using Lemma 4.3 (11), (2) C(S)(y) ∧ [S(y) → D[x,y] (x)] ≤ C(S)(y) ∧ [(S(y) ∧ R(y, x)) → R(x, y)] = C(S)(y) ∧ S(y) ∧ [S(y) → (R(y, x) → R(x, y))] = C(S)(y) ∧ S(y) ∧ [R(y, x) → R(x, y)] = C(S)(y) ∧ [R(y, x) → R(x, y)]. Since R(y, x) ≥ C(S)(y)∧S(x) we have S(x)∧C(S)(y) = S(x)∧C(S)(y)∧ R(y, x) hence, by Lemma 4.3 (11), (2) and Proposition 8.14 one gets S(x) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ [S(y) → D[x,y] (x)] = S(x) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ R(y, x) ∧ [S(y) → D[x,y] (x)] ≤ S(x) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ R(y, x) ∧ [R(y, x) → R(x, y)] = S(x) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ R(y, x) ∧ R(x, y) ≤ S(x) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ R(x, y) ≤ C(S)(x). By Lemma 4.3 (1) this yields S(x) ∧ [S(y) → D[x,y] (x)] ≤ C(S)(y) → C(S)(x). This last inequality holds for each y ∈ X hence S(x) ∧ [S(y) → D[x,y] (x)] = S(x) ∧ (S(x) ∧ [S(y) → D[x,y] (x)]) ≤
y∈X
≤ S(x) ∧
y∈X
y∈X
[C(S)(y) → C(S)(x)] = DS (x).
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181
Now we shall establish the converse inequality. We know that C(S)(x) ∧ S(y) ≤ R(x, y). By Proposition 8.17 the following inequalities hold DS (x) ≤ DSR (x) ≤ (S(y) ∧ R(y, x)) → R(x, y) for any y ∈ X. Then by Lemma 4.3 (1): DS (x) ∧ S(y) ∧ R(y, x) ≤ R(x, y). Since C([x, y])(y) ≤ R(y, x) we get DS (x) ∧ S(y) ∧ C([x, y])(y) ≤ DS (x) ∧ S(y) ∧ R(y, x) ≤ R(x, y). Thus by F C ∗ 3 we obtain DS (x)∧S(y)∧C([x, y])(y) ≤ C([x, y])(y)∧R(x, y) = [x, y](x)∧C([x, y])(y)∧ R(x, y) ≤ C([x, y])(x). It follows that DS (x) ∧ S(y) ∧ C([x, y])(y) ≤ C([x, y])(x) hence, by Lemma 4.3 (1) and Lemma 8.5 DS (x) ∧ S(y) ≤ C([x, y])(y) → C([x, y])(x) = D[x,y] (x). Applying again Lemma 4.3 (1) we obtain DS (x) ≤ S(y) → D[x,y] (x) for each y ∈ X hence DS (x) ≤ S(x) ∧
[S(y) → D[x,y] (x)].
y∈X
The formulation of axiom F C ∗ 3 has Lemma 2.1 in [112] as starting point. The following result establishes the equivalence of F C ∗ 3 with a direct generalization of F C3. Proposition 8.19. The following assertions are equivalent: (1) The axiom F C ∗ 3 holds; (2) For any S ∈ B, x, y ∈ X and α ∈ (0, 1], S(x) ∧ S(y) ∧ [α → C(S)(y)] ∧ [α → R(x, y)] ≤ α → C(S)(x). Proof. By Lemma 4.5 (1) S(x) ∧ S(y) ∧ [α → C(S)(y)] ∧ [α → R(x, y)] = S(x) ∧ S(y) ∧ [α → (C(S)(y) ∧ R(x, y))],
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hence, by Lemma 4.3 (1) the inequality in (2) is equivalent to S(x) ∧ S(y) ∧ α ∧ [α → (C(S)(y) ∧ R(x, y))] ≤ C(S)(x). According to Lemma 4.3 (2) S(x) ∧ S(y) ∧ α ∧ [α → (C(S)(y) ∧ R(x, y))] = S(x) ∧ S(y) ∧ α ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ R(x, y) = S(x) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ R(x, y) ∧ α because C(S)(y) ≤ S(y). Thus the inequality in (2) is equivalent to (a) S(x) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ R(x, y) ∧ α ≤ C(S)(x). Assuming F C ∗ 3 holds, the inequality (a) also holds since α ≤ 1. Conversely, if in (a) one takes α = 1 one obtains F C ∗ 3. Definition 8.20. Let C be a fuzzy choice function on (X, B). We define the fuzzy relation R2 on X by R2 (x, y) = [(S(x) ∧ DS (y)) → C(S)(x)]. S∈B
Remark 8.21. Let C be a fuzzy choice function, S ∈ B and x, y ∈ X. By Definition 5.16 (i) R(x, y) ∧ S(x) ∧ DS (y) = [ =
(C(T )(x) ∧ T (y))] ∧ S(x) ∧ DS (y)
T ∈B
[S(x) ∧ T (y) ∧ C(T )(x) ∧ DS (y)].
T ∈B
Then F C ∗ 1 is equivalent to the following statement • For any S, T ∈ B and x, y ∈ X S(x) ∧ T (y) ∧ C(T )(x) ∧ DS (y) ≤ C(S)(x). In Section 5.2 the following revealed preference axiom was considered: W AF RP ◦ For any S, T ∈ B and x, y ∈ X the following inequality holds: [S(x) ∧ C(T )(x)] ∧ [T (x) ∧ C(S)(x)] ≤ E(S ∩ C(T ), T ∩ C(S)). Theorem 7.3 asserts that W AF RP ◦ and F C ∗ 3 = W F CA are equivalent. A problem is if we can find a similar result for condition F C ∗ 1. In order to obtain an answer to this problem we introduce the following axiom: W AF RPD For any x, y ∈ X and S, T ∈ B, [S(x) ∧ C(T )(x)] ∧ [T (y) ∧ DS (y)] ≤ I(S ∩ C(T ), T ∩ C(S)).
8.3 New Congruence Axioms
183
Theorem 8.22. For a fuzzy choice function C : B → F(X) the following are equivalent: (i) C verifies F C ∗ 1; (ii) R ⊆ R2 ; (iii) C verifies W AF RPD . Proof. (i) ⇔ (ii). The following assertions are equivalent: • R ⊆ R2 ; • For any x, y ∈ X: (C(S)(x) ∧ S(y)) ≤ [(T (x) ∧ DT (y)) → C(T )(x)]; S∈B
T ∈B
• For any x, y ∈ X and S, T ∈ B :
C(S)(x) ∧ S(y) ≤ (T (x) ∧ DT (y)) → C(T )(x). • For any x, y ∈ X and S, T ∈ B: C(S)(x) ∧ S(y) ∧ T (x) ∧ DT (y) ≤ C(T )(x). In accordance with Remark 8.21 (i) and (ii) are equivalent. (iii) ⇒ (i) Assume that C verifies W AF RPD . Let x, y ∈ X and S, T ∈ B. By W AF RPD one gets S(x) ∧ T (y) ∧ C(T )(x) ∧ DS (y) ≤ I(S ∩ C(T ), T ∩ C(S)) = = [(S(u) ∧ C(T )(u)) → (T (u) ∧ C(S)(u))] ≤ u∈X
≤ (S(x) ∧ C(T )(x)) → (T (x) ∧ C(S)(x)) = = [(S(x) ∧ C(T )(x)) → T (x)] ∧ [(S(x) ∧ C(T )(x)) → C(S)(x)] = = (S(x) ∧ C(T )(x)) → C(S)(x) because (S(x) ∧ C(T )(x)) → T (x) = 1 (by Lemma 4.3 (5)). It follows that S(x) ∧ T (y) ∧ C(T )(x) ∧ DS (y) = = [S(x) ∧ T (y) ∧ C(T )(x) ∧ DS (y)] ∧ (S(x) ∧ C(T )(x)) ≤ C(S)(x) in accordance with Lemma 4.3 (1). According to Remark 8.21, C verifies F C ∗ 1. (i) ⇒ (iii) Assume C fulfills F C ∗ 1. By Remark 8.21, for any S, T ∈ B and x, y, u ∈ X we have
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8 Degree of Dominance
S(x) ∧ T (y) ∧ DS (y) ∧ C(T )(x) ∧ S(u) ∧ C(T )(u) ≤ S(u) ∧ T (y) ∧ C(T )(u) ∧ DS (y) ≤ C(S)(u). Thus, by Lemma 4.3 (1): S(x) ∧ T (y) ∧ DS (y) ∧ C(T )(x) ≤ (S(u) ∧ C(T )(u)) → C(S)(u) = = (S(u) ∧ C(T )(u)) → (T (u) ∧ C(S)(u)) This inequality is true for each u ∈ X, hence S(x) ∧ T (y) ∧ DS (y) ∧ C(T )(x) ≤ I(S ∩ C(T ), T ∩ C(S)) so C verifies the axiom W AF RPD . Let W be the transitive closure of the fuzzy preference relation R. We notice that axioms F C ∗ 1-F C ∗ 3 are expressed in terms of R. If R is replaced with W the following three congruence axioms are obtained: SF C ∗ 1 For any S ∈ B and x, y ∈ X the following inequality holds: S(x) ∧ DS (y) ≤ W (x, y) → C(S)(x). SF C ∗ 2 For any S ∈ B and x, y ∈ X the following inequality holds: S(x) ∧ DS (y) ∧ (W (y, x) → W (x, y)) ≤ DS (x). SF C ∗ 3 For any S ∈ B and x, y ∈ X the following inequality holds: S(x) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ W (x, y) ≤ C(S)(x). SF C ∗ 3 is exactly the congruence axiom SF CA (Strong Fuzzy Congruence Axiom) defined in Section 5.2. Proposition 8.23. SF C ∗ 1 ⇒ SF C ∗ 3. Proof. Similar to the proof of Proposition 8.14. Proposition 8.24. SF C ∗ 3 ⇒ SF C ∗ 2. Proof. Let S ∈ B and x, y ∈ X. We observe that W (x, y) ≥ R(x, y) ≥ C(S)(x) ∧ S(y). Therefore, using SF C ∗ 3 we get for any z ∈ X: C(S)(z) ∧ S(x) ∧ [C(S)(z) → C(S)(y)] ∧ [W (y, x) → W (x, y)] = = S(x) ∧ C(S)(z) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ [W (y, z) → W (x, y)] ≤ ≤ C(S)(z) ∧ (C(S)(y) ∧ S(x)) ∧ [(C(S)(y) ∧ S(x)) → W (x, y)] =
8.3 New Congruence Axioms
185
= C(S)(z) ∧ (C(S)(y) ∧ S(x)) ∧ W (x, y) ≤ ≤ S(x) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ W (x, y) ≤ C(S)(x). We proceed next as in the proof of Proposition 8.16. Extending our results from Chapter 7 we have introduced new axioms of congruence expressed in terms of the degree of dominance and we have established relationships between them and some axioms of revealed preference. These results can be summarized in Figure 8.1.
SFC *1
SFC * 3
SFC * 2
FC *1
FC * 3
FC * 2
WAFRPD
WAFRP0
?
Fig. 8.1. Axioms of revealed preference and congruence
The bottom line of the diagram contains axioms of revealed preference; the other lines contain axioms of congruence. An open problem is to complete the above diagram with an axiom of revealed preference equivalent to F C ∗ 2. Example 8.25 will clarify the notion of degree of dominance. Given a set of alternatives and a set of criteria we want to establish the hierarchical structure induced by each criterion. Finally we define an aggregated degree of dominance and we determine the overall hierarchy. Example 8.25. Consider a universe of alternatives X = {x1 , x2 , x3 , x4 , x5 } and a set of criteria B = {S1 , S2 , S3 }, where
S1 = 0.3χ{x1 } + 0.5χ{x2 } + 0.2χ{x3 } + 0.2χ{x4 } + 0.6χ{x5 } , C(S1 ) = 0.1χ{x1 } + 0.2χ{x2 } + 0.2χ{x3 } + 0.1χ{x4 } + 0.3χ{x5 } ; S2 = 0.2χ{x1 } + 0.4χ{x2 } + 0.3χ{x3 } + 0.5χ{x4 } + 0.4χ{x5 } , C(S2 ) = 0.1χ{x1 } + 0.3χ{x2 } + 0.2χ{x3 } + 0.4χ{x4 } + 0.1χ{x5 } ;
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8 Degree of Dominance
S3 = 0.4χ{x1 } + 0.3χ{x2 } + 0.2χ{x3 } + 0.2χ{x4 } + 0.6χ{x5 } , C(S3 ) = 0.3χ{x1 } + 0.2χ{x2 } + 0.2χ{x3 } + 0.1χ{x4 } + 0.4χ{x5 } . The degrees of dominance of alternative xi , i = 1, . . . , 5 with respect to criterion Sj , j = 1, . . . , 3 calculated according to Definition 8.1 are represented in the following table: DSi (xj ) x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 S1
0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.6
S2
0.1 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.1
S3
0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.6
Figure 8.2 indicates the hierarchy of alternatives for each of the three criteria. According to criterion S1 , the alternative with the greatest potentiality of being chosen is x5 , alternatives x2 and x3 can be equally chosen with the
x4
x5
x5
x2
x1
x2 , x3
x3
x2 , x3
x1 , x 4
x1 , x5
x4
S1
S2
S3
Fig. 8.2. The hierarchy of alternatives induced by criteria S1 , S2 , S3
8.3 New Congruence Axioms
187
degree 0.2 and alternatives x1 and x4 have the least chance of being chosen 0.1, etc.
1 n
Define the aggregated degree of dominance of an alternative x: D(x) = DS (x), where n=card B. S∈B
In our case: D(x1 ) =
0.5 3 ,
D(x2 ) =
0.7 3 ,
D(x3 ) = 0.2, D(x4 ) =
0.7 3 ,
D(x5 ) =
1.3 3
The hierarchy of alternatives determined by the aggregated degree of dominance is given by D(x1 ) < D(x3 ) < D(x2 ) = D(x4 ) < D(x5 ). Overall, we notice that alternative x5 has the greatest chances of being selected and alternative x1 the least.
9 Similarity and Rationality Indicators for Fuzzy Choice Functions
Similarity relations were introduced by Zadeh [118] as fuzzy generalizations of equivalence relations. The notion of similarity relation was extended by Trillas and Valverde [107] for an arbitrary t-norm. In the literature on the similarity relations different notions are used for the same notion: likeness relation, indistinguishability relation, fuzzy equality, etc. (see [68], p. 254). With regard to the fuzzy preference relations the notion of similarity defined in [118], [107] is successfully applied (see [40]). The reasonings based on fuzzy choice functions require an appropriate notion of similarity. The aim of this chapter is to give a suggestive answer to this question. We define the degree of similarity E(C1 , C2 ) of two fuzzy choice functions on a fuzzy choice space (X, B). The assignment (C1 , C2 ) → E(C1 , C2 ) induces a similarity relation on the set of fuzzy choice functions on (X, B). For 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 we introduce the (∗, δ)-equality of two fuzzy choice functions C1 , C2 ; this notion extends the Cai δ–equality [23], [24]. A significant part of fuzzy revealed preference theory is centered on connecting the fuzzy choice functions and fuzzy revealed preferences associated with them. Some of these connections are expressed by the functions φ1 , φ2 , ψ1 , ψ2 , ψ3 defined in Section 9.1. The main results of Section 9.1 show how the functions φi and ψj connect the similarity of fuzzy choice functions and the similarity of fuzzy preference
Irina Georgescu: Fuzzy Choice Functions, StudFuzz 214, 189–231 (2007) www.springerlink.com
c Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007
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9 Similarity and Rationality Indicators for Fuzzy Choice Functions
relations. In particular, these functions translate the (∗, δ)–equality of fuzzy choice functions into the (∗, δ)–equality of fuzzy preference relations ([23], [24], [116]). The rationality indicators RatG (C) and RatM (C) introduced in Section 9.2 give us a measure of the degree of rationality of a fuzzy choice function C. Instead of checking whether C is rational or not, we will compute its degree of rationality. This way we obtain a modality of comparing the fuzzy choice functions with respect to their rationality. The axioms of revealed preference W AF RP , SAF RP and the axioms of congruence W F CA, SF CA have been intensely studied in the previous chapters. Section 9.3 is devoted to new indicators W AF RP (C), SAF RP (C), W F CA(C) and SF CA(C), which express the degree to which the choice function C verifies the corresponding axioms. The main result of the section is Theorem 9.31, which establishes (in the framework of the G¨ odel t–norm) that W F CA(C) = SF CA(C) and also gives their expression that depends on the rationality indicators. We obtain a statement that not only generalizes a part of the fuzzy version of Arrow–Sen Theorem (see Theorem 6.7), but also gives to this a numerical formulation. Another result of this section is Theorem 9.36 which in the context offered by Lukasiewicz t–norm establishes some relations between the four studied indicators. Theorem 9.31 corresponds to the statements (1) and (2) from Theorem 6.7, while Theorem 9.36 corresponds to the statement (4) of Theorem 6.7. The Arrow index of a fuzzy choice function is the subject of Section 9.4. This number measures the degree to which a choice function verifies the Fuzzy Arrow Axiom. The last section of the chapter deals with the consistency indicators F α(C) and F β(C) which numerically evaluate the extent to which the choice function C satisfies the consistency axioms F α and F β, respectively. The equality
9.1 Similarity of Fuzzy Choice Functions
191
W F CA(C) =min(F α(C), F β(C)). Theorem 6.13 can be obtained as a particular case of this equality. Summarizing, by considering the indicators of this chapter, one concludes: • the properties of rationality, the axioms of revealed preference and congruence, the consistency conditions and the connections among them are numerically evaluated; • such indicators allow for a hierarchy of a class of fuzzy choice functions and offers the possibility of selecting that fuzzy choice function that expresses more adequately a decision situation.
9.1 Similarity of Fuzzy Choice Functions In this section we shall introduce two new notions: the degree of similarity and the (∗, δ)–equality of fuzzy choice functions. We shall prove two theorems that establish some correspondences between the similarity of fuzzy choice functions and the similarity of fuzzy preference relations. In particular, we analyze how these correspondences translate the (∗, δ)-equality of fuzzy choice functions into the (∗, δ)-equality of fuzzy preference relations. We fix a continuous t-norm ∗. Let X be an arbitrary set. Recall that a similarity relation on X is a reflexive, symmetric and ∗–transitive fuzzy relation on X. For x, y ∈ X, Q(x, y) is the degree of similarity of x and y. If Q1 and Q2 are two fuzzy relations on X then the degree of equality E(Q1 , Q2 ) is given by E(Q1 , Q2 ) = (Q1 (x, y) ↔ Q2 (x, y)). According to Lemma 4.12, the asx,y∈X
signment (Q1 , Q2 ) → E(Q1 , Q2 ) defines a similarity relation on the set of fuzzy preference relations on X and E(Q1 , Q2 ) is the degree of similarity of Q1 and Q2 . If we interpret X as a universe of alternatives and Q1 and Q2 as the preferences of two agents, then the real number E(Q1 , Q2 ) expresses how “similar” these preferences are.
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9 Similarity and Rationality Indicators for Fuzzy Choice Functions
The approximate reasonings on vague choices require a notion of similarity for fuzzy choice functions; if C1 , C2 are two fuzzy choice functions then we need to define the degree of similarity E(C1 , C2 ) for expressing the extent to which C1 and C2 behave similarly. At the same time we need to define the (∗, δ)–equality of fuzzy choice functions. We have seen that the main part of fuzzy revealed preference theory concerns the connections between the fuzzy choice functions and the fuzzy preference relations. Therefore we will study the way the similarity and the (∗, δ)–equality of fuzzy choice functions connect with the similarity and the (∗, δ)–equality of fuzzy preference relations. Definition 9.1. Let C1 , C2 be two fuzzy choice functions on (X, B). The degree of similarity E(C1 , C2 ) of C1 and C2 is a real defined by E(C1 , C2 ) = ρ(C1 (S)(x), C2 (S)(x)). x∈X S∈B
For δ ∈ [0, 1] we say that C1 and C2 are (∗, δ)–equal (C1 = (∗, δ)C2 in symbols) if E(C1 , C2 ) ≥ δ. The above definition of the degree of similarity of two fuzzy choice functions C1 and C2 takes into consideration the alternatives and the available fuzzy subsets of the same fuzzy choice space (X, B); the biresiduum connects the way C1 and C2 act on these elements. Proposition 9.2. For any fuzzy choice functions C1 , C2 , C3 on (X, B) the following hold (1) C1 = C2 iff E(C1 , C2 ) = 1; (2) E(C1 , C2 ) = E(C2 , C1 ); (3) E(C1 , C2 ) ∗ E(C2 , C3 ) ≤ E(C1 , C3 ). Proof. (1) and (2) Obvious. (3) By Lemma 4.5 (7) and Lemma 4.7 (8) the following inequalities hold E(C1 , C2 ) ∗ E(C2 , C3 ) = (C1 (S)(x) ↔ S∈B x∈X
9.1 Similarity of Fuzzy Choice Functions
C2 (S)(x)) ∗ ≤
193
(C2 (S)(x) ↔ C3 (S)(x))
S∈B x∈X
[((C1 (S)(x) ↔ C2 (S)(x)) ∗ (C2 (S)(x) ↔ C3 (S)(x))] ≤
S∈B x∈X
≤
[(C1 (S)(x) ↔ C3 (S)(x))] = E(C1 , C3 ).
S∈B x∈X
Denote by F CF (X, B) the set of fuzzy choice functions on (X, B) and by F P (X) the set of fuzzy preference relations on X. According to Proposition 9.2, the assignment (C1 , C2 ) → E(C1 , C2 ) defines a similarity relation on F CF (X, B). If C1 and C2 are two fuzzy choice functions then E(C1 , C2 ) express how “similar” are the acts of choice corresponding to C1 , respectively C2 . Using this notion of similarity, in the next sections we shall define several rationality indicators of fuzzy choice functions. In this chapter all the fuzzy preference relations associated with a fuzzy ¯ , P˜ , etc. will be denoted RC , R ¯ C , P˜C , etc. choice function C, i. e. R, R Let F PG (X) (resp. F PM (X)) be the subset of F P (X) containing those fuzzy preference relations Q for which G(., Q) (resp. M (., Q)) is a fuzzy choice functions. Let us consider the functions φ1 : F PM (X) → F CF (X), φ2 : F PG (X) → F CF (X) defined by φ1 (Q) = M (., Q) for any Q ∈ F PM (X) φ2 (Q) = G(., Q) for any Q ∈ F PG (X). We also consider the functions ψi : F CF (X, B) → F P (X), i = 1, 2, 3 defined by ¯ C and ψ3 (C) = P˜C ψ1 (C) = RC , ψ2 (C) = R for any fuzzy choice function C. The following result shows to what extent the similarity of the fuzzy preference relations is transformed by the functions φ1 and φ2 into the similarity of the corresponding choice functions. Theorem 9.3. If Q1 , Q2 ∈ F P (X) then
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9 Similarity and Rationality Indicators for Fuzzy Choice Functions
(1) E(φ1 (Q1 ), φ1 (Q2 )) ≥ E(Q1 , Q2 ) ∗ E(Q1 , Q2 ); (2) E(φ2 (Q1 ), φ2 (Q2 )) ≥ E(Q1 , Q2 ). Proof. (1) According to Lemma 4.7 (2), (8), (9) and Lemma 4.8 (1) it follows that: E(φ1 (Q1 ), φ1 (Q2 )) = =
ρ(φ1 (Q1 (x)), φ1 (Q2 (x))) =
S∈B x∈X
ρ(M (S, Q1 )(x), M (S, Q2 )(x)) =
S∈B x∈X
=
ρ(S(x) ∗
S∈B x∈X
((S(y) ∗ Q1 (y, x)) → Q1 (x, y)), S(x) ∗
y∈X
((S(y) ∗
y∈X
Q2 (y, x)) → Q2 (x, y))) ≥ ≥ ρ( (S(y) ∗ Q1 (y, x)) → Q1 (x, y)), (S(y) ∗ Q2 (y, x)) → S∈B x∈X
y∈X
y∈X
Q2 (x, y))) ≥ ≥ ρ((S(y)∗Q1 (y, x)) → Q1 (x, y), (S(y)∗Q2 (y, x)) → Q2 (x, y)) ≥
S∈B x,y∈X
≥
ρ(S(y) ∗ Q1 (y, x), S(y) ∗ Q2 (y, x)) ∗ ρ(Q1 (x, y), Q2 (x, y)) ≥
S∈B x,y∈X
≥
ρ(Q1 (y, x), Q2 (y, x)) ∗ ρ(Q1 (x, y), Q2 (x, y))
S∈B x,y∈X
≥ E(Q1 , Q2 ) ∗ E(Q1 , Q2 ). (2) According to Lemma 4.7 (2), (8), (9) and Lemma 4.8 (1) we get E(φ2 (Q1 ), φ2 (Q2 )) = ρ(φ1 (Q1 (x)), φ1 (Q2 (x))) = =
S∈B x∈X
ρ(G(S, Q1 )(x), G(S, Q2 )(x)) =
S∈B x∈X
=
ρ(S(x) ∗
S∈B x∈X
≥
ρ(
S∈B x∈X
≥
[S(y) → Q1 (x, y)], S(x) ∗
y∈X
(S(y) → Q1 (x, y)),
y∈X
[S(y) → Q2 (x, y)]) =
y∈X
(S(y) → Q2 (x, y)) ≥
y∈X
ρ(S(y) → Q1 (x, y), S(y) → Q2 (x, y)) ≥
S∈B x,y∈X
≥
ρ(Q1 (x, y), Q2 (x, y)) = E(Q1 , Q2 ).
S∈B x,y∈X
Corollary 9.4. (1) If Q1 = (∗, δ)Q2 then φ1 (Q1 ) = (∗, δ ∗ δ)φ1 (Q2 ) and φ2 (Q1 ) = (∗, δ)φ2 (Q2 ); (2) If ∗ is the G¨ odel t-norm then Q1 = (∗, δ)Q2 implies φ1 (Q1 ) = (∗, δ)φ1 (Q2 ).
9.1 Similarity of Fuzzy Choice Functions
195
The following theorem establishes how the functions ψ1 , ψ2 and ψ3 translate the similarity of the choice functions into the similarity of the corresponding fuzzy preference relations. Theorem 9.5. If C1 , C2 ∈ F CF (X, B) then (1) E(ψ1 (C1 ), ψ1 (C2 )) ≥ E(C1 , C2 ); (2) E(ψ2 (C1 ), ψ2 (C2 )) ≥ E(C1 , C2 ); (3) E(ψ3 (C1 ), ψ3 (C2 )) ≥ E(C1 , C2 ) ∗ E(C1 , C2 ). Proof. (1) According to Lemma 4.7 (1), (8) and Lemma 4.8 (2) it follows that E(ψ1 (C1 ), ψ1 (C2 )) = ρ(ψ1 (C1 )(x, y), ψ1 (C2 )(x, y)) =
x,y∈X
ρ(RC1 (x, y), RC2 (x, y)) =
x,y∈X
=
ρ(
x,y∈X
≥
(C1 (S)(x) ∗ S(y)),
S∈B
(C2 (S)(x) ∗ S(y)) ≥
S∈B
ρ(C1 (S)(x) ∗ S(y), C2 (S)(x) ∗ S(y)) ≥
x,y∈X S∈B
≥
ρ(C1 (S)(x), C2 (S)(x)) = E(C1 , C2 ).
x,y∈X S∈B
(2) By applying directly the definitions it follows that E(ψ2 (C1 ), ψ2 (C2 )) = ρ(ψ2 (C1 )(x, y), ψ2 (C2 )(x, y)) = =
x,y∈X
¯ C (x, y), R ¯ C (x, y)) = ρ(R 1 2
x,y∈X
=
ρ(C1 ([x, y])(x), C2 ([x, y])(x)).
x,y∈X
The assignment y → Sy = [x, y] leads to ρ(C1 ([x, y])(x, y), C2 ([x, y])(x)) = ρ(C1 (Sy )(x), C2 (Sy )(x)) ≥
x,y∈X
≥
x∈X y∈X
ρ(C1 (S)(x), C2 (S)(x)) = E(C1 , C2 ).
x∈X S∈B
(3) According to Lemma 4.7 (2), (4), (8) and Lemma 4.8 (2) it follows that ρ(ψ3 (C1 )(x, y), ψ3 (C2 )(x, y)) ≥
x,y∈X
≥
ρ(P˜C1 (x, y), P˜C2 (x, y)) ≥
x,y∈X
≥
x,y∈X
ρ(
S∈B
C1 (S)(x)∗S(y)∗¬C1 (S)(y),
S∈B
C2 (S)(x)∗S(y)∗¬C2 (S)(y)) ≥
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9 Similarity and Rationality Indicators for Fuzzy Choice Functions
≥
ρ(C1 (S)(x), C2 (S)(x)) ∗ ρ(¬C1 (S)(y), ¬C2 (S)(y)) ≥
x,y∈X S∈B
≥
ρ(C1 (S)(x), C2 (S)(x) ∗ ρ(C1 (S)(y), C2 (S)(y))
x,y∈X S∈B
≥
ρ(C1 (S)(x), C2 (S)(x)) ∗
x,y∈X S∈B
E(C1 , C2 ) ∗ E(C1 , C2 ).
ρ(C1 (S)(y), C2 (S)(y)) =
x,y∈X S∈B
Corollary 9.6. (1) If C1 = (∗, δ)C2 then ψ1 (C1 ) = (∗, δ)ψ1 (C2 ), ψ2 (C1 ) = (∗, δ)ψ2 (C2 ) and ψ3 (C1 ) = (∗, δ ∗ δ)ψ3 (C2 ); (2) If ∗ is the G¨ odel t-norm then C1 = (∗, δ)C2 implies ψ3 (C1 ) = (∗, δ)ψ3 (C2 ). Next let us suppose that Cˆ = G(., RC ). ˆ i.e. Recall that a fuzzy choice function C on (X, B) is G–normal if C = C, if the rationality of C is ensured by the fuzzy revealed preference relation RC . ˆ can be considered a measure of the degree The degree of similarity E(C, C) ˆ is, the more rational the choice function of rationality of C: the bigger E(C, C) C is. In the following let us assume that ∗ is the G¨ odel t-norm ∧. Lemma 9.7. Let C, C be two fuzzy choice functions. Then for any S ∈ B and x ∈ X we have (i) E(C, C ) ∧ C(S)(x) ≤ C (S)(x); (ii) E(C, C ) ∧ ¬C(S)(x) ≤ ¬C (S)(x). Proof. (i) E(C, C ) ∧ C(S)(x) = C(S)(x) ∧ ≤ C(S)(x) ∧ [C(S)(x) → C (S)(x)]
[C(T )(y) ↔ C (T )(y)] ≤
y∈X T ∈B
= C(S)(x) ∧ C (S)(x) ≤ C (S)(x). (ii) According to (i) we have E(C, C ) ∧ ¬C(S)(x) ∧ C (S)(x) ≤ C(S)(x) ∧ ¬C(S)(x) = 0. It follows that E(C, C ) ∧ ¬C(S)(x) ∧ C(S )(x) = 0, therefore E(C, C ) ∧ ¬C(S)(x) ≤ ¬C (S)(x).
9.1 Similarity of Fuzzy Choice Functions
197
Lemma 9.8. Let C and C be two fuzzy choice functions and x, y ∈ X. Then (i) E(C, C ) ∧ RC (x, y) ≤ RC (x, y); (ii) E(C, C ) ∧ ¬RC (x, y) ≤ ¬RC (x, y). Proof. (i) By applying Lemma 9.7 (i) we have: E(C, C ) ∧ RC (x, y) = E(C, C ) ∧ [C(S)(x) ∧ S(y)] =
S∈B
[E(C, C ) ∧ C(S)(x) ∧ S(y)] ≤
S∈B
≤
[C (S)(x) ∧ S(y)] = RC (x, y).
S∈B
(ii) By (i) we have E(C, C ) ∧ ¬RC (x, y) ∧ RC (x, y) ≤ RC (x, y) ∧ ¬RC (x, y) = 0, from which it follows that E(C, C ) ∧ ¬RC (x, y) ≤ ¬RC (x, y).
Lemma 9.9. If C and C are two fuzzy choice functions and x, y ∈ X then E(C, C ) ∧ P˜C (x, y) ≤ P˜C (x, y). Proof. According to Lemma 9.7 we have E(C, C ) ∧ P˜C (x, y) = E(C, C ) ∧ [C(S)(x) ∧ S(y) ∧ ¬C(S)(y)] = =
S∈B
[(E(C, C ) ∧ C(S)(x)) ∧ S(y) ∧ (E(C, C ) ∧ ¬C(S)(y))] ≤
S∈B
≤
[C (S)(x) ∧ S(y) ∧ ¬C (S)(y)] = P˜C (x, y).
S∈B
ˆ ≤ Theorem 9.10. For any fuzzy choice function C on (X, B) we have E(C, C) ¯ C ). E(RC , R Proof. According to the definition of Cˆ we have ˆ = ˆ E(C, C) [C(S)(x) ↔ C(S)(x)] = =
x∈X S∈B
ˆ [C(S)(x) → C(S)(x)]
x∈X S∈B
ˆ since C ⊆ C. ¯ C we get Using the definition of R
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9 Similarity and Rationality Indicators for Fuzzy Choice Functions
¯C ) = E(RC , R =
¯ C (x, y)] = [RC (x, y) ↔ R
x,y∈X
¯ C (x, y)] [RC (x, y) → R
x,y∈X
¯ C ⊆ RC . since R Since RC is reflexive and [x, y](x) = [x, y](y) = 1, [x, y](z) = 0 for z ∈ {x, z}, one obtains
ˆ C([x, y])(x) = [x, y](x) ∧
([x, y](z) → RC (x, z))
z∈X
= [[x, y](x) → RC (x, x)] ∧ [[x, y](y) → RC (x, y)] = RC (x, x) ∧ RC (x, y) = RC (x, y). Then ¯ C (x, y) = C([x, ˆ ¯ C (x, y) RC (x, y) → R y])(x) → R ˆ = C([x, y])(x) → C([x, y])(x). Therefore ˆ = E(C, C) ≤
ˆ [C(S)(x) → C(S)(x)] ≤
x∈X S∈B
ˆ (C([x, y])(x) → C([x, y])(x)) =
x∈X y∈X
=
¯ C (x, y)] = E(RC , R ¯ C ). [RC (x, y) → R
x,y∈X
Example 9.11. (I) In this example a particular class of fuzzy choice function is studied with emphasis on the degree of similarity. Let X = {x, y} and B = {A, B} where A, B ∈ F(X) are given by A = αχ{x} + χ{y} ; B = χ{x} + βχ{y} (0 ≤ α, β ≤ 1). Consider the function C : B → F(X) defined by: C(A) = γχ{x} + χ{y} ; C(B) = χ{x} + δχ{y} (0 ≤ γ ≤ α, 0 ≤ δ ≤ β). For any α, β, γ, δ as above, C is a fuzzy choice function on (X, B). First we compute the fuzzy preference relation RC : RC (x, x) = RC (y, y) = 1; RC (x, y) = (C(A)(x) ∧ A(y)) ∨ (C(B)(x) ∧ B(y)) = β ∨ γ;
9.1 Similarity of Fuzzy Choice Functions
199
RC (y, x) = (C(A)(y) ∧ A(x)) ∨ (C(B)(y) ∧ B(x)) = α ∨ δ. Thus RC =
1
β∨γ
α∨δ
1
.
ˆ ˆ We compute the values of C(A) and C(B): ˆ C(A)(x) = A(x) ∧ [A(x) → RC (x, x)] ∧ [A(y) → RC (x, y)] = α ∧ (β ∨ γ) ˆ C(A)(y) = A(y) ∧ [A(x) → RC (y, x)] ∧ [A(y) → RC (y, y)] = = α → (α ∨ δ) = 1 ˆ ˆ and similarly, C(B)(x) = 1 and C(B)(y) = β ∧ (α ∨ δ). ˆ of C and C: ˆ Then we compute the degree of similarity E(C, C) ˆ = ˆ E(C, C) (C(z) → C(z)) S∈{A,B} z∈{x,y}
ˆ ˆ = [C(A)(x) → C(A)(x)] ∧ [C(A)(y) → C(A)(y)]∧ ˆ ˆ ∧[C(B)(x) → C(B)(x)] ∧ [C(B)(y) → C(B)(y)] = [(α ∧ (β ∨ γ)) → γ] ∧ [(β ∧ (α ∨ δ)) → δ] = = {[(α ∧ β) ∨ (α ∧ γ)] → γ} ∧ {[(β ∧ α) ∨ (β ∧ δ) → δ]} = = [(α ∧ β) → γ] ∧ [(α ∧ β) → δ] = (α ∧ β) → (γ ∧ δ) = 1 if α ∧ β = γ ∧ δ . = γ ∧ δ if α ∧ β > γ ∧ δ (II) We use the same data from Example 5.44. Therefore X = {x1 , x2 , . . . , xn , . . .}, B = {[x1 ], . . . , [xn ], . . .} and the fuzzy choice function C defined by 1 if x = x n C([xn ])(x) = n 1 if x = x . n for any n = 1, 2, . . . and for any x ∈ X. We have seen that 1 if x = x n G([xn ], RC )(x) = n 0 if x = x n 1 if x = x n M ([xn ], RC )(x) = 0 if x = x n
Therefore for any n, m ∈ N: G([xn ], RC )(xn ) ↔ C([xn ])(xn ) =
1 n
↔
1 n
if n = m 0 ↔ 1 if n = m
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9 Similarity and Rationality Indicators for Fuzzy Choice Functions
=
1 if n = m 0 if n = m
.
G([xn ], RC )(xn ) ↔ M ([xm ], RC )(xn ) = =
1 n
if n = m
1 if n = m Therefore
1 n
↔ 1 if n = m
0 ↔ 0 if n = m
.
E(C, G(., RC )) =
∞
(G([xm ], RC )(xn ) ↔ C([xm ])(xn )) = 0
n,m=1
E(G(., RC ), M (., RC )) = ∞ 1 = 0. n n=1
∞
(G([xm ], RC )(xn ) ↔ M ([xm ], RC )(xn )) =
n,m=1
9.2 Rationality Indicators In this paragraph we study the indicators of G-rationality and M -rationality of a fuzzy choice function, notions that refine the property of the fuzzy choice function of being G-rational, resp. M -rational. Among them we will introduce the indicators of G-normality and M -normality, corresponding to the case when the G-rationalization (resp. the M -rationalization) of the fuzzy choice function C is exactly the fuzzy preference relation RC . A main question in fuzzy revealed preference theory is if a fuzzy choice function is rational or not. The way of answering by “yes or no” focusses on the class of rational fuzzy choice functions, but completely ignores the others. In accordance with fuzzy logic, we need to have a measure for “the rationality” of any fuzzy choice function. The rationality indicators will define the degree to which a fuzzy choice function is rational. In this way we are able to compare two fuzzy choice functions with respect to their rationality. Let (X, B) be a fuzzy choice space and C a fuzzy choice function on (X, B). One denotes by R the set of all fuzzy preference relations on X (R = F(X 2 )).
9.2 Rationality Indicators
201
By the G–rationality (resp. M –rationality) of C we mean that there exists Q ∈ R such that C = G(., G) (resp. C = M (., Q). The real number E(C, G(., Q)) (resp. E(C, M (., Q))) shows to which extent C and G(., Q) (resp. C and M (., Q)) have the same values, i. e. to which extent the fuzzy preference relation Q G–rationalizes (resp. M –rationalizes) C. In order to evaluate how G–rational (resp. M –rational) C is, we will take into account the whole set of values {G(.Q)|Q ∈ R} (resp. {M (.Q)|Q ∈ R} and we will retain its supremum. Definition 9.12. For the fuzzy choice function C let us define RatG (C) = E(C, G(., Q)); RatM (C) = E(C, M (., Q)); Q∈R
Q∈R
N ormG (C) = E(C, G(., RC )); N ormM (C) = E(C, M (., RC )). The previous definition is stated in terms of the similarity degree of fuzzy choice functions. Lemma 9.13. For any set X we have (a) N ormG (C) = 1 iff C is G–normal; (b) N ormM (C) = 1 iff C is M –normal. The real number RatG (C) (resp. RatM (C)) is called the indicator of Grationality (resp. M -rationality) of C. Intuitively, RatG (C) (resp. RatM (C)) expresses the degree to which the fuzzy choice function C is G-rational (resp. M -rational). N ormG (C) (resp. N ormM (C)) is called the indicator of Gnormality (resp. M -normality) of C and evaluates the degree to which C is G-normal (resp. M -normal). Each of these indicators allow us to compare any two fuzzy choice functions. For example, if for the fuzzy choice functions C1 and C2 we have RatG (C1 ) ≥ RatG (C2 ), then the fuzzy choice function C1 is “more G– rational” then C2 . This way one obtains a hierarchy of every family of fuzzy choice functions with respect to each of the four indicators. Now we shall study the connections between these rationality indicators.
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9 Similarity and Rationality Indicators for Fuzzy Choice Functions
Lemma 9.14. (i) N ormG (C) ≤ RatG (C); (ii) N ormM (C) ≤ RatM (C). Proof. Directly from Definition 9.12. Proposition 9.15. If Q is a fuzzy preference relation on X then SC(Q) ≤ E(G(., Q), M (., Q)). Proof. Let S ∈ B and x ∈ X. According to Lemma 4.3 (2), (4) we get SC(Q) ∧ M (S, Q)(x) ≤ SC(Q) ∧ [(S(y) ∧ Q(y, x)) → Q(x, y)] ≤ ≤ (Q(x, y) ∨ Q(y, x)) ∧ [(S(y) ∧ Q(y, x)) → Q(x, y)] ≤ ≤ [Q(x, y) ∧ [(S(y) ∧ Q(y, x)) → Q(x, y)]] ∨ [Q(y, x) ∧ [(S(y) ∧ Q(y, x)) → Q(x, y)]] ≤ ≤ Q(x, y) ∨ [Q(y, x) ∧ [(S(y) ∧ Q(y, x)) → Q(x, y)]] = Q(x, y) ∨ [Q(y, x) ∧ [Q(y, x) → (S(y) → Q(x, y))]] ≤ Q(x, y) ∨ [Q(y, x) ∧ (S(y) → Q(x, y))] ≤ S(y) → Q(x, y). Therefore SC(Q) ∧ M (S, Q)(x) ≤ S(x) ∧
[S(y) → Q(x, y)] = G(S, Q)(x).
y∈X
By Lemma 4.3 (1) SC(Q) ≤ M (S, Q)(x) → G(S, Q)(x) = M (S, Q)(x) ↔ G(S, Q)(x) because G(S, Q)(x) ≤ M (S, Q)(x). This inequality holds for all S ∈ B and x ∈ X hence SC(Q) ≤
[M (S, Q)(x) ↔ G(S, Q)(x)] = E(G(., Q), M (., Q)).
S∈B x∈X
Proposition 9.16. RatM (C) ≤ RatG (C). Proof. Let Q be a fuzzy preference relation on X. Let us consider the fuzzy preference relation Q on X defined by Q (x, y) = Q(y, x) → Q(x, y) for any x, y ∈ X. Then for all S ∈ B and x ∈ X: G(S, Q )(x) = S(x) ∧ [S(y) → Q (x, y)] = S(x) ∧
y∈X
y∈X
[(S(y) → (Q(y, x)) → Q(x, y)]
9.2 Rationality Indicators
= S(x) ∧
203
[(S(y) ∧ Q(y, x)) → Q(x, y)]
y∈X
= M (S, Q). Then G(S, Q ) = M (S, Q) for each S ∈ B hence G(., Q ) = M (., Q). It follows that E(C, M (., Q)) = E(C, G(., Q )) = RatG (C). This inequality holds for any Q ∈ R hence RatM (C) = E(C, M (., Q)) ≤ RatG (C). Q∈R
Proposition 9.17. N ormM (C) ≤ N ormG (C). Proof. Let S ∈ B and x ∈ X. By Lemma 5.37 (iii) we have C(S)(x) ≤ G(S, RC )(x) ≤ M (S, RC )(x), hence, using Lemma 4.3 (5), (10): C(S)(x) ↔ M (S, RC )(x) = M (S, RC )(x) → C(S)(x) ≤ ≤ G(S, RC )(x) → C(S)(x) = C(S)(x) ↔ G(S, RC )(x). It follows that N ormM (C) = ≤
[C(S)(x) ↔ M (S, RC )(x)] ≤
S∈B x∈X
[C(S)(x) ↔ G(S, RC )(x)] = N ormG (C).
S∈B x∈X
Theorem 9.18. RatG (C) = N ormG (C). Proof. Let Q ∈ R. We shall prove that (a) E(C, G(., Q)) ≤ N ormG (C). Since C(S)(x) ≤ G(S, RC )(x) for any x ∈ X and S ∈ B it follows that N ormG (C) = [C(S)(x) ↔ G(S, RC )(x)] =
S∈B x∈X
[G(S, RC )(x) → C(S)(x)].
S∈B x∈X
Then to prove (a) is equivalent to show that for any S ∈ B and x ∈ X we have (b) E(C, G(., Q)) ≤ G(S, RC )(x) → C(S)(x). Let S ∈ B and x ∈ X. We shall prove that (c) E(C, G(., Q)) ∧ G(S, RC )(x) ≤ C(S)(x).
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9 Similarity and Rationality Indicators for Fuzzy Choice Functions
For any y ∈ X and T ∈ B the following inequalities hold G(T, Q)(x) ∧ T (y) = T (x) ∧ T (y) ∧ [T (z) → Q(x, z)] ≤ z∈X
≤ T (y) ∧ (T (y) → Q(x, y)) = T (y) ∧ Q(x, y) ≤ Q(x, y). By Lemma 9.7 (i), E(C, G(., Q)) ∧ C(T )(x) ≤ G(T, Q)(x) for any T ∈ B, therefore using the previous inequalities, we get E(C, G(., Q)) ∧ RC (x, y) = E(C, G(., Q)) ∧ [C(T )(x) ∧ T (y)] = =
T ∈B
[E(C, G(., Q)) ∧ C(T )(x) ∧ T (y)]
T ∈B
≤
[G(T, Q)(x) ∧ T (y)] ≤ Q(x, y).
T ∈B
According to Lemma 4.3 (1) it follows that E(C, G(., Q)) ≤ RC (x, y) → Q(x, y). Then, by Lemma 4.3 (7) one gets E(C, G(., Q)) ∧ G(S, RC )(x) = = S(x) ∧ [S(z) → RC (x, z)] ∧ E(C, G(., Q)) ≤
z∈X
≤ S(x) ∧
[(S(y) → RC (x, z)) ∧ (RC (x, y) → Q(x, y)] ≤
y∈X
≤ S(x) ∧
[S(y) → Q(x, y)] = G(S, Q)(x).
y∈X
Then, by Lemma 9.7 (i) it follows E(C, G(., Q)) ∧ G(S, RC )(x) ≤ E(C, G(., Q)) ∧ G(S, Q)(x) ≤ C(S)(x). We have proved (c). By Lemma 4.3 (1) one obtains immediately (b). From (b) and Lemma 9.14 (i) one obtains RatG (C) = N ormG (C). The previous theorem has a remarkable significance. It shows that the indicator of G-rationality coincides with the indicator of G-normality. At the same time it offers a simple way of computing the indicator of G-rationality. According to Theorem 9.18 and Lemma 9.13 (a) it follows that RatG (C) = 1 iff C is G–rational. The following theorem establishes in the presence of hypotheses H1 and H2 a much simpler formula for computing RatG (C) than the one given by Theorem 9.18.
9.2 Rationality Indicators
205
Theorem 9.19. If a fuzzy choice function C verifies hypotheses H1 and H2 ¯ C )). then RatG (C) = E(C, G(., R Proof. Let Q be a reflexive fuzzy preference relation on X and x, y ∈ X. We shall prove ¯ C (x, y). (a) E(C, G(., Q)) ∧ Q(x, y) ≤ R We remark that G([x, y], Q)(x) = [x, y](x) ∧
([x, y](z) → Q(x, z)) = Q(x, x) ∧ Q(x, y) =
z∈X
Q(x, y). Then E(C, G(., Q)) ≤ C([x, y])(x) ↔ G([x, y], Q)(x) = ¯ C (x, y) ↔ Q(x, y) ≤ Q(x, y) → R ¯ C (x, y). =R According to Lemma 4.3 (2) we get ¯ C (x, y)) E(C, G(., Q)) ∧ Q(x, y) ≤ Q(x, y) ∧ (Q(x, y) → R ¯ C (x, y) ≤ R ¯ C (x, y). = Q(x, y) ∧ R ¯ C we obtain E(C, G(., RC )) ∧ RC (x, y) ≤ R ¯ C (x, y), If we take in (a) Q = R hence by using the definition of RC and Lemma 4.5 (5), it follows that (E(C, G(., RC )) ∧ C(S)(x) ∧ S(y)) = S∈B
= E(C, G(., RC )) ∧
(C(S)(x) ∧ S(y)) =
S∈B
¯ C (x, y). = E(C, G(., RC )) ∧ RC (x, y) ≤ R By the definition of the supremum, it follows that for any S ∈ B the following inequality takes place: ¯ C (x, y). E(C, G(., RC )) ∧ C(S)(x) ∧ S(y) ≤ R By Lemma 4.3 (1) we have ¯ C (x, y)). (b) E(C, G(., RC )) ∧ C(S)(x) ≤ S(y) → R But C(S)(x) ≤ S(x) hence E(C, G(., RC )) ∧ C(S)(x) ≤ S(x) ∧
¯ C (x, y)) = (S(y) → R
y∈X
¯ C )(x). = G(S, R By applying again Lemma 4.3 (1) it follows
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9 Similarity and Rationality Indicators for Fuzzy Choice Functions
¯ C )(x). (c) E(C, G(., RC )) ≤ C(S)(x) → G(S, R ¯ C ⊆ RC , hence by Lemma 4.5 (10): According to the definition, R ¯ C )(x) = S(x) ∧ ¯ C (x, z)) G(S, R (S(z) → R ≤ S(x) ∧
z∈X
(S(z) → RC (x, z)) = G(S, RC )(x).
z∈X
By applying Lemma 9.7 (i) we obtain ¯ C )(x) ≤ E(C, G(., RC )) ∧ G(S, R ≤ E(C, G(., RC )) ∧ G(S, RC )(x) ≤ C(S)(x), from which, according to Lemma 4.3 (1) ¯ C )(x) → C(S)(x). (d) E(C, G(., RC )) ≤ G(S, R From (c) and (d) it follows ¯ C )(x)) = E(C, G(., RC )) ≤ (C(S)(x) ↔ G(S, R ¯ C )). = E(C, G(., R
S∈B x∈X
¯ C )). The According to Theorem 9.18 we obtain RatG (C) ≤ E(C, G(., R converse inequality is true by the definition of RatG (C). ¯ C has a simpler expression than RC , therefore under hypotheRemark 9.20. R ses H1 and H2 when we compute RatG (C) the formula from Theorem 9.19 is preferred. Lemma 9.21. Let Q be a fuzzy preference relation on X. Then E(C, M (., Q)) ∧ SC(Q) = E(C, G(., Q)) ∧ SC(Q). Proof. By applying Proposition 9.15 and Proposition 9.2 (2) and (3) E(C, M (., Q)) ∧ SC(Q) ≤ E(C, M (., Q)) ∧ E(G(., Q), M (., Q)) ≤ E(C, G(., Q)) from which we get E(C, M (., Q)) ∧ SC(Q) ≤ E(C, G(., Q)) ∧ SC(Q). The inverse inequality follows similarly. Let us define ScRat(C) = =
[E(C, M (., Q)) ∧ SC(Q)]
Q∈R
[E(C, G(., Q)) ∧ SC(Q)].
Q∈R
9.2 Rationality Indicators
207
ScRat(C) is called the indicator of strongly complete rationality of C. Proposition 9.22. N ormM (C) ≤ ScRat(C). Proof. Let us consider the fuzzy preference relation R◦ on X defined by R◦ (x, y) = RC (y, x) → RC (x, y) for any x, y ∈ X. According to the proof of Proposition 9.16 we have M (., RC ) = G(., R◦ ). If RC (y, x) ≤ RC (x, y) then R◦ (x, y) = RC (y, x) → RC (x, y) = 1; if RC (y, x) > RC (x, y) then R◦ (y, x) = RC (x, y) → RC (y, x) = 1. Thus R◦ is strongly complete hence SC(R◦ ) = 1. Therefore, by Lemma 9.21 N ormM (C) = E(C, M (., RC )) = E(C, G(., R◦ )) = E(C, G(., R◦ )) ∧ SC(R◦ ) = E(C, M (., R◦ )) ∧ SC(R◦ ) ≤ ScRat(C). Theorem 9.23. Let C1 , C2 be two fuzzy choice functions on (X, B). Then (1) RatG (C1 ) ∧ E(C1 , C2 ) ≤ RatG (C2 ); (2) RatM (C1 ) ∧ E(C1 , C2 ) ≤ RatM (C2 ); (3) N ormG (C1 ) ∧ E(C1 , C2 ) ≤ N ormG (C2 ); (4) N ormM (C1 ) ∧ E(C1 , C2 ) ≤ N ormM (C2 ). Proof. (1) Let Q be a fuzzy preference relation on X. We shall prove that (a) E(C1 , G(., Q)) ∧ E(C1 , C2 ) ≤ E(C2 , G(., Q)) Let S ∈ B and x, y ∈ X. Applying Lemma 9.7 (i) and Lemma 4.3 (2) it follows E(C1 , G(., Q)) ∧ E(C1 , C2 ) ∧ C2 (S)(x) ∧ S(y) ≤ ≤ E(C1 , G(., Q)) ∧ C1 (S)(x) ∧ S(y) ≤ G(S, Q)(x) ∧ S(y) = = S(x) ∧ S(y) ∧ [S(z) → Q(x, z)] ≤ S(y) ∧ (S(y) → Q(x, y)) = z∈X
= S(y) ∧ Q(x, y) ≤ Q(x, y). By Lemma 4.3 (1) one obtains from here E(C1 , G(., Q)) ∧ E(C1 , C2 ) ∧ C2 (S)(x) ≤ S(y) → Q(x, y).
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9 Similarity and Rationality Indicators for Fuzzy Choice Functions
Since this inequality holds for any y ∈ X we have E(C1 , G(., Q)) ∧ E(C1 , C2 ) ∧ C2 (S)(x) ≤ S(x) ∧
[S(y) → Q(x, y)] =
y∈X
G(S, Q)(x). By Lemma 4.3 (1) (b) E(C1 , G(., Q)) ∧ E(C1 , C2 ) ≤ C2 (S)(x) → G(S, Q)(x) Applying twice Lemma 9.7 (i) it follows E(C1 , G(., Q))∧E(C1 , C2 )∧G(S, Q)(x) ≤ C1 (S)(x)∧E(C1 , C2 ) ≤ C2 (S)(x) , hence, by Lemma 4.3 (1) (c) E(C1 , G(., Q)) ∧ E(C1 , C2 ) ≤ G(S, Q)(x) → C2 (S)(x). From (b) and (c) one obtains that for any S ∈ B and x ∈ X E(C, G(., Q)) ∧ E(C1 , C2 ) ≤ G(S, Q)(x) ↔ C2 (S)(x), from where we get (a). By (a) we have RatG (C1 ) ∧ E(C1 , C2 ) = [E(C1 , G(., Q)) ∧ E(C1 , C2 )] ≤
Q∈R
E(C2 , G(., Q)) = RatG (C2 ).
Q∈R
Inequalities (2), (3), (4) can be proved similarly. Remark 9.24. Let δ ∈ [0, 1]. If RatG (C1 ) ≥ δ and C1 =δ C2 then RatG (C2 ) ≥ δ. This shows that the indicator of G-rationality is preserved by the δ-equality of the fuzzy choice functions. Similar remarks can be formulated for the other three indicators. The following example shows that there exist cases when the two notions that express the notion of rationality (G-rationality and M -rationality) can be very far away from one another. Example 9.25. Let X = {x, y} and the fuzzy subsets of X defined by A = χ{x} + 0χ{y} ; B = 0χ{x} + χ{y} .
9.2 Rationality Indicators
209
If B = {A, B} then we obtain a fuzzy choice space (X, B). Consider the fuzzy choice function C on (X, B) defined by C(A) = aχ{x} + 0χ{y} ; C(B) = 0χ{x} + bχ{y} where 0 < a, b ≤ 1. An arbitrary fuzzy preference relation on X has the form Q(x, x) = a , Q(y, y) = b , Q(x, y) = d , Q(y, x) = c where 0 ≤ a , b , c , d ≤ 1. By an easy computation we obtain G(A, Q)(x) = a ; G(A, Q)(y) = G(B, Q)(x) = 0 ; G(B, Q)(y) = b hence G(A, Q) = a χ{x} + 0χ{y} and G(B, Q) = 0χ{x} + b χ{y} . Applying the definition we get E(C, G(., Q)) = [C(A)(x) ↔ G(A, Q)(x)] ∧ [C(A)(y) ↔ G(A, Q)(y)] ∧ [C(B)(x) ↔ G(B, Q)(x)] ∧ [C(B)(y) ↔ G(B, Q)(y)] = (a ↔ a ) ∧ (b ↔ b ). Thus RatG (C) =
{(a ↔ a ) ∧ (b ↔ b )|a , b ∈ [0, 1]} = 1.
The fuzzy choice function M (., Q) has the form: M (A, Q)(x) = M (B, Q)(y) = 1 M (A, Q)(y) = M (B, Q)(x) = 0. By calculus we get E(C, M (., Q)) = a ∧ b .Since this equality holds for any Q it follows that RatM (C) = a ∧ b. In conclusion, RatG (C) = 1 and RatM (C) = a ∧ b. While C is G–rational for any a and b, the indicator of M –rationality RatM (C) varies with a and b. The more a and b are less, the more the M – rationality of C is less. The previous example illustrates that there exist cases when the G–rationality and the M –rationality of a fuzzy choice function can differ very much. The goal of the following example is to illustrate the way a set of fuzzy choice functions can be ranked with the help of the indicator of G–rationality. Example 9.26. Consider the set of alternatives X = {x, y} and two fuzzy subsets A and B of X given by A = 12 χ{x} + χ{y} , B = χ{x} + 12 χ{y} . If we
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take A and B available sets we obtain the choice space (X, B). Suppose we have a decision making problem for which there are proposed as models 10 fuzzy choice problems (e. g. as a result of 10 independent expertises). The 10 fuzzy choice problems are specified by the corresponding choice functions: C1 (A) = 13 χ{x} + χ{y} ; C1 (B) = χ{x} + 15 χ{y} C2 (A) = 14 χ{x} + χ{y} ; C2 (B) = χ{x} + 15 χ{y} C3 (A) = 18 χ{x} + χ{y} ; C3 (B) = χ{x} + 13 χ{y} C4 (A) = 15 χ{x} + χ{y} ; C4 (B) = χ{x} + 14 χ{y} C5 (A) = 13 χ{x} + χ{y} ; C5 (B) = χ{x} + 13 χ{y} C6 (A) = 18 χ{x} + χ{y} ; C6 (B) = χ{x} + 19 χ{y} C7 (A) = 17 χ{x} + χ{y} ; C7 (B) = χ{x} + 18 χ{y} C8 (A) = 18 χ{x} + χ{y} ; C8 (B) = χ{x} + 14 χ{y} C9 (A) = 16 χ{x} + χ{y} ; C9 (B) = χ{x} + 13 χ{y} C10 (A) = 13 χ{x} + χ{y} ; C10 (B) = χ{x} + 16 χ{y} . According to the calculations of Example 9.11 (I) and Theorem 9.18: RatG (C1 ) = E(C1 , Cˆ1 ) =min( 13 , 15 ) =
1 5
RatG (C2 ) = E(C2 , Cˆ2 ) =min( 14 , 15 ) =
1 5
RatG (C3 ) = E(C3 , Cˆ3 ) =min( 18 , 13 ) =
1 8
RatG (C4 ) = E(C4 , Cˆ4 ) =min( 15 , 14 ) =
1 5
RatG (C5 ) = E(C5 , Cˆ5 ) =min( 13 , 13 ) =
1 3
RatG (C6 ) = E(C6 , Cˆ6 ) =min( 18 , 19 ) =
1 9
RatG (C7 ) = E(C7 , Cˆ7 ) =min( 17 , 18 ) =
1 8
RatG (C8 ) = E(C8 , Cˆ8 ) =min( 18 , 14 ) =
1 8
RatG (C9 ) = E(C9 , Cˆ9 ) =min( 16 , 13 ) =
1 6
RatG (C10 ) = E(C10 , Cˆ10 ) =min( 13 , 16 ) = 16 . With the help of the G–rationality indicator we obtain the following hierarchy of the 10 fuzzy choice functions (see Figure 9.1). It follows that the fuzzy choice problem given by the fuzzy choice function C5 is the best with respect to G–rationality.
9.3 Revealed Preference and Congruence Indicators
211
C5
C1 , C2 , C4
C9 ,C10
C3 , C7 , C 8
C6
Fig. 9.1. Hierarchy of fuzzy choice functions
9.3 Revealed Preference and Congruence Indicators The fuzzy revealed preference and congruence axioms are conditions on the rationality of vague choices. The indicators studied in the previous section represent a way of evaluating the rationality of a vague act of choice. Following
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this reasoning, we need to associate to the axioms of fuzzy revealed preference and congruence some indicators with the purpose of evaluating how much such condition is verified by a fuzzy choice function. The goal of this section is to define and study some indicators of the axioms of revealed preference W AF RP , SAF RP and the axioms of congruence W F CA, SF CA. These indicators express the degree to which the axioms W AF RP , SAF RP , W F CA and SF CA are verified by a fuzzy choice function. The results proved in this section establish connections between these indicators and the G–rationality indicator. Definition 9.27. For a fuzzy choice function C on (X, B) we define the following indicators of the axioms W AF RP , SAF RP , W F CA and SF CA:
(i) W AF RP (C) =
[P˜C (x, y) → ¬RC (y, x)];
x,y∈X
(ii) SAF RP (C) =
[PC∗ (x, y) → ¬RC (y, x)];
x,y∈X
(iii) W F CA(C) =
[S(x) ∗ C(S)(y) ∗ RC (x, y) → C(S)(x)];
x,y∈X S∈B
(iv) SF CA(C) =
[S(x) ∗ C(S)(y) ∗ WC (x, y) → C(S)(x)].
x,y∈X S∈B
Remark 9.28. For a choice function C the following equivalences hold:
W AF RP (C) = 1 iff C verifies W AF RP ; SAF RP (C) = 1 iff C verifies SAF RP ; W F CA(C) = 1 iff C verifies W F CA; SF CA(C) = 1 iff C verifies SF CA. The indicator W AF RP (C) expresses the degree to which the choice function C verifies W AF RP . Similar interpretations can be given to the other three indicators. The following proposition holds for an arbitrary t–norm ∗.
9.3 Revealed Preference and Congruence Indicators
213
Proposition 9.29. If C is a fuzzy choice function on (X, B) then W F CA(C) ≤ T rans(RC ). Proof. Let x, y, z ∈ X. We shall prove the inequality (a) W F CA(C) ∗ RC (x, y) ∗ RC (y, z) ≤ RC (x, z) Let us denote T = [x, y, z]. By (H2) C(T ) is normal hence C(T )(x) = 1 or C(T )(y) = 1 or C(T )(z) = 1. We analyze these three cases. • C(T )(x) = 1 In this case 1 = C(T )(x) ∗ T (z) ≤ RC (x, z), hence RC (x, z) = 1. • C(T )(y) = 1 Thus W F CA(C) ∗ RC (x, y) ∗ RC (y, z) ≤ ≤ RC (x, y) ∗ RC (y, z) ∗ [(T (x) ∗ C(T )(y) ∗ RC (x, y)) → C(T )(x)] = = RC (x, y) ∗ RC (y, z) ∗ [RC (x, y) → C(T )(x)] ≤ ≤ RC (x, y) ∗ [RC (x, y) → C(T )(x)] = RC (x, y) ∗ C(T )(x) ≤ ≤ C(T )(x) = C(T )(x) ∗ T (z) ≤ RC (x, z). • C(T )(z) = 1 Thus W F CA(C) ∗ RC (x, y) ∗ RC (y, z) ≤ RC (x, y)∗RC (y, z)∗[(T (y)∗C(T )(z)∗RC (y, z)) → C(T )(y)]∗W F CA(C) = RC (x, y) ∗ RC (y, z) ∗ [RC (y, z) → C(T )(y)] ∗ W F CA(C) = RC (x, y) ∗ RC (y, z) ∗ C(T )(y) ∗ W F CA(C) ≤ RC (x, y) ∗ C(T )(y) ∗ [(T (x) ∗ C(T )(y) ∗ RC (x, y)) → C(T )(x)] = = RC (x, y) ∗ C(T )(y) ∗ [(RC (x, y) ∗ C(T )(y)) → C(T )(x)] = RC (x, y) ∗ C(T )(y) ∗ C(T )(x) ≤ C(T )(x) = C(T )(x) ∗ T (z) ≤ RC (x, z). Therefore the inequality (a) is verified for all the three cases. From (a) it follows immediately that W F CA(C) ≤ (RC (x, y) ∗ RC (y, z)) → RC (x, z) for any x, y, z ∈ X, therefore W F CA(C) ≤
[(RC (x, y) ∗ RC (y, z)) → RC (x, z)] = T rans(RC ).
x,y,z∈X
The following two results hold for the G¨ odel t–norm ∧.
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ˆ ∧ T rans Proposition 9.30. If C is a fuzzy choice function then E(C, C) (RC ) ≤ W F CA(C). Proof. Let S ∈ B and x, y ∈ X. We shall prove that ˆ ∧ T rans(RC ) ∧ RC (x, y) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ S(x) ≤ C(S)(x). (a) E(C, C) Let z ∈ X. Knowing that C(S)(y) ∧ S(z) ≤ RC (y, z) and applying Proposition 4.29: ˆ ∧ T rans(RC ) ∧ RC (x, y) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ S(x) ∧ S(z) ≤ E(C, C) ˆ ∧ T rans(RC ) ∧ RC (x, y) ∧ RC (y, z) ∧ S(x) ≤ RC (x, z) E(C, C) From this one gets: ˆ ∧ T rans(RC ) ∧ RC (x, y) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ S(x) ≤ S(z) → RC (x, z) E(C, C) for each z ∈ X, therefore ˆ E(C, C)∧T rans(RC )∧RC (x, y)∧C(S)(y)∧S(x) ≤
[S(z) → RC (x, z)].
z∈X
We deduce that ˆ ∧ T rans(RC ) ∧ RC (x, y) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ S(x) ≤ S(x) ∧ E(C, C)
[S(z) →
z∈X
ˆ RC (x, z)] = C(S)(x). By applying Lemma 9.7 (i) we obtain ˆ ∧ T rans(RC ) ∧ RC (x, y) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ S(x) ≤ E(C, C) ˆ ∧ C(S)(x) ˆ E(C, C) ≤ C(S)(x) and (a) is proved. According to (a), for any S ∈ B and x, y ∈ X we have ˆ ∧ T rans(RC ) ≤ (S(x) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ RC (x, y)) → C(S)(x) E(C, C) from where ˆ ∧ T rans(RC ) ≤ E(C, C)
[(S(x) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ RC (x, y)) →
x,y∈X S∈B
C(S)(x)] = W F CA(C) The following theorem is the first main result of this section. Theorem 9.31. If C is a fuzzy choice function on (X, B) then ˆ ∧ T rans(RC ) = W F CA(C) = SF CA(C) = E(C, C) ˆ ∧ T rans(R ¯ C ). = E(C, C)
9.3 Revealed Preference and Congruence Indicators
215
ˆ ≤ E(RC , R ¯ C ), hence, by PropoProof. According to Theorem 9.10, E(C, C) sition 4.29: ˆ ∧ T rans(RC ) ≤ E(RC , R ¯ C ) ∧ T rans(RC ) ≤ T rans(R ¯ C ); E(C, C) ˆ ∧ T rans(R ¯ C ) ≤ E(RC , R ¯ C ) ∧ T rans(R ¯ C ) ≤ T rans(RC ); E(C, C) From these two inequalities it follows immediately ˆ ∧ T rans(RC ) = E(C, C) ˆ ∧ T rans(R ¯ C ). E(C, C) Let S ∈ B and x, y ∈ X. Since RC (x, y) ≤ WC (x, y) we have (S(x) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ WC (x, y)) → C(S)(x) ≤ (S(x) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ RC (x, y)) → C(S)(x). From this, SF CA(C) ≤ W F CA(C). For the converse inequality W F CA(C) ≤ SF CA(C) we have to show that for any S ∈ B and x, y ∈ X (a) W F CA(C) ≤ (S(x) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ WC (x, y)) → C(S)(x). Inequality (a) is equivalent with (b) W F CA(C) ∧ S(x) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ WC (x, y) ≤ C(S)(x). According to Proposition 9.29, W F CA(C) ≤ T rans(RC ) and according to Lemma 4.30, T rans(RC ) ∧ WC (x, y) ≤ RC (x, y). Then W F CA(C) ∧ S(x) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ WC (x, y) ≤ T rans(RC ) ∧ S(x) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ WC (x, y) ≤ ≤ S(x) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ RC (x, y) from where one obtains W F CA(C) ∧ S(x) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ WC (x, y) ≤ S(x) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ RC (x, y) ∧ W F CA(C) ≤ ≤ S(x) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ RC (x, y) ∧ [(S(x) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ RC (x, y)) → C(S)(x)] = = S(x) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ RC (x, y) ∧ C(S)(x) ≤ C(S)(x). With this (b) is proved, therefore W F CA(C) ≤ SF CA(C). It follows W F CA(C) = SF CA(C). Let S ∈ B and x ∈ X. Since C(S) is a normal fuzzy subset of X there exists z ∈ X such that C(S)(z) = 1, therefore S(z) = 1. Then
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ˆ C(S)(x) = S(x) ∧
[S(u) → RC (x, u)] ≤ S(x) ∧ [S(z) → RC (x, z)] =
u∈X
= S(x) ∧ [1 → RC (x, z)] = S(x) ∧ RC (x, z). From this it follows ˆ W F CA(C) ∧ C(S)(x) ≤ W F CA(C) ∧ S(x) ∧ RC (x, z) = S(x) ∧ C(S)(z) ∧ RC (x, z) ∧ [(T (u) ∧ C(T )(v) ∧ RC (u, v)) → u,v∈X T ∈B
C(T )(u)] ≤
≤ S(x) ∧ C(S)(z) ∧ RC (x, z) ∧ [(S(x) ∧ C(S)(z) ∧ RC (x, z)) → C(S)(x)] = = S(x) ∧ C(S)(z) ∧ RC (x, z) ∧ C(S)(x) ≤ C(S)(x). ˆ ˆ One obtains W F CA(C) ≤ C(S)(x) → C(S)(x). Since C(S)(x) ≤ C(S)(x), ˆ then C(S)(x) → C(S)(x) = 1 therefore ˆ ˆ W F CA(C) ≤ [C(S)(x) ↔ C(S)(x)] = E(C, C). S∈B x,y∈X
ˆ ∧ T rans(RC ). By Proposition 9.29, it follows that W F CA(C) ≤ E(C, C) ˆ ∧ T rans(RC ) ≤ W F CA(C) is ensured The converse inequality E(C, C) ˆ ∧ T rans(RC ). With this by Proposition 9.30, therefore W F CA(C) = E(C, C) the theorem is proved. The previous theorem establishes a tight connection between the indicators of weak and strong fuzzy congruence axioms, the indicator of G–normality and ¯ C . The comthe degree of transitivity of the revealed preferences RC and R mon value between W F CA(C) and SF CA(C) equals the minimum between ¯ C ), therefore W F CA(C) and SF CA(C) express how N ormG (C) and T rans(R transitive G–rational the choice function C is. The indicators W F CA(C) and ¯C SF CA(C) are a refined manner of computing the rationality of C. Since R has a much simpler form than RC , from the computational point of view, the last expression is preferred for obtaining these two indicators. The following results are true for the case when ∗ is the Lukasiewicz t– norm and in the presence of hypotheses H1 and H2.
9.3 Revealed Preference and Congruence Indicators
217
Lemma 9.32. Let x, y ∈ X, Q1 and Q2 be two fuzzy preference relations on ˜ ∗ R(x, y) ≤ X. Then E(Q1 , Q2 ) ∗ Q1 (x, y) ≤ Q2 (x, y). In particular, E(R, R) ˜ y). R(x, Proposition 9.33. Let C : B → F(X) be a fuzzy choice function on the fuzzy ˜ ≤ W F CA(C). choice space (X, B). Then E(R, R) Proof. Let C : B → F(X) be a fuzzy choice function. We intend to prove that ˜ ≤ R(x, y) ∗ C(S)(y) ∗ S(x) → C(S)(x). E(R, R) ˜ ∗ R(x, y) ∗ C(S)(y) ∗ By Lemma 4.3 (1), this is equivalent with E(R, R) S(x) ≤ C(S)(x). By Lemma 9.32, ˜ ∗ R(x, y) ∗ C(S)(y) ∗ S(x) ≤ R(x, ˜ y) ∗ C(S)(y) ∗ S(x). E(R, R) ˜ y) = ¬P˜ (y, x) and C(S)(x) = ¬¬C(S)(x), we intend to prove Since R(x, ˜ y) ∗ C(S)(y) ∗ S(x) = ¬P˜ (y, x) ∗ C(S)(y) ∗ S(x) ≤ ¬¬C(S)(x). R(x, By Lemma 4.3 (1), this is equivalent with ¬P˜ (y, x) ∗ C(S)(y) ∗ S(x) ∗ ¬C(S)(x) = 0. By Lemma 4.3 (1) and Lemma 4.6 (9) this is equivalent with C(S)(y) ∗ S(x) ∗ ¬C(S)(x) ≤ P˜ (y, x). If we explicate P˜ (y, x) we get C(S)(y) ∗ S(x) ∗ ¬C(S)(x) ≤
[C(T )(y) ∗ ¬C(T )(x) ∗ T (x)],
T ∈B
which is true.
Proposition 9.34. Let C : B → F(X) be a fuzzy choice function on the fuzzy ˜ choice space (X, B). Then W F CA(C) ≤ E(R, R). Proof. Let C : B → F(X) be a fuzzy choice function. ˜ = ˜ y)], we have to prove the folSince E(R, R) [R(x, y) ↔ R(x, S∈B x,y∈S
˜ y) for each S ∈ B lowing two inequalities: (a) W F CA(C) ≤ R(x, y) → R(x, ˜ y) → R(x, y) for each S ∈ B and and x, y ∈ S and (b) W F CA(C) ≤ R(x, x, y ∈ S.
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9 Similarity and Rationality Indicators for Fuzzy Choice Functions
By Lemma 4.3 (1), this gets down to proving the following two inequalities: ˜ y) and (b’) W F CA(C) ∗ R(x, ˜ y) ≤ R(x, y). (a’) W F CA(C) ∗ R(x, y) ≤ R(x, We prove first (a’). Since R(x, y) = ¬P (y, x) and by Lemma 4.3 (1), (a’) is equivalent with W F CA(C) ∗ R(x, y) ∗ P˜ (y, x) = 0. We explicate the left–hand side of the above inequality. W F CA(C) ∗ R(x, y) ∗ P˜ (y, x) = W F CA(C) ∗ R(x, y) ∗ (C(S)(y) ∗ ¬C(S)(x) ∗ S(x)) = W F CA(C) ∗
S∈B
[R(x, y) ∗ C(S)(y) ∗ ¬C(S)(x) ∗ S(x)] =
S∈B
[W F CA(C) ∗ R(x, y) ∗ C(S)(y) ∗ ¬C(S)(x) ∗ S(x)].
S∈B
We consider an arbitrary member of this union. By Lemma 4.3 (2), (3): W F CA(C) ∗ R(x, y) ∗ C(S)(y) ∗ ¬C(S)(x) ∗ S(x) = [R(s, t) ∗ C(T )(t) ∗ T (s) → C(T )(s)]∗ T ∈B s,t∈T
∗R(x, y) ∗ C(S)(y) ∗ ¬C(S)(x) ∗ S(x) ≤ [R(x, y)∗C(S)(y)∗S(x) → C(S)(x)]∗R(x, y)∗C(S)(y)∗S(x)∗¬C(S)(x) ≤
R(x, y) ∗ C(S)(y) ∗ S(x) ∗ C(S)(x) ∗ ¬C(S)(x) = 0. Therefore W F CA(C)∗R(x, y)∗ P˜ (y, x) = 0. Now we prove (b’). By Proposition 6.5 and Lemma 4.3 (3) ˜ y) ≤ W F CA(C) ∗ R(x, y) ≤ R(x, y). W F CA(C) ∗ R(x, Theorem 9.35. Let C : B → F(X) be a fuzzy choice function. Then ˜ W F CA(C) = E(R, R). Proof. By Propositions 9.33 and 9.34. Theorem 9.36. Let C be a fuzzy choice function on (X, B). Then the following properties hold: (i) W F CA(C)2 ≤ SF CA(C) ≤ W F CA(C); ˜ (ii) W F CA(C) = W AF RP (C) = E(R, R); (iii) W AF RP (C)5 ≤ SAF RP (C) ≤ W AF RP (C).
9.3 Revealed Preference and Congruence Indicators
219
Proof. (i) The inequality SF CA(C) ≤ W F CA(C) is obvious. We prove now the inequality W F CA(C)2 ≤ SF CA(C). This is equivalent with proving that W F CA(C)2 ∗ W (x, y) ∗ C(S)(y) ∗ S(x) ≤ C(S)(x). First we shall prove that W F CA(C) ≤ E(R, W ). Since R(x, y) ≤ W (x, y), E(R, W ) = [R(x, y) ↔ W (x, y)] = [W (x, y) → R(x, y)]. x,y∈X
x,y∈X
By Proposition 4.30 and Proposition 9.29 we obtain that W F CA(C) ≤ T rans(R)(x, y) ≤ W (x, y) → R(x, y), that implies that W F CA(C) ≤ E(R, W ). By Proposition 9.32, Lemma 4.3 (2) and the definition of W F CA(C), W F CA(C)2 ∗ W (x, y) ∗ C(S)(y) ∗ S(x) ≤ W F CA(C) ∗ E(R, W ) ∗ W (x, y) ∗ C(S)(y) ∗ S(x) ≤ W F CA(C) ∗ R(x, y) ∗ C(S)(y) ∗ S(x) ≤ [R(x, y) ∗ C(S)(y) ∗ S(x) → C(S)(x)] ∗ R(x, y) ∗ C(S)(y) ∗ S(x) ≤ C(S)(x). (ii) It suffices to prove W F CA(C) = W AF RP (C). First we prove the inequality W F CA(C) ≤ W AF RP (C); this means to prove that W F CA(C) ≤ P˜ (x, y) → ¬R(y, x) ⇔ W F CA(C) ∗ P˜ (x, y) ∗ R(y, x) = 0. Suppose by absurdum there exist x, y ∈ X such that W F CA(C)∗ P˜ (x, y)∗ R(y, x) > 0. Then [P˜ (x, y) → ¬R(y, x)] ∗ R(y, x) ∗ C(S0 )(x) ∗ S0 (y) ∗ ¬C(S0 )(y) = [ (C(S)(x) ∗ S(y) ∗ ¬C(S)(y)) → ¬R(y, x)] ∗ R(y, x) ∗ C(S0 )(x) ∗ S0 (y) ∗ S∈B
¬C(S0 )(y) = C(S0 )(x) ∗ S0 (y) ∗ C(S0 )(y) ∗ ¬R(y, x) ∗ R(y, x) = 0. We have obtained W AF RP (C)∗R(y, x)∗C(S0 )(x)∗S0 (y)∗¬C(S0 )(y) = 0, which is a contradiction. (iii) The inequality SAF RP (C) ≤ W AF RP (C) is obvious. We prove now W AF RP (C)5 ≤ SAF RP (C). By (ii) and Proposition 9.29 we obtain ˜ 3 ≤ T rans(R). ˜ W AF RP (C)4 ≤ T rans(R) ∗ E(R, R) ˜ ∗ T (R)(x, ˜ ˜ y). We obtain by comBy Proposition 4.30, T rans(R) y) ≤ R(x, putation ˜ ˜ ∗ T (R)(x, ˜ ˜ y) ⇒ W AF RP (C)4 ∗ T (R)(x, y) ≤ T rans(R) y) ≤ R(x, ˜ ˜ W AF RP (C)5 ∗ T (R)(x, y) = W AF RP (C) ∗ W AF RP (C)4 ∗ T (R)(x, y) ≤
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9 Similarity and Rationality Indicators for Fuzzy Choice Functions
˜ ∗ T (R)(x, ˜ ˜ y) ≤ ≤ W AF RP (C) ∗ T rans(R) y) ≤ W AF RP (C) ∗ R(x, ¬R(y, x), by the definition of W AF RP (C). Finally, we have obtained ˜ W AF RP (C)5 ∗ T (R)(x, y) ≤ ¬R(y, x), consequently W AF RP (C)5 ≤ ˜ T (R)(x, y) → ¬R(y, x). Theorem 9.36 proved for the Lukasiewicz t–norm establishes some connections between the indicators of revealed preference and the indicators of congruence. In particular, Theorem 9.36 (ii) offers a way of computing the indicators W F CA(C) and SF CA(C).
9.4 The Arrow Index of a Fuzzy Choice Function In this section we shall introduce the Arrow index A(C) of a fuzzy choice function C. A(C) measures the degree to which C verifies F AA. We prove an extensionability property of the Arrow index with respect to the similarity relation of two fuzzy choice functions. Definition 9.37. Let C be a fuzzy choice function on (X, B). The Arrow index A(C) of C is defined by A(C) = [(I(S1 , S2 )∧S1 (x)∧C(S2 )(x)) → E(S1 ∩C(S2 ), C(S1 )]. S1 ,S2 ∈B x∈X
We remark that A(C) = 1 iff C verifies the Fuzzy Arrow Axiom. Intuitively, the real number A(C) represents the degree of truth of the statement “The fuzzy choice function C verifies Fuzzy Arrow Axiom”. According to Theorem 6.38, the Fuzzy Arrow Axiom characterizes the full rationality of a fuzzy choice function C and the congruence axioms W F CA and SF CA as well. Then the Arrow index A(C) can be considered a measure of the full rationality of C. The following theorem shows how the similarity relation E(., .) behaves with respect to the Arrow index.
9.4 The Arrow Index of a Fuzzy Choice Function
221
Theorem 9.38. If C, C are two fuzzy choice functions on (X, B) then A(C)∧ E(C, C ) ≤ A(C ). Proof. Let S1 , S2 ∈ B and x ∈ X. We shall prove that
A(C) ∧ E(C, C ) ∧ I(S1 , S2 ) ∧ S1 (x) ∧ C (S2 )(x) ≤ ≤ E(S1 ∩ C (S2 ), C (S1 ))
(9.1)
It suffices to prove that for any y ∈ X the following two inequalities hold
A(C) ∧ E(C, C ) ∧ I(S1 , S2 ) ∧ S1 (x) ∧ C (S2 )(x) ≤ ≤ (S1 (y) ∧ C (S2 )(y)) → C (S1 )(y)
(9.2)
and
A(C) ∧ E(C, C ) ∧ I(S1 , S2 ) ∧ S1 (x) ∧ C (S2 )(x) ≤ ≤ C (S1 )(y) → (S1 (y) ∧ C (S2 )(y))
(9.3)
By Lemma 4.3 (1), the inequality (9.2) is equivalent to
A(C) ∧ E(C, C ) ∧ I(S1 , S2 ) ∧ S1 (x) ∧ C (S2 )(x) ∧ S1 (y) ∧ C (S2 )(y) ≤ ≤ C (S1 )(y)(9.4) According to Lemma 4.5 (1) C (S1 )(y) → (S1 (y) ∧ C (S2 )(y)) = (C (S1 )(y) → S1 (y)) ∧ (C (S1 )(y) → C (S2 )(y)) = C (S1 )(y) → C (S2 )(y) hence the inequality (9.3) is equivalent to
A(C) ∧ E(C, C ) ∧ I(S1 , S2 ) ∧ S1 (x) ∧ C (S2 )(x) ∧ C (S1 )(y) ≤ ≤ C (S2 )(y)
(9.5)
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9 Similarity and Rationality Indicators for Fuzzy Choice Functions
From the definition of A(C) we infer that
A(C) ≤ ≤ (I(S1 , S2 ) ∧ S1 (x) ∧ C(S2 )(x)) → E(S1 ∩ C(S2 ), C(S1 ))
(9.6)
Applying (9.6) and Lemma 9.7 and Lemma 3.12 (vii) de extensionabilitate we get A(C) ∧ E(C, C ) ∧ I(S1 , S2 ) ∧ S1 (x) ∧ C (S2 )(x) ∧ S1 (y) ∧ C (S2 )(y) ≤ ≤ A(C) ∧ S1 (x) ∧ C(S2 )(x) ∧ I(S1 , S2 ) ∧ S1 (y) ∧ C (S2 )(y) ∧ E(C, C ) ≤ ≤ I(S1 , S2 ) ∧ S1 (x) ∧ C(S2 )(x) ∧ [(I(S1 , S2 ) ∧ S1 (x) ∧ C(S2 )(x)) → E(S1 ∩ C(S2 ), C(S1 )] ∧ S1 (y) ∧ C (S2 )(y) ∧ E(C, C ) = = I(S1 , S2 )∧S1 (x)∧C(S2 )(x)∧E(S1 ∩C(S2 ), C(S1 ))∧S1 (y)∧C (S2 )(y)∧ E(C, C ) ≤ ≤ S1 (y) ∧ C(S2 )(y) ∧ E(S1 ∩ C(S2 ), C(S1 )) ∧ E(C, C ) ≤ C(S1 )(y) ∧ E(C, C ) ≤ C (S1 )(y). Then (9.4) has been proved. Applying again (9.6) and Lemma 9.7 and Lemma 3.12 (vii) we obtain A(C) ∧ E(C, C ) ∧ I(S1 , S2 ) ∧ S1 (x) ∧ C (S2 )(x) ∧ C (S1 )(y) ≤ I(S1 , S2 ) ∧ S1 (x) ∧ C(S2 )(x) ∧ [(I(S1 , S2 ) ∧ S1 (x) ∧ C(S2 )(x)) → E(S1 ∩ C(S2 ), C(S1 )] ∧ E(C, C ) ∧ C (S1 )(y) = = I(S1 , S2 ) ∧ S1 (x) ∧ C(S2 )(x) ∧ E(S1 ∩ C(S2 ), C(S1 )) ∧ E(C, C ) ∧ C (S1 )(y) ≤ ≤ C(S1 )(y) ∧ E(S1 ∩ C(S2 ), C(S1 )) ∧ E(C, C ) ≤ S1 (y) ∧ C(S2 )(y) ∧ E(C, C ) ≤ C(S2 )(y) ∧ E(C, C ) ≤ C (S2 )(y). Hence (9.5) was proved. Thus (9.2) and (9.3) follow, hence (9.1) holds for all S1 , S2 ∈ B and x ∈ X. By Lemma 4.3 (1) we get A(C)∧E(C, C ) ≤ (I(S1 , S2 )∧S1 (x)∧C (S2 )(x)) → E(S1 ∩C (S2 ), C (S1 )) for all S1 , S2 ∈ B and x ∈ X. Therefore
9.5 Consistency Indicators
A(C) ∧ E(C, C ) ≤
223
[(I(S1 , S2 ) ∧ S1 (x) ∧ C (S2 )(x)) → E(S1 ∩
S1 ,S2 ∈B x∈X
C (S2 ), C (S1 )]
i.e. A(C) ∧ E(C, C ) ≤ A(C ). The proof is finished.
9.5 Consistency Indicators In Chapter 6 the consistency properties F α and F β , fuzzy versions of Sen’s consistency conditions α and β have been studied. This section concerns the consistency indicators F α(C) and F β(C) associated with a fuzzy choice function C. F α(C) represents the degree in which C verifies the consistency condition F α and F β(C) the degree in which C verifies F β. A representative result of Chapter 6 shows that a fuzzy choice function C verifies the congruence axiom W F CA if and only if it verifies F α and F β. In this section we will prove the equality W F CA(C) = F α(C) ∧ F β(C), that is a strong refinement of the mentioned theorem. In order to prove it some preliminary propositions with intrinsic interest are needed. We fix a continuous t–norm ∗ and a fuzzy choice function C defined on a fuzzy choice space (X, B). Definition 9.39. The consistency indicators F α(C) and F β(C) are defined by
F α(C) =
[I(S, T ) ∗ S(x) ∗ C(T )(x) → C(S)(x)]
S,T ∈B x∈X
F β(C) =
[I(S, T ) ∗ C(S)(x) ∗ C(T )(y) → (C(S)(x) ↔ C(T )(y))]
S,T ∈B x∈X
Lemma 9.40. The following assertions hold:
(1) F α(C) = 1 iff C verifies F α; (2) F β(C) = 1 iff C verifies F β.
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9 Similarity and Rationality Indicators for Fuzzy Choice Functions
The real number F α(C) (resp. F β(C)) is called the F α–consistency indicator (resp. the F β–consistency indicator) of C. F α(C) expresses the degree to which C verifies the condition F α and F β(C) the degree to which C verifies F β. The results of this section are proved under the hypotheses H1 and H2 and by assuming that ∗ is the G¨ odel t–norm. Proposition 9.41. If C is a fuzzy choice function on (X, B) then F α(C) ≤ ¯ C ). E(RC , R ¯C ) = ¯ C ⊆ RC is always true, E(RC , R Proof. Since the inclusion R ¯ C (x, y)) = y) ↔ R
(RC (x,
x,y∈X
¯ C (x, y)). (RC (x, y) → R
x,y∈X
¯ C (x, y). Let S ∈ B. By Lemma 4.3 We prove that F α(C) ≤ RC (x, y) → R (2) F α(C) ∧ I([x, y], S) ∧ [x, y](x) ∧ C(S)(x) = = [((I(S, T ) ∧ S(u) ∧ C(T )(u)) → C(S)(u)] ∧ I([x, y], S) ∧ S,T ∈B u∈X
[x, y](x) ∧ C(S)(x) ≤ ≤ ((I([x, y], S)∧[x, y](x)∧C(S)(x)) → C([x, y])(x))∧I([x, y], S)∧[x, y](x)∧ C(S)(x) = I([x, y], S) ∧ [x, y](x) ∧ C(S)(x) ∧ C([x, y])(x) ≤ C([x, y])(x). We remark that I([x, y], S) = ([x, y](u) → S(u)) = u∈X
= ([x, y](x) → S(x)) ∧ ([x, y](y) → S(y)) = = (1 → S(x)) ∧ (1 → S(y)) = S(x) ∧ S(y).
Then the above inequality becomes: F α(C) ∧ I([x, y], S) ∧ [x, y](x) ∧ C(S)(x) = = F α(C) ∧ S(x) ∧ S(y) ∧ C(S)(x) = = F α(C) ∧ C(S)(x) ∧ S(y) ≤ C([x, y])(x). since C(S)(x) ≤ S(x). We have obtained F α(C) ∧ C(S)(x) ∧ S(y) ≤ C([x, y])(x) for each S ∈ B
9.5 Consistency Indicators
F α(C) ∧ RC (x, y) = F α(C) ∧
(C(S)(x) ∧ S(y)) =
S∈B
¯ C (x, y). C(S)(x) ∧ S(y)) ≤ C([x, y])(x) = R
225
(F α(C) ∧
S∈B
¯ C (x, y) and by Lemma 4.3 (1), Finally, F α(C) ∧ RC (x, y) ≤ R ¯ C (x, y). F α(C) ≤ RC (x, y) → R Proposition 9.42. If C is a fuzzy choice function on the fuzzy choice space ˆ (X, B) then W F CA(C) ≤ E(C, C). Proof. Let S ∈ B and x ∈ X. ˆ It suffices to prove that W F CA(C) ≤ C(S)(x) → C(S)(x). By Lemma 4.3 (1), this is equivalent to ˆ W F CA(C) ∧ C(S)(x) ≤ C(S)(x). By hypothesis H1, C(S) is a normal fuzzy subset of X, therefore there exists v ∈ X such that C(S)(v) = 1 and S(v) = 1. ˆ By applying the definitions of W F CA(C) and C(S) and Lemma 4.3 (2), (6), (11) we obtain ˆ W F CA(C) ∧ C(S)(x) = = [(RC (s, t) ∧ C(T )(t) ∧ T (s)) → C(T )(s)] ∧ S(x) ∧ (S(u) → T ∈B s,t∈X
RC (x, u)) ≤
u∈X
≤ [(RC (x, v) ∧ C(S)(v) ∧ S(x)) → C(S)(x)] ∧ S(x) ∧ [S(v) → RC (x, v)] = = [(RC (x, v) ∧ S(x)) → C(S)(x)] ∧ S(x) ∧ RC (x, v) = = S(x) ∧ [S(x) ∧ (RC (x, v) → C(S)(x))] ∧ RC (x, v) = = S(x) ∧ [RC (x, v) → C(S)(x)] ∧ RC (x, v) = = S(x) ∧ RC (x, v) ∧ C(S)(x) ≤ C(S)(x).
Proposition 9.43. If C is a fuzzy choice function on the fuzzy choice space ˆ ≤ F α(C). (X, B), then E(C, C) Proof. By applying the definition of F α(C), we have to prove
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9 Similarity and Rationality Indicators for Fuzzy Choice Functions
ˆ ≤ E(C, C)
[(I(S, T ) ∧ S(x) ∧ C(T )(x)) → C(S)(x)].
S,T ∈B x∈X
It suffices to prove that for any S, T ∈ B and x ∈ X, ˆ ∧ I(S, T ) ∧ S(x) ∧ C(T )(x) ≤ C(S)(x). E(C, C) ˆ = ˆ E(C, C) ρ(C(S)(x), C(S)(x)) =
S∈B x∈X
ˆ (C(S)(x) → C(S)(x)) since
S∈B x∈X
ˆ ˆ ρ(C(S)(x), C(S)(x)) = C(S)(x) → C(S)(x). By applying Lemma 4.3 (12) and Lemma 4.5 (7) we get ˆ )(x) = I(S, T )∧S(x)∧ C(T (S(u) → T (u))∧S(x)∧T (x)∧ (T (u) → RC (x, u)) ≤ ≤ S(x) ∧
u∈X
u∈X
[(S(u) → T (u)) ∧ (T (u) → RC (x, u))] ≤
u∈X
≤ S(x) ∧
ˆ (S(u) → RC (x, u)) ≤ C(S)(x)
u∈X
ˆ )(x) ≤ C(S)(x). ˆ We have proved that I(S, T ) ∧ S(x) ∧ C(T By applying Lemma 4.3 (2) we compute ˆ ˆ ˆ )(x) ≤ E(C, C)∧I(S, T )∧S(x)∧C(T )(x) ≤ E(C, C)∧I(S, T )∧S(x)∧ C(T ˆ ∧ I(S, T ) ∧ S(x) ∧ C(T ˆ )(x) ≤ E(C, C) ˆ ∧ C(S)(x) ˆ ≤ E(C, C) = ˆ )(y) → C(S )(y)] ∧ C(S)(x) ˆ = [C(S ≤ S ∈B y∈X
ˆ ˆ ≤ [C(S)(x) → C(S)(x)] ∧ C(S)(x) = ˆ = C(S)(x) ∧ C(S)(x) = C(S)(x).
Proposition 9.44. If C is a fuzzy choice function on the fuzzy choice space (X, B), then W F CA(C) ≤ F α(C). Proof. By Propositions 9.42 and 8.43. Proposition 9.45. If C is a fuzzy choice function on the fuzzy choice space (X, B) then W F CA(C) ≤ F α(C) ∧ F β(C).
9.5 Consistency Indicators
227
Proof. We have proved in Proposition 9.44 that W F CA(C) ≤ F α(C). We still have to prove that W F CA(C) ≤ F β(C). Suppose by absurdum W F CA(C) ≤ F β(C). Then there exist S, T ∈ B, x, y ∈ X, such that W F CA(C) ≤ (I(S, T ) ∧ C(S)(x) ∧ C(S)(y)) → [C(T )(y) ↔ C(T )(x)], i.e. W F CA(C) ∧ I(S, T ) ∧ C(S)(x) ∧ C(S)(y) ≤ C(T )(x) ↔ C(T )(y) = [C(T )(x) → C(T )(y)] ∧ [C(T )(x) → C(T )(y)]. Therefore W F CA(C) ∧ I(S, T ) ∧ C(S)(x) ∧ C(S)(y) ≤ C(T )(x) → C(T )(y) or W F CA(C) ∧ I(S, T ) ∧ C(S)(x) ∧ C(S)(y) ≤ C(T )(y) → C(T )(x). Suppose W F CA(C) ∧ I(S, T ) ∧ C(S)(x) ∧ C(S)(y) ≤ C(T )(x) → C(T )(y). It follows (a) W F CA(C) ∧ I(S, T ) ∧ C(S)(x) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ C(T )(x) ≤ C(T )(y). One remarks W F CA(C) ∧ I(S, T ) ∧ C(S)(x) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ C(T )(x) ≤ ≤ W F CA(C) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ S(x) ∧ C(T )(x) ≤ C(S)(y) ∧ S(x) ∧ C(T )(x) ∧ S(y) because C(S)(y) ∧ S(y) = C(S)(y). Since C(S)(y) ∧ S(x) ≤ RC (y, x) one obtains (b) W F CA(C) ∧ I(S, T ) ∧ C(S)(x) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ C(T )(x) ≤ W F CA(C) ∧ RC (y, x) ∧ C(T )(x) ∧ S(y). By (a) and (b) one infers (c) W F CA(C) ∧ RC (y, x) ∧ C(T )(x) ∧ S(y) ≤ C(T )(y). By applying Lemma 4.3 (2) we obtain: W F CA(C) ∧ [RC (y, x) ∧ C(T )(x) ∧ S(y)] = = [RC (x, y)∧C(S)(y)∧S(x) → C(S)(x)]∧(RC (y, x)∧C(T )(x)∧ x,y∈X S∈B
S(y)) ≤
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9 Similarity and Rationality Indicators for Fuzzy Choice Functions
[RC (y, x) ∧ C(T )(x) ∧ S(y) → C(T )(y)] ∧ (RC (y, x) ∧ C(T )(x) ∧ S(y)) = RC (y, x) ∧ C(T )(x) ∧ S(y) ∧ C(T )(y) ≤ C(T )(y). We obtain W F CA(C) ∧ RC (y, x) ∧ C(T )(x) ∧ S(y) ≤ C(T )(y) that contradicts (c). Proposition 9.46. If C is a fuzzy choice function on the fuzzy choice space (X, B) then F α(C) ∧ F β(C) ≤ W F CA(C). Proof. Let S ∈ B and x, y ∈ X. F α(C) ∧ I([x, y], S) ∧ [x, y](y) ∧ C(S)(y) ≤ (I([x, y], S) ∧ [x, y](y) ∧ C(S)(y)) → C([x, y])(y)) ∧ I([x, y], S) ∧ [x, y](y) ∧ C(S)(y) = I([x, y], S) ∧ [x, y](y) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ C([x, y])(y) ≤ C([x, y])(y). Since I([x, y], S) = S(x) ∧ S(y) we have F α(C) ∧ S(x) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ RC (x, y) = F α(C) ∧ S(x) ∧ S(y) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ RC (x, y) = F α(C) ∧ I([x, y], S) ∧ [x, y](y) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ S(x) ∧ S(y) ∧ RC (x, y) ≤ C([x, y])(y) ∧ S(x) ∧ S(y) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ RC (x, y). Explicating RC (x, y), we obtain (c) F α(C) ∧ S(x) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ RC (x, y) ≤ F α(C) ∧ C([x, y])(y) ∧ S(x) ∧ S(y) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧
(C(H)(x) ∧ H(y)) =
H∈B
(F α(C) ∧ C([x, y])(y) ∧ S(x) ∧ S(y) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ C(H)(x) ∧ H(y)).
H∈B
We prove that (d) F α(C) ∧ C(H)(x) ∧ H(y) ≤ C([x, y])(x). Indeed, according to the definition of F α(C) F α(C) ∧ C(H)(x) ∧ H(x) = F α(C) ∧ C(H)(x) ∧ H(y) ∧ H(x) = F α(C) ∧ I([x, y], S) ∧ [x, y](x) ∧ C(H)(x) ≤ [I([x, y], H) ∧ [x, y](x) ∧ C(H)(x) → C([x, y])(x)] ∧ I([x, y], H) ∧ [x, y](x) ∧ C(H)(x)] =
9.5 Consistency Indicators
229
I([x, y], H) ∧ [x, y](x) ∧ C(H)(x) ∧ C([x, y])(x) ≤ C([x, y])(x).
By applying the definition of F β(C) and (c) F β(C) ∧ F α(C) ∧ S(x) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ RC (x, y) ≤ [F α(C) ∧ F β(C) ∧ C([x, y])(y) ∧ S(x) ∧ S(y) ∧ C(H)(x) ∧ H(y)]. H∈B
Considering one member of this union and applying (d) F α(C) ∧ F β(C) ∧ C([x, y])(y) ∧ S(x) ∧ S(y) ∧ C(H)(x) ∧ H(y) ≤ ≤ F α(C) ∧ F β(C) ∧ C([x, y])(y) ∧ S(x) ∧ S(y) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ C([x, y])(x) = = F α(C) ∧ F β(C) ∧ I([x, y], S) ∧ C([x, y])(x) ∧ C([x, y])(y) ∧ C(S)(y) ≤ [(I([x, y], S) ∧ C([x, y])(x) ∧ C([x, y])(y)) → (C(S)(x) ↔ C(S)(y))] ∧ (I([x, y], S) ∧ C([x, y])(x) ∧ C([x, y])(y) ∧ C(S)(y) ≤ ≤ (C(S)(x) ↔ C(S)(y)) ∧ C(S)(y). Consequently, F β(C) ∧ F α(C) ∧ S(x) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ RC (x, y) ≤ ≤ (C(S)(x) ↔ C(S)(y)) ∧ C(S)(y) ≤ C(S)(x). By Lemma 4.3 (1) F β(C) ∧ F α(C) ≤ (S(x) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ RC (x, y)) → C(S)(x), therefore F β(C) ∧ F α(C) ≤
[(S(x) ∧ C(S)(y) ∧ RC (x, y)) → C(S)(x)] =
S∈B x,y∈X
W F CA(C).
Theorem 9.47. If C is a fuzzy choice function on the fuzzy choice space (X, B) then F α(C) ∧ F β(C) = W F CA(C). Proof. By Propositions 9.45 and 9.46. Remark 9.48. From Theorem 9.47 it follows that a fuzzy choice function C verifies W F CA iff it verifies conditions F α and F β (Theorem 6.13). Accordingly, Remark 9.48 says that the statements “C verifies W F CA” and “C verifies F α and F β” are simultaneously true, and Theorem 9.47 strengthens this result, showing that their degrees of truth are equal.
23