G.W. Leibniz. The Art of Controversies (The New Synthese Historical Library)

GOTTFRIED WILHELM LEIBNIZ: THE ART OF CONTROVERSIES

The New Synthese Historical Library Texts and Studies in the History of Philosophy VOLUME 60

Managing Editor: Simo Knuuttila, University of Helsinki Associate Editors: Daniel Elliot Garber, Princeton University Richard Sorabji, University of London Editorial Consultants: Jan A. Aertsen, Thomas-Institut, Universität zu Köln Roger Ariew, Virginia Polytechnic Institute E. Jennifer Ashworth, University of Waterloo Michael Ayers, Wadham College, Oxford Gail Fine, Cornell University R. J. Hankinson, University of Texas Jaakko Hintikka, Boston University Paul Hoffman, University of California, Riverside David Konstan, Brown University Richard H. Kraut, Northwestern University, Evanston Alain de Libera, Université de Genève John E. Murdoch, Harvard University David Fate Norton, McGill University Luca Obertello, Università degli Studi di Genova Eleonore Stump, St. Louis University Allen Wood, Stanford University

The titles published in this series are listed at the end of this volume.

GOTTFRIED WILHELM LEIBNIZ The Art of Controversies Translated and Edited, with an Introductory Essay and Notes by MARCELO DASCAL Tel Aviv University, Israel

with QUINT´IN RACIONERO AND ADELINO CARDOSO

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

ISBN-10 ISBN-13 ISBN-10 ISBN-13

1-4020-5227-8 (HB) 978-1-4020-5227-9 (HB) 1-4020-5228-6 (e-book) 978-1-4020-5228-6 (e-book)

Published by Springer, P.O. Box 17, 3300 AA Dordrecht, The Netherlands. www.springer.com

Printed on acid-free paper

All Rights Reserved © 2006 Springer No part of this work may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording or otherwise, without written permission from the Publisher, with the exception of any material supplied specifically for the purpose of being entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work.

En un mot, l’art de conferer et disputer auroit besoin d’estre tout refondu. [In a word, the art of negotiating and disputing should be entirely redone.] Leibniz, Nouveaux essais sur l’entendement humain (4.7.11)

[…] you have to find a way to put the extremes together, not necessarily by diminishing the extremity of each one, but to form the art of transition. […] You have to keep the extremes but find the link, always find the link, so that there is an organic whole. Daniel Barenboim (In Barenboim and Said 2004: 68-69)

Et qui publice loquitur, pati debet publice contradicentem. [And the person who speaks in public must bear to be contradicted in public.] Leibniz, Letter to Honoré Fabri (GP IV 246)

Contents

Abbreviations About the Apparatus Acknowledgements Introductory Essay 1. Vices of Mingled Disputes 2. The Controversy of Controversies 3. The Religion of a Peasant 4. The Elements of Thinking 5. The Balance of Law 6. Can there be an Obligation to Believe? A. First draft B. New version C. Final version 7. Controversies on Sacred Matters 8. The Judge of Controversies A. First draft B. Definitive version C. Richelieu and De Groot on controversies D. The utility of controversies E. The most useful kind of controversies F. Controversies 9. Towards a Heuristics for Litigation A. Preserving form in litigation B. All possible litigations C. A handbook of practical litigations D. Juridical commonplaces E. Brocardic principles F. The art of writing dialogues 10. The Method of Jurists and the Method of Doctors 11. Interpretation and Argumentation in Law A. Prolegomena B. On the interpretation, foundations, application and system of laws 12. Towards a Heuristics for Discovery A. The art of invention B. Tables, divisions, and the plurality of methods vii

xi xiii xv xix 1 7 25 29 35 41 42 44 44 49 55 57 58 60 61 61 62 65 65 66 67 68 70 72 75 77 78 79 93 94 98

viii

13. 14. 15. 16.

17. 18. 19. 20. 21.

22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31.

32.

Contents

C. A principle of discovery D. A rule of discovery Estimating the Uncertain Towards a Numerical Universal Language The Encyclopedia and the Method of Discovery Towards a Heuristics for Persuading A. The power of persuading B. Concurrence of arguments C. Quickly defeating an adversary D. Words E. Paradoxes F. Wrongdoing G. How grave a sin is not saying the truth? H. The occasion for persuading I. Disputing until completion The Other’s Place Persuading a Skeptic On Controversies On Principles Two Prefaces to the General Science A. The instauration of the sciences: A preface B. Foundations and examples of a new general science Introduction to a Secret Encyclopedia On the Creation of a New Logic New Openings Theology and the Principle of Contradiction Changing Religion Methods of Reunion An Ars Characteristica for the Rational Sciences ‘Characterizing’ Definitions and Demonstrating Propositions Advancing the Art of Discovery Correspondence with the Hamburg Jungians A. Leibniz to Placcius (March 1679) B. Leibniz to Placcius (January 1687) C. Leibniz-Vagetius-Leibniz (1686-1687) D. Leibniz to Placcius (1687) E. Leibniz to Placcius (April 1695) F. Leibniz to Placcius (May 1696) The Philosophical Sin Controversy

101 101 105 119 129 143 144 145 145 146 147 148 148 152 155 163 167 201 209 213 214 216 219 225 231 237 241 247 263 271 275 285 286 290 291 295 296 297 305

Contents

33.

Confronting the Catholic Hardliners: Two Memoirs for Pellisson A. First memoir B. Second memoir 34. Defining what Pertains to Faith 35. Judgment of a Catholic Doctor 36. Presumptions and Fictions in Legal Argumentation: Correspondence with Johannes Werlhof A. Leibniz to Werlhof (July 1696) B. Leibniz to Werlhof (1687-1696) C. Werlhof to Leibniz (July 1696) D. Leibniz to Werlhof (July 1696) E. Werlho f to Leibniz (August 1696) F. Leibniz to Werlhof (August 1696) 37. The ‘Method of Establishments’ To Thomas Burnett of Kemeny 38. The Achievements of Logic and Beyond To Gabriel Wagner 39. Pacts, Contracts, and Natural Law 40. Approaching the Church of England A. Annotator’s preface (A) B. Annotations to the translator’s preface C. Synopsis 41. Dialectic Principles and their Application A. The strength and the weakness of reason B. Between Bayle and Le Clerc C. Letter to Jaquelot (October 1706) 42. The History and Tasks of Logic To Cornelius Dietrich Koch 43. Bold Conjectures To Louis Bourguet 44. The Dynamics of Formulating and Expounding the System To Nicolas-François Remond 45. The Use of Logic against Skepticism To Karl G. Ehler Biographical Notes References Subject Index Name Index

ix

309 309 315 325 329 341 342 343 347 349 350 352 359 373 391 399 400 405 406 419 420 420 422 429 435 445 451 455 473 483 509

Abbreviations

/HLEQL] V:RUNV  $ 6lPWOLFKH6FKULIWHQXQG%ULHIH(GLWHGVLQFHE\YDULRXV/HLEQL] 5HVHDUFK &HQWHUV LQ *HUPDQ\ &XUUHQWO\ SXEOLVKHG E\ $NDGHPLH 9HUODJ %HUOLQ  %  'LH /HLEQL]+DQGVFKULIWHQ GHU .|QLJOLFKHQ |IIHQWOLFKHQ %LEOLRWKHN ]X +DQQRYHU (GLWHG E\ ( %RGHPDQQ +DQQRYHU/HLS]LJ  UHSU +LOGHVKHLP   &  2SXVFXOHV HW IUDJPHQWV LQpGLWV (GLWHG E\ / &RXWXUDW 3DULV  UHSU+LOGHVKHLP   ' 2SHUD2PQLD(GLWHGE\/'XWHQV*HQqYHUHSU+LOGHVKHLP    (  2SHUD 3KLORVRSKLFD TXDH H[VWDQW ODWLQD JDOOLFD JHUPDQLFD RPQLD (GLWHGE\-((UGPDQQ%HUOLQ  )& 2HXYUHVGH/HLEQL](GLWHGE\$)RXFKHUGH&DUHLO3DULV UHSU+LOGHVKHLP   *0 /HLEQL]HQV0DWKHPDWLVFKH6FKULIWHQ(GLWHGE\&,*HUKDUGW+DOOH UHSU+LOGHVKHLP   *3  'LH 3KLORVRSKLVFKHQ 6FKULIWHQ YRQ * : /HLEQL] (GLWHG E\ &, *HUKDUGW%HUOLQUHSU+LOGHVKHLP   *5 7H[WHVLQpGLWV(GLWHGE\**UXD3DULV  *8  /HLEQLW]¶V 'HXWVFKH 6FKULIWHQ (GLWHG E\ * ( *XUKDXHU %HUOLQ   . 'LH:HUNHYRQ/HLEQL](GLWHGE\2.ORSS/HLS]LJ  >

>

+

/+  /HLEQL]+DQGVFKULIWHQ 1LHGHUVlFKVLVFKHQ /DQGHVELEOLRWKHN +DQQRYHU  0 5HFKVWISKLORVRSKLVFKHVDXV/HLEQL]HQVXQJHGUXFNWHQ6FKULIWHQ(GLWHG E\*0ROODW/HLS]LJ  1( 1RXYHDX[HVVDLVVXUO HQWHQGHPHQWKXPDLQ,Q$9,DQGLQ*39  3  /HLEQLW]HQV JHVDPPHOWH :HUNH (UVWH )ROJH *HVFKLFKWH (GLWHG E\ *$3HUW]+DQQRYHU   7UDQVODWLRQV  /  3KLORVRSKLFDO 3DSHUV DQG /HWWHUV 7UDQVODWHG E\ /( /RHPNHU 'RUGUHFKWQGHG  0$ *:/HLEQL]±6FULWWL3ROLWLFLHGL'LULWWR1DWXUDOH7UDQVODWHGE\ 90DWKLHX7RULQR  3$ /RJLFDO3DSHUV7UDQVODWHGE\*+53DUNLQVRQ2[IRUG  65 'H6XPPD5HUXP±0HWDSK\VLFDO3DSHUV7UDQVODWHGE\ *+53DUNLQVRQ1HZ+DYHQ

About the Apparatus

In addition to the Introductory Essay, each Chapter comprises an Introduction that sketches its background, gives an overview of its contents, offers some interpretative suggestions, and indicates the Chapter’s significance in the context of the book. For multi-text Chapters, in most of the cases an Introduction is given for each of the individual texts too. The footnotes contain marginal additions or corrections by Leibniz as well as additional information on textual matters. The endnotes provide information about persons, events, concepts, and controversies mentioned in the text, which a 21st century reader is unlikely to be familiar with; they also include cross-references to other Leibniz texts (in this volume or elsewhere), references to relevant studies, and interpretative suggestions. The two kinds of notes have been distinguished in order to allow for a continuous reading of the text and its modifications, prior to considering the additional material given in the endnotes. The References contain only the titles referred to or made use of and is not intended as a bibliography on Leibniz’s Art of Controversies. Most of the references to writings Leibniz himself refers to are included in the endnotes of the Chapters, with the exception of a few classical works, which are listed in the References. Further information on authors Leibniz often mentions can be found in the Biographical Notes. These authors are marked with an asterisk in their first occurrence in each of the Chapters. A list of Abbreviations serves to refer to the most used editions of Leibniz’s works. A few Leibniz titles are included in the References. Spelling in the 17th century varied. In general, Leibniz’s spelling was respected. Proper names are rendered either in Latin or in the person’s national language. Words added to the translation in order to make it clearer are in square brackets. When necessary, words in the original language are given in italics, within parentheses. The nominative singular is used for Latin words. xiii

Acknowledgements

The idea of a collection of Leibniz’s texts on the art of controversies arose in 1995, in the Institute of Advanced Studies of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. I had organized an international research group on “Leibniz the Polemicist” for a whole academic year, and the Institute accepted and financed the idea. As fellows of the Institute we maintained a weekly seminar on Leibniz and his controversies and held daily conversations and sometimes fierce discussion about the texts we studied together. In the course of that memorable year in Jerusalem, two of us – Quintín Racionero and myself – became convinced that this overlooked aspect of Leibniz’s work deserved to be brought to the attention of the learned public in the form of a book. This idea developed into the project, which after ten years of intermittent work throughout the world, new partners, countless modifications, and many other vicissitudes, comes now to fruition in the form of this volume. It has been a challenge that only persevering cooperative work, gracious support by many colleagues, friends and institutions, and a firm belief in the value of the effort could face. Let all those who made it be faced be thanked and explicitly mentioned, as far as my memory can be trusted. My first thanks go to the Institute’s head at the time, David Shulman, for recognizing the significance of the original research proposal and for supporting it, not only with a generous grant, but also with his active interest in the progress we were making. Thanks are also due to the Institute’s staff for providing all we needed and more – efficiency, sympathy, and care. Even the doorkeepers, who had no idea who is this Leibniz, contributed their share to the positive atmosphere, be it late at night or on Shabbat and holidays. The year-long fellows of the group, Gideon Freudenthal, Massimo Mugnai, Carl Posy, Quintín Racionero, Elhanan Yakira, as well as our short term visitors – Fernando Gil, Kuno Lorenz, Olga Pombo, Alan Gross, Maria Rosa Antognazza, Hans Burkhardt, Sergio Cremaschi, Nuno Nabais, Martha Spranzi, Alfredo Tomasquin, were wonderful companions, colleagues, and critics. So too the regular participants in our weekly seminar – Daniel Cook, Noa Zauderer xv

xvi

Acknowledgements

Na’aman, Yaron Senderowicz, Galia Yanoshevsky, Daniel Mishori, David Heyd, Yaron Ezrahi, Ashraf Nur, Ora Gruengard, Rodica Amel. Their willingness to engage in an attentive and often controversial dialogue centered on controversies and on Leibniz was the stimulating background without which this book could not be born. Ever since that primordial research group dispersed, the enthusiasm it generated regarding the role of controversies in the history of ideas led to the creation of the International Association for the Study of Controversies. Many colleagues have since joined this Association, which has convened so far meetings in Tel Aviv, Madrid, Paris, Vercelli, Lugano, Pisa, Istanbul, Jerusalem, Taipei, Amsterdam, and is preparing further ones. IASC, inspired by the spirit of Leibniz’s art of controversies, stimulates fruitful debates that contribute to the advancement of knowledge, and thanks are due to its members for not despairing to see this book in print. The Spanish Ministry of Education granted me a research fellowship, thanks to which I could spend several months at the Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia in Madrid, devoting most of my time to this project. The Centre d’Histoire de la Philosophie Moderne (Conseil National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris) offered me a fellowship that allowed me to make use of the rich material in the libraries of Paris. Thanks to the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, which granted me its prestigious prize, I could spend one fruitful year in Germany, pursuing my research on controversies and on Leibniz. Half of this year I was the Leibniz Professor at Leipzig University’s Institute for Advanced Studies thanks to Georg Meggle’s invitation, and the other half, a visiting professor at Giessen University, thanks to Gerd Fritz’s invitation. The Gulbenkian Foundation granted me, thanks to Olga Pombo, a Professorship at the Centro de Filosofia da Ciência, Faculty of Sciences, University of Lisbon, where I intensively worked with Adelino Cardoso in furthering the book. The Centro de Filosofia of the University of Lisbon contributed generously to the formatting and final preparation of the book for printing, which was expertly performed by Filipa Afonso. Tel Aviv University granted me the sabbaticals and leaves of absence for all the travel involved in the research. To all these institutions, I can only say that I have done the best in order to justify their support of this project. In the translation of some texts the cooperation of Leibniz scholars such as Gideon Freudenthal and Daniel Cook was extremely helpful. Daniel also read parts of the manuscript and suggested corrections. Bernardino Orio de Miguel read the whole manuscript and his remarks were always valuable. Pol Boucher thoroughly revised some of the juridical translations and provided useful historical and technical information. João Lopes Alves and José de Sousa e Brito also provided assistance regarding juridical terminology. Serhii Wakulenko helped to decipher and translate a

Acknowledgements

xvii

difficult manuscript. Andreas Blank, during his stay at Tel Aviv University, co-conducted with me a seminar using the texts here collected, read and helped to improve most of the manuscript, and was a constant source of support and insight. So were my colleagues at Tel Aviv University, especially Noa Zauderer Naaman and Yaron Senderowicz, whose unfailing interest and challenging questions were always stimulating. Olga Pombo, an old friend in Leibniz, listened attentively to my lengthy speculations about this or that text at her home in Lisbon (where part of the work on this book was performed), making enlightening remarks and demonstrating unrestricted enthusiasm for the project. Cristina Marras was very helpful in collecting bio- and bibliographical information, locating original manuscripts, suggesting additional relevant texts, and discussing the material. Miguel Smid contributed to the first English version of several of the Latin texts. Iñigo Medina García contributed to the notes and made useful remarks on the translations. Mogens Laerke read carefully parts of the manuscript and detected some mistakes. And, last but not least, the graduate students in my annual Leibniz seminar in Tel Aviv, as well as in seminars and research workshops in several other universities, provided perceptive remarks that left their mark on this book, although they cannot be individually traced. The German-Israeli research group on “Controversies in the République des Lettres” (financed for three years by the German Israeli Research Foundation) was an attentive forum for discussing Leibniz’s art of controversies. Members of the group in Tel Aviv and Giessen provided valuable criticism of the Introductory Essay and made suggestions concerning some of the translations and notes. In particular I would like to thank Thomas Gloning and Gerd Fritz for their careful reading of several texts and for their helpful suggestions. The cooperation of the colleagues in the three hubs of the Academy Edition of Leibniz’s writings was essential for carrying out this project. I wish to extend, particularly, my warmest thanks for their generous help to Heinrich Schepers (Münster), Herbert Breger (Hanover), and Hartmut Rudolph (Potsdam). They have been extremely supportive and helpful in advice, criticism, finding the manuscripts, and helping in deciphering and interpreting them. Stephan Waldhoff (Potsdam) deserves my special thanks for his detailed and patient help in this respect. Philip Beeley (Münster) generously provided valuable missing information. Three women, whether they know it or not, are deeply involved in the completion of this project and deserve our gratitude: our wives – Varda, Lola, Isabel. Their wonderful hospitality and their tolerance for our eccentricities and oblivion of the rest of the world whenever we met (in Tel Aviv, in Madrid, in Jerusalem, in Lisbon, or elsewhere) to advance the

xviii

Acknowledgements

project, was not of the passive, but of the very active, supportive, and stimulating kind. It is not easy, finally, to give appropriate expression to my gratitude to Quintín Racionero and Adelino Cardoso, without whom this book would not be now in your hands (or computer screen), dear reader. Quintín and I were partners of this project since its inception and shared its conception and most of its evolution. His unbelievable erudition and his vast knowledge of Leibniz have left their mark throughout this volume. He managed to fit his busy schedule to mine in order to take a week off, in Tel Aviv, Madrid, Lisbon, Giessen, Paris, for working together on a few chapters and notes at a time. He generously offered his home and the facilities of the UNED for our work when I was in Madrid. Unfortunately, due to personal reasons, Quintín had to interrupt his work on this project. But I hope the final result does justice to his spirit and to his belief in its importance, and will please him. When I first talked with Adelino about the project, he was immediately enthusiastic about it, and jumped on board without hesitating. He not only dedicated much of his time to it, but also obtained the financial support of the Centro de Filosofia, of which he is a leading member. His expertise in Leibniz contributed to valuable crossreferences and his special focus on the idea of mediation, which he considers central to leibnizianism, fits as a glove the key elements of Leibniz’s art of controversies; both enriched significantly the book. To both of you, dear friends, my profound gratitude for this wonderful cooperativecontroversial partnership of many years, which (how could it be otherwise?) both illustrates and confirms the essence of Leibniz’s art of controversies. Marcelo Dascal Tel Aviv, April 2006

Introductory Essay

In one of several intellectual self-portraits Leibniz wrote in the course of his life, he describes a “man of religion” he met one day in Paris (K IV 452-454). This man had “meditated at length about controversies”. He enjoyed reading the Church Fathers, but his veneration for them was not excessive. By the age of 17 he had “penetrated so deeply the subtleness of the Schoolmen that he embarrassed his teachers”. Contrary to the current opinion that this kind of study was useless, he believed it had made him realize “up to what point the refinement of the human mind can go”. Their writings, he was sure, contained so many solid and beautiful things that they would be admired by all learned persons if they were formulated clearly and neatly – which he was capable to do, since he excelled in his singular ability of “explaining a passage and making its true sense apparent”. He was versed in history and the writings of the ancients, and he possessed a natural and simple style, yet strong and touching when necessary. One could say that he “mastered perfectly the humanities”. His studies of jurisprudence between the ages of 18 and 21 soon brought him fame and a position at a princely court, where up to 25 years of age he had “the occasion of studying controversies”. The rumors about the new discoveries in mathematics and physics motivated him to contribute to the advancement of science, leaving aside his earlier studies. In two years he became a famous mathematician, invented machines that were considered extraordinary and, in spite of being a foreigner, he was acclaimed for his achievements. It was at this time, Leibniz writes, that he met this man. He was surprised to see him “reading books of controversies”. His modest appearance and his ordinary way of speaking did not bear out his fame as a professional mathematician. Upon Leibniz’s manifestation of his surprise, the man told him that people were mistaken about him. His main concern, he said, was theological. He had applied himself to mathematics, as he had done to scholasticism, with the sole purpose of perfecting his mind and learning the art of inventing and of demonstrating – which he now thought to have achieved as far as anyone else. xix

xx

Introductory Essay ( 1

6 ')

0 '7

1

6

1 ' Yet, while throughout his life he dealt with controversies, both theoretically and practically, this man never assembled in a single work his insights on this topic; nor did he elaborate a blueprint for such a work – as he did for many other ideas of his, even though he rarely carried out such projects; in short – he never actually wrote a systematic account that would deserve the name of ‘Theory of Controversy’. But this is not unusual in Leibniz’s modus operandi and we must pick up the glove. It is the task of his readers and interpreters, as so many similar tasks he left for posterity, to identify the relevant pieces and to recover from them the design of the mosaic he probably had in mind. This is what the painstaking collecting, translating, and commenting represented by the present volume purports to begin to do. Though the result perhaps does not reveal a full-fledged general theory, it certainly unearths enough shared goals, elements, principles, strategies, and argumentative practices, to be appropriately called ‘art of controversies’ – an enriched ars disputandi deserving a place next to the other pillars or Leibniz’s method, the ars inveniendi and the ars judicandi.

1. Introduction In all likelihood, Leibniz is the early modern thinker who maintained the largest and most varied network of correspondents, with whom he discussed an impressive array of topics, in a wide range of disciplines. He wrote several substantive letters a day and, although he condemned the ‘spirit of contradiction’ that animates some polemicists, he did not shy away from engaging in sustained debate in philosophy, law, theology, politics, or science – whenever he deemed them necessary and useful. In his major works he employed the dialogical form as a sharp critical tool, and he used the journals of his time as a forum where he criticized the theories of his contemporaries and defended his own views against his opponents. He also sought the criticism of others, which he deemed invaluable as a source of learning, and – somewhat naively – assumed

Introductory Essay

xxi

others would rejoice in receiving his own serious and well-intentioned criticism. No wonder that he reflected and wrote quite a lot about the principles that should govern such a time-consuming praxis, in order to make sure that it would be not a waste of time but rather a tool in the construction of knowledge. The growth of knowledge, he believed, required the cooperation of many minds – and he worked for the creation of appropriate institutional frameworks (academies, societies, journals) for this purpose. Such cooperation would be best served by infusing it with a critical spirit that values the confrontation of opposed positions, not for the doubtful pleasure of winning, but for its potential contribution to advancing our knowledge. Rather than presuming harmony, knowledge should be built out of the variety of diverging views. In this spirit, objections should be praised and taken seriously as key contributions to conceptual clarification, and major efforts should be made to learn about opposed points of view, acknowledge their respective contributions to truth, detect their points of divergence, and seek to reconcile between them. Leibniz was a firm believer in the persuasive power of such an intellectual strategy not only in theoretical, but also in practical matters. 0

'2 %> +

0

1

5 1

*

:

5

'( . 7 '

1

In spite of Leibniz’s persistent inclusion in his projects of a “General Science” of a chapter devoted to the methods for solving controversies, Couturat – who dealt with this subject in his book La Logique de Leibniz (1901) – did not include in his 1903 edition of Leibniz’s unpublished texts those manuscripts that develop the theme. Mollat too, in both his editions of juridical texts (1885 and 1893), did not notice the relevance of the art of controversies, even though some of the texts he selected for publication clearly emphasize the value of the modes of argumentation employed by the early jurists in dealing efficiently with polemics. As for Grua’s 1948 edition, guided by his interest in Leibniz’s philosophy of law (cf. Grua 1953, 1956), it was no doubt instrumental in calling attention to Leibniz’s ideas on many other subjects as well, and included texts directly related to controversies. Grua, however, did not recognize the methodological significance of the texts he published on this topic – which is perhaps the reason why he didn’t single them out in a separate section of his edition. Baruzi (1909), interested mainly in Leibniz’s religious thought and politics (cf. Baruzi 1907), was perhaps the only

xxii

Introductory Essay

range of Leibniz’s writings on the “art of controversies” – the art that is supposed to theorize about the praxis briefly described above – remains to this day largely unheeded to. Another reason for that is that these writings were, in general, not included in the “philosophical” series of the Academy edition, which led researchers to presume they had no philosophical interest. Furthermore, only a very small portion of it was available in translation. The unquestionable significance of this work is the motivation for this volume, which will provide the reader with a further piece of the “Leibniz puzzle” – a piece that offers a quite unusual perspective for appreciating his thought and action. In this introductory essay, we will first present the historical background explaining the rise of interest in negotiations, dialogue, tolerance, and the peaceful solution of controversies in the second half of the seventeenth century. We will then survey the intellectual sources that provided Leibniz with the materials for the development of an “art of controversies”. An overview of the contents of this art will then follow, in which the role of each of its components will be highlighted. Next, we will show how the principles and techniques of this art are part and parcel of Leibniz’s major fields of research and action – theology, law, politics, metaphysics, epistemology, and science. We will then highlight the significance of the art of controversies for Leibniz’s entire philosophical stance – a significance that ultimately lies in its essential role in Leibniz’s “rationalism”. Finally, we describe the criteria that guided us in the compilation of this volume.

2. Motivation The peace of Westphalia, which puts an end to the 30 years war in Europe is signed in 1648, two years after Leibniz’s birth. The peace of Utrecht, which puts an end to the 14-years long Spanish succession war, is signed in 1714, two years before Leibniz’s death. Both were “world wars” % E ' 20 th century editor of Leibniz’s unpublished writings who devoted special attention to Leibniz’s practice of and reflection about the art of controversies (he must be also credited with re-printing the self-portrait of Leibniz with which this Introductory Essay opens). 2 The Thirty Years War (1619-1648) was the first global war in Europe, as well as the most devastating one, especially in central Europe. Its last phase, the so-called FrancoSwedish period (1635-1648), was characterized by an absence of stable fronts, a situation where the only regular tactics was the systematic destruction of the territories through which the armies passed. The more reliable calculations mention the astronomic

Introductory Essay

xxiii

Between these two dates, European intellectuals and politicians were concerned with the ways of promoting peace and avoiding the devastating effects of these wars. This political and intellectual concern gave birth not only to intensive political negotiations, but also to an intensive reflection on the conditions for the achievement of peace in Europe, coupled with attempts by their proponents to persuade their intellectual colleagues in other countries and to muster their influence upon the political leaders for the implementation of such projects. In this, and other ways, the community of European intellectuals known as the “République des Lettres” played a key role. Pierre Bayle, an exile in the wake of Louis XIV’s anti-Huguenot policies, and a fighter for tolerance, was certainly aware of this role when he founded his journal Nouvelles de la République 'A ( intellectual communication, namely a supra-national forum for the

3

proportion of 30% to 50% of population reduction within the Empire, with local variations related to the proximity to the battle zones (see Lutz 1982: I 24). Even though England didn’t take part in this war, its own revolutionary process, from 1621 (with the first conflicts between Charles I and the Parliament) to 1649 (with Cromwell’s victory and the king’s execution), evolved chronologically and involved an amount of devastation parallel to that of the continental war (Hill 1965). No doubt the period inaugurated with the Peace of Westphalia was not, strictly speaking, peaceful. But the wars undertaken by Louis XIV did not significantly modify the international status quo, which respected the stipulations of the peace treaty. The balance of power was altered by two events: on the one hand, the succession to the Spanish throne (which Carlos II’s will assigned to a grandson of Louis XIV) and, on the other, the ascension of Russia which challenged Sweden’s supremacy in the north. Under these conditions war became once more inevitable, this time reaching beyond Europe, due to the participation of the American colonies. The diversification of the fronts in the double war – the Spanish Succession War (1700-1716) and the Great Northern War (1700-1721) caused less devastation in any particular territory; but, as a whole, the result was as bloody as that of the Thirty Years War. Nevertheless, the period between the two wars yielded the basis for European stability, which, after the Treaties of Utrecht (1716) and Nystadt (1721), would not undergo significant changes until the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars. The journal was founded in 1684 and published in Rotterdam, where Bayle lived in exile. Each monthly issue included reviews of recently published books on theology, politics, philosophy, science, history and other subjects. The quality as well as the critical character of the reviews made the journal an obligatory reference for the intellectual life of the time, as well as a vehicle for debate. The earliest examples of this kind of journals were the Philosophical Transactions, published by the Royal Society of London since 1661 and the Journal des Sçavans, a private publication that begins to appear in Paris in 1665. But soon they were emulated, among many others, by the Acta Eruditorum of Leipzig (1682), the Miscellanea curiosa and the Ephemerides of Nürenberg, several Giornalli dei litterati, published in various Italian cities since 1685, and the Journal de Trévaux, a Jesuit publication that began to appear in 1701.

xxiv

Introductory Essay

exchange of ideas. Along with other journals and an intense private and semi-private correspondence, it contributed to create a vast network of contacts among intellectuals of all Europe, an achievement made possible by the favorable climate following the Peace of Westphalia. This network, that included also the newly created academies (which, though supported by each state, were in fact international in their membership), allowed for cooperation in the construction of knowledge and provided a framework wherein ideological conflicts could become the object of rational discussion. Without over-estimating the role played by this “République des Lettres” in political affairs, one should not under-estimate it either. Even though the actual influence of intellectuals upon political praxis was scant, their new forms of communication and debate permitted to remove several important topics from the exclusive area of confessional dispute. In this way, the République des Lettres contributed to the development of an autonomous realm of reason, independent of issues of faith. Its importance, from our point of view, lies in its decisive role in the emergence of an arena for debate, as well as in providing a living model of coexistence, and even cooperation, in spite of and through disagreement. Leibniz became a key node in this forum of debate and communication. He symbolized, perhaps more than any other savant of his time, the connection between knowledge and politics. As we shall see, his “Art of Controversies” is nourished by this double source, stemming from the intrinsic connection, in Leibniz’s thought, between science – whose ultimate aim is the happiness of humankind – and morality. The efforts to bring about peace through meetings, in which reasonable solutions to the theological and ecclesiastical issues in dispute were sought, preceded the Thirty Years War. In the first phase of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, a methodology of “colloquia” was put in place for this # = E ' refusal by the pope to convene an Ecumenical Council and by the Protestants to subscribe to any obedience formula, brought an end to the 4

This methodology relied upon the so-called politiques – most of them followers of Erasmus, who “not having sworn neither to the Pope nor to Luther, were only motivated by the glory of God and by the good of Christendom”. It employed the attempts to develop a syncretistic theology as a propaedeutic tool. The Diet of Augsburg (1530) convened by Charles V was the first major attempt of this sort. But Philip of Hesse had already made a similar experiment, when he organized a colloquium in Marburg, where Luther and Zwingli were invited to resolve doctrinal divergences. Also Maria of Medicis, France’s regent, employed the same procedure in the Poissy colloquium (1561), with the aim of reducing the divergences between Huguenots and Catholics.

Introductory Essay

xxv $ 6 '

6 (

8

D '( '2 D 6

' ./

.C 6 ./

'2 0

'(

C D ' +

'

(

0 / '

5

0

The colloquium of Thom, organized by the Jesuits in 1648, a few months before the Peace of Westphalia, when the situation in Poland was still uncertain, demonstrates the limits of the colloquia methodology prior to the Peace of Westphalia. Once the re-catholicization of Poland was assured, the Jesuits lost all interest in continuing the discussions. Their interest shifted to the application of the ius reformandi, whose principal victims would be the Calvinists and the Socinians. 6 The literature on the development and application of the principle of tolerance is considerable. See, among others, Chaunu (1984), Decobert (1988), Garrison (1991), Leclerc (1994), Kamen (1967), and Nederman and Laursen (1996). As far as we know, the many and laborious efforts of conciliation made in the 16th and 17th centuries have not been so far the object of a comprehensive study. See, however, Christin (1997), Turchetti (1984), and Hazard (1966), especially part II, chap. II, devoted to the LeibnizBossuet reunion attempt. 7 The final form of the lockean doctrine of tolerance is that of the four Letters Concerning Toleration. The first letter was published anonymously in Latin in 1689, the second and third, by the author, in 1690 and 1693, and the fourth, incomplete, postumously in 1706. All of them can be found in volume 6 of The Works of John Locke (London 1823; reprinted by Aalen Verlag, Hildesheim, 1963). It is well known that Locke didn’t always hold the views expressed in the Letters. As a young man he defended the right of the magistrates to prosecute religious dissidents – a position he argued for in his Two Tracts on Government. His change of opinion is usually attributed to the influence of Lord

xxvi

Introductory Essay ',

.$@3&1 +

1

3 ' ,

0 '7 '( '

'D 1 '' 6 < ;

+ ''

&

&' 0 ') ID

?

'< @ '

Ashley, first Earl of Shaftesbury, whose Whig government policy included “tolerance, commercial interest, individual freedom, Protestantism, and parliamentary supremacy”. This influence is now well documented with the publication of An Essay Concerning Tolerance, written by Locke in 1667 – the year he entered the service of Shaftesbury as his physician and confident. The best version of this unpublished and for the most part lost work is available in J. Locke: Scritti Editi e Inediti sulla Tolleranza, edited by C. Viano (Torino, 1961, pp. 81-107). There is no point here in referring the reader to the vast literature on Locke’s doctrine of tolerance. As for the influence of his model of argumentation on this issue, which has overshadowed the earlier – as well as many of the latter – models, it suffices to quote Nederman and Laursen (1996: 2): “A virtual consensus seems to exist in the English-speaking world that the first true theoretical defense of tolerance was proposed by John Locke”. 8 See Parker (1980: chap. 4). Nevertheless, the Edit de Nantes was a truly tolerant ordinance. For, within the limits established in its 94 overt and 57 covert articles, it permitted the realization of periodic national synods of the Reformed Church, as well as the teaching of Calvinism in three universities (Montauban, La Rochelle, and Nîmes). As demonstrated by ulterior events, the French authorities found ways to restrict quite drastically the conditions stipulated in the Edit, so as to make life for the Huguenots in France impossible. From the conquest of La Rochelle by Richelieu in 1628 until their final expulsion with the revocation of the Edit by Louis XIV in 1685, the number of Huguenot believers was reduced from 1250000 to a mere 80000. 9 Essay (4.16.14). In order to understand Locke’s argument in this paragraph, it is worthwhile noticing that, for him, it is precisely in virtue of their reliance upon divine revelation that religious beliefs should not be included among those propositions that are probable.

Introductory Essay

xxvii

words, one has not to be an epistemological skeptic in order to be tolerant. So, Locke’s notion of tolerance is in fact a condescending attitude of “toleration” towards opinions about whose falseness there is no doubt whatsoever. They are tolerated on exclusively political grounds, i.e., in so far as they are not perceived as socially dangerous. Thus, although Locke’s model undoubtedly marks a progress in grounding the notion of tolerance in a reflection that goes beyond considerations of realpolitik, it remains however a minimalist model. For it seeks to ensure nothing more than the preservation of a peaceful coexistence within a given social fabric. There is nothing in this model suggesting the possibility of a reconciliation of the divergent opinions, and therefore the need to stimulate a rational debate between them. Error and truth are a priori assigned to one or to the other – which makes such a debate irrelevant and eventually also dangerous. The possibility – and need – of such a debate is precisely what other models developed after the Peace of Westphalia acknowledged. Leibniz is certainly the thinker that envisaged this possibility most seriously and undertook to shape such an alternative model. He was clearly not satisfied with Locke’s notion of tolerance. According to him, the conception of tolerance as a resting point ensuring political stability is insufficient. Rather, tolerance must be viewed as a starting point, capable of promoting the rational debate aimed at overcoming the differences, instead of taking them for granted. In Chapter 40A, Leibniz declares that he has a method by means of which “it is possible to go beyond mere tolerance”. He goes on to claim that tolerance should be viewed as moderation – something that is especially necessary in those issues in which controversy arises. In a letter to Molanus (22 February 1698; GR 412-415), he defines moderation as the attitude of “talking without condemning” (loquendum tantum de non condemnando – GR 415). Once this attitude is adopted, it paves the way for applying the “method ” Leibniz has in mind, namely “ placing in front of one’s eyes the weight of both sides’ arguments as if in a balance ” (Chapter 40A). Tolerance, t hus, is not a result of the endeavor to prevent confrontation. It is the necessary preamble for allowing for a true, passionless confrontation of reasons to take place: “… the powers should first agree as to mutual tolerance in order to sweeten the minds” (To the Landgrave of Hessen-Rheinfels, February 1685; GR 190). Without this step it would be foolish to expect to achieve any results – not to mention a stable peace.

Consequently, any doubt concerning these beliefs can only come from a lack of understanding of what is revealed or from a defect in the believer’s faith.

xxviii

Introductory Essay

Whereas for Locke tolerance is an ethical-political requirement with which stability would be ensured without the need for any further dialogue or negotiation, for Leibniz it is a basic principle of the ethics of communication and debate, without which the negotiation, necessary for rationally weighing the positions and eventually overcoming the differences, would be impossible. Consequently, in his Synopsis (Chapter 40C), Leibniz distinguishes between two strategies for handling the solution of controversies: controversiae conciliatio per tolerantiam and per consensum. We should not mistakenly believe that the first of these strategies corresponds to the application of Locke’s “toleration”. For, such an application does not in fact solve a controversy – it just leaves it unsolved, while preventing its eventual harmful social consequences. The first strategy, in Leibniz’s view, simply leads to a solution in case the mere removal of mutual condemnation and passionate discourse reveals that there is no real opposition and thereby brings the debate to rest. The second strategy is required when moderation alone does not entirely remove the opposition. Nevertheless, moderation is required for it clears the ground for a dispassionate consideration of the arguments involved and allows the parties to seek (and eventually reach) an agreed upon solution. Leibniz’s “art of controversies” consists precisely in the ensemble of efforts by him to elaborate the conceptual framework and tools required for the use of this second strategy.

3. Sources Leibniz’s concern with controversies runs through his whole life. Among his earlier remembrances, he mentions the lively interest aroused in him by reading medieval disputationes – which he did read in spite of his teacher’s prohibition.10 Two months before his death, he is still concerned with the topic. He talks once more about the “judge of controversies” and keeps looking for the appropriate conceptual framework for analyzing and

10

“Leibniz’s life” (K I xxxv). This autobiographical fragment – written by Leibniz in 1676, presumably as a resumé intended to accompany his requests for employment in Germany after his sojourn in Paris – shows the role of controversies in his early education. Leibniz writes: “when as little more than a child I wandered casually through my father’s library, I stumbled upon some books of controversies […]; I then first began to realize that, in general, not all that is said is correct and that often people hold excessively passionate opinions about problems that do not always have much value. So that, before reaching the age of 17, I was working on an exact discussion of a certain controversy” (p. xl).

Introductory Essay

xxix

solving controversies. His advice to the young Ehler is to persevere in this task, declaring that he has no doubt that it can be achieved (Chapter 45). As in most of the projects he considered of fundamental importance, Leibniz’s work on the art of controversies was intermittent and – as far as we know from his published manuscripts – did not reach the stage of a full mature formulation. The letter to Ehler shows that he is fully aware of the incompleteness of his work in this domain, but this does not prevent him to continue to have faith in its importance and feasibility, and to entrust its achievement to the next generations. The attention he devoted to the project, at different times in his life, was determined both by his commitment to other major intellectual endeavors and by the surrounding circumstances. Among the latter, the ups and downs of the reunification negotiations, as well as his mood regarding their prospects of success.11 In order to elaborate his art of controversies, Leibniz – following St. Paul’s advice to always work opportune et importune, i.e., taking advantage of each and every available clue (GR 190) – makes use of a variety of sources. The first of these sources was the practice and theory of disputations. Originally, the disputatio was an amplification of the expositio, i.e., the explication of a text through interlinear or marginal remarks. As such remarks grew in size, the expositio became a systematic and more or less independent commentary of the text. Given the diversity of possible interpretations, the commentaries had to argue against each other. The disputatio results from the codification of the rules for such disputes, including their proper order, the roles of the participants (defendens, arguens; proponens, opponens), the kinds of permitted moves (e.g., concedo, nego, distingo), and the questions that can be debated and those that cannot. From the 13th century onwards, the disputatio frees itself from the role of textual commentary, leaving room for debates about any chosen theme – quodlibet – which at first were permitted only once a week. Along with this thematic ‘freedom’, however, logical strictures developed concerning the moves the contenders were allowed to make. This was particularly emphasized in the variety of disputatio called obligatio, in 11

For the various stages and results of the negotiations for the reunification of the Christian churches, as well as for Leibniz’s involvement therein, see Racionero (2001). As a rule, Leibniz was aware of the difficulties in reaching a consensus in matters that depended to a large extent upon the varying interests of politicians. For this reason, he usually remained at the backstage, letting the official initiatives (e.g., the requests of the imperial representative, Rojas y Spínola, or the exploratory suggestions of the Elector of Brandenburg, Friedrich Wilhelm) play the leading role. In particular, he took care of the methodological, historical, and doctrinal aspects of the debates. He was, however, an important figure in such negotiations and spent an enormous amount of work in them.

xxx

Introductory Essay

which each of the disputants was ‘obliged’ to reply in logically specified ways (see Yrjönsuuri 2001). In this respect, the art of disputing played the role of a procedure for teaching and exercising logic. The model of disputation, in its several varieties, became also a tool for conducting intra-religious as well as inter-religious debates (see Dascal 2004b). In the first decades after the Reformation, the disputatio was the prototype for the inter-confessional colloquia which, instead of solving the divergences between Catholics and Protestants, exacerbated them, as Leibniz pointed out (NE 4.7.11; A VI 6 417-418).12 Disputatio, which was still in use in Leibniz’s time, was well-known to him, and was to contribute significantly to the logical, dialectical, and rhetorical aspects of his art of controversies. His teacher, Jakob Thomasius had published in 1670 a manual of logic for beginners, which included, for adults, a large section on disputation (Erotemata Logica pro incipientibus, accessit pro adultis Processus disputandi; Leipzig: G. H. Frommann). In his letter to Thomasius of 2 September 1663 (GP I 7-18), he displays already at a young age his skill in this genre. As a man of his century, however, he soon became aware of the predominant mood of Early Modern thought – a pitiless criticism of ‘scholasticism’, which included the uncompromising dismissal not only of Aristotelian logic, but also of disputatio. The latter was viewed by thinkers such as Bacon, Descartes, Locke, and Malebranche as consisting essentially in futile verbal skirmishes, which deviated the mind from real inquiry and was useless for the advance of knowledge. To be sure, Leibniz too criticized the disputatio model. But, in conformity with his tolerant outlook, he acknowledged also its potential usefulness. What is to blame – he argued against Locke , for example – is not the tool itself, but the bad use it is made of by some. Locke had argued that, in order to prevent “the running out of disputes into an endless train of syllogisms” (Essay 4.7.11), the Schoolmen had introduced “general propositions, most of them indeed self-evident, […] beyond which men in .%

(

:disputatio5

B

7

',

.3 0 '' ', 0 disputatio ./ ? 5 Disputationes medicae super primam libri primi Avicennae, etiam philosophis valde utiles .C..&9 .3 7 ) ./>3 .///& '' Disputationum anatomicarum selectarum, C ' ?S ./#C ./$.9Disputationes chirurgicae selectae, $ ' " ./$$ ./$C9 Disputationes ad morborum historiam et curationem facientes, ./$/'2 F & .3 'L .@@3 &'

Introductory Essay

xxxi

dispute could not retreat”; he thus made disputatio directly responsible for stopping inquiry at vacuous generalities, rather than stimulating the search for the true “foundations whereon the sciences [are] built” (ibid.). For Leibniz, however, the bad use of the ‘maxims’ or ‘principles’ “should not lead to blaming their use in general; all truths are subject to the inconvenience that, when they are joined to falsities, one can draw false conclusions and even contradictory ones” (NE 4.7.12; A VI 6 422). The same is true of disputation. He willingly admits the misuses to which it is subject, and attributes these in part not only to the incompetence of the disputants and to their tendentious motives, but to the fact that it is “illgoverned” (malreglé), which is why “often one does not conclude anything or concludes wrongly” (NE 4.7.11; A VI 6 418). None of this means, however, that “the art of disputing or of combating by reasons” cannot be improved; in fact it must be corrected, developed, and, ultimately, “redone” (tout refondu), for it is “very big and very important” (ibid.). In fact, the chapters of this book illustrate the variety of ways in which Leibniz – ever more aware of the importance of this art – endeavored, from his youth, to fulfill the task of re-creating it on sounder grounds. From early on, he pointed out that the formal dialectical structure of disputatio was insufficient to capture what is at stake in most significant controversies and per se did not provide a method ensuring a wellgrounded, non-arbitrary decision of the debated issue (Chapter 1). He noticed the insufficiency of deductive logic alone to deal with issues of interpretation (Chapter 11) and for drawing probabilistic and presumptive inferences that involve uncertainty (e.g., Chapters 5, 36, 38). He sought to improve the medieval model by introducing the idea of a ‘balance of reason’ (e.g., Chapter 2). And he also kept some of the features of this model, such as the rules which distribute asymmetrically the onus probandi of opponent and proponent – dialectical rules that play in fact a crucial role in his argumentation against Bayle, for example (Chapter 41; see also Théodicée, Discours Préliminaire; Dascal 1987: Chapter 6). Naturally, logic was to play a key role in Leibniz’s art of controversies – to wit his often mentioned ideal of devising a method for solving any controversy as it were ‘arithmetically’ (e.g., Chapters 14, 28). But, as mentioned above, the logic of disputatio was not enough for fulfilling such a dream. On the one hand, it was necessary to transform it in a real calculus. And Leibniz indeed contributed significantly to the systematization of syllogistic logic and created new extensional and intensional calculi – thereby in fact articulating for the first time the modern concept of formalization (cf. Dascal 1978). On the other, he soon realized the insufficiency of traditional logic for his purposes, and looked

xxxii

Introductory Essay '( 0

K

K

.A K ' 1 0

his own (Chapter 31C).14 For Jungius, logic was, like for the Port Royal $ '' 1 * 1 ' K 5 L 5 ' ) K 5 & 1

* 1 0 1

'

7 5 13

0

Leibniz’s appreciation for Joachim Jungius, as well as the latter’s influence upon the genesis and development of Leibniz’s logical thought, are generally acknowledged, but scarcely studied in detail (see, however, Kangro 1969). It can be conjectured that Jungius’s empiricist ideas regarding natural science also influenced Leibniz. In a 1679 letter to Christian Philip, recalling the conversation they had in Hamburg, Leibniz linked his criticism of Cartesian mechanics with Jungius’s views, whom he credits with a better understanding of “the general analysis of concepts” than Descartes (A II 1 495). The same link is established in Chapter 14, where Leibniz argues that, if Jungius’s work had been better known, the reform of the sciences would have gone well beyond Descartes. Although it is difficucult to assess the hypothesis of a direct influence of Jungius’s physics upon Leibniz, the influence of his logic and epistemology is beyond doubt. Leibniz was familiar with the first edition (1638) of the Logica Hamburgensis, which he quotes in the above mentioned letter to J. Thomasius, as well as with the second one (1681), a copy of which he owned and kept in his private library. His abundant annotations on this and other works of Jungius are now available (A VI 4 1048-1090). On Jungius’s logic, see Scholz (1931) and Ashwort (1967). On the place of logic in Jungius’s and Leibniz’s systems, see Schupp (1980). For further references to Jungius, see Chapter 31. 14 Many recent studies address the logical difficulties posed by relations for Leibniz. Most of them seek to contest or at least to amend the standard account, due to Russell, according to which Leibniz had reduced all relational predicates to monadic ones. Among the most influential of these studies, mentioned in chronological order: Parkinson (1965), Rescher (1967), Hintikka (1972), Ishiguro (1972), Mates (1984), Mugnai (1992). For an assessment of the problem and its interpretations, see Racionero (1999).

Introductory Essay

xxxiii

probabilities.15 This encounter was extremely influential in the development of Leibniz’s own studies in the field of probabilities (Chapter 13). With a rigorous treatment of probabilities, Leibniz expected to overcome the limitations of the purely deductive method of solving controversies. The latter could only be applied to matters subjected to strict necessity – the realm of “eternal truths”. With the addition of a calculus of probabilities, the way would be paved for treating disputes about contingent or factual matters with comparable rigor.16 This would permit the application of the art of controversies to a much wider variety of domains. The thus extended Characteristica, Leibniz boasts, “will give us the means to calculate in all matters as in arithmetic, in order to determine either certitude, when there are enough data for it, or at least the degrees of probability” (To JeanFrédéric, April 1679; A II 1 557). In this spirit, Leibniz undertook to formalize probabilities through the study of various types of games. Most of the studies about Leibniz’s work on probabilities focus on its formal-mathematical aspect, overlooking the fact that it involved other aspects as well – those for which the name ‘dialectical’ is appropriate. Couturat himself observed that the restriction of Leibniz’s views on probability to their mathematical aspects was inaccurate. “For the mathematicians – he says – the theory of probabilities was nothing but an occasion to formulate and solve purely mathematical problems, whereas for Leibniz, it was really a part of logic” (Couturat 1901: 248-249). He further identified this “part of logic” with “the true Topics or Dialectics” (ibid.). And indeed, this is the constant point of view held by Leibniz, from his earliest writings such as the Nova Methodus (1667) and Chapter 15 (1679), to the more mature texts such as Chapter 37 (1697) and Chapter 9E (1711). As far 15

16

Leibniz became acquainted with Pascal’s thought through Arnauld, who put him in contact with the Jansenist circles. He had shown interest in Pascal since the early 70’s, with the publication of Pascal’s Pensées (To Jean-Frédéric, 21 May, 1671; A II 1 112). Thanks to des Billettes and to the Perrier family, Leibniz consulted Pascal’s manuscripts on geometry, where – as he admitted many years later (GM V 399) – he found the “light beam” that led him to the discovery of the infinitesimal calculus. As late as December 1696, Leibniz asks des Billettes about the fate of these manuscripts, but the latter is unable to inform him (GP VII 464). He also studied Pascal’s manuscripts on probabilities, this time through Nicole and Pascal’s sisters, Mmes de Saint-Amour and de Roannez. Pascal had proposed solutions to the problems the Chevalier de Meré had submitted to Huygens, Fermat and himself (GP IV 570). Apparently, it is from these solutions that Leibniz obtained all the information he needed for establishing the foundations of his own calculus of probabilities, as developed in Chapter 13, which in fact consists in a generalization of Pascal’s theorems. “Thus, the form of disputation has been shown to be necessary in necessary matters, where eternal truths occur, but not in contingent matters where the most probable must be chosen” (Chapter 38).

xxxiv

Introductory Essay 5 0 (

-

.C//97

: :

5 5 : :

% %AC %A/&'

5 5

'-

* ./ ? " %>.&' Leibniz’s juridical background – as can be seen from the terminology he consistently employs, as illustrated in the preceding paragraph – was another essential source of his thought on controversies. Several of the Chapters in this volume emphasize that it is the jurists that provide the best examples of work in the direction of the ‘new logic’ and that they deserve to be imitated in this. In Chapter 5 he goes as far as to suggest that, instead of taking science (including mathematics) as a model of knowledge to be followed in other domains, it is rather the juridical model that should serve as a paradigm for science. In so far as the natural sciences consist in the ‘interrogation of nature’, they have a lot to learn from the detailed interrogation procedures developed by the legal disciplines, and this includes the set of rules for determining the value or weight of each type of evidence. Having been in London, where he had the occasion to observe first hand the discussions in the Royal Society regarding the proper conduction of experiments and observations and the interpretation of their results, his juridical mind presumably realized how far the new experimental science was from having developed a systematic, precise, and detailed epistemology, if compared to what two millennia of jurisprudence had achieved in Law. In Chapter 38, where he gives a survey of the components of logic and assesses their value, Leibniz points out two specific problems that remain unsolved after one adds the tools of mathematical probability to logic’s arsenal, namely the crucial roles of presumption and of the ways for

17

The nature and use of probabilities was also a controversial issue in theology, where “probabilists” and “canonists” maintained a long controversy on this subject. See Chapter 5, note i. Leibniz studied and annotated this literature, as shown by his highlighting passages such as the passage of Baronius’s Manuductio, where four degrees of probability are distinguished (A VI 4 C 2006).

Introductory Essay

xxxv '-

1 '

( .3 K '

' 0

& #' .C' @&

'' '(

'( '( 0 ' 6

'' &'(

6 T

'7

6 & .@ K ' '* 18

The logic employed by jurists to estimate the value of different kinds of presumptions is a recurrent theme in Leibniz’s correspondence with the Bernouilli brothers about the calculus of probabilities. As against the purely mathematical treatment the latter proposed for the Ars conjectandi, Leibniz insists on the relevance of the juridical and political approach: “I have also reflected on these matters in the past, especially as they are used in jurisprudence and politics; I call it the doctrine of the degrees of probability” (To Jacques Bernouilli, 5 March 1697; GM III 377). In another letter, he lists different kinds of proof that can be extracted from juridical logic in order to estimate probabilities: “Since my youth I dealt with this kind of argument when I first wrote about law, discussing conjectures, indications, presumptions and incomplete, semi-complete, complete, and similar degrees of proof. In fact, no one has elaborated this kind of argument better than the jurists” (To Jean Bernouilli, 6 June 1710; GM III 850). A similar list of kinds of proof can be found in Chapter 5 and in NE (4.16.5). On the sources of this hierarchy of proofs in the tradition of penal law, see Chapter 36, note z. 19 Jurists are not the only ones who rely on presumptions. For example – as Leibniz points out (Chapter 10) – a physician engaged in diagnosis employs the same kind of logic in his reasoning (see also NE 4.16.9).

xxxvi

Introductory Essay P ( K

-

CK *

Q ./.>9?B

3$>&'K ',

I %> A3&'

+ ( 6 '( 0 .C@/& + *

* %

..

.CC/9

0

'( 0

0 '

(

+

% *

1

0 '

''+

.@

#>&

' ( 2 '

') %. ' Thus, the whole range of traditional, as well as modern tools of rhetoric is mustered for the construction of the new leibnizian Topics, towards the fulfillment of the plan of expanding logic well beyond its traditional scope. The components of this new Topics he lists in his project of a new encyclopedia of 1679 indicate the central role he assigns in the project to those rhetorical components directly associated with the art of controversies, namely loci dialectici, inventio Rhetorica, ars argutiarum,

20

21

As far as we know, the first Leibniz scholar to call attention to the centrality of the concept of presumption in Leibniz’s ars disputandi was the late Ezequiel de Olaso (1975, 1990). The importance of hermeneutics in those domains (e.g., theology, jurisprudence) where historical knowledge is required is emphasized by Leibniz in Chapter 37.

Introductory Essay

xxxvii +

.$&'( ' & %% 0'

( 0 '

7 ') :

0 6

&

5 '( + 7

/&' ( 5 '

7

) ,

+ 1

22

2

', = +

.C3/ %/& &I K

Leibniz never gives a complete list of the dialectical and rhetorical means that can be used in the ars inveniendi. His lists of such means vary in his different formulations of this art. They include, among others, the “art of interrogating”, i.e., of eliciting testimony and checking one testimony against another (Chapter 38); the “art of experimenting”, which is nothing but the art of interrogating nature (GP VII 126); the “art of conjecturing” or of forming hypotheses (C 174); the “art of deciphering” cryptograms as well as any proposition comprising fragmentary data; and the “art of guessing” the meaning of enigmas, which consists in the ability to ask intelligent questions, combining the useful data and excluding the wrong and superfluous ones (ibid; see also C 162). All these “arts” are accompanied by an arsenal of formal or quasi-formal heuristics, appropriate for different purposes (cf. Chapters 9, 12, 16), which Leibniz on one occasion subsumes under what he calls ars formularia (Chapter 15). The plurality and openness of the means that constitute the network-like structure of the ars inveniendi suggests that Leibniz believes that only a plurality of methods and a rich and multiply accessible data-base can serve as a satisfactory tool for discovery. For, not only truth can be found in a variety of ways, but it can also be approximated, estimated, partially found, etc. – for all of which purposes “the best method is to make as many comparisons as one can” (A VI 4 961).

xxxviii <

Introductory Essay

1

'< 1

1 0 '; '

5 5 + (

5

'

=*


.C3A 0

7

=*

'


+ '

+

%>

')

6

', 9 ' 7

I

'(

5

U -

5

%A .C@>5'

%A

-

3K

.C@%&

0 = +

= +

1 =

6 ,+ .A>C&'

'

= 6

5

Introductory Essay

xxxix

Leibniz’s typology further excludes from the domain of “controversies” the “way of dispute or discussion”, where the contenders proceed in a completely disorderly way, employing at will arguments, invectives, evasion, and all sorts of stratagems. In this kind of clashes, the objections and proposals of the adversary are not subjected to serious scrutiny, and there is no concern for, nor possibility of advancing towards a solution based on reasons. The dispute resembles the Hobbesian pre-contractual war of all against all, where nobody can win – certainly not rationally. Here, the parallel with war lies at the procedural level: “there are no rules that disputants are obliged to follow rigorously” (Chapter 27). The need of methods for avoiding the “vices” that transform controversies into disputes was one of the first theoretical concerns of the young Leibniz in this matter (Chapter 1). Reasons, as well as orderly procedure, are no doubt present in another of the “ways” Leibniz considers as not deserving the title “controversy”. This is the “way of accommodation” (la voie de l’accommodement), which “leads to a blind alley” (Chapter 27). It leads to a blind alley because its purpose is merely devising an ad hoc means of neutralizing the opposition between the contenders. Therefore, instead of addressing the deep reasons underlying the conflict, the solutions this way proposes are short-lived because they remain at a rather superficial level. The reasons used in such an approach are typical of the instrumental use of reason, where the ultimate ends (Max Weber’s Zweckrationalität) are not under discussion. In warfare, the “way of accommodation” is comparable to the establishment of occasional pacts, not based on the real, long-term strategical interests of the partners. Sometimes, the desire for compromise may lead to what Leibniz calls “the way of condescending” (la voie de la condescendence), where a contender makes concessions to the demands of the opponent, forgetting that there are points “in which concessions are impossible” (ibid.). Condescending in fact amounts to yielding to the opponent without seriously considering the implications of this act. In this respect, it differs

pending the progress of the negotiations. Bossuet (June/October 1693) rejects altogether Leibniz’s definition of the issue, arguing that infallibility is not a matter of fact, so that the only admissible starting point for the Catholics is that “the church cannot be mistaken”. Consequently, “there is no hope for a reunification if one wishes to suppose that the decisions on matters of faith of the Council of Trent may remain suspended” (FC I 501). One can see that, while Leibniz was correct theoretically by rejecting the “way of authority” as blocking a true discussion of the issues (i.e., a true “controversy”), he failed in practice, for he should have known that the Catholics would not give up the prerogatives granted them by the principle of authority as a basis for the negotiations. For an analysis of the Leibniz-Bossuet controversy, see Frémont (Forthcoming).

xl

Introductory Essay ' )

5

' (

0 6 ' B 0'%# (

1 )

+

A/

7 '%$ 7 " ##A$& (

)

,

.C/@97 ( )

.#$@&

B

.C/@97

I .#C$&' )

)

5

6 '&1 7 " # @$A&'%C

%#

%$

B 0

) B 0)

?

E

( B

=

( +

(

M

' 6

') 5/

)

0

'= Mothe "

/

7

)

+ %C

5

5 5

'

#>>&' ) ) .C$C&

) ';

+

5

)

+

7

. #$/&

+ '

?

+

.$3C '

(

0+ 0

+ 0

.C.%.C3C&

*

'0 7

+

Introductory Essay

xli

The historical method could be generalized in terms of the principle that a dispute could be solved if we could reconstruct the shared past of the present contenders, so as to find out exactly the historical point where divergence arose. We could then eliminate the divergence by going back to the point where agreement prevailed. Leibniz’s critique has in view not so much the fallibility of historical knowledge as the lack of available methods capable of grounding it. If such methods were available, they would certainly permit to establish the truth of revealed religion, for “it is grounded upon facts of ancient history” (To Nicaise, 30 April 1697; GP II 57). But this would require much more time than what one could dispose of in the pressing problem of the reunification of the Christian churches. Another difficulty Leibniz discerned in the application of the historical method to controversies was that, even if it were secure, the formulations yielded by it would always be poorer in content than those required for the suppression of divergences, because they would be unable to capture the additional contents highlighted by these divergences.27 Furthermore, the use of the historical method in a situation of controversy could not ensure that the reconstruction of the past by the present contenders would be agreed upon. The present dispute is rather likely to project itself onto the past. That is to say, the “historical” reasons adduced run the risk of being not “real” reasons, but rather merely apparent or “ideological” ones.28 In order to avoid this, the “historical method” would have to become a “critical” one, as we have seen. In particular, it would have to be coupled with a rigorous hermeneutic methodology that would provide the “controls” necessary to avoid fanciful interpretations of the past.29 the church in standing by error and its desire to repress the dissidents fiercely (see Calov’s Systema locorum theologicorum, 1655-1677). 27 To Seckendorff (1683; A II 1 533-534), where he again mentions Huet. 28 Leibniz was familiar with – and also somewhat guilty of – such obstinate “misunderstandings” where historical interpretations often became ideological confrontations. The correspondence with Bossuet, for instance, displays numerous examples of this kind of abuse of history. In his letter of 1691, Leibniz had made use of the case of the Bohemian Utraquists, whom the church had admitted as true Catholics, in spite of the fact that they did not follow the resolutions of the Council of Konstanz about the administration of the sacraments of the Eucharist (FC I 344). But Bossuet rejected this example as a precedent that fits the situation of the Protestants vis-à-vis the Council of Trent, making use of many other historical references (FC I 495). What is instructive in this case is the fact that both Leibniz and Bossuet display a remarkable historical erudition, which does not lead them, however, to doctrinal agreement. 29 As the historian of the house of Brunswick-Lüneburg, Leibniz was naturally interested in the problem of transforming this discipline into a science. He may be rightly considered one of the founders of modern historical methodology. He viewed “history”, conceived in a broad sense, as one of the central tools for the Encyclopedia, which

xlii

Introductory Essay

On the basis of what controversy is not, we may now try to delineate its leibnizian identi-kit. A controversy is an orderly (rather than random) debate where reasons (rather than power) are the decisive tools. These reasons should address the deep and general (rather than superficial and ad hoc) issues; they should consider seriously (rather than condescendingly) the opponent’s views; and they should be based on strict methodological control (rather than on ideologically-prone free interpretation). In spite of this emphasis on the role of reasons, one should not forget the initial parallel with war. Contenders engage in a controversy because they have a reasonable hope to win. Therefore, the “serious aim” of a contest of this sort – just as in other warlike games – is to put an end to the contest (Chapter 7; see also Chapter 1). Controversy’s prize, unlike in other warlike games, is the persuasion “either of the adversary himself or else of some other listener” and “a full victory is the one that subjugates declared enemies also in their minds”, by the force of reasons alone (ibid.). Such reasons, however, are always contextually given, plural, and motivated. “Thus, in order to understand in depth how controversies can arise … we must take into account the person of the contestants, the contest’s prize, the hope of success according to the laws of competing, and finally the reasons used in the contest” (ibid.); we should not overlook either the situation in which the controversy takes place (Chapter 16H). It is the need to take into should contain “the general inventory of our public treasure”. As such it would include a historia rerum (containing all the observations already performed about physical, psychological and social facts) as well as a historia locorum et temporum, comprising geography and history in the usual sense (De ratione perficiendi Encyclopaediam Alstedii; D V 183; cf. Couturat 1901: 158, 570-571). The methods of these two “histories”, natural and civil (Historia universalis, id est tam naturalis quam civilis, K I 51), are essentially analogous, for in both cases one has to establish the reliable data from which one can go on to discover general truths (C 524). Their difference lies in the different types of observation involved in each. In history, the crucial point is how to determine the reliability of the various kinds of “testimony”. Hence his insistence on the combination between history and criticism and on the need of a comparative method, as mentioned above. The “art of criticism”, he says, consists in “the examination and use of the ancient monuments” (To Nicaise, 1697; GP II 567). This must be done through a comparative approach applied to at least three levels or domains of historical research: to the ‘archaeological’ domain, where the task is to copy and examine all kinds of documents (letters, diplomas, seals, etc.) or monuments (ruins, clothes, habits, etc.); to the “philological” domain, where the main topic of research is the etymological and comparative study of languages; and to the “hermeneutic” domain, where the objective is to clarify the meaning of the texts or obscure expressions through its comparison with other similar texts or expressions (cf. his correspondence with Koch on some Greek philosophers; GP VII 469-481). Leibniz’s contributions to all three domains were considerable. See Davillé (1909), Conze (1951), Spitz (1952), Racionero (1991), and De Mauro and Formigari (1990).

Introductory Essay

xliii

account so many variables that explains why the art of controversies cannot be reduced to a narrow conception of logic. As far as we know, no single leibnizian text expounds the various components of this art. We can find, however, scattered in the many writings here collected, written in virtually all the periods of his life, elements of this art that correspond to the components of the above definition. At what might be called the tactical level, we find a series of methods designed both to avoid the negative properties and to promote the positive ones. In the earliest systematic text in our collection – significantly called “Vices of a mingled dispute” (Chapter 1) – Leibniz classifies the causes and types of disorder and confusion that affect controversies. The avoidance of such causes not only prevents controversies to lapse into noncontroversies; it is coupled with positive suggestions as to the forms of organization and conduct of a controversy. The capital importance of the order of the arguments in a controversy leads Leibniz to propose various ways of conceiving of and preserving ‘form’ in a controversy. ‘Form’, referring to controversies, is sometimes conceived by Leibniz as a reduction to a symbolic language, the Characteristica Universalis, which will allow then the solution of the controversy by mere calculation (Chapters 14, 21). It may also merely mean the observation of an “art of disputing” (Kunst aus zu disputieren, Chapter 16I), i.e., the ‘syntactic’ structure of a dispute – a procedure that should at least assure its ‘completion’ in the sense that all arguments and counter-arguments presented by the contenders are put in their proper place and thus taken into account. It may rather refer to the nature of the arguments presented, with a view to ensuring their relevance to the step in the debate in which they are presented, and avoiding undue interference not only in the procedure but also in the content of other, independent arguments (Chapter 9A). And this is only a sample of the forms in which ‘form’ – whose absence is, as stated in the opening sentence of Chapter 1, the major vice of a controversy – is interpreted by Leibniz, and illustrated in many other chapters. 7 ', '7 + ..& 0'0 '

'E '6

'7

1

xliv

Introductory Essay '1 '2 0 +

:

%

AA A# C$&'(

5 A> ( '

1

1 + *

*

%

CC />&'(

'D '

*

6

'(

' '

+ '

%/

6 * 5 0

'( 1 +

+

%3&1 0 A. '

( + PQ 30

31

.@') I,

The image of a “balance of reason” is central in Leibniz’s art of controversies, and appears, explicitly or implicitly, in many of the chapters of this book. It is associated with the idea of a rationality that, in the absence of deductive certainty, contents itself with ‘inclining’ reasons. See Dascal (2001, 2003b, 2004a, 2005). In fact, the “suspension” tactic had been designed by Rojas y Spínola. The bishop’s idea was to obtain a provisional reunification, setting aside difficult – but not essential – issues of a theological nature, until the return of a climate of confidence would permit their calm discussion within a reunited church. Leibniz had been favorable to this tactic, both in the negotiations between Protestants and Catholics and between the Lutherans and the Reformed. But he was aware of the difficulty in establishing an agreed upon list of issues that could be set aside. While Rojas y Spínola had in mind problems such as the Virgin’s conception, the Protestants wanted to include in the list the problem of papal infallibility – which the Catholics obviously were not prepared to “suspend” even provisionally (cf. the echoes of these debates, not at all hypothetical in Chapter 27).

Introductory Essay

xlv

disapproved by anyone; second, it would lead to the end, furnishing a sure means to arrive at a conclusion”. Leibniz’s proposal in fact grants the notion of moderation a new tactical role. Whereas, as a component of tolerance, it was a precondition for a rational debate to take place, here it acquires the further role of endowing the controversy with a – so to speak – “rational dynamics”. Leibniz clearly discerns this dual role of moderation: “… there is nothing that makes a dispute more commendable than the moderation of the disputants; well, I claim that this moderation will be manifest here in a quite special and indisputable way”. Such a way consists in providing a structure for the debate such that it will force the contenders to be moderate. The central piece of this structure is the active participation of a rapporteur (expounder), whose function – unlike that of the judex controversiarum of Leibniz’s earlier writings – is not that of a judge nor of a conciliator. His function is to maintain the order of the debate and, especially, to reformulate and summarize the contenders’ positions and arguments so that the whole “economy of the issue” emerges unmistakably. The rapporteur thus functions as “a palpable sign of moderation and equity”. The figure of the rapporteur represents in fact a procedure intended to permit the comparison of the opposed positions in a controversy regarding the points they share and those where they actually diverge. This is achieved through a process of reformulation, analysis, and synthesis, which gradually modifies the contenders’ perspectives on the issues under dispute. The general principle of this change of perspectives is the rule “Put yourself in the place of the other!”, whose epistemic import is pointed out by Leibniz: “one has to think calmly, after having placed oneself in the place of the other, because this provides considerations that are appropriate to know better the consequences of what oneself does” (Chapter 17). In this way one would be less prone to commit the mistakes that all too often occur in controversies: “One sticks to personal matters, to the readings and considerations that are favorable to a certain party; one does not pay attention to what the opposed party puts forth; and through these and a thousand other maneuvers one employs unintentionally and unawares, one manages to mislead oneself or at least to change, converting or perverting oneself according to what one has met” (NE 2.21.22; A VI 6 182).32 The importance Leibniz attributed to this rule for the proper conduct of controversies is manifest in the fact that, in the heat of the irenic 32

In addition to its tactical and strategic role in the conduct of controversies, the principle “Put yourself in the place of the other!” has not only an epistemological use, but is a fundamental principle of interpretation, as well as an ethico-political use in Leibniz (cf. Dascal 1993, 1995; Naert 1964; Racionero 1995).

xlvi

Introductory Essay 0

+ 6

0

' 1

6 1 L :

+

+ 5

A$& 2 AA '

( 0 AA

1 0

.C3C

,+ $A. C$%&') 2

1 " 7 " # %A$$%#$$9

' +

5 '<

1+

0 5 %>>A &'(

L

W&

+ "

, + 5 '

K

?4 CC C/&9 7 A A%# A%/& #@@&' 1

'

, 7

, E

=

97 . #%> #%.&9 B 9 ) = + 7 / #@$ 1

') +

.. K

'

.C3#97

7

(

E

# A.@ A%%&'', 0 '

,é é "

.C/@

0 K

/ I2

+ ! " #$$&'<

B

.C@A' I8

X

0 +

+ '? 'O & + ,+

$>C&'

+

& '(

Introductory Essay

xlvii

animates it.34 In fact, the mutual reformulation of each other’s positions and arguments has the further advantage of enriching the exchange of perspectives with a parallel exchange of conceptual frameworks or “languages” – an achievement of whose difficulty Leibniz is well aware of: “it seems to me as difficult to make these people change their language as to teach a raven to sing like a nightingale” (Chapter 19). In order to make viable the reformulation of the opponents’ positions and thereby to reconstruct the “true place of the other” in a debate, Leibniz makes use of an arsenal of tools for the implementation of his art of controversies. This arsenal comprises, first, both the ars iudicandi and the ars inveniendi. The former elaborates demonstrative proof (which, when applicable, is supposed to decide conclusively a dispute), as well as the doctrine of mathematical probabilities (which, when applicable, permits the formalization of non-conclusive proof). The latter includes the traditional tools of rhetoric and dialectics, as well as other ones, either adapted from other domains (e.g., the already mentioned ars deciphratoria and ars argutiarum) or created by Leibniz himself, such as a variety of semiotic means (cf. Dascal 1978). In several chapters, the dialectic value of some of these semiotic means is apparent. For example, Chapter 40 contains a synoptic table that is invaluable for sorting out possible controversial points. Or the reconsideration of the Platonic method of division by means of diagrams or tables that reveal its shortcomings, if taken as a sine qua non that does not permit the use of a plurality of ‘intermediate’ genera and species (Chapter 12B). Others are useful ‘formal’ devices for ordering the arguments in a controversy (Chapter 16I). And, on the linguistic end of the semiotic spectrum, one should not forget the fundamental dialectic value of loci communes (Chapter 9D), rhetorical paradoxes (Chapter 16E), the ambiguity of terms (Chapter 16D), real or apparent clashes or concurrence of arguments (Chapter 16B), stratagems (Chapters 16C and 16F), and so on. What is important to keep in mind is that all these texts, which certainly 34

Sometimes Leibniz calls this method of conducting a controversy simply the “exposition method” (methodus expositoria) or the “method of diminished refutations” (methodus imminuti elenchi), thereby showing the internal, rather than necessarily external role of the rapporteur (Chapter 40). The essential contribution of this method to the reconciliation between the adversaries consists, according to him, in showing to each other “the plausibility of the opponent’s arguments” (ibid.). Only when the contenders are incapable of performing by themselves this reformulation task, the presence of the rapporteur – or, as he is called in this text, the annotator (whose mission is “to show that the divergencess are not so many as thought”) – becomes necessary. One should notice that this later position of Leibniz differs from his earlier position (Chapter 1), that grants the actual presence of a ‘director’ of a dispute a fundamental role in avoiding its deterioration.

xlviii

Introductory Essay 5

* 1

1

'D

* .$&' (

5

1

*

+

0 ', +

#>

A#& '

( 5 0 5

' 'A$

V' , 5

' 5

+

A.E&' ( 1

0 &

+

' ' 1

#>&' (

' < 1 0 '5 0' The consensual method is not viewed by Leibniz as opposed to the method of tolerance, but as presupposing it. He refers to “conciliation through consensus” in several juridical texts, where he elaborates upon its underlying idea, namely that it involves the finding or construction of 35

He employs this expression in the synopsis through which he sums up the themes treated by G. Burnet in An Exposition of the thirty nine Articles of the Church of England (Chapter 40). Leibniz’s formula distinguishes between two ways of resolving controversies or of conciliation: per consensum and per tolerantiam.

Introductory Essay

xlix '+ '

*

5

' ' &'7 '"

AC

#$ #39 ?= 3%3&' /' *

?= /AA& 0 ' ' A@&'+

+ : ', +

6

A@&

5 B :

6

5 5

9 : &9 5

:

: : 5

5

5 :

59

59 ' * '

0

0 6

'( (

-

%<

.C@$9! " ...&':;

5 '

0 0 A/ + '

36

On Leibniz’s notion of juridical obligation and its implications, see Racionero (1993). For another sense of ‘obligation’ and its implications, see Chapter 6. 37 In Chapter 8E Leibniz exemplifies this procedure.

l

Introductory Essay

because it expresses (in the metaphysical as well as semiotic senses Leibniz endows this term with) better the real structure of the situation. The clearer this expression is, i.e., the fuller the consensus it corresponds to, the less arbitrary it is and therefore the more it manifests universal harmony. Herein one may perhaps discern the sense of Leibniz’s “eclecticism”. It does not consist in the juxtaposition of apparently reconcilable theses belonging to opposed systems, without modifying such theses – as the Calixtines and others thought to be possible. Nor does it consist in the integration of diverse materials into a synoptic-syncretistic vision – in the Ciceronian way. It consists rather in developing a ‘higher’ viewpoint, wherein the theses in confrontation are inscribed in a more comprehensive order which grants them a new meaning within an harmonious framework. In this respect, Leibniz’s eclecticism corresponds to Leibniz’s ontological notion of harmony: “the commerce of substances or monads does not result from influx but from the consensus whose origin is divine pre-formation” (De ipsa natura; GP IV 510). At the epistemological level, the search for consensus thus functions as a dynamic process whereby reason can overcome what, at lower levels, seem to be irreconcilable contradictions. With the “consensual method” we thus reach the rock bottom foundation for not only resolving but also benefiting from controversies: “When [reason] destroys a thesis, it builds the opposing thesis. And when it seems that it simultaneously destroys the two opposed theses, it is then that it promises something deeper, provided we follow it as far as it can go, not in a spirit of dispute, but with an ardent desire to search for and disentangle the truth, [a desire] that will always be recompensed by some considerable success” ( Théodicée, Discours Preliminaire, 80; GP VI 97). The leibnizian goal, therefore, is neither to amalgamate in a ‘system’ divergent positions nor to merely destroy such divergences; it is rather to integrate them within a broader perspective that explains the reason and meaning of the detected opposition. Contradiction, which is both logically and metaphysically impossible, serves as a trigger of great heuristic fecundity in this relentless movement to overcome it. Controversial reason is always situated and progressive. It is a laborious work towards higher perfection, which operates – analytically and synthetically – upon what is known to us at any given point or situation,38 the aim always being to advance in the establishment of truths that are self-grounded and attested, but not validated, by consensus, in conformity with the ‘method of establishments’ (Chapter 37), with the help of all the means a broader conception of logic and rationality has developed so far and will certainly continue to develop. 38

Recall Leibniz’s ubiquitous use of the expressions ex datis and quoad nos.

Introductory Essay

li

5. Scope It is well known that Leibniz’s major works do not have the form of theoretical treatises. He prefers to present his ideas in the form of dialogical exchanges with his contemporaries. This choice reflects a burgeoning underlying polemical activity, which is no doubt the prevalent modus operandi of Leibniz the thinker and the man of action, whose devise was Theoria cum Praxi. Naturally, his writings on the art of controversies are intimately connected with this polemical activity, and shed light on it. Since Leibniz was engaged in controversies in virtually every topic he dealt with, the scope of application of his art of controversies is practically the totality of his oeuvre.39 As a devoted activist of the irenic cause, church political controversies and their theological counterparts figure prominently in his controversy40 related writings. Leibniz addressed the most important doctrinal and theological questions in debate: predestination, justification, the original sin and its effects upon Adam’s progeny, the relationship between faith and reason and between natural and revealed religion. Beyond countless doctrinal points, what is at stake – on the theoretical and political level – is the very conception of the Church: is it merely an institution with its interests, hierarchical structure, and rules or, above all, a moral entity, whose most distinctive norm is charity? Whatever the answer, it had wide ranging anthropological, cultural, and political implications, e.g., for the conception of human and for the encounter of Christian Europe with other peoples and cultures, in the West, the East, and the South. Although the main objective of Leibniz’s irenic activity was to solve the practical problem of creating a shared doctrinal basis for reuniting Christendom, its theoretical import is immense in his thought. The importance of what was at stake in these controversies and the difficulty in finding solutions were, no doubt, a determinant factor in shaping Leibniz’s art of controversies. The ideas of moderation, of reformulation of the adversary’s position, of “congruent propositions” as an expanded and deeper basis for consensus, etc. take shape in his participation in these 39 40

For analyses of a sample of his controversies, see Dascal (ed.) (Forthcoming b). On the importance of theological and church political concerns in Leibniz’s philosophy, the classical work is Baruzi’s (1907). See also Genin (1980) and Dascal (1975). Leibniz’s participation in the religious negotiations for the reconciliation between the Christian churches is documented in Eisenkopf (1975). See also Racionero (2001). The corpus of religious debates in which Leibniz intervened remains to be compiled, but an approximate idea of its scope can be gathered from the texts in the five first sections of Grua’s edition.

lii

Introductory Essay

controversies and in his reflections about them. Although these ideas did not yield the practical results Leibniz hoped for, they had a lasting effect in Leibniz’s firm belief that controversies can lead to productive results, at least in other areas. As a philosopher of law, Leibniz debated with leading thinkers – among whom some of the most important jurists of his time – about the foundations of justice and of natural law.41 As a jurist, he was considered an authority, and maintained a detailed correspondence on key technical and theoretical issues (see Chapters 31, 36, and 39). He undertook the systematic reform of civil and international European law – an undertaking guided by the concerns for order, clarification, and redefinition of the juridical positive corpus.42 As a lawyer, he experienced the problem of the so-called “hard cases”, where the need of a rigorous method of interpretation arises with particular acuteness.43 In all these capacities, the peculiar nature of juridical confrontations, as well as the potential 41

The two classical books on Leibniz’s juridical philosophy are those of Grua (1953, 1956). In addition to his analysis of the materials he published in his 1948 edition, Grua studies the historical antecedents of each leibnizian theme he presents, as well as the main debates concerning them. Schneiders (1966) and Sève (1989) update Grua’s treatment. See also König (1998), Boucher (Forthcoming a), and Döring (Forthcoming) .There is no available compilation or even catalogue of the juridical polemics in which Leibniz intervened, but their presence in the ensemble of his work is considerable. A follower (although with major modifications) of Grotius’s natural law approach, Leibniz debated mainly with the followers of Hobbes’s voluntarism (Pufendorf, Barbeyrac, Sharrock), as well as with those who, extending this line of thought, began to open the way for juridical individualism (particularly Locke). 42 Leibniz’s most important contribution to the history of the ordering, cataloguing, and codification of laws is the Codex juris gentium diplomaticus (1693), which includes a preface that sums up the principles of his juridical philosophy. The circumstances in which he compiled and selected this corpus of ancient diplomatic laws, as well as the objectives that guided him in this task are described in a letter to Basnage de Beauval of 16 October 1692 (GP III 90). In 1700 he published a second part of this work, the Mantissa Codicis juris gentium diplomatici. 43 See especially his early writings: Disputatio juridica de Conditionibus, a dissertation submitted by Leibniz in 1665 for obtaining the degree of bachelor in law (and published in 1669 without his authorization), and De casibus perplexis in iure, a dissertation that earned him the doctor’s degree from the University of Altdorf in 1667, at the age of 21. In these two dissertations, Leibniz develops a method of evaluation of the juridical norms applicable to hard cases. Although he didn’t elaborate it further, this method comprises a non-mathematical model of the logic of probabilities, to which he often refers to later. This model has been studied by Kalinowski (1977). Miguel Sánchez Mazas, in several of his studies (e.g., 1978), systematized and developed this model, applying to it ideas of the Characteristica Universalis. See also the recent study of the “method of cases” by Boucher (Forthcoming b).

Introductory Essay

liii

applicability to other areas of “juridical logic” became apparent to him (see, e.g., Chapters 5, 10, 31, 38). As a senior counselor at the Mainz and Hanover courts, Leibniz was prevented from engaging in public political disputes.44 Nevertheless, in his correspondence, as well as in his memoranda and notes not intended for publication, the debate form is evident. His contenders are often philosophers who – like Hobbes and Spinoza – had already died.45 But there are also cases of actual political controversies, like the one he conducted in his last years with Saint Pierre about the latter’s plan for a perpetual peace in Europe.46 44

45

46

Such a restriction did not apply to earlier political writings, such as the Specimen demonstrationum politicarum pro eligendo rege polonorum (1669), where he proposed a method to solve the problem of electing the King of Poland, and the Caesarinus Fürstenerius - De Suprematu Principium Germaniae (1677), where he redefined the notion of sovereignty in view of the ‘double sovereignty’ situation in Germany; nor did it apply to writings such as the Mars Christianissimus (1683), which served the antiLouis XIV policies of the German princes. In the period when he was most influential (1690-1710), Leibniz acted not only as a minister of the court of Hanover (where he accumulated the functions of counsel, librarian, and official historian), but also as advisor of the courts of Vienna and Saint Petersburg. By virtue of his special relation with Sophie Charlotte, his voice was also influential in the court of Brandenburg, where he had founded and presided (though only nominally) the Berlin Academy of Sciences. Since 1700 he was also a member of the Paris Academy, by a special decision of Louis XIV. Even after he no longer was in favour in Hanover (which was only relative to his aspirations, for he was not dismissed of any of his jobs), Leibniz’s area of influence grew, both in England – through Princess Caroline of Wales – and in France – through his friendship with duchess Elisabeth-Charlotte and Nicolas Remond, respectively mother and chief counsellor of the regent, Philippe d’Orleans. As far as Hobbes is concerned, see among others the Meditations about the common notion of justice (M 56-81), as well as the Remarks on the French translation of Shaftesbury’s Letter on Enthusiasm (GP III 407-417), which contains a critique of contractualist theories. As for Spinoza, even though there is no text specifically devoted to a refutation of his political theory by Leibniz, part of the analysis devoted to Spinoza in the Preliminary Discourse of the Théodicée may be interpreted in this way. The Abbé de Saint Pierre was couselor of Duke Philippe d’Orléans and wrote, among other political and economic tracts, a project for achieving perpetual peace in Europe. Leibniz’s debate with him is quite peculiar. First, because – contrary to his habit of avoiding political confrontations – Leibniz engaged in it directly and second, because Saint Pierre’s opinions in part became representative of the new French international policy, once the duke became Regent upon Louis XIV’s death. Leibniz may have abandoned his customary caution in these matters because, after the Elector of Hanover moved to England in 1714, he felt free to express his political views; furthermore, he was desperate to establish new contacts in order to avoid isolation. In addition to that, the content of this debate touched upon Leibniz’s long-term defense of a conception of Europe according to which the status quo imposed by the national states (upon which the subsequent policy of a balance of power between France and England was based) should

liv

Introductory Essay

It is, however, in his work as a publicist defending particular political proposals that Leibniz displays his tactical mastery, by employing the full range of rhetorical weapons and other topoi of his art of controversies, in the service of not only winning a particular battle, but always with a view to a more comprehensive solution of political conflicts. One may discern three types of models employed by him in these writings, depending on the nature of the audience and circumstances. In the “secret memorandums”, written upon the request of some prince, he follows the traditional pattern of situational analysis. But he strengthens its logical aspects, so as to make the policy recommendations emerge, at the end, as the logical consequence of weighing the preceding considerations, sometimes as the only possible way, sometimes as the preferred alternative among the few remaining ones.47 The “manifests” were designed as pieces addressed to public opinion in order to justify the necessity or importance of certain decisions already taken or that should be taken by the ruler. Their style is both solemn and passionate, although the use of affective tropes never obscures the thread of reasoning.48 The third and most original of the leibnizian models is the one where he employs the form of a “dialogue”.49 As it were, be overcome. He took thus the opportunity to promote his conception of a peace based on a true “unity in diversity”. The texts of this debate are compiled in Robinet (1995). See also Racionero (2001). 47 For the former, see for example Securitas publica (1670; A IV 1 131-214) or Denkschrift zur Begründung einer neuen protestantischen Kur (1684; A I 4 221-237). For the second, see Consilium Aegyptiacum (1671-1672; A IV 1 217-410), especially the text titled De eo quod Franciae interest (A IV 1 246-252). Although not secret, Leibniz’s plan for the election of the king of Poland (Specimen demonstrationum politicarum pro rege Polonorum eligendo, 1669; A IV 1 3-98) for Baron Boineburg, belongs to this type of model. This text – which is almost a political treatise – begins by praising mathematical demonstration and one of its original formal proposals is the assigning of different weights to the votes of different classes of voters. Nevertheless, its procedures are more dialectical than mathematical. In this sense it is parallel to juridical texts of the same period, such as the Nova Methodus (1667) and the De casibus perplexis in jure (1666). The Specimen was published too late for the election, but Boineburg made use of it in his speech in support of the Count Palatine of Neuburg. 48 The series of tracts written by Leibniz against Louis XIV’s policy are magnificent examples of this category, including several pieces, from Mars christianissimus (1683; A IV 2 446-502) to La justice encouragée (1701; FC III 313-344) and Paix d'Utrecht inexcusable (1713; FC IV 1-147). 49 Leibniz in fact employs this model not only in politics or in polemics, but in all sorts of domains, throughout his life. One of his first writings, the Confessio Philosophi (1674), which establishes the grounds for his project of a rational theology, is in dialogical form, as is also Chapter 3, of the same year. In physics, the long dialogue Pacidius Philalethi (1676) synthesizes his studies on movement. A set of dialogues written in 1679, which Baruzi called “mystical”, are in fact part of his metaphysical and epistemological

Introductory Essay

lv '

( 5 ';

0 5 '$>

' 5 ' 7 1

1

* '-

*

& 9 &'

B '( 0 1

50

5

5

onslaught on skepticism: Dialogue entre Poliandre et Théophile, Dialogue entre Théophile et Polidore, Dialogus inter theologum et misosophum, and Chapter 18. Sometimes the characters in the dialogue are not given names, as in the De connexione inter res et verba (1678; translated in Dascal 1987) or the Dialogus (1677). In these cases, the dialogical form seems to help Leibniz to formulate his own position against traditional views or proposals by other philosophers (in the Dialogus, for instance, he is arguing for an intimate relation between signs and words which avoids the ‘supernominalism’ of Hobbes). Sometimes his “dialogues” reproduce actual conversations, as the Dialogue effectif sur la liberté de l’homme (1695), which transcribes the dialogue he held in the same year with Dobrzensky. Leibniz justifies the use of the dialogical form by the fact that “it insinuates the truth with familiar language, by making apparent the order of meditation that goes from what is known to what is unknown” (Pacidius Philalethi; C 594). Apart from the didactic effectiveness of this rhetorical genre, however, the leibnizian dialogues implement and illustrate the way Leibniz thought controversies following the order of reasons should be conducted. See Chapter 9F for his reflections on the art of writing dialogues. This is remarkably achieved in Chapter 18 and in the Dialogue entre un cardinal et l'amirante [sic] de Castille (1702; FC III 345-359), and less successfully in the Nouveaux essays and the Essais de Théodicée.

lvi

Introductory Essay

advisors.51 His principal advice to a court politician consists in a set of rules for seeking and conducting fruitful discussions with fellow politicians, with open-minded scholars, and eventually also with a spiritual guide. These rules, which go beyond politics for they amount in fact to principles for organizing Leibniz’s own cooperative intellectual work, a work he conducts in so many simultaneous fronts, include recommendations such as: finding an appropriate “companion of studies”; writing down a detailed project of action for oneself, similar to the “instruction one gives to public ministers”; maintaining a list of “all that can be of help, including useful thoughts”; and, above all, taking into account “the point of view of the other”.52 It is well known how eager Leibniz was to submit his metaphysical proposals to discussion by the most important philosophers of his time. He discussed them with his seniors (Hobbes, Spinoza, Arnauld, Malebranche, Locke, J. Thomasius, Huet, Conring, etc.), as well as with members of his age group (Bayle, C. Thomasius, Foucher, Jaquelot, Placcius, de Volder, etc.), and of the younger generation (Hartsoeker, Eccard, Wolff, des Bosses, Wagner, Koch, etc.). In all these intellectual encounters, his aim is threefold: (a) to understand as fully as possible the most important metaphysical alternatives to his own; (b) to identify the shared elements and the remaining divergences; and (c) to sharpen his own system in the light of his competitors’ objections. For example, his confrontation with Spinoza’s system is, for him, the lever for providing a better explanation of the non-deterministic character of his notions of contingency and freedom in a world ruled by pre-established harmony.53 Another example is 51

The best known of Leibniz’s “prince portraits” is the one bearing the title Portrait du prince tiré des qualités et de vertus héroïques du Duc Jean-Frédéric de BrunswickLüneburg (1679; K IV 459-487). The same ideas are elaborated and presented without the panegyric elements in the Projet de l’éducation d’un prince (1690; MA 265-278), which was written for the ambassador La Bondinière. In texts such as these, Leibniz’s views are presented as contrasting with those of Machiavelli. 52 Cf. Chapter 18 (ad finem). For the significance of such rules for Leibniz’s epistemology, see Dascal (2000). 53 Leibniz’s relationship with Spinoza’s philosophy was intense and prolonged. Spinoza and Jungius were the only thinkers whose virtually entire available work was carefully annotated by Leibniz; and in Spinoza’s case, more than once. It is important, however, to point out that the core of Leibniz’s views on contingency and necessity (or on freedom and determinism) had already taken shape before he learned about Spinoza’s philosophy. His first contact with it was through the Tractatus theologico-politicus, which was sent to him by Graevius (April 1671). In spite of the latter’s comment that the Tractatus was a “liber pestilentissimus” (A I 1 142), Leibniz was sufficiently impressed to write immediately to Spinoza (October 1671), under the pretext of requesting information about his optical work. By that time he had already written the Confessio Natura (1668),

Introductory Essay

lvii

Leibniz’s submitting to Arnauld, prior to publication, the first mature version of his metaphysics, the Discours de Métaphysique. When “the great Arnauld” responds by dismissing Leibniz’s thesis summarily, Leibniz is upset and forcefully demands Arnauld’s attention and serious criticism. Leibniz’s insistence leads to a dense and polemical correspondence with Arnauld, whose upshot is a clarification and deepening of the conceptual basis of Leibniz’s metaphysics.54 Through such discussions, controversy becomes an integral part of the system itself and of its constitution, rather than merely a way of defending a ready-made theory. Obviously, since controversy always involves a partner, its course cannot be entirely determined by one’s aims and tactical moves. The story of the relationship between Leibniz and Locke illustrates this fact. Leibniz realized quite early the philosophical importance of Locke’s An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), whose French summary, published by Le Clerc in his Bibliotheque Universelle already in 1688, he read and annotated. In 1696, he “found the draft” of these early comments and sent them to Thomas Burnett, suggesting that he should give them to Locke (GP III 176, 180). But Locke declined to reply to Leibniz’s

54

the Von der Allmacht (1670-1671) and a letter to Wedderkopf (May 1671) – all texts where, no doubt still somewhat immaturely, he had formulated the basis of his enduring solution to the problem above mentioned. In fact, only in 1675 did Leibniz get to know (partially) Spinoza’s Ethica, through a manuscript borrowed from Tschirnhaus. Presumably his fragmentary reading induced Leibniz to try to meet Spinoza. For this purpose he went from London to The Hague in November 1676. He reports that they talked “at length several times” (A II 1 378-381); Spinoza’s references to these conversations describe a rather cold atmosphere (GP I 123-130). Given the lack of trust in which Spinoza lived, it is natural that the reaction of both thinkers was different. At any rate, Leibniz’s reaction was of profound admiration, since between the first and second meetings he writes the Quod Ens perfectissimum existit in order to present it to Spinoza; and immediately after (in December), he writes several notes on topics presumably suggested by the conversations (later included in his De summa rerum book project; GR 263-268; SR). A later plan to go to Holland was abandoned due to Spinoza’s death. But Leibniz continued to be interested in Spinoza’s philosophy. In 1678 he receives from Schuller the Opera postuma, which he reads attentively and annotates profusely (A VI 4 1705-1777; GP I 139-152). It is a well-known fact that Arnauld’s motivation in relation to Leibniz was not purely theoretical. He saw in Leibniz, the Lutheran who had been appointed by the Duke of Mainz to conduct negotiations for the reunification of the Christian churches, a very important potential convert to Catholicism. Leibniz was, of course, well aware of this motivation. Nevertheless he placed the philosophical interest of elaborating a coherent and defensible metaphysics above such a circumstantial interest. On Leibniz’s use of the strategy described in Chapter 16F in the beginning of the correspondence with Arnauld, see Dascal (1995).

lviii

Introductory Essay

comments.55 Nevertheless, with the publication of Coste’s complete French translation of the Essay in 1700, Leibniz developed his earlier comments into a full-fledged commentary, which he intended to publish at some point, still hoping to be able to first discuss the issues with Locke. A new opportunity arose when Lady Masham, Cudworth’s daughter and a close friend of Locke since 1681, wrote to Leibniz in early 1704, inquiring about his reaction to Bayle’s criticism of his system in the article “Rorarius” of the Dictionnaire Historique et Critique. She concluded her letter by saying: “Mr. Locke whose company I am so happy as to injoy in my familie, desires me to present you his humble service” (To Leibniz, 29 March 1704; GP III 338).56 Leibniz undertook to expound to her the principles of his 55

As reported by Burnett, upon receiving Leibniz’s “paper”, Locke declared that this was “the greatest favor done to him by you, whom he much appreciates” (To Leibniz, 30 November 1696; GP III 186). Later on, Burnett suggests that Locke’s unwillingness to reply lies in his satisfaction with a situation where the “German scholars do not know our books, and we do not read theirs”, a situation that prevents “scholarly wars” between the two countries (To Leibniz, 23 July 1697; GP III 208). In fact, however, we know (and Leibniz came to know later, with the posthumous publication of Locke’s correspondence) what Locke’s opinion of Leibniz’s views was. He had read not only Leibniz’s comments on the Essay but also his important epistemological paper, “On cognition, truth and ideas” (1684), published in the Acta Eruditorum. His conclusion was far from flattering: “I must confess to you that Mr. L.-‘s great name had raised in me an expectation which the sight of his paper did not answer, nor that discourse of his in the Acta Eruditorum, which he quotes, and I have since read, and had just the same thoughts of it, when I read it, as I find you have. From whence I only draw this inference, That even great parts will not master any subject without great thinking, and even the largest minds have but narrow swallows” (Locke to Molyneux, 10 April 1697; GP V 6n). Upon learning about these comments, Leibniz also expressed a non-flattering view about Locke’s philosophy, saying that “it contains some good things, but rather thin, and some of them have no solidity whatsoever” (To Caroline, 10 May 1715; K 11 39). 56 In fact, it was Leibniz who first approached Lady Masham, in a letter dated 14 December 1703, with the pretext that he “had learned” that she was about to send him a copy of her father’s Intellectual System. He praises the book as containing “much erudition and as much light combined together”, and declares that he has “contributed a little to this great system that your father has legated to us” (GP III 336). Presumably, Leibniz knew that Locke was living at the Mashams’ residence, and initiated the correspondence with Lady Masham as a way of re-establishing contact with him. No doubt the renewal of his interest in communicating with Locke was also related to the fact that, as established by the Act of settlement of 1703, the House of Hanover was to inherit, sooner or later, the crown of England. Besides the political appeal of becoming the advisor of the king of a major power, Leibniz did not hide his intellectual interest in moving to “a large city like London” (GP III 182), where “sçavants hommes abound, from whom one can benefit and who can help you, for there are many things that a single person cannot do alone” (GP III 175). In this respect he contrasted London and Paris with the grim situation in Hanover, where “one hardly finds with whom to talk” (ibid.).

Introductory Essay

lix

philosophy, interpreting her replies as coming directly from Locke’s mouth.57 Furthermore, given this new opportunity for discussing with Locke – albeit indirectly – Leibniz virtually completed his commentary on the Essay by April 1704 (To Sophie Charlotte, 25 April 1704), a commentary he described as aiming not to refute Locke, but to close the gap between their philosophies as well as “to clarify many things which he (Locke) treats only superficially” (To Sophie Charlotte, 25 April 1704; K 10 230). However, Locke alleged his poor health as a reason for not really entering in the debate Leibniz so hoped for, for it had “put an end to his inquiries into philosophical speculations” (Lady Masham to Leibniz, 3 June 1704; GP III 351). Locke’s death in November 1704, in any case, put an end to Leibniz’s hopes of a fruitful controversy with Locke. Leibniz could have been summarizing this story by saying that “death does not take into account our desires, nor the growth of knowledge” (To Burnett, 7 March 1696; GP III 175). Given the circumstances, Leibniz had no alternative but to engage in a debate with Locke’s text, whose result, the Nouveaux essais sur l’entendement humain, was only posthumously published. What is remarkable is that, although he is the sovereign author of this dialogue, Leibniz undertakes (most of the time) to formulate Locke’s positions in the most faithful and favorable possible way. His aim is clearly not refutation, but rather the integration of Locke’s insights with his own, in order to yield a broader comprehensive system. In this he no doubt follows his own rules for the conduct of a rational controversy, namely moderation, reformulation, expansion of the basic notions and principles, and conciliation at a deeper level. The fact that he decided not to publish the Nouveaux essais after Locke’s death and his justification of this decision testify to his deep belief in the fruitfulness of a direct exchange of views. Referring to his intensive work on the Essay in the months prior to Locke’s death, he wrote several years later: “I have devoted several weeks on remarks on this important work, in the hope of discussing about it with Mr. Lock himself. But his death has stopped me, and brought about that my reflections were left behind, although they were completed. My aim was to clarify things, rather than to refute another’s views” (To Coste, 16 June 1707; GP III 392; our italics).

57

“I consider the correspondence I have with Lady Masham as if it were partly with Mr. Lock himself, for, since he was at her home in Oates when this lady wrote and replied to me about my philosophical hypothesis, making it plain that Mr. Lock saw our letters, it seems that he had some role therein, at least regarding his judgment about it, which he did not hide from that lady” (To Burnett, 2 August 1704; GP III 297-298).

lx

Introductory Essay

The art of controversies was also significant in Leibniz’s scientific work. Let us consider here a single example, which prima facie seems to have no significance other than personal – the famous controversy with Newton about the priority of the invention of the calculus.58 On the face of it, the issue is factual: who was the first to invent a certain mathematical tool? Thus conceived, the dispute might be solved by gathering all the relevant evidence. But things turn out to be not so simple. First of all, what exactly is the mathematical invention claimed by both Leibniz and Newton? Is it indeed “the same”? If we take into account, for example, the different notations used by them, their calculi are not observationally “the same”. (Recall that Leibniz was a semiotician who attributed extreme importance to appropriate notations.) No doubt at a certain level – say, of the mathematical operations permitted by the calculus – “sameness” can be justifiably claimed, and accepted by both contenders. But this does not make the controversy subside. The further question of the new calculus’ significance and function immediately arises. Newton saw in the calculus a tool for handling certain physical problems – which is why he didn’t care to publish his invention in the first place. Leibniz, on the other hand, saw in it the herald of a major revolution that would mark the end of the Cartesian conception of mathematics.59 Furthermore, the further development of the calculus – the “results” it yielded – also become significant in the controversy. Leibniz had a broader view of its significance that led to the rapid expansion of the mathematics of the infinite by himself and his colleagues and disciples, whereas Newton had a limited view of the calculus’ function that kept it within the narrow role of ancilla physicae.60 58

Rupert Hall (1980) is still the most complete account of the dispute between Newton and Leibniz concerning the invention of the calculus, although he doesn’t analyze systematically its argumentative aspects and its broader mathematical significance. Gross (1998) argues that controversies over priority in science are not just psychological or sociological marginal curiosities. 59 This can be gathered from Leibniz’s correspondence with Bodenhausen (collected in GM V and VII) and from the Nouvelles remarques touchant l’analyse des transcendantes différentes de celles de la Géométrie de M. Descartes (GM V 278-279) that Leibniz published in 1692 in the Journal des Sçavans. 60 This is not to say that Leibniz had provided better mathematical foundations for the calculus than Newton. In fact, as pointed out by Bourbaki (1960: 168), none of them provided ‘foundations’ for the calculus – a task that was only accomplished in the 19th century: “one must observe that the way to modern analysis is paved only when Newton and Leibniz, turning their back to the past, accept to look for the justification of the new methods provisionally, i.e., not in rigorous demonstrations but in the fecundity and coherence of the results”. Serfati (Forthcoming) attributes this ‘operational’ or ‘pragmatic’ approach to the issue of ‘providing foundations’ to Leibniz, who reacted in this way to Newton’s disciples insistence – in their controversy with Leibniz’s

Introductory Essay

lxi

Viewed under this light, the former, rather than the latter, may be considered its real “inventor”. This controversy thus illustrates how the various components of Leibniz’s art of controversies must be taken into account in order to assess an apparently simple ‘matter of fact’. The only thing blatantly missing in it was moderation.

6. Significance The Newton-Leibniz controversy illustrates, in addition, another aspect of the close link between a dialectical approach to the construction of knowledge and the peculiar nature of Leibniz’s method – as we shall see. Leibniz’s attitude vis-à -vis the events that prevented his actual dialogue with Locke in fact reveals and puts into practice an original epistemological conception. Instead of assuming the need to begin from the first principles or from scratch – as in a tabula rasa –, he conceives of the construction of knowledge as a historically situated process. One always begins, so to speak, in medias res and, rather than having to clear the ground completely before proceeding, one has to take advantage of the existing conceptual structures in order to make further progress.61 It may well be that Locke’s alleged lack of interest in debates was one of the reasons for his lack of interest in discussing with Leibniz.62 But it is also possible that it reflects an epistemological outlook – profoundly different from Leibniz’s – according

61

62

followers – on a demand for foundations. In any case, the difference between Leibniz and Newton lies rather in the kind of results they envisaged. Unlike Newton, Leibniz stressed not only the broader mathematical implications of the calculus, but also – as we have just seen – the epistemological importance of the “provisional method”. “ I thus understood that the opinions of the ancients should not be demolished, but rather they should be explicated and corroborated, for they are presently condemned and held in contempt for no other reason than [the fact] that their meaning is ignored” (Specimen demonstrationum catholicarum seu apologia fidei ex ratione; GR 30). Leibniz elaborates this theme in his correspondence with Remond, where – against the wholesale rejection of the past prevalent in his time – he defends the existence of a “ perennial philosophy” which rests upon the sediments of truth present in past (and other) traditions: “ By calling attention to these traces of truth in the Ancients, or (more generally) in those that preceded us, one would extract gold from mud, a diamond from its ore, and light from darkness; and it would in fact be a sort of perennial philosophy” (To Remond, 26 August 1714; GP 3 624-625). Locke’ s modus operandi in general, and in particular his rhetoric in the Essay, has been described as “ conversational” rather than “ disputational” (Walmsley 1993). This might have been one reason for his avoidance of an open debate with Leibniz, although in other occasions Locke did not refrain from engaging in private and public controversy – e.g., with Bishop Stillingfleet.

lxii

Introductory Essay

to which communication and debate are essentially external, rather than intrinsic to the formation and evolution of knowledge.63 Leibniz’s epistemological strategy, just as it is opposed to Locke’s, is opposed to the Cartesian requirement of eliminating all dubious beliefs as a precondition for establishing the sure foundations of knowledge. By the same token, it is a more efficient strategy – Leibniz believes – to combat skepticism. In fact, both Locke and Descartes are vulnerable to skeptical objections, in so far as they rely upon the foundational role of either the senses or intellectual intuition – which are the sources of “knowledge” most heavily questioned by the skeptics. Leibniz, on the contrary, by admitting the provisional value of the traditions where knowledge is always embedded, is not equally dependent upon a foundational moment as they are. For him, the search of solid foundations should not deter us from proceeding on the basis of “provisional foundations” in order to advance knowledge. Against Descartes, who “has recommended so much the art of doubting” while at the same time “contenting himself with the alleged evidence of ideas”, Leibniz emphasizes that even axioms must be demonstrated; nevertheless – he continues – “one often can and must be satisfied with relying upon some assumptions, at least until some day one can transform them into theorems, for otherwise one would eventually be stopped too much”.64 Leibniz’s method of analysis and synthesis consists in fact in a double movement, whereby one proceeds to derive results from a provisionally given set of axioms while at the same time trying to ground them upon deeper principles.65 63

64

65

On the correlation between epistemological positions and attitudes towards controversy, see the case of Arnauld vs. Malebranche (Dascal 1990b). On Locke’s ‘externalist’ view of the role of language in thought, as opposed to Leibniz’s, see Dascal (1987, 1994, 1998a). Recommandation pour instituer la science generale (A VI 4 704; GP VII 165). This text, first published by Erdmann, was probably prepared for publication in a French or Dutch journal, according to Gerhardt. Couturat (1901: 148) conjectures that it was intended for the French Academy; upon the Academy’s unfavorable reaction, Leibniz would have addressed Louis XIV himself to sponsor his project. Couturat dates this text at around 1680. Even the most obvious “primary propositions” such as The whole is greater than its part should be demonstrated – and Leibniz undertakes to do so in On the demonstration of primary propositions (1671-1672; A VI 2 479-486; translated in Dascal 1987). But this should not hamper the progress of inquiry: “I am of the opinion that no proposition should be accepted without proof, and no word without explanation; but only in so far as the delay in the investigation of the subject matter can be tolerated” (id.; in Dascal 1987: 147). According to Leibniz, synthesis (whose model for him is the ars combinatoria) begins with the simplest elements in order to generate the complex ones, whereas analysis starts from the complex and seeks to establish the simple elements. However,

Introductory Essay

lxiii

The ultimate reason for proceeding in this way is to avoid delaying indefinitely the useful results of scientific inquiry: it is well known that, as for Bacon, for Leibniz the value of science lies in its contribution to humankind’s happiness (C 169). But the “provisional method” is also relevant for dealing with controversies: “… one must always try to advance our knowledge, and even the establishment of many things upon a few assumptions will not lack utility. For at least we would know that these few assumptions remain to be proven in order to reach a full demonstration, and in the meantime we would have at least hypothetical [demonstrations] and we would get rid of the confusion of disputes”.66 Notice that he speaks of getting rid of the confusion of disputes or of confused disputes (as in Chapter 1) but not of disputes as such. Actually, the “provisional method” functions as a means of introducing order in controversies, and thereby of increasing the hope of solving them rationally. And in so doing, the requirements of rigor, characteristic of the demonstrative method, are not loosened, but rather fastened. To be sure, the assumptions provisionally taken to be true are not certain, but they are far from being arbitrary; they should be explicitly made rather than tacitly taken for granted; the conclusions deduced from them should be rigorously demonstrated and they should be clearly marked as conditional upon the assumptions, so that no reader would be misled.67 Under these strictures, says Leibniz, “one should hope to have many books written in this way, where there would be no danger of error” (A VI 6 450). Without abandoning the ideal of a demonstrative science, Leibniz thus takes a realistic – perhaps one could even say a pragmatist – methodological stance, which fully acknowledges the role of uncertainty in the pursuit of useful knowledge. This realism, in

66

67

the former should not “wait” for the latter to achieve its task, otherwise inquiry would be paralyzed. Instead, both should proceed simultaneously (C 159). A feedback loop between them would ensure the appropriate adjustments of the results obtained and thus permit progress. Therefore, they are both complementary parts of the ars inveniendi (C 167). See Chapter 12 and Dascal (1987: 130-132). Recommandation pour instaurer la science generale (A VI 4 704; GP VII 165). See also Chapter 43, where Leibniz defends the need for ‘bold conjectures’. “… it is very important to make explicitly all the assumptions one needs, without taking the liberty to take them tacitly for granted, under the pretext that the thing is evident by itself through the inspection of the figure or through the contemplation of the idea” (Recommandation, ibid.). “Thus, one is very far from accepting gratuitous principles. To which one should add that even principles whose certainty is not full may be useful, provided one builds upon them only through demonstration. For even though all the conclusions in this case are only conditional and valid only under the assumption that these principles are true, this very connection, as well as the conditional propositions are at least demonstrated” (NE 4.12.6; A VI 6 450).

lxiv

Introductory Essay

turn, is not only practically useful, but also methodologically justified, in so far as, given our cognitive limitations, we cannot know in advance the perfect demonstrative order, which we can approach only in the course of the growth of our knowledge.68 Leibniz’s ‘pragmatist’ attitude towards a calculus that ‘worked’ without (both) its inventor(s) being able to provide its foundations is not – unlike perhaps Newton’s – casual: it is consonant with the methodological stance we have just described. Under this light, he and Newton seemingly diverge at a deeper level – namely, their attitude vis-à-vis a controversy’s epistemic value. For Newton, as shown in his performance in other debates he was involved in (cf. Dascal 1998b), experimental results are supposed to decide unequivocally any truly scientific contest; if a contender refuses to accept the verdict of such results, he can only do so because of hidden motives that have nothing to do with the scientific enterprise, and there is no point in pursuing a debate of this kind. On this view, there is no room for a controversy where the contenders, by the very act of disagreeing, contribute to the clarification of the issue and the eventual emergence of alternative conjectures for explaining their divergences as well as the experimental results about whose interpretation they diverge. Needless to say, at this point, that this attitude is quite different from Leibniz’s, for whom controversy is not only useful, but presumably also constitutive of a construction of knowledge that cannot but be collective. This suggests that controversies are essential for Leibniz’s modus operandi, i.e., for his “method”. Unlike Malebranche, he does not consider them as a disturbance one has to engage in only to protect one’s reputation.69 Nor are they – as for Descartes – something accessory, a mere 68

69

“The perfect scientific order is the one where propositions are ranged according to their simplest demonstrations, and in such a way that they flow from each other, but this order is not known in advance, and it is increasingly discovered with the perfectioning of science. One can even say that the sciences abbreviate themselves by augmenting themselves – which is a quite true paradox, for the more one discovers truths, the more one is in a position to notice in them an ordered sequence and to formulate ever more universal propositions, from which the others are nothing but instances and corollaries” (Discours touchant la methode de la certitude et l’art d’inventer pour finir les disputes et pour faire en peu de temps des grands progrés; A VI 4 959; our italics). In his 20-years long controversy with Arnauld, Malebranche often complains that the former makes use of railing rather than argument, with the aim of exciting the imagination and the passions and thereby winning the audience’s favor (e.g., Oeuvres Complètes VI 141, 267). He takes this situation to be the rule in controversies, which he considers to be useless for the acquisition and growth of knowledge. His only reason for engaging in this controversy, he declares, is to protect his credibility against Arnauld’s attempts to undermine it (ibid. VI 189). Dascal (1990b) argues that Malebranche’s attitude vis-à-vis controversies is not only tactical, but derives from his epistemology: it

Introductory Essay

lxv

device used by an essentially monologic reason to confirm one’s convictions. To be sure, Descartes employs what Beyssade and Marion (1994) call a “responsorial schema”. These authors point out that at the end of the Discours de la Methode he asks for comments and criticisms; the Meditations provide a reply to the metaphysical criticisms leveled against the Discours; Descartes sends the manuscript to a selected group of scholars, whose objections, along with his replies he publishes together with the original text in a single volume. He thus makes use of a dialogical process that seems to play a significant role in the development of his thought. Nevertheless this role is far from constitutive, as it is for Leibniz. For what Descartes wants to obtain by this process is to dispel possible misunderstandings of his position and to present it so as to eliminate any possible future mistakes.70 There is no question of modifying – at least explicitly – his previously formulated views. In so far as there is ‘controversy’ with his objectors, it is not intended to absorb whatever is valuable in their insights. The objectors function only as a test-group for the clarity and distinctness of the author’s views. In this sense, for Descartes, the responsorial schema plays no significant role in the formation of knowledge. As we have seen, this is not the case in Leibniz’s conception of controversies and their use in knowledge formation. In the light of this constitutive role, one can understand why the art of controversies functions as an overarching principle of organization for Leibniz’s various logical, rhetorical/dialectical and methodological concerns. This, in turn, contributes to elucidating the nature of Leibniz’s appeal to “formalism”. No doubt the importance he attributed to the choice of appropriate notations (cf. Cajori 1925) and his endless attempts to

70

is the attitude of a Platonist philosopher who firmly believes that knowledge is achieved through meditation, not through dialogue. For instance, he takes the first series of objections, by Caterus, as a courteous attempt to “help” him, rather than as those of an adversary. Consequently, he takes them as an occasion to explain the meaning of key terms he had used in the Meditations, e.g., the term ‘idea’: Caterus, says Descartes, “feigns to understand my words quite differently from what I intended, in order to give me the opportunity to explain them more clearly” (First Replies, AT IX 81). And he concludes his Sixth Replies (to the objections of a group of theologians and philosophers) by claiming that the very fact that these learned and authoritative scholars, in spite of their “extremely exact and extensive examination” of his text, have not found “any error or paralogism in my demonstrations”, proves their solidity (AT IX 244). The same attitude can be found in Descartes’s mathematical correspondence. For example, in his quarrel with Fermat he accuses the latter’s objections of involving either paralogisms or misunderstanding: “in each point he objects to again, he either commits a new paralogism, or he corrupts the sense of my reasons, thus showing that he has not understood them” (AT II 12-13).

lxvi

Introductory Essay

“algebricize” logic suggest a narrow interpretation of this notion, as a brilliant but unsuccessful anticipation of modern logic.71 But Belaval (1960) has shown that it has a much broader epistemological scope, if contrasted with the “intuitionism” that underlies Descartes’s method. In our view, this insightful characterization must be further extended by acknowledging the fact that, for Leibniz, ‘formal’ includes all sorts of systematic procedures, in addition to the use of formalized calculi. His “method” consists in taking advantage, on each occasion and for each kind of subject matter, of the most adequate component of a rich arsenal of different kinds of “formalisms”, not necessarily reducible to a narrow conception of logical form. From the viewpoint of the role of the art of controversies in Leibniz’s methodology, a better understanding of his conception of rationality can be achieved. Rationality, for him, is not monological, but dialogical;72 it is not confined to algorithmic methods, but comprises a variety of heuristic procedures as well; it goes beyond the domain of the necessary that pertains to all possible worlds, for it is embodied and situated in the actual world. In short it is a rationality that – to use an expression of Leibniz himself (Chapter 15) – can be said to be “softer” (blandior), a rationality that comprises more than calculative-demonstrative rationality alone. If there is a controversy Leibniz the rationalist and the believer cannot afford not to win, it is the battle with the skeptics of his time. The art of controversies would be useless if it could not provide the means for facing this challenge. And it does, providing – as it should be expected in the light of the principle of the other’s place – an appropriate strategy for each kind of skeptic opponent. We find indeed, in the chapters of this volume, at least four different types of skeptic, whom Leibniz combats with different strategies. Let us examine each of them. In Chapter 2, Hobbes is picked up as the representative of skeptical relativism. Appeals to right Reason in order to decide, for instance, 71

72

Couturat (1901: 386-387) argues that Leibniz “possessed almost all the principles of Boole’s and Schröder’s logic, and on some points he was even more advanced than Boole himself”; nevertheless, his system of logic ultimately failed because “algorithmic logic (i.e., rigorous and exact logic) cannot be based on the confused and vague notion of comprehension”. In the same vein, Couturat claims that Leibniz disregarded the mathematical work on probabilities of his contemporaries because they did not realize that probability theory should be “a part of logic”, i.e., it should have “its own special symbolism and algorithm” (p. 249). For another, ‘semiotic’ interpretation of Leibniz’s notion of formalism, see Dascal (1978: passim). In Chapter 4 Leibniz introduces a justification of the referential power of language in its communicative use that might be considered as a foundation for what today one might call a dialogical theory of meaning.

Introductory Essay

lxvii

controversial legal issues, whose solution is not explicitly dictated by positive law – he argues – are useless, because one can always ask “whose reason?”, thus either incurring in infinite regress in the search of a criterion or in arbitrariness. To which Leibniz responds: “But those who object in this way have not, so far, understood what I have in mind. In the first place, it is not clear that it is impossible to choose right reason as a judge, at least in some questions, examples of which follow” (Chapter 2, paragraph 56). His examples are “questions that are immediately obvious to the senses”, where “there is no need for another judge of controversies besides the senses themselves” (paragraph 57) and questions “amenable to calculation”, where “the necessary conclusion emerges with maximum evidence” (paragraph 58). The certainty of sensory evidence or mathematical proof is thus the reply to the skeptic. Although this chapter introduces the image of the Balance of Reason pointing out all the care necessary for properly using Reason and provides a set of subtle procedures for the difficult hermeneutic problem of interpreting the Scriptures and the mysteries of faith, Leibniz is here still, as far as the battle against skepticism is concerned, a Cartesian, in spite of professing not to be one.73 In Chapter 18, the ‘adversary’ is not a doctrinaire skeptic, but simply a learned and intelligent gentleman who is disappointed with the variety of methods that purport to provide secure means to attain knowledge – especially with those methods supposedly capable of overcoming doubt. This is not a reason for Leibniz not to address seriously the objections this man, who comes to him in the hope of overcoming his doubts, raises. Quite on the contrary, for this is the kind of man that a philosopher like Leibniz, who is himself weary of Cartesianism, should be able to rescue from the grip of skepticism. To achieve this, he employs a dialectic strategy which, rather than attempting to refute head-on, in a dogmatic way, the objections, argues from the point of view of the opponent, acknowledging the weight of some of his reasons and even justifying them. In a Socratic way, he seeks thereby to lead the opponent to admit the possibility that he might be wrong, thus paving the way for him to persuade himself – with the help of some guidance and a set of practical rules – of the unjustified nature of his generalized doubt and of the possibility of overcoming it.

73

“I confess that I am nothing less than a Cartesian” (To J. Thomasius, 20 April 1669; A II 1 15). Responding to Galloys’s ‘phenomenalism’ and ‘probabilism’ (cf. Chapter 22), Leibniz also appeals to the certainty of evidence, arguing that not everything is appearance nor merely probable – which he exemplifies in a Cartesian vein: that I feel myself feeling (me a me sentiri sentientem) is something that is absolutely certain, although it is a truth of fact (To Galloys, 1672; A II 1 222-229).

lxviii

Introductory Essay

In Chapter 41, Leibniz confronts Bayle, a skeptic who skillfully uses reason and the art of disputation in order to argue for the irrationality of faith. Here, again arguing from the point of view of the opponent, Leibniz employs ‘hard’ reason and the rules of disputatio – especially the asymmetry between proponent and opponent concerning the burden of proof. This strategy allows him to distinguish (a classical move in disputatio) between objections that prove the falsity of a thesis and those to which so far no satisfactory response has been found. The latter only show that the thesis is difficult to defend (and perhaps also that its current defenders are incompetent), but not that it is indefensible. Since the rules do not require the proponent to prove the truth of the thesis, he takes this distinction in order to refute Bayle’s objection, as it is formulated in the response to Le Clerc. In Chapter 45, Leibniz mercilessly attacks arguments that he dubs “merely Pyrrhonic” for their absurd consequence, namely, that they would imply that all opinions are indistinguishable as to their factual value. That this is not the case can be shown, in some cases, by traditional logic. When this is not sufficient, a ‘new logic’, capable of dealing with nondemonstrative arguments, will do the job. This short paragraph, written half a year before Leibniz’s death, summarizes the punch of his mature strategy against a skeptic: Whenever possible, a deductive knockout; when not, a series of knock downs using the broader repertoire of non-demonstrative logic. The amplification of the notion of rationality is essential for facing skepticism’s onslaught on rationalism, which the skeptics equate with the attainment of certainty. Leibniz’s rationalism refuses to accept the combat in these terms, for it refuses to reduce the scope of rationality to the limits imposed by such an equation. By including within the scope of rationality procedures that do not necessarily yield certainty, Leibniz extends the range of rational beliefs and actions to those areas which skeptics and narrow, ‘harder’ rationalists alike would be forced to exclude from rationality’s domain. Against Descartes’s demand to accept as true only what is absolutely certain (which excludes beliefs tainted even by minimal reasons for doubt), the skeptic argues that in all alleged absolute certainties it is possible to disclose minimal reasons for doubt. Consequently, if rationality requires absolute certainty it is to be found practically nowhere. Facing the narrow rationalist’s position that demands a total inclination of the “Balance of Reason” in order to accept something as true, the skeptic contends that this Balance in fact never inclines towards one of the scales, i.e., that it remains forever in equilibrium (isostheneia), since there are always reasons of equal weight for and against any position. While the

Introductory Essay

lxix

skeptic seeks to suppress altogether the role of reason as a guide for rational decisions and beliefs, the narrow rationalist insists that reason is able to perform this role, but actually reduces it to the very limited domain of certain or necessary truths. What Leibniz’s broader conception of rationality – which, pace Couturat (1901: 259) goes well beyond the calculus of probabilities – offers is a way out of this dilemma (cf. Dascal 2005). By admitting that reasons have different weights, that debates take place in an asymmetrical space structured by presumptions, that to attain knowledge one does not have to begin with absolute foundations or with a tabula rasa, Leibniz’s “art of controversies” shows that the absence of certainty does not necessarily lead to the paralysis of isostheneia. He thereby substantiates his claim that reason can “incline without necessitating”.74 Nothing could be a clearer proof of the central role of the art of controversies for Leibniz.

7. Policies The selection of texts was guided by the bias that motivates this volume. Unlike what Leibniz requires from his rapporteur (Chapter 19), we want to state from the outset the parti pris underlying the conception of this volume. It is grounded on the view that the usual, logically based picture of leibnizian rationality severely limits the scope and nature of his rationalism. We believe that, in addition to and along with strict, deductive logic, Leibniz has elaborated also a variety of tools intended to capture other aspects of rationality, both practical and theoretical, which complete the picture by letting us be reasonable also in situations where our choices cannot derive from logical considerations alone. Controversies are one such situation – certainly not the only one. They require whoever wishes to be reasonable in participating in them or judging the positions in confrontation to weigh carefully the reasons adduced in favor of each. Ideally – as Leibniz himself thought it possible – this might be done by a sort of logicinspired calculus. Some of the best texts in which Leibniz expresses this belief are translated in this volume. For example, Chapter 21B contains the often quoted passage where Leibniz claims that, with his proposed method, controversies could be solved by an unquestionable computation. What those who quote this passage systematically forget to mention are the hedges in quantum and ex datis through which he severely limits the scope of the calculative procedure. They also overlook the fact that this text 74

This phrase is included by Leibniz in the summary of paragraph 13 of the Discours de Metaphysique (Lestienne edition, p. 42).

lxx

Introductory Essay ?

< 'D

:

5

0 ' 6 6

0

'(

1 0

1 0

0 '7

0

' ( 0

5

'( ' 6

&

'D 1 1 ' 2

0

5

' E

1 *

1

+ 5

&

0'D 0 ' +

1

1 7

5

'

Introductory Essay

lxxi

The ordering of the chapters is mainly chronological, with the intention of giving an idea of the evolution of Leibniz’s ideas about controversies. Yet, as in other domains, it is surprising how many of Leibniz’s ideas are so to speak pre-formed and indestructible, recurring in and on from the beginning to the end of his career, so that talk of a linear evolution is always problematic regarding his career. In some cases the chronological criterion was superseded by the criterion of thematic grouping. In this way, closely related texts – usually very short – could be put together in a single chapter in order to provide some ‘critical mass’ to a particular aspect of the art of controversies. This criterion, in its turn, was violated in the case of certain texts – notably Chapter 17 – which, being relevant to various thematic groupings and sufficiently important on their own, were kept apart as a separate chapter. Our goal was to provide a representative collection of those texts that form the “non-logical” bulk of Leibniz’s “art of controversies”. As far as the present state of the edition of Leibniz’s works goes, and as far as we could find out concerning the unpublished manuscripts, our compilation has probably achieved this goal – with an important proviso. We have not included in this volume excerpts of easily available and translated works (such as the Nouveaux essais or the Théodicée) which are directly pertinent to the “art of controversies”. We have included chunks of Leibniz’s correspondence which are relevant to the book, either because they discuss controversies or because in them Leibniz actually engages in debates in different domains. No doubt in his huge correspondence other letters relevant for this volume might be found. Our main criterion here was to look for those letters that explicitly refer to the principles, aims, strategies, tactics and moves, either of controversies in general or of the specific controversial issues the correspondence in question deals with. In this respect, obviously we could not aim at completion. Nor could we, however, ignore the correspondence altogether, since – after all – most of Leibniz’s polemical activity (and a significant part of his reflection about controversies) was conducted in his correspondence. In some cases we found it useful to group in a single chapter a number of related texts that, together, reveal some particular aspect of Leibniz’s art of controversies. Whenever available, we used the version of the texts as published in A. In other cases, we checked the published versions with the manuscripts and, eventually, translated also parts of the manuscript omitted by the editors. Our translation policy was to produce a fluent and readable English text, while keeping the flavor as well as the terminological and stylistic peculiarities of Leibniz’s Latin, French or German. Admittedly, this is not an easy task. Our note-policy was designed with a view to making this

lxxii

Introductory Essay

volume useful for Leibniz scholars, historians of ideas, logicians, rhetoricians, argumentation theorists, pragmatists, philosophers, as well as for a larger audience. We also had in mind to let the reader experience the incredibly rich, multi-faceted network of disciplines, themes, issues, texts, and authors that constituted the dialogical background within which Leibniz’s thought took shape and evolved dialectically. Our cross-reference policy, across the chapters of this book as well as to other writings in the Leibniz corpus, is intended to bring to mind the plurality of methods and applications of Leibniz’s art of controversies, out of which a coherent picture emerges. With these policies, we purport to share with the reader our exciting hands-on experience of the plural forms, sources and domains of Leibniz’s pluralism. The art of controversies is a crucial component of this pluralism. For it is concerned with no less than the ability to be critical and yet to be able to discern what can be learned from each doctrine, ancient or modern, close or distant; with the ability to go beyond apparent oppositions, to uncover their possible convergences and to create the basis for their reconciliation in a ‘system’ whose unity is not achieved through the elimination of the particularity and opposition of its components, and nevertheless is ‘organic’.

Chapter 1 VICES OF MINGLED DISPUTES

In a letter of 26 April 1668, Baron Boineburg, Prime Minister at Mainz, writes to Hermann Conring*, the most important of the Calixtines in Hanover, that he had met the young Leibniz who had made upon him a very good impression, which is why he had given him a juridical appointment at the Mainz court. His intention was to include the young Leibniz in the group of intellectuals of various confessions working at the project of reunification of the Christian churches, a group to which Conring, Professor of Politics and Medicine at Helmstedt, belonged. Presumably upon Boineburg’s request, Leibniz sends Conring by the end of the 1660’s his Nova methodus discendae docendaeque Jurisprudentiae (1667), where he mentions that the preparation of a jurist would benefit much from a study of how debates are conducted in tribunals. They engage in a 10-year long correspondence, debating intensely issues such as the kinds of logic used in law (A II 1 168), the distinction between demonstrative and probable knowledge and their fields of application (A II 1 29-31, 34-35, 394-397, 397-400, 418-420), the politically pregnant question of the coherence of the various positive legal systems in force at the time in different countries with canonical law and with the universal principles of natural law (A II 1 30-31, A II 1 30-31, 33-35, 41-43). It is reasonable to assume that the present text, written in this period, was related to the interests shared by Boineburg, Conring and Leibniz, namely, setting the stage for resolving political, religious, legal and other controversies in a rational way. Leibniz examines systematically several possibilities of conducting a dispute progressively complicating them with additional variables, indicates the drawbacks of each of them, and towards the end, before the text is interrupted, tends to favor a model where disputes are guided by a “director” and opinions, arguments or “votes” are weighed rather than simply counted.

Date: 1668-1671 Edition: A VI 2 387-389 Language: Latin 1 M. Dascal (ed.), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. The Art of Controversies, 1–6. © 2006 Springer.

2

Chapter 1

(1) A mingled dispute is a dispute in which the form of reasoning is not respected.1 In it, either a conclusion is not to be sought or it is to be sought. (2) If a conclusion is not to be sought, the dispute is useless, unless one only looks for pleasure; if a conclusion is to be sought, the votes are either to be counted or to be weighed. Furthermore, either it is possible to dispute or not to dispute. (3) If the votes are to be counted, then either all [participants] are informed or they are not informed. If all are informed, and if the votes are to be counted, and if it is not possible to dispute, then it will be useless for the voters to adduce reasons. For there is no hope that someone will easily abandon his opinion on the basis of reasons not his own; it would suffice then that each one be asked for his opinion and that he reply without giving any reason, for he would reason in vain. (4) If all [participants] are not informed but only a few are, who have to inform the others, and if the votes are to be counted and it is not permissible to dispute, then, regardless of whether the informed ones disagree or agree with each other, it will be very difficult for the non-informed ones to adjudicate the truth of their assertions, in case the issue is to be orally decided on the spot. (5) If the decision takes some time, then certainly the others can write down what they hear (for this they are given paper) and evaluate it at their leisure; although it may happen that both the speakers – in their oral exposition – and the hearers – in receiving the information – omit many things, perhaps quite important ones. Whereas, when the matter is put in writing, then it often happens that it is expounded rather slowly and in an awkward fashion, by virtue of the difficulties due to reading.a (6) If those who are to be informed assent once the information is given, the thing is clear; whereas, if they dissent, then we are back in the situation where all are informed; but if [some participants] add something new, then they are to be considered the informed one, the others those to be informed, and we are back in the first situation.

1

Earlier version: “… which has no order of argumentation” (… cuique ordo argumentandi non est). In paragraph 8 Leibniz spells out some of the problems that the lack of a proper order of argumentation creates.

1. Vices of Mingled Disputes

3

(7) If the votes are to be counted and there is the possibility of disputing, then either there is a director, who acts as such, or there is no director. If there is no director, the entire dispute is useless, since [it is assumed here that] the votes are to be counted, not weighed; for, unless there are secret reasons or unusual maneuvers (artificia), hardly anybody will shift from his own opinion to that of the other in public discussions, especially in juridical matters; and, in most cases, there is no way to determine whether some conclusion follows and how it is to be reached in matters of great dispute; the same occurs, for opposite reasons, in political deliberations, where interest itself demands at times that one abandon one’s opinion and cease to insist on it. Furthermore, if there is no director, then either it is possible to reply and dispute ad infinitum, or else one can say to the other, from the first moment, “I have already expounded my opinion; expound now yours; there is no reason to [continue to] dispute” – except when the other replies giving information that prevents [the audience] from shifting to the opposing party. (8) If for the above reason one continues to reply, then either this is done through alternating turns of speech or through a continuous peroration.b If the reply allows for alternation or permits interpolations by the other, the following problems arise: (a) each [participant] is not able to complete his line of reasoning; (b) we forget the preceding reasons when discussing the present one; (c) although we wish to connect the present reason with the others, the tedium of the first discussion eliminates, in the other discussions, the desire to listen to the remaining [reasons], leading to a decline in attention; (d) the hearers of these disorganized repartees end up forgetting them [all] or becoming confused. In these ways it becomes hopeless both to convince the adversary – who can always jump from one topic to another, to elude the reasoner, and to pursue the matter ad infinitum – and to persuade an audience that has been confused or bored. (9) If, on the other hand, the dispute is through a continuous discourse, then the first of the problems above disappears, since anyone can complete his argumentation. But another problem arises: reasons are not opposed to reasons, a man does not face another man, a foot is not matched by another.2 This allows one to elude the adversary’s best arguments and to repeat, instead, that which was refuted a hundred times, not to speak of the possibility that both the speaker and his audience forget what has already been said, thereby entering into countless replicas. 2

This is a usual expression in the 17th century, referring to the foot as a measuring unit that had different values in different countries.

4

Chapter 1

(10) A type of dispute by continuous peroration is the written one, which has the advantage that it avoids forgetting what was said, since everything is recorded. But it has against it the reader’s fatigue, due to the inevitable length, since everything is necessarily longer when written; and, here too, forgetfulness is a threat, as can be seen from the many examples of those who have engaged in disputes by publishing books against each other.c A further problem arises: the possibility of prolixity and of copying from others is more tempting in writing than viva voce, since in speech one must be fearful of the audience’s judgment before leaving, which is not the case in writing, since letters do not blush. (11) If there is a director, with the power to formulate questions adequately and to interrupt or terminate the dispute whenever appropriate (even though he may not have the authority to impose [his views] on the others – an authority about which I do not wish to speak here), then, assuming that this director is prudent and good, the dispute may have a [successful] end. For the director either formulates from the beginning preliminary questions, or else he formulates them in view of the discrepancies between the parties. And, whenever a new reason is advanced, he suspends the counting of the former and inquires about the new reason. In this way, he can completely avoid leaving arguments without refutation, since from the reasons of the reasons he can always formulate [the] new emerging questions, thus avoiding the omission of anything. Therefore, if such a good and smart director is available, there is hope that the majority [of disputes] can be handled correctly. However, the directors are often not so clever and skilful; sometimes they are clever but mischievous, and they employ the art of formulating questions – be they preliminary or emergent – only in those matters useful to them or in those where they have some particular interest. Thus, justice depends upon their will, which is in a way deplorable.d (12) And it is quite common in all these situations that only by chance one reaches a decision, which is as often just as unjust. For in most cases the reasons – be they the final ones, the first ones, or those adduced in particular circumstances – tend to remain tenaciously fixed in the mind, thereby escaping from the [power of the] director and of any other [person]. Furthermore, under the threat of the tedium of a long dispute, a minor reason may become as decisive as a solid one.e Besides, to trust only the director’s goodness and prudence is alien to the reasons of justice as well as of politics.

1. Vices of Mingled Disputes

5

(13) Finally, it is totally unjust to count the votes, especially those of the [civil] servants.3 Such a counting is more tolerable when the advisors are themselves the interested parties, thus risking their own skins, as it happens in companies (societatibus). But what is in question here are matters pertaining to the prince or to the common good. Why should the prince, or the director appointed by him, comply with the majority, as if, by caprice of the Gods, the prince were nothing but one more among the advisors?f (14) Consequently, the votes should be weighed. But then, the disputes may be endless. Indeed, this would happen if they were not submitted to any rules. However, it is possible to submit them to firm and solid rules, so that [one may proceed] as quickly as in other [matters], and avoid every doubt without the danger of being mistaken, without omitting or repeating anything, without there being a reason without a response nor a response without its reply [if it is so admitted], without shifting to another [theme] before concluding the preceding one, without anything being said without proof, and nothing being concluded except formally.g a

On Leibniz and the medieval disputatio, see Introductory Essay, section 3; see also Chapters 38 and 27, note 6. For an overview on disputatio, see Weijers (Forthcoming); for scholastic meta-disputation on disputatio, see Martin (Forthcoming). b Leibniz refers here to the traditional distinction between dialectics and rhetoric, the former dealing with discourse that alternates between speakers, whereas the latter deals with continuous speech. See Quintillian, II, 20, 7: “There are two genres of speech: the one, long and continuous, which follows rhetoric; the other, concise, which follows dialectics”. This distinction, common in Hellenistic rhetoric, comes from Aristotle, as reported by Alexander of Aphrodisia, In Topicis 5-7 (Wallis edition). c This is a critique of written disputations that was customary since the Renaissance. In his letter to Christian Northoff of 1497, Erasmus, for one, criticizes the pedagogical method based on the study of medieval disputations, whose reading “only helps to learn barbarism with enormous effort” (barbariem immenso labore discere iuvat; Opus Epistolarum Des. Erasmi Roterdami Denuo Recognitum et Auctum per P. S. Allen, M. A. et H. M. Allen, Oxonii, in Typographeo Clarendoniano, 1922, vol. I, p. 173). As opposed to this method, Erasmus stresses the virtues of an education based on “the art of conversation”: “Also, the conflict and as it were the fight between minds is what demonstrates, excites and increases the nerve of the spirit” (Conflictatio quoque et tanquam palestra ingeniorum nervos animi praecipue tum ostendit, tum excitat, tum adauget; ibid.) On this view, through the simulation of verbal disputes where the most capable students “function as arbiters of the debate”, one teaches the students to “be obliged to correct each other mutually” (ut ipsi quoque inter sese alius alium emendent; De ratione studii, in Opera Omnia, vol. II, 3 The Latin term here, officialium, is ambiguous as between civil servants or artisans. We have opted for the first meaning, since the civil servants are those likely to have more vested interests in public disputes, and Leibniz is trying to formulate the most neutral possible framework for non-mingled disputes. Furthermore, Leibniz goes on to speak about the prince.

6

Chapter 1

p. 125). For the sources and epistemological significance of this leibnizian critique, see Introductory Essay, Sections 3 and 6, respectively. d Leibniz is here pointing out how human debility and the influence of one’s interests can be determinant over and above considerations of rationality, method, and justice. For a similar realistic assessment of human performance, see Chapter 18, written more than 10 years later. Contrary to Voltaire’s opinion, it turns out that Leibniz was far from naïve. e This can be taken as a subtle indirect critique of the skeptic isostheneia. Leibniz is suggesting that the apparent success of the skeptic’s strategy of providing a contrary argument of the same weight to any given claim is merely a result of the circumstances in which disputes usually take place. It is due to these circumstances that reasons that, as such, are not of the same weight, seem to be so. Here too, he is anticipating his later antiskeptical writings (such as the text mentioned in the preceding note). f In Leibniz’s political thought, a constant theme is his defense of absolutism, in the sense of the priority of the “common good” over individual rights. It is in this context that the issue of the “weighing” of votes arises. A crucial text in this respect is Leibniz’s Remarques Considérables sur la Jurisprudence (1676; A IV 1 572-577). Leibniz points out that, although the weight of an opinion or proposed course of action has to do with its probability of being true and useful and the force of the reasons justifying it, it also depends upon the degree of generality of the point of view taken by the proponent of the opinion in question. In this sense, it is indispensable for Leibniz that a prince be advised by a council of “sages” (Letter to Falaiseau, July 1705; K IX 142) capable of rising above their limited interests, whose opinions, therefore, carry more weight than those dictated by individual interests (Consultatio de naturae cognitione; 1679; A IV 3 866-882; K III 312330). In this respect, the scientific academies he sought to create were politically significant too. The prince, however, is the supreme representative of the common good and its administrator (Letter to Landgrave Enrst von Hessen-Rheinfels, 14 August 1683; A I 3 314), and should operate from a point of view taking into account the entire “environment”, as someone who builds a house where he is not going to live or plants an orchard of whose fruits he is not going to eat (Memoire pour des personnes eclairées et de bonne intention, 1692; K X 21). This global perspective – rather than his personal interests – is what grants the prince’s vote more weight than any other vote. g Leibniz, after having brilliantly diagnosed the problem, concludes his analysis suggesting that there is a way out, but without spelling it out. Perhaps the spelling out of what might be for him a solution at the time is to be found in Chapter 2.

Chapter 2 THE CONTROVERSY OF CONTROVERSIES

This is an extremely rich and carefully thought text, in which Leibniz makes substantive contributions to a number of important problems with which he was very much concerned – including, among others, Scriptural hermeneutics, the resolution of religious and philosophical controversies, a suitable model for juridical procedure, and the role of subjective factors in rational decision. What is remarkable is how he systematically elaborates – in a seamless interplay of detail, argument, and generalization – a model of rationality that is capable of suggesting solutions for all the above problems. The picture he elaborates is that of the rational endeavor as consisting in the ‘weighing of reasons’ in a ‘rational balance’. This model can be successfully applied to so many different problems and fields precisely because it points the way to overcome arbitrariness – the greatest enemy of rationality in Leibniz’s view – also in the broad range of situations where certainty is unattainable. No wonder that both the metaphor of the ‘balance’ and that of the ‘judge of controversies’ pervade his thought and writings throughout his life (see, among others, Chapters 5, 7, 8, 40). In all likelihood, Leibniz was prompted to write this fairly elaborate text by the publication of the Tractatus generales de controversiis fidei (Köln, 1670), by the brothers Adriaan and Peter van Wallenburch – a book he later excerpted and annotated (A VI 4 2471-2472). Born in Rotterdam, in a Reformed family, the two brothers converted to Catholicism and became known as the “controversialist Catholic brothers”. Against the Protestants’ claim that Scripture itself is the only ‘judge’ necessary for resolving theological disagreements, they argued that this amounts to confusing the law with the judge, and contended that without the authority of the latter it is impossible to interpret correctly the Scriptural text and thereby settle whatever disagreements that arise. After nearly 150 years of religious controversy initiated with the Edit of Worms (1521), the debate in the 1660’s shifted to the question whether an institutional authority was required as a ‘judge’ or whether reason alone would be sufficient for deciding. This issue had recently been the object of an intense polemic between Lodewijk Meyer, a friend of Spinoza, and Johann Ludwig Wolzogen, which is mentioned by Leibniz in paragraph 33 (see notes i and j).

7 M. Dascal (ed.), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. The Art of Controversies, 7–24. © 2006 Springer.

8

Chapter 2 In his characteristic way, Leibniz undertakes here to chart systematically the actual and possible positions in this debate and to extend his analysis beyond the narrow limits of religious controversy. Thus, the hermeneutic procedures he proposes for dealing with the meaningfulness of belief in propositions that cannot be understood (such as the mysteries of faith) have general semantic and epistemological implications. And the ‘balance of reasons’ model he develops herea is later extended and applied by him to rational deliberation in general, particularly – but not only – in the case of controversies.

Date: 1669-1671 Edition: A VI 1 548-559 Language: Latin

Short commentary on the judge of controversies: The Balance of Reason and the Textual Norm (1) The controversy of controversies is the question of the judge of controversies, from which the decision, conclusion, results, and effects of other controversies depend. (2) This question has been discussed everywhere throughout time, but never as much as in our time, when agitated religious disputes have risen to a level never reached before. (3) The Roman Church claims that a certain visible and infallible judge is necessary in order to put an end to the controversies and to find a solution for the disputes; and this is the concern of God’s providence, for it seems that he would not abandon [in this matter] the cause of his people, i.e., the Church. (4) As for the Protestants, i.e., those who have split off from the Roman Church, some are textualists, other mixed, and other rationalists. (5) The textualists are those who affirm that the judge of controversies is the Sacred Scripture’s text itself. This position is – surprisingly – condemned by some, but I think their criticism is unfair. For they contend that the Sacred Scripture’s text is not its own interpreter and that it can no more be the judge of religious controversies than writing the laws of a republic is sufficient

2. The Controversy of Controversies

9

without the appointment of interpreters or judges who apply them to particular cases. (6) This is how these critics argue, but their argument is flawed. I agree that the text itself is not sufficient for deciding precisely in questions about its meaning, unless additional support is provided. But I think the text itself is sufficient for all religious questions concerning faith. Isn’t this a contradiction? Certainly hardly at all. For questions concerning faith, i.e., regarding the grounds for salvation, should not be derived from the text through inferences; they should be expressly contained in it. (7) If the rule nothing should be admitted as known to be necessary for salvation unless expressly contained in the Sacred Scripture were followed, then all questions concerning salvation through faith would vanish, and consequently the Scripture would be the judge of all controversies about what is necessary for salvation. (9)1 In other laws, however, this is not the case, for in the Republic it is necessary to decide also those questions that are not contained in the law, whereas in questions of faith there is no such necessity.2 (10) It may be argued that certain questions not expressly decided in the Scripture may also occur to a theologian, e.g., the question of the marriage of cousins and the like; or, likewise, the question of divorce regarding a given bond. (11) My answer is that such questions are not questions of faith but of custom; they are not theoretical, but practical questions; they are matters where there is no obligation to believe but only to act. (12) But how to decide in these questions? I answer that here the Sacred Scripture is not the judge of the controversies, but something else is, so that there is no reason to adhere to the Scripture in these cases. The situation is entirely different with respect to questions remote from practice, like GOD’s unity and trinity, Christ’s nature and person, Christ’s and the bread presence in the supper, predestination, and other such questions that occupy the world. Regarding these questions, no proposition is to be accepted as belonging to faith unless it is expressly contained in the Sacred Scripture, taken literally from the sources. 1 2

There is no paragraph with the number 8. Paragraphs 9 and 58 refer to the Wallenburch brothers’ Tractatus generales (1669), VI, 1, tract. 1, examen 2, paragraphs 1-2.

10

Chapter 2

(13) But what happens if a question is raised about the meaning of the original text, which is dubious, as when there may be equivocations in Hebrew? My reply: even here there is no difficulty if things are said to concern faith only when all versions3 agree. For, if I am not mistaken, the translations do not disagree in important points, and the original Greek text is only minimally obscure. And, although the Hebrew text is more obscure, it hardly gives any occasion for dispute concerning any major principle of faith. (14) Whether we employ the adversaries’ old versions when disputing with them, or by common consent we translate literally the New Testament, there will be no difference. The procedure to be followed in this translation is: where all versions agree, employ this common usage of the word; where they disagree, employ the word’s origin or its appropriate etymological meaning, or else, when this is not sufficient, as in a case of ambiguity, the ambiguous meanings (which are few and easily decidable) should be expounded. (15) And indeed, when there is a question about the meaning of a passage, the translation is usually the same. For example, the Evangelicals and the Reformed translate entirely in the same way the passages of the Scripture about the Lord’s supper, as well as other passages. (16) But – you say – the Sacred Scripture, at the very least, cannot be the judge of its own authenticity. That is correct: indeed the text itself – for instance, “Three are those who provide testimony” – cannot be the judge of its authenticity.b Indeed, this must be proven by reason and history, just as the Sacred Scripture’s divinity cannot be, in general, gathered from itself, since in such cases its own testimony is not acceptable. Even though it declares itself to be GOD’s word, this should be proven in another way. (17) But what about the possibility of reducing expertly to a single use the words commonly employed in the collections of Scripture’s verses, where they are usually assumed to have many senses? I reply: the collections of Sacred Scripture’s verses are composed in two ways; they either show what concerns faith (e.g., the catechisms, the principles of faith, the teaching of religion, confession, etc.); or else they serve to make agreeable, explain, and illustrate the fundamental questions of the theologians; still other

3

Versio will be sometimes translated as ‘translation’ and sometimes as ‘version’, depending on the context.

2. The Controversy of Controversies

11

collections serve to inspire people in assemblies and writings, by adorning discourse [with quotes] as if they were pieces of a mosaic. (18) In the collections composed in order to represent articles of faith, the periods should be shown not to be mutilated, but complete, in order to avoid any occasion of dispute. Hence, if a period begins by some conjunction or relative [pronoun], or by what follows or precedes the conjunction or the relative, one should order clearly antecedents and consequents, so that [each] period should be absolute.c (19) We should not perhaps be too scrupulous here, provided we avoid the vulgar bad habit of those collections that divide one proposition in two parts and give only the predicate or the subject, or only the antecedent or the consequent, or else one of the disjuncts. There is nothing worse than that. For in these cases one [thing] is not affirmed per se and simpliciter (except in conjunctions), and I think it should not be moved to whatever place indiscriminately, for in this way anything can be manufactured out of anything – as Tertullian* has correctly argued, in his book on the prescriptions for writing, against the improper usage of Homer’s poems.d The full proposition must be exhibited. In controversial passages, we must be even more rigorous: we must exhibit the full period up to where and from whence it is absolute. (20) But there remains a non-negligible difficulty. Since one has faith not in words, but in their meanings, it is not enough for us to believe that the person who uttered the sentence ‘this is my body’ said the truth unless we know also what he said. However, we do not know what he said if we only have the words and ignore their meaning (vis et potestas). Here is how I prove this: [To have] faith is to believe. To believe is to consider [something] true. Truth does not belong in words but in things; for whoever considers [something] true, considers that the thing is such as signified by the words; but nobody is able to do so unless he knows what the words signify or at least unless he thinks about their meaning. (21) This is a very hard knot. But it can be solved. My reply is that it is not always necessary for faith to know that a particular sense of the words is true; [it suffices that] we understand that sense and do not reject it positively, but rather leave it under doubt even though we might be inclined towards some other [sense]. Furthermore, it is sufficient that we believe in the first place that whatever is contained in the meanings be true; this is clearly the case in those mysteries, where practice does not vary whatever the meaning turns out [finally] to be.

12

Chapter 2

(22) The understanding, however, cannot occupy itself barely with words, like a parrot. It must perceive some meaning, albeit general and confused, or – so to speak – disjunctive, as in the perception of every theoretical matter by a peasant or any other common person. (23) Thus, if I heard Christ saying ‘this is my body’, it is necessary that under the sound ‘this’ I perceive confusedly all its antecedents in the period, which certainly includes the bread and whatever is contained in it. In order not to determine in this confused interpretation whether the bread is made of the body of Christ or whether something that is contained in it is actually the body of Christ, it would be sufficient to understand [the ‘this’] as “that which is the body of Christ”. (24) But what about the improper sense? In this case, I think that, upon listening to the words of the text, Christians ought to take them as true under the proper sense. Yet [they should do so] with the pious candor that knows it can deceive itself and that perhaps the proposition is true in a figurative sense (sensu tropico), thus acting in a surer way. This faith will be disjunctive, although it inclines towards one of its parts. And indeed, this is what most Christians do in practice, if you look at it carefully. (25) I am not denying, therefore, that the mind should think of something else besides the words. But I deny that any formula regarding faith should be prescribed, except for the words contained in the Sacred Scripture. However, an explanation can be separately added for the more ignorant, provided it brings to mind that sense which can be piously believed, even though not prescribed by GOD; or else one can openly deny that maybe GOD, in his supreme wisdom, has communicated these effects otherwise than they think.e (26) Indeed, if you pay attention you will observe – as I said – that most mortals have only a confused and often equivocal understanding of the meanings of the terms in propositions dealing with theoretical matters, i.e., not those that prescribe what is good or what is to be done, but what is true. (27) In fact, how few mortals – though all of them often think about truth and falsity, existence and essence, matter, cause, etc. – how few of them, I ask, have had these words thoroughly explained to them even once. Ask a peasant, and you will learn that during his whole life he has only used these words casually, often without having in mind what they mean – a kind of thought I usually call ‘blind’.

2. The Controversy of Controversies

13

(28) Still much more admirable is [the fact that] all Schoolmen, led by Aristotle, use the term ἡ αὶτἱα (hē aitia) for cause – material and formal, efficient and final – the only ones they call Causes.f And yet neither Aristotle, nor any Scholastic, nor anyone whatsoever since the beginning of the world has explained what is meant by the word ‘cause’ when so broadly used. All those who have attempted to define the term cause in this broad sense have made use of still more obscure terms, the majority of which are metaphors that conceal ambiguities. This shows that they never understood the terms they have used so often. Suarez, for example, defined cause as that which presses (influit) being into something else; but what does it mean to press being into something else?g (29) Therefore, it would be sufficient for us to understand Christ’s words ‘this is my body’ as much as the Schoolmen understand their axiom that there are four types of causes. If for so long they have talked correctly about causes and have believed in Aristotle, without availing themselves of a more distinct meaning of the word, it is equally legitimate for believers to believe in GOD’s word without any other, more distinct, available understanding. (30) It can be taught that the faith of the majority of Christians consisted, and has always consisted, in the approval of propositions that are not understood. Thus, if you ask a peasant whether he believes that GOD exists, he will be angry at such a doubt. And if you ask him what is it that he names GOD, he will be no less surprised at your asking such a thing, but he will finally admit that he hardly ever cared about what is understood by the word GOD, and that it was enough for him to repeat that proposition with some confused meaning attributed to the words, through which GOD is imagined variously, either as a big and wise man, or as something else. (31) What I say about the peasants is true also of the wisest philosophers and theologians who prattle so much about Essence, person, nature, suppositio, and who mention, among the articles of faith, that GOD is one in essence and three in persons – all of them hesitate a lot, or at least have sometimes hesitated, about what is understood by these words. Yet, even when they were in doubt about the meaning of such words, they would not tolerate anyone’s denial of their belief in the unity of essence and in the trinity of three persons. In fact the common person, who repeats after the pastor the formulae of the catechism, never reaches, through his own effort, the point of suspecting that there is something obscure underlying those words. Thus, he finds more security and peacefulness in repeating, as the others do, the inculcated words, than in appearing to be curious by inquiring into the meaning of the terms.

14

Chapter 2

(32) To conclude: to whoever thinks that a distinct knowledge of the meaning of the mysteries of faith is necessary for salvation, one should prove – I insist – that neither I, an insignificant Christian, nor he himself (who thinks so), have ever had such [a distinct knowledge]. Consequently, the grasping of a formula expressly [present in] the Sacred Scripture, accompanied by a confused understanding of its meaning and some disjunctive assent or opinion, is sufficient for Salvation. For even those who deny that faith is compatible with the fear of the opposite and that it is an opinion, even these [persons] – if sincere – should try to explain for what reason faith is accepted [sometimes] more and [sometimes] less. But whether to accept it is established by the testimony of Christ.

(33) So much for the textualists. The rationalists are either pure or mixed. Both rely on the text and on reason; they show that it is possible to demonstrate by necessary rational inference that what is explicitly contained in the text is true. But [they diverge] when the text’s meaning is doubtful, as well as when nothing certain can be determined by reason as in matters regarding facts, and a conflict arises between the text and reason. [This conflict] is not absolute, but just a conflict of probabilities. [For instance], the real presence of Christ’s body, as well as the Trinity in GOD, is probable according to the text (for from the text it cannot be gathered except probably) [but] improbable (although not impossible, for I make in this no concession to the Sociniansh and Reformed) according to reason. In such a case, it must be asked whether to side with reason or with the text’s words. The Reformed (in practice) and the Socinians (in theory and practice) say that one should rather side with reason and interpret the words in a contrived way, rather than to admit something that is improbable according to reason. As against this, the Evangelicals (in practice and theory) and the Reformed (in theory) say that one should side with the proper meaning of the words, even if it is improbable according to reason (provided it is not impossible), rather than interpret the words contrivedly or figuratively. And the state of the controversy between [the] Philosopher interpreter of the Scripturei and Wolzogenj was precisely this. I say that the Reformed [hold this view] in theory but not in practice because they deny that the presence of Christ’s body in the supper is, according to reason, only improbable, [claiming that it] is in fact impossible. The improbability is only proved by means of induction from other examples. So, when the Socinians contend that in the whole of nature one cannot find any single Being with three subsistences

2. The Controversy of Controversies

15

(subsistentia),4 it is not impossibility that is inferred, only improbability. By induction one infers improbability, by Demonstration, impossibility. (34) My opinion is that one should rather side with the meaning of the text, even if it is improbable according to reason, provided it is possible, on account of its condition of being GOD’s saying. For, he who is knowledgeable would not give us words through which we would be deceived. He would have done so, however, if the meaning which agrees most with the text according to the rules of interpretation (leaving aside the reasonings made) were false. And since he is also powerful, he can accomplish whatever he promises. (35) I will give an example. Let there be two [persons], Titius and Cajus. Let Titius be a rich and pious man, and Cajus, poor and frivolous. Titius swears to me in the accepted words: “I will give you 1000 thalers”. Cajus says the same, merely promising. I believe that, taking [things] in themselves (per se), i.e., without his commitment, it is improbable that Titius will give me 1000 thalers; for it cannot be presumed that anyone will give [away], especially such a large sum. Yet, that Cajus will give [me that sum] is not only improbable, but also impossible, since by hypothesis he does not have nor is likely to have so much money. Hence, the words of Cajus either should not be accepted on faith, or if they are accepted on faith, they should be understood in a restricted and figurative way, for example [as meaning] “I will give you 1000 thalers, of course [thalers] written on paper”. But Titius would be rightly upset if his words were rendered in such a way, for he is rich and can [do it] and he is knowledgeable and wants [to do it]; especially since his assertion was a pledge, and to pledge while playing with equivocations is not – normally – something a pious man [would do]. Hence, although it is improbable per se, when one considers the words and especially the balance that inclines the person towards these words, it is probable, and in practice it is to be assumed that Titius will in fact give [me] that amount of money. (35)5 Let us apply this to GOD. GOD is our Titius eminently. For, he is the richest or most powerful, as well as the most knowledgeable. Hence, his words preponderate over [the words] of all others’ oaths. This GOD promises that our bodies will be resurrected remaining the same (eadem 4

The young Leibniz denotes by ‘subsistence’ the substance in so far as it exists per se and contains in itself its principle of action: “Substance is an entity that subsists per se. An entity that subsists per se is an entity that has in itself a principle of action” (De transsubstantiatione, 1668; A VI 1 508). 5 Number 35 is repeated in the text.

16

Chapter 2

numero) as they are now. Considered in itself, without the promise, this is not impossible (as everybody agrees), but it is improbable that at some future time all the parts of a thing dispersed in millions of places will be put together again. From this a Socinian concludes that this is improbable, even if the promise is added to it; hence the words of the promise are better interpreted in another way, be it in a restricted, figurative, or metaphorical way. As against this, a Catholic concludes that, taking into account the words of the promise, and adding to it the circumstances of the speaker, it is probable – and it is to be held in practice – that GOD wants his words to be understood in the proper sense and that they come into being in this way, and since he is capable, it will be done. (36) Till now, we have spoken about religious controversies. Now we turn to secular ones. In religious controversies, where the issue is the foundations of faith, it is necessary to have some infallible judge, who is either a man who has received from GOD the gift of infallibility – according to the Pontificals – or else a text that is to be retained literally without any addition or deletion – according to the Evangelicals. (37) In other controversies, unrelated to the foundations of faith, there is no need for complete infallibility, but only for moral certainty, i.e., practical infallibility. Theoretical controversies are pertinent in this respect only in so far as they lead to diversity in practice. For instance, the theoretical question of the blood’s circulation implies many changes in the practice of healing. (38) In such practical controversies, either each one decides for oneself, or else social consensus is required. Thus, nowadays such practical questions as the kind of life one is to embrace for oneself or for one’s son, or whether traveling is useful, and the like, are questions one decides by oneself, without asking for the approval of the republic. Each one’s reason is the judge of controversies in these cases. (39) Other questions are to be decided by the authority and judgment of society, e.g., the questions that pertain to public acts: war, peace, treaties, public administration, the selling of real estate (in certain places), migration (in certain places), and the like. (40) If the republics are well constituted, and the judge of controversies is not subject to passions, it would be useful that no person act without society’s knowledge, and all [actions] should be acknowledged by public authority, even what pertains to private [matters]. But, if the judges of

2. The Controversy of Controversies

17

controversies were subject to passions, this would imply an intolerable servitude, as in some religious orders. (41) Thus, the judge of controversies is one thing in a republic subjected to passions and another in a republic not subjected to them. A certain man or a certain collective, on whose will depends what is to be done, is subjected to passion [if] now and then it [the will] is ruled by affections such as love, hatred, envy, impulse; and to obey their dictates is a major [form of] servitude. (42) And this is the situation of almost all republics in our time. For in the courts the judges are particular men or particular collectives and, although it is possible to appeal [their decisions], such an appeal is judged by other men and other collectives, so that a man’s welfare (salus) often depends upon the desire of others. (43) There is, however, a judge not subjected to passion, namely the casting of lots.k Here, it is universally concluded that the decision to be adopted is that which a random casting of lots provides. Add Gatakerl and Voetiusm on the casting of lots. (44) For the most part, there is a mixture of human [decision] and [decision by] chance, as in [decisions by] the majority of votes, where [each] vote depends on the men, whereas the majority depends on chance. (45) Among all the common judges of controversies, the majority of votes is the best. I believe indeed that one should obey the will of the majority, for when in doubt the largest part is to be taken for the whole, since it is closer to the whole. (46) However, some moderation is needed here too. No doubt it is equitable [to assume] that the suffrage of someone who contributes more than most of the others to the republic – in works, efforts, merits – should be considered more than that of a single person. (47) But this judge of controversies is subject to the same difficulties as an individual person (although not so easily and often), namely to the passions; in fact, nothing is more inconstant than a multitude, and to consign the life and destiny of good men to it is the same as to trust an unstable sea. (48) Is it thus necessary to take refuge in chance, which lacks affections and is not carried away by passion? This is certainly not the case at least in

18

Chapter 2

those [matters] where the avoidance of damage is sought. But inasmuch as obtaining some benefit is concerned, e.g., who should be elected the leader of the Venetians or the king of Poland, it is more tolerable to act by chance, for here no one is damaged if a certain king is not elected. (49) But where the avoidance of damage is sought, e.g., [in the issue of] a man’s life and destiny or in the solution of conflicts, what is more inept than deciding by chance, even if it were known that some judges had done it? (50) But, even where the concern is to obtain a benefit, in case [the procedure by] chance misfires, although no private person is damaged, in the long run a more serious damage to the republic – to which an incompetent [ruler] is [thereby] imposed – may be caused. (51) To hope for GOD’s extraordinary assistance here is almost impious, for GOD – I think – gave us reason for us to use, rather than to rely on the uncertainty of throwing lots. Otherwise, the ineptitude of the vulgar ways of proving should be excused and the ancient Germans would have been right in deciding conflicts in a single combat (monomachia). (52) If one thinks about this thoroughly, while man is subject to passions, chance is also irrational, so that one should look for some reason which is not subject to passions. Such a reason, however, is not found in any particular man (unless God miraculously sends someone); it is rather right reason abstractly taken [which] must be, in my opinion, the judge of controversies in the world. (53) And I think everybody would agree that, if there were a sure way of finding that right reason in all given cases, then it should be everywhere the judge of controversies. In this way, truth, utility, piety, GOD’s will, and the public good would be always preserved. (54) As against this, it is retorted that this right reason cannot be found without some other judge, and to assume it abstractly is a useless, worthless, inefficient idea, and alien to practice. (55) Thomas Hobbes thus mocks those who appeal to right reason, [arguing that] by the name of right reason they understand their own [reason], so that in fact they appeal to themselves.n

2. The Controversy of Controversies

19

(56) But those who object in this way have not, so far, understood what I have in mind. In the first place, it is not clear that it is impossible to choose right reason as a judge, at least in some questions, examples of which follow. (57) First, in questions that are immediately obvious to the senses, there is no need for another judge of controversies besides the senses themselves. For instance, it is never disputed whether something is white or black. In such questions – I think – there is no need for a judge of controversies. (58) There are, however, questions where, similarly, there is no need for a judge of controversies besides reason, because the truth can be manifestly discovered by means of a sure procedure, accessible also to common persons, e.g. in geometrical and arithmetical questions about the size of things. When the question is amenable to calculation, there is no need for a judge, since if one numbers everything diligently and attentively without omitting anything, the necessary conclusion emerges with maximum evidence. The same is true in geometrical [questions]. This is why all jurists say that a verdict contrary to a maximally evident truth, given by a knowing judge, is [in a] broad [sense] void; but if it is given by an ignorant, the objection to an error of calculation and the need to correct it belongs to the law (jure) itself and can be raised even when the verdict is already past the stage of execution. In such a way, it is clear that what is evidently demonstrable should be withdrawn from the judge’s decision and trusted to the balance of reason; the [jurists] express the same opinion about [cases] where the judge issues a verdict against the terms of the law, thus deviating from the norm of the text. (59) If someone discovered a way for humankind to achieve in all questions the same practical infallibility as the theoretical [infallibility] achieved in questions about the performance of calculations, he would thereby have shown – I believe – how right reason is to be established and obeyed as the judge of all controversies. (60) Just as if there were a certain balance of reason such that in each of its scales the circumstances (momenta) regarding a cause were carefully expounded and weighed, and their examination would incline [to one side], one should pronounce a verdict in favor of that party. If someone were to teach men how to construct such a balance, he would have delivered to them a greater art than that fabulous science of making gold. (61) But that Art is the true logic, which, endowed with a certain exact and rigorous form of proceeding, excludes all sophisms. Such an art can be

20

Chapter 2

developed more than it seems, although certainly no one has so far produced nor employed it. (62) The rules of that art should be established – as I said – exactly. Let somebody present his reasons, let him ask whether in them he assumes nothing that has not been previously demonstrated through reason or proved by the testimony of the senses. Let no ambiguous expression and no previously unexplained word (up to the last one) be used. Though in practical affairs usually there are for each side equally true reasons, and of course advantageous and disadvantageous ones, let one calculate precisely their quantity and extract the conclusion from it. (63) It is just, however, to limit somehow the exposition of each party’s reasons to a certain period of time, within which all the reasons of each side should be alleged. Once this is done, the fences are to be closed and the examination is to be done by that most accurate method: the parties heed, with the judges, to each other’s reasoning, following the thread of the true logic, so that nothing obscure and doubtful be assumed and nowhere it be possible to deviate from the eternal law of reasoning. (64) Just as in the casting of lots everybody heeds to each other’s stirring and extracting of the little spheres or cards so that no thrown sphere be ignored, nor any other fraud be performed, so too when that rigorous method is diligently followed, it is equally possible to avoid every fraud, i.e., every sophism. This is the good that the true inventive and judging logic may bring to humankind. (65) Just as in weighing it is necessary to pay attention that all the weights are put into place, to check that they are not in excess, to check that they are not adulterated by other metals nor heavier or lighter than they should, to verify the balance’s correct position, with the arms equidistant, the scales with equal weights, etc.; so too in this rational balance attention must be paid to the propositions as to the weights, to the balance as to their connection, and no unexamined weight or proposition is to be admitted. Just as one is to estimate the gravity of the weights, so too [one should measure] the truth of a proposition; just as the gravity of the weights measures the gravity of the things to be weighed, so too the truth of the propositions adduced in the proof measures the truth of the principal proposition of the question under discussion; just as one must take care that no weight be omitted or added, so too one is to take care that nothing unfavorable or favorable to the topic examined be omitted or that the same thing, expressed in different words, be repeated. The mechanism of the balance is similar to

2. The Controversy of Controversies

21

the connection of the propositions; just as one scale should not be lighter than the other, so too if one of two premises is weaker than the other, the conclusion must follow from the weaker one; just as the arms must be linked to each other by the beam, so too from pure particulars nothing follows, for they are sand without lime; just as the arms must be at equal distances from the beam, so too the place of the proposition must be such that the middle term be equidistant from the major and the minor, which is achieved by observing an exact and eternal Sorites.o (65)6 It is therefore certain that, if men want to apply themselves with patience and diligence to all questions, they will be able to be practically as infallible as a calculator or somebody who weighs. For if a calculator omits something in calculating, by casually not writing the figure, he fails, but his failure is not an error of calculation. And such negligence can be corrected afterwards as easily as an error of calculation. Likewise, if in the calculation or computation (as Hobbes calls it) of reasons,p someone omits in his list any favorable and unfavorable things, he concludes validly from the rest of the list, but this is not an error in reasoning, but rather in discovering (inveniendo). But in order to ensure that the inquiry ends at some point, it must be established peremptorily that after that fatal omission no new reasons can be adduced; and after the execution [of the operation], there can be no accusation of an error of calculation or of reasoning. (66) For men to be able to establish this [kind of] examination with facility, pleasure, without tediousness, and in a maximally fruitful way, the Republic that chooses this judge of controversies should [establish] a book of definitions in natural order, where all words in usage are defined, up to the indefinable terms. That is to say, the republic should explain what must be the usage of those words in public reasonings, in order to avoid that in each particular case one need always work out the definition. The indefinables related only to the senses should be represented either in pictures or in an observatory (gazophylacro) of the things signified, as much as possible embedded in nature, accompanied by tags containing the words [that refer to them]. There should not be lists of several meanings, but once a meaning is assigned to a word, one should prevent that other meanings be attributed to it. (67) Next, once the meaning of the words is given, another book, under the title theorems should contain many of the most famous true propositions – all of this according to the most rigorous observation of the logical laws. In this way, it will be possible to access the propositions already demonstrated 6

Number 65 is repeated in the text.

22

Chapter 2

(as the mathematicians refer to the Elements of Euclid), so that an abbreviated [procedure of] examination be performed in particular cases. (68) Thirdly, one should compile a historical book, where all the memorable [facts mentioned by the] historians should be collected in one book, in chronological order. In this book, authors will be quoted and their reliability precisely weighed in the balance, particularly regarding extraordinary book[s], and [what] is criticized should be exactly reproduced [in its own] words [taken from] any one history, so that, even if [the author’s words] are indeed ambiguous, those interested will be able to examine them. (69) Fourthly, one should compile a book of experiments, where all experiments of nature and of art should be collected according to the order of things. It is possible to argue against [the contents of] our historical and experimental books (for the latter is also historical), as long as [their contents] are taken to hold until the contrary is proven (when the historical [book] refers repeatedly [to something], from independent sources, the reference is to be considered faithful); meanwhile the conclusion (executio) should not be withheld (beyond a very brief period of time, except in [issues] that can hardly be repaired; nor should it be withheld when the thing does not suffer delay); but once the contrary is proven, a revision is to be made, and someone who proves the contrary should receive a prize. Against the book of definitions and propositions, however, there is no room for arguing nor for a complete revision, even when an error is detected (this can be doubted, for what happens if several modes of proceeding are employed? Once an error is detected one should abstain from [using] the propositions [affected], using only the combined terms themselves (nudis terminis combinatis); the error appears immediately as in the proofs of calculations, when different forms of computing are applied.7 We should try to see if there is a proof of errors similar to that of calculations). But if someone – in a case not concerning himself – spontaneously volunteers to show an error in the book of Theorems, he should be attentively listened to, and if he succeeds in convincing, he deserves gracious remuneration. The book of Theorems, where the propositions so far calculated are compiled, is as useful as the tables of sines, logarithms, squares and cubes, the great Pythagorean table,q and other arithmetical books that relieve us from the burden of calculation. If 7

Leibniz refers here to such tests of arithmetical operations as “casting out nines”, which he often gives as an example of the possibility of checking “mechanically” and “visibly” whether the result is correct. This proof, the abjectio novenaria, consists in subtracting the multiples of 9 from the result as well as from the numbers involved in the operation and checking whether the remainders are equal. See Chapters 15, note j; 28, note k; and Chapter 30, note d.

2. The Controversy of Controversies

23

someone were to find an error in the Canon of sines, he would certainly deserve much gratitude from the mathematicians. (70) Fifthly, an alphabetical index of all the mentioned books should be compiled. It should also contain, for the two first theoretical books, the correspondences (harmonicae) between the words, such as that which obtains in a definition between the mother (genus) or the daughter (species); likewise, it should contain, for the last two books, the correspondences due to the fact that a thing signified by one word turns out to be connected in practice with the thing signified by another. Such an index will help discovery, just as the books help judgment. At first the two first books with the index would be sufficient, for they are both easier [to make] and necessary for judgment, whereas the other two are merely useful for judgment, the facts being more [pertinent] for discovery. The Republic should take care of judgment, while discovery should be delegated to the parts or to those whom the republic appoints to assist the parts in a particular case. However, in cases that touch the Republic itself, where single [persons] are the parts and the whole the judge, a rigorous formal [procedure] that precludes every fraud should be applied. This can be first instituted in the universal society of sages, and then be step by step and easily extended to the others as well. a

See note o. Cf. John I, 5-8. c Leibniz is here recommending the elimination of embedded clauses, so as to make the structure of the periods clearer. d Tertullian, De praescriptione haereticorum (ca. 200 A.D.). e In other words, either “they” are indeed ignorant and need a convoluted interpretation, or else their peculiar understanding is perfectly acceptable. See Chapter 3. f Compare with Leibniz’s marginal comments on Daniel Stahl’s Compendium Metaphysicae (1655), particularly A VI 1 27. g The definition of cause here ridiculed by Leibniz is to be found in Francisco Suarez*, Metaphysicarum disputationum (1597), 12, Sect. 2, 4 and 13. h Leibniz is referring here, presumably, to F. Socinus’s* Adversus eos, qui rerum ad salutem suam aeternam pertinentium cognitionem diligenter per se ipsi non inquirunt. i This phrase refers to Lodewijk Meyer (1629-1681), who published anonimously a book titled Philosophia S. scripturae interpres; exercitatio paradoxa, in qua vera philosophiam infallibilem S. Literas interpretandi norma esse (Amsterdam, 1666). Meyer claimed that the sanctity of the Sacred Scriptures can be proved only through reason and that the scriptural text being ambiguous, the norm of intepretation must be in every case reason. j Ludwig van Wolzogen (1633-1690), a Reformed theologian, wrote De scripturarum interprete adversus exercitatorem paradoxum (Utrecht, 1668) against Meyer. This and other works of his exacerbated the debates between what Bayle* called “théologiens rationaux et non-rationaux” in his lively and sarcastic description (Réponse aux Questions d’un Provincial (1703-1707), chapter 130), to which Leibniz refers in his Théodicée (Discours Preliminaire, 14). b

24 k

Chapter 2

See paragraph 52 below, where Leibniz characterizes the casting of lots (or chance in general) as irrational. See also his reference to Georgius Ulicavius Lithuanus’s (alias Leibniz) Specimen demonstrationum politicarum pro eligendo rege polonorum (1669), whose Proposition 19 demonstrates that, a choice by lot being irrational and dangerous, a more rational way of electing the king of Poland should be adopted. See also Chapter 13, note e. l Thomas Gataker (1574-1654), Cambridge educated English theologian and clergyman. Member of the assembly of divines at Westminster and one of the 47 clergymen who opposed the trial of Charles I. Author of On the Nature and Use of Lots (1619), in virtue of which he was accused of favoring games of chance. m Gisbert Voetius (1589-1676), famous Reformed theologian, jurist and polemicist. Active participant in the excommunication of the Remonstrants (followers of Arminius who diverged from Calvinism; see Chapter 43, note n), he also held a long controversy with the Catholic theologian Cornelius Jansenius, the founder of Jansenism. He defended the scholastic method against Cartesianism (Staat des Geschils, Over de Cartesiaansche Philosophie, 1656) and trained his students at the University of Utrecht in the technique of disputation. Author of Disputationes selectae theologicae (5 volumes; 1648-1655), Voetius was particularly interested in the relationship between science and faith (Oratio inauguralis de pietate cum scientia conjugenda, 1636). n The reference is to Hobbes’s* De Cive II, 1. See also Hobbes’s Dialogue between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Law of England (Hobbes 1740: 121-122) and the discussion of this passage in Dascal (2005: 32-33). o For an analysis of this analogy Leibniz elaborates so carefully, see Dascal (2005). p Hobbes, Leviathan I,5. In De corpore I,1,2, Hobbes says, very concisely: “By reasoning I understand computing”. q Das grosse einmahl eins (in German in the original). Leibniz refers here to the multiplication table. In a fragment titled “The general language” (1678; C 277-278), he says that in order to be able to use his projected language, one should be able to perform some computation and, at the very least, to know “the great Pythagorean table”. In the same fragment, he describes the casting out of nines (novenaria proba), see note 7, as an “admirable artifice” which, applied to the general language, would allow for verifying the correctness of reasoning like one checks the correctness of arithmetical operations.

Chapter 3 THE RELIGION OF A PEASANT

This text was written in Paris about a year after Leibniz arrived there on a political mission: to submit to Louis XIV his project of the conquest of Egypt in order to divert France from its imperialistic European designs. The mission failed because France declared war on Holland barely two months after Leibniz’s arrival in March 1972. The echoes of these fateful events are poetically evoked in this text.a In spite of its political failure, Leibniz’s Parisian sojourn was perhaps the most important formative period in his life. In addition to his scientific and philosophical encounters, he was also active in theological matters. His meetings with Antoine Arnauld* and Malebranche* prompted the writing of the Philosopher’s Confession (1673), whose purport is to show the sufficiency of reason regarding the explanation of the most difficult theological problems. The text here translated, written at the same time, highlights, on the other hand, the fact that simple persons are endowed with a grassroots religiosity that provides no less important support for religious beliefs than philosophical or theological arguments. Indeed, both lines of argumentation appear to be for Leibniz complementary and necessary for a full account of religion. The present stage setting for a dialogue was carefully corrected by Leibniz, as if it were prepared for sending to someone, presumably to Arnauld, to whom he had previously given the manuscript of the Philosopher’s Confession.b The purported dialogue, however, did not go beyond its preliminary stages – those that define the conditions under which a “judge of controversies” is supposed to act. In this respect, this text can be seen as a contribution to the elaboration of this notion (see Chapters 1, 2, 8, 19).

Date: November 1673 Edition: A VI 3 152-154 Language: Latin 25 M. Dascal (ed.), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. The Art of Controversies, 25–28. © 2006 Springer.

26

Chapter 3

Dialogue on the religion of a peasant Two years and two months have elapsed since I have sailed down the Rhine from Strasbourg to Mainz. At the time, the river, guarded by the quietude of its two banks and displaying with the happy autumn its vineyards, invited the traveler tired by a long peregrination to a more placid journey. One would believe that in this deeply calm scenery, the hills themselves exulted, while the nymphs of the Black Forest performed their dance with unusual joy. However, just as the frisking of animals often indicates a change of weather and the agitated leaps of the dolphins are often taken as presages of tempests, so too it seemed that Germany anxiously desired to enjoy a peace that it would soon forfeit. It also seemed that the king of rivers, the Rhine, well versed in fate, enjoyed a freedom that would not last. For now, the poor river, harassed by powerful armies, profaned in both riverbanks, jammed with ships, subjugated by the bridges thrown upon it, remembers the earlier happiness only in the midst of wails. But let us lead the soul away from such disgraceful thoughts. In order to travel more freely, I hired from a Strasbourg [skipper] a small boat, covered since the wind might blow strongly, but hardly capable to accommodate a few men – just a table and a bunk bed. We were joined by a peasant from the Lower Palatinate, a man who later revealed not to be inconsequent, who had I don’t know which subtle feeling for his religion, and who was sagacious. Indeed the Calvinists are usually considered in Germany to be more sagacious than the others – even when they are peasants. We willingly accepted this man, who immediately offered to row in order to pay for the trip. In the last minute, as we had already released the mooring cables, a Jew – a lineage that is not infrequent along the Rhine – shouted (not without displeasing me) and persuaded the profit-avid skipper to return to the shore. Once the Jew had embarked, we at last began to sail for true. Since I was tired and the night approached, I lay in the bunk bed. After this night, as I was more alert on the following morning, I slowly engaged in a relaxed conversation with the other passengers in order to kill the time. The skipper, taking advantage of the occasion, said: “Sir, although we don’t know who you are and from where you come, we are nevertheless so persuaded of your good faith, that we have voted unanimously to appoint you to be the judge of a certain controversy that arose among us last night while drinking, if you do not refuse us this benefit”. Smiling, I inquired what the controversy was about, for – I said – I must know it before I accept a task that is perhaps above my forces. At this point the Palatinate’s peasant said:

3. The Religion of a Peasant

27

“The issue among us regards religion. Whatever your religion is, we beg you that, for a while, you leave aside your involvement in it, and above all that you do not favor your servant – who has ardently expressed himself in favor of the Roman [religion] – more than the others”. To this, I replied: “You ask from me something that is difficult and somewhat tricky. For it seems necessarily to require the following: either that I connive with your position or that I betray mine”.c To be sure, there is a moderate combination of the two, if only I have not been deceived in this matter by giving credit to a honest man, from our land (a pagi nostri), and expert in laws and customs as much as one can expect from a peasant.d He indeed argued that the judge should be so alien to the parties’ commitments that he could not appear himself as a witness, even in those clear and adequate cases that define [unequivocally] the issue and permit its resolution. The task the republic imposes upon he who judges concerns only what the litigants have done and proved; so that, whatever my opinion, I will not pronounce myself about it, but only about the arguments used for its defense.e And [the peasant added] that they [the discussants in the boat] were not in fact as dumb as to engage in a debate with me, a man apparently so different from them; and that they would not use any reasons other than those that can come to any peasant’s mind. That is why they asked me to remain motionless and not to help any of the parties, judging only on the basis of what had been maintained by each of them. Having agreed to this method,f and having accepted its conditions, we were ready to listen and to speak to each other. a

Müller and Krönert (1969: 23) conjecture, on the basis of the present text, that Leibniz indeed undertook a trip to Strasbourg in the summer of 1671 for his Mainz patron, von Boineburg, whose son was due to begin his studies there at the university in the winter. In Strasbourg Leibniz had conversations with the historian Johann Heinrich Boeckler about Descartes and his philosophy. b As he reports in the Preface to the Essais de Théodicée (GP VI 43). c This dilemma – which Leibniz quickly evades by suggesting a way between its horns – should be interpreted here at the generic level, rather than as suggesting that his own religion is identical to that of his servant. d The allusion to the honesty of villagers, whose religious root beliefs are embedded in community life, suggests a source of ‘data’ and ‘arguments’ for the solution of religious controversies that should not be neglected; along with the mention of the peasant’s expertise in “laws and customs”, this shows that Leibniz already holds the view he later explicitly states about the need to interweave theory and practice, arguing that “practical” men possess an “empirical knowledge” that sometimes surpasses that of theoreticians and certainly complements it, and must therefore be taken into account (Recommandation pour instituer la science generale; A VI 4 712).

28 e

f

Chapter 3

For other constraints aimed at preserving the judge’s neutrality, see the chapters mentioned in the introduction above, especially Chapter 19. The method here described for carefully limiting the debate to the arguments actually presented and to the data available not only avoids bias, but also allows for a stepwise progress in finding a solution, even when certainty is not achievable. In this respect it corresponds to what Leibniz later calls ‘the method of establishments’, and gives credence to Leibniz’s claim that he had been working to develop this method since his youth (cf. Chapter 37).

Chapter 4 THE ELEMENTS OF THINKING

This text belongs to a set of “Parisian Notes”, written by Leibniz at the end of his sojourn in France. The four years he spent in Paris were among the most important in his intellectual life. In Paris he was exposed to the recent innovations in all fields of knowledge – from mathematics (not only the mathematics of the infinite, which led to his invention of the calculus, but also the studies of probabilities such as Pascal’s) to Cartesian physics and metaphysics. With his characteristic drive towards synthesizing, Leibniz summarized his Parisian reflections in a set of writings intended to become a book that would bear the title De Summa Rerum (A VI 3 472, 475). They were transcribed and translated for the first time in 1913 by the Russian scholar I. Jagodinsky. This edition was sharply criticized for its mistakes, especially by A. Rivaud (1914). The Academy edition not only corrected such mistakes, but also added to the set other pieces omitted by Jagodinsky. A recent bilingual (Latin-English) edition has been published by G.H.R. Parkinson (1992). The De Summa Rerum texts are particularly important because they permit to witness the elaboration of Leibniz’s logical thought and its influence upon his metaphysics. They reveal his painstaking search for the appropriate formulation of an idea through a number of oscillations the Academy edition records in footnotes. Some of these oscillations are discernible in the slight variations of the definitions used by Leibniz in the present text, as well as in his abrupt interruption of the flow of argumentation in order to re-examine what had just been said: “It will be useful to examine the above again”.a Our translation differs from Parkinson’s in significant respects. In particular, we think his decision to interpret De Summa Rerum as “on the highest (or supreme) being” (p. xiv) severely restricts the creative ambiguity of the title Leibniz purposefully chose; and this is relevant for understanding a text like the present one bearing the title “The elements of thinking” as a component of the De Summa Rerum. As Parkinson himself points out, this expression also means “on the totality of things”. Unlike Parkinson, however, we do not think the two senses are equivalent for Leibniz, for if this were the case, he would have been a Spinozist; rather, the issue of the relationship between “the supreme being” and “the totality of things” is an essential component of the

29 M. Dascal (ed.), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. The Art of Controversies, 29–33. © 2006 Springer.

30

Chapter 4 problematic that underlies the development of Leibniz’s metaphysics. After his visit to Spinoza in 1676, he writes the piece “That a most perfect being exists” (Quod ens perfectissimum existit) (A VI 3 574-579), where, against Spinoza, he argues that the existence of such a supreme being, i.e., of the most perfect being, depends upon the demonstration of the possibility of each of its alleged predicates as well as of their compatibility. In a note written immediately after this text, titled “A principle of mine is that, whatever can exist and is compatible with the other [things], exists” (Principium meum est, quicquid existere potest, et aliis compatibile est, id existere), Leibniz further argues that, contrary to Spinoza’s belief, not all possibles are compossibles (A VI 3 581-582). This, of course, rises to center stage the question of what is to be understood as “totality of things”: does it encompass the totality of the possibles or only that of the existents? Within this problematic, The elements of thinking is crucial, because it deals precisely with the discursive, communicative and mental constraints that cannot be ignored in any attempt to determine “the totality of things”. In the context of this volume, the present text is remarkable because it contains perhaps the first mention of a “pragmatic-dialogical” grounding of the truth of propositions, both the necessary and the factual ones. Leibniz elaborates this idea in the 1680’s, notably in Chapter 20. We might then hypothesize an evolution in Leibniz’s theory of meaning and truth, where a “dialectical” or “audience-oriented” component becomes progressively more important. Roughly, three stages can be singled out. In Chapter 2, written in 1669, the dialectical component, symbolized by the metaphor of the “Balance of Reason”, is external to meaning, insofar as the latter can exist independently and can be recovered through hermeneutical procedures governed by philological or combinatorial rules. In the present text of 1676, the dialogicalcommunicative context, expressed in such notions as “conceding” or “granting”, becomes essential for determining the provability – hence, the truth – of a proposition. This process is further extended, which is what becomes apparent in 1685 (Chapter 20). Here, the interplay between opposed positions becomes the essential component of demonstrations, which “do not proceed from assertions but from concessions or hypotheses” and, ultimately, consist in nothing but “showing that some hypotheses are in conflict with each other” – i.e., in making manifest the contradictions embedded in the very structure of meaning.

Date: April 1676 Edition: A VI 3 504-507 Language: Latin If it is true that there is some perfect demonstration, i.e., such that nothing in it remains unproved, then it is necessary that there are Elements of thinking; for a demonstration will be the more perfect the more all [its parts] are analyzed (resoluta).b But I immediately see that this is false. For, a demonstration is also perfect when one reaches identical [propositions], which may be achieved even if all is not analyzed [in it].

4. The Elements of Thinking

31

There are indeed [terms] that are not absolutely simple, like ‘parabola’ and ‘ternary’, which can nevertheless be predicated of themselves.c On the other hand, it is certain that, if there are Elements of thinking, then certainty can be achieved in knowledge (scientia), i.e., everything can be demonstrated in it. Conversely, if everything can be demonstrated, it seems that there are Elements of thinking. All the sophisms of the ancients as well as of the moderns stem from the distorted use of language. Manifestly, if someone wants to speak, he must first of all explain what he understands by the word [used] and follow the rule according to which, once the defined is replaced by its definition, no conflicts arise; on the contrary, the replacement of the defined by its definition should generate evident or necessary [propositions]. Evident or necessary is, in the first place, [the proposition that] anything is that which it is, or that it is not what it is not. I am not saying that something such as this exists in things. What I am saying is that we should call ‘necessary’ propositions of the kind ‘A is A’, ‘A is not not-A’, ‘if A is BC and C is DE, then A is BDE’, and that once men have established these rules of speaking, they consider that whatever conforms to them is truly said . By ‘proposition’ I mean ‘A is B’ or ‘A is not B’. ‘A’ is called the subject, ‘B’, the predicate and ‘is’, the copula. ‘A’ and ‘B’ can be any noun in the nominative case. Taken together, ‘is B’ can be represented by a verb, e.g., ‘is a sentient’ is the same as ‘feels’ (sentit). Instead of ‘is’ one can sometimes say ‘was’ or ‘will be’. Having said this, let us return to the simple case, namely ‘A is B’ or ‘if A is B, then C is D’. Proposition: ‘A is (is not) B’. ‘C is (is not) D’. ‘If A is (is not) B, then C is (is not) D’. To reason is to make a proposition out of other given [propositions] by replacing terms in one of the given ones by its [corresponding] predicate in another. To convince is to reason from that which is granted (ex concessis). To demonstrate is to reason from that which ought to be granted (ex concedendis). The propositions that ought to be granted are those that persons who communicate have agreed upon to grant in order to permit them to communicate usefully with themselves as well as with others. For this it has been necessary that whoever speaks explain the signs he uses through other signs whose meaning is known. Then, once this definition was accepted, he should commit himself to use this definition constantly, so as to give himself permission to substitute the signification for the defined and, more generally, the predicate for the subject. On the other hand, it was also necessary that the addressee give his assent to this, if he indeed wanted to communicate.

32

Chapter 4

Therefore, some propositions are to be granted, and this is due to the very necessity of discourse. Definition: ‘A is BC’ means that the speaker is declaring to always give permission to substitute ‘BC’ for ‘A’. Absolutely identical proposition: ‘A is A’, ‘A is not not-A’. Hypothetically identical proposition: ‘If A is B, and B is C, then A is C’. It will be useful to examine the above again. Men communicate with themselves and with others, sometimes tacitly, sometimes with words or writings, sometimes through gestures and other signs. Those signs whose meaning is not apparent without a declaration must be declared. A declaration is performed either by means of other signs that are already known, or by means of the things to be signified, or else by pointing to examples of those things. He who declares a sign commits himself to use it, in each of its occurrences, in the sense in which he explained it. A declaration verbally performed in these terms is a definition. Therefore, the use of words does not consist only in the fact that they signify, but also in that they signify for both [interlocutors]. We have the experience that we or someone else concatenate words in a certain way according to the accepted usage, substituting the one for the other; this is what we call a proposition; for, to say ‘A is B’ is nothing but to say that I will permit to substitute ‘B’ for ‘A’. In this way, we seek to achieve that, in the sequel, we ourselves as well as the others (whom we consider as if they were ourselves) concatenate words always in the same manner. This ensures that the work of thinking and communicating in the sequel is made easier, and that we are able to connect at once various and different things among themselves.d To do this is to prove. In other words, to prove a proposition is to bring about that anyone be able to employ it constantly, i.e., that he be able to substitute the predicate for the subject. This is done in two ways, either through reasoning or ostensively. Reasoning is making one proposition out of others, by replacing each term present in any of them by what in another is its predicate. Whenever the propositions that are assumed are granted, the reasoning is a conviction, whereas if the propositions ought to be granted, the reasoning is a demonstration.1 The propositions that ought to be granted are those that, if they were not granted, discourse would be in vain. That is, ‘A is A’ and ‘A is not not-A’, ‘If A is B then A will not be not-B’. For, if these propositions are not admitted, we will not be able to talk about anything definite, and anything could be said with equal justification. To which one might add: ‘If A is B, and B is C, then A is C’, for this is precisely what we want when we make propositions, namely to be able to 1

A ‘proof’ thus yields a warrant for further reasoning, which will have either be ‘demonstrative’ or ‘convincing’, depending on whether the premises are granted (by some intended addressee) or ought to be granted (by everyone).

4. The Elements of Thinking

33

substitute the predicate for the subject; likewise, ‘A is BC’, and ‘BC is A’, admitting that BC is A’s definition. Finally, whenever I speak with myself, I have to grant to myself the proposition ‘I am aware of this or of that, that is, of what I sense’. Whatever is demonstrated in this way we call true. a

For a study of other oscillations of this sort, see Dascal (1977). See Chapter 22, where Leibniz develops the same idea. See also Parkinson (1992: 133, note 3). c In The organon or the great art of thinking of 1679, Leibniz further elaborates upon the idea that complete analysis is not necessary for producing demonstrations. In most cases it is sufficient to reduce the multitude of notions to a few basic ones, whose possibility is posited without demonstration. For example, he argues that all movement trajectories in the whole of geometry can be reduced (revocari) to two unanalyzed kinds of motion – straight and circular (which Euclid did not explain, but postulated); given these two notions, “it is possible to demonstrate that all the other curves, e.g., parabola, hyperbole, conchoid, spiral, are possible” (A VI 4 159). d This remark will later develop into the theory of “blind thinking” (cogitatio caeca), which explains the substantive role of signs in expanding the range of the complexity of what can be thought beyond the limited scope of what can be grasped “in one glance” (uno obtutu). For an analysis and explanation of these notions, see Dascal (1978). b

Chapter 5 THE BALANCE OF LAW

This text, so far not published in the Academy Edition, is one of those in which Leibniz employs a pseudonym – a practice he was apparently fond of in his early career. The suggested date is that corresponding to the provisional dating of the Leibniz Archive in Hanover. According to a note of Raspe on top of the manuscript (C 210), “this is nothing but the beginning of an extremely elegant essay which, had it been completed would have presented the very noble part of logic devoted to probability”. In fact, Raspe may be wrong on both counts. On the one hand, the text seems to be complete and thoroughly corrected by Leibniz, although it might perhaps be considered a preamble or preface for some larger work. On the other, its significance, in our opinion, goes well beyond the logic of probabilities. The debate about ‘probabilism’ in the direction of consciences, for example, revolves around a notion of probability that has little to do with mathematical probability; the same is the case regarding the notion of ‘privilege’ Leibniz employs in the present text. Generally speaking the object of the present text is to point out to what extent the jurists practice a ‘logic of the contingent’, which is extremely relevant for many other fields and can therefore be imitated in them. When listing the varieties of this logic as they are in use among jurists, it is perhaps worthwhile to distinguish between three categories, hinted at by Leibniz’s grouping of them, namely: (a) those pertaining to the logical status of juridical procedures (e.g., the relative value of proofs and presumptions, legal hermeneutics, etc.); (b) guidelines for judicial investigation (investigation, deception, intimidation, etc.); (c) the foundational principles underlying the legal system (e.g., axioms or maximsa) and its use (the juridical topicsb).

Date: 1676(?) Edition: C 210-214; LH IV, VI, 17, 1-2 Language: Latin 35 M. Dascal (ed.), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. The Art of Controversies, 35–40. © 2006 Springer.

36

Chapter 5

Towards a Balance of Law concerning the Degrees of Proofs and of Probabilities Gottfried the Truthful of Lublin I present here a certain balance of the law, a new kind of instrument with which it is possible to estimate the value, not of precious metals and stones, but of something more precious than that: the weights of reasons. The current opinion is that the arguments of those who debate, the opinions of authors, or the discourses of those who deliberate, are not to be counted but weighed by he who has in his hands the supreme power to decide, once everything has been weighed. A weighty reason may destroy many conjectures and vice versa: it sometimes happens that reasons in themselves worthless if considered one by one, end up pressing a scale down when accumulated.1 For this reason everybody acknowledges that such a logometric balance is in the nature of things, although nobody indicates where it is to be found.2 Therefore, we are now finally extracting from the sanctuaries of jurisprudence a thing extremely useful for all aspects of life that was so hidden in them that it hardly could be acknowledged. At any rate, one should admit as certain that, just as the mathematicians have excelled above the other mortals in the logic, i.e., the art of reason, of the necessary, so too the jurists did in the logic of the contingent. Hence, we can learn much from their precepts about complete and half-complete proofs, about presumptions, about conjecturing regarding the meanings of the laws, about contracts and wills, about criminal clues (indicia); and about the arguments directing investigations, cheating, intimidation, interrogation under torture, all of which in their lowest, intermediate and highest degrees; and finally about the legal commonplaces of arguments, which complete the Topics with the axioms of law, commonly called maxims.3 For ultimately, what is a judicial process if not the form of disputing transferred from the Schools to life, purged of vacuousness and limited by public authority in such a way that it is illicit to wander about or to twist or to omit whatever can be shown to be relevant for the search of truth? 1

Erased by Leibniz: “This kind of scales, which must be extracted from the temples of jurisprudence, would be of the utmost utility for human life”. 2 Marginal addition: “Aristotle, the father of logic, does not deal with this; his interpreters much less. Those who in our times have excelled above everyone in matters of logic, Joachim Jungius* and Antoine Arnauld* have also overlooked this part [of logic] no less than the others”. 3 Erased by Leibniz: “which others call kyrias doxas (supreme beliefs)”.

5. The Balance of Law

37

To be sure, if men were to exert themselves in all things with diligence and expertness and if they endeavored to investigate nature and – most important of all – to discern the true way of eternal happiness, as much as judges or commissaries expend their energy in quarrels about (often small) amounts of money, comparing arguments with arguments, examining documents, interrogating witnesses and going into the details of the case at hand – there can be no doubt that much more care would be taken of the health of the body and the salvation of the soul than is usually done.4 It is well known that physicians have also diligently elaborated precepts regarding symptoms (indicatio). But in this they are very far from the rigor (akribeia) of the jurists, so that, as Pliny says, in no other activity is one under more risk.c To be sure, one should not underestimate the recommendations given by Claudinus, author of the Introduction to Maladies,d or by Sanctorius in his Method to Avoid Errors in Medicine;e but they are weak if compared with the well-developed works of the jurists like those of Rutger Rulland On the Commissary,f whom this author has instructed with such a wealth [of models] of interrogation and subinterrogation that it is not likely that anything will escape him. How often one wonders about the perversity of human intelligence, which applies all its diligence where it is least needed. [People] deal with utmost seriousness and effort with things such as dripping [water], the obstruction of light by a neighbor’s house, the [right of] passage, the access, and [the right to open a track] through a field, [or] three little goats. Scholars and experts express their opinions, as if these were the most important of things;5 one goes from court to court, lest one lose the first audience, and nothing is neglected in order to conclude the controversy with a right judgment; no less than if in the Roman senate one were debating [the fate of] the part of Asia on this side of Mount Taurusg or [about] the kingdom of Egypt. To be sure, one should praise these judges and counsels for their industriousness and religiosity; they perform their duty in little [affairs] no less than in major [ones]; and God’s prize recompenses [all] work, be it insignificant or not.6 But one should blame humankind for the fact that, whereas it exercises such an excellent prudence in small affairs, it usually leaves the major ones to chance. 4

Marginal addition: “Not to mention very serious political deliberations or military consultations, where most of the time authority or eloquence prevail over reason, especially when lack of time or the difficulty and multiplicity of aspects of the matter make it difficult to recognize the force of reasons”. 5 De summa rerum; this expression, presumably here used ironically by Leibniz, is the title of the work on metaphysics, theology, and other “top of the world” themes he projected at about the same time, a part of which is Chapter 4. 6 Erased by Leibniz: “It can happen that an obscure man [deserves the prize] in checkers, or for being a good artisan in his profession, or for another reason …”.

38

Chapter 5

Hence, the example set by the jurists of the use of human reason should be followed in the extremely serious deliberations about life and health, about the state, about war and peace, about the management of consciousness, and about taking care of eternity. Theologians have reasons for not being angry if one provides them with advice on this matter. For whoever examines with care their published debates (Colloquia) would wonder how such important topics are treated so perfunctorily, not to say preposterously.7 There are those who do not argue, but harangue; here and there a harvest of sophisms pullulates, and for the most part spirits are exacerbated and aroused to the point of loud insults. Finally, time is consumed to such an extent, that the dispute turns around and around, and even those who were most interested in initiating it wait impatiently for its end, utterly bored and hopeless that it will bear any fruit. But leaving aside the controversies between the sects that divide the Christian World, our work about the degrees of proof is addressed above all to those who direct consciences.h Particularly because among them there has been in recent years a passionate dispute about the force and authority of probability. There are those who think that a sage and prudent man can act following a less probable or less certain opinion, whereas others denounce this [view] as if it were a great sacrilege.i Prosper Fagnani, a well-known writer belonging to the so-called Canonists, ponderously demonstrates how jurists are much more severe in these matters than theologians.j But Honoré Fabri,* theologian and philosopher of great intelligence and vast knowledge, opposes [Fagnani’s claims], and both acquits the probabilists on several points and prescribes the addition of important precautions [to their views]. Nevertheless, he ends up by declaring, following the views of his own party, that in many cases those men who take care of their own conscience, as well as the physicians of souls or directors of consciences, are entitled to rightly prefer an opinion that seems to themselves less probable or less sure, even though this [privilege] would never be granted to a judge or lawyer in a clearly similar matter.k I have somehow noticed this not without surprise; hence, I think one should appreciate how much more can be learned in this respect from the laws and from the jurists about those things that have been put to test by a long experience of life and by the manifold discussion of controversies, rather than by borrowing from some apprentice writers that which, thought about in the shadow of the Schools with more subtlety than precision, does not bring to any subject a comparable light. 7

Erased by Leibniz: “and sophistically”. By erasing this expression, Leibniz tries to slightly moderate his critique of the lack of method he detects in the conduct of the colloquia, supposedly intended to solve the religious controversies. He suggests that the use of some of the juridical procedures would be helpful to overcome this.

5. The Balance of Law

39

In any event, I do not want it to be inferred from the above that I tend to believe that the jurists proceed faultlessly and that everything they set up is well grounded and cannot be improved. Is there such a thing in human affairs? I gladly confess that we often make use of an uncertain juridical system (jus) and that in many cases the intervention of a new legislator is needed, and that many points, especially in judicial procedure, require reform; and that, furthermore, [in this area] routine (periergia) commands, so that through excessive attention to the solemnity of formalities, the question at issue is often veiled – the litigants becoming thus tired and exhausted by the judicial delays. But this [only] shows that nothing is so excellent that it cannot suffer from abuse. Ultimately, I admit that this method of judging and weighing opposed reasons, as if in a balance, has not been elaborated among jurists in such a way as to render the new investigation here proposed superfluous. Nevertheless, it is apparent that the materials for this work have been provided by them and that these new reflections by me, whatever their value, have emerged from their diligence. Certainly nobody has provided so many helps. We, however, who have also contributed, and not superficially, to other doctrines, will perhaps be able to add something to the perfection of this very useful method, regarding which – satisfied with having acceded to it through a new kind of theory – we will gladly and frankly applaud anyone who, with better success, will be able to achieve it.8 a

In the chapter of the Nouveaux essais (4.7) on the evident “propositions called maxims or axioms”, Leibniz discusses the principles of natural law and of justice as deriving from this kind of propositions, much as one derives the theorems of geometry – although he claims that, in both cases, the axioms should be demonstrated (4.7.1; A VI 6 406). In the same chapter, however, he also mentions other maxims, such as the ‘brocardic’ principles (see Chapter 9E). b See Chapter 9(D-E) for the role of topoi in juridical argumentation. In Leibniz’s plan for an encyclopedia serving the art of discovery, Topics is the first main division. See Chapter 15. c Leibniz’s critique of the medicine of his time (to which he himself contributed – e.g., his controversy with Georg Ernst Stahl; D II 2 131-161), is less sweeping that it could seem. Leibniz compares the legal and medical methods in Chapter 10, and suggests the former as a model for the improvement of the latter. d Julius Caesar Claudinus (ca. 1550-1618), De ingressu ad infirmos libri duo, Bologna, 1612. Re-edited several times in the 17th century (e.g., Basel, 1616, 1641; Frankfurt, 1675). e Santorio Sanctorius (1561-1636), Methodus vitandorum errorum omnium, qui in arte medica contingunt libri XV, Venice, 1602. f Rütger Rulant (1568-1630), Tractatus de commissariis et commissionibus Camerae Imperialis. Frankfurt, 1596. See also Chapter 10. 8

Leibniz is here interested mainly in retaining the “copyright” of his idea of developing the balance idea in the light of the legal “materials” and applying it to other fields.

40 g

Chapter 5

The Taurus Mountains form a mighty barrier running parallel to the Mediterranean coast in Southern Turkey. Their passageways were strategically and commercially important in antiquity. h Who are the addressees of this exhortation? Besides priests and pastors, especially the Jesuits (see following note), one might also think of political leaders (especially the prince) who are required by Leibniz to provide their subjects not only with just and efficient governance, but also with a model of behavior (see, e.g., Portrait of the Prince, 1679; K IV 459-487). i Probabilism is a moral doctrine clearly formulated in the 16th and 17th centuries, although its basic ideas were already present in medieval theological debates around the idea that a dubious law does not obligate (lex dubia non obligat). The Dominican theologians of Salamanca were the first to formulate, at the end of the 16th century, the thesis that in case there are doubts about the lawfulness of an action, the moral agent is allowed to follow an opinion that is not the most probable, provided he has good reasons for that. Probabilism was adopted by the Jesuits (Suárez, Laymann), who made it the base of their casuistry. Pascal and the Jansenists criticized the lax morality of the probabilists, a critique that led the Dominicans to adopt an anti-probabilist position in 1656. Leibniz was familiar with this debate, as his careful reading of the writings of several participants in it (e.g., Vincent Baron, Manuductio, Paris, 1665-1666; Honoré Fabri, Apologeticus Doctrinae Moralis eiusdem Societatis, Lyon, 1670; Honoré Fabri, Pithanophilus seu dialogus vel opusculum de opinione probabile, Roma, 1659; Bernard Stubrockius [= Honoré Fabri], Notae in notas Vendrochii, Brussels, 1659; Ludovicus Montaltius [= Blaise Pascal], Litterae provinciales, de morali et politica Jesuitarum disciplina, 4th ed., Köln, 1665; J. Caramuel de Lobkowitz, Apologema pro antiquissima et universalissima doctrina, de probabilitate. Contra novam, singularem, improbabilemque D. Prosperi Fagnani Opinationem, Lyon, 1663). For some of his remarks on these writings see A VI 4 1335-1343; A VI 4 26012637. j Prospero Fagnani (1598-1678) taught Canonical Law at the University of Rome, and since 1618 was the secretary of the Council Congregation as well as member of other ecclesiastic congregations. Presumably Leibniz has in mind here Fagnani’s Commentaria super quinque libros Decretalium, Rome, 1661. In the quite peculiar Leibnizian terminology, the ‘casuists’ are “moralists or natural theology authors”, who elaborate a rational morality touching upon general issues as well as specific ones such as contracts, marriage, oaths, etc. The ‘canonists’, on the other hand, are those who ground their statements upon the Church canons emanating from the Councils, from Papal decisions and from the Protestant princes (cf. De ordine bibliothecaria librorum theologicorum, 1693; A IV 5 608). k In Roman Law, ‘privilege’ denotes an exceptional norm that derogates a general norm. The modern sense of the term fits therein: an advantage given to certain persons in detriment of others, thus making exception to the general norm or rule. See Chapters 11 and 39.

Chapter 6 CAN THERE BE AN OBLIGATION TO BELIEVE?

This text is devoted to a key theological issue, raised by the Reformation. The traditional Catholic position contends that faith is rationally necessary, since not to believe in God’s existence is possible only for he who “does not know” (nescius). Luther’s contention, on the contrary, is that faith does not derive from man’s will nor can it be achieved through rational persuasion; it is rather a divine gift. Besides their theological interest, the several versions of the text display a Leibniz eager to use his developing logical skills – especially in modal logic – in dealing with the subtle doxastic-deontic problem of what, if anything, can compel someone to have a belief of any sort. We follow the Academy edition in translating here a “first draft”, a “new version”, and the “final version”. It should be noted, however, that there are in fact five drafts preceding the latter. Each of them contains relevant variants vis-à-vis the published “first draft”, which we take into account in our notes. Of particular interest is the fact that the “first draft” ends without having reached Leibniz’s main objective, namely the proof that there is no obligation to believe. Instead, quite surprisingly, its second and last theorem is an attempt to prove what the same text lists as an axiom. This is consonant with Leibniz’s methodological principle that analysis (i.e., demonstration) should be pursued as far as possible – which includes attempting to demonstrate purported axioms.a Here, he does so by trying to prove a deontic proposition (regarding an “obligation”) using exclusively the logical modalities – thereby getting involved in some equivocations. The consideration of the other versions of this “first draft” allows the reader to witness Leibniz’s struggle with these difficulties, as well as to see what he was in fact aiming at. In fact, these equivocations could be avoided by the use of the notion of “hypothetical necessity” – which Leibniz had already applied both to physics and to ethics. In the Philosopher’s Confession (1673), for example, an affinity between physical and moral necessity is established, on the grounds that both, belonging to ‘sciences dealing with quality’, differ from ‘geometrical necessity’ (A VI 3 118).b

41 M. Dascal (ed.), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. The Art of Controversies, 41–47. © 2006 Springer.

42

Chapter 6 The present text can be viewed as belonging to the attempt to account for how the will is determined, within the framework of a comprehensive moral theory. Defined as an inclination (Théodicée, 22; GP VI 116), “the will is not in our power” (Confessio Philosophi; A VI 3 132); it is driven by spontaneous and involuntary motives. This will be the core of the De affectibus (1679; A VI 4 1410-1441), grounded on the articulation between affect and determination.c

Date: First half of 1677 (?) Edition: A VI 4 C 2149-2155 Language: Latin

A. FIRST DRAFT On the obligation of believing Definitions An obligation is a necessity under the fear of a just punishment.1 A just punishment is a punishment that would be imposed by the wisest and the most powerful (potentissimus). Wisdom is the science of happiness. Science is certain knowledge. Happiness is a state of pleasure without pain. To believe is to be conscious of reasons that persuade. Probability is the excess of reasons given in favor of what is in question over those against it. To be in your power (potestate) is the same as to depend upon your will, that is, to exist if you will. Axioms There is a wisest and most powerful (potentissimus) being.2 There is no obligation towards things that are not in one’s power (potestas). 1

In two other versions of this text, Leibniz included and then erased here two different specifications of the notion of ‘necessity’: (a) “… necessity of the wise. For that towards which others are compelled by force, the wise are compelled by reason”; (b) “Necessary is that which it is impossible that it does not occur”. 2 In another version of the text: “The wisest being is also the most powerful”.

6. Can there be an Obligation to Believe?

43

Theorem I In what concerns faith, only our diligent attention depends upon our will. To have faith or to believe is, as I said, to be conscious of reasons.3 The consciousness of reasons requires sometimes reasons, sometimes consciousness of them without sensing (sine sensu) that these reasons depend upon the nature of the thing. [In this case], therefore, all that can be in our hands is the perception of these reasons without consciousness.4 But such a perception can be reached in two ways: either the reasons appear by chance or they are searched by us. Now, chance does not depend upon our will and searching depends upon our attention. Therefore, when what is in question is the consciousness of reasons, i.e., faith, the only thing that depends upon our will is [our] attention – as we intended to demonstrate. Theorem II5 There is no obligation towards things that are not in one’s power (potestas). Those things that are not in the power of the wise are not necessary for the wise. Therefore, given a state of affairs, if these things cannot occur by virtue of external chance, they cannot occur at all. Things that are impossible to occur, given a state of affairs, necessarily do not occur, i.e., their contrary is necessary.

3

4

5

In another version of the text, Leibniz makes use of the definition of probability given above: “To believe is to be conscious of the probability, i.e., of the excess of the reasons given in favor of that which is in question over those against it; but the consciousness of such reasons does not depend upon our will”. In another version of the text, Leibniz explains this peculiar notion: “Just as it is not in my power (potestas) not to see when my eyes are open, so too it is not in my power not to acknowledge that which presents itself to the mind when the mind is attentive”. In the present version of the text, Theorem II is identical to Axiom II – which is rather surprising. In other versions, however, Theorem II has three further different formulations, along with different demonstrations: (a) “Theorem II: There is no obligation to believe. For an obligation is the necessity of the wise. Therefore, that to which one is obliged is necessary for the wise. What is necessary for the wise is certainly necessary for everyone. What is impossible is much less necessary”. (b) “Theorem II: There is no obligation towards the impossible. Indeed, what is impossible is not possible. What is not possible is not. What is not is not necessary. What is not necessary is not necessary for the wise. What is not necessary for the wise, there is no obligation towards it (by the definition of obligation). Therefore, there is no obligation towards the impossible”. (c) “Theorem II: There is no obligation to believe; only to be attentive. For, if one is attentive and faith does not follow from that, then faith is not in our power (by Theorem I). Regarding that which is not in our power, there is no obligation. Therefore, there is no obligation to believe”.

44

Chapter 6

B. NEW VERSION Definitions 1. An obligation is a necessity imposed by the fear of a just punishment. 2. A just punishment is a punishment that would be imposed by the wisest and the most powerful (potentissimus). 3. To believe is to be conscious of reasons that persuade us. 4. Something is in [your] power (potestate) if it is done in case you will it. 5. Consciousness is the memory of our actions. Axiom There is no obligation towards things that are not in one’s power (potestas). Theorem I There is no obligation to believe. For to be conscious of reasons is not in our power. Lemma Consciousness is not in our power. For consciousness is memory, by definition 5.

C. FINAL VERSION6 On the obligation of believing. A reasoning advertised as a demonstrationd Definitions 1. An obligation is a necessity imposed under the fear of a just punishment. 6

There are two manuscripts of this text. We follow the manuscript published in the Academy Edition, which differs significantly from the one published by Grua (181-182), retaining in the following notes those variants that seem to us to be most significant for understanding the text.

6. Can there be an Obligation to Believe? 2. 3. 4. 5.

45

To believe is to be conscious of reasons that persuade us. Something is in [your] power (potestate) if it is done if you will it. Fear is the will to avoid. Consciousness is the memory of our actions. Experiment 7

It is not in our power to recall or not to recall now some past thing. Proposition I

Consciousness is not in our power. Demonstration: For consciousness is memory by definition 5. Memory is not in our power, by the preceding experiment. Therefore, consciousness is not in our power either. Proposition II To believe or not to believe something is not in our power. Demonstration: For to believe is to be conscious of the reasons that persuade us of that which is to be believed, by definition 2. Consciousness is not in our power, by proposition I. Therefore, to believe or not to believe [something] is not in our power. Proposition III There is no obligation towards that which is not in our power. Demonstration: Since fear is nothing but the will to avoid punishment, by definition 4, it follows that nothing in what is obliged can contribute to the obligation’s fulfillment except the will to avoid punishment by obedience or 7

In the other version of this text: “Furthermore, the more we think we want to forget something, the more we think about that thing, hence the less we forget it. In contrast, we cannot persuade ourselves now that something that did not happen to us has happened to us. Therefore, neither remembering nor forgetting is in our power. To be sure, something of the sort could be achieved by means of some artifice capable of exciting one’s memory, but such artifices are neither immediately and directly efficient nor are their effects in our power. In any case, there is no doubt that, whenever my memory reports to me some past event, I cannot prevent this event from being present to me”. Leibniz here, starting from Pascal’s well-known pragmatic “paradox of forgetting” (if, in order to forget x, you have to remember that you want to forget x, then you cannot but remember what you want to forget), generalizes it – as he often does. The independence of memory from the will is again stated much later, in the NE (4.1.8): “la memoire n’est pas une chose qui depend de nostre volonté” (A VI 6 359).

46

Chapter 6

complying. Therefore, since this makes clear that the fear of punishment should not induce anything else than the will to obey, and that the obligation is the necessity induced by the fear of punishment, by definition 1, it follows that there is no obligation other than the will to obey. Therefore, there is no obligation concerning those things that are not done even given the will to obey, i.e., those things that are not in one’s power, by definition 3. Proposition IV There is no obligation to believe, but only to search with utmost application. To believe [something] is not in one’s power, by proposition II; there is no obligation concerning what is not in one’s power, by proposition III. Therefore, there is no obligation to believe. Q.E.D. Corollary From this it is evident that it is vain to oblige someone to swear to later believe or not to believe something. Scholium Hence, the obligation or order to believe leads only to the utmost tendency (conatus) to believe, that is, to the most accurate search of reasons to believe – which, however, should be moderate, so as not to make us expect from anyone more application than the state of his affairs and way of life allows him.8, e In order to understand this more clearly: in the present moment I am not obliged to believe or to recall something, since this does not depend upon me. Nevertheless, I am sometimes obliged to try to find reasons, which I can later recall, i.e., believe. By a similar method one can demonstrate many things in moral matters and in natural theology. This would be of great importance for the soul’s tranquility. For, only demonstration yields certainty; only certainty, long-lasting tranquility; and only tranquility, happiness. a

See, for example, “On the demonstration of primary propositions” (A VI 2, 479-486; translated in Dascal 1987, pp. 147-159).

8

In the other version of this text: “Nothing can be objected to this demonstration if the definitions I have given are followed. If, however, someone does not admit them, the dispute ends, for [the opponent] thereby declares he employs the words obligation, to believe, etc. in a sense different from the one I attribute to them. As for myself, I declare to be satisfied with demonstrating the proposition according to the sense I have assumed these words to have – which I think is not different from their ordinary usage”.

6. Can there be an Obligation to Believe? b

47

This idea is concisely expressed much later also in the Théodicée (Discours Préliminaire, 2): “Thus, one can say that physical necessity is based upon moral necessity, i.e., upon the choice by a wise man who acts wisely; and that the one as well the other must be distinguished from geometrical necessity” (GP VI 50). c See Cardoso (2005: 260-265). d The frequentative verb vendito, which we have translated ‘advertise’, literally means “to offer again and again for sale”, whence two different figurative meanings have developed, the one positive (praise, commend), the other negative (boast; the noun venditatio often means ostentation). We are inclined towards the latter reading, especially because in the manuscript published by Grua the subtitle had, after ratiocinatio, “communicated to me” (mihi communicata). The Editors of the Academy Edition, in the light of their praise for the demonstration this text contains (A VI 4 lxxiv), have probably opted for the positive reading. e In addition to its interest for presenting a clear formulation of a procedural rule (agreement about definitions) that conditions the proper conduct of a debate, this passage also suggests an explanation of the curious subtitle Leibniz gave to his text: its demonstrative character is only “advertised” or “alleged” because, depending upon the acceptance of a set of definitions (that Leibniz senses to be rather problematic), its conclusions are at best strongly hypothetical. In the correspondence with H. Conring, mainly in his letter of the 19th March 1678, Leibniz claims that the demonstration is performed through a chain of definitions, which connects the principles with the conclusion. These principles are not definitions, but identical propositions (undemonstrable) or excperiments (experimenta). The rigour of analytic procedure doesn’t grant apodictic status to the conclusions resulting from experiments, which keep a margin of problematicity (cf. A II I 397-400).

Chapter 7 CONTROVERSIES ON SACRED MATTERS

Although its background is undoubtedly Leibniz’s work in attempting to settle religious controversies, this well-elaborated text explores the nature of controversy in general. Leibniz begins by defining a controversy as involving an issue that can be decided by means of argumentation, like in a tribunal. In this, it is different from both war (where a solution is imposed by force) and disputation (where the discussion may be endless, with no hope of decision). Leibniz stresses that, in a controversy, the aim is resolving the issue, rather than attributing victory to one of the contenders. For this purpose, it is necessary to satisfy the contenders’ hope by means of ‘sensible evidence’ – which can stem either from authority (human or divine) or from reason (comprising not only proofs, but also half-proofs and probabilities). Expressing his clear preference for the latter, he concludes by returning to the topic of the “judge of controversies” (see Chapters 2, 8, 19) and unequivocally stating that the “final judge regarding the judge is reason”.

Date: 1677? Edition: A VI 4 C 2163-2167 Language: Latin

On General Sacred Controversies A controversy is here [taken to be] a question disputed [agitata] in a trial [judicium]. A trial is the state of those who contest by means of reasons in the hope of success. Trial is opposed to War. War is the state of those who contest by means of force.a There is no need to add, in the definition of war, the hope of success, as we did in the definition of trial. For the very nature of a contest by means of force is such that, upon its conclusion, it usually becomes clear who the 49 M. Dascal (ed.), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. The Art of Controversies, 49–54. © 2006 Springer.

50

Chapter 7

winner is. Whereas, when one contests by means of reasons, at the end of the contest rarely is it clear to whom the truth or the victory belongs. A trial therefore differs from a Dispute in that in a trial one hopes, at the beginning of the contest, to achieve success; whereas, when one begins a Dispute, without a judge or a rule, it is feared that nothing will be achieved, so that the state of minds and things remains the same at the end of the Dispute. Hence Disputes can be useful as an exercise; but if we seriously seek success in the contest, we should have recourse to some trial. There is success in a contest when, upon its conclusion, the thing reaches such a state that one can no longer continue to fight easily. Therefore, the serious aim of a contest is to put an end to contests. Success in a contest is more general than victory, since it is possible to reach the end of a contest without a winner. For instance, when both die; or when, both remaining alive and well, they break off an uncertain contest by making peace; or when neither side convinces the other; or when it becomes apparent that the contest is futile, since the state of the controversy is not grounded in things or assertions, but only in words – in all these cases, once they become clear, the debate ceases.1 A contest is an experimental clash (experimentum) of forces performed by both contenders with the aim of making clear who is stronger. However, since beings endowed with soul and intelligence never do anything in vain, it is obvious to the contestants that their purpose is to obtain some prize in the contest, be it the brabeum,2 the glory of winning, or some sort of profit which inflames the contest by stimulating the contestants’ enthusiasm. It is possible to compete through the forces of the mind or of the body, and even with those of fortune. For he who is more fortunate may be considered more powerful. Indeed, powerful is he who has a powerful friend, which fortune certainly is. The hope of success lies in the nature of a contest such that it makes it reasonable to expect success. Hence, I am not speaking here of that sort of hope through which one can fool oneself, but of the hope dictated by the thing itself; that is, of the cause of hope which the French call apparence. In the same sense I would say that trial is the state of contests by means of reasons with a justified hope of success. Thus, in order to understand in depth how controversies can arise in a trial, either in sacred or in civil matters, we must take into account the person 1

Marginal addition: “Consequently, in order to make clear the nature of the typically human state called judgment, according to the definition above, it is necessary to consider those who engage in the contest”. 2 This was the name of the prize in public games, in the late Roman period.

7. Controversies on Sacred Matters

51

of the contestants, the contest’s prize, the hope of success according to the laws of competing, and finally the reasons used in the contest. For the study of the judge or norm belongs to the study of the hope of success. Regarding the contestants, one may ask whether they should speak up in person, i.e. whether they must themselves be heard. Indeed, this question arises in controversies about sacred matters too. For one may ask whether it is appropriate for a layman – however careful he may be in these matters – to inquire into these topics, to read the Holy Scripture, and to examine old documents;b whether it is appropriate to incite public controversy in religious matters and to promote forcefully the Reformation; or rather whether it is not up to a scholar or even to someone especially educated for that purpose to initiate such things in private and by virtue of his education. And finally, whether even he who dares to undertake public action in these subjects should be instructed by a specific divine mission, be it ordinary or extraordinary. The question of whether one should permit or forbid the reading of the Holy Scriptures is therefore pertinent here; so too, the question of the forbidden books and of the index of expurgations, as well as that of the implicit faith of the innocents; of the right to punish the disputants who doubt and those who deny, the heretics, the apostates, those who relapse; and the right of the inquisitors of heretic depravity. Also the question of whether to admit heretics in discussions and colloquia and whether one should grant them free passage and respect their faith, and finally of whether it is necessary to have a license (missio) – ordinary or extraordinary – in order to be able to teach. For, in all such issues, the question of the right to admit or reject some [persons] in religious controversies, private or public, always arises. The prize of a contest conducted through reasons is to yield persuasion – either of the adversary himself or else of some other listener. Persuading the adversary is the highest prize of a contest through reasons. For, ultimately, a full victory is the one that – as someone said – subjugates declared enemies also in their spirits;c a victory such that, for that reason, there is no further need for the authority of the courts, nor for military action, nor for the fear of punishment, in order to achieve our purpose and wrest the adversary’s acknowledgment. Persuading the audience has the force (vis) either of restraining the adversary, by shame or fear, from further entrenching himself, or else of letting us achieve what we want thanks to the judgment and authority of those who applaud. In addition, through persuasion we seek some good, for ourselves or for someone else. Our own good [may be] glory, i.e., obtaining the prize or the honor offered to the contenders; or whatever concerns us about which

52

Chapter 7

someone would raise a controversy; or our security – ensured by the punishment imposed upon the wicked. We seek the good of someone else through persuasion when we endeavor to make the listeners better – even when we ourselves benefit from it, for charitable actions include the teaching of those who err. God indeed has established the highest prizes for charity. The hope of success depends upon the certainty that there will be a sensible sign (nota sensibilis) of victory. A sensible sign is that which is indisputable, e.g. whether the color of some presented thing is black or white, and no one disputes about this. Nor, in general, is there any trial about things that are actually perceived by everybody, since it is obvious that anyone called [to express his opinion] would declare himself in favor of the true winner. For example, if your arrow has hit the target closer than mine, there is no issue about the victory, for it is obvious that anyone called would immediately say that your arrow is the closer one, even if he ignored the fact that it is yours. The way to reach a sensible sign in a trial depends on the type of trial. But the sensible sign sought is either [a sign] of truth or of persuasion. If it is of persuasion, what else can be obtained besides the approval of the audience? This is certainly a sensible thing (res sensibilis), which is sufficient in civil matters, where, through the authority or assent of the audience we achieve what we looked for in the contest, namely glory or the thing itself. On the other hand, in sacred matters, where a sensible sign of the truth is sought, neither the persuasion nor the approval of the audience is sufficient, unless the audience is infallible regarding the argument in question. The signs of truth are either reason or authority. Authority is either divine or human. It is either mute or oral. Mute divine authority is the report of a past revelation. Oral divine authority is a present revelation, attested to by some miracle.d The latter includes also the proof by fire, water, fortune, temporal happiness, and other signs (nota), whose ground lies in that, in conformity with providence, God gives some sign (signum), be it permanent or new (the latter being less probable), whenever we wish to ask Him.e Human authority refers either to that regarding which someone else’s testimony is accepted or else to that regarding which nobody is obliged to believe unless [he] has the privilege of infallibility. Each of these is, again, either mute or oral. For instance, the authority of the Fathers is mute, because one may dispute about explication. Human authority is either individual or collective, such as the authority of a whole generation, a family, a sect, or a people. The only oral authority is the contemporary one, and it is either that of a man, or of a people, or even of an infallible multitude. For infallibility may derive either from divine grace or from the

7. Controversies on Sacred Matters

53

nature of the thing, as when someone testifies about some question of fact and there is no reason to believe that his judgment is mistaken, or we even know that he may not be mistaken – for instance, a multitude’s testimony about matters of fact. The perpetual consensus of Christians throughout the centuries is of this sort. So too is some view about some matter of fact accepted up to the present time, provided one can show that there has been no change in it, since this entails that the view in question was not manmade (facta). Arnauld’s principle pertains to this.f A sign of infallibility coming from divine grace would be the necessity of someone ordained for dispensing the sacraments, since in this way those who had the succession would also have the presumption. The signs of all these authorities, except that of present revelation, be they from a man or from an infallible council, are mute, i.e., they always require someone else’s explanation or a reasoning or some other judgment. One should mention here the method of Masenius and Veronius, who wanted to reduce the Protestants to prove without reasoning their faith according to Scripture, i.e., to a question of authority or oral scripture.g Reasons are either proofs, or presumptions, or semi-proofs or probabilities. For them to provide a sensible sign, they must be arranged in a certain form, so that the evidence of the truth becomes apparent. Above all one needs this form when what is in question is establishing the mute or oral authority of the judge himself. For the final judge regarding the judge is reason. a

Leibniz quotes here Grotius’s* definition (De jure belli ac pacis, Amsterdam, 1642, 1, 1, par. 2). b These precautions refer to the decree of the Council of Trent that forbade laymen (against the recommendation of the Protestant reformers) to read the Holy Scriptures without the permission and guidance of ecclesiastical authorities. c Confessos animo quoque subjugat hostes. From Claudius Claudianus, Roman poet of the 4th-5th century A.D., Panegyricus de sexto consulatu Honorii Augusti, verse 248. d Leibniz employs here a rather peculiar distinction between mute and oral. The criterion underlying this distinction is not the actual use of speech or writing, but actual ‘presence’. In this sense, a past miracle is ‘mute’, whereas a present miracle, so to speak, ‘speaks to us’. e The ‘permanent’ signs mentioned by Leibniz are the general indications that allow one to recognize the existence of providence. The ‘new’ ones are particular miracles, objects of specific requests by the believer. According to Leibniz’s doctrine of miracles, the latter are less probable, even though they are neither impossible nor refutable qua signs (cf. Discours de Metaphysique, paragraphs 6-7 - A VI 4 1537-1539; Théodicée, 207 - GP VI 240-241; Letter to the Landgrave Ernst von Hessen-Rheinfels, 1 February 1686 - GP II 12). f Leibniz is here referring to the distinction between what is perpetual (God-created) and what is man-made. The absence of change in the former is an indication of its truth. Arnauld argues that since the Apostles no innovation concerning the mysteries of the Eucharist could have taken place. A. Arnauld, La perpetuité de la foy de l’Eglise Catholique touchant l’Eucaristie, defendue contre les livres du Sieur Claude (Paris, 1669).

54 g

Chapter 7

Jakob Masenius (Semanus), 1606-1681, was a Jesuit whose writings include mystical, polemical and rhetorical topics. Leibniz probably refers here to his Methodus fidei conciliandi (Köln, 1652). François Veron (1575-1649) was a Jesuit polemist, engaged in converting the Reformed. He devoted his life to studying and provoking controversies with the huguenots throughout France. His defaming response to Samuel Bochart in the “conference” they held in Caen (1628) led to his silencing decreed by the Parliament of Rouen (1631). According to the Academy Edition, Leibniz refers here to the Methodus veroniana, sive brevis et perfacilis modus, quo quilibet Catholicus etiam scholis Teologicis non exercitatus, potest solis Bibliis sive Genevensia illa sint sive alia, et confessione fidei religionis praetendae ministrem evidenter mutum reddere, et religionario cuicumque, quod in omnibus et singulis praetentae reformationis suae punctis errare teneatur demonstrare (Köln, 1619). But Leibniz may also have referred to the earlier and often re-edited work of Veron, Methode de traiter les controverses de religion (Paris, 1615).

Chapter 8 THE JUDGE OF CONTROVERSIES

This group of texts includes two types of writings. A, B and F address the notion of a ‘judge of controversies’, which seems to have been the intended title for a work Leibniz did not complete. D and E address the problem of religious controversies, their eventual futility, and propose a criterion for identifying those that are indeed useful – which in fact amounts to a proposal of a general strategy for advancing in the project of reunion by postulating a unity of all Christian confessions at a level of abstraction above their divisions. C spells out the futility of one type of controversies, namely those motivated only by the rhetorical aim of serving the reputation of the contenders. Some of the pieces are carefully written, while others are false starts soon interrupted and abandoned. The context to which these texts belong is a set of writings that Leibniz prepared in the first months of his appointment in Hanover, as part of the task assigned to him by the Duke to advise him in his religious policy. Viewed from a broader perspective, it can be said that the present set of texts develops the project of “Catholic Demonstrations” conceived by Leibniz while in Mainz. They are related to other texts such as Chapter 6 – which applies the ideas of B to the specific case of religious beliefs, Chapter 7 – which is in fact a detailed elaboration of the ideas sketched in F, “Various definitions of the Church” (A VI 4 2174-2179) – which already announces the main idea expounded in E), and others. With the upcoming visit of Nicolaus Stensen, the papal envoy to reunion negotiations in Hanover and elsewhere in Germany and Austria, the problem of religious controversies acquired for Leibniz a practical turn. In all likelihood, the six pieces here grouped comprise materials that Leibniz intended to use in his upcoming discussions with Stensen. Some of these materials turn up also in his later discussions with Rojas y Spínola* (see Chapters 20, 27, and 35). In fact, the two rounds of negotiations were not disconnected and, according to Baruzi (1907: 259-262), Stensen, a former

55 M. Dascal (ed.), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. The Art of Controversies, 55–63. © 2006 Springer.

56

Chapter 8 Protestant, had the undercover mission of closely watching Bishop Rojas y Spínola’s (the Emperor’s envoy) steps in the first round of negotiations. The main novelty in the present writings, if compared with the pieces written in Mainz, lies in their focusing on the nature of controversies and on the conditions for their solution, both in general and in the particular case of divided Christendom. These texts are characterized by an implicit va et vient between the former and the latter, characteristic of Leibniz’s theoria cum praxi concern (cf. “Recommendation for creating a general science”, A VI 4 692713, esp. p. 711; and Chapter 34 – where the theoretical idea of “union” is cashed out in terms of the idea of “practical assent”). The thematic unity of the ensemble lies in the exploration of what counts as a proper judge of controversies, i.e., of the authority capable of solving controversies of different types, particularly religious ones. The expression ‘the judge of controversies’, albeit developed in A, B, and F in a very general sense (as in Chapter 19), is closely related, on the one hand, to its juridical counterpart and, on the other, as argued in E, to the ultimate moral authority of the Christian values of charity and love of God. The latter, in its turn, is linked to the theological (as well as political, hermeneutic, and philosophical) debates about the authority of the Pope, of the Councils, of the traditional interpretation of the Biblical text, and of what counts as ‘right reason’.a From the point of view of Leibniz’s theory of controversies, these texts are extremely interesting because they reveal the different tendencies that pull him in opposite directions. In A and B he distinguishes between ‘external’ (a court’s decision) and ‘internal’ (persuasion, truth) factors capable of settling a controversy, dismisses the former as incapable of determining opinion or belief, and focuses on the latter. His own set of definitions and propositions leads him, however, to an extreme subjectivism, expressed in the claim that “absolutely speaking, there is no judge of controversies except each one for himself” (A; repeated in Prop. 9 of B). This conclusion seems to frighten him, making him end B with a seemingly extemporaneous defense of logic as an ‘objective’, albeit ‘internal’ (rather than external) reliable judge. The same search for an ‘internal objective’ trustworthy authority can be observed in E. This time, the rejected external objectivity consists in the contingencies of Church history and politics, while the rejected internal subjectivism is mere faith in particular (rather than universal) religious/moral principles.

Date: 1677 Edition: A VI 4 C 2155-2163 Language: Latin

8. The Judge of Controversies

57

A. FIRST DRAFT1 On the Judge of Controversies The judge of controversies is the one by whose verdict (judicio) controversies are terminated.2 Controversies concern either opinion and truth or the possession of aliens’ things.3 The judge of controversies concerning possessions is anyone who is sufficiently powerful (potens), namely anyone having as much [power] as required for granting, withholding or conserving possession. For indeed, once possession is granted or withheld by his will, it is useless to raise another controversy about that possession.4 The only question that remains is that of truth.b The judges in the Republic may bring about that we surrender regarding something that is ours, thus preventing us from resisting against those who have caused the offense; but they cannot bring about that we believe that the action was just, even if we dare not – or should not dare – contradict them. I think that we do not owe absolute obedience to the highest power in the Republic, but rather only patience or lack of resistance, which was the usage vis-à-vis the old Church. Controversies about opinions can only be terminated by someone who is able to persuade someone else of something. Since we have defined the judge [of controversies] as he who terminates controversies, only he who refutes (tollit) contrary opinions, that is, only he who persuades, terminates controversies regarding matters of opinion; hence it is evident that the judge of controversies is he who has the power of persuading. Absolutely speaking, there is no judge of controversies except each one for himself. For nobody has the power to persuade someone else about anything.

1

This draft has been erased by Leibniz. Another formulation, erased by Leibniz: “The judge of controversies is he whose verdict (judicio) is infallible”. 3 Another formulation, erased by Leibniz: “Controversies are either about truth or about what is to be believed/held, or about what is to be done”. 4 Different versions of these notions have been erased by Leibniz: [1] “I call possession the power (potestas) over the thing. For he who seems to possess a thing is the one who has it in his power (potestas). The judge of controversies concerning possession is he who is the most powerful (potentissimus). For his judgment is infallible”; [2] “For the most powerful (potentissimus) is he who, by his will, grants or withholds possession; hence, it is not strange that his verdict about possession is infallible, since it depends [only] upon his will”. 2

58

Chapter 8

B. DEFINITIVE VERSION On the Judge of Controversies Prop. 1. Definition. A controversy is a question about which contrary opinions are held. Prop. 2. Definition. A judge of controversies is he who has the right to terminate controversies. Prop. 3. To terminate a controversy is to bring about that contrary opinions are no longer held. For, to terminate or to end something is to cause it to cease to exist. And a controversy ceases to exist when contrary opinions are not held (by prop. 1). Prop. 4. The right to terminate controversies depends upon the power (potentia) to terminate them. For, since there is no obligation to believe (as I said elsewhere), there is no obligation to give up one’s own opinion. Hence, no one has the right to take [my opinion] away from me, except if he can do it against my will. Prop. 5. The judge of controversies is he who has it in his power (potestas) to terminate controversies. For, the judge of controversies is the one who has the right to terminate them (prop. 2), that is, the power (potentia) to do so (by prop. 4).5 Prop. 6. Whoever is a judge of controversies must have the power (potestas) to [perform] one of two alternatives: either to induce men to forget the controversy or achieve their persuasion. For, the judge of controversies must be able to terminate them (by prop. 5), that is, to bring about the cessation of contrary opinions (prop. 3). But opinions cease in two ways: either by oblivion or by a change towards another opinion. Hence, the judge of controversies must be able to achieve either oblivion or persuasion. 5

We have translated both potestas and potentia by ‘power’. For Leibniz, following Roman Law, potestas consists in having the right (jus) of making juridical decisions along with the power (potentia) of enforcing them.

8. The Judge of Controversies

59

Prop. 7. He who has in his power (potestas) to persuade must also have in his power (potestas) to arouse attention. For, to persuade is to make you believe. To believe is to be aware of the reasons (as I said elsewhere). But there is no awareness without attention, hence no one can persuade if he is not capable of attention . Prop. 8. There is no man who can produce in another oblivion or attention as a habit. This proposition cannot be demonstrated by reason; it depends upon experience. Prop. 9. Absolutely speaking, no man is a judge of controversies vis-à-vis another. For, absolutely speaking, no man has the power (potestas) to produce oblivion or attention in another (by prop. 8), and since attention is necessary for persuasion (by prop. 7), it follows that, absolutely speaking, no man has the power (potestas) always to produce oblivion or persuasion in another. Therefore (by prop. 6), in absolute terms, no man has the power to terminate controversies. That is, (by prop. 5) absolutely speaking, no man is a judge of controversies. I say ‘absolutely speaking’ because I further admit that, assuming the hearer’s attention and the instructor’s infallibility, it is possible for someone to be a judge of controversies. However, it is necessary [for this] that he prove before another judge, that is, before myself, that he is a judge; so that, absolutely speaking, I alone among men am for me, personally, the judge of controversies.6 This I will show later on. There is a method to examine whether arguments have conclusive force or not. According to the logicians, all arguments can be reduced to the form all A is B, all B is C; therefore, all A is C. Since this form is indisputable, all we have to examine are the two premises, all A is B and all B is C. The argument is not valid unless these propositions are either known by themselves or else proven. Propositions known by themselves 6

Erased variants: [1] “Absolutely speaking, everyone is for himself the only judge of controversies among men. For, although it is not in my power (potestas) to produce in me oblivion, it is in my power (potestas) to produce attention”. [2] “Absolutely speaking, everyone is for himself the only judge of controversies among men. For one’s adoption of an opinion makes cease the opposite one at least for oneself (since no one can hold two [opposed] opinions simultaneously, though one can doubt, i.e., to have a neutral opinion). Hence everyone has the power (potentia)”.

60

Chapter 8 are those which result either from experience or from their terms, that is, those whose opposite implies contradiction. In both cases, it is in our power (potestas) to judge. As for those propositions that have to be proven, an argument is needed, which can be reduced to the same form. Therefore, the same reasoning recurs: he who argues either fails to prove, that is, he asserts something which cannot be proven in that form and hence his entire argument falls, or else he ultimately reduces everything to propositions known by themselves, in which case the proposition will have been proven. And it does not matter if some things are only probable. For it is possible to demonstrate even the probability of propositions.

C. RICHELIEU AND DE GROOT ON CONTROVERSIES Cardinal Richelieu understood controversies deeply, as is well known, and he enjoyed talking with able persons. One day he invited Mr. de Groot7 to talk with him. Now one must be aware that Mr. de Groot was then completely different from what he had been in his youth: for, having abandoned that fire of dispute, which warms more than it enlightens, and having returned to that obedient simplicity which alone is agreeable to God, he now envisaged controversies in a quite different way than before. Upon seeing him, the Cardinal said: I will be pleased to listen to your opinion about the means to reconcile controversies, for I know that you have meditated a lot about this. Groot: It is true that I have studied this subject for a long time, but Your Excellency will allow me to tell you that I have abandoned it. Richelieu: How come you think [that] what occupies the minds of so many people is no longer worth your time? G: It is true that there is no easier way to [achieve a] reputation than the way of controversies. A man who has some knowledge about antiquity, and thanks to it knows the art of reasoning, has no difficulty in succeeding in it.

7

Hugo Grotius.*

8. The Judge of Controversies

61

D. THE UTILITY OF CONTROVERSIES8 On the utility of controversies Controversies about the church’s unity and the schism Since the more vexing controversies are those regarding the Unity of the Church and the Schism, it is necessary to show their utility. To be sure, the Schism is bad, since it hurts charity, which can be demonstrated by the consensus of the Saint Fathers. Therefore, he who

E. THE MOST USEFUL KIND OF CONTROVERSIES On the most useful kind of controversies I have always been surprised by the fact that among the large number of controversies the least necessary ones are those that most often occur. It is currently believed that it is not error that makes a heretic, but rather pertinacious improbity. It is also believed that the Schism consists in nothing but an offense to charity. Therefore, first of all we ought to dispute about the true nature of probity and charity, provided we appreciated more what is solid than what is specious. For it is very likely that error without impiety does not hurt, and it is completely certain that faith without charity is useless. Nevertheless, it should not be thought that the nature of true charity has been sufficiently explored by everyone; if this were the case, all of us would feel inflamed by divine ardor, for the known goods cannot but be desired. And certainly some people would not raise the doubt as to whether someone can be saved without performing an act of love to God above all other things; nor would they come to think that contrition is not in our power (potestas); nor would they have prescribed often useless formulae which are alien to true charity, nor would they have addressed to creatures the love which is only due to God – if only they knew what it means to love God above all things. Furthermore, no one can be praised for loving God as he should, unless he is ready to contribute to God’s glory and to the public good, by throwing away not only his wealth and pleasures, but also his fame and life. 8

This draft has been erased by Leibniz.

62

Chapter 8

Whoever loves God truly, and whoever strives for the public good with sincere devotion, is truly in the Catholic Church; all the others are schismatic.c For schism is nothing but what harms charity’s general connection (vinculum). I confess that it would be for the utmost public good that the reunion of the Christians be performed under a single head: hence I do not reject .

F. CONTROVERSIES9 Controversies, civil as well as religious, concern either the trial (judicium) or the cause, or as commonly said, either the judicial process or the merits of the cause. The controversies concerning the trial itself are sometimes called general, pre-judicial, and preliminary. A trial is the state of [those] men who contest by means of reasons, with the hope of achieving success or conclusion.d The hope for victory must be based upon a certain visible sign that is not subject to further dispute, such as the sentence of the judge, the persuasion of the adversary, the evidence of reason. Every other sign is for most of the time the source of new difficulties. If there remains some ambiguity or obscurity in his sentence, the judge can suppress it through explanation. I confess, however, that no judge would be needed if two litigants would agree on a certain form of disputation and follow it accurately. In this way, natural truth (naturae veritas) or at least the probability of both opinions would be spontaneously discovered and then reason itself would act as judge. Judgment is opposed to war, which is the state of men who contest through force; here it is useless to add the hope for success, since this is already contained in the very nature of these [kinds of] contests, namely, the one who is more powerful or lucky will prevail. Nevertheless, not every state of contest through reasons is a trial, for often it lacks the hope for success, namely when both sides obstinately defend their positions, leaving the audience in suspense. Those who dispute through reasons will be said to have won when they have attained their objective, which is to persuade. Thus, he who wins by luck or in a duel or through what is called purging (purgatio) or through ordeal (probatio) by fire or water or, finally, he who wins by torture – I don’t think he persuades about his innocence or the guilt of his adversary; he only takes home the prize that is the impunity which is in question. 9

This draft has been erased by Leibniz.

8. The Judge of Controversies a

63

See, for example, Chapters 3 and 33. See also the Examen Religionis Christianae of 1686 (also known as ‘Systema Theologicum’), where Leibniz mentions as the principal topics leading to religious controversies the following: “the Sacred Scriptures, ancient piety, right reason (recta ratio) itself, and the veracity of history” (A VI 4 2357). In this text Leibniz applies and develops extensively the strategy of talking only about the unifying factors and omitting the dividing ones (cf. Dascal 2003b). b At the beginning of this paragraph, Leibniz distinguishes, broadly speaking, between two types of controversies – concerning internal or mental states (opinion and truth) and external states, such as the possession of things. After arguing that the ruling of a judge in the latter cannot affect one’s internal states, he focuses on the former case. By saying here that the only remaining problem is that of ‘truth’, he should be taken to be using this term metonymically for the whole of the first class of controversies, since in the following paragraph and later, in the definitive version, his main concern will not be truth, but persuasion, opinion, and belief. c Leibniz’s notion of ‘Catholic Church’, to be contrasted with ‘Roman Church’, plays a key role in his reunion strategy. In “De Ecclesia Catholica” (A VI 4 2330-2332), he defines the Catholic or Universal Church as consisting in an internal rather external union between all those who, above all, are motivated to act by the love of God and the public good. The only true ecclesiastic authority, according to Leibniz, derives from this union and, therefore, belongs to the true Catholic Church. This authority, however, is of a moral nature, and surpasses all other forms of ecclesiastic authority. The consequences of this position for the religious controversies of the time are immense. On the one hand, no one of the contending parties claiming supremacy on the basis of contingent historical pedigrees in fact possesses the true authority required. On the other hand, it turns out that all those confessions that profess and strive for the love of God and the public good are in fact already united in the true Church, so that none of them can be blamed as ‘schismatic’. Strategically, while the former point neutralizes the presumptions of the parties involved in the reunification negotiations, the latter permits to conduct the negotiations on the basis of an initial declaration of union, which would provide a framework for debating the remaining – and necessarily minor – divergences (see Chapter 27). d This definition, as well as a substantial part of what follows, is to be found in Chapter 7.

Chapter 9 TOWARDS A HEURISTICS FOR LITIGATION

On a par with his work on the foundations of law, the reorganization and systematization of the legal system, and the teaching of law, Leibniz, in spite of his refusal to be either a judge or a lawyer, was deeply concerned with the practice of law. He sought to develop means to make it more effective so as to ensure the making of justice through the legal system. To this end, he considered the prevention of endless and disordered litigations a sine qua non. Proper procedural “form” (see Chapter 1) and knowledge about legal controversies were, for him, essential for this purpose. Texts A, B, and C in this chapter are devoted to these tasks. In addition to that, the recognition of the role of argumentation principles and patterns other than deductive ones, such as the legal commonplaces, was for him a condition for success in the courts. Texts D and E deal with such principles. Text F emphasizes the neutrality required for adequately reporting the arguments of the parts in a debate and for their proper evaluation – a condition not only for a fair decision in a court, but also for a rational solution of a controversy.

A. PRESERVING FORM IN LITIGATION At the end of 1677 Leibniz was appointed juridical counselor in Hanover. His main task was codifying and systematizing – as he had done in Mainz – the different legal systems in use there. Beyond his earlier contribution to the organization of the body of laws, however, now he was also concerned with putting some order in the practice of argumentation in the courts. In A, he suggests legislation (now standard in Europe) to prevent endless litigation, thus ensuring the decision of each case brought before a court. The procedure he proposes undertakes to control the relevance of the adversaries’ arguments to each other. In this respect its ‘formality’ is comparable to that of reasoning syllogistically, where the use of irrelevant premises is ruled out.

65 M. Dascal (ed.), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. The Art of Controversies, 65–74. © 2006 Springer.

66

Chapter 9 Date: 1677-1678 Edition: A VI 4 C 2756-2757 Language: Latin

The way to dispute in form A law should be proposed to the effect that nobody can prevent the Chambers from deciding every case in the Chambers and the Princely Court.1 Our procedure has the defect that the defendant is allowed to provide independent counter-arguments (articulus reprobatorius separatus), i.e., items of defense or objections. The former must be addressed to the arguments (articulus probatorialis) presented by the accusation, which they [can] knock out,2 by limiting with their replies the strength of those arguments. Similarly, it would be impossible to introduce useless arguments, if one were to proceed formally (in forma) through simple syllogisms or at least through sorites. The mode of disputing formally has been despised due to [its abuse] in the Schools and by the Schools, whereas nothing really can be more useful to humankind than observing it constantly when deliberating.

B. ALL POSSIBLE LITIGATIONS In this text, Leibniz claims that it is possible to develop an exhaustive taxonomy of all types of litigation and of the legal solutions provided for them. He suggests that this dialectical form of organizing the material would yield a fundamental teaching tool. As in Chapter 10 – he compares the legal disciplines and methods with the medical ones. In spite of the ‘formal’ drive explicitly appealed to in both A and B, it is important to notice that there is in them no hint whatsoever to his idea of applying some formal calculus capable of offering an incontestable ‘mechanical’ decision procedure (e.g., Chapter 21) for all litigations. His proposals would at best allow for the identification of the ‘dialectical syntax’ of a debate, represented by a formal schema of the type he presents in Chapter 16I, but not for a decision in favor of one of the litigants. Furthermore, he was well aware of the hermeneutic problem in deciding whether a counterargument is or is not ‘relevant’ (see Chapter 11, roughly from the same period).

Date: 1677-1678 Edition: A VI 4 C 2754-2755; GR 749 1

The italicized phrases are in German in the original. They are in fact standard formulae in the procedural rules of Hanover’s court. 2 The verb Leibniz uses here is elidere ‘eliminate’, from which the grammatical term ‘ellipsis’ is derived. See Chapter 12, note 7.

9. Towards a Heuristics for Litigation

67

Language: Latin

Enumeration of all possible litigations3 Perfect jurisprudence is to be studied in such a manner as to make clear that he who has studied it is capable to remedy all litigations. For indeed the true method of studying law consists in enumerating all possible litigations, in classifying them at least by genres and classes (since it is impossible to do so one by one), and in appending the remedy that can solve them. Furthermore, whether litigations arise through a complaint (actio) or by virtue of a reply (exceptio) or a retort, their form is the same. For, the same litigation is, from one side, complaint and from the other, reply, according to the occasion in which it is presented. In overlooking this, the otherwise excellent law scholar Nicholas Vigelius departed somewhat from the true method.a Civil jurisprudence deals with all kinds of litigations that private citizens may undertake concerning private affairs, whether one argues because one is deprived of a good or because one suffers some damage. One lays a complaint on account of the fortune, negligence or ill will of others. One also lays a complaint with respect to those who, not being themselves the cause of one’s damage, still do not want to remedy it, even though they could do so. For, indeed, every litigation either concerns him who is the cause of our ill or him who is not the cause of our good. Just as in medicine physiology differs from pathology, so too in jurisprudence nomothetics differs from lawsuits.b The theory of actions differs from the theory of lawsuits as pathology differs from therapeutics.

C. A HANDBOOK OF PRACTICAL LITIGATIONS Here Leibniz proposes to add to the existing legal handbooks a survey of the most important controversies in the field, including a presentation of the texts, of the arguments, and of the famous authors who have supported each side. He conceives of this as a supplement to Treutler’s legal encyclopedia, taking into account the vast literature accumulated since its publication.

Date: 1677-1680 (?) Edition: LH Jur. 6, 34; partial edition GR 768 3

The translation ‘litigation’ for querella has been preferred over ‘quarrel’, since the text clearly belongs to a juridical context.

68

Chapter 9 Language: Latin

Towards the writing of a Handbook of the famous practical Controversies This handbook (enchiridion) may be composed as a supplement to Treutler’s.c It must be prepared following those authors who have already produced collections of this kind,4 like Fachineus,d Hackelmann,e Hunnius,f etc., as well as the practical (practicoteris) commentators, like those of the Strasburg College, Hahnius,g Struvius,h Brunnemann;i the most famous modern practitioners, e.g., Gailius,j Mynsingerus,k and others;5 Basil,l Finckelthusius,m Carpzovius,n Mavio, Brunnemann, Richter,o Philippi, and by others like them. The arrangement [must be] the same as Treutler’s, i.e., that of the Digests.p Also the way of treating the issues [must be] the same as Treutler’s, briefly presenting the texts, the arguments and the most recent and most famous authors in support of each of the sides, especially as embedded in the courts’ (dicasterium) praxis. In any case, I am referring to practical controversies, i.e., those that may be or usually are raised in lawsuits, although in his work Treutler mixed these with theoretical controversies.

D. JURIDICAL COMMONPLACES Leibniz here undertakes to examine the grounds for adopting or justifying the use of a juridical commonplace (locus communis or topos) rather than another. Unlike Aristotle and traditional rhetoric he does not assume simply the ‘givenness’ of a topos and its eventual (rhetorical or other) efficacy as a sufficient ground for its use, for this would mean some sort of arbitrariness. Instead, he examines their presumptions and consequences and proposes criteria to justify and apply these heuristic-procedural principles. The commonplace he examines here is “it is more favorable to assign a case to law L1 than to law L2”. The criterion he proposes is whether L1 is more capable of solving questions of the kind at stake than L2. The justification of this criterion is based on an argument “from 4

Grua interrupts here his transcription of the text, giving the following note: “[Leibniz] abandons the plan defined in the Nova Methodus (A VI 1 334). He chooses authors named in A VI 1 334-335 and 346-348, rather than those he added in the revision [of the Nova Methodus], especially [Wolfgang Adam] Lauterbach [whose important work Compendium Juris, published in 1679, was carefully annotated by Leibniz]. He adds Philippi”. Grua’s transcription continues in the paragraph beginning with “The arrangement” (ordo). We have translated also the missing passage. 5 Unreadable passage.

9. Towards a Heuristics for Litigation

69

less to more”, namely, whatever can be solved by a less restrictive law (L2) can also be solved by a more restrictive one (L1), but not vice-versa. In this respect, a more restrictive law is more precise and is ‘favorable’ in the sense of providing the courts with more effective legal means of deciding in some cases. Yet, Leibniz observes that, if one refers the case to the more restrictive law L1, this may turn out to be unfavorable to the plaintiff, for the court will have to rule against complaints not fully substantiated by specific proof. Against such an inequitable bias, Leibniz recommends the general principle that the courts restrain themselves in issuing negative decisions, preferring positive ones.

Date: 1677-1678? Edition: A VI 4 C 2757 Language: Latin

Commonplaces One can often ask to which place to assign a proposition that involves a multiplicity of notions. For instance,6 the Velleyan law is more favorable than the Macedonian (for if one decides against the Velleyan law, the formal claim of restitution (condictio) of what is not due (indebitum) is valid (datur),q whereas this is not the case if one decides against the Macedonian law). It is inquired to which of the two laws it is better to refer the proposition considered. I would refer it to the Velleyan law, since through it one can solve positive questions, which is not the case through the Macedonian law. This is how I show it: If a certain question was decided in favor of the Macedonian law, if follows that it must be decided likewise in favor of the Velleyan, by the argument from less to more. However, this argument is not valid from the Velleyan to the Macedonian, except negatively, for what is not granted to the former, is granted even less to the latter. But, for this very reason, negative decisions are to be taken less than positive ones, since it is evident that one must deny what cannot be proved.

6

Leibniz employs here the Latin term Senatusconsultus, which he defines as follows: “Senatusconsultus is that which the Senate commands and establishes” (A VI 4 2930). These ordinances, decrees, or laws were usually (though not always) labeled in Rome following the name of the Senator who proposed them. In what follows, Leibniz exemplifies his point in the present text by comparing the laws known as “Velleyan” and “Macedonian”. The former, promulgated in 46 A.D., frees women from the obligation to respond for other’s debts (intercessio pro alio), the justification of this step being women’s imbecilitas (Dig. 15,1,1). The latter was promulgated in 75 A.D. in order to avoid situations as that of the wealthy Macedus who did not pay his debts while at the same time lending money to his son; the law forbids this kind of felony (Dig. 14,6,1).

70

Chapter 9

E. BROCARDIC PRINCIPLES Heinrich Ernst Kestner (1671-1723), author of De statu jurisprudentiae, necessariaque juris naturalis et civilis conjunctione (Rinteln, 1699), was Leibniz’s correspondent from 1708 to 1716. They discussed mainly but not only specific juridical matters (e.g., the nature of pacts, contracts, and prescriptions – cf. Chapters 36 and 39) and issues in the philosophy of law (see Chapter 11, note L). In general, Leibniz is well-disposed towards Kestner’s projects of legal reform (D IV 3 253). In his letter to Leibniz from 14 December 1710, Kestner mentions, among other things, his critique of the so-called ‘brocardic’ forms of argumentation, declaring them useless.r This gives Leibniz the occasion of defending such forms of argumentation on the grounds that some of them are legitimate juridical principles and others, useful rules of invention, related to the ‘art of conjecturing’, the ‘art of interpreting’, the evaluation of the degree of probability, etc. He further stresses that these rules are not logically necessary, but, if carefully examined, they can be explicitly formulated, thus ensuring their usefulness. In the Nova Methodus, Leibniz describes brocardica as formal precepts of absolute generality, e.g., “Every manner of loosing a right is voluntary” – a principle he applies in Chapter 36 to usucaption (A VI 1 309); he contrasts them with ‘intermediate’ principles, restricted to a particular subject matter only, e.g., “One should not impetrate a legal action against someone to which one owes reverence” (A VI 1 311). He acknowledges, however, that brocardic principles may be ill-formulated, abused, and therefore encumbered by exceptions (A VI 1 362). In the NE, when defending general principles (such as maxims and axioms) from Locke’s onslaught on them, Leibniz distinguishes between good and bad brocardic principles, condemning the former but stressing that even they may become good and useful if properly reformed (see also Chapter 5). In any case, Leibniz shows a more nuanced attitude toward brocardica than Kestner. He considers heuristic rules such as these, widely employed by jurists, as valuable and useful and even as a necessary component of the ‘art of discovery’, provided one keeps in mind “what degree of certitude or of probability is to be assigned to them and on what grounds they rest”. Their number, however, should be neither too small (as in the case of medicine) nor excessive, as it tends to be in juridical practice (Discours touchant la methode de la certitude et l’art d’inventer pour finir les disputes et pour faire en peu de temps des grands progress, 1690; A VI 4 958; see also Chapter 29). In a set of remarks addressed to Kestner, Leibniz writes that “It is more difficult to cure the uncertainty of law [than that of logic]” (Sed juris incertitudini mederi difficilius est; D IV 3 254). In his usual auto-biographical projections of ideas that seem to him important later in life, he claims that as a young man he had worked in the part of logic dealing with the kind of rules that should help also to remedy for uncertainty in general, but had to interrupt this work due to his many occupations. Roughly, he relates this to the Aristotelian Topics, but contends that the scope of what he has in mind goes well beyond it, for it seeks to provide not only rules for devising arguments, but also for establishing their respective weights in deliberating. The theme of controversies looms large in this letter, and perhaps constitutes the background against which the

9. Towards a Heuristics for Litigation

71

contribution of brocardic principles to the heuristics of litigation is in fact considered.

Date: 30 January 1711 Edition: D IV 3 264 Language: Latin

To Heinrich Ernst Kestner Having been distracted [by other things] and also prevented by a trip to Wolfenbüttel, I haven’t so far replied to your latest letter,s which I do now. I thank you for sending your erudite and useful dissertation.t The allegations of authors are the more useful in juridical controversies the more they deal with the usage and reception of laws and customs. These allegations are also useful when one refers the reader to writers who discuss some subject matter more carefully. But, for the most part, it is vain and frivolous allegations that prevail among authors. The so-called ‘brocardic’ are either the solid principles of law themselves or else certain topic rules.7 The former are necessary. The latter would be useful if properly examined and rendered explicit; they have to do roughly with matters of fact and the art of conjecturing, in which I include also the art (artificium) of interpreting. Nevertheless, that part of Logic whereby the degrees of verisimilitude and the weights of arguments would be established has nowhere been elaborated so far. In my youth, I occasionally addressed this task,u but having my attention divided among several occupations, I had to keep this as merely an intention. Aristotle’s topics do not correspond to what I have in mind, for they consist in rules that on occasion can help to devise arguments,v but which cannot teach the weight inherent to each argument and judgment. I would like to ask Herthius’s friends whether we should expect some posthumous writings from him.w I remember to have seen Brandius, author of a booklet on the true and the pretended philosophy of jurists, when he worked in Worms – if I am not mistaken – as the town secretary. I read his book, which seemed to me rather thin. I am not aware of other works of his.x 7

The term ‘brocard’ and derivatives, derived from Burchard of Worms (965-1025), the first compiler of the religious canons in force in his time (Leges et statuta familiae S. Petri Wormatiensis), was used in the late Middle Ages both to refer to the principles or axioms of law and to controversial issues. The expressions ‘brocardica materia’ and ‘brocardiser’ were widely used in the Renaissance to denote controversial matters and the practice of engaging in controversy.

72

Chapter 9

The famous Thomasius seems to me to proceed much more accurately in his recent writings than in his older ones: He recently published welldocumented work about feudal origins, where there is much first rate material. His controversy with Herthius was unknown to me, and I haven’t seen the writings of none of them.y Herthius has proved to be very knowledgeable in public German Law. Thomasius, in turn, if he pursues the way he recently undertook in German History, will relieve himself and others from many doubts. Yet, his philosophy is, to this day, still immature (sylvestris) and, so to speak, pedestrian (archipodialis).z

F. THE ART OF WRITING DIALOGUES The genre dialogue was extremely popular in Leibniz’s time. He himself wrote quite a few philosophical pieces in this genre, including his major works – the NE and the Théodicée. Chapter 18 is a less known but outstanding example. He was thus certainly an authority capable of giving worthy advice for whoever ventured in the genre. Yet in this little piece what he is concerned with is the efficacy not so much of dialogue writing as a literary device for philosophical purposes, but as a tool for properly representing – and thus helping to resolve – controversies, including litigations. For this purpose, the main condition he sets up is the impartiality of the author of the dialogue. He stresses that the author should divest himself of any pretension to actually participate in the controversy and satisfy himself with the role of a fair and helpful rapporteur, described by him in detail in Chapter 19.

Date: 1695? Edition:aa LH IV 3,5e 29 Language: Latin

On the Dialogistic Art It is usual to write dialogues in such a way that the author favors one side.bb The truly philosophical dialogistic art would be to write so that both sides dispute with equal art, and that those things that a ferocious adversary could say be actually said. Thus, ultimately, the triumph of the dialogue would be the triumph of the cause. Indeed, it would then be like a colloquium and a judiciary conference of the litigating partiescc – the dialogue’s author acting, as it were, as a judge or, if you prefer, as president and moderator. a

N. Vigelius (1529-1600), a jurist whose method Leibniz appreciates (see Chapter 10, note d), author of Methodus universi juris civilis, Lyon, 1568; Frankfurt, 1628. b See Chapter 11, note L.

9. Towards a Heuristics for Litigation c

73

Hieronymus Treutler (1565-1607), Selectarum disputationum ad jus civile Justinianaeum quinquaginta libris Pandectarum comprehensum (Marburg, 1628). d Andreas Fachineus (1590-1610). e Leopold Hackelmann 1563-1619). f Helfrich Ulrich Hunnius (1583-1636). g Heinrich Hahn (1636-1668). h Georg Adam Struve (1619-1692). i Johann Brunnemann (1608-1672). j Andreas von Gail (1526-1587). k Joachim Mynsinger (Münsinger) von Frundeck (1514-1588). l Basil the Great (330-379). m Sigismund Finckelthaus (1580-1644). n Benedict Carpzov (1595-1666), author of Practica nova imperialis Saxonica rerum criminalium, Wittenberg, 1635. See also Chapter 36, note z. o Christoph Philipp Richter (1602-1673). p On Treutler’s work, see note c; on the Digests, see Chapter 11, note 4. q Dig. 12,6,65; 22,3,5, par. 4; 12,6,25, end. r In a later letter to Leibniz, of 1st July 1716, Kestner suggests to consider the corpus of old laws as having for us not the force of laws but of ‘reasons’. His major concern is – like Leibniz’s – to put some order and clarity in the multitude, obscurity, and imperfection of the laws, in the variety of tribunals, and above all in the uncertainty that reigns. For this, a brief, clear, sufficient and authoritative Code is the remedy he suggests (D IV 3 269; Couturat 1901: 584). s Leibniz replies here to Kestner’s letter of December 14, 1710. His reply is written in the margins of Kestner’s letter, apparently in a hurry. We have introduced a few corrections to Dutens’s transcription of the manuscript. t De inutili legum, doctorum et brocardicorum allegatione (Rinteln, 1710). In a later letter, Leibniz indicates that he received several writings by Kestner (To Kestner, 1 November 1713; D IV 3 266). u Presumably Leibniz is here referring to his early work on probabilities (Chapter 13). Unlike on other occasions, Leibniz seems here to minimize the import and extension of his early work on probabilities, although stressing at the same time the importance of this topic. v The typical function of renaissance topics or dialectics was the ‘invention’ of arguments for specific occasions and purposes. w Johannes Nicolaus Herthius (1652-1710), a specialist in German feudal law. x In the context of this letter the reference is presumably to Johann Martin Brandes’ De vera et simulata jurisconsultorum philosophia, also mentioned in Nova methodus discendae docendaeque jurisprudentiae (A VI 1 326). y Presumably the controversy was about feudalism, more precisely about the Lippe-Detmold law, mentioned in Kestner’s letter of 14 December 1710, to which Leibniz is replying. z See Chapter 31E for another kind of criticism of Christian Thomasius by Leibniz. aa This translation is based upon the Vorausedition of this text, which will be published in A IV 7 or 8. We thank Dr S. Waldhoff from the BBAW Leibniz Forschungstelle (Potsdam) for bringing this text to our attention and Dr H. Rudolph, head of the Forschungstelle for granting us permission to make use of this material. bb Obviously, this is the case in both the NE and the Théodicée.

74 cc

Chapter 9

Presumably what he has in mind is the kind of meeting for the purpose of clarification of the issues and arguments as well as, eventually, of negotiation, which nowadays take place at the judge’s chamber, prior to or in the course of the trial – a meeting that may help to solve the case more swiftly, rationally, and justly.

Chapter 10 THE METHOD OF JURISTS AND THE METHOD OF DOCTORS

At the time he wrote this piece, Leibniz endeavoured to develop a ‘special physics’, based on the notion of force rather than on the notion of movement.a The notion of force thus plays the role of a mediating concept, between abstract movement and the concrete subject of this movement.b In this version of his physics, which anticipates his dynamics of 1689, a new physical/moral intelligibility of nature emerges, which operates by observation and conjecture rather than mathematically. Leibniz in the present text pays allegiance to the medical tradition according to which medicine is a conjectural art.c It is in this respect that it can take as a model jurisprudence – which has developed in the course of its history mechanisms for evaluating different courses of actions. The dialectical nature of medicine derives from the fact that it cannot be the work of any single individual – which makes it mandatory that the historical record of conflicting opinions be made available for the discussion of every single case.

Date: 1677-1678 Edition: A VI 4 C 2755-2756 Language: Latin

The Method of Jurisconsults A Paradigm for the Method of Medicine Since medicine is still for the most part empirical, even more than any other science, it follows that it must rely to a great extent on the use of testimony, since a single person cannot experience everything. For this reason, I would like the physicians to go beyond what is required, even more 75 M. Dascal (ed.), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. The Art of Controversies, 75–76. © 2006 Springer.

76

Chapter 10

than the jurists do. I think that, if in certain domains libraries, thesauri, and excerpts are useful, then this is particularly true of special physics and even more medicine. In short, I would like diligent men to sum up in a few collected works the countless observations already made, as well as, when appropriate, the judgements of the physicians. All this should be condensed in statements, mentioning their respective authority and sometimes their word[s]. This work would follow [for that purpose] the method of the jurists, who have formulated rules – of amplification, limitation, reply (replicatio), counter-reply (duplicatio), etc. – which contribute much to restrict prolixity, in the way done by Vigeliusd and Rulant in his work Commissarii.e For example, let it be the RULE: Active cold, applied locally, alleviates pain. Let the most important authors that approve of this proposition in general be mentioned. Likewise, let those who reject its generality [be mentioned], as well as those who recommend the contrary. Let also the examples on one or the other side which do not contain [the pain’s] amplification nor appeasement be mentioned. Once this is done, add the contrary amplifications or exceptions, that is, those that raise doubts about the validity of the rule. Concerning pain, it is AMPLIFIED first in colic: cf. Hipp. 6 Epid.,f section 8, whose words should be noted. Secondly, in gallbladder gallstones: cf. Sanctor. in l. Fen.,g p. 668; thirdly, in gout: cf. Hipp., sect. 5, aph.h 25, etc. EXCEPTION: If the gout is not bilious. Concerning cold, one should except cold water; this exception is reproached by Hippocrates (aph. 25), whereas it is approved by most present-day physicians, partly for theoretical, partly for practical reasons. To this, it is replied: [only] if cold water is poured drop by drop. This reply or defense of the rule is proposed and approved by Mercuriale.i a

See the Clash of bodies of 1678; published in Leibniz (1994). See Cardoso (2005: 177-182). c This tradition is, for example, illustrated by F. Sanches’s claim that “medicine is a nonmetaphysical conjectural art” (Opera Medica, 1636, p. 621). Regarding Leibniz’s medical writings, see Dumas (1976). For the dialectical element in medical praxis, see Leibniz’s references to the need to take into account, along with the indications favorable to a treatment, also its counter-indications (e.g., Chapters 31B and 16, note 2). d See Chapter 9, note a. e See Chapter 5, note f. f Hippocrates, Epidemiarum libri. g S. Sanctorius (1561-1636), Commentaria in Avicennae primam Fen libri primi canonis, Venice, 1625. h Hippocrates, Aphorisms. i Girolamo Mercuriale (1530-1606), Praelectiones Patavinae in omnes Hippocratis Aphorismorum libros, Venice, 1619. b

Chapter 11 INTERPRETATION AND ARGUMENTATION IN LAW

One month after arriving at the Hanover court (December 1676) to take up his job as a librarian, Leibniz reminds the Duke that in Mainz he had already acted as a judge of the high court of appeals, and requests to be appointed his private advisor for juridical affairs (To Jean-Frédéric, 1679; A I 2 19-21). By the end of 1677 he receives the desired appointment, which led him to update his juridical ideas. In particular he revised and expanded ideas he had previously expounded in the New Method for Learning and Teaching Jurisprudence (1667). Such a process was accompanied by the adoption of a new point of view. Whereas in earlier work his perspective was that of analyzing positive law as a given, his new task required him to view the law from the point of view of the legislator, i.e., the Duke. For Leibniz, this did not mean abandoning the earlier perspective, but rather attempting to combine both perspectives, so that in the very act of promulgating a law, the criteria for its interpretation and systematic codification would be already foreseen. He deals with this cluster of problems in a series of texts written in 1678 or 1679: with the codification issue, in the Preface to the New Codex (GR 624-628); with the rational organization of the Digests, in The Rationale of the Digests (GR 629632); with the judge’s interpretation and application of the law, in On the Judge’s Task Regarding Complaints (GR 761-763); with the role of dialectic argumentation, in Chapter 9; with operationalizing the notion of justice, in On Obligation (GR 743-745) and On Complaints (GR 750-760). The present text, which belongs to the same cluster, can be read as a systematic and succinct treatment of all these concerns. Its guiding thread lies in the consideration of the notion of interpretation in a multi-faceted way: from the viewpoints of the text itself, of the legislator’s actual and desirable intentions, of the relevant contextual factors, of the forms of justifying and applying a law, of logic, and of the systemic constraints upon its interpretation and role. The result is a comprehensive theory of the various factors involved in the determination of meaning, which anticipates much of what pragmatic theory spells out today. In the light of this hermeneutic theory, which is both general in scope and oriented towards legal matters, the possibility of a rational interpretation and

77 M. Dascal (ed.), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. The Art of Controversies, 77–92. © 2006 Springer.

78

Chapter 11 application of the law, which combines formal and heuristic elements, emerges clearly. In the course of his careful analysis, Leibniz provides a detailed account of various modes of legal argumentation, demonstration and definition. He relied heavily in this text upon the Digests, passages of which regarding the principles of interpretation he excerpted and annotated (cf. A VI 4 2903-2905). In addition to the main text, we include here the fragment that in fact presents clearly the aim and scope of the text and provides as well a set of definitions of some of its key concepts.

A. PROLEGOMENA Date: 1678-1679 Edition: A VI 4 C 2781; GR 632 Language: Latin ON THE INTERPRETATION, REASONS, APPLICATION, AND SYSTEM OF LAW Civil law is the legal system of a city.1 A city is a society created in order to achieve happiness.2 A law is a statement about what has to be done or avoided, having the force of obligating. A system is a set of statements adequate to be taught. Regarding individual statements it is possible either to interpret them or to argue [about, for] them. One thing is to interpret a statement, another, he who states.3 For it often happens that someone does not say sufficiently [well] what he wanted to say or what had to be said, had it come to his mind. Therefore, there can be interpretation not only of what is said but also of who says; hence the distinction between rhêtón and diánoian, what is said (dictum) and what is thought (sententia). This is why it is said that one should not take into account so much the words of the laws but rather their force (vis) and their reach (potestas).4 Accordingly, one must look for the thought in the reasons that prompted the legislator. 1

Civitas (city) is the usual term in Roman Law for “state” or “commonwealth”. Leibniz’s is essentially the traditional Aristotelian definition of polis: “It is evident that the best city is obligatorily the one whose organization allows each citizen to prosper the most and to lead a happy life” (Politics 1324a 23-24). 3 Leibniz employs here the pair enuntiatio vs. enuntians, which in today’s linguistic jargon of pragmatics corresponds to utterance vs. utterer. 4 The expression vis et potestas (force and power or authority) is traditionally used, in the wake of Canonic Law, to refer to the full content or meaning of the law – a usage extended 2

11. Interpretation and Argumentation in Law

79

B. ON THE INTERPRETATION, FOUNDATIONS, APPLICATION AND SYSTEM OF LAWS Date: 1678-1679 Edition: A VI 4 C 2782-2791 Language: Latin A law is a statement about what has to be done or avoided, having the force of obligating. With regard to statements are applicable [the notions of]: interpretation, argumentation and method. Firstly, every statement receives an interpretation. But the interpretation is double – of what is said and of the thought, rhêtoû kai dianoías; for often we do not say sufficiently [well] what we wanted to say; so that it is not enough to understand the words but one must search for the reasons that might have prompted the speaker. Therefore, to know the laws is not [just] to consider their words, but their force and reach (De Legibus, 1.17). The interpretation of what is said (dictum) involves both that of the isolated words and that of their connection, that is, both etymology5 and syntax. The interpretation of isolated words eliminates obscurity, i.e., when no sense is obvious, as well as homonymy or so to speak excessive clarity, i.e., when there are several obvious senses.6 In both cases interpretation consists in making explicit the signification, whether literal (propria) or figurative

5

6

elsewhere by Leibniz to other kinds of meaning as well (cf. Chapter 2, paragraph 20). But it is convenient here, in consonance with the Dig. 1, 17 (scire leges non hoc est earum verba tenere, sed vim ac potestatem) to indicate the two components of this content, hence our translation. In fact, Leibniz explicitly refers here to the De Legibus (Dig. 1,3, 1.17), the first treatise of the Digests, which is the earliest complete compilation of Roman laws and jurisprudence, made by a committee appointed by Justinian; completed in 533 A.D. For another usage of this expression, see Chapter 2. ‘Etimology’ at the time refers not only to the origin of words, but also to their meaning – i.e., to what is today known as ‘semantics’. Whereas most of the texts compiled by Leibniz’s secretary and follower Eccard in the Collectanea Etymologica deal with etymology in the first sense, the important and extensive manuscript, so far unpublished, Epistolica de historia etymologica dissertatio, deals mostly with the second sense of this term. Leibniz’s term, apparet, which we translated by the adjective obvious, is related to the vocabulary of probabilities (cf. Chapter 13). In this connection, an “obvious” sense is that which is the most probable one or the one that prevails in the given context. The absence of any such prevalent sense, as well as the existence of many equally probable senses hampers interpretation.

80

Chapter 11

(tropica),7 demanded by the passage to be explained. The elimination of homonymy can make use of Topics I, 13.a Aristotle deals with the four kinds of metaphor in his Poetics. b How definitions are to be traced out will be explained below in more detail. The interpretation of the connection eliminates, in turn, either obscurity or excessive clarity, i.e., amphiboly.c In both cases interpretation consists in making explicit the sense (sensus), whether literal (proprium) or figurative (figuratum). For what is a trope in single words is equivalent to a figure in [their] connection.8 The interpretation of what is thought (sententia) is the search not so much for what the Legislator said but for what he had in mind about the present issue, that is, what he would have said if the question at stake had been proposed to him.d In fact, it often happens that men speak in a very generic way or say one thing for another; when they act in this way, and substitute the genus for the species or a term for its opposed one, correction is required; for erroneous (falsa) consequences would follow if one were to insist in the word [meaning]. If, on the contrary, they speak in a more specific way than necessary, that is, if they substitute the species for the genus, then no correction is needed, but rather completion (supplementum). Hence we sometimes look for reciprocal subjects where a predicate is contained from the outset, even if the Legislator enumerated only special cases (with which we will deal also later). In this case, [the interpretation] consists in finding the common reason by virtue of which the same predicate is contained in several subjects.e Thus, he who interprets the thought (tên diánoian) interprets not only the enunciation (enuntiatio) but even more the person who enunciates it (enuntians), supplying (supplens) what the later said in an imperfect way; however, he supplies not according to his own thought (sententia), but according to the thought of the speaker. Therefore, such an interpretation can be gathered from the speaker’s affects (affectus) as well as from his reasons. It seems that the affects must be taken into account in order to interpret the private dispositions (lex privata) that a testator formulates in his will, for he there legislates on his own affairs. But in the interpretation of public laws one should not take into account the legislator’s affects, for he is a 7

Leibniz distinguishes in the next paragraph between “trope” and “figure”. But we decided to use the term ‘figurative’ for both. The distinction in question is not Aristotelian in origin. It comes rather from the Hellenistic rhetorical treatise of Triphonius, whose Tropics influenced Cicero and Quintillian, and the subsequent Western tradition. 8 Between this paragraph and the next, another manuscript of this text contains a paragraph on argumentation. In the present manuscript, this theme is treated later, after the theme of interpretation is completed. Since this corresponds to the original plan laid out by Leibniz at the beginning, we shall include the paragraph in question below, in the place that seems to be more appropriate for it. See note 9.

11. Interpretation and Argumentation in Law

81

magistrate, i.e., not the master but the administrator of public affairs. Indeed legislators themselves avoid expressing openly their affects, for they want to be perceived as making all [their decisions] on the basis of reasons. For this reason, even if we may have evidence of the legislator’s affects through his biography or through the history of his time, and even if one could easily conjecture towards what side he would have been inclined or how he would perhaps have responded to the reasons of the pretexts put forth, it is nevertheless improper to reduce, after so many centuries, the city’s point of viewf to the unreflective wish (inconsulta libido) or to the weaknesses of a man, even deceased; and one’s skill for conjecturing will be wasted by attempting to unearth from history and thereby establishing the legislators’ vices. Nevertheless one must admit that the affects often become reasons, that is, they serve to determine certain principles. This happens above all in moral and civil affairs, which involve advantages and disadvantages for both sides, so that most persons generally do not compare or weigh them accurately enough;g rather, they examine only certain advantages that conform to their momentary state of mind, and precipitate themselves to follow them. Thus, those legislators that consider profit important establish certain principles for themselves and follow them in legislating. For example, they value more trade than military affairs or public defense, believing mistakenly that money is, more than the soldier, the nerve of public management; likewise, without taking into account primogeniture and the conservation of family patrimony, they divide up the belongings equally among the children and neglect the privileges of the dowry and determine other things of the same kind which are not fully in agreement with reason. These legislator’s principles, then, are the result of an unreflective affect (affectus inconsultus); nevertheless, when expressed as laws and sanctioned in the republic, no private interpreter should depart from them.h Therefore, it is understood that an interpretation of a legislator’s thought derives from the reasons which motioned the legislator, although maybe they wouldn’t have motioned another person; that is, the interpretation must derive from those principles which are in agreement either with his affects or with his objective or with his grounds (status rationis), or else from those principles which are in agreement with the state of the republic at that moment.i Now, if such principles are not clearly absurd or contrary to reason, and if they are clearly ratified by law or by custom, they must be followed in the interpretation and application of the laws. Otherwise, the interpreter would be allowed to modify the laws arbitrarily, thus acting as legislator; it could then happen that the critic of the legislator’s affects or erroneous principles is himself acting by virtue of affects or making a mistake – for which [kind of] controversy we have no judge. In conclusion,

82

Chapter 11

the interpretation of the law’s meaning derives from the legislator’s reasons, be they true or apparent. True reasons are those that the wisest legislator would have followed,j and they come either from the law of nature or from the consideration of the state. From the law of nature are those principles that are perpetual and apply always and everywhere, that is, in every city and in any situation of the city. For example, one has to worship God, one has to honor the magistrates and the parents.k The principles that come from the consideration of the state are not equally suitable for every city or for every moment or situation of a given city. Thus, different cities differ regarding the importation of foreign goods, since there are goods that can be so necessary for our city as salt is for Sweden or wheat for Italy, so that their importation must be promoted by all possible means, including by granting it privileges. On the other hand, France punishes the importation of foreign salt with very stringent penalties, since it is rich in salt. Likewise, the same republic changes in different times; for example, when fairs were in favor in Germany, since we had not enough merchants and craftsmen, it was necessary to grant privileges to the foreign ones; furthermore, since the roads were insecure, those points that were under the protection of imperial safe-conduct at certain times were frequented by merchants, who moved from one [fair] to the other in groups almost like the caravans in Asia. At present, things have changed to such an extent that fairs have become nearly detestable, though not to the point of having to suppress them but to have to legally regulate them, so that it does not turn out that, through the edicts and privileges already granted, we attract foreigners in order to sack ourselves. Therefore, the principles of this kind of laws must be established in function of geography and history, that is, in function of the knowledge of places and times, with the help of the nomothetic part of political science.l The apparent reasons are those that moved the legislator but wouldn’t have moved a wise man. They originate either in the legislator’s private interest disguised behind the appearance of a common good, or in an error of the legislator. The causes of error are, in turn, either prejudices, or invalid reasonings (asyllógista), or affects. The legislator’s reasons or principles are either explicit or inferred. An example of explicit reason is the juridical principle that a fetus should be considered as a newborn whenever what is under consideration is its good.m The inferred principles are reached either by certain or by probable inference. This is best performed as in physics or astronomy, when one looks for hypotheses that are suitable to save the phenomena; likewise, whenever

11. Interpretation and Argumentation in Law

83

several particular laws are given, one has to search for a common principle that accounts for (ratio reddi) all of them.n Up to now we have explained the interpretation of the laws; next, we deal with the argumentation applied to laws. For every statement, argumentation can be twofold: first, from an antecedent, i.e., from some reason for the statement to the proposed statement, and it is called proof (probatio); second, from the proposed statement to some consequent, that is, to some conclusion which can be deduced from it, and it is called consequence.9 The proof of a law coincides with the interpretation of its meaning (tƝs dianoías), derived from true reasons; hence, to prove a law is no more than to provide its true reason, that is, not only why it has been promulgated, but also why it must be maintained. These reasons derive from ethics or politics, and they either persist or have ceased to be valid, in which case it is not possible to give the true reason of the law in the present state of affairs. But we have already dealt with all this in the interpretation of the meaning or thought (sententia); what should be now done is to expound more distinctly the way of proving. The majority of laws are statements that are not absolutely necessary but are at most [contingently] true. Nevertheless they are capable of exact or infallible proofs, i.e., demonstrations, as long as one tries to prove not their absolute truth, but their probability. For it is often possible to demonstrate the probability when, given two opposed [possibilities], one of them occurs much more frequently than the other by virtue of the nature of things, just as we have exact and fully mathematical reasonings regarding the game of dice and other games that also depend on fortune.o However, a proof and, in general, an argumentation is either valid (recta) or invalid (vitiosa). A valid proof is either exact, in which case it is a demonstration, or else topic. An invalid proof, in turn, either simulates a demonstration, and then it is a paralogism, or else it simulates a topical syllogism, and it is called a sophism p According to this, it can happen that one and the same reasoning is at once a paralogism and an honest topic, when the reasoner disguises a topical syllogism as a demonstration. Besides, it cannot be denied that in the laws there are invalid arguments. 9

Here is the proper place for adding the variant mentioned in note 8: “Argumentation either starts from an antecedent, in which case it is called Proof or else leads to a consequent, in which case it is called consequence. For indeed we can either prove a law or another statement from its reasons or else derive conclusions from it. The former is more theoretical and serves to constitute the art of law (ars juris); the latter is more practical and serves to the application of the laws in the courts. However, in the same way as theory is helpful for practice, so too the reasons of the laws can be drawn from their consequences” . The expression ‘the art of law’ corresponds to an amplified notion of legal theory, comprising, according to Leibniz, at least the logic, method, rules, and science of law (see GR 773).

84

Chapter 11

Demonstration is a priori when it proceeds from what is most known according to nature or from what would have been most known according to the order of philosophizing; or a posteriori when it proceeds from that which happens to be most known to us, although it should have been dealt with subsequently from the point of view of the optimal order of philosophizing. In every demonstration there is some resolution, either of the subject alone or of the subject and predicate simultaneously. To resolve consists in replacing a term by its definition or part thereof, or else by another term previously demonstrated in the resolution of the actual term. Thus, a demonstration comprises two ingredients, namely a definition and a previously demonstrated theorem. To them, however, at times may be added accepted assumptions (but then the conclusion is not an absolute proof, but depends upon the hypothesis [that] the assumption [is true]) and experiments, making the demonstration, at least in part, an a posteriori one. An absolute a priori demonstration only needs definitions and predemonstrated theorems. And, since these previous theorems were also demonstrated and there cannot be an infinite regress, the first theorems must have been demonstrated through definitions alone. In conclusion, it is clear that the final analysis of every absolute a priori demonstration consists, ultimately, in definitions alone.q So, as the only place of a perfect demonstration is the definition, it will be advisable to expound, in a few words, its nature and the way of finding them. A definition is the expression of the concept we have of the defined. The defined is a term that we explicate in the definition, so that it can be distinguished from any other. Hence, it is evident that definitions are not arbitrary. To be sure, there are certain contradiction-implying concepts that do not correspond to the definition of any thing, [but] such definitions are not principles of demonstration because opposite conclusions can follow from them. Therefore, it is fundamental to ensure, first of all, that the concept explicated in the definition is possible.r Once this is done, a name can be arbitrarily attached to the concept; nevertheless, if what we want is to be understood by everyone and there are already names in usage for the concept, these names should be retained – which is above all necessary when we want to interpret the words of others. Therefore, there are two ways of making definitions: the one consists in forming diverse concepts through combinations of notions, to which names are then given; the other, in finding the meanings of a commonly used name or of a name as used by the author we wish to explain; the former is more sublime and not everyone is capable of it; the later, more popular.10 10

The term ‘sublime’ used by Leibniz here, in opposition to ‘popular’ or ‘ordinary’, refers to what Quintillian calls ‘genus validum’. Cf. Quint. 12, 10, 58 and 66. There is a certain

11. Interpretation and Argumentation in Law

85

Given a term, its signification is found by compiling the different locutions referring to it in ordinary usage or in our author – this is what dictionaries are good for.s But they [the dictionaries] ought to observe, regarding each term, firstly, the epithets that are affirmed or denied of it; then a list of subjects, appositions, synonyms (or cognates) and particular antonyms, as well as all the other things to which the term is associated in recto; afterwards, the regimen (rectio) will have to be dealt with, i.e., that which is associated with the term in obliquo.t At this point a signification satisfying all collected locutions should be sketched, following exactly the same method whereby we sketch the hypotheses by means of which we satisfy all the phenomena. This will be achieved by looking for the reasons of particular [locutions]; for instance, by considering the several subjects of a term – be they species or individuals – of which the proposed term is usually predicated or not. Once this is done in many different cases and these reasons are collected in one [term], we will finally obtain each part of the definition, i.e., the various genera which, when combined, constitute each other’s reciprocal differences.11 And if we thus continue to look [for genera] or if we use the genera already found elsewhere, we will find the genera of genera, and finally reach the supreme and most universal genera of our science, whose reciprocal predications, in turn, reveal the most universal and easy propositions, in which equally evident properties (affectiones) are enunciated of the most universal subjects.12 From here, through divisions, we will again descend to the species and, by subsuming them, we will demonstrate not only the common properties but, by interconnecting many common properties, also the proper ones.u And if, in the same way we have proceeded with the species, we go round several attributes of a subject, looking for the reasons why each inheres in the subject and then interconnect them, then we will finally construct a definition permitting to demonstrate many things besides those already mentioned.v However, it often happens that the signification of words can be understood in such a way that those that seem to be figuratively [used]

11

12

parallel between this evaluation of the two approaches to definition and that (see above) of the two methods of demonstration, the a priori and the a posteriori, the former being “more theoretical”, the latter “more practical”. This sentence is particularly difficult to understand and translate, and has eluded the only translation of this text we are aware of. See Parmentier (1995: 66). In our opinion, it refers to the condition, spelled out in 12B, that a genus can be predicated of all its species and is equivalent to their disjunction. This implies that a genus is in fact the combination or sum of all the ‘specific differences’ between its species. These most general properties or “affections” are, ultimately, the categories. See, for example, Leibniz’s technical use of ‘affection’ in the set of definitions appended by him to Des Bosses’s letter of 12 December 1712 (GP II 472). The same use of the term is found in the De Arte Combinatoria of 1666 (A VI 1 191-192).

86

Chapter 11

(tropica) are in fact literally [used] (dicta). For example, however different ‘to cultivate God’ (deum colere) and ‘to cultivate the land’ (terram colere) are, they allow for a common concept, since ‘to cultivate’ is in general to endeavor to make a thing beneficial for oneself through one’s zeal. Samuel Bohl, an attentive researcher of the Hebrew language, used to call this kind of significations “formal concepts”.w It cannot be denied, of course, that this method of investigation of the signification of names is conjectural and – to use a barbarian but adequate word – provisional. For it can happen that a way of speaking previously neglected by us later supervenes and forces us to modify accepted definitions, just like the astronomers have to change frequently their hypotheses in the light of new observations. But this should not surprise us since, if our purpose is to interpret the ordinary or writers’ expressions, it is evident that the method to find out what the others have in mind cannot be demonstrative, but only probable. But, if what we want is to establish the elements of science and we have allowed ourselves, by condescension (par complaisance) and convenience, to make use of the words’ popular meaning – and this was our purpose – the certainty of science is not affected at all by having or not penetrated exactly the people’s or writers’ mind, for we could as well have dispensed with them, giving arbitrary names to our concepts.x Even so, we have preferred to reduce to the minimum the use of our freedom in order to be more easily understood. Once we have the definitions, it is easy to demonstrate the subject’s properties and to justify the proposed statements and, therefore, of the laws. For, given the predicate’s definition, the analysis (resolutio) of the subject must be pursued until one discovers that each part of the predicate’s definition is a part of the subject’s definition. Once this is done, it will be evident that the predicate inheres in the subject. There are many ways to abbreviate and simplify the work. First of all, it is useful to look for reciprocal propositions, that is, [to look for] those subjects in which the proposed predicate is evidently (primo) inherent. For instance, “[legal] tutor” (curator) is present (datur) in “minor”, “absent”, “prodigal”; why? Because none of them can provide for his needs; so that whenever this is the case, a tutor is given and whenever it is not the case a tutor is not given.y Given propositions of this type, we may dispense with a medley of useless propositions. Next, if propositions already demonstrated yield a reciprocal predicate common to two [terms], it follows that both are mutually subject and predicate too. In this way previously demonstrated theorems allow for a big saving, for thanks to them it is not always necessary to continue the analysis until the definitions.z Probable argumentation comes from either the nature of things or from people’s opinions. The former is, in turn, either presumption or conjecture. It is a presumption if the proposed statement follows from what is surely true,

11. Interpretation and Argumentation in Law

87

without any requirement other than the negative one, namely that no impediment [for its truth] obtains. Therefore we will always have to declare ourselves in favor of he who has the presumption unless someone else demonstrates the contrary. Such are most of the moral reasonings. There is conjecture when, in order to prove with accuracy one of two contrary [positions], one has to use some positive [propositions] about whose truth there is no certainty, and nevertheless we meanwhile13 declare ourselves in favor of that which is easiest [to happen], i.e., of that which, in its genus, involves less requisites or smaller ones.aa This is what the jurists’ saying, in the obscure [cases] the minimum must be followed, means.14 The doctrine of the degrees of probability which, as far as I know, nobody has treated as it should be treated, belongs in here.bb Sometimes there is no argumentation that justifies a law; for it is not possible to justify everything that has been promulgated by the ancient;15 nevertheless, even these [laws] should not be modified without a major reason, for as a jurist says, in important [things] nothing should be hastily changed.16 Sometimes the justification provided by jurists or legislators is rather disappointing. Often it does not fit properly the present state of the republic. However, the absence of a justification for a law does not cancel the law itself, and this matter is not subject to the judgment of private persons nor of the inferior magistrates. Likewise, it is impossible to justify two laws when they conflict with each other. The consequence derived from the laws, that is, the application of the laws to particular matters not explicitly included in them is the main task of the jurist and already involves the interpretation of the [legislator’s] intention (interpretatio dianoetica) about which we have spoken before, an interpretation that takes place when the legislator did not talk about the case at hand but wanted to talk about it. Such an [interpretation] can be either extensive, that is, completing (suppletoria), or restrictive, that is, corrective (correctoria). It is extensive if, by virtue of the law’s own justification (ratio), what it prescribes extends to cases not made explicit in the law; it is restrictive if, due to the caducity of the law’s justification, its validity expires, even though the case at hand remains subsumed under the law’s formulation. However, to determine up to what point [interpretation] is permitted to the jurists remain a major problem, which should not be treated in the same way in all republics, since different legislators have granted more or less power to the jurists in this matter. In my opinion the laws must 13

Leibniz’s marginal note: “meanwhile, because the statement can be withdrawn”. Semper in obscuris quod minimum est, sequimur. Dig. 50, 17 1.9. 15 Non omnium quae a majoribus constituta sunt ratio reddi potest. Dig. 1,3 1.20. 16 Nihil facile mutandum in solemnibus. Dig. 4, 1 1.7. 14

88

Chapter 11

be conceived so that the interpretation [of the legislator’s intention] is not necessary.cc There is another, uncontroversial, type of consequence derived from the laws, namely the one where the words and meaning (sententia) of the law coincide. This happens whenever a proposition is added to the law in order to yield an argument such that one of its premises is the law and the conclusion is the decision of a given question.dd The added proposition can be either another law or a statement extracted from another science: for example, the jurists use to take many things from logic regarding conditional and disjunctive propositions; from physics, regarding legitimate birth and lethal wounds; and from mathematics, regarding the definition of borders or the computation of [inheritance] according to the Falcidic law.ee It remains to treat the Method of the Laws, that is, the System organizing a plurality of laws. In this System, both the content (materia) and the form (forma), i.e., the order, must be taken into account. The system’s content consists in the laws themselves in which one should observe the same [rule] observed regarding the stones with which we construct a building. That is to say, they must be cut in such a way that they fit each other comfortably and firmly, and no empty space between them is left; likewise, the laws should be coordinated in such a way that they neither conflict with each other nor leave any margin of doubt regarding any case. No such system is so far available, but in my opinion there is no doubt that it can be achieved. People tend to think otherwise, for they believe that there are infinite cases, so that to enumerate all of them is beyond human power. This would be the case if our aim were to enumerate all cases; but he who knows the universal can easily range a countless quantity of things in classes, so that nothing remains outside. People also believe that there is no law without exception, whereas what the jurist wants are rules without exceptions, for he considers that if [the rule] failed in a single case, it would not perform its role. How to conciliate all this or how to conclude from the laws something with certainty if we are never sure? The answer is that, although certain laws can have exceptions, the legal system as a whole must be exempt from them, for the laws limit each other – from one law a rule can be drawn; from another, an exception; from a third, a repartee (replicatio), and so on.ff The result is a magnificently economical way of making laws, which reveals how a few laws could cover countless cases, since countless combinations regarding the cases raised can be made out of a few laws. This only requires writing a book that expounds which kinds of law are able to constrain which other kinds of law – which is not difficult provided one understands what I have said about presumption. For every law has its presumption, which is in force in any given case, unless it is proved that some impediment or contradiction emerges, which would generate an

11. Interpretation and Argumentation in Law

89

exception extracted from another law. But in that case the charge of proof is transferred to he who adduces the exception. a

Aristotle, Topics. Leibniz mistakenly refers to Chapter 13 (“The tools of dialectics”) of Book I, whereas he in fact intends Chapter 15 (“Of the distinction of the different senses”), which indeed is located in 106a1-108a6, as mentioned by the Academy edition (which, however, does not rectify Leibniz’s reference). b Aristotle, Poetics, Chapter 21 (“Of the species of the name”), especially 1457b7–16. c Leibniz is quite precise in his use of terminology here: the homonymy of single words corresponds, at the syntactic level (the one treated in the present paragraph), to amphiboly or the possibility of multiple structural readings of the same sentence, as in “Visiting relatives may be boring”. d It is important to notice in this sentence the subjunctive “what he would have said” (dicturus fuisset), which is opposed to both factual expressions, “what he said” (dixit) and “what he had in mind” (habuit in mente). This triple distinction is explicitly introduced and analyzed in another text, the “Example of Legal Definitions” (GR 721-743), written ca. 1678 and revised in the late 1690’s. In the revised version, Leibniz distinguishes between two kinds of “tacit” meaning, both opposed to the meaning “expressed” by the words used: “Expression is to be distinguished from tacit intention, the latter being used in order to add something to what has been specifically expressed, as when one desires to make a special mention. The tacit has at times the form of a conjecture and at times of a consequence. In the latter case, it is implicit. The tacit is in the mind, not in the words. The implicit can be that which is neither in the mind nor in the words, but in the thing itself” (GR 725). In terms of the distinction between the psychological “notion” and the logical “idea” (cf. Meditationes de cognitione, veritate et ideis, 1684; A VI 4 585-592), the tacit belongs to the former, and the implicit to the latter. The conjectural inferences related to the tacit have to do with communicative intentions, being therefore pragmatic in nature, whereas the logical inferences that spell out the implicit are logico-ontological in nature. Leibniz’s point seems to be that interpretation cannot be reduced to the latter, although it cannot also overlook it. e The interpreter is required to “complete” the meaning of a law or ordinance by finding out the predicate by virtue of which the various things to which it applies are exchangeable (“reciprocal”), i.e., regarding which they are “equal” from the point of view of that particular law. Such a predicate is what Aristotle calls the proprium (Topics 102a18-30). f Mens civitatis, ‘mind of the city’. This should not be confounded with Machiavelli’s notion of raison d’état. Leibniz, as other Tacitists, opposes to the Machiavellian identification of the reason of state with the prince’s interest the idea that the interest of the state is represented by the beliefs regarding the common good shared intuitively by the citizens. These shared beliefs are one of the sources of natural law, especially according to Felden, one of the natural law theorists whom Leibniz appreciates and follows. See Sève (1989: Chap. 3). g Notice the image of the balance here, which is also implicit above in the use of the verb “to incline”. See, among others, Chapters 2 and 5. h Notice that Leibniz is not criticizing the legislator in question for the principles that guide him (placing trade above security). His critique concerns the fact that such a legislator, based on a momentary preference, does not take into account global considerations. For instance, in the set of secret reports addressed to the Duke of Mainz on France’s war against the Netherlands, Leibniz stresses considerations regarding the Empire’s security and the corresponding military measures; but he also takes into account economic and constitutional measures (Securitas Publica, 1671; A IV 1 133-170, 174-206). On the other

90

Chapter 11

hand, he constrains the freedom of interpretation by demanding respect for the objective content of established law, whether it agrees or not with one’s preferences or affects. In this respect, the role of the interpreter is not that of evaluating the law. i Leibniz is here relating interpretation to the two principal kinds of context distinguished by pragmatics, namely, the psychological and the socio-historical context. j The wise legislator is the one who legislates according to the principles of justice as well as to an understanding of the situation. The reasons underlying such legislation, i.e., those taking into account both the abstract and the concrete factors, are those he calls “true reasons”. Leibniz’s definition of justice as “the charity of the sage” (see, among many other texts, the Praefatio Codicis Juris Gentium Diplomatici, 1693; K VI 457-492; the same definition appears also in a text of 1678, De Justitia; GR 614-616), combines in fact these two components, giving to his conception of justice a distinctly pragmatic flavor, and thereby relating it directly to interpretive practice. k These two examples of “natural” ethical principles are given by Aristotle as examples of principles that do not require dialectical justification, for they are universally accepted. For those who doubt them – which is possible because they are not logically demonstrable truths – it is sufficient to point to social sanctions (kólasis) ensuing their violation, which corresponds to the equally persuasive pointing to empirical evidence (aísthƝsis) for those who doubt that snow is white (Topics 105a3-9). l Leibniz understands by “nomothetic part of political science” legislation. Upon receiving Kestner’s work on legislation, which he describes as a “nomothetic dissertation”, Leibniz observes that, contrary to the opinion of strict adherents of natural law theory such as Kestner, legislation is not purely driven by ethical considerations, but has to do also with actual social practice: “Ethics explains the nature of virtues and passions, but jurisprudence instructs about their use for society” (To Kestner, 24 October 1709; GR 688; on another aspect of the Leibniz-Kestner relationship, see Chapter 9E). Leibniz’s conception of jurisprudence is intended to bridge the gap between ethics and politics, which had been stressed by the Machiavellian tradition, without falling into the natural law position that subordinates completely politics to ethics. In “On Roman Law” of 16801684, Leibniz identifies nomothetics with the politics of law and with jurisprudence (A VI 4 2873). m This principle is explicitly formulated, and thereby becomes a legal principle, in Digesta 1,5 1.7. n Leibniz here employs one of the characteristic formulations of his Principle of (Sufficient) Reason. It is worth noticing that the analogy here drawn between the natural and juridical realms will later become a central tenet of his metaphysics, as expressed for example in the Principes de la Nature et de la Grace (1714). This passage also suggests the doctrine of different levels of generalization that appears in the Discours de Metaphysique (paragraphs 21-22; A VI 4 1563-1566). o See Chapter 13. p The Aristotelian distinction between actual demonstration and its simulation, here alluded to by Leibniz, can be found, for example, in Rhetoric 1356a3-4, 18-19. q In his correspondence with Conring*, dating from the same year in which he wrote the present text, Leibniz spells out his view on the relationship between resolution, demonstration, definition and analysis. He defines analysis as “the resolution of the defined into its definition or of the proposition into its demonstration” and demonstration as “nothing but a chain of definitions” (To Conring, January 3, 1678; GP I 185). Subsequently (To Conring, March 19, 1678; GP I 194), he defines the definition of a

11. Interpretation and Argumentation in Law

91

complex idea as “its resolution in parts, just as a demonstration is nothing but the resolution of a truth into other truths already discovered”. r Leibniz is here struggling with characterizing different notions of definition, as well as with the problem of their eventual arbitrary character, raised with particular acuteness by Hobbes’s claim that reasoning consists in computations performed with linguistic signs. He had previously dealt with such problems in 1677, in important texts such as Quid sit idea (GP VII 263-264) and Dialogus (A VI 4 20-25). He continues to deal with them until he crystallizes definitively his account of the types of knowledge and of definition in 1684, in Meditationes de cognitione, veritate et ideis (A VI 4 585-592). In this respect, the present text, written in 1678-1679, can be seen as a step towards such crystallization. On Leibniz’s early views on definition, see Dascal (1987: chap. 4). s Throughout this paragraph on the way to reach appropriate definitions, Leibniz combines different approaches. On the one hand, he is employing the Aristotelian notion of categories (praedicamenta, see Chapter 38), on the other, the Platonic ‘method of division’ (diaeresis, see Chapter 12B). He is also anticipating the contrastive methods developed by structural linguistics, in which syntagmatic “frames” are used in order to study the meaning of lexemes, morphemes and phrases, as well as to find their semantic components. These “operational procedures”, which structural linguists like to compare to the experimental procedures of natural science, comprise, among others, the “method of substitution”, the “collocation test”, the “commutation test”, etc. – a nice example of the plurality of heuristics needed for achieving an apparently simple discovery or invention task (cf. Chapter 12). t See Chapters 31C and 38, note o. u See notes e and 11. v In other words, once the analysis or resolution is completed, synthesis or composition can be performed, without however leading back to the initial point, but rather permitting the demonstration or discovery of new truths – a thesis already defended by Leibniz in the De Arte Combinatoria (A VI 1 163-230). w Samuel Bohl, Disputatio prima (-tredecima) pro formali significationis eruendo primum in explicatione Scripturae Sacrae, Rostock, 1637-1638. x If this is the case, i.e., if a pristine conceptual analysis could achieve the same results as a tortuous analysis of the semantics and pragmatics of natural languages, why then should Leibniz spend so much effort in describing the latter? For some ideas that might help answering this question, see Introductory Essay, Sections 3 and 4. y The procedure proposed by Leibniz consists in spelling out the implicit predicate shared by a number of nouns, and then generalizing it in order to define a set (“those that need a tutor”) to which all these nouns, as well as any other sharing the predicate in question, belong. The propositions (and subjects) in question are ‘reciprocal’ in the weak sense that their subjects can replace each other with respect to the shared predicate, but not in general. z Compare: “all theorems are nothing but stenographic notations, i.e., shorthand for thinking, in order to release the mind from the need to think distinctly the same things, without making them lose anything of their correctness” (A VI 4 179). aa On the ontological nature of the notion of ‘facility’, which is necessary to explicate the notion of objective probability, the one stemming from “the nature of things”, see Dascal (1978: 83-85). See also the use of this notion in Chapter 13. bb Notice that, whereas degrees of probability are inherently involved in conjectural arguments, for they refer to the degrees of ‘facility’ of occurrence of something or of its requisites, they are not pertinent to presumptive arguments.

92 cc

Chapter 11

See note 34. Similarly, a contemporary theoretician of juridical argumentation (McCormick 1978), contends that the validity of a juridical argument, having as its major premise a law and as its conclusion the judge’s decision, depends upon the possibility of finding the appropriate minor premise that ensures that the argument is a valid syllogism. In this sense, juridical argumentation consists, for McCormick as well as for Leibniz’s position here, in replacing enthymematic inferences by syllogistic ones. ee The law in question, one of the best known of Roman Law, due to Publius Falcidius and promulgated in 40 A.D., restricts the part of his estate a head of a family can freely legate to anyone, the remaining part being obligatorily legated to the legitimate heirs. ff The limitation of conflicts of interpretation is, for Leibniz, not only a function of the systematic nature of law, but also of the rule-governed conduct of legal (and other) disputes, as forensic practice shows. See, in this respect, Chapter 16F. dd

Chapter 12 TOWARDS A HEURISTICS FOR DISCOVERY

Since his youth, Leibniz conceived of ‘logic’ as comprising not only proof but also discovery. When he later developed the idea of a ‘general science’, he consistently included in it two subdivisions, namely, the ‘art of judging’ and the ‘art of inventing’, and associated with them, respectively, ‘analysis’ and ‘synthesis’ (see Chapter 38). While the guiding idea of the general science was to ground both its components upon a rigorous ‘universal mathematics’, Leibniz was aware of the fact that this was not sufficient for discovery, which requires also heuristic methods, capable of complementing their deductive counterparts. Such methods range from the exploitation of mathematical and logical tools such as the ars combinatoria (see B), the calculus of probabilities (see Chapter 13), and the characteristica universalis (FC VII 103), through the appropriate compilation, organization, and presentation of extant knowledge with a view to its inventive use (see Chapters 15, 22, 40),a up to the use of traditional as well as new topoi – including standard ways of reasoning and arguing such as diaeresis (see B) and ‘rules of thumb’ for reaching results sought in one’s investigation (see C and D). A small sample of these methods is assembled in the present Chapter – other examples being scattered throughout the book. Text A discusses the project of an art of invention ‘in general’ suggesting that it implies a particular combination of analysis and synthesis; it also exemplifies the different types of heuristics mentioned above. Taken together, what emerges is a plurality of methods necessary for the progress of human knowledge, and thus part and parcel of the eminently rational nature of such a process, in spite of the fact that they are not reducible to formal devices. Furthermore, unlike for Descartes, it becomes apparent that method does not consist, for Leibniz, in a single, linear order of proceeding uniformly. No doubt to proceed methodically – in invention as elsewhere – means, for him, to proceed orderly, but order is intrinsically plural. In this sense, methodological plurality is itself the most important ‘principle of invention’.

93 M. Dascal (ed.), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. The Art of Controversies, 93–104. © 2006 Springer.

94

Chapter 12

A. THE ART OF INVENTION This is one of the most marginally annotated manuscripts of Leibniz – which suggests the importance he assigned to the art of discovery. Indeed, this is an important text due to its attempt to generalize the very concept of a method of invention, as well as of a method of investigation. As in other texts on this subject, Leibniz surveys all sorts of methods that are useful for discovery. And in most of them he mentions analysis and synthesis, referring the first to the ars judicandi and the latter to the ars inveniendi. What is peculiar in the present text is that both analysis and synthesis are treated as types of the “method of investigation” (methodus quaerendi). The distinction he points out between the two is, thus, not functional, but rather pragmatic in nature: whereas analysis is said to be more difficult, synthesis is said to be more time consuming; furthermore, whereas the former is said to be impossible to achieve in some cases, the latter is said to always lead to a solution. In spite of such differences, or perhaps because of them, Leibniz considers an “admirable invention” the combination of the two methods, which he labels “analytical synthesis”.b The present text culminates and is abruptly interrupted with a revealing mathematical example, which may well be an instantiation of that “admirable invention”. For, the proposed “perfect” method of enumeration and classification of transcendental curves is in fact based upon the analysis of such curves as derivable or composed from simpler curves. Without this analytic component no ‘reason’ or ‘law’ for the proper progressive enumeration could be given. At the same time, the proposed method can only achieve perfection – according to Leibniz – by employing the art of combinations – which he always mentions as the paradigmatic example of synthesis. Leibniz’s failure to achieve his attempted enumeration may be seen perhaps as a limitation of the purely a priori approach in yielding the desired ‘general formula’, which eventually paves the way for the consideration of the other kinds of heuristics of invention, not necessarily combinatorial in nature.

Date: 1678? Edition: A VI 4 A 79-83 Language: Latin

On the art of discovery in general One should make sure that, when investigating, one does not work in vain, which can be achieved if we take care that we always discover something, even if we do not find what we are looking for. One should also make sure that, in the process of investigation, we are aware that we are always and ever more approaching that which [the investigation] is all about, for if we know the art of continuously progressing, we will necessarily reach that which [the investigation] is all about. Hence, we should act like someone looking for a needle who does not disperse his gaze here and there

12. Towards a Heuristics for Discovery

95

(except perhaps at the beginning), but runs through all the places in an orderly way, so as to be sure of not returning to places where he already was.1 On the difficulty of dividing into parts, where anatomy is needed rather than dilacerations; hence nothing is achieved unless one shows the junctures of things.c A most important art is to divide a difficulty into parts so that each [partial] difficulty be independent of the others, otherwise the difficulty would have been divided only apparently. And it is to be ensured that the part be easier than the whole. The method of discovery would be perfect2 if we could anticipate, perhaps even demonstrate, before beginning to deal with the subject matter, that following it we will reach the exit; the method is more perfect when it does not make use of any theorem demonstrated by others or of any problems solved by others.3 One’s conscience will determine whether one’s method is free of chance (casu),4 i.e., whether one would have reached [the solution], had one not previously known something else. When we search for the useful, we do well if we employ all [methods]. When we search in order to improve our mental ability, we must try the [more] perfect ways as much as possible. Our research5 aims at the construction either of a whole science and of each of its parts, or else at something particular. On the other hand, we look either for a demonstration or for an enunciation (enuntiatio). Furthermore, either we look for an enunciation in which some determined thing which was looked for is stated, or else we generally look for some elegant enunciation. The former is to investigate a problem, the latter, a theorem. 1

2

3

4

5

In the margin: “In the course of an investigation one should always respect justice, i.e., not to prefer one thing over another without a reason or not to do anything without a reason. If this method is rigorously observed we will always find the best ways. But it is difficult always to follow [justice]: when we are necessarily forced to choose, we will make sure that each one will have its turn (nous ferons que chacun aye son tour)”. In the margin: “On the use of characters for eliminating useless considerations, for fixating the mind, and therefore for proceeding more rapidly. The most perfect methods are those that can be executed by one’s own power (proprio Marte), without books; also … ”. One might think that here Leibniz made a mistake, for what seems relevant is not to avoid relying upon previous problems but rather upon previous solutions. In fact, however, the notion of ‘problem’ he is using in this text, as will become evident below, is the one of the De Arte Combinatoria (A VI 1 167-230), where the formulation of ‘problems’ is in fact part of the means for finding solutions, and hence a fundamental tool in the art of discovery. In the margin: “I don’t want to deal here with extemporaneous discoveries, since I am not writing here about private utility, but rather about public utility; nor can I discuss sufficiently at present the issue of the best ways”. In the margin: “Reduction of the genus to certain species, though it is most useful the reduction of the genus to a single most inferior (infima) species”. See B below.

96

Chapter 12

The method of investigation is twofold, either Synthetic or Combinatory, or else Analytic. From these, the Analytic is more difficult, while the Synthetic is more prolonged.6 Sometimes the Analytic method, by the nature of things, cannot find the exit; the Synthetic, always can. For example, the Analytic method alone cannot find the exit in the art of deciphering, as well as in other cases where one has to make tables and run through them – as when we want to know whether a given number is prime and we examine orderly possible divisors. On the admirable invention of an analytical synthesis: when all those things that otherwise could be run through one by one can be conjoined in a general formula; the latter, which seems to be a species, is in fact a genus, i.e., a genus brought down to the form of a species. This is done with the help of a saturated (plenissima) or maximally composed species, of which all the others are ellipsis.7, d On tables or inventories, as helps to the combinatory art. On divisions and subdivisions, necessary for creating tables, i.e., the enumeration of all species.8 On the many tables to be made so that the same thing appears in many different ways.9 Exhibitions are either columns, or figures, or tables.10 On columns or series simply exhibited. On inventories, i.e., on various co-orderings or indices of the same things. On figures as well as maquettes (modulos). Thus, he who wants to erect a fortification will usefully make a maquette representing all the elevations and accidents of the ground, so as to be easily able to project it in various perspectives. In this connection, to produce a Universal Atlas, i.e. a work comprising figures, as well as a Theater of Nature and the Arts, i.e., maquettes conserving the things themselves, both alive and dead: for the 6

In the margin: “The modes of enumerating are twofold. Either we begin from one genus, the rest being provided by the differences, or else we consider every member equally as genus or difference, and from their combination we come to an enumeration where each member is, in its order, equally intermediate and last”. See B below. 7 ‘Ellipsis’ is here used in the grammatical sense. See Chapter 9, note 2. 8 In the margin: “On the various modes of dividing and subdividing in order to obtain in different ways subaltern genera”. See B below. 9 In the margin: “On the Tables of Ramus* and other doctors such as Zwinger. One should investigate the antiquity of the Tables”. Theodor Zwinger (1533-1588) was a Protestant humanist. Leibniz is referring here to the Theatrum humanae vitae, edited by Th. Zwinger, Basel, 1586-1587 and 1604. 10 In the margin: “On the perfect discovery of all species, including the subaltern ones – which cannot be done through dichotomies, unless they are established in many ways, although in this case only by a priori combination”. See B below.

12. Towards a Heuristics for Discovery

97

dead ones, along with their peeled skins (exuviae) and fragments (avulsa); for the living ones, so as to let them act and grow according to their nature. On the Repertoires or Indices, which either show propositions or at least questions, or else the chapters under which terms are compiled or just the terms themselves. Also, on organizing libraries, i.e., on book catalogues along with valuable advice on how to compile them. On Photius’s work.e On the rule of the art of combination, namely: to begin from the simplest and to proceed to the most general; to proceed always through what is easy and never to progress by jumping; never to search for something, but rather to let oneself be guided by the thing’s nature; or, in case we search for something, to know that it lies in front of our doors. On the progression of series. Whenever we discover a progression by means of an a posteriori table, we have certainly obtained something useful and clever; nevertheless, we have not proceeded in a perfect manner, since we would have been able to discover the same law of progression a priori, in case we can demonstrate it independently from the table.11 To discover the law of progression is also useful for the simultaneous consideration of all species, since in this way we connect them all. One should search for a connection of species such that the simpler ones serve for the more compound, and also to investigate how all the former stem from the latter.f One should investigate the origin of species from each other, so that it will be possible to demonstrate, in terms of this origin, that all of them are obtained orderly.g Thus, he who claims that it is correct to use the method of representing all the curves by their foci, must demonstrate that all the curves derive from this, i.e., that given a curve it is always possible to find the number of its foci.12 The method of enumerating is not perfect if it does not put forth some determinate reason. For instance, the enumeration of the transcendent curves through one or many evolvent curves [might be grounded] on the fact that any of the former [can be described] by one or many of the latter. However, what should be investigated is [precisely] this, namely whether, in case a transcendent curve cannot be exhibited through the evolution of a single algebraic one, it can nevertheless be exhibited through two, three, etc. Then one would have the true method. That is to say, one should demonstrate that all transcendent curves are produced if, instead of the foci, ordered algebraic 11 12

In the margin: “Rarely a discovery is free from some chance”. In the margin: “A demonstration should be given to the effect that every algebraic curve has a certain number of foci. And if someone does not possess this demonstration and leaves it for further research, he has not proceeded in a perfect way, since all rigorous discovery must carry with itself its own demonstration”.

98

Chapter 12

curves were employed, at least for those transcendent curves that have already been described by algebraic evolvent ones. However, the enumeration must be done so that, in the first place, all the transcendent curves obtained by the evolution of one algebraic are presented; then, all the combinations of algebraic curves should be formed to produce other transcendent curves obtained by a single pair (binio) of algebraic curves – under which I count also cases in which one algebraic is replaced by points, in which case it should be verified whether and which transcendent curves previously generated by the evolution of a single algebraic curve are repeated; then one should proceed in the same way for triads (ternio) of algebraic curves, and so on. Finally, one should treat in the same way the transcendent curves in view of producing superior transcendent ones.h

B. TABLES, DIVISIONS, AND THE PLURALITY OF METHODS This text explicitly deals with a formal detail of the Platonic and scholastic ‘method of division’, which is here criticized: by using only dichotomies, Leibniz shows, this method fails to comprise all the cases of subaltern classes in the intermediary space between a genus and its (minimal) species. In fact however, it expands A in interesting ways. Its specific objective is to elaborate upon the issues briefly mentioned in the margins of A (notes 5, 6, 8, and 10). In particular, it undertakes to show how a requisite formulated in A can be fulfilled, namely, how it is possible to make “many tables … so that the same thing appears in many different ways”. The two first words in its title, ‘tables’ and ‘divisions’, are crucial in providing the answer, while the third, ‘method’, is crucial in understanding its significance. The mathematical machinery underlying the answer is simple, as explained in the Dissertation on the Art of Combinations (1666). The ninth Use of Problems I and II is the following: “Given the species of divisions, find the pre-divisions, i.e., the genera and subaltern species” (A VI 1 191). The solution is simple for a dichotomy, for there are no intermediary classes between the genus and its two species. It becomes somewhat more complicated for a politomy, i.e., a division of a (supreme) genus into more than two (minimal) species. Consider, for instance, a trichotomy – the smallest politomy. The three species it comprises, a, b, and c, will give rise to one ‘com3nation’ (abc, i.e., the supreme genus itself), three ‘un-ions’ (a, b, c – i.e., each of the species), and three ‘com2nations’ (ab, ac, bc), which are precisely the subaltern genus or the intermediate species (ibid.). With the help of tables or diagrams such as the ones in the present text or the many others used in De Arte Combinatoria, it is easy to represent graphically the composition and position of these intermediate classes in a tree-like or other kind of structure, provided the number of species is not too big, of course: if there are 11 minimal species of virtue, for example, there will be 2035 intermediate

12. Towards a Heuristics for Discovery

99

‘complexions’ of virtues, and one may be short of paper for representing all of them and their corresponding trees synoptically.i Yet, even if we had the means for such a representation and the combinatorial analysis satisfied the formal constraint that each genus must (a) be predicable of each of its species and (b) be equivalent to (hence substitutable by) a disjunction of all of them, the real problem would be far from resolved.j For, we would still need some other, evaluative criterion to select among all the intermediate ways of grouping the species those that are ‘useful’ – a task that requires ‘judgment’.k And this is something that the combinatory – not even with the help of its proposed solution to problems such as XI (“Finding the useless variations”) and XII (“Finding the useful variations”) – is able to provide. If so, one might ask, what is the utility – qua method of discovery – of all this powerful and beautiful formal apparatus? This question brings us to the third word in the title, ‘method’. The fundamental utility of the combinatorial procedure, as well as of the appropriate tabular representation of its procedures, from the point of view of the art of discovery, is to demonstrate and present to the eye the complete range of ways in which a class can be subdivided or the set of elements belonging to the class can be combined into sub-classes. As such, this analytic-combinatorial procedure demonstrates and exhibits the inherent multiplicity of “one and the same thing” (the class or genus). It is beyond its scope to pick up the ‘best’, ‘correct’, or even most ‘useful’ one of these sets of sub-classes – this properly synthetic step in the process of discovery is left to a properly heuristic component of the method, namely, ‘judgment’. Furthermore, neither of these steps relies upon the ultimate, definitive analysis of the class. To be sure, at each stage, its elements are assumed as given, but the very same analytic exercise could be applied to them as well, without damaging its synthetic usefulness. In this sense, the real hero of this text is the very notion of ‘intermediary’, and in this way it suggests how to give heuristic substance to A’s idea of an ‘analytical synthesis’, a method that is at each point of its application a hybrid of synthesis-cum-analysis.

Date: 1678 Edition: A VI 4 A 122-123 Language: Latin

Tables. Divisions. Method. Genera and Subaltern Species It is useful to jointly present in a table the method for treating in various ways the same question. For, in this way, thanks to the different possible orderings (dispositiones), both the various affinities of things among themselves and the various subaltern genera the mind abstracts from the lowest (imae) species will be apparent.

100

Chapter 12

Everything can be discovered through divisions; furthermore, since it is possible to find each and every proper genus13 of all species, all of this can be discovered by means of dichotomies.l For instance, a

b

c

d

g f e Where e is divided into f and d, f into g and c, and g into a and b. I claim that all lowest species, a, b, c, d, can be found by means of a single subdivision, but not all subaltern genera, e.g., the proper genus of the three [species] a, b, d will not appear thereby. In order for it to be seen too, other dichotomies are needed, e.g.,

a

b

c

d

i h e The enumeration must be made in as many different ways of subdividing as are necessary in order to make apparent all subaltern species. Therefore, the method of subdivisions is sufficient precisely when we are requested to find the most inferior (infimae) species. But this is not the case when what we want to determine are the so-called rubrics or titles of things, and to search for their various genera. Here I understand the most inferior species not absolutely but rather relatively to their proper genus. That is, I consider a, b, c, d as the most inferior species of those that are under investigation. The question is whether the most inferior species should be joined to those equally remote from the genus. 13

“A proper genus is an attribute shared by many and only by them. For example, animal [is the proper genus] of man and brute. That is to say: if d is a and e is a, and if what is not- d and is not-e is not-a, then a is the proper genus of the species d and e” (A VI 4 295).

12. Towards a Heuristics for Discovery

101

C. A PRINCIPLE OF DISCOVERY Leibniz compares in this piece two cases. In the first, the introduction of an additional element (e) leads to additional ways of solving a problem. However, given the redundancy of this element, there is no added value, from the point of view of discovery, in such a case. In the second, two distinct and, at least on the face of it, non-redundant ways of discovering a solution, are possible. In this case, Leibniz claims that something new is discovered, namely the previously unknown relationship between the two solutions. It thus emerges that some forms of correspondence or – speaking Leibnizianese – inter-expressibility of two methods or solutions are not only ways of establishing a truth, but also ways of finding it. Metaphysically, the foundation for this heuristic way for discovery resides, ultimately, in the pre-established existence of a network of relations that ensures the correspondence of the ways that lead to “one and the same thing”.m Yet, even before it explicitly becomes in Leibniz’s system a metaphysical principle, inter-expressibility reveals itself as a useful epistemological heuristic tool.

Date: 1682? Edition: A VI 4 A 509; C 158 Language: Latin If something can be discovered in two ways, first, by a, b, c, d; and second, by a, b, c, d, e; then it can be discovered by e together with three of the remaining four, omitting one of them. This, however, is not a general rule. If something can be discovered by a, b and by d, e, there is a relation between a, b and d, e. Therefore, from a double method of discovering the same thing, something new is usually discovered in turn.

D. A RULE OF DISCOVERY Here, Leibniz generalizes a procedure he allegedly employed in developing one aspect of his theory of color, in the context of discussions of Mariotte’s theory. What he highlights, in particular, is the heuristic value of a prior consideration of facts that, on the face of it, would contradict the purported theory. This allows the theory-builder to sharpen the theory in such a way that it has in advance the means to overcome objections based on such facts.

Date: November, 1682 Edition: A VI 4 A 509-510 Language: Latin

102

Chapter 12

A rule of discovery of mine, which I employ when I want to reach the determination of something,14 consists in examining first the objections of those who endeavor to prove its non-viability. For, the solutions [of the objections] provide me with a way to prove what I intend, or at least to add to it something. Thus, for example, Mariotte endeavors to prove that permanent colors are different from emphatic colors in origin and nature,n and does so by arguing that in permanent colors no scattering (evagatio) is detected, except insofar as it is due to the laws of refraction.o Therefore, when explaining the origin of permanent colors, I have tried to solve this objection and have discovered that the aforementioned scattering can be detected only in a solid colored ray, in which case it is large, i.e., noticeable, and not in the small ones which are the ones forming permanent colors. I call a ray solid when it ends in a shadow, such as a ray that passes through an orifice; such are most of the rays having permanent colors, because they come from very bright corpuscles which lie between opaque bodies. a

Text A is in fact organized as a project for an encyclopedia. In Chapter 15, written at about the same time as A, the title links the terms encyclopaedia and methodo inventoria, thus establishing the connection of the leibnizian encyclopedia with the heuristics of discovery. See also A VI 4 294. b He might in fact have picked up this idea from Hobbes,* who considers the specificity of philosophy with respect to common sense (which is ‘synthetic’) and science (which is ‘analytic’) as lying in its combination of these two methods (De corpore, Chap. 6, paragraphs 1-3). In his youth, Leibniz admired very much Hobbes, and quoted him often, not only referring to his political and juridical ideas. For example, the De Arte Combinatoria contains several references to Hobbes. Along with Leibniz’s ‘hobbesian’ thesis that words or, more generally, signs play a crucial role in thought, Tönnies (1887: 566-567) was led by this ‘evidence’ to claim that Leibniz’s fundamental insights in logic came from Hobbes. Couturat (1901: 457-472) contests this claim, arguing that it is based at most on mere “inductions more or less verisimilar” (p. 462) and that wherever Leibniz adopts a hobbesian doctrine, he corrects it thoroughly (p. 466). For discussion of some of Couturat’s interpretations of the relationship between leibnizian and hobbesian ideas, especially regarding the role of signs in thought, see Dascal (1987: Chapters 1, 2, and 4). c Leibniz criticizes Descartes’s rule of analysis using the same anatomical metaphor. He argues that Descartes merely says that complex problems should be cut into simpler ones, but does not give indications about how to perform the cutting: “He who did not learn the junctures, dilacerates rather than practices anatomy” (GP IV 330). d In Leibniz’s later thought, the only ‘species’ that satisfies this requisite of plenitude is God’s monad. In terms of the present text, it turns out that God is then the ‘general formula’ out of which, by a simple operation of deleting, all other concepts (‘species’) can be generated. This amounts to the specification of the mechanisms (calculus ratiocinator) through which, first, all ideas can be generated once we have the “alphabet of human thoughts”. The other mechanism – if we use the idea of a Turing Machine – should be a mechanism of copying. It seems that this is the mechanism characteristic of the so-called ‘analytic’ 14

Leibniz employs the curious expression ‘praestiturus’ to denote something both predetermined and that will-be-determined.

12. Towards a Heuristics for Discovery

103

theory of predication of Leibniz, where a predicate is ‘copied’ from the set of predicates of the subject, thereby generating a proposition, and at the same time ensuring its truth. Now, since both mechanisms only function if one assumes the analysis of the subject or of the most complete ‘species’ as given, both predication and ‘species ’ generation are examples of the admirable method of “analytic synthesis”. e Photius was a post-Justinian jurist who organized the first library of juridical books. The work referred to is his Myriobiblon sive Bibliotheca librorum, first printed in Augsburg (1601) and reprinted in Rouen (1653). f Note the inversion of the traditional idea, according to which the simple precedes the compound. This is an anticipation of Leibniz’s later thesis (e.g., in the Monadology) that the simple is subordinated to the compound, for only the latter is a complete and truly unified substance. See Cardoso (2005: 213-215). g Leibniz is here anticipating one of the main difficulties faced much later by Darwin’s theory of evolution, namely the “lacunae” in the evidence he had for actually demonstrating the orderly evolutionary sequence of species (NE 3.6.12; A VI 6 307). h A curve is algebraic when its equation contains only algebraic expressions (e.g., addition, subtraction, roots, etc.). Other curves are called transcendent (e.g., y = sin x, y = log x, or equations where x appears as an exponent). In Euclidean geometry only figures constructible with circles and lines were permitted and in Cartesian geometry, only algebraic curves. Leibniz, however, allowed also for transcendent curves. He hoped to provide a complete enumeration and classification of transcendent curves, by applying combinatorial means. This would have been achieved by means of the construction of evolvent curves (an evolvent E of a curve C is obtained by constructing the tangents at each point of C; these curves were studied by Christian Huygens in his Horologium Oscillatorium, Paris, 1673). By building the evolvents of all algebraic curves one obtains the first class of transcendent curves; by building the evolvents of all transcendent curves of this class, one obtains the second class; and so on. Nevertheless, Leibniz did not succeed in showing that in this way all transcendent curves would be obtained, and abandoned his plan. We thank Herbert Breger for his help on this note. i “How many varieties will there be in the division of virtues in 11 species, considering not only com2nations, but also the con3nations, and so up to the co10nations, as well as the supreme genus and the minimal species?”, asks Leibniz; and he replies: 2047. For, “our mind is so fecund in abstracting that, given as many things as we want, it will be possible to find their genus, i.e., the concept shared by all and only them” (A VI 1 191). j “But it is required for a genus that it be suitable to each individual [species] and that it be convertible with all of them taken disjunctively” (ibid.). k “Examples [of the usefulness of the combinatorial method] are found everywhere in philosophy, and they are not lacking in jurisprudence as well as in medicine, where all the pharmaceutical variety of remedies springs from the mixture of several ingredients; but, in order to choose the useful mixtures, superior judgment is needed” (A VI 1 177). l See Chapter 31, note 2. m As he contends in his anti-Hobbes Dialogus of 1677: “And this proportion or relation [between the characters that express the same thing] is the foundation of truth” (A VI 4 24). n Edme Mariotte (1620-1684), well known French physicist, member of the Académie Royale des Sciences, published in 1681 a Traité des couleurs, where he distinguishes between ‘fixed or permanent’ and ‘apparent’ colors (Edme Mariotte, Oeuvres, The Hague, 1740, vol. 1, p. 197). The former, like the color of a candle’s flame or of flowers, come from illuminated or luminous bodies, are stable, and have an objective cause; the latter are

104

Chapter 12

‘changeable’, like the colors light acquires when it passes through a prism or a drop of water. In his Essais de logique (Oeuvres, vol. 2, p. 657), Mariotte, talking of colors, distinguishes between real and apparent qualities. Leibniz employs the term ‘emphatic’, in connection with colors, in the De Systemate Scientiarum of 1695 (A IV 6 195-197), giving as an example the heaven’s ceiling: emphatica ut arcus coelestis. Presumably, this term refers to the reflection of a color or object in water or in a mirror, which gives rise to a phenomenon bene fundatum, rather than to mere appearance. o The occurrence or not of evagatio is for Mariotte a matter of a natural law or principle: “it is a law of nature that light spreads in straight lines through a transparent medium” (Essais de logique, part II, in Oeuvres, vol. 2, p. 658).

Chapter 13 ESTIMATING THE UNCERTAIN

In this text, written after he had had the opportunity, in Paris, to become acquainted with the manuscripts of Pascal and with the work of Huygens on the analysis of games and the calculation of probabilities therein, Leibniz seeks to characterize in a precise and justified way the notion of a ‘just game’ and to provide mathematical means for estimating the chances of winning (and losing) in several instances of such games. In the first, more philosophical part, a variety of epistemological, juridical, metaphysical, psychological, and mathematical considerations are intertwined, while in the second part the argument is more densely mathematical, although the mathematics is quite simple. In the context of this book, the special interest of this chapter – a significant specimen of Leibniz’s work in the theory of probability – lies in the fact that probability is mentioned by him in virtually all occasions he speaks of the need of a new logic or new methods that apply to domains hitherto barely treated by means of rigorous ‘rational’ tools – see Chapters 14, 21, 24, 28, 30, 31, 37, 38, 42, 43, and also NE 4.16.9; A VI 6 466). A series of initial simplifying assumptions yields the basic notions required for the later mathematical treatment. For example, the notions of ‘hope’ and ‘fear’ are purged of their psychological content in order to become precisely and objectively quantifiable. Leibniz is aware of the different influence that loss and gain may have on players with different psychological characteristics or wealth,a but such differences are set aside for, if taken into account, they would relativize the notion of ‘fair game’.b Although he claims to use a sort of empirical method based on the observation of gamblers’ behavior, in fact the considerations that predominate in this text are those that permit the study of an idealized object suitable for a systematic formal account. This permits tackling quite complicated problemsc with mathematical tools that can be seen as a straightforward extension of the De arte combinatoria.d But Leibniz’s acquaintance with probabilities antedates his mathematical meeting with them in Paris. As early as 1669, he employed this notion in the demonstration of a key political propositon.e As a jurist, he was familiar with

105 M. Dascal (ed.), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. The Art of Controversies, 105–117. © 2006 Springer.

106

Chapter 13 the tradition in criminal law, dating back to the early 16th century, which distinguished several ‘degrees of proof’ in terms of their different verisimilitude (see Chapter 36 and references therein). And it is to this tradition, not to the mathematical one, that he refers in order to substantiate their epistemological and philosophical significance (NE 4.16.15). This juridical source of Leibniz’s concern with probabilities is not absent from the present text, throughout which moral and juridical concepts, terminology, illustrations, and possible applications of the theory of probabilities are present. Several researchers have noticed its presence here and elsewhere in Leibniz’s work on the calculus of probabilities, recognized a certain mismatch between the mathematical results and the juridical and other practical needs, and yet attributed this to Leibniz’s failure in applying the former to the latter.f But one can as well ask, why should they match? Perhaps they do not match because they deal with different phenomena and different kinds of ‘probability’, each of them impervious to the methods and requirements of the other?g

Edition: A VI 4 A 92-101 Date: September 1678 Language: Latin

On The Estimation of the Uncertain A game is just if there is the same proportion (ratio) of hope to fear on each [side].1 In a just game the hope is worth as much as it has been bought for, since it is just to buy a thing for its worth, and the fear is worth as much as the hope’s price. Axiom. If players do similar things so that no difference between them may be noticed except that consisting in the outcome, then the proportion of hope to fear is the same. This can be demonstrated by metaphysical [principles]. Where appearances are the same,2 one can form about them the same judgment, i.e., the reason for forming an opinion about the future outcome is the same; but an opinion about a future outcome consists either in hope or in fear. If the pool (sors) is formed by an equal contribution of the players, each one plays in the same way, and the same prize and the same penalty are determined for the same outcome, the game is just. 1

Erased by Leibniz: “A game is just if each [side] commits as much [as the other] to the pool (sors) and each has the same amount of hope”. Modern translations of Leibniz’s terminology would be ‘fair’ for justus, ‘chance’ for spes, and ‘risk’ for metus. We keep, however, the more literal translations. 2 The term apparet sometimes refers to “likelihood” rather than “appearance”, as it does here.

13. Estimating the Uncertain

107

Given these conditions, each player’s hope is worth as much as he contributes. For a player buys the hope for a price when he contributes, and surely the price is just, since the game is just, by what precedes. Therefore, the hope has as much value as the player has bought it for, i.e., it is worth as much as his contribution. More generally, under the same conditions, whether the pool is made by equal contributions or whether it comes from another source, the hope’s estimation amounts to a man’s portion of the pool. For, regarding the hope’s estimation, it doesn’t matter wherefrom the pool comes (for this corresponds to the fear of losing, which is null when no contribution has been made); there will be as much hope as there was when the pool was made with [the players’] contributions. But in this case the hope’s estimation corresponded to a man’s portion of the pool; therefore, here too it corresponds to what each one contributed. In other words, if we conceive of the whole pool as belonging to all and that everyone’s hope is the same, then if the game is interrupted and the players want to distribute the pool in the proportion of the hope or of the right to profit it bears, a man’s portion is due to each one. The more persons gamble for the same pool in a just game, the less is the hope to win; for the estimated value of the hope is smaller, since the more players the less a man’s portion. But the fear of losing is also smaller – otherwise the game wouldn’t be just. The more players there are who contribute equally to the pool, the higher the hope for profit, but also the fear of losing. Indeed, with one coin I can gain three; yet, in so doing I do not act more prudently than someone who is playing against one person; therefore, it is necessary that the fear of losing has increased too. Assuming that the pool is distributed in as many parts as there are players and that these parts are A, B, C, etc., then the hope’s estimated value is A + B + C, etc. divided by the number of parts or players, for the pool is A + B + C, and a man’s portion of it measures his hope. The same is the case even if the whole pool is not totally distributed according to the bets made (partes propositae), for it is understood that a man’s portion of the remainder – and therefore of the whole and of that which was already distributed, i.e., of A + B + C itself – belongs to each player.

108

Chapter 13

If I expect A or B with the same hope, then my hope’s estimated value will be half the sum of A and B. For it is exactly as if there are two players and the outcome awards A to one of them and B to the other. If I expect A or B or C with the same hope, then my hope’s estimated value will be one third of the sum of A, B, and C. The demonstration is the same as before. In general, in case it is possible to treat the several positive (utilis) outcomes disjunctively,3 the estimated value of the hope will be the sum of the possible utilities collected in all the outcomes, divided by the number of outcomes. Likewise, in case it is possible to consider the several negative results disjunctively, the estimated value of the fear will be the sum of the possible losses collected in the various cases, divided by the number of outcomes or cases. It is possible to reach the same conclusion as follows: Probability is the degree of possibility.h Hope is the probability of winning. Fear is the probability of losing. The estimation of a thing is as high as the claim (jus) each one has in it. If several [persons] are linked to one thing, i.e., if a thing is shared by several people through the same claim, each person’s claim is a man’s portion of the claim to the whole thing. If several partners (socius) under identical conditions make a contract4 among themselves about a shared thing and they do not withdraw anything from their society as a whole, their claim does not diminish. For the claim as a whole continues to belong to the society, and the partners are all in the same relation. I think that, likewise, the claim still belongs to the society if the partners have not given anything to a third party nor have taken anything from the society. This refers to those persons who do not suffer more with a loss than they rejoice with a gain, i.e., to those whom a loss does not harm too much and can continue the game. Indeed, to constrain them by this condition does not amount to impose upon them a burden. Up to this point, however, to impose the necessity to play is to impose a burden, for the mind is in so doing occupied without any gain and [the person’s] claim does not thereby increase. 3 4

That is, independently of each other. The verb employed by Leibniz, paciscantur, stems from the root “pact”, yet it is clear in this context that the kind of pact intended is a ‘contract’ (see Chapter 39).

13. Estimating the Uncertain

109

This is the case, therefore, only in those persons for whom the mind’s occupation with the game equals the pleasure they draw from playing. When there is only hope without fear, the mind’s occupation can in no way be considered harmful – which is the case if someone else had contributed to the pool. If the hope is bigger than the fear, it behooves the prudent person who has the leisure and can continue [to play] to take the chance. Let us now leave aside the consideration of what can increase or decrease a person’s disposition to play; let us rather observe those who have already gambled or use to do it often. Given that games are frequent transactions, which allow whoever so wants and whenever he so wants to find easily a buyer for his expectation as if in an auction sale, then one can reason as follows: The hope [for a thing] is as big as the capacity (potestas) to obtain the thing. The capacity to obtain a thing in every outcome is the claim (jus) to the whole thing. The capacity to obtain a thing in a certain outcome is to the capacity to obtain the thing in every outcome as the possibility of that one outcome is to the possibility of all outcomes. If the outcomes are equally easy or equally possible, the capacity to obtain the thing in a single outcome is to the capacity of obtaining it in every outcome as unity is to the number of outcomes. If the outcomes are equally easy, the capacity to obtain the thing in a single outcome is to the whole claim (since the whole claim and the capacity to obtain the thing in every outcome are one and the same thing) as unity is to the number of outcomes. If the events are equally easy, the capacity to obtain the thing in a single outcome is the proportional part (portio aliquota) of the claim to the thing, i.e., it amounts to the estimated value of the thing [divided] by the number of outcomes. This can be understood by imagining that I become the heir of the players. Since everyone’s claim is the same, it follows that I will gain as much with the death of one as with that of another, and that I will receive the whole thing with the death of all of them; hence, I receive with each player’s death a man’s portion. Therefore, since it is demonstrated that we can be considered as having as much in credit as is the probability of winning,5 and we can be considered as lacking [in credit] as much as is the probability of losing6 (in fact, this is what I recall Roberval* doubtedi), we shall easily solve everything else as follows: 5 6

Erased by Leibniz: “we have as much claim as the probability of gaining”. What the text literally says here is “as distant of the thing as is the probability of losing”.

110

Chapter 13 Theorems

(1) If the several outcomes are equally easy and I [can] win only in one of them and in none of the others, then my hope will be worth the proportional part (pars aliquota) of the [whole] thing, i.e., the part corresponding to dividing it by the number of outcomes. Let n be the number of outcomes and R the thing; the hope will be

R n

,

which is precisely what we have shown a little before, namely that when the outcomes are equally easy the capacity of winning in a single outcome is that portion of the total estimated value obtained by dividing it by the number of outcomes. (2) If the several outcomes are equally easy and I [can] win in some of them while losing in others, then the hope’s estimated value will be that share of the thing that is in the same proportion to the whole thing as the number of favorable outcomes is to the total number of outcomes. That is,

s f f = or s = R. R n n

The proof is obvious: if there are several

favorable, equal outcomes, the estimated value of the hope is a multiple of that which corresponds in the case of only one favorable outcome, for it merely is repeated a few times.7 One should notice that, when I have said up to now ‘if there are several equally easy outcomes’ I meant that these several outcomes are all the possible outcomes.8 If all outcomes are equally easy and to each of them a certain reward (res), to be received for that outcome, is assigned, the hope will be the proportional part of the sum of these rewards relative to the number of outcomes. s=

A  B  Cetc n

; for example,

A  B  Cetc 3

. The demonstration relies on

theorem (1), since I can earn A in a single outcome and not in others; hence the estimated value of the hope of receiving A is so on. Therefore, the estimated value of the total hope is

7

A B , of B, n n A  Betc . n

, and

Leibniz here is simply referring to the first theorem, which is perhaps why he uses an elliptical phrase (“if there are several equal outcomes”) we have completed, rather than fully specifying: “if the several outcomes are equally easy and only one of them is favorable”. 8 The numbering of theorems stops here.

13. Estimating the Uncertain

111

The reasoning concerning the fear to lose and the hope to win is the same, for what is for me a fear to lose is for the others a hope to win. If hope and fear concur in appraisable things having a price or common measure, then the final hope or fear will be [respectively] their difference with the initial hope and fear.j Granted this, if the initial hope is larger than the initial fear, then the final hope will be the excess of hope over fear, and the final fear will be less than zero. And conversely, if the initial fear is larger, then the final fear will be the excess of fear over hope, and the final hope will be less than zero.k If some of all the possible outcomes yield the reward A, some others reward B, and the remaining ones reward C, then the total hope is the aggregate of the individual rewards each multiplied by the number of outcomes that yield them, divided by the total number of possible outcomes. Thus, if the number of possible outcomes yielding A is Į, the number of possible outcomes yielding B is ȕ, the number of possible outcomes yielding C is Ȗ, and the number of all outcomes is n, then the hope will be s =

DA  EB  JC n

. The demonstration of this is evident, for the same

occurs if we assume that the totality of events amounts to Į + ȕ + Ȗ. For instance, given the rewards A, M, N, B, P, Q, C, R, S, the hope will be s = A M  N  B  PQC  R S n

.

Let us assume now that A, M, and N are equivalent, i.e., A = M = N, and that the number of repetitions of A is Į and that ĮA = A + M + N; likewise, if B = P = Q and the number of repetitions of B is ȕ, then B + P + Q = ȕB; and if C = R = S and the number of repetitions of C is Ȗ; therefore, s =

D A  E B  JC n

. QED

If the number of possible outcomes is larger than that of the cases in which some reward is assigned to an outcome, still the same we just said will have to be said too, and it is necessary that Į + ȕ + Ȗ = n . For the same is the case if to the remaining outcomes to which nothing is assigned we assign 0 – which can, indifferently, be written or erased. For instance, assuming that n = Į + ȕ + Ȗ + į, s = the same as s =

DA  EB  JC n

DA  E B  JC  G 0 n

, which is

.

If two players play under the condition that whoever wins three times takes all and I have won twice, what is my expectation to take all, i.e., what is the estimated value of my hope? It is obvious that if my adversary also wins once,l we will be in the same position. Let us assume in general that it

112

Chapter 13

is necessary that the game be finished in six useful rounds – i.e., rounds in which one of us wins.m Further, let us assume that the game’s rationale requires that in each round one of us wins or loses. At the beginning, before any of us wins, we are in the same position. After I win a round, it is evident that the other must also win once in order to return to the situation of equality. However, he has only five rounds [left], so that he is in more danger than if he had more rounds to play. If he wins next, the situation will return to the state of equality. At this point, the game reaches a state equivalent to what would have happened in case we had, from the beginning, determined that he who wins the first two rounds wins the game. All this must be understood as referring to games allowing for draws – which contrast with games where three consecutive rounds, with no interrupting victory by the adversary, must be won. But this is not relevant here. It is sufficient that everything returns to the state of equality. So, in the next round either the situation returns to equality or the other player needs two rounds to reestablish equality. Let us assume that I won the second round too. We will then be in a state in which either I win or the situation returns to the preceding state.n At this point, while my hope is to win the whole game, my adversary’s hope is to return to the preceding state, where he needed to win one round to reach equality and I two to obtain victory – i.e., the state in which he needs three rounds and I two for reaching victory. If the initial agreement were that whoever first wins two rounds wins the game, if I win one round, it is evident that with this victory I would bring about that our hope in the second round become different: with the same justification that I expect victory he expects the return to equality, i.e., with the same justification I have for hoping for the whole, he hopes for half of it. Thus, the estimated value of my hope is double that of his. Consequently, I am entitled to two thirds and he to one third – although he needs three favorable rounds to win, while I need only one. In fact, the number of rounds cannot be estimated, for the value of each of them is heterogeneous, i.e., unequal. There is, however, a difficulty in what I just said, namely, that I hope for the whole with the same right as he hopes for half of it. Indeed, it does not seem that the issue is what I would hope to obtain, but rather what profit I would hope to make, for both of us already have something, albeit unequal: let us say that I have y and he, x. Let the whole reward be R = y + x. My hope for profit will be R – y, i.e., R less what I already have, i.e., y + x – y, i.e., x. Thus, I hope for a profit of x and the adversary hopes for a profit of R 2

– x, i.e.,

R 2

less what he already has, i.e.,

yx 2 yx 2

– x, i.e.,

y x 2

.

. Nevertheless, the profit he Thus, my hope for profit is x and his is and I can make in this game must be the same, once we deduct that in which

13. Estimating the Uncertain we differ. Therefore, x = R – x; hence R = 4x and x

113

yx 2 R = 4

and 2x = y – x and 3x = y. Furthermore, y = . From this calculation something other than

above would result, namely that the hope must be estimated by the number of rounds needed for victory – assuming, of course, that each player has, in addition to that to what he already has a claim, the same claim to make a new profit in the next round, i.e., that the profit each player makes in the second round is the same. But this is not yet certain. What is certain is that at the outset each one has the same hope of profit; afterwards, it can happen that the one who wins has also more hope to make a new profit than the other. However, there may be a mistake in the calculation, so let us begin anew: when I won the first round, I thereby already earned something, which we will call y; and that for which we will have to continue to gamble, with equal right, is now R – y. Obviously, the calculation should be made in such a way that an advance payment of my earlier profit was made to me, and then the remainder is contended for in the second round; so that the same result would be reached as if no advance payment had been made but all had been continued according to the rules of the game. Since the pool (sors) is R – y, my claim to the remainder will be R – R y 2

. And if I win, I will win the whole of R – y, which, added to the y I

already have, yields R. But from this we do not learn anything. At the beginning I have

R 2

; my first victory is worth for me y; therefore,

R – z; z is the value of the first loss of the adversary, who 2 R R R therefore has + y; since – z + + y = R, z = y.o Hence, after the first 2 2 2 R R + y and the loser has – y. If I win in the second round the winner has 2 2 R round, I get v . But then I get the whole. Therefore, + y + v = R, i.e., 2 R y+v= and the adv ersary receiv es nothing, for he has in fact 2 R R – y – v, but – y – v = 0. If in the second round I am defeated, I lose x, 2 2 R i.e., I receive –x, whereas my adversary gets x. I have, thus, + y – x, the 2 R adversary has – y + x, and we are back to a draw, each of us receiving 2

I have now

114

Chapter 13

only half the claim to the whole pool R. Therefore, we receive each x or

R 2

–y+x=

R 2

R 2

+y–

; hence y – x = 0 or y = x.

I assume that there are two equally easy outcomes, the one that I lose x or y, the other that I make the profit v. Hence my expectation to earn what I don’t have so far is

By rv 2

, that is, half the difference between v and y. But

this hope is precisely the profit I made by winning in the first round, for I then won nothing but the hope of having an easier win than my adversary in By rv 2

the second round; hence

= y.9 Therefore, 2y =

By rv 2

. It follows that

B is – and r is +. Otherwise we would have y = – v, so that v – y = 2y, i.e., v = 3y; yet we had above y + v =

R 2

, hence 4y =

R 2

, and thus y = R . 8

R 2

Whence it would follow that he who won the first round and has have

R 2

R 8

+

, i.e.,

5R 8

+ y will

.10

However, if from the outset we consider that with the first victory I earn the expectation either of

1 2

in case I am beaten in the second round or of 1 in

case I win, the value of the expectation obtained with the first victory will be 1 1 2 2

or

3 . 4

This is a priori discrepant. It should therefore be examined very carefully whether one should ask about the whole or about the profit and loss. At the beginning I have an equal hope either of winning it all or of losing it all through the game’s outcome; hence at first I have

R0 2

. Thanks to my

victory in the first round I acquired something – let us call it y; therefore, I acquired the hope either of winning the whole, i.e., (since I have already half of it or

R 2

, and y) of making a profit of

hope is y itself; hence y = 9

R yy 2 2

R 2

– y, or else of losing y; but that

, i.e., 2y =

R 2

– 2y, i.e., y =

R 8

.

The v the Academy edition has in the denominator, instead of 2, is obviously wrong, as showed by what follows. 4R 5R 10 Not + as the Academy edition has it. 8 8

13. Estimating the Uncertain

115

But it is clear that one could reply to this reasoning by arguing that y cannot be the hope towards itself and has to be defined through something else. Indeed, it is said that I acquired the hope to win the complement of the hope for

R 2

with the fear of losing that same hope; but

it is not clear that this hope must be defined in this reflexive way.p If we imagine that the players have no property other than the given hopes [defined by the game] and that the winner of the first round has the hope 1 , 2

of 1 or

whereas the loser of the first round has the expectation of

1 2

or

0, it is evident that the former’s hope is 3 and that of the latter 1 . This is 4

4

absolutely true and must be here applied, for it has been assumed that no one of the players has anything more than these hopes, and if someone wanted to give him alternative hopes, as defined above, he couldn’t do better than put the players in the situation described. If we estimate the hope in the above suggested reflexive manner, let us see what follows in case we estimate also the adversary’s hope. He has the hope either of gaining y or of losing v, which is 3y. But y = it follows that his expectation will be

yv 2

, i.e., –y or –

R 8

R 8

and v =

3R 8

;

. In fact, he made

a profit of –y, i.e., he lost y. But this is irrelevant; it suffices that we have shown that the totality of the expectation must be estimated. Let us now consider the case of having to win in three rounds and represent the estimated value of the first victory by y, of the second by (y), and of the third by ((y)). In the first round one will obtain y, i.e., R 4

i.e., y = y  (( y )) 2

+

( y) 2

or (y),

;q in the second round one will obtain y or ((y)), i.e., (y) =

; therefore, y = 2(y) – ((y)) =

4((y)).11 [Thus], (y) = y + (((y))) +

R 2

((( y )))  ((((( y ))))) 2

y  (( y )) 2

R 4

+

( y) 2

. It follows that 6(y) = R +

, ((y)) = (y) +

( y )  ((( y ))) 2

, ((((y)))) =

. One will always be able to find the value of the

intermediate terms through the first and the last. Well considered, it is easier to calculate the above arithmetical progression, whose nature is that always half the sum of two [terms] is equal to the intermediate [term]. Thus, one must establish an arithmetical R , y, (y), ((y)), (((y))), … R, whose 2 11 The “i.e., y” (seu y) the text has here is surely a mistake.

progression

intermediate terms are the

116

Chapter 13

numbers of rounds less one, or one more than the number of rounds. The difference between R 2

R 2

and y is calculated by dividing the difference between

and R, i.e., between the first and the last term, which is

R 2

divided by the

12

number of intermediate terms: since in the present case this number is 5, the difference between the first term

R 2

and the second, y, is

R 10

.

a

In addition to the mathematical analysis of games, Leibniz was interested in other aspects of games. For example, he considered them an important didactic tool and pointed out a connection between ludic activity and inventiveness: on the one hand, in creating games the mind gives free rein to the imagination; on the other, playing frees the mind of burdens and constraints that consume mental energy and limit creativity (To Remond; GP III 667). See also Couturat (1901: 582-583). b Unless all ‘reasons’ for an action, including also affects (as Leibniz points out to Clarke; GP VII 392), were included in the definition – which would render rather difficult to use it for calculations. c Such as the ‘division problem’, for which Pascal was unable to provide a correct solution. This problem, which is relevant to the juridical problem of division of an heritage between several heirs, consists in finding the ‘just’ way of dividing the pool between the two players in a game that is interrupted before any of them has accumulated the number of rounds won that entitles him to get the whole pool – ‘just’ meaning proportional to the entitlement each has by virtue of the victories obtained until the interruption. d In fact, the attempt, before the text breaks off, of generalizing the solution of the last problem in terms of the not much more sophisticated theory of arithmetical progression proves to be unnecessary and misleading. e Proposition 19 of Specimen demonstrationum politicarum pro eligendo rege polonorum: since there are more unworthy than worthy candidates for the job of king of Poland, and if we draw lots, it is more probable that they will pick up one of the many than one of the few, it will be more probable that an unworthy candidate will be elected rather than a worthy one. Hence the election by drawing lots is dangerous and must be rejected (A IV 1 18). See also Chapter 2, note k. f E.g., Parmentier (1993). g Two translations with commentaries of this text are available: Parmentier (1995: 147-177) and De Melo and Cussens (2004). h As pointed out by Parmentier (1995: 161), ‘possibility’ here cannot mean ‘metaphysically possible’, in the usual leibnizian sense. As a metaphysical and logical modality, possibility is bivalent, i.e., does not admit of degrees. What Leibniz has in mind here are possibles that are, so to speak, closer to reality than others in the sense that they are easier to realize or more feasible. A similar notion is used by him in “What is an idea” (1677), where he distinguishes two senses of ‘idea’ – as the ‘remote’ capacity of thinking of a thing or as the 12

Leibniz writes “in the table” (in tabula), probably thinking of a table he did not actually draw.

13. Estimating the Uncertain

117

‘proximate’ capacity of thinking of the thing; for the latter he uses the term ‘facility’ (GP VII 263). The term ‘easy’ (facilis) appears many times in the present text, albeit always in connection with ‘the same’, in order to stress the parity of feasibility of the outcomes. Both Leibniz’s ontology and his epistemology need gradualistic modalities, and the statement “probability is the degree of possibility” establishes in fact the link between the two, a link he expresses more explicitly by means of the world ‘easy’ elsewhere: “Easy is that which is very possible, i.e., that which has few requisites; facility is in things, probability in the mind” (A VI 2 500). See Dascal (1978: 82-85). i This remark indicates that Leibniz discussed with Roberval issues in the theory of probabilities, probably in connection with Pascal’s work on this subject. j Leibniz is here simply ‘defining’ the final hope (sf) or fear (mf) as consisting of the initial hope (si) or fear (mi) plus a certain (positive or negative) delta (įs or įm). k This paragraph compares the differences between hope and fear in the initial and final states of a game. According to Leibniz, there is a certain invariance between these states. Yet, what remains invariant in the hope-fear relationship is not the magnitude of the difference between them, but rather, besides its proportion (see the definition of ‘just game’), its direction or sign: if one begins to play with more hope than fear (or vice-versa), then by the end of the game – whatever its results – one will still have more hope than fear (or vice-versa). This is in fact a seemingly paradoxical – yet consonant with the experience of many players – phenomenological ‘law’. l And consequently, since no one has as yet taken it all, the situation at this point is that he and myself have won once each. m Five ‘useful’ rounds are sufficient to decide a game that requires three wins by the winner. Why the extra round? n The ‘preceding state’ is that discussed in the preceding paragraph, i.e., where I had won one round and the adversary none. o In this paragraph, up to this point , the variables z and y must be understood as having negative values. Henceforth, z is no longer used and y, as well as v and x, have a positive value. p Why not? There are mental states that are properly defined in a self-referential way, such as intentions, for example. See Grice (1989: Chapters 5 and 6), Searle (1983), Schiffer (1988). q That is, y amounts to half the total hope possible in round 2. This total is the sum of the hope in each of the two alternatives, which are either losing and returning to the previous, initial R state (where the hope of both players is equal, ) or winning and thus obtaining (y). 2 ( y) R R Thus, y is the half of + (y), that is, + . 2 4 2

Chapter 14 TOWARDS A NUMERICAL UNIVERSAL LANGUAGE1

Along with other texts of the years 1678-1680, Leibniz pursues here his endeavor to outline one of the main tools of his mega-project of a ‘general science’ – the idea of a universal language. In this respect, this text provides further prefatory material (supporting some of the claims made, for example, in Chapters 21, 28 and 29) for the mega-project). Always with an eye to the practical utility of his inventions (in another text of this period he stresses the use of the general science as a ‘guide to happiness’ – A VI 4 136-139), here he envisages the use of this numerical version of the universal language, the “easiest of all languages”, by missionaries, in order to spread the true religion without spreading, at the same time, the divisions within Christianity. Numbers are particularly suitable candidates for creating this language for a number of reasons. As against the Pythagorean and hermetic traditions, renewed by the cabbala popular in his time, which emphasize the “mysteries concealed in numbers”, Leibniz rather points out the intelligibility of numbers as compared to any other symbols. Besides, numbers are used everywhere by virtually everyone. Furthermore, arithmetic displays a rigorous and clear system of rules that govern the permissible combinations of symbols and the operations one performs with them. Its systematic character may have suggested to Leibniz that the search for ‘characteristic’ numbers for concepts may be the key to solving the hard problem of completing the analysis of concepts up to reaching the ultimate ‘alphabet of human thoughts’ (see A VI 4 270-274 and Chapter 28). Since he gives no examples of characteristic numbers here, it is hard to know precisely what he has in mind when claiming that each thing has a characteristic number that fits it by virtue of a ‘true reason’. In the context of this and other contemporary texts, he may mean by this a numerical representation (e.g., in terms of a product of primes) corresponding to the full analysis of the concept of the thing in question in terms of the primitive 1

The text here translated is the revised copy of the original from 1678-1679. It is also in Leibniz’s handwriting, and is more carefully composed, containing some brief additions that help to understand the arguments.

119 M. Dascal (ed.), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. The Art of Controversies, 119–127. © 2006 Springer.

120

Chapter 14 concepts of the ‘alphabet of human thoughts’. Bu he may also be suggesting a deeper, metaphysical way, in which the proper arithmetical representation corresponds to the basic structure of a thing as a combination of the two ultimate components of all things – unity or God and nothingness. Indeed, he tended to associate with the ‘dyadic’ (binary) arithmetic he developed around 1679 metaphysical significance.a The claim that the discovery of characteristic numbers would contribute to demonstrate to everybody what the true religion is – thus settling religious controversies – provides some support for this hypothesis.b Naturally, the arithmetic model also suggests the idea of an easy way of ‘calculating’ the solution for all controversies. This motive remains, however, somewhat minor in a text like the present one, where he speaks also of probabilities, of weighing rather than counting reasons, and of the dangers of the linguistic manipulation of emotions – all of them alluded to here as rational means of rebutting Hobbes’s ‘importune’ questioning of the objectivity of reason and truth, a position to which Leibniz opposes his firm belief in the existence and accessibility of an unquestionable ‘recta ratio’, conceived as a ‘statics of the universe’ and well captured by the arithmetic model.

Date: 1679? Edition: A VI 4 A 263-270; GP VII 184-189 Language: Latin

Characteristic Numbers for a Universal Language An old saying affirms that God made all things according to weight, measure and number. Nevertheless, there are things that cannot be weighed, such as those lacking force and power; there are also things lacking parts, which thus admit of no measure. However, there is nothing which does not submit to number. Therefore, numbers are as if a metaphysical figure and arithmetic is something akin to the statics of the universe,c by which the degrees of things are examined. Ever since Pythagoras’s time, men have believed that enormous mysteries lie concealed within numbers. It is probable that it was Pythagoras who brought this opinion from the Orient to Greece, as has occurred with many other things. However, because the true key to the mystery is ignored, the most scrupulous of men have fallen for the futile and superstitious: from that arose a certain vulgar cabbala, far removed from the true one, as well as many absurdities under the false name of magic, which fill the books. In the meanwhile, the opinion has remained ingrained among men that it was possible to find wonderful things with numbers and characters and a certain language which some call Adamic and which Jakob Böhme calls the language of nature.d And yet, I do not know if anyone among mortals has clearly discerned to this day the true reason why each thing may be assigned its own

14. Towards a Numerical Universal Language

121

characteristic number. Thus, there have been very learned men who confessed not to understand what I expounded when I occasionally broached a topic of this nature in an interview with them. Moreover, although recently certain eminent men envisaged a certain Universal Language or Characteristic by means of which notions and all things would be elegantly ordered, and with the help of which different nations could communicate their thoughts and anyone could read what another wrote in his own language, still, nobody has addressed the language or Characteristic wherein the arts of inventing and judging are contained – that is to say, the language whose signs or characters do the same service as Arithmetical signs do vis-à-vis numbers and Algebraic signs vis-à-vis magnitudes taken in the abstract.e Nevertheless, it seems that when God gave these two sciences to the human race he wished to bring to our attention that a much larger mystery is hidden within our understanding, the mere shadows of which would be these two sciences. It is a fact, by what fate I know not, that I, when still a boy, hit upon this sort of thoughts, which, as usual with early inclinations, later remain deeply engraved in one’s mind. Two things have been extraordinarily useful to me (although they are usually ambiguous and harmful to many): first, that I was almost self-taught, and secondly that I have sought out new things in every science as soon as I came in contact with it, even before having understood enough of the trivial things. However, in so doing I have gained two things: first, I have not filled my spirit with vain things that ought to be unlearned, things which were accepted more due to the authority of those who teach them than on the basis of their arguments; secondly, I have not rested until I had examined the entrails and roots of each doctrine and reached the principles themselves, whence I would be able to discover by my own effort all those things with which I busied myself. Thus, once I had moved from my readings of historical narratives (which gave me great pleasure ever since my childhood days) and from the cultivation of style (which I exercised in a fluent prose written with such ease that my masters were afraid lest I remained bound to these pleasures) to logic and philosophy, as soon as I began to have some understanding in these matters, my God, what wild dreams born from these papers I concocted in my brain! I would present them to my masters who would remain astonished. Among other things, sometimes I raised doubts concerning the categories (praedicamenta). For, I would say, just as there are categories or classes of simple notions, so there should be a new kind of category, within which the propositions (or the complex terms) themselves would be arranged in a natural order. Evidently, at that time I was not acquainted with proofs even in my dreams and I did not know that this very thing I desired is what geometers did by arranging propositions in such an

122

Chapter 14

order that one is proven from the other. Therefore, my doubt was certainly vain; but, since my masters would not appease it, I pursued the novelty of that thought, trying to establish the categories of complex terms or propositions. By devoting myself to this task with all my strength, I necessarily reached the admirable idea that one could devise a certain alphabet of human thoughts such that by combining the letters of this alphabet and the words thus formed one could discover and judge all matters pertaining to reason. Once I became aware of this, I was extraordinarily exultant, doubtless with an infantile joy, as I did not yet understand the magnitude of this discovery. Later, however, the more my knowledge advanced, the more my decision to proceed with such an important undertaking was confirmed. Nevertheless, other studies distracted me. When at age twenty I devoted my time to academic work, I wrote a treatise called De arte combinatoria, which was published in 1666 as a small book, in which I publicly presented this admirable discovery. Yet, this is a treatise such as might be written by a young man who recently graduated from school and as yet is not imbued with the real sciences (for in those places not even mathematics was carefully cultivated,2 and had I ended my childhood in Paris, perhaps I would have made [then] a more mature contribution to these sciences), although I do not regret having written this treatise for two reasons: first, because it greatly pleased many very ingenious men, and secondly, because on that occasion the world was given some notice of my discovery, even though now I don’t think I have been the first to conceive such ideas. In fact, I have often wondered why no mortal, as far as the documented memory of men extends, has realized the importance of the thing. Reflections of this kind should be among the first to come to mind to those who reason in an orderly way. This is what happened to me: I was dealing with logic while still a child, I had not yet touched on the moral, mathematical or physical [questions]; nevertheless, I reached that idea for the simple reason that I always looked for the first principles. I believe the true reason for that lack of attention lies, from the outset, in the fact that principles are mostly arid and unpleasant, so that, once they are slightly tasted, they are left aside. However, I find it extremely surprising that three men – Aristotle, Joachim Jungius* and René Descartes – did not go into a matter of such importance. Aristotle examined with great perspicuity the inside of notions in his Organon and his Metaphysics. Joachim Jungius from Lübeck is a man known by few, even within Germany; but so great was his judgment and so obvious his mental ability that I know not whether the renewal of the sciences could have been more rightfully expected from any mortal, 2

A sarcastic allusion to the little esteem Leibniz had for his hometown’s university.

14. Towards a Numerical Universal Language

123

Descartes not excluded, had this man been known or supported. But he already was an old man when Descartes was beginning to flourish, so that one can but regret that they had no knowledge of each other. As for Descartes, this is not the appropriate place to praise a man who by his sheer greatness of spirit has almost exceeded praise itself. And the truth is that he followed a path among ideas which is truthful and straight and leads up to here. However, because he was excessively concerned with gaining approval, it seems that he violently cut off the thread of his investigation and, satisfied, he published his metaphysical meditations and examples of his geometrical work, publications with which he intended to draw men’s attention towards himself. As for the rest, he decided to carefully study the nature of bodies on medicine’s behalf. Having thus correctly proceeded, had he also concluded the task (to order the ideas in the mind), thence a greater light than could be believed would surely have been shed upon the experiments themselves. There is no other reason to explain why he did not apply his mind to this, except that he did not sufficiently understand the meaning (ratio) and power (vis) of the task. For, had he seen the mode of building a rational and arithmetical philosophy as clearly and incontestably [as I do], it is plausible that he would have followed another way for the creation of his sect (for which he so longed). In fact, the sect to be followed in this kind of philosophizing will, by the nature of things, exert from its very inception a mathematic-wise (geometrico ritu) power over reason, which will not perish nor grow weak before the disappearance of the sciences among humans on account of some barbarian invasion.f The reason I did not give up pursuing these reflections, despite being distracted by so many different things, is the fact that I have seen its full magnitude and have discovered an extraordinarily easy way to achieve it. This is what I ultimately discovered with my most intense reflections. Now, nothing else is needed except to achieve that Characteristic in which I am working (which must be sufficient for the Grammar of such an admirable language and for a dictionary with most of the most frequent terms) or, what is equivalent, to provide the characteristic numbers of the ideas of all the most useful things. I contend that nothing else is needed but to establish a philosophical and mathematical course (as they call it) with a new method which I can prescribe and which contains nothing that is more difficult than other courses, nor farther from common usage and comprehension, nor stranger in its notation.g It would not require much more work than what is required for [preparing] some courses or some encyclopedias – as they are called. I think some chosen men can conclude this work within five years, but already within two years they will be able to produce, by means of an irrefragable calculus, the doctrines most often used in life, namely morals and metaphysics.h

124

Chapter 14

Once the characteristic numbers of most notions are formed, humankind will have a new type of instrument which will enlarge the mind’s power to a far greater degree than the eyes’ power was increased by optical lenses, an instrument as superior to microscopes and telescopes as reason is superior to sight. No magnetic needle ever offered greater comfort to seamen than this Little Dipper (cynosura) shall offer those traversing a sea of experiences. Whatever other consequences will ensue from this depends upon fate, except that they must be great and good. With respect to all other qualities, men can become worse; only straight reason cannot be at all if it is not good. Who would doubt that reason will be straight everywhere provided it remains as clear and certain as it has been so far in arithmetic? Thanks to this, that importune objection with which nowadays people harass each other and which deviates many from their desire to reason can be dispelled – namely, when somebody reasons not so much by examining the argument but by responding with the general question: Whence do you know that your reason is straighter than mine? What is your criterion of truth?i Moreover, if one calls attention to one’s arguments, the audience will lack the patience to examine them. Indeed, most of the time it is necessary to scrutinize many things, and this demands an effort of many weeks of him who tries to follow rigorously the extant laws of reasoning.j Hence, after many skirmishes, emotion often triumphs over reason and controversies are rather ended more by cutting the Gordian knot than by untying it. This happens mainly in deliberations pertaining to life, where undoubtedly something has to be decided, but few are able to examine the pros and cons (which often are, both, many) as if on the scales of a balance. As a result, either each one is led to represent one circumstance or another more intensely due to his specific mind-inclination, or each one learns to depict and adorn things more eloquently and efficiently, or else each is able to enthrall the others’ minds, especially if he manipulates their emotions astutely.k Hardly anyone in a deliberation is able to take into account the complete table of incomes and expenses, i.e., not only to count but also to ponder correctly the pros and cons. Therefore, two disputing persons seem to me to resemble two merchants who have long been in each other’s debt on many counts, but who never wanted to perform an examination [of their accounts] by means of a general balance.l Instead, each keeps exaggerating in a different way his respective credits and the truth and magnitude of his respective commitments (nominum) (i.e., of their debts): obviously they will never put an end to their contest. We should not wonder that this has happened so far in many controversies where the issue is not transparent (that is, subject to numbers).m Our characteristic, however, will subject everything to numbers and, in order to let reasons be pondered too, it will provide a sort of statics. n Even

14. Towards a Numerical Universal Language

125

probabilities are subject to reckoning and proof, since it is always possible to estimate, from the given circumstances (ex datis), what will more probably happen. Finally, he who is persuaded with certainty of the truth of religion and [consequently] embraces the others with such charity as to desire humankind’s conversion to the way of truth, will doubtless admit, as far as he understands these things, that there is nothing more efficient than this invention for propagating faith, except the miracles and saintliness of a certain apostolic man or the victories of a great monarch. Therefore, wherever this language – the easiest among languageso – is allowed to be introduced by missionaries, the true religion, which is in perfect agreement with reason, will be easily established and no impostor’s apostasy will have to be feared in the future, just as men do not rapidly turn away from arithmetic or geometry once they have learned them. Thus, I repeat what I have often said: a man who is neither a prophet nor a prince could never undertake anything more appropriate for the good of humankind and even more for divine glory. But we must go beyond words. For, due to the admirable connection of things it is very difficult to assign characteristic numbers to notions of separate things. For that purpose, if I am not mistaken, I have found an elegant artifice through which one can show how to verify (comprobare) reasonings through numbers. I first imagine that those admirable characteristic numbers are already given; then, and once a general property of theirs is observed, I provisionally adopt those numbers that conform to this property; next, employing these numbers, I immediately prove with admirable reason all the logical rules by means of numbers; next, I show how it is possible to know whether certain argumentations are correct in form; in case the arguments are correct or conclusive also materially, it will finally be possible to establish how the true characteristic numbers of things will be obtained without any effort by the mind nor any danger of error. a

See, for example, De organo sive Arte Magna cogitandi (A VI 4 156-160), where he claims that binary arithmetic illustrates the principle that nature “operates in the simplest way”, that is, “yields the maximum of effects through minimal means”; he cautiously stresses that it is beyond human capacity to understand how the series of things is generated from the combination of “the pure being and nothingness”, but suggests that the way in which “all numbers can be marvelously expressed by one and zero” is a sure indicator of how that mystery too is based on rational order. b Since 1701, when he realized with the help of Father Bouvet, that his binary arithmetic had an ancient Chinese counterpart (cf. Explication de l’arithmetique binaire, qui se sert des seuls caractères 0 et 1, avec des remarques sur son utilité , et sur ce qu’elle donne le sens des anciennes figures chinoises de Fohi; GM VII 223-227; Discours sur la théologie des chinois; published with the title Lettre de M. G. G. de Leibniz sur la philosophie chinoise à M. de Remond; D IV 1 169-211), this ‘metaphysico-theological’ aspect of the characteristic was certainly reinforced

126 c

Chapter 14

In his Essay de Dynamique (1693), Leibniz distinguishes between ‘statics’, which consists in an abstract, geometrical conception of movement, and ‘dynamics’, which explains movement in terms of force (GM VI 218). See also note n. d Natur-Sprache, in German in the original. J. Böhme, Mysterium Magnum, Amsterdam, 1640, chapters 35, 60. e Leibniz criticizes here and elsewhere projects of ‘universal languages’ such as those of Dalgarno (1661) and Wilkins (1668) for focusing mainly on their communicative function and overlooking their role as a tool of thinking – provided the appropriate criteria for the choice of their signs are followed (cf. Dascal 1978; Pombo 1987). These criteria are to be gathered from arithmetic or algebraic ‘signs’ (nota) in the context of the operations performed with them. These signs, like the ‘particles’ in natural language are considered by him of particular importance in a Characteristic that serves primarily as an instrument of thought and not of communication, since they correspond to the ‘operations of the mind’ (NE 3.7.6; A VI 6 333; see Dascal 1998a). f Leibniz’s renaissance-influenced view of history holds that progress is a characteristic of the course of history, unless it is interrupted by the intervention of ‘barbaric’ forces, as it happened in the Middle Ages (cf. his correspondence with J. Thomasius, especially A II 1 25-26). Though he does not discard the possibility that ‘barbarian’ military men who hate science might, even in his own time, seize power and prevent the progress of knowledge, he is more afraid in this regard of the proliferation of irresponsible and frivolous books (A VI 4 699-700). g Concerning binary arithmetic, however, Leibniz “does not recommend … to introduce it instead of the ordinary decimal practice” which is briefer and with which people are accustomed. This in spite of the fact that the former “compensates for its length by being the most fundamental for science” and yields useful discoveries “whose reason lies in the fact that, by reducing numbers to the simplest principles, i.e., 0 and 1, a wonderful harmony appears everywhere” (GM VII 225). h Below, Leibniz once more refers to those matters that ‘pertain to life’, stressing how they require a ‘weighing’ paradigm and how emotions intervene powerfully in deliberations concerning such questions. Here, he refers not only to ethics, but also – and rather surprisingly – metaphysically, to this kind of life-related concerns. This can be explained if one recalls that in the De affectibus, also of 1679, Leibniz – as against Descartes who connects the emotions to physics – seeks to connect them to metaphysics. Defined as the state of the mind in so far as it determines itself toward one or another series of thoughts, the affect has a primary role as mediator in “the admirable passage from power to act” (A VI 4 1432). i See Chapter 2, paragraphs 53-54, and the references in note n of that Chapter. j See Chapter 38, where Leibniz stresses how time-consuming reasoning in strict logical form is. k See Chapter 16F, where ‘astute manipulations’ are, at least in some cases, justified. l For the image of the balance, see Chapters 2, 5, 38, and others. m We have translated liquid by ‘transparent’. Yet, the force of Leibniz’s metaphor might be better rendered by keeping the financial meaning of ‘liquidity’, which matches that of ‘numerary’, both suggesting that numbers are, like some sort of cash, the best embodiment of ultimate value. For other epistemologically relevant uses of the financial metaphor by Leibniz, see A VI 4 338 and Dascal (1987: Chapter 1 and the manuscript LH IV, VII, B, 3, 16r, reproduced in the frontispiece of the book). n Although acknowledging the importance of weighing reasons and stressing the insufficiency of merely computing them, Leibniz maintains that his characteristic is capable of handling

14. Towards a Numerical Universal Language

127

also the former task, if one adds to it the calculus of probabilities. This should be achieved, however, by what can be compared to a slight addition to, rather than to a major breach with standard – i.e., ‘static’ rather than ‘dynamic’ – Cartesian physics. See note c. o See, however, note g.

Chapter 15 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA AND THE METHOD OF DISCOVERY

This is one of the many texts Leibniz devoted throughout his life to his cherished project of a New Encyclopedia. Though he usually connects the encyclopedia with the ars inveniendi (e.g., in Chapter 22), here this connection is quite explicit and functions as the guiding principle of the project. A discovery-oriented Encyclopedia is useful, according to him, not only for scholarly purposes, but also “for life”; that is, it fulfills straightforwardly what he considers to be the aim of all scientific endeavors – increasing human happiness. Leibniz highlights this here by stressing that the encyclopedia must be structured so as to provide easy access to the ‘problems’ it permits to address and solve, for it is this orientation that makes it ‘useful to life’. It will be recalled that the notion of ‘problem’ plays a crucial role in the De Arte Combinatoria, and is conceived as a defining trait of the ‘synthetic method’. But unlike in the De Arte, where he attempts to formulate the problems in terms of their bare formal structure, so as to reveal how the combinatorial calculus can lead to their solution, here no such attempt is made, and the notion of ‘problem’ acquires a broader sense. Consequently, the encyclopedia’s contribution to the solution of problems is no longer viewed as purely combinatorial or formal, but rather as involving also heuristic aspects – akin to those discussed elsewhere by Leibniz (see Chapter 12). In consonance with this shift, although the text begins in a familiar more mathematico tone, it soon makes clear that Leibniz has not in mind the at the time customary Euclidean reading of the ‘mathematical model’ – which he criticizes. While he underlines the validity and usefulness of mathematical methods, he points out their insufficiency for accounting for nature – explicitly dissociating, thus, mathematical and natural intelligibility. Of particular interest is the distinction he introduces between a method that ‘compels’ the mind and a ‘softer’ mode of treating problems (blandior tractandi ratio), which is also able to persuade. This notion, introduced at the very heart of the text, becomes in fact the organizing principle of the ordering and selection of topics to be included in the New Encyclopedia, and justifies its complementary

129 M. Dascal (ed.), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. The Art of Controversies, 129–141. © 2006 Springer.

130

Chapter 15 nature: both the strictly demonstrative arts and the ‘softer’ arts figure here side

by side . Furthermore, the acknowledgment of the need for a blandior tractandi ratio explains also the fact that even in the more strictly more mathematico first part of the text, there are ‘softenings’ of the hard line, in clauses that demand the acknowledgment and use of ‘degrees’, for instance. The resulting classification and ordering of sciences here is rather unusual and differs from the many others proposed by Leibniz (e.g., NE 4.21; A VI 6 521527; De systemate scientiarum; A IV 6 195-197): it begins with what might be called the methodical sciences or arts, i.e., those that provide the tools for thinking and discovery (e.g., rational grammar, logic, mnemonics), followed by the object-oriented sciences (e.g., mathematics, physics, psychology, biology), and culminates with human-related sciences (moral science, geopolitics and theology) – the whole being subjected to the ultimate practical concern of all scientific knowledge, namely human happiness.

Date: 15 June 1679 Edition: A VI 4 A 338-349; C 30-41 Language: Latin

Project of a New Encyclopedia to be written following the method of invention I have often reflected on the fact that men could be much happier than they are if all they have in their power (in potestate) they would also have in cash (in numerato), so as to be able to use it when needed. However, we are not aware of our wealth, like a trader without bookkeeping or a library without an index. In the form we actually operate, we may perhaps be useful for our remote descendants, but we will not benefit from the fruit of our work. We endlessly dispute, we endlessly accumulate, we seldom reach a demonstration of anything or its consignation to a repertoire – in short, we hardly make use of our studies. If we go on like this, it is to be feared that an irremediable damage be caused, and barbarian times will return due to the tediousness of scholarship, in view of the fact that the huge multitude of objects and books destroys all hope for pleasure and hides solid and useful knowledge under a mass of useless things. How it was possible to reach such a bad situation – is also something about which I have meditated and consulted illustrious men, from whose conversation and writings I benefited. Since I finally think to have devised a remedy that is very compendious and efficient, that is within the reach of a few individuals, that could be realized with limited resources; furthermore, since I was lucky – through a divine gift – to discover some secrets (arcanum) of the art of invention, which the experience of remarkable examples has perfectly tested – examples which, once they will be presented

15. The Encyclopedia and the Method of Discovery

131

to the public, it will be apparent that I have perhaps presented them as non negligible guarantors of even greater hope. For all these reasons, I dare to invite all men in the republic, distinguishable for their culture and goodwill, to a joint enterprise. I wish that everything [in this enterprise] be undertaken according to these men’s opinion not less than my own; I do not assume a role other than that of exhorting them; and I will have in the future the same status as theirs, contributing the same amount of work as I expect from them. Thus, in order to proceed stepwise, I think that the proposals for the Society’s bylaws should be first communicated, so that these bylaws which seem to be the first thing to be established, as well as their execution, be put in motion.a I will now delineate the essence of my project or rather wish, which I submit to the judgment of the intelligent. Regarding the manner of executing it, I will speak a bit more conspicuously and will compare my view with that of those who will approve the idea of the institution, and we will promise each other mutual help. The essence of the project consists in the ordering of available human knowledge that is most important and useful for life in a way proper for discovery. Consider numerical progressions: once a table is made up to a certain point, usually it will emerge easily the way to continue the progression; for instance, if someone orders the square numbers (i.e. , those resulting from the multiplication of a number by itself) and exhibits them in a table, it will soon appear a very easy way to continue the table by simple addition, without any multiplication. Numbers

0

1

2

3

4

Squares

0

1

4

9

16 25 36 49 64 81 100

Differences 1 3 (or odd numbers)

5

7

5

9

6

7

8

11 13 15

17 19

If one adds to a square number, say, 49, the corresponding odd number in the table, i.e., 15, one obtains the following square number, i.e., 64, by addition, without having to multiply 8 by itself. The same occurs in larger numbers, where multiplication is more difficult – whence the economy achieved by employing addition is very useful. Similarly, once the discoveries in any field are correctly ordered in a table, the way of continuing these discoveries will appear, i.e. , the mode of discovering new things will be much easier than if one would try to discover them one by one and as if beside its own series.

132

Chapter 15

Since things, when they are presented nude and in their simplicity, divested of all superfluities, are most perspicuous and appear as if in a table, it follows that the present encyclopedia should be written mathematically (more mathematico) by propositions accurately and concisely expressed – to which, however, it will be permitted to add explanatory comments, where more freedom and space will be available. For it is certain that not only mathematics, but all other disciplines can be distinctly treated through some theses or enunciations (enuntiatio). As far as possible, one should look for propositions that are for the most part true (plerumque verae), for which it is possible to distinguish degrees; in case this can be done, the universal ones should come first, and among them to be preferred are those that are reciprocal with respect to their subject. The latter in fact are most useful in analysis, whereas those that are universal but not reciprocal practically only occur in synthesis. In this connection those laws of philosophizing given by Aristotle, which the Ramists taught in the past, are relevant.b In each science a proposition is either a principle or a conclusion. Principles are definitions, or axioms, or hypotheses, or else phenomena. Among these, definitions are, taken in themselves, arbitrary, though they have to fit usage and be approved by the consensus of the colleagues,1 in order to prevent confusion in case they are understood diversely throughout the work. Axioms are those propositions that everyone considers evident and that, when attentively considered are patent from the terms (ex termini constant). Hypotheses are propositions highly useful; they are confirmed by their success and their conformity with conclusions derived from them in several domains; they cannot so far be demonstrated with sufficient rigor, which is why they have to be, for the time being, assumed. Phenomena are propositions proved by experience; however, if the experiment is not easy to perform or has not been performed by ourselves, it must be attested by witnesses. One has to abstain from doubtful experiments, unless they are of decisive importance, in which case one has to advert to the degree of reliability they have. Conclusions are either observations, or theorems, or problems. Observations are drawn from phenomena alone by induction. Theorems, in turn, are discovered – to be sure – by reasoning from whatever principles, but they state only what is true. Problems, moreover, refer to praxis – and this is the place to note that all the rest must ultimately be directed towards problems, i.e., to practices useful for life. The order of positioning must be mathematical, although not Euclidean. To be sure, Geometers demonstrate their propositions with a certain rigor, 1

The colleagues (socii) alluded to here are probably the intended members of the Society mentioned earlier in the text.

15. The Encyclopedia and the Method of Discovery

133

but they compel the mind rather than illuminating it. In this, they gain much admiration, by extracting assent from the unsuspecting reader and encircling him with unexpected techniques; but they do not take into account to a sufficient extent neither the memory nor the ingenuity of the reader, since they hide somehow the reasons and natural causes of the conclusions, thus preventing the easy recognition of the manner in which they achieve their discoveries. But this is precisely the most important thing in every science: not to know only the conclusions and their demonstrations, but to know also the origins of the discoveries, which is the only thing memory needs to retain, for from it the rest can be derived by one’s own forces.c Therefore, the light of invention and the rigor of demonstration must be coupled, and the elements of each science must be written in such a way that the reader or the disciple will always see their connection, thus becoming not a follower of the master but as it were a partner of his discovery.d To be sure, the sciences will thus be less the objects of admiration, but will be more useful and it will be easier to promote them. In order to treat, to write the sciences in this manner, men capable to achieve discoveries and knowledgeable of the true reasons are needed, for they have to write as if they themselves had discovered them – which not everyone is able to do. It follows, then, that it would not be necessary to begin by definitions, axioms, and phenomena or experiments, but to introduce these progressively as soon as their use is required by the natural order of thinking.e Indices or catalogues should be added to the propositions arranged in the order proper for discovery (ordine inventorio). In these indices, previous discoveries presented for easy use as well as the useful combinations thereof should be ordered like in tables. This will lead to the emergence of many new discoveries, of which otherwise we would have not thought, and certain harmonic series will appear which will provide a thread that, if followed, will open the door for still greater discoveries. This light should reach also mathematics. Therefore, just as the other sciences have to access certainty following the example of mathematics, so too the asperity of mathematics must be mitigated by a softer mode of proceeding (blandior tractandi ratio) that follows the example of the other sciences, so that we simultaneously obtain (extorqueamus) the will’s trust and satisfy the mind avid of clearly knowing the causes.f It is necessary to include as many figures and diagrams as possible insofar as this can be conveniently done; and it should be noted that this is of greater importance for perfecting science than is usually realized. No doubt, both the propositions and their demonstrations must be presented in such a way that they can be fully read and understood even in the absence of any diagrams. In any case, one should always add in parentheses what corresponds to the letters figuring in the diagrams. Whereas the latter are

134

Chapter 15

needed to help the imagination, the former are necessary to help the mind (mens), to provide distinct concepts, and to distance the mind (animus) from images – so that we learn also to discover by the sheer force of the mind without the help of diagrams, and so that it becomes clear that the efficiency of a demonstration does not depend upon the delineation of the figures attached to it. For the same reason, demonstrations should be also performed without algebraic calculus. Even though algebra is very useful and I appreciate it very much, and it is needed for results that otherwise we could not obtain, one should nevertheless avoid using it whenever a truth can be proved by a certain natural reason that guides the mind through the very ideas of things. Therefore, the sciences and their elements should be constructed avoiding the use of algebraic calculus. However, when we already possess to a sufficient extent some science, the calculus is extremely useful in order to draw from it consequences and a variety of cases and applications, as well as to reach with minimal mental effort as many results as one looks for. Our Encyclopedia, thus, must be written in such a way that enunciations and demonstrations of truths do not depend upon neither diagrams nor a calculus, but rather upon axiomatic definitions and propositions posited as premises. Even so, some diagrams should be added whenever possible, while preserving the algebraic calculus only for those cases in which it displays special elegance and usefulness. For propositions and demonstrations to be expressed without figures, some onomatopoeia2 is often necessary in order to avoid circumlocutions. In so doing, one should always have in view clarity and ease: one should avoid new words unless they are really needed and useful and, in case they have to be created, we should adopt only those that conform to the common usage of words – so as not to engender obscurity while striving for saving words.g This Encyclopedia should comprise all the sciences that are based on reason alone or on reason and experience, i.e., those sciences that do not derive from the will of some authority. This excludes divine and human laws that stem from a power of decision (arbitrium); some frivolous arts, which cannot be solidly grounded, are also excluded. According to the method above, the sciences to be first and foremost compiled are the following ones. The first is Grammar, i.e., the art of understanding what the body of this Encyclopedia will convey to us. First of all the rational grammar should be expounded, applied thoroughly to Latin and occasionally illustrated by examples from other languages. The rational grammar treats the regular

2

In Greek. Onomatopoetic words, like diagrams and figures, and to some extent also algebraic formulae, are iconic signs, bearing a direct, non-arbitrary, hence relatively transparent relation to their significations – hence their usefulness.

15. The Encyclopedia and the Method of Discovery

135

signification of all the particles, flexions and collocations,3 showing how the signification can always replace the signified (significatum). For example, the cases of a noun can always be eliminated by replacing them by certain particles accompanied by the nominative, as demonstrated by those languages where there are no nominal flexions except by means of particles. Verbs can be always reduced to nouns to which one adds the verb est. Adverbs are for verbs what adjectives are for nouns. Finally, the particles must be replaced by their significations until one reaches a point where they cannot be eliminated by any further explication, as is the case with est, et, non; the number of these particles must be established so that by adjoining them to nouns in the nominative all the remaining ones can be explicated. This is what in this [part of the] work has to be shown. This is also the true analysis of characters that are commonly used by humans in speaking as well as in thinking. One must take into account mainly the regular part of grammar and less the part that deals with the anomalies, since the present grammar is written not so much for learning a language as for making possible the rigorous analysis of words. For very often there occur in logic inferences that do not follow from logical principles but from grammatical ones, i.e., from the signification of the flexions and the particles. This grammar can be accommodated in the Encyclopedia in such a way that it will be extraordinarily helpful also for students.h The next is Logic – by which I mean here only the art of inferences, i.e., the art of judging that which is proposed. In this sense, logic has to be drawn from the usage of speakers and writers. To be sure, the recurrent modes of inference in speech must be classified and derived from a few simple ones. This will show how the latter, even though they have not been metamorphosed into another form, as done by the School, being rather left in the form they have in common usage as well as in writers, by no means have less force: they are formally conclusive too and can be demonstrated through the usual scholastic forms as well. The utility of this logic lies in reducing to rules the more compounded, devious and implicit forms of reasoning, which occur so frequently in life; through these rules the [validity] of these forms of reasoning can be determined, without reducing them to the scholastic figures and modes.i Just as experienced arithmeticians have created for themselves several shortcuts (compendia) or forms of computing that produce correct results (even though they not always order the characters in the vulgar way beginners do, they succeed in demonstrating so that we know that we can rely upon them),j so too persons experienced in speaking and thinking have prepared for themselves many shortcuts for stating and 3

Collocatio refers to the simplest of syntactic structures – the juxtaposition of words in a phrase without connecting particles. Though simple and concise, this structure can bear a variety of meanings.

136

Chapter 15

reasoning out of bits or particles of thoughts (cogitatis voculis sive particulis), which yield correct conclusions by the force of form, no less than the scholastic modes. Still, [such shortcuts], given the explication of the particles by rational grammar, must be demonstrated in terms of the scholastic modes, thus submitting them to certain rules whose observation ensures their correct use. The third is the Mnemonic Art, the art of retaining and recalling into memory what we have learned. This art employs many elegant shortcuts and devices, which can sometimes be useful for life. First and foremost, the part of this art that should be cultivated is the art of recalling (ars reminiscendi), through which we bring to memory those things we need, which are latent in memory but not always spring to mind. One thing is to retain and another to recall, and not always we recall what we retain, unless we provide ourselves with some means for it.k The fourth is Topic or the art of discovery, i.e., the art of leading our thoughts towards the elicitation of some unknown truth, or to find the means for a certain end. This art includes the dialectical loci,4 rhetorical invention (inventio), the art of cunning (ars argutiarum), the art of deciphering or of divination, and, finally, algebra – all of which contain nice examples of the Topic art, which should be known to whoever wants to exercise this art. Algebra, however, is not invoked here in connection with its general role, but rather as allowing for the formation of universal rules, to be illustrated in the comments5 by means of specific examples. The fifth is the Art of formulae (ars formularia), which deals with the same and the different, the similar and the dissimilar, i.e., [the art] of the forms of things, taking the mind away (abstrahendo) from magnitude, place (situs), and action. This art includes formulae as well as comparisons of formulae, and many rules that the algebraists and geometers have devised for their own use depend upon it, although these rules do not pertain to magnitude but to other factors.6 4

5

6

The Latin rhetorical tradition uses the expression loci dialectici for dialectics in general, referring to the ensemble of non-demonstrative loci. The dialectical loci include loci communes (employed in any argument) and loci proprii (fitting just one kind of argument or perhaps even some specific discipline or theme). See Chapter 9D for some examples. In scholiis. See Spinoza’s use of this term in Ethica for the comments or explanations of propositions and their demonstrations. Leibniz seems to outline here a domain of mathematics that was inexistent in his time and continues to be up to the present (as a separate domain, at least). Herbert Breger (1989) proposes to view it as the study of transformations. By this is meant what physicists today call ‘symmetry’, namely invariance under a group of transformations. The underlying idea is the same as in the theory of combinations. Yet Leibniz, as usual, generalizes it, and undertakes to study all sorts of transformations, not only those dealt with by arithmetic, geometry (see under Geometry below ‘transformational geometry’), algebra, and topology.

15. The Encyclopedia and the Method of Discovery

137

The sixth is Logistics, which treats of the whole and the part, of magnitude in general, as well as of ratios and proportions. It includes the fifth book of Euclid’s Elements as well as most of Algebra. The seventh is Arithmetic, which treats of the distinct expression of magnitude by means of numbers. The eighth is Geometry, the science of place (situs) or figures. It can be usefully divided in the following parts: Elementary geometry of the plane, elementary geometry of the solid, Conic, Organic, and Transformational. One should be aware of the fact that geometry, even in its elementary part, has not yet been developed as it should. This art includes also Geodesics, part of civil and military Architecture, as well as Tornatoria7and Textoria8, all of which insofar as they make abstraction of matter. Optics too is purely geometrical, if only it takes into account a few natural phenomena.9 The ninth is the Science of Action and Passion, i.e., Mechanics or science of power and movement. This science connects physics with mathematics. Its aim is not to find how to track the traces of movements assumed to be continuing, for this is a purely geometrical question. Its aim is to determine how the directions and velocities of movements change due to the collision of bodies – which cannot be achieved by imagination alone, and requires a more sublime science. Therefore, it comprises the treatment of statics, the firmness of structures, ballistics, parts of pneumatics and hydrostatics, the inflammation of candles (velificatio), as well as of other parts of mechanics, most of which should also be included in Harmonics.l The tenth10 is the Science of sensible (sensibiles) qualities, which I use to call Poeographia. These qualities, insofar as they are to be defined, should be distinguished by their varieties and degrees, the subjects in which they exist and those which produce them, and finally the consequences that follow from them. They are either simple or compounded. The former 7

From torno, ‘turn in a lathe’ for shaping wood or metal; presumably refers to the study of shapes engendered by lathe-like circular motion. 8 From texo, ‘weave’; hence, the study of woven, interwoven, and other kinds of textures. 9 All the sciences mentioned in this paragraph are ‘subaltern’ to geometry in the sense described by Leibniz in the Recommandation pour instituer la science generale. A geometer who “is aware of a few principles of discovery to which geometry must be applied needs no more than that in order to discover by himself the main rules of these sciences” (A VI 4 708) He . gives as an example the rules of perspective (pp. 708-709) . 10 Between the 9th and the 10th sciences, Leibniz had inserted what is now the 12th science, namely Cosmography. Furthermore, he had initiated the description of an 11th science, Geography, which does not appear in the final text: “The eleventh is Geography, which includes Mathematical Geography. In this science one must try to explain the earlier and the future form of our globe, the origins of mountains and rivers, and similar things, out of which one can extract many secrets”. After this, Meteorology, which is in the final text incorporated into Cosmography, is introduced: “The twelfth science is Meteorology ”.

138

Chapter 15

cannot be described; rather, in order to be cognized they must be sensed – which is the case with light, color, sound, smell, taste, heat, cold. The latter can be explained by description; hence they are somehow intelligible, like solidity, fluidity, smoothness, viscosity (tenacitas), friability, fissility and other qualities of this kind; similarly, volatility, fixity, solubility, coagulation, precipitation. The preceding simple qualities cannot be subjected to reasoning, except insofar as they are usually associated with the compounded ones, as well as with the preceding ones which share with them magnitude, place and change (mutatio). Hence, the simple qualities have to be treated historically, i.e., one should list in what manner they are usually associated with each other and with the intelligible qualities. On the other hand, the intelligible qualities or the mixed ones fall under geometric and mechanic considerations; thus they give rise to theorems about their causes and effects, whence it is possible to proffer some judgment about the causes and effects of those that are only sensible. The core of all physics, therefore, turns around a rigorous enumeration of these qualities, their distinction by degrees, and how they are associated with each other in the same or in several subjects, provided these subjects have with each other some correspondence (convenientia), connection or interaction (commercium). The eleventh one is the science of substances (subjecti) that are similar at least in appearance. This science is Homeographia,m where one has to begin with those things that are indeed maximally similar and maximally shared, as the four bodies popularly called elements;11 thereafter should come those less shared but endowed with various qualities, such as salts, saps, rocks, metals. The above mentioned qualities of these bodies must be enumerated according to their degrees and differences, both those that these bodies reveal spontaneously to the senses and those that appear when a body is treated by itself or else mixed with others. Notice that one should begin by the spontaneous ones; furthermore, there are various manners of treating a body by itself: only by means of other bodies maximally shared (air, earth, water, fire), or by means of others that cause them little perturbation, or else by those that yield minimal confusion in the investigation of causes. Hence, making use of the investigation of qualities previously described, it will be possible to determine the nature of substances, as far as possible through experimental data. I have no doubt that with this art, in few years we will achieve extensive knowledge of the inner economy of bodies. The twelfth is Cosmography, i.e., the science of the larger bodies of the world. It includes Physical Astronomy, which not only explains phenomena through hypotheses, but also attempts to show which hypothesis is truer or at least more probable. It belongs to it to account for the general fluids, whether visible or invisible, which encircle and penetrate us, wherein the 11

Earth, water, fire, air.

15. The Encyclopedia and the Method of Discovery

139

larger bodies swim. One should investigate whether the kinds and movements of these fluids can be defined in some way in terms of the phenomena of terrestrial bodies. This includes the observations of the major changes of our globe and their causes, as well as Meteorology. The thirteenth is the science of organic bodies, which are called species. This science can be called Idographia.n The species should be rigorously distinguished not through the common use of dichotomies, but through the combinations of the qualities that permit to distinguish between them. First and foremost one should take into account those properties that present themselves directly to the senses; the others too, as soon as they are explored, should be diligently recorded, designated by their differences and degrees, and described according to their features. As in the case of similar substances, in the organic species too one should proceed gradually, investigating their properties. First, one should examine the properties the species have by virtue of directly manifesting themselves to the senses (beginning with vision); then those they acquire by being treated by themselves, either alone (i.e., in themselves and exposed to air), or by association with other individuals similar to them (in this they differ from the similar substances), or else by being examined by means of water, fire, or other bodies, above all the maximally similar ones; and finally those properties that result from their association with more compounded bodies, including those belonging to the same species, and mainly with animal bodies, since all this investigation must be oriented towards the knowledge of the nature of animals. The fourteenth is Moral science, i.e., the science of the mind (animus) and its emotions (motus): knowing and directing them.12 The sixteenth is Geopolitics, which treats of the state of our Earth in relation to the human species. It comprises all History and civil Geography.13 The eighteenth is about non-corporeal substances, i.e., of natural theology. This Encyclopedia should contain also a Practical part, dealing with the use of the sciences for happiness, that is, of how to act taking into account the fact that we are only human. In view of the fact that most effort lies in developing these sciences up to a sufficient degree of perfection, we must make the best possible use of [our] time. Therefore, my plan is that, after dividing the work among us, we elaborate as soon as possible a delineation of the whole. Let this draft be the basis of all the rest, let it be increased and polished every day, let the steps be ever larger. I do not see what can prevent twenty erudite persons 12 13

Science number 15 is missing. Science number 17 is missing.

140

Chapter 15

from terminating in a couple of years what could certainly be accomplished in a decade by someone with sufficient knowledge. It is well known that persons who are outstanding due to their erudition and love for truth dispose of many thoughts and experience. But these for the most part are lost for the Republic, because they are dispersed, heterogeneous, and do not converge into a single body of science. For this reason, if these persons will put into paper and communicate their thoughts and experience, incomplete and disorganized as they are, they will help marvelously this project, while at the same time will sail towards their glory, the just and reasonable glory that this Society will guarantee in all trust to each one according to his discoveries. a

Since his return from Paris in 1676, Leibniz sought support for his projects, especially for the Encyclopedia project from powerful and rich princes and aristocrats, and envisaged the creation of Societies or Foundations for such a purpose. For a survey of his activity as a creator of societies, academies, and similar undertakings motivated not only by financial reasons, but also by a deep realization of the collective nature of the scientific enterprise, see Couturat (1901: 501-528). b Leibniz must have in mind here mainly Aristotle’s Topics. Ramus’s ‘dialectics’ was devoted to the ‘art of discovery’ (i.e., for Leibniz, ‘synthesis’), and for this purpose considered the topoi its principal tool. c Notice that Leibniz – as he spells out in the next sentence – distinguishes in fact between what a formal demonstration ‘shows’, namely the formal validity of its conclusion, and what needs further to be ‘shown’, namely the “reasons and natural causes” or the actual reasoning process that leads not so much to the conclusion as to the discovery of the whole formal demonstration. d In Leibniz’s perspective, learning new contents is associated with acquiring new competencies, and therefore indispensable for preparing the mind for new discoveries. e The New Encyclopedia should serve both aims: progress in determining the foundations of knowledge as well as in the growth of knowledge, i.e., in analysis and in synthesis. Its structure, therefore, need not be subordinated exclusively to one or the other, but rather display the fact that both go hand in hand and are necessary for each other’s appropriate performance. Leibniz’s emphasis in this text on fitting the encyclopedia to the needs of discovery might be a consequence of their neglect by the extant encyclopedias. f Leibniz does not specify to which ‘other sciences’, where a ‘softer mode of proceeding’ is followed, he is referring here. What is important for him in this passage seems to be to mark the distinction as well as the complementariness of two aspects or modes of the rational method. Mathematics, in his time, provided a model of rationality that stressed the rigor of demonstration and axiomatization. It is to this ‘asperity’ that the ‘softness’ Leibniz introduces here is contrasted. The former corresponds to the demands of logic, whereas the latter to those of rhetoric. In trying to make the point that both are equally needed in the scientific enterprise, Leibniz stresses that even mathematics needs the ‘softness’ in question, for it too needs the ‘light’ of discovery procedures along with the logical rigor that ensures the validity of any discovery. On the idea of ‘soft rationality’, see Dascal (2001, 2003b, 2005). g This long paragraph illustrates the double allegiance commanding the construction of the New Encyclopedia (see notes e and f): discovery potential and solid grounding, persuasiveness and rigor. It is vis-à-vis the different criteria implied by these different

15. The Encyclopedia and the Method of Discovery

141

aims that Leibniz evaluates the advantages and disadvantages of using various kinds of procedures and signs, notably pictorial and calculative ones. The ‘natural reason’ he appeals to here seems to cater to both aims, for it does not shun the creativity of imagination and its ‘soft’ persuasiveness, while at the same time valuing the clarity, precision, economy, and certainty of an axiomatic system and of a calculus. The appearance of hesitation and even of contradiction (to use figures, but not to use them; not to use algebra, but yes to use it; etc.) in fact arises from the leibnizian strategy of reconciling opposites, with its typical difficulties. This is beautifully summarized in this paragraph’s last sentences, which spell out Leibniz’s terminological policy: new words should be very sparingly introduced, for they might clash with common usage and, rather than contributing to precision, easiness and clarity, engender obscurity – which is what typically happens with the massive introduction of technical jargon. This advice is related to the inherent difficulty of any terminology available at a given time to express new concepts – especially those violating the oppositions entrenched in that terminology. But Leibniz does not succumb to the temptation of an easy solution to this difficulty by creating an entirely new terminology. Instead, he makes use of the inherent flexibility of natural language, which allows for the use of apparent oxymoronic constructions for achieving and expressing conceptual innovation. See also, below, the paragraph devoted to logic. h Except for a few early studies such as Neff (1870) and Schulenburg (1973; research performed in 1929-1939), the extent and richness of Leibniz’s linguistic investigations and theories has only recently come to be thoroughly appreciated (e.g., Aarsleff 1969; Dascal 1971, 1978, 1987, 1990a; Gensini 1990, 1991, 2000). The ‘rational’ or ‘universal’ grammar captures the syntactic and semantic regularities shared by many or all natural languages (see, e.g., Grammaticae cogitations - A VI 4 111-116; Analysis linguarum A VI 4 102-105; Characteristica verbalis - A VI 4 333-337, transl. in Dascal 1987). Of special epistemological importance for Leibniz is the relationship between language and thought, for which the analysis of ‘particles’ and grammatical cases, which represent the operations of the mind, are of particular interest (Analysis particularum - A VI 4 646-667; cf. Dascal 1990a, 1998a, 2003a). i Leibniz suggests here a ‘natural logic’, certainly related to ‘natural reason’ (see note g), which is typically displayed in natural languages and has the virtue of permitting to express ‘naturally’ inferences that it is cumbersome to express ‘formally’. He is in fact criticizing in this way syllogistic logic, which he was, at the same time, attempting to expand, e.g., by incorporating in it the modes Aristotle excluded as invalid. However, as we see here, he realizes its insufficiency for dealing with the wealth of non-syllogistic inferences he is aware of, such as the grammatically-based inferences he mentions at the end of the paragraph on rational grammar. See Chapters 31C and 38. j The shortcuts in question include such ‘tests’ of the correctness of a calculation as the abjectio novenaria (casting out nines). See Chapter 2 note 7. k Signs are, for Leibniz, essential both for storing and recalling – a distinction he often refers to. See Dascal (1978: Chapter 6 and 1987: Chapter 2). l Maybe Leibniz refers here to his project of a new physics, as expressed in the De corporum concursu (1678), in which mechanics would be integrated in a dynamic conception of nature which would thus display its order and beauty. m Etymologically, ‘science of resemblances’, from Gr. homoios, ‘resembling’. n ‘Idography’ (Gr. eidos, form). Perhaps an allusion to Leibniz’s anti-Cartesian conception of bodies as different from mere extension, and therefore as including ‘forms’ that a ‘science of bodies’ ought to investigate.

Chapter 16 TOWARDS A HEURISTICS FOR PERSUADING

Winning an argument and persuading the adversary is not just a matter of logic, as Leibniz was well aware of. Rhetoric, psychology, favorable circumstances, and sometimes even cheating are no less important than rationality in shaping a heuristics of persuasive moves in debates and negotiations.a In the texts here assembled, Leibniz addresses different kinds of such factors, which he considers useful in life and not objectionable on moral grounds, for devising successful dialectic strategies capable of winning an argument and eventually also of persuading an adversary and thus contributing to resolve a dispute. In A, he lists the kinds of factors capable of yielding persuasion and points out their shared psychological ground. In B, Leibniz identifies a usual fallacy committed by those who, eager to win an argument or to display their wit, overlook the cumulative effect of interconnected arguments in strengthening a position, and undertake to refute each of them as if they were independent of each other. C suggests a way to exploit an adversary’s rhetorical weaknesses to one’s advantage. D provides subtle advice on how the proper choice of words and fashionable phrases at different stages of a debate can decide it. E attempts to account for the persuasiveness of the combination of beauty, clarity, and unexpectedness in a proposition. In F, Leibniz shows how it is possible to manipulate the adversary into making concessions by making him feel at fault towards oneself. In G, he takes up the traditional moral issue of whether lying should be condemned unconditionally.1 He distinguishes ‘saying a falsity’ from ‘lying’ and argues that the former is permissible whenever it is done in order to prevent a greater evil. From the point of view of communicative interaction, this general tenet is translated into a series of concrete steps, ranging from evaluating the personal and public damage that might be caused by saying the truth, through dodging an inquirer’s questions by giving ambiguous replies, up to the straightforward denial of a truth. H brings us to the debate-cum-negotiation with which Leibniz was most involved in his life. He was always in the lookout for any opportunity to 1

The manuscript contains references to St. Augustine’s writings on lying (De Mendacio, 395; Contra mendacium, 420) and to Paul Laymann, Theologia moralis (München, 1625), as well as to other works.

143 M. Dascal (ed.), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. The Art of Controversies, 143–162. © 2006 Springer.

Chapter 16

144

progress in the solution of the religious conflicts of his time, and here he spells out what are the parameters of a changing context one should be attentive to in order not to miss the slightest chance of progressing in the achievement of this major task. In I we see Leibniz the formalist devising a formal syntactic structure for ensuring an orderly conduct of a dispute – with no pretence, however, of providing also a solution for it, as the Characteristica Universalis purported to do. In most of these texts, Leibniz is clearly handling disputes and even negotiations as combats, as in other occasions, but the means for winning he discusses here are quite different from the legal, formal or rationally persuasive ones he emphasizes elsewhere (e.g., Chapters 9A, 7, 28). Leibniz’s long-lasting concern with connecting ethics with practical morality, which is apparent in some of these texts, yields heuristic guidelines for behavior in cases of apparent moral conflict. Taken together, these texts can be seen as contributions to an ethics of argumentation capable to deal with a reality where conflict is not an exception, where reason does not rule independently of psychology and historical contingency, and where logic and rhetoric work shoulder to shoulder – an ethics whose basic principle Chapter 17 states.

A. THE POWER OF PERSUADING This paragraph on persuasion is part of a manuscript containing also a more detailed discussion of dreams. This suggests that it belongs to Leibniz’s reflections on the operations of the mind, prompted by his reading of Hobbes’s De Corpore. Both topics are, indeed, psychological. But their treatment by Leibniz here differs sharply in tone and style. While dreams are discussed in the light of reports of the author’s self-observations and impressions about the phenomenon, persuasion is given a precise definition. Furthermore, the key factor underlying all the forms of achieving persuasion – namely, the ability to arouse the attention of the addressee to something – is put in evidence.b

Date: 1669-1670 Edition: A VI 2 276 Language: Latin The power of persuading lies either in the reasons to be set forth, or in the affections to be aroused, or even in what is, as it were, the vehicle of both, namely in the art of calling attention – each of which comprises specific rules. Indeed, we do not follow most of what we know, because we do not pay attention [to it] while acting. And attention is nothing but reflection.

16. Towards a Heuristics for Persuading

145

B. CONCURRENCE OF ARGUMENTS Leibniz considers here the issue of the joint weight of arguments in supporting the probability of a thesis or course of action. While taken individually each can provide only little support, which can therefore be neglected, together they strengthen each other thus mounting a ‘strong proof’, which can no longer be neglected. A thesis supported by concurring arguments cannot thus be refuted by calling into question any single one of them separately. An argumentative strategy of this kind is what Leibniz calls here ‘the sophism of division’ (see note d). This is a familiar ‘dishonest’ move in disputes, which he accuses the young Boylec of committing in the debate he maintained with Bentley about the authenticity of the Letters of Phalaris (see note e). Reacting to this episode, Leibniz is first cautious and prefers to withhold judgment until experts on the matter pronounce themselves (GP III 255-256), but soon declares that he is inclined to believe that the experts’ decision would be against Boyle, “who has wanted to show up his cleverness and ability” in defending the authenticity of the letters, but who is “too capable to believe seriously that they are” (GP III 267268; see note f).

Date: April 1699 Edition: GR 660 Language: Latin In those matters in which one should content oneself with verisimilitude, the concurrence (concursus) of arguments or indications,2 which, although separately are of little use, together are helpful, provides strong support (magna probatio); and, in order to refute [what is thus supported] it is not sufficient to pluck individual indications. This is what I call “the sophism of division”,d which is usually employed by those who put up a brilliant (speciosè) defence of a bad cause, of which it is obvious that they are not convinced. This is what the young Boyle did against Bentley, when he [Boyle] defended [the authenticity of] the Letters of Phalaris.e I think this noble young man repented later from [engaging in] this contest (certamen), once he realized in his mature age how far his lack of renown had misled him into ill-calculated actions, doubtless motivated by bad advice.f

C. QUICKLY DEFEATING AN ADVERSARY A sequential order of the moves to be used in disputing, designed to speed up and ensure victory, is here proposed. This order suggests a crescendo of blows, the initial ones attacking the adversary’s rhetorical incompetence and/or his 2

This term is also used by Leibniz in medical language, where the interplay of indications and counter-indications of a treatment must be taken into account in adopting or rejecting the proposed treatment; see Chapter 10.

Chapter 16

146

argumentative stratagems. Only at the end a series of increasingly difficult, “relevant questions” are to be raised leading to the coup de grâce. In this short note, Leibniz formulates a rhetorical strategy to achieve quick victory in a dispute. By its choice of terms, the text itself in fact illustrates the power of such rhetorical devices.3

Date: 1683-1686 Edition: A VI 4 A 578 Language: Latin In ordinary discourse, when a formal dispute takes place,4 in order to defeat quickly an adversary one should bring to the fore false expressions, more those that are ridicule than those that are to be purged, and more those that are shameful than those that are irritating; and finally a packed succession of questions relevant to the matter at hand.

D. WORDS Leibniz describes here a certain practice of debate, in all likelihood a staple entertainment in the Parisian salons he had visited, for which the image of ‘fencing with words’ is appropriate. In this game, what counts most is the agility of the contenders, i.e., their ability to quickly find the appropriate words or arguments, rather than their cogency, for no well grounded conclusion, but only momentary victory is sought. Far from considering, like Schopenhauer (1942), all debates as futile displays of eristic rhetoric, however, Leibniz analyzes them with a view to identifying and correcting their ‘vices’ (see Chapter 1), in order to make room for a more serious and useful form of dialectics.

Date: 1678-1684 Edition: A VI 4 A 63-64 Language: German Words are like jettons for the wise and like money for the unwise.5 3

4

5

Leibniz employs in the title of this note the term convincere, which we have translated ‘to defeat’. In all likelihood, he is thus catering to this term’s ambiguity in Latin, namely: on the one hand “to persuade”; on the other, “to refute” or “to defeat”. In English, the former meaning was preserved in the verb convince and the latter, in the verb convict. Obviously, the strategy he proposes here could hardly “convince” an adversary, though it might help to defeat him. Presumably, the term ‘formal’ here should not be taken as referring to logical form, but rather – as it is sometimes the case in Leibniz (e.g., Chapters 1 and 16I) – as referring to the fact that something displays a certain order or merely follow some sort of form. Marginal note: “Sunt nobis signa, sunt vobis fercula digna”. This proverb refers to a procession where signs, namely statues, insignia, images, etc. are carried upon pedestals,

16. Towards a Heuristics for Persuading

147

Because for the wise they serve as signs, whereas the unwise take them as causes and reasons.g Hence, in common parlance, whoever can throw upon the other a stylish and fashionable saying, has already defeated the other, unless the other is able to return an equivalent blow. This is not difficult for those who train themselves in [the art of] speaking and are always ready, since words have so many meanings. Now, when both fencers have fought for a while to the joy of those who listen to them, either they shift to another subject, or the audience intervenes in the conversation, or else courtesy requires that the conversation be concluded, lest one be taken as contentious or pedantic. Whoever will cut [the conversation] in this way, must make use of the moment in which his opponent is not ready for replying or in which he has said something whose importance does not require a response. For one should not always have the last word. It is in this way that debates end, especially when one has been talking as a pastime. However, when one must reach a conclusion and make a decision,h one usually appeals to the last apparent reasons used, those which are still fresh in one’s memory, or one yields to those [reasons] that are most accepted. Therefore, no wonder that not only in ordinary chat no conclusion is reached, but also that, in deliberations, the conclusion is often wrong.

E. PARADOXES This note is of uncertain date. In fact the date proposed by the Academy Edition is based on its parallels with other rhetorical writings of the same period, such as D – to which it is quite close in content, albeit following an opposite argumentative direction. Leibniz deals here with a classical problem in rhetoric, which is particularly important in the Aristotelian tradition: how to make room for both, emotions and reasons in rational persuasion. He distinguishes between unexpectedness and paradox on the one hand, and clarity and beauty on the other. He is then able to suggest an explanation how a certain kind of rhetorical beauty – the one that combines unexpectedness with clarity – has an immediate cognitive and emotive impact that yields belief in a quite different way from the more lengthy process of proving required when one is confronted with a paradox.

Date: 1678-1681 Edition: A VI 4 A 90 Language: Latin

stands, or litters. It can be translated as: “For us the signs are important, for you, the stands”.

148

Chapter 16

All beautiful propositions are pronounced without having been expected. One thing is an unexpected proposition, another, a paradoxical one. Paradoxes are also pronounced beside men’s opinions, and for the most part are even contrary to current opinion.i However, an unexpected beautiful proposition may be so clear that it will be immediately admitted by the audience;j the opposite happens with the paradoxical ones, which are not believed unless they are proven.

F. WRONGDOING This text considers taking advantage, for argumentative or other purposes, of a certain psychological or moral principle that “entitles” one to be compensated by someone who has caused him some sort of damage. By deliberately manipulating a situation so that the damage is lesser than the expected remedy, one acquires a substantial advantage over the adversary.k

Date: 1672-1676 Edition: A VI 3 377; GR 701-702 Language: French It is sometimes useful to tolerate some wrongdoing (tort) that someone does to us in a matter of little consequence, for if it is some important person that has so slipped, this will produce in him some tendency (if he is good natured) to do us good on some other occasion, and we can arrange things so as to ensure that the latter occasion be more important for us than the former.l

G. HOW GRAVE A SIN IS NOT SAYING THE TRUTH? This text can be profitably seen as complementary to and contrasting with Chapter 17. There, Leibniz suggests a strategic use of the Golden Rule, whose principle consists in always imagining the worst thing the other – when considered as an adversary or enemy – can do to us. This principle, however, is justified ethically in terms of the equity of the relationship between the points of view of two persons, which applies even between enemies. Here, the ethical principle invoked is the comparative idea of the global calculus of the best, in the name of which the universality of the moral injunction not to lie is questioned, leading to lowering its status to that of a norm whose application is relative to the circumstances. From this perspective, it may turn out that it is legitimate to lie, for instance, to an enemy, if this leads to a global reduction of evil. The biblical passages collected show in fact that lying is not only permitted but even praised in some cases. And the Church Fathers address this evidence by means of a variety of argumentative strategies, which are far from

16. Towards a Heuristics for Persuading

149

unanimous in their conclusion. Although the prohibition of lying is implied in the Ninth Commandment (“You shall not bear false witness against your neighbor; Exodus 20:13), its violation thus being a sin, it is not a law originating in the primitive Church, so that, strictly speaking, its correct application depends on the human capacity to evaluate its consequences from a point of view that should be as global as possible. The manuscript comprises two intertwined parts, written by two different hands. One of the hands compiles a list of passages illustrating lies and deceptions performed by important Old and New Testament figures, as well as discussions of these cases and of lying in general by Fathers of the Church and Augustine.m It is perhaps written by a secretary under Leibniz’s instructions, and we translate it in roman font. Leibniz’s contribution consists in a set of inserted corrections and comments, which we translate in italics. Grua has only edited the concluding final comment, which expresses Leibniz’s position vis-à-vis lying as permissible under the condition that the harm it causes is less than the harm it prevents. Yet, this position emerges as a result of the analysis of the examples compiled and of a critique by Leibniz of their explanation by Augustine. It is this background that both explains Leibniz’s concern with the problem of lying and justifies the moderate solution he proposes for this problem, which is in line with his ethics of moderation.n

Date: After 9 January 1700? Edition: LH I, 6, 15; GR 702 Language: Latin

Saying a falsity6 is not condemnable (Genesis 27): From Jacob against Isaac, harming Esau, through the ruses of the mother, Rebecca.o (Genesis 42): From Joseph, who made believe he was a stranger, although he was one of the twelve brothers.p Joseph’s [lie]:7 Augustine in the book Contra mendacium says that neither what Joseph said in order to deceive his brothers [Gen. 42, 7-9]8 nor the fact that David simulated insanity [1 Kings 21, 13], as well as other things like that should be considered as lies, but rather as prophetic 6

7

8

Falsiloquium literally means ‘the saying of a falsity’, to which there is no direct corresponding term in English. In the title Leibniz had initially written mendacium (‘mendacity’), then mendacium vel potius (‘or rather’) falsiloquium, and finally he erased mendacium vel potius. What follows is a marginal addition, which is followed by a comment by Leibniz. Henceforth, marginal additions will be indented. Henceforth, we give the presumably correct references, rather than the maybe mistaken or difficult to decipher ones in the manuscript.

Chapter 16

150

sayings and actions that must be referred to in order to understand those things that are true. Thus, Augustine in fact excuses false utterances associating to them I don’t know what prophetic or mystical sense, and in this way it would be possible to excuse any false-saying whatsoever. q

(Exodus 1): Labor Chrysostom:r И țĮȜȠІ ȥıİϿįȠȣ, И țĮȜȠІ įȠȜȠІ, that is: Oh beautiful lie (mendacium)! O laudable fraud (dolus)! He praises these midwifes and, besides, believes that they will be granted eternal recompense. Jeromes on Ezekiel 17t and on Isaiah, repeated in Ambroseu on Book VI.v (1 Samuel 21) From David: simulating insanity.w (2 Kings 8) From the prophet Elijah, when interrogated by Ben-Haddad, king of Syria.x (2 Kings 10) From king Jehu, for killing the worshipers of Baal.y (Judith 13) The gift of the liar in order to kill Holofernes.z Commenting the passage in Luke 24,aa where Jesus makes believe that he is a traveler who has to walk farther than the two disciples who have to break off earlier, in the book Contra mendacium, chapter 13, Augustine responds: if Jesus, by simulating through his external behavior, did not want to say anything other than that he was going to walk farther, then one would be justified in saying he lied by simulating. If however one understands well [what he said] and one looks for what he wanted to say, one will realize that it is a mystery. Here too Augustine attempts to dodge the objection by means of I don’t know what invented mystery.bb (Galatians): From Paul – who admonishes Peter without the intention of admonishing,cc according to the opinion of Origen, Chrysostom, Jerome, and many other Fathers. Referred to in Sixtus Senensis, Bibliotheca, vol. 6, note 274.dd

16. Towards a Heuristics for Persuading

151

Augustine, however, as usual disagrees (regarding this passage) in his letters 8-19.9 He thinks that Peter was not admonished by Paul deceptively and in a simulated way, but truly and justly. The opinions of many Fathers of the primitive Church match the examples mentioned [above].10 The multitude of opponents leads Augustine (as one can see) to be not sufficiently coherent with himself when he speaks of the Egyptian midwifes as follows: Great human intelligence and pious lie for the purpose of salvation. In general, the doctors of moral theology follow Augustine. Among them, Laymann,ee in Book IV, Treatise III, Chapter III, says the following: “Yet, although it is correct to say that David, Judith, and – even more – the patriarch Jacob lied, since they did not say all the things [they said] by divine inspiration, but also added some things due to their peculiar simplicity, with God permitting their imperfections; nevertheless it does not follow that they sinned. For, being victims of an invincible ignorance, they thought that in such case[s] it was alright to deceive by lying, since the truth that lying is not permitted in any case was not yet known at that time, since even in the time of St. Augustine it had not become usually accepted”. So far Laymann. Augustine himself discusses cases of lying in De mendacio, chap. 14, which is cited by Gratian 2 XXII.8.ff But, since this doctrine of Augustine has not been approved by any ecumenical council, it cannot be taken for a definitive dogma. And even if it had been decided (definita) by some council, it wouldn’t become a matter of divine law [ius divinus] or an article of faith, but only a positive prohibition of ecclesiastic law [ius ecclesiasticus], since the Church cannot establish new articles of faith or create divine law, as correctly argues the bishop of Meaux in his letters.gg And every doctrine that has been accepted by the Saint Fathers of the Church cannot be against an article of faith or against divine law.hh Strictly speaking it is convenient to distinguish saying a falsity from lying, as one distinguishes cunning (dolus) and fraud (fraus).11 It so happens, indeed, that just as there is a good cunning, so too saying a falsity (not bordering in any way on fraud) is not only licit but also imperative – in so far as it cannot be omitted without committing a grave sin. For instance, if someone by not saying a falsity12 would cause the killing of an innocent or, beyond that, a major damage to the republic. 9

This may refer to Augustine’s commentary on verses 8-19 of Galatians. The words in italics in this sentence are corrections introduced by Leibniz. 11 The distinction, as characterized below, hinges on whether the intention is to cause harm or not. 12 Erased by Leibniz: “unduly saying the truth”. 10

Chapter 16

152

For, if the art of dodging an inquirer by means of equivocal [replies] is not at hand, then it is better to deny the truth than, by declaring it, to bring about very great evils. It is not relevant that one should not do evil in order to bring about something good, for often such an evil ceases to be an evil by being used for the good – which is not the case in those acts which are, by their very nature, sinful. But it cannot be proved, either by reason or by the authority of the sacred scriptures, that every [instance of] saying a falsity is, by its very nature, sinful. Rather, the contrary must13 be considered as demonstrated.

H. THE OCCASION FOR PERSUADING Leibniz went to Vienna by the end of the summer of 1700, urged by the new Bishop of Neustadt, Franz Anton von Buchhaim, who had replaced Rojas y Spínola* as the imperial negotiator after the latter’s death. Buchhaim, who had participated in the successful round of negotiations held in Loccum in 1698, had become, as his predecessor, a close, enthusiastic, and trusted associate of Leibniz in the enterprise of Protestant-Catholic reunification. He needed Leibniz in Vienna, for he sensed it was the arena of promising developments, which required prompt consultation and action. The new apostolic nuncio, Giovanni Antonio Davia, was supportive, Emperor Leopold I was actively involved, the change of popes was in the air. There was a real opportunity of obtaining from the Pope a formal “new instruction” issued to the Catholic negotiator, which the Protestants required, the Emperor was willing to write to the Pope requesting his support and to send a trustful envoy to act in Rome on behalf of the cause. Although there were on both sides opponents,ii for which reason Leibniz’s visit was surrounded by secrecy, he was persuaded that the circumstances were such that, at long last, success might be achieved with hard work and prudence. He, for one, didn’t spare his energy. In the ten weeks he stayed in Vienna and surroundings, he drafted the important documents needed, the new papal instruction (A I 19 225-235), the letter of the Emperor to the Pope (A I 19 212-215), the imperial instructions to the designated envoy to Rome (A I 19 225-235), and a detailed report on the state of the negotiations to be presented to the imperial court (A I 19 239-252); he held numerous meetings; wrote countless letters; and even found time to inspect the manuscripts left by Rojas y Spínola. The present well structured draft, written in Vienna presumably for his own use, reflects Leibniz’s optimism-cum-realism. In terms of the very lucid analysis of the ‘kairos’ thus created and how to take advantage of it here provided, the ‘possibility of success’ was high, provided each side came to

13

Instead of debet (‘must’), Grua transcribed potest (‘can’).

16. Towards a Heuristics for Persuading

153

realize the ‘magnitude of the hope’ such a success would accomplish. The negotiations had reached a most promising point, both concerning their detailed and quasi-official formulations and the probability of success.14 Several elements of the strategy Leibniz sketches here are already present in other Chapters (e.g., 26, 27, 33, 35). As on these occasions, the basic principle consists in demanding from each side to take into account the other side’s perspective (see Chapter 17). This principle is here spelled out with the help of a sort of modal axiom, namely, “possibility consists in the possibility of the requisites”. This is also the basic underlying idea of Gerhard Molanus’* ‘irenic method’. According to Molanus (and certainly also in Leibniz’s view), the problem at stake being much harder than the problems faced by Euclid, the method required is also less certain of its results.jj Yet, he believed that, as a rule, it is possible to make the impossible possible precisely by bringing about the fulfilment of the requisites.kk The consideration of the requisites – both those shared by the parties and those specifically bearing on each of them – leads from an abstract and relatively vague notion of ‘possibility’ to an operational and therefore effective notion thereof. The reciprocal satisfaction of these requisites would advance the negotiations and the likelihood of their success precisely in that it would provide palpable indications or ‘signs’ (cf. Chapter 33) of each side’s seriousness of intent. And the requisites themselves would be formulated with utmost moderation. For this purpose, a committee of well-intentioned and “as moderate as possible” (A I 19 202) theologians from both sides would work out proposals to solve remaining controversial issues; even so, it is not required from either side to approve them: “Rome does not have to approve these moderate opinions and to adopt them; it is sufficient that it declares them permitted and not contrary to faith” (ibid.). Unfortunately, in spite of the lucidity, the intensity of the joint effort, and the optimism, this round of negotiations also failed.

Date: November 1700 Edition:15 LH I 11, 226 Language: Latin Persuasion is needed both for the Roman Catholics, especially for Rome, and for the Protestants, especially their princes and the most powerful among them. Persuasion [addresses] shared and specific points. The shared points are those that acknowledge the importance of this undertaking for the salvation of the souls, as well as for the temporal well 14

‘Hope’, a technical term for the chances of winning in a game, which Leibniz employs in his writings on the calculus of probabilities (Chapter 13), is here defined in terms of the persuading ‘reasons’ adduced and the ‘affections’ aroused. In all likelihood, he is here alluding to this earlier sense of the term, while at the same time relying on its definition here, as well as to the familiar, non-technical sense of ‘positive expectation’. 15 This translation is based upon the Vorausedition of this text prepared by Dr. S. Sellschopp, from the BBAW Leibniz Forschungstelle (Potsdam). This text will be published in A IV 7 or 8. We thank Dr. H. Rudolph, head of the Forschungstelle, for permitting the use this material.

154

Chapter 16

being of Christianity, thus avoiding – on both sides – actions that are against decorum, retractions, and insults. The principles of each of the sides should be conserved. On the specific points, the first goal [is] to obtain from Rome a sufficient instruction.ll For this purpose, both negotiation and arguments are needed. The negotiations include Imperial letters and letters from the Papal nuncio, written reports of the Reverend Bishop, oral reports [concerning the same issues] by the Theologian. One can also think of the possibility that the representatives of the Emperor in Rome induce the cardinals favorable [to the negotiations] to cooperate. The arguments consist in presenting, on the one hand, the magnitude of the hope and, on the other, the possibility [of success]. From the former it follows that Rome wants; from the latter, that Rome can. It also follows an obligation, for what is at stake is the salvation of millions who, when the demands (vinculum) of charity are disrupted, perish due to schismatic hatred and blood baths. The allegation and guilt of schism is obviously the task of Rome. The hope comes from the [favorable] disposition of the minds, which was never greater. The causes of the [favorable] dispositions: The number of princes, the diminishing hatreds, the Roman rectifications.16 There were never [oportunities] such as these, and there were never [circumstances] as the most recent ones. Occasions must be taken advantage of, lest they vanish once times and persons change. Possibility consists in the possibility of the requisites. There are requisites from the Protestants and from Rome. From the Protestants, for their return so to speak to the hierarchy, once the schism is eliminated: to explain themselves acceptably about the doctrines and, on the remaining issues, to submit themselves to the church’s decision…17 From Rome, to be as tolerant as possible concerning the rites and to suppress from the Protestants, by means of an efficient declaration, the pretexts of [Catholic] abuses against divine honour. Furthermore, to make explicit dogmatic issues in the most convenient way, leaving for [later] decision by the church minor issues whenever doubts 16

Marginal addition: “The hatreds should not be resurrected by imposing rigorous [demands and] it is good to observe that Rome’s rigors have not proved [to be useful]”. 17 Text interrupted.

16. Towards a Heuristics for Persuading

155

are raised by the Protestants concerning whether a [valid] decision already obtains. These measures are possible or legitimate. The Greek example – be it in the past, as in the Council of Florence,mm be it today, when the Greeks are under Latin influencenn – should not be compared with that of so many flourishing Protestant nations. The example of the French, who do not recognize the last Lateran Council’s decisions and yet are not for this reason heretics, as witnessed by Bellarmine.oo The arguments of the Protestants showing that the enterprise is possible and legitimate, decent, useful, and fruitful. For it to reveal itself as possible, it is necessary that the Roman Papacy declare itself [favorable]pp – otherwise the Protestants will not make further progress. It would also be [necessary to employ] the Loccum method.qq For it to be revealed as legitimate, one should make clear to them [the Protestants] that nothing that runs against conscience is demanded. About decency, [arguments] have already been [adduced]. Utility will appear if damage is avoided and good results are obtained. Concerning damage control, one should avoid raising suspicions – to which everyone is quite prone, as if it were a matter of division and battle between the parties. Thus, it is as if, having dissolved the Confession of Augsburg, one wanted to deprive them [the Protestants] of the benefit of a just peace.rr The advantages are either spiritual or temporal. Spiritual: return (redintegratio) to charity, hence to salvation. Temporal: public peace, previously disturbed by the [above mentioned] allegation. Other (private) benefits are ephemeral,18 and should not be the main motivation. About which something [will be said] in the appropriate place.

I. DISPUTING UNTIL COMPLETION This note is an unusual attempt by Leibniz to provide a formal structure in which all the possibilities of moves in the discussion of a given issue can be exhaustively represented. Through such a representation, some of the basic requirements of a proper dispute would be achieved, namely, avoiding irrelevance, redundancy, and self-contradiction. In this respect, the present text might be seen as providing the form of representation or notation that the rapporteur described in Chapter 19 might use in order to fulfill his task. The background for this model is clearly dyadic in the Platonic sense as well as combinatorial. The 18

Res nata, lit. ‘a born thing’, by opposition to res aeterna, means something ephemeral, transient, insignificant, hence Sp. and Port. ‘nada’.

Chapter 16

156

idea of an exhaustive enumeration of possibilities, here applied to the dialectic process, can be found also in “De l’horizon de la doctrine humaine” (1693; see Leibniz 1991). In another text (presumably from 1676), Leibniz claims, on the contrary, that the number of primary propositions, axioms, terms, and definitions is infinite (C 186).

Date: 1683-1686 Edition: A VI 4 A 576-578 Language: Latin

Method of Disputing until the Completion of the Subject Matter Art of Disputing19 [This method will ensure] that no party can say anything that is not at least pertinent to the matter at hand or that has already been affirmed or refuted. The same method serves in every deliberation, in replying in judicial proceedings, in terminating philosophical or theological controversies, and, in general, wherever many things are said in a misleading way:20 Argument 1 2 3

Objection21 1(1) 1(2) 2(1) 2(2) 3(1) 3(2)

Repartee22 1(1)(1) 1(1)(2)

Retort23 1(2)((1)) 1(2)((2))

The columns are always expanded as follows: the successive ones become longer than the preceding ones, up to the point where nothing else remains to be said. This method is also useful when the dispute begins; however, if it is used to reply in juridical proceedings, or if one is to represent orderly an already resolved question, it is possible to reduce its extension by moving part of [the table] longitudinally as well as vertically, leaving a space or interval between columns. 19

In German in the original: Kunst außzudisputieren. German distinguishes between disputieren and außdisputieren, the former referring to debating or disputing without specification of a partner or adversary, the latter being necessarily ‘dialogical’, for it requires the specification of a partner or adversary. 20 The following diagram presupposes that each argument can only be either accepted (value “1”) or rejected (value “2”). 21 Exceptio. 22 Replica. 23 Duplica.

16. Towards a Heuristics for Persuading [Argument]

[Objection]

157 [Repartee]

[Retort] 1(1)((1))(((1)))

1(1)((1)) 1(1)((1))(((2))) 1(1) 1(1)((2))(((1))) 1(1)((2)) 1(1)((2))(((2))) 1 1(2)((1))(((2))) 1(1)((2)) 1(2)((1))(((2))) 1(2) 1(2)((2))(((1))) 1(2)((2)) 1(2)((2))(((2)))

‘1(2)((2))(((1)))’ means first argument, second objection, second repartee, first retort.

a

For the heuristics for the art of discovery, naturally a more reason-oriented part of dialectics than the art of persuading, see Chapter 12. b On the importance Leibniz assigns to the notion of attention and its connection with awareness or consciousness, see Chapter 6. c Charles Boyle (1676-1731). d This sophism or fallacy is defined by Aristotle as “to synthesize that which is divided or to divide that which belongs to the compound” (Rhetoric 1401a 25-26). For instance, “even though a man is a shoemaker and good, we cannot combine the two properties and also say that he is a good shoemaker” (De Interpretatione 20b35). What Leibniz calls here, however, ‘sophism of division’ is quite different, though related to the Aristotelian definition. He is stressing the fact that the degree of probability of a thesis is not merely the sum of the degrees of probability of each piece of evidence that supports it, but also a function of the interconnections between these pieces of evidence. In an unpublished manuscript of the same period (LH IV 3, 5e 14), he writes: “A body of interconnected arguments strengthens the faith in each other. For this reason, it is most invalid to want to refute a chosen set of these arguments one by one”. He also points out that this ‘plucking’ strategy is “the more dishonest the more ingenious is the person who practices it” and concludes by stating that “this is what I call ‘the sophism of division’, which is quite usual in making ridicule of the arguments of others”. [Cuncta argumenta inter se conjuncta alterum alteri fidem invicem firmabunt. Invalidissima quare singulatim selecta velle confutari, id improbi magis quam ingeniosi fuerit hominis. … Hoc est quod ego voco sophisma divisionis, nonnullis familiari in eludendis aliorum argumentis.]

158 e

Chapter 16

Phalaris (5th century B.C.), the tyrant of Agrigento, was famous for his extreme cruelty, although the Roman sophists depicted him as a humane person. It was the English classical scholar Richard Bentley, in his Dissertation on the Letters of Phalaris (1699) that demonstrated that the well-known Letters of Phalaris had been in fact written quite late (2nd century A.D.) by a sophist or rhetorician. Charles Boyle defended the authenticity of the Letters. f Leibniz comments on the Letters of Phalaris episode in a letter to Thomas Burnett of 2 February 1700, where he says: “Since I don’t like personal contests, I have not examined with care the accusations leveled against Mr. Bentley, nor how he defends himself. Usually, there is some misunderstanding leading to such disputes. As for the main issue between Mr. Bentley and Mr. Boyle, I tend to believe that [any respectable] arbiters of the debate would pronounce themselves against the Letters of Phalaris, despite all the beautiful, ingenious and well-informed arguments of Mr. Boyle, who has wanted to show his wit and ability like Cardan in his Praise of Neron, for I think he [Boyle] is too capable to seriously believe that these letters are indeed from Phalaris” (GP III 267-268). See Chapter 30, note i. g These two opening sentences are important for Leibniz, for he cares to translate them into French in another fragment (A VI 4 64). The first sentence is borrowed from Hobbes*, who, in turn, paraphrased Bacon. Though the underlying metaphor in the three authors’ use of this dictum compares contrastively words with money and with counters, it is important to notice that for Leibniz this metaphor conveys something quite different than for his two predecessors. See Dascal (1987: Chapter 1). h See Chapter 1, for the distinction between inconsequential debates that are nothing but pastimes and serious deliberations that aim to reach a conclusion. Leibniz is suggesting here that the habit, acquired in the former, of juggling with words just to please an audience, may hamper the conduct of the latter. i This characterization of a paradoxical proposition is rhetorical rather than logical. j Leibniz here employs the notion of clarity along the lines of traditional rhetoric, i.e., as one of the virtues pertaining to style that grants it persuasive power. In his early work Marii Nizoli de Veris Principiis et Vera Ratione Philosophandi Contra Pseudophilosophos (1670), he speaks indeed of the clarity of style (A VI 2 409). However, already in that work he also attributes to clarity not only a persuasive, but also an epistemic role (later elaborated in the Meditationes de cognitione, veritate et ideis of 1684), as is patent, for example, in his definition of certainty as “the clarity of truth” (ibid.). k Leibniz is well aware of the fact that a sound moral principle can sometimes be used strategically in order to take advantage of an opponent. For example, in Chapter 17, he discusses the usefulness of the principle of “the other’s place” for anticipating an adversary’s moves. For a comparative analysis of Chapters 16F and 17, see Dascal (1995). l Leibniz has actually applied argumentatively the ‘compensation principle’ here described in his correspondence with Arnauld, playing the role of the plaintiff against an alleged wrongdoing by Arnauld (see Dascal 1995). For another example of its use, this time with Leibniz not as the plaintiff, but as the one who has to face a complaint of this sort, see Chapter 31A. m Augustine wrote two tracts on lying, De mendacio and Contra mendacium. n We are grateful to Stephan Waldhoff’s help in identifying the structure of this manuscript and to Serhii Wakulenko assistance in deciphering the manuscript and in locating all the relevant passages referred to in it. o Old and blind, Isaac prepares to bless Esau, his eldest son. He asks Esau to go hunting and prepare for him a tasty meal, after which he will be blessed. Rebecca, who listened to the

16. Towards a Heuristics for Persuading

159

conversation, reported it to Jacob and told him about her plan to deceive Isaac into blessing Jacob by taking him for his brother. She would prepare the meal Isaac liked, Jacob, disguised as Esau, would bring it to him and get the blessing. So they did. Jacob covered his arms with a goat’s skin in order to resemble the hairy Esau, and after his doubts were overcome, the satiated Isaac blessed Jacob. As Esau returns, the deception is discovered, but Isaac could do no more than recommend to Esau to serve his brother and to vaticinate that he would be able to free himself from Jacob’s domination. p Joseph had wisely managed the affairs of Egypt, accumulating reserves for the hard years to come. When famine fell upon the earth, only in Egypt there were abundant supplies of food. Jacob sent his other sons to Egypt in order to buy wheat. Joseph behaved as if he did not recognize his brothers and treated them as spies. However, unknowing to them, he ordered to fill their sacks with wheat and put in them also the money they had brought for paying. q After Joseph’s death in Egypt, the new pharaoh, worried about the proliferation of Jews there, ordered the Jewish midwifes to kill the newborn Jewish males. They did not fulfill the order and, when interrogated by him, they lied, replying: “Because the Hebrew women are not as the Egyptian women; for they are lively, and are delivered ere the midwives come in unto them”. They were recompensed by God. r St. John Chrysostom (347-407), Church Father. s St. Jerome (347-419), biblical translator, Church Father. t Jerome’s commentary on Ezekiel 17, 19-21 is in fact a reflection on the violation of pacts (especially with God) and their consequences, which bear on the general theme of the present text: “The popular opinion (sententia saecularis) usually waved against us by those who claim that enemies should be fraudulently deceived is “deception (dolus), or virtue, who requires [them] in the enemy?”. For us to acquiesce to it, Zedekiah did worse than that: indeed, he not only deceived the enemy, but the friend with whom he had linked himself through a pact [in the name] of the Lord. Therefore, as long as you do not establish laws and a pact in God’s name, it is prudent and courageous to deceive and overcome the adversary as you can; if, however, you are under the constraint of an oath, it is no way an enemy, but rather a friend who trusted you, and under an oath, i.e., a pledge before God, that has been deceived. This is why the Scripture says now: mine oath that he had despised, and my covenant that he had broken, even it will I recompense upon his own head. And lest we thought the oath, the alliance and the pact belonged to the king of Babylon or to Zedekiah, who made it, it continues: for his trespass that he had trespassed against me. Therefore, he who despises an oath deceives he through whom and commits injustice with he in whose name the adversary trusted. For this reason: And I will spread my net upon him, and he shall be taken in my snare, and I will bring him to Babylon, and will plead with him there. Therefore, everything Nebuchadnezzar did to Zedekiah, he did not do with his forces, but with the wrath of God, in whose name he had falsely oathed” (S. Hieronymi Presbyteri Opera. Pars I. Opera exegetica 4: Commentariorum in Hiezechielem libri XIV, Typographi Brepols Editores Pontificii, 1964 (= Corpus Christianorum, vol. 75), pp. 220-221). The episode to which this passage refers is Zedekiah’s plot with the Egyptian king Aprias against Nebuchadnezzar, under whose dominion Zedekiah had become king of Israel in 597 B.C. In so doing, Zedekiah acted against Jeremiah’s advice (Jeremiah 30-39). u St. Ambrose (339-397), bishop of Milan, Church Father, converted and baptized Augustine. v Presumably the reference is to a passage on the midwifes episode: “In the Scripture there are midwifes who are mentioned … in the third [book], where the pharaoh orders them to kill the sons of the Hebrews (Exodus 1, 15ff.); to which they replied that Hebrew women do

160

Chapter 16

not give birth the same way as the Egyptian ones do: they give birth before the midwifes reach them. This passage is useful for the salvation of the Hebrews; and also, leaving aside the uncomfortable aspect, it nourishes the faith of the midwives, who learned to lie for salvation and to deceive for excusing [themselves]” (Sancti Ambrosii Mediolanensis Episcopis Epistolae. Prima Classis. Epistola V. In Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Patrologiae Latinae, vol. 16, pp. 894-895). w Feeling threatened by Aquis, king of Gath, in whose land he took refuge from Saul, David simulated madness which saved him. x Consulted by an envoy sent by Ben-Haddad about whether the king would survive a malady that affected him, Elijah replied “yes”, omitting however that he would be killed by the envoy, Hazael. y Jehu (king of Israel, 842-815 B.C.) employed the following expedient in order to eliminate all the worshipers of Baal: posing as a great worshiper of Baal, he called for an assembly of all his worshipers, where a great sacrifice to the god would be made. The mass of worshipers was killed by soldiers strategically placed around the god’s temple. z Holofernes was the commander of the Assyrian troops which laid siege on Bethulia (a strategic town on the route to Jerusalem). Judith seduced and inebriated him and, after he was fast asleep, cut his throat. In this way she saved her people from the imminent danger of being forced to worship Nebuchadnezzar as their god. aa The resurrected Jesus meets with Emmaus’s disciples, who were returning home disappointed and skeptical. He joins them and only reveals his identity at the end of the journey, when he consecrates the bread. bb Augustine sometimes employs allegorical interpretation of the Scripture. Leibniz may be here objecting to his excesses in using this sort of hermeneutic procedure. cc According to Paul’s report, when in charge of the Church of Antioch, Peter used to have his meals with the gentiles converted to Christianity, but he secluded them when Christians of Jewish ascendance came to Antioch. Thus, after James’s arrival, Peter hypocritically avoided the sharing of the table with the Christian gentiles (Galatians 2, 11-14). dd Sixtus Senensis (Bibliothecæ Sanctæ F. Sixti Senensis, 2nd vol., Venice, 1574, p. 428 [= Book VI, note 274]) indeed provides a long list of Church Fathers, including Theodorus, Eusebius, Didymus, Apollinarius, Chrysostom, Theodoretus, Theophylactus, Ioannes, and Oecumenius. All of them are mentioned with their qualifications and all agree with Origen’s opinions on this episode, which Sixtus describes as follows: “Origen, commenting this passage (Galatians, 2) in his Commentaries to the Epistle to the Galatians and in the 10th volume of the Stromata, pronounced two opinions that were debated at length later. The first is that Peter and Paul did not engage in a true, but rather in a simulated dissidence for the benefit of the disciples, both being in total inner agreement. [Their aim was to show that], just as Peter, when reprehended by Paul with a simulated reprehension about his simulation regarding the legal provisions (legalia) [= provisions of the ancient law that have no influence in matters of salvation] does not contradict Paul, but as if acknowledging his felony remains silent, so too those who believed that these provisions ought to be obeyed would reflect upon it and give up this obedience. The other opinion is that none of them sinned by simulating, because it is legitimate – even more, it is necessary in many things – to use simulation with the pious purpose of helping”. Against this position and the weight of the mass of authority supporting it, only one dissenter is mentioned – Augustine, whose position Sixtus describes as follows: “Augustine, dissenting from them, affirms that Peter was not reprehended in a simulated way, but rather really and justly, because the simulation employed by Peter for helping the [Christian] community would result in a scandal and

16. Towards a Heuristics for Persuading

161

the loss of the gentiles. Augustine wrote about this wisely and piously in three letters to Jerome as well as elsewhere. It seems, however, that he sometimes treats Peter in a harsher way than he deserves, suggesting that he wanted, through a superstitious and mistaken simulation, to impose heavy duties (legalia onera) upon the community”. ee Paul Laymann (1574-1635), Theologia Moralis in V. Lib. partita. Quibus materiæ omnes practicæ, cum ad externum Ecclesiasticum, tum internum Conscientiæ forum spectantes, nova Methodo explicantur (Douai, 1635; the quote is from chapter 13, number 9, p. 473). It is followed by a passage in which Laymann praises Augustine’s replicas to those who object to his analyses of these and the other cases of lying, deception, and simulation here considered. See also Chapter 27, note q. ff Gratian of Cluse, Benedictine theologian and canonist of the 12th century. The Gratian Decree of 1152 (Secunda Pars, Causa XXII, II, 8) refers to Chapter 14 of Augustine’s De mendacio, and distinguishes several kinds of lies (Patrologiae Cursus Completus, seu Bibliotheca universalis, ed. Migne, Paris, 1891, vol. 187, pp. 1132-1133; also to be found in Corpus Iuris Canonici, Decretum Gratiani, secunda pars, causa 22, quaestio 2, canon 8, ed. Aemilius Ludovicus Friedberg, Leipzig 1879). gg Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet*. In a letter to Leibniz of 9 January 1700, he writes: “According to this rule, one must take as certain that the ecumenical councils, when they decide some truth, do not propose new dogmas, but only declare those that have always been believed and explain them in more clear and precise terms” (A I 18 226). hh In this paragraph Leibniz subtly inserts in the discussion the controversial issue of the authority of ecumenical councils regarding what counts as an article of faith and, using his juridical skill, shifts to this question and expresses his view on the matter (cf. Chapter 34). This, along with the extensive discussion of an array of scriptural and patristic cases, shows that the ostensive theme of this text – the moral problem of lying – is but an instantiation of much more general issues having to do with the conflicts that, at the time it was written, still deeply separated Catholics and Protestants. Against this background, the presumed agreement with Bossuet, a powerful figure in the Catholic camp, was – as the addition of a reference to his letter shows – of great significance for Leibniz. ii “There are many suspicions and prejudice. Few people worry about spiritual matters, and many want only to avoid difficulties and work; they want to be otiose critics; they don’t want to be dedicated collaborators. There are also malevolent persons and a variety of factions – much caution is needed in order not to undergo damage” (To Buchhaim, 6 November 1700; A I 19 201). jj Molanus to Leibniz, 15 May 1685; A I 4 503. kk Ibid. ll The instruction in question is that to be issued to the Roman representative in the negotiations. This is an important point for the Protestants. mm Held in 1438-1439, this Council was attended by the Patriarch of Constantinople and other important Greek Orthodox dignitaries, who reached an agreement with the Roman cardinals about the central doctrinal issues dividing western and eastern Christendom. The local Greek clergy, however, repudiated the agreement, which was not put into practice. nn Perhaps Leibniz has in mind the agreement signed in 1640 between the Protestants and the Greek Church, which was aborted by the Patriarchs of Constantinople, Alexandria and Antioch, whose decision was ratified by the Jerusalem Synod of 1672. The cancellation of that agreement was in the interest of the Venetians who had possessions in the Eastern Mediterranean and promoted the rapprochement between the Greek and the Latin Churches.

162 oo

Chapter 16

The fifth and last Lateran Council, 1512-1517, whose decisions were rejected by the French. Cardinal Bellarmine (Disputationes de controversiis Christianae fidei adversus huius temporis haereticos, 1586, Book II, chapter 13) affirms that, even among the Catholics, there are those who question the status of this Lateran Council as a general council. pp Presumably, this ‘declaration’ refers both to the Protestant’s arguments mentioned in the preceding paragraph and to the declaration mentioned above as one of the specific requisites that Rome must fulfill. qq The ‘Loccum method’ here mentioned is presumably the “irenic method” devised by Molanus,* abbot of Loccum, Leibniz’s closest associate in the irenic negotiations. In a summary of the method sent to Leibniz in May 1685 (A I 4 504-505), Molanus begins by categorically stating that “peace with the Catholic church is possible”, and goes on listing the points of disagreement and spelling out the requisites the Pope should fulfill in order to achieve peace. rr Possibly, an allusion to the Münster/Osnabrück treaty (1648) that ended the Thirty Years War. The treaty used the expression ‘the adherents of the Augsburg Confession’. The plural was intended to suggest that the treaty on religious peace, also signed in Augsburg, but in 1555 (Augsburger Religionsfriede), granted free exercise of their cult to Catholics, Lutherans, and Calvinists, rather than only to Catholics and Lutherans.

Chapter 17 THE OTHER’S PLACE

In this incomplete but carefully formulated note, Leibniz elaborates upon the ‘political’ uses of the so-called Golden Rule, a basic principle of Christian morality often expressed as “not doing what one would not want to be done to oneself”. Expressed in this way, the principle might suggest an ego-centered point of view. But Leibniz makes clear that what he calls ‘the true point of view in politics and morals’ consists rather in the ability to view things from the point of view of the other, taking into account the other’s circumstances, needs, and goals – as if placing oneself in his or her ‘place’. The advantages of so doing are many, not only in ethics and politics, but also in epistemology and argumentation. The best method for obtaining political or military intelligence, Leibniz argues, relies upon this principle. It affords, in general, a precious tool of inquiry because, by considering what others would think or how they would react, one can overcome one’s inevitable epistemic limitations. In particular, the principle gives rise to two corollaries that Leibniz spells out, which can be viewed either as prudential presumptions or as heuristic rules of conduct: if, viewed from the other’s place, something seems unjust, one has to suspect that it is indeed unjust; and if we would not choose something (e.g., a course of action) if in the other’s place, we should think it over with more leisure and care. A further corollary, not spelled out here, but widely employed by Leibniz as a negotiating party or mediator in the solution of conflicts, is to understand the distinction the opponent makes between his essential needs or positions and those he can give up with relative ease. By taking this distinction into account, one can advance towards a solution by making the appropriate concessions and moderating one’s demands (see, e.g., Chapters 27 and 35). In argumentation, one can view the precept – admirably put to use by Leibniz in Chapter 18 – that one can only persuade an adversary by arguing from premises acceptable to him, as a further corollary of “the other’s place” principle. Although it would not be difficult to envisage many other applications of this ‘true point of view’, perhaps the most important one

163 M. Dascal (ed.), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. The Art of Controversies, 163–166. © 2006 Springer.

164

Chapter 17 is in the theory of justice, for Leibniz’s three main principles of justice are consistently formulated by invoking the other’s point of view.1 Leibniz’s ethical justification of the ‘political’ uses of this principle parallels that of Chapter 16G, invoking similar grounds, such as the prevention of consequences that are more harmful than the violation of ethical or juridical obligations (e.g., not to lie, to fulfill one’s contractual obligations, etc.). Such a justification, however, requires extremely subtle discernment of mental states (see, e.g., Chapter 36), which implies the exercise of judgment and does not bear the ‘sure sign of truth’ characteristic of universal or ‘absolute truth’.a Nevertheless, the principle in its various uses is fundamental for Leibniz, who mentions it in some of his most important writings.b

Date: 1679? Edition: A IV 3 903-904; GR 699-701 Language: French The other’s place is the true point of view both in politics and in morals. Jesus Christ’s precept of putting oneself in the other’s place is not only good for the end our Lord speaks of,2 i.e., morals, in order to know our duty with respect to our neighbor, but also for politics, in order to know what designs our neighbor may harbor against us. One’s best access to these designs is obtained by putting oneself in his place, or when one pretends to be counselor and State minister of an enemy or suspect prince. This fiction stimulates our thoughts, and has served me more than once to guess with utmost precision what was concocted elsewhere. In all truth, it can happen that our neighbor is not so ill-meaning or even so clear-sighted as I suppose, but it is safest to assume the worst in political matters, i.e., when it is a question of taking precautions and being on the defensive; just as it is necessary to assume the best in moral affairs, i.e., when what is at stake is harming or offending the other. However, morals itself allows for this kind of policy, when the feared evil is great, as long as the desired security or the guarantee does not cause evils that are greater than the one [to be avoided]; and there is indeed an actio damni infectic in natural law. Thus,

1

The principles “to harm no one”, “to give everyone what he is due”, and “to live honestly” are indeed ‘translated’ respectively as: what you do not want to be done to you, do not do to another; what you want to be done to you, do to another; and what you want others to do to themselves, do to yourself. These are formulations of Christian Thomasius (who calls them, respectively, the rules of ‘justice’, ‘propriety’, and ‘honesty’) that Leibniz endorses in a letter to Bierling of 20 October 1712 (GP VII 508-510). 2 Matth. 7, 12 “So whatever you wish that men would do to you, do so to them; for this is the law of the prophets”; Luc. 6, 31 “And as you wish that men would do to you, do so to them”.

17. The Other’s Place

165

commutative, or if you wish conservative jurisprudence, namely, the one that preserves what each party has, supports this approach. Mr. Sharrok did not believe this principle of morality – namely, not to do that which you would not like to be done unto yourself – to be an absolute truth.d However, Mr. Reiher in the notes, p. 127,e and Pufendorf,* in De jur. Nat., book 5, ch. 13,f sustain it. But they add that the will [the principle refers to] must be understood as a well-ordered will, i.e., one not infected by a false self-love (philautie)g and which observes God’s commands and those of the legitimate powers, following Amesius, Cas. consc., book 3, ch. 1, quest. 6 in this respect.h Pufendorf links this principle, further, to the law which commands us to make other men equal to us, loc. dic., in fin. 5.i See what Mr. Strimesius says in his Origines morales, Diss. de principio morali omnium primo par. 18.j But as soon as this great limitation is necessary and one has to examine the [types of] will and of benefit to be drawn from this principle, it will cease to be a sign and will require other signs.k Thus, it may be said that the other’s place is an appropriate place, both in morals and in politics, to make us discover thoughts, which would otherwise not occur to us. In particular, that everything we would consider unjust, if we were in the other’s place, must seem to us suspect of injustice; and even that everything we would not desire if we were in that place must make us hold on and examine it more maturely. Thus, the sense of the principle is: do not do or refuse with ease what you would not like to be done or refused to you. Think more maturely about it, after having put yourself in the other’s place, as that will provide you with the appropriate considerations for better knowing the consequences of your acts. It is possible to distinguish, further, between the will one would have if one were in the other’s place – which can be unjust, such as, for example, not wanting to pay – and the judgment one would make in that case, for one will always be forced to acknowledge that one must pay. Will is a lesser sign than judgment.l Yet, neither the one nor the other is a sure sign of truth, both serving only to detain us, to arouse our attention and to help us in learning about the consequences and the magnitude of the evils which [our actions] can cause to the other [...].3 a

On the problem of reconciling Leibniz’s combination of the moral and the political uses of the principle, see Dascal (1995). b For a brief discussion of the principle, in the wake of Locke’s giving it as an example of a rule of practical morality, see note k. The principle is also mentioned, among other writings, in the Examen religionis Christianae (FC I 558). c In Latin in the original: ‘action against a non-performed harm’. A parallel expression, cautio damni infecti, ‘precaution against a non-performed harm’ is employed by Leibniz in a similar sense, i.e., intended but not done harm, in his Praefatio Codicis juris gentium 3

The text breaks off here.

166

Chapter 17

diplomatici of 1693 (A IV 5 48-79). In his commentary of Placcius’s book De Actionibus published in 1679, Leibniz mentions damno infecto, ‘non-performed harm’, as one of the categories needed in the classification of the kinds of harm litigations dealt with by Placcius (GR 747; see also Chapter 31). The idea is that one is morally and prudentially, as well as legally, justified in taking steps against eventual harm by others if one has good reasons to suspect them of intending to do such harm. For example, one is justified in breaking a treatise or contract when one has good reasons not to trust the other signatory’s commitment to fulfill the contract’s provisions or guarantees. For, if one overlooks this suspicion (when it is reasonable) – Leibniz is saying – one might cause more harm than that caused by one’s violating the contract. d Robert Sharrock (1630-1684), arch-dean of the cathedral of Winchester, Ypothesis ethice de finibus et officiis secundum naturae jus, Oxford, 1660, 1682. e Leibniz makes use of the Gotha edition (1667), edited by Samuel Reyher, of Sharrock’s work. Presumably Reyher’s note refers to this edition. f Samuel Pufendorf, De jure naturae et gentium, Lund, 1672. In S. Pufendorf, Gesammelte Werke, volumes 1-2, Berlin 1998. g Leibniz’s well-known and often repeated definition of love (e.g., in the letter to Nicaise of 4 May 1698: “to love is to feel pleasure in what suits the beloved one’s happiness”; GP II 581) is essentially altruistic. Since love causes happiness in the lover, it is a form of selflove; yet, in so far as it is derived entirely from the beloved’s happiness, i.e., from ‘true love’, it is not in fact egoistic, and therefore can be conceived as true self-love. False selflove, on the contrary, is presumably based on motives or interests other than causing happiness to others, being thus essentially egoistic. h William Ames (1576-1633), De conscientia eius jure et casibus, 1632. This is a work that engages in a controversy against Bellarmine. i Pufendorf, op. cit., V, 13, 5, where the notion of equity is discussed. j Johann Samuel Strimesius (1648-1730), professor of theology at the university of Frankfurt an der Oder, who criticized Hobbes’s moral philosophy (Pranologia apodictica sive philosophia moralis demonstrativa pythanalogiae Hobbesianae opposite, Frankfurt, 1677). Leibniz’s reference is to Origines morales (Frankfurt, 1679). k Presumably Leibniz is here using the term marque in the sense of a sensible, nonproblematic, transparent indication of how to apply the principle in each case. The demand for and the nature of such ‘signs’ in ecclesiastic matters was often an issue of contention. See, e.g., Chapter 33A. In the sort of hierarchy adumbrated in the last paragraph of this text, where signs are ranged according to their epistemic value, the signs offered by the other’s place principle are certainly not ‘sure signs of truth’ for they act only as ‘recommendations’ for epistemic caution. In discussing this principle in NE (1.2.4), Leibniz claims that it is neither an ‘innate principle’ nor, presumably, an ‘innate truth’ derivable from innate principles, and points out that it is a rule that “far from being capable of serving as a measure, rather needs a measure”. l See note k.

Chapter 18 PERSUADING A SKEPTIC

As the recently appointed advisor for juridical affairs to the Duke of Hanover, Leibniz was in charge of accompanying the inter-confessional negotiations that intensified with the visit of the Apostolic Vicary, Nicolaus Stenus (Stensen) by the end of 1677. The Danish physician and biologist Stensen, converted to Catholicism, had been designated by Pope Innocence XI to conduct exploratory meetings about the possibility of the reunification of the Christian churches. Leibniz held a conversation with Stensen, which he transcribed carefully (GR 268-272) and which served as raw material for the fictional “Dialogue between Poliandre and Theophile” (A VI 4 2219-2240) of 1679. This dialogue is one of a series of four important dialogues of this period, to which Baruzi (1905) gave the collective title “mystical dialogues”. One of them – certainly the most important one, for its extension and quality – is the present text. At about the same time Leibniz was working in the second version of the project he called “Catholic Demonstrations”, which should establish the rational basis of a theology that could be shared by all Christian confessions (A VI 1 494-500). This project confronted him directly with the skeptical attitude, which he had experienced a few years earlier in France – especially in the figure of Simon Foucher with whom he corresponded from 1675 to 1696. The skeptics denied the very possibility of a rational theology and of the conciliation between reason and faith. Against them, therefore, it was not sufficient to provide “demonstrations”; they should at least be coupled with rebuilding an authentic spiritual sensitivity, as a precondition for a productive encounter. The “Conversation between Father Emery and the Marquis de Pianese” lies at the meeting point of all these leibnizian endeavors. For this reason, although it is both an anti-skeptical text (as emphasized by Ezequiel de Olaso) which certainly contains mystical elements (as stressed by Baruzi), neither of these aspects exhausts its import. The two characters in the “Conversation”, rather than representing actual historical persons, represent two paradigmatic human types, possibly exemplified in Leibniz’s environment and certainly relevant for his purposes. In order to characterize these two human types more explicitly, Leibniz rewrote the initial pages of the text, transforming it into a dialogue beginning

167 M. Dascal (ed.), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. The Art of Controversies, 167–200. © 2006 Springer.

168

Chapter 18 with a brief narrative. Both characters are in fact products of disenchantment – the one becomes a skeptic regarding both religion and science as unable to overcome the predominant vanity and intrigue of court life, and the other withdraws from such a life in order to restore the integrity and power of his faith. Between the skeptic who is on the verge of cynicism and the deeply religious man there seems to be an abyss that prevents the very possibility of a real conversation, not to say of persuasion. What is remarkable in the “Conversation” is how Leibniz, having depicted such extreme conditions, undertakes to show how even in such a case true dialogue can become possible. At first, while displaying a certain curiosity vis-à-vis the personality of the famous hermit, the marquis does little more than present one after the other the main skeptic topoi. The hermit, however, does not endeavor to persuade the marquis to accept a system of beliefs or any given method. He rather lures the marquis into a voyage where reason is used in an unprejudiced way with the practical aim of leading to his salvation through faith – a faith which, freed from its commitment to any established dogma, is capable of meeting the requirements of rationality, beyond any particular confession. Once the marquis is persuaded of the possibility and value of this voyage and commits himself to undertaking it with all his “application”, the “balance of reason” is no longer in equilibrium. The skeptical isostheneia gives place then to an initially slight inclination of the balance, which slowly evolves into the enthusiasm of a newly found faith, grounded in rational persuasion. This achievement, as the dialogue shows, is possible if one argues from the other’s reasons, rather than against them, showing how those reasons can be also seen as leading into a different direction. The “Conversation”, some of whose strategies are soon elaborated into a set of rules for solving controversies (Chapter 19) and whose echoes are to be found in Chapter 27, thus adumbrates a model for dialogue that may lead to conciliation by expanding considerably the repertoire of argumentative means. There is a manuscript containing a partially similar version of the beginning of the present dialogue. It bears the title “Dialogue between an able politician and a church man of acknowledged piety”. This manuscript, published by the Academy (A VI 4 2241-2244), contains roughly 10% of the entire dialogue (see note k) and has been thoroughly rewritten by Leibniz in the final version. Baruzi (1905) published only this short beginning and Foucher de Careil in fact combined, without any warning, the two versions into one.

Date: 1679-1681 Edition: A VI 4 C 2245-2283; FC II 512-546 Language: French

18. Persuading a Skeptic

169

Conversation between Father Emery the Hermit and the Marquis of Pianese, Minister of State of Savoy, which has yielded a Remarkable Change in this Minister’s Life or Dialogue about the application one must have for One’s Salvation The marquis of Pianese is well known in the world. Emery Stahl was an achieved German gentleman, capable of a brilliant career in the court, but God removed him from that in the right moment. He made an extraordinary decision, especially for a young man who was raised in luxury, who disposed of the means appropriate for his condition. He decided to leave it all and to go look for a place of reclusion in the Swiss mountains. He lived there in utter simplicity, with his soul lifted towards heaven, and even his moments of relaxation had only God as their object. For, he took pleasure in contemplating God in the marvels of nature. He used to study the simple things, out of which he was skillful in extracting admirable essences, and all those beautiful pieces of knowledge that had earned him mundane prestige, purged of their profane components, became for him as many diverse representations of that greatness and beauty of God which enthralled him. He had a wonderful talent for mathematics, and he wanted to try to imitate their certainty in higher matters. Some of his reflections have been found among his papers, which might one day be published.a He practiced generous charity towards the poor, giving them even medicines whose effects were extraordinary. These achievements ran against his desire to hide. His reclusion became widely known in the world, many people believing that he possessed that famous philosophers’ stone. Princes and noblemen went to see him in order to satisfy their curiosity. But he disappointed them quickly, for he spoke only about God and virtue, which he did with so much force and enthusiasm that all his visitors were deeply touched, some of them taking and performing strong resolutions to cut all the chains of human considerations. The Marquis of Pianese was amongst the latter.b He had gone to see our hermit with this mundane spirit that looks for novelties. He was immediately charmed by the sweetness of his manners, as well as surprised by the austerity of his life. They held many conversations, in which the Marquis conducted himself deftly, for he was endowed with a lively mind, but he addressed matters of piety in an excessively nonchalant way. The hermit was

170

Chapter 18

not happy with that and he undertook to study carefully his interlocutor in order to get to know his weaknesses so as to be able to attack him through them. He soon observed that the Marquis often talked about the vanity of all things in the world. Although this seemed favorable to piety and retirement, the subtle hermit noticed that the Marquis understood it in a different sense: he was in fact infected by the skepticism current among courtiers and he hated all application to matters that are not visibly related to the senses and to the present interests. He even tended to include in the category of vain investigations an extraordinary care of heavenly matters, certainly believing that it is enough to guide oneself by the example of others and to respect custom.c Having thus taken the Marquis’ pulse, and being sure that this was his illness, the hermit diverted the conversation towards the sciences. He said that we should thank God for having given us so many means of knowing and loving him. The Marquis replied that he had always believed that we knew practically nothing, that mathematics was more amusing than useful except for those that make a profession out of it, that medicine was ill grounded, that morality was haunted by imagination, that theology was bound by difficult controversies. His view was that one should leave research on nature to persons who made inquisitiveness their profession and to follow only custom in morals and the Church in matters of faith.d He had seen many highly reputed persons, but he never saw in them anything capable of convincing him that there was such a thing as knowledge of God and nature above the vulgar one. He believed that often there was more affectation and pose, that one would make a big show out of small curiosities or of a measure of austerity capable of astonishing ordinary people, but that, ultimately, we were all equally ignorant whenever the issue was about something of importance. Finally, he declared that he wanted to be proved to be wrong, and that he was persuaded that, if there was somebody in the world capable of changing his mind, this was the person he had now the honor to talk to. All this was intended to force the hermit to disclose himself somewhat, for the Marquis ardently hoped to watch a display, since he had been told that the hermit was an adept.1 The hermit, however, turned the conversation towards a different direction. He let the Marquis know that he didn’t attribute to himself anything that was above the vulgar, except for application; for – he said – men differ only in their application, which is in what consists the grace that distinguishes them, since one can say that nature has [otherwise] treated them equally. God grants attention to those he wants to withdraw from public corruption: they don’t need revelation nor miracles; 1

‘Adept’ was currently used at the time to refer to alchemists. See the suggestion above that Emery possessed the philosophers’ stone and was reputed to be a sort of magician.

18. Persuading a Skeptic

171

it is not even necessary that they have knowledge above the ordinary – neither of nature nor of God; for the seeds of the most important truths are in the soul of the lowest peasant and one must only collect and cultivate them carefully.e That is to say, one should not consider things nonchalantly, but rather take the inviolable resolution to relate everything to one end – which is to perfect oneself. And, as if what was at stake was to obtain a position or to make a fortune, one should demonstrate the same care as that demonstrated by prudent persons who decidedly pursue their ends. I have no other secret (he said) to reveal to those who seek not small curiosities but something big and solid.2 For, if I had panaceas and dyes, which I don’t, I wouldn’t count them as of any value if compared with that universal medicine of souls. Therefore, I am not surprised, Monsieur, that you despise all attachments, since you imagine that the only things that deserve attachment are striking and extraordinary, which only rarely or not at all exist as one wishes. As for myself, I believe that ordinary things as fire and water are the most efficient ones; hence, I feel that what is extraordinarily useful in the world lies only in the use [of things] and in the application [of the mind].f Consider the Elements of the geometers. Is there anything simpler than the axioms and the requests that are to be found at the beginning of this book? Nevertheless, their mere ordering has yielded so many surprising truths. This is, therefore, how custom differs from reason. Those who follow the former do not penetrate into anything; they resemble schoolchildren who content themselves with reading Euclid’s axioms without moving on to the theorems derived from them, or to a skeptic who would ridicule those geometers who boast they possess extraordinary knowledge and who have in fact nothing else than what they draw from so low and trivial truths, which one would be ashamed to mention in a social conversation. You, Monsieur, desire only striking novelties, signa et prodigia.3 Yet, when one reports to you only ordinary things, while showing that it is up to you to draw from them something important for your perfection, even though one shows you the method and volunteers to pave the way for you, you are disheartened. However, this is the order of things, established by providence. We wouldn’t know anything if we would not know it through the principles, which are always easy. A man who knew by heart the beautiful propositions of geometry without knowing their demonstrations would have loaded his memory, but he would not have perfected his mind. The same is true regarding the science of God and the true life. One can only tell you ordinary things, since one must begin by the 2 3

Here the transition from reported speech to direct dialogue begins. “Signs and wonders” (see Matth. 24:24; Mark 13:22). This phrase is a warning, since Jesus warns that such signs and prodigies will be displayed by false prophets whose aim is to seduce the people.

172

Chapter 18

easy principles granted by you, but if you apply yourself, a happy change will occur in you, of which you will be surprised. Marquis o f Pianese: I strongly doubt reason can establish something solid regarding practical matters, for there is nothing but custom in morality and faith in religion that can be followed. The Hermit : You apparently distinguish custom and faith; but, as you conceive of it, it seems to me that your faith is nothing but a sort of custom in matters of cult. If you were born a Mohammedan, you would claim the same.g P: I thank God for what I am. E: Doesn’t a Muslim do the same? P: What do you want one to do? God grants his grace to whomever he wants. E: Yes, no doubt, and to those who want it. P: Willing itself is God’s grace. E: But willing is nothing but a strong resolve to apply oneself to what concerns one’s salvation; it is useless to look for the source of the will. For what can one desire more from God and from nature? Isn’t it sufficient not to need anything else than will and attention in order to be either happy or inexcusable? P: This application you recommend would be useful if there were indications that one could benefit from research; but experience shows that there is nothing as useless as that. And when one wants to abandon custom in order to meditate and to follow some presumed reason, one gets immediately lost in a labyrinth of disputes. For I observe that men almost never agree with each other, that there is no way to eliminate doubt, and that reflection itself only serves to confuse us more. It seems to me that nature has not made us in order to enjoy truth, but to let us follow appearances. This is why I have decided long time ago not to worry any more about this presumed knowledge; I would be satisfied with living an easy life, a life free from all reflections that make one stubborn. E: Beware, Monsieur, not to be too negligent with yourself, thereby offending God who has not given you such a penetrating mind in order to use it for watching only the surface of things. I think it would be more to the point to blame our laziness rather than nature, which has certainly created us for a nobler end than the animals who follow blindly each other and throw themselves each behind the other. As for the uncertainty that you believe to find everywhere, I could disclose to you its cause as well as its remedy, if you agree. P: I would be delighted. For what you suggest as a remedy against uncertainty seems to me paradoxical, and paradoxes are agreeable when a clever person like you gives them one day a beautiful look.

18. Persuading a Skeptic

173

E: I am far removed from those who enjoy paradoxes and I do not propose things except when I am deeply convinced of them. I can assure you that my attempt to satisfy you will not aim at satisfying your love for novelty; I will rather take advantage of your inclination in order to make you more attentive. Here is then the cause of uncertainty and of fruitless disputes; we will talk later about the remedies. There is comfort and lack of comfort, good and evil in all things of the profane as well as of the sacred world – this is what disturbs men, this is what gives rise to the diversity of opinions, everyone considering each thing from a particular side. There are only a few persons capable to turn around the thing until they put themselves in the place of their adversary – that is to say, persons who undertake to examine the pro and the contra with equal application and without bias, in order to see to which side the balance should incline.h One needs a lot of time for this, and our passions and amusements do not afford it to us.i Normally, we have a certain spirit of contradiction, and we are proud not to listen to anything without having some criticism; we make a point of opposing every judgment and desire of ordinary men. In this way, we make everything problematic, and since we enjoy disputes, why are we surprised if everything turns out to be disputable for those who do not go beyond light considerations? Especially since, usually, one does not engage in them for benefit but for amusing oneself.j You yourself said that you want to follow custom, Monsieur, and yet you say that you enjoy paradoxes. This means that you don’t intend to follow them. Holding singular opinions gives us an imaginary superiority over others, [for] we would feel sorrowful if we spoke like the vulgar, even though we follow the general flood of corruption. What we are interested in is speaking well and looking well, nothing else.k When we find some ingenious rejoinder that can rebuff or discomfit the person who presents to us some proposition, which may be useful and well grounded, we are satisfied with our victory, and we move on to other topics, without examining who is actually right – at least when our interest is not at stake, since we are ready to accept a defeat that flatters our laziness with some appearance of reason. The source of all this lies in the fact that we treat most issues by way of amusement or showing-up, rather than in order to reach a conclusion that could have some influence in conducting our lives – like students of philosophy who discuss about the virtues, vices and passions without being touched by it in any way. P: Do you want one to rack one’s brains about a thousand useless things? Isn’t it enough for everyone to follow his vocation and the course of life he has decided upon after a mature deliberation? The rest should serve to rejoice rather than to sorrow us. E: It is certainly enough that everyone follow his vocation, but it pertains to our vocation to think about the correction of our life and to rectify our

174

Chapter 18

judgment on important matters which can make us change something in our behavior. Do you think that Constantine the Great would have ever decided to become a Christian or that Carloman, Charlemagne’s uncle, would have abdicated in order to care only for his salvation, if they had only thought lightly and in passing about these matters? You will say that Constantine the Great witnessed a miracle and Carloman exaggerated (you will perhaps even laugh at the innocence of his time). I agree with you that the zeal for piety and taking care of our affairs are not incompatible; hence, Carloman’s act is not always an example to be followed.l However, regarding the miracle that forced Constantine to convert, this is something not yet verified; even if it were, I believe that God’s voice that speaks to us internally must have as much power upon balanced minds as a prodigy that strikes the vulgar.m For this reason I would hope that men set up themselves to decide sometimes to take a sort of mental retirement, in order to examine with leisure their present and future state and to take some vigorous resolution, not so much in order to abandon the world but to get rid of this dangerous indifference. P: Believe me that there have been many that have been led often to this kind of reflections. But, having realized that this has yielded nothing but mental disturbance, whose only result is to poison the sweetness of the limited amount of life nature has granted us, they abandoned them – especially since they observed that the more one thinks about it the more one is confused. I belonged to these dreamers; but Montaigne and Le Vayer have cured me from this kind of illness.n E: Oh, Monsieur, what are you saying! These are the true means to suffocate all Christian feeling and to plunge into an unhappy skepticism. As for me, I couldn’t read these authors without feeling pity both for their blindness and for the evil they produce in the souls. I thank God not for having presumably received from him more talent than others, for I am ready to give it up. I think the ordinary problem lies in the fact that those who have more wit and knowledge are also those who have less devotion. But I have received from God a particular grace, which I appreciate more than all others, a grace that many people would not accept: I am pervaded by the sacred truths and I intend to retain in my ears this voice that calls us to exercise our judgment. This is why everything I think of gives me occasion to correct myself and there is no conversation that does not offer me the opportunity to relate everything to the glory of this God I love. You would hardly believe, Monsieur, what sweetness I find in this way of life, and if it were usual for men to experience it, many persons would envy my happiness. I am persuaded that the World is a sort of City as well ordered as possible, controlled by the Lord’s wisdom and sovereign power. How could I not love such a master who is goodness itself and who satisfies all my desires? For if I am lucky to preserve up to the end these opinions which are

18. Persuading a Skeptic

175

so favored by his grace and so reasonable, I will surely enjoy a happiness that goes beyond all imagination, whereas if I distance myself from God even a little I see only misery in the human condition. This is why I am not surprised that those who do not think deeply enough about these matters do not choose to reflect seriously, for such a reflection would present to them their unhappy state without letting them see any remedy. A slave chained in the galleys will endeavor to turn his thoughts away from his unhappiness, and he who expects torture when leaving his prison will plunge in a sort of stupor, so as not to feel the torment in advance. But those first Christians [who] waited for martyrdom’s crown, had pleasure in their chains, and when they believed they were destined to glory after passing by some difficult moments, they did not follow at all Montaigne’s advice, according to which one should plunge into death with one’s head down and thinking about it as little as one can.o I think that you will grant me that whoever holds these generous opinions and is satisfied with the future can make reflections that are compatible with the sweetness of life. I would dare to say that one can not really enjoy life without being persuaded of what I have just explained. Aren’t we in a prison that gives us a thousand sorrows, and when leaving it aren’t we to expect greater tortures than those reserved for criminals? For those who are decapitated feel practically nothing upon dying, whereas most those who die in their beds are subject to torments of agony that often go beyond the torments inflicted upon the convicted. But there is still something else to fear beyond death. For, whatever the effort we do in order to divert our attention from the worries of the future, it is not in our power to prevent some bothersome ideas to enter our minds, ideas that, contrary to our will, make us think about what we will become, serving as admonition to those who can correct themselves and as punishment to those who are evil. For this sourness is salutary for the former and unbearable for the latter; and yet, those who do not feel it should consider themselves as more unfortunate because God does not even grant them the grace of his admonition. It remains true, however, that those who will not listen to his voice deserve more punishment than the others. P: Your speech hurts and confuses me, and if I had foreseen that you would speak in this way I would have avoided giving you the occasion to do so. E: Eh, Monsieur, is it to confuse you to propose to you the means to live with an incomparable satisfaction, in such a way that you will be able to expect everything and fear nothing? P: You depict a horrifying picture of life and death, and in order to calm me down you tell me fairy tales. For all these nice promises dissolve in the air when one examines them without bias, and I have often heard such things

176

Chapter 18

from visionaries and hypocrites.p Therefore I avoid this kind of useless discussions as far as I can. E: For my part, I consider it to be one of the greatest sins to deviate the mind from the necessary attention. It is to turn off the rest of divine light, it is to oppose the emerging grace, it is to come dangerously close to a sin against the Holy Ghost. P: These are big words, but I do not let myself be blinded by their gleam. I think it is enough to have examined things closely once in order to make one’s mind, and once this has been done one must stick to it without confusing the mind any longer; otherwise one would always suffer, floating between fear and hope.q E: I reply by drawing a comparison from a field familiar to you. Imagine that you are on top of a bastion captured from the enemy. There are reasons to fear that there is a hidden mine underneath the bastion. You look for it in vain and, tired from searching, you must rest, whatever will happen. You will certainly be anguished for quite a while; the slightest noise will cause you a mortal fear, unless you are brutal or hardened, or endowed with excellent natural powers, or else if you are used to overcome the passions by reason. For it is true that reason will direct you to divert the mind from these useless worries that are of no help and do not let you rest. But the same reason does not want you to neglect to think about some new way of protecting yourself; and you would be quite wrong to reject the slightest new clue in a matter of such importance, under the pretext that you have thought enough about it and that you shouldn’t worry about it any more. To be sure, you would have the right to speak thus if you were sure to have done all that can be done and if you possessed a method that ensured that you have not overlooked anything. This would exempt you from all future investigations, which can be the case when what is at stake is to look for the mine. But you will admit that you are too skeptic to believe that one could find such a method regarding matters more remote from the senses. Nevertheless, isn’t it strange that you purport to exempt yourself from all care only because chance has not crowned your first efforts and because you are disheartened? Certainly, if the task were to dig in order to find this dangerous mine, you would not be so negligent, and you would imagine that the powder could snatch away your legs and arms, leaving you to drag a remaining life worse than death. And yet, when the issue is the ultimate misery or happiness, you pretend a false tranquility that one day will cost you much. P: But it follows that I wouldn’t be able to do anything else if I had always to look for or if I had always to listen to all those that meddle with lecturing us. E: You give a despicable name to my salutary recommendations. But you shouldn’t fear that many people would bother you with them. They are

18. Persuading a Skeptic

177

familiar with their surroundings: you will not be bothered by them. Your obligations should not serve as a pretext, because the hour we are to use – if I am happy enough to make you agree – could it detract from your obligations, whatever they are? P: You are really insistent, and I must grant you what you wish, for I respect you enough for not allowing you to think I am stubborn – but only on the condition that you will not burden me with these things henceforth. E: This condition is unfair. For how do you want me to find precisely that precious moment God has perhaps reserved for you? You should know that one strike does not knock down the tree; beware that you are stipulating something that is directly against your interests, something that does not depend upon me to promise nor upon you to accept. P: After having violated my prior resolution of not getting involved anymore in such discussions, you have produced in me some willingness to listen to what you would say. But beware to affirm only what is well grounded. You know that, thank God, I am a Christian. But I want you to return to the source, as if you were dealing with a person that doesn’t grant you anything, regardless of what he believes deep in his heart. For, since you have taken me to be a Skeptic, I will impersonate a Skeptic and employ his weapons in order to make you repent for it. E: What you say is pleasing rather than intimidating to me, Monsieur. There are few persons who boast to belong to the big world who do not need sometimes a bolstering of their faith. I prefer that you reply expressing your true feeling than that you grant me anything just for complying. P: Well, then, let us begin. E: I have always acknowledged that Skepticism is the source of incredulity and of the lack of attachment to spiritual things I observe in mundane persons. They imagine that most things that are delivered from the pulpits are fantasies, for they have often observed that those who preach speak following their interests even though they are not the most convinced; they have seen that a great deal of absurdities and fables are mixed with pious teachings; they have discovered many falsely devout persons. And when a confrontation takes place, the ordinary vivacity of persons that have always participated in social encounters grants them an advantage over those who are devoted to piety, who keep themselves away or are kept away from the world; the latter’s humble simplicity is quickly disarmed by this imperious and despising air of the former, who are impatient when one disturbs their pleasures or their business. If they wanted to pursue to the end the inquiry, maybe they would recognize themselves at last. But their frivolity or distraction do not allow them to get attached and, having learned through an infinity of examples that it is easy to dispute about anything that is not given to the senses, they believe there is nothing certain. They are

178

Chapter 18

easily persuaded that positive dogmas are nothing but inventions of some able hypocrite or of some melancholic mind who is barred by nature or fortune from enjoying the pleasures they condemn in others. I have thus learned, through many conversations, that we will have much to gain by rekindling the will to find the truth – which has been abolished by the despair of finding it. P: You have spotted the point where I am most sensitive. I have indeed realized that we are all ignorant in so far as we are,4 that all our reasonings are grounded only on assumptions, that we lack principles that enable us to judge about things, that there is no rule of truth, that each of us has his particular sense and that there is almost no shared sense.r For, were it not for this reason, wherefrom would come all the discussions, which led an old man to say that clocks would agree better than philosophers? Wherefrom would it result that all meetings yield nothing, that we never see that an able man cedes to another, and that even several persons whom I believe are looking sincerely for the truth never meet each other on their way? E: It should not be difficult to develop these points. Let us suppose, just for fun, that we could find the truth, that one could establish incontestable principles, that it is possible to have a sure method to deduce from them important consequences, and that God himself sends to us from heaven this new Logic. I am convinced that, in spite of that, men would not cease to quarrel, as they usually do. P: If you could demonstrate that to me, it would already be something. E: This is easy to see, Monsieur. Wouldn’t you grant that there is a means to be certain about the conclusions drawn in Geometry? P: I admit it. E: And in spite of that, there are people who strangely quarrel in this domain, to wit those purported circle squarers or cube doublers.s It is therefore certain that we would have a Geometry as uncertain and contested as metaphysics, if there were many writers similar to a certain Bertrand de la Coste,t or to a man I have met in Paris, who, in a book titled Haec nova novis,5 promises to provide nothing less than the squaring of the circle, the doubling of the cube, and the perpetual movement, all together. P: That is true, and I grant that sometimes it happens that we have good principles which we don’t make use of. But how can we know whether those we have are good or whether we have made good use of them? Geometry is sufficiently verified by the senses and the occurrences, whose help is useless in spiritual matters and in those matters that concern the future. 4 5

Text variant: “that all our knowledge is nothing but vanity”. “News for the moderns” is a possible free translation of this book, which the Academy edition declares to be unknown.

18. Persuading a Skeptic

179

E: Nature has been more liberal with us than we think, and we have other means to judge things. If you had had leisure for studying geometry, you would have seen that its principles do not depend on experience. They depend on certain propositions of the sovereign reason, which apply also to other subject matters. For example, if there were a balance exactly adjusted on its two sides and loaded on both sides with two equal globes of the same stuff, wouldn’t you grant that it would remain in equilibrium after one had balanced it once? P: I grant it. E: Tell me: on the basis of what do you judge this [to be true]? Do you need an experience in order to be sure of it, or rather isn’t it an inner light that forces you to grant your agreement to it? P: It is true that I would dare to engage in it whatever courage I have, and yet – I confess – I don’t remember having ever had the experience in question. E: But think about it a bit and tell me why your judgment is as it is. P: It is because I clearly see that it is not possible to justify diversity when everything is similar on both sides. E: This is a good start. I assure you that there are many other principles we employ every day in reasoning without having learned them from experience, and yet success verifies them. And there is no sensible man who does not comply with them, when what is at stake is not a vain dispute but a matter of practice and interest. Who is not quite persuaded that the Romans were masters of a large portion of the world, that there is a Pope in Rome, and that there will be a winter and a summer next year? For, even though none of these [principles] can be demonstrated absolutely, they are so certain that we would venture our lives based on them, as we do every day on the basis of even less certain principles.6 We hold as certain that what has always occurred as far as we remember (e.g., that night and day follow each other) will occur again; similarly, that it is not likely that those who have not been able to arrange their mutual relations will be able to agree regarding a large number of minor matters. It is in this way that we judge that there is a city in the world called Constantinople. The following principle of our religion is of the same kind: one cannot make a large number of correct and detailed predictions of the changes that will take place after several centuries, unless one is a prophet sent by God. And there are many similar axioms. P: All these things are certain enough, but there are many others that are not certain at all, for which men battle with each other. Recall for example 6

The term ‘principles’ employed in Emery’s present turn is deliberately ambiguous, covering rules of inference, axioms, and obviously true propositions that can serve as premises of a sound inference.

180

Chapter 18

the animosities between theologians, the uncertainties of law, the contradictions of doctors, the diversity of customs and of maxims [of conduct], and you will agree with me. Maybe you yourself will confess that one should not hope to end it all. E: What would you give me, Monsieur, if I would show you a method that guarantees that they would always be ended, following the principles of an undisputable prudence? P: I would give you my word that I would always listen to you with all the attention a man is capable of.u E: This is owed only to God. If you grant me this it is only in order to make you attentive to God. Isn’t it true that we possess the art of assessing consequences?v P: That is indeed the case when they are reduced to form. E: But isn’t it always easy to reduce them to form? P: I think it is. This is practiced in the schools, in a fruitless way. E: No, Monsieur, it is not practiced there. One begins to do it there, or rather one feigns to do it, but one does not proceed with it to the end, and one does not pay attention to the fact that form does not consist in the tedious ‘whoever’, ‘and’, ‘therefore’.7, w P: In what does it consist, then? E: In that all reasoning, once expressed in precise and sufficient propositions so that there is nothing to add, with the useless words removed as far as possible, and ordered and connected in such a way that the conclusion is yielded by the form and not by the matter (i.e., in the present case as well as in any other)x – this, I say, is an argument in form, even though it does not follow the order and fashion of the school. For a chain of arguments or a sorites,8 a dilemma or enumeration of all cases, as well as every mathematical demonstration rigorously formed – even an algebraic calculation or an arithmetical operation – are arguments in form, as much as the vulgar three-termed syllogisms. P: This surprises me. But I consider it reasonable, and I begin to see that if we had the patience or the leisure to employ this rigor, we would be able to examine everything with order and method. For I can see that every argument can be reduced to form, i.e., made precise and simple, and that once this is done, one can judge infallibly and distinctly whether something is missing for the completeness and the connection of the premises. Yet, I still discern one difficulty: even if all premises are put into form, the difficulty concerning the matter has not been removed, i.e., how can we 7

In Latin: quicunque, atqui, ergo. Leibniz is referring to the repetitive elements characteristic of syllogistic or other logical patterns. 8 Sorites and dilemma are types of so-called “compounded syllogisms”, formed through the chaining of several simple syllogisms.

18. Persuading a Skeptic

181

know whether the propositions we have employed are true or false, and whether they require proof or can be taken as principles. E: I will give you a sure method of completing the investigation: not to admit anything that is even slightly doubtful without having it proved in the same form.y P: But one usually makes mistakes by taking for certain or doubtful that which is not. E: Here is the remedy. Strictly speaking, one must say that every proposition needs proof, if it is provable. But there are only two kinds of propositions that cannot be proved. The first are those whose contrary implies contradiction: for what would be my proof good for, if the same conclusion can be true or false? The others are those who consist in an internal experience, that cannot be rectified by indices or witnesses, since it is immediately present to me and there is nothing between it and myself, as in the case of the propositions ‘I am’, ‘I feel’, ‘I think’, ‘I want this or that’. But it is not so certain to say: ‘that which I feel subsists outside of myself’, ‘that which I think is reasonable’, ‘that which I want is just’.z P: If you don’t employ other principles besides those you have mentioned, I cannot but agree with you. But I can hardly understand how principles that are so limited and sterile can yield so many things that we purport to know. E: My reply is that these principles are not as limited as they seem. For through the principle of contradiction all the axioms whose truth becomes apparent by the mere explication of terms are demonstrated, for otherwise there would be contradiction in terms. And the inner experiences provide us the means for judging about the things that exist outside ourselves. For when the appearances we sense are well ordered (bien suivies), so that they allow for successful predictions, they allow us thereby to distinguish wakefulness from what we call dreams; and knowing by the axioms that every change must have some cause, this leads us to the knowledge of the things external to ourselves.aa P: Your replies give me a satisfaction I had not expected. Now, if the main axioms were ranged and demonstrated as the geometers do, i.e., in form and rigorously, and if the experiences were well ordered and connected with the axioms, I think one could create in this way admirable Elements of human knowledge,bb and distinguish between the true, the probable and the doubtful. I can even imagine that this enterprise would not be above the forces of a few able persons, for I clearly envisage that in those matters where it is not possible to go beyond probability, it would be sufficient to demonstrate the degree of probability and to make visible to which side the balance of probabilities (apparences) must necessarily be inclined.cc

182

Chapter 18

E: This would be desirable, but in order to achieve my present purpose, I don’t require as much. Since you acknowledge that there are means to be certain of what one has to judge of things through probabilities, let us content ourselves with using this kind of rigor regarding the question of supreme misery or happiness.dd For, since this is possible, as we have acknowledged, it follows that every reasonable man must use this incontestable method. Not in all things, for this is impossible, since time would not suffice for it, but at least in the most important points of life, especially when what is at stake is either sovereign happiness or unlimited misery. Isn’t it deplorable to see that men already possessed for a long time an admirable tool for avoiding ill reasoning, and that they have not used it because some pedants had ridiculously abused such a beautiful invention. Should humankind suffer from their stupidity? Should we deprive ourselves from a means that could bring us rest in life, just for the sake of those who cavalierly disdain logic as well as any other serious form of application? I know that many reliable persons would be surprised by my proposals favorable to logic, reasoning in form and rigor, and I even think that those who do not know me might take this as an opportunity for forming a bad opinion about me. But I believe that I would be able to explain myself to them, if they would make the effort to listen carefully to me. I know that they usually assume that mistakes are rarely due to a neglect of the form; and they point out other sources of error, which I acknowledge. But I trust I can show that these are nothing but hidden derivations (écoulements cachés) of the neglected form, and that there is no need to provide other precepts in order to avoid them. For it is sufficient to care for enough exactitude and to have enough patience in order to respect form rigorously. However, I understand form in a somewhat different way than usual, as I have explained above. Euclid, in my opinion, has usually reasoned in form. Why then not follow elsewhere the same rigor, i.e., this simplicity of cleaned up propositions, this order or concatenation of reasons, this care not to omit anything under the pretext that an enthymeme is being used, endeavoring to note down all the propositions employed, either explicitly or referring to them (par remission)? This is what rendered the geometricians so exact, and there is nothing in all this that cannot be done everywhere. Let us think, if you please, about the amount of application of a Euclid or a Apollonius, what patience, what lengthy sequence of reasons: and yet the fruit of such a huge work has been but the solution of a small number of problems – useful to truth, no doubt, but such that the flourishing kingdom of China has been able to live without it for so many centuries.ee As for ourselves, who boast being Christians, we have not the guts to undertake a much easier and shorter work, which would make us sure of the true religion and would give us the means to incontestably

18. Persuading a Skeptic

183

persuade reasonable people – all of it causing to our minds a contentment that goes beyond anything we could wish for down here. P: It is true that this way of reasoning in rigor would lead us to the end, but I am afraid we might be sorry for that. For, we might find the contrary of what we purport to. Bear in mind that I am talking as a skeptic who has the right to suspect that what is said of providence and of faith is nothing but nice chimeras. I fear that such an excessively exact investigation might reveal to us the absurdity of all that talk, in case one finds out, ultimately, that everything is vain – in which case it would have been better to be happily mistaken conserving a slight hope which can passably comfort us, than to meet despair by looking for certainty. E: This is the last effort of dying Skepticism. This challenge isn’t worth more than despair. It is in vain that one tries to cheat one’s conscience, and it is a crime not to employ all one’s forces in order to learn one’s duty. If providence exists, do you believe that God would be exposed to this kind of reason? If fear of offending a great Prince restrains the more exalted ones, would we dare to act against the laws of the Monarch of the universe, who will certainly know how to enforce them in a way capable to terrorize us, tiny worms on earth. This fear is well grounded, as long as we are not quite sure that such a monarch does not exist, and the least reason to suspect that such a great disgrace as his fury [might fall upon us] should affect a prudent person.ff But there are many other suspicions, for all the appearances are in favor of [the existence of] providence. P: There are, however, more difficulties than simple persons envisage. E: Don’t you accept that there is an admirable order in things? P: Not quite. I admire the production of things, but I find fault in their destruction. Every organic body in itself is admirably well built, but this multitude of bodies that collide with each other produce a strange effect. Is there anything as hard as observing that the stronger surmounts the weaker, that justice and power do not coincide at all, and that everywhere what prevails is a sort of chance, which mocks wisdom and equity? E: I reply that everything that seems to us extravagant will be rewarded9 in a way that is unforeseeable to us. In fact, this is in accordance with the order of providence, otherwise there would not be any merit in it. Nevertheless providence can be inferred quite well from what you have granted, for since a part of things is well ordered, so that it is almost impossible not to acknowledge in it an infinite wisdom, it is impossible to believe that his providence does not cover everything. It will care to make 9

Recompensé. Leibniz is here presumably exploring the similarity between recompenser (reward) and compenser (compensate) in order to strengthen the analogy between the physical, the metaphysical, the ethical and the theological versions of his general principle of compensation (the principle of the best or of perfection).

184

Chapter 18

the least insect with divine craftsmanship, there will be twenty thousand visible animals in one drop of water, and none of them will be such that its structure isn’t superior to all the ingenuity of human inventions – in sum, the least atom will be full of dynamic bodies, being thus marvelously well formed.gg Therefore, how would it be possible that this providence, that has been so careful with the smallest part, would neglect the whole, and that which is noblest in the universe, namely minds (esprits)? P: I would gladly surrender [to this argument], if you could free me from some important scruples that block me. You maintain that it is providence that forms, for instance, every thing that is so successfully connected in the construction of animals. This would be reasonable, were it only the case for a particular cause. For when we see a poem, we have no doubt that it was composed by a man; but when what is in question is nature as a whole, one must reason otherwise. Lucretius, following Epicure, made use of a few exceptions that greatly hurt your argument, based on the order of things. He says that feet are not made for walking; rather, men walk because they have feet. If you ask, then, why it turns out that things fit each other so well in the animal’s machine, as if everything was made intentionally, Lucretius will reply that it is necessity that brings about that ill-made things disappear and well-made ones are preserved and seem to be the only ones; therefore, although there is an infinity of ill-made things, they cannot remain among the others.hh E: These persons are patently wrong. For we never see things half-made; how would the ill-made things disappear so early, and how would they escape our eyes armed with the microscope? On the contrary: as we penetrate ever deeper inside nature, we have reason to be marveled by the surprise of what we find. First of all, there are beautiful things that do not help a species to maintain itself and be more salient than another – e.g., the admirable structure of the eyes will not give to a species the advantage of existing over another. Furthermore, why do all the animals that have wings display in them a surprising mechanism? Why there is no species of birds having drafts of wings, defectively built or such that one of the wings be alright and the other defective, since, without appealing to providence, the well-winged ones would had nothing in their favor over the others? Please observe the difference between an animal damaged by an accident and the most imperfect species, and you will admit that nature does nothing in this world that is not marvelous. P: Even if I granted that everything is well made in this world where we are, what would you say to Epicure’s reply that there have been and there are infinite worlds of all kinds, among which there should necessarily be also some well-made ones, or such that have corrected themselves step by step.ii

18. Persuading a Skeptic

185

There is no reason to be marveled, therefore, if it turns out that we find ourselves precisely in a world of barely satisfactory beauty. E: I confess that this is the last redeployment of sophisticated Epicureanism, but I will make you see as clearly as the day that it is not defensible. For all the likelihood in the world indicates that things are not less beautiful and in agreement with each other in regions of the universe other than in this one. I agree that, absolutely speaking, [Epicure’s] fiction is not impossible, i.e., that it does not imply a contradiction when one considers only the present reasoning, based upon the order of things (although there are others which destroy it absolutely). Yet, it is as little believable as to assume that an entire library has been created one day by the casual concourse of atoms. For there is always more likelihood that a thing is made in an ordinary way than to suppose that we have stumbled by chance upon a happy world. If I were transported into a new region of the universe, where I would see clocks, furniture, books, buildings, I would bet all I have that this was the work of some reasonable being, although it is possible – absolutely speaking – that this were not the case. One can make belief that there might be in the infinite extension of things a region where books write themselves. But this would be one of the greatest coincidences of the world, and I would have to be out of my mind to believe that this region where I would be is precisely the possible region where books are written by chance, and, unless one were blind, one should not accept a supposition that is so strange (although possible) rather than that which is put in practice in the ordinary course of nature. For the likelihood of the one is as small relative to the other as a speck of sand relative to a world. Therefore, the likelihood of the supposition in question is as if infinitely small, i.e., morally null. Consequently, there is moral certainty to the effect that it is providence that governs things. There are also other demonstrations that are absolutely geometrical,10 but they cannot be easily inserted in a colloquial conversation. Besides, what I have just said should suffice for my present purposes and for your wishes. P: You have not yet won, for there is a difficulty to overcome, which seems to me to be quite big. I am forced to admit that there is infinitely more 10

The expression ‘moral certainty’ is used by Leibniz for the metaphysical purpose of characterizing contingent truths, as opposed to necessary truths which are grounded upon logical or ‘geometrical’ necessity (cf. Discours de metaphysique, paragraph 13; A VI 4 1546-1549). In the present text he employs a probabilistic argument showing that the theologically fundamental idea of providence (God rules the world according to the principle of the best) has nothing but moral certainty, i.e., is a factual truth. In the De libertate a necessitate in eligendo written between 1680 and 1684 (A VI 4 1450-1455), Leibniz says: “The first principle about existences is the following proposition: God wants to choose the most perfect. This proposition cannot be demonstrated; it is the first of all propositions of fact” (p. 1454).

186

Chapter 18

likelihood in favor of a governing wisdom than in favor of chance as the author of so much beauty and of so many wonderful machines. However, since we do not know the law of the universe and the laws of this great Monarch, who follows no other rule than his will, how can we draw conclusions that are more advantageous for us than for all other creatures? Would this great God lower himself to the point of subverting the order of the universe for the love of us, who are, compared to him, like the smallest grain of dust with which the wind plays? We see that everything changes, that everything is destroyed – how could we be exempt from this? E: There are two extremes to avoid, regarding the laws of the universe: there are those who believe that everything happens with a mechanical necessity, as in a clock; others believe that God’s sovereignty consists in a freedom without rule.jj The golden middle is to consider God not only as the first principle nor only as a free Agent. One must also acknowledge that his liberty is modified (se determine) by his wisdom and that man’s mind is a small model of God,kk albeit infinitely below his perfection. When this is the idea of God one has, one can love and honor him; but when one conceives him in excessively metaphysical terms, as a principle of emanation to which understanding cannot be attributed except equivocally or as a I don’t know what being that is the cause not only of things but also of reasons, who therefore does not follow reasons when he acts – one cannot have for him love or trust.ll For, if nothing is just in itself, or if the will of the stronger is the rule of justice, there would be no difference between a tyrant and a King: one will fear him, but one will not love him. For maybe he enjoys making us miserable, maybe those who produce most evil down here are those whom he likes most, maybe honest people are for him nothing but fragile creatures without vigor. If this is the case, I agree with you that providence would be of no help – the world would in fact be governed by a demon. But that cannot be the case. Wisdom and justice are ruled by their eternal theorems, just as arithmetic and geometry. God does not establish them by his will, but contains them in his essence, and follows them. Otherwise another [kind of] wisdom would be necessary for properly establishing them, or else one should admit that he would establish them in this rather than another way by pure chance. If this were the case, fortune would be the provider of God’s graces just as she provided those of Emperor Sigismund who, in order to reward an old servant, let him choose between two closed boxes, one of which was full of gold and the other, of lead.mm P: But what if someone would not find this so absurd as you think it is? E: It would be possible to convince him. The theorems of justice, of wisdom and of sovereign beauty are geometrically demonstrable and reducible to the principle of contradiction, i.e., their contrary implies contradiction in terms. Now, we can well infer, from these admirable

18. Persuading a Skeptic

187

mechanical devices that God has used, that he knows how to find the simplest constructions, like the great geometers, that is, the means that yield most effect with less effort – and this is the one and only principle of wisdom, upon which justice itself depends and upon which our happiness is grounded. P: I don’t quite see here this connection, and I don’t grasp how you go from the order that exists in physical things to that order we wish to take place in the moral ones.nn E: Why, Monsieur? You see that the least nerve has its use in the body, just as the least rope in a big vessel; and you do know that an able geometer does not trace a line that does not serve his demonstration. Will you doubt that the soul of man is within order? – this soul that is a sort of small God, governing a separate world, and duplicating in a certain way and representing in itself the big world? It is sometimes said about a defunct that ‘he was an able man, but what good was this for him; he is dead, and all his prodigious accumulation of beautiful knowledge has perished in a moment, as if it had never existed’. It is our ignorance that makes us speak like that. If we understood the springs and bolts of providence, we would realize that nothing is lost, that everything is employed in the most beautiful way, that it is incompatible with the order of things that our souls perish and that any perfection acquired in this life be lost. Jesus Christ admirably – as usual – says that all the hairs in our head are counted and that a glass of cold water, with which we have alleviated a poor man’s thirst will be rewarded.11 Do you think the other virtues and perfections will be forgotten, that we have no motive for considering ourselves happy, and that we do not have to strive to know and love such a superbly lovable benefactor? For God, if he exists – which cannot fail to be the case –, has undoubtedly cared mainly for this kind of creatures, capable of knowing and loving him, when he has formed the others; and since he is himself a mind (esprit), and everything is done for the minds, I am sure that the minds have been well ordered with preference over all other things, which they infinitely surpass in nobility because they express their creator’s perfection in a manner which differs completely from that of the other creatures, which are incapable of this elevation. Given that, it is therefore impossible that things be made in a manner such that a mind could have reason to complain. Otherwise God would not have been either perfect enough to be aware of this defect or powerful enough to remedy it. Whence I conclude what I had claimed at the beginning, namely that the world is a city composed of all the minds under the rule of the great Monarch of the universe; that this city is formed according to the greatest possible perfection; that there is nothing more to wish for those who love him; and that, if God gave them the option of inventing something for their 11

Matth. 10, 30 ; Luke 12, 7.

188

Chapter 18

satisfaction, they themselves could not rise – through their imaginations and desires – to the level of happiness that has been prepared for them. P: I am very moved by the beautiful things you say, for at last I don’t find anything to object. You overcome all my scruples, and I feel a satisfaction that is the greater the less expected it was. Now it seems to me that I am one of the happiest creatures, while earlier I complained about my misery and endeavored to divert my attention from the search of truth in order not to think about [my misery].oo E: It is true that we are happy if we want to. For, even though we cannot will the good without God’s help, it remains true that our happiness depends upon our will, whatever causes it [the will]. And this is all that can be hoped for in nature – unless we would want to be happy by necessity, which is certainly impossible in the order of things, for otherwise God would have done it. But let us not get involved here in the issues – more curious than necessary – that can arise from this, issues about which I have satisfied a friend in a conference, and have put in writing, which I could let you see one day.pp At this moment, I would rather advance, for I have not raised this subject just for giving you this inner joy whose signs I can see, but rather for pushing you towards the good that will make it last. You have felt the miserable state of men who are not imbued with these truths. You know that a hidden bitterness infects all the pleasures through which they seek to divert their pain. The mere thought of death frightens them, and those who have taken most precautions against it have no other remedy than patience, no other comfort than necessity, against which they are aware that it would be foolish to strive. But one of the Ancients rightly pointed out that a soldier that executes with sadness the orders of his captains is valueless: one must follow him with joy, and in order to be joyful, one must not only accept, but also approve that which happens. Notice then what you owe to God and make it known – if not to the others at least to your own conscience – that you have become another man. You were necessity’s slave; you have become a minister of God, of a God who loves you and whom you love, of a God who is for you everything, who makes everything you could wish with prudence, and who will never abandon you if you do not neglect him first. Your happiness is one of the fundamental concerns of his State, inscribed in diamond tables: but it is necessary that your attachment be sincere, for one cannot deceive God, who pierces the most recondite folds of the heart. P: I confess that I feel a certain ardor I was not acquainted with, and that I am now in a state that seems to me to be somehow above the human. But you know that men are subject to the impression of the senses, that their memory is weak, and that even the Saints have sometimes felt a chill in their faith. Please, add to the infinite obligation I owe you the means to guarantee that I keep my present happiness.

18. Persuading a Skeptic

189

E: There are two means that one must combine, namely prayer and practice. By prayer I understand any elevation of the soul towards God; that is, a perpetual search for solid reasons that make God appear to you grand and lovable. For, meditations that are not supported by reasons are nothing but arbitrary imaginations that vanish at the least sensation. You should thus make a habit for yourself to find everywhere some reason that incites in you an act of cult and love, since there is nothing in nature that does not give you a motive for making a hymn to him. Praise his name in all that happens: when you see evil persons prospering, recall that God keeps an eye on them, to become either the objects of his mercy or the victims of his justice, since there is no evil that shall not serve a greater good. When things happen otherwise than you had wanted, believe that God thereby is giving you the opportunity to exercise your virtue and that you were mistaken. For, one can be mistaken following the rules of prudence, since one is unable to think about everything and to be informed about everything. This is why you should always affirm within yourself that you don’t want anything, except provisionally, i.e., until God explains himself about it. Above all, you should make a habit of noticing everywhere orders, connections and beautiful progressions, and to be aware of the fact that in this life we cannot yet have enough experience thereof regarding matters of morality, politics, and theology. God indeed tests our faith through apparent quarrels that he will settle in a happy future; in the meantime, we should be impressed and reassured by those sensible experiences of God’s greatness and wisdom, which are to be found in the marvelous harmonies of mathematics as well as in these inimitable machines invented by God that nature reveals to our eyes. For nature conspires wonderfully with grace, and the physical marvels are an appropriate aliment for keeping the divine fire that warms happy souls, for it is there that one can see God through the senses, whereas elsewhere one sees him only through the understanding.qq I have often noticed that those who are not touched by such beautiful things are insensible to that which must be truly called the love of God. For I am well aware that many people do not have a true idea of what this love consists in, but if you reflect about what I have just said you will be not mistaken about it. It remains to talk about external practice, which is an infallible consequence of inner sincerity. How is it possible to be possessed by such great truths and to remain in a state of inaction that has to do with incredulity? No sensible man has ever jumped into an abyss he thought to have seen. Who does not try to escape from a lion that attacks furiously? Where can be found a wise courtier who does not respect the gaze of a severe master or who does not try to make himself agreeable to a prince that can make his fortune? It is therefore impossible to find a man that truly loves God and does not make some effort to please him.

190

Chapter 18

P: What you say is true. But I think men of good will often remain, as it were, suspended because they do not quite know what is God’s will. E: Let us begin by the commandments that are undisputable and then try to get clear, step by step, about the others as well. Nobody doubts that charity is recommended to us above everything else. Let us cling to it and believe in our lord who has included in this precept the law as well as the prophets.12 But let us remember that true charity comprises all men, including our enemies – not only when they are defeated, but also at the apex of their insult. Let us consider them as madmen (furieux) we pity when they are doing their best to harm us and whom we repel without hatred. All the evil ones are in fact miserable and do not deserve to be hated. They are humans, they have been created in the image of God; something troubled their education or the course of their life, making them despair; they are all susceptible of the highest perfection, if only we had the occasions to regain them. Let us then work for that purpose as much as we can, remembering that the biggest conquest is that of a soul, since there is no noblest thing in nature. And since it is oppression and misery that usually render men evil and criminal, hardening their souls, let us try to forestall the despair of so many unhappy ones who moan. Let us not look for glory in these endeavors, which are great only if compared to earthquakes, floods and other public disasters. Let us consider that it will be useless to appear advantageously in history while being unhappy personally. For we should not fool ourselves: the Lord is a just judge – we will feel the evils we have done, and we will feel them fully. Nothing escapes his memory. The order of things, the universal harmony, and this sort of necessity according to which everything should be repaired, demands God’s vengeance – not only for the lost souls and the blood shed, but also for the least misdeed. On the other hand, let us rejoice if God has done some good – especially to souls – through us. He will reward us, not only for the achievement, but also for our ineffective good will, provided it was sincere and ardent. Nevertheless, I believe that the happiness of those to whom God has given both the will and success will shine more, one day, in that happy land of reward: “Those who will bring justice to many will shine like stars”.13 Yet, I believe above all that there is no happier person than a statesman that has employed well his power and has done something great for God’s glory and for the public good. This regards you, Monsieur, for you must acknowledge the great power you have. Think carefully about this and always remind yourself that you owe a lot to God. If you miss a single opportunity to do the good, God will not overlook 12 13

Matth. 7, 12; 22, 39-40. Qui ad justitiam erudierunt multos fulgebunt quasi stellae. Leibniz has probably quoted from memory, for the biblical text says justi fulgebunt sicut sol (‘the justs will shine like the sun’), Matth. 13, 43.

18. Persuading a Skeptic

191

it, and your laziness, your lack of fervor, and your fashionable doubts will not be sufficient to pay for it. Above all, beware of not abstaining from undertaking laudable ventures for fear of being mocked. It would be, in a sense, to somehow repudiate one’s God and to expose oneself to another terrible repudiation in that great day.14 It is better to sacrifice for him our glory and, working for his honor, to take upon ourselves the shame of a failure, after having followed the light God had given us: we can be assured that he will not let us regret it. This is why whenever there is some likelihood to do the good, we should take action without waiting for all the signs of infallible success, which maybe will never be found: every thing that is beautiful is difficult. Every time something great has been performed, at first there was no likelihood, but some powerful genius, whom God had armed with courage, has overcome all difficulties – and his merit has only been greater for that. You will ask why to engage in this exhortation, since I do not see at present the need to do something big for the glory of God.rr As far as I am concerned, I haven’t the slightest idea for I do not interfere in your affairs of state. But I am persuaded that we would often find occasion to manifest our zeal if we would watch the circumstances in order to take advantage of them. Too bad that we want to serve God at our leisure, and God will not accept from us this gift of services so little swift. Let us now conclude and, if you wish, let us agree about a number of rules between us, which we will follow later. P: I approve your advice, for I think there must be some sensible means to arouse one daily. I agree in advance with all you will consider useful and I grant you all the authority of a legislator.ss E: I accept only the power of communicating to you my project. Firstly, I think every man who is concerned with his salvation must look for a study companion. I mean study regarding salvation. For that purpose one needs a faithful friend, not moved by self-interest, of sincere intentions, more attached to yourself than to your status, having sympathy – especially spiritual – towards you, and with whom you could find both relief and benefit. Secondly, one must prepare a written project that will serve as a rule for the rest of one’s life, which will thereby be reduced to a few major maxims one should always have in sight. This project will resemble the instructions usually given to ministers. For an instruction must be detailed, including resolutions about the most important as well as the regular meetings that may occur. One should never violate such resolutions except due to some strong reason and when something quite extraordinary happens. But one should not include in these resolutions anything without a cause. I have seen many advices given by fathers to their children in wills, but I have seen 14

That is, the day of the Final Judgment.

192

Chapter 18

few [persons] who have preferred to provide lessons for themselves rather than for others. Thirdly, one must examine oneself every day about the standing of one’s project, in order to verify what one has missed and what one has achieved. One must take care to observe every day a visible correction. For this purpose, one must sometimes make new rules and inflict upon oneself irrevocable punishments. Fourthly, one must divide one’s time without too much constraint. There should be days for dispatching, days for visits, free days (i.e., days serving to handle a number of vague affairs), days of relaxation, days of retirement. One must also reserve a part of each day to God and meditation, and to the self-examination mentioned above. Fifthly, one must keep a record of everything that may be useful, including useful thoughts. One should have a diary-notebook of passed things, a reminder-notebook of future things or things to do, handy sheets of paper for writing down quickly whatever memorable things pop up in reading, in conversation, in work, or in meditation – and afterwards one could range all this thematically in a compilation. It would even be practical to have an Enchiridion or handbook, where the most important pieces of knowledge we need would be marked, in order to relieve our memory in the meetings. (And it would be useful to write them down in cipher.) Since there are things one must know by heart, one could assure this by means of verse – for which purpose the burlesque would be particularly appropriate. But this is not the place to elaborate upon this.tt Sixthly, one must look for all imaginable skills in order to moderate the passions, which can disturb the use of reason. For this purpose, one must get used not to be irritated by anything, not to be angry, to avoid sadness – which is possible when we are convinced of our great truths. Regarding joy, it should only be moderate and uniform, for a major overflow of spirits is followed by a natural sadness and is highly damaging to health. After moderate joy the most beautiful and useful passion is hope, or rather that uniform and durable joy, which is nothing but well grounded hope, since other joys are fleeting whereas the joy of hope is continuous. I have noticed that only hope sustains courage as well as curiosity: as long as it is reduced by annoyances, old age, illness, bothering reflections about misery and the alleged vanity of human things – adieu our noble enterprises, à Dieu our beautiful researches. But I have given you an infallible recipe to conserve this great good, which ensures tranquility in this life and provides a taste of a better one. Seventhly, one must exercise true charity vis-à-vis the others. Here is what it consists in, in my opinion. One should not only not hate anyone, whatever defects a person may have, but one must also love everyone in proportion to the good qualities that remain in him, for there is no man who

18. Persuading a Skeptic

193

does not have many such qualities. We don’t know God’s judgment about him, and it may be quite different from ours, since we are misled by the appearances. You are allowed to lean towards suspicion and to form a rather bad opinion of all others inasmuch as you have to take precautions, especially in some important matter regarding which one should trust as little as possible; yet, one must have a good opinion of everybody, as much as reason affords, regarding their own good and their relief: this is the agreement between the viper and the dove.uu Besides, do not be so vain as to think that God considers yourself more [valuable] than anyone else, do not seek your comfort proudly at the expense of your neighbor, put yourself in the place of the unhappy and think about what you would say were you there. Endeavor to satisfy everybody and, if possible, do your best to let nobody leave you sad or discontent. Go beyond that and try to do the good even when it will hardly be acknowledged and it will not be known that you did it. For you have to do the good for the pure pleasure of having done it. If you don’t feel this way, it is because you still don’t love God as one should love him, since the sign of the love of God is to envisage the common good with supreme ardor and through the pure movement of the disinterested pleasure one finds in it – just as you will be pleased to see a beautiful face, to listen to a well shaped concert, to watch an insolent evil person rebutted and an innocent miserable relieved, although you have no self-interest in any of these. This is the true spirit of charity that ensues from a sincere love of God, source of all beautiful things. Recall that God has put you in a garden you must cultivate: even though you are aware of your weakness, you must act according to the lights and forces he has granted you. And if there is some failure of your will, be sure you will contrite. For, God asks only for your heart since he has kept for himself what actually happens. Therefore, never give up when the good advices do not succeed: begin once more with the same zeal, even though accompanied by the prudence one learns in the course of time. God is the master, but he is a good master: none of your troubles will be lost, if you have devoted them to his service, although he may feign not to acknowledge them.vv This is why you should write a memoir about all one should desire regarding the common good; and if you are in a position to perform any of it, do not let yourself be prevented to do so by considerations regarding your self-interest or your reputation. For you must view your possessions and your glory as means God has put in your hands in order to serve him more vigorously. You shall not prostitute them to ill effect, since this would amount to making God’s gifts useless; but, on the other hand, you shall not spare them when his service is the aim. Write down in the memoir I just mentioned your desires as well as those of others, when you see a reason for that. Listen carefully to the motives they may have and weigh them

194

Chapter 18

carefully; for, having many things to do according to your list, you shall prefer the most certain ones, the surest ones, the most necessary ones and the most useful ones.ww However, when a proposition has some of these advantages but not the others, you need that logic which discerns the degrees of likelihood of the good and evil things, in order to choose what is more feasible and deserving to be done. Anyhow, an average likelihood of [achieving] a great good that does not carry [any] danger should be sufficient. Since you are in charge of commonwealth affairs and a great prince reputed for his wisdom trusts you, make good use of it and never give up when your good will and your proposals are not accepted. The prince is an image of God in a closer way than other humans, and I have recommended above not to surrender when it seems that God does not favor your endeavors. The same is true, mutatis mutandis, regarding a prince – he reflects upon things you do not think about.xx Keep your entire zeal for him and work for his service and even for his satisfaction not only with fidelity but also with joy. Such a submission and bond will perhaps yield, ultimately, some good effect. God has the heart of the princes in his hand: maybe he will make you find a favorable moment and a mood in which you will achieve more through an occasional word than you had earlier achieved through refined arguments. God gives men attention and attention is allimportant.yy A hope as great as this should console you for all the obstacles you may find. A prince embodying this great authority granted him by God should not be considered as a man, but as a powerful creature resembling a mountain or an ocean, whose extraordinary movements may produce strange effects in changing the order of things. Don’t you see that he can make armies and peoples move with the least wink, that mountains are pierced and rivers are diverted when he signs a note with some black liquid? And you are so unjust as to wish that such a powerful being should abide by your smallest efforts? If it were so easy to govern, we would be in pretty bad shape. Hence, when you are convinced of the importance of what you want to propose to him, you should not be impatient when he does not understand your reasons. Things have many faces: he views them perhaps from another angle and you cannot and should not expect that he examine them always in depth. Nevertheless, you should yourself address them from various angles, adroitly and submissively, and if you find some day in your master a propitious moment such as the one I have found today in you – good Lord! – what good wouldn’t you bring to the world! Whenever a great prince without ordinary weaknesses and frivolities applies himself assiduously to the common good, and when he engages in reflections similar to ours, which occur easily to elevated souls, then one should believe that God himself takes part in it, and that great effects are to be expected. You will remember that I have said before that there is no

18. Persuading a Skeptic

195

acquired perfection that gets lost, even through death. The more one is powerful and wise, the more one will one day feel the effects. This is the case also regarding the power of princes, for they already have down here great advantages even vis-à-vis the other world, if their heart is directed towards God and if they make use of their power to serve him. However, if they remain indifferent or if they put their forces in the service of evil, they will become objects of God’s anger as much as they have been of his goodness. Let us leave now the princes, even though I could not and should not abstain from talking about them, for, since you have almost as much access to the prince as I now have to you, it was my duty to encourage you to such beautiful endeavors. I can add that this consideration has been one of the most important ones in leading me to chase you until God has granted me success well beyond my expectations. P: I swear, my dear, that your admonitions have touched my heart in a way that was unknown to me until now. I owe this change to God’s goodness, which I know now better than ever. If he grants me life and success, I will carry out your advices and you will see me at work from tomorrow. You rightly recommend that I find a companion for holy studies; could I choose somebody other than you? We will set up together the grand project that should order my affairs and bring tranquility to my mind. We will also work at organizing my time and at preparing these other memoirs that will always make me think about what I could do for God and for the common good. I feel an incredible pleasure when I figure out the things you have just explained to me and when I think about how you have convinced me of this wonderful paradox about happiness and human greatness. For I confess that I used to hate nature, which I considered to be the author of our misery; since I was persuaded that all our efforts were in vain, I was led to an inexpressible aversion towards all serious reflection. And I am still wondering how you have succeeded in overcoming it. In any case, I am grateful to God for having removed me from a precipice, whose frightening abyss I can now see; when I think of the happy state in which I now find myself, I am overwhelmed with love towards the author of all good. My God, open the eyes of all men and make them see the same things I see; it would be impossible for them not to love you; but you have your reasons for not granting the same grace to all, and I adore them. I am sure that one cannot change anything in the order you have established without destroying its sovereign beauty. Hence I approve everything you have done. However, since you have not so far declared yourself about my future, I will do what I consider most in accordance with your will. I will make public your glory at every moment, I will endeavor to consider and make the others consider the reasons of eternal wisdom, which your creations reflect upon those who are happy enough to find pleasure in the contemplation of the

196

Chapter 18

nature of things. Furthermore, the expansion of the true religion, the unity of your church, and the relief of public misery will be the objects of my concerns (voeux). I will care for working without pause at the undisputable demonstrations of true religion, for I envisage the means to provide them, and we will try to combine in them strength and touching capacity. It remains only one thing for me to desire, namely that you will grant me the grace, my God, to transmit to many others these emotions (mouvements) I feel in myself, especially to those who have most power to do the good. From you, my dear friend, for whom these holy thoughts have become a habit, I ask to endeavor to inflame me ever more as long as my affairs will permit me to remain next to you, working at our projects and arranging everything before my departure. I would wish to pull you out from here, but if this is not possible, I will not fail to meet you again. In the meantime, your letters will substitute for your person, a person I will always endear as the tool God has made use of in order to bring me back to life. a

In the Confessio naturae contra atheistas of 1668-1669 (A VI 1 489-493), one already finds the idea that the study of mathematics, especially as applied to the natural sciences, at first may seem to remove one from the love of God, but finally becomes the best means to bring one close to God. Note that the intellectual path attributed here to Emery echoes, of course, Leibniz’s own path. b Charles Emmanuel Philibert de Simiane, Marquis de Pianese (1608-1677) was Minister of State of Savoy, and became famous for his conversion. c Pianese is here described as holding the typical fideistic position of some skeptics of the time. d These precepts correspond precisely to those of Descartes’s “provisional ethics” in Part III of the Discourse on Method, which in turn is inspired by similar ideas expressed by Montaigne. e See Chapter 3. f This “pragmatism” is often found in the leibnizian texts of this period, where he stresses that science and their method should be understood in function of their end, which is its usefulness to the good life (C 159). This corresponds to the idea – often expressed by Leibniz – that the value of knowledge, particularly of science, lies in its capacity to contribute to human happiness. g This remark on the distinction between matters of cult and matters of faith, as well as the following remarks on grace and its requirements, allude to the Jesuit-Jansenist ongoing debate, which was temporarily suspended in 1679 by the so called “Church’s Peace” established by Pope Clement IX. h The image of the balance (see Chapters 2, 5, etc.) is here connected by Leibniz with the idea of “the place of the other”, spelled out in Chapter 17, a text which was also written in 1679. i In the final section of this dialogue, one of the rules (the sixth) proposed by Leibniz is designed to create the necessary tranquility. j Disputes of this sort, where pure amusement, rather than a decision, is sought, are one of the categories of “mingled disputes” that Leibniz leaves aside as of little interest (Chapter 1). k The next paragraph of Emery’s intervention, as well as Pianese’s reply, constitutes the only overlapping between the two extant manuscripts (cp. A VI 4 2243 with 2251). In fact,

18. Persuading a Skeptic

197

the smaller manuscript seems to be animated by quite another design. It focuses on the wrongdoings of the Church, particularly the Crusades, and presents Emery as an apologetic predicator who argues that the critique of such actions, even though fully justified, is in fact damaging for piety. In the complete dialogue, Leibniz abandons this approach, and concentrates on a rational reconstruction of faith, capable of restoring the authenticity of the spirit of religion. l Carloman (715-754), son of Charles Martel, handed over the control of his provinces to his brother Pepin the Short (Charlemagne’s father), in order to become a Benedictine. m Flavius Valerius Constantinus Magnus, Roman emperor (306-337). In the eve of the Battle of Pons Milvium (28 October 312), he dreamt with a cross with the inscription In hoc signo vinces ‘with this sign you will win’. In the wake of his victory, he promulgated the Edict of Milan (313), which made Christianity the official religion of the Empire. n The reference to the two leading skeptic authors, Michel de Montaigne (1533-1592) and La Mothe Le Vayer (1588-1672), reflects the anti-skeptic motif present in this dialogue. See also Théodicée (253; GP VI 267). o Montaigne, Essais III, 9. See Arnauld and Nicole, La Logique ou l’Art de Penser (III, 20, 6), where the same advice is provided. p Leibniz’s critical attitude to the mystics, ‘enthusiasts’ and ‘visionaries’ is spelled out in detail in NE 4.19. q To avoid these emotional oscillations, as well as their moral causes and consequences, is a constant preoccupation of Leibniz. He criticizes the Stoics for admitting an order of the world that has to be accepted by every person, be it in consonance or not with her feelings and desires. This external constraint, thus, may be a constant source of disturbance in the individual’s state of mind. As opposed to this, Leibniz argues that the harmony between cosmic and individual order ensures a state of enduring contentment (see, e.g., GP VII 151, 333-334). r The above are typical theses of religious skepticism, which the Counter-Reformation employed against the Lutheran thesis of the free interpretation of the Scripture. The multiplicity of interpretations was thereby traced back to the weakness of human understanding, which justified the reliance on the authority of the church as the only legitimate interpreter (cf. Popkin 1993: 18). s Leibniz mentions some of these individuals below. Quarrels between mathematicians were not infrequent at the time. Among the most notorious ones were those involving Fermat and Descartes (cf. Dascal 1998b), Wallis and Hobbes (cf. Jesseph 1999) and, of course, Newton and Leibniz (cf. Rupert Hall 1980). t Bertrand de la Coste, Démonstration de la quadrature du cercle, qui est l’unique connaissance et principal sujet de toutes les mathématiques, Hamburg, 1677. u To make such a promise is not something negligible, since Emery had made clear that “attention” or “application” is his most important requirement. Getting, at this point, Pianese’s commitment to attend “always” to his words marks then the success of Emery’s preliminary moves in the dialogue. On the importance of attention, see Chapters 8 and 16A. Attention for Leibniz is particularly important because it is a requirement for apperception or reflection, the highest and distinguishing mental ability of man (see, for example, the Preface of NE - GP V 45; GP VII 330; Dascal 1998a). v That is, the rules of logic which allow determining whether an inference is valid. The doctrine of “consequences” (consequentiae) was one of the most important achievements of medieval logic. For a survey, see Kneale and Kneale 1962: Chapter IV,5; for a detailed study, see King (2001).

198 w

Chapter 18

Notice that Leibniz is here not actually enlarging the traditional notion of logical “form”, to include not only non-syllogistic, but also non-demonstrative inference, such as the inductive ones used as examples by Emery a few turns before, and the probabilistic ones he mentions below. Such an expansion of logic is undertaken by Leibniz in later texts (Chapters 38 and 45). Here he rather points out certain components of the notion of ‘logical form’, such as order, explicitness, elimination of redundancy, and precise formulation, which form part of the modern notion of formalization, of which he is one of the creators. x On the traditional logical and linguistic notions of ‘matter’ vs. ‘form’, see Dascal (1990a). y This “rule” is nothing but the first of Descartes’s Principles of Philosophy. But Leibniz’s insistence on a “formal” way of overcoming doubt distinguishes him radically from the Cartesian reliance on the “natural light”. See Belaval (1960) on the opposition between Leibniz’s “formalism” and Descartes’s “intuitionism”. Pianese’s reply, criticizing the subjectivism of the Cartesian criterion, gives Emery the opportunity of presenting the leibnizian formal criterion as the appropriate one. It should be noted that, while here Leibniz accepts the Cartesian rule of doubt, later on he treats it as a presumption that should be rejected and replaced by the opposite one (see Recommandation pour instituer la science générale of 1686, A VI 4 692-713, especially pages 703 ff.). For the significance of this leibnizian move, see Dascal (2003b). z The critique of Cartesian subjectivism is quite clear in this paragraph, which can be compared with what is explicitly said in the Discours de metaphysique, paragraph 2 (A VI 4 1532-1533). aa See “On the way of distinguishing between real from imaginary phenomena” (GP VII 319322). bb For Leibniz, a son of his time, Euclid’s Elements provide a methodological model, though he stresses that one should improve it – among other things by demonstrating the axioms. According to him, this was already realized by Ancient and Modern thinkers, such as Apollonius, Proclus, Roberval, and Arnauld (NE 4.7.1; GP V 387). For a different, more critical attitude towards the Euclidean paradigm, see Chapter 15. cc This is a clear statement showing that Leibniz considers probabilities as belonging to calculative reason. The use of the balance metaphor here indicates also that not all of its uses refer to “soft rationality”. dd Notice that the “rigor” in question is considerably weakened (if compared to strict deductive rigor) by the extremely subtle combination of nothing less than three modal expressions – “il y a moyen” (= possibility), “s’asseurer” (= certainty), and “doit” (= obligation) – in the antecedent of this sentence: “… il y a moyen de s’asseurer de ce qu’on doit juger des choses sur les apparences …”. ee Does the mention of the flourishing of China – about which Leibniz had not yet deepened his knowledge – in spite of its lack of formal methods mean that the latter are irrelevant for practical matters? Whatever the answer, the point being made here is that, even though the application of formal methods is quite exacting and able to solve a small number of problems, it is obligatory to use them for the most important issues – those pertaining to salvation. ff This is a version of the so called “attrition” argument, employed by Catholic preachers – especially the Jesuits – during the Counter-Reformation. The argument, contested by the Protestants, views as legitimate a repentance that does not stem from belief in God, but from fear of divine punishment. It addresses an audience that doubts God’s existence, pointing out that even if the probability of God’s existence is quite small, prudence

18. Persuading a Skeptic

199

recommends obedience to Christian norms. This argument, which bears some resemblance to Pascal’s bet, was discussed and approved in the Council of Trent. gg See Leibniz’s notion of plenitude (e.g., Monadology, paragraph 8; GP VI 608; see also GP VII 290). hh Lucretius, De Rerum Natura IV 824-825. ii Diogeni Laertiis vitae philosophorum X, 45, 73-82. Cf. Lucretius, De Rerum Natura II, 1048-1066. jj The two extremes correspond to Spinoza’s necessitarianism, on the one hand, and Descartes’s voluntarism, on the other. kk This thesis appears in several of Leibniz’s later texts, e.g., in the Discours de Metaphysique, paragraphs 35-36 (A VI 4 1584-1588). ll The paramount ‘excessively metaphysical’ conception of God Leibniz is attacking here is, of course, Spinoza’s. mm Sigismund (1368-1437), King of Germany, King of Hungary, and Holy Roman Emperor. nn The affinities and connections between the physical and the (broadly conceived) moral realm include, for Leibniz, their shared underlying principle of the best (Tentamen Anagogicum, GP VII 272), the use of final causes in physics (Letter to Bayle; GP III 54), as well as their ranking together as ‘sciences of quality’ as opposed to mathematics, a ‘science of quantity’ (Confessio Philosophi; A VI 3 118). See Cardoso (Forthcoming). oo At this point Pianese’s resistance breaks down. It is interesting to note that the reasons he gives for this stem both from logos (lack of further objections) and pathos (feeling of satisfaction and happiness). To this one may add the impressive ethos with which Leibniz has endowed the character of the hermit. The conjunction of these three sources of persuasion is a remarkable example of the effective combination of the three components of ethical rhetoric in the Aristotelian tradition. pp This is a reference to his conversation with Nicolaus Stensen. See the introduction to this Chapter. qq The process of spiritual conversion described by Leibniz in this paragraph as “prayer” summarizes ideas that are developed in the Confessio Philosophi of 1673, particularly the capacity of reason – if used constantly and with application – to reveal order and harmony of the world, the effects of divine providence, and the agreement between nature and grace. rr Leibniz is here taking his distance from providing any specific political recommendation addressed to any particular prince – of the kind he himself often formulated, as befit to his tasks as the ducal private advisor. Similarly, in the “Portrait of a prince” (K IV 459-487), also written in 1679, his characterization of the prince stresses the virtues required of a statesman rather than the particular policies he should follow. ss This is one possible model – though not the only one – to conclude a debate-dialogue, namely the unconditional acceptance of the “rules” set up by one of the participants. For some comments on the rules proposed by Emery, see Dascal (2000). tt On Leibniz’s concern with mnemonics, see Dascal (1978) and the texts discussed therein. uu Matth. 10, 16. See Chapter 17, where the assumption that the other is a dove corresponds to the ethical point of view, whereas the assumption that the other is a viper corresponds to the political point of view. See also the distinction between the “ethical” and the “strategical” uses of the ‘other’s place’ principle in Dascal (1995). vv This paragraph, stemming directly from the homiletic genre, provides some justification for classifying this dialogue as “mystical”, as done by Baruzi. ww This list of properties, intended to guide the determination of one’s order of priority for the execution of one’s various aims, is presumably hierarchically ordered, the highest quality –

200

Chapter 18

or the more “weighty” – to be expected from any action being “utility”. This conforms to Leibniz’s well known insistence that the highest value of science lies in its contribution to human happiness. See Chapter 15. xx See “Portrait of a Prince”, mentioned in note rr. Here, the distinguishing property of the prince, which brings him closer to God is his “synoptic” vision of the commonwealth’s needs. yy See note u.

Chapter 19 ON CONTROVERSIES

This text reports a conversation between Leibniz and Prince Johann Friedrich of Hanover, who sought advice on advancing the negotiations for the reunification of the Church. The subject of controversies is mentioned in the correspondence between Leibniz and the prince as early as 1677 (A I 2 33; A I 2 225-227). Leibniz continued to discuss this topic with the Landgrave Ernst von HessenRheinfels, to whom he sent the present text. The Landgrave refers to these issues at the end of his Le Catholique sincere et discret, mentioning Leibniz’s letter to him from October 1680 (A I 3 246f) and his reply to him from November 1680 (A I 3 250-255). The overall goal was to establish the ‘signs’ of the true Church – a controversial issue between Catholic and Protestant theologians (see, e.g., Chapter 33). Leibniz claims to have returned to his earlier efforts to develop a method to solve controversies in general, and reached significant results – a true breakthrough. If compared to the Llullist, magic-impregnated ‘method’, he contends, the method he developed is ‘scientific’, akin to the geometrical method.a The new method in fact is addressed to overcoming the vices he had detected in ‘mingled disputes’.b Among other things, it would prevent the excessive reliance on quotations and authorities, the exploitation of alleged contradictions of the adversary, the weakening and distorting of the adversary’s arguments, the repetition of reasons already given, ad hominem claims, digressions, unclear order. Applying these measures, whose principal feature is moderation, it is possible to reformulate orderly and coherently any given debate, highlighting the respective weights of arguments and counter-arguments. This procedure would be directed by a rapporteur, whose task does not consist in deciding in favour of one or the other side, but to make the debate intelligible and thus rationally decidable by the appropriate audience, such as a prince or an enlightened community. The significant advance Leibniz senses here may thus consist precisely in the introduction of this new figure, the rapporteur, quite different from his earlier ‘judge of controversies’ (Chapters 2, 8). The text concludes with a list of rules to be followed by this new figure.

201 M. Dascal (ed.), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. The Art of Controversies, 201–208. © 2006 Springer.

202

Chapter 19

Date: 1680 Edition: A IV 3 204-212 Language: French The variety of studies I have been forced to undertake interrupted a long time ago my project of working at an exact discussion of some controversies. I think it is now time to come back [to it],1 since I have been asked to treat in depth the important question of the signs of the true Church. I had developed for myself a very peculiar method, which had two great advantages: first, it could not be disapproved of by anyone; second, it would lead to the end, furnishing a sure means to arrive at a conclusion. I once talked about this method with a great prince, who objected at first that many others had already proposed supposedly new methods, but that no advancement had been achieved thereby. I called his attention immediately to the difference between my promise and theirs: for they always promise very easy methods, by which they hope to convince their adversaries in a short time; whereas I declare that the method I undertake is very difficult, and that it requires great dedication and a great deal of time. So that their promises and mine are as different as those of a Llullist, who purports to teach us quickly the Pansophia,c and a Geometer who understands true analysis and warns us that a little more care is needed in order to achieve solid knowledge. This prince was quite satisfied; but he told me that it would be good to have some visible sign of the advantage of this method – a sign capable of appealing to everybody, even before getting to the details. I answered that he had anticipated what I was going to say and that indeed there is here a rather surprising sign of the virtue of this method, which made it visible that it is one of a kind. When I noticed that he was impatient to learn what such a sign could be, I said to him: You will agree, Sire, that there is nothing that makes a dispute more commendable than the moderation of the disputants; well, I claim that this moderation will be manifest here in a quite special and indisputable way. He astutely replied that moderation could have a quite opposite effect in different people. For those that practice controversies – he said – are often so enthusiastic that they cannot admit that somebody would speak otherwise than they do, for they consider it to be a betrayal of their party to display any kind of lenience. To this, I replied that the objection was quite important, but that it had no place along the route I wanted to follow; for here – I said – the nature of the dispute forces people to speak moderately in spite of themselves. What you say here – replied the prince – is surprising; but it seems to me as difficult to make these people change their language as to teach a raven to sing like a nightingale.d Noticing that he enjoyed the paradox I had proposed, I persisted, saying that there was here 1

In the margin, Leibniz writes: “return to the study of controversies”.

19. On Controversies

203

another mystery, namely that the combatants would have their arms so bound that they could not move except in an orderly fashion and in due measure, and that they would be pulled by machines which would do all the work, as in a naval battle, where the movement of the vessel and the force of the gun rule over the combatants. Furthermore, anger would be out of question if one could not discern clearly between friend and foe. You speak enigmatically, said the prince, and I don’t understand a word of what you say. Your Highness will be satisfied by my clarification, I replied. What I purport to do, in short, is to write down controversies in such a way that the reader cannot know which party is favored by the author. If I achieve this purpose, what can I be blamed for and how can I be exposed to the fury of anyone? Everyone would be forced to admit that the form of my undertaking imposes upon me moderation, and that I couldn’t so disguise myself without sweetening things and retaining a measure of impartiality everywhere. Although I don’t yet understand the rest – said the prince – I already find this invention excellent. If you succeed in realizing it, and if you are able to write down controversies without letting it be known which party you favor, I anticipate an extraordinary success for you. People will be attracted by such an unexpected novelty and everybody will want to read your works by virtue of their rarity. Furthermore, you can count on the readers’ attention, since, eager to impute to you some partiality, they will scrutinize you carefully, picking up words everywhere [in your text] for that purpose. It will be enjoyable to observe the disputes between those who will claim that you belong to one or another party, in spite of you or in spite of themselves. People will fight in order to have you or not to have you on their side, as in Greece, Seven cities fight over the lineage of the famous Homer.2 I see that Your Highness scorns me in good spirit, I replied. But I am concerned that, instead of fighting for my favor, they will rather, by shared agreement, condemn me to keep the store (garder la boutique). The prince replied politely that I should not be concerned by that, and that he knew me well enough to be sure that I would say things capable of awakening people. Ultimately, he said, what more do you want: I will take care of the hazards; you work it out for the love you have for me; I know that you can do what you promise, if you devote yourself to it in the required manner. After this, Sire, there is no possible reply, I said. Your Highness’s orders have the peculiarity that they make people capable of obeying, provided they are granted the liberty to consult the source of your enlightenment in order to find there the necessary instructions. 2

Septem urbes certant de stirpe insignis Homeri. A Greek epigram, presumably from Alexandria (2nd Century A.D.).

204

Chapter 19

Let us leave that aside – said the prince – and let us see how you plan to perform the task. For, although I now understand well the great force of this manifest sign of your fairness, which will conquer for you all existing honest people; and, although I have no doubt that, having thus prepared the minds of people by presenting yourself equitably among them, you will also be able to touch their hearts very effectively; nevertheless, I would be glad to learn about the details of your enterprise. I answered that I was afraid His Highness would perhaps abandon all the hopes with which he had heightened my spirits, once I had pointed out the difficulties awaiting [my project]. He reassured me very kindly, saying that I was wrong to assume he would so easily change his mind, and insisting that he was convinced of what I could do. I thanked him with a deep bow, and continued as follows: If all men had the good will I have, and if all men of good will had the penetrating lights of Your Highness, we would not need a method for disputes. The masked sophisms would be immediately discerned from solid reasons, and neither declamations nor puns would succeed in elevating bagatelles to realities. However, just as ordinary men lack the required penetration for discerning between good and bad, they also lack the necessary application and patience for overcoming by means of time the deficiencies of their nature; and, by trying to imitate the great geniuses through the swiftness of their judgment, they find themselves entangled in the difficulties of the matter, and if sometimes they arrive at the truth, it is only by chance. Nevertheless, it is known that judgment is equally distributed among all men – only they lack the will to exercise it. The cause of this deficiency is that people are not used to focusing their minds and meditating attentively upon one and the same thing. For, when they undertake to prove their views, they rely upon the first reason that occurs to them as if by chance. But, since such a reason usually presupposes something as ill grounded as that which they wish to prove, they react with anger when one requires them to prove their presupposition, especially when the proof of the proof forces them to undertake a further proof: they then claim that one should not exhaust them and that their adversary is uncharitable for always denying without ever proving his own views. Nevertheless, they do not acknowledge (or do not want to acknowledge) that they make a mockery of the world by offering as proofs things as uncertain as those under question, in order to simulate having presented reasons, and thereby forcing their opponents – by the law of equity – to present their own reasons. The opponent, on his part, doesn’t fail to do the same. The arguments, once closely examined, are nothing but the conclusion formulated in other words; the audience and the disputants are finally bored by the length of the dispute, and one stops speaking or writing without having reached a conclusion. This is the method of the ignoramuses, whose

19. On Controversies

205

mind or memory is unable to offer anything of value, and who, therefore, turn the conclusion around in different forms in order to make believe they have proved it. I confess that clever and erudite persons advance further in the subject matter, saying a thousand nice things on both sides – things that are relevant. Choice examples, evidence from antiquity, apparent contradictions by their adversaries, and so-called ad hominem arguments – they don’t miss any of these. This is a field where fertile minds have the liberty to amuse themselves; they are never at a loss, and – what is more important – they will always find something that brings reason to their side. For, there are on both sides abuses and mistakes. They triumph when they catch their adversaries; they make sure this advantage is recognized by their disciples and admirers; all minor writers copy this passage for more than a decade, until some other courageous champion finds the means for another triumph. Only then does one leave aside the old argument and produce others; often one resurrects those that have been buried by forgetfulness; and in order to acquire a bit of reputation, one makes fun of religion, although more by habit than by malice. I have no doubt that there have often been perfectly well-intentioned persons looking for the absolutely pure truth, with the dedication this deserves. But, driven by the pressures of their zeal, which prevented them from reflecting enough about method, they did not achieve the success they hoped for. For, having met as much zeal in their adversaries, they clashed rudely, or else, having had to deal with some subtle and adroit sophist, they had the misfortune of seeing how the force of their blows was deflected, rather than faced – without being able to surmount the malice of their adversary. They would protest, take heaven as witness, the others would take advantage of their emotion, and finally everything would go up in thin smoke. I must now mention some of the abilities one learns by oneself and practices without thinking in the heat of the dispute. The first is that each person who disputes chooses his own order and orders as he pleases both the reasonings of the adversary and his own. This disturbs everything, for it entails that just as there are replies, there are new dispositions of the subject matter. This confounds the reader, who has difficulties in putting all of it together, and requires from him either a great deal of memory, or free time, or even judgment. The second is that the disputes tend to thicken and inflate themselves into [many] volumes; this distresses those who want to examine them carefully and are prevented from doing so unless they renounce every other occupation. The third ability consists in hiding or weakening the adversary’s arguments when one reports them. This is often done without illfaith, due to the haste one has to turn everything to one’s advantage. The

206

Chapter 19

fourth is the repetition of the reasons adduced, without taking into account our adversary’s replies – which occurs either due to forgetfulness or to avoidance, since often these reasons seem to us pitiful and not deserving to be reported; nevertheless, the adversary believes otherwise. The fifth is digression, as when one engages wholeheartedly in a discussion of some lateral difficulty, where one believes one is able to obtain some advantage over the adversary. This makes new questions arise every day; [along with the use of] peculiar, harsh and scandalous expressions, condemnations and heresies which had not come to mind at the beginning of the dispute, [for] no one wants to give up, and authors take pride in defending that which had escaped through their mouths without thinking. I dare say that the method which I purport to employ reduces these difficulties at once, and excludes them formally. For one will actually see a representation of the reasons of both sides which is so faithful that every reader will need only common sense in order to judge, without depending upon the expounder’s expression of his inclination. But I see that other affairs require Your Highness’s attention, so that I will be obliged to defer the rest of this project until Your Highness decides to command me to complete it. Then the prince turned around and saw that a large package of letters, requiring immediate attention, had been brought to him. He manifested displeasure at this interruption: you see – he said to me – we are the slaves of our greatness and we cannot enjoy that which pleases us when we want. We will complete this conversation as soon as possible. In the meantime, you will think about the execution of your plan, the effects of which I expect to be extraordinary. Upon this I left, but no sooner had I departed, he called me back in order to add a word. I warn you – he said – that it is not only for the love of myself but also for the love of God that you undertake this work, whose importance you can well estimate. Since you undertake it in such an uncommon way, you are aware that it might yield considerable results for the well-being of many souls that are embarrassed by the multitude and confusion of things to be examined. Let the world no longer be baffled, and [you can] be sure that there are many cultivated persons who will joyfully join hands with the clarity of truth, and who will not hide the effect this will produce in them; consider also that these inclinations will one day lead to the reunification of minds, and that one does not always anticipate the great events that emerge from small occasions. I said that I had not enough vanity to expect advantages other than those of some specific readers. He answered that I should not put limits to the divine blessing, and that I should remember my own maxim – which I had often repeated – namely, that after putting our own consciences in order, we should above all work at something important for God’s glory and for the

19. On Controversies

207

common good, which is what distinguishes us from those whose piety is passive. We may be sure that the small amount of suffering we endure here for the interests of this great master of the universe, whose wisdom is so profound, and whose justice is so constant, will be infinitely compensated by the splendors of the future life. I replied that I recognized indeed the maxim I had always preached, but that it was designed mainly for the great, to whom God had given the means to contribute significantly to the advancement of the general good, so that it depends only upon them to shine in the other life as well as in this one; that indeed we men could have good thoughts, but that the Sovereigns are the true instruments of divine glory, and that the very conditions of their spirituality are much above that of other men, provided they profit from their advantages. The prince seemed to me moved by these words, and he assured me that he would never lack good will and that he would make all efforts to see to it that those feasible things that he perceived as being in the interest of God’s glory would succeed. This was the end of the conversation. But God, who does everything for the best, even though his reasons often remain hidden to us, has taken away this prince from the world – which forced me to abandon all these projects, until I think I have again found in another prince3 – who is no less enlightened than the other – that which I had lost so unexpectedly. It must be noted 1. that this method will first be applied to the question of the Church and what depends upon it, as an experiment, since the decision on this question would provide a precedent for all the rest; 2. that he who uses this method will be neither judge, nor party, nor reconciliator, but only expounder; 3. that the expounder’s faithfulness will be apparent in that no one will be able to guess which party he belongs to – which is unheard of in controversies, and can be taken as a palpable sign of moderation and equity; 4. that he will maintain a certain indisputable order which will bear the clarity of evidence, and which must exclude formally the five difficulties indicated above; 5. that he will summarize the disputes as much as possible, so that one can see all their economy, even though what often makes these things prolix and difficult is not so much their nature as the complicated and ambiguous expressions used by the authors, which one must develop so as not to let them say that their reasons have been neglected; 3

The Landgrave of Hessen-Rheinfels. See the introduction to the present Chapter.

208

Chapter 19

6. that it will usually be easy for a man of common sense to make his judgment based on the report given, without any need that the expounder declare [his own opinion]. a

In his De Arte combinatoria (1666), Leibniz mentions Ramon Llull as a valuable precursor of his Combinatory. Here, 14 years later, he distances himself from precursors like Llull, presumably because the method here described departs significantly from the combinatory and from other ‘calculative’ tools for resolving controversy on which he had been working too (see, e.g., Chapter 14). b In Chapter 1, a text written soon after the De Arte combinatoria. c Leibniz is here scorning the attempts in vogue in the 17th century to fuse the totality of science with a broadly conceived Christianity in an amalgam. The best known representative of this kind of syncretism was Johann Amos Comenius (1592-1670), author of Pansophiae prodromus (1639-1644). d Cf. La Fontaine, Fables, Book 9, Fable 16.

Chapter 20 ON PRINCIPLES

Setting aside the Cartesian attempt to ground all knowledge upon a single principle, Leibniz here assumes the need for at least two basic principles – the principle of contradiction and the cogito. As argued by Ortega y Gasset (1979), Leibniz is the ‘philosopher of principles’, who multiplies them as a function of the complexity and diversity of the problems he addresses. This raises the question of the status, value, and evolution of his ‘principles’. In the present text, he considers these issues from two points of view. From an axiomatic perspective, what characterizes a principle is its ‘evidence’, i.e., the fact that it is a truth presupposed in all other truths rather than depending upon its consensual acceptance. From another perspective, principles are characterized by their inferential role, which need not be absolute. Accordingly, they function as hypotheses and are called ‘reflective’, ‘indirect’ (as opposed to ‘immediate’) and ‘formal’. As such, they are validated by their heuristic role in the demonstrative process, i.e., through their usefulness in reaching plausible conclusions and responding to objections, up to showing the impossibility of the contrary hypothesis. This multiple perspective allows him to keep his distance, regarding principles, both from foundationalism and conventionalism.

Date: 1679-1685 (?) Edition: A 6 4 A 124-125; C 183-184 Language: Latin Those two primary principles – the one of reason: identical [propositions] are true and those implying a contradiction are false; the other, of experience: various [things] are perceived by mea – are such that it can be proved of them, first, that they cannot be demonstrated; second, that all other propositions depend on them, i.e., that if these two principles are not true, then there cannot be any truth and cognition. Hence, either [these principles] are to be admitted without difficulty, or one has to renounce all 209 M. Dascal (ed.), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. The Art of Controversies, 209–211. © 2006 Springer.

210

Chapter 20

investigation of truth. It should be added that there is no reason of doubt that can be raised against these principles which is not also [a reason of doubt] against all other propositions. I remember that a clever man (the Bishop of Thinab) wanted to reduce all evidence to authority, to which I objected that man can reach knowledge by himself. But he argued as follows: Whatever is proved (or whatever is given evidence for) is proved either from evident or from non-evident [propositions]. If it is proved from non-evident [propositions], then it cannot be rendered evident. But if it is proved from evident [propositions], then the question arises about these [propositions], either ad infinitum – in which case there will be no evidence – or else some [propositions] will be evident in themselves. But whence will we know that these propositions are evident in themselves, except through consensus, i.e., as those accepted by all?1 I answer that those [truths] are evident in themselves which, if they are annulled, all other truth is also annulled. Moreover, I have observed that I can prove some things without assuming any [propositions] except those that are conceded. Thus when I want to show that an opinion defended by somebody is absurd, I assume the propositions which he admits and I conclude from them in legitimate form the contradictory of a proposition which he asserted. From this follows the falsity of one of the propositions that was assumed by him, i.e., it follows that they cannot be true together. It also follows that someone can prove the absurdity only of those propositions that involve several assertions or concessions; that is to say, one deduces the absurdity of what has been argued from such concessions. From here it follows that all demonstration is a deduction ad absurdum.c And demonstration does not require assumptions or direct principles but only reflexive principles. And thus the difficulty, which torments all, concerning how we are certain of those principles from which demonstrations proceed, vanishes. It should be said that demonstrations do not proceed from assertions but from concessions or hypotheses, and that they do nothing else but showing that some hypotheses are in conflict with each other. Therefore, I only assume [the] reflexive, or indirect, or formal principles, i.e., first that the syllogistic form is good, and second, that contradiction is absurd. But I use no material principles, or the matter of demonstration, other than those hypotheses of the adversary of which I show that they contain a falsity. It follows that all demonstration is ad hominem.

1

Marginal addition: I nevertheless concede that all men are led by authority in many cases (see St. Augustine’s pamphlet on the utility of faith) and that common opinion is often [the outcome] of the ultimate analysis of our practical judgments; I think, however, that whoever is prepared to reflect accurately will discover the higher principles of judgment.

20. On Principles a

211

The formulation of these principles is not the familiar one, as it appears in later texts. The first, the principle of contradiction, for example, is later distinguished from the ‘principle of (sufficient) reason’ – the former accounting for necessary truths and the latter for contingent ones. The second principle is usually referred to by him as one of the two basic truths comprised by the Cartesian ‘cogito’: “there are two general absolute truths, i.e., referring to the actual existence of things; the one is that we think; the other, that there is great variety in our thoughts” (To Foucher, 1675; A II 1 246; see also To Gallois, 1672; A II 1 227). b Cristobal Rojas y Spínola* (1626-1695). c Notice that Leibniz here does not employ the standard expression reductio ad absurdum.

Chapter 21 TWO PREFACES TO THE GENERAL SCIENCE

At the beginning of the 1680’s, Leibniz returns to his project of a General Science. The two texts here translated, both written in the spring of 1682, are in fact drafts of a possible preface to a book that should crown this project, which would deserve the Baconian title “Instauratio” – meaning both renewal and restoration. Unfortunately, the book was never written. The two prefaces provide us with a reasoned outline of its planned contents, unifying the many fragments Leibniz, in all likelihood, wrote with this book in mind. Text A describes the sad state of 17th century knowledge in Leibniz’s eyes with the help of a series of vivid metaphors. It provides a diagnosis of the problem, prescribes the medicine for it, and formulates a condition for the success of the proposed treatment. That is to say, this text deals, in an extremely succinct way, with the main components of the General Science: the Encyclopedia – properly ordered, indexed, and containing not only conclusions but also their respective demonstrations. The Art of Judging leads to these demonstrations, while the Art of Discovery leads from what is known to new discoveries. Leibniz’s diagnosis of the confusion that reigns in the organization of knowledge is sharp: the multiplicity of opinions and sects, and the apparently insoluble controversies among them is both the manifestation and the cause of the problem. No wonder that his main concern is to develop a method capable of “clearing the ground” by eliminating as much of these controversies as possible. The availability of this method thus becomes for him the condition for the success of the whole project of a General Science. And he presents the envisaged method as an “irreversible” and “irrefragable” calculus, i.e., as a procedure whose application does not leave room for discussion. Once available, this method should permit to decide (and thereby end) those controversies liable to deductive solutions. Beyond that, it would also permit to specify the precise status of those matters that, while remaining controversial, are nevertheless prone to rational evaluation, through procedures such as hypothetical, probabilistic or presumptive proof.

213 M. Dascal (ed.), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. The Art of Controversies, 213–218. © 2006 Springer.

214

Chapter 21 Text B follows A in stressing the need to deal formally with controversies as a means both to solve as much of them as can be formally solved and, thus, to get them out of the way for further progress. Unlike A, however, B not only does not underrate the value of non-conclusive, dialectical reasoning, but rather highlights it. In fact, most of the disciplines listed at the end of this text as examples of the General Science are unlikely to be rigorously formalized – which suggests that the inclusion of “ordinary”, i.e., “dialectical” analysis in the planned book is presumably due to the fact that it provides the appropriate method for these disciplines. Furthermore, preface B announces that immediately after the Introduction, the book will contain a detailed exposition of Descartes’s replies to the objections to his Meditations, followed by Leibniz’s own proposal as to how Descartes should have properly responded to those objections. In a sense he seems to be applying here the dialectical form as “rule of discovery” (see Chapter 12D). To be sure, his declared purpose is to clarify, in this way, how his doctrine differs from Cartesianism, at about the time his polemics with the Cartesians gains momentum. But the choice of the debate form as the appropriate way to achieve this hermeneutic purpose is a telltale sign of the importance he attaches to this form whenever a formal or calculative method can hardly be expected to help. In this respect, it is worth noticing that preface B contains a well-known passage, which became emblematic of Leibniz’s “calculative” approach to controversies and to rationality in general. In this passage, Leibniz depicts how, through the use of the method he allegedly devised, disputants could easily solve their divergences by using a pen and calculating (see also Chapter 28). This often quoted passage has been systematically misinterpreted by overlooking that Leibniz is careful enough to stress, even in this enthusiastic passage, that controversies can be treated computationally only partially, i.e., only as far as “what can be determined from the [available] data” is concerned. A few years earlier (see Chapter 14), he was aware of this and other limitations, but still believed the arithmetic characteristic he was then proposing would be able to overcome them.

A.THE INSTAURATION OF THE SCIENCES: A PREFACE Date: Spring 1682 (?) Edition: A VI 4 A 440-441 Language: Latin If, when I think about the state of human knowledge, I were asked to describe it, the image that comes to my mind is that of a retreating army or [of an army] dispersed in the fields looking for booty, respecting neither banners nor orders. Or – to use an even better simile – the gear of presentday erudition seems to be comparable to a huge magazine, stacked with a complete variety of goods, and yet obviously in a mess and disordered, every

21. Two Prefaces to the General Science

215

good mixed with every other good, without any numerical or literal indices giving access to them, with no inventory, no bookkeeping (liber rationum), from which some light might be drawn. In [such a depot], the larger the mass of collected things, the less the use they can be put to. Thus, [the problem is] not only to bring in new merchandises, but also to produce a work that will correctly order those already in our possession. It is also necessary to select an order such that new additions will always find later their correct place, and without having to disturb and move around daily the extant goods due to the repeated access to them – which usually happens to a well-intentioned but not judicious head of household who, never being satisfied, decides to modify every night the aspect and state of his family.a The same seems to us to happen in the sciences, where we burn with a perpetual desire of reform and innovation. Instead of making use of the results of our [prior] researches, we leave them undigested and immediately grasp others, without establishing anything certain upon which we will be able to build later with security. Nor is the infinite mass of books that replicate the same of little concern – about which there will be room to speak more in detail later. Thus, two things are needed in order to escape such confusion: an ample inventory endowed with multiple and very reliable indices, and a book of justifying reasons (liber subductarum rationum). The former, i.e., the inventory, should either contain or refer to a complete history of nature and art as well as whatever is considered worth remembering in virtue of its meaning or what it is related to. As for the latter, i.e., the book of reasons, it should comprise the demonstrations themselves drawn from what is known (be they absolute or hypothetical, for there is no other possibility), which prove either the truth, or the highest probability or a presumption.b However, to my mind, our hope would be in vain, given so much variety of human opinions, unless we make use of a method whose elements will be developed in the present work. This method clears our path from all controversies, thus ensuring that we will be able to proceed in all fields, even in those that are most remote from the senses and figures, by means of an irrefragable calculus and a fixed order. In this way, the republic will immensely benefit from the fact that in all disciplines it will ultimately be achieved what had been achieved in the past in geometry. This would enable men of talent not to seek fame by suppressing the contributions of their elders, but rather by developing their discoveries, as I have already pointed out. At the same time, it would enable the compilation of an irrefutable book of justifying reasons (subductarum rationum) that have been publicly examined. Thus, anything falling within the scope of human reasoning would find, thanks to our analysis of notions,c a constant and invariable house and room in a general inventory – even though the same thing, due to its multiple uses or

216

Chapter 21

relationships, can often be located in several places, although it could in each step be referred to through the index.

B. FOUNDATIONS AND EXAMPLES OF A NEW GENERAL SCIENCE Date: Spring of 1682 (?) Edition: A VI 4 A 442-443 Language: Latin

Synopsis of a book whose title will be: Foundations and examples of a new general science for the instauration and development of the sciences for the benefit of public happiness In the Introduction to this work it should be expounded how I hit upon the foundation of such an admirable art. Something should also be said about the present state of knowledge. In order to make clear the difference between my principles and those of the Cartesians, it will be useful to begin with a selection of objections by well known scholars to Descartes’s Meditations, along with Descartes’s replies – to which I will add my own replications,d as well as how I provide for what those scholars demanded from Descartes. I will also expound the ordinary analysis of human judgments, i.e., the principles upon which ordinary people base their opinions, which are not to be despised, in spite of being dialectical.e Undoubtedly it would not be necessary to refer back these principles to other, more certain ones, if my aim were nothing but to confirm what is already known; but, since the art of discovery’s entire secret depends upon the analysis of truth (i.e., of the correction of human judgments), and since thanks to this art human knowledge could grow immensely, it follows that it is useful for us to progress up to the ultimate analysis. Next, the exposition of the foundations of the eternal truth, where the manner of giving in all disciplines absolutely rigorous demonstrations, equal if not superior to the mathematical ones – since mathematicians make many assumptions that could be here demonstrated. We will present here, thus, a new and marvelous calculus, which occurs in all our reasonings and which is not less rigorous than arithmetic or algebra. Through this calculus, it is always possible to terminate that part of a controversy that can be

21. Two Prefaces to the General Science

217

determined from the data,1 by simply taking a pen, so that it will suffice for two debaters (leaving aside issues of agreement about wordsf) to say to each other: let us calculate! In this way, just as when two arithmeticians dispute about a calculation mistake, so too the method I am proposing will yield the same solution, including for ignorant persons or for those who are not willing to use it. In short, what will be expounded is a method of disputing formally (in forma)g that is adequate for the treatment of questions, free of the tedium of scholastic syllogisms, and capable of overcoming those distinctions through which in the schools each party eludes the other. Examples of the new art will be presented, especially my general mathematics (mathesis generalis).h The new foundations of mechanics, so far ignored.i Demonstrations in general physics, as well as essays in special physics linked to a provisional medicine. Elements of moral and civil science, as well as of natural law and of public utility.2 Under the last rubric, one should discuss issues such as relieving the subjects from most of their burden, increasing the rulers’ benefits, and military art. Next, metaphysics and natural theology. Finally, the foundations of literature and the humanities, wherefrom historical proofs of revealed theology should be drawn.j We will conclude with an exhortation addressed to those persons who are most illustrious by virtue of dignity and knowledge, about their opportunity to increment immensely human happiness in a short time, if only we wish to do so.k a

This passage employs a variety of related metaphors for the description of the sad state of human knowledge and the ways to improve it. b Notice the inclusion under the term ‘demonstration’ of several kinds of proof: absolute and hypothetical proofs, conclusive proofs (of truths), as well as probabilistic and presumptive proofs. This list suggests a sort of scale of “epistemic force” of the various kinds of proof, which should be compared with the scale proposed in Chapter 5. c This is a clear indication that the method he has in mind here is the Characteristica Universalis, which would be based on a complete analysis of concepts resulting in an “Alphabet of human thoughts” (see Chapter 14, as well as A VI 4 84, 158, etc.) 1

Ex datis. This important expression has several uses in Leibniz, among which we single out three: a) referring to the set of data out of which probabilities can be estimated (cf. Chapters 13, 14, 24); b) referring to the need to compile and order the knowledge available to humankind (e.g., Chapters 23, 28); c) referring to a method of inquiry that does not rely at the outset only upon demonstrated premises, but proceeds on the basis of available data and hypotheses, leaving their verification or analysis for a latter stage (e.g., Chapter 38; also, “On the demonstration of primary propositions”, A VI 2 479-476, translated in Dascal 1987). For further uses of this or closely related expressions, see Chapters 4, 30, note c, 31; as well as Couturat (1901: 272-273). 2 For Leibniz, the expression ‘public utility’ has a positive connotation, associated with well being and justice. He contrasts publica utilitas and possessiones (A VI 4 2896), and characterizes ‘just’ as that which is of public usefulness: justum esse quod publice utile est (A VI 4 2797).

218 d

Chapter 21

Leibniz annotated indeed the Meditations and the Objections as well as Descartes’s Replies (A VI 4 1699-1703); he also commented the Meditations (A VI 4 1778-1783), and he later developed systematically his objections to the Principles of Philosophy of Descartes (Animadversiones in partem generalem Principiorum Cartesianorum; GP IV 350-400). The idea of examining carefully the Objections raised by renowned thinkers to the Meditations in order to find out whether Descartes had replied properly to them and eventually of supplying alternative or complementary replies sounds like a promising application of a dialectical approach. e The allusion is to the Aristotelian distinction between the “analytic” (i.e., demonstrative) principles and the “dialectical” principles (the éndoxa or widely shared opinions), which, although less rigorous than the former, are claimed by Leibniz to be no less essential for science. f See Chapter 6, note 8, where Leibniz formulates the procedural “rule”: if there is no agreement about the definitions or meanings of the terms employed, a proper disputation is impossible. g For the importance Leibniz attaches to reasoning in forma, see Dascal (1978: 214ff.). h See Couturat (1901: Chapter 7) and Serres (1968). i See Leibniz (1994). See also Chapter 10. j Leibniz sometimes complains about the situation of the letters and humanities in his time. See, for instance, De republica literaria (A VI 4 428-438). In the same text, he praises “Huet’s historical method” (p. 435). Huet’s proposal was to end theological controversies by finding consensus among all ancient peoples (see Introductory Essay, Section 4). Leibniz often makes use of historical sources in his theological and political argumentation, e.g., in Chapter 27. For further examples of this kind of argumentation, see Consideratio locorum potissimorum quae pro Purgatorio ex Scriptura Sacra et Sanctis patribus adducuntur (A VI 4 2126-2144) and Examen religionis Christianae (A VI 4 2355-2455), both analyzed in Dascal (2003b). k An example of such an exhortation can be found in Chapter 15, as well as in Paraenesis de scientia generali (A VI 4 971-980).

Chapter 22 INTRODUCTION TO A SECRET ENCYCLOPEDIA

This is one of a cluster of texts – to which Chapters 21 and 23 also belong – written by Leibniz in the decade of 1680, which elaborate upon the project of a General Science. Unlike its companions in the cluster, which describe the project and its utility, the present one provides definitions of key notions, lists primitive concepts, and spells out fundamental principles. Of particular interest is the fact that Leibniz formulates here the taxonomy of kinds of concepts or ideas (obscure, clear, distinct, etc.) which will later be systematized in the Meditationes de cognitione, veritate et ideis (A VI 4 585-592), which becomes his standard reference to this basic epistemological issue (see Chapter 28, note 5). In Leibniz’s own terms, here he talks not about “what pertains to the book”, but about “what pertains to its content”.

Date: 1683-1685 (?) Edition: A VI 4 A 525-531; C 511-515 Language: Latin

Introduction to a secret encyclopedia, or foundations and examples of the General Science, about the renewal and growth of the sciences and the way of perfecting the mind and making discoveries for the benefit of public happiness It will be necessary to speak both of what pertains to this book, and of what pertains to the content of the book. As to the book, it will be necessary to speak of its author, its scope, argument and form; its occasions; its language, and the judgments that others are to form about it. In case the author is anonymous, however, one must speak first about its usefulness and the method of using it, and the rest is to 219 M. Dascal (ed.), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. The Art of Controversies, 219–224. © 2006 Springer.

220

Chapter 22

be reduced to these two items. The book’s plausible usefulness is gathered from [what is known] about the author and his aids, as well as from its scope and form. The method of use is gathered from the theme and form alone. The book’s theme is the General Science itself; we must treat both, its principles (praecognita) and its precepts. The principles of the sciences are of reason and of fact, i.e., dogmatic and historical. The dogmatic principles are: the definition, names, object, method or division, and utility or end of science. The General Science is nothing but the science of what is thinkable in general in so far as it is such. This includes not only what has hitherto been regarded as logic, but also the art of discovery, along with method or the means of arrangement, synthesis and analysis, didactics or the science of teaching, the so called Gnostology,1 Noology,2 the art of reminiscence or mnemonics, the art of characters or of symbols, the Art of Combinations, the Art of Subtlety (Ars Argutiarum), and philosophical grammar; the Art of Llull, the Cabbala of the wise, and natural magic. Perhaps it also includes Ontology, or the science of something and nothing, of being and not being, of the thing and its mode, and of substance and accident. It does not make much difference how you divide the Sciences, for they are one continuous body, like the ocean. The object of this science is what is thinkable in general in so far as it is such, as well as the mode of considering it.3 This excludes, therefore, a name without a notion, i.e., that which is nameable but not thinkable – e.g., Blitiri, which the Schoolmen give as an example. That which is thinkable is either simple or complex. The simple is called a notion or concept. The complex is that which contains an enunciation, i.e., an affirmation or negation, truth or falsity. A concept is either distinct or confuse; either clear or obscure; either simple (i.e., primitive) or composite (i.e., derivative); and either adequate or inadequate. A concept is clear when having it allows us to recognize the thing presented to us, such as the concepts of horse, light, color, circle. Otherwise, the concept is obscure, such as the one I have of a man whose face I do not represent to myself sufficiently well, or such as 1

‘Gnostology’, in the 17th century, refers to the study of the nature of the disciplines in which knowledge is partitioned and their order. See Gil (1984: 392-404). 2 ‘Noology’, from Gr. noùs, is the study of the mind, including its habits. This neologism was introduced by the Lutheran scholastic Georg Gutke (1589-1634) in his Habitus primorum principiorum seu intelligentia (1625). 3 Marginal addition: “We consider many things not in themselves but according to the mode in which we perceive them and how they affect us”.

22. Introduction to a Secret Encyclopedia

221

those unskilled in geometry have of an elliptical figure which they call an oval – without distinguishing the true one, which must be described by drawing from two foci, from that which is described by arcs of circles. A concept is distinct when I can consider separately the marks (nota) I have for recognizing a thing and distinguish between them. Thus an assayer has a distinct concept of gold: he does not only recognize it by its sight, sound and weight, but he can also communicate and describe the marks of gold. A concept is adequate when it is so distinct that it contains nothing confused, be it when the marks themselves are known through a distinct concept or through other marks, up to simple or primitive notions. A concept is primitive4 when it cannot be analyzed into others; that is, when the thing has no marks, but is its own sign. It can be doubted, however, whether any concept of this kind can be noticed distinctly by men, i.e., in such a way that they know they have it. And indeed, such a concept can only be of the thing which is conceived through itself, namely of the supreme substance, that is, God.5 But we can have no derivative concepts except by means of the primitive concept, so that in fact nothing exists in things except through the influence of God and nothing is thought in the mind except through the idea of God. Nevertheless, we do not understand distinctly enough the way in which the natures of things flow from God, nor the ideas of things from the idea of God.a This would amount to ultimate analysis, i.e., to adequate knowledge of all things through their cause. The complex is an enunciation (enuntiatio) or a composite of enunciations. Further, [a complex can] be either an argumentation or a composite of several argumentations having a common conclusion, or else an exposition (tractatio). A subject matter could also be dealt with through questions, since a question is either one or a composite of several questions.b Every enunciation is affirmative or negative, true or false, pure or modal, categorical or hypothetical, fully explicit (explicata) or contracted. The nature of a negative [enunciation] consists simply in that one negation cancels another, and that if it is true then the affirmative is false, and conversely. 4

Marginal addition: “It is convenient to suppress here abstract concepts, particularly because there are abstractions of abstractions. Hence, instead of heat, we shall consider the hot; otherwise one might further imagine (fingo) some caloreity, and henceforth infinitely”. 5 Marginal addition: “A concept is either apt or inept. An apt concept is one of which it is accepted that it is possible, i.e., that it does not imply a contradiction”.

222

Chapter 22

An enunciation is held to be true by us when our mind is inclined to follow it and no reason for doubting it can be found. Ultimately, however, a proposition (propositio) is true, absolutely and in itself, when it is either identical or reducible to identical propositions; that is, when it can be demonstrated a priori – or when the connection of [its] predicate with [its] subject can be made explicit in such a way that [its] reason be always evident. And indeed, nothing at all happens without some reason, i.e., there is no proposition, except identical ones, in which the connection between subject and predicate cannot be displayed distinctly. In fact, in identical propositions the subject and the predicate coincide, or amount to the same. This is one of the first principles of all human reasoning and after the principle of contradiction it has the greatest use in all the sciences. Thus Euclid’s axioms, such as If equals are added to equals..., are just corollaries of this principle, for no reason can be given for diversity.c Similarly, the axiom used by Archimedes at the beginning of his treatise on equilibrium is a corollary of this principle of ours (that nothing is without a reason).d Since, however, we are not always able to discover the reasons for everything a priori, we are compelled to trust [our] senses and authorities, and especially [our] inner perceptions and various perceptions that agree with one another. We were granted a natural propensity to trust the senses and to consider the same those things in which we detect no difference, as well as to believe all appearances unless there is a reason against this – otherwise we would never do anything.e In matters of fact, those things are sufficiently true which are as certain as my thoughts and perceptions of myself. Here we must dispute with the Skeptics.f First principles a priori6

Principles of metaphysical certainty Nothing can at the same time be and not be, but everything either is or is not. Nothing is without a reason. First principles of a posteriori knowledge, i.e., of logical certainty Every perception of my present thinking is true.

6

This table is a marginal addition to the text.

22. Introduction to a Secret Encyclopedia

223

Principles of topical knowledge Everything is presumed to remain in the state in which it is. The more probable is that which has fewer requisites, i.e., that which is easier. Principle of moral certainty Everything which is confirmed by many indications, which can hardly concur except in the truth, is morally certain, i.e., incomparably more probable than [its] opposite. Principle of physical certainty Everything men have always and in many ways experienced will continue to happen, e.g., that iron sinks in water. It does not seem that it is within human power to [perform] an analysis of concepts that reaches primitive notions, i.e., things that are conceived through themselves. Yet, the analysis of truths is more within human power, because we can demonstrate many truths absolutely and reduce [them] to primitive indemonstrable truths; let us therefore devote most of our effort to this. Categories (praedicamenta), i.e., an ordered catalogue of concepts, as well as of conceivable things or of simple terms. The concepts are:7 Possible. Entity. Substance. Accident or adjunct. Absolute substance. Limited substance, or that can be passive. Living substance, which has in itself a principle of operation or a Soul. Thinking substance, which acts on itself – also called mind. Every soul is immortal. The mind, however, is not only immortal, but also always has some knowledge of itself, i.e., some remembrance of previous [things], and therefore is capable of reward and punishment. A living or sentient substance that lacks reason or reflection is a body. The substantial form of the body is the soul. The soul is a substance, both active and passive. Matter is that which is passive only and never acts, but is acted on at any moment, even when it seems to act. Consequently, matter is only an instrument of a form or soul.

7

The following list is given at the margin: “Possible. Entity. Existent. Potent. Knowing. Willing. Enduring. Changing. Suffering (patiens). Perceiving. Having location. Extended. Bounded. Shaped. Touching. Neighboring. Distant.”

224 a

Chapter 22

This paragraph has a Spinozistic flavor, which Leibniz had already criticized in earlier writings (see Chapter 4). Here, Leibniz defends, in addition to a parallelism between the ‘derivation’ of things from the one, divine substance and of ideas from the concept of that substance, also the view that the latter depends upon the former. b Having identified above concepts as ‘simple’ and enunciations as ‘complex’, Leibniz goes on here to apply the notion of complexity or composition to levels or kinds of discourse beyond the enunciation. Thus, as with many of his dichotomies, this one appears to be subtler than it appears to be at first, for among the concepts too, there are those that involve complexity. It is worth remembering that the term ‘complexio’, in Leibniz’s Art of Combinations refers to any kind of combination, whereas ‘combination’ (which he writes ‘com2natio’) refers to only one of them. c Euclid, Elements, Book I, Axiom 2. “If one adds equal quantities to equal magnitudes the result will be identical”. If all the magnitudes involved are identical, then there would be no reason whatsoever for a difference in the results of the operations involved. Leibniz discusses this and other axioms in NE (4.7). d Archimedes, Planorum equiponderantium inventa, vel centra gravitatis planorum, in Opera, Basel 1544, p. 125. e That is to say, we have a presumption in favor of appearances. f Facing the skeptic challenge is one of the main epistemological tasks undertaken by Leibniz. See Introductory Essay, Section 6, for his various strategies in fulfilling this task. For the issue here mentioned, his reply to Jean Gallois as early as 1672 is particularly relevant (A II 1 222-229).

Chapter 23 ON THE CREATION OF A NEW LOGIC

The obvious care with which Leibniz wrote this text, its characteristic style, and the call for public support it contains all suggest that it was intended as a memorandum addressed to the powers that be, which could be enticed to support his grandiose projects. After describing the two main obstacles that stand in the way of realizing such projects, he boldly affirms that such obstacles can be overcome quickly and easily, provided the required support and cooperation among scholars is obtained. The first obstacle is essentially socio-psychological: human laziness, lack of perseverance, occupation with routine tasks, lack of public support, etc. The second is substantive. It has to do with the insufficiency of traditional logic, which he compares to “child arithmetic”, to tackle the complexity of advanced theoretical problems and of practical endeavors. According to Leibniz, these insufficiencies can be overcome by broadening the scope of logic, to include, on the one hand, a method capable to securely keep research in the right path and, on the other, to secure the norms to be followed in the case of controversies and deliberations that require the proper consideration of opposing arguments. In this connection he mentions religious controversies, political deliberations, as well as both juridical and medical practice – the latter being usually mentioned by him as exemplifying domains where some contribution – though not sufficient – has been made to the “new logic”. In the concluding paragraph, for obvious reasons, he focuses on the task of providing a secure thread for research. The Academy edition claims that this piece, if compared with Chapter 22, provides “an alternative, broader definition of the General Science” (A VI 4 526). The reason given for this is that in Chapter 22 General Science is characterized in terms of its methodological and theoretical aspects, whereas here what is emphasized are its personal and social uses.a Yet, it is worth mentioning that there is also a theoretical broadening linking the two texts. Leibniz’s stress, in the present text, on the kind of ‘new logic’ needed for the

225 M. Dascal (ed.), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. The Art of Controversies, 225–230. © 2006 Springer.

226

Chapter 23 General Science is indeed a sequel to the inclusion in Chapter 22 of “topical knowledge”, for the “principles” of the latter should also be able to deal with the dialectics of deliberation in presence of conflicting arguments discussed in the present text.

Date: 1683-1685 (?) Edition: A VI 4 A 532-537 Language: Latin

A thread for thinking or on creating a new logic It is well known that not only all truths are determined in the nature of things and in the mind of God, the knowing author of them all, but also that it is determined what can be inferred by us from the information we already have, be it with absolute certainty or with the highest possible probability the data allow for. It is in our power not to make mistakes in our inferences, if only, as far as the form of arguing is concerned, we observe strictly the logical rules, and, as far as the matter [argued about is concerned],b we assume no proposition whose truth or high probability given the data has not been previously demonstrated with rigor. The mathematicians have followed this method, provoking admiration by its success. It is also in our power to terminate controversies, if only we write down accurately and in form the adduced arguments. For this purpose, one should not be limited to formulate and examine syllogisms, but also pro-syllogisms and pro-syllogisms of syllogisms, until either the proof is complete (absolvatur) or it becomes apparent what remains to be investigated and proved by the arguer – otherwise the ancient vicious circle repeats itself and Diogenes’s barrel returns.c We could, thus, have compiled in a short time a large thesaurus of truths, if, having recorded precisely the disputations, we would have observed the method of disputing, and published their conclusions in a sort of public Proceeding for Scholars1 – just as Democritus stamped with his seal whatever he had discovered after careful investigation, or as the mathematicians as soon as they have proved or established something, add to it the sign Q.E.D. or Q.E.F.2 In this way we would always learn something, namely a truth already proved or at least reduced to the simpler propositions still to be proved; we would thus not be led to return later to the preceding 1

2

Acta publica eruditorum. This is surely an allusion to the Leipzig journal Leibniz had founded with Otto Mencke the year before. See Laever (1986). Standard concluding formulae in mathematical and logical demonstrations: Quod erat demonstrandum ‘what was to be proved’ and Quod erat fallendum ‘what was to be disproved’.

23. On the Creation of a New Logic

227

controversy, but rather to the new questions born from it, without reaching infinity; since we would thus have always advanced somewhat, and would not have worked in vain, we would soon be able to know in many issues whatever the human mind can know about them from the data.d This method would have contributed much to humankind’s happiness. For we would have used, as far as possible, the given informations as if they were divine gifts, deducing from them what can be deduced. We would thus have stored in the public treasury of human science most remedies for our maladies and resources for our life, which we now search through useless efforts and futile divagations, unaware that we already possess them. Even if it were patent that we could not obtain from the data what we looked for, we would turn our attention to obtaining new data by methodically designed means. And even if experiments were not possible to perform, we would at least reach mental tranquility and spiritual peace. For, just as no serious mathematician looks for a purely mechanical perpetuus motus, whose impossibility has been proven,e so too no prudent person would exhaust himself with futile disquisitions, nor would he create difficulties for others, nor would he arouse the ire of those who do not agree with him; instead, he would employ his mental powers in those endeavors that can be dealt with fruitfully. However, there have been in the past, as well as in the present, many and powerful obstacles that prevent the success of the above helpful suggestions. Such obstacles are of two kinds.f The first and main obstacle seems to me to be the lack of a serious human will to act.g This should not surprise us, once we observe how the affairs regarding eternal salvation are negligently treated and how flippantly routine matters are handled. To give an ordinary example: the most important thing in this life is health; yet, many persons ruin it fully aware of what they are doing, most persons do not take care of it, and very few persons think about it seriously and efficiently. How many people would behave like that peasant described by Benivenius in his most strange observations?h The peasant, who suffered from inveterate dropsy, asked for help. Benivenius, seeing that he was desperate, told him that there was nothing to be done. Since the peasant begged for at least an advice, Benivenius, smiling, replied: I have nothing to recommend to you but that you should drink as little as you can. The peasant abstained from drinking for a whole year, thus defeating, thanks to the steadfastness of his mind, an illness the doctors had declared incurable. Who would not reject a doctor who would prescribe to his patients the remedy that succeeded with that peasant? Most people would prefer a sure death to such a hard remedy. Similarly, we prefer being comfortably led throughout all kinds of errors and ills by the indiscipline of our mind, rather than submitting ourselves to a sober severity of thinking which would grant a sure hope of salvation. It

228

Chapter 23

would be necessary for that to have much patience and strong resoluteness in order to follow rigorously an accurate path of investigation, without any indulgence with the mind’s propensity to let itself play or wander about. Furthermore, few are those who care for the truth. Those who have wealth and leisure are most of the time paralyzed, for they think they already possess all they need in order to live comfortably, and thereby renouncing to look for what they lack. Those who are endowed with goodwill and see how much human ingenuity can achieve, are distracted most of the time by domestic or public affairs.i Moreover, there are many projects, especially in the investigation of nature, that require financial means that can only be provided by collective cooperation. The second obstacle is the imperfection of the Art of Logic. I think that the logic practiced in the Schools is as distant from the logic that is needed in order to direct the mind in the investigation of the various kinds of truth as child arithmetic is distant from the algebra of an expert mathematician. Just as before signing a treatise on war and peace it is usual to discuss the preliminary issues, and just as in ancient Rome the praetor initially prescribed to the litigants a formula according to which the trial would then be conducted,j and just as those who take to the sea not only study the itinerary, but take with them compass and hydrographic tables as well as carefully made navigation charts, in order not to deviate from the correct course; so too we would begin an investigation in vain, having to interrupt it immediately or falling in error and despairing from achieving the desired results, unless we do not first determine the correct way and a sure indicator of the way to follow whenever we reach a crossroads. Similarly, we would be heedless to engage with others in a disputation, which might degenerate in a pastime or an exercise in cheating or, even worse, in losing time, or else in quarrels, invectives, and fights, unless we agree about an explicit norm, itself not subject to controversy, that makes possible for the disputants to reach concord. In fact, if one consults attentively the proceeding of the colloquia like those of Regensburg, Montbeliard, and others of the same kind,k one realizes that they could not be successful because there had not been agreement about the mode of disputing. Likewise, in political meetings and deliberations about war, peace, and other extremely serious issues, one can observe that one works with inadequate enumerations and many other faults against the art of reason.l As for the courts, since the judicial process itself consists in nothing but a special logic, it is absolutely evident how imperfect is the logic under which one works, since (omitting an infinity of other things) it is usually unclear upon whom falls the burden of proof; moreover, when there are conflicting arguments, no scales are available in which these arguments can be weighed in order to show on which side lies the highest probability. Not to mention medical decisions, which are made

23. On the Creation of a New Logic

229

on the basis of each physician’s private opinion, without following any determinate form, and for the most part rashly and distractedly, although they concern matters of utmost importance, highly conjectural in nature, where the highest degree of caution is required – it is easy to understand how many and how frequent are the failures that must occur by virtue of the method itself, failures that often lead to the death of the patient. Hopefully, we can today overcome, at least partially, these obstacles, both publicly and privately. In the public sphere, by making use of all those things that today arouse curiosity and stimulate learning. Indeed, it is well known that kings, princes and states are presently inclined to foment the search for truth – to wit the flourishing of royal and ducal societies and academies in France, England and Italy. Everywhere publicly supported laboratories and prizes for researchers are created. Many noblemen and wealthy persons enjoy the study of curiosities. Our century’s great discoveries in anatomy, astronomy, physics, mechanics, and mathematics arouse in ingenious minds greater hopes. Everywhere scholars are rewarded with copious stipends. If only they wished to cooperate, taking advantage of this magnificent occasion, we would acquire rapidly the largest thesaurus of solid knowledge. In the private sphere, the time is ripe for the expert in analysis to develop a logic that is appropriate for guiding particular investigations, i.e., A THREAD FOR THINKING. For, since there is today so much matter of splendid thoughts, what remains is to give them form. I call THREAD OF THINKING a sure and easy method that, if we were to follow it, we would be able to proceed without mental effort, without quarrels, without fear of making mistakes, with no less security than he who in a labyrinth would possess an Ariadne’s thread. And I think that such a method is in our power and that it can be achieved without difficulty. Moreover, this method would be so evident that it would unquestionably terminate all controversies, precisely as those disputes that can take place regarding numerical calculations are terminated without difficulty by an expert arithmetician either by himself or with the help of a colleague. To my mind, the application of this method ranges among the best things that can happen to humankind. I can demonstrate a priori both the possibility as well as the facility to develop it and its utility and efficacy; I can also explain it in such a way that any attentive and prudent person will realize its necessary success. Indeed I dispose of both, experiments and examples, that support a posteriori the above claim. I have no doubt that, with God’s help, I can promise to execute this project within a few years, given enough leisure and the help of collaborators.

230 a

Chapter 23

In terms of the distinction made by Leibniz at the beginning of Chapter 22, between talking about the book and about its contents, the Academy’s suggestion would seem to put the present chapter in the former category and 22 in the latter. b Leibniz is here employing the traditional distinction between the form and content (matter) of an argument, which was embedded in the distinction between formal and material logic. c Diogenes of Sinope (412-323 B.C.), the famous cynical philosopher. d Cf. Chapter 21, note 1. e Leibniz engaged in a controversy with Denis Papin who claimed to be able to prove the possibility of perpetuus motus. Leibniz claimed that the issue was mutually accepted as formally decided without the need to prove all the pro-syllogisms and syllogisms. See Chapter 38, note z; Freudenthal (1999). Part of this polemics consisted in articles published in the Acta eruditorum (see note 1). f On other obstacles for furthering Leibniz’s innovative and ambitious projects belonging to the family of ‘general science’, see Chapter 12A and Recommandation pour instituer la science generale (A VI 4 692-713). g For this particular psychological obstacle, see Chapter 18. h R. Dodonée, Medicinalium observationum exempla rara. Accessit Antonii Benivenii de abditis nonnullis ac mirandis morborum et sanationum causis liber, Köln, 1581. i This second case is Leibniz’s case. He also suffers from the third case as the many letters asking money for the Harz project, precisely in these years, show. j The praetor, responsible for the administration of a Roman province, had also the juridical task of summarizing, with the agreement of the parts, their declarations, as well as the content to the contention, prior to bringing the matter to court. The ‘formula’, which evolved into a precisely structured formal document, contained, in addition, instructions issued by the magistrate to the judge, and granted the latter the power as well as the obligation to judge the case. k These colloquia were intended to promote the reunion of the Christian churches. See Introductory Essay, Section 2. l Leibniz presumably singles out here the problem of correctly listing the relevant points because either their omission or their incorrect positioning in a (political) deliberation may lead to grave mistakes.

Chapter 24 NEW OPENINGS

We have here another example of a sort of general considerations on the state of knowledge at his time along with proposals about how to improve it, which Leibniz often writes, addressing the general learned public, rulers, and eventually merchants and noblemen capable of financing his projects.a In this respect it can be compared, for instance, with Chapters 21 and 30. The project he wants to promote here is that of a General Science, along with its companion, the Encyclopedia. Unlike other texts with the same overall aim, however, the present piece, along with others written in the same year, such as the “Recommendation for instituting the general science” (A VI 4 692-713) and the Preface to the planed book PLUS ULTRA (A VI 4 677-686), somehow presents the project against a broader background. The General Science, here compared with the toolbox everyone has and must have at home rather than a set of technical instruments, is not presented as useful only for the scientist, but also for all sorts of practical endeavors – such as those of the ruler, the politician, the jurist, the physician, the merchant, and even everyman. As such, it is not seen as a branch of mathematics – not even of the Universal Mathematics (mathesis universalis) under which Leibniz often places it. Mathematicians are here even blamed for (a) trying to penetrate too deep in waters which are, by their nature, shallow and (b) neglecting the application of their findings to practice. History, on the other hand, is hailed as practically useful as well as scientifically sound. It is some combination of this sort that mathematics and the ‘solid’ sciences should strive to, in the framework of General Science. What is ‘new’ in these Nouvelles ouvertures is its emphasis on the ‘science of probabilities’ as providing such a bridge. On the one hand, it is as rigorous and demonstrative as the rest of mathematics; on the other, however, its conclusions go only as far as the available data allow for; consequently, while it is better, in important practical decisions, to follow them than to follow one’s feeling or intuition, there is no absolute certainty in it.

Date: 1686 Edition: A VI 4 A 686-691 Language: French 231 M. Dascal (ed.), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. The Art of Controversies, 231–236. © 2006 Springer.

232

Chapter 24

Since we live in a century that undertakes to deepen things, those who are concerned with the general good must strive to take advantage of this disposition, for it may not last long. For, men thus disposed may one day slip from curiosity into indifference and, finally, into ignorance, especially if by bad luck or by their lack of method it turns out that they don’t benefit much from it. Still, it is well known that mathematics – which is the masterpiece of human reason – has never advanced as far; and if medicine has not yet advanced proportionately to the nice observations of physics, this requires perhaps only good order, which sovereigns might institute in order to make better use of the advantages humankind has already obtained over nature. Civil history and all that is called belles lettres find themselves [now] in the spotlight. And even though we are far from having extracted from the Greeks and the Latins all that is possible and there remain beautiful collections of pieces (spicileges) to be done, one can be sure that in the main things are clear. For some time now work on medieval history is being done. From the archives’ chests and dust, ancient sheets of paper, many chronicles, diplomas, and memoirs are rescued – which are useful to shed light on the sovereigns’ origins, alterations and quarrels. Shortly, we will have to search at the Chinese and Arabs in order to be able to complete humankind’s history – as much as one can find it in the records that are still available to us, be it in writing, in stone or metal, or in men’s memory. For, one should not neglect at all tradition; and I believe that from all that is not written, the languages themselves are the best and larger significant remains of the old world, out of which it would be possible to obtain information about the origin of peoples and often about that of things as well. I know that many philosophers and mathematicians scorn these investigations of facts; but, on the other side, socialites (gens du monde) are usually fond only of the study of history and despise everything that smacks of scientific reasoning, or leave it to professionals. I believe both sides exaggerate. History would be very useful,b even if it would only serve to entertain men in their desire for glory, which is the motivation for most good actions; and it is certain that the respect sovereigns themselves have for posterity’s judgment has often a positive effect.1 I admit that history has sometimes an aura of romance, especially when what is at stake are motives one keeps secret, but it tells always enough in order to teach us about the events; one finds everywhere in history excellent lessons given by the greatest men who have succeeded and

1

Erased variant: “posterity’s judgment has a great effect upon sovereigns”. It is well known that Leibniz himself envisaged “posterity’s judgment” as more important than his contemporaries’ judgment about his intellectual achievements.

24. New Openings

233

failed, and nothing is better than to learn at someone else’s expense. The history of antiquity is of absolute necessity for the proof of religion’s truth and, leaving aside the excellence of the doctrine, it is by its completely divine origin that ours2 differ from all others, which are far from it in all respects. The best use of the most refined and deepest critique may consist in providing sincere witness of these great truths by means of ancient writers verified with precision; and if the Mohammedans and even the libertines and pagans do not give in to reason, we can say that this is mainly because they do not know ancient history; also, those who ignore it totally are always children, like that Egyptian who spoke to Solon judged the Greeks very well.3 But if I value so much the beautiful historical knowledge that somehow leads us into the secrets of providence, I do not value less the way of the sciences in order to know the greatnesses of divine wisdom, whose marks are in the ideas God has put in our soul, and in the structure of the bodies he has provided us with. Briefly put, I value all kinds of discoveries in whatever field and I realize that it is because one ignores the relationships and the consequences of things that one despises the works and efforts of others,c which is the surest indication of lesser minds. Persons of meditation usually do not enjoy this multitude of shallow and uncertain views one must make use of in the conduct of affairs and in the practical sciences, such as politics and medicine; but they are mistaken. In these matters, as in games where one has to make a decision and take sides even when there is no certainty, there is a science that guides us in uncertainty itself in order to discover on what side the biggest probability is to be found.d But it is amazing that it is almost unknown and that logicians have not so far examined the degrees of probability or verisimilitude of conjectures or proofs, whose estimation, however, is as certain as that of numbers. This estimation can and must serve us not for reaching certainty, which is impossible, but for acting in the most reasonable way possible on the basis of the facts or knowledge available to us.e After which, there will be no reason to reproach us and we will at least succeed most of the time, provided we imitate those wise players and good merchants who divide [their risk] in small bets rather than committing too much to a single one, thus exposing themselves to going bankrupt all at once. There is, therefore, a science of the most uncertain things, which provides demonstrative knowledge of the degrees of likelihood and uncertainty. The ability of experienced persons often consists in knowing, thanks to routine, the choice they should make; however, since most often than not they judge flippantly, the philosophers 2 3

That is, our Christian faith. Variant: “like the Egyptians judged the Greeks”. Leibniz is referring to the following passage: “And then one of the [Egyptian] priests, a very old man, said: ‘Ah, Solon, Solon, you Greeks are ever children. There isn’t an old man among you’” (Plato, Timaeus 22b).

234

Chapter 24

and mathematicians could be of great help to them if they would henceforth examine practical matters rather than resting content with their abstract speculations. Yet, just as their blunder consists in their wanting to excavate where all that has to be done is to feel the ground, one can likewise observe on the other side that businessmen excessively trust luck and do not even want to throw the feelers, preferring rather to choose boldly the option that fits most their dispositions or prejudices – be it that they decide to act or to remain irresolute.f For, vulgar politicians like only simple and superficial thoughts, such as a witty man finds often at the tip of his tongue; and when the matter requires reflection they recoil. Why is it that the deep sciences, which they consider a tiresome profession, do not please them? But they are punished for their laziness in their own jurisdiction and in conducting their business, since while they rush after verbal negotiations and unreliable views, they neglect what in their profession is most certain <sec>, namely finances and military affairs, [which are] both almost entirely mathematical, as can be gathered from considering commerce, industry, the navy, artillery, etc. Jurisprudence itself is a science where reasoning has a great share and I don’t find in antiquity anything as close to the geometrical style as the style of jurists, whose traces have been conserved in the Pandects.g As for theology, it is quite clear how far metaphysics, on the one hand, and history and [the study of] languages, on the other, are necessary for it. From all things in this world after spiritual tranquility nothing is more important than health, whose conservation or recuperation demands profound meditations in physics and mechanics. How many times we suffer due to ignorance or to inadvertently following some simple reasoning or ready made observation, which we would not fail to notice if we applied ourselves as we should and men would make use of their advantages?h This is why I hold that nothing should be neglected and that it is up to all men to devote special attention to the search for truth; and since there are certain mechanical tools that every household has, even though other ones are reserved for the artisan whom they particularly serve, so too we must try to acquire the general science capable of enlightening us everywhere. And, since we are all curious of knowing the prices and uses of products and tools that we would not be capable of manufacturing in order to be able at least to purchase and use them when needed, likewise we must know the true price and utility, as well as in some way the history of the sciences and arts in which we are not involved, in order to be aware of how in the republic of letters everything works together (conspire) for the perfection of the mind and for the advantage of humankind, more or less as in a town to whose flourishing all the well managed and well grounded professions contribute. To my mind, two things would be necessary for men to be able to benefit from their advantages and to do all they can in order to contribute to their

24. New Openings

235

own happiness, at least as far as knowledge is concerned – for I am not considering now what has to do with redressing their will.i These two things are, first, a precise INVENTORY of all the available but dispersed and illordered pieces of knowledge – at least of those that seem to us, to begin with, to be the most important; and, secondly, the GENERAL SCIENCE that must provide not only the means for making use of the available knowledge, but also the method of judging and discovering, in order to go farther and supply what we lack. The inventory I am talking about would be quite different from the systems (systemes) and dictionaries, and would comprise a wealth of lists, enumerations, tables, and progressions, which would serve to put always under our gaze – in whatever meditation or deliberation we are engaged in – the catalog of facts and circumstances, as well as of the most important suppositions and maxims that must serve as the basis for reasoning.j To be sure, to create this is not the enterprise of a single person, not even of a group of persons. Nevertheless, I believe that attending better to the task it would be possible through the care of a few able and industrious people to achieve easily something approaching the target, which would be incomparably better than the present state of confusion, in which it seems that our own wealth makes us poor, as it would happen in a large storehouse lacking the order necessary for finding what is needed, since to have something without the possibility of making use of it is the same as to have nothing. But, since the general science must also serve to make a good inventory, for it is for the particular sciences what the science of accounting is for a merchant or a man in charge of finances, it is with it that one must certainly begin. a

The Introduction to this volume of the Academy edition conjectures that this text was prepared in order to be submitted to Louis XIV (A VI 4 lvi). b The utility of history here professed extends well beyond its political aspects here emphasized, as the references to the history of languages, theology, and science make clear. On Leibniz as a historiographer, as well as a methodologist of historiography, see Davillé (1909). c This is a further aspect of the epistemological importance Leibniz assigns to “the other” (Chapter 17) and to the collective character of the construction of knowledge. See also his remark below on the Republic of Letters. See also Dascal (2000). d See Chapter 13. e On what can be known on the basis of the available data (ex datis), see Chapter 21, note 1. f Leibniz is here criticizing both, the excessive foundational drive of certain philosophers and the flippant (and risky) superficiality of those who blindly trust their ‘intuition’. The intermediate position he, as usual, defends can be compared with the one he favors in viewing analysis and synthesis as a double-pronged method, where each complements the other. See, e.g., Chapters 12A and 30. g The question of the actual use of the Pandects in juridical practice was very much in Leibniz’s mind. See Chapters 9, note c; 39, note c.

236 h i j

Chapter 24

On the importance of ‘application’, see Chapter 18. On whether this redressing is possible or not, see Chapter 6. See Chapters 12A, 15, 22, and other texts where Leibniz gives various formulations of his Encyclopedia project.

Chapter 25 THEOLOGY AND THE PRINCIPLE OF CONTRADICTION

Honoré Fabri* (1607-1688), a Jesuit, worked in a variety of topics, including biology, physics, metaphysics, ethics and theology, revealing in his writings a great erudition as well as a tendency to controversy. Leibniz got in touch with him in the period of elaboration of his own physics (1670-1671) and corresponded episodically with him. He annotated Fabri’s treatises on generation and man as well as on physics. Leibniz expressed his affinity with Fabri, especially regarding his criticism of Cartesian physics, in particular of the reduction of bodies to extension (e.g., GP IV 245). But Leibniz also criticized him for the lack of rigor of his alleged demonstrations: “I would like, however, that you were a little more severe in demonstrating than you have been” (GP IV 260). With time Leibniz’s criticism of Fabri becomes more aggressive and extends to other domains. He accuses him of simulating a demonstration in the theory of movement without actually providing it (A VI 4 2711); he excerpts and annotates extensively, as well as criticizes two of Fabri’s books, on ethics and on physics;a and he accuses him of committing a paralogism when he claims that salvation requires belief in the articles of faith “because they were determined by the Pope” (De Unitate Ecclesiae Romanae, 1669-1671, A VI 1 547). The present text, which deals with the metaphysical issues underlying central theological doctrines, reveals a deep gap between Leibniz and his anti-Cartesian colleague. According to Leibniz, Fabri holds that there are in God actual ‘virtualities’, i.e., contradictory aspects, which do not derive from our thinking about him. After a detailed summary of Fabri’s argument, Leibniz launches a virulent critique where, in a crescendo, he describes Fabri as a defendant who openly confesses his crime, namely: that the principle of contradiction does not hold regarding God. From this, Leibniz argues, it follows that Fabri not only supports heretics and atheists, as well as holds the heretic doctrine of double truth,b but also destroys the basis of rational theology in so far as without the principle of contradiction and its corollaries no argumentation or refutation is at all possible.c This text is a remarkable

237 M. Dascal (ed.), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. The Art of Controversies, 237–240. © 2006 Springer.

238

Chapter 25 example of Leibniz’s praxis of discussion in which, eager to defend what he takes to be the minimal requisite of intelligibility (the principle of contradiction) even in the hard theological case of the intelligibility of the mysteries of faith, he takes off the gloves and abandons all his own recommendations regarding moderation, as well as his stern opposition to the use of terms such as ‘heresy’ or ‘heretic’ (see Chapter 33).

Date: 1685 Edition: A VI 4 C 2340-2342 Language: Latin

On not violating the principle of contradiction in divine matters: against Honoré Fabri Metaphysicians call ‘virtualities’ certain different aspects (ratio) of an object, which are in fact the same in reality, although they behave as if they really were distinct vis-à-vis contradictory predicates. They claim that divine nature and the person of the Word are virtualities of this kind – which, although they are one and the same thing in reality, they behave as if they really were distinct vis-à-vis contradictory predicates.d Some [metaphysicians] argue that such virtualities can be found also in created beings. As against this, Father Fabri (Metaph., book 1, proposition 31) contends that there isn’t and there cannot be any virtual distinction in created things.e He argues that this is proved by the fact that contradictory predicates do not inhere (inesse) one and the same thing (by the axiom). From this, I gather, he concludes that no virtual distinction exists (by the definition) either, since he is concerned with major virtual distinctions, by which he means that one and the same thing behaves vis-à-vis contradictory predicates as if it were to be distinguished from itself. We are forced to admit that there are many things in divine matters that go beyond human comprehension, which we however do believe by virtue of the faith divinely infused in us.f Yet, nobody will apply such a claim of incomprehensibility to the created things. Hence, Father Fabri refutes a number of alleged examples of virtuality in created things and reaffirms that, in general, formally contradictory predicates are such that one negates the other and that our mode of conceiving is either true or false – against those who affirm that – even in divine matters – the predicates that presuppose a formal distinction are not formally contradictory, but only [contradictory] for the understanding, i.e., according to our mode of conceiving.g If true, then we [effectively] understand; if false, then the mode [of conceiving] that generates chimeras must be proscribed, since the letters (res literaria) – and even less theology – do not require fictions and lies.h Finally, to those who object that the same reason that proves that one should not admit [formal

25. Theology and the Principle of Contradiction

239

distinctions] in created things also proves that these distinctions should not be posited in divine matters, he retorts that we know by faith that many things inherent in God lie beyond our comprehension. It will be said, he argues, that, if contradictory predicates in God are admitted, it is impossible to reply to the atheists’ arguments; nevertheless, he replies, in order for the principle that contradictory predicates cannot occur simultaneously, no virtual distinction is needed – which however exists in God due to the infinite power of [his] perfection. Furthermore, he argues, once I will have demonstrated to the atheist that God exists, he will easily acknowledge that there are in God [predicates] that lie beyond human comprehension and that the principles that guide our scientific work derive from created things. If created things contained virtualities, there would be no human science, since all principles can be reduced to the principle of contradiction. So says Father Fabri.i This shows us how far a preconceived opinion can lead a man. We have here a defendant confessing that in divine matters there is no room for the principle of contradiction, since according to him it is grounded only in created things, even though this principle must hold wherever there is truth and falsity. What do the atheists and anti-Trinitarians listen to with more pleasure? Therefore, nothing absurd is non-assertible concerning divine matters, and there is no room in this sphere for refutation or reasoning. Normally, it is said that in divine matters there is nothing against reason, but there are many things above it.j But these Schoolmen, in their deepest entrails affirm the contrary, and in fact adopt the double truth theory against the Lateran Council.k Does he believe that one can demonstrate to the atheists that God exists if the principle of contradiction is denied? Therefore, it would be more prudent and sane to say that neither in divine nor in created matters contradictory propositions should be admitted. Strictly speaking, the mystery of the Holy Trinity must be explained so as to avoid a true and specific contradiction, or else one must surely desert (transfugere) to the anti-Trinitarian side. Furthermore, that principle of human argumentation – two things that are equal to a third are equal to each other – must be strictly held, since it is grounded in the principle of contradiction. And it should not be violated in divine matters – otherwise, by suppressing any kind of argumentation, it will be possible to assert with impunity anything about God, and syllogisms and their modes and figures would be useless in theology. Thus, one should fear that he who asserts such things strengthens heresy, and we must explain the mystery of Trinity in such a way as to avoid these pitfalls. a

H. Fabri, Apologeticus doctrinae moralis eiusdem Societatis, Lyon, 1670 (A VI 4 26262637); Physica id est scientia rerum corporearum in decem tractatus distributa, Lyon, 1669 (A VI 2 187-209).

240 b

Chapter 25

This doctrine claims that one and the same proposition can be true in human science and false in theology. The expression ‘double truth’ was first used by Cardinal Etienne Tempier in 1277 in his characterization of the naturalistic Aristotelianism predominant in the Faculty of Arts in Paris, which he condemns. It has been argued (de Libera 1991: 122-129) that such a doctrine was never held by anyone in the Middle Ages, but it was later held in the Renaissance by such thinkers as Pietro Pomponazzi and Francisco Sanches. The latter, in his considerations about the use of dreams in medicine, argues that, although the existence of demons that produce dreams is true in theology, it is false in natural science (F. Sanches, “De divinatione per somnium, ad Aristotelem”, in Opera Medica, Toulouse, 1636). c Leibniz criticizes Fabri along similar lines in NE (4.18.1-9): “I have been surprised by seeing one day in Father Honoré Fabri’s (one of the ablest members of his order) Summa Theologica that he denied (as still do some theologians), regarding divine matters, the great principle that states: [two] things that are equal to a third are equal to each other” (A VI 6 496). d In the early phase of his thought, Leibniz sought in the idea of “hypostatic union” (the union of two hierarchically ordered distinct natures) the explanation of the incarnation of the Word (cf. De incarnatione Dei seu de unione hypostatica, 1669-1670, A VI 1 532-535). e H. Fabri, Metaphysica demonstrativa sive scientia rationum universalium, Lyon, 1648. f This is one of the central contentions of Leibniz against Bayle in the Théodicée. On the same issue, see the first part of Chapter 2. For discussion of how it is possible, in Leibniz’s view, to believe what one does not understand, see Dascal (1975; English version in Dascal 1987). g Leibniz here follows the scholastic terminology, according to which a ‘formal’ distinction is a distinction in re, whereas an ‘objective’ distinction is merely conceptual. h On the moral legitimacy and strategic usefulness of lies, see Chapter 16G. i In the same passage of the NE mentioned above (in note c), Leibniz says, concerning Fabri’s rejection of virtualities: “The same author rejects in his philosophy virtual distinctions, which the followers of Scotus introduce in created things, on the grounds that [such distinctions] would overrule the principle of contradiction. And when one objects to him that it is necessary to admit such distinctions in God, he replies that faith so commands. But how can faith command anything that overrules a principle without which every belief (creance), affirmation or negative would be useless” (A VI 6 498) j Leibniz anticipates here the thesis, defended in the Théodicée (e.g., Discours Preliminaire, 57-60), that there cannot be invincible objections to truth and that, therefore, the truths of faith are ‘above reason’ (because they are incomprehensible) but not ‘against reason’. See also Dascal 1975. k The Lateran Council of 1512-1517, to which Leibniz also refers in NE (4.17.24; A VI 6 494) indeed condemned the double truth doctrine, according to which what is true in science can be false in theology and vice-versa.

Chapter 26 CHANGING RELIGION

This is a carefully elaborated memorandum presumably designed to be used by Leibniz or by other representatives of the Protestant side in some round of the reunification negotiations. It is written in a quasi-axiomatic form, into which, however, a subtle ‘calculus of presumptions’ is embedded. This ‘calculus’ spells out the assumptions that must be taken into account as well as the relative weight of the different presumptions that distribute asymmetrically the charge of the proof. The complete consideration of all these factors is what tips the balance – at least minimally – towards one or the other scale, thus complying with the requirement of providing a reason either for keeping an earlier modification of a state of affairs or for canceling it and returning to the state prior to that modification. Once this general theoretical structure is put in place, Leibniz applies it systematically to the Protestant vs. Catholic controversy. In this way, he sort of ‘formalizes’ what each side would have to prove in order to hold its ground, thereby indicating the way to solve the controversy – through ‘pondering’, however, rather than through ‘computing’. It is worth noticing that, by adopting as a corollary of the principle of sufficient reason the view that those who undertake a change or persist in it have to justify it, Leibniz is putting the heavier charge of the proof upon Protestant shoulders, although this does not exempt the Roman Church from the eventual task of justifying – if so challenged – an alleged substantial change in early Christianity through which it came into being. The focus of the discussion is on ‘external’, i.e., institutional change of confession. But ‘inner’ changes in belief are also brought into consideration as part of the relevant assumptions to be weighed, and are necessary for justifying the ‘external’ changes. One might perhaps see Chapter 6, written ten years earlier, as the ‘inner’ counterpart of the present Chapter. Together, they show that it makes sense on occasion to change confession, though there cannot be any obligation to do so.

241 M. Dascal (ed.), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. The Art of Controversies, 241–245. © 2006 Springer.

242

Chapter 26

Date: 1686/1687 Edition: A IV 3 305-309; GR 167-170 Language: Latin

Cogitations on changing one’s external religion1 Nothing should be done without a reason, and much less should anything be changed without a reason. In the most important things, change is dangerous, unless there is a weighty and urgent reason for it. Most dangerous of all is to adopt changes in matters of salvation, which are the most important of all. Indeed, the risk concerning salvation is, due to the nature of the object, infinitely larger than comparable risks, because what is at stake is infinite well being and suffering – hence it requires as much care as possible. From the very fact that one should not perform any change without a reason, it follows that one must undertake a Change of a change2 performed without a reason, provided the time elapsed ever since the latter has been in force does not provide a new reason for retaining the change.a Thus, if the same reasons that existed for undertaking the change persist and if the issue is of great importance, then the change of the change is not only justifiable but also necessary. Whenever the issue is salvation, the case is that, if the change has been ill established, one should prevent it from strengthening with time; it should rather be corrected as soon as the error is detected. Ultimately, what is true of the change of a change is also true of the change of a changed change, and everything should be returned to its integrity, unless there is a powerful reason against it. In my opinion these principles must be admitted by everyone, the only controversial point being their application to the controversies here discussed. For, it follows from these principles that one should not change the religion within which one was born without a very weighty reason: a Protestant should return to the Church if his elders had ill-reformed [it]; it would be otherwise, however, if it were shown that the Roman pontiff had modified the primeval religion. 1

A more complete title, from a manuscript copied by someone else, reads: “Cogitations on changing one’s external profession of religion and on what has to be proved to the Protestants who do not want to return to the Roman church, if they prefer in good conscience to remain in [the state of] separation”. The term ‘external’ refers to the contrast between public adhesion to a church and inner religious experience. Grua gives to this text the title “On changing religion and the schism”. 2 Mutatio mutationis. The first ‘change’ appears in the original with an initial capital.

26. Changing Religion

243

It is beyond doubt that the Protestant religion has been introduced in the last century through a modification in the religion then in force. The religion modified by the first Protestants was considered Catholic by the modifiers (mutantes) themselves, shortly before the change. It was up to the first Protestants to show that the change undertaken by them was necessary. Nevertheless, the Protestants themselves acknowledge that, in what they call Papacy, one can find men who grasped the Christ’s value with a sincere and living faith. Therefore, the state of the Roman-Catholic Church [represented a] danger for those who, based on the Protestant views, believed in and did things they either knew to be wrong or sinful or else were guilty of ignoring this.b In fact, a sincere and living faith nourished by charity cannot coexist with sinning against one’s conscience.c So, the error [of wrong beliefs] too, just as the ignorance, which is incompatible with a sincere and living faith, is in this case ultimately culpable.3 Yet, he who believes in truths or does what is just while feeling or fearing the contrary, in fact distances himself from the way to salvation as far as the sincerity of the good intention4 is concerned. In fact, without a good intention there can be no living and true faith. To be sure, we can believe or do things we are not sure about, and it is also true that we can tolerate things we disapprove.d For it is contradictory to believe in that which one disapproves. Furthermore, there are in fact degrees of doubt, [some of] which are not incompatible with faith. Indeed, Christ himself said that faith can be weak.5 Whenever many reasons in support of each of the sides are presented to us, we are presumed to believe in that side for which the arguments have more weight, even though the preponderance might be minimal. It can at times happen that one prefers to follow, in action or in praxis, a course of action supported by arguments of the lesser weight, when the mistake in so doing is less dangerous.e In addition, it can happen that someone consciously acts against his belief or opinion and still can be excused for that. However, this cannot happen where in the interest of salvation one must follow the truth, for there is no higher risk than risking one’s salvation. 3

At the beginning of this paragraph the Academy edition has si where Grua has is. We opt for the latter. 4 Leibniz erased ‘of his conscience’ (conscientiae suae – which Grua transcribes as conscientiae luce), replacing it by rectae intentionis. 5 Matth. 16.

244

Chapter 26

No one can be directly accused of error or ignorance; [one can be accused] only of neglecting the task of looking for the truth.f Thus, the lack of faith is only condemnable by virtue of being contrary to charity or to good intention. To withdraw from the communion of a Church is a serious matter; it is even more serious to create a contrary communion. If the latter unfortunately happens, the damage [caused] is extreme and given the circumstances it is called schism or heresy. If someone realizes that he unfortunately produced a schism, then he is expected to do all he can possibly do in order to return to the unity of those from whom he is separated. I think this is true, even though the Church from which one is separated is merely particular, provided it is not known that this particular Church is separated from the Universal one.g Whoever severs himself from a particular Church that is intimately connected to the universal one deserves to be severed from the Universal Church. He who separates himself from a particular Church and does not join in communion another particular Church is anyway separated from the Universal Church, and if the separation occurred improperly, he lives in sin.h If there are several Churches in conflict with each other, universality being attributable to the one and Schism to another, then he who is aware that he has inappropriately separated himself from one of them must rather return to it than to join another, unless there is an important reason that persuades him that the one from which he withdrew is indeed schismatic. But such a reason must be strong enough to prevail over an urgent reason for re-unification. Thus, a Protestant who acknowledged that the Reformation of his peers required further proof and wanted to join the Greek rather than the Latin Church, would need a stronger reason in favour of the Greek against the Latin than someone who wanted to join the Turkish Church. For the Protestants to demonstrate that they were justified in abandoning the Roman Church, they should prove that they could not remain within it except by behaving in ways that run against good conscience (bona animi intentio). If after the separation it becomes apparent that the Protestants who withdrew from the Roman Church did not have a real cause for the withdrawal, they must return to it, as has been previously explained. Also those who were born in the Protestant communion must return to the Roman Church, unless it becomes apparent that acting in this way would be against good conscience. For, since there is no reason why the elders withdrew, the elders would not have withdrawn, so that the

26. Changing Religion

245

[younger] would also not have withdrawn. In this way everything must be re-unified. As for those who joined the Protestants coming from elsewhere, e.g., from the Greek Church, the Mohammedans or the pagans, once they would become aware of the injustice of Protestantism, they would return to the earlier state, i.e., to the obligations they or their elders had before they joined Protestantism. Regarding those who abandoned the Roman Church or whose elders did, they should prove one of two things: either that the Roman Church’s demands are incompatible with good conscience (recta conscientia) or that the Roman Church is itself schismatic and separated from the communion of the Catholic Church – although the latter reason is reducible to the first. If a pagan converted to the Christian Religion were to deliberate which confession to join, it would not suffice for him, in order to choose the Roman, to [learn that] the Protestants had separated themselves from the Romans. He would need further arguments, e.g., that all those who separated themselves from the Roman communion have done this schismatically, or (what would be sufficient) that the Roman itself never separated itself from another schismatically. a

See Chapter 36 about the issue of whether the passage of time alone can provide a ‘reason’ or be a ‘cause’ for anything, in particular for changes of ownership. b Leibniz is here making a veiled allusion to those in the Reformed camp who took advantage of the Reformation in order to obtain the same kind of benefits they accused the Catholic Church of being corrupted by. c In other words, true faith must be accompanied by a fitting inner disposition. In this respect, as Leibniz insists on many occasions, one can belong to the true Catholic Church, i.e., to the universal Christian Church (cf. Chapter 8E), if one has the correct moral dispositions, even if one is not in agreement with the resolutions of the Council of Trent, and therefore does not belong to the Roman Church. See for example his correspondence with Landgrave Ernst von Hessen-Rheinefels (A II 1 537; A I 4 388). d This is the minimalist Lockean tolerance Leibniz undertakes to transcend – a tolerance allowed only regarding what goes on in foro interno. See Introductory Essay, Section 2. e Notice the presence of the image of the balance (cf. Chapters 2, 5, and others) in Leibniz’s mind, which surfaces ‘naturally’ in a passage like this – including in the choice of terms like praeponderare. f See Chapter 6. g See Chapter 6. h Leibniz defends here the principle that a Christian must belong to some given Church, in spite of the fact that for him religion is essentially a relationship between each person and God. That is to say, the mediation of the Church is necessary, presumably because religion is, ultimately, not an individual but a communitarian affair. The rather strong statement in this paragraph seems to run against what he says elsewhere about the right to salvation and the ‘natural religion’ of pagans, innocents, and other ‘non-affiliated Christians’ (e.g., Chapter 33; GR 56; Théodicée, 95-96).

Chapter 27 METHODS OF REUNION

This memorandum was handed over by Leibniz to Landgrave Ernst von Hessen-Rheinfels at the end of a two-week visit he paid to the Landgrave in the first leg of his long journey to Italy. During this visit, Leibniz held many hours of conversation with the Landgrave about the problem of the reunification of the Christian churches. The issue had become acute in the wake of the revocation by Louis XIV of the Edit of Nantes in 1685, with the ensuing exodus of the French Calvinists. Leibniz was persuaded that the theological solution of the problem was still possible, but that it required the support of political authorities such as the Emperor and the Pope. Although the official purpose of his trip to Italy was collecting materials for the history of the House of Brunswick, Leibniz’s secret agenda included also negotiations on the issue of reunification. It is worth mentioning that Leibniz sent this same memorandum, at the same time, to Arnauld*, who mentions it in his letter of 6 December 1687 to the Landgrave, writing that Leibniz’s memorandum on “the Spanish bishop’s project for the reconciliation between the Lutherans and the Roman Church is very interesting, but I don’t think your Highness expects any success from it” (Arnauld, Oeuvres, 1775, vol. 3, pp. 41-46). In preparation for a possible round of negotiations, Leibniz undertook to reexamine the plan that seemed to him the most promising. Such a plan had been proposed by Bishop Rojas y Spínola,* the emperor’s envoy to the Hanover negotiations in 1683. (It is perhaps due to this fact that Foucher de Careil mistakenly dated this text as being from this year.) Although Rojas y Spinola’s plan or “method” was relatively old by 1687, Leibniz still believed that it was the best available procedure for obtaining reconciliation within Christendom. This was also Landgrave Ernst’s opinion, which is why he invited Leibniz on this occasion. Basically, Rojas y Spínola purported to create first a de facto reunification based on the double principle that the Protestants would acknowledge the Pope’s authority in exchange for the latter’s withdrawal of the charge of heresy against them and respect for their ecclesiastical organizations. This provisional peace would in turn create the conditions for the later discussion, in a conciliatory spirit, of the remaining issues.a

247 M. Dascal (ed.), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. The Art of Controversies, 247–262. © 2006 Springer.

248

Chapter 27 Leibniz basically favors this plan, which he spells out in the required detail for making it stand a chance of becoming operative. But the present text turns out to be much more than a mere elaboration of Rojas y Spínola’s plan. Leibniz characterizes and compares the various actual and possible approaches to the reunification problem, applying in a systematic way the principle of the place of the other (see Chapter 17). This reveals the need to take into account the asymmetries involved in all conflicts – without which there is no hope to conduct negotiations capable to solve a conflict. Concretely, this means the differences in status, responsibilities, and power of the contenders, factors which – taken together – allow each to realistically estimate what kind of concessions can be expected from the other. In this way, it becomes apparent that the arguments in a debate must be evaluated in the light of the contextual circumstances that determine their weight. This very erudite and strategically very subtle text thus illustrates how the “balance of reason” (see Chapters 2, 5, etc.) should work.b

Date: November 1687 Edition: A I 5 10-21; FC II 1-21 Language: French Of all methods proposed to overcome the great Western schism which is still prevalent and has damaged Christianity so much and caused so much harm, both spiritual and temporal, I find most reasonable the one which the bishop of Thina, now bishop of Neustadt, has negotiated with some Protestant theologians.c Nevertheless, I am aware that only through a great resolve and a great zeal, as well as the extraordinary perceptiveness of a Pope, of an emperor or of some of the most important princes, both Catholic and Protestant, it will be possible to overcome the difficulties the practical application of this method will raise. But the fruition of such a great good depends only on us and, given these conditions, the task is possible – which is already much. Let us leave aside the way of mutual tolerance and civil peace, a way with which it is always necessary to begin (although this way mitigates evil rather than eliminating its cause, like physicians who begin their healing by the most pressing symptoms).d Leaving this aside, it will be agreed that the way of rigor is not always licit, nor safe, nor always effective, as witnessed by the case of the Marranos, who have subsisted for many generations, giving rise to many a sacrilege, profanation and other great evils.e The way of disputation or discussion is ineffective, as there is no judge or regulated form that the disputing parties are obliged to follow exactly. For this reason, both in conferences and in the writings of controversy, the disputing parties rant to the winds, busy themselves in punctilious discussions, swerve from the issue in digressions, change the order, answer only to that which they find convenient, mask the adversary’s objections or solutions, try to escape them through derision or invectives, employ repetitions, do not distinguish

27. Methods of Reunion

249

the job of the respondent from that of the opponent nor that of the one who must prove from that of the one who must not.f So that it may be said that most books of controversy have been written for self-satisfaction and for obtaining the applause of one’s own party by catching one’s adversary by surprise, rather than by persuading and enlightening him. For which reason colloquia and conferences are usually fruitless, and are often only good to turn spirits sour and to give rise to new controversies.g It also seems that the way of accommodation is a blind alley. To be sure, there are controversies that consist only in misunderstandings, in which it is only necessary to establish certain distinctions and to use the way of clarification (as, for example, in the question of sacrificeh). In others it is sufficient to employ the way of abstraction (as in the issue of the Pope’s superiority over the councils, or in the question of the immaculate conception of the Virgin).i But there are controversies of such a degree of precision that distinctions are good for nothing in them; and there are other controversies that are so essential that they can neither be disregarded (en faire abstraction) nor ignored. Now, where the way of abstraction is not allowed, even less so is the way of condescension; and even though there are points one can grant, there are others where nothing can be conceded.j For this reason, those who have tried to accommodate the opponents by telling them that they should be satisfied with the articles taught by the first ecumenical councils and acknowledge as brothers in Christ all those who agree with such articles, have wasted their efforts and have been considered as a new sect by all parties. This position led to multiplying discussions instead of ending them, for it clashes with the principles of all parties.k However, there still remains an open way that encompasses the good of all the preceding peaceful ways and has the importance of accommodating the principles of both Catholics and Protestants. This way seems to me an effect of divine providence, which has willed that, despite the great opposition that seemingly exists between parties, there remain a way to arrive at a reunion without weapons or disputes, leaving unscathed the principles of Protestants as well as those of Catholics. If this were only true in theory, it would already be much; but often transforming theory into practice only depends on the good intent of men and on favorable circumstances, and that which is not yet ripe may perhaps reach its perfection one day through heaven’s blessing. Hence the importance of making this thought known and preserved. Here is what it is all about, as far as I have been able to understand it. The great principle of Catholics is that a Christian remains in the inner communion of the Church and is not a heretic nor a schismatic when he is in a submissive spirit, ready to believe and willing to learn what God reveals not only by the written word of the holy Scriptures but also by his unwritten

250

Chapter 27

word, which serves as interpretation and of which he has made the Church the depository. Thus, when an important issue becomes the subject of controversy and the Catholic Church testifies, in a legitimate and legitimately carried out ecumenical council, that a certain article of faith, i.e., an article expressly or virtually revealed by the holy Scripture or by the tradition God has caused to reach down to us through his Church, we must defer to that article without the least reservation, taking for granted that it is the Holy Ghost who is speaking and who directs his Church in all truth (in omnem veritatem). It follows that whoever remains in that spirit of submission will not be formally a heretic when unwittingly lending credit to some heresy, nor will he be a schismatic when he is excommunicated or expelled (clave errante) from the Church.l Moreover, just as he who is mistaken with a certain semblance of truth regarding the person of the true Pope, by not acknowledging him or by acknowledging an anti-Pope, is not truly schismatic, since his error lies in the fact but not in the right; so too those who doubt whether a given council is ecumenical or not, believing they have sound reasons and being so persuaded of their opinion that their mistake is morally invincible in the present state of things, are not heretics, provided they sincerely and in good faith acknowledge the power of the councils and of the Catholic Church. Examples of this abound: in France, and partially in Germany, the councils of Constance and Basel passed or pass as ecumenical, but the Italians disagree with that. On the other hand, the last Lateran Council,m convened by Pope Leo X, passes for a legitimate ecumenical council in Italy; nevertheless, there are Catholics that doubt it, as cardinal Bellarmine acknowledges in XVI, 2, De conciliorum auctoritate, ch. XIII: “Some, he says, doubt whether the [last] Lateran council was really general, for which reason the issue (of the Pope’s superiority with regard to the Council) is still open today, even among Catholics”.1, n Even when the council of Trent was over, there were those in France who did not recognize it as an ecumenical council, as witnessed by the acts and memoirs that were published; and although the clergy wished, during the assembly of states after the death of Henry IV, that it be recognized as such by an authentic act, the third state and the sovereign courts opposed this. Nevertheless, it seems that the Council of Trent is tacitly recognized at present, at least insofar as matters of faith are concerned (quoad fidem).o Let us now examine the principles of Protestants, in order to see whether they can be reconciled with those of the Roman Catholic Church. I assume it is in the Augsburg confession that these principles are to be sought, for individual authors vary too much, universities themselves argue with each other, and the other representative books are not generally accepted; on the 1

In Latin.

27. Methods of Reunion

251

other hand, those who call themselves reformed have expressly declared they approve the Augsburg Confession, and wished to participate in the religious peace prior to the peace of Westphalia on account of this declaration.p And when the doctors of Dillingenq accused the Protestants called Lutherans of having withdrawn from the Augsburg confession, and consequently of not being in a position to enjoy the tolerance granted to those belonging to that confession, the theologians from Saxony, at their elector’s command, published books with the manifest intent of proving the contrary.2 And quite recently, after Count Collonitsch, bishop of Neustadt, now cardinal and archbishop of Strigonia, primate of Hungary,r had ordered the publication of a book showing to what extent they had departed from the aforementioned confession, a theologian from Saxony,s at the elector’s request, did not hesitate to assert the contrary and protest because the Lutherans were being harmed. The electors, princes, and free cities of the empire that signed first, and all the other kings, princes and States which later approved the Augsburg confession, declared at the beginning of this work, distributed and read in the Augsburg Diet (1530) in the presence of the emperor Charles V, that they did not reject the Church’s judgment pronounced in a general council. For they assert, in the first place, that after His Imperial Majesty manifested in the summons to the Diet that his intention was to listen to the Protestants and to attempt to reestablish harmony, and after having proposed at the opening of the Diet that each should expound their opinion in Latin and in German, and after having declared besides that His Majesty could not decide anything in matters of faith but would undertake to persuade the Pope to summon a general council; the said electors, princes, and states offered in all obedience to attend that general council, and testified that they had already had recourse to it in proper juridical fashion; and they protested that, unless an agreement was reached, they would not give up this appeal nor derogate it by other treaties or negotiations. Now, everybody knows that whoever appeals to a judge acknowledges his jurisdiction. Hence it follows that their commitment is still valid, since they claim this ecumenical and legitimate council has not yet taken place, and that all Protestants profess to be entirely in agreement with the positions expressed in the confession of Augsburg; and although Protestants have published the reasons which keep them from acknowledging the Council of Trent as having been legitimately held, among others because they claim it has convened without listening to them, 2

According to the Academy edition, the “books” in question, presumably annotated by Leibniz, are in fact memoranda prepared for Johann Georg, Prince Elector of Saxony. They include Nochmalige Haupt-verteidigung des Augapfels auf abermaligen Befehl (Leipzig, 1630) and Nothwendige Verteidigung des Augapfels auf Befehl (Leipzig, 1628), both published in Acta Sanctorum (ed. J. Bolland, 58 volumes, 1643-1847).

252

Chapter 27

this does not prevent them from being bound even today to submit to a general council carried out in the appropriate fashion, unless they openly renounce the Confession of Augsburg. This thought, which Catholic doctors have only mentioned en passant when writing against the Protestants, and upon which they seem not to have insisted enough, has been recovered and presented for negotiation by the bishop of Thina, with the authorization of His Imperial Majesty. The said prelate has traveled with letters of recommendation or credentials from His Imperial Majesty to the courts of many electors and Protestant princes of the empire, in order to ask for a positive declaration and to inquire whether they still hold the same opinion as their predecessors and are still willing to submit to the judgment of the universal Church, if the Pope would decide to summon a general council to be held in the appropriate manner; and in order to ask them as well, at the same time, what this manner must be in their opinion. He also asked them how they would conduct themselves in such a council, so that the proceedings would not be elusive and useless, and offered them the favorable intervention of His Majesty before His Holiness, following the example of Charles V and other great emperors.t Furthermore, the said prelate was commanded to, and had the intention to scrutinize those involved in order to know whether it would be possible to convene a preliminary, but true reunion, so that the Protestants, especially those from Germany, Hungary and other hereditary countries belonging to His Imperial Majesty (for the good of which he displays particular care, as well as for the good of Christianity in general) reconcile themselves with the holy roman catholic apostolic Church, awaiting for the decision of said future council, without being obliged in principle to renounce all opinions rejected in the Council of Trent, and without having to sign all canons and anathemas of the same council of Trent, and without being expected to change what is tolerable in their rites and discipline, as long as they express their rejection not in a spirit of disobedience of the decisions of the Catholic church, but on the grounds that Catholics may make a factual error, namely that the said council did not meet legitimately; and provided they declare sincerely and in good faith that they revere the ministerial leader of the Catholic church as personified by the first among its bishops, to whom they would have to promise, to begin with, true filial obedience; and, finally, provided they clearly acknowledge the power of the Catholic Church and of the ecumenical councils which represent it; all of it on account of the promised assistance of the Holy Ghost, which shall never be lacking until the end of centuries, as long as the process is legitimate, without it ever being possible in that case for councils to say something contrary to the holy Scripture, to apostolic tradition and, in a word, to the truth that saves.

27. Methods of Reunion

253

Upon this, according to the state of the question, defined as I have just explained, the bishop of Thina has carefully collected the opinions of many doctors, both Catholic and Protestant, and has made it known that he had received declarations and approval from some famous Catholic doctors who declared that, the case being as it has been expounded, it is in the Pope’s power to admit within the Church those Protestants who are in that spirit of submission and embrace the essential principle that makes one a Catholic, even though their deeply rooted presuppositions, which it would be difficult to eliminate all of a sudden in the actual spiritual climate, may prevent them from abandoning the factual mistake that repulses them when it comes to ratifying the Council of Trent; for it is known and it has been pointed out above, that there are other famous councils over which Catholics themselves argue. As for the specific dogmas defined in the Council of Trent, it is evident that particular errors, which do not run counter to the general principle of Catholicism, do not make a heretic. Otherwise, many holy fathers would surely be true heretics, having supported dogmas which the Church has later condemned, and which even then ran counter to apostolic tradition, as is the error of re-baptizing heretics, which was excused by saint Cyprian and condemned by the Donatists,u as saint Augustine says: “The master is acquitted, but the disciple is condemned”.3 However, it is irrelevant to the question at hand whether the Church’s decision preceded or came after the error, as long as ignorance of this fact is morally invincible in the present condition of minds – which can be truthfully claimed of an infinite number of Protestants, who are so concerned with their education and other impressions that they cannot be yet persuaded that the decisions of the council of Trent have been legitimately made and deserve to be acknowledged as oracles of the universal Church, so that it will be necessary to lead them gradually in order to obtain what is desired from them. And because it is possible to attend to their salvation without having obtained it yet, and to make them susceptible of receiving the holy sacraments of the Church, it seems that everything possible must be done for them. This followed Saint Paul’s example, “who did it all for everybody”4 and showed great condescension toward the Jews, to the extent of making Timothy undergo circumcision in order to please those who wished nations to take charge of the observation of the law, although the apostolic council of Jerusalem, the first of all councils, had already decided the opposite.v It cannot be denied that this power belongs to the Pope, for he is evidently the legitimate administrator of all the spiritual goods of the universal Church, especially in the time in between councils,5 and if 3

Absolvitur magister, condemnatur discipulus. qui omnibus omnia factus est (I Corinthians 9, 22). 5 Tempore inter-conciliari. 4

254

Chapter 27

anything can be done in a valid manner, the Pope can do it, and if it can be done lawfully and all circumstances have been adequately weighed, it seems he must do it. Some, who support the principles approved by the assembly of the French clergy concerning the superiority of the council, could doubt whether this would not amount to indirectly placing the Pope above the council,6 by assigning him the power to suspend somehow the effect of the council. But when the council has been dissolved, what remains thereof is not a living judge who may declare his positions, but a dead or dumb law which requires an interpretation and execution from a living judge.w However, those doctors who posit the superiority of the councils are forced to acknowledge only the Pope as the living and visible judge in the universal Church. It is he who must interpret the laws and apply them to the facts. It is thus not at all derogating a council to argue as we have done; it is rather good reasoning to consider that this council may be conceived vis-à-vis certain people as a law still unpublished or unknown and that could not yet be known by them, just as the congregation of cardinals selected for the interpretation and execution of the council has deemed in many other, though less important, meetings.x It is also necessary to restrict somewhat the thesis that what has once been decided in an ecumenical council must not be disclaimed nor questioned in another council. It is true that this must not be done regularly, but it does not follow that it must never be done. We have the example of the council of Florence, where discussions were held with the Greeks on the errors dealt with and condemned in other councils.y Reason and good sense clearly show that when several nations, comprising a sizable part of Christendom, have not acknowledged a certain council, in the conviction that the procedure has not been adequate, it is possible to condescend towards them by summoning a new council so as to satisfy them, especially when it seems that the schism might thereby end or at least be very weakened, and that there is no great likelihood to end it so quickly by other means (except through the extraordinary intervention of divine providence, on which we cannot count without tempting God). Thus, all this depends on the prudence of those to whom God has entrusted the governance of his Church; and indeed this is no more than a lawful way, and almost the only one, to obtain the introduction and publication of legitimate decrees from the council in question among the nations that refuse to acknowledge them: to have them confirmed by a council they do not reject, for it must not be doubted that the new council confirms the Catholic truths of the preceding one, for otherwise we would be doubting the assistance of the Holy Ghost 6

Presumably Leibniz has here in mind the provincial synod held in Tours (1493), to which the origins of the Gallican Church can be traced.

27. Methods of Reunion

255

and of the councils’ authority, so that Catholics risk nothing and win much – which must lead them to fostering this method of reunion.7 It is also understood that, if the main issue is settled, i.e., that protestant nations are ready to re-enter the Catholic Church and the Pope is willing to receive them, the Church will have no scruples in granting them other grantable points, namely: the matrimony of priests, the holy orders of qualified protestant ministers, and the communion under the two species for all nations, although limited in a certain sense, as well as the omission of certain unnecessary rites, toward which the nations yet to be reconciled may feel at present an invincible repulsion. On their part, however, they will have to accept that their bishops and priests be ordained and that they administer the holy sacraments according to the rites which the Church considers essential; furthermore, they shouldn’t condemn other Catholics who practice other approved rites, and they should believe in and teach the dogmas decided in the Council of Trent. This is obvious, for they are received in the outer communion of the Church by their submission to the Pope and to ecclesiastical hierarchy, the only one capable of preserving unity, for this union would not survive if they did not take each other for brothers and could not commune with each other. Regarding the opinion of theologians and other able and distinguished personalities among the Protestants with respect to bishop of Thina’s proposal, there are many who have not dared to speak, out of fear of being caught by surprise, for it is natural for those belonging to the opposite party to be suspicious when asked such questions. Some, who are biased against the Pope and the Catholic clergy, believe that all it is desired is to fool and ruin them in any possible manner (quavis modo), and that this kind of negotiations is only good to make them fall into the trap, to test their weakness, or at least to provoke a schism amongst them. For this reason in many courts and universities, when theologians have begun negotiations with the bishop of Thina at their lords’ command, they have been unwilling to get down to business and have demanded first that the prelate show them the Papal credentials; they have also excused themselves by saying they would not dare to go a step further in such an important matter without contacting their fellow theologians. Nevertheless, there have been some, among the most respectable by their life and their knowledge, who have expounded their views, and there was a great prince, very enlightened and well-intentioned regarding the peace of the Church and the good of the homeland, who has ordered his theologians, both from the court and from 7

It is worth noticing Leibniz’s cunning in this argument: given that the Catholics believe the Council of Trent to have been legitimate, and hence inspired by the Holy Ghost, they should not fear that a new universal council, equally inspired by the Holy Ghost, would modify the decisions of the Council of Trent.

256

Chapter 27

the university, to start negotiations with the bishop of Thina, so as to see how far could this issue be carried.8 These theologians, obeying their lord, have considered it was their duty not to refuse honestly and in good faith to provide the clarification they were asked for. For what are they good for, these able theologians, whom princes maintain at their expense in order to use their advice, if they refuse their lord’s request to speak their minds and to engage in a friendly dialogue wherein no harm is to be feared as long as one proceeds with prudence?z They have thought one should not suspect charity, and, taking into account the concessions made by the Catholics by reaching out to them, their conscience and the zeal which all true Christians must show for the restoration of the unity of the Church did not allow them to respond unfriendly to the outward signs of goodwill shown by the Catholics by order of the head of the empire; nor could they send back to his land such an accredited prelate without starting any negotiations whatsoever over his proposals, for otherwise reproach would fall on the Protestants, and the Catholic side, which is the strongest, would feel itself justified in resorting to more rigorous methods, boasting that it had done what was needed to solve the conflict in friendly terms. Here is how I have learned about their substantive opinions, formulated in a text they have given their lord as a result of their conversations, which has later been sent by his order to the bishop of Thina.aa They declare that they consider it possible to reestablish unity, and that one should work for it with all one’s energy. They distinguish between controversies, saying there are some of greater importance and some of lesser importance (maioris et minoris momenti). Regarding controversies of the former kind, they are of the opinion that Protestants should not compromise, and that the Roman Church can show condescension on the following issues: the communion under the two species, the exclusion9 of particular masses, the justification of the sinner, the marriage of clergymen, the validity of the ordinations they perform, divine cult in vulgar language, and last, the Episcopal rights of protestant princes. They believe the Pope can grant these things, if taken in a reasonable sense, without clashing with the principles of the Roman Catholic Church. Regarding controversies of lesser caliber, here is how they distinguish [between] them, from their point of view: there are some where it all comes down to a matter of phrases or formulae, without any real discussion of substance, e.g., the issues of the number of sacraments and of whether there is a sacrifice proper in the sacrament of the altar; and there are controversies on issues about which the members of one side do not agree among 8

Leibniz refers to the Duke of Hanover, Ernst-August, who sponsored the negotiations held in 1683. 9 Foucher de Careil mistakenly gives ‘extension’ instead of ‘exclusion’.

27. Methods of Reunion

257

themselves, e.g., whether and how good deeds are meritorious, whether the Holy Virgin has been conceived without original sin, whether the Pope is the Antichrist; and they think it necessary in these controversies, out of mutual condescending, to follow the opinion which both sides might approve. Finally, there are controversies where nothing of the above may happen, among which some are quite important in themselves, but not sufficiently so as to prevent a previous union, such as are the issues of purgatory, of the limits of the Pope’s authority, of the canon and reading of the Scriptures, of the manner of real presence, of the indulgences, of the cult of holy relics and images, of auricular confession, etc. – all of which must be left for the decision of a free and ecumenical council. These same theologiansbb have thought that their declarations concerning a free and ecumenical council could be considered ambiguous, elusive and wily, if they did not explain themselves clearly. Since this is the knot of the problem, they have declared that we must trust so completely the aid of the Holy Ghost promised to the Catholic Church in the holy Scriptures, that it is necessary to submit from now on to what an ecumenical council may decide by majority of votes on the issues at stake,cc once reasonable precautions have been taken, controversies have been carefully examined and the reasons of both sides have been listened to with attention, for, barring a miracle, there is no other way down here to end controversies. But, so as to better provide for the freedom of the council, and in their own interest, they have deemed it reasonable that their superintendents or inspectors, who would be declared by the Pope true catholic bishops of the Teutonic rite on account of the return of the Protestants to the Church, attend this future ecumenical council not as defendants but as judges, with their own vote and seat among the other bishops of the Latin or Greek rite. They consider there would be great but reasonable advantage for Protestants therein, of which their predecessors were unaware, for they wanted to attend the council without having made any stipulations as to the vote and seat of their superintendents or bishops. For, being unable to reject today what their forebears offered when presenting their confession to the emperor, namely the acknowledgment of a free and legitimate ecumenical council in the future, they believed they were doing a service to the entire body of Protestants by adding to the renewed offer such considerable and advantageous precautions. The document prepared by these theologians,dd which essentially consists of what I have just explained, was given by them to their prince and by the prince to the bishop of Thina. The latter declared to be reasonably satisfied with this draft. He believes that it does not follow from it that more concessions could not be extracted from either side once one gets down to the negotiations; and later on I have heard that the Roman court, touchy as it

258

Chapter 27

is especially in these matters, has not found the project to be despicable nor poorly led, although it has not judged it to be ripe enough to take part in it and commit its authority to it. Nevertheless, it has been shown above that if the project were to be carried out, the Catholic Church would risk nothing and win much. On the other hand, the Protestant theologians mentioned have taken such precautions, as I have just explained, that they cannot be accused of causing their side any harm; and if all their colleagues agreed with them, as it seems they could not refuse to do as far as the heart of the matter is concerned, following the commitment of their predecessors and their confession, it would correspond to the Pope to take the first step by speaking his mind above all on the conditions which these theologians have deemed necessary for the preliminary reunion to be successful. Finally, it must be acknowledged that there are still considerable difficulties in the declaration of the protestant bishops I have just expounded, especially regarding the marriage of bishops, which is only practiced today, to the best of my knowledge, among Protestants, and regarding the validity of ordinations of Protestants, which the Pope could not approve retroactively according to the principles of the Catholic Church. But it seems that the Church, which can grant marriage to priests, could also grant it to bishops, for, according to divine law, the distinction between them does not seem to hold for matrimony. It could also happen that the Protestants give it up by themselves. As far as the second issue is concerned, it is possible that if the Protestants succeeded in the other issues, and were not forced to acknowledge the invalidity of their ordinations in the preliminary meeting, perhaps they would content themselves with having this matter deferred until the next council, hoping that in the future, after the preliminary meeting, they would be acknowledged as properly ordained and would be given the orders in a manner agreed between the sides, which for Catholics would have everything necessary for a true ordination, and could be considered by them as a confirmation of what they purport to already have, until the judgment of the Catholic Church, summoned to a council, intervene. As far as concerns the practical difficulties involved in the execution of these projects, I acknowledge they are many, but I will not deal with them here. It is up to those who disagree with these proposals to list the difficulties, as it behooves the good willing persons to contribute, in all that depends on them, to overcoming these difficulties, just as if they were the authors or performers of these projects. For it can rightly be said that since the Regensburg colloquium in the past century,ee where both sides came pretty close to each other, nothing has officially come from the hands of Protestants that affords greater ease for the re-establishment of the unity of the western Church, than the declaration I have just expounded.

27. Methods of Reunion a

259

Arnauld, in his letter to Landgrave Ernst von Hessen-Rheinfels of 29 December 1687 (Oeuvres, vol. 3, pp. 49-51) discusses the question of the Pope’s (and of legitimately convened Councils’) authority. According to him, this authority is infallible and therefore unquestionable in “matters of faith”, but not so in “matters of fact”. In the latter, “where the Church may be mistaken, one is not obliged to acquiesce if one is persuaded of the contrary, and one would not cease to remain a member of the true Church, if one were anathematized for that” (pp. 50-51). b On the present text, see Laerke (Forthcoming). c Hanover’s library contains several copies of Rojas y Spínola’s manuscript, under the name Regulae circa Christianorum Omnium Ecclesiasticam Reunionem. On this work and its influence on Leibniz, see Eisenkopf (1975: Chapter 1, 3). d Tolerance, as conceived at the time, is thus, for Leibniz, only the first step towards permitting discussion and mutual understanding. See Introductory Essay, Section 2. e ‘Swines’, pejorative name given to Spanish Jewish converts who were suspected of keeping their Jewish faith secretly. For an analysis of this phenomenon, see Netanyahu (2000). The “way of rigor” was in fact the standard approach of the Catholic Church regarding the forced conversion of non-Christians, as defined by Augustine: “And the Lord said to the serf: wander by the streets and force them to enter to fill my house”; “And the master said to the servant, ‘Go out to the highways and hedges, and compel people to come in, that my house may be filled’ […]’” (Luke 14, 23). Since the marrano problem was no longer actual by the end of the 17th century, it is reasonable to assume that Leibniz is here alluding to a much more pressing problem: the then ongoing application of this “way of rigor” to the Calvinists in France. Leibniz, like Bayle* in his Commentaire Philosophique, condemns this method. The two first volumes of Bayle’s Commentaire were published in 1686. This book was severely criticized by the Calvinist theologian Jurieu in his book Des droits de deux souverains, la conscience et le prince (1687), and Jurieu had been criticized by Leibniz as early as 1685 (e.g., in his notes to Jurieu’s work L’esprit de M. Arnauld; GR 231). f Leibniz is here alluding to the medieval disputatio, where the roles of the contenders and the permitted and required moves were strictly codified. Disputationes were still held in several European countries as far as the 18th century. Leibniz, who was familiar with this literature (see his letter to J. Thomasius of 2 September 1663; A II 1 3; GP I 7-8), extends his critique to other forms of dispute, mainly on theological matters, that no longer followed the medieval rules. For further remarks on disputatio, see Introductory Essay, Section 3, and for a systematic discussion of the problems of confused disputes, as well as for their eventual correction, see Chapter 1. Whereas in that Chapter Leibniz considers it possible to somehow overcoming the confusion of disputes, in the present text, written twenty years later, he is clearly skeptic about such a possibility, and hence rejects the usefulness of the “way of disputation”. This does not mean that he gives up entirely the idea of putting order in disputes, as illustrated by Chapters 16I and 30. g On the ubiquitous colloquia and their methodology, see Introductory Essay, Section 2. h The issue consists in determining whether Christ’s presence in the sacramental bread and wine is “real and substantial” (as defended by the Catholics), “real but mystical” (as defended by the Lutherans), “symbolic but effective” (as defended by the Calvinists), or “symbolic” (as defended by the Zwinglians). According to Leibniz, it is possible to overcome the apparent contradiction between these positions by removing the Cartesian “misunderstanding” that equates extension with the essence of bodies. See Letter to Arnauld, November 1671 (A II 1 75-76).

260 i

Chapter 27

The idea is to leave aside certain problems until the circumstances are ripe to address them. See Letter to Landgrave Ernst von Hessen-Rheinfels, January 11, 1684 (A I 4 320). j The “way of condescension” (synkatábasis) had been proposed by the 16th and 17th centuries “irenic” theologians (see Brosseder 1967: 25ff.). It consists in focusing the debate first on matters of possible agreement between the parties, rather than on central points where they are clearly opposed. Leibniz observes that most proponents of this method have “either ignored or hidden each party’s principles or else they have demanded that the parties avoid conceding what would entail the ruin of their cause” (Letter to Rojas y Spínola, April 1683; A I 3 568). Of course, the term ‘condescension’ has not for Leibniz the sense of disdain, haughtiness or insolence, for he sometimes recommends the use of this method, although he is aware of its fundamental limitation, namely, that a true reconciliation cannot be achieved and sustained if one never discusses the central issues at stake (Letter to Ernst von Hessen-Rheinfels, October 1685, A I 4 380). k The position here criticized by Leibniz is that of the Calixtines. See Introductory Essay, note 26. l This is in fact the substance of the Bishop of Thina’s method, namely, to minimize the allegations of heresy and schism as much as possible. On this point, Pellisson, who was speaking on behalf of Bossuet, sternly opposed Leibniz’s proposals. See Chapter 33A. m See Chapter 25, note k. n The Council of Konstanz (1414-1418) put an end to the great western schism and established the superiority of councils over the pope, as well as the obligation to convene them regularly. None of these decisions were followed by the ensuing pontiffs. The Council of Basel (1431-1443), initiated in Basel and continued in Ferrara and Florence, put an end to the separation of Greek orthodox, Armenians and Jacobites, by permitting these confessions to keep their rites and canonical authority. These decisions were in force only for a short time, namely until the fall of Constantinople. The Council of Lateran mentioned here by Leibniz, the fifth bearing this name (1512-1517), restored the superiority of the pope over the councils, for which reason it provoked protests by theologians and priests who were of the opinion that it was not possible to cancel in this way the decrees of the Council of Konstanz. The issue of the relationship between papacy and the councils remained thus open until the solemn conciliatory resolution adopted by the Council of Trent (1545-1563). Cardinal Bellarmine (died in 1621), well-known for his involvement in the Galileo affair, was a leading Jesuit, who took part in the preparation of the Catholic Vulgata. His Disputationes de controversiis Christianae fidei (1586) was important, among other things, because it provided the basic repertoire of topoi used in the 17th century religious controversies. Acknowledging its importance, some Protestant colleges created chairs devoted to disputing Bellarmine’s theses. o The Council of Trent issued two kinds of decrees, doctrinal (“dogmatic”) and organizational (“of reform”). The latter were those intended to address most of the complaints that led to the Reformation. Whereas the Catholic Church in most countries immediately adopted both, the French church, still in the grip of the idea of the autonomy of a Gallican church, and due to the political rift between the king and the parliament, did not formally accept the reform decrees, although they were in the course of time adopted as a matter of custom. p The Augsburg confession is a document, written by Melanchthon (1497-1560), which was approved by the emperor and by the elector princes and free cities in 1530. Its aim was to demonstrate the conformity between the doctrines taught in their territories with the universal church. Although it provoked much criticism by Protestants on the grounds that it made too many concessions to the Catholics (to which Melanchthon replied in his

27. Methods of Reunion

261

Apologia of 1531), in 1555 it acquired a special status for most Lutherans as a confession de foi. q Leibniz refers mainly to the Jesuit Paul Laymann (1574-1635), who taught canonical law at the University of Dillingen (1625-1632). His Theologia moralis (1625) was a standard textbook of Catholic moral education in the Counter-Reformation. He participated in the debate with the Protestants with his Justa defensio Sanctissimi Romani Pontifici and his Pacis compositio inter principes et ordines Imperii Romani Catholicos adque Augustanae Confessioni adhaerentes, both of 1629. He was among the few Catholic clergymen to see the Augsburg Confession as a basis for discussion. See also Chapter 16, note ee. r Cardinal Leopold Kollonitsch (died in 1707) preceded Rojas y Spínola as Bishop of Neustadt. He was a close collaborator of Emperor Leopold I, and prepared the reunification efforts of the Catholic Church. Leibniz mentions him again in a letter to Landgrave Ernst Hessen-Rheinfels (29 July 1688; A I 5 183), saying that Kollonitsch and Rojas y Spínola were the only Catholic bishops “who still preached”. He was appointed Primate of Hungary in 1691 and cooperated with Rojas y Spínola in the reunification negotiations that took place in Budapest from 1691 to 1693. He wrote Augustana et antiAugustana Confessio (Vienna, 1681), where he attributes to the Protestants the responsibility for the failure of the reunification efforts at the moment of the Augsburg Confession (see notes p and s). s The theologian here referred to is known by the pseudonym Antonio Alberti. In fact, he was a Jansenist, Amable de Toureil (died in 1719), who wrote, upon request of the Protestant Elector of Saxony, Gründliche Wiederlegung gegen Päpstliches Buchs, so Augustana et anti-Augustana genennet (Leipzig, 1684). “Alberti” corresponded with Leibniz from 1689 to 1694, although Leibniz never was aware who he was (cf. Müller and Krönert 1969: 97, 99). t The example to which Leibniz refers is that of emperor Charles V’s convening in Augsburg the two parties, Protestants and Catholics, in order to solve their divergences by debating them in his presence. The result of this meeting was the establishment of provisional norms for the relations between the various confessions (the so-called “interim of Augsburg”). The meeting also called upon the Pope to convene a council in this spirit – a call with which Pope Clement VII did not comply. u Donatism was a sect, with many followers in Northern Africa, which broke away from the Roman Church in 312. They followed Cyprian’s doctrine that only the councils were inspired by the Holy Ghost, from which it followed that they should prevail over the pontiff. It was the emperor Constantine the Great who put an end to this dissension, bringing back the Donatists to the Roman Church. Presumably it is this imperial intervention that prompts Leibniz to mention this example. v The episode in question is narrated in Acts 16, 1. The so-called Council of Jerusalem refers to the agreement between Paul and Peter in 48-49 A.D., where it was decided that the Jews who converted to Christianity could continue to follow their customs (particularly circumcision), whereas the gentile Christians were not required to follow those customs (Acts 15, 1-21). w When the legislators are no longer exercising their legislative function, the intention animating the laws they created can only be determined through the actual interpretation of their text according to hermeneutic principles. See Chapter 11. See also Dascal and Wroblewski (1988). x In the hypothetical scenario proposed here by Leibniz, the Protestants should be considered as Christians who supposedly did not and could not know the resolutions of the Council of Trent. This would justify their non-condemnation, hence their permanence within the

262

Chapter 27

Church (as if they had never left it). Obviously this violates the legal presumption according to which not knowing a law or decree is not a justification for not complying with it. Leibniz’s strategy here consists precisely in exploring the inherent possibility in all presumptive arguments of presenting reasons that are strong enough to justify the violation of a presumptive conclusion in a specific case. The reasons he presents presuppose what he takes to be the core of a negotiation process really capable to lead to reunification: on the one hand, the identification of the Council of Trent as the main difficulty to be sidestepped; on the other, Rojas y Spínola’s plan to provoke a reunification de facto prior to the solution of the more difficult issues. Given these presuppositions, Leibniz views as weighty reasons against the application of the above mentioned presumption the following: a) there are antecedents of its suspension; b) the Pope, as the legitimate “administrator of the Church” is entitled to proceed in this way; and c) the Pope, as the only living and visible magistrate, has the power to interpret the council’s decisions. It is important to notice that the effect of this argument is to shift the burden of proof to the Pope’s shoulders, making him virtually responsible for the eventual failure of the negotiations. Upon recognizing this implication of Leibniz’s strategy in the negotiations held in the 1690’s, Bossuet immediately interrupted them. See Chapter 33B. y See note m. z The Berlin Calvinists requested assurances that Rojas y Spínola was an official representative of the Pope (not only of the Emperor), and that the Pope was committed to accepting the results of the negotiations. Since Rojas y Spínola was not able to produce the required assurances, they abandoned the 1683 colloquium. aa The text in question, a kind of protocol of the Hanover meeting, was compiled by G. W. Molanus* and H. Barckhausen. It bears the title Methodus reducendae unionis ecclesiasticae Romanenses et Protestantes (1683) and is preserved in several manuscript copies in Hanover. bb See notes p, q, and r. cc The question of whether majority of votes is sufficient for defining a ‘legitimate council’ is discussed in Chapter 34. dd See note z. ee The Regensburg Colloquium (1541) was the last of three religious colloquia organized by the Emperor Charles V in the wake of the Peace of Augsburg. He was personally present in this colloquium, where he proposed a set of 23 theses (the “Regensburg Book”) as a basis for the discussion.

Chapter 28 AN ARS CHARACTERISTICA FOR THE RATIONAL SCIENCES

In the wake of his major mature writings in logic, metaphysics and theology in the ‘breakthrough year’ of 1686,a the present text may be read as ‘taking stock’ of the rational underpinnings of what has been achieved and of future prospects in these and other areas of knowledge. Leibniz does not overlook the fact that the advancement of knowledge may owe much to fortune, but he stresses here what the systematic use of reason can contribute to it. And he emblematically chooses here for this contribution ‘the art of characters’ – an expression he coined for referring to a symbolic formal language, based on the thorough analysis of notions, which would render thinking, wherever it is rationally performed, precise and reliable. The present text also contains an often quoted passage where Leibniz claims that, with the help of the Ars characteristica, all controversies can be solved by the opponents calmly and politely sitting down and simply ‘calculating’ the solution. Unlike other similar texts – which read like rhetorically polished pamphlets addressed to princes and other potential financing sources –, where he unrestrictedly praises the miraculous results to be expected from the achievement of the Universal Characteristic project, here he allows himself to raise possible objections and suggests what has to be done in order to overcome them. His major concern seems to be showing that the Characteristic can be really Universal in scope and thus to be really paradigmatic of the application of reason everywhere. Thus, on the one hand, he describes virtually all of his mathematical, metaphysical and theological ‘discoveries’ as somehow related to, and even exemplifying the potentialities of the ars characteristica. On the other, he undertakes to show that a universally conceived Characteristic can naturally be extended to include probabilistic reasoning, thereby becoming capable to deal rationally with the vast practical and theoretical domains where ‘conjectures’ prevail. Although his main point in generalizing the idea of an ars characteristica as the flagship of his rationalism is that rationality is not to be sought only in the ability of counting and measuring, the ‘balance of reason’ this text envisages as a paradigm of rationality is in fact one where the proportional weights of reasons are precisely determinable – hence subject to computation – rather

263 M. Dascal (ed.), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. The Art of Controversies, 263–269. © 2006 Springer.

264

Chapter 28 than ‘uncountable’ and perhaps even ‘imponderable’ as he suggests in other texts.b

Date: 1688? Edition: A VI 4 909-915; GP VII 198-203 Language: Latin Everything we know with certainty is established either by demonstrations or by experiments and, in both, reason dominates. Indeed, the very art of preparing experiments and using them relies upon reasons that are certain, for it obviously does not depend upon chance or luck. Leaving aside experiments – which involve expenses, preparations and equipment, time, and may even be helped by luck – let us speak now only about perfecting the sciences in so far as they are grounded upon reason. The progress of the rational art of discovery depends, for the most part, upon perfecting the Ars Characteristica. The reason why it is customary to search for demonstrations in numbers and lines alone and in those things represented by them lies in the fact that there are no handy (tractabilis) characters corresponding to notions other than numbers. This is also the reason why not even geometry has been so far treated analytically, except in so far as it is reduced to numbers through algebra, in which general numbers are designated by letters. There is, however, another, more sublime geometrical analysis by means of adequate characters, through which one can solve many [problems] more beautifully and concisely than through algebra – and I have examples (specimina) of it. Furthermore, there are demonstrations also beyond what is quantifiable: the logicians’ forms illustrate this; the jurists in the Digests also provide true demonstrations – examples of which I have given in my De Conditionibus;c Johannes Suisset – known as the Calculator – and others after him – have even given demonstrations in metaphysics about the degrees and intensions of forms;d and both Platonists and Aristotelians make some statements that can easily be clothed in demonstrative form. If there were either a certain precise language (called Adamic by some authors) or at least a kind of truly philosophical writing, through which notions would be retraced (revoco) to an alphabet of human thoughts, then all those things that can be reached by reason from the data would be discoverable by means of a sort of calculus – like problems in arithmetic or geometry are solved. And this [language] would be the true Cabbala of mystical words, or the true arithmetic of Pythagorean numbers, or the true Characteristica of the magicians or of the wise men.e

28. An Ars Characteristica for the Rational Sciences

265

When I was a child, I dared to conjecture about these important things, and included en passant some suggestions about them in a little book I published as an adolescent under the title De Arte Combinatoria.f That this is possible1 – in fact, easy – to achieve within a few years, by a team of intelligent collaborators, at least in so far as its initial step is concerned – I can prove with geometrical certainty. What revealed to me these truest and most beautiful outlines of this Most General Analytic of Human Thoughts was a deeper examination of mathematical analysis – to which I devoted myself so diligently that I doubt there are many who have spent more effort in it. That I have been the first to overcome some inscrutable [problems] in mathematics, with the approval of the best mathematicians, is well known by whoever zealously studies this discipline. Beyond the axioms and theorems of Euclid about magnitude and proportion, I have discovered things much more important and of broader use about Coincidence, Congruence, Similitude, Determination, Cause and Effect or power, relations in general, the container and the contained, that which occurs by itself or by accident; about the general nature of substance,2 about the perfect spontaneity, non-generability (ingenerabilitas) and incorruptibility of substances, and about the union of things and the concordance (conspiratio) of substances among themselves. Whence the secret of the union between mind and body is brought to light; as well as the way through which the substances operate, God’s contribution therein, the cause of evil along with the conciliation of freedom with providence as well as with the certainty or determined truth of contingent [things]; and finally metamorphosis in view of metempsychosis.3 In demonstrations I make use of two principles. One of them is that what implies contradiction is false. The other, that it is possible to give a reason of every truth (which is not immediate or identical); that is to say, that the predicate’s notion is always explicitly or implicitly contained (inesse) in that of the subject – which occurs no less in extrinsic than in intrinsic denominations, and no less in contingent than in necessary truths. The distinction between necessary and contingent truths is virtually the same as the distinction between commensurable and incommensurable numbers. Just as commensurable numbers can be analyzed into a common measure, so too the necessary truths can be demonstrated or reduced to 1

Reference to the project described a few paragraphs above. Erased by Leibniz: ‘individual’. 3 In this paragraph, the punctuation seems to be intended to organize Leibniz’s long list of discoveries – all somehow ‘reason-based’ and hence likely to benefit from the Characteristica – into roughly four (inevitably overlapping) broad thematic groups: ‘universal mathematics’ (mathesis universalis), metaphysics, theology, and ethics. 2

266

Chapter 28

identical truths. Yet, in the case of incommensurable reasons, the analysis (resolutio) somehow proceeds up to infinity; to be sure, one reaches some common measure and a determined series4 – albeit endless – is obtained. Likewise, through the same process contingent truths require an infinity analysis, which only God can go through (transire); hence they can be known a priori and with certainty by God alone. Although it is always possible to give a reason for a posterior state in terms of the preceding one, and the latter can be likewise accounted for, one does not reach a last reason in the series. But the progress towards infinity itself acts as a reason, which might in its way be immediately understood from the outset as being outside the series, i.e., in God the creator, from which both anterior and posterior things depend –more than each of them depends upon the others. Therefore, every truth that is not susceptible of analysis nor can be demonstrated on the basis of its own reasons, but rather receives its ultimate reason and certainty from the divine mind, is not necessary. Such are all the truths I call factual truths. This is contingency’s root, which I doubt anyone has so far explained. The distinction between an obscure and a clear notion, a confuse and a distinct one, an adequate and an inadequate one, a suppositive and an intuitive one, has been already explained by me in a short paper published in the Acta Eruditorum of Leipzig.5 Returning now to the expression of thoughts by means of characters, I am afraid that controversies will never end and the sects will never be silenced unless we reduce complex reasonings to simple calculations and words with vague and uncertain meanings to precise characters. Obviously, once this is performed, every paralogism will be nothing but a calculation mistake and every sophism expressed in this new kind of writing will in turn be nothing but a solecism or barbarism, easily refutable by this philosophical grammar’s rules. Henceforth, whenever controversies arise, there will be no need of more disputation than what occurs between two philosophers or calculators.g It will be sufficient to pick up their pens, sit down at the desks (abacus) and say to each other (eventually addressing each other friendly)h: let us calculate. For no one to think I am boasting or hoping for the impossible, let me stress that through the proposed art, which can be mastered with appropriate 4

A ‘series’ is defined by Leibniz as a ‘manifold endowed with a rule of order’ (De Affectibus; A VI 4 426) . 5 “Meditationes de cognitione, veritate, et ideis”, Acta Eruditorum, November 1684, 537-542 (A VI 4 585 -592). Leibniz repeats this classification in many texts, with slight terminological variations. He seems to have conflated here two of these occurrences, for ‘suppositive’ is a term that occurs in the Discours de metaphysique of 1686, §24 (A VI 4 1568), whereas in the “Meditationes” – which he refers to here – the terms he employs are ‘symbolic’ or ‘blind’ (A VI 4 586, 587).

28. An Ars Characteristica for the Rational Sciences

267

application alone, it is possible to obtain whatever can be extracted from the data regardless of one’s ingenuity, i.e., what can be determined on the basis of the data like in geometrical problems. But those truths of fact that depend upon chance or luck, by the same token obviously do not belong to the art of discovery. Furthermore, no one should underestimate, by virtue of the just mentioned limitation, the utility of this art everywhere where conjectures are needed, e.g., in human and natural history, in the art of examining natural bodies or persons having an intellect – hence in ordinary life, medicine, law, military affairs, and the government of a state.i It should be known how much reason is of help in all these matters (in fact it helps enormously) and that this art – which is nothing but the apex and most compact use of human reason’s [capacity of employing] symbols and marks – is capable of this and much more. Thus, when what is searched is not determinable or expressible from the data, one can do one of two things: either to approximate ad infinitum, or else, when dealing with conjectures, at least to determine, by means of demonstrative reason, the degree of probability itself that it is possible to obtain from the data. We should learn how the given circumstances are to be reduced to proportions (ratio) and how these can be put together, as if [in the scales of] a similar balance [where] income and expenses [are compared], so as to allow us to choose that which is maximally in agreement with reason.j To be sure, we sometimes make mistakes in this [endeavour]. Yet, like someone who is perfectly knowledgeable in games that combine chance with reason, we should do what reason commands; in this way most of the time we will obtain what we want, like good players and craftsmen of their own fortune, whom, as said by the proverb, the balls and dice look after;6 and we will believe that the desired result itself is not only of the high verisimilitude but also of higher certainty, being therefore ready, as far as it fits us, to buy the hope paying its price or risk. No more in fact could be demanded from human reason. In this way, among other things I cultivate a certain part of logic, so far hardly touched, dealing with the estimation of the degrees of probability, and with the balance (statera) of proofs (probatio), conjectures, and indications. I can also show how in this general calculus, just as in the numerical calculus, it is possible to think of tests (examina) or indications of the truth that correspond to the proof by casting out nines and the like. In short, I have generalized this proof from ordinary numbers to algebra.k Even after the discovery and divulgation of this analysis, however, there will always remain a difference between intelligences: some of them reason more quickly and more extemporaneously than others. This is shown by the fact that, even after Arithmetic has been discovered and conducted to such a 6

In French in the margin: Les balles cherchent les bons joueurs.

268

Chapter 28

degree of perfection that nothing else is required for common usage, some people are able to perform the hardest operations without calculi or pen, by the sheer force of their mind. Furthermore, in these matters experience will always prevail. Even when this art will be well advanced, experienced persons will prevail over those who, having equal intelligence and knowledge, have practiced it less. Someone who has often performed calculations of a certain kind (e.g., by means of coins7), having preserved in his memory the results he often experienced, performs such calculations much more rapidly than those who have more experience with other coins than with this one. Likewise, those who have experienced many things of a certain kind can often bypass, with the help of their recollection of the events, the need to reason, and therefore they are superior in their capacity for extemporaneity. There is no doubt that, if one day this true general analytic art be considered to be absolute and be put into use, men knowing it and experienced in its use will be as superior, caeteris paribus, to others as a knowledgeable person is to an ignorant one, a learned person to a simple-minded one, an expert mathematician to an apprentice, and a prestigious algebraist to a mere calculator. Nevertheless, with sufficient application, everything can be ultimately discovered by anyone, and this could be also achieved, as far as reasoning from the data is concerned, with the help of the correct method, by a superior and much exercised intelligence, with only a difference of velocity – whose weight is heavier in action than in meditation and discovery. For the most part, especially in what concerns the growth of science, matters requiring reflection take more time, whereas, in acting, people often are guilty of haste and they are those to blame whenever by virtue of a previous delay they are forced to hurry – as the proverb goes, the lazy are always in a hurry.8 No doubt those who take their time in acting and postpone excessively the reflection until the last moments of action in order to make up their minds impose upon themselves the need to deliberate precipitously. To conclude, if the invention of telescopes and microscopes has shed so much light in our knowledge of nature, it is easy to understand how much this new Organon, through which – as far as it is humanly possible – one instructs the mind’s eye itself, would contribute. To be sure, it would be reckless to promise, on the basis of the first assaults, the ultimate perfection of an art that grows with human experience which, conducted by that art itself, always unveils more varied and rich data. Just as the Chinese say that he who learned a few thousand characters is able to write the finest things, provided one takes into account additional hidden 7 8

Per florenos et solidos – Leibniz is referring here to accountant’s calculations. [P]igros semper festinare.

28. An Ars Characteristica for the Rational Sciences

269

factors, or a special talent, or an eminent master; so too the fruitfulness of this art will be felt the more in proportion to the progress made by each particular person or by humankind as a whole. In the meantime, we will succeed in progressing continuously along a given series, as much as it is in our power. Thus, by extracting from what is available (ex datis) what is possible to extract – which has so far been only minimally done –, we will use and enjoy as much as possible, for the health of the body and the perfection of the mind, those treasures already discovered and their divine benefits. a

The Discours of Metaphysics, the General Inquiries about the Analysis of Concepts and of Truths, and the Examination of the Christian Religion. See Dascal (2003b: 132-152) for a proposal concerning the possible connections between the progress made by Leibniz in each of these three major writings. b See, among others, Chapters 2 and 38. c Leipzig: Johannis Wittigau, 1665 (A VI 1 99-150). French translation by Pol Boucher, Paris, Vrin, 2002. d Richard Swineshead (or Suisset, Suinset), nominalist logician, mathematician, and physicist. Fellow of Merton College, Oxford. Known as ‘the calculator’ because of his work Liber calculationum (ca. 1350; printed 1477 and 1520). See also Chapters 30, note e; 44, note g. e Leibniz refers here, among others, to Robert Fludd (1574-1637), English physician and theosophist, author of Utriusque cosmi maioris scilicet minoris metaphysica, physica atque technica historia (Oppenheim and Frankfurt, 1617-1621) and Philosophia Moysaica (Gouda, 1638). f Dissertatio de Arte Combinatoria In qua Ex Arithmethicae fundamentis Complicationum ac Transpositionum Doctrina novis praeceptis exstruitur, et usus ambarum per universum scientiarum orbem ostenditur; nova etiam Artis Meditandi, Seu Logicae Inventionis semina sparguntur. Leipzig: J. S. Fick and J. Polycarp, 1666 (A VI 1 165-230). g Leibniz is here contrasting between scientific and mathematical ‘controversies’, which – according to him – are formalizable and thereby easily resolvable, and the endless sectarian disputes of his time, for which the scholastic disputatio served then, in the wake of Descartes, as a paradigmatic topos of uselessness and verbalism. See also Locke (Essay, 4.7.11). It should be noted, however, that this topos is not quite correct, since scholastic disputations, and particularly their obligations variety, are quite strictly formal and invariably come to an end. h The suggestion is perhaps that a friendly attitude is possible once there is an agreed upon method of resolving the issue and sectarianism is thereby set aside. i Compare the domains listed here, where conjectures are the rule – hence, where a ‘probabilistic’ extension of the ars characteristica is needed – with those listed in the paragraph under note 1, where this is not the case. j The analogy between balancing probabilities and balancing accounts is supposed to suggest that the former can be as precise as the latter. k See Chapter 2, note 7.

Chapter 30 ADVANCING THE ART OF DISCOVERY

In this text, probably contemporary of Chapter 28, Leibniz, after a brief presentation of the basic ideas of his ‘great discovery’ of how the certainty of arithmetic can be extended to other domains, provides a critical outline of the history of the attempts to provide mathematical demonstrations beyond mathematics and traditionally conceived logic. His aim seems to be twofold. In addition to listing a respectable list of precursors to his project, he purports to explain why the obvious benefits from such an extension have not so far been pursued and cashed out. Among these ‘precursors’ he mentions his youthful work The Art of Combinations, which he still considered worthwhile and was thinking of reediting in a revised and expanded way (see Chapter 42, note d). Thus, he concludes his survey with a list of defects he finds in his predecessors’ attempts. One of his major concerns is that of psychological feasibility, i.e., of devising a method that would assure certainty without overburdening the mind and without sacrificing our creativity. For this purpose, he formulates the necessary condition that “one must pursue synthesis until one can transform it into analysis” – i.e., that synthesis (or discovery) should follow its own autonomous way before its reduction to analytic demonstration is undertaken. In this connection, he makes use of the metaphor of the way in order to make the point that the surest way is not always the best one, so that, instead of relying on algebra, advanced geometry would do better to devise its own ‘characteristic’.a Yet, he also stresses the need of ultimately demonstrating even the axioms that Euclid made use of without demonstration, and which even extremely demanding geometers would not consider to be at all doubtful. The way Leibniz attempts to reconcile the apparently conflicting demands of synthesis and analysis, of the art of discovery and the art of judgment, in the last paragraph of this text, by introducing subtle argumentative distinctions, deserves particular attention.

Date: 1688-1690 Edition: A VI 4 A 963-970 Language: French 275 M. Dascal (ed.), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. The Art of Controversies, 275–283. © 2006 Springer.

276

Chapter 30

A project and attempts for reaching some certainty in order to end a large number of disputes and to advance the art of inventing Men have had a taste of the way to reach certainty: the logic of Aristotle and of the Stoics shows that; but mainly the example of mathematics and, I would add, that of the Roman jurists, who provide many reasonings in the Digests which do not differ in the least from demonstrations. Nevertheless, this way has not been followed, because it is a bit uncomfortable and because one has to follow it slowly and in the appropriate pace. It may be, I believe, due to the fact that no one has appreciated its effects. People have not realized how important it would have been to be able to establish the principles of metaphysics, physics, and morality with as much certainty as the elements of mathematics. It so happens that I have discovered that by this means, one would achieve not only a solid knowledge of many important truths, but one would also reach an admirable art of discovery and an analysis that would yield in other domains something similar to what algebra does in [the domain of] numbers. I have even found something astonishing: that it is possible to represent numerically all types of truths and inferences.b More than twenty years ago I demonstrated this important fact and discovered a method that leads infallibly to the general analysis of human knowledge – which can be judged by a small treatise I published then.1 To be sure, it smacks partly of a young man and apprentice, but its basis is good, and I have ever since built upon it – as long as other occupations and distractions permitted. I then found that there are certain terms that are primitive – if not absolutely, at least as far as our knowledge goes. Once these terms are established, every reasoning could be determined as if numerically (à la façon des nombres), and even for those for which the available circumstances or data are insufficient for determining the issue, one could nevertheless determine mathematically the degree of probability.c I have observed that the reason why we so easily make mistakes outside of mathematics and why geometers have been so successful in their reasoning lies in the fact that in geometry and other branches of abstract mathematics one can perform experiments in ongoing proofs not only regarding the conclusion, but at every moment and at every step made beyond the premises, by reducing everything to numbers. In physics, however, after a long chain of reasoning, experience often refutes the 1

Dissertatio de Arte Combinatoria (1666; A VI 1 163-230).

30. Advancing the Art of Discovery

277

conclusion, without redressing the reasoning and marking the step in which a mistake has been made. In metaphysics and morality it is much worse, for often one cannot perform in them experiments regarding the conclusions, except quite vaguely, and in metaphysical matters experience is sometimes absolutely impossible in this life. The only means to redress our reasonings is to make them as sensible as are those of the mathematicians, so that one could detect one’s error by sight; and, when people dispute, one could simply say unceremoniously, ‘let us count’, in order to see who is right. If words were made according to an artifice I see as possible, which those who have created universal languages have not envisaged, one could obtain the same effect through words themselves – which would be incredibly useful for human life. Nevertheless, in the meanwhile there is another way, less beautiful indeed, but already opened, whereas the former should be opened from scratch. It consists in making use of characters as in mathematics, which are appropriate to fixate our minds, and adding to this a numerical proof. By means of this, once a reasoning in morality, physics, medicine, or metaphysics is reduced to these terms or characters, one will be able to apply to it at any moment a numerical test,d so that it will be impossible to be mistaken if one does not so desire. This is perhaps one of the most important discoveries ever made. It is convenient to say something about those who have tried to provide demonstrations outside of mathematics. Aristotle was the first in logic, and it can be said that he has succeeded, although it is hard to say he was equally successful in the other sciences he has dealt with; if we had the books of Chrysippus or of other Stoics, we would have found in them attempts in that direction; one can say that the Roman jurists have given us some nice examples of demonstrative reasoning. Among the Schoolmen there was a certain Jean Suisset, called the Calculator, whose works I have not been able to find, having seen only those of some of his followers.e This Suisset began to act as a mathematician within scholastics, but few have followed suit, because it would have required leaving the method of disputes in favor of that of accounting and reasoning, where a stroke of the pen would have saved a lot of clamors. In my opinion, it is noticeable that when John Scotf wanted to illustrate how an angel was able to be in heaven and earth like a bad name that, in Virgil, on

278

Chapter 30

earth are her feet, but her head is lost in the cloudy sky,2 he made use of Euclid’s proposition about the equality of parallelograms.3 Raymond Lull too acted as a mathematician and somehow was aware of the art of combinations.g Lull’s art would be a nice thing, if the fundamental terms Goodness, Magnitude, Duration, Power, Wisdom, Will, Virtue, Glory4 [he employs] were not vague and therefore useful only to talk rather than to discover the truth. I do not recall having seen a demonstrating philosopher of the last century – except for Tartaglia who did something about movement,h Cardano about proportions,i and Franciscus Patritius, who was a man of beautiful ideas, but lacking the lights necessary for carrying them out. He wanted to redress the geometers’ modes of proving, having noticed that something was missing in them; and he wanted to do the same in metaphysics, but he did not have enough energy for that; the preface to his New Geometry, dedicated to the Duke of Ferrara, is admirable, but the content is deplorable.j It is, however, our century that has made the effort to produce demonstrations. Galileo has broken the ice with his new science of movement.k I have seen the work on dioptrics by a [member of the Academy of the] Lincei called Stelliola,l in which I notice something of the method of proceeding demonstratively outside of mathematics, i.e., in physics; likewise, in Kepler, in Gilbertm and Cabeus,n and in Snell,o whose work on dioptrics has not been yet published, but whose discoveries have – it seems – opened the eyes of Mr. des Cartes. Mr. Morin, who had published a book on light, undertook to give in it demonstrations of God’s existence in a geometrical way;p at the same time, Mr. des Cartes, prompted by Father Mersenne,q undertook to write down his Metaphysical [Meditations] in demonstrative form – but if he ever made patent his weakness, it is in this endeavor that he has done so. And almost at the same time Thomas Hobbes undertook to write in demonstrative form both in morality and in physics. There is a mixture in Hobbes of an 2

In Latin in the text: ingrediturque solo et caput inter nubile condit. Virgil, Aeneid, IV, 177 (transl. A. S. Way, London, MacMillan, 1916). 3 This is proposition 35, Book I, of Euclid’s Elements: “Parallelograms which are on the same base and in the same parallels are equal to one another” (transl. Th. L. Heath, The Thirteen Books of Euclid’s; in Great Books of the Western World, vol. II, Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1952, p. 21). Presumably, Leibniz is comparing here the shared base of the two parallelograms with the ground and their shared upper parallel with heaven. The former would correspond to the characters (or, in the case of Euclid’s demonstration, the figures) that anchor any proof in sense perception, whereas the later corresponds to the content of the proof, which can consist in extremely abstract metaphysical matters, such as the issue of the nature of angels. 4 All in Latin in the text.

30. Advancing the Art of Discovery

279

extraordinarily penetrating and strangely weak, almost incontinent mind. The reason is that he did not take enough advantage of mathematics in order to protect himself from paralogisms. At the same time, Father Fabri* also began to write demonstratively.r One can say that he provides enlightenment and that he was one of the most knowledgeable and universal scholars of his order; but, lacking the true analysis his proofs were rather careless and, had he put forth less propositions and demonstrated more exactly those he had given, he could have done much. An anonymous author publishes in England a very ingenious Tentamen Metaphysicum in order to prove that the world could not be eternal;s but he assumes that one infinite cannot be larger than another, i.e., that the infinite is a magnitude, which is not certain. In addition to the above, the Chevalier Digby undertook to provide Demonstrations of the immortality of the soul,t and his loyal Achatesu Thomas Albius, who excelled in geometry and metaphysics as Mr. Digby excelled in the knowledge of the world and in chemistry, has published some nice works written in a demonstrative fashion. I have seen only his Metaphysical Euclid;v there is no doubt that it contains deep thoughts, but it is too obscure and his demonstrations are far from being able to convince or enlighten. Finally, Spinoza undertook to provide demonstrations – those he published about a part of Mr. des Cartes’s Principles were well received.w One must confess that this author has had some nice and profound thoughts, but there are others that are so confused and so distant from the clearness of the mathematicians that one does not know what to say about them – and yet he wants them to pass for incontestable demonstrations. His demonstrations are sometimes extremely complicated, and often the proposition he relies upon in order to prove another is much more difficult than the conclusion. Among the Aristotelians there are still very able persons who have undertaken to provide demonstrations – and two of them are not to be disdained: Abdias Trew, a mathematician from Altorf who has put into demonstrative form Aristotle’s eight books on Physics,x and Johannes Felden, who is known thanks to a commentary he published on Grotius’s* de Jure belli ac pacisy, which was refuted by Mr. Grasvinckel;z Felden has written an Elements of jurisprudence where there are undoubtedly some solid thoughts.aa There is a very able professor at Jena called Mr. Weigel.* He has published a beautiful work called Euclidean analysis, where there are many fine thoughts useful for perfecting logic and making demonstrations in philosophy.bb Among other things, he has given5 to some friends an Essay 5

The word ‘communiqué’ has been replaced by ‘donné’.

280

Chapter 30

demonstrating God’s existence based on [the assumption] that all the other beings must be continually created.cc He has also published a very ingenious Moral Sphere, which is a sort of allegory explaining all morality in terms of the astronomers’ doctrine of the sphere.dd This Moral sphere is appended to the Jena edition of Mr. Pufendorf’s* Elements of Universal Jurisprudence, who has added to it a few definitions and axioms in geometrical fashion, which are quite ingenious. Ramus* reproached Euclid for, having cared for the rigor of demonstration, he abandoned the method that seems to be more appropriate for enlightening the mind; but good Ramus, who had wanted to modify Euclid’s method, lost not only rigor but also truth and exactitude. The excellent author of the Nouveaux Essais de Geometrie has in a way put together the clarity of order with certainty.ee Mr. Mercator, one of the best geometers of our time, has also published Elements of Geometry, where he shows in some essays how one could join in geometry clarity and certainty.ff In my view, however, if one cannot obtain both simultaneously, it is better to be exact at the cost of order rather than to keep order at the expense of truth. And one could say much in favor of the order Euclid has adopted.gg I have observed also a defect in those who attempt to write demonstratively, namely that they cut the subject matter in so many small propositions that the mind is distracted by that. This is why one should distinguish the most important propositions from the less important ones. There is also this further defect: the authors who write by means of propositions do not know where to conclude, since there are infinitely many propositions. I think there are two [sic] limits prescribed by reason, which are: 1) it is necessary to continue the synthesis until one can turn it into analysis, 2) it is useful to continue the synthesis until one sees infinite progressions, 3) whenever there are nice theorems, especially those that are useful for practical matters, it is good to mark them down too. But the first rule suffices as far as what is necessary is concerned. The most general defect – of which one cannot exempt even Euclid – is that one assumes axioms that could be demonstrated. To be sure, this defect does not harm certainty if these axioms are justified by an infinity of experiences – which is what happens with those of the mathematicians. But this defect does harm the perfection of the mind, and is in fact the main reason why it has not been possible so far to transform the geometers’ synthesis into analysis. What I say here might be surprising, but one must know that algebra, as well as Viète’s and des Cartes’s analysis, consists in an analysis of numbers rather than of lines – even though, in it, geometry is indirectly reduced, in so far as all magnitudes can be expressed by numbers. Nevertheless, this often requires big detours, and often geometers can prove with few words what is quite long to do through calculation. And when one

30. Advancing the Art of Discovery

281

finds an equation in some difficult problem, it doesn’t immediately follow that one has thereby the desired construction of the problem. The algebraic way in geometry is no doubt sure, but it is not the best one, and it is as if in order to go from one place to another one wanted always to follow the course of the rivers – like an Italian traveler I knew, who always traveled by boat when he could and, although there are twelve German leagues from Würzburg to Wertheim following the Main river, he preferred to take this way than to travel by land in [only] five hours. Yet, when land roads are not yet opened and cleared, as in America, one is very happy to be able to use a river. The same is the case in geometry, once it goes beyond the Elements; for the imagination would get lost in the multitude of figures if algebra would not help it until a characteristic appropriate for geometry, which marks situations as arithmetic marks magnitudes, has not been established – which is feasible and would be very useful both for discovery and for helping the imagination. I have been sent a writing by late Mr. Pascal called Geometrical spirit, where this famous [man] observes that the geometers are in the habit of defining all that is a bit obscure and of demonstrating all that is a bit doubtful. I wish he had provided us with some indications for recognizing what is too doubtful or too obscure.hh And I am persuaded that, for the perfection of the sciences, it is even necessary to prove some of the propositions called axioms – as Apollonius has endeavored to demonstrate some of those that Euclid assumed without demonstration.ii Euclid was right, but Apollonius was even more right. It is not necessary to do it, but it is not unimportant to do it, and it is necessary from some points of view.jj The late Mr. Roberval* was reflecting about new Elements of Geometry, where he intended to demonstrate rigorously many propositions that Euclid had assumed or supposed. I don’t know whether he completed that work before his death, but I know that many made fun of it: if they had known the importance of such an endeavor, they would have judged otherwise. It is not necessary for the apprentices, nor for the usual masters, but for advancing the sciences and for crossing the Columns of Hercules, there is nothing more necessary. a

See “A geometric characteristic” (1679; GM V 141-168), partially translated in Dascal (1987). b See Chapter 14. c See Chapter 21, note 1. d In all likelihood, Leibniz would illustrate this claim with the example of casting out nines. See Chapter 2, note 7. e Richard Swineshead. See Chapter 28, note d. f John Duns Scotus (ca. 1266-1308), Quaestiones in IV libros sententiarum, lib. II, dist. 2, qu. 6 (Opera omnia, 1639, vol. 6, pp. 198f.).

282 g

Chapter 30

Ramón Llull (ca. 1235-1316). Often referred to by Leibniz as a precursor of his own work on combinations. See Chapter 22. h Niccolò Fontana Tartaglia (1499-1557). i Girolamo Cardano (1501-1576), De proportionibus, numerorum, motuum, ponderum, sonorum, aliarumque rerum mensurandarum, Basel, 1570. See also Chapters 16, note f; 29, note p; 31, note hh. j Franjo Petriþ, alias Francesco Patrizi (1529-1597), Della nuova geometria, Ferrara, 1587. k Galileo Galilei (1564-1642), Discorsi e dimostrazioni matematiche, intorno a due nuove scienze attenenti alla mecanica et i movimenti locali, Leiden, 1638. l Niccolo-Antonio Stelliola (1547-1623), Il Telescopio, Naples, 1627. m William Gilbert (1544-1602). n Nicolaus Cabeus (1585-1650). o Only the excerpts (reported by Isaac Vossius in his De lucis natura et proprietate of 1662) of Willebrord Snell van Roijen’s (1591-1626) manuscript Dioptrics have remained (cf. GP IV 318). p Jean-Baptiste Morin (1583-1656), De vera cognitione Dei ex solo naturae lumine per theoremata adversus ethnicos et atheos mathematico more demonstrata, Paris, 1655. q See René Descartes, Meditationes. Secundae Objectiones (AT VII 128). r On Leibniz’s ambivalent relationship with the Jesuit Honoré Fabri, see Chapter 25. s Seth Ward (1617-1689), Philosophicum Specimen sive tentamen de divinis attributis, animae immortalitate, scripturae auctoritate, Oxford, 1652. t Kenelm Digby (1603-1665), Demonstratio immortalitatis animae rationalis, sive tractatus duo philosophici, in quorum priori natura et operationes corporum, in posteriori vero, natura animae rationalis … explicantur, Frankfurt, 1664, Paris, 1655. See also the English original edition of this work, titled Two Treatises. In the one of which the nature of bodies; in the other the nature of man soule is looked into: in way of the discovery of the immortality of reasonable souls, Paris, 1644. Digby is mentioned in De Arte Combinatoria (A VI 1 201). u Achates was the faithful (fidus – in Latin in the text) companion of Aeneas when he fled from Troy and never abandoned him, even in the most difficult moments – according to Virgil’s Aeneid (VI, 158). v Thomas Albius, alias Thomas White, alias Thomas Anglus (1593-1676), Euclides Metaphysicus, London, 1658. w Baruch de Spinoza, Renati Des Cartes Principiorum Philosophiae Pars I, et II, more Geometrico demonstratae, Amsterdam, 1663. x Abdias Trew (1579-1669), Physica Aristotelica conscripta et redacta ad methodum accurate demonstrativam, Nüremberg, 1656. y Johannes von Felden, Annotata in Hugonem Grotium de jure belli et pacis, Amsterdam, 1653. See Chapter 31, note d. z Theodor Grasvinckel (1600-1660), Stricturae ad censuram Johannis a Felde in libros Grotii de jure belli ac pacis, Amsterdam, 1653-1654. aa Felden, Elementa juris universi et in specie publici justinianaei, Frankfurt and Leipzig, 1664. bb Erhard Weigel, Analysis Aristotelica ex Euclide restituta, Jena, 1658. cc The originally handwritten proof is later printed in Weigel’s Philosophia mathematica, Theologia solida … complectens, Jena, 1693, Appendix partis generalis, pp. 33-36: Demonstratio mathematica, quavis Euclidea fortior, esse Deum, mundi creatorem et rectorem.

30. Advancing the Art of Discovery dd

283

E. Weigel, Sphaera moralis, in S. Pufendorf, Elementorum Jurisprudentiae universalis libri II, Jena 1693. In “Atlas Universalis”, a text from the late 1670’s, Leibniz includes this work of Weigel among the useful analogical “corporeal depictings” of “incorporeal things” (A VI 4 90). See also note bb. ee Antoine Arnauld,* Nouveaux élémens de geometrie, Paris, 1667. ff Nicolaus Mercator (ca. 1620-1687), Euclidis elementa geometrica novo ordine ac methodo demonstrata, cum introductione brevi in geometricam, London, 1678. gg For a more critical attitude towards Euclid, see Chapter 15. hh Notice the subtle argumentative alternation between ‘a bit’ and ‘too’. ii Leibniz defended the need and possibility to demonstrate not only Euclid’s axioms but even more ‘evident’ logical principles such as “the whole is bigger than its parts” throughout his life – from “On the demonstration of primary propositions” (1671; A VI 2 479-486; translated in Dascal 1987) to the Nouveaux Essais (1704; Book IV, chapters 7-8; A VI 6 406-432). jj Notice the interplay of modalities in this sentence: ‘it is not necessary’, [but] ‘it is not unimportant’, [and] ‘it is necessary from some points of view’. See also the former sentence: ‘right’ and ‘even more right’.

Chapter 31 CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE HAMBURG JUNGIANS

Once he gives up the hope to obtain a job in Paris and finally decides to accept Duke Johann Friedrich’s appointment in Hanover, Leibniz undertakes to re-establish his intellectual contacts in Germany. A prime target for this endeavor is Hamburg (“our Paris”), where a group of scholars edits and pursues the work of Joachim Jungius* – whom he considered the best logician and one of the best minds of the century. This group comprised professors of logic, metaphysics, moral philosophy, law, natural sciences, mathematics, as well as physicians and other scholars – including Vincenz Placcius,* Johann Vagetius,a Heinrich Siver,b Martin Fogel,c Johann von Felden,d and others. He meets some of them in the fall of 1678, when he spends a couple of months in Hamburg with the purpose of purchasing for the Duke of Hanover the library of the recently deceased Martin Fogel.e Even before leaving Paris, on 10 May 1676, Leibniz writes to Placcius, like him a former student of Jakob Thomasius, reporting on his current work and seeking information about what is going on in Hamburg. He mentions his recent achievements in mathematics as the main reason why he did not pursue his work in law. In fact, in spite of his failure in interesting Fogel in his initial work in physics,f he seeks to re-establish contact with the Hamburg circle, this time through the juridical and theologico-political interests he shares with Placcius. Referring to his New Method of Learning and Teaching Jurisprudence (1667), he says that this book was “poured out, rather than written”, for it was done “on the way, without books, without the leisure for polishing it” – hence Placcius is right in believing Leibniz could produce something better in this domain. “Furthermore – he adds – it contains many things I don’t even hold anymore, so that I am not surprised that you do not agree with me on several points, for I too would modify quite a lot if I had the occasion to revise such a badly rounded off work” (A II 1 260).g Nevertheless, he declares his interest in working towards the improvement of juridical science and assures Placcius

285 M. Dascal (ed.), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. The Art of Controversies, 285–303. © 2006 Springer.

Chapter 31

286

that he will “produce something better” in this field (ibid.). He shows familiarity with the Hamburg intellectual production by praising Placcius’s book defending the “necessity of religion” – stressing that he always believed that “the true jurisprudence is inseparable of religion and philosophy” (ibid.), as well as Fogel’s “rare maturity of judgment” (ibid.) and Felden’s “judgment and demonstrative skill” (p. 259). Above all, he is interested in Jungius, and inquires – here as well as throughout the whole correspondence with Placcius and with other members of the group – about the publication of his works and especially about the fate of the manuscripts left by him.h In the following years an intense exchange develops between Leibniz and Hamburg, especially with Placcius (until 1697, about a year before his death) – including several visits by Leibniz to the northern town. This exchange covers a wide variety of topics. The pieces here included illustrate Leibniz’s interest in pure as well as in applied logic – the scope of both of which he seeks to expand in the wake of Jungius (whom he does not hesitate, however, to occasionally criticize). In this spirit he deals with the theory and use of probabilities, pursues his earlier work in law and jurisprudence, and demonstrates particular concern for how to handle disputes. The interaction with the Hamburg group proves to be quite useful for Leibniz. Prompted by Placcius, he submits to him an elaborate set of criteria for the classification of legal actions (see A), no doubt connected to his work in re-organizing systematically the legal system.i In contrast to Placcius’s blunt critical attitude vis-à-vis certain authors, Leibniz displays a milder, tolerant approach, according to which one should rather make the effort to find useful (and perhaps truthful) ideas even in doctrines that seem at first blush repugnant to one’s convictions (see E and F). Though expressing confidence in the importance of his project of a Universal Characteristic (see D) and using strict logical form to defend, against the proposals of Jungius and Vagetius, the reduction of relational inferences in the ‘oblique’ mode to straightforward ‘direct’ sentences (see C), Leibniz also is concerned with probabilistic and presumptive inferences (see B), with ‘diaeresis’ (see A), and with Jungius’s ‘heuretics’ (D VI 1 32, 38, 40, 42) as presumable components of the logic of discovery,j and with the ‘legitimate form of disputing’ characteristic of juridical practice – none of which are reducible to standard logic (see F).

A. LEIBNIZ TO PLACCIUS In an earlier letter to Placcius (July 1678), Leibniz manifests his intention to reduce jurisprudence to its fundamental elements (A II 1 421), thus providing the rational foundation for “God’s providence or justice” (A II 1 422), as well as to establish the continuity between natural and civil law – a suggestion made by Placcius himself (A II 1 461). The present letter, in consonance with the above aims, provides a good example of the application of analysis and classification as a discovery procedure. Indeed, Leibniz, as usual, takes this opportunity to discuss the virtues and limitations of ‘diaeresis’ as a method (see note 2). As a letter, it is unusual for the rigor, detail, and simplicity of the

31. Correspondence with the Hamburg Jungians

287

systematic classification of legal actions it proposes in only a few pages,k which suggests something Leibniz reflected about carefully, rather than something that occurs to him in the spur of the moment.l Starting from the analysis of a legal action as comprising two basic constitutive components – factual and normative –, Leibniz shows how this allows to bring under a single, reasoned structure the multiplicity of apparently incompatible classifications of legal actions in use.1 This drive towards a simplification that engenders order without sacrificing plurality is characteristic of other juridical writings of Leibniz of the same period.m

Date: March 1679 Edition: A II 1 692-694; D VI 1 27-29 Language: Latin Since you invite me to sum up my thoughts on the classification of complaints, I will say what occurs to me right now about this topic; but I will put it in such a way that, whatever I say you should know that it is submitted to your judgment. Since every complaint comprises two components, the petition and the reason for it, I have thought that there are also two grounds for dividing the complaints: some of their types derive from what is complained about, and others from what constitutes the right to complain. There are also other types, but it will be sufficient at this point to expound these two main ones. Furthermore, one must also take into account that the same minimal species can be derived in different ways from one and the same highest genus, depending on how we decide to move through different subaltern genus. This is the main reason why so much variety arises in the way recognized authors treat methodically the same topic, as is evident from the example of those who have undertaken to investigate the species of virtues or of affects through continuous subdivisions. It follows from this that, if someone wishes, in dividing, not only to enumerate all the minimal species, but also to capture all the intermediate species, he should not content himself with a single division, but must rather combine different methods. This is why I think a certain diaeretic method to be useful, although not perfect.2 I prefer rather the combinatorial method, which is the only one 1

An ‘action’ is defined by Leibniz, in the legal context, as “undertaking to obtain one’s right in a trial” (Actio est jus persequendi jus suum in judicio; in Definitionum juris specimen, A VI 3 628). 2 Diaeresis is a method that can be traced back to the pre-socratics, which Plato developed into a systematic procedure of successive dichotomous division of a genus up to its ultimate species (cf. Soph. 218b-231e; Polit. 258b-287a), and whose heuristic value for syllogistic logic and definitions Aristotle acknowledged. In Chapter 12B Leibniz applies t h i s m e t h o d a n d d i s c u s s e s some of its problems. See also his discussion of

288

Chapter 31

through which one can orderly enumerate all the subaltern species from the highest genus to the minimal species, like the numbers in a table [of calculation] (abacus) and the kinds of relationship in a genealogical tree. Nevertheless, the diaeretic method is a prelude to the combinatorial method, for if you combine several different tables of division of different [things], it may happen that you will reach the perfect enumeration of all the subaltern species. But, leaving this aside, let us return to our divisions. Thus, I say that, since in every suit (libellus) there is a narration and a conclusion (for a suit can be considered as an enthymeme), which constitute the matter of the complaints of the suits, the division [should be made] either according to the narration of the remotest past or to the petition about the future, i.e., the conclusion. Now, the narration concerns the facts. There are many kinds of fact: something can happen by chance, by culpability, by mistake (dolum) – whence the [kinds of] complaints regarding a fact (i.e., those that do not result from a crime (delictus) nor from a contract, and in general not from a voluntary action but from the thing itself). Likewise, the complaints motivated by a crime or quasi-crime. A fact, however, can also be the equivalent of a law, which I use to denote by the general term ‘disposition’ – such facts are contracts, wills, and public laws. For, unlike crimes or quasi-crimes and things that happen by chance, that which consists in the mere end of a fact and does not determine the right by form itself but only by the effect is a fact.3 Thus, if someone wants to organize jurisprudence according to the order of facts, he should first deal with the actions that originate in chance rather than in the will of the person, then with crimes, and finally with laws, i.e., contracts and wills. He should then enumerate the complaints originating in each [kind of] fact. But if someone considers first the right that arises from the fact and the conclusions deduced from the narration included in the suit, he should proceed in a completely different way. In the first place, he will consider whether what the petition is about consists in a precise species or in a kind of things capable of reparation. Indeed, sometimes it is in the power of the accused to opt for reparation, while sometimes the thing itself must be extracted from him precisely, be it smoothly, by force, or by imprisonment, if needed. What determines a certain precise species lies either in the action and suffering (passio) of the person or in the tradition to which the thing belongs. I refer to what concerns the precise action and suffering of a person by the

3

“distinctions or the grounds for divisions” in his annotations to Alsted’s Encyclopedia (A VI 4 1134-1150, esp. 1138). Leibniz defines an act as “an effect of the will” (A VI 4 2820) and a fact as the “effectivity of an act”, by opposition with omission (A VI 4 2823).

31. Correspondence with the Hamburg Jungians

289

expression ‘most personal’ (personalissima) – which covers corporal punishment, the reverence and obedience the subjects owe their superiors, the military duties of soldiers under the obligation of the oath; in the past, the Ligian vassals too were under the obligation of serving without being allowed to be replaced against the will of the lord. To this category belong the bond (vinculum) of matrimony, the tie (nexus) of servitude, and in general everything that affects the person in such a way that reparation is not accepted against the will of the agent. If what is in question is a precise tradition of a thing, the defense of the accused and other matters in the complaint can be pursued on the basis of the thing. I can indeed obtain the thing under consideration against your will through a judge and deceptively offering retribution. Next, those things that are not demanded by persons in such a strict way, being rather susceptible to reparation, like compensations for caused damage, promissory notes, future warranties (cautiones), and many other things of this sort. You see how far another face of methodical jurisprudence arises if you follow the second line of attack. Furthermore, if you blend the various grounds of classification, as is usually done, and combine other major points in the many classifications available, it is apparent how much variety will emerge. You ask my opinion about what to choose. I think that the aim of the person dealing with jurisprudence must be examined for this purpose. Thus, if the aim is to pursue the art of legislating and to apply the elements of jurisprudence present in civil law, the order of facts is to be followed. For the politician’s task is to show what must be replaced where in the republic, so as not to leave anything void, ill located, idle, vain, harmful. But if the aim is to impart to the people the already conceived and instituted laws, then the later order of enumerating the complaints should be followed. For indeed it is not necessary for this purpose to teach the origins and causes of the laws, but only to define everything in very few and very broad perspicuous formulae – which cannot be done more compendiously and more generally than by letting people be advised as to what they can or must in a given moment demand or grant. The same distinction is to be observed regarding the judge and the lawyer. It is not the judge’s task to find out, on the basis of the narration of the fact, what complaint ought to have been filed; his task is to judge whether the conclusion follows from the narrated things and whether the latter have been proved. By contrast, it is the lawyer’s or the plaintiff’s task to reason at home in order to determine which complaints to file. To this belongs the science of warranties (scientia cautelarum), which can be seen as a part of the art of economics, since it is the prudent pater familias’ duty to understand these arts.

290

Chapter 31

I conclude then that, for the sake of creating (invenire) a law and a complaint (which are tasks of a politician or an economist), the facts that generate rights are to be enumerated. But for making the created laws available to the public and for letting the complaints already filed be judged by the courts, one must begin by considering that which has been petitioned. But I submit what I have here presented, as you see, to your enlightened judgment. So far, I have not received anything from Vagetius. I will thank the famous Edzard as soon as possible.n Be well.

B. LEIBNIZ TO PLACCIUS Leibniz gives vent here to his interest in ‘applied logic’, stressing in particular the practical importance of a calculus of probabilities. Resorting to his familiar metaphor of a balance in which to weigh arguments, he protests against the lack of a method to establish degrees of probability. Yet, in the example he gives in this letter, no such method is forthcoming, for he simply assumes that such degrees are given and proceeds to draw the consequences that follow from them. In so doing, he spells out the further assumptions needed for the application of the calculus of probabilities to a given issue. Furthermore, he stresses the need to “distinguish carefully” between presumptions and probabilities, thereby hinting that the former are not reducible to a calculus as the latter are.

Date: 14 January 1687 Edition: D VI 1 36-37 Language: Latin It is a great pleasure to see those works that deal with logic and the analytic art not only for their sake, but as applied to the public benefit – as in fact do the jurists when they discuss proofs, presumptions, interpretations, and indications, as well as physicians when they discuss the signs that constitute indications and counter-indications.o In the past, I intended to write something about the estimation of the degrees of probability – an extremely practical and useful part of logic, which I was astonished to see neglected.p Everybody mouths the claim that arguments must be assessed not by their number but by their weight; but who has provided the scales through which one could weigh arguments and judgments that clash with each other, in order to allow us to choose what is most probable given the data?q Like the mathematicians, I consider certainty or truth as a whole, and probabilities as parts; so that probabilities are, with respect to truth, what acute angles are with respect to a right angle. Let there be two [events] and let B be twice as probable as A. Let us assume henceforth that one of them is

31. Correspondence with the Hamburg Jungians

291

true. Given this, I claim that the probability of A has to be considered the third part of the truth, and the probability of B, two thirds of the truth. Together, both compose, disjunctively (alternativè), the whole truth. But this must be understood as referring to the [final] effect, rather than as if truth itself had in it parts of falsity. For instance, if the persons L. and M. attribute each to himself the right to receive a sum of up to 30 out of the same amount (capite), and neither precedes the other in possession nor another amount (capite) is put forth, and it is twice as probable that it is L. rather than M. that benefits from the right in question, then it would conform to natural equity to divide [the sum] in the proportion I have mentioned. To be sure, in such cases as this, presumptions must be carefully distinguished from probabilities.r Yet, even though a division of uncertain things of this sort is not in use – and rightly so – in the courts, considerations like this can at least be useful for evaluating judgments and degrees of probability in order to know towards which side we should be more inclined. My salutations to Marquardus Gudius and my promise to send him some inscriptions I received from an Italian abbot.s P.S. In Hamburg, a city with a large population that the Most Serene Rudolph Augustus calls ‘our Paris’,t there are no doubt all kinds of scholars, curious persons, and artisans who excel in their work in various things. It would be very useful if someone in his leisure time would prepare a sort of catalogue of all of them, and I think it would not be unpleasant to do it. I would like to receive the index of Jungius’s manuscripts (fasciculi) by Vagetius.

C. LEIBNIZ-VAGETIUS-LEIBNIZ A term that appears in a sentence in the nominative case is a ‘direct’ term, whereas terms appearing in other cases are ‘oblique’ ones. Standard syllogistic logic operates with sentences containing only direct terms. Therefore, it cannot as such account for inferences involving oblique terms, e.g.: ‘Mary is Christ’s mother; Christ has twelve disciples; therefore Mary is the mother of someone who has twelve disciples’. An account of obviously valid inferences such as these requires therefore a significant expansion of traditional logic (cf. NE 4.17.4). Beyond logic, they seem to raise a problem for Leibniz’s monadic conception of complete individual substances (e.g., Mates 1986: 61-62), which seems to exclude the existence of relations. Regardless of whether this is the case or not, we have here a text where Leibniz undertakes to demonstrate how it is possible to justify logically inferences of the kind in question. In so doing he defends a position contrary to that of Jungius, and is criticized by the latter’s disciple, Vagetius. Locke, whose knowledge of logic is not held in high esteem by Leibniz, u was certainly not fond of the detail Leibniz (and others)

Chapter 31

292

devoted to these demonstrations, for he affirms that those who give excessive importance to words, like logicians and men of science, give them “a more obscure, uncertain, and indeterminate sense” (Essay 3.10.6). The careful demonstrations presented and argued about in the following texts show precisely the significance of such ‘verbal excesses’.

(a). Leibniz: example of a demonstration from the direct to the oblique Date: between 7 December 1686 and 4 March 1687 Edition: D VI 1 38-39 Language: Latin First supposition, derived from the part of logic concerning inferences from the direct to the direct. To be a predicate in a universal affirmative proposition is the same as to be capable of being substituted without loss of truth (salva veritate) for the subject in every other affirmative proposition where that subject plays the part of predicate; from a predication, therefore, this substitution follows, and conversely the predication follows from the substitution. For instance: (first part) since painting is an art, if we have ‘a thing which is painting’ we should be able to substitute ‘a thing which is an art’. Conversely: (second part) if it should be shown that for ‘he who learns painting’ it is always possible to substitute in the way described, without loss of truth, ‘he who learns an art’, then the proposition ‘he who learns painting learns an art’ will be true. Second supposition, from the grammatical meaning of cases. A specific (specialis) oblique [case] is equivalent (aequipollet) to a general oblique [case] taken with a specific direct [case], and therefore they can be mutually substituted for each other. For instance: (first part) [the term] ‘he who learns a thing which is painting’ can be substituted for the term ‘he who learns painting’. Conversely: (second part) [the term] ‘he who learns an art’ can be substituted for the term ‘he who learns a thing which is an art’. Third supposition. If B can be substituted for A, and C for B, and D for C, then D can also be substituted for A. Theorem An inference from the direct to the oblique is valid. Article 1. [Grant] the following in the direct [case]: ‘painting is an art’. Article 2. I assert that it follows from this, in the oblique [case]: ‘he who learns painting learns an art’.

31. Correspondence with the Hamburg Jungians

293

Proof Article 3. [Let there be] a term ‘he who learns painting’. Article 4. ‘He who learns a thing which is painting’ can always be substituted for the above term (by the first part of the second supposition). Article 5. Again, it is always possible to substitute for that [term], in the manner stated above, ‘he who learns a thing which is an art’ (by the first part of the first supposition). For painting (article 1) is an art. Article 6. But for that term, again, ‘he who learns an art’ can always be substituted (by the second part of supposition 2). Article 7. By the third supposition, therefore, arguing from the first to the last (namely, from article 3 to article 6, through 4 and 5), for the term ‘he who learns painting’ it can always be substituted, in the manner stated above, ‘he who learns an art’. Article 8. From this, finally, it is inferred (by the second part of supposition 1) ‘he who learns painting learns an art’. Q.E.D., as proposed in article 2. Remark It must be understood that the converse inference, from the oblique to the direct, is not valid. For from ‘he who strikes a human face strikes a man’, it does not follow that therefore a human face is a man. A shorter version:v Suppositions: Inference from the direct to the direct. E.g., there is painting, therefore there is an art, since painting is an art. The equivalence of a specific oblique [case] to a general oblique [case] and a specific direct [case] taken together – e.g., between ‘painting’ and ‘a thing which is painting’. The sorites. Proposition: Painting is an art, [therefore] he who learns painting learns an art. Proof: For he who learns painting learns a thing which is painting (by supposition 2). But painting is an art. Therefore he who learns a thing which is painting learns a thing which is an art (by article 2, taken with supposition 1).

294

Chapter 31

Further: he who learns a thing which is an art learns an art (by supposition 2). Therefore he who learns painting learns an art (by articles 1, 2, and 3, taken with supposition 1).

(b). Vagetius: Critique of Leibniz’s demonstrationw Date: 4 March 1687 Edition: D VI 1 40-41; 42 Language: Latin (i) First segment … Finally, #7.x I enjoyed to get to know your thoughts on the demonstration of the inference from the direct [to the oblique], and I am most grateful to you for communicating them to me. It seems, however, that the first mode assumes the very inference that it is sought to prove, in 1.3.4. Hence, it cannot withstand [an accusation of] begging the question. As for the later [mode], it seems to be solid as well as observed also by others who polished it, and its use is unquestionable (dignissimus). The inference from a compound to its parts, which is supposed in number 3, has its exceptions; nevertheless here, as far as I can see, they are not to be feared. In fact, it [this mode] is supported by the Logica Hamburgensis. I believe something from Logica Hamburgensis VIII, 12 and VIIII, 33 is needed here. Number II itself is also based on X, 4.11. Furthermore, God reveals the secrets of the disciplines, and makes what is so revealed sources of glory for his holy name as well as useful for the true needs of humankind. Let he protect you and satisfy all your desires. … (ii) Second segment … #7. I have studied with pleasure the inference from direct [to oblique] that somehow relies upon the substitution of equivalent terms. There is a proof of this in Logica Hamburgensis III, 33, 1.7. But there can be many proofs of the same thing, and among them, and one of them is more in agreement with other minds. A converse (inversa) proof by means of characters, not of words, has been communicated to me by Fogel in the past; it has [only] a few lines.y …

31. Correspondence with the Hamburg Jungians

295

(c). Leibniz: reply to Vagetius’s critique Date: 20 May 1687 Edition: D VI 1 43 Language: Latin … I think the inference from the direct to the oblique is proved, in the one and in the other way, from suppositions that differ in both cases from the conclusion. If however someone does not accept the suppositions, I admit that for him nothing has been proved until they are also demonstrated. I have myself noted that the second [supposition], which you prove, is deeper, and I use a similar method for expressing certain reasonings imitating algebraic equations.z Besides, I do not condemn those demonstrations that proceed validly from certain suppositions, which are called into question by more pertinacious authors. For these demonstrations at least prove a connection of truths, leading us to know that one thing that has been assumed in a supposition remains to be demonstrated.aa Archimedes employs the same method. …

D. LEIBNIZ TO PLACCIUS The first part of this letter (here omitted) deals with a minor confusion about a small sum of money that Leibniz, in the rush of his trip to Hamburg, created. It shows both his absent-mindedness and care to avoid mistakes in such matters. It also contains some suggestions about Placcius’s health. In its last part, the letter depicts as Leibniz’s most important endeavor at the time the advancement of his project of representing concepts by characters, which – once completed in the form of a Universal Characteristic – would permit the solution of all controversies in every domain. He realizes, however, that this project is still in an embryonic stage and therefore should not yet be divulged, on pain of damaging his reputation.

Date: 1687bb Edition: D VI 1 21-22 Language: Latin … I am now engaged in some reflections about public law and our history, partly by commission, and from time to time I examine the archives for this purpose. I recently fell upon a golden seal of the Emperor Heinrich IV – the

296

Chapter 31

oldest of all those I have seen.cc The rest of my time I spend in working on analysis, whose climax consists for me in bringing about that everything be concluded in all kinds of controversies by means of characters and calculation, as in algebra and arithmetic – at least given some data that are certain, coming either from experience, or from authority, or from whatever other source.dd And I believe this is in our power, so as to allow disputants to end a controversy if only they agree to sit down at the abacus. However, some preliminary work is needed for such a major project, and since this work is not yet concluded, I don’t want to expound publicly [these ideas], thus making them [liable] to be mentioned with the intention of provoking laugh.ee

E. LEIBNIZ TO PLACCIUS This letter is of particular interest because of Leibniz’s clear and seemingly candid statement of his attitude towards texts and positions of other thinkers. He distinguishes between a primarily critical attitude that looks for faults with the intention of rejecting doctrines that differ significantly from the critic’s own position, and a primarily conciliatory-cooperative attitude, which endeavors to disclose, in work other than one’s own or one’s narrow group’s, ideas worthy of being explored and clarified, and to undertake the effort necessary for that purpose. Consonant with the view, developed in his maturity, that no seriously developed doctrine can be entirely devoid of valuable content, he depicts himself as holding, “by nature and education”, the latter attitude, which prevents him of acting as a ‘censor’ of Placcius’s writings. That this was not always his attitude is clear from the other texts included in this chapter, where he does not hesitate to play the role of the radical critic or to react accordingly.

Date: 17 April 1695 Edition: D VI 1 52-53 Language: Latin I acknowledge receipt of your most welcome letters, and I thank you in advance for what you intend to send me. I have no doubt that it will be excellent. It would be sufficient to send the Brunswick-Lüneburg package by regular mail; in this way it would reach me safely. In the meantime, I rejoice in receiving from yourself news about you, and I hope you are in good health – for I had not received from you anything for quite a while, except on occasion of the controversy that I understood to have taken place between you and Mr. Thomasius*.ff On some occasions I wanted to ask you what kind of Jungius’s pages have been lost in the fire at Vagetius’s building. I hope, however, that many of them have been preserved, and that for the most part only bundles of copies have been destroyed. I beg you to let me know

31. Correspondence with the Hamburg Jungians

297

what remains or what we can expect from it. I hope that, among what you offered to send me, the Ethics is yours – which entitles us to expect from it much good produce, like from everything you publish, and even more from the recent second edition of your The Perfect Jurist. In any case, I highly appreciate our Mr. Thomasius’s intelligence; in general, however, I approve him more readily when he expounds his own views than when he rejects those of others. My long experience has taught me not to disdain anything easily. There are profound reflections in every kind of doctrines, each with its own usefulness, even though they are not so obvious. Therefore, what has been reflected upon in various kinds of interpretations I usually consider to deserve applause for its precision,4 rather than contempt; in this way I stimulate the learned to explore those deeper notions rather than being deterred by them. Hence, you should not doubt that I will be an eager and, as far as possible, a studious reader of whatever emanates from you. Nevertheless, to exercise criticism requires more work, and it should not be expected from me,gg for by nature and education I am prepared to look for, in the writings of others, [what contributes to] my own improvement rather than to the others’ failure. If it seems necessary to call attention to this, I will not hide my own candor. Be well!

F. LEIBNIZ TO PLACCIUS In addition to providing a further glimpse into the amplitude of Leibniz’s interests and contacts, this letter is significant for its showing the persistent presence in Leibniz’s mind of a concern for the proper way of handling controversies. It is worth noticing his use of the image of a saw as a cooperative way of either reaching a solution of a controversy or else of stopping it short of further arguments. Roughly three decades after Chapters 1, 2, 5, 8, 10, and others, the topics of appropriate form in disputing, of a judge of controversies, and of juridical logic, rather than standard logic as the best approximation and source for a logic of controversies – all of them subjects about which he believed he had much to learn from Jungius and his disciples – emerge forcefully once more on top of Leibniz’s priorities, and his views on this subject are at this point of his life are here asserted concisely and incisively.

Date: 29 May 1696 Edition: D VI 1 71-73 Language: Latin Since I have been absent from Hanover for a few weeks, especially for health reasons, I received with some delay your letter accompanied by the 4

In Greek in the text: ĮțȡȚȕİȚĮ.

298

Chapter 31

not valueless The apology of Socrates against Cardano,hh written by a young man who was close to you for quite some time – for which I thank you. His analysis of Cardano’s discourse pleases me much, and I do not agree with those who consider such things insignificant. I have experienced how useful logical form is in order to put an end to controversies, and I am amazed that its use is so far uncommon and that it is employed where it cannot be successful, whereas where it can really be successful, it is not employed. Indeed, when one combats orally (viva voce), one can hardly observe for a long time the rigor of form, be it due to tedium or, mainly, because it is difficult to keep in mind correctly a whole chain [of arguments] elaborated at length.ii Consequently, the disputants usually shift to free conversation after the first pro-syllogism.jj If, however, the severe laws of form were observed by those who send their writings to each other, it wouldn’t be neither unpleasant nor difficult, by sending and re-sending syllogisms and replies, to move the saw back and forth until either that which had to be proved would be concluded or else the disputant (argumentator) would have nothing else to assert. Yet, in order to put this into practice, many other things should be followed that are not sufficiently established in regular use (vulgo). The most important of these things are to be gathered from the jurists: [for example], that often, especially in concrete issues, it is reasonable that the respondent become the opponent and vice-versa – as when the defendant, by raising an objection, transfers to himself the charge of the proof. And it seems to me that Jungius himself, even though he has supplanted all others in this kind of things, has not yet resolved them satisfactorily. As for myself, I call the legitimate form of disputing ‘the judge of controversies’, and I am astonished with the negligence of men who do not employ certain methods (rationes) – which are in their reach – to escape from so many labyrinths. I have praised to you Franciscus Mercurius van Helmont* and Knorr von Rosenroth,kk not for their cabbalistic meditations, but for many other correct opinions they seem to me to hold. I am built in such a way that, everywhere, I look for and observe that which may be the object of praise rather than that which deserves reprehension. Jungius’s ‘noematic disputations’ll are no doubt excellent, as everything he has done. Nevertheless, I do not know whether it would not be better to provide something of his work that would be more agreeable and comprehensible to common persons, e.g., some of his observations against Descartes, Hobbes and other similar [authors], as well as some of his mathematically inspired work. They say that Mr. Weigel* decided to go up to Sweden. I wish him success. Indeed he is not only very well-disposed, but also he teaches many remarkable things, which I wish would be sufficiently attended to!

31. Correspondence with the Hamburg Jungians

299

I think you have seen the map of the great Tartar or of the northern Orient, made by Mr. Nicolaas Witsen, consul from Amsterdam.mm It is doubtless very good and teaches us many previously unknown things. Since, however, it is impossible to complete everything in one breath, I have heard that someone from Lübeck, Mr. Brand, who returned from China and Moscow, has noted a considerable number of things concerning the positions of places which seem to differ from those in that map. If I could learn these things thanks to you or to his friends, I would draw much benefit from it. Furthermore, I would very much like to know whether Mr. Brand has taken notes or got to learn something about the differences between the languages spoken by the peoples through which he passed. More specifically, which are and what is the extension of the languages of the Siberians, the Tingressians, and of those who are called Bratzki and similar ones, as well as of the Camulcks, the Mugals, and finally of the Tartars themselves, rulers of China – what are they and up to where are they extended. In fact, if Mr. Brand, through the friends he might have in Moscow or in Siberia, or in the borders of the eastern Moscovite empire, could at least obtain the Lord’s prayer in languages different from Slavic, with Slavic or Russian versions, he would much oblige literary scholars. For languages teach very much about the affinities between peoples. And in maps the borders between languages should be indicated, just as those between the empires. Be well! a

Johann Vagt or Vagetius (1638-1691) was appointed Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in Hamburg upon Fogel’s premature death, and took over the task of preserving and publishing Jungius’s legacy. He produced a second edition of the Logica Hamburgensis (Hamburg 1681), which was annotated and commented by Leibniz (A VI 4 11171121). b Heinrich Siver[s] (1626-1691), Professor of Logic and Mathematics in Hamburg, who attended Jungius’s hebdomadary seminars, gives Leibniz valuable information on Jungius’s and Fogel’s work and manuscripts (A II 1 373-375, 415-417), and reports to him his astronomical, geographical and physical observations. c Martin Fogel (1634-1675), Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in Hamburg, disciple of Jungius, wrote a Philosophical Lexicon, posthumously published by Vagetius (Hamburg, 1689), whose manuscript Leibniz excerpted and annotated in 1685 (A VI 4 1307-1331), as well as philological works on Scandinavian and other languages. Already in 1671 Leibniz tried to interest Fogel in his work in physics (A II 1 77-78, 82-83, 99, 154), apparently without success. Leibniz wrote a substantive review of Fogel’s Elementa Juris (A VI 4 2906-2911). d Johann von Felden, a natural law jurist of broad-ranging interests, was a close friend of Placcius (A II 1 259), to whom he left “many beautiful manuscripts” that Placcius describes in detail to Leibniz and declares his readiness to let him examine them at will (A II 1 403-404). See Chapter 30, notes y and aa.

300 e

Chapter 31

Soon after his arrival in Hanover, in 1678, Leibniz persuades the Duke to purchase the precious library of Martin Fogel that was auctioned. He goes to Hamburg for this purpose, bringing back 3600 books for which he paid the large sum of 2000 thalers. He also borrows 86 manuscripts by Fogel, which he later returned. f Theoria motus abstracti and Theoria motus concreti (1670-1671). See note c. g In fact Leibniz considered improving this work already in Mainz. But only about thirty years after its publication he found time to work systematically towards a second edition (see A VI 1 xviii). The three extant manuscripts with his thorough correction and additions prove that his appraisal of the book was not so negative as it may transpire in the letter to Placcius. Unfortunately, he never completed the revision. The most significant of his revisions are available as footnotes in the Academy edition of the book (A VI 1 261-364). h Most of the manuscripts, held in Vagetius’s house, were destroyed by a fire in 1691, without having been published, in spite of Leibniz’s insistence. The remaining 25000 pages are kept in libraries in Hamburg’s Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Carl von Ossietzky. i See, for example, the Ratio Corporis Juris Reconcinnandi of June 1688 (A VI 2 93-113) and the Systema Juris of 1695 (GR 819-838). j Leibniz complains that Vagetius had not included heuretics in his edition of the Logica Hamburgensis, and suggests that it might be the most secret and general part of Jungius’s logic (To Vagetius, January 1687; D VI 1 38). Vagetius replies that it is rather a particular science that deals with quantity, and – being the art of discovery and judgment, which is relevant for all three operations of the mind – has no particular location in logic and is distributed through all its parts (To Leibniz, February 1687; D VI 1 40). Placcius goes a step further arguing that Jungius would certainly not locate it in logic, but rather in mathematics (To Leibniz, April 1687; D VI 1 42). In his revised formulation of §22 of the Nova Methodus Leibniz characterizes ‘heuretics’ as belonging to the art of discovery: “Reasoning pertains to invention and judgment. Thus Didactics comprises two parts, Mnemonics and Logic, the latter comprising in turn Heuretics and Logocritics. We can indeed remember, discover, and judge propositions or the consideration of truths (which, when it is accompanied by the mind’s reflection is proper of man only). Logocritics corresponds to Aristotle’s Prior Analytics. Heuretics is to be found both in the Second Analytics and in the Topics” (A VI 1 277). k In this respect, it illustrates the ‘peculiarity’ J. Baptiste Bon (author of the preface to the collection of legal writings in volume IV of Dutens’s edition) notes in many of Leibniz’s writings: “underneath a few words ingeniously systematic and deep reflections lurk” (D IV 3 33). l In fact, Leibniz had before him since November 1678 (A II 1 425) Placcius’s forthcoming book De actionibus tractatio bipartita (Hamburg, 1679). He immediately replied with some cursory critical remarks about – among other things – the excess of types in Placcius’s classification (A II 1 425-426), to which Placcius replied on March 15, 1679 (A II 1 460-462), demanding a more extensive reply in the name of the “philosophical friendship praised by Aristotle in the Nichomachean Ethics” (Placcius’s reference is “1.IX Nic. c. XII”, presumably to IX.12.2; but he may also be alluding to IX.2.3, where Aristotle speaks of the “friendship of the good” that “grows with their intercourse”, which makes them “grow better by putting their friendship into practice”, through which “they correct each other’s faults”.) Upon Placcius’s demand, which resembles a complaint Leibniz himself leveled against Arnauld’s cursory and harsh initial reaction to the Discours de Metaphysique (GP II 15-16, 16-17, 34), Leibniz complies (following his own ‘principle of compensation’– cf. Chapter 16F and Dascal 1995), and devotes a careful commentary to the book (A VI 4 2917-2928). The present letter, focusing on the classification of legal

31. Correspondence with the Hamburg Jungians

301

actions, insists on the methodological as well as substantive need to provide criteria of classification that are both formally simple, adequate regarding the subject matter, and comprehensive. m E.g., Juris Naturalis Principia (A VI 4 2809-2812), De postulationibus (A VI 4 28192832), De jure in arte redigendo (A VI 4 2844-2849). Another, also extremely systematic juridical writing of the same period is Chapter 11. n Esdras Edzard (1629-1708), literary scholar, Orientalist, specialized in Jewish culture (see A II 1 207). o See Chapter 10. p See Chapter 13. q See Chapter 21, note 1. r In the example given by Leibniz, the presumptions in question might include those suggested or implied by the conditions he spells out. For example, ‘precedence of possession’ is treated by him as a presumption in his discussion of usucapio (see Chapter 36); and the eventual presumption that he who is poorer has ‘more right’ to receive a part of a sum than he who is richer may be embedded in the determination of the degree of probabilities of the two contenders as 2 to 1. In this respect, the satisfaction of Leibniz’s demand for a method for determining the degrees of probability would require a prior ‘weighing of presumptions’, upon which the use of the ‘calculus of probabilities’, which takes for granted the availability of individual probability assignments to each outcome, depends. The only cases in which it seems to be possible to avoid the reliance upon presumptions in the assignment of such degrees is that of games, analyzed by Leibniz in Chapter 13. Even there, however, Leibniz is aware that there are non-formalizable factors such as the psychological effects of playing a game, winning, and losing, that are nonnegligible, even though they are set aside in the mathematical theory of games and of probabilities. s Marquardus Gudius (1635-1689), bookseller at Copenhagen, author of Antiquae inscriptiones cuum Graecae, tum Latinae: nuper a Ionne Koolio digestae hortatu consilioque Ioannis Georgii Graevii, new ed., Frankfurt, 1731. t Rudolph August (1627-1704), Duke of Brunswick-Lüneburg. u In NE (4.17.9), Leibniz makes Philalethe (= Locke) admit that he had a wrong idea of the importance of logic and its formalities. To Thomas Burnett he comments, after Locke’s death, that “the art of demonstrating was not his strength” (6 July 1706; GP III 307). See also Chapter 42, note 7. v In what follows Leibniz provides a condensed version of the preceding proof. w Vagetius commented upon Leibniz’s demonstration in two complementary segments. The first, sent by himself, in a letter dated 22 February 1687. The second, written by an “anonymous person from Amsterdam” and sent to Leibniz through Placcius in a letter dated 19 April 1687. The latter is undated, but Dutens presumes – plausibly – that it was written or dictated by Vagetius in the same date. Parkinson (1966: L) has mistakenly attributed this segment to Placcius. The relevant portions of both letters are here translated, as well as Leibniz’s reply (piece (c) below), which Dutens presumes – also plausibly – to address both of Vagetius’s comments. x The division of the letters in numbered paragraphs is, as a rule, introduced by the editor, Dutens. y The ‘me’ in this sentence is the anonymous author of the letter, not Vagetius, since the latter is the author of the formal proof in question, and presumably the one who sent it to Fogel. Vagetius’s proof, which is a formal version of a verbal proof given by Jungius, was

302

Chapter 31

presumably communicated by its author to Leibniz, for it was found among the Leibniz manuscripts and is dated 4 January 1687. The manuscript contains in the margin a verbal instantiation by Leibniz of Vagetius’s proof, where he uses the very terms he employs in (a) above, namely, ‘painting’ and ‘art’. A part of this manuscript was edited by Mugnai (1992: 152-153). For the purpose of comparing it with Leibniz’s own proof ((a)), Leibniz’s instantiation of Vagetius’s proof is hereby translated [numbers are added]: “(1) Painting is an art. Therefore, (2) everyone who learns some painting is someone who learns some art. Otherwise, (3) Someone who learns some painting is not someone who learns some art. If this is possible, (4) [There is a] Titius who learns some painting [and] who does not learn some art. Hence, since (5) Titius learns some painting, a fortiori by …[missing text]. (6) Some painting is that which is learned by Titius. But (7) Every painting is an art. Therefore, (8) Some art is that which Titius learns. Therefore, (9) Titius is the learner of some art”. z That is to say, formally expressing logical structure by means of letters and other signs. aa That is to say, the conjectural method contributes significantly both to the ars inveniendi and to the ars judicandi by singling out those worthy ‘connections’ or combinations generated in the ‘synthetic’ stage of inquiry that should be validated in the ‘analytic’ stage by a full proof. bb Dutens’ placement of this letter between letters of 1678 suggests a wrong date. We use Ritter’s dating, instead, since it is supported by Leibniz’s mention, in this letter, of his official appointment in 1685 as historian of the House of Brunswick-Lüneburg (A I 4 205206). cc Heinrich IV (1050-1106), German Emperor, who was involved in a conflict with Pope Gregory VII, which led to the Emperor’s abdication. dd Throughout his life Leibniz gathered definitions from several sources and formulated his own ones. Such definitions are the raw material for the conceptual analysis required by the Characteristica, a project about which he writes much in the late 1680’s, e.g., in Chapter 28. ee A similar concern is expressed by Leibniz in Chapter 14. ff Although he maintained little direct contact with Christian Thomasius and did not agree with most of his controversial views, Leibniz was well informed about his intellectual career. At about the time he wrote this letter, he wrote some notes on Thomasius’s Dissertatio ad Petri Poiret libros de eruditione solida (1694) and expressed to Molanus his concern for the “extraordinary manner of talking” displayed in this work, for “it could harm him – which would cause me pain, since he has much talent, whose use would be ineffective if he caused problems to himself by expressing himself in this way”. According to Leibniz, Thomasius “could say all that is necessary to lead men to true knowledge and virtue without making use of harsh and offensive terms” (GR 86-87). He manifests the same concern in a letter probably written at the beginning of 1696: “Mr. Thomasius, who is very smart and has the talent to write today with elegance, included in his Latin preface to Mr. Poiret’s book thoughts that alarmed certain theologians; he also went on and entered in a debate with a physician from Halle, Mr. Hofman, about the sympathies Mr. Thomasius employs instead of mechanical explanations, holding – in addition – three principles, the mind, the soul, and the body” (To Basnage de Beauval; GP III 122). gg Placcius had asked for Leibniz’s criticism (D VI 1 52). hh Socratis apologia contra Cardanum. Leibniz may be mistaken about this reference, which we have not been able to locate. ii See Chapter 1 where Leibniz compares written and oral debates.

31. Correspondence with the Hamburg Jungians jj

303

Leibniz is here clearly hinting (and, immediately after, spelling it out explicitly) that the ‘form’ he is talking about is not the traditional logical form, as he does in the opening of Chapter 1. On the difficulty of going beyond the pro-syllogisms stage, see Chapter 38. kk Leibniz had mentioned favorably these two persons in his letter of March 1696 (D VI 6870). Placcius in his reply (April 1696; D VI 1 71) reacts rather dismissively. Christian Knorr von Rosenroth (1636-1689), poet, Hebraist, alchemist, and counselor of the prince of Sulzbach, is the author of Kabbala denudata seu doctrina Hebraeorum (2 volumes; Frankfurt, 1677-1684). Leibniz’s expresses much praise for von Rosenroth in a letter to Landgrave Ernst von Hessen-Rheinfels of 10 October 1688 (A I 5 43). Franciscus Mercurius van Helmont (1614-1699), physician, naturalist, and philosopher. His works include, among others, Alphabeti vere naturalis Hebraici brevissima delineatio (Sulzbach, 1667) and Quaedae praemeditatae et consideratae cogitationes super quatuor capita libri libri primi Moisis (Amsterdam, 1697). ll Leibniz considered Jungius’s logic and particularly his ‘protonoetics’ as fundamental for the development of a ‘general heuristics’. See Jungius’s Protonoeticae Philosophiae Sciagraphia, in Kangro (1968: 256-271). On the method of protonoetics, see di Liscia (2002). mm Nicolaas Witsen (1641-1717), well-known Dutch cartographer, who made the first reliable maps of Russia and its provinces in the 1680’s. Leibniz admired his concern for providing also information about the languages of the regions he mapped. In this connection, Leibniz reports to have asked Witsen for a version of the Pater Noster in the languages he had access to (NE 1.3.8; A VI 6 103).

Chapter 32 THE PHILOSOPHICAL SIN CONTROVERSY

The question of whether ignorance of moral and religious precepts is a sin was one of the episodes of a broader and intense controversy between the Jansenists, led by Arnauld,* and the Jesuits, having to do with the notion of ‘philosophical sin’. The quarrel began, quite unusually, due to the publication in June 1686 in the Jesuit college of Dijon of an internal document entitled “Theological Theses about the Sins”. Antoine Arnauld’s critical eye did not miss a text that, for him, was an affront to Catholic orthodoxy. The confrontation begins in 1688, reaches its peak in 1689-1690 with five complaints by Arnauld and the corresponding Jesuit replies, and ends on August 24 1690 with a formal and unequivocal condemnation of the “Theses” by Pope Alexander VIII, who virtually endorsed Arnauld’s arguments. The ‘philosophical sin’ doctrine, as expressed in the “Theses”, is rejected as being “scandalous, reckless, offensive to pious ears, and wrong”. The Papal condemnation is particularly contemptuous of the second thesis, namely that there are actions contrary to reason and to morality, i.e., ‘philosophical sins’, which are not, however, theological ones.a Far from concerning a mere marginal issue, the philosophical sin controversy touches the core of theological-political intelligibility – the question being not only whether there can be moral rectitude outside of Christianity, but also whether a strictly philosophical ethics is possible. The controversy thus highlights a fundamental opposition between an anthropology that is deeply pessimist in that it not only excludes from salvation large segments of the world’s population, but also proclaims the utter uselessness of any human effort towards moral improvement,b and a relatively optimistic one, which admits human moral perfectibility and grants human nature a central role therein. The present text, written in the heat of the debate, focuses on the notion of ignorance: does it always involve culpability or are some of its modes, notably the ‘invincible’ ones, exempt from guilt? Leibniz orderly aligns the arguments of both sides in an attempt to make the debate intelligible, thus allowing for

305 M. Dascal (ed.), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. The Art of Controversies, 305–308. © 2006 Springer.

306

Chapter 32 everyone to make up his mind about the issue at stake. He takes special care not to let his own position (which we know to be contrary to Arnauld’s; see, e.g., Chapter 33) transpire. He is thus skilfully enacting the role of the rapporteur he describes in Chapter 19, although a careful examination of his selection of arguments for reporting and his way of rendering (or overlooking) the comments of each party on the opponent’s positions might undoubtedly reveal some bias.

Date: 1689 Edition: A VI 4 C 2699-2700 Language: Latin Sacred th eses on the sins of ignorance with the reply by the Jesuit fathers concerning certain truths.c There is no invincible ignorance regarding the law of nature.1 See Gerson, On spiritual life, lecture 4: It can happen that someone sins a true theological formal sin although he absolutely doesn’t know it, thus not being aware that he is actually sinning – what is more, although he firmly and without any doubt considers that he is acting correctly and would sin were he not to act in that way. For example, if someone ignores God in the sense that he simply does not know that God exists, and therefore he not only does not actually think of God, but also is firmly convinced that there is no God whatsoever. When dying, Stephan and others will be considered [by some] to have paid tribute to God.d Atheists, who claim there is no God, are not less corrupt and abominable for this reason. For some, ignorance is said to be invincible whenever there is no actual awareness here and now. Jesuit reply defended in Louvain on 18 August 1689: No one can sin truly and theologically unless he had on one occasion some direct knowledge of God, at least obscure and doubtful. Almain,e in moral. chapter 4, prop. 5, says that Altissiodorensis claims that whoever sins is taken to know that he sins or doubts.f To claim that one sins a true formal and theological sin even though he is convinced beyond doubt that he acts correctly is a hard and terrorizing claim. It is possible to prove that whatever is done in conscience’s good faith is not a sin – which is acknowledged by a judge who judges according to the deeds, even against his own science. Replica or other Theses about the sins of ignorance.g It seems that the antagonist admits that there is maliciousness in the sins of ignorance,h but only as much as that present in the sin previously committed consciously. For example, whoever kills due to drunkenness and anticipates that by getting drunk he will kill while drunk – for such sinners, 1

See below for the standard definition of invincible ignorance.

32. The Philosophical Sin Controversy

307

these will not be sins of ignorance. Someone only sins in case he assumes that he is sinning. As against this Father Bernard argues against Abelard in the famous Letter 77.i St. Jerome, in the Dialogue against the Pelagians, particularly against Coelestius,j [claims] that Coelestius was condemned in the Council of Palestine because he denied that one should consider deeds made by ignorance, forgetfulness or inadvertency as equivalent to sinful acts.k Almain’s words have misled a learned man,l since for Altissiodorensis the meaning of ‘whoever sins is supposed to know that he sins’ is not that it is necessary to know in order for a sin [to be committed], but rather that [he who sins] is obligated to know it. The antagonist replies: It is not possible that a formal and theological sin be committed by someone who ignores God in such a way that he simply does not know that he exists, and even less by someone who ignores God in such a way that he believes firmly and without hesitation that there is no God. It follows that all those who are equally sinners by virtue the same blindness,m when they later sin commit different sins if indeed the reason of the sin lies in that blindness. The heretic who sins out of ignorance and mistake is above any disquiet due to temptation, whatever later will be adduced against him – if the antagonist is right. Duplica. Reply to the other Theses about the sins of ignorance; chaired by Rev. Father Joseph de Reux, Louvain, 18 August 1689. Thesis 1. An invincible ignorance of the law of nature exempts one from formal sin. Thesis 2. There is no ground to affirm that there is no invincible ignorance of some central points belonging, however remotely and intricately, to the law of nature. Thesis 5. There are formal sins of ignorance, but only when such ignorance involves guilt.n Thesis 6. There are no formal sins of invincible ignorance. Thesis 7. Ignorance, which is invincible by nature but capable of being overcome (vincibilis) by ordinary grace, is simply capable of being overcome. Thesis 8. Sins of ignorance are not sins of actual knowledge, but of the knowledge that could and should have existed through ordinary helps (auxilia). Thesis 12. A philosophical sin is a formal sin and must be abhorred, although it does not contain all the maliciousness of a theological sin. Thesis 13. In a Christian’s environment there are atheists who turn out to be invincible, whereas in a barbarian environment we do not think this can happen permanently.o

308 a

Chapter 32

“A philosophical or moral sin is a human act contrary to rational nature and to right reason. On the other hand, a theological and mortal sin is a free transgression of divine law. The philosophical sin, although serious because it ignores God or does not actually think of God, is neither an offense to God nor a mortal sin that cancels the friendship with God – hence it does not deserve eternal punishment” (Stephan Bougot, Theses theologicae de peccatis; in A. Arnauld, Oeuvres, vol. 31, p. 40). b About the supposed virtues of pagan sages, Arnauld writes: “… all these pagan sages, who have most displayed their love towards virtue and hatred towards vice, were all idolaters of their own wisdom, virtue and reason (A. Arnauld, La nécessité de la foi en Jésus Christ pour être sauvé, in A. Arnauld, Oeuvres, vol. 10, p. 125); about Greek ethics: “… the more constant maxims of their ethics are nothing but lessons of pride intended to teach men to depend exclusively upon themselves, and to adore only their own reason; to ground their happiness in nothing more nor less than the fruition of their own possessions; to acknowledge only themselves as authors of their virtue and happiness; to pretend they owe nothing to God …” (ibid., p. 115); on Aristotle: “… breaching all limits, they go as far as admitting the possibility of salvation of someone like Aristotle, who was not only an infidel and idolater, but also a completely impious man” (ibid., p. 352); and on the Americans: “… I do not think that in any of the histories of the discovery of this new world it is reported that persons having knowledge of the true God have been found” (A. Arnauld, Seconde denonciation du peché philosophique, in A. Arnauld, Oeuvres, vol. 31, p. 133). See also Cardoso (2000). c Theses sacrae de peccatis ignorantiae cum responso PP. Jesuitarum ad certas veritates, 1689. d Stephan Bougot, author of the controversial Jesuit theses. e Jacques Almain (1480-1515), theologian who taught at the Navarra College in Paris, defended the ‘council theory’ (according to which the councils had the primacy over the Pope). The book to which Leibniz refers is Moralia, 1510. f Presumably ‘Altissiodorensis’ refers to Guillaume d’Auxerre (1150-1231). g M. Steyaert, Theses alterae de peccatis ignorantiae seu Reflexiones ad thesim apud PP. Societatis Jesu propositam in diem 18 augusti 1689, Louvain, 1689. h “Maliciousness, or rather a malicious act is a sin of he who knows that he is sinning” (A VI 3 623). i This letter contains an apology of piety vis-à-vis sinners, and doesn’t mention Abelard, his argument, or the ‘philosophical sin’. These are discussed both in St. Bernard’s Heresies of Peter Abelard and Letter 190, addressed to Pope Innocence II, which bears the title “Traité de Saint Bernard contre quelques erreurs d’Abelard”. j A Roman jurist of the 5th century (died in 431), Coelestius was a controversial figure. He espoused Pelagianism, was condemned in 411 and 417, was ordained after that, returned to Rome and was again condemned in 418. k The Council of Palestine (Jerusalem, 49-50 A.D.), with the participation of some of the Apostles, had as its main purpose to decide the controversial issue of the ‘judaizers’, who demanded that the pagans converted in Paul’s first apostolic drive should be circumcised and submitted to Mosaic law. l The learned man misled is the Jesuit Stephan Bougot, who relied upon Almainus’s rendering of Guillaume d’Auxerre’s words. m In both cases, they suffer from ‘closing the eyes’ (clausio occulorum) to God’s existence. n One is guilty of ignorance when one neglects the efforts required to learn. See Chapter 6. o This thesis is grounded on the presupposition that, in Christianity, there is a gap between revealed theology and natural theology that does not exist in other faiths.

Chapter 33 CONFRONTING THE CATHOLIC HARDLINERS Two Memoirs for Pellisson

A. FIRST MEMOIR Through her sister Louise Hollandine, Abbesse de Maubuisson, Duchess Sophie of Hannover had received a copy of Pellisson’s Reflexions sur les differends de la Religion avec les Preuves de la Tradition Ecclesiastique (Paris 1686). She handed the book over to Leibniz, and asked him to comment upon it. Leibniz complied with the present writing, which was sent by the Duchess to her sister who, in turn, handed it over to Pellisson through her secretary, Mme. de Brinon, who was herself interested in the exchange Leibniz-Pellisson. Mme. de Brinon was Principal of the prestigious St. Cyr College, founded by Mme. de Maintenon, a close friend of Louis XIV in his old age. There are a number of different copies of the manuscript, in some of which the title “Objections” is missing. Whenever it is relevant, we refer to these different versions of the text employing the abbreviations used in the Academy edition. None of the manuscripts is signed, but Pellisson was aware of the author’s identity, as witnessed by a note he inserted in the edition of the fourth part of his Reflexions, which consists in fact in his reply to Leibniz’s objections. The book, titled Reflexions sur les differens de la religion. Quatrième partie. Ou Réponse aux Objections envoyées de l’Allemagne sur l’unité de l’Eglise et sur la question, si elle peut tolérer les Sectes, was published in Paris in 1691. Paul Pellisson-Fontanier (1624-1693) belonged to a Huguenot family and converted to Catholicism in 1652, upon entering the service of Minister Fouquet. In 1658 he was appointed by Louis XIV royal historian and in 1676 head of the “Caisse des Conversions”, the royal office in charge of providing assistance to converted Huguenots. He held both positions until the end of his life, and was a central figure in shaping and enforcing Louis XIV’s policy visà-vis the Protestants in France, in the crucial period prior to and following the revocation of the Edit de Nantes. In addition to the Reflexions, he published a Traité de l’Eucaristie (1694), where he undertook to justify the king’s policy

309 M. Dascal (ed.), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. The Art of Controversies, 309–324. © 2006 Springer.

310

Chapter 33 against the Jansenists. It is important to recall that in all his practical as well as doctrinal activities Pellisson worked in close contact with the omnipresent Bossuet.*

Date: August 1690 Edition: A I 6 73-81 Language: French

Objections I am very grateful to you, Sir,1 for sending me the Reflexions sur les differends de la Religion by Mr. Pellisson. This book is new to me, because in the place where I have stayed for more than two years one hardly sees works of this kind.a I find it quite excellent, and of a completely different category2 than many books that have been coming from France for some time, whose authors I compare to street charlatans. In it there is erudition coupled with meditation, besides that beautiful imprint which makes thoughts sensible and moving. In the past I have read so much on controversies, and have spoken so much with some of the most illustrious controversialists of this century, that most of the books that have been written on these matters seem superfluous to me.b However, Mr. Pellisson´s reputation has induced me to read this work, and I do not regret it at all. But I observe that sometimes he leaves his arguments unfinished, and leads us only up to a certain point where he suddenly abandons us, as if we had already arrived where we were supposed to arrive.c The better a book is, the more sensitive the reader is to this fault, for when someone is delighted with the pleasant company of one’s guide, one is disappointed at seeing him disappear in midway. And this chagrin makes me take the pen in order to point out what I believe still remains to be done. I think we must agree with the Author when he says that in order for us to belong to a Religion, and especially to exchange it for another, it is necessary to believe one has considerable reasons for it.3 For, given that Religion consists in two things – in belief and cult – it is evident that we could not believe in anything if we did not think we have some proof or basis for it. Therefore, it must be acknowledged that we all need some examination,d for otherwise Religion would be arbitrary and we would not be better off than the infidels and the sects. 1

‘Sir’ is crossed out in L1. We choose here the textual variant of E1, which replaces autre force by autre sorte. 3 In the various versions of the text, Leibniz oscillates between ‘reasons’ (raisons) and ‘reasonings’ or ‘arguments’ (raisonnements). In an earlier writing on changing one’s religion, the same wording is used by Leibniz. See Chapter 26. 2

33. Confronting the Catholic Hardliners

311

But the reasons for our persuasion are of two kinds: some can be explained, the others are inexplicable. Those I call explicable can be proposed to others by a distinct reasoning; but inexplicable reasons consist only in our consciousness or perception, and in an experience of inner feeling which we would not be able to make others partake, if we do not find the means to make them feel the same things in the same way. For example, we are not always capable of telling others what it is that we find agreeable or disagreeable in a person, in a picture, in a sonnet, or in a stew.e It is for this reason that it is said that there is no arguing over tastes. For the same reason, we would be unable to make a person who is blind from birth understand what is color. Now, those who claim they find a divine inner light within themselves, or a ray that makes them sense a certain truth, base themselves on inexplicable reasons. And I see it is not only Protestants, but also some Roman Catholics who rely upon this ray. For, besides reasons of belief or of credibility (as they call it), i.e., besides the explicable reasons of our faith, which are naught but a pile of arguments with different degrees of strength, and which taken together cannot support anything but a human faith, they require the light of heaven’s grace to produce a complete persuasion and to give rise to what is called divine Faith.4 Thus, those who base themselves on this light cannot demand from those who are based on a contrary light an examination other than that of each one’s own conscience; that is to say, [they cannot demand more than to know] whether he tells the truth and whether he actually feels the light he boasts to feel. But since this alleged inner light is scarcely reliable, and since the examination of conscience is pretty difficult in this matter, I would have liked Mr. Pellisson to deal exactly with this important point, explaining to us the inner earmarks of the divine light which distinguish it from illusion, just as gold is recognized by its color, weight and other sensible features.f While we wait for this clarification, let us deal with explicable reasons, since it is only through them that we can persuade others. These reasons are either general or particular. The general reasons may be identified with those prejudices that Tertullian,* employing juridical language, called prescriptions.g The particular reasons may be included under the rubric discussion: for, insofar as prejudices only provide that which allows one to presume, or what jurists call a presumption,h they can be erased by a contrary proof; and insofar as they only provide a great likelihood, the particular discussion may introduce more powerful contrary reasons or likelihoods. Hence, Mr. Pellisson´s pretension that there must be infallibility. I believe his intent is to create an argument such as: It is necessary that an infallible prejudice exist; however, if there is one, it cannot be found 4

See I Jo. 4,1.

312

Chapter 33

elsewhere but in this visible Church which is called Roman. Therefore the Roman Church is infallible.5 Let us now consider the first of this argument’s two premises, and let us see how the Author establishes the existence of an infallibility we may comfortably make use of to settle Controversies. He seems to reason in this manner: If there were no infallibility, each one would be forced to conduct a perfect discussion; however, this perfect discussion is impossible, according to many people. Therefore, an infallible prejudice must exist.i Because I love sincerity, I not only agree that not all people can be indiscriminately commissioned to examine controversies exactly, but I would add that even among scholars there are very few who would be able to certify the truth in complex matters. It even seems we have no means of discovering the truth concerning certain issues that have been raised. Some will object that it is not necessary to decide all Controversies; but Mr. Pellisson could reply that there are at least some Controversies the resolution of which is necessary,6 and that it will always be difficult for the people to examine them in depth; hence the people needs a clear and infallible sign accessible to all. There are two replies that can be opposed to the strength of this argument. The first one is that it is enough for men to believe the truth about some necessary issues, even though perhaps they may not have reached knowledge of the truth through very strong explicable reasons, and may not have employed either an infallible prejudice or an exact discussion. Indeed, there are few Christians who enter deeply into the proofs of the truth of Christianity, and it seems enough that there are Scholars who see the advantages of our Faith over other Religions.j There will always be many people who will be compelled to believe in the word of their Shepherd. Happy those whom God has given enlightened Masters,7 or those whom He has willed at least to touch internally, in the absence of the ministry of a good external master.

5

6

7

The manuscripts reveal two crossed out formulations of this passage that are worth mentioning: (1) “Indeed, if it were certain that God has established {an} infallibility on earth, the Roman Church would have great advantages over the {Pro}testant ones”. (2) “Indeed, if it were certain that God has established on earth an infallibility capable of proclaiming (parlante), i.e., a judge of controversies incapable of making mistakes”. “On this point I declare I do not wish to make use for this debate of the distinction between fundamental and non-fundamental articles [of faith]. However, Mr. Pellisson takes it as if I did use it, using the opportunity to oppose this distinction ” [added in the manuscript]. “Although this distinction by which God seems to favor some, more than others, seems harsh to many, to the detriment of salvation” [added in the manuscript].

33. Confronting the Catholic Hardliners

313

There still remains another objection8 which Protestant Theologians do not acknowledge at all,9 but as it has currency among some people who have been praised for their piety – many of which form a group apart, especially in Holland,k who consider that divine justice would be harmed if salvation depended on controversies and on the luck of a good education, which even the well-meaning may lack – it seems worthy of being examined, all the more insofar as it seemingly matches the opinion of various renowned Doctors of the Roman Church.l This objection10 is that there is no absolutely necessary revealed article, so that salvation is possible in any religion, as long as one truly loves God above all things with the love of friendship, based upon His infinite perfections. It will be objected that this might perhaps be claimed of those who remain in innocence, whereas those who are in sin cannot obtain absolution except in the true Church. But we answer that these same theologians agree that, after sin, contrition, i.e., that which comes from this sincere love, erases sins without the intervention of the keys of either the Church or of the Sacrament.m They add that those who are in this feeling of divine love, which in fact is the essence of piety, are enlightened by the light that came to the world in order to enlighten all men; that such men overflow with the grace of the Holy Ghost, and are closely united with the eternal Word and with the divine Wisdom which is in Jesus Christ, even without knowing it sufficiently according to the flesh, and even though they may have never heard the set of letters forming his name.11 They also claim that, ardently wanting to do what they can judge to be in accordance with God’s will, they will always be in good faith, they will never be headstrong and, consequently, they cannot be heretics. Since they are devoted to seeking the truth insofar as other duties allow them, and ready to believe in it when it presents itself to them dressed in the robes needed to make itself recognized, they cannot be held to be infidels. Consequently, this terrible Sentence (whoever does not believe will be damnedn) is not applicable to them, nor do the excommunications with which true or false Churches may fulminate them. They add, to sum up, that 8

“Thus there is another objection coming from those who cannot accept this inequality and of which it can be said that it agrees with the opinion of the Doctors” [added in the manuscript]. 9 “Mr. Pellisson limits himself to my second objection and sidesteps the first one, even though I have declared that the second one is not acknowledged by the Protestants, and that I only use this second objection ad hominem, since it pertains to the principles of the Jesuits” [added in the manuscript]. 10 “It is true there hardly exist perfect people, (1) whose love (2) whose piety has not been interrupted (interrompue)” [Added on the margin and then crossed out again]. 11 Leibniz’s marginal note: “v. Andrad. apud Chemnit. part. I. Ex. com. tr. replic. orig. ad sext. sess. cap. de imbecillitate naturae et legis p.m. 196”. On Payva de Andrada, see notes 24 and L.

314

Chapter 33

this sincere and straight intent they have to conform to the will of God whom they love, makes them belong to the Church, in voto or by a virtual desire which makes them partake of the virtue of Baptism and the Sacraments, ad instar Baptismi flaminis, or in the manner of what is called the Baptism of the Holy Ghost, wherein water plays no part,o just as if they had received the grace by the intervention of visible symbols, for what condemns is not the fault or absence of the Sacraments, but their contempt. Many great men of the Roman Church teach this doctrine, although those who write Controversies try to hide it. It is true that some Protestants combat it, but that is not the issue here. It is enough to show that the opinions of the Doctors of the Roman Church about the salvation of those who live outside it, are not as harsh as is believed: it has been often declared that there is no fundamental article except that of the love of God or filial obedience; that, consequently, only stubbornness or disobedience make the Heretic;12 and that for this reason Saint Salvian, bishop of Marseille, excused the Arians in good faith, although they denied the divinity of Jesus Christ.13,p Here is, then, a part of what remains to be examined in order to complete Mr. Pellisson´s demonstration. I will not speak for the moment of the other premise, which assures us that, if there exist any infallibility, it cannot be found except in the Roman Church. Nor will I deal with other prejudices that are not infallible, on which the Author offers some well thought considerations, as for example what he says about the argument of the large number.q But because these and other similar prejudices require themselves a discussion that is difficult for ordinary people, and do not exempt the scholars from a more exact discussion of these particular issues, I do not wish to broach it for the moment; nor do I wish to deal with the reasons of the Particular Treatise of the Eucharist,r for all these matters would take us too far. It is better to bring to a close one single issue of importance than to tackle several of them. I would like to be able to measure up to the Objections I have described. But I leave it to your judgment, Sir, the question of whether the erudition and energy of Mr. Pellisson are not necessary to perform this task. From such a great genius everything can be expected, as long as the topics under consideration are not utterly impossible.

12

“thus we excuse … some ancients who did not have too clear an opinion concerning the mystery of the Trinity, for having lived before the council of Nicaea, … they cannot be reprimanded” [addition in the manuscript]. 13 “Jesus Christ, and that for that reason we excuse all those who have remained in error or in ignorance concerning important questions before the Church´s definition” [later addition in the manuscript].

33. Confronting the Catholic Hardliners

315

B. SECOND MEMOIR This is Leibniz’s retort to Pellisson’s reply to his first “objections” (in 33A). Pellisson replied on September 4, i.e., barely a month after he received Leibniz’s memoir. In a long letter addressed to Madame de Brinon, to be expedited to Leibniz (A I 6 83-104), he takes up Leibniz’s arguments. In particular, he contests Leibniz’s distinctions between “explicable” and “non-explicable” reasons and between “fundamental” and “non-fundamental” articles of faith. In this way, he seeks to undermine Leibniz’s attempt to eliminate the grounds for employing the category “heretic” so as to permit both a debate on equal footing and the possibility of salvation for those individuals that are not formally members of the Church. Pellisson sums up Leibniz’s position as follows: “We seek the truth in good faith, ready to acknowledge it as soon as it is shown to us. Therefore, we cannot be considered heretics” – to which he replies arguing that “if this defense is accepted, there would never have been heretics, for there has never been one who has not said the same thing” (A I 6 91). The intensity of the exchange between Leibniz and Pellisson indicates that both attached to it much interest. And not only them, for, in addition to those mentioned in note 1, others were involved as well. On September 14, Leibniz writes to Landgrave Ernst von Hessen-Rheinfels reporting about the debate with Pellisson, to which the Landgrave replies on September 21 stressing the importance he attaches to exchanges of this kind (A I 6 104-109; A I 6 109112). The Landgrave, on his part, immediately sent a copy of Leibniz’s retort to Arnauld and to another Jansenist, Father Du Vaucel, who was the Landgrave’s correspondent in Rome. On October 31, Du Vaucel replies accusing Leibniz of holding an extreme form of Socinianism (“one clearly sees that he has a strong penchant towards Socinianism and that he doesn’t believe in the original sin”; A VI I 115n)

Date: October 1690 Edition: A I 6 115-121 Language: French

To Paul Pellisson Fontanier I respect so profoundly Mr. Pellisson’s merit, that I am afraid to reply too freely to his remarks on my Memoir, and thereby to be perceived as a man that would want to engage in a long dispute with him – which would be to take undue advantage of his time. Nevertheless, courtesy obliges me to reply to his sincere remarks, by stating in good faith and sincerely the effect caused in my mind by his reply. He excels, as usual in his writings, in the beauty of his turns of expression, as well as in their precision and force. One always benefits from reading him, be it by learning something, be it by being touched by some good things one already knew – and in this consists the use of eloquence. Nevertheless, I am forced to confess that I am not yet convinced of the main point under consideration.s We should not be

316

Chapter 33

surprised by that, since it is something too important and too difficult. But, since I would like to preserve above all the merit of being sincere, bestowed upon me by Mr. Pellisson (lacking the other merits he adds, which I do not possess), I will try to explain myself so as to let everybody at least acknowledge how far I am from quarrelling. I am sometimes forced to repeat what I have said in my first memoir, when it seems to me that my point has not been taken into account. Furthermore, it seems that his reply is not complete, since some of the more difficult points have not yet been addressed in depth – especially the issue of the opinion of famous Catholic theologians regarding the salvation of material heretics.t I have not the honor of being acquainted with the lady to whom Mr. Pellisson addresses his writing; and I assume that this writing is addressed in fact to me; but what he says about her is sufficient to let me understand that she is a lady of extraordinary wit and piety. I am very grateful for her kindness towards someone she is not acquainted with, and I would like to deserve it in some way. However, since I have been informed that this goes through persons of the highest rank, whose birth entitles them to bear scepters and who have the ability to use them, the awe this awareness impresses upon me leads me to cut short all that is not essential for the issue at hand.u What I wanted to say about those arguments that Mr. Pellisson had in my opinion left incomplete was exemplified by the rest of my memoir as well as by the objections I had raised, which I deemed necessary to discuss after his reflections.v This is why I don’t want to deal with this here as a separate point. I confess that inexplicable motives are naturally suspect and that one should not trust them. However, I have shown that the theologians of the Roman Church make use of them when they claim that the conviction that results from the inner movement of the Holy Ghost makes Faith divine, whereas explicable reasons make it only human, thus having nothing but a verisimilitude: accordingly, they are all forced to look for the internal signs of the Holy Ghost’s movements. If Mr. Pellisson believes that there are no such signs (as his words seem to indicate), how can one preserve the conviction and certainty that must be found in divine Faith, especially in view of the fact that there are so many people who believe without knowing the reasons for it?14 As for the distinction between fundamental and non-fundamental points, Mr. Pellisson is right when he says that the least error in Faith when accompanied by rebellion may deprive one from salvation; however, not all those who are outside the Church’s communion are rebels. The theologians agree that one can be excommunicated unjustly. Furthermore, the Catholics grant that there are material Heretics whom they don’t dare to condemn; 14

Leibniz’s marginal remark: “Mr. Pellisson has not yet replied to this”.

33. Confronting the Catholic Hardliners

317

hence, according to them it is only disobedience that condemns. However, someone who does not hear a command, or does not understand it, or else cannot perform it even if he makes the corresponding efforts, is not disobeying. If the Councils had decided to condemn Copernicus, many able Astronomers would be in danger of becoming hypocrites or else to be excluded from the Church, in spite of themselves. One’s opinions are not voluntary, and one cannot get rid of them as one wishes; this is why (absolutely speaking) they cannot be commanded;w it is enough to be docile and to sincerely tend to take the steps one is able to take in conformity with one’s profession. For this reason those who have sworn to follow certain doctrines and have afterwards changed their opinion (as it happens quite often), are not considered as having commited perjure. Nevertheless, excommunication has a great power, when it is performed justly (clave non errante)15: like the thunderbolt it strikes the obstinate and does not harm the humble. When one says that the Church can never be mistaken regarding Faith, one incurs in an equivocation. Such a statement can mean that God will not let a damnable mistake to completely overtake truth. But it doesn’t follow that all those opinions declared to concern faith are necessarily such. In fact, such a mistake (in case the Church would be mistaken about it) is not damnable. Furthermore, it can sometimes happen that the authorized doctrine be correct as it is presented in the Symbolic books,16 and even as it is taught in the Schools, although it may be mixed with great abuses in practice and in the instruction of the people. A well intentioned person revolts against such abuses; he is not listened to; one wants to force him to retract; he cannot comply without being a hypocrite; he is therefore condemned; can one accuse him of schism? I admit that the Church, which is a sort of Republic, has the advantages of other Republics, even in an eminent manner, so that it must have power and executive capacity (quod extremum est in jurisdictione).17 And it is God who takes upon himself to execute its verdicts, albeit with some reservations. One owes obedience to one’s Superiors and to the Church above all; this is to say much, and I do not hesitate to say it; nevertheless this authority is not quite authorized by God to be entitled to absolute obedience. There are no sufficiently clear titles that 15

16

17

‘[W]ithout making a mistake in using the key’. Excommunication is the strongest punishment according to canonical law. It consists in the exclusion from the community of believers and the impossibility of participating in the sacraments. Being a canonical punishment, the Pope can in principle be mistaken in its use, in which case it can be revoked. Hence the use of the formula clave non errante, whose significance Leibniz emphasizes here. By ‘symbolic books’, the Catholic Church designates, in addition to the Old and New Testaments, the so-called Apostolic Tradition books, such as the Patristic and Liturgical literature of the first three centuries A.D. ‘[W]hich is supreme in jurisdiction’.

318

Chapter 33

could bring one’s mind to rest on this issue, so as to dilute what causes alarm to a well intentioned person. Those who imagine that the Antichrist has thereby put himself in the Throne, believe to witness so terrible abuses that the particular reasons of discussion overcome by far in their mind the prejudice regarding the Superiors’ authority.x Those who are hit by so hideous ideas are not aware that it is possible to surrender to general reasons of convenience.y Without going that far, I would dare to say that they sometimes say things that are worth being paid attention to; above all, it would be necessary to provide effective remedy to many abuses acknowledged by pious and learned persons. This would be the true means to lift the obstacles,z without which many people [will continue to] imagine that we are only trying to cover up things, that there is more politics than zeal, and that those who shout more believe less.18 There are as many maledictions against those who take part in abominations as there are against those who break the union: one opposes prejudice against prejudice, novelty against novelty, Fathers against Fathers; but the balance which is appropriate to weigh the ones against the others is not available to everyone,aa nor is it easy to put to use. To be sure, I am not saying here something quite new, but I am not aware that these difficulties have already been met. Mr. De Meaux,* Mr. Arnauld,* Mr. Pellisson, Mr. Nicole, and some others have said admirable things. But it seems that they do not turn the coin, for they deepen and cultivate some advantageous argument and polish it; however, when one doesn’t see anything but that, one is impressed. The same often happens to some Judges when they have as yet listened only to one witness. But since there is a conflict of reasons, everything must be taken account of, income as well as expenses. Mr. De Meaux, in his Exposition,bb shows how the doctrine of the Council of Trent may have a tolerable meaning. This is welcome, and one should hope that other Doctors from his party would always talk like him. Nevertheless, not everything that is tolerable is true and not everything that is true is necessary. Hence, it does not follow that one must follow doctrines that can be dispensed with. Mr. Arnauld presents very clearly the Oriental Church’s doctrine of real presence;cc he exempts the English Catholics of the allegations of an imaginary conspiracy;19 he highlights the inconvenience of those formulations of the Reformed that 18 19

Nice pun in French: ceux qui crient le plus, croyent le moins. The ‘imaginary’ conspiracy, allegedly organized by Catholic families, was a plot to blow up the Parliament when the English royal family was present. On November 5, 1605, Guy Fawkes and his accomplices planted a bomb under the Houses of Parliament; but it was found, the perpetrator was arrested and beheaded – and the event is commemorated to this day in England. The motive of the plot was King James I’s excessive anti-papism. The plot failed, but stimulated the persecution of Catholics in England.

33. Confronting the Catholic Hardliners

319

support the impossibility that grace be withdrawn.20 Mr. Pellisson demonstrates very well that the internal feelings or experiences which are credible are the general ones, and that in that case it is God’s and nature’s voice that speaks to us; he supports this mentioning many authorities; he highlights the need for a power of excommunication by the Church. Mr. Nicole proves the impracticability of an exact particular examination.21 And all these famous men are wonderfully capable to find the weaknesses of their adversaries; but such particular victories are not decisive. It seems to me that one watches [in these cases] how brave warriors defy an enemy and defeat him under the eyes of the two armies; but this is not the battle. One must show exactly up to what point goes the Ecclesiastical Superiors’ authority and the necessity to pay them obedience; for it is not unlimited. And one must show that this power extends to all that is demanded from the Protestants, or else one must opt for particular discussions and abandon once and for all general arguments that are inconclusive. I reach now the last point, namely whether a true love of God above all is sufficient for salvation. I don’t dare to decide it, and I wouldn’t say, in Pellisson’s terms, that he who loves God can be saved without taking pains to participate in Disputes or Controversies. I would say rather the contrary, for the most certain way is to neglect nothing, this being in fact commanded by true love. One must look for the true Church and listen to it when one recognizes it, to pay obedience to the Superiors as much as possible without hurting one’s conscience, and to employ carefully all the means to get to know God’s revealed desires. But when after all this one does not succeed in finding the truth about certain important points, the question is whether one can be saved. It is quite sure that Theologians usually distinguish between material and formal Heretics, and that they condemn the latter but not the former. It is possible to say that the Jesuits in general hold that a material Heretic can enjoy salvation through true contrition, although they believe this is not easy to perform.22 It will be difficult to find among them Authors who hold a different view, and there are many who have applied this 20

The French expression is ‘inamissibilité de la grace’. Leibniz refers to the Calvinist thesis according to which grace is a gratuitous and unconditional gift of God, which does not depend upon a man’s merits nor can be removed due to his demerits. The traditional doctrine of predestination held that the good persons are predestined to grace and salvation. Calvin held the so-called ‘double predestination’ view, namely, that evil persons are also predestined, to damnation of course. Calvin defends double predestination in Institutio Christianae Religionis (1536), XV, 5. See Chapter 40, note c. 21 The reference is to the “examination of conscience” (See note d). Pierre Nicole (16251695) was co-author with Arnauld of La logique ou l’art de penser and La grande perpétuité. He stresses the impossibility of an exact knowledge of oneself and of one’s acts. See the essay “La connaissance de soi-même” in his Essays de morale (1671). 22 Marginal remark: “Mr. Pellisson has overlooked this in his last reply”.

320

Chapter 33

doctrine also to pagans as I have pointed out, even though the Protestant Authors have protested against this. However, true contrition is a penitence based on divine love; formal Heresy is damnable only when the will’s rectitude is lacking in the act of penitence; consequently, the love of God which comprises this filial obedience is also lacking therein; faith is dead without the charity that makes up for the lack of knowledge: therefore, following these principles, everything boils down to this.dd What? Does Mr. Pellisson want to suppress the distinction between formal and material Heretics? Why are some first century Fathers, who had quite strange opinions even about Trinity (as acknowledged by Father Petauee) and other matters, excused? The reason is that it is accepted that, before the Church’s decision, errors were not Heresies since they were not accompanied by disobedience. Saint Salvian’s quote likewise shows that he excuses in good faith the Arians, without feeling sorry about them as if they were to be damned.23 Therefore, the most fundamental point is obedience (which is not perfect unless it is performed due to a disinterested motive stemming from divine love). Why is the schism such a great evil? Isn’t it because it hurts charity so badly? These are neither particular opinions of some obscure Schoolmen, nor of some modern authors full of paradoxes, whose unusual opinions I do not approve at all.ff For this reason, I do not discuss Mr. Pellisson’s well taken observation about the Schoolmen and these other Authors. I also agree with him that this doctrine should not become a pretext for authorizing Sects and that true love does all that is in its power in order to get to know God’s will concerning the Church and other matters, trying to comply with this and to cultivate union. Nevertheless, it doesn’t follow that it [true love] is never to be found outside the visible communion of the Church. I have already observed that one can be within the Church in voto, just as one can participate in the Sacraments’ effects without receiving them as such.gg It seems to me that Mr. Pellisson overlooks the distinctions that have to be made regarding such an important point, presumably because he wanted to reflect more about it and to consult (as he says somewhere) the Authors I had mentioned.24 One should not be surprised by the fact that the Councils and Symbolic Books do not touch such a delicate matter, which cannot be understood by everyone, particularly since it is subject to abuses. Regarding this issue, it is sufficient to talk about the ordinary ways to salvation, without mentioning those who can be deprived 23

Marginal note: “Mr. Pellisson has overlooked this point too”. Leibniz had mentioned Saint Salvian in his first memoir (see note p). 24 In Leibniz’s manuscript, ‘as he says somewhere’ is crossed out. In the version he published, Pellisson adds the following marginal comment to Leibniz’s text: “Mr. Leibniz wrote this before he received the preceding memoir regarding Payva Andradius”. This memoir, bearing the title “Autre lettre touchant le Docteur Portugais Payva Andradius”, was dispatched by Madame de Brinon to Leibniz on November 1st 1690 (A I 6 123-126).

33. Confronting the Catholic Hardliners

321

from it due to the Superiors’ injustice or some other reason. It is well known that the Council of Trent was quite reserved about issues that were not controversial vis-à-vis the Protestants. Since the Church has not decided anything about them, why should one despise the accepted views of wellknown Doctors, especially when they are useful for lifting the big difficulties raised about God’s justice, which can reduce the love that is due to him above all. The desire to win our cause and to bring back the adversaries should not make us adopt positions that are useful for this purpose, but hurt the essence of piety. Mr. Pellisson himself states very judiciously in a passage of his first volume, that our lights are too shallow in order to penetrate the depth of God’s justice.hh Let us not, then, pronounce outrageous condemning sentences against our brethren, and let us content ourselves with saying that it is dangerous to be deprived from the ordinary ways to salvation: this is sufficient for making clear the importance of the Church and to constrain all of us to make all imaginable efforts to re-establish union. Both sides must adopt a good disposition in order to lift the obstacles. Cursed be those who maintain the schism through their obstinacy, those who do not want to listen to reason, and those who want to be always right. a

Leibniz received the book at about the end of his journey to Italy, from November 1687 to June 1690. An indication of the importance he attributed to the issues raised by Pellisson is the fact that immediately upon his return to Hanover he composed the present “objections”. b Leibniz was fascinated with the controversy literature since his early days (see Introductory Essay, Section 3; Chapter 1; and GP VI 43). He never lost sight of this literature. Among the more recent texts, he was familiar with those of Bossuet against the Jansenists and of Father Maimburg against Seckendorff, Jurieu and Bayle.* Furthermore, he was personally acquainted with the Jansenists Arnauld* and Nicole, the Catholics Stensen and Rojas y Spínola,* the Lutheran Molanus,* as well as the Calvinist theologians of Helmstedt, Leipzig and Berlin. It should be emphasized that the attribute ‘superfluous’ does not apply, according to Leibniz, to the controversy writings of any of these authors. c It seems that Leibniz is here suggesting that Pellisson’s argumentation is essentially enthymematic, which is typical of the propaganda fidei literature, where the reader is presumed to share the premises that allow him to draw by himself certain conclusions. d The term examen clearly evokes the Jesuit notion of ‘examination of conscience’ (examen de conscience) as well as the Calvinist ‘way of examination’ (voie d’examen). These notions refer to an introspective process of auto-validation of a person’s faith. Leibniz’s usage of the term examen, however, usually emphasizes the analytic and cognitive aspects involved in arguing and providing reasons for adopting a certain position. This double connotation of the term is explored by Leibniz in the sequel in order to move from the subjective to the objective level of the religious debate – to which he refers below, respectively, as ‘inexplicable’ and ‘explicable’ reasons. Leibniz’s subtle views on the examen de conscience, against the Pietist view of a rather passive conscience, are best expounded in his interventions in the well-known “Quarrel of Pure Love”, notably in: Report on the Process against Molinos (GR 76-80); Correspondence with Morell and Nicaise (GR 100-146); Von der wahren Theologia Mystica (GU I 410-413).

322 e

Chapter 33

In terms of Leibniz’s well-known classification of types of knowledge (cf., e.g. A VI 4 585592), these are examples of “clear” but not “distinct” knowledge. The “je ne sais quoi” (I don’t know what) was a traditional topos in the rhetoric of the time; it is discussed by Boileau in his Art Poétique and used by Locke in his well known critique of the notion of substance (Essay 1.4.20). f In terms of the classification of types of knowledge mentioned in note e, Leibniz is here demanding from Pellisson to provide at least a “nominal definition” of the divine light, which would permit us to have “distinct” knowledge of it. g Leibniz is here referring to Tertullian’s De praescriptione haereticorum (2nd century A.D.), where the author employs the term ‘prescription’ in the sense it had in Roman juridical practice at the time. According to this practice, the prosecutor (praetor, equivalent to the French ‘juge d’instruction’) had to prefix to the “formula” of indictment the specification of the conditions under which it should be brought to judgement (praescriptio) and those that limited the scope of the formula (exceptio). See Tertullian, De praescriptione haereticorum, XXI, 1; Adversus Marcum III, 1. See also K. J. Stirnimann (1949). In the specific sense used by Tertullian, a prescription is a restrictive operator, whose application to the formula leads to a simplification of the juridical process. In this sense, it is essentially a mandatory procedural rule such as “an accusation already judged should not be judged again” (praescriptio rei judicatae) or “without prejudice of other claims” (praescriptio praejuditii). On the juridical sense of praescriptio, see Chapter 36; on the formula, see Chapter 23, note j. h On the particular importance Leibniz assigns to the concept of presumption in his juridical logic, see Introductory Essay, Section 3. It is possible that here he is giving this term the sense employed by Tertullian, who restricts presumptions to what he calls “conjectures” (conjecturae; see De praescriptione haereticorum, XVII, 7). i Pellisson is thus claiming for his demand of infallibility the status of a prescription in the above sense, on the grounds that without it the procedure for deciding religious issues would be endless. j The same argument is used by Leibniz in the Preface to the Théodicée. k The reference is to the Quakers, specifically to William Penn, to whom Leibniz devotes in 1695 a long commentary (GR 88-93). Presumably he has also in mind Spener’s Pietism (see his letter to Avemann, 1st July 1691; GR 80-81). See Racionero (2001). l Leibniz is here referring mainly to Diogo Payva de Andrada (1528-1575), an important theologian in the Council of Trent. In his Orthodoxarum Explicationum Libri Decem (Venice, 1564) he argues that it is possible to appeal to the inner light provided this does not lead to the suspension or modification of dogmatic truths. Leibniz refers to the same author (under the name of ‘Jacques’) on this point in Théodicée, 96. m Here and in the next paragraph Leibniz describes the main points of the Quietist doctrine, which gave rise to the well-known “querelle du pur amour”. See note d. n Mark 16, 16. “He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved; but he that believeth not shall be damned”. o Acts 10, 44-48. This same example is used by Leibniz in Théodicée, 93-99, where he speaks about the extraordinary forms of salvation, in connection to which he explicitly refers to his polemic with Pellisson (at I 96). See also De Causa Dei of 1710 (GP VI 455-456). p Saint Salvian (ca. 400-480), bishop of Marseilles, author of De gobernatione Dei, criticized the immorality of Roman customs, as opposed to the innocence and purity of those of the “barbarians”, who espoused Arianism only because they did not know the true doctrine. Nevertheless, this should not deprive them from salvation. q That is, the justification of a thesis on the basis of its support by the majority of authorities.

33. Confronting the Catholic Hardliners r

323

Reference to Pellisson’s work of 1694, mentioned in the introduction to this Chapter. Leibniz identifies the rhetorical power of Pellisson’s style and acknowledges its argumentative force. Yet, he suggests that, per se, these features of his argumentation are not sufficient for persuasion in matters of particular importance or complexity. t See Chapter 27. u Leibniz is alluding here to the fact that Pellisson was writing on behalf of Bossuet, who, in turn, was acting on behalf of Louis XIV, who was probably aware of the contents of these writings. v See note c. Pellisson, in his reply, had dealt first with Leibniz’s claim that he had left many arguments incomplete, observing that if Leibniz were to be specific about this criticism, he would be delighted to reply (A I 6 85). w That is to say, no one can compel a person to hold a belief or opinion: “nobody has the power to persuade someone else about anything” (see Chapter 6). x This is a Lutheran image against the Papacy, which had been often used during the Reformation. On this point, Leibniz is thus critical of his fellow Lutherans, and defends the validity of the general prescription (see note g) that requires obedience to the legitimate ecclesiastical authorities. y With the formulation raisons generales de convenance, Leibniz is here weakening the notion of “prescription” or “general reason”, which purports to be absolute. In this way he thinks the Protestants would be able to accept as reasonable some prescriptions. In this sense, he is recommending that they make concessions on this matter – according to the “method of condescension” (see Chapter 27), so as to permit the holding of negotiations. In the short reply Pellisson thinks fit for Leibniz’s memoir, he interrupts the debate precisely on this issue, with the following drastic claim: “‘I cannot believe’ is not a good excuse for protecting oneself from the punishments due for incredulity” (Letter of Paul Pellisson-Fontanier to Marie de Brinon, for Leibniz; 1 November 1690; A I 6 126). z Here Leibniz is demanding, in its turn, concessions from the Catholics, not at the level of their “prescriptions”, but at the particular level of concrete wrongdoings the Protestants allege were performed by the Church against them. This is a further application, of course, of the “method of condescension”. aa See Chapters 2, 5 and others on this balance, for whose mechanism Leibniz, to the end of his life, claims no one has yet accounted for. bb Mr. de Meaux is Bossuet. This short book, Exposition de la doctrine de l’Eglise Catholique sur les matières de controverse (1671), which received the solemn approval of Pope Innocence XI, and provoked many Protestant reactions, was sent to Leibniz through Mme. de Brinnon. cc See A. Arnauld, De la frequence de l’Eucharistie (1643). dd Leibniz contends here that, without charity in the sense of a basic trust in the good intentions of fellow Christians, it is impossible to settle the issues under dispute. Such a trust is the basis for Leibniz’s notion of tolerance (see Introductory Essay). The notion of charity, which he generalizes beyond the idea of “Christian charity”, plays a central role in Leibniz’s ethics and theory of justice (see, for example, Remarques considerables sur la jurisprudence of 1676; A IV 2 744-746). In the present passage one might see an anticipation of the so-called “principle of charity” as formulated in 20th century theories of language and communication. See Dascal and Wroblewski (1987). For, the presumption Leibniz defends is that, in a situation of conflict, one should not assume that the opponent is not at least as honest and well-intentioned as oneself, just as one should not assume that the interlocutor is irrational, ignorant, etc., as required by the principle of communicative charity. s

324 ee

Chapter 33

Denis Petau (1583-1652), Theologica dogmata, 4 volumes, Paris (1644-1650). In volume II, Petau discusses Trinity. Leibniz had carefully read and annotated this volume (GR 332338). ff This is an allusion to the Casuists whom Leibniz had criticized. Like Pascal, he condemns casuistry as leading to a relaxation of moral strictures. Yet, unlike Pascal, he praises the Casuists for employing the notion of degrees of probability in order to evaluate states of consciousness. See, for the critical assessment, the letter to Graevius of April 1670 (A II 1 38), and for the positive appreciation, De religione magnorum virorum (especially GR 43) and Chapter 42. gg About the forms of belonging to the Church, see Chapter 26. hh Paul Pellisson-Fontanier, Reflexion sur les différends de la Religion, 4th ed., vol. 1, 1689, p. 23.

Chapter 34 DEFINING WHAT PERTAINS TO FAITH

In this concise and extremely systematic piece, Leibniz tackles what is perhaps the main stumbling block of the irenic negotiations under way at the time it was written – the question of what counts or should count as a ‘legitimate’ Ecumenical Council, what are the issues under its authority to decide, and what is the procedure it should follow for making such decisions. This problem underlies the deep divergence that emerges in the negotiations with Bossuet (see Chapter 33). If a way is found to bypass it and reach an agreement on these points, then – so it seems to Leibniz, Molanus*, and Rojas y Spínola* – the path will be wide open to bridge the gap between Protestants and Catholics on all remaining divergences. Accordingly, convening a legitimate council is the key element in Molanus’s plan or ‘method’ and will become the main strategy in the scheme Leibniz devises with Rojas y Spínola (see Chapter 35). The question, of course, is how to define the legitimacy of a council with sufficient precision to dispel the Protestant suspicions (in the wake of what had happened in the Council of Trent) and the Catholic fear of undermining thereby the for them sacred authority of the Church. In a sequence of four sharp and detailed dilemmas, Leibniz spells out the content and procedural alternatives between which the negotiators have to opt. He in fact thus provides an analysis of the possible components of the concept ‘legitimate council’, which allow for different combinatorial solutions. Although he does not say what is the solution he would recommend, it is not difficult to guess on what side he stands in each of the dilemmas – although the circumstances (cf. Chapter 16H) may lead him to weigh one or another of his ‘analytically’ preferred options differently. In addition to its importance for the specific topic it refers to, this piece is not only exemplary as a conceptual exercise. It also provides substantial material for reflection on more general philosophical notions and problems, such as the delimitation of the domain of religious belief, the role of history and tradition in it, the question whether there can be an obligation to believe (see Chapter 6), the relationship between intellect and will in religious as well as in other kinds of belief, and the nature of collective decision making.

325 M. Dascal (ed.), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. The Art of Controversies, 325–327. © 2006 Springer.

326

Chapter 34

Date: 1692 Edition: A IV 4 582 Language: Latin

On the authority of definitions in matters of faith 1º. One may ask, what is the subject matter capable of definition by the Church, so that the Church can define what pertains to divine faith and must be believed on pain of [committing the sin of] heresy. Thus are excluded:a most matters of fact, philosophical positions, and in theology those things that are of so little importance that they cannot be viewed as having to be necessarily believed.b 2º. One may ask, whether it is necessary that those things the Church defines as matters of faith have always been considered as such by the Church and have reached us through the apostolic tradition, or whether the Church can define as pertaining to faith things that have neither been so transmitted nor follow with certainty from what has been transmitted. c 3º. One may ask, whether assent or belief is something that resides in the intellect or whether it can be governed by the will, so that [concerning] he who decides in his mind that he will impose upon himself to think in a certain way because he desires a certain effect, even though he doesn’t presently see any proofs nor recalls having seen them in the past and even it seems to him to see contrary ones,d one will have to say – for this reason – that he assents to the word;e that is to say, whether in [matters of] faith practical, without speculative, assent is sufficient. 4º. It is asked whether, in order to keep the form of a future legitimate council, it is necessary that the controversial articles to be defined [by the council] be previously examined in the light of the sacred scripture and the ecclesiastic tradition; so that a future decision will be, from a strict legal point of view, void, [even] in case it gathers the [majority] of votesf and conforms to the elders, in the absence of such prior discussion and the presentation of any reason based on the scriptures or the tradition;g or whether in fact it is legitimate to proceed like in the dance (ballotatio) or ball game (sphaerismus) of the Italian public affairs, where things depend upon the movements and the will (arbitrium) of each participant.h

34. Defining what Pertains to Faith a

327

The demarcation in question had strong practical consequences. A truce (which held until 1678) in the conflict between Rome and Port Royal was achieved by Arnauld’s appeal to the distinction between the question of whether Jansenius’s texts actually contained the doctrines attributed to him (a factual issue that is not in the power of the Pope to decide) and the question whether such doctrines are to be condemned by the Church (an issue that the Pope has the right to decide). See Dascal (1990a: 87-88, 96-97). The papal recent condemnation (1690) of the ‘philosophical sin’ (Chapter 32) led to a clash with the Jesuits. These and other political consequences show how far from purely theoretical are the issues discussed in this text. b Some such things of ‘little theological importance’ are discussed by Leibniz in the Examen religionis Christianae (A VI 4 2355-2455). c On the need for reasons that justify one’s change of religion, see Chapter 26. A fortiori, changes within a given religion, even when following the required formal procedures, should not be arbitrary. See below, item 4º. d Leibniz is here describing, of course, the well known phenomenon of wishful thinking as well as that of self-deception. e See Chapter 2, paragraphs 20ff. f The characterization of a ‘legitimate Council’, and in particular the majority of votes issue is discussed in Chapter 27. g Leibniz is here criticizing a voting-with-no-justification procedure as a way to take reasoned collective decisions, as he did long before in Chapters 1 and 2. Politically, he is of course afraid that, given the likelihood that even in a legitimate council the Protestants would be outnumbered, so that a counting of votes would not favor their positions. In what follows he further suggests that such a procedure is arbitrary. h The maneuvers described so vividly presumably are ironical about what is going on in the Papal court at the time.

Chapter 35 JUDGMENT OF A CATHOLIC DOCTOR

This is a remarkable text both for its content and for the circumstances of its design. It is written at a moment when Leibniz’s irenic negotiations reach its highest peak (for another, similar and related peak, see Chapter 16H). He is convinced that there is a real chance of success, and that what remains to be done is to persuade Protestants and Catholics to accept the terms of an agreement he and others had been elaborating for quite a while. The present text spells out such terms. Using the “method of concessions” (Chapter 27), it sets up fundamental concessions of approximately equal weight each side is supposed to make without sacrificing more than it can. No attempt is made in the plan to solve all controversial issues, but rather to lay out an agreed mechanism for solving them so as to compel both sides to accept such solutions. The basic idea is that the Catholics would accept the Protestants’ contention that only a ‘legitimate’ ecumenical council could solve the points in dispute, i.e., a council in which – unlike the Council of Trent – they would have the right to participate; such a council should be convened by the Pope “and other Christian princes”. The Protestants, in turn, would unconditionally accept to abide by the decisions of this legitimate council. Though perhaps politically naïve, after so much elapsed time and spilt blood had entrenched each side’s positions, there was a strong logical-juridical basis for such a plan, and its appeal to run-of-the-mill Christians tired of war and dispute was considerable. Most importantly, Leibniz had finally found a Catholic partner who shared his views and was willing to go ahead with the plan – Rojas y Spínola*, with whom he had been negotiating for more than a decade. Their mutual trust was such that, after accepting Rojas y Spínola’s suggestion that “it would be very useful if some documents were written and made public with due approval” by both sides, although cautiously warning that “one should proceed stepwise” (A I 10 151), Leibniz enthusiastically gallops ahead. He writes one of these documents (the present text), asks Rojas y Spínola to approve and obtain formal approval for this “Catholic” document, asks him to write a parallel document “in the name of some Protestant theologians”, and assures him that “we, on our side, will make sure that what has been written in the name of the Protestants can be published” (A I 10 152-153). This stratagem, which makes

329 M. Dascal (ed.), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. The Art of Controversies, 329–340. © 2006 Springer.

330

Chapter 35 abundant ‘political’ use of the Other’s Place Principle (Chapter 17) and of the legitimacy of certain lies (Chapter 16G), is of course (for Leibniz) morally acceptable, since the good to be achieved if it succeeds is far superior to the irregularities it appeals to. It was also intended to gain time and circumvent delaying maneuvers by eventual opponents. The letter of Leibniz to Rojas y Spínola quoted above, which accompanies the present text, is dated 5 October 1694. In his reply dated 17 November, Rojas y Spínola adheres to the project (A I 10 169). Leibniz replies immediately on 28 December, getting into the details, such as the proper way of printing the two texts, as well as about the way of proceeding (modus agendi), pointing out that “more harmony and communication on both sides is necessary” (A I 11 137). He urges that time is essential and that Rojas y Spínola is irreplaceable for the realization of this plan (A I 11 134-135). He died, however, in March 1695, the stratagem was not executed, and this promising round of negotiations thus aborted.

Date: 1694 Edition: A I 10 156-169 Language: Latin

Judgment of a Catholic Doctor about a Treatise of Reunification Recently Concluded with some Protestant Theologians 1) Sometime ago I have heard rumors about the Negotiation of the Reunification of the Church that a certain reverend and illustrious bishop1 preliminarily held with some Protestant theologians by order of the Emperor. Although my opinion about this had been immediately asked, I did not want to express my view about something insufficiently known to me. I did not hide, however, that the present circumstances raised in me only a faint hope. I had no reservations, of course, about the prudence of those to which the Emperor assigned such an arduous task; nevertheless I suggested that one should fear that such a negotiation be seen as a scandal by Catholics, while distancing even more the Protestants from the Catholic truth. For, having often dealt with Protestant theologians and politicians, I was aware of the extent to which they differed from our ones, and how low was the opinion of many among them not only of the Roman Curia and the Catholic clergy, but also of the doctrine of our [theologians]. I was, thus, of the opinion that the issue was not so much that of communion under both species and of allowing clergymen to marry, but rather of the very serious controversies regarding faith and the sacraments. To be sure, I was aware that, among the more moderate Protestants, many did not consider the Pope as the 1

The word ‘Episcopus’ is a marginal addition.

35. Judgment of a Catholic Doctor

331

Anti-Christ, and that even some of them went as far as thinking that the errors they imputed to the Catholics did not destroy the grounds for salvation. This, however, is not sufficient for reunification, unless the Protestants admit all those things that it is known the Catholic Church takes to be matters of faith and of divine law. Hence, I was afraid those who took part in that negotiation would promise more than what they could deliver. 2) Now that some of what was discussed between that reverend … and those famous Protestant theologians was communicated to me, I can express myself more freely about the whole issue.a I have observed with pleasure that the Illustrious … behaved so prudently that he ably managed to extract from various Protestants certain statements and worked out their dilution within our [theses]. Thereafter, I was glad to notice that some controversial matters, such as the justification, the merits of our doings, free will, the original sin, the certainty of grace, and the like, which were at first believed to be capital [issues] by the alleged Reformation, were explained by the Protestants in such a way that they seemed to differ from Catholic doctrine not so much in substance as in their wording. There remain, however, some fundamental points of faith that we consider to be established by the Catholic Church, concerning which these Protestant doctors avow to dissent from our [doctors]; furthermore, they are prone to declare that they will rather remain in Schism than to give in to the truth we believe in, which was – as we trust – expressly declared by the Church. In this respect, unless they change their minds or be clearer about their meaning, it seems difficult – not to say impossible – that, respecting our conscience, we accept them in the Church’s chest. 3) However, since this is liable to some explanation and distinctions, and in order not to appear as omitting some point held by the Catholic side, what we can somehow do without hurting our conscience in order to attain the high objective of peace in the Church, or at least in order to facilitate joining it, I will expound here my opinion in a slightly more articulated way – having been requested to do so by those who are in a position to decide on these issues. I pray to God that his grace prevent me to give up anything that can damage the Catholic faith, as well as not to refuse to concede anything that – observing the necessary precautions – the Catholics in one way or another concede, possibly contributing thereby to the salvation of souls. 4) I think, however, that the foundation for the whole negotiation consists in the true doctrine about the Catholic Church.b Once this doctrine is adequately explained, either the remaining controversies are defused or they can surely be eliminated in an assured way. Therefore, it is above

332

Chapter 35

all necessary to correctly instruct the Protestants about this doctrine, and that they subject themselves to the Catholic truth. Indeed, after the acknowledgment of the three-in-one (trinunus) and savior God and of the incarnated God, nothing is more necessary to be acknowledged than the authority of the Catholic Church, ruled by God with its Holy Ghost, and through which he wants us to be ruled. Thus, I believe that the fate of all this negotiation depends upon achieving success on this point. 5) Those who conceive the Church as nothing but a crowd of believers hold an inadequate conception of it, for a certain connection between [the believers] is required. And it is not sufficient to say that the church is an assembly (coetus), i.e., a crowd that shares something. It is necessary that, as in the City or Republic, the crowd be assembled in a single body as if united by a Spirit, forming a certain moral person. Just as men gathered in the market place in order to sell or buy, or in an amphitheatre in order to watch, or in temple in order to listen constitute an assembly but do not form a body, so too the believers, even if they are all equally under God’s gaze and are all in the same place, they do not thereby form the Catholic Church, unless something else be added. An assembly of believers differs from the Church as much as a disordered crowd gathered against an attack by an unexpected enemy differs from a regular army with its divisions, companies and legions under the orders of the Commander. Therefore, the Church is a sort of Theocracy or Sacred City, whose efficient cause is God, whose matter are all the believers under the supreme commander Christ, God and man, whose form of government consists in fundamental laws prescribed by divine law and, finally, whose end is the eternal happiness of its citizens. Consequently, the Church is the highest human thing, to be preferred over all others. 6) Therefore, one must hold the view that the Catholic Church must be visible and consist in a single government – which is prescribed by God. In order to understand better the form of this government and the fundamental laws of this divine Republic, one should know that, by the will of the Supreme Commander Christ, at present invisible, a certain Vicar power (Vicaria potestas) was left on earth, to whom the leaving Christ promised his Spirit. One should also know that only power has enough authority for men to fearlessly trust it in all those things that are related to the end of this Republic, i.e., eternal salvation. All believers, regardless of status and condition, owe their true obedience to that power; the disobedient can be deterred through the heaven’s keys that will be entrusted to the Church, by depriving them from the fruit of spiritual benefits in punishment for their obstinacy. The same Ecclesiastic power receives the gift (donum) of infallibility, so as to be

35. Judgment of a Catholic Doctor

333

directed by his Spirit in full truth in the way towards salvation. Furthermore, Christ commanded that his sacred body be perceived as the Symbol of unity and charity – like a password (tessera) of the faithful citizen who is a member of the mystical body whose head is Christ. Those who remain however, by their fault, outside such a communion are Schismatic, whereas those who obstinately do not accept some dogma of faith established by the Church must be considered entirely heretic. As for those who persevere in their stubbornness, they have no true love for God, nor charity for their neighbors, nor do they enjoy, as far as salvation is concerned, God’s grace or the Church’s Sacraments – thus remaining in the state of damnation. 7) But, although there is still controversy among the Catholic themselves about the supreme Vicar power in the Catholic Church, it is well-known that divine law established that that power would manifest itself in an Ecumenical Council representing the entire Church, presided – in virtue of the same law – by the Supreme Pontiff, i.e., the Bishop of the Christian world, i.e., the Bishop of Rome (Episcopus orbis Christiani primarius, nempe Romanus). Such a Council, when correctly held, is infallible in what concerns salvational faith,2 and must be obeyed by the believers. A divine decree has also determined that the Metropolite Bishop of the Christian World would be simultaneously the Bishop of all the Catholic Church and its ministering head, holding not only the primacy in order but also in power, in charge of undertaking all those acts needed for the preservation of the Church that can and must be properly performed without convening a general Council. Ordinary divine law, i.e., a rule of good order marvellously introduced in each Church, confers upon the remaining Bishops certain prerogatives inherent to their sacred functions and determines their pre-eminence over their clergy; similarly, the latter are distinguished from the laymen by a mark of ordainment and by the power to minister certain Sacraments. Thus, the foundation of Ecclesiastic Hierarchy is the sacred order, whose mark is bestowed through the Holy Ghost’s intervention on the occasion of the act of impositio manuum by he who has the right to perform it.3 In this, the line of succession must be preserved, so that, following the rule of order, no one be taken to be ordained unless in case he was ordained by those who, in turn, received from those who were correctly ordained – and so 2 3

The faith that brings about salvation, also called efficient faith. The ‘imposition of hands’ is an old ritual gesture symbolizing the transmission of a power or good one possesses. In Deut. 34,9, Moses ‘imposes his hands’ on Joshua thereby transmitting to him his power and authority. Among the apostles, the gesture implies the transmission of the Holy Ghost’s gift, namely, the capacity of expressing “the word” with eloquence and efficacy, Acts 8,17ff.; 19,6.

334

Chapter 35

on, up to the impositio manuum by the Apostles – the Holy Ghost and the power to perform the divine duties (res divina). In this way, it becomes apparent that the Church’s guidance is based on a succession through the Spiritual propagation of the shepherds. 8) These are the grounds of the Catholic doctrine about the Church. Those who do not accept them cannot, without offending its principles, be embraced by the fraternity or be admitted in the communion of our ceremonies. It follows that whoever wants to be a Catholic must sincerely welcome the following points regarding the Church: Firstly, that the Catholic Church is infallible in all those matters having to do with the faith required for salvation; secondly, that this infallibility manifests itself in an Ecumenical Council presided by the Roman Pope; thirdly, that the Roman pope has over the others, by divine law, the primacy not only of order but also of power; fourthly, that the clergymen, according to their [hierarchical] degrees, differ from the Laymen by divine law and by the sequence of ordainment; fifthly, that the Sacrament of the Eucharist is the password (tessera) of Christian unity; sixthly, that the power to absolve or condemn sins as well as of excommunication, which exists in the Church and is exercised by its Prelates and Ministers, has great influence upon the souls, and puts in a condition of eternal damnation those who deserved the Ecclesiastic verdict of damnation. 9) Let us assume that what we desire is achieved, namely that there is a very clear agreement with the Protestants regarding all the above points and, in general, about the essence of the [first] point about the Catholic Church. Once this is granted, I think that a large step towards reunification has been made, and I have great hope that such a laudable negotiation will be crowned with success. Since the parts sincerely submitted themselves to a certain visible judge of controversiesc whose judgment can be obtained, there will always be at hand a reason for eliminating completely dissension, as far as it is necessary to suppress it through a decision. Therefore, if the Protestants submit themselves to the Ecumenical Councils, we are in possession of an unquestionable solution to the controversy, be it by reference to decisions of previous Councils or by adjourning to a future general Council those issues that are known not be so far undecided. Thus, whenever a controversial [issue] remains between Catholics and those Protestants who, we assume, agree [with the procedure outlined], and no continuous tradition about it is available, what is needed is to examine it in the light of the factual question whether the proposition under dispute has been or not decided upon by an Ecumenical Council. In cases where further examination [of the controversial issue] is needed, since the relationship between those

35. Judgment of a Catholic Doctor

335

who disagree is not an easy one, one may appeal to the remedy of a new Council. However, such a remedy would be useless unless the parts agreed that the Council should be considered legitimate and Ecumenical – in which case one might reach an agreement with the Protestants referred to about the form of such a Council. For, in fact, every prudent person easily realizes that what those Protestant authors who in the past demanded a free Council meant by this – namely, a Council where not human authority prevailed, but the Holy Ghost’s [intention] as determined through the Sacred Scripture – would be a minimal condition sufficient for reaching a solution. In a Republic, besides the Law, a man is necessary, i.e., a judge, a living interpreter of the Law, who, based in the Law passes the sentence in the cause at hand and pronounces it; a man who, whether he decides correctly or not, is considered to have applied the law – otherwise there would be no end to litigations. Likewise, in the Sacred Republic instituted by God, besides the divine Laws and the Sacred Scripture, a judge of controversies capable of applying faith to [the decision] of a familiar case [under dispute] is needed. This judge – in contrast to lay judges – has received from God the great privilege of infallibility, so that we can follow without fear his judgment in all matters related to salvation, for without this privilege his judgment would be useless and indeed dangerous for salvation – a situation that would deprive the Sacred Republic from the binding force of a sure authority making it fall into anarchy. Therefore, the unityloving Protestants who, on the basis of the Augsburg Confession’s formula, call for a Christian Council, agree with us that what will have been formally decided, after a mature discussion and taking into account all the caution required by Christian prudence, by a vast majority of votes in a legitimate Council – i.e., a Council convened by the Supreme Pontiff and the most important Christian Princes – must be taken as the definition of the Council itself as dictated by the Holy Ghost, the supreme guide of the Church, if ever it takes place. Otherwise, if what has been said is rejected, all that has been said about the unity of the Catholic Church is in vain. 10) Thus, if that most Reverend Sir, using Imperial Authority vis-à-vis the Protestant German princes and others, could obtain the following: first, a decrease in the number of controversies, [followed by] the clearest possible expression, by the wise Protestant Theologians who are moderate and endowed with authority, of how far they can endorse those points which the Catholics consider as established; second, that the same Protestants commit themselves to a Legitimate Ecumenical Council about the controversies remaining after the exhaustion of the declarative

336

Chapter 35

Method;4 third, [that] the Protestants declare their opinion about the form and mode of the Council so as to make clear that they do not diverge from the Catholic principles, as far as the essentials are concerned. Once these capital points are obtained, I would think that an important achievement had been reached, and the value of its future results should not be underestimated, for the solid foundation of the Reunification had been erected, upon which, with God’s help, one day it might be possible to construct the building of the desired peace in the Church. 11) There will be, maybe, those who will wonder why one should deal again, in a new Council, with the issues already decided in the Council of Trent and others. But this scruple would not detain any prudent person, provided the rest was clear. For what is lawful, can be done without danger, and if done would be most fruitful for our souls, must in any case be done.d Why wouldn’t it be permitted to discuss once again matters already settled earlier, not with the intention of calling them into question, but of confirming and proclaiming them? I see here no danger because, if anyone would fear that this would lead to the opportunity to elude the Council’s authority, he would be afraid of something there is no reason to be afraid of. In fact, we assume that there is no difficulty whatsoever with those Protestants who commit themselves to a future Council regarding whether the authority of the Ecumenical Councils should be preserved, since it has already been pointed out that they must acknowledge this previously, i.e., before convening a new Council complying with their request. One can ask, however, whether certain Councils, whose determinations they [the Protestants] do not accept, are truly ecumenical and legitimately convened. We also assume that their objection to those very Councils is based not in de jure mistakes which violate the authority of the Councils or of the Church, but in factual mistakes, in so far as they deny that certain necessary conditions have been observed; this, in any case, is an issue previously raised, since it is well-known that also among the Catholics there is controversy about the authority of certain Councils. Thus, each time plausible reasons for doubting the determinations of some Council are adduced, especially by whole nations or large territories, there is nothing that forbids bringing the same issue to be dealt by a new Council. Certainly every prudent person acknowledges that there is a big difference between what an individual or a few demand and what is granted to nations and their highest authorities. Towards the latter one can indulge in many concessions in view of the magnitude of the expected results, provide these concessions 4

In a correction of the text, Leibniz replaces ‘declarative method’ by ‘expositive method’. For the method in question see the preceding paragraph.

35. Judgment of a Catholic Doctor

337

be licit. We know, indeed, that the [determinations] of the General Council of Lyon against the Greek [Church] were reconsidered in the Council of Florence – leaving aside other examples.e Therefore, I consider those who would strive to block such a great good (if indeed, as is assumed, there were serious hope of achieving it through a new Council) by means of an empty formality as ridiculous (absurdus), if not dishonest and distant from Christian charity. There is no reason for fear, for we Catholics should not fear that, in a new Council, the Holy Ghost amend the sentence it determined in an earlier Council or pronounce another sentence. 12) I believe that [the way towards the envisaged results] has been in fact cleared by the hypothesis that such results can be obtained from the Protestants. If this actually happens, I take it for certain that those to whom God trusted his Church will not lack the divine grace and the prudence required in order to moderate everything so that the Church cannot incur any damage. Therefore, so far the negotiations held by the Reverend Sir … deserve unrestricted praise and support, provided they remain within the outlined boundaries. To say the truth, however, I cannot hide that some persons divulge [the rumor] – which has been reported to me – that the Protestants with whom he dealt as if want somehow to keep some controversies out of the authority of future Councils, preventing them to be submitted to the Church’s rule and rather leaving them in permanent suspension – which is in fact a pact that the Pope himself could not underwrite. But such a desire by the Protestants would collide with the very principles of the Catholic faith regarding the Church, whose hands cannot be tied in such a way. Unless the Church itself considers that the issue can remain undecided and that it is not contained in the word divinely transmitted. That there are persons who make such demands is a sign that they do not understand the authority of the Church and of the Councils, and therefore that to announce new councils in order to satisfy them is useless. However, since this information is not trustworthy nor based on written material, but rather on rumors alone, and may have been the result of an illintentioned or incorrect interpretation, I prefer to suspend my judgment. Since I can observe that the Sir … has proceeded very circumspectly with the writings that reached me, I prefer to have the same opinion concerning those writings I did not see, rather than to indulge in unfounded suspicions. 13) Besides, I understand that in the ongoing negotiations between the Reverend and Illustrious Sir … and some Protestant Theologiansf another issue, even more important but dependent upon the earlier ones, has been raised: whether and how the Protestants who are ready to abbey

338

Chapter 35

by a future Council according to the rules established above can, in the meantime, be accepted within the Catholic Church’s communion by the Supreme Pontiff, while their theses are kept pending their final determination by the future Council. I think this issue deserves careful scrutiny and I prefer to listen to what Wise Men have to say about it rather than to proffer my own judgment. Yet, since I have to deal with it, I hope to have said that, rightfully, the issue comprises two faces: the one is to inquire what has been deliberated and deserves to be translated into practice; the other is to ask what is lawful absolutely speaking.g If things remain as they are, I doubt that the [result of the negotiations] might be easily translated into practice due to the excessive dissonance between the opinions and cults – unless the minds on both sides are adequately prepared. Meanwhile, since humankind is led by a few [leaders] and all these things follow the leaders – the king’s heart being in God’s hands, I would think that there is no reason for despair. For, if peace is restored to the Christian world and, with the concurrence of the Supreme Pontiff and the Great Emperor, some other powerful and wise princes were to join to it their energy and efficiency, it would be easy to obtain the assent of the main Theologians – whom the others usually follow – for [proposals] based on equity. Furthermore, if in an abstract and absolute way the question were raised, what is lawful, I would dare to say generally that, given that the spirits are sufficiently prepared, the supreme law of the Church is the salvation of the Christian people. And if once the Supreme Pontiff could judge according to the rules of Christian prudence, the great Western schism would be suppressed or greatly reduced – nothing of the kind being reasonably to be expected through any other way. If this is assumed, I would tend to think that entire Protestant Nations that would be willing to acknowledge again the complete Hierarchy of the Roman Catholic and Apostolic Church might be received within the communion, keeping some of their wrong opinions, provided they would promise in God that they as well as their theses would submit themselves to the legitimate future determination of an Ecumenical Council. 14) What inclines me towards the above belief is the following reason. Wherever what is at stake is the salvation of souls, I believe the Supreme Pontiff has in its power to do every thing that is not against natural law and the indispensable divine law. Hence, until the contrary is proven to me, I will be more in favour of the Pontiff’s power, especially when used for salvation purposes, than in favour of curtailing it without a compelling reason. Hence, I think that some saint fathers who made in the past mistakes that today – and rightly so – are considered to be heresies, were not in fact heretical because their contrary had not yet

35. Judgment of a Catholic Doctor

339

been determined by the Church. Thus, the Fourteenth Day believers in Asia and the Rebaptizers of the heretics in Africa were Saint persons h – among them St. Cyprian, not to mention others. Yet, those who after the Council of Nicaea held such beliefs were heretical, for what makes someone heretical is not the belief but the obstinacy. Furthermore, in order for someone to be considered obstinate and heretical, it is required not only that the contrary belief be determined by the Church, but also that this be established by the determination itself or that it be capable of being determined through [its] appropriate study. Thus, although Cardinal Bellarmine notes that in the last Lateran Council the Pontiff’s supremacy had been determined,i he does infer from this that the French and others that abbey by the Council of Basel are heretics, since he admits that they doubted that the Lateran Council had been ecumenical.j On their part, the French do not accuse the Roman Curia of heresy, because they know that the Curia does not admit the authority of the Council of Basel in the wake of the dispute between Pope Eugene IV and the Council. Examples of a similar procedure could be drawn from Ecclesiastic History. Thus, granting that the Protestants are mistaken, and that their error – given the state of things and minds – cannot be at present overcome; and that particularly they are not willing to bow to the determination of a Council whose Ecumenical authority they actually call into question; and that they admit, however, the authority of the Catholic Church and of the non-controversial Councils; and that they acknowledge the principles required for a future Council to bring the issue to an end; and therefore that they are prepared to submit and obey regarding the rest. Through such a concession, one can rightly hope to entirely eliminate, or at least to reduce, such a serious and regrettable wound in the Church. I think the Supreme Pontiff can, once everything is correctly prepared, welcome in the Church’s bosom those nations or provinces that feel like it – for the benefit to all souls is enormous and evident, whereas the loss is rather uncertain or null. What are the required preparations is up to the prudent men to decide – I have no doubt that the Most Reverend and Illustrious Sir … has wisely contributed to this [aspect] too. This is what I had to say about an extremely crucial matter such as this, respecting in all things the judgment of the prudent men and, above all, of the Saint Roman Catholic Apostolic Church itself, to which I willingly trust my possessions. The End. a

Leibniz refers here to the texts discussed at the conference of theologians held in Hanover in 1683: The Regulae of Rojas y Spínola, on the Catholic side, and the Methodus of Molanus

340

Chapter 35

and Barckhausen, on the Protestant side. Additional material pertaining to the irenic negotiations and Rojas y Spínola can be found in Chapters 8, 16, 20, 27, 33, and 37. b Notice that Leibniz is not saying ‘the true doctrine of the Catholic Church’. In fact, he is hinting at his earlier proposal (Chapter 8E) to redefine the term ‘Catholic Church’ in a more abstract, therefore more encompassing way, as the only real foundation upon which a true reunification can rest. See Chapter 26. c See Chapters 2, 8, and 33. d In this interesting formulation of a principle for action, Leibniz connects considerations of lawfulness, prudence and usefulness. e Council of Lyon, Second Session, 18 May 1274; Council of Florence, 1439-1445. The document referred to is the Bulla Unionis Graecorum “Laetentur Caeli” of 6 July 1439. Both councils dealt with the reunification of the Latin and Greek churches. The Council of Florence, attended by bishops from both sides, was recognized as a true ecumenical council, and yielded several agreements – which for the most part were not applied. f According to he Academy edition, Leibniz here refers once more to Molanus and Backhausen’s Method. In all likelihood this is also the method Leibniz is referring to in Chapter 16H. g A somewhat fancy way of repeating the distinction, already used in this text, between de facto and de jure, which emphasizes that a successful negotiation must deal with both, but mainly solve the problems raised by the first kind of issues. h In the first centuries of Christendom, the Fourteenth Day believers commemorated Easter on the 14th of Nissan, the day of the Jewish Passover holiday, rather than on the following Sunday; i.e., on the day of Christ’s death rather than on his resurrection day. The Rebaptizers opposed the tradition of accepting as valid the baptism performed by heretics, and demanded a new baptism for those thus baptized. This led to an intense conflict, especially in North Africa, where the Council of Carthage at the beginning of the third century approved that procedure. Tertullian,* in his On Baptism, defends the Rebaptizers’ position and St. Cyprian contests Pope Stephen’s authority on this matter and is condemned to death in September 257. i Lateran Council, session XI, 19 December 1516. j Bellarmine, Disputationes de controversiis christianae fidei adversus huius temporis haereticos, vol. II, De Conciliis et Ecclesia, book 2, chapter 18.

Chapter 36 PRESUMPTIONS AND FICTIONS IN LEGAL ARGUMENTATION Correspondence with Johannes Werlhof

Johannes Werlhof (1660-1711), a young jurist who obtained a chair at the University of Helmstedt thanks to Leibniz’s support, published in 1696 a Defense of Grotius’s* doctrine of ‘prescription’ in international law. Based on this doctrine, he launched an attack on Pierre Du Puy’s earlier (1655) defense of France’s claim to the kingdom of Bourgogne as against the rights of the Emperor – a topic that rose to the top of the international agenda in the 1690’s in the light of Louis XIV’s bellicose intentions vis-à-vis Germany. Werlhof sent his book to Leibniz on 23 June 1696, indicating that he would not object to obtaining a position as a professor of law which might be connected with some political job (A I 12 676). By mid-July, Leibniz responded briefly but favorably both to the book and to the request. This led to an intense correspondence between them from July to September, whose ostensive theme was the legal status of the rights of possession of land – in international as well as in internal relations. More specifically, what was at stake was the precise nature of the legal notions of ‘prescription’ and ‘usucaption’ (see note 2), as well as the conditions for their just and correct application. Needless to say that both Leibniz and Werlhof, however scholarly the juridical considerations they put forth, never lost sight of their political implications for the relations between Louis XIV and Germany. The framework of the discussion is Grotius’s natural law approach, which Leibniz held in great esteem. Nevertheless, he argues that, in the issue at hand, this approach is insufficient to settle all the problems, and must be combined with legislation capable of avoiding turning each case into a ‘perplex’ case of endless debate. Legislation, however, is not sufficient either, for most of the arguments involved are in fact based on presumptions that cannot be formalized by laws demanding unequivocal evidence and yielding conclusive proof.

341 M. Dascal (ed.), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. The Art of Controversies, 341–357. © 2006 Springer.

342

Chapter 36 Consider for example the principle that no one gives up willingly what belongs to oneself. Leibniz views it as a ‘natural presumption’. As such, it does not per se rule out the right a person that lives for a long time in a property abandoned by its original owner and makes proper use of the land – i.e., the property’s current ‘possessor’ – has to claim ownership (‘usucaption’). If to support this claim, however, ‘abandonment’ – understood as the ‘intention to abandon’ by the original owner – were to be proven, the usucaption claim could hardly be upheld, unless a formal declaration of such an intention had been made by the owner, for the identification of intentions is itself presumptive in nature. This clashes, however, with the acknowledged and just usucaption right, supported by other presumptions, which are spelled out by Leibniz in great detail. Ultimately, the solution to this ‘perplexity’ lies in the ability of the judge to assign carefully, in each case, the appropriate weight to each of the presumptive conclusions, so as to reach a reasonable and just conclusion. The legislator, in his turn, must provide the legal instruments capable of facilitating, rather than encumbering the judge’s task with ‘legal fictions’. Finally, jurisprudence – perhaps one should say the philosophy of law – must clarify the nature of the presumptions involved, their relative importance, and how the process of weighing all the arguments involved is to be conducted. It is in this last capacity that Leibniz, assisted in this by the penetrating objections of his protégé Werlhof, gives us here an amazing example of the complexities of the dialectics inherent in ‘juridical logic’ – which he considered the most advanced branch of the ‘new logic’ he sought to develop.

A. LEIBNIZ TO WERLHOF1 Date: July 1696 Edition: A I 12 691; GR 846 Language: Latin

Excerpt from the answer I received your letter along with the package containing a few copies of the book in defense of Grotius,a and disposed of them as you indicated; as for myself, I thank you for the gift. I see no reason why you should not be trusted with the Ordinary Professorship by the supreme court;b and if my opinion will be heeded to, I believe you must be granted the position you postulate for yourself. I will not hide this opinion whenever appropriate, and I hope it will not be in vain. 1

The complete version of this reply to Werlhof’s letter of June 23 1696 (A I 12 676-677) was not found, which is why the Academy edition provides only the available excerpt. Werlhof (item D below) replies to the complete letter.

36. Presumptions and Fictions in Legal Argumentation

343

Your Vindications of Grotius exemplifies [the quality] of your reflection, as well as of your knowledge. Since you seem to want to know what I think about this subject matter, I herebyc send you what I had occasionally commented about this topic in a disorderly way (so as not to forget it), and compiled from my notes with interpolated materials, in the hope to receive your evaluation, which I highly consider, etc.

B. LEIBNIZ TO WERLHOFd Date: 1687-1696? Edition: A I 12, 692-696; GR 842-846 Language: Latin

On the origin and legitimacy of prescription and usucaption2 Concerning the right of prescription and usucaption, I agree with the eminent Grotiuse that it does not originate only from civil law, but that also between nations, by virtue of right reason (recta ratio), the force of immemorial time is valid in order to oppose actions that are undertaken later. But I have to disagree somewhat with those who impute to someone an intention to abandon [a property] on the basis of its lack of use for a long period. For me, it is evident that one does lose a property by virtue of abandonment; yet, whether it was or not abandoned is a matter of fact, which it is difficult to prove. No one usually believes that a person throws away what belongs to her, unless she has explicitly expressed the intention to do so. Hence, a person who abandons for a long while possessions carelessly lost, even if she despairs from recovering them, should not be seen as having renounced them. Thus, in my view, most writers, misled by the example of civil law and custom, are more liberal than appropriate in granting this kind of alienation. The legislator, indeed, quite often resolves an issue within a community (suos) as if by a detour (aversio),f cutting a difficult knot with the sword, since this usually leads to less damage than engaging in the perplexity of [endless] discussion.g 2

A ‘prescription’ is a juridical instrument through which ownership of a property is legally withdrawn or granted on the grounds of abandonment by the owner and continued occupation by the possessor for a certain period of time. More specifically, ‘prescription’ refers to the loss of ownership by an owner who has foregone his duty to care for the property and to undertake legal action against occupiers. ‘Usucaption’ is the right to a property peacefully held for more than a stipulated period of time, which grants to the holder or ‘possessor’ of the property its legal ownership. The term ‘usucaption’ is equivalent to ‘acquisitive prescription’. For a discussion of Leibniz’s views on prescription and usucaption, largely based on the present text, see Grua (1956: 291-296).

344

Chapter 36

I often employ this principleh in reconciling civil laws with reason. Thus, it is not unusual that the law concocts (fingit) an intention to abandon that does not exist, in a way that is neither unjust nor improvident. But, since legislative authority is not in the hands of jurists inspired by natural law, the latter should not rely on fictions but rather on arguments. Whoever is knowledgeable about and attentive to his rights and does not take advantage of an opportunity to recover his possessions, can in fact be considered imprudent and negligent; but this does not allow one to think that he wanted to alienate his possessions, as long as it can be believed that, if asked, he would give replies other [than that he so desires]. If we proclaim that the punishment for neglect is the loss of the property, then we give up the cause concerning abandonment. For this reason, to put it frankly, it has always seemed to me that the weight of time in the transfer of possessions between those who abide solely by the right of reason (jus rationis) should not be determined by the intention to abandon – which is usually inexistent. Rather, it should be assessed by some more determinable effect of the long time elapsed, like the obscurity in which the past is surrounded – for the delay in acting increases the likelihood that the possessor will lack arguments to defend his right against the claims of the plaintiff.3 For, if there were no obscurity, I would think that no more action should be accorded than if the affair had been concluded the day before yesterday. Finally, I think it is correct to distinguish between immemorial time [as such] and the fact that, by force of its antiquity, it suppressed the memory of things or obscured it. In this respect, the assessment of the quantity [of time] differs significantly in private and public affairs, since in the former knowledge vanishes easily, whereas in the latter it is kept in chronics and archives. It is well known that sometimes men eagerly divulge the performance of actions they attribute to themselves, whereas – due to the death of knowledgeable witnesses – the information through which their intention could be inferred is lost. And the plaintiffs (actores), even those who unintentionally contributed by their negligence and inaction to the deterioration of the position of the defendants (conditio reorum), should [be considered as] suffering rather than causing damage. Thus, ordinary people, perceiving by natural light that which in the prescription is just, use to request that the indolent plaintiffs explain why they have done nothing for so long. I think that, for this reason, usucaptions and prescriptions originated more in the laws than in the presumed will to abandon – which, although conceived by very wise men, run against common sense. I prefer to believe that the legislators have rather induced than discovered abandonment. Accordingly, in order to punish those culpable of delaying and to warn men about their duty, they stipulated 3

The delay in question (mora agendi) consists in a juridically determined delay in performing a certain obligation or action.

36. Presumptions and Fictions in Legal Argumentation

345

deadlines for everyone to understand that, as much as they want to preserve their rights, if they don’t act in time they will be considered as having abandoned [the property] by virtue of that kind of presumption against which no contrary proof can be adduced – [a presumption] that hardly differs from a fiction.i Furthermore, where no guilt is found, it is evident that the reason of the fortuitous or accidental must be considered (as often happens in law), so that the plaintiff (actor) should not be heard merely by virtue of the obscurity due to antiquity, even if he provides arguments; this, in case one can justly fear that the counter-arguments by means of which the defendant (reus) would support his objections (exceptio) would have vanished by the time he is called. Since this is something whose assessment is extremely hard (perplexus), the juridical authorities did not condemn the decision of such an issue by establishing a time limit, by means of a sort of detour (aversio), an action being excluded.j According to Grotius, the same thing was accepted by nations in remote antiquity.k I believe, however, that where there are no established laws or customs and things are regulated by natural law alone, each person’s right is preserved; yet, only at the expense of being quite often unable to find a solution, the opposed plea (exception) of delay being excluded, hence also the plea of damage caused (which is uncertain but easy to admit) by whom is responsible for the obscurity to the part that, by delaying, prevents the other part from using arguments that, under other conditions, might have been sufficient.l To be sure, there is assessment of uncertain damages, e.g., of [one’s] expectations; furthermore, someone who deprives a person from an uncertain future expectation must undoubtedly be judged as having caused damage – the same being true of someone who renders trust in the past useless. The culpability for this fact should be attributed [to someone], whether it resulted from negligence or malevolence, or else from malchance: e.g., when the plaintiffs’ arguments reach the defendant too late, it would be unjust to punish the defendant for the lasting lack of opportunity for the plaintiff [to inform the defendant of his rights]. This truth is confirmed by the fact that it holds also in [more] recent events: when unfortunately the defendant lacks means of defence, the assessment of the resulting obscurity should not be neglected, especially if the case is doomed to failure by an innocent plaintiff. It has been correctly said that the remedies of usucaptions and prescriptions have pleased legislators as a means to terminate litigations and to bring about the end of uncertainty regarding property rights – and this conforms to our arguments, if we calculate properly (si bene computemus). For, if ancient things could be all the time unearthed, men would always spend an agitated life and would be constantly involved in perplex controversies. This is also the reason why transactions and the authority of the judged thingsm should not be retractable. In the meantime, however,

346

Chapter 36

there is no sufficiently distinct accepted account of this matter. In general, one should favour the defendant and the possessors against the plaintiffs: litigations and those who move actions are hateful and it is believed that the possessor – especially a long standing one – has acquired possession legitimately, unless there is evidence to the contrary. If, however, it is apparent that the plaintiff bases [his claim] on a sure ground, then the advantage turns to his favour, for when the defendant makes use of a plea he plays the role of a plaintiff. Therefore, the correct ministration of justice does not consist in suppressing quarrels, but rather – assuming that men abide by charity – either in anticipating those quarrels that will arise or else in concluding maturely those that have already arisen through the restitution of property. The objective is to prevent hate and the reasons thereof to grow, and thus to avoid the need for serious remedies against a spreading evil; the worse of these remedies is a trial (sensus), as when a fracture has not been properly welded and the surgeon has to break it open again. No doubt men feel more unpleasantly the lack of things to which they are accustomed, upon which they have built their arguments (rationes). Thus, to deprive at some point later innocents from a property earlier usurped is a kind of punishment that deeply humiliates. And vice-versa, those who recover things their ancestors had lost resemble, once they obtain what they most easily would dispense with, those who strive to make profit: both seem to have found a treasury. Grotius’s remark that long-lasting possessors have conserved their possessions through their care is not unimportant; although these possessors have thereby received fruits, in the light of the uncertainty of human affairs, their lot was superior to that of those whose ability or luck was comparable to those things that deserve to be preserved due to the fruits they bear by themselves. Thus, the possessor can in general exact from the demander (revindicans) acting after a long time quite a lot, on the basis of his and his family luck, work, and expenses. The reason for this is that, if one adds to a plea concerning the obscuring delay – which is thereby unfavourable to the defendant and is by itself efficient – a plea concerning the services provided and the undeserved calamity [about to hit] the defendant, natural reason shows that the action can hardly succeed, although it is clearly grounded in the laws in force. All of this was justifiably considered by the legislators in order to avoid with one hit those assessments that would hardly yield any result, once the action is rejected. Likewise, nations can be persuaded to decide to repel those who agitate the obscurities of the past. What has been decided by nations, however, is a matter of fact, about which one should discuss more. No doubt, some authorities must resist the more to the armies reclaiming obsolete rights and do not admit arbiters or conciliators the more they are dangerous because, in addition, the evils of war are usually increased by war itself and spread to the neighbors. Hence,

36. Presumptions and Fictions in Legal Argumentation

347

up to this day, in the law of nations there are stronger grounds (ratio) for favoring the possessor than in civil law, because in a well-ordered city perplex controversies are terminated more easily. Nevertheless, if a prince wants to verify the right of the ancestors with the help of experts, I don’t think that he should be repelled by appealing to the sole prescription of the time elapsed, provided, among the pleas, the above mentioned inconveniences due to the legally recognized lag (mora) are taken into account. All of these factors can be included in the category of natural prescription or the right against an action originating in the perplexity due to the time elapsed. In order for this work to be further grounded and to be clearer how far it must proceed through the careful examination of reasons, I enjoin the experts to show this with zeal and solid argument. Frequently we observe that iniquity musters the support of time, against which our empire is more interested in resisting than the French, who hardly have against us [the evidence] required to object to the prescription.n Charlemagne certainly does not belong to them other than by having also been their lord.o

C. WERLHOF TO LEIBNIZ4 Date: 14 July 1696 Edition: A I 12 713-715; GR 846-848 Language: Latin Your letters have always been very agreeable to me, especially the last one, to which you attached a magnificent and erudite example of your extremely ingenious reflections on a theme I have also dealt with.5 Since this reminds me of the fact that you have dealt with many issues of natural law and the law of nations – which you yourself describe as circumstantial writings,6 whereas I consider them illustrious and erudite works – I cannot refrain from telling you how much I would like to see, read and carefully weigh everything of this sort you have produced. I wouldn’t dare to implore you – which I strongly desire to do – to communicate to the literary world or at least to me a little more of your reflections about a number of selected issues. No doubt, it is obvious that, in those matters in which the power of

4

Grua publishes a salutation not included in the Academy edition: “Illustrious and most Honorable Sir and Great Protector”. The Latin term used is patronus, which can also mean “lawyer”. ‘Protector’ might be more suitable because Werlhof obtained a chair of Law at the university of Helmstedt by virtue of Leibniz’s recommendation (GR 842n). 5 Text B above. 6 Leibniz refers to his own observations as “written in the midst of the turmoil” (tumultuaria scriptione) in the letter accompanying the De praescriptione (Text A above).

348

Chapter 36

your mind is more penetrating and your contemplation of things deeper, the least [of your contributions] provides a most fecund handle for other topics that must be investigated more thoroughly. But, since you ask for my opinion in general about what you sent me, I repeat first what I have recently stated; second, regarding in particular the topic under discussion, I add that I have proved many things, though there remain doubts in a few questions. What you say about the factual question regarding the abandonment (derelictio) of something is correct, and I accept it. Perhaps, however, one should call into question not this kind of fact as such, but only in so far as, while interpreting it, one has the opportunity of discovering a certain rule of natural equity – which is not far from your principles. But this is controversial, namely, whether anyone can be assumed to abandon what belongs to him, unless he expressly manifested his intention to that effect. I would like to dwell on this. It is known that consensus, however indicated and accepted, has the power of transferring the right [of property]. But there are signs of consensus other than letters and words. The rule is: no one is presumed to abandon what belongs to him. But rules have exceptions, and I don’t know whether a mere fiction can account for the exceptions here. One thing is a fiction that springs arbitrarily from the human will; another, a presumption that arises from natural conjectures. It seems incompatible with the intelligence of a prudent and honest man that a knowing and discussing person, who is aware of his rights, will not take advantage of the occasion to recover [his] things, and that [he], after a very long time extending beyond human memory, create difficulties for the bona fide possessors. It should be assumed that someone does not want what a good and prudent man does not want, for the contrary would be opposed to natural equity – hence, the latter can neither be presumed nor expected. Furthermore, it is not necessary either to degrade (delabi) oneself to the point of demanding that in such cases a punishment for neglect be established, for this follows from the natural presumption and equity.p Since it is beyond doubt that there is no precise science (liquida scientia) of the mind’s inner sense, there is no entirely sure knowledge about whether something can be considered to have been abandoned. Indeed, human knowledge of human desires does not proceed according to sure science, but rather according to interpretation; and even through writing one does not understand with certainty what our will declares, but rather only what it indicates with verisimilitude. Hence it is not evident how one can infer the intention of not abandoning [a property] as well as other things, as long as this intention has not been verbally proclaimed [and understood] according to rules of correct interpretation from probable signs. Furthermore, the same thing can sometimes be based on several grounds, especially if under different influences. I was delighted with your

36. Presumptions and Fictions in Legal Argumentation

349

philosophical reflections, stemming from the innards of things, about the plea of an obscurity-causing delay (mora obscuratrix). I would only add, regarding [your] final words, that, were someone to argue that the ambition of establishing borders as well as of stretching them (relying upon a prescription that is invalid among free peoples) should be rather restricted than infinitely expanded, I do not think that this is in any way incompatible (repugnans) with the solid and genuine reasons of our empire.7 Doubtless, in most issues raised against the French, there are enough arguments without the need to appeal to the prescription in question. It may be helpful, however, to add to these a further argument – namely, how far the French violate their professed position against the prescription. For example, once any piece of land is ceded to them, they immediately contend that whatever can be linked to this piece of land on the grounds of some retrospective memory belongs to it today. [The French attitude] is well known not only through the disputes – so far harmless – about Carolingian law (which presumably does not favour neither the Germans nor the French), but also through the recent cases of Alsace and other places. These are the main things that came to my mind in reading your very erudite writing – things about which I would like to learn more. Forgive me, Sir, the liberty I have taken and the precious time of yours I have consumed with my letter. P.S. Please, pass the included letters to Mr. Böhmer,q if it doesn’t disturb you.

D. LEIBNIZ TO WERLHOF Date: 17 July 1696 Edition: A I 12 740-741; GR 848 Language: Latin To Mr. Werlhof, Professor of Law in Helmstedt Very noble man and honorable supporter, I have immediately taken care of your letters to Mr. Bőhmer. I understood what things you wish to conclude; my congratulations for the deserved appointment; I pray that you continue for a long time to serve the republic in that dignified position.8 7

Clearly a reference to the Holy Roman Empire, which shifts the discussion to the politically pressing problem of French ‘imperialism’. 8 This paragraph is omitted by Grua.

350

Chapter 36

It is exactly as you suspect. I am in the habit of writing down sometimes the little thoughts that arise casually so that they do not vanish.r They remain in this form, in loose cards still unordered. I have often taken the decision to order them; but, besides my daily occupations, the bulk of the cards prevented this so far. Nevertheless, I will have at some point to overcome this difficulty. Therefore, I do not object to showing you those pieces that deal with juridical and cognate matters, in order to be evaluated in the light of the fruit of my [work]. I am glad that [my] last draft has not displeased [you] entirely. I acknowledge with pleasure that the mind expresses itself not only through words but also through sufficient signs.s How much is sufficient is a matter of fact, but how to define it is the task of reason. Thus, except for the laws (i.e., when natural law is considered), this issue belongs to the jurisdiction of logic. When we inquire about human intentions, everyone can interrogate himself about the reasons whence the intention to alienate something springs. If men acted always rationally, anyone who would not take advantage of an occasion should be taken to be unwilling. However, very often we do nothing, due to imprudence, neglect, lassitude, procrastination, hope, or fear, so that in such cases it is not proper to attempt to judge whether someone wants what a prudent man wants. An omission may be punished, [but] it does not seem to me to be compatible with natural law to make believe (fingi) that what someone ought to have wanted can be said to be what he wanted or rather that it can be believed that he did not want some belonging of his because he did not display enough prudence in pursuing his right. Every presumption of what is false (which is ordinarily called a legal and de jure [presumption] and usually believed not to admit contrary proof) is a fiction. I do not admit fictions in natural law. The laws disallow them straightforwardly, by virtue of the principle of aversion (principium aversionis).t Therefore, it always seemed to me [necessary] to endeavour resolutely to adumbrate some elements of natural law. I am not as enclosed (complector) in my views as to neglect the opinions of the experts like you. Hence, if you are ready to teach me something, you will find in me a docile pupil. I think that the extension of the prescription is more useful than damaging for the French, as is usually the case with usurpers, who hope to be able, with time, to legitimate initially unjust actions. As for the rest, be well and prosper.

E. WERLHOF TO LEIBNIZ Date: 4 August 1696 Edition: A I 13 207-208; GR 849

36. Presumptions and Fictions in Legal Argumentation

351

Language: Latin Magnificent and most noble Sir, most respected Sir and Patron, I gladly acknowledge what you announce with pleasure, adding the benevolent wish that I can take for accomplished that which I have desired. The more so since I am sure I have benefited from your support in this matter. I am afraid, however, that the matter is not similarly free of impediments in the Palace of Wolfenbütel and elsewhere. Everyone desirous of the development of the studies of moral, civil and juridical questions is interested in providing for the compilation and ordering of your reflections on these topics, based on those dispersed notes [you have mentioned]. In so far as I am concerned, I will be obliged with a remarkable benefit, if you, dearest patron, send me some of your reflections, and I implore you vehemently to do so, provided you could do it without inconvenience and sorrow. Of course I will keep whatever part of [your notes] you send me as a treasury. Turning now to the problem at hand,9 I am pleased to briefly add that I entirely agree that one should pursue its careful examination and that I have occasionally explored, in connection with this, the mental disposition of each person. I came upon convincing arguments to the effect that not every presumption of abandonment is false. Indeed, if a presumption of this kind is true, then that which is thus presumed cannot be taken as a fiction.u I agree that that which is presumed in this way should not be considered as what is called a presumption of right and de jure. I wanted only to make room, in case of doubt, for natural conjectures, which – as far as I can see – are really very different from fictions, although in general they can mislead. Human affairs, however, must yield a solution; hence, whenever it is not possible to obtain clear knowledge (liquida notitia) of that which is hidden in the mind, the conjectures must be bent towards the more favorable side. Now, longlasting possession (possessio) is more favorable to the case than the neglected ownership (dominium) of the property for a very long time, perhaps even immemorial,v following those principles that you very ably and with a wealth [of arguments] deduced in the analysis you just sent to me.10 I have already received Mr. Böhmer’s reply to my letters. I like him for his high intelligence and his remarkable desire for true erudition. Nowadays, 9

Grua’s edition of E begins at this paragraph. Grua adds here an interesting annotation by Leibniz, not included in the Academy edition: “If we give weight to arguments not on the basis of their force but on the basis of the cause’s interest, then this is fiction. One thing is what can be concluded from various arguments, another, from the passage of time alone, which I would like to have been shown to be a sufficient argument. If it [the passage of time] is in the interest of the cause, let us help it [the cause] with the causes of its interest, not with invalid reasons”.

10

352

Chapter 36

minds that are motivated in their studies only by the passion of knowledge itself are rare. Therefore, he deserves the support of all good persons, so that his case (ratio) be taken into account in the transformation of academic institutions that seems to us imminent.w Be well, and continue to help this friend of yours.

F. LEIBNIZ TO WERLHOF Date: 7 August 1696 Edition: A I 13 209-210; Grua 849-851 Language: Latin Very noble Sir and very erudite and honored follower Since some time ago it seemed to me that the Chancellor of Wolfenbütel had a very good opinion of you, I expected that that palace would not differ from others in honoring you.11 Regarding my meditations about the sources of law, I have endeavored to elaborate certain overarching chapters from which the actions and pleas themselves could be derived.x For, those who have so far written about natural law appear not to have treated this matter in such a way that it permits to demonstrate black on white whether and to what extent an action is to be undertaken. The further elaboration of these chapters would be useful for putting together the precepts of Roman and common law. In fact, the legislators, departing here and there from natural reason’s cunning (akribeia), correctly discern certain things in view of [providing] an easier solution as if through a detour (aversio). I see in the mentioned chapters, which are sort of instantiations of natural jurisprudence, a certain inherent order that flows elegantly. For this reason I await for some leisure in order to polish these writings which have been so far only roughly laid down. There are two questions raised by the issue under discussion: the one is whether there can in fact emerge conjectures sufficient for implying the alienation of a thing that has been abandoned for a long time – which I did not deny; the other is whether, in general, from the mere long-lasting cessation one can infer the intention to abandon [a property], at least with a probability which is sufficient for making a pronouncement – which doesn’t seem to me to be the case, and I rather think it is up to the person who so claims to prove it. If such a proof (probatio) is unavailable, then one must say that a general prescription about the remoteness of time of the presumed 11

Paragraph omitted by Grua.

36. Presumptions and Fictions in Legal Argumentation

353

abandonment should not be built by natural law – otherwise it becomes a fiction, which we allow legislators to hold, but not to natural law legal advisors. You correctly state that there must be a solution in human affairs. But I do not go along with your proposal that conjectures supporting the more favorable part be brought to the fore when clear knowledge (liquida notitia) – to which I add: sufficiently valid to make a pronouncement – is not available; unless, as I will shortly argue, you explain. For, if we give weight to arguments not on the basis of their force, but on the basis of the cause’s interest, we are already within the genus fiction. It is convenient, in natural law, to call a spade a spade:12 if the cause is of interest, let us help it on the basis of the causes of its interest, rather than with invalid arguments.y I concede that one might demand a better grounding (ratio) of the weaker conjectures, based on the nature of the object – not, as people often ask for, in hidden matters, but rather in matters of high risk such as public safety.z It belongs to the task of a prudent man to follow, in important affairs, that which is safer, even though it is not the most likely (verisimilis). I also concede that arguments that are weak if taken one by one may acquire force due to their sole conjunction. More generally stated, let us say conjoined conjectures have no sufficient force, adding that the advantages of the cause separately considered are not sufficient too. I claim, however, that it may be the case that, putting together the arguments that are insufficient to prove (invalida probandi) and the insufficient advantages, from the combination of the conjectures and the advantages a sufficient ground emerge for the judge to make a justified (cum ratione) pronouncement – not quite of what is true but of what is equitative, and as if to be surrogated.aa Indeed, the judge’s task includes this kind of fiction, namely that the res judicata be taken as true – although here there is not really a fiction. Nevertheless, the legal advisor (jurisconsultus) must provide the judge with the rules capable to help him to judge and to attribute to each thing its weight, or at least, based on an example of juridical logic, to provide him with a method which he can make use of [in the cases] brought before him. In the question we are discussing, it seems to me that, in general, the arguments adduced in order to prove alienation are fragile, whereas the arguments in favor of the possessor (possidens) or (if you prefer) against the adversary are usually valid. When the judge makes a pronouncement in favor of the possessor (possessor), generally on the grounds of the causes of the advantage expounded by you and me, he hardly should be moved by the arguments for alienation. In general, however, a rule of temporal prescription should not be established by natural law; rather, the matter should be left, for the reasons adduced, to the religion the judge abides by.bb 12

scapham scapham nominare, ‘to name a boat a boat’.

354

Chapter 36

The fiction that indications (indicia) per se invalid are sufficient in hidden matterscc (which I know has not been sufficiently argued for by you) has caused damage to many innocents. Under this pretext, extremely violent torture was often used, and countless men and women, as if convinced of [practicing] magic, died a cruel death. This is vigorously shown, among others, by the well-known author of Cautionis criminalis, the Jesuit Friedrich Spee – which I heard from the mouth of Most Eminent Prince Johann Philip, Elector of Mainz.dd There are in the writings known to be by Father Spee things of which one can infer this, though I would not have noticed them without this Indication. He was a man of such knowledge and virtue that I consider him to be among the most important and most likeable of his order. I wanted to add in passing these remarks because I think that you will like to know them. Besides, everyone realizes that the above conclusion is absurd, since it is difficult to demonstrate, and therefore it could be readily blocked; for it would be the same as eliminating the advantage of the defendant due to the mere obscurity of the matter rather than increasing it. I admit that, whenever the republic is in great danger it is sometimes necessary that the innocents suffer, so to speak, the punishment of their helplessness. This is why I have taken into account, in my juridical writings, both good and bad fortune. We should also act in order to mitigate as much as possible the necessary evil. Be well and prosper. P.S. I value highly Mr. Böhmer’s multifaceted erudition, and I have no doubt that, once spread out,13 it will be praised in your surroundings. In natural law too one must distinguish between de jure truth and a de facto execution that is at arm’s reach and is actually achievable. Thus, in spite of the long lasting possession, the Right remains, grounded on the principles of natural jurisprudence – even though it is very often rendered useless in view of the objection of the obscuring delay and similar ones; as a result, the action becomes ineffective in the light of the difficulty of evaluation [even when] the matter is trusted to the arbitrage of a trustworthy person. a

J. Werlhof’s Vindiciae Grotiani dogmatis de praescriptione inter gentes liberas … contra Petrum Puteanum, Helmstedt, 1696. The book undertakes to refute Pierre Du Puy’s Du droit du Roy au royaume de Bourgogne contre les pretentions des Empereurs d’Allemagne (in Du Puy, Traitez touchant les droits du roy tres-chretien, Paris, 1655). Du Puy had argued in favor of France’s claim to be the rightful successor of Charlemagne in the kingdom of Bourgogne, rejecting the application – in this as well as in other cases of

13

The text has spartam. We decided to read this as sparsam ‘spread out’, ‘disseminated’. In Latin texts ‘s’ and ‘t’ are often exchanged.

36. Presumptions and Fictions in Legal Argumentation

355

international relations – of the claim of ‘prescription’ (see note 2). Werlhof, based on Grotius, upholds the Emperor’s claim of prescription, in the interest of peace. b Werlhof had applied for this position at the University of Helmstedt. c The remittance in question corresponds to B below. d This text, a version of which was sent by Leibniz accompanying the letter in A, is an elaborate discussion of prescription and usucaption, probably written by Leibniz much earlier, rather than as a comment on Werlhof’s book he just received, as Grua suggests. The Academy edition in fact contests Grua’s suggestion on the grounds that the content similarities between Leibniz’s and Werlhof’s texts can be accounted for by their same departure point, namely Grotius. Furthermore, Leibniz was familiar with Du Puy’s book as early as 1669, and one of the arguments in his text (see text to note L) has as its background a letter of Grotius to his brother, first published in his Epistolae in 1687 (letter 738 of the Appendix), which Leibniz quotes in 1689. There are two manuscripts of the present text, by the hand of the same secretary. They are slightly different, indicating that Leibniz corrected the first. The version corrected by Leibniz – probably the one sent to Werlhof – has not been retrieved. e H. Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis, 1625, book II, chapter 4. This chapter is entirely devoted to the topic of usucaption and prescription. Its full title is worth having in one’s mind while reading Leibniz’s present text: “On presumed abandonment, by virtue of which one takes hold of something; and on the difference between the right of property thus acquired and the right of usucaption or prescription”. f See note j. g Leibniz devoted much work to a particular kind of ‘hard cases’ which he dubbed ‘perplex cases’ (casus perplexus): Disputatio de casibus perplexis in Jure (A VI 1 231-256). He defines ‘perplexity’ as a logical situation in which it is impossible to reach a conclusion due to the circularity engendered by the fact that each position overruns the other in some respect. A French translation and commentary of this difficult text by Pol Boucher is forthcoming. h Presumably, this is the just mentioned need to avoid ‘perplexity’. i A presumption of this kind, called praesumption juris de jure, consists in the establishment of fixed delays for moving an action, appealing of a sentence, etc. Acknowledged as arbitrary procedural steps intended to allow for the proper administration of justice, these delays in principle admit no extension, under no circumstances. j certo constituto limite velut per aversionem. The notion of ‘aversion’ has a long legal history, much richer than transpires from its common usage here. Its earlier occurrence refers to the prohibition of transferring ownership of one’s land to a foreign citizen or power. Grotius (referring to Cicero’s De offic. Book 2, Chap. XII) points out that this idea is in fact found in one of the laws of the Twelve Tables – the earliest document of Roman law – that established that one keeps eternally one’s right of property vis-à-vis a foreign possessor: “against an enemy, eternal authority”, adversus hostem aeterna auctoritas (Leibniz may not have known this note by Grotius, presumably published for the first time in the 1746 translation of Grotius’s book by Jean Barbeyrac – Le droit de la guerre et de la paix par Hugues Grotius, Bâle, 1746, vol. 1, p. 263). Leibniz drives here a parallel between the legislator’s drive to settle legally issues of ownership in civil and public (especially international) laws, be it by forbidding or by regulating prescription, as being both motivated by the need to prevent endless debate in these potentially explosive issues. He thus heeds to Grotius’s warning that, if the ‘principle of aversion’ is admitted, “it will ensue that … there will be no end to the disputes concerning the kingdoms and their

356

Chapter 36

borders” (Grotius, ibid., p. 264). Notice that the parallel mentioned is what accounts for Leibniz’s use of the expression suos in the former use of ‘aversion’. k H. Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis, book II, chap. 4, par. 9. Grotius here raises the conjecture, for which he provides some historical evidence (see his note to this paragraph, in Barbeyrac’s translation, vol. 1, p. 271), that – contrary to the ancient ‘principle of aversion’ – legislators, already in the remote past, realized the danger for peace among nations in not allowing prescription (and hence usucaption), and adopted an international law establishing this right under certain conditions. l The complex scheme used in this argument is based on the logic of ‘but’ (cf. Dascal 2003c: Chapter 6). m Known as the “res judicata principle”. n See note a. The following ironic reference to who actually ‘owns’ Charlemagne makes fun of the main argument of Du Puy for France’s right to Bourgogne. o A note by an unknown hand is added at the end of the manuscript: “The objections of a perplexity harmful to me that is caused by your delay in acting, of a disaster I do not deserve, of the right to a thing owned by me for a long time, impressed the legislators and led them to introduce the temporal prescription, holding the indolent plaintiff, in most cases, as a negligent [person] to be punished”. p Werlhof seems here to be elucidating the nature of the presumption in question, “not to will that which a good and prudent man does not will”. On the one hand, it is a valid presumption, he argues, because its opposite would be contrary to natural equity. On the other hand, however, it should not be confused with a necessary principle of justice, which would require legislation and the consequent stipulation of punishment in case it is violated. q Justus Henning Böhmer (1674-1749), Hanover jurist, founder of Protestant canonic law. Professor in Halle and advisor of Frederic the Great. Author of Jus ecclesiasticum protestantium (1714) and Corpus juris canonici (1747). r See Chapter 18, in fine. s On ‘sufficient’ and ‘visible’ signs, see Chapter 33. t See note j. u Werlhof makes here a subtle distinction between the presumption as such and its content or application. v The classical opposition mentioned here is that between possession (materially holding a property for a significant period of time) and dominium (ownership of a property certified by a juridical title issued by a competent authority). w Werlhof is here heavily hinting that Leibniz might help, like he had helped him, with a recommendation (and perhaps more) in favor of Böhmer, who was a candidate for a chair of mathematics in Helmstedt. x Leibniz was working at the time on a sort of combinatory of legal actions, pleas, replicas, etc. (cf. GR 673-677). For an analysis of this project, see Boucher (Forthcoming). y See note 10. z The ‘hidden matters’ Leibniz is referring to here are crimes such as adultery, for which usually there is no direct, conclusive evidence. In such cases – which Leibniz extends to more important public matters – it is necessary to make use of a more sophisticated theory of proof, capable of taking into account the relative weight of each element of evidence to be put on the scales. When Leibniz lists a whole hierarchical typology of proofs in NE (4.16.5), he shows his familiarity with the long tradition of penal law that dealt extensively with this issue, including the founder of Saxon penal law, Benedict Carpzov (1595-1666; Jurisprudentia forensis romano-saxonica, Leipzig, 1668), Matthias Berlich (1586-1638;

36. Presumptions and Fictions in Legal Argumentation

357

Conclusiones practicabiles secundum divi augusti constitutiones saxonicas, Arnheim, 1664), and many others. In this respect, the following passage of Everhardus is worth quoting: “…furthermore, this is useful to prove hidden crimes, such as theft, adultery, conspiracy and similar ones, which are usually performed in a concealed way. Indeed, in acts such as these and alike, probable indices and strong presumptions are sufficient …” (N. Everhardus, Loci argumentorum legales, 1525, p. 10). Pol Boucher has called our attention to this rather neglected aspect of Leibniz’s background. aa Surrogation consists in the judicial replacement of a thing or person by another. In the present context, the idea is that the judge’s declaration or even his verdict can be later modified. Notice that Leibniz is here presenting several reasons that, though permitting a judicial ‘pronouncement’ about the case, and thus satisfying the need to reach solutions in civil litigations, in fact weaken its grounds so as to make it apparent that the inferences that lead to the decision are very far from conclusive ones. bb Leibniz here points out that there is no formal procedure in natural law to establish the time span for a prescription. This renders the decision on such issues a matter of exercising judgment and weighing the factors involved. But why to appeal to the judge’s religion as a relevant (and perhaps decisive) criterion of judgment in this case? cc See note z. dd Friedrich Spee von Langenfeld (1591-1635), Cautio criminalis seu de Processibus contra Sagas liber, Rinteln, 1631. Leibniz mentions Spee favorably on several occasions (e.g., the Plus ultra, A VI 4 682; the Preface to Novissima Sinica; D IV 1 78-83).

Chapter 37 THE ‘METHOD OF ESTABLISHMENTS’ To Thomas Burnett of Kemeny

This letter portrays how Leibniz’s mind is busy, at any given moment, with a wide variety of interests and projects. In this particular moment, however, he seems to be especially excited by various concurrent things in which he is actively involved. He is giving the last touch, prior to publication, to his book Novissima Sinica. Historiam nostri temporis illustratura (1697), a major comprehensive study of Chinese culture and science – which he believes to pave the way for the realization of his vision of a culturally unified ‘grand Europe’, as well as for the proper understanding of the true natural theology.a Concomitantly, after the interruption of the negotiations with the Catholics following Rojas y Spínola’s death (see Chapter 35), he takes part on a new track of unification efforts, focused on bringing together all the Protestant denominations – including the Anglican Church (see Chapter 40). His ongoing interest in the religious negotiations is amply reflected in this letter. At the philosophical front, impressed by Locke’s Essay, Leibniz seeks to engage in a fruitful dialogue with him. Furthermore, in the wake of the publication in 1695 of his New system for explaining the nature of substances and their communication, as well as the union between soul and body, which provoked an unexpectedly harsh public reaction by his correspondent and friend Foucher, he pursues the elaboration of the fundamental notion of ‘simple substance’, which becomes the cornerstone of his later ‘monadological’ metaphysics. Politically, the reported completion of his history of the House of Brunswick announces that the Hanover days are likely to be replaced by more exciting London days, of which Leibniz already anticipates the intellectual pleasures. Hardly anyone could be a better go-between for Leibniz’s English dreams than Thomas Burnett of Kemeny* – an influential English gentleman, scholar, and Loke’s friend. The most interesting topic in this letter, from the point of view of this book, is however Leibniz’s solemn announcement of the conception of a new method, which he calls the ‘Method of Establishments’ and declares that, were he to have enough time and health, he would see in its development his principal task henceforth.b As usual, he takes mathematics as a model for other areas of knowledge which, lacking the proposed method, debate endlessly the same

359 M. Dascal (ed.), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. The Art of Controversies, 359–372. © 2006 Springer.

360

Chapter 37 issues and, consequently, are unable to make any real progress. The new method would permit the establishment of at least some points as ‘beyond dispute’, so as to clear the ground for the construction of new knowledge. What is praised in mathematics, thus, is not particularly the axiomatic paradigm, but rather two basic distinctions – between what is certain and what is uncertain, and between what has been discovered and what is still to be discovered. Once developed, the ‘Method of Establishments’ would flesh out these two distinctions, elaborating upon probabilistic means of estimating the uncertain, juridical logic, textual hermeneutics, historical methods, etc. Together, this would lead to a notion of ‘establishment’ that would both enlarge the notion of demonstration and serve the needs of the art of discovery.

Date: 1 February 1697 Edition: A I 13 547-559; GP III 186-197 Language: French

To Thomas Burnett of Kemeny Sir Although I have taken care to remind Madame the Electress of Brunswick of her intention to write you, as she has done, I myself have not yet replied to your letters, which are suffused both by your goodness and your curiosity, which befit the very wide circle of your acquaintances and the extension of your knowledge.1 However, this delay was occasioned not only by the many occupations that distract me, but rather because I have wanted to write you in great detail on a number of matters. First, I am happy to learn that the ferric mineral waters have done you good; they counteract the blockages that are the source of most ailments. But one should complement them with something which helps to strengthen one’s spirits and is beneficial to what is called the genus nervosum. The tour you have just made throughout the countryside, followed now by pleasant conversation in London, along with a proper diet, will help you to recover. I thank you, sir, for the books you have purchased for me. I will take care of reimbursement through the resident and I have asked him to repay you from now on for whatever you will have paid out. You are correct in saying that few good books are coming out in the world, but still many more are coming out than one would like to buy, let alone read. It is true that I purchase many that I never read: but it is sufficient to have them in order to consult them as needed and to occasionally glance at various passages. I greatly value books against the Socinians or in favor of the truth of religion, if they are sound. It is true that most of what authors are wont to say 1

Leibniz seems to indulge here in the double meaning of the term ‘connaissance’.

37. The ‘Method of Establishments’

361

on these issues is rather well-explored elsewhere and consists only of repetitions. But when these are writings like those of a Stillingfleet or a Bentley,c one cannot praise them enough because of the effect they may have on thinking people, in order to make them appreciate the excellence of the Christian Religion. A man named Jaquelot* has published a book in Holland dedicated to the King, where he claims to prove [the date of] the beginning of the world according to the Mosaic chronology through various secular Histories – at least negatively – since if the human race were older, there would have been more traces of it. This book has some good points, but there are defects as well. But my precept is to profit from books and not to criticize them.d I wish I understood the best of English poetry in order to experience myself what you tell me about your outstanding poets, but I thank you for the information. I am excited to learn that we can hope for a new edition of the [history of] sacred origins by the Bishop of Worcester. The Dictionary of Mr. Bayle* has been published,e but I have not yet seen it; I expect much of it. Mr. le Clerc* will soon bring out a work [called] De Arte critica; it will comprise two octavo volumes: it is truly his element and he will better succeed in it than in physics, although his work [in physics] should not to be scorned.f Mr. Leti, Mr. le Clerc’s father-in-law, is finishing up a Treatise on lotteries, economic, political, theological and comic – this is the title he himself gives to it.g The Memoires of Mr. de Bussi-Rabutin have been published in Paris and reprinted in Holland; these are two volumes which contain a large number of letters.h You know that Mr. de Bussi-Rabutin has been deeply involved in the intrigues of the Court of France. From Paris, I have received the Memoirs on China of Father le Comte, S.J., who returned from there a few years ago.i They comprise two octavo volumes, in which one learns details concerning the modern state arising in this country – most importantly, the express declaration of the monarch granting freedom for the Christian Religion (which previously had only been tolerated by a sort of collusion), and the peace treaty between the Chinese and the Russians, which sets the boundaries of the two empires. A bad book, entitled The History of the Love Adventures of Queen Christina has been published in Holland.j We are supposed to believe that it has been written by an officer of the Queen, but that is not at all likely, since there are too many crude mistakes in it, as for example, when he says that the Queen would walk to the staircase in order to receive cardinals and ambassadors, which is laughable, as she would not even leave her audience-room. We have with us an Italian gentleman – who has spent several years in service to the Queen – who has made us aware of so many such mistakes and absurdities that they deprive the book of any worth; I have asked him to put his remarks in writing. It is a shame indeed that the world is filled by so many shabby

362

Chapter 37

booklets, so poorly written and ridiculous, that are nothing but lampoons (pasquinades) worthy of punishment. I am upset that there is no way of accommodating Mr. le Clerc in England. Liberius de S. Amore (since this book is attributed to him) has caused him damage. I often have had to face people who criticize me with reasons taken from that book. However, if one properly explains the Trinity and on what it is grounded – i.e., not on three absolute beings, but on three real relations – there is nothing unreasonable in it; and if one never worships in a genuine cult of the divine anything other than the supreme substance, our practices cannot be blamed. The Socinians,k instead, profess to worship a single creature, but have notions about God unworthy of His grandeur. Consequently, the theory and the correctly understood practice of the Universal Church is incomparably better, provided one takes care not to associate an independent cult with the humanity of Jesus Christ, as some uneducated persons have done – especially among the Roman Catholics (Romanistes). As for Mr. le Clerc, although I greatly appreciate him for his erudition, I think that he follows a bit too precipitously his feelings and that he is often attracted by novelty, without having sufficient foundations for it. I see that an old grudge still exists among the Remonstrants because of Vorstius, whose book De Deo was burned at the order of King Jacques I.l I wish that Mr. le Clerc could be persuaded to speak out against these errors. I am waiting impatiently for the second volume of the Works of the Emperor Julian, which Mr. de Spanheim is editing, because it will contain most of his notes, particularly on the book of this apostate emperor against the Christians, and on the response of St. Cyril, Archbishop of Alexandria. It is the response of St. Cyril that has preserved the work of Julian for us, whereas the other writings of the Pagans against the Christians are almost all lost. He recently let me know that the second volume will appear shortly.m This work appears quite propitiously at a time when there is good reason to write about the truth of the Christian Religion in order to shut the mouths of its opponents. Mr. Jaquelot’s book has been sent to Madame the Electress.n Since our Court preacher has taken upon himself the task of preaching on the truth of religion, she has given him the book. Thus instead of reading it for a few hours, she will hear it the whole year. Part of the work is philosophical and opposed to Spinoza, but apparently the author himself announces that what there is of philosophy in it is not the strongest part of the book, and that he is more interested in the historical part, which justifies the Mosaic [i.e., Biblical] chronology. Mr. Allix’s History of the Councils does not lack good qualities, because the author is knowledgeable.o He would do well, however, to stick as much as possible to the precise language of the Councils in order to minimize contradictions. He might be very happy to learn that the Duke

37. The ‘Method of Establishments’

363

Rudolph August of Brunswick is making available to the public a major work containing the Proceedings of the Council of Constance and other volumes related to it.p I have furnished much unpublished material for this enterprise and have procured eight manuscript volumes from the emperor’s library. I myself possessed in manuscript a life of the Emperor Sigismund, written in old German by a member of his court; the public will thus learn from it. I wish that Mr. Locke had spoken his mind to Mr. Cunningham about my comments,q or that Mr. Cunningham would speak freely about them to me; for I do not think of myself as stubborn and reason is my master. However, Mr. Locke is distracted from these thoughts because of matters of commerce.r This issue of commerce is an extensive one – even quite subtle and quasi mathematical, like that of coinage with which it is closely connected. Thus Mr. Newton will be quite capable of [dealing with] it as well; however, it is a shame that he will be diverted from weightier matters, for which scarcely anyone but he is appropriate. I had hoped particularly that Mr. Newton continue what he began in physics and color theory. I thank you nevertheless, sir, for having forwarded my note to him;s Mr. Wallis has also received his and has written me a long and learned reply.t I will answer him soon and urge him to write us something on the art of deciphering, about which he had succeeded marvelously in his youth.u He would do well to enlighten the public with his thoughts on this matter. I have heard that there is someone else in England who is even more adept at deciphering. I would like to know his name and details, since this is also a quasi-mathematical subject. I have previously strongly approved of the thoughts of the late Mr. Petty, who demonstrated the application of mathematics to economicalpolitical matters.v I myself [did likewise], in a small book on the election of a King for Poland, [written] at the request of an ambassador who was to be posted to Warsaw and published under a pseudonym in 1669. I showed that there is a kind of mathematics in the assessment of reasons: sometimes one must add them together and other times multiply them in order to have the [correct] sum.w Logicians have not taken notice of this. A learned theologian, who is a professor of mathematics, recently asked me whether one could write a theology methodo mathematica.x I replied to him that one could assuredly do it – and that I myself had drafted some samples, but that such a work could not be realized without first providing also the elements of philosophy, at least partially, and putting them in mathematical order, to the extent necessary for theology.y Since you also wish, sir, that I let you know my thoughts on the issue of firmly establishing the truth(s) of the Christian Religion – your zeal on this point being highly laudable – I can tell you what I wish were done. We have a number of excellent books on the truth of the Christian religion. The

364

Chapter 37

[Church] Fathers who have written against the pagans were happier combating idolatry than upholding our mysteries. Nevertheless, one must confess that the writings of Origen against Celsus, of Lactantius against pagans in general,z of St. Cyril against the Emperor Julian and St. Augustine’s The City of God, contain excellent things; to which one might add what Philiponus wrote against Proclus,aa even though Philiponus’s arguments are not always rigorous. I also find good arguments in St. Gregroy of Nyssus. From scholastic times, there are several good books against the Jews and the Muslims, to which one may add what Thomas Aquinas wrote contra Gentes.bb Since the revival of learning, Pico della Mirandola and Reuchlin took advantage from the works of Jewish Cabalists; Cardinal Bessarion and other Platonists have made good use of the books of Plato, Plotinus and other Platonists, following the example of the Fathers and especially of the author of the book falsely attributed to St. Dionysius the Areopagite, which had been brought into Europe in the ninth century. Augustine Steuchus shows the sequence of all this rather nicely in his book De Perenni Philosophia.cc However, the work of Mr. du Plessis Mornay, On the Truth of the Christian Religion, greatly surpasses it.dd And the incomparable Grotius surpasses even himself and all other authors – ancient and modern – in his sterling book on the same subject.ee I recall having seen a small volume by Breen, a Remonstrant theologian, on the truth of our religion, which was not bad.ff Quite recently, M. Huet,* now Bishop of Avranches, has undertaken, particularly in his Evangelical Demonstrations, to prove that the prophecies of the Old Testament have been precisely fulfilled in the person of Jesus Christ, and since God alone can tell us any details about the future – which surpasses even the power of the angels – he concluded that the books of the two Testaments are divine. His reasoning is solid and his book is quite erudite, even though I am not of his opinion in all the learned digressions that he has inserted in his work, whereby he makes nearly all the gods and legends of paganism originate from Moses and the Hebrews. In this, it appears to me that not only he, but others as well exaggerate and give too much free course to their imagination and to jeux d’esprit. But this minor defect does not at all undermine the main argument.gg I will not speak here of several authors – English as well as French, and even German – who have written quite recently on the same subject. Instead of judging the works of others, I will tell you how one should proceed, to my mind, in order to better satisfy reasonable minds. Several times I have commented that, in philosophy as well as in theology – and even in matters of medicine, law and history – there are infinitely many good books and solid thoughts scattered here and there, but that we hardly ever arrive at establishments.hh I mean by an ‘establishment’ the situation in which one determines and completes at least certain points

37. The ‘Method of Establishments’

365

and puts certain theses beyond dispute, in order to gain ground and to have foundations upon which to build. This is precisely the method of the mathematicians,ii who separate the certain from the uncertain (certum ab incerto), the discovered from that which is to be discovered (inventum ab inveniendo), and it is what we hardly ever do in other disciplines, because we like to flatter the ears with nice discourses – which form an agreeable mixture of the certain and the uncertain, suitable for making the one be accepted at the expense of the other. This manner of writing is easy for the learned and the witty for who do not lack ideas, knowledge, and agreeable means of expression, and pleasing to the readers who are pleasantly entertained while reading. However, this is usually a passing fashion, as music or comedy, which hardly has any effect on minds nor gives them any repose. As a result, one constantly turns around, always examining the same questions as being problematic and subject to a thousand exceptions. One day Mr. Casaubon senior was led into an old lecture hall in the Sorbonne and told that they had been arguing there for over 300 years. He said: “So what did they decide?”jj This is precisely the situation with most of our learning. Your great Bacon has made the same remark. Men usually study only for ambition or self-interest – and eloquence aids them in attaining their goal; truth, instead, requires deep meditations, which do not fit the self-interested views of most of those who engage in learning. That is why we make so little progress, even though we do not lack excellent minds that could go quite far if they proceeded properly. I am sure that if we made proper use of the intelligence and qualities that God and nature have already granted us, we would now be able to remedy a number of the evils that crush humankind, and even to cure a number of sicknesses that, due to our faults, are not healed. Likewise, if we wanted to meditate with order and proceed properly, we would be able to establish correctly the truth of religion and to end a great many of the controversies which divide humankind and cause so much suffering to the human race. To be sure, some people are so stubborn that even were one to furnish the most incontestable mathematical proofs, they would not yield. But it would always be good to have such proofs that sooner or later would have an effect on the best-tempered minds. That, then, is what I wish to be done. Now this is how one should proceed. I differentiate the propositions for which I would like establishments to be achieved into two kinds: those that can be demonstrated absolutely with metaphysical necessity and in an incontestable manner; and those that can be demonstrated morally, that is to say, in a manner that provides what one calls moral certainty – as when we know that China or Peru exist, even though we have never seen them and have no absolute proof of it. St. Augustine, in his book On the utility of believing,kk has made solid reflections on this type of certitude. This is how we know that we are not

366

Chapter 37

presently dreaming when we read and write this letter, though it is possible for God to cause everything to appear to us in a dream in the way that it presently appears to us, and that consequently there is no metaphysical necessity that can assure us that we are not dreaming. So too theological truths and inferences are of two kinds – some have metaphysical certainty and others have moral certainty. The first presuppose definitions, axioms, and theorems, taken from true philosophy and from natural theology. The second presuppose in part history and fact and in part the interpretation of texts.ll But in order to be well-served by history and by these texts, and in order to establish the truth and antiquity of the facts, the authenticity and the divinity of our sacred books, and ecclesiastical antiquity as well, and finally, the meaning of the texts, one must again have recourse to true philosophy and in part to natural jurisprudence. So it appears that such an endeavor demands not only history and ordinary theology, but philosophy, mathematics, and jurisprudence as well. For philosophy has two parts: the theoretical and the practical. Theoretical philosophy is based on the true analysis exemplified by mathematics, which one must apply also to metaphysics and natural theology by supplying good definitions and solid axioms. Practical philosophy, however, is based on the true topics or dialectics, that is to say, on the art of estimating the degrees of proof (probation). This art has not yet found a place in the works of logical authors, and jurists alone have provided examples of it which are not to be overlooked, since they may serve as a start for developing a science of proofs, appropriate for verifying historical facts and for furnishing the meaning of texts – for it is jurists who are usually concerned with both at trials. Consequently, before one can subject theology to the method of establishments, as I call it, one must have a demonstrative metaphysics or natural theology as well as a moral dialectic and a natural jurisprudence, whereby one can learn demonstratively how to assess the degrees of proofs. For, several probable arguments joined together sometimes constitute moral certainty, sometimes not. There must be a reliable method to be able to determine this. With some truth, people often say that reasons should not to counted, but weighed; however, no one has as yet given us the scales that would serve to weigh the force of reasons. This is one of the greatest defects of our logic whose effect we indeed experience in the most important and serious matters of life, concerning justice, the tranquility and well-being of the state, the welfare of mankind, and religion as well. It is almost thirty years ago that I made these remarks publicly,mm and since then I have performed much research in order to lay the foundations of such an undertaking, but a thousand distractions have prevented me from spelling out (mettre au net) the philosophical, juridical and theological elements I had planned. If God grants me further life and health, I will make it my main

37. The ‘Method of Establishments’

367

endeavor.nn I would not have proven then all that can be proven, but I would at least have proven a very important part thereof, in order to begin the method of establishments and to give an opportunity for others to advance further. But I must stop. I am, with dedication, Your humble and obedient servant, Leibniz P.S. Although I have written you a rather long letter, I continue to find more things to say. I beg you to add to the books with which you have helped us through the assistance of the Resident Mr. Berry, the book that claims to explain the origins of Deism in England along with the rejoinder. Also [add] that Satire you have written about to Madame the Electress of Brunswick, which she wishes to see as she will have told you – although I think that it will not be that well understood, lacking knowledge of the circumstances. It should also be easy to obtain the book of Mr. Witson [Whiston] and that of the Reader of Gresham College who has written against Mr. Burnet’s Theory of the Earth,oo and the book on the ruins of Palmyra or Tadmor, as well as the Philosophical Transactions of the last years. You are correct, Sir, to say that to work towards establishing the truth of Religion would be more worthwhile than the History of Brunswick. Indeed, I would be quite unhappy if I had to occupy myself all the time with this History. However, since nearly all I have intended to do for the History of Brunswick has been put together, and there remains only the final touch and the connections, I consider it almost finished.pp If I could contribute to the laudable purpose of which you speak, undertaken by those who labor for the establishment of the truths of Christianity, I would do it with all my heart. However, it is necessary that everything be done here in proper form, without upsetting or entirely forsaking the Princes who honor me with their good graces – for which one might easily find some expedient. It is not a long distance and I would love to spend a substantial portion of my time in England, to enjoy the excellent company that abounds in England – without entirely abandoning my Masters in Germany, inasmuch as my humble advice is occasionally requested on matters concerning the rights and interests of these princes, about which I may be better informed than many others.qq I hope that my discoveries in mathematics – about which the public is now well informed, and which have even been applauded by the most excellent men of your island (where the mathematical sciences hold the throne) – will contribute a little to the reputation of my philosophicotheological meditations. And a propos this matter, I will relate to you a short

368

Chapter 37

story about the late Mr. Pascal, which I learned from the late Duke of Roannez, who had been his dear friend. You know that Mr. Pascal (who died too soon) devoted himself in the end to establishing the truths of religion. Since he was known – with good reason – as an excellent mathematician, his acquaintances [who were] positively disposed towards religion were quite pleased with his intention, because they deemed it would be beneficial to religion itself to see by his example that strong and solid thinkers can at the same time be good Christians. It so happens that Mr. Pascal discovered some extraordinary and profound truths at this time about the cycloid. Since his friends thought that others would be hard put to follow them – as indeed his methods were quite novel at the time – they urged him to propound them to all the mathematicians of the day in the form of problems, because they believed that it would help to even further enhance his reputation if the others could not solve them at all. However, Mr. Wallis of England, Father Laloubere of France, and others found a way to resolve the problems, and that caused some harm to Mr. Pascal, because people did not know the circumstances. As for myself, I am not so vain as to make any comparison with this celebrated man, and do not think of myself as being able to do things where others cannot at all succeed, but I have had the good fortune to make several discoveries, which have the benefit that they open the path to further progress and that they increase the number of methods which belong to the art of invention. I also had the good fortune to produce an arithmetical machine infinitely different from that of Mr. Pascal’s, since mine makes large multiplications and divisions in a moment, without ancillary additions or subtractions, whereas that of Mr. Pascal’s (which one speaks of, not without reason, as a marvelous thing) was strictly for additions and subtractions, which one could [then] combine with Napier’s rods, as has been done ever since Moreland. That is why Messrs. Arnauld, Huygens and even Messrs. Perrier, nephews of Mr. Pascal, once they saw my specimen in Paris, acknowledged that there was no comparison between Mr. Pascal’s and mine. I shall not talk of it any further, since apparently you have seen it here yourself. If such fine discoveries of Mr. Pascal in the deepest sciences are able to give weight to the ideas he promises on the truth of Christianity, I would be so bold as to say that what I have had the good fortune to discover in the same sciences will not be in detriment to the thoughts that I also have on religion. The more so as my thoughts are the result of a much greater and longer study than that which Mr. Pascal had devoted to these important theological matters – besides the fact that he was quite prejudiced for Rome, as his posthumous Pensées have made known, and that he had not studied with as much care as I did history and jurisprudence, both are required in order to establish certain truths of the Christian religion, as I have already

37. The ‘Method of Establishments’

369

said in my letter. It is true that his extraordinary ingenuity makes up for everything, but often hard work and information are as necessary as genius. So, if God still grants me health and life for some time, I hope that he will also give me enough time and freedom of mind to fulfill my vows – made more than 30 years ago – to contribute in this most important of all matters to piety and public education. You are receiving six items here. My letter is two of them; there are two postscripts, one quarto, one octavo; and then a copy of another letter with its postscript.2 P.S. It is necessary, Sir, that I share with you a letter that I wrote several months ago to the Bishop of Salisbury,rr for reasons which will become clear from the letter itself. I send you a copy of the letter in confidence, begging you not to communicate it at all to others, but to discuss it with the bishop in order that I get his opinion – insofar as that is possible – either from himself or through you. I have not written this letter to him without the approval of the Electress, who, however, is not at all involved in it, the reason for which you can well understand. At the time I wrote this letter, we had not received any news from you for a long time, otherwise I would have addressed it to you. But, not knowing your address, it was simply inserted in the packet sent by the Elector; I hope that it has been delivered, though I expect to get some assurance of that and to hear the thoughts made about it.ss The letter itself mentions some manuscripts that Duke Rudolf August of Brunswick wishes to obtain from England for his new edition of the proceedings of the Council of Constance, concerning which we believed that the gracious assistance of the bishop of Salisbury could be of use to us. But the postscript speaks of two matters which have a connection to religion and to the public, both of which are within the competence of this illustrious bishop. The Electress has since received a letter from him, dated 15 December of the past year,3 to which she has already responded. It appears from the Bishop’s letter that certain black practices4 directed against the King are still feared, and that one has to take all imaginable precautions in order to protect his person.tt However, we hope that God – who manifestly protects this great prince – will confound them, and that France will decide to pursue peace in earnest. Perhaps [France] hopes that peace will break up the Great Alliance; yet there are grounds to think that they will be mistaken in this as well. We are taking measures which will contribute to assuring 2

The postscript [of letter N. 223] has not been found. The manuscript of this letter is listed in B as LBr. 131, 7-8. It was printed in G. Burnett, A Memorial offered to Her Royal Highness the Princess Sophia, London, 1815, pp. 97-99. 4 In English. 3

370

Chapter 37

public order, in that henceforth the empire will have standing troops capable of preventing that we are taken by surprise.

a

This book has been published (for the first time in its entirety) in Chinese translation, in 2006. b In an earlier letter to Burnett (July 1696), Leibniz mentions such a method: “I agree with you that ethics and politics could be established in a solid and incontestable way; but in order to apply them to actual use, an entirely new kind of logic, completely different of those we have so far, would be needed; this is what is lacking especially in the practical sciences” (GP III 183). c Edward Stilingfleet (1635-1699), Bishop of Worcester since 1689 and a leading Anglican theologian, was a stern opponent of Socinian trends in England. He engaged in a controversy with Locke on the grounds that the Essay provided the epistemological and metaphysical basis for John Toland’s (1670-1722) Christianity not Mysterious (London, 1696). Stillingfleet’s book here mentioned is Origines sacrae, of 1662, to whose 7th edition (1701-1702) Leibniz refers. As for Richard Bentley (1662-1742), the reference is likely to be to The Folly and Unreasonableness of Atheism (London, 1692). Bentley is also mentioned in Chapter 16B. d Isaac Jaquelot, Dissertations sur l’existence de Dieu, The Hague, 1697. e Pierre Bayle, Dictionnaire historique et critique, Rotterdam, 1696. f Jean Le Clerc, Ars Critica (first ed. 1697, 8 th ed. 1778). Presumably the reference here to his physics is to Leclerc’s Physica sive de rebus corporeis, Amsterdam, 1696. The book mentioned before is his Liberii de Sancto Amore Epistolae Theologicae, 1679. g G. Leti (1630-1701), Critique historique, politique, morale, economique, et comique sur les lotteries, Amsterdam, 1697. h Roger de Bussy-Rabutin, Mémoires. Paris: J. Anisson, 1696. i Louis Lecomte (1655-1728), Nouveaux mémoires sur l’etat present de la Chine, Paris, 1696. j Anonymous, Histoire des intrigues galantes de la Reine Christine de Suede, 1697. k See the biographical note on F. Socinus. l Conrad von dem Vorst (1549-1622), Tractatus theologicus de Deo, seu Disputationes decem de natura et attributa Dei, Steinfurt, 1610. m It seems that Ezechiel Spanheim (1629-1710) informed Leibniz in an unfound letter about the forthcoming publication of this second volume. The episode referred to by Leibniz is the attack of the Roman Emperor Julian (361-363), known as Julian the apostate, against the Christian religion. He wrote three books against the Galileans (Contra Galilaeos), to which St. Cyril, Patriarch of Alexandria, responded in his Apologia sanctae religionis Christianorum contra libros impii Juliani (433). n See note d. o Pierre Allix (1641-1717), French Protestant, defended against Bossuet the apostolic origin of the Albigenses and the Valdenses. Author of Remarks upon the Ecclesiastic History of the Albigenses (1692) and De Messiae duplici adventu (1701). The book mentioned in the text was not published, according to the Academy edition. p Hermann von der Hardt (ed.), Magnum Oecumenicum Constantiense Concilium I-VI, Frankfurt-Leipzig, 1696-1700. q In March 1696 Leibniz had sent to Burnett his Quelques remarques sur le livre de M. Locke (A VI 6 3-9) and in July he allowed Burnett to show them to whoever he wanted, but stressed that “if they fall in his [Locke’s] hands or in those of his friends it will be better,

37. The ‘Method of Establishments’

371

since this will give him the occasion of instruct ourselves and clarify the matter” (GP III 180). Burnett reported in November that he had sent the Remarques to Cunningham, Locke’s friend, “to put them in the hands of Mr. Lock” (GP III 186). But Locke never replied to Leibniz’s comments, except by conveying to him, through un ‘bon mot’ reported by Burnett in July 1697 that he was not interested in engaging in a debate with the German philosopher: “… we live in quite peaceful neighborhood with the gentlemen of Germany because they do not know our books and we do not read theirs, so that the account is well adjusted on both sides” (GP III 208). r affaires du negoce. Locke had been appointed as member of a parliamentary committee in charge of commerce (GP III 186). s A note from 6 December 1695, which Burnett reports having given to Newton personally. But Newton was very busy to reply due to his new job as Warden of the Mint (GP III 186). t John Wallis (1616-1703), important Oxford mathematician at Oxford, took part in a virulent mathematical controversy with Hobbes (see Jesseph 1999). Leibniz refers to a note for Wallis he sent to Burnett also on 6 December 1695. Wallis’s reply is from 1 December 1696. Both can be found in J. Wallis, Opera, vol. 3, 1699, pp. 653 and 653-655. u Leibniz indeed replied on 19 March 1697. See Wallis, ibid., pp. 672-674. v William Petty (1623-1687), political economist and statistician. w The book in question is Specimen demonstrationum pro eligendo rege Polonorum (A IV 1 3-98). x Johann Andreas Schmidt (1652-1726). y Probably he is referring to his Demonstrationes Catholicarum Conspectus of 1668-1669 (A VI 1 494-500) and later similar undertakings – which he here criticizes for not being grounded on a more general conceptual analysis and axiomatization. See note ll. z Lactantius, De Divinis institutionibus adversus gentes libri VII. aa Philoponos, De Aeternitate mundi contra Proclum. bb Summa contra Gentiles, in Opera omnia (ed. Vivès), Paris, 1871-1880, volumes 13-15. cc A. Steuchus Eugubinus (1496-1549), De perenni philosophia libri X, Lyon, 1540. dd Philippe du Plessis-Mornay (1549-1623), De la Verité de la Religion Chrestienne. Contre les Athées, Epicuriens, Payens, Juifs, Mahumedistes, et autres Infideles, Antwerp, 1581. ee Sensus librorum sex, quos pro veritate religionis christianae Batavice scripsit, Paris, 1627. ff Daniel de Breen (1594-1664), Breves in Vetus et Novum Tesamentum annotationes. Adj. … brevissimus dialogus de veritate religionis Christianae, Amsterdam, 1664. gg Pierre Daniel Huet, Demonstratio evangelica, Paris, 1679. See Introductory Essay, Section 4. hh Having considered several possibilities of translation such as ‘determinations’, ‘decisions’, ‘resolutions’, ‘assumptions’, all of which bear rather precise meanings in Leibniz’s vocabulary, it was decided to keep the English etymological equivalent of the French establissemens, since Leibniz obviously is here employing this term as a sort of neologism, with a quite specific meaning. ii By giving mathematics as an example of the ‘method of establishments’, Leibniz in fact stresses the hypothetic-deductive nature of both, this method and mathematics. In this respect, both are opposed to the absolute certainty claimed by those who attribute evidence to the axioms of geometry, for example. jj I. Casaubon (1559-1614), Swiss humanist, author of Animadversionum in Athenaei Deipnosophistas libri quindecim, Lyon, 1600. His son, Meric Casaubon (1599-1671) was educated in Oxford and wrote in defense of his father against the critics of the Catholics. kk Augustine, De utilitate credendi, 319 A.D..

372 ll

Chapter 37

Leibniz makes clear in this paragraph why a purely demonstrative method is insufficient for theological purposes (see note y) and argues for a combined, deductive-cum-dialectic method. mm So, if we trust his memory, Leibniz’s first public mention of the ‘balance of reason’ was in the late 1660’s, i.e., at about the time he wrote Chapter 2, which is indeed devoted to this idea. According to the Academy edition, Leibniz is actually referring to the Specimina juris also of 1669 (A VI 1 365-430), but no specific reference is provided; the Academy’s alternative suggestion is “the above mentioned Specimen demonstrationum politicarum”. It seems, however, that Leibniz’s reminiscence is much more specific and has to do with the particular need of a new logic of weighing rather than computing reasons. nn In spite of this wish, in the remaining 20 years of his life the development of this missing component of logic, which he considers as fundamental, did not actually become Leibniz’s “main endeavor”. oo Th. Burnet, Telluris theoria sacra, 1681-1689. pp In fact, Leibniz did not complete the History of the House of Brunswick. Its completion required the effort of many historians throughout more than a century after his death, which culminated with the publication of the monumental Annales Imperiii Occidentis Brunsvicenses (see P, volumes I-III). qq Already about a year earlier Leibniz had expressed his desire to live in a stimulating intellectual environment like London (To Burnett, 7 March 1696; GP III 175), and this possibility was discussed in detail with Burnett and others. Nevertheless, Leibniz was not relieved of his duties as historian of the House of Brunswick until his last days, nor was he appointed historian of England when George of Hanover became King of England, has he had hoped. rr Gilbert Burnett. See Chapter 40. ss The Bishop of Salisbury’s reply to the Elector was enclosed in a letter from James Cresset to Leibniz. The enclosure, probably forwarded by Leibniz to H. van der Hardt, was not found. tt Georg of Hanover (1660-1727) became King of England in 1714, after Queen Anne’s death.

Chapter 38 THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF LOGIC AND BEYOND

Gabriel Wagner* was a rebellious philosopher, 14 years younger than Leibniz, who studied in Leipzig and Halle and with whom Leibniz had an ambivalent intellectual relationship. He certainly did not accept Wagner’s professed materialism, nor his sweeping criticism of syllogistics and scholastic logic, and even less his outspoken and ungrateful critical attitude towards nearly anyone that came under his viewfinder, friend or foe. Yet, Leibniz took him quite seriously and, judging by the time he spent discussing Wagner’s positions and arguments,a he clearly valued their innovative character and the challenge they represented. This explains perhaps why he appreciated Wagner and supported him throughout his agitated life.b The present letter, where Leibniz defends logic’s usefulness, is a reaction to Wagner’s sustained criticism of traditional logic in the weekly publication Vernunftübungen he had founded in Hamburg and sent to Leibniz.c He takes the opportunity – as he often does – to provide an auto-biographical sketch of his interests and work in logic and related fields. This account is important for two main reasons. On the one hand, it shows how Leibniz connects apparently disconnected pieces of his work. On the other, it provides a comprehensive vision of his conception of logic as something much broader than the prevailing conception. In fact, he later proposes to Koch to write a history of logic that should include the components of this broader conception usually left aside by historians of logic at the time (see Chapter 42). A significant aspect of Leibniz’s broader vision is that, according to it, logic should encompass also non strictly deductive forms of inference – not only probabilistic, but also juridical, medical, and dialectical ones (see Chapters 10, 11, 24, and 36). In this respect, Leibniz is in agreement with Wagner’s point that the narrowly conceived conception of logic characteristic of scholastics is insufficient for accounting for its role as ‘the art of thinking’ (Denklehre) and does not correspond to the ‘natural logic’ shared by all human beings and necessary for the scientific investigation of factual reality. But the orientation

373 M. Dascal (ed.), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. The Art of Controversies, 373–390. © 2006 Springer.

374

Chapter 38 Leibniz imparts to the ‘new logic’ departs significantly from the Cartesian assumptions Wagner seems to adopt.

Date: 27 February 1697 Edition: GP VII 514-527 Language: German

To Gabriel Wagner Honorable and Illustrious Sir, The fact that you had expressed your inclination and good opinion toward me publicly – and indeed, far beyond my deserts – even before you made my acquaintance, made it all the more pleasant to receive your recent writing, together with your scholarly and thoughtful publication, the Vernunftübungen. I am obliged to you and I offer you my thanks and my services; in particular, I wish to reveal to you sincerely my well-meant though tentative thoughts on several matters, with the hope that you will accept them, illustrious doctor, in good spirit and perhaps, after ripe consideration, find something useful in them. I note, therefore, that your Vernunftübungen has given certain learned persons an opportunity to grow indignant and to interpret it as a declaration of war against a kind of farcical learning which is now carried on in the higher schools and in others as well and which is universally praised and cultivated. They hold that you oppose it in part, and especially insofar as it is removed from the knowledge of nature, and they view this as a deliberate effort to bring into derision and abuse by other people the whole class of those who deal in such learning. Now I am assured that this is not entirely your intention, and I cannot approve this vicious interpretation of it, especially since you have defended yourself against it and since I perceive from your Latin writings that you are yourself far from devoid of such learning. Your style in Latin (as well as in German) has an unusual amount of delicacy and expressiveness in the tradition of the ancients – which proves that you neither lack familiarity with them nor oppose it. But since the opposite impression seems to have some basis, I am inclined to think that you would do well, Sir, to clear up a few matters, either in further issues of the Vernunftübungen or in some other public way. In this way you would rescue the wounded honor of these scholars and remove a burden from yourself by giving assurance that you had no intention of finding fault either with the sciences or types of learning or with those who devote themselves with dedication to them and understand them fully, and least of all, that you

38. The Achievements of Logic and Beyond

375

wanted to censure, scold or deride all these scholars or any single one of them. From my own viewpoint, I confess that in my early youth I was inclined to reject much of what was accepted in the learned world. But with growing years and a closer insight I discovered the usefulness of many things which I had before considered trivial, and I learned not to condemn anything too easily. I consider this rule better and safer than that taught by certain Stoic lovers of wisdom and after them by Horace – not to wonder at anything.d I have made this clear to the so-called Cartesians in France and elsewhere and have warned them that by deriding the Schools, they are helping neither themselves nor scholarship but are merely making learned men more bitter toward new ideas, however good. To some extent this proved to be useful, as the not entirely undeserved criticism [of Cartesianism] by the learned Huet,* Bishop of Avranches, proves. And though Father Malebranche* is otherwise my good friend, I have never been able to approve his efforts to rule out, first, the critical study of Greek and Roman antiquities, then the reading of the rabbinical and Arabic literature, then the industry of the astronomers, and then something else,e for after all, these things all have their usefulness, and it is good that there are people working at them, who must therefore be encouraged through praise further to pursue their great work, which they often carry out without reward, instead of being frightened away from it through contempt. I have no doubt that you are for the most part in agreement with me, since you have expressed yourself ably on oriental languages,f astronomy, and other fields. However, Sir, since you have in the main tended, if I understand you, to reject to ban completely the art of reasoning or logic and its close relative, the common science (gemeindlichen Wissenschaft) or metaphysics,1 and since you have explicitly included me (upon whom you bestow too much praise) among those who despise logic, I consider it all the more important to explain my position to you. I have no doubt that you have written as you have because of a sincere zeal for the true and useful sciences, so that men need not be delayed and led to lose valuable time through fruitless ruminations; and I do not doubt that you have honored me by calling upon me as witness to such a well meant aim. But as my opinion on the matter is in a certain measure different from yours, I should like to see if we can understand and compare our respective positions. I believe, Sir, that you are right in what you have in mind but that your expressions go beyond what you mean. By logic or the art of thinking I understand the art of using the understanding not only to judge proposed [truth] but also to discover hidden 1

The expression ‘gemeindlichen Wissenschaft’ is unusual in Leibniz, and it is not clear to what it refers. Loemker translates it by ‘general science’, as if Leibniz had written ‘allgemeine Wissenschaft’.

376

Chapter 38

[truth]. If such an art is possible, i.e., if there are proved advantages to be found in its uses, it follows that it ought by all means to be sought and valued highly, indeed, that it ought to be considered as the key to all the arts and sciences. Now, you seem to admit that there are excellent advantages to be gained by thought and investigation; if you are merely unwilling to admit that this procedure should be named logic, our controversy concerns only a word. But since I do not think that this is your purpose, I cannot see how your thoughts should be interpreted, unless your position is that you are rejecting, not the true logic, but what we have heretofore honored by that name. If this is your opinion, I must indeed acknowledge that all our logics until now are but a shadow of what I should wish and what I see from afar; but I must also acknowledge, to stick to the truth and give everyone his due, that I also find much that is good and useful in the logic of the past. Gratitude as well compels me to say this, for I think I can truthfully say that even the logic taught in the schools has been most fruitful for me. Before I entered a class in which it was taught, I was immersed in the historians and poets, for I had begun to read history as soon as I could read at all, and I found great pleasure and value in verse. But as soon as I began to learn logic, I was greatly stirred by the classification and order of thoughts that I perceived in it. I came at once to notice that something great must be hidden in it, as far as a lad of thirteen years could notice such a thing.g My greatest pleasure lay in the so-called Praedicamenta,h which seemed to me to be a standard roll of everything in the world, and I examined many logics to find out where the best and most exhaustive lists could be found. I often asked myself and my companions to which category and subdivision of it this or that might belong (although I couldn’t understand why so many things were excluded from them), and it seemed to me, too, that some of the categories, especially the last two or perhaps four, were superfluous because they were included in the earlier ones or because no actual use for them could be found.i I soon made the amusing discovery of a method of guessing or of recalling to mind, by means of the categories, something forgotten as long as one still has a picture of it but cannot get at it promptly in one’s brain. One needs only to ask oneself or others about certain categories and their subdivisions (of which I had compiled extensive tables out of various logics) and examine [the answers], so as to readily exclude all irrelevant matters, thereby narrowing the problem down until the true culprit is discovered. Nebuchadnezzar could perhaps have reconstructed his forgotten dream in this way. In such tabulations of knowledge I attained practice in division and subdivision as a basis of order and a bond of thoughts. Here the Ramists and Semi-Ramists ought to be accountable for.j Whenever I found a list of things belonging together, and especially whenever I found a genus or a general concept

38. The Achievements of Logic and Beyond

377

under which a number of particular species was subsumed, as for example, the number of the emotions or of the virtues and vices, I had to put them into a table and to find out how the species followed from each other. Usually I found that the enumeration was incomplete and that more species could be added. I took great pleasure in such matters and I wrote out all kinds of stuff, but then forgot it and let it be lost. Many years later, however, I found some of it and now it does not entirely displease me. Later on I realized the value of these exercises each time I tried to work out a specific topic (materia). I recall that once, when I asserted something, a learned friend asked me how I could think of everything that I had put in it, even though its applicability was not at once apparent. I replied – what was true – that I did it by division and subdivision, using these as a net or snare to capture the elusive game. I found too that such division served to make for accurate descriptions of things, not to mention other advantages. Fortunately I was well advanced in the so-called humanities when I had these thoughts, otherwise I could hardly have avoided once more going back from the things to the words.k Many other ideas occurred to me, some of which I took to my teachers;l among others whether, just as simple terms or notions are ordered through the known categories, one could not set up categories and ordered series for complex terms or truths as well. For at that time I did not know that mathematical demonstrations were what I was seeking.m I also observed that the topics or loci of the methods of explanation and demonstration were of great use in recalling, at the proper time, things already in our head but not in our thoughts, so that we might not merely prate about things but investigate them better. I noticed that such loci or main points are to be used as sources, not merely of the methods of proving a given (dargestellt) truth, but also of the methods of explaining a given (vorgegeben) object, and that we may thus speak of them not merely as argumentative (argumentabilia) but also as descriptive (predicabilia).2 Hence the five well-known predicables of Porphyry are far from being sufficient, since they contain only predicates in recto or denominations, and not even all of them;3 one must add limitation (definitio; the Dutch call it bepaeling) and division (divisio), for the latter too are additions (beylagen) , for example, that every regular solid is either 4-, 6-, 8-, 12-, or 20-sided.n But Porphyry overlooked the predicables which 2

Leibniz employs here the German terms Beweisslichkeiten (lit. ‘things related to proof’) for the former and Beleglichkeiten (lit. ‘things related to verification’) for the latter. Both terms stem from the Aristotelian theory of categories and relate to forms of speaking. An alternative translation for the second term might be ‘predicable’. 3 Leibniz employs the term ‘predicable’ in the same sense as Aristotle (Topics 101b17-25), namely as the ways in which the predicate is attributed directly (in recto) to the subject through the copula. Porphyry’s list of predicables, which includes genus, species, proprium, differentia, and accidens , became standard in the Middle Ages.

378

Chapter 38

serve for predicates in obliquo or as sources of further additions (anbeylagen) if I may use such a word, and these are found in the Topics, since cause, effect, whole, part, etc., are in fact of this kind.o I find that Placcius,* the famed jurisconsult of Hamburg (whose learning, industry, thoughtfulness, and exceptionally sharp discernment I esteem highly and whose patronage I would wish for you), has ably treated the loci before others and grasped the heart of the matter. Jurists have made good use of these things in their legal loci and elsewhere. This may lead to a certain art of questioning which is useful not only for judges and interrogators but also on journeys and in opportunities to see unusual things and speak with special persons from whom one may learn much, so that one can make the best use of such transient and never returning opportunities and not be angry with one’s self later for having failed to ask questions or to observe this thing or that. Here belongs also the art of inquiry into nature itself and of putting it on the rack – the art of experimenting (Ars Experimentandi) which Lord Bacon initiated so ably. You will reply that the ablest heads have no great use of such helps but get along well enough with their natural understanding and that simpletons cannot achieve as much even with all such helps.4 There is some truth in this, but it is also true that there are few who know or make use of these helps and that it is a misfortune for the human race that it has taken so little advantage of the grace revealed by God and of the treasures of benevolent nature. For I am of the opinion that men could accomplish things deemed incredible until now, if they really wanted to apply themselves to it, but their eyes are still closed, and everything takes time to ripen. So I am convinced that with the advantage of these helps and the willingness to use them, a poor head could excel, just as a child with a ruler can draw better lines than the greatest master with free hand. The greatest geniuses (ingenium), however, would make unbelievable progress if they took advantage of such helps. So far I have discussed only that part of the accepted logic that serves discovery and which, in a sense, should precede; now the part that concerns judgment must be considered. Here we come to inferences and their figures and modes. This is the part which people hold to be the most useless; they make fun of Barbara and Celarent. My own view, however, is different, and although Mr. Arnauld,* in his Art of Thinking,p thinks that men do not easily make errors in the form but almost always in the materia of thought, the situation is in fact quite otherwise. Mr. Huygens has observed, as have I, that mathematical errors themselves, of the kind called paralogisms, usually arise through a neglect of form.q It is certainly no small matter that Aristotle 4

We have translated Vorteil (lit. ‘advantage’) by “help”, the term employed by Bacon referring to the methods of induction, through whose application one avoids mistakes in the investigation of nature.

38. The Achievements of Logic and Beyond

379

reduced these forms to unerring laws, having been the first actually to write mathematically outside of mathematics. I too have contributed something curious, having demonstrated mathematically that each of the four figures has exactly six valid modes and that therefore, in contrast to the popular doctrine, one figure has as many as another, nature being regular in everything.r This seems to me no less worthy of our consideration than the number of regular solids.s To be sure, Aristotle’s work is but a beginning, virtually the ABC, for there are other more complex and difficult forms which can only be used once they are understood with the help of these first and simple forms, as for example, the Euclidean inferences in which proportions are transposed and ratios inverted, compounded, divided, etc.5 Even addition, multiplication, and division of numbers, as they are learned in the arithmetic schools, are demonstrations in form (argumenta in forma), and we can depend upon them because they prove by virtue of their form. In this sense one may say that an entire bookkeeping calculation demonstrates formally and consists in arguments in form (argumenta in forma). This is also true of algebra and many other formal proofs, which are indeed empty yet perfect. It is simply unnecessary for all forms of proof to be labeled omnis, atque, and ergo. Into all infallible sciences that are exactly demonstrated, higher logical forms are incorporated, some of which come from Aristotle, some of which from other sources. Cardano* saw this in his Logic.t And just as counting on fingers and the use of lines and crosses are left to peasants, while accountants have more sophisticated procedures, so too, when one has uplifted logic higher in the true sciences, one leaves to school children this calculating by the fingers as it were, i.e., by means of omnis, atque, and ergo, by means of which they cannot count beyond three at a time, so to speak, because their inferences and three-term syllogisms (syllogismi tritermini) can have only three terms and three propositions.u It is sometimes advisable, however, to stick to such peasant-calculating and child’s logic. We sometimes accept small change in bunches but prefer to count over larger pieces, especially of gold, separately, and if we had to count diamonds, we should gladly count them on our fingers, because such counting, though of the poorest type, is also the surest, whereas the higher, the more artificial, and the more rapid the counting, the greater the danger of error. Likewise in logic: in important matters such as theological controversies which concern the essence and will of God, as well as those regarding our soul, we do well to analyze matters most industriously and reduce everything to the simplest and most easily grasped inferences, so that even the less talented pupil can unequivocally see what follows and what does not. It will be found that men have often reached a standstill and remain stuck in important discussions because they abandon form, just as we can 5

Invertendo, componendo, dividendo rationes (in Latin in the text).

380

Chapter 38

change a ball of twine into a Gordian knot by trying to unwind it in a disorderly way. In this connection I must set down my thoughts about the proper use of formal disputation. This has been banned to the lecture halls of both higher and lower schools, and one of the most important means of avoiding human errors has thus come to be considered almost as a child’s game of which one is ashamed when it leads us to what is correct. And it is no wonder that it is treated in this way, for it often seems that we do not want to use it to reach the truth but only to give young people a little courage in showing themselves and defending themselves in public. Accordingly, one commonly begins with a syllogism, but the proposition which is denied or which is subjected to distinction is rarely established by a new syllogism, even less so the disputed proposition of the prosyllogism, etc., as should be done in a true disputation in form.v Instead, it is common to break off into conversation and speeches and to end in a word of honor or a compliment. Now I admit that it can hardly be otherwise if its purpose is merely to exercise youths. For if we wanted to carry through a formal disputation, several days would be spent on one syllogism in order to determine its correctness, and by then where would the audience (auditorium) and the other opponents (opponentes) be? The large number of prosyllogisms, moreover, would compose a real labyrinth from which we could not escape without a protocol, to say nothing of the great understanding and unusual acuteness needed to carry a demonstration back to its primary sources and fundamental truths on the spur of the moment. Therefore, it is a human incongruity to use logical form only where it can be of little help and must soon be stopped – that is, in oral controversies, and by young people, merely for practice. But where form might help us out of great difficulties, that is, in written disputations, especially in important spiritual controversies, we neglect it, with the result that there often arise harmful errors which are retained because in free discourse we think more of skill, eloquence, and subtlety, and of approval and esteem as well, than of the foundation of truth. The result is that, when both sides are defended by able and alert people, no decision is reached, but both sides are merely stiffened. I have often thought about this matter and have made some tests, and I find that whoever undertakes to prove something cannot fail if he constructs a syllogism for every wholly or partially denied proposition until he finally has to stop because of the lack of proof and admits it, or if he drives his opponent back to undeniable propositions and thus to obtain his agreement, or else (what sometimes happens in contingent matters) if he attempts to shift the burden of proof to his opponent.w Thus, the disputation form, as far as necessary matters where eternal truths are concerned, is rough and ready completed, which is not the case in

38. The Achievements of Logic and Beyond

381

contingent matters where the most probable must be chosen. This leads to a double issue. The first concerns presumption, that is, when and how one is allowed to shift the demonstration from one’s self to someone else. The second (which precedes the former) concerns the degrees of probability (de gradibus probabilitatis), i.e., how to weigh and estimate considerations which do not constitute a perfect demonstration but run counter to each other (indicantia and contraindicantia, the medics call themx), in order to reach a decision. For the common saying is true enough – rationes non esse numerandas sed ponderandas, reasons are not to be counted but weighed.y But no one has as yet pointed out the scales to do that, though no one has come closer to doing so and offered more help in this than the jurists. I have therefore thought a good bit about this matter and hope sometime to fill this need. This will also serve the art of exegesis and therefore theology. And it contains an infallible judge of controversies, not indeed permitting us always to discover the truth, since God has often kept that for himself regarding the supreme secrets and does not always reveal to us what we should like to know. Nevertheless one can at least determine, first, whether the matter is perfectly proved, and then, if it is not, whether and to what extent it has been given credibility. I once carried out an experiment with a scholar in a semimathematical controversy. We were both seeking the truth, and we exchanged letters which, though courteous, were not without mutual complaints to the effect that each unintentionally distorted the opinions and utterances of the other. I then proposed the syllogistic form, which was agreeable to my opponent. We carried the matter beyond the twelfth prosyllogism, and from the time we began this, complaints ceased, and we understood each other, to the benefit of both sides.z Since it was an easy and pleasant practice to send and re-send syllogisms and pro-syllogisms with our formal replies, we should also be able to use often this method in order to get to the bottom of the important scientific problems and to help free ourselves of fantasies and dreams. For, the very form of our procedure will eliminate all repetition, irrelevance, and unnecessary prolixity, as well as all deficiencies and omissions, whether intentional or unintentional, and finally, all disorder, misunderstanding, and dishonest conduct of the argument. This is what I wanted to say about the great, and for the most part tested, advantages of the accepted logic when it is rightly used. But I consider it certain that the art of reasoning can be carried incomparably higher and I believe I already have a foretaste of it, which I could hardly have attained, however, without mathematics. Though I found some basis for it even before I was a novice in mathematics, and had printed a little later, in my twentieth year, something about it, I have finally come to see how blocked are the ways to it and how hard it would have been to open them without the aid of the deeper mathematics.aa What can actually be accomplished here is in my

382

Chapter 38

judgment of such scope that I cannot expect adequately to be believed without actual proof, and so must postpone a further exposition. I shall therefore break off for this time and comment on the objections which you raise to logic. I find that they apply only to its abuse or misuse. 1. Logic as the art of reasoning may serve the purposes of order and of good discourse, even though those who teach it are neither ordered nor speak well. This merely means that they do not well understand or at least do not well practice their art. For one may understand everything that Ptolemy, Aristoxenus, and Zarlinus have written about music and yet not be able to sing or play.bb 2. If no one is convinced by logic, the reason for this is that no one takes the form, i.e., the orderly process, seriously, but uses it only for the amusement of youth or rather, hardly tries to use it at all. 3. There is some truth in the assertion that a great part of the arts were discovered and can he taught with a purely natural logic. But a reasonable man who understands neither writing nor numbers can also calculate with a natural arithmetic when necessary; does this prove that the art of calculating amounts to nothing? I myself am of the opinion that mathematics, history, and other subjects should be learned before an extensive mastery of logic, for how can one order one’s thoughts if one has never thought of much? But once provided with a store of good thoughts, one can survey and measure them, and with the help of the order that is uncovered in them, one can all the more readily discover something new.cc This is similar to the art of speech. I am of the opinion that in learning a language one should stick to practice rather than to grammar. But once one is fairly proficient in the language, its grammar will help carry him further in it. In addition to all this, I must also mention the fact that Plato achieved a good bit in logic and that disputation by means of questions also has its uses.dd I do not think that Archimedes and Descartes can be considered as despisers of logic; Descartes at least studied it most industriously under the Jesuits at la Fleche and was well at home in the Scholastic philosophy, which contains much that is good if it can only be dug out. I value Jungius* very highly and the loss of his manuscripts cannot be adequately lamented. Nor do I put Feldenee in any low category, and the other scholars whom you mention are also not to be despised. 4. I cannot admit that logic has made no discoveries. Everything discovered by the understanding has been discovered through the good rules of logic, although they may not have been explicitly noted or written down from the beginning. A good painter who has through practice mastered true proportions uses the art of measuring and perspective, for even though he has not described or expressly known of these arts, their basis is in him.

38. The Achievements of Logic and Beyond

383

Meanwhile, painting too has become far more perfect since perspective has become a part of mathematics (wisskunst). 5. There is no doubt that a man who is skilled in using the advantages of the art of reasoning proceeds with more acuteness than others. 6. Men are reasonable even without a formulated science of reasoning, just as they can sing without the art of music. But if as much industry had been applied to the true art of reasoning as has been expended on the art of singing, men would have accomplished wonders. We have neglected this because we pay little attention to things which are not immediately noticeable to the external senses. Cicero has well said that nothing is more beautiful than virtue, but how few see it!ff As for your remarks on the explication of words, these explanations are useful when they at the same time exhibit their cause, as happens in the definitions which I call real and which I have explained elsewhere.gg To take an example which is a little more difficult than the one you offer (why 3 times 4 is 12), why are the results of the successive addition of odd numbers always perfect squares?hh Thus 1

3

5

7

9

11

13

1__4__9 16 25 36

49

1 = 1 │ 3 + 1 = 4 │ 5 + 4 = 9 │ 7 + 9 = 16 │etc. . In discovering the cause for this, we shall also discover the right use of the art of thought. 7. I have already admitted your assertion that everything may be learned without the art of inferring and have replied to it. Just as the Chinese have done many excellent things with only a natural art of measurement, so most things have been found out without using an authentic art of thinking. Yet the value and utility of the art of thinking is established, as is that of the art of measuring. 8. It is true that the art of thinking must first be sought by using as models examples of good thinking. But after it has been found in these, we may attend directly to the art, so that it may itself become good and serve as a model, though without abandoning the practice and study of good thinking.ii A painter, sculptor, or architect studies ancient models and formulates an ideal (vorbild) from them, thus yielding rules which can be followed. Yet no one stops viewing beautiful works of art.

384

Chapter 38

9. In spite of the transience and the multiplicity of human attitudes, there is only one art of thinking, although each person may follow his own inclinations in practice, just as there is only one art of riding which applies to all riders and horses, though not every saddle fits all horses. Numbers themselves may be grasped in many different ways. It is true that pure mathematics (mathesis pura) is not in itself the doctrine of reason (Vernunftlehre), but it is one of its first products, being its application to magnitudes or to number, measure, and weight. I have discovered, too, that algebra derives its advantages from a much higher art, namely, the true logic.jj 10. Logic contains much that is difficult and much that is easy, just as does mathematics. What is easier than the first lesson in numbers, and what is more difficult than finding irrational roots (radices surdae)? One may begin with the easiest and save the difficult until other sciences have been mastered. These beginnings will serve as a foretaste for youth, but that which is higher, both in logic and in arithmetic, belongs to those who go far in knowledge and in language and wish to rise even higher. It is well known that Aristotle says of ethics, and Grotius* of rhetoric, that they are not appropriate for students. I understand this to mean the higher use of these sciences, for Aristotle would not deprive youth of the De Civilitate Morum of Erasmus, nor would Grotius forbid the Progymnasmata of Aphthonius. kk 11. I should hold that all the consequences lie in the abstract and not in the circumstances, unless the latter involve something commensurate with the abstract form.ll This is true in all applications of science to contingent matters. The art of practice consists in bringing contingent [things] under the yoke of science, as far as possible. The more we do this, the more does theory conform to practice. For example, long ago only the forces of motion (bewegungskräfte) were considered in mechanics. Galileo began to study mathematically the strength of the bodies used in motion and raised the question of which forms of the same matter offer the most resistance. Later I improved and increased his rules. Galileo treated the motion of heavy bodies without considering the resistance of air. Blondel, in writing on pumps, also thinks that this is not necessary. On both rational and empirical grounds I hold the contrary.mm 12. The common logic is indeed often in error. What it says of genus and differentia needs improvement, for one can make a differentia out of the genus and vice versa, or so to speak (humorously but precisely), one can say that man is an animal rational with as much right as that man is a rational animal.6 When I say that a cube is a regular parallelepiped,7 I can take either term for genus or differentia. 6

In Latin in the text: Homo est rational animale and Homo est animal rationale. Leibniz in general adopts the intensional point of view in logic, but he believes that the intensional

38. The Achievements of Logic and Beyond

385

13. I leave undecided the question of how far one may say that the pure logician is an ass.8 Scaliger said the same thing about mathematicians.nn Even a coachman could serve no purpose among men away from his coach or stable, if he showed no signs of understanding. 14. Pure mathematics proves nothing against logic. For just as it has borrowed much from logic, it also comes to the rescue of logic, for its example serves to warn people, as may be seen in your twenty-third exercise.9 The spiral of Archimedes, which you mention there, is not so wonderful as may be thought. If something is continuously lifted more than it falls, is there any wonder that it finally reaches an elevated point? What you say of tangent angles also has its limits, if rightly understood. If you admit infinite extension, it follows of course that one angle is greater than another. Your remark in the twentieth exercise, that there may be in a moving object something that is without motion, is not opposed to common reason but only to the common semblance of it, and hence it is a paradox. It must also be observed that the axis is not a part. Furthermore, just as it is not proper to be always making verses, so it is improper to be always throwing syllogisms about. To define or limit all terms is as little feasible as to divide all numbers into their factors. I hold that juridical definitions too are logical. 15. Even if logic is nothing but a bag full of good reminders, it is certainly not futile. I have no praise for the new logicians who condemn the old rather than improving upon them. It is not always in our power to find the truth when not enough data are at hand, but we can always guard against error if we have time to think about a matter and to discover everything possible from the data (ex datis) – if we bring logic to full perfection. For instance, I have brought matters so far with my infinitesimal calculus of differences and sums that many problems can now be solved in mathematical physics which one could not even venture to try before. When data are lacking, we can at least observe what data we lack. If we had adequate practice in the true art of reasoning, it would also help us in those thoughts which we must grasp on the spur of the moment, but for the time being, we still lack most of such an art, and I have not had time to examine this point. I also admit that when a logician gives rules without examples, it is like trying to learn fencing with mere verbal instructions. and extensional interpretations are equivalent – which is what he claims here. Elsewhere he employs the same example for this purpose: “Aristotle seems to have followed the way of ideas [i.e., the intensional point of view], since he says that animal is contained in man, i.e. one notion in the other; although it is more usual to say that men are contained in animals” (GP VII 228). 7 Cubus est parallelepipedum regulare. 8 Purus logicus est asinus. 9 This must be a reference to the Vernunftübung (i.e., ‘Reason Exercise’) number 23.

386

Chapter 38

17.10 There is much that is good in Realis de Vienna,oo and this may be why he is not generally rebuked. As for me, I lay little importance in rebuking but much in expounding. When a new book reaches me, I search for what I can learn, not for what I can censure in it.pp 18. I would think that the Sorbonne and other collegia are not to be despised. So far as I know, logic is in no more disrepute in France and England than in Germany. Yet I must agree that the most learned people would do well to use few Scholastic terms (terminos scholae), especially in writing for ordinary readers. Otherwise they are like a tailor who lets the seams be seen, as Mr. Dillherr once wittily remarked to me about those who use such terms in the pulpit.qq In conclusion, I agree with you that without making much ado about logic and similar fields, the youth should be at once introduced into the positive sciences, just as I hold that languages are to be learned primarily through use, even though grammar is not to be overlooked but to be used at the proper time for greater accuracy of language use. I hope these remarks, which have grown more extended than I had planned, will suffice to show you my thoughts and that they may serve to achieve a conciliation or moderation (temperament), since both sides do presuppose the art of reason, even though you try to restrict it to pure mathematics only, where it appears in its most beautiful form, though not completely or exclusively. If I should have the good fortune to make peace between you and the common teaching tradition, it would give me much pleasure, for the result would be that you could find a greater opportunity not merely to attack what is useless but to construct, without being hindered, something of value for our common use. I remain, my illustrious Sir, entirely at your service. a

The present letter is an example of this. Another example is the two-day long debate he held a year later in Hanover with Wagner. The debate, whose record has been kept, focused on key theses of Leibniz’s metaphysics against which Wagner raised precisely formulated objections (GR 389-399). b In addition to helping him out of his suspension and fine at Leipzig University around 1690, and recommending him for several jobs he managed to hold only for short periods, Leibniz gave him money for medical assistance and lodging when the impoverished and sick Wagner turned up in Hanover in March 1704 seeking his help (K X 227). c In 1696, an acquaintance of Wagner in Hamburg asks Leibniz to help him. This is followed by a letter of Wagner in September, in which he briefly introduces himself to Leibniz, promising to send him the Vernunftübungen, and expressing the hope for learning much from him. Leibniz, who was familiar with Wagner’s first publication against Christian Thomasius, with which he agreed on several points, and after perusing some of the issues of Wagner’s weekly, welcomes him. Henceforth, the correspondence broaches many topics, where disagreement between them is rather the rule – Wagner in his impetuous style and Leibniz moderate and sometimes fatherly. When, in a letter of early 1697 10

There is no number 16.

38. The Achievements of Logic and Beyond

387

Wagner describes his irritation because of an attack against him by a Prof. Meier, Leibniz advises him to adopt a quite different attitude towards controversy: “Shouldn’t it be better to laugh at the opponents rather than to scold them? … I think that men often oppose each other because they don’t know each other. What happens with them is like what happens with the Americans, who, because they do not speak the same language, eat each other …” (Stiehler 1966: 149). d Horace, Epistolae I, 6, 1-2. As for the quote from the Stoics, Leibniz takes it from Cicero’s Tusculanae Disputationes VI, 81: Sapientis est proprium nihil, cum accederit, admirari. e Malebranche indeed says these things, albeit with the major qualification that this kind of learning is useless for salvation. Leibniz, on the contrary, considers all kinds of learning as valuable, and cannot accept Malebranche’s and the other Cartesians’ position in this respect. On Leibniz’s “eclecticism”, see Introductory Essay, Section 4; note pp below; Chapter 44; and Dascal (1993, 2000). f Among the “other fields” in question, Leibniz probably has in mind physics – the science Wagner himself considered to be the primary field to which a proper logic should be able to contribute. g Leibniz’s autobiographical sketches in general describe him as a self-taught man interested in whatever fell under his hand. This is the image usually presented by his biographers. The image he gives here of himself, where he emphasizes the role of logic in his intellectual development, corresponds closely to what he says in an autobiographical memoir written after 1675 (P IV 165-172): “When I first became acquainted with logic, that which repealed others as thorns I approached with affection, and I not only exercised myself in the easy logical examples, but also I would raise objections – which most impressed my teachers” (pp. 167-168). h This is the standard Scholastic term for the Aristotelian “categories”. i Leibniz here suggests that he was already aware, at the age of thirteen, of problems surrounding the Aristotelian theory of categories, especially concerning their number. Although Aristotle gives different lists of categories, the traditionally accepted one comprises the ten following categories: substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, situation, habit, action, and passion (Categories 1b26-27; see also Topics 103b22-23). The expression ‘category and its subdivisions’ here employed by Leibniz presumably refers to Aristotle’s distinction between the categories themselves (the ten mentioned above, which the Schoolmen dubbed praedicamenta) and the ways in which they are applied (Categories I 3; which the Schoolmen called ante-praedicamenta). The latter consist in the following four distinctions: (1) univocal, equivocal, and analogous; (2) complex vs. simple; (3) that which is in a subject vs. that which is said of a subject; (4) transitive vs. non-transitive. It is the usefulness of the ante-praedicamenta that Leibniz questions here. Whereas the nominalists tended to consider the Aristotelian list of categories as open, allowing for the discovery of other categories, the realists and conceptualists were of the opinion that the list was closed, and the terms that seemed not to be covered by it should be better analyzed in order to show that they did fit the list. The reducibility of all categories to that of substance is in fact a central thesis of Leibniz’s metaphysics, to be found already in his bachelor’s thesis defended on June 9, 1663 (Disputatio metaphysica de Principio Individui; A VI 1 3-19). j In the wake of Ramus’s* work, a sharp controversy developed, especially in Germany, between Aristotelians (like Philipp Melanchthon) and anti-Aristotelians who adopted Ramism (like Rudolph Agricola). The so-called Semi-Ramists attempted to mediate between these two parties. One offshoot of Semi-Ramism’s influence can be found in the work of Jungius,* which Leibniz admired (See Introductory Essay, Section 3 and Chapter

388

Chapter 38

31). In fact, Leibniz’s combination, a little later in the letter, of Aristotelian topics with Ramist loci suggests the influence of Semi-Ramism upon his own thought. On the impact of Ramus and his followers on Leibniz, see Blank (Forthcoming). k Leibniz is here expressing, in a strongly baroque phrasing, his criticism of the temptations of Ramist dialectics, which he equates with verbal manipulation. This is why, a few lines before, he claimed that the Ramists as well as the Semi-Ramists “ought to be accountable for”. l Leibniz mentions three teachers of his high-school years, all of whom were logicians: Johannes Hornschuch, Tielmann Bachusius, and Jakob Thomasius. m Leibniz is referring here to his De arte combinatoria (1666), which later on he criticizes for the imperfect knowledge of mathematics he had when he wrote it (To Johann Friedrich, 1671/1673; K III 254). n Both limitation (e.g., through relative clauses) and division, act as modifiers that change the scope of a given term or denomination. They are, therefore, important devices to be taken into account by a theory of the praedicabilia. o In contrast to in recto predications, those where the predicate cannot be attributed directly to the subject through the copula are called in obliquo. The latter were studied by Jungius, who explored the non-syllogistic inferences they give rise to, e.g., ‘Jesus Christ is God; therefore, Jesus Christ’s mother is God’s mother’. Leibniz expresses here his desire to expand syllogistic logic to include oblique inferences. This desire, however, is not motivated solely by logical reasons, for such an expansion of logic would correspond to the needs of his metaphysics. See Chapter 31C and Introductory Essay, Section 3. p See A. Arnauld and P. Nicole, La Logique ou l’Art de Penser, Book 3, Chapter 1. q Presumably Leibniz refers here to his first meeting with Huygens, held in Paris in 1672. On that occasion, the famous Huygens proposed to the young Leibniz a mathematical problem that had no possible solution, for it involves a formal impossibility. Leibniz soon discovered this, thereby winning Huygens’s lasting friendship. In fact, Leibniz saw this as a paradigmatic case of “paralogism” – a notion that ever since acquired great methodical importance for him (see, for instance, GP VII 201). r The idea, taken from J. Hospinianus’s De syllogismi categorici modis (1560), that there are more valid modes of syllogism than in traditional syllogistic theory, is one of the central issues that Leibniz’s early work, De Arte Combinatoria (1666) addresses. s The discovery that there are seven and only seven regular polyhedrons has been considered, since Plato’s Timaeus as one of the most remarkable achievements of the human mind. t The Renaissance logician Girolamo Cardano is here credited with the idea cherished by Leibniz that the foundations of mathematics must come from logic, rather than the other way around, as propounded by the Bernouilli brothers. In this respect, see Cardano’s Practica Arithmeticae (in Opera Omnia, vol. IV, Leiden, 1663). Cardano is further credited with the insight that the success of this program of “logicization” of mathematics required the amplification of logic. In this respect, Leibniz presumably refers to his work on probabilities (De ludo aleae; in Opera Omnia, vol. IV) as well as, more generally, to his Dialectica (Basel, 1566; in Opera Omnia, vol. I). u Applied to Leibniz’s criticism of Descartes’s critique of logic and formalism in general, what Leibniz is saying here is that Descartes criticized logic only because he considered only this most trivial level of logic or fomalization, and overlooked the achievements of Renaissance logic (e.g., Cardano). For Leibniz, of course, even this trivial level should not be despised. v To deny (nego) and to make a distinction (distinguo) are two codified moves in the tradition of medieval disputatio.

38. The Achievements of Logic and Beyond w

389

In this long sentence, Leibniz sums up three possible strategies in a formal dispute. See Chapter 10. y See Chapters 5 and 14, among others. z Leibniz refers here to a controversy he held with Denis Papin, ostensively dealing with the issue of the possibility of a perpetuum mobile, but in fact confronting different views of the foundations of mechanics. It is not true, as Leibniz claims here, that this controversy was resolved by its reduction to syllogistic form, since Papin never accepted Leibniz’s pretended formal resolution. On this controversy see Freudenthal (1999). aa The youthful mathematical work to which Leibniz refers is the De Arte Combinatoria. On Leibniz’s later attitude towards this work, see Chapter 42, note d. The “deeper mathematics” to which Leibniz refers is the result of his studies and discoveries in Paris, where he became acquainted with the most important mathematicians of his time, and invented the calculus. In his correspondence with Bodenhausen (GM VII 355, 362) Leibniz emphasizes that, for him, his calculus situs or ‘new geometrical analysis’, for one, is just an example (specimen – a word he likes to use) of a broader approach to mathematics, which goes far beyond the Cartesian ‘analytic geometry’, an approach that – according to him – would completely transcend Cartesian mathematics. bb The famous astronomer Ptolemy wrote a well-known treatise on music, Harmonikôn Biblia (translated into Latin in 1682). Aristoxenes of Tarento, a disciple of Aristotle, conceived of the soul as “the music (harmony) of the body”. Giovanni Zarlino (1519-1590) was a Venetian musicologist who published Institutiones Harmonicae (1558), which was influential in the history of Italian music. None of them, indeed, became famous for his ability as a performer. Leibniz´s argument here seems to presume the possibility of distinguishing sharply between the theoretical knowledge of logic and its actual use, as it is the case in music, where theoretical understanding need not involve a corresponding practical ability in the relevant domain. For the distinction between these two types of knowledge, knowing that and knowing how, see Ryle (1949). A somewhat similar distinction underlies the distinction between the types of knowledge Leibniz calls, respectively, “distinct” and “clear” in the De cognitione, veritate et ideis (A VI 4 585592). cc Leibniz is here expressing one of the basic principles of his “method”, namely, that “order” presupposes something to be ordered, and therefore cannot be the first step – as required by Descartes’s ordre des raisons. See the beautiful metaphor of the store full of merchandises that requires not the purchase of additional merchandises, but rather ordering in order to allow for the further progress of knowledge (Chapter 24). dd In Chapter 1 (paragraph 11), Leibniz discusses the advantages and disadvantages of a ‘director’ who conducts a debate by means of questions. In Chapter 42 (note j), he points out the epistemic insufficiency of the “disputation by means of questions”, as used, among others, by Thomas of Aquinas. Here, in a conciliatory mood, he admits the partial usefulness even of such disputes. ee See Chapter 31, note d. ff Cicero, De Senectute. gg De cognitione, veritate et ideis (A VI 4 585-592). hh This is the famous “magical triangle”, whose importance in Leibniz’s system-building endeavors has been emphasized by Serres (1968). ii Notice the dynamic interplay between skill, cognition, and meta-cognition in this passage. The latter, for which Leibniz coined the term apperception, is according to him the highest level of knowledge, of which only men are capable. See R. McRae (1976), and Dascal (1998). x

390 jj

Chapter 38

See Leibniz’s notion of a mathesis universalis (e.g., GM VII 61). See also Couturat (1901: 283-322). kk Aphthonius of Antioch (3rd-4th centuries A.D.) is known for having edited the Progymnasmata of Hermogenes of Tarsus (160-225 A.D.), which was the canonical rhetorical work of late antiquity. Aphtonius’s elaboration of Hermogenes’s system superseded the latter, and gave rise to a series of commentaries that were central in the Byzantine rhetorical tradition. Both Aphtonius’s text and Erasmus’s De civilitate morum puerilium (1530) are well-known examples of influential pedagogical works. ll On Leibniz’s conception of abstractness and its relation with concreteness, see De abstracto concreto, substantia, accidente, substantivo, adjectivo et similibus (A VI 4 570-573) and De abstractis (A VI 4 573-574). mm François Blondel (1617-1686), a mathematician and engineer, published two important works on military technology, Nouvelle manière de fortifier les places (Paris, 1683) and L’art de jeter les bombes (Paris, 1683). nn Julius Caesar Scaliger (1484-1558), Italian philologist and physician, was a prolific writer, known for his work in grammar and rhetoric. Leibniz often mentions his Sull’origine della lingua latina, posthumously published in 1609. oo “Realis de Vienna” was a pseudonym used by Wagner. Leibniz, therefore, must be here referring only to those writings where Wagner uses the pseudonym, namely his writings against Christian Thomasius. pp In a nutshell, Leibniz expresses here the operational basis of his eclecticism: before rebuking any writing or position, try to find out what is worthwhile in it. See also Chapter 31E. qq Johann Michael Dillherr (1604-1660), German philologist and theologian, was professor of sacred eloquence in Jena and of theology in Nüremberg.

Chapter 39 PACTS, CONTRACTS, AND NATURAL LAW

At the turn of the century, jurists continued to debate legal issues of various kinds within the framework of the philosophical discussion of the foundations and scope of Natural Law. The discussion about the ‘actual efficacy’ of pacts of different degrees of formality, as compared to formal contracts, is but one example of this. Pacts, as distinct from ‘contracts’, can range from ‘bare’ to ‘dressed’, their ‘dressing’ being, in turn, either ‘intrinsic’ or ‘extrinsic’, and so on, until they reach the conventionality of ‘quasi-contracts’. The question is to what extent the relatively informal, natural, spontaneous promises issued on occasion involve legal obligations that have to be fulfilled. Leibniz’s intervention in this seemingly technical debate, as exemplified by the present text, is a comment on his correspondent M. D. Meier’s analysis of the issue, addressed to the jurist L. O. Veltheim.a Leibniz’s few remarks are incisive, but they indicate that, rather than adopting a definite stance in favor either of Natural Law theorists or of Contractualists, what he seeks is to mediate between these two poles, taking advantage of the usefulness of each position for different juridical purposes. In order to help understanding Leibniz’s cryptic remarks, we have provided excerpts (larger than Grua’s) of Meier’s text to which they apply.1

Date: 18 January 1700 Edition: LH 2,6 13-18; GR 868-870 (partial) Language: Latin

1

Grua, in addition to Leibniz’s marginal remarks (which were sent to Meier, who acknowledged their reception on February 9), provides very little of Meier’s text. In order to make Leibniz’s points understandable, we completed the sentences, and in some cases, the relevant paragraphs to which Leibniz reacts, using the manuscript (LH 2, 6, Bl. 13-18). Grua’s excerpts are indicated by curled brackets. We have also added two marginal remarks by Leibniz (marked with asterisks) not included in Grua’s edition.

391 M. Dascal (ed.), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. The Art of Controversies, 391–397. © 2006 Springer.

392

Chapter 39

Annotations on Meier’s Epistolary Discourse on the Controversies about the Actual Efficacy of Pacts vis-à-vis Contracts (1700)b After praising Veltheim for his erudition and status in juridical matters, Meier argues that, there being no point in discussing non-controversial juridical principles, he will address directly those controversial questions that have practical consequences and serve to test the general principles. I decided to describe briefly the natures and differences of certain questions and, as far as my ability goes, to expound and resolve them according to the principles of law. The first to {conduct a campaign against contracts} was the illustrious jurist {Mr. Stryck,c Leibniz’s marginal remark (a): It would be preferable to deal with the topic omitting personal references. who singled out the following consequences of the actual capacity of pacts to yield efficient obligations: punishment has no room in unnamed contractsd and the distribution of contracts has no room in bona fide and strictly legal [contracts]; and all true contracts are consensual by virtue of pacts that are in force.} … As to what concerns our topic, [it should be noted that] {at first}, when humankind, not yet scattered, behaved with innocent simplicity and without the pleasure of cheating, {the conventions had a very strong obligating force, although they were bare and not determined by any positive law.} Leibniz’s marginal remark (b): It seems to be assumed here as certain that bare pacts (pacta nuda) obligate absolutely by natural law to perform what was promised. {Later on}, however, be it because, with the increase in the number of men, their malice also augmented, be it because, due to an uneven use of reason, not all of them were able to equally understand with probity the precepts of natural law, be it due to slyness and cunningness, to seduction, to a certain unawareness of danger, to the profuse kindness of the majority, to enthusiasm, or to countless similar reasons, men were led to make promises easily and indiscriminately, thereby {finding themselves inadvertently in the grip of obligations.}

39. Pacts, Contracts, and Natural Law

393

Leibniz’s marginal remark (c): From a bare pact something akin to a privilege of competence (privilegium competentiae) naturally follows. … Hugo Grotius* in his admirable work De jure belli ac pacis (II, 11, 3.4), lists three degrees of [commitment to an] obligation. The first, which he calls ‘Assertion’, states a present disposition (animum) towards the future, …, in which case, since only the truth of a thought is required, the right to repent and change one’s mind remains untouched. Next, [the degree of commitment] of a ‘Promise’ (pollicitas), where the will determines itself by means of a sign indicating the necessity of persevering in the future, …, in which case there is some obligation by the one who promises, although he does not grant the other his own right. Finally, the ‘Perfect Promise’ stipulates this [obligation], {where, in order to determine the will it is accompanied by a sign of willing to transfer one’s right to another,} i.e., if simultaneously the thing is transferred or in this way something is performed. Leibniz’s marginal re mark (d): Such a sign is not necessary because the transference of the rights follows from my promise and its acceptance by another person.e … {I assume that all conventions are grounded in consensus}: whenever it is absent, a pact is like an animator without a soul (sine anima animans), for consensus is the common essence of conventions. This substantial requisite from both parties involved in the pact (pacisentes) can be {full or less full}. If the latter is the case and the contracting parties did not yet reach a full agreement, but have at least discussed the affair in view of declaring to each other, without committing themselves, their intention to reach an agreement, and they establish the conditions specifying the extent of their intended obligations; then we can call it a Treatise (Tractatus), which corresponds to Grotius’s assertion both in mode and in effect. Indeed, if we must adopt this indeterminate and uncertain stance, it is because not only the human soul has the capacity to change its mind, but also because Grotius’s and later jurisprudence raise doubts about whether the other party will accept the broad conditions or not. However, the {pact} about negotiating a treatise (pactum de tractando), which usually precedes the treatise, differs in this respect from the latter, since the former is universally acknowledged as fully obligating; yet this obligation goes no further than making a treatise, not implementing it. It seems, thus, that the parties involved in this [kind of] pact have only the

394

Chapter 39

intention that, if they do not reach an agreement, both are entitled to abandon the treatise. Otherwise, the parties have agreed fully and perfectly regarding the same desideratum concerning the subject matter or deeds, which amounts to what is generally called a pact. In so far as [a pact] {is concluded seriously and deliberatedly, it follows naturally that what at first was a matter of will becomes a matter of necessity by virtue of what was later done (ex post facto). Leibniz’s marginal remark (e): This requires moderation. Therefore, [the pact] obligates by Natural Law, which holds that there is nothing more fitting human trust than to fulfill that which has been agreed upon by those who made the pact (Grotius II, 11, 1),} by Divine Law (see Neb ix.v.8; Hebr. vi.v.18; I Cor. x.v.13; II Thess. iii.v.3; II Tim. ii.v.13) {, as well as by the Law of Nations, which concerns the public accords made between free peoples} or between rulers. Leibniz’s margina l re mark (f): It is also congruent with human goodwill not to seek profit in the harm of another who has been duped, even when this was done without malevolence.f The latter concern peace, truces, alliances, and similar pacts, which obligate both parts in such a way that, if they are violated, the harmed party derives from it a just cause in order to compel through war the harming or violating party to restore the law, in case there is no superior [power] shared by both. These laws (jura) do not admit, in those pacts seriously and deliberately concluded, more distinct [specifications]; they have, however, the same efficacy, be it because they are expressed in ordinary terms, be it because the subject matter or the words or the writing or something else intervenes, provided they are not vitiated by the lack of some requisite or condition, nor by the incapacity or turpitude of some person or cause. Leibniz’s marginal remark (g): There is more deliberate spirit in public matters and the danger of illusion is greater; and he who defines a limit does not thereby increase the degrees of obligation. These laws, however, have made a difference regarding the pacts; not because they did not purport to observe them, but because the fulfillment of [the pact] itself, which is the supreme law, would require them to be determined in certain ways. In fact, that Majesty can, by natural law, add to or subtract something from civil laws, whenever the necessity or utility of the subject matter so requires, is as true as the possibility of

39. Pacts, Contracts, and Natural Law modification of natural law itself.2 between bare and dressed pacts.3

395 Hence, legislators distinguished

… {I would not dare, neither in the capacity of he who loans some convenient thing [commodans rem commodatam] to someone nor as his representative [commodatarius], to demand expenses, either by virtue of the loaning pact or by virtue of a customary accord (condictio).} Leibniz’s marginal note (h): This would not follow from the bare pact, but it is quite different from [a situation where] there would have been no accord. … Whenever a pact is dressed in these ways and clashes with a contract, the contract prevails and absorbs the effects of the pact. For instance, two men agree about the sale of a building – which is termed a selling pact; and therefore, on the basis of this pact, the contracting parties can be obligated to undertake the sale, as efficaciously as if they were forced to do so by a stipulation; but the obligation goes no further than initiating the sale – not concluding it, in case the parts cannot reach an agreement about the price. Leibniz’s margina l note (*): Therefore, not for making the sale effective (non ad vendendum). Once examined in this way the bare pacts, I turn now to those pacts Civil Law calls {‘dressed’. These may be dressed in two ways: Intrinsically, i.e., either by their inner form that fits a given subject matter, which in law is called ‘name’, or through the present intervention of a factual giving (factive datio)}, which is taken as a cause; {or else extrinsically}, several aspects of which will be discussed in what follows. Leibniz’s marginal note (i): Rather on the contrary: contracts regarding the law of nations are intrinsically made by the law of nature itself, whereas

2 3

Natural law can be ‘modified’ in the sense that it requires interpretation too, like civil law. Leibniz defines a ‘bare pact’ by opposition to a ‘contract’: “A contract is a convention that yields action. A bare pact is a convention that does not yield action” (Contractus est conventio pariens actionem. Pactus nudus est conventio quae actionem non parit; A VI 3 615). A bare pact is thus an informal commitment that does not stipulate mutual obligations; a ‘dressed pact’, in contrast, is thus called because it stipulates the actions the involved parts are to perform.

396

Chapter 39

the extrinsic ones derive their force from the Law – which explains [the denomination] ‘name’. A contract is said to be intrinsically dressed when it is defined as a convention yielding by its own force or energy an efficient obligation and a civil action. A contract is said to be a convention whose essential basis and requisite is, I claimed above, consensus. Now, {consensus can be either true or else simulated (fictus) or presumed,}4 since it inclines the affair (negotium) towards the beneficiary (contrahens), {which later is known as a ‘quasi-contract’} Leibniz’s inter-lineal note (j): Not always this is what a quasi-contract is about. … … Mr. Stryck … defends the view that all true contracts are in fact, at present, consensual. In his The Modern Use of the Pandects,g chapter 8, [he argues that] this applies to both named and unnamed contracts, since the force of consensual contracts consists in the fact that from the mere contract one infers the obligation, prior to the intervention of anything else. This, however, overlooks the fact that a consensus between the contracting parts is not equally present in all other contracts. Had he (Stryck) employed the concept of consensus as a generic essence,h there would be no reason to disagree with him. Otherwise, as his own words highlight, if I am not mistaken, he thinks that, in all contracts, consensus alone yields perfection, whence obligation is inferred. I will be allowed to distance myself slightly from his authority in this matter, raising a negative consideration. I think indeed that his [Stryck’s] thesis is true enough so as not to be defeated by the argument concerning the force of modern pacts. Indeed, it couldn’t be possible that, through this thesis, the nature of contracts and their specific differences be jumbled, as well as part of their validity be suppressed, for both consuetudinary law and the doctrine of pacts strictly interpreted are, first and foremost, opposed to it, as has been discussed above at length. Leibniz’s marginal note (**): This is correct.

4

A ‘presumed contract’ obtains when the agent presupposes that the other would have agreed if the occasion for this had occurred. For instance, if my neighbor’s house is in fire, I presume that he would agree that I invade his house in order to put off the fire. The house owner, in this respect, is the ‘beneficiary’ mentioned in the sequel.

39. Pacts, Contracts, and Natural Law a

397

Valentin Veltheim (1645-1700), obtained an M.A. in Jena, where he also studied theology and became Professor of ethics and politics (1672), of logic and metaphysics (1679), of theology (1683), and was several times rector. He became well-known through his controversy with Pufendorf,* against whom he wrote Vera et genuina fundamenta juris naturae contra Pufendorfium (1674). In 1690 he published Theologia moralis. b Melchior Daniel Meier (†1733), historian and jurist, at first in Helmstedt, from where he sends Leibniz a small tract on law and thanks him for his comments on this text. He traveled to Holland and England and then taught history and state law in Hanover. Eventually he obtains a post as vice-archivist in Hanover. His correspondence with Leibniz encompasses eight letters exchanged between 1699 and 1703 (B 630). c Samuel Stryck (1640-1710), Professor of Law at the universities of Frankfurt am Oder and Wittenberg, author of Disputatio juridica de jure privelegiati contra privilegiatum (Frankfurt, 1684) and Usus modernus Pandectarum (Wittenberg, 1690). d A contract is ‘unnamed’ (innominatus) when it binds two persons through a reciprocal obligation which is the result of a certain action by one of them. In the Digests (19, 5, 5), four modalities of these contracts are distinguished: ‘I give in order for you to give’ (do ut des), ‘I give in order for you to do’ (do ut facias), ‘I do in order for you to give’ (facio ut des), and ‘I do in order for you to do’ (facio ut facies). In Leibniz’s philosophy of law, the kind of reciprocity characteristic of this type of contracts would belong to the level of ‘equity’ (equitas), rather than to either ‘strict’ law (jus strictum) or ‘piety’ (pietas) (see Nova Methodus Docendae Discendaeque Jurisprudentiae, A, VI, 1, 343-344). In this respect, unnamed contracts occupy a mid-position between ‘bare pacts’ and full-fledged ‘contracts’. e In other words, the act of promising followed by its acceptance amounts to the actual performance of the transference of rights. Leibniz is here proposing a condition for the ‘full performativity’ of a promise that differs from Meier’s condition for a ‘perfect promise’. On the notion of ‘performativity’ in present-day philosophy of language, see Austin (1962) and Searle (1969). f Leibniz’s basic principles of justice, canonically formulated already in the Digests (Dig. 1,1 1.10 §1), one of which is here clearly evoked, are: To live honestly, to harm no one, and to give everyone what he is due (see, e.g., De iustitia et jure; A VI 4 C 2780). g See note c. h In this sense, it would be indeed possible to say that all contracts are consensual, by virtue of having been contracted – but this would devoid Stryck’s claim of any specific content.

Chapter 40 APPROACHING THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND

Gilbert Burnet,* Bishop of Salisbury, was an important figure in Queen Anne’s court. After the Peace of Reijswick (1697), with the growth of France’s power, it became mandatory to promote the union of all Protestant churches as a basis for joint political action. In this context, Leibniz wrote to Bishop Burnet secretly informing him of the unification negotiations under way, asking for the support of the British crown, and inviting him to take part in them (December 1698; K 8 101). Although prudent in his reaction, Burnet was not indifferent to the idea – to wit his Exposition published in London in 1699, where he proposed a theological basis for uniting the Protestant churches in England. The book was received in Hanover in July 1700 and immediately arose the interest of the Lutheran theologian of the court, Molanus,* who saw it as useful for the negotiations in course in Germany on the unification of the Protestant churches. Molanus wrote to Jablonski,* the Calvinist theologian of the Berlin court, suggesting the invitation of an Anglican representative to the negotiations in question. He also wrote to Burnet congratulating him for his text, reporting on the negotiations, and commenting on Jablonski’s Latin translation of the chapter on predestination (Article 17), a translation that was published in Berlin in 1701, under the title De praedestinatione et gratia tractatus. The reactivation of the Hanover-Berlin negotiations in 1704 led Jablonski to ask Leibniz to annotate his Latin text, with a view to its possible use in the negotiations. Leibniz was familiar with the book and had already annotated it (GR 454-456); on May 12, 1702 he wrote to Burnet expressing his wish for a full Latin translation (K VIII 349). At the same time, he responded to Jablonski’s request by producing a new set of annotations for Article 17 as well as an Introduction. Jablonski approved Leibniz’s notes in 1705, and asked him to develop them and to make explicit their aim, namely the unification of the Protestant churches. On June 24, 1705, Leibniz sent to Burnet his annotations and manifested to him, according to Jablonski’s wish, the purpose for which they were written. With the abrupt interruption of the negotiations between Hanover and Berlin the whole project came to an end. Leibniz’s Burnet-related material, published by Grua (453-477) in the section “Notes sur G. Burnet”, includes several pieces. We translate here one of the

399 M. Dascal (ed.), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. The Art of Controversies, 399–417. © 2006 Springer.

400

Chapter 40 versions of the Praefatio annotatoris, the Praefatio interpretis, and the Synopsis. In the two prefaces, Leibniz develops the “expository method”, which elaborates the idea of tolerance not as the way to terminate disputes, but rather as the condition for a rational debate (see Introductory Essay, Section 2). Such a method requires the negotiators to reformulate their positions until the maximum of common ground is reached, permitting to locate precisely the points of divergence. In spite of the failure of the Jablonski-Molanus scheme, Leibniz remained interested in the issue, especially in view of his writing of the Théodicée. He composed (ca. 1706, according to GR 453) a “synopsis” of Burnet’s work, which he intended to use as a basis for his Latin writing against Bayle.* This synopsis was finally elaborated into the Causa Dei of 1709, published as an addendum to the Théodicée (GP VI 437-462). Besides its intrinsic interest, the Synopsis – also here included – shows how the proper semiotic organization of the different components of a position is an essential ingredient of Leibniz’s art of controversies, as a means of presenting them ‘formally’, i.e., orderly and visibly (see Chapters 1 and 19).

On Gilbert Burnet’s An Exposition of the 39 Articles of the Church of England A. ANNOTATOR’S PREFACE (A)1 Date: December 1705 (?) Edition: GR 457-461 Language: Latin [Already as an adolescent, I have treated the issue of freedom, contingency, fate, and predestination, and it seems to me that I have found a thread in this labyrinth, namely: I have found the root of contingency, whose notion in metaphysics bears some analogy with the nature of the incommensurables in geometry.a In the same way as the more one approaches the center of the planetary system the more it is easier to harmonize the puzzling movements of the stars, so too by penetrating more deeply than usual into these arguments, I realize that the positions held by 1

The following sentence was erased from the manuscript: “From G. G. L. to the benevolent reader, salutations”. Grua suggests that this erasure is due to Leibniz’s wish that his preface be published anonymously, as shown by the fact that the translator’s name had been omitted. These are understandable precautions, given the involvement of both of them in the negotiations.

40. Approaching the Church of England

401

defenders and critics differ among themselves less than what they seem to differ to them. In this respect, even though my present intention is not to expound the issue as a whole, I have been stimulated by the extremely elegant and intelligent dissertation of the reverend Bishop of Salisbury].2 If any doubt has disturbed since antiquity the human race, this is the question of freedom and necessity.3 In fact, already among the ancients, it seems that those who defended fate did not leave in our power anything for which we could be praised or censored.4 As for those in favor of human liberty, on the contrary, they were of the opinion that divine providence should be denied, due to the fact that it would tie the futures through a diamond-hard chain of inevitability. Facing this conflict, the candid persons lacking experience were paralyzed, as if the human endeavor for achieving virtue was vain, whereas the evil ones felt free to commit all sorts of crimes as if, once suppressed the master, there are no punishments any more or that it is useless to worry about them. With the advent of Christian theology, new difficulties arose regarding the help of divine grace in promoting good customs and God’s participation (concursus) in evil actions. When the Manicheans, reviving a remote pagan dogma, transformed divinity into a pair, as if good and evil actions had each their own God, and when the Mohammedans later on flooded the world with their violence and ignorance, both incurred in a barbarous temerity by virtue of their doctrine that the future is ineluctable. The ancients identified a sophism to which they gave the famous name of “lazy argument”,5 whose conclusion is that it is useless to do anything, for the future is the future, whether you do something or not. But this is false, for, even the lazy among us, do things that will yield future things to us. Furthermore, there is no certain future except under the assumption of its causes and their understanding, and this includes even those actions we undertake under the influence of presages. It is sometimes said that the Mohammedans, due to this false belief, do not avoid the places infected by the plague and other dangers. Among the Christians too, one can observe – and wonder – how men who are far from stupid employ this kind of reasoning, which proves too much. For, if it were valid, one would not move away from a precipice, nor would one leave a house about to fall apart; although [the argument] is used only in less evident cases or when one is driven by one’s passions or indolence. For instance, if you recommend to 2

This entire paragraph was erased. Leibniz hesitated about the precise formulation of this sentence. Instead of ‘doubt’ he first wrote ‘error’ and then ‘controversy’, later erasing both. After the word ‘question’ he wrote and then erased ‘of destiny, freedom, and divine grace’. 4 Leibniz erased, after ‘it seems that’, the following: ‘[they] subordinated everything to an uncontrollable necessity’. 5 The Greek name of this argument, logos argos, has been erased by Leibniz from the text. 3

402

Chapter 40

those who indulge in excesses that they care about their health, or to those who forebode a future illness that they take some medicine from the outset and that they consult a careful physician, they might immediately reply that their days are counted and that neither a physician nor the use of any remedy would be able to modify the fatal outcome. Furthermore, in many other public and private affairs of importance, in war as well as in peace, prudence is superseded by the belief in necessity or by the hope in one’s good luck. But this is nothing but to take refuge in the predestination of the Turks, abandoning one’s judgment and letting chance decide, like the sailor who, having lost all hope of success in the midst of a strong tempest, lets himself be carried by the waves of fate. This can only be excused when a stronger force hits us or when in the midst of uncertainty no light illuminates reason; however, no excuse is to be granted to someone who voluntarily shuts his eyes and lets the imminent evils fall upon himself. All this shows how much disgrace a mistake so widely made has brought to humankind. This mistake is responsible for most of the superstitions and for all illusions, as well as for the pernicious arrogance of the divinatory arts, through which men, instead of following truthful advice, bring ruin upon themselves as if it came from heaven. The same kind of mistake is made when one assumes that there is an astrological fate, as if what happens to us is written in the stars.b Nowadays a specific evil should be added. It is typical of Protestant Christians and originates with their theologians’ debates, particularly the controversy about predestination, which – even though it did not lead to a schism – incremented the evil in question and made it take root.c Among the Catholics,6 the [existence of a] supreme authority restrained the doctors, for otherwise no lesser hatred would have erupted among them, as shown by what happened to Michel le Bay, as well as between the Dominicans and the Jesuits and between the latter and the Jansenists – each with a different fortune, according to whether the wind blew from Rome or from the palaces.d There is no evidence that there was a contest about predestination between Luther and Zwingli. As for myself, having been interested in the question of liberty, contingency, fate and predestination since my adolescence, and having discussed it with important men, it seemed to me that I could bring some light to this subject.7 In fact, anyone will be able to easily solve the lazy sophism, once he reflects about the following: the futures are certain either in themselves, or by prescience or by divine predestination; but [it is not certain] that you will do or not do something. [For example,] it is established 6

Leibniz employs here the term ‘Pontificals’, perhaps in order to use a non-depreciative term for what the Anglicans usually dubbed ‘Papists’. 7 Leibniz erased here: ‘it seemed to me that I had found a thread in this labyrinth’.

40. Approaching the Church of England

403

that you will die in a given day, but it is not established that you will or not consult a physician, or that you will follow a diet or rather that you will commit excesses. Similarly, if you remain on dry land, you will be less liable to drown in the waves than if you plunge in the waters: for, if your death in the waters is established, it is necessary that you boarded the vessel that is about to sink, that this [sinking] took place, and that the causes of these events occurred previously (praefiniuntur).8 But there is no room for demanding that our deliberations should take into account any of these things, for since you ignore the futures or the decrees, you can only do that which conforms to what you know: for yourself, you are the future, whatever you do or fail to do; that is to say, you are the artisan of your fortune or destiny.e With a little attention and perspicacity, anyone will easily see this by himself.f Hence, it is surprising that an issue so in evidence as that of the end of life has given occasion to so intense disputes. But men, most of the time, look for the core in the bark, whereas theologians discuss the more serious issues in a more complex way. Yet, if men were willing to benefit from each other rather than to defeat each other, they would easily obtain from each other what is just.g For almost everyone agrees to defend the divine honor and to establish practices of salvation. And it seems that those who have devised the strictest formulae have sinned more in their words than in their views. In fact, there is so much agreement (consensus) regarding the most important matters, that there are not enough tears in the eyes of the well-intentioned persons that watch how the Church’s wounds prevent reunion due to so light causes. Reflecting more attentively on this, I was led to somewhat deeper meditations about the root of contingency and the origin of evil, which seem to me capable to resolve comfortably most of the difficulties. However, I had not the time to expound them with the care they deserve;h but the very elegant and sharp dissertation of the Reverend Bishop of Salisbury in the chapter devoted to the seventeenth article, in his An Examination of the 39 Articles of the Church of England, stimulated me to select [from my meditations] the most simple and appropriate one for the case in question. Its reading has moved me, so that – upon the request of some friends – I have added to it some annotations capable of paving the way towards more sure and tranquilizing reflections than those usually made.9 No doubt the illustrious author, with his arguments, has summed up the opposed opinions of the contenders so accurately and eloquently that I don’t think it would be easy to find another writing that would be more benefic for the common good as well as for my own good, for the present purpose. For, someone who is used to view every 8 9

Leibniz erased here, referring to the causes: ‘although unknown’. Leibniz erased: ‘I am not opposed to the illustrious author in anything’.

404

Chapter 40

thing as if in a table can easily comprehend the essential in each topic through brief notes.i The equanimous reader will determine to what extent this will contribute to concord. In addition to that, a priest who is a good friend,10 in whom moderation and knowledge compete, translated that dissertation into Latin, with elegance and lucidity, ornamenting it with a beautiful preface, which I praise everywhere, for it facilitates my task of making this work known to the nonEnglish reader. I have observed that, in most cases, opponents either agree with each other or can agree with each other while preserving each the essentials of his doctrine; any remaining disputes would belong to the schools rather than to the Church.j I have erased everywhere in the text the denomination ‘Lutherans’ and replaced it by ‘Evangelical’, thus called by antonomasia in German usage;k for the sectarian denomination applied to us always seemed to me inconsistent and lacking in dignity, as well as intolerable,l except by those who, either following alien usage or pushed by their own habit, are unable to notice how bad it sounds. I have further thought that with this expository method (methodus expositoria) it would be possible to go beyond mere tolerance between the churches.m It seems that the Reverend Bishop is particularly fond of this method, which he uses by placing in front of one’s eyes the weight of both sides’ arguments as if in a balance, so that one of the opponents appears to be more reasonable than the other.n The moderating effect [of this method] will prove to be even more needed once the core of the controversy – which it correctly defines – is reached, making apparent that [regarding this core] the parties converge without contest and with no detriment to the hypotheses concerning the [divine] decrees; all of which we will show at the beginning of our Annotations. We will also show, if I am not mistaken, that – concerning the order of the divine decrees, an issue in which most of the dispute consists – the problem evaporates once one considers both the connection (nexus) of things and the entire series of possibles, for the most knowledgeable of men cannot discern anything in the latter without the former. I only implore not to be seen as someone that tries to make a foolhardy and ambitious incursion in someone else’s domain:o I sincerely affirm that I have only done so due to many exhortations of friends, who practically imposed upon me the obligation to do every profitable thing I considered such. What will be treated here belongs mostly to natural theology, having been treated for a long time by the philosophers, although they are also useful for the theology revealed to the Christians, contained in the Sacred 10

Leibniz erased ‘the Reverend Jablonski, court preacher of the King of Prussia’, presumably in view of the Jablonski-Leibniz agreement to publish this material anonymously, as mentioned in our introductory note to the present text.

40. Approaching the Church of England

405

Scripture. We deal sparsely with these texts and we should not easily depart from the interpretations of the Catholic Church;p in fact, there are renowned interpreters of the divine work, endowed with all available resources, who support our opinions in this respect. We also believe that one should carefully take into account the ancient ecclesiastic sources, both those of the first centuries and the later ones – a topic quite subtly discussed by the great Augustine;q nor should we be contemptuous of the teachings of the following centuries, immediately preceding the “light of the letters”,r for even from a barbarian language, like from silex, superb sparks of deep truth sometimes spring. However, the increase in literary elegance would have yielded greater light if it had not brought, along with eloquence, rivalry and the desire to insult and condemn, instead of the moderation of the Schoolmen, for whom it was sufficient to affirm or deny and argue for both, in order to ensure the vigor of their disputes.s We follow their example, and we will not use any disqualifying comment against any opinion, except those that are explicitly injurious towards God or offend the practice of piety – none of which we expect any of the Protestant parties to do. Our aim in this work is to serve the Church; to testify to this intention with deeds will be sufficient in order to bring about the awareness that such an endeavor should not be neglected, even if it is not successful at present.t

B. ANNOTATIONS TO THE TRANSLATOR’S PREFACE11 Date: December 1705 (?) Edition: GR 466 Language: Latin Wherever Lutherans are mentioned, we have used instead Evangelical Brothers or the like, for we consider that the latter, although incorrectly used by the Reformed (even though they are also Evangelical), is more adequate than the former, which sounds sectarian.u To Paragraph VII of the Preface To show that the adversaries rely upon fairly plausible arguments is a great truth, and can contribute much to the conciliation of the opponent’s 11

Jablonski’s translation of the part referring to predestination in Burnet’s work is not included here, nor the Preface he wrote for it. Only the initial part of Leibniz’s annotations to paragraph 7 of this Preface are here included, for it is there that Leibniz elaborates upon his methodological considerations. The remaining annotations, which address in a detailed way specific theological points, illustrate the application of his method.

406

Chapter 40

spirits, for it entails that we thereby moderate our negative judgments about each other’s minds and personae. This, however, is not sufficient to tolerate doctrines in the eyes of those who consider that the opponents’ doctrines – even though they are supported by plausible arguments – remain fairly dangerous.v Therefore, although the mentioned method of plausibility is useful for ecclesiastical peace, the summarizing-cataloguing method (methodus inminuti elenchi) would have been much more useful by showing that the dissensions themselves are not as big as they seem.w This is what the annotator has tried to do in order to achieve his purpose, namely that both parties commit themselves, as propounded by him, to expound correctly their views. Nevertheless, his proposal did not consist in prescribing anything to the erudite theologians of both parties, but rather in endeavoring to grant them the occasion to let him provide in the most moderate form the formulation that ought to be put forth or approved. Hence these [formulations] were elaborated not so much with the intention of deciding but with the aim of learning and eliciting the most complete testimony of the men invested with authority.

C. SYNOPSISx Date: December 1705(?) Edition: GR 473-477 Language: Latin

40. Approaching the Church of England

Table Iy

407

408

Chapter 40

Table II12

12

The ‘coronation’ in this table presumably refers to those martyrs who faced extreme probation and were thus graced with salvation. Early medieval iconography represented these saints with crowns.

40. Approaching the Church of England

409

ON GOD Divine magnitude God’s independence. All things depend upon him, have their origin in him and are under his government, whence he intervenes in all things, including the evil ones. Physical predetermination. Omnipotence. Whereby what he wants fully (plene) occurs and, as an antecedent will or tendency, has a corresponding effect in a situation of conflict (concursus).z Anypeuthynia.13 God´s knowledge (scientia). Foundation of the foreknowledge of contingents. Knowledge of the conditionals or middle knowledge (scientia media).aa Divine goodness Degrees of will. Antecedent and consequent will. God antecedently wills all the good. wills everyone to be saved.bb On the classes of singulars. has also non-contrary conditional wills On the will for signs and approval. God consequently wills the best. On the complete will. How does he will evil? Not by itself. He permits the evil of culpability consequently, but not gratuitously. What does ‘permission’ mean here? He does not will the evil of culpability. How does he harden?cc He does not intend the evil of punishment per se. It is a subsidiary good. Nobody is punished for someone else’s sin. He is not intransigent. He does not reprove positively. He does not reprove absolutely. Predestined to be condemned?dd 14 Justice. Also according to our notions. 13 14

Freedom from the obligation to justify one’s action or decision. Grua has here “from the sage’s goodness” (ex bonitate sapientis) which is not in the manuscript.

410

Chapter 40 Not despotism. Morality arises from nature, not from God’s discretion.

What is shared by God’s greatness and goodness God is hidden, but always manifests his glory, neither only in a future century, nor only in the last day. Alien to any anthropomorphism. The freest (liberrimus) and at the same time the most determinated (determinatissimus). He contemplates himself and at the same time the nature of things, that is, his glory and the perfection of things. Nothing is vile nor despicable for him. One cannot say that he is subjected to things, although he adjusts himself to them. The origin of things. The ultimate reason of things. He examines all the possibles and chooses the best. Reciprocal participation15 among things. The dispute about the order of decrees ceases, [namely] whether that which is first in intention is last in execution or vice versa. All good originates in God. Also in evil. The nature of evil is in privation. The origin of evil. God is not the author of evil. ON MAN Differences concerning souls. On the Fall. The original sin [causes] the corruption of humankind (massa). Men are equally bad, but in different ways. Whether the [original] sin damnates without actual sin. On deceased non-baptized children. Residual freedom. Spontaneity as against coercion. Contingency as against necessity or fate. It is a necessary [thing] which is merely possible.ee Certainty without necessity. 15

Perikhorèsis (in Greek in the original) means, in theology, that things participate in each other.

40. Approaching the Church of England

411

Hypothetical necessity. Composite or divided sense. One thing is not to be possible, another not to be done. Futuribility (futuritio).16 The contingent futures of a truth, determined from itself. Determination by causes, inclines [but] does not necessitate. [There] is no complete indifference. Freedom or control of our actions. Coexists with the determination towards the best. Actual sin Its cause. See “What is shared by God’s magnitude and goodness”. God’s contribution. See “God’s magnitude”.17 Whether ignoring God is a mortal sin. Good action and the various helps to it. Internal helps. Actual and habitual grace. A sufficient help and a sine qua non help.18 Natural and supernatural helps. General and special helps Whether they are granted to infants and moribunds. Sufficient grace given to he who desires it, given to everyone, including the evil ones, given to he who does what he is able to do, given to the pagans. Helps for desiring, arousing, assisting. Efficient by itself, successful (victoriosum) Whether by itself or by accident. Whether efficient thanks to the concurring circumstances. Whether resistible or not. Regenerating19 cooperating, gratifying. Discrimination (discretio) of men. 16

A term apparently borrowed from Suárez*. See GR 353. These are cross-references to sections of “On God” above. 18 Auxilium quo et sine quo non. 19 The word “after” or “later” (postea) put by Leibniz after regenerans does not seem to be part of the text (as Grua takes it to be), but an indication to advance this item to a later position, an indication that Leibniz also marks by an arrow. 17

412

Chapter 40 [Whether] from corruption.20 Whether from ourselves. Whether a man is capable to discern himself. Whether predestination includes reprobation. Election. Whether it is, although grounded in reasons, absolute, gratuitous, foreseen by faith, in Christ. Whether it is relative (respectiva) to the least resistance, the best use of freedom.ff Whether it is controllable. Sometimes a victorious grace is granted to those who resist, correcting the worst into the optimal. One does not choose what is in itself better, but what is more adequate to the end. See “Order of decrees”. Persevering in sanctity. The gift of perseverance. Whether baptism regenerates. Whether conversion due to the events is true.gg Whether the elected are always in a state of grace and the reprobate in the contrary state.

ON PRACTICE On practice in general, according to the preceding doctrine. On God’s cult God’s magnitude must be acknowledged. God’s wisdom Nothing exists without a reason. Our dependence. God’s goodness. We should not only be obedient towards but also satisfied with [his] justice without despotism and with his love for us.hh On the organization of life Usefulness of considering freedom and certainty for vigor and tranquility. 20

Leibniz no doubt refers here to the general corruption of humankind due to the Fall. Yet the manuscript has only ex corruptioni, and not ex massa corrupta, as rendered by Grua.

40. Approaching the Church of England

413

The determination of the future does not yield lazyness, despair, licentioussness, security, neither in moral nor in spiritual matters, because certainty is not absolute, i.e., that you will do something or not, as is the case in Mohammedan fate; because it is not known; hence the usefulness of caring for the future and filial fear. Our justification is certainly known, but [God’s] election or final grace is not similarly known. It is useful for emulating God to attribute to him goodness and justice. It is contrary to the practice of virtue to attribute to God notions contrary to goodness and justice or close to tyranny and cruelty. CONCILIATION On conciliation in general Agreement (consensus) occurs when [it is accepted that] one errs more by rejecting the other’s [position] than by defending one’s own, even though the latter seems easier to do.ii Here one should deal with the imputation of consequences, the concealment of difficulties, the search of more congruent expressions, the middle way (via media),jj see Article 39 of the Church of England. Tolerance [is achieved] when salvation-related practices are kept. On the concealment of difficulties. a

The metaphor of the labyrinth and the search for a thread to escape from it is omnipresent in Leibniz’s writings, and the mathematics of the infinite figures prominently as the basic analogical model for the metaphysical thread sought for by Leibniz. The immediate antecedent for the present remark might well be the earliest plan he drafted for a theodicy, between 1695 and 1697 (GR 370-374), which begins with the sentence: “There are two famous labyrinths, [which explain] all errors: … one is that of liberty; the other, that of the composition of the continuum” (GR 371). Since the early 1670’s Leibniz wrote on the first labyrinth, e.g, in Von der Allmacht und Allwissenschaft Gottes und der Freiheit des Menschen, 1671 (A VI 2 579-580), and in the De Summa Rerum (1675-1676) he already uses the mathematical analogy (A VI 3 475). b It should be noted that the appeal to divinatory arts or to astrology is not, strictly speaking, a case of the lazy argument, for consulting the astrologers, presumably with the intention of adapting one’s actions to their predictions, amounts to “doing something”, rather than simply “abandoning oneself to the waves of fate”. Even though Leibniz lumps the two

414

Chapter 40

cases together, the distinction is quite important for the defense of his metaphysics against those who accuse it of determinism. c Predestination, in one form or the other, is accepted by Lutherans and Calvinists alike. However, the latter believe that those who are elected and destined to salvation and those who are condemned to damnation are predetermined by God’s absolute and irrevocable decree, regardless of what they may do. The former, on the other hand, believe that salvation also depends upon one’s acceptance of faith, which manifests itself in good actions. The differences in how this was formulated gave rise to a long and sometimes violent dispute among the Protestants, which Leibniz undertook to minimize pointing out its purely speculative character. See Chapter 33, note 20. d The internecine Catholic conflicts mentioned here by Leibniz are doctrinal as well as political. The conflict between Jesuits and Dominicans has to do mainly with the notion of grace, with moral issues, and with the missionary policy – especially the question of the Chinese rites (roughly between 1650 and 1710). The tension reaches a peak in 1656, when the Dominicans reject moral probabilism and condemn the Jesuits’ casuistry. The conflict between Michel le Bay (1513-1589) and the Jesuits anticipates the conflict between these and the Jansenists. Bay’s doctrines of grace, free will, and human moral impotence after the fall become the focus of an open controversy with the Jesuits. Given the extreme asymmetry of the forces involved, at a time the Jesuits enjoyed great power, Bay’s views were condemned by the Sorbonne (1560), by the universities of Alcalá and Salamanca (1566), and by Pope Pius V in the bull Ex omnibus affictionibus (1567). The conflict between Jansenists and Jesuits was moral and political, but also philosophical, insofar as it involved the conception of man and of the relationship between peoples and cultures. The first shot was Arnauld’s rection to La Mothe le Vayer’s De la vertu des payens (1637). In a violent pamphlet, De la necessité de la foi en Jesus-Christ pour être sauvé (1641), Arnauld rejects the view that pagans are susceptible of salvation. The Jesuits counter-attack, accusing Jansenius of heresy and leading to his condemnation by the Pope (1654). Since 1656, with Pascal’s Lettres provinciales, the debate focuses on morality and the Jesuit missionary policy. The philosophical sin controversy (see Chapter 32) is a particular instance of the ramifications of this conflict. e “We sin because we can and we want” (Confessio Philosophi; A VI 3 131). Indeed, this doctrine, as claimed by Leibniz in the beginning of this paragraph, appears already in youthful writings. f On the importance Leibniz grants to attention, see Chapters 16A and 18. Compare too: “The truth is that we like to wander and that it is a sort of promenade that resists being subjected to attention, to order, and to rules. It seems that we are so habituated to play and amusement that we play ourselves (nous nous jouons) even in the most serious occupations and when we less think about [playing]” (Théodicée, 56). g Compare Chapter 30. h In all likelihood, Leibniz is here referring to his metaphysical production in the second half of the eighties, which comprises, among other things, the Discours de Metaphysique (1686) and, even more explicitly related to the themes here mentioned, De libertate, fato, gratia Dei (1683-1686; GR 306-322). Eventually the more complete exposition he has in mind is to be found in the Théodicée. i This is the essence of the ‘method of exposition’, which comprises not only linear but also synoptic representation as the best means to capture the relational structure of concepts and arguments, thus allowing one to grasp – as far as possible for human limited means – a global vision of the matter at hand. j Cf. Chapter 27.

40. Approaching the Church of England k

415

Notice that the antonomasia in question, which is related to the above noticed use by Leibniz of ‘Pontificals’ instead of either ‘Papists’ or ‘Catholics’, reflecting his terminological care in not hurting Christian sensibilities, is not employed by him in the present text vis-à-vis “the Turks”, whom he unhesitatingly denominates ‘Mohammedans’. l This is an allusion to the post-reunion future state, where sectarianism is supposed to disappear. In anticipation, its terminological counterparts, suggests Leibniz, should be eliminated immediately. m See Introductory Essay, Section 4. n For other uses of the balance metaphor, see, among others, Chapters 2 and 5. o Leibniz anticipates objections to the fact that a Lutheran dares to speak about matters relative to the Anglican faith. p Leibniz means here the “universal church”, referring to his project of “catholic demonstrations” (e.g., A VI 1 494-500) that should provide a doctrinal basis acceptable to all Christian denominations. Only when based on such a shared doctrine any Christian church can be properly called “catholic” (from the Greek kathólikon, namely ‘for all’ or ‘universal’). See Chapters 8 and 26. q Presumably the reference here is to Augustine’s De civitate Dei and its providentialist philosophy of history. r Leibniz is consistent throughout his life in his defense of the (sometimes hidden) value of scholasticim against the contempt of his ‘modern’ colleagues as well as their renaissance predecessors. s In the Nouveaux Essais (4.7.11), whereas Philalethe-Locke criticizes the Schools for having “established dispute as the touchstone of people’s ability”, Theophile-Leibniz, though admitting that “the art of holding conferences and disputing would have to be entirely reshaped”, defends the “art of disputing or combating through reasons” as “very powerful and very important” (A VI 6 417-418). See also Chapter 38, where Leibniz defends the value of medieval disputations against the negative attitude towards them prevalent in his time. t The endeavor in question, which overrides the issue of which of the parties is right, is evidently that of pursuing tirelessly, in spite of successive failures, the reunion of the Christian churches – if not all of them at least the Protestant ones. u See note k and the text corresponding to it. Leibniz obviously considers this terminological matter very important. Along with the rejection of the sectarian name ‘Lutheran’ (and, a fortiori, ‘Protestant’), Leibniz wants to stress that the fact that the Calvinists called themselves ‘evangelical’ should by no means be taken to imply that the Lutherans were not ‘evangelical’. v Notice the difference between the personal dimension (“conciliation of spirits”) and the objective political dimension (“dangerous doctrines”). w Whereas the method of plausibility grants reasonability to the arguments supporting the theses in confrontation, but not necessarily to the theses themselves, the method of summarizing and cataloguing addresses directly the latter, seeking to estimate the “real distance” between them. In this sense, one might say that the method of plausibility is able to create a positive attitude or atmosphere, by preventing the de-legitimization of the opponent on the grounds that he employs unreasonable arguments, even though the position supported by such arguments may seem absurd. The method of summarizing and cataloguing, on the other hand, goes beyond that, bringing the opponents closer not only in their attitudes and thereby improving the atmosphere of the debate, but also reducing the putative gap between their positions. While the former would thus yield at best “superficial” conciliation, the latter would lead to more “substantive” conciliation.

416

Chapter 40

Jablonski, grandson of Comenius, is the main representative in the second half of the 17th century of the Calixtine position, which seeks conciliation at the more superficial level – and this is the main criticism Leibniz levels here against him. For further reflections by Leibniz on the methodological dimension of the reunification negotiations, see Chapters 16H and 27. x This synopsis sums up and organizes thematically the main theses of Burnet’s book as well as Leibniz’s comments. It seeks to provide a catalogue of the obstacles to the unification of the Protestant churches. The text is organized in three layers: (a) the general themes under debate; (b) an analytic list of topics that spells out the obstacles; (c) a set of minimal statements that serve as a basis for the discussion and orient it. Leibniz explains this kind of structure and its function when he decides to employ an analogous version of it, a couple of years later, in his argumentation against Bayle: “Since my purpose is to preserve piety and religion, and since the dogmas of the churches subscribing to the Augsburg Confession always seemed to me the surest and most adequate for this purpose, I wrote a very brief synopsis of those of my views I thought could be used in this respect, so that a basis [of discussion] would be laid down before the eyes and judgment of our most illustrious theologians” (GP III 29). In the text intended to be used against Bayle, Leibniz’s formulations are expanded and elaborated. So much so, that the whole of its ten pages corresponds only to roughly one page of the present Synopsis. One might view the present Synopsis as a kind of thematic index or catalogue of the issues that the mentioned text develops much less concisely. y We try to reproduce here the synoptic structure of Leibniz’s manuscript, which it is hard to perceive in Grua’s edition. There are two main tables and four sections detailing (part of) the tables. Leibniz indicates topics treated by Burnet but not included by him in the synopsis. These references are omitted in what follows. z The reference is to the “fight or competition between possibles” to exist (concursus possibilium): “combat entre tous les possibles, tous prétendant à l’existence” (Théodicée, 201). God’s will is decisive in the sense that it is what ultimately issues the decree of existence. According to Leibniz, such a decree is an exercise of God’s absolute freedom, but it can only be the choice of the best, so that it cannot be arbitrary. aa So called because it occupies an intermediate position between the ‘science of intelligence’ through which God knows the possibles qua possible, i.e., regardless of the actual existence or inexistence, and the ‘science of vision’ through which God intuitively grasps the existents qua existents. The latter is the knowledge God has of the decisions finite wills will make in any hypothetical set of circumstances – e.g., if the habitants of Sidon and Tyre had converted in case they had witnessed the miracles the Jews had seen. The task of this middle knowledge is to conciliate human freedom with divine prescience. See Craig (1988). bb In Théodicée, 22 (GP VI 115-116) Leibniz explains the notion of ‘antecedent will’, and says that God has a ‘serious inclination’ towards the sanctification and salvation of all men (as well as towards other things). cc In the most widely accepted Catholic doctrine, God wants salvation and thus provides sufficient graces to all men, but becomes insensitive to the recurrent sinner who does not atone responding to the grace granted him. dd The original sin engenders in every person a disposition to sin. It is controversial whether this disposition is sufficient to condemn a soul or requires actual sin, to which guilt and punishment are associated. See Théodicée (92) for a discussion of this issue.

40. Approaching the Church of England ee

417

Leibniz’s very concise formulation, Necessarium est quod solum possibile, is rather cryptic and therefore problematic as far as its understanding and translation is concerned. In the present textual environment, where he undertakes to modulate the notions of both necessity and contingency, what he has in mind is perhaps what he explains in Théodicée, 21 (GP VI 115): “One can understand evil metaphysically, physically and morally. Metaphysical evil consists in mere imperfection, physical evil in suffering, and moral evil in sin. Now, although physical and moral evil are not necessary, it is sufficient that by virtue of the eternal truths they be possible. And since the immense region of truths contains all possibilities, there must be an infinity of possible worlds, evil must be part of many of them, and even the best of them must contain evil; this is what has determined God to permit evil” (our underlining). ff In Protestant theology, especially Calvinist, original sin corrupts human nature, but it does not eliminate freedom completely. The remaining freedom, within the limitations imposed by the fact that it is a basically corrupt nature that makes use of it, can still be “well” used, either by virtue of not resisting grace or by choosing the least evil of the available alternatives. gg Whereas baptism is an indelible gift of grace, it is questionable whether the particular events occurring in the course of life that may lead to faith are sufficient for ensuring grace. hh See Chapter 18. ii See Chapter 17. jj Luis Molina (1535-1600) reformulates the doctrine of predestination in the light of the “middle knowledge” (see note aa) God has of the ‘futuribles’, by means of the thesis of post praevisa merita. God is said to predestine a person to salvation after he foresees her merits as future ones. In this way, both grace and free will ‘cooperate’ towards salvation.

Chapter 41 DIALECTIC PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION

In this set of closely related writings, Leibniz makes use of the strategy he will later develop and generalize in the Théodicée against Bayle’s* fideistic argument.a According to Bayle, since the belief in a single and perfect principle as governing all things is incompatible with the existence of evil, the belief in God cannot be based on reason but only on the authority of faith. Leibniz’s strategy consists in questioning the second of Bayle’s premises, namely, that the objections of the Manicheans and others raise “difficulties that human reason cannot resolve” – which would prove the incompatibility in question. It comprises two steps, one based on logical considerations, the other on dialectical ones. First, he distinguishes between the human inability “to detail the reasons that have led God to permit evils” and God’s actually having such reasons, in spite of their being inaccessible to humans. In the light of this distinction, he contends that the objections cannot demonstrate the incompatibility, i.e., they cannot be ‘absolutely invincible’. On the contrary, it must be always possible to rebuke objections ‘against the truth’ – the truth here being that there are (or at least may be) reasons for a perfect being to permit evil – otherwise reason would contradict itself by both proving and disproving the same proposition. But this logical point is not sufficient against an objector who would demand the proof of the truth in question, rather than just accepting its assumption. The second step relies on the dialectical principle – in use in scholastic disputatio – that the defender of a thesis does not have to prove it, but only to refute successfully the opponent’s objections. It is this asymmetry in the burden of proof that allows to dissociate between the ‘defensibility’ of a thesis and its ‘provability’, the latter – but not the former – requiring the thesis’ full intelligibility and justifiability, though both certainly grant it a rational status, albeit ‘weaker’ in one case than in the other. The texts gathered in the present chapter represent, thus, a stage in Leibniz’s thought in which, facing a threatening, sharp skeptical opponent,b he thinks first and foremost dialectically, harnessing dialectical and logical means not

419 M. Dascal (ed.), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. The Art of Controversies, 419–427. © 2006 Springer.

420

Chapter 41 only to achieve argumentative and ‘political’ victory, but also to shape the new epistemic concepts needed for this purpose.

A. THE STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS OF REASON Leibniz criticizes here Bayle’s reply to Jaquelot’s* critique of his position in his book on the conformity of reason with faith.c Leibniz’s critique consists in pointing out that Bayle overlooks the asymmetry between proving and refuting. Rational methods may not be strong enough to account for something with certainty and completeness – being able to provide only less perfect accounts of the thing in question; but they may be strong enough to refute specific objections against the ‘weak’ account they have provided. Applied to religion, this means that, although they are neither rationally provable nor fully intelligible, the mysteries of faith are not, because of this, rationally indefensible.

Date: 1706 Edition: GR 62 Language: French “Nevertheless he limits himself to showing that the philosophical objections against religion are so strong that our reason is too weak for resolving them”. As for myself, I think that this amounts, ultimately, to an attack.1 Reason can be too weak for explaining, proving, discovering something, but it is not too weak for replying to a misleading objection. To hold the opposite view is to turn upside down all the lights of reasoning and to admit that something false can be demonstrated; and to be demonstrated is nothing but to be proved in such a way that reason would not be capable of replying…

B. BETWEEN BAYLE AND LE CLERC* Bayle’s Réponse is a reply to a second round of criticism by Le Clerc, in the 9th volume of his journal, Bibliothèque choisie, in the wake of Bayle’s earlier reply to Le Clerc, in Réponses aux questions d’un provincial. Though expressly referring to the article “Manicheans” in Bayle’s Dictionnaire Historique et Critique,d the polemics – whose tone had become quite aggressive – turns in fact on a fundamental opposition about whether reason and faith are compatible. On the whole Leibniz was on the side of Le Clerc. “If I had to decide between them –

1

The use of ‘attack’ indicates that Leibniz is here conceptualizing the issue in dialectical terms. The original (pour moy je croys que dans le fond c’est attaquer) does not spell out who is attacking and who is attacked.

41. Dialectic Principles and their Application

421

he writes to Burnett – I would incomparably prefer the Origenist party of Mr. Le Clerc over the Manichean party of Mr. Bayle” (GP III 310).e But he was not interested in making his preference publicly known. Being in the midst of a debate with Bayle about his own thesis of pre-established harmony, he did not want to open a new front against him, and rejected Basnage de Beauval’s invitation to this effect (GP III 143-144). In fact, he was worried by the public impact of debates of this kind (see C below), which he considered to be harmful to religion. He suggested to Basnage, instead of a direct confrontation with Bayle, a stratagem for taking advantage – for the benefit of religion – of the latter’s proven argumentative abilities.f Yet, this confrontation, which couldn’t but touch on the central issue of the compatibility of reason with faith, was already in the offing, and Leibniz is about to confront Bayle directly on this matter in the “Discours préliminaire de la conformité de la foy avec la raison”, which opens the Théodicée. Here, he takes the opportunity of the clear summary of Bayle’s argument provided in the Réponse for highlighting its logical and dialectical fundamental weakness.

Date: 1706 Edition: GR 62-64 Language: French

Réponse pour M. Bayle à M. le Clercg In the Reply to Mr. Le Clerc on behalf of Mr. Bayle, one finds on page 18 the following: “Mr. Bayle’s doctrine (which is here in question) can be reduced to the following three propositions: Natural light and Revelation teach us clearly that there is only one Principle of all things and that this Principle is infinitely perfect. The way to reconcile the moral and physical human evil with all the attributes of this one and only infinitely perfect Principle of all things surpasses philosophical lights; so that the Manicheans’ objections leave open difficulties that are irresolvable by human reason. In spite of that, it is necessary to firmly believe that which natural light and revelation teach us about the unity and infinite perfection of God, just as we believe by faith and by our submission to divine authority in the mysteries of trinity, incarnation, etc.” It seems to me that there is something to be said about the second proposition. It puts together two quite different things, one of which can be true without the other. For, it could be true that we cannot explain distinctly how the physical and moral human evil is in agreement with God’s perfection, i.e., in what makes the detail of the reasons that led God to permit these evils; but it does not follow that the objections raised in this respect could not be resolved.

422

Chapter 41

For it is possible that God has such reasons without it being possible for us to point them out. And whoever wants to raise an irresoluble objection must prove that it is impossible that God could have these reasons. That is to say, it is necessary that the objector provide an argument inferring God’s imperfection from the permission of evil and that this argument be such that it is impossible to rebuke it properly; in other words, this argument must be well formed and, concerning its matter, it must be such that all the propositions in it be either granted or proved by another argument of the same kind. Now, I claim that such an argument is not available if one assumes that propositions I and III are true, and that if it were available it would have been a demonstration. For, what is a demonstration if not an argument that one cannot rebuke properly? To say that one must admit what Reason or Revelation teaches us in spite of there being invincible objections to it is to suppose an impossible case. For, an invincible objection is the demonstration through which reason teaches us that a proposition is false; but it is not possible that Reason or Revelation teach us the pro and the contra. Consequently, I consider it a fact that one can respond to all the objections that can be made against the truth, even though this response is not always capable of explaining up to the bottom the nature of the thing. The same happens in human affairs. A great Prince whose wisdom cannot be called into question neglects to take advantage of some big benefit or to avoid some big evil, without our being able to know for what reason. Bold people would say that he has behaved wrongly; but there will also be those who will say that one has to believe that he had higher reasons for his behavior, although they are not able to point out what they are. Often it is the case that what seems to be is not: When Gramond let himself be beaten by order of Cardinal Richelieu in order to embarrass the king and make him have recourse to the Cardinal, everybody thought that Gramond had failed to do what he ought to have done; but those who would have known his reasons would have judged that the soldier had in fact yielded to the politician.h Almost all of France believed that the king of France had made a mistake in signing the peace of Ryswyk;i yet, the following events showed that it had not been a bad decision at all.

C. LETTER TO JAQUELOT This is a reply to Jaquelot’s letter of 4 April 1706 (GP III 482), where he impatiently complains about Leibniz’s breach of his promise to go see him in Berlin. Leibniz had expected Jaquelot to make a stopover in Hanover in his way to Holland, but Jaquelot says he cannot assure this, because he is not “the master

41. Dialectic Principles and their Application

423

of the road”. He also expresses his irritation due to the “impertinent summary” a friend of Bayle published of his book and says he is still considering whether to respond in kind. Leibniz advises, instead, moderation, “avoiding what can offend” Bayle, whose abilities he praises.j He then elaborates the points he made in texts A and B above, albeit with a different emphasis in each of the available versions of this letter.2

Date: 6 October 1706 Edition: GR 64-68 Language: French

To Isaac Jacquelot Monsieur, The reason I delayed my reply was the expectation of your passage, but now I will gladly write you even before I have the honor to see you. As I conceive my system, there is nothing which is not connected. My relationship towards it resembles that of Mr. Caritidès about his placet in Les Fâcheux, where he says: “No, Sir, not a single word can be removed”.k I am glad to learn that you will reply to Mr. Bayle, and I have no doubt that you will do it, Sir, as you have already done, that is, in such a way that a bright and knowledgeable person, who can still do so much service to the letters an even to religion if he decides to make this his goal, will be led to do so, rather than being turned away from it. … this is why I am annoyed by the big quarrel he [Bayle] has had with Mr. le Clerc, another excellent person, very able to enlighten us. Both ought to turn their efforts into instructing us about many things and advancing each on his side without clashing with each other and without mixing personal contestations with the discussion of things. One should hope that highly capable people apply their intelligence and knowledge to edifying truths rather than to dangerous paradoxes and to error, be in the form of objections or otherwise. As far as I am concerned, I am far from being irritated by the unjust and erroneous objections a penetrating mind addresses to me against truth; on the contrary, I am rather pleased to examine them. For, objections such as these always serve to clarify what is at stake and to shed new light on it. Yet, what is good for learned and thinking persons may sometimes cause damage to others, especially when the objections made against those truths about which it is 2

We will use the second version, the one Grua calls “B”, as the basis for this translation, introducing the significant parts of version “A” not present in “B” indented in the appropriate position.

424

Chapter 41

important that the public be persuaded are not raised with all the necessary caution. But I wish these objections would be written in Latin books, or those who are read only by learned people like the Schoolmen, especially when what is at stake are truths regarding which it is important that the public be persuaded. I find, however, that Mr. Bayle makes the objections stronger than they are, when he claims that there are invincible ones against the truth. The reply to the questions of a provincial and the one that has just been made on his behalf to Mr. le Clerc seems to me to involve some difficulty when it says on p. 18 […]3. For, if the manner of making evil consonant with God’s perfection means detailing the reasons that lead him to permit evils, this manner might be inexplicable, since it depends, maybe, upon the universal harmony, which involves the infinite. The objections raised against permitting evil, however, can and must be susceptible of a good solution, since it is not necessary that he who replies to an objection justify a priori his thesis and explain in depth every one of the obscure and different aspects it contains. Yet, it is necessary that ingenious persons capable of application be able to find the means to reply to the objections; otherwise there would be no longer any obscurity in this respect, for it would be clear that the thesis is false; and it would be wrong to hold for certain that which is refuted by an objection to which one is incapable of replying appropriately. […] I believe most of those who have discussed in depth the use of reason in theology, like Vedelius, Musaeus,l and others, will agree with what I just said. It is true that whoever is well persuaded of a truth is not under the obligation to examine all the objections that can be raised against it, and that it would be wrong for most people to try to do it. It is also true that one should not distance oneself from the letter of the text, when the contrary reasons are merely verisimilar. But everyone agrees that Reason and Revelation could not teach an absurdity. On the issue of the origin of evil, whoever wanted to present an invincible objection to God’s goodness and wisdom would have to prove for example that evil could be avoided without loss of some more considerable good. But in order to prove this thesis, it wouldn’t be enough to say that someone else could not prove the contrary, nor to show the connection of these evils with greater goods, for it is sufficient 3

What we omit here is proposition II, quoted in text B above.

41. Dialectic Principles and their Application

425

to be able to say that this connection is possible as long as the contrary be proved. But this, no one would undertake to do, since an absurdity would follow from it, namely, that God would not have acted according to the most perfect wisdom; since it is true that there is an infinitely perfect God who has permitted evil, one must say with St. Augustine that he has done so for a greater good, even though it is above the forces of human reason to show a priori and in detail in what this good consists. For, it suffices to know roughly and a posteriori that it is necessary that such a thing be, since the evil has effectively occurred and God exists. If someone thinks otherwise and believes truth can get entangled in the difficulties consisting in invincible objections, he deprives himself from the means of knowing truth, or he recognizes two contradictory truths. I am of the opinion, therefore, that one can and must reply to the objections of the libertines, atheists, infidels, and heretics, and I entirely approve what the last Lateran Council recommends to Christian philosophers – with the intention of prompting them to apply themselves to responding to the bad reasons of those Averroists and other peripateticians who claimed at the time that the immortality of the soul was true according to faith and false in philosophy.m And I applaud your intention to defend faith against the objection originating in modern philosophy. As for the principal issue of the Agreement between Faith and Raison, I hold the common opinion, namely, that one must distinguish between what is above Reason and what is against Raison. That is to say, there are quite a few things in Faith and even in Nature that we cannot sufficiently explain and which we cannot justify (rendre raison). But there is no truth of Faith or Nature that is against Reason. And this decision is evident, since Reason, in the sense I give to this term here, is nothing but a chain of truths, and the truth cannot be double or contrary to itself. From this it follows also that there cannot be an invincible objection against the truth. For, an absolutely invincible argument is nothing but a demonstration. And such an invincible objection is in fact the demonstration of the falsity of the thesis. Let me explain what is an absolutely invincible argument, in order to avoid such claims as that what is invincible for some people might not be invincible for others or that an objection that all men together cannot resolve might be resolved by the angels. For me, an absolutely invincible or demonstrative argument has characteristics of certainty, which are recognizable by virtue of logic. These characteristics are: when an argument is invincible, when reduced to order it must be in good form according to the rules and that the premises be either certain or proved by another argument

426

Chapter 41

of the same kind; and this should go on until one reaches the point where one needs only propositions that are certain. Therefore, there will always be the possibility to reply to an argument that is not demonstrative either by showing that the form is not perfect in some step of the chain or else by denying the certainty of some premise. To be sure, this rigor as it is applied in mathematics and in the establishment of all eternal truths is not always needed (de saison) in contingent and natural matters, where one follows rather the highest verisimilitude. But it is needed when one wants to argue against a mystery of faith, for what is at stake is not what has verisimilitude as such, since the mysteries are sometimes contrary to the appearances, although they cannot be contrary to what is certain. I am sure you will show this clearly in your writings, and in the meantime I greet you, Sir, your humble and obedient servant.

a

For an analysis of Leibniz’s application of this innovative strategy to the issue of the mysteries of faith in the Théodicée, as compared to earlier strategies he had employed on this issue, see Dascal (1987: Chapter 6). b “Mr. Bayle avoids continuing his discussion of my opinions, for he seems to be afraid to be forced to abandon his skepticism” (To Thomas Burnett, 6 July 1706; GP III 310). Contrast this with the self-effacing attitude expressed in the quote in note f. c I. Jaquelot, Conformité de la foi avec la raison, ou Défense de la religion contre les principales difficultés répandues dans le Dictionnaire Historique et Critique de M. Bayle (Amsterdam, 1705). The passage of Bayle Leibniz quotes is from volume III, p. 642 of Réponses aux questions d’un provincial (Rotterdam, 1706). d Le Clerc had focused on this article, in his Défense de la Providence contre les Manichéens dont les raisons ont été proposées par M. Bayle dans son Dictionnaire critique (1699). e Origen defended, against the Manicheans, the existence of a single principle. Leibniz goes on to explain his reasons: “The one undertakes to amplify God’s goodness; the other reduces both divine goodness and power” (ibid.). f “But to undertake to satisfy expressly the difficulties raised by Mr. Bayle, as you seem to advise me to do, Sir, is what I am afraid I could not do without harming religion. For, I would only provoke such an able man to present his difficulties, if possible, in an even better light, without my being sure of being able to remedy the evil I would have thus caused. In order to refute Mr. Bayle profitably, I would propose the following stratagem (invention): Someone would undertake to combat the arguments he makes from time to time in favor of religion; by thus obliging him to support them, he would be forced to say a thousand beautiful things that would be advantageous to religion and to himself; for example, when he disputes against Mr. Bernard about God’s simplicity, he shows very well that a composite being is not a being endowed with true unity; he also excellently shows in many places that a being that thinks must be a simple substance without parts and that, therefore, it is not subject to destruction” (GP III 144). Maneuvers such as these, presumably justifiable by the higher good they would bring about (see Chapter 16F-G), seem to be, however, unworthy of the moral and intellectual respect due to the other (Chapter 17).

41. Dialectic Principles and their Application g

427

Réponse pour Mr Bayle à Mr Le Clerc, au sujet du 3. et du 13. article du 9. tome de la Bibliothèque choisie, Rotterdam, R. Leers, April 1706. [Later included in P. Bayle, Œuvres Diverses IV, 1631), 989-1009]. h Gabriel Barthélemy Gramond (1590-1654), President of the Parliament of Toulouse and member of the State Council. The episode Leibniz reports reveals Richelieu’s machiavellianism and casts doubt about the ethical basis for the ‘strategic’ use of the Other’s Place Principle, defended in Chapter 17. i The Treaty of Rijswijk, which put an end to the war between France and the Great Alliance, was signed in the Fall of 1697. j On this typical leibnizian attitude towards debates, see Chapter 31E, as well as the letters to Thomas Burnett of 29 May and 6 July 1706 (GP III 306, 310). k Caritidès, a pedantic valet, is one of the annoyers in Molière’s Les Fâcheux, who asks Marquis Eraste (Act III, Scene 2) to submit to the King a job request on his behalf. (Such petitions were known as placet, Latin for ‘approved’.) When Eraste complains that the petition is too long, Caristidès, proud of his superior literary creation (“Tant de méchants placets, Monsieur, sont présentés, qu’ils étouffent les bons”), adamantly refuses to shorten it, uttering the sentence quoted by Leibniz. l Quoted by Bayle, Réponses, III, p. 652; also mentioned in Théodicée, Discours Préliminaire, 20 and 67. m Ibn-Rushd (Averroes) himself never held the double truth theory, which he in fact opposed. It was nevertheless widely attributed to him by Christian theologians in the Middle Ages, ignorant of his main works. On the fifth Lateran Council’s condemnation of this doctrine, see Chapter 25, note k.

Chapter 42 THE HISTORY AND TASKS OF LOGIC To Cornelius Dietrich Koch

Cornelius Dietrich Koch (1676-1724) was a professor of philosophy in Helmstedt. His polemics with Christian Wolff about the significance of identical propositions was well-known in post-leibnizian circles. The occasion of the present letter is a proposal of a history of logic sent to him by Koch. In the present letter, which can be seen as complementing in this respect the letter to Wagner (Chapter 38), Leibniz conceives the history of logic (as well as logic itself) in broader terms than usual – be it as presented in the Aristotelian textbooks or in the Port Royal Logic. The expression “the art of thinking”, employed in the first paragraph of the letter, strongly suggests an allusion to the Port Royal text (see note b). As it will become clear in the present letter, Leibniz’s notion of “art of thinking” is much more encompassing than that of Port Royal. In this respect, logic in this restricted and more traditional sense – here described by the phrase “use of reason” (usus rationis) – is for Leibniz only a part of his broader project of a comprehensive art of thinking. This project is expounded, for example, in Chapter 15. The present letter, edited by Gerhardt according to the manuscript found in the Leibniz Archive in Hanover, is much longer than the one Leibniz actually sent to Koch, whose original, published by L. Stein in 1888 (“Die in Halle gefundenen Leibnizbriefe”, Archiv für die Geschichte der Philosophie 1: 398-400), includes the following annotation, which is missing in the manuscript: “Dabam Brunsvigae 2. Sept. 1708”. This seems to be the most likely date, although the letter may also have been written before, being sent only later, in a reduced version. The present translation is of the larger version, published by Gerhardt and revised according to the Hanover manuscript. We include between angle brackets the passages Leibniz suppressed. Because these passages usually refer to personal assessments by Leibniz, be it on the Casuists, on Jungius,* or on other thinkers, their elimination by Leibniz is of considerable interest, in a letter that, as the present one, refers to what must be included in a history of logic. In the reduced version actually sent by Leibniz, there are also added passages, which are here placed between double angle brackets.

429 M. Dascal (ed.), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. The Art of Controversies, 429–434. © 2006 Springer.

430

Chapter 42

Date: 2 September 1708 Edition: GP VII 476-479; LBr 86 Bl. 47-48 Language: Latin

To Cornelius Dietrich Koch I thank you for the program where you expound the very praiseworthy project of establishing the basis for a History of Logic and ask for my opinion about it.a It remains to be known whether under the term logic you include the entire art of thinking or only the art that consists in the use of reason.b Indeed you notice that in a broad sense the arts of imagination and memory also belong to [logic]. But even if you only take as logic the art of reason, again the latter is in fact double, depending on whether it deals with the art of expounding or the art of verifying. In both there is room for judgment and invention. And again, in judgment as in invention use can be made of analysis and synthesis.c The little book on the art of combinations, which you say you have sought in vain, was composed and published by me when still an adolescent, in Leipzig in 1666; it was later re-published1 without my knowledge.d The art of combinations corresponds to synthesis. There are two degrees in verifying, for either the way to truth is certain or else we must content ourselves with verisimilitudes – which is the case when there are not enough data to determine the truth. However, the doctrine of verisimilitude has not yet been studied by anyone with the consideration it deserves. To be sure, Aristotle identified probability, which he deals with in the Topics, with the applause and authority of others. He calls éndoxa that which pleases others and parádoxa that which does not please them.e For that very reason, he gives rules accepted by the common public, which are more appropriate to win the approval of others than to inquire about verisimilitude; the latter depends not so much on others’ judgment as it does on the things themselves, and does not rest on topoi considered to be sufficiently firm but rather on other, broader foundations. The Casuists, who have written reasonably enough on probabilities in moral issues, also follow Aristotle in this respect, but apply [his doctrine] inadequately to matters of conscience, where the verisimilitude of things must be heeded more than the opinion of men.f Although the judgments and testimony of others also somehow concern verisimilitude.2 I place this part of logic among the desiderata, although its seeds are dispersed here and there, and nowhere to 1

2

Gerhardt has recusus (non-existent in Latin, which suggests ‘rejected’), but the manuscript has recursus (lit. ‘re-appeared’). Added by Leibniz: “although they are only a part of it insofar as people are also to be counted among things. For there is some verisimilitude in this: in that we believe that the others perceive (sentire) correctly”.

42. The History and Tasks of Logic

431

such an extent as among Jurists, where presumptions, indications, conjectures and proofs that may be more complete or less complete are everywhere brought to consideration. Therefore, it would be useful for the History [of logic] to deal with all these parts.g And it would also be very valuable for the work [i.e., the History of Logic] to investigate if there is room to acknowledge the existence of some correct account of the syllogistic forms prior to Aristotle; for it seems hardly likely to me that he discovered this doctrine by himself and carried it forward to such an extent.h In any case it was later thinkers who appropriately added the fourth figure, which Averroes attributed to Galen, although there is no trace thereof in the Galenic writings that have been preserved. As far as concerns what is usually called the indirect modes of the first figure, they actually belong to the fourth.3,4 I discovered long ago that there may be up to six valid modes of this figure, no more and no less. I would like to know who was the first to make the remark on distributed and non-distributed terms, whence derives the rule that a term not distributed in the premises cannot be distributed in the conclusion, for there is no trace of this in Aristotle; and yet, these rules allow for proving the useful modes more economically than Aristotle’s [rules]. The authors of Summae and other Schoolmen like them produced some blameless things among many inane others.5,i It would also be useful to study the interrogative (interrogatoria) method of disputation of the Ancients, and this art could somehow be reconstructed from the dialogues of the Socratics. Nevertheless, this is more useful for the counter-examination of those involved in litigations than for the debates of philosophers, and yields better results in bringing out to light what men know than in investigating what they know not.j In addition, you cite the author of an art of using reason, illustrated mostly with juridical examples. I do not know who its author may be, nor which are the associations of Philoanalytics in Germany;6 Concerning 3

Erased by Leibniz: “if only one transposes the premises”. On Leibniz’s theory of the syllogism, see Couturat (1901: Chap. 1). 4 Erased by Leibniz: “Some logicians mistakenly included [the indirect modes in the first figure] so as to avoid the fourth Galenic figure. For, to tell the truth, the sole transposition of premises does not alter the figure, since the premise that contains the major or the minor term of the conclusion, whichever place the premise is put in, is always the major or the minor premise. However, because the modes of the first figure called indirect have their middle predicate in the major proposition and the middle subject in the minor proposition, they doubtless belong to the fourth figure, not to the first”. 5 Leibniz’s addition: “and they do not deserve to be disdained at all. You know well that Petrus Hispanus reached the Papacy”. 6 Added by Leibniz: “At any rate, one should still follow Jungius’s recommendation about the need to take into account the referent in explaining the meaning”. We have given here an expanded translation-interpretation of the Latin text, which is extremely condensed: Jungii ea de re consilium intra destinata stetit. We take this to refer to the demand, which

432

Chapter 42

Reimann’s Logical History, Mollerus found fault with the bookle’s title, as you remember; but a little later Reimann replied [to him] in the Historiae Literariae Sciagraphia.k As regards Joachim Jungius, it is fit to mention him with the greatest praise, for in my assessment he was the greatest man of his time, and exceeded all others with his science of true logic, including the author of a certain Art of thinking.l,7,m As for myself, I do not know whether I have succeeded in communicating something to my friends with respect to my logical proofs, except perhaps that which I proposed on the 24 useful modes, i.e., six in each of the figures.n,8 a

b

7

8

The historiography of logic is a relatively recent undertaking in the history of ideas. Traditionally, Petrus Ramus* was considered to be the first historian of logic, by virtue of his “Historical Introduction” in the first book of his Scholae in Liberales Artes (Basel, 1569). Bartholomew Keckermann´s three logical works (Hanover, 1598, 1605, 1613) addressed the history of logic in a more systematic and rigorous way. In the 17th century interest on this subject grew and several histories of logic were written, the most important of which is due to Reimann (see note k). The expression “the art of thinking” (l’art de penser) was used by Arnauld* and Nicole as equivalent to “logic” in the title of their La Logique ou l’Art de Penser (2nd ed., 1664). Known as “The Port Royal Logic”, this book became the most important logic textbook in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. In spite of its many conceptual Jungius was first to proclaim in a non-intuitive manner, that the truth value of propositions be judged according to the semantic criterion of reference. On Jungius and on Leibniz’s appreciation for his logic, see Introductory Essay, Section 3. Erased by Leibniz: “Locke, of whom I have a mediocre opinion in this field, for, although he is quite an ingenious man, he is not sufficiently solid and profound”. At the end of the letter, Leibniz added this full paragraph: “As I write this, a program of yours has fallen into my hands that you published some years ago on the only way of resolving every sophism. But, to tell the truth, I do not wholly approve of the affirmations that are made proceeding from that author of the Art of thinking. It is true that the conclusion by the force of form may not be inferred from a single premise of a syllogism, although when one considers the matter [rather than the form], one may overlook even more easily the other premise. In this it can be said that only the conclusion is taken into consideration, and not the other [premises]. Furthermore, the difficulty does not always lie in the minor [premise], but not infrequently it is rather the major [premise] that has to be proven. And often it is of great interest for judging to supply the [premises] omitted in the Enthymemes, since the snake of erroneous arguments hides in that grass. Therefore, after the invention of the rules of syllogisms, to wish for a single principle of judgment independent from formal rules would be to regress from the already-discovered art to the state of rough nature. To reply by arguing that there is no omitted reason in the argument would be but to answer to the conclusion, claiming that no omission has been performed [regarding the conclusion]. But if this is permitted, the same subterfuge would also ruin excellent syllogisms, unless we finally return to form or to matter, i.e., to the premises. Still, a certain form of alignment may be conceived, thanks to which it is possible to discover the inconsequence of non-legitimate modes, if only certain remarks be added. For in syllogisms there is a certain imitation of mathematics”. Leibniz repeats here verbatim a claim made in De formis syllogismorum mathematice definiendis (A VI 4 497).

42. The History and Tasks of Logic

433

innovations, it divides logic in its traditional four parts, which deal, respectively, with concepts, judgments, reasoning, and method. c As pointed out by Couturat (1901: 178-182), the so-called “methods” of analysis and synthesis are viewed by Leibniz as procedures used in a complementary way both in the art of discovery and in the art of judgment (cf. FC VII 123; C 557, 572; GP VII 183). See Chapters 12A and 30, as well as Dascal (1971). d In 1690, an unauthorized re-edition of the book appeared in Frankfurt. Leibniz was upset by this, especially because the publisher did not mention that it was a work written in his youth. He reacted by publishing a disclaimer in the Acta Eruditorum (February 1691), where he makes clear that he no longer holds the views expressed in that book and announces that he had already been working in a new “Art of Combinations” (Ravier 1966: 215). There are two drafts of Leibniz’s ideas for this (C 560-561; C 561-563), one of them dated 1680. In both of them his intention to expand considerably the scope of the art of combinations is patent. The “ignorance” Leibniz imputes to his youthful production lies perhaps in his awareness of the mistakes he had made there. Nevertheless, he considers, as late as 1686, the foundations laid down in that book as valuable (Chapter 30). e Aristotle, Topics 100b21-23. f On Leibniz and the issue of the examen de conscience, see Chapter 33, note d. Leibniz opposes both, a pure subjective “examination of conscience” as defended by the Calvinists and Cartesians, and an “objective” one, as practiced by Jesuit Casuistry, whose objectivity, however, is based only on a sort of “phenomenology of opinions”. On Leibniz and Casuistry, see Chapter 33, note ff. g It is apparent here how, through his distinction between “verisimilitude” and “probability”, Leibniz endeavors to avoid the reduction of the epistemic value of probabilities either to its Pascalian mathematical matrix or to its Aristotelian topical matrix. See Introductory Essay, Section 3. h We know today that the theory of syllogism indeed precedes Aristotle, having been developed first in sophistic discussions about logic and grammar, as well as in Plato’s philosophy. This was first pointed out by Präntl (1853). i Leibniz, contrary to the influential Baconian and Cartesian attitude, was among the few “modern” philosophers who did not disdain the logical heritage of the Middle Ages, as is made clear in note 5. Pedro Julião, alias Hispano, born in Lisbon, became Pope John XXI in 1276. More than as pope he is remembered as a philosopher and logician. He wrote a logical treatise, later called Summulae Logicales, probably the most influential logical treatise in the 13th century. It was still used up to the 17th century (see the Gymnasium Speculationum of 1605, a collection of texts for philosophy students at the University of Paris, of which the Summulae form the logical chapter). j Leibniz is here relating the medieval method of quaestiones (as in, e.g., Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologica and Summa Contra Gentiles) to Socratic maieutic, and pointing out their essential limitation, namely the fact that both are epistemically insufficient in so far as they do not provide tools of discovery. As opposed to this, Leibniz’s art of controversies, which is a part of his broader conception of logic, purports to offer means to expand knowledge. See Introductory Essay, Section 3. k Jakob Friedrich Reimann (1668-1743) is considered in Germany as the founder of the history of literature. The term sciagraphia in his book’s title, taken from architecture, means “plan”. He was headmaster of the Hildesheim Gymnasium and corresponded with Leibniz. Of particular significance in the context of this letter is his critique of current approaches to logic in De logices Aristotelicae, Rameae, Cartesianae, et ecclectiae insufficientia (1697).

434 l

Chapter 42

See note b. Leibniz was not very appreciative either of Locke´s knowledge of logic or of his negative attitude towards scholastic logic as expressed, for example, in the Essay (Introduction, Paragraph 2). In a marginal annotation to a letter of Koch addressed to him (7 May 1715), for example, Leibniz writes: “The vulgar logic of the Scholastics is more useful than many think, as Wolff acknowledges in his dissertation De methodo mathematica elementis. Locke and others who despise it do not understand it” (GP VII 481). On Leibniz’s relations with Locke, see Introductory Essay, Section 5. n Notice Leibniz’s carefully selective appreciation of his own logical work, which he repeats and elaborates in the letter to Koch of August 31, 1710 (GP VII 481). On the mathematization of the 24 syllogistic modes mentioned by Leibniz, see Schedae de novis formis et figuris syllogisticis (C 205-209) and De formis syllogismorum Mathematice definiendis (A VI 4 497-505). m

Chapter 43 BOLD CONJECTURES To Louis Bourguet

Louis Bourguet* corresponded with Leibniz during the last decade of his life and kept him updated about recent publications and ongoing debates, sometimes expressing his own views. On one such occasion, referring to the difficulty of choosing between different cosmological hypotheses, Leibniz demands from Bourguet to do what he himself avows to be unable to do in this case, namely, to employ strict formal reasoning.a The present letter deals, as usual, with many topics. It has been included in this volume mainly for three reasons: the critique of recent philosophical and scientific controversies, in which Malebranche,* among others, is involved (see also notes 1 and i); the remarks, near the end, on the art of conjectures and probabilities; and Leibniz’s own boldness in making conjectures as well as taking a stand in a ‘hot’ controversy in ‘biology’ – the issue of the generation of animals.

Date: 22 March 1714 Edition: GP III 564-570 Language: French

To Louis Bourguet I have been told more than once that people have received news of my death. The same thing happened to Mr. Magliabecchi,b who was quite angry about it. In Germany they say that it means a long life. I am quite indifferent about it and I think it means nothing. But I am not at all indifferent to see that you, sir, and the renowned Mr. Vallisnieri,c have been so impressed by it. I am indeed obliged to you on this and I wish you had not grieved over me in vain. I strongly wish that one could further investigate the important point of the generation of animals, which could bear some analogy with that of 435 M. Dascal (ed.), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. The Art of Controversies, 435–443. © 2006 Springer.

436

Chapter 43

plants.1 Mr. Camerarius of Tübingen believed that the grain is like the ovary and the pollen (although in the same plant) resembles the male’s sperm.d But even were that true, the question would always remain, whether the basis for metamorphosis or the preformed living being is in the ovary, following Vallisnieri, or in the sperm, following Leeuwenhoek.e For I believe that a preformed living being – be it plant or animal – must always be the basis of the metamorphosis and that the same dominant monad must be in it. No one is better suited to clarify this doubt than Mr. Vallisnieri, and I am anxious to see his dissertation soon; his dedication would give me more credit than I deserve.f When I argue that there is no such thing as chaos, I do not mean that our globe or other bodies have never been in a state of external disorder, for that would be contradicted by experience. For instance, the mass the Vesuvius 1

Instead of this paragraph, Leibniz had originally written: “I confess that the seminal animals quite resemble others whose destiny is not as important as that of the former. And the figures of all these animals have not so far revealed anything extraordinary, as far as I know. But one can retort, on their behalf, that the seeds (graines) of plants do not yet promise what they [will] do, that the vast quantity of these animals seems favorable to generation, and that it is quite enough that all the seeds that have been examined have shown this. Although nothing animated has yet been discovered in the ovaries, I hold it for beyond doubt that an animal is nothing but the transformation of an already animated body. Also, it does not seem that one can explain the role of the sexes by the ovaries alone. Nevertheless, I confess that these are nothing but guesses, for it is not impossible that the seminal animals are as unimportant as those found, for instance, in spiced water (eau poivrée), and that instead of them there is in the ovaries some animated thing that is the basis of the transformation. Up to now, however, the hypothesis of seminal animals has seem to me to be the most plausible. It has also been considered beautiful by Mr. Huygens, by Mr. Hartsoeker and by others. I say this not in order to contradict Mr. Vallisnieri, nor to preempt his judgment – which has for me much weight – but only to stimulate him to further clarify this important issue”. This erased paragraph is in fact a closer and more aggressive discussion of Vallisnieri’s account of animal life in terms of ovary-based transformations. Leibniz tends to accept rather Leeuwenhoek’s position that favors the sperm. His argumentation thus consists in, while conceding that there are difficulties with the latter, claiming that there are more difficulties with the former. His conclusion is that the sperm theory is “the most plausible” of the two, although it is as much a piece of guesswork as its competitor, and the door is left open for Vallisnieri – the “weight” of whose judgment is duly praised – to provide further evidence for the ovary theory. This is, no doubt, an example of ‘balanced’ argumentation. Since, however, both the sperm and the ovary theory are compatible with – in fact, operate within – the pre-formation view held by Leibniz, this view is not called into question by the controversy and therefore is not open to weighing here and can be declared to be “beyond doubt”. In fact, as Leibniz points out in an earlier letter to Bourguet, he is persuaded that “a natural organic body can never be formed by chaos or by a non-organic body … [because] … this is a consequence of the production of things by a perfectly wise cause” (GP III 562). This direct dependence of a given ‘empirical’ generalization such as pre-formation upon a metaphysical principle grants the former no certainty, but at least the status of what the Discours de Metaphysique terms a ‘very strong presumption’.

43. Bold Conjectures

437

throws out is such a chaos. What I mean is that someone who possesses sense organs penetrating enough to perceive the tiny particles of things would find everything quite organized. And if he could continually magnify their penetration as needed, he would always see – in the same mass – new organs, which had been imperceptible at the previous degree of penetration. But it is impossible that a creature be able to penetrate all at once into the tiniest piece of matter, since the actual subdivision is infinite. Consequently, the appearance of chaos occurs only at a sort of distance, like in a lake full of fish, or rather like in an army seen from afar, where one is unable to distinguish the organization observed there. So I think that our globe was once in a state similar to that of a fiery mountain; it is at that time that the minerals that are discovered today and can now be imitated in our furnaces have been formed. You can find my conjecture elaborated more fully in an old piece inserted in the Proceedings (Actes) of Leipzig, entitled Protogaea;g I would appreciate your opinion of it, as well as that of Vallisnieri. The boulders that are, so to speak, the bones of the earth, are the scoria or vitrified remains of this ancient fusion. Sand is nothing but glass resulting from this vitrification and pulverization by motion. The water of the seas is like a deliquescent oil,2 created by cooling after calcination. So three elements (matieres) are found quite extensively on the surface of our globe (to wit, seas, boulders and sand) explained quite naturally by fire, which it would not at all be easy to explain by any other account. This water once covered the whole Earth and caused many changes to it, even before Noah’s flood. I am thus rather inclined toward the view either of Mr. Descartes, who believes that our Earth had at one time been a fixed star, or toward my own view, according to which it could have been part of a fixed star – since there could have been a melted piece or a large spot thrown off from the sun, to which the earth is always trying to fall back. I would like to be apprised of the whole process whereby mercury is extracted from iron, even in case it would be from a certain type of iron containing tin. This experiment deserves being repeated several times, especially concerning the attraction that should have been noticed there. If mercury were already present in this mass, it is sufficient [to know] that the fire had not expelled it beforehand when this metal had passed by the flame. The attraction of such mercury by the fire, reported by Mr. Zanichelli,h seems to me considerable. I admit that until now I have never seen the transmutation of any metals; however, I do not venture to say that it is impossible; I would be delighted to learn more of your thoughts and observations on minerals. 2

In Latin in the text: oleum per deliquium. This expression is used in the Protogaea. In the chemical terminology of the time per deliquium denotes the dissolution of a salt or other substance in water.

438

Chapter 43

I now come to what you say, sir, about the Reverend Father Malebranche. If he truly believes that there is something active in us that determines our will, why does he not want to admit anything analogous to this in other substances? I suspect, however, that he admits such a determining principle [to be] in us only in order to avoid certain theological difficulties. When I speak of the force and of the action of creatures, I mean that each creature is at present pregnant with its future state, and that it naturally follows a certain course, if nothing prevents it; and that the monads – which are the true and sole substances – cannot be prevented naturally [from realizing] their internal determinations, since they envelop the representation of all [that is] external. Nevertheless this is not a reason for me to claim that the future state of a creature follows from its present state without the concurrence of God; I am rather of the opinion that conservation is an ongoing creation whose variation conforms to order. Consequently Father Malebranche could perhaps accept pre-established Harmony without relinquishing his hypothesis, which claims that God is the only acting power; by the way, [his hypothesis] does not seem to me to be justified. A while ago, a book was published in Paris against him concerning the activity of creatures; and he responded to it.i I have not as yet seen either the book or his response. I am afraid that this might be a battle similar to the one on pure love which in the past provoked much agitation in France.j A correct definition (as the one I have given for love) would have put an end to the matter for them.k Big fights fade under the weight of weak powder.3 But when one has not defined one’s ideas, there is a lot of room for reasoning pro and con.4 I imagine that when Father Malebranche says that we see everything in God he refers to the mind’s perception, not only with regard to visible qualities such as shapes and colors, but with regard to sounds and other sensible qualities as well. You have aptly noted that this Father – acknowledging that all bees (mouches à miel) are enveloped in some way or another in the [bee] from which they have originated – could [also] believe that the ensuing perceptions of a soul can originate from the development of its total present (presentée) perception. And I think that he could 3

4

In Latin in the text: Certamina tanta pulveris exigui iactu compressa quiescent. This is a passage from Virgil’s The Georgics IV, 86-87, quoted by Montaigne (Essais II,12). The following passage in the manuscript is marked by Leibniz as not to be sent: “The difficulty raised against the communication of movement vanishes once one takes into account that material things and their movement aren’t but phenomena. Their reality lies only in the agreement between the appearances of the monads. If the dreams of a person were sequentially exact and if the dreams of all souls were in agreement with each other, there would be no need for anything else in order to make of them body and matter”.

43. Bold Conjectures

439

acknowledge this all the more easily because he allows that, in the soul, certain thoughts give birth to others. I am of your opinion, sir, that one cannot explain what is the [nature of the] existence of a substance by depriving it of activity; but usually people are not attentive to defining their terms and one [thus] speaks confusedly about substance – the [proper] understanding of which, however, is the key to inner philosophy (philosophie interieure). It is the difficulty found therein that has so perplexed Spinoza and Mr. Locke. Others, like you, have also spoken highly of the Abbé Conti to me, and I would be happy to see your Commerce Literaire, to which I might contribute some short comments, which it would be good to communicate to him. One must let him have the stimulus of wanting the glory to be original, in the hope that he one day will produce something good in his own right. Mr. des Cartes would have us believe that he [himself] barely read anything. That is somewhat exaggerated. It is good to study others’ discoveries in a way which reveals to us the origin of their discoveries, and which renders them our own in some fashion. I would hope that authors would furnish us with the history of their discoveries and the process by which they arrived at them. When they do not do so, one must conjecture about them in order to better benefit from their works. If journalists would do that in reports they make about books they would render a great service to the public. I am also very happy to hear what you have told me, sir, about Mr. Tomaseo Cataneo, a Greek scholar and an outstanding Platonist, who does not reject my views.l I do not remember if I already told you that there is also in Paris a fine man, a member of the Council of the Duke of Orleans named Mr. Remond – who is an excellent Platonist and has greatly relished my Théodicée, as he attested to me in a very gratifying letter. He has since sent me some fine Latin verses of Abbé Fraguier – philosopher and great poetm – which speak positively of my meditations. Indeed, Plato – of all the ancient philosophers – is the one who most comes to my mind with respect to metaphysics. There are currently fine editions of Greek books in Venice; I would like to know who is in charge of these editions. You have pleased me in noticing the difference between blind necessity – as in the number of dimensions (which is three) – and moral necessity or necessity of convenience (de convenance), as in the laws of motion: it is apparently in this that Spinoza has gone wrong and that Bredenbourg has got entangled,n as you rightly point out. The laws of motion possess great many beauties. They not only conserve the amount of absolute force – which des Cartes correctly noted (even though he explained it poorly, confusing motion with force)o – but also the amount of relative or directional force. Mr. des Cartes believed that the intervention of souls by no means violates the first law – i.e., the conservation of absolute force; I add that this intervention does

440

Chapter 43

not violate the second law either – i.e., the conservation of direction. If Mr. des Cartes had had knowledge of this latter conservation, he would have struck upon [the doctrine of] pre-established harmony. I have also demonstrated a nice proposition, namely, that there is not as much movement (as des Cartes understands it), but as much motional action (action motrice) in the world during the same time interval, e.g., as much during one hour as during another. Also, the quantity of uniform motional action can be gauged by the force exercised through time,5 as well as by the quantity of the simple or indifferent effect expressed in the velocity of the action.6 The equality of the two estimates is a good example of something mathematical in metaphysics. I oppose the simple effect (as in a movement in the same horizontal plane) to the violent effect (as in the elevation of a weight upwards).7 It is true, Sir, that the excellent modern authors of the Art of thinking,p of the Search for Truth,q and of the Essays on the Understandingr are not wedded to fixating their ideas through definition. In this they have followed too much the example of Mr. des Cartes, who distrusted the definition of familiar terms, which everyone – to his mind – understands, and which indeed are commonly defined by equally obscure [terms].8 But my method of definition is quite different, since one commonly understands these terms only in a confused manner, which is insufficient for reasoning. In order to remedy this, it is not necessary to go through all the combinations;s it is sufficient to explain properly the terms which one employs. I have produced many definitions which I hope one day to order; but the problem is that, where I am, I lack the conversation and assistance of suitable people capable of understanding my purposes. The logic of syllogisms is truly demonstrative, like arithmetic and geometry. In my youth, I proved not only that there are in fact four figures – which is easy enough – but also that each figure possesses six valid (utiles) modes, and that it cannot have neither more nor less of them – as opposed to the usual view that attributes only four modes to the first and second, and five to the fourth. I have also proven that the second and third figures are directly derived from the first, without the need for conversions which are themselves demonstrated by the second or third figure, whereas the fourth figure is one degree lower and requires the mediation of the second or the third, or (which is the same thing) of conversions.t The art of conjecturing is 5

In Latin in the text: per vim ductam in tempus. In Latin in the text: per quantitatem effectus simplicis (vel indfferentis) ductam in celeritatem efficiendi. 7 In Latin in the text: Effectum simplicem (velut translationem in eodem horizonte) oppono violento, veluti sublationi gravis in altum. 8 In Latin in the text: per aeque obscurum. 6

43. Bold Conjectures

441

based on what is more or less easy (facile), or rather more or less feasible (faisable), for the Latin facilis, which is derived from faciendo means, literally, feasible. For example, with two dice, it is as feasible to throw 12 points as to throw 11, for both of them can only be obtained in one way; but it is three times as feasible to throw 7 points, since the latter can be obtained by throwing 6 and 1, 5 and 2, and 4 and 3 – and each one of these combinations is as feasible as another. The Chevalier de Meré (author of the book of Delights (Agréments) was the first to present these thoughts, which were followed up by Messrs. Pascal, Fermat and Huygens. The Pensionary [of the States of Holland] de Witt and Mr. Hudde have also since worked on this. The late Mr. Bernouilli, with my encouragement, devoted himself to this matter.u One can also estimate probabilities a posteriori, through experience, and one must have recourse to it for want of a priori reasons: for example, it is equally probable that an infant who is about to be born will be male or female, because the number of males and females in this world is nearly equal. One can say that what happens more or what happens less is also what is more feasible or less feasible in the present state of affairs, once one takes into account all the factors that should bring about the production of the event in question. I beg you to let the Excellencies be; they do not sit well in a philosophical letter. Mr. Herman has written me from Frankfurt on the Oder that he awaits my instructions in order to send me your remarks on my Théodicée. Since I intend to leave soon, I will find them in Hanover. He is going to publish in Holland his book on the motion of liquids; but my Meditations Dynamiques will not be in it; I wrote him that it would be more suitable to publish it as a separate little book, for which I will prepare the canvass and which Mr. Herman will be able to develop and elaborate. He is quite capable in fact of saying solid things on his own right.v Sincerely yours, P.S. Although I am planning to leave,w I would like to be advised here that my letter has reached you. It would be nice if you were to indicate your address to me more clearly. a

“Since in metaphysics one does not have, like in mathematics, the advantage of being able to fixate ideas through figures, the rigor of reasoning must compensate this – and such a rigor can only be accomplished in these matters through the observation of logical form. I have observed this more than once, and I have remarked that Mr. Descartes and Spinoza, having detached themselves from the rigor of form in their purported metaphysical demonstrations, have fallen into paralogisms. Therefore, I beg you, Sir, to reflect about how you could reduce your reasonings about this issue to proper form, for I do not see as yet how to do it. Without this there will always be remarks and replicas to make, without our being able to know whether we have made progress or not” (GP III 592).

442 b

Chapter 43

Antonio Magliabecchi (1633-1714), librarian of the Grand Duke of Tuscany in Florence, known for his enormous knowledge and memory about books. c Antonio Vallisnieri (1661-1730), Italian physician and naturalist, held the chair of medicine and natural history at the university of Padua, was opposed to the ‘spontaneous generation’ doctrine, and performed experiments about insect life, especially about their generation. d Joachim Kammermeister (1500-1574), German humanist, was co-author with Melanchthon of the Augsburg Confession (see Chapter 27, note p). e Anton van Leeuwenhoek (1632-1723), Dutch naturalist, inventor of the microscope, thanks to which he made important discoveries, including that of the protozoa, spermatozoids, microbes, blood corpuscles. His collected works (Opera omnia sive Arcana naturae) began to appear in 1715. His research was very important in the debate about spontaneous generation. f The book referred to is A. Vallisnieri’s Lezione academica intorno all’origine delle fontane, Venice, 1715. g Protogaea sive de Prima Facie Telluris et Antiquissimae Historiae Vestigiis in ipsis Naturae Monumentis Dissertatio, posthumously published by Christian L. Scheid, Göttingen, 1749. h Gian Girolamo Zanichelli (1662-1729), botanist, mineralogist, physician, and pharmacologist. Became famous thanks to his creation of the ‘Pievone pills’ for the treatment of genital diseases, for which he obtained a ‘privilege’ (= patent) in 1701. With the fortune he accumulated he was free to devote himself to research and traveled widely collecting plants and stones. i Laurent Boursier (1679-1749), De l’action de Dieu sur les créatures ou de la prémotion physique, Lille, 1713. Malebranche’s reply is to be found in his Reflexions sur la prémotion physique, Paris, 1715. j The so-called ‘pure love quarrel’ was one of the most passionate quarrels in France at the end of the 17th century (1694-1699). It was a theological and moral dispute involving two parties led by Fénelon and Bossuet, respectively. The former holds that love is disinterested and it the purer the less benefits it seeks. For Fénelon, the fifth and highest degree of love is the love for God, entirely divested from any desire of beatitude. Bossuet, on the other hand, holds that charity is disinterested, but cannot be separated from the desire of beatitude. He thus reaffirms the traditional doctrine that holds a cleavage between love and reward, while at the same time holding that there is a connection between hope for some reward and charity. See Naërt (1959). k Leibniz’s (often repeated by him) definition is: “to love is to have pleasure in the good, the perfection and the happiness of another [person]” (A I 14 58). In a letter to Princess Sophie of September 1697, from which this quote is taken, Leibniz takes a stand on the quarrel, proposing a solution that in fact mediates between the two parties. By viewing pleasure as intrinsic to the act or state of loving, Leibniz’s position distinguishes itself from both and opens the possibility of combining them: unlike Fénelon, love does involve pleasure and, unlike Bossuet, such a pleasure is conceptually inseparable of the notion of love, rather than being an extrinsic motivation or further hope of the act of love. l Tommaso Cattaneo (1660-1725). m Claude Fraguier (1666-1728), Jesuit Latinist and Hellenist, Professor of Literature at Caen, member of the Academy of Inscriptions, versified in Latin Plato’s philosophy. He was a friend of Huet* and wrote for the Journal des Sçavans. n Johannes Bredenburg (1643-1691), wine merchant and amateur philosopher, baptized in Rotterdam as a Lutheran, became a Collegiant in the late 1660s. The Rotterdam Collegiants, as the Remonstrants (see Chapter 2, note m), belonged to a strong tradition of dissent from strict Calvinism in the town, and preached a tolerant policy in religious

43. Bold Conjectures

443

matters. In two early pamphlets he criticized the Remonstrants for breaking with this tradition. He supported Isaac d’Huisseau’s attempt (in La Reunion du christianisme, 1670) of using a Cartesian methodology for reducing Christianism to its dogmatic essentials in order to bring about reunification. His rationalist tendency, supported by rumors of his sympathy with Spinoza’s Tractatus theologico-politicus (1670) did not please his fellow Collegiants, whose pressure led him to write a refutation of the Tractatus (Enervatio Tractatus theologico-politici, 1675), which Bayle considered the best attack on Spinoza he had seen. His philosophical and theological oscillations got him involved in several controversies, and finally brought him to a fideism similar to Bayle’s. His last work was a fierce attack on Pierre Jurieu’s intolerance, in the wake of the publication of Jurieu’s Tableau du Socinianisme (1690). o The locus classicus of this criticism of Leibniz to Descartes is the Brevis Demonstratio Erroris Memorabilis Cartesii published in Latin in January 1686 in the Acta Eruditorum (A VI 4 2027-2030) and in French in September 1686 in the Nouvelles de la Republique des Lettres. p Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole, La Logique ou l’Art de Penser, 1st ed., Paris, 1662. q Nicholas Malebranche, De La Recherche de la Verité où l’on traite de la nature de l’esprit et de l’usage qu’il en doit faire pour éviter l’erreur dans les sciences (Paris, 1674-1675). r John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. London, 1690 (2nd ed, 1694; 3rd ed., 1695; 4th ed., 1700; 5th ed., 1706). s “[A]ller par toutes les combinaisons”. Presumably Leibniz means by this unusual expression “perform a complete analysis” – his typical requirement for good definitions, which he here mitigates. t Leibniz was proud of these achievements in the theory of syllogisms. See Chapter 38. u An example of Leibniz’s work on probabilities can be found in Chapter 13. v Presumably Leibniz refers to the mathematician Jacob Hermann (1678-1733), who was a disciple of Jacques Bernouilli. As for the “Dynamic Meditations”, Leibniz did not write a book with such a title; probably he has in mind here the Dynamica de Potentia (1689) and/or the Specimen Dynamicum (1695). w This letter is written from Vienna, which, after a sojourn of 21 months, Leibniz leaves on Setember 3, 1714.

Chapter 44 THE DYNAMICS OF FORMULATING AND EXPOUNDING THE SYSTEM To Nicolas-François Remond

Nicolas Remond* was a correspondent of Leibniz from 1713 until his death. With a wide range of interests, he constantly asked Leibniz for explanations, especially about his metaphysics. The present letter is in fact Leibniz’s reply to one such a request. It describes a writing that Leibniz would have liked to write for the like of Remond, i.e., for a cultivated public earnestly interested in philosophy but weary of tackling the often specious arguments, formulated in technical jargon, which philosophers of different persuasions used to brandish against each other. Had this writing been written, it would show how a philosophical doctrine could be formulated in non-partisan language, accessible to all. It would also illustrate and ground Leibniz’s eclecticism, actually showing that the truth is not in the possession of any individual or sect, but rather its traces can be found in every culture, period and author – this being the correct method for constituting a ‘perennial philosophy’. And above all, by combining in a single writing his earlier polemical publications as he purported to do, he would not only produce what might become the first widely accessible published synthetic account of his system,a but would also thereby demonstrate the essential role of his critical exchanges with his contemporaries in the constitution of the system. But has such a text been actually written? Well, there are two candidates, and in fact none of them really fits the above description. One is the text prepared by Leibniz, but not sent to Remond along with Leibniz’s letter of July 1714 (GP III 622-624). The other is the Principes de la nature et de la grace fondés en raison, actually sent to Remond accompanying the present letter (GP VII 624-625). While the former was retained because Leibniz feared it was too abstract – i.e., rather technical – and might confuse Remond,1 the latter was indeed much easier to understand – 1

“I am afraid this letter full of thoughts so abstract and distant for usual imaginations may disgust you. I would not even like you to reflect too much about it: it is better to return to it later. I wanted, however, to indicate how much I praise and honor you by writing to you

445 M. Dascal (ed.), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. The Art of Controversies, 445–449. © 2006 Springer.

446

Chapter 44 after all it was written for a young prince. Yet, pace Gerhardt (GP III 600), who claims it resembles the Théodicée in this respect (of course this would render it appropriate to send to a convert to Leibnizianism after reading this book, as Remond was supposed to be), it is neither dialectically structured nor thematically organized like the Théodicée. In fact, the unsent manuscript seems to be a simplified summary of the Monadology (which is perhaps the real reason why Leibniz, afraid of being misread, was so reticent about diffusing it) rather than of the Principes – both written in the same year, for different purposes and audiences.b Furthermore, neither the unsent manuscript nor the sent Principes quite fits the two other characteristics announced by Leibniz in this letter.c It seems, therefore, that the interesting text promised to Remond was never actually written by Leibniz.

Date: 26 August 1714 Edition: GP III 624-625 Language: French

To Nicolas-François Remond de Montmort I hope my reply of the last month has been delivered to you. I take advantage now of [the services of] Mr. Sulli, an English watchmaker, whose merits are unusual and who is versed in mathematics, in order to send you a small discourse I have made for Prince Eugene about my philosophy.d I had hoped that this brief writing would contribute to make my meditations better understood, by uniting in it what I had published in the journals of Leipzig, Paris, and Holland.e In those [pieces published in] Leipzig I adjust myself to the language of the School, whereas in the others I adjust myself more to the style of the Cartesians. In this last piece, however, I undertake to express myself in a way that can be understood by those who are not yet used to the style of either. If after that, Sir, you continue to find difficulties in what I have published, please be kind enough to signal them.f They will give me the opportunity to further clarify things. If I had time, I would compare my principles (dogmes) with those of the ancients and of other able men. The truth is more distributed than one thinks. But it is often masked and also quite often complicated and even weakened, mutilated, and corrupted by additions that damage it and make it less useful. By disclosing the traces of truth in the ancients or (more generally speaking) in previous [authors], one would thereby be extracting gold from mud, the diamond from its mine, and light from the shadows – and this would indeed amount to a certain perennial philosophy.2 what I would not easily write to others. For this reason this letter must be only for you. Many others would consider it either absurd or unintelligible” (GP III 624). 2 Underlined and in Latin in the original: perennis quaedam philosophia.

44. The Dynamics of Formulating and Expounding the System

447

One could even say that one would be able to observe, in this way, some progress in [human] knowledge. The Easterners had beautiful and great ideas about divinity; the Greeks added reasoning and a sort of science. The Church Fathers rejected what was incorrect in Greek philosophy. But the Schoolmen tried to employ for Christianity whatever was viable in Pagan philosophy. I have often said that there is hidden gold in the scholastic dung of the barbarians;3 and I wish we could find an able man versed in Irish and Spanish philosophy, having the capacity to extract from them the good there is in them. I am sure that his effort would be compensated by many beautiful and important truths. There was a certain Suisset who mathematized Scholastic questions: though his writings are little known, what I have seen of them seems to me profound and considerable.g Julius Scaliger talked of him with praise, but Vives talked of him with despise.h I would rather trust Scaliger, since Vives was a little superficial. I don’t think that Father Malebranche’s* views are too distant from mine. The passage from occasional causes to pre-established harmony doesn’t seem to be too difficult. A certain Mr. Parent, from the Académie Royale des Sciences, who undertook to refute me here and there, spreads the idea that I have added nothing to the theory of occasional causes.i But he doesn’t seem to have taken into account the fact that, according to me, the laws of bodies are not disturbed – neither by God nor by souls.j The Benedictine, Reverend Father François Lamy has also attempted to refute me in his book De la connoissance de soy même.k He has not understood me correctly, and I believe my reply has been published in one of the Paris journals. I am not aware that he replied.l I am not aware either of any review of my Théodicée in the Journal des Sçavans.m To conclude, I take the liberty of recommending Mr. Sulli to you,4 P.S. I hope to leave [Vienna] soon and I don’t know whether I will not visit England.n If I will receive the honor of your letters, they can be always addressed to Hanover. 3 4

Underlined and in Latin in the original: aurum latere in stercore illo scholastico barbariei. The verso of the manuscript contains a marginal, interrupted sentence, by another hand. Since it does not run over Leibniz’s own text, it may have been written on the sheet before Leibniz used it. Its content supports this hypothesis, for it concerns the kind of thing the Emperor’s court in Vienna was interested in, and it is connected with Leibniz, the House of Hanover man. He may even have himself dictated this beginning of a memorandum to a secretary (the style is quite his): “Since the change of scene in Great Britain seems important for the general good of Europe, in particular for the Very August House of the Emperor and for the Empire; I have no doubt that all the well-intentioned powers wish to take advantage of this change, as much as possible, so that there will be no reason to regret a /interruption/”.

448 a

Chapter 44

The only previous account of his ‘system’ published by him, the “Systeme nouveau de la nature et de la communication des substances, aussi bien que de l’union qu’il y a entre l’ame et le corps” (Journal des Sçavants, June 1695), was not quite comprehensive. The best known synthetic expositions of Leibniz’s metaphysics, such as the Discours de Metaphysique (1686) and the Monadologie (1714), remained unpublished. b This hypothesis is supported by the fact that Leibniz, in his letter of July 1714, to which the unsent manuscript should have been adjoined, apologizes for not sending it on the grounds that “it has grown under my hand” to which he adds his usual excuse: “many distractions prevented me from completing it” (GP III 618). The Monadology surely required of him much undistracted energy. Rather than giving up, however, Remond writes back that he is comforted “by not having received the clarifications you honor me to promise about the monads by these words that announce an infinite gain and the more than infinite pleasures that naturally ensue, it has grown under my hand” (GP III 626). c Gerhardt claims that in the Principes Leibniz speaks of “the use and value of the contributions of ancient philosophers to his philosophical system” (GP III 600), but we were unable to substantiate this claim. d This letter is written from Vienna, where Leibniz was, among other things, a tutor of the young Prince Eugene of Savoy. e Acta Eruditorum, Journal des Sçavans, and Nouvelles de la Republique des Lettres, respectively. Together, the articles published by Leibniz in these journals comprise – except for the Théodicée – virtually the totality of the philosophical work he published in his life. f Obviously Remond could not comply, for he never received the promised writing. He did not comply either when he did receive, instead, the Principes de la nature et de la grace. g See Chapter 28, note d. h Juan Luis Vives (1492-1540), a friend of Erasmus and Maria Tudor’s tutor, author of On the causes of the decline of the arts (1531), among many other publications. For Scaliger, see Chapter 29, note p. i Antoine Parent (1666-1716), physicist and mathematician, author of an important work on three-dimensional analytic geometry (1700), contributed, along with Edme Mariotte, to the development of hydraulic wheels. A member of the Académie Royale des Sciences since 1699, he was a prolific writer with a broad range of interests, which are represented in a three volume collection of his scientific essays published in 1713 (Essais et recherches de mathématique et de physique). j The laws of nature, which include mechanics, are contingent rather than necessary, but they have the status of very strong presumptions, as Leibniz explains in the Discours de Metaphysique. As such they do not exclude the possibility of ‘miracles’ that violate them; yet the explanation of an apparent violation of these laws requires powerful reasons – which means that real miracles are rather rare and therefore do not “disturb the laws of bodies” by some external intervention. k Three volumes, Paris, Pralard, 1694-1698. l François Lamy (1636-1711), became a Benedictine after escaping death in a duel thanks to a copy of The Rule of St. Benedict which he carried in his pocket. A deeply religious and ascetic Maurist, he was, however, the first to teach Cartesianism at several monasteries. He was a close friend of Bossuet*, and defended the Maurist edition of St. Augustine’s works against the Jansenists and the Jesuits. His printed works include Le Nouvel Athéisme Renversé, ou refutation du système de Spinoza (Paris, 1696) and L’incrédule amené à la Réligion par la Raison (Paris, 1711), among many others. His five volumes treatise De la connaissance de soi-même (Paris, 1694-1698) provoked a controversy with

44. The Dynamics of Formulating and Expounding the System

449

Malebranche, as well as with Leibniz, who replied to the extended abstract of the book published in the Journal des Sçavants (8 and 15 September 1698) with an (unpublished) “Addition à l’Explication du systeme nouveau touchant l’union de l’ame et du corps” (GP IV 572-590) and with a “Réponse aux Objections contre le Systeme de l’harmonie préétablie dans le livre de la Connoissance de soy-même” (Supplement du Journal des Sçavants, 1709). This controversy has been partially studied by Woolhouse and Francks (1994), Woolhouse (2001), and Blank (2003). m Notice in this paragraph Leibniz’s preoccupation with the critical reactions to his work and to its proper understanding. n Leibniz apparently still hoped to be summoned to London by the former Duke of Hanover, now King of England. But the King, wary of the opposition by Newton and Clarke to Leibniz, had decided years before to leave him at home. In fact, as soon as he learned that Leibniz was looking for a better position in Vienna, he ordered his counselor to leave Vienna immediately and to return to Hanover.

Chapter 45 THE USE OF LOGIC AGAINST SKEPTICISM To Karl G. Ehler

Karl Gottlieb Ehler (1685-1753), secretary of the Republic of Gdansk (Danzig) on the Baltic Sea, worked for a while in Paris and was an astronomer in Berlin, where presumably Leibniz met him. Through him, Leibniz had previously received a book sent to him by Isaac Papin, a former Calvinist theologian who converted to Catholicism.1 When he converted to Catholicism in 1690 under the influence of Bossuet, Papin sought to provide additional support for his thesis about the relationship between faith and science by employing skeptical arguments against science.a This is the position that transpires in his La Tolérance des Protestants et l’autorité de l’Eglise (1692) – the book sent to Leibniz by Ehler. This modification in Papin’s position did not particularly please Leibniz, which is why he “rejoices” for not having to respond to him due to his death. Leibniz, who died a few months after writing this letter, takes this opportunity to spell out his views on how to react to skeptical argumentation in general (see Chapter 18). In so doing he stresses the role of “good logic” (recta logica) as the “judge of controversies” – the former understood in a much broader sense than formal logic alone (see Chapter 38). It is remarkable that, in one of his last writings, he continues to make use of concepts he found essential for the art of controversies already in his early writings on this topic (see Chapters 1 and 2).

Date: 10 May 1716 Edition: D V 1 403-404 Language: Latin

1

Leibniz wrongly refers to this author as ‘Jacob’ instead of ‘Isaac’. The book in question was published shortly after Papin’s conversion and sent to Leibniz by the author, via Ehler, shortly before his death in 1709 (Müller and Krönert 1969: 214). It is rather strange that Leibniz mentions this book eight years after he received it.

451 M. Dascal (ed.), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. The Art of Controversies, 451–453. © 2006 Springer.

452

Chapter 45

To Karl Gottlieb Ehler Your letters, along with the little book by Jacob Papin, have reached me quite quickly and well. I thank you, not only because you have been willing to send it to me but also for writing me. The news I receive that the illustrious Papin has passed away is welcome, not because I rejoice in his death but because it frees me from the useless task of examining a book about which there is nothing I could have said that might have been particularly pleasing to this man. The arguments he employs are merely Pyrrhonic, and are only good to make uncertain all things in human affairs; but then, for the same reason, we would not be able to determine with any certainty in what do authors differ neither in history nor in science.b On my part, I consider good logic to be a sufficient judge of controversies wherever the fundamentals of judging are available to man, for2 there are matters for which it is necessary that something be inferred from something (ipéchein3); and wherever something is necessary, it is also possible.c This too we can obtain through logic, and here I do not postulate any other logic than the vulgar one, whose precepts Aristotle established. However, whenever there are alternative ways supported by non-sophistical though non-demonstrative arguments, one must assess which of them has most verisimilitude. I confess that we need a new logic of the degrees of verisimilitude, whose principles have not yet been established, although some seeds thereof are to be found4 more among the jurists than elsewhere.d The astronomical observations you generously sent me have been forwarded to the Acta of Leipzig for publication.e Before that I studied them carefully. Your most flourishing republic can congratulate itself for being in peace, amidst so many calamities that afflict Poland; but God will put an end to this also for the Poles. And I hope that also in this matter salvation will come from the hand of the great Russian monarch.f I am very pleased that the Hekerum,g Prussia’s glorious contribution to astronomy, is safely in your hands. I don’t know whether Kircher’s widow, whose husband’s merits were praised by the experts, is amongst you; they say that the son follows in the footsteps of the father.h Prussia always had plenty of excellent minds, and I will be pleased to learn who are the ones now flourishing and which ones will bring us flowers and fruits. As for the rest, be well and take care.

2

Dutens has here verùm (‘but’), whereas the manuscript has nam (‘for’, ‘since’). In Greek in the original. 4 Dutens has here habentur, whereas the manuscript has invenientur. 3

45. The Use of Logic against Skepticism a

453

Isaac Papin (1657-1709) was a Calvinist theologian who engaged in a controversy with P. Jurieu about efficacious grace. Leibniz had read and annotated in the late 1680’s two of his books, Essai de théologie sur la providence et sur la grace (1687) and La vanité des sciences (1688; see GR 577). He manifested his approval for Papin’s thesis that science is laudable when it increases our knowledge of God’s creation and therefore approaches us to God, while otherwise its arrogance is dangerous and is to be condemned – a thesis he often mentions (e.g., in “La felicité”; GR 579-584). b Leibniz here makes clear that he does not accept a skeptical way of grounding tolerance. This is part of his general onslaught on skepticism. He rejects, on the one hand, the use the Catholic church makes of skepticism regarding the possibility of various interpretations of the biblical text in order to justify its demand for accepting only the interpretation grounded on the authority of the church. On the other hand, he also rejects the skepticism of Protestants like Bayle,* who adopt, on religious matters, a fideism that separates completely between reason and faith and, more broadly, a general epistemological skepticism. It is against this general epistemological skepticism, that would undermine the idea of factuality and progress in history and science, that the last sentence of this paragraph is addressed. c Leibniz makes use here, in fact, of a corollary of a well known law of modal logic (from ‘p is necessary’ it follows that ‘p is possible’), which he employs here as a lieu commun. d See Introductory Essay, Section 3, as well as, among others, Chapter 13, and NE (4.15-16). e Reference to the journal founded by Leibniz, Acta Eruditorum. See Chapter 23, note 1. f Leibniz expressly sides here with Peter the Great and the coalition led by him, which included Poland, Saxony, and Denmark, against Sweden’s hegemony in the Baltic area. This conflict, known as the “Second Nordic War”, lingers from 1700 to 1721, and ends with Peter’s victory. g Perhaps a reference to a manuscript by the Prussian astronomer Johannes Hevelius (16111687), who, like Ehler, was also from Danzig. h Athanasius Kircher (1602-1680), a renowned German polymath with whom Leibniz shared many interests, had been educated by the Jesuits and did not hide his interest in the hermetic tradition, which he cultivated alongside his scientific work. He was a friend of Fabri,* who introduced him to the astronomer Hevelius.

Biographical Notes

Antoine Arn auld (1612-1694), philosopher, theologian, logician, and grammarian. He was a central Jansenist figure and became the leader of Port-Royal after publishing his first book, De la fréquente communion (1643). Professor of Philosophy at the Sorbonne from 1641 to 1656, he was expelled by instigation of the Jesuits, with whom he was engaged in an intense political and theological dispute, which led to the inclusion of his work in the index (1663). In spite of the hostility of his colleagues of PortRoyal to modern thought, especially to Cartesianism, Arnauld adopted a basically Cartesian stance. A brilliant polemicist, he wrote, through Mersenne’s mediation, the Fourth Objections against Descartes's Meditations (1641). He also conducted a twenty years long philosophical and theological debate with Malebranche. He corresponded with Leibniz in two crucial moments in Leibniz's intellectual development: the elaboration of his early physics (1670-1671) and the elaboration of his mature metaphysics (1686-1690). The latter interaction, initiated with Leibniz's submission to Arnauld's consideration of the Discourse on Metaphysics (1686), yielded a sharp polemical correspondence, which remains to this day crucial for understanding Leibniz's central metaphysical views. Arnauld cooperated with Isaac Le Maître in the first translation of the Bible into French. Apart from an extensive theological work, Arnauld coauthored two books that were influential in the 17th and 18th centuries: Grammaire générale et raisonnée (1660), with Lancelot, and La logique, ou l’art de penser (1662), with Nicole. Pierre Bayle (1647-1706), philosopher, historian of ideas, and polemicist. His writings were marked by his sharp critical ability, which led to a sceptical attitude and, ultimately, to fideism. Born a Calvinist, he converted early in his life, under the influence of the Jesuits, to Catholicism and then back to Calvinism – a sure indication of a searching mind. Since 1675, he taught Aristotelian Philosophy at the Protestant Academy of Sedan, at the invitation of his friend, the Calvinist theologian Pierre Jurieu, with whom he later held a bitter theological, political, and philosophical 455

456

Biographical Notes

controversy. After the closing of the Academy (1681) – one of the initial steps in the suppression of religious tolerance in France, which culminated with the revocation of the Edit of Nantes (1685) – he went into exile along with many other Huguenots and settled in Rotterdam, where he was a professor at the Ecole Illustre until his death. Bayle held a basically Cartesian philosophical stance, especially regarding dualism, and favored Malebranchian occasionalism as a solution to the problem of the interaction between mind and body. He corresponded with Leibniz (1687-1702), and his critique of Leibniz’s “bizarre” hypothesis of pre-established harmony in the article “Rorarius” of his Dictionary provoked Leibniz’s reaction and led to a controversy that culminated in the Théodicée – which is largely an attempt to refute Bayle’s contention that there is no possible conciliation between faith and reason. He founded and edited the important journal Nouvelles de la République des lettres (1684-1687), where he stimulated a critical exchange of ideas in all disciplines. His densely argued Commentaire philosophique (1686) remains a mainstay of the doctrine of religious tolerance and his Réponse aux questions d’un Provincial (1703-1706) argues for the views with which Leibniz most directly contends in the Théodicée. Bayle’s most influential work was the Dictionnaire historique et critique, first published in 1696, followed by many expanded and revised editions. Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet (1627-1704), theologian, preceptor of the royal dauphin since 1670, Bishop of Meaux since 1681, was the éminence grise of Louis XIV’s religious politics. A prolific writer and scholar, he became a member of the French Academy in 1669. A sharp polemicist, very influential in Catholic policy, he was a severe doctrinal critic of Protestantism, against whom he wrote a series of fundamental texts, among which: Réfutation du catéchisme du pasteur Ferry (1655), Histoire des variations des Églises protestantes (1688), Avertissement aux protestants (1689-1691). He defended the view that there is a sharp contrast between the perennial truths of the Catholic Church and the unsteady course of Protestant doctrine, which demonstrates the superiority of the former. In his Relation sur le quiétisme (1698), he attacked Fénelon and Madame de Guyon and contributed to the papal condemnation of quietism in 1699. He wrote a Cartesian-inspired philosophical treatise, Traité de la connaissance de Dieu et de soi-même (publ. 1741), and his non-theological work of most impact in his time was the Discours sur l’histoire universelle (1679). He corresponded with Leibniz from 1692 to 1701, mainly debating the question of the reunification of Christian churches.

Biographical Notes

457

Louis Bourguet (1678-1742), whose earlier interest was in ancient languages and the history of the alphabet, became later on a natural scientist and member of the academy of sciences of Berlin, as well as a professor of philosophy and mathematics in Neuchâtel. He corresponded with some of Leibniz’s correspondents, through whom he got in touch with Leibniz in 1709, and remained his friend and correspondent until 1716. Their correspondence covered a broad range of topics, including cosmological issues and an interesting critique by Leibniz of the second edition of Newton’s Principia in a letter from 1715. Bourguet defended in some publications Leibniz’s scientific and metaphysical views, and studied carefully the Théodicée, about which he asked for and obtained clarifications. Gilbert Bu rnet(t) (1643-1715), theologian and historian, of Scottish origin. Studied in Aberdeen, Amsterdam, and Paris. Ordained as a priest of the Scottish Church in 1665, he becomes professor of theology in Glasgow in 1669. Since 1673 in London, where he was close to John Wilmot’s Catholic party, he had to leave England in 1683, under James II. He worked out an agreement that permitted William and Mary’s return in 1688. An active supporter of the new Protestant regime, he was appointed Bishop of Salisbury in 1689 by William of Orange. An important figure in Queen Anne’s court, he was the teacher of her son, the Duke of Gloucester. Burnet was a member of the Royal Society already in 1665 and was influenced by the “Cambridge Platonists”. Being familiar with many religious denominations, he had a tolerant orientation and defended the acceptance in the high clergy of non-conformists. His An Exposition of the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England (1699) contains a clear doctrinal statement that the German theologians from Berlin and Hanover considered useful for the unification of all the Protestant churches. Among his other works are The History of the reformation of the Church of England (3 volumes, 1679-1715) and An Enquiry into the measures of submission to the Supreme Authority (1688). Thomas Burnett of Kemeny [Kemnay] (1656-1729), a relative of Gilbert Burnet, was a jurist and amateur philosopher, who traveled throughout Europe. In the 1690’s he established close links with Princess Sophie of Hanover and corresponded with her and with Leibniz (from 1695 to 1715). Through him Leibniz’s attempts to contact Locke and his circle were conducted, with the help of Richard Bentley. Thomas Burnett met Malebranche in Paris and was arrested in the Bastille in 1702 due to his family links with Gibert Burnet. Leibniz intervened for freeing him. He

458

Biographical Notes

supported the House of Hanover’s claim to the throne of England, which Leibniz considered his great opportunity to realize his unfulfilled dream to move to London. Girolamo Cardano (1501-1576), physician, mathematician, physicist, astrologer. Well known physician, whose services were solicited by princes and noblemen, he was the first to give a clinical description of typhus and held a chair of medicine in Pavia. His pantheistic naturalism bore the mark of neo-platonic influence, and his books on philosophical subjects were widely read. His work in algebra is a landmark in the history of mathematics. His Ars magna sive de regulis algebricis contains the solution of the cubic equation due to Niccolò Tartaglia. He was the first to provide the rudiments of a calculus of probabilities, in Liber de ludo aleae. He had the ability to write on scientific and philosophical subjects in a way accessible to a wide audience, as in De subtilitate rerum, Practica arithmetica et mensurandi singularis, and De proportionibus, numerorum, motuum, ponderum, sonorum, aliarumque rerum mensurandarum. Hermann Conring (1606-1681), physician, politician, naturalist. After studies in Leiden becomes professor of natural philosophy and then of medicine in Helmstedt. Although not a professional jurist, he is considered the founder of the history of German Law. Thanks to his broad European perspective, his services as an advisor of princes and kings were sought, including by Louis XIV. Served also as a doctor of Queen Christine of Sweden and was a supporter of Harvey’s theory of blood circulation. An Aristotelian who valued and practiced experiment, he was a vigorous opponent of hermetic, cabbalistic, astrological, and other tendencies he considered non-scientific. In Church politics, he was a Lutheran favorable to the irenic Helmstedt theologians. Through Christian von Boineburg, minister of the Duke of Brunswick, Conring got in touch with Leibniz and was instrumental in his appointment in Hanover. In their correspondence they discuss a variety of juridical, medical, theological, metaphysical, natural philosophy, and epistemological topics. He calls into question Leibniz’s notion of a demonstration as a definitionbased chain of substitutions, an objection that leads Leibniz to further thoughts about his conception of analysis. They also diverge in natural philosophy. Whereas Conring espouses a mechanist mathematical reductionism, claiming that all properties of natural things are quantities, so that natural philosophy is a “concrete mathematics”, Leibniz acknowledges a qualitative aspect of nature and denies that all properties of bodies are quantifiable – even movement. In his vast intellectual production, part of

Biographical Notes

459

which is collected in 7 volumes (1730), Conring employed many pseudonyms. Honoré Fabri (1608-1688), a Jesuit, was a well-known natural scientist, philosopher, and theologian, professor of philosophy and mathematics in Lyon, and member of the Jesuit Minor Vatican Penitentiary, in charge of Inquisition-related activities. A free mind, he criticized Descartes for his doctrine of ‘subtle matter’, Huygens for his account of the rings of Saturn as explaining the planet’s origin, Pascal for his criticism of the Jesuits, and Pope Clement IX for the so-called ‘pax clementina’, which Fabri considered to be fraudulent vis-à-vis the Jansenists. He intervened in favor of Galileo, indicating the possibility of a non-literal interpretation of the biblical passages that were argued by the Church to contradict the Earth’s motion. For his defense of probabilism against the Canonists he was jailed for a short period in 1672. Although he was rehabilitated, his book on this topic remains in the Index. Leibniz appreciated his work, which he studied and annotated, and corresponded with him. Fabri’s major scientific work is Physica, id est scientia rerum corporearum (Lyon, 1669), to which many other titles could be added, such as Tractatus physicus de motu locali (Lyon, 1641), Tractatus duo, quorum prior de plantis et de generatione animalium, posterior de homine (Paris, 1666), and Philosophia universa (Lyon, 1646), where he undertakes to bring together a philosophical and a scientific general outlook. His theological views are expressed in Pithanophilus sive Dialogus de opinione probabili (Rome, 1659) and Apologeticus doctrinae moralis Societatis Iesu (Lyon, 1670) – to whose second edition (Köln, 1672), he adds a refutation of Pascal’s Provinciales [a copy of which was annotated by Leibniz (A VI 4 2626-2637)]. Hugo Grotius [de Groot] (1583-1645), Dutch jurist, diplomat and politician, theologian, poet, is best known as the leader of the modern conception of natural law and the founder of the “law of nations”. An erudite humanist, Grotius edited works of Euripides, Strobaeus, Martianus Capella, and others, and was receptive to the ideas of Francisco Suárez. Henri IV of France called him “le miracle de Hollande” and introduced him to his Conseil d’Etat. He received a doctorate in Law from the University of Orléans, was appointed in 1609 historian of the General States, was Pensionary of Rotterdam, and since 1617 permanent member of the Netherlands State Council. He took part in several political, juridical, and theological controversies. His political career came to an end when he was condemned to life imprisonment at the age of 35. In 1621 he escaped from

460

Biographical Notes

prison with the help of his wife and spent the rest of his life mostly in Paris, where he became a central figure of the circle of late-humanist scholars, which included Mersenne, Fabri, and many others. It was there that he wrote his famous book De jure belli ac pacis (Paris, 1625), which had a lasting impact – among others upon Leibniz – as the founding document of modern natural law and international law. He influenced Leibniz not only for his legal and political ideas, but also as an important early figure among the scholars who worked for the irenic ideal (cf. his De veritate religionis christianae, Leiden, 1627). Franciscus Mercuriu s van Helmont (1614-1699), a renowned physician who served as a resident several aristocratic families, in England and other countries. His medical and diplomatic duties allowed him to be in touch with several scholars throughout Europe and to contribute to the circulation of ideas, some of them esoteric. He developed the doctrine, due to Paracelsus, of the archeus as the vital principle, and elaborated a monadology similar to Leibniz’s, whom he thus anticipated. According to him, the physical and spiritual world are composed of monads and is ruled by a cosmic ‘sympathy’; the monads are indivisible and eternal, but capable of development and improvement. Leibniz, who had studied his works and had met him in 1671 and 1680, invited him, prompted by Electress Sophia, to visit Hanover in 1694 in order to expound his system, which drew from Platonic, alchemist, Rosicrucian and Hermetic sources. He was closely associated with Lady Anne Conway, who introduced him to the Quakers, some of whose beliefs he adopted. Among his works, Alphabeti vera naturalis Hebraici brevisima delineatio (Sulzbach, 1667), The Divine Being and Its Attributes Philosophically Demonstrated (London, 1683), Opuscula philosophica (Amsterdam, 1690). Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), an Oxford graduate, was a public figure and a systematic philosopher. In the service of the Earls of Devonshire as financial manager and tutor, he traveled with the young heirs in the continent, especially to France and Italy (1608-1610, 1634-1637) and met leading thinkers of the century, including Bacon, Galileo, Mersenne, Gassendi, and perhaps Locke. Exiled in France (1640-1651) by virtue of his support of English royalists, he returned to England under Cromwell. But his views on the separation between Church and State were opposed by the royalists and, along with his critique of both Anglicanism and Presbyterianism, temporarily allies under the Restoration, led to his condemnation for heresy and endangered his safety. A stern polemicist and skilled rhetorician, Hobbes criticized Descartes’s Metaphysical

Biographical Notes

461

Meditations, engaged in a mathematical dispute with the Oxford mathematicians John Wallis and Seth Ward, and held a long debate on freewill with the Anglican Bishop John Bramhall. He developed a comprehensive philosophical system, encompassing political philosophy, law, epistemology, and natural philosophy under the umbrella of a materialist metaphysics. The young Leibniz admired his work and corresponded with him briefly in 1670-1671. He was particularly interested in Hobbes’s nominalism, which assigned to language a constitutive role in reasoning, but criticized the relativization of truth this position led Hobbes to endorse, and was not satisfied with Hobbes’s way of dealing with the relationship between reason and faith and the determinism that his materialism was charged by Bramhall to entail. Leibniz, a partisan of natural law theory, also opposed Hobbes’s contractualism. Pierre Daniel Huet (1630-1721), member of the French Academy and preceptor of the Dauphin, was in his youth an enthusiastic Cartesian, who appreciated the innovative character of Descartes’s ideas. Later he became a strong critic of Cartesianism, on the grounds that he didn’t accept that the cogito and the lumiere naturelle can function as criteria of the achievement of certainty. In this spirit, he published a Censura philosophiae Cartesianae (Paris, 1689), which is presumably the book to which Leibniz refers in Chapter 38. His critique of Cartesianism is the reason why in his time he was considered a skeptic and his positions dangerous for religion. Arnauld, for instance, finds a close similarity between Huet’s Demonstratio evangelica and La Mothe le Vayer’s De la vertu des payens , and warns against its dangers (Œuvres, III, p. 400). But in fact, along with the fallible nature of human knowledge, Huet insisted that experience grants knowledge in the midst of uncertainty, and was thus closer to the ‘mitigated skepticism’ of Gassendi. His “historical method”, designed to end theological controversies by determining the truth of historical claims through the attempt to find the most ancient points of agreement between several peoples and traditions, instantiates his ‘scientific’ approach. Leibniz appreciated this method, not without some criticism thereof (see Introductory Essay, Section 4). In general, Leibniz’s assessment of Huet was, as indicated in Chapter 38 and in the correspondence with Nicaise (GP II 533), much more nuanced than that of his contemporaries. Huet’s posthumously published Traité de la faiblesse de l’esprit humain (Paris, 1722) makes clear indeed that his skepticism was far from radical. Leibniz and Huet held a long correspondence between 1673 and 1695 (partially published in GP III 1-22).

462

Biographical Notes

Daniel Ernst Jablonski (1660-1741), theologian, uncle of Comenius, was the Bishop of the Moravians, to whose exiled congregation he helped throughout his life. He studied theology at Frankfurt-on-the-Oder and Oxford, specializing in Biblical philology. Reformed preacher at Magdeburg (1683), court preacher at Königsberg (1691) and Berlin (1693), he was ordained Bishop in 1699. With the transformation of Brandenburg into the State of Prussia, Jablonski made it his main goal to unify all the (evangelical) Protestant denominations under the leadership of Prussia – the so-called ‘Unionist’ movement. He worked in close cooperation with Leibniz and Molanus for this purpose. He also cooperated with Leibniz in another project, the creation of the Academy of Sciences in Berlin, founded in 1700 and inaugurated in 1711, with Leibniz as president. Jablonski was the Academy’s first vice-president and in 1737 became its president. He made a careful edition of the Old Testament (1720) and thanks to him the Berlin edition of the Babylonian Talmud was printed. Isaac Jaquelot (1647-1708), from a Huguenot family, educated as a priest. After the revocation of the Edit of Nantes flees to The Hague, where he acquires a reputation as a preacher. But after the publication in 1690 of a two volume critique of Jurieu’s – leader of orthodox Calvinism in Holland –attack on Socinianism, Jaquelot has to flee once more. He is finally invited by Queen Sophie Charlotte for the position of Chaplain of the Prussian court in Berlin. Through her, Jaquelot becomes acquainted with Leibniz, with whom he met several times and corresponded from 1702 to 1706. He opposed Leibniz’s doctrine of preestablished harmony, which he believed to be inferior to Malebranche’s occasionalism, on the grounds that it “multiplied beings without necessity and created a thousand difficulties” (GP III 482) and suppressed free will (GP III 441). A sharp polemicist, he published a critique of Bayle’s doctrine of the incompatibility of faith with reason, Conformité de la foi avec la raison, ou Défense de la religion contre les principales difficultés répandues dans le Dictionnaire Historique et Critique de M. Bayle (1705), Bayle’s reply in the second volume of his Entretien de Maxime et de Thémiste (1707) being followed by Jaquelot’s Entretien de Maxime et de Thémiste, ou réponse à l’examen de la théologie de M. Bayle (1707). His critical review in the Journal des Savans of a book defending Descartes’s demonstration of God’s existence, “ Examen d’un écrit qui a pour titre : Iudicium de argumento Cartesii pro existentia Dei petito ab ejus idea” (1701) provoked a flurry of debates in the pages of this and other journals. Probably it was also a topic in the conversations Jaquelot held with Leibniz, in which they had discussed the Cartesian proof earlier. They certainly also

Biographical Notes

463

discussed the proper way to refute Bayle’s views on the relationship between faith and reason; yet, though both agreed on the need to refute Bayle, their strategies of argumentation differed substantively. Joachim Jungius (1587-1657), natural scientist, logician, mathematician, educator, physician. Professor of mathematics in Giessen (1609-1614), studied medicine in Rostock and Padua. Professor of logic and natural philosophy in the Hamburg’s Gymnasium (1629), resigned due to conflicts with the administration and the clergy over allegations of his Calvinist tendencies, and devoted his time to research. He was the founder of the first society for the research of nature – Societas Ereunetica – in northern Europe. Its aim was to transform the investigation of nature, with the help of empirical work and a new mathematical ‘heuretics’, into an axiomatic science. His ‘empiricism’ comprised a new empirical methodology for science (Protonoetica), with the help of which chemistry was to lead to the discovery of the elements of the natural order. Jungius’s logic was anti-scholastic and he defended the independence of logic from metaphysics, as well and the application of mathematics to natural science. Although most of his writings remained unpublished, Jungius was a reputed philosopher, whom Leibniz ranked among the most important thinkers of the century. In his life he published very little – notably Geometria empirica (1627), the first three volumes of the textbook Logica Hamburgensis (1638), and Analysis logica apparentis demonstrationis libri VI (1652); his disciples published posthumously some of his manuscripts in physics and biology. In the 20th century a renewed interest in his work has yielded the publication of more so far unpublished material, e.g., additions to the Logica Hamburgensis (J. Jungius, Logica Hamburgensis, ed. by R. W. Meyer, Hamburg, J. J. Augustin, 1957) – including some of the manuscripts Leibniz was so eager to examine, which were rescued from the 1691 fire in Vagetius’s house, where they were stored. For the remaining manuscripts, see C. Meinel, Der handschriftliche Nachlass von Joachim Jungius in der Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg, Stuttgart, Hauswedell, 1984. Jean Le Clerc (1657-1736), born into a Calvinist family in Genève, studied theology and philology; since 1684, professor at the Remonstrant seminar of Amsterdam. Sided with other rationalist critics of the Reformation ideology, but criticized Richard Simon’s (and Spinoza’s) contestation of Moses’ authorship of the Pentateuch. Translator of the Bible and editor of the works of Erasmus in ten volumes and of Grotius’s De veritate religionis christianae, Le Clerc was also editor of three journals:

464

Biographical Notes

Bibliothèque universelle et historique, Bibliothèque choisie, Bibliothèque ancienne et moderne. The 80 volumes of these journals were an important forum for debates, in which the best minds of the time participated. His major work is a study of methods of critique of sacred as well as profane, old as well as recent texts, the Ars Critica (1697; 8th ed. 1778). Philosophically, he was basically a Cartesian, but he was an admirer of Newton and a friend of Locke. He was also a critic of Bayle, especially on religious issues. Leibniz was familiar with his work, which he often mentions, not always in agreement with him. Nicolas Malebranche (1638-1715), priest, philosopher and scientist. After a scholastic education in high school and the Sorbonne, entered in 1660 the Oratory, an order created for increasing the religiosity of Catholic priesthood. Until he discovered and read in 1664 Descartes’s Traité de l’homme, Augustine was the major influence in his intellectual development. Through Descartes, he turned his intellectual efforts to philosophy and science. Life in the Oratory granted him plenty of free time for research and writing. He acquired the best scientific knowledge available at the time (for example, he studied the new infinitesimal calculus with the Marquis de l’Hopital), worked in microscopy, and was elected in 1699 a member of the Académie royale des sciences, where the influence of his ideas was remarkable in the controversy they provoked between two ‘parties’ – the malebranchistes and the anti-malebranchistes. Basically a Cartesian, his deep religious background led him to attempt reconciling faith and reason, which in turn implied reformulating the emblematic Cartesian theses: the founding status of the cogito, the immanence of ideas in the thinking subject, the origin of eternal truths. In his best known book, De la recherche de la vérité, où l’on traite de la nature de l’esprit de l’homme, et de l’usage qu’il en doit faire pour éviter l’erreur dans les sciences (Paris, 1674-1675 ; first published in 2 volumes, followed by several thoroughly revised and expanded editions), he elaborates the anticonceptualist, Platonist-sounding doctrine that the objectivity of knowledge is ensured by the fact that our thought is performed through the ‘vision in God’ of ideas, rather than by ‘modifications of the mind’. This, and other philosophical ideas of Malebranche provoked intense critical reactions, notably by Simon Foucher (in his Critique de la recherché de la vérité, 1675) and by Antoine Arnauld (in his Des vrayes et des fausses idées, 1683), to which Malebranche reacted promptly and rather violently, yielding prolonged polemics (especially in the second case; cf. Dascal 1990a). Malebranche corresponded with Leibniz on several topics, ranging from physico-mathematical issues (e.g., the Cartesian principle of the

Biographical Notes

465

conservation of the quantity of movement, of whose mistake he persuades Malebranche) to theological issues such as grace and salvation. On the issue of mind-body causality, Leibniz’s doctrine of pre-established harmony was intended to be a more reasonable alternative than Malebranche’s occasionalism; yet the latter did not vanish as easily as Leibniz had expected, and remained for quite a while a vigorous idea, supported and developed by many. Gerhard Wolter Molanus (1633-1722), Lutheran theologian, a student of Georg Calixt and a friend and collaborator of Leibniz. He studied theology at Helmstedt and in 1659 was appointed professor of mathematics at Rinteln, and of theology a number of years later. He held various ecclesiastical positions: director of Hanover’s consistory (since 1674), abbot of Loccum (since 1677), and was the advisor of the Electors of Hanover on religious affairs. In this capacity, he participated in the interconfessional colloquia held in the court of Hanover with the aim of advancing the irenic project of reunion between Protestants and Catholics. Born in the midst of the Thirty Years War, he witnessed its catastrophic consequences and was strongly motivated to find the way to avoid this in the future. He was the head of the Protestant committee that negotiated with the Catholics, represented by Rojas y Spínola and Niels Stensen, under the surveillance of Bossuet. In this capacity he prepared the protocols of the meetings and wrote two important documents: Regulae circa Christianorum omnium ecclesiasticam reunionem and Cogitationes privatae. The irenic method developed by Molanus consisted in two fundamental points: convening a truly ecumenical council with the participation of theologians and clergy from the various Christian confessions, whose decisions would be binding and would replace, on some points, those of the Council of Trent; and the acceptance by the Protestants of the Pope’s Christian primacy, a right stemming from Christian tradition. In the wake of the failure of the Protestant-Catholic nearly twenty years of negotiations, he turned his efforts to the union of the Protestants, which the Queen of Prussia, Sophie Charlotte pressed for. In all these endeavors Molanus worked as a partner of Leibniz, with whom he shared the irenic ideal, was in intense contact, and sometimes even engaged in co-writing detailed proposals for overcoming difficulties disclosed in different stages of the negotiations. David Vincenz Placcius (1642-1699), was born and passed away in Hamburg, studied briefly with Johannes von Felden in Helmstedt and then in Leipzig with Jakob Thomasius, becoming then Leibniz’s fellow student.

466

Biographical Notes

Returning to Hamburg he practiced law until he became in 1675 a Professor of Rhetoric and Moral Philosophy at the town’s Gymnasium. His writings include poetry, literary history, law, and philosophy. He was one of the defenders of the natural law approach and basically followed Aristotle’s ethics. His many publications include, among others, De interpretatione legum (Orléans, 1665), Institutiones medicinae moralis (Hamburg, 1667), Accessiones ethicae, juris naturalis, et rhetoricae (Hamburg, 1690). Leibniz was familiar with his work, which he discussed in a sustained and varied correspondence. Samuel Pufendorf (1632-1694), leading natural law philosopher and jurist in Germany. Studied theology and law at Leipzig, politics and moral philosophy at Jena, and completed his studies at Leiden. His first book, Elementorum Jurisprudentiae Universalis Libri Duo (1660) made him known and he was invited to occupy the first chair of natural and international law in Germany, at Heidelberg, where he developed natural law theory along lines that diverged from Grotius’s. In 1668 he became professor of international and natural law at Lund, where he wrote his eitght-volumes magnum opus, De jure naturae et gentium (1672), which had a huge impact for over a hundred years. Leaving academia, Pufendorf became court historian in Stockholm from 1677 to 1688, and then he occupied a similar position at the court of the Elector of Branderburg, in Berlin. As a political historian, his horizon transcended the scope of his duties and revealed a global European perspective. His De statu Imperii Germanici (1667), published under a pseudonym, undertook to show the inconsistencies of the dual structure of the Holy Roman Empire, with the emperor in Vienna and the Electors in Germany sharing power and sovereignty. Leibniz, contrary to him, considered these inconsistencies merely apparent and viewed the structure of the Empire as a model for a federative state. Leibniz also diverged from Pufendorf in the field of natural law and the controversy between them in fact went beyond specific issues in any given field, expressing rather different perspectives in law, politics, theology, and history (see Döring, Forthcoming). Petrus Ramus or Pierre de la Ramée (1515-1572) was one of the most widely read Renaissance humanists, among whom he enjoyed much prestige due to his outspoken anti-Aristotelian stance. His M.A. dissertation, Quaecumque ab Aristotele dicta essent commentitia esse (Paris, 1536) had immediate impact and its ideas were further developed in Aristotelicae Animadversiones and Dialecticae Partitiones (both published in Paris, 1543). He undertook to replace formal Aristotelian logic by a new,

Biographical Notes

467

rhetoric-based “dialectics”, which he considered to be closer to natural argumentation and more useful for discovery. The Sorbonne’s reaction to his ideas led to their condemnation by royal decree (1544). He was rehabilitated by Henry II and held a chair at the Royal College of Paris (1551). His prolific production includes also Institutiones dialecticae (Paris, 1543), Platonis epistolae latinae (Paris, 1549), Ciceronianus (Paris, 1557), Scholae gramaticae (Paris, 1559), Scholae dialecticae (Basel, 1559), and much more. His work was very influential in his time. Nicolas-François Remond was ‘Chef des Conseils’ of the Duke of Orléans, Regent of France after Louis XIV’s death. His brother, Pierre Remond de Montmort, a mathematician, member of the Académie des Sciences and of the Royal Society, author of a treatise on games, also corresponded briefly with Leibniz. After reading the Théodicée, NicolasFrançois became an enthusiastic supporter of Leibniz, describing himself as his faithful disciple. The correspondence between them, initiated in 1713, continued until Leibniz’s death. Remond was associated with other Leibniz supporters in Paris, including Varignon who was very active in the LeibnizNewton struggle about the calculus. Remond was in fact an important link between Leibniz and what was going on in England at the time, especially through the Venetian Conti who became a close friend of Newton. But his interests were quite broad, ranging from mathematics and politics to literature and philosophy, and he informed Leibniz about what was going on in the Republique des Lettres. Gilles Personne de Roberval (1602-1675) was an influential physicist and mathematician, creator of a balance that bears his name, and leading figure in the research on infinitesimals that led to the development of the calculus. He was a founding member of the Académie des Sciences and a friend of leading scientists of his time, such as Marin Mersenne, Jean Gallois (editor of the Journal des Sçavans), Etienne and Blaise Pascal, Christian Huygens, Pierre Gassendi, and Pierre de Fermat. A severe critic of Descarte’s Discours de la Méthode, as well as of his mathematics, he sided with Fermat in his acrimonious polemics with Descartes. In January 1675, Leibniz discussed with him in Paris the mistakes in Descartes’s Geometry and in November-December, after his death, examined the manuscript he had left of his Elementa geometrica. Jean Galois, with the support of Colbert and the Duke of Chevreux, proposed Leibniz for the chair of Roberval in the Académie des Sciences (Müller and Krönert 1969: 37, 39-40). He authored a Traité de Méchanique des poids soustenus par des puissances sur les plans inclinéz à l’horizon (Paris, 1636) and edited

468

Biographical Notes

Aristarch of Samos’ De mundi systemate, parties et motibus eiusdem (Paris, 1644). His posthumously published works include Traité de Géometrie (publ. 1996), Les principes du devoir et des connaissances humaines (publ. 1992), Traité des indivisibles (publ. 1987). Cristobal Rojas y Spínola (1626-1695) was Bishop of Thina from 1666 to 1686, when he was appointed by Emperor Leopold Bishop of Wiener-Neustadt. Throughout his life, he endeavored to bring about the reunification of the Christian churches. For this purpose he traveled widely and held reunification meetings with leading Lutheran theologians, e.g., G. W. Molanus, a close associate of Leibniz. Rojas y Spínola’s treatise Regulae circa christianorum omnium ecclesiasticam reunionem (1683), reprinted many times, formed the basis for the meetings held in Hanover in 1683. Leibniz’s relations with Rojas y Spínola began in 1679 and continued virtually until the latter’s death. Leibniz regarded highly Rojas y Spínola, and even considered writing his biography – one of the many projects he didn’t carry out. For more information on Rojas y Spínola, see R. Mäumer (1999). Faustus Sozz ini (Socinu s) (1539-1604), following his uncle Laelius Socinus (1525-1552), was an anti-Trinitarian theologian, whose doctrine influenced the rise of English Unitarianism and represented a major contribution to the rationalist trend in 17th century theology. Denounced by the Inquisition in 1559, he took refuge in Zürich. From 1563 to 1574 he lived in the Medici court in Florence, where he developed his doctrines, which he defended in public controversies in Switzerland in 1574. Since 1579 he lived in Poland, where he was the leader of the anti-Trinitarian community of the ‘Polish Brothers’ until 1683, when he took refuge from persecution in small Polish villages. In the turn of the century, the so-called Raków Catechism, spelling out the Socinian creed, is elaborated and translated into several languages (published in 1630 as De vera religione). The Polish Socinians were forced into conversion or exile by the Polish Diet, and dispersed throughout Europe; communities survived in several regions up to the 19th century. Socinus is a ‘rationalist’ interpreter of Christian faith, according to Leibniz’s classification in Chapter 2, because he argued, in many polemical writings, against those who do not employ their own reason in establishing the articles of faith relevant for salvation. Among his works, De Sanctae Scripturae Auctoritate (ca. 1580), Refutatio libelli, quem Jacobus Vuiecus Jesuita anno 1590 polonice edidit, de divinitate Filii Dei et Spiritus Sancti (1594), Christianae religionis

Biographical Notes brevissima institutio per interrogationes Catechismum vulgo vocant (ca. 1603).

469 et

responsiones,

quam

Francisco S uárez (1548-1617), philosopher, theologian, jurist. His education was oriented towards an ecclesiastic career: he studied Canonic law, philosophy and theology at the University of Salamanca. He then taught philosophy and theology in several universities: Salamanca, Valladolid, Alcalá, Collegio Romano, and Coimbra. A Jesuit who contributed significantly to the revival of scholasticism, his initial work is a famous commentary on Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologica, published in 1590. In his most important philosophical work, Metaphysicarum Disputationum tomi duo (1597), he developed an original conception of metaphysics, defending the thesis of the ontological and epistemological primacy of the individual. This operates a radical transformation of metaphysics with anthropological and political implications, for it leads to the assertion of the value of human nature and the autonomy of civil society. In this respect, Suárez is a precursor of the Christian natural law theorists. Leibniz discusses his conceptions of matter and form in the Disputatio Metaphysica de Principio Individui (1663; A VI 1 12), and of cause in the Preface to Nizolius (1670; A VI 2 418) and in Chapter 2, paragraph 28), as well as in his later writings. Suárez’s Opera omnia comprises 28 volumes (ed. Vives, Paris, 1856-1861). Quintus Sep timius Florens Tertullia nus (155/160 B.C. – after 220 A.D.). Early Christian author from Carthage, born in a pagan family, had a good intellectual upbringing, especially in Law, which is manifest in his writings after conversion. A masterful Latin writer and well versed in Greek, he created about a thousand neologisms designed to express Christian concepts. He combated Gnosticism, but became a leader of Montanism, whose last “tertullians” returned to Christian orthodoxy in 438, under the influence of Augustine. About thirty of his writings have been preserved. Among them, the Apologeticum, addressed to the magistrates, which contests the legality of lawsuits against the Christians and affirms that the human soul is naturally Christian. In De praescriptione haereticorum, he denies the heretics the right of using the Scriptures and argues that faith and reason are incompatible. Although he does not expressly employ the formula “I believe because it is absurd” (credo quia absurdum est), usually attributed to him, he defends the view that faith does not need the support of philosophy: “it is believable because it is foolish, … certain because it is impossible” (credibile est quia ineptum… certum est quia impossibile). Leibniz refers often to his juridical thought and makes

470

Biographical Notes

use of his terminology; he also compiled approvingly what he considered to be important elements of his Eucharistic ideas (“De locis Tertulliani circa Eucaristiam”, 1677-1680; A VI 4 2533-2539). Christian Thomasius (1655-1728), son of Jakob Thomasius, Leibniz’s teacher in Leipzig, was a philosopher and jurist, who taught at Leipzig and Halle, where he was one of the founders of the new university. He was involved in several controversies, including with his former student Gabriel Wagner, with the Pietists, and with the doctrinarian orthodoxy prevalent in Leipzig. Thomasius, influenced by Pufendorf, adhered to natural law theory, to which he was an important contributor. A critic of the aristocracy’s culture mondaine, he defended however a strict separation of Law, politics and theology from ecclesiastical authority and faith. He corresponded occasionally with Leibniz, who was well informed about his work, of which he was often critical. In addition to his juridical works, he wrote about a wide range of topics, and was considered by Diderot, along with Bruno, Cardano, Bacon, Campanella, Descartes, Hobbes, Leibniz, Le Clerc, and Malebranche, a representative of eclecticism, “that philosophy which is so reasonable”, whose practitioners exercise “the most beautiful prerogative of humankind, the freedom of thinking by oneself” (Encyclopédie, article “Eclectisme”). Johann Gabriel Wagner (1660-1717), studied in Leipzig and Halle under Christian Thomasius. While a teacher of philosophy in the Hamburg Gymnasium, he got in touch with Leibniz in 1696, and ever since they had a substantive philosophical relationship. Little is known about his life, except that he frequently got into trouble. The last known report about him is by a scholar from Göttingen, who writes in 1717 that Wagner came to see him “in a pitiful shape” (Jaumann 2004: 694). As soon as he obtained his doctoral degree, he launched a virulent critique of his teacher’s Christian Thomasius’s Introductio in Philosophiam Aulicam (1691), titled Discursus et dubia in ChTh Introductionem in Philosophiam Aulicam (1691), which he signed with the pseudonym ‘Realis de Vienna’. The rift between them deepened after further attacks by Wagner on Thomasius’s (whom he ironically dubbed ‘the Socrates of the Germans’) subsequent work. This is only an example of Wagner’s character and sharp polemical attitude, which also prevented him from obtaining steady employment. In Hamburg he was expelled from the Gymnasium due to the weekly criticism he leveled in his Vernunftübungen against traditional forms of thought. An independent and original mind, historiographers now view him as an important figure in the German ‘Radical Enlightenment’ of the late 17th and

Biographical Notes

471

early 18th century, a member of what Herder in 1794 called “the society of our invisible ones” (Jaumann 2004: 695), whose work is part of the ‘clandestine’ philosophical literature of the time. He did indeed express and forcefully argue for what were quite radical positions in his time, such as a version of materialism defending the priority of physics, a cultural nationalism claiming the superiority of the Germans’ understanding over that of all others and of German as a scientific language, as well as a peculiar theory of mind. In spite of all this, Leibniz corresponded with him until 1708 and supported him materially and morally on several occasions. Wagner’s (i.e., Realis de Vienna’s) publications also include Responsum philosophicum ad Christiani Thomasii quaestionem de definitione substantiae (1693), Prüfung des Versuchs Vom Wesen des Geistes (1707), Meditatio de gravitatis et cohaesionis causa (1712). Erhard Weigel (1625-1699), a mathematician, inventor and philosopher, was a highly esteemed teacher of Leibniz in Jena, where he was professor of mathematics. It is said that another of his famous students there, the jurist Samuel Pufendorf, developed his conception of natural law on the basis of one of Weigel’s lectures. For Weigel, mathematics was the complete model for all thought, thus occupying the position of a General Science or Universal Mathematics –ideas later developed by Leibniz, albeit along different lines. Weigel elaborated the Pythagorean doctrine that numerical relationships underlie everything and applied it to, in addition to natural philosophy, moral philosophy and moral pedagogy, as well theology. He created an ‘art of calculating’ for the learning and practicing of moral virtues, demonstrated mathematically the mystery of the trinity, and applied his pan-mathematic view to numerous other subjects. Among his writings, Synopsis jurisprudentiae mnemoneutica (1669), Idea matheseos universa (1669), Pancosmos aetherus et sublunaris (1670), Universi corporis pansophici Pantologia (1673), Arithmetische Beschreibung der Moral-Weisheit von Personen und Sachen (1674), Compendium logisticae (1691).

References

Aarsleff, H. 1969. The study and use of etymology in Leibniz. In Akten des Internationalen Leibniz-Kongresses, vol. 3 (= Studia Leibnitiana Supplementa 3), pp. 173-189. Ashworth, E.J. 1967. Joachim Jungius and the logic of relations. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 49: 72-85. Austin, J. L. 1962. How to Do Things with Words. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Barenboim, D. and Said, E.W. 2004. Parallels and Paradoxes: Explorations in Music and Society. New York: Vintage Books. Baruzi, J. 1907. Leibniz et l’organisation religieuse de la terre. Paris: F. Alcan. Baruzi, J. 1909. Leibniz. Avec de nombreux textes inédits. Paris: Bloud et Cie. Belaval, Y. 1960. Leibniz critique de Descartes. Paris: Gallimard. Beyssade, J.-M. and Marion, J.-L. (eds.). 1994. Descartes: Objecter et Répondre. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Biermann, K.R. 1967. Überblick über die Studien von Leibniz zur Warscheinlichkeitsrechnung. Sudhoffs Archiv 51(1): 79-85. Blank, A. 2003. Incomplete entities, natural non-separability, and Leibniz’s response to François Lamy’s De la connaissance de soi-même. The Leibniz Review 13: 1-17. Blank, A. Forthcoming. Ramus and Leibniz on analysis. In Dascal (ed.) [a] Boucher, P. Forthcoming a. Leibniz: What kind of juridical rationalism? In Dascal (ed.) [a]. Boucher, P. Forthcoming b. La méthode des cas et son utilization par Leibniz. In Akten des VIII. Internationalen Leibniz-Kongress. Bourbaki, N. 1960. Eléments d’histoire des mathématiques. Paris: Hermann. Breger, H. 1989. Symmetry in Leibnizian physics. In The Leibniz Renaissance, ed. by Centro Fiorentino di Storia e Filosofia della Scienza. Firenze: Leo S. Olschki, pp. 23-42. Brosseder, J. 1967. Oekumenische Theologie. München: Max Hueber. Cajori, F. 1925. Leibniz – the master builder of mathematical notations. Isis 7: 412-429.

473

474

References

Cardoso, A. 2000. Uma nova heresia à medida de um novo mundo: A ofensiva de Arnauld contra a doutrina do pecado filosófico. Philosophica 15: 117-133. Cardoso, A. 2005. O Trabalho da Mediação no Pensamento Leibniziano. Lisboa: Colibri. Cardoso, A. Forthcoming. Morality and feeling: Genesis and determination of the will in Leibniz. In Dascal (ed.) [a]. Chaunu, P. 1984. Le Temps des Réformes. Bruxelles: Editions Complexe. Christin, O. 1997. La paix de religion. L’autonomisation de la raison politique au XVIème Siècle. Paris: Seuil. Conze, W. 1951. Leibniz als Historiker. Hannover: Niedersächsisches Jahrbuch. Couturat, L. 1901. La logique de Leibniz. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Craig, W.J. 1988. The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents from Aristotle to Suarez. Leiden: Brill. Dalgarno, G. 1661. Ars Signorum, vulgo character universalis et lingua philosophica. In The Works of George Dalgarno of Aberdeen. Edinburgh: Constable (1834), pp. 1-82. Dascal, M. 1971. About the idea of a generative grammar in Leibniz. Studia Leibnitiana 3: 272-290 [reprinted in Dascal (1987)]. Dascal, M. 1975. La razón y los misterios de la fe según Leibniz. Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofía 1: 193-226 [English translation in Dascal 1987]. Dascal, M. 1977. Charactères et pensée dans les Notes Parisiennes de Leibniz. Les Etudes Philosophiques 1977(4): 387-398 [English translation in Dascal 1987]. Dascal, M. 1978. La Sémiologie de Leibniz. Paris: Aubier-Montaigne. Dascal, M. 1987. Leibniz. Language, Signs, and Thought. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Dascal, M. 1990a. Leibniz on particles: Linguistic form and comparatism. In T. de Mauro and L. Formigari, pp. 31-60. Dascal, M. 1990b. The controversy about ideas and the ideas about controversy. In Gil (ed.), pp. 61-100. Dascal, M. 1993. One Adam and many cultures: The role of political pluralism in the best possible world. In M. Dascal and E. Yakira (eds), pp. 387-409. Dascal, M. 1994. Conocimiento y lenguaje en la filosofia moderna. In E. de Olaso (ed.), Del Renacimiento a la Ilustración I (= Enciclopedia Iberoamericana de Filosofía, vol. 6). Madrid: Editorial Trotta and Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, pp. 15-51.

References

475

Dascal, M. 1995. Strategies of dispute and ethics: Du tort and La place d'autruy. In Akten der VI. Internationalen Leibniz-Kongress, vol. 2, pp. 108-116. Dascal, M. 1998a. Language in the mind's house. Leibniz Society Review 8: 1-24. Dascal, M. 1998b. Controverses et polémiques. In M. Blay and M. Halleux (eds.), La science classique XVI e-XVIII e siècle. Dictionnaire Critique. Paris : Flammarion, pp. 26-36. Dascal, M. 2000. Leibniz and epistemological diversity. In A. Lamarra and R. Palaia (eds.), Unità e Molteplicità nel Pensiero Filosofico e Scientifico di Leibniz. Firenze: Leo S. Olschki, pp. 15-37. Dascal, M. 2001. Nihil sine ratione Æ Blandior ratio (‘Nothing without a reason Æ A softer reason’). In Akten der VII. Internationalen Leibniz Kongress, vol. I, pp. 276-280. Dascal, M. 2003a. On the epistemological role of natural languages according to Leibniz. Historiographia Linguistica 30: 187-204. Dascal, M. 2003b. Ex pluribus unum? Patterns in 522+ texts of Leibniz's Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe VI, 4. The Leibniz Review 13: 105-154. Dascal, M. 2003c. Interpretation and Understanding. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Dascal, M. 2004a. Alter et etiam. Rejoinder to Schepers. Leibniz Review 14: 137-151. Dascal, M. 2004b. On the use of argumentative reason in religious polemics. In T. L. Hettema and A. van der Kooij (eds.), Religious Polemics in Context. Assen: Van Gorcum, pp. 3-20. Dascal, M. 2005. The balance of reason. In D. Vanderveken (ed.), Logic, Thought and Action. Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 27-47. Dascal, M. and Wroblewski, J. 1987. Transparency and doubt: understanding and interpretation in pragmatics and in law. Law and Philosophy 7: 203224. Dascal, M. (ed.). Forthcoming a. Leibniz: What Kind of Rationalist?. Dordrecht: Springer. Dascal, M. (ed.). Forthcoming b. The Practice of Reason: Leibniz and his Controversies. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Dascal, M. and Chang, H. (eds). Forthcoming. Traditions of Controversy. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Dascal, M. and Yakira, E. (eds.). 1993. Leibniz and Adam. Tel Aviv: University Publishing Projects. Davillé, L. 1909. Leibniz historien. Essai sur l’activité et la méthode historique de Leibniz. Paris: Alcan.

476

References

Decobert, J. 1988. L’idée de tolérance avant la Philosophie des Lumières. Lille: Presses de l’Université de Lille. Descartes, R. 1891-1912. Oeuvres de Descartes. Ed. by C. Adam and P. Tannery. Paris: Vrin [= AT]. Döring, D. Forthcoming. Leibniz vs. Pufendorf: A controversy in the eve of the Enlightenment. In Dascal (ed.) [b]. Dumas, M.-N. 1976. La pensée de la vie chez Leibniz. Paris: Vrin. Eisenkopf, P. 1975. Leibniz und die Einigung der Christenheit. München, Paderborn, Wien: F. Schöningh. Ferriani, M. 1982. Leibniz, Bernouilli, il possibile e il probabile. In D. Buzzetti and M. Ferriani (eds.), La grammatica del pensiero: Logica, linguaggio e conoscenza nell'età dell'Iluminismo. Bologna: Il Mulino, 151-182. Frankfurt, H. (ed.). 1972. Leibniz. A Collection of Critical Essays. New York: Anchor Books. Franklin, P. 2001. The Science of Conjecture. Evidence and Probability Before Pascal. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Frémont, C. Forthcoming. Rhetoric, irenicism, and truth. In Dascal (ed.) [b]. Freudenthal, G. 1999. Perpetuum Mobile – The Leibniz-Papin Controversy. Berlin: Max-Planck-Institut für Wissenschaftsgeschichte (Preprint 127). Garrison, J. 1991. Guerre civile et compromis, 1559-1598. Paris: Seuil. Genin, A. 1980. La philosophie religieuse de Leibniz. Tours: Presses de l’Université de Tours. Gensini, S. 1990. Vulgaris opinio babelica: Sui fondamenti storico-teorici della pluralità delle lingue nel pensiero di Leibniz. In De Mauro and Formigari (eds.), pp. 61-83. Gensini, S. 1991. Il naturale e il simbolico: Saggio su Leibniz. Roma: Bulzoni. Gensini, S. 2000. De linguis in universum: On Leibniz's Ideas on Language. Münster: Nodus. Gil, F. 1984. Mimesis e Negação, Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional/Casa da Moeda. Gil, F. (ed.). 1990. Controvérsias Científicas e Filosóficas. Lisboa : Fragmentos. Grice, P. 1989. Studies in the Way of Words. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Gross, A. 1998. Do disputes over priority tell us anything about science?. Science in Context 11: 161-179.

References

477

Grua, G. 1953. Jurisprudence universelle et théodicée selon Leibniz. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Grua, G. 1956. La justice humaine selon Leibniz. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Hazard, P. 1963. The European Mind, 1680-1715. New York: Meridian Books [J. Lewis May translation of La Crise de la Conscience Européenne, 1935]. Hill, C. 1965. Puritanism and Revolution. Studies in Interpretation of the English Revolution of the 17th Century. London: Mercury Books. Hintikka, J. 1972. Leibniz on plenitude, relations and the 'reign of law'. In Frankfurt (ed.), pp. 155-190. Hobbes, T. 1740. Dialogue between a Philosopher and a Student of the common Law of England. In The English Works of Thomas Hobbes (ed. W. Molesworth), vol. 6. London: John Bohn, pp. 3-160. Ishiguro, H. 1972. Leibniz’s theory of the ideality of relations. In Frankfurt (ed.), pp. 191-213. Jaumann, H. 2004. Handbuch Gelehrtenkultur der Frühen Neuzeit, vol. 1. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. Jesseph, D. M. 1999. Squaring the Circle: The War between Hobbes and Wallis. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Kalinowski, G. 1977. La logique juridique de Leibniz. Conception et contenu. Studia Leibnitiana 9: 168-189. Kamen, H. 1967. The Rise of Toleration. London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson. Kangro, H. 1968. Joachim Jungius’ Experimente und Gedanken zur Begründung der Chemie als Wissenschaft. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner. Kangro, H. 1969. J. Jungius und G.W. Leibniz: Ein Beitrag zur geistigen Verhältnis beider Gelehrten. Studia Leibnitiana 1: 175-207. King, P. 2001. Consequence as inference: Medieval proof theory 13001350. In M. Yrjönsuuri (ed.), 117-145. Kneale, W. and Kneale, M. 1962. The Development of Logic. Oxford: Clarendon Press. König, P. 1998. Das system des Rechts und die Lehre von den Fiktionen by Leibniz. In J. Schröder (ed.), Entwicklung der Methodenlehre in Rechtswissenschaft und Philosophie vom 16. bis zum 18. Jahrhundert. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, pp. 137-161. Krüger, L. 1981. Probability in Leibniz: On the internal coherence of a dual concept. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 63: 47- 60 . Laerke, M. Forthcoming. Apology for a credo maximum: On three basic rules in Leibniz’s method of religious controversy. In Dascal (ed) [a].

478

References

Laever, A. G. 1986. De “Acta Eruditorum” onder Redactie van Otto Mencke: De Geschiedenis van een Internationaal Geleerdenperiodiek tusse 1682 en 1707. Amsterdam / Maarssen: APA-Holland Universiteits Pers. Leclerc, J. 1994. L’histoire de la tolérance au siècle de la Réforme. Paris: Albin Michel. Leibniz, G. W. 1717 Collectanea Etymologica. Ed. by J. G. Eccard. Hannover : N. Forsterus [Reprinted G. Olms, Hildesheim, 1970]. Leibniz, G. W. 1913. Elementa philosophiae arcanae de summa rerum. Ed. by I. Jagodinsky. Kasan. Leibniz, G. W. 1991. De l'horizon de la doctrine humaine et La restitution universelle. Ed. by M. Fichant. Paris: Vrin. Leibniz, G.W. 1994. La réforme de la dynamique: De corporum concursu et autres textes inédits. Ed. M. Fichant. Paris : Vrin. Leibniz, G. W. 1995. L’estime des apparences. Ed. and transl. by M. Parmentier. Paris: Vrin. de Libera, A. 1991. Penser au Moyen Age. Paris: Seuil. di Liscia, D.A. 2002. ‘Operosum negotium’: Jungius’ doxoskopisch Betrachtung des Aristotelismus von Zabarella. In G. Piaia (ed.), La presenza dell’aristotelismo Padovano nella filosofia della prima modernità (Atti del Colloquio Internazionale in Memoria di Charles B. Schmitt). Roma/Padova: Antenore, pp. 215-255. Lutz, H. 1982. Reformation und Gegenreformation. München: Olenburg. McCormick, N. 1978. Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. McRae, R. 1976. Perception, Apperception, and Thought. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Malebranche, N. 1962-1970. Oeuvres Complètes de Malebranche. Ed. by A. Robinet. Paris: Vrin. Martin, C. J. Forthcoming. Disputing about disputing: The medieval procedure of positio and its role over the nature of logic and the foundations of metaphysics. In Dascal and Chang (eds). Mates, B. 1986. The Philosophy of Leibniz: Metaphysics and Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press. de Mauro, T. and Formigari, L (eds). 1990. Leibniz, Humboldt, and the Origins of Comparativism. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. de Melo, W. D. C. and Cussens, J. 2004. Leibniz on estimating the uncertain: An English translation of De incerti aestimatione with commentary. The Leibniz Review 14: 31-53. Mugnai, M. 1972. Leibniz’s Theory of Relations. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner.

References

479

Müller, K. and Krönert, G. 1969. Leben und Werk von G. W. Leibniz: Eine Chronik. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann. Naërt, E. 1959. Leibniz et la querelle du pur amour. Paris: Vrin. Naërt, E. 1964. La pensée politique de Leibniz. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Nederman, C.J. and Laursen, C. 1996. Difference and Disent: Theories of Tolerance in Medieval and Early Modern Europe. London: Rowman & Littlefield. Neff, L. Leibniz als Sprachforscher und Etymologe. Heidelberg: Ulrich Richen. Netanyahu, B. 2000. The old-new controversy about Spanish marranism. In C. Carrete Parrondo, M. Dascal, F. Márquez Villanueva and A. Sáenz Badillos (eds.), Encuentros & Desencuentros: Spanish-Jewish Cultural Interaction Throughout History. Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, pp. 545578. de Olaso, E. 1975. Leibniz et l'art de disputer. In Akten des II. Internationalen Leibniz-Kongresses, vol. 4 (= Studia Leibnitiana Supplementa 15), pp. 207-228. de Olaso, E. 1990. Sobre la filosofía leibniziana de las controversias. In Gil (ed.), pp. 115-129. Ortega y Gasset, J. 1979. La Idea de Principio en Leibniz y la Evolución de la Teoría Deductiva. Madrid: Alianza. Parker, G. 1980. Europe in Crisis, 1598-1648. London: Collins. Parkinson, G. H. R. 1963. Logic and Reality in Leibniz's Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Parmentier, M. 1993. Concepts juridiques et probabilistes chez Leibniz. Revue d’Histoire des Sciences 46: 439-485. Pombo, O. 1987. Leibniz and the Problem of a Universal Language. Münster: Nodus. Popkin, R. 1993. Scepticism and modernity. In T. Sorell (ed.), The Rise of Modern Philosophy: The Tension between the New and Traditional Philosophies from Machiavelli to Leibniz. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 15-32. Präntl, C. 1853. Über die Entwicklung der Aristotelischen Logik aus der Platonischen Philosophie. München: Kö niglich Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften [repr. Damstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1968]. Racionero, Q. 1991. “Wissenschaft und Geschichte bei Leibniz”. Studia Leibnitiana 23: 57-78. Racionero, Q. 1993. “The rights of Adam: A critique of natural rights and the moral dimension of rationality according to Leibniz”. In Dascal and Yakira (eds.), pp. 345-364.

480

References

Racionero, Q. 1994. Politische Aufklärung und Staatstheorie bei Leibniz. In M. Buhr (ed.), Das geistige Erbe Europas. Naples: Vivarium, pp. 517539. Racionero, Q. 1995. El principio de la place d'autruy y la racionalidad de la política en Leibniz. In I. Murillo (ed.), La filosofía en la encrucijada de la nueva Europa. Madrid: Diálogo Filosófico, pp. 583-622. Racionero, Q. 1999. Identidad y análisis: Materiales para una ontología de la verdad en Leibniz. Logos 23: 52-83. Racionero, Q. 2001. “Leibniz y la reunificación de las iglesias cristianas”. In Q. Racionero (ed.), El Siglo de Leibniz. Madrid: Akal. Ravier, E. 1966. Une bibliographie des oeuvres de Leibniz. Hildesheim: G. Olms (reprint). Rescher, N. 1967. The Philosophy of Leibniz. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Rivaud, A. 1914. Catalogue critique des manuscripts de Leibniz. Poitiers: Société Française de Philosophie. Robinet, A. 1995. Correspondance Leibniz – Castell de Saint Pierre. Paris: Centre de Philosophie du Droit. Rupert Hall, A. 1980. Philosophers at War: The Quarrel between Newton and Leibniz. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ryle, G. 1949. The Concept of Mind. London: Hutchinson. Sánchez Mazas, M. 1978. Modelli aritmetici per l'informatica juridica. Informatica e diritto (1978): 163-215. Schiffer, S. 1988. Meaning. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Schneider, I. 1981. Leibniz on the probable. In J. Dauben (ed.), Mathematical Perspectives. New York: Academic Press, pp. 201-219. Schneiders, W. 1966. Naturrecht und Gerechtigkeit bei Leibniz. In E. Hochstetter and G. Schischkoff (eds.), Zum Gedenken an des 250. Todestag von G.W. Leibniz. Meisenheim/Glan, pp. 607-650. Scholz, H.1931. Geschichte der Logik. Berlin: Junker und Bünnehaupt. Schopenhauer, A. 1942. The Art of Controversy. In Complete Essays of Schopenhauer (T. C. Saunders translation). New York: Wiley Book Company. von der Schulenburg, S. 1973. Leibniz als Sprachforscher (ed. by K. Müller). Frankfurt/Main: Klostermann. Schupp, F. 1980. Theoria – praxis – poiesis: Zur systematischen Ortsbestimmung der Logik bei Jungius und Leibniz. In Akten des III. Internationalen Leibniz-Kongresses, vol. 3 (= Studia Leibnitiana Supplementa 21), pp. 1-11. Searle, J. R. 1969. Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

References

481

Searle, J. R. 1983. Intentionality. An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Serfati, M. Forthcoming. The principle of continuity and the ‘paradox’ of leibnizian mathematics. In Dascal (ed.) [b]. Serres, M. 1968. Le système de Leibniz et ses modèles mathématiques. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Sève, R. 1989. Leibniz et l’école moderne du droit naturel. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Spitz, L. 1952. The significance of Leibniz for historiography. Journal of the History of Ideas 13: 333-348. Stiehler, G. 1966. Materialisten der Leibniz-Zeit. Ausgewählte Texten. Berlin: VEB. Stirnimann, J.K. 1949. Die praescriptio Tertullians im Lichte des römischen Rechts und der Theologie. Freiburg, Switzerland: Paulusverlag. Tönnies, F. 1887. Leibniz und Hobbes. Philosophische Monatshefte 23: 557-573. Turchetti, M. 1984. Concordia o Tolleranza?. Milano: Franco Angelli. Walmsley, P. 1993. Disputation and conversation: Probability and the rhetoric of natural philosophy in Locke’s Essay. Journal of the History of Ideas 54(3): 382-394. Weijers, O. Forthcoming. The medieval disputatio. In Dascal and Chang (eds). Wilkins, J. 1668. An Essay towards a Real Character and a Philosophical Language. London: Gellibrand & Martyn. Woolhouse, R. S. 2001. Leibniz and François Lamy’s De la connaissance de soi-même. Leibniz Review 11: 65-70. Woolhouse, R. S. and Francks, R. 1994. Leibniz, Lamy, and ‘the way of pre-established harmony. Studia Leibnitiana 26: 76-90. Yrjönsuuri, M. (ed.). 2001. Medieval Formal Logic. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Subject Index Agreement, lxi, 47, 81, 112, 125, 161, 193, 199, 218, 228, 230, 251, 260, 261, 329, 334, 335, 380, 393, 394, 395, 403, 413, 438 see also Consensus Alchemy, 170, 271, 303, 460 Algebra, 97-98, 103, 134, 136, 137, 141, 216, 228, 260, 264, 267, 275, 276, 280, 281, 296, 379, 384, Allegation, 71, 154, 155, 260, 390, 463 Alphabet of human thoughts, 102, 119, 120, 122, 217, 264 Ambiguity, xlvii, 10, 20, 22, 23, 29, 62, 79, 80, 121, 143, 146, 179, 207, 257 Amphiboly, 80, 89 Amplification, 76, 388 Analysis, xxxii, xlv, lxii, 33, 41, 84, 86, 90, 91, 93, 94, 99, 102, 103, 116, 119, 132, 135, 140, 141, 202, 214-217, 220, 221, 223, 229, 235, 263-267, 271, 272, 275, 276, 279, 280, 286, 296, 302, 325, 366, 371, 384, 430,433, 443, 458 see also Resolution Ancestor, 346, 347 Ancient, xix, xlii, lii, 18, 31, 87, 125, 160, 188, 218, 228, 232, 233, 314, 345, 374, 401, 405, 431, 439, 448, 457, 461 Anglican, 359, 370, 399, 415, 461 Animal, 26, 139, 184, 384, 385, 436 seminal, 436 Antagonist, 306, 307

Abandonment, 244, 342, 343-344, 348, 351-353, 355, 394 Absolutism, 6 Abstract, 18, 90, 121, 126, 153, 271, 276, 278, 338, 340, 384, 390, 445 Absurdity, lxviii, 81, 183, 186, 210, 354, 415, 424, 425, 446, 469 Academy, liii, lxii, 278, 442 edition, xvii, xxii, 29, 35, 41, 89, 114, 147, 168, 178, 225, 235, 243, 251, 300, 309, 340, 342, 347, 351, 355, 370, 372, 455-457 Accident, 184, 220, 223, 265, 345, 411 Accommodation, xxxix, 26, 249 Action, lvi, 6, 51, 57, 116, 137, 163, 191, 200, 243, 268, 387, 399, 409, 411, 438 legal, 40, 70, 165, 286, 287, 343-347, 352, 354-355, 395-397 moral, 40 principle of, 15, 340 Ad hominem, 201, 205, 210, 313 Adept, 170 Admonition, 175, 195 Adversary, xxxi, xlii,, lxv, lxvii, 3, 51, 62, 72, 111-114, 117, 143, 145, 146, 148, 156, 158, 159, 163, 173, 201, 204-206, 210, 249, 319, 354 Affection, 17, 85, 144, 153, 387 Agent, 40, 289 free, 186 legal, 289, 396 moral, 40 483

484 Antecedent, 9, 11, 12, 83, 198, 262, 409, 416 Antichrist, 257, 318, 331 Apodictic, 47 Apostate, 51, 362, 370 Apostles, 53, 308, 333, 334 A posteriori, 84, 85, 97, 222, 229, 271, 272, 425, 441 Apparence, 50, 181 Appearance, lxviii, 82, 104, 106, 172, 181, 183, 193, 222, 224, 426, 437, 438 Apperception, 197, 389 see also Consciousness Application, 46, 168-173, 182, 197, 199, 204, 235, 267, 268, 424 see also Attention A priori, xxvii, 84, 85, 94, 96, 97, 114, 222, 229, 266, 271, 424, 425, 441 Arbitrariness, lxvii, xxxi, l, lxiii, 7, 68, 84, 86, 91, 132, 134, 189, 310, 327, 355, 416 Argumentation, xxi, xxi, 2, 3, 25, 29, 39, 49, 65, 70, 77-92, 125, 144, 163, 218, 221, 239, 321, 323, 341-357, 416, 436, 451, 463, 467 Aristotelian, xxx, 70, 78, 80, 90, 91, 147, 157, 199, 218, 240, 264, 279, 377, 387, 388, 429, 433, 455, 458, 466 Arithmetic, xxxiii, 19, 22-24, 115, 116, 119-128, 137, 180, 186, 214-217, 225, 228, 264, 267, 275, 281, 296, 368, 379, 382, 384, 440 binary, 120, 125, 126 Art of characters, 220, 263-269 see also Characteristic of combinations, 94, 96, 220, 224, 275, 278, 430, 433 see also Combinatory

Subject Index of conversation, 5, 147, 170, 171, 185, 298 see also Conversation of cunning, 136 of defining, 272, 281, 439 see also Definition of dialogue, xvi, liv, lv, lix, lxv, 26, 72, 167, 431 see also Dialogue of discovery, see of inventing of disputing, xxx, xxxi, xliii, 1-6, 10, 36, 66, 145, 155-157, 217, 226, 248, 286, 297, 298, 415 see also Disputatio, Disputation, and Dispute of divination, 136, 402, 413 of exegesis, 381 of experimenting, xxxvii, 378 of expounding, 386, 430 see also Method, expository of formulae, 136 of interpreting, 70, 71 see also Interpretation of interrogating, xxxiv, xxxvii, 36, 37, 378 of inventing, xix, 93-98, 121, 130, 135, 136, 275-283, 368 of judging, 93, 121, 135, 213 see also Judgment of legislating, 289 see also Legislation mnemonic 136 see also Memory of practice, 384 of speech, 31, 86, 135, 147, 173, 482 see also Rhetoric of subtlety, 220, 380 see also Subtle of thinking, see Thinking, art of of understanding, 134, 375 of verifying, 40, 430

Subject Index Assertion, 2, 15, 30, 50, 210, 382, 393 Assumption, lxii, lxiii, 84, 105, 178, 199, 210, 216, 241, 280, 290, 371, 401, 419 Astronomy, 82, 138, 229, 375, 452 Atheism, 237, 239, 306, 307, 370, 425 Attention, 3, 20, 39, 43, 59, 71, 144, 157, 165, 172, 176, 194, 197, 257, 383, 414 Audience, liv, 3, 30, 51, 52, 62, 124, 147, 148, 158, 198, 201, 204, 380 Authenticity, 10, 145, 158, 197, 366 Authority, 4, 7, 36-38, 51-53, 56, 76, 78, 121, 194, 210, 259, 296, 336, 344, 406, 419, 421, 470 of Church, 56, 63, 160, 161, 197, 247, 255, 257-260, 317-319, 325-327, 332, 333, 335-337, 339, 340, 402, 453 divine, 49, 52, 134, 421 institutional, 7, 16, 51, 191, 335, 355, 356 of judge, 53, 56, 345 moral, 56, 63 public, 16, 36 of Scripture, 53, 152 way of, xxxix Axiomatic, 134, 141, 209, 241, 360, 463 Axiomatization, 140, 371 Balance see also Scales of law, 35-40 of reason, xxxi, xliv, lxvii, lxviii, 7, 8, 19, 20, 30, 89, 168, 173, 179, 248, 263, 372

485 of reasons, xxvii, 6, 15, 22, 36, 70, 71,124, 126, 160, 181, 200, 201, 241, 242, 263, 267, 290, 318, 323, 344, 353, 436, 404 Baptism, 314, 340, 412, 417 Barbarian, 86, 123, 126, 130, 307, 405 Beauty, 143, 147, 148, 169, 185, 186, 193, 195, 264, 315 Begging the question, 294 Being, supreme, 29, 30 Believe change of, xlv, 241-245 obligation to, 41-47, 325 Believer, xxi, xxvi, lxvi, 13, 53, 317, 332, 333, 339, 340 Benevolence, 351, 378, 400 Bible, 56, 148, 159, 190, 362, 453, 455, 459, 462, 463 see also Scripture Body, 11-14, 37, 50, 138, 183, 223, 265, 269, 302, 359, 436, 438, 456, 465 Bookkeeping, 130, 215, 379 Brabeum, 50 Cabbala, 119, 120, 220, 264, 298, 458 Calculation, xlii, lxvii, 19, 21, 22, 105, 141, 180, 217, 266, 280, 296, 379 Calculative, lxvi, lxix, 141, 198, 208, 214 Calculus, xxxi, xxxiii, xxxv, lx, lxiv, lxix, 29, 66, 93, 102, 106, 123, 129, 134, 141, 148, 213, 215, 216, 241, 264, 267, 290, 301, 385, 389, 458, 464, 467 Calvinism, xxv, xxvi, 24, 26, 259, 262, 319, 321, 399, 414, 415, 417, 433, 442, 451, 453, 455, 462, 463 see also Church, Reformed

486 Canonist, xxxiv, 38, 40, 161, 459 Cartesianism, xxxii, lx, lxii, lxvii, 24, 29, 103, 127, 141, 198, 209, 211, 214, 216, 237, 259, 374, 375, 387, 389, 433, 443, 446, 448, 455, 456, 461, 462, 464 Casting of lots, 17, 20, 24 out nines, 22, 24, 141, 267, 281 Casuism, 40, 324, 414, 429, 430, 433 Category, 85, 91, 121, 122, 223, 376, 377, 387 Catholicism, lvii, 7, 16, 24, 41, 55, 152, 153, 154, 161, 167, 198, 201, 241, 243, 248, 253, 261, 305, 309-327, 329-340, 415, 416, 451, 455, 465 see also Church, Catholic Cause, 13, 199, 332, 411, 471 Certainty, xliv, lxvii-lxix, 7, 14, 28, 31, 36, 42, 46, 52, 61, 62, 82, 86-88, 113, 124, 125, 133, 141, 158, 169, 177, 179, 181, 183, 194, 198, 210, 233, 264, 266, 267, 271, 275, 276, 279, 280, 290, 296, 316, 326, 331, 337, 348, 392, 401, 402, 410, 412, 420, 424-426, 452, 461, 469 see also Necessity and Uncertainty absolute, lxvii, lxviii, 226, 231, 371 413 geometrical, 153, 178, 265 logical, 222, 425 metaphysical, 222, 223, 366, 436 moral, 16, 185, 223, 365, 366 physical, 223 Chance, 4, 17, 18, 24, 37, 43, 95, 97, 106, 176, 183, 185, 186, 204, 264, 267, 288, 329, 402 Chaos, 436, 437

Subject Index Character, 95, 103, 120, 121, 135, 220, 271, 272, 277, 278, 294, 296 Characteristic numbers, 119-127 universal, 93, 217, 263, 271, 277, 286, 295 see also Art of characters Charity, 52, 56, 61, 90, 125, 155, 169, 190, 192, 243, 244, 256, 320, 333, 337, 346, 442 see also Principle of Cheating, 36, 143, 183, 228, 392 Christ, 5, 9, 12, 13, 14, 38, 53, 56, 103, 160, 164, 174, 243, 247, 249, 252, 254, 257, 312, 323, 332, 334, 368 Church Catholic, 8, 62, 63, 162, 243-245, 250, 252, 255-261, 314, 330-335, 337-340, 405, 414, 453, 456 of England, 399-417 Fathers, xix, 61, 148, 159, 160, 364, 447 Gallican, 254, 260 Greek, 161, 245, 340 Latin, 161, 244 Oriental, 318 particular, 244 primitive, 149, 151 Reformed, xxvi, xliv, 10, 14, 23, 24, 54, 245, 251, 318, 405, 462 Roman, see Catholic true, 63, 201, 259, 313, 319 universal, 63, 244, 245, 252-254, 260, 362, 415 Clarity, lxv, 79, 80, 134, 141, 143, 147, 158, 206, 207, 280 Clashing, xxxix, xlvii, 50, 141, 205, 249, 256, 290, 327, 342, 395, 423

Subject Index Class, 63, 99, 103 Classification, 94, 130, 166, 266, 286, 287, 289-301, 376, 468 Coexistence, xxiv, xxvii, 243 Cogito, 209, 211, 461, 464 Collegiant, 442, 443 Color, 52, 101-104, 138, 220, 311, 363, 438 Combinatory, 30, 94, 96, 99, 103, 129, 155, 208, 287, 325, 356 see also Art of combinations Communication, xxiii, xxiv, xxviii, lxii, lxvi, 30-32, 89, 121, 126, 140, 143, 221, 323, 330, 359, 438, 448 oral, 2, 4, 52, 53, 154, 298, 302, 380 written, lv, 2, 4, 11, 53, 72, 192, 204, 232, 264-266, 348, 350, 361, 365, 382, 394 Communion, 244, 245, 249, 255, 256, 316, 320, 330, 333, 334, 338 Companion, lvi, 191, 195, 231, 282 Compensation, 126, 148, 158, 183, 207, 289, 300, 441, 447 Complaint, 67, 69, 77, 158, 287-290, 300, 305, 381 Complexity, lxii, 33, 91, 102, 121, 122, 209, 220, 221, 224, 225, 266, 312, 323, 342, 377, 379, 387, 403 Composition, lxvi, 91, 98, 224, 413 Comprehensible, 123, 238, 239, 298 see also Incomprehensible and Intelligible Computing, lxix, 21, 22, 24, 88, 91, 126, 135, 241, 263, 372 Concept, xxi, xxviii, xxxii, xlvii, lvii, 75, 84, 86, 91, 102, 103, 119, 120, 134, 141, 217, 219-221, 223, 224, 240, 271, 295, 302, 325, 371, 373, 414, 432

487 Concession, xxxix, 14, 30, 143, 163, 210, 248, 256, 257, 260, 323, 329, 336 Conciliation, xxi, xxv, xlviii, lix, 60, 88, 167, 168, 252, 265, 275, 405, 413, 415, 416, 421, 456 see also Moderation and Reconciliation Conclusive, 59, 125, 135, 217, 341, 356, 357 non-conclusive, xlvii, 214, 319 Concordance, 265 Concrete, 75, 90, 143, 298, 323, 390, 458 Condemnation, xxviii, 8, 240, 253, 254, 305, 307, 308, 317, 327, 340, 409, 414, 427, 453, 456, 460, 467 non-condemnation, 261 Condescension, 86, 249, 253, 256, 260, 323 Condition, 27, 88, 107, 108, 175, 213, 247, 258, 334, 393 Confession, Augsburg, 155,162, 250, 251, 260, 261, 335, 416, 442 Conflict, xxiii, xxiv, xxxix, liv, 5, 14, 18, 30, 31, 87, 88, 92, 144, 161, 163, 210, 244, 248, 256, 302, 318, 323, 327, 340, 401, 409, 414, 453 Confrontation, xxi, xxvii, l, lvi, lxix, 177, 305, 415, 421 Confusion, xliii, lxiii, lxvi, 1-6, 12-14, 132, 138, 174, 206, 213, 215, 221, 235, 259, 279, 295, 440 Congruence, li, 265, 394, 413 Conjecture, xxxv, lxiii, lxiv, 36, 75, 81, 86, 87, 89, 233, 263, 267, 269, 322, 348, 351-353, 431, 435-443

488 Conscience, 35, 38, 95, 155, 183, 188, 206, 242-245, 256, 311, 319, 321, 331, 430, 433 Consciousness, 38, 43-45, 157, 311, 324 see also Apperception Consensus, xxix, xlviii, l, li, 16, 53, 61, 132, 210, 218, 348, 393, 396, 403, 413 Consequent, 9, 11, 83, 87-89, 158, 165, 180, 197, 409, 413 Conspiracy, 318, 357 Contender, xxix, xxxix, xli-xliii, xlv, xlvii, lx, lxiv, 49-54, 55, 146, 248, 259, 301, 403 see also Opponent, Proponent, and Respondent Contest, xlii, lxiv, 49-52, 62, 124, 145, 404 Context, 67, 77, 79, 90, 101, 248 Contingency, xxxiii, lvi, 35, 36, 63, 144, 185, 211, 265, 266, 380, 381, 384, 400, 402, 403, 410, 411, 417, 426, 448 Continuity, 3-5, 192, 220, 287, 334, 413 Contract, 36, 40, 70, 108, 166, 288, 391-397 bare, 391, 395 dressed, 391, 395 formal, 391 nude, 132 quasi-contract, 396 Contradiction, xx, l, 9, 30, 60, 84, 88, 141, 173, 180, 185, 201, 205, 221, 259, 265, 362 see also Principle of Controversy, see also Contest, Debate, Discussion, Dispute, and Judge of perplex, 345, 347 philosophical, 7, 271

Subject Index religious, 8, 16, 51, 55, 63, 225 sacred, 49-54 semi-mathematical, 381 theological, 156, 218, 271, 305-308, 379, 459, 461 theoretical, 16, 68 Conversation, lv, lvii, 26, 72, 121, 130, 147, 167-169, 174, 247, 380, 462 see also Art of conversation Conversion, 125, 196, 199, 259, 412, 468, 469 Conviction, 3, 31, 32, 145, 146, 173, 177, 178, 186, 192, 194, 195, 202, 279, 254, 300, 306, 315, 316, 378, 382 see also Persuasion Correspondence, xxiv, lii, liii, lxxi, 89, 101, 138, 285-303, 341-357 Corruption, 170, 173, 306, 410, 412, 417 Council Ecumenical, xxiv, 151, 250, 254, 257, 329, 333-335, 338, 465 general, 162, 251, 252, 255, 333-335 Lateran, 162, 239, 240, 250, 260, 339, 340, 425 legitimate, 251, 255, 262, 325-327, 329, 335 of Basel, 260, 339 of Carthage, 340 of Florence, 155, 254, 337, 340 of Jerusalem, 253, 261 of Constance (Konstanz), xli, 260, 363, 369 of Lyon, 337, 340 of Nicaea, 314, 339 of Palestine, 307, 308 see also of Jerusalem

Subject Index of sages, 6 of Trent, xxxix, xli, 53, 199, 245, 250-253, 255, 260, 261, 262, 318, 321, 322, 325, 329, 336, 465 universal, 255 Creativity, 116, 141, 275 Creature, 61, 186-188, 194, 362, 437, 438 Crime, 183, 237, 288, 356, 357, 401 Criticism, xx, xxx-xxxii, xlii, lvii, lviii, 8, 9, 22, 40, 73, 81, 98, 102, 126, 129, 161, 173, 197, 224, 237, 240, 260, 291, 294-297, 302, 323, 324, 361, 362, 371, 373, 375, 388, 401, 415, 416, 420, 443 Crowd, 332 Culpability, 243, 288, 305, 344, 345, 409 Cult, 165, 172, 189, 196, 256, 257, 310, 338, 362, 412 see also Rite Cunning, 151, 255, 352 see also Art of Curve, 33, 94, 97, 98, 103 algebraic, 97, 98, 103 transcendent, 94, 97, 98, 103 Custom, 9, 27, 71, 81, 129, 170-173, 180, 260, 261, 343, 345, 401 Damnation, 319, 320, 322, 333, 334, 414 Data, xxxiii, xxxvii, xlii, 28, 125, 138, 214, 217, 226, 227, 231, 235, 264, 267, 268, 269, 276, 290, 296, 385, 430 Death, 175, 176, 188, 227, 229, 344, 435, 467

489 Debate, xx, xxiii, xxiv, xxvii, xxviii, xlii, xliii, xlv, xlvii, liii, lxiv, 5, 7, 8, 27, 28, 35, 36, 47, 50, 65, 143, 145, 146, 158, 196, 199, 201, 214, 248, 260, 302, 305, 312, 315, 321, 323, 341, 355, 359, 386, 389, 391, 400, 415, 416, 421 Decision, xxxi, xxxix, lix, lxix, 2, 4, 7, 8, 17, 19, 49, 56, 58, 65, 66, 69, 81, 92, 134, 147, 196, 207, 228, 233, 252, 253, 255, 257, 262, 320, 325-327, 329, 334, 335, 345, 357, 371, 380, 381, 409, 416, 425 Declaration, 32, 63, 154, 162, 230, 251-253, 257, 258, 342, 357, 361 Decree, 53, 69, 161, 254, 260, 262, 333, 403, 404, 410, 412, 414, 416 Deductive, xxxi, xxxiii, xliv, lxviii, lxix, 65, 93, 198, 213, 371-373 see also Conclusive and Demonstrative Definition, 21-23, 29, 31, 32, 46, 47, 56, 78, 80, 84-86, 90, 91, 129, 132-134, 218, 220, 271-273, 280, 302, 322, 325-327, 366, 383, 385, 438, 440, 443 see also Art of defining indefinable, 21 Deliberation, 3, 8, 37, 38, 124, 126, 147, 156, 158, 173, 225, 226, 228, 230, 235, 403 Demonstration, 15, 30, 31, 44, 83, 84, 108, 134, 217, 239, 275 see also Proof

490 Demonstrative, xlvii, lxiii, lxiv, lxvi, 1, 32, 47, 86, 130, 209, 218, 231, 233, 264, 277-279, 286, 366, 372, 425 non-demonstrative, lxviii, 136, 198, 426, 440, 452 Deontic, 41 Determination, 42, 77, 102, 199, 265, 339, 411, 413 Devotion, 62, 174, 177 Diaeresis, 91, 93, 286, 287 Diagram, xlvii, 98, 133, 134, 156 Dialectics, xxx, xxxi, xxxiii, xxxvii, xlvii, liv, lxv, 5, 30, 66, 73, 75, 76, 89, 90, 136, 140, 146, 157, 214, 226, 216, 218, 342, 366, 373, 388, 419-427 Dialogue, xx, li, liv, lv, lxv, lxvii, lxxii, 25-28, 30, 72, 156, 167-200, 256, 307, 359 see also Art of dialogue Dichotomy, 98, 287 see also Diaeresis Didactics, lv, 116, 220, 300 Digests, 68, 73, 77-79, 90, 264, 276, 397 Dioptrics, 278 Director, xlvii, 1, 3-5, 38, 389 Disagreement, xxiv, 2, 7, 10, 151, 162, 250, 258, 335, 396 Discourse, xxviii, 3, 5, 11, 30, 32, 146, 224, 380, 382, 392 Discussion, xxiv, xxviii, xxxix, xliv, lvi, 3, 20, 38, 49, 75, 155, 161, 202, 206, 213, 238, 241, 247, 248, 256, 259, 261, 262, 311, 312, 314, 318, 326, 335, 343, 391, 416, 423, 436 Disjunctive, 11, 12, 14, 85, 88, 99 Disorder, xxxix, xliii, 65, 214, 332, 343, 380, 381, 436

Subject Index Disposition, 80, 109, 154, 205, 232, 234, 245, 288, 321, 351, 393, 416 Dispute disputation, xxix-xxxi, xxxiii, lxviii, 5, 24, 49, 62, 218, 228, 248, 259, 266, 269, 355, 388, 419, 431 disputing see Art of formal, 146, 380, 382, 389 meta-disputation, 5 mingled, 1-6 undisputable, 180, 190, 196 Distinction, lxviii, 1, 5, 53, 78, 80, 89, 90, 94, 129, 138, 140, 141, 151, 158, 163, 196, 199, 218, 230, 238-240, 258, 265, 266, 289, 312, 316, 320, 327, 340, 356, 380, 387-389, 414, 419, 433 Divinity, 10, 51-53, 154, 184, 199, 207, 224, 238-240, 249, 254, 266, 311, 314, 320, 322, 337, 362, 366, 401-403, 409, 447 Division, xlvii, 91, 98-100, 103, 116, 145, 155, 157, 220, 287, 288, 291, 376, 377, 388 see also Diaeresis Dogma, lxvii, 151, 154, 161, 168, 220, 253, 260, 322, 333, 401, 416, 443 Dominican, 40, 402, 414 Doxastic, 41 Eclecticism, 271, 387, 390, 445, 470 Edit of Nantes, 247, 456, 462 Education, xxviii, 5, 51, 190, 253, 261, 296, 297, 313, 369 see also Didactics and Pedagogy Efficacy, 68, 72, 229, 333, 391-395 Elector, xxix, liii, 251, 260, 261, 354, 360, 362, 367, 369, 372, 460

Subject Index Elements, xx, xliii, lvi, lxii, 78, 86, 99, 133, 134, 138, 153, 167, 180, 181, 215, 217, 286, 289, 350, 363, 366, 437 of thinking, see Thinking Ellipsis, 66, 96 Eloquence, 37, 315, 333, 365, 380, 405 see also Rhetoric Emperor, 152, 154, 186, 197, 199, 247, 248, 251, 257, 260-262, 295, 330, 338, 341, 362, 363, 364, 447, 466 Empirical, 27, 75, 90, 105, 384, 436, 463 Encyclopedia, xxxvi, xli, 39, 67, 102, 129-141, 213, 219-224, 231, 236, 288 Éndoxa, 218, 430 Enthusiasts, liii, 197 Enthymeme, 92, 182, 288, 321, 432 Enumeration, 66-68, 94, 96-98, 100, 103, 138, 156, 180, 228, 235, 288, 377 Enunciation, 80, 95, 132, 134, 220, 221, 222, 224 Epicureanism, 185 Epistemology, xxvii, xxxii, xxxiv, xlv, l, liv, lvi, lviii, lxii, lxiv, lxvi, 6, 8, 101, 105, 106, 117, 141, 163, 219, 224, 235, 370, 453 Equilibrium, lxviii, 168, 179, 222 Equity, xlv, 148, 166, 183, 204, 207, 291, 338, 348, 356, 397 Error, xxvii, lxiii, lxv, 19, 21-23, 61, 82, 125, 182, 228, 242-244, 250, 252, 253, 277, 316, 339, 379, 384, 385, 401, 423 Essence, 12, 13, 131, 186, 259, 313, 321, 334, 379, 393, 396, 414 Establishment, xxxix, l, lxiii, 261, 359, 360, 363-367, 371, 426

491 Ethics, xxviii, xli, 83, 90, 126, 144, 148, 149, 163, 164, 183, 196, 199, 237, 265, 305, 308, 323, 370, 384, 427 see also Virtue Ethos, 199 Etymology, xlii, 10, 79, 141, 371 Eucharist, xli, 53, 314, 334 Evangelical, 10, 14, 16, 404, 405, 415 see also Lutheranism Evidence, xxxiv, lx, lxii, lxvii, 19, 53, 62, 81, 148, 157, 205, 207, 209, 210, 341, 346, 347, 356, 371, 436 Evil, origin of, 403, 410, 424 Evolvent, 97, 98, 103 Examination, 19-22, 124, 192, 265, 310, 311, 319, 321, 334, 347, 351, 431, 433 Excommunication, 24, 313, 317, 319, 334 Expectation, 109, 111, 114, 115, 153, 195, 345 Experience, 32, 38, 59, 60, 117, 124, 132, 134, 135, 140, 172, 179, 181, 189, 209, 233, 242, 268, 276, 277, 280, 296, 297, 311, 319, 366, 401, 436, 441 Experiment, xxxiv, lxiv, 22, 45, 47, 50, 84, 91, 123, 132, 133, 138, 207, 227, 229, 264, 276, 381, 437, 458 Expounder, xlv, 206-208, 400-403, 406 see also Judge of controversies Expression, 84, 89, 137, 206, 266 Extensional, xxxi, 385 External, xlvii, lxii, 30, 43, 56, 63, 150, 181, 179, 197, 241-245, 312, 383, 436, 438, 448 Extraordinary, 18, 51, 169-171, 191, 194, 248, 254, 322, 436

492 Facility, 21, 91, 117, 229 see also Feasible Faith see also Believer fundamental article of, 11, 13, 161, 237, 312, 314-316 matter of, 170, 196, 250, 251, 259, 326 mystery of, 8, 11, 14, 53, 238, 239, 314, 364, 420-422, 426, 471 question of, 9 Fallacy, 143, 157 Falsity, xxxi, lxviii, 12, 143, 149-152, 181, 210, 220, 238-240, 265, 291, 350, 351, 401, 420, 422-425 Feasible, xxix, 116, 117, 194, 207, 275, 281, 385, 441 Feeling, lxvii, 12, 26, 43, 174, 177, 197, 231, 243, 311, 313, 319, 320, 362 Feudalism, 73 Fiction, 164, 185, 238, 341-357 Fideism, 443, 453, 455 Figure, lxiii, 12, 21, 80, 96, 103, 120, 133-135, 137, 141, 194, 215, 221, 239, 278, 281, 308, 378, 379, 431, 432, 436, 440, 441 Force, xlii, xlv, 6, 37, 38, 42, 49-51, 59, 62, 73, 75, 78, 79, 120, 126, 134-136, 217, 268, 288, 317, 323, 335, 343, 344, 351, 353, 366, 392, 396, 402, 432, 438, 439, 440 Forget, xxxix, 3, 4, 45, 58, 205, 206, 307 Form in form, 19, 23, 65, 66, 125, 180-182, 226, 379, 380, 432 see also Formal of computing, 22, 135 dialectical, xxxi, 66, 146

Subject Index of dialogue, li, liv of disputation, xxxiii, 62, 380 of disputing, 36, 146, 155-157, 226, 286, 298, 381, 389, 423 of reasoning, 2, 135, 182, 435 Formal, xxxiii, xxxvii, xlvii, liv, lxvi, 13, 66, 69, 70, 78, 93, 98, 99, 105, 129, 140, 144, 146, 152, 198, 209, 210, 214, 230, 238, 240, 263, 269, 271, 301, 305-307, 319, 320, 327, 329, 342, 357, 379, 381, 388, 389, 391, 432, 451 Formalism, lxv, lxvi, 144, 198, 388 Formalization, xxxi, xlvii, 198 Formula, xxiv, xlviii, 12-14, 61, 66, 94, 102, 134, 136, 228, 230, 289, 317, 322, 335, 403, 469 Fortune, 50, 52, 67, 83, 171, 178, 186, 263, 267, 354, 368, 386, 402, 403 Freedom, xxix, lvi, 86, 90, 132, 186, 257, 265, 361, 369, 400, 401, 409-412, 416, 417, 447, 462 Fundamental, xxix, xlv, xlvii, 10, 66, 84, 95, 99, 102, 126, 164, 185, 219, 260, 286, 303, 305, 320, 329, 331, 332, 359, 372, 380, 420, 421 see also Faith, fundamental article of Game, 24, 83, 146, 153, 301, 326, 377, 380 Generation of animals, 435 of plants, 103 spontaneous, 442 Genus, 23, 80, 85, 87, 95-100, 103, 115, 287, 288, 376, 377, 384 see also Species Geography, xlii, 82, 137, 139

Subject Index Geometry, xxxiii, 33, 39, 103, 125, 136, 137, 171, 178, 179, 186, 215, 221, 264, 275, 275-281, 371, 389, 400, 440 Globe, 137, 139, 179, 436, 437 Glory, 50-52, 61, 125, 140, 175, 190, 191, 193, 195, 207, 232, 294, 410, 439 Gnostology, 220 Good, 4, 12, 26, 51, 63, 125, 148, 166, 178, 193, 207, 210, 255, 315, 382, 401, 403, 424, 439 common, 5, 6, 82, 89, 193-195, 207, 403 Grace, 52, 170, 172-176, 195, 196, 199, 207, 311, 313, 314, 319, 331, 333, 337, 378, 401, 411-414, 416, 417, 453 Habit, liii, 11, 59, 158, 189, 196, 205, 350, 387, 404 Happiness, xxiv, lxiii, 37, 42, 46, 52, 78, 119, 129, 130, 139, 166, 174-176, 182, 187, 188, 190, 195, 199, 216, 217, 219, 227, 235, 308, 332, 442 see also Unhappiness Harm, xxviii, 108, 109, 121, 149, 151, 164-166, 190, 248, 256, 280, 289, 317, 356, 368, 380, 394, 397, 421 Harmony, xxi, l, 126, 190, 197, 199, 251, 330, 424 pre-established, lvi, 421, 438, 440, 447, 456, 462, 465 universal, l, 190, 424 Hatred(s), 17, 154, 190, 307, 402 Hebrew, 10, 86, 159, 303, 364 Heresy, 51, 61, 155, 206, 237-239, 244, 247, 249, 250, 253, 260, 313-316, 320, 326, 333, 338-340, 425, 460, 469

493 formal, 319, 320 material, 316, 319, 320 Hermeneutic, xxxvi, xli, xliii, lxvii, 7, 8, 30, 35, 56, 66, 77, 160, 214, 261, 360 Hermetic, 119, 453, 458, 460 Hermit, 168-170, 172, 199 Heuretic, 286, 300, 463 Heuristic, l, lxvi, 65-74, 93-104, 129, 143-162, 163, 209, 287, 303 Hierarchy ecclesiastic, 154, 255, 333, 338 epistemic, xxxv, 166 History, xix, xli, xlii, lii, 10, 63, 81, 126, 139, 231-235, 364, 366, 376, 382, 439, 452, 453 ecclesiastic, 56, 339, 362, 370 of logic, 429-434 Holy Ghost, 176, 252, 255, 257, 261, 313, 316, 332, 333, 335 Scripture, 51, 53, 249, 250, 252, 257 see also Scripture Trinity, 239 see also Trinity Virgin, 257 Homiletic, 199 Honesty, 27, 83, 164, 186, 204, 323, 348 Hope, xlii, lix, lxiii, 4, 18, 49-52, 62, 105-117, 130, 131, 153, 154, 180, 183, 192, 194, 215, 248, 267, 296, , 339, 350, 369, 402, 439, 442 Huguenot, xxiii-xxvi, 54, 309, 456, 462 Hypothesis, lxiii, 15, 30, 32, 41, 47, 84, 86, 132, 138, 209, 213, 215, 217, 221, 337, 371, 411, 416, 435-438, 456 Idea, lxv, 18, 29, 89, 91, 116 Idolatry, 308, 364

494 Ignorance invincible, 151, 306, 307 sin of, 306, 307 Illness, 170, 174, 192, 227, 402 Imagination, lxiv, 116, 134, 137, 141, 170, 189, 281, 364, 430, 445 Immortality, 223, 425 Impartiality, 5, 28, 59, 63, 65, 72, 201-208 Impersonate, 177 Implicit, 51, 56, 89, 91, 135 Improbability, 14-15 Imprudence, 344, 350 Inclination, lxviii, lxix, 11, 12, 15, 19, 42, 81, 124, 168, 173, 181, 206, 222, 291, 338, 396, 411, 416, 437 Incomprehensible, 238, 240 see also Unintelligible Incredulity, 177, 189 Index, 23, 51, 96, 97, 130, 133, 181, 215, 216, 357, 416 see also Inventory Indication, xxxv, 53, 76, 145, 223, 267, 281, 290, 431 see also Sign counter-indication, 76, 145, 290 Individual, 6, 17, 52, 75, 85, 103, 130, 139, 197, 245, 265, 291, 336, 445 Induction, 14, 15, 102, 132, 198 Inesse, 238, 265 see also Inherent Infallibility, xxxix, xliv, 8, 16, 19, 21, 52, 53, 57, 59, 83, 189-192, 259, 311-314, 332-335, 381 Inference, xxxi, 9, 14, 82, 89, 92, 135, 141, 179, 197, 198, 226, 276, 286, 291-295, 357, 366, 373, 378, 379, 388 Infidel, 308, 310, 313, 425

Subject Index Infinite, lx, lxvii, 29, 84, 88, 156, 183-185, 215, 239, 242, 279, 280, 313, 385, 413, 421, 424, 437, 448 In foro interno, 245 see also Internal Inherent, 71, 86, 99, 238, 239, 342 Injustice, 4, 5, 159, 165, 245, 321, 344, 423 Innovation, 29, 53, 141, 215, 230, 426, 433, 461 see also Reform Inquiry, xxx, xxxvi, lxii, lxiii, 21, 163, 177, 217, 302, 378 see also Research Instauration, 213, 214, 216 Intellect, 325, 326 Intelligence, 37, 50, 163, 268, 348, 365, 416, 423 Intelligibible, 75, 119, 129, 138, 201, 238, 305, 419, 420 Intensional, 384 Intention, 87-89, 150, 151, 243, 244, 261, 335, 336, 342-344, 348, 350, 352, 393, 394, 405, 406, 410, 413, 425, 433 Interest particular, 4, 41, 129, 141, 219 self-interest, 191, 193, 365 Interlocutor, 32, 170, 323 Internal, xlvii, 56, 63, 174, 181, 316, 319, 411, 438 Interpretation, 7, 8, 14, 30, 56, 66, 77-92, 197, 254, 261, 290, 297, 453 see also Hermeneutic Intolerance, 443 Intuition, lxii, 198, 231, 235, 266, 432 see also Knowledge, intuitive Invalid, 59, 69, 82, 83, 141, 157, 340, 349, 351-354, 401

Subject Index Invention see Art of inventing Inventory, xlii, 96, 215, 235 see also Index and Repertoire Investigation, lxii, 35, 36, 39, 86, 93-96, 100, 123, 138, 139, 170, 181, 183, 210, 226-229, 232, 373, 378 see also Research Invincible, 151, 240, 250, 253, 255, 305-308, 419, 422-425 Irenic, xlv, li, 153, 162, 260, 325, 329, 340, 458, 460, 465 Irrational, 18, 24, 323, 384 see also Rational Irrelevance, xxvii, 65, 155, 198, 253, 376, 381 Isostheneia, lxviii, lxix, 6, 168 Jansenism, xxxiii, 40, 196, 261, 305, 310, 315, 321, 402, 414, 448, 455, 459 Jesuit, xxiii, xxv, 40, 54, 196, 198, 237, 260, 261, 305-308, 319, 321, 327, 354, 402, 414, 433, 442, 448, 453, 455, 459, 469 Jew, 26, 159, 253, 261, 364 see also Hebrew Judge of controversies, xxviii, lxvii, 7-23, 25, 49, 55-63, 201, 297, 298, 312, 335, 381, 451, 452 see also Expounder Judgment, 4, 16, 23, 37, 50-53, 57, 62, 71, 99, 103, 106, 145, 164, 165, 174, 204, 208, 210, 251, 258, 275, 286, 300, 329-339, 357, 378, 382, 402, 430-433 Jurisconsult, 75-76, 378 Jurisprudence, 19, 36, 37, 67, 68-69, 75-76, 77-92, 103, 164-165, 234, 272, 286, 289, 322, 335, 341-357, 366, 381, 391-397

495 Justice, lii, 4, 6, 39, 65, 77, 90, 95, 164, 183, 186, 187, 190, 313, 321, 323, 346, 355, 356, 366, 397, 409, 412, 413 King, liii, liv, lviii, 18, 24, 116, 186, 260, 318, 361-363, 369, 372, 404, 422, 449 Knowledge adequate, 221 advancement of, xvi, xxi, xxiv, xxx, lix, lxii-lxv, 93, 126, 140, 235, 389 a posteriori, 222 certain, 42 clear, 351, 353, 389 demonstrative, 253 distinct, 14, 322, 389 doubtful, 14, 281 empirical, 27 foundation of, lxii, 140, 209 of God, 170, 171, 306, 308, 409, 416 historical, xxxvi, xli, 253 human, 181, 214, 216, 217, 271, 276, 348, 447, 461 intuitive, 89, 266, 416 middle, 416, 417 model of, xxxiv obscure, 13, 219, 424 of oneself, 319 probable, 1 topical, 223 useful, lxiii, 130, 131 Labyrinth of continuum, 413 of disputes, 172 of freedom, 413 Language adamic, 120 formal, 263

496 philosophical, 220, 266, 272 symbolic, 259, 263 universal, 119-127, 277 Law canonic, 78, 469 Carolingian, 349 civil, 78, 289, 343, 394 codification, 77 common, 352 criminal, 106 feudal, 72, 73 international, 341, 355, 356, 460, 466 natural, 1, 89, 217, 345, 350, 391-397, 460, 466 Roman, 40, 78, 90, 92 Laziness, 172, 173, 191, 225, 234, 268, 401, 402, 413 Legislation, 65, 90, 341, 356, 395 Legislator, 39, 77-82, 87, 89, 90, 261, 342-346, 352, 353, 356, 395 Libertine, 233, 425 Library, xxviii, xxxii, 76, 97, 130, 185, 300, 363 Lie, 120, 148-152, 160, 161, 238, 240, 330 Light divine, 176, 311, 322 enlightenment, 203, 470 illumination, 103 inner, 179, 311, 322 natural, 198, 421 Likelihood, 5, 15, 35-38, 61, 106, 153, 179, 185, 186, 191, 194, 233, 254, 265, 311, 327, 344, 353, 361, 431 see also Probability Limitation, 76, 92, 94, 165, 260, 267, 377, 388 Literal, 9, 80, 215, 459 Litigation, 65-74, 166, 335, 345, 346, 357, 431

Subject Index Loci, xxxvi, xlvii, 136, 357, 377, 378, 388 see also Topoi Logic applied, 286, 290 formal, 451 history of, 373, 429, 430, 431 modal, 41, 453 natural, 141, 373, 382 new, 105, 225-230, 342, 452 pure, 385 of the contingent, 35, 36 Logistics, 137 Logocritics, 300 Logometric, 36 Logos, 199, 401 Love of God, 56, 63, 189, 193, 206, 314, 319, 320 pure, 321, 438 self-, 165, 166 Lutheranism, xliv, lvii, 162, 197, 247, 251, 259, 261, 321, 323, 399, 404, 405, 414, 415, 442, 458, 465, 468 see also Evangelical Machine, xix, 98, 184, 186, 189, 203, 368 see also Mechanics Turing, 102 Magic, 120, 170, 201, 220, 354, 389 Majority, will of the, 17 Malevolence, 161, 345, 394 Maliciousness, 306-308 Maneuver, xlv, 3, 327, 330, 426 Manichean, 401, 419-421, 426 Manipulation, 120, 124, 126, 143, 148, 388 Mark, 140, 221, 267, 277, 280, 281, 333, 411 see also Sign visible, 62, 202 Materialism, 373, 461, 471

Subject Index Mathematics, xix, xxxiv, lx, 29, 88, 105, 122, 129-133, 136, 137, 140, 189, 196, 199, 226, 232, 275-280, 285, 359, 360, 363, 365-368, 371, 379, 381-384, 388, 389, 413, 426, 432, 441, 458 pure, 384-386 universal, 93, 217, 231, 265, 471 Maxim, xxi, 36, 39, 70, 180, 191, 206, 207, 235, 308 see also Principle Meaning, xxxvi, xlii, l, lxv, lxvi, 9-15, 21, 30-32, 36, 47, 77-79, 82-91, 123, 135, 147, 164, 266, 292, 313, 318, 331, 366, 431 see also Sense Mechanics, xxxii, 20, 66, 102, 103, 137, 138, 141, 187, 217, 227, 229, 234, 384, 389, 448 Medicine, 39, 66, 67, 70, 75-76, 103, 145, 170, 171, 217, 225, 228, 232, 233, 240, 267, 277, 373 Melancholic, 178 Memory, 44, 45, 122, 133, 136, 147, 171, 188, 205, 232, 268, 344, 349, 430 Metamorphosis, 265, 436 Metaphor, 7, 13, 16, 30, 80, 102, 126, 158, 198, 213, 217, 275, 290, 389, 413, 415 Metaphysics, xxii, lvii, 29, 30, 37, 90, 123, 126, 178, 217, 234, 264, 265, 276-279, 359, 366, 387, 388, 400, 414, 439-441, 448 Metempsychosis, 265 Method a posteriori, 84, 85, 97, 271, 299 a priori, 84, 85, 97, 222, 271 of colloquia, xxiv, xxv, xxx, 38, 51, 72, 228, 230, 249, 258, 259, 262, 465

497 of concessions see Concession of condescension see Condescension empirical, 105, 463 of enumeration, see Enumeration of establishments, 29, 359-372 see also Establishment expository, 400, 404 incontestable, 66, 182, 279, 365, 370 of inventing, 70, 130, 133, 368 see also Art of inventing provisional, lxiii, 261 of reunion see Reunion summarizing, 230, 406, 415 Metropolite, 333 Military, 51, 37, 81, 89, 126, 137, 163, 217, 234, 267, 289 Mind, xix, 5, 50, 124, 154, 174, 175, 187, 204-206, 227, 233, 253, 268, 277, 294, 331, 338, 364, 365, 388, 406, 452 see also Soul Miracle, 18, 52, 53, 125, 170, 174, 257, 416, 448 Misery, 176, 182, 190, 192, 195, 196 Misunderstanding, xli, lxv, 158, 249, 259, 381 Modality, 41, 116, 117, 153, 198, 221, 283, 453 Moderation, xxvii, xxviii, xlv, li, lix, 17, 27, 38, 46, 149, 153, 192, 201-203, 207, 238, 330, 335, 337, 386, 394, 404-406, 423 Mohammedan, 172, 233, 245, 364, 401, 413, 415 Monad, l, 102, 359, 436, 438, 448, 460 Monomachia, 18

498 Morality, xxiv, li, 16, 40, 42, 46, 56, 63, 75, 87, 139, 143, 144, 148, 151, 158, 161, 163-165, 170, 172, 185, 189, 197, 199, 217, 223, 240, 245, 276-278, 280, 305, 308, 324, 365, 366, 410, 413, 414, 417, 421, 430 Motivation, xxii, xxxi, lxiv, 42, 155, 166, 187, 189, 193, 232, 316, 318, 320, 442 Movement, l, liv, lxii, 33, 75, 126, 137, 193, 237, 278, 316, 438, 440 see also Mechanics perpetual, 178, 227, 230 Mundane, 169, 177 Mystery, lxvii, 119-121, 125, 150, 203 see also Faith, mystery of Mystical, liv, 150, 167, 199, 259, 264, 333 Name, xx, xxxiii, 84, 176, 220, 273, 313, 376, 395, 396, 415 Nature, xxxiv, xxxvii, 21, 37, 75, 82, 96, 104, 120, 125, 129, 141, 172, 179, 184, 185, 188, 189, 195, 268, 306, 307, 374, 378, 379, 395, 410, 425, 448, 458, 463 Necessary concept of, 42, 318, 410, 417, 452, 453 condition, 275, 280, 281, 283, 326, 332, 336, 373, 422, 424 conclusion, lxvii, 14, 19 domain, lxvi, 36, 380 principle, 71, 356 proposition, 31, 83, 88, 448 truth, lxix, 30, 185, 211, 242, 265, 312, 318 Necessity see also Certainty geometrical, 41, 47, 185 hypothetical, 41, 411

Subject Index moral, 41, 47, 439 physical, 47 Negotiation, xxii, xxiii, xxviii, xxix, xxxix, xliv, li, lvii, 55, 63, 73, 143, 152-154, 162, 201, 234, 241, 247-262, 323, 325, 329-340, 399, 416, 465 Noematic, 298 Nominalism, 269, 387, 461 Nomothetics, 67, 82, 90 Noology, 220 Norm, li, lii, 8, 19, 23, 40, 51, 148, 199, 225, 228, 261, 287 Notion adequate/inadequate, 220, 221, 266 clear/obscure, 220, 221, 266 confuse/distinct, 220, 221, 266 suppositive/intuitive, 266 Number, 19, 70, 96-98, 105-117, 119-127, 131, 156, 264, 265, 266, 276, 290, 314, 368, 377, 379, 380, 384, 387, 439 see also Casting out nines and Characteristic numbers Obedience, xxiv, 45, 57, 160, 251, 252, 289, 317, 319, 320, 332 Objection, xxi, xxxix, lvi, lxii, lxv, lxviii, 19, 66, 102, 124, 150, 157, 202, 298, 309, 310, 313, 354, 420, 458 invincible, 240, 422, 424, 425 Obligation, 9, 69, 154, 164, 177, 198, 230, 289, 344, 391-397, 404, 409, 424 to believe, 9, 41-47, 58, 241, 245, 325 Oblique, 85, 286, 291-295, 378, 388 Occasion, xix, xxxiii, 10, 67, 148, 152-155, 175, 229, 247, 333, 348, 350, 391, 403, 406 see also Opportunity

Subject Index Occasionalism, 456, 462, 465 Omission, 2, 11, 21, 36, 182, 230, 255, 288, 350, 381, 432 Onomatopoeia, 134 Operation, lx, 21, 22, 24, 102, 119, 126, 141, 144, 180, 223, 224, 268, 300 Opponent, xxxi, xxxix, xlvii, lxvi-lxviii, 46, 147, 158, 163, 204, 249, 263, 298, 323, 330, 380, 381, 387, 404, 406, 415, 419 Opportunity, xxix, 143, 152, 174, 182, 189, 190, 217, 312, 336, 345, 348, 367, 378, 386, 421, 451 see also Occasion Optics, 124, 137 Order see also Disorder demonstrative, 372 of discovery, 95 expository, 404 geometric, 201 mathematical, 363 natural, 21, 121, 133, 463 religious, 17 Organon, 33, 122, 268 Orthodoxy, 305, 462, 469, 470 Other’s place, xlv, xlvii, lxvi, 20, 140, 158, 163-166, 168, 196, 199, 248, 330, 406, 413, 427 Outcome, 105-117, 210, 301, 402 Ownership, 245, 342, 341-357, 396 see also Usucaption Pact, xxxix, 70, 108, 159, 337, 391-397 see also Contract Pagan, 233, 245, 308, 320, 362, 364, 401, 411, 414, 447 Pansophia, 202, 208 Paradox, lxiv, 45, 117, 147, 148, 158, 172, 173, 195, 202, 320, 385, 423

499 Paralogism, lxv, 83, 237, 266, 279, 378, 388, 441 Particle, 126, 135, 136, 141, 437 Passion, lxiv, 16-18, 90, 137, 173, 176, 192, 352, 387, 401 Pathos, 199 Peace, xxii-xxvii, liii, liv, 16, 26, 38, 50, 155, 162, 196, 227, 228, 247-251, 255, 262, 331, 336, 338, 355, 356, 361, 369, 386, 394, 399, 402, 406, 422, 452 Peasant, 12, 13, 25-28, 171, 227, 379 Pedagogy, 5, 390, 471 Perception, 12, 43, 52, 81, 207, 209, 220, 222, 278, 311, 315, 333, 374, 376, 416, 430, 437, 438 apperception, 197, 389 Perfection, 30, 39, 67, 84, 94, 97, 125, 133, 139, 171, 183, 186, 187, 190, 195, 219, 234, 239, 249, 264, 268, 269, 279-281, 313, 383, 385, 393, 396, 410, 420, 421, 424, 425, 442 imperfect, 73, 80, 151, 184, 228, 388, 417, 422 Performativity, 397 Peroration, 3, 4 Person, xlii, 9, 11-13, 15-18, 50, 51, 80, 81, 109, 148, 157, 170, 177, 183, 193, 196, 227, 229, 238, 288, 289, 317, 318, 332, 335, 336, 348, 351, 352, 354, 364, 393, 423 Persuasion, 3, 26, 41-45, 51, 52, 56-59, 62, 63, 90, 125, 129, 140-144, 146, 147, 152, 153, 157, 158, 163, 167-170, 174, 175, 178, 179, 183, 191, 195, 199, 244, 247, 249-251, 253, 259, 281, 300, 311, 323, 329, 346, 362, 424, 436, 445, 465 see also Conviction, Power of persuading, and Rhetoric

500 Petition, 287-290, 427 Philosophy Ancient, 439, 448 Greek, 439, 447, 448 see also Aristotle, Plato, Skepticism Irish, 447 Modern, xxx, xxxii, 415, 425, 433 see also Arnauld, Bacon, Bayle, Descartes, Grotius, Hobbes, Jungius, Locke, Malebranche, Pascal, Spinoza Pagan, 447 Perennial, 445, 446 Scholastic, 382, 415 Spanish, 447 Physical, xlii, lx, 41, 47, 75, 138, 183, 189, 199, 223, 409, 417, 421 Physician, xxxv, 37, 75, 76, 231, 248, 290, 402, 458, 460 Physics, xix, liv, 29, 41, 75, 76, 82, 88, 126, 127, 130, 137, 138, 141, 199, 217, 229, 232, 234, 237, 276-279, 285, 361, 363, 385, 387 Piety, 12, 15, 18, 63, 151, 160, 168-170, 174, 177, 197, 207, 305, 308, 313, 318, 322, 369, 397, 405, 416 Plaintiff, 69, 158, 344-346, 356 Platonic, 91, 98, 155, 460 Pleasure, 2, 21, 42, 109, 121, 130, 166, 169, 175, 178, 188, 193, 195, 376, 377, 386, 392, 442 Point of view, xxi, l, lvi, lxvii, lxviii, 6, 99, 148, 149, 163-166, 199, 209, 256, 283, 375 Polemics, xxili, lii, liv, lvii, lxxi, 7, 24, 214, 230, 322, 420, 445, 455, 456, 460, 462, 464, 467, 468, 470

Subject Index Politics, 1, 3, 4, 6, 25, 37, 40, 56, 78, 82, 83, 90, 98, 102, 105, 163-165, 189, 199, 218, 225, 228, 230, 233, 235, 247, 260, 272, 285, 305, 318, 327, 329, 330, 341, 349, 359, 361, 363, 370, 371, 397, 399, 414, 415, 420, 455-461, 466-470 Pontiff, 242, 261, 333, 335, 338, 339 Pool, 105-117 Pope, 16, 40, 55, 56, 152, 154, 155, 162, 167, 179, 196, 237, 242, 243, 247-262, 302, 305, 308, 317, 323, 327, 329, 330, 333-340, 402, 414, 415, 433, 456, 459, 465 see also Pontiff Possession, 57, 63, 291, 301, 308, 339-346, 356 long-lasting, 346, 351, 352, 354 Possibility, 3, 4, 10, 15, 22, 30, 33, 66, 67, 77, 89, 92, 108, 109, 116, 117, 126, 152-154, 167, 168, 198, 209, 215, 227, 229, 230, 235, 259, 262, 283, 308, 315, 317, 319, 372, 388, 389, 394, 426, 442, 448, 453, 459 Power, xxiii, xlii, liii, 4, 36, 41-47, 57-61, 78, 87, 88, 95, 120, 123, 124, 126, 134, 146, 158, 174, 195, 223, 226, 248, 262, 265, 278, 296, 332-334, 347, 394 of persuading, xxv, 57, 144, 145, 323 Practice, xx, xxxix, 9, 11-16, 23, 27, 35, 65-68, 71, 90, 139, 132, 146, 157, 189, 231, 235, 249, 286, 362, 369, 376, 381-384, 403, 405, 412, 413 Praetor, 228, 230, 322 Pragmatics, 30, 45, 77, 78, 89, 90, 91, 94

Subject Index Pragmatism, lxiii, lxiv Prayer, 189, 199, 299 Predestination, li, 9, 319, 399-405, 409-414, 417 see also Providence Predication, 30-33, 80, 84-86, 89, 91, 99, 103, 222, 238, 239, 265, 292, 377, 378, 388, 431 Prediction, 150, 164, 171, 179, 181, 190, 413 see also Prophecy Prejudice, 82, 161, 168, 234, 311, 312, 314, 318, 322, 368 Premise, 21, 32, 59, 65, 88, 92, 134, 163, 179, 180, 217, 276, 321, 419, 425, 426, 431, 432 Prescription, 11, 70, 311, 322, 323, 341-357 Presumption, xxiv, xxxv, lxix, 35, 36, 53, 63, 68, 86-88, 163, 198, 215, 224, 241, 262, 290, 291, 301, 311, 322, 323, 341-357, 381, 431, 436, 448 Prince, liv, lvi, 5, 6, 40, 125, 183, 194, 199, 201-207, 251, 255, 354, 422, 446 Principle, 209-211, 222-223 see also Maxim of aversion, 350, 355, 356 brocardic, 39, 70, 71, 272 of charity, 56, 154, 193, 323 of contradiction, 181, 186, 209, 211, 222, 237, 238, 239, 240 of faith, 10 incontestable, 178 of invention, 93 of morality, 56, 148, 158 of natural law, 1 of reason, 90, 209, 211, 220, 241 of the other’s place see Other’s place

501 Privilege, 35, 38, 40, 52, 81, 82, 335, 393, 442 Prize, xlii, 22, 37, 50-52, 106, 229 Probability, xxxiv, xxxv, lii, lxvi, 6, 14, 29, 35-40, 42, 43, 49, 53, 60, 62, 79, 83, 108, 120, 145, 181, 182, 198, 215, 217, 226, 233, 286, 291, 352, 388, 430, 433, 435, 441 see also Likelihood, Verisimilitude, and Improbability calculus of, xxx, xlvii, lxix, 93, 125, 127, 153, 198, 231, 290, 301, 458 degree of, xxiii, 36, 70, 87, 91, 157, 181, 233, 267, 276, 290, 301, 324, 381 estimation of, 105-117, 233, 267, 290, 345 Probity, 61, 392 Procedure, xxiv, xxx, xxxiv, xxxix, xliii, xlv, liv, lxvi-lxix, 7, 8, 10, 18, 19, 22, 23, 30, 35, 38, 39, 47, 65, 66, 68, 91, 99, 101, 140, 141, 160, 201, 213, 218, 247, 254, 286, 287, 322, 325, 327, 334, 339, 357, 376, 379, 381, 433 Profit, 50, 81, 107, 112-115, 207, 346, 361, 394 Progress, l, lxii, lxiii, 28, 93, 94, 97, 126, 140, 144, 214, 216, 264, 266, 269, 365, 378, 389, 441, 447, 453 Project, 55, 96, 130, 206, 229, 258, 276, 430 Prolixity, 4, 76, 381 Promise, 16, 131, 177, 202, 203, 229, 252, 331, 393, 397 Proof, see Demonstration charge of, xxxi, 89, 241, 298 formal, 301, 379

502 historical, 217 semi-proof, 49, 53 Prophecy, 125, 149, 150, 179, 364 Proponent, xxxi, lxviii, 6, 260 Proportion, 103, 106, 107, 109, 110, 116, 117, 137, 192, 263, 265, 267, 291, 379, 382 Propriety, 164 Protestantism, xxvi, 7, 8, 10, 14, 16, 23, 53, 152-155, 161, 243, 245, 251, 252, 258, 311, 319, 320, 330, 404, 405, 456, 462 see also Calvinism, and Lutheranism Protonoetics, 303 Providence, 8, 52, 53, 171, 183-187, 199, 233, 249, 254, 265, 286, 401, 426, 453 Prudence, 4, 37, 152, 171, 180, 188, 189, 193, 254, 256, 330, 335-338, 339, 348, 350, 353, 402 Psychology, 89, 90, 105, 130, 143, 144, 148, 225, 230, 275, 301 Public action, 16, 51 corruption, 170 debate, liii, 3, 5, 51, 421, 468 good, 18, 61-63, 95, 145, 191, 217, 290 happiness, 216-218, 219-224 peace, 155 see also Peace reasoning, 21 treasury, 227, 346 utility, 95, 217 Punishment, 42, 44, 46, 51, 52, 175, 223, 289, 308, 344, 346, 348, 354, 356, 362, 392, 409, 416 Quakers, 322, 460 Quarrel, lxv, 37, 67, 178, 189, 197, 228, 229, 232, 305, 321, 346, 423, 442 Quietism, 322, 456

Subject Index Ramism, 132, 376, 387, 388 Semi-Ramism, 376, 387, 388 Rapporteur, xlv, xlvii, lxix, 72, 155, 201, 306 see also Expounder Rational, 6, 14, 20, 24, 40, 77, 93, 120, 123, 136, 140, 141, 147, 263-269, 384, 419 balance, see Balance of reason(s) debate, xxiv, xxvii, xlv, lix, 65, 400 decision, lxix, 7, 8 grammar, 130, 134, 136, 141 interpretation, 77 method, 105-117, 140, 420 morality, 40 order, 125 persuasion, 41, 147, 168 theology, liv, 167, 197, 237, 286 Rationalism, xxii, lxvi, lxviii, lxix, 8, 14-15, 263, 443, 463, 468 Rationality, xliv, l, lxvi, lxviii, lxix, 6, 7, 140, 143, 168, 198, 214, 263 Reason balance of, see Balance of reason(s) explicable, 321 force of, 37, 366 general, 311, 318, 323 inexplicable, 311, 321 particular, 311, 318 practical, 76 principle of, see Principle of reason right, 18, 19, 56, 63, 308, 343, 354 theoretical, 76, 225, 366 Reasoning, xxxv, liv, 2, 3, 20, 21, 32, 44, 53, 60, 82, 83, 87, 111, 125, 132, 135, 178, 179, 185, 205, 268, 276, 277, 300, 383, 401, 420, 435, 438, 441, 461

Subject Index Reciprocal, 80, 85, 86, 89, 91, 132, 397 Reconciliation, xxvii, xlvii, li, lxxii, 247, 260 see also Conciliation Recto, 85, 291-295, 377, 388 Reflection, xxii, xxiii, xxvii, lxxi, 144, 159, 172-175, 195, 197, 210, 223, 234, 268, 297, 300, 316, 325 Reform, xxxii, lii, 39, 70, 197, 215, 241-245, 260, see also Innovation Reformation, xxiv, xxx, 41, 51, 197, 198, 244, 245, 260, 261, 323, 331 Reformulation, xlv, xlvii, li, lix, 201-208, 400, 417 Refutation, xlvii, liii, lix, lxvii, lxviii, 4, 143-146, 157, 237, 239, 419, 420, 426, 445, 456 irrefutable, 215 Relation, xxxii, lv, 101, 103, 108, 261, 265, 291, 355, 362, 387 Religion, 7-16, 25-28, 37, 49-54, 125, 148-152, 172, 179, 196, 237-262, 305-340, 353, 360, 366, 368, 369, 399-417, 426, 464 see also Church change of, 241-245, 327 Remonstrant, 24, 362, 364, 442, 443, 463 Repertoire, lxviii, 97, 130, 168, 260 Replica, 3, 157, 161, 306, 441 see also Retort Reply, xxx, 3, 5, 67, 76, 156, 177, 203, 295, 312, 315, 378, 423 counter-reply, 76 Republic, 8, 9, 16-18, 21, 23, 27, 57, 81, 82, 87, 140, 151, 215, 234, 289, 317, 332, 335, 354 Reputation, lxiv, 55, 60, 193, 205, 295, 310, 367, 368 disrepute, 386

503 Research, xlii, 97, 170, 172, 225, 366 see also Inquiry Resolution, xxiv, xlviii, l, 1, 7, 27, 49, 72, 84, 90, 91, 143, 208, 260, 269, 312, 389, 403, 419, 420, 425, 432 see also Analysis Respondent, 249, 298 see also Opponent Retort, 67, 157, 239, 315, 436 see also Replica Retraction, 154 Reunification, xxix, xxxix, xli, xliv, lvii, 1, 55, 63, 152, 167, 201, 206, 241, 247, 248, 261, 262, 329-340, 416, 443, 456, 465, 468 see also Irenic and Reunion Reunion, xxv, 55, 62, 63, 230, 247-262, 403, 415, 465 Revelation, xxvi, 52, 53, 170, 421, 422, 424 Rhetoric, xxx, xxxvi, xxxvii, xlvii, liv, lv, lxv, 5, 54, 55, 68, 80, 90, 136, 140, 143-147, 158, 199, 322, 323, 384, 390, 467 see also Persuasion Rights, 256, 290, 341, , 348, 393, 397 individual, 6 of nations, 347, 394, 395, 459 of property see Usucaption Rite, 154, 252, 255, 257, 260, 414 see also Cult Rule, xxix, xxxi, xxxiv, xxxix, lvi, lix, lxvii, lxviii, 5, 15, 20, 30, 31, 70, 71, 76, 83, 88, 93, 113, 119, 125, 135-137, 144, 163, 168, 189, 192, 197-199, 201, 226, 259, 266, 272, 299, 338, 348, 353, 382-385, 414, 425, 430-432 golden, 148, 163

504 Sacraments, xli, 53, 253, 255, 256, 259, 313, 314, 320, 330, 333, 334 Salvation, 9, 14, 37, 151-155, 168-200, 227, 237, 241-245, 305, 308, 312-316, 319-322, 331-335, 338, 387, 403, 408, 413-416 Scales, lxviii, 19, 20, 21, 36, 124, 228, 267, 290, 356, 366, 381 see also Balance of reasons Schism, 61, 62, 63, 154, 242, 244, 245, 248-250, 254, 255, 260, 317, 320, 321, 331, 333, 338, 402 see also Heresy Scholastic, xix, xxx, 5, 13, 24, 98, 135, 136, 217, 220, 240, 269, 277, 364, 373, 382, 386, 387, 415, 419, 434, 447, 463, 464, 469 Science general, xxi, 56, 93, 119, 213-218, 219, 220, 225, 226, 230, 231, 234, 235, 375 Scripture, 8, 9, 10, 12, 14, 23, 63, 326, 335 see also Holy Scripture and Testament Sect, 23, 38, 52, 123, 213, 249, 261, 266, 310, 320, 415, 445 Sectarianism, 269, 404, 405, 415 Semantic, 8, 79, 91, 141, 432 see also Word Semiotic, xlvii, l, lx, lxvi, 400 see also Sign Sense (ling.), see also Meaning figurative, 12, 14-16, 47, 79, 80 improper, 12, 16 metaphorical, 16 proper, 12, 79 Sense (psych.), lxii, lxvii, 19-21, 138, 139, 170, 176-178, 188, 189, 215, 222, 383 Series, 96, 97, 125, 126, 131, 133, 146, 266, 269, 377, 404

Subject Index Sign, 117, 132, 140, 182, 207, 280, 333, 393, 395, 396 see also Character and Indication infallible, 312 sensible, 52, 53 of truth, 52, 164, 165 visible, 62, 202, 356 Similarity, 136-139, 169, 265 Sin, 152, 176, 243, 307 formal, 306, 307 of ignorance, 306, 307 of lying, 148-152 original, 257, 315, 331, 416, 417 philosophical, 305-308, 327, 414 Skepticism, lv, lxii, lxvii, 6, 160, 167-200, 426, 451-453 Socinianism, xxv, 14, 16, 315, 360, 362, 370, 443, 462, 468 Sophism, 20, 31, 38, 83, 145, 157, 204, 266, 401, 402, 432 see also Paralogism Sorites, 21, 66, 180, 293 Soul, 26, 37, 38, 50, 153, 169, 171, 174, 187, 189, 190, 194, 223, 272, 336, 338, 393, 438 see also Mind Species, xlvii, 23, 80, 85, 89, 95-100, 102, 103, 139, 184, 255, 256, 287, 288, 330, 377 see also Genus Speech, 3-5, 53, 135, 171, 382 Spontaneity, 22, 42, 62, 138, 265, 391, 410, 442 Statesman, 190, 199 see also Elector, Emperor, and Prince Stoicism, 197, 276, 277, 375 Strategy, xxi, xxviii, xxxix, lxv, lvii, lxii, lxvi-lxviii, 6, 40, 55, 63, 141,143-146, 148, 153, 157-160, 168, 199, 224, 240, 248, 262, 325, 389, 419, 426, 463

Subject Index Stubbornness, 172, 177, 314, 333, 363, 365 Subaltern, 96, 98, 99, 100, 137, 287, 288 see also Division Subdivision, 96, 100, 287, 376, 387 Subjective, 7, 56, 198, 321, 433 Subordinate, 90, 103, 140, 401 Subsistence, 14, 15, 181 Substitution, 31, 91, 271, 292, 294, 458 see also Surrogation Subtle, lxvii, 6, 26, 38, 41,143, 164, 198, 205, 224, 241, 248, 275, 321, 356, 363, 459 see also Art of subtlety Suppositive, 266 Surrogation, 357 Syllogism, 66, 83, 180, 217, 226, 239, 279, 298, 380, 385, 432, 440 pro-syllogism, 226, 230, 298, 303, 381 Syllogistic, 65, 92, 141, 210, 291, 381, 388, 389, 431 figure, 135, 239, 378, 431, 440 mode, 135, 136, 141, 239, 378, 378, 388, 431-434, 440 non-syllogistic, 141, 198, 388 Symbol, xliii, lxvi, 119, 220, 259, 263, 266, 267, 314, 317, 333 Synod, xxvi, 161, 254 Synopsis, xxviii, xlvii, l, 99, 200, 216-218, 400, 406-413, 414, 416 Syntax, xliii, 66, 79, 89, 135, 141, 144 Synthesis, xlv, l, lxii, 91, 93-99, 102, 103, 129, 132, 140, 220, 235, 275, 280, 302, 430, 433 System, l, lvi-lix, lxvi, lxxii, 101, 119, 141, 168, 389, 423, 445-449 legal, 1, 35, 39, 65, 66, 78-92, 286

505 Table, xlvii, 22, 24, 96-101, 131-133, 136, 228, 235, 272, 288, 376, 377, 404, 407, 408 Tendency, 46, 148, 237, 409, 443 Testament New, 10, 149, 317, 364 Old, 149, 317, 364, 462 Testimony, xxxvii, xlii, 10, 14, 20, 52, 53, 75, 406, 430 see also Witness Textual, xxix, 7-24, 310, 360, 417 Textualist, 8, 14 Theocracy, 332 Theology, xx, xxii, xxiv, xxxiv, 37, 130, 151, 170, 189, 234, 235, 237-240, 263, 271, 326, 381, 401, 417 moral, 151 natural, 40, 46, 139, 217, 308, 359, 366, 404 rational, liv, 167, 237, 363, 424 revealed, 217, 308, 404 Theorem, xxxiii, lxii, 21, 22, 39, 41-44, 84, 86, 91, 95, 110, 132, 138, 171, 186, 265, 280, 292-295, 366 Thinking, 29-33, 91, 116, 117, 126, 130, 133, 135, 175, 205, 206, 220, 222, 237, 263, 327, 361, 423 art of, 373, 378, 383, 384, 429-432, 440 blind, 33 elements of, 29-33 thread for, 226-230 Time delay, 22, 268, 344, 345, 346, 355, 423 elapsed, 329 immemorial, 343, 344 lag, 347 limit, 345

506 Tolerance, xxii, xxv-xxvii, xlv, xlviii, 245, 248, 251, 259, 323, 400, 403, 413, 453, 456 Topics, xxxiii, xxxvi, lvii, 36, 39, 70-73, 80, 89, 90, 140, 300, 366, 377, 378, 387, 388, 430, 433 Topoi, liv, 39, 93, 68-69, 140, 168, 260, 269, 322, 430 see also Loci Tradition, xxxv, 41, 75, 76, 80, 103, 106, 136, 147, 199, 232, 250-253, 288, 289, 317, 319, 322, 325, 326, 334, 340, 356, 374, 388, 390, 442 Tranquility, 46, 176, 192, 195, 196, 227, 234, 366, 412 Trial, 49-53, 62, 74, 228, 287, 346, 366 Tribunal, 1, 37, 49, 65-74, 77, 230 Trinity, 9, 13, 14, 239, 314, 320, 324, 362, 421 Truth absolute, 83, 164, 165, 211 contingent, 185, 265, 266 double, 237, 239, 240, 426 eternal, 216, 380, 417, 426, 464 factual, 185, 266 natural, 62 necessary, see Necessary truth universal, 164 veracity, 63 Uncertainty, xxxi, lxiii, 18, 70, 73, 105-117, 172, 173, 233, 345, 346, 360, 365, 402 Understanding, xxvii, 12-14, 23, 29, 90, 98, 121, 134, 186, 189, 197, 238, 259, 375, 378, 380, 382, 385, 389, 439 Unhappiness, 174, 175, 190, 193, 367 Unintelligible, 446 see also Incomprehensible and Intelligible

Subject Index Union, 56, 63, 240, 255-257, 265, 318, 320, 321, 359, 399, see also Body Universal, 23, 85, 88, 132, 244, 424 see also Characteristic, Church, Council, Grammar, Harmony, Mathematics, Truth proposition, lxiv, 85, 132 Usucaption, 70, 301, 341-357 see also Ownership Valid, lxiii, 83, 92, 155, 197, 251, 254, 291-295, 340, 343, 353, 356, 379, 388, 431, 440 see also Invalid Verdict, lxiv, 19, 57, 317, 334, 357 Verisimilitude, 106, 145, 233, 316, 348, 426, 430, 433 see also Probability degree of, 71, 267, 426, 452 Vicar, 332, 333 Victory, xlii, 49-53, 62, 101-117, 125, 145-146, 173, 197, 319, 320, 329, 332, 420 Virtual, 238-240, 314 Virtue, 90, 98, 99, 103, 141, 159, 169, 173, 189, 199, 287, 308, 314, 354, 377, 383, 401, 413 see also Ethics Visionary, 176, 197 Voluntarism, lii, 199 see also Will Vote, liv, 1-6, 17, 257 majority of, 17, 257, 262, 326, 327, 335, 365 War, xxii-xxiv, xxxix, xlii, lviii, 16, 25, 38, 49, 62, 89, 162, 228, 329, 346, 374, 394, 402, 427, 453 Warrant, 32, 289 Weighing, see Balance of reasons and Probability

Subject Index Will (law), xxiii, 36, 191, 288 Will (psych.), 17, 42, 45, 46, 134, 165, 172, 178, 186, 190, 204, 288, 326, 332, 393, 409 Wisdom, 12, 42, 174, 183, 186-189, 194, 195, 207, 233, 308, 313, 375, 412, 422, 424, 425 Wise, 38, 42, 43, 47, 82, 90, 146, 147, 189, 195, 233, 335, 338, 344, 436

507 Witness, 27, 37, 132, 149, 181, 205, 233, 318, 344 see also Testimony Word, lv, lxii,10-16, 20-23, 31, 32, 50, 76, 78-80, 84-89, 102, 122, 125, 134, 135, 141, 143, 146-147, 158, 194, 238, 240, 249, 250, 264, 266, 271, 272, 277, 292, 300, 326, 333, 348, 350, 367, 376, 383, 394, 403, 423 Wrongdoing, 148, 158, 197, 323

Name Index Bachusius, T., 388 Bacon, F., xxx, lxiii, 158, 213, 365, 378, 433, 460, 470 Barbeyrac, J., lii, 355, 356 Barckhausen, H., 262, 340 Baron, V., xxxiv, 40 Baruzi, J., xxi, li, liv, 55, 167, 168, 199 Basil the Great, 68, 73 Basnage de Beauval, H., lii, 302, 421 Bayle, P., xxiii, xxxi, lvi, lviii, lxviii, 23, 199, 240, 259, 321, 361, 370, 400, 416, 419-427, 443, 453, 455, 456, 462-464 Becher, J. J., 272 Belaval, Y., lxvi, 198 Bellarmine, R., 155, 162, 166, 250, 260, 339, 340 Benivenius, 227 Bentley, R., 145, 158, 361, 370, 457 Berlich, M., 356 Bernard, St., 40, 307, 308, 426 Bernouilli, Jacques, xxxv, 388, 441, 443 Bernouilli, Jean, xxxv, 388, 441, 443 Bernouilli, Johann, xxxv, 388 Berry, 367 Bessarion, B., 364 Bishop of Avranches, see Huet, P. D. Bishop of Meaux, see Bossuet, J.-B. Bishop of Neustadt, see Rojas y Spínola, C., Kollonitsch, L., and Buchheim, F. A. Bishop of Salisbury, see Burnet, G. Bishop of Thina, 248, 252-257, 260, 468 see also Rojas y Spínola

Aarsleff, H., 141 Abelard, P., 307, 308 Agricola, R., 387 Alberti, A., see Toureil, A. de Albius, Th., see White, Th. Alexander of Aphrodisia, 5 Allix, P., 362, 370 Almain, J., 306, 307, 308 Alsted, J. H., xliii, 288 Altissiodorensis, see de Auxerre, G. Ambrose, St., 150, 159 Amesius, 165 Andrada, see Payva de Andrada, D. Aphthonius, 390 Apollonius, 182, 198, 281 Archimedes, 222, 224, 295, 382, 385 Aristotle, 5, 13, 36, 68-71, 78, 80, 89-91, 122, 132, 140, 141, 147, 157, 199, 218, 240, 264, 272, 276-279, 287, 300, 308, 377-379, 384-389, 429, 430-433, 452, 455, 458, 466 Aristoxenus, 382 Arnauld, A., xxxiii, lvi, lvii, lxii, lxiv, 25, 36, 53, 158, 197, 198, 247, 259, 272, 283, 300, 305-308, 315, 318-321, 323, 327, 368, 378, 388, 414, 432, 443, 455, 461, 464 Augustine, St., 143, 149, 150, 151, 158, 159, 160, 161, 210, 253, 259, 364, 365, 371, 405, 415, 425, 448, 464, 469 Austin, J., 397 de Auxerre, G., 306-308 Averroes, 427, 431

509

Name Index

510 Bishop of Worcester, see Stillingfleet, E. Blank, A., 388, 449 Blondel, F., 384, 390 von Bodenhausen, W., lx, 389 Bochart, S., 54 Boeckler, J. H., 27 Bohl, S., 86, 91 Böhme, J., 120, 126 Böhmer, J. H., 349, 356 Boileau-Despréaux, N., 322 von Boineburg, C., 1, 27, 458 Bossuet, J.-B., 151, 161, 260, 456 Boucher, P., lii, 269, 355-357 Bougot, S., 308 Bourguet, L., 435-443, 457 Boursier, L., 442 Bouvet, J., 125 Boyle, C., 145, 157, 158 Bramhall, J., 461 Brand, 299 Brandes, J. M., 71, 73 Bredenburg, J., 442 de Breen, D., 364, 371 Breger, H., 103, 136 de Brinon, M., 309, 315, 320, 323 Brosseder, J., 260 Brunnemann, J., 68, 73 Buchhaim, F. A., 152, 161 Burchard of Worms, 71 Burnet, G., 361, 369, 371, 399-417, 457 Burnett, Th., lvii-lix, 158, 301, 359, 360, 367, 370, 421, 426, 427, 457-458 de Bussi-Rabutin, 361 Cabeus, N., 278, 282 Calixt, G., 465 Calvin, J., 319

Camerarius, 436 Campanella, T., 272, 470 Cardan, G., 158, 272, 273, 278, 283, 298, 302, 379, 388, 458, 470 Cardoso, A., 47, 76, 103, 199, 308 Carloman, 174, 197 Carpzov, B., 68, 73, 356 Casaubon, I., 365, 371 Casaubon, M., 371 Castaneus, H. L., 272, 273 Cataneo, T., 439 Celsus, 364 Charlemagne, 347, 354, 356 Charles V, xxiv, 251, 252, 262 Chrysostom, J., 150, 159, 160 Cicero, 80, 383, 389 Clarke, S., 116, 449 Claudianus, C., 53 Claudinus, J. C., 37, 39 Coelestius, 307, 308 Collonitsch, L., see Kollonitsch, L. Comenius, J. A., 208, 416, 462 Conring, H., lvi, 1, 47, 90, 458-459 Constantinus, 197 Conti, Abbot, 439, 467 Coste, B. de la, 178, 197 Coste, P., lix Couturat, L., xxi, xxxiii, xlii, lxii, lxvi, lxix, 73, 102, 116, 140, 217, 218, 390, 431, 433 Cresset, J., 372 Cunningham, A., 363, 371 Cussens, J., 116 Cyprian, St., 253, 339, 340 Cyril, St., 362, 364, 370 Dalgarno, G., 126 Darwin, C., 103

Name Index Dascal, M., xxx, xxxi, xliv, xlv, xlvii, li, lv-lvii, lxii, lxiv-lxvi, lxix, 24, 33, 63, 91, 102, 117, 126, 140, 141, 158, 161, 197-199, 217, 218, 235, 240, 261, 269, 300, 323, 327, 356, 387, 389, 426, 433, 464 Davia, G. A., 152 Davillé, L., xlii, 235 Democritus, 226 des Bosses, B., lvi, 85 Descartes, R, xxx, xxxii, lx, lxii, lxiv, lxv, 27, 93, 102, 122, 123, 126, 214, 216, 218, 269, 272, 278, 282, 298, 382, 388, 437, 439, 440, 441, 443, 459, 464, 467, 470 Digby, K., 279, 282 Dillherr, J.M., 386, 390 Diogenes, 226, 230 Dionysius the Aeropagyte, St., 364 Dodonée, R., 230 Du Plessis Mornay, P., 364, 371 Du Puy, P., 341, 354-356 Duke of Hanover, 77, 167, 256, 201, 285, 372, 388 Duke of Roannez, 368 Dumas, M.-N., 76 Dutens, L., 301, 302 Eccard, J. G., 79 Edzard, E., 290. 301 Ehler, K., xxix, 451-453 Eisenkopf, P., li, 259 Elector of Brandenburg, 466 Elector of Mainz, 354 Elector of Saxony, 251, 261 Emperor Heinrich IV, 295, 302 Emperor Julian, 362, 364, 370 Emperor Leopold, 152, 261, 468 Emperor Sigismund, 73, 186, 199, 363

511 Epicure, 184, 185, 371 Erasmus of Rotterdam, xxiv, 5, 273, 384, 390, 448 Ernst-August, see Duke of Hanover Euclid, 22, 33, 153, 279, 182, 224, 265, 275, 280, 281, 283 Everhardus, N., 357 Fabri, H., 38, 40, 237-240, 272, 279, 282, 453, 459, 460 Fachineus, A., 68, 73 Fagnani, P., 38, 40 Falcidius, P., 92 von Felden, J., 89, 272, 279, 282, 285, 299, 465 Fénelon, F. de S. de la Mothe-, 442, 456 de Fermat, P., xxxiii, lxv, 197, 441, 467 Fick, J. S., 269 Finckelthusius, S., 68, 73 Fludd, R., 269 Fogel, M., 285, 294, 299, 300, 301 Foucher de Careil, L. A., 168, 247, 256 Foucher, S., lvi, 167, 211, 389, 464 Fraguier, Abbot C., 439, 442 Francks, R., 449 Frederic the Great, 356 Freudenthal, G., 230, 389 von Gail, A., 68, 73 Galen, 431 Galilei, G., 260, 278, 282, 384, 459, 460 Gallois, J., lxvii, 211, 224, 467 Garrison, J., xxv, 467 Gataker, Th., 17, 24 Gensini, S., 141 Gerhardt, C. J., lxii, 429, 446, 448 Gerson, 306

512 Gil, F., 220 Gilbert, W., 278, 282 Graevius, J. G., lvi, 324 Gramond, G. B., 422, 427 Grasvinckel, T., 279, 282 Gratian of Cluse, 151, 161 Gregroy of Nyssus, St., 364 Grice, H. P., 117 Grotius, H., lii, 53, 60, 341, 341-345, 355, 356, 364, 384, 393, 394, 459-460 de Groot, H., see Grotius, H. Grua, G., xxi, lii, 44, 47, 68, 149, 242, 343, 351, 352, 355, 391, 399, 409, 411, 412 Gudius, M., 291 Gutke, G., 220 Hackelmann, L., 68, 73 Hahn, H., 68, 73 van der Hardt, H., 372 Hartsoeker, N., lvi, 436 van Helmont, F. M., 298, 303, 460 Henry IV, 250, 467 Herman, J., 441, 443 Hermogenes of Tarsus, 390 Herthius, J. N., 73 von Hessen-Rheinfels, E., xxvi, 6, 53, 201-207, 245, 247, 259-261, 303, 315 Hevelius, J., 453 Hippocrates, 76 Hispanus, P., 431 Hobbes, Th., xxxix, lii-lvi, lxvi, 18, 21, 24, 91, 102, 103, 120, 144, 158, 166, 197, 272, 278, 298, 371, 460-461, 470 Homer, 203 Horace, 375, 387 Hornschuch, J., 388 Hospinianus, J., 388

Name Index Hudde, J., 441 Huet, P. D., xli, lvi, 218, 364, 371, 375, 442, 461 d’Huisseau, I., 443 Hunnius, H. U., 68, 73 Huygens, C., xxxiii, 103, 105, 368, 378, 388, 436, 441, 459, 467 Jablonski, D. E., 399, 400, 416, 462 Jacques I, 362 Jagodinsky, I., 29 James I, 318 Jansenius, C., 24, 414 Jaquelot, I., lvi, 361, 370, 422-427, 462-463 Jean-Frédéric, see Duke of Hanover Jerome, St., 150, 159, 161, 307 Jesseph, D. M., 197, 371 Johann Friedrich, see Duke of Hanover Jungius, J., xxxii, lvi, 36, 122, 272, 285-303, 382, 387, 388, 429, 432, 463 Junius, H., 273 Jurieu, P., 259, 321,453, 455 Justinian, 73, 79, 103, 282 Kammermeister, J., 442 Keckermann, B., 432 Kepler, J., 278 Kestner, H. E., 70-73, 90 King, P.197 Kircher, A., 453 Kneale, M., 197 Kneale, W., 197 Knorr von Rosenroth, C., 298, 303 Koch, C. D., xliii, lvi, 373, 429-434 Kollonitsch, L., 251, 261 Krönert, G., 27, 261, 451, 467

Name Index de La Mothe le Vayer, F., 197, 414, 461 Lactantius, 364, 371 Laerke, M., 259 Laever, A., 286 Lamy, F., 447, 448 Lancelot, C., 455 Lauterbach, W. A., 68 Laymann, P., 40, 143, 151, 161, 261 Le Bay, M., 402, 414 Le Clerc, J., lvii, lxviii, 361, 362, 370, 420-427, 463-464 Leclerc, J., xxv Le Comte, L. D., 361 van Leeuwenhoek, A., 436, 442 Le Maître, I., 455 Leti, G., 361, 370 de Libera, A., 240 Llull, R., 201, 202, 208, 220, 278, 282 de Lobkowitz, C., 40 Locke, J., xxv, xxvi, xxviii, xxx, lii, lvi-lxii, 269, 291, 301, 312, 363, 370, 371, 415, 432, 434, 439, 443, 457, 460, 464 Loemker, L. E., 375 Louis XIV, 25, 247, 309, 323, 341, 458, 467 Lucretius, 184, 199 Luther, M., xxiv, 402 McCormick, N., 92 McRae, R., 389 Macedus, 69 Machiavelli, N., lvi, 89, 90 Magliabecchi, A., 435, 442 Maimburg, Father, 321 de Maintenon, F. d’Aubigny, Mme., 309 Malebranche, N., xxx, lvi, lxii, lxiv, 25, 272, 375, 435, 438, 443, 449, 455, 457, 464-465, 470

513 Mariotte, E., 102-104, 448 Martin, C. J., 5 Mascardus, 272, 273 Masenius, J., 53, 54 Masham, Lady, 316 Mates, B., 291 de Maubuisson, A., Mme., 309 de Mauro, T., 276 Mavio, 68 Medici, xxiv, 468 Meier, M. D., 391-397 Melanchthon, P., 260, 287 de Melo,W. D. C., 116 Menochius, J., 272 Mercator, N., 280, 283 Mercuriale, G., 76 de Meré, Chevalier, 441 Mersenne, M., 467 Meyer, L., 7, 23 Molanus, G. W., xxvii, 153, 162, 262, 302, 321, 325, 339, 340, 399, 400, 462, 465, 468 Molière, 427 Molina, L., 417 Moller, H. H., 432 de Montaigne, M., 197 Montaltius, L., 40 see Pascal, B. Morin, J.-B., 278, 282 Müller, K., 27, 261, 451 Mynsingerus, 68 Naërt, E., xlv, 442 Neff, L., 141 Netanyahu, B., 259 Newton, I., lx, lxi, lxiv, 197, 363, 371, 449, 457, 464, 467 Nicole, P., xxxiii, 197, 318, 319, 321, 388, 432, 433, 455 Northoff, C., 5 Novarini, L., 272

Name Index

514 de Olaso, E., 167 Origen, 150, 160, 364, 426 Ortega y Gasset, J., 209 Papin, D., 230, 389 Papin, I., 451, 453 Paracelsus, 460 Parent, A., 447, 448 Parkinson, G. H. R., xxxii, 29, 33, 301 Parmentier, M., 85, 116 Pascal, B., xxxiii, 40, 105, 116, 281, 324, 368, 441, 459, 467 Patrizi, F., 282 Paul, St., 150, 151, 160, 253 Payva de Andrade, D., 313, 320, 322 Pellisson-Fontanier, P., 260, 309-324 Perrier, xxxiii, 368 Petau, D., 324 Peter, St., 150, 151, 160, 161, 261, 453 Peter the Great, 453 Petty, W., 363, 371 Phalaris, 145, 158 Philiponus, 364 Philippi, 68 Photius, 103 de Pianese, Marquis, 167-200 Pico della Mirandola, 364 Placcius, D. V., lvi, 166, 285-303, 378, 465 Plato, 233, 287, 364, 382, 439 Pliny, 37 Plotinus, 364 Polycarp, J., 299 Pombo, O., 126 Pomey, F., 272, 273 Pomponazzi, P., 240 Pope Alexander VIII, 305 Pope Clement VII, 261

Pope Clement IX, 196, 459 Pope Gregory VII, 302 Pope Innocence XI, 167, 323 Pope Pius V, 414 Pope Stephen I, 340 Popkin, R., 197 Posner, C., 272 Prince Eugene, 446, 448 Prince Johann Philip, 354 Proclus, 198, 364 Ptolemy, 382, 389 Pufendorf, S., lii, 165, 166, 283, 397, 466, 470, 471 Pythagoras, 22, 24, 119, 120, 264, 471 Quintillian, 5, 80, 84 Racionero, Q., xxix, xxxii, xlii, xlv, xlix, li, liv, 322 Ramus, P., 96, 140, 280, 387, 388, 432, 466-467 Raspe, E., 35 Realis de Vienna, see Wagner, G. Reiher, 165 Reimann, J.F., 432, 433 Remond, N.-F., liii, lxi, 116, 125, 439, 445-449, 467 Reuchlin, J., 364 de Reux, J., 307 de Richelieu, Cardinal, 60, 422 Richter, C. P., 73 Rivaud, A., 29 de Roberval, G. P., 109, 117, 198, 281, 467-468 de Rojas y Spínola, C., xxix, xliv, 55, 56, 152, 211, 247, 248, 259-262, 321, 325, 329-340, 359, 465, 468 Rudolph August, 291, 301, 363 Rudolph, H., 73, 153

Name Index Rulant, R., 39, 76 Rupert Hall, A., lx, 197 Ryle, G., 389 Salvian, St., 314, 320, 322 Sanches, F., 76, 240 Sanctorius, S., 37, 39, 76 Scaliger, J. C., 47, 272, 273, 385, 390, 447, 448 Schiffer, S., 117 Schmidt, J.A., 371 Schopenhauer, A., 146 von der Schulenburg, S., 141 Scotus, D., 240, 281 Searle, J. R., 117, 397 Seckendorff, V. L., xli, 321 Sellschopp, S., 153 Semanus, see Masenius, J. Serres, M., 218, 389 Sève, R., lii, 89 Sharrok, R., 165, 166 Simiane, C. E. P. de, 196 see Pianese, Marquis de Siver, H., 285, 299 Sixtus Senensis, 150, 160 Snell van Roijen, W., 278, 282 Socinus, F., 370, 378, 468-469, 470 Socinus, L., 468 Sophie, of Hanover, 309, 442, 457, 460 Sophie Charlotte, of Brandenburg and Prussia, liii, lix, 462, 465 Sozzini, F., see Socinus, F. von Spanheim, E., 370 Spee, F., 354, 357 Spener, P. J., 322 de Spinoza, B., liii, lvi, lvii, 7, 30, 224, 272, 279, 282, 362, 439, 441, 443, 448 Stahl, D., 23, 272 Stahl, G.E., 39

515 Stein, L., 429 Stelliola, A., 278, 282 Stensen, N., 55, 167, 199, 321, 465 Stenus, N., see Stensen, N. Steuchus, A., 364, 371 Steyaert, M., 308 Stiehler, G., 387 Stillingfleet, E., lxi, 361, 370 Stirnimann, J., 322 Strimesius, S, 165, 166 Struve, G.A., 68, 73 Stryck, S., 392, 396, 397 Stubrockius, B., 40 see Fabri, H. Suárez, F., 13, 23, 40, 411, 459, 469 Suisset, J., see Swineshead, R. Sulli, 446, 447 Swineshead, R., 264, 269, 277, 281 Tacitus, 89 Tartaglia, N., 458 Tempier, E., 240 Tertullian, 11, 23, 311, 322, 340 Thomas Aquinas, St., 364, 389, 433, 469 Thomasius, C., lvi, 72, 73, 164, 296, 302, 386, 390, 470 Thomasius, J., xxx, xxxii, lvi, lxvii, 126, 259, 285, 388, 465, 470 de Toureil, A., 261 Toland, J., 370 Treutler, H., 73 Trew, A., 279 Triphonius, 80 Vagetius, J., 285, 286, 290-295, 299, 300, 301 Valeriano, M., 272 Vallisnieri, A., 435-437, 442 Varignon, P., 467 Veltheim, V., 397 Veron, F., 53, 54

516 Vigelius, N., 72, 273 Virgil, 277, 278 Vives, J.-L., 371, 447, 448 Voetius, 17, 24 Voltaire, 6 Vorstius, J., 362 Vossius, I., 282 Wagner, J. G., lvi, 373-390, 429, 470-471 Wakulenko, S., 158 Waldhoff, S., 73, 158 van Wallenburch, A., 7, 9 van Wallenburch, P., 7, 9 Wallis, J., 363, 368, 371, 461 Ward, S., 282, 461

Name Index Weigel, E., 279, 282, 283, 298, 471 Weijers, O., 5 Werlhof, J., 341-357 White, Th., 279, 282 Wilkins, J., 126, 272, 273 Witson, 367 de Witt, A., 441 Wolff, C., lvi, 429, 434 Wolzogen, J. L., 7, 23 Woolhouse, R. S., 449 Wroblewski, J., 323 Zanichelli, G., 437, 442 Zarlinus, G., 382, 389 Zwinger, Th., 96 Zwingli, H., xxiv, 402

Synthese Historical Library Texts and Studies in the History of Logic and Philosophy Series Editor: Simo Knuuttila (University of Helsinki) 1. M.T. Beonio-Brocchieri Fumagalli: The Logic of Abelard. Translated from Italian by S. Pleasance. 1969 ISBN 90-277-0068-0 2. G.W. Leibniz: Philosophical Papers and Letters. A Selection, translated and edited, with an Introduction, by L.E. Loemker. 2nd ed., 2nd printing. 1976 ISBN 90-277-0008-8 3. E. Mally: Logische Schriften. Grosses Logikfragment – Grundgesetze des Sollens. Herausgegeben von K. Wolf und P. Weingartner. 1971 ISBN 90-277-0174-1 4. L.W. Beck (ed.): Proceedings of the Third International Kant Congress. 1972 ISBN 90-277-0188-1 5. B. Bolzano: Theory of Science. A Selection with an Introduction by J. Berg. Translated from German by B. Terrell. 1973 ISBN 90-277-0248-9 6. J.M.E. Moravcsik (ed.): Patterns in Plato’s Thought. 1973 ISBN 90-277-0286-1 7. Avicenna: The Propositional Logic. A Translation from Al-Shifa¯ ’: al-Qiya¯ s, with Introduction, Commentary and Glossary by N. Shehaby. 1973 ISBN 90-277-0360-4 8. D.P. Henry: Commentary on De Grammatico. The Historical-Logical Dimensions of a Dialogue of St. Anselms’s. 1974 ISBN 90-277-0382-5 9. J. Corcoran (ed.): Ancient Logic and its Modern Interpretations. 1974 ISBN 90-277-0395-7 10. E.M. Barth: The Logic of the Articles in Traditional Philosophy. A Contribution to the Study of Conceptual Structures. 1974 ISBN 90-277-0350-7 11. J. Hintikka: Knowledge and the Known. Historical Perspectives in Epistemology. 1974 ISBN 90-277-0455-4 12. E.J. Ashworth: Language and Logic in the Post-Medieval Period. 1974 ISBN 90-277-0464-3 13. Aristotle: The Nicomachean Ethics. Translation with Commentaries and Glossary by H.G. Apostle. 1974 ISBN 90-277-0569-0 14. R.M. Dancy: Sense and Contradiction. A Study in Aristotle. 1975 ISBN 90-277-0565-8 15. W.R. Knorr: The Evolution of the Euclidean Elements. A Study of the Theory of Incommensurable Magnitudes and its Significance for Early Greek Geometry. 1975 ISBN 90-277-0509-7 16. Augustine: De Dialectica. Translated with Introduction and Notes by B. D. Jackson from the Text newly edited by J. Pinborg. 1975 ISBN 90-277-0538-9 ´ Szab´o: The Beginnings of Greek Mathematics. Translated from German. 1978 17. A. ISBN 90-277-0819-3 18. Juan Luis Vives: Against the Pseudodialecticians. A Humanist Attack on Medieval Logic. Texts (in Latin), with Translation, Introduction and Notes by R. Guerlac. 1979 ISBN 90-277-0900-9 19. Peter of Ailly: Concepts and Insolubles. An Annotated Translation (from Latin) by P.V. Spade. 1980 ISBN 90-277-1079-1 20. S. Knuuttila (ed.): Reforging the Great Chain of Being. Studies of the History of Modal Theories. 1981 ISBN 90-277-1125-9

Synthese Historical Library 21. J.V. Buroker: Space and Incongruence. The Origin of Kant’s Idealism. 1981 ISBN 90-277-1203-4 22. Marsilius of Inghen: Treatises on the Properties of Terms. A First Critical Edition of the Suppositiones, Ampliationes, Appellationes, Restrictiones and Alienationes with Introduction, Translation, Notes and Appendices by E.P. Bos. 1983 ISBN 90-277-1343-X 23. W.R. de Jong: The Semantics of John Stuart Mill. 1982 ISBN 90-277-1408-8 24. Ren´e Descartes: Principles of Philosophy. Translation with Explanatory Notes by V.R. Miller and R.P. Miller. 1983 ISBN 90-277-1451-7 25. T. Rudavsky (ed.): Divine Omniscience and Omnipotence in Medieval Philosophy. Islamic, Jewish and Christian Perspectives. 1985 ISBN 90-277-1750-8 26. William Heytesbury: On Maxima and Minima. Chapter V of Rules for Solving Sophismata, with an Anonymous 14th-century Discussion. Translation from Latin with an Introduction and Study by J. Longeway. 1984 ISBN 90-277-1868-7 27. Jean Buridan’s Logic. The Treatise on Supposition. The Treatise on Consequences. Translation from Latin with a Philosophical Introduction by P. King. 1985 ISBN 90-277-1918-7 28. S. Knuuttila and J. Hintikka (eds.): The Logic of Being. Historical Studies. 1986 ISBN 90-277-2019-3 29. E. Sosa (ed.): Essays on the Philosophy of George Berkeley. 1987 ISBN 90-277-2405-9 30. B. Brundell: Pierre Gassendi: From Aristotelianism to a New Natural Philosophy. 1987 ISBN 90-277-2428-8 31. Adam de Wodeham: Tractatus de indivisibilibus. A Critical Edition with Introduction, Translation, and Textual Notes by R. Wood. 1988 ISBN 90-277-2424-5 32. N. Kretzmann (ed.): Meaning and Inference in Medieval Philosophy. Studies in Memory of J. Pinborg (1937–1982). 1988 ISBN 90-277-2577-2 33. S. Knuuttila (ed.): ModernModalities. Studies of the History of Modal Theories from Medieval Nominalism to Logical Positivism. 1988 ISBN 90-277-2678-7 34. G.F. Scarre: Logic and Reality in the Philosophy of John Stuart Mill. 1988 ISBN 90-277-2739-2 35. J. van Rijen: Aspects of Aristotle’s Logic of Modalities. 1989 ISBN 0-7923-0048-3 36. L. Baudry: The Quarrel over Future Contingents (Louvain 1465–1475). Unpublished Latin TextscollectedandtranslatedinFrenchbyL.Baudry.TranslatedfromFrenchbyR.Guerlac. 1989 ISBN 0-7923-0454-3 37. S. Payne: John of the Cross and the Cognitive Value of Mysticism. An Analysis of Sanjuanist Teaching and its Philosophical Implications for Contemporary Discussions of Mystical Experience. 1990 ISBN 0-7923-0707-0 38. D.D. Merrill: Augustus De Morgan and the Logic of Relations. 1990 ISBN 0-7923-0758-5 39. H.T. Goldstein (ed.): Averroes’ Questions in Physics. 1991 ISBN 0-7923-0997-9 40. C.H. Manekin: The Logic of Gersonides. A Translation of Sefer ha-Heqqesh ha-Yashar (The Book of the Correct Syllogism) of Rabbi Levi ben Gershom with Introduction, Commentary, and Analytical Glossary. 1992 ISBN 0-7923-1513-8

THE NEW SYNTHESE HISTORICAL LIBRARY Texts and Studies in the History of Philosophy 41. George Berkeley: De Motu and The Analyst. A Modern Edition with Introductions and Commentary, edited en translated by Douglas M. Jesseph. 1992 ISBN 0-7923-1520-0 42. John Duns Scotus: Contingency and Freedom. Lectura I 39. Introduction, Translation and Commentary by A. Vos Jaczn., H. Veldhuis, A.H. Looman-Graaskamp, E. Dekker and N.W. den Bok. 1994 ISBN 0-7923-2707-1 43. Paul Thom: The Logic of Essentialism. An Interpretation of Aristotle’s Modal Syllogistic. 1996 ISBN 0-7923-3987-8 44. P.M. Matthews: The Significance of Beauty. Kant on Feeling and the System of the Mind. 1997 ISBN 0-7923-4764-1 45. N. Strobach: The Moment of Change. A Systematic History in the Philosophy of Space and Time. 1998 ISBN 0-7923-5120-7 46. J. Sihvola and T. Engberg-Pedersen (eds.): The Emotions in Hellenistic Philosophy. 1998 ISBN 0-7923-5318-8 47. P.J. Bagley: Piety, Peace, and the Freedom to Philosophize. 1999 ISBN 0-7923-5984-4 48. M. Kusch (ed.): The Sociology of Philosophical Knowledge. 2000 ISBN 0-7923-6150-4 49. M. Yrj¨onsuuri (ed.): Medieval Formal Logic. Obligations, Insolubles and Consequences. 2001 ISBN 0-7923-6674-3 50. J.C. Doig: Aquinas’s Philosophical Commentary on the Ethics. A Historical Perspective. 2001 ISBN 0-7923-6954-8 51. R. Pinzani: The Logical Grammar of Abelard. 2003 ISBN 1-4020-1246-2 52. J. Yu: The Structure of Being in Aristotle’s Metaphysics. 2003 ISBN 1-4020-1537-2 53. R.L.FriedmanandL.O.Nielsen(eds.):TheMedievalHeritageinEarlyModernMetaphysics and Modal Theory, 1400-1700. 2003 ISBN 1-4020-1631-X 54. J. Maat: Philosophical Languages in the Seventeenth Century: Dalgarno, Wilkins, Leibniz. 2004 ISBN 1-4020-1758-8 55. L. Alanen and C. Witt (eds.): Feminist Reflections on the History of Philosophy. 2004 ISBN 1-4020-2488-6 56. O. Harari: Knowledge and Demonstration. Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics. 2004 ISBN 1-4020-2787-7 57. J.Kraye and R.Saarinen(eds.):MoralPhilosophyon theThreshold of Modernity.2004 ISBN 1-4020-3000-2 58. P. Phemister: Leibniz and the Natural World. Activity, Passivity and Corporeal Substances in Leibniz’s Philosophy. 2005 ISBN 1-4020-3400-8 59. V. Mäkinen and P. Korkman (eds.): Transformations in Medieval and Early- Modern ISBN 1-4020-4211-6 Rights Discourse. 2005 60. M. Dascal: G.W. Leibniz. The Art of Controversies. 2006 ISBN 1-4020-5227-8

springer.com