HANDBOOK OF THE EQUITY RISK PREMIUM
HANDBOOKS IN FINANCE Series Editor
WILLIAM T. ZIEMBA Advisory Editors
KENNETH J. ARROW GEORGE C. CONSTANTINIDES B. ESPEN ECKBO HARRY M. MARKOWITZ ROBERT C. MERTON STEWART C. MYERS PAUL A. SAMUELSON WILLIAM F. SHARPE
amsterdam • boston • heidelberg • london new york • oxford • paris • san diego san francisco • singapore • sydney • tokyo
HANDBOOK OF THE EQUITY RISK PREMIUM By
Rajnish Mehra
amsterdam • boston • heidelberg • london new york • oxford • paris • san diego san francisco • singapore • sydney • tokyo
Elsevier Radarweg 29, PO Box 211, 1000 AE Amsterdam, The Netherlands Linacre House, Jordan Hill, Oxford OX2 8DP, UK First edition 2008 c 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved Copyright No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior written permission of the publisher Permissions may be sought directly from Elsevier’s Science & Technology Rights Department in Oxford, UK: phone (+44) (0) 1865 843830; fax (+44) (0) 1865 853333; email:
[email protected]. Alternatively you can submit your request online by visiting the Elsevier web site at http://elsevier.com/locate/permissions, and selecting Obtaining permission to use Elsevier material
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress ISBN: 978-0-444-50899-7 For information on all Elsevier publications visit our website at books.elsevier.com Printed and bound in the USA 08 09 10 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Dedicated to my parents to Jyoti and Ravi to Neeru and to Chaitanya
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Contents
List of Contributors
xvii
Preface
xix
Introduction to the Series
xxiii
1
The Equity Premium: ABCs
1
Rajnish Mehra (UCSB) and Edward C. Prescott (Arizona State)
2
1. Introduction 1.1. An Important Preliminary Issue 1.2. Data Sources 1.3. Estimates of the Equity Premium 1.4. Variation in the Equity Premium Over Time 2. Is the Equity Premium Due to a Premium for Bearing Non-Diversifiable Risk? 2.1. Standard Preferences References Appendix A
2 2 3 6 9 11 14 25 29
Appendix B
29
Appendix C
35
Appendix D
35
Risk-Based Explanations of the Equity Premium
37
John B. Donaldson (Columbia) and Rajnish Mehra (UCSB)
Introduction 1. Alternative Preference Structures 1.1. Preliminaries 1.2. Coincidence of Risk and Time Preferences in CRRA utility 1.3. Separating Risk and Time Preferences: Epstein–Zin and others 1.4. Variation in the CRRA and EIS
39 41 41 44 46 52 vii
viii
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2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
3
1.5. Habit Formation 1.6. Behavioral Models 1.7. Beyond One Good and a Representative Agent Production Economies Disaster Events and Survivorship Bias Market Incompleteness and Trading Frictions 4.1. Restricted Participation Model Uncertainty Concluding Comments References
Non-Risk-based Explanations of the Equity Premium
55 61 71 78 81 86 86 91 93 94
101
Rajnish Mehra (UCSB) and Edward C. Prescott (Arizona State)
4
Introduction 1. The Inappropriateness of Using T-Bills as a Proxy for the Intertemporal Marginal Rate of Substitution of Consumption 1.1. Liquidity 1.2. Transaction Balances 2. The Effect of Government Regulations and Rules 3. Taxes 4. Borrowing Constraints 5. The Impact of Agent Heterogeneity and Intermediation Costs 6. Concluding Comments References
102 102 104 104 106 107 110 113 114 114
Equity Premia with Benchmark Levels of Consumption: Closed-Form Results
117
Andrew B. Abel (Wharton)
1. Preferences 2. The Canonical Asset 2.1. The Price of the Canonical Asset 2.2. The Rate of Return on the Canonical Asset 3. Risk, Term, and Equity Premia 4. Log-Normality 5. Risk, Term, and Equity Premia Under Log-Normality with Consumption Externalities and Without Habit Formation 6. Linear Approximations to Risk, Term, and Equity Premia 7. Second Moments 7.1. Linear Approximations to Second Moments 8. Correlation of Dividend-Price Ratio and the Rate of Return on Stock 8.1. Correlation of Dividend-Price Ratio and the Excess Rate of Return on Stock
120 126 127 129 131 134 135 137 138 140 142 144
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9. Special Cases 9.1. Rational Expectations 9.2. Distorted Beliefs 10. Accuracy of Approximations 11. Summary References
5
146 146 151 153 156 156
Discussion: Francisco Gomes (LBS)
158
1. Introduction 2. Preferences with Benchmark Levels of Consumption 3. Changing the “Benchmark Level” of the Explanation 3.1. Aggregate Moments 3.2. Micro-Economic Implications 3.3. Micro-Economic Foundations and Aggregation 4. Leverage, Correlation between Dividends and Consumption, and distorted Beliefs 4.1. Levered Equity Claims and Correlation Between Dividends and Consumption 4.2. Non-Rational Expectations 5. Final Remarks References
158 159 161 161 162 163
Long-Run Risks and Risk Compensation in Equity Markets
163 163 164 165 165
167
Ravi Bansal (Duke)
1. Introduction 2. Long-Run Risks Model 2.1. Preferences and the Environment 2.2. Long-Run Growth Rate Risks 2.3. Long-Run Growth and Uncertainty Risks 2.4. Data and Model Implications 3. Cross-Sectional Implications 3.1. Value, Momentum, Size, and the Cross-Sectional Puzzle 4. Conclusion References
168 170 170 171 174 176 185 185 191 191
Discussion: John C. Heaton (Chicago)
194
1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
194 194 195 197 198 198
Summary A Low-Frequency Component in Consumption? Preferences Returns and Long-Run Cash Flows Conclusion References
x
Contents
6
The Loss Aversion/Narrow Framing Approach to the Equity Premium Puzzle 199 Nicholas Barberis (Yale) and Ming Huang (Cornell)
7
1. Introduction 2. Loss Aversion and Narrow Framing 3. The Equity Premium 3.1. Modeling Loss Aversion and Narrow Framing 3.2. Quantitative Implications 3.3. Attitudes to Large Monetary Gambles 3.4. Attitudes to Small Monetary Gambles 3.5. The Importance of Narrow Framing 4. Other Applications 5. Further Extensions 5.1. Dynamic Aspects of Loss Aversion 5.2. Other Forms of Narrow Framing 6. Conclusion and Future Directions References
201 203 207 207 212 216 218 220 224 225 225 226 227 228
Discussion: Xavier Gabaix (New York)
230
1. Work Out More Systematically the Preferences of PT vs. EU Investors—The “Equity Protection Puzzle” 2. Make Quantitative Predictions, Particularly About Equilibrium Market Phenomena, Rather than Just about Individual Trading Behavior 3. Do a Version of the Model in Continuous Time References
232 233 234
Discussion: Ravi Jagannathan (Northwestern)
235
Financial Markets and the Real Economy
237
230
John H. Cochrane (Chicago)
1. Introduction 1.1. Risk Premia 1.2. Who Cares? 1.3. The Mimicking Portfolio Theorem and the Division of Labor 2. Facts: Time Variation and Business Cycle Correlation of Expected Returns 2.1. Variation over Time 2.2. Variation Across Assets 2.3. Return Forecasts—Variation over Time 2.4. The Cross Section of Returns—Variation Across Assets 3. Equity Premium 3.1. Mehra and Prescott and the Puzzle 3.2. The Future of the Equity Premium
239 239 242 243 244 244 245 246 251 257 261 266
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4. Consumption Models 4.1. Hansen and Singleton; Power Utility 4.2. New Utility Functions 4.3. Empirics with New Utility Functions 4.4. Consumption and Factor Models 5. Production, Investment, and General Equilibrium 5.1. “Production-Based Asset Pricing” 5.2. General Equilibrium 6. Labor Income and Idiosyncratic Risk 6.1. Labor and Outside Income 6.2. Idiosyncratic Risk, Stockholding, and Micro Data 7. Challenges for the Future References Appendix
267 267 270 273 286 290 290 294 302 302 307 314 314 322
Discussion: Lars Peter Hansen (Chicago)
326
References
8
Understanding the Equity Risk Premium Puzzle
329
331
George M. Constantinides (Chicago)
1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
Introduction Habit Persistence Limited Stock Market Participation and Per Capita Consumption Incomplete Markets and Idiosyncratic Income Shocks Concluding Remarks References
332 337 345 349 355 356
Discussion: Hanno Lustig (UCLA)
360
1. Introduction 1.1. Environment 1.2. Preferences and Endowments 2. Complete Markets 2.1. Equilibrium 2.2. Equity Premium Puzzle 3. Missing Markets 3.1. Equilibrium 3.2. Mankiw’s Recipe for Generating Risk Premia 3.3. Constantinides and Duffie 3.4. Independence of Idiosyncratic Shocks from Aggregate Conditions 4. Missing Markets and State-Dependent Solvency Constraints 4.1. Incomplete Markets 4.2. Complete Markets
360 361 361 362 363 364 364 365 365 366 368 370 370 371
xii
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9
5. Conclusion References A. Second-Order Taylor Expansion B. Constantinides and Duffie
372 372 373 374
Cash Flow Risk, Discounting Risk, and the Equity Premium Puzzle
377
Gurdip Bakshi (Maryland) and Zhiwu Chen (Yale)
1. Introduction 2. Economic Determinants of Equity Premium 2.1. Cash Flow Process 2.2. The Discounting Process 2.3. Dynamics of the Market Portfolio 2.4. Dynamics of the Equity Premium 3. Time-Series Data on S&P500 EPS, EPS Growth, and the Interest Rate 4. Implications of the Model for Equity Premium 4.1. How Large Is the Interest-Rate Risk Premium? 4.2. Maximum-Likelihood Estimation of the (Physical) Gt Process 4.3. Compensation for Cash Flow Risk and the Equity Premium 5. Concluding Remarks and Extensions Appendix References
379 381 381 382 383 385 387 389 389 391 392 396 398 400
Discussion: Vito D. Gala (LBS)
403
1. Discussion 1.1. Calibration and Estimation 1.2. Where Is the Equity Premium Puzzle? References
403 404 405 407
Discussion: Lior Menzly (Proxima)
409
1. Introduction 2. The Model 2.1. Pricing Kernel 2.2. Cash Flow Process 2.3. The Model—Solutions 3. Calibration 3.1. Calibrating the Model 3.2. Estimation Results 4. Two-Stage Procedure—An Empirical Concern 5. Conclusion References
410 410 410 411 411 412 412 412 412 414 414
xiii
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10 Distribution Risk and Equity Returns
415
Jean-Pierre Danthine (Lausanne), John B. Donaldson (Columbia), and Paolo Siconolfi (Columbia)
1. Introduction 2. The Business Cycle and the Labor Market 2.1. The Stylized Facts of the Business Cycle 2.2. The Labor Market 3. The Model Economy 3.1. Workers 3.2. Shareholders 3.3. The Firm 3.4. Equilibrium 3.5. Numerical Procedures and Calibration 4. An Economy with Distribution Risk Only 5. Adding Aggregate Uncertainty 6. Comparative Dynamics and Welfare Assessment 6.1. Changes in the Correlation of Productivity and Distribution Shocks 6.2. Changes in Risk Aversion and the Conditional Mean Distribution Shock 6.3. Other Comparative Dynamic Tests 6.4. Welfare Considerations 6.5. Explaining the Market Value to National Income Ratio 7. Technology-Driven Variations in Factor Shares 8. Robustness 9. An Alternative Interpretation of the Sharing Mechanism 10. Related Literature 11. Concluding Comments References
Discussion: Urban J. Jermann (Wharton) References
11 The Worldwide Equity Premium: A Smaller Puzzle
417 418 418 421 423 423 424 425 427 429 430 432 436 437 438 440 441 442 443 446 448 452 459 460
463 466
467
Elroy Dimson (LBS), Paul Marsh (LBS), and Mike Stauhton (LBS)
1. Introduction 2. Prior Estimates of the Equity Premium 2.1. Expert Opinion 3. Long-Run International Data 3.1. The DMS Global Database: Composition and Start Date 3.2. The DMS Global Database: General Methodology and Guiding Principles 4. Long-Run Historical Rates of Return 4.1. Extremes of History 4.2. The Long-Run Perspective
469 471 472 474 475 477 479 480 483
xiv
Contents
5. New Global Evidence on the Equity Premium 5.1. The Equity Premium Around the World 5.2. A Smaller Risk Premium 5.3. Survivorship of Markets 5.4. Survivorship Bias Is Negligible 6. Decomposing the Historical Equity Premium 6.1. Unanticipated Success 6.2. Decomposition of the Equity Premium 6.3. From the Past to the Future 7. Conclusion References Appendix 1: Decomposition of the Equity Premium Appendix 2: Data Sources for the DMS Database
12 History and the Equity Risk Premium
486 487 489 490 492 493 493 495 497 500 501 505 507
515
William N. Goetzmann (Yale) and Roger G. Ibbotson (Yale)
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
Introduction Historical Conception and Measurement of the Equity Risk Premium Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and Inflation History as Written by the Winners? The Equity Premium Over the Very Long Term Conclusion References
Discussion: Stephen F. LeRoy (UCSB) References
13 Can Heterogeneity, Undiversified Risk, and Trading Frictions Solve the Equity Premium Puzzle
516 517 521 523 524 527 528
530 534
535
John C. Heaton (Chicago) and Deborah Lucas (Northwestern)
1. Introduction 2. Labor Income as Background Risk 2.1. Calibrating the Income Process 2.2. Adding Trading Frictions 3. Entrepreneurial Income as Background Risk 4. Limited Participation and Limited Diversification 5. Conclusions References
537 539 544 547 552 555 556 556
Discussion: Kjetil Storesletten (U Oslo)
558
1. Introduction 2. Labor Income Risk
558 559
xv
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3. Transaction Costs 4. Concentrating Aggregate Risk on Fewer Hands 4.1. Entrepreneurial Risk 4.2. Limited Participation 5. Conclusion References
14 Asset Prices and Intergenerational Risk Sharing: The Role of Idiosyncratic Earnings Shocks
560 560 560 561 562 563
565
Kjetil Storesletten (U Oslo), Chris Telmer (CMU), and Amir Yaron (Wharton)
1. Introduction 2. An Analytical Example of the Constantinides–Duffie Model 2.1. Calibration of the Constantinides–Duffie Economy 2.2. Model Implications 3. Incorporating the Life Cycle 3.1. Calibration 4. Quantitative Results 4.1. Asset Pricing Implications 4.2. Sensitivity Analysis 5. Conclusions References A. Calibration Appendix B. Asset Pricing
567 569 570 571 573 576 577 580 581 581 584 587 590
Discussion: Darrell Duffie (Stanford)
591
References
Index
592
593
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List of Contributors
Andrew B. Abel, Department of Finance, 2315 Steinberg Hall-Dietrich Hall, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 3620 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6367, USA Gurdip Bakshi, Department of Finance, Smith School of Business, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742, USA Ravi Bansal, Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, 1 Towerview Drive, Durham, NC 27708, USA Nicholas Barberis, Yale School of Management, 135 Prospect Street, New Haven CT 06511, USA Zhiwu Chen, Yale School of Management, 135 Prospect Street, New Haven, CT 06520, USA John H. Cochrane, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago, 5807 S. Woodlawn, Chicago IL 60637, USA George M. Constantinides, Graduate School of Business, The University of Chicago, 5807 South Woodlawn Avenue, Chicago IL 60637, USA Jean-Pierre Danthine, University of Lausanne, Bldg Extranef, Dorigny, CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland Elroy Dimson, London Business School, Regents Park, London NW1 4SA, UK John B. Donaldson, Graduate School of Business, Columbia University, 3022 Broadway, New York, NY 10027-6989, USA Darrell Duffie, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, 518 Memorial Way, Stanford, CA 94305-5015, USA Xavier Gabaix, Department of Finance, Stern School of Business, New York University, 44 West 4th Street, Suite 9-190, New York, NY 10012, USA Vito Gala, London Business School, Regent’s Park, London, NW1 4SA, UK
xvii
xviii
List of Contributors
William N. Goetzmann, Yale School of Management, 135 Prospect Street, New Haven, CT 06511-3729, USA Francisco Gomes, Department of Finance, London Business School, Regent’s Park, London NW1 4SA, UK Lars Peter Hansen, Department of Economics, University of Chicago, 1126 East 59th St., Chicago, Illinois. 60637, USA John C. Heaton, The University of Chicago, Graduate School of Business, 5807 South Woodlawn Avenue, Chicago, IL 60637, USA Ming Huang, Johnson Graduate School of Management, Cornell University, 319 Sage Hall, Ithaca, NY 14853-6201, USA Roger G. Ibbotson, Yale School of Management, 135 Prospect Street, New Haven, CT 06511-3729, USA Ravi Jagannathan, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 2001 Sheridan Rd, Evanston, IL 60208, USA Urban J. Jermann, Department of Finance, The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, 3620 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6367, USA Stephen F. LeRoy, Department of Economics, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA 93106, USA Deborah Lucas, Kellogg School of Management, 2001 Sheridan Rd, Evanston, IL 60208, USA Hanno Lustig, Department of Economics, University of California at Los Angeles, Bunche Hall 8357, Box 951477, Los Angeles, CA 90095-1477, USA Paul Marsh, London Business School, Regents Park, London NW1 4SA, UK Rajnish Mehra, Department of Economics, 3014 North Hall, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA 93106-9210, USA Lior Menzly, Director of Quantitative Research and Risk Management, Proxima Alfa Investment (USA), 623 Fifth Ave, 14th Floor, New York, NY 10022, USA Edward C. Prescott, Department of Economics, W. P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85287-3806, USA Paolo Siconolfi, Columbia Business School, 3022 Broadway, Uris Hall 820, New York, NY 10027, USA Mike Staunton, London Business School, Regents Park, London NW1 4SA, UK Kjetil Storesletten, Department of Economics, University of Oslo, PO Box 1095 Blindern, N-0317 Oslo, Norway Chris Telmer, Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University, Posner Hall, Room 350, Tech and Frew Streets, Pittsburgh, PA 15213, USA Amir Yaron, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 2325 Steinberg Hall-Dietrich Hall, 3620 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6367, USA
Preface
Historical data provide a wealth of evidence documenting that for more than a century, U.S. stock returns have been considerably higher than the returns for Treasury bills. The average annual real return (that is, the inflation-adjusted return) on the U.S. stock market for the past 110 years has been about 7.9 percent. In the same period, the real return on a relatively riskless security was a paltry 1.0 percent. The difference between these two returns, 6.9 percentage points, is the equity premium. The generally accepted tenet of the neoclassical paradigm has been that the observed differences in the rates of return to financial assets, in particular, the large difference between the average returns on corporate equity and T-bills, is a premium for bearing non-diversifiable aggregate risk. What came as a surprise to many economists and researchers in finance was the conclusion of a research paper that Edward Prescott and I wrote in 1979. We found that stocks and bonds pay off in approximately the same states of nature or economic scenarios and hence, they should command approximately the same rate of return. The historical U.S. equity premium was an order of magnitude greater than could be rationalized in the context of the standard neoclassical paradigm of financial economics. In fact, using standard theory to estimate risk-adjusted returns, we found that stocks on average should command, at most, a 1 percent return premium over bills. Since, for as long as we had reliable data, (about a hundred years), the mean premium on stocks over bills was considerably and consistently higher, we realized that we had a puzzle on our hands. It took us six more years to convince a skeptical profession and for “The Equity Premium: A Puzzle” to be published. I want to emphasize that the equity premium puzzle is a quantitative puzzle; standard theory is consistent with our notion of risk that, on average, stocks should return more than bonds. The puzzle cannot be dismissed lightly because much of our economic intuition is based on the very class of models that fall short so dramatically when confronted with financial data. It underscores the failure of paradigms central to financial and economic modelling to capture the characteristic that appears to make stocks comparatively riskier. Hence, the viability of using this class of models for any quantitative assessment—for instance, to gauge the welfare implications of alternative stabilization policies—is thrown open to question.
xix
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Preface
Creative research emerges at the fault lines where theory confronts observations. Over the past two decades, attempts to resolve the puzzle have become a major research impetus in finance and economics. Several generalizations of key features of the Mehra–Prescott (1985) model have been proposed to reconcile observation with theory. Consequently, we have a deeper understanding of the role and importance of the abstractions that contribute to the puzzle. While no single explanation has fully resolved the anomaly, considerable progress has been made and the equity premium is a lesser puzzle today than it was twenty years ago. This Handbook brings together fourteen papers by key researchers that span the spectrum of research efforts to resolve the Equity Premium Puzzle. I designed this volume to be a collection of essays by experts in the field, discussing their own work and contribution to the Equity Premium literature. My motivation is to give the profession a critical look at the subject through the eyes of the researchers that have made fundamental contributions to the field. Each essay is followed by an expert commentary. The expository style is intended to make the material accessible to doctoral students and beginning researchers in the field. In this spirit, individual chapters are self-contained and can be read independently. The three introductory chapters provide a summary and overview of research over the past 20 years. The first chapter explains why the equity premium is a puzzle. Chapter two is an extended survey of the risk-based explanations of the equity premium while chapter three surveys non-risk based explanations. The remaining chapters are arranged alphabetically by author. Each chapter has a descriptive title and an abstract. There is little value added in summarizing them here. This volume has taken the better part of four years to bring to press, as many essays went through two rounds of refereeing. I am grateful to the anonymous referees for their detailed comments, to the authors and discussants for their willingness to incorporate suggestions and for their diligence in adhering to our guidelines in preparing their contributions to this volume. Thanks are due to Francisco Azeredo, Alok Khare and Chaitanya Mehra, who contributed to this volume’s accessibility by reading and critiquing the chapters from a student’s perspective. Most of the papers were presented and discussed at “The Equity Premium Puzzle Conference,” held in October 2005 at the University of California, Santa Barbara, to commemorate the twentieth anniversary of the publication of “The Equity Premium: A Puzzle.” The conference was sponsored by the Laboratory for Aggregate Economics and Finance at UCSB and North Holland. I thank Finn Kydland, the director of LAEF, Scott Bentley, the executive editor and David Clark, the publishing director at North Holland for their generous support. Special thanks are due to Vijaisarath Parthasarathy, at Elsevier, Chennai, where this issue was typeset, for the patience and grace with which he handled the innumerable iterations involved in bringing this volume to press. The equity premium puzzle has its genesis in the research program initiated by Robert Lucas and Edward Prescott at Carnegie Mellon in the mid 70s, a program that transformed dynamic economics. I was fortunate to have learned economics from them, and to have witnessed that paradigmatic shift. I want to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to both of them.
Preface
xxi With Ed Prescott, our association has evolved from his role as mentor to that of co-author and colleague. The famous mathematician, Mark Kac, once made a distinction between two kinds of geniuses: the “ordinary” and the “magicians”. An ordinary genius is a fellow that you and I would be just as good as, if we were only many times better. It is different with magicians. The working of their minds is mysterious and profound and even after we understand what they have done, the creative process by which they have done it, is impossible to emulate. The last 30 odd years of collaborating with Ed Prescott have convinced me that he is, truly, a magician. It was at Carnegie too that I met John Donaldson and George Constantinides; over the years, they have been generous with their time and advice and have served as a sounding board for ideas. Both of them contributed immeasurably to this volume by their meticulous reading of and comments on many of the papers collected here. Finally, I thank my wife, Neeru, for editorial assistance. Her insightful comments and recommendations reflect her passion for words, versatility of expression and command of the language.
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Introduction to the Series
Advisory Editors: Kenneth J. Arrow, Stanford University; George C. Constantinides, University of Chicago; B. Espen Eckbo, Dartmouth College; Harry M. Markowitz, University of California, San Diego; Robert C. Merton, Harvard University; Stewart C. Myers, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Paul A. Samuelson, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; and William F. Sharpe, Stanford University. The Handbooks in Finance are intended to be a definitive source for comprehensive and accessible information. Each volume in the series presents an accurate, self-contained survey of a sub-field of finance, suitable for use by finance and economics professors and lecturers, professional researchers, graduate students and as a teaching supplement. The goal is to have a broad group of outstanding volumes in various areas of finance. William T. Ziemba University of British Columbia
xxiii
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CHAPTER 1
The Equity Premium: ABCs Rajnish Mehra University of California, Santa Barbara, and NBER and
Edward C. Prescott Arizona State University and Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
1. Introduction 1.1. An Important Preliminary Issue 1.2. Data Sources 1.3. Estimates of the Equity Premium 1.4. Variation in the Equity Premium over Time 2. Is the Equity Premium due to a Premium for Bearing Non-Diversifiable Risk? 2.1. Standard Preferences References Appendix A Appendix B Appendix C Appendix D
2 2 3 6 9 11 14 25 29 29 35 35
JEL Classification: G10, G12, D9 Keywords: asset pricing, equity risk premium, CAPM, consumption CAPM, risk free rate puzzle
We thank George Constantinides, John Donaldson and Viral Shah for helpful comments and Francisco Azeredo for excellent research assistance. HANDBOOK OF THE EQUITY RISK PREMIUM c 2008 by Rajnish Mehra and Edward C. Prescott. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved. Copyright
1
2
Chapter 1 • The Equity Premium: ABCs
1. INTRODUCTION The year 1978 saw the publication of Robert Lucas’ seminal paper “Asset Prices in an Exchange Economy” in Econometrica. Its publication transformed asset pricing and substantially raised the level of discussion, providing a theoretical construct to study issues that could not be addressed within the dominant paradigm at the time, the Capital Asset Pricing Model.1 A crucial input parameter for using the latter is the equity premium2 (the return earned by a broad market index in excess of that earned by a relatively risk-free security). Lucas’ asset pricing model allowed one to pose questions about the magnitude of the equity premium.3 In our paper, “The Equity Premium: A Puzzle,”4 we decided to address this issue. In this chapter we take a retrospective look at our original paper and show why we concluded that the equity premium is not a premium for bearing non-diversifiable risk.5 We critically evaluate the data sources used to document the puzzle and touch on other issues that may be of interest to the researcher who did not have a ringside seat 20 years ago. We stress that the perspective here captures the spirit of our original paper and not necessarily our current thinking on these issues.6 This and the subsequent two chapters are motivated by the intention to make this volume a self-contained reference for the beginning researcher in the field. The chapters that follow address the research efforts that have preoccupied the profession in an effort to explain the equity premium. This chapter is organized into two parts. Part 1 documents the historical equity premium in the United States and in selected countries with significant capital markets (in terms of market value) and comments on data sources. Part 2 examines the question, “Is the equity premium a premium for bearing non-diversifiable risk?”
1.1. An Important Preliminary Issue Any discussion of the equity premium raises the question of whether arithmetic or geometric returns should be used for summarizing historical return data. In Mehra and Prescott (1985), we used arithmetic averages. If returns are uncorrelated over time, the appropriate statistic is the arithmetic average because the expected future value of a $1 investment is obtained by compounding the mean returns. Thus, this is the appropriate statistic to report if one is interested in the mean terminal value of the investment.7 1 See
Mossin (1966) for a lucid articulation. was generally assumed to be in the 6–8 percent range. 3 To put this advance in perspective, an equivalent contribution in physics would be to come up with a model that enabled one to address the question of whether the value of Newton’s gravitational constant G (6.672 × 10−11 Nm2 /kg2 ) is reasonable, given other cosmological observations. Why is the value of G what we observe? 4 See Mehra and Prescott (1985). 5 This chapter draws on material in Mehra and Prescott (2003). All of the acknowledgements in that chapter continue to apply. 6 For an elaboration, see McGrattan and Prescott (2003, 2005) and Mehra and Prescott (2008) in this volume. 7 We present a simple proof in Appendix A. 2 This
Rajnish Mehra and Edward C. Prescott
3
The arithmetic average return exceeds the geometric average return. If returns are log-normally distributed, the difference between the two is one-half the variance of the returns. Since the annual standard deviation of the equity returns is about 20 percent, there is a difference of about 2 percent between the two measures. Using geometric averages significantly underestimates the expected future value of an investment. In this chapter, as in our 1985 paper, we report arithmetic averages. In instances where we cite the results of research when arithmetic averages are not available, we clearly indicate this.8
1.2. Data Sources A crucial consideration in a discussion of the historical equity premium has to do with the reliability of early data sources. The data we used in documenting the historical equity premium in the United States can be subdivided into three distinct subperiods, 1802–1871, 1871–1926, and 1926–present, with wide variation in the quality of the data over each subperiod. Data on stock prices for the 19th century is patchy, often necessarily introducing an element of arbitrariness to compensate for its incompleteness.
1.2.1. Subperiod 1802–1871 Equity Return Data The equity return data prior to 1871 is not particularly reliable. To the best of our knowledge, the stock return data used by all researchers for the period 1802–1871 is due to Schwert (1990), who gives an excellent account of the construction and composition of early stock market indexes. Schwert (1990) constructs a “spliced” index for the period 1802–1987; his index for the period 1802–1862 is based on the work of Smith and Cole (1935), who constructed a number of early stock indexes. For the period 1802–1820, their index was constructed from an equally weighted portfolio of seven bank stocks, and another index for 1815–1845 was composed of six bank stocks and one insurance stock. For the period 1834–1862, the index consisted of an equally weighted portfolio of (at most) 27 railroad stocks.9 They used one price quote, per stock, per month, from local newspapers. The prices used were the average of the bid and ask prices, rather than transaction prices, and the computation of returns ignores dividends. For the period 1863–1871, Schwert uses data from Macaulay (1938), who constructed a valueweighted index using a portfolio of 25 Northeast and Mid-Atlantic railroad stocks;10 this index also excludes dividends. Needless to say, it is difficult to assess how well this data proxies the “market,” since undoubtedly there were other industry sectors that were not reflected in the index. 8 In
this case an approximate estimate of the arithmetic average return can be obtained by adding one-half the variance of the returns to the geometric average. 9 “They chose stocks in hindsight . . . the sample selection bias caused by including only stocks that survived and were actively quoted for the whole period is obvious” (Schwert (1990)). 10 “It is unclear what sources Macaulay used to collect individual stock prices but he included all railroads with actively traded stocks.” Ibid.
4
Chapter 1 • The Equity Premium: ABCs
Return on a Risk-Free Security Since there were no Treasury bills extant at the time, researchers have used the data set constructed by Siegel (2002) for this period, using highly rated securities with an adjustment for the default premium. Interestingly, based on this data set, the equity premium for the period 1802–1862 was zero. We conjecture that this may be due to the fact that since most financing in the first half of the 19th century was done through debt, the distinction between debt and equity securities was not very clear-cut.11
1.2.2. Subperiod 1871–1926 Equity Return Data Shiller (1989) is the definitive source for the equity return data for this period. His data is based on the work of Cowles (1939), which covers the period 1871–1938. Cowles used a value-weighted portfolio for his index, which consisted of 12 stocks12 in 1871 and ended with 351 in 1938. He included all stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange, whose prices were reported in the Commercial and Financial Chronicle. From 1918 onward he used the Standard and Poor’s (S&P) industrial portfolios. Cowles reported dividends, so that, unlike the earlier indexes for the period 1802–1871, a total return calculation was possible. Return on a Risk-Free Security There is no definitive source for the short-term risk-free rate in the period before 1920, when Treasury certificates were first issued. In our 1985 study, we used short-term commercial paper as a proxy for a riskless short-term security prior to 1920 and Treasury certificates from 1920–1930.13 Our data prior to 1920 was taken from Homer (1963). Most researchers have used either our data set or Siegel’s.
1.2.3. Subperiod 1926–Present Equity Return Data This period is the “Golden Age” with regard to accurate financial data. The NYSE database at the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) was initiated in 1926 and provides researchers with high-quality equity return data. The Ibbotson Associates Yearbooks14 are also a very useful compendium of post-1926 financial data.
11 The first actively traded stock was floated in the U.S. in 1791 and by 1801 there were over 300 corporations, although less than 10 were actively traded (Siegel (2002)). 12 It was only from February 16, 1885, that Dow Jones began reporting an index, initially composed of 12 stocks. The S&P index dates back to 1928, though for the period 1928–1957 it consisted of 90 stocks. The S&P 500 debuted in March 1957. 13 See Mehra and Prescott (2008) in this volume for a discussion on the choice of a proxy for the risk-free asset. 14 Ibbotson Associates, 2006. Stocks, bonds, bills and inflation. 2005 Yearbook. Ibbotson Associates, Chicago.
5
Rajnish Mehra and Edward C. Prescott
TABLE 1 U.S. Annual Real Growth Rate of Per Capita Consumption of Non-durables and Services 1889–1978
1889–2004
1889–1929
1930–1978
1930–2004
Mean
0.018
0.018
0.021
0.016
0.018
Std. Dev.
0.036
0.032
0.044
0.028
0.022
–0.140
–0.135
–0.463
0.520
0.450
Serial Correlation
Return on a Risk-Free Security Since the advent of Treasury bills in 1931, short-maturity bills have almost universally been used as proxy for a “real” risk-free security15 since the innovation in inflation is orthogonal to the path of real GNP growth.16 With the debut of Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS) on January 29, 1997, the return on these securities is the real risk-free rate.17
1.2.4. Consumption Data In our study, we used the Kuznets–Kendrik–NIA per capita real consumption of nondurables and services for the period 1889–1978. Our data source was Grossman and Shiller (1981). An updated version of this series is available in Shiller (1989).18 The initial series (the flow of perishable and semi-durable goods to consumers) for the period 1889–1919 was constructed by William Shaw.19 Simon Kuznets (1938, 1946) modified Shaw’s measure by incorporating transportation and distribution costs, and created a series (the flow of perishable and semi-durable goods to consumers) for the period 1919–1929. The final version of these series is available in an unpublished mimeograph underlying Tables R-27 and R-28 in Kuznets (1961). Kendrick (1961) made further adjustments to these series in order to make them comparable to the Department of Commerce’s personal consumption expenditure series. Kendrick’s adjustments are available in Tables A-IIa and A-IIb in Kendrick (1961). This is the data source that Grossman and Shiller (1981) used in constructing the1889–1929 subset of their series on per capita real consumption of non-durables and services. The post-1929 data is from the National Income and Product Accounts of the United States. Table 1 details the statistics on the growth rate of real per capita consumption of non-durables and services, while Figure 1 is a time-series plot. We used the statistics in the 1889–1978 column in our original study. 15 Mehra
and Prescott. Ibid. (1980) documents that in postwar data the innovation in inflation had a standard deviation of one-half of one percent. 17 Mehra and Prescott. Ibid. 18 Further updates are available on Robert Shiller’s website: www.econ.yale.edu/∼shiller. 19 See Shaw (1947). 16 Litterman
6
Chapter 1 • The Equity Premium: ABCs 0.15
0.10
0.05
0.00
20.05
FIGURE 1
2001
1997
1993
1989
1985
1981
1977
1973
1969
1965
1961
1957
1953
1949
1945
1941
1937
1933
1929
1925
1921
1917
1913
1909
1905
1901
1897
1889
20.15
1893
20.10
U.S. annual real growth rate of per capita consumption of non-durables and services
1889–2004. Source: Mehra and Prescott (1985), updated by the authors.
While the serial correlation of consumption growth for the entire sample is negative, Azeredo (2007) points out that for more than the last 70 years it has been positive. In addition, we note that the standard deviation has declined.20 We discuss the implications for the equity premium in Section 2.1.2 and further in Appendix B.
1.3. Estimates of the Equity Premium Historical data provides us with a wealth of evidence documenting that for over a century, stock returns have been considerably higher than those for Treasury bills. This is illustrated in Table 2, which reports the unconditional estimates21 for the U.S. equity premium based on the various data sets used in the literature, going back to 1802. The average annual real return (the inflation adjusted return) on the U.S. stock market over the last 116 years has been about 7.67 percent. Over the same period, the return on a relatively riskless security was a paltry 1.31 percent. The difference between these two returns, the “equity premium,” was 6.36 percent. 20 Christina Romer (1999) points out that the larger pre-1929 estimates may be an artifact of the early methodology rather than due to a change in the underlying stochastic process. 21 To obtain unconditional estimates, we use the entire data set to form our estimate. The Mehra–Prescott data set spans the longest time period for which both consumption and stock return data is available; the former is necessary to test the implications of consumption-based asset pricing models.
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Rajnish Mehra and Edward C. Prescott
TABLE 2 U.S. Equity Premium Using Different Data Sets Real return on a market index (%)
Real return on a relatively riskless security (%)
Equity premium (%)
Data set
Mean
Mean
Mean
1802–2004 (Siegel)
8.38
3.02
5.36
1871–2005 (Shiller)
8.32
2.68
5.64
1889–2005 (Mehra–Prescott)
7.67
1.31
6.36
1926–2004 (Ibbotson)
9.27
0.64
8.63
TABLE 3 Equity Premium for Selected Countries Mean real return
Country
Period
Market index (%)
Relatively riskless security (%)
Equity premium (%)
United Kingdom
1900–2005
7.4
1.3
6.1
Japan
1900–2005
9.3
−0.5
9.8
Germany
1900–2005
8.2
−0.9
9.1
France
1900–2005
6.1
−3.2
9.3
Sweden
1900–2005
10.1
2.1
8.0
Australia
1900–2005
9.2
0.7
8.5
India
1991–2004
12.6
1.3
11.3
Source: Dimson et al. (2002) and Mehra (2007) for India.
Furthermore, this pattern of excess returns to equity holdings is not unique to the U.S. but is observed in every country with a significant capital market. The U.S. together with the U.K., Japan, Germany, and France accounts for more than 85 percent of the capitalized global equity value. The annual return on the British stock market was 7.4 percent over the last 106 years, an impressive 6.1 percent premium over the average bond return of 1.3 percent. Similar statistical differentials are documented for France, Germany, and Japan. Table 3 documents the equity premium for these countries.
8
Chapter 1 • The Equity Premium: ABCs
The dramatic investment implications of this differential rate of return can be seen in Table 4, which maps the capital appreciation of $1 invested in different assets from 1802 to 2004 and from 1926 to 2004. One dollar invested in a diversified stock index yields an ending wealth of $655,348 versus a value of $293, in real terms, for $1 invested in a portfolio of T-bills for the period 1802–2004. The corresponding values for the 78-year period, 1926–2004, are $238.30 and $1.54. It is assumed that all payments to the underlying asset, such as dividend payments to stock and interest payments to bonds, are reinvested and that no taxes are paid. This long-term perspective underscores the remarkable wealth-building potential of the equity premium. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that the equity premium is of central importance in portfolio allocation decisions and estimates of the cost of capital and is front and center in the current debate about the advantages of investing Social Security Trust funds in the stock market. In Table 5 we document the premium for some interesting historical subperiods: 1889–1933, when the United States was on a gold standard; 1934–2005, when it was off the gold standard; and 1946–2005, the postwar period. Table 6 presents 30-year moving averages, similar to those reported by the U.S. meteorological service to document “normal” temperature.
TABLE 4 Terminal Value of $1 Invested in Stocks and Bonds Stocks
T-bills
Investment period
Real
Nominal
Real
Nominal
1802–2004
$655,348.00
$10,350,077.00
$293.00
$4,614.00
1926–2004
$238.30
$2,533.43
$1.54
$17.87
Source: Ibbotson (2006) and Siegel (2002).
TABLE 5 Equity Premium in Different Subperiods Real return on a market index (%)
Real return on a relatively riskless security (%)
Equity premium (%)
Time period
Mean
Mean
Mean
1889–1933
7.01
3.39
3.62
1934–2005
8.08
0.01
8.07
1946–2005
8.19
0.71
7.48
Source: Mehra and Prescott (1985). Updated by the authors.
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Rajnish Mehra and Edward C. Prescott
TABLE 6 Equity Premium 30-Year Moving Averages Real return on a market index (%)
Real return on a relatively riskless security (%)
Equity premium (%)
Time period
Mean
Mean
Mean
1900–1950
7.45
2.95
4.50
1951–2005
8.53
1.11
7.42
Source: Mehra and Prescott (1985). Updated by the authors.
Although the premium has been increasing over time, this is primarily due to the diminishing return on the riskless asset, rather than a dramatic increase in the return on equity, which has been relatively constant. The low premium in the 19th century is largely due to the fact that the equity premium for the period 1802–1861 was zero.22 If we exclude this period, we find that difference in the premium in the second half of the 19th century relative to average values in the 20th century is less striking. We see a dramatic change in the equity premium in the post-1933 period—the premium rose from 3.62 percent to 8.07 percent, an increase of more than 125 percent. Since 1933 marked the end of the period when the U.S. was on the gold standard, this break can be seen as the change in the equity premium after the implementation of the new policy.
1.4. Variation in the Equity Premium Over Time The equity premium has varied considerably over time, as illustrated in Figures 2 and 3. Furthermore, the variation depends on the time horizon over which it is measured. There have even been periods when it has been negative. The low-frequency variation has been countercyclical. This is shown in Figure 4, where we have plotted the stock market value as a share of national income23 and the mean equity premium averaged over certain time periods. We have divided the time period from 1929 to 2005 into subperiods where the ratio market value of equity to national income (MV/NI) was greater than and when it was less than the mean value24 over the sample period. Historically, as the figure illustrates, subsequent to periods when this ratio was high, the realized equity premium was low. A similar result holds when 22 See
the earlier discussion on data. Mehra (1998) it is argued that the variation in this ratio is difficult to rationalize in the standard neoclassical framework since, over the same period, after-tax cash flows to equity as a share of national income are fairly constant. Here we do not address this issue and simply utilize the fact that this ratio has varied considerably over time. 24 Mean MV/NI for the period 1929–2005 was 0.91. 23 In
FIGURE 3 6
4
2
0 1989
1986
1983
1980
1977
1974
1971
1968
1965
1962
1959
1956
1953
1950
1947
1944
1941
1938
1935
1932
1929
Equity risk premium over the 20-year period 1926–2004. (Source: Ibbotson (2006))
2003
2004
2001
8 1998
10
2001
12 1995
14
1999
16 1992
18
1997
Realized equity risk premium per year: 1926–2004.
1995
1993
1991
1989
1987
1985
1983
1981
1979
1977
1975
1973
1971
1969
1967
1965
1963
1961
1959
1957
1955
1953
FIGURE 2
1951
1949
1926
260
1947
1945
Average Equity Risk Premium (Percent)
Equity Risk Premium (Percent)
10 Chapter 1 • The Equity Premium: ABCs
60
40
20
0
220
240
11
Rajnish Mehra and Edward C. Prescott 16.00
2.50
2.00 Average Equity Premium
12.00 10.00
1.50
8.00 1.00
6.00 4.00
0.50
Ratio of Market Value to National Income
14.00
2004
2001
1998
1995
1992
1989
1986
1983
1980
1977
1974
1971
1968
1965
1962
1959
1956
1953
1950
1947
1944
1941
1938
1935
1932
0.00
1929
2.00 0.00
FIGURE 4 Market value to national income ratio and average equity premium (average of subperiods when the MV/NI ratio is > or < avg. MV/NI ratio).
stock valuations are low relative to national income. In this case the subsequent equity premium is high. Since after-tax corporate profits as a share of national income are fairly constant over time, this translates into the observation that the realized equity premium was low subsequent to periods when the price/earnings ratio is high, and vice versa. This is the basis for the returns predictability literature in finance. In Figure 5 we have plotted stock market value as a share of national income and the subsequent three-year mean equity premium. This provides further conformation that, historically, periods of relatively high market valuation have been followed by periods when the equity premium was relatively low.
2. IS THE EQUITY PREMIUM DUE TO A PREMIUM FOR BEARING NON-DIVERSIFIABLE RISK? Why have stocks been such an attractive investment relative to bonds? Why has the rate of return on stocks been higher than that on relatively risk-free assets? One intuitive answer is that since stocks are “riskier” than bonds, investors require a larger premium for bearing this additional risk; and indeed, the standard deviation of the returns to stocks (about 20 percent per annum historically) is larger than that of the returns to T-bills (about 4 percent per annum), so, obviously they are considerably more risky than bills! But are they?
12
Chapter 1 • The Equity Premium: ABCs 16.00
2.50
2.00 Average Equity Premium
12.00 10.00
1.50
8.00 1.00
6.00 4.00
0.50
Ratio of Market Value to National Income
14.00
2.00
2004
2001
1998
1995
1992
1989
1986
1983
1980
1977
1974
1971
1968
1965
1962
1959
1956
1953
1950
1947
1944
1941
1938
1935
1932
0.00 1929
0.00
FIGURE 5
Market value to national income ratio and average 3-year ahead equity premium (average of subperiods when the MV/NI ratio is > or < avg. MV/NI ratio).
Figures 6 and 7 illustrate the variability of the annual real rate of return on the S&P 500 index and a relatively risk-free security over the period 1889–2005.25 To enhance and deepen our understanding of the risk-return trade-off in the pricing of financial assets, we take a detour into modern asset pricing theory and look at why different assets yield different rates of return. The deus ex machina of this theory is that assets are priced such that, ex-ante, the loss in marginal utility incurred by sacrificing current consumption and buying an asset at a certain price is equal to the expected gain in marginal utility, contingent on the anticipated increase in consumption when the asset pays off in the future. The operative emphasis here is the incremental loss or gain of utility of consumption and should be differentiated from incremental consumption. This is because the same amount of consumption may result in different degrees of well-being at different times. As a consequence, assets that pay off when times are good and consumption levels are high—when the marginal utility of consumption is low—are less desirable than those that pay off an equivalent amount when times are bad and additional consumption is more highly valued. Hence, consumption in period t has a different price if times are good than if times are bad. Let us illustrate this principle in the context of the standard, popular paradigm, the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). The model postulates a linear relationship between an asset’s “beta,” a measure of systematic risk, and its expected return. Thus, high-beta stocks yield a high expected rate of return. That is because in the CAPM, 25 The
index did not consist of 500 stocks for the entire period.
13
Rajnish Mehra and Edward C. Prescott 60
40
20
0
220
1965
1969
1973
1977
1981
1985
1989
1993
1997
2001
2005
1969
1973
1977
1981
1985
1989
1993
1997
2001
2005
1961
1957
1953
1949
1945
1941
1937
1933
1929
1925
1921
1917
1913
1909
1905
1965
FIGURE 6
1901
1897
1893
260
1889
240
Real annual return on S&P 500 Index (%) 1889–2005.
Source: Mehra and Prescott (1985). Data updated by the authors.
25 20 15 10 5 0 25 210 215
FIGURE 7
Real annual return on T-bills (%) 1889–2005.
Source: Mehra and Prescott (1985). Data updated by the authors.
1961
1957
1953
1949
1945
1941
1937
1933
1929
1925
1921
1917
1913
1909
1905
1901
1897
1893
225
1889
220
14
Chapter 1 • The Equity Premium: ABCs
good times and bad times are captured by the return on the market. The performance of the market, as captured by a broad-based index, acts as a surrogate indicator for the relevant state of the economy. A high-beta security tends to pay off more when the market return is high—when times are good and consumption is plentiful; it provides less incremental utility than a security that pays off when consumption is low, is less valuable, and consequently sells for less. Thus, higher-beta assets that pay off in states of low marginal utility will sell for a lower price than similar assets that pay off in states of high marginal utility. Since rates of return are inversely proportional to asset prices, the lower beta assets will, on average, give a lower rate of return than the former. Another perspective on asset pricing emphasizes that economic agents prefer to smooth patterns of consumption over time. Assets that pay off a larger amount at times when consumption is already high “destabilize” these patterns of consumption, whereas assets that pay off when consumption levels are low “smooth” out consumption. Naturally, the latter are more valuable and thus require a lower rate of return to induce investors to hold these assets. (Insurance policies are a classic example of assets that smooth consumption. Individuals willingly purchase and hold them, despite their very low rates of return.) To return to the original question: are stocks that much riskier than T-bills so as to justify a 7-percentage differential in their rates of return? What came as a surprise to many economists and researchers in finance was the conclusion of our paper, written in 1979. Stocks and bonds pay off in approximately the same states of nature or economic scenarios and, hence, as argued earlier, they should command approximately the same rate of return. In fact, using standard theory to estimate risk-adjusted returns, we found that stocks on average should command, at most, a 1 percent return premium over bills. Since, for as long as we had reliable data (about 100 years), the mean premium on stocks over bills was considerably and consistently higher, we realized that we had a puzzle on our hands. It took us six more years to convince a skeptical profession and for our paper “The Equity Premium: A Puzzle” to be published (Mehra and Prescott (1985)).
2.1. Standard Preferences The neoclassical growth model and its stochastic variants are a central construct in contemporary finance, public finance, and business cycle theory. It has been used extensively by, among others, Abel et al. (1989), Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987), Becker and Barro (1988), Brock (1979), Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985), Donaldson and Mehra (1984), Kydland and Prescott (1982), Lucas (1978), and Merton (1971). In fact, much of our economic intuition is derived from this model class. A key idea of this framework is that consumption today and consumption in some future period are treated as different goods. Relative prices of these different goods are equal to people’s willingness to substitute between these goods and businesses’ ability to transform these goods into each other. The model has had some remarkable successes when confronted with empirical data, particularly in the stream of macroeconomic research referred to as Real Business Cycle Theory, where researchers have found that it easily replicates the essential
15
Rajnish Mehra and Edward C. Prescott
macroeconomic features of the business cycle. See, in particular, Kydland and Prescott (1982). Unfortunately, when confronted with financial market data on stock returns, tests of these models have led, without exception, to their rejection. Perhaps the most striking of these rejections is our 1985 paper.26 To illustrate this we employ a variation of Lucas’ (1978) endowment economy rather than the production economy studied in Prescott and Mehra (1980). This is an appropriate abstraction to use if it is the equilibrium relation between the consumption and asset returns that are being used to estimate the premium for bearing non-diversifiable risk, which is what we were doing. Introducing production would only complicate the selection of exogenous processes, which resulted in the observed process for consumption.27 To examine the role of other factors for mean asset returns, it would be necessary to introduce other features of reality such as taxes and intermediation costs as has recently been done.28 If the model had accounted for differences in average asset returns, the next step would have been to use the neoclassical growth model, which has intertemporal transformation opportunities through variations in the rate at which the capital stock is accumulated, to see if this abstraction accounted for the observed large differences in average asset returns. Since per capita consumption has grown over time, we assume that the growth rate of the endowment follows a Markov process. This is in contrast to the assumption in Lucas’ model that the endowment level follows a Markov process. Our assumption, which requires an extension of competitive equilibrium theory,29 enables us to capture the non-stationarity in the consumption series associated with the large increase in per capita consumption that occurred over the last century. We consider a frictionless economy that has a single representative “stand-in” household. This unit orders its preferences over random consumption paths by ∞ E0 β t U (c t) , 0 < β < 1, (1) t=0
where ct is the per capita consumption and the parameter β is the subjective time discount factor, which describes how impatient households are to consume. If β is small, people are highly impatient, with a strong preference for consumption now versus consumption in the future. As modeled, these households live forever, which implicitly means that the utility of parents depends on the utility of their children. In the real world, this is true for some people and not for others. However, economies with both types of people—those who care about their children’s utility and those who do not—have essentially the same implications for asset prices and returns.30 26 The
reader is referred to McGrattan and Prescott (2003) and Mehra and Prescott (2007 and 2008) for an alternative perspective. 27 In a production economy, consumption would be endogenously determined, restricting the class of consumption processes that could be considered. See Appendix C. 28 See McGrattan and Prescott (2003) and Mehra and Prescott (2007 and 2008). 29 This is accomplished in Mehra (1988). 30 See Constantinides, Donaldson, and Mehra (2002, 2005). Constantinides et al. (2007) explicitly model bequests.
16
Chapter 1 • The Equity Premium: ABCs
We use this simple abstraction to build quantitative economic intuition about what the returns on equity and debt should be. E0 {·} is the expectations operator conditional upon information available at time zero (which denotes the present time), and U : R+ → R is the increasing, continuously differentiable concave utility function. We further restrict the utility function to be of the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) class U (c, α) =
c1−α − 1 , 1−α
0 < α < ∞,
(2)
where the parameter α measures the curvature of the utility function. When α = 1, the utility function is defined to be logarithmic, which is the limit of the above representation as α approaches 1. The feature that makes this the “preference function of choice” in much of the literature in Growth and Real Business Cycle Theory is that it is scaleinvariant. This means that a household is more likely to accept a gamble if both its wealth and the gamble amount are scaled by a positive factor. Hence, although the level of aggregate variables such as capital stock have increased over time, the resulting equilibrium return process is stationary. A second attractive feature is that it is one of only two preference functions that allows for aggregation and a “stand-in” representative agent formulation that is independent of the initial distribution of endowments. One disadvantage of this representation is that it links risk preferences with time preferences. With CRRA preferences, agents who like to smooth consumption across various states of nature also prefer to smooth consumption over time, that is, they dislike growth. Specifically, the coefficient of relative risk aversion is the reciprocal of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. There is no fundamental economic reason why this must be so. We will revisit this issue in the next chapter, where we examine preference structures that do not impose this restriction.31 We assume there is one productive unit, which produces output yt in period t, which is the period dividend. There is one equity share with price pt that is competitively traded; it is a claim to the stochastic process {yt}. Consider the intertemporal choice problem of a typical investor at time t. He equates the loss in utility associated with buying one additional unit of equity to the discounted expected utility of the resulting additional consumption in the next period. To carry over one additional unit of equity, pt units of the consumption good must be sacrificed, and the resulting loss in utility is pt U (ct). By selling this additional unit of equity in the next period, pt+1 + yt+1 additional units of the consumption good can be consumed and βEt {(pt+1 + yt+1)U (ct+1)} is the expected value of the incremental utility next period. At an optimum, these quantities must be equal. Hence, the fundamental relation that prices assets is pt U (ct) = βEt {(pt+1 + yt+1)U (ct+1)}. Versions of this expression can be found in Rubinstein (1976), Lucas (1978), Breeden (1979), and Prescott and Mehra (1980), among others. Excellent textbook treatments can be found in Cochrane (2005), Danthine and Donaldson (2005), Duffie (2001), and LeRoy and Werner (2001).
31 See
Epstein and Zin (1991) and Weil (1989).
17
Rajnish Mehra and Edward C. Prescott
We use it to price both stocks and risk-less one-period bonds. For equity we have U (ct+1 ) 1 = βEt Re,t+1 , U (ct )
(3)
where Re,t+1 =
pt+1 + yt+1 . pt
For the risk-less one-period bonds, the relevant expression is U (ct+1 ) Rf ,t+1 , 1 = βEt U (ct )
(4)
(5)
where the gross rate of return on the riskless asset is by definition Rf ,t+1 =
1 , qt
(6)
with qt being the price of the bond. Since U (c) is assumed to be increasing, we can rewrite (3) as 1 = βEt Mt+1 Re,t+1 , (7) where Mt+1 is a strictly positive stochastic discount factor. This guarantees that the economy will be arbitrage-free and the law of one price holds. A little algebra shows that −U (ct+1), Re,t+1 . (8) Et (Re,t+1) = Rf ,t+1 + Covt Et (U (ct+1)) The equity premium Et (Re,t+1) − Rf ,t+1 thus can be easily computed. Expected asset returns equal the risk-free rate plus a premium for bearing risk, which depends on the covariance of the asset returns with the marginal utility of consumption. Assets that co-vary positively with consumption—that is, they pay off in states when consumption is high and marginal utility is low—command a high premium since these assets “destabilize” consumption. The question we need to address is the following: is the magnitude of the covariance between the marginal utility of consumption large enough to justify the observed 6 percent equity premium in U.S. equity markets? To address this issue, we make some additional assumptions. While they are not necessary and were not, in fact, part of our original paper on the equity premium, we include them to facilitate exposition and because they result in closed-form solutions.32
32 The exposition below is based on Abel (1988), his unpublished notes, and Mehra (2003). See Appendix B for the analysis in our 1985 paper.
18
Chapter 1 • The Equity Premium: ABCs
These assumptions are ct+1 1. the growth rate of consumption xt+1 ≡ is i.i.d. ct yt+1 is i.i.d. 2. the growth rate of dividends zt+1 ≡ yt 3. (xt , zt ) are jointly log-normally distributed. The consequences of these assumptions are that the gross return on equity Re,t (defined above) is i.i.d. and that (xt , Re,t) are jointly log-normal. Substituting U (ct) = ct−α in the fundamental pricing relation33 U (ct+1) , (9) pt = βEt (pt+1 + yt+1 ) U (ct ) we get
pt = βEt (pt+1 + yt+1)x−α t+1 .
(10)
As pt is homogeneous of degree 1 in y, we can represent it as pt = wyt , and hence Re,t+1 can be expressed as
w+1 w+1 yt+1 Re,t+1 = = · · zt+1 . w yt w
(11)
It is easily shown that w=
βEt {zt+1 x−α t+1 } 1 − βEt {zt+1 x−α t+1}
;
(12)
hence, Et {zt+1} . βEt {zt+1 x−α t+1} Analogously, the gross return on the riskless asset can be written as Et {Re,t+1} =
Rf ,t+1 =
1 1 . β Et {x−α t+1}
(13)
(14)
Since we have assumed the growth rate of consumption and dividends to be lognormally distributed, eμz + 2 σz 1
Et {Re,t+1} =
2
βeμz −αμx +1/2(σz +α 2
2 σ 2 −2ασ ) x,z x
(15)
33 In contrast to our approach, which is in the applied general equilibrium tradition, there is another tradition of testing Euler equations (such as Eq. (9)) and rejecting them. Hansen and Singleton (1982) and Grossman and Shiller (1981) exemplify this approach. See Appendix D for an elaboration.
19
Rajnish Mehra and Edward C. Prescott
and 1 ln Et {Re,t+1} = − ln β + αμx − α 2 σx2 + ασx,z , 2
(16)
where μx = E(ln x), σx2 = Var(ln x), σx,z = Cov(ln x, ln z), and ln x is the continuously compounded growth rate of consumption. The other terms involving z and Re are defined analogously. Similarly, Rf =
1 −αμx + 12 α 2 σx2
(17)
βe
and 1 ln Rf = − ln β + αμx − α 2 σx2 . 2 ∴
ln E{Re} − ln Rf = ασx,z .
(18)
(19)
From (11) it also follows that ln E{Re} − ln Rf = ασx,Re , where σx,Re = Cov(ln x, ln Re ).
(20)
The (log) equity premium in this model is the product of the coefficient of risk aversion and the covariance of the (continuously compounded) growth rate of consumption with the (continuously compounded) return on equity or the growth rate of dividends. If we impose the equilibrium condition that x = z, a consequence of which is the restriction that the return on equity is perfectly correlated to the growth rate of consumption, we get ln E{Re} − ln Rf = ασx2 ,
(21)
and the equity premium then is the product of the coefficient of relative risk aversion and the variance of the growth rate of consumption. As we see ahead, this variance is 0.001369, so unless the coefficient of risk aversion α is large, a high-equity premium is impossible. The growth rate of consumption just does not vary enough! In Mehra and Prescott (1985) we report the following sample statistics for the U.S. economy over the period 1889–1978: Risk-free rate Rf = 1.0080 Mean return on equity E{Re} = 1.0698
20
Chapter 1 • The Equity Premium: ABCs
Mean growth rate of consumption E{x} = 1.0180 Standard deviation of the growth rate of consumption σ{x} = 0.0360 Mean equity premium E{Re} − Rf = 0.0618 In our calibration, we are guided by the tenet that model parameters should meet the criteria of cross-model verification: not only must they be consistent with the observations under consideration, but they should not be grossly inconsistent with other observations in growth theory, business cycle theory, labor market behavior, and so on. There is a wealth of evidence from various studies that the coefficient of risk aversion α is a small number, certainly less than 10.34 We can then pose a question: if we set the risk aversion coefficients α to be 10 and β to be 0.99, what are the expected rates of return and the risk premia using the parameterization above? Using the expressions derived earlier, we have 1 ln Rf = − ln β + αμx − α 2 σx2 = 0.124 2 or Rf = 1.132, that is, a risk-free rate of 13.2 percent! Since ln E{Re} = ln Rf + ασx2 = 0.136, we have E{Re} = 1.146, or a return on equity of 14.6 percent. This implies an equity risk premium of 1.4 percent, far lower than the 6.18 percent historically observed equity premium. In this calculation we have been liberal in choosing the values for α and β. Most studies indicate a value for α that is close to 3. If we pick a lower value for β, the risk-free rate will be even higher and the premium lower. So the 1.4 percent value represents the maximum equity risk premium that can be obtained in this class of models given the constraints on α and β. Since the observed equity premium is over 6 percent, we have a puzzle on our hands that risk considerations alone cannot account for.
2.1.1. The Risk-Free Rate Puzzle Philippe Weil (1989) has dubbed the high risk-free rate obtained above “the risk-free rate puzzle.” The short-term real rate in the U.S. averages less than 1 percent, while the high value of α required to generate the observed equity premium results in an unacceptably 34 A
number of these studies are documented in Mehra and Prescott (1985).
21
Rajnish Mehra and Edward C. Prescott
high risk-free rate. The risk-free rate as shown in Eq. (18) can be decomposed into three components: 1 ln Rf = − ln β + αμx − α 2 σx2 . 2 The first term, −ln β, is a time preference or impatience term. When β < 1, it reflects the fact that agents prefer early consumption to later consumption. Thus, in a world of perfect certainty and no growth in consumption, the unique interest rate in the economy will be Rf = 1/β. The second term, αμx , arises because of growth in consumption. If consumption is likely to be higher in the future, agents with concave utility would like to borrow against future consumption in order to smooth their lifetime consumption. The greater the curvature of the utility function and the larger the growth rate of consumption, the greater the desire to smooth consumption. In equilibrium, this will lead to a higher interest rate since agents in the aggregate cannot simultaneously increase their current consumption. The third term, 12 α 2 σx2 , arises due to a demand for precautionary saving. In a world of uncertainty, agents would like to hedge against future unfavorable consumption realizations by building “buffer stocks” of the consumption good. Hence, in equilibrium, the interest rate must fall to counter this enhanced demand for savings. Figure 8 plots ln Rf = − ln β + αμx − 21 α 2 σx2 calibrated to the U.S. historical values with μx = 0.0175 and σx2 = 0.00123 for various values of β. It shows that the precautionary savings effect is negligible for reasonable values of α (1 < α < 5). For α = 3 and β = 0.99, Rf = 1.65, which implies a risk-free rate of 6.5 percent— much higher than the historical mean rate of 0.8 percent. The economic intuition is 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10
220 230 240 250 260 270 280 a
FIGURE 8
Mean risk-free rate vs. α.
49
47
45
43
41
39
37
35
33
31
29
27
25
23
21
19
17
15
13
9
11
7
5
210
3
1
0
b5 0.99 b 5 0.96 b 5 0.55
22
Chapter 1 • The Equity Premium: ABCs
straightforward—with consumption growing at 1.8 percent a year with a standard deviation of 3.6 percent—agents with isoelastic preferences have a sufficiently strong desire to borrow in order to smooth consumption that it takes a high interest rate to induce them not to do so. The late Fischer Black35 proposed that α = 55 would solve the puzzle. Indeed, it can be shown that the 1889–1978 U.S. experience reported above can be reconciled with α = 48 and β = 0.55. To see this, observe that since var(x) = 0.00123 = ln 1 + [E(x)]2
σx2
and
1 μx = ln E(x) − σx2 = 0.0175, 2
this implies α=
ln E(R) − ln Rf σx2
= 48.4. Since 1 ln β = − ln Rf + αμx − α 2 σx2 2 = −0.60, this implies β = 0.55. Besides postulating an unacceptably high α, another problem is that this is a “knifeedge” solution. No other set of parameters will work, and a small change in α will lead to an unacceptable risk-free rate, as shown in Figure 8. An alternate approach is to experiment with negative time preferences; however, there seems to be no empirical evidence that agents do have such preferences.36 Figure 8 shows that for extremely high α, the precautionary savings term dominates and results in a “low” risk-free rate.37 However, then a small change in the growth rate of consumption will have a large impact on interest rates. This is inconsistent with a crosscountry comparison of real risk-free rates and their observed variability. For example, throughout the 1980s, South Korea had a much higher growth rate than the U.S., but real rates were not appreciably higher. Nor does the risk-free rate vary considerably over time, as would be expected if α was large. In Section 3 we show how alternative preference structures can help resolve the risk-free rate puzzle.
35 Private
communication, 1981. a model with growth, equilibrium can exist with β > 1. See Mehra (1988) for the restrictions on the parameters α and β for equilibrium to exist. 37 Kandel and Stambaugh (1991) have suggested this approach. 36 In
23
Rajnish Mehra and Edward C. Prescott
correl . 5 20.14 correl . 5 0.00 correl . 5 0.45
0.4
Equity Premium (Percent)
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
20.1 0
FIGURE 9
0.5
1
1.5 a
2
2.5
Equity Premium vs. α.
2.1.2. The Effect of Serial Correlation in the Growth Rate of Consumption The preceding analysis has assumed that the growth rate of consumption is i.i.d over time. However, for the sample period 1889–2004 it is slightly negative (−0.135), while for the sample period 1930–2004 the value is 0.45. The effect of this non-zero serial correlation on the equity premium can be analyzed using the framework in Appendix B. Figure 9 shows the effect of changes in the risk aversion parameter on the equity premium for different serial correlations.38 When the serial correlation of consumption is positive, the equity premium actually declines with increasing risk aversion, thus, further exacerbating the equity premium puzzle.39 An alternative perspective on the puzzle is provided by Hansen and Jagannathan (1991). The fundamental pricing equation can be written as Et (Re,t+1) = Rf ,t+1 − Covt
38 In
addition, see Figure 2B in Appendix B. Azeredo (2007) for a detailed discussion.
39 See
Mt+1 , Re,t+1 . Et (Mt+1)
(22)
24
Chapter 1 • The Equity Premium: ABCs
This expression also holds unconditionally, so that E(Re,t+1) = Rf ,t+1 − σ(Mt+1)σ(Re,t+1)ρR,M /E(Mt+1)
(23)
E(Re,t+1) − Rf ,t+1 /σ(Re,t+1) = −σ(Mt+1)ρR,M /E(Mt+1),
(24)
or
and since −1 ≤ ρR,M ≤ 1,
E(Re,t+1) − Rf ,t+1 /σ(Re,t+1) ≤ σ(Mt+1)/E(Mt+1).
(25)
This inequality is referred to as the Hansen–Jagannathan lower bound on the pricing kernel. For the U.S. economy, the Sharpe ratio, E(Re,t+1) − Rf ,t+1 /σ(Re,t+1), can be calculated to be 0.37. Since E(Mt+1) is the expected price of a one-period risk-free bond, its value must be close to 1. In fact, for the parameterization discussed earlier, E(Mt+1) = 0.96 when α = 2. This implies that the lower bound on the standard deviation for the pricing kernel must be close to 0.3 if the Hansen–Jagannathan bound is to be satisfied. However, when this is calculated in the Mehra–Prescott framework, we obtain an estimate for σ(Mt+1) = 0.002, which is off by more than an order of magnitude. We would like to emphasize that the equity premium puzzle is a quantitative puzzle; standard theory is consistent with our notion of risk that, on average, stocks should return more than bonds. The puzzle arises from the fact that the quantitative predictions of theory are an order of magnitude different from what has been historically documented. The puzzle cannot be dismissed lightly, since much of our economic intuition is based on the very class of models that fall short so dramatically when confronted with financial data. It underscores the failure of paradigms central to financial and economic modeling to capture the characteristic that appears to make stocks comparatively so risky. Hence, the viability of using this class of models for any quantitative assessment, say, for instance, to gauge the welfare implications of alternative stabilization policies, is thrown open to question. For this reason, over the last 20 years or so, attempts to resolve the puzzle have become a major research impetus in finance and economics. Several generalizations of key features of the Mehra and Prescott (1985) model have been proposed to better reconcile observations with theory. These include alternative assumptions on preferences,40 modified probability distributions to admit rare but disastrous events,41 survival
40 For example, Abel (1990), Bansal and Yaron (2004), Benartzi and Thaler (1995), Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (2001), Campbell and Cochrane (1999), Constantinides (1990), Epstein and Zin (1991), and Ferson and Constantinides (1991). 41 See Rietz (1988) and Mehra and Prescott (1988).
Rajnish Mehra and Edward C. Prescott
25
bias,42 incomplete markets,43 and market imperfections.44 They also include attempts at modeling limited participation of consumers in the stock market45 and problems of temporal aggregation.46 We examine some of the research efforts to resolve the puzzle47 in the next two chapters.
References Abel, A. B. Stock prices under time varying dividend risk: An exact solution in an infinite horizon general equilibrium model. Journal of Monetary Economics 22 (1988): 375–394. Abel, A. B. Asset prices under habit formation and catching up with the Joneses. American Economic Review, Papers and Protocols 80 (1990): 38–42. Abel, A. B., N. G. Mankiw, L. H. Summers, and R. J. Zeckhauser. Assessing dynamic efficiency: Theory and evidence. Review of Economic Studies 56 (1989): 1–20. Aiyagari, S. R., and M. Gertler. Asset returns with transactions costs and uninsured individual risk. Journal of Monetary Economics 27 (1991): 311–331. Alvarez, F., and U. Jermann. Asset pricing when risk sharing is limited by default. Econometrica 48 (2000): 775–797. Attanasio, O. P., J. Banks, and S. Tanner. Asset holding and consumption volatility. Journal of Political Economy 110(4) (2002): 771–792. Auerbach, A. J., and L. J. Kotlikoff. Dynamic Fiscal Policy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1987). Azeredo, F. Essays on aggregate economics and finance. Doctoral dissertation, University of California, Santa Barbara (2007). Bansal, R., and J. W. Coleman. A monetary explanation of the equity premium, term premium and risk-free rate puzzles. Journal of Political Economy 104 (1996): 1135–1171. Bansal, R., and A. Yaron. Risks for the long run: A potential resolution of asset pricing puzzles. Journal of Finance 59 (2004): 1481–1509. Basak, S., and D. Cuoco. An equilibrium model with restricted stock market participation. The Review of Financial Studies 11 (1998): 309–341. Becker, G. S., and R. J. Barro. A reformulation of the economic theory of fertility. Quarterly Journal of Economics 103(1) (1988): 1–25. Benartzi, S., and R. H. Thaler. Myopic loss aversion and the equity premium puzzle. Quarterly Journal of Economics 110 (1995): 73–92. Bewley, T. F. Thoughts on tests of the intertemporal asset pricing model. Working paper, Northwestern University (1982). Billingsley, P. Probability and Measure. John Wiley and Sons, New York (1995). Boldrin, M., L. J. Christiano, and J. D. M. Fisher. Habit persistence, asset returns, and the business cycle. American Economic Review 91 (2001): 149–166. 42 See
Brown, Goetzmann, and Ross (1995). example, Bewley (1982), Brav, Constantinides, and Geczy (2002), Constantinides and Duffie (1996), Heaton and Lucas (1997, 2000), Lucas (1994), Mankiw (1986), Mehra and Prescott (1985), Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004), and Telmer (1993). 44 For example, Aiyagari and Gertler (1991), Alvarez and Jerman (2000), Bansal and Coleman (1996), Basak and Cuoco (1998), Constantinides, Donaldson, and Mehra (2002), Danthine, Donaldson, and Mehra (1992), Daniel and Marshall (1997), He and Modest (1995), Heaton and Lucas (1996), Luttmer (1996), McGrattan and Prescott (2000), Sethi (1997), and Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2006). 45 Attanasio, Banks, and Tanner (2002), Brav, Constantinides, and Geczy (2002), Mankiw and Zeldes (1991), and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002). 46 Gabaix and Laibson (2001), Heaton (1995), and Lynch (1996). 47 The reader is also referred to the excellent surveys by Kocherlakota (1996), Cochrane (1997), and Campbell (1999, 2001).
43 For
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Hansen, L. P., and K. J. Singleton. Generalized instrumental variables estimation of nonlinear rational expectations models. Econometrica 50 (1982): 1269–1288. Hansen, L. P., and K. J. Singleton. Stochastic consumption, risk aversion and the intertemporal behavior of asset returns. Journal of Political Economy 91 (1983): 249–268. He, H., and D. M. Modest. Market frictions and consumption-based asset pricing. Journal of Political Economy 103 (1995): 94–117. Heaton, J. An empirical investigation of asset pricing with temporally dependent preference specifications. Econometrica 66 (1995): 681–717. Heaton, J., and D. J. Lucas. Evaluating the effects of incomplete markets on risk sharing and asset pricing. Journal of Political Economy 104 (1996): 443–487. Heaton, J., and D. J. Lucas. Market frictions, savings behavior and portfolio choice. Journal of Macroeconomic Dynamics 1 (1997): 76–101. Heaton, J. C., and D. J. Lucas. Portfolio choice and asset prices: The importance of entrepreneurial risk. Journal of Finance 55 (2000). Homer, S. A History of Interest Rates. Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, NJ (1963). Ibbotson Associates. Stocks, bonds, bills and inflation. 2005 Yearbook. Ibbotson Associates, Chicago (2006). Kandel, S., and R. F. Stambaugh. Asset returns and intertemporal preferences. Journal of Monetary Economics 27 (1991): 39–71. Kendrick, J. W. Productivity trends in the United States, NBER 71 (1961). Kocherlakota, N. R. The equity premium: It’s still a puzzle. Journal of Economic Literature 34 (1996): 42–71. Kuznets, S. S. Commodity Flow and Capital Formation, NBER 34, New York (1938). Kuznets, S. S. National Product since 1869, National Bureau of Economic Research Number 46, New York (1946). Kuznets, S. S. Capital in the American economy: Its formation and financing studies in capital formation and Financing, NBER (1961). Kydland, F., and E. C. Prescott. Time to build and aggregate fluctuations. Econometrica 50 (1982): 1345– 1371. LeRoy, S. H., and J. Werner. Principles of Financial Economics. Cambridge University Press, New York (2001). Litterman, R. B. Bayesian procedure for forecasting with vector auto-regressions. Working paper, MIT (1980). Lucas, D. J. Asset pricing with undiversifiable risk and short sales constraints: Deepening the equity premium puzzle. Journal of Monetary Economics 34 (1994): 325–341. Lucas, R. E., Jr. Asset prices in an exchange economy. Econometrica 46 (1978): 1429–1445. Luttmer, E. G. J. Asset pricing in economies with frictions. Econometrica 64 (1996): 1439–1467. Lynch, A. W. Decision frequency and synchronization across agents: Implications for aggregate consumption and equity returns. Journal of Finance 51 (1996): 1479–1497. Macaulay, F. R. The movements of interest rates, bond yields and stock prices in the U.S. since 1856. National Bureau of Economic Research, New York (1938). Mankiw, N. G. The equity premium and the concentration of aggregate shocks. Journal of Financial Economics 17 (1986): 211–219. Mankiw, N. G., and S. P. Zeldes. The consumption of stockholders and nonstockholders. Journal of Financial Economics 29 (1991): 97–112. McGrattan, E. R., and E. C. Prescott. Is the stock market overvalued? Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review (2000). McGrattan, E. R., and E. C. Prescott. Average debt and equity returns: Puzzling? American Economic Review 93 (2003): 392–397. McGrattan, E. R., and E. C. Prescott. Taxes, regulations, and the value of U.S. and U.K. corporations. Review of Economic Studies 92 (2005): 767–796. Mehra, R. On the existence and representation of equilibrium in an economy with growth and nonstationary consumption. International Economic Review 29 (1988): 131–135. Mehra, R. On the volatility of stock prices: An exercise in quantitative theory. International Journal of Systems Science 29 (1998): 1203–1211.
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APPENDIX A Suppose the distribution of returns period by period is independently and identically distributed. Then, as the number of periods tends to infinity, the future value of the investment, computed at the arithmetic average of returns, tends to the expected value of the investment with probability 1. To see this, let T
VT = Π (1 + rt ) , t=1
where rt is the asset return in period t and VT is the terminal value of $1 at time T . Then
T
E(VT ) = E Π (1 + rt ) . i=1
Since the rt s are assumed to be uncorrelated, we have T
E(VT ) = Π E (1 + rt ) i=1
or T
E(VT ) = Π (1 + E (rt )) . i=1
Let the arithmetic average AA =
T 1 rt . T t=t
Then, by the strong law of large numbers (Theorem 22.1, Billingsley (1995)), T
E(VT ) → Π (1 + AA) i=1
as T → ∞
or E(VT ) → (1 + AA)T as the number of periods T becomes large.
APPENDIX B The Original Analysis of the Equity Premium Puzzle In this appendix we present our original analysis of the equity premium puzzle. Needless to say, it draws heavily from Mehra and Prescott (1985).
30
Chapter 1
•
The Equity Premium: ABCs
The Economy, Asset Prices and Returns We employ a variation of Lucas’ (1978) pure exchange model. Since per capita consumption has grown over time, we assume that the growth rate of the endowment follows a Markov process. This is in contrast to the assumption in Lucas’ model that the endowment level follows a Markov process. Our assumption, which requires an extension of competitive equilibrium theory, enables us to capture the non-stationarity in the consumption series associated with the large increase in per capita consumption that occurred in the 1889–1978 period. The economy we consider was judiciously selected so that the joint process governing the growth rates in aggregate per capita consumption and asset prices would be stationary and easily determined. The economy has a single representative “stand-in” household. This unit orders its preferences over random consumption paths by ∞ t E0 β U (ct ) , 0 < β < 1, (1B) t=0
where ct is per capita consumption, β is the subjective time discount factor, E{·} is the expectation operator conditional upon information available at time zero (which denotes the present time), and U : R+ → R is the increasing concave utility function. To ensure that the equilibrium return process is stationary, we further restrict the utility function to be of the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) class U (c, α) =
c1−α − 1 , 1−α
0 < α < ∞.
(2B)
The parameter α measures the curvature of the utility function. When α is equal to one, the utility function is defined to be the logarithmic function, which is the limit of the above function as α approaches one. We assume there is one productive unit that produces output yt in period t, which is the period dividend. There is one equity share with price pt , that is competitively traded; it is a claim to the stochastic process {yt }. The growth rate in yt is subject to a Markov chain; that is, yt+1 = xt+1 yt ,
(3B)
where xt+1 ∈ {λ1 , . . . , λn } is the growth rate, and Pr{xt+1 = λj ; xt = λi} = φij .
(4B)
It is also assumed that the Markov chain is ergodic. The λi s are all positive and y0 > 0. The random variable yt is observed at the beginning of the period, at which time dividend payments are made. All securities are traded ex-dividend. We also assume that the matrix A with elements aij ≡ βφij λ1−α for i, j = 1, . . . , n is stable; that is, lim Am as j m → ∞ is zero. In Mehra (1988) it is shown that this is necessary and sufficient for the expected utility to exist if the stand-in household consumes yt every period. The paper
31
Rajnish Mehra and Edward C. Prescott
also defines and establishes the existence of a Debreu (1954) competitive equilibrium with a price system having a dot product representation under this condition. Next we formulate expressions for the equilibrium time t price of the equity share and the risk-free bill. We follow the convention of pricing securities ex-dividend or ex-interest payments at time t, in terms of the time t consumption good. For any security with process {ds } on payments, its price in period t is ∞ s−t U (ys )ds , (5B) β Pt = Et U (yt ) s=t+1
as the equilibrium consumption is the process {ys} and the equilibrium price system has a dot product representation. The dividend payment process for the equity share in this economy is {ys}. Consequently, using the fact that U (c) = c−α , Pte = P e (xt , yt) ∞ α s−t yt ys |xt , yt . =E β ysα s=t+1
(6B)
The variables xt and yt are sufficient relative to the entire history of shocks up to, and including, time t for predicting the subsequent evolution of the economy. They thus constitute legitimate state variables for the model. Since ys = yt xt+1 . . . xs , the price of the equity security is homogeneous of degree one in yt , which is the current endowment of the consumption good. As the equilibrium values of the economies being studied are time-invariant functions of the state (xt , yt ), the subscript t can be dropped. This is accomplished by redefining the state to be the pair (c, i), if yt = c and xt = λi . With this convention, the price of the equity share from (6B) satisfies pe (c, i) = β
n
φij (λj c)−α [pe (λj c, j) + λj c]cα .
(7B)
j=1
Using the result that pe (c, i) is homogeneous of degree one in c, we represent this function as pe (c, i) = wi c,
(8B)
where wi is a constant. Making this substitution in (7B) and dividing by c yields wi = β
n
(1−α)
φij λj
(wj + 1)
for i = 1, . . . , n.
(9B)
j=1
This is a system of n linear equations in n unknowns. The assumption that guaranteed the existence of equilibrium guarantees the existence of a unique positive solution to this system.
32
Chapter 1 • The Equity Premium: ABCs
The period return if the current state is (c, i) and next period state (λj c, j) is pe (λj c, j) + λj c − pe (c, i) pe (c, i) λj (wj + 1) − 1. = wi
rije =
(10B)
The equity’s expected period return if the current state is i is Rie =
n
φij rije .
(11B)
j=1
Capital letters are used to denote the expected return. With the subscript i, it is the expected return conditional upon the current state being (c, i). Without this subscript, it is the expected return with respect to the stationary distribution. The superscript indicates the type of security. The other security considered is the one-period real bill or riskless asset, which pays one unit of the consumption good next period with certainty. From (6B), f
pi = pf (c, i) n U (λj c) =β φij U (c) j=1 =β φij λ−α j .
(12B)
The certain return on this riskless security is 1
f
Ri =
f pi
(13B)
−1
when the current state is (c, i). As mentioned earlier, the statistics that are probably most robust to the modeling specification are the means over time. Let π ∈ Rn be the vector of stationary probabilities on i. This exists because the chain on i has been assumed to be ergodic. The vector π is the solution to the system of equations π = φT π, with n
πi = 1
and
φT = {φji}.
i=1
The expected returns on the equity and the risk-free security are, respectively, Re =
n i=1
πi Rie
and
Rf =
n i=1
f
πi Ri .
(14B)
33
Rajnish Mehra and Edward C. Prescott
Time sample averages will converge in probability to these values given the ergodicity of the Markov chain. The risk premium for equity is, Re − Rf , a parameter that is used in the test. The parameters defining preferences are α and β, while the parameters defining technology are the elements of [φij ] and [λi ]. Our approach is to assume two states for the Markov chain and to restrict the process as follows: λ1 = 1 + μ + δ,
λ2 = 1 + μ − δ,
φ11 = φ22 = φ,
φ12 = φ21 = (1 − φ).
The parameters μ, φ, and δ now define the technology. We require δ > 0 and 0 < φ < 1. This particular parameterization was selected because it permitted us to independently vary the average growth rate of output by changing μ, the variability of consumption by altering δ, and the serial correlation of growth rates by adjusting φ. The parameters were selected so that the average growth rate of per capita consumption, the standard deviation of the growth rate of per capita consumption, and the first-order serial correlation of this growth rate, all with respect to the model’s stationary distribution, matched the sample values for the U.S. economy between 1889–1978. The sample values for the U.S. economy were 0.018, 0.036, and −0.14, respectively. The resulting parameters’ values were μ = 0.018, δ = 0.036, and φ = 0.43. Given these values, the nature of the test is to search for parameters α and β for which the model’s averaged risk-free rate and equity risk premium match those observed for the U.S. economy over this 90-year period. The parameter α, which measures people’s willingness to substitute consumption between successive yearly time periods, is an important one in many fields of economics. As mentioned in the text, there is a wealth of evidence from various studies that the coefficient of risk aversion α is a small number, certainly less than 10. A number of these studies are documented in Mehra and Prescott (1985). This is an important restriction, for with a large α virtually any pair of average equity and risk-free returns can be obtained by making small changes in the process on consumption. Given the estimated process on consumption, Figure 1B depicts the set of values of the average risk-free rate and equity risk premium, which are both consistent with the model and result in average real risk-free rates between zero and four percent. These are values that can be obtained by varying preference parameters α between 0 and 10 and β between 0 and 1. The observed real return of 0.80 percent and equity premium of 6 percent are clearly inconsistent with the predictions of the model. The largest premium obtainable with the model is 0.35 percent, which is not close to the observed value. An advantage of our approach is that we can easily test the sensitivity of our results to such distributional assumptions. With α less than 10, we found that our results were essentially unchanged for very different consumption processes, provided that the mean and variances of growth rates equaled the historically observed values. We use this fact in motivating the discussion in the text.
34
Chapter 1 • The Equity Premium: ABCs
Average Risk Premia (Percent)
R e2R f
2
1 Admissible Region
0
1
2
3
Rf
4
Average Risk-Free Rate (Percent)
FIGURE 1B 0.3
Equity Premium (Percent)
0.25
Set of admissible average equity risk premia and real returns.
correl. 5 20.14 correl. 5 0.45
0.2 0.15 0.1 0.05 0
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
Risk-Free Rate (Percent)
FIGURE 2B
Set of admissible average equity risk premia and real returns.
As mentioned earlier in the text, the serial correlation of the growth rate of consumption for the period 1930–2004 is 0.45. Figure 2B shows the resulting feasible region in this case (we have also included the region from Figure 1B for comparison). The conclusion that the premium for bearing non-diversifiable aggregate risk is small remains unchanged.
35
Rajnish Mehra and Edward C. Prescott
APPENDIX C Expanding the set of technologies in a pure exchange, Arrow–Debreu economy to admit capital accumulation and production as in Brock (1979), Prescott and Mehra (1980), or Donaldson and Mehra (1984) does not increase the set of joint equilibrium processes on consumption and asset prices. Since the set of equilibria in a production company is a subset of those in an exchange economy, it follows immediately that if the equity premium cannot be accounted for in an exchange economy, modifying the technology to incorporate production will not alter this conclusion.48 To see this, let θ denote preferences, τ technologies, E the set of the exogenous processes on the aggregate consumption good, P the set of technologies with production opportunities, and m(θ, τ) the set of equilibria for economy (θ, τ). Theorem ∪ m(θ, τ) ⊃ ∪ m(θ, τ)
τεE
τεP
Proof. For θ0 εθ and τ0 εP , let (a0 , c0 ) be a joint equilibrium process on asset prices and consumption. A necessary condition for equilibrium is that the asset prices a0 be consistent with c0 , the optimal consumption for the household with preferences θ0 . Thus, if (a0 , c0 ) is an equilibrium, then a0 = g(c0 , θ), where g is defined by the first-order necessary conditions for household maximization. This functional relation must hold for all equilibria, regardless of whether they are for a pure exchange or a production economy. Let (a0 , c0 ) be an equilibrium for some economy (θ0 , τ0 ) with τ0 εP . Consider the pure exchange economy with θ1 = θ0 and τ1 = c0 . Our contention is that (a0 , c0 ) is a joint equilibrium process for asset prices and consumption for the pure exchange economy (θ1 , τ1 ). For all pure exchange economies, the equilibrium consumption process is τ, so c1 = τ1 = c0 , given that more is preferred to less. If c0 is the equilibrium process, the corresponding asset price must be g(c0 , θ1 ). But θ1 = θ0 so g(c0 , θ1 ) = g(c0 , θ0 ) = a0 . Hence, a0 is the equilibrium for the pure exchange economy (θ1 , τ1 ), proving the theorem.
APPENDIX D Estimating the Equity Risk Premium Versus Estimating the Risk Aversion Parameter Estimating or measuring the relative risk aversion parameter using statistical tools is very different than estimating the equity risk premium. Mehra and Prescott (1985), as 48 The
discussion below is based on Mehra (1998).
36
Chapter 1 • The Equity Premium: ABCs
discussed earlier, use an extension of Lucas’ (1978) asset pricing model to estimate how much of the historical difference in yields on Treasury bills and corporate equity is a premium for bearing aggregate risk. Crucial to their analysis is their use of micro observations to restrict the value of the risk aversion parameter. They did not estimate either the risk aversion parameter or the discount rate parameters. Mehra and Prescott (1985) reject extreme risk aversion based upon observations on individual behavior. These observations include the small size of premia for jobs with uncertain income and the limited amount of insurance against idiosyncratic income risk. Another observation is that people with limited access to capital markets make investments in human capital that result in very uneven consumption over time. A sharp estimate for the magnitude of the risk aversion parameter comes from macroeconomics. The evidence is that the basic growth model, when restricted to be consistent with the growth facts, generates business cycle fluctuations if and only if this risk aversion parameter is near zero. (This corresponds to the log case in standard usage.) The point is that the risk aversion parameter comes up in a wide variety of observations at both the household and the aggregate level and is not found to be large. For all values of the risk aversion coefficient less than 10, which is an upper bound number for this parameter, Mehra and Prescott find that a premium for bearing aggregate risk accounts for little of the historic equity premium. This finding has stood the test of time. Another tradition is to use consumption and stock market data to estimate the degree of relative risk aversion parameter and the discount factor parameter. This is what Grossman and Shiller report they did in their American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings article (1981, p. 226). In a paper in which they develop “a method for estimating nonlinear rational expectations models directly from stochastic Euler equations,” Hansen and Singleton illustrate their methods by estimating the risk aversion parameter and the discount factor using stock dividend consumption prices (1981, p. 1269). What the work of Grossman and Shiller (Ibid.) and Hansen and Singleton (1982, 1983) establish is that using consumption and stock market data and assuming frictionless capital markets is a bad way to estimate the risk aversion and discount factor parameters. It is analogous to estimating the force of gravity near the earth’s surface by dropping a feather from the top of the Leaning Tower of Pisa, under the assumption that friction is zero. A tradition related to statistical estimation is to statistically test whether the stochastic Euler equation arising from the stand-in household’s intertemporal optimization holds. Both Grossman and Shiller (1983) and Hansen and Singleton (1982) reject this relation. The fact that this relation is inconsistent with the U.S. time-series data is no reason to conclude that the model economy used by Mehra and Prescott to estimate how much of the historical equity premium is a premium for bearing aggregate risk is not a good one for that purpose. Returning to the analogy from physics, it would be silly to reject Newtonian mechanics as a useful tool for drawing scientific inference because the distance traveled by the feather did not satisfy 1/2gt2 .
CHAPTER 2
Risk-Based Explanations of the Equity Premium John Donaldson Columbia University and
Rajnish Mehra University of California, Santa Barbara, and NBER
Introduction 1. Alternative Preference Structures 1.1. Preliminaries 1.2. Coincidence of Risk and Time Preferences in CRRA utility 1.3. Separating Risk and Time Preferences: Epstein–Zin and others 1.4. Variation in the CRRA and EIS 1.5. Habit Formation 1.6. Behavioral Models 1.7. Beyond One Good and a Representative Agent 2. Production Economies 3. Disaster Events and Survivorship Bias 4. Market Incompleteness and Trading Frictions 4.1. Restricted Participation 5. Model Uncertainty 6. Concluding Comments References
39 41 41 44 46 52 55 61 71 78 81 86 86 91 93 94
We are grateful to Francisco Azeredo, Ravi Bansal, George Constantinides, Vito Gala, Alok Khare, and Edward Prescott for their comments on earlier drafts of this chapter.
HANDBOOK OF THE EQUITY RISK PREMIUM c 2008 by John B. Donaldson and Rajnish Mehra. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved. Copyright
37
38
Chapter 2 • Risk-Based Explanations of the Equity Premium
Abstract This essay reviews the family of models that seek to provide aggregate risk-based explanations for the empirically observed equity premium. Theories based on nonexpected utility preference structures, limited financial market participation, model uncertainty, and the small probability of enormous losses are detailed. We impose the additional requirements that candidate models yield consistent intertemporal portfolio choice and that a representative agent can be constructed that is independent of the underlying heterogeneous economy’s initial wealth distribution. While many models are able to replicate a wide variety of financial statistics including the premium, few satisfy these latter criteria as well. JEL Classification: D50, D52, E30, E32, G00, G11, G12, D90, D91, D10, D11 Keywords: equity premium puzzle, habit persistence, borrowing constraints, limited participation, incomplete markets, idiosyncratic income shocks, life-cycle savings, non-expected utility preferences, prospect theory, rank-dependent, expected utility, disaster events, survivorship bias
John Donaldson and Rajnish Mehra
39
INTRODUCTION Mehra and Prescott (1985) demonstrated that the empirical equity premium (the return earned on a well-diversified “market portfolio” in excess of that earned by a risk-free T-bill) is an order of magnitude greater than can be rationalized as a premium for bearing non-diversifiable risk in the context of the standard neoclassical representative agent paradigms of financial economics.1 Inevitably, the subsequent literature has principally focused on modifying the standard paradigm to generate much larger non-diversifiable premia.2 As a companion exercise, these efforts have adopted an ancillary goal of replicating the risk-free rate, rate of return volatilities, return autocorrelations, return cross correlations, and return correlations with consumption growth. In this chapter, we review this literature, which falls into four broad categories: 1. Preference-based theories: These theories seek to modify an agent’s preferences so that he is acutely sensitive in some way to poor consumption outcomes. Outcomes may be “poor” in either an absolute sense or in a relative sense vis-`a-vis some external benchmark, as in the habit formation literature. Illustrations sometimes require that agent preferences be defined over objects directly reflective of the agent’s portfolio experience, such as his recent gains or losses. While this latter feature is outside the standard expected utility construct, axiomatic foundations are nevertheless sometimes available. Section 1 of this essay focuses on these theories.3 2. Disaster scenarios: Researchers have also explored models where utility is of the standard CRRA variety, yet in which the worst outcomes are much more disastrous than the worst cases possible in the standard Mehra and Prescott (1985) context. Rietz (1988) and Barro (2006), in particular, fall into this category.4 Literatures 1 and 2 are dual to one another: either agents in the model must effectively be very sensitive to bad outcomes, or it is the outcomes themselves that must be very bad. 3. Trading frictions: Under either of the categories above, the premium will still be counterfactually small if agents can somehow insure against their worst consumption outcomes. Since the standard Mehra and Prescott (1985) representative agent construct is implicitly one of complete markets, perfect insurance opportunities are available in that context. Furthermore, for models parameterized to the per capita aggregate consumption process of the U.S. economy, agents do not find themselves in situations of extreme consumption risk. There must then 1 The following chapter (Mehra and Prescott (2008b)) surveys the literature on non-risk-based explanations of the equity premium. 2 Mehra and Prescott (1985) can match the premium with a very high CRRA. Alternatively, we can view the literature as seeking to match the premium (and other financial quantities) with a low CRRA. 3 For example, Abel (1990), Bansal and Yaron (2004), Benartzi and Thaler (1995), Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (2001), Campbell and Cochrane (1999), Constantinides (1990), Epstein and Zin (1991), and Ferson and Constantinides (1991). 4 See also Mehra and Prescott (1988) and Brown, Goetzman, and Ross (1995).
40
Chapter 2 • Risk-Based Explanations of the Equity Premium
be added features to the model, which deny at least some of the agents with risky consumption profiles access to a full set of state claims. Incomplete markets (whether in the form of restricted financial market participation for some agents or in the form of allowing trade in only a restricted set of assets) and collateral constraints are possibilities that have been explored.5,6,7 4. Model uncertainty: Nearly all the asset pricing literature presumes rational expectations; the relevant agents in the economy know the true probability distributions governing the relevant state variables: dividends, wages, etc. The model uncertainty literature presumes that this is not the case; it thereby introduces another source of uncertainty, a feature that gives rise to an additional risk premium for equity securities. Barrillas et al. (2006) and Weitzman (2007) are cases in point. We do not address this entire literature in full detail, as many of the topics are dealt with in specific chapters of the present volume. Category 3, in particular, is thoroughly considered in the essays by Constantinides and by Heaton and Lucas, particularly as regards classical incompleteness (too few securities are traded).8 We thus consider only the impact of borrowing constraints. Loss aversion and narrow framing are carefully considered in the Barberis and Huang chapter.9 As it constitutes a preference-related modification, we consider it in the present chapter but in an abbreviated form. As a field of study, model uncertainty as applied to the premium is in its infancy. While potentially very fruitful, the literature is small and our discussion will be correspondingly brief. Most research has followed the preference route, and this is the literature that we will emphasize.10 Whenever possible, we cast the discussion within the original Mehra and Prescott (1985) discrete-time representative agent setting.
5 For incomplete market formulations, see Bewley (1982), Brav, Constantinides and Geczy (2002), Constantinides and Duffie (1996), Heaton and Lucas (1997, 2000), Krebs (2000), Lucas (1994), Lustig and van Nieuwerburgh (2005), Mankiw (1986), Mehra and Prescott (1985), Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2007), and Telmer (1993). 6 For restricted participation and collateral constraints, see Aiyagari and Gertler (1991), Alvarez and Jerman (2000), Bansal and Coleman (1996), Basak and Cuoco (1998), Constantinides, Donaldson, and Mehra (2002), Daniel and Marshall (1997), Danthine, Donaldson, and Mehra (1992), He and Modest (1995), Heaton and Lucas (1996), and Luttmer (1996), McGrattan and Prescott (2001), and Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004). 7 Attanasio, Banks, and Tanner (2002), Brav, Constantinides, and Geczy (2002), Brav and Geczy (1995), Mankiw and Zeldes (1991), and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) are models that also incorporate restricted participation. 8 Constantinides (2008) and Heaton and Lucas (2008). 9 Barberis and Huang (2008). 10 Gabaix and Laibson (2001) and Heaton (1995). The reader is also referred to the excellent surveys by Kocherlakota (1996), Cochrane (1997), Campbell (2001, 2003), and DeLong and Magin (2007), preliminary draft. These papers review the proposed explanations for the magnitude of the premium, and the associated models. For an up-to-date international perspective on the empirical magnitude of the premium, see Dimson, Marsh, and Staunton (2008). Goetzmann and Ibbotson (2008) review the conceptual issues in its measurement over the long term.
John Donaldson and Rajnish Mehra
41
1. ALTERNATIVE PREFERENCE STRUCTURES 1.1. Preliminaries The focus of this section is to assess the extent to which plausible preference structures alone can rationalize the basic stylized facts as they relate to asset returns and the equity premium. The analysis in the previous chapter shows that the isoelastic CRRA preferences used in Mehra and Prescott (1985) can be made consistent with the observed equity premium only if the coefficient of relative risk aversion is implausibly large. Before proceeding with our discussion of alternative preference structures, we examine in detail some especially attractive features of the CRRA class, which makes it the “preference function of choice” in modern finance and macroeconomics. These features, while desirable in their own right for logical or empirical reasons, also constitute common properties that any reasonable preference specification should display. (i) Equilibrium Return Stationarity CRRA preferences result in a stationary equilibrium return process. This property is readily demonstrated in the context of the Mehra and Prescott (1985) model, where both the equity return and the return on the risk-free asset follow stationary processes, despite the fact that the level of output in the economy is growing over time and hence is itself non-stationary.11 This is consistent with the statistical evidence on the time series of asset returns over the past 100 years. Asset returns appear to be stationary, although the level of stock prices and the magnitude of aggregate dividends have grown enormously. Any serious preference structure should yield equilibrium return series with this feature. (ii) Aggregation Actual asset prices are formed via the trading behavior of large numbers of heterogeneous investors as each attempts to maintain his individual optimal portfolio composition, given his information on the future distribution of returns. Equilibria in such economies are difficult to characterize. If financial markets are competitive and complete, and agent preferences are expected utility, there will, in general, exist, by construction, a representative (single-agent) economy with the same aggregate consumption series as the heterogeneous agent economy and the same asset price functions. These economies are comparatively easy to analyze. In addition, if the representative agent can be constructed in a manner that is independent of the underlying heterogeneous agent economy’s initial wealth distribution, we say the economy displays aggregation. Aggregation (vis-`a-vis the existence of a representative agent) is the stronger, more restrictive, and more desirable property. It implies that assets may be priced in the representative agent economy without knowledge of the wealth distribution in the 11 See
Eqs. (8)–(11) in Mehra and Prescott (1985) or Appendix B of Chapter 1 of this volume.
42
Chapter 2 • Risk-Based Explanations of the Equity Premium
underlying heterogeneous agent counterpart. Under aggregation, results derived in the representative agent economy are general and robust. Aggregation also permits the use of the representative agent for welfare comparisons.12 In what follows, we provide a brief description of how the representative agent is constructed and then point out the additional structure imposed by aggregation. Consider an exchange economy of k = 1, 2, . . . K agents. We make the following notational identifications: ctk represents agent k’s period t consumption, while qte and qtb , respectively, denote the period t prices of the equity and one period risk-free security. The period t price of a state claim to one unit of consumption in period t + j, if state θ θ occurs, is denoted by qt,j . By analogy, the corresponding period t desired holdings of e,k b,k θ,k these securities by agent k are, respectively, zt , zt , and zt,j . For notational simplicity, we have suppressed the dependence of these quantities and prices on the period t state. With this notation in mind, the period t decision problem faced by an arbitrary agent k is ∞ max E β t u ctk t=0
subject to e,k
b,k
ctk + zt+1 qte + zt+1 qtb +
∞ j=1
e,k e qt
θ,k
θ zt+1,j qt,j ≤ zt
∞ b,k θ,k θ,k θ + Yt + zt + zt + zt,j qt,j .
θ
j=1
θ
In equilibrium, both goods and asset markets must clear: K
ctk = Yt ,
k=1 K
e,k
zt = 1,
k=1 K
b,k
zt
= 0,13
k=1 K
θ,k
zt,j = 0 for all j, θ.
k=1
Under competitive market conditions, equilibrium is Pareto optimal. This means the equilibrium consumption allocations above are also the solution to
12 Suppose, alternatively, that aggregation fails. Then each possible initial wealth distribution, via its associated representative agent, will display its own asset pricing characteristics. No general statements may be made. 13 The assumption that bonds are in zero net supply is not innocuous, although it is customary in the literature. In particular, it allows representative agent models to match the risk-free rate more easily. For a recent perspective see Gomes and Michaelides (2006).
43
John Donaldson and Rajnish Mehra
max E
K ∞
λk u ctk
t=0 k=1
subject to K
1
K
ctk ≤ Yt ,
k=1
in general directly depend on the initial endowment where the weights λ , . . . , λ
θ,k b,1 b,K e,1 e,K , k = 1, . . . , K . z0,j and distributions z0 , . . . , z0 , z0 , . . . , z0 θ,j For the given λ1 , . . . , λK we define the utility function of the representative K K
agent as u(Ct ) = λk u ctk , where Ct = Yt = ctk .14 These weights correspond to k=1
k=1
the inverses of the Lagrange multipliers on the consumers’ decentralized problems. Roughly speaking, consumers with greater endowments are accorded higher λs. The equilibrium stock and bond prices in the heterogeneous agent economy are then identical to those arising in a homogeneous agent economy where a “representative agent,” constructed as above, maximizes15 ∞ t E0 β u (Ct ) , 0 < β < 1, t=0
subject to
Ct + zet+1 qte + zbt+1 qtb ≤ qte + Yt zet + zbt ,
where, in equilibrium, zet = 1 and zbt = 0 ∀t. Under this equivalence, the representative agent is a stand-in for the weighted average of the economy’s members. As we have noted, the weights and thus the asset price series itself will, in general, depend on the initial wealth distribution. This is an enormously complicating feature as it suggests that asset prices in any period are in significant ways dependent on wealth distributions many years previously. If all agents in the decentralized economy have preferences of the CRRA type, however, the weights 1 multi-agent λ , . . . , λK will be independent of the initial wealth distribution, a fact that makes the use of representative agent models for asset pricing exercises more plausible. More formally, aggregation requires that the period utility function must be of the 1−1/γ k , where the α k are parameters form u ctk = e−α ct or u ctk = (γ/γ − 1) α k + γctk unique to agent k. To emphasize this point again, even if the individual preferences assume neither of these forms (but are still expected utility), there will continue to 14 We use capital letters to denote economy wide aggregates. For representative agent economies, individual and aggregate quantities coincide, so we use the aggregate notation in those contexts. In situations of clear agent heterogeneity, for example in OLG models, we denote individual agent quantities by lower case variables. 15 See Prescott and Mehra (1980) for an early articulation of this and Constantinides (1982) for a formal analysis of this decentralization perspective.
44
Chapter 2 • Risk-Based Explanations of the Equity Premium
exist a representative agent whose preferences are the weighted average of the individual agent preferences. However, they cannot be used to make any statements about “off-equilibrium” paths.16 (iii) Time-Consistent Planning Time consistency implies that the optimal future-contingent portfolio decisions made at t = 0 remain the optimal decisions even as uncertainty resolves and intermediate consumption is experienced. When considering multi-period decision problems, time consistency is a natural property to propose. In its absence, one would observe portfolio rebalancing not motivated by any event or information flow but rather simply motivated by the (unobservable) changes in the investor’s preference ordering as time passed. Asset trades would be motivated by endogenous and unobservable preference characteristics and would thus be mysterious and unexplainable. To understand the utility restrictions that time consistency imposes, let us consider a two-period context, t = 0, 1, where any one of s ∈ S possible states may occur the next period. Denote by c1 (s) the investor’s consumption at date t = 1 contingent on state “s” occurring. Johnsen and Donaldson (1985) demonstrate that if the overall (both periods’ consumption) utility function is to exhibit time-consistent planning, there must exist continuous and monotone increasing functions f ( ) and {us ( ) : s ∈ S} such that u c0 , c1 s : s ∈ S = f c0 , us c0 , c1 s : s ∈ S , where us (c0 , c1 (s)) is the state s contingent utility function. The recursive preference structure of Kreps and Porteus (1978), which makes explicit the preference for the timing of uncertainty resolution, is closely related. Note that under this formulation, preferences in any future state sˆ may be conditioned on consumption today c0 , but not on consumption planned for states s = sˆ that, de facto, have not occurred. In effect, the utility function must be of a form such that utility representations in future states can be recursively nested as individual arguments of the overall utility function, a condition fulfilled by the expected utility representation. We are thus, assuredly, in a time-consistent planning context under the expected utility assumption.17
1.2. Coincidence of Risk and Time Preferences in CRRA utility One restriction imposed by the CRRA class of preferences is that the coefficient of risk aversion is rigidly linked to the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. One is the reciprocal of the other. If an individual is averse to variation of consumption across different states at a particular point of time, then this feature implies he will 16 Within the context of seeking to replicate the equity premium, the statement is intended to remind the reader that, without aggregation, the asset pricing properties may become unique to the particular underlying initial wealth distribution. As a result, the same asset pricing results may not apply across various initial wealth distributions and associated representative agents. No statements of any generality can be made. 17 Time-consistent planning is satisfied in the Mehra and Prescott (1985) setup, because they assume an expected utility preference representation, in addition to the CRRA period utility specification.
45
John Donaldson and Rajnish Mehra
be averse to consumption variation over time as well. Since, on average, consumption is growing over time, the agents in the Mehra and Prescott (1985) setup have little incentive to save. The demand for bonds is low, and as a consequence the risk-free rate is counterfactually high. We illustrate this in the context of a deterministic two-period model where agents have preferences of the form u(c, γ) =
c1−γ 1−γ
and we solve the following problem: max u(c0 , γ) + β u(c1 , γ) subject to c0 + s0 ≤ Y0 , c1 ≤ s0 (1 + r). The solution is
1 β(1 + r)
1γ
=
Y0 − s0 (1 + r)s0
=
c0 . c1
As γ → ∞ (greater CRRA), c0 c1 → 1, the agent wishes for an extremely smooth consumption profile across time, a preference that is maintained under uncertainty. In a setting without uncertainty, this effectively means that the agent dislikes growth in his intertemporal consumption profile. In an asset pricing environment in which the representative agent’s consumption is growing exogenously through time (in order that it be properly calibrated), the agent will thus demand a very high rate of return in order to hold securities, the very possession of which increases his intertemporal consumption discrepancy. From the perspective of intertemporal consumption smoothing, the parameter 1/γ is referred to as the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (hereafter EIS). While indeed increasing the premium, increasing the CRRA has the counterfactual consequence of increasing mean returns to a level much in excess of what is observed, especially in the case of the risk-free security. In order to confirm these effects, let us explore the mean returns and volatilities for a number of CRRAs in the context of the basic Mehra and Prescott (1985) model and calibration.18 From Table 1 there is no doubt that increasing risk aversion increases the equilibrium equity premium: as the agent increasingly dislikes consumption variation of any sort, he must be paid an increasing premium in order to be willing to hold risky securities in preference to risk-free ones. It also improves the volatilities of the respective 18 This
model is described in greater detail in Appendix B to Chapter 1 (Mehra and Prescott (2008a)).
46
Chapter 2 • Risk-Based Explanations of the Equity Premium
TABLE 1i The Mehra and Prescott (1985) Model: Various CRRAs (Rates of return annualized in percent) U.S. Dataii
γ=2
γ=3
γ=5
γ=9 18.25
Ere
6.98
7.84
9.58
12.83
SDr e
16.54
4.34
4.99
6.36
9.24
Erf
0.80
7.56
9.10
11.85
15.93
SDr f
5.67
1.06
1.61
2.73
4.99
Erp
6.18
0.28
0.48
0.97
2.31
SDr p
16.67
4.20
4.70
5.69
7.61
i Same ii Data
calibration as Mehra and Prescott (1985), but for various γ. for the period 1889–1978.
return series. But the cost in other counterfactuals is very great. In particular, even as the CRRA is not yet absurdly large (γ = 9), the mean equity and risk-free returns become much too high, at, respectively, 18.25 and 15.93 percent annualized. This is a direct consequence of the single-preference parameter construct: in order to induce the representative agent to hold either type of security—an action that reduces the extent of his intertemporal consumption smoothing—security prices must fall to very low levels. Equivalently, the returns on all types of securities must be very high.19 There is no a priori reason that the desire to smooth consumption across states within a period and the desire to smooth consumption intertemporally should be tightly bound together. After all, one may speak of intertemporal consumption smoothing in a no-risk environment (in a context, say, of motivating savings behavior), and one may as well speak of risk aversion in an uncertain, atemporal environment. The situation considered previously requires that the same parameter describe the extent of sensitivity to both of these variations. Empirical studies seem to suggest, in fact, that investors are more desirous of a smooth intertemporal consumption stream than they are of an atemporal risk-free environment.
1.3. Separating Risk and Time Preferences: Epstein–Zin and others Epstein and Zin (1989, 1991, 2001) and Kreps and Porteus (1978) have emphasized a class of preferences that they term “generalized expected utility” (GEU), which 19 Mehra and Prescott’s (1985) calibration admits a small degree of negative autocorrelation in the growth rate of consumption. Azeredo (2007) argues that the Mehra and Prescott (1985) consumption autocorrelation estimates may be due to consumption data mismeasurement prior to 1929 and that mild positive autocorrelation is more accurate. If the stochastic process governing the growth rate of consumption is positively serial correlated, then as the risk aversion increases progressively, the equity premium eventually declines and turns negative. The earlier assertion that a higher CRRA leads to a larger premium is therefore consumption process-specific. The consumption process underlying most tables and model evaluations in this survey, however, is that of Mehra and Prescott (1985) in order to benchmark a basis of comparison.
47
John Donaldson and Rajnish Mehra
allows independent specification of the coefficient of risk aversion and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.20 These preferences separate time and risk preferences in a way that preserves the time-consistency property of the previous section.21 The basic notions involved in separating time and risk preferences are roughly summarized as follows: first characterize preferences over riskless consumption sequences (C0 , C1 , C2 , . . .) with a Koopmans’ (1960) time aggregation V ( ) where U (t C) = V (u(Ct ), U (t+1 C)).22,23
(1)
In the above expression, U ( ) is the overall utility representation, Ct is the period t consumption, u( ) is the period utility function, and (t C) denotes a continuous consumption sequence (Ct , Ct+1 . . .). This framework is then generalized to evaluate uncertain consumption sequences essentially by replacing the second argument in V (, ) by the period t certainty equivalent of the probability distribution over all possible consumption continuations. The resultant class of recursive preferences may be notationally characterized as Ut = V (u (Ct ), μt (Ut+1 )) ,
(2)
where μt ( ) describes the certainty equivalent function based on the conditional probability distribution over consumption sequences beginning in period t + 1. Such preferences are dynamically consistent. If the certainty equivalent is obtained via expected utility, the preferences fall into the Kreps and Porteus (1978) family. If it is obtained via a more general risk aggregator of the Chew–Deckel class (e.g., disappointment aversion risk preferences to be considered shortly), the preferences are said to be of the more general Epstein and Zin (1989) variety. These preferences have axiomatic underpinnings as well.
20 This preference construct has as its intellectual antecedents the time-consistent recursive preference structures of Kreps and Porteus (1978) and Johnsen and Donaldson (1985), and the Chew (1983, 1989) and Dekel (1986) preference generalization, which allows the independence assumption of classical expected utility to be relaxed. The latter is important for at least two reasons. First, there are widely reported violations of independence in the experimental literature; the Allais (1979) paradox is perhaps the most celebrated example. Second, this generalization has permitted the creation of preference structures that allow greater utility weight on bad outcomes than would arise in an expected utility context; see, in particular, Gul (1991). Not only is there empirical support for the hypothesis of high sensitivity to bad outcomes, but it is also a plausible feature that allows consumption-based asset pricing models to better replicate the premium. The reader is directed to Backus et al. (2004) for an elegant and detailed discussion of this preference class. 21 More recently, Kihlstrom (2007) proposes an alternative dynamic choice model. 22 We use the same notation as Backus et al. (2004) and Johnsen and Donaldson (1985). See the former study for a careful discussion of all the issues involved. 23 Preferences over deterministic consumption sequences that have the form (1) satisfy three reasonable properties (by construction): (i) history independence (preferences over consumption sequences (C0 , C1 , C2 , . . .) do not depend on prior consumption); (ii) future independence (preferences for period t consumption, Ct ) are independent of future consumption (t+1 C); and (iii) stationarity (preferences are the same at all dates).
48
Chapter 2 • Risk-Based Explanations of the Equity Premium
In their most basic analysis, Epstein and Zin explore the CES-like specialized preference ordering that is detailed below: 1− 1ρ 1− 1ρ 1− ρ1 ut ≡ u(Ct , CEt+1 ) = (1 − β)Ct + β(CEt+1 )
(3)
with 0 < β < 1, 1 = γ > 0, ρ > 0, or, in the case of ρ = 1, u(Ct , CEt+1 ) = (1 − β) logCt + β log(CEt+1 )
(4)
where CEt+1 = CE(u˜ t+1 ), the certainty equivalent of next period’s utility, is calculated according to (5) [CE (u˜ t+1 )]1−γ = Et (u˜ t+1 )1−γ , 1 = γ > 0, or log(CE (u˜ t+1 )) = Et (log u˜ t+1 ) , γ = 1.
(6)
In the above specification, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution ρ may be specified independently of the CRRA γ. Note that if γ = 1/ρ, recursive substitution to eliminate ut+1 yields ut = (1 − β) Et
∞
1 1−γ
β
j
1−γ Ct+j
,
(7)
j=0
which represents the same preference ordering over uncertain consumptions streams as the ordering given by ∞ 1−γ Et β j Ct+j , j=0
a fact that suggests we may unambiguously view the parameter γ of (3) and (4) as the CRRA (Epstein and Zin (1989) provide a more formal argument). Similarly, as the parameter ρ becomes smaller, the agent becomes less willing to substitute utility, and thus consumption, intertemporally. The parameter β can be viewed as the agent’s customary time preference parameter. Weil (1989) uses these preferences in a setting otherwise identical to that of Mehra and Prescott (1985) to compute the resultant premium. Even as specialized to the Epstein–Zin (1989) preference structure, Weil (1989) demonstrates that the Mehra and Prescott (1985) solution for the equilibrium price functions, q e Yt , xi = νi Yt and q b Yt , xi = ωi , still applies with the proviso that the constants νi , ωi now must satisfy a system of non-linear equations. Using an endowment process {Yt } otherwise identical to that of Mehra and Prescott (1985), Weil (1989) obtains the results detailed in Table 2.
49
John Donaldson and Rajnish Mehra
TABLE 2i Equilibrium Mean Rates of Return Under Epstein–Zin Preferences: Various Parameters/Selections (Rates of return annualized in percent. The first entry is the premium; the second is the risk-free rate.) EIS
CRRA(γ)
(ρ)
0
0.5
1
5
10
20
45
∞
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.48
0.94
1.77
3.01
5.25
5.24
5.21
5.01
4.78
4.40
4.09
0.01
0.06
0.11
0.51
1.01
1.89
3.14
6.20
6.16
6.12
5.79
5.40
4.73
3.93
0.01
0.07
0.12
0.55
1.08
2.00
3.27
7.14
7.08
7.03
6.56
6.02
5.06
3.76
2
1
0.2
0.1
0.05
1/45
i This
0.10
0.18
0.26
0.88
1.64
2.91
4.34
15.02
14.81
14.61
13.02
11.11
7.75
2.45
0.24
0.35
0.45
1.31
2.33
4.04
5.72
25.73
25.32
24.96
21.68
17.87
11.23
0.85
0.56
0.72
0.87
2.12
3.66
6.25
8.66
50.51
49.55
48.61
41.26
32.80
18.65
−2.23
1.13
1.36
1.60
3.58
6.22
11.22
17.11
138.91
135.56
132.25
107.44
80.69
40.39
−9.22
is Table 1 of Weil (1989).
It is readily apparent that the Epstein–Zin preference construct can, per se, provide some progress toward the equity premium puzzle resolution, but not a complete resolution. In particular, if the CRRA is set at 45 and ρ at 0.1, then a reasonable match to the data (mean values) is obtained. But if a much more reasonable CRRA of 1 is hypothesized, the premium is a scant 0.45 percent, while the mean risk-free rate is 25 percent.24 Both of these features are counterfactual. As Weil (1989) argues, generalizing preferences in the direction of Epstein and Zin (1989) seems only to deepen the puzzle: (1) in abstract economies such as Mehra and Prescott’s (1985), calibrated to observed per capita income dynamics (Ct = Yt ), there is insufficient consumption 24 Consistent with these findings yet using a very different methodological perspective, Kocherlakota (1990) demonstrates that when the growth rate of consumption is i.i.d. (an assumption with substantial empirical support), asset pricing models that separate the CRRA and the EIS as per (1)–(4) have no more explanatory power in empirical tests than those preferences for which these parameters coincide as in the standard Mehra and Prescott (1985) paradigm.
50
Chapter 2 • Risk-Based Explanations of the Equity Premium
growth risk to justify a substantial premium unless agents are implausibly risk-averse. (2) Furthermore, per capita consumption growth is too high (μ = 1.8 percent) for the equilibrium risk-free rate to be low, when agents are averse to intertemporal consumption substitution to the extent observed. In hindsight, these results are not entirely surprising. Even under Epstein–Zin’s (1989, 1991) preferences, there is one parameter alone, γ, which is given the entire role of characterizing the degree of risk aversion. Furthermore, by separating time and risk preferences, their structure tends to strengthen the influence of the intertemporal substitution parameter 1/ρ. As a result, agents must once again be offered a counterfactually high risk-free rate in order to induce them to save more in an environment when mean consumption growth is exogenously fixed at 1.8 percent. Note that Weil’s findings do not disqualify the entire Epstein–Zin family since other approaches to obtaining certainty equivalents may apply. They do suggest, however, that the difficulty may be in separating time and risk preferences where the agent does not need to be too risk-averse to match the data. Epstein–Zin preference constructs have been employed more successfully by Bansal and Yaron (2004) in a richer economic environment. These authors postulate processes on consumption growth and the dividend which are distinct but share a small, but highly persistent time varying expected growth component. The resultant ‘long run consumption risk’ is specially onerous for Epstein–Zin style representative agents who desire an early resolution of uncertainty.25 This latter feature demands a preference specification where the CRRA > (1/EIS), a precondition that the Bansal and Yaron (2004) calibration easily satisfies. For the γ = 10 and ρ = 1.5 case, they are able to replicate all the stylized facts quite well: Ere = 6.84%, Erf = 0.93%, σre = 18.65% and σrr = 0.57%. (Table 4 in Bansal and Yaron (2004)).26 That the persistent growth component is small lends credibility to their basic consumption growth hypothesis, as it is very difficult, empirically, to distinguish this possibility from the more customary i.i.d. consumption growth assumption. While an EIS as high as 1.5 is disputable, there is no prevailing consensus estimate of this quantity, even as regards to it being greater, equal to, or less than one. (See Attanasio and Vissing-Jorgensen (2007), Hall (1988), Guvenen (2006) and Yogo (2004).
25 See
also the chapter by Ravi Bansal in this volume (Bansal (2008)). the presence of long run consumption risk should be an especially important factor in the Epstein and Zin preference context is more apparent if we examine the corresponding process on the marginal rate of substitution, 26 Why
Mt+1 =
U1(Ct+1 ) Ct+1 θ e : ln Mt+1 = θ ln β + ln − (1 − θ) rt+1 U1(Ct ) ρ Ct
Wt+1 + Ct+1 1−γ e = ln , and rt+1 is the period t + 1 return on the agent’s wealth Wt 1 − 1/ρ 1 portfolio, Wt . If γ = ρ , the standard power utility case, the expression collapses whereby only consumption growth matters for the MRS variation. If γ = 1/ρ, the wealth component adds another source of risk. Long run persistence in dividend growth affects this latter term. where θ =
51
John Donaldson and Rajnish Mehra
We view Bansal and Yaron (2004), its predecessors and successors, as important for a number of reasons.27 First and foremost, it emphasizes the importance of long run growth variation for the asset pricing literature. Their paper also suggests that a full resolution of the equity premium puzzle may demand an improved understanding not only of investor preference structures, but also of the long run statistical characteristics of the principal aggregate macro series.28 More recently, Kallenbrunner and Lochstoer (2006) have demonstrated that the consumption growth process postulated by Bansal and Yaron (2004) will arise endogenously in a fairly standard production style real business cycle model, purely as a result of the consumption smoothing efforts of the representative agent armed with the same Epstein-Zin preference specification. While the authors match a fairly limited set of business cycle facts, their study is important not only for lending further credibility to the Bansal and Yaron (2004) perspective but also for the critical issue of cross model verification. Although standard Epstein and Zin preferences do not necessarily go very far in resolving the equity premium puzzle, it is nevertheless informative to study the full implication of these preferences for the properties of security returns beyond the equity premium. Within the standard Mehra-Prescott (1985) context, Epstein and Zin (1989, 1991) develop an elaborate dynamic programming argument to derive the following asset pricing equation. ⎫ ⎧ ⎨ C˜ − 1ρ θ 1 1−θ ⎬ j t+1 1 + r˜t+1 ≡ 1, Et β e ⎭ ⎩ Ct 1 + r˜t+1
(8)
j
e denotes the period t return on the agent’s wealth portfolio and rt+1 the period where r˜t+1 t return on some asset j included within it.29 In the above expression, the pricing kernel is of the form
1−θ − 1 θ C˜ t+1 ρ 1 β e Ct 1 + r˜t+1 where, θ = (1 − γ)/(1 − 1/ρ).
27 We include in the list of predecessors Backus and Zin (1994) and Cochrane and Hansen (1992). Other implementations of the Epstein–Zin preference construct are Epstein and Zin (1989), Yogo (2006) and Malloy et al. (2005). 28 Bakshi and Chen, (2008) modify the standard model by identifying dividend processes as a fixed fraction of earnings plus an i.i.d error. Potential errors in consumption measurement are there by avoided. They also assume risk free interest rates follow a mean reverting process with constant volatility. As with Bansal & Yaron (2004) they derive closed form solutions and match the premium. 29 Cochrane derives this relationship in the Appendix to his essay in this volume (2008).
52
Chapter 2 • Risk-Based Explanations of the Equity Premium
This is a geometric average (with weights θ and 1 − θ, respectively) of the kernel of the standard CCAPM, − 1 C˜ t+1 ρ , β Ct and the reciprocal of the gross return on the wealth portfolio.30 Epstein and Zin (1991) next consider a linear approximation to the prior geometric average, − 1 1 C˜ t+1 ρ + (1 − θ) , (9) θ β e Ct 1 + r˜t+1 which, when substituted into (8), yields ⎧ ⎫ ⎪ ⎪ − 1ρ ⎨ ⎬ C˜ t+1 1 j j Et θ β 1 + r˜t+1 + (1 − θ) 1 + r ˜ =1 e t+1 ⎪ ⎪ Ct 1 + r˜t+1 ⎩ ⎭
(10)
As is well known, the standard CAPM relates the undiversifiable risk of an asset to the covariance of its returns with the returns on the market portfolio. When time and risk preferences are distinct, Eq. (10) suggests that both covariances matter: the covariance of an individual asset’s return with the market portfolio captures its essential undiversifiable risk, while the covariance of its returns with the consumption growth rate fundamentally captures its risk across time periods. With separate time and risk preferences, it is natural that both should be separately and individually present. But, as we are aware, this alone does not, in general, solve the puzzle.31
1.4. Variation in the CRRA and EIS But what about the basic Epstein–Zin construct generalized to admit time variation in the CRRA and EIS parameters? Several authors, in particular, have suggested that countercyclical risk aversion may allow for resolving the puzzle (cf. Campbell and Cochrane (1999), Gordon and St. Amour (2000, 2003), and Danthine et al. (1992)). Note, however, that such modifications should still respect time-consistent planning and aggregation while also generating stationary equilibrium security returns. 30 The
difficulty in having a pricing kernel that is dependent on the return to the agent’s wealth portfolio is the ambiguity that is introduced in the corresponding empirical tests of the model: what is a reasonable proxy for the wealth portfolio? Epstein and Zin (1991) use the traditional “market portfolio” as that proxy, but it can reasonably be argued that this overstates the covariance of investor wealth and individual asset returns. In particular, there is no labor income in their model, and thus their abstraction implies that human capital wealth is a negligible component of total wealth. 31 Azeredo (2007) confirms that mild positive autocorrelation in the growth rate of consumption also leads to negative equity premia for reasonably parameterized Epstein–Zin utility (EIS near zero) in a standard Mehra and Prescott (1985) setting. For mild positive serial correlation and EIS near 1, the equity premium is positive but still very small.
53
John Donaldson and Rajnish Mehra
Simple generalizations to admit countercyclical risk aversion are, first and foremost, problematic along the return stationarity dimension. Consider a simple expected utility, representative agent preference specification of the form E
∞
t
β u (Ct , γt ) ,
t=0
where 1−γ
u (Ct , γt ) =
Ct t 1 − γt
with the stochastic process on γt , the period CRRA, chosen so that corr (γt , gt ) < 0 (gt denoting the output growth rate, gt = Yt /Yt−1 − 1). An exploration of this non-trivial generalization of the standard Mehra and Prescott (1985) paradigm is revealing (see Danthine et al. (2004) for details). In particular, returns are non-stationary. This latter assertion can be seen from a straightforward calculation of the representative agent’s equilibrium (Ct = Yt ) intertemporal marginal rate of substitution (IMRS): IMRSt, t+1 = β
(Yt ) γt − γt+1 u1 (Yt+1 , γt+1 ) =β . u1 (Yt , γt ) (gt+1 )γt+1
(11)
Clearly, the IMRSt,t+1 depends not only on a transformation of the growth rate of output alone, as in Mehra and Prescott (1985), but also directly on the level of output Yt . The presence of Yt in expression (11) guarantees that risk-free asset prices and the equilibrium risk-free return will not be a stationary series (the same is true of the risky asset). We notice also that the presence of γt and γt+1 introduces another source of uncertainty into the agent’s economic environment, albeit one that he correctly anticipates (rational expectations). It turns out that this single-parameter curvature variation has big consequences for the equity premium and risk-free rate generated by the model. This is presented in Table 3, where the output growth process is otherwise identical to that found in Mehra and Prescott (1985). Note that under these parameterizations, the problem is not that returns are insufficiently volatile or that the premium is too small, but that both these quantities are too large! Returns on both securities, but especially the equity security, are also much too large relative to the data. The point is not that the model fails, for the idea that one parameter—even if it now assumes two distinct values—should allow enough flexibility to explain a myriad of financial statistics remains a bit preposterous. Rather, what is of interest is the qualitative fact that parameter uncertainty appears to have an enormous influence on the representative agent’s demand for securities. But can this effect play itself out more constructively in an Epstein–Zin context? Melino and Yang (2003) explore a generalized version of Epstein and Zin (1989) that admits parameter uncertainty in the CRRA for “timeless gambles,” the EIS, and the
54
Chapter 2 • Risk-Based Explanations of the Equity Premium
TABLE 3 Variation in the CRRA: Representative Cases (Summary return statistics in percent, annualized; unless otherwise indicated, β = 0.96, π = 0.47, μ = 0.018, σ = 0.036, N = 120, Y 0 = 1)i,ii (1) Mehra and Prescott (1985) γ1 = γ2 = 3
(2) γ 1 = 1.0 γ 2 = 1.5
(3) γ 1 = 0.5 γ 2 = 1.0
(4) γ 1 = 4.0 γ 2 = 4.5
(5) γ 1 = 1.5 γ 2 = 1.0
(6) γ 1 = 1.0 γ 2 = 1.5
Ere
9.58
16.95
16.14
21.5
19.56
18.77
SDr e
4.99
53.04
53.17
51.94
59.81
58.36
Erf
9.10
8.47
7.19
15.74
6.84
7.79
SDr f
1.61
34.21
33.90
35.78
34.61
35.75
Erp
0.48
8.48
5.76
12.72
10.98
SDr p
4.7
34.92
32.75
43.21
40.32
8.945 35.26
i Panel 1 reports results from the original Mehra and Prescott (1985) model when the CRRA is fixed at γ = 3. ii The number N indicates the length of the time series of prices and dividends that was used to compute return statistics. N = 120 corresponds to 30 years of data. Reported mean returns and standard deviations represent averages of estimates obtained from 1000 independently generated time series of this length.
agent’s subjective discount factor:32 1 ρ γt ! γtt ρt ρ ut = ct t + βt Et ut+1 .
(12)
They also allow γt ∈ {γ H, γ L }, ρt ∈ {ρH, ρL }, and βt ∈ {β H, β L }, where all parameters superscripted by H occur simultaneously, and so also for those superscripted by L (there are two parameter sets); H and L are also coincident with the high and low growth states, respectively. Roughly speaking, they derive expressions for the equilibrium Ere, SDr e, Erf, and SDr f in the context of a consumption growth process identical to that of Mehra and Prescott (1985) and then ask what sets of parameters allow the resolution of these equations to satisfy the observed values of Ere , SDr e , etc. Melino and Yang (2003) find that certain reasonable sets of parameters do allow the exact replication of the four required historical moments. Generally speaking, this is accomplished with “modest procyclical variation in the EIS, but strong countercyclical 32 More precisely, under this specification, 1 − γ is the CRRA , EIS is defined by 1/(1 − ρ ), and β is the t t t t t customary (though now stochastic) subjective discount factor. Formulation (11) leads to an equilib!1−γ(st )/ρ(st ) −1 γ(s )−1 Qt /β(st )) rium IMRSt of the form IMRSt+1 = β (st ) gt+1t [1 + Qt+1 ][γ(st )/ρ(st+1 )] , where st e denotes the underlying state influencing β, γ, and ρ; gt is the period t growth rate, and Qt = qt /ct , the “priceto-earnings ratio.” From our discussion of Epstein and Zin (1989, 1991), we would expect such a term to be present in the IMRSt .
55
John Donaldson and Rajnish Mehra
TABLE 4i Parameter Values that Replicate Ere, SDr e, Er f, SDr f (Countercyclical CRRA 1 − γ and procyclical EIS 1 / (1 − ρt ); constant β) β
γL
γH
ρL
ρH
0.950
−25.00
0.89
1.25
1.31
0.960
−51.89
1.85
0.16
0.17
0.965
−18.91
0.67
−0.38
−0.40
0.970
−21.21
0.76
−0.92
−0.97
0.980
−22.25
0.79
−1.98
−2.10
0.990
−22.57
0.81
−3.04
−3.22
i This
is Table 4 of Melino and Yang (2003).
risk aversion on the part of the representative agent.”33 Variation in the subjective discount factor is found to have only negligible effects. A sample of the relevant parameters is found in Table 4. The reader may judge for herself whether any of the reported combinations constitute a reasonable resolution of the equity premium and associated puzzles. We venture only to comment that, for all cases, the degree of risk aversion implied by the low growth state seems high, especially in a context where the probability that the low growth state will continue for more than one period is less than 50 percent. There is also the added complication that risk tolerance cannot be uniquely identified with the γ parameter; rather, it appears that β, γ, and ρ all enter into the preference for random consumption sequences. Melino and Yang (2003) is important, for it presents with clarity the importance of countercyclical risk aversion at least as a (joint with procyclical EIS) sufficient quantity for resolving the first and second moments of the equity and risk-free securities.
1.5. Habit Formation A second approach to modifying preferences, that of incorporating habit formation, was initiated by Constantinides (1990) and Sundaresan (1989).34
1.5.1. The Concept Under this specification, the agent’s period-by-period utility is a function not only of his current consumption but also of his past consumption history. In its simplest form, the representative agent is postulated as maximizing E
∞
β t u(Ct − α Ct−1 ),
(13)
t=0 33 Melino
and Yang (2003), Section 7. et al. (2004) develop a notion of habits being formed at the level of individual goods. It is a notion that has yet to be applied, to our knowledge, in the equity premium literature. 34 Ravn
56
Chapter 2 • Risk-Based Explanations of the Equity Premium
where Ct−1 denotes the agent’s prior period consumption and α measures the intensity with which the prior period’s consumption experience influences utility today. Note that preferences are no longer time separable under this specification: by assumption, an increase in the agent’s current consumption, while lowering the marginal utility of his consumption today, increases the marginal utility of his consumption tomorrow. Informally, if the “agent eats more today, he ends up being hungrier when he wakes up tomorrow.” A number of variations on this basic model are considered in the literature. Under the most obvious of these generalizations, the agent’s “stock” of habit is represented as some known function of his entire consumption history: u( ) = u(Ct , St ), where St = S(Ct−1 , Ct−2 , . . .) denotes an aggregator function that summarizes the agent’s past consumption experience. Alternatively, the effect of the habit may be captured as the ratio of current consumption to its habit or benchmark level as per St , u1 ( ) > 0, u2 ( ) > 0. u(Ct , St ) = u Ct , Ct Both of these representations are referred to as internal habit models, as the magnitude of the habit is determined by the actions of the individual agent alone.35 Pollock (1970) and subsequently Abel (1990) postulate a habit that is external to the agent. Since Abel (1990), this perspective has been referred to as “keeping up with the Joneses.”36 It suggests that the agent is primarily concerned with his own consumption relative to the consumption of others in society; for example, u( ) = u(Ct − αC ¯ t−1 ), where C t−1 denotes the societal average consumption level in the previous period and α¯ the measure of his sensitivity to it. From the agent’s perspective, C t−1 is exogenous. Under this interpretation the agent wakes up feeling hungrier if those around him had all enjoyed a large meal. It is an indirect way of modeling an agent’s preference for relative “status.” In a representative agent equilibrium context Ct = C t , but this does not imply that internal and external habit formations lead to equivalent asset pricing relationships.37 35 Habits that enter as a ratio to current consumption are compatible with balanced growth (see King and Rebelo (1988)), whereas difference representations such as (11) are not. In order to restore balanced growth in the latter case, the difference must be normalized by some series that grows on average at the same rate as consumption. Such a normalization will appear in most preference specifications going forward. 36 See Andrew Abel’s chapter in this volume (Abel (2008)). 37 To demonstrate the difference, we need only write out the equilibrium equations that the equity price must satisfy: in the case of an internal habit, Ct−1 = C t−1 , qte satisfies " ! e + dt+1 + u1 (Ct+1 − αCt ) αqte dF ( ), a. u1 (Ct − αCt−1 ) qte = β u1 (Ct+1 − αCt ) qt+1 where the final term reflects the fact that higher asset purchases in period t reduce the habit in t + 1. In the case of an otherwise " identical externalehabit, ! b. u1 (Ct − αCt−1 ) qte = β u1 (Ct+1 − α Ct ) qt+1 + dt+1 dF ( ).
With a finite number of possible dividends (and thus a finite number of habit levels), in either case the state-contingent asset prices can be obtained as the solution to a system of linear equations (leading to a level stationary equilibrium). This is directly analogous to the Mehra and Prescott (1985) situation.
57
John Donaldson and Rajnish Mehra
We summarize these various alternatives by the tree structure below: habit formation external measured as a difference
internal measured as a ratio
difference
ratio
Strictly speaking, preferences structures of this form lie outside the family of recursive preference structures that admit consistent planning for a subtle reason: utility today depends on past consumption, which may depend on consumption plans that are no longer feasible. The way around this is to view past consumption as a habit state variable and view utility today as conditional upon it. In this way, consistency of choice is preserved. Aggregation is also preserved under this simple habit formation, provided u( ) is of the CRRA form.
1.5.2. Relationship to the Equity Premium As noted elsewhere in this volume, one source of the equity premium puzzle is the very low volatility in per capita consumption growth. If the risky asset is to command a high rate of return in an environment of very little (per capita) consumption risk, agents must be extremely risk-averse—much more so than micro studies to date have been able to identify. Incorporating a habit feature sidesteps this issue by postulating that agents are averse to variations in habit-adjusted levels of consumption rather than to consumption variation itself. Especially in circumstances where the current consumption level and the habit do not differ significantly, small changes in consumption growth can generate very large variations in habit-adjusted consumption growth. Even in the presence of modest overall habit-adjusted risk aversion, such variation may contribute to a resolution of the puzzle. Another way to present the mechanism underlying habit models is to compute the agent’s effective (or local) CRRA in the special case where the habit is well proxied by a fixed subsistence level of consumption:38 u( ) = u Ct − C =
38 See
also the discussion in Weil (1989).
Ct − C
1−γ
1−γ
.
(14)
58
Chapter 2 • Risk-Based Explanations of the Equity Premium
Under these circumstances, −Ct u11 (Ct ) γ = . u1 (Ct ) 1 − C/Ct
(15)
Note that if the subsistence level of consumption is high relative to actual consumption (a high threshold for status), then the local CRRA can be very large. For example, if γ = 3 and C/Ct ≈ 0.9, then the effective CRRA ≈ 30. Under this habit specification, effective risk aversion is time-varying: higher consumption in period t − 1 provokes the agent to be more risk-averse, ceteris paribus, in period t. It is also countercyclical: when Ct (and output) is low relative to C in a recession, C/Ct will be high and thus the effective CRRA high. With effective risk aversion not directly observable, these theories will be difficult to test empirically. Nevertheless, these simple relationships give us some idea of what is going on. They also provide an early warning sign that naive habit formation may not necessarily represent a “cure-all” that allows otherwise standard stochastic equilibrium paradigms to explain the full range of financial phenomena. The basic ingredient of the model, per capita consumption, in particular, does not display much variation in the data. This suggests that under a proper calibration Ct and Ct−1 will typically be similar in value. With an α close to 1 and standard CRRA utility, the argument Ct − αCt−1 will frequently be very small and be on the most concave portion of the agent’s utility surface. Marginal utility will be highly volatile and, as a consequence, the risk-free rate is likely to be counterfactually highly volatile as well.39 This is borne out in many studies for a wide range of settings (see, e.g., Constantinides (1990), Jermann (1998), etc.). Taming this excessive volatility is a particular focus of the habit specification described in the next section.
1.5.3. The Campbell and Cochrane (1999) Mechanism Campbell and Cochrane (1999) postulate a process on an external habit, Xt , and a period utility function of the simple CRRA form: u(Ct , Xt ) =
(Ct − St )1−γ , 1−γ
(16)
where Ct in this case denotes the individual agent’s consumption and Ct − Xt St = , Ct his surplus consumption habit. Note that from the agent’s perspective, St is exogenous although in equilibrium this will not be so. They next postulate that (1) consumption growth follows an i.i.d. log-normal process, 39 The
reader is also referred to the section on habit formation in Mehra and Prescott (2008b).
59
John Donaldson and Rajnish Mehra
Δct+1 = log Ct+1 − log Ct ≡ g + ν˜t where ν˜t ∼ i.i.d. N 0, σν2 ,
(17)
and (2) the log of the surplus consumption ratio log St = st also follows a log-normal process to be consistent with (1): st+1 = (1 − φ) s¯ + φ st + λ (st ) (Δct+1 − g) ,
(18)
where φ, s, ¯ and g are parameters, s¯ = log S (S denotes the steady-state surplus consumption ratio), and λ (st ) is a prespecified sensitivity function. As a result, the period t, t + 1 pricing kernel is of the form −γ u1 (Ct+1 , St+1 ) St+1 Ct+1 · MRSt, t+1 = β =β U1 (Ct , St ) St Ct ¯ t )+(1+λ(st ))Δct+1 −λ(st )g] = βe−γ[(1−φ)(s−s ¯ t )]ν¯t+1 ] = βe−γ[(φ−1)(st −s)+[1+λ(s
(19)
by identification (1) above. Under this specification it is apparent that the standard deviation of the MRS, as well as its correlation with consumption growth (both important determinants of the premium), will be determined by the form of the sensitivity function. Campbell and Cochrane (1999) go on to make the following assumption on the form of λ (st ): ⎧ ⎨1# 1 − 2(st − s) ¯ − 1 st ≤ smax (20) λ(st ) = S ⎩ 0 s ≥s t
max
# where S = σ β/(1 − φ) and smax = s¯ + (1/2) 1 − S 2 . These requirements allow the habit formulation not only to reflect certain key features of the data but also to generate a plausible habit process.40 In doing so, the authors attempt to set an upper bound on what can be achieved with a habit model in an exchange setting; that is, they seek to provide a sort of “performance standard” that other competing habit formulations must exceed. No axiomatic foundations for the postulated surplus consumption process are proposed, however. Lastly, an i.i.d. process on dividend growth is postulated, one that is imperfectly correlated with growth in consumption: Δ dt+1 = g + ω˜ t+1 , ω˜ t+1 ∼ i.i.d. N 0, σω2 with corr(ω˜ t , ν˜t ) = ρ. (21) As before, dt denotes the log of the actual period t dividend, Dt . With an independently specified dividend process, the Ct = Yt identity characteristic of Mehra and a first-order approximation, (14) and (15) imply Xt+1 = φXt + (1 − φ) (1 − S)Ct , which appears fairly conventional.
40 To
60
Chapter 2 • Risk-Based Explanations of the Equity Premium
Prescott (1985) is broken, allowing an implicit wage process, levered capital structure, etc. The parameters ρ and σω remain to be specified. The model—and, in particular, the surplus consumption process—is designed to replicate the observed low risk-free rate volatility. Taking advantage of the well-known properties of the log-normal return process in conjunction with model specifications (16)–(19), it becomes a matter of straightforward manipulation to derive the implied f expression for log rt : f
ln rt = −lnβ + γg − γ(1 − φ) (st − s) ¯ −
γ 2σ2 (1 + λ (st ))2 . 2
(22)
Under substitution into (18), expression (22) becomes f
ln rt = −lnβ + γg −
γ (1 − φ) , 2
(23)
a constant. This clearly is an extreme case of low volatility, and Campbell and Cochrane (1999) offer generalizations by which the precise real risk-free rate volatility can be matched as well. Plausibility dictates that the habit should not be predetermined, except possibly at the steady state, and formulations (18) and (20) also satisfy this requirement. Indeed, the fact that Δct+1 appears in the expression for the period t + 1 surplus consumption ratio st+1 dictates that current consumption growth has some influence on the habit.41 Since the habit is external, it represents the influence on an individual’s preference ordering of the average consumption plan of others in the society. Even in an environment of instant communication, it is perhaps unreasonable to presume an immediate and fully external habit adjustment process. The sensitivity parameter λ (st ) is also increasing in st by construction. This guarantees countercyclical risk aversion and, as the authors demonstrate, a countercyclical market price of risk. By making the agent very risk-averse when consumption is already low, this feature accentuates the perceived riskiness of a variable consumption stream. Table 5 presents some sample results of this elaborate exercise. From these results it is clear that habit formation as articulated by Campbell and Cochrane (1999) is a powerful mechanism for influencing security returns in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. Its flexibility is even greater than what Table 5 suggests since Campbell and Cochrane (1999) subject the model to other tests (e.g., predictability), which it easily transcends. Yet we remain uneasy, as there is no empirical evidence to support the assertion that surplus consumption habits evolve in the way proposed. Furthermore, for the reported simulation, the agent’s effective CRRA varies between 1 and 100, which is arguably extreme. The surplus consumption habit process in Campbell and Cochrane (1999) is highly specialized in other ways. Ljungqvist and Uhlig (1999), in particular, point out that under their specification, the representative agent would experience substantial welfare 41 Including current consumption as a part of the habit formation process may be used to ensure that period t’s consumption never falls below period t’s habit. Otherwise, period utility may not be well defined.
61
John Donaldson and Rajnish Mehra
TABLE 5 Equilibrium Security Returns and the Premium in a Campbell–Cochrane Model (Rates of return, growth rates annualized in percent; g = 1.89, σ = 1.50, lnr f = 0.94, Φ = 0.87, ρ = 0.20, σω = 11.2, β = 0.89, S = 0.057, Smax = 0.094) Postwar data
Simulated moments
Erf
0.94
0.094
SDr f
(not reported)
0
Ere
7.58
7.630
SDr e
(not reported)
15.200
Erp
6.69
6.640
SDr p
15.7
15.200
EΔct
1.89
1.890
SDΔct
1.22
1.220
Source: Campbell and Cochrane (1999), various tables.
gains if 10 percent of her endowment were periodically destroyed. The basic intuition is straightforward: while utility is diminished in the period in which consumption endowment is destroyed, future utility gains result since the habit is correspondingly lower. If the former loss is more than compensated for by the latter gains, the overall result is welfare-enhancing. While this is never the case under standard linear habit evolution, this is possible under the Campbell and Cochrane (1999) construct.42 These anomalies suggest the need for an axiomatic treatment of habit formation.
1.6. Behavioral Models Behavioral models are ones for which the postulated agents are not “fully rational.” While this can mean that they do not have rational expectations43 or that they do not 42 These observations are not as general as would initially appear. Consider the representative agent utility
function β t {g (xt ) + v (ct , xt )}, where xt is the aggregate consumption history, ct is the agent’s time-t consumption and v(ct , xt ) is increasing and concave in ct ; g(xt ) and v(ct , xt ) together constitute the agent’s period utility function. With an external habit, marginal utility is given by ∂v (ct , xt ) /∂ct , independent of g(xt ). The class of utility functions with common v(ct , xt ) but different g(xt ) support the same equilibrium but may, in general, have different welfare implications. Campbell and Cochrane indeed focus on equilibrium implications driven exclusively by marginal utility ∂v (ct , xt ) /∂ct . It is not the case that all utility functions in the class will necessarily exhibit identical welfare implications and therefore the criticism leveled by Ljungquist and Uhlig (1999) against Campbell–Cochrane cannot be viewed as a general statement. We thank George Constantinides for pointing this out to us. 43 By this we mean, in the context of this essay, that agents know the exact probability distribution governing all random outcomes—returns, consumption, etc.—driving the model.
62
Chapter 2 • Risk-Based Explanations of the Equity Premium
update their beliefs using Bayes’ rule, in the context of this essay it will be taken to mean that the agents make decisions in accordance with preferences that are not expected utility defined over consumption or wealth (indirect utility). In this sense, “habit formation” preferences are behavioral, although their successful use in explaining a wide class of phenomena has given them a degree of acceptance not typical of the broader behavioral finance literature. While the proposed family of behavioral preference structures is otherwise quite large, most have not been applied to the study of the “equity premium” and associated puzzles.44 For this reason, we restrict our attention to four: (1) the happiness maintenance preferences of Falato (2003), (2) the disappointment aversion and generalized disappointment aversion of Gul (1991) and Routledge and Zin (2004), (3) the prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) as applied, most especially, by Barberis et al. (2001), and (4) the rank-dependent expected utility preference structures of Quiggin (1982, 1993).
1.6.1. Happiness Maintenance Consistent with a large body of experimental evidence (see Isen (1989) for a review), Falato (2003) builds on the assumption that risk aversion may be procyclical. The phenomenon he seeks to capture is the following: investors who are experiencing high utility—due either to a favorable income or to wealth shock—become more risk-averse, as they do not wish these favorable circumstances to be lost; that is, they seek “happiness maintenance.” Falato’s model postulates that investors derive direct utility from both consumption and the consumption-to-wealth ratio. (As with Melino and Yang (2003), the associated MRS in his model also necessarily contains as an argument the consumption-to-wealth ratio.) In particular, Falato (2003) assumes that the agent’s period utility is defined over a composite good u( ) = u(gt ) = 1−θt
where g(Ct , Wt ; θt ) = Ct
(g (Ct , Wt ; θt ))1−γ , 1−γ
θ
Wt t and Wt , wealth, satisfies Wt = qte + Yt zet
(the setting is otherwise a pure Mehra and Prescott (1985) exchange economy). The agent’s full preference ordering over random consumption sequences is thus given by E0
∞ t=0
44 For
1−γ
βt
Ct 1−γ
Wt Ct
(1−γ)θt ,
the wider classes that have been used for macroeconomic studies, see Backus et al. (2004).
(24)
63
John Donaldson and Rajnish Mehra
where θt = θ x¯ t (n) and n 1 Yt−τ . x¯ t (n) = n+1 Yt−τ−1
(25)
t=0
If n = 0, Eq. (25) reduces to
Yt θt = θ Yt−1
.
It is this latter feature that captures the “happiness maintenance” phenomenon underlying Falato’s (2003) work: high average dividend (consumption) growth in the recent past, x¯ t (n), leads the agent to be more risk-averse over wealth in the current period via the exponent (1 − γ)θt of the wealth-to-consumption ratio. Falato (2003) proves that equilibrium prices exist for a Mehra and Prescott (1985) economy when the representative agent has “happiness maintenance” preferences.45 Furthermore, the postulated ordering admits consistent planning and generates stationary return series. Preliminary analysis suggests that a representative agent may be constructed. The issue of full aggregation remains open, however. As with Melino and Yang (2003), the methodology required to calculate statecontingent asset prices and returns involves the solution to a non-linear system of equations. Table 6 contains the results of this exercise for a sample set of parameters. We are drawn particularly to the γ = 3, θ = 0.24 case, which matches nearly all the moments exceptionally well, with the sole qualification that the SD of the equity return is about 30 percent too large. This is furthermore accomplished in a model with fewer degrees of freedom than, e.g., Melino and Yang (2003). The presence of the consumption-to-wealth ratio as an argument of the period utility function is not entirely surprising given earlier work by Lettau and Ludvigson (2001). What is perhaps more striking (but not reported in the table) is the ability of Falato’s model also to explain the predictable feature of stock returns (see, e.g., Campbell and Shiller (1988)) at least as well as the habit construct of Campbell and Cochrane (1999).46 Countercyclical risk aversion is clearly not a necessary condition for this class of models to replicate, acceptably, the equity premium and allied statistics. Furthermore, the addition of the (Ct /Wt ) ratio does not require the presence of a scaling factor since the consumption-to-wealth ratio series is endogenously stationary. The remaining behavioral approaches rely directly on countercyclical risk aversion. In both of them, the investing agents are concerned especially with bad outcomes relative to some benchmark, and it is how this latter quantity is defined that sets them apart.47 45 Such an exercise is non-trivial. The main challenge to establishing existence derives from the endogenous nature of the pricing kernel, which is, in turn, the result of the utility function’s dependence on wealth. 46 In Falato’s (2003) model, the cost of the business cycle is also about ten times the original estimate of Lucas (1985). See also Alvarez and Jermann (2004). 47 As such, they are direct descendants of Reitz (1988). Reitz (1988) retains the expected utility representation and postulates a low-probability-very-low-consumption state. In Routledge and Zin (2004) and Barberis et al. (2001), the “disaster” is measured relative to a benchmark. This fact facilitates a more reasonable model calibration.
64
Chapter 2 • Risk-Based Explanations of the Equity Premium
TABLE 6 Financial Statistics under Happiness Maintenancei (All cases: β = 0.99, n = 2, π = 0.43, μ = 0.018, δ = 0.036; various γ, θ; returns annualized in percentage terms)ii E(rf )
θ = 0.24
θ = 0.18
θ = 0.12
θ = 0.06
θ = 0.00
E(re )
E(rp )
SD(rf )
SD(r e )
SD(rp )
γ = 1.1
2.36
2.56
0.19
0.71
4.04
3.98
γ=2
2.85
3.75
0.90
1.87
8.12
7.90
γ=3
0.84
6.95
6.11
5.55
23.17
22.57
γ = 1.1
2.48
2.66
0.17
0.68
3.94
3.88
γ=2
3.27
3.89
0.63
1.64
6.66
6.45
γ=3
3.46
5.60
2.15
3.69
12.69
12.14
γ = 1.1
2.60
2.76
0.16
0.63
3.85
3.80
γ=2
3.62
4.09
0.46
1.39
5.59
5.41
γ=3
4.49
5.59
1.09
2.62
8.38
7.95
γ = 1.1
2.72
2.87
0.15
0.60
3.77
3.72
γ=2
3.94
4.30
0.36
1.20
4.83
4.67
γ=3
5.16
5.85
0.69
2.00
6.18
5.85
γ = 1.1
2.85
2.99
0.14
0.56
3.69
3.65
γ=2
4.27
4.55
0.29
1.04
4.23
4.10
γ=3
5.74
6.22
0.48
1.57
4.87
4.60
i Table ii The
4.1 in Falato (2003). μ, δ parameters refer to the output growth process in Mehra and Prescott (1985).
We emphasize the Routledge and Zin (2004) generalization of Gul (1991) since the latter model does not satisfactorily explain the premium in the context of a straightforward Lucas (1978)-Mehra and Prescott (1985) tree economy while the former does.48
1.6.2. Generalized Disappointment Aversion Disappointment-averse preferences place a greater utility weight on outcomes that disappoint. For Gul (1991), this threshold is to be identified with consumption realizations that lie below the (conditional) certainty equivalent consumption level, while for Routledge and Zin (2004) outcomes more distant from the certainty equivalent are given special weighting.49
48 Bonomo and Garcia (1993), however, combine a joint Markov switching endowments model with a disappointment version to match the first and second moments of the equity premium and the risk-free rate. 49 Gul (1991) disappointment aversion (DA) preferences in a standard Mehra–Prescott (1985) economy do not per se resolve the premium. Bonomo and Garcia (1993) enhance the construct by incorporating a joint process on consumption and dividends that follows a Markov switching model—in addition to (DA) preferences. They are able to match the risk-free rate and the first two moments of the premium.
65
John Donaldson and Rajnish Mehra
As in the Epstein and Zin (1989) utility construct, time and risk preferences are separated. Their recursive intertemporal utility function U(Ct , CEt+1 ) has the form U (Ct , CEt+1 ) = (1 −
1 1+ρ
γ Ct
1 γ + CE 1 + ρ t+1
1/γ ,
(26)
where CEt+1 is the certainty equivalent pertaining to random consumption in the following period. In functional form (26), ρ is the marginal rate of time preference and 1/1 − γ the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Risk preferences and the certainty equivalent computation are specified as follows. Let us presume a pure Mehra and Prescott (1985) setting with a finite number of states and suppose, in some period t, that the output level is Yti = Y i. Temporal risk preferences are represented as a period utility function of the form u(C) = C α /α (α = 0) or u(C) = log C(α = 0). The period t + 1 certainty equivalent consumption level CEt+1 = CEt+1 Y˜ i is then endogenously determined as the solution to the following definitional equation: α CEt+1 Y˜ i i ˜ u CEt+1 Y = α j α α j α δCEt+1 Y i Y Y πi j = . πi j −θ − α α α j Y j ≤ δCEt+1 (Y i ) (27) If θ = 0, structure (27) reduces to the definition of a certainty equivalent in a pure expected utility context.50 Otherwise, there is a penalty, proportional to θ, for consumption realizations that lie sufficiently below the endogenously determined certainty equivalent. If δ = 1, the certainty equivalent computation follows according to Gul (1991); if δ < 1, the context is that of Routledge and Zin (2004). Note that there is no mention of any external reference point as in the (external) habit formation literature. Nevertheless, the model generates countercyclical risk aversion, a feature that bodes well for its asset pricing characteristics. Furthermore, GDA preferences are homothetic, are linear in probabilities, and have the same aggregation properties as CRRA expected utility structures. They admit consistent planning, and Routledge and Zin (2004) provide the axiomatic underpinnings. Table 7 gives a quantitative idea of how well GDA preferences perform in the standard Mehra and Prescott (1985) environment. A number of these results are worthy of explicit mention. When dividend volatility is low, GDA preferences give only modest premia; they become quite large only when SD(Yt ) = 0.10. For the data period underlying the empirical background to the 50 When θ = 0, the Gul-Routledge-Zin structures relax the independence assumption that underlies the expected utility representation. Independence fails because mixing in some arbitrary payoff lottery with two lotteries under comparison may fundamentally change the tail properties of each.
66
Chapter 2 • Risk-Based Explanations of the Equity Premium
TABLE 7i Equilibrium Security Returns and the Premium: GDA Preferences (Various parameter combinations; all returns in percent) Parameter choices A
B
C
D
E
F
−0.5000
α
1
1
0.5000
−2
1
γ
1
1
1
1
0.5000
θ
9
24
9
9
9
9
δ
0.9692
0.9692
0.9692
0.9692
0.9692
0.9692
ρ
0.0300
0.0300
0.0300
0.0300
0.0300
0.0300
1
SD(Yt ) = 0.05 A
B
C
D
E
F
Erf
1.74
1.56
1.72
1.62
2.45
3.89
SDr f
1.26
1.44
1.25
1.23
1.21
1.11
Ere
4.30
4.68
4.33
4.46
5.07
6.63
SDr e
5.72
6.14
5.68
5.52
5.86
6.14
Erp
2.56
3.12
2.61
3.84
3.86
2.74
F
SDr p
not reported SD(Yt ) = 0.10 Aii
B
C
D
E
Erf
1.74
1.56
1.72
1.62
2.45
SDr f
1.26
1.44
1.25
1.23
1.21
1.11
Ere
8.07
9.66
8.17
8.59
8.86
10.46
SDr e
14.37
16.26
14.27
13.80
14.55
14.91
Erp
6.33
8.10
6.45
6.97
6.65
9.35
SDr p
3.89
not reported
i Table
7 is an amalgamation of selected results reported in Tables 1 and 2 in Routledge and Zin (2004). return statistics for the risk-free rate are identical for the SD(Yt ) = 0.05 and 0.10 cases because risk-free securities do not result in disappointments. ii The
article, de-trended dividend volatility is on the order of 12 percent, which advocates for the model with SD(Yt ) = 0.10; Campbell (1999) argues that the SD of dividend should be as high as 28 percent. Qualitative results generally match intuition; comparing columns A and B, the result of a greater penalty is to raise the risk-free asset prices and lower equity ones: risky securities are less desirable and the premium rises. Comparing columns B and D, the representative agent becomes atemporally more risk-averse and the premium naturally increases. In general, equity volatilities (SD(Yt ) = 0.10 case) match the data quite well; risk-free rate volatilities are generally too small. Although
67
John Donaldson and Rajnish Mehra
not part of Table 7, it can also be shown that the risk-free rate is procyclical. Overall, the results are very good, and the model is advantaged by retaining a utility specification defined only over the agent’s consumption. Note also that countercyclical risk aversion is generated endogenously within the (GDA) construct. To see this, consider the cases of columns A and B: disappointment aversion is the only source of risk aversion (α = 1). As a result, the pricing kernel is risk-neutral in the high growth states (no disappointing outcomes) but substantially risk-averse in the low growth states (see Routledge and Zin (2004) for a more detailed analysis). There is one other major structure that provides countercyclical risk aversion: prospect theory as applied to asset pricing.
1.6.3. Prospect Theories The major reference is Barberis et al. (2001). See also the essay by Barberis and Huang in this volume. The idea is to postulate investors who derive utility not only from their period-by-period real consumption, but also over equity portfolio gains and losses relative to a plausible benchmark.51 Roughly speaking, these investors max U(C) + V(G/L), where G/L denotes gains or losses. That utility is defined over only equity gains/losses rather than over aggregate gains and losses to total wealth is an illustration of the notion of “narrow framing.” Furthermore, investors are more sensitive to losses than to gains (this is the essence of the notion of “loss aversion”), with the extent of the loss sensitivity depending on the agent’s prior portfolio experience. Equity gains and losses are measured with respect to a benchmark, and if the investor’s past experience has been to sustain losses relative to his benchmark, then he is modeled as being more acutely sensitive to further ones. If his recent experience has been one of equity portfolio gains, then the agent is modeled as being less sensitive to losses (provided they are not so severe as to negate past gains). These requirements lead to a kink in the agent’s utility curve at gain = loss = 0. Roughly speaking, loss aversion as captured in Barberis et al. (2001) implies linear utility over gains and losses to the equity portion of an investor’s portfolio of the form Xt+1 , Xt+1 ≥ 0, V (Xt+1 , St , zt ) = λ (zt ) Xt+1 , Xt+1 < 0, where f
e Xt+1 = St Rt+1 − Rt St . f
e and Rt , designate, respectively, the gross rates Following our customary notation, Rt+1 of return on stock and risk-free bonds from period t to t + 1 and St the value of the stock portion of the investor’s portfolio. The latter is subscripted by t alone, as the risk-free
51 See also Benartzi and Thaler (1995). These authors postulated investors with loss-averse preferences over variations in their financial wealth only. Without any direct connection to consumption, it is impossible to ascertain how their model might describe the joint processes on equilibrium returns and consumption growth, for example.
68
V(Xt 11, St, zt )
Chapter 2 • Risk-Based Explanations of the Equity Premium
zt . 1
zt 5 1 Xt 11,0
FIGURE 1
458
zt ,1
Xt1150
Xt 11 . 0
Xt 11
V (Xt+1 , St , zt ): Utility of equity portfolio gains or losses. Source: From Barberis et al. (2001).
rate from period t to t + 1 is solely determined by the risk-free bond’s price in period t. Gains or losses are thus measured relative to what would have been earned had the stock portion St of his portfolio been invested in risk-free assets. The slope parameter λ(zt ) measures the degree of loss sensitivity which is dependent on a variable, zt , that recalls past portfolio experience, where zt = 1 captures a case of no prior gains or losses, zt < 1 means prior gains, and zt > 1 means prior losses. A representative graphical portrayal is found in Figure 1.52 More formally, in a discrete-time asset pricing context, the representative agent undertakes to assemble portfolios of the stock market index with value St in conjunction with an aggregate valuation of risk-free bonds, Bt , so as to solve ∞ Ct1−γ t+1 t (28) + bt β V (Xt+1 , St , zt ) , max E β 1−γ t=0
where the first term is the standard present discounted utility of consumption under CRRA utility, and the second, V( ), captures the utility/disutility of gains and losses, Xt+1 , in the stock market portion of the optimal portfolio, St ; the zt -term is as indicated above. The standard period t budget constraint and the constraint governing the evolution of wealth are, respectively, Ct + St + Bt ≤ Wt ,
(29) f
e Wt+1 = St Rt+1 + Bt Rt ,
(30)
where Wt represents period t wealth and St , Bt the amounts of it allocated, respectively, to stock and risk-free bonds post-consumption, Ct , in period t. It remains to detail the precise form of V( ). Barberis et al. (2001) postulate 52 An amplified version of this same representation may be found in the companion chapter by Barberis and Huang (2008).
69
John Donaldson and Rajnish Mehra
V (Xt+1 , St , z)t =
⎧ ⎪ Xt+1 ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ f f f e ⎪ ⎪ ⎨St (zt Rt − Rt ) + λSt (Rt+1 − zt Rt ), ⎪ Xt+1 ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩λ(zt )Xt+1
f
e Rt+1 ≥ zt Rt , and zt ≤ 1, f
e Rt+1 < zt Rt , and zt ≤ 1, f
e Rt+1 ≥ Rt , and zt > 1, f
e Rt+1 < Rt , and zt > 1,
(31) where λ(zt ) and zt+1 evolve according to λ(zt ) = λ + k(zt − 1) , and
zt+1
Re = η zt e Rt+1
(32)
+ (1 − η)1,
(33)
where λ > 1, η > 0, and k > 0 are constants and zt is an index that captures whether the investor has recently experienced gains (zt ≤ 1) or losses (zt > 1). Some careful interpretation is in order. Equation (33) describes the evolution of the historical experience variable, zt , where Re amounts to the average stock return and η is a parameter that captures the memory in the adjustment process.53 If equity returns e > 1), this experience tends to increase zt+1 > zt are much less than average (Re /Rt+1 since η ≥ 0. If η = 0, Eq. (31) suggests that zt ≈ 1 or that prior gains and losses have an immediate effect on the investor’s risk attitude. If η = 1, then the benchmark adjusts slowly. Note that λ(zt ), the loss sensitivity, is increasing in zt . Otherwise, bt = b0 (C)−γ, where (C)−γ is purely a scaling factor that is included to maintain stationarity in the equilibrium asset return distributions and b0 determines the relative utility of gains and losses vs. the utility of consumption. There is, however, no formal proof that investor preferences of this type survive aggregation and no axiomatic foundation for their existence. It remains to close the economy by specifying the exogenous dividend and consumption processes (as in any exchange model, there is one equity security outstanding, and risk-free bonds are priced in zero net supply). Barberis et al. (2001) consider a number of scenarios. We first report the one that is in the spirit of a pure Mehra and Prescott (1985) setting: Dt+1 Ct+1 = log = gC + σC ε˜t+1 , log Ct Dt where ε˜t+1 ∼ i.i.d. N (1, 0), where gC = 1.84 and σC = 3.79 (both expressed in percent) as estimated from data for the period 1926–1995. The results are presented in Table 8. 53 Re is actually determined within the model in order that, at equilibrium, the median value of Z ≡ 1. This t turns out, not surprisingly, to be approximately the average equity return.
70
Chapter 2 • Risk-Based Explanations of the Equity Premium
TABLE 8i The Equity Premium in a Model with Loss Aversion (γ = 1, β = 0.98, λ = 2.25, η = 0.9, gC = 1.84%, σC = 3.79%; various b0 , k; annualized returns in percent) Data
log rf
0.58
b0 = 0.7
b0 = 2
b0 = 100
b0 = 7
b0 = 2
b0 = 100
k=3
k=3
k=3
k = 150
k = 100
k = 50
3.79
3.79
3.79
3.79
3.79
3.79ii
E log rP
6.03
0.63
0.88
1.26
3.50
3.66
3.28
SD log rP
20.02
4.77
5.17
5.62
10.43
10.22
9.35
0.30
0.13
0.17
0.22
0.34
0.36
0.35
2.25
2.25
2.25
10.70
7.50
4.40
Sharpe ratio Average loss aversion i This
is Table II of Barberis et al. (2001). their specification it can be shown that log rf is constant.
ii Under
TABLE 9i The Equity Premium in a Model with Loss Aversion and Distinct Consumption and Dividend Processes (gD = gC = 1.84, σC = 3.79, σD = 0.12, w = 0.15, η = 0.9, γ = 1, β = 0.98, λ = 2.25; all return measures in percent) Data
b0 = 0.7 k=3
b0 = 2 k=3
b0 = 100 k=3
b0 = 0.7 k = 20
b0 = 2 k = 10
b0 = 100 k=8
log rf
0.58
3.79
3.79
3.79
3.79
3.79
3.79
E log rP
6.03
1.30
2.62
3.68
5.17
5.02
5.88
20.02
17.39
20.87
20.47
25.85
23.84
24.04
0.30
0.07
0.13
0.18
0.20
0.21
0.24
0.10
0.15
0.15
0.15
0.15
0.15
0.15
2.25
2.25
2.25
5.80
3.50
3.20
SD log rP Sharpe ratio Ct+1 P ρ ,r Ct t+1 Average loss aversion i This
table is drawn from Table III in Barberis et al. (2001).
Note that for very large k, which leads via Eq. (30) to very high loss aversion in some states of the world, the premium can rise to a level of 3.50 percent in conjunction with about half (10.4 percent) of the observed historical equity return volatility. Increases in the value of the parameter b0 , which place greater overall relative weight on the utility of gains and losses, also lend to increases in the premium, but only to 1.26 percent when b0 = 100. Clearly, it is the loss aversion parameter that has the power. Table 9 presents results when the consumption and dividend processes are specified independently: Ct+1 = gC + σC ξ˜t+1 , log Ct
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John Donaldson and Rajnish Mehra
log
Dt+1 Dt
= gD + σD ε˜t+1 ,
0 ξt ∼ i.i.d N , 0 εt
1 w
w 1
.
Comparing Tables 8 and 9, it is apparent that separating consumption from dividends has a substantial effect on raising the premium as well as on increasing return volatilities. This is not qualitatively entirely surprising, since there is now much greater dividend volatility–which makes equities more volatile–and this in turn affects an agent’s V ( ) utility much more significantly. Although stock returns are now less highly correlated with consumption (Table 9), this does not matter since the investor is concerned about stock market volatility per se. This latter fact more than compensates for the correlation diminution. By way of contrast, this feature is relatively unproductive in habit-style models as the increased volatility of returns is offset by its reduced correlation with consumption; the net consequence is very little change in the premium. An increase in the parameter k, by increasing loss aversion, has a similarly salutary effect on the premium as it does in Table 8. Loss aversion/narrow framing is an appealing idea, and Barberis et al. (2001) analyze its equilibrium asset pricing implications in a careful and through way. There is, however, a sense in which their study is premature. In particular, we as yet lack choice theoretic underpinnings, and the aggregation properties are as yet unconfirmed (strict aggregation will not hold).
1.7. Beyond One Good and a Representative Agent All of the models considered in the prior sections of the review have been essentially one good, representative agent models. In this section we first highlight elements of the multi-goods literature, which otherwise retains the representative agent construct. Subsequently, we explore a one good heterogeneous agent model where preferences are postulated to have a non-standard expected utility form (rank-dependent expected utility).
1.7.1. Multiple Goods A basic reference here is Piazzesi et al. (2007), which considers preferences defined over two goods, all non-housing consumption (this category comprises non-durable goods consumption and the flow of services from non-housing durables) and housing services. Adopting an otherwise standard Lucas-(1978) style exchange setting, the authors postulate the representative agent’s preferences to be of the form max E
∞ t=0
t
β u(Ct ) ,
(34)
72
Chapter 2 • Risk-Based Explanations of the Equity Premium
where 1− 1
Ct σ , u(Ct ) = 1 − 1/σ (ε−1)/ε
Ct = (Ct
(35)
(ε−1)/ε ε/(ε−1)
+ ωst
)
.
(36)
In (34)–(36), ct denotes non-housing consumption and st the flow of housing services; accordingly, σ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and ε is the corresponding intratemporal elasticity. For high ε values, the agent is very willing to substitute goods within a period; as ε → ∞, they become perfect substitutes. In this way, the level of housing services directly affects the marginal utility of non-housing consumption (the numeraire), and therein lies an additional source of consumption risk. In severe recessions where both housing services and non-housing consumption are simultaneously low, for example, the marginal utility of non-housing consumption is especially high as the agent tries to substitute future non-housing consumption for the anticipated shortfall in future housing services. This increases MRS volatility. An important methodological insight allows the equilibrium pricing kernel to be expressed in terms of non-housing consumption and the share of income going to housing services, an insight that avoids the challenge of constructing a time series for the somewhat imprecise notion of “housing services.” For the parameterization 1/σ = 5, β = 0.99, and ε = 1.05, they obtain a premium of 3.5 percent in conjunction with a risk-free return of 1.8 percent and a premium standard deviation of 11 percent. None of these parameter values is a priori objectionable.54 Another study in the multi-good tradition is Ait-Sahalia et al. (2004), which characterizes investor consumption behavior using time series of luxury-goods purchases. Roughly speaking, the idea is that since the “rich” own a vastly disproportionate share of non-pension equity and debt, their consumption behavior should matter for equity pricing. For this group, furthermore, the marginal consumption items are likely to be luxury goods (proxied by sales of expensive automobiles, the sales of high-end Manhattan co-operative apartments, etc.). The distinction between luxury and basic consumption goods is captured in their utility specification: u (ct , Lt ) =
(ct − a)1−φ (Lt + b)1−ϕ + 1−φ 1−ϕ
(37)
with constants a, b > 0 and φ > ϕ. The former assignment implies that subsistence consumption is positive for basic goods and negative (−b) for luxury goods. In equilibrium, luxury goods are not consumed by those with low consumption levels (the poor). In fact, there exists 54 Piazzesi et al. (2007) rely on two sources of uncertainty: consumption growth and the log expenditure ratio for housing. For that study it is important that they be statistically independent, a property that is assumed. Others have questioned its validity.
73
John Donaldson and Rajnish Mehra 1/φ
a c = a + bϕ/φ Pt > a such that Lt = 0 for ct ≤ c (Pt is the relative price for luxury goods vis-`a-vis basic ones). Finally, the rich consume an increasing fraction of luxury goods as their incomes rise: ct = 0, (38) lim xt → ∞ Xt where Xt = ct + Pt Lt denotes total consumption expenditure. Of relevance to this essay is the fact that this specification leads to two unconditional asset pricing equations of the form −φ ct+1 − a f e = 0, (39) rt+1 − rt+1 E β ct − a −ϕ Lt+1 + b Pt f e E β = 0. rt+1 − rt+1 Lt + b Pt+1
(40)
Ait-Sahalia et al. (2004) then focus their model on a number of issues related to and inclusive of the equity premium puzzle. Using various self-constructed time series, each corresponding to the aggregate purchase of some type of luxury goods (e.g., luxury cars, wine, apartments, etc.), as proxy consumption sequences, the authors estimate, respectively, the implied CRRAs and equity premia, and explore the ability of the model to replicate the cross-sectional returns of the 25 Fama and French (1993) portfolios. Broadly speaking, they find that certain of these series co-vary strongly with the observed return on equity and lead to high premia (7.8 percent, using an index of Manhattan co-op apartment prices). In most cases, the CRRA estimates are on the order of one-tenth that obtained using standard NIPA aggregate consumption measures: since this latter series hardly varies at all and is little correlated with equity returns. The idea is certainly an appealing one, and the results are impressive. Yet the by-now-familiar questions remain: what are the axiomatic foundations, in what sense is aggregation allowed, etc.? A less radical foray into multiple-goods territory is found in Yogo (2006). As such, Yogo (2006) provides another illustration of both the potential and the limitations of the Epstein–Zin utility specification. He considers a model in which the representative agent’s intratemporal utility level is a CES function of non-durable goods consumption, Ct , and the stock of durable goods, Dt :55 ut = u (Ct , Dt ) = (1 −
1− 1ρ α) Ct
+
1− ρ1 αDt
1 1− 1ρ
.
(41)
55 In models of this type, the non-durable good is always the numeraire. Technically, period utility is a function of non-durable goods consumption and the service flow from the stock of durable goods. Yugo (2006) assumes the service flow is directly proportional to the stock.
74
Chapter 2 • Risk-Based Explanations of the Equity Premium
This is coupled with an Epstein–Zin intertemporal utility specification of the form Ut =
(1 − β) [u (Ct , Dt )]
1− σ1
% κ1 1−1σ1 $ 1−γ + β Et Ut+1 .
The corresponding MRSt,t+1 is thus κ 1 1 − σ1 v(Dt+1 /Ct+1 ) ρ − σ Ct+1 1− κ1 MRSt,t+1 = ρ · Rw,t+1 , Ct v(Dt /Ct ) where
(42)
(43)
κ = (1 − γ)/(1 − 1/σ) % 11 $ 1 v (Dt /Ct ) = 1 − α + α (Dt /Ct )1− ρ 1− ρ
and Rw,t+1 is the return on wealth from the optimal portfolio. Following Hansen and Singleton (1982), Yogo (2006) then estimates the parameter values (α, β, ρ, σ, γ) that are consistent with (1) the above model and (2) the historical returns on the 25 Fama–French portfolios.56 He obtains the estimates σ = 0.024, α = 0.827, ρ = 0.52, β = 0.9 and γ = 191, all of which seem plausible except for the risk aversion estimate and, possibly, the relative intratemporal emphasis on durable goods (α = 0.827). That these values can, via (41)–(43), match the data quite well is attributable to the additional terms in the IMRSt,t+1 expression, which are dependent on the (Dt /Ct ) ratio. In the data, this ratio is highly procyclical and thus magnifies the countercyclicality of the marginal utility of consumption. Marginal utility becomes very high at business cycle troughs where both consumption itself and the (Dt /Ct ) ratio are low. Nevertheless, because durable consumption is so smooth, the required CRRA estimate is still excessive relative to that obtained in standard microeconomic applications. While the Epstein and Zin construct is flexible in accommodating many phenomena, it does not necessarily do so for reasonable parameter choices. Note that for this story to work, ρ < σ. In comparing financial statistics, it is the low value of the EIS that allows the model to replicate the historically observed risk-free rate. Multiple goods are not, however, any guarantee of puzzle resolution. Although Yogo (2006) obtains generally attractive results in a model with durable and nondurable goods within the Epstein–Zin preference specification, Giannikos (2007) derives equilibrium premia similar to that obtained in Mehra and Prescott (1985) using standard CES preferences defined over non-durable goods consumption and various representations of the durable goods service flow. His results are driven by positive autocorrelation in the estimated non-durable consumption dividend, a fact that leads to a negative premium on the non-durable goods firm (recall Azeredo (2007)). This negative premium overwhelms the positive premium to the durable goods—producing firm, giving an overall market premium that is counterfactually small and is negative for some parameterizations. 56 As
such, Yogo’s (2006) model also displays a form of composition risk (via the Dt /Ct ratio).
75
John Donaldson and Rajnish Mehra
1.7.2. Agent Heterogeneity There already exists a substantial literature that explores the magnitude of the premium in incomplete market settings where heterogeneity is captured via the experience of idiosyncratic income shocks. In this section, we focus alternatively on preference heterogeneity, its implications for the equity premium in a trading environment, and, ultimately, the usefulness of the representative agent construct. The literature is extremely small: we found only two directly relevant papers, Chan and Kogan (2002) and Chapman and Polkovnichenko (2006).57 Each studies an exchange equilibrium where financial markets are complete. Chan and Kogan (2002) postulate agents with ratio habit preferences of the form u (ct , Xt ; γ) =
1 (ct /Xt )1−γ 1−γ
where ct is the consumption of an individual agent with CRRA parameter value γ. The Xt term, which is their measure of the economy wide living standard, is defined as a weighted average of past aggregate endowment realizations: xt = ln(Xt ) satisfies &t xt = x0 e−λt + λt e−λ(t−s) ys ds 0
where yt = ln(Yt ), and Yt is the period t economy wide endowment. The latter follows a standard Brownian motion process. Note that the choice of the parameter λ determines how strongly past endowment experience influences the living standard measure. Chan and Kogan (2002) construct a representative agent and solve for equilibrium by solving the associated planning problem. Changes in the cross sectional distribution of wealth lead to changes in the economy wide level of risk aversion in the following way. Since the risk averse agents hold most of their wealth in stocks, when endowment is low and the stock’s price low, the fraction of the economy’s wealth controlled by these agents diminishes, leading to increased economy wide risk aversion. The resultant countercyclical risk aversion allows their model to match nearly all of the Campbell and Cochrane (1999) results except for the volatility of the risk free rate. In Chan and Kogan (2002) it is too high relative to what is observed in the data; in Campbell and Cochrane (1999) it matches the data by construction. Chan and Kogan (2002) is important particularly for generating countercyclical risk aversion endogenously in a way that works to resolve the puzzle. In Chapman and Polkovnichenko (2006), preference heterogeneity works against these same stated goals. They postulate a setting where investors have different rank dependent expected utility preferences (RDEU). With its surprising implications, the paper demands a somewhat detailed review. Rather than weighing various utility outcomes by their objective probabilities, RDEU preferences weight outcomes by some 57 We
thank Nick Barberis for bringing these papers to our attention.
76
Chapter 2 • Risk-Based Explanations of the Equity Premium
non-linear weighting function defined over the cumulative probabilities of outcomes that have been utility ranked from worst to best. Typical parameterizations end up over weighting bad outcomes. In general, a RDEU welfare functional will have kinks at allocations where consumption outcomes are equal across any two states. Consider an environment of i = 1, . . . , n states of nature and K agents where all agents have the same CRRA utility function over consumption outcomes in particular states, k 1−γ ci k k , U ci = 1−γ where cik represents agent k’s consumption in state i. Let C k, P k denote a consumption lottery where, respectively, consumption across states is ranked from worst to best, and P denotes the vector of cumulative probabilities. More specifically, C k, P k = k
k k c1 . . . , cN , P1k , . . . , PNk where cik < ci+1 and Pik = πj where πj is the objective j≤i
probability of the state corresponding to the consumption allocation cjk . Note that different outcomes will have different associated vectors of cumulative probabilities. In the Chapman and Polkovnichenko (2006) formulation, the RDEU value function of agent k is given by U k ({C, P }) =
N
qk (P ) uk cik ,
(44)
i=1
φk k φk where qk (P ) = Pik − Pi−1 is the weighting function. Note that if φk ≡ 1, the expression collapses to one of expected utility, and if φk < 1, the agent is pessimistic. In general equilibrium, the qk (P ) weights will be endogenously determined, just as the consumption outcomes across states are themselves determined endogenously in equilibrium. The authors then go on to consider a two-agent, two-date equilibrium where the agents differ in their pessimism parameters, φk . With φ1 = 1 (expected utility) and φ2 = 0.4 (substantial pessimism), they find that the equity risk premium is only 17 percent of the risk premium in an economy where the consumers are identical (φ1 = φ2 = 0.4). It is, however, twice the level obtained for the corresponding homogeneous preference economy, where everyone has expected utility (φ1 = φ2 = 1). In solving for the equilibrium, they construct a representative agent and solve accordingly. In equilibrium, REDU economies display limited risk sharing since the preference structure implies that for small risk premia, the more pessimistic agent may not choose to invest in the risky asset at all. Aggregate risk is then priced only by the less pessimistic agent. What is present is endogenous participation in the equity markets. In a dynamic equilibrium multi-agent RDEU model, we could imagine a situation of some agents entering and exiting the equity markets voluntarily as the economy passes from expansions to recessions. Would such an economy endogenously exhibit countercyclical risk aversion? Would the attractive business cycle/equity premium characteristics of, e.g., the Guvenen (2005) and Danthine and Donaldson (2002) models be preserved, despite
77
John Donaldson and Rajnish Mehra
the fact that participation in equity markets is not fixed a priori? These are reasonable issues to explore. From the perspective of this paper, the results are especially striking. In particular, Chapman and Polkovnichenko (2006) remind us that using the representative agent construct in a non-standard heterogeneous preference setting may be uninformative as it ignores important endogenous risk-sharing effects. Before leaving this body of material, some comparative remarks might be useful. Table 10 summarizes the properties of the various preference specifications considered thus far. We first note that a number of open questions remain. Many involve aggregation. Without this property, the results of Chapman and Polkovnichenko (2006) may recur in other contexts. The habit formation construct of Campbell and Cochrane (1999), the prospect theory of Barberis et al. (2001), and the GDA preferences of Routledge and Zin (2004) all yield effective countercyclical risk aversion, and in many respects, their results with regard to the equity premium are similar. A number of features of the GDA construct would seem to give it an edge, however. Relative to simple expected utility, it
TABLE 10 Characteristics of Principal Asset Pricing Paradigms Attribute
Preference type A B C D E F G H I Conventional Epstein– Melino– Constantinides– Campbell– Falato Zinn– Barberis– RDEU CRRA Zin, Yang Sundaresan Cochrane Routledge Huang Chew– (linear habit) Deckel
1. Does a representative agent exist?
Yes
Yes
?i
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
2. Is strict aggregation a possibility?
Yes
No
No
?
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
3. Does its use in portfolio problems lead to time consistent planning?
Yes
Yes
?
Yes
?
?
Yes
?
?
4. Do choicetheoretic axiomatic foundations exist?
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
?
5. Is countercyclical risk aversion a principal feature?
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
?
i The
question mark indicates that the answer to the question is unknown or not fully understood.
78
Chapter 2 • Risk-Based Explanations of the Equity Premium
generates the fewest additional parameters and is the only structure of the three (to date) with axiomatic foundations. Relative to the two alternatives cited above, they are the only structure that allows the separation of risk and time preferences. (More recent work by Barberis and Huang (2001) allows this as well.) Furthermore, there is no need for external scaling or an external reference point to maintain return stationarity. In short, GDA preferences have the advantage of economy and simplicity. It is unclear, however, if any of these constructs will be compatible with the stylized financial and business cycle facts—or, indeed, with generally accepted consumption processes—when placed in a production setting. Numerous other behavioral representations are modeled in the literature. Constantinides et al. (2007), for example, argue for a period utility representation of the form U (ct ) + LV (Bt ) , 1−γ
where ct denotes the period consumption and V (Bt ) = Bt B /(1 − γB ) the utility of bequests, Bt . The L parameter assumes a value of 0 except in the final period of the agent’s life when L = 1 (the context is obviously one of finitely lived overlapping generations). Since Bt measures the value of bequests, it is a quantity that will be highly correlated with the return on the stock market. As a result, agents who are substantially bequest risk-averse will demand a high premium to hold equity securities in their final period of life. While this modeling device does lead to a high premium, other counterfactuals arise.
2. PRODUCTION ECONOMIES The production-based asset pricing literature is oriented to constructing models that successfully replicate both the stylized facts of the business cycle and the financial markets. To review how the business cycle is characterized in the data and in dynamic, stochastic, general equilibrium models, see the section by Danthine, Donaldson, and Siconolfi in this volume (Danthine et al. (2008)). Relevant papers with a primary focus on the equity premium puzzle include Jermann (1998), Boldrin et al. (2001), Danthine et al. (1992), Danthine and Donaldson (2002), and Guvenen (2005). Lettau and Uhlig (2000) focus only on the relationship of habit formation to consumption volatility, although the implications of their results for the premium are straightforward. Production models display the feature that the dividend series and the asset pricing agent’s consumption series are endogenously determined within the model.58 All the mechanisms reviewed in this section will have consequences for the statistical properties of these series. Habit formation in a production context such as Hansen (1985), in particular, will induce the model’s representative agent to tailor his investment 58 Accordingly,
assets are then priced using the standard Lucas (1978) asset pricing perspective.
79
John Donaldson and Rajnish Mehra
and labor service decisions in such a way as to reduce, dramatically, his endogenous consumption volatility vis-`a-vis an otherwise identically parameterized construct without the habit feature: consumption as a pure macroeconomic quantity becomes counterfactually smooth, and the associated premium falls essentially to zero. A successful model must thus display not only a strong desire on the part of agents for consumption smoothing but also severe (but plausible) technological restrictions that inhibit their ability to do so. Within the production literature, most models require some variation on habit formation to generate a high and countercyclical level of effective risk aversion. The complementary features that interfere with the consequent consumption smoothing are myriad. We consider Jermann (1998) as an important illustrative case. Jermann’s equilibrium allocations of consumption, investment, etc. solve ∞ t max E β u (Ct − αCt−1 ) , {It }
t=0
subject to Kt+1 = (1 − Ω) Kt + ϕ (It /Kt ) Kt Ct + It ≤ f (Kt , Pt Nt ) λt λt = ρλt−1 + ε˜t , where f (Kt , Pt Nt ) λt = K θ (Pt Nt )1−θ λt , with θ = 0.64, β = 0.99, ρ = 0.99, u (Ct − αCt ) =
(Ct − αCt−1 )1−γ , 1−γ
with γ = 5, Ω = 0.025, and Pt = (1.005) Pt−1 ; i.e., a constant growth rate of labor productivity of 0.5 percent per quarter (the calibrated time period).59 Clearly, it is the habit formation feature most prominently that causes the agent to display a strong desire for consumption smoothing. But what features stand in his way from doing so? First and foremost is the cost of capital adjustment function, φ
It Kt
Kt =
a1 1−ξ
It Kt
1−1/ξ + a2 ,
where ξ = 0.23, and a1 , a2 are constants chosen so that the balanced growth path is invariant to ξ. Second, and less transparently, there is no ability of the agent to vary his labor supply, despite the fact that his period preference ordering manifests no disutility from doing so. The results of Jermann’s (1998) exercise are presented in Table 11. All the claims we have made in this section are manifest in Table 11. Consider column A’s statistics. This corresponds to an unfettered production model: no habit and 59 Under
a growth scenario β = 0.99 = βˆ (1.005)1−γ, where βˆ is the subjective discount factor.
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Chapter 2 • Risk-Based Explanations of the Equity Premium
TABLE 11i The Equity Premium in the Production Economy of Jermann (All parameter values as in text, except as noted; various scenarios; all return statistics in percent, annualized) Parameter choices E
Fiii
3.91
0.82
1.580
0.61
11.46
0.460
4.23
4.58
7.00
1.590
2.90
1.21
6.09
19.86
0.480
0.02
0.26
0.03
0.67
6.18
0.001
0.02
0.26
0.03
0.67
6.18
0.001
A
B
C
D
Erf
4.26
3.36
4.20
SDr f
0.62
0.76
0.59
Ere
4.28
3.66
SDr e
1.02
Erp Erp SDr p SD ΔC/SD ΔY (ii)
not reported 0.77
0.78
0.33
1.14
0.49
A. Standard model: α = 0, a1 = a2 = 0 – no habit, no COA. B. Same as case A but with γ = 10. C. Habit formation, no COA. D. Costs of adjustment, no habit formation. E. Habit and adjustment costs. F. Habit and adjustment costs but variable labor supply. i Columns A–E are from Table 1 in Jermann (1998), while column F is from Boldrin et al. (2001). ii This is the SD of the consumption growth rate relative to the SD of the output growth rate. iii Preferences as noted in text; α = 0.9, ξ = 0.23; otherwise as in Jermann (1998).
no adjustment costs, so the agent is totally free to adjust his investment to smooth out his consumption. As a result, the premium is a miserly 0.02 percent, which is even lower than its exchange economy counterpart. Column B corresponds to an otherwise identical case but for γ = 10. The premium does rise, but by an insignificant 0.24 percent, and return standard deviations remain much too low (compare this result with those in Table 1). In column C, the agent displays habit formation with a habit parameter α = 0.82. This greatly amplified effective risk aversion induces the agent to tailor his investment plan to elicit greater consumption smoothing. As a result, the SD of the growth rate of consumption declines by more than one-half. Despite the added local risk aversion, the smoother consumption series draws the premium—and the return volatilities—more or less back to their column A values. Costs of adjustment (column D) make it substantially more expensive for the agent to effect consumption smoothing via investment volatility. With this obstruction, the premium rises but still falls short even of 1 percent. When habit formation is incorporated in conjunction with COA (column E), the premium matches its historical benchmark, confirming the earlier intuition; equity return volatility is quite reasonable as well, as is the mean risk-free rate. Only the risk-free rate volatility is mismatched, with the model producing an SD more than twice the historical level. This is not entirely surprising given the knife-edged nature of the habit formation mechanism and the enormous swings in risk aversion it tends to generate.
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Column F, from an early version of Boldrin et al. (2001), contains the results for a slightly modified Jermann (1998) model enriched by incorporating an agent whose utility is linear in leisure (risk-neutral), essentially as in Hansen (1985). Such an agent is unconcerned with variations in his labor supply; under this specification, the agent’s period utility function is of the form u(Ct , Ct−1 , 1 − nt ) = log(Ct − αCt−1 ) + Bnt , Unfortunately, this added flexibility causes the premium to collapse to a mere 0.001 percent, with the equity and risk-free standard deviations not far behind at, respectively, 0.46 and 0.48 percent. This example fully illustrates the difficulty in incorporating standard preference mechanisms into production settings. As of this writing, we are unaware of any attempts to incorporate “loss aversion” or “happiness maintenance” into a production context, but the consequences are likely to be similar. Note that nearly all recent production models rely in some way on habit formation. Eschewing this feature, Campanale et al. (2006) explore the business cycle and agent pricing properties of a production economy very similar to Jermann (1998) (for instance, there is a cost to adjusting capital) where the representative agent possesses Epstein–Zin preferences and the certainty equivalent is obtained using GDA risk preferences and special cases thereof (expected utility and (DA), disappointment aversion preferences). Solving the model using traditional discrete state-space methodologies, they are able to replicate a very wide class of stylized financial and business cycle facts, thereby effectively challenging the habit formation device. Perhaps most strikingly, they do so for implied risk aversion that is similar to a logarithmic expected utility agent. As with the earlier habit-based literature, risk-free rate volatility remains excessive.60 It would also be of interest to know the consequences for their results of admitting a variable labor supply. The paper is important not only for introducing these richer preference structures into a production context but also for more broadly re-energizing the asset pricing production research program. Production-based asset pricing models are important because they afford an opportunity for cross-model verification. Since the actions of the same agents give rise to both macroeconomic and financial phenomena, a comprehensive, reliable model should be able to explain both sets of stylized facts equally well. At the current level of understanding, this is not yet the case.
3. DISASTER EVENTS AND SURVIVORSHIP BIAS Reitz (1988) proposed a solution to the equity premium puzzle that incorporates a very small probability of a very large drop in consumption (a “disaster state”). Beyond the incorporation of this third growth state, the structure of his model is identical to that of 60 Kallenbruner and Lochstoer (2004) demonstrate that a reasonably calibrated production model with Epstein–Zin preferences can jointly explain important macroeconomic and financial stylized facts without the excessive risk-free rate volatility characteristic of habit formulations.
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Chapter 2 • Risk-Based Explanations of the Equity Premium
Mehra and Prescott (1985). Since disaster states are ones of extremely high marginal utility of consumption, we might expect their incorporation to push up risk-free asset prices and diminish risky ones. As a result, the premium should rise. Table 12 presents a sample of scenarios drawn from Reitz (1988). The incorporation of the disaster scenario, even with small conditional or unconditional probability, does allow for a resolution of the premium. This is not in dispute although the plausibility of such a huge drop in consumption is open to question. The model requires a 1-in-100 chance of a 25 percent decline in consumption to reconcile the equity premium with a risk aversion parameter of 10. Following on these results, Barro (2006) details all major cross-country consumption declines post-1913. While certain European countries experienced consumption declines of as much as 64 percent during World War II (e.g., Germany and Greece), even in the worst years of the Great Depression, U.S. consumption only declined by about 30 percent. In light of these figures, the percentage declines postulated by Reitz (1988) do not seem so extreme. One must assess other potential implications of the model, however. One is that the real interest rate and the probability of the occurrence of the extreme event move inversely. For example, the perceived probability of a recurrence of a depression was probably very high just after World War II and subsequently declined over time. If real interest rates rose significantly as the war years receded, that evidence would support the Rietz hypothesis. Similarly, if the low probability event precipitating the large decline in consumption were a nuclear war, the perceived probability of such an event has surely
TABLE 12 The Equity Premium and Risk-Free Rate: Possible Disaster State (All returns in percent, annualized) Panel Ai Disaster: Output falls to half its previous value Probability of entering
γ
β
Erf
Erp
0.0008
7.00
0.997
0.83
6.18
0.0030
5.30
0.980
0.89
6.15
Disaster
Panel
Bii
Disaster: Output falls to three-fourths its previous value Probability of entering
γ
β
Erf
Erp
0.010
9.80
0.999
0.74
6.95
0.014
8.85
0.999
0.84
6.49
Disaster
i Taken ii Taken
from Table 3 of Reitz (1988). from Table 6 of Reitz (1988).
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varied over the last 100 years. It must have been low before 1945, the first and only year the atom bomb was used. And it must have been higher before the Cuban Missile Crisis than after it. If real interest rates had moved as predicted, that would have supported Rietz’s disaster scenario. But they did not. The reader is referred to Mehra and Prescott (1988) for a detailed response to Reitz (1988) along these lines. Barro (2006) presents a model in the same spirit as Reitz (1988) but in a context where more attention may be given to calibration and the historical record. The historical justification for his calibration is, in fact, fascinating to read. The point of departure of the paper is a postulated stochastic process for aggregate output growth that allows for rare events in a generalized Rietz setting. Specifically, he models aggregate output growth as a random walk with drift, whose innovations are of three possible types: 1. “diffusive” shocks (i.i.d. normal shocks), 2. jump shocks of “type v”—shocks that represent situations where output contracts sharply but there is no occurrence of a default on debt, and 3. jump shocks of “type w”—shocks that represent situations where output contracts sharply and a default on debt ensues.61 In particular, Barro assumes that the log of output Yt ≡ Ct grows according to the random walk with drift process: log Yt+1 = log Yt + g + u˜ t+1 + v˜t+1 ,
(45)
where u˜ t+1 is an i.i.d random variable distributed N (0, σu2 ) and v˜t+1 ( jump shock “type v”) captures low probability downward jumps in GDP. If a disaster occurs, with probability p, output declines by the fraction b. Very roughly speaking, a reasonable calibration requires b to be large and p small. More formally, −p 0, with probability e , −p (46) v˜t+1 = ˜ log 1 − b , with probability 1 − e . In his calibration exercise, b˜ is a random variable whose probability density function coincides with the frequency distribution reflecting the size of contractions in 35 countries in the 20th century (b˜ ranges from 0.17 to 0.62). Barro also admits the possibility of default on government debt of proportion d, with probability q whenever a “type v” jump occurs. In other words, whenever a jump shock of “type v” occurs, there is a probability q ofa “type w” jump. Table 13 presents a sample of results for the calibration exercises b˜ = d˜ . In all cases, preferences are as in Mehra and Prescott (1985) with CRRA = 4 and time preferences parameter β = e−ρ = e−0.03 = 0.9704. The results presented here are intriguing and lend support to a resurrection of the disaster scenario as a viable justification for the premium. The distinction between “type v” events and “type w” events is theoretically appealing in terms of their different implications for quantities and prices. However, we feel 61 Barro
(2006) does not explicitly define a type w shock. We introduce it here as an aid to exposition.
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Chapter 2 • Risk-Based Explanations of the Equity Premium
TABLE 13i Financial Statistics: Barro’s (2006) Model (All rates of return annualized in percent; all cases θ = 4, σu = 0.02, q = 0.4; time preference e−ρ, ρ = 0.03) g = 0.025
g = 0.025
g = 0.020
g = 0.025
p = 0.017
p = 0.025
p = 0.017
p = 0.017
Ere
7.1
4.4
5.1
6.1
Erf
3.5
−0.7
1.5
2.5
Erp
3.6
5.2
3.6
3.6
this distinction is largely a consequence of the specific functional forms used to model the two types of rare events and the assumption that they are independent—something we intuitively think is not very plausible. To support the observed equity premium (in the baseline model), a decline in GDP growth of 50 percent is needed. The plausibility of such a substantial decline in per capita GDP growth is justified by the figures in Barro (2006, Table 1), where this decline is shown to be 64 percent in Germany and Greece (during World War II) or 31 percent in the U.S. (during the Great Depression). These observations, however, are not at an annual frequency.62 Looking at data at an annual frequency, we see little evidence of such a substantial decline either in GDP growth or in the growth rate of consumption. If the equity premium is estimated at an annual frequency, then the relevant growth rates should also be at annual frequencies. We argue that calibrations should be done at the same frequency as observations. As is standard in the equity premium literature, Barro calibrates his model using output growth rates rather than consumption growth rates since in a pure exchange setting they are identical. While this distinction may not matter in a stylized economy without disaster states, the two quantities might empirically be quite different in the event of an extreme disaster. Consumption per capita will probably be a much smoother series than GDP per capita. In the event that such states occur, consumption is unlikely to remain a constant proportion of the output. Capital investment and capital utilization rates will change and act as channels to absorb the negative productivity shocks (see also Section 2), enabling consumption smoothing over time and across states. For this reason, since we do live in a production economy, it would be interesting to explore the robustness of Barro’s (2006) results using cross-country data on the growth rates of per capita consumption instead of output within that more general context.
62 In a sense the results are obtained using the 4-year drop in consumption as if it is a 1-year effect. The claimed equity premium should be compared to the observed 4-year effect (4 × 6 = 24 percent) and not the 1-year 6 percent.
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A closely related literature concerns “peso problems.” This means that returns are higher than justified by current experience because investors assign a positive probability to some as-yet-unrealized disaster state. In the context of this essay, it suggests the possibility that the observed equity premium in the U.S. may result from expectations of disaster events that happen not to have materialized in the sample period of observations. Recent work by Goetzmann and Jorion (1999) supports this perspective: after concluding that the high U.S. historical premium is in some sense unique, they suggest that it may be attributable to the fact that disastrous events (most especially WWII) affecting many financial markets have largely spared the U.S. economy. In a production setting similar to Jermann’s (1988) but with a variable labor supply, no costs of adjustment and no habit (a model that is in some sense set up with a bias against resolving the puzzle), Danthine and Donaldson (2002) replicate all first moments of returns, nearly exactly, in a peso-style model where the disaster is anticipated but never realized. The required ingredients mandate a debt-to-equity ratio of 0.3, an anticipated disaster state where output falls by 50 percent, a CRRA of 3, and a (conditional) probability of entering the disaster state of 0.008. Return volatilities are much too low, however (this is to a lesser extent true for Barro (2006) as well). A similar but more detailed exercise is undertaken by Cecchetti et al. (1993, 2000) in an exchange setting. All this is to suggest that unrealized beliefs may be critical to the puzzle’s resolution and that the results in Reitz (1988) and others can be strengthened if reported returns are generated from time series in which the actual disaster state does not appear. Veronesi (2004) goes one step further by postulating a peso-style model with representative agent learning. Dividends follow a simple linear stochastic process where the drift coefficient assumes one of two values, a normal level of θ¯ and a low, ¯ there is a small probability of shifting from θ¯ to θ¯ and a high probrecession level of θ; ability of returning. The drift coefficient is not observed directly, however, and Veronesi (2004) derives the period-by-period posterior probability of being in the normal growth state. This estimate itself evolves stochastically. Veronesi (2004) then explores the asset pricing characteristics of this economy for time paths where the low growth state is never actually realized. He derives high price sensitivity to dividend changes, increased return volatility in perceived recessions, etc. as well as significant equity premia. Unfortunately, theories built on beliefs other than pure rational expectations are difficult to test empirically. Another attempt at resolving the puzzle proposed by Brown et al. (1995) focuses on the related notion of survival bias. The central thesis here is that the ex-post measured returns reflect the premium, in the U.S., on a stock market that has successfully weathered the vicissitudes of fluctuating financial fortunes. Many other exchanges were unsuccessful, and hence the ex-ante equity premium was low. Since it was not known a priori which exchanges would survive, for this explanation to work, stock and bond markets must be differentially influenced by a financial crisis. Governments have expropriated much of the real value of nominal debt by the mechanism of unanticipated inflation. Five historical instances come readily to mind: during the German hyperinflation, holders of bonds denominated in Reichmarks lost virtually all value invested in those assets. During the Poincar´e administration in France in the 1920s, bond holders
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Chapter 2 • Risk-Based Explanations of the Equity Premium
lost nearly 90 percent of the value invested in nominal debt. And in the 1980s, Mexican holders of dollar-denominated debt lost a sizable fraction of its value when the Mexican government, in a period of rapid inflation, converted the debt to pesos and limited the rate at which these funds could be withdrawn. Czarist bonds in Russia and Chinese debt holdings (subsequent to the fall of the Nationalists) suffered a similar fate under communist regimes. The above examples demonstrate that in times of financial crisis, bonds are as likely to lose value as stocks. Although a survival bias may impact on the levels of both the return on equity and debt, there is no evidence to support the assertion that these crises impact differentially on the returns to stocks and bonds; hence, the equity premium should not necessarily be materially affected. In every instance where trading equity has been suspended, due to political upheavals, etc., governments have either reneged on their debt obligations or expropriated much of the real value of nominal debt through the mechanism of unanticipated inflation. The difficulty that several model classes have collectively had in explaining the equity premium as a compensation for bearing risk leads us to conclude that perhaps it is not a “risk premium” but rather due to other factors. We consider these in the next section.
4. MARKET INCOMPLETENESS AND TRADING FRICTIONS Market incompleteness assumes one of two different forms: (1) certain securities are not traded, and/or (2) certain individuals are for some reason excluded from financial market participation. A complete market structure where all investors can trade any security is necessary for the construction of the representative agent. In this case, the equilibrium in a heterogeneous full information economy is isomorphic in its asset pricing implications to the equilibrium of a representative agent, full information economy, if households have von Neumann–Morgenstern preferences. It is this paradigm that has provided the foundation to the essay so far. In this section we briefly review context (2), above, since the first is more than adequately considered in the essays by Constantinides and Heaton and Lucas. In our discussion of (2), we focus on restricted participation resulting from borrowing constraints imposed on certain agents.
4.1. Restricted Participation In infinite horizon models, the effect of borrowing constraints and transaction costs is to force investors to hold an inventory of bonds (precautionary demand) to smooth their consumption. As a result, agents come close to equalizing their marginal rates of substitution with little effect on the equity premium: the economy is essentially one of complete markets.63 Recent attempts to resolve the puzzle by incorporating both 63 This
is true unless the supply of bonds is unrealistically low. See Aiyagari and Gertler (1991).
John Donaldson and Rajnish Mehra
87
borrowing constraints and consumer heterogeneity have thus focused on finite horizon OLG economies. One such example is proposed in Constantinides, Donaldson, and Mehra (2002).64 The authors construct an overlapping-generations (OLG) exchange economy in which consumers live for three periods. In the first period, a period of human capital acquisition, the consumer receives a relatively low endowment income. In the second period, the consumer is employed and receives wage income subject to large uncertainty. In the third period, the consumer retires and consumes the assets accumulated in the second period. The implications of a borrowing constraint are explored by deriving and contrasting the stationary equilibria in two versions of the economy. In the borrowing-constrained version, the young are prohibited from borrowing or from selling equity short. This is not an artificial constraint since loans and short sales require collateral (accumulated wealth), which the young typically lack. The borrowing-unconstrained economy differs from the borrowing-constrained one only in that the borrowing constraint and the shortsale constraint for the young are absent. There are two types of securities in the model, bonds, and equity with ex-coupon and ex-dividend prices qtb and qte , respectively. Bonds are a claim to a coupon payment b every period, while the equity is a claim to the dividend stream {dt }. The consumer born in period t receives deterministic wage income w 0 > 0 in period t, when young; 1 stochastic wage income wt+1 > 0 in period t + 1, when middle-aged; and zero wage income in period t + 2, when old. The consumer purchases zet,0 shares of stock and zbt,0 bonds when young. The consumer adjusts these holdings to zet,1 and zbt,1 , respectively, when middle-aged. The consumer liquidates his/her entire portfolio when old. Thus, zet,2 = 0 and zbt,2 = 0. An unconstrained representative agent’s maximization problem is formulated as follows. The agent born in period t solves 2 i β U (ct,i ) emaxb E zt,i , zt,i i=0 subject to ct,0 + qte zet,1 + qtb zbt,1 ≤ w 0 , e b e b 1 ct,1 + qt+1 zet,2 + qt+1 zbt,2 ≤ qt+1 + dt+1 zet,1 + qt+1 + b zbt,1 + wt+1 , e b b e ct,2 ≤ qt+2 + dt+2 zt,2 + qt+2 + b zt,2 , where ct,j is the consumption in period t + j (j = 0, 1, 2) of a consumer born in period t. When considering the borrowing constrained equilibrium, the following additional constraints are imposed: zet,0 > 0 and zbt,0 > 0. The model introduces two forms of restricted participation. First, consumers of one generation are prohibited from trading claims against their future wage income 64 See
also the companion papers by Constantinides et al. (2005, 2007) and the paper by Storesletten et al. (2008) in this volume.
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Chapter 2 • Risk-Based Explanations of the Equity Premium
with consumers of another generation.65 Second, consumers of one generation are prohibited from trading bonds and equity with consumers of an unborn generation. As discussed earlier in Section 2, absent a complete set of contingent claims, consumer heterogeneity in the form of uninsurable, persistent, and heteroscedastic idiosyncratic income shocks, with countercyclical conditional variance, can potentially contribute to the resolution of empirical difficulties encountered by representative-consumer models.66 The novelty lies in incorporating a life-cycle feature to study asset pricing. As discussed earlier, the attractiveness of equity as an asset depends on the correlation between consumption and equity income. If equity pays off in states of high marginal utility of consumption, it will command a higher price (and consequently a lower rate of return) than if its payoff is in states where marginal utility is low. Since the marginal utility of consumption varies inversely with consumption itself, equity will command a high rate of return if it pays off in states when consumption is high, and vice versa.67 In and of itself, this is the standard intuition. A key insight of the paper is the observation that as the correlation of equity income with consumption changes over the life cycle of an individual, so does the attractiveness of equity as an asset. Consumption can be decomposed into the sum of wages and equity income. A young person looking forward has uncertain future wage and equity income; furthermore, the correlation of his equity income with his consumption will not be particularly high, as long as stock and wage income are not highly correlated. This is empirically the case, as documented by Davis and Willen (2000). Equity will thus be a hedge against fluctuations in wages and a “desirable” asset to hold as far as the young are concerned. The same asset (equity) has a very different characteristic for the middle-aged. Their wage uncertainty has been entirely resolved: their future retirement wage income is either zero or deterministic, and the innovations (fluctuations) in their consumption occur from fluctuations in equity income. At this stage of the life cycle, equity income is highly correlated with consumption. Consumption is high when equity income is high, and equity is no longer a hedge against fluctuations in consumption; hence, for this group, it requires a higher rate of return. The characteristics of equity as an asset therefore change, depending on who the predominant holder of the equity happens to be. Life-cycle considerations thus become crucial for asset pricing. If equity is a “desirable” asset for the marginal investor in the economy, then the observed equity premium will be low, relative to an economy where the marginal investor finds it unattractive to hold equity. The deus ex machina is the stage in the life cycle of the marginal investor. 65 Being homogeneous within their generation, consumers have no incentive to trade claims with consumers of their own generation. 66 See Mankiw (1986) and Constantinides and Duffie (1996). 67 This is precisely the reason, why high-beta stocks in the simple CAPM framework have a high rate of return. In that model, the return on the market is a proxy for consumption. High-beta stocks pay off when the market return is high, i.e., when marginal utility is low; hence, their price is (relatively) low and their rate of return high.
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The authors argue that the young, who should be holding equity in an economy without frictions and with complete contracting, are effectively shut out of this market because of borrowing constraints. The young are characterized by low wages; ideally, they would like to smooth lifetime consumption by borrowing against future wage income (consuming a part of the loan and investing the rest in higher-return equity). However, they are prevented from doing so because human capital alone does not collateralize major loans in modern economies for reasons of moral hazard and adverse selection. In the presence of borrowing constraints, equity is thus exclusively priced by the middle-aged investors, since the young are effectively excluded from the equity markets, and we observe a high equity premium. If the borrowing constraint is relaxed, the young will borrow to purchase equity, thereby raising the bond yield. The increase in the bond yield induces the middle-aged to shift their portfolio holdings from equity to bonds. The increase in demand for equity by the young and the decrease in the demand for equity by the middle-aged work in opposite directions. On balance, the effect is to increase both the equity and the bond return while simultaneously shrinking the equity premium. Furthermore, the relaxation of the borrowing constraint reduces the net demand for bonds, and the risk-free rate puzzle re-emerges.68 In a subsequent paper, Da Silva (2006) generalizes the Constantinides et al. (2002) restricted participation model to admit habit formation where the habit coefficients of the old and middle-aged differ.69 Using the notation of this section, the objective function of the period t-born representative agent is 2 i max E β u ct,i − ηi ct−1, i , (47) {zet,i , zbt,i } i=1 with η1 , η2 the habit parameters. It follows that the MRS and the effective level of risk aversion of the middle-aged agent are, respectively, βu1 ct,2 − η2 ct,1 (48) , u1 ct,1 − η1 ct,0 − η2 βE u1 ct,2 − η2 ct,1 γct,1 . ct,1 − η1 ct,0
(49)
the latter expression corresponding to the standard CRRA period utility function, u(c) = (c1−γ /1 − γ), interacting with the habit. It is immediately apparent from (48) that both η1 and η2 appear in the MRS and that, by (49), the effective CRRA is thus time-varying. 68 Bear
in mind, however, that the returns reported for this construct are annualized 20-year returns. Silva and Giannikos (2006) explore the same construct where the CRRA of the old agent is greater than the corresponding value for the middle-aged agent. 69 Da
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Chapter 2 • Risk-Based Explanations of the Equity Premium
Generally speaking, Da Silva and Giannikos (2006) plausibly hypothesize that η1 > η2 , suggesting that the elderly more readily accept consumption levels altered relative to that of their middle-aged working years than do the middle-aged relative to their youth. The model yields surprisingly good results. In particular, for γ = 2 and (η1 , η2 ) = (0.7, 0.2), the premium exceeds 4 percent. This figure is associated with standard deviations that match their empirical counterparts quite well (20 and 7 percent for the equity and risk-free securities, respectively); average returns, however, are somewhat too high across the board. By (49), the effective CRRA of the middle-aged agent is 3.37 (2.48 for the old agent), figures that, per se, will not raise eyebrows. Compared to the effective risk aversion coefficient in Campbell and Cochrane (1999), these figures are astonishingly low. Generally speaking, a high equilibrium premium can result even if η1 and η2 are both small, a fact that is not necessarily true of infinite horizon constructs. A premium of 2.96 is obtained, for example, from a parameter combination of γ = 2, η1 = 0.30 and η2 = 0.05.70 Da Silva’s work is an example of the case where a small amount of agent heterogeneity goes a long way toward matching the data. As in representative agent habit models, risk aversion is effectively stochastic. Nevertheless, returns are stationary since the MRS depends only on consumption growth rates, which themselves are stationary series.71 The level dependence effects noted in Danthine et al. (2004) are thus absent. Guvenen (2005) invokes limited participation but within a traditional infinite horizon production context. In his model, shareholders can trade stocks and bonds to smooth out their own consumption, while workers can only trade risk-free bonds. Thus limited in their trading opportunities, workers can only self-insure by acquiring bonds, thereby bidding up their prices, and leading to a low risk-free rate. Although shareholders have multiple consumption smoothing devices (capital shares, bonds), in equilibrium they end up issuing bonds to workers and thus indirectly provide insurance to them. Not only does Guvenen’s (2005) abstraction lead to a replication of all the basic financial stylized facts, but he is also able to demonstrate a near equivalence with the habit formation construct of Campbell and Cochrane (1999). The restricted participation construct of Guvenen (2005) is related to the hypothesis that firms’ shareholders directly provide partial income insurance to their workers in the context of a labor contract (see Danthine et al. (2008) in this volume). In either case, the equilibrium outcome is one in which the wealthier agents with greater access to consumption smoothing devices end up insuring the less wealthy, restricted-access agents. With regard to replicating the stylized facts, it does not seem important whether the insurance is provided within the firm or in the financial market. In the former case, 70 All
figures are obtained in a context where the endowment process is identical to that hypothesized in Constantinides et al. (2002). 71 For CRRA preferences, u(c) = c1−γ /1 − γ, the MRS is ⎛ ⎞−γ β
u (ct+1 − ct ) (ct+1 − ct )−γ ⎜ gt,t+1 − 1 ⎟ =β =⎝ ⎠ u (ct − ct−1 ) (ct − ct−1 ) 1 1− gt−1 ,t
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shareholder consumption is more variable as they are residual claimants: wages essentially leverage their dividend income streams. In the latter case (Guvenen (2005)), shareholders have, on net, negative bond positions: they hold leveraged portfolios and receive as a result equally high risk consumption streams. Surely, these alternative mechanisms can be assessed on empirical grounds—Mehra and Prescott’s (2007) balance sheet analysis of the U.S. economy emphasizes the latter alternative since wealthy shareholders are found to be net borrowers in the economy. The actual fact is likely to be a bit of both. Both alternatives are more appealing—based on micro-foundations—than the somewhat higher-level abstraction, e.g., of Campbell and Cochrane (1999). In an important, very recent paper, Gomes and Michaelides (2006) go beyond Constantinides et al. (2005) by endogenizing stock market participation (there is a fixed cost to participation and only as agents become sufficiently wealthy are they willing to pay it) in a production based OLG model where agents experience idiosyncratic labor income shocks and borrowing constraints (they cannot borrow against their stochastic life cycle earnings profile). They find that the equity risk premium is relatively unaffected by the limited participation, and is almost entirely determined by incomplete risk sharing within the shareholder class. Non stock market participants are more realistically less wealthy than their counterparts in Guvenen (2005). In their baseline parameterization they derive an equlibrium premium of around 4% with a 2.5% risk free rate. The model is itself a new benchmark and reminds us how the progressive endogenization of previously fixed decisions can change our perspective on the fundamental drivers of financial phenomena. It lacks only a standard macro-style labor leisure choice, something that experience has shown will not be helpful for the task at hand. Nevertheless, Gomes and Michaelides (2006), appears to be the most comprehensive production model to date.
5. MODEL UNCERTAINTY The original Mehra and Prescott (1985) model, as well as all the modifications considered heretofore in this essay, are rational expectations formulations. As such, the agents in the model know exactly the environment in which they operate, including precise knowledge of the stochastic process governing the evolution of output (also the dividend and consumption) and any other state variables that arise in more elaborate versions. At best, this is a very strong assumption. In reality, the exact form of the relevant stochastic processes is not known to investors, at least with regard to distribution parameters, and it is reasonable to expect that this “model uncertainty” would itself command a premium. Three recent papers in this tradition are Mehra and Sah (2002), Barillas et al. (2006), and Weitzman (2007). Mehra and Sah (2002) analyze the consequences of human mood fluctuations on financial markets. The consequences turn out to be surprisingly large. They address a
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very specific question: can small fluctuations in the subjective discount factor (β) and the risk aversion coefficient (γ) of agents result in large price movements in equity markets? They consider the type of fluctuations that occur over a short period of time rather than as secular changes in individual tastes. On a given day, for example, an individual may be in one of several possible preference states, but he is unaware of these taste fluctuations and thus does not implicitly incorporate their consequences into his optimization decisions. In a variant of the Mehra-Prescott (1985) paradigm, they show that even changes of small magnitude in γ and β can have a significant impact on the evolution of asset prices. Their analysis assumes that taste fluctuations occur around temporally stable preferences, and it employs two simplifying assumptions. First, the growth rate of dividends is assumed to evolve according to a geometric Brownian motion. This allows them to derive a closed-form representation for the equity price in terms of the subjective parameters of interest and the drift and volatility parameters of the Brownian motion. Second, they assume that although the parameters change stochastically, the agent’s demands are based on the assumption that the current realization will prevail forever. Thus, the agent, in his demand for securities, behaves myopically with respect to changes in these parameters; their analysis has been criticized on this account. Weitzman (2007) addresses the equity premium, the risk-free rate, and the excess volatility puzzles in a pure exchange economy where the representative agent has standard CRRA preferences. The continuously compounded growth rate of consumption is assumed to be i.i.d with a normal distribution. Its mean and variance, however, are uncertain. While the first three specifications are standard, the last differs from the setting in Mehra and Prescott (1985), where the mean and variance are treated as known parameters that are calibrated to past sample averages. The structural uncertainty in the mean and variance of the growth rate of aggregate consumption introduces a form of Bayesian posterior background risk that is inherited from the prior and does not converge to zero as the number of subsequent observations increases to infinity. This background risk fattens the tails of the posterior distribution of future consumption growth rates and increases significantly the value of both the equity premium and excess volatility, while simultaneously decreasing the risk-free rate (as the motivation for precautionary savings becomes relatively more important than intertemporal substitution). In his framework, expected utility fails to exist except when preferences are logarithmic (γ = 1).72 Weitzman circumvents this problem by assuming that the precision w = 1/σ 2 is a truncated-gamma p.d.f. with truncation parameter δ > 0, which represents a lower bound for the support of the prior distribution of w. The assumption that 1/δ > σ 2 guarantees both the existence of finite expected utility and that the posterior distribution is in the same form as the prior and is subject to the same bounding constraint. 72 See
Geweke (2001).
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In general, with Bayesian learning it should not matter what initial values are assigned to the parameters characterizing the priors since, as the sample size grows, they converge to the true values. In Weitzman’s (2007) context, this holds true for all model parameters except δ, which controls the convergence properties of expected utility. The structural parameter δ never loses its critical impact on the subsequent behavior of agents, regardless of the amount of data accumulated over time. One natural concern (and a potential criticism) about the model is that there is no learning about fundamentals in this setting. If δ does not decline as the sample size grows, then in what sense is the representative agent learning through time? In this model the representative agent can never precisely assess the volatility of consumption growth even if the sample size is infinity. A second concern is that there is, as yet, no refutable hypothesis. Is the calibrated optimal value of δ a reasonable one? More importantly, how can one assess whether a value of δ is reasonable? For instance, to account for the equity premium, it might well be the case that Weitzman is using a low (reasonable) value of the risk aversion coefficient, but an unrealistic value of δ. In Barillas et al. (2006), the agent is in the possession of an approximating model that he does not entirely trust. This latter fact manifests itself in the agent postulating a set of unspecified models—which are statistically similar, as measured by entropy— to his benchmark and which he believes will govern the data. The consequence of this model uncertainty is to allow an otherwise standard construct to satisfy the Hansen and Jagannathan (1991) bounds.
6. CONCLUDING COMMENTS Is the resolution of the equity premium and other financial puzzles dependent on a wise choice of preference structures alone? There is ample indication, in many of the models considered in this essay, that certain behavioral style constructs can come close to such resolution: they work. In many cases, however, we do not know the axiomatic foundations underlying them or their behavior in more general settings. In that sense, we have very incomplete knowledge. Yet, the significance of the equity premium and related puzzles cannot be overstated. The consistency of neoclassical intertemporal economics would seem to rest, in large measure, on its eventual resolution. Our sense is that the context of infinitely lived agents may not ultimately be the most fruitful setting. If one lives forever in a stationary return environment of complete markets, there is an intuitive sense that small risks should not matter. Properly measured and accounted for, they should average out over long horizons. Investors should therefore be largely indifferent to them, implying a very low premium. For finitely lived agents nearing retirement, however, the same risks are critical: a downturn in the stock market is potentially crippling for life, for example. It is our view that a fully satisfactory resolution of the puzzle is likely to await more tractable multi-agent models with a richer demographic structure.
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