HANDBOOK OF THE EQUITY RISK PREMIUM
HANDBOOKS IN FINANCE Series Editor
WILLIAM T. ZIEMBA Advisory Editors
KENNETH J. ARROW GEORGE C. CONSTANTINIDES B. ESPEN ECKBO HARRY M. MARKOWITZ ROBERT C. MERTON STEWART C. MYERS PAUL A. SAMUELSON WILLIAM F. SHARPE
amsterdam • boston • heidelberg • london new york • oxford • paris • san diego san francisco • singapore • sydney • tokyo
HANDBOOK OF THE EQUITY RISK PREMIUM By
Rajnish Mehra
amsterdam • boston • heidelberg • london new york • oxford • paris • san diego san francisco • singapore • sydney • tokyo
Elsevier Radarweg 29, PO Box 211, 1000 AE Amsterdam, The Netherlands Linacre House, Jordan Hill, Oxford OX2 8DP, UK First edition 2008 c 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved Copyright No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior written permission of the publisher Permissions may be sought directly from Elsevier’s Science & Technology Rights Department in Oxford, UK: phone (+44) (0) 1865 843830; fax (+44) (0) 1865 853333; email:
[email protected]. Alternatively you can submit your request online by visiting the Elsevier web site at http://elsevier.com/locate/permissions, and selecting Obtaining permission to use Elsevier material
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress ISBN: 978-0-444-50899-7 For information on all Elsevier publications visit our website at books.elsevier.com Printed and bound in the USA 08 09 10 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Dedicated to my parents to Jyoti and Ravi to Neeru and to Chaitanya
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Contents
List of Contributors
xvii
Preface
xix
Introduction to the Series
xxiii
1
The Equity Premium: ABCs
1
Rajnish Mehra (UCSB) and Edward C. Prescott (Arizona State)
2
1. Introduction 1.1. An Important Preliminary Issue 1.2. Data Sources 1.3. Estimates of the Equity Premium 1.4. Variation in the Equity Premium Over Time 2. Is the Equity Premium Due to a Premium for Bearing Non-Diversifiable Risk? 2.1. Standard Preferences References Appendix A
2 2 3 6 9 11 14 25 29
Appendix B
29
Appendix C
35
Appendix D
35
Risk-Based Explanations of the Equity Premium
37
John B. Donaldson (Columbia) and Rajnish Mehra (UCSB)
Introduction 1. Alternative Preference Structures 1.1. Preliminaries 1.2. Coincidence of Risk and Time Preferences in CRRA utility 1.3. Separating Risk and Time Preferences: Epstein–Zin and others 1.4. Variation in the CRRA and EIS
39 41 41 44 46 52 vii
viii
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2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
3
1.5. Habit Formation 1.6. Behavioral Models 1.7. Beyond One Good and a Representative Agent Production Economies Disaster Events and Survivorship Bias Market Incompleteness and Trading Frictions 4.1. Restricted Participation Model Uncertainty Concluding Comments References
Non-Risk-based Explanations of the Equity Premium
55 61 71 78 81 86 86 91 93 94
101
Rajnish Mehra (UCSB) and Edward C. Prescott (Arizona State)
4
Introduction 1. The Inappropriateness of Using T-Bills as a Proxy for the Intertemporal Marginal Rate of Substitution of Consumption 1.1. Liquidity 1.2. Transaction Balances 2. The Effect of Government Regulations and Rules 3. Taxes 4. Borrowing Constraints 5. The Impact of Agent Heterogeneity and Intermediation Costs 6. Concluding Comments References
102 102 104 104 106 107 110 113 114 114
Equity Premia with Benchmark Levels of Consumption: Closed-Form Results
117
Andrew B. Abel (Wharton)
1. Preferences 2. The Canonical Asset 2.1. The Price of the Canonical Asset 2.2. The Rate of Return on the Canonical Asset 3. Risk, Term, and Equity Premia 4. Log-Normality 5. Risk, Term, and Equity Premia Under Log-Normality with Consumption Externalities and Without Habit Formation 6. Linear Approximations to Risk, Term, and Equity Premia 7. Second Moments 7.1. Linear Approximations to Second Moments 8. Correlation of Dividend-Price Ratio and the Rate of Return on Stock 8.1. Correlation of Dividend-Price Ratio and the Excess Rate of Return on Stock
120 126 127 129 131 134 135 137 138 140 142 144
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9. Special Cases 9.1. Rational Expectations 9.2. Distorted Beliefs 10. Accuracy of Approximations 11. Summary References
5
146 146 151 153 156 156
Discussion: Francisco Gomes (LBS)
158
1. Introduction 2. Preferences with Benchmark Levels of Consumption 3. Changing the “Benchmark Level” of the Explanation 3.1. Aggregate Moments 3.2. Micro-Economic Implications 3.3. Micro-Economic Foundations and Aggregation 4. Leverage, Correlation between Dividends and Consumption, and distorted Beliefs 4.1. Levered Equity Claims and Correlation Between Dividends and Consumption 4.2. Non-Rational Expectations 5. Final Remarks References
158 159 161 161 162 163
Long-Run Risks and Risk Compensation in Equity Markets
163 163 164 165 165
167
Ravi Bansal (Duke)
1. Introduction 2. Long-Run Risks Model 2.1. Preferences and the Environment 2.2. Long-Run Growth Rate Risks 2.3. Long-Run Growth and Uncertainty Risks 2.4. Data and Model Implications 3. Cross-Sectional Implications 3.1. Value, Momentum, Size, and the Cross-Sectional Puzzle 4. Conclusion References
168 170 170 171 174 176 185 185 191 191
Discussion: John C. Heaton (Chicago)
194
1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
194 194 195 197 198 198
Summary A Low-Frequency Component in Consumption? Preferences Returns and Long-Run Cash Flows Conclusion References
x
Contents
6
The Loss Aversion/Narrow Framing Approach to the Equity Premium Puzzle 199 Nicholas Barberis (Yale) and Ming Huang (Cornell)
7
1. Introduction 2. Loss Aversion and Narrow Framing 3. The Equity Premium 3.1. Modeling Loss Aversion and Narrow Framing 3.2. Quantitative Implications 3.3. Attitudes to Large Monetary Gambles 3.4. Attitudes to Small Monetary Gambles 3.5. The Importance of Narrow Framing 4. Other Applications 5. Further Extensions 5.1. Dynamic Aspects of Loss Aversion 5.2. Other Forms of Narrow Framing 6. Conclusion and Future Directions References
201 203 207 207 212 216 218 220 224 225 225 226 227 228
Discussion: Xavier Gabaix (New York)
230
1. Work Out More Systematically the Preferences of PT vs. EU Investors—The “Equity Protection Puzzle” 2. Make Quantitative Predictions, Particularly About Equilibrium Market Phenomena, Rather than Just about Individual Trading Behavior 3. Do a Version of the Model in Continuous Time References
232 233 234
Discussion: Ravi Jagannathan (Northwestern)
235
Financial Markets and the Real Economy
237
230
John H. Cochrane (Chicago)
1. Introduction 1.1. Risk Premia 1.2. Who Cares? 1.3. The Mimicking Portfolio Theorem and the Division of Labor 2. Facts: Time Variation and Business Cycle Correlation of Expected Returns 2.1. Variation over Time 2.2. Variation Across Assets 2.3. Return Forecasts—Variation over Time 2.4. The Cross Section of Returns—Variation Across Assets 3. Equity Premium 3.1. Mehra and Prescott and the Puzzle 3.2. The Future of the Equity Premium
239 239 242 243 244 244 245 246 251 257 261 266
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4. Consumption Models 4.1. Hansen and Singleton; Power Utility 4.2. New Utility Functions 4.3. Empirics with New Utility Functions 4.4. Consumption and Factor Models 5. Production, Investment, and General Equilibrium 5.1. “Production-Based Asset Pricing” 5.2. General Equilibrium 6. Labor Income and Idiosyncratic Risk 6.1. Labor and Outside Income 6.2. Idiosyncratic Risk, Stockholding, and Micro Data 7. Challenges for the Future References Appendix
267 267 270 273 286 290 290 294 302 302 307 314 314 322
Discussion: Lars Peter Hansen (Chicago)
326
References
8
Understanding the Equity Risk Premium Puzzle
329
331
George M. Constantinides (Chicago)
1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
Introduction Habit Persistence Limited Stock Market Participation and Per Capita Consumption Incomplete Markets and Idiosyncratic Income Shocks Concluding Remarks References
332 337 345 349 355 356
Discussion: Hanno Lustig (UCLA)
360
1. Introduction 1.1. Environment 1.2. Preferences and Endowments 2. Complete Markets 2.1. Equilibrium 2.2. Equity Premium Puzzle 3. Missing Markets 3.1. Equilibrium 3.2. Mankiw’s Recipe for Generating Risk Premia 3.3. Constantinides and Duffie 3.4. Independence of Idiosyncratic Shocks from Aggregate Conditions 4. Missing Markets and State-Dependent Solvency Constraints 4.1. Incomplete Markets 4.2. Complete Markets
360 361 361 362 363 364 364 365 365 366 368 370 370 371
xii
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9
5. Conclusion References A. Second-Order Taylor Expansion B. Constantinides and Duffie
372 372 373 374
Cash Flow Risk, Discounting Risk, and the Equity Premium Puzzle
377
Gurdip Bakshi (Maryland) and Zhiwu Chen (Yale)
1. Introduction 2. Economic Determinants of Equity Premium 2.1. Cash Flow Process 2.2. The Discounting Process 2.3. Dynamics of the Market Portfolio 2.4. Dynamics of the Equity Premium 3. Time-Series Data on S&P500 EPS, EPS Growth, and the Interest Rate 4. Implications of the Model for Equity Premium 4.1. How Large Is the Interest-Rate Risk Premium? 4.2. Maximum-Likelihood Estimation of the (Physical) Gt Process 4.3. Compensation for Cash Flow Risk and the Equity Premium 5. Concluding Remarks and Extensions Appendix References
379 381 381 382 383 385 387 389 389 391 392 396 398 400
Discussion: Vito D. Gala (LBS)
403
1. Discussion 1.1. Calibration and Estimation 1.2. Where Is the Equity Premium Puzzle? References
403 404 405 407
Discussion: Lior Menzly (Proxima)
409
1. Introduction 2. The Model 2.1. Pricing Kernel 2.2. Cash Flow Process 2.3. The Model—Solutions 3. Calibration 3.1. Calibrating the Model 3.2. Estimation Results 4. Two-Stage Procedure—An Empirical Concern 5. Conclusion References
410 410 410 411 411 412 412 412 412 414 414
xiii
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10 Distribution Risk and Equity Returns
415
Jean-Pierre Danthine (Lausanne), John B. Donaldson (Columbia), and Paolo Siconolfi (Columbia)
1. Introduction 2. The Business Cycle and the Labor Market 2.1. The Stylized Facts of the Business Cycle 2.2. The Labor Market 3. The Model Economy 3.1. Workers 3.2. Shareholders 3.3. The Firm 3.4. Equilibrium 3.5. Numerical Procedures and Calibration 4. An Economy with Distribution Risk Only 5. Adding Aggregate Uncertainty 6. Comparative Dynamics and Welfare Assessment 6.1. Changes in the Correlation of Productivity and Distribution Shocks 6.2. Changes in Risk Aversion and the Conditional Mean Distribution Shock 6.3. Other Comparative Dynamic Tests 6.4. Welfare Considerations 6.5. Explaining the Market Value to National Income Ratio 7. Technology-Driven Variations in Factor Shares 8. Robustness 9. An Alternative Interpretation of the Sharing Mechanism 10. Related Literature 11. Concluding Comments References
Discussion: Urban J. Jermann (Wharton) References
11 The Worldwide Equity Premium: A Smaller Puzzle
417 418 418 421 423 423 424 425 427 429 430 432 436 437 438 440 441 442 443 446 448 452 459 460
463 466
467
Elroy Dimson (LBS), Paul Marsh (LBS), and Mike Stauhton (LBS)
1. Introduction 2. Prior Estimates of the Equity Premium 2.1. Expert Opinion 3. Long-Run International Data 3.1. The DMS Global Database: Composition and Start Date 3.2. The DMS Global Database: General Methodology and Guiding Principles 4. Long-Run Historical Rates of Return 4.1. Extremes of History 4.2. The Long-Run Perspective
469 471 472 474 475 477 479 480 483
xiv
Contents
5. New Global Evidence on the Equity Premium 5.1. The Equity Premium Around the World 5.2. A Smaller Risk Premium 5.3. Survivorship of Markets 5.4. Survivorship Bias Is Negligible 6. Decomposing the Historical Equity Premium 6.1. Unanticipated Success 6.2. Decomposition of the Equity Premium 6.3. From the Past to the Future 7. Conclusion References Appendix 1: Decomposition of the Equity Premium Appendix 2: Data Sources for the DMS Database
12 History and the Equity Risk Premium
486 487 489 490 492 493 493 495 497 500 501 505 507
515
William N. Goetzmann (Yale) and Roger G. Ibbotson (Yale)
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
Introduction Historical Conception and Measurement of the Equity Risk Premium Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and Inflation History as Written by the Winners? The Equity Premium Over the Very Long Term Conclusion References
Discussion: Stephen F. LeRoy (UCSB) References
13 Can Heterogeneity, Undiversified Risk, and Trading Frictions Solve the Equity Premium Puzzle
516 517 521 523 524 527 528
530 534
535
John C. Heaton (Chicago) and Deborah Lucas (Northwestern)
1. Introduction 2. Labor Income as Background Risk 2.1. Calibrating the Income Process 2.2. Adding Trading Frictions 3. Entrepreneurial Income as Background Risk 4. Limited Participation and Limited Diversification 5. Conclusions References
537 539 544 547 552 555 556 556
Discussion: Kjetil Storesletten (U Oslo)
558
1. Introduction 2. Labor Income Risk
558 559
xv
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3. Transaction Costs 4. Concentrating Aggregate Risk on Fewer Hands 4.1. Entrepreneurial Risk 4.2. Limited Participation 5. Conclusion References
14 Asset Prices and Intergenerational Risk Sharing: The Role of Idiosyncratic Earnings Shocks
560 560 560 561 562 563
565
Kjetil Storesletten (U Oslo), Chris Telmer (CMU), and Amir Yaron (Wharton)
1. Introduction 2. An Analytical Example of the Constantinides–Duffie Model 2.1. Calibration of the Constantinides–Duffie Economy 2.2. Model Implications 3. Incorporating the Life Cycle 3.1. Calibration 4. Quantitative Results 4.1. Asset Pricing Implications 4.2. Sensitivity Analysis 5. Conclusions References A. Calibration Appendix B. Asset Pricing
567 569 570 571 573 576 577 580 581 581 584 587 590
Discussion: Darrell Duffie (Stanford)
591
References
Index
592
593
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List of Contributors
Andrew B. Abel, Department of Finance, 2315 Steinberg Hall-Dietrich Hall, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 3620 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6367, USA Gurdip Bakshi, Department of Finance, Smith School of Business, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742, USA Ravi Bansal, Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, 1 Towerview Drive, Durham, NC 27708, USA Nicholas Barberis, Yale School of Management, 135 Prospect Street, New Haven CT 06511, USA Zhiwu Chen, Yale School of Management, 135 Prospect Street, New Haven, CT 06520, USA John H. Cochrane, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago, 5807 S. Woodlawn, Chicago IL 60637, USA George M. Constantinides, Graduate School of Business, The University of Chicago, 5807 South Woodlawn Avenue, Chicago IL 60637, USA Jean-Pierre Danthine, University of Lausanne, Bldg Extranef, Dorigny, CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland Elroy Dimson, London Business School, Regents Park, London NW1 4SA, UK John B. Donaldson, Graduate School of Business, Columbia University, 3022 Broadway, New York, NY 10027-6989, USA Darrell Duffie, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, 518 Memorial Way, Stanford, CA 94305-5015, USA Xavier Gabaix, Department of Finance, Stern School of Business, New York University, 44 West 4th Street, Suite 9-190, New York, NY 10012, USA Vito Gala, London Business School, Regent’s Park, London, NW1 4SA, UK
xvii
xviii
List of Contributors
William N. Goetzmann, Yale School of Management, 135 Prospect Street, New Haven, CT 06511-3729, USA Francisco Gomes, Department of Finance, London Business School, Regent’s Park, London NW1 4SA, UK Lars Peter Hansen, Department of Economics, University of Chicago, 1126 East 59th St., Chicago, Illinois. 60637, USA John C. Heaton, The University of Chicago, Graduate School of Business, 5807 South Woodlawn Avenue, Chicago, IL 60637, USA Ming Huang, Johnson Graduate School of Management, Cornell University, 319 Sage Hall, Ithaca, NY 14853-6201, USA Roger G. Ibbotson, Yale School of Management, 135 Prospect Street, New Haven, CT 06511-3729, USA Ravi Jagannathan, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 2001 Sheridan Rd, Evanston, IL 60208, USA Urban J. Jermann, Department of Finance, The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, 3620 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6367, USA Stephen F. LeRoy, Department of Economics, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA 93106, USA Deborah Lucas, Kellogg School of Management, 2001 Sheridan Rd, Evanston, IL 60208, USA Hanno Lustig, Department of Economics, University of California at Los Angeles, Bunche Hall 8357, Box 951477, Los Angeles, CA 90095-1477, USA Paul Marsh, London Business School, Regents Park, London NW1 4SA, UK Rajnish Mehra, Department of Economics, 3014 North Hall, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA 93106-9210, USA Lior Menzly, Director of Quantitative Research and Risk Management, Proxima Alfa Investment (USA), 623 Fifth Ave, 14th Floor, New York, NY 10022, USA Edward C. Prescott, Department of Economics, W. P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85287-3806, USA Paolo Siconolfi, Columbia Business School, 3022 Broadway, Uris Hall 820, New York, NY 10027, USA Mike Staunton, London Business School, Regents Park, London NW1 4SA, UK Kjetil Storesletten, Department of Economics, University of Oslo, PO Box 1095 Blindern, N-0317 Oslo, Norway Chris Telmer, Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University, Posner Hall, Room 350, Tech and Frew Streets, Pittsburgh, PA 15213, USA Amir Yaron, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 2325 Steinberg Hall-Dietrich Hall, 3620 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6367, USA
Preface
Historical data provide a wealth of evidence documenting that for more than a century, U.S. stock returns have been considerably higher than the returns for Treasury bills. The average annual real return (that is, the inflation-adjusted return) on the U.S. stock market for the past 110 years has been about 7.9 percent. In the same period, the real return on a relatively riskless security was a paltry 1.0 percent. The difference between these two returns, 6.9 percentage points, is the equity premium. The generally accepted tenet of the neoclassical paradigm has been that the observed differences in the rates of return to financial assets, in particular, the large difference between the average returns on corporate equity and T-bills, is a premium for bearing non-diversifiable aggregate risk. What came as a surprise to many economists and researchers in finance was the conclusion of a research paper that Edward Prescott and I wrote in 1979. We found that stocks and bonds pay off in approximately the same states of nature or economic scenarios and hence, they should command approximately the same rate of return. The historical U.S. equity premium was an order of magnitude greater than could be rationalized in the context of the standard neoclassical paradigm of financial economics. In fact, using standard theory to estimate risk-adjusted returns, we found that stocks on average should command, at most, a 1 percent return premium over bills. Since, for as long as we had reliable data, (about a hundred years), the mean premium on stocks over bills was considerably and consistently higher, we realized that we had a puzzle on our hands. It took us six more years to convince a skeptical profession and for “The Equity Premium: A Puzzle” to be published. I want to emphasize that the equity premium puzzle is a quantitative puzzle; standard theory is consistent with our notion of risk that, on average, stocks should return more than bonds. The puzzle cannot be dismissed lightly because much of our economic intuition is based on the very class of models that fall short so dramatically when confronted with financial data. It underscores the failure of paradigms central to financial and economic modelling to capture the characteristic that appears to make stocks comparatively riskier. Hence, the viability of using this class of models for any quantitative assessment—for instance, to gauge the welfare implications of alternative stabilization policies—is thrown open to question.
xix
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Preface
Creative research emerges at the fault lines where theory confronts observations. Over the past two decades, attempts to resolve the puzzle have become a major research impetus in finance and economics. Several generalizations of key features of the Mehra–Prescott (1985) model have been proposed to reconcile observation with theory. Consequently, we have a deeper understanding of the role and importance of the abstractions that contribute to the puzzle. While no single explanation has fully resolved the anomaly, considerable progress has been made and the equity premium is a lesser puzzle today than it was twenty years ago. This Handbook brings together fourteen papers by key researchers that span the spectrum of research efforts to resolve the Equity Premium Puzzle. I designed this volume to be a collection of essays by experts in the field, discussing their own work and contribution to the Equity Premium literature. My motivation is to give the profession a critical look at the subject through the eyes of the researchers that have made fundamental contributions to the field. Each essay is followed by an expert commentary. The expository style is intended to make the material accessible to doctoral students and beginning researchers in the field. In this spirit, individual chapters are self-contained and can be read independently. The three introductory chapters provide a summary and overview of research over the past 20 years. The first chapter explains why the equity premium is a puzzle. Chapter two is an extended survey of the risk-based explanations of the equity premium while chapter three surveys non-risk based explanations. The remaining chapters are arranged alphabetically by author. Each chapter has a descriptive title and an abstract. There is little value added in summarizing them here. This volume has taken the better part of four years to bring to press, as many essays went through two rounds of refereeing. I am grateful to the anonymous referees for their detailed comments, to the authors and discussants for their willingness to incorporate suggestions and for their diligence in adhering to our guidelines in preparing their contributions to this volume. Thanks are due to Francisco Azeredo, Alok Khare and Chaitanya Mehra, who contributed to this volume’s accessibility by reading and critiquing the chapters from a student’s perspective. Most of the papers were presented and discussed at “The Equity Premium Puzzle Conference,” held in October 2005 at the University of California, Santa Barbara, to commemorate the twentieth anniversary of the publication of “The Equity Premium: A Puzzle.” The conference was sponsored by the Laboratory for Aggregate Economics and Finance at UCSB and North Holland. I thank Finn Kydland, the director of LAEF, Scott Bentley, the executive editor and David Clark, the publishing director at North Holland for their generous support. Special thanks are due to Vijaisarath Parthasarathy, at Elsevier, Chennai, where this issue was typeset, for the patience and grace with which he handled the innumerable iterations involved in bringing this volume to press. The equity premium puzzle has its genesis in the research program initiated by Robert Lucas and Edward Prescott at Carnegie Mellon in the mid 70s, a program that transformed dynamic economics. I was fortunate to have learned economics from them, and to have witnessed that paradigmatic shift. I want to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to both of them.
Preface
xxi With Ed Prescott, our association has evolved from his role as mentor to that of co-author and colleague. The famous mathematician, Mark Kac, once made a distinction between two kinds of geniuses: the “ordinary” and the “magicians”. An ordinary genius is a fellow that you and I would be just as good as, if we were only many times better. It is different with magicians. The working of their minds is mysterious and profound and even after we understand what they have done, the creative process by which they have done it, is impossible to emulate. The last 30 odd years of collaborating with Ed Prescott have convinced me that he is, truly, a magician. It was at Carnegie too that I met John Donaldson and George Constantinides; over the years, they have been generous with their time and advice and have served as a sounding board for ideas. Both of them contributed immeasurably to this volume by their meticulous reading of and comments on many of the papers collected here. Finally, I thank my wife, Neeru, for editorial assistance. Her insightful comments and recommendations reflect her passion for words, versatility of expression and command of the language.
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Introduction to the Series
Advisory Editors: Kenneth J. Arrow, Stanford University; George C. Constantinides, University of Chicago; B. Espen Eckbo, Dartmouth College; Harry M. Markowitz, University of California, San Diego; Robert C. Merton, Harvard University; Stewart C. Myers, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Paul A. Samuelson, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; and William F. Sharpe, Stanford University. The Handbooks in Finance are intended to be a definitive source for comprehensive and accessible information. Each volume in the series presents an accurate, self-contained survey of a sub-field of finance, suitable for use by finance and economics professors and lecturers, professional researchers, graduate students and as a teaching supplement. The goal is to have a broad group of outstanding volumes in various areas of finance. William T. Ziemba University of British Columbia
xxiii
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CHAPTER 1
The Equity Premium: ABCs Rajnish Mehra University of California, Santa Barbara, and NBER and
Edward C. Prescott Arizona State University and Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
1. Introduction 1.1. An Important Preliminary Issue 1.2. Data Sources 1.3. Estimates of the Equity Premium 1.4. Variation in the Equity Premium over Time 2. Is the Equity Premium due to a Premium for Bearing Non-Diversifiable Risk? 2.1. Standard Preferences References Appendix A Appendix B Appendix C Appendix D
2 2 3 6 9 11 14 25 29 29 35 35
JEL Classification: G10, G12, D9 Keywords: asset pricing, equity risk premium, CAPM, consumption CAPM, risk free rate puzzle
We thank George Constantinides, John Donaldson and Viral Shah for helpful comments and Francisco Azeredo for excellent research assistance. HANDBOOK OF THE EQUITY RISK PREMIUM c 2008 by Rajnish Mehra and Edward C. Prescott. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved. Copyright
1
2
Chapter 1 • The Equity Premium: ABCs
1. INTRODUCTION The year 1978 saw the publication of Robert Lucas’ seminal paper “Asset Prices in an Exchange Economy” in Econometrica. Its publication transformed asset pricing and substantially raised the level of discussion, providing a theoretical construct to study issues that could not be addressed within the dominant paradigm at the time, the Capital Asset Pricing Model.1 A crucial input parameter for using the latter is the equity premium2 (the return earned by a broad market index in excess of that earned by a relatively risk-free security). Lucas’ asset pricing model allowed one to pose questions about the magnitude of the equity premium.3 In our paper, “The Equity Premium: A Puzzle,”4 we decided to address this issue. In this chapter we take a retrospective look at our original paper and show why we concluded that the equity premium is not a premium for bearing non-diversifiable risk.5 We critically evaluate the data sources used to document the puzzle and touch on other issues that may be of interest to the researcher who did not have a ringside seat 20 years ago. We stress that the perspective here captures the spirit of our original paper and not necessarily our current thinking on these issues.6 This and the subsequent two chapters are motivated by the intention to make this volume a self-contained reference for the beginning researcher in the field. The chapters that follow address the research efforts that have preoccupied the profession in an effort to explain the equity premium. This chapter is organized into two parts. Part 1 documents the historical equity premium in the United States and in selected countries with significant capital markets (in terms of market value) and comments on data sources. Part 2 examines the question, “Is the equity premium a premium for bearing non-diversifiable risk?”
1.1. An Important Preliminary Issue Any discussion of the equity premium raises the question of whether arithmetic or geometric returns should be used for summarizing historical return data. In Mehra and Prescott (1985), we used arithmetic averages. If returns are uncorrelated over time, the appropriate statistic is the arithmetic average because the expected future value of a $1 investment is obtained by compounding the mean returns. Thus, this is the appropriate statistic to report if one is interested in the mean terminal value of the investment.7 1 See
Mossin (1966) for a lucid articulation. was generally assumed to be in the 6–8 percent range. 3 To put this advance in perspective, an equivalent contribution in physics would be to come up with a model that enabled one to address the question of whether the value of Newton’s gravitational constant G (6.672 × 10−11 Nm2 /kg2 ) is reasonable, given other cosmological observations. Why is the value of G what we observe? 4 See Mehra and Prescott (1985). 5 This chapter draws on material in Mehra and Prescott (2003). All of the acknowledgements in that chapter continue to apply. 6 For an elaboration, see McGrattan and Prescott (2003, 2005) and Mehra and Prescott (2008) in this volume. 7 We present a simple proof in Appendix A. 2 This
Rajnish Mehra and Edward C. Prescott
3
The arithmetic average return exceeds the geometric average return. If returns are log-normally distributed, the difference between the two is one-half the variance of the returns. Since the annual standard deviation of the equity returns is about 20 percent, there is a difference of about 2 percent between the two measures. Using geometric averages significantly underestimates the expected future value of an investment. In this chapter, as in our 1985 paper, we report arithmetic averages. In instances where we cite the results of research when arithmetic averages are not available, we clearly indicate this.8
1.2. Data Sources A crucial consideration in a discussion of the historical equity premium has to do with the reliability of early data sources. The data we used in documenting the historical equity premium in the United States can be subdivided into three distinct subperiods, 1802–1871, 1871–1926, and 1926–present, with wide variation in the quality of the data over each subperiod. Data on stock prices for the 19th century is patchy, often necessarily introducing an element of arbitrariness to compensate for its incompleteness.
1.2.1. Subperiod 1802–1871 Equity Return Data The equity return data prior to 1871 is not particularly reliable. To the best of our knowledge, the stock return data used by all researchers for the period 1802–1871 is due to Schwert (1990), who gives an excellent account of the construction and composition of early stock market indexes. Schwert (1990) constructs a “spliced” index for the period 1802–1987; his index for the period 1802–1862 is based on the work of Smith and Cole (1935), who constructed a number of early stock indexes. For the period 1802–1820, their index was constructed from an equally weighted portfolio of seven bank stocks, and another index for 1815–1845 was composed of six bank stocks and one insurance stock. For the period 1834–1862, the index consisted of an equally weighted portfolio of (at most) 27 railroad stocks.9 They used one price quote, per stock, per month, from local newspapers. The prices used were the average of the bid and ask prices, rather than transaction prices, and the computation of returns ignores dividends. For the period 1863–1871, Schwert uses data from Macaulay (1938), who constructed a valueweighted index using a portfolio of 25 Northeast and Mid-Atlantic railroad stocks;10 this index also excludes dividends. Needless to say, it is difficult to assess how well this data proxies the “market,” since undoubtedly there were other industry sectors that were not reflected in the index. 8 In
this case an approximate estimate of the arithmetic average return can be obtained by adding one-half the variance of the returns to the geometric average. 9 “They chose stocks in hindsight . . . the sample selection bias caused by including only stocks that survived and were actively quoted for the whole period is obvious” (Schwert (1990)). 10 “It is unclear what sources Macaulay used to collect individual stock prices but he included all railroads with actively traded stocks.” Ibid.
4
Chapter 1 • The Equity Premium: ABCs
Return on a Risk-Free Security Since there were no Treasury bills extant at the time, researchers have used the data set constructed by Siegel (2002) for this period, using highly rated securities with an adjustment for the default premium. Interestingly, based on this data set, the equity premium for the period 1802–1862 was zero. We conjecture that this may be due to the fact that since most financing in the first half of the 19th century was done through debt, the distinction between debt and equity securities was not very clear-cut.11
1.2.2. Subperiod 1871–1926 Equity Return Data Shiller (1989) is the definitive source for the equity return data for this period. His data is based on the work of Cowles (1939), which covers the period 1871–1938. Cowles used a value-weighted portfolio for his index, which consisted of 12 stocks12 in 1871 and ended with 351 in 1938. He included all stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange, whose prices were reported in the Commercial and Financial Chronicle. From 1918 onward he used the Standard and Poor’s (S&P) industrial portfolios. Cowles reported dividends, so that, unlike the earlier indexes for the period 1802–1871, a total return calculation was possible. Return on a Risk-Free Security There is no definitive source for the short-term risk-free rate in the period before 1920, when Treasury certificates were first issued. In our 1985 study, we used short-term commercial paper as a proxy for a riskless short-term security prior to 1920 and Treasury certificates from 1920–1930.13 Our data prior to 1920 was taken from Homer (1963). Most researchers have used either our data set or Siegel’s.
1.2.3. Subperiod 1926–Present Equity Return Data This period is the “Golden Age” with regard to accurate financial data. The NYSE database at the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) was initiated in 1926 and provides researchers with high-quality equity return data. The Ibbotson Associates Yearbooks14 are also a very useful compendium of post-1926 financial data.
11 The first actively traded stock was floated in the U.S. in 1791 and by 1801 there were over 300 corporations, although less than 10 were actively traded (Siegel (2002)). 12 It was only from February 16, 1885, that Dow Jones began reporting an index, initially composed of 12 stocks. The S&P index dates back to 1928, though for the period 1928–1957 it consisted of 90 stocks. The S&P 500 debuted in March 1957. 13 See Mehra and Prescott (2008) in this volume for a discussion on the choice of a proxy for the risk-free asset. 14 Ibbotson Associates, 2006. Stocks, bonds, bills and inflation. 2005 Yearbook. Ibbotson Associates, Chicago.
5
Rajnish Mehra and Edward C. Prescott
TABLE 1 U.S. Annual Real Growth Rate of Per Capita Consumption of Non-durables and Services 1889–1978
1889–2004
1889–1929
1930–1978
1930–2004
Mean
0.018
0.018
0.021
0.016
0.018
Std. Dev.
0.036
0.032
0.044
0.028
0.022
–0.140
–0.135
–0.463
0.520
0.450
Serial Correlation
Return on a Risk-Free Security Since the advent of Treasury bills in 1931, short-maturity bills have almost universally been used as proxy for a “real” risk-free security15 since the innovation in inflation is orthogonal to the path of real GNP growth.16 With the debut of Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS) on January 29, 1997, the return on these securities is the real risk-free rate.17
1.2.4. Consumption Data In our study, we used the Kuznets–Kendrik–NIA per capita real consumption of nondurables and services for the period 1889–1978. Our data source was Grossman and Shiller (1981). An updated version of this series is available in Shiller (1989).18 The initial series (the flow of perishable and semi-durable goods to consumers) for the period 1889–1919 was constructed by William Shaw.19 Simon Kuznets (1938, 1946) modified Shaw’s measure by incorporating transportation and distribution costs, and created a series (the flow of perishable and semi-durable goods to consumers) for the period 1919–1929. The final version of these series is available in an unpublished mimeograph underlying Tables R-27 and R-28 in Kuznets (1961). Kendrick (1961) made further adjustments to these series in order to make them comparable to the Department of Commerce’s personal consumption expenditure series. Kendrick’s adjustments are available in Tables A-IIa and A-IIb in Kendrick (1961). This is the data source that Grossman and Shiller (1981) used in constructing the1889–1929 subset of their series on per capita real consumption of non-durables and services. The post-1929 data is from the National Income and Product Accounts of the United States. Table 1 details the statistics on the growth rate of real per capita consumption of non-durables and services, while Figure 1 is a time-series plot. We used the statistics in the 1889–1978 column in our original study. 15 Mehra
and Prescott. Ibid. (1980) documents that in postwar data the innovation in inflation had a standard deviation of one-half of one percent. 17 Mehra and Prescott. Ibid. 18 Further updates are available on Robert Shiller’s website: www.econ.yale.edu/∼shiller. 19 See Shaw (1947). 16 Litterman
6
Chapter 1 • The Equity Premium: ABCs 0.15
0.10
0.05
0.00
20.05
FIGURE 1
2001
1997
1993
1989
1985
1981
1977
1973
1969
1965
1961
1957
1953
1949
1945
1941
1937
1933
1929
1925
1921
1917
1913
1909
1905
1901
1897
1889
20.15
1893
20.10
U.S. annual real growth rate of per capita consumption of non-durables and services
1889–2004. Source: Mehra and Prescott (1985), updated by the authors.
While the serial correlation of consumption growth for the entire sample is negative, Azeredo (2007) points out that for more than the last 70 years it has been positive. In addition, we note that the standard deviation has declined.20 We discuss the implications for the equity premium in Section 2.1.2 and further in Appendix B.
1.3. Estimates of the Equity Premium Historical data provides us with a wealth of evidence documenting that for over a century, stock returns have been considerably higher than those for Treasury bills. This is illustrated in Table 2, which reports the unconditional estimates21 for the U.S. equity premium based on the various data sets used in the literature, going back to 1802. The average annual real return (the inflation adjusted return) on the U.S. stock market over the last 116 years has been about 7.67 percent. Over the same period, the return on a relatively riskless security was a paltry 1.31 percent. The difference between these two returns, the “equity premium,” was 6.36 percent. 20 Christina Romer (1999) points out that the larger pre-1929 estimates may be an artifact of the early methodology rather than due to a change in the underlying stochastic process. 21 To obtain unconditional estimates, we use the entire data set to form our estimate. The Mehra–Prescott data set spans the longest time period for which both consumption and stock return data is available; the former is necessary to test the implications of consumption-based asset pricing models.
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Rajnish Mehra and Edward C. Prescott
TABLE 2 U.S. Equity Premium Using Different Data Sets Real return on a market index (%)
Real return on a relatively riskless security (%)
Equity premium (%)
Data set
Mean
Mean
Mean
1802–2004 (Siegel)
8.38
3.02
5.36
1871–2005 (Shiller)
8.32
2.68
5.64
1889–2005 (Mehra–Prescott)
7.67
1.31
6.36
1926–2004 (Ibbotson)
9.27
0.64
8.63
TABLE 3 Equity Premium for Selected Countries Mean real return
Country
Period
Market index (%)
Relatively riskless security (%)
Equity premium (%)
United Kingdom
1900–2005
7.4
1.3
6.1
Japan
1900–2005
9.3
−0.5
9.8
Germany
1900–2005
8.2
−0.9
9.1
France
1900–2005
6.1
−3.2
9.3
Sweden
1900–2005
10.1
2.1
8.0
Australia
1900–2005
9.2
0.7
8.5
India
1991–2004
12.6
1.3
11.3
Source: Dimson et al. (2002) and Mehra (2007) for India.
Furthermore, this pattern of excess returns to equity holdings is not unique to the U.S. but is observed in every country with a significant capital market. The U.S. together with the U.K., Japan, Germany, and France accounts for more than 85 percent of the capitalized global equity value. The annual return on the British stock market was 7.4 percent over the last 106 years, an impressive 6.1 percent premium over the average bond return of 1.3 percent. Similar statistical differentials are documented for France, Germany, and Japan. Table 3 documents the equity premium for these countries.
8
Chapter 1 • The Equity Premium: ABCs
The dramatic investment implications of this differential rate of return can be seen in Table 4, which maps the capital appreciation of $1 invested in different assets from 1802 to 2004 and from 1926 to 2004. One dollar invested in a diversified stock index yields an ending wealth of $655,348 versus a value of $293, in real terms, for $1 invested in a portfolio of T-bills for the period 1802–2004. The corresponding values for the 78-year period, 1926–2004, are $238.30 and $1.54. It is assumed that all payments to the underlying asset, such as dividend payments to stock and interest payments to bonds, are reinvested and that no taxes are paid. This long-term perspective underscores the remarkable wealth-building potential of the equity premium. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that the equity premium is of central importance in portfolio allocation decisions and estimates of the cost of capital and is front and center in the current debate about the advantages of investing Social Security Trust funds in the stock market. In Table 5 we document the premium for some interesting historical subperiods: 1889–1933, when the United States was on a gold standard; 1934–2005, when it was off the gold standard; and 1946–2005, the postwar period. Table 6 presents 30-year moving averages, similar to those reported by the U.S. meteorological service to document “normal” temperature.
TABLE 4 Terminal Value of $1 Invested in Stocks and Bonds Stocks
T-bills
Investment period
Real
Nominal
Real
Nominal
1802–2004
$655,348.00
$10,350,077.00
$293.00
$4,614.00
1926–2004
$238.30
$2,533.43
$1.54
$17.87
Source: Ibbotson (2006) and Siegel (2002).
TABLE 5 Equity Premium in Different Subperiods Real return on a market index (%)
Real return on a relatively riskless security (%)
Equity premium (%)
Time period
Mean
Mean
Mean
1889–1933
7.01
3.39
3.62
1934–2005
8.08
0.01
8.07
1946–2005
8.19
0.71
7.48
Source: Mehra and Prescott (1985). Updated by the authors.
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Rajnish Mehra and Edward C. Prescott
TABLE 6 Equity Premium 30-Year Moving Averages Real return on a market index (%)
Real return on a relatively riskless security (%)
Equity premium (%)
Time period
Mean
Mean
Mean
1900–1950
7.45
2.95
4.50
1951–2005
8.53
1.11
7.42
Source: Mehra and Prescott (1985). Updated by the authors.
Although the premium has been increasing over time, this is primarily due to the diminishing return on the riskless asset, rather than a dramatic increase in the return on equity, which has been relatively constant. The low premium in the 19th century is largely due to the fact that the equity premium for the period 1802–1861 was zero.22 If we exclude this period, we find that difference in the premium in the second half of the 19th century relative to average values in the 20th century is less striking. We see a dramatic change in the equity premium in the post-1933 period—the premium rose from 3.62 percent to 8.07 percent, an increase of more than 125 percent. Since 1933 marked the end of the period when the U.S. was on the gold standard, this break can be seen as the change in the equity premium after the implementation of the new policy.
1.4. Variation in the Equity Premium Over Time The equity premium has varied considerably over time, as illustrated in Figures 2 and 3. Furthermore, the variation depends on the time horizon over which it is measured. There have even been periods when it has been negative. The low-frequency variation has been countercyclical. This is shown in Figure 4, where we have plotted the stock market value as a share of national income23 and the mean equity premium averaged over certain time periods. We have divided the time period from 1929 to 2005 into subperiods where the ratio market value of equity to national income (MV/NI) was greater than and when it was less than the mean value24 over the sample period. Historically, as the figure illustrates, subsequent to periods when this ratio was high, the realized equity premium was low. A similar result holds when 22 See
the earlier discussion on data. Mehra (1998) it is argued that the variation in this ratio is difficult to rationalize in the standard neoclassical framework since, over the same period, after-tax cash flows to equity as a share of national income are fairly constant. Here we do not address this issue and simply utilize the fact that this ratio has varied considerably over time. 24 Mean MV/NI for the period 1929–2005 was 0.91. 23 In
FIGURE 3 6
4
2
0 1989
1986
1983
1980
1977
1974
1971
1968
1965
1962
1959
1956
1953
1950
1947
1944
1941
1938
1935
1932
1929
Equity risk premium over the 20-year period 1926–2004. (Source: Ibbotson (2006))
2003
2004
2001
8 1998
10
2001
12 1995
14
1999
16 1992
18
1997
Realized equity risk premium per year: 1926–2004.
1995
1993
1991
1989
1987
1985
1983
1981
1979
1977
1975
1973
1971
1969
1967
1965
1963
1961
1959
1957
1955
1953
FIGURE 2
1951
1949
1926
260
1947
1945
Average Equity Risk Premium (Percent)
Equity Risk Premium (Percent)
10 Chapter 1 • The Equity Premium: ABCs
60
40
20
0
220
240
11
Rajnish Mehra and Edward C. Prescott 16.00
2.50
2.00 Average Equity Premium
12.00 10.00
1.50
8.00 1.00
6.00 4.00
0.50
Ratio of Market Value to National Income
14.00
2004
2001
1998
1995
1992
1989
1986
1983
1980
1977
1974
1971
1968
1965
1962
1959
1956
1953
1950
1947
1944
1941
1938
1935
1932
0.00
1929
2.00 0.00
FIGURE 4 Market value to national income ratio and average equity premium (average of subperiods when the MV/NI ratio is > or < avg. MV/NI ratio).
stock valuations are low relative to national income. In this case the subsequent equity premium is high. Since after-tax corporate profits as a share of national income are fairly constant over time, this translates into the observation that the realized equity premium was low subsequent to periods when the price/earnings ratio is high, and vice versa. This is the basis for the returns predictability literature in finance. In Figure 5 we have plotted stock market value as a share of national income and the subsequent three-year mean equity premium. This provides further conformation that, historically, periods of relatively high market valuation have been followed by periods when the equity premium was relatively low.
2. IS THE EQUITY PREMIUM DUE TO A PREMIUM FOR BEARING NON-DIVERSIFIABLE RISK? Why have stocks been such an attractive investment relative to bonds? Why has the rate of return on stocks been higher than that on relatively risk-free assets? One intuitive answer is that since stocks are “riskier” than bonds, investors require a larger premium for bearing this additional risk; and indeed, the standard deviation of the returns to stocks (about 20 percent per annum historically) is larger than that of the returns to T-bills (about 4 percent per annum), so, obviously they are considerably more risky than bills! But are they?
12
Chapter 1 • The Equity Premium: ABCs 16.00
2.50
2.00 Average Equity Premium
12.00 10.00
1.50
8.00 1.00
6.00 4.00
0.50
Ratio of Market Value to National Income
14.00
2.00
2004
2001
1998
1995
1992
1989
1986
1983
1980
1977
1974
1971
1968
1965
1962
1959
1956
1953
1950
1947
1944
1941
1938
1935
1932
0.00 1929
0.00
FIGURE 5
Market value to national income ratio and average 3-year ahead equity premium (average of subperiods when the MV/NI ratio is > or < avg. MV/NI ratio).
Figures 6 and 7 illustrate the variability of the annual real rate of return on the S&P 500 index and a relatively risk-free security over the period 1889–2005.25 To enhance and deepen our understanding of the risk-return trade-off in the pricing of financial assets, we take a detour into modern asset pricing theory and look at why different assets yield different rates of return. The deus ex machina of this theory is that assets are priced such that, ex-ante, the loss in marginal utility incurred by sacrificing current consumption and buying an asset at a certain price is equal to the expected gain in marginal utility, contingent on the anticipated increase in consumption when the asset pays off in the future. The operative emphasis here is the incremental loss or gain of utility of consumption and should be differentiated from incremental consumption. This is because the same amount of consumption may result in different degrees of well-being at different times. As a consequence, assets that pay off when times are good and consumption levels are high—when the marginal utility of consumption is low—are less desirable than those that pay off an equivalent amount when times are bad and additional consumption is more highly valued. Hence, consumption in period t has a different price if times are good than if times are bad. Let us illustrate this principle in the context of the standard, popular paradigm, the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). The model postulates a linear relationship between an asset’s “beta,” a measure of systematic risk, and its expected return. Thus, high-beta stocks yield a high expected rate of return. That is because in the CAPM, 25 The
index did not consist of 500 stocks for the entire period.
13
Rajnish Mehra and Edward C. Prescott 60
40
20
0
220
1965
1969
1973
1977
1981
1985
1989
1993
1997
2001
2005
1969
1973
1977
1981
1985
1989
1993
1997
2001
2005
1961
1957
1953
1949
1945
1941
1937
1933
1929
1925
1921
1917
1913
1909
1905
1965
FIGURE 6
1901
1897
1893
260
1889
240
Real annual return on S&P 500 Index (%) 1889–2005.
Source: Mehra and Prescott (1985). Data updated by the authors.
25 20 15 10 5 0 25 210 215
FIGURE 7
Real annual return on T-bills (%) 1889–2005.
Source: Mehra and Prescott (1985). Data updated by the authors.
1961
1957
1953
1949
1945
1941
1937
1933
1929
1925
1921
1917
1913
1909
1905
1901
1897
1893
225
1889
220
14
Chapter 1 • The Equity Premium: ABCs
good times and bad times are captured by the return on the market. The performance of the market, as captured by a broad-based index, acts as a surrogate indicator for the relevant state of the economy. A high-beta security tends to pay off more when the market return is high—when times are good and consumption is plentiful; it provides less incremental utility than a security that pays off when consumption is low, is less valuable, and consequently sells for less. Thus, higher-beta assets that pay off in states of low marginal utility will sell for a lower price than similar assets that pay off in states of high marginal utility. Since rates of return are inversely proportional to asset prices, the lower beta assets will, on average, give a lower rate of return than the former. Another perspective on asset pricing emphasizes that economic agents prefer to smooth patterns of consumption over time. Assets that pay off a larger amount at times when consumption is already high “destabilize” these patterns of consumption, whereas assets that pay off when consumption levels are low “smooth” out consumption. Naturally, the latter are more valuable and thus require a lower rate of return to induce investors to hold these assets. (Insurance policies are a classic example of assets that smooth consumption. Individuals willingly purchase and hold them, despite their very low rates of return.) To return to the original question: are stocks that much riskier than T-bills so as to justify a 7-percentage differential in their rates of return? What came as a surprise to many economists and researchers in finance was the conclusion of our paper, written in 1979. Stocks and bonds pay off in approximately the same states of nature or economic scenarios and, hence, as argued earlier, they should command approximately the same rate of return. In fact, using standard theory to estimate risk-adjusted returns, we found that stocks on average should command, at most, a 1 percent return premium over bills. Since, for as long as we had reliable data (about 100 years), the mean premium on stocks over bills was considerably and consistently higher, we realized that we had a puzzle on our hands. It took us six more years to convince a skeptical profession and for our paper “The Equity Premium: A Puzzle” to be published (Mehra and Prescott (1985)).
2.1. Standard Preferences The neoclassical growth model and its stochastic variants are a central construct in contemporary finance, public finance, and business cycle theory. It has been used extensively by, among others, Abel et al. (1989), Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987), Becker and Barro (1988), Brock (1979), Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985), Donaldson and Mehra (1984), Kydland and Prescott (1982), Lucas (1978), and Merton (1971). In fact, much of our economic intuition is derived from this model class. A key idea of this framework is that consumption today and consumption in some future period are treated as different goods. Relative prices of these different goods are equal to people’s willingness to substitute between these goods and businesses’ ability to transform these goods into each other. The model has had some remarkable successes when confronted with empirical data, particularly in the stream of macroeconomic research referred to as Real Business Cycle Theory, where researchers have found that it easily replicates the essential
15
Rajnish Mehra and Edward C. Prescott
macroeconomic features of the business cycle. See, in particular, Kydland and Prescott (1982). Unfortunately, when confronted with financial market data on stock returns, tests of these models have led, without exception, to their rejection. Perhaps the most striking of these rejections is our 1985 paper.26 To illustrate this we employ a variation of Lucas’ (1978) endowment economy rather than the production economy studied in Prescott and Mehra (1980). This is an appropriate abstraction to use if it is the equilibrium relation between the consumption and asset returns that are being used to estimate the premium for bearing non-diversifiable risk, which is what we were doing. Introducing production would only complicate the selection of exogenous processes, which resulted in the observed process for consumption.27 To examine the role of other factors for mean asset returns, it would be necessary to introduce other features of reality such as taxes and intermediation costs as has recently been done.28 If the model had accounted for differences in average asset returns, the next step would have been to use the neoclassical growth model, which has intertemporal transformation opportunities through variations in the rate at which the capital stock is accumulated, to see if this abstraction accounted for the observed large differences in average asset returns. Since per capita consumption has grown over time, we assume that the growth rate of the endowment follows a Markov process. This is in contrast to the assumption in Lucas’ model that the endowment level follows a Markov process. Our assumption, which requires an extension of competitive equilibrium theory,29 enables us to capture the non-stationarity in the consumption series associated with the large increase in per capita consumption that occurred over the last century. We consider a frictionless economy that has a single representative “stand-in” household. This unit orders its preferences over random consumption paths by ∞ E0 β t U (c t) , 0 < β < 1, (1) t=0
where ct is the per capita consumption and the parameter β is the subjective time discount factor, which describes how impatient households are to consume. If β is small, people are highly impatient, with a strong preference for consumption now versus consumption in the future. As modeled, these households live forever, which implicitly means that the utility of parents depends on the utility of their children. In the real world, this is true for some people and not for others. However, economies with both types of people—those who care about their children’s utility and those who do not—have essentially the same implications for asset prices and returns.30 26 The
reader is referred to McGrattan and Prescott (2003) and Mehra and Prescott (2007 and 2008) for an alternative perspective. 27 In a production economy, consumption would be endogenously determined, restricting the class of consumption processes that could be considered. See Appendix C. 28 See McGrattan and Prescott (2003) and Mehra and Prescott (2007 and 2008). 29 This is accomplished in Mehra (1988). 30 See Constantinides, Donaldson, and Mehra (2002, 2005). Constantinides et al. (2007) explicitly model bequests.
16
Chapter 1 • The Equity Premium: ABCs
We use this simple abstraction to build quantitative economic intuition about what the returns on equity and debt should be. E0 {·} is the expectations operator conditional upon information available at time zero (which denotes the present time), and U : R+ → R is the increasing, continuously differentiable concave utility function. We further restrict the utility function to be of the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) class U (c, α) =
c1−α − 1 , 1−α
0 < α < ∞,
(2)
where the parameter α measures the curvature of the utility function. When α = 1, the utility function is defined to be logarithmic, which is the limit of the above representation as α approaches 1. The feature that makes this the “preference function of choice” in much of the literature in Growth and Real Business Cycle Theory is that it is scaleinvariant. This means that a household is more likely to accept a gamble if both its wealth and the gamble amount are scaled by a positive factor. Hence, although the level of aggregate variables such as capital stock have increased over time, the resulting equilibrium return process is stationary. A second attractive feature is that it is one of only two preference functions that allows for aggregation and a “stand-in” representative agent formulation that is independent of the initial distribution of endowments. One disadvantage of this representation is that it links risk preferences with time preferences. With CRRA preferences, agents who like to smooth consumption across various states of nature also prefer to smooth consumption over time, that is, they dislike growth. Specifically, the coefficient of relative risk aversion is the reciprocal of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. There is no fundamental economic reason why this must be so. We will revisit this issue in the next chapter, where we examine preference structures that do not impose this restriction.31 We assume there is one productive unit, which produces output yt in period t, which is the period dividend. There is one equity share with price pt that is competitively traded; it is a claim to the stochastic process {yt}. Consider the intertemporal choice problem of a typical investor at time t. He equates the loss in utility associated with buying one additional unit of equity to the discounted expected utility of the resulting additional consumption in the next period. To carry over one additional unit of equity, pt units of the consumption good must be sacrificed, and the resulting loss in utility is pt U (ct). By selling this additional unit of equity in the next period, pt+1 + yt+1 additional units of the consumption good can be consumed and βEt {(pt+1 + yt+1)U (ct+1)} is the expected value of the incremental utility next period. At an optimum, these quantities must be equal. Hence, the fundamental relation that prices assets is pt U (ct) = βEt {(pt+1 + yt+1)U (ct+1)}. Versions of this expression can be found in Rubinstein (1976), Lucas (1978), Breeden (1979), and Prescott and Mehra (1980), among others. Excellent textbook treatments can be found in Cochrane (2005), Danthine and Donaldson (2005), Duffie (2001), and LeRoy and Werner (2001).
31 See
Epstein and Zin (1991) and Weil (1989).
17
Rajnish Mehra and Edward C. Prescott
We use it to price both stocks and risk-less one-period bonds. For equity we have U (ct+1 ) 1 = βEt Re,t+1 , U (ct )
(3)
where Re,t+1 =
pt+1 + yt+1 . pt
For the risk-less one-period bonds, the relevant expression is U (ct+1 ) Rf ,t+1 , 1 = βEt U (ct )
(4)
(5)
where the gross rate of return on the riskless asset is by definition Rf ,t+1 =
1 , qt
(6)
with qt being the price of the bond. Since U (c) is assumed to be increasing, we can rewrite (3) as 1 = βEt Mt+1 Re,t+1 , (7) where Mt+1 is a strictly positive stochastic discount factor. This guarantees that the economy will be arbitrage-free and the law of one price holds. A little algebra shows that −U (ct+1), Re,t+1 . (8) Et (Re,t+1) = Rf ,t+1 + Covt Et (U (ct+1)) The equity premium Et (Re,t+1) − Rf ,t+1 thus can be easily computed. Expected asset returns equal the risk-free rate plus a premium for bearing risk, which depends on the covariance of the asset returns with the marginal utility of consumption. Assets that co-vary positively with consumption—that is, they pay off in states when consumption is high and marginal utility is low—command a high premium since these assets “destabilize” consumption. The question we need to address is the following: is the magnitude of the covariance between the marginal utility of consumption large enough to justify the observed 6 percent equity premium in U.S. equity markets? To address this issue, we make some additional assumptions. While they are not necessary and were not, in fact, part of our original paper on the equity premium, we include them to facilitate exposition and because they result in closed-form solutions.32
32 The exposition below is based on Abel (1988), his unpublished notes, and Mehra (2003). See Appendix B for the analysis in our 1985 paper.
18
Chapter 1 • The Equity Premium: ABCs
These assumptions are ct+1 1. the growth rate of consumption xt+1 ≡ is i.i.d. ct yt+1 is i.i.d. 2. the growth rate of dividends zt+1 ≡ yt 3. (xt , zt ) are jointly log-normally distributed. The consequences of these assumptions are that the gross return on equity Re,t (defined above) is i.i.d. and that (xt , Re,t) are jointly log-normal. Substituting U (ct) = ct−α in the fundamental pricing relation33 U (ct+1) , (9) pt = βEt (pt+1 + yt+1 ) U (ct ) we get
pt = βEt (pt+1 + yt+1)x−α t+1 .
(10)
As pt is homogeneous of degree 1 in y, we can represent it as pt = wyt , and hence Re,t+1 can be expressed as
w+1 w+1 yt+1 Re,t+1 = = · · zt+1 . w yt w
(11)
It is easily shown that w=
βEt {zt+1 x−α t+1 } 1 − βEt {zt+1 x−α t+1}
;
(12)
hence, Et {zt+1} . βEt {zt+1 x−α t+1} Analogously, the gross return on the riskless asset can be written as Et {Re,t+1} =
Rf ,t+1 =
1 1 . β Et {x−α t+1}
(13)
(14)
Since we have assumed the growth rate of consumption and dividends to be lognormally distributed, eμz + 2 σz 1
Et {Re,t+1} =
2
βeμz −αμx +1/2(σz +α 2
2 σ 2 −2ασ ) x,z x
(15)
33 In contrast to our approach, which is in the applied general equilibrium tradition, there is another tradition of testing Euler equations (such as Eq. (9)) and rejecting them. Hansen and Singleton (1982) and Grossman and Shiller (1981) exemplify this approach. See Appendix D for an elaboration.
19
Rajnish Mehra and Edward C. Prescott
and 1 ln Et {Re,t+1} = − ln β + αμx − α 2 σx2 + ασx,z , 2
(16)
where μx = E(ln x), σx2 = Var(ln x), σx,z = Cov(ln x, ln z), and ln x is the continuously compounded growth rate of consumption. The other terms involving z and Re are defined analogously. Similarly, Rf =
1 −αμx + 12 α 2 σx2
(17)
βe
and 1 ln Rf = − ln β + αμx − α 2 σx2 . 2 ∴
ln E{Re} − ln Rf = ασx,z .
(18)
(19)
From (11) it also follows that ln E{Re} − ln Rf = ασx,Re , where σx,Re = Cov(ln x, ln Re ).
(20)
The (log) equity premium in this model is the product of the coefficient of risk aversion and the covariance of the (continuously compounded) growth rate of consumption with the (continuously compounded) return on equity or the growth rate of dividends. If we impose the equilibrium condition that x = z, a consequence of which is the restriction that the return on equity is perfectly correlated to the growth rate of consumption, we get ln E{Re} − ln Rf = ασx2 ,
(21)
and the equity premium then is the product of the coefficient of relative risk aversion and the variance of the growth rate of consumption. As we see ahead, this variance is 0.001369, so unless the coefficient of risk aversion α is large, a high-equity premium is impossible. The growth rate of consumption just does not vary enough! In Mehra and Prescott (1985) we report the following sample statistics for the U.S. economy over the period 1889–1978: Risk-free rate Rf = 1.0080 Mean return on equity E{Re} = 1.0698
20
Chapter 1 • The Equity Premium: ABCs
Mean growth rate of consumption E{x} = 1.0180 Standard deviation of the growth rate of consumption σ{x} = 0.0360 Mean equity premium E{Re} − Rf = 0.0618 In our calibration, we are guided by the tenet that model parameters should meet the criteria of cross-model verification: not only must they be consistent with the observations under consideration, but they should not be grossly inconsistent with other observations in growth theory, business cycle theory, labor market behavior, and so on. There is a wealth of evidence from various studies that the coefficient of risk aversion α is a small number, certainly less than 10.34 We can then pose a question: if we set the risk aversion coefficients α to be 10 and β to be 0.99, what are the expected rates of return and the risk premia using the parameterization above? Using the expressions derived earlier, we have 1 ln Rf = − ln β + αμx − α 2 σx2 = 0.124 2 or Rf = 1.132, that is, a risk-free rate of 13.2 percent! Since ln E{Re} = ln Rf + ασx2 = 0.136, we have E{Re} = 1.146, or a return on equity of 14.6 percent. This implies an equity risk premium of 1.4 percent, far lower than the 6.18 percent historically observed equity premium. In this calculation we have been liberal in choosing the values for α and β. Most studies indicate a value for α that is close to 3. If we pick a lower value for β, the risk-free rate will be even higher and the premium lower. So the 1.4 percent value represents the maximum equity risk premium that can be obtained in this class of models given the constraints on α and β. Since the observed equity premium is over 6 percent, we have a puzzle on our hands that risk considerations alone cannot account for.
2.1.1. The Risk-Free Rate Puzzle Philippe Weil (1989) has dubbed the high risk-free rate obtained above “the risk-free rate puzzle.” The short-term real rate in the U.S. averages less than 1 percent, while the high value of α required to generate the observed equity premium results in an unacceptably 34 A
number of these studies are documented in Mehra and Prescott (1985).
21
Rajnish Mehra and Edward C. Prescott
high risk-free rate. The risk-free rate as shown in Eq. (18) can be decomposed into three components: 1 ln Rf = − ln β + αμx − α 2 σx2 . 2 The first term, −ln β, is a time preference or impatience term. When β < 1, it reflects the fact that agents prefer early consumption to later consumption. Thus, in a world of perfect certainty and no growth in consumption, the unique interest rate in the economy will be Rf = 1/β. The second term, αμx , arises because of growth in consumption. If consumption is likely to be higher in the future, agents with concave utility would like to borrow against future consumption in order to smooth their lifetime consumption. The greater the curvature of the utility function and the larger the growth rate of consumption, the greater the desire to smooth consumption. In equilibrium, this will lead to a higher interest rate since agents in the aggregate cannot simultaneously increase their current consumption. The third term, 12 α 2 σx2 , arises due to a demand for precautionary saving. In a world of uncertainty, agents would like to hedge against future unfavorable consumption realizations by building “buffer stocks” of the consumption good. Hence, in equilibrium, the interest rate must fall to counter this enhanced demand for savings. Figure 8 plots ln Rf = − ln β + αμx − 21 α 2 σx2 calibrated to the U.S. historical values with μx = 0.0175 and σx2 = 0.00123 for various values of β. It shows that the precautionary savings effect is negligible for reasonable values of α (1 < α < 5). For α = 3 and β = 0.99, Rf = 1.65, which implies a risk-free rate of 6.5 percent— much higher than the historical mean rate of 0.8 percent. The economic intuition is 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10
220 230 240 250 260 270 280 a
FIGURE 8
Mean risk-free rate vs. α.
49
47
45
43
41
39
37
35
33
31
29
27
25
23
21
19
17
15
13
9
11
7
5
210
3
1
0
b5 0.99 b 5 0.96 b 5 0.55
22
Chapter 1 • The Equity Premium: ABCs
straightforward—with consumption growing at 1.8 percent a year with a standard deviation of 3.6 percent—agents with isoelastic preferences have a sufficiently strong desire to borrow in order to smooth consumption that it takes a high interest rate to induce them not to do so. The late Fischer Black35 proposed that α = 55 would solve the puzzle. Indeed, it can be shown that the 1889–1978 U.S. experience reported above can be reconciled with α = 48 and β = 0.55. To see this, observe that since var(x) = 0.00123 = ln 1 + [E(x)]2
σx2
and
1 μx = ln E(x) − σx2 = 0.0175, 2
this implies α=
ln E(R) − ln Rf σx2
= 48.4. Since 1 ln β = − ln Rf + αμx − α 2 σx2 2 = −0.60, this implies β = 0.55. Besides postulating an unacceptably high α, another problem is that this is a “knifeedge” solution. No other set of parameters will work, and a small change in α will lead to an unacceptable risk-free rate, as shown in Figure 8. An alternate approach is to experiment with negative time preferences; however, there seems to be no empirical evidence that agents do have such preferences.36 Figure 8 shows that for extremely high α, the precautionary savings term dominates and results in a “low” risk-free rate.37 However, then a small change in the growth rate of consumption will have a large impact on interest rates. This is inconsistent with a crosscountry comparison of real risk-free rates and their observed variability. For example, throughout the 1980s, South Korea had a much higher growth rate than the U.S., but real rates were not appreciably higher. Nor does the risk-free rate vary considerably over time, as would be expected if α was large. In Section 3 we show how alternative preference structures can help resolve the risk-free rate puzzle.
35 Private
communication, 1981. a model with growth, equilibrium can exist with β > 1. See Mehra (1988) for the restrictions on the parameters α and β for equilibrium to exist. 37 Kandel and Stambaugh (1991) have suggested this approach. 36 In
23
Rajnish Mehra and Edward C. Prescott
correl . 5 20.14 correl . 5 0.00 correl . 5 0.45
0.4
Equity Premium (Percent)
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
20.1 0
FIGURE 9
0.5
1
1.5 a
2
2.5
Equity Premium vs. α.
2.1.2. The Effect of Serial Correlation in the Growth Rate of Consumption The preceding analysis has assumed that the growth rate of consumption is i.i.d over time. However, for the sample period 1889–2004 it is slightly negative (−0.135), while for the sample period 1930–2004 the value is 0.45. The effect of this non-zero serial correlation on the equity premium can be analyzed using the framework in Appendix B. Figure 9 shows the effect of changes in the risk aversion parameter on the equity premium for different serial correlations.38 When the serial correlation of consumption is positive, the equity premium actually declines with increasing risk aversion, thus, further exacerbating the equity premium puzzle.39 An alternative perspective on the puzzle is provided by Hansen and Jagannathan (1991). The fundamental pricing equation can be written as Et (Re,t+1) = Rf ,t+1 − Covt
38 In
addition, see Figure 2B in Appendix B. Azeredo (2007) for a detailed discussion.
39 See
Mt+1 , Re,t+1 . Et (Mt+1)
(22)
24
Chapter 1 • The Equity Premium: ABCs
This expression also holds unconditionally, so that E(Re,t+1) = Rf ,t+1 − σ(Mt+1)σ(Re,t+1)ρR,M /E(Mt+1)
(23)
E(Re,t+1) − Rf ,t+1 /σ(Re,t+1) = −σ(Mt+1)ρR,M /E(Mt+1),
(24)
or
and since −1 ≤ ρR,M ≤ 1,
E(Re,t+1) − Rf ,t+1 /σ(Re,t+1) ≤ σ(Mt+1)/E(Mt+1).
(25)
This inequality is referred to as the Hansen–Jagannathan lower bound on the pricing kernel. For the U.S. economy, the Sharpe ratio, E(Re,t+1) − Rf ,t+1 /σ(Re,t+1), can be calculated to be 0.37. Since E(Mt+1) is the expected price of a one-period risk-free bond, its value must be close to 1. In fact, for the parameterization discussed earlier, E(Mt+1) = 0.96 when α = 2. This implies that the lower bound on the standard deviation for the pricing kernel must be close to 0.3 if the Hansen–Jagannathan bound is to be satisfied. However, when this is calculated in the Mehra–Prescott framework, we obtain an estimate for σ(Mt+1) = 0.002, which is off by more than an order of magnitude. We would like to emphasize that the equity premium puzzle is a quantitative puzzle; standard theory is consistent with our notion of risk that, on average, stocks should return more than bonds. The puzzle arises from the fact that the quantitative predictions of theory are an order of magnitude different from what has been historically documented. The puzzle cannot be dismissed lightly, since much of our economic intuition is based on the very class of models that fall short so dramatically when confronted with financial data. It underscores the failure of paradigms central to financial and economic modeling to capture the characteristic that appears to make stocks comparatively so risky. Hence, the viability of using this class of models for any quantitative assessment, say, for instance, to gauge the welfare implications of alternative stabilization policies, is thrown open to question. For this reason, over the last 20 years or so, attempts to resolve the puzzle have become a major research impetus in finance and economics. Several generalizations of key features of the Mehra and Prescott (1985) model have been proposed to better reconcile observations with theory. These include alternative assumptions on preferences,40 modified probability distributions to admit rare but disastrous events,41 survival
40 For example, Abel (1990), Bansal and Yaron (2004), Benartzi and Thaler (1995), Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (2001), Campbell and Cochrane (1999), Constantinides (1990), Epstein and Zin (1991), and Ferson and Constantinides (1991). 41 See Rietz (1988) and Mehra and Prescott (1988).
Rajnish Mehra and Edward C. Prescott
25
bias,42 incomplete markets,43 and market imperfections.44 They also include attempts at modeling limited participation of consumers in the stock market45 and problems of temporal aggregation.46 We examine some of the research efforts to resolve the puzzle47 in the next two chapters.
References Abel, A. B. Stock prices under time varying dividend risk: An exact solution in an infinite horizon general equilibrium model. Journal of Monetary Economics 22 (1988): 375–394. Abel, A. B. Asset prices under habit formation and catching up with the Joneses. American Economic Review, Papers and Protocols 80 (1990): 38–42. Abel, A. B., N. G. Mankiw, L. H. Summers, and R. J. Zeckhauser. Assessing dynamic efficiency: Theory and evidence. Review of Economic Studies 56 (1989): 1–20. Aiyagari, S. R., and M. Gertler. Asset returns with transactions costs and uninsured individual risk. Journal of Monetary Economics 27 (1991): 311–331. Alvarez, F., and U. Jermann. Asset pricing when risk sharing is limited by default. Econometrica 48 (2000): 775–797. Attanasio, O. P., J. Banks, and S. Tanner. Asset holding and consumption volatility. Journal of Political Economy 110(4) (2002): 771–792. Auerbach, A. J., and L. J. Kotlikoff. Dynamic Fiscal Policy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1987). Azeredo, F. Essays on aggregate economics and finance. Doctoral dissertation, University of California, Santa Barbara (2007). Bansal, R., and J. W. Coleman. A monetary explanation of the equity premium, term premium and risk-free rate puzzles. Journal of Political Economy 104 (1996): 1135–1171. Bansal, R., and A. Yaron. Risks for the long run: A potential resolution of asset pricing puzzles. Journal of Finance 59 (2004): 1481–1509. Basak, S., and D. Cuoco. An equilibrium model with restricted stock market participation. The Review of Financial Studies 11 (1998): 309–341. Becker, G. S., and R. J. Barro. A reformulation of the economic theory of fertility. Quarterly Journal of Economics 103(1) (1988): 1–25. Benartzi, S., and R. H. Thaler. Myopic loss aversion and the equity premium puzzle. Quarterly Journal of Economics 110 (1995): 73–92. Bewley, T. F. Thoughts on tests of the intertemporal asset pricing model. Working paper, Northwestern University (1982). Billingsley, P. Probability and Measure. John Wiley and Sons, New York (1995). Boldrin, M., L. J. Christiano, and J. D. M. Fisher. Habit persistence, asset returns, and the business cycle. American Economic Review 91 (2001): 149–166. 42 See
Brown, Goetzmann, and Ross (1995). example, Bewley (1982), Brav, Constantinides, and Geczy (2002), Constantinides and Duffie (1996), Heaton and Lucas (1997, 2000), Lucas (1994), Mankiw (1986), Mehra and Prescott (1985), Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004), and Telmer (1993). 44 For example, Aiyagari and Gertler (1991), Alvarez and Jerman (2000), Bansal and Coleman (1996), Basak and Cuoco (1998), Constantinides, Donaldson, and Mehra (2002), Danthine, Donaldson, and Mehra (1992), Daniel and Marshall (1997), He and Modest (1995), Heaton and Lucas (1996), Luttmer (1996), McGrattan and Prescott (2000), Sethi (1997), and Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2006). 45 Attanasio, Banks, and Tanner (2002), Brav, Constantinides, and Geczy (2002), Mankiw and Zeldes (1991), and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002). 46 Gabaix and Laibson (2001), Heaton (1995), and Lynch (1996). 47 The reader is also referred to the excellent surveys by Kocherlakota (1996), Cochrane (1997), and Campbell (1999, 2001).
43 For
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Hansen, L. P., and K. J. Singleton. Generalized instrumental variables estimation of nonlinear rational expectations models. Econometrica 50 (1982): 1269–1288. Hansen, L. P., and K. J. Singleton. Stochastic consumption, risk aversion and the intertemporal behavior of asset returns. Journal of Political Economy 91 (1983): 249–268. He, H., and D. M. Modest. Market frictions and consumption-based asset pricing. Journal of Political Economy 103 (1995): 94–117. Heaton, J. An empirical investigation of asset pricing with temporally dependent preference specifications. Econometrica 66 (1995): 681–717. Heaton, J., and D. J. Lucas. Evaluating the effects of incomplete markets on risk sharing and asset pricing. Journal of Political Economy 104 (1996): 443–487. Heaton, J., and D. J. Lucas. Market frictions, savings behavior and portfolio choice. Journal of Macroeconomic Dynamics 1 (1997): 76–101. Heaton, J. C., and D. J. Lucas. Portfolio choice and asset prices: The importance of entrepreneurial risk. Journal of Finance 55 (2000). Homer, S. A History of Interest Rates. Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, NJ (1963). Ibbotson Associates. Stocks, bonds, bills and inflation. 2005 Yearbook. Ibbotson Associates, Chicago (2006). Kandel, S., and R. F. Stambaugh. Asset returns and intertemporal preferences. Journal of Monetary Economics 27 (1991): 39–71. Kendrick, J. W. Productivity trends in the United States, NBER 71 (1961). Kocherlakota, N. R. The equity premium: It’s still a puzzle. Journal of Economic Literature 34 (1996): 42–71. Kuznets, S. S. Commodity Flow and Capital Formation, NBER 34, New York (1938). Kuznets, S. S. National Product since 1869, National Bureau of Economic Research Number 46, New York (1946). Kuznets, S. S. Capital in the American economy: Its formation and financing studies in capital formation and Financing, NBER (1961). Kydland, F., and E. C. Prescott. Time to build and aggregate fluctuations. Econometrica 50 (1982): 1345– 1371. LeRoy, S. H., and J. Werner. Principles of Financial Economics. Cambridge University Press, New York (2001). Litterman, R. B. Bayesian procedure for forecasting with vector auto-regressions. Working paper, MIT (1980). Lucas, D. J. Asset pricing with undiversifiable risk and short sales constraints: Deepening the equity premium puzzle. Journal of Monetary Economics 34 (1994): 325–341. Lucas, R. E., Jr. Asset prices in an exchange economy. Econometrica 46 (1978): 1429–1445. Luttmer, E. G. J. Asset pricing in economies with frictions. Econometrica 64 (1996): 1439–1467. Lynch, A. W. Decision frequency and synchronization across agents: Implications for aggregate consumption and equity returns. Journal of Finance 51 (1996): 1479–1497. Macaulay, F. R. The movements of interest rates, bond yields and stock prices in the U.S. since 1856. National Bureau of Economic Research, New York (1938). Mankiw, N. G. The equity premium and the concentration of aggregate shocks. Journal of Financial Economics 17 (1986): 211–219. Mankiw, N. G., and S. P. Zeldes. The consumption of stockholders and nonstockholders. Journal of Financial Economics 29 (1991): 97–112. McGrattan, E. R., and E. C. Prescott. Is the stock market overvalued? Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review (2000). McGrattan, E. R., and E. C. Prescott. Average debt and equity returns: Puzzling? American Economic Review 93 (2003): 392–397. McGrattan, E. R., and E. C. Prescott. Taxes, regulations, and the value of U.S. and U.K. corporations. Review of Economic Studies 92 (2005): 767–796. Mehra, R. On the existence and representation of equilibrium in an economy with growth and nonstationary consumption. International Economic Review 29 (1988): 131–135. Mehra, R. On the volatility of stock prices: An exercise in quantitative theory. International Journal of Systems Science 29 (1998): 1203–1211.
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APPENDIX A Suppose the distribution of returns period by period is independently and identically distributed. Then, as the number of periods tends to infinity, the future value of the investment, computed at the arithmetic average of returns, tends to the expected value of the investment with probability 1. To see this, let T
VT = Π (1 + rt ) , t=1
where rt is the asset return in period t and VT is the terminal value of $1 at time T . Then
T
E(VT ) = E Π (1 + rt ) . i=1
Since the rt s are assumed to be uncorrelated, we have T
E(VT ) = Π E (1 + rt ) i=1
or T
E(VT ) = Π (1 + E (rt )) . i=1
Let the arithmetic average AA =
T 1 rt . T t=t
Then, by the strong law of large numbers (Theorem 22.1, Billingsley (1995)), T
E(VT ) → Π (1 + AA) i=1
as T → ∞
or E(VT ) → (1 + AA)T as the number of periods T becomes large.
APPENDIX B The Original Analysis of the Equity Premium Puzzle In this appendix we present our original analysis of the equity premium puzzle. Needless to say, it draws heavily from Mehra and Prescott (1985).
30
Chapter 1
•
The Equity Premium: ABCs
The Economy, Asset Prices and Returns We employ a variation of Lucas’ (1978) pure exchange model. Since per capita consumption has grown over time, we assume that the growth rate of the endowment follows a Markov process. This is in contrast to the assumption in Lucas’ model that the endowment level follows a Markov process. Our assumption, which requires an extension of competitive equilibrium theory, enables us to capture the non-stationarity in the consumption series associated with the large increase in per capita consumption that occurred in the 1889–1978 period. The economy we consider was judiciously selected so that the joint process governing the growth rates in aggregate per capita consumption and asset prices would be stationary and easily determined. The economy has a single representative “stand-in” household. This unit orders its preferences over random consumption paths by ∞ t E0 β U (ct ) , 0 < β < 1, (1B) t=0
where ct is per capita consumption, β is the subjective time discount factor, E{·} is the expectation operator conditional upon information available at time zero (which denotes the present time), and U : R+ → R is the increasing concave utility function. To ensure that the equilibrium return process is stationary, we further restrict the utility function to be of the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) class U (c, α) =
c1−α − 1 , 1−α
0 < α < ∞.
(2B)
The parameter α measures the curvature of the utility function. When α is equal to one, the utility function is defined to be the logarithmic function, which is the limit of the above function as α approaches one. We assume there is one productive unit that produces output yt in period t, which is the period dividend. There is one equity share with price pt , that is competitively traded; it is a claim to the stochastic process {yt }. The growth rate in yt is subject to a Markov chain; that is, yt+1 = xt+1 yt ,
(3B)
where xt+1 ∈ {λ1 , . . . , λn } is the growth rate, and Pr{xt+1 = λj ; xt = λi} = φij .
(4B)
It is also assumed that the Markov chain is ergodic. The λi s are all positive and y0 > 0. The random variable yt is observed at the beginning of the period, at which time dividend payments are made. All securities are traded ex-dividend. We also assume that the matrix A with elements aij ≡ βφij λ1−α for i, j = 1, . . . , n is stable; that is, lim Am as j m → ∞ is zero. In Mehra (1988) it is shown that this is necessary and sufficient for the expected utility to exist if the stand-in household consumes yt every period. The paper
31
Rajnish Mehra and Edward C. Prescott
also defines and establishes the existence of a Debreu (1954) competitive equilibrium with a price system having a dot product representation under this condition. Next we formulate expressions for the equilibrium time t price of the equity share and the risk-free bill. We follow the convention of pricing securities ex-dividend or ex-interest payments at time t, in terms of the time t consumption good. For any security with process {ds } on payments, its price in period t is ∞ s−t U (ys )ds , (5B) β Pt = Et U (yt ) s=t+1
as the equilibrium consumption is the process {ys} and the equilibrium price system has a dot product representation. The dividend payment process for the equity share in this economy is {ys}. Consequently, using the fact that U (c) = c−α , Pte = P e (xt , yt) ∞ α s−t yt ys |xt , yt . =E β ysα s=t+1
(6B)
The variables xt and yt are sufficient relative to the entire history of shocks up to, and including, time t for predicting the subsequent evolution of the economy. They thus constitute legitimate state variables for the model. Since ys = yt xt+1 . . . xs , the price of the equity security is homogeneous of degree one in yt , which is the current endowment of the consumption good. As the equilibrium values of the economies being studied are time-invariant functions of the state (xt , yt ), the subscript t can be dropped. This is accomplished by redefining the state to be the pair (c, i), if yt = c and xt = λi . With this convention, the price of the equity share from (6B) satisfies pe (c, i) = β
n
φij (λj c)−α [pe (λj c, j) + λj c]cα .
(7B)
j=1
Using the result that pe (c, i) is homogeneous of degree one in c, we represent this function as pe (c, i) = wi c,
(8B)
where wi is a constant. Making this substitution in (7B) and dividing by c yields wi = β
n
(1−α)
φij λj
(wj + 1)
for i = 1, . . . , n.
(9B)
j=1
This is a system of n linear equations in n unknowns. The assumption that guaranteed the existence of equilibrium guarantees the existence of a unique positive solution to this system.
32
Chapter 1 • The Equity Premium: ABCs
The period return if the current state is (c, i) and next period state (λj c, j) is pe (λj c, j) + λj c − pe (c, i) pe (c, i) λj (wj + 1) − 1. = wi
rije =
(10B)
The equity’s expected period return if the current state is i is Rie =
n
φij rije .
(11B)
j=1
Capital letters are used to denote the expected return. With the subscript i, it is the expected return conditional upon the current state being (c, i). Without this subscript, it is the expected return with respect to the stationary distribution. The superscript indicates the type of security. The other security considered is the one-period real bill or riskless asset, which pays one unit of the consumption good next period with certainty. From (6B), f
pi = pf (c, i) n U (λj c) =β φij U (c) j=1 =β φij λ−α j .
(12B)
The certain return on this riskless security is 1
f
Ri =
f pi
(13B)
−1
when the current state is (c, i). As mentioned earlier, the statistics that are probably most robust to the modeling specification are the means over time. Let π ∈ Rn be the vector of stationary probabilities on i. This exists because the chain on i has been assumed to be ergodic. The vector π is the solution to the system of equations π = φT π, with n
πi = 1
and
φT = {φji}.
i=1
The expected returns on the equity and the risk-free security are, respectively, Re =
n i=1
πi Rie
and
Rf =
n i=1
f
πi Ri .
(14B)
33
Rajnish Mehra and Edward C. Prescott
Time sample averages will converge in probability to these values given the ergodicity of the Markov chain. The risk premium for equity is, Re − Rf , a parameter that is used in the test. The parameters defining preferences are α and β, while the parameters defining technology are the elements of [φij ] and [λi ]. Our approach is to assume two states for the Markov chain and to restrict the process as follows: λ1 = 1 + μ + δ,
λ2 = 1 + μ − δ,
φ11 = φ22 = φ,
φ12 = φ21 = (1 − φ).
The parameters μ, φ, and δ now define the technology. We require δ > 0 and 0 < φ < 1. This particular parameterization was selected because it permitted us to independently vary the average growth rate of output by changing μ, the variability of consumption by altering δ, and the serial correlation of growth rates by adjusting φ. The parameters were selected so that the average growth rate of per capita consumption, the standard deviation of the growth rate of per capita consumption, and the first-order serial correlation of this growth rate, all with respect to the model’s stationary distribution, matched the sample values for the U.S. economy between 1889–1978. The sample values for the U.S. economy were 0.018, 0.036, and −0.14, respectively. The resulting parameters’ values were μ = 0.018, δ = 0.036, and φ = 0.43. Given these values, the nature of the test is to search for parameters α and β for which the model’s averaged risk-free rate and equity risk premium match those observed for the U.S. economy over this 90-year period. The parameter α, which measures people’s willingness to substitute consumption between successive yearly time periods, is an important one in many fields of economics. As mentioned in the text, there is a wealth of evidence from various studies that the coefficient of risk aversion α is a small number, certainly less than 10. A number of these studies are documented in Mehra and Prescott (1985). This is an important restriction, for with a large α virtually any pair of average equity and risk-free returns can be obtained by making small changes in the process on consumption. Given the estimated process on consumption, Figure 1B depicts the set of values of the average risk-free rate and equity risk premium, which are both consistent with the model and result in average real risk-free rates between zero and four percent. These are values that can be obtained by varying preference parameters α between 0 and 10 and β between 0 and 1. The observed real return of 0.80 percent and equity premium of 6 percent are clearly inconsistent with the predictions of the model. The largest premium obtainable with the model is 0.35 percent, which is not close to the observed value. An advantage of our approach is that we can easily test the sensitivity of our results to such distributional assumptions. With α less than 10, we found that our results were essentially unchanged for very different consumption processes, provided that the mean and variances of growth rates equaled the historically observed values. We use this fact in motivating the discussion in the text.
34
Chapter 1 • The Equity Premium: ABCs
Average Risk Premia (Percent)
R e2R f
2
1 Admissible Region
0
1
2
3
Rf
4
Average Risk-Free Rate (Percent)
FIGURE 1B 0.3
Equity Premium (Percent)
0.25
Set of admissible average equity risk premia and real returns.
correl. 5 20.14 correl. 5 0.45
0.2 0.15 0.1 0.05 0
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
Risk-Free Rate (Percent)
FIGURE 2B
Set of admissible average equity risk premia and real returns.
As mentioned earlier in the text, the serial correlation of the growth rate of consumption for the period 1930–2004 is 0.45. Figure 2B shows the resulting feasible region in this case (we have also included the region from Figure 1B for comparison). The conclusion that the premium for bearing non-diversifiable aggregate risk is small remains unchanged.
35
Rajnish Mehra and Edward C. Prescott
APPENDIX C Expanding the set of technologies in a pure exchange, Arrow–Debreu economy to admit capital accumulation and production as in Brock (1979), Prescott and Mehra (1980), or Donaldson and Mehra (1984) does not increase the set of joint equilibrium processes on consumption and asset prices. Since the set of equilibria in a production company is a subset of those in an exchange economy, it follows immediately that if the equity premium cannot be accounted for in an exchange economy, modifying the technology to incorporate production will not alter this conclusion.48 To see this, let θ denote preferences, τ technologies, E the set of the exogenous processes on the aggregate consumption good, P the set of technologies with production opportunities, and m(θ, τ) the set of equilibria for economy (θ, τ). Theorem ∪ m(θ, τ) ⊃ ∪ m(θ, τ)
τεE
τεP
Proof. For θ0 εθ and τ0 εP , let (a0 , c0 ) be a joint equilibrium process on asset prices and consumption. A necessary condition for equilibrium is that the asset prices a0 be consistent with c0 , the optimal consumption for the household with preferences θ0 . Thus, if (a0 , c0 ) is an equilibrium, then a0 = g(c0 , θ), where g is defined by the first-order necessary conditions for household maximization. This functional relation must hold for all equilibria, regardless of whether they are for a pure exchange or a production economy. Let (a0 , c0 ) be an equilibrium for some economy (θ0 , τ0 ) with τ0 εP . Consider the pure exchange economy with θ1 = θ0 and τ1 = c0 . Our contention is that (a0 , c0 ) is a joint equilibrium process for asset prices and consumption for the pure exchange economy (θ1 , τ1 ). For all pure exchange economies, the equilibrium consumption process is τ, so c1 = τ1 = c0 , given that more is preferred to less. If c0 is the equilibrium process, the corresponding asset price must be g(c0 , θ1 ). But θ1 = θ0 so g(c0 , θ1 ) = g(c0 , θ0 ) = a0 . Hence, a0 is the equilibrium for the pure exchange economy (θ1 , τ1 ), proving the theorem.
APPENDIX D Estimating the Equity Risk Premium Versus Estimating the Risk Aversion Parameter Estimating or measuring the relative risk aversion parameter using statistical tools is very different than estimating the equity risk premium. Mehra and Prescott (1985), as 48 The
discussion below is based on Mehra (1998).
36
Chapter 1 • The Equity Premium: ABCs
discussed earlier, use an extension of Lucas’ (1978) asset pricing model to estimate how much of the historical difference in yields on Treasury bills and corporate equity is a premium for bearing aggregate risk. Crucial to their analysis is their use of micro observations to restrict the value of the risk aversion parameter. They did not estimate either the risk aversion parameter or the discount rate parameters. Mehra and Prescott (1985) reject extreme risk aversion based upon observations on individual behavior. These observations include the small size of premia for jobs with uncertain income and the limited amount of insurance against idiosyncratic income risk. Another observation is that people with limited access to capital markets make investments in human capital that result in very uneven consumption over time. A sharp estimate for the magnitude of the risk aversion parameter comes from macroeconomics. The evidence is that the basic growth model, when restricted to be consistent with the growth facts, generates business cycle fluctuations if and only if this risk aversion parameter is near zero. (This corresponds to the log case in standard usage.) The point is that the risk aversion parameter comes up in a wide variety of observations at both the household and the aggregate level and is not found to be large. For all values of the risk aversion coefficient less than 10, which is an upper bound number for this parameter, Mehra and Prescott find that a premium for bearing aggregate risk accounts for little of the historic equity premium. This finding has stood the test of time. Another tradition is to use consumption and stock market data to estimate the degree of relative risk aversion parameter and the discount factor parameter. This is what Grossman and Shiller report they did in their American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings article (1981, p. 226). In a paper in which they develop “a method for estimating nonlinear rational expectations models directly from stochastic Euler equations,” Hansen and Singleton illustrate their methods by estimating the risk aversion parameter and the discount factor using stock dividend consumption prices (1981, p. 1269). What the work of Grossman and Shiller (Ibid.) and Hansen and Singleton (1982, 1983) establish is that using consumption and stock market data and assuming frictionless capital markets is a bad way to estimate the risk aversion and discount factor parameters. It is analogous to estimating the force of gravity near the earth’s surface by dropping a feather from the top of the Leaning Tower of Pisa, under the assumption that friction is zero. A tradition related to statistical estimation is to statistically test whether the stochastic Euler equation arising from the stand-in household’s intertemporal optimization holds. Both Grossman and Shiller (1983) and Hansen and Singleton (1982) reject this relation. The fact that this relation is inconsistent with the U.S. time-series data is no reason to conclude that the model economy used by Mehra and Prescott to estimate how much of the historical equity premium is a premium for bearing aggregate risk is not a good one for that purpose. Returning to the analogy from physics, it would be silly to reject Newtonian mechanics as a useful tool for drawing scientific inference because the distance traveled by the feather did not satisfy 1/2gt2 .
CHAPTER 2
Risk-Based Explanations of the Equity Premium John Donaldson Columbia University and
Rajnish Mehra University of California, Santa Barbara, and NBER
Introduction 1. Alternative Preference Structures 1.1. Preliminaries 1.2. Coincidence of Risk and Time Preferences in CRRA utility 1.3. Separating Risk and Time Preferences: Epstein–Zin and others 1.4. Variation in the CRRA and EIS 1.5. Habit Formation 1.6. Behavioral Models 1.7. Beyond One Good and a Representative Agent 2. Production Economies 3. Disaster Events and Survivorship Bias 4. Market Incompleteness and Trading Frictions 4.1. Restricted Participation 5. Model Uncertainty 6. Concluding Comments References
39 41 41 44 46 52 55 61 71 78 81 86 86 91 93 94
We are grateful to Francisco Azeredo, Ravi Bansal, George Constantinides, Vito Gala, Alok Khare, and Edward Prescott for their comments on earlier drafts of this chapter.
HANDBOOK OF THE EQUITY RISK PREMIUM c 2008 by John B. Donaldson and Rajnish Mehra. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved. Copyright
37
38
Chapter 2 • Risk-Based Explanations of the Equity Premium
Abstract This essay reviews the family of models that seek to provide aggregate risk-based explanations for the empirically observed equity premium. Theories based on nonexpected utility preference structures, limited financial market participation, model uncertainty, and the small probability of enormous losses are detailed. We impose the additional requirements that candidate models yield consistent intertemporal portfolio choice and that a representative agent can be constructed that is independent of the underlying heterogeneous economy’s initial wealth distribution. While many models are able to replicate a wide variety of financial statistics including the premium, few satisfy these latter criteria as well. JEL Classification: D50, D52, E30, E32, G00, G11, G12, D90, D91, D10, D11 Keywords: equity premium puzzle, habit persistence, borrowing constraints, limited participation, incomplete markets, idiosyncratic income shocks, life-cycle savings, non-expected utility preferences, prospect theory, rank-dependent, expected utility, disaster events, survivorship bias
John Donaldson and Rajnish Mehra
39
INTRODUCTION Mehra and Prescott (1985) demonstrated that the empirical equity premium (the return earned on a well-diversified “market portfolio” in excess of that earned by a risk-free T-bill) is an order of magnitude greater than can be rationalized as a premium for bearing non-diversifiable risk in the context of the standard neoclassical representative agent paradigms of financial economics.1 Inevitably, the subsequent literature has principally focused on modifying the standard paradigm to generate much larger non-diversifiable premia.2 As a companion exercise, these efforts have adopted an ancillary goal of replicating the risk-free rate, rate of return volatilities, return autocorrelations, return cross correlations, and return correlations with consumption growth. In this chapter, we review this literature, which falls into four broad categories: 1. Preference-based theories: These theories seek to modify an agent’s preferences so that he is acutely sensitive in some way to poor consumption outcomes. Outcomes may be “poor” in either an absolute sense or in a relative sense vis-`a-vis some external benchmark, as in the habit formation literature. Illustrations sometimes require that agent preferences be defined over objects directly reflective of the agent’s portfolio experience, such as his recent gains or losses. While this latter feature is outside the standard expected utility construct, axiomatic foundations are nevertheless sometimes available. Section 1 of this essay focuses on these theories.3 2. Disaster scenarios: Researchers have also explored models where utility is of the standard CRRA variety, yet in which the worst outcomes are much more disastrous than the worst cases possible in the standard Mehra and Prescott (1985) context. Rietz (1988) and Barro (2006), in particular, fall into this category.4 Literatures 1 and 2 are dual to one another: either agents in the model must effectively be very sensitive to bad outcomes, or it is the outcomes themselves that must be very bad. 3. Trading frictions: Under either of the categories above, the premium will still be counterfactually small if agents can somehow insure against their worst consumption outcomes. Since the standard Mehra and Prescott (1985) representative agent construct is implicitly one of complete markets, perfect insurance opportunities are available in that context. Furthermore, for models parameterized to the per capita aggregate consumption process of the U.S. economy, agents do not find themselves in situations of extreme consumption risk. There must then 1 The following chapter (Mehra and Prescott (2008b)) surveys the literature on non-risk-based explanations of the equity premium. 2 Mehra and Prescott (1985) can match the premium with a very high CRRA. Alternatively, we can view the literature as seeking to match the premium (and other financial quantities) with a low CRRA. 3 For example, Abel (1990), Bansal and Yaron (2004), Benartzi and Thaler (1995), Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (2001), Campbell and Cochrane (1999), Constantinides (1990), Epstein and Zin (1991), and Ferson and Constantinides (1991). 4 See also Mehra and Prescott (1988) and Brown, Goetzman, and Ross (1995).
40
Chapter 2 • Risk-Based Explanations of the Equity Premium
be added features to the model, which deny at least some of the agents with risky consumption profiles access to a full set of state claims. Incomplete markets (whether in the form of restricted financial market participation for some agents or in the form of allowing trade in only a restricted set of assets) and collateral constraints are possibilities that have been explored.5,6,7 4. Model uncertainty: Nearly all the asset pricing literature presumes rational expectations; the relevant agents in the economy know the true probability distributions governing the relevant state variables: dividends, wages, etc. The model uncertainty literature presumes that this is not the case; it thereby introduces another source of uncertainty, a feature that gives rise to an additional risk premium for equity securities. Barrillas et al. (2006) and Weitzman (2007) are cases in point. We do not address this entire literature in full detail, as many of the topics are dealt with in specific chapters of the present volume. Category 3, in particular, is thoroughly considered in the essays by Constantinides and by Heaton and Lucas, particularly as regards classical incompleteness (too few securities are traded).8 We thus consider only the impact of borrowing constraints. Loss aversion and narrow framing are carefully considered in the Barberis and Huang chapter.9 As it constitutes a preference-related modification, we consider it in the present chapter but in an abbreviated form. As a field of study, model uncertainty as applied to the premium is in its infancy. While potentially very fruitful, the literature is small and our discussion will be correspondingly brief. Most research has followed the preference route, and this is the literature that we will emphasize.10 Whenever possible, we cast the discussion within the original Mehra and Prescott (1985) discrete-time representative agent setting.
5 For incomplete market formulations, see Bewley (1982), Brav, Constantinides and Geczy (2002), Constantinides and Duffie (1996), Heaton and Lucas (1997, 2000), Krebs (2000), Lucas (1994), Lustig and van Nieuwerburgh (2005), Mankiw (1986), Mehra and Prescott (1985), Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2007), and Telmer (1993). 6 For restricted participation and collateral constraints, see Aiyagari and Gertler (1991), Alvarez and Jerman (2000), Bansal and Coleman (1996), Basak and Cuoco (1998), Constantinides, Donaldson, and Mehra (2002), Daniel and Marshall (1997), Danthine, Donaldson, and Mehra (1992), He and Modest (1995), Heaton and Lucas (1996), and Luttmer (1996), McGrattan and Prescott (2001), and Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004). 7 Attanasio, Banks, and Tanner (2002), Brav, Constantinides, and Geczy (2002), Brav and Geczy (1995), Mankiw and Zeldes (1991), and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) are models that also incorporate restricted participation. 8 Constantinides (2008) and Heaton and Lucas (2008). 9 Barberis and Huang (2008). 10 Gabaix and Laibson (2001) and Heaton (1995). The reader is also referred to the excellent surveys by Kocherlakota (1996), Cochrane (1997), Campbell (2001, 2003), and DeLong and Magin (2007), preliminary draft. These papers review the proposed explanations for the magnitude of the premium, and the associated models. For an up-to-date international perspective on the empirical magnitude of the premium, see Dimson, Marsh, and Staunton (2008). Goetzmann and Ibbotson (2008) review the conceptual issues in its measurement over the long term.
John Donaldson and Rajnish Mehra
41
1. ALTERNATIVE PREFERENCE STRUCTURES 1.1. Preliminaries The focus of this section is to assess the extent to which plausible preference structures alone can rationalize the basic stylized facts as they relate to asset returns and the equity premium. The analysis in the previous chapter shows that the isoelastic CRRA preferences used in Mehra and Prescott (1985) can be made consistent with the observed equity premium only if the coefficient of relative risk aversion is implausibly large. Before proceeding with our discussion of alternative preference structures, we examine in detail some especially attractive features of the CRRA class, which makes it the “preference function of choice” in modern finance and macroeconomics. These features, while desirable in their own right for logical or empirical reasons, also constitute common properties that any reasonable preference specification should display. (i) Equilibrium Return Stationarity CRRA preferences result in a stationary equilibrium return process. This property is readily demonstrated in the context of the Mehra and Prescott (1985) model, where both the equity return and the return on the risk-free asset follow stationary processes, despite the fact that the level of output in the economy is growing over time and hence is itself non-stationary.11 This is consistent with the statistical evidence on the time series of asset returns over the past 100 years. Asset returns appear to be stationary, although the level of stock prices and the magnitude of aggregate dividends have grown enormously. Any serious preference structure should yield equilibrium return series with this feature. (ii) Aggregation Actual asset prices are formed via the trading behavior of large numbers of heterogeneous investors as each attempts to maintain his individual optimal portfolio composition, given his information on the future distribution of returns. Equilibria in such economies are difficult to characterize. If financial markets are competitive and complete, and agent preferences are expected utility, there will, in general, exist, by construction, a representative (single-agent) economy with the same aggregate consumption series as the heterogeneous agent economy and the same asset price functions. These economies are comparatively easy to analyze. In addition, if the representative agent can be constructed in a manner that is independent of the underlying heterogeneous agent economy’s initial wealth distribution, we say the economy displays aggregation. Aggregation (vis-`a-vis the existence of a representative agent) is the stronger, more restrictive, and more desirable property. It implies that assets may be priced in the representative agent economy without knowledge of the wealth distribution in the 11 See
Eqs. (8)–(11) in Mehra and Prescott (1985) or Appendix B of Chapter 1 of this volume.
42
Chapter 2 • Risk-Based Explanations of the Equity Premium
underlying heterogeneous agent counterpart. Under aggregation, results derived in the representative agent economy are general and robust. Aggregation also permits the use of the representative agent for welfare comparisons.12 In what follows, we provide a brief description of how the representative agent is constructed and then point out the additional structure imposed by aggregation. Consider an exchange economy of k = 1, 2, . . . K agents. We make the following notational identifications: ctk represents agent k’s period t consumption, while qte and qtb , respectively, denote the period t prices of the equity and one period risk-free security. The period t price of a state claim to one unit of consumption in period t + j, if state θ θ occurs, is denoted by qt,j . By analogy, the corresponding period t desired holdings of e,k b,k θ,k these securities by agent k are, respectively, zt , zt , and zt,j . For notational simplicity, we have suppressed the dependence of these quantities and prices on the period t state. With this notation in mind, the period t decision problem faced by an arbitrary agent k is ∞ max E β t u ctk t=0
subject to e,k
b,k
ctk + zt+1 qte + zt+1 qtb +
∞ j=1
e,k e qt
θ,k
θ zt+1,j qt,j ≤ zt
∞ b,k θ,k θ,k θ + Yt + zt + zt + zt,j qt,j .
θ
j=1
θ
In equilibrium, both goods and asset markets must clear: K
ctk = Yt ,
k=1 K
e,k
zt = 1,
k=1 K
b,k
zt
= 0,13
k=1 K
θ,k
zt,j = 0 for all j, θ.
k=1
Under competitive market conditions, equilibrium is Pareto optimal. This means the equilibrium consumption allocations above are also the solution to
12 Suppose, alternatively, that aggregation fails. Then each possible initial wealth distribution, via its associated representative agent, will display its own asset pricing characteristics. No general statements may be made. 13 The assumption that bonds are in zero net supply is not innocuous, although it is customary in the literature. In particular, it allows representative agent models to match the risk-free rate more easily. For a recent perspective see Gomes and Michaelides (2006).
43
John Donaldson and Rajnish Mehra
max E
K ∞
λk u ctk
t=0 k=1
subject to K
1
K
ctk ≤ Yt ,
k=1
in general directly depend on the initial endowment where the weights λ , . . . , λ
θ,k b,1 b,K e,1 e,K , k = 1, . . . , K . z0,j and distributions z0 , . . . , z0 , z0 , . . . , z0 θ,j For the given λ1 , . . . , λK we define the utility function of the representative K K
agent as u(Ct ) = λk u ctk , where Ct = Yt = ctk .14 These weights correspond to k=1
k=1
the inverses of the Lagrange multipliers on the consumers’ decentralized problems. Roughly speaking, consumers with greater endowments are accorded higher λs. The equilibrium stock and bond prices in the heterogeneous agent economy are then identical to those arising in a homogeneous agent economy where a “representative agent,” constructed as above, maximizes15 ∞ t E0 β u (Ct ) , 0 < β < 1, t=0
subject to
Ct + zet+1 qte + zbt+1 qtb ≤ qte + Yt zet + zbt ,
where, in equilibrium, zet = 1 and zbt = 0 ∀t. Under this equivalence, the representative agent is a stand-in for the weighted average of the economy’s members. As we have noted, the weights and thus the asset price series itself will, in general, depend on the initial wealth distribution. This is an enormously complicating feature as it suggests that asset prices in any period are in significant ways dependent on wealth distributions many years previously. If all agents in the decentralized economy have preferences of the CRRA type, however, the weights 1 multi-agent λ , . . . , λK will be independent of the initial wealth distribution, a fact that makes the use of representative agent models for asset pricing exercises more plausible. More formally, aggregation requires that the period utility function must be of the 1−1/γ k , where the α k are parameters form u ctk = e−α ct or u ctk = (γ/γ − 1) α k + γctk unique to agent k. To emphasize this point again, even if the individual preferences assume neither of these forms (but are still expected utility), there will continue to 14 We use capital letters to denote economy wide aggregates. For representative agent economies, individual and aggregate quantities coincide, so we use the aggregate notation in those contexts. In situations of clear agent heterogeneity, for example in OLG models, we denote individual agent quantities by lower case variables. 15 See Prescott and Mehra (1980) for an early articulation of this and Constantinides (1982) for a formal analysis of this decentralization perspective.
44
Chapter 2 • Risk-Based Explanations of the Equity Premium
exist a representative agent whose preferences are the weighted average of the individual agent preferences. However, they cannot be used to make any statements about “off-equilibrium” paths.16 (iii) Time-Consistent Planning Time consistency implies that the optimal future-contingent portfolio decisions made at t = 0 remain the optimal decisions even as uncertainty resolves and intermediate consumption is experienced. When considering multi-period decision problems, time consistency is a natural property to propose. In its absence, one would observe portfolio rebalancing not motivated by any event or information flow but rather simply motivated by the (unobservable) changes in the investor’s preference ordering as time passed. Asset trades would be motivated by endogenous and unobservable preference characteristics and would thus be mysterious and unexplainable. To understand the utility restrictions that time consistency imposes, let us consider a two-period context, t = 0, 1, where any one of s ∈ S possible states may occur the next period. Denote by c1 (s) the investor’s consumption at date t = 1 contingent on state “s” occurring. Johnsen and Donaldson (1985) demonstrate that if the overall (both periods’ consumption) utility function is to exhibit time-consistent planning, there must exist continuous and monotone increasing functions f ( ) and {us ( ) : s ∈ S} such that u c0 , c1 s : s ∈ S = f c0 , us c0 , c1 s : s ∈ S , where us (c0 , c1 (s)) is the state s contingent utility function. The recursive preference structure of Kreps and Porteus (1978), which makes explicit the preference for the timing of uncertainty resolution, is closely related. Note that under this formulation, preferences in any future state sˆ may be conditioned on consumption today c0 , but not on consumption planned for states s = sˆ that, de facto, have not occurred. In effect, the utility function must be of a form such that utility representations in future states can be recursively nested as individual arguments of the overall utility function, a condition fulfilled by the expected utility representation. We are thus, assuredly, in a time-consistent planning context under the expected utility assumption.17
1.2. Coincidence of Risk and Time Preferences in CRRA utility One restriction imposed by the CRRA class of preferences is that the coefficient of risk aversion is rigidly linked to the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. One is the reciprocal of the other. If an individual is averse to variation of consumption across different states at a particular point of time, then this feature implies he will 16 Within the context of seeking to replicate the equity premium, the statement is intended to remind the reader that, without aggregation, the asset pricing properties may become unique to the particular underlying initial wealth distribution. As a result, the same asset pricing results may not apply across various initial wealth distributions and associated representative agents. No statements of any generality can be made. 17 Time-consistent planning is satisfied in the Mehra and Prescott (1985) setup, because they assume an expected utility preference representation, in addition to the CRRA period utility specification.
45
John Donaldson and Rajnish Mehra
be averse to consumption variation over time as well. Since, on average, consumption is growing over time, the agents in the Mehra and Prescott (1985) setup have little incentive to save. The demand for bonds is low, and as a consequence the risk-free rate is counterfactually high. We illustrate this in the context of a deterministic two-period model where agents have preferences of the form u(c, γ) =
c1−γ 1−γ
and we solve the following problem: max u(c0 , γ) + β u(c1 , γ) subject to c0 + s0 ≤ Y0 , c1 ≤ s0 (1 + r). The solution is
1 β(1 + r)
1γ
=
Y0 − s0 (1 + r)s0
=
c0 . c1
As γ → ∞ (greater CRRA), c0 c1 → 1, the agent wishes for an extremely smooth consumption profile across time, a preference that is maintained under uncertainty. In a setting without uncertainty, this effectively means that the agent dislikes growth in his intertemporal consumption profile. In an asset pricing environment in which the representative agent’s consumption is growing exogenously through time (in order that it be properly calibrated), the agent will thus demand a very high rate of return in order to hold securities, the very possession of which increases his intertemporal consumption discrepancy. From the perspective of intertemporal consumption smoothing, the parameter 1/γ is referred to as the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (hereafter EIS). While indeed increasing the premium, increasing the CRRA has the counterfactual consequence of increasing mean returns to a level much in excess of what is observed, especially in the case of the risk-free security. In order to confirm these effects, let us explore the mean returns and volatilities for a number of CRRAs in the context of the basic Mehra and Prescott (1985) model and calibration.18 From Table 1 there is no doubt that increasing risk aversion increases the equilibrium equity premium: as the agent increasingly dislikes consumption variation of any sort, he must be paid an increasing premium in order to be willing to hold risky securities in preference to risk-free ones. It also improves the volatilities of the respective 18 This
model is described in greater detail in Appendix B to Chapter 1 (Mehra and Prescott (2008a)).
46
Chapter 2 • Risk-Based Explanations of the Equity Premium
TABLE 1i The Mehra and Prescott (1985) Model: Various CRRAs (Rates of return annualized in percent) U.S. Dataii
γ=2
γ=3
γ=5
γ=9 18.25
Ere
6.98
7.84
9.58
12.83
SDr e
16.54
4.34
4.99
6.36
9.24
Erf
0.80
7.56
9.10
11.85
15.93
SDr f
5.67
1.06
1.61
2.73
4.99
Erp
6.18
0.28
0.48
0.97
2.31
SDr p
16.67
4.20
4.70
5.69
7.61
i Same ii Data
calibration as Mehra and Prescott (1985), but for various γ. for the period 1889–1978.
return series. But the cost in other counterfactuals is very great. In particular, even as the CRRA is not yet absurdly large (γ = 9), the mean equity and risk-free returns become much too high, at, respectively, 18.25 and 15.93 percent annualized. This is a direct consequence of the single-preference parameter construct: in order to induce the representative agent to hold either type of security—an action that reduces the extent of his intertemporal consumption smoothing—security prices must fall to very low levels. Equivalently, the returns on all types of securities must be very high.19 There is no a priori reason that the desire to smooth consumption across states within a period and the desire to smooth consumption intertemporally should be tightly bound together. After all, one may speak of intertemporal consumption smoothing in a no-risk environment (in a context, say, of motivating savings behavior), and one may as well speak of risk aversion in an uncertain, atemporal environment. The situation considered previously requires that the same parameter describe the extent of sensitivity to both of these variations. Empirical studies seem to suggest, in fact, that investors are more desirous of a smooth intertemporal consumption stream than they are of an atemporal risk-free environment.
1.3. Separating Risk and Time Preferences: Epstein–Zin and others Epstein and Zin (1989, 1991, 2001) and Kreps and Porteus (1978) have emphasized a class of preferences that they term “generalized expected utility” (GEU), which 19 Mehra and Prescott’s (1985) calibration admits a small degree of negative autocorrelation in the growth rate of consumption. Azeredo (2007) argues that the Mehra and Prescott (1985) consumption autocorrelation estimates may be due to consumption data mismeasurement prior to 1929 and that mild positive autocorrelation is more accurate. If the stochastic process governing the growth rate of consumption is positively serial correlated, then as the risk aversion increases progressively, the equity premium eventually declines and turns negative. The earlier assertion that a higher CRRA leads to a larger premium is therefore consumption process-specific. The consumption process underlying most tables and model evaluations in this survey, however, is that of Mehra and Prescott (1985) in order to benchmark a basis of comparison.
47
John Donaldson and Rajnish Mehra
allows independent specification of the coefficient of risk aversion and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.20 These preferences separate time and risk preferences in a way that preserves the time-consistency property of the previous section.21 The basic notions involved in separating time and risk preferences are roughly summarized as follows: first characterize preferences over riskless consumption sequences (C0 , C1 , C2 , . . .) with a Koopmans’ (1960) time aggregation V ( ) where U (t C) = V (u(Ct ), U (t+1 C)).22,23
(1)
In the above expression, U ( ) is the overall utility representation, Ct is the period t consumption, u( ) is the period utility function, and (t C) denotes a continuous consumption sequence (Ct , Ct+1 . . .). This framework is then generalized to evaluate uncertain consumption sequences essentially by replacing the second argument in V (, ) by the period t certainty equivalent of the probability distribution over all possible consumption continuations. The resultant class of recursive preferences may be notationally characterized as Ut = V (u (Ct ), μt (Ut+1 )) ,
(2)
where μt ( ) describes the certainty equivalent function based on the conditional probability distribution over consumption sequences beginning in period t + 1. Such preferences are dynamically consistent. If the certainty equivalent is obtained via expected utility, the preferences fall into the Kreps and Porteus (1978) family. If it is obtained via a more general risk aggregator of the Chew–Deckel class (e.g., disappointment aversion risk preferences to be considered shortly), the preferences are said to be of the more general Epstein and Zin (1989) variety. These preferences have axiomatic underpinnings as well.
20 This preference construct has as its intellectual antecedents the time-consistent recursive preference structures of Kreps and Porteus (1978) and Johnsen and Donaldson (1985), and the Chew (1983, 1989) and Dekel (1986) preference generalization, which allows the independence assumption of classical expected utility to be relaxed. The latter is important for at least two reasons. First, there are widely reported violations of independence in the experimental literature; the Allais (1979) paradox is perhaps the most celebrated example. Second, this generalization has permitted the creation of preference structures that allow greater utility weight on bad outcomes than would arise in an expected utility context; see, in particular, Gul (1991). Not only is there empirical support for the hypothesis of high sensitivity to bad outcomes, but it is also a plausible feature that allows consumption-based asset pricing models to better replicate the premium. The reader is directed to Backus et al. (2004) for an elegant and detailed discussion of this preference class. 21 More recently, Kihlstrom (2007) proposes an alternative dynamic choice model. 22 We use the same notation as Backus et al. (2004) and Johnsen and Donaldson (1985). See the former study for a careful discussion of all the issues involved. 23 Preferences over deterministic consumption sequences that have the form (1) satisfy three reasonable properties (by construction): (i) history independence (preferences over consumption sequences (C0 , C1 , C2 , . . .) do not depend on prior consumption); (ii) future independence (preferences for period t consumption, Ct ) are independent of future consumption (t+1 C); and (iii) stationarity (preferences are the same at all dates).
48
Chapter 2 • Risk-Based Explanations of the Equity Premium
In their most basic analysis, Epstein and Zin explore the CES-like specialized preference ordering that is detailed below: 1− 1ρ 1− 1ρ 1− ρ1 ut ≡ u(Ct , CEt+1 ) = (1 − β)Ct + β(CEt+1 )
(3)
with 0 < β < 1, 1 = γ > 0, ρ > 0, or, in the case of ρ = 1, u(Ct , CEt+1 ) = (1 − β) logCt + β log(CEt+1 )
(4)
where CEt+1 = CE(u˜ t+1 ), the certainty equivalent of next period’s utility, is calculated according to (5) [CE (u˜ t+1 )]1−γ = Et (u˜ t+1 )1−γ , 1 = γ > 0, or log(CE (u˜ t+1 )) = Et (log u˜ t+1 ) , γ = 1.
(6)
In the above specification, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution ρ may be specified independently of the CRRA γ. Note that if γ = 1/ρ, recursive substitution to eliminate ut+1 yields ut = (1 − β) Et
∞
1 1−γ
β
j
1−γ Ct+j
,
(7)
j=0
which represents the same preference ordering over uncertain consumptions streams as the ordering given by ∞ 1−γ Et β j Ct+j , j=0
a fact that suggests we may unambiguously view the parameter γ of (3) and (4) as the CRRA (Epstein and Zin (1989) provide a more formal argument). Similarly, as the parameter ρ becomes smaller, the agent becomes less willing to substitute utility, and thus consumption, intertemporally. The parameter β can be viewed as the agent’s customary time preference parameter. Weil (1989) uses these preferences in a setting otherwise identical to that of Mehra and Prescott (1985) to compute the resultant premium. Even as specialized to the Epstein–Zin (1989) preference structure, Weil (1989) demonstrates that the Mehra and Prescott (1985) solution for the equilibrium price functions, q e Yt , xi = νi Yt and q b Yt , xi = ωi , still applies with the proviso that the constants νi , ωi now must satisfy a system of non-linear equations. Using an endowment process {Yt } otherwise identical to that of Mehra and Prescott (1985), Weil (1989) obtains the results detailed in Table 2.
49
John Donaldson and Rajnish Mehra
TABLE 2i Equilibrium Mean Rates of Return Under Epstein–Zin Preferences: Various Parameters/Selections (Rates of return annualized in percent. The first entry is the premium; the second is the risk-free rate.) EIS
CRRA(γ)
(ρ)
0
0.5
1
5
10
20
45
∞
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.48
0.94
1.77
3.01
5.25
5.24
5.21
5.01
4.78
4.40
4.09
0.01
0.06
0.11
0.51
1.01
1.89
3.14
6.20
6.16
6.12
5.79
5.40
4.73
3.93
0.01
0.07
0.12
0.55
1.08
2.00
3.27
7.14
7.08
7.03
6.56
6.02
5.06
3.76
2
1
0.2
0.1
0.05
1/45
i This
0.10
0.18
0.26
0.88
1.64
2.91
4.34
15.02
14.81
14.61
13.02
11.11
7.75
2.45
0.24
0.35
0.45
1.31
2.33
4.04
5.72
25.73
25.32
24.96
21.68
17.87
11.23
0.85
0.56
0.72
0.87
2.12
3.66
6.25
8.66
50.51
49.55
48.61
41.26
32.80
18.65
−2.23
1.13
1.36
1.60
3.58
6.22
11.22
17.11
138.91
135.56
132.25
107.44
80.69
40.39
−9.22
is Table 1 of Weil (1989).
It is readily apparent that the Epstein–Zin preference construct can, per se, provide some progress toward the equity premium puzzle resolution, but not a complete resolution. In particular, if the CRRA is set at 45 and ρ at 0.1, then a reasonable match to the data (mean values) is obtained. But if a much more reasonable CRRA of 1 is hypothesized, the premium is a scant 0.45 percent, while the mean risk-free rate is 25 percent.24 Both of these features are counterfactual. As Weil (1989) argues, generalizing preferences in the direction of Epstein and Zin (1989) seems only to deepen the puzzle: (1) in abstract economies such as Mehra and Prescott’s (1985), calibrated to observed per capita income dynamics (Ct = Yt ), there is insufficient consumption 24 Consistent with these findings yet using a very different methodological perspective, Kocherlakota (1990) demonstrates that when the growth rate of consumption is i.i.d. (an assumption with substantial empirical support), asset pricing models that separate the CRRA and the EIS as per (1)–(4) have no more explanatory power in empirical tests than those preferences for which these parameters coincide as in the standard Mehra and Prescott (1985) paradigm.
50
Chapter 2 • Risk-Based Explanations of the Equity Premium
growth risk to justify a substantial premium unless agents are implausibly risk-averse. (2) Furthermore, per capita consumption growth is too high (μ = 1.8 percent) for the equilibrium risk-free rate to be low, when agents are averse to intertemporal consumption substitution to the extent observed. In hindsight, these results are not entirely surprising. Even under Epstein–Zin’s (1989, 1991) preferences, there is one parameter alone, γ, which is given the entire role of characterizing the degree of risk aversion. Furthermore, by separating time and risk preferences, their structure tends to strengthen the influence of the intertemporal substitution parameter 1/ρ. As a result, agents must once again be offered a counterfactually high risk-free rate in order to induce them to save more in an environment when mean consumption growth is exogenously fixed at 1.8 percent. Note that Weil’s findings do not disqualify the entire Epstein–Zin family since other approaches to obtaining certainty equivalents may apply. They do suggest, however, that the difficulty may be in separating time and risk preferences where the agent does not need to be too risk-averse to match the data. Epstein–Zin preference constructs have been employed more successfully by Bansal and Yaron (2004) in a richer economic environment. These authors postulate processes on consumption growth and the dividend which are distinct but share a small, but highly persistent time varying expected growth component. The resultant ‘long run consumption risk’ is specially onerous for Epstein–Zin style representative agents who desire an early resolution of uncertainty.25 This latter feature demands a preference specification where the CRRA > (1/EIS), a precondition that the Bansal and Yaron (2004) calibration easily satisfies. For the γ = 10 and ρ = 1.5 case, they are able to replicate all the stylized facts quite well: Ere = 6.84%, Erf = 0.93%, σre = 18.65% and σrr = 0.57%. (Table 4 in Bansal and Yaron (2004)).26 That the persistent growth component is small lends credibility to their basic consumption growth hypothesis, as it is very difficult, empirically, to distinguish this possibility from the more customary i.i.d. consumption growth assumption. While an EIS as high as 1.5 is disputable, there is no prevailing consensus estimate of this quantity, even as regards to it being greater, equal to, or less than one. (See Attanasio and Vissing-Jorgensen (2007), Hall (1988), Guvenen (2006) and Yogo (2004).
25 See
also the chapter by Ravi Bansal in this volume (Bansal (2008)). the presence of long run consumption risk should be an especially important factor in the Epstein and Zin preference context is more apparent if we examine the corresponding process on the marginal rate of substitution, 26 Why
Mt+1 =
U1(Ct+1 ) Ct+1 θ e : ln Mt+1 = θ ln β + ln − (1 − θ) rt+1 U1(Ct ) ρ Ct
Wt+1 + Ct+1 1−γ e = ln , and rt+1 is the period t + 1 return on the agent’s wealth Wt 1 − 1/ρ 1 portfolio, Wt . If γ = ρ , the standard power utility case, the expression collapses whereby only consumption growth matters for the MRS variation. If γ = 1/ρ, the wealth component adds another source of risk. Long run persistence in dividend growth affects this latter term. where θ =
51
John Donaldson and Rajnish Mehra
We view Bansal and Yaron (2004), its predecessors and successors, as important for a number of reasons.27 First and foremost, it emphasizes the importance of long run growth variation for the asset pricing literature. Their paper also suggests that a full resolution of the equity premium puzzle may demand an improved understanding not only of investor preference structures, but also of the long run statistical characteristics of the principal aggregate macro series.28 More recently, Kallenbrunner and Lochstoer (2006) have demonstrated that the consumption growth process postulated by Bansal and Yaron (2004) will arise endogenously in a fairly standard production style real business cycle model, purely as a result of the consumption smoothing efforts of the representative agent armed with the same Epstein-Zin preference specification. While the authors match a fairly limited set of business cycle facts, their study is important not only for lending further credibility to the Bansal and Yaron (2004) perspective but also for the critical issue of cross model verification. Although standard Epstein and Zin preferences do not necessarily go very far in resolving the equity premium puzzle, it is nevertheless informative to study the full implication of these preferences for the properties of security returns beyond the equity premium. Within the standard Mehra-Prescott (1985) context, Epstein and Zin (1989, 1991) develop an elaborate dynamic programming argument to derive the following asset pricing equation. ⎫ ⎧ ⎨ C˜ − 1ρ θ 1 1−θ ⎬ j t+1 1 + r˜t+1 ≡ 1, Et β e ⎭ ⎩ Ct 1 + r˜t+1
(8)
j
e denotes the period t return on the agent’s wealth portfolio and rt+1 the period where r˜t+1 t return on some asset j included within it.29 In the above expression, the pricing kernel is of the form
1−θ − 1 θ C˜ t+1 ρ 1 β e Ct 1 + r˜t+1 where, θ = (1 − γ)/(1 − 1/ρ).
27 We include in the list of predecessors Backus and Zin (1994) and Cochrane and Hansen (1992). Other implementations of the Epstein–Zin preference construct are Epstein and Zin (1989), Yogo (2006) and Malloy et al. (2005). 28 Bakshi and Chen, (2008) modify the standard model by identifying dividend processes as a fixed fraction of earnings plus an i.i.d error. Potential errors in consumption measurement are there by avoided. They also assume risk free interest rates follow a mean reverting process with constant volatility. As with Bansal & Yaron (2004) they derive closed form solutions and match the premium. 29 Cochrane derives this relationship in the Appendix to his essay in this volume (2008).
52
Chapter 2 • Risk-Based Explanations of the Equity Premium
This is a geometric average (with weights θ and 1 − θ, respectively) of the kernel of the standard CCAPM, − 1 C˜ t+1 ρ , β Ct and the reciprocal of the gross return on the wealth portfolio.30 Epstein and Zin (1991) next consider a linear approximation to the prior geometric average, − 1 1 C˜ t+1 ρ + (1 − θ) , (9) θ β e Ct 1 + r˜t+1 which, when substituted into (8), yields ⎧ ⎫ ⎪ ⎪ − 1ρ ⎨ ⎬ C˜ t+1 1 j j Et θ β 1 + r˜t+1 + (1 − θ) 1 + r ˜ =1 e t+1 ⎪ ⎪ Ct 1 + r˜t+1 ⎩ ⎭
(10)
As is well known, the standard CAPM relates the undiversifiable risk of an asset to the covariance of its returns with the returns on the market portfolio. When time and risk preferences are distinct, Eq. (10) suggests that both covariances matter: the covariance of an individual asset’s return with the market portfolio captures its essential undiversifiable risk, while the covariance of its returns with the consumption growth rate fundamentally captures its risk across time periods. With separate time and risk preferences, it is natural that both should be separately and individually present. But, as we are aware, this alone does not, in general, solve the puzzle.31
1.4. Variation in the CRRA and EIS But what about the basic Epstein–Zin construct generalized to admit time variation in the CRRA and EIS parameters? Several authors, in particular, have suggested that countercyclical risk aversion may allow for resolving the puzzle (cf. Campbell and Cochrane (1999), Gordon and St. Amour (2000, 2003), and Danthine et al. (1992)). Note, however, that such modifications should still respect time-consistent planning and aggregation while also generating stationary equilibrium security returns. 30 The
difficulty in having a pricing kernel that is dependent on the return to the agent’s wealth portfolio is the ambiguity that is introduced in the corresponding empirical tests of the model: what is a reasonable proxy for the wealth portfolio? Epstein and Zin (1991) use the traditional “market portfolio” as that proxy, but it can reasonably be argued that this overstates the covariance of investor wealth and individual asset returns. In particular, there is no labor income in their model, and thus their abstraction implies that human capital wealth is a negligible component of total wealth. 31 Azeredo (2007) confirms that mild positive autocorrelation in the growth rate of consumption also leads to negative equity premia for reasonably parameterized Epstein–Zin utility (EIS near zero) in a standard Mehra and Prescott (1985) setting. For mild positive serial correlation and EIS near 1, the equity premium is positive but still very small.
53
John Donaldson and Rajnish Mehra
Simple generalizations to admit countercyclical risk aversion are, first and foremost, problematic along the return stationarity dimension. Consider a simple expected utility, representative agent preference specification of the form E
∞
t
β u (Ct , γt ) ,
t=0
where 1−γ
u (Ct , γt ) =
Ct t 1 − γt
with the stochastic process on γt , the period CRRA, chosen so that corr (γt , gt ) < 0 (gt denoting the output growth rate, gt = Yt /Yt−1 − 1). An exploration of this non-trivial generalization of the standard Mehra and Prescott (1985) paradigm is revealing (see Danthine et al. (2004) for details). In particular, returns are non-stationary. This latter assertion can be seen from a straightforward calculation of the representative agent’s equilibrium (Ct = Yt ) intertemporal marginal rate of substitution (IMRS): IMRSt, t+1 = β
(Yt ) γt − γt+1 u1 (Yt+1 , γt+1 ) =β . u1 (Yt , γt ) (gt+1 )γt+1
(11)
Clearly, the IMRSt,t+1 depends not only on a transformation of the growth rate of output alone, as in Mehra and Prescott (1985), but also directly on the level of output Yt . The presence of Yt in expression (11) guarantees that risk-free asset prices and the equilibrium risk-free return will not be a stationary series (the same is true of the risky asset). We notice also that the presence of γt and γt+1 introduces another source of uncertainty into the agent’s economic environment, albeit one that he correctly anticipates (rational expectations). It turns out that this single-parameter curvature variation has big consequences for the equity premium and risk-free rate generated by the model. This is presented in Table 3, where the output growth process is otherwise identical to that found in Mehra and Prescott (1985). Note that under these parameterizations, the problem is not that returns are insufficiently volatile or that the premium is too small, but that both these quantities are too large! Returns on both securities, but especially the equity security, are also much too large relative to the data. The point is not that the model fails, for the idea that one parameter—even if it now assumes two distinct values—should allow enough flexibility to explain a myriad of financial statistics remains a bit preposterous. Rather, what is of interest is the qualitative fact that parameter uncertainty appears to have an enormous influence on the representative agent’s demand for securities. But can this effect play itself out more constructively in an Epstein–Zin context? Melino and Yang (2003) explore a generalized version of Epstein and Zin (1989) that admits parameter uncertainty in the CRRA for “timeless gambles,” the EIS, and the
54
Chapter 2 • Risk-Based Explanations of the Equity Premium
TABLE 3 Variation in the CRRA: Representative Cases (Summary return statistics in percent, annualized; unless otherwise indicated, β = 0.96, π = 0.47, μ = 0.018, σ = 0.036, N = 120, Y 0 = 1)i,ii (1) Mehra and Prescott (1985) γ1 = γ2 = 3
(2) γ 1 = 1.0 γ 2 = 1.5
(3) γ 1 = 0.5 γ 2 = 1.0
(4) γ 1 = 4.0 γ 2 = 4.5
(5) γ 1 = 1.5 γ 2 = 1.0
(6) γ 1 = 1.0 γ 2 = 1.5
Ere
9.58
16.95
16.14
21.5
19.56
18.77
SDr e
4.99
53.04
53.17
51.94
59.81
58.36
Erf
9.10
8.47
7.19
15.74
6.84
7.79
SDr f
1.61
34.21
33.90
35.78
34.61
35.75
Erp
0.48
8.48
5.76
12.72
10.98
SDr p
4.7
34.92
32.75
43.21
40.32
8.945 35.26
i Panel 1 reports results from the original Mehra and Prescott (1985) model when the CRRA is fixed at γ = 3. ii The number N indicates the length of the time series of prices and dividends that was used to compute return statistics. N = 120 corresponds to 30 years of data. Reported mean returns and standard deviations represent averages of estimates obtained from 1000 independently generated time series of this length.
agent’s subjective discount factor:32 1 ρ γt ! γtt ρt ρ ut = ct t + βt Et ut+1 .
(12)
They also allow γt ∈ {γ H, γ L }, ρt ∈ {ρH, ρL }, and βt ∈ {β H, β L }, where all parameters superscripted by H occur simultaneously, and so also for those superscripted by L (there are two parameter sets); H and L are also coincident with the high and low growth states, respectively. Roughly speaking, they derive expressions for the equilibrium Ere, SDr e, Erf, and SDr f in the context of a consumption growth process identical to that of Mehra and Prescott (1985) and then ask what sets of parameters allow the resolution of these equations to satisfy the observed values of Ere , SDr e , etc. Melino and Yang (2003) find that certain reasonable sets of parameters do allow the exact replication of the four required historical moments. Generally speaking, this is accomplished with “modest procyclical variation in the EIS, but strong countercyclical 32 More precisely, under this specification, 1 − γ is the CRRA , EIS is defined by 1/(1 − ρ ), and β is the t t t t t customary (though now stochastic) subjective discount factor. Formulation (11) leads to an equilib!1−γ(st )/ρ(st ) −1 γ(s )−1 Qt /β(st )) rium IMRSt of the form IMRSt+1 = β (st ) gt+1t [1 + Qt+1 ][γ(st )/ρ(st+1 )] , where st e denotes the underlying state influencing β, γ, and ρ; gt is the period t growth rate, and Qt = qt /ct , the “priceto-earnings ratio.” From our discussion of Epstein and Zin (1989, 1991), we would expect such a term to be present in the IMRSt .
55
John Donaldson and Rajnish Mehra
TABLE 4i Parameter Values that Replicate Ere, SDr e, Er f, SDr f (Countercyclical CRRA 1 − γ and procyclical EIS 1 / (1 − ρt ); constant β) β
γL
γH
ρL
ρH
0.950
−25.00
0.89
1.25
1.31
0.960
−51.89
1.85
0.16
0.17
0.965
−18.91
0.67
−0.38
−0.40
0.970
−21.21
0.76
−0.92
−0.97
0.980
−22.25
0.79
−1.98
−2.10
0.990
−22.57
0.81
−3.04
−3.22
i This
is Table 4 of Melino and Yang (2003).
risk aversion on the part of the representative agent.”33 Variation in the subjective discount factor is found to have only negligible effects. A sample of the relevant parameters is found in Table 4. The reader may judge for herself whether any of the reported combinations constitute a reasonable resolution of the equity premium and associated puzzles. We venture only to comment that, for all cases, the degree of risk aversion implied by the low growth state seems high, especially in a context where the probability that the low growth state will continue for more than one period is less than 50 percent. There is also the added complication that risk tolerance cannot be uniquely identified with the γ parameter; rather, it appears that β, γ, and ρ all enter into the preference for random consumption sequences. Melino and Yang (2003) is important, for it presents with clarity the importance of countercyclical risk aversion at least as a (joint with procyclical EIS) sufficient quantity for resolving the first and second moments of the equity and risk-free securities.
1.5. Habit Formation A second approach to modifying preferences, that of incorporating habit formation, was initiated by Constantinides (1990) and Sundaresan (1989).34
1.5.1. The Concept Under this specification, the agent’s period-by-period utility is a function not only of his current consumption but also of his past consumption history. In its simplest form, the representative agent is postulated as maximizing E
∞
β t u(Ct − α Ct−1 ),
(13)
t=0 33 Melino
and Yang (2003), Section 7. et al. (2004) develop a notion of habits being formed at the level of individual goods. It is a notion that has yet to be applied, to our knowledge, in the equity premium literature. 34 Ravn
56
Chapter 2 • Risk-Based Explanations of the Equity Premium
where Ct−1 denotes the agent’s prior period consumption and α measures the intensity with which the prior period’s consumption experience influences utility today. Note that preferences are no longer time separable under this specification: by assumption, an increase in the agent’s current consumption, while lowering the marginal utility of his consumption today, increases the marginal utility of his consumption tomorrow. Informally, if the “agent eats more today, he ends up being hungrier when he wakes up tomorrow.” A number of variations on this basic model are considered in the literature. Under the most obvious of these generalizations, the agent’s “stock” of habit is represented as some known function of his entire consumption history: u( ) = u(Ct , St ), where St = S(Ct−1 , Ct−2 , . . .) denotes an aggregator function that summarizes the agent’s past consumption experience. Alternatively, the effect of the habit may be captured as the ratio of current consumption to its habit or benchmark level as per St , u1 ( ) > 0, u2 ( ) > 0. u(Ct , St ) = u Ct , Ct Both of these representations are referred to as internal habit models, as the magnitude of the habit is determined by the actions of the individual agent alone.35 Pollock (1970) and subsequently Abel (1990) postulate a habit that is external to the agent. Since Abel (1990), this perspective has been referred to as “keeping up with the Joneses.”36 It suggests that the agent is primarily concerned with his own consumption relative to the consumption of others in society; for example, u( ) = u(Ct − αC ¯ t−1 ), where C t−1 denotes the societal average consumption level in the previous period and α¯ the measure of his sensitivity to it. From the agent’s perspective, C t−1 is exogenous. Under this interpretation the agent wakes up feeling hungrier if those around him had all enjoyed a large meal. It is an indirect way of modeling an agent’s preference for relative “status.” In a representative agent equilibrium context Ct = C t , but this does not imply that internal and external habit formations lead to equivalent asset pricing relationships.37 35 Habits that enter as a ratio to current consumption are compatible with balanced growth (see King and Rebelo (1988)), whereas difference representations such as (11) are not. In order to restore balanced growth in the latter case, the difference must be normalized by some series that grows on average at the same rate as consumption. Such a normalization will appear in most preference specifications going forward. 36 See Andrew Abel’s chapter in this volume (Abel (2008)). 37 To demonstrate the difference, we need only write out the equilibrium equations that the equity price must satisfy: in the case of an internal habit, Ct−1 = C t−1 , qte satisfies " ! e + dt+1 + u1 (Ct+1 − αCt ) αqte dF ( ), a. u1 (Ct − αCt−1 ) qte = β u1 (Ct+1 − αCt ) qt+1 where the final term reflects the fact that higher asset purchases in period t reduce the habit in t + 1. In the case of an otherwise " identical externalehabit, ! b. u1 (Ct − αCt−1 ) qte = β u1 (Ct+1 − α Ct ) qt+1 + dt+1 dF ( ).
With a finite number of possible dividends (and thus a finite number of habit levels), in either case the state-contingent asset prices can be obtained as the solution to a system of linear equations (leading to a level stationary equilibrium). This is directly analogous to the Mehra and Prescott (1985) situation.
57
John Donaldson and Rajnish Mehra
We summarize these various alternatives by the tree structure below: habit formation external measured as a difference
internal measured as a ratio
difference
ratio
Strictly speaking, preferences structures of this form lie outside the family of recursive preference structures that admit consistent planning for a subtle reason: utility today depends on past consumption, which may depend on consumption plans that are no longer feasible. The way around this is to view past consumption as a habit state variable and view utility today as conditional upon it. In this way, consistency of choice is preserved. Aggregation is also preserved under this simple habit formation, provided u( ) is of the CRRA form.
1.5.2. Relationship to the Equity Premium As noted elsewhere in this volume, one source of the equity premium puzzle is the very low volatility in per capita consumption growth. If the risky asset is to command a high rate of return in an environment of very little (per capita) consumption risk, agents must be extremely risk-averse—much more so than micro studies to date have been able to identify. Incorporating a habit feature sidesteps this issue by postulating that agents are averse to variations in habit-adjusted levels of consumption rather than to consumption variation itself. Especially in circumstances where the current consumption level and the habit do not differ significantly, small changes in consumption growth can generate very large variations in habit-adjusted consumption growth. Even in the presence of modest overall habit-adjusted risk aversion, such variation may contribute to a resolution of the puzzle. Another way to present the mechanism underlying habit models is to compute the agent’s effective (or local) CRRA in the special case where the habit is well proxied by a fixed subsistence level of consumption:38 u( ) = u Ct − C =
38 See
also the discussion in Weil (1989).
Ct − C
1−γ
1−γ
.
(14)
58
Chapter 2 • Risk-Based Explanations of the Equity Premium
Under these circumstances, −Ct u11 (Ct ) γ = . u1 (Ct ) 1 − C/Ct
(15)
Note that if the subsistence level of consumption is high relative to actual consumption (a high threshold for status), then the local CRRA can be very large. For example, if γ = 3 and C/Ct ≈ 0.9, then the effective CRRA ≈ 30. Under this habit specification, effective risk aversion is time-varying: higher consumption in period t − 1 provokes the agent to be more risk-averse, ceteris paribus, in period t. It is also countercyclical: when Ct (and output) is low relative to C in a recession, C/Ct will be high and thus the effective CRRA high. With effective risk aversion not directly observable, these theories will be difficult to test empirically. Nevertheless, these simple relationships give us some idea of what is going on. They also provide an early warning sign that naive habit formation may not necessarily represent a “cure-all” that allows otherwise standard stochastic equilibrium paradigms to explain the full range of financial phenomena. The basic ingredient of the model, per capita consumption, in particular, does not display much variation in the data. This suggests that under a proper calibration Ct and Ct−1 will typically be similar in value. With an α close to 1 and standard CRRA utility, the argument Ct − αCt−1 will frequently be very small and be on the most concave portion of the agent’s utility surface. Marginal utility will be highly volatile and, as a consequence, the risk-free rate is likely to be counterfactually highly volatile as well.39 This is borne out in many studies for a wide range of settings (see, e.g., Constantinides (1990), Jermann (1998), etc.). Taming this excessive volatility is a particular focus of the habit specification described in the next section.
1.5.3. The Campbell and Cochrane (1999) Mechanism Campbell and Cochrane (1999) postulate a process on an external habit, Xt , and a period utility function of the simple CRRA form: u(Ct , Xt ) =
(Ct − St )1−γ , 1−γ
(16)
where Ct in this case denotes the individual agent’s consumption and Ct − Xt St = , Ct his surplus consumption habit. Note that from the agent’s perspective, St is exogenous although in equilibrium this will not be so. They next postulate that (1) consumption growth follows an i.i.d. log-normal process, 39 The
reader is also referred to the section on habit formation in Mehra and Prescott (2008b).
59
John Donaldson and Rajnish Mehra
Δct+1 = log Ct+1 − log Ct ≡ g + ν˜t where ν˜t ∼ i.i.d. N 0, σν2 ,
(17)
and (2) the log of the surplus consumption ratio log St = st also follows a log-normal process to be consistent with (1): st+1 = (1 − φ) s¯ + φ st + λ (st ) (Δct+1 − g) ,
(18)
where φ, s, ¯ and g are parameters, s¯ = log S (S denotes the steady-state surplus consumption ratio), and λ (st ) is a prespecified sensitivity function. As a result, the period t, t + 1 pricing kernel is of the form −γ u1 (Ct+1 , St+1 ) St+1 Ct+1 · MRSt, t+1 = β =β U1 (Ct , St ) St Ct ¯ t )+(1+λ(st ))Δct+1 −λ(st )g] = βe−γ[(1−φ)(s−s ¯ t )]ν¯t+1 ] = βe−γ[(φ−1)(st −s)+[1+λ(s
(19)
by identification (1) above. Under this specification it is apparent that the standard deviation of the MRS, as well as its correlation with consumption growth (both important determinants of the premium), will be determined by the form of the sensitivity function. Campbell and Cochrane (1999) go on to make the following assumption on the form of λ (st ): ⎧ ⎨1# 1 − 2(st − s) ¯ − 1 st ≤ smax (20) λ(st ) = S ⎩ 0 s ≥s t
max
# where S = σ β/(1 − φ) and smax = s¯ + (1/2) 1 − S 2 . These requirements allow the habit formulation not only to reflect certain key features of the data but also to generate a plausible habit process.40 In doing so, the authors attempt to set an upper bound on what can be achieved with a habit model in an exchange setting; that is, they seek to provide a sort of “performance standard” that other competing habit formulations must exceed. No axiomatic foundations for the postulated surplus consumption process are proposed, however. Lastly, an i.i.d. process on dividend growth is postulated, one that is imperfectly correlated with growth in consumption: Δ dt+1 = g + ω˜ t+1 , ω˜ t+1 ∼ i.i.d. N 0, σω2 with corr(ω˜ t , ν˜t ) = ρ. (21) As before, dt denotes the log of the actual period t dividend, Dt . With an independently specified dividend process, the Ct = Yt identity characteristic of Mehra and a first-order approximation, (14) and (15) imply Xt+1 = φXt + (1 − φ) (1 − S)Ct , which appears fairly conventional.
40 To
60
Chapter 2 • Risk-Based Explanations of the Equity Premium
Prescott (1985) is broken, allowing an implicit wage process, levered capital structure, etc. The parameters ρ and σω remain to be specified. The model—and, in particular, the surplus consumption process—is designed to replicate the observed low risk-free rate volatility. Taking advantage of the well-known properties of the log-normal return process in conjunction with model specifications (16)–(19), it becomes a matter of straightforward manipulation to derive the implied f expression for log rt : f
ln rt = −lnβ + γg − γ(1 − φ) (st − s) ¯ −
γ 2σ2 (1 + λ (st ))2 . 2
(22)
Under substitution into (18), expression (22) becomes f
ln rt = −lnβ + γg −
γ (1 − φ) , 2
(23)
a constant. This clearly is an extreme case of low volatility, and Campbell and Cochrane (1999) offer generalizations by which the precise real risk-free rate volatility can be matched as well. Plausibility dictates that the habit should not be predetermined, except possibly at the steady state, and formulations (18) and (20) also satisfy this requirement. Indeed, the fact that Δct+1 appears in the expression for the period t + 1 surplus consumption ratio st+1 dictates that current consumption growth has some influence on the habit.41 Since the habit is external, it represents the influence on an individual’s preference ordering of the average consumption plan of others in the society. Even in an environment of instant communication, it is perhaps unreasonable to presume an immediate and fully external habit adjustment process. The sensitivity parameter λ (st ) is also increasing in st by construction. This guarantees countercyclical risk aversion and, as the authors demonstrate, a countercyclical market price of risk. By making the agent very risk-averse when consumption is already low, this feature accentuates the perceived riskiness of a variable consumption stream. Table 5 presents some sample results of this elaborate exercise. From these results it is clear that habit formation as articulated by Campbell and Cochrane (1999) is a powerful mechanism for influencing security returns in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. Its flexibility is even greater than what Table 5 suggests since Campbell and Cochrane (1999) subject the model to other tests (e.g., predictability), which it easily transcends. Yet we remain uneasy, as there is no empirical evidence to support the assertion that surplus consumption habits evolve in the way proposed. Furthermore, for the reported simulation, the agent’s effective CRRA varies between 1 and 100, which is arguably extreme. The surplus consumption habit process in Campbell and Cochrane (1999) is highly specialized in other ways. Ljungqvist and Uhlig (1999), in particular, point out that under their specification, the representative agent would experience substantial welfare 41 Including current consumption as a part of the habit formation process may be used to ensure that period t’s consumption never falls below period t’s habit. Otherwise, period utility may not be well defined.
61
John Donaldson and Rajnish Mehra
TABLE 5 Equilibrium Security Returns and the Premium in a Campbell–Cochrane Model (Rates of return, growth rates annualized in percent; g = 1.89, σ = 1.50, lnr f = 0.94, Φ = 0.87, ρ = 0.20, σω = 11.2, β = 0.89, S = 0.057, Smax = 0.094) Postwar data
Simulated moments
Erf
0.94
0.094
SDr f
(not reported)
0
Ere
7.58
7.630
SDr e
(not reported)
15.200
Erp
6.69
6.640
SDr p
15.7
15.200
EΔct
1.89
1.890
SDΔct
1.22
1.220
Source: Campbell and Cochrane (1999), various tables.
gains if 10 percent of her endowment were periodically destroyed. The basic intuition is straightforward: while utility is diminished in the period in which consumption endowment is destroyed, future utility gains result since the habit is correspondingly lower. If the former loss is more than compensated for by the latter gains, the overall result is welfare-enhancing. While this is never the case under standard linear habit evolution, this is possible under the Campbell and Cochrane (1999) construct.42 These anomalies suggest the need for an axiomatic treatment of habit formation.
1.6. Behavioral Models Behavioral models are ones for which the postulated agents are not “fully rational.” While this can mean that they do not have rational expectations43 or that they do not 42 These observations are not as general as would initially appear. Consider the representative agent utility
function β t {g (xt ) + v (ct , xt )}, where xt is the aggregate consumption history, ct is the agent’s time-t consumption and v(ct , xt ) is increasing and concave in ct ; g(xt ) and v(ct , xt ) together constitute the agent’s period utility function. With an external habit, marginal utility is given by ∂v (ct , xt ) /∂ct , independent of g(xt ). The class of utility functions with common v(ct , xt ) but different g(xt ) support the same equilibrium but may, in general, have different welfare implications. Campbell and Cochrane indeed focus on equilibrium implications driven exclusively by marginal utility ∂v (ct , xt ) /∂ct . It is not the case that all utility functions in the class will necessarily exhibit identical welfare implications and therefore the criticism leveled by Ljungquist and Uhlig (1999) against Campbell–Cochrane cannot be viewed as a general statement. We thank George Constantinides for pointing this out to us. 43 By this we mean, in the context of this essay, that agents know the exact probability distribution governing all random outcomes—returns, consumption, etc.—driving the model.
62
Chapter 2 • Risk-Based Explanations of the Equity Premium
update their beliefs using Bayes’ rule, in the context of this essay it will be taken to mean that the agents make decisions in accordance with preferences that are not expected utility defined over consumption or wealth (indirect utility). In this sense, “habit formation” preferences are behavioral, although their successful use in explaining a wide class of phenomena has given them a degree of acceptance not typical of the broader behavioral finance literature. While the proposed family of behavioral preference structures is otherwise quite large, most have not been applied to the study of the “equity premium” and associated puzzles.44 For this reason, we restrict our attention to four: (1) the happiness maintenance preferences of Falato (2003), (2) the disappointment aversion and generalized disappointment aversion of Gul (1991) and Routledge and Zin (2004), (3) the prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) as applied, most especially, by Barberis et al. (2001), and (4) the rank-dependent expected utility preference structures of Quiggin (1982, 1993).
1.6.1. Happiness Maintenance Consistent with a large body of experimental evidence (see Isen (1989) for a review), Falato (2003) builds on the assumption that risk aversion may be procyclical. The phenomenon he seeks to capture is the following: investors who are experiencing high utility—due either to a favorable income or to wealth shock—become more risk-averse, as they do not wish these favorable circumstances to be lost; that is, they seek “happiness maintenance.” Falato’s model postulates that investors derive direct utility from both consumption and the consumption-to-wealth ratio. (As with Melino and Yang (2003), the associated MRS in his model also necessarily contains as an argument the consumption-to-wealth ratio.) In particular, Falato (2003) assumes that the agent’s period utility is defined over a composite good u( ) = u(gt ) = 1−θt
where g(Ct , Wt ; θt ) = Ct
(g (Ct , Wt ; θt ))1−γ , 1−γ
θ
Wt t and Wt , wealth, satisfies Wt = qte + Yt zet
(the setting is otherwise a pure Mehra and Prescott (1985) exchange economy). The agent’s full preference ordering over random consumption sequences is thus given by E0
∞ t=0
44 For
1−γ
βt
Ct 1−γ
Wt Ct
(1−γ)θt ,
the wider classes that have been used for macroeconomic studies, see Backus et al. (2004).
(24)
63
John Donaldson and Rajnish Mehra
where θt = θ x¯ t (n) and n 1 Yt−τ . x¯ t (n) = n+1 Yt−τ−1
(25)
t=0
If n = 0, Eq. (25) reduces to
Yt θt = θ Yt−1
.
It is this latter feature that captures the “happiness maintenance” phenomenon underlying Falato’s (2003) work: high average dividend (consumption) growth in the recent past, x¯ t (n), leads the agent to be more risk-averse over wealth in the current period via the exponent (1 − γ)θt of the wealth-to-consumption ratio. Falato (2003) proves that equilibrium prices exist for a Mehra and Prescott (1985) economy when the representative agent has “happiness maintenance” preferences.45 Furthermore, the postulated ordering admits consistent planning and generates stationary return series. Preliminary analysis suggests that a representative agent may be constructed. The issue of full aggregation remains open, however. As with Melino and Yang (2003), the methodology required to calculate statecontingent asset prices and returns involves the solution to a non-linear system of equations. Table 6 contains the results of this exercise for a sample set of parameters. We are drawn particularly to the γ = 3, θ = 0.24 case, which matches nearly all the moments exceptionally well, with the sole qualification that the SD of the equity return is about 30 percent too large. This is furthermore accomplished in a model with fewer degrees of freedom than, e.g., Melino and Yang (2003). The presence of the consumption-to-wealth ratio as an argument of the period utility function is not entirely surprising given earlier work by Lettau and Ludvigson (2001). What is perhaps more striking (but not reported in the table) is the ability of Falato’s model also to explain the predictable feature of stock returns (see, e.g., Campbell and Shiller (1988)) at least as well as the habit construct of Campbell and Cochrane (1999).46 Countercyclical risk aversion is clearly not a necessary condition for this class of models to replicate, acceptably, the equity premium and allied statistics. Furthermore, the addition of the (Ct /Wt ) ratio does not require the presence of a scaling factor since the consumption-to-wealth ratio series is endogenously stationary. The remaining behavioral approaches rely directly on countercyclical risk aversion. In both of them, the investing agents are concerned especially with bad outcomes relative to some benchmark, and it is how this latter quantity is defined that sets them apart.47 45 Such an exercise is non-trivial. The main challenge to establishing existence derives from the endogenous nature of the pricing kernel, which is, in turn, the result of the utility function’s dependence on wealth. 46 In Falato’s (2003) model, the cost of the business cycle is also about ten times the original estimate of Lucas (1985). See also Alvarez and Jermann (2004). 47 As such, they are direct descendants of Reitz (1988). Reitz (1988) retains the expected utility representation and postulates a low-probability-very-low-consumption state. In Routledge and Zin (2004) and Barberis et al. (2001), the “disaster” is measured relative to a benchmark. This fact facilitates a more reasonable model calibration.
64
Chapter 2 • Risk-Based Explanations of the Equity Premium
TABLE 6 Financial Statistics under Happiness Maintenancei (All cases: β = 0.99, n = 2, π = 0.43, μ = 0.018, δ = 0.036; various γ, θ; returns annualized in percentage terms)ii E(rf )
θ = 0.24
θ = 0.18
θ = 0.12
θ = 0.06
θ = 0.00
E(re )
E(rp )
SD(rf )
SD(r e )
SD(rp )
γ = 1.1
2.36
2.56
0.19
0.71
4.04
3.98
γ=2
2.85
3.75
0.90
1.87
8.12
7.90
γ=3
0.84
6.95
6.11
5.55
23.17
22.57
γ = 1.1
2.48
2.66
0.17
0.68
3.94
3.88
γ=2
3.27
3.89
0.63
1.64
6.66
6.45
γ=3
3.46
5.60
2.15
3.69
12.69
12.14
γ = 1.1
2.60
2.76
0.16
0.63
3.85
3.80
γ=2
3.62
4.09
0.46
1.39
5.59
5.41
γ=3
4.49
5.59
1.09
2.62
8.38
7.95
γ = 1.1
2.72
2.87
0.15
0.60
3.77
3.72
γ=2
3.94
4.30
0.36
1.20
4.83
4.67
γ=3
5.16
5.85
0.69
2.00
6.18
5.85
γ = 1.1
2.85
2.99
0.14
0.56
3.69
3.65
γ=2
4.27
4.55
0.29
1.04
4.23
4.10
γ=3
5.74
6.22
0.48
1.57
4.87
4.60
i Table ii The
4.1 in Falato (2003). μ, δ parameters refer to the output growth process in Mehra and Prescott (1985).
We emphasize the Routledge and Zin (2004) generalization of Gul (1991) since the latter model does not satisfactorily explain the premium in the context of a straightforward Lucas (1978)-Mehra and Prescott (1985) tree economy while the former does.48
1.6.2. Generalized Disappointment Aversion Disappointment-averse preferences place a greater utility weight on outcomes that disappoint. For Gul (1991), this threshold is to be identified with consumption realizations that lie below the (conditional) certainty equivalent consumption level, while for Routledge and Zin (2004) outcomes more distant from the certainty equivalent are given special weighting.49
48 Bonomo and Garcia (1993), however, combine a joint Markov switching endowments model with a disappointment version to match the first and second moments of the equity premium and the risk-free rate. 49 Gul (1991) disappointment aversion (DA) preferences in a standard Mehra–Prescott (1985) economy do not per se resolve the premium. Bonomo and Garcia (1993) enhance the construct by incorporating a joint process on consumption and dividends that follows a Markov switching model—in addition to (DA) preferences. They are able to match the risk-free rate and the first two moments of the premium.
65
John Donaldson and Rajnish Mehra
As in the Epstein and Zin (1989) utility construct, time and risk preferences are separated. Their recursive intertemporal utility function U(Ct , CEt+1 ) has the form U (Ct , CEt+1 ) = (1 −
1 1+ρ
γ Ct
1 γ + CE 1 + ρ t+1
1/γ ,
(26)
where CEt+1 is the certainty equivalent pertaining to random consumption in the following period. In functional form (26), ρ is the marginal rate of time preference and 1/1 − γ the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Risk preferences and the certainty equivalent computation are specified as follows. Let us presume a pure Mehra and Prescott (1985) setting with a finite number of states and suppose, in some period t, that the output level is Yti = Y i. Temporal risk preferences are represented as a period utility function of the form u(C) = C α /α (α = 0) or u(C) = log C(α = 0). The period t + 1 certainty equivalent consumption level CEt+1 = CEt+1 Y˜ i is then endogenously determined as the solution to the following definitional equation: α CEt+1 Y˜ i i ˜ u CEt+1 Y = α j α α j α δCEt+1 Y i Y Y πi j = . πi j −θ − α α α j Y j ≤ δCEt+1 (Y i ) (27) If θ = 0, structure (27) reduces to the definition of a certainty equivalent in a pure expected utility context.50 Otherwise, there is a penalty, proportional to θ, for consumption realizations that lie sufficiently below the endogenously determined certainty equivalent. If δ = 1, the certainty equivalent computation follows according to Gul (1991); if δ < 1, the context is that of Routledge and Zin (2004). Note that there is no mention of any external reference point as in the (external) habit formation literature. Nevertheless, the model generates countercyclical risk aversion, a feature that bodes well for its asset pricing characteristics. Furthermore, GDA preferences are homothetic, are linear in probabilities, and have the same aggregation properties as CRRA expected utility structures. They admit consistent planning, and Routledge and Zin (2004) provide the axiomatic underpinnings. Table 7 gives a quantitative idea of how well GDA preferences perform in the standard Mehra and Prescott (1985) environment. A number of these results are worthy of explicit mention. When dividend volatility is low, GDA preferences give only modest premia; they become quite large only when SD(Yt ) = 0.10. For the data period underlying the empirical background to the 50 When θ = 0, the Gul-Routledge-Zin structures relax the independence assumption that underlies the expected utility representation. Independence fails because mixing in some arbitrary payoff lottery with two lotteries under comparison may fundamentally change the tail properties of each.
66
Chapter 2 • Risk-Based Explanations of the Equity Premium
TABLE 7i Equilibrium Security Returns and the Premium: GDA Preferences (Various parameter combinations; all returns in percent) Parameter choices A
B
C
D
E
F
−0.5000
α
1
1
0.5000
−2
1
γ
1
1
1
1
0.5000
θ
9
24
9
9
9
9
δ
0.9692
0.9692
0.9692
0.9692
0.9692
0.9692
ρ
0.0300
0.0300
0.0300
0.0300
0.0300
0.0300
1
SD(Yt ) = 0.05 A
B
C
D
E
F
Erf
1.74
1.56
1.72
1.62
2.45
3.89
SDr f
1.26
1.44
1.25
1.23
1.21
1.11
Ere
4.30
4.68
4.33
4.46
5.07
6.63
SDr e
5.72
6.14
5.68
5.52
5.86
6.14
Erp
2.56
3.12
2.61
3.84
3.86
2.74
F
SDr p
not reported SD(Yt ) = 0.10 Aii
B
C
D
E
Erf
1.74
1.56
1.72
1.62
2.45
SDr f
1.26
1.44
1.25
1.23
1.21
1.11
Ere
8.07
9.66
8.17
8.59
8.86
10.46
SDr e
14.37
16.26
14.27
13.80
14.55
14.91
Erp
6.33
8.10
6.45
6.97
6.65
9.35
SDr p
3.89
not reported
i Table
7 is an amalgamation of selected results reported in Tables 1 and 2 in Routledge and Zin (2004). return statistics for the risk-free rate are identical for the SD(Yt ) = 0.05 and 0.10 cases because risk-free securities do not result in disappointments. ii The
article, de-trended dividend volatility is on the order of 12 percent, which advocates for the model with SD(Yt ) = 0.10; Campbell (1999) argues that the SD of dividend should be as high as 28 percent. Qualitative results generally match intuition; comparing columns A and B, the result of a greater penalty is to raise the risk-free asset prices and lower equity ones: risky securities are less desirable and the premium rises. Comparing columns B and D, the representative agent becomes atemporally more risk-averse and the premium naturally increases. In general, equity volatilities (SD(Yt ) = 0.10 case) match the data quite well; risk-free rate volatilities are generally too small. Although
67
John Donaldson and Rajnish Mehra
not part of Table 7, it can also be shown that the risk-free rate is procyclical. Overall, the results are very good, and the model is advantaged by retaining a utility specification defined only over the agent’s consumption. Note also that countercyclical risk aversion is generated endogenously within the (GDA) construct. To see this, consider the cases of columns A and B: disappointment aversion is the only source of risk aversion (α = 1). As a result, the pricing kernel is risk-neutral in the high growth states (no disappointing outcomes) but substantially risk-averse in the low growth states (see Routledge and Zin (2004) for a more detailed analysis). There is one other major structure that provides countercyclical risk aversion: prospect theory as applied to asset pricing.
1.6.3. Prospect Theories The major reference is Barberis et al. (2001). See also the essay by Barberis and Huang in this volume. The idea is to postulate investors who derive utility not only from their period-by-period real consumption, but also over equity portfolio gains and losses relative to a plausible benchmark.51 Roughly speaking, these investors max U(C) + V(G/L), where G/L denotes gains or losses. That utility is defined over only equity gains/losses rather than over aggregate gains and losses to total wealth is an illustration of the notion of “narrow framing.” Furthermore, investors are more sensitive to losses than to gains (this is the essence of the notion of “loss aversion”), with the extent of the loss sensitivity depending on the agent’s prior portfolio experience. Equity gains and losses are measured with respect to a benchmark, and if the investor’s past experience has been to sustain losses relative to his benchmark, then he is modeled as being more acutely sensitive to further ones. If his recent experience has been one of equity portfolio gains, then the agent is modeled as being less sensitive to losses (provided they are not so severe as to negate past gains). These requirements lead to a kink in the agent’s utility curve at gain = loss = 0. Roughly speaking, loss aversion as captured in Barberis et al. (2001) implies linear utility over gains and losses to the equity portion of an investor’s portfolio of the form Xt+1 , Xt+1 ≥ 0, V (Xt+1 , St , zt ) = λ (zt ) Xt+1 , Xt+1 < 0, where f
e Xt+1 = St Rt+1 − Rt St . f
e and Rt , designate, respectively, the gross rates Following our customary notation, Rt+1 of return on stock and risk-free bonds from period t to t + 1 and St the value of the stock portion of the investor’s portfolio. The latter is subscripted by t alone, as the risk-free
51 See also Benartzi and Thaler (1995). These authors postulated investors with loss-averse preferences over variations in their financial wealth only. Without any direct connection to consumption, it is impossible to ascertain how their model might describe the joint processes on equilibrium returns and consumption growth, for example.
68
V(Xt 11, St, zt )
Chapter 2 • Risk-Based Explanations of the Equity Premium
zt . 1
zt 5 1 Xt 11,0
FIGURE 1
458
zt ,1
Xt1150
Xt 11 . 0
Xt 11
V (Xt+1 , St , zt ): Utility of equity portfolio gains or losses. Source: From Barberis et al. (2001).
rate from period t to t + 1 is solely determined by the risk-free bond’s price in period t. Gains or losses are thus measured relative to what would have been earned had the stock portion St of his portfolio been invested in risk-free assets. The slope parameter λ(zt ) measures the degree of loss sensitivity which is dependent on a variable, zt , that recalls past portfolio experience, where zt = 1 captures a case of no prior gains or losses, zt < 1 means prior gains, and zt > 1 means prior losses. A representative graphical portrayal is found in Figure 1.52 More formally, in a discrete-time asset pricing context, the representative agent undertakes to assemble portfolios of the stock market index with value St in conjunction with an aggregate valuation of risk-free bonds, Bt , so as to solve ∞ Ct1−γ t+1 t (28) + bt β V (Xt+1 , St , zt ) , max E β 1−γ t=0
where the first term is the standard present discounted utility of consumption under CRRA utility, and the second, V( ), captures the utility/disutility of gains and losses, Xt+1 , in the stock market portion of the optimal portfolio, St ; the zt -term is as indicated above. The standard period t budget constraint and the constraint governing the evolution of wealth are, respectively, Ct + St + Bt ≤ Wt ,
(29) f
e Wt+1 = St Rt+1 + Bt Rt ,
(30)
where Wt represents period t wealth and St , Bt the amounts of it allocated, respectively, to stock and risk-free bonds post-consumption, Ct , in period t. It remains to detail the precise form of V( ). Barberis et al. (2001) postulate 52 An amplified version of this same representation may be found in the companion chapter by Barberis and Huang (2008).
69
John Donaldson and Rajnish Mehra
V (Xt+1 , St , z)t =
⎧ ⎪ Xt+1 ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ f f f e ⎪ ⎪ ⎨St (zt Rt − Rt ) + λSt (Rt+1 − zt Rt ), ⎪ Xt+1 ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩λ(zt )Xt+1
f
e Rt+1 ≥ zt Rt , and zt ≤ 1, f
e Rt+1 < zt Rt , and zt ≤ 1, f
e Rt+1 ≥ Rt , and zt > 1, f
e Rt+1 < Rt , and zt > 1,
(31) where λ(zt ) and zt+1 evolve according to λ(zt ) = λ + k(zt − 1) , and
zt+1
Re = η zt e Rt+1
(32)
+ (1 − η)1,
(33)
where λ > 1, η > 0, and k > 0 are constants and zt is an index that captures whether the investor has recently experienced gains (zt ≤ 1) or losses (zt > 1). Some careful interpretation is in order. Equation (33) describes the evolution of the historical experience variable, zt , where Re amounts to the average stock return and η is a parameter that captures the memory in the adjustment process.53 If equity returns e > 1), this experience tends to increase zt+1 > zt are much less than average (Re /Rt+1 since η ≥ 0. If η = 0, Eq. (31) suggests that zt ≈ 1 or that prior gains and losses have an immediate effect on the investor’s risk attitude. If η = 1, then the benchmark adjusts slowly. Note that λ(zt ), the loss sensitivity, is increasing in zt . Otherwise, bt = b0 (C)−γ, where (C)−γ is purely a scaling factor that is included to maintain stationarity in the equilibrium asset return distributions and b0 determines the relative utility of gains and losses vs. the utility of consumption. There is, however, no formal proof that investor preferences of this type survive aggregation and no axiomatic foundation for their existence. It remains to close the economy by specifying the exogenous dividend and consumption processes (as in any exchange model, there is one equity security outstanding, and risk-free bonds are priced in zero net supply). Barberis et al. (2001) consider a number of scenarios. We first report the one that is in the spirit of a pure Mehra and Prescott (1985) setting: Dt+1 Ct+1 = log = gC + σC ε˜t+1 , log Ct Dt where ε˜t+1 ∼ i.i.d. N (1, 0), where gC = 1.84 and σC = 3.79 (both expressed in percent) as estimated from data for the period 1926–1995. The results are presented in Table 8. 53 Re is actually determined within the model in order that, at equilibrium, the median value of Z ≡ 1. This t turns out, not surprisingly, to be approximately the average equity return.
70
Chapter 2 • Risk-Based Explanations of the Equity Premium
TABLE 8i The Equity Premium in a Model with Loss Aversion (γ = 1, β = 0.98, λ = 2.25, η = 0.9, gC = 1.84%, σC = 3.79%; various b0 , k; annualized returns in percent) Data
log rf
0.58
b0 = 0.7
b0 = 2
b0 = 100
b0 = 7
b0 = 2
b0 = 100
k=3
k=3
k=3
k = 150
k = 100
k = 50
3.79
3.79
3.79
3.79
3.79
3.79ii
E log rP
6.03
0.63
0.88
1.26
3.50
3.66
3.28
SD log rP
20.02
4.77
5.17
5.62
10.43
10.22
9.35
0.30
0.13
0.17
0.22
0.34
0.36
0.35
2.25
2.25
2.25
10.70
7.50
4.40
Sharpe ratio Average loss aversion i This
is Table II of Barberis et al. (2001). their specification it can be shown that log rf is constant.
ii Under
TABLE 9i The Equity Premium in a Model with Loss Aversion and Distinct Consumption and Dividend Processes (gD = gC = 1.84, σC = 3.79, σD = 0.12, w = 0.15, η = 0.9, γ = 1, β = 0.98, λ = 2.25; all return measures in percent) Data
b0 = 0.7 k=3
b0 = 2 k=3
b0 = 100 k=3
b0 = 0.7 k = 20
b0 = 2 k = 10
b0 = 100 k=8
log rf
0.58
3.79
3.79
3.79
3.79
3.79
3.79
E log rP
6.03
1.30
2.62
3.68
5.17
5.02
5.88
20.02
17.39
20.87
20.47
25.85
23.84
24.04
0.30
0.07
0.13
0.18
0.20
0.21
0.24
0.10
0.15
0.15
0.15
0.15
0.15
0.15
2.25
2.25
2.25
5.80
3.50
3.20
SD log rP Sharpe ratio Ct+1 P ρ ,r Ct t+1 Average loss aversion i This
table is drawn from Table III in Barberis et al. (2001).
Note that for very large k, which leads via Eq. (30) to very high loss aversion in some states of the world, the premium can rise to a level of 3.50 percent in conjunction with about half (10.4 percent) of the observed historical equity return volatility. Increases in the value of the parameter b0 , which place greater overall relative weight on the utility of gains and losses, also lend to increases in the premium, but only to 1.26 percent when b0 = 100. Clearly, it is the loss aversion parameter that has the power. Table 9 presents results when the consumption and dividend processes are specified independently: Ct+1 = gC + σC ξ˜t+1 , log Ct
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John Donaldson and Rajnish Mehra
log
Dt+1 Dt
= gD + σD ε˜t+1 ,
0 ξt ∼ i.i.d N , 0 εt
1 w
w 1
.
Comparing Tables 8 and 9, it is apparent that separating consumption from dividends has a substantial effect on raising the premium as well as on increasing return volatilities. This is not qualitatively entirely surprising, since there is now much greater dividend volatility–which makes equities more volatile–and this in turn affects an agent’s V ( ) utility much more significantly. Although stock returns are now less highly correlated with consumption (Table 9), this does not matter since the investor is concerned about stock market volatility per se. This latter fact more than compensates for the correlation diminution. By way of contrast, this feature is relatively unproductive in habit-style models as the increased volatility of returns is offset by its reduced correlation with consumption; the net consequence is very little change in the premium. An increase in the parameter k, by increasing loss aversion, has a similarly salutary effect on the premium as it does in Table 8. Loss aversion/narrow framing is an appealing idea, and Barberis et al. (2001) analyze its equilibrium asset pricing implications in a careful and through way. There is, however, a sense in which their study is premature. In particular, we as yet lack choice theoretic underpinnings, and the aggregation properties are as yet unconfirmed (strict aggregation will not hold).
1.7. Beyond One Good and a Representative Agent All of the models considered in the prior sections of the review have been essentially one good, representative agent models. In this section we first highlight elements of the multi-goods literature, which otherwise retains the representative agent construct. Subsequently, we explore a one good heterogeneous agent model where preferences are postulated to have a non-standard expected utility form (rank-dependent expected utility).
1.7.1. Multiple Goods A basic reference here is Piazzesi et al. (2007), which considers preferences defined over two goods, all non-housing consumption (this category comprises non-durable goods consumption and the flow of services from non-housing durables) and housing services. Adopting an otherwise standard Lucas-(1978) style exchange setting, the authors postulate the representative agent’s preferences to be of the form max E
∞ t=0
t
β u(Ct ) ,
(34)
72
Chapter 2 • Risk-Based Explanations of the Equity Premium
where 1− 1
Ct σ , u(Ct ) = 1 − 1/σ (ε−1)/ε
Ct = (Ct
(35)
(ε−1)/ε ε/(ε−1)
+ ωst
)
.
(36)
In (34)–(36), ct denotes non-housing consumption and st the flow of housing services; accordingly, σ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and ε is the corresponding intratemporal elasticity. For high ε values, the agent is very willing to substitute goods within a period; as ε → ∞, they become perfect substitutes. In this way, the level of housing services directly affects the marginal utility of non-housing consumption (the numeraire), and therein lies an additional source of consumption risk. In severe recessions where both housing services and non-housing consumption are simultaneously low, for example, the marginal utility of non-housing consumption is especially high as the agent tries to substitute future non-housing consumption for the anticipated shortfall in future housing services. This increases MRS volatility. An important methodological insight allows the equilibrium pricing kernel to be expressed in terms of non-housing consumption and the share of income going to housing services, an insight that avoids the challenge of constructing a time series for the somewhat imprecise notion of “housing services.” For the parameterization 1/σ = 5, β = 0.99, and ε = 1.05, they obtain a premium of 3.5 percent in conjunction with a risk-free return of 1.8 percent and a premium standard deviation of 11 percent. None of these parameter values is a priori objectionable.54 Another study in the multi-good tradition is Ait-Sahalia et al. (2004), which characterizes investor consumption behavior using time series of luxury-goods purchases. Roughly speaking, the idea is that since the “rich” own a vastly disproportionate share of non-pension equity and debt, their consumption behavior should matter for equity pricing. For this group, furthermore, the marginal consumption items are likely to be luxury goods (proxied by sales of expensive automobiles, the sales of high-end Manhattan co-operative apartments, etc.). The distinction between luxury and basic consumption goods is captured in their utility specification: u (ct , Lt ) =
(ct − a)1−φ (Lt + b)1−ϕ + 1−φ 1−ϕ
(37)
with constants a, b > 0 and φ > ϕ. The former assignment implies that subsistence consumption is positive for basic goods and negative (−b) for luxury goods. In equilibrium, luxury goods are not consumed by those with low consumption levels (the poor). In fact, there exists 54 Piazzesi et al. (2007) rely on two sources of uncertainty: consumption growth and the log expenditure ratio for housing. For that study it is important that they be statistically independent, a property that is assumed. Others have questioned its validity.
73
John Donaldson and Rajnish Mehra 1/φ
a c = a + bϕ/φ Pt > a such that Lt = 0 for ct ≤ c (Pt is the relative price for luxury goods vis-`a-vis basic ones). Finally, the rich consume an increasing fraction of luxury goods as their incomes rise: ct = 0, (38) lim xt → ∞ Xt where Xt = ct + Pt Lt denotes total consumption expenditure. Of relevance to this essay is the fact that this specification leads to two unconditional asset pricing equations of the form −φ ct+1 − a f e = 0, (39) rt+1 − rt+1 E β ct − a −ϕ Lt+1 + b Pt f e E β = 0. rt+1 − rt+1 Lt + b Pt+1
(40)
Ait-Sahalia et al. (2004) then focus their model on a number of issues related to and inclusive of the equity premium puzzle. Using various self-constructed time series, each corresponding to the aggregate purchase of some type of luxury goods (e.g., luxury cars, wine, apartments, etc.), as proxy consumption sequences, the authors estimate, respectively, the implied CRRAs and equity premia, and explore the ability of the model to replicate the cross-sectional returns of the 25 Fama and French (1993) portfolios. Broadly speaking, they find that certain of these series co-vary strongly with the observed return on equity and lead to high premia (7.8 percent, using an index of Manhattan co-op apartment prices). In most cases, the CRRA estimates are on the order of one-tenth that obtained using standard NIPA aggregate consumption measures: since this latter series hardly varies at all and is little correlated with equity returns. The idea is certainly an appealing one, and the results are impressive. Yet the by-now-familiar questions remain: what are the axiomatic foundations, in what sense is aggregation allowed, etc.? A less radical foray into multiple-goods territory is found in Yogo (2006). As such, Yogo (2006) provides another illustration of both the potential and the limitations of the Epstein–Zin utility specification. He considers a model in which the representative agent’s intratemporal utility level is a CES function of non-durable goods consumption, Ct , and the stock of durable goods, Dt :55 ut = u (Ct , Dt ) = (1 −
1− 1ρ α) Ct
+
1− ρ1 αDt
1 1− 1ρ
.
(41)
55 In models of this type, the non-durable good is always the numeraire. Technically, period utility is a function of non-durable goods consumption and the service flow from the stock of durable goods. Yugo (2006) assumes the service flow is directly proportional to the stock.
74
Chapter 2 • Risk-Based Explanations of the Equity Premium
This is coupled with an Epstein–Zin intertemporal utility specification of the form Ut =
(1 − β) [u (Ct , Dt )]
1− σ1
% κ1 1−1σ1 $ 1−γ + β Et Ut+1 .
The corresponding MRSt,t+1 is thus κ 1 1 − σ1 v(Dt+1 /Ct+1 ) ρ − σ Ct+1 1− κ1 MRSt,t+1 = ρ · Rw,t+1 , Ct v(Dt /Ct ) where
(42)
(43)
κ = (1 − γ)/(1 − 1/σ) % 11 $ 1 v (Dt /Ct ) = 1 − α + α (Dt /Ct )1− ρ 1− ρ
and Rw,t+1 is the return on wealth from the optimal portfolio. Following Hansen and Singleton (1982), Yogo (2006) then estimates the parameter values (α, β, ρ, σ, γ) that are consistent with (1) the above model and (2) the historical returns on the 25 Fama–French portfolios.56 He obtains the estimates σ = 0.024, α = 0.827, ρ = 0.52, β = 0.9 and γ = 191, all of which seem plausible except for the risk aversion estimate and, possibly, the relative intratemporal emphasis on durable goods (α = 0.827). That these values can, via (41)–(43), match the data quite well is attributable to the additional terms in the IMRSt,t+1 expression, which are dependent on the (Dt /Ct ) ratio. In the data, this ratio is highly procyclical and thus magnifies the countercyclicality of the marginal utility of consumption. Marginal utility becomes very high at business cycle troughs where both consumption itself and the (Dt /Ct ) ratio are low. Nevertheless, because durable consumption is so smooth, the required CRRA estimate is still excessive relative to that obtained in standard microeconomic applications. While the Epstein and Zin construct is flexible in accommodating many phenomena, it does not necessarily do so for reasonable parameter choices. Note that for this story to work, ρ < σ. In comparing financial statistics, it is the low value of the EIS that allows the model to replicate the historically observed risk-free rate. Multiple goods are not, however, any guarantee of puzzle resolution. Although Yogo (2006) obtains generally attractive results in a model with durable and nondurable goods within the Epstein–Zin preference specification, Giannikos (2007) derives equilibrium premia similar to that obtained in Mehra and Prescott (1985) using standard CES preferences defined over non-durable goods consumption and various representations of the durable goods service flow. His results are driven by positive autocorrelation in the estimated non-durable consumption dividend, a fact that leads to a negative premium on the non-durable goods firm (recall Azeredo (2007)). This negative premium overwhelms the positive premium to the durable goods—producing firm, giving an overall market premium that is counterfactually small and is negative for some parameterizations. 56 As
such, Yogo’s (2006) model also displays a form of composition risk (via the Dt /Ct ratio).
75
John Donaldson and Rajnish Mehra
1.7.2. Agent Heterogeneity There already exists a substantial literature that explores the magnitude of the premium in incomplete market settings where heterogeneity is captured via the experience of idiosyncratic income shocks. In this section, we focus alternatively on preference heterogeneity, its implications for the equity premium in a trading environment, and, ultimately, the usefulness of the representative agent construct. The literature is extremely small: we found only two directly relevant papers, Chan and Kogan (2002) and Chapman and Polkovnichenko (2006).57 Each studies an exchange equilibrium where financial markets are complete. Chan and Kogan (2002) postulate agents with ratio habit preferences of the form u (ct , Xt ; γ) =
1 (ct /Xt )1−γ 1−γ
where ct is the consumption of an individual agent with CRRA parameter value γ. The Xt term, which is their measure of the economy wide living standard, is defined as a weighted average of past aggregate endowment realizations: xt = ln(Xt ) satisfies &t xt = x0 e−λt + λt e−λ(t−s) ys ds 0
where yt = ln(Yt ), and Yt is the period t economy wide endowment. The latter follows a standard Brownian motion process. Note that the choice of the parameter λ determines how strongly past endowment experience influences the living standard measure. Chan and Kogan (2002) construct a representative agent and solve for equilibrium by solving the associated planning problem. Changes in the cross sectional distribution of wealth lead to changes in the economy wide level of risk aversion in the following way. Since the risk averse agents hold most of their wealth in stocks, when endowment is low and the stock’s price low, the fraction of the economy’s wealth controlled by these agents diminishes, leading to increased economy wide risk aversion. The resultant countercyclical risk aversion allows their model to match nearly all of the Campbell and Cochrane (1999) results except for the volatility of the risk free rate. In Chan and Kogan (2002) it is too high relative to what is observed in the data; in Campbell and Cochrane (1999) it matches the data by construction. Chan and Kogan (2002) is important particularly for generating countercyclical risk aversion endogenously in a way that works to resolve the puzzle. In Chapman and Polkovnichenko (2006), preference heterogeneity works against these same stated goals. They postulate a setting where investors have different rank dependent expected utility preferences (RDEU). With its surprising implications, the paper demands a somewhat detailed review. Rather than weighing various utility outcomes by their objective probabilities, RDEU preferences weight outcomes by some 57 We
thank Nick Barberis for bringing these papers to our attention.
76
Chapter 2 • Risk-Based Explanations of the Equity Premium
non-linear weighting function defined over the cumulative probabilities of outcomes that have been utility ranked from worst to best. Typical parameterizations end up over weighting bad outcomes. In general, a RDEU welfare functional will have kinks at allocations where consumption outcomes are equal across any two states. Consider an environment of i = 1, . . . , n states of nature and K agents where all agents have the same CRRA utility function over consumption outcomes in particular states, k 1−γ ci k k , U ci = 1−γ where cik represents agent k’s consumption in state i. Let C k, P k denote a consumption lottery where, respectively, consumption across states is ranked from worst to best, and P denotes the vector of cumulative probabilities. More specifically, C k, P k = k
k k c1 . . . , cN , P1k , . . . , PNk where cik < ci+1 and Pik = πj where πj is the objective j≤i
probability of the state corresponding to the consumption allocation cjk . Note that different outcomes will have different associated vectors of cumulative probabilities. In the Chapman and Polkovnichenko (2006) formulation, the RDEU value function of agent k is given by U k ({C, P }) =
N
qk (P ) uk cik ,
(44)
i=1
φk k φk where qk (P ) = Pik − Pi−1 is the weighting function. Note that if φk ≡ 1, the expression collapses to one of expected utility, and if φk < 1, the agent is pessimistic. In general equilibrium, the qk (P ) weights will be endogenously determined, just as the consumption outcomes across states are themselves determined endogenously in equilibrium. The authors then go on to consider a two-agent, two-date equilibrium where the agents differ in their pessimism parameters, φk . With φ1 = 1 (expected utility) and φ2 = 0.4 (substantial pessimism), they find that the equity risk premium is only 17 percent of the risk premium in an economy where the consumers are identical (φ1 = φ2 = 0.4). It is, however, twice the level obtained for the corresponding homogeneous preference economy, where everyone has expected utility (φ1 = φ2 = 1). In solving for the equilibrium, they construct a representative agent and solve accordingly. In equilibrium, REDU economies display limited risk sharing since the preference structure implies that for small risk premia, the more pessimistic agent may not choose to invest in the risky asset at all. Aggregate risk is then priced only by the less pessimistic agent. What is present is endogenous participation in the equity markets. In a dynamic equilibrium multi-agent RDEU model, we could imagine a situation of some agents entering and exiting the equity markets voluntarily as the economy passes from expansions to recessions. Would such an economy endogenously exhibit countercyclical risk aversion? Would the attractive business cycle/equity premium characteristics of, e.g., the Guvenen (2005) and Danthine and Donaldson (2002) models be preserved, despite
77
John Donaldson and Rajnish Mehra
the fact that participation in equity markets is not fixed a priori? These are reasonable issues to explore. From the perspective of this paper, the results are especially striking. In particular, Chapman and Polkovnichenko (2006) remind us that using the representative agent construct in a non-standard heterogeneous preference setting may be uninformative as it ignores important endogenous risk-sharing effects. Before leaving this body of material, some comparative remarks might be useful. Table 10 summarizes the properties of the various preference specifications considered thus far. We first note that a number of open questions remain. Many involve aggregation. Without this property, the results of Chapman and Polkovnichenko (2006) may recur in other contexts. The habit formation construct of Campbell and Cochrane (1999), the prospect theory of Barberis et al. (2001), and the GDA preferences of Routledge and Zin (2004) all yield effective countercyclical risk aversion, and in many respects, their results with regard to the equity premium are similar. A number of features of the GDA construct would seem to give it an edge, however. Relative to simple expected utility, it
TABLE 10 Characteristics of Principal Asset Pricing Paradigms Attribute
Preference type A B C D E F G H I Conventional Epstein– Melino– Constantinides– Campbell– Falato Zinn– Barberis– RDEU CRRA Zin, Yang Sundaresan Cochrane Routledge Huang Chew– (linear habit) Deckel
1. Does a representative agent exist?
Yes
Yes
?i
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
2. Is strict aggregation a possibility?
Yes
No
No
?
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
3. Does its use in portfolio problems lead to time consistent planning?
Yes
Yes
?
Yes
?
?
Yes
?
?
4. Do choicetheoretic axiomatic foundations exist?
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
?
5. Is countercyclical risk aversion a principal feature?
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
?
i The
question mark indicates that the answer to the question is unknown or not fully understood.
78
Chapter 2 • Risk-Based Explanations of the Equity Premium
generates the fewest additional parameters and is the only structure of the three (to date) with axiomatic foundations. Relative to the two alternatives cited above, they are the only structure that allows the separation of risk and time preferences. (More recent work by Barberis and Huang (2001) allows this as well.) Furthermore, there is no need for external scaling or an external reference point to maintain return stationarity. In short, GDA preferences have the advantage of economy and simplicity. It is unclear, however, if any of these constructs will be compatible with the stylized financial and business cycle facts—or, indeed, with generally accepted consumption processes—when placed in a production setting. Numerous other behavioral representations are modeled in the literature. Constantinides et al. (2007), for example, argue for a period utility representation of the form U (ct ) + LV (Bt ) , 1−γ
where ct denotes the period consumption and V (Bt ) = Bt B /(1 − γB ) the utility of bequests, Bt . The L parameter assumes a value of 0 except in the final period of the agent’s life when L = 1 (the context is obviously one of finitely lived overlapping generations). Since Bt measures the value of bequests, it is a quantity that will be highly correlated with the return on the stock market. As a result, agents who are substantially bequest risk-averse will demand a high premium to hold equity securities in their final period of life. While this modeling device does lead to a high premium, other counterfactuals arise.
2. PRODUCTION ECONOMIES The production-based asset pricing literature is oriented to constructing models that successfully replicate both the stylized facts of the business cycle and the financial markets. To review how the business cycle is characterized in the data and in dynamic, stochastic, general equilibrium models, see the section by Danthine, Donaldson, and Siconolfi in this volume (Danthine et al. (2008)). Relevant papers with a primary focus on the equity premium puzzle include Jermann (1998), Boldrin et al. (2001), Danthine et al. (1992), Danthine and Donaldson (2002), and Guvenen (2005). Lettau and Uhlig (2000) focus only on the relationship of habit formation to consumption volatility, although the implications of their results for the premium are straightforward. Production models display the feature that the dividend series and the asset pricing agent’s consumption series are endogenously determined within the model.58 All the mechanisms reviewed in this section will have consequences for the statistical properties of these series. Habit formation in a production context such as Hansen (1985), in particular, will induce the model’s representative agent to tailor his investment 58 Accordingly,
assets are then priced using the standard Lucas (1978) asset pricing perspective.
79
John Donaldson and Rajnish Mehra
and labor service decisions in such a way as to reduce, dramatically, his endogenous consumption volatility vis-`a-vis an otherwise identically parameterized construct without the habit feature: consumption as a pure macroeconomic quantity becomes counterfactually smooth, and the associated premium falls essentially to zero. A successful model must thus display not only a strong desire on the part of agents for consumption smoothing but also severe (but plausible) technological restrictions that inhibit their ability to do so. Within the production literature, most models require some variation on habit formation to generate a high and countercyclical level of effective risk aversion. The complementary features that interfere with the consequent consumption smoothing are myriad. We consider Jermann (1998) as an important illustrative case. Jermann’s equilibrium allocations of consumption, investment, etc. solve ∞ t max E β u (Ct − αCt−1 ) , {It }
t=0
subject to Kt+1 = (1 − Ω) Kt + ϕ (It /Kt ) Kt Ct + It ≤ f (Kt , Pt Nt ) λt λt = ρλt−1 + ε˜t , where f (Kt , Pt Nt ) λt = K θ (Pt Nt )1−θ λt , with θ = 0.64, β = 0.99, ρ = 0.99, u (Ct − αCt ) =
(Ct − αCt−1 )1−γ , 1−γ
with γ = 5, Ω = 0.025, and Pt = (1.005) Pt−1 ; i.e., a constant growth rate of labor productivity of 0.5 percent per quarter (the calibrated time period).59 Clearly, it is the habit formation feature most prominently that causes the agent to display a strong desire for consumption smoothing. But what features stand in his way from doing so? First and foremost is the cost of capital adjustment function, φ
It Kt
Kt =
a1 1−ξ
It Kt
1−1/ξ + a2 ,
where ξ = 0.23, and a1 , a2 are constants chosen so that the balanced growth path is invariant to ξ. Second, and less transparently, there is no ability of the agent to vary his labor supply, despite the fact that his period preference ordering manifests no disutility from doing so. The results of Jermann’s (1998) exercise are presented in Table 11. All the claims we have made in this section are manifest in Table 11. Consider column A’s statistics. This corresponds to an unfettered production model: no habit and 59 Under
a growth scenario β = 0.99 = βˆ (1.005)1−γ, where βˆ is the subjective discount factor.
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Chapter 2 • Risk-Based Explanations of the Equity Premium
TABLE 11i The Equity Premium in the Production Economy of Jermann (All parameter values as in text, except as noted; various scenarios; all return statistics in percent, annualized) Parameter choices E
Fiii
3.91
0.82
1.580
0.61
11.46
0.460
4.23
4.58
7.00
1.590
2.90
1.21
6.09
19.86
0.480
0.02
0.26
0.03
0.67
6.18
0.001
0.02
0.26
0.03
0.67
6.18
0.001
A
B
C
D
Erf
4.26
3.36
4.20
SDr f
0.62
0.76
0.59
Ere
4.28
3.66
SDr e
1.02
Erp Erp SDr p SD ΔC/SD ΔY (ii)
not reported 0.77
0.78
0.33
1.14
0.49
A. Standard model: α = 0, a1 = a2 = 0 – no habit, no COA. B. Same as case A but with γ = 10. C. Habit formation, no COA. D. Costs of adjustment, no habit formation. E. Habit and adjustment costs. F. Habit and adjustment costs but variable labor supply. i Columns A–E are from Table 1 in Jermann (1998), while column F is from Boldrin et al. (2001). ii This is the SD of the consumption growth rate relative to the SD of the output growth rate. iii Preferences as noted in text; α = 0.9, ξ = 0.23; otherwise as in Jermann (1998).
no adjustment costs, so the agent is totally free to adjust his investment to smooth out his consumption. As a result, the premium is a miserly 0.02 percent, which is even lower than its exchange economy counterpart. Column B corresponds to an otherwise identical case but for γ = 10. The premium does rise, but by an insignificant 0.24 percent, and return standard deviations remain much too low (compare this result with those in Table 1). In column C, the agent displays habit formation with a habit parameter α = 0.82. This greatly amplified effective risk aversion induces the agent to tailor his investment plan to elicit greater consumption smoothing. As a result, the SD of the growth rate of consumption declines by more than one-half. Despite the added local risk aversion, the smoother consumption series draws the premium—and the return volatilities—more or less back to their column A values. Costs of adjustment (column D) make it substantially more expensive for the agent to effect consumption smoothing via investment volatility. With this obstruction, the premium rises but still falls short even of 1 percent. When habit formation is incorporated in conjunction with COA (column E), the premium matches its historical benchmark, confirming the earlier intuition; equity return volatility is quite reasonable as well, as is the mean risk-free rate. Only the risk-free rate volatility is mismatched, with the model producing an SD more than twice the historical level. This is not entirely surprising given the knife-edged nature of the habit formation mechanism and the enormous swings in risk aversion it tends to generate.
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Column F, from an early version of Boldrin et al. (2001), contains the results for a slightly modified Jermann (1998) model enriched by incorporating an agent whose utility is linear in leisure (risk-neutral), essentially as in Hansen (1985). Such an agent is unconcerned with variations in his labor supply; under this specification, the agent’s period utility function is of the form u(Ct , Ct−1 , 1 − nt ) = log(Ct − αCt−1 ) + Bnt , Unfortunately, this added flexibility causes the premium to collapse to a mere 0.001 percent, with the equity and risk-free standard deviations not far behind at, respectively, 0.46 and 0.48 percent. This example fully illustrates the difficulty in incorporating standard preference mechanisms into production settings. As of this writing, we are unaware of any attempts to incorporate “loss aversion” or “happiness maintenance” into a production context, but the consequences are likely to be similar. Note that nearly all recent production models rely in some way on habit formation. Eschewing this feature, Campanale et al. (2006) explore the business cycle and agent pricing properties of a production economy very similar to Jermann (1998) (for instance, there is a cost to adjusting capital) where the representative agent possesses Epstein–Zin preferences and the certainty equivalent is obtained using GDA risk preferences and special cases thereof (expected utility and (DA), disappointment aversion preferences). Solving the model using traditional discrete state-space methodologies, they are able to replicate a very wide class of stylized financial and business cycle facts, thereby effectively challenging the habit formation device. Perhaps most strikingly, they do so for implied risk aversion that is similar to a logarithmic expected utility agent. As with the earlier habit-based literature, risk-free rate volatility remains excessive.60 It would also be of interest to know the consequences for their results of admitting a variable labor supply. The paper is important not only for introducing these richer preference structures into a production context but also for more broadly re-energizing the asset pricing production research program. Production-based asset pricing models are important because they afford an opportunity for cross-model verification. Since the actions of the same agents give rise to both macroeconomic and financial phenomena, a comprehensive, reliable model should be able to explain both sets of stylized facts equally well. At the current level of understanding, this is not yet the case.
3. DISASTER EVENTS AND SURVIVORSHIP BIAS Reitz (1988) proposed a solution to the equity premium puzzle that incorporates a very small probability of a very large drop in consumption (a “disaster state”). Beyond the incorporation of this third growth state, the structure of his model is identical to that of 60 Kallenbruner and Lochstoer (2004) demonstrate that a reasonably calibrated production model with Epstein–Zin preferences can jointly explain important macroeconomic and financial stylized facts without the excessive risk-free rate volatility characteristic of habit formulations.
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Chapter 2 • Risk-Based Explanations of the Equity Premium
Mehra and Prescott (1985). Since disaster states are ones of extremely high marginal utility of consumption, we might expect their incorporation to push up risk-free asset prices and diminish risky ones. As a result, the premium should rise. Table 12 presents a sample of scenarios drawn from Reitz (1988). The incorporation of the disaster scenario, even with small conditional or unconditional probability, does allow for a resolution of the premium. This is not in dispute although the plausibility of such a huge drop in consumption is open to question. The model requires a 1-in-100 chance of a 25 percent decline in consumption to reconcile the equity premium with a risk aversion parameter of 10. Following on these results, Barro (2006) details all major cross-country consumption declines post-1913. While certain European countries experienced consumption declines of as much as 64 percent during World War II (e.g., Germany and Greece), even in the worst years of the Great Depression, U.S. consumption only declined by about 30 percent. In light of these figures, the percentage declines postulated by Reitz (1988) do not seem so extreme. One must assess other potential implications of the model, however. One is that the real interest rate and the probability of the occurrence of the extreme event move inversely. For example, the perceived probability of a recurrence of a depression was probably very high just after World War II and subsequently declined over time. If real interest rates rose significantly as the war years receded, that evidence would support the Rietz hypothesis. Similarly, if the low probability event precipitating the large decline in consumption were a nuclear war, the perceived probability of such an event has surely
TABLE 12 The Equity Premium and Risk-Free Rate: Possible Disaster State (All returns in percent, annualized) Panel Ai Disaster: Output falls to half its previous value Probability of entering
γ
β
Erf
Erp
0.0008
7.00
0.997
0.83
6.18
0.0030
5.30
0.980
0.89
6.15
Disaster
Panel
Bii
Disaster: Output falls to three-fourths its previous value Probability of entering
γ
β
Erf
Erp
0.010
9.80
0.999
0.74
6.95
0.014
8.85
0.999
0.84
6.49
Disaster
i Taken ii Taken
from Table 3 of Reitz (1988). from Table 6 of Reitz (1988).
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varied over the last 100 years. It must have been low before 1945, the first and only year the atom bomb was used. And it must have been higher before the Cuban Missile Crisis than after it. If real interest rates had moved as predicted, that would have supported Rietz’s disaster scenario. But they did not. The reader is referred to Mehra and Prescott (1988) for a detailed response to Reitz (1988) along these lines. Barro (2006) presents a model in the same spirit as Reitz (1988) but in a context where more attention may be given to calibration and the historical record. The historical justification for his calibration is, in fact, fascinating to read. The point of departure of the paper is a postulated stochastic process for aggregate output growth that allows for rare events in a generalized Rietz setting. Specifically, he models aggregate output growth as a random walk with drift, whose innovations are of three possible types: 1. “diffusive” shocks (i.i.d. normal shocks), 2. jump shocks of “type v”—shocks that represent situations where output contracts sharply but there is no occurrence of a default on debt, and 3. jump shocks of “type w”—shocks that represent situations where output contracts sharply and a default on debt ensues.61 In particular, Barro assumes that the log of output Yt ≡ Ct grows according to the random walk with drift process: log Yt+1 = log Yt + g + u˜ t+1 + v˜t+1 ,
(45)
where u˜ t+1 is an i.i.d random variable distributed N (0, σu2 ) and v˜t+1 ( jump shock “type v”) captures low probability downward jumps in GDP. If a disaster occurs, with probability p, output declines by the fraction b. Very roughly speaking, a reasonable calibration requires b to be large and p small. More formally, −p 0, with probability e , −p (46) v˜t+1 = ˜ log 1 − b , with probability 1 − e . In his calibration exercise, b˜ is a random variable whose probability density function coincides with the frequency distribution reflecting the size of contractions in 35 countries in the 20th century (b˜ ranges from 0.17 to 0.62). Barro also admits the possibility of default on government debt of proportion d, with probability q whenever a “type v” jump occurs. In other words, whenever a jump shock of “type v” occurs, there is a probability q ofa “type w” jump. Table 13 presents a sample of results for the calibration exercises b˜ = d˜ . In all cases, preferences are as in Mehra and Prescott (1985) with CRRA = 4 and time preferences parameter β = e−ρ = e−0.03 = 0.9704. The results presented here are intriguing and lend support to a resurrection of the disaster scenario as a viable justification for the premium. The distinction between “type v” events and “type w” events is theoretically appealing in terms of their different implications for quantities and prices. However, we feel 61 Barro
(2006) does not explicitly define a type w shock. We introduce it here as an aid to exposition.
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Chapter 2 • Risk-Based Explanations of the Equity Premium
TABLE 13i Financial Statistics: Barro’s (2006) Model (All rates of return annualized in percent; all cases θ = 4, σu = 0.02, q = 0.4; time preference e−ρ, ρ = 0.03) g = 0.025
g = 0.025
g = 0.020
g = 0.025
p = 0.017
p = 0.025
p = 0.017
p = 0.017
Ere
7.1
4.4
5.1
6.1
Erf
3.5
−0.7
1.5
2.5
Erp
3.6
5.2
3.6
3.6
this distinction is largely a consequence of the specific functional forms used to model the two types of rare events and the assumption that they are independent—something we intuitively think is not very plausible. To support the observed equity premium (in the baseline model), a decline in GDP growth of 50 percent is needed. The plausibility of such a substantial decline in per capita GDP growth is justified by the figures in Barro (2006, Table 1), where this decline is shown to be 64 percent in Germany and Greece (during World War II) or 31 percent in the U.S. (during the Great Depression). These observations, however, are not at an annual frequency.62 Looking at data at an annual frequency, we see little evidence of such a substantial decline either in GDP growth or in the growth rate of consumption. If the equity premium is estimated at an annual frequency, then the relevant growth rates should also be at annual frequencies. We argue that calibrations should be done at the same frequency as observations. As is standard in the equity premium literature, Barro calibrates his model using output growth rates rather than consumption growth rates since in a pure exchange setting they are identical. While this distinction may not matter in a stylized economy without disaster states, the two quantities might empirically be quite different in the event of an extreme disaster. Consumption per capita will probably be a much smoother series than GDP per capita. In the event that such states occur, consumption is unlikely to remain a constant proportion of the output. Capital investment and capital utilization rates will change and act as channels to absorb the negative productivity shocks (see also Section 2), enabling consumption smoothing over time and across states. For this reason, since we do live in a production economy, it would be interesting to explore the robustness of Barro’s (2006) results using cross-country data on the growth rates of per capita consumption instead of output within that more general context.
62 In a sense the results are obtained using the 4-year drop in consumption as if it is a 1-year effect. The claimed equity premium should be compared to the observed 4-year effect (4 × 6 = 24 percent) and not the 1-year 6 percent.
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A closely related literature concerns “peso problems.” This means that returns are higher than justified by current experience because investors assign a positive probability to some as-yet-unrealized disaster state. In the context of this essay, it suggests the possibility that the observed equity premium in the U.S. may result from expectations of disaster events that happen not to have materialized in the sample period of observations. Recent work by Goetzmann and Jorion (1999) supports this perspective: after concluding that the high U.S. historical premium is in some sense unique, they suggest that it may be attributable to the fact that disastrous events (most especially WWII) affecting many financial markets have largely spared the U.S. economy. In a production setting similar to Jermann’s (1988) but with a variable labor supply, no costs of adjustment and no habit (a model that is in some sense set up with a bias against resolving the puzzle), Danthine and Donaldson (2002) replicate all first moments of returns, nearly exactly, in a peso-style model where the disaster is anticipated but never realized. The required ingredients mandate a debt-to-equity ratio of 0.3, an anticipated disaster state where output falls by 50 percent, a CRRA of 3, and a (conditional) probability of entering the disaster state of 0.008. Return volatilities are much too low, however (this is to a lesser extent true for Barro (2006) as well). A similar but more detailed exercise is undertaken by Cecchetti et al. (1993, 2000) in an exchange setting. All this is to suggest that unrealized beliefs may be critical to the puzzle’s resolution and that the results in Reitz (1988) and others can be strengthened if reported returns are generated from time series in which the actual disaster state does not appear. Veronesi (2004) goes one step further by postulating a peso-style model with representative agent learning. Dividends follow a simple linear stochastic process where the drift coefficient assumes one of two values, a normal level of θ¯ and a low, ¯ there is a small probability of shifting from θ¯ to θ¯ and a high probrecession level of θ; ability of returning. The drift coefficient is not observed directly, however, and Veronesi (2004) derives the period-by-period posterior probability of being in the normal growth state. This estimate itself evolves stochastically. Veronesi (2004) then explores the asset pricing characteristics of this economy for time paths where the low growth state is never actually realized. He derives high price sensitivity to dividend changes, increased return volatility in perceived recessions, etc. as well as significant equity premia. Unfortunately, theories built on beliefs other than pure rational expectations are difficult to test empirically. Another attempt at resolving the puzzle proposed by Brown et al. (1995) focuses on the related notion of survival bias. The central thesis here is that the ex-post measured returns reflect the premium, in the U.S., on a stock market that has successfully weathered the vicissitudes of fluctuating financial fortunes. Many other exchanges were unsuccessful, and hence the ex-ante equity premium was low. Since it was not known a priori which exchanges would survive, for this explanation to work, stock and bond markets must be differentially influenced by a financial crisis. Governments have expropriated much of the real value of nominal debt by the mechanism of unanticipated inflation. Five historical instances come readily to mind: during the German hyperinflation, holders of bonds denominated in Reichmarks lost virtually all value invested in those assets. During the Poincar´e administration in France in the 1920s, bond holders
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Chapter 2 • Risk-Based Explanations of the Equity Premium
lost nearly 90 percent of the value invested in nominal debt. And in the 1980s, Mexican holders of dollar-denominated debt lost a sizable fraction of its value when the Mexican government, in a period of rapid inflation, converted the debt to pesos and limited the rate at which these funds could be withdrawn. Czarist bonds in Russia and Chinese debt holdings (subsequent to the fall of the Nationalists) suffered a similar fate under communist regimes. The above examples demonstrate that in times of financial crisis, bonds are as likely to lose value as stocks. Although a survival bias may impact on the levels of both the return on equity and debt, there is no evidence to support the assertion that these crises impact differentially on the returns to stocks and bonds; hence, the equity premium should not necessarily be materially affected. In every instance where trading equity has been suspended, due to political upheavals, etc., governments have either reneged on their debt obligations or expropriated much of the real value of nominal debt through the mechanism of unanticipated inflation. The difficulty that several model classes have collectively had in explaining the equity premium as a compensation for bearing risk leads us to conclude that perhaps it is not a “risk premium” but rather due to other factors. We consider these in the next section.
4. MARKET INCOMPLETENESS AND TRADING FRICTIONS Market incompleteness assumes one of two different forms: (1) certain securities are not traded, and/or (2) certain individuals are for some reason excluded from financial market participation. A complete market structure where all investors can trade any security is necessary for the construction of the representative agent. In this case, the equilibrium in a heterogeneous full information economy is isomorphic in its asset pricing implications to the equilibrium of a representative agent, full information economy, if households have von Neumann–Morgenstern preferences. It is this paradigm that has provided the foundation to the essay so far. In this section we briefly review context (2), above, since the first is more than adequately considered in the essays by Constantinides and Heaton and Lucas. In our discussion of (2), we focus on restricted participation resulting from borrowing constraints imposed on certain agents.
4.1. Restricted Participation In infinite horizon models, the effect of borrowing constraints and transaction costs is to force investors to hold an inventory of bonds (precautionary demand) to smooth their consumption. As a result, agents come close to equalizing their marginal rates of substitution with little effect on the equity premium: the economy is essentially one of complete markets.63 Recent attempts to resolve the puzzle by incorporating both 63 This
is true unless the supply of bonds is unrealistically low. See Aiyagari and Gertler (1991).
John Donaldson and Rajnish Mehra
87
borrowing constraints and consumer heterogeneity have thus focused on finite horizon OLG economies. One such example is proposed in Constantinides, Donaldson, and Mehra (2002).64 The authors construct an overlapping-generations (OLG) exchange economy in which consumers live for three periods. In the first period, a period of human capital acquisition, the consumer receives a relatively low endowment income. In the second period, the consumer is employed and receives wage income subject to large uncertainty. In the third period, the consumer retires and consumes the assets accumulated in the second period. The implications of a borrowing constraint are explored by deriving and contrasting the stationary equilibria in two versions of the economy. In the borrowing-constrained version, the young are prohibited from borrowing or from selling equity short. This is not an artificial constraint since loans and short sales require collateral (accumulated wealth), which the young typically lack. The borrowing-unconstrained economy differs from the borrowing-constrained one only in that the borrowing constraint and the shortsale constraint for the young are absent. There are two types of securities in the model, bonds, and equity with ex-coupon and ex-dividend prices qtb and qte , respectively. Bonds are a claim to a coupon payment b every period, while the equity is a claim to the dividend stream {dt }. The consumer born in period t receives deterministic wage income w 0 > 0 in period t, when young; 1 stochastic wage income wt+1 > 0 in period t + 1, when middle-aged; and zero wage income in period t + 2, when old. The consumer purchases zet,0 shares of stock and zbt,0 bonds when young. The consumer adjusts these holdings to zet,1 and zbt,1 , respectively, when middle-aged. The consumer liquidates his/her entire portfolio when old. Thus, zet,2 = 0 and zbt,2 = 0. An unconstrained representative agent’s maximization problem is formulated as follows. The agent born in period t solves 2 i β U (ct,i ) emaxb E zt,i , zt,i i=0 subject to ct,0 + qte zet,1 + qtb zbt,1 ≤ w 0 , e b e b 1 ct,1 + qt+1 zet,2 + qt+1 zbt,2 ≤ qt+1 + dt+1 zet,1 + qt+1 + b zbt,1 + wt+1 , e b b e ct,2 ≤ qt+2 + dt+2 zt,2 + qt+2 + b zt,2 , where ct,j is the consumption in period t + j (j = 0, 1, 2) of a consumer born in period t. When considering the borrowing constrained equilibrium, the following additional constraints are imposed: zet,0 > 0 and zbt,0 > 0. The model introduces two forms of restricted participation. First, consumers of one generation are prohibited from trading claims against their future wage income 64 See
also the companion papers by Constantinides et al. (2005, 2007) and the paper by Storesletten et al. (2008) in this volume.
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Chapter 2 • Risk-Based Explanations of the Equity Premium
with consumers of another generation.65 Second, consumers of one generation are prohibited from trading bonds and equity with consumers of an unborn generation. As discussed earlier in Section 2, absent a complete set of contingent claims, consumer heterogeneity in the form of uninsurable, persistent, and heteroscedastic idiosyncratic income shocks, with countercyclical conditional variance, can potentially contribute to the resolution of empirical difficulties encountered by representative-consumer models.66 The novelty lies in incorporating a life-cycle feature to study asset pricing. As discussed earlier, the attractiveness of equity as an asset depends on the correlation between consumption and equity income. If equity pays off in states of high marginal utility of consumption, it will command a higher price (and consequently a lower rate of return) than if its payoff is in states where marginal utility is low. Since the marginal utility of consumption varies inversely with consumption itself, equity will command a high rate of return if it pays off in states when consumption is high, and vice versa.67 In and of itself, this is the standard intuition. A key insight of the paper is the observation that as the correlation of equity income with consumption changes over the life cycle of an individual, so does the attractiveness of equity as an asset. Consumption can be decomposed into the sum of wages and equity income. A young person looking forward has uncertain future wage and equity income; furthermore, the correlation of his equity income with his consumption will not be particularly high, as long as stock and wage income are not highly correlated. This is empirically the case, as documented by Davis and Willen (2000). Equity will thus be a hedge against fluctuations in wages and a “desirable” asset to hold as far as the young are concerned. The same asset (equity) has a very different characteristic for the middle-aged. Their wage uncertainty has been entirely resolved: their future retirement wage income is either zero or deterministic, and the innovations (fluctuations) in their consumption occur from fluctuations in equity income. At this stage of the life cycle, equity income is highly correlated with consumption. Consumption is high when equity income is high, and equity is no longer a hedge against fluctuations in consumption; hence, for this group, it requires a higher rate of return. The characteristics of equity as an asset therefore change, depending on who the predominant holder of the equity happens to be. Life-cycle considerations thus become crucial for asset pricing. If equity is a “desirable” asset for the marginal investor in the economy, then the observed equity premium will be low, relative to an economy where the marginal investor finds it unattractive to hold equity. The deus ex machina is the stage in the life cycle of the marginal investor. 65 Being homogeneous within their generation, consumers have no incentive to trade claims with consumers of their own generation. 66 See Mankiw (1986) and Constantinides and Duffie (1996). 67 This is precisely the reason, why high-beta stocks in the simple CAPM framework have a high rate of return. In that model, the return on the market is a proxy for consumption. High-beta stocks pay off when the market return is high, i.e., when marginal utility is low; hence, their price is (relatively) low and their rate of return high.
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The authors argue that the young, who should be holding equity in an economy without frictions and with complete contracting, are effectively shut out of this market because of borrowing constraints. The young are characterized by low wages; ideally, they would like to smooth lifetime consumption by borrowing against future wage income (consuming a part of the loan and investing the rest in higher-return equity). However, they are prevented from doing so because human capital alone does not collateralize major loans in modern economies for reasons of moral hazard and adverse selection. In the presence of borrowing constraints, equity is thus exclusively priced by the middle-aged investors, since the young are effectively excluded from the equity markets, and we observe a high equity premium. If the borrowing constraint is relaxed, the young will borrow to purchase equity, thereby raising the bond yield. The increase in the bond yield induces the middle-aged to shift their portfolio holdings from equity to bonds. The increase in demand for equity by the young and the decrease in the demand for equity by the middle-aged work in opposite directions. On balance, the effect is to increase both the equity and the bond return while simultaneously shrinking the equity premium. Furthermore, the relaxation of the borrowing constraint reduces the net demand for bonds, and the risk-free rate puzzle re-emerges.68 In a subsequent paper, Da Silva (2006) generalizes the Constantinides et al. (2002) restricted participation model to admit habit formation where the habit coefficients of the old and middle-aged differ.69 Using the notation of this section, the objective function of the period t-born representative agent is 2 i max E β u ct,i − ηi ct−1, i , (47) {zet,i , zbt,i } i=1 with η1 , η2 the habit parameters. It follows that the MRS and the effective level of risk aversion of the middle-aged agent are, respectively, βu1 ct,2 − η2 ct,1 (48) , u1 ct,1 − η1 ct,0 − η2 βE u1 ct,2 − η2 ct,1 γct,1 . ct,1 − η1 ct,0
(49)
the latter expression corresponding to the standard CRRA period utility function, u(c) = (c1−γ /1 − γ), interacting with the habit. It is immediately apparent from (48) that both η1 and η2 appear in the MRS and that, by (49), the effective CRRA is thus time-varying. 68 Bear
in mind, however, that the returns reported for this construct are annualized 20-year returns. Silva and Giannikos (2006) explore the same construct where the CRRA of the old agent is greater than the corresponding value for the middle-aged agent. 69 Da
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Chapter 2 • Risk-Based Explanations of the Equity Premium
Generally speaking, Da Silva and Giannikos (2006) plausibly hypothesize that η1 > η2 , suggesting that the elderly more readily accept consumption levels altered relative to that of their middle-aged working years than do the middle-aged relative to their youth. The model yields surprisingly good results. In particular, for γ = 2 and (η1 , η2 ) = (0.7, 0.2), the premium exceeds 4 percent. This figure is associated with standard deviations that match their empirical counterparts quite well (20 and 7 percent for the equity and risk-free securities, respectively); average returns, however, are somewhat too high across the board. By (49), the effective CRRA of the middle-aged agent is 3.37 (2.48 for the old agent), figures that, per se, will not raise eyebrows. Compared to the effective risk aversion coefficient in Campbell and Cochrane (1999), these figures are astonishingly low. Generally speaking, a high equilibrium premium can result even if η1 and η2 are both small, a fact that is not necessarily true of infinite horizon constructs. A premium of 2.96 is obtained, for example, from a parameter combination of γ = 2, η1 = 0.30 and η2 = 0.05.70 Da Silva’s work is an example of the case where a small amount of agent heterogeneity goes a long way toward matching the data. As in representative agent habit models, risk aversion is effectively stochastic. Nevertheless, returns are stationary since the MRS depends only on consumption growth rates, which themselves are stationary series.71 The level dependence effects noted in Danthine et al. (2004) are thus absent. Guvenen (2005) invokes limited participation but within a traditional infinite horizon production context. In his model, shareholders can trade stocks and bonds to smooth out their own consumption, while workers can only trade risk-free bonds. Thus limited in their trading opportunities, workers can only self-insure by acquiring bonds, thereby bidding up their prices, and leading to a low risk-free rate. Although shareholders have multiple consumption smoothing devices (capital shares, bonds), in equilibrium they end up issuing bonds to workers and thus indirectly provide insurance to them. Not only does Guvenen’s (2005) abstraction lead to a replication of all the basic financial stylized facts, but he is also able to demonstrate a near equivalence with the habit formation construct of Campbell and Cochrane (1999). The restricted participation construct of Guvenen (2005) is related to the hypothesis that firms’ shareholders directly provide partial income insurance to their workers in the context of a labor contract (see Danthine et al. (2008) in this volume). In either case, the equilibrium outcome is one in which the wealthier agents with greater access to consumption smoothing devices end up insuring the less wealthy, restricted-access agents. With regard to replicating the stylized facts, it does not seem important whether the insurance is provided within the firm or in the financial market. In the former case, 70 All
figures are obtained in a context where the endowment process is identical to that hypothesized in Constantinides et al. (2002). 71 For CRRA preferences, u(c) = c1−γ /1 − γ, the MRS is ⎛ ⎞−γ β
u (ct+1 − ct ) (ct+1 − ct )−γ ⎜ gt,t+1 − 1 ⎟ =β =⎝ ⎠ u (ct − ct−1 ) (ct − ct−1 ) 1 1− gt−1 ,t
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shareholder consumption is more variable as they are residual claimants: wages essentially leverage their dividend income streams. In the latter case (Guvenen (2005)), shareholders have, on net, negative bond positions: they hold leveraged portfolios and receive as a result equally high risk consumption streams. Surely, these alternative mechanisms can be assessed on empirical grounds—Mehra and Prescott’s (2007) balance sheet analysis of the U.S. economy emphasizes the latter alternative since wealthy shareholders are found to be net borrowers in the economy. The actual fact is likely to be a bit of both. Both alternatives are more appealing—based on micro-foundations—than the somewhat higher-level abstraction, e.g., of Campbell and Cochrane (1999). In an important, very recent paper, Gomes and Michaelides (2006) go beyond Constantinides et al. (2005) by endogenizing stock market participation (there is a fixed cost to participation and only as agents become sufficiently wealthy are they willing to pay it) in a production based OLG model where agents experience idiosyncratic labor income shocks and borrowing constraints (they cannot borrow against their stochastic life cycle earnings profile). They find that the equity risk premium is relatively unaffected by the limited participation, and is almost entirely determined by incomplete risk sharing within the shareholder class. Non stock market participants are more realistically less wealthy than their counterparts in Guvenen (2005). In their baseline parameterization they derive an equlibrium premium of around 4% with a 2.5% risk free rate. The model is itself a new benchmark and reminds us how the progressive endogenization of previously fixed decisions can change our perspective on the fundamental drivers of financial phenomena. It lacks only a standard macro-style labor leisure choice, something that experience has shown will not be helpful for the task at hand. Nevertheless, Gomes and Michaelides (2006), appears to be the most comprehensive production model to date.
5. MODEL UNCERTAINTY The original Mehra and Prescott (1985) model, as well as all the modifications considered heretofore in this essay, are rational expectations formulations. As such, the agents in the model know exactly the environment in which they operate, including precise knowledge of the stochastic process governing the evolution of output (also the dividend and consumption) and any other state variables that arise in more elaborate versions. At best, this is a very strong assumption. In reality, the exact form of the relevant stochastic processes is not known to investors, at least with regard to distribution parameters, and it is reasonable to expect that this “model uncertainty” would itself command a premium. Three recent papers in this tradition are Mehra and Sah (2002), Barillas et al. (2006), and Weitzman (2007). Mehra and Sah (2002) analyze the consequences of human mood fluctuations on financial markets. The consequences turn out to be surprisingly large. They address a
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very specific question: can small fluctuations in the subjective discount factor (β) and the risk aversion coefficient (γ) of agents result in large price movements in equity markets? They consider the type of fluctuations that occur over a short period of time rather than as secular changes in individual tastes. On a given day, for example, an individual may be in one of several possible preference states, but he is unaware of these taste fluctuations and thus does not implicitly incorporate their consequences into his optimization decisions. In a variant of the Mehra-Prescott (1985) paradigm, they show that even changes of small magnitude in γ and β can have a significant impact on the evolution of asset prices. Their analysis assumes that taste fluctuations occur around temporally stable preferences, and it employs two simplifying assumptions. First, the growth rate of dividends is assumed to evolve according to a geometric Brownian motion. This allows them to derive a closed-form representation for the equity price in terms of the subjective parameters of interest and the drift and volatility parameters of the Brownian motion. Second, they assume that although the parameters change stochastically, the agent’s demands are based on the assumption that the current realization will prevail forever. Thus, the agent, in his demand for securities, behaves myopically with respect to changes in these parameters; their analysis has been criticized on this account. Weitzman (2007) addresses the equity premium, the risk-free rate, and the excess volatility puzzles in a pure exchange economy where the representative agent has standard CRRA preferences. The continuously compounded growth rate of consumption is assumed to be i.i.d with a normal distribution. Its mean and variance, however, are uncertain. While the first three specifications are standard, the last differs from the setting in Mehra and Prescott (1985), where the mean and variance are treated as known parameters that are calibrated to past sample averages. The structural uncertainty in the mean and variance of the growth rate of aggregate consumption introduces a form of Bayesian posterior background risk that is inherited from the prior and does not converge to zero as the number of subsequent observations increases to infinity. This background risk fattens the tails of the posterior distribution of future consumption growth rates and increases significantly the value of both the equity premium and excess volatility, while simultaneously decreasing the risk-free rate (as the motivation for precautionary savings becomes relatively more important than intertemporal substitution). In his framework, expected utility fails to exist except when preferences are logarithmic (γ = 1).72 Weitzman circumvents this problem by assuming that the precision w = 1/σ 2 is a truncated-gamma p.d.f. with truncation parameter δ > 0, which represents a lower bound for the support of the prior distribution of w. The assumption that 1/δ > σ 2 guarantees both the existence of finite expected utility and that the posterior distribution is in the same form as the prior and is subject to the same bounding constraint. 72 See
Geweke (2001).
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In general, with Bayesian learning it should not matter what initial values are assigned to the parameters characterizing the priors since, as the sample size grows, they converge to the true values. In Weitzman’s (2007) context, this holds true for all model parameters except δ, which controls the convergence properties of expected utility. The structural parameter δ never loses its critical impact on the subsequent behavior of agents, regardless of the amount of data accumulated over time. One natural concern (and a potential criticism) about the model is that there is no learning about fundamentals in this setting. If δ does not decline as the sample size grows, then in what sense is the representative agent learning through time? In this model the representative agent can never precisely assess the volatility of consumption growth even if the sample size is infinity. A second concern is that there is, as yet, no refutable hypothesis. Is the calibrated optimal value of δ a reasonable one? More importantly, how can one assess whether a value of δ is reasonable? For instance, to account for the equity premium, it might well be the case that Weitzman is using a low (reasonable) value of the risk aversion coefficient, but an unrealistic value of δ. In Barillas et al. (2006), the agent is in the possession of an approximating model that he does not entirely trust. This latter fact manifests itself in the agent postulating a set of unspecified models—which are statistically similar, as measured by entropy— to his benchmark and which he believes will govern the data. The consequence of this model uncertainty is to allow an otherwise standard construct to satisfy the Hansen and Jagannathan (1991) bounds.
6. CONCLUDING COMMENTS Is the resolution of the equity premium and other financial puzzles dependent on a wise choice of preference structures alone? There is ample indication, in many of the models considered in this essay, that certain behavioral style constructs can come close to such resolution: they work. In many cases, however, we do not know the axiomatic foundations underlying them or their behavior in more general settings. In that sense, we have very incomplete knowledge. Yet, the significance of the equity premium and related puzzles cannot be overstated. The consistency of neoclassical intertemporal economics would seem to rest, in large measure, on its eventual resolution. Our sense is that the context of infinitely lived agents may not ultimately be the most fruitful setting. If one lives forever in a stationary return environment of complete markets, there is an intuitive sense that small risks should not matter. Properly measured and accounted for, they should average out over long horizons. Investors should therefore be largely indifferent to them, implying a very low premium. For finitely lived agents nearing retirement, however, the same risks are critical: a downturn in the stock market is potentially crippling for life, for example. It is our view that a fully satisfactory resolution of the puzzle is likely to await more tractable multi-agent models with a richer demographic structure.
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CHAPTER 3
Non-Risk-based Explanations of the Equity Premium Rajnish Mehra University of California, Santa Barbara, and NBER and
Edward C. Prescott Arizona State University, and Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
Introduction 1. The Inappropriateness of Using T-Bills as a Proxy for the Intertemporal Marginal Rate of Substitution of Consumption 1.1. Liquidity 1.2. Transaction Balances 2. The Effect of Government Regulations and Rules 3. Taxes 4. Borrowing Constraints 5. The Impact of Agent Heterogeneity and Intermediation Costs 6. Concluding Comments References
102 102 104 104 106 107 110 113 114 114
JEL Classification: G10, G12, G28, N42, D9 Keywords: asset pricing, equity risk premium, liquidity, risk free rate, transaction balances, government regulations, taxes, agent heterogeneity, intermediation costs
We thank John Donaldson and Ellen McGrattan for invaluable comments. HANDBOOK OF THE EQUITY RISK PREMIUM c 2008 by Rajnish Mehra and Edward C. Prescott. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved. Copyright
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INTRODUCTION A widely accepted tenet of the neoclassical paradigm has been that the observed differences in the rates of return on financial assets, in particular, the large difference between the average returns on corporate equity and T-bills, are a premium for bearing nondiversifiable aggregate risk. The findings in our paper, “The Equity Premium: A Puzzle” that only a small part of this difference is a premium for bearing aggregate risk came as a surprise to the profession. Over the last 20 years or so, attempts to successfully account for the equity premium have become a major research impetus in finance and economics. A majority of these explanations have focused on mechanisms to increase the premium for bearing non-diversifiable risk.1 In this chapter, in contrast, we review the nascent literature that takes as given the findings in Mehra and Prescott (1985) and tries to account for the observed magnitude of the equity premium by using factors other than aggregate risk. Much of this literature re-examines the appropriateness of the abstractions and assumptions made in our original paper. In particular, the appropriateness of using T-bills as a proxy for the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution of consumption, the impact of government regulations, the abstractions from taxes, diversification and intermediation costs, borrowing constraints and agent heterogeneity have been explored. We consider each in turn and examine their impact on the equity premium.
1. THE INAPPROPRIATENESS OF USING T-BILLS AS A PROXY FOR THE INTERTEMPORAL MARGINAL RATE OF SUBSTITUTION OF CONSUMPTION In the two decades since “The Equity Premium: A Puzzle” was published, the way we think about economic phenomena has undergone a fundamental change, influenced in large measure by the development of Real Business Cycle theory by Kydland and Prescott (1982). One finding of the real business cycle literature is that the real after-tax return on capital, that is the after tax capital income divided by the cost of reproducing the tangible capital stock, averages 4.5 percent, with modest variation, over time. A key question that arises is, what is a good empirical counterpart to the household’s real interest rate? Mehra and Prescott (1985) used the highly liquid T-bill rate, corrected for expected inflation, as a proxy for the return on the riskless asset that is used by agents to smooth consumption. The appropriateness of this assumption was questioned by McGrattan and Prescott (2003) and more recently by Mehra and Prescott (2007). The remainder of this section closely follows the discussion in these papers. An assumption implicit in Mehra and Prescott (1985) is that agents use both equity and the riskless asset to intertemporally smooth consumption. This is as a direct consequence of the first-order condition (see ahead) for the representative household in their 1 Many
of the chapters in this volume elaborate on these efforts. The previous chapter (Donaldson and Mehra (2008) surveys this literature.
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TABLE 1 Household Assets and Liabilities (Average of 2000 and 2005) Assets (GDP)
Liabilities (GDP)
Tangible household
1.65
Liabilities
0.7
Corporate equity
0.85
Net worth
4.15
Non corporate equity
0.5
Pension and life insurance reserves
1.0
Debt assets
0.85
Total
4.85
Total
4.85
model, which saves by optimally allocating resources between equity and risk less debt. Equation (1) is the standard asset pricing equation in macroeconomics and finance. Uc (ct+s ) e d 0 = Et ) , (1) (rt,t+s − rt,t+s Uc (ct ) e d where Uc (ct+s ) is the marginal utility of consumption at time t + s, rt,t+s and rt,t+s are, respectively, the return on equity and the risk less asset over the period t, t + s and Et is the expectation conditional on the agent’s information set at time t. Is it reasonable to assume that the return on T-bills is equal to the real interest rate that households use to save for retirement and smooth consumption? Do households actually hold T-bills to finance their retirement? If this were empirically true it would be reasonable to equate their expected marginal rate of substitution of consumption to the rate of return on T-bills. This question cannot be answered in the abstract, without reference to the asset holdings of households. A natural next step then is to examine the assets held by households. Table 1 details these holdings for American households. The four big asset-holding categories of households are tangible assets, pension and life insurance holdings, equity (both corporate and non corporate), and debt assets. In the year 2000, privately held government debt was only 0.30 GDP, a third of which was held by foreigners. The amount of interest bearing government debt with maturity less than a year was only 0.085 GDP, which is a small fraction of the total household net worth. Virtually no T-bills are directly owned by households.2 Approximately one-third of the outstanding T-bills are held by foreigners, in particular foreign central banks, and two-thirds by American financial institutions. Although there are large amounts of debt assets held, most of these are in the form of pension fund and life insurance reserves. Some are in the form of demand deposits for which free services are provided. Most of the government debt is held indirectly; however, some is held in the form of savings bonds that people gift to their grandchildren.
2 Table
B-89, Economic Report of the President 2005.
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Thus, much of intertemporal saving is in debt assets such as annuities and mortgage debt, held in retirement accounts and as pension fund reserves. Assets other than T-bills, are held to finance consumption when old. Two natural questions then are who holds T-bills and do the holders use them to intertemporally smooth consumption? A large fraction of the stock of short-term U.S. T-bills are held by foreign central banks and are used to smooth exchange rates. These central banks are not using these assets to equate the marginal utility of consumption today to the expected discounted marginal utility of consumption tomorrow. U.S. households do hold a sizable quantity of close substitutes for T-bills. These including money market accounts, and bank CDs with maturities of one year, or less. They are of the order of magnitude of 0.50 times GDP. However, these short-term liquid assets with low expected returns are held, in most part, for reasons other than saving for retirement. These include liquidity and the maintence of transaction balances.
1.1. Liquidity Part of these assets are held for liquidity purposes and as precautionary balances which serve as a substitute for insurance against idiosyncratic risk. The latter is very costly to insure against because of the associated moral hazard and administrative costs. When this is the case, in the household’s maximization problem there are Lagrange multipliers, which are not zero, and as a result the expected returns are less than that predicted by a theory that abstracts from the costs of insuring against idiosyncratic risk. One of the first attempts to quantify this liquidity premium was the work of Bansal and Coleman (1996). In their model, some assets other than money play a key feature by facilitating transactions. This affects the rate of return they offer in equilibrium. Considering the role of a variety of assets in facilitating transactions, they argue that, on the margin, the transaction service return of money relative to interest-bearing checking accounts should be the interest rate paid on these accounts. They estimate this to be 6 percent, based on the rate offered on NOW accounts for the period they analyze. Since this is a substantial number, they suggest that other money-like assets may also implicitly include a transaction service component to their return. Insofar as T-bills and equity have a different service component built into their returns, this may offer an explanation for the observed equity premium.
1.2. Transaction Balances Large transaction costs are associated with moving into and out of high-yielding assets, with a major component being record keeping. With assets whose prices vary, there are capital gains or losses associated with every sale of these assets which must be reported on the annual tax form. This is why money market accounts hold debt securities until they mature. Thus, there are no capital gains or losses associated with the transaction when an individual buys or sells shares in his money market account. All that the money market mutual fund need report to its shareholders is an annual statement of the interest they received on the 1099 form. This is a major reason that sizable quantities of currency and non-interest-bearing demand deposits are held. We note that Ml is about 15 percent of GDP.
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Brokerage charges were (and perhaps continue to be for some) another significant cost associated with getting into and out of higher-yielding securities such as stocks and bonds. It is true that discount brokers now exist, but gaining the prerequisite knowledge is costly in terms of time. If the holding period is short, even for a risk-neutral investor it makes no sense for the investor to buy and later sell stocks unless the expected return on stocks is huge. Based on the above insights, both McGrattan and Prescott (2003) and Mehra and Prescott (2007) conclude that returns on T-bills and short-term debt are not a reasonable empirical counterpart of the household interest rate in Eq. (1). Hence, it would be inappropriate to equate the return on these assets to the marginal rate of substitution for an important group of agents. McGrattan and Prescott (2003), who are concerned with the difference in the returns on debt and equity held to finance retirement, use long term high grade municipal bonds as their measure of the long term household interest rate during the gold standard period of 1880–1934. They note that as these bonds were tax exempt and were held directly by individuals, no further adjustment for taxes and intermediation costs is required. They do not adjust for inflationary expectations, arguing that prices were expected to be stable during this period. For the post World War II and Korean War period (1960–2002), they use “the highest grade corporate bonds which were held primarily in tax-deferred pension funds.” To account for inflationary expectations they subtract the inflation rate for the previous 10 years. Since government regulations during the interwar years affected bond returns (see ahead), they used NIPA capital returns for these years. Their results are plotted in Figure 1. The returns for the entire period are seen to be remarkably close to 4 percent, considerably higher than the 0.8 percent return for T-bills reported by Mehra and Prescott (1985). 10% 8
Gold standard period
Postwar period
6
4 2 0 22
High-grade bonds NIPA capital
24 1880
1900
FIGURE 1 Source: McGrattan and Prescott (2003).
1920
1940
1960
1980
2000
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Chapter 3 • Non-Risk-based Explanations of the Equity Premium
Mehra and Prescott (2007) argue that an inflation indexed default-free bond portfolio would essentially be a risk free asset that could be used for savings to finance consumption when old. Since TIPS have only recently (1997) been introduced in the U.S. capital markets, it is difficult to get accurate estimates of the mean return on this asset class. Due to the small quantity supplied, these average returns are not necessarily the same as they would be, had the quantity been larger. The average real return for the 1997–2005 period was 3.7 percent. An alternative would be to use assets such as indexed mortgages guaranteed by Ginnie Mae or issued by Fannie Mae. Recent work by Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2007) provides evidence for a convenience yield on all treasury securities (not limited to T-bills). They document that the debt/GDP ratio in the U.S. is negatively correlated with the spread between corporate bond yields and Treasury bond yields and claim that the result holds even when controlling for the default risk of corporate bonds. They argue that the corporate bond spread reflects a convenience yield that investors attribute to Treasury debt. This yield, which varies with the debt/GDP ratio, is in the 0.2–1.6 percent range. This finding, if it holds up, provides additional evidence that returns on even longdated Treasury securities probably underestimate the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution of consumption and further strengthen the arguments in McGrattan and Prescott (2003).
2. THE EFFECT OF GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS AND RULES McGrattan and Prescott (2003) argue that the estimated expected return on debt assets in the U.S. (including T-bills) over the period 1926–2000 is biased downwards because of various regulations (in particular, W and X) that helped the Treasury keep nominal rates below 2.5 percent during the 1941–54 period. Table 2 shows that the return on debt securities during that period was considerably lower than their long-term average value. This serves as a reminder that governments can pursue regulatory policies that result in negative interest rates over an extended period of time. Clearly, these rates have little to do with the agents’ marginal rate of substitution that would be inferred were there no regulations. Such regulatory periods should be excluded in estimating the long-term average rates on debt securities. TABLE 2 U.S. Inflation Adjusted Average Return on Debt Period
1926–2004
1926–40 and 1955–2004
1941–1954
U.S. Treasury bills
0.74%
1.68%
−3.59%
Intermediate-term government bonds
2.48%
3.60%
−2.71%
Long-term government bonds
2.84%
3.86%
−1.88%
Long-term corporate bonds
3.25%
4.36%
−1.89%
Source: Ibbotson 2005.
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The third column in Table 2 shows how the conventionally used numbers (in column 2) change when the 1941–54 period is excluded. The estimated average rates increase by about 1 percent for all asset classes. In the case of T-bills, a further adjustment needs to be made to the returns in the 1930s. During that period, in some states, T-bills were exempt from personal property taxes while cash in the form of bank notes was not. This created an additional demand for the T-bills, suggesting they were sold at a premium. Again, these rates on return have little to do with the marginal rate of substitution of consumption over time. The effect of these adjustments is to further reduce the magnitude of the equity premium relative to T-bills. To summarize: using the return on a relative risk-free asset that is used for life cycle saving as a proxy for the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution of consumption (instead of a T-bill return) can significantly reduce the equity premium. Adjusting debt returns for government regulations further reduces the premium by 1 percent irrespective of the debt asset used as a benchmark.
3. TAXES McGrattan and Prescott (2003) point out that although taxes on equity income were low until the mid-1930s, they rose dramatically during the war years. They argue that equity returns should be adjusted to reflect this, especially because of regulations that discouraged insurance companies and pension funds from holding equity in tax deferred accounts. They use IRS data to compute the marginal tax rates on equity income distributions. Figure 2 is a plot of the marginal tax rates on equity income distributions. These rates peaked at about 50 percent. 60% 50 40 30 20 10 0
1920
1940
1960
FIGURE 2 Source: McGrattan and Prescott (2003).
1980
2000
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Chapter 3 • Non-Risk-based Explanations of the Equity Premium
Consider the case where the tax on corporate distributions is increased from 0 percent to 50 percent and the additional revenue collected is returned to households in a lump sum. If all, or almost all investments are financed by retained earnings, the value of the stock would be twice as high when the distribution tax rate is zero as when this tax rate is 50 percent. A consequence of this is that the return on equity computed in the standard way will be twice as high when the tax on distribution is 50 percent. This is important because there have been large changes in the tax rate on corporate distributions to owners. Figure 2 plots the distribution tax rate for the United States. McGrattan and Prescott (2003) use this to compute the after tax equity returns to households after making a number of other adjustments to account for inflation, diversification costs and the fact that some equity was not taxed or was tax deferred. Figure 3 is a plot of their estimate of the after tax return on equity. An interesting question that arises from their analysis is, why was the return on corporate equity so high in the 1960–2000 period? McGrattan and Prescott (2000, 2005) answer this in the process of estimating the fundamental value of the stock market in 1962 and 2000. They chose these two points in time because after-tax corporate earnings, net corporate debt, and corporate tangible capital stock were approximately the same relative to GDP and the tax system had been stable for a number of years. Further, at neither point in time was there any fear of full or partial expropriation of capital. What differed was that the value of the stock market relative to GDP in 2000 was nearly twice as large as in 1962. What changed between 1962 and 2000 were the tax and legal-regulatory systems. The marginal tax rate on corporate distributions was 43 percent in the 1955–1962 period
10% 8 6 4 2 0 22
Large company stocks NIPA capital
24 1880
1900
FIGURE 3 Source: McGrattan and Prescott (2003).
1920
1940
1960
1980
2000
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Rajnish Mehra and Edward C. Prescott
and only 17 percent in the 1987–2000. This marginal tax rate on dividends does not have consequences for steady-state after-tax earnings or steady-state corporate capital, if tax revenues are returned lump sum to households. This tax rate does, however, have consequences for the value of corporate equity. The important changes in the legal-regulatory system, most of which occurred in the late 1970s and early 1980s, were that corporate equity was permitted to be held as pension fund reserves and that individuals could invest on a before-tax basis in individual retirement accounts that include equity. The threat of a lawsuit is why debt assets and not equity with higher returns were held as pension fund reserves prior to the late 1970s. At that time, little equity was held in defined contribution retirement accounts because the total assets in these accounts were then a small number. Thus, debt and not equity could, and was, held tax free in 1962. In 2000, both could be held tax-free in defined benefit and defined contribution pension funds and in individual retirement accounts. Not surprisingly, the assets held in tax deferred retirement accounts were large in 2000, being approximately 1.3 GDP (McGrattan and Prescott (2000)). In determining whether the stock market was over or undervalued vis-`a-vis standard growth theory, McGrattan and Prescott (2000, 2005) exploit the fact that the value of a set of real assets is the sum of the values of the individual assets in the set. They develop a method for estimating the value of intangible corporate capital, something that is not reported on balance sheets and, like tangible capital, adds to the value of corporations. Their method uses only national account data and the equilibrium condition that aftertax returns are equated across assets. They also incorporate the most important features of the U.S. and U.K. tax systems into the model, in particular, the fact that capital gains are only taxed upon realization. The formula they develop for the fundamental value of corporate equities V is V = (1 − τd )KT + (1 − τ d ) (1 − τc )KI
(2)
where τd is the tax rate on distributions, τc is the tax rate on corporate income, KT is the end-of-period tangible corporate capital stock at reproduction cost, and KI is the end-of-period intangible corporate capital stock at reproduction cost. The reasons for the tax factors are as follows. Corporate earnings significantly exceed corporate investment, and, as a result, aggregate corporate distributions are large and positive. Historically, these distributions have been in the form of dividends though buybacks have come to be an increasingly important form of distribution in recent years. Therefore, the cost of a unit of tangible capital on margin is only 1 − τd units of forgone consumption. In the case of intangible capital, the consumption cost of a unit of capital is even smaller because investments in intangible capital reduce corporate tax liabilities.3 The tricky part of the calculation is in constructing a measure of intangible capital. These investments reduce current accounting profits and the returns on the existing stock 3 In fact, formula (1) must be adjusted if economic depreciation and accounting depreciation are not equal and if there is an investment tax credit. See McGrattan and Prescott (2005).
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Chapter 3 • Non-Risk-based Explanations of the Equity Premium
of intangible capital but increase future accounting profits. The formula for steady-state before tax accounting profits is π=
i KT + iKI − gKI , 1 − τc
(3)
where g is the steady-state growth rate of the economy and i the steady-state after-tax real interest rate. Note that gKI is the steady-state net investment in intangible capital, which reduces accounting profits because it is expensed. Note also that all the variables in formula (3) are reported in the system of national accounts with the exception of i and KI . McGrattan and Prescott (2005) estimate i using national income data. Their estimate of i is the after-tax real return on capital in the non-corporate sector, which has as much capital as does the corporate sector. They find that the stock market was neither overvalued nor undervalued in 1962 and 2000. The primary reason for the low valuation in 1962 relative to GDP and high valuation in 2000 relative to GDP is that τd was much higher in 1962 than it was in 2000. A second reason is that the value of foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations grew in the period. An increase in the size of the corporate intangible capital stock was also a contributing factor. McGrattan and Prescott (2005) find that in the economically and politically stable 1960–2000 period, the after-tax real return on holding corporate equity was as predicted by theory if the changes in the tax and regulatory system were not anticipated. These unanticipated changes led to a large unanticipated capital gain on holding corporate equity. Evidence of the importance of these changes is that the share of corporate equity held in retirement accounts and as pension fund reserves increased, from essentially zero in 1962 to slightly over 50 percent in 2000. This share is significantly higher for publicly traded securities as Schedule S corporations and small private Schedule C corporations are not held in retirement accounts. This is important because it means that half of corporate dividends are now subject to zero taxation. In periods of economic uncertainty, such as those that prevailed in the 1930–1955 period with the Great Depression, World War II, and the fear of another great depression, the survival of the capitalistic system was in doubt. In such times, low equity prices and high real returns on holding equity are not surprising. This is the Brown, Goetzmann, and Ross (1995) explanation of the equity premium. By 1960, the fears of another great depression and of an abandonment of the capitalistic system in the United States had vanished, and clearly other factors gave rise to the high return on equity in the 1960–2000 period.
4. BORROWING CONSTRAINTS4 In models with borrowing constraints and transaction costs, the effect is to force investors to hold an inventory of bonds (precautionary demand) to smooth consumption. 4 The reader is also referred to the section on Market Incompleteness and Trading Frictions in Chapter 2 in this volume.
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Hence, in infinite horizon models without borrowing constraints, agents come close to equalizing their marginal rates of substitution with little effect on the equity premium.5 Some recent attempts to resolve the puzzle incorporating both borrowing constraints and consumer heterogeneity appear promising. One approach, which departs from the representative agent model, has been proposed in Constantinides, Donaldson and Mehra (2002). In order to systematically illustrate these ideas, the authors construct an overlappinggenerations (OLG) exchange economy in which consumers live for three periods. In the first period, a period of human capital acquisition, the consumer receives a relatively low endowment income. In the second period, the consumer is employed and receives wage income subject to large uncertainty. In the third period, the consumer retires and consumes the assets accumulated in the second period. The authors explore the implications of a borrowing constraint by deriving and contrasting the stationary equilibria in two versions of the economy. In the borrowingconstrained version, the young are prohibited from borrowing and from selling equity short. The borrowing-unconstrained economy differs from the borrowing-constrained one only in that the borrowing constraint and the short-sale constraint are absent. An unconstrained representative agent’s maximization problem is formulated as follows. An agent born in period t solves: 2 i β U (Ct,i ) (4) max E {zet,i ,zbt,i } i=0 subject to ct,0 + qte zet,0 + qtb zbt,0 ≤ w 0
(5)
e b e b 1 ct,1 + qt+1 zet,1 + qt+1 zbt,1 ≤ qt+1 + dt+1 zet,0 + qt+1 + b zbt,0 + wt+1 e b ct,2 ≤ qt+2 + dt+2 zet,1 + qt+2 + b zbt,1
(6)
ct,j is the consumption in period t + j(j = 0, 1, 2) of a consumer born in period t. There are two types of securities in the model, bonds, and equity with ex-coupon and ex-dividend prices qtb and qte respectively. Bonds are a claim to a coupon payment b every period, while the equity is a claim to the dividend stream {dt }. The consumer born in period t receives deterministic wage income w 0 > 0 in period t, when young; stochas1 tic wage income wt+1 > 0 in period t + 1, when middle-aged; and zero wage income in period t + 2, when old. The consumer purchases zet,0 shares of stock and zbt,0 bonds when young. The consumer adjusts these holdings to zet,1 and zbt,1 , respectively, when middle-aged. The consumer liquidates his/her entire portfolio when old. Thus zet,2 = 0 and zbt,2 = 0. 5 This
is true unless the supply of bonds is unrealistically low. See Aiyagari and Gertler (1991).
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Chapter 3 • Non-Risk-based Explanations of the Equity Premium
When considering the borrowing constrained equilibrium the following additional constraints are imposed: zet,0 = 0 and zbt,0 = 0. The model introduces two constraints on consumer trades. First, consumers of one generation remove cannot trade claims against their future wage income with consumers of another generation.6 Second, consumers of one generation cannot trade bonds and equity with consumers of an unborn generation. They build on the observation that absent a complete set of contingent claims, consumer heterogeneity in the form of uninsurable, persistent and heteroscedastic idiosyncratic income shocks, with countercyclical conditional variance, can potentially resolve empirical difficulties encountered by representative-consumer models.7 The novelty of their paper lies in incorporating a life-cycle feature to study asset pricing. The idea is appealingly simple. As discussed earlier, the attractiveness of equity as an asset depends on the correlation between consumption and equity income. If equity pays off in states of high marginal utility of consumption, it will command a higher price, (and consequently a lower rate of return), than if its payoff is in states where marginal utility is low. Since the marginal utility of consumption varies inversely with consumption, equity will command a high rate of return if it pays off in states when consumption is high, and vice versa.8 A key insight of their paper is that as the correlation of equity income with consumption changes over the life cycle of an individual, so does the attractiveness of equity as an asset. Consumption can be decomposed into the sum of wages and equity income. A young person looking forward at his life has uncertain future wage and equity income; furthermore, the correlation of equity income with consumption will not be particularly high, as long as stock and wage income are not highly correlated. This is empirically the case, as documented by Davis and Willen (2000). Equity will thus be a hedge against fluctuations in wages and a “desirable” asset to hold as far as the young are concerned. The same asset (equity) has a very different characteristic for the middle-aged. Their wage uncertainty has largely been resolved. Their future retirement wage income is either zero or deterministic and the innovations (fluctuations) in their consumption occur from fluctuations in equity income. At this stage of the life cycle, equity income is highly correlated with consumption. Consumption is high when equity income is high, and equity is no longer a hedge against fluctuations in consumption; hence, for this group, it requires a higher rate of return. The characteristics of equity as an asset therefore change, depending on who the predominant holder of the equity is. Life cycle considerations thus become crucial for asset pricing. If equity is a “desirable” asset for the marginal investor in the economy, then the observed equity premium will be low, relative to an economy where the marginal 6 Being homogeneous within their generation, consumers have no incentive to trade claims with consumers of their own generation. 7 See Mankiw (1986) and Constantinides and Duffie (1996). 8 This is precisely the reason why high-beta stocks in the simple CAPM framework have a high rate of return. In that model, the return on the market is a proxy for consumption. High-beta stocks pay off when the market return is high, i.e. when marginal utility is low, hence their price is (relatively) low and their rate of return high.
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investor finds it unattractive to hold equity. The deus ex machina is the stage in the life cycle of the marginal investor. The authors argue that the young, who should be holding equity in an economy with markets for all event-contingent commodities, are effectively shut out of this market because of borrowing constraints. The young are characterized by low wages; ideally they would like to smooth lifetime consumption by borrowing against future wage income (consuming a part of the loan and investing the rest in higher return equity). However, they are prevented from doing so because human capital alone does not collateralize major loans in modern economies for reasons of moral hazard and adverse selection. In the presence of borrowing constraints, equity is thus exclusively priced by the middle-aged investors, since the young are effectively excluded from the equity markets and we observe a high equity premium. If the borrowing constraint is relaxed, the young will borrow to purchase equity, thereby raising the bond yield. The increase in the bond yield induces the middle-aged to shift their portfolio holdings from equity to bonds. The increase in demand for equity by the young and the decrease in the demand for equity by the middle-aged work in opposite directions. On balance, the effect is to increase both the equity and the bond return while simultaneously shrinking the equity premium. Furthermore, the relaxation of the borrowing constraint reduces the net demand for bonds and the risk-free rate puzzle re-emerges.
5. THE IMPACT OF AGENT HETEROGENEITY AND INTERMEDIATION COSTS A limitation of the homogenous household construct is that it precludes the modelling of borrowing and lending among agents. In equilibrium, the shadow price of consumption at date t + 1 in terms of consumption at date t is such that the amount of borrowing and lending is zero. Homogenous household models are thus incapable of matching the quantities of assets held and intermediated. To address this issue, Mehra and Prescott (2007) construct a model economy that incorporates agent heterogeneity in the form of differences in the strength of the bequest motive. In light of their earlier finding (1985) that the premium for bearing nondiversifiable aggregate risk is small, their analysis abstracts from aggregate risk. The only uncertainty that agents face is idiosyncratic risk about the duration of their lifetime after retirement. Agents have identical preferences for consumption; however, they differ with respect to their intensity for bequests. In equilibrium, those with a strong bequest motive accumulate equity assets and, when retired, live off the income of these assets. The households with no bequest motive buy annuities during their working years and consume the annuity benefits over their retirement years. We emphasize that annuities are mostly defined benefit pension plans. The incorporation of agent heterogeneity allows them to capture a key empirical fact—that there is a large amount of borrowing and lending between households, in
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particular, between older households. This borrowing is done either directly, by issuing mortgages to finance owner occupied housing or indirectly, by owning partially debt financed rental properties through direct or limited partnerships or REITS. Mehra and Prescott (2007) abstract from that small amount of borrowing and lending directly between households and assume that all of it is intermediated through financial institutions such as banks and pension funds. For the United States, in 2005 the amount intermediated was approximately 1.6 times the GDP. Their intermediation technology is constant returns to scale with intermediation costs being proportional to the amount intermediated. To calibrate the constant of proportionality, they use Flow of Funds statistics and data from National Income and Product Accounts. The calibrated value of this parameter equals the net interest income of financial intermediaries, divided by the quantity of intermediated debt and is a little over 2 percent. In the absence of aggregate uncertainty, the return on equity and the borrowing rate are identical, since the agents who borrow are also marginal in equity markets. In their framework, government debt is not intermediated and thus its return is equal to the lending rate. The equity premium relative to government debt is the intermediation spread. The divergence between borrowing and lending rates gives rise to a 2 percent equity premium even in a world without aggregate uncertainty.
6. CONCLUDING COMMENTS In this essay, we present plausible arguments that using an appropriate benchmark for the households’ real interest rate, incorporating the effect of government regulations, taxes and intermediation costs can account for a large part of the observed equity premium. As a result, we have a deeper understanding of the role and importance of the abstractions that contribute to the puzzle. While no single explanation fully resolved the anomaly, considerable progress has been made and the equity premium is a lesser puzzle today than it was twenty years ago.
References Aiyagari, S. R., and M. Gertler. Asset returns with transactions costs and uninsured individual risk. Journal of Monetary Economics 27 (1991): 311–331. Bansal, R., and J. W. Coleman. A monetary explanation of the equity premium, term premium and risk free rate puzzles. Journal of Political Economy 104 (1996): 1135–1171. Brown, S., W. Goetzmann, and S. Ross. Survival. Journal of Finance 50 (1995): 853–873. Constantinides, G. M., J. B. Donaldson, and R. Mehra. Junior can’t borrow: A new perspective on the equity premium puzzle. Quarterly Journal of Economics 118 (2002): 269–296. Constantinides, G. M., and D. Duffie. Asset pricing with heterogeneous consumers. Journal of Political Economy 104 (1996): 219–240. Davis, S. J., and P. Willen. Using financial assets to hedge labor income risk: Estimating the benefits. Working paper, University of Chicago (2000). Donaldson, J. B., and R. Mehra. Risk based explanations of the equity premium forthcoming in Handbook of the Equity Risk Premium, R. Mehra, ed. Amsterdam (2008).
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Economic Report of the President (2005). Council of Economic Advisors. United States Government Printing Office. Washington. Ibbotson Associates. Stocks, bonds, bills and inflation. 2005 yearbook. Ibbotson Associates, Chicago (2006). Krishnamurthy, A., and A. Vissing-Jorgensen. The demand for treasury debt. Working paper, Northwestern University (2007). Kydland, F., and E. C. Prescott. Time to build and aggregate fluctuations. Econometrica 50 (1982): 1345– 1371. Mankiw, N. G. The equity premium and the concentration of aggregate shocks. Journal of Financial Economics 17 (1986): 211–219. McGrattan, E. R., and E. C. Prescott. Is the stock market overvalued? Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review (2000). McGrattan, E. R., and E. C. Prescott. Average debt and equity returns: Puzzling? American Economic Review 93 (2003): 392–397. McGrattan, E. R., and E. C. Prescott. Taxes, regulations, and the value of U.S. and U.K. corporations. Review of Economic Studies 92 (2005): 767–796. Mehra, R., and E. C. Prescott. The equity premium: A Puzzle. Journal of Monetary Economics 15 (1985): 145–161. Mehra, R., and E. C. Prescott. Intermediated quantities and returns. Working paper, UCSB (2007).
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CHAPTER 4
Equity Premia with Benchmark Levels of Consumption: Closed-Form Results∗ Andrew B. Abel The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania and NBER
1. Preferences 2. The Canonical Asset 2.1. The Price of the Canonical Asset 2.2. The Rate of Return on the Canonical Asset 3. Risk, Term, and Equity Premia 4. Log-Normality 5. Risk, Term, and Equity Premia Under Log-Normality with Consumption Externalities and Without Habit Formation 6. Linear Approximations to Risk, Term, and Equity Premia 7. Second Moments 7.1. Linear Approximations to Second Moments 8. Correlation of Dividend-Price Ratio and the Rate of Return on Stock 8.1. Correlation of Dividend-Price Ratio and the Excess Rate of Return on Stock 9. Special Cases 9.1. Rational Expectations 9.2. Distorted Beliefs 10. Accuracy of Approximations 11. Summary References
120 126 127 129 131 134 135 137 138 140 142 144 146 146 151 153 156 156
∗ I thank Martin Lettau, Sydney Ludvigson, Rajnish Mehra, Jessica Wachter, Amir Yaron, Jianfeng Yu, participants in the Finance Seminar at the Stern School, the European Summer Symposium in Financial Markets, Gerzensee, Switzerland, and the Penn Macro Lunch Group for helpful comments.
HANDBOOK OF THE EQUITY RISK PREMIUM c 2008 by Elsevier B.V. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved. Copyright
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Abstract I calculate exact expressions for risk premia, term premia, and the premium on levered equity in a framework that includes habit formation, keeping/catching up with the Joneses, and possible departures from rational expectations. Closed-form expressions for the first and second moments of returns and for the R2 of a regression of stock returns on the dividend-price ratio are derived under log-normality for the case that includes keeping/catching up with the Joneses. Linear approximations illustrate how these moments of returns are affected by parameter values and illustrate quantitatively how well the model can account for values of the equity premium, the term premium, and the standard deviations of the riskless return and the rate of return on levered equity. For empirically relevant parameter values, the linear approximations yield values of the various moments that are close to those obtained from the exact solutions. JEL Classification: G12 Keywords: equity premium, term premium, risk premium, habit formation, catching up with the Joneses
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Mehra and Prescott (1985) showed that over a period of almost a century, the equity premium—the excess of the rate of return on stocks over the rate of return on riskless bills—averaged 6.18 percent per year. They then calibrated a general equilibrium asset pricing model of the sort introduced by Lucas (1978) and showed that such a model, with conventional values of the coefficient of relative risk aversion, cannot come close to accounting for the historically observed equity premium. In the two decades since Mehra and Prescott proclaimed an equity premium puzzle, a large body of research has been devoted to closing the gap between theoretical asset pricing models and empirically observed asset returns. The seminal study by Mehra and Prescott used a simple general equilibrium model with a representative consumer with constant relative risk aversion transacting in frictionless asset markets to determine the prices of unlevered equity and riskless bills. Subsequent research has extended this simple model to allow for heterogeneous consumers, trading frictions, more general preferences, leverage, a richer time series of the endowment of consumption, and departures from rational expectations. Since the equity premium puzzle is a quantitative puzzle, many of these studies provide numerical solutions rather than closed-form solutions for equilibrium prices and rates of return. In this chapter, I will provide closed-form solutions for the equilibrium price and rate of return on a canonical asset. The canonical asset is general enough to include riskless bills and risky stocks and thus allows analysis of the equity premium. I will extend the basic framework used by Mehra and Prescott to allow for preferences that display habit formation and a specific form of externalities. I will also allow for leverage so that I can examine the return on levered equity. Finally, I will allow for departures from rational expectations, though I will set up the framework so that rational expectations is a special—indeed focal—case. Instead of enriching the time-series structure used by Mehra and Prescott, I will simplify it by restricting attention to growth rates of consumption and dividends that are i.i.d. over time, though unlike Mehra and Prescott, I will allow consumption and dividends to differ from each other. As in Mehra and Prescott, I will assume that there is a representative consumer who transacts in frictionless markets. An advantage of closed-form solutions is that they provide a precise description of how equilibrium rates of return depend on various parameters. Though this description is precise, it is not always transparent. To help understand the effects of various parameters on the equilibrium rates of return, I will provide linear approximations to the closed-form solutions. I will show that, for empirically relevant parameter values, these linear approximations tend to be very close to the values obtained by evaluating the exact closed-form expressions. In this chapter, the major departure from the standard model1 is the specification of preferences to include a benchmark level of consumption that captures habit formation
1 In
this context, the standard model is the Lucas (1978) fruit-tree model, generalized by Mehra and Prescott (1985) to be stationary in growth rates of consumption. The standard model has a representative agent with time-separable utility who can trade assets frictionlessly without restrictions, such as short sale constraints.
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Chapter 4 • Equity Premia with Benchmark Levels of Consumption: Closed-Form Results
and consumption externalities that are sometimes called “keeping up with the Joneses” or “catching up with the Joneses.” I will introduce this more general specification of preferences in Section 1. In Section 2, I introduce the canonical asset and compute its equilibrium price and rate of return. The expression for the rate of return on the canonical asset can be used to determine rates of return on riskless bills, levered equity, and a claim on a single dividend to be received one period in the future. In Section 3, I use these rates of return to define and compute the risk premium, term premium, and equity premium. Beginning in Section 4, I restrict attention to log-normally distributed growth rates. In Section 4, I provide identities that will be helpful in computing expected returns under log-normality. Beginning in Section 5, I generally restrict attention to the case without habit formation, though I allow consumption externalities of the keeping/catching up with the Joneses variety. I compute closed-form expressions for risk, term, and equity premia in Section 5, and in Section 6, I compute linear approximations to these expressions. In Section 7, I compute exact closed-form expressions for the variances of the rates of return, and then I compute linear approximations to these expressions. Although the vector of exogenous growth rates of consumption and dividends is independently and identically distributed over time, the rate of return on stocks is predictable if preferences display the catching up with the Joneses feature. In fact, the dividend-price ratio can be used to predict the rate of return on stocks, and in Section 8, I compute the R2 of a regression of stock returns on the dividend-price ratio. In Section 9, I examine various special cases of the model and focus on the quantitative predictions for the equity premium, the term premium, the standard deviations of the riskless rate and the rate of return on stock, and the R2 of the regression of stock returns on the dividend-price ratio. The quantitative implications in Section 9 are based on the approximations of these features of assets, so I show in Section 10 that the approximations are, in fact, close to the values obtained by evaluating the exact closed-form solutions.
1. PREFERENCES Consider a discrete-time economy with a continuum of identical infinitely-lived consumers. Each period the economy receives an endowment of a homogeneous non-storable good. Because the good is non-storable, in equilibrium all of it is consumed in the period in which it arrives. The quantity of this good is exogenous and stochastic. The representative consumer maximizes a utility function that differs in two important ways from the standard time-separable isoelastic utility function commonly used in asset pricing models. First, the utility flow in each period depends on a benchmark level of consumption that evolves endogenously over time. Second, the representative consumer does not necessarily have rational expectations and thus may not use the objective distributions of random variables when evaluating lifetime utility. For the sake of obtaining closed-form solutions for asset prices, I specify a simple parametric utility
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function that embodies these two departures from standard preferences. At time t, an individual consumer maximizes ⎧ 1−α ⎫ j ∞ ⎬ ⎨ c 1 1 t+j , (1) Ut = Et∗ γ ⎭ ⎩ 1+δ 1 − α νt+j j=0 where ct+j is the individual’s own consumption in period t + j, νt+j is the benchmark level of consumption that I will specify in Eq. (2), 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1, the operator Et∗{} is the conditional expectation based on the consumer’s subjective distribution of exogenous stochastic variables as of time t, δ ≥ 0 is the rate of time preference, and α > 0 is a curvature parameter. Beginning in Section 5, I will confine attention to cases in which the benchmark defined in Eq. (2) does not depend on a consumer’s own past consumption; in these cases, α is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. In the special case in which γ = 0 and in which the subjective distributions equal the true objective distributions, the utility function in Eq. (1) is the standard time-separable isoelastic utility function with rational expectations. The parameter γ measures the extent to which utility flow in period t depends on ct /νt , the ratio of the consumer’s own consumption to the benchmark level of consumpγ tion νt . Specifically, utility flow in period t is an isoelastic function of ct /νt , which 1−γ can be written as an isoelastic function of ct (ct /νt )γ . Thus, utility flow in period t is an isoelastic function of a weighted geometric average of ct , the consumer’s own consumption in period t, and ct /νt , the ratio of the consumer’s own consumption to the benchmark level of consumption. In the extreme case in which γ = 1, utility flow in period t depends only on the ratio of the consumer’s own consumption to the benchmark level of consumption.2,3 Suppose that the benchmark level of consumption in period t is
1−D θ θ1 D Ct 0 Ct−1 Gt , νt ≡ ct−1
(2) γ
2 The benchmark ν affects utility flow in period t in the “ratio form” c /ν , rather than in the “dift t t γ ference form” ct − νt as in Constantinides (1990) and Campbell and Cochrane (1999). The ratio form facilitates the finding of closed-form expressions for equilibrium asset prices and returns. As Campbell and Cochrane point out, the difference form of the specification allows the coefficient of relative risk aversion to vary over time, whereas the ratio form does not allow this variation. However, the difference form requires that the current level of consumption never falls below the current benchmark level, which requires additional restrictions on the processes generating consumption and the benchmark. 3 In an economy with production and capital accumulation (Abel (2005)), I rule out the case in which γ = 1. If ∞ a given sequence of consumption and benchmarks between ∞γ = 1, consumers would be indifferent ct∗ , νt∗ t=−∞ and, for instance, a sequence 2ct∗ , 2νt∗ t=−∞ in which all consumptions and benchmarks are twice as high. That is, if γ = 1, consumers are indifferent to the scale of the economy. In a production economy with capital accumulation, the scale of the economy is endogenous, and the indifference to scale would create a problem for a benevolent social planner. However, such a problem does not arise in the endowment economy I study here because the scale of the economy is exogenous.
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where ct−1 is the individual’s own consumption in the previous period, Ct is the average consumption per person in the current period, Ct−1 is the average consumption per person in the previous period, 0 ≤ D ≤ 1, θ0 ≥ 0, θ1 ≥ 0, θ0 + θ1 ≤ 1, and G ≥ 1. The assumption that G ≥ 1 allows for the possibility that the benchmark level of consumption can grow exogenously. In equilibrium in this representative consumer economy, the individual’s own consumption in period t, ct , equals the average consumption per person in period t, Ct . While an individual consumer treats his own consumption, ct , as a choice variable, the average consumption per person, Ct , is exogenous to the individual and thus is treated as a parameter in the individual’s decision problem. If D = 1, then the benchmark is simply νt ≡ ct−1 , which is an example of habit formation. In this case, an individual’s own consumption in period t directly affects utility flow in period t and also affects the benchmark level of consumption in period t + 1. (I will use the term “habit formation” to indicate that the benchmark depends on that person’s own past consumption. Campbell and Cochrane (1999) have extended this terminology to include cases in which the benchmark in a person’s utility function depends on past levels of aggregate consumption per capita, but not directly on past levels of the person’s own consumption. They recognize that this terminology is unusual and so refer to such preferences as displaying “external habit formation.” I will reserve the term “habit formation” for cases in which the benchmark depends on the consumer’s own past consumption. I will use the term “consumption externalities” to refer to what Campbell and Cochrane call external habit formation.)4 The case without habit formation, but with consumption externalities, is represented θ θ1 by D = 0, so that the benchmark is νt ≡ Ct 0 Ct−1 G t , which is exogenous to an indiθ0 θ1 vidual consumer. The term Ct Ct−1 captures the notion that the benchmark level of consumption depends on the current and/or recent level of consumption per person in the economy. For instance, if θ0 + θ1 = 1 and G = 1, the benchmark level of consumpθ 1−θ tion is νt = Ct 0 Ct−1 0 , which is simply a weighted geometric average of current and lagged consumption per person. Within this restricted class of benchmark functions, if θ0 = 1, so that θ1 = 0, the benchmark level of consumption is simply νt = Ct , as in Gali (1994). Alternatively, if θ1 = 1, so that θ0 = 0, then the benchmark level of consumption is νt = Ct−1 , as in the specification of the “catching up with the Joneses” preferences in Abel (1990).5 As a step toward calculating the pricing kernel, which is the equilibrium value of the representative consumer’s marginal rate of substitution between current consumption, 4 See also the usage in the chapter by George Constantinides in this volume, where he distinguishes between “internal” and “external” habit. 5 In Abel (1990) I used the term “catching up with the Joneses” to describe the case in which ν = C t t−1 , because the benchmark level of consumption depends on lagged rather than current consumption. With this terminology, one might describe the case in which νt = Ct as a case of “keeping up with the Joneses,” because the benchmark level of consumption depends on the contemporaneous consumption of others. Dupor and Liu (2003) refine the terminology for various features of consumption externalities. If utility flow is u(c, b), where c is the individual’s own consumption and b is a benchmark that equals the average level of consumption by others, they define jealousy as ∂u/∂b < 0 and keeping up with the Joneses as ∂2 u/∂c∂b > 0. The utility function in Eq. (1) displays jealousy. It also displays keeping up with the Joneses for the case in which the curvature parameter α, introduced in Eq. (1), is greater than one.
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ct , and next period’s consumption, ct+1 , differentiate Eq. (1) with respect to ct to obtain ⎧ 1−α ⎫ 1−α ⎬ 1 ∗ ⎨ ct ct+1 ∂Ut 1 = Et − γD . (3) γ ⎩ νtγ ⎭ ∂ct ct 1 + δ νt+1 Because all consumers are identical, ct = Ct in equilibrium. Let xt+1 ≡ Ct+1 /Ct = ct+1 /ct be the (gross) growth rate of consumption from period t to period t + 1, and use this definition of xt+1 and the definition of the benchmark level of consumption in Eq. (2) to rewrite Eq. (3) as ∂Ut γ(α−1) Ht , = ct−α νt ∂ct
(4)
where 1−η Ht ≡ 1 − DγβEt∗ xt+1 xυt ,
(5)
and6 1 G (1−D)γ(α−1), 1+δ η ≡ α + θ0 (1 − D) γ (1 − α) > 0, υ ≡ γ (α − 1) [D + θ1 (1 − D)] > −1.
β≡
(6) (7) (8)
Note that the factor β can be larger than one. However, β cannot be so large that certain series fail to converge. I will provide a more specific upper bound for β in Section 2.1. The pricing kernel is the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution, Mt+1 ≡
1 ∂Ut+1 /∂ct+1 . 1 + δ ∂Ut /∂ct
(9)
Use Eq. (4) and the definition of the benchmark in Eq. (2) to rewrite Eq. (9) as −η
Mt+1 = βxυt xt+1
Ht+1 . Ht
(10)
inequalities in Eqs. (7) and (8) are derived as follows. Rewrite η as η = [1 − θ0 (1 − D) γ] α + [θ0 (1 − D) γ]. The assumptions that θ0 ≥ 0, θ1 ≥ 0, and θ0 + θ1 ≤ 1 imply that 0 ≤ θ0 ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ θ1 ≤ 1. Also, since 0 ≤ D ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1, both of the terms in square brackets in the expression for η are nonnegative, and since the terms in square brackets sum to one, at least one of them must be positive. Since α > 0, it follows that η > 0. Rewrite υ as υ = αγ [D + θ1 (1 − D)] − γ [D + θ1 (1 − D)], so that υ + 1 = {αγ [D + θ1 (1 − D)]} + {1 − γ [D + θ1 (1 − D)]}. Since 0 ≤ D ≤ 1, 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1, and 0 ≤ θ1 ≤ 1, it follows that 0 ≤ γ [D + θ1 (1 − D)] ≤ 1. Therefore, since α > 0, both of the terms in curly brackets in the expression for υ + 1 are non-negative and at least one of them is positive. Therefore, υ + 1 > 0, so υ > −1.
6 The
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Chapter 4 • Equity Premia with Benchmark Levels of Consumption: Closed-Form Results
In the standard case of time-separable isoelastic utility, which is represented by γ = 0, we have β = 1/(1 + δ), η = α, υ = 0, and Ht ≡ 1. Therefore, the marginal rate of substitution in Eq. (10) is simply Mt+1 = βx−α t+1 ,
if γ = 0.
(11)
If we introduce a benchmark level of consumption into the utility function (γ > 0), but confine attention to the case with D = 0, so that there may be consumption externalities but no habit formation, the marginal rate of substitution in Eq. (10) is −η
Mt+1 = βxυt xt+1 ,
if D = 0,
(12)
since Ht ≡ 1 when D = 0. If the growth rate of consumption, xt , is independently distributed over time, then in the standard isoelastic case, Mt+1 = βx−α t+1 is also independently distributed over time. However, with a benchmark level of consumption, the pricing kernel Mt in Eq. (12) is, in general, not independently distributed over time. In fact, since η > 0, the serial correlation of Mt has the opposite sign of υ, which can be positive, negative, or zero. Under rational expectations, Backus, Gregory, and Zin (1989) have shown that the term premium has the opposite sign of the serial correlation of the pricing kernel. Therefore, the term premium has the same sign as υ, as I will show under log-normality of xt (and without habit formation) in Section 5. In the standard case of time-separable utility, υ = 0, so the term premium is zero if the growth rate of consumption, xt , is independently distributed over time. In the case considered by Gali (1994) (θ1 = 0 = D, so that υ = 0; and G = 1), the −η marginal rate of substitution in Eq. (12) becomes Mt+1 = βxt+1 , which is the pricing kernel for standard time-separable isoelastic utility in which the coefficient of relative risk aversion is constant and equal to η. Gali points out an interesting special case in which γ = 1 = θ0 , so that the benchmark is simply νt = Ct and, as in Abel (1990), consumers care only about the ratio of their own consumption to the benchmark. In this special case, η = 1, so that regardless of the value of the curvature parameter α, the pricing kernel is Mt+1 = βx−1 t+1 , which is the marginal rate of substitution for a standard logarithmic utility function without benchmark levels of consumption (α = 1 and γ = 0). Thus, asset prices in this special case of Gali’s specification would be identical to asset prices that would arise in the simple case of logarithmic utility without benchmark levels of consumption. The specification of the utility function has seven fundamental parameters: the curvature paramater α; the rate of time preference δ; the importance of the consumptionbenchmark ratio as measured by γ; the relative weight D of the consumer’s own past consumption in the benchmark; the weights θ0 and θ1 on contemporaneous and lagged aggregate consumption in the benchmark; and the exogenous growth rate G in the benchmark. Beginning in Section 5, I generally restrict attention to the case without habit formation, though I allow consumption externalities of the keeping/catching up with the Joneses variety. In this case, D = 0, which implies Ht ≡ 1. With Ht ≡ 1, Eq. (10) shows that the pricing kernel depends on only the three
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“derived” preference parameters β, η, and υ in Eqs. (6), (7), and (8), respectively. Thus, one could not recover the seven fundamental parameters by observing data on asset returns. The reason for starting with seven fundamental parameters is to illustrate that many different representations of preferences can be captured by the three derived parameters β, η, and υ. These parameters are defined precisely in Eqs. (6), (7), and (8), respectively. Loosely speaking, β is an adjusted time-preference discount factor, η is a curvature parameter related to risk aversion, and υ is a parameter reflecting the role of past (aggregate or individual) consumption. Table 1 summarizes the relationships among the fundamental preference parameters and the derived preference parameters in interesting special cases. To see how the marginal rate of substitution determines asset prices and rates of return, let Rt+1 be the one-period gross rate of return on an asset from period t to period t + 1. Consider a consumer who reduces consumption in period t by one unit and purchases one unit of the asset in period t. In period t + 1, the consumer collects any payoff (for instance, dividends or coupons) and then sells the asset and uses the proceeds to
TABLE 1 Preference Parameters and Pricing Kernel in Various Cases Time separable
Habit formation
Keeping up with the Joneses
Catching up with the Joneses
Fundamental preference parameters γ
0
0<γ≤1
0<γ≤1
δ
≥0
≥0
≥0
0<γ≤1 ≥0
α
>0
>0
>0
>0 ≥1
G
—
—
≥1
D
—
1
0
0
θ0
—
—
1
0
θ1
—
—
0
1
β
1 1+δ
1 1+δ
1 γ(α−1) 1+δ G
1 γ(α−1) 1+δ G
η
α
α
α + γ (1 − α)
α
υ
0
0
γ (α − 1)
Ht
1
γ (α − 1) γ(α−1) 1 − βγEt∗ x1−α t+1 xt
Mt+1
βx−α t+1
Derived preference parameters and pricing kernel
Ht Mt+1
— —
γ(α−1) −α Ht+1 βxt xt+1 Ht
1
1
−α−γ(1−α) βxt+1
γ(α−1) −α βxt xt+1
Special case in which γ = 1 α−1 1 − βEt∗ x1−α 1 t+1 xt Ht+1 βxtα−1 x−α t+1 Ht
βx−1 t+1
1 βxtα−1 x−α t+1
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Chapter 4 • Equity Premia with Benchmark Levels of Consumption: Closed-Form Results
increase consumption in period t + 1. Since the payoff plus the proceeds from the sale of the asset equal Rt+1 units of consumption, the consumer can increase ct+1 by Rt+1 . Optimality from the consumer’s point of view in period t requires that the subjective expected reduction in utility from reducing ct by one unit equals the subjective expected increase in utility from increasing ct+1 by Rt+1 units, so that 1 ∂Ut+1 ∂Ut ∗ = Et Rt+1 . ∂ct 1 + δ ∂ct+1
(13)
The first-order condition in Eq. (13) can be rewritten using the definition of the marginal rate of substitution in Eq. (9) as Et∗{Mt+1 Rt+1 } = 1.
(14)
Equation (14) is the familiar fundamental condition of asset pricing: the product of the marginal rate of substitution and the gross rate of return on any frictionlessly traded asset has a conditional expectation equal to one. The only unfamiliar aspect of Eq. (14) is that the conditional expectation is based on the consumer’s subjective distribution, which may differ from the objective distribution. Using the marginal rate of substitution in Eq. (10), the fundamental condition of asset pricing can be written as βxυt ∗ −η Et xt+1 Ht+1 Rt+1 = 1. Ht
(15)
In the next section, I will define a canonical asset and will use Eq. (15) to determine the equilibrium price of this asset.
2. THE CANONICAL ASSET The fundamental condition for asset pricing in Eq. (15) can be used to determine the price of any frictionlessly traded asset in the absence of borrowing constraints and other restrictions such as short sale constraints. To avoid the need for separate derivations for the equilibrium prices of, for instance, riskless bills and stocks, I will calculate the equilibrium price of a canonical asset, introduced in Abel (1999), that is general enough to include these assets as special cases. The canonical asset is an n-period asset, where n may be infinite. In period t, the λ λ λ canonical asset is a claim to a stream of n payoffs an−1 yt+1 , an−2 yt+2 , . . . , a0 yt+n , where a0 > 0, aj ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . , n − 1 are constants, yt+j > 0 is a random variable, and λ ≥ 0 is a constant. The (gross) growth rate of the random variable yt is zt+1 ≡ yt+1 /yt . Recall that xt+1 is the (gross) growth rate of consumption per capita. I will assume that the vector (xt+1 , zt+1 ) is i.i.d. over time and that even when the subjective distributions differ from the corresponding objective distributions, the subjective distributions
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incorporate the fact that (xt+1 , zt+1 ) is i.i.d. over time. The definition of Ht in Eq. (5) and the assumption that (xt+1 , zt+1 ) is i.i.d. over time imply that (xt+1 , zt+1 , Ht+1 ) is i.i.d. over time. When λ = 0, the canonical asset is a fixed-income security, with a deterministic stream of payoffs an−j in period t + j, for j = 1, . . . , n. For instance, a coupon bond with face value F , maturity n, and coupon d is represented by a0 = d + F and aj = d, for j = 1, . . . , n − 1. A pure discount bond is represented by d = 0. A consol that pays a constant coupon d forever is represented by aj = d, for j = 1, 2, 3, . . . . Securities with risky payoffs are represented by λ = 0. For instance, in Lucas (1978), unlevered equity pays a dividend per capita in each period that equals consumption per capita. Thus, the payoff in period t + j is Ct+j , so unlevered equity can be represented by the canonical asset with λ = 1, n = ∞, aj = 1, and yt+j ≡ Ct+j , for j = 1, 2, 3, . . . . As explained in Abel (1999), levered equity is represented by λ > 1.7 This formulation of levered equity has been adopted by, for example, Bansal and Yaron (2004) and Lettau, Ludvigson, and Wachter (2004).
2.1. The Price of the Canonical Asset Let pt (n, λ) be the ex-payment (e.g., ex-dividend for equity, ex-coupon for bonds) price of the canonical asset in period t. The price also depends on the sequence of the constants aj , j = 0, . . . , n − 1, and on the properties of the stochastic process for yt , but, to reduce clutter, I have not included this dependence in the notation. A consumer can buy a unit of the canonical asset at price pt (n, λ) in period t and then in period t + 1 λ can collect the payoff an−1 yt+1 and sell the asset at price pt+1 (n − 1, λ) when the asset becomes an (n − 1)-period asset. Therefore, the gross rate of return on the asset from period t to period t + 1 is Rt+1 (n, λ) =
λ + pt+1 (n − 1, λ) an−1 yt+1
pt (n, λ)
.
(16)
Substituting the rate of return on the canonical asset from Eq. (16) into the fundamental condition of asset pricing in Eq. (15), recognizing that pt (n, λ) is known at time t 7 To
illustrate levered equity most simply, consider a heuristic example with one-period levered equity. Define q ≡ y − B, where y is the payoff to owners of equity before making any payment to bondholders, and 0 ≤ B < E{y} is the payment promised to bondholders. The payoff to one-period levered equity is max [q, 0]. If the probability of default is small enough to allow us to ignore default, the payoff to levered equity is simply q, with mean E{q} = E{y} − B, standard deviation sd{q} = sd{y}, and coefficient of variation equal to sd{y}/(E{y} − B) = λ(sd{y}/E{y}), where λ ≡ 1/ (1 − (B/E{y})) ≥ 1. That is, the coefficient of variation of the levered payoff (ignoring bankruptcy) is λ times as large as the coefficient of variation of the unlevered payoff y. If y is log-normally distributed, then the coefficient of variation of y λ is approximately λ times as large as the coefficient of variation of y, so y λ with λ > 1 reflects the fact that leverage increases the coefficient of variation of the payoff to equity. If we interpret B/E{y} as the leverage ratio, then λ is an increasing function of the leverage ratio. Note that without leverage, i.e., with B = 0, λ = 1. This description is heuristic and, importantly, has ignored the role of default. In Abel (1999), I take explicit account of bankruptcy and show that for a broad range of values of the leverage ratio B/E{y}, the rate of return on a one-period asset paying y λ is very close to the rate of return on a one-period asset paying max [y − B, 0].
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Chapter 4 • Equity Premia with Benchmark Levels of Consumption: Closed-Form Results
and multiplying both sides by pt (n, λ), yields a recursive expression for the price of the canonical asset pt (n, λ) =
βxυt ∗ −η λ Et xt+1 Ht+1 an−1 yt+1 + pt+1 (n − 1, λ) . Ht
(17)
I will hypothesize that the price of the canonical asset, which must satisfy Eq. (17), is pt (n, λ) = ω(n, λ)
xυt ytλ , Ht
(18)
where ω(n, λ) is a function to be determined. As a step toward determining the function ω(n, λ), substitute Eq. (18) into Eq. (17) and use the facts that an−1 and ω(n − 1, λ) are υ−η nonstochastic and that (xt , zt ) is i.i.d. (so that the unconditional means of xt+1 zλt+1 and −η xt+1 Ht+1 zλt+1 equal the means of the corresponding conditional distributions at time t) to simplify and obtain ω(n, λ) = A(λ) ω(n − 1, λ) + B(λ) an−1 , where
and
for n ≥ 1,
(19)
υ−η A(λ) ≡ βE ∗ xt+1 zλt+1 > 0
(20)
−η B(λ) ≡ βE ∗ xt+1 Ht+1 zλt+1 > 0.
(21)
Equation (19) is a first-order linear difference equation. In order to guarantee that this difference equation converges as n grows without bound, I will assume that β and the subjective distribution of (xt+1 , zt+1 ) are such that A(λ) < 1. This assumption is υ−η −1 equivalent to β < E ∗ xt+1 zλt+1 , which allows β to exceed one to the extent that ∗ υ−η λ E xt+1 zt+1 is less than one. Equation (19) has a simple boundary condition associated with it. After an asset has paid its last payment, it is formally a zero-period asset, and its price is zero. That is, pt (0, λ) = 0 so ω(0, λ) = 0. Using this boundary condition, evaluate the difference equation in Eq. (19) for n = 1 to obtain ω(1, λ) = B(λ) a0 .
(22)
For arbitrary n, the solution to the difference equation in Eq. (19) that satisfies the boundary condition in Eq. (22) is ω(n, λ) = B(λ)
n
ai−1 [A(λ)]n−i .
(23)
i=1
The function ω(n, λ) can be increasing or decreasing in the maturity n. For a pure discount bond with face value F , a0 = F and aj = 0 for j = 1, . . . , n − 1. In this case,
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Andrew B. Abel
ω(n, λ) = B(λ) [A(λ)]n−1 F , which is strictly decreasing in n because A(λ) < 1. For a security with a level stream of payoff coefficients aj = d for j = 0, . . . , n − 1, we have n ω(n, λ) = B(λ) 1 1−−[A(λ)] A(λ) d, which is increasing in maturity n. A coupon bond is a composite of a discount bond with a face value of F and a security that promises a level stream of payments d, so a0 = d + F and aj = d, for j = 1, . . . , n − 1. Therefore, for an
n-period coupon bond, ω(n, λ) = B(λ) [A(λ)]n−1 F + 1 − A(λ) A(λ) , decreasing in n if d/F
1 − [A(λ)]n 1 − A(λ) d
, which is increasing
1 − A(λ) A(λ) , and invariant to n if d/F
A(λ) < = 1 −A(λ) . in n if d/F > That is, if the coupon is small relative to the face value, the coupon bond is more like a discount bond in which ω(n, λ) is decreasing in n. If the coupon is large relative to the face value, the coupon bond is more like a security with a flat stream of payoffs, and ω(n, λ) is increasing in maturity n. The expression for ω(n, λ) in Eq. (23) completes the solution of the equilibrium price of the canonical asset for arbitrary values of n and λ. The functions A(λ) and B(λ) are unconditional moments of the subjective distributions of exogenous random variables. Given the subjective distributions of the exogenous random variables, Eqs. (20) and (21) give the values of A(λ) and B(λ), which can be used along with the sequence of payoff coefficients aj , j = 0, . . . , n − 1, in Eq. (23) to obtain the value of ω(n, λ). Substituting this value of ω(n, λ) into Eq. (18) and using the definition of Ht in Eq. (5) gives the price of the canonical asset for any n and λ.
2.2. The Rate of Return on the Canonical Asset To calculate the rate of return on the canonical asset, substitute the expression for the price of the canonical asset from Eq. (18) into the expression for the rate of return in Eq. (16) to obtain an−1 + ω(n − 1, λ) Rt+1 (n, λ) =
xυt+1 Ht+1
ω(n, λ)
λ Ht x−υ t zt+1 .
(24)
It will be convenient to rewrite the rate of return on the canonical asset in Eq. (24) as Rt+1 (n, λ) = J (xt+1 , zt+1 , Ht+1 ; n, λ) × K(xt , Ht ) ,
(25)
where J (xt+1 , zt+1 , Ht+1 ; n, λ) ≡
λ υ an−1 λ ω(n − 1, λ) xt+1 zt+1 zt+1 + ω(n, λ) ω(n, λ) Ht+1
(26)
and K(xt , Ht ) ≡ x−υ t Ht .
(27)
Equation (25) expresses the rate of return on the canonical asset as the product of J (xt+1 , zt+1 , Ht+1 ; n, λ) and K(xt , Ht ), which are independent of each other because
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Chapter 4 • Equity Premia with Benchmark Levels of Consumption: Closed-Form Results
the vector of exogenous random variables (xt , zt , Ht ) is independently distributed over time. I will confine attention to assets for which aj = 1, for j = 0, 1, 2, . . . , n − 1. In this case, Eq. (23) implies that 1 1 − A(λ) 1 , = ω(n, λ) B(λ) 1 − [A(λ)]n
(28)
ω(n − 1, λ) 1 − [A(λ)]n−1 . = ω(n, λ) 1 − [A(λ)]n
(29)
which implies that
Substitute Eqs. (28) and (29) into the definition of J (xt+1 , zt+1 , Ht+1 ; n, λ) in Eq. (26), set an−1 = 1, and rearrange to obtain J (xt+1 , zt+1 , Ht+1 ; n, λ) υ λ 1 1 − A(λ) λ −1 n−1 z H x = + 1 − z [A(λ)] t+1 t+1 t+1 . B(λ) t+1 1 − [A(λ)]n
(30)
Because (xt , zt , Ht ) is i.i.d. over time, J (xt+1 , zt+1 , Ht+1 ; n, λ) is i.i.d. over time. Therefore, the objective conditional expectation of J (xt+1 , zt+1 , Ht+1 ; n, λ) equals the objective unconditional expectation of J (xt+1 , zt+1 , Ht+1 ; n, λ). Now define E H −1 xυ zλ B(λ) Ψ (λ) ≡ , A(λ) E zλ
(31)
where the operator E{} (without an asterisk) denotes the expectation using the objective distribution of the relevant random variables. I have suppressed the time subscripts from the variables inside the expectation operator, with the understanding that any variables inside the operator (such as H and x) are contemporaneous with each other (i.e., Ht and xt ). I will show later that Ψ(λ) helps determine the term premium. Use Eq. (31) to rewrite Eq. (30) as E zλ 1 J (xt+1 , zt+1 , Ht+1 ; n, λ) = 1 − [A(λ)]n B(λ) −1 λ υ z H x zλt+1 t+1 t+1 t+1 × [1 − A(λ)] + 1 − [A(λ)]n−1 Ψ (λ) A(λ) . E zλ E xυ zλ H −1
(32)
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Now compute the objective unconditional expectations of both sides of Eq. (32) to obtain λ 1 − [A(λ)]n−1 E z . (33) E{J (xt+1 , zt+1 , Ht+1 ; n, λ)} = 1 + A(λ) [Ψ (λ) − 1] B(λ) 1 − [A(λ)]n
The expectation of K(xt , Ht ) is calculated directly from the definition in Eq. (27) to obtain E{K(xt , Ht )} ≡ E x−υ H .
(34)
Finally, calculate the expected value of Rt+1 (n, λ) in Eq. (25) using the independence of J (xt+1 , zt+1 , Ht+1 ; n, λ) and K(xt , Ht ) and Eqs. (33) and (34) to obtain λ 1 − [A(λ)]n−1 E z E x−υ H . E{Rt+1 (n, λ)} = 1 + A(λ) [Ψ (λ) − 1] B(λ) 1 − [A(λ)]n
(35)
Equation (35) gives the unconditional expected rate of return on a canonical asset with arbitary λ and arbitrary n, provided that a0 = . . . = an−1 = 1. This expression simplifies considerably for one-period canonical assets. With n = 1, E zλ E x−υ H . E{Rt+1 (1, λ)} = B(λ)
(36)
The expected rates of return in Eqs. (35) and (36) are expectations based on the objective distributions of equilibrium rates of return. In the case in which subjective distributions differ from objective distributions, the subjective distributions guide behavior, and equilibrium rates of return depend on subjective distributions. However, in a long time series of observations on equilibrium rates of return, the sample average will correspond to the objective expectations of these rates of return (which depend on subjective distributions through A(λ), B(λ), and Ψ (λ) in Eqs. (20), (21), and (31), respectively) as in Eqs. (35) and (36). I will use these equations to calculate risk, term, and equity premia, which I will define in Section 3.
3. RISK, TERM, AND EQUITY PREMIA I will define the risk premium for the set of canonical assets with a given value of λ as the excess of the expected rate of return on the one-period version of the canonical
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Chapter 4 • Equity Premia with Benchmark Levels of Consumption: Closed-Form Results
asset with that value of λ relative to the rate of return on a one-period riskless bill. Specifically, I will define the unconditional risk premium RP (λ) as RP (λ) ≡
E{Rt+1 (1, λ)} − 1. E{Rt+1 (1, 0)}
(37)
Use the expression for the expected rate of return on one-period canonical assets from Eq. (36) to rewrite the risk premium in Eq. (37) as RP (λ) =
B(0) λ E z − 1. B(λ)
(38)
Equation (38) can be rewritten by using the definition of B(λ) in Eq. (21) to obtain E ∗ x−η H E zλ RP (λ) = − 1. E ∗ x−η Hzλ
(39)
To interpret the sources of the risk premium in Eq. (39), rewrite this equation as E ∗ x−η H E ∗ zλ E zλ 1 + RP (λ) = × . E ∗ x−η Hzλ E ∗ zλ
(40)
This risk premium—more precisely, 1 + RP (λ)—is the product of two ratios on the right-hand side of Eq. (40). The first ratio differs from one to the extent that there is a nonzero subjective covariance between the risky payoff in period t + 1, zλt+1 , and the part −η of the pricing kernel in Eq. (10) that is unpredictable one period in advance, xt+1 Ht+1 . If −η λ zt+1 is (subjectively) uncorrelated with xt+1 Ht+1 , this component of 1 + RP (λ) equals one, and thus it does not contribute to the risk premium. If zλt+1 is negatively correlated −η with xt+1 Ht+1 under the subjective distribution, so that the risky payoff is high when the marginal utility of consumption is low, then the risk premium is positive. Under rational expectations, the second ratio on the right-hand side of Eq. (40) equals one, and this term does not contribute to the risk premium. However, if the representative consumer is pessimistic, in the sense that the subjective expectation E ∗ zλ is less λ than the objective expectation E z , this ratio exceeds one, which contributes to a positive risk premium. Pessimistic consumers will underprice the risky asset, leading to an increase in the realized rate of return on this asset. Equivalently, with E zλ > E ∗ zλ , the realized rate of return on the risky asset is higher than the representative consumer expects. For any given value of λ, I will define the term premium as the excess of the expected rate of return on a security with maturity n > 1 relative to the expected rate of return
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on a security with the same value of λ and with a maturity of one period. Specifically, I will define the unconditional term premium T P (n, λ) as T P (n, λ) ≡
E{Rt+1 (n, λ)} − 1. E{Rt+1 (1, λ)}
(41)
Substituting the expected rate of return on the canonical asset from Eq. (35) into the definition of the term premium in Eq. (41) and using Eq. (36) yields T P (n, λ) = A(λ) [Ψ (λ) − 1]
1 − [A(λ)]n−1 . 1 − [A(λ)]n
(42)
The sign of the term premium is the same as the sign of Ψ (λ) − 1. The magnitude of the term premium is increasing in maturity n. For an infinite-maturity asset, such as a stock or a consol, the term premium is computed by taking the limit as n → ∞ to obtain T P (∞, λ) = A(λ) [Ψ (λ) − 1] .
(43)
I will define the equity premium as the excess of the expected rate of return on the canonical asset with n = ∞ and λ ≥ 1 relative to the rate of return on a one-period riskless bill (n = 1, λ = 0). Specifically, I will define the unconditional equity premium EP (λ) as EP (λ) ≡
E{Rt+1 (∞, λ)} − 1. E{Rt+1 (1, 0)}
(44)
The definitions of the risk premium in Eq. (37) and the term premium in Eq. (41) imply that EP (λ) = (1 + RP (λ)) (1 + T P (∞, λ)) − 1.
(45)
Substitute the risk premium from Eq. (39) and the term premium from Eq. (43) into Eq. (45) to obtain E ∗ x−η H E zλ EP (λ) = [1 − A(λ) + Ψ (λ) A(λ)] − 1. E ∗ x−η Hzλ
(46)
I have defined the risk, term, and equity premia as ratios of unconditional expectations of rates of return on various assets. The values of these premia would be unchanged if they were defined as ratios of conditional expectations of the same rates of return.
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Chapter 4 • Equity Premia with Benchmark Levels of Consumption: Closed-Form Results
Specifically, Eq. (25) and the fact that (xt , zt , Ht ) is i.i.d. over time imply that for any two canonical assets characterized by (n1 , λ1 ) and (n2 , λ2 ), respectively, Et {Rt+1 (n1 , λ1 )} Et {J (xt+1 , zt+1 , Ht+1 ; n1 , λ1 )} E{Rt+1 (n1 , λ1 )} = = . Et {Rt+1 (n2 , λ2 )} Et {J (xt+1 , zt+1 , Ht+1 ; n2 , λ2 )} E{Rt+1 (n2 , λ2 )}
(47)
Thus, for instance, the conditional equity premium, Et {Rt+1 (∞, λ)}/Et {Rt+1 (1, 0)} − 1, equals the unconditional equity premium defined in Eq. (44). Similarly, the conditional risk and term premia equal the respective unconditional risk and term premia defined in Eqs. (37) and (41).
4. LOG-NORMALITY Suppose that the objective of the vector (ln x, ln z) is N (μ, Σ) where μ = 2 distribution σx σxz (μx , μz ) and Σ = . It is straightforward to show that for constants a, b, σxz σz2 and λ, E{xa } E zλ = exp (a − b) μx + 0.5 a2 − b2 σx2 − bλσxz b λ E xz
(48)
E xa zλ E xb zλ = exp −abσx2 . a+b λ λ E x z E z
(49)
and
∗ ∗ Suppose that the subjective distribution of the vector (ln x, ln z) is N (μ , Σ ), ∗2 ∗ σx σxz
. Let θx ≡ μ∗x − μx and θz ≡ μ∗z − μz , so where μ∗ = μ∗x , μ∗z and Σ∗ = ∗ σxz σz∗2
θ ≡ θx θz is the amount by which the mean of the subjective distribution, μ∗ , Ωxx Ωxz ≡ Ω ≡ Σ∗ − Σ exceeds the mean of the objective distribution, μ. Let Ωxz Ωzz be the amount by which the variance-covariance matrix of the subjective distribution exceeds that of the objective distribution. It is straightforward to show that
E ∗ xa zλ = exp a a λ E x z
λ θ + 0.5 a
a λ Ω . λ
(50)
I will use Eqs. (48), (49), and (50) to derive simple expressions for the risk, term, and equity premia under log-normality.
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5. RISK, TERM, AND EQUITY PREMIA UNDER LOG-NORMALITY WITH CONSUMPTION EXTERNALITIES AND WITHOUT HABIT FORMATION Equation (35) is an analytic expression for the unconditional objective expectation of the rate of return on the canonical asset for arbitrary n and λ. Given the values of various moments of the objective and subjective distributions of the exogenous stochastic variables xt , zt , and Ht , it is a simple matter to compute A(λ), B(λ), and Ψ(λ) (from Eqs. (20), (21), and (31), respectively) and substitute the values into Eq. (35) to obtain the unconditional objective expectation of the rate of return on the canonical asset. Similarly, it is a simple matter to compute the risk premium RP (λ) in Eq. (39) and the term premium T P (∞, λ) in Eq. (43). In order to derive easily interpreted expressions for the expected rate of return, the risk premium, the term premium, and the equity premium expressed as functions of the parameters of the distributions of the exogenous stochastic variables, henceforth I will restrict attention to cases in which (1) the exogenous growth rates xt and zt are jointly log-normal (and, as before, i.i.d. over time) and (2) D = 0, so that preferences do not depend on the individual’s own lagged consumption, though, of course, they may depend on current or lagged aggregate consumption. With D = 0, we have Ht ≡ 1. To calculate the risk premium under log-normality with D = 0, rearrange Eq. (39) and set H ≡ 1 to obtain E x−η E zλ E ∗ x−η E x−η zλ (51) RP (λ) = − 1. E{x−η } E ∗ x−η zλ E x−η zλ Now use Eqs. (48) and (50) to calculate the ratios of moments in Eq. (51) to obtain RP (λ) = exp ηλσxz − λθz + ηλΩxz − 0.5λ2 Ωzz − 1.
(52)
As a step toward calculating the term premium, I will calculate Ψ(λ) under lognormality and the assumption that D = 0. Substitute A(λ) from Eq. (20) and B(λ) from Eq. (21) into the expression for Ψ(λ) in Eq. (31), and use the fact that Ht ≡ 1 when D = 0 to obtain E xυ−η zλ E ∗ x−η zλ E xυ zλ E x−η zλ (53) Ψ(λ) = × × . E zλ E xυ−η zλ E ∗ xυ−η zλ E x−η zλ The expression for Ψ(λ) in Eq. (53) is the product of three factors. The first factor is a ratio in which the numerator is the product of two expectations and the denominator is the product of two expectations. If the variables x and z were deterministic, the numerator and the denominator of this ratio would be equal and this factor would equal one. The second factor is the ratio of the objective expectation of a random variable to the subjective expectation of the same variable. The third factor is the ratio of the subjective expectation of a different random variable to the objective expectation of that variable.
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Under rational expectations, in which the subjective expectations of variables equal the objective expectations of those variables, the second and third factors are both equal to one. Under the assumption of log-normality, the first factor on the right-hand side of Eq. (53) can be calculated using Eq. (49) and the second and third factors on the right-hand side of Eq. (53) can be calculated using Eq. (50) to obtain Ψ(λ) = exp υησx2 − υθx + υ[η − 0.5υ] Ωxx − υλΩxz .
(54)
Ψ(λ) is one component of the term premium in Eq. (43). The other component of the term premium is A(λ), which is defined in Eq. (20). Under log-normality, A(λ) is given by A(λ) = β exp (υ −
η) μ∗x
+
λμ∗z
+ 0.5 υ − η
λ Σ
∗
υ−η λ
.
(55)
Note that under log-normality with D = 0, so that Ht ≡ 1, the definition of B(λ) in Eq. (21) implies that ∗ B(λ) = β exp −ημ∗x + λμ∗z + 0.5 η2 σx∗2 + λ2 σz∗2 − 2ηλσxz .
(56)
Substituting Ψ(λ) from Eq. (54) into the expression for the term premium in Eq. (43) gives a closed-form expression for the term premium of an infinite-maturity canonical asset in terms of the parameters of the subjective and objective log-normal distributions, T P (∞, λ) = A(λ) exp υησx2 − υθx + υ [η − 0.5υ] Ωxx − υλΩxz − 1 ,
(57)
where A(λ) is given by Eq. (55). Under rational expectations, θ = 0 and Ω = 0, so the term premium is simply T P (∞, λ) = A(λ) exp υησx2 − 1 , which has the same sign as υησx2 . Since ησx2 > 0, the term premium has the same sign as υ. Under standard time-separable preferences, γ = 0 so that υ = 0 and the term premium is zero. With a benchmark level of consumption, γ > 0, so that υ and the term premium have the same sign as α − 1, which can be positive, zero, or negative. To compute the equity premium under log-normality without habit formation, i.e., with D = 0, set Ht ≡ 1 and apply Eqs. (48) and (50) to Eq. (46) to obtain EP (λ) = [1 − A(λ) + Ψ(λ) A(λ)] exp ηλσxz − λθz + ηλΩxz − 0.5λ2 Ωzz − 1, (58) where A(λ) is given by Eq. (55) and Ψ(λ) is given by Eq. (54).
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6. LINEAR APPROXIMATIONS TO RISK, TERM, AND EQUITY PREMIA I have derived exact expressions for the risk premium, term premium, and equity premium under log-normality and D = 0. These expressions are very easy to implement, but they are cumbersome to interpret. To understand the effects of various parameters on these premia, I will linearize the exact expressions as functions of the parameters. Specifically, I will treat each of these premia as functions of β, μ, Σ, θ, Ω, and I will linearize each of these premia around β = 1, μ = θ = 0, and Σ = Ω = 0. Define φ ≡ β, μx , μz , σx2 , σxz , σz2 , θx , θz , Ωxx , Ωxz , Ωzz as a vector containing the effective discount factor β, the parameters of the objective log-normal distribution, and the difference between the parameter values of the subjective and objective lognormal distributions. Let φ0 = (1, 0, . . . , 0) be the value of φ around which I linearize the risk premium, term premium, and equity premium. Equations (54), (55), and (56) imply that Ψ(λ; φ0 ) = A(λ; φ0 ) = B(λ; φ0 ) = 1.
(59)
Linearizing the risk premium in Eq. (52) yields RP (λ) ∼ = ηλσxz − λθz + ηλΩxz − 0.5λ2 Ωzz .
(60)
Under rational expectations, θ = 0 and Ω = 0, and the linearized risk premium is simply ηλσxz , which is (up to a logarithmic approximation) the negative of the conditional −η covariance of the pricing kernel (in which xt+1 is unpredictable one period in advance) λ and the growth rate, zt+1 , of the risky payoff. I will indicate that the term premium on an infinite-maturity canonical asset depends on the parameter vector φ by rewriting Eq. (43) as T P (∞, λ; φ) = (Ψ(λ; φ) − 1) A(λ; φ) .
(61)
Recall from Eq. (59) that Ψ(λ; φ0 ) = A(λ; φ0 ) = 1. Therefore, T P (∞, λ; φ0 ) = 0, and the first-order linear approximation of the term premium is ∂Ψ(λ; φ0 ) (φ − φ0 ) . T P (∞, λ; φ) ∼ = ∂φ
(62)
Linearizing the expression for Ψ(λ) in Eq. (54) yields the following linear approximation to the term premium on an infinite-maturity asset: T P (∞, λ; φ) ∼ = υησx2 − υθx + υ [η − 0.5υ] Ωxx − υλΩxz .
(63)
Under rational expectations, θ = 0 and Ω = 0, so the linearized term premium is simply υησx2 .
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Equation (45) implies that the linear approximation to the equity premium is the sum of the linear approximations to the risk premium and to the term premium on an infinite-maturity asset. Therefore, Eqs. (60) and (63) imply EP (λ) ∼ = ηλσxz + υησx2 − υθx − λθz + υ(η − 0.5υ) Ωxx + (η − υ) λΩxz − 0.5λ2 Ωzz .
(64)
Under rational expectations, θ = 0 and Ω = 0, so the linearized equity premium is simply ηλσxz + υησx2 .
7. SECOND MOMENTS In this section I calculate the variances of the conditional and unconditional objective distributions of the rate of return on the canonical asset under log-normality and without habit formation, so that D = 0. Since Ht ≡ 1 when D = 0, Eq. (25) implies Rt+1 (n, λ) = J (xt+1 , zt+1 , 1; n, λ) K(xt , 1).
(65)
The objective variance of Rt+1 (n, λ) conditional on information available at date t is Vart {Rt+1 (n, λ)} = [K(xt , 1)]2 Var{J (xt+1 , zt+1 , 1; n, λ)}.
(66)
The variance of J (xt+1 , zt+1 , 1; n, λ) on the right-hand side of Eq. (66) is an unconditional variance because J (xt+1 , zt+1 , 1; n, λ) is i.i.d., so its conditional and unconditional variances are identical. I will confine attention to two special cases of Eq. (66), corresponding to riskless one-period bills and to equity. In the case of riskless one-period bills, n = 1 and λ = 0, so Eq. (32) reveals that J (xt+1 , zt+1 , 1; 1, 0) is constant. Thus, the conditional variance of the riskless one-period return is zero. Indeed, this conditional variance must be zero in order for the bill to be (conditionally) riskless. In the case of equity, n = ∞ and the conditional variance of the rate of return depends on the (unconditional) variance of J (xt+1 , zt+1 , 1; ∞, λ), since Ht ≡ 1 when there is no habit formation (i.e., when D = 0). Setting n = ∞ and Ht = 1 in Eq. (32) yields E zλ zλt+1 xυt+1 zλt+1 (1 − A(λ)) + Ψ(λ) A(λ) J (xt+1 , zt+1 , 1; ∞, λ) = . (67) B(λ) E zλ E xυ zλ Therefore, E {J (xt+1 , zt+1 , 1; ∞, λ)} =
E zλ B(λ)
[1 − A(λ) + Ψ(λ) A(λ)] ,
(68)
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which is consistent with Eq. (33) with n = ∞. Use the facts that ⎧ 2 ⎫ ⎬ ⎨ λ z = exp λ2 σz2 , E ⎭ ⎩ E zλ ⎧ ⎨ E
υ λ
xz ⎩ E xυ zλ
and
E
zλ E zλ
2 ⎫ ⎬
⎭
= exp υ 2 σx2 + λ2 σz2 + 2υλσxz ,
xυ zλ E xυ zλ
= exp λ2 σz2 + υλσxz
along with Eq. (67) to obtain E [J (xt+1 , zt+1 , 1; ∞, λ)]2 ⎤ ⎡ 2 (1 − A(λ))2 exp λ2 σz2 λ E z ⎥ ⎢ 2 = ⎣ + [Ψ (λ) A(λ)] exp λ2 σz2 + υ 2 σx2 + 2υλσxz ⎦. B(λ) + 2 (1 − A(λ)) Ψ (λ) A(λ) exp λ2 σz2 + υλσxz
(69)
(70)
(71)
(72)
Use Eqs. (68) and (72) along with the fact that Var{u} = E u2 − [E{u}]2 to obtain Var{J (xt+1 , zt+1 , 1; ∞, λ)} =
2 E zλ B(λ)
V (λ) ,
(73)
where V (λ) ≡ (1 − A(λ))2 exp λ2 σz2 − 1 + [Ψ (λ) A(λ)]2 exp λ2 σz2 + υ 2 σx2 + 2υλσxz − 1 + 2(1 − A(λ)) Ψ(λ) A(λ) exp λ2 σz2 + υλσxz − 1 .
(74)
imply that the Therefore, Eqs. (66) and (73) and the fact that K(xt , 1) = x−υ t conditional variance of the rate of return on an infinite-maturity asset, such as equity, is 2 E zλ −υ V (λ). (75) Vart {Rt+1 (∞, λ)} = x B(λ) t In order to calculate the unconditional variance of the rate of return on the canonical asset in Eq. (25), I will use the following identity for independent random variables K
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Chapter 4 • Equity Premia with Benchmark Levels of Consumption: Closed-Form Results
(which is abbreviated notation for K(xt , Ht ) in Eq. (27)) and J (which is abbreviated notation for J (xt+1 , zt+1 , Ht+1 ; n, λ) in Eq. (26)): Var{K × J } = E K 2 E J 2 − [E{K}]2 [E{J }]2.
(76)
Rearrange Eq. (76) and use the fact that Rt+1 (∞, λ) = K × J to obtain Var{Rt+1 (∞, λ)} = Var{K} Var{J } + [E{K}]2 Var{J } + [E{J }]2 Var{K}.
(77)
Equation (27) implies that when D = 0, K(xt , Ht ) = x−υ t , which is i.i.d. Under lognormality with D = 0, E{K(xt , 1)} = exp −υμx + 0.5υ 2 σx2
(78)
Var{K(xt , 1)} = exp υ 2 σx2 − 1 exp −2υμx + υ 2 σx2 .
(79)
and
To summarize, the objective unconditional variance of the rate of return on equity under log-normality with D = 0 is given by Eq. (77), where E{K} is given by Eq. (78), Var{K} is given by Eq. (79), E{J } is given by Eq. (68), and Var{J } is given by Eq. (73). For riskless one-period bills (n = 1, λ = 0), the unconditional variance is particularly simple. Equation (22) together with a0 = 1 implies ω(1, 0) = B(0), so that Eq. (24) implies Rt+1 (1, 0) =
1 −υ x B(0) t
(80)
when D = 0, so that Ht ≡ 1. Therefore, the unconditional variance of the rate of return on the one-period riskless asset is Var{Rt+1 (1, 0)} = [B(0)]−2 exp υ 2 σx2 − 1 exp −2υμx + υ 2 σx2 .
(81)
7.1. Linear Approximations to Second Moments I will linearize the conditional and unconditional variances of the rate of return on the canonical asset around the point φ = φ0 , where, as in Section 6, φ ≡ (β, μx , μz , σx2 , σxz , σz2 , θx , θz , Ωxx , Ωxz , Ωzz and φ0 = (1, 0, . . . , 0). For infinite-maturity
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assets, such as stocks or consols, the linear approximation to the conditional variance is obtained by first linearizing Var{J (xt+1 , zt+1 , 1; ∞, λ)} in Eq. (73), using Eq. (59), to obtain ' } ≡ υ 2 σx2 + λ2 σz2 + 2υλσxz . Var{J (xt+1 , zt+1 , 1; ∞, λ)} ∼ = Var{J
(82)
Substituting Eq. (82) into Eq. (66) and using the fact that K(xt , 1) = x−υ t yields the linearized conditional variance 2 2 υ σx + λ2 σz2 + 2υλσxz . Vart {Rt+1 (∞, λ)} ∼ = x−2υ t
(83)
As a step toward linearizing the unconditional variance of the return on an infinitematurity canonical asset, observe from Eq. (78) that E{K(xt , 1; φ0 )} = 1.
(84)
Using Eq. (59), Eq. (68) implies that E{J (xt+1 , zt+1 , 1; ∞, λ; φ0 )} = 1.
(85)
Equations (73) and (79) imply that Var{J (xt+1 , zt+1 , 1; ∞, λ; φ0 )} = Var{K(xt , 1; φ0 )} = 0.
(86)
Linearizing Eq. (77) around φ = φ0 , and using Eqs. (84), (85), and (86) yields ' } + Var{K}, ' Var{Rt+1 (∞, λ)} ∼ = Var{J
(87)
' } is the linearized variance of J (xt+1 , zt+1 , 1; ∞, λ) in Eq. (82), and where Var{J ' Var{K} ≡ υ 2 σx2 is the linearized variance of K(xt , 1), obtained by linearizing Eq. (79). Therefore, Var{Rt+1 (∞, λ)} ∼ = 2υ 2 σx2 + λ2 σz2 + 2υλσxz .
(88)
The linearized unconditional variance of the one-period riskless rate is calculated by linearizing Eq. (81) to obtain Var{Rt+1 (1, 0)} ∼ = υ 2 σx2 .
(89)
Notice that the linearized variances (conditional and unconditional) of the riskless rate and the rate of return on equity depend on the moments of the objective distributions,
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but do not depend on any deviation of the moments of the subjective distributions from the corresponding moments of the objective distributions. Of course, the linearizations are expansions around φ = φ0 where the means and second moments of the objective and subjective distributions are both equal to zero.
8. CORRELATION OF DIVIDEND-PRICE RATIO AND THE RATE OF RETURN ON STOCK Let ϕt (λ) ≡ ytλ /pt (∞, λ) be the dividend-price ratio of an infinite-maturity asset, such as equity, for which aj = 1 for all j. Equation (18), the limit as n → ∞ of Eq. (28), and the definition of K(xt , Ht ) in Eq. (27) imply ϕt (λ) =
1 − A(λ) K(xt , Ht ). B(λ)
(90)
Recall from Eq. (25) that, with n = ∞, the rate of return on stock is Rt+1 (∞, λ) = J (xt+1 , zt+1 , Ht+1 ; ∞, λ) K(xt , Ht ), where J (xt+1 , zt+1 , Ht+1 ; ∞, λ) and K(xt , Ht ) are independent of each other. To the extent that K(xt , Ht ) exhibits variation, the dividend-price ratio will vary, and this variation will help predict the rate of return on stock. To measure the correlation between the dividend-price ratio and the rate of return on stock, I will use the following lemma. Lemma 1 Let X and Y be independent random variables and let a = 0 be an arbitrary constant. Let νX ≡ Var {X}/[E{X}]2 be the square of the coefficient of variation of X and let νY ≡ Var {Y }/[E{Y }]2 be the square of the coefficient of variation of Y . Then the square of the correlation of aX and XY is R2 = νX /(νX νY + νX + νY ). 2 Proof. R2 = E aX 2 Y − E{aX} E{XY } / (Var {aX} Var {XY }). Since X and Y are independent, R2 = [E{Y }]2 [Var {X}]2 / (Var {X} Var {XY }) = [E{Y }]2 Var {X}/ Var {XY }. Use the identity for independent variables in Eq. (77) to obtain an expres2 2 sion for Var {XY }, and rewrite R2 as R = [E{Y }] Var {X}/ (Var {X} Var {Y } + 2 2 [E{Y }] Var {X} + [E{X}] Var {Y } . Divide the numerator and denominator by [E{X}]2 [E{Y }]2 and use the definition of the coefficient of variation to obtain R2 = νX / (νX νY + νX + νY ). Let νK be the square of the coefficient of variation of K(xt , Ht ) and νJ be the square of the coefficient of variation of J (xt+1 , zt+1 , Ht+1 ; ∞, λ). Applying Lemma 1 A(λ) with X = K(xt , Ht ), Y = J (xt+1 , zt+1 , Ht+1 ; ∞, λ), and a = 1 −B(λ) , so that ϕt (λ) = aX and Rt+1 (∞, λ) = XY , the R2 of a regression of the rate of return on equity on the dividend-price ratio is R2 =
νK . νK νJ + νK + νJ
(91)
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The expression for R2 in Eq. (91) is an exact expression and holds for the case with habit formation (so that Ht is endogenous) as well as for the case in which Ht ≡ 1. Now, as in Sections 5, 6, and 7, I will confine attention to the case with log-normality and without habit formation so that Ht ≡ 1. When Ht ≡ 1, K(xt , Ht ) = x−υ t , so that under log-normality, the squared coefficient of variation of K(xt , Ht ) is νK = exp υ 2 σx2 − 1.
(92)
Substituting Eq. (92) into Eq. (91) yields 2 2 exp υ σx − 1 . R2 = (νJ + 1) exp υ 2 σx2 − 1
(93)
In the case of standard preferences without a benchmark level of consumption, γ = 0, which implies that υ = 0, so that R2 in Eq. (93) is zero. That is, the dividend-price ratio has no predictive power for the risky rate of return in the case with standard preferences. However, the introduction of a benchmark level of consumption allows υ to differ from zero and thus enables the dividend-price ratio to predict the rate of return on stock. Now use the expression for the mean of J (xt+1 , zt+1 , 1; ∞, λ) in Eq. (68) and the variance of J (xt+1 , zt+1 , 1; ∞, λ) in Eqs. (73) and (74) to obtain (νJ + 1) exp υ 2 σx2 =
Υ(λ) [1 − A(λ) + Ψ(λ) A(λ)]2
,
(94)
where Υ(λ) ≡ (1 − A(λ))2 exp υ 2 σx2 + λ2 σz2 + [Ψ(λ) A(λ)]2 exp λ2 σz2 + 2υ 2 σx2 + 2υλσxz + 2 (1 − A(λ)) Ψ (λ) A(λ) exp υ 2 σx2 + λ2 σz2 + υλσxz .
(95)
Finally, substitute Eq. (95) into Eq. (93) and multiply the numerator and denominator of the resulting expression by [1 − A(λ) + Ψ(λ) A(λ)]2 to obtain R = 2
[1 − A(λ) + Ψ(λ) A(λ)]2 exp υ 2 σx2 − 1 Υ (λ) − [1 − A (λ) + Ψ (λ) A (λ)]2
.
(96)
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I will approximate R2 around φ = φ0 by taking the ratio of the linearized numerator of Eq. (96) to the linearized denominator of Eq. (96) to obtain8 R2 ∼ =
υ 2 σx2 λ2 σz2 + 2υ 2 σx2 + 2υλσxz
(97)
.
As with the approximate variances of the riskless rate and the rate of return on equity, the approximate value of R2 in Eq. (97) depends on the objective moments of the distribution of (xt , zt ) but does not depend on the subjective moments of the distribution of (xt , zt ).
8.1. Correlation of Dividend-Price Ratio and the Excess Rate of Return on Stock I have shown that the dividend-price ratio at time t can be used to predict the rate of return on stock from period t to period t + 1. The ability to forecast the rate of return on stock in this model does not reflect any ability to forecast dividend growth because dividend growth, zλt+1 , is i.i.d. Instead, the predictability of the rate of return on stock is the direct result of the predictability of the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution in the case in which υ = 0. The predictable component of the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution is captured by K(xt , Ht ) ≡ x−υ t Ht . Since, as shown in Eq. (90), the dividend-price ratio is proportional to K(xt , Ht ), and since, as shown in Eq. (25), the rate of return on the canonical asset is proportional to K(xt , Ht ), variation in K(xt , Ht ) allows the dividend-price ratio to predict the rate of return on any asset that is a special case of the canonical asset. For instance, the dividend-price ratio can predict the rate of return on stock and the rate of return on one-period riskless bills. However, the dividendprice ratio cannot predict the excess rate of return on stock relative to one-period riskless bills, when the excess rate of return is defined as the ratio of the gross rates of return on
8 Rewrite
Eq. (96) as R2 =
where
2 RN 2 RD
,
2 RN = [1 − A(λ) + Ψ (λ) A(λ)]2 exp υ 2 σx2 − 1
is the numerator of R2 and 2 RD = Υ (λ) − [1 − A(λ) + Ψ (λ) A(λ)]2 2 2 2 is the denominator of R2 . When φ = φ0 , RN = 0 and RD = 0. Linearizing RN around φ = φ0 yields 2 ∼ 2 2 2 2 ∼ ( RN = υ σx and linearizing RD around φ = φ0 yields RD 2Ψ + 2A( + λ2 σz2 + 2υ 2 σx2 + 2υλσxz − 2A( − =
( + A( , where Ψ ( is the linearized value of Ψ (λ) and A( is the linearized value of A(λ). There2 −A( + Ψ 2 ∼ 2 2 2 2 fore, R = λ σ + 2υ σ + 2υλσxz . Taking the ratio of the approximate value of R2 to the approximate D
z
x
2 value of RD yields Eq. (97) in the text.
N
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Andrew B. Abel
the two assets. Specifically, using Eq. (25), the excess rate of return on stocks, expressed in ratio form, is J (xt+1 , zt+1 , Ht+1 ; ∞, λ) Rt+1 (∞, λ) = , Rt+1 (1, 0) J (xt+1 , zt+1 , Ht+1 ; 1, 0)
(98)
which is i.i.d., and hence is unpredictable. Indeed, the fact that the ratio of returns in Eq. (98) is i.i.d. accounts for the fact that conditional and unconditional premia are equal in this model. An alternative formulation of the excess rate of return is the arithmetic difference S ≡ between the rates of return on stocks and one-period riskless bills. Define Jt+1 b b S E J (xt+1 , zt+1 , Ht+1 ; ∞, λ), Jt+1 ≡ J (xt+1 , zt+1 , Ht+1 ; 1, 0), and Jt+1 ≡ Jt+1 − Jt+1 , so S × K (xt , Ht ), the rate of return on one-period that the rate of return on stock is Jt+1 b riskless bills is Jt+1 × K(xt , Ht ), and the arithmetic excess rate of return on stocks is E Rt+1 (∞, λ) − Rt+1 (1, 0) = Jt+1 × K (xt , Ht ).
(99)
The excess rate of return in Eq. (99) is proportional to K(xt , Ht ) and thus is predictable by the dividend-price ratio, which is also proportional to K(xt , Ht ). However, for empirically plausible values, the R2 of the regression of the arithmetic excess return in Eq. (99) on the dividend-price ratio is extremely small. Applying Eq. (91), the R2 of the regression of the arithmetic excess stock return on the dividend-price ratio is R2 =
νK νJ E
νK , + νK + νJ E
(100)
b E . Since Jt+1 ≡ where is νJ E is the square of the coefficient of variation of Jt+1 E S J (xt+1 , zt+1 , Ht+1 ; 1, 0) = a0 /ω(1, 0) is constant, Var Jt+1 = Var Jt+1 , so
νJ E
S Var Jt+1 = b 2 . S E Jt+1 − E Jt+1
(101)
Rearrange S the right-hand side of Eq. (101) using b the facts that E{Rt+1 (∞, λ)} = E Jt+1 E{K(xt , Ht )} and E{Rt+1 (1, 0)} = E Jt+1 E{K(xt , Ht )} to obtain νJ E = νJ S Q, where Q ≡
E{Rt+1(∞, λ)} E{Rt+1(∞, λ)} − E{Rt+1(1, 0)}
(102)
2 and νJ S is the squared coefficient of variation of
S . Equations (100) and (102) and the fact that νK νJ E ≥ 0 imply that Jt+1
R2 ≤
νK 1 = . ν S νK + νJ E 1 + νJK Q
(103)
To get a sense of the size of the upper bound on R2 on the right-hand side of Eq. (103), consider an average (gross) rate of return on stocks, E{Rt+1 (∞, λ)}, of 1.0698 per year
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and an average equity premium, E{Rt+1 (∞, λ)} − E{Rt+1 (1, 0)}, of 0.0618 per year, as in Mehra and Prescott (1985). In this case, Q = 300. Empirically, the ratio νJ S /νK is greater than one. If νJ S /νK were as low as one, the upper bound on R2 would be 1/(1 + 300) = 0.003. In calibrations reported later in this chapter, νJ S /νK is greater than 5, so the upper bound on R2 is smaller than 1/(1 + 1500) = 0.00067.
9. SPECIAL CASES In this section, I will examine the characteristics of rates of return in various special cases. I will adopt the normalization that the variance of ln z equals the variance of ln x, i.e., that σz ≡ σx . With this normalization, λ captures any difference in the standard deviations of the “un-normalized” values of ln z and ln x. Also, with this normalization, the covariance σxz = ρσx2 , where −1 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 is the correlation of ln x and ln z.
9.1. Rational Expectations Under rational expectations (RE), subjective distributions are identical to the corresponding objective distributions, so that θ = 0 and Ω = 0. In this case, the approximate equity premium in Eq. (64) simplifies to EP (λ) ∼ = (λρ + υ) ησx2 ,
under RE,
(104)
which is the sum of the approximate risk premium from Eq. (60) RP (λ) ∼ = λρησx2 ,
under RE,
(105)
and the approximate term premium from Eq. (63) T P (∞, λ) ∼ = υησx2 ,
under RE.
(106)
The approximate unconditional variance of the rate of return on equity in Eq. (88) simplifies to Var{Rt+1 (∞, λ)} ∼ under RE. (107) = 2υ 2 + λ2 + 2υλρ σx2 , The approximate unconditional variance of the one-period riskless rate under rational expectations is the same as in Eq. (89). Finally, the approximate value of R2 in Eq. (97) simplifies to R2 ∼ =
υ2 , λ2 + 2υ 2 + 2υλρ
under RE.
(108)
The value of R2 in Eq. (108) applies to a regression of the equity rate of return (rather than the excess equity rate of return) on the dividend-price ratio. As emphasized in subsection 8.1, excess returns are not predictable in the model presented here, so the
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model cannot account for the empirically observed predictability of excess returns. Nevertheless, the model can account for predictability of equity returns, and in the calculations throughout this section I will focus on the R2 of the regressions of the equity rate of return on the dividend-price ratio.
9.1.1. Perfectly Correlated ln x and ln z In the original Lucas (1978) model of asset pricing in an exchange economy, equilibrium consumption per capita, Ct , is identically equal to the dividend per capita on risky stock, ytλ . In the current framework, the identity of consumption per capita and dividend per capita is represented by Ct ≡ yt and λ = 1. Because Ct ≡ yt , the growth rates of consumption and dividends are identically equal. That is, xt ≡ zt , so ρ = 1. In this subsection, I will maintain the assumption that ρ = 1, but I will allow λ to differ from one to take account of levered equity. In the remainder of this subsection on asset returns under rational expectations, I will examine values of the risk premium, term premium, equity premium, standard deviations of rates of return on one-period riskless bills and levered equity, and the R2 of regressions of the equity rate of return on the dividend-price ratio. Table 2 presents the approximate values of these six features of asset returns for five particular cases. The final column of Table 2, labeled “Data,” presents the empirical values of these features of the data. TABLE 2 Approximate Features of Rates of Return Standard
Consumption externalities
Data
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
υ
0
3.85
1.25
1.25
1.7
η
48.5
10
10
10
20
Leverage
Yes
Utility function
No
No
Yes
Yes
λ
1
1
3.6
3.6
3.6
ρ
1
1
1
0.2
0.2
6.18%
1.27%
4.59%
0.92%
1.84%
(6)
RP (λ)
λρησx2
T P (∞, λ)
υησx2
0
4.91%
1.59%
1.59%
4.33%
1.70%
EP (∞, λ)
(λρ + υ) ησ 2x
6.18%
6.18%
6.18%
2.51%
6.17%
6.18%
|υ| σx ) σx 2υ 2 +λ2 + 2υλρ
0
13.74%
4.46%
4.46%
6.07%
5.67%
3.57%
s.d.{Rriskless } s.d. Rrisky R2
υ2 λ2 + 2υ 2 + 2υλρ
0
22.11% 17.88% 15.10% 16.43% 16.54% 38.7%
6.2%
8.7%
13.6%
9%
Sources for data: Equity premium, standard deviations of riskless and risky rates from Mehra and Prescott (1985), Table 1. Term premium reported in Abel (1999) based on Ibbotson Associates (1994, Exhibit 9, p. 31). R2 from Fama and French (1988), Table 3.
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Chapter 4 • Equity Premia with Benchmark Levels of Consumption: Closed-Form Results
With ρ = 1, the approximate equity premium in Eq. (104) simplifies to EP (λ) ∼ = (λ + υ) ησx2 ,
under RE, if ρ = 1,
(109)
which is the sum of the approximate risk premium from Eq. (105) RP (λ) ∼ = λησx2 ,
under RE, if ρ = 1,
(110)
and the approximate term premium from Eq. (106), which is invariant to ρ. The expression for the approximate unconditional variance of the rate of return on equity in Eq. (107) simplifies to (111) Var{Rt+1 (∞, λ)} ∼ = (υ + λ)2 + υ 2 σx2 , under RE, if ρ = 1, and Eq. (108) implies that the R2 of a regression of the rate of return on equity, Rt+1 (∞, λ), on the dividend-price ratio, ϕt (λ), is approximately R2 ∼ =
υ2 (λ + υ)2 + υ 2
,
under RE, if ρ = 1.
(112)
Standard Utility Function and No Leverage With a standard utility function that does not include benchmark levels of consumption, γ = 0, which implies υ = 0 and η = α, where α is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. The seminal papers of Lucas (1978) and Mehra and Prescott (1985) analyze unlevered equity, which is represented here by the canonical asset with n = ∞ and λ = 1. In this case, the approximate equity premium in Eq. (109) simplifies to EP (λ) ∼ = ασx2 ,
under RE, if ρ = 1, γ = 0, and λ = 1.
(113)
In this case, since υ = 0, the term premium is zero, and the equity premium is composed entirely of the risk premium. Eq. (113) is the essence of the Mehra–Prescott equity premium puzzle. Over the time period examined by Mehra and Prescott, 1889–1978, the average value of the equity premium was 0.0618 per year and the annual standard deviation of the growth rate of consumption per capita, measured here by σx , was 0.0357. Thus, if the coefficient of relative risk aversion, α, equals 10, which is a very high value in the judgment of Mehra and Prescott, the equity premium would be only (10)(0.0357)2 = 0.0127, i.e., 1.27 percent per year. In order for the model to match the historical equity premium of 0.0618, the coefficient of relative risk aversion, α, would need to equal 0.0618/(0.0357)2 = 48.5, which is far higher than the upper bound of 10 imposed by Mehra and Prescott on the value of α.9 Note from Eq. (112) that with standard preferences, which imply υ = 0, the approximate value of R2 is zero. Indeed, when υ = 0, the exact expression for R2 in Eq. (96) is also equal to zero. Therefore, the dividend-price ratio cannot help predict the rate of 9 Kandel and Stambaugh (1991) provide a compelling challenge to arguments that the coefficient of relative risk aversion is no larger than 10.
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Andrew B. Abel
return on equity in a linear regression. In addition, with υ = 0, the rate of return on one-period riskless bills is constant, which is indicated by a value of zero for s.d.{Rriskless } in column 1 of Table 2. Consumption Externalities and No Leverage Consumption externalities, by allowing υ to be positive, can increase the equity premium associated with any given value of η, introduce variability in the one-period riskless rate of return and a positive term premium, and help account for the ability of the dividend-price ratio to predict equity returns, though as discussed in subsection 8.1, they cannot account for the predictability of excess returns. In the absence of leverage, λ = 1. Therefore, in this case, the approximate equity premium in Eq. (109) becomes EP (λ) ∼ = (1 + υ) ησx2 ,
under RE, if ρ = 1
and
λ = 1.
(114)
Thus, for given values of η and σx2 , the equity premium implied by the model increases by a factor 1 + υ. Therefore, the introduction of a positive υ allows the model to match the historical value of the equity premium with a smaller value of η. For instance, if η = 10 (which would arise if, for instance, α = 10 and θ0 = 0), the model will deliver (λ) an approximate equity premium equal to its historical average value if (1 + υ) = EP 10σx2 = 0.0618/ 10 (0.0357)2 = 4.85, or equivalently, if υ = 3.85, as in column 2 of Table 2. In Abel (1990), I suggested that this formulation of utility might help account for the historically observed equity premium, but I acknowledged that the implied variability of the riskless rate was far larger than the historical variability of the riskless rate. Equation (89) implies that the approximate standard deviation of the one-period riskless rate is |υ| σx , which equals (3.85)(0.0357) = 13.74 percent. However, the historical standard deviation of the riskless rate reported by Mehra and Prescott (1985) is only 5.67 percent per year. The fact that υ can differ from zero when utility depends on a benchmark level of consumption implies that benchmark utility introduces a term premium and also allows the dividend-price ratio to help predict the rate of return on equity. Substituting υ = 3.85 into Eq. (106) yields a term premium of (3.85)(10)(0.0357)2 = 0.0491, or 4.91 percent, which is much higher than the empirical value. For instance, in Abel (1999) I report, based on data from Ibbotson Associates (1994, Exhibit 9, p. 31), that over the period 1926–1993 the term premium on long-term government bonds relative to short-term riskless bills was about 170 basis points per year, or 0.0170. The term premium in the model is for infinite-maturity assets with risky payoffs, whereas the data applies to finite-maturity riskless claims. However, I have argued in Abel (1999) that these differences in maturity and risk may increase the term premium in the model, but by only a small fraction of one percent per year. Thus, the 491 basis point term premium produced by the model in this case is too high compared to the empirical term premium. Finally, substituting υ = 3.85 into Eq. (112), with λ = 1, shows that a linear regression of the rate of return on equity on the dividend-price ratio has an approximate R2 of 0.387, which is much higher than typical values of R2 in such regressions. For
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Chapter 4
•
Equity Premia with Benchmark Levels of Consumption: Closed-Form Results
instance, using annual real returns on the value-weighted NYSE portfolio, Fama and French (1988, Table 3) report R2 = 0.09 for the period 1941–1986. Thus, consumption externalities without leverage can account for the observed equity premium with a value of η = 10. However, the implied value of υ, 3.85, leads to too much variability in the one-period riskless rate of return, to too high a term premium, and to too high a value of R2 in a regression of the equity rate of return on the dividend-price ratio. The next challenge is to account for the observed value of the equity premium with a lower value of υ. Consumption Externalities with Leverage Adding leverage to the model with consumption externalities allows the model to match the historical equity premium with a lower value of υ. The lower value of υ reduces the variability of the riskless rate, the term premium, and the value of R2 in the model toward more realistic values. The standard deviation of the growth rate of dividends, zλt+1 , is approximately λ times the standard deviation of zt+1 . Since zt+1 ≡ xt+1 , the standard deviation of the growth rate of dividends is approximately λ times σx , the standard deviation of the growth rate of consumption. Using data from Table 2, p. 402, of Cecchetti, Lam, and Mark (1990), the standard deviation of dividend growth is 3.6 times the standard deviation of consumption growth, so I will set λ = 3.6. With λ = 3.6, the approximate equity premium in Eq. (109) will equal the historical value of 0.0618 with η = 10 and σx = 0.0357 if υ = 0.0618/ 10 (0.0357)2 − 3.6 = 1.25. Because the introduction of leverage permits a reduction in the value of υ, it also reduces the variability of the one-period riskless rate, the term premium, and the value of R2 . As shown in column 3 of Table 2, with υ = 1.25, the approximate standard deviation of the one-period riskless rate in Eq. (89) is (1.25) (0.0357) = 0.0446, which is much closer to its historical value of 5.67 percent, as reported by Mehra and Prescott (1985). Also, with υ = 1.25, the approximate term premium is (1.25)(10)(0.0357)2 = 0.0159, which is much closer to the empirical value of the term premium of 0.0170 mentioned earlier. With λ = 3.6 and υ = 1.25, Eq. (112) implies that the R2 of a regression of the rate of return on equity on the dividend-price ratio is approximately 0.062, which is more in line with the values reported by Fama and French (1988). Finally, from Eq. (111), the approximate unconditional standard deviation of the rate of return on equity when λ = 3.6 and υ = 1.25 is 0.1788, which is not far from the value of 16.54 percent reported by Mehra and Prescott (1985).
9.1.2. Imperfectly Correlated ln x and ln z I have shown that with η = 10, υ = 1.25, and λ = 3.6, the rational expectations solution of the model with ρ = 1 generates realistic values for five features of returns: the equity premium; the term premium; the unconditional standard deviation of the risky rate of return; the unconditional standard deviation of the riskless rate of return; and the R2 of the regression of the equity rate of return on the dividend-price ratio. However, with ρ = 1, consumption growth and dividend growth are perfectly correlated. I will show
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Andrew B. Abel
that reducing the value of ρ to a more realistic value reduces the ability of the model to match the equity premium, unless the value of η is allowed to be greater than 10. Campbell and Cochrane (1999) argue that the correlation between consumption growth and dividend growth is difficult to estimate accurately and ultimately settle on a value of 0.2 to use in their calculations. I will follow their lead and set ρ = 0.2. Since the equity premium under rational expectations approximately equals (λρ + υ) ησx2 , reducing the correlation ρ to 0.2 from 1.0 substantially reduces the equity premium when λ = 3.6 and υ = 1.25. In fact, when these values of ρ, λ, and υ are combined with η = 10 and σx = 0.0357, the approximate equity premium is only 0.0251, which is less than half of the historical average equity premium. As shown in column 4 of Table 2, the other four features of the returns implied by these parameter values are not as far from empirical values. Specifically, the approximate standard deviation of the rate of return on stocks is 0.1510, and the approximate R2 of the regression of the equity rate of return on the dividend-price ratio is 0.087. The approximate term premium and the approximate standard deviation of the riskless rate are invariant to the correlation ρ, and hence these features are the same in column 4 as in column 3. Doubling the value of the curvature parameter η to 20 and increasing the value of υ slightly to 1.7, while keeping λ = 3.6, ρ = 0.2, and σx = 0.0357, allows the model to match the empirical value of the equity premium and produces standard deviations of the riskless rate and the rate of return on equity that are close to their empirical values. Specifically, as shown in column 5 of Table 2, these parameter values lead to an equity premium of 0.0617, a standard deviation of the riskless rate of 0.0607, and a standard deviation of the rate of return on equity of 0.1643. However, these parameter values lead to a value of the term premium of 0.0433, which is too high compared to the data, and an R2 of 0.136, which is a bit high.
9.2. Distorted Beliefs In order to focus on the role of distorted beliefs on rates of return, I will restrict attention to the case in which xt ≡ zt , so that σx2 = σxz = σz2 . I assume that the subjective distributions take account of the fact that xt ≡ zt , so that θx = θz and Ωxx = Ωxz = Ωzz . In this case, the approximate equity premium in Eq. (64) simplifies to EP (λ) ∼ = (υ + λ) ησx2 − θx + [η − 0.5 (υ + λ)] Ωxx ,
if xt ≡ zt .
(115)
Note that υ + λ > 0 because υ > −1 (Eq. (8)) and λ ≥ 1. Although the distortion of beliefs, represented here by nonzero values of θx and Ωxx , affects the approximate equity premium, Eqs. (89), (88), and (97) show, as mentioned earlier, that the distortion of beliefs does not affect the approximate unconditional variances of the riskless and risky rates of return, nor does it affect the approximate R2 of a regression of the risky rate of return on the dividend-price ratio.
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9.2.1. Standard Utility Function and No Leverage In the case with standard utility (γ = 0, so υ = 0) and no leverage (λ = 1), the approximate equity premium in Eq. (115) simplifies to EP (1) ∼ = η σx2 + Ωxx − (θx + 0.5Ωxx ),
if xt ≡ zt , γ = 0, and λ = 1.
(116)
In Abel (2002), I used the term pessimism to describe a situation in which the subjective distribution of the growth rate is first-order stochastically dominated by the objective distribution of the growth rate. When the growth rate is log-normal, I measure the amount of pessimism about the growth rate by Δ1 , where Δ1 satisfies E ∗ {x} = e−Δ1 E{x}, which implies Δ1 = − (θx + 0.5Ωxx ) .
(117)
Substituting Eq. (117) into Eq. (116) yields EP (1) ∼ = η σx2 + Ωxx + Δ1 ,
if xt ≡ zt , γ = 0, and λ = 1.
(118)
It is evident from Eq. (118) that pessimism, measured by Δ1 , increases the equity premium. The economic reason for this effect is that pessimism reduces the price of the risky asset, which increases the rate of return to anyone who buys this asset. On average, the realized rate of return is higher than the amount required by consumers to compensate them for the risk of holding equity because the realized rate of return on equity is higher, on average, than consumers expect. Indeed, in the special case with standard utility (γ = 0) and no leverage (λ = 0), an increase in pessimism about the expected growth rate causes an equal-sized increase in the objective average equity premium. In Abel (2002), I used the term doubt to describe a situation in which the subjective distribution of the growth rate is a mean-preserving spread of the objective distribution of the growth rate. When the growth rate is log-normal, an increase in doubt is represented by an increase in Ωxx ≡ σx∗2 − σx2 , holding constant θx + 0.5Ωxx = −Δ1 . Equation (118) shows that an increase in doubt increases the equity premium. The economic reason is that an increase in doubt increases the perceived riskiness of equity and thus increases the equity premium that consumers require in order to hold equity.
9.2.2. Consumption Externalities with Leverage In the presence of consumption externalities and/or leverage, we can interpret the effects on the equity premium of distorted beliefs by generalizing the measure of pessimism. Instead of comparing subjective and objective distributions of the growth rate xt+1 , I will compare the subjective and objective distributions of xυ+λ t+1 (which, in the special case with standard utility (υ = 0) and no leverage (λ = 1), is simply the growth rate xt+1 ).
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Now when the growth rate is log-normal, I will the amount υ+λ υ+λ measure of pessimism about ∗ −Δυ+λ xυ+λ by Δ , where Δ satisfies E E x x = e , which implies υ+λ υ+λ t+1 Δυ+λ = − (υ + λ) θx − 0.5 (υ + λ)2 Ωxx .
(119)
Substituting Eq. (119) into Eq. (115) yields EP (λ) ∼ = (υ + λ) η σx2 + Ωxx + Δυ+λ ,
if xt ≡ zt ,
(120)
which has the same form and interpretation as Eq. (118). Again, an increase in pessimism Δυ+λ increases the equity premium, and an increase in doubt, represented as an increase in Ωxx holding Δυ+λ constant, increases the equity premium.
10. ACCURACY OF APPROXIMATIONS I have conducted the analysis in two distinct parts. First, I set up the model and derived exact solutions for the equilibrium price and expected rate of return on the canonical asset. Because the canonical asset is sufficiently general, I used it to calculate rates of return on various assets, including one-period riskless bills and infinite-horizon levered equity. To obtain closed-form expressions for these exact solutions, I restricted attention to the case without habit formation (but with consumption externalities including keeping/catching up with the Joneses) and with log-normally distributed growth rates of consumption and dividends. The second part of the analysis started with the exact solutions derived in the first part, and derived linear approximations to various moments of asset returns. The rationale for approximating these expressions was to help interpret closed-form solutions, in particular, to understand the effects of various parameters on the means and variances of returns. In Section 9.1, I examined some quantitative features of the model under rational expectations. For clarity, I used the approximate expressions for the moments of asset returns. In this section, I will briefly explore the accuracy of these approximations by comparing the values obtained by evaluating the approximate expressions with the values obtained by evaluating the corresponding exact expressions. Before comparing the approximate and exact solutions, I need to address an issue regarding the parameter values. As discussed in Section 1, the primitive specification of preferences includes seven parameters: the curvature paramater α, the rate of time preference δ, the importance of the consumption-benchmark ratio as measured by γ, the relative weight D of the consumer’s own past consumption in the benchmark, the weights θ0 and θ1 on contemporaneous and lagged aggregate consumption in the benchmark, and the exogenous growth rate G in the benchmark. For the purposes of asset pricing in the absence of habit formation (i.e., with D = 0), these seven preference parameters can be summarized by the three parameters β, η, and υ defined in Eqs. (6), (7), and (8), respectively. The approximate expressions for the equity premium, the term premium, the variances of the riskless rate of return and the rate of return on stocks, and
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Chapter 4 • Equity Premia with Benchmark Levels of Consumption: Closed-Form Results
the value of R2 are invariant to β. Thus, in Section 9.1 I did not specify a value for β. However, the exact expressions for these features of asset returns depend on β. Thus, to compare the exact and approximate expressions, I need to specify a value for β. I will choose a value for β by calibrating the model to the exact expression for the riskless rate of return under rational expectations. In the case without habit formation, D = 0, which implies Ht ≡ 1, so setting λ = 0 in Eq. (36) implies that the average one-period riskless rate is E x−υ . (121) E{Rt+1 (1, 0)} = B(0) Setting λ = 0 in Eq. (21) to obtain B(0), imposing rational expectations, and substituting the result into Eq. (121) yields E x−υ E{Rt+1 (1, 0)} = . (122) βE{x−η } Let Rf be the empirical average value of the one-period riskless rate. The model will yield an expected one-period riskless rate equal to Rf if β is chosen to set the right-hand side of Eq. (122) equal to Rf . Under log-normality, the value of the β that will allow the model to match this value of the expected riskless rate is exp (η − υ) μx + 0.5 υ 2 − η2 σx2 . (123) β= Rf In the case with consumption externalities and leverage under rational expectations with perfectly correlated consumption growth and dividend growth in Section 9.1.1, I have set μx = 0.018, σx = 0.0357, η = 10, and υ = 1.25. Mehra and Prescott (1985) report Rf = 1.0080. Substituting these values into Eq. (123) yields β = 1.09. At first blush, a value of β greater than one might lead to two concerns. One concern is that β > 1 might imply that the rate of time preference δ is negative. However, the definition of β in Eq. (6) shows that β can exceed one with a positive rate of time preference δ if G > 1 and (1 − D) γ (α − 1) > 0. The second concern is that some important infinite sums will fail to converge. However, as shown by Mehra (1988, Appendix) and Kocherlakota (1990), β can be slightly greater than one in a growing economy without causing this problem. However, for the particular parameter values in this example, including λ = 3.6, the value of A(λ) exceeds one when β = 1.09. In order to make A(λ) less than one, so that the difference equation in Eq. (19) will converge, I will set β = 1.075.10 10 The
values of derived preference parameters β, η, and υ are consistent with various combinations of the seven fundamental preference parameters. If, for example, δ = 0.01, G = 1.01279, D = 0, α = 14, γ = 0.4979, θ0 = 0.618, and θ1 = 0.193, then the values of the three derived parameters are β = 1.075, η = 10, and υ = 1.25, as in column 1 in Table 3. If, for example, δ = 0.01, G = 1.0076, D = 0, α = 25, γ = 0.3759, θ0 = 0.554, and θ1 = 0.188, then the values of the three derived parameters are β = 1.060, η = 20, and υ = 1.70, as in column 2 of Table 3.
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Of course, reducing the value of β is equivalent to increasing the rate of time preference, and as a result of the increased rate of time preference, the (net) expected riskless rate increases to 0.0227, or 2.27 percent per year. Having chosen a value for β, I can compute the exact as well as the approximate values of the equity premium, the standard deviations of the riskless rate of return and the rate of return on stock, and the value of R2 in a regression of stock returns on the dividend-price ratio. As illustrated in column 1 of Table 3, the approximations are quite close to the exact values for the equity premium, the standard deviation of the riskless rate, and the value of R2 . The approximation for the standard deviation of the risky rate of return is not as good, but is within 10 percent of the value obtained from the exact expression. Table 3 also reports approximate and exact values for the case with consumption externalities and leverage under rational expectations with less than perfectly correlated consumption growth and dividend growth. As in Section 9.1.2, I have set the correlation ρ = 0.2. As I discussed earlier, the model is better able to deliver empirically realistic values if η is increased to 20 and if υ is increased to 1.7. In order for A(λ) to be smaller than one, as required for the difference equation in Eq. (19) to converge, I have reduced β to 1.060. Despite this reduction in β, relative to its value in column 1, the expected riskless rate is only 1.82 percent per year, which is lower than its value in column 1. Again, the approximate values of the equity premium, the standard deviation of riskless
TABLE 3 Exact and Approximate Moments of Returns (1)
(2)
β
1.075
1.060
υ
1.25
Preference parameters
1.70
10
η Leverage parameter, λ
20
3.6
3.6
Growth rate parameters μx = μz
0.018
0.018
σx = σz
0.0357
0.0357
ρ
1.0
0.2
Moments of returns from model
Exact
Approx.
Exact
Approx.
Equity premium
6.37%
6.18%
6.36%
6.17%
s.d.{Rriskless } s.d. Rrisky
4.57%
4.46%
6.19%
6.07%
19.59%
17.88%
17.91%
16.43%
R2
6.1%
6.2%
13.5%
13.6%
Expected (net) riskless rate
2.27%
1.82%
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rate, and the value of R2 are very close to the values obtained from the exact expressions. And the approximate value of the standard deviation of the risky rate is within 10 percent of the value obtained from the exact expression.
11. SUMMARY I have derived exact expressions for the price and rate of return on a canonical asset in a framework that extends the standard utility function to include habit formation, keeping/catching up with the Joneses, and possible departures from rational expectations. The canonical asset is general enough to include one-period assets and infinite-maturity levered equity, and thus can be used to calculate risk premia, term premia, and equity premia. To calculate exact closed-form expressions for the first and second moments of returns, I have restricted attention to the case that excludes habit formation, but includes keeping/catching up with the Joneses, and I have assumed that the growth rates of consumption and dividends are jointly i.i.d. log-normal. After deriving the exact expressions for the first and second moments of returns, I have derived linear approximations to these expressions to show clearly how these moments of returns are affected by various parameters. I have used these linear approximations to show, quantitatively, how well the model can account for the empirical values of the equity premium, the term premium, the standard deviations of the riskless return and the rate of return on levered equity, and the value of R2 of a regression of stock returns on the dividend-price ratio. Finally, I showed that the approximations yield values of these moments that are close to those obtained from the exact solutions, for empirically relevant parameter values.
References Abel, A. B. Asset prices under habit formation and catching up with the Joneses. American Economic Review 80(2) (1990): 38–42. Abel, A. B. Risk premia and term premia in general equilibrium. Journal of Monetary Economics 43, (February) (1999): 3–33. Abel, A. B. An exploration of the effects of pessimism and doubt on asset returns. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 26(7–8) (2002): 1075–1092. Abel, A. B. Optimal taxation when consumers have endogenous benchmark levels of consumption. The Review of Economic Studies 72(1) (2005): 21–42. Backus, D. K., A. W. Gregory, and S. E. Zin. Risk premiums in the term structure: Evidence from artificial economies. Journal of Monetary Economics 24(3) (1989): 371–399. Bansal, R., and A. Yaron. Risks for the long run: A potential resolution of asset pricing puzzles. Journal of Finance 59(4) (2004): 1481–1509. Campbell, J. Y., and J. H. Cochrane. By force of habit: A consumption-based explanation of aggregate stock market behavior. Journal of Political Economy 107(2) (1999): 205–251. Cecchetti, S., P. Lam, and N. Mark. Mean reversion in equilibrium asset prices. American Economic Review 80(3) (1990): 398–418. Constantinides, G. M. Habit formation: A resolution of the equity premium puzzle. Journal of Political Economy 98(3) (1990): 519–543. Dupor, B., and W.-F. Liu. Jealousy and equilibrium overconsumption. American Economic Review 93(1) (2003): 423–428.
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157 Fama, E. F., and K. R. French. Dividend yields and expected stock returns. Journal of Financial Economics 22(1) (1988): 3–25. Gali, J. Keeping up with the Joneses: consumption externalities, portfolio choice, and asset prices. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 26(1) (1994): 1–8. Ibbotson Associates. Stocks, Bonds, Bills, Inflation, 1994 Yearbook. Ibbotson Associates, Chicago (1994). Kandel, S., and R. F. Stambaugh. Asset returns and intertemporal preferences. Journal of Monetary Economics 27(1) (1991): 39–71. Kocherlakota, N. R. On the “Discount” factor in growth economies. Journal of Monetary Economics 25(1) (1990): 43–47. Lettau, M., S. C. Ludvigson, and J. A. Wachter. The declining equity premium: What role does macroeconomic risk play? April (2004). Lucas, R. E., Jr. Asset prices in an exchange economy. Econometrica 46(6) (1978): 1429–1445. Mehra, R. On the existence and representation of equilibrium in an economy with growth and nonstationary consumption. International Economic Review 29(1) (1988): 131–135. Mehra, R., and E. C. Prescott. The equity premium: A puzzle. Journal of Monetary Economics 15(2) (1985): 145–161.
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Discussion: Equity Premia with Benchmark Levels of Consumption: Closed-Form Results Francisco Gomes London Business School
1. INTRODUCTION Andy Abel’s paper discusses the role of preferences with consumption externalities, leveraged equity claims, and non-rational expectations in explaining the equity premium puzzle. The “equity premium puzzle” is a term that is now used to define a 20-year-old literature, started by Mehra and Prescott (1985). In many ways, the search for an answer to this puzzle did for the asset pricing field what the famous search for the proof of Fermat’s last theorem did for the field of mathematics. Searching for the proof of Fermat’s last theorem lasted more than 300 years, drawing the attention of many of the greatest minds in the field, as well as scientists from related fields. In a similar way, many finance academics and several economists with very limited (if any) previous interest in the field contributed to the equity premium puzzle debate. In both cases, the search for answers led to the development of multiple new ideas and techniques, which in turn contributed to their respective fields in many (often unexpected) ways, sometimes even spawning whole new areas of research. This was particularly the case for asset pricing. The field underwent a significant revolution in the last two decades, and a sizable number of those changes can be traced back to contributions toward the equity premium puzzle debate. Preferences with “benchmark levels of consumption,” which Andy discusses in detail in his paper, is a very good example of this. The basic idea was borrowed from economics, where it has existed since at least Duesenberry (1949), but in an attempt to explain the equity premium puzzle, the concept was significantly expanded and transformed. As a byproduct, these preferences have since been used in several other asset pricing areas, and in other fields of economics. Before discussing Andy’s paper in more detail, I will conclude this comparison by pointing out two very important differences, to which I shall return later on. First,
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while Fermat’s last theorem is by itself of very limited consequence for the field of mathematics, the equity premium debate is extremely important, not only for asset pricing and finance, but for many other fields of economics as well. The equity premium puzzle revealed a fundamental weakness in the ability of extant economic models to price non-hedgeable risk. As such, it impacts every field of economics dealing with behavior under uncertainty and potentially questions the results in those areas, in particular those of a quantitative nature. Second, while the mathematicians’ quest had a clear ending (i.e., finding the proof), ours did/does not. It is not just about matching the (historical) equity premium; it is also about matching the riskless rate, the volatility of consumption growth, the ex-post volatility of the riskless rate, the correlation between consumption and stock returns, the term premium, the volatility of investment, etc. As soon as we explain one piece of the puzzle, we immediately add another one. That’s what makes this search an ongoing saga, and one that contributes to the continuing progress of the field. After all, if we just want a model that will match the observed equity premium, that is not very hard: Mehra and Prescott themselves showed us that it can be done with the Lucas (1978) model and power utility with a risk aversion coefficient of 50. If that were a satisfactory answer, the equity premium puzzle literature would never have been born! In my discussion I will start by summarizing the results presented in the paper, and then point out some of the (yet) unanswered questions.
2. PREFERENCES WITH BENCHMARK LEVELS OF CONSUMPTION The main theme in Andy’s paper is the concept of benchmark levels of consumption. More precisely, and following the notation in the paper, the utility function of the representative investor is given by U = Et
j ∞ 1 u(ct , vt ) , 1+δ j=0
where vt denotes a benchmark level of consumption, such that 1. a higher consumption benchmark decreases utility: ∂u < 0; ∂v 2. a higher consumption benchmark increases the marginal utility of current consumption: ∂2 u > 0. ∂c∂v
Chapter 4 • Equity Premia with Benchmark Levels of Consumption: Closed-Form Results
160
The benchmark level of consumption, υt , can be an arbitrary function of past consumption levels (habit formation preferences, e.g., Constantinides (1990)), or it can depend on the consumption of a reference group (consumption externality, also referred to as “catching up with the Joneses,” or “external habit formation,” e.g., Abel (1990)). In this paper Andy uses a very nice general framework that allows him to nest these two formulations. In addition, the literature has typically focused on the following parametric representations: ⎧ ⎨u[ct /g(υt )] “ratio” or “multiplicative” form (e.g., Abel (1990)), u(ct , υt ) = u[ct − g(υt )] “difference” or “additive” form (e.g., Constantinides ⎩ (1990)). Andy’s paper focus exclusively on “ratio” habit models, which allows him to derive closed-form solutions for asset prices. One important feature of this formulation is that it doesn’t affect the local curvature of the utility function. For example, take the common power utility specification u[ct /g(υt )] =
[ct /g(υt )]1−α ; 1−α
(1)
then the relative risk aversion is −c
∂2 u/∂c2 = α, ∂u/∂c
just as in the “standard” model with constant υt .1 This result is visible in column 2 of Table 2 in the paper. The consumption externality model generates a modest risk premium: 1.27 percent, even with a local curvature of 10. Preferences with benchmark levels of consumption increase the agent’s willingness to smooth consumption over time, and thus (typically) decrease the riskless rate and increase the term premia. Column 2 in Table 2 shows that, through this channel, the model’s implied equity premium actually matches the data. However, this is the result of a counterfactually high term premia: 4.91 percent. In addition, the volatility of marginal utility increases (for most standard specifications of g(υt ), ct /g(υt ) is more volatile than ct ) and therefore the volatility of the riskless rate is also higher than in the data.
1 More
precisely, the model with ∂u = 0. ∂υt
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The “difference” models provide more flexibility but are usually less tractable. Let me take the power utility specification from Eq. (1) but now write it as u[ct − g(υt )] =
[ct − g(υt )]1−α . 1−α
(2)
The local risk aversion coefficient in this model is −c
∂2 u/∂c2 αct = . ct − g(υt ) ∂u/∂c
So, the agent’s risk aversion is always higher than α and, moreover, as ct falls toward g(υt ), the agent’s risk aversion coefficient increases (toward infinity).2 Naturally, since the representative agent in this model is more risk-averse, the implied risk premium is mechanically higher. This is hardly surprising and could have already been obtained by setting a high risk aversion coefficient in the “standard” model (i.e., without a benchmark level of consumption). However, since risk aversion is time-varying and countercyclical, this leads to a time-varying risk premium (and Sharpe ratio). Therefore, the degree of (average) risk aversion required to match the equity premium is not as high as in the model without a benchmark level of consumption.3 Unfortunately, Campbell and Cochrane (1999) show that this effect is quantitatively very small: the model with benchmark level of consumption still requires a very high (average) coefficient of relative risk aversion to match the observed equity premium.
3. CHANGING THE “BENCHMARK LEVEL” OF THE EXPLANATION 3.1. Aggregate Moments As successive models managed to explain the equity premium and the riskless rate, a new benchmark level of explanation was set: match the equity premium, the riskless rate, the term premium, the volatility of the riskless rate, the correlation between consumption growth and dividend growth, etc. The successive papers in this literature have tried to address these different issues. For example, Campbell and Cochrane’s (1999) model tackles a standard problem with these preferences, the high volatility of the riskless rate, by reverse-engineering a process for g(υt ) that prevents large fluctuations in marginal utility. Andy’s paper does a very good job at describing the successes and failures of these models with respect to aggregate moments. Moreover, as discussed in the introduction, these preferences have now been used to explain other asset pricing features (see Wachter (2006), Bekaert et al. (2005), or Abel (1999), this case, the standard model can be obtained by setting g(υt ) = 0. mechanism can also be obtained with the “ratio” formulation, in a model with preference heterogeneity (see Chan and Kogan (2002)). 2 In
3 This
Chapter 4 • Equity Premia with Benchmark Levels of Consumption: Closed-Form Results
162
among others), and in applications outside finance as well (see Carroll et al. (2000), or Furher (2000), among others).4 The latest generations of these models perform relatively well at matching several aggregate moments, although they do require a very high value of risk aversion . . . which was the basic puzzle in the first place!5 I will now argue that the latest challenges for these preferences are at the micro level.
3.2. Micro-Economic Implications The initial idea of preferences with a benchmark level of consumption was essentially a “micro-foundations”-driven concept. By simple introspection we would probably agree that once we get used to a certain consumption level we find it difficult to “cut back.” Likewise, we often see households buy certain items just because some of their neighbors or co-workers have bought them. Moreover, there is a large volume of supporting experimental and psychological evidence for these effects, and many marketing or even political campaigns are frequently based on those exact premises. It is therefore surprising that while these models have been relatively successful at matching aggregate quantities, they have performed much worse when confronted with micro-level evidence. These preferences make agents more averse to fluctuations in consumption across time and (in some cases) across states. In a model of micro-economic behavior, this implies that these agents will have a much higher demand for both precautionary and retirement savings, since they will “suffer more” from a drop in consumption. The wealth accumulation implied by these preferences is therefore counterfactually high, particularly for younger households (see Gomes and Michaelides (2003) or Polkovnichenko (2005)). In the finance literature this makes it extremely hard to explain the participation puzzle.6 Gomes and Michaelides (2003) show that agents with these preferences would have very high savings ratios, and it would take extremely unrealistic transaction/participation costs to exclude them from investing even a small fraction of that into equities. Tests for the presence of benchmark levels of consumption by estimating reduced-form Euler equations on micro-consumption data have produced mixed results. Dynan (2000) finds evidence against these preferences, while Ravina (2005) finds supporting evidence for both habits and catching up with the Joneses. In addition, cross-sectional data for individual households and investors present a special challenge for the “difference” or “additive” form of consumption externalities in Eq. (2). Under the “additive” form, the utility function must be specified to guarantee that ct − g(υt ) is positive for everyone in the cross section. Unless we allow the 4 Chapman
(1998) discusses some counterfactual macro-economic implications of these models.
5 Note that this is still an important advance relative to the “basic model,” with power utility and no benchmark
level of consumption. Such a model would also require a high value of risk aversion to match the equity premium, and even then it would fail on many other dimensions (e.g., it would deliver a counterfactually high riskless rate; Weil (1989)). 6 The participation puzzle refers to the difficulty in explaining why 50 percent of the U.S. population does not own any equity (with similar or larger numbers reported in most OECD countries).
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external benchmark υt to differ across households, this requires that g(υt ) is always smaller than the lowest level of consumption in the cross section. As a result, g(υt ) would be negligible relative to the consumption of the majority of households, and thus it would have a negligible impact on their behavior. The “ratio” model, or the “habit models,” do not suffer from this problem.
3.3. Micro-Economic Foundations and Aggregation The (majority of the) asset pricing models that use these preferences only assume that they apply to the representative investor in the economy. This is an important point because the aggregation exercise is potentially non-trivial. Even if all individual investors have these preferences, the representative investor’s utility function might take on a different form, particularly in the case of the “difference model” outlined above (Eq. (2)). On the one hand, this is actually a good defense against the previously discussed “negative micro-evidence.” These representative agent asset pricing models do not imply counterfactual micro behavior, because they are not equivalent to a model with heterogenous agents with those same preferences. However, on the other hand, such a defense immediately raises the question: “But what then is the motivation for assuming such preferences for the representative investor?” More generally, what are the micro-foundations of preferences with benchmark levels of consumption? Recent developments in the literature have proposed some potential answers, but this still remains an important open question.
4. LEVERAGE, CORRELATION BETWEEN DIVIDENDS AND CONSUMPTION, AND DISTORTED BELIEFS The remainder of Andy’s paper studies the role of levered equity claims, imperfect correlation between dividends and consumption, and distorted beliefs. I will now discuss those in sequence.
4.1. Levered Equity Claims and Correlation Between Dividends and Consumption In the Lucas (1978) model, there is only one source of wealth in the economy: the “tree” that produces the aggregate dividend flow. There is no storage technology and/or no productive sector; thus the representative agent’s consumption (ct ) must equal aggregate dividends (dt ) in every period: ct = dt
∀t .
(3)
So, in equilibrium, equity is essentially a consumption claim: every period it pays the aggregate consumption as its dividend. Abel (1999) introduces levered equity claims in
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Chapter 4 • Equity Premia with Benchmark Levels of Consumption: Closed-Form Results
the model by specifying instead dt = (ct )λ
∀t ,
(4)
where λ > 1. While Eq. (3) equates the volatilities of consumption and dividend growth, Eq. (4) allows them to differ. Using those two moments to calibrate λ, we find that the risk premium increases from 1.27 percent to 4.59 percent (column 3 in Table 2 of the paper). The logic is quite straightforward. The only source of priced risk in this economy is aggregate consumption risk. Both claims (the one in Eq. (4) and the one in Eq. (3)) are perfectly correlated with aggregate consumption, but since λ > 1, the second claim has a higher loading on this unique factor. However, if we use Eq. (4), then dividends are no longer equal to consumption, which now becomes an exogenous quantity in the model. This equation must therefore be viewed as a reduced form for a model that explicitly incorporates additional sources of income/wealth. A similar issue arises when calibrating the correlation between consumption growth and dividend growth, which is equal to 1, under both Eqs. (3) and (4), while in the data that number is much smaller. Relaxing this assumption also requires the introduction of additional sources of income in the model, or alternatively we can write a different reduced-form representation that will produce a lower correlation such as dt = (ct )λ + εt
∀t .
(5)
For a given volatility of dt , a lower correlation between dividends and consumption significantly decreases the risk premium, since equity is no longer perfectly correlated with aggregate risk. This is visible in column 4 of Table 2 in the paper, where the risk premium now falls from 4.59 percent to 0.92 percent when the correlation decreases from 1 to 0.2. Production economy models provide a natural framework for endogeneizing this separation between consumption and dividends, by modeling labor income that enters explicitly into the investor’s budget constraint. Jermann (1998) incorporates preferences with benchmark levels of consumption in a production economy model where, endogenously, consumption growth and dividend growth have different volatility and are no longer perfectly correlated. The results are not as strong as in the pure exchange economy model with exogenous consumption.7
4.2. Non-Rational Expectations The final part of the paper explores departures from the rational expectations paradigm, by introducing distorted beliefs. More precisely, Andy explores two sources of distortion, “pessimism” and “doubt.” Under “pessimism,” the agent’s subjective probability distribution of future payoffs (F ) is first-order stochastically dominated by the 7 For examples of exchange economy models where investors explicitly receive an exogenous labor income flow in addition to the equity dividend, see Abel (1994) or Santos and Veronesi (2006).
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objective probability distribution (F ). Under “doubt,” F is a mean-preserving spread of F . The risk premium increases with both “pessimism” and “doubt” since, for a given price, investors assign either a lower expected return to the asset or a higher volatility, respectively. Of course, important questions are how much “pessimism” and/or “doubt” is required, and are those values credible? This is the greatest hurdle for these explanations: they require measures of expectations, for which we have only proxies. Those proxies are either based on limited survey evidence or inferred indirectly from market prices and thus are conditional on a pricing model and/or estimation technique.
5. FINAL REMARKS Preferences with benchmark levels of consumption have significantly improved our ability to match asset pricing data, but they still fail to solve the essence of the puzzle: match the historical risk premium with a low coefficient of relative risk aversion. In addition, the micro-economic foundations for these preferences are not as straightforward as initially thought. Either they are the result of aggregating households with these same preferences, in which case several counterfactual micro-economic results must be explained, or the micro-foundation question is left unanswered. Introducing leverage improves the performance of the model, but less so if the separation between consumption and dividends is modeled explicitly. Non-rational expectations may be a route to explore, but more empirical work measuring real expectations is still required. Only then will a realistic calibration of those models be possible.
References Abel, A. Asset prices under habit formation and catching up with the Joneses. American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 80 (1990): 38–42. Abel, A. Exact solutions for expected rates of return under Markov regime switching: Implications for the equity premium. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 26(3) (1994): 345–361. Abel, A. Risk premia and term premia in general equilibrium. Journal of Monetary Economics 43(1) (1999): 3–33. Bekaert, G., E. Engstrom, and S. Grenadier. Stock and bond returns with moody investors. Working paper, Columbia University (2005). Campbell, J. Y., and J. Cochrane. By force of habit: A consumption based explanation of aggregate stock market behavior. Journal of Political Economy 107(2) (1999): 205–251. Carroll, C., J. Overland, and D. Weil. Saving and growth with habit formation. American Economic Review 90(3) (2000): 341–355. Chan, Y. L., and L. Kogan. Heterogeneous preferences, catching up with the Joneses and the dynamics of asset prices. Journal of Public Economics 110(6) (2002): 1255–1285. Chapman, D. Habit formation and aggregate consumption. Econometrica 66 (1998): 1223–1230. Constantinides, G. Habit formation: A resolution of the equity premium puzzle. Journal of Political Economy 98 (1990): 519–543. Duesenberry, J. Income, Saving, and the Theory of Consumer Behavior, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (1949).
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Chapter 4 • Equity Premia with Benchmark Levels of Consumption: Closed-Form Results Dynan, K. Habit formation in consumer preferences: Evidence from panel data. American Economic Review 90 (2000): 391–406. Fuhrer, J. C. An optimizing model for monetary policy: Can habit formation help? American Economic Review 90(3) (2000): 367–390. Gomes, F., and A. Michaelides. Portfolio choice with internal habit formation: A life cycle model with uninsurable labor income risk. Review of Economic Dynamics 6 (2003): 729–766. Jermann, U. Asset pricing in production economies. Journal of Monetary Economics 41 (1998): 257–275. Lucas, R., Jr. Asset prices in an exchange economy. Econometrica 46(6) (1978): 1429–1445. Mehra, R., and E. Prescott. The equity premium: A puzzle. Journal of Monetary Economics 15(2) (1985): 145–161. Polkovnichenko, V. Life cycle consumption and portfolio choice with additive habit formation preferences and uninsurable labor income risk. Review of Financial Studies (2005). Ravina, E. Habit formation and keeping up with the Joneses: Evidence from micro data. Working paper, Stern School of Business (2005). Santos, T., and P. Veronesi. Labor income and predictable stock returns. Review of Financial Studies 19 (2006): 1–44. Wachter, J. A consumption-based model of the term structure of interest rates. Journal of Financial Economics 79 (2006): 365–399. Weil, P. The equity premium and the risk-free rate puzzle. Journal of Monetary Economics 24 (1989): 401–421.
CHAPTER 5
Long-Run Risks and Risk Compensation in Equity Markets Ravi Bansal∗ Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, and NBER
1. Introduction 2. Long-Run Risks Model 2.1. Preferences and the Environment 2.2. Long-Run Growth Rate Risks 2.3. Long-Run Growth and Uncertainty Risks 2.4. Data and Model Implications 3. Cross-Sectional Implications 3.1. Value, Momentum, Size, and the Cross-Sectional Puzzle 4. Conclusion References
168 170 170 171 174 176 185 185 191 191
Abstract What drives the compensation in equity markets? This article shows that long-run growth and economic uncertainty in the economy play an important role in determining the risk in equity markets. The size of the market risk premium, the level of the risk-free rate, the volatility of asset prices, and differences in the risk compensation across assets are shown to be related to risks pertaining to the long-run growth and uncertainty in the economy. JEL Classification: G12, E44 Keywords: long-run risks, volatility risks, intertemporal elasticity of substitution ∗I
thank Amir Yaron, Dana Kiku, John Heaton, and Lars Hansen, and the Editor, Rajnish Mehra, for their comments. The usual disclaimer applies. HANDBOOK OF THE EQUITY RISK PREMIUM c 2008 by Elsevier B.V. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved. Copyright
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1. INTRODUCTION Several aspects of asset markets are puzzling. The work of Mehra and Prescott (1985) shows that the magnitude of risk compensation in equity markets is a puzzle—Treasury bills offer a return of about 1 percent per annum while the equity market portfolio offers 7.5 percent. What risks justify such a sizable compensation for holding equity? Another equally puzzling, and related, dimension is the large difference in the average returns across equity portfolios. For example, the return to value firms exceeds that of growth firms by about 7 percent per annum. In addition to these return puzzles, Shiller (1981) and Leroy and Porter (1981) document the volatility puzzle—it is hard to explain the high volatility of equity prices. This article highlights the ideas developed in Bansal and Lundblad (2002), Bansal and Yaron (2004), Bansal, Khatchatrian, and Yaron (2005), Bansal, Dittmar, and Lundblad (2002, 2005), and Bansal, Gallant, and Tauchen (2007) pertaining to various financial market anomalies. This research argues that the magnitudes of asset returns and volatility are a natural outcome of risks associated with the long-run growth prospects and changing economic uncertainty in the economy. Bansal and Yaron (2004) argue that investors care about the long-run growth prospects and the level of economic uncertainty. Changes in these fundamentals drive the risks and volatility in asset prices. They document that consumption and dividend growth rates contain a small long-run component. That is, current shocks to expected growth alter expectations about future economic growth not only for short horizons but also for the very long run. Agents care a lot about these long-run components as small revisions in them lead to large changes in asset prices. Any adverse movements in the long-run growth components lower asset prices and concomitantly the wealth and consumption of investors. This makes holding equity very risky for investors, making them demand a high equity risk compensation. Bansal and Yaron further argue that time variation in expected excess returns is due to variation in economic uncertainty. They model this uncertainty by incorporating time-varying consumption volatility in the consumption process. Empirical motivation for this channel is provided by Bansal, Khatchatrian, and Yaron (2005)—their robust empirical finding is that current consumption volatility predicts future asset valuations and that current asset valuations predict future consumption volatility. Both projection coefficients are significantly negative. A rise in economic uncertainty lowers asset prices—that is, asset markets dislike economic uncertainty. Bansal and Yaron derive the result that volatility shocks, in equilibrium, carry a separate risk premium; this is a novel feature of their model. Epstein and Zin (1989) preferences play an important role in the Bansal and Yaron model. These preferences allow for separation between risk aversion and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES) of investors. An IES larger than one is required for the wealth to consumption ratio to rise with expected consumption growth; when the IES is smaller than one, high expected growth lowers the wealth to consumption ratio. The equity price to dividend ratio mirrors the behavior of the wealth to consumption ratio. This ensures that equity payoffs are high when consumption and corporate profits rise, leading to a positive equity risk premium. An IES larger than one is also required to capture the data feature that asset markets dislike economic uncertainty.
Ravi Bansal
169 The magnitude of the IES is a key empirical issue. Hansen and Singleton (1982), Attanasio and Weber (1989), and Attanasio and Vissing-Jorgensen (2003) estimate the IES to be well in excess of one. Hall (1988) and Campbell (1999), on the other hand, estimate its value to be well below one. Bansal and Yaron argue that the estimates for the IES in Hall and Campbell are not a robust guide for the magnitude of the IES parameter. They show that even if the population value of the IES is larger than one, the estimation methods used by Hall would measure the IES to be close to zero. That is, there is a severe downward bias in the point estimates of the IES. Bansal and Yaron as well as Bansal, Khatchatrian, and Yaron (2005) further argue that the economic implications when the IES is less than one—a rise in consumption volatility and/or a drop is expected growth raises asset valuations, are counterfactual, making the low magnitude of the IES suspect. The arguments presented in Bansal and Yaron also have immediate implications for the cross-sectional differences in mean returns across assets. Firms whose expected cash-flow (profits) growth rates move with the economy are more exposed to longrun risks and hence should carry a higher risk compensation. In Breeden (1979), Lucas (1978), and Hansen and Singleton (1982), the riskiness of the asset is determined by the consumption beta of the asset. However, the consumption beta of an asset is not exogenous—in equilibrium, it is determined by the systematic risks in cash flows and the preference parameters of the representative agent. That is, cross-sectional differences in betas of assets reflect differences in the systematic risks in cash flows. Risks in cash flows should consequently contain information about differences in mean returns across assets. We review the work of Bansal, Dittmar, and Lundblad (2002, 2005), who show that systematic risks in cash flows can account for the cross-sectional differences in risk premia of assets. Specifically, their cash-flow betas can account for the puzzling value, size, and the momentum spread in the cross section of assets. Bansal and Lundblad (2002) rely on long-run components and varying risk premia to address issues in international equity markets. Developed markets’ asset prices and returns show a high degree of correlation; however, dividends and earnings growth across these economies are virtually uncorrelated. Bansal and Lundblad show that high asset price volatility and correlation across national equity markets are due to the long-run component in dividend growth rates and time-varying systematic risk. The argument that long-term economic growth and uncertainty are the key drivers of risks in equity markets is distinct from the arguments presented in Campbell and Cochrane (1999). They argue that equity market risks are driven largely (even exclusively) by fluctuations in the ex-ante rate of discount (cost of capital) through external habit formation. Sorting out which of the channels is critical for explaining the risk compensation in equity markets, consequently, is largely an empirical issue. Using the Efficient Method of Moments (EMM) estimation technique, Bansal, Gallant, and Tauchen (2007) document the differences between the Bansal and Yaron and Campbell and Cochrane models. A unique dimension of the Bansal, Gallant, and Tauchen paper is that consumption and dividends in their model are cointegrated—this feature is typically missing in earlier work on asset market models. The remainder of the article has three sections. Section 2 discusses the long-run risks model of Bansal and Yaron. Section 3 discusses the issue of cross-sectional differences in returns across asset portfolios. Section 4 presents concluding comments.
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2. LONG-RUN RISKS MODEL 2.1. Preferences and the Environment We consider a representative agent with the generalized preferences developed in Epstein and Zin (1989). The logarithm of the Intertemporal Marginal Rate of Substitution (IMRS), mt+1 , for these preferences, as shown in the Epstein and Zin paper, is mt+1 = θ log δ −
θ gt+1 + (θ − 1)ra,t+1 . ψ
(1)
If Rt+1 is the gross return on the asset, then log (Rt+1) ≡ rt+1 is the continuous return on the asset. Using the standard asset pricing restriction for any continuous return ri,t+1 , it follows that1 θ Et exp θ log δ − gt+1 + (θ − 1)ra,t+1 + ri,t+1 = 1, ψ
(2)
where gt+1 equals log(Ct+1 /Ct )—the log growth rate of aggregate consumption. The return, ra,t+1 , is the log of the return (i.e., continuous return) on an asset that delivers aggregate consumption as its dividends each time period. The time discount factor is δ and the parameter θ ≡ 1 − γ/(1 − 1/ψ), where γ ≥ 0 is the risk aversion (sensitivity) parameter, and ψ ≥ 0 is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. The sign of θ is determined by the magnitudes of the risk aversion and the elasticity of substitution.2 Note that when θ equals one, the above IMRS and the asset pricing implications collapse to the usual case of power utility considered in Mehra and Prescott (1985). The return to the aggregate consumption claim, ra,t+1 , is not observed in the data while the return on the dividend claim corresponds to the observed return on the market portfolio rm,t+1 . The levels of market dividends and consumption are not equal; aggregate consumption is much larger than aggregate dividends. The difference is financed by labor income. In the model, aggregate consumption and aggregate dividends are treated as two separate processes and the difference between them implicitly defines the agent’s labor income process.
1 Note
that the standard asset pricing condition in frictionless markets is Et [exp(mt+1 + rt+1)] = 1,
where the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution is Mt+1 and log(Mt+1 ) ≡ mt+1 . The logarithm of the gross return for an asset equals rt+1 . 2 In particular, if ψ > 1 and γ > 1, then θ will be negative. Note that when θ = 1, that is, γ = (1/ψ), the above recursive preferences collapse to the standard case of expected utility. Further, when θ = 1 and in addition γ = 1, we get the standard case of log utility.
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The key ideas of the model are developed and the intuition is provided via approximate analytical solutions. However, all the quantitative results reported in the paper are based on numerical solutions of the model. To derive the approximate analytical solutions for the model, we use the standard first-order Taylor series approximation developed in Campbell and Shiller (1988),3 ra,t+1 = κ0 + κ1 zt+1 − zt + gt+1 ,
(3)
where lowercase letters refer to variables in logs, in particular, ra,t+1 = log(Ra,t+1 ) is the continuous return on the consumption claim, and zt ≡ log (Pt /Ct ) is the log price to consumption ratio. Analogously, rm,t+1 and zm,t correspond to the continuous return on the dividend claim and its log price-dividend ratio. As Pt + Ct /Ct is the agent’s wealth to consumption ratio, fluctuations in the price to consumption ratio, consequently, also correspond to movements in the wealth to consumption ratio. Parameters κ0 and κ1 are approximating constants that both depend only on the average level of z.4 From Eq. (1) it follows that the innovation in the IMRS, mt+1 , is driven by the innovations in gt+1 and ra,t+1 . Covariation with the innovation in mt+1 determines the risk premium for any asset. The simpler model specification, with only long-run growth rate risks, is discussed first. The full model that incorporates long-run growth rate and economic uncertainty risks is presented after that.
2.2. Long-Run Growth Rate Risks The agents’ IMRS depends on the endogenous consumption return, ra,t+1 . The risk compensation on all assets depends on this return, which itself is determined by the process for consumption growth. The dividend process is needed for determining the return on the market portfolio. To capture long-run risks, consumption and dividend growth rates, gt+1 and gd,t+1 , are modeled to contain a small persistent predictable component xt, xt+1 = ρxt + ϕe σet+1 , gt+1 = μ + xt + σηt+1 , gd,t+1 = μd + φxt + ϕd σut+1 , et+1 , ut+1 , ηt+1 ∼ N.i.i.d.(0, 1), 3 Any
(4)
equity return can be written as
Pt+1 Dt+1 Dt+1 Rt+1 = . Pt Dt Dt The approximate return expression follows from taking the log of the gross return and then taking a first-order Pt+1 Taylor series approximation of log 1 + D around the average value of the log of the price-dividend ratio, t+1 which is referenced as z in Eq. (3). The approximating constants κ0 and κ1 are solely determined by the average value of z. 4 The Campbell–Shiller approximate return follows from using a first-order Taylor series expansion of the ¯ + exp(z)). ¯ The value of κ1 is set at 0.997, which is consistent continuous return. Note that κ1 = exp(z)/(1 with the magnitude of z¯ in our sample and with the magnitudes used in Campbell and Shiller (1988). 1+
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with the three shocks, et+1 , ut+1 , and ηt+1 , assumed to be mutually independent. The volatility of the consumption growth rate innovation is σ. Similarly, the volatility of the innovation in xt+1 and gd,t+1 is ϕe σ and ϕd σ, respectively. The parameter ρ determines the persistence of the expected growth rate process. First, note that when ϕe = 0, the processes gt and gd,t+1 are i.i.d. Second, if et+1 = ηt+1 , the process for consumption is the ARMA(1,1) used in Campbell (1999), Cecchetti, Lam, and Mark (1993), and Bansal and Lundblad (2002). If, in addition, ϕe = ρ, then consumption growth corresponds to an AR(1) process used in Mehra and Prescott (1985). Two additional parameters, φ > 1 and ϕd > 1, calibrate the overall volatility of dividends and its correlation with consumption. The parameter φ can be interpreted, as in Abel (1999), as the leverage ratio on expected consumption growth. Alternately, this says that corporate profits, relative to consumption, are more sensitive to changing expected economic growth conditions. That is, any fluctuation in xt leads to larger changes in expected dividend growth relative to expected consumption growth. The maintained assumption is that the three innovations are uncorrelated. It is straightforward to allow the three shocks to be correlated; however, to maintain parsimony in the number of parameters, they are assumed to be independent. Note that consumption and dividends are not cointegrated in the above specification—Bansal, Gallant, and Tauchen (2007) develop a specification that does allow for cointegration between consumption and dividends. Asset prices reflect expectations of future growth rates. To develop some intuition about long-run risks, consider the quantity
Et
∞
j κ1 gt+j ,
j=1
with κ1 less than one, this expectation equals κ1 xt /(1 − κ1 ρ). Even if the variance of x is tiny, but ρ fairly high, then shocks to x can alter growth rate expectations for the long run, leading to volatile asset prices. Bansal and Lundblad (2002) and Bansal and Yaron (2004) provide empirical support for the existence of this long-run component in observed growth rates.
2.2.1. Equilibrium and Asset Prices The consumption and dividend growth rates processes are exogenous in this endowment economy. Further, the IMRS depends on an endogenous return ra,t+1 . To characterize the IMRS and the behavior of asset returns, a solution for the log price to consumption ratio zt and the log price-dividend ratio zm,t is needed. The relevant state variable for deriving the solution for zt and zm,t is the expected growth rate of consumption xt . Exploiting the Euler equation (2), the approximate solution for the log priceconsumption zt has the form zt = A0 + A1 xt . An analogous expression holds for
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the log price-dividend ratio zm,t .5 Bansal and Yaron (2004) show that the solution coefficients are A1 =
1−
1 ψ
1 − κ1 ρ
,
A1,m =
φ−
1 ψ
1 − κ1,m ρ
.
(5)
It follows that A1 is positive if the IES, ψ, is greater than one. In this case the intertemporal substitution effect dominates the wealth effect. In response to higher expected growth, agents buy more assets, and consequently the wealth to consumption ratio rises. The level of consumption rises due to a rise in expected growth; however, wealth rises more than consumption. In the standard power utility model with risk aversion larger than one, the IES is less than one, and hence A1 is negative—a rise in expected growth potentially lowers asset valuations. That is, the wealth effect dominates the substitution effect.6 Corporate payouts (i.e., dividends), with φ > 1, are more sensitive to long-run risks (i.e., A1,m > A1 ), and changes in expected growth rate lead to a larger reaction in the price of the dividend claim than in the price of the consumption claim. Equation (3), the solution in (5), and the dynamics for the consumption and dividend growth rates provide a complete characterization for the endogenous returns on the consumption and the dividend asset.
2.2.2. Pricing of Long-Run Growth Risks Substituting the equilibrium return for ra,t+1 into the IMRS, Bansal and Yaron show that the innovation in mt+1 is
θ 1 ϕe σet+1 − θ + 1 σηt+1 − (1 − θ) κ1 1 − mt+1 − Et (mt+1 ) = − ψ ψ 1 − κ1 ρ = −λm,η σηt+1 − λm,e σet+1 .
(6)
The parameters λm,e and λm,η determine the risk compensation for expected growth rate shock and the independent consumption shock ηt+1 . The risk compensation for the ηt+1 shocks is very standard as λm,η equals the risk aversion parameter γ.7 In addition, with power utility, that is, when θ equals one, λm,e = 0. Long-run risks are priced only when θ differs from one, that is, when risk aversion is not the reciprocal of the IES—this highlights the importance of the generalized preferences of Epstein and Zin (1989). The market price of long-run risks is sensitive to the magnitude of the permanence parameter ρ. The risk compensation for 5 The expression for the intercept terms A for the valuation ratio for the consumption claim, and A 0 0,m for the dividend claim are not important for our qualitative results. 6 An alternative interpretation with the power utility model is that higher expected growth rates increase the risk-free rate to an extent that discounting dominates the effects of higher expected growth rates. This leads to a fall in asset prices. 7 This follows by substituting the expression for θ and simplifying the expression [θ/ψ − θ + 1].
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long-run risks, λm,e , rises as the permanence parameter ρ rises. The conditional volatility of the pricing kernel is constant, as all risk sources have constant conditional variances. As asset returns and the pricing kernel in this model economy are conditionally log-normal, the risk premium on any asset i is Et [ri,t+1 − rf ,t ] = −covt (mt+1 , ri,t+1 ) − 0.5σr2i ,t . Given the solutions for A1 and A1,m , it is straightforward to derive the equity premium on the market portfolio, E(rm,t+1 − rf ,t ) = βm,η λm,η σ 2 + βm,e λm,e σ 2 − 0.5Var(rm,t ). The market portfolio’s beta with respect to the long-run risk component is
ϕe 1 . βm,e ≡ κ1,m φ − ψ 1 − κ1,m ρ
(7)
(8)
The exposure of the market return to long-run risk is βm,e , and the market price of the long-run risk is λm,e . The expressions for these variables reveal that a rise in ρ increases both βm,e and λm,e . Consequently, the risk premium on the asset also increases with ρ. The market portfolio’s beta with respect to the short-run risk component ηt+1 is determined by the exposure of the dividend’s innovation to ηt+1 . The assumption that the dividend innovation of the market portfolio is independent of the short-run shock in consumption ηt+1 implies that βm,η will be zero in our calibration exercise. As all shocks have a constant conditional variance, the conditional risk premium on the market portfolio and its conditional volatility are constant. The ratio of the two, namely the Sharpe ratio, is also constant. In order to address issues that pertain to timevarying risk premia and predictability of risk premia, Bansal and Yaron augment the above model by incorporating time-varying economic uncertainty.
2.3. Long-Run Growth and Uncertainty Risks Bansal and Yaron model fluctuating economic uncertainty as time-varying volatility of consumption growth. The consumption and dividends dynamics that incorporate stochastic volatility are xt+1 = ρxt + ϕe σt et+1 , gt+1 = μ + xt + σt ηt+1 , gd,t+1 = μd + φxt + ϕd σt ut+1 , 2 σt+1
(9)
− σ ) + σw wt+1 , =σ + et+1 , ut+1 , ηt+1 , wt+1 ∼ N.i.i.d.(0, 1), 2
ν1 (σt2
2
where σt+1 , the conditional volatility of consumption growth, represents the timevarying economic uncertainty incorporated in consumption growth rate. The unconditional mean of the time-varying variance of consumption growth is σ 2 , and σw determines the volatility of shocks to consumption uncertainty. The parameter ν1 determines the persistence of shocks to consumption variance. To maintain parsimony, it is assumed that the shocks are uncorrelated and only one source of time-varying economic uncertainty affects consumption and dividends.
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The relevant state variables in solving for the equilibrium price-consumption (and price-dividend) ratio are now xt and σt2 . Thus, the approximate solution for the price-consumption ratio is zt = A0 + A1 xt + A2 σt2 . The solution for A1 is unchanged (Eq. (5)). The solution coefficient A2 for measuring the sensitivity of the priceconsumption ratio to volatility fluctuations is 2 2 θ 0.5 θ − ψ + (θA1 κ1 ϕe ) A2 = . (10) θ(1 − κ1 ν1 ) An analogous coefficient for the market price-dividend ratio, A2,m , is provided in Bansal and Yaron (2004). The expression for A2 provides two valuable insights. First, if the IES and risk aversion are larger than one, then θ and consequently A2 are negative. In this case, a rise in consumption volatility lowers asset valuations and increases the risk premia on all assets. To capture the intuition that a rise in economic uncertainty lowers asset valuations requires that the IES be larger than one. Bansal, Khatchatrian, and Yaron (2005) present robust empirical evidence that asset markets dislike economic uncertainty—that is, A2 is negative. This empirical evidence, given the expression for A2 , has a direct bearing on the plausible magnitude for the IES. Second, an increase in the permanence of volatility shocks, that is ν1 , magnifies the effects of volatility shocks on valuation ratios as changes in economic uncertainty are perceived by investors as being long-lasting.
2.3.1. Pricing of Uncertainty Risks As the wealth to consumption ratio is affected by consumption volatility shocks, so are the return ra,t+1 and the IMRS. Specifically, the innovation in mt+1 is mt+1 − Et (mt+1 ) = −λm,η σt ηt+1 − λm,e σt et+1 − λm,w σw wt+1 ,
(11)
where λm,η , λm,e , and λm,w are the market prices of risks for the short-run, long-run, and volatility risks. The market prices of systematic risks, including the compensation for stochastic volatility risk in consumption, can be expressed in terms of underlying preferences and parameters that govern the evolution of consumption growth as λm,η = γ,
1 κ1 ϕ e , λm,e = γ − ψ 1 − κ1 ρ
κ1 (1 + ( κ1 ϕe )2 ) 1 1−κ1 ρ . (1 − γ) λm,w = γ − ψ 2 (1 − κ1 ν1 )
(12)
Expression (11) is similar to the earlier model (see Eq. (6)) save for the inclusion of wt+1 , the shocks to consumption volatility. In the special case of power utility, when
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θ = 1 or more specifically, where γ = 1/ψ, the risk compensation parameters λm,e and λm,w are zero. The long-run risks and volatility risks are not reflected in the innovation of the pricing kernel. With power utility there is no separate risk compensation for longrun growth rate risks and volatility risks—with Epstein and Zin preferences, both risks are priced. The pricing of long-run and volatility risks is an important and novel feature of the Bansal and Yaron model. The equity premium in the presence of time-varying economic uncertainty is Et (rm,t+1 − rf ,t ) = βm,η λm,η σt2 + βm,e λm,e σt2 + βm,w λm,w σw2 − 0.5Vart (rm,t+1 ),
(13)
where βm,w ≡ κ1,m A2,m . The first β corresponds to the exposure to short-run risks, and the second to long-run risks. The last beta, βm,w , is the exposure of the asset to volatility risks. The risk premium on the market portfolio is time-varying as σt fluctuates. The ratio of the conditional risk premium to the conditional volatility of the market portfolio fluctuates with σt , and hence the Sharpe ratio is time-varying. The maximal Sharpe ratio in this model economy, which approximately equals the conditional volatility of the log IMRS, also varies with σt .8 This implies that during periods of high economic uncertainty all risk premia will rise. The first-order effects on the level of the risk-free rate, as discussed in Bansal and Yaron (2006), are the rate of time preference and the average consumption growth rate, divided by the IES. Increasing the IES keeps the level low. The variance of the risk-free rate is determined by the volatility of the expected consumption growth rate and the IES. Increasing the IES lowers the volatility of the risk-free rate. In addition, incorporating economic uncertainty leads to an interesting channel for interpreting fluctuations in the real risk-free rate. In particular, Bansal and Yaron show that this has serious implications for the measurement of the IES in the data. In the presence of varying volatility, the estimates of the IES based on the projections considered in Hall (1988) and Campbell (1999) are seriously biased downwards.
2.4. Data and Model Implications 2.4.1. Data and the Growth Rate Dynamics Bansal and Yaron (2004) calibrate the model described in (4) and (9) at the monthly frequency. From this monthly model they derive time-aggregated annual growth rates of consumption and dividends to match key aspects of annual aggregate consumption and dividends data. Further, as in Campbell and Cochrane (1999) and in Kandel and Stambaugh (1991), they assume that the decision interval of the agent is monthly, but the targeted data to match is annual.9 8 Given the conditional normality of the logarithm of the IMRS, the maximal Sharpe ratio is simply the conditional standard deviation of the logarithm of the IMRS. 9 The evidence regarding the model is based on numerical solutions using standard polynomial-based projection methods discussed in Judd (1998). The numerical results are quite close to those based on the approximate analytical solutions.
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For consumption, BEA data on real per capita annual consumption growth of non-durables and services for the period 1929–1998 is utilized. This is the longest single data source of consumption data. Dividends and the value-weighted market return data are taken from the CRSP. All nominal quantities are deflated using the CPI. To facilitate comparisons between the model, which is calibrated to a monthly decision interval, and the annual data, the monthly model is time-aggregated to the annual frequency to derive annual statistics. The annual real per capita consumption growth mean is 1.8 percent, and its standard deviation is about 2.9 percent. This volatility is somewhat lower for our sample than for the period considered in Mehra and Prescott (1985), Kandel and Stambaugh (1991), and Abel (1999). Table 1, adapted from Bansal and Yaron (2004), shows that in the data, consumption growth has a large first-order autocorrelation coefficient and a small second-order one. The standard errors in the data for these autocorrelations are sizeable. An alternative way to view the long horizon properties of the consumption and dividend growth rates is to use variance ratios, which themselves are determined by the autocorrelations (see Cochrane (1988)). In the data the variance ratios first rise significantly and at about 7 years start to decline. The standard errors on these variance ratios, not surprisingly, are quite substantial. There is considerable evidence of small sample biases in estimating autoregression coefficients and variance ratios (see Hurwicz (1950) and Ansley and Newbold (1980)). To account for any small sample biases, Bansal and Yaron also report statistics based on 1000 Monte Carlo experiments TABLE 1 Time-Series Properties of Data Variable
Estimate
S.E.
σ(g)
2.93
(0.69)
AC(1)
0.49
(0.14)
AC(2)
0.15
(0.22)
AC(5)
−0.08
(0.10)
AC(10)
0.05
(0.09)
V R(2)
1.61
(0.34)
V R(5)
2.01
(1.23)
V R(10)
1.57
(2.07)
11.49
(1.98)
σ(gd ) AC(1)
0.21
(0.13)
corr(g, gd )
0.55
(0.34)
Table 1 displays the time-series properties of aggregate consumption and dividend growth rates: g and gd , respectively. The statistics are based on annual observations from 1929 to 1998. Consumption is real per capita consumption of non-durables and services; dividends are the sum of real dividends across all CRSP firms. AC(j) is the jth autocorrelation, VR(j) is the jth variance ratio, σ is the volatility, and corr denotes the correlation. Standard errors are Newey and West (1987) corrected using 10 lags.
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Chapter 5 • Long-Run Risks and Risk Compensation in Equity Markets
each with 840 monthly observations corresponding to the 70 annual observations available in the annual data set. In terms of the specific parameters, Bansal and Yaron (2004) calibrate ρ at 0.979, which determines the persistence in the long-run component in growth rates. Their choice of ϕe and σ ensures that the model matches the unconditional variance and the autocorrelation function of annual consumption growth. The standard deviation of the one-step-ahead innovation in consumption, that is σ, equals 0.0078. This parameter configuration implies that the predictable variation in monthly consumption growth is very small, as the implied R2 is only 4.4 percent. The exposure of the corporate sector to long-run risks is governed by φ, and its magnitude is similar to that in Abel (1999). The standard deviation of the monthly innovation in dividends, ϕd σ, is 0.0351. Bansal and Yaron also consider the consumption and dividend dynamics that incorporate time-varying volatility (see Eq. (9)). The parameters of the volatility process are chosen to capture the persistence in consumption volatility. Based on the evidence of slow decay in volatility shocks, they calibrate ν1 , the parameter governing the persistence of conditional volatility, at 0.987. The shocks to the volatility process have very small volatility, and σw is calibrated at 0.23 × 10−5 . Bansal and Yaron show that with this configuration, the assumed consumption and dividend growth rates very closely match the key consumption and dividends data features reported in Table 1. Table 2 presents the targeted asset market data for 1929 to 1998. The equity risk premium is 6.33 percent per annum, and the real risk-free rate is 0.9 percent. The annual market return volatility is 19.42 percent, and that of the real risk-free is quite small, TABLE 2 Asset Market Data Variable
Estimate
S.E.
Returns E(rm − rf )
6.33
(2.15)
E(rf )
0.86
(0.42)
σ(rm )
19.42
(3.07)
σ(rf )
0.97
(0.28)
Price-dividend ratio E(exp(p − d))
26.56
(2.53)
σ(p − d)
0.29
(0.04)
AC1(p − d)
0.81
(0.09)
AC2(p − d)
0.64
(0.15)
Table 2, adapted from Bansal and Yaron (2004), presents descriptive statistics of asset market data. E(rm − rf ) and E(rf ) are, respectively, the annualized equity premium and mean risk free-rate. σ(rm ), σ(rf ), and σ(p − d) are the annualized volatilities of the market return, the risk-free rate, and the log price-dividend, respectively. AC1 and AC2 denote the first and second autocorrelations. Standard errors are Newey and West (1987) corrected using 10 lags.
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about 1 percent per annum. The volatility of the price-dividend ratio is quite high, and it is a very persistent series. In addition to these data dimensions, Bansal and Yaron also evaluate the ability of the model to capture the predictability of returns and the new evidence (see Bansal, Khatchatrian, and Yaron (2005)) that price-dividend ratios are negatively correlated with consumption volatility at long leads and lags. It is often argued that consumption and dividend growth, in the data, is close to being i.i.d. Bansal and Yaron show that their model of consumption and dividends is also consistent with the observed data on consumption and dividends growth rates. However, while the financial market data is hard to interpret from the perspective of the i.i.d. growth rate dynamics, Bansal and Yaron show that it is interpretable from the perspective of the growth rate dynamics that incorporate long-run risks. This issue is further considered in Shephard and Harvey (1990), Barsky and Delong (1993), and Bansal and Lundblad (2002), who show that discrimination across the i.i.d. growth rate specification and the one that incorporates long-run components is extremely difficult in finite samples. Given these difficulties in discrimination across models, Anderson, Hansen, and Sargent (2003) utilize features of the long-run growth rate dynamics developed in Bansal and Yaron for motivating economic models that incorporate robust control.
2.4.2. Preference Parameters The preference parameters take account of economic considerations. The time preference parameter δ < 1 and the risk aversion parameter γ in Bansal and Yaron is either 7.5 or 10. Mehra and Prescott (1985) do not entertain risk aversion values larger than 10. Bansal and Yaron focus on an IES of 1.5—an IES value larger than one is important for their quantitative results. There is considerable debate about the magnitude of the IES. Hansen and Singleton (1982) and Attanasio and Weber (1989) estimate the IES to be well in excess of 1. More recently, Guvenen (2006) and Attanasio and Vissing-Jorgensen (2003) also estimate the IES over one—they show that their estimates are close to that used in Bansal and Yaron. However, Hall (1988) and Campbell (1999) estimate the IES to be well below one. Bansal and Yaron (2004) argue that the low IES estimates of Hall and Campbell are based on a model without time-varying volatility. They show that ignoring the effects of time-varying consumption volatility leads to a serious downwards bias in the estimates of the IES. If the population value of the IES in the Bansal and Yaron model is 1.5, then the estimated value of the IES using Hall estimation methods will be less than 0.3. Bansal and Yaron show that with fluctuating consumption volatility, the projection of consumption growth on the level of the risk-free rate does not equal the IES, leading to the downwards bias. This suggests that Hall and Campbell’s estimates are not a robust guide for calibrating the IES. In addition to the above arguments, the empirical evidence in Bansal, Khatchatrian, and Yaron (2005) shows that a rise in consumption volatility sharply lowers asset prices at long leads and lags and that higher asset valuations today predict higher corporate earnings growth. Figures 1 to 4 use data from the U.S., the U.K., Germany, and Japan
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to highlight the volatility channel. The asset valuation measure is the price to earnings ratio, and the consumption volatility measure is constructed by averaging eight lags of the absolute value of consumption residuals; see Bansal, Khatchatrian, and Yaron (2005) for additional details. It is evident from the graphs that a rise in consumption volatility lowers asset valuations for all counties under consideration—this highlights the volatility channel and motivates the specification of the IES larger than one. In terms of growth rate predictability, Ang and Bekaert (2007) and Bansal, Khatchatrian, and Yaron (2005) report a positive relation between asset valuations and expected earnings growth. These data features, as discussed in the theory sections above, again require an IES larger than one.
2.4.3. Asset Pricing Implications To underscore the importance of two key aspects of the model, preferences and longrun risks, first consider the genesis of the risk premium on ra,t+1 —the return on the asset that delivers aggregate consumption as its dividends. The market risk premium magnifies these risk compensations due to leverage and, consequently, larger exposure to the various risk components.
3 2 1 0 21 22 23 55
60
65
70
75
Cons. Volatility (12 qrt.) FIGURE 1
80
85
90
95
log price-earnings ratio
P/E ratio and consumption volatility for the U.S. Both series are standardized.
(Source: Bansal, Khatchatrian, and Yaron (2005)).
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3 2 1 0 21 22 23 76
78
80
82
84
86
88
92
94
96
98
log price-earnings ratio
Cons. Volatility (12 qrt.) FIGURE 2
90
P/E ratio and consumption volatility for the U.K. Both series are standardized.
3 2 1 0 21 22 23 76
78
80
82
84
86
Cons. Volatility (12 qrt.) FIGURE 3
88
90
92
94
96
98
log price-earnings ratio
P/E ratio and consumption volatility for Germany. Both series are standardized.
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Chapter 5 • Long-Run Risks and Risk Compensation in Equity Markets
3
2
1
0
21
22 76
78
80
82
84
86
Cons. Volatility (12 qrt.) FIGURE 4
88
90
92
94
96
98
log price-earnings ratio
P/E ratio and consumption volatility for Japan. Both series are standardized.
Table 3 shows the market price of risk and the breakdown of the risk premium from various risk sources. Column 1 considers the case of power utility as the IES equals the reciprocal of the risk aversion parameter. The prices of long-run risks and economic uncertainty are zero—with power utility, long-run risks and volatility risks are not priced separately. In this case, the risk premium on the consumption asset equals γσ 2 and is 0.7 percent per annum—that is, only short-run risks are priced. Column 2 of Table 3 considers the case of Epstein and Zin preferences with an IES less than one (set at 0.5). The price of long-run growth rate risks is positive and negative for volatility risks. However, the consumption asset’s beta for the long-run risks is negative. This, as discussed earlier, is because A1 is negative (see Eq. (5)), implying that a rise in expected growth lowers the wealth to consumption ratio. Consequently, long-run risks in this case contribute a negative risk premium of −1.96 percent per annum. The market price of volatility risk is negative and small; however, the asset’s beta for this risk source is large and positive, reflecting the fact that asset prices rise when economic uncertainty rises (see Eq. (10)). In all, when the IES is less than one, the risk premium on the consumption asset is negative, which is highly counterintuitive. Column 3 of Table 3 shows that when the IES is larger than one (set at 1.5), the price of long-run growth risk rises. More importantly, the asset’s beta with respect to the long-run growth risk is positive and that for volatility risk is negative—hence, both risk sources contribute toward a positive risk premium. The risk premium from long-run growth is 0.76 percent and that for the short-run consumption shock is 0.73 percent. The overall risk premium for this consumption asset is 1.52 percent. This evidence shows
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TABLE 3 Risk Components and Risk Compensation ψ = 0.1
ψ = 0.5
ψ = 1.5
mprη
93.60
93.60
93.60
mpre
0.00
137.23
160.05
mprw
0.00
−27.05
−31.56
βη
1.00
1.00
1.00
βe
−16.49
−1.83
0.61
βw
11026.45
1225.16
−408.39
prmη
0.73
0.73
0.73
prme
0.00
−1.96
0.76
prmw
0.00
−0.08
0.03
Table 3 presents model-implied components of the risk premium on the consumption asset for different values of the intertemporal elasticity of the substitution parameter, ψ. All entries are based on γ = 10. The parameters that govern the dynamics of the consumption process in Eq. (9) are identical to Bansal and Yaron (2004): ρ = 0.979, σ = 0.0078, ϕe = 0.044, ν1 = 0.987, σw = 0.23 × 10−5 , and κ1 = 0.997. The first three rows report the annualized percentage prices of risk for innovations in consumption, the expected growth risk, and the consumption volatility risk—mprη , mpre , and mprw , respectively. These prices of risks correspond to annualized percentage values for λm,η σ, λm,e σ, λm,w σw in Eq. (11). The exposures of the consumption asset to the three systematic risks, βη , βe , and βw , are presented in the middle part of the table. Total risk compensation in annual percentage terms for each risk is reported as prm∗ and equals the product of the price of risk, the standard deviation of the shock, and the beta for the specific risk.
that an IES larger than one is required for the long-run and volatility risks to carry to a positive risk premium. It is clear from Table 3 that the price of risk is highest for the long-run risks (see columns 2 and 3) and smallest for the volatility risks. A comparison of columns 2 and 3 also shows that raising the IES increases the prices of long-run and volatility risks in absolute value. The magnitudes reported in Table 3 are with ρ = 0.979—lowering this persistence parameter also lowers the prices of long-run and volatility risks (in absolute value). Increasing the risk aversion parameter increases the prices of all consumption risks, as shown in Eq. (12). Hansen and Jagannathan (1991) document the importance of the maximal Sharpe ratio, determined by the volatility of the IMRS, in assessing asset pricing models. Bansal and Yaron show that incorporating long-run risks increases the maximal Sharpe ratio for their model, and it satisfies the non-parametric bounds of Hansen and Jagannathan (1991). The risk premium on the market portfolio (i.e., the dividend asset) is also affected by the presence of long-run risks. To underscore their importance, assume that consumption and dividend growth rates are i.i.d. This shuts off the long-run risk channel. The market risk premium in this case is Et (rm,t+1 − rf ,t ) = γCov(gt+1 , gd,t+1 ) − 0.5Var(gd,t+1 ),
(14)
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Chapter 5 • Long-Run Risks and Risk Compensation in Equity Markets
and market return volatility equals the dividend growth rate volatility. If shocks to consumption and dividends are uncorrelated, then the geometric risk premium is negative and equals −0.5Var(gd,t+1 ). If the correlation between monthly consumption and dividend growth is 0.25, then the equity premium is 0.08 percent per annum—similar to the evidence documented in Mehra and Prescott (1985) and Weil (1989). Bansal and Yaron show that incorporating long-run growth rate risks (see Eq. (4)) produces an annual equity risk premium of 4.2 percent and a risk-free rate of 1.34 percent along with market return and price-dividend volatility of 16.21 percent and 0.16, respectively. These are fairly comparable to what we see in the data (see Table 2) and highlight the importance of long-run growth rate risks. Bansal and Yaron show that the full model that incorporates long-run growth rate risks and fluctuating economic uncertainty provides a very close match to the asset market data reported in Table 2. That is, this model can account for the low risk-free rate, high equity premium, high asset price volatility, and low risk-free rate volatility. This model also quantitatively matches additional data features, such as (i) predictability of returns at short and long horizons using the dividend yield as a predictive variable, (ii) time-varying and persistent market return volatility, (iii) negative correlation between market return and volatility shocks, i.e., the volatility feedback effect, (iv) negative relation between consumption volatility and asset prices at long leads and lags, documented in Bansal, Khatchatrian, and Yaron (2005). In all, this evidence shows that incorporating long-run risks in growth rates and fluctuating economic uncertainty can help interpret a wide array of the asset market puzzles.
2.4.4. Value of Contingent Claims and Macro Markets Using the Efficient Method of Moments (EMM), Bansal, Gallant, and Tauchen (2007) consider the implications of alternative asset pricing models presented in Bansal and Yaron and in Campbell and Cochrane (1999). A unique dimension of this paper is that they model the consumption and dividends as being cointegrated, a feature that is missing in earlier work of Campbell and Cochrane (1999) and Bansal and Yaron (2004). Bansal, Gallant, and Tauchen evaluate the value of contingent claims on the aggregate wealth of the economy. This is a first step in assessing the plausibility of introducing contingent claims on macro variables for better risk sharing, as espoused by Shiller (1998). This valuation exercise also helps understand the different channels operating in these models. Bansal, Gallant, and Tauchen document large differences in the prices of put options on the consumption claim across the two asset pricing models. The volatility of the consumption claim in the Bansal and Yaron model is about one-fourth that of the market return, while in the Campbell and Cochrane model it is about as volatile as the market portfolio.
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3. CROSS-SECTIONAL IMPLICATIONS 3.1. Value, Momentum, Size, and the Cross-Sectional Puzzle Table 4, taken from Bansal, Dittmar, and Lundblad (2005), shows that there are sizeable differences in mean real returns across assets. Bansal, Dittmar, and Lundblad (2005) use quarterly data from 1967 to 2001. They rely on standard book-to-market, size, and momentum sorted portfolios. For the first two sorts, firms are sorted into different deciles once a year, and the subsequent return on these portfolios is used for empirical work. For momentum assets, CRSP-covered NYSE and AMEX firms are sorted on the basis of their cumulative return over months t − 12 through t − 1. The loser portfolio (M1) includes firms with the worst performance over the last year, and the winner portfolio (M10) includes firms with the best performance. The data shows that subsequent returns on these portfolios have a large spread (i.e., M10 return − M1 return), of about 4.62 percent per quarter—this is the momentum spread puzzle. Similarly, the highest book-to-market firms (B10) earn average real quarterly returns of 3.27 percent, whereas the lowest book-to-market (B1) firms average 1.54 percent per quarter. The value spread (return on B10 − return on B1) is about 2 percent per quarter— this is the value spread puzzle. What explains these big differences in mean returns across portfolios?
TABLE 4 Portfolio Returns Mean
Std. Dev.
Mean
Std. Dev.
Mean
Std. Dev.
S1
0.0230
0.1370
B1
0.0154
0.1058
M1
−0.0104
0.1541
S2
0.0231
S3
0.0233
0.1265
B2
0.0199
0.1200
B3
0.0211
0.0956
M2
0.0070
0.1192
0.0921
M3
0.0122
S4
0.0233
0.1174
B4
0.1089
0.0218
0.0915
M4
0.0197
S5
0.0242
0.1112
0.0943
B5
0.0200
0.0798
M5
0.0135
S6
0.0207
0.0869
0.1050
B6
0.0234
0.0813
M6
0.0160
0.0876
S7 S8
0.0224
0.1041
B7
0.0237
0.0839
M7
0.0200
0.0886
0.0219
0.1001
B8
0.0259
0.0837
M8
0.0237
0.0825
S9
0.0207
0.0913
B9
0.0273
0.0892
M9
0.0283
0.0931
S10
0.0181
0.0827
B10
0.0327
0.1034
M10
0.0358
0.1139
Table 4, reported in Bansal, Dittmar, and Lundblad (2005), presents descriptive statistics for the returns on the 30 characteristic-sorted decile portfolios. Value-weighted returns are presented for portfolios formed on momentum (M), market capitalization (S), and book-to-market ratio (B). M1 represents the lowest momentum (loser) decile, S1 the lowest size (small firms) decile, and B1 the lowest book-to-market decile. Data are converted to real using the PCE deflator. The data are sampled at the quarterly frequency, and cover the first quarter of 1967 through the fourth quarter of 2001.
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Chapter 5 • Long-Run Risks and Risk Compensation in Equity Markets
The central idea, in theory, is that differences in exposure to systematic risk should justify this puzzling difference in mean returns. The static CAPM (see Sharpe (1964)) implies that these differences mirror differences in market betas of assets, while Lucas (1978) and Breeden (1979) argue that they reflect differences in exposure to aggregate consumption movements. Evidence presented in Hansen and Singleton (1982) for the consumption-based models, and in Fama and French (1992) for the CAPM, shows that these models have considerable difficulty in accounting for the differences in observable rates of return across assets. Consequently, identifying economic sources of risks that justify differences in the measured risk premia continues to be an important economic issue. Bansal, Dittmar, and Lundblad (2002, 2005) connect systematic risks to cash-flow risks. They build on the intuition developed in the Bansal and Yaron (2004) model. This intuition is provided in Eq. (8). Assume that the dividend growth rate dynamics for equity i follow Eq. (4). In equilibrium, the differences in the risk premium across assets mirror the differences in their long-run risks beta, βi , βi =
φi ϕe 1 − κ1 ρ
−
1 ϕe ψ 1 − κ1 ρ
κ1 .
(15)
An important insight is that βi risk measure differs across assets only because of the differences in φi —the exposure of dividends to long-run risks. In the cross section of assets, the systematic risks in cash flows determine the differences in the systematic risks in the asset. Assets with higher φi are more exposed to systematic risks, and agents, consequently, should demand a higher risk premium of such assets. Empirical work for cross-sectional differences in mean returns, typically, explores the link between cross-sectional mean return and the systematic risk measure, βi . That is, it considers the projection E(ri,t+1 ) = λ0 + λc βi .
(16)
As the βi and the cash-flow risks measures, φi , are correlated in the cross section, it follows that cross-sectional differences in mean returns must mirror differences in φi . Given this connection, Bansal, Dittmar, and Lundblad ask if cash-flow betas can explain differences in mean return across assets.
3.1.1. Measuring Risks in Cash Flows To measure consumption risks in cash flows (i.e., cash-flow betas), Bansal, Dittmar, and Lundblad model the joint dynamics of observed cash flow and aggregate consumption growth rates as an autoregression (VAR). I briefly discuss this below.
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Ravi Bansal
For any asset i, using the return approximation in Eq. (3), the log price minus log cash flow, pi,t − di,t , satisfies pi,t − di,t =
j κi,0 j + Et κi,1 gi,t+1+j − κi,1 ri,t+1+j . 1 − κi,1 ∞
∞
j=0
j=0
(17)
The log price − cash flow ratio is determined by the discounted expected cash-flow growth rates and discounted expected returns. The discount rate, κi,1 , is less than one by construction. Exploiting (3) and (17), it follows that return innovations are related to innovations in expectations of future cash flows and returns: ∞
ri,t − Et−1 [ri,t ] = {Et − Et−1 }
∞ j j κi,1 gi,t+j − {Et − Et−1 } κi,1 ri,t+j
j=0
j=1
= ηgi ,t − ηei ,t .
(18)
j The piece ηgi ,t = {Et − Et−1 }[ ∞ j=0 κi,1 gi,t+j ] is cash-flow news and represents the revision in expectations of the sum of future dividend growth rates. Analogously, ηei ,t represents discount rate news. Given the return decomposition, the consumption beta can be described as βi =
Cov(ηgi ,t − ηei ,t , ηt ) Cov(ri,t − Et−1 (ri,t ), ηt ) = = βi,g − βi,e , Var(ηt ) Var(ηt )
(19)
where ηt is the time t innovation in consumption growth. The consumption beta is governed by two components—the cash-flow beta and the beta of discount rate news. Bansal, Dittmar, and Lundblad ask if the cash-flow beta, βi,g , can explain differences in risk premia across assets. To estimate the cash-flow betas, they model the de-meaned log consumption growth, gc,t , as a simple AR(1) process: gc,t = ρc gc,t−1 + ηt ,
(20)
with ρc being the AR(1) coefficient and ηt the consumption news at date t. Further, they assume that the relationship between de-meaned dividend and consumption growth rates is gi,t = φi ui,t =
K 1
L j=1
K
gc,t−k + ui,t ,
(21)
k=1
ρj,i ui,t−j + ζi,t .
(22)
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Chapter 5 • Long-Run Risks and Risk Compensation in Equity Markets
The expression 1/K K k=1 gc,t−k represents a trailing K-period moving average of past consumption growth—this a measure of xt discussed above in the Bansal and Yaron (2004) model. The parameter φi measures the leverage of the dividends, as discussed in Eq. (4). This specification allows for cash-flow growth rates to depend on the current consumption innovation through the process for ζi,t . This contemporaneous covariance is reflected in the measured cash-flow betas. Equations (20), (21), and (22) characterize a simple VAR. The q-vector, Yt , is Yt = [gi,t ui,t · · · ui,t−(L−1) gc,t · · · gc,t−(K−1) ] ,
(23)
and the dynamics of the state variables and portfolio cash flow growth can then be expressed as Yt = AYt−1 + vt ,
(24)
where A is the q × q matrix of coefficients. Let the first element of Yt be gi,t such that e1 zt = gi,t , where e1 is a q × 1 vector with first element 1 and remaining elements 0. From Eq. (18), it follows that ηgi ,t is equal to ∞
ηgi ,t = {Et − Et−1 }
j
κi,1 gi,t+j
j=0
= e1
∞
j
κi,1 Aj vt
j=0
−1 = e1 I − κi,1 A vt .
(25)
This residual represents the innovation to current and expected future cash-flow growth rates. The exposure of this innovation to consumption growth is measured by projecting it on the innovation in consumption growth, specifically, ηgi ,t = βi,g ηt + ξgi ,t .
(26)
The resulting projection coefficient, βi,g , is the asset’s cash-flow beta developed in Bansal, Dittmar, and Lundblad (2002, 2005). Note that if ui,t is uncorrelated with consumption innovation, then the cross-sectional differences in the cash-flow beta based on Eq. (26) solely reflect differences in φi . Hence, if one imposes the restriction that ui,t is uncorrelated with consumption innovations, then it is sufficient to focus on φi . Given the cash flow’s consumption beta, Bansal, Dittmar, and Lundblad run the cross-sectional regression, E[Ri,t ] = λ0 + βi,g λc to evaluate the empirical plausibility of the cash-flow beta model.
(27)
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3.1.2. Dividends and Cash Flows Bansal, Dittmar, and Lundblad measure the cash flows as dividends for each portfolio in a standard manner, specifically, Rt+1 = ht+1 + yt+1 ,
(28)
where ht+1 is the price appreciation and yt+1 the dividend yield (i.e., dividends at date t + 1 per dollar invested at date t). We observe Rt+1 (RET in CRSP terminology) and the price gain series ht+1 (RET X) for each portfolio; hence, yt+1 = Rt+1 − ht+1 . The level of the dividends we use in the paper is computed as Dt+1 = yt+1 Vt ,
(29)
Vt+1 = ht+1 Vt ,
(30)
where with V0 = 1. Hence, the dividend series that we use, Dt , corresponds to the total cash dividends given out by a mutual fund at t that extracts the dividends and reinvests the capital gains. The ex-dividend value of the mutual fund is Vt , and the per dollar return for the investors in the mutual fund is Rt+1 =
Vt+1 + Dt+1 = ht+1 + yt+1 . Vt
(31)
From this equation, it is evident that Vt is the discounted value of the dividends that we use. Bansal, Dittmar, and Lundblad (2005) also use repurchase adjusted dividends and earnings as a measure of cash flows. The empirical evidence is similar to that found using cash dividends. More recently, Bansal and Yaron (2006) use market clearing restrictions as a way to identify the appropriate trading strategy to use for measuring aggregate dividends. This measure, relative to the per share-based traditionally used measure (as in Eq. (29)), incorporates the relative shift in scale of the different sectors and yields different insights into the sources of the asset price variation.
3.1.3. Performance of Cash-Flow Beta Model As predicted by the Bansal and Yaron (2004) model, the consumption leverage of divided growth rates has great explanatory power. Bansal, Dittmar, and Lundblad show that using φi or βi,g as the risk measure yields a highly positive and significant price of risk estimates of λc , and the cross-sectional R2 are well in excess of 60 percent. Using an alternative asset menu of 25 portfolios based on the Fama–French 5 × 5 two-way sort on market capitalization and book-to-market value also yields comparable results. Bansal, Dittmar, and Lundblad (2002, 2005) also ask if the cash-flow risks are related to the long-run risks of Bansal and Yaron (2004). They show that when, in Eq. (21), K = 1, the consumption risks are largely short-run risks and the cash-flow betas are not able to capture the cross-sectional differences in risk premia. Increasing K, and hence
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exaggerating the long-run risks, is important for the success of the cash-flow betas in capturing differences in mean returns across assets. In contrast, alternative models find it quite hard to explain the differences in mean returns for the 30 asset menus used in Bansal, Dittmar, and Lundblad. The standard consumption betas (i.e., C-CAPM) and the market-based CAPM asset betas have close to zero explanatory power. The R2 for the C-CAPM is 2.7 percent, and that for the market CAPM is 6.5 percent, with an implausible negative slope coefficient. The Fama and French three-factor empirical specification also generates point estimates with negative, and difficult to interpret, price of risk for the market and size factors—the cross-sectional R2 is about 36 percent. Compared to all these models, the cash-flow risks model of Bansal, Dittmar, and Lundblad is able to capture a significant portion of the differences in risk premia across assets. In addition, Bansal, Dittmar, and Lundblad (2001) and Bansal, Dittmar, and Kiku (2007) also consider a risk measure based on stochastic cointegration between the log level of dividends and consumption. This risk measure is estimated via the projection of the deterministically de-trended level of log dividends on the de-trended level of log consumption. Bansal, Dittmar, and Kiku (2007) derive new results that link this cointegration parameter to consumption betas by investment horizon and evaluate the ability of their model to explain differences in mean returns for different horizons. Hansen, Heaton, and Li (2006) inquire about the robustness of the stochastic cointegration-based risk measures considered in Bansal, Dittmar, and Lundblad (2001). Bansal, Dittmar, and Kiku provide new evidence regarding the robustness of the stochastic cointegration-based measures of permanent risks in equity markets. Parker and Julliard (2005) evaluate if long-run risks in aggregate consumption can account for the cross section of expected returns. Malloy, Moskowitz, and Vissing-Jørgensen (2006) evaluate if long-run risks in the consumption of stockholders has greater ability to explain the cross section of equity returns, relative to aggregate consumption measures. Bansal, Dittmar, and Lundblad (2005) also discuss why cash-flow risks may capture the differences in risk premia when standard consumption betas fail to do so. The Bansal and Yaron model helps explain why this may be the case—in this model of multiple risks, the consumption beta is not sufficient to capture differences in risk premia across assets. Imagine that risk premia are determined by Eq. (13), that is, there are multiple sources of risks. Let the shocks to the various risk sources be correlated, and then the standard consumption beta will measure a weighted linear combination of the three different betas. While each individual beta may be important in capturing the risk premia across assets—a weighted linear combination may fail to do so. Bansal, Dittmar, and Lundblad (2005) provide simulation evidence wherein the C-CAPM betas fail to explain the difference in mean returns across assets, while the cash-flow betas capture a sizable portion of the cross-sectional differences in mean returns. The approach pursued in Bansal, Dittmar, and Lundblad (2005) derives constant risk measures. Jagannathan and Wang (1996) and Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) focus on time-varying return betas. Deriving and measuring time-varying cash-flow betas would be a valuable extension for future research.
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4. CONCLUSION The work of Bansal and Lundblad (2002), Bansal and Yaron (2004), and Bansal, Gallant, and Tauchen (2007) show that long-run growth rate risks and varying economic uncertainty are important for quantitatively interpreting financial markets. These papers argue that investors care about the long-run growth prospects and the uncertainty surrounding the growth rate. Risks associated with changing long-run growth prospects and varying economic uncertainty drive the level of returns and asset price volatility in financial markets. A key issue in terms of the preferences of investors is their attitude toward risk as measured by risk aversion and the magnitude of the parameter that determines intertemporal substitution. Based on recent empirical evidence on the magnitude of the IES, and on its economic implications for asset markets, Bansal and Yaron argue that the IES should be larger than one. They show that only when the IES is larger than one does increased economic uncertainty translate into a drop in asset prices. Bansal, Khatchatrian, and Yaron (2005) find very robust empirical evidence that a rise in economic uncertainty lowers asset prices across different samples and countries. This evidence suggests that the IES may indeed be larger than one. Bansal, Dittmar, and Lundblad (2002, 2005) show that long-run risks in cash flows of portfolios should explain differences in mean returns across assets. They measure cash-flow risks via estimating cash-flow betas and find that the consumption risks in cash flows of portfolios explain very well the differences in mean returns across equity portfolios. Using cash flows and consumption, they devise ways to measure cash-flow betas that capture systematic risks in cash flows. These risk measures, they find, provide very sharp information about differences in risk premia across assets. They show that the cash-flow betas can explain the differences in mean returns for value, size, and momentum sorted portfolios. All of this evidence and the economics underlying it support the view that the longrun risks and uncertainty channel contain very valuable insights about the workings of financial markets.
References Abel, A. B. Risk premia and term premia in general equilibrium. Journal of Monetary Economics 43 (1999): 3–33. Anderson, E., L. P. Hansen, and T. Sargent. A quartet of semi-groups for model specification, robustness, prices of risk and model detection. Journal of the European Economic Association 1 (2003): 68–123. Ang, A., and G. Bekaert. Stock return predictability: Is it there? Review of Financial Studies 20 (2007): 651–707. Ansley, C. F., and P. Newbold. Finite sample properties of estimators for autoregressive moving average models. Journal of Econometrics 13 (1980): 159–184. Attanasio, P. O., and A. Vissing-Jorgensen. Stock market participation, intertemporal substitution and risk aversion. American Economic Review 93 (2003): 383–391. Attanasio, P. O., and G. Weber. Intertemporal substitution, risk aversion and the Euler equation for consumption. Economic Journal 99 (1989): 59–73.
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Chapter 5 • Long-Run Risks and Risk Compensation in Equity Markets Bansal, R., R. F. Dittmar, and D. Kiku. Cointegration and consumption risks in asset returns. Review of Financial Studies forthcoming (2007). Bansal, R., R. F. Dittmar, and C. Lundblad. Consumption, dividends and the cross-section of equity returns. Working paper. Duke University (2001). Bansal, R., R. F. Dittmar, and C. Lundblad. Interpreting risk premia across size, value, and industry portfolios. Working paper. Duke University (2002). Bansal, R., R. F. Dittmar, and C. Lundblad. Consumption, dividends and the cross-section of equity returns. Journal of Finance 60 (2005): 1639–1672. Bansal, R., R. A. Gallant, and G. Tauchen. Rational pessimism, rational exuberance, and asset pricing models. Review of Economic Studies forthcoming (2007). Bansal, R., V. Khatchatrian, and A. Yaron. Interpretable asset markets? European Economic Review 49 (2005): 531–560. Bansal, R., and C. Lundblad. Market efficiency, asset returns, and the size of the risk premium in global equity markets. Journal of Econometrics 109 (2002): 195–237. Bansal, R., and A. Yaron. Risks for the long run: A potential resolution of asset pricing puzzles. Journal of Finance 59 (2004): 1481–1509. Bansal, R., and A. Yaron. The asset pricing-macro nexus and return-cash flow predictability. Working paper. Duke University (2006). Barsky, R., and B. J. DeLong. Why does the stock market fluctuate? Quarterly Journal of Economics 108 (1993): 291–312. Breeden, D. T. An intertemporal asset pricing model with stochastic consumption and investment opportunities. Journal of Financial Economics 7 (1979): 265–296. Campbell, J. Y. Asset prices, consumption and the business cycle, in J. B. Taylor, and M. Woodford, eds., Handbook of Macroeconomics, Volume 1. Elsevier Science, North-Holland, Amsterdam (1999). Campbell, J. Y., and J. H. Cochrane. By force of habit: A consumption-based explanation of aggregate stock market behavior. Journal of Political Economy 107 (1999): 205–251. Campbell, J. Y., and R. J. Shiller. The dividend-price ratio and expectations of future dividends and discount factors. Review of Financial Studies 1 (1988): 195–227. Cecchetti, S. G., P.-S., Lam, and N. C. Mark. The equity premium and the risk free rate: Matching the moments. Journal of Monetary Economics 31 (1993): 21–46. Cochrane, J. H. How big is the random walk in GNP? Journal of Political Economy 96 (1988): 893–920. Epstein, L., and S. Zin. Substitution, risk aversion and the temporal behavior of consumption and asset returns: A theoretical framework. Econometrica 57 (1989): 937–969. Fama, E., and K. French. The cross-section of expected stock returns. Journal of Finance 59 (1992): 427–465. Guvenen, F. Reconciling conflicting evidence on the elasticity of intertemporal substitution: A macroeconomic perspective. Journal of Monetary Economics 53 (2006): 1451–1472. Hall, R. E. Intertemporal substitution in consumption. Journal of Political Economy 96 (1988): 339–357. Hansen, L. P., J. Heaton, and N. Li. Consumption strikes back? Measuring long-run risk. Working paper. University of Chicago (2006). Hansen, L. P., and R. Jagannathan. Implications of security market data for models of dynamic economies, Journal of Political Economy 99 (1991): 225–262. Hansen, L. P., and K. Singleton. Generalized instrumental variables estimation of nonlinear rational expectations models. Econometrica 50 (1982): 1269–1286. Hurwicz, L. Least square bias in time series, in T. Koopmans, ed., Statistical Inference in Dynamic Economic Models. Wiley Press, New York (1950). Jagannathan, R., and Z. Wang. The conditional CAPM and the cross-section of expected returns. Journal of Finance 51 (1996): 3–54. Judd, K. Numerical Methods in Economics. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA (1998). Kandel, S., and R. F. Stambaugh. Asset returns and intertemporal preferences. Journal of Monetary Economics 27 (1991): 39–71. LeRoy, S., and R. Porter. The present value relation: Tests based on implied variance bounds. Econometrica 49 (1981): 555–574.
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193 Lettau, M., and S. Ludvigson. Resurrecting the (C)CAPM: A cross-sectional test when risk premia are time-varying. Journal of Political Economy 109 (2001): 1238–1287. Lucas, R. Asset prices in an exchange economy. Econometrica 46 (1978): 1429–1446. Malloy, C. J., T. J. Moskowitz, and A. Vissing-Jorgensen. Long-run stockholder consumption risk and asset returns. Working paper. University of Chicago (2006). Mehra, R., and E. C. Prescott. The equity premium: A puzzle. Journal of Monetary Economics 15 (1985): 145–161. Newey, W. K., and K. D. West. A simple, positive semi-definite, heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix. Econometrica 55 (1987): 703–708. Parker, J., and C. Julliard. Consumption risk and the cross-section of expected returns. Journal of Political Economy 113 (2005): 185–222. Sharpe, W. Capital asset prices: A theory of market equilibrium under conditions of risk. Journal of Finance 19 (1964): 425–442. Shephard, N. G., and A. C. Harvey. On the probability of estimating a deterministic component in the local level model, Journal of Time Series Analysis 11 (1990): 339–347. Shiller, R. J. Do stock prices move too much to be justified by subsequent changes in dividends? American Economic Review 71 (1981): 421–436. Shiller, R. J. Macro markets: Creating institutions for managing society’s largest economic risks. Oxford University Press, New York (1998). Weil, P. The equity premium puzzle and the risk-free rate puzzle. Journal of Monetary Economics 24 (1989): 401–421.
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Discussion: Long-Run Risks and Risk Compensation in Equity Markets John Heaton Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago, and NBER
1. SUMMARY Bansal and his co-authors have produced a series of important and provocative papers that demonstrate how low-frequency risk can provide a justification for observed risk premia. Bansal summarizes this work and helps us understand the linkages between long-run risk in consumption and long-run risk in financial securities. Since he does such a nice job of explaining the economics of the approach, I focus on a few issues raised by Bansal’s work and by some of my own.
2. A LOW-FREQUENCY COMPONENT IN CONSUMPTION? An important aspect of the model of Bansal and Yaron (2004) is the presence of a lowfrequency component in aggregate consumption. Shocks to the level of consumption are persistent, as are shocks to volatility. A substantial and time-varying equity premium results when dividends display exposure to the shocks. It is natural to ask whether there is any empirical support for the assumed model of consumption. As Bansal argues, one piece of evidence may come from financial markets. Agents could use the model’s structure along with signals from asset prices to detect the low-frequency component. This may take the rational expectations assumption to an untenable position, however. Unless agents directly observe the low-frequency shocks driving consumption, it is not clear how the shocks could be reflected in security prices. Appealing to the standard idea that the econometrician observes a smaller information set than agents is also a little delicate in this context. In the model of preferences considered by Bansal and Yaron (2004), the exact conditioning information of the agents is needed in order to derive the implications of the model.
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An interesting way of introducing a concern for low-frequency components, even when agents have a hard time detecting those components, is provided by the recent work of Hansen and Sargent (2007). In their work the representative agent is uncertain about the probability model generating consumption. There are two alternative models: one where consumption is not predictable and one where consumption is predictable. Because the agent is worried about model uncertainty, she acts as if there is a very high probability attached to the model with predictable consumption. This model generates both the high-risk premia consistent with a low-frequency component in consumption, and consumption dynamics that are difficult to distinguish from an i.i.d. model. There is evidence in the literature for an important predictable low-frequency component to consumption. This evidence is typically obtained using additional variables to predict consumption along with plausible economic linkages across variables. Examples include the work of Fisher (2006) and Mulligan (2002). In Hansen et al. (2006a) we consider a bivariate model for aggregate consumption and aggregate corporate earnings. We present evidence that corporate earnings are co-integrated with aggregate consumption as predicted by most models of business cycles and economic growth. Under the co-integration assumption, corporate earnings reveal important long-run shocks to consumption. To illustrate this, Figure 1 reports the impulse response of aggregate consumption to the two shocks in the model.1 We call the first shock a “consumption shock”; it impacts both consumption and earnings contemporaneously. In contrast, the second shock impacts earnings contemporaneously but has no immediate impact on consumption. We call this shock an “earnings shock.” Shocks to corporate earnings predict consumption over many quarters and reveal an important low-frequency component of consumption similar to the setup considered by Bansal and Yaron (2004).
3. PREFERENCES In his work, Bansal employs the recursive specification of preferences developed by Kreps and Porteus (1978), Epstein and Zin (1989b), Weil (1990), and others. In the context of models with long-run consumption risk, this model of preferences is useful because it induces a concern for the resolution of uncertainty. In a standard model with time-additive CRRA utility, risk prices are determined by risk aversion and the oneperiod or instantaneous impact of shocks on consumption. With recursive preferences, the long-run impact of shocks on consumption also influences risk prices. Shocks that strongly predict future consumption have larger risk premia. Calibration of the models considered by Bansal does run into the problem that consumption is not that volatile even in the long run. Large levels of risk aversion are typically needed to fit aggregate and cross-sectional risk premia. An advantage of the assumption of recursive preference is that the effects of high risk aversion on the level of 1 This
figure is taken from Hansen et al. (2006b).
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196 0.01 0.009 0.008 0.007
Impulse Response
0.006 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.001 0 0
5
10 Horizon (years)
depicts response to a consumption shock
FIGURE 1
15
20
depicts response to an earnings shock
Impulse responses implied by the VAR of the Hansen–Heaton–Li model.
interest rates can be controlled by assuming the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES) is close to 1. In the calibration exercise considered by Bansal and Yaron (2004), the IES parameter is assumed to be greater than 1 so that shocks that forecast increased future consumption also increase the price-to-dividend ratio or wealth-to-consumption ratio. This produces the desired effect that shocks that forecast future consumption have a magnified risk premium. In the model, this is captured by variation in the market return, which becomes part of the stochastic discount factor with recursive utility. There is some controversy over the value of the IES parameter used by Bansal and Yaron (2004) because of other evidence in the literature. In particular, the typical assumption is that the IES parameter is less than 1. As Bansal points out, however, many of the existing estimates in the literature are sensitive to the assumption that consumption is homoskedastic. This identification problem is potentially magnified if the true underlying preferences are of the recursive form as shown by Hansen et al. (2006b). An issue related to the assumption about the IES parameter is the solution method used by Bansal and many others in the literature. The general stochastic discount factor induced by recursive preferences has a term in consumption growth and a term in the
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“continuation value” due to future consumption. Following earlier work by Epstein and Zin (1989a), shocks to the “continuation value” are replaced by shocks to the return to holding a claim on aggregate consumption (the “market” return). This generates a proper solution to the model except for the case of logarithmic intertemporal risk preferences (IES = 1). At this point the wealth-to-consumption ratio is constant so that the market return covaries exactly with consumption. Shocks to future consumption still matter to the consumer, but the continuation value from future consumption plans must be calculated directly. Shocks to the derived continuation value then enter the stochastic discount factor. In Hansen et al. (2006a), we show how the continuation value can be calculated in a log-linear stochastic environment with logarithmic intertemporal utility. Further, we develop an approximation to the case of a more general value of the IES parameter that works well for values of the IES near 1. This approach is extended to an environment with stochastic volatility in Hansen et al. (2006b). An advantage of this method of solution is that it allows for the consideration of values for the IES parameter close to 1, where the more typical use of the return to the market portfolio breaks down.
4. RETURNS AND LONG-RUN CASH FLOWS In his work with Lundlad and Dittmar, Bansal develops the idea of a “cash flow” beta where the long-run covariance between consumption and dividends is assumed to drive risk premia. Measured differences in this long-run covariance across portfolio cash flows do coincide with observed differences in average returns to the portfolios. This is an important finding because there is very little heterogeneity in the contemporaneous covariance between shocks to consumption and the returns to the portfolios considered by Bansal. This is reflected in the well-established fact that the consumption CAPM cannot explain the value premium, the size effect, and other observed risk premia. The contrast between the cash flow beta measure of risk and the contemporaneous covariance between returns and shocks to consumption creates a tension. One potential resolution of this tension could be that the short-run dynamics of risk exposure are difficult to model or measure. For example, there could be important market frictions, behavioral biases, or general model misspecification. In these situations, the long-run covariances between returns and consumption (as in Daniel and Marshall (1997)), or between long-run shocks to consumption and portfolio cash flows may be more appropriate measures of risk. If short-run implications are to be ignored, what do we mean by the “short run?” One way to answer this question is to specify a complete model of pricing and then examine the model’s predictions for the pricing of a portfolio’s cash flows at different frequencies. For example, the holding period returns for each future cash flow can be calculated. The one-period portfolio return is just a weighted average of these individual returns. By ignoring the contribution from short-term cash flows, a long-run return is calculated. Alternatively, the rate at which the price of future cash flows declines relative to the predicted growth in cash flows can be used to infer a long-run return. These
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alternative specifications of long-run returns and their long-run limits are developed in Hansen et al. (2006a).2 We apply our analysis to portfolios of growth and value stocks. Consistent with the results in Bansal et al. (2005), we find that portfolios of value stocks are predicted to have high long-run returns.
5. CONCLUSION Bansal’s paper does a nice job of summarizing his work and showing why the consideration of long-run risk can potentially help us to understand observed security prices. The paper also points the way toward the work to be done both in modeling the dynamics of consumption and in understanding how long-run risk is priced.
References Bansal, R., and A. Yaron. Risks for the long run: A potential resolution of asset pricing puzzles. Journal of Finance 59 (2004): 1481–1509. Bansal, R., R. F. Dittmar, and C. T. Lundblad. Consumption, dividends, and the cross-section of equity returns. Journal of Finance (2005). Daniel, K., and D. Marshall. Equity-premium and risk-free-rate puzzles at long horizons. Macroeconomic Dynamics 1 (1997): 452–484. Epstein, L., and S. Zin. Substitution, risk aversion and the temporal behavior of stock returns: An empirical investigation. Journal of Political Economy 99 (1989a): 263–286. Epstein, L. G., and S. E. Zin. Substitution, risk aversion, and the temporal behavior of consumption and asset returns: A theoretical framework. Econometrica 57 (1989b): 937–969. Fisher, J. The dynamic effects of neutral and investment-specific technology shocks. Journal of Political Economy (2006). Hansen, L. P., and T. J. Sargent. Fragile beliefs and the price of model uncertainty. Working paper. University of Chicago (2007). Hansen, L. P., and J. Scheinkman. Long term risk: An operator approach. Working paper. University of Chicago (2006). Hansen, L. P., J. C. Heaton, and N. Li. Consumption strikes back?: Measuring long run risk. Working paper. University of Chicago (2006a). Hansen, L. P., J. Heaton, N. Roussanov, and J. Lee. Intertemporal substitution and risk aversion. Handbook of Econometrics, volume 6 forthcoming (2006b). Kreps, D. M., and E. L. Porteus, Temporal resolution of uncertainty and dynamic choice. Econometrica 46 (1978): 185–200. Mulligan, C. Capital, interest, and aggregate intertemporal substitution. Working paper. NBER (2002). Weil, P. Nonexpected utility in macroeconomics. Quarterly Journal of Economics 105 (1990): 29–42.
2 The
analysis in Hansen et al. (2006a) is conducted in a log-linear environment. Hansen and Scheinkman (2006) extend this to more general environments.
CHAPTER 6
The Loss Aversion/Narrow Framing Approach to the Equity Premium Puzzle Nicholas Barberis and Ming Huang Yale University and Cornell University/SUFE
1. Introduction 2. Loss Aversion and Narrow Framing 3. The Equity Premium 3.1. Modeling Loss Aversion and Narrow Framing 3.2. Quantitative Implications 3.3. Attitudes to Large Monetary Gambles 3.4. Attitudes to Small Monetary Gambles 3.5. The Importance of Narrow Framing 4. Other Applications 5. Further Extensions 5.1. Dynamic Aspects of Loss Aversion 5.2. Other Forms of Narrow Framing 6. Conclusion and Future Directions References
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We thank Rajnish Mehra for inviting us to contribute a chapter, and are grateful to him and to participants in the “20th Anniversary of the Equity Premium” conference in Santa Barbara, California, for valuable feedback. Huang acknowledges financial support from the National Natural Science Foundation of China under grant 70432002.
HANDBOOK OF THE EQUITY RISK PREMIUM c 2008 by Elsevier B.V. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved. Copyright
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Abstract We review a recent approach to understanding the equity premium puzzle. The key elements of this approach are loss aversion and narrow framing, two well-known features of decision-making under risk in experimental settings. In equilibrium, models that incorporate these ideas can generate a large equity premium and a low and stable risk-free rate, even when consumption growth is smooth and only weakly correlated with the stock market. Moreover, they can do so for parameter values that correspond to sensible attitudes to independent monetary gambles. We conclude by suggesting some possible directions for future research. JEL Classification: G10, G11, D9 Keywords: asset pricing, equity risk premium, CAPM, consumption CAPM, risk-free rate puzzle
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1. INTRODUCTION One of the best-known stock market puzzles is the equity premium puzzle, which asks why stocks historically earned a higher average return, relative to T-bills, than seems justified by standard measures of risk (Mehra and Prescott (1985)). In this essay, we discuss a recent approach to addressing this puzzle. The broad theme of this approach is that we may be able to improve our understanding of how people evaluate stock market risk, and hence our understanding of the equity premium, by looking at how people evaluate risk in experimental settings. Specifically, this approach argues that loss aversion and narrow framing, two of the most important ideas to emerge from the experimental literature on decision-making under risk, may play an important role in the way some people think about the stock market. Loss aversion is a central feature of Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory—a descriptive theory, based on extensive experimental evidence, of how people evaluate risk. In this theory, the carriers of value are not absolute levels of wealth, but rather, gains and losses measured relative to a reference point. Loss aversion is the finding that people are much more sensitive to losses—even small losses—than to gains of the same magnitude. To understand narrow framing, recall that under traditional utility functions defined over consumption or total wealth, the agent evaluates a new gamble by first mixing it with the other risks he is already facing and then checking whether the combination is attractive. Narrow framing, by contrast, is the phenomenon documented in experimental settings whereby, when people are offered a new gamble, they sometimes evaluate it in isolation, separately from their other risks. In other words, they act as if they get utility directly from the outcome of the gamble, even if the gamble is just one of many that determine their overall wealth risk. This behavior is at odds with traditional utility functions, under which the agent only gets utility from the outcome of a new gamble indirectly, via its contribution to his total wealth. Motivated by these ideas, some recent papers propose that people are loss-averse over changes in the value of their stock market holdings. In other words, even if stock market risk is just one of many risks that determine their overall wealth risk—others being labor income risk and housing risk, say—people still get utility directly from stock market fluctuations (narrow framing) and are more sensitive to losses than to gains (loss aversion). For reasons we discuss later, most implementations also assume that people focus on annual gains and losses. Informally, then, people evaluate stock market risk by saying, “Well, stocks could go up over the next year, and that would feel good; but they could also go down, and since I’m more sensitive to losses than to gains, that would be really painful. Overall, the stock market doesn’t look like an attractive risk to me.” According to the approach we describe in this essay, it is this sort of thinking that leads the investing population to demand a high equity premium. Why should economists be interested in this particular approach to the equity premium puzzle? What are its selling points? In this survey, we emphasize two. First, a model that incorporates loss aversion and narrow framing can generate a high equity premium while also matching other aspects of the data, such as the low and stable
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risk-free rate, the low volatility of consumption growth, and the low correlation of stock returns and consumption growth. With some additional structure, it can also match the high volatility and time-series predictability of stock returns. A second benefit of the framework described here is that it can address the equity premium puzzle for preference parameters that are “reasonable,” by which we mean parameters that correspond to sensible attitudes to independent monetary gambles. This is important because it was, in part, the difficulty researchers encountered in reconciling the high average return on stocks with reasonable attitudes to large-scale monetary gambles that launched the equity premium literature in the first place. The approach we survey here was first proposed by Benartzi and Thaler (1995). In their framework, the investor is loss-averse over fluctuations in the value of his financial wealth, which, since financial wealth is just one component of total wealth, constitutes narrow framing. One drawback of this framework is that, since the investor gets no direct utility at all from consumption or total wealth, consumption plays no role, making it hard to check how well the model describes the joint properties of stock returns and consumption growth. Benartzi and Thaler’s work therefore opens up a new challenge: to build and evaluate more realistic models in which, even if the investor gets utility from fluctuations in the value of one component of his wealth, he also gets some utility from consumption. In large part, this essay surveys the progress that has been made on this front, drawing primarily on the analysis of Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001) and Barberis and Huang (2004). The story we tell in this essay is a simple one: investors require a high equity premium because any drop in the stock market over the next year will bring them direct disutility. To some readers, this story may be too simple, in that the distance between assumption and conclusion may appear too close for comfort. We are aware of this concern and agree that if the loss aversion/narrow framing framework is to gain currency, its predictions must be tested and confirmed. Fortunately, tests of the framework are starting to appear, and we discuss some of them at the end of the essay. Even before the outcome of these tests is known, however, there is a methodological contribution in the research surveyed here that even a skeptical reader can appreciate: the papers we discuss show how loss aversion and narrow framing can be incorporated into more traditional models of asset pricing, thereby helping us understand the predictions of these features of decision-making. In Section 2, we discuss loss aversion and narrow framing in more detail, examining both the evidence they are inferred from and the interpretations they are given. In Section 3, we show that, once embedded into more traditional utility functions, these features can generate a high equity premium and a low and stable risk-free rate, even when consumption growth is smooth and only weakly correlated with stock returns; and moreover, that they can do so for parameter values that correspond to sensible attitudes to both large-scale and small-scale monetary gambles. We highlight the importance of the narrow framing assumption by showing that, without this feature, the results are very different. In Section 4, we note that the analysis also has implications for a portfolio puzzle, the stock market participation puzzle. Section 5 considers various
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extensions of the basic framework, while Section 6 concludes and discusses possible directions for future research. Since loss aversion and narrow framing are the defining features of the approach we describe here, the framework should, strictly speaking, be called the “loss aversion and narrow framing” approach to the equity premium puzzle. Given that narrow framing is the more distinctive of the two ingredients, we sometimes abbreviate this to the “narrow framing” approach.1
2. LOSS AVERSION AND NARROW FRAMING Loss aversion is a central feature of Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory, a prominent descriptive theory of decision-making under risk. In this theory, the carriers of value are not absolute wealth levels but, rather, gains and losses measured relative to a reference point. Loss aversion is a greater sensitivity to losses—even small losses—than to gains of the same magnitude and is represented by a kink in the utility function. The most basic evidence for loss aversion is the fact that people tend to reject gambles of the form
1 1 , (1) 110, ; −100, 2 2 to be read as “win $110 with probability 1/2, lose $100 with probability 1/2, independent of other risks” (Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Tversky and Kahneman (1992)). It is hard to explain this evidence with differentiable utility functions, whether expected utility or non-expected utility, because the very high local risk aversion required to do so typically predicts an implausibly high level of aversion to large-scale gambles (Epstein and Zin (1990), Rabin (2000), Barberis, Huang, and Thaler (2006)).2 For reasons of tractability, the asset pricing models we describe later do not incorporate all features of prospect theory. However, even if it were possible to solve a dynamic asset pricing model that did incorporate all of prospect theory’s features, we would not expect the implications for the equity premium to be very different. Under prospect theory, attitudes to a gamble like the stock market, which entails a moderate probability of a gain or of a loss, are largely determined by loss aversion alone.3 1 Benartzi and Thaler (1995) use the label “myopic loss aversion.” By using this phrase, they emphasize the investor’s sensitivity to losses (loss aversion) and his focus on annual gains and losses (myopia), but not the narrow framing. As we will see, narrow framing is more crucial to the results than the annual evaluation of gains and losses. We therefore prefer to emphasize the narrow framing while playing down the myopia. 2 There is also strong evidence of what Thaler (1980) calls an “endowment effect,” which can be thought of as loss aversion in the absence of uncertainty. Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1990) conduct a series of experiments in which subjects are either given some object such as a coffee mug and then asked if they would be willing to sell it, or not given a mug and then offered the chance to buy one. The authors find that mug owners demand more than twice as much to sell their mugs as non-owners are willing to pay to acquire one. 3 The asset pricing implications of other features of prospect theory are studied, in simple settings, by Barberis and Huang (2005), who focus on the probability weighting function; and by Barberis and Xiong (2005) and Gomes (2005), who focus on the concavity (convexity) of the value function over gains (losses).
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The classic demonstration of narrow framing is due to Tversky and Kahneman (1981), who ask 150 subjects the following question: Imagine that you face the following pair of concurrent decisions. First examine both decisions, and then indicate the options you prefer. Choice I. Choose between A. a sure gain of $240, B. a 25 percent chance to gain $1,000 and a 75 percent chance to gain nothing. Choice II. Choose between C. a sure loss of $750, D. a 75 percent chance to lose $1,000 and a 25 percent chance to lose nothing. Tversky and Kahneman (1981) report that 84 percent of subjects chose A, with only 16 percent choosing B, and that 87 percent chose D, with only 13 percent choosing C. In particular, 73 percent of subjects chose the combination A&D, namely a 25% chance to win $240, a 75% chance to lose $760,
(2)
which is surprising, given that this choice is dominated by the combination B&C, namely a 25% chance to win $250, a 75% chance to lose $750.
(3)
It appears that instead of focusing on the combined outcome of decisions I and II—in other words, on the outcome that determines their final wealth—subjects are focusing on the outcome of each decision separately. Indeed, subjects who are asked only about decision I do overwhelmingly choose A; and subjects asked only about decision II do overwhelmingly choose D. In more formal terms, it appears that we cannot model the typical subject as maximizing a utility function defined only over total wealth. Rather, his utility function appears to depend directly on the outcome of each of decisions I and II, rather than just indirectly, via the contribution of each decision to overall wealth. As such, this is an example of narrow framing. More recently, Barberis, Huang, and Thaler (2006) have argued that the commonly observed rejection of the gamble in Eq. (1) is not only evidence of loss aversion, but of narrow framing as well. To see why, note that most of the subjects who are offered this gamble are typically already facing other kinds of risk, such as labor income risk, housing risk, or financial market risk. In the absence of narrow framing, they must therefore evaluate the 110/100 gamble by mixing it with these other risks and then checking if the combination is attractive. It turns out that the combination is almost always attractive: since the 110/100 gamble is independent of other risks, it offers useful diversification benefits, which, even if loss averse, people can enjoy. The rejection of the
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110/100 gamble therefore suggests that people are not fully merging the gamble with their other risks, but that, to some extent, they are evaluating it in isolation; in other words, that they are framing it narrowly. By the same token, any evidence of aversion to a small, independent, actuarially favorable risk points to a possible role for narrow framing. Examples of such evidence in the field are the high premia consumers pay for telephone wiring insurance and the low deductibles chosen in automobile insurance contracts (Cicchetti and Dubin (1994), Rabin and Thaler (2001), Cohen and Einav (2005)).4 Motivated by these ideas, some recent papers propose that people are loss-averse over changes in the value of their stock market holdings. In other words, even if stock market risk is just one of many risks that determine their overall wealth risk—others being labor income risk and housing risk, say—people still get utility directly from stock market fluctuations (narrow framing) and are more sensitive to losses than to gains (loss aversion). Is it plausible that people might frame stock market risk narrowly? To answer this, it is helpful to first think about the underlying sources of narrow framing. One view is that narrow framing stems from non-consumption utility, such as regret. Regret is the pain we feel when we realize that we would be better off today if we had taken a different action in the past. Even if a gamble that an agent accepts is just one of many risks that he faces, it is still linked to a specific decision, namely the decision to accept the gamble. As a result, it exposes the agent to possible future regret: if the gamble turns out badly, he may regret the decision to accept it. Consideration of non-consumption utility therefore leads quite naturally to preferences that depend directly on the outcomes of specific gambles the agent faces. A second interpretation of narrow framing is proposed by Kahneman (2003). He argues that it occurs when decisions are made intuitively, rather than through effortful reasoning. Since intuitive thoughts are by nature spontaneous, they are heavily shaped by the features of the situation at hand that come to mind most easily; to use the technical term, by the features that are most “accessible.” When an agent is offered a new gamble, the distribution of the gamble, considered separately, is much more accessible than the distribution of his overall wealth once the new gamble has been merged with his other risks. As a result, if the agent thinks about the gamble intuitively, the distribution of the gamble, taken alone, may play a more important role in decision-making than would be predicted by traditional utility functions defined only over wealth or consumption. In Tversky and Kahneman’s (1981) example, the outcome of each one of choices A, B, C, or D is highly accessible. Much less accessible, though, is the overall outcome once two choices—A&D, say, or B&C—are combined: the distributions in (2) and (3) are less “obvious” than the distributions of A, B, C, and D given in the original question. As a result, the outcome of each of decisions I and II may play a bigger role in decisionmaking than predicted by traditional utility functions. Similar reasoning applies in the case of the 110/100 gamble. 4 For more discussion and evidence of narrow framing, see Kahneman and Tversky (1983), Tversky and Kahneman (1986), Redelmeier and Tversky (1992), Kahneman and Lovallo (1993), and Read, Loewenstein, and Rabin (1999).
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It seems to us that both the “regret” and “accessibility” interpretations of narrow framing could be relevant when investors—even sophisticated investors—think about stock market risk. Allocating some fraction of his wealth to the stock market constitutes a specific action on the part of the agent—one that he may later regret if his stock market gamble turns out poorly.5 Alternatively, given our daily exposure, through newspapers, books, and other media, to large amounts of information about the distribution of stock market risk, such information is very accessible. Much less accessible is information about the distribution of future outcomes once stock risk is merged with the other kinds of risk that people face. Judgments about how much to invest in stocks might therefore be made, at least in part, using a narrow frame. The accessibility interpretation of narrow framing also provides a rationale for why investors might focus on annual gains and losses in the stock market. Much of the public discussion about the historical performance of different asset classes is couched in terms of annual returns, making the annual return distribution particularly accessible.6 While Tversky and Kahneman’s (1981) experiment provides conclusive evidence of narrow framing, it is also somewhat extreme in that, in this example, narrow framing leads subjects to choose a dominated alternative. In general, narrow framing does not necessarily lead to violations of dominance. All the same, Tversky and Kahneman’s (1981) example does raise the concern that, when applied to asset pricing, narrow framing might give rise to arbitrage opportunities. To ensure that this does not happen, the analysis in Section 3 focuses on applications to absolute pricing—in other words, to the pricing of assets, like the aggregate stock market, which lack perfect substitutes. Since the substitutes are imperfect, there are no riskless arbitrage opportunities in the economies we construct. We would not expect narrow framing to have much useful application to relative pricing: in this case, any impact that narrow framing had on prices would create an arbitrage opportunity that could be quickly exploited. While the regret and accessibility interpretations both suggest that narrow framing may play a role when people evaluate stock market risk, they make different predictions as to how long-lasting this role will be. Under the regret interpretation, the agent simply gets utility from things other than consumption and takes this into account when making decisions. Since he is acting optimally, there is no reason to expect his behavior 5 Of course, investing in T-bills may also lead to regret if the stock market goes up in the meantime. Regret is thought to be stronger, however, when it stems from having taken an action—for example, actively moving one’s savings from the default option of a riskless bank account to the stock market—than from having not taken an action—for example, leaving one’s savings in place at the bank. In short, errors of commission are more painful than errors of omission (Kahneman and Tversky (1982)). 6 Clever tests of this logic can be found in Gneezy and Potters (1997) and Thaler et al. (1997). The latter paper, for example, asks subjects how they would allocate between a risk-free asset and a risky asset over a long time horizon such as 30 years. The key manipulation is that some subjects are shown draws from the distribution of asset returns over short horizons—the distribution of monthly returns, say—while others are shown draws from a long-term return distribution—the distribution of 30-year returns, say. Since they have the same decision problem, the two groups of subjects should make similar allocation decisions: subjects who see short-term returns should simply use them to infer the more directly relevant long-term returns. In fact, these subjects allocate substantially less to the risky asset, suggesting that they are simply falling back on the returns that are most accessible to them, namely the short-term returns they were shown. Since losses occur more often in high-frequency data, they perceive the risky asset to be especially risky and allocate less to it.
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to change over time. Narrow framing is therefore likely to be a permanent feature of preferences, and if it leads the agent to demand a high equity premium today, then it will lead him to demand a high equity premium in the future as well. Suppose, however, that narrow framing instead stems from intuitive thinking and from basing decisions only on “accessible” information. In this case, the agent would be happier with a different decision rule, but has failed to go through the effortful reasoning required to uncover that rule. We would therefore expect the agent’s behavior to change over time, as he learns that his intuitive thinking is leading him astray, and either through his own efforts, or by observing the actions of others, discovers a better decision rule. If accessibility-based narrow framing is driving the equity premium, we would expect the premium to fall over time as investors gradually switch away from narrow framing. Our discussion has treated loss aversion and narrow framing as two distinct phenomena. Recent work, however, suggests that they may form a natural pair, because in those situations where people exhibit loss aversion, they often also exhibit narrow framing. For example, as noted above, the rejection of the 110/100 gamble in (1) points not only to loss aversion, but to narrow framing as well. Kahneman (2003) suggests an explanation for why loss aversion and narrow framing might appear in combination like this. He argues that prospect theory captures the way people act when making decisions intuitively, rather than through effortful reasoning. Since narrow framing is also thought to derive, at least in part, from intuitive decisionmaking, it is natural that prospect theory, and therefore also loss aversion, would be used in parallel with narrow framing.
3. THE EQUITY PREMIUM In this section, we discuss various ways of modeling loss aversion and narrow framing and then demonstrate the advantages, from the perspective of addressing the equity premium puzzle, of a model that incorporates these features of decision-making. Specifically, in Section 3.2, we show that such a model can generate a high equity premium at the same time as a low and stable risk-free rate, even when consumption growth is smooth and only weakly correlated with stock returns; and then, in Section 3.3, that it can do so for preference parameters that correspond to reasonable attitudes to large-scale monetary gambles.
3.1. Modeling Loss Aversion and Narrow Framing Benartzi and Thaler (1995) are the first to apply loss aversion and narrow framing in the context of the aggregate stock market. They consider an investor who is loss-averse over changes in the value of his financial wealth, defined here as holdings of T-bills and stocks. Since financial wealth is just one component of overall wealth—others being human capital and housing wealth—defining utility directly over fluctuations in financial wealth constitutes narrow framing.
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Benartzi and Thaler (1995) argue that, in equilibrium, their investor charges a high equity premium. The reason is that the high volatility of stock returns leads to substantial volatility in returns on financial wealth. Given that he is more sensitive to losses than to gains, these fluctuations in his financial wealth cause the investor substantial discomfort. As a result, he only holds the market supply of stocks if compensated by a high average return. A weakness of Benartzi and Thaler’s (1995) framework is that, since the investor gets direct utility only from changes in the value of his financial wealth, and none at all from consumption or total wealth, consumption plays no role, making it hard to check how well the model describes the joint properties of stock returns and consumption growth. An important challenge therefore remains: to build and evaluate a more realistic model in which, even if the investor gets utility from fluctuations in the value of one component of his wealth, he also gets some utility from consumption. Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001) take up this challenge. Before presenting their specification, we introduce the basic economic structure that will apply throughout our essay. At time t, the investor, whose wealth is denoted Wt , chooses a consumption level Ct and allocates his post-consumption wealth, Wt − Ct , across three assets. The first asset is risk-free and earns a gross return of Rf ,t between t and t + 1. The second asset is the stock market, which earns a gross return of RS,t+1 over the same interval, and the third is a non-financial asset, such as human capital or housing wealth, which earns a gross return of RN,t+1 . The investor’s wealth therefore evolves according to Wt+1 = (Wt − Ct )((1 − θS,t − θN,t )Rf ,t + θS,t RS,t+1 + θN,t RN,t+1 ) ≡ (Wt − Ct )RW ,t+1 ,
(4)
where θS,t (θN,t ) is the fraction of post-consumption wealth allocated to the stock market (the non-financial asset) and RW ,t+1 is the gross return on wealth between t and t + 1. A stripped-down version of Barberis, Huang, and Santos’ (2001) framework can be written as follows. The investor maximizes
E0
∞ t=0
1−γ C −γ β t t + b0 β t+1 C t υ(GS,t+1 ) , 1−γ
(5)
subject to the standard budget constraint, where GS,t+1 = θS,t (Wt − Ct )(RS,t+1 − 1), x for x ≥ 0, v(x) = λx for x < 0, where λ > 1, and where C t is aggregate per capita consumption.
(6) (7)
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The first term inside the brackets in Eq. (5) ensures that, as in traditional models, the investor gets utility directly from consumption. Consumption utility takes the standard, time-additive, power form analyzed by Mehra and Prescott (1985). The parameter β is the time discount factor, while γ > 0 controls the curvature of the utility function. The second term introduces narrow framing and loss aversion. The variable GS,t+1 is the change in the value of the investor’s stock market holdings, computed as stock market wealth at time t, θS,t (Wt − Ct ), multiplied by the net stock market return, RS,t+1 − 1; υ(GS,t+1 ) represents utility from this change in value. Narrow framing is therefore introduced by letting the agent get utility directly from changes in the value of just one component of his total wealth, with b0 controlling the degree of narrow framing. Loss aversion is introduced via the piecewise linear form of υ(·), which makes the investor −γ more sensitive to declines in stock market value than to increases. Finally, C t is a neutral scaling term that ensures stationarity in equilibrium. Equation (6) is the simplest way of specifying the stock market’s “gains” and “losses” that the investor is loss-averse over. Here, so long as θS,t > 0, a positive net return is considered a gain and, from (7), is assigned positive utility; a negative net return is considered a loss and is assigned negative utility. Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001) work primarily with another, possibly more realistic formulation, GS,t+1 = θS,t (Wt − Ct )(RS,t+1 − Rf ,t ),
(8)
in which a stock market return is only considered a gain, and hence is only assigned positive utility, if it exceeds the risk-free rate. In Section 2, we noted that even though narrow framing has mainly been documented in experimental settings, both the “regret” and “accessibility” interpretations suggest that people may frame the stock market narrowly as well. One could argue that they also suggest that people will frame their non-financial assets narrowly: for example, on the grounds that the distribution of those assets’ returns is also very accessible. The specification in (5) can certainly accommodate such behavior, but we have found that doing so has little effect on our results. For simplicity, then, we assume that only stock market risk is framed narrowly. The preferences in (5) are a simplified version of Barberis, Huang, and Santos’ (2001) specification. In an effort to understand not only the equity premium, but also the volatility and time-series predictability of stock returns, their original model captures not only loss aversion, but also some dynamic evidence on loss aversion, sometimes known as the “house money” effect, whereby prior gains and losses affect current sensitivity to losses. The specification in (5) strips out this dynamic effect, leaving only the core features of loss aversion and narrow framing. We discuss the full model in Section 5.7 7 Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001) also consider the case in which the investor gets utility from changes in total wealth, rather than in stock market wealth, so that there is no narrow framing.
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The first-order conditions of optimality for the preferences in (5), (7), and (8) can be derived using straightforward perturbation arguments. They are 1 = βRf ,t Et 1 = βEt RS,t+1
C t+1
−γ ,
(9)
Ct C t+1 Ct
−γ
+ b0 βEt v RS,t+1 − Rf ,t .
(10)
When there is no narrow framing, so that b0 = 0, these equations reduce to those derived from a standard asset pricing model with time-additive power utility over consumption, such as that of Mehra and Prescott (1985). Introducing narrow framing, so that b0 > 0, has no effect on the first-order condition for the risk-free rate, condition (9): consuming a little less today and investing the savings in the risk-free rate does not change the investor’s exposure to losses in the stock market. Narrow framing does, however, introduce a second term in the first-order condition for the stock market, condition (10): consuming less today and investing the proceeds in the stock market exposes the investor to potentially greater disutility from a drop in the stock market. Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001) assign the preferences in (5), (7), and (8) to the representative agent in a simple endowment economy, and, using conditions (9)–(10), show that, when the model is calibrated to annual data, the narrow framing term can generate a substantial equity premium and a low and stable risk-free rate, even when consumption growth is smooth and only weakly correlated with stock returns. Much as in Benartzi and Thaler (1995), the intuition is that, since the investor gets direct utility from changes in the value of his stock market holdings and is more sensitive to losses than to gains, he perceives the stock market to be very risky and only holds the market supply if compensated by a high average return. Of course, in assigning the utility function in (5) to a representative agent, Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001) are assuming that the key features of these preferences survive aggregation. Intuitively, if all investors are loss-averse over annual fluctuations in stock market wealth, it is hard to see why this would “wash out” in the aggregate. However, this point has not yet been formalized. While the preference specification in (5) yields a number of insights, it also has some limitations. First, it does not admit an explicit value function. This makes it hard to compute attitudes to independent monetary gambles and therefore to check whether the preference parameters (γ, λ, b0 ) used to generate a high equity premium are reasonable or not. Second, the preferences in (5) are intractable in partial equilibrium settings and so cannot be used to investigate the implications of narrow framing for portfolio choice. Finally, to ensure stationarity, the narrow framing component has to be scaled by an ad-hoc factor based on aggregate consumption. Recently, Barberis and Huang (2004) propose a new preference specification that overcomes these limitations. Their starting point is a non-expected utility formulation
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known as recursive utility, in which the agent’s time t utility, Vt , is given by Vt = W (Ct , μ(Vt+1 |It )),
(11)
where μ(Vt+1 |It ) is the certainty equivalent of the distribution of future utility, Vt+1 , conditional on time t information It , and W (·, ·) is an aggregator function that aggregates current consumption Ct with the certainty equivalent of future utility to give current utility (see Epstein and Zin (1989), for a detailed discussion). Most implementations of recursive utility assign W (·, ·) the form 1
W (C, y) = ((1 − β)C ρ + βy ρ ) ρ ,
0 < β < 1,
0 = ρ < 1,
(12)
where β is a time discount factor and ρ controls the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Most implementations also assume homogeneity of μ(·). If a certainty equivalent functional is homogeneous, it is necessarily homogeneous of degree one, so that μ(kz) = kμ(z),
k > 0.
(13)
In its current form, the specification in Eq. (11) does not allow for narrow framing: an investor with these preferences only cares about the outcome of a gamble he is offered to the extent that that outcome affects his overall wealth risk. Barberis and Huang (2004) show, however, that these preferences can be extended to accommodate narrow framing. They specify their utility function in a general context, but for the specific three-asset setting introduced earlier, their formulation reduces to Vt = W (Ct , μ(Vt+1 |It ) + b0 Et (v(GS,t+1 ))),
(14)
where 1
W (C, y) = ((1 − β)C ρ + βy ρ ) ρ , μ(kz) = kμ(z), k > 0,
0 < β < 1,
GS,t+1 = θS,t (Wt − Ct )(RS,t+1 − Rf ,t ), x for x ≥ 0, v(x) = λx for x < 0, where λ > 1.
0 = ρ < 1,
(15) (16) (17) (18)
Relative to the usual recursive specification in Eq. (11), this new formulation maintains the standard assumptions for W (·, ·) and μ(·). The difference is that a new term, which captures loss aversion and narrow framing, has been added to the second argument of W (·, ·). As before, GS,t+1 represents changes in the value of the investor’s stock market holdings, measured relative to the risk-free rate. By letting the investor get direct utility v(GS,t+1 ) from changes in the value of this one component of his wealth, we are
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introducing narrow framing, with the degree of narrow framing again controlled by b0 . Loss aversion is introduced through the piecewise linearity of v(·), just as in the earlier specification in (5).8 Since our focus is on the effects of narrow framing, we give the certainty equivalent functional μ(·) the simplest possible form, namely 1
μ(z) = (E(zζ )) ζ ,
(19)
where the exponent ζ is set to the same value as the exponent in the aggregator function, ρ. We denote this common value 1 − γ, so that ρ = ζ = 1 − γ.
(20)
3.2. Quantitative Implications We now use the specification in Eq. (14) to illustrate two benefits of the narrow framing approach in more detail: first, that it can generate a high equity premium at the same time as a low and stable risk-free rate, even when consumption growth is smooth and only weakly correlated with stock returns; and in Section 3.3, that it can do so while also making sensible predictions about attitudes to large-scale monetary gambles. To see the first result, consider a simple economy with a representative agent who has the preferences in Eq. (14). As before, there are three assets: a risk-free asset in zero net supply, and two risky assets, a stock market and a non-financial asset, both in positive net supply. Barberis and Huang (2004) show that, in this setting, the first-order conditions of optimality are
1 = βRf ,t Et Et 0=
Ct+1 Ct
−γ βEt
Ct+1 Ct
γ
1−γ
−γ
,
(21)
Et (v(RS,t+1 − Rf ,t )),
(22)
RW ,t+1
−γ Ct+1 (RS,t+1 − Rf ,t ) Ct
−γ
Ct+1 Et Ct
+ b0 Rf ,t
β 1−β
1 1−γ
1 − αt αt
−γ
1−γ
8 It is straightforward to also allow for the narrow framing of the non-financial asset. Doing so does not have a significant effect on our results.
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Et 0=
−γ Ct+1 (RW ,t+1 − Rf ,t ) Ct
−γ
Ct+1 Et Ct
+ b0 Rf ,t
β 1−β
1 1−γ
1 − αt αt
−γ
1−γ
θS,t Et (v(RS,t+1 − Rf ,t )),
(23)
where αt ≡ Ct /Wt is the consumption to wealth ratio, and where RW ,t+1 is defined in Eq. (4). We consider an equilibrium in which (i) the risk-free rate is a constant Rf ; (ii) consumption growth and stock returns are distributed as Ct+1 = gC + σC εC,t+1 , Ct log RS,t+1 = gS + σS εS,t+1 , log
where
εC,t εS,t
∼N
0 1 , ρCS 0
ρCS 1
, i.i.d. over time;
(24) (25)
(26)
(iii) the consumption to wealth ratio αt is a constant α, which, using RW ,t+1 =
Wt+1 1 Ct+1 = , Wt − Ct 1 − α Ct
(27)
implies that log RW ,t+1 = gW + σW εW ,t+1 ,
(28)
where gW = gC + log σ W = σC , εW ,t+1 = εC,t+1 ;
1 , 1−α
(29) (30) (31)
and (iv) the fraction of total wealth made up by the stock market, θS,t , is a constant over time, θS , so that θS,t =
St = θS , ∀t, S t + Nt
(32)
where St and Nt are the total market value of the stock and of the non-financial asset, respectively. Barberis and Huang (2004) demonstrate that this structure, while
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restrictive, can be embedded in a general equilibrium framework with endogeneous production. Barberis and Huang (2004) also show that, under this structure, Eqs. (21)–(23) simplify to α=
1−γ 1 2 γ γ 1 − β Rf e(1−γ)σC /2
1 1−γ β 1 b0 Rf
(33)
−γ − α 1−γ gS +σS2 /2 0= e − Rf 1−β α 2 2 + (λ − 1) egS +σS /2 N εS − σS − Rf N εS + egS +σS /2−γσS σC ρCS − Rf , (34)
1
−γ 1−γ β 1 − α 1−γ gS +σS2 /2 − Rf θS e 0 = b0 Rf 1−β α 2 + (λ − 1) egS +σS /2 N εS − σS − Rf N εS +
1 gC +σC2 /2−γσC2 − Rf , e 1−α (35)
where εS =
log Rf − gS . σS
(36)
We use Eqs. (33)–(35) to compute the equilibrium equity premium. First, we set the return and consumption process parameters to the values in Table 1. These values are estimated from annual data spanning the 20th century and are standard in the literature. Then, for given preference parameters β, γ, b0 , and λ, and for a given stock market fraction of total wealth θS , Eqs. (33)–(35) can be solved for α, Rf , and gS , thereby giving us the equity premium. Table 2 presents the results. We take β = 0.98 and θS = 0.2, and consider various values of γ, λ, and b0 . The parameter β has little effect on attitudes to risk; setting it to TABLE 1 Parameter Values for a Representative Agent Equilibrium Model gC and σC are the mean and standard deviation of log consumption growth, σS is the standard deviation of log stock returns, and ρCS is the correlation of log consumption growth and log stock returns. Parameter gC
1.84%
σC
3.79%
σS
20.00%
ρCS
0.10
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Nicholas Barberis and Ming Huang
TABLE 2 Equity Premia and Attitudes to Large-scale Gambles The table shows, for given aversion to consumption risk γ, sensitivity to narrowly framed losses λ, and degree of narrow framing b0 , the risk-free rate Rf and equity premium EP generated by narrow framing in a simple representative agent economy. πL is the premium the representative agent would pay, given his equilibrium holdings of risky assets and wealth of $75,000, to avoid a 50:50 bet to win or lose $25,000. Rf (%)
EP(%)
πL ($)
0
4.7
0.12
6,371
0.05
3.7
3.72
6,285
0.10
3.4
4.63
6,269
3
0
4.7
0.12
6,371
3
0.05
2.7
7.00
8,027
1.5
3
0.10
2.3
8.12
8,188
3
2
0
7.1
0.24
11,754
3
2
0.05
5.3
3.29
8,318
3
2
0.10
4.7
4.37
7,383
3
3
0
7.1
0.24
11,754
3
3
0.05
3.3
6.65
8,981
3
3
0.10
2.4
8.08
8,601
γ
λ
1.5
2
1.5
2
1.5
2
1.5 1.5
b0
0.98 ensures that the risk-free rate is not too high. Our results are quantitatively similar for a range of values of θS . The table confirms that narrow framing of stocks can generate a substantial equity premium at the same time as a low risk-free rate, even when, as shown in Table 1, consumption growth is smooth and only weakly correlated with stock returns. For example, the parameter values (γ, λ, b0 ) = (1.5, 2, 0.1) produce an equity premium of 4.63 percent and a risk-free rate of 3.4 percent, while (γ, λ, b0 ) = (1.5, 3, 0.1) produce a premium as high as 8.12 percent with a risk-free rate of only 2.3 percent. The intuition is the same as in Benartzi and Thaler (1995) and Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001): if the agent gets utility directly from changes in the value of the stock market and, via the parameter λ, is more sensitive to losses than to gains, he perceives the stock market to be very risky and only holds the available supply if compensated by a high average return. The assumption that the agent evaluates stock market gains and losses on an annual basis is important for our results, but not critical. Table 3 reports equity premia for an investor with the preferences in Eq. (14), but who evaluates stock market gains and losses at intervals other than a year. The table shows that, even though the equity premium declines as the interval grows, long evaluation periods can still generate substantial equity premia at the same time as a low risk-free rate.
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TABLE 3 Equity Premia for Different Evaluation Periods The table shows, for given aversion to consumption risk γ, sensitivity to narrowly framed losses λ, and degree of narrow framing b0 , the risk-free rate Rf and equity premium EP generated by narrow framing in a simple representative agent economy. πL is the premium the representative agent would pay, given his equilibrium holdings of risky assets and wealth of $75,000, to avoid a 50:50 bet to win or lose $25,000. T is the interval, in years, over which stock market gains and losses are measured. T
γ
λ
b0
Rf (%)
EP(%)
πL ($)
0.5
1.5
2
0.1
2.5
7.59
6,257
1
1.5
2
0.1
3.4
4.63
6,269
2
1.5
2
0.1
4.0
2.53
6,288
3
1.5
2
0.1
4.3
1.70
6,301
The intuition for why the equity premium is lower for longer evaluation periods, first pointed out by Benartzi and Thaler (1995), is straightforward. Since the distribution of stock returns has a positive mean, the probability of seeing a drop in the stock market falls as returns are aggregated at longer intervals. While annual stock returns might be negative 40 percent of the time, five-year returns are negative less often. A loss-averse agent is therefore less scared of stocks when he evaluates their returns at longer intervals and, as a result, he demands a lower equity premium.
3.3. Attitudes to Large Monetary Gambles We now demonstrate another attractive feature of the preference specification in Eq. (14), namely that it can deliver a high equity premium for parameterizations that are “reasonable,” in the sense that they correspond to sensible attitudes to independent monetary gambles. This is important because it was, in part, the difficulty researchers encountered in reconciling the equity premium with attitudes to monetary gambles that launched the equity premium literature in the first place. Economists are primarily interested in attitudes to large-scale monetary gambles, so we begin with those. In Section 3.4, we also consider attitudes to small-scale gambles. The literature has suggested a number of thought experiments involving large-scale gambles. Epstein and Zin (1990) and Kandel and Stambaugh (1991) consider an individual with wealth of $75,000 and ask what premium he would pay to avoid a 50:50 chance of losing $25,000 or gaining the same amount; in Kandel and Stambaugh’s (1991) view, a premium of $24,000 is too high, but a premium of $8,333 is more reasonable. Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) think about the value of x for which an agent would be indifferent between certain consumption of $x and a 50:50 chance of $50,000 consumption or $100,000 consumption. Rabin (2000) suggests a mild condition, namely that an agent should accept a clearly attractive large gamble such as a 50:50 bet to win $20 million against a $10,000 loss.
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It does not matter, for our results, which of these thought experiments we use. In what follows, we focus on the one suggested by Epstein and Zin (1990) and Kandel and Stambaugh (1991). In our view, a reasonable condition to impose is9 Condition L: An individual with wealth of $75,000 should not pay a premium higher than $15,000 to avoid a 50:50 chance of losing $25,000 or gaining the same amount. Barberis and Huang (2004) show that, to avoid a gamble g offering an equal chance to win or lose x, an investor with the preferences in Eq. (14) would pay a premium equal to 1 A Wt − (E(Wt + g)1−γ ) 1−γ + b0 x2 (λ − 1) , (37) π= A + b0 λ where γ
A = (1 − β) 1−γ α − 1−γ , 1
(38)
with α already computed in Eqs. (33)–(35). In this calculation, they make the simplest possible assumption, namely that, whatever degree of narrow framing b0 and level of loss aversion λ the investor uses when thinking about stock market risk, he also uses when thinking about the independent monetary gamble g. When b0 = 0, Eq. (37) gives the premium that would be charged by an agent with standard power utility preferences. When b0 > 0, the premium in Eq. (37) reflects the fact that, to some extent, the investor is framing gamble g narrowly. For large b0 , Eq. (37) reduces to π=
x (λ − 1), 2λ
(39)
the premium that would be charged by an agent who evaluates gamble g completely in isolation and who is λ times as sensitive to losses as to gains. Using Eq. (37), the rightmost columns in Tables 2 and 3 show, for each parameterization, the amount that the representative agent would pay, given his equilibrium holdings of risky assets, to avoid the symmetric bet in condition L. The rows in which b0 = 0 reproduce a well-known result; that for power utility preferences, those values of γ low enough to make sensible predictions about attitudes to large-scale monetary gambles inevitably generate too low an equity premium. Table 2 shows, however, that as soon as narrow framing is allowed—in other words, as soon as b0 > 0—it is easy to find parameterizations that give a high equity premium while also satisfying condition L. When (γ, λ, b0 ) = (1.5, 2, 0.1), for example, the investor charges a substantial equity premium of 4.63 percent, and a reasonable $6,269 to avoid the ±$25,000 gamble. How is it that the preference specification in Eq. (14) can reconcile attitudes to stock market risk and to the large-scale monetary gamble in condition L when other specifications have trouble doing so? To see how, note first that, in the simple representative 9 We
use the label “condition L” to emphasize that we are thinking about large-scale gambles.
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Chapter 6 • The Loss Aversion/Narrow Framing Approach to the Equity Premium Puzzle
agent economy described by conditions (i)–(iv) in Section 3.2, the equity premium is determined by the agent’s attitude, in equilibrium, to adding a small amount of stock market risk to a portfolio that is only weakly correlated with the stock market. Why can we say “weakly” correlated? Since representative agent economies are calibrated to aggregate data, the correlation of stock returns and consumption growth, ρCS , must be set to a low value; given that the consumption to wealth ratio is constant, this immediately implies a low correlation between stock returns and returns on total wealth.10 To generate a substantial equity premium, then, we need the agent to be strongly averse or, at the very least, moderately averse, to a small, weakly correlated gamble. To satisfy condition L, we need the agent to be mildly averse or, at most, moderately averse, to a large, independent gamble. Now consider the two functions in the second argument of W (·, ·) in Eq. (14), namely μ(·) and v(·). For a γ of 1.5, the μ(·)-term, by virtue of its local risk-neutrality, produces only mild aversion to a small, weakly correlated gamble, but moderate aversion to a large, independent gamble. For a λ of 2, the v(·)-term, by virtue of being piecewise linear, produces moderate aversion both to a small, weakly correlated gamble and to a large, independent gamble. For a degree of narrow framing b0 that is high enough, the two terms therefore generate moderate aversion to a small, weakly correlated gamble—thereby giving a substantial equity premium—and moderate aversion to a large, independent gamble, thereby satisfying condition L.
3.4. Attitudes to Small Monetary Gambles In Section 3.3, we saw that the preferences in Eq. (14), capturing both loss aversion and narrow framing, can generate a large equity premium for preference parameters that also correspond to sensible attitudes to large-scale monetary gambles, in that they satisfy condition L. In fact, condition L does not put very sharp restrictions on the range of equity premia that we can generate: as Table 2 shows, it can be consistent with premia as low as 0.12 percent or as high as 8.12 percent. In this section, we show that by requiring the preference specification in Eq. (14) to also make sensible predictions about attitudes to small-scale gambles, we can put tighter bounds on the range of equity premia that narrow framing can plausibly generate. The intuition is straightforward. As argued earlier, in the simple representative agent economy of Section 3.2, the equity premium is determined by the agent’s attitude, in equilibrium, to adding a small amount of weakly correlated stock market risk to the rest of his portfolio. If we impose constraints on the investor’s attitude to a small, independent risk, it is likely that we will also constrain his attitude to a small, weakly correlated risk and thereby, also, the equity premium he will charge. What condition should we impose on attitudes to small-scale gambles? As with large-scale gambles, the earlier literature has suggested a number of relevant thought experiments. For consistency with our earlier discussion, we return to Epstein and Zin 10 Of course, in more general representative agent economies, the consumption to wealth ratio need not be constant. So long as the ratio is sufficiently stable, however, it should still follow that stock returns and returns on total wealth are only weakly correlated.
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Nicholas Barberis and Ming Huang
PREFERENCES WITH NARROW FRAMING
0.1 0.09 0.08 0.07
b0
0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 0
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
FIGURE 1
The “×” signs mark the parameter values for which an agent who is loss-averse over stock market risk would charge an equity premium higher than 5 percent in a simple representative agent economy. The “+” signs mark the parameter values for which the agent would pay a premium below $40 to avoid a 50:50 bet to win or lose $250 at a wealth level of $75,000.
(1990), who ask how much an individual with wealth of $75,000 would pay to avoid a 50:50 bet to lose $250 or to win the same amount. In our view, a reasonable condition to impose here is11 Condition S: An individual with wealth of $75,000 should not pay a premium higher than $40 to avoid a 50:50 chance of losing $250 or gaining the same amount. Figure 1 shows how condition S sharply restricts the range of equity premia that can be generated by the preferences in Eq. (14). The “×” signs show, for γ = 1.5, the values of λ and b0 that produce equity premia higher than 5 percent. Clearly, either a high sensitivity to losses λ or a high degree of narrow framing b0 , or both, is required to generate equity premia as large as 5 percent. Note that our earlier condition on attitudes to large-scale gambles, condition L, is satisfied by all values of λ and b0 spanned by the graph—in other words, by all pairs (λ, b0 ) ∈ [0, 4] × [0, 0.1]. If condition L were 11 We
use the label “condition S” to emphasize that we are thinking about small-scale gambles.
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Chapter 6 • The Loss Aversion/Narrow Framing Approach to the Equity Premium Puzzle
TABLE 4 Equity Premia and Attitudes to Small-scale Gambles The table shows, for given aversion to consumption risk γ, sensitivity to narrowly framed losses λ, and degree of narrow framing b0 , the risk-free rate Rf and equity premium EP generated by narrow framing in a simple representative agent economy. πL (πS ) is the premium the representative agent would pay, given his equilibrium holdings of risky assets and wealth of $75,000, to avoid a 50:50 bet to win or lose $25,000 ($250). γ
λ
b0
Rf (%)
EP(%)
πL ($)
πS ($)
1.5
2
0.035
3.8
3.14
6,297
38.7
1.5
3
0.012
3.8
3.06
7,252
37.7
3
2
0.050
5.3
3.29
8,318
39.5
3
3
0.016
5.4
3.10
10,259
37.1
the only condition constraining our choice of preference parameters, we could therefore easily obtain premia higher than 5 percent. The “+” signs in the figure show the values of λ and b0 that satisfy condition S. Imposing this condition severely restricts the range of feasible values of λ and b0 . In fact, we cannot obtain an equity premium as high as 5 percent without violating it. Even though condition S does restrict the feasible parameter set, it still allows for sizable equity premia. Table 4 lists some parameter values that satisfy both condition L and condition S and yet still produce equity premia above 3 percent.
3.5. The Importance of Narrow Framing While narrow framing is admittedly an unusual feature of preferences, it is crucial to our results. To demonstrate this, we now show that, in the absence of narrow framing, it becomes much harder to replicate some of the attractive features of the preferences in Eq. (14)—much harder, for example, to reconcile a high equity premium with reasonable attitudes to large-scale monetary gambles and, in particular, with the attitudes imposed by condition L. Consider a model in which the agent is loss-averse over annual changes in total wealth, rather than in stock market wealth. Such a model maintains the assumptions of loss aversion and of annual evaluation of gains and losses, but by changing the focus from gains and losses in stock market wealth to gains and losses in total wealth, it removes the narrow framing. One such preference specification is the following: Vt = W (Ct , μ(Vt+1 |It )),
(40)
where 1
W (C, y) = ((1 − β)C ρ + βy ρ ) ρ ,
0 < β < 1,
0 = ρ < 1,
(41)
and where the certainty equivalent functional μ(·) takes a form proposed by Gul (1991), often referred to as “disappointment aversion”:
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Nicholas Barberis and Ming Huang
μ(V )1−γ = E(V 1−γ ) + (λ − 1)E((V 1−γ − μ(V )1−γ )1(V < μ(V ))), 0 < γ = 1, λ > 1.
(42)
While the specification in (42) looks somewhat messy, it is simply a function with a kink, which makes the investor more sensitive to losses than to gains. The parameter λ controls the relative sensitivity to losses.12 We consider a simple economy with a representative agent who has the preferences in Eqs. (40)–(42). The market structure is the same as before. There are three risky assets: a risk-free asset, in zero net supply, and two risky assets, a stock market and a non-financial asset, each in positive net supply. Epstein and Zin (1989) show that the first-order conditions of optimality are
ρ−1 1 ρ 1 C t+1 ρ RW ,t+1 , (43) 0 = Et φ β ρ Ct
ρ−1
ρ−1 1 ρ ρ 1 C C t+1 t+1 ρ RW ,t+1 (RS,t+1 − Rf ,t ) , (44) 0 = Et φ β ρ Ct RW ,t+1
ρ−1
ρ−1 1 ρ ρ 1 C C t+1 t+1 ρ 0 = Et φ β ρ RW ,t+1 (RW ,t+1 − Rf ,t ) , (45) Ct RW ,t+1 where
⎧ 1−γ −1 x ⎪ ⎨ for x ≥ 1, 1 − γ φ(x) = (46) 1−γ −1 ⎪ ⎩λx for x < 1. 1−γ We look for a simple equilibrium in which conditions (i)–(iii) of Section 3.2 hold.13 Under these conditions, Eqs. (43)–(45) become
1−γ
1−γ ρ ρ β β 0= C1 − 1 + (λ − 1) C1 N ( εC − (1 − γ)σC ) 1−α 1−α − (λ − 1)N ( εC ),
(47)
0 = C2 − Rf C3 + (λ − 1)(C2 N ( εC − σS ρCS + γσC ) − Rf C3 N ( εC + γσC )), 0=
1 C1 − Rf C3 1−α
C1 + (λ − 1) N ( εC − (1 − γ)σC ) − Rf C3 N ( εC + γσC ) , 1−α
(48)
(49)
12 Epstein and Zin (2001) and Ang, Bekaert, and Liu (2005) discuss the implementation of disappointment aversion in dynamic environments. 13 It is straightforward to show that such a structure can be embedded in a general equilibrium model.
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Chapter 6 • The Loss Aversion/Narrow Framing Approach to the Equity Premium Puzzle
where
1 C1 = exp (1 − γ)gC + (1 − γ)2 σC2 , 2
1 2 2 2 C2 = exp gS − γgC + σ − 2γσS σC ρCS + γ σC , 2 S
1 C3 = exp −γgC + γ 2 σC2 , 2
1 1 β εC = − gC + log , σC ρ 1−α
(50) (51) (52) (53)
and where N (·) is the cumulative normal distribution function. We use Eqs. (47)–(49) to compute the equilibrium equity premium. As before, we set the return and consumption process parameters to the values in Table 1. Then, for given preference parameters β, ρ, and γ, we use Eq. (47) to compute the consumption to wealth ratio α, Eq. (49) to compute the risk-free rate Rf , and Eq. (48) to compute the mean log stock return gS . To check whether the parameters corresponding to any particular equity premium are reasonable—in other words, whether they satisfy condition L—we need to know the premium an agent with the preferences in Eqs. (40)–(42) would pay to avoid a gamble to win or lose x with equal chance. Following the analysis in Epstein and Zin (1989), it can be shown that the premium π is given by 1 ⎛
1−γ
1−γ ⎞1−γ x x +λ 1− ⎜ 1+ W ⎟ Wt π t ⎜ ⎟ =1−⎜ (54) ⎟ . Wt 1+λ ⎝ ⎠ The parameters β and ρ have little effect on attitudes to risk. We set them to 0.95 and −1, respectively, to ensure that the risk-free rate is not too high. The area shaded with “+” signs in Figure 2 shows the values of γ and λ for which the representative agent satisfies condition L; in other words, the values for which, given his equilibrium holdings of risky assets and wealth of $75,000, he pays a premium below $15,000 to avoid a 50:50 chance of losing $25,000 or winning the same amount. The area shaded with “×” signs shows the values of γ and λ for which the representative agent charges an equity premium higher than 2 percent. There is no overlap between the two regions: in fact, the largest equity premium that we can generate with this preference specification under condition L is 0.93 percent, far smaller than the equity premia derived from narrow framing in Table 2.14 14 Epstein and Zin (1990) and Epstein and Zin (2001) obtain comparable results. For example, in Table 5 of their paper, Epstein and Zin (2001) report that, for parameterizations of the preferences in (40)–(42) that match the historical equity premium, the representative agent may charge as much as $23,000 to avoid the ±$25, 000 bet. See also Bekaert, Hodrick, and Marshall (1997).
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Nicholas Barberis and Ming Huang
DISAPPOINTMENT AVERSION PREFERENCES 10 9 8 7 equity premium . 2%
6 5 4
pay ,$15,000 to avoid a 6$25,000 gamble at W 5 $75,000
3 2 1 1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
␥ FIGURE 2 The “×” signs mark the parameter values for which an agent with a recursive utility function with Gul (1991)-type certainty equivalent would charge an equity premium higher than 2 percent in a simple representative agent economy. The “+” signs mark the parameter values for which the agent would pay a premium below $15,000 to avoid a 50:50 bet to win or lose $25,000 at a wealth level of $75,000.
To see the intuition for this result, recall from Section 3.3 that, in the simple representative agent economy considered here, the equity premium is determined by the agent’s attitude, in equilibrium, to adding an extra dollar of stock market risk to a portfolio that is only weakly correlated with the stock market. In the absence of narrow framing, the agent evaluates this extra risk by merging it with his other risks and checking if the combination is attractive. Since the stock market is only weakly correlated with his other risks, it diversifies those other risks and so the combination is attractive: even a loss-averse agent enjoys diversification. As a result, he charges a low equity premium. To generate a large premium, we would need to push up aversion to overall wealth risk, but this would immediately lead to a violation of condition L. As we saw in Section 3.3, a simple way out of this difficulty is to argue that, when the agent evaluates stock market risk, he does not fully merge it with his other risks but, rather, evaluates it in isolation; in other words, that he frames stock market risk narrowly.
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Chapter 6 • The Loss Aversion/Narrow Framing Approach to the Equity Premium Puzzle
4. OTHER APPLICATIONS Barberis, Huang, and Thaler (2006) argue that the preferences in Eq. (14) can also address a portfolio puzzle that is closely related to the equity premium puzzle, namely the stock market participation puzzle: the fact that, even though stocks have a high mean return, many households have historically been unwilling to allocate any money to them. Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) report, for example, that in 1984, only 28 percent of households held any stock at all, and only 12 percent held more than $10,000 in stock. Non-participation was not simply the result of not having any liquid assets. Even among households with more than $100,000 in liquid assets, only 48 percent held stocks (see also Haliassos and Bertaut (1995)). One approach to this puzzle is to argue that there are transaction costs of investing in the stock market; another is to examine whether non-stockholders have background risk that is somewhat correlated with the stock market (Heaton and Lucas (1997, 2000), Vissing-Jorgensen (2002)). A third approach is preference-based, and this is the one Barberis, Huang, and Thaler (2006) focus on. Specifically, they show that the preferences in Eq. (14) can generate stock market non-participation and, mirroring the results for the equity premium, that they can do so for preference parameterizations that are reasonable, in other words, that make sensible predictions about attitudes to large-scale monetary gambles by, for example, satisfying condition L. It is easy to see how the preferences in (14) generate non-participation: if the agent gets direct utility from fluctuations in the value of any stocks that he owns, and if he is loss-averse over these fluctuations, he is naturally going to be averse to stock market risk and may refuse to participate. How is it that Barberis, Huang, and Thaler (2006) generate non-participation for reasonable parameter values? An agent who refuses to participate in the stock market is effectively refusing to take on a small amount of a risk that is, according to Heaton and Lucas’ (2000) estimates, relatively uncorrelated with his other risks. To generate such attitudes at the same time as reasonable attitudes to large-scale gambles, we need preferences that generate moderate aversion to a small, weakly correlated risk—thereby leading to stock market non-participation—at the same time as moderate aversion to a large, independent risk, thereby satisfying condition L. As discussed in Section 3.3, the preferences in Eq. (14) can achieve exactly this. Without narrow framing, it becomes much harder to find preference specifications that can generate non-participation for reasonable parameter values. In the absence of narrow framing, the agent decides whether to participate by mixing a small amount of stock market risk with his other risks and checking whether the combination is attractive. Since stock market risk is only weakly correlated with his other risks, it is diversifying, and so the combination is, quite generally, attractive. To prevent the agent from participating, we need to impose very high aversion to overall wealth risk, but this typically leads to implausible aversion to large-scale gambles and, in particular, to violations of condition L. This logic has been confirmed by Heaton and Lucas (2000), Haliassos and Hassapis (2001), and Barberis, Huang, and Thaler (2006), who consider a number of different specifications without narrow framing—including
Nicholas Barberis and Ming Huang
225
specifications that incorporate loss aversion—and find that all of them have trouble generating non-participation for reasonable parameter values.15
5. FURTHER EXTENSIONS 5.1. Dynamic Aspects of Loss Aversion In equilibrium, the preferences in (5) and (14) can easily deliver a high equity premium and a low and stable risk-free rate, but they have a harder time matching the empirical volatility of returns. Under these preferences, the volatility of returns is typically very similar to the volatility of dividend growth and is therefore too low. Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001) show that incorporating dynamic aspects of loss aversion into the specification in (5) can help match the empirical volatility of returns.16 Drawing on a number of different experimental tests, Thaler and Johnson (1990) argue that the degree of loss aversion is not constant over time, but depends on prior gains and losses. In particular, they present evidence that losses are less painful than usual after prior gains, perhaps because those gains cushion any subsequent loss, and that losses after prior losses are more painful than usual, perhaps because people have only limited capacity for dealing with bad news. Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001) capture this evidence by making v(·) in (5) a function not only of the current stock market return RS,t+1 but also of prior gains and losses in the stock market. They then show that this raises the volatility of returns relative to the volatility of dividend growth: on good dividend news, the stock market goes up, giving the investor a cushion of prior gains and making him less sensitive to future losses; as a result, he perceives stocks to be less risky and discounts their future cash flows at a lower rate, thereby pushing prices still higher and raising the volatility of returns. The same mechanism also generates predictability in the time series: after prior gains, the investor perceives the stock market to be less risky and so pushes the price of stocks up relative to dividends; but from this point on, average returns will be lower, as the investor needs less compensation for the lower perceived risk. Price-dividend ratios therefore predict returns. One attractive feature of this mechanism is that it preserves the low correlation of stock returns and consumption growth seen in the models of Section 3: since movements in the price-dividend ratio are driven by innovations to dividends, the correlation of stock returns and consumption growth is similar to the correlation of dividend growth and consumption growth and is therefore low. T