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Hayek: A Collaborative Biography
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Hayek: A Collaborative Biography
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Archival Insights into the Evolution of Economics Series Editor: Robert Leeson This series provides a systematic archival examination of the process by which economics is constructed and disseminated. All the major schools of economics will be subject to critical scrutiny; a concluding volume will attempt to synthesise the insights into a unifying general theory of knowledge construction and influence. Titles include: Robert Leeson (editor) THE KEYNESIAN TRADITION Robert Leeson (editor) THE ANTI-KEYNESIAN TRADITION Robert Leeson (editor) AMERICAN POWER AND POLICY Roger Frantz and Robert Leeson (editors) HAYEK AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS Robert Leeson (editor) HAYEK: A COLLABORATIVE BIOGRAPHY PART I Robert Leeson (editor) HAYEK: A COLLABORATIVE BIOGRAPHY PART II Robert Leeson (editor) HAYEK: A COLLABORATIVE BIOGRAPHY PART III Robert Leeson (editor) HAYEK: A COLLABORATIVE BIOGRAPHY PART IV Robert Leeson (editor) HAYEK: A COLLABORATIVE BIOGRAPHY PART V Robert Leeson (editor) HAYEK: A COLLABORATIVE BIOGRAPHY PART VI Leslie Marsh (editor) PROPRIETY AND PROSPERITY New Studies on the Philosophy of Adam Smith Forthcoming titles: Robert Leeson (editor) HAYEK: A COLLABORATIVE BIOGRAPHY PART VII Robert Leeson (editor) HAYEK AND THE AUSTRIAN SCHOOL Leslie Marsh and Roger Franz (editors) HERBERT SIMON
Archival Insights into the Evolution of Economics Series Standing Order ISBN: 978–1–4039–9520–9 (Hardback) You can receive future titles in this series as they are published by placing a standing order. Please contact your bookseller or, in case of difficulty, write to us at the address below with your name and address, the titles of the series and the ISBN quoted above. Customer Service Department, Macmillan Distribution Ltd, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS, England
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Hayek: A Collaborative Biography Part VI Good Dictators, Sovereign Producers and Hayek’s ‘Ruthless Consistency’ Edited by
Robert Leeson
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Introduction, selection and editorial matter © Robert Leeson 2015 Individual chapters © Contributors 2015 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House, 6–10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The authors have asserted their rights to be identified as the authors of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2015 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries ISBN: 978–1–137–47924–2 This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.
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Contents
List of Illustrations
vi
Notes on Contributors
vii
1
Introduction Robert Leeson
1
2
The Battle of Ideas: Neoliberal Economics and Politics in the 20th Century Philip Plickert
73
3
Hayek, Orwell, and The Road to Serfdom Andrew Farrant
152
4
Pigou and the Pigouvian Legacy Rogério Arthmar
183
5
F. A. Hayek and the Demise of the Socialist System Yuri N. Maltsev
214
6
Hayek in Australia, 1976 Rafe Champion
233
7
Hayek and Coase Travel East: Privatization and the Experience of Post-Socialist Economic Transformation Kiryl Haiduk
8
Anders Breivik, Fascism and the Neoliberal Inheritance Tad Tietze
Index
249 281
293
v
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List of Illustrations
Figures 7.1 7.2
Dynamics of crude oil prices, 1970–2013 Foreign bank ownership in the selected transition economies and broad money-to-GDP ratio (left-hand scatter) and the share of non-performing loans in total volume of loans (right-hand scatter), 1996–2009
262
269
Tables 3.1 7.1
Number of persons who were directed under Defence Regulation 58A Asset share of foreign-owned banks in the selected transition economies, 1996–2009, percentage of total volume of assets
vi
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168
268
Notes on Contributors
Rogério Arthmar is Visiting Professor, University of Western Australia Business School, and Associate Professor of Economics, Federal University of Espírito Santo. Rafe Champion is an independent researcher. Andrew Farrant is Assistant Professor of Economics, Dickinson College. Kiryl Haiduk was formerly at the Belarusian Economic and Outreach Center (Minsk, Belarus), Research Center of the Institute for Privatization and Management. Robert Leeson is Visiting Professor of Economics, Stanford University, and Adjunct Professor of Economics, University of Notre Dame Australia. Yuri N. Maltsev is Professor of Economics, Carthage College, Wisconsin, and Senior Fellow, the Ludwig von Mises Institute. Philip Plickert is Economics Editor, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, and Lecturer in Economics, Goethe-University. Tad Tietze, School of Psychiatry, University of New South Wales, Australia.
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1 Introduction Robert Leeson
1 ‘Ruthless consistency’: from Manchester to Vienna via London and Chicago Ideologies – like religions – mix ‘knowledge’ with faith: followers are often unable to distinguish between the two, and have little understanding about ‘knowledge’-to-faith quotients within their own community. As a result, ideologues are often incapable of predicting the consequences of their actions. Bringing deregulated ‘personal liberty’ to both the financial sector and the former Soviet Empire facilitated one form of tax-funded producer sovereignty: ‘the strife over subsidies’, as oligarchs cornered both markets and governments (see Chapter 7). Feudalism and capitalism interacted in four phases: co-existence, partial economic elimination (neo-feudalism), social submergence, and liberty-driven reappearance through deregulatory capture in the financial sector and in post-communist Russia (financial neo-feudalism). Before the 1974 Nobel Prize for Economic Sciences, the British branch of the Neoclassical School had dominated economic discourse (mixed with some Lausanne elements, such as Pareto ‘efficiency’); Marshallians proposed regulation and market-based remedies to encourage private and social benefits and discourage social costs. Coal symbolizes both: energy is tapped for productive or household consumption uses; and – assuming the evidence and analysis of relevant scientific community is more likely to be correct than false – climate change is the Pigouvian externality. Coal-fired steam ships transported millions of migrants to the New World in the decades before the Great War, initiating vast social, as well as geographical, mobility. In 1895 (at aged 14), Milton Friedman’s mother, Sarah, migrated to the United States and worked as a ‘seamstress 1
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in a “sweatshop”’. On 25 March 1911, Sarah Friedman leapt from an open ninth-floor elevator door to escape the Triangle Factory Fire. 140 mostly young migrant women were either burnt alive or jumped to their deaths. This 9/11-style New York trauma spontaneously intensified the 20th-century regulation wave – that lasted until Friedrich von Hayek’s 1974 Nobel Prize for Economic Sciences. The two Sarah Friedmans were, presumably, not related: Milton once knew his father’s surname but was ‘too uncertain now to record my present impression’. His parents, who had ‘heated discussions about where the money was to come from to pay incoming bills’, spoke Hungarian ‘only when they wanted to keep something from the children’ (Friedman and Friedman 1998, 19–21; Stein 1962, 220). The New World market-based correction of externalities provided Friedman with a subsidized education; in September 1946, his achieved status was rewarded by an appointment to the University of Chicago. Six months later, von Hayek’s Old World-ascribed-status-assisted ability to acquire tax-exempt donations from businessmen (primarily, the ‘Volker Fund of St Louis’) facilitated an ‘expenses paid’ trip to the London Dorchester Hotel, the Paris Grand Hotel, and from there to Pilgrim Mountain (Mont Pèlerin): It was George [Stigler]’s and my first trip abroad ... Here I was, a young naïve provincial American, meeting people from all over the world ... This marked the beginning of my active involvement in the political process. (Friedman and Friedman 1998, 159–161) Stigler’s (1982) parents had migrated separately to the United States at the end of the 19th century: ‘my father from Bavaria and my mother from what was then Austria-Hungary (and her mother was in fact Hungarian)’. The Victorian liberal, John Bright, found in America ‘a free church, a free school, free land, a free vote, and a free career for the child of the humblest born in the land’ (cited by Bradley 1980, 61). The post-1870 British system of publically-funded elementary education was influenced by the American model: compared to the Habsburg Empire, Britain and America have been relatively successful in promoting human-capital-fuelled social mobility. The 1954 Brown versus Board of Education Supreme Court decision was a marker on the road-from-slavery: Little Rock became the symbol of resistance to ‘interference’ with the Arkansas anti-integration laws. In September 1957, a mob of over 1000 white protesters prevented nine African-American high school students from exercising their consti-
Introduction
3
tution right by enrolling – and attending – Little Rock Central High School. Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus questioned both the authority of the Supreme Court and the validity of desegregation. President Dwight D. Eisenhower (24 September 1957) declared: At a time when we face grave situations abroad because of the hatred that communism bears towards a system of government based on human rights, it would be difficult to exaggerate the harm that is being done to the prestige and influence and indeed to the safety of our nation and the world. Our enemies are gloating over this incident and using it everywhere to misrepresent our whole nation. We are portrayed as a violator of those standards which the peoples of the world united to proclaim in the Charter of the United Nations. (cited by Damms 2002, 129) The year after Brown versus Board of Education, Friedman (1955) noted that there had been sizable underinvestment in human beings ... This underinvestment in human capital presumably reflects an imperfection in the capital market: investment in human beings cannot be financed on the same terms or with the same ease as investment in physical capital ... The productivity of the physical capital does not – or at least generally does not – depend on the co-operativeness of the original borrower. The productivity of the human capital quite obviously does – which is, of course, why, all ethical considerations aside, slavery is economically inefficient. All bureaucracies – public and private – are prone to inefficiencies: Friedman (1955), who invoked Pigouvian externalities ‘neighborhood effects’ to justify public-funded education, proposed a ‘mixed’ system under which governments would continue to administer some schools but parents who chose to send their children to other schools would be paid a sum equal to the estimated cost of educating a child in a government school, provided that at least this sum was spent on education in an approved school. Friedman’s voucher system may improve outcomes through marketbased incentives: the mission of The Friedman Foundation for
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Educational Choice – to advance ‘school choice for all children’ – is within the Marshallian tradition (Pigou 1925); so too is Friedman’s mea culpa capacity. In Britain and elsewhere, the divisions within the working class are as strong as the divisions between classes: the aspirations of the upper working class require a distance to be maintained. Their relative social success can be explained through different discount rates: the interest rate in the brain. Education and business are both vehicles for social advancement for those who value deferred consumption; the ‘business conservative’ donor class can acquire a belated and ideology-loaded ‘education’ through Austrian-influenced think tanks. Those with low ascribed and achieved status, who heavily discount future consumption, pose problems for public policy and future tax liabilities. Wartime patriotism facilitated a no-strike pledge by American labour unions: by autumn 1946, average real weekly wages had fallen to Great Depression levels. In 1945, Philip Murray, head of the steelworkers’ union complained that steel company stockholders had received more than $700 million in wartime dividends. By the early 1950s, labour union membership reached its highest-ever level (Horowitz and Carroll 2002, 7, 9). Most Americans describe themselves as middle class. In contrast, Leo Rosten noted the depth of the [English] class distinction, which is just beginning to disappear, has created degrees of bitterness which I’ve never found in the United States. There is a hatred. Hayek (1978) replied: My impression of England may be wrong in the sense that I only really know the south. All you are speaking about is the north of England, where I think this feeling prevails. But if you live in London – Right now my relations are mainly in the southwest of England, where my children live, and I don’t find any of this sharp resentment. And the curious thing is that in the countryside of southwest England, the class distinctions are very sharp, but they’re not resented. [laughter] They’re still accepted as part of the natural order.1 Hayek’s (1949; 1975; 1994, 92) plan for social revolution was designed with previous failure in mind:
Introduction
5
the more conservative groups have acted, as regularly as unsuccessfully, on a more naïve view of mass democracy and have usually vainly tried directly to reach and to persuade the individual voter. Hayek referred to the silver voice of that genius in persuasion, Lord Keynes ... ... [who] was exceedingly difficult to resist in conversation or discussion. Even if you knew that he was wrong, you sometimes found it extraordinarily hard to maintain your position while you talked to him – although once you turned away, you realised that you had been misled ... people got enchanted by merely listening to his words.[His Old Etonian] voice was so bewitching. ‘The English working class, as Mr Wyndham Lewis has put it, are ‘branded on the tongue’ (Orwell 1968a, 5). Two advertising executives, the Baghdad-born brothers Charles and Maurice Saatchi, recruited the actor Laurence Olivier to equip the former Secretary of State for Education and Science to ‘speak’ persuasively to the British individual voter. Mrs. Thatcher regarded the Saatchi and Saatchi ‘Labour isn’t working’ poster as ‘wonderful’; their ‘Britain is going backwards’ television advertisement had shots of climbers inching their way down Mount Everest (Fallon 2007; Edwards 2011). Hayek (1978) reflected: I oughtn’t to praise them because the suggestion of the Institute [of Economic Affairs] came from me originally; so I let them on the job, but I’m greatly pleased that they are so successful.2 In addition to the Old Etonian Anthony Fisher, the IEA was founded and run by Ralph Harris (2006, 171–172) and Arthur Selden, who were ‘proud’ of their own upward social mobility and the ‘unprivileged backgrounds’ of the more ‘robust’ IEA authors. Harris, the son of a working class, council-housed tramways inspector, was the beneficiary of the primary vehicle of British social mobility: for-social-profit public education. At Cambridge University, Stanley Dennison introduced him to von Hayek’s aristocratic social philosophy. At the IEA, ‘poverty was the spur to invention’ in ‘proclaiming the missionary truths’. After ennoblement by a grocer’s daughter – as Baron Harris of High Cross – he became President of the Mont Pelerin Society (1982–1984).
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Neoclassical theory is not required to predict that British Airways would use ‘dirty tricks’ to sabotage their more cost-efficient Virgin competitor (Gregory 1993); all incumbents have incentives to deter entrants. Capitalism combined with tax-funded education allows achieved status to compete with its ascribed status incumbent – those who value democracy must protect its most valuable property: human capital formation. According to Ludwig von Mises’ (1985 [1927], 19, 44, 42–51) Liberalism in the Classical Tradition, Austrians have different priorities: The program of liberalism, therefore, if condensed into a single word, would have to read: property, that is, private ownership of the means of production (for in regard to commodities ready for consumption, private ownership is a matter of course and is not disputed even by the socialists and communists). All the other demands of liberalism result from this fundamental demand. [emphasis in original] Mises left an eternal instruction: It cannot be denied that Fascism and similar movements aiming at the establishment of dictatorships are full of the best intentions and that their intervention has, for the moment, saved European civilization. The merit that Fascism has thereby won for itself will live on eternally in history The ‘similar movements’ of ‘bloody counteraction’ that von Mises referred to included the French anti-Semitic ‘l’Action Française’ plus ‘Germans and Italians’. The Italians obviously refers to Mussolini’s 1922 March on Rome; reference to ‘Ludendorff and Hitler’ obviously refers to the 1923 Ludendorff–Hitlerputsch (or Munich Beer Hall Putsch). The demand for free trade in corn was followed by the demand for free trade in land: an attack on the landed aristocracy in the name of peasant proprietorship (Bradley 1980, 201–202). Hayek (1978) dismissed the First Austrian Republic as a ‘republic of peasants and workers’;3 Mises (1985 [1927], 43–44) described the foundations of Hayek’s (2010 [1960]) The Constitution of Liberty: Those of the old regime had displayed a certain aristocratic dignity, at least in their outward demeanor. The new ones, who replaced them, made themselves contemptible by their behavior. Nothing has done more harm to democracy in Germany and Austria than the hollow arrogance and impudent vanity with which the Social-Democratic
Introduction
7
leaders who rose to power after the collapse of the empire conducted themselves. Thus, wherever democracy triumphed, an antidemocratic doctrine soon arose in fundamental opposition to it. There is no sense, it was said, in allowing the majority to rule. The best ought to govern, even if they are in the minority. This seems so obvious that the supporters of antidemocratic movements of all kinds have steadily increased in number. The more contemptible the men whom democracy has placed at the top have proved themselves to be, the greater has grown the number of the enemies of democracy. There are, however, serious fallacies in the antidemocratic doctrine. What, after all, does it mean to speak of ‘the best man’ or ‘the best men’? The Republic of Poland placed a piano virtuoso at its head because it considered him the best Pole of the age. But the qualities that the leader of a state must have are very different from those of a musician. The opponents of democracy, when they use the expression ‘the best,’ can mean nothing else than the man or the men best fitted to conduct the affairs of the government, even if they understand little or nothing of music. But this leads to the same political question: Who is the best fitted? Was it Disraeli or Gladstone? The Tory saw the best man in the former; the Whig, in the latter. Who should decide this if not the majority? And so we reach the decisive point of all antidemocratic doctrines, whether advanced by the descendants of the old aristocracy and the supporters of hereditary monarchy, or by the syndicalists, Bolsheviks, and socialists, viz., the doctrine of force. The opponents of democracy champion the right of a minority to seize control of the State by force and to rule over the majority. The moral justification of this procedure consists, it is thought, precisely in the power actually to seize the reins of government. One recognizes the best, those who alone are competent to govern and command, by virtue of their demonstrated ability to impose their rule on the majority against its will. Here the teaching of l’Action Française coincides with that of the syndicalists, and the doctrine of Ludendorff and Hitler, with that of Lenin and Trotzky. Many arguments can be urged for and against these doctrines, depending on one’s religious and philosophical convictions, about which any agreement is scarcely to be expected. This is not the place to present and discuss the arguments pro and con, for they are not conclusive. The only consideration that can be decisive is one that bases itself on the fundamental argument in favor of democracy.
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Hayek (1978) agreed – democracy had one advantage and ‘no other’: You see, my concern has increasingly become that in democracy as a system it isn’t really the opinion of the majority which governs but the necessity of paying off any number of special interests. Unless we change the organization of our democratic system, democracy will – I believe in democracy as a system of peaceful change of government; but that’s all its whole advantage is, no other.4 Hayek (1978) just learned [Mises] was usually right in his conclusions, but I was not completely satisfied with his argument. That, I think, followed me right through my life. I was always influenced by Mises’s answers, but not fully satisfied by his arguments. It became very largely an attempt to improve the argument, which I realized led to correct conclusions. But the question of why it hadn’t persuaded most other people became important to me; so I became anxious to put it in a more effective form.5 Hayek (1978) reflected that omnipotent democracy which we have is not going to last long. What I fear is that people will be so disgusted with democracy that they will abandon even its good features.6 During the rule of the Habsburg Empire, Mises was legally allowed to add ‘von’ to his name; before the First Austrian Republic collapsed into a one-party police state, he had become a card-carrying Austro-Fascist (member number 282632) and a member of the official Fascist social club (number 406183) (Hülsmann 2007, 677, n149). In an apparent reference to Liberalism in the Classical Tradition (Caldwell 1995, 70, n67), Hayek (1995 [1929], 68), while praising Edwin Cannan’s ‘fanatical conceptual clarity’ and his ‘kinship’ with Mises’ ‘crusade’, noted that British-Austrians had failed to realise necessary consequences of the whole system of classical liberal thought: ‘Cannan by no means develops economic liberalism to its ultimate consequences with the same ruthless consistency as Mises.’ Without making any connection to Hayek and Mises, George Orwell’s (1968b [1940], 12–13) review of Hitler’s Mein Kampf made two Austrian School-related observations. First, ‘the situation in Germany, with its
Introduction
9
seven million unemployed, was obviously favourable for demagogues’. And second, Hitler had recently been respectable. He had crushed the German labour movement, and for that the property-owning classes were willing to forgive him almost anything. Both Left and Right concurred in the very shallow notion that National Socialism was merely a version of Conservatism.7 According to Jeremy Rifkin (2005), in the first post-communist decade, 89 countries find themselves worse off economically than they were in the early 1990s ... The 356 richest families on the planet enjoy a combined wealth that now exceeds the annual income of 40% of the human race. Rifkin is a critic of capitalism – most economists are not; and his data must be critically evaluated. However, Elizabeth Warren’s (2007) ‘The Coming Collapse of the Middle Class’ suggests that America has not been well served by Austrian-style policy advice. The pre-Hayek liberal Utopian/optimism mix is primarily associated with 1776, 1789, 1832, 1833, 1846, 1848 and 1883. In 1903, the 1846 repeal of the Corn Law was defended by Henry Campbell-Bannerman, the leader of the Liberal Party, then in opposition: ‘We believe in free trade because we believe in the capacity of our countrymen.’ The 1833 abolition of slavery in the British Empire reflected the growing liberal consensus (Bradley 1980, 75, 68). The 1832 Great Reform Act was followed by the 1867 enfranchisement of the ‘labour aristocracy’, and the 1884 enfranchisement of agricultural labourers: stepping stones on the road to the universal franchise. Benjamin Disraeli, who complained that the 1867 Act would ‘lead to an American constitution’, contemptuously described Richard Cobden and Bright as ‘the two members for the United States’. The 3rd Viscount Palmerston complained that they had ‘run amuk against everything that the British Nation respects and values – Crown, Aristocracy, Established Church, Nobility, Gentry and Landowners’ (Bradley 1980, 62–63). The bust of the anti-Austrian hero of 1848, Lajos Kossuth, is displayed in the United States Capitol, atop Capitol Hill, with the inscription: Father of Hungarian Democracy, Hungarian Statesman, Freedom Fighter, 1848–1849. Von Hayek apparently wished it to be known – posthumously – that The Road to Serfdom was written to justify the liberty of the ‘old’ European aristocracy and to provide the road-back-to-serfdom
10 Robert Leeson
for the tax-paying ‘new’ aristocracy of labour (Leeson 2014a, chapter 3). Three years after The Road to Serfdom (1944), Hayek’s fundraising provided a ‘private railroad car’ (Friedman and Friedman 1998, 161): the April Fool’s Day convening atop Pilgrim Mountain.
2
The Magic Pilgrim Mountain
John Davenport described the ascent: From the station platform at Vevey, Switzerland, a little funicular railroad pointed up the mountain-side. As I swung aboard and as the cables tightened, I was vaguely conscious that something new and exciting lay at the top. It did, for the first meeting of what became known as the Mont Pelerin Society ... was indeed a unique gathering and a turning point in the life of most participants. (cited by Friedman and Friedman 1998, 160) The year Hayek was awarded the Nobel Prize for Economic Sciences, his Society met in Brussels: Murray and Joey [Rothbard] had met up with Ralph Raico in Germany and they made their own way by car to Brussels ... As is customary, the Mt. Pelerin meetings were held in one of the most expensive hotels in the city as befitted the fact that almost all attendees were either think-tank executives traveling on expense accounts, South American latifundia owners, for whom hundred-dollar bills were small change, or the officers of the Society itself, a self-perpetuating oligarchy who, thanks to its members’ dues, traveled around the world in first-class accommodations. (Hamowy 2003) To Victorian classical liberals, the United States was ‘regarded as a shining example of all that was best in modern civilization’ (Bradley 1980, 60). The Buchanans of Tennessee include a State governor and a Nobel Laureate (Kyle 2012); James Buchanan (1992, 130) met his first ‘Princess’ through one of Hayek’s ‘luxurious’ Mont Pelerin Society meeting. Hayek (1978) explained to Buchanan that the Constitution of the United States must be collapsed into a single sentence written by a European aristocrat.8 The essence of Victorian liberalism was self-reliance: as Cobden explained, ‘while I will not be the sycophant of the great, I cannot become the parasite of the poor’ (cited by Bradley 1980, 70). Buchanan (1992, 130) observed that at Mont Pelerin Society meetings, there was
Introduction
11
‘too much deference accorded to Hayek, and especially to Ludwig von Mises who seemed to demand sycophancy’. In return, Mises conjured-up an alluring aristocratic demeanor: He could be unbelievably stubborn, but people would not detect that in daily life, for he had excellent manners. He was brought up at a time when Austria was an empire and good manners and self-discipline were not only a prerequisite of the court, but a must for a member of every cultured family. One does not lose good habits in later life, nor did Lu. He would never sit down with me at mealtime, even on the hottest day, without wearing his jacket. (Margit Mises 1976, 143) Raico (2012), Ronald Hamowy (2002; 2010) and Rothbard (1973) made careers as courtiers and fools to von Hayek and von Mises:9 For those of us who have loved as well as revered Ludwig von Mises, words cannot express our great sense of loss: of this gracious, brilliant and wonderful man; this man of unblemished integrity; this courageous and lifelong fighter for human freedom; this all-encompassing scholar; this noble inspiration to us all. And above all this gentle and charming friend, this man who brought to the rest of us the living embodiment of the culture and the charm of pre-World War I Vienna. For Mises’ death takes away from us not only a deeply revered friend and mentor, but it tolls the bell for the end of an era: the last living mark of that nobler, freer and far more civilized era of pre-1914 Europe ... Mises himself, spinning in his inimitable way anecdotes of Old Vienna ... a mind of genius blended harmoniously with a personality of great sweetness and benevolence. Not once has any of us heard a harsh or bitter word escape from Mises’ lips. Unfailingly gentle and courteous ... an inspiration and as a constant star ... Ludwig Mises never once complained or wavered ... stand[ing] foursquare for the individualism and the freedom that he realized was required if the human race was to survive and prosper ... We could not, alas, recapture the spirit and the breadth and the erudition; the ineffable grace of Old Vienna. But I feverently [sic] hope that we were able to sweeten his days by at least a little ... But oh, Mises, now you are gone, and we have lost our guide, our Nestor, our friend. How will we carry on without you? But we have to carry on, because anything less would be a shameful betrayal of all that you have taught us, by the example of your noble life as much as by your immortal works. Bless you, Ludwig von Mises, and our deepest love goes with you.10
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During the Great War, Hayek (1994, 44–45) developed a great interest in the drama, and this must have been the first interest which I pursued systematically for some time and where I showed real initiative. In addition to reading and watching the ‘ancient Greek dramas’, he even started to write tragedies myself. On rather violent and more or less erotic historical themes (Andromache, Rosamund, etc), but I never finished a play, though I was working up towards some rather effective scenes I had thought out. One theme occupied him most for quite a long time. It was a play about Andromache. With all the implications; very obscure, and only half understood. But ending in a magnificent scene which indeed would be theatrically very effective – Andromache is the slave of Achilles’s son, wandering from the castle out onto the sea, onto a rock extending out into the sea, and the sun rises and she runs up to the sun: ‘It’s you, it’s you, my Hector.’ And she falls into the sea. Hayek (1978) was enthralled by Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749– 1832), the author of the play in which Doctor Faustus sells his soul to the devil in return for academic advancement: In a purely literary field, I was reading much more fine literature as a young man and, as you have probably become aware, I was a great Goethe fan. I am thoroughly familiar with the writings of Goethe and with German literature, generally, which is incidentally partly because of the influence of my father. My father used to read to us after dinner the great German dramas and plays, and he had an extraordinary memory and could quote things like the ‘Die Glocke,’ Schiller’s poem, from beginning to end by heart, even in his – I can’t say his old age; he died at fifty-seven. He was, in the field of German literature, an extraordinarily educated man. As a young man before the war, and even immediately after, I spent many evenings listening to him. In fact, I was a very young man. Of course, I started writing plays myself, though I didn’t get very far with it. But I think if you ask in this sense about general influence, Goethe is really probably the most important literary influence on my early thinking.11
Introduction
13
The Bildungsroman – the coming-of-age literary genre – is conventionally dated to Goethe’s (Schiller-assisted) Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship: the chronicle of a personal ascent via the mysterious Tower Society. When Robert Chitester asked about classical education being ‘no longer at all a common thing in the United States’, Hayek (1978) replied: You see, I used to define what the Germans call Bildung, a general education, as familiarity with other times and places. In that sense, Americans are not very educated. They are not familiar with other times and places, and that, I think, is the basic stock of a good general education. They are much better informed on current affairs ... I doubt whether the Americans are book readers. You see, if you go to a French provincial town, you’ll find the place full of bookstores; then you come to a big American city and can’t find a single bookstore. That suggests a very fundamental contrast.12 Hayek told Charlotte Cubitt (2006, 5) that he and his fellow European émigrés sat in the ‘sardonic corner’ of the London School of Economics (LSE) Common Room making ‘malicious’ comments about the competence of their English colleagues. The classically-educated Hayek (1994, 84) concluded Department of Economics meetings with a call-to-action against the LSE Director: ‘Beveridge delendus est’ (‘Beveridge should be destroyed’). But: It turned out that the LSE economists, and even Lionel Robbins, had not had a classical education ... I found out that not one of them understood what I was saying. It’s a famous phrase, a story from, I believe, Cicero ... I assumed this to be popular knowledge. In Thomas Mann’s (1960 [1924]; 372–373, 380, 390, 403, 441; 1953) Magic Mountain, the ascenders are transported from mundane ‘flatlands’ to fantasyland, where – through medical institutionalization – those with ‘a grudge against life’ achieve ‘a higher sanity’. Vienna is described as ‘a sort of mummy, as it were, of the Holy Roman Empire of the German people’; Hans Castor – who may have symbolized both the Weimar Republic and the Revelation of St John of the Cross – is the ‘pure fool’, the Knight in pursuit of the Holy Grail. Two characters compete for Castor’s loyalty: Settembrini, the authorial ‘homo humanus’ voice; and the ‘well dressed’ Jewish ‘homo dei’, Naphta, who compared ‘Manchester liberalism’ with ‘the kingdom of God’. Naphta’s medical problems may be associated with his father’s death, ‘nailed crucifix-like on the door of his burning home’.
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Those on The Magic Mountain are exposed to ‘Mental Gymnastics’ in ‘the charmed circle’ and ‘mystic triangle’, before ‘sudden enlightenment’, which leads to ‘Freedom’, ‘Research’, ‘Changes’, the ‘Fullness of Harmony’ and a ‘contemptuous aristocratic air’ (Mann 1960 [1924], 65, 149, 276, 203, 219, 267, 345, 635, 464). Psychiatry flourished in post-Habsburg Vienna. The Freudian Mises, whose first episode of mental illness may have been triggered by his father’s death in 1903, lived with his devoutly Jewish mother until she died in 1937 (Hülsmann 2007, 75, 726). Cubitt (2006, 168), Hayek’s secretary and appointed biographer, did not specify which school of psychiatry her employer was supervised by; but Hayek (1978) told Earlene Craver: ‘it seems that it was through psychiatry that I somehow got to the problems of political order.’13 Austrians attribute Hayek’s and Mises’ academic market failure status to ideology-driven corruption. However, in Viennese academic circles, Mises was ‘regarded as a monstrosity – a Jew who was neither a capitalist nor a socialist’ (Hayek 1978).14 Mises’ hysteria has explanatory power: The one thing about Lu that was as astonishing as it was frightening was his temper. Occasionally he showed terrible outbursts of tantrums. I do not really know what else to call them. I had experienced them in Vienna on various occasions. Suddenly his temper would flare up, mostly about a small, unimportant happening. He would lose control of himself, start to shout and say things, which coming from him, were so unexpected, so unbelievable, that when it happened the first few times I was frightened to death. Whatever I said would enrage him even more. It was impossible to reason with him. So I kept silent or went out of the room. I gradually realized that these outbursts had nothing to do with me. I was just there, I was the outlet which gave him the opportunity to relieve himself. And I learned to understand that these terrible attacks were really a sign of depression, a hidden dissatisfaction and the sign of a great, great need for love. Sometimes I could not help myself, I cried when I was alone. But it never took long, and he followed me to my room or wherever I was. He could not bear to see me crying. He took me in his arms; he kissed me again and again and started to apologize. I stopped him. I could not be angry with him. I pitied him too much. (Margit Mises 1976, 44) Intervention is required to counterbalance the efforts of those who seek to kick away the ladder of social and economic mobility. Von Mises (2009a [1946]), a paid business sector lobbyist, suspected that Hayek had
Introduction
15
invited some to ascend Pilgrim Mountain who might question, rather than obediently consume, his producer-sovereignty ‘knowledge’: What makes for freedom – political, intellectual and religious as well as economic – is not government interference, but the market economy. No government interference is needed to prevent the emergence of monopoly prices ... Laissez faire does not mean: let the evils last. It means: let the consumers, i.e., the people, decide – by their buying and by their abstention from buying – what should be produced and by whom. The alternative to laissez faire is to entrust these decisions to a paternal government. There is no middle way. Either the consumers are supreme or the government. Mises (2009a [1946]) explained the importance of his a priori scientific method: The weak point in Professor Hayek’s plan is that it relies upon the cooperation of many men who are known for their endorsement of interventionism. It is necessary to clarify this point before the meeting starts. As I understand the plan, it is not the task of this meeting to discuss anew whether or not a government decree or a union dictate has the power to raise the standard of living of the masses. If somebody wants to discuss these problems, there is no need for him to make a pilgrimage to the Mount Pèlerin. He can find in his neighborhood ample opportunity to do so. [Mises’ emphasis] For Friedman (1955), market-based intervention was required to address ‘neighborhood effects’; Mises ‘stomped’ out of one of the inaugural Mont Pelerin sessions because ‘You’re all a bunch of socialists’ (Friedman and Friedman 1998, 161); Lionel Robbins recounted that Mises made a dreadful exhibition of himself – attacking us all calling us Socialists and Interventionists and indulging in a degree of irrelevance quite unbelievable to those who didn’t know his prickly temperament. (cited by Howson 2011, 662–663) The Great War and its aftermath undermined intergenerational entitlements. Arthur Koestler (1950, 19) described some of the affected: Those who refused to admit that they had become déclassé, who clung to the empty shell of gentility, joined the Nazis and found
16
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comfort in blaming their fate on Versailles and the Jews. Many did not even have that consolation; they lived on pointlessly, like a great black swarm of tired winter flies crawling over the dim windows of Europe, members of a class displaced by history. Free Traders like Bright described the aristocracy as a moribund social class; Whigs and Tories saw a noble background and land ownership as ‘essential requirements for political power’. In the public policy domain, experts confronted landowning aristocratic amateurs for influence (Bradley 1980, 52, 66). A century later, von Hayek (1949, 420–421), in reaffirming the predemocratic view, appropriated the label of expertise for the aristocratic amateurs: there was a crucial distinction between ‘the real scholar or expert and the practical man of affairs’ and non-propertied intellectuals, who were ‘a fairly new phenomenon of history’, and whose low ascribed status deprived them of what Hayek regarded as a central qualification, ‘experience of the working of the economic system which the administration of property gives’.15 Capitalism utilized more potent sources of wealth than land; the mid-19th century struggle for influence was, symbolically, between ‘the millowners of Manchester and the landowners’ (Bradley 1980, 58). To maintain their aristocratic lifestyles, von Hayek and von Mises ‘plundered the mill’ through ‘business conservative’ donors. Before Hayek, liberals had an entirely different vision. ‘Trust the People’ was the motto of the Victorian liberals; Gladstone had more faith in Scottish crofters than ‘the upper ten thousand’ (Bradley 1980, chapter 6). Before Mises – The Last Knight of Liberalism – the Manchester Party vision was that ‘the battle plain is the harvest-field of the aristocracy, watered with the blood of the people’; and the foreign policy establishment was ‘a gigantic system of outdoor relief for the aristocracy of Great Britain’ (Bright cited by Bradley 1980, 124). The writing of Mann’s The Magic Mountain (Der Zauberberg) spanned 12 years but two distinct worlds (1912–1924): in 1912, Hayek and Mises were legal aristocrats; by 1924, they were ‘von’ criminals. Mann (1953), whose Berghof sanatorium was located atop a Swiss mountain – both geographically and figuratively – recommended that those seeking to understand this imaginary world should read it at least twice.
3
Hayek, Mises, McCarthy and Nixon
Shortly after Fritz Machlup’s recommendation that Hayek be awarded the Nobel Prize for Economic Science, John Kenneth Galbraith’s (1973,
Introduction
17
1) presidential address to the American Economic Association addressed the ‘insufficiently normative’ content of economics. According to Galbraith, earlier in the century Businessmen and their political and ideological acolytes kept watch on departments of economics and reacted promptly to heresy’ including ‘anything that seemed to threaten the sanctity of property, profits ... or which involved sympathy for unions ... public regulation. This could have been addressed at Hayek, Stigler and the Mont Pelerin Society. In 1936, Charles Walgreen, the founder of the largest drug retailing chain in the United States, withdrew his niece from the University of Chicago because he observed that she was being corrupted by free love and communism. The Chicago Tribune stirred up the case, and the Illinois legislature set up an investigating committee. Walgreen, who was then persuaded that his observation was wrong, donated $500,000: after 1958, Stigler (1988, 157) held the ‘princely salary’ and ‘luxuriously upholstered chair, the Charles R. Walgreen Professorship of American Institutions’. Half a century after the end of the American civil war, Europe confronted its own dysfunctional neo-feudal legacy. Mises (2009b [1978], 62–63) described his role as the preeminent intellectual White Terrorist: My political activity from 1918 to 1934 can be broken down into four stages. The most important task I undertook during the first period, which lasted from the time of the monarchy’s collapse in the fall of 1918 until the fall of 1919, was the forestalling of a Bolshevist takeover. The fact that events did not lead to such a regime in Vienna was my success and mine alone. Mises (1985 [1927], 49, 50) expected to become the intellectual Führer of a Nazi–Classical Liberal Pact. Fascists would have to embrace Mises’ liberalism to achieve their common aims: if Fascism wanted really to combat socialism it would oppose it with ideas ... Fascism will never succeed as completely as Russian Bolshevism from freeing itself from the power of liberal ideas. Mises would provide these ideas: ‘There is however only one idea that can be effectively opposed to socialism, viz, liberalism’.
18 Robert Leeson
Mises (1951 [1922], 87, 104, n1, 105, 89, 88; 2009b [1978], 62–63) instructed his disciples to examine ‘life history through the psychoanalytical method ... The sickness of a man whose sexual life is in the greatest disorder is evident in every line of his writings.’ In his successful post-First War anti-communism: ‘Few supported me in my efforts, and any help was relatively ineffective.’ In the competitive post-Second War anti-communist environment, Mises often had in his hand a list of figures: whenever a discussion or a speech bored him, he took out one of the little scraps of paper he used to carry with him and started to write. People who watched him must have thought he made notes, but he wrote nothing but irregular rows of figures, and once in a while he added them up. They must have been meaningless, and I considered them a sort of doodling, but I never asked him about it. (Margit Mises 1976, 27) Eighty-five years after the end of the American civil war, on Lincoln Day (9 February) 1950, Senator Joe McCarthy began his crusade for a ‘new birth of honesty and decency in government’ by claiming to have in his hand a list of figures: This is a time of ‘the cold war’ ... war between two diametrically opposed ideologies. The great difference between our western Christian world and the atheistic Communist world is not political, gentlemen, it is moral. For instance, the Marxian idea of confiscating the land and factories and running the entire economy as a single enterprise is momentous. Likewise, Lenin’s invention of the one-party police state as a way to make Marx’s idea work is hardly less momentous ... The real, basic difference, however, lies in the religion of immoralism ... invented by Marx, preached feverishly by Lenin, and carried to unimaginable extremes by Stalin. This religion of immoralism, if the Red half of the world triumphs – and well it may, gentlemen – this religion of immoralism will more deeply wound and damage mankind than any conceivable economic or political system. Today we are engaged in a final, all-out battle between communistic atheism and Christianity. The modern champions of communism have selected this as the time, and ladies and gentlemen, the chips are down – they are truly down ... Ladies and gentlemen, can there be anyone tonight who is so blind as to say that the war is not on? Can there by anyone who fails to realize that the Communist world has said the time is now? ... that this is the time for the show-down
Introduction
19
between the democratic Christian world and the communistic atheistic world? Unless we face this fact, we shall pay the price that must be paid by those who wait too long ... The reason why we find ourselves in a position of impotency is not because our only powerful potential enemy has sent men to invade our shores ... but rather because of the traitorous actions of those who have been treated so well by this Nation. It has not been the less fortunate, or members of minority groups who have been traitorous to this Nation, but rather those who have had all the benefits that the wealthiest Nation on earth has had to offer ... the finest homes, the finest college education and the finest jobs in government we can give. This is glaringly true in the State Department. There the bright young men who are born with silver spoons in their mouths are the ones who have been most traitorous ... I have here in my hand a list of 205. McCarthy wrote to President Harry S. Truman: I have in my possession the names of 57 Communists who are in the State Department at present ... While the records are not available to me, I know absolutely of one group of approximately 300 certified to the Secretary for discharge because of communism. He actually only discharged approximately 80 ... Failure on your part will label the Democratic Party of being the bedfellow of international communism. Certainly this label is not deserved by the hundreds of thousands of loyal American Democrats throughout the Nation, and by the sizable number of able loyal Democrats in both the Senate and the House.16 Disraeli (20 February 1846) referred to ‘the disciples of the school of Manchester’ to denigrate the promoters of laissez-faire – especially Cobden and Bright, founders of the Manchester-based Anti-Corn Law League. In a letter to Henry Drummond, Disraeli (19 November 1848) described himself as a ‘wretched correspondent – in the matter of letter writing, being of the Manchester school & caring only for the imports’ (Chaloner 1962, 137; Monypenny 1912, 363; Disraeli and Gunn 2004, 482). For the classical-liberal intellectual wing of the Democratic Party, New York was the ‘Manchester of America’ (Bradley 1980, 36). In April 1945, Hayek (1978), on a Road to Serfdom promotional lecture tour, began with a tone of profound conviction, not knowing how I would end the sentence, and it turned out that the American public is an exceedingly grateful and easy public ... I went through the United
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States for five weeks doing that stunt [laughter] everyday, more or less, and I came back as what I thought was an experienced public lecturer, only to be bitterly disappointed when I went back to England [where his American ‘stunt’ didn’t work]. Well, after all, you see, the New York audience apparently was a largely favorable one, which helped me. I didn’t know in the end what I had said, but evidently it was a very successful lecture ... what I did in America was a very corrupting experience. You become an actor, and I didn’t know I had it in me. But given the opportunity to play with an audience, I began enjoying it. [laughter]17 Eight months later, the American Economic Review published Hayek’s (1945) ‘Use of Knowledge in Society’ – a prelude to his 1974 Nobel lecture on ‘The Pretence of Knowledge’. At the 1949 Mont Pelerin Society meeting in Seelisberg, Popper led a session on the ‘Role of the State in Education and Research’ which addressed ‘Selection of teachers.’18 At the same meeting, Hayek scribbled a note with three sections: first ‘summer reading’ (which contained ‘Mill–Taylor’), second an eight-person list of prospective Mont Pelerin Society members (which included ‘Nymeyer’), plus ten ‘Source[s] of Funds’ (which also included Frederick Nymeyer).19 Shortly after leaving Britain, Hayek (23 December 1950) informed Lawrence A. Kimpton, the University of Chicago Vice-President, that he had just had lunch with a rather exceptionally intelligent and educated businessman who had startled him by seriously asserting that the first two of the sequential Social Science courses were organized by communist sympathisers. This apparently honest and intelligent man, whose son was studying at the University, had undertaken continuous observation before reaching this conclusion.20 The evidence suggests that Hayek was referring to Nymeyer who, through the Libertarian Press, had devoted a large part of his life and presumably his finances to locating and publishing everything he could find on the second-generation Austrian School economist Eugen Böhm-Bawerk – a project that Hayek (4 September 1962) assisted him with. Kimpton rose to the bait. After an arranged lunch with Kimpton, Nymeyer (22 January 1951) informed Hayek that the University authorities now knew that they could not claim the reputation of being an institution of learning; they could, instead, be perceived rather as an institution of propaganda with an anti-capitalist and subversive to freedom and a competitive freedom bias. Nymeyer suggested to Kimpton that someone who holds to Individualism should be designated to audit all courses.21
Introduction
21
Nymeyer’s (2 April 1951) objectivity consisted of as much information on Menger–Böhm Bawerk–Mises–Hayek as on Marx–Veblen–Keynes, with naturally the material heavily weighted for the former. Hayek (30 March 1951) replied that his tactic had worked: Nymeyer’s lunch with Kimpton had evidently made a considerable impact. Somewhat conspiratorially, Hayek (23 December 1950) forwarded to Kimpton a pamphlet – apparently written by Representative William Horsley – which he explained incidentally, he had received in a plain envelope soon after he arrived in Chicago.22 Hayek (7 November 1953) invited Nymeyer to join the Mont Pelerin Society.23 In 1954, the US House of Representatives investigated tax exempt foundations (H. Res 217). Mr Reese of Tennessee investigated ‘Pro-communist and pro-socialist propaganda financed by tax-exempt foundations’. The University of Chicago was targeted: its ‘Roundtable is propaganda not education’. Moreover ‘The U of C under Hutchins has distinguished itself by being the ‘only institution for higher learning in America which has been investigated five times for immoral or subversive activities’. In the fifth hearing, Horsley sought to deny the University of Chicago tax exemption.24 As noted above, William Beveridge, the LSE Director and designer of the British Welfare State, recruited Hayek (1994, 84), who concluded LSE Department of Economics meetings with: ‘Beveridge delendus est’ (‘Beveridge should be destroyed’). Hayek also told Nadim Shehadi: ‘I personally believe that Beveridge was completely incapable of any sexuality’ (cited by Dahrendorf 1995, 156). President Robert Hutchins attempted to persuade the Department of Economics to accept Hayek; when they refused, he appointed him to the Committee on Social Thought as the Professor of Social and Moral Sciences. Hayek (30 March 1951) speculated to Nymeyer that this ‘knowledge’ could prove to be of ‘considerable importance’ for the future. According to the University of Chicago website, in 1949 ‘Hutchins steadfastly refused to capitulate to red-baiters who attacked faculty members’; in 1951 he was replaced by Kimpton.25 When in 1955, the University of Michigan considered promoting the Keynesian econometrician and future recipient of the Nobel Prize for Economic Sciences, Lawrence Klein, from part-time lecturer to full professor, William A. Paton, an accountant and soon-to-be Mont Pelerin Society member, informed Gardner Ackley, the Chair of the Department of Economics, that this was ‘all a plot’ to ‘solidify Jewish control of the department’ (Ackley cited by Hollinger 1998, 152, n76). Paton (11 February 1955) insisted that Hayek be allowed to ‘respond candidly’ to the proposed promotion. Just in case Hayek was unaware of the
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ideological dimension, Paton reminded him that Klein was ‘completely in the wrong camp’. The University of Michigan formally invited Hayek to pass judgement on Klein. Hayek’s written reply (if he made one) is not in the Hayek archives.26 The anti-Semitic Hayek (1978) ‘never sympathized with either macroeconomics or econometrics’: the Klein episode, and Hayek’s role, have not been exhaustively examined (see, for example, Schrecker 1986, 253–255; Brazer 1982, 219–228). In a postscript to Science Jews and Secular Culture Studies in Mid-Twentieth-Century American Intellectual History (1998), David Hollinger (2013) reported that he had been unable to use some evidence because of a restriction that had since expired (Ackley describing Paton’s anti-Semitic statements in a 1979 interview with Marjorie Brazer): Paton’s ‘successful opposition to Klein is central to my discussion of the McCarthy Era at Michigan’. William Haber, a University of Michigan economist who aided Jewish refugees, believed that Paton’s anti-Semitism underpinned his opposition to Klein – a charge contested by Paton’s son, William A. Paton, Jr (Hollinger 1998, 152, n76; Howe Verhovek 1989). The restricted 1979 Ackley interview supports Haber’s judgement.27 According to Klein (1986, 28), the campaign succeeded: A large scale digital computer was installed at Michigan, and we started a project for automatic model solution – simulation, if you like – but it was not quite brought to fruition before I was to leave Ann Arbor. In the McCarthy era I left Michigan for the peace and academic freedom of Oxford ... In 1958 I returned to America and took up a professorship at Pennsylvania, where I admired the position of the president, provost and deans on the serious matter of academic freedom. In the 1946 election, the Republican Party national chairman proclaimed: ‘The choice which confronts Americans is between Communism and republicanism’. Richard Nixon (House of Representatives) and McCarthy were beneficiaries. In 1957, McCarthy died in disgrace; on 9 August 1974, Nixon was forced to resign the presidency after being pursued by The Washington Post and then by the broader press. Alive, Mises (1881–1973) had been a liability: the planning for the June 1974 Austrian revivalist meeting only began when he was unambiguously incapable of attending. On 9 October 1974, the Nobel Foundation issued a press statement: von Hayek’s contributions in the field of economic theory are both profound and original. His scientific books and articles in the twenties
Introduction
23
and thirties aroused widespread and lively debate. Particularly, his theory of business cycles and his conception of the effects of monetary and credit policies attracted attention and evoked animated discussion. He tried to penetrate more deeply into the business cycle mechanism than was usual at that time. Perhaps, partly due to this more profound analysis, he was one of the few economists who gave warning of the possibility of a major economic crisis before the great crash came in the autumn of 1929.28 After eight decades, evidence in support of this assertion has yet to surface (Klausinger 2012, 172, n10; 2010, 227).
4
Hayek’s triangles: the flow of fashionable opinion
Hayek (1978) believed there is a chance of making the intellectuals proud of seeing through the delusions of the past. That is my present ambition, you know. It’s largely concerned with socialism, but of course socialism and unlimited democracy come very much to the same thing. And I believe – at least I have the illusion – that you can put things in a way in which the intellectuals will be ashamed to believe in what their Fathers believed.29 Chitester asked: How does one translate, then, from the theoretical to the practical and political? Who is the intermediary? Is there a class of individuals, then, that must lie between the intellectual and the politician? How do you bridge the gap? Hayek (1978) replied: Well, I think under normal circumstances it ought not to be too difficult, because what I call the intellectuals, in the sense in which I defined it before – the secondhand dealers in ideas – have to play a very important role and are very effective.30 According to Hayek (1978), fashionable opinions blocked his influence: I never sympathized with either macroeconomics or econometrics. They became the great fashion during the period as a curious
24 Robert Leeson
pattern, thanks to Keynes’s influence. In the case of macroeconomics, it’s clear. But Keynes himself did not think very highly of econometrics, rather to the contrary. Yet somehow his stress on aggregates, on aggregate income, aggregate demand, encouraged work in both macroeconomics and econometrics. So, very much against his own wishes he became the spiritual father of this development towards the mathematical econometric economics. Now, I had always expressed my doubts about this, and that didn’t make me very popular among the reigning generation of economists. I was just thought to be old-fashioned, with no sympathy for modern ideas, that sort of thing.31 Hayek (1978), who was prone to self-pity and was seeking funding for a televised debate (‘The Paris Challenge to Socialists’), explained to Chitester, a television entrepreneur: But, of course, in my particular span of life I had the misfortune that the intellectuals were completely conquered by socialism. So I had no intermediaries, or hardly any, because they were prejudiced against my ideas by a dominating philosophy. That made it increasingly my concern to persuade the intellectuals in the hopes that ultimately they could be converted and transmit my ideas to the public at large. That I cannot reach the public I am fully aware. I need these intermediaries, but their support has been denied to me for the greater part of my life. I did not teach ideas which, like those of Keynes, had an immediate appeal and whose immediate relevance for practical problems could be easily recognized.32 Hayek (1978) added: I don’t think there could ever be any communication between Mr. Galbraith and myself. I don’t know why, but it’s a way of thinking which I think is wholly irresponsible and which he thinks is the supreme height of intellectual effort. I think it’s extremely shallow. I go so far as that when in this recent plan, which had to be postponed, of challenging an opposite group of socialist intellectuals, he was one of three whom I would exclude. I won’t use the exact phrase, which would be libelous and which I don’t want to be recorded, but he and two others I on principle excuse because they think in a way with which I could not communicate ... I don’t want to be offensive, but it’s a certain attribute which is common to journalists of judging opinions by their likely appeal to the public. [Galbraith was] more of a journalistic type.33
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25
At the IEA, Harris (2006, 171) and Selden recruited Harold Wincott (Financial Times), Oscar Hobson (News Chronicle), William Clark (The Times), Richard Fry (Manchester Guardian), Paul Bareau (Statist) and Andrew Alexander (Yorkshire Post and the Daily Mail); the Daily Telegraph appeared to be entirely captured by the IEA. To support merit-based rule by intellectuals and ‘non aristocratic’ professionals, John Stuart Mill (1848, 546) proposed that the government should provide ‘endowments or salaries for the maintenance of what has been called a learned class’. This ‘clerisy’ would educate the people in their political responsibilities and ‘free them from their habitual enslavement to custom and arbitrariness’ (Bradley 1980, 90). In The Constitution of Liberty, von Hayek (2010 [1960], 190–193) provided an ascribed status alternative: However important the independent owner of property may be for the economic order of a free society, his importance is perhaps even greater in the fields of thought and opinion, of tastes and beliefs ... The importance of the private owner of substantial property, however, does not rest simply on the fact that his existence is an essential condition for the preservation of the structure of competitive enterprise. The man of independent means is an even more important figure in a free society when he is not occupied with using his capital in the pursuit of material gain but uses it in the service of aims which bring no material return ... The leadership of individuals or groups who can back their beliefs financially is particularly essential in the field of cultural amenities, in the fine arts, in education and research, in the preservation of natural beauty and historic treasures, and, above all, in the propagation of new ideas in politics, morals, and religion ... It is only natural [emphasis added] that the development of the art of living and of the non-materialistic values should have profited most from the activities of those who had no material worries. Hayek (1978) didn’t ‘believe a word’ of religion So far as I do feel hostile to religion, it’s against monotheistic religions, because they are so frightfully intolerant. All monotheistic religions are intolerant and try to enforce their particular creed ... In spite of these strong views I have, I’ve never publicly argued against religion because I agree that probably most people need it. It’s probably the only way in which certain things, certain traditions, can be maintained which are essential ... It so happens that an Indian girl, who is trying to write a biography of myself, finally and very hesitantly
26 Robert Leeson
came up with the question which was put to Faust: ‘How do you hold it with religion?’ [laughter] But that was rather an exceptional occasion. Generally people do not ask. I suppose you understand I practically never talk about it. I hate offending people on things which are very dear to them and which doesn’t do any harm.34 Hayek (1978), while asserting ‘that there are in the surrounding world a great many orderly phenomena which we cannot understand and which we have to accept’, created his own ‘free’ market religion whilst promoting faith in traditional religions (particularly Catholicism) and the ‘spontaneous’ order as an alternative to Enlightenment endeavours in the social sciences.35 We must, he informed his Mont Pelerin Society ‘intermediaries’, recognize that we owe our civilization to beliefs which he used to call ‘superstitions’ but which for polemical purposes he now called ‘symbolic truths’. Our lives must be co-governed by ‘morals’ and reason, where the ‘truth of morals is simply one moral tradition, that of the Christian West, which has created morals in modern civilization’ [Hayek’s emphasis] (1984; cited by Leeson 2013, 197).36 Hayek (1949) urged that we must make the building of a free society once more an intellectual adventure. ... What we lack is a liberal Utopia, a deed of courage ... the courage to be Utopian. In ‘The Road from Serfdom’, Erik ‘Ritter von’ Kuehnelt-Leddihn (1992) explained: with the exception of Fritz Machlup, the original Austrian School consisted of members of the nobility ... [Hayek] descended from a family ennobled at the end of the eighteenth century by the Holy Roman Emperor. Although Americans are prohibited from using European titles, some attach ‘Jr.’ and ‘III’ to the names of their heirs. According to Llewellyn Rockwell Jr. (2008), the co-founder of the Ludwig von Mises Institute, Erik was a Catholic, an Old Liberal, and a trusted advisor to Otto von Habsburg and Cardinal Ratzinger (now Benedict XVI). He was a hereditary knight of the Holy Roman Empire and an adjunct scholar of the Mises Institute (great combination!). The Holy Roman Emperor (HRE) and the Pope (P) were at the apex of the feudal triangle, with the First (clergy), Second (nobility) and Third (commoners) Estates below them:
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27
HRE + P I II III
Resources (tithes and taxes) and deference flowed up the triangle. In private, von Mises (2007 [1958], 11) explained that the masses must learn: you are ‘inferior and all the improvements in your conditions which you simply take for granted you owe to the effort of men who are better than you’. In public, Mises (1944, 88, 20), informed them: Profit is the reward for the best fulfillment of some voluntarily assumed duties. It is the instrument that makes the masses supreme. The common man is the customer for whom the captains of industry and all their aides are working ... Free enterprise is the characteristic feature of capitalism. The objective of every enterpriser-whether businessman or farmer-is to make profit. The capitalists, the enterprisers, and the farmers are instrumental in the conduct of economic affairs. They are at the helm and steer the ship. But they are not free to shape its course. They are not supreme, they are steersmen only, bound to obey unconditionally the captain’s orders. The captain is the consumer. Invoking a phrase usually reserved for prostitutes, Mises (1960 [1948], 55) referred to the camp-followers of Lord Keynes [who were] imitating their idol’s own procedures. For what many people have admiringly called Keynes’ ‘brilliance of style’ and ‘mastery of language’ were, in fact, cheap rhetorical tricks. Hayek utilized the fashion industry model – a near-perfect example of producer sovereignty – to explain his plan for revolution: C+P
A
M
The ‘free’ market ‘Captains’ (C) of producer sovereignty, in this instance, Hayek plus the politicians (P), are at the top of the Austrian School
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neo-feudal knowledge triangle; at the bottom are academics (A), or intellectuals, and the ‘masses’ (M). In Hayek’s (1978) fashion-driven CAMP model, the persuasive influence of propertied intellectuals (C) trickles down the triangle to the non-propertied intellectuals, the ‘secondhand dealers in ideas’ (A), who use their producer sovereignty to persuade the masses (M), to whom the politicians, through a trickle-up-the-triangle process, have to respond: Oh, I’m sure you can’t operate any other way. You have to persuade the intellectuals, because they are the makers of public opinion. It’s not the people who really understand things; it’s the people who pick up what is fashionable opinion. You have to make the fashionable opinion among the intellectuals before journalism and the schools and so on will spread it among the people at large.37 According to Hayek (1978), Americans were particularly prone to fashion: Oh, yes, particularly in the sense that the Americans are more liable to this sort of quick change. There is a much more deeply ingrained tradition on the Continent than there is in American urban life. I don’t know American rural life at all, and I may do injustice to the rural America. All I see is the urban America, and urban America certainly [represents] often an instability and changeability which I have not come across anywhere else ... The very balance consists in the fact that they are passing fashions. They have great influence for the moment, but I should not be surprised if – In this case, I might be surprised, but let me just give an example: if I come back again, say, in two years, which is my usual interval, I shall find people are no longer jogging. As a wartime General, Eisenhower deployed the 101st Airborne Division – the ‘Screaming Eagles’ – in Operation Overlord and the liberation of Europe; as President, he deployed them – and invoked ‘human rights’ – to prevent White Terrorists from denying African-American children their constitutional rights (Damms 2002, 129). According to Hayek (1978), Americans were particularly prone to the ‘fashion’ of ‘human rights’: You see, my problem with all this is the whole role of what I commonly call the intellectuals, which I have long ago defined as
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the secondhand dealers in ideas. For some reason or other, they are probably more subject to waves of fashion in ideas and more influential in the American sense than they are elsewhere. Certain main concerns can spread here with an incredible speed. Take the conception of human rights. I’m not sure whether it’s an invention of the present administration or whether it’s of an older date, but I suppose if you told an eighteen year old that human rights is a new discovery he wouldn’t believe it. He would have thought the United States for 200 years has been committed to human rights, which of course would be absurd. The United States discovered human rights two years ago or five years ago. Suddenly it’s the main object and leads to a degree of interference with the policy of other countries which, even if I sympathized with the general aim, I don’t think it’s in the least justified. People in South Africa have to deal with their own problems, and the idea that you can use external pressure to change people, who after all have built up a civilization of a kind, seems to me morally a very doubtful belief. But it’s a dominating belief in the United States now.38 According to Hayek (1978), fashion is a very serious problem so far as moral change is concerned. While, on the one hand, I believe that morals necessarily evolve and should change very gradually, perhaps the most spectacular and almost unique occurrence in our lifetime was a fashion which refused to recognize traditional morals at all. What was the final outbreak of the counterculture was the people who believed that what had been taught by traditional morals was automatically wrong, and that they could build up a completely new view of the world. I don’t know whether that had ever occurred before. Perhaps it came in the form of religious revolutions, which in a sense are similar; but this sense of superiority of the deliberately adopted rules of conduct as against all the cultural and traditional rules is perhaps, in the moral field, the most spectacular thing I’ve seen happening in my lifetime. It certainly began in – Well, I have to correct myself at once. It did happen in Russia in the last century. But in my lifetime, it happened the first time in the forties and fifties and started from the Englishspeaking world – I’m not quite sure whether it began in England or the United States – and that created in some respects a social atmosphere unlike anything I can remember or has happened in Western European history.39
30 Robert Leeson
Hayek (1978) berated American fashion for ending European empires: It’s so clear that in some respects America is bringing pressure on the other countries in respects that are by no means obvious that they are morally right ... An early instance was the extreme American anticolonialism: the way in which the Dutch, for instance, were forced overnight to abandon Indonesia, which certainly hasn’t done good to anybody in that form. This, I gather, was entirely due to American pressure, with America being completely unaware that the opposition to colonialism by Americans is rather a peculiar phenomenon.40
5
Dynasties or democracies: ‘my system of democracy’
In either the public or the private sector, concentrated power can be socially weakening. America could have been ‘discovered’ by the first Tudor king, Henry VII, had Christopher Columbus’ brother, Bartholomew, been more rhetorically persuasive; the second Tudor king, Henry VIII, later promoted the 12th-century Welsh Prince Madoc as the true ‘discoverer’ so as to legitimize himself as an emperor rather than a mere king and thus escape the papal prohibition on divorce (Kimberley 2014). The de-concentrated power of early modern Europe allowed Columbus to request expeditionary funding from John II of Portugal plus two republics (Genoa and Venice), before succeeding with Ferdinand II of Aragon and Isabella I of Castile. In 1474, Columbus was in awe of the Chinese: ‘this country is as rich as any that has ever been found’ (cited by Wiesner, Ruff and Wheeler 2008, 296). The Chinese could have established a world hegemony, temporarily at least, as a result of Admiral Zheng He’s expeditionary voyages (1405– 1433); but a subsequent Ming emperor decreed that such entrepreneurial activities violated some dynastic foundational documents: concentrated political and patronage power prevented further explorations. The Chinese relative decline was only sustainably reversed after 1978. Victorian classical liberals sought to construct the world to reward merit, rather than patronage. Through monarchical-imperial patronage, wealthy families like the Hayeks and the Mises became aristocrats. Four years after the fall of the Habsburg Empire, Mises (1951 [1922], 234–235) found a replacement: The wars waged by England during the era of Liberalism to extend her colonial empire and to open up territories which refused to admit foreign trade, laid the foundations of the modern economy ... England, which had become the greatest colonial power, proceeded to manage
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31
her possessions according to the principles of free trade theory ... It was not cant for English free traders to speak of England’s vocation to elevate backward people to a state of civilization. England has shown by acts that she has regarded her possessions in India, in the Crown colonies, and in the Protectorates as a general mandatory of European civilization. ... In judging the English policy for opening up China, people constantly put in the foreground the fact that it was the opium trade which gave the direct, immediate occasion for the outbreak of war complications. But in the wars which the English and French waged against China between 1839 and 1860 the stake was the general freedom of trade and not only the freedom of the opium trade. Victorian liberals, such as Bright, promoted Indian independence; Cobden sought to construct an international order ‘based on free trade rather than military power’ (Bradley 1980, 126, 131). At the beginning of the long post-World War II boom, and four years after Indian independence, Mises (1951 [1922], 234–235) asserted: Were England to lose India today, and were that great land, so richly endowed by nature, to sink into anarchy, so that it no longer offered a market for international trade – or no longer offered so large a market – it would be an economic catastrophy of the first order. Mises explained that opium addicts were displaying consumer sovereignty; Hayek explained to Cubitt (2006, 15) that of the two empires he had watched decline, ‘England’s downfall had been the more painful to him’. The Chinese Qing dynasty (1644–1912), like the Habsburgs and Hohenzollerns, left a legacy of only partly legitimized governments – although the Republic of China (1912–1949) survived longer than either the First Austrian Republic (1919–1934) or the Weimar Republic (1919– 1933). The national humiliation caused by the Opium Wars, combined with aggression from the Empire of Japan (1937–1945), facilitated the Maoist seizure of power (1949). Between the Great Chinese famine (caused by the Great Leap Forward, 1958–1961) and the revival of Mao’s power (the Cultural Revolution, 1966–1976), market forces were used more productively. After 1978, China resumed Admiral Zheng He’s legacy through export-led industrialization. For reasons that are inexplicable from a Machiavellian geopolitical perspective, American ‘tear down this wall’ foreign policy facilitated the economic and military catch-up of two (at the time of writing) cooperating super-powers: communist China and the Russia of the Oligarchs. Having provided the intellectual
32 Robert Leeson
justification of the Opium Wars, Mises (and Hayek) promoted the relative weakening of the West through international anti-communism. The modern state emerged through the decline of the Habsburg quasi-monopoly-power – exercised through the Holy Roman Empire. Henry VII humbled his ‘overmighty subjects’, the English nobility – an unintentional marker on the road to civil society. In pursuit of his first divorce, Henry VIII humbled the other pillar of the feudal edifice: the Roman Catholic Church. Cost–benefit analyses of modern concentrated power must focus on the State and one of its enemies, tax havens, the Third Estate (labour and employer trade unions) and the Fourth (the media). Tax strikers can have their power degraded through international cooperation (the ‘International Gottfried von Haberler Conferences’ have been organized by the Austrian Schooler, Kurt Leube, in the Liechtenstein tax haven);41 capital strikes (credit squeezes) cause recessions; labour strikes disrupt production and deter investment (symbolized by the corrupt ‘Spanish Practices’ of the British print unions). Rupert Murdoch’s 1984–1985 victory over the unions – and his overbearing influence on election outcomes – symbolizes another aspect of this power-concentration dysfunction. Murdoch’s Fox News and The Times relentlessly promote the aristocratic von Hayek. In a Manhattan Institute third annual Walter B. Wriston Lecture in Public Policy, Murdoch (1990) described ‘The War on Technology’ in Hayekian terms: we were encouraged by Mrs. Thatcher’s victory in the miners’ strike and by signs that authorities were prepared to protect private property from the actions of massed pickets ... The war between new technology and outmoded social institutions continues. At stake is the very idea of human progress ... The great truth, which being an immigrant perhaps I can see more clearly than the average citizen, is this: Modernization is Americanization. It is the American way of organizing society that is prevailing in the world ... The decision to rely on market forces is the essence of modernization. Yet technological change often provokes atavistic, authoritarian responses. The real danger of the present technological revolution is that we may be panicked by future shock into regressive schemes of regulation ... The immediate result of our victory was greater freedom and flexibility, and higher profits, for News Corp. But the Battle of Wapping also ushered in a silver age of British newspaper journalism.42 Twentieth-century human capital analyses, which can dissipate tensions about competing factor shares, provided a formalized version of Victorian
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33
liberalism: societal conflict could be mitigated through widespread capital ownership and co-ownership. From this perspective, there are two class-promoting parasites: communists, on the mythical working class, and aristocratic Austrians on business-owning donors. Classical economics was alchemy-based: through public policy intervention, markets could turn the base metal of primitive self-interest into the gold of the socially optimal result. Before Stigler’s (1966) Coase theorem, non-Austrian neoclassical economics was externality-based: public policy should aim for full-cost pricing through the price-induced elimination of ‘spontaneous’ subsidies; shortly after Stigler’s (1971) insightful ‘regulatory capture’ application of Pigouvian negative externalities to public/private sector interaction, deregulation produced both benefits and costs (deregulatory capture). Externalities apply not only to third-party costs and benefits but also to an individual’s second party. When asked, many report that they want to save for retirement; most tobacco consumers report that they want to – and will, some day – quit. But short-run (impulsive) neurons frequently override long-run utility maximization. Full-cost pricing and public health information can counterbalance subtle advertising, and nudge individuals towards their reported outcomes; likewise, incentives can increase the number of self-funded retirees and thus reduce the burden on future taxpayers. Austrian School economists acquired ruling class status through dynastic patronage. The ‘Liberal Awakening’ in Britain was based on the faith that the extended franchise would be used to ‘promote high ideals’ rather than self-interest. Self-interest combined with idealism: many were excluded from office by the aristocratic establishment (Bradley 1980, 15, 49). Some societal change requires intervention – through, in this instance, revolution, or ruling class retreat, driven in part by fear of revolution: an externality-internalization modification of the entry-restricting incentives of incumbents. Austrians fear the taxation powers of the propertyless; the Marshallian tradition sought to expand the property-owning democracy through human capital formation. Four years after the collapse of the Habsburg Empire, Mises (1922, 435; 1951, 443–434) declared that ‘the Lord of Production is the Consumer’ (‘Der Herr der Produktion ist der Konsument’). According to Mises, From this point of view the capitalist society is a democracy in which every penny represents a ballot paper. It is a democracy with an imperative and immediately revocable mandate to its deputies ... Special means of controlling [the entrepreneur’s] behaviour are unnecessary. The market controls him more strictly and exactingly than could any government or other organ of society.
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Hayek (1978) told Buchanan: in general the question of the franchise is what powers they can confer to the people they elect. As long as you elect a single, omnipotent legislature, of course there is no way of preventing the people from abusing that power without the legislature’s being forced to make so many concessions to particular groups. I see no other solution than my scheme of dividing proper legislation from a governmental assembly, which is under the laws laid down by the first. After all, such a newfangled conception gradually spreads and begins to be understood. And, after all, in a sense, the conception of democracy was an artifact which captured public opinion after it had been a speculation of the philosophers. Why shouldn’t – as a proper heading – the need for restoring the rule of law become an equally effective catchword, once people become aware of the essential arbitrariness of the present government.43 According to Hayek (1978), democracy led to other types of ‘social justice’ interventions: But with our present method of democracy, you don’t have to agree, but you have to – You are pressed, on the pretext of social justice, to hand out privileges right and left;44 with the usual rules of the parliamentary system in which they function, they [the masses] realize that with the present type of democracy, government is inevitably driven into intervention, even against its professed principles. It’s always the sort of cynicism of people who still believe it would be nice if we could stick to our liberal principles, but it proves in practice to be impossible. So they resign themselves reluctantly, and perhaps some more cynically. They believe other people are getting out things from the process of corruption; so they decide to participate in it. It’s quite cynical.45 In England, the Republican Interregnum (1649–1660) resurrected fears of the ‘many-headed monster’: ‘no King, no nobles’. Four years after the collapse of the Habsburg edifice, von Mises (1951 [1922], 76) expressed the same fear: Grave injury has been done to the concept of democracy by those who, exaggerating the natural law notions of sovereignty conceived it as limitless rule of the volonté générale [general will]. There is really no essential difference between the unlimited power of the democratic state and the unlimited power of the autocrat. The idea that carries
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35
away our demagogues and their supporters, the idea that the state can do whatever it wishes, and that nothing resists the will of the sovereign people has done more evil perhaps than the Caesar-mania of degenerate princelings. Both have the same origins in the notion of a state based purely on political might. The legislator feels free of all limitations because he understands from the theory of law that all law depends on his will. It is a small confusion of ideas, but a confusion with profound consequences, when he takes his formal freedom to be a material one and believes himself to be above the natural conditions of social life. The conflict which arises out of this misconception shows that only within the framework of Liberalism does democracy fulfil a social function. Democracy without Liberalism is a hollow form. Hayek (1978) explained: Sometimes in private I say I have made one discovery and two inventions in the social sciences: the discovery is the approach of the utilization of dispersed knowledge, which is the short formula which I use for it; and the two inventions I have made are denationalization of money and my system of democracy.46 Hayek (1978) told Robert Bork that he wished to resurrect the ‘old tradition’: I’m frankly trying to destroy the superstitious belief in our particular conception of democracy which we have now, which is certainly ultimately ideologically determined, but which has created without our knowing it an omnipotent government with really completely unlimited powers, and to recover the old tradition, which was only defeated by the modern superstitious democracy, that government needs limitations. For 200 years the building of constitutions aimed at limiting government. Now suddenly we have arrived at the idea where government, because it is supposedly democratic, needs no other limitations. What I want to make clear is that we must reimpose limitations on governmental power.47 Capitalism was the problem: Well, capitalism has, of course, raised expectations which it cannot fulfill. Unless we take from government the powers to meet the demand of particular groups, which are raised by their success, I think it will destroy itself. This applies to both capitalism and democracy.48
36 Robert Leeson
Hayek (1978) explained: You know, it was The Road to Serfdom [1944] which led me to The Constitution of Liberty [1960]. Having done The Constitution of Liberty, I found that I had only restated in modern language what had been the classical-liberal view; but I discovered there were at least three issues which I had not answered systematically ... So I felt I had to fill the gaps;49 in The Constitution of Liberty I was still mainly attempting to restate, for our time, what I regarded as traditional principles. I wanted to explain what nineteenth-century liberals had really intended to do. It was only at the time when I had practically finished the book that I discovered that nineteenth-century liberals had no answers to certain questions. So I started writing the second book on the grounds that I was now tackling problems which had not been tackled before. I was not merely restating, as I thought, in an improved form what was traditional doctrine; I was tackling new problems, including the problem of democracy.50 With understatement, Stephen Kresge (1994, 29) noted that Hayek ‘never felt entirely at home in Chicago’. In 1962, Hayek (1978) retired from the University of Chicago and returned to Europe: I believe that in a way the thing on which I have now been working for seventeen years, which I have now at last finished – Law, Legislation and Liberty [1973–1979] – is probably a much more original contribution to the thing. It’s not merely a restatement, but I have developed my own views on several issues – on the whole relation between rule and order, on democracy, and the critique of the social justice concept, which were absolutely essential as complements to the original ideas, answering questions which traditional liberalism had not answered.51 Hayek (1978) reflected: And anything or anybody which will help the politician be elected is by definition a good purpose. I think people can be made to recognize this and to restore general limitations on the governmental powers; but that will be a very slow process, and I rather fear that before we can achieve something like this, we will get something like what [J. L.] Talmon [1960] has called ‘totalitarian democracy’ – an elective
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37
dictatorship with practically unlimited powers. Then it will depend, from country to country, whether they are lucky or unlucky in the kind of person who gets in power. Possibly referring to Austro-Fascism, Hayek added: After all, there have been good dictators in the past; it’s very unlikely that it will ever arise. But there may be one or two experiments where a dictator restores freedom, individual freedom.52 Americans embrace Benjamin Franklin in this context: ‘those who give up essential liberty to gain a little temporary safety, deserve neither liberty nor safety’ (cited by Napolitano 2010, 232). Rosten exclaimed to Hayek: I can hardly think of a program that will be harder to sell to the American people. I’m using ‘sell’ in the sense of persuade. How can a dictatorship be good? To which Hayek (1978) replied: ‘Oh, it will never be called a dictatorship; it may be a one-party system.’53
6 Caldwell’s Challenge: ‘democracy is dangerous and ought to be limited’ In The Road to Serfdom: The Definitive Edition, the third general editor of The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek described Hayek’s martyrdom: The worst of the lot, Herman Finer’s scabrous Road to Reaction, was also picked out for mentioning by Hayek in the 1956 foreword. The overarching message of the book was evident in its very first sentence: ‘Friedrich A. Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom constitutes the most sinister offensive against democracy to emerge from a democratic country for many decades.’ According to Finer, Hayek’s call for constitutionalism and advocacy of the rule of law was indicative of his antidemocratic biases, the ‘very essence’ of Hayek’s argument being ‘the idea that democracy is dangerous and ought to be limited.’ Toward the end of the book (published, we remember, in 1945) we find Finer remarking on ‘the thoroughly Hitlerian contempt for the democratic man so perfectly expressed by Hayek [unattributed emphasis]. (Caldwell 2007, 21)
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In public interviews, Hayek repeatedly explained that democracy is dangerous and ought to be limited. Rosten asked: You created a furore in the United States, England, and I imagine around the world, with The Road to Serfdom, because it came out at a time when you were a lone voice speaking in the wilderness about the terrible dangers which were inherent in turning over to government – even good government by a good and well-intentioned people – powers which were both dangerous and inexorable ... Has it occurred to you since then that this was one reason there was so much vicious response, because the English and the Americans could not believe that they were in danger of becoming serfs. It seemed unthinkable ... If you were to write that book over again, first. Would you make any changes? and secondly, what would you call it? Hayek (1978) replied: Well, I suppose I would still call it the same, although I was never quite happy with the title, which I really adopted for sound. The idea came from [Alexis de] Tocqueville, who speaks about the road to servitude; I would like to have chosen that title, but it doesn’t sound good. So I changed ‘servitude’ into ‘serfdom,’ for merely phonetic reasons.54 ... You can tell the people that our present constitutional order forces politicians to do things which are very stupid and which they know are very stupid. I am not personally trying to blame the politicians; I rather blame the institutions which we have created and which force the politicians to behave not only irrationally but I would say almost dishonestly. But they have no choice. So long as they have to buy support from any number of small groups by giving them special privileges, nothing but the present system can emerge. My present aim is really to prevent the recognition of this turning into a complete disgust with democracy in any form, which is a great danger, in my opinion. 55 In consequence, Hayek promoted ‘a system of really limited democracy’.56 Hayek (1978) warned Thomas Hazlett that democracy is dangerous and ought to be limited: It’s not the ultimate solution, but it may not only delay or slow down the process; it may do even more. It may affect opinions in the right direction. People may come to understand what the trouble is. So I’m all in favor of it, particularly since I have been watching the thing
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operating in Switzerland, where again and again referendums stopped action which the politicians believed they had to take in order to satisfy the majority. Then it turned out when they asked the majority that the majority turned them down. It happened so frequently in Switzerland that I became convinced that this is a very useful brake on the bad features of our present-time democracy. I don’t think it’s a longtime solution, but it might give a sufficiently long pause for the public to appreciate what the dangers are.57 Hayek (1978) told Armen Alchian that democracy is dangerous and ought to be limited: The general phrase which I am using so often that you probably have heard of it is that I am pessimistic in the short run, optimistic in the long run. If the politicians don’t destroy the world in the next thirty years, I think there’s good hope for it. But the chances are not very good. [laughter]. I think the great danger is that the so-called fight against inflation will lead to more and more controls and ultimately the complete destruction of the market. I hope that on Monday there will be a letter from me in the Wall Street Journal, which just suggests that I hope they would put in every issue in headline letters the simple truth: ‘Inflation is made by government and its agents. Nobody else can do anything about it.’58 Bork asked: in your latest book. Law, Legislation and Liberty, you’re starting from a premise, I take it, that liberty is really declining throughout Western democracies, and in fact is in considerable danger of extinction within the foreseeable future. I wonder if you’d care to talk a little bit about the evidence you see for the proposition that liberty is, in fact, declining and is in danger. In reply, Hayek (1978) explained that democracy is dangerous and ought to be limited: Well, of course, the original occasion was my analysis of the causes of the intellectual appeal of the Nazi theories, which were very clearly – I mean, take a man like Carl Schmitt, one of the most intelligent of the German lawyers, who saw all the problems, then always came down on what to me was intellectually and morally the wrong side. But
40 Robert Leeson
he did really see these problems almost more clearly than anybody else at the time – that an omnipotent democracy, just because it is omnipotent, must buy its support by granting privileges to a number of different groups. Even, in a sense, the rise of Hitler was due to an appeal to the great numbers. You can have a situation where the support, the searching for support, from a majority may lead to the ultimate destruction of a democracy.59 With respect to ‘Hitlerian contempt for the democratic man’: Victorian liberalism was based on faith in ‘the people’ as opposed to the ‘effete values of the aristocrat’. Mill’s promotion of representative government was based on ‘the moral and educative value of the vote’. As Bright put it: ‘if class has failed, it was time to try the nation’ (Bradley 1980, 150, 159, 167). Trade unions were the ‘spontaneous expression of working class self-help and political maturity’ (Bradley 1980, 176; Jackson 2014); for Hayek, they posed the greatest ‘danger’ to his ‘personal liberty’. Hayek (1978) explained to Buchanan: with our present method of democracy, you don’t have to agree, but you have to – You are pressed, on the pretext of social justice, to hand out privileges right and left ... I am most concerned, because it’s the most dangerous thing at the moment, with the power of the trade unions in Great Britain. While people are very much aware that things can’t go on as they are, nobody is still convinced that this power of the trade unions to enforce wages which they regard as just is not a justified thing. I believe it’s a great conflict within the Conservative party at the moment that one-half of the Conservative party still believes you can operate with the present law and come to an understanding with the trade union leaders, while the others do see that unless these privileges of the trade unions to use coercion and force for the achievement of their ends is in some form revoked or eliminated, there’s no hope of curing the system. The British have created an automatic mechanism which drives them into more and more use of power for directing the economy. Unless you eliminate the source of that power, which is the monopoly power of the trade unions, you can’t [correct this] ... Fifteen years ago, when I knew more about it, it seemed to me that the American trade unions were a capitalist racket rather than, in principle, opposed to the market as such. There seem to be tendencies in public opinion and in American legislation to go the British way, but how far it has gone I don’t know. The reason why I was so very much acutely aware of the British significance
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is because I happened to see the same thing in my native country, Austria, which is also a country governed by the trade unions. At the present moment, nobody doubts that the president of the trade union association is the most powerful man in the country. I think it works because he happens to be personally an extremely reasonable man. But what will happen if they get a radical in that position I shudder to think. In that sense, the position in Austria is very similar to that in Britain.60 Hayek (1978) informed Rosten that there was ‘a comic part’ about two dead Jewish-born colleagues: ‘I think I can now tell you the story behind it.’ Herman Finer’s parents were killed by Hitler; Finer’s 1945 Road to Reaction provided an interpretation of Hayek’s intentions which are quite similar to that which Hayek – in public, and for private-until-posthumous consumption – provided himself (Leeson 2014a, chapter 3). According to Hayek, Finer [1898–1969] had come to hate the London School of Economics, and particularly Harold Laski [1893–1950], because when he had come to the United States and war broke out, he had asked for a leave, an extension of leave, and it was denied him because he was needed for teaching. He was so upset about this that he turned against the London School of Economics, and particularly Laski. Then it happened that I was the first member of the London School of Economics on which he could release all his hatred of the place. So I had to suffer for Harold Laski. [laughter] Rosten replied: ‘I am horrified to hear you adopt so simple a psychological point of view’[laughter]. When Laski died, it was thought that the 1920–1950 era might become known as ‘The Age of Laski’ (Ebenstein 2003, 56).61 According to Hayek (1978), Laski, of course, at that time had become a propagandist, very unstable in his opinions ... he was frightfully offended by my The Road to Serfdom. He was very egocentric and believed it was a book written especially against him ... He still had the capacity of getting students excited at first, but even they noticed after two or three months he was constantly repeating himself. And he was extraordinarily inconsistent ... he was wholly unreliable, both his stories and his theoretical views. I was present one evening in August 1939, when he held forth for half an hour on the marvels of Communist achievement.
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Then we listened to the news, and the story of the Hitler-Stalin Pact came through. And when we finished the news, he turned against Communism and denounced them as though he had never said a word in their favor before.62
7 Hayek’s trickle-down-the-triangle: Orwell and General Motors Hayek’s (1949, 418) ‘intellectuals’ consisted of journalists, teachers, ministers, lecturers, publicists, radio commentators, writers and artists: all of whom may be masters of the technique of conveying ideas but are usually amateurs so far as the substance of what they convey is concerned. The General Motors cartoon promotion of The Road to Serfdom explained why government interference with the market is poison and why we must choose between firing squads and the power to fire employees.63 For Hayek’s ‘masses’, Orwell’s message is synonymous with The Road to Serfdom (Lane 2013). In his review of The Road to Serfdom, Orwell (1944) largely agreed with Hayek’s two ‘negative’ suggestions. First, Hayek’s thesis is that Socialism inevitably leads to despotism, and that in Germany the Nazis were able to succeed because the Socialists had already done most of their work for them, especially the intellectual work of weakening the desire for liberty. By bringing the whole of life under the control of the State, Socialism necessarily gives power to an inner ring of bureaucrats, who in almost every case will be men who want power for its own sake and will stick at nothing in order to retain it. [And second, Britain] is now going the same road as Germany, with the left-wing intelligentsia in the van and the Tory Party a good second ... In the negative part of Professor Hayek’s thesis there is a great deal of truth. It cannot be said too often – at any rate, it is not being said nearly often enough – that collectivism is not inherently democratic, but, on the contrary, gives to a tyrannical minority such powers as the Spanish Inquisitors never dreamed of. But Orwell (1944) objected to Hayek’s notion that The only salvation lies in returning to an unplanned economy, free competition, and emphasis on liberty rather than on security ... Professor Hayek is also probably right in saying that in this
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country the intellectuals are more totalitarian-minded than the common people. But he does not see, or will not admit, that a return to ‘free’ competition means for the great mass of people a tyranny probably worse, because more irresponsible, than that of the State. The trouble with competitions is that somebody wins them. Professor Hayek denies that free capitalism necessarily leads to monopoly, but in practice that is where it has led, and since the vast majority of people would far rather have State regimentation than slumps and unemployment, the drift towards collectivism is bound to continue if popular opinion has any say in the matter. The former Nazi, Reinhard Kamitz, was a Mont Pelerin Society member. A few weeks before the announcement of his Nobel Prize, Hayek told a secondhand dealer in ideas: It may be said that effective and rational economic policies can be implemented only by a superior leader of the philosopher-statesman type under powerful autocracy. And I do not mean a communistdictatorship but rather a powerful regime following democratic principles. The interviewer, Seigen Tanaka (1974), reported ‘Saying this, Prof. Hayek shifted his eyes to the snow capped mountains at a distance.’64 In 1978, referring to General Augusto Pinochet, Hayek explained in The Times that under certain ‘historical circumstances,’ an authoritarian government may prove especially conducive to the long-run preservation of liberty: there are ‘many instances of authoritarian governments under which personal liberty was safer than under many democracies’ (cited by Farrant, McPhail and Berger 2012).
8 Hayek’s trickle-up-the-triangle and ‘secondhand dealers’ in financial opium In Austrian Economics in America: The Migration of a Tradition, Karen Vaughn (1994, 8) described the 1970s–1990s flowering of a new Austrian literature ... eventually, the small group grew larger (and older) and opened up their conversation to include friendlier voices closer to the mainstream. In 1994, Long-Term Capital Management hedge fund was launched; and collapsed in 1998, after a US$3.6 billion bailout. Two Long Term
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Capital Management directors, Myron Scholes and Robert Merton, were awarded the 1997 Nobel Prize for Economic Sciences. The British Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown (2005), referred to the ‘economic stability’ of the ‘post 1997 monetary and fiscal settlement’. In his Mansion House speech to the City of London annual dinner, Brown (2004) stated that ‘in budget after budget I want us to do even more to encourage the risk takers’. Four years before Lehman Brothers disappeared, Brown opened their London headquarters and told their bankers: I would like to pay tribute to the contribution you and your company make to the prosperity of Britain ... During its 150 year history, Lehman Brothers has always been an innovator, financing new ideas and inventions before many others even began to realize their potential.65 Brown (2005) told a CBI audience that I believe 2005 will go down in history as ... an important economic moment ... My vision is of a Britain made for globalisation – the location of choice and the place for business to be ... Britain is well placed to become world leaders in some of the worlds’ fastest growing, most wealth creating sectors ... my first and foremost commitment is to maintain economic stability: stability yesterday, today and tomorrow ... at every point I want to work with you and listen to your concerns so that just as we are meeting the stability challenge, we can meet all long term challenges by making the reforms you need and the modernisation you require and the country requires for economic success. ... We all agree that at the heart of the modern enterprise challenge is minimising regulatory concerns ... Whenever I go to the USA and talk to businessmen and women there, they express exactly the same frustrations about regulation and the same hopes about reducing burdens. And I know that you feel that what we need is real delivery – and I want to underline this by a better understanding of risk and indeed implementing a modern risk based approach to regulation so that the culture change we all agree upon can be advanced ... In the old regulatory model – and for more than one hundred years – the implicit principle from health and safety to the administration of tax and financial services has been, irrespective of known risks or past results, 100 per cent inspection whether it be premises, procedures or practices. So regulation came to mean that government routinely and continuously inspected everyone and everything, demanded information from all of us on a blanket basis, required forms to be filled in for all issues subject to regulation
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and inspection – the only barrier to complete coverage usually being a lack of resources. This approach, followed for more than a century of regulation by governments of all parties is outdated. The better, and in my opinion the correct, modern model of regulation – the risk based approach – is based on trust in the responsible company, the engaged employee and the educated consumer, leading government to focus its attention where it should: no inspection without justification, no form filling without justification, and no information requirements without justification, not just a light touch but a limited touch. The new model of regulation can be applied not just to regulation of environment, health and safety and social standards but is being applied to other areas vital to the success of British business: to the regulation of financial services and indeed to the administration of tax. And more than that, we should not only apply the concept of risk to the enforcement of regulation, but also to the design and indeed to the decision as to whether to regulate at all. Brown (2005) promised new legislation: we will make this risk based approach a statutory duty of the regulators. And driving further the risk based approach in financial services, I will publish at the Pre Budget Report 10 new simplification and deregulatory measures which will cut demands for information, forms and reporting requirements including cutting by 15 per cent disclosures of change of control and up to 20 FSA consultations each year. So we will abolish this requirement and reduce the burdens placed upon you – the first of a series of regulatory requirements which by working together we can abolish in the interests of the British economy. This was Brown’s radical commitment to minimize regulation and to maximize flexibility and to reach out and to take our rightful place in the world. A vision of Britain as the place to be. Let us together make Globalisation work for Britain to the benefit of all – for British companies, the British economy and the British people.66 Two years later, in his Mansion House speech, Brown (2007) congratulated his audience on these remarkable achievements, an era that history will record as the beginning of a new golden age for the City of London ... I believe it will be said of this age, the first decades of the 21st century, that out of the greatest restructuring of the global economy, perhaps
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even greater than the industrial revolution, a new world order was created.67 Two years after Brown’s Mansion House speech, the Mont Pelerin Society President, Deepak Lall (2009), came close to issuing a Society mea culpa: ‘complacency’ about financial sector deregulation had preceded the Global Financial Crisis. The following year, in a Newsweek Business Elite essay on ‘The Triumphant Return of Hayek’, Ruchir Sharma (2010) declared: Last year the consensus opinion was that we are all Keynesians now. Virtually everyone in the commentariat believed that John Maynard Keynes’s solution for the Great Depression – heavy government spending to resuscitate the economy – was also the answer to today’s global downturn. The first cracks in the consensus appeared with the outbreak of the fiscal crisis in Greece earlier this year. Across the developed world, critics began to argue that government spending had reached the point of diminishing returns, and was producing an anemic recovery that mainly benefited specialinterest groups. And the electorate listened. From Europe to the United States, as voters started to reward candidates focused on fiscal discipline and less government intervention, Keynesianism quickly fell out of favor. Sharma (2010) provided the epistemological foundations: In a sign of the times, some of the most popular videos on YouTube this year are satires on economic policy; the latest lampoons the Fed amid a growing feeling that policymakers are committing what economist Friedrich Hayek called the ‘fatal conceit’ in micromanaging the economic cycle. Hayek hated policy intervention of any kind ... Hayek was associated with the Austrian school, ascendant in the 19th and early 20th centuries, which argued that the private sector should be left free to carry out the task of any readjustment in a downturn. Faith in the market’s purging power served the U.S. well in the 19th century, when the economy emerged stronger after each recession, but was taken too far in the policy mix of tight money and high taxes that led to the Great Depression and the rise of the Keynesians. Austrian School economists promote the deregulated financial sector ‘free’ market liberty that led to the global financial crisis – Sharma
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(2010), the head of Emerging Markets at Morgan Stanley Investment Management, concluded that Keynes’ and Friedman’s fortunes had fallen, ‘leaving Hayek triumphant, once again’.
9
Hayek, power and sovereignty
Hayek (1978) reflected about his intellectual evolution: I think I was just taken in by the theoretical picture of what democracy was – that ultimately we had to put up with many miscarriages, so long as we were governed by the dominant opinion of the majority. It was only when I became clear that there is no predominant opinion of the majority, but that it’s an artifact achieved by paying off the interests of particular groups, and that this was inevitable with an omnipotent legislature, that I dared to turn against the existing conception of democracy. That took me a very long time.68 In the 19th and 20th centuries, labour unions began to rival employer trade unions: von Mises (1909–1973) and von Hayek (1950–1992) were paid aristocratic lobbyists for employer trade unions and their ‘free’ market. Stigler (1988, 148) recalled: ‘There was no Chicago School of Economics when the Mont Pelerin Society first met.’ Before then, most classical liberals – with the notable exception of von Mises – promoted de-concentrating power to increase liberty. Gradually, liberty came to be defined asymmetrically: the state should re-regulate labour unions, whilst providing deregulation for employer unions (especially in the financial sector), leaving the taxpayer to fund inevitable bailout. Hayek created a split within Marshallian Neoclassical School. Rhetorically, Hayek’s (1944) The Road to Serfdom echoed the influences of the ordo-liberal Freiburg School and pre-Hayek Chicago economists: To split or decentralise power is necessary to reduce the absolute amount of power, and the competitive system is the only system designed to minimize by decentralization the power exercised by man over man. Henry Simons’ (1948 [1934], 42, 43, 58) pre-Hayek Chicago manifesto, ‘A Positive Program for Laissez Faire’, proclaimed: It is an obvious responsibility of the state under this policy to maintain the kind of legal and institutional framework within which competition
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can function effectively as an agency of control. ... The great errors of economic policy in the past century may be defined – and many of our present difficulties explained – in terms of excessive political interference with relative prices and in terms of disastrous neglect of the positive responsibilities of government under a free-enterprise system. For Simons: The great enemy of democracy is monopoly, in all its forms ... corporations, trade associations ... trade-unions – or, in general, organization and concentration of power in functional classes. The state had a duty to eliminate monopolies and ‘our gigantic corporations’ needed ‘outright dismantling’. Does tobacco consumption reflect advertising-induced producer sovereignty, or Austrian-promoted consumer sovereignty? As chairman of the smokers’ ‘personal liberty’ group, Forest, Harris insisted that tobacco consumers had the right to impose second-hand costs on others. In 1995, he unsuccessfully led a light-up-in-the-buffet-car civil disobedience campaign against the smoking ban. In Murder a Cigarette, Harris and Judith Hatton (1998) explained that the externalities of secondhand smoke were based on ‘pseudo-science, anecdotal evidence, selective surveys and statistical jiggery-pokery’. Is knowledge-construction and dissemination influenced by the incentives associated with the search for funding? At the IEA, Harris (2006, 169) described ‘[t]he crucial role of intellectuals in opening minds to radical changes in public and business policy’: what – implicitly or explicitly – is being exchanged in this market? Does it matter if the Austrians are funded by the tobacco lobby and tax havens? Harris (2006, 167) explained: ‘The IEA was a charitable trust and therefore forbidden from conducting anything approaching political propaganda.’ At the 1959 Oxford meeting of the Mont Pelerin Society, Harris and Seldon described ‘The Tactics and Strategy of the Advance to a Free Economy’: Before the war and up to about 1950, the warnings of liberal economists went largely unheeded, and only the short-sighted, stop-go ideas of interventionists had the ear of the politicians and the public. But for some years now, it has been possible to preach the free economy with some hope of being understood and without the automatic accusation of acting as the lackeys of capitalists. (Chapter 2)
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The IEA was founded as Galbraith’s (1958) The Affluent Society was published; according to Harris (2006, 167), this enabled ‘critics to link the advertising industry in this high brow campaign against free markets.’ At the IEA, there was ‘spontaneous agreement’ that Galbraith had to be rebutted. The IEA pursued two fascinating aspects of marketing: the first the supply of finance for domestic durables and the second the promotion of consumer demand for the changing goods and services on offer in the marketplace. The neoclassical bathwater – consumption creates goods (utility), while work produces bads (disutility) – is in the process of being thrown out by the insights of behavioural economics and neuroscience. But many neoclassical insights are still serviceable: what does the neoclassical assumption of self-interest reveal about the response of Hayek’s (1949) ‘inferior’ and ‘mediocre’ ‘secondhand dealers in ideas’ to pecuniary incentives? As Adam Smith (1827 [1776], 137) famously noted: People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices. The Mont Pelerin Society had to be funded: in his 1952 Mont Pelerin Society President’s circular, Hayek, referring to his European financier, bemoaned that he had yet to find ‘an American Dr. Hunold’ (Chapter 2). Before the Mont Pelerin Society, neoliberals had insisted on an active role for the state to de-monopolize the economy and establish a legal framework to safeguard competition against cartels and concentration tendencies. This was the position of the pre-Hayek Chicago economists and the Freiburg School, which propagated vollständigen Wettbewerb (a kind of perfect competition). Hayek dismissed the concept of ‘perfect competition’ as a fiction: anti-cartel activity would be an intolerable threat to the rule of law (Chapter 2; Vanberg 2013; Goldschmidt and Hesse 2013). The year after Friedman’s Nobel Prize, Hayek (1992a [1977]) declared that after three decades of trickle, the Mont Pelerin Society’s main purpose has been wholly achieved. I became very much aware that each of us was discovering the functioning of real freedom only
50 Robert Leeson
in a very small field and accepting the conventional doctrines almost everywhere else. So I brought people together from different interests. Any time one of us said, ‘Oh yes – but in the field of cartels you need government regulation,’ someone else would say, ‘Oh no! I’ve studied that.’ That was how we developed a consistent doctrine and some international circles of communication. Harris’ (2006) justification for the IEA contribution to the road Towards a Liberal Utopia was that ‘the Keynesian curtain [had] descended on independent scholarship’. In his Memoirs, Dalton (1953, 115) described how Hayek’s ‘consistent doctrine’ was applied at the LSE: Robbins became an ‘addict of the Mises–Hayek anti-Socialist theme’, ‘variety’ tended to disappear, and the LSE began to teach a ‘more uniform brand of right wing economics’. In 1932, Dalton wrote to a friend that the ‘Robbins– Hayek tendency (and they have several echoes on the staff) is very retrograde’ (cited by Pimlott 1985, 215). After a visit to Nazi Germany in spring 1933, Dalton noted that ‘Geistige Gleichschaltung [intellectual coordination] is the Nazi ideal in education. There is something of this too in the economics department of the [London] school of economics’ (cited by Durbin 1985, 103).
10
The Pilgrim Mountain street code
Internet communities reveal what many suspected: individuals are often motivated by curiosity and community as much as by the cash nexus. Organized communism in the Soviet Union collapsed largely because of the technological advances of Silicon Valley ‘garage communists’ (many of whom had little concern for their own property rights), marketed by Schumpeterian entrepreneurs and utilized by the US military. Hayek took the credit: he thoroughly enjoyed watching the television pictures from Berlin, Prague, and Bucharest. ‘He would beam benignly, and the comment was “I told you so”,’ said Hayek’s son. (Cassidy 2000) Mill described Toryism as ‘tout bonnement [simply] a reverence for government in the abstract’;69 Austrians revere markets in the abstract. Post-communist euphoria evaporated as a result of the abstract, institutionless application of Stigler’s (1966) Coase Theorem to the former Soviet Empire. At the first international meeting of ‘neoliberals’ – the 1938 Paris Colloque convened to discuss Walter Lippmann’s (1937) An
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Enquiry into the Principles of the Good Society – the French philosopher, Louis Rougier, stated: To be a liberal does neither mean to let as the ‘Manchester man’ circulate the cars in all directions such as they wish, which results in traffic jams and permanent accidents; nor does it mean to prescribe as the planner every car a precise departure time and route; it means to decide on a street code. Hayek ‘Liberal Utopia’ sought to make ‘possible what only recently seemed utterly remote’ to ‘influence on public opinion, which made possible step by step what only recently seemed impossible’. This could not be achieved through ‘practical’, ‘sensible’ and dull, ‘realistic’ arguments (Chapter 2). By reverentially ignoring non-Utopian reality (drinkor drug-impairment etc.), the Coase theorem denies the need for a street code: drivers could choose their speed and thus their efficiency-maximizing time of arrival if – through telepathy – each could costlessly negotiate with all. In 1991, the Soviet Union collapsed and the anti-Pigouvian Ronald Coase (who had been repeatedly nominated by Hayek) was awarded the Nobel Prize for Economic Sciences. Rothbard (1992), the co-founder of the Ludwig von Mises Institute descended from Pilgrim Mountain with eight Commandments, including the Austrian street code: ‘In a sense the strategy we are now proclaiming is a strategy of Outreach to the Rednecks.’70 Rothbard proposed to establish an Austrian police state with, in effect, only notional controls on coercive power: 4. Take Back the Streets: Crush Criminals. And by this I mean, of course, not ‘white collar criminals’ or ‘inside traders’ but violent street criminals-robbers, muggers, rapists, murderers. Cops must be unleashed, and allowed to administer instant punishment, subject of course to liability when they are in error. 5. Take Back the Streets: Get Rid of the Bums. Again: unleash the cops to clear the streets of bums and vagrants. Where will they go? Who cares? Hopefully, they will disappear, that is, move from the ranks of the petted and cosseted bum class to the ranks of the productive members of society. Rothbard (1992) was describing ‘Right-Wing Populism: A Strategy for the Paleo Movement’; Hitler promoted street-based disorder so as to promote himself as the ‘order’-restoring saviour. According to Rothbard’s hero:
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What distinguished liberal from Fascist tactics is not a difference of opinion regarding the use of armed force to resist armed attackers, but a difference in the fundamental estimation about the role of violence in a struggle for power. Violence was ‘the highest principle’ and must lead to civil war. The ultimate victor to emerge will be the faction strongest in number ... The decisive question, therefore always remains: How does one obtain a majority for one’s own party? This however is purely an intellectual matter. (Mises (1985 [1927], 49, 50) According to Hayek (1978), it’s, of course, no longer the will of the majority, or the opinion of the majority, I prefer to say, which determines what the government does, but the government is forced to satisfy all kinds of special interests in order to build up a majority. It’s as a process. There’s not a majority which agrees, but the problem of building up a majority by satisfying particular groups. So I feel that a modern kind of democracy, which I call unlimited democracy, is probably more subject to the influence of special interests than any former form of government was. Even a dictator can say no, but this kind of government cannot say no to any splinter group which it needs to be a majority.71 You have to build up a majority, which then acts.72
6.
Mea culpa
After the onset of the Great Depression, Hayek and Mises were, in effect, academic cheerleaders for the deflation and labour liquidation that facilitated Hitler’s rise to power (Leeson 2014b). In his Nobel Lecture, John Hicks (1972) emphasized that he had abandoned his attachment to the Austrian business cycle: It is not the case (as used to be supposed) that there is any single physical index by which we can distinguish those techniques which lie ‘further down’ the spectrum from those which lie ‘higher up’. There is no such index which can be employed without exception. I could already show (in 1939) that the ‘Period of Production’ that was used for this purpose by Böhm-Bawerk and Hayek will not in general serve.
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In the second edition of Theory of Wages, Hicks (1963, 307) stated: I can date my own personal ‘revolution’ rather exactly to May or June 1933. It was like this. It began (rather oddly, as it turned out) with Hayek. His Prices and Production is one of the influences that can be detected in The Theory of Wages. Hayek (1933) had professionally discredited himself before he delivered his University of London Tooke Professor of Economic Science and Statistics inaugural lecture (Sraffa 1932a; 1932b). The lecture took place on 1 March 1933, as newspapers reported the Reichstag Fire. Hicks (1972), who taught at the LSE between 1926 and 1935, was ‘deeply ashamed’ of the influence exerted over him in the first edition of Theory of Wages (1932) the tradition in which I was working in [chapters] IX–X – the tradition of Böhm-Bawerk and [Knut] Wicksell – was much less familiar to English readers than that of Pigou, on whom I was drawing in VI ... even before the General Theory appeared in 1936, I had begun to draw some of the consequences ... The first result of the new point of view, when I reached it in 1933–35, was to make me deeply ashamed of what in those chapters I had written. I realised (too late) how inappropriate it was. It had nothing to do with the state of the world at the time when I was writing. I had diagnosed a disease, but it was not the right disease. The unemployment of 1932 was of quite a different character from what I had supposed. Robbins (1971, 154), Hayek’s LSE colleague, also issued a post-Austrian mea culpa: I shall always regard this aspect of my dispute with Keynes as the greatest mistake of my professional career, and the book, The Great Depression, which I subsequently wrote, partly in justification of this attitude, as something which I would willingly see be forgotten ... Now I still think that there is much in this theory as an explanation of a possible generation of boom and crisis. But, as an explanation of what was going on in the early ’30s, I now think it was misleading. Whatever the genetic factors of the pre-1929 boom, their sequelae, in the sense of inappropriate investments fostered by wrong expectations, were completely swamped by vast deflationary forces sweeping away all those elements of constancy in the situation which otherwise might have provided a framework for an explanation in
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my terms. ... The theory was inadequate to the facts. Nor was this approach any more adequate as a guide to policy. Confronted with the freezing deflation of those days, the idea that the prime essential was the writing down of mistaken investments and the easing of capital markets by fostering the disposition to save and reducing the pressure on consumption was completely inappropriate. To treat what developed subsequently in the way which I then thought valid was as unsuitable as denying blankets and stimulants to a drunk who has fallen into an icy pond, on the ground that his original trouble was overheating. Friedman spent autumn 1950 in Europe as Special Representative attached to the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation. PostHitler Germany left its mark: those members of Rose Friedman’s family who had not left their homeland ‘all died in the Holocaust. We have never learned where or how’. As Milton worked, Rose apprehensively guarded their two children: Of course I knew there were no Nazis in the park but somehow there was always in my subconsciousness those terrible stories about what happened to Jewish children during the Nazi era. That trip to Germany haunted me for many years. (Friedman and Friedman 1998, 3, 180) Friedman (6 November 1950) wrote to Don Patinkin about his experiences: on coming into Germany, Rose and I had a tremendous feeling of revulsion, the hatred of years came to the surface + we saw a Nazi in every German face. That softened a bit but did not disappear in a few days ... Industrially, Europe is a mess. By comparison, the U.S. is the purest of pure competitive economies. Everything here is rigid + controlled and competition almost nonexistent. God knows what can be done about it. (cited by Leeson 2003, 239–240) In his Nobel Lecture, Hayek (1974) provided the anti-Pigouvian answer: those remarkable anticipators of modern economics, the Spanish schoolmen of the sixteenth century, who emphasized that what they
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called pretium mathematicum, the mathematical price, depended on so many particular circumstances that it could never be known to man but was known only to God. One of the two Germanic powers has successfully avoided responsibility for Hitler: ‘We have persuaded the world that Hitler was German and Mozart was Austrian.’ Hayek was at pains to point out and was to repeat this many times, that his family could not have Jewish roots ... when I asked him whether he felt uncomfortable about Jewish people he replied that he did not like them very much, any more than he liked black people. When Mrs Thatcher elevated Peter Bauer to the House of Lords, Hayek reminded Cubitt (2006, 51) of his ascribed status: a ‘small ... Jewish boy from Hungary’, and indicated that he was ‘the size of a dwarf’. What did the diminutive Friedman see in Hayek’s face, or faces? Hayek’s childhood friend, J. Herbert Fürth (20 April 1984), informed Gottfried Haberler that Hayek’s family ‘adhered to Nazism long before there was an Adolf Hitler’.73 Fürth (23 March 1992) told Paul Samuelson that Hayek’s father was the president of a ‘highly nationalistic society of “German” physicians’ who competed with the politically neutral general Medical Association. Hayek’s mother was ‘equally nationalistic, and mad at me because I had “seduced” her son from nationalism.’74 Hayek explained to Cubitt (2006, 17, 51) that to ‘his certain knowledge’, in Austria, Nazism ‘had been actively upheld long before it had reached Germany’. Hayek’s (1978) youngest brother, Erich, was part of a völkisch group, whose members, according to Mises (1944, 94–96), became ‘obedient and faithful slaves of Hitler’.75 Hayek’s middle brother, Heinz, joined the German Nazis; but was prematurely released by the Americans from the Würzburg de-Nazification camp after informing his interrogators that he was related to the author of the Reader’s Digest trickle-down version of The Road to Serfdom (Blundell 2007, 146–147). Hayek’s (1992b [1945], 223) other ‘face’ implicitly – and implausibly – insisted on ‘justice’ to members of his own Austrian family: ‘shooting in cold blood’. Friedman (2002) issued a mea culpa: We have learned about the importance of private property and the rule of law as a basis for economic freedom. Just after the Berlin Wall fell and the Soviet Union collapsed, I used to be asked a lot: ‘What
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do these ex-communist states have to do in order to become market economies?’ And I used to say: ‘You can describe that in three words: privatize, privatize, privatize.’ But, I was wrong. That wasn’t enough. The example of Russia shows that. Russia privatized but in a way that created private monopolies-private centralized economic controls that replaced government’s centralized controls. It turns out that the rule of law is probably more basic than privatization. Privatization is meaningless if you don’t have the rule of law. What does it mean to privatize if you do not have security of property, if you can’t use your property as you want to?76 Friedman’s willingness to acknowledge error – here and elsewhere – is evidence that he should be located at the scientific end of the ‘knowledge’-to-faith spectrum.
11
Hayek, ‘the Other’, and ‘financial considerations’
In 1945, Harold Luhnow, President of the Volker Fund, pressed Hayek (1994, 126–7) to write an American version of The Road to Serfdom. Hayek recalled that he estimated that it would cost $30,000 over three years, adding that he would need an American university appointment. Lucknow told Hayek, ‘Money is yours.’ Cubitt (2006, 122, 10) reported that Hayek was caught in the ‘cheating matter’ – stealing, or doubledipping, from ‘educational charities’ – to maintain his aristocratic lifestyle. When Walter Morris complained to Cubitt about being deceived [,] Hayek laughed, and told me that he had wanted to have nothing to do with this but did not mind being told about it as an anecdote. The editor of The Road to Serfdom: The Definitive Edition, explained: I owe a special debt to Mrs. Dorothy Morris of the Morris Foundation, Little Rock, who provided me with the ‘seed money’ for the project ... Walter Morris was instrumental in the creation of the Collected Works [of F. A. Hayek] project, and the Morris Foundation has been constant in its support throughout the years. I first sought financial support for the project at the Mont Pelerin meeting. (Caldwell 2007, x)
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The Old World ‘discovery’ of America was matched by ‘the invention of America’ and the ‘construction of the Other.’ Hayek (1978) had a visceral dislike of ‘the Other’: I don’t have many strong dislikes. I admit that as a teacher – I have no racial prejudices in general – but there were certain types, and conspicuous among them the Near Eastern populations, which I still dislike because they are fundamentally dishonest. And I must say dishonesty is a thing I intensely dislike. It was a type which, in my childhood in Austria, was described as Levantine, typical of the people of the eastern Mediterranean. But I encountered it later, and I have a profound dislike for the typical Indian students at the London School of Economics, which I admit are all one type – Bengali moneylender sons. They are to me a detestable type, I admit, but not with any racial feeling. I have found a little of the same amongst the Egyptians – basically a lack of honesty in them.77 In 1918, 85 per cent of those ruled by the Habsburgs were illiterate (Taylor 1964, 166); Habsburg reconquistadors appear to suffer functional illiteracy and papal-infallibility-blindness. According to one of the editors of The Collected Writings of F. A. Hayek: But I must say, I understand what Hayek is saying. Many years ago I taught for two years in ... I had a much older student originally from Iraq, who had, himself, taught mathematics for awhile in Libya. He happened to live not far from where I was staying outside ... , and he invited me for a drink one evening. We had a couple of pints, and chatted for a few hours (he did have some interesting stories of life in Iraq under Saddam). At the end of the school year, when he discovered that he had earned a passing but relatively low grade, he came to see me in my office, and asked, how I could give him such a grade? After all, hadn’t he bought me a drink? Were we not, now, ‘friends’? I came to notice this attitude frequently among a number of the Middle Eastern students; that establishing ‘friendships’ was supposedly the way to (I don’t want to say, ‘buy’) ‘influence’ their situation in life. Now, of course, we all know the phrase, ‘It’s not what you know, but who you know.’ And, obviously, that is an element of life everywhere. But I discovered that it is far stronger and pervasive in some cultures compared to others. As for cheating. My institution, ... University, has an associative relationship with two Chinese universities, and a sizable
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number of Chinese students come to ... as part of their final year of study. There is ‘statistically significant’ degree of attempted group cheating among many of them. My ... , who earned her ... degree from ... told me she observed the same thing when she studied there. I was doing consulting work on market reform and privatization in the former Soviet Union during the regime’s last years of existence. I found that there was a pervasive attitude among many that personal connections and bribery were the primary means of survival and improvement in life. Now, it is true, the nature of the communist regime created these perverse institutional incentives. But, nonetheless, it did influence the behavioral patterns of many people. Those in the bureaucracy and the Party were especially cynical about all of this, and contemptuous of all verbal and written promises and commitments.78 Certain Americans appear susceptible to Romanov princesses, Bilgewater dukes and Habsburg vons. Hayek (1978) explained: The robber baron was a very honored and honorable person, but he was certainly not an honest person in the ordinary sense. The whole traditional concept of aristocracy, of which I have a certain conception – I have moved, to some extent, in aristocratic circles, and I like their style of life. But I know that in the strict commercial sense, they are not necessarily honest. They, like the officers, will make debts they know they cannot pay. For the last 25 years of his life, Hayek refused to pay his secretary/ soiled-bed nurse, who reported: because of the many gaps between one donor and another, and because cheques were lost, or not sent, or forwarded to the wrong bank, I was almost permanently in debt until about three years before Hayek’s death. I once asked Hayek whether he did not mind having to beg for money so often. He just laughed, and said he did not mind it in the least, that all his professional considerations had been based on financial considerations. (Cubitt 2006, 10) Those who have been summoned by bells to aristocratic service through, for example, hagiographic editing of The Collected Writings of F. A. Hayek, maintain: Those, like Hayek, who had grown up and then still worked in societies in which rule of law, ‘fair play,’ ‘honesty is its own reward,’ a
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sense of individual responsibility, etc., meant something would be shocked and bothered when they came into contact with people from cultures and institutional orders in which the ‘rules of the game’ were viewed as being very different. By the way, any such accusation that Hayek was racist is totally misplaced, just as was the accusation a few years ago that he was antisemitic (in an article in HOPE [Reder 2000] that tried to link Hayek with the presumed antisemitism of [Joseph] Schumpeter and Keynes). Among his closest friends and associates in the old Vienna where Austrian Jews such as Mises, Fritz Machlup, and the sociologist, Alfred Schutz. (Machlup helped to edit Hayek’s The Pure Theory of Capital for readability – alas, without much success!) Karl Popper was saved from ‘oblivion’ in New Zealand, after he had to leave Austria, by Hayek helping to have it [sic] appointed to a position at the LSE.79
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In Chapter 2, Philip Plickert describes the evolution of deregulated liberty – beginning with the ‘existential crisis’ that the philosophy of economic liberalism faced in the first half of the twentieth century. In three post-war decades, Hayek influenced post-1974 deregulation, Chinese communist-capitalism and the collapse of the Soviet Empire. Plickert analyses Hayek’s intellectual strategy, and the neoliberal influence on the intellectual climate and on specific policy outcomes. Orwell’s (1945; 1949) Animal Farm and Nineteen Eighty-Four were as influential as The Road to Serfdom, especially the Reader’s Digest and General Motors cartoon versions. In Chapter 3, Andrew Farrant explores the connections between Hayek, Orwell and The Road to Serfdom in the context of their conflicting attitudes towards the post-war British Labour government. Friedman recalled that Britain was still in a sad way two years after the war [and that he would] never forget [Walter Eucken’s] pleasure at eating the first orange he had seen in seven or eight years ... His courage in resisting the Nazis became legendary. Eucken and Ludwig Erhard ‘laid the foundation’ for the ‘German economic miracle’ and the ‘groundwork’ for their ‘social market economy’ (Friedman and Friedman 1998, 159, 160). Six years after Erhard’s (1897–1977) death, Hayek (1983, 55) dropped a bombshell: at a
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Mont Pelerin Society meeting, Erhard had – allegedly and exclusively – confided in him: I hope you don’t misunderstand me when I talk of social market economy. I mean that the market in itself is social, not that is must be made social. The following year, Hayek dropped another bombshell: Pigouvian externalities were invented not by a Great War ambulance driver and co-recipient of the 1947 Nobel Peace Prize but by one of Stalin’s 1905 gun-runners (Leeson 2014c). In Chapter 4, Rogério Arthmar documents Arthur Cecil Pigou’s life and legacy. Chapters 5–8 examine Hayek’s influence on four contrasting environments: pre-demise communism, Australia, post-communism and the subterranean world of those who are attracted to ‘personal liberty’ and animosity towards ‘the Other’. In Chapter 5, Yuri Maltsev describes the problem of restraining one location of concentrated power: the State. At the Moscow State University, he risked seven years in jail for reading The Road to Serfdom (he didn’t know if the supplier was a ‘charming fish’ KGB informer). He ‘became an ardent anti-socialist armed with Hayekian logic and arguments after I’ve finished it’. In the 1970s, the Institute of Labor Research in Moscow (where Maltsev worked) set 460,000 wage rates and over 90 million work quotas for 110 million government employees; the 400 employees of the State Committee on Prices set and ‘managed’ over 23 million prices. Maltsev highlights a central Hayekian insight: the division of labour is matched by the division of knowledge. The Austrian fourth generation also has a division – between Hayek and Rothbard: Hayek’s argument rests on ignorance; the Mises/Rothbard argument rests on the inability to calculate (because of the absence of a price mechanism). Thus for Miseans, Hayek was a social democrat. Hayek and Mises were both advocates – and while they marketed slightly different products, in their negative rhetoric they jointly succeeded. To those oppressed by communism, they provided a ‘vision’. Prime Minister of Estonia Mart Laar told Maltsev that he studied The Road to Serfdom and other banned ‘pro-capitalist’ literature in secret seminars long before the collapse of the Soviet Empire. As Caldwell (2010) reported in The Washington Post, one of Rupert Murdoch’s Fox News employees, the television entrepreneur and conspiracy theorist, Glenn Beck, created an Austrian bull market for The Road to Serfdom.
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Caldwell also used the analogy of a horse’s orifice when confronted with Hayek’s lies. In 1962, Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom was officially translated into Chinese: bureaucratic ‘capitalist roaders’ wished to get acquainted with Hayek. The Chinese translation was a not-to-be-circulated ‘internal document’. The translator, Weizao Teng, who referred to Hayek as a ‘loyal lackey defending the capitalist system’, claimed that Hayek’s books were ‘full of poison’: the translated book would allow academics to ‘criticize modern bourgeois reactionary economic theories’. In Chapter 6, Rafe Champion provides the first detailed account of Hayek’s five-week 1976 visit to Australia, including a somewhat unprofitable meeting with the Liberal Party Prime Minister, Malcolm Fraser (1975–1983). On Remembrance Day 1975, the Labor Prime Minister, Gough Whitlam (1972–1975), had been dismissed by the GovernorGeneral, Sir John Kerr; yet Australia remained a functioning democracy, and in 1982, Bob Hawke, the former president of the Australian Congress of Trade Unions (1969–1980), became Labor Party Prime Minister (1983–1991). Australia was a quasi-corporate state: government and trade unions (labour and employer) cooperated through high wages, tariff protection, export marketing boards and industrial relations courts. This equilibrium was shattered by the Labor Party through tariff reductions (under Whitlam) and extensive deregulation (under Hawke). It is difficult to assess Hayek’s direct country-specific influence on Australia; the policy directional change was more directly influenced by a remarkable group of public-spirited neoclassical public policy intellectuals, mostly located in Canberra. Indeed, the establishment of the Melbourne-based Institute of Public Affairs (1943–) had preceded the establishment of Hayek’s Mont Pelerin Society. It is easier to assess the influence of both Hayek and the Coase theorem on the countries of the post-Soviet Empire. In Utopia, Thomas More (1997 [1516]) argued that the practice of enclosure – attaching legal property rights to land previously held communally – had produced anti-social results, specifically theft. The Enclosure Acts created England of the Oligarchs: in Chapter 7, Kiryl Haiduk compares the ‘vision’ of ‘liberal Utopia’ to the reality – asymmetric privatization and the rise of Russia of the Oligarchs. The qualifications of one post-communist contributor, Richard Ebeling, appeared to include no more than a California State College undergraduate degree, a Rutgers University MA plus the Hillsdale College Ludwig von Mises Professorship of Economics.
62 Robert Leeson
Two-thirds of a century after Mises (1985 [1927]) embraced Fascism, Rothbard (1994a; 1994b) defended Byron De La Beckwith, Jr. (the Ku Klux Klan assassin of civil rights worker Medgar Evers, who was convicted because he was politically ‘incorrect’), Silvio Berlusconi (newly elected to the Italian Chamber of Deputies, media tycoon, a ‘dedicated free-marketeer’, and later convicted tax-fraudster and Prime Minister), Mussolini (because he had a reluctant ‘anti-Jewish policy’), Islamo-Fascists, and those described as ‘neo-fascists’. Hayek and his disciples believe that Pigou (18 November 1877–7 March 1959) was a communist spy, and ‘Bill Phillips’ (18 November 1914–4 March 1975) was an underground communist who operated transmission stations for the Soviets (Leeson 2014c). On 18 November 1991, Hayek received the Presidential Medal of Freedom from President George W. H. Bush: we honor Professor Friedrich von Hayek for a lifetime of looking beyond the horizon. At a time when many saw socialism as ordained by history, he foresaw freedom’s triumph. Over 40 years ago, Professor von Hayek wrote that The Road to Serfdom was not the road to the future or to the political and economic freedom of man. A Nobel laureate, he is widely credited as one of the most influential economic writers of our century. Professor von Hayek is revered by the free people of Central and Eastern Europe as a true visionary, and recognized worldwide as a revolutionary in intellectual and political thought. How magnificent it must be for him to witness his ideas validated before the eyes of the world. We salute him.80 On 23 March 1992, President Bush issued a press release: Barbara and I are saddened by the death of Friedrich August von Hayek. I presented him the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1991 because he was one of the great thinkers of our age who explored the promise and contours of liberty. Professor von Hayek revolutionized the world’s intellectual and political life. Future generations will read and benefit from his works.81 The following year (26 February 1993) the World Trade Center was bombed, killing six, and injuring thousands: the ‘Blind Sheik’, Omar Abdel-Rahman, apparently an al-Qaeda affiliate, was sentenced to life
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imprisonment. Six months after the attack, Rothbard (1993) declared: the ‘A-rabs’ under investigation haven’t done anything yet. I mean, all they’ve done so far is not assassinate former President George Bush, and not blow up the UN building or assassinate [United States Senator] Al D’Amato; ... I must admit I kind of like that bit about blowing up the UN building, preferably with [Secretary General] Boutros BoutrosGhali inside. In ‘A New Strategy for Liberty’, Rothbard (1994c) provided the final solution to the ‘coordination problem’ between Austrian economists and ‘Redneck’ militia groups: A second necessary task is informational: we can’t hope to provide any guidance to this marvellous new movement until we, and the various parts of the movement, find out what is going on. To help, we will feature a monthly report on ‘The Masses in Motion.’ After the movement finds itself and discovers its dimensions, there will be other tasks: to help the movement find more coherence, and fulfil its magnificent potential for overthrowing the malignant elites that rule over us. Rothbard (1994d) explained that ‘the least’ Austrians could do ‘is accelerate the Climate of Hate in America, and hope for the best’.82 Do businesses have social responsibilities? Do those in the business of public policy promotion have the responsibility to channel social passion into outcomes that strengthen democracy? Should hate groups be funded by the taxpayer? In Chapter 8, Tad Tietze describes one consequence of the ‘Outreach to the Rednecks’: the influence of Austrian School of Economics visions on the Norwegian mass murderer Anders Breivik.
Notes 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
UCLA oral history interview with Leo Rosten. UCLA oral history interview with Thomas Hazlett. UCLA oral history interview with Robert Chitester. UCLA oral history interview with Leo Rosten. UCLA oral history interview with Earlene Craver. UCLA oral history interview with Leo Rosten.
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7. Orwell (1968 [1940]) also noted that Hitler was not a Benthamite: ‘After a few years of slaughter and starvation ‘Greatest happiness of the greatest number’ is a good slogan, but at this moment ‘Better an end with horror than a horror without end’ is a winner.’ 8. ‘I think the phrase ought to read, ‘Congress should make no law authorizing government to take any discriminatory measures of coercion.’ I think this would make all the other rights unnecessary and create the sort of conditions which I want to see.’ UCLA oral history interview with James Buchanan. 9. Hamowy (2003) recalled that at Hayek’s Committee on Social Thought tutorials there were ‘three students and only two chairs! Having arrived last, I was compelled to use the table as a seat, which I tried to mount by turning Hayek’s wastepaper basket upside down to use as a step, all this while Hayek continued to complete the point he was making when I entered his office. It probably comes as no surprise that my attempt proved disastrous. The wastepaper basket overturned and rolled away, I fell to the ground, and the table, unable to sustain the pressure I was placing on it as I grabbed for it, tipped over, knocking one of the other student’s chairs into Hayek’s desk. All and all, the effect was that Hayek’s office looked a shambles but to my great surprise and pleasure Hayek was guffawing to the point where his eyes were tearing.’ In Hayekian circles, Hamowy was known as the ‘gay dwarf’ (Cubitt 2006, 265). 10. http://mises.org/rothbard/misesobit.asp 11. UCLA oral history interview with Axel Leijonhufvud. 12. UCLA oral history interview Robert Chitester. 13. UCLA oral history interview with Earlene Craver. 14. UCLA oral history interview with Armen Alchian. 15. ‘Though nobody will regret that education has ceased to be a privilege of the propertied classes, the fact that the propertied classes are no longer the best educated and the fact that the large number of people who owe their position solely to the their general education do not possess that experience of the working of the economic system which the administration of property gives, are important for understanding the role of the intellectual.’ 16. US Senate, State Department Loyalty Investigation Committee on Foreign Relations, 81st Congress; Joseph McCarthy to President Harry Truman February 11, 1950, Congressional Record, 81st Congress 17. UCLA oral history interview Robert Chitester. 18. Hayek Papers Box 81.12. 19. Hayek Papers Box 81.6. 20. Hayek Papers Box 55.1. 21. Hayek Papers Box 40.23. 22. Hayek Papers Box 55.1. 23. Hayek Papers Box 78.22. 24. http://archive.org/stream/TheWorldOrder_329/22-Reece-CommitteeHearings-Tax-Exempt-Foundations-1953_djvu.txt 25. http://president.uchicago.edu/directory/robert-maynard-hutchins. In 1960, Kimpton left the University of Chicago to work for Standard Oil of Indiana. http://president.uchicago.edu/directory/lawrence-kimpton 26. Hayek Papers Box 67.6.
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27. George Katona, in his 1979 interview with Brazer, insisted that the tape recorder be turned off before he would answer questions about Paton and Klein. 28. http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/1974/ press.html 29. UCLA oral history interview with James Buchanan. 30. UCLA oral history interview with Robert Chitester. 31. UCLA oral history interview with Jack High. 32. UCLA oral history interview with Robert Chitester. 33. Ibid. 34. Ibid. 35. Ibid. 36. Closing Mont Pelerin Society address. Hayek Papers Box 110.38. 37. UCLA oral history interview with Thomas Hazlett. 38. UCLA oral history interview with Robert Chitester. 39. Ibid. 40. In UCLA oral history interview with Axel Leijonhufvud, Armen Alchian, and Earlene Craver, Hayek (1978) also referred to ‘a great general fashion in Vienna due to the influence of Mach on the whole intellectual outlook’; ‘the man who drew my attention to Menger’s book was Othmar Spann. I don’t know if the name means anything to you. He was semicrazy and changed violently from different political persuasions – from socialism to extreme nationalism to Catholicism, always a step ahead of current fashions;’ ‘there was a stage in which I was reading all the Taylor stuff, but that was a little later. I think it was at the beginning of my economics reading, but that was the time of the great fashion of Taylorism.’ 41. http://www.ecaef.li/index.php?catID=518&navID=338&GOTO=1 42. http://www.city-journal.org/article01.php?aid=1631 43. UCLA oral history interview with James Buchanan. 44. Ibid. 45. UCLA oral history interview with Thomas Hazlett. 46. UCLA oral history interview with Armen Alchian. 47. UCLA oral history interview with Robert Bork. 48. UCLA oral history interview with Leo Rosten. 49. UCLA oral history interview with Armen Alchian. 50. UCLA oral history interview with James Buchanan. 51. UCLA oral history interview with Armen Alchian. 52. UCLA oral history interview with Leo Rosten. 53. Ibid. 54. Ibid. 55. Ibid. 56. UCLA oral history interview with Jack High. 57. UCLA oral history interview with Thomas Hazlett. 58. UCLA oral history interview with Armen Alchian. 59. UCLA oral history interview with Robert Bork. 60. UCLA oral history interview with James Buchanan. 61. In Why Orwell Matters, Christopher Hitchens (2002, 81) incorrectly stated that Hayek inherited Laski’s chair at the LSE. 62. UCLA oral history interview with Leo Rosten.
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63. (http://mises.org/books/TRTS/). 64. Hayek Papers Box 52.28. 65. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/2969215/GordonBrowns-curse-did-the-prime-minister-kill-Lehman-Bros.html 66. http://www.cbi.org.uk/ndbs/press.nsf/0363c1f07c6ca12a8025671c00381cc 7/ee59d1c32ce4ec12802570c70041152c?OpenDocument 67. http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.hm-treasury.gov. uk/2014.htm 68. UCLA oral history interview with Leo Rosten. 69. http://archive.spectator.co.uk/article/18th-june-1910/20/the-letters-of-johnstuart-mill-john-stuart-mill-h 70. Rothbard (1926–1995) did not attend the inaugural Mont Pelerin Society meeting. 71. UCLA oral history interview with James Buchanan. 72. UCLA oral history interview with Thomas Hazlett. 73. Fürth Papers. Hoover Institution. Box 5. 74. Ibid. Box 6. 75. UCLA oral history interview with Leo Rosten. 76. http://www.cato.org/special/friedman/friedman/friedman4.html 77. UCLA oral history interview with Robert Chitester. 78. Email to Leeson, 30 August 2010. 79. Ibid. 80. http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=3642&year=&month= 81. h t t p : / / b u s h l i b r a r y . t a m u . e d u / r e s e a r c h / p u b l i c _ p a p e r s . php?id=4098&year=1992&month=all 82. http://www.unz.org/Pub/RothbardRockwellReport-1994sep-00001
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Howson, S. 2011. Lionel Robbins. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hülsmann, J. G. 2007. Mises: The Last Knight of Liberalism. Auburn, Alabama: Ludwig von Mises Institute. Jackson, B. 2014. In Leeson 2014. Kimberley, H. 2014. ‘Deacon’ McCormick and the Madoc Myth. In Leeson, R. ed Archival Insights into the Evolution of Economics Volume 7: Hayek: a Collaborative Biography Part 3 Fraud, Fascism and Free Market Religion. Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Macmillan Klausinger, H. 2010. Hayek on Practical Business Cycle Research: A Note. In H. Hagemann, T. Nishizawa, Y. Ikeda (eds.), Austrian Economics in Transition: From Carl Menger to Friedrich Hayek. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 218–234. Klausinger, H. Ed. 2012. Editorial notes. Business Cycles Volume VII The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Klausinger, Hayek, F. A. 2012. Business Cycles Volume VII The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. H. Klausinger Ed. Klein, L. 1986. Lawrence R. Klein. In Breit, W. and Spencer, R.W. eds. Lives of the Laureates. Cambridge: MIT Press. Koestler, A. 1950. Arthur Koestler. In Crossman, R. 1950. Ed. The God that Failed. New York: Harper and Row. Kresge, S. 1994. Introduction. In Hayek, F. A. 1994. Hayek on Hayek an Autobiographical Dialogue. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Supplement to The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek. Stephen Kresge and Leif Wenar Eds. Kuehnelt-Leddihn, E.R. 1992. The Road from Serfdom. National Review 44.8: 32. Kyle, R. 2012. The Buchanans of Tennessee: From Nashborough to the Nobel Prize. Murfreesboro, TN: Twin Oaks Press. Lal, D. 2009. The Mont Pelerin Society: A Mandate Renewed. The Mont Pelerin Society Presidential Address New York 5th March. http://www.econ.ucla.edu/ lal/MPS%20Presidential%20Address%203.5.09.pdf Lane, M. 2013. The Genesis and Reception of The Road to Serfdom. In Leeson, R. ed. Archival Insights into the Evolution of Economics Volume V Hayek: A Collaborative Biography Part 1: Influences, from Mises to Bartley. Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Macmillan. Leeson, R. 2003. ed. Keynes, Chicago and Friedman. London: Chatto and Windus. Leeson, R. 2014a. Archival Insights into the Evolution of Economics Volume VI Hayek: A Collaborative Biography Part III Austria, America and the Rise of Hitler 1899– 1933. Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Macmillan. Leeson, R. 2014b. Archival Insights into the Evolution of Economics Volume XI Hayek: A Collaborative Biography Part VII The 1974 Nobel Prize for Economic Sciences.Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Macmillan. Leeson, R. 2014c. Archival Insights into the Evolution of Economics Volume VIII Hayek: A Collaborative Biography Part IV Fraud, Fascism and Free Market Religion. Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Macmillan. Lippmann, W. 1937. An Enquiry into the Principles of the Good Society. Boston: Little, Brown. Mann, T. 1953. The Making of the Magic Mountain. The Atlantic January: 41–45. Mann, T. 1960 [1924]. The Magic Mountain. London: Penguin. Mill, J. S. 1848. Principles of Political Economy: With Some of Their Applications to Social Philosophy, Volume 2. London: John Parker.
70 Robert Leeson Mises, L. 1922. Die Gemeinwirtschaft: Untersuchungen über den Sozialismus. Germany: Gustav Fischer Verlag. Mises, L. 1944. Bureaucracy. New Haven: Yale University Press. Mises, L. 1951 [1932]. On Socialism. New Haven: Yale University Press. Mises, L.1960. Planning for Freedom and twelve other essays and addresses. South Holland, Illinois: Libertarian Press. Mises, L. 1985 [1927]. Liberalism in the Classical Tradition. Irvington-on-Hudson, New York: Foundation for Economic Education. Translated by Ralph Raico. First edition 1927. Mises, L. 2009a [1946]. Observations on Professor hayek’s Plan. Libertarian Papers Vol 1 No 2. Mises, L. 2009b [1978]. Memoirs. Auburn, Alabama: Ludwig von Mises Institute. Mises, M. 1984. My Life with Ludwig von Mises. Cedar Falls, Iowa. Center for Futures Education. Second edition. Monypenny, W. F. 1912. The Life of Benjamin Disraeli, Earl of Beaconsfield Volume II 1837–1846. London: The Times Publishing Company. More, T. 1997 [1516]. Utopia. New York, NY: Dover Thrift Edition. Murdoch, R. 1990. The War on Technology. Manhattan Institute third annual Walter B. Wriston Lecture in Public Policy. City Journal Autumn. http://www. city-journal.org/article01.php?aid=1631 Napolitano, A. 2010. A Judicial Odyssey towards Freedom. In Block, W. 2010. Ed. I Chose Liberty: Autobiographies of Contemporary Libertarians. Auburn Alabama: Ludwig von Mises Institute. Orwell, G. 1944. The Road to Serfdom by F. A. Hayek/The Mirror of the Past by K. Zilliacus Observer 9 April. Orwell, G. 1968a. The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell: As I Please 1943–1945. England: Penguin Books. Edited by S. Orwell and I. Angus. Orwell, G. 1968b. The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell My Country Right or Left 1940–1943. England: Penguin Books. Edited by S. Orwell and I. Angus. Orwell, G. 1945. Animal Farm. London: Secker and Warburg. Orwell, G. 1949. Nineteen Eighty-Four. London: Secker and Warburg. Peart, S. and Levy, D, 2005. The ‘Vanity of the Philosopher; From Equality to Hierarchy in Post-Classical Economics. Michigan: University of Michigan Press. Pigou, A.C. 1925. Memorials of Alfred Marshall. New York: Macmillan Co. Pimlott, B. 1985. Hugh Dalton A Life. London: Cape. Raico. R. 2012. Classical Liberalism and the Austrian School. Auburn, Alabama: Ludwig von Mises Institute Reder, M. W.2000. The Anti-Semitism of Some Eminent Economists. History of Political Economy Winter 32.4: 1011–1016. Rifkin, J. 2005. Capitalism’s future on trial. The Guardian 22 June http://www. theguardian.com/politics/2005/jun/22/eu.world1 Robbins, L. 1971. Autobiography of an Economist. London: Macmillan. Rockwell, L. H. Jr. 2008. Remembering Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn. LewRockwell.com http://www.lewrockwell.com/lrc-blog/remembering-erik-von-kuehnelt-leddihn/ Rothbard, M. N. 1973. Ludwig von Mises: 1881–1973 Human Events October 20, p. 7 http://mises.org/rothbard/misesobit.asp
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Rothbard, M. N. 1992. Right-Wing Populism: A Strategy for the Paleo Movement. Rothbard Rockwell Report Vol 3.1. http://www.unz.org/Pub/ RothbardRockwellReport-1992jan-00005 Rothbard, M. N. 1993. Who Are the Terrorists? Rothbard Rockwell7 Report August Vol 4.8. http://www.unz.org/Pub/RothbardRockwellReport-1993aug00001 Rothbard, M. N. 1994a. Those Jury Verdicts. Rothbard Rockwell Report May Vol 5.5. http://www.unz.org/Pub/RothbardRockwellReport-1994may00009 Rothbard, M. N. 1994b. Revolution in Italy! Rothbard Rockwell Report July Vol 5.7. http://www.unz.org/Pub/RothbardRockwellReport-1994jul-00001 Rothbard, M. N. 1994c. A New Strategy for Liberty. Rothbard Rockwell Report October Vol 5.10. http://www.unz.org/Pub/RothbardRockwellReport-1994oct00001 Rothbard, M. N. 1994d. Invade the World. Rothbard Rockwell Report September Vol 5.9. http://www.unz.org/Pub/RothbardRockwellReport-1994sep-00001 Schrecker, E. W. 1986. No Ivory Tower: McCarthyism and the Universities. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sharma, R. 2010. The Triumphant Return of Hayek. Newsweek (Pacific Edition), 01637061, 12 June, Vol. 156, Issue 23. Simons, H. C. 1948. Economic Policy for a Free Society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Smith, A. 1827 [1776]. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson and Peter Brown. Sraffa, P. 1932a. Dr. Hayek on Money and Capital. Economic Journal 42.165, March: 42–53. Sraffa, P. 1932b. Rejoinder. Economic Journal 42.166, June: 249–251. Stein, L. The Triangel Factory Fire. New York: J.B. Lippincott Company. Stigler, G. J. 1966. The Theory of Price. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 3rd ed. Stigler, G. J. 1971. The theory of economic regulation. Bell J. Econ. Man. Sci. 2:3–21 Stigler, G. J. 1982. George J. Stigler. Biographical. http://www.nobelprize.org/ nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/1982/stigler-bio.html Stigler, G. J. 1988. Memoirs of an Unregulated Economist. New York: Basic Books. Talmon, J. L. 1960. The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy. Britain: Secker & Warburg. Tanaka, S. 1974. What will happen to the world as Keynesian economic theories are disproved? Views of Professor Hayek, a World-Famous Authority on Inflation Sought. Shuukan Post May 17. Taylor, A. J. P. 1964. The Habsburg Monarchy 1809–1918: A History of the Austrian Empire and Austria Hungary. England: Peregrine. Van Horn, R. and P. Mirowski. 2009. The Rise of the Chicago School of Economics and the Birth of Neoliberalism. In The Road from Mont Pèlerin, edited by, P. Mirowski and D. Plehwe. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Vanberg, V. 2013. Hayek in Freiburg. In Leeson, R. Ed Archival Insights into the Evolution of Economics Volume V Hayek: A Collaborative Biography Part 1: Influences, from Mises to Bartley. Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Macmillan.
72 Robert Leeson Vaughn, K. 1994. Austrian Economics in America: The Migration of a Tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Warren, E. 2007. The Coming Collapse of the Middle Class. http://gradlectures. berkeley.edu/lecture/collapse-of-middle-class/ Wiesner, M.E. Ruff, J.R. and Wheeler, W. B. 2008. Discovering the Western Past: A Look at the Evidence Volume 1 to 1789. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
2 The Battle of Ideas: Neoliberal Economics and Politics in the 20th Century Philip Plickert
The first half of the 20th century was a tragic time for classical liberals. Their philosophy, arguing for a limited state and a self-regulated economy, had dominated policies in the 19th century in the Western world. But from the late 19th and early 20th centuries, progressive intellectuals suspicious of capitalism were beginning to play a greater part in public discourse. In the war from 1914 to 1918, the classical liberal world came to an end, politically as well as intellectually. As Hayek (1967 [1951]) later remembered: ‘At the end of the First World War the spiritual tradition of liberalism was all but dead.’ The war had triggered a massive expansion of (military) government. It brought the first large-scale experiments with central coordination of resource allocation, production and distribution, as well as trade restrictions and strong regulation. After 1918, the liberal social order lay in ruins, in Russia and – to a lesser extent –in the Western countries as well. As a result of the huge build-up of public debt for war financing, the end of the Gold Standard and the subsequent rapid expansion of the paper money supply, hyperinflation emerged in Central Europe, with devastating consequences for social stability. Many intellectuals looked with sympathy at the advance of socialism. ‘Socialism is the watchword of our days,’ Ludwig von Mises (2008 [1922], 1), one of the few unreconstructed liberals, warned in his book Die Gemeinwirtschaft (Socialism). Five years later, he sounded even more pessimistic, and lamented: ‘The world does not want to hear about liberalism any more’ (1993 [1927], 2). By contrast, John Maynard Keynes (1926) welcomed the end of ‘laissez-faire’. Further advances of state control over the economy were made during the Great Depression. The economic crisis was popularly interpreted as a failure of ‘chaotic capitalism’ which brought mass unemployment, social hardship and political instability. Governments responded with state interventions, 73
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and launched public employment projects. This was the case not only in national socialist Germany, where economic dirigisme corresponded with political dictatorship, but also in America, where the New Deal administration substituted market coordination with centralized regulation of prices and production.1 Public opinion and many economists applauded. The philosophy of economic liberalism was thus facing an existential crisis in the first half of the 20th century. This chapter explores how embattled liberals in various places tried to cope with the fundamental challenges, and how they organized after the Second World War. Their aim was to debate and disseminate a reconstructed liberalism. The most important platform for these efforts was the Mont Pèlerin Society, founded in 1947 by a group of economists and intellectuals, who convened in Switzerland at the invitation of Friedrich August von Hayek. At the opening session (1 April 1947) Hayek, quoting from the last paragraph of Keynes’ General Theory declared Public opinion ... is the work of men like ourselves, the economists and political philosophers of the last few generations, who have created the political climate in which the politicians of our time must move. I do not find myself often agreeing with the late Lord Keynes, but he has never said a truer thing than when he wrote ... that ‘the ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else’.2 At first, their enterprise was not taken seriously. Joseph Schumpeter (1950, 449) even ridiculed their attempt to stop the ‘March into Socialism’,3 stating sarcastically, I believe that there is a mountain in Switzerland on which congresses of economists have been held which have expressed disapproval of all or most of these things [the ‘March into Socialism’]. But these anathema have not even provoked attack. During the coming decades, the economists from Mont Pèlerin in Switzerland succeeded in forming an international network with affiliated think tanks which proved extremely influential. Their mission was to revise and revive liberal economics and promote them in intellectual circles. Many of the men Hayek convened rose to academic prominence and influenced the climate of opinion or managed to win over decision makers among the elites. Thus they stopped the ‘March into
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Socialism’, and even started a movement towards a reversal of the trend. The historical contexts that enabled them to do that will be examined in this chapter. However, one must be careful not to fall into the trap of conspiracy thinking when uncovering the organizational and personal connections between the group of MPS thinkers and political circles. Several Leftleaning scholars have succumbed to that temptation. Their expositions of the influence of MPS members and of Hayek’s long-term strategy (‘battle of ideas’) culminated in allegations of a neoliberal ‘intellectual hegemony’, a concept propagated by Marxist theoretician Antonio Gramsci.4 This is a historical fabrication. When Hayek started his efforts to bring together like-minded (neo-)liberals, any notion of short-term ‘hegemony’ seemed to be a fantasy. The intellectuals that he convened were isolated in their respective countries, and Hayek saw himself practically drowned by the ‘Keynesian avalanche’.5 Thus, he tended to aspire to an anti- or counter-hegemonic enterprise. His was a long-term strategy to break the dominance of collectivist public opinion by offering intellectuals an alternative: a neoliberal utopia as a counterweight to the socialist utopias. The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: I start with a short account of the four centres of origin of neoliberal thought – Vienna, London, Freiburg and Chicago – presenting the main thinkers and their approaches to a renewed liberalism in the context of the interwar period. One important aspect is their reaction to the Great Depression, the emergence of Keynesianism and their position on stimulus policies. The second section describes the debates at the first international meeting of ‘neoliberals’ in Paris 1938 at the Colloque Walter Lippmann. The third section briefly analyses the emergence of the new liberal research programme, with reference to the theory of science of Imre Lakatos. The fourth section shows how Hayek developed the idea of an international intellectual organization, and seized the opportunity to start the Mont Pèlerin Society in 1947. Sections 5 and 6 offer a short analysis of Hayek’s intellectual strategy and how it was implemented with the MPS. Sections 7 to 10 present case studies of the influence that neoliberals had on (economic) policy and the intellectual climate in different national environment in the post-war era, such as West Germany, Italy, France, Britain and the United States. Section 11 gives an account of the later development of (neo-)liberal economic theory and their partial return to classical liberal optimism and ‘laissez-faire’. Section 12 assesses a number of different factors how the MPS network helped to generate an intellectual ‘turn of tide’ or even an intellectual ‘counter-revolution’,
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as some commentators put it, in Britain and the USA since the 1970s, culminating in the governments of free market politicians with a strong presence of MPS advisers. The chapter concludes with some thoughts on the power of ideas in the making of history.
1 Four centres of liberalism: Vienna, London, Freiburg, Chicago During the inter-war period and especially after the onset of the depression, classical economic liberalism was at its lowest ebb. Although these historic shocks triggered massive interventions into the economy and society which were approved of by the great majority, there were still some intellectuals who opposed these developments. As Hayek (1967 [1951], 195) later remembered, the main body of liberal thought has been safeguarded through that eclipse in the intellectual history of liberalism ... indeed, during that very period the foundations were laid for a new development. He identified four centres of renewed liberalism: London, Vienna, Chicago and Freiburg. In London, there was the circle of colleagues and disciples of Edwin Cannan. The group in Vienna consisted of Ludwig von Mises and his students. The Chicago School grew up around Frank Knight and Henry Simons, with Aaron Director, Milton Friedman and George Stigler as the younger generation. Finally, the German group had Walter Eucken as its intellectual leader, with Wilhelm Röpke closely connected. Another group which Hayek mentioned existed in Italy, with Luigi Einaudi at its head. In Switzerland and in France there were also some local networks which sought to revive liberal ideas. With the ‘old’ or classical liberal paradigm heavily under attack, these groups were forced to think ahead. In their specific national-political and intellectual-cultural settings, they developed different strategies to reconfigure their liberal ideology, to meet the new challenges, and save the ‘hard core’ of market economics. To achieve this aim, some distanced themselves from parts of the classical liberal heritage, namely the ‘laissez-faire’ approach. The furthest steps towards a liberal revisionism were made in Freiburg and Chicago – in remarkably similar directions, as we will see. Vienna In Vienna, Mises led the way for orthodox liberalism. His Privatseminar for economists and other social scientists became the rallying point of
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some of the brightest minds of the younger Austrian generation of economists, most notably Hayek, Gottfried von Haberler and Fritz Machlup. The seminar acquired intellectual fame well beyond Austria. With his radical theoretical critique of communism in the famous ‘socialist calculation debate’, Mises sparked a controversy that impressed many young economists at the time (see Lavoie 1985; Caldwell 1997). He claimed that a ‘rational cost calculation’ would be impossible in a socialistic economy. Due to the lack of information about scarcity relations (prices), the planner had no orientation on what to produce and in which way. Waste and inefficiency would be inherent in a socialist economy. In the 1920s, Hayek was his collaborator at a small private institute for business cycle research, and he later continued the debate with a refined argument about dispersed knowledge which a planning authority would not be able to centralize. Hayek also adopted Mises’ ‘idealistic’ vision of history with regard to the trend towards socialism. It was ideas rather than material forces that mattered; and intellectual elites rather than ordinary people were the main supporters of socialism. Mises (2008 [1922], 471–472) wrote in his celebrated and controversial book Die Gemeinwirtschaft: Only ideas can overcome ideas and it is only the ideas of Capitalism and of Liberalism that can overcome Socialism. Only by a battle of ideas can a decision be reached. London The London School of Economics, where Hayek took up a post as professor in 1931, was also a difficult environment for liberals. The ideas which informed the founding of the LSE were anti-liberal.6 Surprisingly and ironically, it was at the economics faculty of the LSE that a small liberal bastion developed under the influence of Edwin Cannan, who was responsible for a widely acclaimed edition of Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations. Although Cannan was in many respects close to the classical ideals of economic liberalism, especially free trade, he also combined elements of Utilitarianism and welfare economics in his world view. Contrary to advocates of laissezfaire, he emphasized that the institutional and legal framework of the market could and should be organized so as to maximize the utility that consumers could draw from the economy. He did not share the vision of an ‘invisible hand’ to regulate market interaction and called instead for conscious design of institutions (see Cannan 1997 [1912], 24–25).
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During the interwar period, Cannan and his friends at LSE called for a return to unrestricted free trade and a repeal of protectionist privileges and restrictions. Only with such reforms would competition work. Among the cartels nurtured by the state, Cannan and his colleagues, Lionel Robbins (1971 [1934], 186) and W. W. Hutt, targeted trade unions. In their eyes, the power of the unions coupled with nominally inflexible wages were to a large extent responsible for high unemployment in Britain in the 1920s and the 1930s. On all these issues there was a bitter fight between socialists and liberals, and between economists and political scientists, at the School. Left-leaning students of economics preferred to go to Cambridge rather than LSE. After Cannan’s retirement in 1928, Lionel Robbins took over his chair and became the dominant figure in the economics department. It was Robbins who made the Austrian business cycle explanation of the economic crisis popular in the English-speaking world. When Hayek joined LSE, he rose to become the principal opponent of Keynes’ theories, as his colleague John Hicks (1967, 203) remembered. For some time, LSE students were fascinated by the Austrian professor. But then later he was completely outflanked by Keynes and the Cambridge group. In the late 1930s, Hayek and Robbins were standing in the shadow while Keynes was hailed by the public. Robbins (1971, 153–154) later came to regret his anti-interventionist writings and policy advice during the Great Depression. Freiburg Of all the centres of neoliberal economics, the Freiburg School, with Walter Eucken and Franz Böhm as the outstanding protagonists, supported by Wilhelm Röpke and Alexander Rüstow, went furthest in its efforts to redefine the essence of liberal economics; it thereby prepared the ground for the later ‘social market economy’ in Germany.7 The Freiburg group of economists and legal scholars began their discussions in the early 1930s and were active in church-affiliated resistance circles against the National Socialist regime.8 At the heart of their research program was a quest for a ‘workable and humane order’ for the economy and society alike, as Eucken (1990 [1952], 14), the Head of the School, put it. This involved a redefinition of the relationship of state and market. They accused earlier liberals of a mistaken ‘laissez-faire’ attitude which they claimed was self-defeating, and instead they advocated a ‘strong state’ as an arbiter for a true competition order. Eucken claimed that only such a state would be able to resist the gradual occupation by interest groups.9
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In a similar vein, Alexander Rüstow (1963 [1932], 258) complained at the annual meeting of German-speaking economists in the Verein für Socialpolitik in Dresden 1932, about the decline of the liberal state, and advocated the need for a ‘new liberalism’, stating: The new liberalism, which is reasonable today and which I and my friends represent, calls for a strong state, a state above the economy, above the interests, where it belongs.10 Contrary to the existing interventionist state, his ideal neoliberal ‘strong state’ gained its strength through self-restraint and its ability to say ‘no’.11 Wilhelm Röpke,12 in his analysis of the growth of special interest groups and the subsequent ‘monopolistic-interventionist regidification’ came close to what Mancur Olson (1982, 17–35) later called ‘collectivist sclerosis’ (cf. Schüller 2003, 26). Rüstow’s speech is commonly regarded as the first public manifesto of German ‘neoliberalism’, although many of the Freiburg group adopted the label ‘ordoliberalism’ after the war. Like his friend Wilhelm Röpke (1930), an outspoken enemy of the Nazi party, Rüstow was among the first non-Jews and non-socialists to emigrate in 1933 after the Nazi seizure of power. They both settled in Istanbul where they accepted posts at the university. Röpke moved to Geneva after four years, where he found a congenial environment among Swiss liberals and other émigrés. The members of the Freiburg School, however, stayed in Germany although they were in a dangerous position; in 1944, Constantin von Dietze and Adolf Lampe were arrested and questioned by the Gestapo, as was, briefly, Eucken. The Freiburg School’s research program was based on the fundamental idea of the ‘interdependence’ of the economic, the political and legal systems as well as the social order. Their preoccupation with a competition order was not only – and not even primarily – inspired by economic efficiency or welfare concerns, but by ethical considerations about a free society. By dismantling monopoly powers and establishing a legal framework for competition, individuals would gain freedom and also security. Both were endangered by ‘any major concentration of power ... be it political, public power or be it the power of single persons or social groups’ (Böhm 1957, 112). Some of the ordo- or neoliberal ideas could be called romantic-conservative or communitarian, especially in Röpke’s writings on the small-scale Mittelstand society. Others had a Kantian constructivist approach to establishing the competition order, which was opposed to the evolutionary approach to social order that Hayek
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forcefully embraced later.13 In the 1930s and 1940s, however, Hayek was very much impressed by the works of his German colleagues. Chicago At the same time, in Chicago there emerged a school of nonconformist liberal economists who were on the one hand strongly opposed to the collectivist politics of the New Deal, but on the other hand deeply sceptical about a simple revival of old liberal ideas. Frank Knight and Jacob Viner are usually presented as the main founding figures of the Chicago School in the late 1920s. Less well known today is Henry Simons who at the time was ‘slowly establishing himself as the head of a school’ (Director 1948). Simons is of special interest for this study of neoliberalism because his concepts, and the thrust of the whole Old Chicago School, show a striking parallelism to the thoughts of the neoliberals of the Freiburg School (see Plickert 2008, 80–86; van Horn 2009, 209–213; Köhler and Kolev 2011).14 Contrary to today’s prejudice about the Chicago School, the old generation had serious concerns about the workability and the results of free markets. Knight had made important contributions to economic theory with his distinction between ‘risk’ and ‘uncertainty’ and also his qualifications about Pigou’s externalities and market-failure argument (Breit and Ranson 1982, 193–197), but he had ethical reservations against competitive capitalism (Knight 1999 [1923]). He only reluctantly accepted the market economy on the basis of its superior efficiency, and because he held that the alternative, a planned economy, was an extremely dangerous threat to personal freedom (see Kasper 1993, 429). His younger colleague, Simons (1948 [1934], 42, 43, 58), was also far from being an apologist for capitalism. In 1934, he published the essay ‘A Positive Program for Laissez Faire’ with a radical redefinition of old liberal ideas: The representation of laissez faire as a merely do-nothing policy is unfortunate and misleading. It is an obvious responsibility of the state under this policy to maintain the kind of legal and institutional framework within which competition can function effectively as an agency of control. ... The great errors of economic policy in the past century may be defined – and many of our present difficulties explained – in terms of excessive political interference with relative prices and in terms of disastrous neglect of the positive responsibilities of government under a free-enterprise system.
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Simons, similar to the Freiburg professors, advocated an active role for the state in establishing and enforcing an effective framework for a competitive order. At the same time, he held an equally damning judgement of monopolies and their consequences: The great enemy of democracy is monopoly, in all its forms ... corporations, trade associations ... trade-unions – or, in general, organization and concentration of power in functional classes. In his ‘positive program’ he assigned to the state the duty to eliminate monopolies,15 and he called for the ‘outright dismantling of our gigantic corporations’ and also the labour organizations who have power over society and had been greatly strengthened by the policies of the New Deal. The ideas of the Old Chicago and the Freiburg School were echoed by Hayek (1994 [1944], 21, 160) in the 1940s. In The Road to Serfdom he condemned the ‘wooden insistence of some liberals on certain rules of thumb, above all the principle of laissez faire’ and he further explained: To split or decentralise power is necessary to reduce the absolute amount of power, and the competitive system is the only system designed to minimize by decentralization the power exercised by man over man. Many years after the deaths of Simons and Eucken, he still acknowledged his intellectual indebtedness to both of them, mentioning them in The Constitution of Liberty as among ‘those who have contributed most to shaping my ideas’ (2011 [1960], 41). The leading figures of the younger Chicago School, like Milton Friedman and George Stigler, later rejected Simons’ economic policy prescriptions as too interventionist and ‘populist’, especially his condemnation of large corporations and his preference for progressive taxation and egalitarian income distribution. They even questioned his credentials as an economic liberal (see DeLong 1990, 601–602). Notwithstanding his pupils’ reservations, Simons had a lasting impact on the Chicago School, and especially on Friedman in particular, through his preference for rules over discretion in economic and monetary policy.16 The Great Depression and stimulus policies The economists of the Chicago School were sceptical about the discretionary fiscal policies proposed by the New Deal administration. It is,
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however, a myth that ‘Chicago’ was totally opposed to expansionary policies for fighting the depression, and that they relied entirely on the self-healing forces of the markets. As J. Ronnie Davis (1971, 25) has shown, all major Chicago economists, like Knight, Viner and Simons, had been supporting an anti-cyclical fiscal policy since 1930; together with prominent left-wingers like Alvin Hansen, they were calling for a stimulus to overcome the depression. Knight told Senator Robert Wagner that all economists agreed that in bad times the government should spend as much as possible, and reduce taxes. In contrast to the later Keynesian doctrine of the high unemployment equilibrium, most Chicago economists maintained that the labour market would always eventually come back to full employment. But the way to recovery by self-correction might be too long and painful. The pragmatic response of the Chicago economists differed from the more doctrinaire stance which the Austrian economists Mises and Hayek took at the time; the latter objected to expansionary measures to reflate the economy. In this regard, Vienna was far distant from Chicago (see Klausinger 2003). Interestingly, in Germany Wilhelm Röpke developed a peculiar ‘protoKeynesian’ theory of an expansionary fiscal policy to push the economy back on a growth path. Röpke was one of the most promising German researchers in the business cycle theory. In principle, he followed the Austrian ideas of business cycle fluctuations driven by monetary expansions, and he thought it necessary that distortions in the production structure must be corrected by ‘cleansing recessions’. When the German economy kept contracting, and total output had shrunk more than a fifth since the summer of 1929, he acknowledged that this was far more than a normal recession. In the winter of 1930/31, Röpke was a member of the Brauns Commission advising the government on the question of unemployment, which climbed to more than 5,000,000 the following year. To stop the downward spiral, Röpke called for an Initialzündung, a state stimulus to get the engine of the economy going again. The crisis, he warned, had degenerated into a secondary phase, a vicious circle, where recession feeds recession.17 The Brauns Commission report proposed public investments in infrastructure, energy, agriculture and housing, all financed by credit, to boost the economy. For normal times, Röpke opposed state involvement to stimulate the economy, however, since this would generate inflationary pressures (see Plickert 2008, 69–70). It is not surprising therefore, that Röpke – like Knight and Simons – vigorously rejected the permanently expansionary fiscal policies that Keynes’ followers advocated. Knight (1999 [1937], 365) wrote a review of Keynes’ General Theory in which he saw ‘a concept of inflation as a
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remedy for depression and unemployment’; Simons (1936) went so far as to condemn the book as potentially becoming ‘the economic bible of a fascist movement’. Keynes (1952 [1936], ix) himself could also attract such polemic reproaches. In the introduction to the German translation of his General Theory, which came out in 1936, he seemingly made advances to the regime by writing that his theory could ‘much more easily be adapted to the circumstances of a total state’ than the theory of production and distribution with laissez-faire.18
2
Paris 1938: Birthplace of neoliberalism
In the late 1930s, Walter Lippmann’s (1965 [1937]) book The Good Society provided important inspiration to the nascent movement of neoliberals. The American writer, a much respected journalist in Washington of the progressive camp, had spent most of his life on the Left.19 When The Good Society came out it was evidence of a profound ideological break with earlier socialist and collectivist beliefs. In the first part of the book, Lippmann (1965 [1937], 3) warned of the advance of ‘collectivist movements’ and ideologies of different colours that, although seemingly opposed, all ‘worshipped the same god’, the coercive power of the state; ‘[t]heir promise is that through the power of the state men can be made happy’. In essence, as Lippmann explained, these movements were not progressive, but a primitive and fearful reaction to the dynamics of an open, complex and globally interdependent market society. The Good Society contained one of the earliest expositions of the structural similarities of totalitarian regimes from Right and Left; not only did he warn of fascism and National Socialism but also of Soviet communism. Lippmann emphasized their common traits, and claimed that on the altar of collectivist planning they were sacrificing individual freedom. Central economic planning would follow the wartime formula, with rationing of consumption and forced labour, and would lead to the suppression of political rights, especially the right to express dissent on the plan.20 One of Lippmann’s arguments particularly provocative to his progressive friends was his denunciation of ‘gradual collectivism’ – including the New Deal – as a pre-stage for open, totalitarian collectivism. Economic protectionism would ultimately turn into military conflict. Lippmann (1965 [1937], 139–140) warned that ‘the early nineteenth-century dream of international socialism has given way to the twentieth-century nightmare of national socialism’. In contrast to this apocalyptic vision, the second part of the book pleaded for ‘A Reconstructed Liberalism’. He started with a trenchant
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critique of classical liberalism, especially the dogma of laissez-faire. It had allowed the economy to operate in a legal vacuum, ignoring the fact that the market system and private property were man-made institutions that could and should be modified to suit human needs. Lippmann (1965 [1937], 227) proposed a wide field for ‘liberal reforms’. Most notably, he advocated strict regulation against giant, monopolistic corporations. Furthermore, he advocated a tax scheme with the aim of a more egalitarian income distribution. Today’s reader can perceive a certain tension between the two parts of the book; Lippmann’s blunt repudiation of all ‘collectivist’ policies, including the New Deal, contrasted with the compromising and egalitarian reformist agenda.21 To the contemporary reader, however, the prevailing message of Lippmann’s manifesto was his rejection of ‘collectivism’ and his insistence on the market as the only suitable coordination mechanism for a free society. The Good Society attracted a great deal of interest not only in America but also in Europe. As Hayek (1967 [1951], 199) later recalled, Walter Lippmann had delighted and encouraged all liberals by the publication of his brilliant restatement of the fundamental ideals of classical liberalism. In France, the philosopher Louis Rougier was enthusiastic about the book and organized a translation which was published in 1938. The 49-year-old professor was at the time a key figure in the emergence of a renewed liberalism in France and beyond.22 When he learned that Lippmann was going to travel to Europe for his honeymoon, Rougier seized the opportunity to organize a conference in honour of the American author. The Colloque Walter Lippmann (CWL 1939, 11) was held from 26 to 30 August 1938 in Paris at the Institut International de Coopération Intellectuelle. Rougier invited a group of 26 scientists, civil servants, economists and industrialists, more than half of whom were French, including the philosopher Raymond Aron and the and lawyer Louis Baudin. Of the other Europeans, many were living in exile, such as Röpke and Mises who at the time both taught in Geneva, Hayek who taught in London, and Alexander Rüstow who lived in Istanbul. Many of these contacts Rougier had established with the help of William Rappard, a Zurich-based economic historian. Besides the academics, some highranking French civil servants like Jacque Rueff and Roger Auboin, as well as several industrialists, took part in the Colloque.
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All of the participants of this small convention in autumn 1938 – just one month before the Munich conference – were aware of the imminent threat to peace and freedom in the world. They wanted to rescue what was left of liberal doctrines and explore new ways to defend the basic tenets. Since liberalism seemed fatally ill, the conference became the place of birth for neoliberalism; the Colloque Walter Lippmann became the first international convention of liberals wishing to connect to launch a counter-attack on the collectivist zeitgeist. As will be shown and analysed in the following section, they tried to explain why classical liberalism had failed, and then they attempted to develop an agenda diverging from that classical doctrine although the contours and ideological content of that redefined liberalism were still unclear (for a detailed analysis, see Plickert 2008, 87–112). Lippmann emphasized in his introductory remarks that pre-war ‘old liberalism’ had shown ‘essential defects’ and was ‘a conglomerate of truths and errors’. The task of the Colloque, Rougier (CWL 1939, 21) asserted, should be to formulate a new doctrine about which ‘none of us has now more than a vague idea’. The discussions indeed showed a great variety of opinions on the crisis of liberalism. Yet despite many differences on the details, the great majority of the conference agreed to abandon the idea of laissez-faire. This marked a decisive break with earlier classical liberals of the 19th century.23 In the economic sphere, many of the participants, especially the German economists Röpke and Rüstow, warned that there was a dangerous growth of cartels and monopolies. While Mises insisted that most monopolies were created or encouraged through government regulations, for instance by protective tariffs and other market entry barriers,24 Röpke and Rüstow also saw an inherent tendency in modern capitalism towards concentration and giant corporations. They cautioned against the social consequences of these developments. At the root of the world economic crisis and the political drive towards collectivism, Röpke and Rüstow asserted, lay not economic problems but the problem of social disintegration. In an atomistic and ‘uprooted’ mass society, workers demanded social security. Classical liberalism had ignored the need of people for social integration, so people had turned towards the promises of collectivist movements.25 The liberal revisionists now devised a positive programme to prevent economic concentration and exploitative monopolies. It was suggested that the state should conduct a vigorous competition policy. Rüstow (CWL 1939, 41) lamented the ‘intellectual and moral weakness of the state’ which was negligent of its ‘duties as a market police [and] lets competition degenerate’. Instead
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of the alleged ‘night-watchman state’ of the classic era, Rüstow advocated the concept of a ‘strong state’ which could neutrally set the rules of the game and in some cases intervene in a pro-market direction.26 Clearly, Mises and Rüstow marked the extremes of the opinion spectrum with the Austrian apologetic of classical liberalism and Rüstow going very far in his renunciation of ‘paleo-liberalism’. Another field of debate was the right-liberal approach towards social policy. This discussion quickly turned towards the causes of the great depression and mass unemployment. Here again, two poles of opinion emerged. At one end were Mises and Rueff, who asserted the self-healing power of the market and denounced state interventions and social security schemes – especially unemployment insurance and minimum wages – as part of the problem; Rueff declared apodictically that the market would come into equilibrium if not hindered or distorted by interventions. At the other end was a smaller group of sceptics led by Lippmann, who claimed the ethical responsibility of the state to alleviate the social hardships of unemployment.27 Hayek’s contributions to the crucial debates on competition and social policy have not been recorded but for a few short technical remarks.28 On some points he was close to Mises’ stance, but he also saw the need for a more fundamental reorientation of liberalism as his introductory statement to the founding meeting of the Mont Pèlerin Society nine years later would make clear. As Lippmann had demanded in his opening speech, the Colloque was to develop an agenda for a new liberalism. One key feature of this new liberalism was its insistence on a legal framework for competition instead of a ‘laissez-faire’ attitude. Notwithstanding many differences in the details, the majority of the Colloque Walter Lippmann acknowledged that this was a sine qua non for a free economy and society. Otherwise, competition would degenerate into cartels, and society would be torn apart by opposing rent seeking forces, and eventually it would fall into chaos or totalitarianism, as the German participants warned. At the beginning of the five-day conference, Rougier (CWL 1939, 16) had compared the new liberal policy concept to the regulation of traffic: To be a liberal does neither mean to let as the ‘Manchester man’ circulate the cars in all directions such as they wish, which results in traffic jams and permanent accidents; nor does it mean to prescribe as the planner every car a precise departure time and route; it means to decide on a street code.
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– and that set of rules had to be adapted to the conditions of the times and technology. The extent to which the contours of the new liberalism were still unclear also became apparent through their difficult search for a name for the new approach. On the first day, Louis Baudin (CWL 1939, 30, 31, 33, 7) expressed his misgivings about the term ‘liberalism’ and stated that he preferred ‘individualism’ for which Rougier also showed sympathy. Mises warned that to give up the self-designation of liberals could be seen as a concession to the totalitarians. Rueff raised objections to using the prefix ‘neo’, stating that if one aspired to ‘a restoration of liberalism’ this should be stated openly. However, the conference made clear that they did not seek a restoration but an innovation. On the last day of the conference, Rueff suggested ‘liberalism from the left’ since ‘it tends to bring the poorest classes the greatest welfare’. Louis Marlio, one of the businessmen, preferred ‘positive liberalism’ or ‘social liberalism’ – or ‘neoliberalismus’.29 In his introduction to the printed record of the Colloque, Rougier took up this name for the new doctrine. Apparently, he was using this term strategically; in liberalism’s fundamental crisis, it was to signal a fresh intellectual beginning. While the international exchange of minds in Paris had been a promising start, no further action materialized. The participants of the Colloque agreed to set up a research institution, a kind of think tank, named ‘Centre International d’Études pour la Rénovation du Libéralisme’ (CIRL). The Centre was intended to hold conferences, and they planned a conference for early 1939 on the subject of ‘The Liberal State’. Lippmann, Hayek and Röpke were entrusted with establishing the American, British and Swiss sections of the CIRL. However, these branches never displayed any activity. The CIRL in Paris, however, did organize six public conferences with discussions in the following year. As Rougier pointed out in a letter to Aron, the centre should be a political action group ‘absolutely above the parties’. Röpke congratulated him for having managed to attracted some leaders of non-communist trade unions (Denord 2001, 28–29). This indicates the political openness and pragmatism of early neoliberalism in its choice of allies. With the outbreak of the war, however, the CIRL ceased operations, and the international network among neoliberals was severely disrupted.
3
Neoliberalism as a new research programme
The first attempt at neoliberal revision in 1938, although abortive in the short run, became a milestone in the intellectual development of
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liberalism. In the late 1930s, mainstream economic theory had turned away from the classical liberal doctrine of a self-regulated market. The Keynesian idea of government interventions to overcome macroeconomic slumps was increasingly accepted, although it took more than a decade for it to break through fully. Shortly after the war, this development was called a ‘Keynesian revolution’ by Lawrence Klein (1949), and later the account was made to fit in with Thomas Kuhn’s (1970 [1962]) framework for ‘scientific revolutions’.30 In politics, most governments now adhered to the idea that the state had to intervene in order to secure ‘full employment’ and also to provide a wide social security net. Market regulations were ubiquitous and strict. Dissenting economists who did not subscribe to these new policies were increasingly regarded as out of touch. However, liberal economics did not totally vanish, but metamorphosed into neoliberalism and remained a competitor to the interventionist economists. After being an undercurrent for nearly three decades, the neoliberal current gradually re-emerged in the 1970s. When Keynesianism got into trouble, a new wave of free market economics became increasingly influential and managed to turn the tide against Keynesianism. This metamorphosis from liberal to neoliberal economics in the 1930s can best be explained by the more differentiated theory of science by Imre Lakatos (1968; 1970) which seems more suited to social sciences than Kuhn’s account.31 According to Lakatos, scientific research programs consist of a ‘hard core’ (fundamental hypotheses of a theory) and a ‘protective belt’ (auxiliary hypotheses and assumptions). In the case of liberal economics, the hard core postulates that a decentralized coordination of economic activity through the market and the price system is superior to central planning and administration. However, that pro-market thesis was under strong pressure for justification after the debacle of the Great Depression. As testified by the Colloque Walter Lippmann, many of the remaining liberals were full of self-doubt. To rescue the central tenets of economic liberalism, they endeavoured to adjust the ‘protective belt’ of auxiliary hypotheses. Among them was the recognition that the self-regulating market mechanism was seriously damaged. In many respects, competition was eliminated by the emergence of cartels and monopolies – on the goods markets as well as on the labour markets. Thus, the flexibility of the price mechanism was hampered; downward adjustments in particular were slow or even impossible. Furthermore, expansionary monetary policy in the 1920s had distorted price signals, thereby causing a distorted allocation of capital investments and resources, as
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the Austrian business cycle theory postulated. The persistent economic problems were blamed on a ‘market economy’, which – in the eyes of the liberals – was not really a market economy. Consequently, in order to save their ‘hard core’ hypothesis and their normative theory, the embattled liberals modified the ‘protective belt’. Above all, they abandoned the laissez-faire stance and acknowledged the need for a legal framework. The state was assigned the task of safeguarding competition and reforming monetary policy. This idea was shared by the German ordoliberals around Eucken, Simon’s ‘old’ Chicago School, and Hayek (Köhler and Kolev, 2011). To some classical liberals like Mises, the revisionism went too far, implying a dangerous concession to the interventionists, but the majority of liberals thought it necessary and not in contradiction with the fundamentals of liberal economics. In the introduction to a German translation of Lippmann’s The Good Society, Röpke (1945a, 29) wrote explicitly of a ‘hard core’ of liberalism, that the revisionists not only wish to preserve, but they have become such decisive critics of historical liberalism for the sake of its preservation.
4
The Road to Mont Pèlerin
Hayek did not forget the impetus arising from the Paris conference. During the war, he developed his own ideas for international cooperation of liberal minds. From the late 1930s he abandoned ‘technical’ economics, and concentrated instead on studies in social philosophy and the history of ideas. In several essays published in Economica, later collated in the book The Counter-Revolution of Science: Studies on the Abuse of Reason, Hayek (1952a) took aim at the French rationalist and constructivist-utopian traditions of thought. As a by-product of his research on the German tradition of idealizing the power of the state, he produced his famous book, The Road to Serfdom (1944), in which he warned the British public against adopting socialist policies. Both works testify to the immense importance he attributed to the long-term impact of intellectuals on political developments. In order to reverse the fatal trends, he considered a move towards intellectual-historical revisionism as mandatory. Thus, the road that eventually brought him to Mont Pèlerin started with a plan for a German–English historical society. Hayek (1967 [1944], 136) first presented this plan in February 1944 at King’s College,
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Cambridge, in a lecture entitled ‘Historians and the Future of Europe’. There he focused on the tasks for the years immediately following the war. If Germany finally collapsed, Hayek feared that the whole of central Europe might get drawn into a firestorm. He demanded that Germany should be won back to the values of European civilization by way of re-education. In the midst of the ‘moral and intellectual desert’ a few isolated ‘oases’ with uncorrupted intellectuals existed; in order to strengthen their position, Hayek proposed establishing a network of international contacts with like-minded liberals. To institutionalize the cooperation between British and German historians, he called for the foundation of an ‘Acton Society’ to discuss and disseminate ‘Whig historical’ teaching.32 In August 1945, Hayek (1945, 5) wrote a memorandum for a broader and bigger project with a longer time horizon, now named the ‘ActonTocqueville Society’.33 He sketched out the idea for an ‘International Academy for Political Philosophy’ with its headquarters in the Swiss or Austrian Alps. To realize this ambitious vision, Hayek wished to invest $500,000 – but without saying a word about how this sum could be raised. The academy should abstain from day-to-day politics and solely engage in the exchange of philosophical ideas. Interestingly, Hayek seemed ready to invite a fairly wide spectrum of opinions; within the confines of ‘a wide liberalism that was once common good of almost all Englishmen and Americans’, he saw a place for ‘many shades of opinion, from “liberal socialists” at the one end to “liberal conservatives” on the other’. In another note ‘The Prospects of Freedom’, written in October 1946, Hayek took an even more long-term view. His plans were not primarily about the immediate post-war ideological reconstruction, but he sought to influence the coming generation. Significantly, he referred to Keynes’ conviction about the long-term impact of ideas; once they were brought into circulation, it would be some time before they became effective. Though Hayek was regaining some optimism for the long-term prospects, the immediate future looked bleak, with communist movements not only gaining dominance in Eastern Europe but also attempting to seize power in some Western European countries. Hayek wrote to Leonard Read, President of the Foundation for Economic Education,34 commenting that [w]hile there are many hopeful signs in the trend of public opinion and while I by no means despair of a return to reason if enough time is granted for the present confusion to clear ... The danger of a violent
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communist rising in Italy, in France and in other parts of central Europe has to be taken quite seriously.35 At the same time as Hayek was refining his plans for a European academy, he was involved in launching an American project to further the study of free-market economics. Rob van Horn and Philip Mirowski (2009) interpret this as the origins of the post-war Chicago School. A central role in these efforts was taken by Simons. Hayek’s first contact with Simons, the leading figure of the older Chicago economists apart from Frank Knight, dated back to 1934. During the war they discussed problems of a competition policy that Simons had raised in his Positive Program for Laissez Faire. Hayek felt deep sympathy for Simons, and had great respect for his attempts to reformulate liberal economics, though on some points he himself did not go as far in his revisionism. In April 1945, when Hayek went to America on a Road to Serfdom promotional tour, he met Harold Luhnow, president of a Kansas Citybased furniture company and responsible for the charitable Volker Fund. Luhnow offered Hayek a grant from the Fund if he provided a version of The Road to Serfdom modified for an American readership. Later that month, Hayek discussed the matter with his friend Friedrich A. Lutz, a student of Eucken, who at the time was teaching in Princeton. Before returning to Britain, Hayek wrote to Luhnow, saying that the right place for the projected research would be Chicago ‘where there are a number of people whose collaboration would be extremely useful’.36 In the course of the next 12 months in Chicago, there were preparations and an intense exchange with Hayek, who travelled to the USA again in 1946. Above all, Simons was very active. He dreamt about creating an institute that over a period of 20 years would produce scholarly and semi-popular literature for the promotion of liberal ideas. In this regard, Hayek’s and Simons’ visions of long-term influence were very similar. Hayek succeeded in persuading the Volker Fund to offer the university sufficient money to pay for a tenured position for Aaron Director, Milton Friedman’s brother-in-law. Director was to become administrative head of the ‘Free Market Study’ as the project was to be called, and he was expected to write a book on the issue. However, on 19th June, just one month before the launch of project was finally agreed upon, Simons committed suicide. His death came as a shock to Hayek, who feared the whole plan could falter.37 Nevertheless, the Chicago project went ahead, even though Director never wrote the promised book-long study.38 Meanwhile, an unexpected offer from Switzerland opened a window of opportunity to Hayek to realize his plans for an international
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association of liberals in central Europe. During the war, Hayek had had an exchange of letters with Röpke, who was working tirelessly on newspaper articles and three books, thus becoming an important voice in Europe.39 After the war, Röpke was very pessimistic about the future, and planned to establish an international, tri-lingual scholarly journal as a forum for liberal intellectuals. Through the ‘immense destructions of this new ‘Thirty Years War’ Röpke saw ‘the forms of occidental life and thinking fundamentally shattered’.40 He warned of the danger if Fascism and National Socialism were replaced ‘by other forms of collectivism’, namely Soviet communism. The monthly journal, titled Occident, was intended to mobilize ‘a front of all those with good intentions’. Like Hayek in his memorandum for the ‘Acton-Tocqueville Society’, Röpke wanted to form a broader coalition of thinkers, and suggested that this coalition should include in party political terms ‘liberals’ as well as ‘conservatives’ or ‘democrats’, possibly even moderate socialists.41 For his project, Röpke received crucial support from Albert Hunold, a businessman in Zurich, who was keen on mobilizing liberal intellectuals.42 He used his business contacts to raise SFr 50,000, mainly from banks, insurance companies and the chemical industry.43 During the winter of 1945 and the spring of 1946, Röpke and Hunold were negotiating with publishing houses; however, their relationship turned sour in a conflict about the ownership of Occident and editorial competence relating to its contents. Hunold was about to return all the money he had collected, but his interest was then revived by William Rappard telling him of Hayek’s plans. In June 1946, Hunold offered Hayek the money.44 At first, Hayek responded with a very pessimistic note and politely declined the offer.45 But a month later, he changed his mind and seized the opportunity to convene a first international convention of 20 to 30 scholars ‘on neutral ground’.46 Hunold finally managed to secure SFr 15,000 from the initial capital for the new cause.47 Thus, Hayek had unexpectedly obtained quite considerable funds to start his intellectual organization. In the last days of 1946, eight years after the Colloque Walter Lippmann, Hayek sent a three-page letter of invitation for a conference in April 1947 at Mont Pèlerin, near the small resort of Vevey on Lake Geneva. According to a typewritten list, the letter was sent to more than 50 academics and intellectuals. Six of those invited – most notably Mises, Röpke and Rüstow – had already been part of the first attempt in Paris to form an international group of intellectuals to rethink liberalism.
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In the end, 39 people came to attend the first meeting at Mont Pèlerin. The largest group came from the United States – 17 people including, most importantly, the Chicago economists Knight, Director, Friedman and Stigler.48 The travel expenses of the scientists, journalists and several representatives of the Foundation for Economic Education were paid for by the Volker Fund. Ideologically, these think-tankers were uncompromising economic liberals and ardent supporters of Mises, who had only reluctantly joined the conference to make ‘a pilgrimage to Mont Pèlerin’.49 The strong presence of Americans marked a difference from the Colloque Walter Lippmann, where mainly French and continental European liberals had dominated. Since travelling through Europe was still difficult in 1947, only Eucken was able to overcome the travel restrictions from Germany.50 An important contingent of eight participants came from the UK, most notably Lionel Robbins of the LSE and Karl Popper, who had with Hayek’s help gained a professorship there.51 Four participants came from France, among them the economist Maurice Allais and the philosopher Bertrand de Jouvenel; four came from Switzerland, led by Hunold, Röpke and Rappard; one from Italy and three from Scandinavia.52 Despite the adverse circumstances, Hayek had been able to convene a remarkable group at the Hotel du Parc in the village of Mont Pèlerin, near Vevey. Among the 39 guests at Mont Pèlerin there were several outstanding economists, no less than four of them – Hayek, Friedman, Stigler and Allais – later to be awarded the Nobel Prize. In his invitation letter in December 1946, Hayek stressed the ‘strong desire for closer contacts among all those who have become gravely concerned about the chances of preserving a free civilization’. There was a danger that societies were driven ‘ever further in a totalitarian direction’, Hayek told his friends. While in each country there were only a few who thought actively on those questions, according to Hayek combined they represent a considerable force and I have been struck by the similarity of the aims and of the conclusions reached by many of the isolated men in different parts of the world. Again, he mentioned the names of Lord Acton and de Tocqueville, whose works could serve as starting points for the intellectual effort. As topics for discussion, he suggested the following: Free Enterprise or Competitive Order, The Problems and Chances of European Federation, The Future of Germany, Liberalism and Christianity, Modern Historiography, and Political Education.53
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Hayek’s aim was, as he explained in a second circular letter, different from that of a political organization, such as the ‘Liberal International’ which was founded at the same time: Our purpose is not to spread a given doctrine, but to work out in a continuous effort, a philosophy of freedom which can claim to provide an alternative to the political views now widely held. Our goal, in other words, must be the solution not of the practical task of gaining mass support for a given program, but to enlist the support of the best minds in formulating a program which has a chance in gaining general support ... This task was essentially a long-run effort, concerned not so much with what would be immediately practicable, but intellectual foundations of individual freedom.54 Over the years the Mont Pèlerin Society (MPS) has served the purpose of enabling an intellectual exchange over the fundamentals of (neo-)liberal philosophy. By providing a space for frank discussion between scientists who often felt ideologically isolated in their home countries, it helped to strengthen their ideological morale. As Friedman, one of the youngest participants, remembered later: ‘The importance of that meeting [in April 1947] was that it showed us that we were not alone’ (quote in Nash 1976, 26). For many members, the society’s meetings became veritably ... a spiritual fountain of youth, to which we could all repair once a year or so to renew our spirits and faith in a growing company of fellow believers; the one time a year when a generally beleaguered minority could stop looking over their shoulders and let themselves go in a thoroughly supportive environment. (Friedman 1976, xxi–xxii) One of the early members from Germany, Alfred Müller-Armack (1971, 44), recalled the importance of the MPS meetings in a similar way: To those who were in a constant struggle in the German discussion about the validity and applicability of liberal principles, the spiritual environment of this Society provided a sense of liberation and the chance to meet likeminded people who were striving to excel each in liberality. At the beginning, the political currents ran against Hayek’s creed – not just in Eastern Europe and China where the communists had taken over, but in most countries of the world. With regard to economic policy, the participants
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of Hayek’s conference also abhorred what they saw after 1945 in the West: the continuation of many wartime controls, and the nationalization of key industries in several large European countries, as well as the expansion of a collective welfare state. The discussions at Mont Pèlerin testify to the degree to which many of the liberal intellectuals almost despaired of the situation. Therefore, the MPS was founded to counter these tendencies through intellectual work and to re-establish the foundations of liberal philosophy. In retrospect, the project of the Mont Pèlerin Society was surprisingly successful, and according to John Davenport (1981, 1) some declared that the first meeting was a ‘turning point in the life of most participants’. This is also true to a certain extent for liberalism itself as the discussions at the meeting in Vevey confirmed that the metamorphosis into neoliberalism begun in the 1930s would continue in the post-war era. In his opening speech, Hayek (1967 [1947], 149) emphasized the ‘great intellectual task’ that they faced. This consisted of ‘purging traditional liberal theory of certain accidental accretions’ and also ‘facing up to some real problems’ with an over-simplified liberalism that had ‘turned into a somewhat stationary and rigid creed’. In the first session (the title had been changed to ‘Free Enterprise and Competitive Order’), Hayek’s remarks sounded ‘ordoliberal’ in the Freiburg sense when he acknowledged that it had been a fatal tactical mistake of many nineteenth century liberals to have given the impression that the abandonment of all harmful or unnecessary state activity was the consummation of all political wisdom. (MPC 1947, 46; the speech is reprinted in Hayek 1952 [1947]) Because they had not specified a positive role for the state and its legitimate and necessary government activities. Hayek demanded a policy which deliberately adopts competition, the market and prices as its ordering principle and uses the legal framework enforced by the state in order to make competition as effective and beneficial as possible – and to supplement it where, and only where, it cannot be made effective. [The lack of such a policy had been] as much responsible for the decline of competition as the active support which governments have given directly and indirectly to the growth of monopoly. (MPC 1947, 48) With these statements, Hayek had distanced himself from the laissezfaire creed (that his older friend Mises was nostalgic for) and adopted
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the neoliberal stance.55 Similarly, Aaron Director (MPC 1947, 48, 70) was critical of the fact that the substantial and increasing amount of state intervention which tends to destroy the competitive order is a direct consequence of the incomplete character of the theory of liberalism as developed in the nineteenth century. This metamorphosis of liberalism into neoliberalism is exemplified in Hayek’s (MPC 1947, 48, 42) statement: It is the first general thesis which we shall have to consider that competition can be made more effective and more beneficent by certain activities of government than it would be without them. As the main obstacles to a functioning competitive economy, he identified cartels in the products markets as well as labour market. While he harshly criticized the ‘organised violence’ of the unions,56 he also complained about the entrepreneurs saying that many of the pretending defenders of ‘free enterprise’ are in fact defenders of privileges and advocates of government activity in their favor rather than opponents of all privilege.57 Walter Eucken reported on the German situation, where the economy was still being run by government and military agencies. All important resources were centrally allocated. However, in Eucken’s view, neither a ‘planned economy’, where the state steers the daily economic process, nor a ‘free economy’ where ‘there is the danger, that freedom is abused to finally kill freedom’, was the right approach. Instead he called for a ‘competitive order’ which brings freedom and order into the right balance.58 Along very similar lines, Director, the Chicago economist, mentioned several ‘fields in which state action is required to make the competitive order work: (1) The prevention of private monopolies; (2) The control of combinations among either business concerns or workers; (3) The provision of monetary stability’ (MPC 1947, 78). There was no disagreement between the Freiburg School and the old Chicago School on these essential points (cf. Köhler and Kolev 2011). As with the competition policy, the Mont Pèlerin meeting also revised its liberal stance towards the social policy. Hayek and Director acknowledged both saying that the call for ‘social security’ was now a powerful
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demand by the people. But they warned about policies which blocked the market. Director wanted to abolish all kinds of measures, such as subsidies, minimum wages, protection for small shops, and tariffs that gave privileges for special groups. Instead, he advocated measures to increase equality of opportunity, such as improving the health of children from poor families and giving them a better education. Friedman proposed his ‘negative income tax’ scheme as a way to provide some social benefits to the needy yet at the same time to preserve incentives to work. The broader sociological approach that Röpke and Rüstow had presented at the Paris meeting was not accepted by the majority at Mont Pèlerin. Röpke’s call to preserve the traditional small-scale structure of family agriculture, and to exempt it to a certain extent from market pressure to change, was rejected by Karl Brandt, an agricultural economist at Stanford University; although Brandt was a native German, he had American agricultural structures in mind. Contrary to the Colloque Walter Lippmann, where European thinkers dominated, at the MPS founding meeting discussions the large group of Americans, especially the younger Chicago economists as well as the libertarian activists, represented a different flavour of neoliberalism.59 When the Mont Pèlerin gathering debated about a common manifesto, it turned out that they shared a concern for freedom but could not agree on a more specific political or economic programme. A first draft for a ‘Statement of Aims’ for their society (in HIA, MPS coll.; reprinted in Hartwell 1995, 49–50) was provided by Hayek, Eucken, Gideonse, Hazlitt, Iversen and Jewkes, although Hayek was at first opposed to issuing any public manifesto. Their ten-point statement put a clear emphasis on economic questions, starting with the first thesis: Individual freedom can be preserved only in a society in which an effective competitive market is the main agency for the direction of economic activities. Only the decentralization of control through private property in the means of production can prevent those concentrations of power which threaten freedom. Such a system would ‘maximize output in terms of individual satisfaction’. A necessary condition for a free society with an effective competitive order was a ‘proper legal and institutional framework’ and the respect of government activity for the rule of law to limit discretionary power. This draft for the ‘Statement of Aims’ did not meet with general approval. Therefore, Robbins was asked to sketch another draft which was limited to more general statements. It began dramatically:
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The central values of civilization are in danger. Over large stretches of the earth’s surface the essential conditions of human dignity and freedom have already disappeared. In others they are under constant menace from the development of current tendencies of policy. The position of the individual and the voluntary group are progressively undermined by the extensions of arbitrary power. Even that most precious possession of Western man, freedom of thought and expression, is threatened by the spread of creeds which, claiming the privilege of tolerance when in the position of a minority, seek only to establish a position of power in which they can suppress and obliterate all views but their own. The Society should further study inter alia the ‘present crisis’ and think on a ‘redefinition of the functions of the state’, explore ‘methods of re-establishing the rule of law’, ‘the possibility of establishing minimum standards by means not inimical to initiative and the functioning of the market’, think of ‘methods of combating the misuse of history’ and discuss ‘the problem of the creation of an international order conducive to the safeguarding of peace and liberty’.60 To this day, this short programme has been the only collective statement by the MPS in a history of over 60 years. The reduced form would probably in fact have proved to be of advantage, as it left room for discussions among a society of individualists, and gave flexibility for them to adjust to changing historical and political conditions. As Hayek had wanted, the MPS as a collective never became a political pressure group advocating certain reforms, but it did create a space for discussions among like-minded intellectuals who shared the same philosophical ideals and educated each other to strengthen their arguments. One surprising difficulty for them was to agree on a specific and more concrete programme, and another problem was to choose a name for the Society. In this regard, as Knight pointed out, none of the names stood for anything in economics. Hayek’s suggestion of ‘Acton-Tocqueville Society’ was rejected for several reasons. Neither of those names stood for anything in economics, criticized Knight. Other members had historical or religious objections. Friedman didn’t want the society to be named after a person but rather after principle; Popper suggested the ‘Periclean Society’. In the end, Karl Brandt’s solution ‘The Mont Pèlerin Society’ was accepted, although Popper stated that he found that name meaningless. Finally the participants elected Hayek as the first president of the Society. Eucken, Jewkes and Rappard became vice-presidents. The Swiss
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businessman Hunold, who had shown his organizational and fundraising talents, was chosen as executive secretary, and Director was to be treasurer. Between the board members and the officers of the society, there emerged a spontaneous division of labour, but the bulk of the work was done by Hayek and Hunold in tandem. They were the driving forces: Hayek intellectually and Hunold as organizer.
5
The beginning of the revival of liberal movement
The establishment of the MPS had a significant effect on the consolidation of the nascent (neo-)liberal movement. It helped to internationally coordinate the rise of this intellectual force, which eventually became a political factor. Looking back on this development, as Hayek (1983a, 19) declared in the early 1980s, the founding conference at Mont Pèlerin marked ‘the beginning of the revival of a liberal (freiheitliche) movement in Europe’. However, the post-war origins were quite humble and the circumstances adverse. In the beginning, it resembled a refuge for embattled neoliberals whose ideology was deemed obsolete by the vast majority of the public, and in academic spheres as well. Schumpeter was quite correct in observing that the economists’ protests from the ‘mountain in Switzerland’ did not bother many. In economics, Keynesianism was the dominant research programme. In practical politics, this translated into expansionary fiscal politics, which became the ‘new orthodoxy’ (Bleaney 1985, 83). In Britain and the USA, legislation more or less explicitly stated the aim of ‘full’ or ‘maximum’ employment. Most Western countries embarked on establishing and expanding a welfare state, with Britain a forerunner. And some, like Britain and France, nationalized large industries as well as financial institutions (cf. Dunkerley and Hare 1991; Chadeau 2000). Government controls over the economy (price controls, rationing etc.) that had been established and extended during the war were left in place. Apart from one notable exception, namely West Germany, economic policy in Europe and America tended to ignore neoliberal economists’ critiques and proposals. As an organization, the MPS also had a difficult start. After the first meeting at Mont Pèlerin, Hunold received enthusiastic letters of gratitude from Stanley Dennison, John Davenport, Carl Iversen, Milton Friedman, Michael Polanyi, Karl Brandt and others.61 A characteristic reaction came in the judgement from John Jewkes of Oxford University, who stressed the importance of connecting liberal thinkers across nations, stating:
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I have always felt that the first conference was of very great importance in enabling the liberal social scientists to exchange views and establish personal relations. Since that conference there has been most fruitful collaboration among many of the members.62 For the American participants, the exchange with European liberal thinkers was important. Prior to the Mont Pèlerin convention, Friedman had expressed his regret that the Chicago economists knew so little about the work of the ‘Europeans in the same tradition’.63 It was Eucken who had made a particularly strong impression on the Americans, as Röpke reported64 and Friedman later recalled. For Eucken, having been interrogated by the Gestapo in 1944 about his contacts with the anti-Hitler conspirators, the journey to Switzerland was the first trip abroad for many years. Friedman recalled Eucken’s reaction to being there, ‘I shall never forget his pleasure at eating the first orange he had seen in seven or eight years’. What Eucken told his American colleague showed what it was like to live in a totalitarian country, as well as in a country devastated by war and by the rigidities imposed by the occupying authorities. (Friedman and Friedman 1998, 160) As inspiring as the first meeting was, for almost a year thereafter the society more or less stagnated. In late 1947, the society was officially incorporated as a ‘General Not for Profit Corporation’ in the State of Illinois.65 However, this administrative move was not yet followed by any concrete activities. In the spring of 1948, Hayek himself confessed being worried about the slow progress.66 Hunold, who was impatient to get things started, reported that he was hearing from different sides that the MPS was regarded as a ‘lame society’.67 Meanwhile, the confrontation between the USA and the USSR, the former wartime allies, had hardened into the Cold War. In late summer of 1948, the Russian military blockade of West Berlin increased the pressure on this symbolic frontline city. From the point of view of the neoliberal intellectuals, the free civilization was in an extremely perilous state, particularly since communist and socialist ideas were gaining influence in many Western European countries. Within the society, there emerged two camps with different views about the right strategy to counter the threat. At a meeting of MPS Board of Directors in September 1948 in Basle, Karl Brandt pushed for public activities declaring that ‘[i]f our work is not completed in six years, it
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will not make any sense any more’. He and others wanted immediate and direct political actions; otherwise, they claimed ‘the world will be drowned under the wave of collectivism’. Jacque Rueff urged the publication of a liberal manifesto. But Hayek cautioned these wishes, referring to the experience at Mont Pèlerin where the group had had great difficulty in agreeing on a common statement. Any public declaration, he emphasized, should be based on deeper prior research and studies. Friedrich Lutz supported that call for a strictly scientific orientation of any publications. As Brandt remarked, the group around Hayek followed the line that the society should concentrate on scholarly work and keep away from politics.68 In his eyes, the MPS was far too passive. In June 1949, he circulated a memorandum on the future of the MPS in which he again criticized the way that the MPS activities were confined by its statutes to an internal exchange of ideas. He warned that the preclusion of a journal or publications of the society frustrated its self-proclaimed aim to defend freedom.69 Some of the financial supporters of the MPS also criticized the Society’s operations as too discreet.70 Hunold secretly shared these concerns.71
6
‘What we lack is a liberal Utopia’
None of the calls for a more activist and political approach could change Hayek’s (1967 [1949], 179) mind. The project he envisioned was strictly intellectual and long-term in orientation. In his paper ‘The Intellectuals and Socialism’, distributed to his MPS friends after its first meeting, Hayek had set out a theory of how fundamental political changes, namely the sweep towards socialism since the late 19th century, had been prepared by intellectual forces. According to his analysis – and in line with Mises’ earlier reasoning – the intellectual battle was decisive. The efforts of his fellow Mont Pèlerins should therefore be directed at gaining the support of the intellectual elite, not at the masses of the people directly. As an example of such a successful strategy, he referred to the Fabians, an elitist socialist group in Britain. By contrast, he said the more conservative groups have acted, as regularly as unsuccessfully, on a more naïve view of mass democracy and have usually vainly tried directly to reach and to persuade the individual voter. The figure of the ‘intellectuals’ that Hayek (1967 [1949], 180, 191) had in mind comprised a rather broad class of professionals, namely jour-
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nalists, teachers, ministers, lecturers, publicists, radio commentators, writers and artists, all of whom may be masters of the technique of conveying ideas but are usually amateurs so far as the substance of what they convey is concerned. These intellectuals Hayek called ‘secondhand dealers in ideas’ as opposed to the ‘original thinkers’ or scholars who had more profound knowledge and engaged in real scientific research. The slightly pejorative name Hayek chose did not reduce his high esteem in their eyes, or his power: He realized that they acted in a way similar to gatekeepers by controlling the flow of news and commentary that ordinary people consumed and which shaped the climate of opinion. According to Hayek’s theory that he also shared with Keynes, the influence of the intellectuals was greater than the influence of material interests.72 The Left had gained intellectual supremacy Hayek contended, with speculative-utopian socialist visions of a future planned economy and society, whereas liberal intellectuals had only limited influence with their ‘practical’, ‘sensible’ and rather dull ‘realistic’ arguments. Furthermore, Hayek (1992 [1949], 53–54, 194) urged that [w]e must make the building of a free society once more an intellectual adventure. ... What we lack is a liberal Utopia, a deed of courage. His Constitution of Liberty, which he presented first to his MPS fellows in the late 1950s, could be regarded as such a utopian politico-economic order. What liberals had to learn from the socialists was the ‘courage to be Utopian’. This would make their thinking more attractive to the intellectuals, thereby gaining influence with public opinion and ‘making possible what only recently seemed utterly remote’. In the German translation of the article, this strategic advice was put even more clearly as ‘influence on public opinion, which made possible step by step what only recently seemed impossible’. Following this line, the advice of ‘thinking the impossible’ or ‘thinking the unthinkable’ echoed in many (neo-)liberal think tanks in the following years (cf. Cockett 1994). In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the prospects of winning public opinion did indeed seem ‘utterly remote’. The neoliberal academics were faced with a largely hostile intellectual climate. But at least they had established their ideological refuge, where they discussed economic and philosophical issues and learned from each other. In July 1949, the Mont
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Pèlerin Society met again in Switzerland, at Seelisberg, a small town near the Vierwaldstädter lake.73 The conference was attended by 56 members. The next meeting, in 1951, took place in Beauvallon, a small town on the French Riviera. In 1953, however, they returned to Seelisberg, and then in 1954 they held a conference in Venice – as usual, Hunold understood the importance of combining working sessions with tourist trips to make the conventions all the more attractive. In 1956, the MPS held a small meeting in (West) Berlin, while some members took the opportunity to make a trip into the communist eastern part of the city. For the tenth anniversary of the MPS foundation, the members convened in St. Moritz. In 1958, the Society for the first time managed to arrange a meeting in Princeton, USA, after many years of unsuccessfully trying to raise enough funds. Hayek attributed this to ‘the fact ... simply that I have not found an American Dr. Hunold’.74 The Princeton conference was largely organized by the retired businessman Jasper Crane, a former director of Dupont Corporation. At this meeting, tensions with the European secretary Hunold surfaced, which over the next four years led the Society into a deep crisis (Hartwell 1995, 100–133). At the heart of the conflict lay a personality conflict – a growing alienation between Hayek and Hunold, which turned into bitter enmity. Although Hunold tried to give the impression that there was also an ideological dimension to the fight, careful study of the archival evidence suggests that this was not the case (Plickert 2008, 178–189). The antagonism split the Society. Hunold mobilized many of the members, especially the Swiss and the German section, and even corresponded with the German Ministry of Economics. On his side he had Röpke, who had been elected President of the MPS in 1960; but Hunold was finally forced to give up his position as executive secretary of the Society. In the end, Hunold and Röpke were so embittered that they left the MPS in late 1961, and several of their friends, Rüstow in particular, also quit. The result was that the American element of the Society became dominant and the sociological and ordoliberal elements were lost. But even before that, there had been occasional setbacks and frustrations on the part of Hayek.75 Nevertheless, the 1950s were, for the most part, a time of rapid expansion for the Society. On the fifth anniversary of the foundation of the MPS, Hayek (1952b, 731) seemed fairly optimistic about the prospects for intellectual liberalism. He said: Gone are the days when the few outmoded liberals walked their paths lonely, ridiculed and without response from the young.
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Referring implicitly to the MPS network he emphasized that ‘at least personal contact among the proponents of neo-liberalism has been established’. The numbers of attendees at the meetings rose from fewer than 50 to 120 in St. Moritz and about 140 in Princeton. The membership climbed from 39 after the 1947 founding meeting to 172 in 1951, and to 258 in 1961. By the mid-1960s the Society had, despite the resignation of a number of members in the course of the so-called Hunold affair, exceeded 300 members. The Society was now mobilizing large conventions of increasingly self-confident academics and intellectuals. Some members even started complaining that the MPS was growing too large, and the original intimate atmosphere was lost. As Hayek’s biographer, Hans Jörg Hennecke (2000, 262) stated, the meetings were now resembling ‘troop parades of economic liberalism’. This was similar to the way that MPS secretary Hunold had earlier used military metaphors for their intellectual enterprise. He had been full of pride when conveying ‘greetings from the general staff of liberal economists’ to a conference of the Liberal World Union in Knokke (Bieri 1954). A sign of the growing importance of the MPS was the number of prominent political figures it attracted, most notably the German economics minister, Ludwig Erhard, and the Italian president, Luigi Einaudi. Erhard joined the Society at the invitation of Eucken.76 Several of his most important economic advisers were from the ranks of the Freiburg School, such as Eucken, Franz Böhm and Leonhard Miksch, or came from the wider ordoliberal camp, such as Müller-Armack, Erhard’s state secretary.77 One of the most active members in the 1950s was certainly Röpke. The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, whose founding publisher Erich Welter also became an MPS member, featured long essays by Röpke and extensive reports of the Society’s meetings. From Italy, Einaudi followed the call for membership from Röpke, with whom he shared a long-standing intellectual friendship and a similar understanding of neoliberalism.78 From Austria, Reinhard Kamitz, the finance minister, and later the president of the central bank, joined the MPS. Several prominent Swiss figures gave their support to the MPS. They also had the backing of the Neue Zürcher Zeitung and its editor-in-chief, Willy Bretscher. While there was a concentration of supporters in continental Europe, the British section consisted mainly of Hayek’s former LSE colleagues, apart from Robbins, who left the Society in 1950. Antony Fisher, a businessman and think-tank founder, became an active member. His Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) provided an important source of studies and ideas which inspired some of the Thatcherite reforms. The largest
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number of MPS members, more than a third of the total, lived in the USA – with Chicago being the dominant intellectual stronghold. Milton Friedman became the rising star of the younger generation of Chicago economists, and in the MPS. In the 1950s and early 1960s, however, the MPS was still centred around Hayek as its intellectual ‘leader’. Although the Society was registered as an American charity, in its early years it was culturally very much an ‘old European’ Society.
7
A surprise breakthrough in Germany
The revival of liberal economics owed much to the political breakthrough that neoliberal ideas gained in West Germany. This development started in 1948 and was all the more surprising, as a return to a market economy was regarded as totally unfeasible, even absurd, by most in the aftermath of the war. Most Western countries stuck to the ‘lessons of the Great Depression’, namely that an uncoordinated ‘capitalist’ market produced unacceptable results, such as cyclical breakdowns and mass unemployment. They therefore retained many elements, such as interventionism, regulation and the central allocation of resources, which had been established in the 1930s and in the 1940s during the war. The Marxist historian Eric Hobsbawm (1994, 176–177) correctly remarked that after 1945 they were virtually all states which, deliberately and actively, rejected the supremacy of the market and believed in the active management and planning of the economy by the state. In this environment, ‘champions of complete market freedom, such as Friedrich von Hayek, saw themselves and their like as prophets in the wilderness’. Surprisingly, the neoliberals were able to break this pattern in Germany, a country with a long statist and collectivist tradition, where state-led economic centralization and planning had reached its apex under the National Socialist regime. Virtually all consumption and investment goods were rationed and allocated according to political plans. After the military, political and economic breakdown, many aspects of this economic policy were not changed at first by the allied occupation authorities; for instance, the price freeze ordered in 1936 by Göring to repress inflationary tendencies was kept in place after 1945. As Eucken (1948a; 1948b) pointed out, the repressed prices did not reflect the real relative scarcities. Therefore, the market mechanism was paralyzed; much of the production was sold on the black market. In the harsh
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winter of 1946/47, millions of Germans, among them many refugees and those expelled from the East, starved. Since economic conditions showed no signs of improvement, the US military authorities under General Lucius D. Clay began to see the need for reform. However, many of the top US economic advisors were thinking along dirigist lines. For instance John K. Galbraith (1966 [1948], 95), then the head of the US State Department section for economic policy in the occupied areas, argued in an article on ‘The German Economy’ that there was only one way to stop the deterioration of the situation through organized action; that meant planning. The German neoliberals were highly dissatisfied with the advisers defending the system of controls and rationing. From exile in Switzerland, Röpke spoke critically: ‘Like their old Jeeps they discharge their New Dealers in Germany’.79 Radical economic reform came on 20 June 1948. Although the outlines for the currency reform had been drafted by the American military authorities and supported by General Clay, the crucial part of the economic reforms, the decontrol of most prices, was the unauthorized work of German neoliberals. Ludwig Erhard had only become director of the economic administration in the Bizone in March of that year, but during the war he had already been thinking about monetary reform.80 In the decisive months of 1948 as director of the economic administration for the English and the American occupation zones, Erhard received crucial support from the neoliberal economists in his advisory council, namely Eucken, Böhm and Miksch. Some of them had been active in the resistance, and had elaborated plans for economic reforms in a post-war Germany.81 They were able to dominate the discussions in the advisory council against the social democratic and socialist economists who insisted on a continuation of state economic planning with price and wage controls (Nicholls 1994, 186–205). To understand just how risky and revolutionary the abolition of price controls appeared at the time, the discussions at Mont Pèlerin in 1947 are quite telling. There, Röpke and Eucken had presented their analyses of the political and economic situation of Germany for the first time to an international audience. Eucken (MPC 1947, 114, 129, 133) warned: The present development shows that the planned economy of the separate states is so inefficient that it is decaying. ... [and] ... ,. [t]he [food] rations are so small that nobody, literally nobody, can live on them.
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Since the controlled economy had degenerated into a barter system and was totally unproductive, Eucken advocated an end to the rationing and price-fixing system, stating I believe that prices must be allowed to rise but only if at the same time a free market and international trade are resumed. This conclusion, however, was met with scepticism by some fellow Mont Pèlerins. Robbins replied that he did not think that the consumption rationing system could be removed, and Brandt, wary of the extremely difficult nutritional situation, warned that establishing in Germany a free price market system, particularly with respect to food, without first having replenished the stocks, would absolutely lead to starvation, unless you took a large number of people and fed them on public relief. When Erhard presented his ideas for decontrol, deregulation and a private market economy, the socialist SPD and even many Christian Democrats raised strong opposition.82 In the Bizone administration, Erhard was helped by Miksch and Müller-Armack who drafted a law (the Leitsätzegesetz) that allowed the economics director to remove price controls. The SPD opposition in the Bizone warned him of the ‘steel bath of free prices’ and that a return to a market economy was tantamount to ‘throwing a fatally ill man in cold water’ (quoted in Erhard 1957, 106–107). By contrast, Müller-Armack (1974 [1948], 104) predicted that decontrol would set free the economic forces and would not be ‘a leap into the dark and into chaos, but quite the contrary, a step out of chaos into the natural order’. Indeed, this prediction proved correct. The day after Erhard announced the end of most price controls, shop windows were suddenly full of consumer goods. Moreover, after the central allocation of resources ended, industrial production started to recover. However, at the same time as repressed inflation was being dealt with by the currency reform, previously concealed underemployment was revealed. Thus, workers who had hitherto been paid with worthless currency were laid off. Wage increases lagged behind consumer price increases. As a result, the trade unions organized mass protests against Erhard. In this situation, he received helpful intellectual support from Röpke. Adenauer had asked Röpke (1950, 18) to write a study, which was presented in August 1948. Under the title ‘Is the German economic
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policy right?’ he vigorously defended the measures taken by Erhard, and concluded that the difference between today and then [before the reforms of June 1948] is so immense that foreigners, who return to Germany after years, talk of a miracle. In 1950, after the Korean War had given another boost to industrial production, the German economy embarked on a long-term boom. With an average growth rate of more than 8 percent during the 1950s, unemployment was falling rapidly and wealth was growing. The talk of an ‘economic miracle’ was now ubiquitous, but the neoliberals vigorously opposed the ‘miracle’ interpretation. In an article for an American libertarian journal, The Freeman, Röpke (1953, 844–845) emphasized that it was neither the Marshall Plan which had started the recovery nor the exceptional thrift and energy of the German people, but the right institutional reforms, ‘the restoration of a comparative market economy and the dismantling of socialism’. Furthermore, he credited Erhard with having broken the myth that the advance of socialism was a ‘historical necessity’. To refute the ‘miracle’ thesis, Hunold (1953) edited a book, Wirtschaft ohne Wunder, with contributions by his Mont Pèlerin friends, including Einaudi and Hayek. Decades later, Hayek mused that the Germans had never really understood that the true miracle of their economic revival was ‘that the other persons in authority let Ludwig Erhard have his way’ (quoted in Hennecke, 2000, 269–270). At the same time, Hayek was concerned that the term ‘social market economy’ would lead to confusion and could blur the liberal meaning of the concept.83 The German economic reform had taken place in a kind of political vacuum, when parties and interest groups were not yet entrenched. This gave Erhard scope for his deregulation measures. His successful political action showed that Hayek’s intellectual strategy was complemented and strengthened by good policy examples to which the economists could point as empirical evidence. As the Economy Minister, Erhard benefited from the intellectual support that liberal circles provided him; indeed, he would not have succeeded without their earlier efforts in the ‘battle of ideas’. Unfortunately, two of his most trusted advisers and collaborators, Eucken and Miksch, died suddenly in 1950, and after the initial economic reforms, the right legal framework for competition was still missing. Franz Böhm, who was active in the CDU and was elected member of Parliament in 1953, took over the crucial task. It was a hard and long fight. A first draft of an anti-cartel law had been devised by a
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friend of Böhm in 1946, but the proposal was blocked by industrialists. In letters to Hunold, the MPS secretary, Böhm complained about the opposition of ‘cartel friendly entrepreneurs’ saying ‘[t]heir delight that I ... have remained isolated is unconcealed’.84 The MPS secretary replied with a call to continue the fight of the neoliberals for the cause of the consumer and ... against the historical liberalism, i.e. against monopoly capitalism.85 Although avoiding such radical language in public, Böhm and Erhard agreed about the cartelists ,and they continued fighting for almost a decade for the core project of the German neoliberal competition economics. Finally, in 1957, the Law against Restraints of Competition (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen) was passed, which declared the principal illegality of cartels, albeit with some exceptions. The law did not go as far in its anti-concentration effect as some German neoliberals had wished, but nevertheless it marked a decisive break with the cartel tradition of German industry. Together with increasing international competition, it contributed to eroding the efficacy of national cartelist formations (cf. Giersch, Paqué and Schmieding 1992, 85).
8
Difficult countries for neoliberals: Italy and France
While West Germany was developing a highly successful market economic order, in other countries the efforts of neoliberal economists were too little or of no avail at all. One reason might have been that in Germany the intellectual preparations had begun much earlier than elsewhere. In addition, the economic planning and controls system was associated in Germany with a discredited political system, whereas in Britain and the USA the collectivist or New Deal policies were part of the anti-depression and war-time industrial policies which the majority of the people supported and wanted to continue after the war. In Italy, neoliberal economists, most prominently Luigi Einaudi, gained some positions of influence after the defeat. As Governor of the Bank of Italy from 1945 he succeeded, with a restrictionist policy, in halting the inflation of the lira. The monetary stabilization laid the basis for the subsequent economic upswing, which was also fostered by a restructuring of the agrarian economy and the development of small and medium-size enterprises. With Einaudi, a few other Italian economists became MPS members, most notably Costantino Bresciani-Turroni, Minister of Trade from 1946 to 1947, and Giovanni Demaria, a director
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of a university of commerce in Milan, and Head of the Economics Commission of the Constitutional Assembly. The group of Italian neoliberals vigorously opposed concentrations of economic and political power, as well as the cartelization and corporatist structures inherited from Mussolini’s regime.86 Einaudi regarded monopolies as ‘enemy no. 1’ and found their development was fostered mainly by state actions, tariffs, subsidies and licences (cf. Richter 1963, 39–40). The Italian neoliberals criticized the heavy presence of state enterprises and made proposals for privatization, but these were not realized. As President of the Republic from 1948 to 1955, Einaudi had a merely representative function, with little influence on the direction of economic policy. He died in 1961, two months after delivering the opening speech at the MPS general meeting in Torino. In France, economic policy after the war was centred on dirigiste planning concepts. Significant sections of French industry had been nationalized already during the Resistance days, and radical unions were in a strong position. In 1946 General de Gaulle instituted a Commissariat Général du Plan, which drafted ‘indicative’ plans for economic development and investments. In the opinions of Hayek (1952a, 182–213) and Röpke (1944, 103–167), this planning attitude of the administration represented in part a rationalist and constructivist French tradition of thought that had been followed since the 18th century, and which tended to overestimate the capacity of the ‘scientific’ social engineer to improve society and economy. At MPS meetings, Hayek’s French friends complained that the ‘indicative’ plans were a fiction, since the small statistical unit produced only crude aggregate pictures of the economy, and the technocratic planners lacked the necessary knowledge for the modernization of industry (cf. Villey 1964; Grün 1964). Since the mid-1950s, when it had become clear that Germany was in the lead economically and that the indicative plans were not as effective as hoped, the French governments had changed their strategy; now they put more emphasis on a Keynesian expansionary fiscal and credit policy, to stimulate growth and achieve full employment. As a consequence, the franc lost internal value and was under devaluation pressure, but ‘the erosion of the currency was a price the government was ready to pay for demand management’ (Dormois 2004, 59) – for some years at least. Towards the late 1950s, the situation became untenable. When de Gaulle returned to power as President of the Republic in 1958, he nominated Jacque Rueff as head of a reform commission. The Rueff plan suggested an end to budget deficits, by making cuts in expenditures and
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subsidies as well as introducing some tax increases. Besides this fiscal consolidation, Rueff advocated a more restrictive monetary policy. As a result, the inflation rate slowed down. To improve its external competitiveness, France devalued its currency, and at the same time trade barriers were abolished. Growth was thus boosted considerably in the next few years, though France was still unable to catch up with Germany. Another plan by Rueff (1961, 118–119) in 1959/1960 for a wider liberalization to get rid of ‘sclerosis in our economic structure’ was not accepted by the Debré government, which was again leaning towards dirigiste concepts.
9
The Keynesian welfare consensus in Britain
A cause for great concern for Hayek were the developments in Britain, his home country before his move to America in 1950. His warning of the Road to Serfdom had been directed at British voters, whom he had tried to convince that the central planning of the economy and the promise of total ‘social security’ by the state presented a danger to individual freedom. His provocative warnings generated a heated debate, in which a remark by Churchill in a radio broadcast, his so-called ‘Gestapo speech’, caused a public outcry. The Prime Minister’s polemic was criticized as having been inspired by Hayek (see Sheamur 2006). Labour won a landslide victory in 1945, and Prime Minister Attlee had a free hand to recast the British economy, nationalize large parts of industry and build an extensive welfare state.87 In contrast to West Germany, where Erhard radically liberalized the economy and sought to break with the past, in Britain the wartime planning mindset prevailed. Price controls and rationing of commodities as well as consumer goods continued well into the 1950s. Hayek (1992 [1947], 40) was highly critical of the policies, and warned of recurrent British balance of payments crises as a consequence of the relative decline in competitiveness. He was also, however, pessimistic about the prospects for a change, and suggested that [i]t is more probable that in the relevant government circles the failure of planning efforts will be regarded as proof that not enough planning and not enough coercive measures have been applied. The new government was carried by a ‘Keynesian welfare’ consensus, which had already begun to develop during the war (Addison 1975). Stafford Cripps, the first post-war Chancellor of the Exchequer, had
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introduced the rhetoric and methods of aggregate demand management and deficit spending. His successor, Hugh Gaitskell, became a fully fledged Keynesian finance minister working for ‘full employment’. In the eyes of an increasing number of voters, however, the policies did not bring the promised great successes. John Jewkes, one of the most active British MPS members, wrote quite optimistically in March 1950 that the tide of Socialism is running back. Even in England, after five years of experience, the people are beginning to change their minds about nationalization and planning. At the next election the socialists will go out of office.88 Indeed, the Conservative party and Churchill regained office in 1951, but they left most of Labour’s economic legacy unchanged. Only the socialization of the steel industry was reversed, and some price controls and rationing for consumer goods were lifted. In the main areas of social and fiscal policy, however, there was an astonishing degree of continuity. Among the Tories, progressives like Harold Macmillan, who had long proposed a ‘middle way’, and R. A. Butler dominated the party line. As Finance Minister, Butler followed Gaitskell’s Keynesian line to the extent that the press spoke of a synthesis – ‘Butskellism’. Labour had laid the fundamentals for a new political consensus lasting three decades, which rested on four main pillars: a mixed economy with a large state sector; powerful trade unions; a comprehensive welfare state; and a Keynesian fiscal policy and ‘demand management’ to achieve full employment (cf. Addison 1975, 270–278). Neoliberal critics of the Keynesian welfare state had little influence, and stood at the fringe of the debate. In this situation, the only viable path for change seemed to be to pursue a Hayekian long-term intellectual strategy to win over public opinion. The opportunity of starting such an enterprise presented itself through the financial help of Antony Fisher, a farming entrepreneur; inspired by Hayek’s ideas, he founded the Institute of Economic Affairs in 1955 in a small office in London.89 According to Cockett (1994, 130), he ‘modelled the IEA very much on the Fabians and the early Socialists’, imitating their methods of disseminating ideas through educational efforts with future opinion leaders in the media, academia and politics. In this, the IEA was following Hayek’s advice precisely. As director for the think tank, Fisher hired Ralph Harris, a young journalist from a working-class background. The second key figure of the Institute’s staff was Arthur Seldon, who proved to be very talented in writing and editing publications. Both had an
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academic background influenced by prominent neoliberals.90 The LSE and other British universities provided a pool of academic collaborators for the Institute with its international network being mainly established through the Mont Pèlerin Society.91 Over the years, the IEA became the focal point of efforts to influence the British climate of opinion. It did so by publishing short and easy-to-read pamphlets on economic policy issues directed at journalists, teachers and students as well as politicians. In the late 1950s, the Institute had already acquired a modest reputation for its work, and had established contacts with academics, journalists and some politicians. At the 1959 Oxford meeting of the MPS, Harris and Seldon (1959, 2, 6, 12) presented a paper entitled ‘The Tactics and Strategy of the Advance to a Free Economy’. Their account sounded modestly optimistic: Before the war and up to about 1950, the warnings of liberal economists went largely unheeded, and only the short-sighted, stop-go ideas of interventionists had the ear of the politicians and the public. But for some years now, it has been possible to preach the free economy with some hope of being understood and without the automatic accusation of acting as the lackeys of capitalists. Established interests, politicians and intellectuals as well as monopolistic entrepreneurs were seen as the main obstructive forces: The Institute’s battle of argument has thus often to be waged on two fronts: not only with intellectuals and politicians who deny or do not understand the basic tenets of a free society, but also with businessmen who profess them but who wish to contract out of competition when it suits them. As for their tactics and strategy, Harris and Seldon advocated their educational approach which was directed at the influencers of public opinion. They insisted that [t]he philosophy of the market economy must be widely accepted; this requires a large program of education and much thought about how to finance it. The first politician of any importance who openly embraced IEA ideas was Enoch Powell, a man of high intellectual and rhetorical capacities who could appeal to elite circles as well to the broader public. Powell had
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resigned in 1957 from the post of Financial Secretary to the Treasury in the Macmillan government in protest over a budget deficit; now he was free to openly criticize the interventionist policies of the Conservatives. He attended IEA discussions and contributed to two publications. One was entitled ‘Rebirth of a Nation’, the other a comparative study on ‘Economic Miracles’, focusing on the German example of a successful non-planned economy. In mid-1960, Powell also became a member of the MPS. Some other promising young Conservative MPs also began to show an interest in the IEA’s ideas. The first was Sir Geoffrey Howe, followed by Sir Keith Joseph and Margaret Thatcher. They were critical of the British government’s attempts to imitate the French model of ‘indicative planning’ as a response to the lack of economic dynamics.92 Yet even if some British politicians began to see by the early 1960s that their country was falling behind more dynamic economies like Germany, most of them thought a major turn in economic policies impossible – even Joseph was sceptical as to whether the radical IEA ideas were ‘politically practical’ (cf. Denham and Garnett 2001, 137–139). At the MPS meeting in France in 1967 Powell (1967, 1–2) discussed the following: What is meant by politically impossible? ... The politician may, and often does, have to take a view upon what is ‘politically practicable’ though only for the immediate future – he must beware of the vulgar error of supposing that there are acts or propositions which are permanently, necessarily and inherently ‘politically impractically’. A year later, this extraordinary politician was pushed out of the Heath shadow cabinet after making a speech denouncing the social consequences of mass immigration, which was criticized as ‘racist’. The younger MPs sympathetic to the IEA, above all Howe, Joseph and Thatcher, kept a low profile. However, in 1968 the Fabian Society, the socialist counterpart of the IEA, published a tract warning that an IEA-inspired ‘New Right’ was becoming more influential. David Collard (1968, 1–5), the author of the booklet, cautioned that ‘the New Right must be respected for the quality, consistency and rigour of its approach’. He warned that while the Left was insisting on nationalizations and economic controls, it was ‘successfully outflanked by the New Right’. The 1970 Conservative party election victory seemed at first to provide an opportunity for a decisive turn towards more market-friendly policies.93 However, the IEA’s hopes were dashed. When the business cycle slowed down and unemployment rose, Heath went back to expansionary Keynesian fiscal and monetary policies, and ignored inflationary
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tendencies. In trade union politics, too, the economic liberals suffered a defeat. Heath’s efforts to push through a reform in union legislation faced fierce resistance from the powerful workers’ interest groups, and as a result of the miners’ strike in the winter of 1972, Heath finally gave in to their demands. Lastly, in his conflict with the Trade Union Congress, he resorted to price and wage controls. The only Conservative MP who voted against these measures was Enoch Powell. In 1974, the Heath government was voted out of office. During all those humiliating years, the IEA-friendly ministers such as Sir Keith Joseph (Secretary of State for Social Services), Margaret Thatcher (Secretary of State for Education) and Sir Geoffrey Howe (Secretary of State for Trade) were subject to Cabinet discipline, and acquiesced.94 By 1972, the IEA editorial director Seldon had given up writing letters urging Joseph and Howe to consider alternative policies. That same year, the IEA went public, publishing a ‘Memorandum’ with harsh criticisms of the government,95 but to no avail (cf. Cockett 1994, 204–210). At the 1974 MPS meeting in Brussels, Arthur Shenfield (1974), the MPS president, gave a speech on ‘The English Disease’, summing up the main features of the ailing economy, including militant unions, low productivity development and high wage demands after the oil price shock – all this resulted in rampant inflation and rising unemployment. Among middle-class voters there was a growing concern about the economic future of the country, but the first attempt of the neoliberals to turn the tide had failed.
10
The post-New Deal era in America
The American MPS members had similarly disappointing experiences with politicians of the Right, who, it was supposed, would challenge the Keynesian zeitgeist but failed to deliver. The United States had been profoundly changed by its New Deal of the 1930s and its involvement in the war. As Robert Higgs (1987, 169–174, 197–204) has convincingly argued, each crisis episode triggered a lasting period of growth in the government. The New Deal brought the biggest leap thus far towards a more centralized government; in the 1940s, the US federal administration had expanded so much that it could exercise powers over the economy which the founding fathers could never have envisaged. The policies started in the emergency situation of the 1930s and 1940s led to a fundamental change in attitudes concerning the relationship between state and market. The old norm of a balanced budget was erased by a Keynesian-inspired ‘fiscal revolution’, as Herbert Stein (1996) called it. An expansionary budget policy was now thought necessary to counter
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insufficient private investment and consumption expenditure. With the Employment Bill of 1945, the state assumed the responsibility of securing the highest possible employment. There were dissenting voices, like those of Henry Simons, Senator Robert Taft and MPS writer Henry Hazlitt. But the opposition could only marginally change the new employment policies. In the economics profession, the Keynesian wave had overwhelmed most of the younger generation with the force of an almost religious conversion (see Samuelson 1966 [1946]). In the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), created in 1946, the most prominent members were Keynesian and interventionist economists, such as Leon Keyserling in the early 1950s, and Walter Heller, Paul Samuelson and James Tobin in the early 1960s. The most influential popular economist of that time was John K. Galbraith; in his much acclaimed book The Affluent Society he criticized wasteful private consumption, stimulated by manipulative advertising, and claimed that the state was chronically underfinanced. Within the MPS, such critiques were met with anger: At the Kassel meeting of the Society, Hayek and Stigler criticized the arbitrary distinction between real and artificial consumer demand; Stigler also pointed out that the share of federal government to GDP without military expenses had doubled since the beginning of the century.96 In the late 1950s, James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock came forward with their ‘Public Choice’ explanations about the growth of governments. According to their reasoning, interacting interest groups and politicians would engage in log-rolling, and in this way they would make the state finance projects and subsidies which would bring profits for them but were nonetheless not in the public interest. Buchanan (1960 [1959]) became one of the most active speakers at MPS meetings, and the University of Virginia, where Buchanan developed his Public Choice theory, became another academic pillar for economic liberals in the USA besides Chicago. Most other universities, however, had yet to become involved. As in the scientific community, the economic liberals were marginalized in the political spectrum. They had even lost their traditional selfdesignation as ‘liberals’ to the Left, and now social democrats used this name.97 Those who did not welcome the New Deal and were unhappy with its legacy were now called ‘conservatives’ or even reactionaries. The rise of the social democratic liberalism to intellectual pre-eminence, and the eclipse of traditional liberalism (‘conservatism’) seemed so definite that Lionel Trilling (1950, ix) wrote in his The Liberal Imagination:
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In the United States at this time Liberalism is not only the dominant but even the only intellectual tradition. For it is the plain fact that nowadays there are no conservative or reactionary ideas in general circulation. He acknowledged that there were some strong ‘impulses’ towards conservatism or reaction, but they did not, as he wrote disdainfully, express themselves in ideas but only in action or in irritable mental gestures which seek to resemble ideas. The remaining liberal-conservatives were confined to a ‘remnant’, as they themselves put it. Edwin Feulner (2003, 4), an influential conservative and later MPS president, wrote of that time: It is difficult now to remember how isolated the conservative remnant seemed in the 1940s and early 1950s, meeting by torchlight in its catacombs. Probably out of this sense of isolation and defeat, the remaining economic liberals and traditional conservatives developed alliances that historian George Nash (1976) traced in his book The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America since 1945. One of the rallying points for the market liberals was the Foundation for Economic Education, which published pamphlets with a Misesian tone, and also a little study written by the Chicago economists Stigler and Friedman. In 1955 a small think tank in Irvington, outside New York, bought the magazine The Freeman which published essays by Mises, Hayek and Röpke, among others. Also in 1955, William Buckley founded the National Review. This magazine gained rapidly in circulation and intellectual reputation, and thereby provided a breakthrough for the nascent ‘conservative movement’. Buckley’s magazine successfully implemented the strategy of ‘fusionism’ between economic liberalism and moral conservatism.98 Within the MPS, the tensions were also felt. For example, Hayek was unhappy about an invitation for Russell Kirk, author of The Conservative Mind, for whom Röpke was full of praise,99 and when Kirk held a speech at the MPS general meetings 1957 in St. Moritz, Hayek reacted by giving the paper ‘Why I am not a Conservative’. This was subsequently reprinted as annex to his Constitution of Liberty. The first opportunity to gain real political power presented itself to the liberal-conservative movement when Barry Goldwater surprisingly
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received the Republican nomination in 1964 and ran for US president. Although vilified by the left-liberal media as a dangerous extremist – a label which he had acquired with his notorious ‘extremism in the pursuit of liberty is no vice’ quote and other statements concerning the use of nuclear weapons in the Cold War – Goldwater gained the support of not only right-wing conservatives but also many economic liberals. They put their hopes in the sympathy that the senator had expressed for market economics, and Goldwater seemed willing to substantially roll back the New Deal structures. In his best-selling book The Conscience of a Conservative, Goldwater (or rather his ghostwriter, Brent Bozell, Buckley’s brother-in-law) had laid out his philosophy of limited government and his general distrust in centralist power; he even called the federal administration a ‘leviathan’ out of control, which must be cut back (Goldwater 1960, 20). During the election campaign, Milton Friedman offered his assistance with economic advice, as did some other MPS members such as Karl Brandt, Warren Nutter and Yale Brozen.100 Goldwater’s crushing defeat at the polls against Lyndon B. Johnson dealt a blow to the hopes of the intellectual liberal-conservative movement. However, the Goldwater episode had two longer lasting effects. For the first time since the war, it had opened a political-intellectual window to ‘think the unthinkable’ – a radical turn for more market-oriented politics. In the long run this enabled, as Friedman remarked in his memoirs, a swing in public opinion towards free-market conservatism (Friedman and Friedman 1998, 369). From this perspective, the Goldwater episode was not a defeat but an indirect victory in the ‘battle of ideas’ which later materialized. The second lasting effect of the Goldwater campaign in 1964 was that it encouraged a whole generation of young conservative activists to enter politics. One of them was Ronald Reagan, who delivered his first nationally broadcast speech, and impressed the nation with his talent for rhetoric. Many of the economic liberals’ hopes for a political about-turn were also focused on Richard Nixon, who became president in 1968 and presented himself as a market-oriented politician. Friedman was his principal economic advisor during the election campaign. The political constellation seemed favourable for a change in politics. After Nixon was elected, he appointed some of Friedman’s friends to key positions in his administration, in particular George Shultz, who served at first as Secretary of Labor and later as Secretary of the Treasury. Paul McCracken and Herbert Stein, two market-liberal economists, joined the CEA. In addition, Friedman’s mentor Arthur Burns was named Chairman of the Federal Reserve. From the point of view of the economic liberals, the Nixon government had already ended tragically in late 1971 because it could not
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cope with the slowdown in growth, the rising unemployment and the inflationary pressures emerging simultaneously. In this difficult situation, Nixon committed what Friedman considered a fatal sin: he opted for price and wage controls to contain inflation.101 While the public welcomed the measures, liberal economists condemned them as a big mistake. CEA member Stein (1994, 167) later remarked regretfully about the ‘radical departure from conservative, free market philosophy’. In 1973, when the first price controls failed to contain inflationary pressures, Nixon resorted to a total price freeze for many goods, including gas. The consequences were recurrent shortages of energy supplies. Friedman went so far as to say that Nixon’s wage and price controls did even more harm to the country than the Watergate scandal (Friedman and Friedman 1998, 387). As a reaction to the government’s anti-market policies, some radical activists broke with the Republican Party. Nixon’s decision to end the Bretton Woods system, suspend the convertibility of the dollar into gold on 15 August 1971, and devalue the currency provoked a band of activists into setting up the Libertarian party. Although it never gained much voter support, it was a catalyst for the libertarian movement. Some of the later advisers to the Reagan administration were members of the Libertarian party, like Ed Crane and David Boaz who in 1977 founded the Cato institute (Kelley 1997, 142–143).
11 The re-orientation of neoliberalism towards ‘laissez faire’ Within the Mont Pèlerin Society, which was the key intellectual organization of neoliberal economists, Americans had gained numerical and intellectual dominance. Since the 1960s, the younger Chicago School, with Friedman as leader, made progress in the discussions. This was particularly relevant to the two central issues of neoliberalism: the conception of a competition order, and the role of the state relating to it. The term ‘neoliberalism’ was used only very rarely by the American MPS members, but shortly after the foundation of the Society they were strongly influenced by the ideas of the early neoliberals. Friedman (1951 [1950]) wrote an essay, ‘Neo-liberalism and its prospects’, in which he identified with the name and the cause. He described the central ideas of neoliberalism as follows: Neoliberalism would accept the nineteenth century liberal emphasis on the importance of the individual, but it would substitute for the nineteenth century goal of laissez-faire as a means to this end, the goal of a competitive order ... The state would police the system, establish
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conditions favourable to competition and prevent monopoly, provide a stable monetary framework, and relieve acute misery and distress. As this shows, the early neoliberals in the 1930s and 1940s had called for an active role by the state to demonopolize the economy and establish a legal framework to safeguard competition against cartels and concentration tendencies. This was the position of the Freiburg School, which propagated ‘vollständigen Wettbewerb’ (a kind of perfect competition) as the ultimate aim, and also the older Chicago School around Simons. Their position had greatly impressed Hayek in the 1940s; but by the late 1940s and early 1950s he had distanced himself from the concept of ‘perfect competition’, which he declared a fiction. A special anti-cartel authority with discretionary powers to intervene and break up big corporations, as advocated by some German ordoliberals, and by Simons, seemed to Hayek an intolerable threat to the rule of law (Hayek 1954). Later, he continued to advocate a general ban on cartels, but he thought that even without such a ban, cartel agreements and tacit collusion would not be stable without legal protection (as had been given them in Germany for many years). A legal decree of annulment in combination with decisive progress towards free trade would be, Hayek thought, sufficient to strengthen competition. Also within the Chicago tradition there was a marked re-orientation. The young Chicago School turned away from the position of ‘Old Chicago’ and from Simons’ rigorous stance on the competition issue. Friedman and Stigler were the leading voices in this re-orientation, supported by Yale Brozen, Harold Demsetz and Sam Peltzman, and later by the legal scholars Richard Posner and Robert Bork. Since the mid-1950s they had become more relaxed about concentrated industries and, conversely, warier of state regulations supposedly enhancing competition and welfare.102 They started to carry out empirical research into the monopoly question. Perfect competition was unrealistic, but monopolies were not as abundant as the older generation had thought. While the old generation of neoliberals were extremely sceptical about big corporations, the younger generation in Chicago now came to appreciate that big corporations also had a positive role in terms of economic efficiency and innovative power. The fact that there were only a small number of suppliers for a certain good would not be sufficient evidence that there was no competition. They therefore concluded that concentrated industries could well be innovative and dynamic (Martin 1976, 304). In Capitalism and Freedom, Friedman (2002 [1962], p.121, 123, 28) referred to G. Warren Nutter’s dissertation, ‘The extent of enterprise
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monopoly in the United States’, and a paper by Stigler who showed that monopolistic structures were not a ubiquitous phenomenon, as critics of the market economy claimed. Consequently, Friedman complained about the ‘over-estimation of the importance of monopoly’. The most common source of monopolies, Friedman stated, were direct or indirect government interventions, as radical liberals like Mises had affirmed. It was protectionist measures by the state that allowed single producers to reap monopoly profits. In a dynamic environment with free trade, monopolistic positions could not be sustained for long, except in those situations where technical conditions made it unavoidable: When technical conditions make a monopoly, the natural outcome of competitive market forces, there are only three alternatives that seem available: private monopoly, public monopoly, or public regulation. All three are bad, so we must choose among the evils. Friedman then made explicit reference to Henry Simons and Walter Eucken, and wrote about them, saying that ‘having learned from both, I reluctantly conclude that, if tolerable, private monopoly may be the least of the evils’. With their ‘revision of the revision’, a reversal of the pessimistic view of early neoliberals regarding competition, cartels and concentration, the neoliberals of the 1960s and 1970s were coming close to preaching the old ‘laissez faire’ view of the free market. Their emphasis now was on deregulation, and their scepticism focused on the activities of the state. This was due to the empirical and theoretical research carried out in Chicago. The ‘Public Choice’ theory also played a role, because it showed that ‘benevolent’ actions of politicians and bureaucrats, who would create a favourable framework for competition, were not the rule but rather the exception. However, the free-market economists just had to keep hoping for some dedicated politician who would realize their agenda.
12
Turning the tide: the intellectual counter-revolution
In the early 1970s, the tide of economic liberalism was still very low. Both the Heath and the Nixon episodes were bitter disappointments. There was reason for frustration on the part of dedicated liberals. A quarter of a century after its inception, the MPS had grown to a large organization, with around 350 members; most of them were professors at prestigious universities and it was no longer isolated.103 Friedman had emerged as the dominant economist within the Society in the 1960s, at which point
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his star was temporarily shining brighter than Hayek’s. In 1970, he was elected President of the Society. When preparing for its silver jubilee meeting, Friedman discussed the idea of dissolving the MPS, as in his view it had served its purpose of providing a refuge for liberals in the difficult times after the war. The great majority of members, however, wanted to continue the organization, which had proved to be an excellent platform for intellectual exchange and networking. The meeting in Montreux, near Mont Pèlerin itself, passed in a joyful atmosphere and also lifted Hayek’s mood; he had been plagued by depression for years. He regained some hope that the tide might be turning – in academic circles at least, the anti-Keynesian front was making great advances. There are three factors which precipitated the change: first, inflationary pressures had emerged since the late 1960s while the world economy was deteriorating significantly. The Keynesian deficit spending policies only produced more inflation, but did not stimulate the economy or reduce unemployment. This development seemed to falsify the Phillips curve with its alleged trade-off between inflation and employment, and it vindicated critics like Friedman (1968) who had warned of this in his address as President of the American Economic Association. Soon, there was talk of a monetarist ‘counter-revolution’ against Keynesianism (Johnson 1971), although in practical politics this counter-revolution had not succeeded at the first attempt. The second factor was that prominent neoliberal economists received high academic honours. The Nobel Prizes for Hayek in 1974 and Friedman in 1976 not only raised their scientific reputation but also boosted their fame and credibility in popular political debates. ‘Nobels’ have an advantage in the ‘battle of ideas’, since their words count more than those of normal scientists.104 The award for Hayek, then already 75 years old, had come as quite a surprise. In the half-decade since the inception of the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences, financed by the Swedish Riksbank, it had been awarded to technical or statistical economists, mostly macroeconomists, with no liberal leaning at all, but rather socialist and Keynesian preferences.105 The third factor was the expanding network of affiliated think tanks which grew around or connected with the MPS organization.106 This increased the firepower of the economic liberals in the battle of ideas. As mentioned, the FEE was the earliest aggressive think tank to promote free-market ideas in the United States.107 In the 1960s, the Volker Fund transferred part of its remaining funds to start the Institute for Humane Studies (IHS). Although these were small bodies with a limited reach, their continual educational efforts prepared the ground for bigger think
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tanks of national importance (Kelley 1997, 62–69, 83–84). Among the most influential of these was the Hoover Institution, located at Stanford University, which began in the 1970s to provide a welcoming research environment for prominent MPS members such as Friedman, Stigler and Thomas Sowell. The American Enterprise Institute became an influential advocacy tank and a counterweight to the left-leaning Brookings Institution in Washington.108 In 1973, the Heritage Foundation began its operations as an advocacy think tank close to the Republican Party with a free-market and socially conservative agenda. Their greatest success was the publication of the volume Mandate for Leadership, which was widely regarded as a blueprint for the Reagan administration. In 1977, the libertarian and anti-establishment Cato Institute opened its offices in San Francisco, receiving funds from the Koch brothers among others. In London, the IEA provided the main platform for Hayek as well as Friedman and other ‘monetarists’. Then the Centre for Policy Studies (CPS), a rival to the Conservative party’s official research department, and the radical Adam Smith Institute came to the fore; they were both advocates for aggressive strategies against the status quo while operating on much smaller budgets than the American think tanks. The most important person for the building of an international network of think tanks was IEA founder Anthony Fisher. After his successful business career, he moved to San Francisco in the 1970s and lived in the same apartment block as the Friedmans. He helped to build up some new liberal public policy research bodies, starting in 1974 with the Canadian Fraser Institute, and later the Manhattan Institute in New York. In 1981, Fisher launched the Atlas Economic Research Foundation to support new public policy research think tanks with liberal agendas around the world. Atlas director John Blundell described it as his mission ‘to litter the world with free-market think-tanks’ (quoted in Cockett 1994, 307). With all these institutes as ‘secondhand dealers in ideas’ it was much easier to reach out to the public and the politicians. The late 1970s saw the rise of and the radicalization of two politicians, Thatcher and Reagan, who shared many views with the neoliberals of the MPS. A radical change in economic policy now became feasible. This change was precipitated by the deterioration of economic conditions during the stagflation period since the mid-1970s. Neoliberals attributed the increase in inflation to the expansionist demand policies after the oil price shock; these produced rising debt levels and inflation but were ineffective at bringing down unemployment. The more the Keynesian welfare state model got into crisis, the more a discussion of market economic alternatives started. In Britain by that time, the IEA had been
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disseminating these ideas for almost two decades; by the early 1970s they had published around 250 studies on public policy issues, many authored by MPS members. Cockett (1994) described the multifaceted efforts of think-tankers, academics and political activists, many with ties to the MPS, to propagate a drastic liberalization of the economy. The first prominent politician to fully convert to the IEA ideas was the conservative Sir Keith Joseph. His wake-up call was a series of articles by the journalist Alfred Sherman, a former communist who had turned radical liberal-conservative. In speeches during the spring and summer of 1974, even before Heath’s defeat in the general election, Joseph (1975, 6) had publicly condemned the effects of socialism and inflation on the British economy and called for a monetarist cure. What shocked the party establishment was that he included the Conservatives in his bitter criticism when he complained: ‘Since the end of the Second World War we have had altogether too much Socialism.’ In 1976, the economic situation worsened dramatically. The public deficit rose to more than 10 per cent relative to the GDP, and Britain had to ask for a credit package at the International Monetary Fund. In the fall of 1976, Prime Minister Callaghan (1987, 425–427) admitted the failure of the Keynesian deficit spending policy that his government had pursued: We used to think that you could spend your way out of a recession, and increase employment by cutting taxes and boosting Government spending ... that option no longer exists, and that in so far as it ever did exist, it only worked on each occasion since the war by injecting a bigger dose of inflation into the economy, followed by a higher level of unemployment as the next step.109 As Dominik Geppert (2002) has suggested, the late 1970s saw the collapse of the post-war consensus based on a mixed economy with a large state sector, powerful trade unions, a comprehensive welfare state and ‘demand management’ to achieve full employment. It was this development, and the interpretations given by the ‘New Right’ to it, which made the rise of a non-consensus politician like Thatcher possible. In the ‘winter of discontent’, 1979, a chain reaction triggered by excessive union demands and reckless strikes tipped public opinion and led to the election of Thatcher as Prime Minister. On both sides of the political spectrum there was talk of an intellectual ‘counter revolution’. Cockett (1994, 286) saw the electoral triumph of Thatcher as ‘the culmination of almost forty years of intellectual and
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political work’ since the Colloque Walter Lippmann and the convention at Mont Pèlerin. Thatcher herself knew how much she owed to the intellectual preparation of her government, and wrote a letter to Hayek in which she said: I am very proud to have learnt so much from you over the past few years. I hope that some of those ideas will be into practice by my Government in the next few months. As one of your keenest supporters, I am determined that we should succeed. If we do so, your contribution to our ultimate victory will have been immense.110 She (1995, 659) described the credo of her government in her memoirs as follows: We intended policy in the 1980s to be directed towards fundamentally different goals from those of most of the post-war era. We believed that since jobs (in a free society) did not depend on government but upon satisfying customers, there was no point in setting targets for ‘full’ employment. Instead, government should create the right framework of sound money, low taxes, light regulation and flexible markets (including labour markets) to allow prosperity and employment to grow. Within the Thatcher government, there were still strong forces unwilling to confront the economic challenges with radical methods: although Thatcher’s choices for key positions in the cabinet were close ideological allies like Sir Keith Joseph (Secretary of State for Industry), Sir Geoffrey Howe (Chancellor of the Exchequer) and John Biffen (Chief Secretary of the Exchequer), there was opposition by moderates like Ian Gilmour (Lord Privy Seal) and Jim Prior (Employment Secretary), the ‘wets’, who did not want a downright confrontation with the trade unions. It was not until the autumn of 1981 that Thatcher could circumvent these obstacles to carry out fundamental reforms of trade union laws. The papers delivered at MPS meetings in the early 1980s testified to doubts and criticisms, for instance by Ralph Harris, about the speed of reforms, the privatization process initiated by Joseph, fiscal policy and monetary stabilization. In the end, however, the general assessment was that the Thatcher government had achieved a remarkable reform record, although in some areas like welfare and education the changes were not as radical as the more ardent supporters from the IEA had wished (Plickert 2008, 404–415).
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In the United States, economists from the ranks of the MPS featured prominently in Ronald Reagan’s advisory team for the 1980 election. One of his key aides was Martin Anderson (1987, 3), a former economics professor from Columbia and a White House staff member under Nixon. MPS member Anderson drew his support from the network of the Society. Among the 74 economic policy advisors in Reagan’s team, 22 – almost a third – were members of the MPS, with a heavy representation of the younger Chicago School. George Shultz headed the Economic Policy Coordination Committee that also included Arthur Burns, Milton Friedman, Alan Greenspan, Paul McCracken and William E. Simons. The Inflation Policy Task Force was dominated by ‘monetarists’ like Karl Brunner, while James Buchanan and William Niskanen contributed to the advisory group on regulation policy. In the advisory group on tax policy, a prominent role was played by the ‘supply side’ economist and tax cut advocate Paul Craig Roberts, who would become Assistant Secretary of the Treasury. For the public, probably the most important economist to give intellectual credence to the Reagan economic policy was Friedman. His manifesto Free to Choose (1980), rapidly turned into a TV series, reached millions. Many of the advisors during the campaign continued to serve the Bush administration.111 Although there remained differences in opinion between ‘supply siders’, ‘monetarists’ and ‘structuralists’ about how to overcome the economic problems of the late 1970s and early 1980s, one key question was about the priorities – fighting inflation (monetarists), cutting taxes (supply siders) or deregulating and opening up competition (structuralists). There were some heated arguments about that, but they were united in their general thrust to give market solutions a preference and ‘roll back the state’ (see Plickert 2008, 420–437). While the restrictive monetary policy to cure inflation resulted in a temporary sharp slump in 1981 and 1982, the economy started a remarkable recovery after 1983 and enjoyed seven years of strong growth and job creation.
13
The power of ideas in politics
Let us finally turn to an assessment of the power of ideas in the development of history. As noted earlier in this chapter, Mises and Hayek held that the ‘power of ideas’ was the driving force. In their idealistic conception, great thinkers (as opposed to ‘great men’ or material or structural forces) possess the decisive long-run influence – in economic and general politics. However, even very attractive and compelling ideas
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cannot radically change the ideological climate or the world unless there are favourable circumstances for such efforts.112 Political and bureaucratic structures have a high degree of inertia. Friedman (2002 [1962], xiv) spoke of the ‘tyranny of the status quo’ and he emphasized: Only a crisis – actual or perceived – produces the real change. When that crisis occurs, the actions that are taken depend on the ideas that are lying around. Of course, ideas are never simply ‘lying around’ – coordinated effort was needed to get these ideas into the heads of the (relevant) people. Hayek had developed a multi-level model of the intellectual world where his primary objective was to create an environment conducive to liberal ‘original thinkers’. They would then generate convincing ideas that gained the support of ‘secondhand dealers’. This strategy was implemented with the foundation of the Mont Pèlerin Society and the expansion of a network of affiliated think tanks with access to the media and to political circles. The media and politicians became more receptive in the 1970s when the material conditions of the economy deteriorated, and Keynesian policies and the welfare state in general entered a fundamental crisis. As Higgs (2008) elaborates, ‘ideological change’ is a complex and often dialectical process in which ideas, events and sociopolitical structures play a role, and which is nondeterministic. The environment of the 1970s was marked by a deteriorating economy, ineffective Keynesian policies and growing awareness by broad sections of the population, especially the middle classes, who felt their economic status threatened. This all contributed to a swing in public opinion and the media which were influenced by neoliberal intellectuals. In this situation, it was the additional ‘human factor’, the rise of dedicated politicians like Thatcher and Reagan, as IEA founderpresident Arthur Seldon (1988, 20–23) put it, which made radical change possible. With regard to the intellectuals that Hayek sought to win over, it must be said that the majority, especially in the social sciences, were and still are critical to neoliberal economics. Although Marxist and Keynesian ideas are no longer as abundant as they were 30 years ago, and it might be said that the Left’s ‘cultural hegemony’ is broken, the claim of a ‘neoliberal hegemony’ seems to be a phantasm. Some researchers have downplayed the influence that particular think tanks had on specific reforms (see Hames and Feasey 1994). Nevertheless, it cannot be denied
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that the 1980s saw dramatic policy changes in the Anglo-Saxon world which had a lasting effect on the political landscape. While the term ‘revolution’ seems exaggerated, given that the basic structure of the welfare state was not removed, the 1980s brought profound reforms in the role of the state in the economy and a rediscovery of the virtues of the market and private initiative. The author wishes to thank Robert Leeson, Stefan Kolev (Erfurt/ Zwickau) and Adam Cleary (London) for corrections and helpful comments on this chapter. The usual caveat applies.
Notes 1. For some striking similarities of the ‘Three New Deals’ in America, Italy and Germany, see Schivelbusch (2006). 2. Hayek’s statement during the session titled ‘Free Economy and Competitive Order’ can be found in the MPS Collection at Hoover Institution Archives, Box 5; another copy is available in the Liberaal Archief in Gent, Belgium. Hayek’s statement has been published in a German translation, see Hayek (1947, pp. 142–143). For a reconstruction of the history of neoliberalism, archival evidence is crucial. The most important documents on the early Mont Pèlerin Society (MPS) are kept in the Hoover Institution Archives (HIA) at Stanford University. Its collection of MPS papers comprises three dozen boxes with correspondence and some of the papers presented at meetings. Until the early sixties, the material was mainly collected by Albert Hunold, the first secretary of the MPS. Furthermore, HIA has another collection of documents on the MPS, assembled by the historian and former MPS president Max Hartwell. A nicely ordered collection of almost all papers delivered at MPS general meetings from 1947 to 1998 is kept in the Liberaal Archief (LA) in Gent, Belgium. These have been collected by the Danish MPS member Christian Gandil and by Jacques van Oeffelen, a former Belgian minister of trade. The LA has published an inventory of its MPS papers (Haegemann, 2004) which is available online: http://www.liberaalarchief.be/MPS2005.pdf. Insights into the network of the (neo-)liberal economists can be drawn from the personal papers of Friedrich August von Hayek at Hoover Institution, the personal literary legacy of Wilhelm Röpke and Hunold in the Institut für Wirtschaftspolitik (IWP) at Cologne University, as well as the papers of Alexander Rüstow in the Bundesarchiv Koblenz (BAK). Most of the correspondence and writings of these key personalities in the LA, as well as about 250 papers presented at MPS meetings, were evaluated for the purpose of the author’s doctoral thesis on the MPS (Plickert 2008). Max Hartwell’s ‘History of the Mont Pelerin Society’ (1995) is more or less confined to organizational issues. Bernhard Walpen’s study (2004) is based on rich historical material, but suffers from poor structuring and strong ideological bias, in particular the Gramscian ‘hegemonic’ approach, coming close to a conspiracy theory. Also relying on this approach, Nordmann (2005, p.223) concluded that the MPS was in fact a ‘combat instrument of a great plan for a neoliberal seizure of power’. This chapter will shed some light on the ‘great plan’ and
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5. 6.
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its realization. One more recent account of the MPS history and its importance for ‘reinventing free markets’ is Burgin (2012). This book focuses on the American intellectual developments, and emphasizes the outstanding impact of Milton Friedman for a return to ‘Laissez faire’ but neglects the debates of early German neoliberals. This was the title of his last public lecture on December 30, 1949, at the American Economic Association, just one week before his death. Schumpeter underlined ‘how far the process of disintegration of capitalist societies has gone’ and pointed out that even the business class and a large number of economists who feel themselves to be opposed to socialism agreed on policies that would enlarge the sphere of public activity and control. Most economists, he claimed, approved of stabilization policies, egalitarian redistributive taxation, regulative measures as regards prices, public control over the labour and the money market and an ‘indefinite extension of the sphere of wants that are, now or eventually, to be satisfied by public enterprise, either gratis or on some post-office principle’ as well as all types of security legislation (Schumpeter, 1950). One of the first who raised the ‘hegemonic’ claim was political scientist Stuart Hall in the context of the Thatcher government. The analysis was then applied specifically to the MPS by Radhika Desai (1995). Plehwe has recently denied the charge of conspiracy theory (Plehwe, 2009, p.36) See ‘Hayek and the Keynesian Avalanche’ by Brian McCormick (1992). They were, according to Ralph Dahrendorf (1995, p.29), ‘a reaction against Gladston, against Cobden and Bright, against individualism and laissez-faire, cosmopolitanism and free trade’. On the German neo- and ordoliberals, see the collection of essays edited by Peacock and Willgerodt (1989). See Goldschmidt (2005) for an account of the Freiburg professors’ courageous involvement with the resistance movement. As early as 1933, Eucken spoke out against Martin Heidegger, who tried to transform the university into an institution subject to the Führerprinzip. After the state-orchestrated November 1938 pogroms against Jews, the professors and protestant pastors met regularly to discuss the Christian duty of resistance to a criminal authority. Later, Eucken and others were active in official as well as covert private research groups on the economic order, where they devised alternatives to the National Socialist command economy. There have been attempts to paint these balancing acts as collaboration, but this completely fails to perceive the intentions of Eucken and his friends. Accounts such as that of Ptak (2009) suffer from heavy ideological bias. In a 1932 paper, Eucken analysed the degeneration of the liberal state from the late 19th century into a post-liberal state. It was drawn into the economic process after it had tolerated the emergence of large corporative structures with the rise of cartels and monopolies. In the end, that laissez-faire state had fallen prey to powerful interest groups who successfully demanded privileges and protection (Eucken 1932, p.327). This analysis was inspired by the special German experience where the Imperial Court had ruled private cartels legal in 1897. Consequently, Germany became a country with a heavily cartelized and concentrated heavy industry, but also with very strong trade unions.
130 Philip Plickert 10. For an account of his life see Meier-Rust (1993). In the late Weimar Republic, Rüstow was head of the research department of the association of German machine producers (VDMA), one of the few business groups still in favour of free trade, and was also very active in political circles. In his youth, Rüstow had been close to a kind of Christian socialism-pacifism but in the 1920s he converted to economic liberal ideas. Still, he must be considered as the most left-leaning of all neoliberals. His sociological thoughts centred on the idea of social integration which was the result of market processes. Nevertheless, for reasons of equality he was a vigorous proponent of open markets. 11. Interestingly, Rüstow also held that there could be ‘liberal interventions’. As opposed to the usual protectionist interventions and subsidies which prevented or slowed down structural changes in the economies, such ‘liberal interventions’ could be employed to alleviate the structural changes. The interventions should be done ‘in the direction’ of market forces (see Rüstow 1932/1963, pp.252–253). One example might be state assistance to strengthen productivity in agriculture in order to make farmers independent of state subsidies. Social policy should also be ‘market conforming’; instead of maximum prices being set for certain goods and rents, or giving subsidies, social transfers should be in cash. This would not distort the price and production structure of the economy, and would at the same time give recipients more freedom. This proposal was later a standard neoliberal idea. Rüstow’s theory of liberal or ‘market conforming’ interventions had a more etatist flavour. It was taken up by Röpke. They were both proponents of a ‘Third Way’ between the extremes of laissez-faire and collectivism (see Röpke 1942/1979, pp.42–43, and 1944, pp.77–80). In his private correspondence with Röpke, Hayek expressed his scepticism about the idea of a ‘Third Way’: the term could be misleading if it suggested an equal distance from liberalism as from socialism. ‘We must have the courage to profess the ideals of old liberalism and individualism, as much as we may criticize the ignorant manner in which some people in the nineteenth century tried to put them into practise’, Hayek insisted, after having praised Röpke’s ‘civitas humana’ as a ‘great achievement’ with which he confirmed in the main arguments but also in the details (Hayek to Röpke, June 6, 1942, in IWP, Röpke papers). 12. On Röpke, see the fascinating biography by Hennecke (2005). 13. On this, see Streit and Wohlgemuth (2000). 14. As Köhler and Kolev emphasize, Eucken cited Simons three times in his posthumously published ‘Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik’ (1952/1990, pp.255, 260, 269). It is unclear whether Simons also read Eucken. Köhler and Kolev rightly identify Hayek as the bridge between the Freiburg and the Chicago Schools. 15. In those cases where competition was not feasible for technical reasons – for instance the railways and the telephone companies, usually called ‘natural monopolies’ – Simons was in favour of socialization. Regulation was not effective, he thought. Eucken, who had the example of the state-run German railways and telecommunication right in front of him, was of different opinion asserting that ‘nationalisation does not solve the monopoly problem’ (Eucken 1949, p.66). 16. One of Simons’ most famous essays was titled ‘Rules versus Authorities in Monetary Policy’ (1936/1948). He advocated a plan for a 100 percent reserve
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19.
20.
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for banks so as to cut back the ability of the commercial banks to increase the money supply and thereby cause large fluctuations in the economy which they held accountable for adverse business cycle shocks. The plan was known as the ‘Chicago plan’, although it was popularized by Irving Fisher (see Köhler/Kolev 2011, p.12). It was on the 100 percent aim, but the rule-oriented approach and the critique of discretionary policies by the central banks later that became the cornerstone for Friedman’s monetarist framework (see as an early exposition: Friedman 1948/1953). Röpke later explained this to an international audience (see Röpke 1933). In the German original, the controversial passage reads as follows: The General Theory could ‘viel leichter den Verhältnissen eines totalen Staates angepaßt werden als die Theorie der Erzeugung und Verteilung einer gegebenen, unter Bedingungen des freien Wettbewerbes und eines großen Maßes von Laissez faire erstellten Produktion’ (Keynes, 1936/1952, p. IX). Lippmann’s biography, with his astounding intellectual journey, is told by Steel (1980) and Riccio (1996). In the early 1930s Lippmann was a staunch supporter of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal. As late as January 1935 he declared himself very satisfied, stating that ‘the vogue of planning, regimenting and regulation and being generally bureaucratic and officious’ coming from Washington was ‘an amazing intellectual and moral recovery in this country’ (quoted in Steel 1980, p.310). But then Lippmann became increasingly irritated by what he perceived as a dangerous tendency of giving the state too much power. His friendship with Roosevelt ended abruptly after the president’s 1936 assault on the independence of the Supreme Court which had obstructed many of the president’s collectivist reform plans. In 1937, Lippmann denounced FDR’s controversial ‘Court packing’ scheme (installing new judges to overturn the Court’s majority) as ‘a bloodless coup d’etat which strikes a deadly blow at the vital center of constitutional democracy’. (quoted in ibid., p.319). These arguments on the practical difficulty of statist planning owed a lot to the Misesian and Hayekian critique of socialism. Their central thesis was that a rational calculation in a planned economy was impossible, since the planner lacked the signalling and allocative function of prices indicating the relative scarcity of and demand for certain goods. When consumers were not allowed to communicate their wishes in a market, central planning would become increasingly dictatorial as well as uneconomical. The so-called socialist calculation sparked off by Mises caused heated discussion between liberal and leftwing economists, see Lavoie (1985). In a letter to Hayek, Lippmann declared: ‘In a crude way I had discerned the inherent difficulty of a planned economy, but without the help I have received from you and from Professor Von Mises, I could never have developed the argument.’ (Riccio 1996, pp.124–125). Steel (1980, p.323) remarks: ‘The book seemed intellectually split down in the middle: half classic laissez-faire, half welfare state liberalism.’ (with ‘liberalism’ in the new American sense). For his turbulent and controversial biography, see Denord (2001) and Marion (2004). In brief, as an academic philosopher, Rougier did not enjoy a major career. As an atheist, he stood aside from the French mainstream of neoThomist philosophy in the inter-war period. In 1936 he took up a position at Lyon University and tried to get involved in politics. The hard Left
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23.
24.
25.
26. 27.
‘front populaire’ government had just assumed power, but their aggressive demands supported economic policy (including a massive increase in real wage costs), alienated entrepreneurs and failed to foster economic recovery. In 1938, the Front had to cede to a centre-right government. Rougier was opposed to democratic egalitarianism and socialism, regarding such systems as dangerous quasi-religious fictions. (He wrote two books on ‘La mystique démocratique’ and ‘Les mystiques économiques’.) In 1938 he published a manifesto ‘Retour au libéralisme’, advocating a ‘constructive liberalism’. During the war, Rougier emigrated to New York and was active in the Comité de la défense des Israélites, but continued his disputes with left-leaning émigrés and also Gaullists. He was later accused of collaboration with the Vichy government because of negotiations he carried out with Churchill in London on behalf of Marshal Pétain over a Franco-British rapprochement, and the help he gave to the Vichy government with the supply of milk powder and other humanitarian causes. After the war, the charges of collaboration and ideological hostility prevented his return to his former academic position. It was not until 1954 that he was rehabilitated. After 1968, Rougier became close to the Nouvelle Droite, with whom he shared a fascination for Greek antiquity. The sentence ‘Laissez faire, laissez aller! Le monde va de lui-même’ is ascribed to the French physiocrats of the late 18th century. One can, however, argue that the slogan was less often used by the partisans of classical liberalism than by later critics of ‘laissez faire capitalism’ of the British liberal political tradition (Greenleaf 1983a). However, he also notes (Greenleaf 1983b, p. 25) that during the parliamentary debate in 1846 over the repeal of the corn laws and free trade i, which were demanded in the movement by Richard Cobden from Manchester, he could not find a single mention of ‘Laissez faire’. Mises’ dynamic concept of competition put an emphasis on the possibility of market entrance, not the entrance of actual competitors. Even if there was only single supplier of a product, this would not be to the detriment of consumers as long as there was the threat of potential competition (cf. Kirzner 2001, pp.104–108 and 110–113). On Mises’ condemnation of government interventions to stop the development towards great enterprises, see his early article ‘Interventionismus’ (1926/1976). The paper ‘A note on the Urgent Necessity of the Re-Orientation of Social Science’, which they presented in Paris, is not included in the booklet of the conference proceedings but can be found in the HIA, MPS coll., Box 5. For this, see his earlier speech at the Verein für Socialpolitik 1932 in Dresden: Rüstow (1932/1963). The ideological split within the Colloque was made explicit by Rüstow’s remark: ‘It is undeniable that here in our circle two different viewpoints are represented[:] Those who do not find anything essential to criticize or to change in traditional liberalism ... In their opinion the responsibility for the whole misfortune lies solely with the opposing side those who, due to foolishness or wickedness or a mixture of both, cannot or will not perceive the salvatory truth of liberalism. We, the others, are searching for the responsibility for the decline of liberalism in liberalism itself; and consequently, we are seeking a solution in a fundamental renewal of liberalism.’ (p.91). The tensions erupted later in private correspondence. In a letter to Röpke,
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29.
30.
31. 32.
33.
34. 35. 36. 37.
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Rüstow later complained about Hayek and ‘his master Mises’ who should be put ‘in spirit in a museum as one of the last surviving examples of that otherwise extinct species of liberals that have caused the current catastrophe’. Reminiscing on the failure of the Colloque in 1938, Rüstow regretted that the resolution passed at the end of the meeting that sought to demonstrate a compromise had ‘upheld the pretence of unity where in reality the sharpest and most fruitful sub-contrarian contrast existed’ (Rüstow to Röpke, February 21, 1942, in BAK, Rüstow papers, Folder 7). In a footnote to the introduction to ‘Compte-rendue des séances du Colloque Walter Lippmann’ Rougier wrote that regrettably the ‘very interesting interventions of Professor F. A. von Hayek’ could not be reconstructed from memory (CWL 1939, p.8). The word néo-liberalisme was added later, probably by Marlio himself before the record was printed; in the provisional version of the typed record that was sent to all participants it was missing (see Colloque Walter Lippmann, Texte provisoire, p.111, in BAK, Rüstow papers, Folder 287). From this perspective (see Coats 1969), the liberal ‘paradigm’ became increasingly embarrassed by intractable ‘anomalies’, above all its alleged inability to explain persistent mass unemployment – until Keynes’ General Theory provided a new ‘paradigm’ which could explain the existence of underemployment and which at the same time offered practical political solutions (deficit spending). Some younger contemporary economists of the time have reported their experience of almost religious conversions to Keynesian macroeconomics (see for instance Samuelson 1946/1966, pp.1517–1518). However, the heroic account of a ‘Keynesian revolution’ against an ossified orthodoxy has been discounted as a myth (cf. Hutchison 1978, Blaug 1991, Laidler 1999). Another point is also problematic: in the Kuhnian framework, a new scientific paradigm completely displaces the old, discredited paradigm, but liberal economics did not disappear. See also: Blaug (1976) and Drakopoulos/Karayiannis (2005). Potential members on the German side that he had in mind were Franz Schnabel, Erich Eyck, Gerhard Ritter, Friedrich Meinecke, Alfred von Martin and Adolf Weber as well as the Freiburg economist Walter Eucken. See handwritten list in HIA, Hayek papers, Box 61–6. Hayek had not had direct contact with Eucken, who had stayed in Germany in ‘inner exile’, but learned of his difficult situation and his intellectual development through Röpke, who also sent him a copy of Eucken’s text book Die Grundlagen der Nationalökonomie (1939/1965). Hayek reacted enthusiastically. ‘It’s a very excellent piece of work which has raised my sincere admiration for our friend. To have retained this independence of thought in this environment!’ (Hayek to Röpke, 17 August 1941, in IWP, Röpke papers, File 5) Hayek 1945: ‘Memorandum on the Proposed Foundation of an International Academy for Political Philosophy Tentatively Called “The Acton-Tocqueville Society”’, in HIA, Hayek papers, Box 61–8. Leonard Read, a former head of the Los Angeles chamber of commerce and after the war a vice president. Hayek to Read, October 16, 1946, in HIA, Hayek papers, Box 20–1. Hayek to Luhnow, May 3, 1945, in HIA, Hayek papers, Box 58–16. Hayek to Luhnow, 25 June 1946, in HIA, Hayek papers, Box 58–16.
134 Philip Plickert 38. Van Horn and Mirowski (2009) has given a detailed account of this project and the funding it received by the Volker Fund. However, the idea that Hayek and other key neoliberals radically changed their economic theory with regard to competition policy in order to please their donors appears as a speculative conspiracy theory. 39. He also influenced the later German Minister of Economics, Ludwig Erhard. Röpke’s trilogy Gesellschaftskrisis der Gegenwart, Civitas Humana and Internationale Ordnung contained his fundamental criticism of collectivist tendencies towards a centralized, over-expanded and intrusive state, and a mass society vulnerable to totalitarian movements. With regard to economic policy, he campaigned for a ‘third way’ to overcome ‘the fruitless alternative between laissez faire and collectivism’ (Röpke 1942/1979, p.43). His social ideal, as laid out in Civitas Humana, was a decentralized economic and political order suitable for self-reliant individuals and small communities. This was a liberal vision with a conservative flavour. In general, he demanded a reduction of state interventions and a reversal of the trend towards state expansion; if interventions in the economy were considered, they should ‘conform’ to the market. This meant that the state should not block the market and the price mechanism, but should rather confine itself to ‘liberal interventions’. Röpke argued along the same lines as Rüstow. (Röpke 1944, pp.77–80). Hayek was full of praise for the Gesellschaftskrisis, and called the book a ‘great achievement’: ‘I almost fully agree with you, not only what concerns the main argument but also with the details.’ However, he was critical of the plea for a ‘third way’, and showed his scepticism regarding the idea of ‘conforming interventions’ (Hayek to Röpke, 6 June 1942, in IWP Röpke papers). In another letter, Hayek criticized ‘again the exaggerated condemnation of laissez faire philosophy’ that Röpke had adopted from Rüstow (Hayek to Röpke, 24 October 1942, in IWP Röpke papers). 40. See Röpke: Projekt einer internationalen Monatsschrift, 1945, 1, in HIA, Hartwell coll., Box 4. 41. Ibid, p.3. A list of contributors he could count on included the wealthy Swiss diplomat, economic historian and scientific activist Rappard, a very important figure of the Swiss liberal intellectual movement; the Italian economist and first post-war Governor of the Banca d’Italia, Luigi Einaudi, later Italian president; and his friends Rüstow, Eucken and Hayek. Furthermore, Röpke hoped to enlist Lippmann, Benedetto Croce, Salvador de Madariaga and Ortega y Gasset as contributors for ‘Occident’ (p.6). 42. Hunold had been the secretary of the Swiss Börsenverein (stock exchange association). In 1945, he worked briefly for a bank and then became Managing Director of the Watchmakers’ Association. He was not so much an intellectual economist as an organising talent. Already in 1943, Hunold had developed his own ideas for a liberal ‘study group’ on economic and political ideas but with a narrower Swiss focus. See (‘Memorandum’, in HIA, MPS Coll, Box 5) and also Plickert (2008, p.131). 43. See the Finanzplan, in HIA, MPS coll., Box 5. 44. Hunold to Hayek,17 June 1946, in IWP, Hunold papers. They had met for the first time in October 1945, when Hunold had invited Hayek to a lecture on ‘The Problem of Full Employment’ in Zurich. 45. Hayek to Hunold, 10 August 1946, in IWP, Hunold papers.
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46. Hayek to Hunold, 9 October 1946, in IWP, Hunold papers. 47. Hunold to Hayek, 3 March 1947, in IWP, Hunold papers. 48. Among the American economists there was also the Princeton professors Frank D. Graham and Fritz Machlup, then at the State University of New York at Buffalo. Furthermore, the American contingent included three notable journalists: Henry Hazlitt, who had been at the New York Times and switched to Newsweek; Felix Morley, one of the founders of Human Events; and John Davenport of Fortune. 49. At first Mises did not want to come to Europe. The idea seemed horrible to him, since he had seen ‘already enough decline’; furthermore, he was concerned about the outcome of a redefinition of liberalism and about the participation of ‘interventionists’ like Röpke. He had unpleasant recollections of the Paris meeting and their discussions. All in all, he saw ‘no need ... to make a pilgrimage to the Mont Pèlerin’ (See Mises: ‘Observations on Professor Hayek’s Plan (Memorandum), 31 December 1946, in HIA, Hayek papers, Box 71–3). Nevertheless, in the end, Mises was persuaded to attend the conference. While he was anxious about any signal of concession, the other extreme position was taken this time by Karl Popper, the author of The Open Society and Its Enemies. He urged Hayek to invite people from the Left: ‘I feel, for such an academy, it would be advantageous, and even necessary, from the very beginning, to secure the participation of some people who are known to be socialists or to be close to socialism. ... My own position was always to try for a reconciliation of liberals and socialists.’ (Popper to Hayek, 11 January 1947, in HIA, Hayek papers, Box 78–36). 50. He was helped by Jacque Rueff, then the head of the inter-allied agency of reparations, who intervened on Eucken’s behalf at the request of the French military authorities. Rüstow could not leave Istanbul because he had not had a new passport since his emigration from Nazi Germany. 51. Other British participants were John Jewkes, Professor of Economics at Oxford; Stanley Dennison of Cambridge University; Michael Polanyi, a chemist turned philosopher at Manchester University; and Veronica Wedgwood, editor of the weekly journal Time and Tide. 52. See ‘Mont Pèlerin Conference, April 1st to 10th, 1947, List of participants’, in HIA, MPS Coll., Box 1. The full list of participants is reprinted in Hartwell (1995, pp.45–46). 53. Hayek circular letter, 28 December 1946, in HIA, Hayek papers, Box 75–10. 54. Hayek circular letter, 2 February 1947, in HIA, MPS Coll., Box 5. 55. The aspired ‘competitive’ order was by no means to be confused with ‘ordered competition’, Hayek cautioned (p.49). 56. Here Hayek referred to Simons’ ‘Reflections on Syndicalism’ (1936/1948). 57. The dangers of monopoly were, as Hayek had pointed out in his ‘Road to Serfdom’ aggravated by the combination of producer and union power who shared in the monopoly gains. Monopolistic structures thus were stabilised and reinforced. ‘The recent growth of monopoly is largely the result of a deliberate collaboration of organized capital and organized labor where the privileged groups of labor share in the monopoly profits at the expense of the community and particularly at the expense of the poorest, those employed in the less-well-organized industries and the unemployed.’ (Hayek 1944, p.207). For a recent econometric study on the New Deal which corroborates
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58. 59.
60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70.
71.
the thesis that cartelized industries made monopoly profits which they were urged to pass over to labour through higher wages, see Cole and Ohanian (2004, pp.783–786). See ‘Votum von Herrn Dr. W. Eucken’, in HIA, MPS coll., Box 27. In a letter to Rüstow, Röpke complained about the slightly ‘strange composition’ of the meeting because of the mass nomination of American participants. Although Mises had been ‘isolated in an almost tragical way’, Röpke wrote that at Mont Pèlerin there was besides Mises ‘of course still a sizeable group of quite hard boiled (men) who shook their heads if reminded of our framework problems’ (the legal and social framework Röpke deemed indispensable for a functioning market economy). On the other hand, he had also experienced support from some; he praised the ‘type of humanistic American of Jeffersonian tradition’ (Röpke to Rüstow, 22 April 1947, in IWP, Röpke papers; reprinted also in Röpke 1976, p.96). Alfred Müller-Armack recollected in his memoirs a ‘dominance of the Anglo-Saxon temperament’. He commented: ‘Attempts to bring into play the social, vital and societal policy, that Röpke, Rüstow and I sought, were met by little echo if not outright opposition.’ (Müller-Armack 1971, p.45). ‘Statement of Aims’, reprinted in Hartwell 1995, pp. 41–42. All these letters are in HIA, MPS Coll., Box 29 Jewkes to Hunold, 20 December [1947], in HIA, MPS Coll., Box 29. Friedman to Hayek, 2 January 1947, in HIA, Friedman papers 86–1. Röpke to Rüstow, 24 April 1947, in IWP, Röpke papers. Certificate No. 4992, State of Illinois, 6 November 1947, in HIA, Hartwell coll., Box 1 Hayek to Read, 22 January 1948, in HIA, MPS Coll., Box 29. Hunold to Hayek, 14 May 1948, in HIA, MPS Coll., Box 29. Quotes from: Minutes of the meeting of the Board of Directors in Basle [in French], in HIA, MPS Coll. Box 1. Brandt memorandum, 28 June 1949, in HIA, MPS Coll., Box 6. Sir Arnold Suenson-Taylor was a prominent figure in the City of London and a liberal activist in Britain from the 1940s, and was raised to the peerage as Lord Grantchester. He warned, in a letter to Hunold, that the business community, if asked to contribute to the funding of MPS meetings, would take a rather ‘short-term view of judging such matters [as][t]he work done at the conferences does not gain the publicity it sometimes deserves’, SuensonTaylor wrote to the MPS secretary: ‘One of the complaints I hear often is that the views of our members are not expressed in time to be of practicable value in dealing with current problems.’ (Suenson-Taylor to Hunold, 8 November 1954, in HIA, MPS Coll., Box 1). From time to time he felt the urge to engage in direct political activism. In a letter to Rüstow he urged: ‘The MP Society must absolutely step in the limelight of the public and must cease to be a wallflower. It is strange that Hayek is such a courageous man, but perhaps he is simply worried because of the not always favourable experiences he had had with the ‘Road to Serfdom’ when he inadvertently became absorbed into the political struggle’, Hunold speculated. ‘For this reason I have full understanding for his scruples.’ (Hunold to Rüstow, 23 February 1953, in HIA, MPS Coll., Box 7). In public, Hunold presented a different view – that of the majority of the Council: The work
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73.
74. 75.
76. 77. 78. 79. 80.
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of the MPS must ‘in no way be about political action with programs, resolutions, and manifests’ he wrote in an article for a Swiss newspaper, the Neue Zürcher Zeitung. It is ‘[w]holly in the liberal tradition [that] the members want to be active individually and personally and will not hide behind programs or resolutions’ (Hunold 1955). This was a total revision of the Marx’s materialistic interpretation of how political worldviews are shaped. According to his famous expression ‘it is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but on the contrary their social existence determines their consciousness’. Although the Marxist Left allegedly adhered to a theory of materialism as the driving force of history, they had understood the key issue of social and moral ideals. Not far from Seelisberg, the Swiss Confederates had taken their famous Rütli oath. Hunold drew an explicit parallel between this oath and the vision of the MPS members. The Swiss decentralized political system, with self-governing local communities and a very limited federal power, appeared to liberals worldwide to be a kind of role model. President’s circular, November 1952, in HIA, MPS Coll., Box 1. The abrupt end to Hayek’s long-standing friendship with Robbins during the course of Hayek’s divorce from his first wife caused a setback to the British MPS group in the early 1950s (cf. Cockett 1994, p.120). Hunold spoke of ‘a certain animosity in England against the MPS’ (Hunold to Hayek, 23 November 1955, in IWP, Hunold papers). Robbins would not communicate with Hayek for more than a decade, and had declared his resignation from the Society. At the same time there was a controversy among German members over the issue of economic cartels (the economic journalist Volkmar Muthesius, a proponent of the Misesian standpoint, attacked the ordoliberals of the Freiburg School). Hayek grew tired of these personal quarrels and complained about the workload. As he wrote to Hunold, an MPS secretary: ‘For a longer time, such an organization cannot be based solely on two men’. Hayek continued, saying: ‘If the prospects are not better in a year, I would like to bring the story formally to an end as long as it is a respectable affair, rather than to see it disintegrate slowly.’ (Hayek to Hunold, 5 February 1956, in IWP, Hunold papers). In a letter to Machlup, Hayek expressed his inclination to hold only one further jubilee meeting in Switzerland and then ‘let the whole thing go to sleep’ (Hayek to Machlup, 18 February 1956, in HIA, Hayek papers, Box 36–17). However, the exciting meeting in Berlin, and especially the anniversary meeting in St. Moritz held in some luxury, revived his determination to go on with the Society. Erhard to Eucken, 13 February 1950, in HIA, MPS Coll., Box 30. On Müller-Armack’s peculiar ideas on the Social Market Economy and his connection with ordoliberalism see Starbatty (1982). For Einaudi’s review of Röpke’s Gesellschaftskrisis der Gegenwart see Einaudi (1942/1954). Röpke to Dohrn, 1 June 1948, in IWP, Röpke papers. For detailed accounts of his earlier life and his emergence as the pre-eminent West German economics politician after the war, see Hentschel (1998) and Mierzejewski (2005). Erhard, who by 1948 was already 50 years old, had been thinking about monetary and economic reforms during the war when he was head of a small private economic research institute. Although plans for
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81.
82.
83.
84. 85. 86.
87.
post-war time reforms assuming defeat of the Nazi regime had been illegal, he had written a memorandum on the issue of war debts. He identified the monetary overhang resulting from the expansionary financing methods of the Nazis as the central problem, (cf. Herbst 1982, pp.410–415). To consolidate the debt, currency reform was necessary. Furthermore, he advocated a step-by-step abolition of price controls, and a return to economic coordination by the market mechanism. He wrote: ‘I was and am of the opinion that the best method to satisfy demand of the public is competition on the market.’(Erhard 1943–44/1977, p.ix). His memorandum closed with remarks resounding to the neo- or ordoliberal credo: ‘The state will never again be relegated into the role of a night-watcher because even the freest market economy, and this one in particular, needs a body of law-making and law enforcement.’ Making clear that he was no advocate of laissez faire, Erhard nevertheless insisted that ‘the desirable aim remains in any case the free market economy based on true performance competition with the regulatives inherent to that economy’ (ibid, p.264). Scientists from the Freiburg School around Eucken had been active since the late 1930s in covert opposition to the Nazi regime (see Goldschmidt 2005). In 1943, they had formed with others a private working group, headed by Erwin von Beckerath, that drafted concepts for a reform of the war economy into a civil market economy based on the price mechanism rather than on political directives. These studies became important conceptual forerunners for the concept of the ‘social market economy’ (Blumenberg-Lampe 1973; Klump 2005). Eucken advocated a competitive order as a ‘third way’ between laissez faire and planning (Rieter and Schmolz 1993, p.100). As a prerequisite for a return to a market economy, he demanded currency reform and the decartelization of the economy, as well as more effective control against monopolies. Eucken made similar proposals in the scientific advisory council to the economic administration body of the Bizone. The CDU had, in 1947, adopted the Ahlener programme that called for the socialization of heavy industry and the banking sector. It was not until Erhard had made his full influence felt that the CDU embraced the Soziale Marktwirtschaft in its Düsseldorf programme of guiding principles two years later. See Hayek’s essay ‘Was ist und was heißt sozial?’ (1957). At an MPS meeting, Erhard told Hayek: ‘I hope you don’t misunderstand me when I talk of social market economy. I mean that the market in itself is social, not that it must be made social.’ (Hayek, 1983b, p.55). Böhm to Hunold, May 12, 1951, in HIA, MPS Coll., Box 30. Hunold to Böhm, June 15, 1951, in HIA, MPS Coll., Box 30. A large part of the Italian economy, including banks, heavy industry and consumer goods producers (i.e. textiles), had been subject to direct or indirect control by the state since the 1930s, through credit and investment rationing by the Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale (IRI). After 1945, many key corporations, among them telecommunications, airlines, the majority of shipyards, almost all of the iron and steel industry and a quarter of the financial sector, remained under state control. The oil company ENI was presented as an example of how successfully a corporation could operate under state influence. The bitter controversy during the election campaign should not obscure the fact that in essence both major parties were in fact quite close on many
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90.
91.
92.
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areas of economic and social policy. Some key proposals had been prepared by prominent members of the Liberal Party such as Lord Keynes and Lord Beveridge. The famous 1942 Beveridge plan for a comprehensive national social security system, which Churchill explicitly endorsed, finally resulted in the creation of the NHS. Already during the war there had developed a growing ‘Keynesian-welfare state’ consensus, as demonstrated by Paul Addison (1975, 1993). Jewkes to Hunold, March 5, 1950, in HIA, MPS Coll., Box 30. Fisher had read Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom in the Reader’s Digest version, and was immediately struck by its arguments. In 1947, Fisher went to see Hayek in his LSE office and asked him for advice on how to become active in politics to counter the collectivist wave. He got quite precise instructions. According to Fisher’s memoirs: ‘Hayek first warned against wasting time – as I was then tempted – by taking up a political career. He explained his view that the decisive influence in the battle of ideas and policy was wielded by intellectuals whom he characterized as the ‘second-hand dealers in ideas’. It was the dominant intellectuals from the Fabians onwards who had tilted the political debate in favour of growing government intervention with all that followed. If I shared the view that better ideas were not getting a fair hearing, his counsel was that I should join with others in forming a scholarly research organisation to supply intellectuals in universities, schools, journalism and broadcasting with authoritative studies of the economic theory of markets and its application to practical affairs.’ (quoted in Cockett 1994, pp.123–124). Immediately after the war, former RAF fighter pilot Fisher had bought a 400-acre farm in Sussex. He first suffered a heavy loss when his herd of cattle was decimated by a disease, but in 1952 he changed his operation, to raising broiler chickens in an agro-industrial method. This new technique had been shown to him in America by F. A. Harper of the FEE, whom Fisher had met at an MPS meeting. Fisher’s idea of mass production of chickens was a great commercial success, and made him a millionaire. Out of this fortune, he financed the IEA. Harris had been trained in economics at Cambridge. His principal teacher there had been Stanley Dennison, one of the founding members of MPS. Seldon, a disillusioned activist from the left-leaning Liberal party, had studied at London School of Economics and was much impressed by Robbins, Hayek and Arnold Plant. The Advisory Council of the IEA was staffed with MPS members, namely Lord Grantchester, Eric Nash, an expert in agricultural economics, and the LSE economists George Schwartz and Graham Hutton. The welfare economist Colin Clark, an ex-Fabian, and financial journalist Sir Oscar Hobson were not members of the MPS, but occasional participants at its conferences. Most British academic members of the Society, including Dennison, Jewkes, Robbins and Paish, as well as Hutt, now a professor at Cape Town, contributed papers to the IEA series. During the 1960s and 1970s, Seldon successfully approached American MPS economists of high academic standing to write publications for the IEA. Those who contributed included Hayek, Haberler, James Buchanan and Milton Friedman. The IEA had warned that the high expectations could not be realized since they rested on unrealistic assumptions. When the ‘National Plan’ failed, the Labour Secretary responded directly to IEA critics. This official reaction was
140
93.
94.
95.
96. 97.
98.
Philip Plickert seen as an important step for the Institute in its efforts to gain political reputation (cf. Denham/Garnett 1998, p.96). During the election campaign, the Conservative leader Edward Heath had given the impression of being determined to fight inflation and to end the policy of budget deficits. Furthermore, he had promised to confront the power of the trade unions. At a meeting at Selsdon Park, his shadow cabinet published a manifesto that sounded staunchly economic liberal, with a commitment to privatization and deregulation. In newspaper articles, Keith Joseph announced that the Conservatives were now the ‘true radicals’. Labour warned of a radically free-market ‘Selsdon man’ who was about to [? destroy] the Keynesians’ idea of a welfare state. Devoted economic liberals placed high expectations on the Heath government, and Seldon even wrote to Joseph about the prospect of ‘destroying socialism for ever’ (Cockett 1994, p.202). Thatcher later wrote in her memoirs about the Heath episode: ‘His errors – our errors, for we went along with them – did huge harm to the Conservative Party and to the country.’ Her political outlook and plans for the future were shaped by this experience of failure. ‘The Heath Government showed, in particular, that socialist policies pursued by Tory politicians are if anything even more disastrous than socialist policies pursued by Labour politicians. Collectivism, without even the tincture of egalitarian idealism to redeem it, is a deeply unattractive creed.’ (Thatcher 1995, pp.195–196). The text was written by LSE professor Alan Walters, one of the leading British advocates of ‘monetarism’, and signed among others by S. H. Frankel, Harry Johnson and David Laidler, all of whom were members of the MPS. They warned Heath of the over-rapid increase in money growth and consequently the mounting inflationary pressure. Because Heath did not heed Walter’s warning, Walter resigned from his post as government adviser. The papers delivered at the Kassel meeting were printed in the short-lived Mont Pèlerin Quarterly (October 1960); see also Plickert (2008, pp.304–305). The gradual usurpation of the term ‘liberalism’ and the change of its original meaning by the Left had already begun during the ‘progressive era’ at the beginning of the century. Traditionally, a ‘liberal’ had emphasized individual liberty and limited state actions, but the new egalitarian ‘liberals’ called for more collective security and public intervention in markets. John Dewey, the influential ‘pragmatist’, declared in his book Liberalism and Social Action that in the 20th century the ends of liberalism could not be reached by dynamic and self-coordinated, decentralized markets, but ‘only by reversal of the means to which early liberalism was committed’, namely ‘organized social planning’ (Dewey 1935/1991, p.40, emphasis added). The strategy was thought out by Frank A. Meyer, one of Buckley’s closest confidants. The National Review opened its columns to economic liberals and even radical libertarians like Murray Rothbard, as well as traditional, religious conservatives like Russell Kirk or the Catholic Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn. The alliance was not always easy, and tensions emerged, with the traditional conservatives accusing the liberals of moral relativism and the radical liberals suspicious of authoritarian traits of the former (see Carey 2004). Nevertheless, the tactical alliance held and grew over the years to become a relevant force in American politics.
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99. Röpke had taken interest in Kirk early on, and urged Hunold to invite him: ‘In my opinion, Kirk would be very worthy of becoming a member a member of our Society.’ (Röpke to Hunold, June 12, 1955, in HIA, MPS Coll, Box 7). See also his article ‘Liberaler Konservatismus in Amerika’ (1955). In the eyes of Hayek, Kirk was ‘representative of a distinctive direction of conservatism which despises the economy and is in many respects truly reactionary’ (Hayek to Hunold, March 23, 1958, in IWP, Hunold papers). 100. For Friedman’s influence on Goldwater, see Leeson (2003, pp.118–124). 101. One of the driving forces was Finance Minister John Connally, who advocated an ‘incomes policy’ to stop a wage–price spiral. In August 1971, with the end of the Bretton Woods system already close, plus the subsequent devaluation of the dollar that would push import prices up, the government and its advisors agreed on wage and price controls. 102. For a comparison of the early neoliberals’ positions on competition and competition policy and the later shift away from those radical propositions, see Plickert (2008, pp.198–206 and 372–382). Trebing (1976, p.314) argues that the experience of the New Deal and some scandals in regulations agencies led the younger Chicago economists to rethink the approach to regulation. One very powerful argument became the ‘regulatory capture’ theory of Stigler (1971), who claimed that most regulation agencies that were supposedly imposed to benefit consumers and the public at large was in fact installed at the demand of the regulated industry to advance their special interests. Van Horn (2009) has a different explanation for the change in the younger Chicago School’s position and their ‘reorientation toward monopoly’; he suspects that they served the interests of corporate donors. 103. A clear sign of its high reputation were the leading functions that MPS members had held in scientific organizations such as the American Economic Association since the 1960s. In 1963, Gottfried Haberler had become President of the AEA, in 1964 Stigler, in 1966 Fritz Machlup and in 1967 Milton Friedman. 104. Weary of the inherent risk of hubris, Hayek warned in his acceptance speech not only of the dangerous ‘pretence of knowledge’ by economists, but called for prize-winning economists to swear an oath not to transgress the boundaries of their discipline (Hayek 1974/1978). 105. In 1969 to Ragnar Frisch and Jan Tinbergen, both moderate socialists who were convinced of the supremacy of central allocation of resources; in 1970 to Samuelson, and 1972 Hicks, prominent Keynesians; and in 1971 to Simon Kuznets, whose statistical methods on national accounting was also used mainly by Keynesians. In 1973 and 1975, the preference of the Swedish academy for economic planning theories was again apparent, with the awards to Wassily Leontief for his input–output models, to the Soviet statistician Leonid Kantorovich for ‘linear programming’, and to the Dutch Tjalling Koopmans for his research on optimal resource allocation. 106. On this, see for instance Denham (1996). 107. The FEE ideology was more radical than that of many MPS members. After the founding meeting, Leonard Read wrote a letter stating: ‘So far as I am concerned, I can see no hopes whatever for [MPS] to become a useful force in the fight for freedom ... the philosophies range all the way from middleof-the-roaders to one who is an out-and-out socialist’ (quote in Doherty
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108.
109. 110. 111.
112.
2007, p.214). Later the foundation had a dispute with Friedman and Stigler, who had written a pamphlet on rent controls (‘Roofs or Ceilings’) with a passage in which they argued that it might be morally desirable for the government to take actions in order to reduce inequality in a society. FEE added a footnote to distance itself from this position. Friedman and Stigler were outraged about this (see Diamond 2008, p.260). From the 1950s, there were many MPS economists like Friedman, Haberler, McCracken and Nutter on the scientific advisory board of the AEI. In the 1970s, it also included some neoconservative intellectuals, namely Irving Kristol (see Smith 1991, pp.174–180). The crucial parts of that speech were written by Callaghan’s son-in-law, the financial journalist Peter Jay, who was close to the IEA. Thatcher to Hayek, May 18, 1979, The letter is online available at the Thatcher Foundation: http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/112178 In an interview years later Hayek praised the choice of advisors. He stated that Margaret Thatcher ‘understands a lot that her aides don’t understand. Reagan only has a common sense and is totally dependent on his staff’, but he went on to say that Reagan ‘has picked the same people as I would have chosen’. The interview was titled ‘An intellectual turnaround in the West’ (Hayek 1985). Among liberals, many remembered John Stuart Mill’s insight from the middle of the 19th century that ideas do not operate in a vacuum. Mill wrote that ‘unless outward circumstances conspire with them, [ideas] have in general no very rapid or immediate efficacy in human affairs; and the most favourable outward circumstances may pass by, or remain inoperative, for want of ideas suitable to conjecture. But when the right circumstances and the right ideas meet, the effect is seldom slow in manifesting itself’ (quoted in Smith 1988, p.21).
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Friedman, Milton (1950/1951), Neo-Liberalism and Its Prospects [typoscript without date, probably late 1950.], HIA, Friedman papers, Box 42–8. Norwegian translation ‘‘Nyliberalismen Og Dens Muligheter’ in: Farmand, February 17, 1951. Friedman, Milton (1962/2002), Capitalism and Freedom, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Friedman, Milton (1968), ‘The Role of Monetary Policy’, American Economic Review 58, March 1968, pp.1–17. Friedman, Milton (1976), ‘Foreword’, in Fritz Machlup (ed.): Essays on Hayek, New York: New York University Press, pp.xxi–xxv. Friedman, Milton and Rose Friedman (1980), Free to Choose. A Personal Statement, New York/London: Harcourt Brace Jonanovich. Friedman, Milton and Rose Friedman (1998), Two Lucky People. Memoirs, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Galbraith, John Kenneth (1948/1966), ‘The German Economy’, reprinted in Seymour E. Harris (ed.) (1966): Foreign Economic Policy for the United States, Cambridge, Ma./New York: Harvard University Press, pp.91–103. Geppert, Dominik (2002), Thatchers konservative Revolution. Der Richtungswandel der britischen Tories 1975–1979, München: Oldenbourg. Giersch, Herbert, Karl-Heinz Paqué and Holger Schmieding (1992), The fading miracle. Four decades of market economy in Germany, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Goldwater, Barry (1960), The Conscience of a Conservative, Shepherdsville, Ky., Victor Publishing. Greenleaf, W. H. (1983a), The British political tradition, Vol. 1: The rise of collectivism, London/New York: Methuen Greenleaf, W. H. (1983b), The British political tradition, Vol. 2: The ideological heritage, London/New York: Methuen. Grün, Karl (1964), ‘Planung gefährdet die Europäische Einheit. Die 14. Jahrestagung der Mont-Pèlerin-Gesellschaft’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, September 18, 1964. Haegemann, Marc (2004), Inventory of the General Meeting Files of the Mont Pèlerin Society (1947–1998), Ghent: Liberaal Archief (Belgium). Hames, Tim and Richard Feasey (1994), ‘Anglo-American think tanks under Reagan and Thatcher’, in Andrew Adonis and Tim Hames (eds.): A Conservative Revolution? The Thatcher–Reagan decade in perspective, Manchester/New York: Manchester University Press, pp.215–237 Harris, Ralph and Arthur Seldon (1959), ‘The Tactics and Strategy of the Advance to a Free Economy’, [paper presented at the MPS general meeting in Oxford 1959], in Liberaal Archief / Gent (Belgium). Hartwell, R. M. (1995), A History of the Mont Pelerin Society, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund. Hayek, Friedrich August von (1944/1994), The Road to Serfdom. 50th Anniversary Edition, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Hayek, Friedrich August von (1944/1967), ‘Historians and the Future of Europe’, in Friedrich August von Hayek (1967): Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp.135–147. Hayek, Friedrich August von (1947/1952), ‘Free economy and competitive order’, German translation in Hayek (1952): Individualismus und Internationale Ordnung, Erlenbach-Zürich: Rentsch, pp.141–155. Hayek, Friedrich August von (1947/1967), ‘Opening Address to a Conference at Mont Pélèrin’, reprinted in Friedrich August von Hayek (1967): Studies
146 Philip Plickert in Philosophy, Politics and Economics, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp.148–159. Hayek, Friedrich August von (1947/1992), ‘Probleme und Schwierigkeiten der englischen Wirtschaft’, (reprinted 1992), Schweizer Monatshefte 92, 5a/1992, pp.24–40. Hayek, Friedrich August von (1949/1967), ‘The Intellectuals and Socialism’, in F. A. Hayek (1967): Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp.178–194. Hayek, Friedrich August von (1951/1967), ‘The Transmission of the Ideals of Economic Freedom’, in F. A. Hayek (1967): Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp.195–200. Hayek, Friedrich August von (1951/1967), ‘The Transmission of the Ideals of Economic Freedom’, in Friedrich August von Hayek (1967): Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp.195–200. Hayek, Friedrich August von (1952a), The Counter-Revolution of Science. Studies on the Abuse of Reason, (reprinted 1979) Indianapolis: Liberty Fund. Hayek, Friedrich August von (1952b), ‘A Rebirth of Liberalism’, The Freeman, July 28, 1952, pp.730–731. Hayek, Friedrich August von (1949/1992), ‘Die Intellektuellen und der Sozialismus’, (reprinted 1992) Schweizer Monatshefte 5a/1992, pp.41–54. Hayek, Friedrich August von (1954), ‘Marktwirtschaft und Wirtschaftspolitik’, Ordo 6, pp.3–29. Hayek, Friedrich August von (1957), ‘Was ist und was heißt sozial?’, in Albert Hunold (ed.): Masse und Demokratie, Erlenbach-Zürich/Stuttgart: Rentsch, pp.71–84. Hayek, Friedrich August von (1960/2011), Constitution of Liberty, in The Collected Works of F.A. Hayek (ed. by Ronald Hamowy), Chicago: University of Chicago Press Hayek, Friedrich August von (1974/1978), ‘The Pretence of Knowledge’, in F.A. Hayek (1978): New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas, London: Routledge & Keegan Paul. Hayek, Friedrich August von (1983a), ‘Die Wiederentdeckung der Freiheit – Persönliche Erinnerungen’, in VDMA and IW (ed.): Produktivität, Eigenverantwortung, Beschäftigung. Für eine wirtschaftspolitische Vorwärtsstrategie, Köln: Deutscher Institut Verlag, pp.9–22 Hayek, Friedrich August von (1983b), ‘Hayek on the Crisis’ [interview], in: Encounter 60, Nr. 5, S. 54–57. Hayek, Friedrich August von (1985), ‘Eine intellektuelle Wende im Westen’ [interview], in: Die Welt, May 5, 1985. Hennecke, Hans Jörg (2000), Friedrich August von Hayek. Die Tradition der Freiheit, Düsseldorf: Verlag Wirtschaft und Finanzen. Hennecke, Hans Jörg (2005), Wilhelm Röpke. Ein Leben in der Brandung, Stuttgart: Schäffer-Poeschel. Hentschel, Volker (1998), Ludwig Erhard: Ein Politikerleben, Berlin: Ullstein. Herbst, Ludolf (1982), Der Totale Krieg und die Ordnung der Wirtschaft: Die Kriegswirtschaft im Spannungsfeld von Politik, Ideologie und Propaganda 1939– 1945, Stuttgart: DVA. Hicks, John R. (1967), ‘The Hayek Story’, in John R. Hicks: Critical Essays in Monetary Theory, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
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Higgs, Robert (1987), Crisis and Leviathan: Critical Episodes in the Growth of American Government, New York: Oxford University Press USA. Higgs, Robert (2008), ‘The Complex Course of Ideological Change’, American Journal of Economics and Sociology 67, 4/2008, pp.547–565. Hobsbawm, Eric (1994), The Age of Extremes. The short twentieth century, London: Penguin. Hunold, Albert (1953) (ed.), Wirtschaft ohne Wunder, Erlenbach-Zürich/Stuttgart: Rentsch. Hunold, Albert (1955), ‘Die Mont Pèlerin Society’, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, May 19, 1955. Hutchison, T. W. (1978), ‘Demythologising the Keynesian revolution: Pigou, wagecuts, and The General Theory’, in T. W. Hutchison: On revolutions and progress in economic knowledge, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.175–199. Johnson, Harry G. (1971), ‘The Keynesian Revolution and the Monetarist Counterrevolution’, American Economic Review 61, May 1971, pp.1–14. Joseph, Keith (1975): ‘This is not the time to be Mealy-Mouthed: Intervention is Destroying us’, in Keith Joseph: Reversing the Trend, London: Barry Rose. Kasper, Sheryll (1993), ‘Frank Knight’s Case for Laisser Faire: The Patrimony of the Social Philosophy of the Chicago School’, History of Political Economy 25, 3/1993, pp.413–433. Kelley, John L. (1997), Bringing the Market Back In. The Political Revitalization of Market Liberalism, New York: New York University Press. Keynes, John M. (1936/1952), Die Allgemeine Theorie der Beschäftigung, des Zinses und des Geldes, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot. Keynes, John Maynard (1926), The End of Laissez Faire, London: Hogarth Press. Kirzner, Israel M. (2001), Ludwig von Mises: The Man and His Economics, Wilmington, Del.: Intercollegiate Studies Institute. Klausinger, Hansjörg (2003), ‘How Far Was Vienna From Chicago in the 1930s?’ The Economists and the Depression’, in Günter Bischof, Anton Pelinka and Alexander Lassner (eds.): The Dollfuss / Schuschnig Era in Austria: A Reassessment, New Brunswick/ London: Transaction Publishers, pp.56–72. Klein, Lawrence R. (1949), The Keynesian Revolution, New York: Macmillan. Klump, Rainer (2005), ‘Der Beitrag der Freiburger Kreise zum Konzept der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft’, in Nils Goldschmidt (ed.), Wirtschaft, Politik und Freiheit. Freiburger Wirtschaftswissenschaftler und der Widerstand, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, pp.383–401. Knight, Frank (1923/1999), ‘The Ethics of Competition’, in Frank Knight (1999) (ed. by Ross B. Emmett), ‘What is Truth’ in Economics?, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp.61–93. Knight, Frank (1937/1999), ‘Unemployment: And Mr. Keynes’s Revolution in Economic Theory’, in Frank Knight (1999) (ed. by Ross B. Emmett), ‘What is Truth’ in Economics?, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp.345–371. Köhler, Ekkehard and Stefan Kolev (2011), The conjoint quest for a liberal positive program: ‘Old Chicago’, Freiburg and Hayek, HWWI Research Paper 109, Hamburg. Kuhn, Thomas S. (1962), The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed. 1970, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Laidler, David (1999), Fabricating the Keynesian Revolution. Studies of the Inter-war Literature on Money, the Cycle, and Unemployment, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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Lakatos, Imre (1968), ‘Criticism and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 69, pp.149–186. Lakatos, Imre (1970), ‘Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes’, in I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave (ed.): Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.91–195. Lavoie, Don (1985), Rivalry and central planning: The socialist calculation debate reconsidered, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Lavoie, Don (1985), Rivalry and central planning: The socialist calculation debate revisited, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Leeson, Robert (2003): Ideology and the International Economy. The Decline and Fall of Bretton Woods, London: Palgrave Macmillan. Lippmann, Walter (1937/1965), The Good Society, (reprinted 1965) New York: Grosset & Dunlap. Marion, Mathieu (2004), ‘Investigating Rougier’, Cahiers D’Épistémologie 314, 2/2004. Martin, David Dale (1976), ‘Industrial Organization and Reorganization’ in Warren J. Samuels (ed): The Chicago School of Political Economy, East Lansing, Mich.: Association for Evolutionary Economics, pp.295–310. McCormick, Brian J. (1992), Hayek and the Keynesian Avalanche, New York: St. Martin’s Press. Meier-Rust, Kathrin (1993), Alexander Rüstow: Geschichtsdeutung und liberales Engagement, Stuttgart: Klett Cotta. Mierzejewski, Alfred C. (2005), Ludwig Erhard. Der Wegbereiter der Sozialen Markwirtschaft, München: Siedler. Mises, Ludwig von (1922/2008), Die Gemeinwirtschaft: Untersuchungen über den Sozialismus, (reprinted 2008) Stuttgart: Lucius & Lucius. Mises, Ludwig von (1926/1976), ‘Interventionismus’, in Ludwig von Mises (1976), Kritik des Interventionismus: Untersuchungen zur Wirtschaftspolitik und Wirtschaftideologie der Gegenwart, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgemeinschaft, pp.1–41. Mises, Ludwig von, (1927/1993), Liberalismus, (reprinted 1993) Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag. MPC (1947): Mont Pèlerin Conference: (typed manuscript), in Liberaal Archief, Gent (Belgium) and also in HIA, MPS Coll.. Müller-Armack, Alfred (1948/1974), ‘Vorschläge zur Verwirklichung der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft’, reprinted in Alfred Müller-Armack (1974): Genealogie der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft, Frühschriften und weiterführende Konzepte, Bern/ Stuttgart: Haupt Verlag, pp.90–109 Müller-Armack, Alfred (1971), Auf dem Weg nach Europa. Erinnerungen und Ausblicke, Tübingen and Stuttgart: Wunderlich Nash, George H. (1976), The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America, Since 1945, New York: Basic Books. Nicholls, Anthony (1994), Freedom with Responsibility. The Society Market Economy in Germany 1918–1963, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Nils Goldschmidt (ed.) (2005), Wirtschaft, Politik und Freiheit. Freiburger Wirtschaftswissenschaftler und der Widerstand, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck. Nordmann, Jürgen (2005), Der lange Marsch zum Neoliberalismus. Vom Roten Wien zum freien Markt – Popper und Hayek im Diskurs, Hamburg: VSA Verlag.
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Olson, Mancur (1982), The Rise and Decline of Nations. Economic Growth, Stagflation and Social Rigidities, New Haven, Conn./London: Yale University Press. Peacock, Alan and Hans Willgerodt (1989) (eds.), German Neo-Liberals and the Social Market Economy, London: Palgrave Macmillan. Plehwe, Dieter (2009), ‘Introduction’, in Philip Mirowski and Dieter Plehwe (eds.), The Road from Mont Pèlerin, Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press, pp.1–42. Plickert, Philip (2008), Wandlungen des Neoliberalismus. Eine Studie zu Entwicklung und Ausstrahlung der ‘‘Mont Pèlerin Society’, Stuttgart: Lucius & Lucius. Powell, Enoch (1967), [paper without title, presented at the MPS general meeting in Vichy 1967], in Liberaal Archief / Gent (Belgium). Ptak, Ralf (2009), ‘Neoliberalism in Germany: Revisiting the Ordoliberal Foundations of the Social Market Economy’, in Philip Mirowski and Dieter Plehwe (eds.), The Road from Mont Pèlerin, Cambridge, MA./London: Harvard University Press, pp.98–138. Riccio, Barry D. (1996), Walter Lippmann – Odyssey of a Liberal, New Brunswick, NJ, and London: Transaction Publishers. Richter, Ingo (1963), Die wirtschafts- und sozialpolitische Konzeption des italienischen Neoliberalismus. Eine vergleichende Betrachtung der Auffassungen Luigi Einaudis, Costantino Bresciani-Turronis und Giovanni Demarias, Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr. Rieter, Heinz and Matthias Schmolz (1993), ‘The ideas of German Ordoliberalism 1938–45: pointing the way to a new economic order’, European Journal of the History of Economic Thought 1, pp.87–114. Robbins, Lionel (1934/1971), The Great Depression, reprinted 1971, New York: Books for Libraries Press. Robbins, Lionel (1971), Autobiography of an Economist, London/Basingstoke: Macmillan. Röpke, Wilhelm (1930), ‘Nationalsozialisten als Feinde der Bauern. Ein Sohn Niedersachsens an das Landvolk’, in Albert Hunold (ed.) (1959), Wilhelm Röpke: Gegen die Brandung. Zeugnisse eines Gelehrten unserer Zeit, Erlenbach-Zürich/ Stuttgart: Rentsch, pp.84–86. Röpke, Wilhelm (1933), ‘Die sekundäre Krise und ihre Überwindung’, in Economic Essays. In honour of Gustav Cassel, London: Routledge, pp.553–568. Röpke, Wilhelm (1942/1979), Die Gesellschaftskrisis der Gegenwart, (reprinted 1979) Bern/Stuttgart: Haupt Verlag. Röpke, Wilhelm (1944), Civitas humana: Grundfragen der Gesellschafts- und Wirtschaftsreform, Erlenbach-Zürch: Rentsch. Röpke, Wilhelm (1945a), ‘Einführung’, in Walter Lippmann: Gesellschaft freier Menschen, Bern: Francke, 27–33. Röpke, Wilhelm (1945b), Internationale Ordnung, Erlenbach-Zürch: Rentsch. Röpke, Wilhelm (1945c), Projekt einer internationalen Monatsschrift [Typoscript], in: HIA, Hartwell Coll., Box 4. Röpke, Wilhelm (1950), Ist die deutsche Wirtschaftspolitik richtig? Analyse und Kritik, Stuttgart/Köln: Kohlhammer Verlag. Röpke, Wilhelm (1953), ‘Economic ‘Miracle’ in Germany’, The Freeman, August 24, 1953, pp.843–846. Röpke, Wilhelm (1955), ‘Liberaler Konservatismus in Amerika’, in: Neue Zürcher Zeitung, May 5,.1955.
150 Philip Plickert Röpke, Wilhelm (1976), Wilhelm Röpke: Briefe 1934–66. Der innere Kompaß, Eva Röpke (ed.), Erlenbach-Zürich: Rentsch: Rueff, Jacques (1961), ‘Die Französische Wirtschaftsreform’, ORDO 12, pp.111–126. Rüstow, Alexander (1932/1963), Die staatspolitischen Voraussetzungen des wirtschaftspolitischen Liberalismus, in Alexander Rüstow (1963), Rede und Antwort, Ludwigsburg: Martin Hoch. Samuelson, Paul A. (1946/1966), ‘The General Theory’, reprinted 1966 in Joseph E. Stiglitz (ed.), The Collected Scientific Papers of Paul A. Samuelson, Vol. 2, Cambridge, MA, and, London, pp.1517–1533. Schivelbusch, Wolfgang (2006), Three New Deals: Reflections on Roosevelt’s America, Mussolini’s Italy and Hitler’s Germany. 1933–1939, New York: Metropolitan Books. Schüller, Alfred (2003), ‘Wilhelm Röpke – Werk und Wirken in Marburg: Lehren für die Gegenwart und Zukunft’, Ordo 54, pp.21–47. Schumpeter, Joseph A. (1950), ‘The March into Socialism’, American Economic Review 40, 2/1950, pp.446–456. Seldon, Arthur (1988), Freedom and Prosperity in the East and the West. The equation with Capitalism and Socialism with special reference to The British Economic ‘Miracle’, [paper presented at the MPS general meeting in Tokyo 1988], in Liberaal Archief / Gent (Belgium). Sheamur, Jeremy (2006), ‘Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, and the British Conservative Party’, Journal of the History of Economic Thought 28, 3/2006, pp.309–314. Shenfield, Arthur (1974), ‘Presidential lecture: The English desease’, [paper presented at the MPS general meeting in Brussels], in LA. Simons, Henry (1934/1948), ‘A Positive Program for Laissez Faire: Some Proposals for a Liberal Economic Policy’, in Henry Simons (1948), Economic Policy for a Free Society, Chicago: Chicago University Press. Simons, Henry (1936), ‘Keynes’ Comment of Money’, Christian Century, July 22, 1936 Simons, Henry (1936/1948), ‘Rules versus Authorities in Monetary Policy’, in Henry Simons (1948), Economic Policy for a Free Society, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp.160–183. Simons, Henry (1944/1948), ‘Some Reflections on Syndicalism’, in Henry Simons (1948), Economic Policy for a Free Society, Chicago: Chicago University Press. Smith, G. W. (1988), ‘Introduction’, in G. W. Smith (ed.): John Stuart Mill’s Social and Political Thought. Critical Assessments, London: Routledge. Smith, James Allen (1991), The Idea Brokers: Think Tanks and the Rise of the New Policy Elite, New York: Free Press. Starbatty, Joachim (1982), ‘Alfred Müller-Armacks Beitrag zur Theorie und Politik der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft’, in Ludwig-Erhard-Stiftung (ed.): Soziale Marktwirtschaft im vierten Jahrzehnt ihrer Bewährung, Bonn: Gustav Fischer, pp.7–26. Steel, Ronald (1980), Walter Lippmann and the American Century, Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company. Stein, Herbert (1994), Presidential Economics. The Making of Economic Policy From Roosevelt to Clinton, Washington: AEI. Stein, Herbert (1996), The Fiscal Revolution in America, Washington: AEI Press.
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Stigler, George J. (1971), ‘The theory of economic regulation’, Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 2, 1/1971, pp.3–21. Streit, Manfred E. and Michael Wohlgemuth (2000), ‘The Market Economy and the State. Hayekian and Ordoliberal Conceptions’, in Peter Koslowski (ed.), The Theory of Capitalism in the German Economic Tradition, Historism, Ordo-Liberalism, Critical Theory, Socialism, Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer. Thatcher, Margaret (1995), The path to power, London: HarperCollins Publishers. Trebing, Harry M. (1976), ‘The Chicago School versus Public Utility regulation’, ‘ in Warren J. Samuels (ed): The Chicago School of Political Economy, East Lansing, Mich.: Association for Evolutionary Economics, pp.311–340. Trilling, Lionel (1950), The Liberal Imagination, New York: Viking Press. Van Horn, Rob (2009), ‘Reinventing Monopoly and the Role of Corporations: The Roots of Chicago Law and Economics’, in Philip Mirowski and Dieter Plehwe (eds.), The Road from Mont Pèlerin, Cambridge, MA./London: Harvard University Press, pp.204–237. Van Horn, Robert and Philip Mirowski (2009), ‘The Rise of the Chicago School of Economics and the Birth of Neoliberalism’, in Philip Mirowski and Dieter Plehwe (eds.), The Road from Mont Pèlerin, Cambridge, MA./London: Harvard University Press, pp.139–178. Villey, Daniel (1964), No title [paper presented at the session ‘Recent Experience of Economic Planning in Western Countries’ at MPS meeting 1964 in Semmering], in LA. Walpen, Bernhard (2004), Die offenen Feinde und ihre Gesellschaft: Eine hegemonietheoretische Studie zur Mont Pèlerin Society, Hamburg: VSA Verlag.
3 Hayek, Orwell, and The Road to Serfdom Andrew Farrant
1
Introduction
In mid-April 1948, F. A. Hayek ceased work on a relatively lengthy draft postscript to The Road to Serfdom.1 Unfortunately, Hayek’s draft postscript – meant to appear in a new edition of Hayek’s book that was initially suggested by the University of Chicago Press in late 1945 – was never published.2 Nevertheless, aspects of Hayek’s partially completed postscript – for example, Hayek’s late 1940s assessment of Clement Attlee’s Labour government – would later appear in Hayek’s 1956 preface to the first American paperback edition of The Road to Serfdom.3 Unsurprisingly, Hayek’s 1956 preface readily ceded that Britain had not gone totalitarian during the Attlee years. In early 1948, however, Hayek had provided a far less sanguine analysis of the way in which Attlee’s government was seemingly taking Britain down the road to serfdom.4 In particular, Hayek was much perturbed by the Attlee government’s late 1947 reintroduction of the wartime power to direct labour. In his draft postscript, Hayek had similarly displayed much concern that the United States might find itself unwittingly heading down the totalitarian road. As Hayek explained, I am convinced that for some time the U.S.A. will continue to move towards state planning ... The basic ideas have already got too much hold. Whether the U.S. will continue on this way into a completely totalitarian system will depend on whether we are willing now to support efforts in the intellectual sphere which may bear fruits only in five or ten years or even later.5
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As Hayek rather more sanguinely told his American audience in 1956, however, while twelve years ago it seemed to many almost sacrilege to suggest that fascism and communism are merely variants of the same totalitarianism which central control of all economic activity tends to produce, this has become almost a commonplace. ... [Similarly, it was] now even widely recognized that democratic socialism [the Attlee government] is a very precarious and unstable affair, ridden with internal contradictions and everywhere producing results most distasteful to many of its advocates.6 Unsurprisingly, Hayek was much gratified by the readily apparent change in public opinion. For Hayek, however, the change in opinion – this ‘sobered mood’ – was primarily attributable to the ‘lessons of events and ... popular discussions of the problem’. As Hayek explained in a footnote, the most effective of these [‘popular discussions’] was undoubtedly George Orwell’s 1984 ... [Orwell] had earlier kindly reviewed this book.7 Much the same assessment of Orwell’s importance can be found in Hayek’s The Constitution of Liberty (1960).8 As Hayek noted, ‘socialist intellectuals’ had ‘indignantly rejected’ the ‘contention that socialism and individual liberty were mutually exclusive’ when The Road to Serfdom was initially published in 1944. Nevertheless, the nub of Hayek’s thesis had subsequently made a very ‘deep impression when [it was] stated in powerful literary form by one from their own midst’.9 Needless to say, Hayek was again invoking Orwell’s writings, and in a footnote he particularly singled out Orwell’s ‘Nineteen Eighty-four ... [and] his review of The Road to Serfdom in the Observer (London), April 9, 1944’.10 Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four is often portrayed as an attack upon socialism. Indeed, while relatively few economists have paid scholarly attention to Orwell’s work, they appear naturally drawn to Hayek’s assessment of Nineteen Eighty-Four.11 For instance, Jennifer Roback argues that ‘Orwell believed that socialism led to totalitarianism ... that is the chief message of Orwell’s 1949 classic’.12 As Roback explains, Orwell thought that capitalism was inevitably unjust and inefficient ... [but thought] that socialism, the best alternative he could come up with, would lead toward totalitarianism.
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He expresses this view most starkly in his ... review ... [of] Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom: ‘Capitalism leads to dole queues ... Collectivism leads to concentration camps.13 Accordingly, ‘1984 is not about television screens and computers ... [1984 is] about totalitarianism and socialism’.14 As I explain in this chapter, however, the portrayal of Orwell as an anti-socialist writer is wide of the mark. For one thing, in the late 1940s Orwell took many pains to repudiate any ‘anti-socialist’ reading of his message in Nineteen Eighty-Four. Indeed, Orwell similarly repudiated any suggestion that his book was an attack upon Clement Attlee’s Labour government. As we shall see, Orwell took a very different view to Hayek when it came to assessing whether the Attlee government’s commitment to democratic planning would ultimately prove compatible with individual liberty.15 In particular, I compare the way in which Hayek and Orwell evaluated the Attlee government’s late 1940s use of Defence Regulation 58A to formally direct labour to take ‘essential’ work. This chapter is organized as follows. Section 1 evaluates the way in which Orwell himself viewed Nineteen Eighty-Four. As we shall see, Orwell did not view his book as an anti-socialist tract. Indeed, Orwell had much familiarity with the writings of Hayek and other anti-socialist writers who would subsequently become members of the Mont Pèlerin Society (for example, Michael Polanyi and John R. Baker) and was well aware of the strengths of their arguments against centralized planning. Nevertheless, Orwell’s faith in the viability of democratic socialism never faltered. Section 2 compares the way in which Hayek and Orwell evaluated the Attlee years. Sections 3 and 4 provide a detailed examination of the Control of Engagement Order, and use primary source material (for example, the yearly reports produced by the Ministry of Labour and National Service) to try and evaluate whether Hayek or Orwell had the more accurate assessment of the way in which the Attlee government made use of its power to direct labour in the late 1940s. Section 5 provides concluding remarks.
2
Hayek, Orwell, and the Logic of Economic Planning
As already noted, Hayek was much pleased by Orwell’s April 1944 review of The Road to Serfdom.16 Nevertheless, Orwell’s review – Hayek’s book was ‘an eloquent defense of laissez-faire capitalism’ – was not the only occasion upon which Orwell discussed Hayek’s ideas in print. Indeed, Orwell had familiarity with the writings of several scholars who would
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later attend the initial meeting of the Mont Pèlerin Society in 1947. As Orwell noted in January 1946, the years since the outbreak of the war in 1939 had seen an unmistakable ‘drift’ towards economic planning and away from ... [the] individualistic society in which property rights are absolute and money-making is the chief incentive.17 Nevertheless, Orwell explained that the highly planned and ‘centralised State’ had been heavily attacked on the ‘ground that, even in terms of its own objectives, it does not work’. Indeed, ‘Professor Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom’ provided by far the ‘ablest exposition’ of this particular ‘viewpoint’. As Orwell himself summarized Hayek’s thesis: Economic planning would destroy ‘liberty’ and was incapable of affording as high a standard of living as laissez-faire capitalism ... [Hayek claimed] that before Hitler came to power his essential work had been done for him by the German Social-Democrats ... who had succeeded in breaking down the average German’s desire for liberty and independence.18 Indeed, Orwell repeated his 1944 assessment of the merits of Hayek’s thesis when he noted that a ‘centralized economy necessarily’ gave immense power to the bureaucrats at the center ... [with] people who want power for its own sake ... [inevitably gravitating] towards the key positions.19 As Orwell explained, however, Michael Polanyi – having ‘studied conditions in the USSR over a number of years’ – had adopted a rather similar line of argument in his 1940 Contempt of Freedom.20 Nevertheless, Orwell maintained that Hayek’s ‘able defence of capitalism’ was scarcely more than ‘wasted labour’ because hardly ‘anyone wishes for the return of old-style capitalism’. Indeed, when faced with the manifestly unpleasant choice ‘between serfdom and economic insecurity’ the average man or woman would ‘probably choose outright serfdom, at least if it were called by some other name’.21 Indeed, Orwell was sure that ‘old style, laissez-faire capitalism is finished’.22 As Orwell had himself put in his 1944 review of The Road to Serfdom, the vast majority of the British populace would seemingly much prefer ‘State regimentation ... [to the] slumps and unemployment’ which he viewed as the inevitable concomitant
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of laissez-faire capitalism.23 Nevertheless, Hayek and similar writers had ‘uttered much useful criticism of the folly and wickedness of the Totalitarian age’.24 Orwell was also familiar with John R. Baker’s Science and the Planned State.25 Although Baker was an early member of Hayek’s Mont Pèlerin Society (but not an attendee at the initial meeting in Switzerland in 1947) he apparently resigned from the MPS shortly thereafter on the grounds that a non-economist such as himself had little to contribute to the MPS’s work (Hartwell 1995, 229). Nevertheless, Baker’s work (namely his August 1944 lecture) appears to have provided the initial spark which ultimately led Orwell to ‘begin serious work’ on the draft manuscript that ultimately became Nineteen Eighty-Four.26 As noted above, Hayek and Roback view Nineteen Eighty-Four as an attack upon socialism per se. Much to Orwell’s chagrin, however, Life magazine had itself taken much the same stance in early July 1949 when it described Orwell’s book as a scathing satire about the fate of man in a highly ‘regimented left-wing police state’.27 According to Life, Orwell was warning the world of the fate which awaits it if it confuses liberalism [i.e., New Deal type ‘socialism’] with regimentation.28 As Life had revealingly noted in an accompanying editorial, however, while Orwell’s trenchant analysis of the inherent logic of totalitarianism would scarcely surprise ‘Liberal Germans’ who had lived through the horrors of Nazism or any ‘Italians who suffered from Mussolini’s castor oil’ it would assuredly have similarly familiar overtones [‘in England’ itself] ... [Orwell’s] book reinforces a growing suspicion that some of the British Laborites revel in [post-war] austerity [rationing, etc.] and would love to preserve it. Indeed, Life argued that much the same could be said of the ‘more fervent’ and power-hungry ‘New Dealers in the U.S.’ and added that the ‘world of Orwell’s 1984’ appeared to be the ultimate outcome of ‘trends already at work’ in the United States itself and noted a stark similarity between Big Brother and ‘some of the most dedicated of the U. S. proponents of the welfare state’.29 As I now explain, however, Orwell was greatly perturbed by the way in which Life had erroneously portrayed his book. Indeed, as Orwell explained in a statement he shortly thereafter dictated to his publisher
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(Fredric Warburg), he was not making a prophecy of what would necessarily ‘happen inside the next forty years in the Western world’. Instead, he – much like Hayek himself in The Road to Serfdom – was providing a warning: ‘something like NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR could happen ... Don’t let it happen. It depends on you.’30 As Orwell explained, however, while ‘something’ much like Nineteen Eighty-Four ‘could happen’ – ‘This is the direction in which the world is going’ – the ‘trend’ itself lay very ‘deep in the political, social and economic foundations of the contemporary world situation’. In particular, Orwell flagged the ‘danger’ that was inevitably generated by the tendency toward an increasingly centralized and powerful state structure [which was] imposed on Socialist [e.g., Britain circa the midlate 1940s] and on Liberal capitalist communities [e.g., the United States] by the necessity to prepare for total war with the USSR.31 Orwell was similarly eager to rebut any suggestion that his book was an attack upon Clement Attlee’s Labour government. As Orwell explained in his dictated statement, the Attlee government was facing some very ‘hard problems’ (e.g., Britain’s balance of payments problem), and he added that If there is a failure of nerve and the Labour party breaks down in its attempt [to address these] problems ... tougher types than the present Labour leaders will inevitably take over, drawn probably from the ranks of the Left, but not sharing the Liberal aspirations of those now in power. Nevertheless, Orwell insisted that Members of the present British government, from Mr. Attlee and Sir Stafford Cripps down to Aneurin Bevan will never willingly sell the pass to the enemy ... the older men, nurtured in a Liberal tradition, are safe ... the younger generation is suspect ... the seeds of totalitarian thought are probably widespread among them.32 Orwell’s publisher shortly thereafter sent Orwell’s dictated statement to Life but it was never published. Instead, Life printed part of a very similar statement that Orwell had sent to the United Automobile Workers.33 As Orwell had explained in his statement to the UAW, however, Nineteen Eighty-Four was not
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an attack on socialism ... [or the] British Labor party ... but ... [was] a show-up of the perversions to which a centralized economy is liable, and which have already been partly realized in Communism and fascism. I do not believe that the kind of society I described necessarily will arrive, but I believe ... something resembling it could arrive ... totalitarian ideas have taken root in the minds of intellectuals everywhere, and I have tried to draw these ideas out to their logical consequences. As Orwell noted, the scene of the book is laid in Britain in order to emphasize that the English-speaking races are not innately better than anyone else ... totalitarianism, if not fought against, could triumph anywhere.34 As is clear, Orwell’s book was not an attack upon democratic socialism or Attlee’s Labour government: as Ralph Thompson of The New York Times subsequently told his readers, when Orwell wrote to the UAW he had amply explained that My recent novel is NOT intended as an attack on socialism or on the British Labor party (of which I am a supporter). (In and Out of Books, The New York Times July 31 1949: BR8)35 Accordingly, I now compare the way in which Hayek and Orwell evaluated the Attlee years.
3
The Attlee government and totalitarian planning?
According to Hayek, the way in which events had unfolded under Attlee’s Labour Government (1945–1951) provided ample evidence to buttress his argument in The Road to Serfdom.36 For example, Hayek argued that the Attlee government’s reintroduction of the wartime Control of Engagement Order in October 1947 more than sufficed to illustrate Hayek’s argument that the ‘inherent logic’ of socialist ‘policies’ would ultimately drive even the most ‘unwilling’ of socialist governments – for example, the Attlee government in the mid-late 1940s – into eventually adopting the ‘kind of coercion’ it ‘disliked’. As Hayek explained, the Attlee government had ‘found itself in peacetime forced to put the conscription of labor back on the statute book’. As Hayek added from the vantage point of 1956, however, it
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hardly diminishes the significance of this [the reintroduction of the power to direct labor under Defence Regulation 58A] when it is pointed out that the power was in fact never used because, if it is known that the authorities have power to coerce, few will wait for actual coercion.37 Although Hayek unsurprisingly ceded that Britain had not gone totalitarian during the Attlee years, he reminded his readers that his 1944 argument had presupposed that the ‘old socialist parties’ – for instance, the Weimar Social Democrats – were much ‘inhibited by their democratic ideals’ and had consequently lacked the ‘ruthlessness required for the performance of their chosen task’. As he revealingly noted in his preface, however, he had gained the impression ... that these inhibitions were if anything weaker among the British socialists than they had been among their German fellowsocialists twenty-five years earlier. As Hayek explained, the ‘German Social Democrats ... under equally or more difficult economic conditions’, had ‘never approached as closely to totalitarian planning as the British Labour government has done’.38 As I now explain, however, Hayek had made much the same highly negative judgement of Attlee’s government following a rather heated early 1948 disagreement with Evan Durbin (a former colleague in the Economics Department at the London School of Economics and a very junior minister in the Attlee government at that time).39 Unsurprisingly, the source of their disagreement appears to have been the Labour government’s re-introduction of the Control of Engagement Order in October 1947. The archival evidence suggests that Durbin had been toying with the idea of resigning from the Attlee government over the issue. Accordingly, Hayek wrote to Durbin shortly after their disagreement – Hayek apologized to Durbin for the way in which he had publicly baited Durbin (Hayek noted that he was ‘rather ashamed’) – and sought to persuade Durbin that he did not really belong in the Labour Party. As Hayek noted, the last three years have confirmed and even exceeded my worst apprehensions ... I begin to fear that your friends may themselves sooner or later create a truly totalitarian system ... [whereas] when I [initially] wrote my book [The Road to Serfdom] I thought that a Socialist government would produce both the general mess and the state of public
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opinion favourable to the creation of a totalitarian system by somebody else. As Hayek rather acidly noted, however, You have certainly more complete totalitarians in your party than e.g., the Weimar Social Democrats had in theirs.40 As is clear, Hayek was much concerned that Britain was heading down the road to serfdom after a mere three years of Labour government. Nevertheless, several months after Hayek’s early 1948 letter to Durbin, Orwell himself published a rather more measured assessment of the first three or so years of Labour government.41 As Orwell explained to his American audience (Orwell’s essay was published in Commentary), Britain – facing a ‘threatening and perhaps desperate economic situation’ (347) – had lived in a ‘state of almost continuous crisis’ for nigh on ‘three years’ but had so far managed to avert the always seemingly imminent ‘supreme calamity’. Indeed, national bankruptcy had been averted by ‘American loans’, by Crippsian ‘austerity’, and by the spending of Britain’s foreign exchange reserves [particularly US dollars] ... [and] when those expedients cease to work it may be put off still further, possibly for decades, by a successful drive for exports.42 Nevertheless, Britain’s ‘fundamental problem’ – that of assuring national solvency while not simultaneously ‘sinking the standard of living to an unbearably low level’ – had remained all but ‘untouched’.43 Orwell’s essay covers much ground. Nevertheless, Orwell noted an all-too-stark incongr